

BHARTRHARI'S CRITISM IN JAIN LOGIC : A STUDY :

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The grammarian-philosopher Bhartrhari opines that *Śabda* is the substratum of the world of appearance and thus he accepts the theory of *Śabdādvaita*. However this key-stone of the Grammarians' system of Metaphysics has elaborately been controverted by the rival schools. Here we propose to record the dialectics of the Jains Philosophers, one of the rival schools of Metaphysics.

This theory of Bhartrhari has been subjected to severe criticism by the Naiyayikas, Mimamsajas, Buddhists and Jains. Now, for our practical purpose we discuss the view of the Jaina logicians like Vidyanandi (9th century A.D.), Abhayadev Suri (11th century A.D.), Prabhacandra (1st half 12th Century A.D.), Vadideva Suri (later half of 12th Century, A.D.) and Shree Yasovijaya jee (18th Century A.D.).

The Jaina logicians argue that the *Śabdabrahman* is a *prameya* and a *prameya* needs a *pramāṇa* for its recognition. ¹ There is no *pramāṇa* through which we can prove the existence of the *Śabdabrahman*².

1. The Mimamsakas also argue that *prameya* is recognised only by *pramana*, viz., *manadhina-meya-siddhi*. Abhsysrbr in *sanmatitaraka-prakaranatika* says : *pramanadhina hi prameyavyavastha* (p.334)
2. Cf. *na ca evambhuta brahmasiddhaye pramanam-upa; abhayate*, Ibid, 3rd Pt., Gatha 6; p. 384.

In the *Tattavārthaślokavārtika*, Vidyanandi opines that the *Śabdabrahman* is not proved by Perception, Inference and verbal Testimony.³ This standpoint of Vidyanandi is also supposed by Sataraksita, Abhayadeva, Prabhacandra and Vadideva. However, Prabhacandra and Vadideva ask the grammarians during their discussion that the *Śabdabrahman* is recognised by *indriyajanya pratyakṣa* or by *atindriya pratyakṣa* or by *Svasamvedanaśīla pratyakṣa*? The first alternative is not qualified enough to recognise the *Śabdabrahman* as it is not recognised by the Jaina Logicians. They argue that this type of *pratyakṣa* is illusory like the perception during dream.⁴ Thus the sensual perception may not be taken as a cause of the perception of the *Śabdabrahman*. In the *Sanmatitarka Prakaraṇa* it has been argued that a sense perceives that which is present and which is also large (*sthūla*) in nature. Therefore the *Śabdabrahman* is not perceived by the sense organs. This is also supported by Prabhacandra in his *Prameyakamalamārtanda*.⁵ During the discussion, both Prabhācandra and Vādideva Suri raise the same question – by which sense organ do we receive the *Śabdabrahman*? either by *Srotrendriya* or by any other *indriya*.⁶ Since the *Śabdabrahman* is beyond the subject of the *Srotrendriya* that may not be a cause to know the *Śabdabrahman*. If we accept that this is subject of the *Srotrendriya*, then we have to accept that everything should

3. Cf. *brahmano na vyavasthanam-aksajnanit kutacara*.

4. Cf. *brahmano na vyavasthanam-aksajnanit kutacara. svapnadaviva mithyatvattasya sakalpatah svayam*. The *Tattvarthaslokavartika* 1/3, sutra 20, Kanike-97, p.240. Also *Tattvarna sutra* (with explanation) Bombay, 1 am 1940, p.21.

5. Cf. *na khaly yathopavarnitasvarupam sabdabrahma pratyaksath praciya, sanvada pratiniyatartha svarupagradaktvenaivasua pratieh*. The *Prameyakamala-martanda*, 1/3, Bombay, 1941, p. 45.

6. Ref. the *nyayakumudacandra*, 1/3, p.142.

be known by each and every *indriya* (sense organ). But it is not possible to accept. Again, in the *Nyāyakumudacandra* it has been explained that the other sense organs (i.e. other than *Srotrendriya*) also are not qualified enough to be cause for the perception of the *Śabdabrahman*; because *Śabda* may not be a subject of any other sense organ other than the *Srotrendriya*⁷. Thus it may be concluded that the *Śabdabrahman* is not recognised by the *indriyajanya pratyakṣa*.

The *Śabdabrahman* is also not a subject of the *atindriyapratyakṣa*. In the *Nyāya-Kumvda Candra*, Prabhacandra opines that the *anindriyapratyakṣa* without any sense organ is not accepted by the grammarians and therefore, that should not be the cause to establish the *Śabdabrahman*⁸. In the reply the grammarians argue that a Yogi realises the existence of the SB (*Śabdabrahman*) through *Dhyāna* and therefore the existence of the SB is proved by *atindriyapratyakṣa* of the *Yogis*. Now the Jaina logicians again argue that if the SB is the only ultimate reality then who will be there to realise it? and if we accept to the Yogis, then we have to accept the Yogi also. Thus, the concept of *advaita* 'non-duality' will no more exist.⁹

7. Refer the *Syadvadaratnakara*, VII/6, p.78 and the *Nyayakumudacandra*, 1/5, p.142.

8. Cf; *napyatindriyapratyaksad; tasyaivatuasambhavat*; Prabhacandra on the *Nyayakumudacandra*, p. 142; also the *Syadvadaratnakara*, 1/7, p, 99.

9. Ibid.

Further, Prabhacandra and Vadideva Suri ask the apponents that if there exists the SB then why do we not feel the existence of that? Here they give two alternatives:

- (i) Due to the absence of *Grāhaka* (*Grāhakatvābhāva*)
- (ii) Due to the *Avidyā* (*Avidyābhibhūta*).¹⁰

We may not say that due to the first alternative the SB is not manifested, because, in the *Sābdādvaitasiddhanta* the SB is *grāhaka* and the *grāhaka-śakti* always exists in it:¹¹ and the second alternative also is not possible as the existence of *Avidyā* is not recognised by the Jaina logicians. It is not out of context to mention that in the *Nyāyakumudacandra*, Prabhacandra categorical rejects the existence of the *Dvaividya*¹². This standpoint of Prabhacandra is also supported by *Vadideva* suri in the *Syadvādaratnākara*¹³. In this context the Jaina logicians again argue that since the *grāhaka-śakti* exists always in the SB, we cannot say that due to the absence of the *grāhaka-śakti* the SB does not manifest. Again, Prabhacandra and Vadideva Suri argue that *Avidyā* is neither identical with SB nor with other than the SB¹⁴ and if it is other than the SB then either it is a *vastu* or it is *avastu*? Both these alternatives have been rejected by the Jaina logicians in their respective works and therefore, according to them, *avidyā* is neither a *vastu* nor an *avastu* viz. (*na ca laghepa praheyatsāyasya brahmanah tadasāt tathāpratibhāso muktotiprasaṅgāt nāpyavasturaśād vastuno nyathābhāvo*

10. ॐ *athasti kasmanna prakasate-grahakabhavat avidyabhibhutavada*. The *Nyayakumuda-Candra*, 1/5, p. 142.

11. Cf. *grahyatvam grahakatvam ca dve sakti tejaso yatha tathaiva sarvasabdanamete prthagavasthite*. The *Vakyapadiya*, 1-55.

12. Cf; *sahibrahmano vyatirikta atiaikia va?* etc. The *Nyayakumuda-candra* 1/5, p. 143.

13. Cf; *sahi sabdobrahmanah sakasabbinna bhaved-abhinna va*, 11/7, p. 99.

14. Refer note 12 above.

bhavati atiprasaṅgāt ca (N.K.C. p.143) and *atha vastuḥ, tanna, abhyupagamaksatiprasakteh*, (Ibid. 1/5, p.143). Thus the existence of the *avidyā* has been rejected by the Jains and it may be suggested that like the *Indriya-pratyakṣa*, the SB is also not proved by the *Anindriya-pratyakṣa*.

Now we should think about the *Svasamvedana-pratyakṣa*. According to vidyanandi if the knowledge which is *kṣaṇika* and *niraṇśa* (Buddhists views) is not proved by the above *pratyakṣa*, Then how shall we establish the existence of the SB by the said *Pratyakṣa* ¹⁵? In this connection, Prabhacandra says that during dream (*Svapnāvasthā*) we cannot feel the SB which manifests with *ātmajyoti*, by the *svasamvedana-pratyakṣa* otherwise, each and every creature will attain liberation without any effort. Because it has been categorically mentioned in the *Advaita-śabda-siddhānta* that the *svasamvedanatva* of SB, which manifests with *ātmajyoti* is liberation. Again, he explains that if the SB will be *svasamvedanaśīla*, then the words like *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* should be *svasamvedanaśīla*, as these words are the *vivarta* of the SB. But this is not accepted, because all the words are not *svasamvedanaśīla*. Thus, the Jaina logicians argue that the SB is not perceived by *svasamvedana-pratyakṣa* ¹⁶. Now we may conclude that the existence of the SB is not proved by perception.

15. Cf; *svataḥssamvedalatsiddhiḥksanikandmsavittivat. na parabrahmano nāpi sa yukta sadhanadvina*. The *Tattvarthaslokavarttika* 1/3, sutra 20, p. 240.

16. Cf; *na ca ghaṭadisabarho va svasamviditas vabhavaḥ yatastadanvitatvam svasam vedamataḥ siddhayet, asvasamviditasvabhavatayaivaasyapratipraniprasiddhatvat*. The *Nyayakumuda-candra*, 1/5, p. 144.

Like perception, the existence of SB is also not proved by inference, another means of the valid knowledge. Secondly, it is also a fact that the inference is not recognised by *Śabdādvaitavādīs* as a way of valid knowledge. In this connection, Vadideva Says that: *nāpyaymānena, tasya tatsadbhāvavedakasya kasyacidasambhavāt*¹⁷. Acarya Vidyanandi also explains vividly regarding this problem. According to him since in the *Śabdādvaiatsiddhānta*, inference is not recognised as a means of valid-knowledge, how can we prove the existence of the SB by inferences.¹⁸

Again the Jain logicians ask that by which inference the *Śabdādvaitavādīs* prove the existence of SB; either by *Kāryāliṅgānumāna* or by *Svabhāvaliṅgānumāna*¹⁹? This is also supported by Abhayadeva Suri and Prabhacandra.²⁰ According to Jaina scholars the first alternative is not justified here, because the eternal SB has an action; neither it has any action chronologically (*arthakriyā*), not it has any action collectively. If there is no action, then how can we, say that the SB may be established through *Kāryāliṅgānumāna*. The second alternative also has no scope to prove the existence of the SB; because it is needed first to establish the existence of the dharmi SB and after that only we can prove it by inference, which is the *Svarupabhutadharma* of the SB. But when the *Dharmī*SB, has no existence, then its *Svabhāvaliṅga* is automatically regarded as non-existence. Thus the SB is not established by inference, the second way of valid knowledge.

17. The *Syadvadtratnakara* I/7, p. 100.

18. Cf. *nanundanattatorthanam pratitedurīlabhatvatah. paraprasiddhirapyasya prasiddhanapramanika. The Tattvarthaslokavarttika*, I/3, Sutra, 20 Verse-97, p. 240.

19. Cf. *napyannmmanatah / tatha hi anumānam bhavat-karyalingam bhavet svabhavalingam va?* Kamalasila on *Tattvarthasamgraha-panjika-tika* verses 147-148, pp. 92-93.

20. Refer the *Sanmatitarkaprakaranatika*, Gatha-6 p. 384 and the *Pramayakamalamarttanda*, I/3, p. 45

In the *Tattvartha-Sloka-varttika*, Vidyanandi refutes the possibility that the SB is proved by the means of Verbal Testimony. He says :

āgamādeva tat-siddhau bhedasiddhistathā na kim.

*nirbādhād-eva cettacyam na pramanamatarad-rte.*²¹

Further, he explains that the followers of the *Śabdādvaita* concepts say the existence of the SB is recognised by verbal testimony, which is free from any kind of obstacles (*bādharahita*). Here Vidyanandi does not support the *nirbādhātva* of the verbal testimony as there is no valid knowledge to prove this²².

Again, an interesting doubt has been raised by Jaina logicians like Vidyanandi, Prabhaçandra and Vadideva Suri that the SB is identified with verbal testimony or the SB is separate from the verbal testimony? In the Case of former alternative the verbal testimony? In the case of former alternative the verbal testimony may not be a cause for the establishment of the SB due to the lack of the relation of cause and effect (*Kārya-kāraṇa bhāva*). The second alternative is also impossible here, because if we accept two things like the SB and the verbal testimony, then the *advaita* "non-duality" character of the SB will no more exist. It is needless to say here again that the grammarians accept the SB as "non-duality", and says every thing is produced from it viz.:

tad-āgamasya niścetum śakyam jatu parikṣakaith.

*naçāgamastato nginnaḥ samasti paramārthataḥ.*²³

21. The *Tattvarthaslokavarttika* I/3, Sutra - 20, Verse-99, p.241.

22. In the commentary the author opines that : *na hi bharantiriyamakḥilabhedapratitir-ityaniscaye tadanyathanupapattya tadbijabhuttam sabdatattvam anadinidhanam brahma sidhyati/ etc.* Ibid, p. 241.

23. Ibid, verse 100; also the *Prameyakamalamarttanda*. IV/3, p.46, also the *suadvadtratnakara* I/7, pp. 101.

To refute the objection of the Jaina logicians, the grammarians may argue that Verbal Testimony is the *Vivarta* of the SB. However, Vidyanandi nicely rejects this type of argument of the grammarians. According to him if the Verbal Testimony or will be the *Vivarta* "appearance" of the SB like other things, then this means of knowledge will be treated as *avidyā*, which is *asat*. Now he asks the opponents that an *asat*, i.e. the Verbal Testimony may not be a cause for a *sat* one i.e. the SB viz *tad-vivartastva vidyātma tasya prajñapakāḥ katham*.²⁴ Thus the verb as testimony may not be a case to prove the existence of the SB.

In the *Tattvarthaslokavarttika*, Vidyanandi not only rejects the existence of the SB, but directly attains Bhārtrhari quoting his first verse from the *Vākyapadīya*. He also opines that there is no such type of Brahman who is without beginning or end, whose very essence is the word, who is the cause of the manifested phonemes, who appears as the objects from whom the creation of the world proceeds viz.

tato natva oaram brahmastyānādinidhanātmakam.
*Vivarte-tvarthabhāvena prakriya jagato yataḥ.*²⁵

Thus the Jaina logician rejects the existence of the SB, which is, according to the grammarians, the real cause of this universe. They not only reject the existence of the SB, but who argue that the world is not engulfed with worlds "*Śabdāmaya*". According to them since the SB is eternal in character, how any change "*vivarta* or *pariṇāma*" is possible with that? Again, they think if the grammarians argue that at

24. The *Tattvarthaslokavrttika* Ibid verse 101, p. 241.

25. Ibid, verse 103, p. 241.

the time of change the SB leaves its own quality or not? As the SB is eternal, the first alternative does not seem to be possible and if the second will be accepted, then, as all the things are engulfed with SB, a dwarf "Vadhira" will be able to listen everything after seeing the things produced from the SB viz. *rūpa samvedana samaya vadhiraśya śabdāsamvedana prasaṅga etc.* ²⁶

Like this, the Jainas, studied the philosophy of grammar in general and Bhaṭṭarhari especially and rejected the view that the world is produced from the SB, which is eternal and the world is engulfed with words. Besides, they reject the theories like : knowledge in general is *śabdānuviddha*, there is eternal relation between *śabda* and *artha* etc. These kinds of studies among the Jainas had taken place in between 9th century A.D. to 19th century A.D. The Jainas not only studied the philosophical side of the sanskrit grammar, but they also prepared their own treatises on the word-formation, some of the works are critically edited and published, but many works are still in manuscript forms.

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26. The *Sammatitarkap* *panatika*, p. 381.