

Anekanta

Philosophy of Co-existence

Acharya Mahapragya

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Forewords

Reality and Non-reality has been the subject of discussion from ancient times. During the Philosophical era, this matter was discussed deeply and critically. The discussion is still going on. Some philosophers consider reality as eternal and transcendental. Some believe it as transitory. Jain philosophy considers this subject with the perspective of *Anekānta*. According to it, there is no contradiction between eternal and transitory. Through harmony or relativity, the co-existence between the two is accomplished.

It is only discussed and analysed elaborately in this book. The efforts of Muni Akshay prakashji in editing this book is notable. The collaboration of Bajrang Jain has also been there.

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**Sri Dungargarh
Rajasthan, India**

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Technical Terms

Adharmāstikāya- Fundamental substance quâ medium of rest- one of the six fundamental **Dravyas** (substances) or five **Astikāyas** (extended substances); the substance which is the unique inevitable medium of rest, passively assisting in the rest of the **jīvas** (souls) and **Pudgalas** (physical substances) which are apt to undertake rest; it is only one (single) in number with respect to substance; it is eternal with respect to time, noncorporeal (i.e. devoid of colour etc.) with respect to mode; it is pervading the whole **Loka** (cosmos) with respect to space; it has innumerable number of **Pradeśas** (indivisible units); it is antithesis of **Dharmāstikāya** (fundamental substance quâ medium of motion).

Adhyavasāya- A subtle level of consciousness, at which its interaction takes place with the **karma-śarīra** (Karmic body).

Agurulaghukagūṇa-	One type of the Sāmānya Guṇa (generic quality); that quality or mode of a substance, which is responsible for keeping intact the existence of the substance.
Akāśastikāya-	Extended existence quâ space – That Dravya (substance), whose Lakṣaṇa (distinguishing characteristic) is to provide room to all other substances.
Anekānta-	Non- absolutist view – The approach which takes cognizance of both the identity and difference, that exist among the origination, cessation and persistence.
Arthakriyā	The potency inherent in the substance for doing any work.
Dharmāstikāya-	Medium of motion – One of the six fundamental Dravyas (substances) or five Astikāyas (extended substances); The substance, which is the unique inevitable medium of motion, passively assisting in the motion of the Jīvas (souls or living beings) and the pudgalas (physical substances), which are apt to undertake motion; it is only one

(single) in number with respect to substance; it is eternal, non-corporeal (i.e., devoid of colour etc.); it is pervading the whole **Loka** (cosmos); it has innumerable number of **Pradeśas** (the indivisible units of the substance); it is antithesis of **Adharmāstikāya** (fundamental substance quâ medium of rest).

Dravyārthika Naya - Stand Point quâ substance – That intended purpose of the knower, which, by subordinating the **paryāyā** (mode), apprehends the **Dravya** (substance); through it, only the aspect of permanence of the substance is taken into account (ignoring the aspect of transitoriness).

Evambhūta - Actualistic standpoint – The last one of the seven kinds of **Naya** (non-absolutistic standpoint) ; The non absolutistic standpoint which accepts only the employment of that word which actually excercises the activity connoted by it; e.g., the teacher is only one who is actually employed in the activity of teaching.

Jīvāstikāya

The Totality of all **Jīvas** (comprising of infinite number of **Jīva Dravya**), which is possessed of the quality of **upayoga** (consciousness or the activity of sentience).

Naigama Naya -

Pantoscopic (figurative or conventional) Naya (non absolutistic standpoint)

1. The view-point which takes stock of both bheda(difference) and abheda(identity).
2. The view-point which is cognizant of the intention (of the speaker).

Naya -

Non-absolutistic standpoint, view-point or a way of approach and observation – Cognizance of a single attribute of an object possessed of infinite attributes. A view-point expressing the intention of the speaker (knower), which takes cognizance of a particular (intended) aspect of object, apprehended through **Pramāṇa** (Valid organ of knowledge), and which does not repudiate the other aspects (of that reality).

Niksepa -	The deposition of the power of expressing the specific meaning in words through the strength of qualifying adjuncts.
Paryāyārthika Naya -	Standpoint quâ mode- The Naya (standpoint) which takes cognizance only of <i>Bheda</i> (difference).
Prameya -	(Cognizable) Object of Pramāṇ - A limb of logic (nyāya); that vastu Which is anekāntātmatka-that which is possessed of mutually opposite attributes.
Pramāṇa -	Valid organ of knowledge – A limb of logic (nyāya); that valid cognition, which is without doubt and contradiction.
Pudgalāstikāya -	That Astikāya (extended substance) in the form of Pudgala (physical substance)- The totality of all Paramāṇuṣ (the ultimate atoms) and Skandhas (the material aggregates) made up of Paramāṇuṣ
Rjusūtra Naya -	Straight and direct approach – A type of Naya (non-absolutistic

stand point); that **Naya**, which takes cognizance of the actually present mode.

Śabda Naya -

Those Nayas (non-absolutistic standpoints), in which the literal aspect is more significant than the aspect of meaning (or purport).

Samābhirūḍha

Naya -

Etymological Naya (non-absolutistic standpoint)- That **Naya**, which makes difference even in the synonyms on the basis of differences in their etymological meanings.

Samgarhanaya -

Synthetic Naya (non-absolutistic standpoint) - That view-point, which apprehends only the general (i.e. common character), (disregarding the specific one);

Samyagdarsana:

By which one can attain the right perception free from doubt and perverseness.

Vyavahāranaya –

Empirical view-point - That view-point, which takes cognizance of the character of a real as it is understood by common people, e.g. the big black bee is black



The truth attained through right vision can only be witnessed and propagated. This visualisation does not come through logic, it gives indirect knowledge but not direct knowledge. When there is visualization the essence of truth comes before us. The whole approach has been formed on the basis of canonical literature which is capable of defining the material sciences and which makes the base for the development of philosophy. Let this be the base of our approach that may take us towards the truth.

Key- Words

<i>Agam</i>	- canonical literature
<i>Chattanyadwait</i>	- duality of consciousness
<i>Kashaya</i>	- passions
<i>Kevali</i>	- omniscient
<i>Shastras</i>	- sacred text
<i>Sadhak</i>	- the person who is engaged in spiritualism
<i>Pramana Shastra</i>	- science of valid cognition
<i>Padartha Shastra</i>	- material science
<i>Sneh</i>	- affinity

1. Truth is Multidimensional

I have studied the canonical literature (*Agams*) of Jains. The study has given rise to the approach that the right vision and the right view are the two rudiments of Jain philosophy. There are many philosophies propounded by many philosophers. It all depends on one's approach. But the criterion I have adopted is that one who has overcome the passions (*Kashaya*) like anger, ego, worldly possessions, greed etc. can achieve right vision and right view. He does not see through his eyes but he sees through his inner eyes. Whatever is seen through the inner eyes, is the truth. There are many philosophies before us. Many persons have gone through them. Unless we create our own vision we cannot reach even the threshold of philosophy. It has been taken for granted that whatever our ancestors have seen, the philosophy ended there. There was nothing beyond that. Majority of the philosophers are seen to have engaged themselves in translating the scriptures of the ancestors or writing new edition for them or interpreting their views only.

An important fact has emerged that there are several modes of substances. They cannot be expressed but known and the super sensuous can know them properly. Modes are innumerable.

They cannot be propounded. Even they cannot be explained by the omniscient. The reason is obvious that the modes are innumerable and the span of life is very short. Even Language has limited power. In such a short span of life one cannot propound the limitless. Whether he is omniscient or *Kevali* he has explained only a limited number of religions, has explained some parts of substances or numbered matters and has not enunciated even the innumerable. The question of knowing the limitless is unthinkable. That means the door for the quest of truth is ajar. If everything had been explained, then nothing had been left for us to explain. It would have been a repetition only. But the fact is that everything has not been said or known. It is our duty to explore what has not been explained and what is unknown and form an approach. Whatever has not been explained is much more than whatever has been said or known. *Uttaradhyana Sutra* has supported this approach. It has been saying that '***Appana Sachchameseja***' i.e. makes search for the truth all by you. If everything would have been known then there was no need to make a search for the truth. Since all is not known neither explained therefore the door of quest for truth is open before us. There is a need for forming a right vision to make search for the truth.

Right vision can be attained easily and also it can be attained by practice and effort. There are many Rishis and Arahats

who had never studied the *Shastras* (sacred text) but they have propounded great truths. How an illiterate can propound such a big truth? This can be a big question but this has answered in a beautiful manner. It has explained that there are ten tastes. The first taste among them is the taste of natural endowment (*Nisarga Ruchi*). A man who never reads the scriptures nor hears them but his passion is subdued; he can easily catch sight of the truth. There have been many such *Rishis* in the legacy of our philosophy. Whether the *Rishis* belong to the *Upanishad* or the *Ishibhasian* or belonging to the legacy of any other form they were visionary. The visionary *Rishis* have enunciated many truths and parts of truth.

A background has created before us to form a broad vision. Our approach will only be narrow if we think through the limits of a single sect. If it is said that whatever has been said and seen in a particular sect was an absolute philosophy then this approach is narrow. If we think beyond the narrow limits of a sect then only our approach broadens. One whose soul is pure, passions abated, conscience purified, only his vision makes a strong base for an approach to the quest of truth.

The taste of natural endowment has become a base for a broader view for me. This is not bound by any sect. This taste of natural endowment is not limited to any sect whether, it is Nyaya Darshan, Vaisheshika Darshan or Jain Darshan. It can happen to any sect, space and time. A person whose soul has

been purified to a certain extent and who has attained right vision through abatement of passions is a visionary. The ultimate truth is that philosophy cannot be enunciated without right vision.

The reason is obvious. When the feelings of attachment and jealousy are dominant, truth cannot be propounded. If truth is not propounded then element or transcendental elements cannot be enunciated. We cannot keep it in the category of philosophy because there may be partiality due to attachment to any sect or the truth may be neglected due to jealousy with other sect. Due to this attachment and jealousy truth disappears. When we go beyond these passions our vision becomes unattached and non-jealous. The unbiased and unattached vision is right vision. The truth propounded in a state of unattachment, is philosophy.

At present the scope of philosophy is far reaching. In the ancient times the studies of material science was within the bounds of philosophy. In the Middle Ages *Pramana Shastra* (science of valid cognition) was also taken at par with philosophy. Philosophy has two main parts namely *Padartha Shastra* (material science) and *Pramana Shastra*. *Nyaya* system of philosophy is a *Pramana Shastra*. *Vaisheshika* philosophy is material science. There is difference between the two. The *Nyaya Shastra* is also called philosophy as the *Vaisheshika* but in the ancient context the *Vaisheshika* is a

philosophy whereas *Nyaya* is a *Shastra*. Logic or *Pramana Shastra* is a criterion to testify philosophy. In the times of the Rishis and visionaries, there was no need for logic or valid cognition. Whatever they said was proof. The science of logic evolved when the Rishis and the super visionaries (*Atindriya Drasta*) did not exist. When the Rishis departed the people asked, “What will become of us?” The Rishis said, “Do not worry, we are leaving logic behind.”

At present logic has become an important part of philosophy. Because of this, we are going far away from the truth. Logic cannot take us to the truth. If we could reach truth through logic, there would not have been any place for caste and deceit in *Nyaya Shastra*. Logic is mainly limited to victory and defeat. The person whose logic is strong wins and the person, whose logic is weak, is defeated. When there was a question of winning and defeat arguments went on among the philosophers. At that time logic and *Pramāna Shāstra* became important. It can be seen in logic as to how by saying *Navakambal* one can defeat the other. *Navakambal* has two meanings – nine Kambal and new Kambal. Some one said 'Nine Kambal' some other said 'New Kambal'. This deceit that entered philosophy and *Pramana Shastra* clearly showed our approach of increasing the number of sects and a basis for winning and defeat. Then the aim of making a search for truth went into the background.

The Jain philosophy has given utmost importance to unattachment with the worldliness. Therefore, there was no place for deceit and caste nor winning and defeat. Though I cannot say that in the middle ages our ancestor Acharya were not quite unattached, there was enough striving for unattachment. Our resolution should be to make a search for truth. Whatever is attainment through a search for truth is the real philosophy. It means that the philosopher and the Sadhak (one who is engaged in spiritual exercises) are one. The person who is engaged in spiritualism (*Sadhak*) is a philosopher and the philosopher is a *Sadhak*. One who is not a *Sadhak* will not be a philosopher. He will embark in deceit, caste and fraud. Therefore, I prefer the words – philosopher saint. One who is a philosopher and also a saint is philosopher saint.

The truth attained through the right vision can only be witnessed and propagated. This visualisation does not come through logic, it gives indirect knowledge but not direct knowledge. When there is visualization the essence of truth comes before us.

It has been said in Asthanang Sutra that whatever is there in this world is the combination of two words. They appear in two terms. One is the soul or sentient and the other non sentient. These are visualized facts and these have also been propounded. There are two types of material substance – one

is with form and the other is without form. The theory of abstract is an important theory of Jain philosophy. The four words are very important –transient and intransient, worldly and unworldly.

The Jain philosophy is based on dualism. In the philosophy of non-dualism, those who are the believer of duality of consciousness (*Chattanyadwait*) accept that everything is born of consciousness. According to the school of non-sentientism, everything crops up from unconscious matter. Creation of unconscious objects from conscious and of conscious from unconscious both remained undual. In such a state there is a third option of dualism wherein both sentient and non-sentient matter has independent existence. None has born from the other. In Jain philosophy ten rules have been propounded- one of them is that no sentient matter will ever be non-sentient and no non-sentient will be sentient. Both have independent existence. None will emerge from the other and will not dissolve into the other. The dualist have established that there are sentient and non-sentient matter both having independent existence.

This dualistic approach has given rise to a question. If the body is insentient and the soul of the body is sentient then how it can be said that it has independent existence. In fact, both are intertwined. This question was subject of argument in the Indian philosophy and more so in the western philosophy.

What is the relation between the two? Jain philosophy has tried to explain the same that the relationship is not artificial but natural. The sentient have the capability to adopt the physical substance. That capability is called affinity (*Sneh*). The sentient beings have the quality of *Sneh* that can absorb the physical substance. A relationship can be established between the two. The sentient has a relationship with the non-sentient but they are not the same. Both have independent existence. They live together but are not same. They are together like the sun and the shade but they are not one. They have no unison. Their independent existence is never lost. The physical substance makes some impression on the sentient and it is so forceful that it makes it equal to non-sentient but cannot totally dissolve into the sentient.

In the *Nandi Sutra* it has been beautifully explained that howsoever dense the cloud may be the separate existence of day and night will remain. Similarly, the physical substance covers the non-sentient substance and makes it close to non-sentient. Even then it cannot make it non-sentient. The existence of the non-sentient never dissolves. This is the sign of its independent existence. There is a special trait in it. This trait is perhaps never explained in philosophy. It is the existence of *Agurulaghu* (no big and no small). This helps in establishing its existence. It is always alert and remains as a watchdog. It does not stir a substance and always gives its

own form to the substance. Had it not been so, the substance would have stirred a substance and the mode would have stirred a mode. There has been a big discovery of right vision and that is *Agurulaghu* trait and the mode of *Agurulaghu*. The trait of *Agurulaghu* is the main base of our existence. It maintains our existence. If we see the outer base of substance, we find many elements that can dissolve our existence but this is an inner power. Very few people are aware of this power. This power is the trait of *Agugrulaghu*, which poses no danger to our existence.

The whole approach has been formed on the basis of canonical literature which is capable of defining the material sciences and which make the base for the development of philosophy. Let this be the base of our approach that may take us towards the truth.

To sum up and conclude it can be said that the attainment of right vision is an achievement of philosophy. The evolution of right vision is the evolution of philosophy. The manifestation of right vision is the manifestation of philosophy. We cannot talk of philosophy without having right vision. We talk of the *Pramana Shastra* but the means to reach the material science or real substance is only right vision. This fact needs to be realised.



Truth is one. Its explanation has many forms and its comprehension is also difficult. Entire truth cannot be expressed. Only partial truth can be expressed. The principle of Anekānta has opened, forever and for all, the door to the quest for truth. It envisages that everyone can make a search for truth. If we try to understand partial truth as the truth, there can be no greater untruth than this. Partial truth cannot be understood as the entire truth. Truth can be realized only through one's own spiritual practice.

Key- Words

<i>Anekānta</i>	-	<i>A multi-faceted point of view</i>
<i>Sadhana</i>	-	<i>Spiritual practice</i>

2. The Quest for Truth

Truth is eternal. One who sees truth does not propound it, but explains it. *Bhagvan Mahavira* was not the propagator of truth, but one who explained it. With long years of penance he visualized the truth and described it within the limitations of language. He perceived that truth can be seen but cannot be expressed in its entirety. Explanations can be given of only one part of the truth. Knowledge is for one's own self and propagation of it is for others. Knowledge can be felt within self. Knowledge is apparent and visible by itself. The process of acquiring knowledge can be both acquired and innate.

By itself, knowledge is neither approved nor disapproved. When acquiring knowledge it can be approved or disapproved. Definitive knowledge is the valid one. The harmony of knowledge development, for the self and for others, direct and indirect, valid and invalid - these different aspects of knowledge has divided truth into many sections. Truth is truth. It is not one for me and different for another and yet what happens is that when I think that it is true may not be true for others. Whatever the other person thinks as true, may not be true for me. These different attitudes towards truth take a person towards untruth.

Mahavira and Buddha were born in India. Lao Tse and Confucius were born in China. Countries were different but the period was the same. All four of them were contemporaries. But truth cannot be differentiated by time and space. It is in the same at all times and at all places. But the one, who reads the works of *Mahavira* understands truth in a certain fashion. The one, who reads the works of Buddha, understands truth in yet another fashion. Yet one who reads Lao Tse or Confucius understands truth in the third and fourth manner respectively.

The form of the truth is one. Its explanation has many forms and its comprehension is also difficult. This situation raises pertinent questions in the mind of a researcher working on truth. He asks, “Is truth real or imaginary; if it is real then why there are differences in explanations, if it is an illusion then why so much effort to understand it?” This situation has taken many people towards the untruth, those who were seeking truth. *Mahavira* contemplated on this subject very seriously. He saw the weakening of those people who were walking towards truth and he saw how “partial truth” was imposing itself on the complete truth, and was being mistaken as the whole. To resolve this problem, he established the idea of *Anekanta* and announced that all these expressions are not the complete truth but a part of the whole truth.

Entire truth cannot be expressed. Only partial the truth can be

expressed. I have realized the entire truth but I am not able to express it in its entirety. Other person too can see truth but will not be able to express it. It can only be the inexpressible part of the truth. I express one part of the truth; other expresses another part of it. Both the parts can be different from each other. This is not difference in truth, nor is it division of truth. It is the relative expression of an aspect of truth. If I think that one part of truth is relevant, someone else thinks other part of truth is relevant. The difference is that of expressiveness of language.

A Word has only that much capability to express in one moment, which is one aspect of the infinite aspects of the truth. Entire language can only express a few aspects of truth. No language has been able to express more than a few thousand aspects of truth nor will they be able to do it either. No human being can give expression to more than a few thousand aspects of truth in his lifetime. Why it is said that such and such is the expression of omniscient? These are the words of those who have seen truth directly. Can he or an omniscient express the entire truth? If he could, then truth will not be infinite, will not be eternal. Hence, he can express a partial truth only.

We cannot close the door to the quest for truth by thinking a partial truth as the entire truth. The principle of *Anekānta* has opened, forever and for all, the door to the quest for truth. It

envisages that everyone can make a search for truth. We all can see truth. Our ancestors made a search for truth, saw it and expressed it. The quest for truth and its realization was for themselves. Its expression was left for us we accept only their expression, we try to understand the partial truth as the truth, there can be no greater untruth than this. Partial truth cannot be understood as the entire truth. Through its parts, a desire to seek truth may be created but truth can be realized, only through one's own spiritual practice (*sadhana*).

Anekānta has presented the path of such *sadhana*, which is through sincerity and without passions. *Mahavira* has said that one who is sincere and committed can attain truth, he accepts things in their own state and does not try to put what is, in a frame of prejudice, does not try to influence the objective truth through his inclination, discipline and *Shanskaras*, does not try to reconcile the conflicting elements in the essential nature of matter through logical or compromising efforts. This effort is an effort towards simplifying thoughts. A committed and sincere man does not incline towards *Mahavira* or anybody else. His mind and heart are empty, a void. He does not insist that what *Mahavira* has said is the truth and what Lao Tse has said is untruth. He tries to understand *Mahavira's* truth in the context of *Mahavira's*

time, place, expectations and situation. He tries to understand Lao Tse's truth in the context of his time, place, expectation and situation, and for the realization of truth, he does his own *sadhana*.

All the questions, problems, complications that arise in the path towards the quest for truth are created by those who see only one aspect of the truth. If one believer of truth believes that A represents truth and B is untruth, then there is another man who believes that the B represents the truth and A is untruth. In this way, by accusing each other's truth as untrue they create problems in the quest for truth. They are not willing to accept element as it is. They want to establish truth on the basis the words on treatise. They are such people who having highlighted the differences in different aspects of truth are raising doubts on the multi dimensional aspect of truth and creating controversy between seers of truth.



*Read the past. It is not enough to know only the present,
look at the future and develop a three dimensional perspective.*

*Only a three dimensional approach can take you towards
growth/development*





The Jain philosophers state that we cannot manage the affairs of this world only of the basis on the lop-sided views. For, there are three aspects of our worldly affairs – 'Pravṛtti' (indulgence), 'Nivṛtti' (abstinence) and 'Taṭasthata' (neutrality). We indulge in any activity to attain happiness; we abstain from whatever is painful; we remain neutral if there is neither happiness nor pain. As this trinity of activity, non-activity and neutrality comprise our worldly affairs, so also origination, cessation and permanence cause happiness to one, pain to another, and neither of the two i.e., neutrality for the third one, respectively.

Key- Words

<i>Anekānta</i>	- <i>A multi-faceted point of view</i>
<i>Dravyarthika</i>	- <i>Describing a thing only with respect to its ultimate substance</i>
<i>Nīścaya Naya</i>	- <i>Scientific view</i>
<i>Nīścaya-dṛṣṭi</i>	- <i>Transcendental view</i>
<i>Nivṛtti</i>	- <i>Abstinence</i>
<i>Paramāṇu</i>	- <i>Ultimate indivisible unit of the physical substance</i>
<i>Paryāyārthika -</i>	<i>Description based on modifications</i>
<i>Pravṛtti</i>	- <i>Indulgence</i>
<i>Pudgala</i>	- <i>Physical substance</i>
<i>Taṭasthata</i>	- <i>Neutrality</i>
<i>Vasudhaiva kuṭumbakam</i>	- <i>The world is like a family</i>
<i>Vyavahāra- dṛṣṭi</i>	- <i>Empirical view</i>
<i>Vyavahāra Naya</i>	- <i>Practical view</i>

3. Philosophical Exposition of Jainism

Since time immemorial the question – “What is truth?” is being asked and debated vehemently. We see an earthen pot. Its shape is a physical element for some time, but some other day by accident or wear and tear it turns itself into soil of the mother earth. Now, what is the true state of it, which is the everlasting state of it – pot or clay? Jain philosophers have resolved this issue by suggesting that we look at each of the two states not in a fragmented way but as an integrated whole, which is possible only through *Anekānta* i.e., a multi-faceted point of view. There are two ways to look at a thing – (A) *Dravyarthika* or substantial (describing a thing only with respect to its ultimate substance) and – (B) *Paryāyārthika* or modal (description based on modifications or change of modes). In other words, the two are called '*Niścaya-dṛṣṭi*' (transcendental view) and '*Vyavahāra-dṛṣṭi*' (empirical view) respectively. When we correlate both views, we find that in both states, i.e., pot and soil, the '*paramānu*', which is the ultimate indivisible unit of the physical substance, remains intact while the change takes place in the form only. The Jain philosophy believes that the '*pudgala*' i.e., the physical substance, which is the substratum of all physical objects, would always remain '*pudgala*' since no change in the substance itself would be possible. However, the process of transforming which goes on every moment in any substance enables it to take different forms.

The basic element in the matter and its changing states both remain and work in unison. Both co-exist. The former is

realized by the '*Dravyārthika Naya*' and the latter by the '*Paryāyārthika Naya*'. The latter is concerned with the 'change' as the element, while the former with the view, which always catches only the 'permanence' as the element. To adhere to only one of them would be only a partial view. The two cannot be separate.

Now, regarding the lop-sided views, the Jain philosophers state that we cannot manage the affairs of this world only of the basis on the lop-sided views. For, there are three aspects of our worldly affairs – '*Pravṛtti*' (indulgence), '*Nivṛtti*' (abstinence) and '*Taṭasthata*' (neutrality). We indulge in any activity to attain happiness; we abstain from whatever is painful; we remain neutral if there is neither happiness nor pain. As this trinity of activity, non-activity and neutrality comprise our worldly affairs, so also origination, cessation and permanence cause happiness to one, pain to another, and neither of the two i.e., neutrality for the third one, respectively.

An illustration would make the idea clear. Three persons simultaneously went to the goldsmith shop. They wanted to buy a golden crown, a golden jar and pure gold in any form respectively. At that time, the goldsmith was busy in manufacturing a golden crown, which he was moulding from the gold obtained from an old golden jar. When the three persons went there, the one who wanted the crown was very happy that the crown was being made; the second who wanted the golden jar was very sad to see that the jar was broken; the third one was interested only in buying gold irrespective of its form, so he remained neutral – neither happy nor sad. Application of this illustration is required to understand the trinity of creation, cessation and permanence.

If there is no change in the world, we cannot survive and maintain the continuity of life. The Jain philosophy explained through the two *nayas* these phenomena in respect of the '*pudgala*', which changes its forms continuously but still maintains its identity as '*pudgala*'.

Any object or a thing has two attributes – first is its integrated state as a whole and the other is its ability to break into innumerable fragments. Comprehending the whole, the synthetic view – that is '*Dravya Dr̥ṣṭi*' and to look at things in piecemeal way is the '*Paryāya Dr̥ṣṭi*'. An earthen lamp burns continuously, although the flames come and go one after the other. So is the case with water flowing into a river. It is the theory of relativity which combines the two features - '*Dravya*' and '*Paryāya*'. We can thus explain the duality of '*Pudgala*' along with its basic integrity, only by adopting the '*Anekānta*', the multi-angular vision, which takes into account the relativity. Jainism proclaims –

*“Je egam Jāṇai se savvam jāṇai,
Je śavvam jāṇai se egam jāṇai.”*

“He who knows one, knows all and the vice-versa”

Our world is united through various kinds of relationships. '*Vasudhaiva kuṭumbakam*' means – the world is like a family. It is a great philosophical exposition. It can be realized only through a synergy of both view-points physical and intrinsic. The Jain philosophers have described the two as '*Vyavahāra Naya*' (practical view) and '*Niścaya Naya*' (scientific view) respectively. When you merge the view-points which you get from both the '*Nayas*', you can then comprehend the truth in its entirety. This is '*Anekānta*' – the all comprehensive view, through which the Truth is realized and expressed scientifically.



The doctrine of anekānta took birth on the basis of inter-dependence of substantial and modal view-points. It conveys the relativity of substance and mode. Anekānta is lexically a negative term, but substantially it is not negative. It is a form of knowledge based on the nature of element or substance. It was enunciated for finding out the nature of truth. It tries to get rid of the internal contradictions apparent between the eternal and the non-eternal, that is, substance and mode. It has asserted that both the eternal as well as non-eternal can co-exist in the same substratum. The purpose of anekānta is not to contradict absolutist view. The basis of anekānta is the triplicate nature i.e. origination, cessation and permanence of substance. The law of anekānta is of universal application.

Key- Words

<i>Adharmāstikāya</i>	-	<i>Medium of rest</i>
<i>Aikāntika</i>	-	<i>One-sided</i>
<i>Ajīva</i>	-	<i>The non-sentient substances</i>
<i>Aneka</i>	-	<i>More than one</i>
<i>Avaktavya</i>	-	<i>Unspeakable</i>
<i>Dharmāstikāya</i>	-	<i>Medium of motion</i>
<i>Dhatura flower</i>	-	<i>A narcotic flower</i>
<i>Dravya</i>	-	<i>The Substance</i>
<i>Jīvāstikāya</i>	-	<i>Soul</i>
<i>Oghaśakti</i>	-	<i>Distant time actualized potentiality</i>
<i>Paryāyārthika</i>	-	<i>The Modal</i>
<i>Prakṛti</i>	-	<i>The insentient element</i>
<i>Pudgala</i>	-	<i>Matter</i>
<i>Pudgalāstikāya</i>	-	<i>Matter</i>
<i>Pudgalāstikāya</i>	-	<i>One of the ultimate substances</i>
<i>Ratnaprabha</i>	-	<i>First of seven infernal earth</i>
<i>Sāhacarya</i>	-	<i>Law of concomitance</i>
<i>Samucitāśakti</i>	-	<i>Immediately actualized potentiality</i>

4. The Right Perspective of Anekānta

The canonical literature (*āgamas*) of the Jainas forms the basis of their philosophical thoughts. The word '*anekānta*' does not appear in the *Āgamas*. The word was first used in the beginning of the age of philosophical writings. Probably, Siddhasena Divākara was the first to use it.

The basis of *anekānta* is *naya*. The Bhagavati Sūtra deals with element from the point of view of two *nayas* – the substantial (*dravyārthika*) and the modal (*paryāyārthika*). The two points of view (*naya*) are relative, according to Acharya Siddhasena. Their relativity is known as *anekānta*.

Some philosophical thoughts in India flow between absolute permanence and absolute transitoriness. The insentient element (*prakṛti*), according to *Sāṅkhya*, is permanent-cum-transitory, but the sentient element (*puruṣa*) is absolutely permanent, having no modifications. According to the *Vaiśeṣika* philosophy, the earth is permanent as cause and transitory as effect, but soul, God and space are without any modification. The element is momentary, according to the Buddhists – whatever is real is momentary, just as the cloud. The concept of eternity is rejected outright in the Buddhist philosophy. In the *Vedānta*, Brahma is absolutely

unchangeable and māyā is changeable; Brahma, being beyond element and unelement, is unspeakable.

What has been said above proves that the concept of 'only permanence' or 'only impermanence' is not of universal application, whereas *anekānta* covers the total element and is, therefore, of universal application. Ācārya Hemchandra puts this universality in a poetic fashion –

*Ādīpamāvyomasamasvabhāvam
syādvādmudrānatibhedi vastu,
tannityamevaikamanityamānya-
diti tvadājñādvistām pralāpāh.*

'The element, not going outside the realm of *syādavāda* is of the same nature, be it a lamp or the space. Some of those (philosophers) who do not obey your dictum O Lord! Indiscreetly declare element to be absolutely permanent, whereas others declare it to be absolutely temporary.'

From the point of view of substance, element neither originates nor perishes. From the point of view of mode, the mode originates and perishes. The Bhagavatī Sūtra speaks of two aspects of element – the permanent and the temporary. The permanent part does not change, the temporary part undergoes change - '**athire palottai, thire na palottai**'.

Umāsvāti defined element as consisting of permanence, origination and destruction on the basis of the two view-

points of substance and mode – **utpādayayadhrauvya-yuktam sat** Element has three characteristics, therefore, it is *anekāntika*. One cannot comprehend its nature without *anekānta*. When it is said – 'Element is permanent', it is one view or *aikāntika* (one-sided). When it is said – 'Element is permanent-cum-temporary', it is the *anekānta* view-point. What is peculiar or new about it is that it simultaneously accepts element as possessed of both permanence as well as transitoriness.

The Meaning of the Term *Anekānta*

Anekānta is lexically a negative term, but substantially it is not negative. *Anekānta* conveys the relativity of substance and mode. It is not possible to have existence of only substance or only mode, that is to say, substance and mode cannot exist without each other. The very nature of element being *anekāntika*, the term *ekānta* cannot be used to comprehend it. *Aneka* does not mean 'indefinite' or 'infinite', but it means 'more than one'. Element is having three characteristics hence '*aneka*' does not mean indefinite, it does not designate only the infinity of modes, it does not mean only 'infinite'.

Modes are successive attributes. Infinite modes are not possible in a single substance simultaneously. For they do not originate simultaneously.

The statement that an object has infinite attributes is available. This means that an object is capable of undergoing infinite modifications. It is only on account of this capability that without giving up its own nature, it goes on transforming itself into various forms.

Why there was the Rising of *Anekānta*?

The element (*sat*) or the substance (*dravya*) is object of knowledge. *Naya*, *anekānta* and *syādvāda* are essentially the forms of knowledge, and are the means to know it. Sometimes we have a propensity to know it wholly, sometimes part by part. The attempt to know the same element through various propensities forms the basis of *nayavāda*, *anekāntavāda* and *syādvāda*.

The doctrine of *naya* is the process of knowing the element part by part. From substantial *naya*, the substance is a real object; the mode is an unreal object. From modal *naya*, it is the vice versa.

The substantial *naya* is the standpoint to comprehend the substance; the mode does not fall in its domain, but it does not mean that it denies the mode. Therefore, though *aikāntika*, such standpoint is a valid point of view (*naya*). If the substantial stand-point denies the mode, it would become invalid (*durnaya*). Similarly the modal point of view comprehends the mode, but it does not deny the substance.

Therefore, though partial, it is a valid view-point (*naya*). If it denies the substance, it, being absolutely *aikāntika*, would become invalid. The non-relative one-sided view has created many problems in the field of philosophical thought. *Anekānta* provides a solution to those problems. If substantial or modal *nayas* were to be non-relative, *anekānta* would not have arisen. The element has an innate capacity of changing and change is thus a part and parcel of element. Permanence and change cannot be separated totally; they cannot exist independently. It is to deny their absolutistic views that non-absolutism arose.

What is Syādvāda?

Anekānta took birth on the basis of inter-dependence of substantial and modal view-points. Syādvāda expresses that very inter-dependence. *Anekānta* has two aspects : permanent and temporary, existence and non-existence, general and particular, one and many, expressible and inexpressible. What unites these aspects is proved through *syādvāda*. Gautama is reported to ask, “Is the *ratnaprabhā* earth permanent or temporary?” Mahāvīra answered, “it is partly permanent and partly temporary”, *syādvāda* accepts both the thesis and the antithesis. How could the contradictory attributes of permanence and transitoriness co-exist together? The question is answered by Mahāvīra, “Ratnaprabhā earth is

permanent from substantial point of view, temporary from modal point of view”. *Naya*, *anekānta* and *syādvāda* – all these three are useful in the field of metaphysics.

Saptabhangī

Existence has many modes. Three dimensions have been identified for determining the nature of each of these modes; existence, non-existence and inexpressibility. These three dimensions can express the nature of existence. For example, a due of two atoms has two aspects. It exists in its own nature, but it does not exist from the point of view of the nature of another entity. An example of atom in modern science may be given – The hydrogen atom consists of two particles – one electron and one proton. The electron has a negative charge and the proton a positive charge. The electron rotates in the circumference, while the proton is stationary in the nucleus. Thus both are opposite to each other. It can be said that the electron is real from the point of view of its own nature, but non-real from the point of view of the nature of proton.

Here a doubt may be raised – when it is a commonplace knowledge that anything is not real from the point of view of opposite nature, why should it be propounded as a theory? For example, Dr. Daya Krishna has raised the question – “The negative characterization, however, is both too wide and too vacuous to be regarded as significant in terms of actual

predication, for if, say there is such a thing as a red rose and we are saying that 'this rose is red' we are not only denying that it has other colours, but also the fact that it is an elephant or any of the other myriad things which are not meant by the term rose in English language. But what could possibly be meant by saying that the object designated by the term 'rose' is not any of those things? It is, of course, being assumed that the other terms are not synonymous of the term 'rose', just as it is being assumed that the term 'rose', itself a homonym designating other things, is used in different contexts.”

The question raised here can be summarily answered thus : the atoms constituting the rose flower have assumed the form of rose at present; they were not so in the past nor will they be so in the future. Therefore, the atoms constituting the rose are rose from the point of view of present times, but they are not rose from the point of view of past or future. Svāmi Visuddhanandaji, the Guru of Dr. Gopināth Kaviraj, is said to have the capacity to change the rose into stone and vice-versa, through the solar science. Another example is that of water. 'This is water' – this statement pertains to the present mode. It would change into oxygen and hydrogen as the process of electrolysis takes place through electricity. (If water is required, the reverse process will transform the air into water).

In these cases the rose (or water) is real from the point of view of the present mode, but it is not real from the point of view of past or future. Therefore, positive and negative statements are made by showing the relativity of the modes of past, present and future.

A substance has two-fold powers : one is the power to hold its own self. This is the quality of *agurulaghu*, which is propounded through a positive statement. The other power is that of keeping one's existence independent of others so that an entity can exist separately, and does not lose its identity. This power is stated through a negative statement, the positive and negative statements are thus not imaginative; their usages are not redundant. A single positive statement cannot describe what it is and what it is not. The rose flower is different from that of *dhatūra* is a case of empirical knowledge, needing no positive-cum-negative statement. But a positive-cum-negative statement is required to show why they are different. Both of them are essentially nothing but matter (or *pudgalāstikāya*). The molecules forming the rose are different from those of the *dhatūra* flower. Therefore, the rose flower is keeping its entity separate from that of the *dhatūra*. If the molecules of both the flowers had identical modes, rose would have been *dhatūra* and *dhatūra* would have been rose. Only the positive statement could not have propounded the

identity-cum-difference or unity-cum-diversity.

The rose flower is a mode of *pudgalāstikāya* (which is one of the ultimate substances) and so is the flower of *dhaturā*. At present, modes of both are different. In future, it is possible that the molecules which have taken the form of *dhaturā* flower may take the form of rose flower, and vice-versa. But, without showing the separation of molecules which have assumed the form of rose from those which have assumed the form of *dhaturā*, it would not be possible for us to identify objects – that is to say, the system of objects would become impossible. For a layman, rose and *dhaturā* are evidently different; for a person who knows the law of transformation, they are not absolutely different; both of them being the modifications of the molecules of matter (*pudgala*). But this modification may change also in future. From the point of view of eternity, we would like to say that as both the flowers are modifications of molecules, they are, identical. But from the point of view of present, we cannot accept them as identical. Therefore, we should have the knowledge of both, the positive and the negative (i.e. what it is, and what it is not). The third alternative of 'unspeakable' in *syādvāda* is not the same as the inexpressibility of Brahma in the Vedānta philosophy. When we have the existence of the present mode, we have the non-existence of the future mode at the same

time. Both cannot be simultaneously expressed; we have, therefore, to take resort to the third alternative of unspeakability. This is the limitation of the language that though both can be known simultaneously, yet they cannot be expressed simultaneously.

Omniscient

Anekānta is a form of knowledge and *anekāntika* substance is the object of knowledge. The basis of *anekānta* is the nature of element (*sat*) or substance. The nature of the substance in itself is permanent-cum-temporary. It does not make any difference if it is known by an ordinary man or an omniscient. The only difference is that a common man knows it through the sensuous knowledge whereas the omniscient knows it through the direct knowledge. The law of *anekānta* is of universal application. Substance cannot exist without mode; therefore, it applies on substance; mode cannot exist without substance; therefore, it applies on mode. The transcendental existence and empirical existence are not absolutely separate in the Jain philosophy. The mode is empirical existence and the substance is transcendental existence; but they are inseparably joined together – both of them are two aspects of the same existence; and therefore, they cannot be conceived of as absolutely independent.

If existence is to be propounded even by an omniscient, he will have to use *syādavāda* and *saptabhaṅgi* and similar is the

case with an ordinary man. When substance in itself is permanent-cum-temporary, how can the omniscient express it in absolute terms? He will have to use the language of *syādvāda* e.g. substance is relatively (i.e. with respect to a particular point of view) permanent and relatively temporary. A part of molecule of three atoms is expressed from one view point, while another part of the same molecule is not expressed from the point of view. There would be no difference, whether this molecule of three atoms is expressed by an omniscient or by an ordinary man.

The explanation of the methodology of *anekānta* does not admit of any difference between an omniscient and an ordinary *śrutajñānī*. The theory of *Syādvāda* is not connected with perfection or imperfection of knowledge. There is no reason to accept that the knowledge of imperfect being is *aikāntika*. *Anekānta* does not imply that the knowledge of one who knows partial truth is *aikāntika* and the knowledge of one who knows the whole truth is *anekāntika*. The basis of *anekānta* is the triplicate nature (i.e. origination, cessation and permanence) of substance and not limitation or unlimitation of knowledge (i.e. *śrutajñāna* and *kevaljñāna*). The object of knowledge of an omniscient in its entirety can be the object of the partial knowledge of *śrutajñānī* also. As already stated, the omniscient knows directly the whole truth whereas a man of partial knowledge can know it through the

statement of the omniscient i.e. through the scriptures; therefore one cannot say that the knowledge of the man of partial knowledge is necessarily *aikāntika*.

The nature of the permanent and the temporary are not imposed on substance by knowledge, perfect or imperfect. Permanence and transitoriness are the objective attributes of the substance, and not of knowledge. Because the substance is intrinsically permanent-cum-temporary, it does not depend on the knowledge of the knower. As the nature of the substance is permanent-cum-temporary for the omniscient, so it is for the ordinary knower (who is endowed with only partial knowledge).

Transcendental and Empirical Truths

The theory of permanence and transitoriness being of universal application, no distinction between transcendental and empirical existence can be admitted. If this distinction is to be made at all, we may put it according to the Jain view as – substance is transcendental, whereas mode is empirical. These two are not absolutely different; therefore, existence of substance can be accepted as permanent as well as transitory without any difficulty.

Notion of Possibility

That the substance is *anekāntika* has two meanings : The first meaning is that it is of triplicate nature of origination, cessation and permanence, therefore, it can be said to be

anekāntika. The second meaning is that the substance has many innumerable or infinite modifications, therefore it has infinite attributes.

Modifications have two varieties : the intrinsic modifications (*arthaparyāya*) and the visible modifications (*vyañjana paryāya*). The intrinsic modifications are subtle, they change with the minutest unit of time (*samaya*, the smallest unit of time, which is further indivisible). This change has twelve stages.

The subtle modifications cannot be known through the senses. They are the object of super-sensuous consciousness. The visible modifications are apparent. They are manifest and, therefore, can be known through the senses also. It is in the case of these apparent modifications that we can think of both, the possible and the probable. Every modification has the possibility of changing into any other mode. A colour can change into another colour, a smell into another smell, a taste into another taste, and a touch into another touch. Yati Bhoja has described two types of potentialities – the potentiality which can be actualized at a distant time (*oghaśakti*) and potentially which can be immediately actualized (*samucitāśakti*); the former is the mediate cause, while the latter is the immediate cause of change. Grass has the potentiality of becoming ghee at a distant future. Curd can change into ghee immediately. The potentialities are too many

to be enumerated. Theoretically, it could be said that potentialities of an object are innumerable as far as the mediate form of potentiality is concerned. A scientist through his research can know a few of these. A person, with the power of super-sensuous knowledge can know them through super-sensuous knowledge. An ordinary man can, however, know only the immediate cause or the visible modifications. We, therefore, cannot put any limitation on the possibilities or probabilities.

The element has five varieties viz. *dharmāstikāya* (medium of motion), *adharmaśtikāya* (medium of rest), *ākāśastikāya* (space), *pudgalāstikāya* (matter) and *jīvāstikāya* (soul).

They never change into one another. The soul does not change into matter and vice-versa. The element or the ultimate substances are absolute truth. Non-absolute truths are only the modifications. Man is not an ultimate substance, it is only a modification. All visible objects are modifications of the ultimate substances, they are not the ultimate substances. Things emanating from modifications can change into each other; they are, therefore, not absolutely different. The doctrine of identity-cum-difference propounded by *anekānta* is useful for understanding the identity as well as difference of the object. These visible objects are possessed of their own shape, qualities and characteristics and therefore, they are different. Thus, gold is not mercury, mercury is not gold. But

at the same time both of them are modifications of the same ultimate substance, viz. *pudgala* (i.e. matter). Therefore, gold can be transformed into mercury and vice-versa. They are non-different or identical from this point of view. Thus, they are neither absolutely different nor absolutely identical, but they are identical-cum-different.

The phenomenon of radioactivity accepted by the modern science is a good illustration to make this point clear. The element uranium which has the atomic number 92 gets transformed into the element Lead which has the atomic number 82, in a specific time-period, on account of its radioactive nature. The atomic numbers of gold and mercury are 79 and 80 respectively. When, through proper external means, the atom of mercury is made to lose one electron, one proton and two neutrons, it will change into the atom of gold.

Anekānta has its limitations; it is applicable only in the field of ontology – only to comprehend the relativity of substance and modification. The science of existence or element is absolute; non-absolutism is not applicable to the ultimate existence or element. Therefore, it is not desirable to apply non-absolutism everywhere. For example, in the field of mathematics, *anekānta* could be applied once in a while, but it is not possible to apply it everywhere.

Eminent statistician, Prof. P.C. Mahalanobis has observed that 'Syādvada' has the genesis or basic foundation of modern

science of statistics : 'I should now like to make some brief observations of my own on the connection between Indian – Jains' views and the foundations of statistical theory. I have already pointed out that the fourth category of *syādvāda*, namely, *avaktavya* or the 'indeterminate' is a synthesis of three earlier categories of 1) assertion ('it is') 2) negation ('it is not'), and 3) assertion and negation in succession. The fourth category of *syādvāda*, therefore, seems to me to be in essence the qualitative but not quantitative aspect of the modern concept of probability.

At the same time it is of interest to note that 1500 or 2500 years ago, *syādvāda* seems to have given the logical background of statistical theory in a qualitative form.

“Secondly, I should like to draw attention to the Jain view that 'a real is a particular which possesses a generic attribute.' This is very close to the concept of an individual in relation to the population to which it belongs. The Jain view in fact denies the possibility of making any predication about a single and unique individual, which would be also true in modern statistical theory.”

“The third point to be mooted is the emphasis given in Jain philosophy on the relatedness of things and on the multiform aspects of reals which appear to be similar (again in a purely qualitative sense) to the basic ideas underlying the concepts of association, correlation and concomitant variation in modern

statistics.”

“The Jain view of 'existence, persistence and cessation' as the fundamental characteristics of all that is real necessarily leads to a view of element as something relatively permanent and relatively changing which has a fervor of statistical reasoning 'A real changes every moment and at the same time continues' is a view which is somewhat sympathetic to the underlying idea of stochastic processes.”

“Finally, I should draw attention to the realist and pluralist view of Jain philosophy and the continuing emphasis on the multiform and intently diversified aspects of element which amounts to the acceptance of an 'open' view of the universe with scope for unending change and discovery. For reasons explained above, it seems to me that the ancient Indian Jain philosophy has certain interesting resemblances to the probabilistic and statistical view of element in modern times.”

Simultaneity

Anekānta does not reject concepts like impossibility or improbability. For example, it is accepted by *Anekānta* that it is neither possible nor probable that the Jiva (soul) may possess the particular modes of atom (which is not *jīva*). Similarly, it is neither possible nor probable that the non-sentient substances (*ajīva*) may possess the modes of *jīva* (the sentient substance). It is not expected of the doctrine of *Anekānta* to turn impossible into possible or improbable into

probable. *Anekānta*'s job is to get rid of the internal contradictions apparent between the eternal and the non-eternal, that is, substance and mode. Seen from the point of view of fluxism, change is real and true, while the eternal is unreal; whereas according to the eternalism (the doctrine of absolute permanence), permanence is real and true, while change (or impermanence) is unreal. This illusion of contrast and conflict between eternal and non-eternal is creating problems in understanding the element (*sat*) or substance (*dravya*). *Anekānta* has tried to resolve this problem by asserting that both – the eternal as well as non-eternal can co-exist in the same substratum. (In other words, they do not need separate substratum to exist in). The substratum of both is the *sat* (element). Therefore, we cannot comprehend *sat* by separating the permanence and creation – cessation (or impermanence). Can we separate a pot from the clay? Can we imagine a cloth different from the fibers? In the same way, can we find out a substratum of mode other than the substance itself? This is not possible at all. It is only by accepting this impossibility that *anekānta* has put forth a solution to the problem.

There is a continuous flow of modes in every real (ultimate) substance. As permanence is the characteristic (nature) of ultimate substance or element, so is the creation and cessation.

The simultaneous occurrence of substance and mode is not at all a philosophical problem. The element is having permanence at the same moment when it is possessed of creation and cessation. Therefore, the state of their simultaneity is bound by the law of concomitance (*sāhacarya*). We misunderstand all laws to be universally applicable – this idea, in fact, creates problems. It is true that two artificial (or undertaken) activities cannot be simultaneous (in the strict sense). This is the law of 'undertakēn actions'. Nevertheless, natural activities can take place in any number, simultaneously, for the law of 'undertaken action' does not apply on them. For example, the destruction and creation take place in the cells of the body, continuously. There is simultaneous creation and destruction. Another example is that of a duet or a di-atomic molecule. It can be a vibrating molecule and non-vibrating molecule at the same time. One of its atoms may be vibrating, while the other one may be non-vibrating. Both these properties (that is vibrating and non-vibrating) exist simultaneously in it. Thus simultaneity means the tri-temporality of change.

In Jain philosophy, both the types of modes viz. actual and potential are accepted. Thus, in clay, the mode of pot is potential while that of clay is actual.

Let us take another example : A person is trying to recite ten verses. After having recited a verse, we can say that he has

actually recited one verse, there is the probability that he would recite the remaining nine verses. As soon as he starts reciting the second verse, the words of the first verse have gone into the space-record, he is actually reciting the second verse and there is the probability that he would recite the next verse, and so on. Now, generally we consider only the present mode as the real one; but it is not an all-pervading rule. The universal law is that the recitation of the first verse which has passed away in the space-record is now not real in the form (or mode) of recitation, but the second waves (or particles) in which the verse was recited are still actually existing in space, and therefore the verse is still real in the form of sound-particles (or waves). Thus we cannot imagine absolute difference between the actual and the potential mode. Thus only the conception of different-cum-identical can take us towards the element. The Jain philosophy has explained the doctrine of simultaneity on the basis of the tri-temporal nature of substance and its transformable modes or states. Therefore, the explanation of presence and absence cannot be made merely on the basis of the sole rule of present tense.

Speech

The Jain philosophy has explained the phenomenon of speech or speaking very deeply. According to it, during speaking, first of all the speaker appropriates the clusters of speech-particles and transforms them into speech and then release them. In this process, in the first instant of time (t_1), the

speech-particles are appropriated and in the second instant of time (t_2), they are released after conversion into speech. But at the same time-instant (i.e. t_2), new clusters of speech-particles are also appropriated, which are then released in the third time-instant (t_3), and so on. In this way, continuously there is simultaneous release of the formerly appropriated speech-particles and appropriation of the new speech-particles, every moment. This shows that during the same (single) instant of time there are two actions – release as well as appropriation. It is to be noted that here release is that of the particles, appropriated in the preceding instant and the appropriation is that of new particles. It means that when set 'A' is released, set 'B' is appropriated; but one does not release and appropriate set 'A' at the same instant of time.

Conclusion

The doctrine of *anekānta* is not meant for contradicting other absolutist views. It is enunciated for finding out the nature of truth. The nature of element (*sat*) is explained through two view-points (*naya*) – substantial and modal. The *naya* is essentially an absolutist view. The purpose of *anekānta* is not to contradict absolutist view. Relative absolutist view is in conformity with the doctrine on *anekānta*. It is only the non-relative absolutist view that has been reviewed by the doctrine of *anekānta*. This sort of review took place in the middle age – the philosophical era. In the Āgama-era, it was propounded only to describe the nature of *sat*.



Anekānta is the most comprehensive principle that determined the nature of Jaina thought in all its branches, social, ethical, psychological, onto-logical, and metaphysical and the like. The concomitance between generic and non-generic, existence and non-existence, speakable and unspeakable, being and non-being, permanent and impermanent, identity and difference of substance and modes, one and many are the main axioms of Anekānta. In Jain philosophy these axioms were very important and fully exploited in the solution of logical problems. Many Jain philosophers discussed the problem of valid knowledge in the light of Anekānta. Its importance has enhanced as a criterion of the investigation of the nature of logic-epistemological tools.

Key- Words

<i>Anyatva</i>	-	<i>Pervasiveness</i>
<i>Dhruvatva</i>	-	<i>Permanance</i>
<i>Ekatva</i>	-	<i>Experience of unity</i>
<i>Hinayāna</i>	-	<i>A branch of Buddhist Community</i>
<i>Jin</i>	-	<i>Omniscient</i>
<i>Jīva</i>	-	<i>The soul</i>
<i>Naya</i>	-	<i>A particular viewpoint</i>
<i>Paratantra</i>	-	<i>Independent</i>
<i>Parikalpita</i>	-	<i>The imaginary</i>
<i>Parinispanna</i>	-	<i>The ultimate</i>
<i>Prakṛti</i>	-	<i>The primordial matter</i>
<i>Puruṣa</i>	-	<i>The sentient element</i>
<i>Sarvam Asti</i>	-	<i>Everything exists</i>
<i>sarvam Nāsti</i>	-	<i>Nothing exists</i>
<i>Tiryag</i>	-	<i>The horizontal</i>
<i>Ūrdhva</i>	-	<i>The vertical</i>
<i>Vyañjanaparyāya</i>	-	<i>The prolonged modality</i>

5. The Axioms of Anekānta

We can know the truth and also express it. It consists in the trio of entity, word and knowledge. Different philosophies have looked at the problem from different angles of vision. The Vedānta has explained the problem from three standpoints – the ultimate, the empirical and the apparent. The *Brahman* is the ultimate truth, while the sensuous world has only empirical validity. The cognition of the 'will-o' the wisp and dream is pure appearance. In *Hinayāna* Buddhism the truth is twofold, viz. the ultimate and the conventional, while in the idealist Buddhism it is threefold, viz. the ultimate (*pariniṣpanna*), the dependent (*paratantra*) and the imaginary (*parikalpita*). The self-nature (momentariness) of the object is the ultimate truth. The universal nature is only a conventional truth on account of its being a product of the intellectual function of exclusion.

Different thinkers have presented the different aspects of truth in their own way. The foundation-stone of such presentation is twofold-intuitive experience and rational knowledge. In intuitive experience the object is known directly and, therefore, there is no difference in such experience. The rational knowledge that occurs at the sensual level does not cognize the object directly and this is the reason why there are

varieties in such cognitions. The Vedānta rejected the modes as unreal while accepting the substance alone as ultimately true. The Buddhist, on the other hand, rejected the substance as imaginary by accepting the element of the modes. According to Jaina logic, both the substance and the modes are ultimately true. When the substance hidden under the waves of modes has no appeal, the modes come up prominently at the cost of the substance which lies submerged under them. When the modes, like waves, lose their identity in the calmness of the unfathomed ocean of substance, the latter alone appears to be ultimately real. The Vedāntic monism is like the waveless ocean and the Buddhist phenomenal is the state of the ocean agitated by waves. Non-absolutism appropriates them both, as so finely expressed in the following beautiful verse –

*Aparyayam vastu samasyamānāma –
dravyametacca vivicyamānam,
Ādeśabhedodit –saptabhanga –
madidrśastvam budhrūpavedyam.*

From the synthetic view-point the object is without modes and from the analytic standpoint it is unsubstantial. “You have realized. Oh Lord, the truth in its sevenfold aspects on account of sevenfold viewpoints, that reveals itself only to the Wise.”

The substance presents itself when our thinking is synthetic, losing all its modes and when our approach is analytical, the

modes become prominent at the cost of the substance. In the formative period on *anekānta* some principles of logical concomitance were discovered and that constituted an epoch-making achievement of that age.

The Concomitance between the Universal and the Particular

The first axiom of non-absolutism is the concomitance of the universal and the particular. The one without the other is inconceivable. The upshot is that a mode without a substance is as impossible as substance without a mode. There is no such gap between truth and untruth. There is hardly any line of demarcation between the truth of one concept and the falsity of another. The gap between them, if any, can be understood if one realizes that the particular bereft of universal is as nonsensical as the universal bereft of the particular. Both the concepts, viz. the universal and the particular, are true if they are mutually dependent. One rejecting the other is false, while both are the true representatives of their own objects of reference.

The Concomitance between the Permanent and the Impermanent

The second axiom of non-absolutism is the concomitance of the permanent and the impermanent, the truth of the one is verified by the truth of the other.

The materialist thinks that the sensuous world alone is true.

There is nothing like the spiritual. The spiritualist, on the other hand, asserts that it is the self alone that is true, the sensuous world is false. The logicians of the Jaina school investigated the truth behind the rival claims and found that the sensuous world was not false. Whatever is possessed of causal efficiency is true. The senses are causally efficient and hence cannot be untrue. Their objects also cannot be false. The characteristic features of a real are origination, cessation and persistence whatever is causally efficient does necessarily arise, cease to exist and also continue. To say that the sensuous world is true and the self is untrue can be possible only in ordinary parlour, but it can never be a language expressive of the truth that is deep and unfathomable. On the other hand, to say that the self alone is the ultimate truth while the sensuous world is unadulterated falsehood can be the language of the spiritual world, but it can never be true of the world as it is. The saints and philosophers cannot express themselves in identical linguistic tools. In spiritual idiom, the sensuous objects are momentary and evanescent. Such idiom could inspire detachment and renunciation, but would miserably fail as a device of logical investigation of the nature of truth. Logic does not distinguish between the element of the sensuous object and the element of the self. The material atoms are as real as the spiritual self in the eyes of the rationalists. All that originates, vanishes and persists is real. This triple criterion of truth is as validly applicable to the

material atoms as to the spiritual self. When the spiritual values become identical with the world outside, the doctrine of impermanence turns to be a controversial issue. Otherwise that is a very valuable doctrine. All the spiritual thinkers, without any exception, have endorsed it. The *Jainas* also have assigned adequate importance to it. Among the twelve contemplations, impermanence occupies the first position. The practitioner of such contemplation repeats within himself the formula – everything is impermanent. But that belongs to the sphere of spirituality. As soon as one switches to rational thinking, it is the definite view of the Jaina philosophers that the discrepancy between the impermanence of the material and the permanence of the spiritual becomes untenable. To the reasoning mind, the permanence and the impermanence are equally shared by the spiritual and the material world. A clear line of demarcation can never be drawn between permanence and impermanence. By the admission of such distinction, the *Sāmkhya* system had to assign both bondage and emancipation to *Prakṛti* (the primordial matter) instead of *Puruṣa* of whom the two were only metaphorically admissible. The *Puruṣa* is eternally free and pure. The admission of bondage and emancipation would make the latter amenable to change and impermanence, a position which could not be acceptable to the *Sāmkhya* system.

Among the Jainas, Ācārya Kundakunda has also asserted, like the *Sāmkhya*, that the *Jīva* (the soul) is not the agent of *karma*.

The *karma* is the agent of itself. If the soul were the agent of *Karma*, he would never be free from it. And it is exactly because he is not the agent, he is the capable of getting rid of *Karma*. From the absolute substantial standpoint, it is true that the nature can never change. Consciousness has a specific nature, which is conscious. It can never lapse. Self-awareness is its specific function. How could then it be the agent of the *karma* which is a heterogeneous entity? This is the standpoint of pure substance, independent of any adventitious adjunct. One can defend the *Sāmkhya's* assignment of bondage and emancipation to the *Prakṛti*. In the language of Jainism one can similarly say that it is only the *karmic* body that is subject to bondage and emancipation. From the semi-absolute substantial standpoint, one could assert that the *jīva* is the agent of *karma*. The substantial standpoint is concerned exclusively with the universal. The mode sinks into insignificance when the universal is predominant. Permanence is true because a thing not only exists but exists for ever. An entity's continuance for long gives an impression of its uninterrupted continuity. When we concentrate on similar or the identical aspects of a thing, the philosophy of identity, universality and substance presents itself as the only valid alternative.

The flow of origination and cessation is going on without interruption. How could one say that the mountain that his ancestors saw still continues to exist? Or the person in front is

the same whom he saw yesterday? The old atoms are constantly giving place to new ones. A person's atomic physical conglomerate is being constantly emitted and replaced by a facsimile; in the absence of such emission the method of photography of the absent object could never be successful. This movement of atoms proves impermanence of the substance. The successive vision of similar modes gives an impression of permanence, exactly as the attention directed to the discrete modes gives rise to the impression of impermanence. Under these two diverse situations, how should we distinguish between the truths of permanence and impermanence? The falsity of the one would entail the truth of the other, which would lead to the controversy that exists between the rival camps, each believing in one or the other alternative. Non-absolutism, however, does not admit the absolute validity of any one of these alternatives. According to it, neither permanence independent of impermanence nor impermanence independent of permanence is the whole truth, both being true only relatively. There is no creation, according to Kuṇḍakunda, without destruction and no destruction without creation and no creation-cum-destruction without continuity or eternity. The synthesis of the three – creation, destruction and continuity – is the truth. The instantaneous modality (*arthaparyāya*) is the mode that is momentary, according to which the mountain or man in front cannot be the same as had been seen ten years before. The prolonged modality (*vyañjanaparyāya*), on the other hand, is one that

continues for an appreciable long time, according to which the mountain or the man standing before is the same as had been seen ten years ago. In instantaneous modality the recognition of similarity is absent while in prolonged modality it is predominant. To deduce impermanence and permanence respectively from dissimilarity and similarity is only a truth and not the truth that is ultimate. The dissimilarity in instantaneous modality as well as similarity in prolonged modality are both nothing but modes which would entail impermanence. In the unending chain of causality there comes a moment when a mountain or a man, as an entity, ceases to exist and dissolves in atoms which, however, do continue to exist in the eternity of time and space. The soul that infused life in that body does likewise never cease to exist. The condition of permanence is the basic substance. A mode, whether momentary or continuous, dissimilar or similar, does as a rule establish impermanence.

The approach or the viewpoint (*naya*) of universality and permanence is the standpoint of substance (*dravyārthika naya*) while that of particularity and change as origination-cum-cessation is the standpoint of modes (*paryāyārthika naya*). These two are the basic standpoints that are mutually relative. From the relativity of these two are derived the two principles of non-absolutism, viz. identity-cum-difference of the universal and the particular, and the relativity of permanence-cum-impermanence.

The Concomitance of Existence and Non-existence

The third axiom of non-absolutism is the concomitance of existence and non-existence. It is sometimes argued that because the surface of a wooden chair is hard, it bears weight and because it is soft, an axe can cut through it. And because hardness and softness contradict each other, they cannot co-exist. But as they appear to co-exist, both of them are only appearance and not element. And along with their unelement the wooden chair is also unreal. This is not the way of non-absolutism, which regards an infinite number of mutually opposed attributes as an inalienable part of a real. A real is an integrated whole of infinite number of attributes. It is exactly because those attributes are mutually opposed that a real is a real in the true sense of the term. Opposition, in fact, is the richness of the real and in the absence of such opposition of the real would be denuded of its element. It is indeed the intrinsic nature of a real to be possessed of such opposed attributes and if so why should an attempt be made to deny its element, by getting ourselves entangled in the labyrinth of imaginary contradictions. As Dharmakīrti puts it, who are we to deny what commends itself to the objects themselves? What should exercise our mind is the search for the source of those oppositions and the conditions of their syntheses. The philosophy of non-absolutism made such a search and found that existence and non-existence go together. Affirmation without negation and negation without affirmation is never

possible. Affirmation is as much an attribute of a real as the negation. Existence is affirmation and non-existence is negation. The intrinsic nature of a substance is the source of existence while the extrinsic nature of a substance is the source of non-existence. The substance of earth of which a pot is made is its own substance. Similarly the pot has its own space, time, colour and shape. A pot exists with reference to its own substance, space, time and modes. But it is non-existent as alien substance, space, time and modes. This relative estimation is a principle of synthesis. A pot does not both exist and not-exist with reference to identical factors of reference. Existence and non-existence as mutually opposed attributes do certainly exist simultaneously in the same object, but the basic conditions of the two (viz. existence and non-existence) are not identical. The principle of relativity points to the way of synthesis and testifies the element of co-existence.

Ācārya Akalaṅka has mentioned a number of reasons for the admission of existence and non-existence. A pot exist with reference to its own nature, it does not exist with reference to an alien nature. This argument leads us to investigate the meaning of 'own nature' and 'alien nature'. Akalaṅka's reply is – the own nature refers to the thing that is responsible for the application of the 'pot concept' and the 'pot word', and what is not amenable to such usage is the alien nature. The affirmation of the own nature and the denial of the alien nature establish the element of a thing. If the alien nature, viz. a piece of cloth,

is not excluded from the own nature, viz. the pot, the word 'pot' would be applicable as designation to all things. And in spite of such exclusion, if the own nature of the pot is not cognized, the latter would be a non-entity like a hare's horn.

The specifically intended pot again passes through a number of phases. Any one among these phases is the own nature while the preceding and succeeding phases are its alien natures.

An intermediate phase of the independent pot again is constantly subject to growth and decay. Therefore the state of the present moment is the own nature while the past and future states are the alien natures. If the existence of the pot is determinable by the past and future moments, exactly in the fashion of the present moment, then all pots – past, present and future – should together be existent at any one moment. The same logic will apply to the nature of non-existence. In other words, if a particular non-existence were determinable by all the past and future non-existences in the same fashion as the present non-existence is determined by its own nature, the upshot will be that any particular moment of non-existence is a totality of all non-existences – past, present and future. Existence and non-existence must each have its own nature, in the absence of which they would lose their identity.

Again, the momentary pot has a good many qualities and modes like colour, taste, smell, form etc. We know its existence by seeing its colour with our eyes, and in this

context the colour is the own nature, while taste etc. of which we are not aware at the moment, are the alien nature. Had taste etc. been the own nature like the colour of the pot, visible at the moment, then the former would be of the nature of colour, on account of its being cognized along with the colour by the eye. And as a result the conception of senses, other than the eye, will be a futile imagination.

Epistemologically viewed, the idea of pot consequent upon the usage of the word 'pot' is the own nature (of pot), while the shape of the pot outside is the alien nature.

Consciousness has two aspects –

1. The aspect of being a cognition, just like an imageless mirror.
2. The aspect of being possessed of a cognitum, just like a mirror with an image.

Of these two, the aspect of being possessed of a cognitum is the own nature (of a pot). In other words, in the epistemological situation, the pot *qua* the cognitum is the own nature while the cognition itself is the alien nature. The criterion is that the point of focus is the own nature while the other auxiliary conditions are the alien nature. The own nature in its essence is the object on which our cognition is fixed. Otherwise all things would be indeterminable. Thus if a pot is considered as nothing other than the cognition itself, then all other things, like a piece of cloth etc., as cognita would be identical with the pot. Exactly similar consequences will

follow if non-existence of a pot is identified with the cognition itself because in that case, non-existence being something indeterminable, the entity called pot would not be amenable to any kind of treatment, ontological or practical.

The Concomitance of the Speakable and the Unspeakable

The fourth axiom of non-absolutism is the concomitance of the speakable and the unspeakable. A substance is possessed of an infinite number of attributes. It is, however, not possible to express in language those infinite numbers of attributes taking place every moment. Besides, our span of life and also the range of language have their own limitations. A substance is unspeakable on account of this infinitude of the aspects of a thing. Only one attribute can at best be spoken of in one moment and many in many moments, but never all during any stretch of time. A thing is thus speakable with reference to only a limited number of its attributes.

The Wide Range of Non-absolutism

The above four axioms are the foundations of non-absolutism. In the speculative period of Jaina philosophy this tetrad of axioms was fully exploited in the solution of logical problems. The growth and development of the epistemological apparatus also did not detract from the importance of these basic axioms. It was always appreciated that the epistemological apparatus itself needed the service of non-absolutism for its own systematic development. Non-absolutism, in fact, was most comprehensive principle that

determined the nature of Jaina thought in all its branches, social, ethical, psychological, onto-logical, metaphysical and the like. It was Ācārya Siddhasena with whom the application of non-absolutism to the various branches of Jaina thought started. After dealing with the nature of varieties of the valid sources of knowledge, Siddhasena added, at the end of his *Nyāyāvatāra*, an investigation into the nature of non-absolutism signifying its unavailability in every such treatise. Akalanka, Vidyānanda, Haribhadra, Mānikyanandi, Vādideva, Hemachandra and others also discussed the problem of valid knowledge in the light of non-absolutism. The principle of non-absolutism was not in the least adversely affected with the development of the science of logic and epistemology, but its importance was rather enhanced as a criterion of the investigation of the nature of logico-epistemological tools. And as a result the concomitance of being and non-being, one and many etc. was gradually firmly established, and Jaina metaphysics developed with the growth of the logical thought.

There is, however, no reason to believe that these axioms of non-absolutism were not effective in the Agamic period. Nor is it a valid assumption that these axioms were discovered in the period of philosophical speculations. The difference, if any, lay in the spheres of the application of these axioms in those two periods. In the Agamic period, the principles were applied mainly in the field of ontology, while in the

speculative age it was in demand for the synthesis of philosophical issues of all types.

The Concomitance of Being and Non-being

The following dialogue between Lord Mahāvîra and his disciple Gautama throws welcome light on the problem.

Gautama : O Lord, does being change into being? Does non-being change into non-being?

Lord : Yes, Gautama! This is exactly so.

Gautama : O Lord! Does this change of being into being and non-being into non-being take place owing to some effort or occur spontaneously?

Lord : Gautama! It is effected by effort and also occurs spontaneously.

Gautama : O Lord! Does your non-being change into non-being exactly in the same way as your being changes into being? Similarly does your being change into being exactly as your non-being changes into non-being?

Lord : Yes, Gautama! That is exactly so.

The above dialogue clearly defines Lord Mahāvîra's assertion of the concomitance of being and non-being in the same entity as also their distinct causal identities.

Lord Mahāvîra rejected both the propositions, viz. everything exists (*sarvam asti*) and nothing exists (*sarvam nāsti*). He proposed a synthesis of the two. Both being and non-being are

true. They are distinct, though predicable of the same entity. The distinctness of the two is unambiguously demonstrated in the following words of Gautama addressed to the upholders of heterodox doctrines. O beloved of Gods, we never speak of being as non-being and non-being as being. We affirm being of the concept 'everything exists' and non-being of the proposition 'nothing exists'. The implication is that being is true as being and non-being is true as non-being. In other words, being and non-being are both real. It is interesting to note here that it is exactly these two propositions which were advanced by two rival Buddhist schools, viz. the *Sarvāstivādins* and the *Mādhyamika Śūnyavādins*.

The implication of the above dialogue is the rejection of absolute being and absolute non-being, and acceptance of the synthesis of the two as concrete aspect of any entity. Being and non-being are also explained as possessed of their definite place and value in the above dialogue.

The Concomitance of the Permanent and the Impermanent

'Is it true, O Lord!' asked Gautama, 'that the unstable changes while the stable does not change, the unstable breaks whereas the stable does not break?'

'Yes, Gautama! This is exactly so.'

A substance is the co-existence of the unwavering and the wavering, the stable and the unstable. It is immutable and mutable both. The soul is immutable and as such it never

changes into non-soul. It is also mutable and as such it passes through various forms of existence. This is explained in the following dialogue between Manditaputra and the Lord.

Manditaputra : 'Is it true, O Lord! That the soul is constantly subject to wavering and as a result it passes through various states?'

Lord : 'Yes, Manditaputra! This is true.'

The same has been said to be true of a material atom which has been regarded as an ever-changing entity in Jainism.

The permanence of the substance is due to its unwavering character (the attribute of immutability), while its impermanence is due to its wavering character (origination and cessation). This is manifest from the following dialogue –

Gautama : 'Is the soul permanent or impermanent, O Lord?'

Lord : 'The soul is permanent in some respect and impermanent in another respect. It is permanent in respect of its substance (which is eternal) and it is impermanent in respect of modes which originate and vanish.'

This is true not only of the soul but of all other substances which are neither absolutely permanent nor absolutely impermanent, but both permanent and impermanent.

The Concomitance of Identity and Difference of Substance and Modes

'Knowledge is the defining characteristic of a soul.' Here the soul-substance and the knowledge-quality are given from the stand-point of difference. On the other hand, it has also been said that what is designated as the soul is the knower, or conversely what is designated as the knower is the soul. Such Āgamic texts assert the identity of soul and knowledge.

The earth is a substance and a pot is its mode. A pot is made of earth and as it cannot be produced without it, it is identical with the earth. The earth cannot exercise the function of holding water before it is transformed into a pot which, therefore, is functionally different from earth. A pot is a product and earth is its material cause; in other words earth is the substance of which the pot is a mode. The relation between the substance and its mode is identity-cum-difference. It, therefore, follows that an effect and a cause are related through identity-cum-difference.

The Concomitance of One and Many

There are dialogues which throw light on the concomitance of one and many. The following dialogue is an illustration in point—

Somila : 'Are you one or many, O Lord?'

Lord : 'I am one in respect of substance, O Somila. However, in respect of knowledge and intuition I am two. In respect of parts (constituents of a

substance), I am immutable, eternal and unchanging. I am many in respect of the ever-changing phases of my consciousness.

The nature of the substance and modes entails the relationship of one and many, universal and particular, permanent and impermanent. The substance is one while the modes are many. The substance stands for the universal and the modes for the particular. The substance is eternal while the modes are changeable.

The universal is two fold – the horizontal (*tiryag*) and the vertical (*ūrdhva*). The proposition 'I am one' refers to the horizontal universal which is the experience of unity (*ekatva*), pervasiveness (*anyatva*) and essence (*dhruvatva*). The proposition 'I am many' in respect of the successive functions of my consciousness represents the vertical universal. There is the experience of before and after in it. The horizontal universal is the essence pervading through the different contemporary states, which establishes their unity. The vertical universal consists in the successive changes that are similar, which establishes a unity running through the past, present and future.

We find elaborate investigations into the nature of non-absolutism and the doctrine of relativism in the *Āgamic* literature. The dictum – no word of the *jin* (omniscient) is independent of *naya* (a particular viewpoint) is the reputed principle of *Āgamic* exegesis. Each proposition of the *Āgama*

was explained by means of the *nayas*. The tradition says that the *Drstivāda*, the twelfth text of the basic scripture, contained philosophical discussions based on different viewpoints. By the third century B.C. the main part of the text was lost, leaving behind only a fragment of it. Vācaka Umāsvāti and Ācārya Siddhasena were the pioneers in the application of the *nayas* to the different philosophical problems of their times and Ācārya Samantabhadra carried this process to its consummation by including a good number of new issues that had cropped up by his time. Siddhasena clearly demonstrated that the Sāmkhya system illustrated the substantial standpoint whereas the Buddhist philosophy is a representative of the modal viewpoint. In this way he made an evaluation of all the systems of thought that were extant, from the relativistic standpoint, with reference to different *nayas*. The most important treatise of his on the subject is the *Sanmati Tarka*, while the most significant work of Samantabhadra on this subject is the *Āpta-Mimāṃsā*, in which he has most successfully been able to apply the principle of sevenfold predication to the current problems of universal and particular, identity and difference, existence and non-existence and such other mutually opposed doctrines to establish a synthesis between them. Both these treatises can be regarded as pioneer works of the philosophy of non-absolutism.

Non-absolutism : Results and Problems

The philosophical speculations based on the non-absolutistic attitude gradually gained in depth. By the eighth century A.D. Ācārya Haribhadra and Akalaṅka further widened its scope. Ācārya Haribhadra's *Anekāntajayapatākā* bears self-evident testimony to this process. The synthetic approach had also an uninterrupted growth. A serious doubt, however, presented itself. The question arose as to whether Jaina philosophy is a mere syncretistic eclectic movement or it had its own original thinking? Some modern scholars also adopt this line of thinking and are convinced that the Jaina thinkers developed their own philosophy by appropriating alien doctrines. Such thought owes its origin to the synthetic approach of the Jains to philosophical problems. A question was raised to Vācaka Umāsvāti that whether the *nayas* are the proponents of alien philosophies or independent upholders of opposition inspired by diverse opinions? For its solution, he answered that these *nayas* are neither of the two but they are the different propensities of knowing the infinite attributes of a substance.



You repeatedly say - try to understand me.

*When I tried to understand myself I understood
the truth in your statement. Without understanding
the self can we understand others ?*





A viewpoint (naya) has a double function, viz. experience of the object and its verbal expression. All the viewpoints may be considered idealistic (jñāna naya) on account of their being of the nature of experience. They can also be considered as linguistic (śabda naya) on account of their being expressed in verbal propositions.

The nature of a thing (substance) is sometimes determined with reference to its intrinsic nature or the material cause (upādāna kāraṇa) while on other occasions it is determined with reference to modes arising from extraneous sources. In the former case the viewpoints may be called transcendental (niścaya naya) and in the latter the empirical (vyavahāra naya).

The propounder of non-absolutism does not claim the validity or invalidity of a viewpoint but proclaims that a viewpoint independent of other viewpoints is false whereas a viewpoint dependent on other viewpoints is true and genuine.

Key- Words

<i>Ākāśāstikāya</i>	-	<i>Accommodation</i>
<i>Artha naya</i>	-	<i>ontological viewpoint</i>
<i>Artha-paryāya</i>	-	<i>objective mode</i>
<i>Atyantābhāva</i>	-	<i>Non-existence</i>
<i>Bhāgīrathī</i>	-	<i>Selfsame Ganges heaven</i>
<i>Jñāna naya</i>	-	<i>Idealistic standpoint</i>
<i>Kriyamāna-kṛta</i>	-	<i>Process and Product</i>
<i>Neti neti</i>	-	<i>Negatively verbal symbol</i>
<i>Sāmānya</i>	-	<i>Universal</i>
<i>Sattā</i>	-	<i>Real</i>
<i>Sthāpanā-niksepa</i>	-	<i>An image</i>
<i>Upādāna kāraṇa</i>	-	<i>Material cause</i>
<i>Viśesa</i>	-	<i>Particular</i>
<i>Vyañjana-paryāya</i>	-	<i>The verbal or conceptual mode</i>

6. The Doctrine of *Naya*: Infinite Modes and Infinite Approaches

Synthetic & Analytic Viewpoint (*Samgraha & Vyavahar Naya*)

Existence is a generic attribute of a substance. There is no substance which is not existent. From the attribute of existence the non-dualistic nature of a substance follows. The consummation of such non-dualism is pure existence or absolute existence. From the standpoint of such existence the nature of the universe would find expression in such proposition as – the universe is one because existence is an all-pervading feature of it.

This non-dualistic approach to element is the viewpoint called synthetic (*samgraha naya*). The propounders of non-absolutism have attempted at reconciling the thoughts of the systems like Vedānta and the Sāmkhya. But this does not mean that they borrowed this non-dualistic or generic viewpoint from the Vedānta or the Sāmkhya systems. On the contrary, they have made a critical estimate of the systems that believed in absolutistic non-dualism. The ultimacy of the universal (existence) and the unelement of the particulars is a pseudo-synthetic viewpoint. The universe can be a unity viewed as existence, but there are attributes other than existence in a substance. Particularity is one such attribute of

the substance. Viewed from this attribute of particularity the universe would appear a dualism of existence (universal and particular). The real (*sattā*) has two facets, viz. substance and the modes or the universal (*sāmānya*) and the particular (*viśesa*).

The universal is an attribute of the substance. The experience based on such universal supports non-duality. The particular is also an attribute of the substance. The experience based on such particular supports dualism. In fact, the variety of experience is attested by the corresponding variety of the attributes. This is the reason why any system of thought based on any particular attribute of the real can be accepted on the basis of various particular standpoints. A real presents itself in a number of ways depending on the knower's interest, inclination and aesthetic as well as moral equipment. The synthetic attitude is an outcome of this doctrine of *nayas* (ways of approach and observation). There is, therefore, no room for the misconception that the doctrine of *nayas* is an eclectic outcome of the different systems of philosophy.

Pantoscopic Viewpoint (Naigama Naya)

A substance is possessed of an infinite number of attributes, but it does not possess all kinds of attributes. Thus a soul has an infinite number of attributes, just like a non-soul (i.e. substance other than soul). There is absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva*) between a soul and non-soul mutually, that is a soul can never become a non-soul and non-soul can never

become a soul. The reason for such absolute non-existence is their own specific natures. A soul is possessed of the specific attribute of consciousness which is absolutely non-existent in a non-soul. The category of a non-soul comprises five substances –

- 1) *Dharmāstikāya* which has the attribute of being the medium of motion.
- 2) *Adharmāstikāya* which has the attribute of being the medium of rest.
- 3) *Ākāśāstikāya* which provides accommodation.
- 4) Matter which has the attributes of colour, odour, taste and touch.
- 5) Time which has the attribute of duration.

The above specific attributes of the non-soul are absolutely non-existent in the soul. These specific attributes constitute the dividing line, between the soul and the non-soul. On the basis of the generic attributes, it is, however, possible to establish unity between the soul and the non-soul and their absolute difference can also be asserted on the basis of specific attributes as noted above. A substance has a character of its own. Its substance-hood is not dependent upon external relations and spacio-temporal determinations. Each substance has its own basic nature, its own specific particularity. It acquires fresh attributes from various relationships, and determinations, but such attributes are not the defining characteristics of it.

A substance possesses attributes and, therefore, it is called the substratum (*dharmi*) of those attributes. The attributes are two fold – qualities and modes. The qualities coexist with the substance while the modes occur in succession. Consciousness is a co-existing attribute of a soul, while pleasure, pain, happiness, sorrow etc. are attributes that occur in succession. An attribute and its substratum are neither absolutely different nor absolutely identical. An attribute can exist only in its substratum, and, therefore, there is non-absolute difference between them on account of this relationship of the content and the contained. The substance is one unitary principle, while the attributes are many, and from this viewpoint they cannot be absolutely identical, as one and many have evidently contrary natures. Identity and difference are thus synthesized in a substance. Such synthesis gives rise to two distinct experiences. Thus (1) the proposition 'the soul exists' embodies the experience of the predominance of identity. The attribute of knowledge is not intended here to be distinct from the substratum soul. (2) The proposition 'the soul is possessed of knowledge' embodies the experience in which the element of difference is predominant. Here the attribute of knowledge is intended to be a feature different from the substratum soul.

In brief, the attribute is subordinate in the viewpoint of identity, while the substratum occupies a predominant place in such experience. In the viewpoint of difference the positions of the attribute and the substratum are reversed.

The cycle of modes ceaselessly revolves about a substance. The modes that occur at the present moment are existent (real) and those that are past and about to come are non-existent (unreal). While the existent mode is related to the object, the non-existent one is to knowledge. The mode that is past does not reside in the object, but is merely an object of knowledge. We imagine an object and construct an image of it. The image, however, does not exist in the world outside, but that remains as an idea inside. The modes, past and future, are ideas in the mind. The will is a element, and the experience arising from it determines our activity. The pantoscopic viewpoint accepts also the element of the will. The authenticity of the popular concepts of causality, substratum etc. is established on the testimony of this way of pantoscopic observation.

1. The Treatment of Cause as an Effect

In the proposition 'this is one year old plant' the transformation of plant is the effect while the period 'one year old' is the cause. The identification of plant with 'one-year-oldness' is by way of treatment of the cause as identical with its effect.

2. The Treatment of Effect as Cause

In the proposition 'violence is suffering', violence is intended to be the cause of suffering. Here violence itself is identified with suffering by way of the treatment of the effect as identical with the cause.

In the usages like the above, the subject-predicate relation is determined on the basis of causality which justifies the act of predicating a cause of an effect, or an effect of a cause.

3. The Treatment of the Content as the Container

In the proposition 'the summit of the cosmos is the place of emancipation (*mokṣa*)', the cosmic summit is not intended to be called emancipation which really belongs to the soul and not to any particular place in the cosmos.

4. The Treatment of Container as the Content

In the proposition 'the dais is shouting', what is meant is that the persons seated on the dais are shouting. Here the container, viz. the dais has been used to denote the content viz. the persons seated on it.

Although the pantoscopic viewpoint is right so far as its own place of application is concerned, it becomes a pseudo-*naigama* viewpoint as soon as it engages itself in considering the difference between an attribute and its substratum, or between a part and the whole as absolute and eternal. The *Vaiśeṣika* system, according to this estimation of element, is an instance of pseudo-*naigama* viewpoint, because it considers an attribute as absolutely different from its substratum.

The Memory Viewpoint (*rjusūtra naya*)

Identity and difference may be experienced with reference to either many things or a single entity. The experience of identity owes its origin to the substantial continuity whereas the experience of difference to the temporal modes. The experience focused on the immediate present as distinct from the past and the future is the momentary standpoint, which has manifold ramifications, some of which are as follows:

1. Process and Product (*kriyamāna-kṛta*)

Suppose a piece of cloth is being made, which is a long process. But in this process the part already made is definitely a product. If this part is not considered as a product, then what is produced at the last moment of the process won't also be a product. Even at the first moment of the process the cloth cannot be said to be absolutely unproduced. It is, therefore, expedient to say that every moment of the process is a product, which has the present moment of experience as its cognitional counterpart.

2. Unconditional Annihilation

Origination and cessation are natural to an object. The origination itself is the cause of cessation. An entity spontaneously originates in the first moment and vanishes in the second. If a thing did not vanish immediately after its origination, it

would be eternal. It is, of course, found that a pot is broken when struck by a piece of stone. But such destruction is the law of the apparent world of things. This rule, however, is not applicable to the subtle world, which is governed by laws that determine the incessant destruction of things.

3. **Unconditional Origination**

A thing, at the moment of its origination, does not produce the second moment which is its effect. What had originated in the first moment ceases to exist in the second moment, and so it cannot act as the cause of the latter. The preceding moment cannot be a cause of the moment that succeeds. It is thus evident that origination is unconditional and spontaneous.

4. **Modes are without Substratum**

A crow is not black. A black colour is black, a crow is crow. Both are distinct. If the black colour was crow, a black bee also, on account of its black colour, would become a crow. Had the black colour been the nature of the crow, there could not be a white crow. The red flesh, white bones and the yellow bile of the crow should also be accepted as black. But the fact is otherwise. It, therefore, follows that black colour is black by itself, whereas a crow is a crow by its own nature.

Such type of thinking represents the philosophy of absolute difference between a substance and its modes. The basic presumption of such logic is the absolute impossibility of any point of contact between a substance and its modes which belong to the substance though absolutely unrelated with it.

5. Absence of Co-existence

The black colour and the crow cannot co-exist in the same substratum, because the modes (such as the colour and crowhood) are possessed of their own potencies which are independently existent, there being nothing called substance as the substratum of those modes. If on the basis of the predominance of black colour in it a crow is called black, then even the blankets, that are predominantly black, should be classified with the crows. The predominance of a particular mode cannot be accepted as the essence of another subordinate mode that is co-existent with it.

6. Impossibility of Substantive – Adjective Relationship

The admission of substantive – adjective relationship between two different modes would entail promiscuity of thought. And in the case of identical modes, such relationship is out of the question.

7. Absence of Cognitum – Cognition Relationship

A cognition does not know an unrelated object. Had it done so, the same cognition would have cognized all kinds of things, and this would destroy the possibility of a determine cognition. A cognition cannot also cognize a related object, because the latter ceases to exist when the former is supposed to cognize it. The cognitum-cognition relationship is based on causality. A cognition can know its cognitum only when the latter has presented itself to the former. But with the passing away of the moment of such presentation, both the cognition and cognitum are things of the past. The question of a cognition knowing its cognitum in such a situation does not simply arise.

8. Absence of Denotatum – Denotative Relationship

The meaning conventionally related to a word cannot be the connotation of the latter. This is so because the relationship determined between a word and its meaning is a thing of the past when the word is requisitioned for use at a subsequent moment. In short, the temporal diversity stands in the way of establishing any relationship between the word and meaning. And the admission of a meaning that is unrelated to the word would cause nothing but confusion. An unrelated meaning, therefore, cannot be the connotation of a word.

A word is not produced by the meaning (idea or thing). It is produced by the palate, tongue, lip etc. This is self-evident. The meaning (idea or thing) also is not produced by the word. The meaning is there even before the production of the word. There is thus no causal relationship between the word and the meaning.

The relation of identity also does not exist between the word and its meaning. They also exist apart in point of space. There is diversity also in respect of the organs which cognize them. The word is cognized by the auditory sense-organ whereas the meaning (idea or thing) is cognizable by any kind of sense-organ, external or internal. The relationship of identity can never be possible on account of the diversity of spatial location and the organs of cognition. The admission of the relation of identity between word and meaning would entail burning sensation in the mouth at the time of articulation of the word 'fire'.

A concept also, like the meaning, is not the referent of a word. The difficulties consequent upon the admission of meaning as the referent of a word should equally apply to the doctrine of the concept as the referent of a word.

The momentary viewpoint (*rjusūtra naya*) is an experience arising from a momentary mode that is immediately present before the person. It rejects the past and the future as unreal. It does not also admit any nexus even between two modes and

also between two relations. Such experience, however, has no sanction of the popular viewpoint which shows that the momentary viewpoint is only a partial representation of element, because otherwise the momentary viewpoint would be an instance of a pseudo viewpoint. It is pantoscopic viewpoint that represents the popular estimation of element. It is only the combination of all viewpoints that is capable of satisfying the popular need and demand, intellectual as well as practical.

The momentary viewpoint is compared to the Buddhist doctrine of universal flux, but because of its being only a partial view of element at the cost of other views, it can be called a pseudo-momentary viewpoint.

Verbal Viewpoint

The word is a powerful medium of our daily life, social and intellectual, which was invested with the power of expressing its meaning (idea or thing) by man himself. The word has also an intrinsic power of expression of its own. It travels from the mouth of the speaker to the ears of the listeners to reveal its meaning. Such revelation or expression is possible also by physical gestures. But the clarity of words is not possible in those gestures or other kinds of symbols. This is why that language is requisitioned for conveying meanings. Our ideas arise from language, and language in its turn makes those ideas capable of deep thinking in philosophy, logic and

science. This is indeed the reason why the verbal viewpoint which is mainly concerned with the philosophy of word, meaning and propositions, occupies an important position in the doctrine of *nayas*. In grammar the difference of tense, case-endings etc. do not entail the difference of the referent, but this is not accepted to be so by the verbal standpoint, which claims that the difference in the tense and case-endings of a word necessarily implies difference in the nature of the referent.

Novelty of Object due to the Difference of (1) Tense, (2) Gender and (3) Number

For instance, the propositions – 'there was a city named Jaipur', 'there is such a city' and 'there will be such a city' – have different and distinct references, because the city of Jaipur is a variable place without any constant character of its own. Here the difference of meaning is due to the difference of tense represented by the verb. Similarly the difference of gender entails novelty of the thing referred to. For instance in the expressions, 'baby boy and baby girl', the component 'baby' has different connotations on account of the change of gender effected by the second component. Similarly, the terms 'god' and 'goddess' have intrinsically different connotations according to the verbal viewpoint. The expression 'mean' which is a singular noun stands for a condition or quality, whereas the plural form 'means' stands for money.

The implication of this *naya* is that meaning of a word necessarily varies with the variation of the tense, gender and number, because no additional part of a word is meaningless. Any additional element in a word is bound to introduce a novelty of meaning.

The Etymological Viewpoint (*samabhirūdhanaya*)

This viewpoint of etymology is much subtler than the verbal viewpoint. The synonymous words, according to this viewpoint, have different meanings, and they do not stand for an identical referent. For linguistic exactness we use specific words to connote specific modes. The practice of bracketing synonyms followed in the vocabularies is a defective method according to this viewpoint. Each word has a shade of its own which makes it irreplaceable by any other word, however close its connotation may be. A morphological difference in a word presupposes a corresponding difference in the meaning intended by the speaker. No two words can be used to denote the selfsame referent. Such use would involve confusion and contradiction. The power of expression should vary from word to word because the absence of variation would obliterate the morphological distinction of the words. Consequently the two words should be admitted as one single verbal symbol. It is, therefore, asserted by this etymological viewpoint that the use of different words should be governed by the difference in the meaning sought to be expressed by them.

The problem of the relation between word and meaning (ideas and things) is worthy of consideration in this connection. Word and meaning are quite distinct entities. Their causal efficiencies are distinct. The conditions of their productions are different.

Word and its meaning stand in the relation of significant and significate. The significant is the word, sign or symbol while the significate is the thing or the idea meant by the significant. There cannot be the relation of identity between the significant and the significate and, therefore, how can diversity of the significate follow from the diversity of the significant?

The solution of the problem can be sought in the light of the words like cognition-cognitum and the luminous objects like the sun, the lamp etc. (1) There is no relation of identity between a cognition and its cognitum although the former is the determinant of the latter. Now, if the knower-known relationship can be admitted between the cognition and the cognitum in spite of their (epistemological) difference, what is the difficulty in accepting the denotatum-denotative relationship between a word and the thing (meant by the word), in spite of their (ontological) difference ? (2) It is common sense that the luminous objects like the sun, the lamp etc. illuminate a pot and other things, though they are physically different from one another. But, if there can exist illumined-illuminator relationship between a pot and a lamp

in spite of their (ontological) difference, then what is the reason that the denotatum-denotative relationship cannot be obtained between them ?

Therefore, as there exists the denotative-denotatum relationship between a word and the thing, it is self-evident that there should be a difference of meaning denoted, consequent upon the difference of the denotative word.

This difference of meaning resulting from the difference of word can be illustrated by the following propositions :

- a) He is moral.
- b) He is a man.

The expressions 'moral' and 'man' are synonymous, but they represent different modes of the same entity, and as such they do not have an identical referent as explained below :

- a) A man is mortal and, therefore, he is represented by the term 'mortal'. The expression 'mortal' expresses the mortality-aspect of a man.
- b) A man is so called because he is the descendant of Manu. The word has a reference to his descent from a certain person, named Manu.

Similarly in the propositions (a) it is the current of *Bhāgîrathî* and (b) it is the source of *Haimavatî*, the expressions '*Bhāgîrathî*' and '*Haimavatî*' refer to the selfsame *Ganges*, but stress two different modes that have reference to the origin of the river. The first term refers to the myth of *Bhāgîrathā*

digging up the bed of the *Ganges*, whereas the second expression refers to the physical origin of the *Ganges* from the *Himālayas*.

The Viewpoint of Function (*evambhūta naya*)

In this viewpoint the relationship between the denotative and the denotatum is further delimited. In that the etymological meaning of the former must be satisfied by the latter. A word in order to be an exact denotative of the sense must refer to the present mode instead of a bygone aspect or an aspect that is to come. In the interest of precision of expression one should use only the word that is indicative of immediately existing mode of the denotatum. In the proposition 'a teacher is teaching the student', the expression 'teacher' has been properly used because he is engaged in the act of teaching at the moment. But in the proposition 'a teacher is taking his lunch', the use of the word 'teacher' is not logically proper because he is taking food instead of doing any kind of teaching at the moment.

The Scope of Viewpoints

The substance stands for the universal whereas the modes refer to the particular aspects of a thing. Substance and modes are indeed the basic objects of cognition. Two fundamental viewpoints have been conceived on the basis of these two aspects of a real –

- a) The cognition or the experience of the substance or the universal of a thing is the source of what is

known as the substantial viewpoint (*dravyārthika naya*).

- b) The mode or the particular in a thing is responsible for what is called the modal viewpoint (*paryāyārthika naya*).

Of the seven *nayas* the Pantoscopic, the Synthetic and the Analytic viewpoints fall under the category of substantial viewpoint. The remaining four viz. the Momentary, Verbal, Etymological and Functional viewpoints constitute the category of modal viewpoint.

According to another system of classification the first four viewpoints which are mainly concerned with the ontological aspect of a thing are called the ontological viewpoint (*artha naya*). The remaining three, being mainly concerned with the linguistic aspect, are called the verbal viewpoint (*śabda naya*).

The Pantoscopic viewpoint is called an idealistic standpoint (*jñāna naya*) on account of its being concerned with the speaker's will or intention and also because the past and future modes referred to in this viewpoint are mere ideas and do not reside in an external object.

A viewpoint (*naya*) has a double function, viz. experience of the object and its verbal expression. All the viewpoints may be considered idealistic (*jñāna naya*) on account of their being of the nature of experience. They can also be considered as

linguistic (*śabda naya*) on account of their being expressed in verbal propositions.

The nature of a thing (substance) is sometimes determined with reference to its intrinsic nature or the material cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*) while on other occasions it is determined with reference to modes arising from extraneous sources. In the former case the viewpoints may be called Transcendental (*nīścaya naya*) and in the latter the empirical (*vyavahāra naya*).

The doctrine of non-absolutism falls under two divisions, viz., complete comprehension through *pramāṇa* and partial assessment through *naya*. The entire object is revealed by the *pramāṇa*, whereas only a particular aspect is determined by the *naya*. The entire object comprehended through the principle on non-absolutism is analysed in parts by means of the system of *nayas*. The water from the ocean contained in the pot can neither be called an ocean nor non-ocean, but it can be called only a part of the ocean. Similarly, a *naya* though arising from the *pramāṇa* is neither a *pramāṇa* nor a non-*pramāṇa*.

A viewpoint (*naya*) is limited in its activity to the presentation of its own subject-matter. It is called a *naya* so long as it does not refute the rival viewpoint. As soon as the refutation of a rival viewpoint is attempted; it falls in the category of pseudo-*naya* (*durnaya*) on account of its being absolutistic in character.

An absolutistic viewpoint that asserts its own validity independently of any other viewpoint gives rise to controversy whereas the relativistic viewpoint or a coordinated viewpoint gives rise to reconciliation or absence of controversy.

Even as gems strung together merge their individuality into a necklace, exactly so the different viewpoints embodying different experiences merge into the philosophy of non-absolutism being held together on the string of relativism.

***Niksepa* or Classification of import of words**

Niksepa stands for a special method of exposition of the import of words. A word expresses numerous modes and shades of its import. For the expression of such modes and shades the selfsame word is qualified by a number of adjuncts. For instance, the '*indra*' can be used as a name of a particular person (*nāma-indra*) or an image of the king of heaven (*sthāpanā-indra*) or person who once enjoyed the status of the king of heaven (*dravya-indra*) or a person actually enjoying the glory and magnificence of the king of heaven (*bhāva-indra*).

The method of *niksepa* was developed in the *Āgamic* period itself. In the speculative period and also in the period of logical developments, the method continued to flourish. While rhetorics give the method of determining the particular meaning of a multisensed word, it is only the commentaries

on the Jaina *āgamas*, which give the method of determining the intended meaning of a unisensed word. This method is useful not only for the treatises on logic but the analytic approach of this method has a universal utility. In that it is a valuable instrument for defining the intended meaning and purpose of any systematic treatise on any subject.

The gradual development of knowledge and practical behaviour including verbal expression takes place in the following order – the object in its wholeness is known through valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) in the first instance, and subsequently the same object is cognized in parts through the *nayas* (viewpoints). All our knowledge is synthetic in the beginning, and becomes analytic at the next stage. When an object is known through valid cognition and the *nayas*, a name is assigned to it. For instance, a thing of a particular shape and capable of holding water is named 'jar'. This nomenclature is responsible for the relationship of denotative and denotatum between the word 'jar' and its referent (the objective jar). This is the initial stage of word-meaning relationship which undergoes semantic expansion in due course. Thus a drawing or a picture of a jar, though incapable of carrying water, is also called jar; likewise a mass of clay (material cause of jar) and a potsherd is also called jar. At this stage of semantic expansion it becomes imperative to ascertain the intended meaning of a word precisely in a particular context of its use. It is only for the purpose of defining the particular intended meaning of

such word that an adjunct is added to it. This method is called the classification of imports of words (*niksepa*).

There is no prescribed limit of exposition through *niksepa*. The scope of such classification of imports is co-extensive with the range of meanings that a word is capable of expressing. The minimum types of such classification are four – an object must have some name and also some shape; it had also modes that are past, as well as the modes that are to come along with the modes that it has at present. This is how the four basic *niksepas* naturally follow :-

1. A name (*nāma-niksepa*) or a demonstrative symbol.
2. Form (*sthāpanā-niksepa*), an image, imaginary or real.
3. Substance (*dravya-niksepa*), past or future modes of the material cause.
4. Essence (*bhāva-niksepa*), the present mode constituting the essence of the thing.

Ācārya Jinabhadragani Ksamāśramana's exposition of *niksepa* is quite different. According to him the *nāma-niksepa* consists in nomenclature of a thing, while its shape, material cause and the effect are respectively the *sthāpanā*, *dravya* and *bhāva niksepa*. In fact, the nomenclature, assumption of a form, causality and the sequel are the minimum determinations of a thing. An object, therefore, must necessarily have these four determinants.

***Naya* and *Niksepa* (Viewpoints and the Classification of Imports)**

A viewpoint has a reference to the object, the knowledge or the verbal symbol, the *niksepa* has also a similar reference. The *naya* is knowledge whereas the *niksepa* is the practical application or usage. The *naya* and *niksepa* are mutually related as theory and its practical application.

Theory	Practical Application
Verbal viewpoint	<i>Nāma-niksepa</i> – verbal usage.
Pantoscopic viewpoint	<i>Sthāpanā-niksepa</i> –
Concerned with the will or the intention of the speaker	cognitional usage
Pantoscopic synthetic analytic and momentary viewpoint	<i>Dravya-niksepa</i> – objective usage
Verbal viewpoint	<i>Bhāva-niksepa</i> – objective usage.

When a single word denotes the name, form and the different modes of an object, the question of the intended and unintended denotatum comes up. The word 'lion' may mean the picture of a lion or the lion as a living animal. The dead body of a lion is also denoted by the word 'lion'. The lion *qua* meaning presents itself as soon as one hears the expression 'lion'. In this way the different modes of the meaning as classes of imports arise. Such classifications as determined by

adjuncts are requisitioned for defining the meaning of a particular word under exposition. The *niksepa* in fact is the selection of a particular meaning from among the meanings of a word.

Knowledge and meditation are only the two stages of a single process. An object acts as a cognitum in respect of an unsteady state of the cognition. The same object, however, becomes a meditatum (an object of meditation) with reference to a steady state of the mind called meditation. The *niksepa* has an important bearing on the process of meditation. One may concentrate on mere name as the meditatum, or on a form or on any past, future or a present mode. In this way any of the numerous modes of an object can become a suitable meditatum.

An image is the representative of the original object, and this is the reason why the pantoscopic viewpoint identifies the original substance (thing) with the idea. The name (nomenclature) has reference to the denotatum and so the verbal viewpoint identifies the original object with the verbum (verbal object). The past and future modes are superimposed on the object, and thus the pantoscopic, synthetic and analytic viewpoints identify the past and future modes with the present mode of the original object. The verbal viewpoint considers the present mode alone as real. In this way the qualified verbal usage is approved by the *nayas* for giving expression to the different modes of an object. By this process

one can arrive at the meaning intended by the speaker through words by overcoming doubt, perversion (error) and uncertainty.

Dialogue

Question 1 - From the above discussion of the nature of *nayas*, it is obvious that the purport of one *naya* is not only different from that of the other *nayas* but it is definitely opposed to the latter. Under such circumstances which should be considered true between the two? If one of them is considered as true, then the other will evidently be untrue. Both of the two mutually opposed views cannot be accepted as true. Is truth also divisible on the basis of viewpoints?

Answer – (1) A thing is a composite of the universal and the particular. The generic attribute in it is the universal, whereas the specific attribute is called the particular. A generic attribute is not absolutely different from the specific attribute and *vice versa*. A thing, therefore, is a natural composite of the generic and the specific attributes. The generic attribute is eternal, while the specific attributes arise and vanish every moment, each succeeding moment replacing the preceding one without break. Each preceding moment is the cause of the moment that succeeds it as its effect. The generic attribute is also the cause of that effect. The auxiliary conditions also enjoy causal efficiency. This is an objective estimate of the nature of a real. The entire range of human thinking or search for truth is based on the duality of universal and particular,

identity and difference or substance and modes. The pantoscopic viewpoint is the will or intention concerned with the universal and, therefore, it accepts the pre-existence of the effect in the cause (the Doctrine of Satkāryavāda of the Sāmkhya system). A believer in the generic attribute cannot think differently. But the specific attribute or the particular is as much real as the generic attribute or the universal. This leads us to the momentary viewpoint (*rjusūtra naya*) which is the outcome of the speaker's attitude based on the particular or the specific attribute, and this is the reason why it rejects such causality by asserting the non-existence of the effect in the cause (*asatkāryavāda*). In other words, whereas one of the viewpoints propounds the doctrine of the existence of the effect in the cause, the other denies it. Such opposition is not whimsical, because it is based on the divergent experiences of the thinkers. Both these experiences are certified by the behaviour of the reals. The generic attribute is as much a true component of a thing as the specific attribute. The generic attributes is eternal. The verbal or conceptual mode (*vyañjana-paryāya*) endures for a while whereas the objective mode (*artha-paryāya*) is evanescent and momentary. The causal relationship is applicable in the first two cases only, while in the latter case causality assumes a different meaning, for example, the doctrine of '*pratītya-samutpāda*' in Buddhism. Both these alternatives are based on two different truths and as such both are true. And this is why

the two different viewpoints look at the two truths differently as they actually are and verbally represent them in accordance with their divergent experiences. A viewpoint is essentially an experience. It does not create the object. It is limited in its function to know the object and express it as it is. A real is not divided on the basis of the viewpoints but the latter are divided on the basis of the objectivity of the former. The philosophies based on absolutistic viewpoints accept as the whole truth either of the alternatives exclusively viz., the system propounding the generic attributes or a theory based on the specific characteristics. This is the reason why some among them assert the pre-existence of the effect in the cause, while the others deny it. The Jaina philosophers, however, regard the viewpoints as relativistic in nature on account of their origin from the relativism of the generic and the specific attributes. The dialogues of Lord Mahāvīra as recorded in the *Ardhamāgadhī* canon are all permeated with the spirit of relativism. And this is why the doctrine of the pre-existence of the effect in the cause and the doctrine of non-existence of the effect in the cause are both considered as relatively true by the Jaina thinkers. The apparent mutual contradiction of the two alternatives is explained on the basis of their relativistic approach. The former is a valid estimate of the aspect of generic attribute, while the latter derives its validity on account of being concerned with the specific attributes of a real. Both the estimates are objectivistic and are based on

relativism. The generic as well as the specific attributes belong to the same object, as limited to them, and as such are free from mutual opposition or inconsistency. If the two aspects are not mutually opposed or inconsistent, why should be diverse experiences arising from them is considered as mutually contradictory ? The appearance of contradiction should be an occasion for our attention as to whether it is due to the divergence of the referents, viz. the generic and the specific attributes. All philosophical contradiction would melt away spontaneously if a real is looked at from all plausible viewpoints without putting an exclusive stress on any one of them.

(2). The *Sāmkhya* system propounds the '*purusa*' as an unchanging eternal entity. The Buddhist philosophers, on the other hand, believe in momentariness of everything. The substantial (*dravyārthika*) and the modal (*paryāyārthika*) viewpoints are not inspired by these doctrines. The substance, in Jainism, is synthesis of continuity, origination and cessation. Neither origination-cessation independent of continuity nor continuity independent of origination-cessation is given to experience. This mutual entailment of the two aspects (origination-cessation and continuity) is responsible for the substantial and modal viewpoints, which demonstrates that the continuity aspect of the substance is permanent and unchanging whereas the origination-cessation aspect is impermanent and ever-changing. The permanence

and impermanence of the substance is not based on the viewpoints. But in fact the latter are based on the former. In other words, it is the nature of things that is the source of *nayas* and not that the nature of the things is determined by them.

(3). Identity and difference are the intrinsic attributes of the substance. The substantial viewpoint represents the former whereas the modal viewpoint is based on the latter. The modes are twofold, viz. 1) represented by an identical concept (*vyañjana-paryāya*), and 2) the modes that are objective (*artha-parīyāya*). The former are a kind of continuity of homogeneous change expressed by words. The latter appear indivisible or the like being ultimate in appearance or element. The substance as an entity is unitary and indivisible. It becomes many and infinite as divided into objective and conceptual or verbal modes. A person is called 'man' from birth to death. The onlooker always finds him as a person on account of the conceptual or verbal symbol, viz. 'person'. This is the identity aspect of the substance. But the person passes through infancy, youth and such other stages. Infancy again is also divisible in sub-stages, for instance, the milking babe, a three year old child and so forth.

In this way the conceptual or the verbal modes represent both identity and multiplicity of a thing.

(4). According to the *Upanisads* the ultimate element is ineffable, being expressible only negatively by the verbal symbols (*neti neti*). In the *Ācārāṅga Sūtra* the 'self' has been

described as unspeakable, being unamenable to any sort of verbal expressions. Lord Buddha also characterized the 'self', 'the life here-after' etc. as indeterminable. The analysis of the nature of the substance reveals that the inexpressibility itself is only relatively true, because it is expressible in reference to another attribute of the real. The objective mode, being momentary and infinitesimal, is not susceptible of being expressed in language. And, therefore, the substance is ineffable in reference to the objective mode. The conceptual or verbal mode, on account of its prolonged continuity, apparentness and being originator of a homogeneous flow of change, is amenable to linguistic expression. The substance, therefore, is speakable in respect of the conceptual or the verbal mode.

The above discussion should clearly show that the viewpoints are based on the fundamental nature and the congregation of modes of the substance. These viewpoints are neither the eclectic combinations of heterogeneous systems nor conceptions based on whim.

Question 2 – Is there any special viewpoint for the expression 'barren woman's son'?

Answer – 'Barren woman's son' is a concept. No concept can be independent of any reference to something else. An unreal entity cannot even be conceived. Neither a 'barren woman' is unreal, nor a 'son' is unreal. Neither the 'sky' is unreal, nor a 'flower' is unreal. The expressions like 'a son of a barren

woman' or 'a sky-flower' are compound concepts. The 'son' is objectively true, and 'a barren woman's son' is a negative concept with reference to a 'son'. Similarly, the 'flower' is a truth. And a 'sky-flower' is a negative concept formed on the basis of the 'flower' existing in its own capacity. A barren woman cannot have a son, but in the absence of any son anywhere, the concept of 'a barren woman's son' would be impossible. The sky cannot have flowers, but if the flowers were not present anywhere in the world, the concept of sky-flower would be impossible. And, therefore, the concepts like 'barren woman's son' or 'a sky-flower', are negative ideas born out of the real existence of their components elsewhere in the world. The pantoscopic viewpoint (*naigama naya*), on account of its being based obviously on the speaker's will or intention, is competent enough to explain such hypothetical truths.



*If the meaning of silence is not to speak,
it is actually the secret of good health, nothing else.
The meaning of silence should actually be to arrest
the purpose of speech.*



*To be ignorant is difficult. But greater difficulty
is to be knowingly ignorant.*





Naya is a point of view, a vision and a way of thinking. There are as many naya as there are ways of speaking. Through the substantial point of view things are described with respect to their ultimate substance and through the modal point of view they are described with respect to its modification i.e. their origination-cessation or impermanence. One naya only analyses a portion of the whole, so naturally the remaining portion too remains allied to it. Modes are innumerable hence viewpoints too are innumerable. Naya is absolutism, but it is in no way the false angle to perception. It bears no eagerness to perceive wholeness in a portion; it is not an exposition of absolute truth. Hence there is scope for healthy contemplation through naya. According to the anekānta (a multi-faceted viewpoint or non-absolutism) school of thought totally identity and totally divergence is an absolutist approach. With this approach truth cannot be explained properly. The Jain philosophers have endeavoured to amalgamate abhed (identity) and bhed (divergence) and reduce ideological conflict.

Key- Words

<i>Abhed</i>	- <i>identity</i>
<i>Abhed vritti and abhedopachar</i>	- <i>perspective of identity</i>
<i>Achetan</i>	- <i>inanimate</i>
<i>Bhed</i>	- <i>divergence</i>
<i>Chetan</i>	- <i>animate</i>
<i>Evambhoot naya</i>	- <i>viewpoint of function</i>
<i>Jiva</i>	- <i>soul</i>
<i>Naya</i>	- <i>viewpoint</i>
<i>Pudagal</i>	- <i>physical substance of matter</i>
<i>Samabhirudh naya</i>	- <i>etymological viewpoint</i>
<i>Samyag darshan</i>	- <i>right vision or proper Perspective</i>

7. Naya, Anekānta and Rules of Thinking

It is hardly possible to ignore *Samyag Darshan* (right vision or proper perspective) when contemplating the doctrine of Jain philosophy, because it is an integral part of Jain philosophy that emanates consciousness. Thought is a dimension of knowledge but *Samyag Darshan* is a consciousness that removes illusion.

Knowledge is acquired from two sources : sensuous consciousness and transcendental consciousness. Thinking is related to sensuous consciousness but in transcendental consciousness there is vision and introspection but no thought.

According to the Jain doctrine, the knowledge gained from sensuous consciousness is a partial knowledge of a substance, not the entire knowledge of the substance. A person possessing sensory consciousness knows the part of the substance. That partial knowledge becomes the subject of controversy. Five individuals gain knowledge about five different aspects of any one substance and each of them believes their own knowledge to be perfect and true and that of the others to be untrue. In Jain philosophy an effort has been made to change this approach and understand truth through right vision; this is called “*Nayavad*”.

Naya is a point of view, a vision, and a way of thinking. However according to Siddhasen Diwakar – there are as many *naya* as there are ways of speaking: *Javeya vayanapaha, taveya chev hunti nayavaya*. This extensive approach makes the areas of contemplation very difficult. It becomes problematic for the listener or the learner to come to any tangible conclusion. In order to ease up this problem the Jain Acharyas have described two separate areas for the thought

1. *Dravyarthik naya* (the substantial point of view) - that means describing a thing with respect to its ultimate substance i.e. its persistence or permanence.
2. *Paryarthik naya* (the modal point of view) – that means describing a thing with respect to its modification i.e. its origination-cessation or impermanence.

These two views have been delineated for the convenience of contemplation and veritable ruling. In fact the thoughts cannot be made veritable by dividing them in persistent and origination-cessation or permanent and impermanent. For exposition of persistence the substantial viewpoint was adopted and for exposition of change the modal point of view was adopted. Both point of views are relative. Nowhere is persistence completely independent of change and vice versa. Yet, in order to get a holistic understanding of existence this arrangement was deemed fit. The substantial point of view analyses persistence or oneness, but does not completely rule

out change, as every viewpoint has its own limitations. It does not believe in polemics of the subject matter. Relativity means that there is nothing absolute. One *naya* only analyses a portion of the whole, so naturally the remaining portion too remains allied to it. This perception clarifies the theory of relativity.

This relativity is also expressed in the sentence – as many viewpoints exist in as many ways of thought. The basis of this argument is its mode. Modes are innumerable hence viewpoints too are innumerable. Only does the combination of innumerable parts enable us to realize the substance in totality. This is not a correct perception to believe that one mode constitutes a whole. *Naya* is absolutism, but it is in no way the false angle to perception. It bears no eagerness to perceive wholeness in a portion; it is not an exposition of absolute truth. Hence there is scope for healthy contemplation through *naya* or viewpoint.

Divergence and identity are two broad areas of contemplation. Identity does not affect the behaviour. Divergence becomes the cause for conflict and disharmony. When dwelling on philosophical ideas it is divergence which gives rise to conflict.

The Jain philosophers have endeavoured to amalgamate *abhed* (identity) and *bhed* (divergence) and reduce ideological conflict. Also there is no total difference between *chetan* (animate) and *achetan* (inanimate) or the *jiva* (soul)

and *pudgal* (physical substance of matter). Conscience is the prime quality of the *jiva* whereas *pudgal* is bereft of conscience. Its prime attribute is quadruple combination of colour, smell, taste and touch. From the perspective of prime attribute *jiva* and *pudgal* are two different substances. Yet from the perspective of state they are not different. *Jiva* also has its form and *pudgal* too has its form. The two are not different also from the viewpoint of knowledgeability, objectivity and transitoribility. According to the *anekānta* (a multi-faceted viewpoint or non-absolutism) school of thought totally identity and totally divergence is an absolutist approach. With this approach truth cannot be explained properly.

There are eight main areas of the *anekānta* viewpoint.

- | | |
|----------------|------------------|
| 1. True | 2. Untrue |
| 3. Permanent | 4. Impermanent |
| 5. Similar | 6. Dissimilar |
| 7. Expressible | 8. Inexpressible |

True and Untrue

Truth may be explained on the basis of substance. The *drauvyansh* (part of persistent) of substance is true. It is related to three periods – it existed in the past, exists in the present and will also exist in the future. In the case of persistence there is only truth and nothing is untruth.

There is a place for both truth and untruth in the portion of modes of substance. The present mode is true but the past and

future modes are untrue. The relativity of this truth and untruth has a great contribution in the development of thoughts.

There are two types of actions in the substance –

1. The actions that take place every moment - According to these changes occur every moment eternally. A thing which exists a second ago ceases to do so the next and takes a new shape. This change is called *arth paryay* (objective mode).
2. The other action is one, which takes place veiled behind the moment. This change is termed *vyanjan paryay* (visible mode).

Arthparyay or objective mode is minute and momentary, while *vyanjan paryay* or visible mode is apparent and longer lasting. *Arth paryay* molds substance into a different shape the very next moment. Without change, any substance cannot retain its existence the very next moment. Hence, according to the perspective of philosophy the work done by the *arth paryay* is extremely important.

Origination, cessation and persistence – the combination of these three awaken the realisation of truth. After analyzing these it is realized that from the perspective of persistence there is no such thing as UNTRUTH. Truth cannot originate from untruth. Untruth can never become truth and vice versa. According to the perspective of

origination and cessation the explanation for truth and untruth can only be given in relationship of cause and effect. Whatever is truth in the form of cause and untruth in the form of effect is called truth-untruth *karyavad* (work-philosophy). The atoms of soil are truth in the form of clay, yet become untruth in the form of pots. After a clay pot is made then the theory of transformation from untruth to truth may be expounded. According to the Jain philosophy, the two alternatives of untruth work-philosophy and truth work-philosophy both are not acceptable. The third alternative of truth-untruth *karyavad* was accepted. In conclusion it may be said that according to substantial point of view untruth *karyavad* and truth *karyavad* both are not acceptable. The rules of cause and effect are applicable only in modes. The modal point of view establishes truth-untruth *karyavad* by accepting truth from the perspective of cause and untruth from the perspective of effect.

Permanent and Impermanent

The basis of the analysis of permanent and impermanent is truth and untruth. Persistence is a part of truth. Because it does not have any origination and cessation, it is permanent. The other part of truth is mode. There are both origination and cessation, so it is impermanent. Persistence is not separable from mode and vice versa, hence truth or substance is permanent and impermanent.

Truth is not explicable only on the basis of permanent or only on that of the impermanent. Just because the sky is the truth, it is not only permanent. It is also impermanent because it is attached with modes. A pot is a mode so it is impermanent, but because the atom of which it is composed is the truth, hence it is also permanent.

Similar and Dissimilar

A substance has two attributes, universal as well as particular. Because of its universal attribute a substance becomes dissimilar. Because soul has the particular attribute of conscience it is dissimilar from a conglomerate of atoms physical substance (*pudgal*). In *anekānta* philosophy both similar and dissimilar are relative. Just because a substance possesses a particular quality it does not become dissimilar and just because it possesses universal quality it does not become similar. Hence no substance can permanently be categorised similar or dissimilar. On the basis of universal attribute it is wrong to look for dissimilarities in soul and atoms physical substance. This theory may also be explained by practical examples. One human being is not similar to the other. This difference is due to their disparity in 'genes', however because all human beings have sensory organs, a heart and such common qualities one human being is similar to the other.

Expressible and inexpressible

Proper or normal behaviour may not be regulated concretely without establishing a mutual correlation between words and its meaning. The meanings are the expressions while words are the mode of expressions. We gain the knowledge from the words through their meaning. If words are used correctly then the correct meaning is expressed. If words are not used properly or used wrongly then the true meaning is not revealed. In the discussion on *naya* (viewpoint) minute attention has been paid to the correct usage of meaning. Meaning has many modes. All the modes may not be said together. In fact even throughout one's life it may not be possible for one to express the innumerable modes. In order to express these innumerable modes one needs innumerable expressions. Our dictionaries fall very short to fulfill this requirement. If we perceive it from this angle we may well say that substance is not expressible.

We talk about one mode of a substance. On the basis of the expression of one mode it may be called expressible.

Expression is used on the basis of particular or difference. With the help of *arth naya* (meaning viewpoint) the realisation of identity or universal is achieved. In identity a word does not hold the main position, but meaning does. In verbal or word viewpoint the realisation of meaning is

only through words. In it words have place of prominence rather than meanings. In direct knowledge it is not essential to look for a relationship between words and meaning. In indirect knowledge the search for the relationship between words and their meaning is imperative. The word-based knowledge found in the meaning gives a new dimension to the thought and language.

Meaning based on words is one approach of knowledge acknowledged as a facet of long-term mode, for example, so and so was a man, is and will be. Word compilers for dictionaries, in order to express the meaning of a single word have also made a compilation of synonyms or words giving one meaning. According to the perspective of etymological viewpoint (*sambhirudh naya*) this effort is useless. They feel that the meaning and knowledge of a word or its synonym is fully accomplished by a word itself. Another word cannot convey its meaning. For example take the two synonyms of cloud. One is *taritwan* and the other *dharadhar* but they originate differently. Whereas the word *taritwan* has been coined from *vidyut* or thunder, the word *dharadhar* has been coined keeping *dhara* or the rains in mind. Hence these two are synonyms. One word cannot express the meaning of both these words. In order to express each synonym, word or verbal viewpoint is required.

In order to realise the meaning of a word when the word is expressive of the meaning, then the synonym available helps avail concrete knowledge of its word meaning. For instance, when the word man is mentioned, then the meaning of man as living being is realised. According to word viewpoint this is its right usage. Since, the viewpoint of function (*evambhoot*) *naya* accepts the ontological aspect of synonym it does not accept the living being called man as man due to the lack of his thinking action. According to this stream of thought, one who thinks is man so the word man (*manushya*) means man only at the time when he thinks. We can even utilise the example of the clay pot. According to the thought process of word viewpoint a clay container having a particular shape is called a clay pot. The viewpoint of function however does not think it proper to associate it with such a meaning if it is not engaged in the act of drawing or retaining water. According to word viewpoint a pot is a pot whether it is engaged in the act of drawing and holding water or not. But according to the viewpoint of function a pot is a pot because it does the work of drawing and holding water. At the time it does not do the work of drawing and holding water, it stops being a pot. The perspective of the viewpoint of function is an absolutely perfect one for gaining meaning. Based on it one can move on to progressive thinking beyond the bondage of orthodox traditional thinking.

The rules of thought

Based on *naya* (viewpoint) there are eight rules of thought.

1. Substance is real. Based on it thoughts have been developed.
2. A thought without substance is impractical. It cannot be given more importance than imagination. A word whose meaning is explicit in its action (*kriyakaritva*) cannot be regarded as merely imagination.
3. Substance cannot be known in entirety. Our knowledge does not have the capacity to know altogether all the different modes of substance.
4. We can only know the whole substance through perspective of identity (*abhed briti and avedopachar*).
5. It is not possible to know the substance face to face. It can only be known through modes.
6. One can know only one mode at a time.
7. It is not possible to explain the innumerable modes of the future just by the knowledge of one mode. So it is advisable to analyse relative truth.
8. Existence is an absolute truth. It can be assumed on the basis of its mode but its direct knowledge cannot be gained.



Anekanta accepts that Ātmā (the soul) and Anātmā (the physical matter) are complementary to each other. The Sat (the real) must have an antithesis. The external and the perishable both are integral parts of the ultimate truth i.e. existence. Both Idealism and Realism in their absolute form are thus mere illusions. When they complement each other, they become the expression of Truth. If we adopt a relative approach, both Vastuvāda and Pratyayavāda seem to be speaking about the same truth. On one hand, there is the Param Astitva and on the other, there are 'Vastu' (things), which have diverse forms. Although both are interspersed, yet in order to analyse them we have to accept their independence. This is the theory of relativity in perceiving things, which is the corner stone of Anekānta Darśana.

Key- Words

<i>Advaita</i>	-	<i>Monism</i>
<i>Jatyantar</i>	-	<i>Interrelatedness</i>

8. Idealism & Realism

As per Jain philosophy, we have two kinds of existence – one is *Parama Astitva* (Transcendental Existence) and the other is *Apara Astitva* (Empirical Existence). The idealist school of philosophers, particularly the *Vedāntins* and the Buddhists do not accept *Apara Astitva* as real. They regard that there is nothing else in existence other than the consciousness itself. The Western philosophers like Kant, Fichte, Shelling, Hegel, Green, James Ward etc. also hold the same view.

On the other hand *Vastuvādis* (Realists) regard empirical existence as real. According to them, the empirical reality exists independently of the consciousness. Other Indian philosophies like *Sāṅkhya* and *Vaiśeṣika* hold the same view. The Western philosophers like Reed, Hamilton and Bertrand Russell and others also hold similar views.

On this issue, the Jain philosophers have followed a distinct line. They regard that there is only partial truth in both i.e. *Vastuvāda* and *Pratyayavāda* and both of them are true only relatively. The Jain philosophers suggest an amendment to the aphorisms formed by *Pratyayavādis*, by putting them in a slightly different way. Instead of saying that there is nothing outside consciousness, one can say that nothing exists beyond existence. The 'existence' is a unit combining both the living and non-living, which is not the case with consciousness. Both *Jīva* and *Ajīva* can be parts of the existence, but the latter

could not be a part of the former. By accommodating the both as parts of existence, the divergence between Idealism and Realism is automatically resolved. It would complicate matters if we say that the non-living is merely a reflection of the living. But if they are regarded as parts of existence, then there is no problem. Consciousness is the dividing line between *Jīva* and *Ajīva*, while existence is a compact formation and there is no duality left. This way, we can justify the views of Idealists (*Pratyayavādis*) too.

When put simply – “It (*sat*) exists”, it denotes '*Parama Astitva*', whereas when we say – “a particular thing exists” – it is '*Apara Astitva*' (empirical existence). In the case of *Param Astitva*, there is no division between *dravya* (substance) and *parayāya* (its various modes). In case of *Apara Astitva*, there would always be divisions on account of various modes and their infinite numbers. In *dravya* (substance), there are two basic qualities – '*sāmānya*' (general) and '*viśeṣa*' (particular). One without the other cannot exist. The former maintains the existence of the substance, whereas the latter invests it with independent properties.

How certain things appear to our eyes is conditioned by our approach? If we adopt '*sāmānya darśana*' or generic view-point, and accept its general qualities, we see '*Param Astitva*'. But when we look at particular qualities through a particular view-point – '*Viśiṣṭa Darśana*', it is '*Apara-Astitva*'. Such divisions are always there due to diversity in our approaches. There is partial truth in both the *Pratyayavāda* and *Vastuvāda*, but they are not contradictory to each other. The former is

trying to prove that it is only the *caitanya* (consciousness), which is everlasting, whereas the latter is trying to say that *caitanya* (consciousness) and *vastu* (matter) are independent of each other.

According to the realists, the 'object of knowledge' (*jñeya*) and the 'knower' (*jñātā*) are two distinct entities and that is why there is a relationship between them. Although the existence of *jñeya* depends upon the knowledge, yet we cannot say that it has come into existence only when the *jñātā* knows it; neither it is created when known, nor it ceases to exist when not known.

'*Pratyayavādis*' argue that if *jñeya* (the object to be known) is independent of the knower then it should look same to everybody. But that does not happen. Different people conceive or perceive the same thing in diverse ways and forms. This diversity is due to subjectivity of the knower. The reason for this difference is in our minds. This argument holds little water. Our knowledge is always relative. That is why a single object is seen and known from different angles by different people, place, time, context, taste, prior beliefs, inclination towards the subject, the capacity of mind to absorb are important factors that contribute to relativity. This explains the logic that has been used by *Vastuvādi* thinkers, who hold that the existence is not the product of our thought; it is there, of its own. Bertrand Russell has put this very succinctly – "If we conceive a tree in our mind, it is only a thought; its real existence is only in the external world."

Our mind represents the 'knower'. The object to be known is different from the knower and it is because of that only, that there can be relationship between the two i.e., - 'knower' and 'known'. F.C.S. Schiller concedes this view, although he is a *Pratyayavādi* – an Idealist. The *Anekānta* doctrine of Jainism has conceived the theory of '*Jatyantara*', which regards that identity or difference are not independent attributes of the substance. In fact, they are inter-related and therefore, inter-dependent. The basic source is existence. It is not dependent on knower's capacity. It is inter-relationship, through which we realize the existence of a thing. Any substance exists on its own, whether we know about it or not. The discovery of the Atom was achieved when the knowledge about it was developed, but its existence was there by itself and it was not dependent on our knowledge about it. The basic source is the same i.e. the existence. So far as both the knower and the thing to be known are concerned, any relationship between them is possible only if there is existence, and not otherwise.

In our world, we have not only *pudgala* (matter) but also the *cetana dravya* (the conscious substance). Since each soul (*Ātmā*), is independent of the other souls, it is both – the 'knower' and 'to be known'. The soul is capable of having both the attributes – '*jñāta*' and '*jñeya*'. The renowned philosopher Kant has very aptly described this phenomenon. "A thought should not be treated as a thing". The same thing can be said about its opposite formulation. So by subscribing to '*Anekānta*', we can analyse '*vicāra*' (thought) and '*vastu*' (thing) together in a relative perspective.

Shelling, even though he is a *Pratyayavādi* (Idealist), accepts that *Ātmā*, (the soul) and *Anātmā*, (the physical matter), are complementary to each other. '*Anekānta*' supports this view. The *Sat* (the real) must have an antithesis. The external and the perishable both are integral parts of the ultimate truth i.e. existence. Both Idealism and Realism in their absolute form are thus mere illusions. When they complement each other, they become the expression of Truth. If we adopt a relative approach, both *Vastuvāda* and *Pratyayavāda* seem to be speaking about the same truth. On one hand, there is the *Param Astitva* and on the other, there are '*Vastu*' (things), which have diverse forms. Although both are interspersed, yet in order to analyse them we have to accept their independence. This is the theory of relativity in perceiving things, which is the corner stone of *Anekānta Darśana*.

If there is no antithesis, the thesis itself could not exist. In such condition, *Vastuvāda* is also a partial truth. Both *Pratyayavāda* and *Vastuvāda* would become parts of non-truth, if they are absolutist, and become parts of truth, if they are mutually relative. If we do not accept the *Parama Astitva*, we cannot explain the matter or *Vastu* and the fundamental root of its mutual relations. On the other hand, if we deny independence of *Vastu*, it would not be possible for us to explain its special attributes. Only by accepting the relativity of the independence of the *Parama Astitva* and *Vastu*, we can explain both of them consistently.



The energy is produced through the process of change. Albert Einstein, the legendary scientist found out that matter could be transformed into energy and the vice-versa. The Jain philosophy has tried to explain this principle through Pariṇāmi Nityatvavāda. The 'dravya' (substance) whether it is 'pudgala' or 'jīva' has infinite potential to sustain itself and that is why its existence is eternal. This potential power manifests itself through the process of change – pariṇamana. All the scientific exploration and experiments that are carried out happen in the realm of pudgala, which is in the form of matter and which can be transformed into energy.

Key- Words

<i>Abhed</i>	-	<i>Perspective of identity</i>
<i>Astikay</i>	-	<i>Five States of Fundamental Existence</i>
<i>Gun</i>	-	<i>Trait</i>
<i>Kramabhavi</i>	-	<i>Reality which changes successively</i>
<i>Ogh</i>	-	<i>General</i>
<i>Parinami-nityatya</i>	-	<i>Persistence-through-change</i>
<i>Paryayarthik</i>	-	<i>Modal</i>
<i>Sahabhavi</i>	-	<i>Reality which persists</i>
<i>Samuchit</i>	-	<i>Particular</i>

9. Transitory Eternity

Nothing in this world is static or immortal. Everything is subject to the process of change or evolution. The Jain philosophers have given a deep thought to this phenomena and they have tried to explain it through a theory called '*Pariṇāmi Nityatvavāda*' (Concept of 'Persistence through Change').

All the things in this world bear two attributes. The first is permanency of existence (*dhrauvya*) and the other is – its capacity to change (*pariṇāman*). So the cycle is – *utpāda* (origination), *vyaya* (extinction) and *dhrauvya* (persistence). What remains as the constant factor in the process of any change is the unifying force. It maintains the originality of the existence in spite of the continuous cycle of creation and extinction or destruction. The belief of those who have caught hold of only this view is called the theory of '*kūṭastha nitya*'. On the contrary, some other philosophers see in this cycle the prominence only of 'continuous succession of changes' like the waves in the ocean. Their view is termed as '*Kṣaṇikavāda*' (fluxism). The Jain philosophers have tried to reconcile both these attributes i.e. '*kūṭastha nitya*' and '*Kṣaṇikavāda*', by propounding the theory of '*Pariṇāmi Nityatvavāda*' – Theory of persistence through Change.

Lord Mahāvīra explained each related issue on the basis of '*Pariṇāmi Nityatvavāda*' when he was asked whether '*ātma*' (the soul) and *pudgala* (the matter) both are eternal, he said that existence never ceases 'to be', in the sense that both are '*nitya*' (eternal). However, since the cycle of their modification never ends, so they are '*anitya*'. In a comprehensive sense, therefore, they are neither '*nitya*' nor '*anitya*'. So call them '*nityānitya*'. No substance ever ceases to exist and it is also true that there is a constant process of change and therefore transformation from one form/shape to another is also a fact.

There are two attributes to reality – *Sahabhavi* or that which persists and *kramabhavi* or that which changes successively. The *sahabhavi* indicates the state of reality while the *kramabhavi* indicates its pace. The *sahabhavi* is called its trait or *gun* while the *kramabhavi* is called the mode (*paryay*). The famous aphorism of Jain philosophy is that no mode can exist without substance and no substance can exist without mode. One Jain philosopher asked the philosophers believing in absolute permanence, the Vedantins, “Who has seen substance without modes? Have they seen it? When have they seen it? In what form have they seen it? Let us know. In the same manner he asked the fluxists who has seen change without substance. Where have they seen it? When have they seen it? In what form have they seen it?

The sequence of change has a certain permanent principle behind it. The events of changes take place in it and not outside it. If you throw a pebble into a lake there are ripples. The form of the lake changes. The water, which was peaceful, has now become disturbed. The small ripples are in water. Without water these ripples do not have any existence; because there are ripples in water we can say that the lake is disturbed. The creation of ripples is an event. It takes place under certain conditions. If there were no lake, there would be no water. If there were no water there would be no ripple. The existence of ripples is dependent on the existence of water. It can also not be possible that there is water but there are no ripples. The existence of water is closely linked to the existence of ripples. Both are imbued with each other – water in ripples and ripples in water.

Substance is the base for modes, substance is not manifest. Modes are manifest. We are not able to see the substance. We see only the modes. All our knowledge is about the modes. There is a pudgal before me. It is a substance. I cannot know it. Out of its different modes I knew only one of them and through that modes I know that it is a pudgal. When I see its colour and form by my eyes and smell its fragrance by my nose I say it is a pudgal. I am not able to perceive it entirely. I know a mango by the smell, colour or taste. I do not have any means of knowing it completely. When the eyes are seeing

then smell and taste become less important. When the sense of smell is greater then the colour is forgotten. It is in this context of totality that I say that we do not perceive the substance. We see only the modes and on the basis of the modes draw our inferences.

Our world of modes is very large whereas our world of substances is very small. The number of modes is infinite in proportion to the number of substances. Each substance is hidden in its modes. It is impossible for the senses to look beyond the modes and see the true substance.

Change takes place both by nature and by use. Intrinsic changes are in-built in the existence of the substance. Empirical change takes place due to external stimuli. It is not true that such changes take place only when the external stimulus is found. The process of change is continuing. Time is its major reason. Time is a dimension of all existence. It is an intrinsic cause for change and so is found in all existence and makes the nature of all existence transitory. The change intrinsic to a substance is subtle. The senses are not able to comprehend these changes at the level of knowledge gained from senses. This change cannot be explained. We see the gross changes that take place due to the mutual stimuli of the soul and matter and define them accordingly. People die due to illness, due to injury, or being killed by somebody and so on. Some die naturally. One who is born will necessarily die.

That is only a change. The internal process of death lies within life. The process of dying begins with birth. The one, who does not die in a first moment, never dies. One who is able to live for one moment will remain immortal? The definition of death as it takes place due to external stimuli is very simple. The death that takes place due to mental or physical weakness is more difficult to describe but the death that takes place in full health can be understood only by scientists or through intuitive perception.

Some philosophers give theological explanations to creation. But Jain philosophy explains it in terms of the changes that take place in the soul. Creation, development or destruction – whatever happens that happens due to the mutual reaction between matter and soul. Time supports both of them. In a certain event external stimuli also contribute. The seed for both the expressed and non-expressed changes exists within the objects. Changes can be collective or individual. Mix sugar with water and it becomes sweet. This is collective change. When the clouds thunder in the sky and a new state is created. Different kinds of molecules got together and the cloud was formed. Some changes already exist within the substance. Such changes are generally individual changes. There are five states of fundamental existence (*astikay*). *Dharmastikay*, *Adharmastikay* and *Akashastikay* – in these, there is intrinsic change. In the soul and in matter both the

types of changes are found, intrinsic and empirical. In them the intrinsic changes are individual. But the collective changes can be empirical also. The entire gross physical world is created due to the collective changes in these two substances. All that is visible has been brought to shape by living beings. We can also say this in different words that all that we are seeing is either the body of beings or body created by beings.

Every existence has an extension, a body, a cluster of indivisibles and a size. Apart from matter all the other four astikays have a continuous texture. Both fusion and fission take place only in physical existence, that is in *pudgal* (matter). Through fusion of molecules, atoms are created and through fission of molecules, atoms get separated; all that remains is the atom in the real sense. Collective changes take place only in *pudgal*. Only *pudgal* has visible existence. Different aspects of the world are created through matter. This is the theatre of the world. If anybody has the prime role it is *pudgal*. This single actor comes before us in different roles. Even though the soul also contributes to this, the main actor remains *pudgal*.

Existence has the capacity to change. That which does not have the capacity to change loses its power to remain in existence the next second. To ensure its existence in the next moment, matter changes itself and only then is able to ensure

its existence. One atom, which is infinitely black, becomes slightly black and that which is slightly black becomes infinitely black. This change is not an outer change. It is taking place within substance itself, spontaneously. The degree of change depends on the loss of the number of infinite units and the gain in them. In the stream of infinite moments in infinite time and infinite number of events, any substance whatsoever it may be, has to undergo infinite transformations in order to keep its fundamental existence intact. If its changes were not infinite, it will not be able to keep its existence forever.

Existence has many attributes. Some expressed, some not expressed. The question arises, “is grass also clarified butter?” The answer would be that there is clarified butter within the grass but it is not fully expressed. Does milk have clarified butter? Yes, it does but it is not fully expressed. When the fat from the milk is extracted then butter can be reclaimed. That which was not expressed now becomes expressed. Substance has two types of strength – general (*ogh*) and particular (*samuchit*). The *ogh* is the governing energy. On its basis the law of cause and effect is established. The cause is always harmonious with the effect. The cause is not expressed; the effect finds expression. Now you will ask, “does the grass have clarified butter or not?” Answering from the perspective of *ogh* energy, it has butter. But from the

perspective of samuchit energy it does not have. We find colour, smell, taste and touch in all substance, pudgal. The rose flower smells fragrant, but it also has an equal amount of bad smell. The fragrance has found expression while the bad smell has not found expression. Sugar is as bitter as it is sweet. Its sweetness has found expression not its bitterness. There is fragrance in rot as there is stench.

The king Jitashatru was going out of town. His minister Subudhi was with him. He crossed a canal. It was full of garbage. Corpses of animals were rotting in it. The stench from it was unbearable. The King blocked his nose with his handkerchief. "What a stench!" The King told the minister. The minister was a philosopher. He said, "Sir, this is the nature of matter." He was able to reduce the disgust being experienced by the King. The matter ended there. After some days, the minister invited the King at his home for a meal. The King drank a glass of water. It was sweet, very clear, and very fragrant. The King said, "Minister, where did you get this water from? I want to drink one more glass of water. I do not think of you as different from me, but you obviously do not think so about me. You drink such nice water but you never get it for me." The minister smiled and then said, "Sir, I bring this water from that canal the stench of which you could not bear." The King said, "This cannot happen. How can this water be from there?" The minister stood his ground. The King wanted

proof. The minister asked for a glass of water from the canal. The water was brought. It was as pure, as sweet and as fragrant as the King has drunk in the minister's house. Not only water, everything changes. The cycle of change is forever on. And all objects can keep changing. From the perspective of ogh energy, we cannot label any object as black or yellow, bitter or sweet, fragrant or otherwise, oily or dry, cold or hot, light or heavy, soft or hard. A neem leaf has all the attributes that are found in the world. But from the samuchit perspective, it is not so. From that perspective, a neem leaf is moist and green. It has its own perfume, it is light and delicate. All our knowledge is empirical and subjective.

A number of events take place in every object through transformation. Energy may increase or decrease. Energy is expressed through change. The famous scientist Einstein established the principle that mass can be converted into energy. This principle of equivalence of mass and energy can only be explained through the principle of changing permanence. Before Einstein, the world of classical physics believed that matter cannot be changed into energy or vice-versa. After Einstein this theory changed. It was accepted that matter and energy are not different but the transformations of a single reality. If one pound of coal is taken and its mass is converted into energy then two billion kilowatts of electricity can be obtained.

According to Jain philosophy, substance has infinite energy, whether it is soul or matter. In the infinite flow of time only that substance can be in existence which has infinite energy. This energy is expressed through change. Today the world of science is basing all its experiments in the world of pudgal. Matter can be reduced to that state where its gross attributes disappear, its mass disappears and what remains is in the form of energy.

Jain philosophy has explained the world in terms of substantial (*dravyarthik*) and modal (*paryayarthik*) *naya* or perspectives. When we look at the world from the perspective of identity (*abhed*) we see only substance. Neem, house, man, animal are all different expressions of substance. When we look at the world from the perspective of differences (*bedh*) then all matter disappears and we see only modes and modes. Change and more change. What is man? He is not a substance. What is he? Even if you search the world you will not get any substance in the name of man. Man is a mode. Neem is not a substance, it is a mode. All the objects we see in this world are modes none of them are substances. Substance does not come before us. It remains imperceptible. Acharya Hemchandra expressed this truth in the following words :

*Aparyayam vastu samasyaman
Madravayametachcha vivichiyamanam*

When we look at things from the perspective of *abhed*, then modes disappear and everything is substance. Then our world will be very small. Expanse will be nullified. If we look at differences then substance disappears and what remains are the modes. Our world becomes very expansive. Differences will swallow up the similarity. There will be only expansion and more expansion.

As far as transformation is concerned both soul and matter have to undergo transformation but the expression pudgal has found in this world, nothing else has. The protean capacity to change which pudgal has, nothing else has. If there is any fundamental substance for the manifested form of modes it is pudgal.



*Doors are closed, windows are closed,
lights are also put off, so the room is dark.
If you desire light, open the doors of your mind.
Open the window also and open the third eye also.
Then the room will not be dark.*



*Let us not think of changing only the system.
If the driver is not good,
what is the use of changing only the car ?*





Jain philosophy is dualistic and monistic both. It has defined creation as the co-ordinate action of both the sentient and the insentient. According to it only the soul or only pudgal cannot make things happen. Their coordinated action makes creation. It explained the world on the basis of Anekānta. With the acceptance of the co-existence of opposing pairs, Jain philosophy has acquired a holistic perspective. It does not look at any stream of thought as false but as relative truth. In the language of Anekānta this is the truth of collective perspective. Only one perspective is not valid. Jain philosophy accepts the independent existence of the soul or element of consciousness. But it does not deny the existence of the non-sentient. This approach makes Jain philosophy dualistic as well as non-dualistic.

Key- Words

<i>Akash</i>	-	<i>Space</i>
<i>Atma</i>	-	<i>Soul</i>
<i>Atmadvaitavadi</i>	-	<i>Philosophers believe in monism based on the soul</i>
<i>Chaitanya-dvaitavad</i>	-	<i>Duality of consciousness</i>
<i>Charamadeha</i>	-	<i>The last embodiment of the soul</i>
<i>Gyanavarniya</i>	-	<i>Knowledge obscuring karma</i>
<i>Jadaadvaitavadi</i>	-	<i>Non-sentience</i>
<i>Kevali</i>	-	<i>Omniscient</i>
<i>Maya</i>	-	<i>Illusion</i>
<i>Mool atma</i>	-	<i>the Soul</i>
<i>Naishchiyik naya</i>	-	<i>Transcendental viewpoint</i>
<i>Samyag-gyan-</i>	-	<i>Right Knowledge,</i>
<i>Samyag darshan</i>	-	<i>Right Belief</i>
<i>Sopakrama</i>	-	<i>Life span vulnerable to external effect</i>

10. Non-dualism and Dualism

Men are conscious beings and therefore they can think and perceive. A human being uses his mind to think and enter into the deep recesses of the mind to perceive. Truth has been sought through reflection, meditation and perception. Consciousness develops in the context of society. Man began living in society and then he searched for truth with a sense of urgency. He wondered, what are the mountains? What are the rivers? What are the objects that are visible to the eyes? Is that all or are there more? Are they created or are they self born? Who creates them? If there is someone who does, then do we know that being? Such questions arose in the minds of people and they began to spend time and effort to find the answers. This chain of events led to the development of perception and thoughts. Perception and thoughts are based on philosophy. Philosophy was not created, it evolved.

When I see something the perception of other person about this is not a binding on me. It depends on that other person. What I perceive with my intuitive perception, I try to articulate with logic. If the other person accepts the logical account of my experience then our thoughts become one. Logic serves to bring people together. Intuitive perception is personal while logic is the binding principle. Logic is the one

that puts together similarities in thoughts. This way intuitive perception and logic together form the fundamentals of philosophy. The palace of philosophy stands on these two pillars.

Two streams of philosophy

The trend of philosophy is ancient. In the history of the world two regions were scribed as the founders of philosophy : India and Greece. Indian and Greek philosophers have influenced the entire world of philosophy. Indian philosophers influenced the East while Greek philosophers influenced the Western world. The eastern philosophy is deeply influenced by Indian thought while all western philosophy is deeply influenced by Greek thoughts. Thus the philosophers of these two regions established their superiority over the whole world.

There are many philosophical trends before me. I prefer to categorise them as materialistic and spiritual. Initially man beheld the apparent. I am standing. There is a tree before me. The ease with which I am able to see the tree, I am not able to see from the ground the ant that is crawling up its trunk. This is because the tree is apparent and the ant is small and my eyes are impressed by the larger image sooner than the smaller image. Man is able to understand the apparent easily, it takes him much longer to reach the small. That which is apparent before us is matter. Philosophers saw the apparent world before all else. They saw that the world was made of earth,

water, fire and air. They observed that all that they saw was a result of these elements. And these four elements created the world.

Some philosophers moved ahead. They discovered space (*akash*). Space is also an element, a matter. Indian philosophy fostered two streams of thought; those who based their philosophy on four elements and those who based it on five elements. There were diverse opinions on this element amongst the western philosophers too. Some said the fundamental source of all creation is water, some others believed it was air and yet others thought it was fire. All these three are thinkers of the apparent. After both these streams of thoughts, based on four and five elements developed, there arose yet again, more conflict in man's mind. He thought the material elements are devoid of consciousness. What then is consciousness? Who thinks? Who reflects? Who tries to know? Material elements do not possess the capacity to think, assimilate and acquire knowledge. He then looked towards consciousness. Consciousness cannot be found in material elements. Consciousness cannot be found in the earth, water, fire, air or space. As he kept thinking about this he came to the conclusion that consciousness is a transformation of these material elements, the resultant effect of these elements when they interact with each other. There is no element other than these. If consciousness had an independent existence, separate from these material elements, then it would be visible somewhere. Like we can see drops of water, we cannot see

drops of consciousness anywhere. So the materialists accepted the existence of consciousness but not as a separate entity. The second stream of thought belongs to those who did not stop at the apparent world but moved further into the world of the subtle. They saw the apparent and the subtle together. They based their thinking on the assumption that consciousness does not emanate from matter. Every particle of matter is bereft of it and so also is an intergraded compound. If none of the material elements is the material cause of consciousness then the mass produced by all of them also cannot be its material cause. Whatever is present as the material cause in each unit can only become manifest in the integrated form of all of them. The material cause of consciousness is neither the unit of any material cause nor the compound formed by them. Hence the origin of consciousness is based on something independent. After a lot of thinking and reflection they moved deeper into thoughts and perceived the origin of consciousness. They called it *atma* or soul which cannot be seen or experienced by the senses. It can be seen only when going deep into the consciousness and so the philosophers who believed in the soul developed the stream of spiritual philosophy.

Dualism in Jain philosophy

Jain philosophy is a spiritual philosophy. It accepts the independent existence of the soul. The spiritual philosophers have defined the soul in many and varied ways. *Vedanta* is one of the prime philosophies of India. *Vedanta* has explained the

soul on the basis of the *Upanishads*. The *Upanishads* are a compilation of decades of thinking at the subtle level. The *Upanishads* are an echo of the intense reflection and attempts made to understand the profound secrets of creation. *Vedanta* is its representation. Its belief is that the *Mool Atma* or the source of the soul is one. The nomenclature by which it is known is *Brahma*. That is the ultimate element in the form of consciousness. All the sentient and the non-sentient of this world emerge as modifications of this, *Mool Atma*. This is the principle of duality of consciousness (*Chaitanya-dvaitavad*). Those who base their philosophy on monism derived from non-sentience (*Jadaadvaitavadi*) say that the material elements alone are real and consciousness is not a element.

Exactly opposite to them are the philosophers who believe in monism based on the soul (*Atmadvaitavadi*). They say the consciousness alone is real and not the material elements.

The materialistic monists say that the consciousness is created from the element. While the spiritual monists say that matter is created from consciousness. Both the thoughts are contradictory. Standing face to face they oppose and decry one another.

Jain philosophy accepts the independent existence of the soul or element of consciousness. But it does not deny the existence of the non-sentient. It believes in the existence of the sentient just as much as it believes in the existence of the non-sentient. Therefore, it is not in conflict with *Jadaadvaitavadi*s but accepts the middle path. It is inclusive

of both the streams. It accepts both the independent existence of the sentient as well as the insentient. Its acceptance of both the ideas makes Jain philosophy dualistic : the sentient and the insentient.

Thus three streams of philosophy have developed : *Jadaadvaitavad*, *Atmaadvaitavad* and *Dvaitavād*. Indian philosophy is divided into these three streams. Some modern philosophers think *Sankhya* philosophy is very ancient and that Jaina philosophy is built on it. This I feel is a narrow perception. *Sankhya* philosophy is undoubtedly very ancient but it should not be forgotten that Jaina philosophy is not less ancient. *Sankhya* philosophy and Jaina philosophy emerged from the same *Shramana* tradition. Since they share a common ethos similarities between them can be explored but their chronology or dependence cannot be asserted. *Shankaracharya* wrote that *Kapil's Sankhya* philosophy was in contradiction to the *Vedas* and even to the texts of *Manu* which is in accordance with the *Vedas*. That is, it is against *Shruti* or oral knowledge and *Smriti* or remembered knowledge and so it is not worth considering or reflecting upon. A reference in the *Padmapurana* says that *Nyaya*, *Vaisheshika* and *Patanjali's yoga* philosophy are in contradiction with oral knowledge and therefore are not acceptable. I am amazed why scholars did not refer to these truths. Why were these factors not taken into account with respect to antiquity and articulation?

If you see *Patanjali's Yoga-sastra* you will find many words there which are similar to those found in *Shramana* literature. They cannot be found in Vedic scriptures. *Kevali*, *Gyanavarniya*, *Karma*, *Samyag-gyan*, *Samyag-darshan*, *Charamadeha*, *Sopakrama*, *Nirupakrama*, *Savitark*, *Savichar*, *Nirvichar*, etc. (omniscient, knowledge obscuring karma, right knowledge, right belief, the last embodiment of the soul, life span vulnerable to external effect, meditation based on verbal knowledge, meditation based on reflections, meditation free from reflections) are words found in great number in *Shramana* literature. *Sankhya* and *yoga* are one stream of thought. The former is the philosophical aspect and the latter is the applied philosophical aspect. They both were not recognized in the *Vedic* tradition and therefore their harmony with the *Shramana* tradition was natural. The *Shramana* philosophy has laid great emphasis on the *Arhat*. Jaina philosophy is the principal school of this trend. *Sankhya*, *Aajivika* and *Buddhist* philosophy belong to *Shramana* tradition. In their exposition of truth, the long years of *Shramanic* influence is embedded.

Jaina philosophy established dualism and *Sankhya* too is dualistic. It established two realities : *Prakriti* and *Purush*. Jain philosophy established two realities : the sentient and the non-sentient. It is said that in this one can discern the influence of *Sankhya* philosophy over Jain philosophy. This belief is born out of inadequate knowledge of Jain texts. Scholars were familiar with the important text,

Tatvarthasutra. But a text earlier to it by five or six centuries did not reach the scholars. If it had reached the scholars this thinking would have not arisen. Both *Jain* philosophy and *Sankhya* philosophy are dualistic and yet they have some fundamental differences. *Sankhya* philosophy believes that all creation is facilitated by *Prakriti*. The main cause of creation is *Prakriti* and because of *Prakriti* all creation has taken place. Jain philosophy has defined creation as the co-ordinate action of both the sentient and the insentient. According to it only the soul or only pudgal cannot make things happen. Only their coordinated action makes creation.

Jain perspective of the universe

Philosopher-saints have explained the world in many ways. According to *Sankaracharya*, the apparent world is not real. The question then is, what is this world? The answer is that it is *Maya* or illusion. It is an experience of the unawakened state. You dreamt of a lion and got scared. When you come to the awakened state, this fear vanished. The lion of the sleeping state is not the lion of the awakened state. In the awakened state the lion of the sleeping state has no validity. The visible world is *Vyavaharik* truth that is empirical truth, not transcendental truth. That which we are seeing in our awakened state and think is real, that will also turn into an illusion when we reach the state of *Brahma*, just like the dream dies on awakening. This way Shankara explained the world as lying between two truths, the *Vyavahar* or empirical truth and the *Paramarth* truth or the transcendental truth.

Brahma is the *paramarthic* truth and the apparent world *Vyavaharic* truth.

Buddhism has also defined the world in terms of transient truth and the supreme truth. According to it both the sentient and the insentient are in a state of flux. This is the supreme truth. Their appearance as one over the three periods of past, present and future is transient truth. Possibly both these truths have influenced the perspective of the *Vedas*. *Shankara's* grand-teacher *Gaudpad* was a great Buddhist scholar. It is possible that his influence over *Shankara* is responsible for *Shankara's* definition of *maya* (illusion).

Jain philosophy explained the world on the basis of *Anekānta*. According to *Anekānta* infinite attributes exist in a substance. As many attributes as there are, so many perspectives there are, so many ways of expression there will be. If we analyse all the standpoints then they can all be categorized into two basic perspectives; the *Naishchiyik naya* (transcendental viewpoint) and *vyavaharik naya* (empirical viewpoint). According to the former both sentience and insentience are the eternal and factual truths. According to the latter the modes of both the substances, sentience and insentience are not eternal but still factual truths.

If transcendental perspective of truth explains the element from the substantial point of view, the empirical standpoint explains the different transformations taking place in the substance. According to *vyavaharik naya* sugar is sweet and white but according to *naishchik naya* it has all the colour,

taste, smell and touch. It can be conclusively said that both sentience and insentience are absolute truths and the changes taking place within them are relative truths. *Vastavik* (actual) truth is that which takes into account both the absolute and the relative truth.

Definition of the world and co-existence

One branch of the neem tree has infinite properties. It is not the fundamental substance. It is the mode of a substance. The root substance is matter and the root substance is also the soul. When soul and pudgal came together, neem was created and so also the branch. In that branch both pudgal and soul exist together. Soul, the sentient and pudgal, the insentient are in mutual conflict. It cannot be a substance if infinite attributes are not in conflict within it. Even within one atom there are infinite pairs of opposing attributes. That is why every substance, according to Jain philosophy is real and yet not real, eternal and yet non-eternal. *Shankaracarya* said that philosophers should first learn to differentiate between the eternal and non-eternal. The one who has not learnt this definition cannot be a philosopher. Without actually having seen it, truth cannot be defined. *Maharishi Patanjali* said, “To think of the eternal as the non-eternal and vice versa is ignorance”. *Shankaracarya* said that *Brahma* is eternal and the world is non-eternal. He defined both the eternal and the non-eternal. But according to him there is no substance which is both eternal and non-eternal. *Brahma* is eternal. The world is neither non-eternal, nor eternal. Jain philosophy looks at it

from another perspective. The essence of its philosophy is that Brahma is also non-eternal and the world is also eternal. The co-existence of the eternal and the non-eternal is thought to be contradictory by some philosophers and so they tried to prove that Jain philosophy itself is an illusion. But Jain philosophers do not accept this allegation. According to them, there is great scope for reconciliation in the nature of a substance – there is no contradiction here. The contradiction lies in our *vyavaharik* perspective. A substance is defined both through the *naischik* and the *vyavaharik* perspective. Acharya Hemchandrā wrote in praise of Bhagavan Mahavira that those who do not know your thoughts think of the space as eternal and the lamp as non-eternal. The space remains the same and so it is eternal. Every moment the flame of the lamp flickers, that is the old dies out and the new is born. With a puff of the wind the lamp is extinguished and so it is non-eternal. Mahavira's philosophy is different. According to this just as space is eternal so is the lamp; and as the lamp is non-eternal, so is space. This is the principle of relativity. No substance can violate this principle: The lamp is only a mode. It may be extinguished but its basic substance that is pudgal does not perish. Space is also a basic substance and so it also does not perish, but space in the form of a pot, cloth, house is all only its modes. They keep originating and perishing. When we see space as only the basic substance then it seems to be only eternal. When we see the lamp only in its present mode we think of it as non-eternal. But nothing is completely bereft of the basic substance. So, to say space is also non-eternal and

that the lamp is eternal is not an illusory perspective but element.

With the acceptance of the co-existence of opposing pairs, Jain philosophy has acquired a holistic perspective. It does not look at any stream of thought as false but as relative truth. All thoughts are modes and modes cannot be absolute truths. Only the fundamental substances can be absolute truths. Jain philosophy does not negate materialistic philosophy but alongside, also accepts spiritualistic philosophy. When the two philosophies come together it becomes Jain philosophy.

Once I was reading Acharya Kundakund's '*Samaysar*'. As I was totally drowned in *Naischyik naya* I began to wonder if I too had become monistic. Truly I had begun to believe that in comparison to dualism, monism was more noteworthy. My dual vision was blinded. As we go along the path of non-dualism we reach a point where there is only existence. Existence has no differentiation. Only modes are different. In Jain epistemology we have two terms – *Darshan* or intuition which is only perceiving the object in general and *Gyan* or cognition which is comprehension of an object in particular. I could experience only the non-dual as the real. Intuition is always bereft of differences. It only perceives the object as a substance; therefore there cannot be any differentiation in its comprehension. Only the general remains, not the particular. When I used my *Gyan* I saw the modes. The moment I began to know the modes I became a believer in dualism. Every mode has a definite form and knowledge seeks to identify

that. Whenever we see the formless then we becomes idealists, monistic. Modes merge into substance and substance into existence. What remains is only existence, where there is no distinction between the sentient and the insentient, between the perceptible and the imperceptible. No differences, no form, all that remains is existence. In the language of *Anekānta* this is the truth of collective perspective. In the discipline of *Anekānta*, only one perspective is not valid. Only when you accept the truth of all other perspectives you accept the truth in any one perspective. Collective perspective is the truth, monism is the truth but *Vyavahar naya* and dualism are also equally true. Element is divided into substance and modes. Substances are divided into five *Astikayas*. Modes are divided into infinite forms. This dualism is as true as monism. After accepting this we cannot call Jain philosophy only dualistic or only monistic. It is dualistic and monistic both.

The existence of substance is eternal. It can never be destroyed. Modes keep changing. The cycle of the destruction of the existent mode and the origination of the non-existent mode is continuously going on. That is Jain Philosophy is neither realistic nor unrealistic, it is both realistic and unrealistic.



*Look at your horoscope. Do not just look at it,
try to make it good*





Man and society are correlated. They cannot be separated from one another. Both have equal importance. Man is different from society because in spite of remaining an integral part of society he retains his individuality; but he develops his desires, aspirations and activities through interdependence and exchange and this way he is not different from society. Anekanta defines man and society in relation to each other. In a man both individualistic and social traits are found. A relative acceptance of the element of man and society can free man from many problems.

Key- Words

<i>Moksha</i>	-	<i>Purest form of consciousness.</i>
<i>Purusharth</i>	-	<i>Hard work</i>
<i>Samyam</i>	-	<i>Restraint</i>
<i>Smriti-dharma</i>	-	<i>Social conduct</i>

11. Man and Society

Man and society are two different elements. The philosophers who believed in individualism are of the opinion that man by himself exists as a human being outside of society. In other words they say that man can live without society. This belief implies that before man became part of a society, he was an individual "in his own right; that for the security of his property, rights and life or for the attainment of some other goal, man founded the institution of a society.

The socialist philosophers believe that man and society cannot be separated from one another. In the history of human development man and society have both figured with equal importance.

Anekānta defines man and society in relation to each other. In a man both individualistic and social traits are found. Man's capabilities define his individuality. Their expressions are part of his social skills. That is why individuals and society are different from one another. Man's individuality can never be non-existent. In spite of remaining an integral part of society man still retains his individuality. In this context, man is different from society. Man develops his desires, aspirations and activities through interdependence and exchange. In this

context man is not different from society. But in the very same context, where man develops his desires, aspirations and activities and establishes inter-dependence in society, he is also different. Man is limited by his feelings. The man who experiences love, happiness, fear and grief is a complete man. These feelings are not common in terms of experience. They cannot be exchanged or substituted. They cannot be given to another. Exchange is the bridge between man and society. On one side of it is man and on the other side is society. The fundamental base of an individual is his emotions and the fundamental base of society is exchange. Emotions are individualistic because they cannot be exchanged.

According to some sociologists, society is a matrix of relationship. Society is a form of social relationship that sustains life. According to sociologist, Greene, society is a large gathering to which every man is bound. From the above two definitions, it is clear that relationships are established and in life it is important for every man to establish relationships. Emotions are neither established nor are they life sustaining. They are intrinsic to man. From the perspective of emotions man is a element and from the perspective of life-sustenance society is element. There is no conflict in the realities of either of them. Man lives comfortably only with the assumption that society is real and keeping this in mind, safeguards social norms and values.

There are two fundamental principles that govern social organization – desires and wealth. For the fulfillment of desires, social relationships develop. Wealth is a tool to fulfill desires. Through *Dharma* (rules and regulations) the social organizations are worked. Of the ancient sociologists, some paid greater emphasis to desires while some others paid to dharma. Kautilya gave importance to wealth. He said that wealth was the root cause for attachment (*karma*) and dharma and, therefore, wealth is of primary importance. In contemporary social organization also wealth is of primary importance. In fact, they are based on wealth. In such a society based on wealth a man has no individual independent value. Without controlling individual freedom a social organization cannot survive. A man does not give as much importance to the feelings of others as he does to his own. Therefore, two situations arise in society.

Individualistic social organization – the need of the self and the need for others. Obviously, it is in such a situation that crime, immorality, exploitation and corruption have grown. Society tried to overcome the differences between the self and the other, through socialism. But even after giving man the independence of individualistic social organization, this problem could not be overcome. That is why in such a situation man plays the role of a puppet in society. Individualistic social organization creates imbalance in

society. Some people become very rich and some very poor. The very rich are enapparented in consumerism. They are constantly worried about their own comfort and prosperity and not about that of others. The needs of their senses increase. They are not able to take time for anything other than consumption. The economically disadvantaged people have to struggle very hard to get the level of comfort they desire. They do not get the opportunity to reflect. In this consumerist society that ponders to the senses, imbalance amongst people has always existed. The history of empires proves that this society of people who do not have time to think or reflect was constructed under the initiative of the very rich. It is from this society that socialism was emerged. Mahavira did not organize society nor did he give the vision for a social organization. He explained dharma and gave the vision of dharma which is neither individualistic nor social. It is related to the *atma* or the soul. The measure of a man is his emotion and the measure of a society is exchange. The measure of dharma which is different from both of these. Its measure is transcendental consciousness, beyond feeling and action.

Jain philosophy does not give the rule for social organization nor does it give the direction for desire and acquisition of wealth. It does not give a vision for a life as a whole and that is why it is incomplete. This argument has been established and yet is not beyond contention. In Jain philosophy the

discussion about *moksha* dominates (*moksha dharma*). The main objective of a philosophy of *moksha* is to discuss dharma. In this context even the meaning of dharma changes. In the context of attachment and wealth, dharma acquires the meaning of being that which controls the working of social organization. In the context of *moksha* it acquires the meaning of correcting or purifying the consciousness. All the directions that Mahavira gave are for the purification of the soul. These directions influenced wealth and attachment. But it cannot be said that Mahavira gave instructions in this direction. Can a philosophy of *moksha*, however, do so?

It is not always possible to separate violence and possessiveness from social organizations. The fundamentals of *moksha-dharma* are non-violence and non-possessiveness. Social organization and *moksha-dharma* cannot be given the same importance. *Moksha-dharma* advises social organization to reduce violence and possessiveness. It favours socialism. And, therefore, at this point there is a possible meeting of the two. But there is no fundamental commonness between the two.

Individualistic social organization was based on the self and so there was no limit, in that thinking, to the accumulation of wealth. In addition to individual freedom, there was freedom for cruelty too. In socialist societies the means of production are socially owned and so the society had control over wealth.

In such a situation individual freedom is hurt. The social organization influenced by moksha-dharma is thus also deeply influenced by compassion. In this situation both individual freedom and control over accumulation are affected. But for this it is very important to direct oneself to improve and refine the quality of social character.

Is it possible to establish a relationship between social organization and moksha-dharma with *Anekānta*? Can a unity between violence and non-violence, possessiveness and non-possessiveness not be established? The advocates of *Anekānta* explained opposites in terms of unity and, therefore, this question is natural. By ignoring this truth we cannot understand the *anekantic* view which says that the very attribute, of unity is not the same as disunity. In an object, contradictory attributes of permanence and impermanence lose their contradiction. But with respect to the attribute to which the object is permanent, it is not impermanent with respect to the same attribute. Similarly, with respect to the attribute to which it is impermanent, it is also not permanent. And yet, permanence and impermanence both exist in unity in an object. That is why an object is both permanent and impermanent and its holistic description can be made in relative terms. In a social organization violence and non-violence, possessiveness and non-possessiveness exist in unity. Through *anekanta* it is not possible to establish oneness between social organization and moksha-dharma. It is not

possible to define the unity between violence and non-violence or possessiveness and non-possessiveness. But in the context of social organization it is possible to describe their existence. Violence and possessiveness cannot be separated from a social organization just because one cannot equate social organization to moksha-dharma. But in fact that in a social organization violence and possessiveness can be minimized, one can see unity in social organization and moksha-dharma.

Dharma being beyond emotions cannot be manifested. It relates to the soul. But since it is a person's attribute, it is also manifested. Morality is an attribute of man and so it is manifested. But it is towards others and so it is social. It is social but not different from the social code of conduct. Social conduct is framed with respect to space, time, changing of different societies and their requirements. Morality does not change with space and time, it is the same everywhere and is influenced by dharma.

Both dharma and morality can be categorized as eternal truths whereas societal conduct cannot be kept in the same category. The first two are intrinsic in man. Societal conduct, however, is imposed on society. In its pure sense, it is societal. In its origin morality is personal and in its expression it is societal. In its true sense dharma is related to the soul and in its expression is personal.

In the trinity of purpose there is a mention of dharma with wealth and desire. This is essentially social ethics. The dharma that is often mentioned along with wealth (*artha*) and attachment (*karma*) is with reference to societal conduct. That is why Mahavira had talked of all these three things in terms of the world. Even in the texts like the *smritis*, dharma has most often been referred to in this manner. All Indians have understood this form of *dharma* as the eternal truth. It is on this basis that many unnecessary practices have evolved in society in the form of:

- i) Orthodoxy : Dharma has given rise to orthodoxy. It being in the name of dharma that people did not have the courage to break traditions and customs.
- ii) Exploitation : In the name of dharma, women have been continually exploited. The theory of *karma* has prevented a rebellion from the ever-exploited poor.
- iii) Lethargy and fatalism : Dharma has fostered fatalism. The result is that people are lazy and inactive.
- iv) Violence and war : Many pages of human history are filled with stories of war and jihad in the name of redemption of religion.
- v) Hatred: Cast distinction and untouchability also result from this understanding of dharma.

In sociological literature the difference between dharma and morality has been explained as the prevalence of some things

that are wrong in terms of morality but right in terms of dharma. Some times dharma advocates against social good. Dharma established untouchability. From the perspective of morality this is wrong. A wife cannot leave her cruel and evil husband – another idea that is supported by dharma even though it is wrong in the eyes of morality. The truth is that morality takes man forward while dharma obstructs man's development. The base for this kind of social practice is the definition of dharma as understood along with Kama and Artha. The kind of dharma that has been defined Jainism, Buddhism, Sankya and Vedanta philosophy cannot be misused like this. The dharma defined by them is a definition of eternal truth. It has no role to play in the ever changing social structure. Social organization cannot be built in the name of dharma. With the interpretation of a changing truth as an unchanging truth, fundamentalism has come into being. Thinkers, the authors of *smriti* texts, accepted the changing social organization. But had its presentation not been in the form of eternal truth this fundamentalist expression of dharma would not have come so far. The projection of women as a weaker sex is also a result of such a lopsided organization. It has no relation to eternal truth.

Mahavira has given the maximum explanation of *karmavad*. His *karmavad* does not in anyway endorse the fact that the poor will remain poor and to absolve their karma they will have to put up with exploitation by the rich. Poverty and

prosperity are social states. Their relation is to the organization of the society and not to karmavad. Mahavira gave hard work (*purusharth*) predominance. In his dharma there was no place for lethargy or inertia. Through effort, major changes can be brought about in the results accrued from karma.

Mahavira gave non-violence the highest value as a dharma. His saying (*sutra*) is that ahimsa is dharma and no violence can be committed in the name of dharma. Dharma is safeguarded through ahimsa and violence cannot be committed to safeguard it.

Mahavira announced that all men are one. Casteism, hatred and untouchability are all elements of violence. There is no place for them in the dharma of ahimsa.

Mahavira gave three characteristics of dharma – non-violence (*ahimsa*), restraint (*sayam*) and penance (*tap*). All three are related to the soul (*atma*) and the individual. The character evolved on the basis of these three factors is of high moral calibre. Consciousness devoid of attachment and aversion is ahimsa. It is the spiritual form of dharma. Do not kill living beings, do not lie, do not steal, observe celibacy, do not be possessive. These are the moral expressions of dharma. The consciousness devoid of attachment and aversion is indeed the soul itself. It is not with respect to anybody else nor is it related by anybody else. Not to kill is a rule to be followed with others. That is why it is a moral. Moral rules are

expressions derived from a spiritual form. They are born from the spiritual form. Therefore they cannot be different from dharma. Herbert Spencer, Thomas Huxley and other similar environmentalists and Human Rights thinkers have separated dharma and morality. This does not hold water. The conduct which is right from the perspective of dharma cannot be wrong from the perspective of morality. The only difference between the two is that dharma is towards and within oneself while morality is with respect to others. But there is not so much of a distance between them such that one single action can be in accordance with dharma and in conflict with morality. Sociologists have highlighted the difference between morality and dharma on the basis of social conduct (*smriti-dharma*). In relation to this, the distance between dharma and morality can be shown. Action that is accepted by dharma can be opposed by morality. This kind of dharma born out of fundamentalism can obstruct development of society.

The spiritual form of dharma is located in the soul while the moral aspect is located in society. This way dharma is spread over two domains. Since both these forms of dharma are eternal they are also unchanging. *Smriti-dharma* is based on utility at a given time and place. So it is ever changing. It is only because this ever-changing dharma has been confused with, and superimposed on, the unchanging dharma that many social ills, which have been discussed by sociologists, have come into being.

Smriti-dharma has given directions for the earning of wealth and its consumption. Even directions to assuage desires have been given. To give these directions are mandatory for smriti-dharma. But this is not the job of dharma based on eternal values. If it were, however, to give directions to guide passions and wealth then it will take the form of an unchanging rule and cause impediments to the growth of society, as it is doing today. But the management of passions and wealth as designed by *smriti-dharma* can be supported by *dharma*. Mahavira provided this support. From the rules of conduct he gave to individual householders, social organization can be greatly benefited. As an example the following rules can be quoted :

1. Do not rob your labourers of their livelihood.
2. Do not over burden animals.
3. Do not give false evidence.
4. Do not have relations with anybody other than your wedded wife.
5. Draw a definite limit to accumulation of wealth. Do not go beyond that limit.
6. Do not go to the distant places to accumulate wealth or increase consumption and so on.

Mahavira gave the secret to reduce attachment that causes wealth accumulation and passionate obsessions. He however did not give the manner in which wealth accumulation should

be organized or how passions should be quenched. He worked within the parameters of a spiritual seer and did not intrude into the territory of an economist, sociologist or endocrinologist. In this respect if anybody thinks his philosophy is incomplete, then they are most welcome to do so. Some may even say that his followers have to look elsewhere for social organizational rules. If eternal vision and eternal truth did not have this dependence then smriti dharma would totally cloud the perspectives of eternal dharma. Completeness and incompleteness can only be relative. A man can exist even without dharma and morality but without wealth and passion, he cannot exist. That the man is real and the society is unreal – with this idea the individualistic philosophers have given man the freedom to acquire limitless wealth and thereby increased exploitation in society. A relative acceptance of the element of man and society can free man from these problems.



*Without knowing the mind we talk a lot
about what we think. We reflect about that which
we do not know. The job of the mind is to think.
Is it efficient in its job ? If yes, then how much
faith can we have on thought ?*





Social life implies inter-relations and mutual relations can be explained only from a relativistic point of view. There are countless social problems relating to language, region, autonomy, casteism and sectarianism. Again there are problems like poverty versus affluence and equality versus disparity. They are solved because the viewpoint of those engaged in solving them is not relativistic and reconciliatory. It is essential to review and investigate them thoroughly from the Anekānta point of view because it will help to analyse an event from multiple angles and develop a viewpoint of reconciling different parts and aspects of the truth. This way a new society can be built on the basis of interdependence, sensitivity, fixing a limit to ones possessions; fixing a limit to one's freedom etc.

Key- Words

<i>Apramāna</i>	-	<i>Invalid knowledge</i>
<i>Bhāva</i>	-	<i>State of the soul</i>
<i>Pramāna</i>	-	<i>Valid knowledge</i>
<i>Samgraha naya</i>	-	<i>Class, synthetic View point</i>
<i>Satyam</i>	-	<i>Truth</i>
<i>Śhivam</i>	-	<i>Benefaction</i>
<i>Sundaram</i>	-	<i>Beauty</i>
<i>vyavahāra naya</i>	-	<i>Analytic view</i>

12. Anekānta & Building a New Society

In all corners of the world one hears a common voice of people visualizing a new man, a new society and a new world. Efforts are also afoot to realize the above vision.

How meaningful is the above voice? Will the efforts succeed? The quest for meaning and success cannot be based on the basis of the permanent. The permanent does not undergo any change, and the vision of a new man, a new society and a new world cannot be realized without effecting a change.

From the viewpoint of *Anekānta* the permanent is real, but so is the impermanent or the changeable. Being can be explained in terms of the permanent for it is unchangeable. One of the intrinsic parts of the unchangeable is change, for change and changelessness are not two different things. Both co-exist.

Since change is possible, the vision of a new man, a new society and a new world is not unattainable or impossible.

The basic cause of change is the viewpoint. On its basis is built a theory and implementation of the theory results in change. We do want to bring about a change but it requires the right perception. We do not want to develop it. The biggest obstacle between the change and the right perception is our belief. Each individual or organization has its own beliefs. A new man, a new society or a new world cannot be visualized on the basis of these beliefs.

A belief is based on selfishness and the concern for personal gain as a result of which one disregards the good or gain of the others. Insistence on the respective caste or sect is rooted in individual beliefs. The same root is responsible for the growth of conflicts, disputes and wars.

With the growth of right perception, a belief changes into a quest for the truth and the opposition between conflicting interests also comes to an end. It is commonly believed that the interests of any two castes, sects and classes are mutually antagonistic. Though in element they are not antagonistic, they are regarded so because of perverted faith or what we call *mithyātvā*. Once the right faith develops the antagonism disappears and even the conflicting interests become complementary instead of being antagonistic.

Right faith implies non-absolutism. Perverved faith means absolutism or the assertion that nothing but what one thinks is right. To treat a mode or thought as a absolute or inclusive is absolutism; to treat it as relative and incomplete is non-absolutism. To determine a real one should have a non-absolutist view. **Anekānta** has two basic viewpoints : absolute and non-absolute or relative. For determining the substance one should use the absolute viewpoint; for determining relations one should use the non-absolute viewpoint.

Relativity

The first principle of *Anekānta* is relativity. Two castes or two sects can be held in a mutually antagonistic relation only by adopting an absolute viewpoint. On the contrary, different

individuals, castes and sects can survive and obtain relative benefits only on the basis of the non-absolutist viewpoint. In fact, the interests of the factory owner and the workers are not incompatible. By keeping in mind the workers' interests, productivity increases and the factory owner's interests are served. Likewise, by keeping in mind the owner's interests those of the workers are served. If both seek to serve their interests in absolutely independent terms, the interests of both are jeopardized.

The principle of class differences and their hostile vested interests needs to be examined in the context of relativity, for on the basis of relativity even antagonistic interests can be reconciled. When these interests are examined in absolute terms, the inevitable result is conflict, violence involving the abandoning of the principle of the purity of means.

Co-ordination

The second principle of *Anekānta* is coordination. It is principle of the quest for unity between two apparently different characteristics of a substance. Characteristics which differ are not altogether different. They have identically also. Reconciliation can be brought about only by recognizing the identity principle. The principle of ecology is one of reconciliation and of interrelationship between different substances. Balance in the universe cannot be established on the basis of the premise, "I alone exist". We survive only by adhering to the principle that "besides me, the other also exists

and we are interrelated”. The balance in the universe can be explained on the basis of the above concept of interrelatedness.

Co-existence

The third principle of *Anekānta* is co-existence. Anything or anybody existent must have their opposite – *yāt sat tat sapratipaksam*. Without the opposite, naming is impossible and so is characterization. The animate and the inanimate are two extremes. Yet they co-exist. The body is inanimate : the soul is animate. They co-exist.

The permanent and the impermanent, the similar and the dissimilar, the identical and the different – all these are mutually contradictory; yet they co-exist. They co-exist in an object. The permanent is not altogether separate from the impermanent, nor is the latter completely separate from the former.

The principle of co-existence is as much practical as it is philosophical. Though the terms system, individual, taste and viewpoint have different denotations even implying inherent opposition, the principle of co-existence applies to them too. Democracy and dictatorship, capitalism and communism are ideologically different political systems. But even they are no exception to co-existence. 'You or me' not 'you and me' is an instance of absolutism by which the problem gets compounded. The holiness of the world of religion has been destroyed by the view : “Only those have the right to survive

who follow my religion, all the rest should be extirpated.” The main strengths of religion are non-violence, friendliness and fraternity. The absolutist view has changed non-violence into violence, friendliness into hostility and fraternity into animosity.

Co-existence implies tolerance and freedom of thought. Both tolerance and freedom of thought are meaningless if we try to enforce our likes, ideas, lifestyle and principles on all others.

Nature has infinite variety, which lends it splendor. Beauty will lose all its charms and meaning if all plants, trees and flowers look alike. The combined principle of *satyam* (truth), *Śhivam* (benefaction), *Sundaram* (beauty) inheres in the principle of unity in diversity and diversity in unity. It is only the above harmony which forms the basis of co-existence.

Monism and dualism are two principles belonging to philosophy. Unity cannot be explained in the absence of monism and diversity cannot be explained without dualism. A harmonious combination of monism and dualism alone constitutes a holistic viewpoint for explaining the world. Likewise, there are enough factors of unity between the animate and the inanimate. On its basis we are able to realize what existence means. There are factors of diversity also between the animate and the inanimate. On its basis we are able to divide and analyze existence. Harmony is a principle of the search for unity, but it does not negate the pre-existent diversity. It is only in this way that we can explain an individual as well as society.

The Basis of Personal Characteristics

Every person has both individual and communal consciousness. Some thinkers give greater importance to be the individual, while others give greater importance to society. It violates the principle of harmony. We cannot assess an individual properly without paying attention to his/her personal qualities. There are seven bases of innate personal characteristics :

1. Physiology
2. Heredity
3. Thinking power of mind
4. Soul's inclination or feelings
5. Sensitivity
6. Instinct
7. Knowledge or capacity to acquire.

The Basis of Building a New Society

The people who think merely of building a new society without taking into consideration the innate traits of an individual cannot accomplish their visions. If equal attention had been paid to individual innate characteristics in socialistic and communistic systems efforts at building a new society would have got a healthy basis. The basic principles essential for socialization are related to innate individual characteristics.

There are five bases on which a new social order can be built : interdependence, sensitivity, fixing a limit to ones possessions; fixing a limit to one's freedom and development of the language, intellectual development, development of ideas, development of technology and art.

In the class view (*samgraha naya*) there is a division of oneness – absence of all distinctions. Society is built on this foundation.

In the analytic view (*vyavahāra naya*) there is predominance of distinction or difference. It is the basis of securing the identity of the individual.

If rules, laws and order are formulated by integrating both society and the individual their compliance will be natural and comprehensive.

There are situation in which the individual interests are secondary and social interests are primary even as there are situations in which social interests are secondary and individual interests are primary. This principle of differentiation between what is primary and what is secondary in a given situation is very useful for a wholesome order. Society cannot be built unless difference or distinction is considered secondary and the freedom of the individual suffers unless sameness or oneness is subordinated. This principle of *Anekānta* relating to primary versus secondary is extremely useful for a successful organization of society.

The Classification of Personality

The biggest problem of an organization, community or nation is related to emotion. Individuals differ in their emotions. They can be classified in four categories : 1) similar to a marsh or a quagmire 2) similar to water full of mud 3) similar to water full of sand and 4) similar to water steadily floating on a rock.

The first type of people having an impure state of the soul (those endowed with the excessively impure modal standpoint) turn the world into a hell. They can neither provide sound organizational set up nor can they adhere to any system.

The second type of people having an impure state of the soul (those endowed with impure modal standpoint) encourage bestiality in society and can never be helpful in bringing about a healthy and non-violent social order.

People having the third type of the state of the soul (those endowed with pure modal standpoint) can cooperate in building a healthy society. They can induct health in the social order.

People having the fourth type of the state of soul (those endowed with purified modal standpoint) can develop divine consciousness in society. They can promote the purity of means and a beneficent outlook.

The first two types believe in the power of punishment. The last two types believe in bringing about a change of heart and in the purity of means.

Spiritual people like Mahatma Gandhi kept dreaming of building a non-violent society and people like Karl Marx kept nursing a vision of a communist society. Neither of the two visions has been fulfilled. Neither could a non-violent society come into being, nor could communist society gain vigour. The reason is an absolutist viewpoint. If we do not make the two visions absolutistic, we can enter in a new society.

By nature an individual is inclined towards selfishness and personal comfort. The effort to forcibly make him exclusively corporatist cannot succeed. According to the *Anekānta* viewpoint it is possible to make communism dynamic by balancing the claims of individualism and collectivism.

No two individuals share the same emotions. Some people have subdued emotions; others have intensive emotions. Therefore a non-violent society cannot be built merely on the basis of a change of heart. Dwelling exclusively on a change of heart denotes an absolutistic view. The *Anekānta* or non-absolutistic view is that a non-violent society can be built on the basis of balanced amalgam of punishment and change of heart.

Anekānta and Democracy

Variedness is a part of human nature. Even tastes and ideas differ from person to person. Nor is ordinary behavior identical. There are a number of languages and sects. To keep them all united democracy follows the principle of equality of fundamental rights. Democracy does not divide people on the basis of inequality. On the other hand, it seeks to forge unity among diverse groups on the basis of equality.

Democracy cannot project a glorious image without balancing the claims of diversity and unity. The philosophical basis of this balancing system is *Anekānta*. According to *Anekānta* nothing is altogether disparate or identical. A general characteristic lends identity to things and a specific characteristic makes them disparate. Absolute insistence on identity destroys usefulness, for then individual specific characteristics cannot be put to use. Absolute insistence on disparity makes things devoid of their basic generality. It is for this reason the *Anekānta* posits the following:

An object is perhaps identical - from a certain point of view all objects are identical.

An object is perhaps disparate - from a certain point of view all objects are disparate.

Unity can be strengthened on the basis of identity. Disparity can be used to utilize an individual's specific qualities. Therefore, it is necessary to know the limitations of both identity and disparity. A mechanical insistence on identity robs a nation of its meritorious and talented people. An absolute insistence on disparity becomes the cause of a nation's disintegration. Therefore, there is need to develop a philosophy which balances and harmonizes identity and disparity. Unity involves belonging to common geographic region. No one who lives within that region can be discriminated against in terms of their need for food, clothing, housing etc. Everyone enjoys an equal

opportunity to develop. It is on this basis that everyone in a democracy has the right to become President, Prime Minister etc. What limits this right is individual excellence or quality. High offices can be manned only by those people who have a highly developed intellectual and administrative competence. Nature has plenty to offer. A democracy can be given a healthy base only by appreciating element of both identicality and disparateness.

Jayacharya, the fourth Acharya of the Svetambar Jain Terapanth Order, applied a harmonious combination of the general and the specific on the basis of *Anekānta* in dealing with the Terapanth Religious Order. As a result the Order kept progressing constantly and avoided being embroiled in mutual conflicts. The above positive viewpoint remains an ideal to this day. Once Jaiprakash Narayan told Acharya Tulsi, “Your Order is a perfect example of socialism. What is needed is that it should now percolate down to each individual throughout society.”

***Anekānta* and Economic Policy**

Now and again one hears everywhere that violence is increasing day by day. Why is it so? The factors responsible for the increase have also been investigated from time to time. Of the many causes put forward the most prominent is economic greed which is engendered by a false or perverse conception. It consists in the belief that one's capital should be enhanced through borrowing with the illogical assumption

that returning the loans involves greater efforts, more business and higher production. Taking loans has now become a source of inspiration, a basis of economic development.

This one-sided or exclusive view of economic development totally disregards physical health, mental peace, emotional balance and environmental protection. This absolutistic economic development has made the human mind purely mechanical. Everyone has the inordinate desire to build an economic empire.

Anekānta has four main viewpoints : substance, space, time and bhāva (state of the soul). The assessment of anything should be relative to substance, space, time and bhāva. Absolute or unqualified assessment creates a number of problems. It is ironical that the economics of development relegates physical health, mental peace, emotional balance and environmental protection to a secondary position.

Increase in consumables through artificial means was deemed necessary because of the increase in population. Economic development was deemed necessary also for removing poverty. Chemical sprays add poison to foods, vegetables and fruits. Despite being aware of this fact people consume these articles. The craving for increasing consumption created by the economic race is, far from reducing poverty, increasing it. Economic wealth is getting more and more confined to a handful of nations and individuals. All this is result of the

absolutistic view of development. A balanced economic policy can be envisioned if man is placed at the centre of economic development and if it is not used for building economic empires. An economic policy unrelated to general human needs is proving self-destructive. It cannot be salvaged by adopting an absolutistic approach.

By forgetting the principle of restricting consumption as propounded by Mahavira, the world has got into a serious situation. Let us again try to view it in the light of *Anekānta*.

Freedom and Dependence

The issue of freedom and dependence is also not beyond controversy. It cannot be explained on the basis of absolutism. No man given to emotional attachment can ever be fully free. There are a number of alternatives like individual freedom, social freedom, and constitutional freedom. They can be explained only relativistically. True freedom is relative to dependence. No other freedom which is absolutistic and not relative to dependence can ever be useful for individuals or for society as a whole.

Absolute freedom to corner wealth and to consume is being instrumental in creating economic disparities and environmental pollution. Poverty, environmental pollution, conflicts, arms race and wars are all the result of an absolutistic approach. Without integrating temporal and spiritual considerations it is impossible to solve the problem of poverty.

Similarly, the environmental problem cannot be solved without combining restraint on consumption with physical efforts, nor can conflicts be avoided without integrating balancing of passions and organizational effort. The urge for manufacturing destructive weapons cannot be got over without developing the mentality of non-aggression and a spiritual viewpoint of individual rights.

The propensity for war cannot be put to an end without diffusing a humanistic viewpoint and without controlling egotism and greed. It is not easy to reconcile the above contradictions. Their intractability can be best addressed by integrating emotional balance with a proper system of governance.

Even apparently opposed events can be reconciled by *Anekānta*. There is complete reconciliation and co-existence in the real world. It is our intellect that has imagined the idea of opposition. Creation and destruction, life and death, permanent and impermanent always go together.

It is very difficult to satisfy the desire for convenience and luxury. Therefore, it is essential to reconcile material progress with spiritual development.

No Problem – individual, social, national or global – can have a proper and enduring solution on the basis of an absolutistic approach. It is only a relativistic one-sided view that can lead to the direction of a proper solution. An absolutistic one-sided view can provide no solution.

Ideas are individual in nature. Any two persons can think in opposite ways. If both of them happen to meet, dogmatic attitude will control the thought. One will say, “Only that which I say is true. What you say is not true.” The absolutistic insistence has only one aim – to prove one self right and the other wrong. It is called dogmatism. It is a by-product of absolutistic view. Such insistence vanishes when one adopts a relativistic attitude. Two apparently opposed ideas can be true if seen in the context of space, time and circumstance.

The happy outcome of *Anekānta* is the birth in an individual of an attitude of non-insistence or refraining from insistence. A person with the above attitude analyses an event from multiple angles as a result of which he develops a viewpoint of reconciling different parts and aspects of the truth. Viewed thus, we can say that *Anekānta* views partial truths in a relativistic and reconciliatory way.

There are countless social problems and they cannot be solved unilaterally or absolutistically. Social life implies interrelations and mutual relations can be explained only from a relativistic point of view. People have held varied views regarding marriage and divorce influenced by time and space considerations. The propriety or otherwise of any one view cannot be upheld on the basis of a single viewpoint.

There are problems like poverty versus affluence and equality versus disparity. It is essential to review and investigate them thoroughly from the *Anekānta* point of view. Again, the nation

faces a number of major problems relating to language, region, autonomy, casteism and sectarianism. They are defying solution simply because the viewpoint of those engaged in solving them is not relativistic and reconciliatory. Inflated egos, imperialistic expansion, market monopoly etc. are international problems. Exclusive thoughts of national development ignoring global perspective also hinder solution of international problems. World peace and the aspirations of the people of the present age demand that all prominent people in the family, community, nation and the world should adopt a non-absolutistic outlook. They should undergo training in relativity, reconciliation, co-existence and freedom. Such a training will be the best way of solving problems relating to world a peace.

Developing philosophical consciousness should precede developing practical consciousness. Behavioural changes are brought about only on the basis of philosophy. It is essential to deliberate on the following philosophical principles for bringing about behavioural changes :

- ❖ Truth cannot be enunciated or propounded. What can be enunciated or propounded is only a fraction of truth. No human being can determine and enunciate more than only a small number of modes out of thousands of modes of truth.
- ❖ Jain philosophy has explained both idealism and realism relativistically.

- ❖ Idealism and realism viewed absolutistically become parts of untruth; on the contrary, viewed non-absolutistically or relativistically, they become parts of truth.
- ❖ Every real entity in the world is a natural combination of the permanent and the impermanent.
- ❖ The quest for truth has been by reflection, contemplation and philosophy. It has developed in a social context.
- ❖ Both the animate and the inanimate represent absolutistic truth. The changes they undergo represent relativistic truth. The real truth lies in a combination of the absolutistic truth and the relativistic truth.



I see what is before me with my eyes.

With what should I see what is not before my eyes ?

The one who answers this question is my guru.

There are many who trade in verbal conundrums.

The guru is one who relates his experience.



It is important to know the method

to be forgetful so that we are free from tensions





Independence and dependence can be explained in terms of relativity. From the absolute point of view nothing is entirely dependent or independent. Independence and dependence can be explained in terms of relativity. From the absolute point of view nothing is entirely dependent or independent. Freedom is an internal characteristic. One who is free from his inner passions, looks for solutions within; he lives a life of action and is independent in the true sense. He is able to reply insults with silence, anger with love, arrogance with humility and faces assaults with calmness. This action is not inspired by the conduct of another man but is instead born out of his own internal thoughts and hence, it is an action. The spiritual meaning of independence is action and that of dependence is reaction.

Key- Words

<i>Advaitic</i>	-	<i>Monistic</i>
<i>Dharma</i>	-	<i>Religion</i>
<i>Jeevo jeevasya jeevanam</i>	-	<i>One creature becomes the reason for another's life</i>
<i>Naya</i>	-	<i>Perspectives</i>
<i>Nischaya naya</i>	-	<i>Transcendental viewpoint</i>
<i>Niyati</i>	-	<i>Predestined</i>
<i>Papa</i>	-	<i>Demerit</i>
<i>Punya</i>	-	<i>Merit</i>
<i>Purushartha</i>	-	<i>Human Effort</i>
<i>Shasvat</i>	-	<i>Eternal</i>
<i>Sutra</i>	-	<i>Theory</i>

13. The Value of Man's Freedom

If this world were *advaitic* (monistic) – there would be only one element and none else. Then there would have been no discourse on independence and dependence. This world has many elements which influence each other. They have a cause and effect relationship also. Under such circumstances, a discussion on dependence and independence becomes necessary. The second aspect is that every aspect of element is changeable. Change is intrinsic to element. Change occurs at every instance of time. Time as defined by the Sun and the Moon, is not uniform for all places and countries. The time that is intrinsic to element and becomes the stimulus for change is multidimensional. It is an internal mode of element. It is always on the move. Its pace keeps the element on the move. It is not blocked anytime or anywhere. It is natural for element that is bound in the inevitable chain of changes, to explore the ideas of dependence and independence. That which is bound by a certain cause and effect relationship cannot be independent. That which is associated with change as an inevitable component cannot be independent. Man is bound by such a relationship that he cannot even break through the pace of time, how can he be independent? Is he dependent? Nothing can be fully dependent. If some aspect is dependent, some other will be independent and also conversely so. The existence of one argument cannot be

proved without establishing the existence of its opposing argument. That man is dependent means he is independent too.

Independence and dependence can be explained in terms of relativity. From the absolute point of view nothing is entirely dependent or independent. Mahavira explained the world in terms of two perspectives (*naya*), the transcendental viewpoint (*nischaya naya*) and the empirical viewpoint (*vyavahara naya*). According to *nischaya naya* every object is seen in its intrinsic form. There is no substratum or substance. No cause, no effect. No creator, no creation. Whatever is, is its intrinsic form. This is an ontological definition. On the other hand, the *vyavahara naya* deals with *nischaya naya* elaborately. Within its ambit lie the relationships between the substratum and the substance, cause and effect, creator and the creation. It is here that a definition of dependent and independent can also be attempted.

Two schools of thinkers have attempted to define independence. The religious thinkers interpret independence as freedom from inner influences (passions which destroy the soul's attributes). Thinkers who have reflected upon the idea in terms of governance interpret it as freedom from external influences (imperfect organizational procedures).

Dharma (religion) is an exposition of the entire element and its norms. So its purview is not limited to man alone but to the organization of entire element. Governance deals with

organizational norms and so its bearing is on inter-personal relationships and the Constitution. Indian seers and philosophers have concentrated primarily on a religious interpretation of independence. One reason for this could be that they did not want to mix the common rules of governance with the eternal rules of religion. On the basis of their definition of *dharmic* or eternal independence they tried to influence independence in governance but did not frame any separate guidelines for them. The authors of *Smriti* and *Purana* texts have however dealt with independence in the context of governance. They placed a lot of importance on intrinsic individual freedom.

Western philosophers have deliberated a great deal on the issue of governance and independence. Philosophers like Aristotle, Locke and Mill and others have established individual freedom as the base for independent governance. On the other hand philosophers like Plato, Machiavelli, Hegel and Bach and others have given greater importance to independence in governance. According to political thinkers, only that man is independent who does his duty – does only that which he ought to. The duty of an individual is decided by societal beliefs and the Constitution. This means that without flouting the norms of society and organization, man is free to do as he wishes. This freedom is used for social and economic growth.

In Mahavira's philosophy the meaning of independence is *Kashaya-mukti* – freedom from anger, ego, disillusion and greed. Only a man free from passions can act independently.

Insult for insult, anger for anger, ego against ego, this is the life full of reactions. Any man who lives the life of reaction can never live a life of independence. A bird pecks at its own image in a mirror, a child tries to catch its own shadow and a lion fighting with its own image falls into a well. All such reactions take place in the outer world only.

Freedom is an internal characteristic. One who is free from his inner passions, looks for solutions within; he lives a life of action and is independent in the true sense. He is able to reply insults with silence, anger with love, arrogance with humility and faces assaults with calmness. This action is not inspired by the conduct of another man but is instead born out of his own internal thoughts and hence, it is an action. The spiritual meaning of independence is action and that of dependence is reaction. *Ahimsa* is action, *himsa* is reaction. So *Mahavira* has identified non-violence as *dharma* and violence as *adharma*. In other words, independence is *dharma* and dependence, *adharma*.

In the inner world, man can be independent beyond limits while in the physical, action-oriented and social world, man cannot be independent beyond limits. There the inner and the outer influences curb his independence. The soul can be completely independent only in its existence. In its contact with the outside world, the independence of soul can be relative. This world changes by itself in its own form. Its outer form is changed by living beings, particularly humans. Is man then capable of changing the world? Can he make it a better place to live in? The answers to this question come from two

opposing streams of thought. One stream of thought belongs to the philosophers who argue for independence. According to them man is free to do as he wishes. He can change the world. He can make it a better place. Those philosophers who have placed great emphasis on time, bind action to time; those who place emphasis on nature, bind action to nature, those who emphasize destiny, bind action to destiny, those who emphasize fate, bind action to fate and those who place human effort at the top, bind action to effort.

Mahavira assessed man's action with an *anekantic* point of view. He said that metaphysically, a real substance is that which has an intrinsic capacity for action, spontaneous action. It is not born out of any stimuli nor is it lost because of any stimuli. It is not bound by any external stimuli and so is completely independent. There are also some attributes of a real substance that lie outside it and are influenced at different levels, by time, nature, universal law, *karma* and effort. Where the influences of time, nature, universal law, karma are more powerful, man is dominated by them and hence although he may be independent in thought, he becomes dependent in action. On the other hand where self-exertion is more powerful, man is independent in exercising it in spite of being dependent on time, etc. As such man's ability to work independently is relative. It is neither absolute, nor perfected nor unhindered. Had he been absolutely independent, man would have, very early in history, changed the world around to his taste and if he had not at all been independent in action, then he would have not been able to change anything in the world.

It is true that man has changed the world and it is also true that he has not been able to change it trice to his whims and fancies; he has not been able to create comforts in the world without bindings. Both these truths are a reflection of man's successes and failures, his capabilities and his inadequacies. If man's capabilities were dependent on any one of the factors such as time, nature etc., then there would have been a conflict between these factors, each one set to destroy the other. But in universal substances and in universal laws there is a harmonious balance between the conflicting and the reconciling. That is why they contribute their respective mite to the completion of a job. From a relative point of view, none of them can be given more importance than the other. They are important and primary in their respective areas. Time cannot work in lieu of nature or nature in lieu of time. Universal laws cannot play the role of effort nor effort that of universal laws. And yet in the world of action, effort occupies the prime place. Effort cannot be separated from the influence of time, but a change can be brought about in the time duration. Effort cannot be separated from fate but fate can be changed with effort. These truths can be tested on the anvil of history and philosophy.

As man's knowledge grows, his capacity for work increases. In the early stages of creation, man's area of knowledge was still not developed. The tools for acquiring knowledge were also limited and so the resultant human exertion was less. In comparison to stone-age, man's knowledge has indeed grown in the atomic age. His tools are strong and the capacity of work has also increased tremendously. The primitive man was

solely dependent on nature. If it rained, crops would grow, as much as an acre of land could grow; as much time as was required to ripen it, so much time it would take. Today's man is not dependent on all this. Having developed different means of irrigation he has removed his dependency on the rains. Having developed fertilizers man has increased the per acre yield and through efficient tools is also trying to reduce the time for ripening of crops.

Many instances where effort has influenced time and nature can be quoted from our cultural history. Factors like time, nature etc. are not endowed with the power of knowledge and so their influence on human effort is minimal. Effort has been blessed with the patronage of knowledge and so it is able to influence time, nature, fate etc. With this influence he is able to make the present different from the past.

Immanuel Kant has propounded that man is independent in his capacity to resolve and so should be independent in action as well as in enjoying the successful or unsuccessful fruits of such labour. If he was not independent in action then he would not be dependent in action or its fruits. The famous contention of the Indian theory of *karma* is that good *karmas* give good results and bad *karmas* give bad results. As the nature of work a man does, so the fruits he reaps. Analyzing this *sutra* (theory) we see that man, while doing new actions is dependent on the older ones. He is not independent in action or in bearing the fruits of this action. If he was not independent then he cannot be held responsible for any good or bad act. The present has no role of its own. He is a puppet in the hands of the past.

The Doctrine of *Karmavad*

The common perception of *karmavad* has deeply influenced the Indian mind. It has been thrown into the mould of fatalism. The influence of fatalism has reduced the capacity to make effort.

Mahavira propounded the principle of human effort (*purushartha*). His principle of *purushartha* was not against the principle of *karma*. *Karma* is the result of *purushartha*. *Karma* can bring about change. By bringing to light the possibilities of *karma* ripening before time and transformation of *karma*, Mahavira made the law of *karma* second to *purushartha*. There is also the possibility of curtailing or increasing the duration of *karma* and also its power of fruition. The principle of transformation of *karma* is that with evil practices, merit (*punya*) can be turned to sin (*papa*) and on the other hand with highly moral actions, *papa* can be turned into *punya*. As his *karma* so the fruits he reaps. Man would have become a puppet at the hands of *karma* if it were not for the principle of premature ripening of *karmas* and transformations of *karma*. Man's independence would have been completely destroyed. Then there would have been no difference between relying on God or *karma*. But the principles of *karma* ripening before time (*udeerann*) and transformation of *karmas* (*sankraman*) have freed man from the monopoly of *karma* by lighting the flame of human effort at the threshold of independence.

Understanding *niyati* in its limited meaning we experience a constriction of *purushartha*; because of it effort is constrained by that which is predestined (*niyati*) but its influence is not so great that the value of *purushartha* is completely negated. If we accept *niyati* as a Universal law, *purushartha* is also a universal law. So *niyati* can draw limits to effort but cannot negate its potency. William James has written that if everything were predestined then there would be no value for effort. Effort would be meaningless since nothing can happen other than that which has been predestined. If there was no freedom to do good or evil in this world then what is the logic of repentance? But again where everything is predestined, one cannot stop anybody from repenting. Till we recognize the responsibility on man's action we cannot hold him accountable for any matter. The *anekantic* perspective leads us to this truth that in this world that which is eternal (*shasvat*) is the destined. That which is temporary cannot be destined. Existence of element is eternal. No amount of effort can turn it into non-existence. That which is a combination is temporary and so cannot be predestined. In changing it lies the real meaning of independence and *purushartha*.

Through *purushartha*, *niyati* can be changed, the world can be changed, can be made a better place. All this lies within the limits of *purushartha*. When such an act is attempted *niyati* also supports. The existence of truth cannot be made or destroyed. This is beyond the scope of *purushartha*. When this relationship between *purushartha* and *niyati* is

understood then one will not feel a conflict between the two but experience a balanced relativity between them. Action is an intrinsic quality of both the sentient and the insentient. The action of the insentient can be intrinsic or motivated by others. The action of the sentient in addition to being intrinsic is also independent. An object moves at a certain pace along a certain route. It does not have the power of will or resolve and so it is not independent. Man is a sentient being. He is capable of desire, resolve and reflection and so he is capable of independent action. Dans Scott too described man's independence along these lines. He wrote that our independence is due to our resolve. Man, knowing full well about the path of *dharma* walks on the the path of *adharma*, this is an example of his independence.

The first step of progress is resolve and the second, effort. These two attributes develop greatly in man. This is why man is the prime player in the modern world of progress. He has created the traits of joy-sorrow, principles, imagination, logic and sentiments within his internal world. In the outer world he has created objects of necessities, comforts and luxuries. Man himself has created war and peace. Darwin established the idea that struggle is necessary for survival. This is temporal and universal. It is the prime cause of conflict among creatures. An echo of this is found in Indian thought also which says, “*jeevo jeevasya jeevanam*” (one creature becomes the stuff for another's life). Darwin saw the world through the perspective of struggle. There is an element of truth in this also. But it is not the whole truth.

Mahavira saw the world in another perspective. He established the idea that the world of beings survives on inter-dependence. If there is the seed of struggle or conflict in man why can there not be the seed of inter-dependence or mutual support? If a being is independent in his struggle then why can he not be independent in his inter-dependence also? The essence of Mahavira's teachings is that man is independent in both struggle and inter-dependence, but to establish peace in the world he should move away from the direction of struggle towards that of interdependence or mutual co-operation. In our lives there are much fewer moments of struggle or conflict and many more moments of interdependence or mutual co-operation. Mahavira did not discount man's independence. He has given a tenet for a change in direction. The *sutra* (theory) is : Man should direct his independence towards virtue and turn the negative into a positive.



*We believe in opposites and so accept that as many problems
so many remedies. Problems plague only those who
do not search for solutions.*



*What is mine ?
The more I try to understand, the more elusive it is.
Nothing is mine. The meaning is clear, but I am not
willing to understand it.*



Appendix


<i>Abhed</i>	- <i>Perspective of identity</i>
<i>Adharmāstikāya</i>	- <i>Medium of rest</i>
<i>Advaitic</i>	- <i>Monistic</i>
<i>Agam</i>	- <i>Canonical literature</i>
<i>Aikāntika</i>	- <i>One-sided</i>
<i>Ajīva</i>	- <i>The non-sentient substances</i>
<i>Ākāśāstikāya</i>	- <i>Accommodation, Space</i>
<i>Akash</i>	- <i>Space</i>
<i>Aneka</i>	- <i>More than one</i>
<i>Anekānta</i>	- <i>A multi-faceted point of view, Non-absolutistic view</i>
<i>Anyatva</i>	- <i>Pervasiveness</i>
<i>Aparigraha</i>	- <i>Non-possessiveness</i>
<i>Apramāna</i>	- <i>Invalid knowledge</i>
<i>Artha naya</i>	- <i>Ontological viewpoint</i>
<i>Artha-paryāya</i>	- <i>Objective mode, Intrinsic modifications, The instantaneous modality</i>
<i>Astikay</i>	- <i>Five States of Fundamental Existence</i>
<i>Atma</i>	- <i>Soul</i>
<i>Atmadvaitavadi</i>	- <i>Philosophers believe in monism based on the soul</i>
<i>Atyantābhāva</i>	- <i>Non-existence</i>
<i>Avaktavya</i>	- <i>Unspeakable</i>
<i>Bhāgīrathī</i>	- <i>Selfsame Ganges</i>
<i>Bhāva</i>	- <i>State of the soul</i>
<i>Bhāva-niksepa</i>	- <i>The present mode constituting the essence of the thing</i>

<i>Chaitanya</i>	-	<i>Dvaitavad - Duality of consciousness</i>
<i>Charamadeha</i>	-	<i>The last embodiment of the soul</i>
<i>Dharma</i>	-	<i>Religion</i>
<i>Dharmāstikāya</i>	-	<i>Attribute of being the medium of motion</i>
<i>Dhatura flower</i>	-	<i>A narcotic flower</i>
<i>Dharmi</i>	-	<i>Substratum</i>
<i>Dhaturā flower</i>	-	<i>A narcotic flower</i>
<i>Dhruvatva</i>	-	<i>Permanence</i>
<i>Dravya</i>	-	<i>Substance</i>
<i>Dravya-niksepa</i>	-	<i>Past or future modes of the material cause</i>
<i>Dravyarthika</i>	-	<i>Describing a thing only with respect to its ultimate substance</i>
<i>Dravyārthika naya</i>	-	<i>Substantial viewpoint</i>
<i>Ekatva</i>	-	<i>Experience of unity</i>
<i>Evambhūta naya</i>	-	<i>Viewpoint of Function</i>
<i>Gun</i>	-	<i>Trait</i>
<i>Gyanavarniya</i>	-	<i>Knowledge obscuring karma</i>
<i>Haimavati'</i>	-	<i>Selfsame Ganges</i>
<i>Hinayāna</i>	-	<i>A branch of Buddhist Community</i>
<i>Jadaadvaitavadi</i>	-	<i>Non-sentience</i>
<i>Jatyantar</i>	-	<i>Interrelatedness</i>
<i>Jeevojeevasyajeewanam</i>	-	<i>One creature becomes the reason for another's life</i>
<i>Jin</i>	-	<i>Omniscient</i>
<i>Jīva</i>	-	<i>The soul</i>
<i>Jīvāstikāya</i>	-	<i>Soul</i>
<i>Jñāna naya</i>	-	<i>Idealistic standpoint</i>
<i>Kashayamukt</i>	-	<i>Pure and free from passions</i>
<i>Kashaya</i>	-	<i>Passions</i>
<i>Kevali</i>	-	<i>Omniscient</i>
<i>Kramabhavi</i>	-	<i>Element which changes successively</i>

<i>Kriyamāna-kṛta</i>	- <i>Process and Product</i>
<i>Maya</i>	- <i>Illusion</i>
<i>Mokṣa</i>	- <i>The place of emancipation</i>
<i>Mool atma</i>	- <i>Source of the Soul</i>
<i>Naigama Naya</i>	- <i>Pantoscopic Viewpoint</i>
<i>Naishchiyik naya</i>	- <i>Transcendental Viewpoint</i>
<i>Nāma-indra</i>	- <i>Name of particular person</i>
<i>Nāma-niksepa</i>	- <i>A demonstrative symbol</i>
<i>Naya</i>	- <i>A particular viewpoint</i>
<i>Neti neti</i>	- <i>Negatively verbal symbol</i>
<i>Niksepa</i>	- <i>Classification of import of words</i>
<i>Niścaya-dṛṣṭi</i>	- <i>Transcendental view</i>
<i>Nischaya naya</i>	- <i>Transcendental viewpoint</i>
<i>Nivṛtti</i>	- <i>Abstinence</i>
<i>Niyati</i>	- <i>Predestined</i>
<i>Ogh</i>	- <i>General</i>
<i>Oghaśakti</i>	- <i>Distant time actualized potentiality</i>
<i>Padarthashastra</i>	- <i>Material science</i>
<i>Papa</i>	- <i>Demerit</i>
<i>Paramānu</i>	- <i>Ultimate indivisible unit of the physical substance</i>
<i>Paratantra</i>	- <i>Independent</i>
<i>Parikalpita</i>	- <i>The imaginary</i>
<i>Parinanityitavat</i>	- <i>Changing Permanence</i>
<i>Parinispāna</i>	- <i>The ultimate</i>
<i>Paryayarthik</i>	- <i>Modal, Description based on modifications</i>
<i>Paryāyārthika</i>	- <i>The modal</i>
<i>Paryāyārthika naya</i>	- <i>Modal viewpoint</i>
<i>Prakṛti</i>	- <i>Insentient element, primordial matter</i>
<i>Pramāna</i>	- <i>Valid cognition, Knowledge</i>

<i>Pramāna shastra</i>	- <i>Science of valid cognition</i>
<i>Pravṛtti</i>	- <i>Indulgence</i>
<i>Presupposes</i>	- <i>Assumes</i>
<i>Pudgala</i>	- <i>Matter, Physical substance</i>
<i>Pudgalāstikāya</i>	- <i>One of the ultimate substances</i>
<i>Punya</i>	- <i>Merit</i>
<i>Puruṣa</i>	- <i>The sentient element</i>
<i>Purushartha</i>	- <i>Human Effort</i>
<i>Ratnaprābhā</i>	- <i>First of seven infernal earth</i>
<i>Rhetories</i>	- <i>The method of determining the particular meaning of a multisensed word</i>
<i>Rjusūtra Nāya</i>	- <i>Memory Viewpoint</i>
<i>Śabda Naya</i>	- <i>Linguistic, Verbal viewpoint</i>
<i>sadhak</i>	- <i>The person who is engaged in spiritualism</i>
<i>Sadhana</i>	- <i>Spiritual practice</i>
<i>Sahabhavi</i>	- <i>Element which persists</i>
<i>Sāhacarya</i>	- <i>Law of concomitance</i>
<i>Samabhirūddhanaya</i>	- <i>Etymological Viewpoint</i>
<i>Sāmānya</i>	- <i>Universal</i>
<i>Samgraha Naya</i>	- <i>Synthetic Viewpoint, Class View</i>
<i>Sampraday</i>	- <i>Tradition</i>
<i>Samucitāśakti</i>	- <i>Immediately actualized potentiality</i>
<i>Samyag</i>	- <i>Gyan-samyag darshan – Right Knowledge, Right Belief</i>
<i>Sarvam asti</i>	- <i>Everything exists</i>
<i>sarvam nāsti</i>	- <i>Nothing exists</i>
<i>Sattā</i>	- <i>Real</i>
<i>Satyam</i>	- <i>Truth</i>
<i>Sayam</i>	- <i>Restraint</i>
<i>Shasvat</i>	- <i>Eternal</i>
<i>Śhivam</i>	- <i>Benefaction</i>

<i>Sneh</i>	-	<i>Affinity</i>
<i>Smriti-dharma</i>	-	<i>Social conduct</i>
<i>Sheh</i>	-	<i>Attinity</i>
<i>Sopakrama</i>	-	<i>Life span vulnerable to external effect</i>
<i>Sthāpanā-indra</i>	-	<i>An image of the king of heaven</i>
<i>Sthāpanā-Niksepa</i>	-	<i>an image</i>
<i>Sundaram</i>	-	<i>Beauty</i>
<i>Sutra</i>	-	<i>Theory</i>
<i>Taṭasthata</i>	-	<i>Neutrality</i>
<i>Temporal</i>	-	<i>Oftime</i>
<i>Tiryag</i>	-	<i>The horizontal</i>
<i>Udeerann</i>	-	<i>Before time</i>
<i>Upādāna kārana</i>	-	<i>Mmaterial cause, Root cause</i>
<i>Ūrdhva</i>	-	<i>The vertical</i>
<i>Varnas</i>	-	<i>It indicates caste i.e. Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaisya & Sudra.</i>
<i>Vasudhaiva kuṭumbakam</i>	-	<i>The world is like a family</i>
<i>Viśesa</i>	-	<i>Particular</i>
<i>Vyañjana-paryāya</i>	-	<i>The verbal or conceptual mode</i>
<i>Vyavahar Naya</i>	-	<i>Behavior Viewpoint</i>
<i>Vyavahāra- dṛṣṭi</i>	-	<i>Empirical view</i>
<i>Vyavahāra Naya</i>	-	<i>Analytic view, Empirical viewpoint, Practical view</i>



His Holiness **Acharya Mahapragya**, a great scholar and a renowned philosopher, is a splended storehouse of infinite wisdom and a saint par excellence. His scientific vision, spiritual approach, philosophical thinking and excellent motivating leadership with far-sighted action plans make him a mystic personality.

He is the able successor to **Acharya Tulsi**, who was a world renowned spiritual leader and who propounded **Anuvrat movement** in 1949 as a perfect code of moral conduct to produce better human beings. With a score of Awards and Honours, he has authored more than 300 books on diverse subjects. At the age of 90, he exudes a remarkable pious personality with global vision and simple down to earth approach.

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