BHARTRHARI'S CRITISM IN JAIN LOGIC

: A STUDY :

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The grammarian-philosopher Bhārthari opines that Šabda is the substratum of the world of appearance and thus he accepts the theory of Sabdādvaita. However this key-stone of the Grammarians' system of Metaphysics has elaborately been controverted by the rival schools. Here we propose to record the dialectics of the Jains Philosophers, one of the rival schools of Metaphysics.

This theory of Bharthari has been subjected to severe criticism by the Naiyayikas, Mimamsajas, Buddhists and Jains. Now, for our practical purpose we discuss the view of the Jaina logicians like Vidyanandi (9th century A.D.), Abhayadev Suri (11th century A.D.), Prabhacandra (1st half 12th Century A.D.), Vadideva Suri (later half of 12th Century, A.D.) and Shree Yasovijaya jee (18th Century A.D.).

The Jaina logicians argue that the Sabdabrahman is a prameya and a prameya needs a pramāṇa for its recognition. There is no pramāṇa through which we can prove the existence of the Sabdabrahman.

1. The Mimansakas also argue that prameya is recognised only by pramana, viz., manadhina-meya-siddhi. Abhsystbrbr in sanmatitaraka-prakaranatika says : pramanadhina hi prameyayavastha (p.334)

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In the *Tattvārthaslokavārtika*, Vidyanandi opines that the *Sabdabrahman* is not proved by Perception, Inference and verbal Testimony. This standpoint of Vidyanandi is also supposed by Sataraksita, Abhayadeva, Prabhacandra and Vadideva. However, Prabhacandra and Vadideva ask the grammarians during their discussion that the *Sabdabrahman* is recognised by *indriyajanyapratyakṣa* or by *atindriyapratyakṣa* or by *Svasamvedanasīlapratyakṣa*? The first alternative is not qualified enough to recognise the *Sabdabrahman* as it is not recognised by the Jaina Logicians. They argue that this type of *pratyakṣa* is illusory like the perception during dream. Thus the sensual perception may not be taken as a cause of the perception of the *Sabdabrahman*. In the *Sanmatitarka Prakaraṇa* it has been argued that a sense perceives that which is present and which is also large (*śhuṇa*) in nature. Therefore the *Sabdabrahman* is not perceived by the sense organs. This is also supported by Prabhacandra in his *Prameyakamalamārtanda*. During the discussion, both Prabhacandra and Vādideva Suri raise the same question – by which sense organ do we receive the *Sabdabrahman*? either by *Srotrendriya* or by any other *indriya*. Since the *Sabdabrahman* is beyond the subject of the *Srotrendriya* that may not be a cause to know the *Sabdabrahman*. If we accept that this is subject of the *Srotrendriya*, then we have to accept that everything should

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6. Ref. the *nyayakumudacandra*, 1/3, p.142.
be known by each and every indriya (sense organ). But it is not possible to accept. Again, in the Nyāyakumudacandra it has been explained that the other sense organs (i.e. other than Śrotrendriya) also are not qualified enough to be cause for the perception of the Sabdabrahman; because Sabda may not be a subject of any other sense organ other than the Śrotrendriya\(^7\). Thus it may be concluded that the Sabdabrahman is not recognised by the indriyajanya pratyakṣa.

The Sabdabrahman is also not a subject of the atindriyapratyakṣa. In the Nyāya-Kumvda Candra, Prabhacandra opines that the anindriyapratyakṣa without any sense organ is not accepted by the grammarians and therefore, that should not be the cause to establish the Sabdabrahman\(^8\). In the reply the grammarians argue that a Yogi realises the existence of the SB (Sabdabrahman) through Dhyāna and therefore the existence of the SB is proved by atindriyapratyakṣa of the Yogis. Now the Jaina logicians again argue that if the Sb is the only ultimate reality then who will be there to realise it? and if we accept to the Yogis, then we have to accept the Yoga also. Thus, the concept of advaita 'non-duality' will no more exist.\(^9\)

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7. Refer the Syadvadaratnakara, VII/6, p.78 and the Nyayakumudacandra, 1/5, p.142.
8. Cf; napatindriyapratyaksad: tasyaivatualambhvat; Prabhacandra on the Nyayakumudacandra, p. 142; also the Syadvadaratnakara, 1/7, p. 99.
9. Ibid.
Further, Prabhacandra and Vadideva Suri ask the opponents that if there exists the SB then why do we not feel the existence of that? Here they give two alternatives:

(i) Due to the absence of *Grāhaka* (Grāhakatvābhāva)
(ii) Due to the Avidyā (Avidyābhibhūta).

We may not say that due to the first alternative the SB is not manifested, because, in the *Śabdādvaitasiddhanta* the SB is *grāhaka* and the *grāhaka-śakti* always exists in it: and the second alternative also is not possible as the existence of Avidyā is not recognised by the Jaina logicians. It is not out of context to mention that in the *Nyāyakumudacandra* Prabhacandra categorical rejects the existence of the Dvaavidyā. This standpoint of Prabhacandra is also supported by Vadideva Suri in the Syadvādaratnākara. In this context the Jaina logicians again argue that since the *grāhaka-śakti* exists always in the SB, we cannot say that due to the absence of the *grāhaka-śakti* the SB does not manifest. Again, Prabhacandr and Vadideva Suri argue that Avidyā is neither identical with SB not with other than the SB and if it is other than the SB then either it is a vastu or it is avastu? Both these alternatives have been rejected by the Jaina logicians in their respective works and therefore, according to them, avidyā is neither a vastu nor an avastu viz. ( na ca laghepa praheyatśayasya brahmanah tadasāt tathāpratibhāso muktotiprasaṅgāt nāpyavasturasād vastuno nyathābhāvo

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14. Refer note 12 above.
bhavati atiprasaṅgat ca (N.K.C. p.143) and atha vastuh, tanna, abhyupagamaksatiprasakteh, (Ibid. 1/5, p.143). Thus the existence of the avidyā has been rejected by the Jains and it may be suggested that like the Indriya-pratyakṣa, the SB is also not proved by the Anindriya-pratyakṣa.

Now we should thinks about the Svasamvedana-pratyakṣa. According to vidyanandi if the knowledge which is kṣaṇika and niranśa (Buddhists views) is not proved by the above pratyakṣa, Then how shall we establish the existence of the SB by the said Pratyakṣa 15? In this connection, Prabhacakandra says that during dream (Svapnāvasthā) we cannot feel the SB which manifests with ātmajyoti, by the svasamvedanapratyakṣa otherwise, each and every creature will attend liberation with out any effort. Because it has been categorically mentioned it the Advaita-śabda-siddhānta that the svasamvedanatya of SB, which manifests with ātmajyoti is liberation. Again, he explains that if the SB will be svasamvedanasīla, then the words like ghāṭa and pāṭa should be svasamvedanasīla, as these words are the vivarta of the SB. But this is not accepted, because all the words are not svasamvedanasīla. Thus, the Jaina logicians argue that the SB is not perceived by svasamvedana-pratyakṣa 16. Now we may conclude that the existence of the SB is not proved by perception.


Like perception, the existence of SB is also not proved by inference, another means of the valid knowledge. Secondly, it is also a fact that the inference is not recognised by Śabdāvaitavādis as a way of valid knowledge. In this connection, Vadideva Says that: nāpyaymānena, tasya tatsadbhāvavedakasya kasyacidasambhavāt. Acarya Vidyanandi also explains vividly regarding this problem. According to him since in the Śabdādvaitaśiddhānta, inference is not recognised as a means of valid-knowledge, how can we prove the existence of the SB by inferences.

Again the Jain logicians ask that by which inference the Śabdādvaitavādins prove the existence of SB; either by Kāryāliṅgānumāna or by Svabhāvalīṅgānumāna? This is also supported by Abhayadeva Suri and Prabhacandra. According to Jaina scholars the first alternative is not justified here, because the eternal SB has an action; neither it has any action chronologically (arthakriya), nor it has any action collectively. If there is no action, then how can we, say that the SB may be established through Kāryāliṅgānumāna. The second alternative also has no scope to prove the existence of the SB; because it is needed first to establish the existence of the dharmi SB and after that only we can prove it by inference, which is the Svarupabhutadharma of the SB. But when the Dharm/SB, has no existence, then its Svabhāvalīṅga is automatically regarded as non-existence. Thus the SB is not established by inference, the second way of valid knowledge.

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17. The Syadvadratnakara l7, p. 100.
20. Refer the Sanmatitarkaparakaranatika, Gatha-6 p. 384 and the Pramayakamalamarattanda, l3, p. 45
In the Tattvartha-Sloka-varttika, Vidyanandi refutes the possibility that the SB is proved by the means of Verbal Testimony. He says:

āgamađeva tat-siddhau bhedaśiddhistathā na kim.
nirbādhād-eva cettacyam na pramanamatarad-ṛte.21

Further, the explains that the followers of the Śabdādvita concepts say the existence of the SB is recognised by verbal testimony, which is free from any kind of obstacles (bādharaḥita). Here Vidyanandi does not support the nirbādhatva of the verbal testimony as there is no valid knowledge to prove this22.

Again, an interesting doubt has been raised by Jaina logicians like Vidyanandi, Prabhacandra and Vadideva Suri that the SB is identified with verbal testimony or the SB in separate from the verbal testimony? In the Case of former alternative the verbal testimony? In the case of former alternative the verbal testimony may not be a cause for the establishment of the SB due to the lack of the relation of cause and effect (Kārya-kāraṇa bhāva'). The second alternative is also impossible here, because if we accept two things like the SB and the verbal testimony, then the advaita "non-duality" character of the SB will no more exist. It is needless to say here again that the grammarians accept the SB as "non-duality", and says every thing is produced from it viz.:

tad-āgamasya niścetum śakyam jatu parikṣakaith.
nacāgamastato nginnaḥ samasti paramārthaḥ.23

22. In the commentary the author opines that : na hi
bharantiyamakhiśabhedapratitir-ityaniscaye tadanyathanupapattya
 tadbijabhitam sabdarattvam anadindhanam brahma sidhyati/ etc.
23. Ibid, verse 100; also the Prameyakamalamarttanda. IV/3, p.46, also
the suadvadratnakara l/7, pp. 101.
To refute the objection of the Jaina logicians, the grammarians may argue that Verbal Testimony is the Vivarta of the SB. However, Vidyanandi nicely rejects this type of argument of the grammarians. According to him if the Verbal Testimony or will be the Vivarta "appearance" of the SB like other things, then this means of knowledge will be treated as avidyā, which is asat. Now he asks the opponents that an asat, i.e. the Verbal Testimony may not be a cause for a sat one i.e. the SB viz tad-vivartastva vidyātmā tasya prajñapakāḥ katham. 24 Thus the verb as testimony may not be a case to prove the existence of the SB.

In the Tattvarthaslokavarttika, Vidyanandi not only rejects the existence of the SB, but directly attains Bhāṛthrhari quoting his first verse from the Vākyapadiya. He also opines that there is no such type of Brahman who is without beginning or end, whose very essence is the word, who is the cause of the manifested phonemes, who appears as the objects from whom the creation of the world proceeds viz.

tato natva oaram brahmastyānādinidhanātmakam.
Vivarte-tvartabhāvena prakriya jagato yataḥ. 25

Thus the Jaina logician rejects the existence of the SB, which is, according to the grammarians, the real cause of this universe. They not only reject the existence of the SB, but who argue that the world is not engulfed with worlds "Śabdamaya". According to them since the SB is eternal in character, how any change "vivarta or pariṇāma" is possible with that? Again, they think if the grammarians argue that at

the time of change the SB leaves its own quality or not? As the SB is eternal, the first alternative does not seem to be possible and if the second will be accepted, then, as all the things are engulfed with SB, a dwarf "Vadhira" will be able to listen everything after seeing the things produced from the SB viz. rūpa samvedana samaya vadhirasya śabdāsamvedana prasaṅga etc. 26

Like this, the Jainas, studied the philosophy of grammar in general and Bhaṭṭṛhari especially and rejected the view that the world is produced from the SB, which is eternal and the world is engulfed with words. Besides, they reject the theories like: knowledge in general is śabdānuviddha, there is eternal relation between śabda and artha etc. These kinds of studies among the Jainas had taken place in between 9th century A.D. to 19th century A.D. The Jainas not only studied the philosophical side of the sanskrit grammar, but they also prepared their own treatises on the word-formation, some of the works are critically edited and published, but many works are still in manuscript forms.

26. The Sammatitarkap panatika, p. 381.