


APPLIED PHILOSOPHY OF ANEKANTA



Dr. Samani Shashi Prajna

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DR. SAMANI SHASHI PRAJÑĀ

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|| Arham ||

After completion of the post-graduate degree, the students undertake the research work. If the research is done with hard work then, it yields special significance.

I have come to know that Jaina Vishva Bharati University is going to publish Dr Samani Shashi Prajñāji's book on "APPLIED PHILOSOPHY OF ANEKANT".

My blessings to her to succeed in enriching her deep knowledge of the Jaina philosophy so that she may be a source of inspiration to the readers all over the world.

Ācārya Mahāshramaṇa

Jasol, Rajasthan

8 October, 2012

FOREWORD

A firm grasp of the Jaina view of reality (including knowledge and language) as identity-in-difference can be attempted only when we distinguish it from other views, both Indian and Western. The Vedic-Upanishadic monism advanced the philosophy of identity or absolute being; the entire play of reality was regarded, as a grand monologue of the lonely transcendental absolute, whatever be the name—Brahman, Iswara, Prakriti, God, etc. This can be called the philosophy of **Being or Identity**. The second typical ontological position is found in the opposite point of view, advocated by Buddhism, the philosophy of becoming or change or difference—an antithesis to the earlier one. According to them, everything is impermanent, momentary and without intrinsic substance. Reality is always in a state of flux. According to this point of view, there is no identity of absolute, but there is only difference, that too transient. This view can be called the philosophy of **Becoming (Change)**. Between the two extremes of Vedantic **monism** and Buddhist '**fluxism**', there were several other systems of thinking like Ramanuja's *Viśiṣṭādvaita*, the doctrine of identity with difference. The emphasis here is on the unchanging absolute (i.e. Brahman) that is wound up with its changing diversities; in other words, the principle of difference is subordinated to that of identity in this philosophy of subordinating Difference to Identity. In Madhva's Dvaitism existence means difference and difference means existence and it is difference that lends significance to identity and it is subordinated to difference; this is the philosophy of subordinating **Identity to Difference**. There were many other systems of philosophy, but since each one presented only one point of

view, none could claim that they had understood all aspects of a given issue.

Jainism, on the other hand, does not propose the primacy of identity or difference, permanence or change; rather, it advocates that only a synthesis of identity and difference, permanence and change, will lead to a balanced view. This comprehensive theory is a combination of existence of reality that is very complex and its limitless manifoldness. This conception of the union of the 'permanent' and 'change' takes us to the central doctrine of Jainism, the theory of relative pluralism, as against the absolutism of the Vedic-Upanishadic view or the total flux of the Buddhists. Jain philosophy can be called the philosophy of **Co-ordinating Identity with Difference**.

Anekānta emphatically states that nothing can be affirmed absolutely as all affirmations are true under certain circumstances, conditions, and limitations. *Anekāntavada* says: All affirmations are true only in a limited sense and all things possess an infinite number of qualities and each of which can be affirmed only in a particular sense. If this is true of physical objects like a pot or an ornament, one can easily imagine the state of abstract concepts, symbolic systems like language, meanings, etc.

In recent years, the theory of relativity of Albert Einstein, a highly complex scientific theory, has been compared with the philosophical theory of relativity in Jainism. Both theories state that an object is not what it appears to be from one point of view and that the other points are not distortions or deviations. Albert Einstein himself remarked, 'We can only know the relative truth, the real truth is known only to the universal observer' (*Cosmology Old and New*, p. 13). In the words of Sir Arthur Eddington, one of the greatest exponents of the theory of relativity, an object is a 'symposium of worlds presented to different view points' (Eddington 1935). He further

adds 'the more viewpoints the better'. *Anekāntvada* views reality including things, words, language, meaning, reality, etc.—as pluralistic, many-sided or expressing itself in many forms. In other words, whatever one might say about reality, is relative. That is why, the doctrine of Jainism may aptly be called 'maybeism' or 'perhapsism'. *Anekānta* or the theory of manifoldness and indeterminateness is 'the ontological assumption that any entity is at once enduring and undergoing changes that is, both constant and inevitable' (*Britannica Online Encyclopedia*). Padmarajiah (1986) in *A Comparative Study of the 'Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge'* points out : 'This comprehensive theory of manifoldness is ontology or a theory of reality, as well as an epistemology or a theory of knowledge. The *anekānta* postulates a reality, which is immensely complex or manifold. Correspondingly, the *anekānta* epistemology postulates a theory of manifold methods of analysis (*nāyavāda*) and synthesis (*syadvāda*) by means of which the complex reality can be comprehended by the mind' (pp, 123-124).

It has one basic principle: co-existence, not only in pairs but also as opposing pairs. It is in the world of nature and mutual co-existence too is the Law of Nature. If there is birth, there is death; if there is light, there is darkness. If there is war, there is peace; if there is happiness, there is sadness; if there is wisdom, there is ignorance. If there is good, there is bad. That seems to be the law of nature and *anekānta* is an expression of that principle.

Proper understanding of the principle of *anekānta* or the co-existence of mutually opposing groups helps one to avoid conflicts and create a better society. There lies its application. Although Indian knowledge systems have historically influenced many Western systems like Romanticism and Postmodernism, the impact has not been fully acknowledged. But now, as in many other fields like economy, computer technology, medicine, yoga, etc., the West is being

forced to accept the contribution of India. Globalization, information technology and the Internet, the rise of post-colonialism and multiculturalism, the borderless world, and such other factors have changed our perceptions. The world is no longer Euro-centric or Westo-centric. There are attempts to globalize all knowledge systems and build a *world bank or a common wealth of knowledges*. The universality of human experience can be captured only in '*world knowledges*'. The time has come to globalize all knowledge systems and shed the epistemic dependency of the rest on the West. The focus in many fields is already shifting from the West to the rest. The world is in for convergence rather than divergence, not just based on Westernization but also on Easternization, based on the blending of both. The twain shall meet by virtue of each moving in the direction of the other and may contribute to a fusion, containing the best of both. But now, as in many fields, like economy, computer technology, medicine, yoga, etc., the West is more than willing to accept the contribution of India in other fields too. Similarly, in the field of language philosophy too, Indians must tell the world that India's knowledge can engage the best in the West. This must be done in English because English is the world's 'window on India'. The world must know that India is the land of great philosophers like Mahavira, Buddha, Śankara and others and language philosophers like Pāṇini, Bhāṣṛhari, Nāgārjuna, and many more. This project involves an in-depth understanding of one's own culture, heritage, philosophies, languages and literatures, language philosophies, values and knowledge systems and 'translating India' into English. These systems should be compared with the Western systems so that the world understands the depth of India's language philosophy, whereas Derrida stops with 'languageism' and thinks that there is nothing beyond language, India's language philosophers have pointed out that through yoga and meditation, it is possible to

transcend the limits of language and achieve 'emancipation'. Comparative philosophy and language philosophy can prove to be very useful and effective in showing India's rich philosophical traditions in the eyes of the world and create a meeting point of the East and the West. As Coward (1990) in his book *Derrida and Indian Philosophy* points out, perhaps 'at some future point Jaina philosophy, especially *Anekānta-vada* or no-one-view philosophy, could be fruitfully taken up for comparison with Derrida' (p. 18). But, at present, this remains a relatively unexplored area.

I am glad to note that Dr. Samani Shashi Prajñā has written a book on the **Applied Philosophy of Anekānta** and comparing it with postmodern philosophy and tried to show how the basic principles of *anekānta* are found in the later theories of the West. It is very timely contribution and we need many more books like this. In one of the chapters she has also attempted a comparison of postmodernism with *anekānt* thus paving a way for systems thinking and intercultural dialogue. We need many more books like Dr. Samani Shashi Prajñā's **Applied Philosophy of Anekānta** to stimulate research and introduction of courses in the departments of philosophy, linguistics, and other language departments. My own book "**An Introduction to India's language Philosophy with a Focus on Comparative Language Philosophy**" (Pearson, forthcoming) is also a similar attempt in the area of language philosophy. I do hope these efforts result in many more publications and research. I strongly recommend Samaniji's book to all research scholars and university departments. Hope it gets due attention.

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PREFACE

Anekāntavāda stands for right vision. It enables us to comprehend the true nature of an object, which is possessed of infinite attributes. Reality, according to the Jainas, is multi-dimensional. It has many facets and qualities. So it is very difficult to comprehend the true nature of a reality in its entirety. Really speaking, only a particular aspect of an object is comprehended by a common man. He, therefore, gives an estimate of reality from a particular standpoint. This is, in fact, only a partial truth about an object and if the person asserts in the like manner, then he/she is not looking upon this standpoint as the only true standpoint. This goes well so far as he/she admits his/her limitations. The fact of the matter is that, he understands that there may be a multitude of different viewpoints of a given situation or event and all those viewpoints in their totality reflect the full nature of the situation or event. And hence, unless we take into account all the different aspects of a thing, we cannot be in a position to comprehend it fully as also to express it correctly and completely.

For the comprehensive understanding of the theory of *anekānta*, certain postulates of *anekānta* is a precondition to be known for readers. They are:

1. The complete truth exists but it can neither be perceived nor be expressed completely.
2. As our perception, thought and expression are sequential in time and space, we can perceive, cognize and express only partial truths.

3. All the descriptions of an object or situation are subject to the chosen reference. One can have clear understanding of the proposed research work 'Applied philosophy of *Anekānta*' by keeping this in mind.

It may not be out of place to speak a word on the genesis of the present work. The late Ācārya śrī Mahāprañā was my source of inspiration to enter into the field of philosophical research. Once he enquired about me and then asked me, why don't you undertake some sort of research along with your teaching in Ladnun? Since then my mind started thinking about the topic in which I can do research. One good day, I went and requested for few topics of research and ācārya śrī chosen the topic of "**Social Relevance of Jaina Doctrines**" and inspired me to write on it. I registered my Ph.D. on this topic and began to work.

In between Jain Vishva Bharati University came with a new syllabus of M.Phil. course for students of Jainology. Due to the inspiration of Ācārya Mahāprañāji, I began to study for M.Phil degree course and dropped Ph.D programme for a year. During the process of the selection for dissertation topic, I decided to work on '**Applied Philosophy of *Anekānta***'. It is because of the reason that when I took admission in *Pārmārthika Śikṣaṇa Saṁsthā*, the very first year, Ācārya Mahāprañāji delivered a weekly lecture series on the applied aspect of *anekānta* in New Delhi. I came to derive the essence of *anekānta* and its practical application in our day-to-day transactions.

The other reason is that I was privileged to gain the knowledge about the thinking of the west and the post-modern philosophers in intensive study course in Calcutta. During that time, Prof. Arun Kumar Mukherjee suggested me that I

undertake this topic and highlight the philosophy of *anekānta* as a way of hermeneutic interpretation and as the best remedy for the conflict resolution that can open the scope for the Inter-cultural dialogue in the age of clash of civilization and culture. The inter-culturality is based on the strong foundation of the maxim that, *we meet to differ and differ to meet*. So an endeavour is made to have a comparative study of the post-modern philosophy with the philosophy of *anekānta*. This would be the new way of interpreting *anekānta* and its relevance in solving the problems of language philosophy and in achieving the goal of successful communication.

Moreover some scholars claim that *anekānta* closes the door to any philosophical discourse by accepting everything contrary or contradictory. It is to eliminate the misconception regarding the theory of *anekānta* that, it is merely a synthesis of all the other philosophical systems and has nothing to contribute anything new to the world of philosophy in itself. It should rather be said in reply that the *anekāntavāda* along with the *nayavāda* and *syadvād* gives us room for dialectic of discourse and an existential view of the live world. In this work efforts will be made to establish that *anekānta* theory is actually a door opener to an unbiased vision, which is a problem solving antidote and to explore the elements of *anekāntic* thinking in western post-modern philosophy for inter-cultural dialogue.

This research book is a section-I of my Ph.D. thesis. I have made a humble effort to bring in special insight to the applied aspect of Jain Metaphysics and Jain epistemology independently, which is the very foundation of the philosophy of *anekānt*. Moreover no independent exhaustive research has been undertaken on this topic so far. So most compelling reason to publish this book is to widen the horizon of social

implications of *Jain* doctrine of *anekānt* in all spheres of life and to highlight the wide implications of the *anekantic* teachings of Mahāvīra in the present scenario exhaustively. The proposed research work deals with the social utility of philosophy of *anekant* in all situations of practical life rather than its theoretical part, which is the central theme of the present research work undertaken.

The book '**Applied Philosophy of a *Anekānta***', is a map of the central provinces of Jain Philosophy. It is an introduction, a guide, a companion and a survey all in one, the heart of Jainism. It consists of five chapters, each providing an account of the main topics in the field of *anekānt* philosophy. The chapters are although introductory, are not elementary, because they seek to give the full character of inquiry into its most important questions. So let us proceed to have bird's eye view of the contents of the chapters and its concluding remarks.

The first chapter deals with the very concept of '**Origin and Development of Theory of *Anekānta* Philosophy**'. Although the word '*anekāntaa*' is not found in the Jaina canonical texts, still the germs of *anekānta* philosophy is scattered here and there in the canons in terms of the word '*siyā*' and '*bhayanā*' (i.e. each statement is made in a certain context). The origin and development of *anekānta* philosophy has been discussed on the basis of the classifications of the four periods- from the period of canons up to the Modern period and survey of four periods is done to highlight the relevance of present work.

The second chapter deals with '**Metaphysical Basis of *Anekānta***'. This doctrine of *anekāntavāda* finds the most important place in Jainism and on this very foundation other

doctrines of the Jainas are built up. The entire Jain metaphysics, epistemology, ethics is based on the *tripadī* of *utpāda* (origination) *vyaya* (destruction) and *dhrauvya* (permanence). The triple nature of reality is the metaphysical basis of *anekānta*, on which strong foundation all the other theories are explained in the logical world of philosophy. Without understanding the Jain metaphysics, we cannot understand the heart of the theory of *anekānta* in Jain philosophy. I have highlighted how the *Jain* nature of reality can act as a guide in understanding the situations of life in right perspective. Along with this the interdependence between the individual actions and the social order is briefly explained from the *anekāntic* perspective.

In the third chapter, **Epistemological Analysis of *Anekāntavāda***, it is highlighted as to how *anekāntavāda* unfolds its vision through *nayavāda* and *syādvāda*. *Nayavāda* is an analytical method of standpoints, while *syādvāda* is the synthetic method of knowledge. The brief introduction of doctrine of *anekānta*, its nature, its limitations, its utility in the expression of multi-dimensional truth is being dealt in this chapter. What we know as the doctrine of co-existence, or the spirit of reconciliation, or the theory of relativity, all these, in fact, originate from *anekāntavāda*. It is primarily in the dialogues of Lord Mahāvīra and his disciples Gautama, Somila, Skandhaka, Jayantī and so forth, we find that Mahāvīra used the language of *anekānta* in all his discourses. *Bhagavatī Sutra* is a living example of *anekāntic* communication. Along with this the brief introduction of *nayavāda* with its sub-classifications is discussed for a primary understanding of the next chapter. It also deals with the implications of philosophy of *anekānta*, *syādvāda*, and *nayavāda* in modern and *Jain* perspective.

In the fourth chapter '**Anekānta in Western Post-modern Philosophy**' an endeavour is made to understand the philosophy of *anekant* in the light of philosophical thinking of post-modern philosophers. It seems that the western thinkers are shifting from metaphysics to epistemology and from epistemology to dealing with the problem of communication through the process of analytic philosophy and language philosophy. The relevance of *anekānta* lies in understanding 'the other'. In this process, we can know the points of overlaps, i.e. the points of agreements and the points of disagreements and with the points of agreements we can correspond with others views and cultures. These larger cultural interests, and understanding is the need of the présent day of cultural conflicts. In this, it is highlighted how the philosophy of *anekānta* is actually a door opener to an unbiased vision, which is a problem solving antidote. Moreover the overlapping points between *Jain* thinking and the western postmodern thinking are discussed from the point of view of *anekāntic* inter-cultural dialogue.

In the fifth chapter, '**Multi-dimensional Application of Philosophy of Anekānta**', effort is made to deal exhaustively with the applied philosophy of *anekānta* in all the fields of present day scenario. Acārya Mahaprajna has rightly mentioned in his book, *Anekānta : The Third Eye*, that the *anekānta* is not only a mere theoretical philosophy, but it is a philosophy of life. The applied philosophy of *anekānta* at individual level, familial level, social level and international level is being discussed in context with the solution to the problem of today. *anekānta* can act as a tool in building up an ideal society, where there will be a peaceful co-existence, religious and social harmony through the tolerance of the 'other' and reconciliation of viewpoints in a specific context through the wide perspective of *anekānta*. It is a

dynamic philosophy of life through which one can lead a life of partnership and participation, a life of friendliness and harmony, a life of non-violence and equality. It indeed touches almost every aspect of life and envisages total change in the horizon of our outlook, thought and action. It provides an integral, balanced and effective approach to the solutions of the problems, which mankind is facing to-day.

Finally the heart of the thesis i.e. concluding remarks, concludes the research by summarizing the key points. It will also justify the new findings and contributions endorsed at my disposal. At the end the compact bibliography of the literature related to the research work that was referred, to develop this work is enlisted.

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Dr Samani Shashi Prajñā

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I

Origin and Development of The Theory of *Anekānta*

The doctrine of *anekāntavāda* finds the most important place in Jainism and on this very foundation other doctrines of the *Jain* philosophy are built up. From the historical point of view, Jainism is proved to be a very ancient religion of the world, originated and developed on the Indian soil. There is no denying the fact that every doctrine originates and develops in the heart of society. The doctrine of *anekānta* is not an exception to this. While explaining the origin and development of *anekānta*, my exposition will be based mostly on the available *Prākṛta* and *Saṃskṛta* materials on *Jain* philosophy. But in reconstructing the history of the *anekāntavāda* occasional help will be taken from the canonical literature of Jainism as well as Buddhism. For better explanation of the development of *anekānta*, the classifications of four periods as accepted by Dalsukha Malavaniya in '*Āgam yuga kā Jain darśana*' is taken into consideration.

The development of literature of Jaina philosophy can be classified into four periods.¹ They are :

1. The Period of *Āgamas* (Before Vikram 470-Vikram 500) : The period near about one thousand years after the liberation of Bhagavān Mahāvīra.
2. The Period of Establishment of *Anekānta* (5th cent. - 8th cent. A.D.).

¹ Pandita Dalsukha Malavaniya. *Āgam Yuga Ke Jaina Darśana*. Jaipur: Prakrit Bhārti Academy, 1990, p. 35.

3. The Period of *Pramāṇa Vyavasthā* (from 8th cent. - 17th cent. A.D.).
4. The Period of *Navya Nyaya* (17th cent. A.D. upto - Modern Age 2006).

1.1 The Period of *Āgama*-s

It is a fact worth noting that though the two sects, i.e. *svetambaras* and *digambaras*, differ in many aspects, but with regard to the theory of *anekāntavāda*, they do not. As far as the development of *anekāntavāda* is concerned, it can be said that it is not very old. From the historical point of view, the last *tīrthaṅkara* of Jain religion, Lord Mahāvīra, is the originator of the *tripadī* of *anekāntavāda*, i.e. a thing which consists of origination, cessation and permanence¹.

According to the sixteenth chapter (*śataka*) of *Bhagavati Sūtra*, śramaṇa Mahāvīra before attaining *kevala-jñāna*, dreamt ten dreams in the temple of *śulpaṇī yakṣa* at Asthika village. Among these ten dreams, the third dream was of a male-cuckoo with strange wings, and by seeing it he was awakened. According to *Bhagavati Sūtra*, this dream meant that Lord Mahāvīra would interpret a strange kind of *svasamaya* (*vāda*) and *para-samaya* (*vāda*).²

*taṇṇaṇ samaṇe bhagavaṃ mahāvīre vicittaṃ
sasamayamparasamayiṃ....ityāśdi.*

¹ *tatra gautamaswāminā niṣḍyātrayaṇa caturdaśa pūvāṇi ghrītāṇi. praṇipatya pṛcchā niṣadyocyate bhagavānścācāṣṭe- "uppannei vā, vīgamei vā, dhuvei vā". etā eva tistro niṣḍdyāḥ āsāmeva sakāśādgaṇabhṛtām "tupādavyaya-dhrauvyayuktam sat" iti pratitirupajāyate, anyathā sttāyogāt. tataśca te pūrvabhava bhāvitamatayo dvādaśāṅgamupa-racayanti, 'Haribhadra kī ṭikā Aśvāyakaśūtra', p. 277a, Hiralal Rasikdas Kapadia, 'A History of the Canonical Literature of the Jains', Surat, 1941, as quoted on p. 3.*

² *Aṅgasuttāṇī II. Vācanā Pramukha, Ācārya Tulsī. Ed. Yuvācārya Mahāprajña. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati, 1997, p. 729*

Paṇḍit Dalsukh Malavaniya has clearly connected this dream with the idea of *anekāntavāda*.¹ It was *śramaṇa* Mahāvīra, who first dreamt of the bird, but later *ācārya*-s have significantly connected this dream with *anekāntavāda*. For, according to them, in the strangeness of the wings of the bird, *śramaṇa* Mahāvīra had seen the theory of non-absolutism, that is *anekāntavāda*.

Though there are some glimpses here and there in the *Jain* canonical literature, the real development starts from the 5th century A.D., when the *śvetāmbara Jain* canonical literature was codified finally. In the *Bhagavatī Sūtra*, the process of *anekāntavāda* is hinted in the form of 'syādvāda'. The origin of *anekānta* can be traced in *āgama* in *Ganadhara* Gautama's questions to the *tīrthaṅkar* Mahāvīra and the answer to it.

The canonical literature (*āgamas*) of the *Jains* forms the basis of their philosophical thoughts. For the origin of *anekānta*, when one looks into the *āgamic* literature. Gautama, the disciple of Mahāvīra raised several thousands of questions, which are specially quoted in the *Bhagavatī Sūtra*. It is these questions of Gautama, which can be considered as the origin of *anekānta* philosophy. Among the series of questions of Gautama, the first question was pertaining to the nature of soul as well as the nature of matter, then regarding the permanent and impermanent nature of universe. In these dialectics, we can find the seeds or germs of *anekānta* philosophy. It highlights the truth that both the predicates (the permanent and impermanent) refer to the same subject. So they are not contradictory to each other, but complimentary to each other. The theory of *anekānta* was explained by using the technical term of *siyā* by *tīrthaṅkara* Mahāvīra. Let us have a glimpse of *anekāntika* discourse.

Gautama : Is the soul permanent or impermanent?

¹ Paṇḍit Dalsukh Malavaniya. *Āgama Yuga kā Jain Darśana*. Jaipur: Prakrit Bharati Academy, 1990, p. 53.

Mahāvīra : The soul is permanent as well as impermanent. From the substantial point of view (*dravyarthiva naya*), soul neither originates nor perishes, so it is permanent. From the modal point of view (*paryāyārthika naya*), the modes originates and perishes. The *Bhagavatī Sūtra*, hints upon the two aspects of reality, permanent and impermanent. It is quoted that ‘*athire palottai, thire no palottai.*’¹ It means, the permanent part does not change, the impermanent part undergoes change.

Mahāvīra very well knew that a substance is possessed of an infinite number of attributes. It is however, not possible to express in language these infinite numbers of attributes taking place every moment. Besides, our span of life and also the range of language have their own limitations. A substance is unspeakable on account of these infinitude aspects of things.² Mahāvīra said, due to limitation of our language only one attribute can best be spoken of, in one moment and many in many moments, but never are, all during any stretch of time. Thus we can speak about a thing reference to only a limited number of its attributes. Mahāvīra got the way to solve the problem of limitation of language through the successive explanation of all qualities from different standpoints.

After the period of canonical speculation, came the age of Umāsvāti and Kundakunda. Umāsvāti (1st or 2nd century A.D.) makes no mention of the *syādvāda*, and does not discuss about the seven alternative predicates as well. In his *Tattvārtha Sūtra*, he didn’t make any explicit reference to the principle of *anekānta*. But still we find an implicit definition of *anekānta* in

¹ *Bhagavatī, Viahāpannattī*. Vol. I. Ed. Mahāprajña. With Prakrit Text Sanskrit Renderings, Hindi Translation and Critical Notations. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati Institute, 1994, verse-1.9.440.

² *Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya*. Vol. I of Jinabhadra Gaṇī. Ed. Dalsukha Malavaniya and Becharadasji. Lal Bhai Dalpatabhai. Ahmedabad: Bhārtīya Samskr̥ti Vidyāmandir, 1968, *gātha (svopajñāvr̥tti)*-450.

his *Tattvārtha Sūtra*, *arpitānarpita siddheḥ*, which means, as ungrasped (unnoticed) aspect of an object is attested by the grasped (noticed) one' as translated by Nathmal Tatia in '*That which is*'.¹ Here Ācārya Umāsvāti has defined *anekānta* in a lucid manner. The *Sarvārthasiddhi* explains that, a particular attribute or mode of an object are brought in to light by the observer for a specific purpose, relegating the other attributes and modes to the background. Such attributes and modes are designated as "the grasped ones", while the unspoken attributes and modes are mentioned as the "ungrasped ones". So when a person speaks about eternal aspect (the substance) of an object, the non-eternal (the modes) is left unsaid and vice versa.

Pūjyapada Devanandī (5th and 7th centuries A.D.) in his commentary, *Sarvārthasiddhi* written on *Tattvārtha Sūtra* comments on this *sūtra* thus, as translated by S.A Jain, 'Substance is characterized by an infinite numbers of attributes. But for the sake of use or need, prominence is given to certain characteristics of a substance from one point of view and prominence is not given to other characteristics, as these are of no use or need at that time.' Thus even the existing attributes are not expressed, as these are of secondary importance (*anarpita*).² There is no contradiction in the same person named Devadatta, being a father, a son, a brother, a nephew as the points of view are different. For his son, he is father, and from the point of view of his father, he is son. Similarly, with regard to his other designation. In the same manner, as depicted in the canonical literature, Umāsvāti expressed his view in different terms of *arpita* and *anarpita* implying the same meaning of canons.

¹ *That Which Is*. English Translation of *Tattvārtha Sūtra* with the Combined Commentaries of Umāsvāti. Pūjyapāda and Siddhasena Gaṇi. America: Collins Publications, 1994, 5.32, p. 136.

² *Sarvārthasiddhi* of Pūjyapāda. Ed. and trans. by Phoolchandra Shastri. Murtidevī Jain Granthamālā. Sanskrit Series-13. Delhi: Bhāratiya Jñānapīṭha, 13th edn. 2005, 5.32, p. 303.

Actually he follows the very same view as found in canons regarding the nature of a Reality. From the standpoint of its specific modes, it is not permanent, from the substantial point of view, it is permanent. Hence there is no contradiction. These two, the general and the particular somehow, are different as well as identical. Thus, these form the cause of worldly intercourse. Till the date of Umāsvāti, while dealing with the doctrine of *nayas*, no explicit reference to non-Jaina school of philosophy is made, nor can it be said that a reference is implicitly present. The viewpoints are not studied with their supporting arguments, nor are they examined and criticized. With Umāsvāti ends the age of *agamās*.

In the Jain canon, *Sūtrakṛtaāṅga Sūtra*, Lord Mahāvīra reflected on the monk way of speech to be in '*vibhajyavāda*' technique or *syādvāda* method.¹ The very same word *vibhajyavāda* is found in Buddhist text named '*Mazhim Nikāya*' *Sutra* 99, in the context of dialogue between the Śubhamaṇavaka and Lord Buddha. Śubhamaṇavaka asked Lord Buddha, that I have heard that only householder is *ārādhaka* and houseless monk is not *ārādhaka*. Let me know your view in this regard. Lord Buddha adopted *vibhajyavāda* method in answering this question. Buddha said, if a householder possesses wrong view, he is *virādhaka* and even houseless monk with the wrong view, is also not *ārādhaka*. If Buddha had replied, only houseless monk is *ārādhaka*, not the householder, then his answer might be one-sided. But he used wrong and right view as the criteria of *ārādhaka* and *virādhaka* kind of householder and houseless monks. So he considered himself as *vibhajyavādi*.

But one point to be noticed here is that Buddha didn't apply *vibhajyavāda* method everywhere, but only in few dialogues as found in *Dīghanikāya* of *Sangiti Pariyāya Sutta*. But

¹ *Sūtrakṛtāṅga Sūtra*. Ed. Mishrimalji Maharaj. Trans. Shrichand Surana. Beawar: Āgam Prakāshan Samiti, 1991, 1.4.22.

Lord Mahāvīra used this 'syādvāda' method in all the occasions of dialogues with the laymen and laywomen, monks and nuns. A long series of the dialogues are found in the *Bhagavatī Sūtra*. But Dalsukha Malavaniya asserts, it is due to Buddha's silence regarding various philosophical questions, which played a great role in the origin of the so called, doctrine of *anekānta*. Let us introspect on the unexplained questions of Buddha, which are later on replied by Lord Mahāvīra.

Unexplained Question of Buddha

The *Majjhimnikāya* (*Cūlamālunkya-sutta*) lists the ten *avyākhyāta*, not to be answered or explained, questions are as follows¹:

1. Is the *loka* (universe) eternal?
2. Is the *loka* not eternal?
3. Is it (the *loka*) finite (with an end)?
4. Is the *loka* not finite?
5. Is the soul identical to the body?
6. Is the soul different from the body?
7. Does the Tathāgata exist after death?
8. Does the Tathāgata not exist after death?
9. Does he both exist and not exist after death?
10. Does he neither exist nor not exist after death?

Various speculations have been made with regard to these *avyākhyāta* questions. The above mentioned ten questions² can be summarized with in three questions. These queries are as follows:

1. The question of permanence and transience and finiteness and infiniteness of the *loka* (universe),

¹ *Majjhimnikāya*. I. Ed. p. V. Bapat. Bihar: Pali Publication Board, 1958, *Cūlamālunkya Sutta*, 63.

² *Majjhimnikāya*, *op.cit.*, *Cūlamālunkya Sutta*, 64.

2. The question of oneness and separateness of the soul and the body; and
3. The question of permanence and impermanence of the soul.

It could be possible that Buddha, in choosing not to be committal in answering the ten questions in either an affirmative way or a negative way, might have dismissed them as inexplicable, though much later on, he believed and asserted that everything is *anitya* or evanescent. However, the clarification of the first four questions form among the ten, which were considered inexplicable by Lord Buddha, is available in the *adhikāra* of *Skandak-Parivrājaka* in *Bhagavatī Sūtra*.

All these questions remained unanswered by him, because he considered that these questions were irrelevant to the practical teaching of the four noble truths. He says, one can refer to the parable of the man, shot with an arrow. When that man is bleeding to death, it is irrelevant, and rather stupid, to ask, "Who shot the arrow?" For the immediate need would be to pull out the arrow and save the man from dying. In another place, Buddha exposed, how utterly senseless was the question about whether Tathāgata exists after death or not. I just show the path of the destruction of birth and death and only this is fruitful to you and rest of the questions of eternality of *loka* etc. should be considered as inexplicable.

The first two *avyākhyāta* questions were explained by Mahāvīra in the following manner

"*Bhikku Jamālī* was asked by Honorable Goutama as follows: 'Is the world eternal or is it non-eternal?' Being asked in this manner, *Jamālī* was thus confused, the venerable Mahāvīra told *Bhikkhu Jamālī* thus : *Jamālī*, "I have many disciples who are *nirgrantha* ('without a stitch') ascetics and not even omniscient, but they are able to tell the answer as much as I can. Otherwise, they would not have spoken to you, as they have in the present case. The world is, *Jamālī*, eternal. It did not

cease to exist at any time, it does not cease to exist at any time and it will not cease to exist at any time. It was, it is and it will be. It is constant, permanent, eternal, imperishable, indestructible, always existing.¹

The world is, Jamālī, non-eternal. For it becomes progressive (in time-cycle) after being regressive. And it becomes regressive after becoming progressive.

The soul (i.e. living being) is, Jamālī, eternal. For it did not cease to exist at any time. The soul is, Jamālī, non-eternal. For it becomes animal after being a hellish creature, becomes a man, after becoming an animal and it becomes god after being a man."

Several points may be noted in this connection. First, Jamālī was confused and remained silent in the beginning, for the question had several ambiguities. Mahāvīra stated that not only he could answer it but also most of his ordinary disciples could. (Was it an oblique reference to the 'silence' of the Buddha, when he first tried to avoid answering such question?) The question might have been ambiguous, but were not unanswerable.

Secondly, in the first four *avyākhyata* questions, the subject was "*loka*". Since it ambiguously means both 'the world' and 'the person'. Mahāvīra used two separate sets of questions, with two different subjects, 'the world' and 'the soul', thus, perhaps foreshadowing the *Jain* ontological distinction between the living and the non-living (spirit and matter). Resolution of ambiguities is, as I have already noted, part of the *vibhajya* method. Third, and this is more important, Mahāvīra, unlike the Buddha, did not reject both of the seemingly contradictory predicates ('infinite' and 'finite'), but rather accepted both of

¹ *Bhagavāi Viāhapaṇṇattī*. Ed. Mahāprajña, With Prakrit Text, Sanskrit renderings, Hindi translation and Critical annotations. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati Institute. Vol. I, II, III, 1994, 9.23.233, *Pupphabhikkhu*, pp. 609-610.

them and avoided the seeming contradiction by showing (or exposing) the different senses in which these predicates could be used. Thus, it could hardly be regarded as an acceptance of a real contradiction. To use the later day philosophic terminology of the *Jains*, the world, from the point of view (*naya*) of continuity, may be called eternal, but from the point of view of change of its states, it is non-eternal. This probably foreshadowed also the *Jain* view of synthesis of the Buddhist doctrine of universal flux with the Vedānta doctrine of the unchanging *Brāhman*.

Regarding the third and the fourth *avyākhyata* questions, Mahāvīra had the following to say: ¹

Skandaka², the resolve for query arose in your mind that 'Is the world finite? Is the world infinite? etc.'

The reply to this query is – O Skandaka, that the world has been propounded by me in four ways, viz., with respect to substance, space, time and modes. With respect to substance, the world is an unitary entity and it has an end. With respect to space, the world is $10^7 \times 10^7$ times innumerable *yojanas* in length and breadth and $10^7 \times 10^7$ times innumerable *yojanas* in circumference. Thus, it has an end.

With respect to time, it was never non-existent; it is never nonexistent; it will never be non-existent in future, it was, it is and it will be, it is eternal, fixed, perennial, indestructible, imperishable, ever present and persistent, and thus it has no end, i.e., it is infinite.

With respect to modes, the world has an infinite number of colour-modes, an infinite number of smell-modes, an infinite number of taste-modes, an infinite number of configuration-modes, an infinite number of heavy-cum-light-modes and an

¹ *Bhagavatī. op.cit., Sutra-2.1.45.*

² *Ibid, 2.45, p. 346.*

infinite number of neither-heavy-nor-light-modes; and thus it has no end, i.e., it is infinite.

Thus, Ó Skandaka, with respect to substance, the world has an end; with respect to space, it has an end; with respect to time, the world has no end; with respect to mode, it has no end.

Afterwards, the same questions were raised with regard to the soul (*jīva*) and Mahāvīra proceeded to solve them as follows:

Skandaka, the following queries came to your mind – Is the soul with end? Is the soul without end?

The reply to this query is – O Skandaka, that the soul has been propounded by me in four ways, viz., with respect to substance, space, time and modes.

With respect to substance, the soul is unitary entity and it has an end.

With respect to space, the soul is possessed of innumerable soul-units and the soul occupies innumerable space-units. Thus, it has an end.

With respect to time, it was never non-existent in the past, it is never non-existent in the present, and never non-existent in the future, it was, it is and it will be, it is eternal, fixed, perennial, indestructible, imperishable, ever present and persistent, and thus it has no end, i.e., it is infinite.

With respect to mode, the soul has an infinite number of modes of knowledge, an infinite number of modes of conduct, an infinite number of modes of heaviness and lightness, an infinite number of modes of neither-heavy-nor-light, and thus it has no end, i.e., it is infinite.

Thus, O Skandaka, with respect to substance, the soul is finite; with respect to space, the soul is finite; with respect to time, the soul is infinite; and with respect to mode, the soul is infinite.¹

¹ *Bhagavaī, op.cit.*, 2.1.46, p. 349.

It is clear from the above dialogue that when Mahāvīra tried to answer the so-called *avyākhyāta* questions through the *vibhajya* method, he had analyzed that from four different ways and thereby clarified the ambiguity contained in, such predicate-expressions, "infinite" and "finite". "Infinite" may mean 'limitless in number of measurement' or 'everlasting'. Similarly, "finite" may mean 'limited in number or measurement' or 'of limited duration'. Notice that all these perspectives have been taken into account in Mahāvīra's method of analysis. One can thus agree with the principle of Mahāvīra, without necessarily agreeing with the *Jain* mythological account of the universe and man. It is also to be noticed that Mahāvīra's analysis is different from that of Buddha, as Buddha maintained his doctrine of the Middle path, by rejecting the two alternative questions, positive and negative, while Mahāvīra came closer to the *anekāntavāda* by accepting both extreme alternatives with proper qualifications and conditionalization.

To the fifth and the sixth questions also, Mahāvīra gave positive answers. For the last four questions too, Mahāvīra's answer would be very definite, for he would say, following the *Jaina* religious faith, that the Tathāgata or the saint exists and reaches the end of the universe after death.

The above sketch shows how the *vibhajya* method in the hands of Mahāvīra was transformed into the *anekānta* philosophy of the *Jains*. If the *vibhajya* method is interpreted only as a method of analysis and classification, then the *Jaina* *anekānta* method may be regarded as the opposite of it, i.e., synthesis. But, in fact, the *vibhajya* method was a generic name for any non-dogmatic and exploratory approach to philosophic and metaphysical questions. It included analysis and synthesis, differentiation and integration.

Mahāvīra thus developed a philosophy of synthesis and toleration, which later came to be designated as the *anekāntavāda*.

Buddha's method was one of withdrawal from philosophic disputes, for he avoided committing himself to any extreme view. In the *Niryukti* of *Sutrakṛtāṅga Sūtra*, we find that during the period of Mahavira, the *Jina*, four doctrines were prominent—

asiyasayaṃ kiriyāṇaṃ, akkiriyāṇaṃ cahai culasīti.

annāṇiya sataṭṭhī venaiyāṇaṃ ca battīsa.¹

i) *kriyāvāda* ii) *akriyāvāda* iii) *ajāñāvāda*, iv) *vinayavāda* and sub-branches of four doctrines were 363 in number. In that period also, so many diverse philosophies prevailed. But Mahāvīra's method was one of the commitment, for he attempted to understand the points of view of the debating parties (in a philosophical dispute), so that their dispute could be resolved and reconciled. Thus the essence of the *anekāntavāda* lies in exposing and making explicit the standpoints or presuppositions of different philosophical schools of thought.

The sevenfold predication was historically a later development in Jainism, for we do not find it clearly mentioned in the early canons. A.N. Upadhye,² however, has located references to the three primary predicates (instead of seven) in the *Bhagavatī Sūtra*. In this context, let me quote Jacobi's statement that in opposition to the Agnosticism of Sañjaya, Mahāvīra has established the *syādvāda* which served to silence some strictly dogmatic opponents.³ Undoubtedly the above statement of the learned scholar is thoughtful and requires considerable attention. To make the point more clear, in the words of Prof. Barua, who follows the same view, we can say that "to avoid error, Sañjaya contended with the four famous negative propositions: A is not B; A is not nor B; A is not both B and not-B; A is neither B nor not-B. It is with regard to the

¹ *Sutrakṛtāṅga Niryukti, gāthā-112.*

² A.N. Upadhye. Introduction to *Pravacanasāra*. Bombay, 1995, p. 83.

³ *Sacred Book of East*. Vol. XLV. Ed. Hermann Jacobi, p. XXVII.

self-same questions that Mahāvīra declared that from these alternatives you cannot arrive at truth; from these alternatives you are certainly led to error."¹ This is quite true. But thereby we cannot deny the germs of the doctrine of *anekāntavāda* in Jaina philosophy before Sañjaya.

We have seen Umāsvāti (2nd cent. A.D.) didn't make any explicit reference to the seven alternative predicates.² In the ten *Niryuktis* of Bhadrabahu also there is no mention of the *saptabhangī*, but it is for the first time in the works of a Digambara Jaina Ācārya Kundakunda, (2nd cent. A.D.) we find the full-fledged seven alternative predicates in one of his *gāthā* of *Pancāstikāya*.³

*siyā atthi natthiubabham avvattavvam puno yattattidayam,
davvam khu sattabhanga adesavasena sambhavadi.*

It means : The Seven Predications are : *Syād asti, syād nāsti, syād asti nāsti, syād avaktavyam, syād asti avaktavyam, syād nāsti avaktavyam and syād asti-nāsti avaktavyam.*

1.2 The Period of Establishment of *Anekānta* (5th cent. A.D. to 8th cent. A.D)

It may be noted here that the all-round development of the *anekānta* philosophy took place in the history, when *Samskṛta* language was first of all used by the *Jain* writers. The *anekānta* philosophy, being itself a synthetic development, historically pre-supposes the existence of many rival and well-developed philosophical schools. In fact, the Jaina philosophy unfolded itself in the context of many severe and serious controversies among such schools as the *Sāṅkhya*, *Bauddha*, *Nyāya*, *Mīmāṃsā* and *Vedānta*. Paṇḍita Sukhalalji Sanghavi and

¹ Barua, *Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy*. Calcutta, 1922, p. 401.

² Some scholars believe that Umāsvāti implicitly referred to the *Saptabhangī* in *Tattvārtha Sūtra*, 5.32.

³ *Pancāstikāya* of Kundakunda. Ed. A. Chakravartinayar, verse-14.

Bechardasji Doshi, two erudite (modern) scholars of Jainism, have described the situations as follows :

When the *Sanskṛta* language found a place in *Jain* Literature and along with the language, the logical method as well as the philosophical discussion was ushered into *Jain* Literature, the discussion of this doctrine gathered strength in the passage of time. The details were then multiplied and rival current thoughts, arguments and proofs were also found a consistent place, with their original nature in the discussion of this doctrine.¹

In this golden philosophical age of Indian Philosophy, the Sage Gautama composed his *Nyāya Sūtra* in 200-450 A.D. According to Professor Dhruva, the Sage Kanāda composed his *Vaiśeṣikā Sūtra* in the first century B.C. and Bādarāyaṇa wrote his *Brahmasūtra* in the fourth century A.D. The *Sāṃkhya Sūtrā* was composed by Muni Kapila in 6-7 century. Īśvarakṛṣṇa composed his *Sāṃkhyakārikā* between the second and the fourth centuries A.D.

The Buddhists and the *Naiyāyikas* were considered pioneers in the field of logic. The Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna (300 A.D.) criticized *Nyāya-sūtra* and in turn Vātsyāyana (400 A.D.) gave the reply in his *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya*. The Buddhist Ācārya Dignāga (500 A.D.) criticized the views of Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara (600 A.D.) and gave the reply to the former in his *Nyāya Vārtika*. The Buddhist Ācārya Dharmakīrti in his *Nyāyabindu* refuted the views of Uddyotakara. The Buddhist ācārya Dharmottara, in his commentary on *Nyāyabindu* has strongly supported the views of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Vacaspati Misra (800 A.D.) in his *Nyāyavārtikatāt-paryatīkā* re-established the position of Uddyotakara by refuting the Buddhist criticism of the *Nyāya* doctrines.

¹ *Sanmati Tarka*. Ed. D. Malavania. Bombay, 1939, Introduction, p. 133.

The refutation and counter-refutation of the Buddhists and the *Naiyāyikas* went on with unabated zeal from the third upto the eight century A.D. This battle of arguments ushered in a new era of logic, when there prevailed conflicts between philosophies, the philosophers are prone to strengthen their respective position through refutation of others by means of logic, relegating the scripture to a secondary place of importance. A philosopher does not depend on the scriptures for the support of his views, but he requires logic in defence of his position.

From this time onward a very important period in the history of Jaina philosophy begins. In the words of Dr. S.C. Vidyabhusana, 'In this era of logic, there existed no systematic *Jain* treatise on logic, its principles being included in the works of metaphysics and religion. With the commencement of the historical period in 453 A.D. there grew up, among the *Jainas* in both the Śvetāmbara and Digambara sects, a band of scholars, who devoted themselves to the study of logic with great interest and enthusiasm.¹

It is during this golden age of Jain philosophy that we meet for the first time two great logicians namely, Siddhasena Divākara (a *śvetāmbara*) and Samantabhadra (a *Digambara*), who both belonged to 7th cent. A.D. and 7th & 8th Cent. A.D. By introducing a systematic study of logic, they laid the foundation of logic among the *Jaina*-s for the first time. Both of them were brilliant scholars, who acquired a great prominence in their epoch. Siddhasena Divākara's *Nyāyāvatāra* is the first treatise on Jain logic, composed in 32 *kārikās* (verses). It occupies a respectable position in Jain logic on account of its being a pioneer work on the subject. In *Nyāyāvatāra*, he says that,

*anekāntmatam vastugocharam sarvesam vidām,
eka desaviśistortho nayasya visayo mataḥ.*

¹ *Sanmati Tarka*. Ed. D. Malavania. Bombay, 1939, Introduction, p. 133.

It means, the omniscient can perceive the multi-dimensional nature of a reality, where as one stand point cognition is done through *naya*.¹

Sanmati Tarka is considered as the book of *anekāntavāda* and *nayavāda*. The word '*Anekānta*' does not appear in the *āgamas*. As per Ācārya Mahāprajña, the word was first used in the beginning of the age of philosophical writings. Probably, Siddhasena Divākara was the first to use it.²

*jeṇa viṇā logassa vavahāro savvahāṇa na nivvādaē,
tassa bhuvaneka guruṇo ṇamo anegaṇṭa vāyassa.*

He says, 'I salute *anekāntavāda* for without which even day to day transactions of society and family would not be managed.' In *Sanmati Tarka*, Siddhasena has introduced quite a number of non-Jaina problems, such as the problem of the causality, general and the particular, difference-cum-identity of attributes and modes, substance and modes etc. and finally established his own *anekāntika* point of view. His declaration was that, all the heretical doctrines combined together form the true *Jaina* doctrine of *syādvāda*, a synthetic and comprehensive view, is really very remarkable in the annals of the *Jaina* tradition. The following verse of Siddhasena shows the all-embracing range of doctrine of *anekānta*:

*bhayaṇā vi hu bhaivyaṇā jai bhayaṇā bhayaṇī savvādavvaem,
evam bhayaṇā ṇiyamo vi hoe samayāviroheṇa.*

As the doctrine of *anekānta* shows all possible sides of a thing and thus does not postulate about a thing in any fixed way, in the same way *anekānta* itself is also subject to this possibility of other side, that is to say, it also sometimes assumes the form

¹ *Nyāyāvatāra* of Siddhasena Divākara. Trans. Vijayamūrti Shāstrācārya. Agās: Shri Param Śruta Prabhāvak Mandal, 1976, *Kārikā*-29.

² *Sanmati Tarka* of Siddhasena Divākara. Ed. Pandit Sukhalal Sanghvi. L.D. Institute of Indology. Ahmedabad, 2000, 3.69.

of one-sidedness (*ekānta*).¹ Siddhasena admits that thus *anekānta* may also become *ekānta*, if it does not go with against the right view of things. Here I want to highlight the deep study of Siddhasena who expounded, first of all, that if we accept *anekānta* as the absolute theory of attaining truth of reality, then such a perspective is also (*ekāntic*) or one-sided view. But most of the scholars assert that this novel view was first of all predicted by Samantabhadra. From the historical point of view; we have to wipe out this mis-conception and give due credit to Siddhasena, which he deserves.

Samantabhadra also composed works like *Āpta Mīmāṃsā*, *Svayambhūstotra*, *Yuktyanusāsana* etc., where he elaborately discussed about the doctrine of *syādvāda*. In his *Āpta Mīmāṃsā*, in the course of his discussion of *Saptabhangi*, he has introduced quite a host of problems such as, *sat*, *asat*, *dvaita*, *advaita*, *ekatva*, *prthakatva*, *nityatva*, *anityatva*, *daiva*, *puruṣārtha* and others and applied *anekāntic* method of resolution to every philosophical problems.

Samantabhadra also wrote in *Samśkrta* language in tune with the view of Siddhasena. He said that *anekānta* is also *anekāntic*, i.e. non-absolutism is not the only way, through which we proceed in the direction of searching the truth, and absolutism is also a way. The verse goes as :

*anekāntopyanekāntḥ pramāṇa naya sadhanah,
anekāntḥ pramāṇātte tadekāntorpitānnayāt.*²

If *anekānta* is *anekānta* in the true sense, then there must not be any insistence that *anekānta* is the only way to realize the truth and there is no other way.

Then we come to the age of Mallavādin (end of 7th cent. A.D.), the commentator of *Sanmati Tarka*, who wrote an

¹ *Sanmati Tarka* of Siddhasena Divākara. *op.cit.*, gāthā-3.27

² *Svayambhustotra* of Ācārya Samantabhadra, 103.

independent text entitled "*Nayacakra*". In this text, it is said that by defeating Buddhism in a dispute, Logician Mallavādin re-established the Jaina faith. *Jinabhadra Gani* (7th or 8th cent. A.D.) is called as a great authority on the sacred literature of the *Jaina*-s. His text, *Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya* is considered as the encyclopedia of the Jaina views'. He almost followed the definition of *anekānta* as accepted by the Siddhasena. Here comes to an end the period of establishment of *anekānta*.

1.3 Jain Logic of the Period of *Pramāṇa Vyavasthā* (8th cent. - 17th cent. A.D.)

In the *Pramāṇa* age, the *Jain ācārya*-s acted as security guards in developing the earlier '*ācārya*-s' view regarding *anekānta*. In this period of the eighth century A.D., again we come to the two great exponents of Jaina philosophy, who tried to spread the *Jain* principles far and wide and thereby contributed much to the upliftment of the *Jain* religion. They are Ācārya Haribhadra (705-755 A.D.) and Akalaṃka (720-780 A.D.). They were most celebrated writers on *Jain* logic. Akalaṃka is called 'the crest gem in the circle of all logicians'. He wrote a commentary on *Tattvārtha Sūtra* named *Tattvārtharāṣṭvārtika*, while Haribhadra (7th cent. A.D.) is described as having protected the words of the *arhat* like a mother, by his 1400 works. Logic had gained a very important place during this era. Haribhadra and Akalaṃka devoted themselves to the study of *Jain* logic, they entered into the wide discussion with their opponents and thereby, they carried the *Jain* mission. Ācārya Haribhadra wrote a book, "*Anekānta Jaya Patakā*" for overcoming refutations made against *anekānta* by the non-*Jain* scholars. Ācārya Akalaṃka wrote a commentary on *Āpta Mīmāṃsā* named *Aṣṭasaṃhārī*, in which, he gave logical solutions to the Buddhist and other philosophical schools.

It is for the first time that we came across a very minute and scholarly description of the doctrine of *syādvāda*. The

important treatment of Indian philosophy in the *Saddarśanasamuccaya* of Haribhadra and its popularity among the scholars preserves the fame of Haribhadra even now. Moreover, he wrote *Anekānta Praveśa*, *Śāstravārtā Samuccaya*, *Sarvagyasiddhi* etc.

Afterwards, we come to the great logicians, Abhyadeva and Vidyānanda belonging to the early part of 9th cent. A.D., both the learned *Jaina*-s gave a very prominent place to logic (*Jaina Nyāya*) in the world of philosophy. Here we find a synthetic review of the *Sāṃkhya*, *Yoga*, *Vaiśeṣika*, *Advaita*, *Mīmāṃsā* and Buddhist philosophy. Vidyānanda in his works *Astasāhasrī* and *Śloka-vārtika* expounded the various logical principles of the *Jaina*-s, *syādvād*, *anekānta* etc. with the special criticism to non-*Jain* doctrines. Abhayadeva, on the other hand, is the author of a treatise on logic called *Vādamahārṇava* or 'the Ocean of Discussions' a commentary on the *Sanmati Tarka*. He is described as a lion, who roamed at ease in the wild forest of books on logic.

Coming to the twelfth century, we meet Mānikyanandi (9th cent. A.D.), Prabhāchandra, Vāḍideva (10th - 12th cent. A.D.) and Hemachandra (1088-1172 cent. A.D.) the well-known figures in *Jaina Literature*. Mānikyanandi wrote *Parīśamukha* and Prabhāchandra wrote *Prameya Kamal Mārtanda* and both of them tried to highlight the *pramāṇa*, *naya* and *anekānta*. Vāḍidevāchārya was a great debator and it is said that as a debator, he becomed to have no rival. To establish the doctrine of *syādvāda*, and *nayavāda*, he wrote *Pramāṇa-naya tattva-lokālankāra* and a voluminous exposition of it, called *Syādvādaratnākara*. Hemcandra is the most celebrated author in *Jainism*. He composed thirty two verses called *Anyayoga-vyavacchedikā*, a beautiful exposition of the six systems, in a very lucid and charming language. He also wrote *pramāṇa mimāṃsā*, which is considered as the landmarks on *Jain philosophical texts*. With him, there comes an end of *Pramāṇa Vyāvasthā* age.

1.4 *Anekāntavāda* from *Navya Nyāya* Period to Modern Age of Logic (From 17th cent. up to Modern age 2010)

Navya Nyāya period of Logic begins with the Gangeśa *Upādhyaṃya* (17th cent. A.D.). He gave birth to *Navya Nyāya* method. From that period onwards, all the philosophers rechecked their view in the context of *Navya Nyāya* method. But it is a matter of misfortune that no *Jaina Ācārya* before Yaśovijaya (1624-1688 cent. A.D.) looked upon this new method. Yaśovijaya, a man of extra-ordinary talent went to *Kāśī* for scriptural study and came back as a *pandita* of Indian philosophy. He then wrote more than one hundred works. He wrote *Jain* texts also in the light of *Navya Nyāya* method and tried to reply to the 'non-*Jain* philosophers' refutations, against *anekānta*. He wrote '*anekānta vyavastha*' and re-established this philosophy of *anekānta*. He wrote *Aṣṭa Sahasrī* and *Sāstravārtā* Sammurcaya's commentary in a new logic method and made both the old texts as modern. He wrote *Jaina Tarka-Bhāṣā*, *Gyān-Bindu* to enrich the treasure of *Pramāṇa* literature. *Nayavāda* is the basis of *anekānta* and on that he wrote *Naya Pradīpa*, *Naya Rahasya*, *Nayopadeśa* etc. In this period Vimaldāsa wrote, *Saptabhaṅgī Tarāṅgini* in the *Navya Nyāya* style to logically establish the theory of (15th cent. A.D) *syādvāda* and *anekānta*.

After this, in the eighteenth century, there begins the period of transition and decline in *Jaina* philosophy. When we try to trace out the histriosity of *anekānta*, the eighteen century and nineteenth century can be compared with the search of trees in the barren land in the absence of any work written on *anekānta*.

In the Modern age also *Jaina* scholars wrote many texts highlighting *anekānta* both in Hindi and in English Language. Although in this age, philosophers don't have to face any objections, still quite often the scholars are misled due to

insufficient knowledge of the *anekānta*. Even Śaṅkarāchārya and Dr. Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan considered *syādvāda* as probability or doubtful or indecisive doctrine. To remove such misconception or misunderstanding regarding the theory of *anekānta* Satkari Mukherjee wrote a comprehensive book named 'Non-absolutism'. B.K. Matilal wrote '*The Central Philosophy of Jainism: Anekāntavāda*'. Dalsukha Malvaniyaji wrote '*Āgam Yuga ka Jaina Darśan*' in which, he tried to trace-out the origin and development of *anekānta* after prolonged research. In this age, Sagarmal Jain also wrote books on *anekānta* and *syādvād*. Then Ācārya Tulsi (20th cent.A.D.) wrote *Jaina Siddhānta Dīpikā*, (translated as *Illuminator of Jaina Tenets*) and '*Bhikṣu Nyāya Karṇikā*' in which he elaborately discussed about *syādvāda*, *nayāvāda* in a very lucid *Samskṛta* language. Ācārya Mahāprajña (1920-2010 A.D.) wrote a series of books on *anekānta* and showed its relevance in the world of affairs. His works are namely, '*Anekānta : The Third Eye*', '*The Quest for Truth*', '*Anekānta : Reflections And Clarifications*', '*Anekānta : Views and Issues*', '*Jaina Darśana : Manan Aur Mīmāṃsā*', '*New Dimensions in Jaina Logic*', '*Jaina Darśana Aur Anekānta*', '*Ekānta Mein Anekānta : Anekānta Mein Ekānta*', '*Anekānta : Philosophy of Co-existence*, etc. These are considered research oriented books, wherein we can perceive the depth of *Jain* philosophical concepts. The speciality of his writing is that, he writes practical application of *anekānta* in all the spheres of life. Thus he tried to bring out the *anekānta* from the world of mere debates to the day-to-day application in life, which is the essence of Mahāvīra's teachings of *anekānta*.

1.5 Survey of the Four Periods

It can be observed here that the history of the development of the *anekāntavāda* passed through four periods.

The first period is the period of canonical literature, wherein we studied *naya* as the basis of *anekānta* and how

anekāntavāda in *vibhijyavāda* method is explored both by Mahāvīra and Lord Buddha. But Mahāvīra is asserted as the propounder of *anekānta*, because he used this method of *anekānta* in every dialogue, for attaining non-absolutist solutions to all the then current problems existing at that point of time.

The second period is dominated by Siddhasena, Samantabhadra and Mallavadin. The main current of this period was not the systematization of logical notions, but against the attack of absolutistic systems. The theories of *anekānta* and *naya* with their perspective of identity-cum-difference were defended with other systems, is the principle topic of discussion of this age.

The third period begins with Akalanika and lasts up to Vadidevasuri. It was necessitated by the attacks of Dignaga and Dharmakirti on the traditional notions of the sources of *anekānta*. All the systems were arranged logically just to reply the non-Jaina debate attacks. Hemachandra was the last philosopher, who contributed to, this period by reconciling the prevailing non-Jaina school of thoughts through the weapon of *anekānta* philosophy. After him, we can say that from the 12th century to 15th century, the Jaina philosophical world of literature had a dark period in the history of logical world in Jainism.

The fourth period is the contribution of Upadhyaya Yasovijaya (17th cent. A.D.). He interpreted the Jaina logic and philosophy in the *Navyanyāya* style and made it up to date. After him as far as my research goes, for two centuries (18th and 19th century) nobody seriously reflected on the theory of *anekāntavāda* and added something new in the world of philosophy. But from the 20th century again the new dimension, new paradigm shift took place in the world of philosophy. Many scholars started having mis-conception that *anekānta* and *syādvād* is the theory of probabilism, maybeism, skepticism and so forth. Moreover it is claimed that *anekānta* is merely a combination of all the heretic alien views and has nothing new

to contribute of its own as found in the writings of Surendra Das Gupta, Padbanabh Jaini, Satkari Mukherjee and so forth. In the 20th century, two great thinkers of the age, Ācārya Tulsī and Ācārya Mahāprajña again came with the deeper philosophical and pragmatic understanding of *anekānta*.

A series of books were written by them in a new style of interpretation of *anekānta*. Moreover questions raised by the scholars who were having ambiguity and inconsistency regarding the concept of *anekānta*, are resolved by them in a logical way. In the modern period in the world of research, the two works were presented in a book form on *Jaina Darshan Mein Anekāntavāda* by Ashok Kumar Jain and Manju Nahata with the specific topic of '*Anekāntavāda through Paintings*'. In the former work philosophical aspect of *anekānta* is dealt with and in the latter work, abstract concept of *anekānta* is expressed in a concrete way by means of skillful art and paintings. Along with this, seminars and conferences held on the topic of *anekāntavāda* in different places of India and abroad, the edited articles presented by the scholars in the respective seminars were compiled and published in the book form namely, '*Multi-Dimensional Application of Anekāntavāda*', '*Ahimsa, Anekānta and Jainism*', '*Factets of Jain Philosophy, Religion and Culture : Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda*'. All the four books, do touch upon more about the theoretical and very less about the practical aspect of *anekāntavāda*. So an independent endeavour has been made by me to present the applied philosophy of *anekānta*. After the brief discussion of origin and development of *anekānta* we will proceed further to have a brief introduction to metaphysical basis of *anekānta*.

II

Metaphysical Basis of *Anekānta*

2.1 Jain Concept of Reality : A Critical Study

The *Jaina* metaphysics is a realistic and relativistic pluralism. It is called *anekāntavāda* or the doctrine of the manyness of Reality.¹ Matter (*pudgala*) and spirit (*jīva*) are regarded as separate and independent Realities. There are innumerable material atoms and innumerable individual souls which are all separately and independently real. And each has got an infinite number of characteristics of its own². A thing possesses innumerable positive and negative characters. It is not possible for us, ordinary people, to know all the qualities of a thing. We can know only some qualities of some things. To know all the aspects of a thing is to become omniscient. Therefore the *Jaina*-s say that he who knows all the qualities of one thing, knows all the qualities of all things, and he who knows all the qualities of all things, knows all the qualities of one thing³. Human knowledge is necessarily relative and limited and so are all our judgments. Mahāvīra propounded that our conduct and behaviour are conditioned by our metaphysical speculation. The incentive for social change emerges from a deep and sound metaphysical theory, which requires proper

¹ Here the term, 'Reality', refers to the Jain concept of entities, objects, so a capital R is used throughout.

² *Anantadharmakam vastu. anantadharmātmakameva tattvam. Anyayoga*, p.22.

³ *Ācārāṅga Sūtra*. Ed. Yuvācārya Mishrimalji 'Madhukar'. With original Text, Hindi version, Notes, Annotation and Appendices. Beawar: Shri Āgam Prakashan Samiti, 1998, 3.74.

application of logic to experience. Samantabhadra, (2nd century A.D.) an ardent follower of Mahāvīra, argues that the conceptions of bondage and liberation, *punya* and *pāpa* (merits and demerits), heaven and hell, pleasure and pain and the like, lose all their relevance and significance if we exclusively recognize either permanence or momentariness as constituting the nature of substance.¹ The affirmation that the momentary disintegration of all things renders impossible such things as, financial transactions, memory, and the common-place relations of the husband and the wife, the teacher and the taught, and also indicates the subservience of ethical problems to the nature of being.

Mahāvīra differs from all absolutists in their approach to unfold the inner nature of reality. He weaves the fabric and structure of reality on the authority of indubitable experience and is not swayed in the least by the fascinations of a priori logic.² Mahāvīra evaluates what is given in experience, and consequently advocates change to be as much ontologically real as permanence. Both are separable, but only in logical thought. Being implies becoming and vice versa. Inconsistent as it may appear at the inception, there is no doubt that experience enforces it and logic confirms it. Mahāvīra adhered to the common experience and found no contradiction between permanence and change, both being free from all absolutism.

A thing has many characters and it exists independently. It is called substance (*dravya*). It persists in and through all attributes and modes. Substance is defined by Umasvati as *guṇaparyāyavad dravyam*, that which possesses qualities and modes³. Out of these innumerable qualities of a substance, some

¹ *Āpta Mīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra, *op.cit.*, verse-3.40.

² K.C. Sogani. *Ethical Doctrines in Jainism*. Solapur: Jain Saṃskṛta Saṃraśak Saṃga, 2001, p. 14.

³ *Tattvārtha Sūtra* of Umāsvāti. English trans. Nathmal Tatia under the title 'That Which is' With the Combined Commentaries of Umāsvāti, Pūjyapāda and Siddhasena Gaṇi. America: Collins Publications, 1994, *Sūtra*-5. 37

are permanent and essential, while others are changing and accidental. The former are called attributes (*guṇa*) and the latter modes (*paryāya*). Substance and attributes are inseparable because the latter are the permanent essence of the substance and cannot remain without it. Modes or modifications are changing and accidental. Jainism here becomes a 'theological means, between Brahmanism and Early Buddhism'. Brahmanism emphasizes the one, the permanent, the real; Early Buddhism emphasizes the many, the changing, the unreal; Jainism points out that both are the two sides of the same thing. Reality, therefore, is also defined as that which possesses the three characteristics of origination, destruction and permanence.¹ Substance has its unchanging essence and therefore is permanent. But it also has its changing modes and therefore is subject to origination and decay. To mistake any one-sided and partial view as the whole truth is to commit the fallacy of *ekāntavāda*. As Jainism takes into account all these partial views from respective perspectives, it is called *anekāntavāda*. *Anekānta* does not imply that the knowledge of one, who knows partial truth is an *aikāntika* and the knowledge of one who knows, the whole truth is *anekāntika*. The basis of *anekānta* is the triplicate nature (i.e. origination, cessation and permanence) of substance and not limited or unlimited to knowledge (i.e. *śrutajñāna* and *kevaljñāna*).

In this chapter effort is made to explain the concept of *sat* from the Jain perspective in detail with sufficient examples quoted by various *ācārya*-s of different time. A critical analysis of Reality can be seen throughout and it is depicted, how change is part and parcel of society based on this concept of trinity of Reality.

Jain philosophy has an important place in the domain of Indian philosophies. The concept of Reality occupies the foremost

¹ *Utpādavyayadhrauvyasamyuktam sat. Tattvārtha Sūtra-5.29.*

place in *Jain* metaphysics. It is metaphysical nature of Reality which acts as a foundational stone in explaining the basic concepts of *Jain* ethics, *Jain* theory of *karma*, *Jain* epistemology and *Jain* theory of *anekānta*. The essence of threefold nature of Reality, i.e., *utpāda*, *vyaya* and *dhrauvya*, is discussed in brief, but its contribution to the world of philosophy and to the world of affairs is taken into consideration to deal it elaborately. In my view, the concept of reality is very peculiar and unique in *Jain* philosophy. Now, let us see what actually *Jain* Reality is.

2.2 Definition of *Sat* (Reality)

The *Jain* philosophy's concept of (*sat*) Reality is different from the rest of the other schools of philosophies. The definition of Reality as given by Umāsvāti (3rd cent. A.D.) is as follows : *utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya-yuktam sat*.¹ Existence is characterized by origination, destruction and permanence. This conception of reality is peculiar in Jainism. An existing reality in order to maintain its permanence and continued existence must, necessarily undergo change in the form of origination and destruction. It seems to be paradoxical in the beginning. But a closer analysis and minute observation will help us to appreciate the significance of this description of reality. Without being clear about the definition of *utpāda*, *vyaya* etc. the understanding of *Jain* reality is incomplete. Let us proceed to define the trinity one by one.

2.3 Definition of *Utpāda* (Origination)

Umāsvāti defined the definition of *sat*, but did not define the definition of *utpāda*, *vyaya* etc. But later *ācāryas* pondered upon the definition of *utpāda*. Ācārya Akalaṃka

¹ *Tattvārtha Sūtra* of Umāsvāti. English trans. Nathmal Tatia under the title 'That Which is' With the Combined Commentaries of Umāsvāti. Pūjyapāda and Siddasena Gaṇi. America: Collins Publications, 1994, 5.30.

(8th cent. A.D.), the commentator of *Tattvārtha Rājavārtika* quotes *svajātyaparityāgena bhāvāntarāvāptirutpādaḥ*.¹ It means *utpāda* is nothing but a modification of a substance without giving up its own nature. With a slight difference, Ācārya Pūjyapāda Devanandī (9th cent. A.D.) defines *utpāda* or origination as :

*cetanasyācetanasya vā dravyasya svām jātīmajahat ubhayanimittavaśād bhāvāntrāvāptirutpādanamutpādaḥ mṛtpindasya ghataparyāyavat.*²

It means, the attainment of other modes by souls or other substances, by means of external and internal causes, without giving up their essential characteristics is called as *utpāda*. For instance, the production of a pitcher from clay.

2.4 Definition of Vyaya (Cessation)

According to Akalaṅka, *vyaya* is nothing but the disappearance of its form.³ Ācārya Pūjyapāda defines *vyaya* as, *tathā pūrvabhāvābhigamanam vyayaḥ yathā ghatotpattau piṇḍākṛteḥ*.⁴ It means, "The loss of the former mode is destruction. For instance, the loss of the lump shape of clay in the production of the pitcher."

2.5 The Definition of Dhrauvya (Permanence)

Ācārya Pūjyapāda defines *dhrauvya*, as there is neither annihilation nor origination of the inherent nature, it is permanent quality. That is, it is permanent. For instance, clay continues to exist in the lump form, in the pitcher and in its

¹ *Tattvārtharājavārtika* of Akalaṅka. Ed. Mahendra Kumar. Delhi: Bhāratiya Gyānapīṭha Prakasan, 2nd edn., 1999, p. 495.

² *Sarvārthasiddhi* of Pūjyapāda. Ed. Phool Chandra Shastri. Delhi: Bhārīya Jñānapeetha, 13th edn., 2005, 5.30, p. 229.

³ *Tattvārtharājavārtika* of Akalaṅka. *op.cit.*, p. 495.

⁴ *Sarvārthasiddhi* of Pūjyapāda. *op.cit.*, 5.30, p. 229.

broken parts. So, reality retains its essential nature in the midst of series of changes, which take place in it.

*anādi pariṇāmikasvabhāvena vyayodayābhāvād dhruvati sthīrībhāvatīti dhruvaḥ dhruvasya bhāvaḥ karma vā dhrauvyaṃ. yathā mṛtpiṇḍa-ghatādyavasthādsu mṛdādyanvāyāḥ.*¹

Thus existence is accompanied by origination, cessation and permanence. The three-fold nature of reality is so inter-related that we can't distinguish them from one another.

2.6 Inter-relation of *Utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya*

The nature of reality is characterized by origination, cessation and permanence. Ācārya Kundakunda (2nd cent. A.D.) deals with this concept of *tripadī* (*utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya*) by dividing it into two parts as : (i) *utpāda* and *vyaya* in relation to *pariyāya* (mode) and (ii) *dhrauvya* to *dravya* (substance).² Here Ācārya Kundakunda is explaining the identity cum difference nature of *dravya* and *pariyāya* on the basis of the *āgamic* view. There cannot be a substance without modes nor modes without a substance; they have a non-different state of relation.³

Here one objection can be raised as, in one and the same reality, there can't exist at a time two elements-permanence and impermanence, like cold and hot, because of being opposite to each other. For this reason, here there is a need to explain the nature of the principle of permanence of *Jain* philosophy in order to avoid the self-contradictory statement. Umāsvati defined the permanence as indestructibility of the essential nature of reality.⁴ Ācārya Pūjyapāda opines that the permanent nature of a substance should be taken from one point of view. If

¹ *Sarvārthasiddhi* of Pūjyapāda. *op.cit.*, 5.30, p. 229.

² *Pravacanasāra* of Kundakunda. Ed. A.N. Upadhye. Agāsa: Paramshruta Prabhavak Mandal, Rajachandra Jain Shastramala, (1st end., 1911), 4th edn., 1984, *gāthā*-18.

³ *Ibid*, *gāthā*-10.

⁴ *Tattvārthasutra* of Umāsvati. *op.cit.*, verse-5.31.

it is permanent from all points of view, then there can be no change at all; and in that case transmigration as well as a way to salvation would become meaningless. So the *tīrthaṅkara* Mahāvīra explained to understand the permanent, and impermanent nature of the reality from different viewpoints. In the *Bhagavatī Sūtra*, it is explained that the non-permanent part (*asthira*) of a reality changes, but the permanent (*sthira*) does not change.¹ Moreover, *tīrthaṅkara* Mahavira elaborated this idea and said, "Souls may be eternal and may be non-eternal at the same time. They are eternal from the substantial point of view and non-eternal from the modal point of view."² If one accepts identity-cum-difference in a reality from the two different standpoints, then no error can be traced by any other schools of philosophy.

2.7 Varieties of Examples Highlighting the Inter-relationship of Trinity

Jain ācāryas have cited different types of novel and living examples for showing the inter-relation of *utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya* nature of *śat*. The very common example of ancient time is of pitcher, clay, and mudness, which is already mentioned earlier as used by Kundakunda in his *Pravacanasāra* text, by Akalaṅka in *Tattvārtharājavārtika* and by Devanandi in his work of *Sarvārthasiddhi*. Ācārya Kundakunda of (2nd cent. A.D.) quotes the example of seed, sprout and treeness. In his text he cites an example :

*paryāyastūdpādavyayadhrauvyairālambyante utpāpa vyaya
dhrauvyānāme yeśadharmatvāt bījāṅkura pādapvat. yathā
kilāṅśinaḥ pādapasya bījāṅkurpādapatvalakṣṇāstrayoṇśā bhaṅgot-
pādadhrauvyalakṣaṇairātmadhārmairālamitaḥ samameva
pratibhānti.*³

¹ *Bhagavai*. Ed. Ācārya Mahāprajña. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati. Vol.- I, 2005, 2.1.2.

² *Bhagavai. op.cit.*, 7.2.36.

³ *Pravacanasāra* of Kundakunda. *op.cit.*, verse-2.9, p. 126.

Let us look at the seed of a plant. When the seed is planted in the soil, it must necessarily break the shell to sprout out. This is the first step in its attempt to grow. Then the sprouting seed further undergoes change and some portion of it, comes out seeking the sunlight and the other portion goes down into the soil, evolves and gradually undergoes enormous changes into the root system. Similarly, the portion that shoots up into the air and sunlight will also undergo enormous changes, of sprouting out in to tendrils and leaves, finally resulting in branches and the stem of the plant all of which are engaged in the task of producing nourishment with the help of sunlight. At every stage, we find change, the old leaves being shed off and the new shoots coming in. This is the general law of nature. The life of the seed never exterminates; it lives, even though it is being constantly changed, and this is what reality is. So, in a substance some modification originates and some other passes away, but the substantiality neither originates nor is destroyed.¹ He further exemplifies as follows,

*yathaiv chotpadyamānam pāṇdubhāven, vyayamānam
haritbhāvenāwatīṣṭhmānam
sahakārfalatvenotpādavyayadhrauvyanyekavastuparyāyadwāren
sahakārfalam...*²

It means, a mango in its unripened state is green in colour. As the process of ripening continues, it becomes yellow in colour. This shows the destruction of green colour and origination of yellow in the same fruit called mango, which shows its permanency.

Lord Mahavira never admitted the absolute expression of any concept as permanent or impermanent. *Bhagavāi* cites an example of *bāla*, from *vyavahāra* point of view, *bāla* means a

¹ *Pravacanasāra* of Kundakunda. *op.cit.*, verse-2.11.

² *Ibid*, verse-2.12, p. 131.

child, and from spiritual point of view, *bāla* means unrestrained being. He says:

*sāsaye bālaye, baliyattam asāsayam,
sāsaye paṇḍiye, paṇḍiyattam asāsayam.*¹

A man is *paṇḍita*, knower of scriptures, from *vyavahāra* point of view, and from spiritual point of view a restrained being i.e. when the modes of *bāla* originates, the modes of *paṇḍita* destroys still, the soulness remains permanent in both the modes.

Even Umāsvāti (3rd cent. A.D.) explains the inter-relation of trinity through the following verse as,

*siddhatvenotpādo vyayosya sansārbhāvato jñeyayḥ,
jīvatvena dhṛāuvyaṁ tritayayutam sarvamevaṁ tu.*²

When a mundane soul attains the state of siddhahood, there is origination of the siddhahood mode and the destruction of mundaneness mode, the permanent in both the stages is soulhood. Thus, trinity is proved.

Umāsvāti in his *Bhāṣya* cites an example of trinity. As elevation and depression of a balance occurs simultaneously. While one end of the beam of the balance raises, the other end falls at the same time; if one end falls, the other raises at the same moment; similarly, without cessation in the prior order, the posterior order cannot come into being. Therefore, both must be accepted to occur simultaneously.³

Umāsvāmi in his *Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra* cites an example of a man in anger and forgiveness supervenes. His angry soul is replaced by a forgiving one, i.e., the forgiving condition comes into existence, at the same time an anger goes

¹ *Bhagavatī*. Ed. Ācārya Mahāprajña. *op.cit.*, 1.9.440.

² *Sābhāṣya Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra* of Umāsvāti. Ed. Khubachandra. Agās: Shri Paramshruta Prabhāvak Mandal, 3rd edn., 1992, verse-5.30.

³ *Sābhāṣya Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra*. *op.cit.*, 5.30, p. 279.

out of existence; and all throughout the process, the soul continues to be the same. In *Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya*, Jinabhadraṅgi (5th cent. A.D.) explains *utpāda*, *vyaya* and *dhrauvya* in philosophical way as :

*nāṇassāvaraṇassa ya samayaṃ tamhā pagāsa-tamaso vā,
uppāya-vyaya-dhammā, taha neya savvabhavāṇaṃ.*¹

With the destruction of darkness, generally the origination of light is seen simultaneously, but the material atoms of both, the darkness and the light are permanent in both the stages. Likewise the destruction of knowledge covering *karma* and the origination of omniscience is simultaneous and still the soulhood is permanent.

In the same way, even Jinadasgaṅgi (6th cent. A.D.) in his *Daśvaikālika Cūṛṇī*, cites two examples of soul and matter. The birth in the human realm is caused due to the death in the heavenly realm, still the soulhood is eternal. Likewise the destruction of an atom and the origination of *dvipradeshi skandha* (an aggregate) and in both the cases, the matterhood remains as permanent.² Siddhasena Gaṅi (6th cent. A.D.) in his 'Sanmati Tarka' text gave a living example of trinity. He says,

*jo āauncaṇakālo so ceva pasāriyassa vi ṇa jutto,
tesim puṇa padivattī-vgame kālaṇtaraṃ ṇatthi.*

*uppajjamāṇakālaṃ uppaṇṇaṃ ti vigayaṃ vigacchataṇtaṃ,
daviyaṃ paṇṇavāyaṇto tikālavisaṃ viṣesei.*³

¹ *Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya* of Jinabhadra Gaṅi. Ed. Dalsukha Malavaniya and Becharadasji. Vol.-1. Lal Bhai Dalpatabhai. Ahmedabad: Bhāṛtīya Samskriti Vidyāmandir, 1968, verse-1340.

² *Āptamīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra. *op.cit.*, verse-3.60.

³ *Sanmati Tarka* of Siddhasena. Ed. Sukhalalji Sanghavi and Pandita Becharadasji. With a Critical Introduction and an Original Commentary. Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of Indology, (1st edn., 1939 A.D.), 2000, verse-3.36-37.

The finger is a thing when bent cannot remain erect and vice-versa. Straightness and crookedness of a thing take place simultaneously. The origination of 'straightness' (*saralatā paryāya*) means the destruction of crookedness (*vakratā paryāya*). They both are the results of one and the same action taking place at one and the same time. And at the same time 'finger' is permanent (*sthiti*) as a finger. This establishes the fact that trinity are *samakālina*, that is to say, they occur at one and the same time.

Now, contrary to that if we take only one *paryāya*, namely, crookedness (*vakratā*) or straightness (*saralatā*), we are able to accomodate a different time limit for each of the three *utpāda*, *sthiti*, and *nāśa*. When the finger ceases to be crooked and becomes straight, from that very moment *saralatā-paryāya* begins. *Vakratā paryāya* begins when the finger loses straight condition and assumes crookedness. And *sthiti sāmānya* remains in force from the moment it becomes straight upto the moment it loses straightness. Thus we are able to allot different moments for each of them.

Thus *utpāda*, *sthiti* and *nāśa*, all these three states of a reality is *bhinnakālina* (occurring at different intervals) or *ekakālina* (occurring simultaneously), at the same time. As we saw above, are themselves different, or one with the *dravya* of which they are the *dharmās* (properties). They are different because they are its constituents and they are not different also, because they don't claim a separate existence being all included in the *dravya*.

Malliṣena (10th cent. A.D.) says, we can experience the origination and cessation through an example of conch. When a white conch is perceived as yellow due to defective eyes and when our eye's defect is removed, again we get knowledge of white conch and knowledge of yellow conch disappears. In white conch, origination of yellow colour and cessation of the

same, and still the knowledge of white colour conch is prevailing in both the states of modes.¹

In our day-to-day affairs, we experience change in the form of origination and cessation in a substance and its permanent nature at one and the same time. Samantabhadra (8th cent. A.D.) cites an example as :

*ghatamaulisuvarṇārthī naśotpādaṣṭhitiṣvayaṃ,
śokapramodamādhyasthyaṃ jano yāti sahetukaṃ. 3.59*

Different psychological reactions are perceived in different individual persons at one and the same time, on the breaking up of a gold *kalaśa* (pot) and the making of a crown out of the same stuff. The man desiring the *kalaśa* is sorry over its destruction, the other man desiring for the crown is happy on its making, the third person desiring only gold, appears to be neutral. Thus, origination, cessation and persistence are identical in this respect, that they are in one and the same substance, but they are also different in the sense, that they give rise to different cognition. So it is clear that, the object is characterized by the three aspects, origination, cessation and persistence. Even Haribhadrāsuri² and Kumārila Bhatta, also has dealt with the problem of the three aspects of an entity by quoting the same example.

Samantabhadra tries to prove the triple nature of a reality through an example of milk also. He says :

*payovrato na dadhyati na payotti dadhivrataḥ,
agorasavrato nobhe tasmāt tattvaṃ trayātmakaṃ. 3.60*

It means, one person vowed to milk, does not eat curds; one vowed to curds, does not eat milk; one vowed to abstinence

¹ *Syādvād-Mañjarī* of Malliṣeṇa Sūri. Ed. Jagadish Chandra Jain. Agasa: Paramśruta Prabhavak Mandal, 1910, p. 198.

² Haribhadrāsuri, verse-478.

form cow products avoids both. Haribhadrāsuri also quoted the very same verse in his text.¹ Therefore, the entity is triple.

Another example is given by Malliṣeṇa in his commentary text *Syādvāda Mañjarī* that nails and hair although we cut, still they grow slowly, the nails are changing every moment. The origination of new nail and disappearance of the old nails goes on and on, still one accepts it, as the same nail. This sort of *pratyabhijñā* (recognition) can occur only in the triple nature of Reality.² Another living example is quoted by Malliṣeṇa as follows:

*na ca jīvādaḥ vastuni harṣāmarṣodasīnyadi,
paryāya paramparānubhavaḥ rasaladarūpaḥ,
kasyacid bādhakasyābhāvāt.*³

Likewise, we experience in our day-to-day life, the various modes of human emotions, namely, pleasure, anger and sadness and so forth. These modes are seen logically undeniable and unobjectionable, experienced in the same human being. Thus the three-fold nature of reality is proved.

This *Jain* theory of the of identity and change has been compared to the chemical change. In 1789, Lavoisier, an eminent scientist, propounded the theory of conservation of matter. According to this theory, matter is constant. Its modifications are only expressions. The modifications do not destroy matter, nor do they add to the quantity of matter. Just as the coal when burnt becomes ash, the matter is not altogether destroyed. It is only converted into ash and gases. The *Jains* have affirmed the same point when they say that in the modifications of *dravya*, the quantum of *dravya* does not change, it is eternal. It expresses itself in different forms.

¹ Haribhadrāsuri, verse-479.

² *Syādvād-Mañjarī* of Malliṣeṇa, *op.cit.*, p. 198.

³ *Ibid*, p. 198.

Therefore, *dravya* is constant in all its modifications.¹ The very same example is quoted by Pūjyapāda in his *Sarvārthasiddhi* text.² Thus, we see, the three-fold nature of reality meet together simultaneously in a single period of time. All the examples quoted above are very much related to our day-to-day life. Let us proceed to explain the possible transgressions occurring in the acceptance of absolute Origination, Cessation, Permanent nature of Reality.

2.8 Transgressions occurring in Acceptance of Absolute Origination of Reality

Kundakunda comments, those who assert mere origination, two-fold transgressions will occur in that case. Firstly, no origination of any sort of effect will take place and secondly, there will be chance of origination of unreal. In brief, if only origination is accepted and no destruction, then there will be lack of cause of origination. As a pot cannot originate as an effect, likewise all the objects of the world also will cease to originate. This is the first transgression. Secondly the possibility of origination of a reality which is impossible, will take place.³

2.9 Transgressions occurring in Acceptance of Absolute Cessation of Reality

Kundakunda says that those who assert mere cessation or destruction of Reality, two-fold transgressions may occur in that case. Firstly, there will be a lack of destruction at all, because the pot originates due to destruction of clay, i.e., if one accepts absolute destruction only, then lack of destruction will prove because destruction cannot take place bereft of origination. Secondly, the reality will cease. If mere destruction of soul

¹ Devendra Śāstrī. *A Source Book in Jain Philosophy*. English trans. T.G. Kalghatgi. Udaipur: Sri Tarak Guru Jain Granthalaya, (1st edn.) 1983, p. 58.

² *Sarvārthasiddhi* of Pūjyapāda. *op.cit.* 5.30, p. 230.

³ *Pravacanasāra* of Kundakunda, *op.cit.*, *gāthā*-8, p. 124. -

reality is asserted, then the knowledge, intuition- virtues of soul also will cease. In that case, there will not be any kind of retention at all.¹

2.10 Transgressions occurring in Acceptance of Absolute Destruction of Permanent Nature of Reality

Kundakunda says, those who assert absolute permanence or *dhrauvya* nature of Reality, two types of transgressions may occur. Firstly, modes will cease. If modes are destroyed, then reality bereft of modes cannot exist at all. So the occasion of destruction of Reality may occur. Secondly the permanent nature of reality converts as impermanent, if we accept the absolute destruction of *dhrauvya* nature of reality.²

As per Umāsvāti's *Sabhāśya Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra*, if we accept absolute permanent nature of a Reality like *Vedānta* philosophy, then soul will remain static in its own one inherent nature. No difference in its states will occur. In the absence of change in the states of soul, the difference of *samsāra* and *mokṣa* will never occur.

*utpādādiyute khalu vāstunyetadupapadyate sarvaṃ,
tadrahite tadabhāvāt sarvamapi na yujyate nītyā*³

If one considers this difference of *samsāra* and *mokṣa* as mere imaginary, then one has to accept the soul bereft of any sort of inherent nature of its own. Because *samsāra* and *mokṣa* are also the nature of soul. When we consider the soul's nature *samsāra* and *mokṣa* and its changing state as imaginary then, one is compelled to agree with the natureless and imaginary existence of the soul also. If one denies any nature of soul, and in the absence of its nature, one is bothered to accept non-existence of the soul itself.

¹ *Pravacanasāra* of Kundakunda. *op.cit.*, *gāthā*-8, p. 125.

² *Ibid. op.cit.*, *gāthā*-9, p. 125.

³ *Sabhāśya Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra* of Umāsvāti, *Sūtra. op.cit.*, 5.29, p. 278.

As quoted in the *Sanmatitarka* of Siddhasena Gaṇī (6th cent. A.D.) that,

*suha-dukkhasam̐paogo ṇa jujaye ṇiccavāya pakkhāmmi,
eghaṇṭucchedeyammi ya suha-dukuhaviyappaṇamajuttam.*¹

From the point of view of those, who hold that an entity is unchangeable, happiness and misery cannot stand; in the opinion of those who hold that things eternally change the idea of happiness and misery can never hold good. Moreover, Siddhasena continued to raise problems in the next stanzas that :

*kammam̐ joganimittam̐ bajjhe bandha-tṭhiē kasāyavasā,
aparīṇaucchiṇesu ya bandha-tṭhikāraṇam̐ natthi.
bandhammi apūraṇte saṃsārbhavogadansaṇam̐ mojjham,
bandham̐ va viṇā makkhasuhapatthanā natthi makkho ya.*²

It means, 'Action current' (yoga) attaches or binds a man through mind, speech and body. And it is through our passions (*kaṣāyas*), that this action-current binding a man takes its firm stand. But if we think that a thing is eternally unchangeable or when we think, the thing is born and in a moment decays, we can never account for the binding of an action or its continuance. If there is no binding by action current, then it will be a folly to desire the happiness of the liberation. In fact, then there cannot be any such thing as liberation at all.

Samantabhadra also quoted the very same idea against *ekantavāda* in *Āptamīmāṃsā* as :

*puṇyapāpakriyā na syāt pretyabhāvaḥ phalam̐ kṛtaḥ,
bandhamokṣau ca teṣāṃ na yeṣāṃ tvaṃ nāsti nāyakaḥ.*³

¹ *Sanmati Tarka* of Siddhasena, verse-1.18.

² *Sanmati Tarka* of Siddhasena. Ed. Sukhallaji Sanghavi and Pandita Becharadasji. *op.cit.* Introduction and an Original Commentary. Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of Indology, (1st edn., 1939 A.D.) 2000, verse-1.19-20.

³ *Āptamīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra. Ed. Saratchandra Ghoshal. With Introduction, Translation, Notes and Original Commentary in English. Delhi: Bhāratiya Jñānpīṭh, 2002, p. 3.40.

It means that, the person who accepts absolute eternal nature of a reality, there will be no possibility of virtuous or sinful acts. Then how can there be rebirth as fruition of the same. O Lord! Then you cannot establish bondage or liberation too.

Devanandī says, the *dhrauvya* nature of *nitya* (permanent) object is the cause of recognition. The remembrance that, this is the same thing I saw yesterday, is recognition. That does not occur accidentally. That which is the cause of such a statement is its intrinsic nature (*tadbhava*). *Tadbhava* is its existence. A thing is seen as having the same nature with which it was seen formerly. So it is recognized through the form, 'This is the same as that'. If it is considered that the old thing has completely disappeared and that an entirely new thing came into existence, then there will be no room for remembrance. And worldly relations which are based on it, would get disturbed. Therefore, the indestructibility of the essential nature of a substance is determined as permanence. But it should be taken from one point of view. If it is taken as permanent from all points of view, then there can be no change at all. And, in that case, transmigration as well as the way to salvation would become meaningless. Transmigration of the soul as a man and the liberation, i.e. the end of transmigration, would both be impossible.¹

Transgressions in Accepting Absolute Momentary Nature of Reality

Ācārya Samantabhadra discusses the transgressions occurring due to the acceptance of absolute momentary nature of *sat*. He says,

*kṣaṇikaikāntapakṣepi pretyabhāvādyasambhavaḥ,
pratyabhijñādyabhāvanna kāryārambhaḥ kutaḥ phalaṁ.*²

¹ *Sarvārthasiddhi* of Pūjyapāda. *op.cit.*, 5.31, p. 231.

² *Āptamīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra. *op.cit.*, *gatha*-3.41.

In the view of those who accept *kṣaṇaikānta* (absolute momentaryness), existence after death etc. is impossible. As there will be no *pratyābhijñā* (This is that only), this kind of recognition or memory etc., is impossible. There cannot be any beginning of any effect leading to any result. It means, if a man does not remember his previous experience, how will he act to satisfy his desire by doing necessary acts. One collects firewood, cooking pot, rice and water, wishing to cook food, without *pratyābhijñā* (recognition); this action (*kāryarambha*) can never take place, and the fruits of the act (*phala*) can consequently never happen. Another argument is preferred against the Buddhists in this verse.

*na hetuphala bhāvadiranyabhāvādananvayāt,
santānāntaravannaikaḥ santanastadvataḥ prthak.¹*

Here, Samantabhadra refutes the view of the Buddhist *kṣaṇaikavāda*, recognizing different moments and unconnected with one another, but taking rise one after another is untenable. Being different and unconnected, relationship of cause and effect cannot exist, as one cannot be like another *santāna* (write). Hemachandra (1088-1172) also raised many objections. He says :

*naikāntavāde sukhadukhabogau na punyapāpe na ca bandhamokṣau,
durnitivāda-vyasanāsinaiva, parairviluptaṁ jagadapyāśeṣam.²*

It means, if we accept the nature of *sat* (reality) as absolute eternal or absolute non-eternal, then we can't explain the experiences of pleasure and pain, merit and sin, bondage and liberation. The triple nature of *sat* if analyzed deeply, can explain obviously above mentioned questions or problems in a right perspective.

¹ *Āptamīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra. *op.cit.*, *gāthā*-3.43.

² *Syādvād-Maṇjarī* of Malliṣeṇa Sūri, *op.cit.*, *kārikā*-27.

2.11 Logical Analysis of Absolute Permanent and Absolute Momentary Nature of Reality

Hemachandra in his work *Anyayogavachedikā* quotes,
*kṛtaprāṇaśākṛtakarmabhogaḥ bhavapramokṣa-smṛtibhaṅgadoṣān,
upekṣya sāksāt kṣaṇabhaṅga-micchā-naho! mahāsāhasikaḥ paraste.*¹

If one accepts absolute momentary nature of *sat*, then it will lead to the fault of loss of deeds, the fault of enjoyment of deeds not done, the fault of ruin of becoming, the fault of ruin of liberation, the fault of ruin of memory. These faults obviously occur as established by experience.

The explicit order of the universe is fundamentally dependent upon the theory of change. If there would be no possibility or potency of change, then cause-effect relationship among the objects can never occur. All the schools of thought unanimously accept the essence of cause and effect in the universe. Most of the scientific researchs and experiments are based on the cause-effect principle. The philosophies like *vedāntins* who do not believe in the reality of modification or change have no answer to the question of how the universe originates out of absolute static reality. To answer this, they might have accepted the concept of *māya*. Accordingly it is *māya*, with the help of which, change takes place. In brief, to deny the concept of change is tantamount to the denial of the existence of the entire world of being.²

The denial of change will lead us to the unending questions and problems regarding the concept of *karma* theory, concept of *puruṣārthavāda*, the concept of inflow of *karma* (*āśrava*) and inhibition of *karma* (*Samvara*) and shedding of *karma* (*nirjarā*) etc., which will never occur. If everything in the

¹ *Syādvād-Mañjarī* of Malliṣeṇa Sūri, *op.cit.*, *kārikā*-18.

² *Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā* of Hemachandra. Ed. Sukhalalji Sanghavi and others. Ahmedabad: Saraswati Pustak Bhandar. Saraswati Oriental Series 'No.-1. 11nd edn., 1989, 1.1.32.

world of affairs would be static bereft of any sort of change, then, every object, which is present, will remain as it is. If we deny change, then cloths, things will remain new forever, which is contradictory to our human experience.

If a person accepts soul as permanent by its nature and doesn't accept any change in their nature, then there will be no fluctuations in the human emotions, no feeling of joy or sorrow, no transmigration of soul, from one realm to another realm. Neither rebirth nor pre-birth can take place. Human efforts will not work at all, the entire human race will never try to attain emancipation. Not only this but also the entire world's religious beliefs and practices and God worship will prove to be of futile effort.

2.12 Criterion of Reality

After an elaborate analysis of the nature of reality, the question arises what can be the logical criterion of reality? In the Indian system of thought, the following four doctrines are found to have determined as the criterion of reality, viz. (i) the doctrine of absolute permanence (*kevalanityatā* or *kūṭasthanityatā*), (ii) the doctrine of absolute impermanence (*kevala-anityatā*), (iii) the doctrine of absolute permanence and absolute change (*nityānityatā*) and (iv) the doctrine of permanence-in-change (*pariṇāmīnityatā*).

As the advocate of the doctrine of permanence-in-change, Jain philosophy speaks against the doctrine of absolute permanence and that of absolute impermanence and takes up the middle path of *pariṇāmīnityatā* (permanence-in-change) in the following manner. Devanandī (9th cent.A.D.) explains the same view with a slight difference.

*tatra paryāyarthikanayāpekṣayā parasparato
dravyāccārthāntarabhāvaḥ,
dravyārthika nayāpekṣayā
vyatirekñānupalabdheranarthāntarabhāvaḥ.¹*

¹ *Sarvārthasiddhi* of Pūjyapāda, *op.cit.*, 5.30, p. 230.

It means, from the point of view of modes, these three characteristics (origination) are mutually different from one another and are also different from the substance. From the point of view of substance, these three are not perceived separately. Mere origination does not exist; because that is without stability and departure; like the hair of a tortoise. Likewise, mere destruction does not exist, because it is without stability and origination. Likewise mere stability does not exist, because it is void of destruction and origination. So, an entity must have mutually respective origination, cessation, and permanence.¹

It was quite natural that in the beginning of the rise of philosophy, every school used to speak in support of its own doctrine and against the invalidity of those of others. But in the age of logic, the Indian scholars advanced the argument that the entity which is capable of performing a function (*arthakriyākārin*), can be only *sat* or reality and nothing else. The credit of advancing this logical criterion of *arthakriyākāritva*, (causal efficiency) goes to the Buddhist tradition. The word '*arthakriyā*' occurs in the early Buddhist work *Lalitavistara* in the sense of being useful to others without any metaphysical significance.

Hemachandra defines the *arthakriyākāritva* as the criterion of existence or being as the performance of certain specific action, or rather, existence, *arthakriyā sāmāthyāt, tallakṣaṇatvād vastunaḥ*.² It means that a certain effect has been produced in some way (causal efficiency) then it is called Reality.

According to *Jain* metaphysics, substance and its modes are not absolutely different like substance and its qualities of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* Philosophy and they are also not absolutely identical, one merging into the other and thus giving rise to

¹ *Syādvād-Mañjarī* of Malliṣeṇa Sūri, *op.cit.*, p. 130.

² *Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā* of Hemachandra, *op.cit.*, *sūtra*-31- 32, p. 25.

absolute eternalism of the *Vedānta* or absolute momentarism of the Buddhist system of thought. There exists a relation of identity-cum-difference between them.¹ One mode cannot be different from another because of the continuity of the same substance throughout its existence. This makes the psychical phenomena of recognition and memory possible to occur.²

Ācārya Hemacandra advanced the argument that, a Reality as conceived by the *Jains*, is capable of performing a function. This criterion of Reality can be applied to the concept of substance (*dravya*) of *Jain* Philosophy in its defence. According to Ācārya Hemacandra, *arthakriyākāritva* (causal efficiency) is the criterion of a reality.

2.13 *Arthakriyākāritva* as a Logical Criterion of Reality

Now, if there is any permanent Reality, there must be causal efficiency in it. If an entity is as absolutely permanent or absolutely non-permanent, then this characteristic does not really occur because according to the *Vaiśeṣika* view, that whose destruction never takes place, which is not produced and which always remains in the same form, is permanent. If this is the nature of Reality, then the question arises, the casual efficiency takes place in this permanent entity in succession or all at once, i.e., simultaneously. The reply to this is, there cannot occur causal efficiency in a permanent entity, because it is capable enough. For this reason, it cannot perform a function, which is going to take place in the second moment, and which is capable, does not make delay in performing a function, otherwise it cannot be called capable. If someone doubts that even being capable, an entity performs a function only on the association of its subsidiaries, then the incapability of a

¹ Akalaṅka's *Granthatrāya*, p. 48, *dravyaparyayaatmartho...*,
atyantabhedabhedau na tadvato.

² Akalaṅka's *Granthatrāya*. *atyantabhedabhedau na tadvato*, p. 48.

permanent entity is proved by this fact, because it is dependent on the assistance of others. The logical principle of the *Nyāya* is this, "that which depends on others is incapable".¹

So a permanent entity does not perform a function even simultaneously, for it is not found in experience that an entity performs at a time a function which is going to be performed in the entire life time, or if a permanent entity performs it even simultaneously, then what will it do at the second moment? If it is said that, it performs a function at the second moment also, then the defect, which comes in the case of performance of a function in succession will also come in this case. If it is argued that a permanent entity does not do anything at the second moment, then because of the absence of causal efficiency, a permanent entity will appear as a non-entity. Thus, there does not take place causal efficiency (*arthakriyākāritva*) in an absolutely permanent entity in succession and simultaneously (*kramākrama*). On the destruction of causal efficiency in reality, the existence of it, does not remain.² Like an absolutely permanent reality, it is not rational to regard reality as absolutely momentary, because a momentary nature is destructible at every moment. For this reason, it cannot perform a function either successively or simultaneously.

Therefore, it can be concluded that logical expression of *arthakriyākāritva* (causal efficiency) as the criterion of Reality is only possible in the case of a Reality, having a nature of permanent-cum-change as conceived in Jain Philosophy. That is to say, this criterion is only applicable to the concept of *sat* (reality) of *Jain* metaphysics. This *anekantic* nature of Reality

¹ *Syādvāda-Maṇjarī* of Malliṣeṇa Sūri, *op.cit.*, p. 30.

² *Ibid*, *op.cit.*, p. 32.

can perform any function either successively or simultaneously because of the causal efficiency being engrossed with in the very nature of an entity.¹ The reality according to the *Jain* philosopher, is a variable constant. It is being and non-being (becoming included), unity and plurality, (one and many) eternal and non-eternal, universal and the particular, rolled into one, as defined by Amrit Chandra in his *Ātmakhyāti*. If causal efficiency is the logical criterion of Reality, the real cannot be an absolute constant, nor can it be an absolute variable. It must be a variable constant. So *tīrthankara* Mahāvīra established the logical criterion of permanence-cum-change nature of Reality.

2.14 Relevancce of Permanent-cum-change Nature of Reality

He clearly said that cognitive concepts follow the law of relativity (*sāpekṣvāda*). Each proposition or statement is made with a certain purpose and in a certain context. So no one can claim the Reality as such either completely eternal or non-eternal. Jainism denies absolute existence or absolute non-existence, absolute permanence or absolute impermanence, absolute being or absolute non-being and defends non-absolutism. An object has two fundamental aspects eternal and non-eternal. It is permanent with respect to its essential substance and impermanent with respect to the modes through which it is ceaselessly passing. The doctrine of non-absolutism finds no contradiction in a Reality, being both permanent and impermanent. To understand this, the problem of change, which has received the keen attention of all Indian thinkers is analysed. There are two fundamental and opposite views of Reality: (1) only what is eternal and unchanging is real, and (2) only

¹ Mahāprajña, Ācārya. *Jain Darśana: Manan Aur Mīmāṃsā*. Ed. Muni Dulharaj. Churu: Ādarśa Sahitya Sanga Publication, 2008, p. 280.

what is incessantly changing is called real. The former is called the philosophy of Being and the latter the philosophy of becoming. In the former change is considered as absolutely unreal, like the doctrine of an abiding entity as that of the *vedānta* tradition, which believes that change is only an illusion emanating from the eternal unchanging Brahman. While in the latter, it is only the modes, that are real as accepted in the Buddhist philosophy. Other traditions fall somewhere in between these two extremes, such as the Sāṃkhya-yoga tradition in which, the eternal substance the soul, is absolutely constant while the primordial matter changes.

The Jaina philosophy is distinct from these theories because the eternal substance and the changing modes are viewed as real and integral. It is not that the modes alone are subject to change, while the eternal substance is also liable to change, though not to absolute cessation and disappearance like the modes. The substance is renewed as the modes of change. Change can occur in both the entity and the attribute,¹ which is very important aspect of *Jain* metaphysics. Transformation is defined as “the continuity of one’s own nature through change”.² The concept of mode is related to the concept of change. Substance and mode are the issues, which have been widely discussed in the field of philosophy under the names of Being and Becoming. According to *Bhagavati Sūtra* and *Pannavaṇā Sūtra* substance is being, permanent, identical and universal, mode is becoming, impermanent, different and particular. *Bhagavati Sūtra* clearly cites that reality manifests in two forms i.e. substance and mode. It doesn't mean that Reality

¹ *Illuminator of Jaina Tenets* of Ācārya Tulsī. Ed. Nathmal Tatia. *sūtrā*-1.40, p. 23.

² *Tattvārtha Sūtrā*. *op.cit.*, 5.41.

is divided. It is, infact one but observer perceives it in two forms. Siddhasena Gaṇi supporting the scriptural view in his commentary on *Tattvārtha Sūtra* says, "ontologically substance and mode are inseparable. The distinction of the two is only a mental projection."¹

2.14.1 Change as Indivisible Nature of Reality

Nature is a good example of the *tripadi*. We live in nature and enjoy natural scenes and utilize the existing objects of the nature. Nature is constituted of living and non-living, non-corporeal and corporeal, fine and gross are characterized by the three aspects of Reality, viz. origination, cessation and permanence. So Reality is the substratum of all these three potent factors.² The river upholds the nature of Reality. Every moment fresh water is entering in it and earlier water is converted into the clouds, still we call the same river *Gangā*, *Brahmaputra* etc. Moreover each and every wave seldom originates and is destroyed, still sustenance of waves is seen clearly. Let me give the example of plants and trees. The tree originates from seeds and by their very nature produces fruits and flowers and the tree extincts as per its own life span duration, still the nature of giving fruits and flowers of trees never ceases.

Suppose if we deny change in the nature of reality, which has remained a debatable issue for the scholars of past and present age too. In our day-to-day life, we observe that change is the part and parcel of every object. Denial of change means denial of infinite possibilities. Denial of origination and cessation can give raise to many questions, which can't be

¹ *Ibid. op.cit.*, verse-5.31; *Sarvārthasiddhi. op.cit.*, p. 394.

² *Pravachana Sāra* of Kundakunda. *op.cit.*, 2.10.

answerable by anyone.¹ Take for an instance, if we consider nothing will destroy in the world, which is contradictory to our regular experience. Seeds will remain as seeds it will never sprout, milk will remain as milk, it will not convert into curd or butter, living beings will remain in the same realm instead of transmigration etc. The entire theory of Jain *karma* will come to an end. No new production of all kinds of food-grains, different qualities of cloths will take place. There will be no amendments in armaments, business, technological advancements and no ups and downs in the rates of products in market, no change in the intake of food items, no change in the fashion of writing in Magazines, Newspapers and other new publications, no change in the fashion of dresses and hair style, life style, no change in the behavior and conduct of men and women, no change in law, no change in the syllabus of education, no change in government rules, and so forth. Thus unending life-oriented questions would arise which can't be answered in the absence of the acceptance of concept of change-cum-permanence. Moreover if we don't accept something permanent in midst of continuous change then following inconsistency in day-to-day life can occur. For instance, the production of honey goes on, in between many honey bees take birth and die, side by side, still production does not stop, it continues. Poems written on nature by writers like William Wordsworth, Rabindranath Tagore are no more, new poets are emerging with the modern style of composing poems, still the tradition of poetry writing goes on and on. The literature work written by various writers in ancient period and in modern period is radically different. This can be

¹ Ācārya Mahāprajā. *Anekānta Hein Tisrā Netra*. Ladnun: Tulsi Adhyātma Needam, 1982, p. 78.

located by reading original texts and today's writings and novels. The methodology of writing prose, poetry, articles, dramas, stories etc. is same, but the fashion of writing has been changed drastically. Thus change is experienced in all walks of life. The change is not only occurring in the external world of affairs but actually occurring within the individual and the change in individual reflects in the society. Anekāntic perspective is nothing but a perspective dedicated to the search of truth. Without understanding the concept of anekanta, and the world of modes as infinite, one cannot realize the permanent-cum-change nature of Reality. The entire human efforts, hard work, around progress, all imaginations and plans are actualised due to the acceptance of infinite possibilities inherited within the nature of Reality and that is exactly not possible without applying the *anekantic* perspective.

III

Epiestemological Analysis of *Anekāntavāda*

3.1 Concept of *Anekānta*

The theory of *Anekānta* with its corollaries of *nayavāda* and *syādvāda* serves a complete and exhaustive philosophy of life. *Anekānta* is the heart of *Jain* metaphysics and *nayavāda* and *syādvāda* are its main arteries or to use a happier metaphor, the bird of *anekāntavāda* flies on its two wings of *nayavāda* and *syādvāda* in the words of Y.J. Padmarajiah.¹ So far as the relationship of three theories is concerned, all these are interconnected. The precedent is the result of the antecedent one. In the absence of the concept of *naya*, the theory of *anekānta* couldn't have emerged. It is *naya* on the basis of which the theory of *anekānta* came into being.² *Syādvāda* came into being when the question of logical expression of innumerable or infinite modifications and attributes of reality arose.³

Anekānta is a form of knowledge and *anekāntika* substance is the object of knowledge. The basis of *anekānta* is the nature of reality (*sat*) or substance. The nature of the substance in itself is permanent and temporary. It does not make any difference, if it is known by an ordinary man or an omniscient. The only difference is that a common man knows it through the

¹ Y.J. Padmarajiah. *Anekāntavāda, Nayavāda and Syādvāda*. Ed. Shreechand Rampuria. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bhāratī Institute, 1996, p. 85.

² *Nayacakra* of Māiladhavala. Ed. Kailāśchandra Shastri. Varanasi: Bhāratīya Jñānpīṭha Publication, 1971, *gatha*-175.

³ M.R. Galera. *Jain Vidya Aur Vigyan*. Eds. Sadhvi Rajīmāti, Samani Mangalprajña. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati Institute, 2005, p. 139.

sensuous knowledge whereas the omniscient knows it through the direct knowledge. The theory of *anekānta* is of universal application. Substance cannot exist without mode; therefore it applies to substance; mode cannot exist without substance; therefore it applies to mode. The transcendental existence and empirical existence are not absolutely separate in the *Jain* philosophy.¹ The mode is empirical existence and the substance is transcendental existence; but they are inseparably joined together. Both of them are two aspects of the same existence and therefore, they cannot be conceived of as absolutely independent.

If existence is to be propounded even by an omniscient, he will have to use *syādvāda* and *saptabhaṅgī* as similar is the case with an ordinary man. When substance in itself is permanent and temporary, how can the omniscient express it in absolute terms? He will have to use the language of *syādvāda*. For example, substance is relatively (i.e. with respect to a particular point of view) permanent and relatively temporary. So the acceptance of truth having multiple facets, partial perception of truth due to limitations of the observer, incomplete description of truth due to limitations of expression, and recognizing the equal possibility of different view points to be true is in brief, is the theory of *anekāntavāda*. This theory spontaneously drive a Jaina, away from extremism, radicalism, and fanaticism. It is discussed in the present chapter, how *anekāntavāda* (the theory of non-absolutism), manifests itself as the most consistent form of realism in Indian philosophy. It would be contextually relevant to briefly touch upon the meaning of *anekānta*, the need of *anekānta* and the inter-relation of *anekāntavāda*, *nayavāda* and *syādvāda*, which together reveal the functional dynamics of *anekāntavāda*.

¹ *Pancāstikāyasāra* of Kundakunda, *op.cit.*, verse-13.

3.1.1 Meaning of the Term *Anekānta*

The term '*anekānta*' is lexically a negative term, but substantially it is not negative. *Anekānta* conveys the relativity of substance and mode. In simple terms, *anekānta* is nothing but a multi dimensional view. The approach which takes cognizance of both the identity and difference, that exist among the *utpāda*, (origination), *vyaya*, (cessation), *dhrauvya* (persistence).¹ It is not possible to have existence of only substance or only mode.² That is to say, substance and mode cannot exist without each other. The very nature of reality being *anekānta*, the term '*ekanta*' cannot be used to comprehend it. The word '*aneka*' does not mean 'indefinite' or 'infinite' but it means more than one as per Acharya Shri Mahaprajña.³ Reality is having three characteristics. '*Aneka*' does not mean indefinite, it does not designate only infinity of modes, it does not mean only 'infinite modes' are successive attributes. Infinite modes are not possible in a single substance simultaneously as they do not originate simultaneously.⁴ Now the background under which the necessity of *anekānta* emerged will be discussed.

3.1.2 Need of *Anekānta*

The Reality (*sat*) or the substance (*dravya*) is an object of knowledge. *Naya*, *anekānta* and *syādvāda* are essential forms of the knowledge, and are the means to know it, sometimes part by part. The attempt to know the same reality through various propensities forms the basis of *nayavāda*, *anekāntavāda* and *syādvāda*. The doctrine of *naya* is the process of knowing the Reality part by part. From the point of substantial *naya*, the

¹ *Jaina Pāribhāṣika Śabdakośa: Dictionary of Technical Terms of Jainism* (English Version) Ed. Yuvacharya Mahashramanna. Ladnun: J.V.B. and J.V.B.U., 2009. p. 25, *Sanmati Tarka Prakarana* of Siddhasena, 1.13.14.

² *Sanmati Tarka Prakarana* of Siddhasena, *op.cit.*, 1.12.

³ Ācārya Mahaprajña. *Anekānta: Reflections and Clarifications*. *op.cit.*, p. 10.

⁴ *Tattvārtha Sūtra* of Umāsvāti. *op.cit.*, verse-5.38.

substances is a real object, the mode is an unreal object. From the point of modal *naya*, it is vice versa.¹

The substantial *naya* is the standpoint to comprehend the substance; the mode does not fall in its domain, but it does not mean that it denies the mode. Therefore, though *aikāntika*, such standpoint is valid point of view (*naya*). If the substantial standpoint denies the mode, it would become invalid (*durnaya*).² Similarly the modal point of view comprehends the mode, but it does not deny the substance. Therefore, though partial, it is valid view-point (*naya*). If it denies the substance, being absolutely *aikāntika*, would become invalid. The non-relative one-sided view has created many problems in the field of philosophical thought. The theory of *anekānta* provides a solution to those problems.³ If substantial or modal *nayas* were to be non-relative, *anekānta* would not have arisen. The reality has an innate capacity of changing and change is thus an essential component of Reality. Permanence and change cannot be separated totally, they cannot exist independently. It is to deny their independence that non-absolutism arose. The non-absolutist realism of the *Jains* neither endorses absolute eternalism nor absolute fluxism, but explains both these extremes as real with reference to different aspects of the same Reality. Now let us proceed to their infinite possibilities in a Reality.

3.1.3 Reality Open to Infinite Possibilities

The substance is *anekāntika*. It has two meanings : the first meaning is, it is of triplicate nature of origination, cessation and permanence. Therefore, it can be said as *anekāntika*. The

¹ *Davvatthiyavattavaṃ avatthu niyamena pajjavan ayassa taha pajjavatthu avattumeva davvatthi yavayassa. Sanmati Tarka. op.cit., verse-1.10.*

² *Jaha ee taha anne patteyam dunnaya naya save. handi hu mūlanayāṇāṃ pannavane vavada te vi. Sanmati Tarka. verse-1.15.*

³ *Ācārya Mahāprajña. Anekānta: Reflections and Clarifications. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati Institute, 2001, p. 11.*

second meaning is that the substance has many innumerable or infinite modifications; therefore it has infinite attributes.

Modifications have two varieties : the intrinsic modifications (*arthaparyāya*) and the visible modifications (*vyañjana paryāya*). The intrinsic modifications are subtle; they change with the minutest unit of time (*samaya*, the smallest unit of time, which is further indivisible). This change has twelve stages.¹

The subtle modifications cannot be known through the senses. They are the object of super-sensuous consciousness. The visible modifications are gross. They manifest themselves and, therefore, can be known through the senses also. It is in the case of these gross modifications, that we can think of both, the possible and the probable. A colour can change into another colour, a smell into another smell, a taste into another taste, and a touch into another touch. Yati Bhoja has described two types of potentialities—the potentiality, which can be actualized at a distant time (*oghaśakti*) and the potentiality, which can be immediately actualized (*samucitāśakti*). The former is the mediate cause, while the latter is the immediate cause of change. Grass has the potentiality of becoming ghee at a distant future. Curd can change into ghee immediately. The potentialities are too many to be enumerated. Theoretically, it could be said that potentialities of an object are innumerable as far as the mediate form of potentiality is concerned.² A scientist through his research can know a few of these. A person, with the power of super-sensuous knowledge can know them through super-sensuous knowledge. An ordinary man can, however, know only the immediate cause or the visible modifications. We

¹ *Nayacakra* of Māiladhavala. Ed. Kailāśchandra Śāstrī. Varanasi: Bhāratiya Jñān Pīṭha Publication, 2000, p. 211.

² *Dravyānuyoga Tarkaṇā* of Shrimad Bhojaka. Ed. Shrimad Rajchandra. With Hindi translation by *Ṭākurprasādaji*. Gujarat: Shri Paramśruta Prabhāvak Maṇḍal, 1977, verse-6, 7.

therefore, cannot put any limitation on the possibilities or probabilities. All of man's hardwork, courage, progress, creativity and plans are based on possibilities and these possibilities cannot be accepted without the perspective of *anekānta*. Now the two wings of *anekānta* i.e., *syādvāda* and *nayavāda* will be discussed briefly.

3.2 The Doctrine of Conditional Dialectics (*Syādvāda*) and Sevenfold Predication (*Saptabhaṅgī*)

The expression *syādvāda* (conditional dialectics) is composed of two words, viz., '*syād*' and '*vāda*'. '*Syād*' is an indeclinable that appears like a verbal form in the potential mood. It stands for multiplicity, obligation, reasoning etc.¹ But in the present context, it stands for multiplicity or multiple character (*anekānta*).² The term is also used to denote particular space and time.³ The word *syāt* in the expression *syādvāda*, has not been used to mean doubt. It is used to denote multiple characters (*anekānta*). The implication is, that *syādvāda* is the doctrine of multiple characters. The non-absolutistic estimation is definite in its character and free from all doubts as indicated by the expression '*syād*', which is absolutely free from any kind of association, direct or indirect, with the verbal form '*syād*' used in the potential mood of Sanskrit conjugation of verbal root.⁴

¹ Mahāprajña. *Anekānta: Views and Issues*. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bhārati Institute, 2001, p. 26.

² *Tattvārthavārtik tīkā*, 4.42. *sa ca linanta pratirūpako nipātaḥ tasyānekānta-vidhivicārādiṣu bahuṣvartheṣu sambhavastu iha vivakṣāvaśāt anekāntārtho grhyate.*

³ *Kaṣāyapāhuḍa* of Gunadharacarya. Part-I. Eds. Phoolchandra Siddhant Shastri, Mahendra Kumar Nyayacarya, Kailāśchandra Shastri, Mathura. The All India Digambara Jaina Sangha, 1974, p. 370.

⁴ *Tattvārtha Vārtika* 1.6.
Syādvādo niścītārthaḥ apekṣitayāthātathyavastuvādivāt.

Thus 'syād' term is the indicator of the relativity of the language.¹

The word 'syāt' is necessary for the affirmation of the desired attribute by the exclusion of the undesired one. And this is why all the propositions, in order to be precise in meaning, should be accompanied by the use of the word 'syāt'. The proposition without such expressive use of 'syāt'² should be understood to have that word implicitly. Thus the word 'syāt' has a double implication :

1. Negation without affirmation or affirmation without negation is not possible.
2. The generic attribute (continuity or the universal) and the specific attribute (origination, cessation or the particular), both these are relative. We never experience cessation without continuity or the latter without the former.³

The nature of a Reality or object is not omnigenous and so it exists in its own nature and does not exist in the nature of alien things,⁴ or, to be more exact, a real thing exists in its present modes and does not exist in its modes that have passed away or will come in the future. The cycle of origination and cessation goes on uninterrupted. The mode that arises, is the affirmation, whereas the mode that has passed away or is yet to arise, is the negation of the object. Affirmation and negation are thus simultaneous moments of the Reality.

¹ Mahāprajña. *Ekānt Mein Anekānta: Anekānta Mein Ekānt* Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bhārati Institute, 2001, p. 228.

² *Nyāyakumudachandra*. Ed. Mahendra Kumar Nyāyaśāstrī. Bombay: Mānikachandra Digambara Jain Granthmālā, 1938. part-II, p. 694. *Syātkāramanteraṇa iṣṭāniṣṭayorvidhiniṣedhānupapatteḥ*.

³ Acharya Mahāprajña. *Anekānta: View and Issues*. *op.cit.*, p. 26.

⁴ *Saptabhaṅgī Taranginī* of Vimaldās. With the Hindi trans. Ṭākhurprasād Sharma. Gujarat: Shri Paramaśruta Prabhāvaka Maṇḍal, 1977, p. 11.

There is no contradiction between the positum and negatum. This is the implication or pre-supposition of the doctrine of conditional dialectics (*syādvāda*). The duality of apparently contrary attributes enjoys mutual concomitance. It is on this finding that the doctrine of non-absolutism (*anekāntavāda*) as a synthesis of infinite number of such dualities is established. The conditional dialectic (*syādvāda*) is, in essence, the system of propositions expressing such multiple character of the Reality.

3.2.1 *Saptabhaṅgī*

The *saptabhaṅgī* (the theory of seven-fold predication) is a method of cognition to apprehend the correct nature of Reality through a sevenfold relative dialectic method. It is treated as complementary to the *syādvāda* doctrine. Akalaṅka thinks of it as a way, which considers the modes of a thing in positive (*vidhimukhena*) and negative (*niṣedhamukhena*) manner without incompatibility in a certain context. In these propositions affirmation, negation, and such other alternatives define the nature of the Reality. This can be demonstrated by the doctrine of seven fold predication (*saptabhaṅgī*) which is as follows¹ :

1. The X certainly (*eva*) exists in some respect (*syāt*).
2. The X certainly (*eva*) does not exist in some respect (*syāt*).
3. The X certainly (*eva*) exists and does not exist in some respect (*syāt*).
4. The X is certainly (*eva*) indescribable in some respect.
5. The X certainly (*eva*) exists and is indescribable in some respect (*syāt*).
6. The X certainly (*eva*) does not exist and is indescribable in some respect (*syāt*).
7. The X certainly (*eva*) exists, certainly does not exist and is indescribable in some respect (*syāt*).

¹ *Saptabhaṅgi Tarāṅginī* of Vimaldas. *op.cit.*, p. 2.

The first *avayava* (standpoint) means that X exists from the viewpoint of its 'own nature'. X exists as X. The second means that X does not exist from the viewpoint of 'foreign nature'. X does not exist as other than X. The third predicates of X, both existence and non-existence in succession. This *avayava* is a compound of the first and the second. It is not simple and primary. The fourth means that both existence and non-existence cannot be predicated of X simultaneously, due to that the limitation of language. But it does not mean that they are not present in X simultaneously. The fifth is a compound one combining the first and the fourth, the sixth is a compound one combining the second and the fourth, and the seventh is a compound one combining the first, the second and the fourth. These seven *avayavas* exhaust all the mathematical possibilities with regard to one character.

The expression 'certainly' (*eva*) in the above propositions indicates the definite character of the assertion or the negation or indescribability or their possible combinations.¹ Sometimes it is suggested that the expression 'also' (*api*) should be substituted for the intended attributes (existence, non-existence, etc.) would not be definitely determined. In the absence of relativism indicated by the phrase 'in some respect' (*syāt*), the use of the expression '*eva*' (certainly) would confer an absolutistic import on the propositions. But by the use of the word '*syāt*' (in some respect) indicative of relativism, the expression 'certainly' (*eva*) loses the absolutistic import and confirms definiteness on the intended attributed predicate in the propositions. For this reason, Ācārya Samantabhadra says that the word '*syāt*' is a symbol of truth.² And therefore, the Jain Ācāryā-s say that in some cases of predications, even if the term, the '*syāt*' is not used, it is to be considered as implicit in the predication.³

¹ *Saptabhaṅgi Taraṅgīnī* of Vimaldas, *op.cit.*, p. 21.

² *Syātākāraḥ satyalakṣaṇaḥ*.

³ *Laghiyastraya* of Akalanka. Ed. Kailashchandra Shastri. Varanasi: Shri Ganesh Varni Dig. Jaina Sansthan, 2002, *śloka*-22.

Syādvāda is the expression of the pictures of Reality obtained from different points of view in definite and determinate logical predications. It expresses a protest against one-sided, narrow, dogmatic and fanatical approach to the problem of reality. It presents a comprehensive and a synoptic picture of reality with particular points of view, of the different characteristics like the permanence and impermanence, similarity and difference, explicable and inexplicable, Reality and appearance.¹ Thus *syādvāda* is the expression of the *anekāntavāda* in logical and predication form.²

3.2.2 Applications of *Anekānta* in Metaphysics

Anekānta is a form of knowledge and *anekāntika* substance is the object of knowledge. The basis of *anekānta* is the nature of reality (*sat*) or substance. The nature of the substance in itself is permanent and temporary. It does not make any difference if it is known by an ordinary man or an omniscient. The only difference is that a common man knows it through the sensuous knowledge whereas the omniscient knows it through the direct knowledge. The theory of *anekānta* is of universal application. Substance cannot exist without mode; therefore it applies to substance; mode cannot exist without substance; therefore it applies to mode. The transcendental existence and empirical existence are not absolutely separate in the *Jain* philosophy. The mode is empirical existence and the substance is transcendental existence; but they are inseparably joined together. Both of them are two aspects of the same existence and therefore, they cannot be conceived of as absolutely independent.

If existence is to be propounded even by an omniscient, he will have to use *syādvāda* and *saptabhaṅgī* as similar is the case with an ordinary man. When substance in itself is

¹ Hemachandrācārya. *Anyayogavyavachedikā*, śloka-25.

² *Laghīyastraya* of Akalaṁka. *op.cit.*, śloka-62.

permanent and temporary, how can the omniscient express it in absolute terms? He will have to use the language of *syādvāda*. For example substance is relatively (i.e. with respect to a particular point of view) permanent and relatively temporary from different point of view.

3.2.3 The Conceptual Analysis of Philosophy of Co-existence

Anekānta took birth on the basis of inter-dependence of two *nayas* i.e. substantial and modal viewpoint. *Syādvāda* expresses that very inter-dependence. *Anekānta* has two aspects : permanent and temporary, existence and non-existence, general and particular, one and many, expressible and inexpressible. In this case, *sāśvata* and *asāśvata*, in ordinary or commonsense knowledge, refer to one logical subject. We do not start with a sort of Cartesian dualism. To do so would be to raise the dust and then complaining the invisibility. It is the *jīva-ajīva* independent existence that appears as the subject, which is logical and epistemological. Now how could this one subject be attributed with the contradictory predicates, *sāśvata* and *asāśvata*? Jain thinkers say that in the phenomenological world of objects, the law of contradiction as law of either thought or things cannot be sustained. Object can only differ from each other. So, no *logical* predicate or epistemological attribute can exclude the other by applying a law of contradiction and excluded middle.

In this context, the absolute view regarding the substance and mode is not reasonable, as both are inter-related to each other. To regard one as true and another as untrue is as meaningless as to breath without air. Substance is the uniting force through which paradoxical nature of the Reality merges into unity. Contrary to it, mode is the dividing force through which unity of Reality undergoes change and diversity. The interdependence and co-existence of substance and mode implies that mode is nothing but the changing property of a

substance. When a substance passes through one condition to another and from one moment to another without losing its essence, it is recognized as mode.¹ This is confirmed by Umasvati in *Sabhāṣya Tattvārthādhigam Sūtrā*, which says an entity is a single whole and it has the dual aspect of change and permanence. The SBT, then discusses the law of contradiction and shows the absence of any opposition between permanence and impermanence, existence and non-existence as attributes of the same entity. What unites these aspects is proved through *syādvāda*. Contradictoriness works only in the formal logic and in the mind of a common man. What works in nature, is the law of complementary. The law of contradiction is in vogue now-a-days. Ācārya Hemachandra answering the problem of contradiction states, 'No contradiction, when conditioned by difference of conditions. It is repeatedly asserted that existence and non-existence are always determinate. Existence is determined by the specific nature or individuality of the subject (*svarūpa*) and non-existence is in its turn determined by the nature or individuality of things which are different from the subject (*pararūpa*).² Thus it proves that the combination of opposites involves no contradiction. Jaina logicians firmly believe that the three contradictions namely, *śahanavasthana virodha*, *vadhyaghātaka virodha*, *pratibandhya-pratibandhaka virodha*³ are widely accepted by almost all the philosophical systems do not apply to the doctrine of non-absolutism. Opposition (*virodha*), according to Jain Philosophy, none of which can be shown to obtain between being and non-being and so forth.

¹ *Paṇṇavaṇā Vṛtti Pātra*, op.cit., 254.

² *Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā* of Hemachandra. Ed. Sukhalalji Sanghavi and others. Saraswati Oriental Series No. 1. Ahmedabad: Saraswati Pustak Bhandar, 2nd edn., 1989, p. 12.

³ *Mahāprajñā. Ekānta Mai Anekānta: Anekānta Mai Ekānta*. Ed. Sādhvi Vishruta Vibha. Delhi: Jaina Vishva Bharati., 2006, pp. 224-225.

1. *Vadhyaghātaka Virodha* :

The first type of oppositional relation is represented by the relation of destruction, which obtains between the destroyable and the destroyer. For example, between snake and mongoose, or fire and water. The destruction in such cases is possible only when two co-existent positive facts come together into collision and the one overpowers the other. There is not such destruction between being and non-being as the two, according to the opponents itself, they do not co-exist in a common substratum even for a moment. If, however, the two are admitted to co-exist in a common substratum, none would destroy the other, because both are equally powerful on account of their independent and equally powerful origin.

2. *Sahanavasthana Virodha* :

The second type is represented by the relation of non-co-existence, which obtains between characteristics originating at different moments of time. For example, between greenness and yellowness of the selfsame mango at different moments of its existence. Yellowness in this context can only succeed greenness and can never co-exist with it. This type of opposition also does not hold good between being and non-being. Non-being cannot inherit the locus of being, because the locus of being has ceased to exist along with the cessation of being. And non-being without a locus is as un-understandable as square-circle. So it becomes clear that pure being and pure non-being has many logical difficulties.

3. *Pratibandhya-pratibandhaka Virodha* :

The third type of oppositional relation is represented by the relation of obstruction, which obtains between the obstructed and the obstructor. For example, the conjunction of a fruit with its stalk obstructs the gravitation of the fruit towards the earth. This type of opposition also is not possible between being and non-being. Being is not an obstructor of non-being, because the existence of being does not obstruct the existence of non-being. We have already seen how the object of our experience is a synthesis of being and non-being.

None of these three types of opposition can be discovered in the assertion of opposing attributes in the substratum. Contradiction or opposition, infact arises when there is mere conjunction and no real synthesis, but the Jain doctrine of *anekānt*, emphasizes on the opposites which occur without mutual separation and not contrary to it.

Ācārya Mahāprajña remarks that there is no contradiction between the positum and the negatum. This is the implication or pre-supposition of the doctrine of conditional dialectics (*syādvāda*). It would be relevant to quote Mahaveer Raj Galera's contention that Mahaprajña has stipulated a few postulates in order to expand his 'theory of opposites'.¹

- i. Co-pposites represent two mutually different directions.
- ii. Existence of co-pposites is a self-proven axiom. It is the very nature of every object to possess the co-pposites simultaneously.
- iii. Co-opposites' do not cancel each other but reinforce each other.

There exists a definite co-ordination even in absolute conflict. Conversely, there exists conflict in apparent cases of harmony. This is the very basis of co-existent evolution. Mahaprajña has established the practical utility of above postulates which can be put to good use in resolving our every day conflicts of life. The duality of apparently contrary attributes enjoys mutual concomitance. It is on this finding that the doctrine of non-absolutism as a synthesis of infinite number of such dualities is established.²

¹ Mahaveer Raj Galera. *Jain Studies and Science*. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati Institute, 2009, p. 38.

² Ācārya Mahāprajña. *New Dimensions In Jaina Logic*. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati, 1984, p. 72.

3.2.4 *Anekāntic* Dialogues in Jaina Canonical Literature

The Jaina philosopher has shown being and non-being as simultaneously true nature of a Reality and hence we cannot agree to the law of contradiction. Absolute being and absolute non-being are certainly exclusive of each other. But this is not the case with the concrete being which alone is real according to Jaina Philosopher. The field of application of the law of contradiction, therefore, should be ascertained by the observation of concrete cases in the real world. Nathmal Tatīā says, "Our experience is thus the sole determinant of contradiction and no abstract logical formulas can give an insight into the nature of the concrete things of the world. Contradiction or opposition, infact arises when there is mere conjunction and no real synthesis but the Jain doctrine of *anekānta*, emphasizes on the opposites which occur without mutual separation and not contrary to it. *Anekāntavāda* as a doctrine, may find its germs here in the question and answer of the master and the disciple."

The understanding of truth has been man's eternal quest. What is truth? What is Reality? What is its nature, this question is asked by Gautama to *tīrthaṅkara* Mahāvīra.

Gautama : What is truth?¹

Mahāvīra : To be created is the essence, creation (*utpāda*) is the truth.

He began to analyze this statement. If, to be created were the truth, then creation would go on endlessly. The population would multiply to such an extent that there would not be even space for living beings and one would get mixed with other beings due to lack of space. Substances would merge into other substances and there would be no space for any new creation. Then there would be a problem. Having thus not

¹ Mahāprajña, Ācārya. *Anekānta: The Third Eye. op.cit.*, pp. 2-3.

understood, this answer pertaining to creation (*utpāda*), Gautama asked again, what is truth? Mahāvīra replied, to be destroyed (*vyaya*) is the truth. Again he began to critically analyze the statement to be created and to be destroyed is the truth. Once born and then dead, what else is left? The answer was still unclear to him. He asked yet again, what is truth? Lord answered; to be eternal (*dhrauvya*) is the truth. Gautama's mind now focus itself. To be created, destroyed, and to remain in existence, this is the three-fold truth. Then he reflected upon this three- fold truth deeply and attained at the conclusion that truth is the conflict between the eternal and non-eternal.

Now Gautama fell into trouble, how to explain the truth, which is eternal and non-eternal by nature. How to explain the multi-faceted truth through language is the first problem. This problem was being solved by the Mahāvīra, the preceptor, by implementing minimum two *naya*s for explaining the nature of Reality i.e. transcendental *naya* and conventional *naya*., *Athire pallotai no thire pallotai*.¹, it means from the transcendental point of view, Reality is eternal and from the conventional point of view reality undergoes change. Now Gautam understood the basic concept of Reality. Different thinkers have presented the different aspects of truth in their own way. The *Vedānta* philosophy has explained the problem from the three standpoints, namely, the ultimate, the empirical and the apparent. The *Brāhmaṇa* is the ultimate truth, while the sensuous world has only empirical validity. The cognition of the 'will-o' the wisp' and dream is pure appearance. In *Hīnayāna* Buddhism the truth is of two fold, viz. ultimate and the conventional.

*arthakriyā sāmārtam yat tadatra paramārtha sat,
anyat samvṛtisat proktam, te svasamanyalaksane.*

¹ *Bhagavatī*. Ed. Ācārya Mahāprajña. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati, 1997, 7.2.58-59.

It means the self nature (momentariness) of the objects is the ultimate truth on account of its being a product of the intellectual function of exclusion. So different thinkers have presented the different aspects of truth in their own way. The *vedānta* philosophy rejected the modes as unreal, while accepting the substance alone as ultimately true. The Buddhist on the other hand, reject the substance as imaginary by accepting the reality of the modes. According to Jain logic, both the substance and the modes are ultimately true. We have experienced that change presupposes the persistence of an underlying permanence. So permanence is to be accounted as an element in a real together with the change. But change means, the cessation of a previous mode or attribute and the coming into being of a new mode. The affirmation of the triple characteristics has therefore, nothing paradoxical about it, like a Cartesian dualism.

The word '*anekānta*' was not used by Mahāvīra and does not appear in the *āgamas*. Siddhasena Divākara may have been the first Jain ācārya to use this word.¹ Take, for the instance, in next sections, Mahāvīra's responses to the questions posed by Indrabhūti Gautama, one of the twelve *gaṇadharās* and the principal disciples of Mahāvīra, Jayantī, a devotee, inquisitive *śrāvikā* (lay-women) and sister of king *atānīka*, and Somila, a dedicated and learned *śrāvaka* (lay-man).

The substance present itself when our thinking is synthetic, losing all its modes and when our approach is analytical, the modes become prominent at the cost of the substance. In the formative period of *anekānta*, some principles of logical concomitance were discovered and that constituted an epoch-making achievement of that age. They are as follows:

¹ Ācārya Mahāprajña. *Anekānta: Reflections and Clarifications*. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati Institute, 2001, p. 9.

Concomitance Between the Permanent and the Impermanent

The first axiom of *anekānta* or non-absolutism is the concomitance of the permanent and the impermanent, the truth of one is verified by the truth of the other. The *anekāntic* dialogue goes as,

Gautama : Is the soul permanent or impermanent?

Mahāvīra : The soul is permanent as well as impermanent.

From the substantial point of view, soul neither originates nor perishes, so it is permanent. From the conventional point of view, the modes of knowledge and intuition of consciousness (soul) originates and perishes. In case of matter also Mahāvīra said that from the above mentioned two *nayas*, matter is also permanent and impermanent both.¹

Gautama understood the nature of two basic Realities namely, *jīva* and *ajīva*. So the right worldview towards the life and world of affairs aroused in him. He began to apply this formula of two fold perspectives and began to think whether the unstable changes or the stable changes. He wanted to solve this problem that origination and cessation occurs in the modes or in permanent nature of the substance. Where does the change occurs and what makes the reality to be permanent. In the quest of the truth, he had a series of conversations with the Mahāvīra regarding axiomatic nature of reality.

The following dialogue is an illustration, which throws light on the concomitance of one and many.

Concomitance of One and Many

Somila : O Lord! Are you one or many?

Lord : “I am one, in respect of substance, O Somila. However, in respect of knowledge and intuition I am two. In respect of parts (constituents of a substance). I am immutable,

¹ *Bhagavaī. op.cit.*, verse-7.2.58-59.

eternal and unchanging. I am many, in respect of the ever-changing phases of my consciousness.¹

The nature of the substance and modes entails the relationship of one and many, universal and particular, permanent and impermanent. The substance is one while the modes are many. The substance stands for the universal and modes for the particular. The substance is eternal, while the modes are changeable.

Concomitance of the Speakable and Unspeakable

A substance is possessed of an infinite number of attributes. It is, however, not possible to express in language those infinite number of attributes taking place every moment. Besides, our span of life and also the range of language have their own limitations. A substance is unspeakable on account of this infinitude of the aspects of a thing.² Only one attribute can be spoken of, in one moment and many in many moments, but never all during any stretch of time. A thing is thus speakable with reference to only a limited number of its attributes.

Concomitance of Slumber State and Awakening State

Lord Mahavira himself explained many a problem by means of this method of division. Once Jayantī asked the Lord, which was better between the states of slumber and awakening? O Jayantī!³ For some souls, the slumber state is commendable, but for others, awakening is wholesome.

Why is it so, O Lord!?

¹ *Bhagavaī. op.cit.*, 18.10.219-220.

² *Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya* of Jinabhadra Gaṇī. Ed. Dalsukha Malavaniya and Becharadasji, Lal Bhai Dalpatabhai. Ahmedabad: Bhārtīya Samskr̥ti Vidyāmandir. Vol.-I, 1968, verse-450; Mahāprajña. *Anekānta: Views & Issues*, *op.cit.*, p. 44.

³ *Bhagavaī. op.cit.*, 12.2.53.

The exclusive assertion of the wholesomeness of slumber or awakening would be an absolutistic answer, which was not approved by Lord Mahāvīra and he explained all the questions by means of divisions of issues avoiding exclusiveness. The empirical world is known as logically speaking, through subject and predicates; metaphysically speaking, subjects having attributes.

Concomitance of Auspicious and Inauspicious Renunciation

Gautama : If one says, I have renounced to commit violence to all *prāṇa* (two to four sensed beings i.e. mobiles), *bhuta* (one sensed beings i.e. plants etc. or immobiles), *sattva* (all first four immobile living beings), *jīva* (five sensed beings). Then, is such renouncement auspicious or inauspicious? Mahāvīra : In some context, it is auspicious and in other, inauspicious.

Gautama : Lord! What is the reason behind this statement?¹

Mahāvīra : The person who is ignorant and can't differentiate between soul and non-soul, mobile and immobile beings, such persons restrain is inauspicious restrain. Such persons don't speak truth. But on the other hand, who has discretion between soul and non-soul, mobile and immobile beings, such persons restrain is auspicious restrain and such person always speaks truth.

Similarly, we have numerous dialogues regarding the problem, whether it is good to be weak or good to be strong?² Whether the souls are mobile or immobile? Whether the souls are powerful or powerless? Whether the body is identical with soul or different? and so forth. All the replies of Mahāvīra were given in *anekāntic* style.

¹ *Bhagavāī. op.cit.*, 7.2.27.

² *Ibid*, 12.2.55.

3.2.5 Philosophy of Co-existence of Pairs in the World of Experience

Change and permanence is the nature of reality. *Anekānta* accepts the co-existence of both the opposites as a fact. Nothing in this world is without limits. Everything has its limits. There is a need for equanimity. Loss and gain, both are to be accepted. It is the norm of life that if there is gain, there will also be loss and vice-versa or the other way round. The two are not distanced; they are mutually connected and go together. Gain is linked to loss and loss to gain. The two are one. The difference is only in time and space. There is no distance between happiness and sorrow. There is no distance between life and death. They both go together. Sometimes one feels happy and life seems bright and sometimes one feels sad and life seems miserable. It is a single chain. The wheels bring in water, empty it and return. The Wheels full of water and empty of water keep coming and going. They work together. Life and death work together. There is no second that belongs entirely to life or entirely to death. The first second of life is also the first second of death. Death is not an event, which takes place after 70-80 years. It can take place even in the first second. With the first second of birth, the event of death also takes place. The one, who does not die in the first second will become immortal, he will never die. The one who is not born in the first second cannot be created in the next. Every object experiences birth every second. Creation and destruction go hand in hand. One cannot find even one man who has been only praised, never condemned or always condemned and never praised. Both go together. The balance is maintained.

The problem arises when one doesn't identify oneself with the problem. If there is emotional distance from the problem, then one will be able to maintain one's equanimity in tough situations. This is a good way to tackle the problems. But

man is strange. They want gain, but not loss, they want joy, but not sorrow, they want life, but not ready to accept death and wish to be praised, never condemnation. They then forget the universal rule. In this dualistic world, nothing comes alone. Everything is in pairs. Man is ignorant. He wants to break the order of *anekāntic* nature of Reality and wants only a single dimension and through such one-sided perspective, one cannot lead a life of equanimity. Now we will proceed towards the detailed implications of Philosophy of Co-existence. The Philosophy of co-existence as propounded by Mahāprajñā has its roots in the Jain āgam-s. *Thāṇam*, *Nandī* and *Daśavaikālika Sūtras* have the description of opposite couplets in plenty. Some of them are as follows: *dharmāstikāya-adharmāstikāya*, *loka-aloka*, *bandha-moksha*, *punya-pāpa*, *āshrava-saṃvara*, *jiva-ajiva*, *truṣṭi-sthāvar*, *dharmā-adharmā*, *vedanā-nirjarā* etc.¹ Similar seven pairs are mentioned in *Nandī Sūtra* of '*śrut gyan*'.² In the *Daśavaikālika Sūtra*,³ the four key emotions, Anger, Ego, Affection and Greed are prominently discussed. *Sūtra* states that these emotions co-exist with the contrasting feelings. Anger can be diluted by forgiveness and Ego with humility. Affection too, is a kind of bondage and can be countered by equanimity. Greed can be overcome is that the opposites coexist.

3.2.6 Opposing Pairs in Our Body

There is co-existence of opposing pairs in our body too. In our body there are billions of cells. Every second, five crore

¹ *Thāṇam. op.cit.*, 2.1.

² *Nandī Sūtra*. Ed. Mahāprajñā. With Prākṛt Text, Sanskr̥t Renderings, Hindi Translation, Comparative Notes and Various Appendixes. Ladnun: Jaina Vishva Bharati, 1997, *Sūtra*-4.55.

³ *Daśvaiāliyam*. Ed. Muni Nathmal. With Prākṛt Text, Sanskr̥t Renderings, Hindi Translation and Critical Annotations. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati, 1975, *Sūtra*-8.37.

cells are being destroyed and new five crore cells are being created. This co-existence is continual. If the cells did not die, then the body would become useless. If new cells were not created, then the body would break down. When both the activities co-exist, then the body lives on. Likewise, in our body exhalation and inhalation both co-exist, then the body lives on. There are two centres in our body : the *gyan kendra* or the centre of wisdom and the *Kām Kendra* or the center of passion. Both of them are opposites. The centre of passion weighs down the consciousness. The centre of wisdom raises the level of the consciousness. One is upward moving and the other is downward moving, the consciousness is in opposition to each other. Life rests on these two movements.¹ There are two types of nerves, sensory and motor nerves, right hemisphere and left hemisphere, sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous system (in *āyurveda-idā nādi* and *pingalā nādi*) works with full co-operation.

In science, there are two centres referred to as glands. One is the pineal-pituitary gland and the other the gonads. The pineal and the pituitary are centers that promote wisdom. Gonads promote passions. Our consciousness depends on the functioning of the pineal and the pituitary. When the secretions of the pineal and pituitary reach gonads, then passions are inflamed. But when these secretions change, then the action of the hypothalamus changes and there begins the growth of wisdom. Both the opposing themes are built within our physical system. Opposing forces are acting in the creation of the body, in the creation of nature, and in the creation of electricity too. In the world of electricity, both the negative and the positive energies work together. If there were only the positive and no negative, then no electricity would be produced. It is

¹ Mahāprajña. *Anekānta: The Third Eye. op.cit.*, p. 6.

compulsory for both the positive and the negative to exist for electricity to be produced. Thus our entire existence is characterized by opposing pairs.

It is quiet relevant to quote the series of pairs as mentioned in the thesis, '*Anekantvada through Paintings*', to highlight the very nature of objective world having pairs.

1. *Pratyakṣa: Parokṣa* (Direct and Indirect)
2. *Rūpa : Arūpa* (Form and Formless)
3. *Śatru : Mitra* (Friend : Foe)
4. *Śiti : Śiti* (Black : White)
5. *Janma : Maraṇa* (Life : Death)
6. *Adhyātmā : Laukika Dharma* (Spiritual ; Mundane Customs)
7. *Śaraṇa : Āśaraṇa* (Shelter and Shelterlessness)
8. *Samyama : Asamyama* (Restraint and Unrestraint)
9. *Lipta : Nirlipta* (Attached : Detached)
10. *Harṣa : Viṣāda* (Enjoyment : Misery)
11. *Dharma : Adharma* (Violence : Non-violence)
12. *Śuci : Aśuci* (Beauty : Non-beauty)
13. *Kendra : Paridhi* (Centre : Circumference)
14. *Yukta : Mukta* (Coalesced : Liberated)
15. *Śuddha : Aśuddha* (Pure : Impure)
16. *Antaḥ : Bāhya* (Internal : External)
17. *Sukha : Dukha* (Happiness and Sorrow)
18. *Śītala : Uṣṇa* (Coolness : Brightness)
19. *Kṛṣṇa : Śukla* (Waning Moon : Waxing Moon)
20. *Antarmukhi : Bahirmukhi* (inwardly Drawn : Outwardly Drawn)
21. *Gati : Agati* (Movement : Non-movement)

22. *Jīva* : *Ajīva* (Living : Non-living)
23. *Sāpekṣa* : *Nirpekṣa* (Relatedness : Unrelatedness)
24. *Praṣṇa* : *Uttara* (Question : Answer)
25. *Svarga* : *Naraka* (Heaven : Hell)
26. *Sacela* : *Acela* (Attired : Unattired)
27. *Bandhana* : *Mukti* (Bondage : Liberation)
28. *Abhāva* : *Ananta* (Absence : Fullness)
29. *Khaṇḍana* : *Mandana* (Refuting : Establishing)
30. *Padārtha* : *Ātmā* (Matter : Soul)¹

It is a common question in the minds of many that the assertion of *anekānta* as both being and non-being is self contradictory. In our day-to-day experience we don't perceive these two opposing ideas one and the same time. But the above mentioned examples of co-existence of opposing pairs proves that they are real nature of the subject or the object.

3.2.7 The Philosophy of Co-existence and its Implications

The doctrine of *anekānta* forms the corner-stone of Jain philosophical thinking. According to the Jainas, we find a multiplicity of reals in the world and each object of knowledge is found to be endowed with infinite characteristics. The infinite number of characteristics, though appear to be mutually contradictory, are, in fact, the inalienable part of a real. As a matter of fact, a real is an integrated whole of infinite qualities or attributes. They do certainly, say the Jainas, co-exist in the same object. This co-existence of mutually opposed characteristics should be accepted as a reality. This is the intrinsic nature of the reality. If we deny this, then there arise various sorts of complications and confusions, which lead to

¹ Manju Nahata. *Anekantvada Through Paintings*. Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass, 2012, pp. 17-19.

conflicts, strifes and tensions. Seeing widely differing theories in the same subject one is apt to get confused, hardly knowing which of them represents the correct position. Here *anekāntavāda* comes to our aid and rescue, and provides an amicable solution to controversies.

The doctrine of *anekānta* forms the corner-stone of Jain philosophical thinking. Hence, the first volume is devoted to the study of the different aspects of this important doctrine of Jaina philosophy. It is the prerogative of the human being to know the truth and also to express it. According to the Jainas, we find a multiplicity of reals in the world and each object of knowledge is found to be endowed with infinite characteristics. The infinite number of characteristics, though appear to be mutually contradictory, are, in fact, the inalienable part of a real. As a matter of fact, a real is an integrated whole of infinite qualities or attributes. They do certainly, say the Jainas, co-exist in the same object. This co-existence of mutually opposed characteristics should be accepted as a reality. This is the intrinsic nature of the reality. If we deny this, then there arise various sorts of complications and confusions, which lead to conflicts, strifes and tensions. Seeing widely differing theories in the same subject one is apt to get confused, hardly knowing which of them represents the correct position. Here *anekāntavāda* comes to our aid and rescue, and provides an amicable solution to controversies.

Ken Wilber says that one can notice that all spatial and directional dimensions have opposites : up vs. down, Inside vs. outside, high vs. low, long vs. short, north vs. south, big vs. small, here vs. there, top vs. bottom, left vs. right etc. All the things we consider serious and important are one pole of a pair of opposites : good vs. evil, life vs. death, pleasure vs. pain, freedom vs. bondage. So also our social and aesthetic values are

always put in terms of opposites : success vs. failure, beautiful vs. ugly, strong vs. weak, intelligent vs. stupid. Even our highest abstractions rest on opposites. Logic, for instance, is concerned with the true vs. false, epistemology, with appearance vs. Reality, massive collection of opposites. It is certainly true that some of the things which we call opposites appear to co-exist in nature.¹ Modern physics, in short proclaims that reality can only be considered a union of opposites. In Von Bert Alanffy's phrase, '*anekānt*' is nothing but, complimentary aspects of the two opposites, one and the same reality. When we acknowledge of the two opposites but ignore their inner unity, we see that the opposites are just two different names for one process.² The theory of *anekānta* means acceptance of co-existence of all events or opposite *pariyāya*-s, in historical narrative.³ Galera rightly says that life and universe is nothing but a delicate balance of opposing forces, conflicting particles, contrasting energies and divergent view points, no adjective, no verb exists in this entire world, which doesnot have an antonym. Without the pairing opposite the world will lose its meaning.⁴

Contemporary science also tells us that if there is a universe, there has to be an anti-universe. If there is a particle, there has to be an anti-particle too. If there is an atom, there is an anti-atom also. If there is substance, there is anti-substance too. Every object is connected to its opposite object. In the quest for anti-particles, scientists have used micro-instruments as

¹ Ken Wilber. *No Boundry: Eastern and Western Approaches to Personal Growth*. Boston: Shambhala, 2001, p. 16.

² Ken Wilber. *No Boundry. op.cit.*, p. 23.

³ Mahāprajña. *Ekānta Mai Anekānta: Anekānta Mai Ekānta*. Ed. Sādhvi Vishruta Vibha. Delhi: Jaina Vishva Bharati, 2006, p. 214.

⁴ Mahaveer Raj Galera. *Jain Vidyā Aur Vigyān*. Ed. Sādhvi Rajeemati, Samani Mangalprajña. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati Institute, 2005, p.

tools. A micro instrument was invented which could measure the subtle changes taking place in the 15th billion part of one second. Then the anti-particle was found. Today it is more than established that without the anti-particle, the particle would have no existence. It is mandatory for both to exist. Ācārya Mahāprajña says, "The basic principle of *anekānta* is the acceptance of the existence of opposition. *Anekānta* is built on this.¹ Truth is multifaceted and hence there are many aspects of it and many angles to observe it."²

Thus our entire existence is characterized by opposing pairs. It is a common question in the minds of many that the assertion of *anekānta* as both being and non-being is self contradictory. In our day-to-day experience we perceive these two opposing ideas one and at the same time. The above mentioned examples of co-existence of opposing pairs proves that they are real nature of the subject or the object. Co-existence of opposing qualities don't oppose each other but are compliment and supportive to one another. We must not only learn to tolerate our differences, we must welcome them as the richness and diversity, which can lead us to true intelligence as rightly said by Albert Einstein. Co-existence implies tolerance and freedom of thought. Both tolerance and freedom of thought are meaningless if we try to enforce our likes, ideas, life-style and principles on all others. Beauty will lose all its charms and meaning, if all plants, trees and flowers look alike. The combined principle of *satyaṃ* (truth), *shivam* (benefaction), *sundaram* (beauty) adheres in the the principle of unity in diversity and diversity in unity. It is only the above harmony which forms the basis of co-existence. We see others through

¹ Mahāprajña. *Anekānta: The Third Eye*, op.cit., p. 9.

² *Sanmati Tarka* of Siddhasena, op.cit., 3.47.

the stereotype mindset. Empathy makes us to know that the other is not an object, but a breathing, thinking, feeling subject like ourselves.

3.3 The Jain Doctrine of *Naya* : Its Implications

At the very outset, it would not be out of place to state here that logic and epistemology have been given important places in the history of Indian philosophical thought right from the very beginning. As a matter of fact, Indian logicians, especially those belonging to the mediaeval age, made significant contributions in the field of logic and here the role of *Jain* logicians cannot be ignored. They really made logic as something independent of metaphysics and religion. Dr. Satishchandra has observed thus in this context : "By about 450 A.D. the Buddhist logician Dignāga and the *Jain* logicians Siddhasena Divākara (5th cent. B.C.), by differentiating the principles of logic from those of religion and metaphysics and laid the true foundation of what is termed as the mediaeval school of Indian logic."¹

These mediaeval logicians were not so much concerned with ontological categories, which occupied pivotal position in the ancient logic, but they attached more importance to the analysis of knowledge-specially, means of valid knowledge and such other allied problems. In this context, one can study and find even elements of logical and linguistic analysis in *Jain* philosophy. They propounded their theories of meaning in their own way, which testify to the fact that they were anticipating the modern theories of logical and linguistic analysis in their own way. It may be mentioned here that Siddhasena Divakara was perhaps the first *Jain* writer to write on systematic logic. Samantabhadra (607 A.D.) wrote *Āpta Mīmāṃsā* and this is

¹ Satishchandra Vidyabhusan. *A History of Indian Logic*. Calcutta: Calcutta University, 1921, p. 158.

concerned with exhaustive and critical exposition of the *Jain* doctrine of *naya* specially *syādvāda* or *saptabhaṅgī naya*. Umāsvāti (2nd cent.-3rd cent. B.C.) and other *Jain* philosophers have also treated this problem of *naya* quite clearly and critically.

Umāsvāti rightly thus asserted : "*pramāṇa nayairadhigamaḥ*".¹ This means that *pramāṇa* and *naya* play their roles in acquisition of right knowledge. *Pramāṇa* is the means of valid knowledge whereas *naya* is the standpoint from which one knows things and beings. This conception of *naya* is the unique feature of *Jain* logic and epistemology, but the problem of *pramāṇa* is tackled by all systems of Indian philosophy. So, the doctrine of *naya* deserves special attention here. Before discussing this doctrine further, it would be proper here to explain what is the distinction between a *pramāṇa* and a *naya*? A *pramāṇa* reveals the thing as a whole (*sakala-grāhin*), while a *naya* reveals only a portion of it (*aṃsagrāhin*). A *naya* is only a part of a *pramāṇa* and hence it cannot be identical with the *pramāṇa*. A *pramāṇa* is compared to an ocean while *nayas* or standpoints are like an ocean water kept in different pitchers.²

The non-relative onesided view has created many problems in the field of philosophical thought. The *anekānta* philosophy provides a solution to those problems. It claims that every reality is multi-dimensional in itself, it means, it possesses infinite number of opposing attributes in the very same Reality. Except omniscient people general people can't comprehend all the aspects of any reality. So *anekānta* takes help of the weapon of *naya* i.e. choosing one perspective at a time.

According to the *Jaina* doctrine of *anekānta*, all knowledge except omniscience, is relative in its nature. All the perceptions which are true, but incomplete technically known as *naya*. In the words of Siddhasena, since a thing has infinite

¹ *Tattvārtha Sūtra* of Umāsvāti. *op.cit.*, *sūtra*-1.6.

² *Tattvārtharājavārtika* of Akalaṃka. *op.cit.*, *sūtra*-1.6, p. 118.

characters, it is comprehended only by the omniscient. But a thing becomes the subject matter of a *naya*, when it is conceived from one particular standpoint. He states :

jāvaiyā vayanavayā tāvaiyā ceva honti ṇayavāya.
*jāvaiyā ṇayavāyā tāvaiyā ceva parasamayā.*¹

Just as there are as many views of the forms of *nayas*, as there are the ways of speaking, so there are as many rival (non-Jain) philosophical tenets as there are views of the form of *nayas*. To see one *naya* as true and others untrue leads to dogmas technically known as *durnaya* (assessment of the truth in absolute sense). Thus, *naya* is a means of undertaking its own exploration of truth without denying the other *nayas*. The theory of *naya* is a tool to eradicate all sorts of dogmatism or absolutist view in the truth.

3.3.1 Different Classifications of *naya*-s

Now, it is proper to compare the different kinds of *naya* as propounded by Lord Mahāvīra. The seven *Naya*-s are nothing but the extension of two, *naya*-s, *dravyārthika naya* and *paryāyārthika naya*.² Basically to deal with the metaphysical problems, these two perspectives are important. The former is related to the persistent part or identity of a substance technically known as *dravya*, while the latter deals with the different forms and attributes of the substance technically known as *paryaya*. *Dravya* is shown to be permanent from *dravyārthika naya* and changing from *paryāyārthika naya*. Of the seven *naya*-s the *naigama*, *saṅgraha*, *vyavahāra*, fall under the category of substantial view point. The remaining four *rjusūtra*, *śabda*, *samabhirūḍha*, and *evambhūta* view points constitute the category of modal view point.

¹ *Sanmati Tarkakarāṇa*, 3.47, p. 306

² *Nayacakra*, *op.cit.*, verse-183.

In *Pañcāstikāyasamgraha* Kundakunda defines and discriminates two *naya*-s thus :

*evam sado viṇāso asado jīvassa natthi uppādo.
tāvadio jīvānaṃ devo maṇuso ti gadiṇāmo.*¹

The *dravyārthika* principle holds that there is neither birth nor death of the *jīva* as it has an indestructible essence, which cannot be extirpated even by Time. *Jīva* is subject to origin and decay only from the point of view of *paryāyārthika naya*. Although soul experiences both birth and death, but still it is neither really destroyed nor created. Origin and decay refer respectively to the disappearing *deva* state or the appearing human state and these are only its *paryāyas* or modes.

Another category of *naya*-s as found in *agama*-s are *niścaya naya* and *vyavahāra naya*. To deal with the religious truth, these two perspectives are important. The former is related to the subtle or transcendental aspect of the truth, while the latter, to the empirical or conventional one. Ācārya Kundakunda has explained the omniscience, on the basis of *nayas* (viewpoints) through the verse of *Niyamsāra* as follows:

*jāṇadi passadi savvaṃ vavahāraṇaṇa kevali bhagavaṃ.
kevalṇāṇī jāṇa passdi ṇiyamaṇa appāṇaṃ.*²

According to the empirical viewpoint (*vyavahāra naya*), the *kevalī* (omniscient) knows everything, but according to the transcendental viewpoint (*niścaya naya*), the *kevalī* knows himself alone. The implication is that, the *kevalī* is omniscient from the practical viewpoint (*vyavahāra naya*) and the knower of himself alone, from the transcendental viewpoint (*niścaya naya*). Needless to state, Jinabhadra has enriched the Jain philosophy by his profound scholarship. Jinabhadra gives an

¹ *Pañcāstikāyasāra* of Kundakunda. Delhi: Bharatiya Jnanpith, 2001, *gāthā*-19, p. 14.

² *Niyamsāra*. Shripadmaprabhmalldharidev viracita. Jaipur: Sahitya Prakashana Evam Prachara Vibhaga, 1984, *gāthā*-59, p. 318.

appropriate example of a *bhramara* (black bee) to show the essential difference between *vyavahāra* and *nīścayanaya* in *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* :

logavvavahāraparo vvavahāro bhaṇai kālao bhamaro.
*paramatthaparo maṇṇai nicchaio pancavaṇṇo tti.*¹

The *bhramara* (black bee), as seen from *vyavahāra naya*, is nothing but black in colour, while the same insect, when seen from *nīścayaya*, contains all the five colours. In other words, *vyavahāra*, unlike *nīścaya*, does not state ultimate truth. On the contrary, *vyavahāra* follow the view upheld by some one *naya* and it does not take into account, as *nīścaya* does, the views upheld by all the *nayas*.

Again seven *naya*-s are further classified under two heads as *artha naya* and *śabda naya*. Specially to deal with the problem of communication, these two perspectives are applied. The former is related to the meaning or senses of a sentence, while the latter, to the words used by a speaker or knower.²

A *naya* has a double function i.e., experience of the object and its verbal expression. The classification of the first four view points , which are mainly concerned with the ontological aspect of a thing are called the *artha naya* .The remaining three *śabda naya*, being mainly concerned with the linguistic aspect on account of being expressed in verbal proposition.³

3.3.2 Seven Types of *Nayavāda*

The Jaina thinkers have been led to the formulation of the methodological scheme consisting of seven ways of looking at reality. They are enumerated in the following order of

¹ *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, Part-1, *gāthā*-75, p. 25

² *Laghīyasthya* of Akalaṃka, *op.cit.*, verse-72.

³ *Tattvārtharājavārtika* of Akalaṃkadeva. Ed. Mahendra Kumar, Nyāyācārya. Vol. II. Delhi: Bharatiya Jñānapīṭha Prakashan, 2nd edn., 1999, *sutra*-1.33.

decreasing denotation¹ : *naigama*, *saṅgraha*, *vyavahāra*, *rjusūtra*, *śabda*, *samabhirūḍha*, and *evambhūta*.² Generally among these, the first three are considered to be *dravyānayas* or substantive standpoints and the other four *paryāyanayas* or modal standpoints.³ We may now proceed to point out, with illustrations, the nature and function of these seven viewpoints.

(i) *Naigama Naya*

Naigama is that *naya*, where the general (*sāmānya*) and the specific (*viśeṣa*) features of the things are judged.⁴ For example, conscious man is a *jīva* (soul). Here the general and the specific nature of *jīva* is described. This *naya* is also recognized by the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* schools of Indian philosophy. So, it is a method of referring to an entity, where its generic and specific characteristics are not distinguished from each other. It is an imprecise statement, but not an incorrect one, for it is conventionally accepted. For e.g., when we use the word, 'the bamboo' we mean thereby, that it possesses both general properties (which are shared by other trees) and specific properties (confined to the bamboo alone). Thus the two attributes of a particular substance when uttered by keeping one in focus and the other in margin is called *naigama naya*.⁵

This truth is also attested in ordinary assertions of work a day life. Asked about his residence a man may observe that his residence is in Asia or India or Bengal or Calcutta or a particular house with a particular number. Ultimately, he may observe for the sake of exactitude that as a soul, he lives with in

¹ *pūrvaḥ pūrvanayo bhūmaviśayaḥ kāraṇātmakaḥ, paraḥ paraḥ punaḥ sūkṣmagocaro hetumaāniha. Nayavivaraṇa, kā.-98.*

² *Thānāma Sutra-7.38.*

³ *dravyārtho vyavahārāntaḥ paryāyārthas tatoparaḥ.* TSV, p. 268.

⁴ *Bhikṣuṇyāyakarṇikā (Bṛhadvṛtti)* of Ācārya Tulsi. Ed. Ācārya Mahāprajña. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati, 2007, 5.4.

⁵ *Laghīyasthya* of Akalaṁka, *op.cit.*, verse-68.

his own body. Now all these observations are true though the first statement presents a broadly generalized concept and the last the most specific one, the intermediate locations representing graduated scale of specification. This way of approach has been called *naigama*. It takes both the aspects of the truth i.e. universal and particular into consideration but emphasizing on either of the two at a time.

(ii) *Samgraha Naya*

Samgraha Naya is the collective or class point of view. *Samgraha* is a *naya* in which the general qualities of the things are taken into consideration, without ignoring the specific qualities of the thing, but the emphasis is given on the general qualities alone.¹ This *naya* is also recognized by the *Sāṃkhya* and the *Advaita* schools of Indian philosophy. For example, when the word substance or *dravya* is used for it as a class which signifies all types of substances. Such a view is only partially correct but does not give the idea of the whole. For it ignores the specific characteristics of that thing. Jains cite *vedānta* as suffering from this fallacy, when it extracts only one class characteristic saying that everything is 'sat' and whatsoever is 'sat' is *Brahman* and rest is *māya*. While explaining *nayas*, he said : 'sarvekam sadviśeṣāt',² that is, all is one because they are *sat* and have equal existence. In the *Sthānāṅgasūtra*, we get *sūtras* such as these : there is one soul, there is one *loka* (universe). For compatibility of these *sūtras*, we have to depend on *saṅgraha naya*, this *naya* regards, all soul as one. So, according to it, 'ege āyā'³ *sūtra* can be accepted. Here, it is to be noted that with the help of *saṅgraha naya*, above-mentioned *sūtras* can be correlated without crossing the limits of *āgamaic* principles. It is a generic or synthetic view. It seeks for the unity in diversity.

¹ *Bhikṣu Nyāya Karṇikā* of Ācārya Tulsī, *op.cit.*, 5.6.

² *sarvamekam sadviśeṣāt. Sabhāṣya Tattvārthādhigamasūtra*, 1.35, p. 65.

³ *Thāṇaṇi*, Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati, Vikram Samvat 2033, *sthāna*-1.2, p. 5.

(iii) *Vyavahāranaya*

In contrast with the *saṅgraha* standpoint, the *vyavahāra* standpoint specializes itself in being concerned with the specific features¹ of the object concerned, without, of course, losing sight of the fact that they cannot stand by themselves without the support of the generic properties in the larger setting of concrete reality. *Vyavahāra* is that *naya* by which the specific qualities of a thing are taken into consideration, not completely ignoring the general qualities of a thing, but by by-passing the general qualities of a thing.² This *naya* is recognized by the *Cārvāka* school of Indian philosophy. It is analytic and particularistic in its approach. It is concerned with the actual present state of an object perceived. For example, when a person is asked to bring a mango fruit, he attempts to bring mango fruit only, but not any other fruit, although he is aware of the fact, that mango is only a species in the genus of fruit.³

(iv) *Rjusūtra Naya*

Rju-sūtra is that *naya* by which a thing is to be judged as it is, without looking into the past and future nature of the thing.⁴ As past is already lost and the future is not born yet. This *naya* does not refer to the past and future of the thing. The past is defunct and the future is unborn. And if experience be the proof of the existence of a thing, the past and future existence of a fact must be rejected as the real traits of the individuals. What we perceive is the present and so it is the present that can be real. Further more, the past has no causal efficiency and so also the future. The real, tree does not serve any purpose or give any advantage or disadvantage. So logical consistency demands that we should regard only that as real, which is existent in the present moment. This line of approach has been pursued by the Buddhist fluxist who declares all reals to be momentary in duration. This approach has been called *Rjusūtra naya*, that is,

¹ *vīśeṣātmakamevārthm vyavahāras ca manyāte.*

vīśeṣabhinnam sāmānyam asatkaraviṣāṇavant. NKV, kā.-8.

² *Laghīyastrya* of Akalaṁka, *op.cit.*, verse-71.

³ *Ibid*, *kārikās* 9 and 10.

⁴ *Ibid*, 5.10.

the approach which gives the straight and direct glimpse of the thing. The present is the real character of the individual. The past and future determinations are as alien to it as the character of other entities. Ācārya Mahāprajña has aptly remarked thus : "The method of *Rjusūtra* recognizes the entity itself (*bhāva*), but does not consider its name (*nāma*) or image (*sthāpanā*), or the causes which constituted it.

The advocate of the next *nayas* goes one step further in the process of particularization. It agrees with the advocate of the previous approach in the assertion that the present alone is real. But as the real is expressed and characterized by work, and words are significant and not meaningless symbols, the real must be understood in the light of the connotation of the term that stands for it.

(v) *Śabda Naya*

Sabda is that *naya* by which a thing is recognized simply by hearing the name of a thing.¹ *Sabda naya* includes all grammatical aspects of a word or of a sentence. For example, 'There was a city named Pataliputra.' The word 'was' in the sentence indicates that it is different from the present one. Thus, this view also maintains that the connotation of the terms is bound to differ if they differ in gender and number. The terms with different number and gender cannot be identical. They are as different as their antonyms. The verbal expression is not an external label, but has a definite connotation, which is bound to differ when the number or gender differs. Man and woman are different because they differ in gender. It is expressive of an entitative difference, which is worth useful in our day-to-day life affairs. This is called *śabdanaya*, the verbalistic approach.

(vi) *Samabhirūdhā Naya*

The next *naya* is called '*samabhirūdhā*', which goes another step further in the process of specification by identifying the etymological meaning (*vyutpattinimitta*) with the real meaning (*pravṛtti nimitta*). The advocate of this line of

¹ *Bhikṣunyāyakarnikā (Bṛhadvṛtti)* of Ācārya Tulsī. *op.cit.*, Sutra-5.11.

approach maintains that the meanings of words must differ with the difference of words. Each word has got a distinctive connotation of its own, so there can be no synonyms in the true sense of the term. *Samabhirūḍha* is that *naya* by which the meaning of a word is judged on the basis of its different etymological meanings. This *naya* is deeper than the *śabda naya*.¹ Well, the Jar is called *ghata kuta*, and also *kumbha* in Sanskrit. They are derived from different radicals and each of them has got a distinctive meaning. Thus the '*ghata*', stands for a particular action, '*kuta*' stands for crookedness, and '*kumbha*' which is, derived from *ku* + *umbha*, stands for this action of filling. The derivative words should therefore be properly affixed to facts, which have these acts as their connotation. It is not consistent to maintain that the words with different connotations do stand for a self-identical denotation.

(vii) *Evambhūta Naya*

Evambhūta naya is a further specialized form of the application of the verbal method. When the meaning of a word is established on the basis of its relevance to the present context, it is called *evambhūta naya*.² For example, there is a difference between a Rājā when he is not shining and a Rājā when he is shining with his royal glory. Grammarians accept this *naya*. *Purandara*, for instance, should be accordingly to this *naya*, designated as such only when he is actually engaged in the act of destroying his enemies. Similarly the designation *śakra* is appropriate only when he is actually manifesting his prowess.³ The fallacy in regard to *evambhūta-naya* consists in refusing to give the object its usual name when it is not functioning.⁴ It

¹ *Bhikṣuṇyāyakaṇṭhikā. op.cit.*, 5.12.

² *Ibid*, 5.13.

³ *Pramana Naya Tattvalokālamkāra (PNTA.) VII.41 yathendānam anubhāvann indrah. śakanakriyā pariṇāṭh śakraḥ pūrdāreṇa pravṛttaḥ purandara ityucyate.*; see IJT 10.26.

⁴ *kriyā'nāviṣaṃ vastu śabda-vācyaṭayā pratikṣipyaṃ tu tadābhāṣaḥ. PNTA. VII.42.*

should be noted here that in the *Tattvārtha Sūtra*¹, the *samabhirūḍha* and the *evambhūta nayas* are considered under the *sabdanaya*, as they are the variety of the *sabdanaya*, and therefore, according to Umāsvāti, the *nayas* are five in number.

Now the treatment of the four *paryāyayas* or the modal standpoints may be resumed. The *śabda naya* is the method of correct nomenclature. This also takes into account grammatical correctness and propriety of expression. In fact, the last three *nayas*, namely, *sabda*, *samabhirūḍha* and *evambhūta nayas* are concerned with proper and appropriate use of words. Broadly speaking all these three are different kinds of the *śabda naya*. It is quite clear from the above explanation that *śabda*, *samabhirūḍha* and *evambhūta* are but the gradual subtler distinction of a thing viewed from the standpoint of time i.e. present. All these three therefore, are but the ramifications of *Rjusūtra*, which may be compared to a tree. As per *Siddhasena*, *Śabda* is a branch of the tree, while *samabhirūḍha* is a twig upon the branch *śabda*, and *evambhūta* is a smaller twig upon the small twig-*samabhirūḍha*.² Western Post Modern philosopher's notion, in the tradition of philosophy of Language, is also in tune with the *nayās*.

3.3.3 Partial Truth of Individual Naya

As already noted the purpose of pointing out to this detailed classification of *nayas* is to show how differently the same object can be viewed by different individuals. However these different aspects are only partially true and since they are only partially true, they are not capable of being wholly true. They, however, cannot be rejected as wholly untrue also. In Jain texts we come across an interesting story of five blind men and elephant.¹ Here in the text *Puruṣārtha Siddhyupāya*, the Ācārya sayṣ, "I bow down to *anekānta* which is the root basis of highest scripture, which dispels the wrong notions about the elephant, of

¹ *Tattvārtha Sūtra* of Umāsvāti. *op.cit.*, 1.34, 35..

² *Sanmati Tarka. op.cit.*, 1.5.

the persons born blind, and which removes the contradictions amongst all those who entertain one-sided or limited points of view. These different aspects can be illustrated by the reactions of some blind persons who were asked to go to an elephant and give its description after touching and feeling it. One who touched its legs described it like a pillar, one who touched its ears described it like a winnowing fan, one who touched the tail, described it like a rope and so on and so forth. Each one was right from his own standpoint because he could experience only a particular limb of the elephant and not the whole elephant. Each one of them was however, wrong because his description didn't confirm to the reality, which the elephant possessed. This reality could be comprehended only by one who could see the whole. The greatest contribution which the *Jains* have made to the world of thought is by their theory of *nayavāda* and *syādvāda*.¹

Thus *naya* can be defined as a particular view point, a view point which gives only a partial idea about an object or a view which cannot over rule the existence of another or even a contrary view about the same object. The *nayas* are necessary in order to understand the partial true nature of a thing. Thus the Doctrine of philosophical standpoints are angles of vision or ways of approach and observation. These angles and ways give partial truths which contain grains of everlasting truth. The cumulative philosophical experience provided by the standpoints is extraordinarily wide-ranging and coherent and deep, and generates faith that truth is understandable. So it is clear that *anekānta* is a metaphysical doctrine, *syādvād* is a logical doctrine and *nayavāda* is an epistemological doctrine.² It demonstrates that truth is relative from the perspective of the perceiver and so has a subjective character and is difficult to articulate objectively.

¹ Mehta T.U. *Path of Arhat: A Religious Democracy*. Ed. Ashok Kumar Singh. Varanasi: Naya Sansar Press, 1993, p. 124.

² Mahāprajña. *Jaina Darshan: Manan Aur Mīmāṃsā*, op.cit., p. 266.

IV

***Anekānta* in the Philosophy of the West**

4.1 Relativity of Language and *Anekānta*

A thing has innumerable number of characteristics. Every object possesses innumerable positive and negative characters. It is not possible for an ordinary person to know all of them. We know only some qualities of the substance. To know all the aspects of substance is to become omniscient. We are all imperfect human beings; we cannot comprehend an object in its totality and our view of it is limited. Human knowledge at its best is after all partial knowledge and it is not free from error and illusion. To view a thing not only from a single point of view, but to examine it from all possible points of view is the real meaning of the doctrine of *anekāntavāda*.

Anekānta is a scientific analysis of the many sidedness of truth and its multiple dimensions and perspectives. '*Anekānta*' means multi-sided views. '*Syādvād*' is composed of two words - '*syāt*' means from a certain point of view or from a certain angle of vision and the word '*vāda*' denotes the system of thought. Emphasizing the limits of ordinary knowledge, Jain philosophy presents the theory that truth is relative to the perspective (*naya*) from which it is known. Furthermore, because reality is many sided and our knowledge is true only from a limited perspective. So all knowledge claims are only relative. In simple terminology, it can be said that *anekānta* teaches , the process of formation of holistic outlook and *syādvāda* acts as the medium of exchange of the viewpoints and expression of intended meaning. The *anekāntic* perspective of

holistic understanding of the objective world and subjective world needs to undergo four steps:

1. Dispassionate perception of phenomenal world.
2. Understanding of an object from multi-dimensional viewpoints.
3. Correct usage of linguistic tools of expression to avoid ambiguities and inconsistencies.
4. Understanding the intention of the speaker and the use of words and statements in a certain context.

When one tries to trace out the historicity of linguistic tools used by *Jains* for knowledge and analysis of the world of affairs, it can be divided under three heads. There are two views regarding this issue. *Umāsvāti* in his book, *Tattvārthasūtra* refers to two means of getting knowledge, *pramāṇa* and *naya - pramāṇanairadhigamḥ*.¹ *Pramāṇa* refers to the apprehension of reality or valid knowledge. *Naya* refers to the different aspects of considering things. While explaining *nayas*, he said : ‘*sarvamekaṃ sadviśeṣāt*’,² that is, all is one because they are *sat* and have equal existence. In the *Sthānāṅgasūtra*, we get *sūtras* such as these : there is one soul, there is one *loka* (universe). For compatibility of these *sūtras*, we have to depend on *saṅgraha naya*, this *naya* regards all soul as one. So, according to it, ‘*ege āyā*’³ *sūtra* can be accepted. Here, it is to be noted that with the help of *saṅgraha naya* above-mentioned *sūtras* can be co-related without crossing the limits of *āgama* principles. *Nayacakra* of Māiladhavala considers three means of knowledge namely, *pramana, naya and nikshepa* as essential for knowing any reality.⁴

¹ *Tattvārthasūtra*. Umāsvāti, 1.6.

² *Sabhāṣya Tattvārthādhigamasūtra*, 35, p. 65.

³ *Ṭhāṇaṃ Sūtra*. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati. Vikram Saṃvat 2033, 1.2, p. 5.

⁴ *Nayacakra* of Māiladhavala. Ed. Kailāschandra Shastri. Varanasi: Bhāratiya Jñānpīṭha Publication, 1971, p. 102.

Reality is multifaceted, any absolute assertion about the reality will not cover the aspects simultaneously. In the words of Siddhasena, since a thing has infinite characters, it is comprehended only by the omniscient. But a thing becomes the subject matter of a *naya*, when it is conceived from one particular standpoint. Therefore to comprehend the true nature of Reality, this doctrine of *anekānta* sparked a revolution in the thoughts of (363) contemporary philosophical schools prevailing during the period of Mahavira also. Mahavira applied the linguistic tool of '*syat*' and tried to perceive and understand each statement with dispassionate outlook and arrived at the conclusion that without taking into consideration the different *naya*-s (view points of substance, space, time and modes), one cannot arrive at the truth.

Ācārya Siddhasena (6th-7th cent. A.D.) has supported absolute unity at the existential level, where there remain no distinction, except pure existence. So Jain logicians don't agree with the statement that relativity is *anekānta* rather, they believe that relativity is the outcome of *anekānta* philosophy. Moreover Jain logicians denote *anekānta* with the term, '*jātyāntara*'¹ i.e. it is unique, neither relative nor absolute. Mahāprajña says that the Jains do not see things in black and white only. Their vision is not restricted to true-false, but the third dimension of relative-truth is added to it. Relativity is actually outcome of *anekānta*.

Nayavāda is a significant contribution of the Jain logic and epistemology. It helps to understand the nature of an object in a comprehensive way. It is the basis of the principle of *anekānta* as already mentioned by Siddhasena Divākara in his work. Māhīla Dhavalā in his *Nayacakra* approves the very same statement with addition to an illustration. For example as the essence of all the scriptures is alphabet; *samyaktva* (Right-world

¹ Dhavalā, 15.25.1, *ko aneyanto nāma. jaccanūtarattaṃ; Tattvārtha Bhāṣya Vṛtti*, 5.29; *Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā*, 1.1.33. *Aṣṭasahasrī Sūtra*-46.107.

-view) is the basis of all the penances, lead is the basis of all the metals and likewise *naya* is the basis or essence of *anekānta*.¹

Lord Mahāvīra, the preceptor, through his enlightenment, articulated way of expressing the truth, which seems absolutists in appearance and non-absolutist in approach. The methodology is recognized as sevenfold dialectic through which multiple aspects of a truth can be expressed. The only condition is that, when one quality becomes dominant in expression, the rest would be secondary at that time.² Ācārya Amṛtchandra (10th cent. A.D.), expounded *anekānta* with a folk imagery and imaging of a seemingly common occurrence in our lives in the countryside at one time in every home and now remains only in the romance of Lord Krishna. The imagery is how the churning process takes place. The churning process in Vṛndāvan, the churning process which brought the *amṛt* by churning the ocean. The example of milk-maid given by Amṛtchandra is worth quoting here. He says :

*ekenākarṣayantī ślattayantī vastutattvमितारेण,
antena jayati jainī nīrmanthānnetramiva gopī.*³

It means that the lady while churning, parts one hand in front and other hand goes behind, by this constant process of the two hands, one going forward and one going backward, there is the triumph of *anekānta*.

Ācārya Mahāprajña also quoted a living example to prove the *arpitānarpita* view of the *anekānta* philosophy as mentioned in *Tattvārtha Sūtra*.⁴ In our daily routine, we

¹ *Nayacakra* of Māilla Dhavala. Ed. Kailāschandra Śāstrī. Varanasi: Bhāratīya Jñānpīṭha Publication, 1971, verse-175.

*tahā satthāṇaṁ maic sammattaṁ teha tavāigunaṇilaye,
dhāvuvāye raso taha ṇayamūlaṁ aṇeyante.*

² *Sarvārthasiddhi* of Pūjyapāda. *op.cit.*, verse-5.32, p. 231.

³ *Puruṣārtha Sīdyupāya* of Amṛtchandra. *op.cit.*, verse-225.

⁴ *Tattvārtha Sūtra*, 5.31.

experience. that when we walk, if the left foot is in front automatically the right will be behind, by this constant process of the two legs, one going forward and one going backward, actual motion occurs. If a person tries to keep both his legs in front, then it is obvious he will fall down. So the practical application of *anekānta* even in motion can be observed in each step of our life.¹

4.2 Knowledge Based on Spatio-temporal is Relative

The entire knowledge of a thing at a particular spatio-temporal locus is conditional and relative to the circumstance.² The eminent philosopher Radhakrishnan³ translates *syādvāda*, as the theory of relativity. Moreover he says, 'the theory of relativity cannot be logically sustained without the hypothesis of an absolute. The fact that we are conscious of our relativity means that, we have to reach out to a fuller conception. It is from that higher absolute point of view that the lower relative ones can be explained.'

The founder of the theory of relativity, Albert Einstein explained his relativity through an interesting story. Mrs. Einstein didn't understand her husband's theories. One day she asked, "What shall I say is relativity?". The thinker replied with an unexpected parable, "When a man talks to a pretty girl for an hour, it seems to him only a minute, but let him sit on a hot stove for only a minute and it is longer than an hour that is relativity."

Anything bound by time and space, cannot be independent. Both are connected to our events. This is so because no event can be explained without time and space. We

¹ Mahāprajña. *Jain Darśana: Manana Aur Mimāṃsā. op.cit.*, p. 278.

² Mahāvīrarāj Gelara. *Science in Jainism*. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati Institute, 2002, p. 17.

³ Radhakrishnan. *Indian Philosophy*. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1966, Vol.-I, pp. 305-306.

take the help of these two (specs) measures and explain events. Sometimes we have to refer to the place and sometimes to the time. Where to go; Right or left? Which is right and which is left, using any point as the reference, we can identify left or right? Otherwise there can be no left or right. Now it is 3:30 in the afternoon in Ladnun. Is it same time in Moscow too? No, it is daylight there. Day and night cannot be identified without the concept of relativity of space and time.

This epistemological and logical theory of the *Jaina*-s is called 'syādvāda'. As a matter of fact, both *anekāntavāda* and *syādvāda* are the two aspects of the same teaching, realistic and relativistic pluralism. They are like the two sides of the same coin. The metaphysical side that reality has innumerable characters is called *anekāntavāda*, while the epistemological and logical side that we can know only some aspects of reality and therefore, all our judgments are necessarily relative, is called *syādvāda*.

Syādvāda can be explained to an ordinary person in a very simple manner. A *Jain* thinker, in explaining *syādvād*, raised his little finger and the next one and asked which is bigger? The right finger is bigger, no doubt was the answer. He then raised only the ring and the middle finger and then asked, which is smaller? The answer was the ring finger. He then said, it is *syādvāda*. The same finger is bigger and smaller both. Thus there is nothing absolutely bigger or smaller. Everything is relatively smaller or bigger. This is the Jain theory of relativity.

In this context, it is relevant to say that there is misconception regarding *anekānta* theory, that it expresses only relative truth and there is nothing like an absolute truth in Jain philosophy. To this Ācārya Mahāprajña replied in his text, '*Jain Darśana Aur Anekānta*,' the existence of basic five substance (medium of motion, medium of rest, space, matter, soul) are

absolute (*nirpekṣa*) truths.¹ Moreover, he says that, bereft of absolute, how can relative truth exist? This question was raised against *anekānta* but *anekānta* is also *anekāntic*. So C.D. Sharma in his book '*A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*' says, the difficulty is that the *nayas* have not been woven together. The non-absolutism is the only thread, which can weave them together. In the absence of absolute, this synthesis is an impossible for Jainism. Even *Jains* accept the absolute truth. Mahāprajña says, without absolute truth, we cannot attain the relative truth. Due to misunderstanding of the nature of the theory, the above statements are made.²

Ācārya Mahāprajña cited an example of relativity through an instance of teacher and the student. The teachers told the student, shorten the line drawn on the black board without erasing any part of it. Now how is it possible to make it short and yet not rubbing a part of it? The student was intelligent, he drew a longer line thus making the original line appear shorter. *Jain* philosophy contends that no philosophic proposition can be true, if it is only unconditionally asserted.³

4.3 Elements of *Anekānta* in Western Philosophy and Post-Modern Philosophy

It is due to one-sided prejudiced mind set, one misunderstands others' viewpoints and behaves otherwise. In the world of western philosophy, there occurred a paradigm shift from philosophizing the metaphysical concepts and epistemological aspects to the new horizon of problem of

¹ Mahāprajña. *Jain Darśana Aur Anekānta*. Ed. Muni Dulharaj. Churu: Ādarśa Sahitya Sanga Publication, 2000, p. 29.

² Chandradhar Sharma. *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*. Delhi: Motilal Banarasisidds, 1991, p. 57.

³ Matilal, Bimal Krishna. *The Central Philosophy of Jainism (Anekāntavāda)*. Ed. Dalsukh Malavania, Nagin J. Shah. Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of Indology, 1981, p. 61.

communication. The western Pre-greek philosophers, who were in search of the ultimate stuff from which this world of being originated, then they thought about one to many substances, then Greek philosophers began to determine their nature and features. In the meadiveal period, the government was dominated by Pope and no independence of thought was allowed and Galileo was burnt alive for expressing his novel thought. In the modern period, due to development in science and mathematics, a new renaissance came into being and the epistemic view of Realist and Idealist schools of thinking became the central issue of the philosophy. After a long debate between the two schools of thoughts, it was ultimately reconciled by Immanuel Kant that, neither the realist nor the idealist stand point will suffice to solve the problems of the epistemic world and the ethical world and he reconciled it by declaring that 'concepts without precepts are blind and precepts without concepts are empty'.

4.4 Western Post-Modern Philosophy

During the late 1920s, '30s, and '40s, Russell and Wittgenstein's formalism was developed by a group of philosophers in Vienna and Berlin, who were known as the Vienna Circle and Berlin Circle respectively, into a doctrine known as logical positivism (or logical empiricism). Logical positivism used formal logical methods to develop an empiricist account of knowledge. Philosophers such as Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach, along with other members of the Vienna Circle, claimed that the truths of logic and mathematics were tautologies, and those of science were verifiable empirical claims. These two constituted the entire universe of meaningful judgments; anything else was nonsense. The claims of ethics, aesthetics and theology were, accordingly, pseudo-statements, neither true nor false, simply meaningless. Karl Popper's insistence upon the role of falsification in the philosophy of

science was a reaction to the logical positivists. With the coming to power of Adolf Hitler and National Socialism in Germany and Austria, many members of the Vienna and Berlin Circles fled Germany, most of them to Britain and America, which helped to reinforce the dominance of logical positivism and analytic philosophy in the Anglophone countries.

Logical positivists typically considered philosophy as having a very limited function. For them, philosophy is concerned with the clarification of thoughts, rather than having a distinct subject matter of its own. The positivists adopted the verification principle, according to which every meaningful statement is either analytic or is capable of being verified by experience. This caused the logical positivists to reject many traditional problems of philosophy, especially those of metaphysics or ontology, as meaningless.

4.5 Ordinary Language Philosophy

After World War II, during the late 1940s and 1950s, analytic philosophy took a turn toward ordinary-language analysis. This movement had two main strands. One followed in the wake of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, which departed dramatically from his early work of the *Tractatus*. The other, known as "Oxford philosophy", involved J. L. Austin. While schools such as logical positivism emphasize logical terms, supposed to be universal and separate from contingent factors (such as culture, language, historical conditions), ordinary language philosophy emphasizes the use of language by ordinary people. Some have argued that ordinary language philosophy is of a more sociological grounding, as it essentially emphasizes on the use of language within social contexts. The best-known ordinary language philosophers during the 1950s were Austin and Gilbert Ryle. Philosophy of language is another area that has slowed down over the course of the last

four decades, as evidenced by the fact that few major figures in contemporary philosophy treat it as a primary research area like Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin, Alfred Tarski, and W.V.O. Quine and so on.

According to the Derridean Deconstruction, context is not fixed. He says, context is never absolutely determinable or the formation of context is never final and saturated. All these views will be discussed in comparison with the *Jaina* view of *nayavāda*, *syādvāda* and *niksepa*. How this concept coincides with the views of Western contemporary philosophy and Post-modern thinkers is highlighted in brief from the *anekāntic* perspective. In a comparative view of multiplicity-in-unity, there are two approaches possible, viz. to see the commonalities or to see the differences. In a judicious view, both are valuable and helpful. For our analysis, we shall undertake the former standpoint.

4.7 Overlapping Between *Anekānta* Philosophy and Western Continental Philosophers' Perspective

The non-relative one sided view has created many problems in the field of philosophical thought. *Anekānta* provides a solution to those problems from the point of view of inter-cultural understanding . Under the umbrella of *anekānta*, all antagonists, one-sided view-holders come and sit together on one platform breaking the system barrier which divides the entire human race. I have clearly highlighted, the doctrine of *anekānta* as an understanding, which urges individuals to study the different religions, cultures, customs, rituals, cults, schools of thought and trace out the underlying points of agreements and disagreements, so that one can have dialogue from the point of view of agreements rather than remain in watertight compartment of thoughts. So an endeavour is made to find out the elements of *anekānta* in philosophical views of Husserl, Wittgenstein, Jean Paul Sartre, Jacques Derrida and to interpret it

from the comparative point of view of western philosopher's thinking with the *Jain* concept of *naya* and *syād* perspective.

4.7.1 Overlapping Between Jainism and Husserl's Philosophical Views

Jaina Nayavāda vis-a-vis Husserl's Phenomenology

The Phenomenologist Husserl's (1859-1938) philosophical investigations are directed to the search for absolute or universally valid truths. The central motive of Husserl's philosophical endeavour is the search for certainty.¹ He is a sharp critique of relativism. Relativism, Husserl thinks, leads to a decline in our confidence in our rational certainty. He says, "If truth is relative, being dependent on historical, cultural or psychological context or background, then it will differ with the difference of context. The ultimate result will be the difference of opinion with regard to truth. This will result in skepticism, where social discord and turmoil will be the final outcome. According to Husserl, this crisis ultimately leads us to look for truth as something context independent as a way out of this crisis.

Jainism is a philosophy of non-absolutism and relative pluralism. *Jain* thinkers will never agree with Husserl that relativism constitutes the crisis of the age. On the contrary, they will emphatically urge that it is rather the other way round. To them, relativism, instead of being the root cause of the crisis of man, is the way out and the only way out of all sorts of crisis that befall us. It is the absolutistic conception of truth irrespective of the consideration of viewpoints which, the *Jains* will forcefully say, is at the root of all the crisis of human civilization. Objects of our knowledge, according to *Jains*, have inexhaustible facets or aspects, and it is impossible for us, except, of course, in the case of *kevaljñāni*, to know directly all the aspects of an object. Along with this, we cannot even

¹ Mrinal Kanti Bhadra. *A Critical Survey of Phenomenology and Existentialism*. Delhi: ICPR and Allied Publishers, 1990, Intro. p. 3.

exhaustively express all the multi-dimensional characteristics of particular object. These are the central points of difference concerning methodology and the outlook between the *Jain* and the Husserlian viewpoint.

Naya deals with a particular aspect of an object, which the cognizer has in view. It is an opinion or viewpoint expressive of a partial truth of the object i.e., *jñātūrābhiprāya* and *vastvainsāgrāhī*.¹ How then can one retrieve the total knowledge of object as given at the very outset in intuition? To have the total knowledge in terms of the *nayas* seems impossible because the *nayas* are not only numerous, but infinite in number. In the *āgama* literature, we get ample elucidation of *anekāntavāda* and *syādvāda*. Words of *Jina* are never indifferent to *naya*. Every Sentence of *āgama* is explained through *nayas*. The object in its wholeness is known through valid cognition (*pramāna*) in the first stance, and subsequently the same object is cognized in parts through the *nayas* (viewpoints). All our knowledge is synthetic in the beginning, and becomes analytic at the next stage. There must thus be some way of abridging all these infinite viewpoints and constructing a total and compact view of reality. There must be a way of making a *saṃkṣepa* or *saṃāsa* of the views. But a word can convey only one characteristic at a particular time and in this way, words can express the characteristics of reality only successively. The full scale and simultaneous expression of all the characteristics of reality is never possible by language.² This view is parallel with the Jain view of *avaktavya* or inexplicable.³

¹ *Illuminator of Jain Tenets*. Ed. Nathmal. Translation of *Jain Siddhanta Dīpikā*, 10.18.

² Mahāprajña, Ācārya. *Jain Darśana Aur Anekant*. Ed. Muni Dulharaj. Churu: Ādarśa Sahitya Sanga Publication, 2000, p. 25.

³ *Saptabhangi Tarangini*, op.cit., p. 15, *avaktavyatvaṃ cāstittvanāstittvavilaksanaṃ*.

It is for this reason that the *Jains* divided *nayas* into *dravyārthika naya* (substantial *naya*) and *paryāyārthika naya* (modal *naya*). *Dravyārthika naya* is one which is concerned with the substantial aspect of an object i.e. the generic and the permanent aspect of an object. For example, Clay is the substance of a pot. Whatever is done to the pot, clay remains the same as something indestructible and permanent. When we consider a pot from the point of view of clay, we are availing ourselves of the substantial *naya*. *Paryāyārthika naya* means that viewpoint, which deals only with the modes or modifications of a thing or substance. Thus when we consider the pot from the viewpoint of its form, we consider particular modifications of clay.¹

Jaina pontiffs also agree *naya* as *anirākṛtetarāṃśo vastvaṃśagrāhi pratipattura-bhiprāyo nayaḥ*². It means, *naya* is a viewpoint expressing the intention of the speaker (knower), which takes cognizance of a particular (intended) aspect of object, apprehended through *pramāṇa*, a valid organ of knowledge and which does not repudiate the other aspects of that reality. Husserl also says the same thing. When we look at an object, what we get in relation to our viewpoint is only one aspect of the object. The viewpoint or the act of consciousness is called the *noesis* and the partial presentation of the object as revealed in the consciousness is called the *noema*. Therefore, Husserl's conception of *noesis* is strictly parallel to the *Jain* concept of *naya*. Noesis has been defined as a meaning-giving intention and the *Jain* view of *naya* has been defined as *Jñāturābhipraya*³ i.e. *abhiprāya* or intention of the knower.

¹ *Tatvārtharājavārtika* of Aklaṃka, Ed. Mahendra Kumar. Delhi: Bhāratīya Gyānapīṭha Prakasan, 2nd edn., 1999, p. 495.

² *Bhikṣu Nyāya Kaṇṇika (Bṛhadvṛtti)* of Ācārya Tulsī. Ed. Ācārya Mahāprajña. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati, 2007, 5.1.

³ *Illuminator of Jaina Tenets*. Ed. Nathmal. Translation of *Jain Siddhānta Dīpikā*, 10.3.

Noesis gives only a partial presentation (or noema) of the object, similar is the case with *naya*. Now according to Husserl, *noesis* with regards to an object are infinite in number so also are the cases of *naya*. *Nayas* are also infinite in number. In this respect Husserl can also say the same thing like the *Jains* without embracing any inconsistency viz. *anantadharmakam vastu*, In strict Husserlian terms, this can be couched as follows : an object as phenomenon has infinitely manifold noematic aspects.

Again, when Husserl says that object, as a system of innumerable noemata corresponding to innumerable noesis, is accessible to the knower through a *noematic nucleus*, he merely echoes with the view of the *Jains* in this regard. Objects are given with an essential onesidedness because of the perspectivism... This onesidedness is exhibited not only in the totality of evidence of the real and objective world, but also in every particular object in it.¹ Substantial viewpoint or *dravyārthika naya* in Jainism is thus, parallel to what in Husserlian language is called a noematic nucleus.² This, the *Jain* call, *abhedavṛtti*.³ Further when Husserl says that the noematic nucleus contains within itself in the form of horizon, the hints of all the possible *noemata*, this also seems to be in agreement with the *Jains* view. A *dravya* contains within itself the possibility of all the *paryāyas*. So there is no contradiction in accepting the view that the substantial view point foreshadows the possibility of all the *paryāyas* that a substance can assume in the form of horizon, as the *noematic* nucleus, implicitly contains all the *paryāyas*. *Dravyārthic naya* contains all the *paryāya naya*-s as hints.

¹ Mrinal Kanti Bhadra. *A Critical Survey of Phenomenology and Existentialism*. p. 83.

² Samarikanta Samanta. *Nayavāda: Phenomenological Interpretation*. Quoted from Tulsi Prajñā. Vol. 135-136, Oct.-Sep., 2007, pp. 43-44.

³ *Saptabhangi Tarangini* of Vimaldas, *op.cit.*, p. 36.

In this respect there is the basis for a point of identity between the different characteristics. And lastly, Husserl says, nothing new when he asserts, that full knowledge of an object, as a system of infinite noemata is never possible, that each *noema* in its reference to other *noemata* gives us only an idea of the object in its totality and that the ultimate unity of perception is never a matter of experience, but always remains an ideal, except the case of *kevalins* and not in respect of the ordinary knower.¹ The *Jain* thinkers also hold the same view. We may thus conclude that the *Jain* thinking, when divested of its natural realistic attitude, can easily be susceptible to phenomenological interpretation and can be said to express the views very close to and almost identical with that of Husserl.

4.7.2 Overlapping Between Jain View of *Anekānta* and Wittgensteinian Philosophical View

The doctrine of *anekānta* also serves as a beacon in studying the epistemological problem of the meaning. The *Jain* logicians, rhetoricians, grammarians and philosophers have dealt with different aspects of meaning, right from the early centuries of Christian era. For example, in the field of epistemology, the theories of *nayavāda*, *syādvād*, *nikṣepavād* and so forth deal with the problem of meaning thoroughly. The terms *śabdanaya* and *arthanaya* are indicative of the linguistic views of the *Jains* reflected in epistemology.² Here it is relevant to have a brief introduction of the fundamental concepts of *śabda naya*, *nikṣepa*, successively and its basic differences.

Śabda Naya

The word is a powerful medium of our daily life, social and intellectual, which was invested with the power of

¹ Samarikanta Samanta. *Nayavāda: Phenomenological Interpretation*. Quoted from Tulsi Prajñā. Vol. 135-136, Oct.-Sep., 2007, pp. 44-45.

² Mahāprajñā, Ācārya. *Jain Darśana Manan Aur Mimamsa*. Ed. Muni Dulharaj. Churu: Ādarśa Sahitya Sanga Publication, 2008, p. 296.

expressing meaning (idea or thing) by man himself. The word has also an intrinsic power of expression of its own. It travels from the mouth of the speaker to the ears of the listeners to reveal its meaning. Such revelation of expression is possible also by physical gestures. But the clarity of words is not possible in those gestures or other kinds of symbols, which also suffer from the difficulty of transmission and communication. This is why, the language is questioned for conveying meanings. Our ideas arise from language, and language in its turn makes those ideas expressible. This is indeed the reason why the verbal viewpoint, which is mainly concerned with the philosophy of word, meaning and propositions, occupies an important position in the doctrine of *naya*-s.

Nikṣepa

The method of *nikṣepa* was developed in the *āgamic* period itself. In the speculative period and also in the period of logical development, this method continued to flourish. While rhetorics gave the method of determining the particular meaning of a multi-sensed word, it is only the commentaries on the Jaina *āgamas*, which gave the method of determining the intended meaning of a unisensed word. This method is useful not only for the treatises on logic, but for the analytic approach. This method has a universal utility in that, it is a valuable instrument for defining the intended meaning and purpose of any systematic treatise on any subject.¹ There is no prescribed limit of exposition through *nikṣepa*.

The *nikṣepa*, in fact is the selection of a particular meaning from among the meanings of a word.² The scope of such classification of imports is co-extensive with the range of

¹ Ācārya Mahāprajña. *New Dimensions In Jaina Logic*. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati, 1984, p. 63.

² *Laghīyastraya*. 74 (*svopajñavivṛtiḥ aprastutārthāpākaraṇat prastutārthavyākaraṇacca nikṣepaḥphalavān*).

meanings, that a word is capable of expressing. The minimum types of such classification are four, an object must have some name and also some shape; it had also modes that are past, as well as the modes that are to come along with the modes that it has at present. This is how the four basic *nikṣepa*-s naturally follow:

- (i) A name (*nāma-nikṣepa*) or a demonstrative symbol.
- (ii) Form (*sthāpanā-nikṣepa*), an image of an entity.
- (iii) Substance (*dravya-nikṣepa*), past or future modes of the material cause.
- (iv) Essence (*bhāva-nikṣepa*), the present mode constituting the essence of the thing.

Ācārya Jinabhadragani Kṣamāśramana's exposition of *nikṣepa* is quite different. According to him, the *nāma-nikṣepa* consists in nomenclature of a thing, while its shape, material cause and the effect are respectively the *sthāpanā*, *dravya* and *bhāva-nikṣepa*.¹

***Naya* and *Nikṣepa* (Viewpoint and the Classification of Imports)**

A viewpoint has reference to the object, the knowledge or the verbal symbol, the *nikṣepa* has also a similar reference.² The *naya* is knowledge, whereas the *nikṣepa* is the practical application or usage. The *naya* and *nikṣepa* are mutually related as theory and its practical application.³ When a single word denotes the name, form and the different modes of an object, the question of the intended and unintended denotatum comes up. The word 'Dean' may mean the picture of a Dean or the Dean

¹ *Viśeṣāvaśyakanbhāṣya. gāthā-60.*
adhavā vatthabhidhāṇaṇṇāmaṇṇhavaṇṇa jo tadāgāro,
kāraṇayā se davvaṇṇakajjāvaṇṇam tayaṇṇbhāvo.

² *Pravacanapraveśa. gāthā-74.*
nayāṇṇugatanikṣepairupāyaibhedavedane,
viracayyārthavākpratyayātmabhedān sṛutārpitān.

³ Ācārya Mahāprajña. *New Dimensions In Jaina Logic.* Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati, 1984, p. 65.

as a living human being. The dead body of a Dean is also denoted by the word 'Dean'. The *nikṣepa*, in fact is the selection of a particular meaning from among the meanings of a word.¹

Language Game and Forms of Life

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) emphasized creating an ideal language for philosophical analysis, which would be free from the ambiguities of ordinary language. This philosophical trend can be called "ideal-language analysis". During this phase, Russell and Wittgenstein sought to understand language, by using formal logic. Ludwig Wittgenstein developed a comprehensive system of logical atomism in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Here he stresses upon the meaning of any word and he talks of logical and elementary propositions and picture theory. He thereby argues that the world is the totality of actual states of affairs and that these states of affairs can be expressed by the language of first-order predicate logic. So a picture of the world can be made by expressing atomic facts as atomic propositions, and linking them using logical operators.

After completion of this book, he was convinced that his doctrines were certainly true and that the major problems of philosophy had been finally solved, at least in principle and he deviated from the ordinary usage of words and coined personal terms and got in to trouble. He said, the world is made up of atomic facts; atomic facts are facts which cannot be analysed into more elemental facts.² Here, he concentrates on what Frege called 'reference'.

Frege says, meaning of a word is two, but the referent is one. The referent is also a word, it contains both the meanings. The same word holds two meanings within itself. The 'venus

¹ *Laghīyāstraya. gāthā-74 (svopajñāvivṛtiḥ aprastutārthāpākaraṇat prastutārthavyākaraṇacca nikṣepaḥphalavān.*

² Derek Johnson. *A Brief History of Philosophy: From Socrates to Derrida*. London: Continnum, 2006, p. 158.

star' is a word, which contain non-equivalent equalities. It contains both the meanings viz. morning and evening star. Frege says that they are not equivalent, but they were resident as meaning in the same word 'venus'. Likewise let us take an illustration of a gaskette, there are many varieties of gaskettes in the market, namely automobile, plumbing, pressure cooker gaskette, etc., so salesman seldom gets confused with the same word denoting different meanings. In such cases a man can understand the meaning of the particular word having varied implications on the basis of the context and on the basis of the intention of the speaker.

Later Wittgenstein changes his view and states that there is not any 'the meaning' as such, it changes according to the context and the Form of life. Wittgenstein in his text, '*Philosophical Investigations*' says that words do not have round meaning as we find them in use in ordinary language. According to him, language is like a game. It is an activity which uses words as-tools. Words are not labels for things. A game is not a game unless played: A language is not a language unless used. Meanings of words are determined by the game we play, by the way we use it for some purpose.

Wittgenstein uses the metaphor of playing chess to explain the language game. His first employment of a game appears in a conversation at Schlick's house in June, 1930 in a discussion of formalism on mathematics. Here, he first compares language with playing a game like chess. According to him, the difference between the game of chess and the syntax of a language is, "solely in their application". In his '*Philosophical Investigations*', he rightly quotes, 'the meaning of word is its use in the language.'¹ That is the meanings of the word is determined by the way we make use of it. In order to

¹ Ludwig Wittgenstein. *Philosophical Investigations*. U.K.: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 3rd edn., 2005, p. 43.

show that sentences in a language, have various functions to perform, he gives examples of language games: the expression of sensation (PI-288), the reporting of past wishes (PI-654), the description of physical objects and description of sense-impression (PI-180), ostensive definition (PI-27) and so forth.

According to Wittgenstein, language is an ever changing process, for every moment it accepts new words, new sentences and new rules. He gives some analogies of language as a game. First of all, he compares with tool kits in a tool box. He says, think of the tools in a tool box: there are hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a ruler, a glue pot, nails etc.. The functions of words are as diverse as the function of these objects.¹ Actually, he wants to say that, various types of language games are but, the various types of uses of words. This view can be compared with the *evambhuta naya*² and *bhāva nikṣepa*³ as it also deals with the functional action of the words. According to the *evambhuta naya*, any word is meaningful only from view point of its pragmatic use. For instance, the word *purandara* should be, according to this *evambhuta naya*, designated as such only, when he is actually engaged in the act of destroying his enemies. Similarly the designation *śakra* is appropriate only, when he is actually manifesting his prowess.⁴

Another important contribution of Later Wittgenstein is the notion of 'Form of Life', established in the later phase of his life. In *Philosophical Investigations*, he says, 'to imagine a language is to imagine a Form of Life'.⁵ But this does not mean

¹ Ludwig Wittgenstein. *Philosophical Investigations*. op.cit., Section-11.

² *Tattvārtha Sūtra*, op.cit., 1.34.

³ *Ibid*, 1.5.

⁴ *Pramāṇa Naya Tattvalokālamkar*. VII.41 *yathendānam anubhavann indrah, śakanakriyā parināth śakraḥ pūrdāreṇ apravṛttaḥ purandara ityucyate*. PNTA VII.41. see Illuminator of Jaina Tenets. op.cit., 10.26; Bhikshu Nyāya Karnikā, op.cit., 5.12

⁵ Ludwig Wittgenstein. *Philosophical Investigations*, op.cit., Sec.-19.

that, a Form of Life' is a language or a language is a Form of Life'. What does follow is that, there is some logical or conceptual connection between these two notions. Actually the Form of Life draws attention to pre-linguistic behavior, which is an essential presupposition of any language. He concluded, that to know words, sentences, or their combinatorial rules is not enough to understand any language, but the Form of life (the environment) in which any person is brought up is also essential for commonsense understanding and for successful communication. Only then, can the correct language game be played and day to day transactions be carried on successfully. This view of Form of life can be compared with the Jain view of understanding of meaning of the word from four dimensional perspectives of substance, place, time and modes. Jains believe that there are also other determinants of existence and non-existence, viz., substance (*dravya*), location (*kṣētra*), time (*kāla*), and modes (*bhāva*).¹ One perspective alone will not do. As every individual is born in a different place, a different time and in a different environment, to understand him/her and to communicate with, we need to look into their Form of life for successful communication and for functional operation. For example, the word 'knight' means one like Sir Gallahad, when we are reading King Arthur and his knights of the Round Table. It refers to P.F. Strawson when we speak of his being knighted by the Queen in recognition not of valour but his erudition. It means a piece on a board of chess, the replica of a horse, with its peculiar moment on the board.² Every word gives meaning only in the context. But we don't understand it and miscommunication and conflict between two or more views occurs.

¹ *Bhāgavati Sūtra*, op.cit., 2.44-45.

² Arun Kumar Mukherjee. *Anekāntavāda and Its Statement in Saptabhaṅgi Naya*. Tulsi Prajñā. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati Institute, No. 113-114, Dec. 2001, p. 27.

By the theory of Language Game Wittgenstein has given a powerful blow to the traditional view of essentialism. The Essentialists emphasize that every word has a fixed meaning. But, Wittgenstein shows that, meaning of every word is conventional, it might change from time to time according to the different context. For example, the word '*saindhava*' has two meanings 'horse' and 'salt'.¹ But if a person is asked to bring *saindhava*, when a soldier is ready to go for war, and a particular person brings salt at that time or when '*saindhava*' is asked during lunch and a particular person brings the horse this is not contextual. The word *vaitarṇi* is a name of river which is considered as sacred in the Hindu tradition, whereas in Jain tradition *vaitarṇi* river is considered as the river which flows in hell. Thus the four-fold perspective of Jainism, can be compared with the Wittgensteinean view of form of life. In this regard, Wittgenstein speaks in tune, with the Jain perspective of *Syādvāda* and parallaly to the perspective of Derridean Deconstruction. Thus he tries to establish a living language-related to the respective Forms of life. It is one of his most remarkable contribution in the field of Language Philosophy.

In sum and substance, it is clear that Wittgenstein view runs in parallel with the Jain view. Like the manifold, indeterminate and relative reality, its knowledge as well as verbal expression is also manifold, indeterminate and relative. It is for our practical purpose only, that we fix the meaning of a particular word or a sentence according to the context, the intention to the speaker, the general purpose and so on. However, meaning is as in-exhaustive as Reality itself.²

¹ Mahāprajña, Ācārya. *Jīva-Ajīva*. Ed. Muni Sumermal & Jethmal Bhansal. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati, 1995, p. 34.

² *Anekantavad & Syādvāda*. Ed. Srichand Rampuria. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati Institute, 1996, p. 268.

4.7.3 Overlapping Between Jainism And Sartrean Philosophical View

Any comparative study in the field of philosophy uses the tool-box method of Wittgenstein's 'Family Resemblance' i.e. which looks to the ideas of 'overlappings' among the various systems of philosophy. The efforts are being made to highlight the points of agreement as well as difference between some of the concepts of *Jaina* philosophy and that of Sartrean philosophy. Jean Paul Sartre (1905-1980), is considered to be an 'Existential Phenomenologist' in the world of Western Philosophy. Though Jain philosophy is an ancient philosophy, it is very scientific, analytic and modern which coincides with the views of modern western philosophical thinking.

Nature of Soul and Being-for-itself

Jain philosophers assert two levels of souls, viz., mundane and liberated souls. Liberated souls are self-complete; they do not possess any sort of desire and any project for future possibilities. But as far as mundane souls are concerned, they are incomplete like Sartrean Being-for-itself. According to Sartre, for-itself is incomplete, and has indeterminate structure and innumerable possibilities. He says, 'It is only in the human world, that there can be lack. Consciousness is primarily a lack: it contains nothingness within itself, and is forever reaching beyond to something else.... At the same time consciousness at a pre-reflective level, has a desire for wholeness...' ¹ Sartre shows also that the existence of desire or unsatisfaction is the living proof of Being for-itself. Jain philosophers also agree that the mundane beings always desire to achieve the higher ladder of spiritual development. So in one sense, mundane souls are incomplete like the Sartrean Being for-itself and always lack something and are always in the process of being built up. As

¹ Teichman Jenny and Graham White. Ed. *An Introduction to Modern European Philosophy*. Newyork: St. Martin's Press, 1995, p. 133.

soul is also a kind of entity, it possesses infinite possibilities. It acquires innumerable varied attributes and modes continuously without any break and keeps on progressing in the various situations of life.

But here the point of disagreement lies in the fact that as the soul gets rid of the bondage of eight types of *karma*-s, they achieve the state of self-completeness. In that stage, there is no lack, no desire, not even any sort of possibility of becoming. But in Sartrean philosophy, *for-itself* has all the characteristics of Platonic becoming. It is always in the process of being built up in its ever renewing attempts at the realization of future projects. The nature of *for-itself* is persistent striving. He says, "*for-itself* i.e. consciousness is a being, which is what it is not and which is not what it is."¹ In this way, Sartre speaks in tune with Jain view of Reality which accepts infinite possibility of origination and cessation of modes in mundane soul. The question of this possibility does not arise in the case of *being-in-itself*. This means that it is neither passivity nor activity. *Being-in-itself* is never possible or impossible, it simply *is*. But *Jains* differ here. They believe that even matter also possesses infinite possibilities always open before it.

Once the *Being for-itself* stops choosing any possibility, it converts itself into an *in-itself*, something like a thing, which is not in tune with the view of the Jain philosophy. Jains believe that when all the possibilities are accomplished, being becomes omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent and self complete. But it never transforms into a thing-like Sartrean existence or *in-itself*. But Sartrean consciousness always keeps on transcending itself for future projects, only death can stop this transcendence and reduce it to a thing-like congealed something.²

¹ W. T Jones. *History of Western Philosophy. op.cit.*, p. 353.

² *Ibid*, p. 353.

Sartrean Concept of Freedom and Jain View of Change of Karma

In Sartrean philosophy, man is said to be absolutely free, i.e. "Man is condemned to be free." In his famous work "*Being and Nothingness*", he says "Man is freedom". Sartre says, consciousness does not make being; it makes meanings. "When the for-itself "upsurges" it makes a world, a world of things that stand in complex spatio-temporal and causal relations ..."¹ Thus the for-itself lives in a world that it has created and for which, as the creator, it is responsible.² Even the Jain philosophers agree with the fact that man is independent or free in doing any auspicious or inauspicious action, but not free to experience its fruitions. Sartre, though he advocates absolute freedom, understands that there are many things which obstruct our exercise of freedom. They can be categorized under five heads: i. My place ii. My past iii. My environment iv. Other human beings and v. My death.³ These are called by Sartre the co-efficient of *facticity*. About these categories Sartre has said that they may obstruct human freedom to a certain extent, but in all of them it is possible to construct a new situation. Even Sartre also admits relative freedom likewise, Jainism agrees with the view that to some extent man is free in changing his future through auspicious religious practices like observation of penances, meditation, etc. But in the fruition of *nikacita Karma*, he is not free, as far as *dalika karma* is concerned, he is free to change the fruition of *karmas*.⁴ Thus Sartre accepts the *anekantic* relativity in the concept of freedom for-itself.

¹ W. T. Jones. *History of Western Philosophy*. p. 354.

² *Ibid*, p. 355.

³ Gregory, McCulloch. *Using Sartre: An Analytical Introduction to Early Sartrean Themes*. London And New York. Routledge, 1994, *op.cit.*, p. 53.

⁴ *Karma Prakriti* of Nemichandra. Ed. Hiralal Shastri. Delhi: Bhartiya Gyanpith, 1964, p. 19(2).

Sartrean Bad Faith and Jaina Belief of *atmakartrityavada*

Sartre says that for-itself has freedom of choice, if he denies to choose, if he refuses to choose from amongst the alternative choices open to him, it means he is fleeing from anguish. What it means is that, he is in bad faith. He says, if someone formulates excuses and gives some causes for not taking a decision or choosing, then he is reducing himself to a thing or in-itself. Moreover, he says if one denies his very nature of transcendence i.e. if he accepts himself to be what he is at a particular time, he becomes an in-itself like a waiter, who tries to make himself solely and wholly a waiter. He is then said to be in bad faith. Sartre says—"Good faith is an attempt to face our freedom and Bad faith is to flee from it."¹ The very same view can be compared with the Jain view that, if any monk or nun hides his own ability or capacity to do some work i.e., penance, recitation of verses, going for alms, then he is *pāpashramaṇ* as mentioned in the *Ācārāṅga Sūtra*² and *Dasvaikālika Sūtra*.³ *Pāpashramaṇ* is a *shramaṇ* (a monk) who, according to Sartre's gloss, is simply in bad faith. Moreover Lord Mahavira has said, man has freedom of action, so he himself is responsible for his own fruition of auspicious and inauspicious *Karmas*. Even Sartre says, "Since our choice of this fundamental project is absolutely spontaneous, we are wholly responsible for it. We cannot pass on the responsibility to others or lay different excuses for ourselves by blaming the time, the place or the circumstances."⁴

Sartre claims that while doing any act, one should also consider 'the other'. It means my freedom does not obstruct or

¹ W.T. Jones. *History of Western Philosophy. op.cit.*, p. 353.

² *Acaranga Sutra*. Ed. Mishrimalji. Beawar: Agam Prakashan Samiti, 1991, verse-5.3.41

³ *Dasvaikālika Sutra*. Ed. Muni Nathmal. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati, 1998, verse-10.8

⁴ W.T. Jones, *History of Western Philosophy. op.cit.*, p. 358.

disturb the others. It should not hurt others. While choosing to perform any action, I know that others have their respective choice of action. Before choosing he has to think that what will happen if all will follow the same, what he has chosen. That means he has to keep 'the others' at his place. Even *Jains* do believe in the concept of oneness of soul. It is rightly quoted in *Acaranga Sutra*, that to kill or harm others is tantamount to kill or hurt the self. So one should behave with others as one wishes to be behaved with the self. If he ignores such question that means he is in bad-faith. He becomes inauthentic. "Even Jain philosophers do agree with the fact that the material cause of each and every action is the human being himself, but situations may be considered as an efficient cause."¹ Jains believe in the theory of '*ātmakarṭṛtvavāda*', So no question of blaming others for one's auspicious and inauspicious *karma-s* that occurs.

In nutshell, we can conclude in this manner in the words of *Vedānta* philosophy: "*ekam sat viprā bahudā vadanti*" i.e. Truth is one but the ways of expression differs. The jaina terminology and Sartrean jargon indicate the same concept but differ in the way of expression.

4.7.4 Overlapping Between Jainism and Derridean Philosophical View

Analytical Language Philosophy

Traditionally, the philosophy of language is concerned with speech. Speech was the model of traditional philosophy of Language. The speaker speaks something he intends to convey. Speaker addresses the hearer. When the hearer understands the meaning, communication occurs. Hearer can clarify the words, if he faces any difficulty. This is the significance of speech. So in the traditional method of philosophy of language, speech was

¹ Acharya Mahāprajña. *Jain Darshan: Manan Aur Mimamsa*. Delhi: Adarsh Sahitya Samgha, 2008, p. 230.

considered as primary and writing the secondary. They claimed, writing is like an orphan (cut off from the speaker) without the father. But Jacques Derrida(1931-2004) defended this by quoting, 'writing is prior to speech'. Derrida says- Language is Utterable. All expressions, utterances belong to some context and it is settled or fixed by the rules of convention. So language has no meaning independent of speaker. Because meaning of any language is determined by the rules of convention and writing represents fundamental features or characteristics of language. So language is something independent from human mind. Language has its own dynamic structure, independent of the speaker. In opposition, Noam Chomsky, says, 'structure of language is derived by the structure of human mind'.

In the Book '*Margin*', Derrida says, to understand any meaning, sign is needed. In order to capture the meaning, we need language, not the speaker. Speaker speaks with the intention to convey something. Derrida says, we look into very structure of language independent of speaker. Austin, a well known Anglo-American philosopher, came with the theory of speech act. He says, when I use language, I do something, so language is not cognitive, but pragmatic. The important lesson that Derrida has derived from Austin is, 'Language is not used in relation to force.' He says, 'When I utter a sentence, what I intend to do, therein lies force. In this sense, when emphasized on force, he deviated himself from western tradition. This is the innovation of Austin according to Derrida. Austin says, "When I use language, I use it to bring about a situation, that was not present." When I use language, for example, I request. When I request, I create certain situation. Thus he concluded that speaker or speech does not represent anything but creates a situation.

Derrida received this insight from Austin. Now we will consider in what way he departs from Austin. As already mentioned Austin insisted on force, and not on the link between

language and reality. Now, Derrida approves that when I speak something, I intend to mean something, that is application of my use of language. How the hearer understands my meaning is a main cause of successful communication. So the meaning is determined by the intention of the speaker. Again each speaker uses sentences in a particular context. So two things are important for understanding any language. They are, the intention of the speaker and the context in which one utters a particular sentence.

He says, "Context is determined by the intention and position of the speaker." Thus Austin concludes, speakers control over intention and context is what is called "total context." Unless there is total context, there will be no communication. Total context represents the ideal condition of successful communication. Total context is nothing but a state where the hearer understands the intention of the speaker completely. Thus, Austin by emphasizing again on this self identical meaning, he is stepping back to the tradition of language and reality. According to Austin, context is fixed by speaker. According to the Derridean Deconstruction, context is not fixed. He says, context is never absolutely determinable or the formation of context is never final and saturated.

The problem of word-meaning and the problem of synonymy is an illustrative issue in Western Post-modern philosophy. There is no one or 'the meaning' of any word. No two words can have a similar meaning in two different contexts. One cannot determine the meaning of a particular word absolutely. All the meanings of the similar words changes, according to the respective contexts. This is indeed, the reason why the verbal view point, which is mainly concerned with the philosophy of word, meaning and propositions, occupies an important place in the Jaina doctrine of *naya*.¹ So *naya* is a partial standpoint,

¹ Ācārya Mahāprajña. *New Dimensions In Logic*. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati, 1984, p. 59.

which determines the context-based use of words. The theory of *niksepa* in Jainism is understood as a theory of word- meaning in terms of the present language philosophy. A word contains opposing non-synonymous meanings, where one is in the focus and the other one is in the margin, depending upon the context.

The Post-structuralist Jacques Derrida's view (1931-2004) seems to be parallel with the Jain concept of *anekānta*. He actually deals with the philosophy of language and Deconstruction. The conceptual argument for deconstruction depends on the relativity which I mean the view that truth itself is always to the different standpoints....¹ In Western world of philosophy, Derrida's Critique focuses on privileging the spoken word over the written word. The spoken word is given a higher value because the speaker and the listener are both present during the utterance simultaneously. Derrida attacked this theory of presence and origins by attacking the notion that speech has priority over Writing.² There is no temporal or spatial distance between speaker, speech and listener. This immediacy seems to guarantee the notion that in the spoken word, we know what we mean, we mean what we say, say what we mean, and know, what we have said. Whether or not perfect understanding always occur *in fact*, this image of perfectly self-present meaning is, according to Derrida, the underlying ideal of Western culture.... of Logo-centricism... which considers writing to be only a *representation* of speech.³ In the course of his critique, Derrida simply reverses this value system and says that 'Writing is prior to speech.' When Derrida attacked on the priority of speech over writing he was attacking on which is very much parallel to the Jaina view of non-absolutism. the

¹ Christopher Butler. *Post Modernism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (Indian Edn.), 2002, p. 16.

² Derek Johnson. *A Brief History of Philosophy: From Socrates to Derrida*, p. 189.

³ Jacques Derrida. *Dissemination*. Trans. With an Introduction and Additional Notes by Barbara Johnson. London: Continuum, 2005, Intro-ix.

notion of any sort of absolute. He supposes that nothing is stable; the so called structure is also not stable. Everything is tentative, *there is no permanent the truth, the meaning, the text, the interpretation and the context*. One cannot tie down the meaning of any word. Moreover, he says every sign is made up of signifier and signified. But he claims that, there is no transcendental signified and no signified can be found as it is an abstract mental construction. Moreover signified is never a finished product. It is like a cloud forming which is endless. So the quest for the meaning of any word, would lead one to the endless deferral. Derrida says that as soon as there is meaning, there is *différance*, from the French verb *différer*, which means both 'to differ', and 'to defer'.¹ So Derrida claimed that meaning is never immediate, it is always deferred. For example, let us try to tie the word 'meaning' of the meaning. The meaning of the word "meaning" according to the Oxford Dictionary is 'what is meant'.² Further it is searched and the meaning of 'meant' is given as, 'what it means'. If the word 'means' meaning is searched, it is found to be 'signify'. Again the same process is continued and we get the meaning of the word 'signify' as being 'significant'. The meaning of the meaning is infinite in its implication, this is what *anekānta* claims. Each word has infinite meanings, if dealt from different perspectives.

Derrida emphasized that language cannot refer to a fixed stable meaning 'deconstruction', is used to unravel meaning from texts in order to show that it is composed of assimilations that cannot be true; the meaning of the text cannot be limited by the intentions of the author of the text.... Words do not carry meaning with them, they 'put off' their ability to carry meaning by referring to other possibilities of meaning. Language is

¹ Jacques Derrida. *Dissemination*. Trans. With an Introduction and Additional Notes by Barbara Johnson. London: Continuum, 2005, Intro-ix.

² Oxford Advance Learner's Dictionary. Ed. Jonathan Crowther, 1991, p. 726.

relational.¹ His term In an attempt to capture the signified (the meaning of the word), we keep moving from one signifier (word) to another signifier, we never get to the signified, the signified gets lost in the search, and we keep going round and round. Thus one can mark the circularity of 'signifiers'. For meaning perpetually slips away from word to word with in the linguistic chain.² One may try defining (i.e. capturing the signified) even of simple words like 'a city', it can never be defined in absolute terms. We can only say, it is a larger town. But, again the word 'town' has to be specified, we can say, it is a large village. This clearly shows that a sign is a sign of another sign with no fixed meaning or signified, there is no final transcendental signified.³ According to Derrida, language is structured as an endless deferral of meaning and any search for the essential, absolute stable meaning must therefore be considered metaphysical. There is no fixed element, no fundamental unit, no transcendental signified that is meaningful in itself.

In addition to this, Derrida pointed out that in everything (sign, text, context) whatever the opposite of it, is always already there, as a trace. According to Derrida, wherever there is endless deferral, there is trace. For example, in light there is trace of darkness and vice-versa. There is a trace of land in sea and vice-versa. In adult there is a trace of child, in man there is a trace of women. You can't dycotomize and say, this is absolute man and absolute women. Jain view of *anekānta* is in agreement with this concept of trace, when Hemachandra also says that in the particles of darkness, there are particles of light

¹ Derek Johnson. *A Brief History of Philosophy: From Socrates to Derrida*. op.cit., p. 202.

² Christopher Butler. *Post Modernism: A Very Short Introduction*, p. 18.

³ N. Krishnaswamy, John Varghese and Sunita Mishra. *Contemporary Literary Theory: A Student's Companion*. Delhi: Macmillan India Ltd, (1st edn., 2001), Reprint 2005, p. 33.

and vice-versa.¹ In the view of Derrida, the other is always already present in the Reality, one doesn't have to invent it. According to the *Jain* view, jar is defined by its resident qualities (for example, red etc.) as well as by "non-jar". This metaphysical idea presented in language, is confirmed in the third statement in *saptabhaṅgī naya* : *syād ghaṭa asti ca nāsti ca*.² The now existing jar is metaphysically determined and defined by its other, non-jar. In this sense, the jar is also non-jar. In the Derridean language, words are signs, the signified is another word. We move from word to word, word to word, with endless deferral. This is the position of today's philosophy of language.

Structuralists Claude Levi Strauss(1829-1902), a French philosopher, had said that, a word is meaningful because of its binary "other" word. A single word by itself has no meaning. In the world around us, if there had been only absolute permanence, then its nomenclature would not have been possible. Since there is permanence, that is why we understand impermanence. If there was only light and no darkness, then light could not have been defined. All the names are given so, on the basis of their opposites. The need for opposites is a fundamental principle. For example, 'yat sat tatt sa pratipakṣam'. Even Claude Levi Strauss says that no word is meaningful all by itself. The word 'day' is not a self-content or self-complete. It is determined by the other. The meaning of the word 'night' is only meaningful with the meaning of the 'day'. The word 'night' is not meaningful by itself. That's why even Structuralist Claude Levis Strauss asserts that there is a binary relation between day and night, God and non-God. The word 'God' is meaningful in reference to non-God. The qualities given to the God i.e. Creator, Destroyer, Sustainer, Merciful etc. are meaningful in reference to the other i.e. the devil or the

¹ *Syādvādamañjarī* of Malliṣeṇa, p. 18; *Anyayoga Vacchedika*, verse-5.

² *Saptabhaṅgi Tarangini* of Vimaldas, *op.cit.*, p. 11.

cruel. The two words are rolled in one. One is revolving around the center of the word and other remains in the margin.

Rejecting this Structuralist view, Jacque Derrida says that a word includes its other within its meaning. He refers to Plato's use of the word *pharmakon*, which means medicine as well as poison.¹ Thus the word contains opposites as its meaning. This idea of Derrida applies in general in his theory of words and meanings. One can say that the sentence, *ghata asti nāsti ca*, reflects this idea, if taken in terms of philosophy of language. The point I want to make is that today's cultural problem of the "other" can be seen in this light. Infact the other or others are not that "other" sealed off against each other. *Anekāntavāda*, then, said this long long ago before Derrida. Western thought, says Derrida, has always been structured in terms of dichotomies or polarities ;good vs. evil, being vs. nothingness, truth vs. error, identity vs. difference, mind vs. matter, presence vs. absence....The second term in each pair is considered as ...opposed in their meanings ,but are arranged in the hierarchical order which gives the first term *priority*, in both the temporal and the qualitative sense of the word.² Bad and good , men and women both are complementary (one that complete the other), not antonyms.³ The same view is accepted in Jainism, no Reality is self-complete by itself, it achieves its completeness because of 'the other'. The moment one privileges one attribute, falls in fallacy. It falls in the category of pseudo-*naya*(*durnaya*) as per jain view, on account of its being absolutistic in character.⁴ Without lie, you can't say truth, in

¹ Jacques Derrida. *Dissemination. op.cit.*, p. 103.

² Jacques Derrida. *Dissemination*. Trans. With an Introduction and Additional Notes by Barbara Johnson. London: Continuum, 2005, Intro-viii.

³ Ācārya Mahāprajña. *Anekānta Hein Tisra Netra*. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati, 1982, p. 4.

⁴ Ācārya Mahāprajña. *New Dimensions In Jaina Logic*. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati, 1984, p. 63.

misunderstanding also there is understanding , in vagueness also there is clarity, in truth also there is untruth and vice-versa. So there is nothing like absolute, everything is always relative to the other. This is why that Jain perspective of *anekānta* which accepts this relativity will never assert anything absolutely.

According to the *anekānta* philosophy when one quality becomes dominant in expression, the rest would be secondary at that time. Samantabhadra in his text rightly says, a significant rule of *anekānta* is that one will be predominant while all the rest will be secondary. It is on this basis that relativity has developed.¹ In this way, multiple truth can be expressed with the help of *syād* particle. In this state, no attributes are left privileged. Along with this Derrida says, if a sign is a sign of another sign and if a text is a text of another text, then a context is a context of another context. This implies that even contextual meaning is not fixed and there is no limit to what may be called 'contextual meaning'.² There is endless deferral in contextual meaning. So language, thought, and meaning are now all in an uncomfortable position; they are unstable.³ This view can be compared with Siddhasena's perspective (*Sanmati Tarka Prakarana*, 3.28) pertaining to *naya*, where he says no word of the *jina* is independent of *naya*. The *nayas* are as many in number as there are ways of putting the sentences. So, many-many commentaries were written in Jainism from the very past on a particular *agamic* text namely, *niryukti*, *tikā*, *cūrṇi*, *bhāṣya* etc. No *ācārya* claimed that the interpretation which is written by him is final. There is always scope for further interpretation

¹ *Āptamīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra, verse-1.22.

² N. Krishnaswamy, John Varghese and Sunita Mishra. *Contemporary Literary Theory: A Student's Companion*. Delhi: Macmillan India Ltd, (1st edn., 2001), Reprint 2005.

³ Derek Johnson. *A Brief History of Philosophy: From Socrates to Derrida*, *op.cit.*, p. 192.

of each and every aphorism. That's why only on *Tattvārtha Sūtra*, on one single text, many commentaries were written.

So it can be concluded that Derridean deconstruction is a kind of hermeneutic freedom-for-all, a joyous release from all the rules and constraints of critical reading and understanding as per some American deconstructionists. Thus, it is mentioned how the western and postmodern philosophers' view seems to be running in parallel with the concept of relativity of *anekāntic* perspective, relativity of meaning, relativity of word and the impossibility of exhaustive cognition as well as expression of any object as accepted by Jain philosophers.

V

Multidimensional Application of *Anekānta*

5.1 Applied *Anekānta*

Anekāntavād is the heart of Jain philosophy. Reality possesses infinite characters which cannot be perceived or known at once by an ordinary man. Different people think about different aspects of the same Reality and therefore their partial findings are contradictory to one another. Hence, they indulge in debates claiming that each of them was completely true. The Jain philosophers thought over this conflict and tried to reveal the whole truth by establishing the theory of non-absolutist standpoint (*anekāntavāda*) with its two wings, *nayavāda* and *syādavāda*.

Every single thing has innumerable characteristics. Every object possesses innumerable positive and negative characters. It is not possible to know all of them. One can know only some qualities of a substance. To know all the aspects of a given substance is to become omniscient. Human beings are by nature imperfect. They cannot comprehend an object in its totality as their view is limited. Human knowledge is necessarily relative so, at its best can have only partial knowledge and it is not free from error and illusion. To view a thing not only from a single point of view, but to examine it from all possible points of view is the real meaning of the doctrine of *anekāntavāda*. After the metaphysical analysis of the theory of *anekānta*, and *anekānta* in post-modern philosophy, the heart of the research work, its applied philosophy will be the focus point of this chapter. Now-a-days the applied ethics, applied bio-ethics, applied science, applied physics, applied psychology, applied medical ethics, applied professional-ethics, applied research-

ethics, applied environmental-ethics, applied statistics, applied kinesiology, applied calculus, applied behavior analysis, applied nutritional studies, etc. topics are issues of special concern. in all the spheres of life.

The Co-existence, Relativity, Tolerance, Equanimity and Reconciliation are the outcomes of theory of *anekānta*. The above mentioned outcomes of *anekānta* would be dealt under this topic from the point of view of its applied philosophy of life.

5.2 Principles of *Anekānta*

Right faith implies non-absolutism. Perverted faith means absolutism or the assertion that nothing but what one thinks, is right. To treat a mode or thought as absolute or inclusive is absolutism; to treat it as relative and incomplete is non-absolutism.¹ The biggest mistake is to consider *anekānta* as mere philosophy and to accept that it is confined to only discussions of truth. Ācārya Mahāprajña said that the doctrine, which does not apply to real life, does not apply to quest for truth either. Life is also a truth; it is a great truth and all explanations derive from it. All principles, streams of thought and arguments originate from it. No truth can be located away from life.²

Now what is the utility of the theory of *anekānta* into day-today practical life of common man to improve their way of living? *Anekānta* is not only a tool for logical development, but it is equally useful in developing the self, family life, society, community, management, therapy, counseling, political decisions, Jurisprudence and all other disciplines of human life. This chapter deals with practical approach of all fields of life and explores new insight to lead a life of peace and harmony.

¹ *Nayacakra* of Mailladhavala. verse-

² Ācārya Mahāprajña. *Anekānta: Views and Issues. op.cit.*, pp. 3-4.

As per the view of Ācārya Mahāprajña, there are five principles of *anekānta*. They are as follows :

- (i) Co-existence
- (ii) Relativity
- (iii) Reconciliation¹
- (iv) Tolerance
- (v) Equanimity.²

(i) Co-existence

The first principle of *anekānta* is Co-existence. Anything or anybody existent must have their opposite, *yat sat tat sapratipakṣam*. Without the opposite, naming is impossible and so is characterization. The animate and the inanimate are two extremes. Yet they co-exist. The body is inanimate; the soul is animate. They co-exist. The permanent and the impermanent, the similar and the dissimilar, the identical and the different, all these are mutually contradictory; yet they co-exist. They co-exist in an object. The acceptance of infinite opposing attributes in an entity or object is called *anekānta*.³ The permanent substance is not altogether separate from the impermanent modes, nor is the latter completely separated from the former.⁴ Co-existence implies tolerance and freedom of thought. Both tolerance and freedom of thought are meaningless, if we try to enforce our likes, ideas, lifestyle and principles on others.

If a person claims his thesis to be truth the absolute on the basis of his comprehension of only a particular aspect of the object, then certainly he is going beyond what he has

¹ Ācārya Mahāprajña. *Anekānt: The Third Eye*, op.cit., p. 20..

² Ācārya Mahāprajña. *Anekānta Hein Tisrā Netra*. op.cit., p. 23.

³ Ācārya Mahāprajña. *Ekanta Mai Anekānta: Anekānta Mai Ekant*. Ed. Sādhvi Vishruta Vibha. Delhi: Jain Vishva Bharati, 2006, p. 202.

⁴ *Sanmati Tarkaprakaraṇa*. op.cit., verse-1.12.

comprehended. This assertion may be called false, according to *anekāntavāda* and will certainly encourage dogmatism and fanaticism, extremism and intolerance. Hence, *anekāntavāda* cautions us against building close systems of philosophy and rather encourages us to formulate a theory of relativity, which harmonizes all mutually contradictory standpoints. This doctrine intends to convey the truth that co-existence of mutually contradictory characteristics of an object is a fact which should not be ignored if we want to live peacefully and smilingly.

(ii) Relativity

The second principle of *anekānta* is Relativity. The analysis of *nayas* shows that every judgement is relative to that particular aspect, from which it is seen or known. This is also called *sāpekṣavāda*, which means relativity of our particular knowledge or judgement to a particular standpoint. Since human judgements are always from particular standpoints, they are all relative and hence not absolutely true or absolutely false. Their outright acceptance as a sole truth, or rejection as totally false, would not be correct. *nayavāda* is an objective perspective. It is a perspective given to us through objects by long experience. Two castes or two sects can be held in a mutually antagonistic relation only by adopting an absolute viewpoint. On the contrary, different individuals, castes and sects can survive and obtain relative benefits only on the basis of the non-absolutist viewpoint. In fact, the interest of the factory owner and the workers are not incompatible. By keeping in mind the workers interests, productivity increases and the factory owner's interests are served. Likewise, by keeping in mind the owner's interests those of the workers are served. If both seek to serve their interests in absolutely independent terms, the interests of both are jeopardized.

(iii) Reconciliation

The Third principle of *Anekānta* is Reconciliation.¹ The utility of the theory of *naya* lies in its analytical approach and the consequential approach of a rational reconciliation of the manifold reality. The task of this rational reconciliation is done by the theory of *syādvāda*. As Dalsukha Mālavaniā, an esteemed *Jain* scholar puts it, "Ācārya Siddhasena has said that, there are as many view points (*naya*-s) as there are statements and there are as many philosophies as there are statements. Enlightening this pronouncement, Ācārya Jinabhadra makes it clear that all philosophies taken collectively constitute Jainism. Contradiction seems to exist in the mutually exclusive statements, so long as they are not harmonized and integrated with each other. The doctrine of *anekānta* is the heart of *Jain* ontology, epistemology and logic. It claims the indeterminateness of reality, its knowledge and its verbal expression. If reality is infinitely manifold, logically there must be infinite ways of intellectually cognizing it and verbally expressing its infinite aspects. This presupposition enables one to harmonize various apparently contradictory descriptions to reality.

Anekāntavāda is the basic to the structure of Jain metaphysics. It seeks to reorient our logical attitude and asks us to accept the unification of contradictions as the true measure of reality. It is the key to unlock the mystery of the paradoxical reality. It is a principle of the quest for unity between two apparently different characteristics of a substance. Characteristics, which differ, are not altogether different. They have identity also. Reconciliation can be brought about only by cognizing the identity principle. The principle of ecology is one of reconciliation and of inter-relationship between different substances. Balance in the universe cannot be established on the

¹ Ācārya Mahāprajña. *Anekānt: Views and Issues*. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati Institute, 2001, p. 3.

basis of the premise, "I alone exist". We survive only by adhering to the principle that "besides me, the other also exists and we are inter-related". The ecological balance in the universe can be explained on the basis of the above concept of inter-relatedness.

(iv) Tolerance

The fourth principle of *anekānta* is Tolerance. Mere co-existence does not make a society. People do not think alike. The effect of genes, impact of environment, influence of time and space, and the conglomeration of one's past deeds make every individual unique. To organize such individuals into a peaceful net and to collectivize their creative skills into a civilized force, *anekānta* principle of tolerance is needed. The foundation of a healthy society indeed lies in bringing about harmony among diverse needs, ideas, thoughts and interests. The vital element of harmony is tolerance.¹

What is tolerance? Tolerance is respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity of our world's cultures, our forms of expression and ways of being human. Tolerance is harmony in difference. Tolerance is a moral duty. Tolerance is the virtue that makes peace possible, and contributes to the replacement of the culture of war by a culture of peace.² What is intolerance? Intolerance is everything that tolerance is not. It is narrow-mindedness, prejudice and fanaticism. Tolerance means conscious respect for diverse viewpoints, faiths, cultures, customs, and convictions. It accepts the dignity of every individual. Tolerance is a positive attribute of mind which means hearty acceptance of others diverse views with due respect.³ Wars and conflicts are unavoidable between intolerant groups and nations. Intolerance is increasingly becoming the

¹ Ācārya Mahāprajña. *The Family and The Nation*. Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers, 2008, p. 110.

² The Un Declaration on Principles of Tolerance, 1995, p. 109.

³ Mahaprajña. *The Family and the Nation*. *op.cit.*, p. 110.

greatest danger to the survival of humanity. Fundamentalism is now the biggest enemy of spirituality the and it is self-destructive. Political intolerance is no less dangerous. It destroys all norms of good governance. No political system can succeed unless rival parties competing for power learn to endure each other. It is evident that disintegration of highly cultured and educated citizens had led to two big world wars. According to *Jains*, forgiveness, should suffix intolerance. Emotions can't be altogether controlled. *Jains* have found out a very effective way to counter this. It suggests spending a couple of minutes everyday to seek forgiveness for ones intolerant acts, words and deeds, and to give forgiveness to others for their intolerance. This *anekāntic* approach of tolerance not only purifies the heart and cleanses the mind from ill the effects of intolerance, but also establishes a friendly abode on the earth.

(v) Equanimity

The fifth principle of *anekānta* is Equanimity. Ācārya Umāsvāti in his *Tattvārtha Sūtra* cites an important aphorism of universal brotherhood "*parasparōpagraho jivānām*" i.e., mutual interdependence of living beings.¹ Nothing is independent. All are interdependent .Our third eye is the eye of equanimity. We have two eyes. Our right eye symbolizes attachment and the left, aversion.²To live in the world of phenomena , one has to develop the *anekāntic* view in practical life with the understanding that all the six levels of beings possess equal consciousness and behave accordingly.*Tirthankar* Mahavira endowed humanity with a fundamental thought on which entire behaviour, patterns and relationship with the environment is based. An equality of all the forms of life and reverence for all of them is his central teaching. He taught, "As you want to live,

¹ *Tattvārtha Sūtra. op.cit.*, 5.21.

² Mahaprajña. *Anekānta: The Third Eye. op.cit.*, p. 88.

so do the others.¹ In his definition of the 'other', he embraced or included not only all living beings that can move but also the existence of non-movable earth, air, water, fire and vegetation, and he made a fundamental contribution to our understanding of ecology.

So *anekāntavāda* and *Syādvāda* are the two relativistic pluralisms. They are like the two sides of the same coin. One is *anekānta* at the thought level and *syādvāda* at the speech level. For example, a pessimistic person looking at a half filled glass of water may say that, the glass is half empty. However the other side of the truth is that glass is also half filled. So *anekānta* requires one to consider and understand other view point also, rather than trying to justify only his or her point, and thus remove the contradiction. The doctrine of *anekānta* should not remain as a mere theory. So an endeavour is made to apply the technique of *anekānta* and its ultimate outcome in the following practical issues of life.

5.3 Change of Vision at Individual Level and *Anekānta*

Anekānta is a well known principle of life. This principle begins with a change in vision. When our vision is not holistic, then our thoughts are not distilled about both the gross and the subtle world. Mahāprajñā quite often used to quote an incident of a dogmatic person. He tries to quench his thirst, by drinking the dirty water of his father's pond, while clean water is available to him. This kind of dogmatic view is found where the third eye, which sees the truth is not open. Dogmatism is the result of the lack of understanding.² Many scholars limit the use of *anekānta* at the level of gross world, this way they narrow down the scope of *anekānta*. There is a saying that 'Beauty lies in the eyes of the beholder.' This means that a person sees what

¹ Ācārāṅga Sūtra, op.cit., 2.3.63.

² Mahaprajñā. *Anekānta: The Third Eye*, op.cit., p. 96.

he wants to see. The concept of *anekānta* lays emphasis on an individual thought process to accept the truth present in the views of others too and accommodate them. This virtue of acceptance is very essential for a society as a whole. It will help in putting a halt to the ever increasing incidents of violence. Recently anti-christian riots occurred in Orissa, violence against North Indians in Mumbai, Taj Hotel bomb blast, series of bomb blasts in different cities of the country etc. are live examples of a one sided perspective.

Every individual should adopt the following maxim i.e. "Do unto others what you want others to do unto you." If this subtle kind of vision develops within human consciousness, then I think all the problems deriving from the absence of compassion namely dowry deaths, feticides and cosmetic tests on animals and over exploitation of natural resources for the personal end, all these problems can be resolved.

It is this human mind, which is responsible for *anekāntic* thought. It is the power of mind to think both creatively and destructively. John Milton rightly said, 'It is man's mind, which can make hell of heaven and heaven of hell.' The U.N. Charter rightly commented that 'War is first of all fought in the minds of men before it is actually fought on the battlefield.' It is the mind which makes plans, build strategies, set goals and breeds love or hatred towards others and which determines one's healthy or poor relationships.

The happy outcome of *anekānta* is the birth of an individual with an attitude of non-insistence or refraining from insistence. A person having one-sided perspective always gives insistence to his own views and it results into quarrel. The supreme way out of such quarrel is the application of *anekāntic* perspective.¹ Such person with the above attitude analyses an

¹ Ācārya Tulsi. *Srāvaka Sambodhi*. Cūru: Ādarśa Sāhitya Sangh, 1998, p. 115.

event from multiple angles as a result of which, he develops a view-point of reconciling different parts and aspects of the truth. 'Only what I believe is truth and what others believe in, is false.'¹ If one does not give up this, he will be doing injustice to other and this too amounts to violence. It is, therefore an absolute necessity for a non-violent to be a non-extremist. It serves as the key to unlock the doors of wisdom and a successful means to establish uniformity amidst diversity in views. Unless we are prepared to change our vision, we can't balance our behavior. The discretion of where to remain active, where to be inactive and where to ignore should be very well understood. We should leave bad habits, develop good ones and thereby remain in the state of balance or equanimity. To ignore evil means to be in the state of balance. Our own peace of mind comes first, only after that we can think of a peaceful family and peaceful society as a whole.

5.4 Peaceful Co-existence at Family Level and *Anekānta*

Family is an important unit of social setup. Mahāprajñā says all the activities in life and society are built on the bricks of opposing principles. If these opposing bricks were not there, there would be no activity, no civilization.² There are opposing desires, opposing aspirations and opposing conduct. The utility of *anekānta* lies in creating a peaceful atmosphere amongst the family members. Usually there are two centers of family disputes between a father and a son and between a mother in law and daughter in law. Familial disputes centre around the father who wants to mold his son's life in the value system in which he has been brought up, because he thinks that he has experience, whereas his son has logic on his side. Similar is the condition between mother in law and daughter in law. She also

¹ Mahāprajñā. *Anekānta Hein Tisara Netra. op.cit.*, p. 6.

² Mahāprajñā, Ācārya. *Anekaṇṭa : The Third Eye*. Trans. Sudhamahi Regunathan. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati Institute. 2002, p. 10.

wants to live a life, as free and independent as she had lived in her parental home, against which her in-laws' members expects certain restraints on her part. All these leads to conflict and unless there is a feeling of tolerance and understanding on both the sides, the problem can't be resolved. As per the view of Ācārya Mahāprajña, "Tolerating each other instead of prevailing differences is the first step for peaceful co-existence."¹ If a group of people can be trained to live together peacefully, one can say that they have learnt the first lesson of non-violence. For this, one has to develop a spiritual consciousness that "I am a sole entity and he is not mine". So every man is at the same time separate from his fellows and related to them. Such separateness and relatedness are mutually necessary postulates. Personal relations can exist only between being who are separate but who are not isolated.² This spiritual perspective will establish healthy and peaceful relationships between the family members, whereas a man of selfish consciousness desires to lead a happy life, which is confined to him. This selfish attitude engenders the seeds of greed, possession or accumulation and gives rise to many problems within a family. So according to Acārya Mahāprajña, the development of *spiritual consciousness is the stepping-stone for peaceful co-existence of a family.*³ The problem today is that, no attempt is made to awaken spiritual consciousness neither in children nor in elders. People don't even know how to subside these emotions. In order to achieve the goal of peaceful co-existence, one should teach the children to breathe properly and make them practice long breathing from the very beginning. Automatically, the doors of our destination i.e. 'peaceful co-existence' will be opened.

¹ Mahāprajña. *Happy and Harmonious Family*, Trans. Sadhvi Vishrut Vibha. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati, 1st edn., 2008, p. 16.

² R.D. Laing. *The Divided Self, Preface to the Prelican*. Edition, 1965, p. 11.

³ *Ibid*, p. 18.

5.5 Tolerance of Views at Social Level and *Anekānta*

Anekānta is the basic concept to find a well-ordered nation. Everybody wishes for an ideal society. T.G. Kalghatgi rightly observes that the spirit of *anekānta* is very much necessary in the society especially in the present day scenario where conflicting ideologies are trying to assert supremacy aggressively. Satish Kumar has written an article in a book 'You are Therefore I Am', which is intune with the *anekāntic* perspective.¹ *Anekānta* brings the spirit of intellectual and social tolerance. Today, freedom of thoughts is the foremost human right, which is applicable to all levels of people, i.e., high and low, rich and poor, white and black, employee and employer, student and teacher and so forth. It is clear that everyone's thoughts, attitudes, sentiments, interests and habits are bound to differ. *Anekānta* teaches us to tolerate and understand this fact and accept the difference of opinions of the members of society for the peaceful co-existence of all the members of society. The moment one begins to consider the angle from which a contrary viewpoint is put forward, one begins to develop tolerance, which is the basic requirement of the practice of 'ahimsa'.

The origin of all wars fought on the battlefield is of ideas and beliefs. *Anekānta* is a view which puts a healing touch at the root of human psyche and tries to stop this war of bloodshed. It makes all absolutes in the field of the thought quite irrelevant and imparts maturity to the thought process. If mankind would properly understand and adopt this doctrine of *anekānta*, it will be realized that the real revolution was not the French or the Russian but the one which taught the man to develop his power of understanding from all possible aspects.

Anekānta teaches us to give due respect to the views of others. The only obstacle is our pre-conceived notion that what I

¹ Satish Kumjar. *Non-violence for All*. Quoted from *Ahiṃsā, Anekānta and Jainism. op.cit.*, p. 68.

think is self-complete truth, what my religious text says is true, this sort of perception towards anything creates commotion in the society by way of communal and religious disharmony. Even in the *Sūyagado*.¹ Mahāvira says, those who praise their own faith and ideologies and blame those of their opponents and thus they distort the truth and will remain confined to the cycle of birth and death. Thus Jains always held that it is wrong, if not dangerous, to presume that one's own creed alone represents truth. Tolerance is, therefore, the characteristic of Jain ideology as propounded by Mahāvira.² The need of the present state of society is to review the conditions of families, where we see non-healthy relations between the members of the families. The ever-increasing numbers of divorces is the clear witness of the deterioration in the level of tolerance in the present era. The greatest outcome of *anekānta* is that, it teaches us to accept a tinge of truth in others viewpoint and once it is realized man begins to understand and tolerate others. I think this tolerance has a deep sense in itself and can solve the many present day social problems.

5.6 Leadership and *Anekāntic* Decision Making

It is a common misconception that *anekānta* philosophy asserts that everybody is right. It doesn't lead a person anywhere, but just leaves him/her hanging in the middle. The theory of *anekānta*, if reflected upon deeply, leads to a definite conclusion. *Tirthankara Mahāvira* says, every decision has four components namely matter (*dravya*), place (*kṣetra*), time (*kāla*) and state (*bhāva*).³ On the basis of these four components,

¹ *Sūyagado*. Ed. Mahāprajña. With Prakrit text, Sanskrit Rendering and Hindi Version with Notes. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bhāratī, 2002, verse-1.1.2.23.

² Vilas A. Sanghavi, *Aspects of Jaina Religion*. Delhi: Bharatiya Jnanpith, 1999, p. 156.

³ *Bhagavati Sūtra*. op.cit., 2.44-45; Mahāprajña. *Anekānta Hein Tisra Netra*. op.cit., p.76.

decisions keep changing. *Anekānta* says, do not take any decision without considering matter, place, time and state. The first decision is right under particular conditions and the second is right in the changed condition. Both are right, relative to the prevailing condition. Relative decisions fall within the purview of truth. For example, a man says, he would not drink milk and after ten days, he begins to do so. His decision not to drink milk may be right in the first situation and the decision to drink milk may also be right in the second situation. For example, in dysentery, milk is like poison. If a man ailing from dysentery, decides not to have milk, it is a right decision. The ailment is cured. If the same person decides to take milk after getting his health improved, that is also a right decision. We cannot accept any decision as an absolute. The successful leader always takes any decision, keeping in his mind the future possibilities of interest. For example, there is a man in service. Today, he may be honest, tomorrow he may cheat and vice versa.¹ One cannot function considering the present mode as the eternal. By breaking the soul of relativity and replacing it with independence, no decision can be taken. All our decisions should be taken at the practical level on the basis of *anekānta*. *Anekānta* is a very significant *sūtra* for knowing the future, learning from the past and for living in the present.² Any leader learns a lesson from the results of the previous decisions and works accordingly at present as per his previous experience and takes the fruitful decisions for the future profit of the organization.

So *anekānta* is a three-dimensional vision. It is not a single one-dimensional vision. It keeps as its foundation all the three time zones. The successful leader always gives due respect to the views of his officers, consults with them, gives them an

¹ Mahāprajña. *Anekānta: The Third Eye*, op.cit., p. 135.

² *Ibid*, p. 74.

opportunity to offer suggestions, comments if any, and makes incentive plans if at all needed and uses laudable statement for an officer, if he yields successful results in the company. On the other hand, if someone discloses the secrets of the company for his personal interest such a member is dismissed for his disloyalty towards the company. In each and every step of life, taking decision is inevitable, in choosing ones career, in choosing one's life partner, in choosing a friend and so forth. We need to look at all the necessary perspectives regarding particular situation before decision. It is basically on our decisions, that success or failure in life depends. *Anekāntic* decision always leads one to success.

5.7 Democracy and *Anekānta*

Opposition is backbone of any democratic setup. Now-a-days, however, the opposition acts more to pull down the ruling party, rather than strengthening it. A supporting and balancing role of opposition will create a healthy environment for the entire country. There is a famous saying, "Variety is the spice of life". Even tastes and ideas differ, from person to person. No ordinary behaviour is identical. There are a number of languages and sects. To keep them all united, democracy follows the principle of equality of fundamental rights. As per the view of Ācārya Mahāprajña, Democracy doesn't divide people on the basis of inequality. On the other hand, it seeks to forge unity among diverse groups on the basis of equality.¹ Democracy means co-existence of rival parties, having totally different outlooks, philosophies and missions. Democracy cannot project a glorious image without balancing the claims of diversity and unity. The philosophical basis of this balancing system is *anekānta*. Many 'isms' like communism, socialism, communalism and fascism have come into existence and

¹ Ācārya Mahāprajña. *Anekānta: Views and Issues. op.cit.*, p. 7.

appearing less dominating. Ultimately democracy has survived and India proclaims to stand as a democratic nation.¹ But can this democracy be successful without making people democratic? The need of the hour is to train the citizens to develop *anekāntic* perspective, as people are not enough trained in it.

Ācārya Amṛtchandra highlighted this view in a metaphorical form. He says, when a milkmaid churns for butter with a rope, one hand is outstretched and releases the same with the other hand. Then the hand behind comes in front and the one in front moves back. Following this order, she is able to extract butter. In this process, one hand sometimes attains primary and the other, secondary position and butter emerges.²

The development of democracy also works on the same principle of the primary and the secondary. It is on this basis that relativity has developed. The one who is important will move ahead with reference to others. They can never progress independently or in absolute. They are connected to the leader and the leader keeps them connected to him. Therefore, of all forms of governance, democracy is considered the most effective and stable way, because it is based on the complementing structure of two opposites. This kind of *anekāntic* view is necessary to be developed in citizens for successful governance of democracy. In democracy, the ruling party takes the objections of opposite party in positive terms. One of the *ācāryas* has rightly commented on this situation in a *Sanskrit śloka* :

*jīvantu me śatruṅaṇāḥ sadaiva yeṣāṃ prasādād vigatajvarohaṃ,
yadā yadā taṃ bhajate pramādāt tadā te pratibodhayanti.*

¹ Sagarmal Jain. Ed. *Multi-dimensional Application of Anekāntavāda*. Vārāṇasi: Parśwanātha Vidhyāpīṭha & Navin Institute of Self-development, 1999, p. 25.

² *Puruṣārtha Siddhupāya* of Amṛt Chandra. *op.cit.*, verse-225.

He says that wherever due to laxity, I commit mistake, my opponents make me alert. So let my opponents parties remain healthy and have a long life. Such a blessing can emanate only from the one believing in *anekāntic* perspective. The existence of opposition is essential for the survival and effective functioning of democracy. To deny opposition, therefore, would mean to deny democracy. In the absence of opposition, democracy certainly loses its lustre, grandeur, credibility and utility. This is our experience and to deny its due place and importance would be suicidal.

5.8 Change in Politics And *Anekānta*

In the present day political atmosphere, the country is facing problems in various states. The country is being badly affected by LTTE, Naxalities, Maoists and attack on Parliament of India, terrorists who plan serial bomb blast based on violence and so forth. We are also witnessing, excessive centralization of political powers in the hands of a few and a large number of able and efficient people are deprived of it, resulting into an all-round deterioration of society. Politics, which is meant to give a good system and order in society, in the present days has unfortunately become the center of creating disorder. In other words, politics has been completely criminalized. Booth capturing, vote rigging and 'might is right' this saying, is playing a free role during elections. If government is not ready to remove such corrupt practices for a better order of society, then people, especially, *anekāntavādīs* will have to take lead and not to participate in voting. The violence pattern then will be automatically corrected. The participation and selection of man of *anekāntic* perspective in the political field is the need of the hour to cope up with the present day problems and for planning better destiny of the nation. Basically the political field is the good application of *anekānta* where opposing parties sit together and try to arrive at fruitful solutions.

Anekāntavāda teaches, to respect not only one party manifestos but also to respect manifestos of other parties. To respect manifestos of other parties means to understand the outlooks, missions and the propaganda of other parties. The members of the two opposing political parties sit together on one platform peacefully and discuss freely is the outcome of philosophy of co-existence.¹ Incidents such as civil-wars, rebellion, street-demonstrations, communal riots, and quarrels in parliament are evidences of anti-democratic outlook. It is also anti-*anekāntavād*. *Anekāntavād* and democratic outlook stand on the policy that the rights of all rival parties need to be respected.

5.9 Conflict Resolution and *Anekānta*

Cultural clash is the fact of global reality. This is because our perception is always backed by our own cultural prejudices. This in turn hides many aspects of truth. Not only things remain in concealment because of prejudices, but it also generates controversies. In modern India, we come across a large number of conflicts between the Hindu and the Muslim in the name of religion and communal riots between the two states of the same country, in the name of language, cultural difference and so forth. Every country has its own culture and tradition. Problems erupt when one tries to impose it on the other. History tells us that events of this nature were commonplace.

Language is an essential and vital part of a culture. Usually people are proud of their mother tongue and do not like the domination of other language in their territory. The application of *anekānta* in this field, will amount to acceptance of other languages equivalent with their own language. No matter, what language or medium is used for communication as long as the message is understood properly. With language

¹ Ācārya Tulsi. *Srāvaka Sambodh*, *op.cit.*, p. 116.

comes folk music, art, dance, drama and literature. The application of *anekānta* will mean to show equal enthusiasm in the folk music, dance etc. of all the countries and traditions. Cultural domination will cease to exist when all cultures are equally appreciated. This will help in building cultural ties and eradicating cultural conflicts. The main cause of violence is insistence over one's views. This one-sided insistence over thoughts leads to mental agitation and which in turn reflects through verbal and physical or domestic violence.¹

The Jaina concept of *syādvāda* implies that affirmation without negation and negation without affirmation is not possible. This is to say that we cannot understand our own philosophy, religion and culture unless we understand others. Therefore understanding others is as significant as understanding oneself. Similarly, it is the prevailing conflict that gives meaning to peace. Peace cannot be understood without conflict. Peace is something which the world eagerly wants, but does not know how to secure. Peace needs a new civilization, a new culture and a new philosophy, where there is no narrowness and no partiality. Huxley is correct to a great extent when he says that, 'War exists because people wish it to exist'. We cannot check violence by remaining violent. But non-violence in action must precede non-violence in thought. R. Prasad also holds that *syādvāda* is an extension of *ahiṃsā* in epistemology. Unless we resolve our differences, we are bound to face tension. Analysing the ultimate causes of war and terrorism, we had come to the conclusion that it is ultimately our divergent and conflicting ideologies that comes in the way. Conflict is an inherent human trait. Conflict arises due to incompatible interests, beliefs and customs. Nathmal Tatia also holds that only intellectual clarity will resolve all conflict and rivalry. Today one man or one country fights with the other because

¹ Ācārya Mahāprajña. *Anekānta: Manan Aur Mimamsa*, op.cit., p. 277.

their views are different. Views are bound to differ because we are guided by different conditions, thoughts, modes and attitudes. Hence it is wrong to think oneself right and rest others as wrong. No one perspective is final or absolute, unless it is understood in terms of relativity. Understanding of different religions, cultures and value systems in the light of *anekānta* can help significantly in cultivating respect and tolerance for the people of alien notions, beliefs, cultures, religions and philosophies and can give full stop to clash of cultures.

5.10 Management *Mantra* and *Anekānta*

The first principle for a successful manager is non-absolutist attitude. The viewpoint derived from an absolutist view makes a problem more complicated rather than solving. The manager who looks at a problem from a relativistic standpoint, can make progress in the process of development. One cannot manage others before he manages himself. As popular in *anekāntavāda*, there are four basic elements, while managing any activity, viz., '*dravya, kṣētra, kāla and bhāva*'. Consideration of above mentioned four views, helps the manager to have a deeper and multi-dimensional understanding of others, to manage the people around him, his subordinates, his business competitors, government officials and even his superiors too. The manager who looks at it from a biased angle cannot succeed in his work. A biased person does not see what is rational, but is inclined towards that which is irrational. Manager performs certain important functions like planning, organizing, leadership and control. Unless and until, the managers take into consideration innumerable condition that go into the success of an organization, the planning of an organization is bound to suffer. So wider the approach of a manager, better the chances for the management to succeed and the organization to prosper. In activities relating to industry and business, several persons work together. They do not always

have the same views. On account of possible divergent views, an environment of conflict may occur. The mystic Jalaludin Rumi has rightly said that, "Life on this planet is nothing but the harmony of the opposites." The modern business school cannot shut their eyes to realities. They must also reorient and train the students of management science in the way, to find harmony. The *anekānta* universities like Nalanda and Takshshila were in fact management schools, and the students produced by these institutes proved to be the most successful prime ministers of various princely states. We have to unearth the methodology of the ancient *gurukuls* and universities in present curriculum of business management. Some modern owner of the business aims only at amassing wealth and being ranked as the richest persons of the world.. But they forget that they have a collective responsibility to see that their mad race for wealth doesn't destroy environment, their industries does not release excessive green house gases which inturn widen holes in ozone layers triggering to global warming. While passing any resolution, manager should consider 'the other', so that an environment of peaceful co-existence can be created.

Another by product of the modern management tools is the worst form of stress that grips the business executives, who are not able to cope with the demands of their bosses. The rate of stress-related deaths among these executives is alarming. We have to reverse this trend through the *anekāntic* perspective and redefine the principles of management in the context of global issues that threaten our survival into the third millennium. If a person develops an *anekāntic* outlook and gives importance to the primary work first and renders secondary importance to other works , will surely succeed in his respective fields.

5.11 Open-mindedness and *Anekānta*

Jainism holds that the followers of other sects can also achieve emancipation, if they are able to destroy attachment and

aversion. The gateway of salvation is open to all. *Jains* do not believe in narrow outlook that, "Only the follower of Jainism can achieve emancipation, others will not." Moreover it is said in the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* (2nd cent. B.C.), the second earliest Jain work, that those who praise their own faith and views and discard those of their opponents, possess malice against them. Hence they remain confined to the cycle of birth and death.¹ In another famous *Jain* work of the same period, the *Isibhāsiyam*, the teaching of the forty-five renounced saints of Śramanic and Brahmanic schools of thought such as *Nārada*, *Bhāradvāja*, *Mankhali-Gośāla* and many others have been presented with due regards.² They are remembered as *arhatṛṣi* and their teachings are regarded as *āgama*. In *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra* also there is a reference to *anyaliṅga-siddhās* i.e. the emancipated souls of others sects. In the history of world religions, there is hardly any example in which the teachings of the religious teachers of the opponents sects were included in one's own scriptures with due esteem and honour. The verse highlighting the broad-outlook of *Hemacandra* (12th cent. A.D.) the celebrated pontiff of jain philosophy is really touching. He says

*bhava bījāṅkurajanānā rāgādyakṣaya mupāgata-yasya,
brahmā vā viṣṇurvā haro vā jino-va namastasmaiḥ*³.

Jains believe that the only way to attain liberation is destruction of attachment and aversion. On the one hand, in whom these two emotions have been totally wiped away, be He Brahma, Vishnu, Shiva or *Jina*, I salute all of them. Finally, we can say that from among all non-absolutist *ācārya*-s, Haribhadra was the most broad-minded. His tolerant attitude to the *ācārya*-s

¹ *Sūtrakṛtāṅga Sūtra*. Ed. Mishrimalji Maharaj. Trans. Shrichand Surana. Beawar: Āgam Prakāshan Samiti, 1991, 1.1.2.23.

² *Isibhāsiyām*. Ed. Welther Schubring. Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of Indology, 1979, verse-1.1.

³ *Mahādevastotra* of Hemachandra, *op.cit.*, verse-44.

of other sects won him plaudits. For he never showed any partisanship and parochialism and considered them as seekers of truth. Though the time he lived in, was marked by individualistic attitude in respect of particular sects. Haribhadra, instead of being individualistic regarding the Jain philosophy, sought a synthesis-specific approach. And, needless to state, this approach is evidence enough of his broadmindedness in those troublesome times. Haribhadra, a staunch advocate of religious tolerance remarks, "One, who maintains equanimity of mind will certainly get emancipation, whether he may be a *śvetāmbara* or *digambara* or Buddhist or anyone else. Along with this he says,

*pakṣapāto na me vire na dveṣaḥ kapiladiṣu,
yuktimadvacanāṃ yasya tasya kāryaḥ parigrahaḥ¹.*

I have no bias towards *Lord Mahāvīra* and no disregard to Kapila and other saints and thinkers. Whosoever is rational and logical ought to be accepted. It is this broad outlook of the *Jains*, which makes them tolerant to the alien thoughts and thereby establish the peace and harmony.

5.12 Art of Non-violent Communication and *Anekānta*

Communication means to exchange thoughts in an effective manner. Communication is a part and parcel of our day-to-day world affairs. Communicating with people is an art and should be learned. For this, language acts as a bridge in expressing ourselves and understanding the feelings and emotions of others. Present age is the age of mass communication. It is the words, which come in purified form through *anekāntic* language of expression and makes one man nearer to the other and maintains healthy relations. The way in which one thinks is the way in which one speaks. Jaina ethics

¹ *Samāṇa Suttaṃ*. Ed. SagarmalJaina. Trans. T.k. Tukol, K.K. Dixit. Delhi: Bhagavan Mahavira Memorial Samiti, (1st edn.), 2nd edn., 1999, verse-728.

draw no real distinction between thought, speech, and action. In a chain reaction, violent thoughts and violent speech lead to violent acts.¹ So *anekānta* is nothing but the art of positive thinking. To maintain peace, the way your thoughts are communicated and the way they are understood should be in parity. In *Daśvaikālika Sūtra*, it is cited that the language which we use for communication should be filtered through some basic non-violent disciplines. It is highlighted in it that anger, greed, fear and laughter, are the four factors that are responsible for violent communication.² Lord Mahāvīra reflected upon the usage of non-violent language. He said, although true, few facts should not be disclosed.³ Draupadi uttered clearly that the son of the blind is also blind, this small although true sentence culminated in the great war of Mahābhārata. Moreover one should not address someone as one eyed, impotent, sick and thief even if he is truly so.⁴ So the language that is harsh and cause sinful activity should be avoided.⁵ Marshall in his book, "*Non-violent Communication*", says one should not blame others for one's inauspicious communication.⁶ A man of *anekāntic* approach utters each and every word cautiously and never blames others for his present situation. Our conversation should be peaceful and non-violent. Never attack directly with words. Never say something that can cause adverse reactions. In political field, the politicians mutually face verbal criticisms, which awaken the communal riots. In society, family disputes,

¹ Rankin Aidan and Atul K. Shah. *Social Cohesion: A Jain Perspective*. London: Diverse Ethics Ltd., 2008, p. 37.

² *Daśvaikālika Sūtra. op.cit.*, 4.12.

³ *Ibid*, 7.12

⁴ *Ibid*, 7.54.

⁵ *Ibid*, 7.2

⁶ Rosenberg. Marshall B. *Non-violent Communication: A Language of Life* U.S.A.: Puddle Dancer Press, 2003, p. 123.

social commotion, international wars and so forth are the outcome of insistence on one's own words. *Anekāntic* technique of speech teaches; always use such non-violent words, which can make our human relations healthy. So there is close relationship between peaceful co-existence and non-violent communication.

5.13 Mutual Understanding of Religious Communities and *Anekānta*

Every religion aims at raising the quality of moral and spiritual life of man. But the root cause of prevailing tensions is self-righteousness and belief of certain leaders of religious movements and campaigns that their religion alone is supreme and can prove to be the panacea for all the problems of mankind. The urgent need of today is removal of seeds of hatred and malevolence within the minds of religious communities. There are institutions in this world, for removal and eradication of physical diseases. But the supreme need of the hour is the establishment of an institution for eradication of communal hatred and bigotry, from the minds of men, the disease that is spreading into vitals of society and threatening the future of mankind. The present scenario really lacks the tolerance of viewpoint of others. Today Islamic fundamentalism, Hindu supremacy, Christian self-righteousness, Buddhists Escapism, is adding to our problems instead of bringing any solution. What we need today is *anekāntic* perspective to tackle the global problems so that the future of humanity is not jeopardized. In my view the founders of religions have never been bigoted and narrow-minded. They have been truly liberal in their outlook. It is only misguided followers, who have created gulf between adherents of different religions.

Today religious leaders are so dogmatic in their views that they are not in a position to give respect to others viewpoints. They claim that salvation is possible only by following their means and principles, i.e. '*māmemkaṁ saraṇam*

vraja'. Application of *anekānta* in the religious sphere will mean to understand and assimilate view point of all religions, communities, sects, and so forth. Different preceptors of different religions developed, different methods all around the world during different periods of time. But due to pre-conceived misconceptions and mental makeup towards their teachers and their own egos, they compel the followers to believe their 'ism' to be the only as the final and complete truth, which resulted in the unwanted communal enmity between different sects. In this context, it will be pertinent to mention Shri Ram Janmabhūmi and Bābari Masjid conflict which is horrifying illustration of overriding fanaticism. So one perspective alone will not do. Mahāprajña says, all the activities in life and society are built on the bricks of opposing principles. If these opposing bricks were not there, there would be no activity, no civilization.¹

History bears witness to the fact that religious intolerance has been the cause of unlimited cruelty and bloodshed. Every religion teaches to love and no religion teaches to kill and yet thousands of lives were taken in the name of religion over an issue of no rational importance. The reasons which create and develop communal outlook, religious intolerance and narrow mindedness are as follows : (1) Jealousy, (2) Desire for fame (3) So called ideological differences, (4) Difference in perception of behaviour pattern (5) Humiliation or degradation inflicted by some previous sect or person.²

The theory of *anekānta* does not advocate unification of all sects by destroying or amalgamating them all but it is an effort to inculcate religious tolerance by understanding the similarities hidden within the seeming external differences. The *Sarvadharmā Samabhāva* is the basic purpose of *anekānta*,

¹ Ācārya Mahāprajña. *Anekānta: The Third Eye*, op.cit., p. 10.

² Sagarmal Jain. *Anekānta ki Jīvan Dr̥ṣṭi*, op.cit., p. 25.

which can become practical through the action plan of Surat Spiritual Declaration signed by religious leaders.

The action plan of "Surat Spiritual Declaration" was formulated under the auspicious presence of H.H. Ācārya Mahāprajña, the spiritual leader of Jain community at Surat on 15th October 2003 on the birthday of A.P.J. Abdul Kalam the Ex. President of India. "Unity of Minds" was established in the Surat Declaration in the auspicious presence of 22 different religious leaders. The SSD Action plan envisages Five Garland Projects. The emphasis of five projects were (i) celebration of inter-religious festivals, (ii) multi-religious projects, (iii) health care and employment, (iv) imbibing value-based education in schools and (v) encouraging interfaith dialogue among religious/spiritual heads. In order to pursue the above in a sustained manner and to co-ordinate all activities, a national level independent and autonomous organization was set up, duly managed by religious/spiritual leaders as well as scholars and enlightened citizens. This organization was named "Foundation for Unity of Religions and Enlightened Citizenship" (FUREC) and it was launched by the President Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam on the birthday of H.H. Ācārya Mahāprajña, the 15th June 2004 at Rashtrapati Bhavan, New Delhi. FUREC functions, at three levels of Human Existence. (a) At the level of the individual, it seeks to develop a common agenda for the development of a violence free individual or the Enlightened Citizen; (b) at the level of society, it seeks to eradicate poverty through economic upliftment, harnessing the teachings of spirituality; (c) at the collective level, it seeks to bring about better understanding between the different faiths/religions and bring about amity between them. Understanding of different religions, cultures and value systems can also help significantly in cultivating respect and tolerance and scope for inter-cultural dialogue.

For Jainism, role of religion is to unite all through love and respect for one another. We must also work for the survival

of religious diversity. Let every religion exist and flourish, let them serve the world in their own ways. Flourishing together is the secret of peace. Unity-in-diversity is the lesson of life. "So let us guide ourselves and our followers not just to tolerate, but to respect other persons points of views and religions, not just to exist, but to co-exist, not just to hail, but to help others. We must not prosper and progress at the cost of others, but sacrifice a part of ourselves for the good of others, because in the good of others lies our own, in the progress of others rests our own and in the joy of others abides our own", says Ācārya Mahaprajña in his address at Surat Spiritual Declaration.

5.14 Communal Violence and *Anekānta*

All the founders of different religions are open-minded but their disciples bear prejudicial attitude towards each other. The sectarian outlook keep on fanning the flames of communal hatred. Today communalism operates in a significantly changed social and political milieu.¹ The disintegration of human race is also one of the basic problems humanity is facing today. Really, the "Human race is one" as propagated by Mahāvīra. It is we, who have erected the barriers of caste, creed, colour, language, nationalities and so forth and thus disintegrating the human race. Due to these man-made divisions, we all are standing in opposition to one another, instead of establishing harmony and mutual love. It is a well-known fact that countless wars have been fought on account of these man-made divisions. Not only this, we are claiming the superiority of our own caste, creed, culture, language, state over others. All over the world class-conflicts are becoming furious day-by-day, *godharā kānda* and recent violence against North Indians in Mumbai is the living example of it, disturbing the peace and harmony of human society in India.

¹ Ram Ahuja. *Social Problems in India*. Jaipur: Rawat Publication, 1992, *op.cit.*, p. 106.

Application of principles of *anekānta* will prevent recurrence of incidents like demolition of Babri Masjid, murders of three Gandhis (Mahatma, Indira and Rajiv), attacks on Aksaydham and Ragunath temples, massacre of Godhra, serial bomb blasts in different states of India and so forth. Practice of the teachings of *anekānta* will stop occurrence of the gigantic scandals and scams, which have plagued and defamed the entire Indian community. Terrorism, which is threatening the very survival of humanity, is a misplaced misconception of freedom and patriotism. To uproot this, we need guns of *anekānta* and not the ammunitions of destruction.

Jainism, from its inception accepts the oneness of the human race and oppose these man-made divisions of caste, creed etc. The incident of *Chandanbālā* as a slave and Mahāvira received alms from her is the living example of equality during the period of *Tīrthaṅkara* Mahāvira. He declared that *ekka maṇussa jāī*¹ i.e. human race is one and nobody is inferior or superior² by accepting the alms from the hands of *sudra* or slaves. All men are equal in their potentiality. No one is superior or inferior as such. It is not the class, colour, but the purification of self and good conduct that makes the difference.

Jain ācāryā-s hold that it is not the mutual conflict but mutual co-operation which can help us in this regard. As *Jains* have *anekāntic* perspective, they believe in the unity of mankind, but unity for them doesn't mean absolute unity. By unity they mean an organic whole in which every organ has its individual existence but work for a common goal i.e. human good. For them unity means unity in diversity. They maintain that every caste, religion, culture and language has full right to

¹ *Ādiprāṇa* of Jinsanācārya. Ed. Pannalal Jain. Varanasi: Bhārtīya Jñānpīṭha, 3rd edn., 1988, verse-38.45.

² *Āyāro*. Ed. Muni Nathmal (Ācārya Mahāprajña). Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati Institute, 1971, 2.49.

exist, with all its peculiarities but at the same time, it is one's pious duty to work for the welfare of the humanity taken as a whole and be prepared to sacrifice one's own interest in the larger interest of the humanity.

5.15 Secularism and *Anekānta*

The concept of secularism was first used in Europe where the church had complete control over all the properties and nobody could use any property without the consent of the church. Some intellectuals raised their voice against this practice. These people came to be known as secular. India's constitution is based on secularism which means that : (a) each citizen would be guaranteed full freedom to practice and preach his religion, (b) state will have no religion, and (c) all citizens, irrespective of their religious faith, will be equal.

In modern social context, there cannot be a better interpretation of *anekānta* than secularism. It is the modern social philosophical definition of *anekānta*. True *Anekāntavādin* does not discriminate on the basis of caste, religion, sex, race and nationality. He is secular in outlook and scientific in approach. A secular state protects all religions equally and favors none at the expense of others. The state recognizes equal rights, privileges and duties as belonging to all citizens, irrespective of their religion or caste. India is one of the good example of secularism and *anekant*. It only means that the state as such does not identify itself with any particular religion. It not only tolerates others but gives equal respect for all religions. It should only mean elimination of religion-based conflicts and confrontations. *Anekānta* can be utilized beneficially in the field of religious tolerance also to create communal harmony which is the real secularism.

5.16 Inter-cultural Dialogue and *Anekānta*

The problem today is not the differences in cultures and 'isms' but is of understanding other as other and intolerance

towards others. Due to this, many conflicts and violence take place. Scientific analysis of conflict has become a major feature of contemporary society. In recent times political, racial, individual, social, structural, ethnic, communal violence especially cultural and religious violence have caused much concern and anxiety to the collective consciousness of the people. The main cause of all sorts of conflicts is : (i) absence of communication, (ii) Imposition of decision, (iii) Absolute feeling of 'the other', (iv) Superiority complex. Various steps by different social reformers have been undertaken in order to control such conflicts and violence. In 20th century Gandhi and Ācārya Tulsi really endeavored for this. Gandhi even gave the principles such as:

- (a) Recognition of basic equality of all,
- (b) Faith in the goodness of the other,
- (c) Love for the opposer.¹

Gandhiji negotiated even with the opponents believing that even the worst enemy has some truth to which the other party has to listen to. In this field ,Inter-cultural dialogue can provide the best measures to have a peaceful world. In the present era, many inter-cultural, inter-religious, and intra-religious dialogues are being organized. These dialogues are leading towards conflict resolution through Jain doctrine of *anekāntavāda*. *Anekānta* is not merely a metaphysical concept, but it is practically a relevant concept. It is a philosophy of co-existence in the words of Mahaprajña, "A kind of intellectual non-violence, which changes the absolutistic framework of the brain." It says everything is relative and multi-dimensional having inbuilt co-existence of opposites." Claude Levi Strauss rightly said that a word is meaningful because of its binary 'other' word. Thus the 'light' and the 'dark' words give meaning to each other by a binary relation. A single word by itself has no

¹ T.K. John. *Roots of Conflicts, Conflicts Resolution Through Non-violence*. Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 1990, pp. 88-89.

meaning. Similarly a single culture has no meaning in the absence of the other. Jacques Derrida goes one step further. He says that a word includes its other within its meaning. It just depends upon the view that which one is in the focus and which one is in the margin. He refers to Plato's use of the word 'pharmakon'.¹ The word 'pharmakon' means medicine, elixir of life as well as poison. Thus the word contains opposites as its meaning. Likewise *anekānta* philosophy accepts the different levels of human perceptions and cultures and does not give privileged treatment to one particular thought. It pleads for different cultures as part and parcel of proper cultural department. Inter-religious and inter-cultural dialogue rejects the two hermeneutics model, hermeneutics of total identity of modernity and of radical difference of post-modernity and pleads for third model of Analogous Hermeneutics² i.e. the *anekāntic* way of interpretation, which collaborates different cultures keeping its identity in a single whole. In Jain canon *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, Mahāvīra says, "to praise ones belief and degrading the others faith leads a man of absolute perspective to unending problems and sorrow."³ So one cannot arrive at the truth, by disowning others truth, simply because they are other people's truth. In inter-cultural dialogue, with reference to *anekānta*, one tries to understand the other from their point of view. Truth cannot be unified. As Ricoeur rightly remarks that, 'uniformization of truth is, no doubt, a dream of reason but it is at the same time an act of violence.' So under the umbrella of *anekāntic*, inter-cultural understanding, we accept the points of agreement and overlook points of disagreement which is

¹ Jacques Derrida. *Dissemination*. Trans. With an Introduction and Additional Notes by Barbara Johnson. London: Continuum, 2005, p. 103.

² Emile Durkheim. "The Elementary Forms of Religious Life", quoted from the book "The origin and Development of Religion", p. 59.

³ *Sutrakṛtāṅga. op.cit.*, 2.50.

meager, and helps in cultivating the virtue of respect for others faith and for a peaceful harmonious world.

5.17 Education and *Anekānta*

Anekāntavāda implies liberalism. This principle classifies that only one aspect of a thing or issue may not be acceptable. Regarding any idea or proposition there may be two or more sides. Therefore, in order to reach a right judgment on a certain issue, we have to take into consideration its various aspects. In today's democratic era, it is quite natural to have various points of view or a variety of opinions, regarding a certain idea. It may not be possible that the stand of a teacher or that of any student in a class will be accepted by all the students in the class. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the various views expressed by the students in a class. In reaching a decision each student should have the self-satisfaction that his viewpoints has also been duly considered. This feeling on the part of the student will promote the development of his personality and help in adopting a liberal attitude about things. In the modern style of teaching, the teacher should try to co-ordinate the various views of the student's posing a consistency that is acceptable as a whole. Evidently, the same idea cannot be imposed on all students. Accordingly, we should instead of merely learning it, as a school of philosophy, treat it as a manual to guide our practical politics, economics, civics, sociology and ethics, and even physical science. Let not the light of *anekānta* remain hidden in the books of Jainism. It should be allowed to spread everywhere, without any inhibition of a label, a dogma, or a sect. *Anekānta* belongs to the whole humanity. The famous dictum of Tulsi is, "Reform yourself and the world will be reformed".¹ We are indeed passing through the most critical phase of human history, when the mankind is threatened with the nuclear catastrophe.

¹ Ācārya Tulsi. *Srāvaka Sambodh. op.cit.*, p. 45.

Let Mahāvīra's message of understanding each other be our beacon light. Education is the most effective means of preventing intolerance. The first step in 'tolerance education' should be to teach people what their shared rights and freedoms are, so that they may be respected, and to promote the will to protect those of others. Education for tolerance should be considered as an urgent imperative.¹ It is necessary to promote systematic and rational tolerance, teaching methods to address the cultural, social, economic, political and religious sources of intolerance. Education policies and programmes should contribute to the development of understanding, solidarity and tolerance among individuals as well as among ethnic, social, cultural, religious and linguistic groups.

Ācārya Mahāprajña a Jain Ācārya was on his *Ahimsā* March for the last five years and spreaded the message of universal brotherhood. Let us resolutely work for the universal friendliness of humanity and let this motivation transcend the national boundaries. Ācārya Mahāprajña also introduced *Jīvan Vijñān*, for the holistic development of personality. He emphasized on spiritual values to be integrated into the curriculum and not separated as an optional subject. They form core components of personal development and help in transformation of the students to a broader base of science and develops an understanding to handle the human relationships from the heart rather than the mind, that is presently needed.

5.18 Human Solidarity and *Anekānta*

Tirthankar Mahavira, 2600 years back claimed that *ekkā manussa Jātī* i.e. 'Human race is one'. He never discriminated any human on the basis of his birth, colour, profession, religion, country, etc. He established the novel notion of oneness of Humanity on the basis of one's action. The criteria for a

¹ Ācārya Mahāprajña. *The Family and The Nation*. Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers, 2008, p. 110.

human lies in the virtue of compassion, sympathy, affection, service, and in the acts of benevolence. He propounded in *Uttaradhyanna Sūtra* that man is *brahmin*, *śūdra*, *kaśtriya* and *vaiśya* not by birth but by action.¹ Noble thoughts and actions justifies the human nature. He abolished the practice of considering one person as high or low on the basis of one's birth, and re-established the merit of action in the world of disparity.

In *Veda*-s it is quoted, "*Amrutasya putram vyaṁ*", i.e. we all are the sons of the same God. "*Ātmavat Sarvabhūteṣu*", i.e. behold all living beings as of equal intrinsic values as of oneself. "*Vishvaṁ eka needaṁ*", i.e. the whole universe is single, all supporting trees keep suggesting for peaceful co-existence without discriminating between one man and the other on the narrow principles of class, colour, languages, province, caste or creed. Today we see that there is a kind of absolute notion of sexual superiority, colour superiority, caste superiority, class, country and religious superiority which is creating reactive violence and inhuman behaviour in the name of untouchable considering the other as inferior due to the one-sided outlook..

The outstanding philosopher of the day Richard Rorty has discussed the cause of distinction between male and female. In male dominated society, only male are considered as human beings as they possess rationality. Women are emotional, so they are not human beings. This kind of approach is threatening for the human solidarity. It is conceived that nine out of ten men or women , are firmly convinced of the superior excellence of their own sex. There is abundant evidence on both sides. If you are a man, you can point out that most poets and scientists are male; if you are a women, you can retort criminals. This question is inherently insoluble, until the *anekantic* perspective is taken into the consideration.

¹ *Uttaradhyanna Sūtra. op.cit.*, verse-12.

Today disputes between man or states or countries is because their views vary. Views are bound to differ, because we are guided by different conditions, thoughts, modes and attitudes. Hence it is wrong to think oneself right and rest others wrong.¹ We are all, which ever part of the world, we come from, persuaded that our own nation is superior to all others. Seeing that each nation has its characteristic merits and demerits, we adjust our standard of values so as to make out that the merits possessed by our nation are the really important ones, while its demerits are comparatively trivial. The only way I know of dealing with this general human conceit is to remind ourselves that man is a brief episode in the life of a small planet, in a little corner of the universe, and that for aught we know, other parts of the cosmos may contain beings superior to ourselves as we are to jelly fish. It is multi-dimensional perspective which envisages us to just turn our global perspective by recognizing the existence of the other human as human.

During Gandhian period (1869-1949), our history witnessed the *śūdras* that were considered as untouchables and they were prohibited to enter into temples, their children's were not allowed to admit in certain schools, they were not allowed to touch the water pot and even touch the Brahmins. If any *śūdra* violated this, he would be punished severely. The novel- 'Untouchable' written by Mulkaraj Anand highlights the social behaviour with *śūdras*. In this novel, he writes, "they clean our dirt, so they are untouchable. If it is so then every one of us are untouchable as we also clean our dirt". Such open-mindedness in thought is the need of the hour.

The central philosophy of Richard Rorty is achievement of Human solidarity i.e. to consider the other person not like external, outsider or foreigner, but as one amongst us. Rorty has given five examples how it threatened the human

¹ Nemichandra Śāstrī. *Viśva Śānti aur Jaina Dharma*, p. 23.

relationship during IIInd world war by Nazis led by Hitler claimed that only Germans have pure blue blood. All the rest are like animals, so let us kill and make the world of Germans. Due to this one-dimensional perspective lakhs of Jews were killed in concentration camp.

Even the inhuman behaviour with black people in the west by the white people was really cruel. The whites didn't consider blacks as one amongst them in present United States. They are deprived from certain privileges of the country, certain professions etc. The kids of black people were not admitted in the convent schools where white people's kids studied. Although civil rights movement occurred against their discrimination, still a kind of segregation in sitting arrangements of buses, washrooms, restaurants, schools, market places, etc., is prevailing. Moreover white people community stay in particular area and rich black people live in highly crowded area, they don't stay together. Even policemen too misbehave with black people. A man who says that he is a machine is 'depersonalized' in psychiatric jargon. A man who says, that Negroes are an inferior race may be widely respected. A man who says, his whiteness is a form of cancer is certifiable. In short, in the context of present pervasive thinking, all our frames of reference are ambiguous and equivocal.¹ All these are because of difference of skin colour and only change of perspective can do away this problem. So to be recognized as a human it require anything but only love, affection, compassion for all human brothers and feeling for sufferings of others.

5.19 Judicial System and *Anekānta*

This exhaustive philosophy is reflected not only in philosophical deliberations or religious castism; but also in many facets of our social life. In our judicial system, in which lies the core of human dignity in society, the greatest

¹ R.D. Laing. *The Divided Self*. Preface to the Pelican Edition, 1965, p. 111.

contribution to the cause of justice is the concept of natural justice, which is based on two fundamental principles : (i) No one would be his own judge for his own cause, and that a judgement should be unbiased and impartial, (ii) Both sides of the case should be heard and that no one should be condemned unheard. On close analysis, both the principles implicitly refer to the attitude of *anekānta*. Further, if he hears only one party and leaves the other party unheard, his approach would be *ekāntika*. Again thus, *anekānta* is the essence of both the principles. A person accused of murder could be hanged, or given life sentence and could also be acquitted, this underlines *anekāntika* approach.¹

5.20 Solution of Many Present Day Problems through *Anekānta*

The present trend of increasing number of nuclear families has been considered as main cause of stress among the teen agers. The entire responsibility of the family is laid on the shoulder of husband and wife in a nuclear family. When we ponder the business organizations the rat race for acquiring more and more money by hook or crook, has led to the deterioration of the graph of morality.

In present scenario, comfort oriented outlook, absence of commitment towards one's duty, lack of mutual help, lack of compassion, lack of universal brotherhood, lack of open-mindedness, lack of proper management in all the fields has led to total disaster. Due to terrorists attacks, serial bomb blasts incidents of rape, kidnapping, hijacking etc., a kind of the feeling of insecurity is increasing in the minds of all. Everyone feels that they are unsafe. In the business market also sudden changes, ups and downs in the values of shares, economic recessions, etc. are really the situations when many businessmen

¹ T.U. Mehta. *Syādvāda and Judicial Process*. in "Multi Dimensional Application of *Anekāntavāda*". Varanasi: P.V.RS., 1999, p. 154.

undergo depression due to sudden loss. So in this age of materialistic culture, over-consumerism, fast communication technology, exploitation of renewable and non-renewable resources due to uncontrolled ambitions and desires, competition between the nations to produce more and more nuclear weapons, use and throw culture etc., leading towards depletion of ozone layer, climate change, global warming at the global level. Along with this Dink culture (Double income and no kids) and the culture of homosexuality has led the entire human race at stake. In addition to this, political instability is really attacking on the very social structure and organization. The only solution for all these problems lies in the *anekantic* life style, if one deeply reflects upon it.¹

The charter of United Nations, an extension of the *anekāntik* principles, has prevented outbreak of major world wars for five decades, despite two super powers at loggerheads, the cold war did not ablaze. But this was a partial success. If allowed to function fully, UNO can solve several international problems amicably. Mere observance of a year as one of tolerance or non-violence will not suffice. What is needed is mutual trust and respect, sincere concern for the fellow nations. Let it be clarified that *anekānta* is not for one world government. People of every country could enjoy national sovereignty, culture and pride, but should not consider themselves supreme with power to enslave others. There is nothing wrong with privatization or nationalization, capitalism or communism, globalization or *swadesi* movement, provided, we understand that these are not absolute systems, and each has some merit. The latest example of *anekāntik* application is the recent decision of the Union Government to link major rivers of the country to prevent famine in some parts and floods in other

¹ *Sādhvi Jinaprabha, Sadhvi Vimal Prajñā. Amrit Kalaśa. Delhi: Ādarsha Sāhitya Prakāshan, Vol. 1.2002, p. 97.*

parts of the country at the same time. The broad lesson is that we should reflect on every problem with the wisdom that there is some sense in every view point, even though at any given time and space, a particular view may offer the best choice. If so, any problem, whether practical or spiritual, social or political, economic or legal, whether pertaining to a family or a nation or a community of nations, can be resolved peacefully.

Thus *anekānta* or *syādvād* tries to make the man conscious of his limitation by pointing out his narrow vision and limited knowledge of the manifold aspects of things, and helps him not to be hasty in forming absolute judgements before examining various other aspects, both positive and negative. Obviously, much of the bloodshed, and much of tribulation of mankind would have been saved if man had shown the wisdom of understanding the contrary viewpoints. Mahāvīra carried this concept of non-violence from the domain of practical behaviour to the domain of intellectual and philosophical discussion. Thus the Jain principle of 'respect for the life of others' gave rise to the principle of 'respect for the views of others'. In fact, the essence of the *anekānta* doctrine is embodied in this principle of respect for the views of others. Thus Kapadia has noted: this doctrine of *anekāntavāda* helps us in cultivating a tolerant attitude towards the views of our adversaries. It does not stop there, but takes us a step forward by making us investigate as to how and why they hold different views and how the seeming contradictions can be reconciled to evolve harmony. It is thus an attempt towards synchronization.

CONCLUSION

All quests for the truth have remained quests for the methods to get to truth. No goal can be achieved without first identifying the method with which to do so. Truth is the goal, knowledge is the method. Truth comes from the knowledge of the senses and its definiteness, from thoughts. This knowledge is neither the truth nor a myth. In relative terms, it is the truth and in absolute terms, it is the myth. The theory of '*anekānta*' being a tool of speculating about the truth is a boon to the world of philosophy. It is an analytic approach to understand each and every aspect of our 'life and affairs of the world'. One of the most revolutionary and radical thinkers of all times, Mahavira developed a unique method of analysis, which could be applied to any facet of our lives. He struck at the roots of blind faith, biased dogmas, and authoritative absolutism with the open minded principle of *anekāntavād*.

In the proposed research work, the three philosophical doctrines namely, *anekāntavāda*, *nayavāda* and *syādvāda* have been explained from the point of view of applied philosophy of life. *Anekānta* is the heart of *Jain* metaphysics and *nayavāda* and *syādvāda* are its main arteries or to use a happier metaphor, the bird of *anekāntavāda* can't fly without its two wings of *nayavāda* and *syādvāda*. As far as my knowledge goes, *anekānta* and *nayavāda* are nothing but objective perspectives and *syādvāda* is a linguistic tool for expressing the *anekāntic* truth. This holistic perspective is a significant tool for solving problems. The need is to understand the efficiency of this tool. Lord Mahavira, from his strong intellectual and intuition power, recognized the fact that comprehensive perception, conception and expression and interpretation of phenomenal world is not

possible for a common man. Along with this, he introspected upon the possible consequences that are going to occur due to the limitation of cognition and expression of the incidents of the world of affairs. He was well aware of the fact that, it will first of all lead to misconception, misunderstanding, misinterpretation, and nonadjustment. One sided dogmatic approach towards the world of objects and subjects subsequently results in problem of being intolerant to the views of others, disrespect for the human dignity, unconcern and negligent notion for the non-human world, the absence of existential emotional connectivity between man and man, man and nature, rational man and social man, ultimately leading towards making impossible the dream of attainment of peaceful co-existence.

Now the question arises, how has such a philosophy come into being and developed. It is clear and distinct that, no philosophy originated and merely flourished in any jungle. Each and every religion or philosophy searches favorable circumstances to get its origin. It is basically due to the two extreme streams of thoughts about reality i.e. absolute eternalism and absolute fluxism, which prepared a ground for its origination. Because non- relative one sided view has created many problems in the field of philosophical thought. It is to deny their independence that non- absolutism came into being.

No new philosophy becomes compatible in our day-to-day life with in a single day. Each philosophy finds its deserved place after facing and overcoming the criticisms of the society and get accustomed to it with the passage of time. The philosophy of *anekānta* came into being in the *āgamic* period. During Lord Mahavira's era, there prevailed 363 types of diverse views of ideologies. After that time period onwards *anekānta* philosophy gradually developed in the heart of society through the four periods, i.e. *Agamic* period, *Philosophical* period, *Anekānta Vyavastha* period and *Navya-Nyaya* period up

to the modern period. It is in the philosophical period , that Ācārya Umāsvāti was first to give the implicit definition of *anekānta* in *Tāttvārtha Sūtra* as *arpitānarpitasiddheh'*, which means when primary qualities of a reality are in focus, the secondary qualities remain in the margin,because we can't express all the characteristics of a particular reality due to the limitation of our language. So an endeavour is made to trace out the history and the development of the theory of *anekānta*, according to the dates of ācāryas and it is really an interesting depiction of the gradual evolution of the *anekantic* thought from the *āgamic* period upto the modern period.

Anekāntavāda is the basic structure of Jain metaphysics. It seeks to re-orient our logical attitude and asks us to accept the unification of contradictions' as the true measure of Reality. How permanence, origination and cessation (impermanence) can logically reside in the same subject. *Anekānta* is the key to unlock the mystery of the paradoxical nature of reality. In the second chapter the metaphysical basis of *anekānta* and the criterion of functional reality is explained by quoting various points in its favour by different *ācāryā-s* in their specific time. The triple nature of reality is the heart of Jain metaphysics, which is the very foundation of Jain philosophy. The entire edifice of Jain theory of *anekānta* is based upon the Jain Metaphysics. So the triple characteristics (origination, cessation and permanence) of a Reality is discussed in detail by quoting logical definitions. In this chapter, the inter-relation of *tripadi* is being dealt with various examples cited by the *ācāryā-s* of philosophical age and other *ācāryā-s* from time to time. All the Jain *ācāryā-s* unanimously assert that permanent-cum-transitory nature of a Reality has a capacity of causal efficiency in three periods of time zone. Without understanding the *anekānta* in *tripadi*, we cannot get to the heart of Jaina philosophy. Moreover the brief explanation of the application of *anekānta* in

the metaphysical world of permanence-cum-change is an important section of this chapter.

In the third chapter, Epistemological Analysis of *Anekāntavāda*, I have tried to give an epistemological analysis of this *anekāntic* principle. Mahavira the *jina*, propounded the philosophy of *anekānta* to attain the truth of multi-dimensional aspects of reality. He reflected upon the multi-dimensional nature of reality and applied two types of perspectives to explain the reality. From the substantial or transcendental point of view, reality is eternal and from the conventional or its modal point of view, reality undergoes change. So we have seen or experienced that change presupposes the persistence of an underlying substance. So permanence is to be accounted as an element always present in an object together with the change. But change means the cessation of a previous mode or attribute and the coming into being of a new mode or attribute. The affirmation of the triple characteristics has, therefore, nothing paradoxical about it.

Basically Mahavira's enlightened interpretation of rendering solutions to the questions put forth before him, by his disciples and laypersons is really a path breaking. *Bhāgavati Sūtrā*, which is considered as the encyclopedia of Jainism, is a scriptural text, where Mahavira used this significant and efficacious tool of '*siya*' or '*syād*' and paved the path of understanding everything from the multi-dimensional perspective. The very nature of each and every subjective and objective reality of world inherently possesses infinite attributes and modes. From endless ages, infinite attributes and modes possessed by every object keep on changing without giving up their eternal and perpetual essence. The fundamental substance remains the same generating various concepts and percepts. It acquires different shapes but the base of independent existence remains unaltered. Every moment both are undergoing change and it will continue to change in the endless future without

giving up its eternal, perpetual essence. The theory of *anekānta* is dealt as a theory of Co-existence and Relativity in this chapter from the point of view of its social relevance.

Moreover the dictum that no word of the *Jina* is independent of *naya* (a particular view point) is the reputed principle of *āgamic* exegesis.¹ The world of experience is constituted by pairs of opposites as quoted in the *Thāṇaṃ Sūtra* “*yat sat tat sa pratipakṣam*”² i.e. It is in the nature of object that the opposing pairs co-exist, then why not two persons having different opinions, interest, habits, thoughts, hobbies can live together peacefully. The *anekāntavāda* and *nayavāda* are the two complementary processes forming a natural and inevitable development of the relativistic pre-supposition of the *Jain* doctrines. The analysis of the seven *nayas* and seven predictions or propositions will provide us the clarity that every judgement is relative to that particular aspect from which it is seen or observed. One who emphasizes only on his/her own viewpoint and conception of truth, brushing aside all other viewpoints can be guided in the right path through the *naya* and *syād* standpoint. The acceptance of relativistic conception of truth in letter and spirit would certainly desist one from treating his own partial view of truth as being absolute one. It is rejecting others viewpoints which is the main cause of commotion all around the world.

The forth chapter, *Anekānta* in the Philosophy of the West, is an humble effort to interpret the comparative study of P Western philosophers' thinking with the *Jain* concept of *naya* and *syād* perspective. During the process of research, I found that how the post modern philosopher Husserl (1859-1938) also speaks in *Jain* tune that 'object as phenomenon has infinitely manifold *noematic* aspects'. According to Husserl, *noesis* (each

¹ *Bhagavī Sūtra. op.cit.*, 4.5.

² *Thāṇaṃ*, 2.10.

standpoint) with regard to an object are infinite in number so also are the cases of *nayas*. *Nayas* are also infinite in number. In this regard Husserl really embraces the Jain view of *anekānta* i.e. '*anantadharmātmakam vastu*' without any inconsistency. In addition to this, Husserl says nothing new when he asserts that full knowledge of an object as a system of infinite *noemata* is never possible, that each *noema* in its reference to other *noemata* gives us only an idea of the object in its totality and that the ultimate unity of perception is never a matter of experience but always remains an ideal except in the case of *kevalins* and not in respect of the ordinary knower. Therefore Husserl's conception of *noesis* is strictly parallel to Jain concept of *naya*. *Noesis* has been defined as a meaning giving intention and the Jain view of *naya* has been defined as *jñāturabhiprāya* i.e. intention of the knower. *Noesis* gives only a partial presentation (*noema*) of the object, similar is the case with *naya*, which is parallel with the Husserlian view.

So it is mentioned how the western philosophers' view seem to be running in parallel with the concept of *anekāntic* relativity of perspective of co-existence of opposites, relativity of meaning of word and impossibility of exhaustive expression of any object in a given moment as accepted by respective philosophers namely, French Philosopher Claude Levi Strauss (1829-1902), Phenomenologist Philosopher Husserl (1859-1938), Wittgenstein (1889-1951), Existentialist Philosopher Jean Paul Sartre (1905-1980), the Post Structuralist Philosopher Derrida (1931-2004), whose views are compared and discussed in brief. Initially it may seem that the discussion is beyond the subject matter of the research undertaken, but for *anekāntic* inter-cultural dialogue we need to look into the Analogous Hermeneutics i.e. the *anekāntic* way of interpretation which can collaborate different cultures keeping its independent identity in a single whole for a better understanding between different cultures and doesn't give privileged treatment to anyone

particular thinking. Thus *anekānta* rejects absolutism and fundamentalism.. It teaches to respect alternative viewpoints even when we disagree with them. This mindset cultivates an attitude of tolerance, openness and co-operation, which helps to build bridges rather than walls, cohesion rather than conflict.

During the then period of Mahavira near about 363 schools of philosophies were prevailing. It was a tradition to ponder philosophically over every conundrum. But in those days, philosophers did not think of Yoga or its application as a task of philosophy. It was considered different from philosophy. Philosophy was understood as explaining the truths of substance, while *Yoga* was understood as training in meditation as accepted in *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* philosophy. One cannot say this division was right. Because of this narrow view, the scope of philosophy was limited to the understanding of the process of creation of Universe and its fundamental substances namely, soul and matter, its nature and its logical utility and so forth. In reality, "Philosophy is that which can present a comprehensive picture of all the truths of life"¹. The philosophy with which we have no connection and through which our present day problems cannot be solved, that philosophy may be useful for some extra-terrestrial, but definitely not useful for man. Indeed a philosophy of matter cannot be life's philosophy. Unless this narrow definition of philosophy is reconsidered, it will not serve any purpose in contemporary times. Today it is essential to change this vision of what use can that philosophy be, which does not touch on problems? How can that which is so cut-off from problems of life, be called a philosophy at all? "Ācārya Mahāphajña rightly said, the last step of the intellect (reasoning), is the first step of the applied philosophy."

The several future generations will be grateful to the holistic thinking of the twentieth century's contemporary

¹ Mahāprajñā. *Anekānta: The Third Eye*, p. 124.

thinkers, who incorporated the concept of applied philosophy, within the arena or purview of philosophy. Ācārya Mahāprajña rightly said, “*Anekānta* is not just a philosophy, but a manual for good life”.¹ So an elaborate explanation has been made as how the application of multi-dimensional philosophy of *anekānta* can act as a remote control in solving the burning problems of today. The theory of *anekānta* teaches to give due respect to the views of others and always try to keep yourself in the shoes of others and behave likewise. So the fifth chapter deals with the Applied Philosophy of *Anekānta*, in which it is hinted upon, how the actions backed up by *anekāntic* perspective is the ultimate solution to the world problems. In this age of intolerance, the theory of *anekānta* has become the necessity of the present day of culture. We see everyone wanting to impose one’s own views on others which is the cause of social anarchy, family quarrels, religious riots, political problems and commercial disharmony. The theory of *anekānta* is dealt as a theory of Co-existence, Relativity, Reconciliation, Tolerance, Equanimity in this chapter from the point of view of its social relevance.

Achievement of happiness, peace and harmony and well ordered society is the innate wish of each and every individual. The way to achieve this innate goal lies in understanding the theory of *anekānta*. With the spec of *anekānta*, we can be able to perceive the tinge of truth in the views and thoughts of others. It is Jain philosophy’s great contribution to the world of conflicts. There are many revolutions that had been taken place in the heart of history, but the practical application of *anekāntic* life style can bring about a great revolution in the society, by giving an effective solution to the problem of tension, miscommunication, familial quarrels, religious riots, organizational strikes, difference of views among the political parties, and communities and so forth, in the world.

¹ Ācārya Mahāprajña. *Anekānta: The Third Eye*, p. 200.

Moreover in the fifth chapter, the heart of proposed work, a wide implication of *anekāntic* perspective in resolving the individual problems to global problems is explained in detail. It is highlighted as how the doctrine of *anekānta* works for change of vision at individual level, for developing the culture of tolerance at family level, for attaining peaceful-co-existence at social level, in resolving communal riot at religious level, for achieving universal brotherhood at national and international level, these burning issues have been dealt from the modern perspective. In various other fields also the role of *anekānta* is dealt with namely, in the secularism, in conflict resolution, in non-violent communication, in education, in successful management, in leadership, and so on and so forth.

In my opinion *anekāntic* perspective and *syādvāda* way of expression seems to be necessary for developing mutual understanding. Thus humble efforts are drawn out to break the narrow walls of *anekānta*, which were confined within the domain of intellectual and philosophical debate, to the domain of philosophy of life. Along with this an endeavour is also made to explain how under the umbrella of *anekānta*, all antagonists, one-sided view-holders come and sit together on one platform breaking the system barrier which divide the entire human race. I have clearly highlighted the doctrine of *anekānta* as an understanding which urges individuals to study different religions, cultures, customs, rituals, cults, schools of thought and trace out the underlying points of agreements and disagreements so that one can have an inter-cultural dialogue from the point of view of agreements rather than remain in watertight compartment of thoughts.

Thus *anekānta* philosophy is a comprehensive perspective of looking at the world of objects and world of thoughts. It is a life's philosophy and is applicable in our common sense experience. So, *anekāntavād* is actually a way of

looking at life and the world. It is an analytical tool, which examines the different conflicting opinions in objective ways and studies how far and in which way each opinion is valid. It is win-win approach and not win-lose approach. It tries to understand the views of others impartially, dispassionately and thereby enhance and widen the mental horizon as well as open-mindedness. As in the past, so even today and years to come, Jainism is destined to play a vital role in the intellectual, social and cultural transformation of the human beings. Hence, a correct understanding, exploration and application of *anekānta* will certainly be fruitful for the welfare of the humanity. It will lead to the establishment of a peaceful world-order. To inculcate the spirit of tolerance as also the attitude of appreciation of other's point of view is the need of the hour, which may be made possible by understanding and following the philosophy of *anekānta*.

So an endeavor is made at my disposal to highlight the holistic approach of understanding each and every situations of life and providing rational and practical solutions to the present burning problems through *anekānta* vs intellectual *ahimsā* at the mental level, non-violent communication at the speech level and relative tolerance and respect for the views of others at social level and developing the attitude of equanimity for the lives of all levels of beings at global level.

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