

ABHIDHĀ

L. D. Series : 131

General Editor

Jitendra B. Shah

Prof. Tapasvi Nandi



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प्रो. तपस्वी नान्दी



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अमदावाद (गुजरात राज्य)-३८०००९.

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अभिधा

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डॉ. तपसी नान्दी

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प्रकाशक

डॉ. जितेन्द्र बी. शाह

नियामक

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PREFACE

Āgam Prabhākar Muni Shri Puṇyavijayji was a profound scholar of the Jaina āgamas and āgamic literature. He had lent significant contribution to the manuscriptology and to the methodology of editing the ancient works. He, moreover, had edited several rare works in an ideal way. Sheth Shri Kasturbhai Lalbhai founded L. D. Institute of Indology in the fifties; thanks to his inspiration.

The L. D. Institute, since its inception, is an important centre for the studies concerning Indological subjects. As one of its academic activities, the Institute organizes lecture-series, one being in the memory of Muni Shri Puṇyavijayji. For this series, learned scholars are invited to deliver lectures on the subjects of their specialization. In this series, Dr. Tapasvi Nandi, professor Emeritus (U.G.C.) and a scholar of Sanskrit Language and literature was invited to deliver lectures in February 2002. We are indeed deeply grateful to him for accepting our invitation and discussing the topic of 'Abhidhā' from the rhetorical angle. Therein, he has also discussed different viewpoints of the ancient ālaṃkārikas, including Ācārya Hemacandra on this subject. We hope that these lectures, now appearing in print, will prove useful to the students of ālaṃkāraśāstra.

L. D. Institute of Indology
Ahmedabad-380009
February 2002.

Jitendra B. Shah
Director

अपि च...

I am thankful to the L. D. Institute of Indology and its Director Dr. Jitendra B. Shah for having arranged my three lectures on 'Abhidhā' under the "Muni Puṇya-Vijayajeesmṛti-vyākḥāna" series, this year.

What follows in this small monograph is only a portion from a chapter on Abhidhā in my project on hand viz. "Sahṛdayāloka or Thought-currents in Indian Literary Criticism" - some eight chapters covering 1100+ pages of which have been already drafted. Kindly give me lots of your good wishes so that this project is completed and it also sees the light of the day.

Abhidhā of course, as considered by literary aesthetes is the power of word yielding the expressed or conventional sense, i.e. the dictionary meaning. This is a normally accepted view and is projected by the Kashmere School of literary aesthetics headed by Ānandavardhana and ably supported by Abhinavaguptapāda and Vāgdevatāvātāra Mammaṭa. They were followed by a host of brilliant writers on poetics, beginning with Ācārya Hemacandra, Vidyādhara and Viśvanātha and ending with the great Appayya Dixit and the greatest Punditarāja Jagannātha. But the course of Abhidhā, as also that of other thought-currents did not run smooth and Ānandavardhana had to face some opposition and also challenge from other great names, such as Mukula, Kuntaka, Mahimā and Bhoja. These ācāryas had their own idea about abhidhā which was either broader or narrower and Mahimā, a strong protegonist of Kāvyaṇumiti was not prepared to go beyond abhidhā and tried to subsume whatever went under the name of gaṇī, lakṣaṇa and even vyañjanā under poetic inference. But these voices were once again silenced by Mammaṭa and his followers who chose to accept Ānandavardhana's lead and follow the

dictates of the Kashmere School of literary aesthetics. But Ācārya Hemacandra though a loyalist, had absorbed something from Bhoja, the lone voice who projected what we may call the Mālava School of literary aesthetics. He tried to project 'gaunī' as a separate and independent śabda-vṛtti in keeping with the original tradition of the pūrva-Mīmāṃsā and also one supported by Bhoja, of course slightly differently, as we will go to see in course of these lectures. So, we have tried to consider in course of these lectures the views of those who do not fall in line with the Kashmere School of thought and also the views of Ācārya Hemacandra who strikes a different note, of course not a discordant note, in projecting 'gaunī', as a separate vṛtti.

If the learned find what follows as interesting, then my task is done. At the same time may I remind the learned not to expect absolutely original ideas from me, as the great Naiyāyika Jayanta has ably stated : "kutósti nūtanam vastu", and prior to him the great Abhinavagupta had stated :

*"ūrdhvordhvam āruhya yad-arthatattvam
dhiḥ paśyati śrāntim avedayantī,
phalaṃ tad ādyaiḥ parikalpitānām
viveka-sopāna-paramparāṅām."*

So, this is an effort to go up the ladder, the viveka-sopāna-paramparā, as laid down not only by the ancient masters, but also by the great modern ālamkārikas, such as Dr. De, Dr. Kane, Dr. Raghavan, Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy, Dr. Rama Rañjana-Mukherjee, my gurus Prof. R. B. Athavale, Prof. R. C. Parikh and Prof. Dr. Kulkarni and my most respected and beloved friends and best among learned, Dr. Revaprasad Dwivedi, Prof. Dr. R. C. Dwivedi, and Dr. N. P. Unni.

Thanking all concerned,

Tapasvi Nandi
Aum Ma Aum.

1

Mukula and Kuntaka

Mukula

We may compare Bhoja's approach, to that of Mukula-Bhaṭṭa, Kuntaka and also Mahima Bhaṭṭa, because these three writes also do not fall in line with the so called Kashmira school of thought. Though of course Mukula and Kuntaka were definitely Bhoja's predecessors, Mahimā was perhaps almost a senior contemporary. The consideration of these writers also is taken up due to the reason that they also do not fall in line with the Kashmir tradition. As it is, they are all pre-Mammata but of course unique in their approach and Bhoja was under their influence. We examine Mukula Bhaṭṭa first.

Mukula Bhaṭṭa to the best of our knowledge, has contributed a single work called the “Abhidhā-vṛtta-māṭṛkā.” Mukula virtually accepts two śabda-vṛttis such as abhidhā and lakṣaṇā, but the latter is also an extension of, and therefore part of abhidhā for him, and is broad enough to include even vyañjanā.

In the very first kārīkā he observes :

“śabdavyāpārato yasya
pratītis tasya mukhyatā
arthāvaseyasya punar
lakṣyamāṇatvaṃ ucyate.” - AVM. I. pp. 2

(Edn. Dr. R. P. Dwivedi, Chowkhamba Vidyābhavan, '73)

He further observes : (pp. 2, ibid) : “śabda-vyāpārād yasyāvagatis tasya mukhyatvam. sa hi yathā sarvebhyo hastādibhyo'vayavebhyaḥ pūrvam mukham avalokyate, tadvad eva sarvebhyaḥ pratiyamānebhyaḥ arthāntarebhyāḥ pūrvam avagamyate tasmān mukham iva mukhya iti śākhādiyāntena mukhya-śabdena abhidhīyate. tasya udāharaṇam, 'gaur anubandhya' iti. atra hi go-śabda-vyāpārāt yāga-sādhana-bhūtā go-tva-lakṣaṇā jātir avagamyate. atas tasyāḥ mukhyatā tad evam śabda-vyāpāra-gamyo mukhyorthaḥ.” i. e. - The apprehension of which is derived through the function of employment of a word is termed mukhya i. e. principal. It is said to be 'mukhya' because as is 'mukha' i. e. face seen first as compared to hands and other limbs, in the

same way that meaning also is apprehended first in comparison with all other meanings apprehended. So, 'that which is like 'mukha' or 'face' is termed 'mukhya' i.e. principal, which is formed with the help of Pāṇini sūtra 5/3/103, viz. "śākhādibhyo yaḥ", which recommends 'ya' suffix which is in the sense of comparison and seen in words such as 'śākhā' etc. The illustration is, "gaur anubandhyaḥ" i. e. 'the cow / ox may be fixed for a sacrifice.' Here, 'go' is a word, and due to its employment gotva-jāti is apprehended as instrument for performing a sacrifice. So, the mukhyatā or principality will be fixed with reference to 'go-jāti'. From this illustration, it is understood that the meaning viz. 'gotva-ādi-rūpa' which is derived by the function of the word 'gauḥ' is mukhya i.e. principal meaning.

But, observes Mukula, that is called 'lākṣaṇika' or secondary whose apprehension follows the examination of a meaning derived through śabda-vyāpāra "yasya tu śabda-vyāpāra-avagamyārtha-paryālocanayā avagatis tasya lākṣaṇikatvaṃ yathā pūrvasmin eva udāharaṇe vyakteḥ." — Mukula thus holds that the meaning of go-vyati or individual cow follows the first apprehension of go-jāti, and therefore the go-vyati-jñāna is lākṣaṇika for him. Mukula holds that — (pp. 2, 3, ibid) : "sā hi na śabda-vyāpārād avasīyate, 'viśeṣyaṃ nābhidhā gacched kṣīṇa-śaktir viśeṣaṇe' iti nyāyāt śabdasya jātimātra-paryavasitatvāt. jātis tu vyaktiṃ antareṇa yāga-sādhana-bhāvaṃ na pratipadyate iti śabda-pratyāyita-jāti-sāmarthyād atra jāter āśraya-bhūtā vyaktir ākṣipyate. tena asau lākṣaṇikī. evaṃ ayaṃ mukhya-lākṣaṇikātma-ṣayopa-varṇana-dvāreṇa śabdasya abhidhā-vyāpāro dvidvidhaḥ pratipādito, niranantarātha-niṣṭhaḥ, sāntarārtha-niṣṭhaś ca."

Mukula holds that go-vyakti is not understood through the function of a word, because there is an all accepted dictum that, "abhidhā can express only one of the two, viz. viśeṣaṇa or viśeṣya. If it conveys viśeṣaṇa then it cannot express viśeṣya, for the whole of its capacity is exhausted in apprehending viśeṣaṇa alone. Following this principle, in the said illustration, the word 'go' has a capacity to convey only 'gotva-jāti'. When the apprehender thinks that 'jāti' by itself, cannot be instrumental in the act of sacrifice, without its reference to the 'go-vyati', so then this 'go-vyakti' is covered by ākṣepa i. e.

implication (= i. e. either by anumāna or inference, or arthāpatti). Thus the meaning of go-vyakti is said to be “lākṣaṇika”, according to Mukula. He further observes that thus by the description of two aspects such as ‘mukhya’ and ‘lākṣaṇika’, twofold abhidhāvyāpāra of a word is established. The first (mukhya) flows directly from the word without anything coming in between, and is therefore said to be ‘nirantarārtha-niṣṭha’ i. e. directly apprehended from a word. The other is termed “sāntarārthanīṣṭha” as it passes through a veil. It starts from word — goes through mukhyārtha i. e. jāti — and rests in vyakti at the next step. It is ‘sāntarārtha-niṣṭha’ because it has antara=vyavadhāna, in form of first meaning which is jāti-rūpa.

Mukula accepts a four-fold division of abhidhā : (pp. 4, ibid) - samprati mukhyā'bhidhā-vyāpārasya cāturvidhyaṃ abhidhīyate

“tatra mukhyas' caturbhedo

jñeyo jātyādi-bhedataḥ”

Mukula says that the Mahābhāṣyakāra has suggested a four-fold classification of words in form of jāti-śabda, guṇa-śabda, kriyā-śabda and yadṛcchā-śabda. When words operate to convey their meaning (svārthābhidhānāya pravartta-mānānām), they are coloured by the upādhis i. e. attributes — upādhyuparañjita-viṣaya-vivekatvād upādhi-nibandhanā pravṛttiḥ. This upādhi i. e. attribute is twofold, viz. vakṛṣ-anniveśita, i. e. which is grafted by the speaker, i. e. which is not natural to it, and ‘vastu-dharma’ i. e. one that naturally resides in an object. The first is illustrated by such words as ‘dittha’ and the like. The form of such words is collected by the last letter — “antya-buddhi-nirgrāhyaṃ samhṛtakramaṃ svarūpaṃ” (pp. 5, ibid). This capacity to yield meaning is injected into a particular word by a speaker, who wants to flash the abhidhā-power of that particular word according to his own choice. — “tat khalu tāṃ tāṃ abhidhāśaktiṃ abhivyañjayatā vaktrā, yadṛcchayā tasmin tasmin samjñini upādhitayā samniveśyate.” (pp. 5)

It may be noted that as Mukula was posterior to Ānandavardhana, he knew. vyañjanā very well and yet he willingly disowns it. He uses such words as “abhi-vyañjayatā” but he does not encourage ‘vyañjanā-śakti’ of a word. He only means, “making it manifest, or making it flash something.”

Mukula considers another view point also. Says he — some people hold that no such ‘saṃhṛta-krama-svarūpa’ is injected into the ‘saṃjñī’ because there cannot be such form independent of ‘ḍa’kāra, etc. Thus it being ‘abhāvātmaka’, it virtually does not exist. For these people, the yadṛcchā-śabdatva of such words as ‘ḍittha’ and the like is also formed because for them also words such as ‘ḍittha’ and the like, having imagined (kalpita) samudāyabhāva, come into exercise for ‘abhidhāna’ of whatever saṃjñā is desired, through the power manifested through the speaker's desire. The idea is, in the object which is called by the name of dittha, even if some imagined ‘ḍittha-tva’ is not there, in the sense of the meaning conveyed by this particular word, the word ḍittha itself will be taken as its meaning. (pp. 5) : “yeṣāṃ api ca ‘ḍa’kārādi-varṇa-vyatirikta-saṃhṛta-krama-svarūpābhāvāt na ḍitthādi-śabda-svarūpaṃ saṃhṛta-kramaṃ saṃjñīṣu adhyavasyate, iti darśanam, teṣāṃ api vakṛ-yadṛcchā’-bhivyajyamāna-śaktibhedānusāreṇa kālpanika-samudāya-rūpasya ḍitthādeḥ śabdasya tat tat saṃjñā’bhidhānāya pravartamānatvāt yadṛcchā śabdatvaṃ ḍitthādīnāṃ upapadyata eva.”

Mukula of course, sides with the earlier view of the vaiyākaraṇas.

Vastu-dharma-rūpa upādhi is also two-fold, ‘sādhya’ and ‘siddha’. The former are the words expressing action — i. e. they are kriyāśabdas, e.g. ‘pacati’ and the like. The latter i.e. ‘siddha upādhi’ is also twofold such as ‘jāti’ and ‘guṇa’. ‘Jāti’ is said to be prāṇa-prada-vastudharma. No object can own its form without its relation with ‘jāti’. So, ‘jāti’ is said to be ‘prāṇaprada-siddha-vastudharma’. Mukula quotes Vākyapadīya : “gaur iti; na hi gauḥ svarūpeṇa gauḥ, nāpya-gauḥ gotvābhisambandhāt tu gauḥ.” - Some attribute (upādhi) becomes the cause of viśeṣādhāna for an object which has obtained its own form : (pp. 5, ibid) : ‘kaścit punar upādhir labdha-svarūpasya-vastunaḥ viśeṣādhānaheṭuḥ, yathā śuklādir gaṇaḥ.” - i. e. like ‘guṇa’ in form of whiteness etc. These qualities such as whiteness etc. are not responsible for the object to attain its own form. For that only ‘jāti’ is capable. But after the attainment of its own form, it becomes instrumental in its ‘viśeṣādhāna’ - i.e. in laying down further its speciality. The ‘guṇa’s such as ‘paramāṇutva’ - ‘atom-ness’ or the quality of being an

atom, which are permanent (i. e. nitya), are also varieties of 'guṇa' - "teṣāṃ api sarveṣāṃ guṇa-jāṭiyatvāt", they are also of the same type as these, i. e. śuklatva and the like. As they are 'nitya' they may be like 'jāti', but because they are 'viśeṣādhānahetu', they are termed guṇas, and not jāti. Thus Mukula concludes : (pp. 6, ibid) - "tad evaṃ prāṇa-pradopādhi-nibandhanatvaṃ yasya śabdasya sa jāti-śabdo yathā gavādiḥ. yasmāt labdha-svarūpasya vastuno viśeṣādhāna-hetuḥ arthaḥ pratīyate, sa guṇa-śabdo yathā śuklādiḥ."

We may observe that these words are taken up fully by Mammaṭa. So, Mukula not only serves as a shaping influence for Bhoja but also for Mammaṭa to some extent because he, i.e. Mukula follows the lead of the grammarians such as Patañjali and Bhartṛhari.

Now, Mukula considers pūrva-pakṣa. It goes like this — Is it not possible that words connoting 'guṇa', 'kriyā' or 'yadṛcchā' — all can be taken as jāti-śabdāḥ ? For example take the word śukla. Now the whiteness in milk, conch, balākā (= name of a bird), etc. is really different but a common word 'śukla' is used for a variety of white colour. Thus 'jāti-nibandhanatva' — of 'guṇa-vācī' words is seen. This can be said of kriyā śabdāḥ also. The kriyā of cooking is different in case of molasses, sesamum, rice etc. and yet it is conveyed by the same word viz. pacati.' The yadṛcchā words such as 'dīṭha' etc. as spoken by humans, parrots etc. are really different and yet because of jāti i.e. 'dīṭha-śabdātva' they are taken to be one. So, as a result the 'cauṣṭayī pravṛtti' of words does not hold good : "ataśca guṇa-kriyā yadṛcchā-śabdānāṃ api jāti-śabdātvaṃ cauṣṭayī śabdānāṃ pravṛttir na upapadyate." (pp. 9, ibid).

The siddhāntin's answer follows : It is not 'jāti' or 'class' which results in cognition of identity, in case of guṇa-śabdāḥ or kriyāśabdāḥ. But it is 'saṃjñī' i.e. the individual who makes for this sense of identity. The difference seen among individuals is the result of their difference in attributes, i. e. the āśraya or substratum. For example, take a face, which when reflected in oil, sword, water or mirror, which are responsible only for the knowledge of the reflections, make for difference seen in the figures seen in them. In the same way, the

individual quality such as whiteness etc., owing to difference with reference to time, place, and context, and thus due to difference in medium, 'kāraṇabheda' - appear different when vested in a conch, and the like. The colour looks, as though different. But thereby 'śuklatva' - 'jāti' is not proved to have existence. For 'jāti' is that one 'dharma' which resides in many. But the substratum of the imagined śuklatva jāti, viz. śukla-vyakti is basically one and identical. Same is the case with such words as 'pacati', 'ḍittha', etc. Thus the 'vyakti' in form of pāka-kriyā is one and the same, and so also the individual — samjñī — named 'ḍittha'. The illusory manifoldness — nānātva — seen in different stages of pākakriyā, or in an individual at different years such as of a child, young boy, young man, etc. etc. — makes, for this wrong perception of jāti in such cases. This is not real. Says Mukula : (pp. 10, ibid) - "atra api ekasyā eva pākādi-kriyā-vyakteḥ, ditthādi-śabda-vyakteḥ, ditthādeśca samjñīno yathā-kramaṃ abhivyañjakānāṃ pākādīnāṃ tathā dhvanīnāṃ vayo'vasthā-viśeṣāṇāṃ kaumārādīnāṃ ca yo bhedas tad vaśena nānāvidhena rūpeṇa avabhāsa-mānatvāt sthitaṃ etat śabda-pravṛtti-nimittānāṃ śabdārthaś caturvidhaḥ iti."

After this Mukula turns to the second variety of abhidhā, i.e. lakṣaṇika abhidhā. This also is two-fold. The AVM 2B reads : "Śuddhopacāra-miśratvāt lakṣaṇā dvidvidhā matā."

Because of its being either śuddha or upacāramiśra, lakṣaṇā is two-fold. The illustrations are 'gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ' and 'gaur vāhikāḥ' respectively. The śuddha-lakṣaṇā is also divided two-fold, such as upādāna-lakṣaṇā and lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā (AVM 3A). Mukula suggests that when something else is imposed to support one thing. "sva-siddhyarthatayā" kṣepo yatra vastvantarasya tat (AVM 3B). - This is called upādānam; or 'inclusive' variety the other is the opposite of this (AVM IV A) : lakṣaṇaṃ tu tad-viparyāsato matam." This is exclusive type. We know that all this has been accepted by Mammaṭa without challenging. But the illustration that Mukula cites for upādāna-lakṣaṇa viz. "gaur-anuvandhyaḥ" is rejected by Mammaṭa. It is taken as 'arthāpatti' or presumption or inference from circumstances, i.e. implication, for in the illustration cited by Mukula we cannot show either rūḍhi or prayojana which is the basis of lakṣaṇā. Mammaṭa also feels that śabda-

pramāṇa is resorted to only when other pramāṇas do not operate. Here, go-vyakti in the present illustration of 'gaur-anuvandhyaḥ' is known through implication. So it is no use utilizing a śabda-vṛtti here.

Lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā occurs when one's meaning is sacrificed to obtain the other sense, as in "gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ".

Mukula proceeds to give a four-fold division of upacāra-miśrā lakṣaṇā (AVM. 4B-5A). He says :

āropā'dhyavasānābhyām
śuddha-gaṇopacārayoḥ (4B) AVM.
pratyekaṃ bhidyamānatvāt
upacāras' caturvidhaḥ." (5A) AVM.

Thus superimposition (āropa) and introsusception (adhvasāna) make for these varieties. Thus in all four-fold upacāra-metaphorical imposition is available.

Thus Mukula first begins with upacāra or identification as śuddha and gaṇa. Śuddha is that which has no upamāna-upameya-bhāva or similarity at its basis. The gaṇa in form of similarity is absent here. This is illustrated by such examples as 'āyurghṛtam' where kārya-kāraṇabhāva — is at its base. Gaṇa upacāra, or identification based on gaṇa such as similarity between upamāna and upameya which results in superimposition of the śabda and artha describing upamāna on that concerning upameya, is illustrated as in "gaur vāhikaḥ".

Now this two-fold upacāra or identification is also two-fold on the basis of adhyāropa or superimposition and adhyavasāna or absorption, i. e. partial and complete identification. Adhyāropa or partial imposition occurs when the difference between the object superimposed and the basic object on which superimposition is done, is not concealed, i. e. the difference between the two is not eroded. Here a lesser object whose identity is not covered up is seen clearly and on this object, another object of superior quality is superimposed. This is called 'adhyāropa'. This is illustrated in both the illustrations i. e. 'āyur ghṛtam' and 'gaur-vāhikaḥ' cited above. Prior to this

Mukula had made one remark that : kecit tu upacāre śabdopacāraṃ eva manyante, na arthopacāraṃ. tad ayuktam. śabdopacārasya arthopacāra-avinābhāvitvāt.” (pp. 16) i.e. only śabdopacāra is not possible as believed by some, because it necessarily involves ‘arthopacāra’. It may also be observed that when Mukula says (pp. 16), dvididhaḥ upacāraḥ, śuddho gaṇaśca. tatra śuddho yatra mūla-bhūtasya...” This suggests that Mukula is in favour of taking only upacāra based on similarity as real upacāra. In Mammaṭa’s mind this impression was lying at the root. It is therefore that by the end of his discussion on upādāna-lakṣaṇā and lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā, he writes : “ubhayarūpā ca iyaṃ suddhā, upacāreṇa a-miśritatvāt”. So, for Mammaṭa also ‘upacāra’ is basically rooted in similarity. Precisely for this, Mammaṭa does not use the term ‘upacāra’ while treating sārōpā and sādhyavasānikā. Mammaṭa also did not favour the upacāra which was śabda-gata.

Mukula explains ‘āropa’ and ‘adhyavasāna’ as : (pp. 18, ibid) : “yatra adhyāropya-āropa viṣayayor bhedaṃ anapahnūtyaiva vastvantare vastvantaraṃ upacaryate tatra an-apahnūta-svarūpa eva vastvantare vastvantarasya adhikasya āropyamāṇatvād adhyāropaḥ.” - We have explained it as above. Adhyavasāna is said to be there - When, “yatra tu upacaryamāṇa-viṣayasya upacaryamāṇe antar-līnatayā vivakṣitatvāt svarūpāpahnavaḥ kriyate, tatra adhyavasānam.”

The śuddha-upacāragata-adhyavasāna is seen in, “pañcālāḥ”. The word ‘pañcāla’ through lakṣita-lakṣaṇā, it being the place for stay of a child of pañcāla, is itself used in the sense of a village : “atra-hi pañcālāpatya-nivāsādhikaraṇatvāj janapade lakṣita-lakṣaṇayā pañcāla-śabdaḥ prayujyate.” (pp. 18, ibid). Gaṇa upacāragata-adhyavasāna is illustrated as in, ‘rājā’. Here ‘gaṇatva’ does not come to mind immediately, but only after some thought is given to it. So, it looks as it were it is ordinary — ‘bhraṣṭam iva’, for the importance of rūḍhi is more powerful here. Thus we have ‘adhyavasāna-yukta-gaṇa-upacāra’ here.

When to these four upacāra-based varieties two as stated above are added, we have in all six varieties of lakṣaṇā — “etena caturvidhena upacāreṇa saha pūrvoktau dvau lakṣaṇābhedaḥ saṃkalayya ṣaṭ prakārā lakṣaṇā vaktavyā” — observes Mukula (pp. 18, ibid).

Now this lakṣaṇā is said to be ‘tri-skandhā’ (i. e. having three basic varieties) on account of its śuddhatva, adhyāropa and adhyavasāna : “eṣā ca lakṣaṇā triskandhā, śuddhatvāt, adhyāropād, adhyavasānāt ca.” (pp. 202, ibid) - Thus when these three each are divided into two we have a scheme of six-fold lakṣaṇā. Mammaṭa also has the same observation : “lakṣaṇā tena ṣad-vidhā” (K.P.II). Mukula explains the sub-divisions such as -

“taṭasthe lakṣaṇā śuddhā
 syād āropastvadūrage || (AVM-VB)
 nigirṇe'dhyavasānaṃ tu
 rūḍhyāsannataratvataḥ | (AVM VIA)

i. e. śuddha lakṣaṇā will be with reference to taṭastha (i. e. independently present), ‘āropa’ i. e. superimposition is with reference to ‘a-dūragā’, and ‘adhyavasāna’ or complete identification is in ‘nigaraṇa’ i. e. swallowing up. This is two-fold; either through rūḍhi or āsannataratā i. e. nearness.”

The idea is - lakṣaṇā is said to be two-fold such as ‘upādāna’ and ‘lakṣaṇa’. Now wherever this occurs, the lakṣya object is not covered up (anuparaktatvāt taṭasthatayā pratiyamāne) by the ‘lakṣaka’ object, and so it remains ‘taṭastha’ i. e. independent of the other object.

This means that the ‘lakṣya’ object is not apprehended as covered up by the ‘lakṣaka’ object, e.g. “gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ”. Here ‘taṭa’ or the bank of the river Ganges is in mind and so, “gaṅgāyāṃ” is used, not ‘vitastāyāṃ’. So, ‘taṭa’ is not realized as completely covered up by a special flow of water, because that special flow is restricted to the limit of only indicating the bank from a distance. So, the apprehension of the bank takes place independently, and not as identified with the Ganges. We have to accept the same situation in case of upādāna lakṣaṇā also, e.g. in “The fat Devadatta does not eat by day.” - “tathā hi - ‘gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣa’ iti atra ghoṣād dhikaraṇa-bhūta-taṭopalakṣaṇā-bhisamdhānena ‘gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣo na vitastāyāṃ’ iti gaṅgā-śabde prayujyamāne taṭasya sroto-viśeṣeṇa-upalakṣakatva-mātropayuktatvena uparāgo na pratiyate, taṭasthatvena eva tasya taṭasya pratiyāt. evaṃ upādāne’pi vācyam — yathā, ‘pīno devadatto divā na bhukta’ iti.” (AVM pp. 20, ibid)

Mukula further observes that when it is required for the *taṭa* to express itself as covered up by the special flow and yet its own form is also to be revealed, then in the illustration viz. ‘*gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ*’, first there is superimposition i.e. *āropa*, for in such an *āropa* there is apprehension of *taṭa* as coloured by the flow. So, the apprehension takes this form : “*ghoṣa* or dwelling is on such a bank which as it is in proximity of a special flow of water, is itself of the form of the flow itself.’ As against that when the idea is to convey extreme proximity — ‘*atyanta āsannatā*’, and when the particular statement is used to convey this extreme proximity, then the bank is presented as completely covered up by the special flow. So, it is shown that the dwelling is, ‘directly on the Ganges, not anywhere else.’ There it is the case of complete identification or swallowing up — ‘*adhyavasāna*’ : “*yadā tu gaṅgā-śabdābhidheyasya sroto-viśeṣasya a-vidūra-vartitayā taṭaṃ anapahnuta-svarūpaṃ sroto-viśeṣoparaktayā vivakṣitaṃ bhavati tadā pūrvasmin udācharaṇe adhyāropo bhavati. srotoviśeṣoparaktasya taṭasya pratiteḥ sroto-viśeṣa-a-vidūra-vartitvāt srotoviśeṣa-rūpe taṭe ghoṣa iti. yadā tu atyantam āsannatām ghoṣam prati srotoviśeṣasya pratipādayitum etad vākyaṃ sroto-viśeṣa-nigīrṇatayā taṭam apahnutya prayujyate ‘gaṅgāyāṃ eva sāksād ghoṣaḥ na tu anyatra iti’, tadā adhyavasānam.* (pp. 20, 21, *ibid*)

Thus, “*gaur vāhikaḥ*” and “*gaur eva ayam*”, are illustrations of *gaṇa-upacāra-mūlaka*, *sāropā* and *sādhyavasānikā*, respectively. Just as *adhyavasāna-lakṣaṇā* is possible with reference to proximity, similarly it is possible with reference to *rūḍhi* also : “*yathā ca āsannataratvena adhyavasānam pūrvam pravibhaktam tathā rūḍhatvena api pravibhaktavyam*” (pp. 22 *ibid*). The illustrations are ‘*pañcālāḥ*’ and ‘*rājā*’. Precisely for this the *kārikā* said, “*rūḍhyāsannataratvataḥ*” *rūḍhatvāt āsannataratvāt ca nigīrṇe arthe adhyavasānam syād ityarthah.*” (pp. 22, *ibid*). Thus *ruḍhi* is also based on a forgotten relation, while *prayojanavatī* has its *saṃbandha* fresh in mind. Mukula has not counted ‘*prayojana*’ as the *hetu* of *lakṣaṇā*.

Mukula here discusses a *prima facie* view. The objector's contention is — “The ‘*mukhyārtha*’ i. e. primary meaning is necessarily, conveyed by word itself. As against this, the *lakṣaṇika*’ i.e. secondary meaning is not collected through the word. To put it more clearly, it can be said that, the

kārya-kāraṇa-relation of a particular meaning with a particular word is ascertained through 'anvaya-vyatireka'. Again this apprehension is with reference only to the four-fold primary meaning such as jāti, guṇa, kriyā and yadr̥cchā. But this is not so in case of the six-fold lākṣaṇika i.e. secondary meaning. This again is in the fitness of things, for if the word is connected directly even with the secondary sense, then even this 'lākṣaṇika' also will be branded as 'mukhya'. Again, as the lākṣaṇika artha is connected with the mukhya i.e. primary sense, and in that case if it is held that this secondary sense is also derived through the agency of the word itself, then the question which arises is that when a word also conveys the secondary sense along with conveying of its primary sense also, is it so that this secondary sense is conveyed in a sāpekṣa way or with some expectancy or nir-apekṣa i.e. in an independent way without expectancy ? — If it is conveyed independently i.e. (nirapekṣaḥ), then its apprehension should take place for all time. If on the other hand its apprehension occurs in a correlated way (sāpekṣaḥ), then the question is what is expected here ? "atha śabdasya mukhyo yo'sāvarthas tena saha saṁbandho lakṣyamāṇasya arthasya dṛṣṭa iti tad-dvāreṇa tasya avagatir iti abhidhīyate, evaṁ sati yadi nirapekṣaḥ svārtha-pratipādana-dvāreṇa lakṣyamāṇaṁ arthaṁ avagamayati tadā sarvadā taṁ arthaṁ avagamayet, atha sāpekṣaḥ, kiṁ tasya apekṣaṇīyam iti āśaṅkya āha" - (pp. 24, ibid)

With reference to the above objection, Mukula observes that —

"vaktur vākyasya vācyasya rūpabhedāvadhāraṇāt

lakṣaṇā ṣaṭ-prakāraiṣā vivektavyā maṇiṣibhiḥ." (7A) (pp. 24, ibid)

"The learned divide this lakṣaṇā, in a six-fold fashion, keeping in mind the formal varieties of vaktā i.e. speaker, vākya i.e. the sentence and vācyā i.e. the sense conveyed." The idea is that each of vaktā, vākya and vācyā are either staying independently or with one of the other two : (i) 'Vaktā' is that person, who utters a sentence to convey some sense to someone else. (ii) 'Vākya' is the use of words having expectancy and which jointly convey a single sense. (iii) 'Vācyā' is the meaning which is the object of a word either through its primary or secondary function. All these three have two sub-

divisions each — i. e. samasta or vyasta i. e. each one stays either with either of the other two, or stays independently. The idea is that with reference to the different situations caused by space and time, these factors are united either in a 'samasta' or 'vyasta' form. As a result there occurs a difference in their nature. Due to this difference in nature, the experts have thought of the six-fold division of lakṣaṇā : “etesām trayāṇām vakrādīnām vyasta-samasta-bheda-bhinnānām deśa-kālāvasthā-vailakṣaṇya-gata-samasta-vyasta-bheda-samyojitānām yaḥ svabhāva-bheda-prapañcaḥ, tata eṣā ṣaṭ-prakārā lakṣaṇā parāmarśa-kuśalair vivecanīyā.” (pp. 24, 25, ibid). Through this six-fold meaning only, a word causes the apprehension of the secondary sense. Thus, through the agency i. e. kāraṇa-sāmagrī such as vaktā or speaker and the rest, the word is connected with the secondary sense and then becomes capable to give the secondary sense. The idea is that the word has expectancy with reference to these six-fold vaktā, vācya etc., when it gives its primary sense. Then, through usage — vṛddha-vyavahāra – through this primary sense, it fixes its relation with the secondary sense. Through the said six-fold meaning the word conveys the secondary sense. So, a word does not give a secondary sense, till its relation with secondary sense is not comprehended. This relation is not brought about naturally, but only through the agency or kāraṇa-sāmagrī such as vaktā or speaker etc., and also only after the primary sense is collected. As is said by Śabarasvāmin — “Then, how is it that a different word (= say, Gaṅgā) is used for a different sense (i.e. say, taṭa) ? The answer is - In our opinion, through the medium of conveying of one's own meaning.” (Mi. Sū. I.4.12) Here, the secondary sense is intended through the primary sense. Śabara has further stated, (Mi. Sū. I. IV. 1) that lakṣaṇā is from day to day usage, i. e. laukikī. Through this it is suggested by him that, when a word proceeds towards the secondary sense, it has an expectancy of a sort of relation. By 'loka' is meant the means of knowledge that come into function in day to day affairs. So, 'laukikī' means 'that which is known in ordinary parlance', i. e. that which is known through popular usage, i. e. that which is established by a word which carries some relation : “etad uktaṃ bhavati. na śabdānām anavadhārita-lākṣaṇikārtha-sambandhānām lakṣaṇikaṃ arthaṃ prati gamakatvam, nā'pi ca tatra sāksāt

saṃbandha-grahaṇam, kim tarhi ? vaktrādi-sāmagry-apekṣayā svārtha-vyavadhānena iti. yad uktaṃ-ācārya-śabarasvāminā” — kathaṃ punaḥ paraśabdaḥ paratra vartate ? svārthābhidhānena iti brūmaḥ.” — iti. atra hi svārtha-dvāreṇa lakṣyamānārthā'bhiniveśitā śabdānāṃ uktā. punaśca asau eva āha — “lakṣaṇā'pi laukikī eva”, iti. atra hi saṃbandhāvadhāraṇa-sāpekṣānāṃ śabdānāṃ lakṣyamāṇe arthe pravṛttir uktā. vyavahāropārūdhāni hi pratyakṣādīni pramāṇāni loka-śabdena abhidhīyante. loka eva viditā laukikī, vyavahāragamyā, parigrhīta-saṃbandha-śabda-niṣṭhā iti arthaḥ.”

Mukula here also quotes from Kumārila -

“nirūdhā lakṣaṇāḥ kāścit
sāmarthyād abhidhānavat,
kriyante sāmprataṃ kāścit
kāścīn naiva tv aśaktiḥ.” - iti.

i.e. Some lakṣaṇās are based on usage. They carry the strength of conveying a meaning like the primary function (= abhidhānavat). While some (other) lakṣaṇās are formed on the spot. Still others are not formed at all (i.e. they are not acceptable at all), because they are bereft of the power to convey sense.” (Tantravārtika-3/1/6 aruṇādhikaraṇa).

The first one is illustrated by 'rāja' and the like. The second variety which is floated on the spot, i. e. the 'tātkālikī', is the result of the context of vṛddha-vyavahāra, vaktā (i. e. the speaker) etc. such as seen in the verse, “snigdha-syāmala.” etc. In this verse the word 'lipta' has its primary sense contradicted because lustre or kānti has no inherent capacity to smear anything as is done by saffron powder. This is so with reference to words such as 'suhṛd', 'rāma', etc. also. The third variety is such which is not marked even in the vṛddhavyavahāra or practice of the seniors and the like. Nor, do we find such situation as in case of words such as 'lipta' and the like. So, this third type is unacceptable. They cannot be put into practice. What Mukula drives at is that lakṣaṇā is possible only in cases of such words as are put into practice by seniors, or which are similar to such practice. Lakṣaṇā is not possible anywhere and everywhere. For in that case any word will be able to deliver any sense, and this we do not find

in reality : “tad evaṃ, vaktrādisāmagrī-anupraveśena śabdānāṃ svārtham arpayatāṃ arthāntaram prati svarūpa-dvāreṇa sajāṭīya-śabda-dvāreṇa vā gamakatayā avadhāritānāṃ lakṣakatvaṃ iti sthitam.” (pp. 30, ibid). The principle established is that, in the context of the instrumentality (sāmagrī) of the speaker etc., a word becomes indicator (lakṣaka) only when through the same instrument (such as vaktā etc.), they are accepted as conveying meaning through their very form either in the practice of the seniors or through such other device.”

After dealing with the four-fold ‘mukhya artha’ and the six-fold lakṣaṇā Mukula discusses a fresh problem. He discusses the four views concerning (i) abhihitānvaya, (ii) anvitābhidhāna, (iii) the samuccaya of these two and (iv) the ‘abhāva’ of these two. He discusses the position of lakṣaṇā with reference to these four alternatives. Says he -

“anvaye’ bhīhitānāṃ sā

vācyatvād ūrdhvaṃ iṣyate - (7B)

anvitānāṃ tu vācyatve, vācyatvasya puraḥ sthitāḥ,

dvaye dvayaṃ, akhaṇḍe tu

vākyārtha paramārthataḥ - 8

nāstyasau kalpiterthe tu

pūrvavat pravibhajyate.” - 9A

i.e. In abhihitānvayavāda lakṣaṇā is believed to take place after vācyatva is over. In anvitābhidhānavāda it is believed to occur prior to the primary i.e. vācyatva. In the two (together), at both the places (i.e. earlier and later), and where ‘akhaṇḍatā’ is accepted with reference to sentence sense lakṣaṇā does not take place at all. It is believed and divided as done earlier in an imagined sense such as word-sense (because in reality only the sentence-sense exists).”

Mukula observes : (pp. 48, ibid) : akhaṇḍe tu ‘vākyārthe’sau lakṣaṇā paramārthena nāsti. bhinnānāṃ padārthānāṃ paramārthato’bhidheya-bhāvasya anupapadyamānatvāt, tad āśritatvācca lakṣaṇāyāḥ kalpita-padārthāśrayeṇa tu sā lakṣaṇā yathā-ruci pūrvavad abhihitānvaya-anvitābhidhāna-tat-samuccaya-

kalpanayā vibhaktavyabhāge niveśyā, parasparasya deśa-kālāvacchedenā'śeṣa-vyavaharṭṛ-niṣṭhatayā rūḍhatvāt.

Mukula observes that in all the four alternatives such as the abhihitānvayavāda and the rest, wherever it is not proper to accept the primary sense, the functioning of lakṣaṇā is suggested. This lakṣaṇā, according to Mukula functions when

- (i) the primary sense, being contradicted by any other means of knowledge becomes impossible,
- (ii) the lakṣārtha being closer to mukhyārtha,
- (iii) and also when this acceptance of the secondary sense — 'sāntarārthagrahaṇa' — rests on some 'prayojana' or reason :-

“yā ca iyam ṣaṭ-prakārā lakṣaṇā pūrvam uktā, sā -

- (i) mukhyārthasya pramāṇāntara-bādhitatvena-a-sambhavāt,
- (ii) lakṣyamāṇasya ca arthasya mukhyārthaṃ prati āsannatvāt,
- (iii) sāntarārthagrahaṇasya ca sa-prayojanatvāt iti evaṃvidha-kāraṇa-tritayātmaka-sāmagrī-samāśrayeṇa vṛddha-vyavahāre paridṛśyate.

Now, says Mukula, the 'āsannatva' or nearness of lakṣyārtha with mukhyārtha is five-fold, according to Bhartṛmitra-such as,

“abhidheyena saṃbandhāt
sādrśyāt samavāyataḥ
vaiparītyāt kriyā-yogāt

lakṣaṇā pañcadhā matā” iti. (pp. 50, ibid)

i.e. through (i) relation with the primary meaning, (ii) through similarity (iii) 'samavāya' i. e. intimate relation, (iv) opposition (iv) relation with verb-kriyāyoga; lakṣaṇā is said to be five-fold. Thus, says Mukula, the 'prayojana' is also two-fold. One 'prayojana' is such which depends on vṛddhavyavahāra which is beginningless in accepting the meaning that is conveyed and therefore depending on the established custom. This is as good as 'rūḍhi' or convention, e. g. in case of words such as 'dvi-refa' etc. This word is having two 'ra'-kāras, as the word 'bhramara', meaning a bee, consists two 'ra'kāras.

So, 'dvi-refa' — i. e. one having two-'ra'kāras, also conveys the same sense without dragging in the word 'bhramara'. Thus, this is as good as 'rūḍhi' or convention. Now Mukula has suggested that 'following a rūḍhi' is a 'prayojana' here.

The second prayojana is different from the above rūḍhi-tulya-prayojana. Mukula observes (pp. 50, *ibid*) : "aparam tu rūḍhyanusaraṇātmakam yat prayojanam uktam, tad-vyatirikta-vastvantara-gatasya samvijñāna-padasya rūpa-viśeṣa-pratipādanam nāma, yathā pūrvam udāhṛtam, "rāmo'smīti".

This second prayojana is in form of establishment of a special form of an object, which is concealed in that object, but the conveying of which is intended. The illustration is, "rāmo'smīti..." etc.

Both these purposes or aims (i. e. prayojanas) are to be determined through the secondary meaning arrived at, with the help of the above mentioned five-fold relation, when the primary meaning is set aside, it being in-appropriate.

Now it may be observed here, that in nirūḍhā lakṣaṇā Mukula tries to find a 'prayojana' in form of 'following convention' as established by usage made current by seniors. But accepting or imagining a 'prayojana' in rūḍhi-mūlā, does not look possible to us. Dr. Rewaprasad observes that even if we accept what Mukula holds here, greater charm is caused by such usages as 'dvi-refa' in place of the direct mention of 'bhramara'. Thus, causing a greater charm could be a prayojana here. But we feel that it is better to hold only rūḍhi as the cause of lakṣaṇā here and such rūḍhi in itself carries its own charm, for ultimately lakṣaṇā or say, poetic deviation of any kind causes charm. So, rūḍhi lakṣaṇā has an inherent charm which does not stand in need of any prayojana.

Mukula provides illustrations for this five-fold lakṣaṇā. At the end of it he observes that in this five-fold lakṣaṇā the expressed meaning is at times (i) atyanta-tiraskṛta i. e. completely lost, or (ii) The expressed is either intended or unintended (vivakṣita / a-vivakṣita) : (pp. 58, *ibid*) "idānīm pañcavidha-saṃbandha-nibandhanāyām āsattau pūrvopavarṇitāyām kvacid vācyasya atiraskārah, kvacid vivakṣitatvaṃ, kvacicca a-vivakṣitatvaṃ iti evaṃ vidham

trayaṃ yat sahr̥dayair upadarśitaṃ, tasya viṣaya-vibhāgaṃ upadarśayitum āha -

sādr̥śye vaiparītye ca vācyasya ati-tiraskriyā-(10 B) vivakṣā ca avivakṣā ca, saṃbandha-samavāyayoḥ, upādāne vivakṣā, tra lakṣaṇe tvavivakṣaṇaṃ tiraskriyā kriyāyoge, kvacit tad-viparītata (12 A)

i.e. The expressed is totally abandoned in case of the relations such as sādr̥śya and vaiparītya. There is intended and un-intended expressed sense in varieties based on 'saṃbandha' and 'samavāya'. In 'upādāna' we have only the vivakṣā of the expressed, i.e. it is always expected, and in 'lakṣaṇa' there is only a-vivakṣā, while in 'kriyā-yoga' the expressed is either abandoned (tiraskriyā) or not. Mukula explains this with reference to the illustrations cited by him, but we feel there is overlappings in these cases and his treatment is not as scientific as either of his predecessor Ānandavardhana or of his successor Mammata.

Mukula also observes : (pp. 66, ibid) : "lakṣaṇāmārgāvagāhitvaṃ tu dhvaneḥ sahr̥dayair nūtanatayopavarṇitasya vidyata iti diśaṃ unmīlayitum idaṃ atra uktam. etacca vidvadbhiḥ kuśāgrīyayā buddhyā nirūpaṇīyam, na tu jhagityeva asūyitavyaṃ iti alaṃ atiprasaṅgena."—

i. e. "This is just to suggest that the newly advocated dhvani by the connoisseurs falls into the region of 'lakṣaṇā' only. The learned with very sharp intelligence have to brood over our observation and that it need not be immediately discarded. So now, enough of further elaboration."

Mukula thus tries to incorporate 'dhvani' under lakṣyārtha and thus for him vyañjanā is part of lakṣaṇā which again is abhidhā itself because it i.e. lakṣaṇā is only an extension of abhidhā.

Mukula concludes to his satisfaction that the word-element which is in itself undivided in form of pure śabda-tattva, i. e. prior to its being classified into the four-fold scheme of jātivācaka, etc. the word-element which is 'a-bhinna' in its original form, attains to the 'vivarta' i. e. illusive change in form of 'śabda', 'artha' and 'saṃbandha'. i. e. word, its meaning and their relation later, then only the abhidhā-śakti is said to be ten-fold. In its original non-dualistic form of word, there is no scope for this ten-fold division : (pp. 69, ibid)

“idānīm sakala-śabda-a-vibhāgātmakasya śabda-tattvasya yadā śabdārtha-saṁbandha-tritaya-rūpatayā rajju-sarpatayā vivarta-mānatvaṁ tadā etad abhidhāvṛttam daśa-vidha-vyavahāro-pārohitayopapadyate, na tu saṁhṛtārthavāk-tattva-ṣayatatayā iti darśayitum āha -

vivartamānaṁ vāk-tattvaṁ

daśadhaiva vilokyate. - 12

saṁhṛta-kramabhede tu

tasmin teṣāṁ kuto gatiḥ.” - 13A

ityetad abhidhāvṛttam

daśadhātra vivecitam. 13B

mukhyasya abhidhāvṛttasya prakārāścatvāraḥ lākṣaṇikasya tu ṣaḍ iti evaṁ daśaparakāraṁ abhidhā-vṛttam atra vivecitam.

This treatment of Mukula's views suggests how he has influenced Bhoja in taking abhidhā as three-fold such as mukhyā, gaunī and lakṣaṇā. We know that this approach is different from the one seen in the Kashmir school the highest expression of which we notice in Jagannātha. But prior to that we have also to take note of Kuntaka and Mahimā also, who influenced the Mālava school like Mukula. The flowering of the thought as seen in the Kashmir school is to be traced in Ānandavardhana, who discusses abhidhā only from the angle of its difference from vyañjanā, and then in the treatment of Mammaṭa and his followers. Jagannātha of course comes last but in him we see the highest flight of abstract thinking and the final word on śabda-vṛttis. Mukula and Kuntaka are viewed as shaping influences for the Mālava tradition as seen in Bhoja and also for the Kashmir tradition as seen in Mammaṭa, for the K. P. is influenced by both the Dhv. and also the Abhidhāvṛtta-mātrkā of Mukula. Hemacandra we will go to observe follows Mammaṭa, but absorbs the teaching of Mukula and Bhoja also, while Vidyādharma, Vidyānātha, Viṣvanātha and Keśava follow the lead of Mammaṭa. So, now we will consider Kuntaka who like Mukula had his share in shaping the views of Bhoja, because for Kuntaka also, ‘abhidhā’ has a connotation wider than permitted by the Kashmir school of thought.

Kuntaka

After explaining the general definition of poetry and before explaining the special definition of it, Kuntaka first of all explains the form of word and meaning. He observes : *evam kāvyasya sāmānyalakṣaṇe vihite viśeṣa-lakṣaṇaṃ upakramate. tatra śabdārthayos tāvat svarūpaṃ nirūpayati -*

‘vācya'rtho vācakaḥ śabdaḥ
prasiddhaṃ iti yadyapi,
tathā'pi kāvya-mārges'min
paramārtho'yaṃ etayoḥ”

— V J. I. 8 (pp. 13, Edn. K. Krishnamoorthy)

i.e. ‘After the general explanation of poetry, the question of its detailed definition is taken up. First of all, the nature of word and meaning is examined :—

That ‘meaning’ is what is signified, and ‘word’ is that which signifies, is so well known that it needs no elaboration. Yet, in the province of poetry, their true nature is as follows :” (V.J.I.8) (Trans. K. Kri.) (pp. 300, *ibid*)

Kuntaka goes on observing that the general meaning of the terms, ‘word’ and ‘meaning’ is of course, well known. The ‘word’ is the signifier and the ‘meaning’ is the signified : “yo vācakaḥ pratyāyakaḥ sa śabdaḥ, yo vācyaś ca abhidheyaḥ so'rtha iti” (pp. 14, *ibid*). Thus the word for Kuntaka is that which causes apprehension of meaning, and the meaning is that which is expressed i. e. apprehended. Now, let us first make it clear that Kuntaka also does not attempt any scientific definition of *abhidhā*, *vācaka śabda* and *vācyārtha* here. He does not have a fool-proof scheme as is seen in the K.P. of Mammaṭa. Or, it may be that he knowingly defies the ruling of Ānandavardhana who clearly distinguished between *abhidhā*, *lakṣaṇā* and *vyañjanā*, and *vācya*, *lakṣya* and *vyaṅgya* senses which are rendered in English generally as the expressed, indicated and suggested senses. No; he has his own approach and is closer to Mukula in the sense that he names only ‘*abhidhā*’ as the ‘*śabda-vṛtti*’ or say, *viśiṣṭā abhidhā*, which is wide enough to include *lakṣaṇā* and *vyañjanā* in its fold, provided this deviation is poetic.

It is this trend which is perhaps inherited by Bhoja also. We will see that it is Bhoja who tries to furnish illustrations, not from worldly usage only, but from pure poetry to illustrate the main three divisions of what he calls *abhidhā*, with its any number of sub-divisions. This trend is perhaps inherited by Bhoja both from Mukula to some extent and Kuntaka to a greater extent. For Kuntaka, as far as poetry, the result of the effort of a poet, is concerned, there is only one function of the poetic word and it is 'abhidhā' which is not to be confused with the *abhidhā* or power of expression of a word giving the conventional meaning only, as is seen in the Kashmir school of thought, but it is the 'power of poetic expression', which includes poetic usages such as *lakṣaṇā* or indication and *vyañjanā* i.e. suggestion, provided they carry the stamp of being pure and beautiful poetic expression, i.e. artistic expression only.

Kuntaka, as Dr. Krishnamoorthy wants us to believe uses such terms as 'dyotaka', 'dyotyā' and 'vyañjaka', 'vyañjya' in the sense of indicator-indicated (i.e. *lakṣaka-lakṣya*) and suggestor-suggested. But we are not convinced. It is only in a very loose sense that the terms *dyotaka-dyotyā* are used by Kuntaka, and we fail to ascertain the exact import of these terms. Normally in the Kashmir school, these terms are taken as synonyms, but Kuntaka does not do it. Whether he takes it to mean *lakṣaka-lakṣya* is also not clear. But it is clear that he is out to include *dyotaka-dyotyā* and *vyañjaka-vyañgyā* under his wider *vācaka-vācyā*. He raises an objection and then silences it to his satisfaction thus. (Under V. J. I. 8 pp. 14, *ibid*) :

“*nanu ca dyotaka-vyañjakau api śabdau saṁbhavataḥ, tad asaṁgrahāt na avyāptiḥ, yasmāt artha-pratīti-kāritva-sāmānyād, upacārāt, tau api vācakau eva. evaṁ dyotyā-vyañgyayor api arthayoḥ pratyeyatva-sāmānyāt upacārād vācyatvaṁ eva. tasmāt vācakatvaṁ vācyatvaṁ ca śabdārthayor loke suprasiddham yadyapi lakṣaṇaṁ tathā'pi asmin alaukike kāvyamārge, kavikarma-vartmani ayaṁ etayor vakṣyamāṇaḥ paramārthaḥ kiṁ api apūrvam tattvaṁ ityarthah.*”

Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy translates : (pp. 300, *ibid*) : “The general meaning of the terms 'word' and 'meaning' is quite well known indeed. The 'word' is

the signifier and the 'meaning' is the signified. One might object that the indicative and suggestive words too which have their own signification may yet be termed 'word' and the above statement would illustrate the fallacy of "too narrow". Our reply is that they are expressive words by implication, the metaphorical application being based on their similarity with denotative words. Similarly, the meanings alluded to are as good as denoted meaning because of the similarity in point of being understood. Thus, although 'signifying' and 'being signified' are enough qualifications to mark off the nature of word and meaning everywhere in the practical world, they do not serve the purpose of poetry whose province is supra-mundane. Therefore, their essence in the world of poetry deserves to be pointed out clearly as is done in the next verse."

One thing is clear. Kuntaka knows the difference between pure abhidhā, gauṇī, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā. But he refuses to accept any scheme of śabda-vṛttis as is done by the Kashmir school. Bhāmaha had rejected certain alaṃkāras as 'vārtā', and promoted the cause of "vakrābhidheya-śabdoktiḥ". Ānandavardhana had also advised the poet to be in search of 'special word and sense' that make for poetry : "yatnataḥ pratyabhijñeyau, tau śabdārthau mahākaveḥ" Dhv. I. 8. Kuntaka therefore chooses to concentrate only on the poetic use of word and sense and as he has to give some name to this special poetic power of a word, he gives the name 'abhidhā' to it, which is not the technical abhidhā of the Kashmir school.

Kuntaka, it seems, has no concern for the fool-proof scheme of word / meaning / word-power, as seen in the Kashmir school of thought. He is concerned only with the poetic. On the otherhand we saw Mukula carrying on from grammar and Mīmāṃsā, but ending in poetry. Bhoja has a much broad-based scheme as we will go to observe and he is trying to absorb both non-poetic and poetic literature. His scheme with twelvefold relationship of word and meaning of course aims at the poetic in the end. He takes care to illustrate the varieties and sub-varieties of first eight varieties of sāhitya from poetic literature and many of his illustrations are read as this or that variety of dhvani in the Dhv. So, clearly we have two trends of thought. One represented by

Ānandavardhana and his followers who present a perfect scheme and the other by such writers as Mukula, Kuntaka, Bhoja, Mahimā, Dhanañjaya and Dhanika and some others who do not fall in line with the Kashmīr school of thought. We will continue with Kuntaka who also forms part of the shaping influence that moulds Bhoja's thinking, Mukula being the earlier one.

As seen above Kuntaka, though not accepting the thinking of the Kashmīr school in a sense that he does not welcome the fool-proof scheme of the functions of a word, on the otherhand follows the author of the Dhv. when he talks of 'the unique expression' as 'word'. He observes : (VJ I. 9 pp. 14, *ibid*)

“śabdo vivakṭitārthaikavācako'
nyeṣu satsu api,
arthaḥ saḥdayāhlādakāri-
sva-spanda sundaraḥ.”

“That unique expression which alone can fully convey the poets' intended meaning out of a hundred alternatives before him is to be regarded as 'word'. Similarly that alone which possesses such refreshing natural beauty as to draw the appreciation of delighted readers is to be marked as 'meaning'. (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 300-301, *ibid*)

That Kuntaka's scheme is broad enough to embrace vyañjanā and vyaṅgyārtha is borne out by the famous illustration from Kumārasaṃbhava, viz. “dvayaṃ gataṃ...” in which he pin-points the use of the special word “kapālinaḥ”, that is the source of beauty. He observes : (pp. 15, *ibid*)—

“atra, paramēśvara-vācaka-śabda-sahasra-saṃbhava'pi kapālina' iti bībhatsa-rasa-ālaṃbana-vibhāva-vācakaḥ śabdaḥ jugupsā”spadatvena prayujyamānaḥ kām api vācaka-vakratām vidadhāti.” - “Though a thousand and one synonyms are possible to refer to the Almighty Lord Śiva, the poet has chosen here the word, “One whom only skulls adorn”, in order that, it may suggest disgust through a word which serves here as a pointer to the primary sentiment of the 'horrid'. And he succeeds in endowing the verse with artistic beauty of expression.” (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 302, *ibid*)

Kuntaka (V.J.I., vṛtti) further remarks - “kavi-vivakṣita-viśeṣābhidhāna-ksamatvaṃ eva vācakatva-lakṣaṇam yasmāt pratibhāyāṃ tat-kālollikhitena kenacit parispendena parisphurantāḥ padārthāḥ prakṛta-prastāva-samucitena kenacit utkarṣeṇa vā samācchādita-svabhāvāḥ santo vivakṣā-vidheyatvena abhidheyatāpadavīm avatarantaḥ tathāvidha-viśeṣa-pratipādana-samarthena-abhidhānena-abhidhīyamānās cetaś camatkāritāṃ āpadyante.”

“Therefore, the proper definition of ‘signification’ is that capacity to convey the particular shade of thought intended by the poet. In fact, in the world of the poet's creative imagination, things come to life with a touch of original invention; or their real nature gets veiled by a rich afflatus calculated to present the subject in a most attractive light; as such, the process of communication is a slave to the poetic intention. Only when the right verbal correlative for the particular has been found, the delight of the reader is assured.

From this it becomes absolutely clear that Kuntaka accepts only one power of word and that is abhidhā, or say, ‘vicitrā abhidhā’ meaning ‘beautiful or artful expression.’ It is not the abhidhā which signifies only the conventional meaning. But it is that abhidhā - which conveys any meaning intended by the poet, be it lakṣya, dyotyā or vyaṅgyā. So, his is the ‘vicitrā abhidhā’ which covers up the lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā also. So, we may say, Kuntaka, has a definite approach, but no definite scheme. He wants to convey the poetic only.

After mentioning the unique features of words and meanings in poetry as distinct from their commonplace aspect, Kuntaka proceeds to show that there should also be the presence of positive artistic beauty. He observes (V.J.I. 10 pp. 20, ibid) -

“ubhau etau alaṃkāryau
 tayoh punar alaṃkr̥tiḥ,
 vakroktiḥ eva, vaidagdhyā-
 bhaṅgī-bhaṅitiḥ ucyate.” - (V.J.J. 10)

“Both these are “the adorned”. Their adornment consists in the poetic

process known as 'artistic turn of speech.' (trans. K. Kris. pp. 308, ibid). Thus 'word and sense' are 'alaṃkārya' and 'vakrokti' is the 'alaṃkāra' for Kuntaka. This is what he calls "vicitrā abhidhā" :

“ubhau etau śabdārthau alaṃkāryau, kenāpi śobhātīsayakāriṇā alaṃkaraṇena yojanīyau. kim tat tayor alaṃkaraṇaṃ iti abhidhīyate-tayoḥ punaḥ alaṃkṛtiḥ -tayoḥ dvitva-saṃkhyā-viśiṣṭayoḥ api alaṃkṛtiḥ prasiddhā-bhidhāna-vyatirekiṇī vicitrā eva abhidhā.” (vṛtti on V J. I. 10 pp. 20, ibid)

“Both these refer to words and meanings which deserve to be looked upon as the subjects of ornamentation for the enhancement of their appeal. “What then is their ornament ?” One might ask. The answer is that though they are two in number, they have only one common ornament.

What exactly is this common ornament. “Artistic turn of speech” is the reply. It stands for a charming and novel utterance peculiar to poetry and distinct from familiar usage. In other words, artistic utterance itself is the ornament in question.” (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 307, ibid)

That Kuntaka is thus a 'kevala-abhidhāvādin', or better say, "kevala-vicitra-abhidhāvādin" is now clear. This follows even from the treatment he presents concerning paryāya-vakratā and upacāra-vakratā as well. In the former he incorporates what we call śābdī vyañjanā.

For upacāra-vakratā Kuntaka observes (V.J.II. 13, 14) (pp. 93, ibid)

“yatra dūrāntare'nyasmāt
sāmānyaṃ upacaryate
leśenā'pi bhavat kāñcid
vaktuṃ udrikta-vṛttitāṃ.” (V.J. II. 13)

and, “yaṃ mūlā sarasollekhā
rūpakādir alaṃkṛtiḥ,
upacāra-pradhānā'sau
vakratā kācid ucyate.” (V.J. II. 14)

i. e. “wherein even when the two are far apart from each other, a common attribute, however slight, is metaphorically superimposed in order to indicate that the resemblance is very close.. (13)

and which forms the basis for various pleasing and inventive figures of speech headed by metaphor — such a type of poetic beauty is designated - by the name, “beauty of metaphorical expression” - (II. 14) (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 381, *ibid*)

Kuntaka’s *upacāra-vakratā* is ‘*prayojanavatī gaṇṇī*’ *lakṣaṇā* itself. So, he seems to accept *lakṣaṇā-mūlā-vyañjanā* under ‘*upacāra-vakratā*’.

In this context, the author of *Ekāvalī*, *Vidyādhara*, observes that, “*etena yatra Kuntakena bhaktau antarbhāvito dhvanis tad api...*” - But we may say that Kuntaka has only partly subsumed *dhvani* under ‘*bhakti*’. Moreover, when Kuntaka on one hand holds that ‘word and sense’ are ‘*alaṃkāryau*’, and on the other hand when he rejects the case of ‘*rasavad alaṃkāra*’ on the ground that ‘*rasa*’ is always ‘*alaṃkārya*’ and never an ‘*alaṃkāra*’, he seems to contradict himself. On the otherhand, *Ānandavardhana* has, a perfect scheme, which holds the whole of ‘*alaṃkāra*’ field as “*vācya-vācaka-rūpa*”. In short Kuntaka has no perfect scheme and his *vicitrā-abhidhā* is a loose concept thus rendering his approach unscientific.

‘*Bhoja*’ as will be observed by us is influenced by *Mukula* and *Kuntaka* and carries his own concept of ‘*abhidhā*’. But *Mahima Bhaṭṭa* is also an important name who defies the scheme of *śabda-vṛttis* as presented by *Ānandavardhana* and the whole of the Kashmir school of thought.



2

Mahimā

Mahimā accepts sādhyā-sādhana-bhāva in any verbal function. He not only does not accept Ānandavardhana's scheme of the three functions of a word such as abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and vyanjanā, but positively denounces it and installs only one function of the word, i.e. only abhidhā and leaves all other meaning to be collected by what he calls 'anumiti' or 'kāvyānumiti' i.e. 'poetic inference' to be precise. We will have to examine his approach in greater details as below.

While referring to the powers belonging to word and sense, Mahimā, observes Prof. Dr. C. Rajendran (pp. 67, "A study of Mahimabhatta's Vyaktiviveka" pub. Calicut, '91), discusses the various aspects of language like word and sentence. According to him, all verbal expressions should be considered as inference since they consist of establishing something (sādhyā) by means of something else (sādhana). The fact that language is used to persuade the hearer to do or not to do something, implies that the hearer has to be convinced of the logic of the speaker's arguments. The hearer has to grasp the connection between śabda and artha, the sādhyā and sādhana, through inference and then only he is convinced of the soundness of the speaker's idea :

(vy.viveka, pp. 26, 27, Edn. Dr. Rewāprasāda Dwivedi, Chowkhamba Skt-series, office, Varanasi, '64) - "sarva eva hi śābdo vyavahāraḥ sādhyā-sādhana-garbhataiyā prāyeṇa anumānarūpo'bhyupagantavyaḥ, tasya para-pravṛtti-nivṛtti-nibandhanatvāt, tayośca sampratyaya-asampratyayātmanor anyathākartuṃ aśakyatvataḥ, na hi yuktiṃ anavagacchan kaścid vipaścid vacana-mātrāt sampratyayabhāg bhavati."

Mahimā divides śabda into two such as 'pada' or word and 'vākya' or sentence. Word is further subdivided into (i) nāman i.e. noun, (ii) ākhyāta or verb, (iii) upasarga i.e. semantic prefix, (iv) nipāta or preposition and (v) karmapravacanīya i.e. adverb. - "dvividho hi śabdaḥ, pada-vākya-bhedāt; tatra padam aneka-prakāraṃ nāmākhyātopa-sarga-nipāta-karmapravacanīya-bhedāt (pp. 27, ibid). 'nāmā' denotes an existing object, which is qualified by either jāti i.e. class, guṇa, i.e. quality, kriyā i. e. action or dravya i. e. substance. -

Mahimā observes : (pp. 28, ibid) : ‘tatra sattva-pradhānāni nāmāni tāni api bahuprakārāṇi sambhavanti. jāti-guṇa-kriyā-dravyāṇām tat-pravṛtti-nimittānām bahurvāt.’ Thus jāti, guṇa etc. are the pravṛtti-nimittas.

‘Artha’, for Mahimā, is two-fold, viz. ‘vācya’ and ‘anumeya’. The ‘vācya’ or expressed is the object of verbal functioning and it is this which is termed ‘mukhya’ or principal. He observes : (pp. 47 ibid) : “arthopi dvividho, vācyo’numeyaśca. tatra śabda-vyāpāra-viśayo vācyaḥ. sa eva mukhya ucyate.”

yad āhuḥ -

“śrutimātreṇa yatrāsya
tādarthyam avasiyate,
taṁ mukhyam artham manyante
gaṇam yatnopapāditaṁ.” - iti.

tata eva, tad anumitād vā, liṅgabhūtād yad arthāntaram anumīyate so’numeyaḥ. sa ca trividhaḥ vastumātram alaṅkāra rasādayaśca, iti. tatra ādyau vācyau api sambhavataḥ anyaḥ tu anumeya eva iti. tatra padasyārtho vācya eva, na anumeyaḥ, tasya - niraṁśatvāt, sādhya-sādhana-bhāva-abhāvataśca. (V. V. pp. 47 ibid) -

Mahimā classifies meaning into two viz. (i) expressed (= vācya) and (ii) inferred (i.e. anumeya). The former is called ‘mukhya’ i.e. principal and is collected by word-power (i.e. abhidhā). It is said, “It is believed to be ‘mukhya’ i. e. principal sense, the essence of which is collected immediately on hearing (the same, i.e. the word). That which is collected by (a special) effort, is the secondary one.

The latter, i. e. anumeya or inferred sense is that which is either directly collected from the principal sense (i.e. mukhyārtha), or from the meaning inferred from it. This anumeya artha is again threefold viz. (i) vastu i.e. idea or a matter of fact, (ii) alaṅkāra i. e. a figure of speech and (iii) rasādi, i. e. aesthetic rapture or sentiment etc. The first two could be met with at expressed level also (= vācyau api), while the third type is necessarily only inferred.

Mahimā holds that the direct meaning of a word is always vācya or expressed, because there is no sādhya-sādhana-bhāva between a ‘pada’ and

its meaning. It means there is no inferential relation between a pada and its artha. The 'pada' is without parts so sādhya-sādhana-bhāva cannot exist.

We have to examine this position minutely. We feel that a sort of self-contradiction can be read in Mahimā's position. At the outset Mahimā had declared that : "sarva eva hi śābdo vyavahāraḥ sādhya-sādhana-garbhatayā prāyeṇa anumānarūpo"bhyupagavtavyaḥ, tasya para-pravṛtti-nivṛtti - nibandhanatvāt, tayosca sampratyaya - a-sampratyayātmanor anyathākartum aśakyatvāt" (pp. 26, 27 ibid). Here Mahimā suggests that the vācyārtha which is collected from a pada having no parts, is directly expressed as the sādhya sādhana-bhāva is not possible in this case. So, there is apparent contradiction. But this contradiction is easily removed when we remember even Ānandavardhana's remarks while advocating the cause of vyañjanā even for the Naiyāyikas under Dhv. III 33. Mahimā has also derived inspiration from Dhv. here. The point is that when somebody speaks he wants to convey something. So, a man resorts to śābda-vyavahāra to convey something and to make somebody else do or undo something. So, this verbal practice is resorted to for accomplishing some object. This becomes clear through inference. The inference is simple. It proceeds like this — "When A speaks, he intends to convey something." That there must be something behind A.'s activity of speaking, is a matter of inference. This becomes clearer when we hear someone shouting in a language not known to us. We infer that he wants to convey to us something for our good or bad. This much is inferred. But what he actually conveys through the words uttered follows directly, through the power of expression, from the word itself. This is what Mahimā wants to suggest. So, there is no contradiction in his statements.

Thus, here, with the acceptance of the 'mukhya' artha, Mahimā accepts, the power of direct expression, i.e. 'abhidhā'. Mahimā accepts only one word-power i.e. abhidhā. All else is 'anumiti' for him. In his 'vyakti-viveka-vyākhyāna', Ruyyaka puts it thus : (pp. 48, ibid) : "arthópi iti. śabdasya vyāpārāntara-nirākaraṇārthaṃ, artha-dvaividhya-ghaṭanam. tathā hi-ṛddhavyavahārāt, samketāt vā, śabdesu artha-nirṇayah teṣāṃ ca yatrārthe vidyamānatvaṃ tasya vācyatvaṃ eva. anyasya tu teṣāṃ abhāvād artha-sāmarthyād avagatiḥ na ca asaṃbaddho'rthas taṃ arthaṃ pratyāyayati.

sambaddhācca arthāntara-pratipattau anumānaṃ eva. tena lakṣaṇāyāḥ anumānāntarbhāvaḥ pratipādito bhavati. tasya ca vyāpakatvāt..... na ca lakṣaṇāyāṃ anumānasya antarbhāvaḥ iti vācyam, tasya tat parihāreṇa vṛtter vyāpakatvāt. vyañjakatvaṃ anumānaṃ eva iti vakṣyate vitatya. tad evaṃ vācyānumeyatva-bhedena arthasya dvaividhyam.”

Ruyyaka explains that in order to eliminate the possibility of the word having any other (i. e. even a second) power, ‘meaning’ is said to be two-fold. Meaning is decided in case of a given word with the help of either the vṛddha-vyavahāra, i. e. practice of the seniors, or through ‘saṃketa’ i. e. convention. In whichever meaning these factors reside, that meaning is called the ‘vācyā’ i. e. expressed. In case of any other meaning where either of these two does not stay at the basis, the other meaning is collected through implication. If the primary meaning is not connected (i. e. is a-sambaddha) with the other meaning, the latter is not conveyed at all. And when through connection, the first meaning yields the second meaning, this apprehension is nothing else but ‘anumāna’ or ‘inference’ only. So lakṣaṇā is covered up by ‘anumāna’, the latter having a wider scope... . . .It cannot be said that ‘anumāna’ is covered up by lakṣaṇā, because even in the absence of lakṣaṇā, anumāna can take place. (Thus, anumāna has a wider field). That (the so called) suggestion is nothing but only inference i. e. ‘anumāna’ will be discussed in greater details (by Mahimā).”

So, for Mahimā there is only one śabda-vyāpāra and that is ‘abhidhā’. All else – i. e. lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā’ fall in the province of anumāna or inference. This means that though not accepting these two functions, Mahimā accepts the meanings derived through these functions and subsumes these meanings — viz. the so-called ‘lakṣyārtha’ and ‘vyaṅgyārtha in the terminology of the kashmir school of thought, under anumeya artha’ i. e. inferred meaning arrived at through ‘anumiti’ or precisely ‘kāvyānumiti’, and certainly not by any function or vyāpāra of a word.

For Mahimā, the ‘vācyā’ is the meaning of a ‘pada’ i. e. word, arrived at through ‘abhidhā’ on the strength of either ‘saṃketa’ or ‘vṛddha-vyavahāra’. But the vākyārtha, or sentence-sense can be either (i) a fact which is already

known and which is not required to be substantiated, and (ii) a fact, which is unknown, expecting to be substantiated. This unknown fact is always established with the help of a known fact with which it is invariably related. Their invariable concomitance is realized from means of valid knowledge i. e. pramāṇas which are three, such as, (i) 'loka' or worldly context, (ii) veda or revealed literature, and (iii) direct experience i. e. adyātma.

Mahimā observes : (pp. 49 ibid) : “vākyaṛthaḥ tu vācyasya arthasya aṁśa-parikalpanāyām, aṁśānām vidhyānuvāda-bhāvena-avasthiter, vidheyāṁśasya siddha-asiddha-tayā upapādāna-anapekṣa-sāpekṣatvena dvividho boddhavyaḥ.

Mahimā had suggested that the meaning derived from a pada is without parts i. e. nir-aṁśa. But the sentence-sense is having 'aṁśa' or parts. Some part is 'vidheya' and some is 'anuvādyā'. i. e. some part is 'newly enjoined' i. e. it is predicated, and some is 'anuvādyā' i. e. which is the 'subject' part and hence already known. The vidheya-aṁśa is also either 'siddha' or 'sādhyā'. The former does not stand in need of being substantiated, the latter needs substantiation. Thus vākyaṛtha is two-fold, when the vidheya-aṁśa is 'a – siddha', it takes the form of sādhyā-sādhana-bhāva, the 'anuvāda' portion turning into a 'sādhana'. This sādhyā-sādhana-bhāva is decided through invariable concomitance i. e. avinābhāva-saṁ-bandha. And this depends on means of knowledge which are three-fold : “asiddhau sādhyā-sādhana-bhāvā-rūpaḥ, anūdyamānasya aṁśasya sādhanā-dhurā-adhirohāt.” (pp. 49, ibid)

(pp. 52, ibid) sādhyā-sādhana-bhāvāśca anayoḥ avinābhāvāvasāya-kṛto' vagantavyaḥ. sa ca pramāṇa-mūlaḥ. tat ca trividham – yad āhuḥ –

'loko vedastathā'dhyātmaṁ.

pramāṇam trividham smṛtam” iti.

Mahimā holds that 'loka' pramāṇa depends only on wellknown worldly matters – “tatra loka-prasiddhārtha-viṣayo lokaḥ. (pp. 52, ibid). 'śāstra-mātra-prasiddhārtha-viṣayo vedaḥ. (pp. 53 ibid) i.e. veda-pramāṇa is that the subject of which is known in śāstra only i. e. in various disciplines. Mahimā adds that by mentioning 'veda', other sources such as itihāsa, purāṇa, dharmā-śāstra etc. are also to be understood, as they all rest on veda : veda-grahaṇam itihāsa-purāṇa-dharma śāstrādi-upalakṣaṇam, teṣām tan-mūla-

tvopagamāt.” (pp. 53, ibid). And, “ādhyātmikārtha-*viṣayaṃ* adhyātman” - (pp. 53 ibid) : “The adhyātma-pramāṇa has spirituality as its subject.” This means that it is self-apprehended.

This sādhyā-sādhana-bhāva is two-fold (i) śābda i. e. that which is expressly stated, and (ii) ‘ārtha’ or that which is implicit. Again both the sādhyā and sādhanā may be expressed either by means of words or by sentence : *sa hi dvividhaḥ śābdaś ca ārthaśca, iti. so'pi ca sādhyā-sādhanayoḥ pratyekaṃ padārtha-vākyārtha-rūpatvāt..... yathāyogyam anyonya-sāṅkaryāt bahuvīdha iti, tasya dīn-mātraṃ idaṃ upadarśyate.”* (pp. 54, ibid) - i.e. words that convey the sādhyā-sādhana-bhāva could be jāti-vācaka, guṇa-vācaka, etc. The meaning of the word again can be an attribute - i.e. dharma, or a substratum, i. e. dharmin. Dharma again can be samānādhikaraṇa, or vaiyadhikaraṇa as when both sādhyā and sādhanā reside either in the same substratum or not. The sādhyā-sādhana-bhāva expressed by a sentence differs on the basis of kārakas used.

One thing that emerges very clearly from this is that Mahimā accepts only abhidhā, and that too in the normal accepted sense of the term as a word-power that yields the conventional meaning which is called primary or mukhya. All else is collected by inference, i. e. all other meaning is ‘anumeya’ for Mahimā. So, he refutes other śabdavṛttis such as guṇavṛtti, lakṣaṇā, tātparya and vyañjanā.

The trend of incorporating other śabda-vṛttis such as lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā in abhidhā was traced by us in Mukula, a near successor of Ānandavardhana. Kuntaka also without rejecting positively any other śabda-vṛtti advocated the case of his vicitrā-abhidhā which as observed by us is not the same as ‘abhidhā that gives the primary meaning, but it is only a ‘poetic expression’ in general. Bhoja also as we will go to see, does not name vyañjanā and incorporates gauṇī and lakṣaṇā under his three-fold abhidhā, the mukhyā being the first variety equivalent to our normal ‘abhidhā’. Mahimā does not subsume other śabda-vṛttis under abhidhā but he totally rejects them as śabda-vṛttis as such and advocates the case of only abhidhā that gives the primary sense, as śabda-vṛtti, one and only.

The rest for him is 'anumāna' i. e. kāvyānumiti. We will examine how he presents his case.

Mahimā proceeds as follows. In such an example as, "upoḍharāgeṇa vilola-tārkaṃ" etc. we have double-meaning statements. Here, the apprehension of the second meaning takes place according to Mahimā, in the following way :

(pp. 113, 114 ibid) : "Yat punaḥ asya aneka-śakti-samāśrayatvāt vyāpārāntara-kalpanaṃ, tad arthasya eva upapadyate, na śabdasya, tasya aneka-śakti-samāśrayatva-asiddheḥ" – i. e. when a word (in such illustrations as quoted above) is said to have such functions that deliver several meanings, and when based on such a premise an additional word-power called vyāñjana is postulated with reference to a word, virtually it is only the meaning which promotes other meanings and not the word, for a word can never be proved to be the substratum of many functions.

Mahimā further argues : "tathā hi, ekāśrayāḥ hi śaktayaḥ anyonya-anapekṣa-pravṛttayah aprākṛta-paurvāparya-niyamā, yugapad eva svakārya-kāriṇyo dṛṣṭāḥ yathā dāhakatva-prakāśakatvādayo'gneḥ" – i. e. Those more than one powers residing in a single substratum, have their functions independent of each other and there is no sequence of earlier and later seen with reference to them. The idea is that these powers operate independently of one another and also simultaneously, or at least without a fixed sequence. For example fire burns a substance and also gives light. But the imagined other functions of words are not such. – "na ca śabdaśrayāḥ śaktayas tathā dṛṣyante, abhyupagamyante vā, niyogataḥ abhidhāśakti-pūrvakatvena itara-śakti-pravṛtti-darśanāt. tasmāt bhinnāśrayā eva tā na śabdaika-samāśrayā iti avaseyam – i.e. In case of word-powers this not so, because other powers (such as lakṣaṇā and vyāñjana) function after abhidhā's function is over. Thus there is no simultaneity but sequence. So, it is better that different objects should be imagined as their substratum and not just 'word'.

Now this bhinna-āśraya or different substratum could be 'artha' i. e. meaning and not śabda or word. Mahimā observes (pp. 114, ibid) : yaś cāsau āśrayo bhinnaḥ sa 'artha' eva iti tad vyāpārasya anumānāntarbhāvo'

bhyupagantavya eva.” – This different substratum could be ‘meaning’, and the functions of this ‘meaning’ element, should be subsumed under ‘anumāna’ or inference alone.

Before we proceed with Mahimā’s contention, we have to evaluate his conviction. He gives the illustration of fire which has different powers operating simultaneously. But we can have instances of objects having different powers not operating simultaneously, but only in sequence and such powers may not be absolutely independent of each other. For example a cricketer can also be a singer and a performing artist and his different powers may not operate simultaneously. Sachin can be a good batsman and also a modest speaker. Sunil Gavaskar, we know was a great batsman, a captain of the team and now also a good critic and a very good commentator also. When he bats he does not comment. So, Mahimā’s illustration proves something which is partially true. Even fire, when it gives heat and light does not help in cooking when not so required.

Now let us see how Mahimā further argues : “tathā hi - (pp. 114, ibid) - gaur vāhika ityādau tāvad gavādayo'rthaḥ bādhitā-vāhikādyarthāntaraikātmyāḥ tād rūpya-vidhāna-anyathā-aupapattyā kenacid amṣena tatra tattvaṃ anumāpayanti, na sarvātmanā.”

Now this other separate substratum is nothing else but ‘sense’. So, its function has to be subsumed under inference. In such illustrations as, “The vāhika is a bull”, the meanings such as ‘go’ i.e. ‘bull’ etc., are not identified with other meaning such as that of vāhika. For Mahimā the process involved is ‘anumāna’. In order to establish ‘abheda’ - superimposition when no other means is available, the meaning such as ‘go’ makes us infer the superimposition through some portion of it, and not through the whole of it.

No speaker, who is not out of his mind, goes for superimposition of one thing over the other, without realizing any element of similarity between the two. – So any intelligent listener, who has knowledge of the speaker's mind, accepts similarity as the basis of superimposition. He does not hold mere physical expression of identity as the basis. Mere physical expression of identity is refuted on the first count by itself, for we can see that ‘vāhika’, the man cannot be a ‘bull’.

So, the expression of identity by the speaker, is only to make the listener apprehend the similarity. The 'prayojana' behind this expression is to cause apprehension of such qualities as inertia (jāḍya) etc. which are associated with 'go', as also seen in the vāhika. This sort of an expression - to use different word for conveying a different substance - is called an 'atideśa'. Here 'go' is used for 'jāḍyādi' (i.e. dullness and stupidity).

For, it is said,

“jātiśabdo'antareṇāpi

jātiṃ yatra prayujyate,

sambandhi-sadṛśād dharmāt

taṃ gauṇīm apare viduḥ” - (v.v.45, pp. 115)

i. e. when a word denoting 'jāti' or class, is used with reference to something else than itself (i.e. sva-vācya), it is done when in that other object there is a quality of similarity. Others call such a usage as, “gauṇī”.

The idea is that in such instances as “upoḍha-rāgeṇa” etc. the word, through abhidhā power gives only the vācya i.e. expressed sense. The power that makes for the apprehension of another sense (arthāntara), rests in the 'sense' i. e. 'artha' and not in the word i. e. śabda. Now this apprehension of another sense, through sense, is, according to Mahimā, through 'anumiti' or inference only. So, the power seen in sense should be taken as inference. In the illustration viz. “gaur-vāhikaḥ” etc., as there is an apparent difference between 'go-tva' and 'vāhika-tva', the identity through 'ekādhikaraṇa' i. e. the use of same case-termination, does not click to sense. Then it makes us infer the identity of qualities such as jāḍyādi-inertness-etc. So the identity is based on the qualities of vāhika, which are similar to gotulya-jāḍyādi i. e. inertia and the like that are associated with vāhika are similar to those resting in the bull. It is clear that any speaker who is not out of sense, never asserts identity between two separate objects without sensing common qualities between the two. Again, the prayojana or the reason behind such awkward or artful expression as calling a human being a bull, is the existence of such qualities as inertia etc. that normally go with the objects such as bull etc. in the object called 'vāhika' on which go-tva is superimposed.

It may be noted that Mahimā has expressed such terms as 'sādrśya' and 'sādharmya', simultancously. He has observed : (pp. 114, ibid) "na hi an-unmattaḥ kaścit, kvacit, kiñcit, kathañcit, sādharmaṃ an-utpaśyan eva akasmāt tattvaṃ āropayati" - i. e. without perceiving 'sādharmya' i.e. the state of having similar or common qualities in any way whatsoever, nobody goes for superimposition of any object on any other object. So the cause of superimposition is apprehension of similarity alone. 'Sādrśya' i. e. - similarity, and 'sādharmya' or having common qualities, are two important terms used in literary criticism. Dr. Rewaprasad observes (pp. 115, ibid) that Mammāṭa has accepted 'upamā' i. e. simile as : 'sādharmya resting on difference", while his followers (such as Viśvanātha) have defined it as similarity (based on difference of objects). Vāmanācārya Jhalkikar in his Bāla-bodhini commentary on the K. P. has discussed at length with reference to both 'sādharmya' and 'sādrśya'. Between these two he accepts "prayojya-prayojaka' bhāva-saṃbandha" i. e. the relation of promoter and promoted; here sādharmya being the promoter and 'sādrśya' being promoted thereby. For Bhartṛhari 'sādharmya' stands for 'samāna-dharma-saṃbandha', i. e. - relation based on similar or common qualities. The etymology of the term 'sādharmya' goes as, "samāno dharmo yayos tau sa-dharmāṇau, tayoḥ bhāvaḥ". Bhartṛhari explains the taddhita-pratyaya conveying 'bhāva', and used after a compound, as 'saṃbandha' or relation. "kṛt - taddhita-samāsebhyaḥ saṃbandhābhidhānaṃ bhāva-pratyayena" — In the term 'sādharmya', the 'śyañ' pratyaya is in the sense of 'bhāva' only. In the notes attached to the 'kāma-dhenu' commentary on Vāmana, Kaiyata's words are quoted. There the explanation of 'bhāva' as — "prakṛti-janya-bodhe prakāribhūto bhāvaḥ" — is also useful in the present context. The meaning of this expression is that, "by bhāva' is meant that 'dharma' or quality, which is lying inside that portion, of a word, to which a pratyaya is attached. In the word 'sādharmya', the pratyaya 'śyañ' is attached to the word 'sa-dharma' or 'sa-dharman'. Its meaning is "that which has similar (or common) qualities." Thus here 'samāna-dharma' is the viśeṣaṇa and the vyakti or person adorned with this is 'viśeṣya'. 'śyañ' suffix is used in the sense of 'bhāva'. So, it means, "samāna-dharma." But the apprehension of "samāna-dharma" is caused by

'samāna-śabda' as well. By 'sādharmya' we have apprehension not only of the equality, but also of the vyakti or person in whom this similarity rests, and also of the relation with it. So, Bhartrhari's view as quoted above is more authentic.

To point out the relation between 'sādṛśya' and 'sādharmya', Jhalkikar (pp. 541, bālabodhinī on K.P.) observes : "yaḥ sādharmaṇa-dharma-pratīyogikaḥ, upamānopameyo-bhayanuyogikaḥ, sambandhaḥ, sa sādharmaṇam iti ucyate; yaśca upamāna-pratīyogikaḥ, upame-yānuyogikaḥ sambandhaḥ, sa sādṛśyaṇam iti ucyate." — iti sādharmaṇa-sādṛśyayor bhedaḥ." — This explanation in 'navya-nyāya'—style pertains to this much that — "the relation that simultaneously rests in both upamāna and upameya, is called sādharmaṇa." 'Sādṛśya' is different from this. It does not stay simultaneously in two, but it rises from one and settles in the other. 'Sādṛśya' or similarity is of one into the other, it is not resting in the two — vice versa. In fact, with reference to sādharmaṇa, we cannot call the substratum as upamāna and upameya, because in the apprehension caused by 'sādharmya' the qualities of the two objects are found to be equal. In sādṛśya there is 'nyūna-adhikātva' between the two i. e. there is difference in quantity of the qualities. In case of one we apprehend 'utkarṣa' and in case of the other, 'apakarṣa'. So, upamāna-upameya-bhāva rests on this 'utkarṣa-apakarṣa' or more and less quantity with reference to the dharma i. e. quality. That having higher degree of quality, 'dharmot-karṣa' is termed upamāna, and that having 'dharmāpakarṣa' is termed upameya. The 'sādṛśya' resting in object having utkarṣa travels into that having 'apakarṣa'. The sādṛśya of both does not go into each other. Thus 'sādharmya' suggests equality with reference to qualities while sādṛśya suggests equality in which the 'upamāna' - element is having a greater quantity of equal quality. The dissimilarity between sādharmaṇa and sādṛśya rests on normal worldly usage. In ordinary parlance it is stated that, "there is 'sādharmya' between these two objects, while there is 'sādṛśya' between those two."

But actually this difference is not exactly borne out by such normal usages also. For the normal usage can take the form of such expression also

as, “there is sādharma of this into that object, and between them is sādṛśya”. In the usage quoted above, where the prakṛti of the term ‘sādharma’ was taken as ending in daul (dvi-vacanānta), and wherein that of sādṛśya as ending in singular (i. e. eka-vacanānta) the opposite can also follow in the present usage.

In different disciplines there is difference with reference to the concepts of ‘sādharma’ and ‘sādṛśya’. The discipline of grammar takes them as different, while the nyāya-darśana takes them as identical and this is acceptable to Mahimā, he being closer to the nyāya discipline.

So, in expressions like ‘gaur-vāhikaḥ’, taken as ‘gauṇī-vṛtti’ and, like ‘gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ’, taken as lakṣaṇā, Mahimā accepts only ‘anumāna’. As noted above in the case for the former, Mahimā holds that no sensible person will identify one object with a totally different object without seeing some similarity between the two. The expression ‘gaur vāhikaḥ’ cannot be taken literally as it is perceived directly as incongruous, we infer that vāhika is a bull in some respects. This secondary sense which is not given by the word directly is only inferred. In the same way the fact of a hamlet being situated on the flow of the river Ganges being contradicted by direct perception, we infer the qualities of coolness and purity of the hamlet from the expressed meaning. Mahimā does not accept dhvanivādin’s observation that the meaning of the hamlet being situated on the bank of the Ganges is derived through lakṣaṇā, and the qualities of coolness and purity of the hamlet are derived through the suggestive power i. e. vyañjanā. For Mahimā both the secondary and suggested senses are arrived at through anumiti kriyā — or inference and so the distinction observed by the Dhvanikāra between bhakti and dhvani is uncalled for.

Mahimā observes (pp. 118)

“tasmād yo'yaṃ vāhikādau gavādi-sādharma-yāvagamaḥ, sa tattvāropa-anyathā-anupatti-parikalpito'numānasya eva viśayaḥ na śabda-vyāpārasya, iti sthitam.”

He further observes (pp. 119, ibid) : “gaṅgāyām ghoṣa ityādau api gaṅgādayórtthāḥ svātmani-anupapatti-bādhita-ghoṣādyadhi-karaṇa-bhāvāḥ, tad-

upādāna-sāmarthyāt saṁbandha-mātra-parikalpita-tattvāropan tad adhikaraṇa-bhāvopagama-yogyam arthāntaram eva taṭādi-rūpan anumāpayanti.

Mahimā further observes that only similarity cannot be the cause of identification or superimposition. Other relations such as 'saṁyoga' or conjunction, etc. also can be the cause. So, through 'Gaṅgā' etc. the objects such as the bank etc. are inferred, and not through any other vṛtti or function of a word, because the fact of being the substratum of the hamlet cannot be understood by any other way : (pp. 119, ibid)

“na hi tat sādṛśyam eva ekaṁ tattvāropa-nibandhanam iṣyate, kiṁ tarhi ? tat-saṁbandhādir api, iti tat-saṁbandha-mātra-samāropita-tadbhāvas taṭādir eva ghoṣādyadhikaraṇabhāvopādāna-anyathā-anupapattyā gaṅgādīnām arthānām anumeya eva bhavitum arhati.

Mahimā accepts only one power of the word and that is the power of direct expression viz. abhidhā. He rejects anything else than that and whatever other meaning is comprehended, he holds, is through 'anumāna' or inference. He firmly believes that the power of a word is exhausted after giving its expressed sense. So, it has no capacity even to know about the existence of the secondary sense, such as the 'taṭa' or bank, in this case. What to think of actually touching this secondary sense ? The metaphorical expression is resorted to only to convey the knowledge of the existence of coolness and purity of the Ganges resting in the hamlet, the object of superimposition, and not similarity, as in the first illustration. The cause viz. 'tattvāropa' i. e. superimposition is identical in both the cases. Mahimā holds that similarity of the object which is superimposed or its saṁyogādi relations are manifold. He quotes a famous kārīkā here, with a difference in reading from the same quoted by Abhinavagupta in his locana on Dhv. i. e. with reference to the expression, “bhāktam āhuḥ tam anye.”

Mahimā observes : (pp. 119, ibid) : “śabdaḥ punaḥ svārthābhidhāna-mātra-vyāpāra-paryavasita-sāmarthyo na arthāntarasya taṭāder vārtam api veditum utsahate, kiṁ punaḥ saṁsparśam iti uktam.

prayojanam punaḥ asya evam-vidhasya ukta-vaicitrya-parigrahasya taṭādaū āropa-ṣṭāye vastuni āropyamaṇa-gaṅgādi-gata-puṇyatva-śītalatvādi-

dharma-pratipattiḥ na sādṛśyaṃ iti pūrvasmād asya viśeṣaḥ. ubhayatra api ca tattvāropa eva hetuḥ. sa hi tat-sāmya-tat-saṃbandhādi-nibandhanatvād bahuvīdha dṛṣṭaḥ-yad āhuḥ-

“abhidheyena saṃbandhāt
sādṛśyāt samavāyataḥ,
vaiparītyāt kriyāyogād
lakṣaṇā pañcadhā matā” – iti.

In the locana, we have, “abhidheyena saṃyogāt” and also, “sāmīpyāt” for ‘sādṛśyāt’ of Mahimā.

In locana, we have ‘abhidheyena saṃyogāt’. The idea is that ‘saṃyoga’ or conjunction is a type of ‘saṃbandha’ i. e. relation in general. Abhinavagupta explains ‘saṃyogāt’ as ‘bhramara-śabdena yasya saṃyogaḥ saṃbandhaḥ’. Mahimā does not like this usage of a specific term to denote a general term. So, he goes for the reading ‘saṃyogāt’, retaining the term denoting a general relation. Similarly, in Locana we have ‘sāmīpyāt’, while Mahimā reads ‘sādṛśyāt’. Abhinavagupta has explained ‘samavāya’ as ‘saṃbandha-mātra’ i. e. any relation whatsoever. The relations such as ‘sāmīpya’ or proximity could be believed to be covered up by ‘samavāya’, so Mahimā opts for sādṛśya. Actually, we can say that not only ‘sāmīpya’, but even ‘sādṛśya’, ‘vaiparītya’ or any other relation could be contained in ‘samavāya’. Because of this only, later naiyāyikas such as Gadādhara and the rest have taken only “abhidheyena saṃbandha”, as definition of lakṣaṇā, which they choose to define as “śakya-saṃbandho lakṣaṇā”. The expression of special relations such as sādṛśya, vaiparītya etc. is covered by ‘saṃbandha’ only, but they are mentioned only to make things clearer. This way, argues Prof. Rewaprasad, the reading of Locana as ‘saṃyogāt’, is more acceptable. The reading ‘sādṛśya’ is not preferred to ‘sāmīpya’ by Locanakāra, because by using the term ‘gaṇa’, the explanation of lakṣaṇā based on similarity is already covered up by him. Virtually ‘saṃbandha’ being manifold, lakṣaṇā may not be taken as five-fold only.

Mahimabhaṭṭa also incorporates what is known as tātparya-śakti under abhidhā only. Some people hold that to convey the correlated meaning of

different words in a sentence, there is a separate power called the tātparya śakti which rests in a sentence. Tātparya śakti is thus advocated by some to explain the apprehension of the intention of the speaker from a sentence or a statement. Mahimā feels that the import of the speaker is inferred by the hearer from the expressed sense. When someone says, “eat poison, but do not eat at his house”, the hearer infers that taking food at his house is more despicable than eating poison. The inference follows the commonsense that, without some special reason, a friend or a well-wisher will never stop anyone from taking food at some person's place. The hearer understands, thus through inference, that eating food will be more harmful than taking poison. Mahimā observes : (pp. 133 ibid)

“viṣabhakṣaṇānujñānāder vākyārthasya aprastutasya eva upanyāso hi pūrvoktena nayena prastutātirikārthāntara-pratipādana-paratvāt, tatra hetutayā avagantavyaḥ, iti na śabdasya tatra vyāpāraḥ parikalpanīyaḥ.

“viṣabhakṣaṇād api parāṃ etad
gṛhabhojanasya dāruṇatām,
vācyād ato'numimate
prakaraṇa-vakṛt-svarūpajñāḥ.” - 67

viṣabhakṣaṇaṃ anu manute
na hi kaścid akāriḍa anu manute
na hi kaścid akāṇḍa eva suhṛdi sudhīḥ,
tena atra arthāntaragatir ārthī
tātparya-śaktijā na punaḥ.” 68

iti saṅgrahārye.

Mahimā, who accepts only ‘abhidhā’ as word-power further rejects the views of those who hold a ‘dirgha-dīrghatara-vyāpāra’ of a word, like that of an arrow. The pūrva-pakṣin argues as follows :

Starting with the expressed sense, till the implied sense is collected, the powers of the word extends further and further like an arrow. There is no separate power of a word for collecting the other implicit sense. Like an arrow shot by a brave bow-wielder cuts through the armour, rips through

the chest and takes the breath away of an enemy, and there is no difference seen in the function of this single arrow, similarly, a word used by a clever poet, in sequence, conveys its primary meaning through abhidhāna (i. e. abhidhā-vyāpāra), and makes the apprehension of the second implied sense by the same power of the word used. There is no difference in the power of function of one and the same word. Again, argues the objector, that ultimate meaning should be taken as the meaning of a given word, for conveying which it is used. Thus, this is the power of the word only and not that of the sense : kiñca yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa śabdārtha iti śabdasya eva asau vyāpāro nyāyō na arthasya.” (pp. 137, ibid). The objector here seems to be the commentator Dhanika, the brother of Dhanañjaya, the author of Daśarūpaka. This is suggested by Dr. Rewaprasad Dwivedi (pp. 140, ibid)

Mahimā does not accept this. He argues as follows : “This is not correct : (pp. 140 ibid) tad ayuktam. sākṣāt-śabdasya artha-pratītihetutva-asiddheḥ.” The word cannot be taken as cause of the (implied) sense. If it is held as cause through sequence (pāraṃparyeṇa), there will be difficulty in placing some objects as effect and others as cause, for there is no regulation to that effect - “pāraṃparyeṇa tu tasya hetutvopagame vastūnām hetu-phala-bhāva-vyavahāra-niyamo na vyavatiṣṭhate.” (pp. 140, ibid)

Mahimā observes : This cannot be accepted. The reason is that in arriving at the sense, word is not the direct cause. It cannot be taken as a cause in sequence also for it will be difficult to name something specific as cause and also something as effect. In case śabda is held as a paraṃparāhetu, then as in case of the spring season being held as the cause of flowering, we will also have to hold a potter who fashions a pot used in watering a plant, as the main cause of flowering. So, it is wiser to accept ‘artha’ or sense as the cause of further sense, and not ‘word’. It is not proper to say that when some function is carried out by a son, his father also is considered the chief substratum of the function concerned. For, in such cases there will follow the contingency of ‘sāṅkarya-doṣa’, — ‘na hi yatra putrasya vyāpāraḥ sa pituḥ eva iti mukhyatayā śakyate vaktum, tayor anyonya-vyāpāra-sāṅkarya-doṣa-prasaṅgāt.” (pp. 140, ibid). The fault will be of mixing up of activities of different agents.

Mahimā further argues that this illustration of an arrow is also not congruent with the situation : “kiñca ayam viṣamaḥ śara-dṛṣṭāntopanyāsaḥ (pp. 140, ibid). The line of his argument proceeds as below : This ‘śara-dṛṣṭānta’ is a mis-fit, because as the arrow on its own does the activities of cutting, piercing, etc. through a single power, the word does not. The word executes its function with the help of ‘sañketa’ or convention. The word has its function only at places where convention is fixed. So, the function of the word is limited upto the expressed sense only, not upto any ‘arthāntara’ i. e. sense beyond the expressed one, as no ‘sañketa’ or convention is fixed with reference to the other extra sense. In case we accept the capacity of a word to give ‘arthāntara’ also, i. e. added sense also, then people will be able to apprehend any sense with the help of any word. So, for a meaning which stands in need of convention, to that only the function of a word is limited, and it does not extend further upto any added sense, in absence of any convention. For the added sense, the function not of word, but of the expressed sense only should be accepted : tataśca abhidheyārtha-viṣaya eva asya vyāpāro yuktaḥ, na arthāntara-viṣayaḥ, tatra sanketābhāvāt. tad abhāve’pi tatra tat parikalpane sarvaḥ kutaścid abhidheyārthavad arthāntaram api pratīyāt. tasmād yatra sañketāpekṣā, tatra eva asya vyāpāra iti avagantum yuktaḥ, na arthāntare; tatra vakṣyamāṇa-nayena arthasya eva tad-upapattisamarthanād iti.” (pp. 140, 141, ibid)

We may observe with Dr. Rewaprasad that Mahimā here pushes two arguments in favour of his thinking. First, he holds that a word cannot convey another sense directly, as it does with reference to its conventional sense, and secondly, a word can convey only that sense with reference to which a convention is fixed. Mahimā is of the opinion that the formation of a pot is the result of coming together of the two halves, and not the potter, as the joining of halves immediately precedes the formation of a pot. Similarly in case of added sense, i. e. ‘arthāntara’ the immediate predecessor is the expressed sense, and not the word itself. So, being an immediate cause the primary sense is the cause of any additional sense, and not the word.

Mahimā also argues that the functions of the arrow and word are not identical. The function of the arrow, in cutting, ripping through and taking the breath away, is its own, i. e. it is an independent power of an arrow. But for the word it is not so. It conveys meaning remaining dependent on the convention. So, the function of the word is not independent but is dependent on something else. Thus a word has a limited capacity to convey only that meaning with reference to which convention is made. It cannot proceed to an added target, like an arrow. It cannot proceed to an added sense of its own. The added sense is collected only by the function of the primary sense, which should be taken here as the cause. So, the added sense has to be accepted as inferred only.

But, we may say that Mahimā's thinking is faulty. The arrow also, when placed in a sheath does not have any capacity even to pierce the softest thing on earth. Only when it is discharged by a mighty shooter, it does the said tricks. So, even the function of an arrow has its capacity, originally borrowed from the shooter's strength. Similarly, a word when used by an expert poet attains the added function to convey an added sense also. But, this is not to justify 'dīrgha-dīrghatara-vyāpāra'. Actually, as explained by Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, we have to accept difference in function to explain difference in meaning, otherwise we will get into a mess where any word will start giving any meaning !

Mahimā, as stated above believes only in one power of word and that is abhidhā. For him 'artha' or meaning is two-fold viz. vācya or expressed and 'anumeya' or inferred. He quotes a kārīkā — "That whose significance is cognised on hearing alone, is believed to be the primary meaning, and the gauṇa or secondary meaning is that which is collected as a result of (special) effort." He observes : (pp. 47, ibid)

"artho'pi dvividho, vācyon'umeyaśca. tatra śabda-vyāpāra-ṣaṣṭo vācyaḥ. sa eva mukhya ucyaṭe. yaḍ āhuḥ :-

śrutimātreṇa yatrāśya
tādarthyam avasīyate,
taṃ mukhyam artham manyante
gauṇam yatnopapāditam."

'Anumeya' or inferred meaning is that, in whose apprehension, the primary meaning or vācyārtha serves as 'hetu' or 'liṅga' i. e. cause, or the 'hetu' can also be that meaning which is derived from the primary sense. — "tata eva, tad anumitād vā liṅga-bhūtād arthāntaram anumīyate, saḥ anumeyaḥ." (pp. 47, ibid). We know that Bharṭṛhari incorporates all meaning other than the primary in 'gauṇa' or secondary, but for Mahimā all meaning else than primary is 'anumeya'. The primary meaning for Mahimā is also the 'mukhya' or principal sense. Mahimā accepts the relationship between word and meaning as conventional. Word gives meaning only when there is convention to that effect. He rejects the view that a word can ever convey such a meaning which is other than primary, i. e. one with reference to which a convention is not formed. He feels that any other meaning, beyond the primary one, can never be collected by the function of a word and that such added sense is arrived at by inference, the primary sense serving as 'hetu' or cause in it. We have seen that Mahimā therefore rejects all other functions such as lakṣaṇā, tātparya and vyañjanā as functions of a word and subsumes them under 'anumāna' or inference.

Mahimā of course accepts the added sense or what may be called the unexpressed sense. This, for Mahimā is threefold viz. (i) vastumātra i. e. of the form of 'vastu' or a matter of fact or idea, (ii) alaṃkāra i.e. figures of speech or artful expression, and (iii) rasādayaśca, i. e. the emotive stuff such as feelings, sentiments etc. The first two could be directly expressed, but for Mahimā, the third variety is 'anumeya' or 'inferred' only. The direct meaning of a word is always expressed, it being without parts and there being no relation of 'sādhyā' or that which is to be established, and 'sādhana' or the instrument with which it is established, between the two i.e. 'vācyā artha' and 'śabda'. He observes : (pp. 47 ibid) : "sa ca trividhaḥ. vastumātram alaṃkāra rasādayaśca. iti. tatra ādyau vācyau api saṃbhavataḥ. anyas tvanumeya eva iti. tatra padasya artho vācyā eva, na anumeyaḥ, tasya nir aṃśatvāt, sādhyā-sādhana-bhāvā'bhāvataḥ'. Mahimā, like Ānandavardhana, also believes that the vācyā or expressed is not so charming as is the unexpressed or inferred : "vācyo hyartho na tathā caṃatkāram ātanoti yathā sa eva vidhi-niṣedhādiḥ kākāvāhidheyatām anumeyatām vā avatīrṇaḥ iti svabhāva eva ayaṃ

arthānām.” The expressed is not as charming as the same when presented through artful intonation or conveyed through inference. This is in the nature of a meaning. The meaning conveyed through simple assertion is also less charming than the same conveyed through double negation. He substantiates his observation by quoting Ānandavardhana who observes :

“sārarūpo'hyarthaḥ sva-śabda-anabhidheyatvena prakāśitaḥ sutarām śobhām āvahati. prasiddhiśca iyaṃ asti eva vidagdha-pariṣatsu yad abhimatatarāṃ vastu vyaṅgyatvena prakāśyate na vācyatvena” iti.

The sequence i. e. krama, observes Mahimā, in the first two varieties such as vastu or matter of fact and alaṃkāra or artful expression, is self-evident and is clearly observed. So, if we resort to vyañjakatva to explain this sequence it is of no use at all. He rejects vyaṅgya-vyañjaka relation between dhvani (i. e. word) and so called sphoṭa also. Similarly on this analogy the promulgation of dhvani vis-a-vis kāvyā which is of the form of word and meaning placed together, is also not acceptable to Mahimā. He accepts 'gamyā-gamaka-bhāva' instead.

Mahima Bhaṭṭa does not accept Ānandavardhana's idea of three types of meaning such as the expressed or vācyā, the indicated or lakṣyā and the suggested or vyaṅgyā. For Mahimā the indicated or lākṣaṇika i. e. metaphorical or secondary sense and the suggested or vyaṅgyā fall in the category of the inferred or 'anumeya' only and thus for Mahimā there is a scheme of twofold meaning only; the vācyā and the anumeya. Thus he seems to reject Ānandavardhana's observation that the indicated — lakṣyamāṇa and the suggested i. e. the vyañyamāṇa are also different from each other. For Ānandavardhana the secondary function or a-mukhya vyavahāra is only an extension of the primary function and it is resorted to when the primary meaning is found to be non-congruent with the context. This secondary sense may not be charming also, and is arrived at only when the primary sense is rejected. This abandonment of the primary sense, in the opinion of Ānandavardhana, could be either partial or total. This secondary function is seen only when we use language. The suggestive function, for Ānandavardhana, is of wider scope and travels beyond language. When use of language is concerned, then also this suggestive function completely

differs from either the primary function of a word in language, i. e. abhidhā, or the secondary function i. e. guṇavṛtti or lakṣaṇā or a-mukhya-vyāpāra, both from the point of view of nature and scope i. e. “svarūpataḥ viśayataḥ ca.” Suggestivity, as noted above travels beyond the medium of language and is seen in any other art-form such as drama, music, painting and what not, taking the form of abhinaya or acting, or notes i. e. śuddha svara, or colours etc. as the case may be. Thus for Ānandavardhana the suggestivity has to be completely distinguished from lakṣaṇā or secondary function of a word.

Not so with Mahimā. He rejects the very basis on which the concept of lakṣaṇā rests. He rejects any other power or function beyond abhidhā or the direct expressive power in case of a word. Mahimā is of the opinion that the fact of ‘krama’ or sequence in the functioning of powers called abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā goes against them belonging to the same substratum, i.e. word. As seen earlier, he feels that if more than one power belongs to the same thing, these powers should function simultaneously like heat and light emanating from fire. But we had observed earlier that his analogy is not applicable in case of a word, as there is no hard and fast rule that all powers belonging to the same thing should function simultaneously only. Even in day to day life we see agents using their various powers as and when the situation so demands. A brave soldier enjoys life also to the full and also fights against the enemy as and when required. A man may be gifted with a number of special capacity which he chooses to exhibit or utilize only when the situation so demands. But Mahimā is satisfied with his own argument and his own illustration of fire oozing light and heat simultaneously, and therefore concludes that word has only one power—abhidhā—that gives the primary sense alone and whatever added sense follows,—call it lakṣyārtha, tātparyārtha or vyaṅgyārtha—call it by any name, it follows from the primary sense alone as an inferred sense, and the word has nothing to do with it. The other meaning follows from the primary sense due to the relation of līṅga-līṅgi-bhāva only. Mahimā observes. (pp. 121, ibid) : “kiñca upacāravṛttau śabdasya mā bhud atiprasaṅga itī avaśyaṃ. kiṃ api nimittaṃ anusartavyam. anyathā anyatra prasiddha-sambandhaḥ katham asaṃmitam (= saṅketa-

virahita) eva arthāntaram pratyāyayet ? yat ca tannimittam tad eva asmābhir iha liṅgam iti ākhyātam. yuktaṃ ca etat. śabdasya tatra vyāpārābhāvāt. vyāpārābhāvaśca saṃbandhābhāvāt. liṅgāt ca liṅgināḥ pratītir anumānaṃ eva; na guṇa-vṛttau arthāntara-pratītiḥ śābdī iti tasyāḥ vācakāśrayatvaṃ asiddham eva.”

Mahimā (pp. 122) further observes in saṃgraha verses :

“yaḥ satattva-samāropaḥ
tat-saṃbandha-nibandhanaḥ,
mukhyārtha-bādhe so'pyārtham
saṃbandham anumāpayet.” (46)

and,

“tat-sāmya-tat-saṃbandhau hi
tattvāropaika-kāraṇam,
guṇavṛtter dvirūpāyāḥ
tat-pratītir ato'numā.” (47)

i. e. ‘tat-sāmya’ and ‘tat-saṃbandha’ — these two are the causes of ‘tattvāropa’ i. e. superimposition of one object over the other. So, in two types of guṇavṛtti (or lakṣaṇā) the apprehension of the cause — i. e. prayojana — is through inference only.

Thus, Mahimā accepts two types of guṇavṛtti : (i) based on ‘tat-sāmya’, as in ‘gaurvāhikaḥ’ and (ii) based on ‘tat-saṃbandha’ as in ‘mañcāḥ krośanti’.

He further observes that abandoning of mukhya-vṛtti is not possible in case of a word. So, only a meaning superimposed on a (primary) meaning causes inference of similarity.

“mukhya-vṛtti-parityāgaḥ
na śabdasya upapadyate,
vihito'rthāntare hyartham
sva-sāmyam anumāpayet.” (48)

Thus, when the function of a word is not established with reference to another sense, how can we hold śabda as ‘skhalad-gati’ with reference to a

result (phala, i. e. another sense) which follows through inference from a given linga or mark i. e. cause ?

“ittham arthāntare śabda-

vṛtter anupapattitaḥ,

phale liṅgaika-gamye syāt

kutaḥ śabdaḥ skhalad-gatiḥ.” (50) (pp. 122, ibid)

Thus, observes Mahimā, that whatever factors are considered in favour of gauṇī vṛtti, are taken by us as promoting anumāna —

“guṇa-vṛttau girāṃ yāvat

sāmagrī-iṣṭā nibandhanam,

saiva liṅgatayā’smābhir

iṣyate arthāntaram prati.”-(55) (pp. 123, ibid)

“na hi tat samayābhāvāt

vācyam śabdaśya kalpyate

pratīyamānatāyām ca

vyaktasya anumeyatā.” (56)

“tasmāt svārthā’tirikteṇa

gatiḥ na arthāntare girāṃ,

vācakatvās’rayeṇā’to

guṇavṛtter asaṃbhavaḥ.” (57)

Mahimā suggests that when we resort to metaphorical expression or gauṇa-vṛtti, the secret underlying this activity is that it is the natural linguistic habit of people that they identify similar or mutually connected objects. When we see a person with long neck and ugly figure we call him ‘karabha’ or a youngone of a camel. Again on seeing children crying in a cradle, we describe the cradle as crying : (pp. 121, ibid) : “loko hi tat-sadṛśam tat-saṃbaddham ca tattvena vyavaharan dṛśyate, tad yathā dīrgha-grīvaṃ vikāṭa-kāyaṃ ca kaṃcit paśyan ‘karabha’ iti vyapadiśati, mañca-saṃbaddhān ca kāṃścit krośato mañcāḥ krośanti iti.” On hearing such sentences which

are non-congruent by nature, an intelligent person concludes that such an incongruous identification has some valid reason as its basis. This he decides through reasoning. Mahimā does not accept 'arthāpatti' as a separate means of knowledge — i. e. pramāṇa and subsumes it under 'anumāna' or inference — "arthāpatter anumānāntarbhāvā'bhyupagamāt iti uktam." (pp. 118 ibid)

Mahimā classifies guṇavṛtti or metaphorical expression into two such as (i) based on similarity, and (ii) based on some other connection : "tat-sāmya-tat-sambandhau hi tattvā-ropa-eka-kāraṇam" (pp. 122, 47a, ibid). For him the apprehension of metaphorical meaning is only logical deduction from literal sense. It is a case of inference where the sādhyā-sādhana-bhāva is collected from loka i.e. worldly parlour. We have noted that for Mahimā, as both 'bhakti' i.e. metaphorical expression and dhvani are covered up by inference, there is no cause to distinguish between the two as is done by Ānandavardhana. Secondary meaning and the so-called suggested sense are, for Mahimā, arrived at by the same process of 'anumiti' i. e. inference, because both are collected from the primary meaning. For Mahimā, even terms involving 'faded metaphors' i. e. rūḍhimūlā lakṣaṇā, have consideration of second meaning and are therefore collected by inference. In that case they are, in the opinion of Mahimā, not different from Dhvani : (pp. 124, ibid)

rūḍhā ye viṣaye'nyatra

śabdāḥ sva-viṣayād api,

lāvaṇyādyāḥ prasaktās te

na bhavanti padaṃ dhvaneḥ (61) (pp. 124, ibid)

Mahimā as observed earlier, also rejects tātparya śakti, which for him falls under anumiti. It may be noted that for Abhinavagupta 'tātparya' is a sentence-function, as explained by the Abhihitānvayavādins, which makes for the correlated meaning of various 'pada's or words in a given sentence. Thus this can be equated with saṃsarga-maryādā of the later navya-naiyāyikas, and the lakṣaṇā of the Bhāṭṭas (Ref. : Dr. K. Kunjuni Raja, p. 222, ibid). But Dhanika's tātparya travels farther than mere sentence-sense as a result of the total of word-meanings. It is wider enough to cover Ānandavardhana's vyaṅgyārtha also. The famous words of Dhanika are, "tātparyaṃ na

tulādhṛtam”, for “it extends upto any limit till the speaker’s intention is collected — ‘yāvat-kārya-prasāritvāt.” Dr. Raja observes (pp. 216, ibid) It can, “cover the whole range of the speaker's intention and cover all implications coming up in the train of the expressed sense.”

But we have seen above how Mahimā rejects the case of tātparya-vṛtti and how he subsumes it under ‘anumiti’. Thus Mahimā’s concepts of ‘abhidhā’ and ‘anumiti’ are powerful enough to digest all other concepts such as gaunī, lakṣaṇā, tātparya, vyañjanā and even the broad concept of ‘vakrokti’ involving ‘Vicitrā abhidhā’ of Kuntaka. This is how Mahimā takes Kuntaka to task. Kuntaka holds such ‘śabda’ and ‘artha’ to be Kāvya, as are charged by charming function of a poet and delight those who know (poetry). So, for Kuntaka such artful expression is the life of poetry which is different from the practice of word and sense as seen in various disciplines. But all this is not correct according to Mahimā. He argues as follows :

Is this special arrangement of word and sense merely the proper usage (aucitya-mātra) of word and sense, or is it only the suggestion of the implicit sense which is different from the expressed sense as experienced by all ? Because, no third alternative is possible it has got to be either of the two.

The first alternative is not acceptable as the mention of such propriety is useless, because it stands refuted by the very assertion of the form of poetry. The point is that it is the poet's business to arrange vibhāvādi, i. e. determinants, etc. It is not different from this. The determinants make for ‘rasa’ only when presented in a special way, and not otherwise. Again, only that theme makes for poetry, which is charged with rasa. So, no question of impropriety ever arises. In other words Mahimā accepts only that as poetry which is charged with rasa, and this rasa is caused only by proper arrangement of vibhavādis. Thus ‘anaucitya’ has no scope in genuine poetry, worth its name. He observes (pp. 142, ibid)

“te ca yathāśāstraṃ upanibadhyamānā rasābhivyakter nibandhanabhāvaṃ bhajante. na anyathā. rasātmakaṃ ca kāvyaṃ iti kutas tatra anaucitya-

samsparsaḥ sambhāvyate yan nirāsārtham ittham kāvyā-lakṣaṇam ācakṣīran vicakṣaṇammanyāḥ ?”

Mahimā says that in case you opt for the second alternative, then you are quoting only the definition of dhvani in different words, for the content of thought is one and the same. Now as far as this dhvani-lakṣaṇa goes, it has been already refuted by us. Mahimā sticks to his gunas and concludes : (pp. 143, 144, ibid)

“atro'cyate'bhidhā-saṃjñāḥ
śabdasya artha-prakāśane,
vyāpāra eka eva iṣṭaḥ yas tu
anyo'rthasya so'khilāḥ.” - (71)

tataśca,

“vācyād arthāntaram bhinnam
yadi talliṅgam asya saḥ,
tan nāntarīyakatayā
nibandho hyasya lakṣaṇam.” - (72) (pp. 143, ibid)

“abhede bahutā na syād
ukter mārgāntarāgrahāt,
tena dhvanivad eṣā'pi
vakroktir, anumā na kim ? - (73) (pp. 144, ibid)

Mahimā also rejects suggestivity - vyañjakatva-as word-power, for there is no other power of the word except 'abhidhā' : (pp. 146, ibid) - Mahimā observes” - nā'pi śabdasya abhidhā-vyatirekeṇa vyañjakatvaṃ vyāpārāntaram upapadyate, yena arthāntaram pratyāyayed; vyakteḥ anupapatteḥ, sambandhāntarasya ca asiddheḥ. Even in the absence of 'vyakti' or 'sambandhāntara', if suggestivity is accepted with reference to a word, then no fixed scheme will hold good in that case — “tad abhāve'pi tad abhyupa-game tasya artha-niyamo na syād, nibandhana-abhāvāt. (pp. 146, ibid) - Word cannot have any direct relationship with suggested meaning. If word had any natural, relationship with suggested sense in form of 'rati'

and other emotions as in case of songs (i. e. music), then one and all could have been able to apprehend the same — “na hi asya, geyasya iva ratyādibhir bhāvaiḥ svābhāvika eva sambandhaḥ sarvasya eva tat-pratīti-prasaṅgāt.” (pp. 146, ibid)

No relation of a word with the suggested sense can be believed to be born of convention as suggestion is ‘aupādhika’ and ‘upādhis’ are innumerable and uncertain. One and the same word may suggest different meanings under different contexts. So, to fix a particular suggested sense in case of a fixed word, like convention in case of expressed sense, is impossible.

Mahimā also examines the possibility of prefixes (= upasargas) being suggestive. He is clear that if suggestivity is totally denied in case of a word, the prefixes can never be accepted as suggesting any meaning. Dr. C. Rajendran in a ft-note (no. 58, pp 72, ibid) observes : “Here the assumption of MB (i.e. Mahima Bhaṭṭa) is that Dyotakatva of the grammarians is the same as the vyañjakatva of the Dhvani theorists. There is however, no supporting evidence adduced.” It may be noted that on an earlier occasion we have also noted that the ‘manifestation’ of sphaṭa cannot be taken as identical with the suggestion of the dhvanivādins. Mahimā holds that the prefixes are said to be ‘dyotaka’ i. e. suggestive only in a metaphorical sense. Actually they are capable of expression only and not suggestion.

Mahimā argues that in fact when we use such words as ‘ghaṭa’ or pot and the like, for directly conveying the meaning of the object called a pot, even there these words such as ‘ghaṭa’ should be held not as directly, expressive of a meaning but only as ‘dyotakas’ or suggestive, for the meaning of ‘ghaṭa-padārtha’ is already existent in our mind and is only revealed by the expression of the word ‘ghaṭa’. Thus even the whole vācya vācaka-vyavahāra’ the business of expression and expressed will be negated. So, it is better to accept metaphorical suggestivity here. Says he - (pp. 153, ibid) :

“evaṃ ca antar-mātra viparivartitayā siddha-sadbhāvānām ghaṭādīnām ghaṭādīśabdā api dyotakā eva syuḥ, na vācakā it, vācya-vācaka-vyavahāro’-staṃ iyāt tasmāt bhāktam eva dyotakatvaṃ upagantavyaṃ na mukhyam.

bhakteḥ ca prayojanaṃ vācyasya arthasya sphuṭatvapratipattiḥ, nimittaṃ ca, viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-pratītyor-ās'ubhāvitayā kramānupalakṣaṇāt sahabhāva-pratītiḥ.”

Mahimā holds that it is only to describe the clarity of the meaning derived from a root modified by a prefix, that the prefix is figuratively stated as suggestive. If it is argued that actually a prefix manifests a particularity i.e. viśeṣa—already existent in a verb and so they are suggestive and not denotative of a ‘viśeṣa’ in a verb, than Mahimā's reply is that you cannot cognise the exact form of viśeṣa i. e. particularity manifested by a prefix. The meaning invariably apprehended should be taken only as ‘expressed’ meaning—if we do not accept this dictum then an adjective applied to a noun will also have to be regarded as ‘dyotaka’. If taken to its extreme end, this would take us to believe that words like ‘ghaṭa’ are also dyotakas as they manifest objects that are in the mind. So also will be the case of words such as ‘nīla’ etc. which are taken as viśeṣaṇas as a rule. — “sāmānyāni ca garbhīkṛta-viśeṣāṇi bhavanti iti teṣāṃ tatra sadbhāva-siddhau satyāṃ nīlādi-śabdā api tat-tat-dyotana-mātra-vyāparāḥ prādi-vad dyotakā bhavituṃ arhanti, na abhidhāyakā iti.” (pp. 152, ibid)

Thus, Mahimā emphatically denies the existence of what is termed as vyañjakatva. He thus accepts only ‘abhidhā’ as word-power and all sense, other than the expressed is collected, according to him by ‘anumāna’. He declares (pp. 157, ibid) : (saṃgrahaśloka)

“svābhāvikaṃ dhvaner yuktaṃ
vyañjakatvaṃ na dīpavat,
dhūmavat kintu kṛtakam
saṃbandhāder apekṣaṇāt.” - (74)

“prādināṃ dyotakatvaṃ
yat kaiścid abhyupagamyate,
tad bhāktam eva, tatra iṣṭam na
mukhyaṃ tad asaṃbhavāt.” - (75)

yathā hi yasya śabdasya
 bhāvā'bhāvānusāriṇī,
 yad arthabuddhiḥ tasya asau
 vācyo'rtha iti kathyate." - (76)

"go-śabdasya iva gaur arthaḥ
 sā'nyathā tvāvyavasthitā
 vācyatva-vyavahāraśca
 na syād arthasya kasya-cit." - (77)

"prādi-prayogā'nugama-
 vyatirekānusāriṇi,
 prakarṣādaḥ matis tena
 tasya tad-vācyatā na kim" - (78)

"viśeṣāvagamasyāśu-
 bhāvād anupalakṣaṇāt
 kramasya sahabhāvitvaṃ
 bhramo bhakter nibandhanam." - (79) (pp. 158, ibid)

We have seen how there was a stiff opposition to the Kashmir school of thought that advocates a fool-proof scheme of chiseled concepts of abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā. The challengers were great names such as Mukula, Kuntaka, Mahimā and Bhoja. But this challenge was taken up by the Kashmir-school again with a successful counter attack by Mammaṭa, Hemacandra and their followers, culminating in the efforts of Appayya and Jagannātha, and the road to him is bedecked by efforts of such greats as Mammaṭa and his followers.

What necessitated this rethinking and re-establishment from Mammaṭa and his followers is creating again a conceptual clarity which originated with Ānandavardhana who established vyañjanā as a distinct power of word and explained how abhidhā and lakṣaṇā were different from it on account of viśaya-bheda and svarūpa-bheda. But Ānandavardhana's attempts were challenged by some anti-vyañjanā thinkers and again they mixed up abhidhā,

lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā also in an incurable way. Kuntaka, though not an anti-dhvani thinker, was also slightly different from Ānandavardhana in the sense that he cared only for the poetic expression and so his concept of vicitrā abhidhā was more ambitious and less clear. Nobody except Mahimā cared strictly for viṣayabheda and svarūpabheda underlying the śabda-vṛttis. But Mahimā erred on the other side. He accepted abhidhā as abhidhā pure and simple as taught by the mīmāṃsakas, grammarians; naiyāyikas and also Ānandavaradhana. But for the extra meaning, the pratīyamāna artha, he postulated kāvyānumiti in place of any word-power. For him, anything beyond expressed sense directly following from the word, was due to inference, and the word never could give any other sense beyond vācyārtha. Thus, even lakṣaṇā—what Mammaṭa calls ‘āropitā-kriyā’ also was not acceptable to him. As was lakṣaṇā/lakṣyārtha so was vyañjanā/vyañgyārtha — equally non-acceptable as following from word. So, for him there was no hesitation on accepting dhvani as ‘bhākta’. But with all his vehemence he was not convincing for the fact remained that whatever was experienced by a man of taste from poetry, was directly from poetry and not from any other thing such as inference. It was poetry, poetry and poetry alone, with its magic web of word and sense, that delighted the aesthete. Even Mahimā had to concede a point when he accepted that his kāvyānumiti was not congruent, with tarkānumiti. So, once again the balance swung in favour of Ānandavardhana, and Mammaṭa and others ridiculed Mahimā for rejecting different powers of a word. A clear-cut scheme of three powers of a word was the requirement of the context to explain the experience that accrued from reading of poetry. A change in a word here and there upset the balance of aesthetic experience and therefore it was word and word and word alone that was held responsible for bringing about the pleasure through the richness of its meaning. Thus, once again Mammaṭa and his followers laid down the royal road of three word-powers that led to the destination of aesthetic experience from poetry.



3

Bhoja and Hemacandra

Bhoja

We know that Bhoja represents, according to us, a tradition, which we call 'the Mālava tradition', to distinguish it from the Kashmir tradition as represented by Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Mammata, Hemachandra, Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha, Viśvanātha, Appayya and Jagannātha, to mention a few.

This is not to suggest that Bhoja is always at cross-roads with the Kashmir tradition and that he always exchanges swords with Ānandavardhana and the rest, but one thing is certain that the tradition Bhoja represents, one which we call the Mālava tradition of literary aesthetics, has certain special traits of its own. It has to be candidly admitted that the views of Bhoja as interpreted by the great modern ālamkārika Dr. Raghavan, for whom we have tremendous respect and love, will be our sole friend, philosopher and guide so far as Bhoja is concerned. But with due respect to the great savant of Indian literary criticism, we have to make a humble confession that at times we fail to understand what Dr. Raghavan explains, or at times we feel we can supplement his efforts, or in very rare cases we may even attempt to correct his impression. In doing this, we will surely go with the text of Bhoja as read in both of his works, viz. the *Sarasvati-kaṇṭhābharaṇa* and the *Śṅgāra-Prakāśa*. Our efforts should not be misunderstood by the world of scholars, for to us, Dr. Raghavan remains, and will remain for a thousand years to come as the greatest interpreter of Bhoja, but we try to approach only in the fashion of a student with his curiosity a little more awakened as compared to a general reader. So, with pranams to both Bhoja and Dr. Rāghavan, who for us is an 'abhinava-bhoja', we will try to explain the concept of abhidhā as explained by Bhoja.

It has to be noted that Bhoja has not discussed independently the topic of śabda-vṛttis in his *Sarasvati-kaṇṭhābharaṇa*, comprising of five chapters.

However there could be traced stray references to the śabda-vṛttis here and there which do not carry any theoretical value, e.g. on pp. 709 (N.S.Edn. 1934 A.D.) we read : “yato rsā”kṣepāt-parihāsa-leśoktyā'maṅgalam, praviśa piṇḍīm, dvāraṃ, bhakṣaya, iti nyāyāt prasiddha-adhyāhāraḥ, ‘darī vadati, mañcāḥ krośanti’ iti prayogadarśanāt ādhārādheya-yor abhedopacāraśca viruddha-lakṣaṇādibhiḥ prayujyamāno na doṣāya iti.” - Such direct or indirect references to śabda-vṛttis do not carry any value for us. We will have to turn to the other work, the Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa for a comparatively more systematic approach to the topic of śabdavṛttis, though it has to be admitted at the outset, that Bhoja, in keeping with the tradition which he seems to have directly inherited from alaṃkāra writers prior to Ānandavardhana, does not treat this topic as systematically as is done by Mammaṭa and other followers of the Kashmir school. We will pick up the thread with the help of Dr. Raghavan. We propose to reach him with honest enquiry as an advanced student.

Bhoja's treatment of śabda-śaktis is part of his larger scheme of explaining what 'sāhitya' is. Dr. Raghavan thus explains : (pp. 87, Bhoja's Śr. Pra, '63) “We have already said that poetry being speech supreme, Sāhitya is, between the two parts of language — śabda and Artha — relation supreme. Thus, sāhitya first means all linguistic expression and the general and inevitable grammatical and logical relations between word and sense; and then it means poetry and the poetic relations between the two. Bhoja means by sāhitya both kinds of relation and he not only deals with poetry but with language also. At the lower levels, lies language with its general Sāhitya; higher up, the language has risen above itself and has bloomed in poetry, and here, the Sāhitya is poetic relation between word and sense. Bhoja defines kāvyā as the Sāhitya or unity of word and sense.

“tat (kāvyam) punaḥ, śabdārthayoḥ; sāhityamāmananti.” tad yathā - “śabdārthau sahitaḥ kāvyam” iti.

It is to a treatment of this sāhitya of śabda and Artha that the Śr. Pra. is devoted. Bhoja calls his work itself Sāhitya Prakāśa in Chapter XI.

yasmin aśeṣa-vidyāsthānārtha-vibhūṭayaḥ prakāśante,

saṃhṛtya, sa sāhityaparakāśa etādṛśo bhavati.”

Chap. XI. p. 430, Śṛ. Pra. Vol. II

The scheme of the whole work is contained in the definition, ‘śabdārthau sahītau kāvyam’, and under the edifice of the Śṛ. Pra. lies the foundation and system called Sāhitya. This has been already pointed out above in Ch. IV (of Śṛ. Pra. Raghavan). Sāhitya is thus defined by Bhoja. It is the relation between Śabda and Artha and is of twelve kinds. Eight of these twelve Sāhityas can be called general and the last four, are special and can be classed as the poetic Sāhityas.

“kim sāhityam ? yaḥ śabdārthayoḥ saṃbandhaḥ sa ca dvādaśadhā, - abhidhā, vivakṣā, tātparyam, pravibhāgaḥ, vyapekṣā, sāmāthyam, anvayaḥ, ekārthī-bhāvaḥ, doṣahānam, guṇopādānam, alaṃkārayogaḥ, rasa-aviyogaśceti.”

Again, at the beginning of chapter VII which begins the treatment of Sāhitya, Bhoja repeats these twelve-fold relations between śabda and Artha as constituting Sāhitya.


“tatra abhidhā-vivakṣā-tātparya-pravibhāga-vyapekṣā-sāmāthyam-anvaya-ekārthībhāva-doṣahāna-guṇopādāna-alaṃkārayoga-rasa-aviyogarūpāḥ śabdārthayoḥ dvādaśa saṃbandhāḥ sāhityam ucyate.” Vol. I. P. 428, Śṛ. Pra.

Even the earlier work of Bhoja, the S.K.Ā. contains indications of this conception of Sāhitya of Bhoja. The first verse of the work — “dhvanir varṇaḥ padaṃ vākyam etc. covers part of contents of chapters I-VI of the Śṛ. Pra and the second verse of the S.K.Ā. gives the last four-fold poetic Sāhitya, - doṣahāna, guṇādāna, alaṃkārayoga, and rasāviyoga or rasānvaya; and commenting on the above-said first verse of the S.K.Ā., Ratneśvara who is acquainted well with Śṛ. Pra. says :

- tad ayamatra tātparya-saṃkṣepaḥ. - sāhitya-nirūpaṇāya kila eṣa granthāraṃbhaḥ. sāhityam ca śabdārthayoḥ saṃbandhaḥ tatra śabda eva ka ityapekṣāyām ayaṃ vibhāgo dhvanir ityādi arthastu stambha-kumbha-ādī-lakṣaṇaḥ loke śāstre ca prasiddhaḥ, saṃbandhaḥ kaścīd anādiḥ. sarvasvāyamānas tu saṃbandhaḥ nānyatreti asminnāyatate. sa caturvidhaḥ-doṣahānam, guṇopādānam, alaṃkārayogaḥ, rasābhi(vi)yogaśceti.”

Ratneśvara on S.K.Ā.I.

This rather long quotation from Dr. Raghavan brings out how ambitious project Bhoja has set himself to. By taking Sāhitya in its widest sense as “coming together of word and meaning”, he wants to cover under this banner both poetry (i.e. kāvya) and non-poetry (i. e. śāstra and loka-bhāṣā). So, Bhoja first takes sāhitya merely as relation between word and sense in general and includes under it two sets of relations, grammatical and poetical. Among the eight grammatical relations four are classed as kevala-śabda saṃbandha-śaktis and the other four as sāpekṣa-śabda-saṃbandha-śaktis. Dr. Raghavan (pp. 88 ibid) gives the following table to explain Bhoja’s classification :



The first eight go under the name of śabda-saṃbandha-śaktis. Dr. Raghavan notes that in Bhoja, (pp. 89, ibid) Abhidhā comprises the three vṛttis, mūkhyā, gaṇī, and lakṣaṇā. Vivakṣā is of three kinds - kākvādi-vyaṅgyā, prakaraṇādi-vyaṅgyā and abhinayādi-vyaṅgyā. In

tatparya is included the pratīyamāna and Dhvani. These eight śabda-saṃbandhas are treated of in Chapters VII and VIII. Poetic Sāhitya begins in Chapter IX.

With this explanation furnished by Dr. Raghavan, we will start our investigation as to what exactly Bhoja wants to cover under 'abhidhā' and whether his treatment is more, or equally or less scientific as compared to Mammaṭa's scheme.

When it is observed by Dr. Raghavan that Bhoja's abhidhā covers three vṛttis viz. mūkhyā, gauṇī, and lakṣaṇā, we feel that Bhoja seems to be under the influence of such writers as Mukula and even Mahimā, who take lakṣaṇā only as part of abhidhā. For Mukula, the ten-fold abhidhā covered the field of a-mukhyā vṛtti also. On the face of it the treatment in the works of Mammaṭa and his followers belonging to the Kashmir tradition seems to be more scientific.

Bhoja (pp. 223, Edn. Josyer, Ch. VII) says :

“tatra abhidhā-vivakṣā..... dvādaśa samarthāḥ sāhityam iti ucyate.” - Then he proceeds -

“teṣu śabdasya arthābhidhāyini śaktir abhidhā. tayā svarūpa iva abhidheye pravartamānaḥ śabdo vṛtti-trayeṇa vartate, tāśca-mukhyā, gauṇī, lakṣaṇā iti tisraḥ.” - We have a quarrel with the very first statement which is loose. When Bhoja defines abhidhā as, “śabdasya arthābhidhāyini śaktiḥ” - he fails to discriminate between the directly expressed sense, called saṃketitārtha, the indicated sense or lakṣyārtha and the suggested sense called vyaṅgyārtha classified clearly in the Kashmir school of thought. Even Kuntaka's 'vicitrā abhidhā' covered all these three under one banner. May be we are in a frame of mind, or we have inherited a mind-set that tends to appreciate more the system as presented by Ānanda-Abhinava-Mammaṭa-Jagannātha—led school of thought.

Bhoja then proceeds as follows : (pp. 223, ibdi)... “tatra sākṣād avyavahitārthā-bhidhāyikā mukhyā. gamyamāna-śauryādi-guṇa-yoga-vyavahitārthā gauṇī

svārthāvinābhūta-arthāntaropalakṣaṇā tu lakṣaṇā iti. tathāhi gaur̥ iti ayaṃ śabdo mukhyayā vṛtṭyā sāsṇādīmantaṃ arthaṃ pratipādayati, sa eva tiṣṭhanmūtratādi-guṇa-saṃpadam̐ apekṣamāṇo yadā bāhlike vartate tadā gauṇīm̐ vṛtṭim̐ anuvadati.

So, it is clear that Bhoja's mukhyā is the 'abhidhā' proper of the Kashmir school. Gauṇī and lakṣaṇā are treated by Mamṛta as part of a-mukhyā vṛtṭi, i.e. lakṣaṇā which is for him six-fold, ṣaḍ-vidhā. But Bhoja takes these two as extension of his wider abhidhā, as done by Mukula. Perhaps even the earlier Mīmāṃsakas also took lakṣaṇā (including gauṇī) as extension of abhidhā. Bhoja keeps gauṇī reserved for relations—'tadyoga' as put by the Kashmir school — based on similarity, and his lakṣaṇā is characterised by such meaning which is another one following from the svārtha - So, 'tadyoga' is accepted even by Bhoja here. He illustrates gauṇī by the same illustration such as "gaur̥ vāhikaḥ" (= bāhlikaḥ). One who urinates while standing like a bull is called 'gaur̥', due to similarity. The Kashmir school seeks comparison in 'jāḍya and māṇḍya' - dullness and stupidily as seen in both.

Bhoja further observes :

tad āha -

“rūḍhyā yatra sad artho'pi
loke śabdo niveśitaḥ
sa mukhyas tat sām̐yāt
gauṇo'nyatra skhalad-gatiḥ.”

yadā tu śabdaḥ svārthataḥ kriyāsiddhau sādhana-bhāvaṃ gantum̐ asamarthaḥ, tadā abhidheya-avinābhūtaṃ arthāntaram̐ lakṣayati. tadā sā ca lakṣaṇā vṛtṭiḥ. yathā gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ prativasati. atra gaṅgā-śabdo viśiṣṭo-daka-pravāhe nirūḍhā'bhidhāna-śaktiḥ. sa ca ghoṣa-karṭṛkāyāḥ prati-vasana-kriyāyā adhikaraṇa-bhāvaṃ gantum̐ asamarthaḥ, svārthā'vinābhūtaṃ taṭam̐ lakṣayati.” (pp. 223, ibid).

This means Bhoja is absolutely clear about the concepts of abhidhā, and also gauṇī and lakṣaṇā and surely he had read what Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta had written. But he chooses a different tradition which recognises 'gauṇī' as an independent vṛtṭi from lakṣaṇā, as seen later also in

Hemacandra. But what Bhoja does is still different. Over and above taking *gaunī* and *lakṣaṇā* as separate functions, he clubs them together as extension of *abhidhā* and thus his *abhidhā* is wide enough to contain these two in its fold. This is, as observed earlier, like Mukula.

He then quotes from Kumārila viz. “*abhidheyā'vinabhūta-pratītir lakṣaṇā*” and calls it the life of artful expression : “*sā eṣā vidagdha-vakrokti-jīvitam.*” Now this expression makes it clear that he appreciates the concept of ‘*vicitrā-abhidhā*’ of Kuntaka, and in the same way he absorbs the influence of Vāmana also, who suggested : “*sādrśyāt lakṣaṇā vakroktiḥ*”. (KSV. IV iii-8)

Bhoja then attempts the classification of the three-fold *abhidhā*, out of which the first viz. *mukhyā*, which is pure *abhidhā* for the Kashmir school, is two-fold : “*tatra mukhyā dvidhā, tathā-bhūtārthā, tad-bhāvāpattiśca*” (pp. 223, *ibid*). Then, he proceeds : “*tathābhūtārthā ṣoḍhā, jāti-viṣayā, vyakti-
viṣayā, ākr̥ti-
viṣayā, guṇa-
viṣayā, kriyā-
viṣayā sambandha-
viṣayāśca iti.*”

Now, it may be said that the divisions and subdivisions suggested here and also elsewhere normally are six or twelve. This is Bhoja’s special feature. Again, here also, the sub divisions of ‘*tathābhūtārthā mukhyā*’ which are six go by the difference in the nature of the objects described. These are broad divisions seen in the world and there is hardly anything special to be noted. Though Bhoja has taken ‘*sāhitya*’ in a very wide sense and his concept covers *śāstra-bhāṣā* and *loka-bhāṣā* or *vyavahāra-bhāṣā* i.e. language in general also, we may say to his credit that he has drawn illustrations from poetry only. ‘*sambandha-
viṣayā*’ is illustrated from the *Vikramorvaśīyam* where Pururavas is said to be the grandson of the Sun and the Moon. But our observation stands that the varieties enumerated by Bhoja, all follow the nature of the object under description. Thus if a *guṇa* is described it is *guṇa-
viṣayā*, if a *kriyā* is described, it is *kriyā-
viṣayā* and so on. We may say this is just Bhoja’s love for hair-splitting.

‘*tadbhāvāpatti*’ variety of *mukhyā* is explained as : “*arthasya a-tathātve adhyāsādibhiḥ tathātvāpādanam tad-bhāvāpattiḥ.*” (pp. 224, *ibid*) This again is six-fold such as - “*sā'pi ṣoḍhā, adhyāsātmikā, kalpanātmikā, vivartātmikā, vipariṇāmātmikā, viparyayātmikā, pravādātmikā ca iti.*”

The adhyāsātmikā is illustrated by “kamalaṃ anaṃbhasi, kamale ca kuvalaye”... etc. (pp. 225). We know that this is a famous illustration of the figure atīśayokti. Thus, Bhoja has quoted famous illustrations every where which we would put under this or that alaṃkāra. The Kashmir school, as we know, puts the whole of ‘alaṃkāra’ — under vācya-vācaka-bhāva, with some undercurrent of vyañjanā or vyaṅgyārtha in many alaṃkāras such as samāsokti, ākṣepa, paryāyokta, aprastuta-praśamsā etc. So, they are a ‘vācya-vācaka-bhāva-vivarta’ for those who follow the Kashmir school of thought. Dr. Raghavan should have gone for such critical and comparative study of Bhoja’s concept of Śabda-vṛttis. Actually he could have devoted a separate chapter to explain Bhoja’s concept of śabda-vṛttis.

‘Mithyājñāna’ seems to be, for example, not different from niścayānta sa-saṃdeha, or bhrāntimān alaṃkāra (pp. 225, ibid). The ‘pravāda’ variety is illustrated by the famous verse from the Meghadūta, viz. “ratna-cchāyā-vyatikara iva...” (pp. 226, ibid), which is for us a beautiful utprekṣā in “barheṇa iva sphurita-rucinā gopa-veśasya viṣṇoḥ.”

Bhoja then proceeds with the second variety of abhidhā, viz. ‘gauṇī’ as (pp. 226, ibid) : “gauṇī dvividhā. guṇa-nimittā, upacāra-nimittā ca. tatra yasyaṃ dvayor vacanayoḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyena vaiyadhikaraṇyena vā prayogaḥ, viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāvā’nyathā’nupapattyaikasya pratīyamāna-abhidhīyamāna-guṇa-dvāraḥ saṃbandho bhavati, sā guṇa-vyavahitārthā guṇa-nimittā.” ... guṇaḥ svārtho viśeṣaṇaṃ pravṛtti-nimittaṃ iti ca eko’rthaḥ. sa dharma-guṇa-kriyā-ākṛti-jāti-svarūpādi bhedād anantaḥ. tat sambandhena yadyapi tannimittā vṛttir ananta-prakārā eva kalpyate, tathā’pi tasyaḥ ṣaḍ eva vikalpā bhavanti mukhya-viśayaḥ, amukhya-viśayaḥ, bheda-viśayaḥ, abheda-viśayaḥ, viśeṣaṇa-viśayaḥ, a-viśeṣaṇa-viśayaḥ, iti.”

Now this again confirms our observation that the divisions and subdivisions suggested by Bhoja go with the nature of the thing described. There is hardly any logical divide. Bhoja also knows that there can be innumerable varieties that go with difference in the nature of the thing described. But he insists on six only. So, virtually there is no rhyme or rhythm in Bhoja’s

varieties except, of course, the outward system of dividing a point into six or twelve sub-varieties.

The 'upacāra' variety of gaṇī which is also six-fold is explained as (pp. 229, *ibid*), "mukhyayā gaṇyā vā anya-viśeṣaṇasya sato'nyatra āropanaṃ upacāraḥ tannimittaka-upacāra-nimittā. sā tu gaṇa-vyavahitārthatvāt gaṇī bhavati, tasyā api dharmā-guṇa-ākṛti-kriyā-svarūpa-jātyādayaḥ pravṛtti-nimitta-tadbhedāt. sā'pi ṣaḍ-prakāra bhavati-dharma-nimittā, guṇa-nimittā, ākṛti-nimittā, kriyā-nimittā, svarūpa-nimittā, jātinimittā ca."

We are reminded of the words of Visvanātha in his Sāhityadarpaṇa (S.D. II-9 vṛtti) viz. "upacāro nāma atyantam viśakalitayoḥ padārthayoḥ sādṛśyāti-śaya-mahimnā bheda-pratīti-sthagana-mātram."

Bhoja holds that lakṣaṇā is basically two-fold : (pp. 233, *ibid*) - "lakṣaṇā lakṣita-lakṣaṇā ca. tayoṛ yasyāṃ upātta-śabdasya arthasya kriyāsiddhau sādhanatva-ayogāt svārtho 'vinābhūtaṃ arthāntaram vyavahitaṃ eva lakṣayati sā lakṣaṇā, tad-vyatiriktā tu vaksyamāṇa-anekarūpā lakṣita-lakṣaṇā iti.

tatra lakṣaṇā ṣoḍhā sāmīpya-lakṣaṇā, sāhacarya-lakṣaṇā, saha-carita-lakṣaṇā, hetulakṣaṇā, tādārthya-lakṣaṇā, parimāṇa-lakṣaṇā ca.

lakṣita-lakṣaṇā'pi ṣaḍdhaiva rūdha-lakṣaṇā, pratīka-lakṣaṇā, vivakṣita-lakṣaṇā, viruddha-lakṣaṇā, tad-anya-lakṣaṇā, prakīrṇa-lakṣaṇā ca.

It is surprising that Bhoja refuses to go beyond lakṣaṇā, especially in varieties called 'vivakṣita-lakṣaṇā' and 'viruddha-lakṣaṇā' which normally for a follower of the Kashmir school, takes us further to vyañjanā and vyaṅgyārtha. Dr. Raghavan has also not discussed all this in details. On the contrary he has not at all chosen to treat the topic of śabdavṛttis in Bhoja as an independent topic. Bhoja's illustration of vivakṣita-lakṣaṇā follows his explanation of this variety such as : "yatra yathā-kathamcit śabdaprayoge vivakṣitaṃ eva lakṣyānusārato lakṣyate sā vivakṣita-lakṣaṇā" - (pp. 235 *ibid*) - The illustrations cited are - 'manasijajaitra-ratham', etc. and, 'cakita-hariṇī-hāri-netra-tribhāgaḥ'. Bhoja observes (pp. 235 *ibid*) - atra na ardha-śabdasya tribhāga-śabdasya arthaḥ, kiṃtu, tābhyāṃ asamagrā-lokanaṃ lakṣyate. na hi bhavati netra-caturbhāgo netra-ṣaḍbhāgo vā iti."

Bhoja does not go beyond lakṣaṇā here. We know that Ānandavardhana has quoted the verse viz. vrīḍāyogānnata. etc. with its fourth line ending in, “hāri-netra-tribhāgaḥ once under Dhv. III 3, 4 - with the words : “padāvayavena dyotanaṃ yathā.” Thus the part ‘tribhāgaḥ’ of the whole compound is for him suggestive of ‘rasa’. Elsewhere under Dhv. III. 33 also this illustration is quoted to explain how ‘ceṣṭāvīs'eṣa’ becomes suggestive of śṛṅgāra-rasa. Under I. 19, Kuntaka also picks up this illustration to demonstrate — viśeṣaṇa-vakratva, a variety of pada-pūrvārdha-vakratā. But Bhoja seems to be satisfied only with the secondary sense here, which is for him only ‘a-samagra-ālokanam’. Similarly Bhoja’s tad-anya-lakṣaṇā, which is illustrated by the famous verse : “suvarṇa-puṣpāṃ pṛthivīm”... etc. also ends with lakṣyārtha only. Says he — “atra na suvarṇa-śabdārtho, na api puṣpa-śabdārthaḥ kiṃtu suvarṇa-śabdena sarva-puruṣārtha-mūlaṃ hiraṇyaṃ, puṣpa-śabdena ca prasavārtho lakṣyate. tābhyāṃ ca lakṣitābhyāṃ vyavasāyināṃ puruṣa-viśeṣāṇāṃ vasumatī sarvān kāmān prasūta iti. Bhoja does not go beyond this while we know that this verse is given by Ānandavardhana under Dhv. I, 13, as an illustration of “a-vivakṣita-vācyadhvani.’ Abhinavagupta in his locana on this explains both lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā such as - (pp. 78, Edn. Dr. Nandi, Ahd. '97-'98) - “suvarṇāni puṣpyati iti suvarṇa-puṣpā. etacca vākyam eva a-sambhavad-svār-tham iti kṛtvā avivakṣita-vācyam. tata eva padārtham abhidhāya anvayaṃ ca tātparya-śaktyā avaga-māyā eva, bādhakavaśena taṃ upahatya sādṛśyāt sulabha-samṛddhi-sambhāra-janatāṃ lakṣayati. tal lakṣaṇā-prayojanaṃ śura-kṛta-vidya-sevakānāṃ prāsastyam a-śabda-vācyatvena gopyamānaṃ san nāyikā-kuca-kalaśa-yugalam iva mahārghatāṃ upanayan dhvanyate iti.” We do not know why Bhoja stops at lakṣaṇā only. But one thing is clear that though Bhoja does not mention ‘vyañgyārtha’ by name, he very much knows the same. In a number of illustrations of lakṣita-lakṣaṇā this is borne out. He observes (pp. 236 ibid) - “anye punaḥ lakṣita-lakṣaṇāṃ anyathā vyācakṣate lakṣaṇayā upacaritavṛttyā gaṇyābhīhitārthena yatra arthāntaram lakṣyate sā lakṣita-lakṣaṇā iti.” - He illustrates such a

variety by 'rathāṅga-nāma', 'pañkti-rathaḥ' etc. Then he gives poetic illustrations which for us are charged with vyañjanā also, a name which he does not mention. For example in, "parimlānaṃ pina-stana.".... etc. We have 'vadati bisinī-patra-śayanam'. Bhoja has a note (pp. 237, ibid) : "atra vadati iti anena upacāra-vṛtṭyā jñāpayati iti, parimlānaṃ ityādibhiḥ tad-dharmaih tanu-sanniveśa-cārutvotkarṣo lakṣyate." Mammaṭa has quoted this verse as an illustration of prasāda-guṇa (K. P. VIII), while Ānandavardhana, under Dhv. I. 14, takes it as an illustration of 'upacarita-śabda-vṛtṭi'. Says he, "yatra hi vyañjakatva-kṛtaṃ mahat-sanṣṭhavaṃ nāsti tatrā'pi upacarita-śabda-vṛtṭyā prasiddhyanurodha-pravartita-vyavahārāḥ kavayo dṛśyante. Read Abhinavagupta (Locana, pp. 82, Edn. Dr. Nandi) on this - "vayaṃ tu brūmaḥ - prasiddhyāṃ prayojanasya a-nighūḍhatā ityārthaḥ uttānena api rūpeṇa, tat-prayojanaṃ cakāsan nighūḍhatā nidhānavad apekṣate iti bhāvaḥ." Bhoja also cites the verse : 'niśvāsāndha ivādarśaḥ candramā na prakāśate and adds (pp. 237, ibid) "atra yathā andhe rūpa-viśeṣābhivyaṅgī na saṃbhāvyate, evaṃ tamasi api... yo rūpagrahaṇāsamarthaḥ sōndha ucyate. tatra upacarita-vṛtṭtau yo'andhavat na paśyati sa evāndha iti ucyate. iha yatra kimcit na dṛśyate tatrā'pi andha-śabdopalakṣita-lakṣaṇayā pravartate. We know that Ānandavardhana cites this verse (Dhv. II. i) as an illustration of atyanta-tiraskṛta-vācyadhvani. With this we come to the end of Bhoja's concept of abhidhā, which includes mukhyā (i. e. abhidhā proper), gauṇī and lakṣaṇā. Bhoja as observed earlier does not treat it as a special topic as is done by ālaṃkārikas of the Kashmir school of thought, but it falls under the twelve types of 'sāhitya' or relation of word and meaning in general, and of course as his illustrations suggest, with a special reference to the poetic use of word and meaning also.

With this Bhoja's treatment of abhidhā is screened.

Hemacandra

Hemacandra gives a four-fold classification of words such as—mukhya, gauna, lakṣaka and vyañjaka.

Kā.s'ā (I.15) : “mukhya-gauna-lakṣya-vyañgyārtha-bhedāt mukhya-gauna-lakṣaka-vyañjakāḥ śabdāḥ” (pp. 18, Edn. Dr. T. S. Nandi, Ahmedabad, June 2000, Pub. L. D. Institute of Indology).

He explains ‘mukhya’ artha as : “sākṣāt saṅketa-viṣayo mukhyaḥ” (K.S.I. 16, pp. 18, ibid) - He adds in this vṛtti - “avyavahānena yatra saṅketaḥ kriyate, sa mukhaṃ iva, hastādyavayavebhyaḥ prathamam pratīyate iti mukhyaḥ. sa ca jāti-guṇa-kriyā-dravya-rūpaḥ, tad-viṣayaḥ śabdo mukhyo vācakaḥ iti ca ucyate. yathā gauḥ, śuklaḥ, calati, devadatta iti. yad āha - mahābhāṣyakāraḥ - ‘catuṣṭayī śabdānām pravṛtṭiḥ’ iti.

Hemacandra is clearly under the impression of both Mukula and Mammaṭa. But the chief merit of this ācārya is that he puts things with absolute clarity and lucidity. He observes that the discussion of the nature of ‘jāti’ and the like is irrelevant to the point and is therefore not discussed here : “jātyādi-svarūpaṃ ca prakṛta-anupayogāt na iha vipaṅcyate.” He refers in brief to the views on saṅketagrahaṇa such as : “jātiḥ eva saṅketa-viṣaya iti eke. tadvān iti apare, apoha iti anye.”

Though Hemacandra has not elaborated this topic in the body of his text which he calls the kā.śā and alaṃkāra-cūḍāmaṇi, the name given by him to his svopajñā vṛtti, he discusses at length in his ‘viveka’ a commentary attached to the text, but also written by himself. Obviously, he has written ‘viveka’ for the more advanced students of this śāstra, i. e. literary aesthetics. He says : (pp. 1, Edn. kā. śā. with Viveka, by Prof. R. C. Parikh and Prof. Dr. V. M. Kulkarni, Bombay, '64) -

“vivarīkartuṃ kvacid dṛbḍham
navam sandarbhitaṃ kvacit,
kāvyānuśāsanasyāyam
vivekaḥ pravitanayate.”

‘to explain something presented, and to add something fresh — this viveka is presented at length.’ So, in his ‘viveka’ on sūtra I. 16 Kā.S’ā he has covered everything that is read in Mammaṭa and Mukula. Hemacandra observes : (pp. 43, ibid)

“catuṣṭayī iti. jāti-śabdāḥ guṇa-śabdāḥ, kriyāśabdāḥ yadṛcchā-śabdāśca tathā hi-sarveṣāṃ śabdānāṃ svārthābhīdhānāya pravartamānānāṃ upādhi-upadarśita-viṣaya-vivekatvāt upādhi-nibandhanā pravṛttiḥ.

upādhiśca dvividhaḥ — vakṛṣ-sanniveśitaḥ, vastudharmaśca. tatra yo vakṛṣ-trā yadṛcchayā tat-tat-saṃjñi-ṣaya-śakti-abhi-vyakti-dvāreṇa tasmin tasmin saṃjñini niveśyate sa vakṛṣ-sanniveśitaḥ. yathā dīthādīnāṃ śabdānāṃ antya-buddhi-nirgrāhyaṃ saṃhṛta-svarūpam. tat khalu tāṃ tāṃ abhīdhāśaktim abhivyañjayatā vakṛṣ-trā yadṛcchayā tasmin tasmin saṃjñini upādhitayā sanniveśyate ataḥ tannibandhanā yadṛcchā-śabdāḥ dīthādāya.”

Hemacandra now makes an interesting note : yeṣāṃ api ca ḍa-kārādi-varṇa-vyatirikta-saṃhṛta-krama-svarūpābhāvāt na dīthādī-śabda-svarūpam saṃhṛtakramam saṃjñiṣu adhyavasyata iti darśanam, teṣāṃ api vakṛṣ-yadṛcchā-abhivyañyamāna-śakti-bhedānusāreṇa kālpanika-samudāya-rūpasya dīthādeḥ śabdasya tat tat saṃjñā'bhīdhānāya pravartamānatvād yadṛcchā śabdatvam upapadyata eva. - This is from Mukula- (pp-5 ibid). Hemacandra then gives the two varieties of vastudharma, such as siddha, and sādhya. He proceeds exactly in the fashion of Mammaṭa and Mukula and also quotes from the Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari —

He also discusses the views of kevala-jātivādins, jāti-ṣiṣṭa-vyaktivādins and apohavādins !

The second opinion - viz. ‘tadvān’ is explained by Hemacandra as : (pp. 44, ibid) -

“jāter artha-kriyāyām anupayogāt viphalam saṃketaḥ. yad-āha

“na hi jātir dāha-pākādau upayujyate iti vyakteśca artha-kriyā-kāritve api ānantya-vyabhicārābhyām na saṃketaḥ kartum śakyate iti jātyupahitā vyaktiḥ śabdārthaḥ.”

Now this can be placed with Māṅkīyacandra's remark in his saṅketa on the K. P. (pp. 15, ibid) :

“vyaktestu arthakriyākāritve api ānantya-vyabhicārābhyām na saṅketaḥ kartuṃ śakyate iti jātimatī vyaktiḥ śabdārtha iti vaiśeṣikādayaḥ.”

We do not know who has influenced whom as both Hemacandra and Māṅkīyacandra were almost contemporary. (See Dr. De, Dr. Kane).

On 'apoha' also H.C.'s remarks are almost identical and then more explanatory with those passed by M. C. - M.C. reads : (pp. 15, ibid)

‘apoha iti’ - jāti-vyakti-tadyoga-jāti mad buddhyākārāṇām śabdārthatvasya anupapadyamānatvāt gavayādi śabdānām a-go-vyāvṛtṭyādi-rūpaḥ apohaḥ śabdārtha iti bauddhāḥ”

H. C. (pp. 44, ibid) reads :

jāti-vyakti-tadyoga-jātimad-buddhyākārāṇām śabdārthatvasya anupapadyamānatvāt gavādi-śabdānām a-go-vyāvṛtṭyādirūpas tad-viśiṣṭaṃ vā buddhi-pratibiṃbakaṃ sarvathā bāhyārtha-sparśa-sūnyam anyāpoha-śabda-vācyam śabdārtha iti.”

Clearly H. C. seems to offer better comments. Again M. C. has 'gavayādi śabdānām', and H. C. has 'gavādi śabdānām' which makes better sense. Then the remark - 'tad-viśiṣṭaṃ vā....' in H. C. also are further explanatory. Thus, our impression, is that perhaps H. C. had M.C.'s 'saṅketa' before him, though he may be himself a senior contemporary of M.C.

Ācārya Hemacandra, the author of Kāvyaṅuśāsana revives a forgotten or better say forsaken tradition of taking 'gauṇī' and 'lakṣaṇa' as independent word-powers, separate and distinct from each other. We had seen earlier how, Bhoja had clubbed 'gauṇī' and 'lakṣaṇā' as part of abhidhā. We will have to refer once again to Bhoja in brief because Hemacandra seems to come closer to Bhoja in his concepts of 'gauṇī' and lakṣaṇā, though of course Bhoja did not give these two any status independent of abhidhā. Bhoja first of all enumerates 12 relations of word and sense./Bhoja (11.223, Josyer Edn.) observes : “tatra abhidhā-vivakṣā-

tātparya-pravibhāga-vyapekṣā-sāmar-thya-anvaya-ekārthībhāva-doṣahāna -
guṇopādāna - alaṃkārayoga - rasa-avi-yoga-rūpāḥ śabdārthayor dvādaśa
samarthāḥ sāhityaṃ iti ucyate.”

teṣu śabdasya arthābhidhāyinī śaktir abhidhā, tayā svarupa iva abhidheye
pravartamānaḥ śabdaḥ vṛtti-trayeṇa vartate, tās ca mukhyā, gauṇī, lakṣaṇās
tisraḥ tatra sāksād avyavahitārthābhidhāyikā mukhyā gamyamāna-
śauryādiguṇayoga-vyavahitārthā gauṇī. Svārtha-avinābhūtārthāntaropalakṣaṇā
tu lakṣaṇeti.”

Bhoja (pp. 226, ibid) continues - “gauṇī dvidhā, guṇanimittā, upacāra-
nimittā ca.

We have discussed these observations of Bhoja on an earlier occasion
but here we will once again go through Bhoja’s writing for attempting a
comparative study of Bhoja and Hemacandra. Bhoja’s abhidhā is ‘that
power of word which expresses meaning. Now here ‘śabdasya
arthābhidhāyinī śaktir’ can be one which directly expresses the meaning or
indirectly also. When it directly expresses the meaning it is termed as
'mukhyā' i.e. principal. Bhoja observes that a word operates in its meaning
(this is strange, because we normally say that a meaning stays in a
word) — “svarūpe iva abhidheye pravartamānaḥ śabdaḥ — in three-fold
way. Thus there are three functions — ‘vṛttitraya’ of a word wherein his
'mukhyā' which directly and without any interference gives a meaning is
the first sub-variety of ‘abhidhā’, which is our normal abhidhā of the
ālaṃkārikas of the Kashmere school, Abhinavagupta, Mammaṭa and
Hemacandra including.

Bhoja’s ‘gauṇī’ is peculiar. He observes : “gamyamāna-śauryādi
guṇayoga-vyavahitārthā gauṇī.” So, for Bhoja ‘gauṇī’ is that variety of
abhidhā which has connection with a meaning which is
'gamyamāna' — implied, and not sāksāt — or directly connected. Again
this meaning is of the nature of such qualities as ‘śaurya’ i. e. bravery and
the like. Thus this variety of abhidhā is connected with implied quality.

Bhoja does not term it as subordinate but it is 'a-mukhyā' in the sense that his mukhyā variety of abhidhā yields a direct meaning and his 'gauṇī' yields gamyamāna i. e. implied meaning. On the other hand we will go to see that for Hemacandra, and even for the earlier Mīmāṃsā thinking which talked of 'gauṇa' function, 'gauṇī' was a secondary function i. e. 'a-mukhya' in the etymological sense, i. e. not-principal function. Again, Hemacandra's concepts of 'gauṇī' and 'lakṣaṇā' are not absolutely identical with those of Bhoja and this will be clear from the following discussion. But for the present we continue with Bhoja who observes : (pp. 226, ibid) "gauṇī dvidhā, guṇa-nimittā, upacāra-nimittā."

Thus 'guṇa' and 'upacāra' are distinct entities with Bhoja. For the Kashmere tradition normally we have a division between sādharma-mūla identification and sādharmyetaramūla i. e. upacāra-mūla identification. But Hemacandra, as we will go to analyse his concepts of gauṇī and lakṣaṇā does not base his classification on similarity i. e. sādharma or non-similarity. He has some other base of distinction. So, his 'gauṇī' thus viewed comes closer to that of Bhoja who has a 'guṇa-nimittā' and 'upacāra-nimittā' gauṇī. Bhoja observes that in his gauṇī, words are placed either in 'sāmānādhikarāṇya' or 'vaiyadhikarāṇya' and on account of the viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva which is not understood otherwise — "anyathā-anupapattyā" there emerges a sort of relation between two words through implied and stated quality. This relationship is promoted or caused by guṇa and hence is termed guṇa-nimittā gauṇī.

Bhoja explains 'upacāra' (pp. 229, ibid) as that state of things where someone else's quality is superimposed on someone else. This 'upacāra' for Bhoja takes place at both the levels i. e. at mukhya and gauṇa level : "mukhyayā gauṇyā vā anya-viśeṣaṇasya sato'nyatra āropanam upacārah." "sā tu gauṇa-vyavahitārthatvāt gauṇī bhavati." Qualities of say a solid substance, if superimposed on an abstract thing it is upacāra for Bhoja. Basically anya-dharmasya anyatra-āropana may be or may not be inspired

by similarity. As noted above in ‘guṇanimittā gauṇī’ two words either in sāmānādhikarāṇya or vaiyadhikarāṇya are brought together and there has to be established a relationship of viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva, which as there is no other choice — anyathā anupapattyā — has to be substantiated through the qualities these two words convey, in one case implicitly conveyed and in the other directly conveyed. So, a sort of similarity between these qualities is expected by Bhoja. In upacāra there is no comparison but superimposition of say ‘A’s qualities on ‘B’. It may be noted that ‘B’ has nothing of it, or say, ‘B’ is incapable of having these qualities. Thus, in “bhavati ruṣi kathorā, kiṅtu ramyā mṛgāksī” or, in “tālaiḥ siñjad-valaya-subhagaiḥ, nartitaḥ kāntayā me” - the qualities of “kathora” and “subhaga” go with a physical entity-mūrtimad-dravya and prāṇi-viśeṣa, but they are superimposed on anger (roṣa), and twinkling bangles (śiñjad-valaya).

Now in this ‘upacāra’ the meaning is secondarily imposed and hence it is ‘upacāra-nimittā-gauṇī for Bhoja.

Lakṣaṇā for Bhoja is also two-fold viz. lakṣaṇā and lakṣita-lakṣaṇā. When for the realisation of meaning of a given word, on account of there being no other instrumentality available, a meaning indicates another meaning which is having a relation of ‘a-vinābhāva’ it is a case of lakṣaṇā which is six-fold.” taylor (i. e. between lakṣaṇā and lakṣita-lakṣaṇā) yasyām upāttaśabdasyārthasya kriyā-siddhau sādhanatvā’yogāt svārtho’vinābhūtam arthāntaram vyavahitam eva lakṣayati sā lakṣaṇā, tadvyatiriktā tu vakṣyamāṇā’neka-rūpā lakṣita-lakṣaṇā, iti. Bhoja says that the ‘arthāntara’ which is having a close-connection (= avinābhāva) such as closeness or sāmīpya, comes up in lakṣaṇā. The illustrations are ‘gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ’ ‘mañicāḥ krośanti’ etc. Sāhacarya lakṣaṇā is seen in ‘kuntān praveśaya’, ‘chatriṇo gacchanti’, etc. Bhoja’s concept of lakṣita-lakṣaṇā is hazy. It is certainly not lakṣaṇā mounted on lakṣaṇā-which is rejected by Mammata. Whatever is not guided by sāmīpya, sāhacarya, saha-carita, hetu, tādarthya, and pariṇāma — is lakṣita-lakṣaṇā, which includes rūḍha-lakṣaṇā as in

dvirepha — which is only abhidhā for Hemacandra, and pratīka-lakṣaṇā, viruddha-lakṣaṣā, tad-anya-lakṣaṇā, prakīrṇa-lakṣaṇā etc. But for Hemacandra 'gauṇī', and 'lakṣaṇā' are clearly distinct.

Hemacandra at Kā.Sā. I. 17 explains, 'gauṇa' artha and at I. 18 explains 'lakṣya' artha and at Kā.Sā. I. 20 he enumerates the functions of a word. We will examine 'gauṇī' and 'lakṣaṇā' that tend to deliver 'gauṇa' and 'lakṣya' meanings respectively as follows.

Kā.Sā I-17 talks of 'gauṇa' meaning as : "mukhyārthabādhe, nimitte, prayojane ca bhedābhedābhyāṃ āropito gauṇaḥ." This 'gauṇa' meaning for Hemacandra is caused when (i) primary meaning is contradicted, (ii) when there is 'nimitta' i. e. 'tadyoga' and (iii) when there is 'prayojana' i. e. motive. This 'gauṇa' is superimposed either through non-identity or 'bheda', or through identity i.e. 'a-bheda'.

Hemacandra explains in his vṛtti - 'gaur vāhīkaḥ', 'gaur evā'yam' ityādaṃ mukhyasya arthasya sāsṇādīmattvād pratyakṣādinā pramāṇena bādhe, nimitte ca sādṛśya-saṃbandhādaṃ, prayojane ca sādṛśya-tādrūpya-pratīpattirūpe sati, āropya-āropa-viṣayayor bhedā'bhedena ca samāropito'tathābhūto'pi tathātvenā'dhyavasito, guṇebhya āyātattvād gauṇaḥ, tadviṣayaḥ śabdopi gauṇaḥ, upacarita iti co'cyate."

This meaning and the word conveying this meaning are both designated as 'gauṇa'. It is also called 'upacarita'. The illustrations are 'gaur vāhīkaḥ' and 'gaurevā'yam'. The first illustration clearly mentions both 'gauḥ' the object superimposed, and the person — vāhīka — the subject on whom the object is superimposed. Thus 'viṣaya' and 'viṣayin' are clearly mentioned — 'bhedena'. In the other illustration only the 'viṣayin' figures and so this is 'a-bhedena āropa'. The direct meaning of 'gauḥ' — an animal having dewlap, etc. — is contradicted by direct perception or pratyakṣa-pramāṇa as we can see that 'vāhīka' is a human being and not a bull. This superimposition is caused due to 'nimitta' — others call it tadyoga — in form of similarity in qualities possessed by both the vāhīka and the bull. The qualities are those of dullness and stupidity. They are similar in both the viṣaya and the viṣayin. The

motive is to suggest the extreme similarity or one-ness between the subject and the object. This meaning is derived through 'guṇa' and is therefore termed 'gauṇa'. The relation was that of sādrśya.

But when the relation is that of kārya-kāraṇa etc., i. e. anything other than sādrśya, then also 'gauṇī' takes place, says Hemacandra. Thus kāryakāraṇabhāva is at the base of the illustration viz. 'āyur ghṛtam' (bhedena) and 'ayur eva idam' (abhedena); tādārthya is illustrated in 'indrāḥ', for 'indrārthā sthūnā', sva-svāmibhāva is in, 'rājā' for rājakīyaḥ puruṣaḥ', or 'grāmaḥ' for 'grāma-svāmī', agramātre avayave 'agraḥ' etc. Here, it may be noted that we have all cases of abhedena — āropaḥ as 'viṣaya' is not separately mentioned. These illustrations are in a way dubious. This will be seen when we discuss Hemacandra's 'lakṣya' artha and 'lakṣaṇā vṛtti'.

Kā.S'ā I. 18 says -

“mukhyārtha-saṃbaddhas tattvena

lakṣyamāṇo lakṣyaḥ.”

This means that the connected meaning which is indicated as identical with the primary meaning is called 'lakṣya'. While in 'gauṇī' for Hemacandra there is superimposition of one object over another one either through complete identification i. e. a-bheda or through difference i. e. bheda, in 'lakṣaṇā' there is superimposition of 'one meaning' over 'another meaning' through a-bheda or complete identity only. The two meanings denote two objects but they are derived from one and the same word. Say for example 'gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ', wherein there is identity between two objects viz. the current of the 'gaṅgā' and the bank of the gaṅgā. But these two objects are not separately or inseparately mentioned as is the case in 'gaur vāhikaḥ' or 'gaur eva ayam'. From the word 'gaṅgā' these two are understood and there is superimposition, through absolute identity, of the meaning of the current of gaṅgā on the meaning of the bank of 'gaṅgā' both of which are expressed through one and the same word i.e. 'gaṅgāyāṃ'. Hemacandra observes in his vṛtti - (pp. 45, Edn. Kulkarni & Parikh)

“Mukhyo'rtho gaṅgādiśabdānām srotāḥ-prabhṛtiḥ, tena sambaddhaḥ taṭādir arthaḥ tattvena abhedena lakṣyamāṇo lakṣyaḥ. tattvena lakṣyamāṇa itī vacanād bhedābhedābhyām āropita itī na vartate. śeṣam tu gaṇa-lakṣaṇam anuvartate eva. tadviśayo śabdo lakṣakaḥ yathā gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ, kuntāḥ, praviśanti. atra gaṅgāyām ghoṣādḥikaraṇatvasya, kuntānām praveśasya ca asaṃbhavāt mukhyārtha-bādhāḥ sāmīpyam sāhacaryam ca nimittam. gaṅgātata itī kuntavanta itī ca prayogāt yeśam na tathā pratītiḥ teśam pāvanatva-raudratvādīnām dharmānām tathā-pratīpādanam prayojanam.”

Thus, the difference between gaṇī and lakṣaṇā for Hemacandra is that while in gaṇī there is superimposition of one object over another object, i.e. one thing over another thing. This is realised either through complete identification or through a state where both are separately mentioned. On the other hand in lakṣaṇā there is also superimposition. But it takes place at meaning level. There is superimposition of the meaning of something over the meaning of another thing but both are mentioned through one and the same word. Again this superimposition is through absolute identity, 'gaṅgā-tata' and 'gaṅgā-pravāha' are not separately mentioned as in gaur-vāhikaḥ, but their meanings are identified through a common expression viz. 'gaṅgā'.

We observed that some illustrations of 'a-bhedena gaṇārtha' such as 'indrāḥ', 'takṣā', 'ādḥakaḥ', 'raktaḥ', 'grāmaḥ', seem to be 'in a way dubious'. This is so because here also the meanings of two separate objects, not directly and separately mentioned, are taken as one; the colour is 'raktaḥ', the cloth is 'red cloth' or 'raktaḥ pataḥ', but only one word is used for two meanings. Even in lakṣaṇā this happens. Two meanings of two different words are identified through a common expression. Thus the sacrificial post for Indra is said to be Indra. This is gaṇī. But here also meanings indicated by an identical word are identified through complete identity — 'a bhedena'. It would have been better if like Mammaṭa and many others Hemacandra also had mentioned 'gaṇī' as a subvariety of lakṣaṇā based on similarity, the rest being śuddhā lakṣaṇā.

May be Hemacandra was guided by one criterion. It can be this. In all illustrations of *gauṇī* of two varieties, the two objects were different from each other. In *lakṣaṇā* the object is the same but two things connected with the same object are identified e.g. 'ghosa' and 'pravāha' — both belong to Gaṅgā. But this is also not applicable in 'kuntāḥ praviśanti'. So, it seems there is no logic in his approach. He finally observes (pp. 46) "yatra ca vastvantare vastvantaraṃ upacaryate sa gauṇaḥ arthaḥ, yatra tu na tathā sa lakṣya iti vivekaḥ."

Thus the classification of *lakṣaṇā* into *gauṇī* and *śuddhā* as presented by Mammaṭa seems more natural. Hemacandra's effort to distinguish between two *śabda-vṛttis* such as *gauṇī* and *lakṣaṇā* which for him are independent of each other, appears to be unnatural or acquired. Thus, the only point of difference is that in *lakṣaṇā* the meaning indicated is 'tattvena lakṣyamāṇaḥ', i. e. is indicated through identity, while in 'gauṇī' it is either through identity or through difference also i. e. 'bhedaḥbhedena'. But the thin line demarcating 'abhedena gauṇī' and 'tattvena lakṣaṇā' remains undefined clearly. For Hemachandra himself says, "śeṣaṃ tu gauṇa-lakṣaṇaṃ anuvartata eva." At the same time one thing, for sure, is clear that Hemacandra's 'gauṇī', is not the same as 'gauṇī' variety of *lakṣaṇa* as conceived by Mammaṭa, or even that of Bhoja. Perhaps in recognising *gauṇī* as a separate *vṛtti*, Bhoja's influence was responsible.



