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Editor : Dr. SAGARMAL JAIN

The Concept of Pañcasīla In Indian Thought

By

Dr. KAMLA JAIN

M. A., Ph. D.

P. V. RESEARCH INSTITUTE

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
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Dedicated
To
The affectionate memory
of
my revered father
Late Shri Kundanlal parakh
Who has made me what I am

—Kamla Jain

PUBLISHER'S NOTE

I am very glad to place in the hands of the readers the valuable work of Dr. (Miss) Kamala Jain which embodies the result of her thesis 'The Concept of Pañcaśīla in Indian Thought', approved for the Ph. D. Degree by the Delhi University.

Ours is the age which saw the tremendous growth of scientific knowledge and discoveries. Science has done a great service to mankind by providing amenities of pleasant living and man has become the master of nature. But it is only one sided picture. Bertrand Russel, the eminent philosopher, comments 'Man is showing some thing of the defects of slave-turned-master. A new moral outlook is called for in which submission to the powers of nature is replaced by respect for what is best in man'. It is where this respect is lacking that scientific technique is dangerous. Science has saved mankind from many miseries and uncertainties of the primitive past but it has landed man in new and gnawing fears and uncertainties. Science is responsible for the discovery of modern atomic weapons of warfare. It has destroyed many superstitions, but has also uprooted the spiritual and moral values of our society. We know much about the atom but not about the values needed for meaningful and peaceful life. We are living in a state of chaos. Our life is full of excitements, fears and value-conflicts. Today, what is needed for mankind is peace, mental as well as environmental; this can only be achieved through the practice of Non-violence, the first and the foremost *śīla* of Indian Ethics. In our age Mahatma Gandhi applied the principle of non-violence in the field of politics and he not only achieved freedom for India through it but also gave a new vision to the politicians of the world. Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru also brought India repute by introducing the idea of

Pañcaśīla for international peace. Thus the concept of **Pañcaśīla** has played an important role in the history of human civilization, modern as well as ancient.

The term **Pañcaśīla** originally belongs to Buddhism but it is retained in some way or the other in different systems of Indian thought also. This doctrine of **Pañcaśīla** is the pivot of Indian ethics and religions. In Jainism these **Pañcaśīlas** are accepted in the form of five **Mahāvratas** and in Hinduism they are known as five **Yamas**.

When I came to know from Pt. Dalsukhbhai Malvania that Dr. (Miss) Kamala Jain of Delhi had written a thesis on this important topic of **Pañcaśīla** I approached her and got the manuscript for publication. I am very much indebted to her for this kindness.

I must express my gratitude to Mr. Kranti Kumar Jain and some others for offering a grant for this publication, without which the publication of this work would not have been possible.

I also thank Dr. R. K. Mathur, who has gone through the press copy and gave valuable suggestions about its linguistic presentation, and Dr. Harihar Singh for seeing it through the press. Lastly, I thank Shri Vinay Shankar Pandya of Ratna Printing works, Varanasi, for their prompt and kind cooperation in printing the book.

I would fail in my duty if I do not thank Shri Gulab Chandji, Vice-President and Shri B. N. Jain, Secretary of Shri Sohanlal Jain Vidya Prasarak Samiti, who have been very instrumental in this publication.

Dr. Sagarmal Jain

Director

P. V. Research Institute

Varanasi—5

FOREWORD

The concept of Pañcaśīla in Indian Thought by Dr. (Miss) Kamala Jain is an important contribution in the field of ethical philosophy. I have hardly come across any single treatise dealing with this concept comprehensively and making a comparative study of the relevant materials in Buddhist and Jaina literature. I, therefore, congratulate the author for her systematic study of the five *śīlas* and *vratas*, the basics of Buddhism and Jainism respectively.

In Buddhism *sīla* (right conduct) is the first step towards attaining the *nibbāna*. In fact, a Buddhist is one who has taken the five *śīlas* and *tri-śaraṇas* (three refuges, viz. *Buddha*, *Dhamma* and *Sangha*). And it is through this *śīla* (right conduct) that the mind obtains concentration (*samādhi*) which leads to wisdom (*prajñā*) in the form of *mokṣa*, call it *nibbāna* if you are a Theravādin and *bodhi*, if you are a Mahāyānist. The author rightly remarks that the spiritual happiness flowing from good conduct is the final goal of life and nothing is superior to it (p. 4). However, I do not agree with the author that "in Śramaṇical thought emphasis is laid on individualistic happiness" (p. 5). In Mahāyāna Buddhism, on the contrary, the main thrust of ideology is towards universal welfare. Also we see that even in present times Buddhist monks and Jaina *munis* have been dedicating their life towards various social activities and building religious and social institutions.

As regards the first *śīla* it may be noted that the word *ahiṃsā* is not very much in vogue in Buddhism. The Buddhist synonymous term is *avihiṃsā*. But it must be admitted that Jainism has far surpassed Buddhism in the conception of the ideal of non-violence in its various aspects. It may also be noted, as the author has rightly pointed out, that absti-

nence from the use of intoxicants is not among the five *vratas* in Jainism (p. 208). However, it seems the Jainas practise it more than the Buddhists. It may be that Jaina Masters did not think it necessary to include it in the five fundamental principles for its obviousness as serious transgression.

In my opinion the book is a significant contribution to the understanding of ethical system of two major Śramaṇic traditions of India. I am sure it will be well-received by the scholarly world.

N. H. Samtani
Head, Department of Pali and
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Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi.

PREFACE

The advancement of science with all its characteristics and weaknesses and its constructive and destructive forces has made the problem of human behaviour and human relationships increasingly important. A deeper scrutiny and understanding of the people, their civilization and especially of their moral and spiritual achievements has become a fundamental necessity. And, therefore, a wider vision of the universe and a clearer insight into the fundamentals of ethics and religion are needed. Hence the main aim of the present undertaking is to study the basic principles of morality in various systems of Indian Philosophy, which contribute to the resolution of certain problems related to human conduct. This, therefore, is a brief study of the entire Indian ethics.

The title of this work is 'The Concept of Pañcaśīla in Indian Thought'. 'Śīla' which stands for 'morality' or 'good conduct' is technically a Buddhist term, but it is existent in some form or the other in most systems of Indian Philosophy. In the present attempt the subject has been restricted to 'Pañcaśīla' because it has been ardently upheld that the essence of Śīla lies mainly in Pañcaśīla—the five basic tenets of morality, and the entire moral code is based on these principles. It should be mentioned, however, that this Pañcaśīla has nothing to do with the Pañcaśīla of the Bandung Conference.

To attempt a discussion of these five principles of morality in all the works of Indian Philosophy from the Ṛgveda down to the philosophical works of Buddhism and Jainism will be a very stupendous task, because the subject is extremely extensive. The present study, therefore, further limits its scope by concentrating only on the Śramaṇical currents of thought—Buddhism and Jainism, where these principles occur

in their fullest maturity, and which lay stress on individualistic spiritual happiness. The Brāhmaṇical trend of thought, it is upheld positively, does accept them and emphasizes them from a socialistic point of view; but the emphasis on them, in this trend, has secondary, implicit and indirect importance. Accordingly, in the present work the Brāhmaṇical systems are just touched upon and given secondary importance only to provide a background to the Śramaṇical trend. Still the system like Pātañjala-Yoga which is almost Śramaṇical in many respects is discussed at some length.

In the field of Buddhism the writer has depended more on the Theravāda canons than the Mahāyāna texts, though occasionally they have been referred to.

With these limitations the present work in its six main chapters deals with the five basic principles of morality for the monks as well as for the laity. The first chapter deals with the meaning, aim and the basis of śīla or morality and also with certain other allied problems. Chapters second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth deal with the five principles, viz. non-violence, non-stealing, celibacy (partial or complete), truthfulness, and abstinence from intoxication and non-possession respectively. These principles have been presented here in the order in which Buddhism itself presents them in its canonical literature.

Having no bias towards or against any system, the study attempts an impartial and objective presentation of facts.

As far as possible, oriental terms have been translated into English. But there are some oriental terms which cannot be translated into English accurately. In such cases as these oriental terms have been retained for the sake of precision and clarity.

I express my thanks to our Ex-Head of the Department of Buddhist Studies, Dr. V. V. Gokhale, for encouraging me to choose this subject. I am thankful to my advisor Dr. B. Jinananda, Reader in this department, for giving me all possi-

ble help. I am deeply indebted to Dr. I. C. Shastri, Ex-Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Institute of Post-Graduate Studies, University of Delhi, who has been extremely generous to me from the day I joined this University as a Ph. D. student till today. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the achievement of this design would have been extremely difficult without his kind and sincere help.

I express my heart-felt gratitude to such eminent scholars of Ahmedabad as Prof. Dalsukhbhai Malvania who has been kind enough to go through the entire work and give me valuable suggestions, the Late Pt. Sukhalalji for his priceless suggestions and discussions, and the Late Pt. Bechardas Doshi with whom even leisure time discussions proved fruitful. I am also thankful to eminent scholars like Prof. N. Dutt and Prof. S. Dutt whom I could not get a chance to see personally, but their works have helped me in studying the subject systematically. I would be failing to fulfil my duties if I do not acknowledge the profound help I received from libraries and other educational institutions, specially I must mention of Shri Mahavir Jaina Public Library which was at my disposal for all Jaina literature.

I am very grateful to Dr. Sagarmal Jain, Director, Parshvanath Vidyashram Research Institute, Varanasi, who took keen interest in bringing out the book. I also express my thanks to my brother Shri Kranti Kumar Jain, Shri B. N. Jain and Shri Gulab Chandji Jain, without whose help and inspiration this work would not have seen the light of the day.

I also owe a great deal to all my friends and companions who helped me in one way or the other in producing this work.

Delhi

Kamala Jain

CONTENTS

Page
9

Preface

Chapter I

ŚILA AND ITS ALLIED PROBLEMS

1-36

Meaning of Śila (1). Aim of morality—happiness (2). Types of happiness : (a) (i) Mundane happiness, (ii) Spiritual happiness, (b) (i) Individual happiness, (ii) Social happiness (3-6). Basis of morality (6). Nature of the aim of morality—conception of Nirvāṇa in various systems (11). Three ways : Action, knowledge and devotion (19). Explicit code of conduct (20) : Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali (21), Jainism (23), Buddhism (29).

Chapter II

NON-VIOLENCE

37-94

Meaning and importance (37). Two aspects : Positive and negative (38). Historical development (41) : Brāhmaṇical (41) : Ṛgveda, Atharvaveda, Brāhmaṇas, Upaniṣads, Smṛtis, Mahābhārata, Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali. Śramaṇical (49) : Non-violence in Jainism : its philosophy (50). Classification & forms of violence (53). General nature of the vow (55). Two aspects : Positive and negative. Two levels the higher—the mahāvratā (59). The five bhāvanās—accessories (60). Exceptions (62). Transgressions, atonements and punishments (64). The lower level—Ahiṃsāṇuvratā (68). the five aiticāras (transgressions) (71). Non-violence in Buddhism : (73). Its aspects—positive and negative (74). Accessories. The psychological analysis : Four Brahmavihāras (77). Stages of violence (80). the precept of the monk (81). Transgressions, punishments and atonements (84); The precept of the laity (90). Application of non-violence (94).

Chapter III**NON-STEALING**

95-124

Meaning and importance (95). Relation with non-violence (96). Historical development (97) : Brāhmaṇical (97) : Ṛgvedas Brāhmaṇas, Upaniṣads, Smṛtis, Mahābhārata, Yogasūtras of patañjali. Śramaṇical (102) : Jainism : Importance. Connection with non-violence (104). Kinds of stealing (104). Two levels : the higher—the mahāvratā (105). Five bhāvanās (108). Exceptions (109). Transgressions and punishments (110). The lower level—Asteyāṇuvratā (111). Five aticāras (112). Buddhism : Importance (113). The precept of the monk, types of stealing (116). Trnsgression and punishments (117). The precept of the laity (122).

Chapter IV**CELIBACY AND CHASTITY**

125-164

A. Celibacy : Different terms (125). Etymological and conventional meaning of Brahmācarya (125). Historical development (126). Brāhmaṇical (126). Ṛgveda, Atharvaveda, Brāhmaṇas, Upaniṣads, Smṛtis, Pātañjala-Yogasūtras. Śramaṇical (133) : Jainism : Etymological and conventional usage (133). Relation with non-violence (135). The Mahāvratā (136). Five Bhāvnās (138). Exceptions (139). Transgressions and Punishments (140). Buddhism : Etymological and Conventional usage (142). Importance. Accessories (143). Transgressions. and Punishments (145).

B. Chastity: The institution of marriage (150). Historical development (151) : Brāhmaṇical (151) : Ṛgveda, Brāhmaṇas, Upaniṣads, Smṛtis. Śramaṇical Jainism (155) : Institution of marriage (156)—The aṇuvratā (158). Five aticāras (161). Buddhism (161) : The institution of marriage—the precept of the laity (163).

Chapter V**TRUTH**

165-201

Two implications: Metaphysical and ethical (165). Importance and meaning (166). Historical development (166): Brāhmaṇical (167): Ṛgveda, Brāhmaṇas, Upaniṣads, Mahābhārata, Smṛtis, Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali. Śramaṇical (177): Jainism: Importance (177). Definition (178). Classifications (179). Two levels: The higher—the mahāvratā (182). Five bhāvanās (184). Exceptions (185). Transgressions, atonements and punishments (186). The lower level—The aṇuvratā (187). the five aticāras (189). Buddhism (190): Two types—Metaphysical and ethical (193). Importance. Transgressions and punishment (196). Modern experiment of truth (200).

Chapter VI**AVOIDENCE OF INTOXICANTS AND
NON-POSSESSION**

202-239

A. Avoidance of Intoxicants: The fifth precept in Buddhism (202). Importance. The position in other systems (202). Types of intoxicants (203). Historical development (203): Brāhmaṇical (203): Ṛgveda, Brāhmaṇas, Upaniṣads, Smṛtis, Mahābhārata, Śramaṇical (208): Jainism: Importance. The result of intoxication (210). Inclusion in the precepts. Buddhism (211): Types of intoxicants (211). The importance, transgressions and punishments (214).

B. Non-possession: Meaning (216). Dāna and aparigraha (217). Historical development (217): Brāhmaṇical (217): Ṛgveda, Brāhmaṇas, Upaniṣads, Aparigraha in Yoga Sūtras. Śramaṇical: Jainism (223): Importance and meaning. Kinds. Two levels: The higher—The mahāvratā (226). Five bhāvanās (228). Exceptions (228). Transgressions and punishments (229). The lower level—The aṇuvratā (230), Five aticāras (232). Dāna (233). Buddhism (234): The tenth precept of the monk. Dāna (237). The vow of aparigraha and the society (238).

CONCLUSION	240-247
BIBLIOGRAPHY	248-258

CHAPTER I

ŚĪLA AND ITS ALLIED PROBLEMS

Meaning of Śīla

The term 'Śīla' literally means nature, character or behaviour. As an adjective, it means good disposition, good character, good conduct, morality or virtue, more precisely speaking, this is what is meant by the term 'suśīla'; however, even without the prefix 'su', 'śīla' conventionally means good conduct or morality. In Indian ethics this is also denoted by the term 'caritra' or more technically by 'cāritra' as is used in Jainism. Śīla, caritra, morality, good conduct, etc., are all synonyms. Śīla or morality can be defined as the conduct based on a distinction between right and wrong or good and bad. Conduct is the general behaviour or character of a person; the term 'good' which is connected with German 'gut' means valuable; a thing is generally said to be good when it is valuable or serviceable for some end or ideal one has in view. "It should be carefully observed however that the term good is also used with reference to conduct (perhaps more frequently) to signify not something which is a means to an end but something which is itself taken as an end, thus the supreme good or 'summum bonum' means the supreme end at which we aim."¹

Morality or good conduct seems to be the distinguishing feature of humanity; it is the moral nature of man which distinguishes him from animals. Animals also satisfy their basic instincts and other allied wants, struggle for their existence, try to overcome obstacles by all means available to them

1. A Manual of Ethics—J. S. Mackenzie, p. 2.

but they lack a feeling of moral sense.¹ They do have feelings which are generally called good, for example, feelings of love, sympathy, etc., but not a moral sense. Their behaviour of love or hatred can be called only an instinctual or impulsive behaviour. It can also be said that animals do not have an explicit moral sense. This is something which is an important, rather the supreme aspect of man's nature. It cannot be claimed, however, that psychology and ethics or conduct-actual and conduct-ideal are two contradictory things. The latter cannot be completely independent of the former. Actually "Every ethical system involves a psychology of conduct, and depends for its developments upon its idea of what conduct actually is."² However, it is not wrong to say that explicit moral sense is the distinguishing feature of humanity.

Aim of Morality

To speak from a psychological viewpoint, the aim of good conduct is happiness and riddance from misery or sorrow. "It is dangerous to make sweeping statements about the huge mass of Indian literature, but I think that most Buddhist and Brahmanic systems assume that morality is merely a means of obtaining happiness."³ At the outset this may appear to be a controversial statement, both for the Indian religious exponents and for the Western ethicists. In the West it is only a class of ethical thinkers called hedonists who believe that the aim of good conduct is happiness alone. Among Indian religious exponents also, the aim of good conduct is not always directly described as happiness. It is sometimes

1. आहारनिद्राभयमैथुनञ्च, सामान्यमेतत् पशुभिर्नराणाम् ।
धर्मो हि तेषामधिको विशेषो, धर्मेण हीनाः पशुभिर्समानाः ॥
—Mahābhā., Śāntiparva, 294. 29.
2. The Philosophy of J. S. Mill—C. Douglas, p. 251.
3. Hinduism and Buddhism—Charles Eliot, vol. I, pp. XXVI.

explained in more negative terms as absence of suffering while sometimes in positive manner as happiness, Ānand or Sukha. Therefore, a classification of the term happiness and its various implications is required in the very beginning. Happiness can be defined more correctly as that which is equivalent to extinction or removal of suffering or rather to a favourable experience as compared with an unfavourable experience. It is, however, not correct to categorize it either as a purely negative or a purely positive concept.

Types of Happiness

In the first place happiness is broadly classified into two types (i) mundane happiness and (ii) spiritual happiness; or (i) bhautika sukha and (ii) ādhyātmika sukha; or (i) 'abhyudaya' and (ii) 'nīśreyasa'. *Mundane happiness* or bhautika sukha refers to mundane achievements, physical felicity in life, temporary removal of suffering, which may not last long or which is just evanescent or transient. Fulfilment of economic necessities, comforts and luxuries in the economic sense is the achievement of what is called 'bhautika sukha' or mundane happiness. In pre-Upaniṣadic literature, it has been the goal of good conduct. And the concept of heaven in Indian literature, though it presupposes the idea of rebirth, can be regarded only as based on the conception of mundane happiness.

Spiritual happiness, on the other hand, refers to the permanent removal of suffering of all kinds. It is not a transient or evanescent achievement. In all scholastic systems of Indian philosophy, it is considered to be the aim of morality. Here, one is more concerned with the means to the end than with the end alone. If the means are proper, the end would certainly be proper and attainable; more emphasis is thus laid on duties than on rights and the right performance of duties would automatically be followed by rights. It suggests, therefore, that effort is to be directed to the performance of duties than

to the exercise of rights. This spiritual happiness flowing from good conduct is the final goal of life, and nothing is superior to it. This is the state of Nirvāṇa, Mokṣa, or deliverance.

Cārvāka materialists in India lay stress on mundane happiness alone.¹ According to them there is nothing like spiritual happiness and no life beyond this life. For them the supreme target is to make this life a success in terms of physical achievements. All supramundane conceptions of happiness are unreal according to Cārvākas. But this is the sole exception among all the systems of Indian philosophy.² Otherwise, all the systems, orthodox or heterodox, lay stress on spiritual happiness—Nirvāṇa or Mokṣa. However much Indian philosophers may differ in their philosophical viewpoints, their ontological, theological or epistemological conceptions, they agree to a great extent in their ethical concepts. In spite of this uniformity it can be noticed that certain misconceptions have arisen. "It is often urged against Indian Philosophy that it is non-ethical in character, there is practically no ethical philosophy within the frontiers of Hindu thinking." The charge, however, cannot be sustained. Attempts to fill the whole of life with the power of spirit are common. Next to the category of reality, that of Dharma, is the most important concept of Indian thought, so far as the actual ethical content is concerned, Buddhism, Jainism and Hinduism are not inferior to others. Ethical perfection is the first step towards divine knowledge."³

Another classification which can be made to clarify the position is that of (i) individualistic happiness and (ii) social-

1. यावज्जीवेत् सुखं जीवेन्नास्ति मृत्योर्गोचरः,
भस्मीभूतस्य देहस्य पुनरागमनं कुतः ।
—Sarva Darśana Saṃgraha—Mādhvācārya, 1.5
2. Cārvākas in a way include early Mīmāṃsakas who do believe in life after death but do not believe in Mokṣa as such.
3. Indian Philosophy—S. Radhakrishnan, vol. I, p. 52.

istic happiness. In Western terminology it can to some extent be compared with egoistic happiness or universalistic happiness. We cannot, however, place the two types of happiness, as the aim of good conduct, in strict watertight compartments. Both individualistic and socialistic happiness are inter-related and interdependent. Still there is an obvious clue for this difference in Indian thought. In the Brāhmaṇical system the ideal of socialistic happiness is apparent while in Śramaṇical thought emphasis is laid on individualistic happiness.

The exponents of *individualistic happiness* believe that the individual should try to seek his own happiness, rather than the happiness of all or a selected few. The logic behind this is that if everybody will seek his own happiness, the happiness of all or a selected few would automatically follow. In principle, this is somewhat similar to Egoistic Hedonism. There has been a well-known school of ethicists of this type, whose chief exponents in the West are Hobbes and Gassendi.¹

The aim of individualistic happiness may at first sight appear as mere selfishness on the part of the individual who seeks his own happiness, which presents rather a repulsive character to moral consciousness and also seems against morality. But if the concept of individualistic happiness is combined with the concept of spiritual happiness, one can see that this is something quite feasible and acceptable. The concept of Nirvāṇa is only based on individualistic happiness. As it is sometimes said 'paramārtha' has its origin in 'swārtha'. Even in the West such a prominent writer as Sidgwick has recognised it as an inevitable element in the complete system of Ethics. "The reason why this should seem so is evident enough. It is clear that the end which we aim at must be some end that should give us satisfaction. Why we pursue an end—the answer is, it satisfies our nature." This is the ultimate answer wherein lies the element of individualistic happiness.

1. History of Ethics—H. Sidgwick, pp. 163-70.

But seeking of physical or mundane happiness with egoistic viewpoint would certainly mean selfishness. The reason is simple enough, that the relationship between the means for satisfaction of material wants and the end (i. e. material happiness) is not a co-ordinated one; since the means are limited, and the wants are unlimited. Therefore, individualistic happiness as combined with materialistic happiness cannot be regarded as the aim of morality. Yet, as mentioned above, egoistic happiness in relation with spiritual happiness is quite feasible and acceptable, because that means working and striving for one's own liberation, that does not clash with others' wants and their means; whether one works for others' liberation or helps others in attaining liberation is a different question.

Socialistic happiness simply means striving for the happiness of others in and through society in general; this can be compared to Universalistic Hedonism, i. e. to seek the happiness of all. "Greatest happiness for the greatest number" is the ideal as John Stuart Mill has said. One need not go into the implications and controversies of this statement. The present purpose, however, is only to show that to some ethicists socialistic happiness is the main aim. Here socialistic happiness means both happiness for society and in society or in other words giving respect to social values in general. The main objective is to pursue social values to enhance social happiness. Apart from this, even the aim of material happiness adjoined to social happiness stands on higher footing than egoistic material happiness. The only thing is that the seeker, after such happiness, is unaware of the highest good or spiritual happiness which is everlasting and perpetual.

Basis of Morality

The classification of individualistic and socialistic happiness is relevant to drawing the distinction between the bases of morality in the two major trends of Indian thought. This

difference indicates the real contrast between the two prominent cultures of India, Brāhmaṇical and Śramaṇical. By Brāhmaṇical culture is meant not only the Brāhmaṇas, but all ritualistic Vedic literature, where renunciation or asceticism is not the main theme. Similarly by Śramaṇical culture is meant not only Jaina and Buddhist systems (though they undoubtedly occupy the main position) but all those schools of thought which lay stress on renunciation and asceticism, even if they later on merged into Vedic or orthodox trend.

The Brāhmaṇical system, ever since the time of the Ṛgveda, held society or social well-being as the basis of the fundamental ingredient of morality. The social set up is the central pivot around which the whole Vedic literature is clustered. Society is the whole for which the individuals, the parts, are supposed to work; it is the whole which is important, the parts are important but only secondarily. The institutions of āśrama (stages of life) and the varṇa (caste system) stand for the orderly progress of society whose individuals have high socio-ethical morale. Though varṇa system does appear in Ṛgveda, prominent scholars believe it to be a later development while the āśrama system is not at all existent in Ṛgveda. However, the life of the householder is most respected, and it is the common feature of both Ṛgvedic and Upaniṣadic literature. Even in the āśrama system sanyāsa or renunciation has been introduced, yet it is not as significant as the householder's life. Only those rituals were held in prominence which were valuable for the people in society.

Thus with social happiness as the basis of morality certain standards of valuation of actions were evolved. These standards in the main are two, (i) the authority of the scriptures and (ii) tradition. The authority of the scriptures is sometimes understood as the sole criterion to justify or reject an action, that is an action is good, only if it is recommended in the

Vedas or the scriptures, otherwise not.¹ Yajñas or sacrifices are the most important recommendation of the Vedas, and for that certain important basic principles were overlooked; as it is said, “Vaidiki hiṃsā hiṃsā na bhavati” (i. e. violence committed in Yajñas etc. is not violence). About this principle, two views are upheld : (1) that there is no hiṃsā² at all in performing such rituals and (2) that though there is hiṃsā,³ the good that one acquires in yajñas is more than the violence involved in yajñas. Thus, whatever is inscribed in the scriptures, is regarded as supremely good.

Another standard which has evolved in this culture is tradition, and it is regarded as the criterion of judgement of an action. An action is good because it is traditionally accepted. This standard implies a motive of changelessness and stability in the general conduct of the individuals, so that the society is stable and orderly. Though this standard does not appeal much to human reason, most ethical thinkers opine that rational morality is much more well-founded than traditional morality; it has its own utility in developing a comprehensive and broad outlook on the varying nature of morality. Certain geographical and other conditions may also bring about certain norms which are traditionally accepted as morally good. A study of some of the tribes in India would reveal interesting facts about the acceptance of certain norms,

1. (i) चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थो धर्मः ।—Mīmāṃsā Sūtras, 1. 1. 2.
(ii) वेदोऽखिलो धर्ममूलम् ।—Manu. 2.6.
2. वेदविहिता तु हिंसा प्रत्युत धर्महेतुः ।
—Prima facie view of Mīmāṃsakas as given in Syādvādamañjarī, Kārikā 11.
3. मृष्यन्ते हि पुण्यसम्मारोपनीतस्वर्गसुधासहाहृदावगाहिनः कुशलाः
पापमत्रोपपादितां दुःखवाह्निकाणिकाम् ।
—Sāṃkhyatatvakaumudī, Kārikā 2.

which may be regarded completely as immoral if convention or tradition is not taken as the criterion of judgement of those norms.

In contrast to social happiness, *individualistic happiness* furnishes the basis of good conduct in non-Brāhmanical or Śramaṇical systems, specially Jaina, Buddhist or Yoga. Śramaṇical culture puts society on a secondary level. Society has its existence only for individuals and not the individuals for society. The result of this emphasis on personal enlightenment or individualism was so strong that even non-Śramaṇical systems could not remain un-influenced by it.

The *basis of conduct in Buddhism* is personal salvation or enlightenment. Even Buddha and Buddhist scriptures are revered as is indicated in the three śaraṇas (in Buddha, Dhamma and Saṃgha) not just to revere Buddha or Buddhist scriptures, but in fact to revere one's own self which deserves enlightenment (atta-dīpa), and to take refuge in one's own self (atta-śaraṇa). And "this autonomic principle and personal basis of Buddhist morality was indeed a new departure, in the history of Indian religion, and laid the foundation for universal religion of Buddhism."¹ The idea that Buddhism made a new departure in Indian thought, however, is not quite correct, because even prior to Buddha, Pāśvanātha had made tremendous contribution to this kind of thought as Prof. Herman Jacobi and Dr. D.D. Kosambi have pointed out. However, the moot point here is that the stress on individualistic happiness in Buddhism is not because its advocate was Buddha, but because it is the perfect path to reach Nibbāna. "It is a purely egoistical impulse, but what more natural than that one who suddenly finds himself in a burning house should seek first of all to save himself."² Thus "In Buddhism morality rightly rests upon individualism and altruism becomes only applied

1. E. R. E., vol. 5, p. 448.

2. Buddhist Essays—Paul Dhakke, Transl. Silacara, p. 130.

individualism. No more solid basis can be found in this world for the love of one's own neighbour than the love of one's ownself."¹ Personal enlightenment is thus the main theme of Buddhism. Now, though individualism is the starting point in Buddhism, it does not however confine itself to individualism but extends itself to altruism as well, that is to the well-being of others. The culmination point of this development is seen in Dīgha Nikāya where Buddha is said to have declared: "I could not attain Parinirvāṇa, so long as all my disciples, upāsakas, monks, vinayadharas etc. would not establish themselves on the right path or in other words would not free themselves from the entanglement of wrong ideas and notions."²

The *Jaina basis of conduct* is likewise individualistic. Each individual should prepare himself for his own salvation; this requires mental, vocal and physical purification. The theory of karman depicts that one is fully responsible for one's own deeds and their results. Society is relegated to secondary status. But the altruistic motive is also visible in the basic standard of valuation, that is 'equality' or 'samatā'. It is the basic principle on which Mahāvira's message of non-violence is based. Jainism, in its religion, philosophy and ethics, advocates samatā. The daily rite of 'Sāmāyika' is grounded on this basic standard of equality, which is needed to be introduced in one's own practice. It is said a 'śramaṇa' becomes a real śramaṇa only through samatā'.³ All one's feelings of disequilibrium or inequality must vanish for one to become fully virtuous.

1. Essence of Buddhism—P. L. Narasu, p. 83.

2. न तावाहं पापिम परिनिब्बायिस्सामि, याव मे भिक्खू न सावका भविस्सन्ति वियत्ता विनीता विसारदा बहुस्सुता धम्मधरधिम्मानुधम्मप्पटिपन्ना सासीचिप्पटिपन्ना अनुधम्मचारिभो सप्पाटिहारियं धम्मं देसेस्सतीति ।—Dīgh., vol. II, p. 82

3. समयए समणो होई ।—Uttarā. 25 32.

By the term 'samatā' is meant something more than mere equality; it also means harmony or Samvāda. This principle of equality or harmony is applicable to this universe of unity in diversity. In this sense it is seen that the principle of 'samatā' of Jaina thought is an improvement upon Kant's maxim, "Act only on that maxim which thou can't at the same time universalize." Here, Immanuel Kant has grounded his view purely on the principle of equality, and ignores the principle of harmony which gives consideration to the element of diversity in nature.

It is thus noted that Brāhmaṇical trend is depicted in socialistic happiness, while Śramaṇical thought emphasizes individualistic happiness. Yet, as is seen the exponents of individualistic happiness, namely Buddha or Mahāvīra, who thought of renunciation and passivity (nivṛtti' as the best and perhaps the only means to spiritual happiness or salvation, cannot be understood as purely individualistic. The desire to communicate the idea of personal salvation or spiritual happiness to others is proof of the fact that Śramaṇical culture does have a socialistic or universalistic aspect. Besides, the 'bodhisattva' of Buddhism and 'tīrthaṅkara' of Jainism are clear examples of the combination of individualistic and socialistic happiness.

Now the standards of valuation of right and wrong action, which have been discussed in the Brāhmaṇical basis of morality, are not only pertinent to these Brāhmaṇical systems, but hold equally good in Śramaṇical systems of Buddhism and Jainism. Whenever a controversy arises with regard to judgement of an action as right or wrong, the scriptures both in Jaina and Buddhist systems are resorted to. Even Buddha had said himself, 'after my death my teachings will be the guide of my disciples'.

The Nature of the Aim of Morality

The second classification of individualistic and socialistic happiness has been furnished as the basis of morality. The

first classification is important from the point of view of the aim of morality. Though most Indian ethicists believe in the ultimate aim as Nirvāṇa or Mokṣa, they differ in the conception of the nature of Nirvāṇa. Therefore, it is relevant to our purpose to discuss the nature of Nirvāṇa in various systems of Indian thought and also a stage of thought prior to the age when the concept of Nirvāṇa or Mokṣa did not exist.

To start with, the Āryans of Ṛgveda worshipped nature, defining different aspects of nature as fire, wind, rain, etc., and held supernatural beings at their control.¹ Religion and morality at that time was confined to the worship of these gods.² Naturally the idea of salvation or Mokṣa was totally absent. Deities were worshipped for material prosperity and for the avoidance of physical calamities.

In the period of Brāhmaṇas, the institute of sacrifice or yajña came into practice. Yajñas were performed for material gains, such as kingdom, victory in war, birth of a son, attainment of heaven after death, etc. Though the idea of heaven, i.e. happiness in the next life, was introduced, yet the concept of Mokṣa or liberation is not found.

The idea of immortality or spiritual happiness is found in Upaniṣads for the first time in Vedic culture. Emancipation or Mukti means in Upaniṣads the state of infiniteness that a man attains,³ when he knows his own self, Brahman. Transmigration of the soul is meant only for those who are ignorant; after the removal of ignorance (Avidyā) the individual merges into the Brahman. Existence, knowledge and bliss are descri-

1. History of Sanskrit Literature—A. A. Macdonell, pp. 116-17.
2. Ibid., pp. 31-33.
3. He who beholds the loftiest and deepest, for him the fetters of the heart break asunder; for him all doubts are solved, and his work becomes nothingness.
—Philosophy of Upaniṣads—Deussen, p. 252.

bed as three essentials of Brahman, i.e. Saccidānanda. Existence means absence of vulnerability or external effect, knowledge is absence of ignorance and bliss means absence of misery. Emancipation, they say, is not a new achievement, a product, an effect or result of an action, but it always exists as the truth of our nature, "thus true knowledge of the self does not lead to emancipation, but is emancipation itself. It is the realization of our own nature."¹ In this positive manner it is a state of pure intelligence, pure being and pure blessedness in Upaniṣads.

Later on we have scholastic period. So far as the early Mīmāṃsakas are concerned, they do not believe in ultimate bliss. They mainly follow the Brāhmaṇas and hold that prosperity in this life and in the next is the sole aim of Dharma. The definition of Dharma is confined to action; the performance of Vedic rituals is accumulation of Dharma. The highest good is thus not a Nivṛtti or cessation of activity but the realization of happiness which flows from pravṛtti or active participation in the duties, namely the rituals and the social duties. Hence self-realization which is ascribed to this state is the enjoyment of heavenly bliss.² However, later on, the conception of Mokṣa is introduced. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's view is explained in Śāstradīpikā of Pārthasārathi Miśra where Mokṣa is explained as "Prapañca sambandhavi-laya,"³ i.e. dissolution of the individual's connections with the empirical. "Kumārila considered the self to be merely the potency of knowledge (jñāna śakti). Cognition of things were generated by the activity of the manas and the other senses.

1. History of Indian Philosophy—S. N. Dasgupta, vol. I, p. 58.

2. यथा स स्वर्गः सर्वान्प्रत्यविशिष्टत्वात् ।

—Mīmāṃsā Sūtras, 4.3.13.

3. न प्रपञ्च स्वरूपाभावः तस्मान्न प्रपञ्चविलयो मोक्षः किं तु प्रपञ्चसम्बन्ध-विलयः ।—Śāstradīpikā, Mokṣavāda.

At the time of salvation there being none of the senses nor the manas, the self remains in pure existence as the potency of knowledge without any actual expression or manifestation."¹ Prabhākara also does not differ much on this point. However, for the early Mīmāṃsakas, conception of liberation is nothing; the Cārvāka conception of liberation can also be put in this category of Mīmāṃsakas, though not exactly identical, for it does not admit of transmigration of the soul. For them Mokṣa is absolute autonomy in this life, or death, and that is bliss.²

The system of Vedānta bases its concept of Mokṣa entirely on Upaniṣads. According to it the preconditions of salvation are three, i. e. understanding the meaning of Upaniṣads correctly (śravaṇa), strengthening the conviction by arguments as stated by the Upaniṣads (manana), and meditating upon them or the processes of concentration (nididhyāsana). With these preconditions one tries to realize the truth as one. The state of this realization is the same as conceived in the Upaniṣads, i.e. merger of individual soul into the universal soul. In Vedānta salvation is dawn of the right knowledge; Brahman alone is the true reality. Vedānta does not totally repudiate the Mīmāṃsā view of action, but it points out that this is meant for ordinary people and the final goal, as the Upaniṣads indicate, is the attainment of the highest knowledge. The mukti state is thus that of pure sat (existence), pure citta (knowledge) and pure Ānanda (bliss), which shines forth in its unique glory and every thing else is simply nothing but an illusion.

The Naiyāyikas, in common with most other systems of Indian Philosophy, believed that the world is full of suffering and that the small bits of pleasure only serve to intensify the

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1. History of Indian Philosophy—S. N. Dasgupta, vol. I, p. 402.
 2. देहोच्छेदो मोक्षः ।—Sarva Darśana Saṃgraha, 1.10.

force of sorrow. Gautama proposes 'niśreyasa' as the object of knowledge. According to him the realization of the aim takes place in the following order.¹ At first knowledge removes wrong notions (Mithyājñāna); at the removal of mithyājñāna, the pollutions (doṣas) like attachment, hatred, etc., are removed; with the removal of attachment and hatred, activities (pravṛttis) cease. When activities stop, birth stops. And the stoppage of birth brings an end to misery or suffering. That is the stage of salvation in which self is divested of all its qualities (consciousness, feeling, willing, etc.) and remains in its own inert state. The state of Mukti according to Nyāya is neither a state of pure knowledge, nor of bliss, but a state of perfect qualitylessness in which the self remains in its pure existence. "It is a negative state of absolute painlessness that is sometimes spoken of as being a state of absolute happiness, though really speaking this state of Mukti can never be a state of happiness. It is a passive state of self in original and natural purity."² The Nyāya contention is that happiness has to be renounced as being inseparable from suffering, and as there is no experience of suffering, in the highest state of freedom from pain, there is no experience of any transcendental felicity or satisfaction in the positive sense. It can only be called a state of felicity in the negative sense. In this way Nyāya repudiates the view of all those opponents who hold that Mokṣa is a state of infinite happiness or pleasure.

Vaiśeṣika school of thought believes both in abhyudaya and niśreyas (prosperity and liberation). Kaṇāda says that dharma is not only a means of liberation, but also of prosperity. Liberation, according to him, is a state of complete freedom from all connections with all special qualities and the self

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1. दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिः दोषमिथ्याज्ञानानाम्, उत्तरोत्तरापायेतदनन्तरापायाद अपवर्गः ।—Nyāya Sūtras, 1.21.
 2. History of Indian Philosophy—S. N. Dasgupta, vol. I, p. 366.

subsists like the sky, free from all conditions and attributes. This state of freedom cannot be regarded as one of pleasure or supreme bliss in the positive sense. It is only an extinction of all kinds of pain in the negative sense as Naiyāyikas hold.

The Sāṃkhyakārikā suggests that everybody is suffering from three types of miseries, viz. ādhibhautika, ādhidaivika and ādhyātmika, i. e. natural, supernatural and mental or spiritual. Man earnestly desires to get rid of them. The mundane means are insufficient as by such means miseries cannot be overcome positively and finally. A person thus is inclined to seek some higher means to remove them absolutely. Kapila proposes that 'Puruṣa' (soul) is put into bondage by the association of Prakṛti (matter). Salvation means the break of this association of puruṣa with prakṛti, which is termed as Kaivalya (purity). In the state of Kaivalya puruṣa remains in pure consciousness, i. e. an objectless consciousness, which is tantamount to absence of discriminative knowledge, because the modification or evolute of prakṛti (Buddhi) is no longer there. And thus Puruṣa stands like a 'mirror' that has nothing to reflect. But unlike Vedānta conception Puruṣa has its separate existence; it does not merge into supreme Brahman.

Yoga system is not different from Sāṃkhya as far as the nature of the ideal of liberation is concerned. Its main contribution lies in the eight-fold path consisting of yama, niyama, etc. As the basic conditions to liberation, yamas are connected with the discipline of apparent conduct. Niyamas are connected with the discipline of mind and body and in this sense they are more personal. Yoga system is more emphatic on the means of liberation than the Sāṃkhya.

Among the heterodox systems, Jainism also believes in the 'theory of karman', but karman is responsible for the mundane life only. Mundane happiness as well as miseries are the results of karman. They signify not only the bodily activities but also mental and vocal activities. Liberation is never

caused by karman; it always means stoppage (saṃvara) of the flow of karma as well as consumption (kṣaya) or nirjarā of already accumulated karman. Karman in Jainism are of two kinds—dravya karma and bhāva karma. The dravya-karma is composed of the particles of matter, while the bhāva-karma (spiritual impure modifications) is absorbed in the soul substance. Liberation for the Jainas is the stoppage or consumption of karmic particles, which may also be understood as a negative state. But this is only a partial interpretation; the state of the liberated one in Jainism has been quite positively described. The liberated soul has an independent individual existence; he is possessed of four infinities, viz. (i) ananta jñāna (infinite knowledge), (ii) ananta darśana (infinite perception), (iii) ananta sukha (infinite happiness), (iv) ananta vīrya (infinite power). In the emancipated stage the changes that a soul goes through are homogeneous. This is called svarūpa-ramaṇa that means the soul wanders within its own qualities. However, the approach to this positive stage, in the sense of stoppage and consumption of karmic particles, may be termed as negative.

The essence of the Buddhist concept of deliverance, like most systems of Indian Philosophy, is the same as the removal of suffering. 'Nibbāna' means extinction of ignorance or desire. "To the Pāli etymologist the main stress is to root *vr* (to cover) and not to *vā* (to blow). Therefore, Nibbāna means extinguishing (of fire) by other means of extinction than by blowing, i. e. going out of fire or lamp."¹ Buddhism also proposes that all existence is misery;² we cannot free ourselves from misery so long as existence is there, and the root of misery lies in desire or 'tanhā'. "Logically the highest knowledge for the Buddhist is nothing but the keenest, most penetrating recognition of this sorrow and highest bliss nothing

1. Pali English Dictionary—Davids & Stede, p. 198.
2. सब्बे संखारा दुक्खा.... —Dhammapada, Maggavagga, 6.

but freedom from this sorrow.”¹ In this way the highest good or ‘summum bonum’ of Buddhism is nothing but sorrowlessness. It is further remarked, “only when a man succeeds in detecting for himself the taint of sorrow and the transiency in the joys of beyond, and renouncing, turns away from them, only then does he catch a glimpse of Nibbāna.”² So far it appears that the ‘ideal’ is purely negative, but this assumption is only partial, because in the same Pāli texts it is said that Nibbāna is the best and deepest happiness.³ The best way to understand it is neither as a purely negative state nor as a purely positive state as Prof. S. N. Dasgupta⁴ and Haridas Bhattacharya⁵ point out. The former has explicitly declared, “The stage at which all worldly experiences have ceased can hardly be described either as positive or negative.” He further points out, “Any one who seeks to discuss whether Nibbāna is either positive and eternal or a mere state of non-existence or annihilation, takes a view which has been discarded in Buddhism as heretical.”⁶ However, the standing place from which one may reach out to Nibbāna is virtue or śīla as Nāgasena replied to King Milinda when the latter posed this question to the former.⁷ The state of Nibbāna is automatically achievable by adopting the right means of Śīla, Samādhi and Prajñā.

1. Buddhist Essays—Paul Dahlke, Transl. Silacara, p. 84.
2. Ibid., p. 85.
3. निब्बानं परमं सुखं....—Dhammapada, Sukhavagga, 8.
4. History of Indian Philosophy, vol. I, p. 109.
5. The Cultural Heritage of India, vol. II, p. 22.
6. History of Indian Philosophy—S. N. Dasgupta, vol. I, p. 109.
7. भन्ते नागसेन, निब्बानस्स सन्निहियोकासो मा होतु सीलं महाराज ठानं सीले पतिट्ठहत्वा ठितो सम्मापटिपन्नो निब्बानं सच्छिकरोति । —Milindapañha, p. 320.

Three ways : Action, Knowledge and Devotion

The question of the means of attaining this ultimate aim of liberation immediately follows. Different systems of thought have stressed different aspects of the means. These means are mainly two, i. e. karma mārga and jñāna mārga. By karmas, in the beginning, was meant only the Vedic sacrifices in yajñās; sacrifice was supposed to be the highest aim. In the period of Ṛgveda and Brāhmaṇas, as has been seen, there was no conception of spiritual, transcendental happiness; material happiness was the sole target of Vedic Āryans, which was achievable by yajñās. Mīmāṃsakas are the representatives of this karma-mārga because the highest aim for early Mīmāṃsakas is nothing more than material happiness.

On the actual texts of Upaniṣads, the Vedāntins based their thought. They are the representatives of jñāna-mārga. For them the highest end of liberation is attainable through perfect knowledge¹ and not through yajñās.

There is also a third Path called bhakti-mārga, which declares that love or devotion to God leads to liberation. Devotion to the supreme being is the starting point for the devotional school, but devotion to all those or any one of them who have been accepted as having attained liberation became the usual practice. This is how personal devotion came into practice and it is successful only when the devotee is able to please his god; and pleasing of god or gods thus gained supremacy. All acts of Krishna, even if they are of a very trivial nature, are supernaturally valuable and the devotees try to

1. (i) प्लवाह्ये ते अद्भुता यज्ञरूपा अष्टादशोक्तमवरं येषु कर्म ।

एतच्छ्रेयो योऽभिनन्दन्ति मूढा जरामृत्युं ते पुनरेवापियन्ति ।

—Muṇḍako. 1.2.7.

(ii) द्वेषिणे वेदितव्ये इति ह एम यद् ब्रह्मविदो वदन्ति परा चैवापरा च ।

तत्रापरा ऋग्वेदो यजुर्वेदः....अथ परा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यते ।

—Muṇḍako. 1.1.4-5.

identify themselves with him in all possible ways in order to please him. P. C. Nahar in his 'Epitome of Jainism' has remarked that Ballabhis find the supreme end in sporting with Krishna.¹ B. G. Tilak points out that according to Bhagavadgītā² both jñāna and karma mārgas are the privileges of a select few, but as far bhakti is concerned, it is open to all. Thus, these three are the main ways of attaining the ultimate goal of liberation in Brāhmaṇical systems. In Jaina and Buddhist systems also the means of attaining liberation can be called a combination of knowledge and action, having of course different meanings (In Jainism and Buddhism conduct or cāritra or śīla can be assimilated to karma). Not only this, the third path of bhakti is also introduced in Jainism and Buddhism.

Explicit code of conduct

With the arousal of Buddhism and Jainism and their stress on certain abstract principles of morality as distinguished from a principle like yajña, later Hinduism started professing asceticism and Śramaṇic ideals. The belief in the supremacy of yajñas started decaying, 'himsā' in all fields of life was condemned, either for sacrifices or for other purposes. The Yoga system, whose full faith lies in Yoga as a means to salvation, can be called as the pioneer of this ascetic Hinduism. As has been already pointed out, yoga pioneers were not Brāhmaṇical in the beginning but belonged to Śramaṇical culture; ³they embraced the Vedic faith afterwards and are thus distinct from Jaina and Buddhists.

1. कृष्णेन सहागोलोके लीलानुभवम् ।
As quoted in Epitome of Jainism—P. C. Nahar.
2. Gītā Rahasya—B. G. Tilak, p. 436-37.
3. Five types of Śramaṇas : Nirgrantha, Śākya, Parivrājakas, Tāpas, Ājīvakas. Out of them Parivrājakas belong to this category.—Piṇḍa., gāthā 445.

The Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali which are however, later than those of Buddha and Mahāvīra are based on individualistic happiness. According to it, personal salvation is possible only through eight-fold means of yoga. By yoga is meant concentration which restricts the fluctuations and activities of the mind (cittavṛttis). The stages of mind stuff are restlessness (kṣipta), infatuation (mūḍha), distraction (vikṣipta), singleness in intent or concentration (ekāgra) and inactivity (nirodha). Of these the first three have nothing to do with yoga, but the last two are the qualities of yoga, which means concentration on the right objects and distraction from the wrong ones. When the mind stops fluctuations completely or is freed from these stages of mind the self attains self-expression.¹ In other words it is liberation. For this Patañjali mentions the eight aids (yogāṅgas) of yoga. These are abstentions (yama), observances (niyama), postures (āsana), regulation of the breath (prāṇāyāma), withdrawal of senses (pratyāhāra), fixed attention (dhāraṇa), contemplation (dhyāna), and concentration (samādhi).² Out of these, it is said, the first five are indirect aids and the last three are the direct ones. This shows that the first five refer to the actualization of these aids to the exterior actions and that the last three predominate spiritual advancement. However, the actualization of the first five aids does not take place without a mental effort on one's own part and the last three are helped by the first five.

Yamas (abstentions) are the first aid in yoga. Placing of Yamas in the first and foremost place in the eight aids itself reveals its importance. It is Yama which can be assimilated with the Buddhist Śīlas and Jaina Vratas. They are the five abstentions of non-injury, truth, abstinence from theft, conti-

1. तद्भावात्संयोगाभावो हानं तद्दृशेः कैवल्यम् ।—Pāt. Yoga, 2.25.

2. यमनियमासनप्राणायाम प्रत्याहारधारणाध्यानसमाधयोष्ठावङ्गानि ।

—Ibid. 2.29.

nence, and abstinence from avariciousness.¹ It has been held by yoga thinkers that with the help of yamas, gross impurities of ordinary minds are removed; it thus constitutes the first stepping stone of spiritual progress. Non-injury is given such a high rank that it is regarded as the root of all other yamas, namely truth, non-stealing, etc. It is here that the chief principle of 'yajña' disappears with the gaining of strength of yamas, specially non-violence. The credit of this rooting out of yajñas, however, goes not only to Patañjali, but also to Sāṃkhya² and Bhāgavata cults; to Kapila, all such rites were impure. In fact, non-violence is held not to be only the root of other yamas but also the niyamas or observances of cleanliness (śauca), contentment (santoṣa), penance (tapa), study (svādhyāya) and devotion to Īśvara (Īśvara-praṇidhāna).³ The yamas and niyamas are closely connected. Both yamas and niyamas pertain to the social and outer life of the individual as well as the personal and inner life. Both of them furnish the positive and negative principles. The essence of the means of liberation rests on these yogānagas only and depicts the importance of the yoga practices as understood by Patañjali. The means for the removal of hindrances in the observance of yamas and niyamas is, therefore, the same as what is called the pratipakṣa bhāvanā or cultivation of the opposites. At the same time they also reveal that they reflect a good combination of the three mārgas of karma, jñāna and bhakti, and nothing seems to have been denounced. The outstanding feature is that the individualistic or personal salvation is held in prominence, when yoga is considered to be a means.

1. अहिंसासत्यमस्तेयं ब्रह्मचर्यं परिग्रहाः यमाः । —Pāt. Yoga, 2.30.

2. दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः स ह्यविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः

—Sāṃkhya Kārikā, 2.

3. शौचसन्तोषतपः स्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानानि नियमाः ।

—Pāt. Yoga, 2.32.

A detailed account of these yamas and their allied niyamas will be given in the subsequent chapters.

Jainism

In Jaina system the means to liberation are enumerated as four. These are jñāna, darśana, cāritra and tapas¹ (knowledge, faith, conduct and asceticism). These four means to liberation can roughly be assimilated to Pātāñjala-yoga as a means in so far as the end of liberation is concerned. This four-fold scheme of means is reduced to a threefold scheme² by Umāsvāti in Tattvārthasūtra, where tapas are included in cāritra. The prefix 'samyak' or 'right' is also his contribution. Right faith, right knowledge and right conduct are the three means of liberation according to him.

Right faith is the starting point; with it begins all spiritual endeavour. No spiritual enhancement is possible without the basic element of right faith; its existence is not quite concrete and apprehensible, nor does it correspond to any external action. It is only the inner attitude of faith towards the essence of ultimate reality (tattvārtha). The ultimate reality, according to Jains, is constituted of the seven tattvas³ (which are sometimes enumerated as nine and sometimes reduced to five). A belief or faith in this existence of reality is 'samyak-darśana.'⁴

Right knowledge can be said to be the application of right faith. But they are so close to each other that one cannot exist without the other, and therefore it is held that they exist

1. नाणं च दंसणं चैव चरित्तं च तवो तथा । —Uttarā. 28.2,3.
2. सम्यग्दर्शनज्ञानचारित्राणि मोक्षमार्गः । —Tattvā. I. 1.
3. जीवाजीवाश्रवबन्धसंवरनिजराभोक्षास्त्वम् । —Ibid. 1.4.
4. तत्त्वार्थश्रद्धानं सम्यग्दर्शनम् । —Ibid. 1.2.

side by side, or they are just the two sides of the same coin.¹ However, with regard to the acquisition of right faith and right knowledge and their order, Jaina thinkers are not unanimous. One group of thinkers—the ‘yugpadvādins’—uphold that faith and knowledge are acquired simultaneously, the other group of thinkers—‘karmavādins’—believe that acquisition takes place in sequence, and the third school of thinkers—the ‘abhedavādins’—point out that actually there is a complete non-difference between the two, i. e. darśana and jñāna.² Even with this difference of thought one can at least conclude that removal of wrong ideas or wrong faith immediately impresses upon someone the acceptance of right things as they are and this is nothing but right knowledge.

The third constituent ‘samyak cāritra’ or right conduct in the threefold scheme does not pronounce its co-existence with right faith and right knowledge, but its absence means deterrence of all spiritual growth. In other words, liberation is impossible without right conduct. What this actually means is that right conduct cannot exist without right faith and right knowledge. Yet, the last two (i.e. right faith and right knowledge) can have their existence without the first.

Now, cāritra is a very comprehensive term and has extensive implications. Its conception is not so abstract as that of right faith. Cāritra literally means partial or complete removal of rāga and dveṣa (attachment and hatred) which are the non-natural qualities of the soul or ātman (vibhāva), and an establishment (partial or complete) in svabhāva (essential qualities) which is grounded in samabhāva or the ultimate principle of samatā or equality. On the basis of karma theory of Jains, cāritra³ may be defined as a mode of abstention

1. ज्ञानं ग्रहणं युगपत् उत्पत्तेः घनपटलविगमे सवितुः प्रतापप्रकाशाभिव्यक्तित्वत् —Sarvārthasiddhi, 1.1.
2. Information supplied by Pt. Sukhlalji.
3. Abhidhāna Rājendra Koṣa, vol. III, pp. 1141-42.

{virati-pariṇāma) caused by destruction (kṣaya), or suppression (upaśama) or destruction-cum-suppression (kṣayopśama) of the cāritra mohaniya karman, i. e. karman of infatuation pertaining to cāritra. In this way the acquisition of cāritra takes place in three stages, that is (i) suppression (upaśama), (ii) partial suppression and partial destruction (kṣayopśama), and (iii) complete destruction (kṣaya). Cāritra as understood in this sense includes all stages of cāritra from cāritra starting as a base and cāritra in the stage of liberation, that is kṣāyika cāritra [comprising all the fourteen stages of spiritual development (guṇasthānas)]¹ in which cāritra actually begins with the fifth stage and ends up in the fourteenth. The stage in which cāritra is introduced, that is the fifth stage of spiritual development, is called deśa-virati śrāvaka guṇasthāna. It is the stage where partial adoption of the vows takes place and which culminates in the fourteenth stage of spiritual development. Jaina texts reveal that it is because of the lack of completion of cāritra that even in the thirteenth stage of spiritual development which is called the sayogin (one with yoga) kevalin guṇasthānas, one is unable to attain complete salvation which is attained in the fourteenth stage, called ayogin (one without yogas) kevalin guṇasthāna. Here, the suffix 'kevalin' (perfect in knowledge) is common to both the stages—thirteenth and fourteenth, but the difference in the two stages is that in the former yoga is present while in the latter yoga is eliminated. By 'yoga' is meant in Jaina system, as distinguished from Pātañjala Sūtras, activities of mind, speech and body,² which hinder spiritual growth. Though at the thirteenth stage these activities are in a very nominal and subdued form, yet they are detrimental to the attainment of final liberation or the fourteenth stage. The fourteenth stage for such a person, however, is not in any way uncertain; he, who is already an omniscient, is sure to reach it, but for a short duration or 'sthiti', these yoga activities hinder

1. For detail—Guṇasthānakramāroha.

2. तिविहे जोए पणत्ते तं जहा-मणजोए वईजाए, कायजोए । —Sthān.3.

the attainment of final goal or the fourteenth stage. Here, therefore, lies the importance of cāritra in spiritual development.

Fivefold Division of Cāritra¹ :

The Sthānāṅga divides cāritra into five types; they are mainly connected with the conduct of monks. But they also refer to the stages of spiritual development, lower or higher.

(1) *Sāmāyika cāritra* : Sāmāyika is the implementation or practice of samata, i.e. equilibrium of mind, free from distractions of attachment (rāga) or hatred (dveṣa) or a state of passivity for violent acts and activity for non-violent acts. In other words, it is equanimity in behaviour to all beings. This cāritra is the foundation of the conduct of a monk. He, therefore, adopts it for the whole life and practises the advanced stages of cāritra in the form of physical and mental penance. The laity adopts it for a limited period, generally for 48 minutes known as 'muhūrta'. The householder abstains from all sinful activities and devotes his time to prayer and meditation; during this period he becomes just like a monk as far as abstinence from sinful activities is concerned. In the case of a monk it is for the whole life known as 'yāvatkathika', and in that of the laity, sāmāyika is known as 'itvarakālika' (for a limited period). Even before the fuller and final ordination, the sāmāyika of the monk is incomplete or 'itvarakālika' because once again he has to take up the vow for the whole life.

This leads one to the discussion of certain precepts in which only the explicit form of sāmāyika cāritra can be seen. These vows or precepts are a kind of or the manifest form of this sāmāyika cāritra, provided they are preconditioned by right faith. These primary vows are the same as non-violence, truth, non-stealing, celibacy or continence and non-avaricious-

1. Sthān. 52, 428; Abhidhāna Rājendra Koṣa, vol. III, p. 1142; Gattvā. 9.18.

ness. These vows cannot, however, be called pure *cāritra*, because they also carry with them certain pollutions; they can only be called incomplete partial *cāritra*, or *cāritra* in so far as they make a person free from attachment and hatred (*rāga* and *dveṣa*), and non-*cāritra* in so far as they are polluted.

These vows or precepts mainly take two forms in Jaina system in accordance with the mental and spiritual maturity of the individuals. The higher course meant for the monks is called the *mahāvratā* where no room is given for the smallest kind of violence, untruth, etc., and it is taken for the whole life. The monk by adopting the higher course tries his best to give up all attachment and hatred. The lower course meant for the general householder called the 'aṇuvratā' or *deśa-virati* (partial abstentions) enjoins him to abstain from major (not minor or that which is unavoidable) violence, untruth, etc. The householder stands on a lower spiritual platform than the monks. The observance of these aṇuvratas is also a branch of *sāmāyika cāritra* because it is presupplemented by right attitude, and also an endeavour for the establishment in *samatā*.

Not only this, even in these separate codes of monks and the laity differences in practices are noticed, which can be attributed to the differences in social set up and other circumstances and also differences in the mental and spiritual maturity of different persons. The account of *sarva-virati* and *deśa-virati* (*mahāvratā* and *aṇuvratā*) thus can be discussed under the head of *sāmāyika cāritra*. Detailed accounts of all these *vratas* or vows will be discussed in the subsequent chapters. So far as the *sāmāyika cāritra* is concerned, it is the first and most important in the fivefold scheme of *samyak-cāritra*.

(2) *Chedopasthāpana cāritra* : When the novice proves true, within a certain period of initiation, called *laghu dīkṣā* (partial initiation) usually, he is promoted to the next step called *badīdīkṣā* (full initiation). This promotion is called *chedo-*

pathāpana cāritra, when he adopts complete ascetic life. The term 'chedopasthāpana' literally means making an end of the previous qualities (cheda) and establishing in the order anew (upasthāpanā).

It is also interpreted as a kind of punishment, for when a monk commits some grievous offence he is given this punishment by the saṃgha. This punishment may take any of the following forms—sometimes his period of initiation is cut partially or fully, and renewal of his initiation takes place so that seniority in the saṃgha is affected. This concept of punishment is called chedopasthāpana cāritra. This is called sāticāra-chedopasthāpana cāritra, i.e. establishment in the order after committing certain transgressions, but the former one, that of badīdikṣā is called niraticāra-chedopasthāpana cāritra because here he commits no transgression before getting established in the order or saṃgha.

(3) *Parihāra Viśuddhi Cāritra* : After having reached a certain standard of firmness in keeping up the mahāvratas a monk can step into the next stage of discipline called the parihāra-viśuddhi-cāritra; in this the monk undergoes certain practices requiring a high degree of self-control and firmness. This prescribes certain rituals and performing of certain austerities in obedience to a self-elected preceptor or guru. At this stage he is so much devoted to his observances that he would not even take care of his own body even in case of severe sickness. In this form of cāritra the yogic practices or tapas are more predominant. But it also demands supernormal physical strength.

(4) *Sūkṣma Samparāya Cāritra* : As the name indicates, in this cāritra, there is almost complete annihilation of the four passions or samparāyas or kaṣāyas.¹ They remain only in a very subtle (sūkṣma) form. In this state passion remains only

1. Four Kaṣāyas (anger, conceit, crookedness and greed—
क्रोध, मान, माया, लोभ)—Sthān. 4.249.

in the form of lobha¹ (convetousness or greed). This cāritra actually depicts the tenth stage of spiritual development known as sūkṣma samparāya guṇasthāna. It is further pointed out that this cāritra is of two types : (i) one achieved at the time of spiritual progress called viśuddhimāna, (ii) another achieved at the time of spiritual regress called saṃkliśyamāna.

(5) *Yathākhyāta Cāritra* : This is the final stage of cāritra when the individual has no arousal of passions even of a subtle kind. Passions or kaṣāyas are completely destroyed. Now the twelfth stage of spiritual development is achieved; it is called ksīṇa (destruction) mohaniya (passions) guṇasthāna.

At this stage no question of transgression in any of the vows remains and the stage viewed as strict jinalpi conduct, i. e. completely in accordance with the monastic discipline. In this sense yathākhyāta-cāritra can be of two types—one enjoyed by the kevalin in his liberated stage and the other enjoyed by the jinalpi monk who is still in bondage but sure to become a kevalin,

Out of these five cāritras, the last three can no more be attained by the monks of the present age, as these require supernormal strength of both mind and body. Actually speaking, they do not indicate any code of conduct. On the other hand, they are the actual achievements of the monks after establishing in finer and finer sāmāyika cāritra. Hence the general term 'cāritra' really indicates only sāmāyika cāritra which means real adoption of right conduct. Therefore, it is sāmāyika cāritra which is the basis of all discussions about the vratas. Mahāvratas and aṇuvratas can be called cāritra only in the sense of sāmāyika cāritra. However, this fivefold classification is important because it highlights the squence of spiritual development.

Buddhism :

Buddhism also promulgates a threefold scheme like Jainism called the sikkātraya as a means for cessation of suffering.

1. Abhidhāna Rājendra Koṣa, vol. 3, p. 1142; Sthān. 4.428.

(Dukkha-Nirodha) or Nirvāṇa. This threefold scheme contains the whole of Buddhist doctrine for spiritual upliftment. These śikṣās are (1) śīla śikṣā, (2) samādhiśikṣā and (3) prajñāśikṣā. The three combined constitute the path of purity. The root of 'dukha' or suffering lies in desire or 'tanhā' according to Buddhism, in Jainism it is 'moha' or infatuation; when this 'tanhā' or attachment is rooted out, spiritual purity becomes manifest. In this context two gāthās from Saṃyutta Nikāya can be quoted. When a deva said to Buddha, "Tangle within, tangle without, in the toils entangled is the race of sentient things, hence would I ask thee Gautama of this : who is't can from this tangle disembroil?"¹ By tangle is meant here the net of craving or desire. The reply given by Buddha to this question is, "the man discreet, on virtue planted firm, in intellect and intuition trained the monk ardent and discriminant, it is he may from this tangle disembroil."² This meaningful reply given by Buddha indicates the relevance and decisive impōrtance of śīla, samādhi and prajñā for the removal of embroilment of tanhā or desire and for the attainment of Nirvāṇa.

The importance of this had not been overlooked by later thinkers too. These two verses of Saṃyutta Nikāya were given to Buddhaghosa to test his knowledge, and Buddhaghosa beyond the expectations of his enquirers gave a superb presentation of his knowledge in his famous work 'Visuddhimagga'. There he deals independently with each of the threefold teachings of Buddha. This threefold scheme is in fact an abridged version of the eightfold path (Aṣṭāṅgika-Mārga)

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1. अन्तो जटा बहि जटा, जटाय जटिता पजा
तं तं गौतम पुच्छामि, को इमं विजटये जटं ति ?
—Saṃyutta., vol. I, p. 14.
 2. सीले पतिट्ठाए नरो सपञ्जो, चित्तं पञ्जं च भावयं
आतापि निपको भिक्खु, सो इमं विजटये जटं ।
—Ibid., vol. I, p. 14.

discussed under the fourth noble truth of Buddha that there is a path leading to the cessation of suffering (Dukkha-Nirudha).

Śīla in general, as has been already seen, means virtue, good conduct, morality or physical discipline, which mainly refers to the five precepts of pānātipāta-veramaṇi, adinnādāna-veramaṇi, kāmamicchācāra-veramaṇi, musāvada-veramaṇi, and surāmeriyamajja-pamādatthāna-veramaṇi which are also discussed in Jaina system and Pātañjala Yogasūtras and yamas respectively. Thus, discipline or morality forms the first part of Buddha's doctrine.

By samādhi is meant the mental discipline or purification of citta (mind) through concentration or meditational practices. These meditational practices form the core of Buddhism. According to Buddhists, purity is more mental than physical, and in Buddhist ethics emphasis has been laid more on mental than on physical discipline,¹ even though physical discipline or śīlas cannot be purely physical without being mental. Lastly, prajñā, the final stage, is attained as the end of all śīla and samādhi, the ultimate knowledge of truth. It is in the third constituent of 'prajñā' that Buddhism offered its own solution to the riddle of the universe. These are the threefold teachings of Buddha as a path to liberation, the glory of which has been sung in verse after verse and in passage after passage in Nikāyas and Dhammapada.

The Jaina doctrine of the path to liberation or Mokṣa called 'triratna' (or the three jewels for liberation) has already been discussed. The first constituent of the Buddhist doctrine, i. e. 'śīla', can well be assimilated to the last constituent of Jaina doctrine, i. e. cāritra. This in fact is the closest

1. It is stated in Majjhima (Part I, p. 292) that ascetic practices do not even lead to kāyabhāvanā (physical discipline) not to speak of cittabhāvanā (mental discipline).

resemblance between the two systems. The conception of cāritra in Jainism, however, is even broader than Buddhist 'śīla' because it includes also in itself the Buddhist samādhi technically called 'dhyāna' in Jainism.¹ On the other hand, the Buddhists being more emphatic on concentration or samādhi put it separately. However, in one system it is put in the first place and in the other, in the last place. There is no logical basis for this difference in order, but this difference becomes meaningless when it is held that in both the systems all the three constituents are taken together, and none in isolation constitutes the path to liberation. Another similarity can be discerned in jñāna of Jainas and the 'prajñā' of Buddhists. Jñāna in its final stage and prajñā also in its climax are the points of culmination according to both the systems, for both of them it is the state of Nirvāṇa or just the verge of Nirvāṇa. Prajñā is the true knowledge of truth, and in this sense only 'kevalajñāna' of Jainas can be understood, and not 'samyak-jñāna' which is just the starting point in spiritual development. Though in the Buddhist prajñā also, two stages may be noted, one depicting the beginning of discriminative knowledge as 'sammādiṭṭhi' and the other, final knowledge of truth as propounded in Buddhism. In Jainism 'jñāna' starts with samyak jñāna and ends in kevalajñāna. In Jainism it is right faith or attitude (which can also be compared with 'sammādiṭṭhi' of Buddhism), while in Buddhism it is samādhi or concentration. Buddhism, as has been said, lays emphasis on concentration or mental discipline as essential to inner purity. It is held that sin or bad conduct is made to flow out by śīla and kāmādhātu or desire or tanhā by samādhi. And wrong views are eradicated only with prajñā. This gross comparison tends to show that in both the systems almost the same factors are treated as the path to

1. There are four dhyānas according to Jaina scriptures; the dhyānas which are comparable to Buddhist samādhi, are the last two, i. e. dharma and śukla dhyānas.

---Aupa. 30.

liberation. However, there are also certain differences at least in the degree of emphasis on different aspects which need not be mentioned here at this point, but at the same time they should not be ignored by a compromising attitude so that the individualities of each system fall to the ground.

The subject with which one is at present concerned is conception of śīla in Buddhism. Practically śīla includes the whole code of moral laws that are prescribed for Buddhist monks and nuns and laymen. The code of conduct of the monks and nuns is clearly and distinctly prescribed in what is called Pātimokkha. Pātimokkha is the accepted code of moral duties of monks and nuns, and declaration of non-transgression of any of the rules contained in it on the fortnightly Uposatha days is regarded as sufficient for making the monks morally pure. This Pātimokkha code is an abridged version of Vinaya for the convenience of monks for the fortnightly recitation of the rules. It is divided into two parts, one meant for the monks and the other meant for the nuns, called Bhikkhu-Pātimokkha and Bhikkhuni-Pātimokkha respectively. And each code contains more than 225 rules.¹

‘Śīla’ does not mean only the Pātimokkha rules, as is pointed out in the Visuddhimagga. There ‘śīla’ is explained in four ways : volition is virtue, mental properties are virtue, restraint is virtue and non-transgression is virtue.² At first, virtue is defined as volition, i. e. virtue implies freedom of choice, free will or a determining power. Then virtue is defined as mental properties indicating that virtue is not only physical but it is also mental. Virtue as restraint means control on the outburst of passions. Lastly, virtue is defined as non-transgression, that is, abiding by the rules of

1. For monks are prescribed 227 rules while for the nuns the number of rules is 311 according to Theravādins.
2. किं सीलं ति ? चेतना सीलं चेतसिकं सीलं संवरो सीलं अवीतिकम्मो सीलं ति ।
—Vis. magga, part I, chap. I, p. 7.

a general code of conduct made by the saṃgha either for the maintenance of Saṃgha or for the individual morality, and non-indulgence in any deliberate trespassing of these rules is expected. This shows that śīla is both internal and external, and mental and physical; besides, it is not only negative but positive as well.

Śīla in fact consists of right speech, right action and right livelihood (sammāvācā, sammākammaṇā, sammājīvā). Refraining from speaking falsehood, malicious words, harsh and frivolous talk is right speech. Right action means refraining from killing, stealing and misconduct. Right livelihood means refraining from earning livelihood by improper means, i. e. arts and crafts of laymen, astronomical forecasts, interpretation of dreams, use of magical powers, etc. These in other words can be split up in five precepts or 'pañcaśīla' of monks, nuns, and lay-people and also unordained novices. In Dīgha Nikāya śīlas have been enumerated as three, that is small, medium and great (cūla, majjhima and mahā) in relation to those of lay-people, unordained novices, and monks and nuns. This is where a discussion of all the five, eight or ten precepts of monks, nuns and lay people is found.

The five precepts are expected from every lay devotee of Buddhism. But the more faithful among the laymen, however, observe three more precepts. They thus observe the aṭṭhasīlas (eight śīlas). The remaining three are : (1) vikāla bhojanā-veramaṇi—not to take meals at odd times, (2) nacchagīta vādita vikusadassana veramaṇi—not to indulge in dances, music, etc., (3) malla-gandha-vilepaṇa-veramaṇi—not to use scents, perfumes, etc.; these are secondary precepts for the lay people. They are usually observed on the Uposatha days such as the eighth and the fourteenth of each fortnight and the full moon day and the moonless day. But these five and eight śīlas are called by Buddhaghosa as gahaṭṭhasīlas; the strength of the śīlas observed is dependent on the mind, speech and action. A Bhikkhu observes the above mentioned

eight precepts compulsorily and wholeheartedly, and instead of *kāmamicchācāra-veramaṇi*, his precept is called *abrahmacārya-veramaṇi*, i. e. complete celibacy, and together with these he has to observe two more precepts which are (1) *uccāsayanamahāsayana veramaṇi*, i. e. not to use very high and comfortable beds and (2) *jātarūparajata patiggahaṇa-veramaṇi*, i. e. not to accept and possess gold and silver and money. Thus these precepts of the monks and nuns called *daśaśīlas* are meant exclusively for monks and nuns.¹ “The so called ten śīlas are found in *Khuddakapāṭha* under the name of *dasa-sikkhāpadas*, are of late origin and served as memorial verses for the use of novices. Strictly speaking they should not be called *dasa-sīlas*—the eightfold śīla or eight pledges which are recommended to the Buddhist layman are *Sikkāpadas* which in the canon however do not occur under the name of śīla nor *sikkhāpada* but as *attanga sammannagata Uposatha*—the fast day with its eight constituents. They are discussed in detail in *Āṅguttara Nikāya* with a poetical setting.”²

In the *Visuddhimagga* Buddhaghosa has described śīla in various ways, which has been discussed in various other scriptures like *Dīgha-Nikāya* and *Vibhaṅga*. In his fourth tetrad he divided śīla in four kinds : (1) *Pātimokkha-saṃvarasīla* (observance of the rules laid down in *Pātimokkha* code), (2) *Indriya saṃvara-sīla* (i. e. virtue as restraint of sense organs), (3) *Ājīva parisuddhi-sīla* (virtue with regard to proper livelihood and abstention from improper and wrong livelihood as has been shown in *Brahmajāla Sutta* of *Dīgha Nikāya*, (4) *Paccayasannissuta sīla*—virtue connected with the requisites of the monks or nuns. This fourfold classification is suggestive of all the five, eight and ten śīlas of monks and nuns. In this sense, it is a very important and comprehensive classification. However, it stresses only the śīlas of monks and not those

1. *Khu. Pāṭha*—*Dasa Sikkhāpadas*.

2. *Pali English Dictionary*—*Dauids & Stede*, p. 172.

of the laity ; though the third type, i. e. ājīva-parisuddhi śīla may be understood to have reference to the ājīva of both of the monks as well as the laity. The laity should not earn their livelihood by improper means nor should the monks beg the alms by wrong means. The monks should resort only to those practices which are prescribed for them and should not try to attract the laity by wrong use of the powers that they might possess, or just by pretending to have some powers which they do not have.

This a general introduction to Śīlas, which are not limited to the monks or nuns only but are applicable to the laity as well. But the minutest details of śīlas of monks and nuns show that Buddhism is more emphatic on the life of the monks and nuns and that it is really an ascetic system which highlights renunciation of the world. But the asceticism is of a moderate type; no faith in self-mortification is shown by the Buddhist monks, though dhutanga practices¹ were discussed, they have been retained by them. But Buddha himself did not pay much heed to them, nor were they regarded as part of morality or śīla. "In the four Nikāyas and also in the Vinaya there is no mention of the term 'dhutanga', not to speak of its inclusion in the list of śīlas. Some of the 'dhutanga' practices such as sapadanacari, pindapātiko, pāmsukuliko etc. are mentioned incidentally in the Nikāyas and the Vinaya, but it is also stated that Buddha himself did not practise them in his own life, while some of his disciples did."² This indifference to dhutangas, therefore, confirms the fact that Buddha stressed the real import of śīlas which is essentially visible in Pañcaśīlas and not only the outward rigor in asceticism.

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1. Dhutanganiddesa—Vis. magga.
 2. Early Monastic Buddhism—N. Dutta, p. 206.

CHAPTER II

NON-VIOLENCE

The principle of non-violence or 'ahimsā' is the first among 'pañcaśīlas' of Buddhism, 'pañcavratas' of Jainism and 'pañcayamas' of Pātāñjala-yoga system, the slight difference, as one can see, in nomenclature of this principle in each system is due to the difference in the languages used in their scriptures. But the term 'ahimsā' is the most popular among all. It is existent all over in Pātāñjala-yoga system, Jaina and Buddhist scriptures. Non-violence has been stressed by religious exponents, social reformers and political leaders, and above all it has been accepted as important from the point of view of one's ownself. Thus it is religiously, ethically, socially, politically and psychologically important and necessary. However, it is closely associated with the very human psychological make up. The instinct of love, sympathy or 'karuṇā' furnishes the basis of 'ahimsā'. The object of love may differ from person to person; for one the field of love may be his ownself while for the other the object of love may be the whole universe. In fact, love should be differentiated from attachment. Love in the highest sense is unselfish, while attachment is directed by selfishness which is variously termed as rāga, triṣṇā or moha in Indian Philosophy. Unselfish love can be accepted as the basis of non-violence and morality. The universality of it is seen in the fact that there is not a single person in the world in whom the whole mental constitution is filled not with love, but only with the opposite of love, i. e. hatred or in other words 'himsā' or violence.

One does at the same time behold that the opposite of love, i. e. hatred, 'himsā' or violence, constitutes the other aspect of human personality. In life in general there exists a relationship between 'himsā' and 'ahimsā'. In a rougher mathe-

metrical form 'ahimsā' and 'himsā' act as numerator and denominator to each other; there is a correlation between the two, i.e. 'ahimsā and himsā'. But a good life or moral life rather would indicate the side of 'ahimsā', i. e. of love; sympathy or 'karuṇā' is more important than the side of 'himsā', i. e. of hatred and violence. Ahimsā is essential for an individual as a member of a family, as a member of the society, as a member of a nation and as a member of the whole universe.

The term 'ahimsā' has its origin in 'himsā'; 'hisi' is its root, which means killing or destroying or hurting a living being. And the opposite of it is 'ahimsā', i. e. non-killing, non-destroying or non-injury.¹ Since 'ahimsā' is a negative term it may be taken literally as purely negative in character, that is only what 'himsā' is not; and it can be inferred from this that 'ahimsā' simply means non-killing, non-injury or non-destruction of living beings, and the positive side of it by way of protecting a living being, helping a living being and loving a living being is not connected with the moral principle of 'ahimsā', and therefore it has no value in itself. But this should be borne in mind that this positive aspect of 'ahimsā' by way of loving each other, helping each other or sympathizing with others, is an indispensable aspect of 'ahimsā'. It is only in this sense that it is an indicator of the active life of the individual.

Activity is the essential factor of all individuals, or of all the souls in bondage; no soul in bondage can live without activity. Absence of activity for such individuals means lifelessness. The passive state and the very pursuit of morality cannot go together. This passive state is indicated by the purely negative aspect of 'ahimsā'. Only don'ts without do's cannot give a complete explanation; thus the meaning of ahimsā should not be understood in the verbal sense only. In its real sense it is both positive and negative. "Ahimsā is

1. हिंसा रहिता अहिंसा—Vācaspatyam, vol. I., p. 582.

non-hate or absence of hatred that is in positive sense sympathy or love" (Schopenhauer). Absence of hatred promotes love, which is the source of unification of different individuals. "Further it is a fact of common experience that hatred retards the common development of both the mind and the body of the individual, while love makes them bloom forth in their natural splendour in the lover."¹ And to this culture of hatred there is no antidote except the practice of love. According to Bosanquet, "In the purity of love and will with the supreme good you are not only saved, but you are free or strong."²

Some may hold that hatred can be quenched by applying it to the object of hatred, or by taking due revenge. But this is wrong, for hatred like all other passions grows by feeding upon the victims. Some Buddhist texts also point out the same, "Hatred does not cease by hatred at any time, but it ceases by love only, it is its nature."³ The same idea is depicted in the pratipakṣa bhāvanā theory of Patañjali, which stresses the cultivation of the opposites of ill thoughts whenever swayed by them.⁴ Hatred is right only in the sense of hatred towards the wrong.

Viewed in this light of the practice of love the principle of 'ahiṃsā' should and would become a working principle of life. This principle of life in its truest sense is higher than the teachings of philosophy and the austere practices of religion. This at first may appear paradoxical—that is how can one try to change psychology into ethics? Or, in other words, how an 'is' can be converted into a 'should be'? If love or ahiṃsā constitutes our psychology

1. Buddha Mimansa—Maitreya, Appendix, p. 70.
2. Ibid.
3. नहि वेरेण वेरानि समन्तीध कुदाचनं,
अवेरेण च सम्मन्ति एस धम्मो सनन्तनो ।
—Dhammapada, Yamakvagga, 5.
4. वितर्कबाधने प्रतिपक्षभावनम् ।—Pāt. Yoga, 2.33.

itself, how is it made the basic ethical principle or how will a fact of life become a law of life? But this should be made clear that a rationalized psychological aspect of one's behaviour alone would make the best moral principle or the law of life.

Therefore, *ahimsā* is incomplete without the positive counterpart based on love, though its negative aspect is equally significant from many standpoints; and there are certain reasons also as to why this moral principle has a negative nomenclature. Firstly, from the point of view of the highest goal of liberation, the term is more appropriate since it is indicative of that inactive state (inactive only in relation to material or mundane activity) which symbolizes *mokṣa*. The term like *āhimsā* is more fitting to express this achievable end. But as a means to this end, as has been seen, it is both negative and positive. Secondly, this term also indicates the circumstantial factors in which it came first in use. In the days in which *ahimsā* came first into use, '*himsā*' or violence had become a habit of life, *himsā* was prevalent in all walks of life. Even in the field of religion, as has been told, it occupied a place in *yajñas*. The use of the term *ahimsā* as non-killing, non-injury therefore stressed the importance of the abstention from certain actions and practices which are harmful and condemnable. This reflects the revolutionary zeal and a sort of '*viśvaprema*' in the religious exponents of those days, who tried to guide the people to avoid violence with a positive effort. It is therefore inconceivable that the positive aspect is irrelevant or meaningless as against negative aspect, from the point of view of religious or moral or spiritual upliftment, or, that this aspect is non-existent in the scriptures. Though in Śramaṇical systems the negative aspect is more emphatically and explicitly discussed, the positive side is not ignored, as will be seen subsequently. In the Jaina scriptures it is found that there are about sixty names¹ attributed to *ahimsā* which indicate both positive and negative aspects of *ahimsā*.

1. Praśna., Saṃvaradvāra, 1.21.

With this basic concept of non-violence, both as positive and negative, it will be a systematic attempt to trace out its development from Ṛgvedic times down to the time of Buddha and Mahāvīra, where the concept is found to be most flourishing. One is not however properly equipped to have a scientific approach to pre-Vedic period, so it is difficult to deal with that period and to trace out the origin or root of this principle during that period.

It is not proper to say that 'non-violence' exists in Ṛgveda in the form it exists in the Upaniṣadic and Śramaṇical systems. It is neither given the place of the highest moral principle nor is its field of application so wide as is found in later times. But it cannot at the same time be assumed that even in an implicit form this moral principle does not exist. In the Ṛgveda morality as such is only a family and social matter. "Truth, right conduct, kindness, loyalty to one's neighbour and comrade...were counted as high virtues. Fraud, malignant speech, lying, violence to defenceless, and adultery were regarded as grave crimes."¹ But supremacy of the yajñas is the theme of the Ṛgveda; yajña was performed to please the gods in order to fulfil the material needs which can be categorized only in the efforts for social welfare. The highest duty of men was towards the gods which was fulfilled only by the performance of yajñas. But there is also a proclamation for their duties towards men; "kindness to all is enjoined; hospitality is reckoned a great virtue."² Herein one can detect the germ of the positive aspect of ahimsā, i. e. compassion or love, but only in a disguised form. No proper promulgation of love or compassion for lower creations is found in the Ṛgveda. On the other hand, the daily life of the Vedic people was full of what is called the opposite of ahimsā or love or sympathy (at least for the lower creations). "The Vedic Indians were a nation of meat-eaters, nor need we believe that they merely

1. Ṛgveda and Vedic Religion—Clayton, p. 14.

2. Indian Philosophy—S. Radhakrishnan, vol. I, p. 110.

ate meat on the occasion of 'sacrifice'. The ox, the sheep and the goat were normal food eaten by men and offered to their gods. Horse-flesh was probably eaten only at the time of 'horse-sacrifices' and not so much as ordinary food. There is no inconsistency between the eating of flesh and the growing sanctity of the cow, which bears already in the Ṛgveda the epithet '*aghnya*' (not to be killed)."¹ Even the recognition of the sanctity of the cow indicates not any spiritual values attached to it but the social and material benefit derived from the cow. All this tends to show the difference between the basis of morality in the Ṛgvedic period on the one hand, and that in the post-Brahmanical period on the other.

The age of the Brāhmaṇas cannot be very distinctively differentiated from the age of the Ṛgveda in most of its features. The Brāhmaṇas give a detailed account of the sacrificial rites. The chief of these Brāhmaṇas are Śatapatha and Aitareya. Though the emphasis was laid on sacrifice as is done in the Ṛgveda, yet one of the most salient features of the Brāhmaṇas is high moral sense and exalted sentiment. And they discuss the duties of men towards men very emphatically. "Side by side with its insistence on outer there was also emphasis on inner purity, truth, godliness, honour of parents, kindness to animals, love of man, abstinence from theft, murder and adultery were inculcated as the essentials of good life."² All this 'kindness to animals', 'love of men', abstinence from murder, indicate the very same concept of *ahiṃsā* if only with a social background "the passage '*yatra vā asāyai khanataḥ kruti kurvanti apaghñanti santi apaḥ śantyā samāyati*' enjoins that when the earth is dug it is injured and water is used for shooting it. All this shows that there is beneath the layer of *hiṃsā* demanded by the Vedic sacrifice, the residuum of *ahiṃsā*. The sacrifice as remarked above was a vehicle of happiness in the eyes of Vedic people.

1. Cambridge History of India, vol. I, p. 91,

2. Indian Philosophy—S. Radhakrishnan, vol. I, p. 132.

At the same time it cannot be forgotten that there was in the Vedic community a section of people whom the idea of killing a victim even in the sacrifice was absolutely repugnant.”¹ However, there did not occur much change in the food habits etc. of the people of those days, “the food of the Indian remains unaltered : the eating of meat is indeed here and there censured as for instance, in a hymn of the Atharvaveda where meat-eating is classed with the drinking of sura as a sinful act. And meat might be avoided like other things by one who was keeping a vow. But it was still the custom to slay a great ox or goat for the entertainment of the guest, the doctrine of ahimsā which forbids the doing of injury to any animal was indeed only in embryo in this period, and was not fully developed until the growth of the belief in transmigration came to strengthen the philosophic tenets of Brāhmaṇas as to the unity of all existence.”²

In the Upaniṣads the term ‘ahimsā’ as such is found to have occurred. It first finds expression in a mystical passage in Chāndogya Upaniṣad,³ where the five ethical qualities, one being ahimsā, are said to be equivalent to a part of the sacrifice in which the whole life of man is made an epitome. According to this Upaniṣad, Krishna was the disciple of Ghora Āṅgīrasa. And Ghora Āṅgīrasa was the person who taught Krishna of ‘ātman-yajña’. And this self-sacrifice (ātman-yajña) does not need gifts to be given to the purohitas, for non-violence, asceticism, liberality, truth, uprightness, etc., are the gifts for this yajña. According to Prof. Kosambi Ghora Āṅgīrasa was the twenty second Tirthankara of Jainas

1. Morals in Brahmanas—Dr. H. R. Karnik.
(The Journal of University of Bombay, Sept. 58).
2. Cambridge History of India, vol. I, p. 123.
3. अतः यत् तपोदानमार्जवमहिंसासत्यवचनमिति ता अस्य दक्षिणा ।
—Chāndogya, 3.17.4.

called Ariṣṭhanemi, who was followed by Pārśvanātha.¹ "This is not exactly the same as Hebrew prophet's 'I will have mercy and not sacrifice', but it comes very near to it";² thus it is clear that the Upaniṣads leave aside many of the rituals and ceremonies of the Vedic and Brāhmanic times, they point out not only the outward consistency but also the inwardness of morality and stress the importance of motive in conduct and inner purity. So far as the positive aspect is concerned, 'in the Upaniṣads we are asked to root out our pride, resentment and lust etc. and not the tender feelings of love, compassion and sympathy.'³ However, the Upaniṣads have gone even further by recommending love to the brute creations of the world.⁴

In Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad three cardinal virtues have been enumerated. A parable is told that once upon a time, gods, men and demons all went to their common forefather Prajāpati, and asked him to communicate the knowledge which he possessed. To the gods Prajāpati communicated the syllable 'da', to the men, he communicated the same syllable 'da'. And also to the demons the same 'da'. Then, he asked each of the three groups as to what they understood by this syllable. The gods replied that they understood by it the practice of self-control, men told that they understood charity, and the demons likewise said that they understood compassion. Prajāpati found each and every answer satisfactory, and he then proclaimed that these three, self-control, charity and compassion were the cardinal virtues for different types of people, according to the predominance of sattva, raja and tama guṇas⁵ in different people. This thus reveals that compassion is considered a significant virtue.

1. Bhāratīya Saṃskṛiti Aur Ahimsā—D.D. Kosambi, p. 51.
2. E. R. E., vol. I, p. 231.
3. Indian Philosophy—S. Radhakrishnan, vol. I, p. 215.
4. Ibid.
5. A Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy—R.D. Ranade, p. 307.

Taittirīya Upaniṣad also points out certain virtues which include compassion and non-violence.¹

Manu, the first law-giver of Hindu society, has clearly and specifically stated the duties of a man, as to how he should behave. He has named these duties 'sāmāsika dharma' the duties of man, in brief; these duties have been explicitly stated as five among which 'ahiṃsā' tops the list.² At other place it is said, "He who gives no creature willingly the pain of confinement or death, but seeks the good of all, enjoys, bliss without end. Flesh cannot be obtained without injury to animals, and the slaughter of animals obstructs the way to heaven. Therefore, one should avoid the flesh....He who during a hundred years annually performs the horse-sacrifice, and he who entirely abstains from flesh, enjoys for their virtue an equal reward."³

Here it is clear that violence and flesh-eating is denounced, but at the same time it can be seen that 'yajña' is not denounced, even horse-sacrifice is regarded as giving the same reward as the abstention from eating flesh. This indicates the continuance of emphasis on material prosperity to be attained in the next life or in heaven with the help of yajña. It is further said, "In eating flesh, in drinking intoxicating drinks and in carnal intercourse, there is no sin, for such enjoyments are natural, but abstention from them produces great reward."⁴ This shows that the conception of virtue in two cultures is somewhat alike. The conception of vice, however, differs; the difference could be attributed to the different bases of the two cultures. Mahābhārata also empha-

1. Tait. I. 9.

2. अहिंसासत्यमस्तेयं शौचमिन्द्रिय निग्रहः ।—Manu. 10.63.

3. Mānava Dharma Śāstra, V. 46.48.53.56.

4. Ibid.

sizes non-violence¹ as the greatest of all virtues. According to it non-violence means abstention from violence not only through body but also through mind and speech. Mental violence should at the outset be abjured.²

After a brief sketch of the development and origin of *ahiṃsā* from the Ṛgvedic period to the epic period, the most developed state of *ahiṃsā* in recent Hinduism can be traced out in the *Pātañjala-yoga-sūtras*. As has already been seen, Patañjali's period is much later than that of Buddha or Mahāvīra, his time is supposed to be 4th or 5th century of our era,³ it cannot therefore be supposed that he remained uninfluenced by the Buddhist and the Jaina thought. The doctrine of 'ahiṃsā', as the first yama in eight yogangas of Patañjali, has a close affinity to the Buddhist and the Jaina conception of *ahiṃsā*. The ambiguous status occupied by this principle in Smṛtis, Epics and the other Brāhmaṇical sources is made clear and distinct in Patañjali. For Patañjali 'ahiṃsā' is not subordinate to anything or even yajñas, but everything else is subordinate to 'ahiṃsā'. *Ahiṃsā* not only means non-injury to all living beings, but also means abstinence from malice towards them in everyway and at all times.⁴ And all other abstentions and observances are rooted in it. Patañjali calls this abstinence the 'mahāvratā'. The term 'mahāvratā' also occurs in the Jaina system and is used for the complete vow of the monks and the nuns. Patañjali

1. अहिंसा परमोधर्मः—Mahābhā. 11. 13

2. कर्मणा न नरः कुर्वन् हिंसा पार्थिवसत्तम्,
वाचा च मनसा चैव ततो दुःखात् प्रमुच्यते
पूर्वं तु मनसा त्यक्त्वा त्यजेथ वाचाय कर्मणा ।

—Māhābhā., Anusāsanaparva, 176.3.

3. Yoga System of Patañjali—J. H. Woods, Introduction, p. XIX.

4. तत्राहिंसा सर्वथा सर्वदा सर्वभूतानामभिद्रोहः ।

—Vyāsa's Comm. On Pāt. Yoga, 2.30.

also uses it in a somewhat similar sense of unconditional and universally applicable vow of the yogin, which is complete in the sense that it is unqualified by species, place, time or urgent necessity,¹ i. e. it makes no room for any exception to commit any act of violence under any circumstance. It is not qualified in respect of species as for example a fisherman can say, 'I will not do injury to any one except catching fish' or in respect of place as when one says, 'I will not slay in a holy place', in respect of time as when one says, 'I will not slay on the fourteenth of the fortnight or on a day of good omen', or when one says in respect of exigency, 'I will slay only for the gods or the Brahmin'. It is this vow which is entitled 'mahāvratā', having no conditions and qualifications. Here one clearly sees that the slaughter of animals for the yajñās or for any other purpose is condemned as in the Śramaṇical systems.

Patañjali further pronounces the helping devices which are auxiliary for the development of these yamas. He points out that if there are inhibitions by perverse considerations (vitarka), there should be cultivation of the opposites (pratipakṣa bhāvanā). What actually it means is that whenever in the mind of a person violence or other similar vices creep in, as for instance, 'I will kill him who hurts me', he should immediately cultivate the opposite of these. He should think: 'Baked upon the pitiless coals of the round of rebirths, I take my refuge in the rules of yoga by giving protection to every living creature'.² Thinking in this way would be a fruitful effort on one's own part to destroy this mental conflict or a tendency to kill. One cannot fight with this by a frontal attack, that is by simply checking it; what one could do is to

1. जातिदेशकालसमयानवच्छिन्नाः सार्वभौमा महाव्रतम् ।

--Pāt. Yoga, 2.31.

2. धारेषु संसाराङ्गारेषु पच्यमानेन मया शरणमुपागतः सर्वं भूताभय-
प्रदानेन योगधर्मः ।—Vyāsa's Comm. on Pāt, Yoga, 2.33.

substitute for it the opposite of such a desire, by reflecting and contemplating on the virtue and goodness of non-killing for love and compassion.

In the next sūtra¹ Patañjali tries to classify violence into various types which, it is pointed out, are suppressed only by 'pratipakṣabhāvanā'. According to him *himsā* is not only physically injuring someone; even asking someone to commit an act of *himsā* and to approve or appreciate such an act committed by some one is also regarded as *himsā*. In this way fundamentally *himsā* is of three types, *kṛta*, *kārita* and *anumodita*, i. e. doing oneself, making someone else to do, and appreciating one who has done it. Now each of these three types of *himsā* can be further divided into three sub-types on the basis of the motive of *himsā* whether it is greed, anger or infatuation. Even, each of these, (greed, anger, and infatuation) is of three types, according to their intensity, i.e. mild, moderate and vehement; thus *himsā* can be of twenty seven varieties in all. Yet again, each of these twenty seven varieties is sub-divided as gentle, moderate and extreme. These are thus gently mild, moderately mild and extremely mild. Similarly, gently moderate, moderately moderate, and keenly moderate; likewise, gently keen, moderately keen and vehemently keen. Hence in this manner *himsā* can be of one hundred and eighty varieties.

This, however, is a moderate type of classification as Vyāsa points out. An extreme type of classification would proclaim *himsā* of innumerable varieties, because of specifications (*niyama*), options (*vikalpa*) and aggregations (*samuccaya*); or because of the fact that there are innumerable varieties among those who breathe the breath of life.²

1. वितर्कहिंसादयः कृतकारितानुमोदिता लोभक्रोधमोहपूर्वका मृदुमध्याधि-
मात्रा दुःखाज्ञानानन्त फला इति प्रतिपक्ष भावनम् ।

—Pāt. Yoga, 2.34.

2. सापुननियमविकल्प समुच्चयभेदादसंख्येया ।

—Vyasa's Comm. on Pāt. Yoga, 2.34.

Patañjali gives another sūtra to throw light upon the importance of ahimsā ; it says that the yogin who has established himself in it acquires a supernatural power. The sūtra says, "As soon as one has established in the abstinence from injury, his presence engenders a suspension of enmity."¹ What in fact Patañjali tries to emphasize is that the effects of abstention from injury not only pertain to the one who has established himself in it, but also to all others who are in direct contact with the yogin, because the yogin develops certain qualities which lead to complete suspension of enmity between men and men, or between animals and animals. Two animals who are supposed to have a natural hostility towards or hatred for each other can live in amity in the presence of such an exalted yogin. In general psychological terms this is called 'negative adaptation', i. e. an individual animal gets adapted to the negative circumstances, but the comparison between the yoga faith of Patañjali and the modern psychology should not be carried too far in this connection. However, a more rational interpretation would be that the yogin works for his own salvation, rather than for mutual co-existence of those who have inborn enmity; nor do we see any logical cause and effect relationship between the presence of an exalted yogin established in non-violence, and the loss of enmity among the different individuals who come in contact with the yogin.

All this, undoubtedly, shows the importance given by Patañjali to the principle of non-violence which is unique in the history of the so-called Vedic systems. He also discusses other four yamas which shall be dealt with in separate chapters.

Non-violence in Jainism

Chronologically, ahimsā in Jainism should have been discussed before the yoga system of Patañjali. But, since Yoga

1. अहिंसाप्रतिष्ठायां तत्सन्निधौ वैरत्यागः ।—Pāt. Yoga, 2.35.

system has been included in Hinduism (though, as has been said earlier, it is a branch of Śramaṇic cult also) it is thought worthwhile to trace out the fuller development of Hinduism from the Brāhmaṇic to the ascetic Hinduism, from the highest ideal of yajña to the ideal of non-violence, from concrete ritualism to the abstract principles of morality.

The cult of non-violence has taken quite a new turn in Jainism. Ahimsā in its extreme form can be noticed only in Jainism, the entire Jaina religious and philosophical system is founded on ahimsā. Naturally, in Jaina literature and scriptures at various places the glory of this principle is sung¹ and the opposite of it is condemned.² The essence of knowledge, it is said, lies in non-killing which is the supreme principle said by the omniscients.³

The underlying principle of non-violence is the principle of equality or 'samatā'; as has been pointed out, 'samatā' is the basis of all morality, philosophy and logic of Jaina thought and prevails all over Jaina system. For this it is said, "No living being loves suffering (dukkha) just as I donot;" thinking thus, one who does not indulge in violence, nor does let others indulge in it, is a true monk (samaṇa) or one who establishes himself in samatā.⁴ It is further stressed that all

1. विद्धर्चिहिसैव भूतानां मातेव हितकारिणी ।
तथा रमयितुं कान्ता विनेतुं च सरस्वती ॥

—Jñānārṇava, 8. 49.

2. हिंसैव दुर्गतेद्वारं हिंसैव दुरितार्णवः ।
हिंसैव नरकं घोरं हिंसैव गहन तमः ॥ —Ibid, Chap. 8, 18.
3. एयं खु नाणिणो सारं जं न हिंसइ किंचणं ।
अहिंसा समयं चैव एतावन्तं वियाणिया ॥ —Sūtrakṛ. 1.1.4.10.
4. जह मम न पियं दुक्खं जाणिय एमेव सब्ब जीवाणं
न हणई न हणावेई य सममणई तेण सो 'समणो' ॥
—Anuyoga., Upakramādhikāra.

living beings, great or small, want to live, none wants to die; therefore the nirgranthas totally abstain from violence.¹

The Jaina view of samatā is that no one is inferior or superior, everybody has the potentiality to develop himself and can achieve the highest goal. One's behaviour should be such that it does not retard the development of or injure the physical, mental, or intellectual vitality or 'prāṇas' of others. This is depicted in the daily prayer recited by the monks and householders, 'I have friendship with all and enmity with none'.¹ Understood in this broad sense, the principle of 'samatā' or 'ahiṃsā' solves all of the Jaina meta-physical, epistemological and ethical problems.

In Jaina scriptures, as has been seen, life of the individual as such is most respected, and equal favour is given to all. In the field of social ethics first of all a sympathetic attitude for all men in general is seen, the so-called caste system did not convince Mahāvīra, or his predecessor Pārśvanātha. They did not like that one class should dominate the other. Even in the order of Mahāvīra there were monks from the so-called 'śūdra' castes, and they were given the same honour and regard as was given to those from the so-called higher castes. This at the outset is the application of equality or 'samatā' to general behaviour of man towards man.

In the intellectual or the philosophical field too, Jainism propounds the theory of 'syādvāda' which means that every judgement is relative. This theory, in brief, expresses the view that every judgement reveals only one aspect of reality, and therefore every judgement is relative and subject to certain conditions. It is because one forgets this limitation and regards his own judgements as unconditionally true, that he

1. सव्वे जीवा वि इच्छन्ति जीविउं न मरिज्जिउं,
तम्हा पाणवहं घोरं निग्गंथा वज्जयन्ति णं । —Daśav. 6.11.
2. 'मिति मे सव्व भूएसु वैरं मज्झ न केणई'
—Āvaśyaka Sūtra, Śrā. Prati.

indulges in a number of quarrels and disagreements and thus hurts the feelings of those who have a different view of reality. Reality as depicted in 'anekāntavāda' has manifold aspects¹ and all the aspects of reality are not revealed to imperfect beings, so most of the judgements regarding reality given by various thinkers and systems of thought are limited and conditional, and, therefore, are only partial explanations of reality. The amendment made by Jainas is that that every judgement should be qualified by a term called 'syāt' meaning thereby relativity. This sympathetic attitude in intellectual field is rightly understood by Prof. A. B. Dhruva as 'intellectual non-violence.'

Another important field of philosophy to which Jainas have applied the principle of non-violence is the field of personal effort in the spiritual life of the person. This expresses itself in the theory of karman. This may at first appear as having no relationship with the doctrine of ahimsā, but a thorough study would reveal that it is only the theory of karman or personal effort (as gods etc.) that can be derived from non-violence or samatā, and no other theory such as eternalism, accidentalism, naturalism, etc., can be said to have originated from samatā or non-violence.

The theory of karman or personal effort expresses that a man is himself responsible for his own spiritual advancement, happiness or misery in this life or the next. The gods or the demons do not assist or hinder in building the fate of the individual. It is his own efforts or past deeds that make his life happy or miserable. The curses or boons from demons or gods or similar supernatural powers do not affect the spiritual advancement of the person except his own deeds called the karman, when these karman obstacles are removed by one's own effort lighter the soul becomes higher it reaches in the spiritual field (karmans according to Jainas are material substances covering the soul due to which it is in bondage).

1. अनन्तधर्मात्मिकं वस्तु । —Sāḍdarśanasamuccaya, 55.

These are thus the manifold aspects of the Jaina doctrines of which non-violence is the basis; moreover it is the root of all other vratas of the Jaina ethics. No other ritual or vrata like veracity, non-stealing or celibacy is meaningful if it is in contradiction with non-violence.¹

Before passing to the actual vrata (vow) of non-violence, it would be more systematic to deal with what violence actually is. For this purpose it is necessary to deal with the analytical classifications of violence. Analysis and classification is the speciality of the Jaina system which depicts the acuteness, accuracy and alertness of the Jaina thinkers in dealing with the fundamental concepts regarding their own conduct as well as of others. In one Jaina text *himsā* is classified into one hundred and eight types² which are further classified into four hundred and thirty two types.

To start with, *himsā* is classified according to various stages of committal of an act of violence. These stages are three; firstly, 'samrambha', i. e. intention to commit an act of violence, secondly, 'samārambha', the stage of preparation for committing an act of violence. Lastly, 'ārambha', the stage of actually committing a preplanned act of violence. Each of these three stages is divided into three types. These are : (i) to commit an act of violence oneself, (ii) to order somebody else to do it, and (iii) to appreciate or approve an act of violence done by someone else. Each of these nine types is further divided in accordance with the three instruments of mind, speech and body; these are twenty seven in all. These twenty seven varieties are sub-divided in accordance with the differences in the motives of the person; the motives are anger, conceit, crookedness and greed. In this way violence is divided

1. तपः श्रुतयमज्ञानध्यानदानादि कर्मणां ।

सत्यशीलव्रतादीनामहिंसा जननीमता ॥

—Jñānārṇava, 8.41.

2. Sarvārthasiddhi, 6.8.

in one hundred and eight types.¹ This classification is very clear and comprehensive, it enables a person to make a proper scrutiny of his own conduct, he can with such an analytical method make out distinctly his own defect or failing and that how far he himself is responsible in a particular act of violence which may sometimes be caused by external factors. But the classification is incomplete, since it does not refer to the degree of intensity of the passions. When the degrees of intensity of the motives are also taken into consideration, the types of violence amount to four hundred and thirty two. There are four degrees of intensity of motives.² The first stage of intensest passions of anger, conceit, crookedness and greed is called *anantānubandhī* (i. e. obstructions in the right attitude). The second stage of a little less intense motives is called *apratyākhyānī* (obstructions in the partial discipline of the householder), the third stage is still less intense and is called *pratyākhyānāvāraṇa* (obstructions in the complete discipline of the monks), and the last stage is the mildest of all called *saṃjvalana* (obstructions in attainment of liberation).

In the first stage of 'anantānubandhī' these motives (or anyone of them) are so overwhelming that a man loses his alertness altogether and he does not even possess the right attitude (or *samyaktva*) which is basic in spiritual enhancement. At the stage of 'apratyākhyānī' his motives are a little less intense but still he is not in a position to develop right conduct, in spite of the fact that he has acquired right attitude. At the third stage of 'pratyākhyānāvāraṇa' the passions are milder, and he adopts, though only partially, the right conduct which he lacks in the second stage, he adopts at this stage the partial vows of the laity. At the last stage of 'saṃjvalana' the passions are in the mildest form, which are fleeting and

1. संरम्भादित्रिकं योगैः कषायैर्व्यहितं क्रमात् ।

शतमष्टाधिकं ज्ञेयं हिंसा भेदैस्तु पिण्डितम् ॥

—Jñānārṇava, 1.8.10.

2. Sthān. 4.249; Paṇṇa. 14.

evanescent; they are compared to a line drawn in water which disappears at the very moment. This is the stage when the individual adopts the complete vows of the monk. But since the passions are still there, they obstruct the attainment of liberation; these four stages are the abridged form of the fourteen stages of spiritual development (guṇasthānas).

This classification which divides ahimsā into four hundred and thirty two types is an improvement upon the Pātañjala Yoga system because it also takes into account the first three stages of samrambha, samārambha and ārambha—the gradual process of starting an act of violence. However, as far as motives and intensity etc. are concerned the classification is comprehensive enough even in Pātañjala system.

This extensive classification pertains to the subjective aspect of an act of violence, i. e. from the point of view of the doer of an act of violence. It is not concerned with the object (i. e. one upon whom violence is inflicted or in other words one who is killed). In this field too, Jaina thinkers have gone reasonably deep. Another classification of violence which pertains to the object is also made in Jaina texts. Here violence is divided into one and eighty varieties.¹ It is pointed out that the living beings are of nine types, namely air, water, fire, earth and vegetables, two-sensed, three-sensed, four-sensed, and five-sensed living beings, killing of any one of these is an act of violence. Up to this point this classification refers to the object involved in an act of violence. However, the classification does not confine itself to the object only, it also throws light on the subject when in the next steps of the classification it makes a reference to the killing of any of these nine types of living beings through the three instruments of mind, speech and body, and in the three ways, i. e. either killing them oneself or by asking another one to kill or by appreciating and approving someone else who has

1. Dharmasaṃgrah, 2.25.

already killed or decided to kill. In this manner this classification regards violence as of one and eighty varieties.

‘Killing’ is an exhaustive term in the Jaina system that means depriving some one of any of its vitalities (prāṇa) which are ten in number.¹ Among these ten vitalities, five vitalities are of five senses, i. e. sense of sight, sense of hearing, sense of smell, sense of taste and sense of touch; out of the rest three vitalities are of mind, speech and body; and the last two vitalities are the vitality of breathing and the vitality of life. With reference to each one of these vitalities violence can be of ten types. Even these vitalities are subdivided into two types, viz. dravya and bhāva (physical and psychical). Thus violence can be of twenty types. This classification also refers both to the object (one who is killed) and to the subject (one who kills). All the living beings, however, do not possess all the vitalities, the possession of the vitalities depend upon the physical and spiritual growth of the individual, but a living being must possess some of these vitalities (at least four of them).² Here it needs to be made clear as to why speech and the body are independently added to the already enumerated five vitalities of senses which also include the tongue or the sense of taste and the sense of touch, which do not apparently differ from speech and the body. The reason is that the vitality of taste is actually different from the vitality of speech and the violence committed by taste is different from that done by speech. Similarly, the violence committed by the sense of touch is to be distinguished from that done by the body. Touch is a special faculty of the body. Sāṃkhya has clarified this point by making a two-fold division of jñānendriyas and karmendriyas. Nevertheless the discussion on the vitalities refers to the object (one who is killed). A critical analysis of the object is made in the Jaina texts in connection with violence, but the emphasis is laid on the subject (the doer) in the act of

1. Sthān. 1.48.

2. Four vitalities : vitalities of life, breathing, touch and body. —Pra. Sāro. 1066.

violence. The object (one who is killed) in making it a real act of violence is only secondarily important, the primary thing is the subject and his intention to commit an act of violence. Umāsvāti also is emphatic on the intention of the subject. He therefore defines violence as depriving of any of the vitalities of living beings out of inadvertence or *pramāda*.¹ The term 'pramāda' or inadvertence is of great significance and also a very comprehensive term, because it refers to all passions, attachment, intoxication, sleep or futile talks. According to Umāsvāti it is inadvertence which turns an apparently violent act into a real act of violence. Hence the importance of the element of subject in the act of violence.

With this clear and distinct concept of violence and its different types, the actual precept, technically named as 'pāñāivāyao Veramaṇam' meaning abstention from hurting the vitalities of any living being, can be discussed. Apparently, the term reveals only the negative aspect of non-violence, but that does not mean only a purely negative injunction meant for the monks or for the laity. The positive aspect of this precept can be significantly seen in various scriptures. Sympathy, love, pity, etc., are given then due place. The term used to signify this pity, sympathy for saving the lives of the living creatures, is called *abhayaḍāna*, i. e. giving the gifts of fearlessness to living creatures.² *Abhayaḍāna* not only means avoidance of giving fear to someone but also to free him from the fear of others.³ It is said at another place that the hurting of living beings is the hurting of one's own self, while feeling sympathy or pity for others is feeling sympathy or pity for one's ownself.⁴ Further in the same

1. प्रमत्तयोगात् प्राणव्यवरोपणं हिंसा । —Tattvā 7.13.
2. दाणाणं सेट्ठं अभयप्पयाणं.... —Sūtrakr. 1.6.23.
3. Saddharmamaṇḍanam—Javāhīracārya, p. 210.
4. जीव-वहो अप्पवहो, जीव दया अप्पदया ।
—Bhaktaparijñā, stanza 23.

text it is said, "Just as you yourself hate suffering, all living being, in the whole universe hate suffering, and therefore one should respect, love and sympathize with all the living beings."¹ Compassion, pity or sympathy is included in the five characteristic signs of the very right attitude (Samyak-darśana) which is 'anukampā.'² Various examples of this 'anukampā' can be cited from various sources which depict that it is not only abstention from violence but also the positive attitude of love or sympathy, which is to be regarded as equally moral and praiseworthy. Queen Dharani ate favourable food out of love and compassion for the child in the womb.³ Another very significant example of pity and compassion can be quoted which has been discussed in Jaina Purāṇa literature. There is a story about the previous birth of the sixteenth Tīrthānkara Śāntinātha when he was King Megharatha.⁴ Once he was sitting in an assembly, all of a sudden a pigeon came trembling with fear and sat in his lap. In the meantime an eagle arrived and asked the king to return him his pigeon which was supposed to be his food; the king said, "The pigeon has taken refuge in me and I am supposed to defend him." The eagle flared up and said, "I am dying of hunger and you are depriving me of my food, do not you know that this is immoral?" The king kept quiet for a moment; on the one hand there was a question of

1. जई ते न पियं दुक्खं जाणिय एमेव सव्व जीवाण ।
सव्वायरमुवउत्तो, अत्तोवमेण कुणसु दयं ।

—Ibid, Stanza 90.

2. Five stages of Samyaktva : Sama, Samvega, Nirveda, Anukampā and Āstha. —Dharmasaṃgraha, chap. 1.
3. तयेणं साधारणीदेवी तं सि अकाल दोहलंसि....गब्भस्स अणुकम्पणट्ठयाए जयं चिट्ठई जयं आसई जयं सुवई आहारं पियणंगब्भं सुहं सुहेने वहति । — Jñātā., chap. 1.
4. Purāṇasārasaṃgraha—Damanandi, Śāntināthacarita, chap. 5.

saving the life of a bird, and on the other, there was the question of food for another. Then what he finally decided is an example of extreme compassion. He asked the eagle to cut some portion of his own body and thus satisfy his appetite. What happened afterwards is irrelevant, nothing could materialize, because all that was done by some gods to test the king's love and compassion for the living beings. Interestingly enough, the story with a slight difference is found in the Mahābhārata and also in the Buddhist literature. This evidently suggests that in Jainism there is proper room for love and compassion—the positive aspect of non-violence for saving the living beings.

The Mahāvratā

In one of the twofold system of Jaina ethics, meant for monks and nuns, the vow of non-violence is technically called as 'sabbāo pāṇāivāyāo veramaṇaṃ' which means complete observance of the precept of non-violence; in negative terms it is complete (sabbāo) abstention (veramaṇaṃ) from violence of all types (major or minor). The monks and nuns, since they stand on a higher spiritual platform, can commit no act of violence, mild, moderate or intense, under any circumstances. They are supposed to observe this vow through mind, speech and body and not to kill with ill intentions, purposely or inadvertently any of the ten vitalities of a living being, movable or immovable (trasa or sthāvara), and even of an invisible (sūkṣma) living being, not to speak of a visible (bādara) living being. They observe the vow themselves. They should not ask anybody else to commit the slightest act of violence; nor do they approve or appreciate such an act of violence committed by some one else.¹ This in brief is des-

1. पद्धमे भंते ! मह्व्वए पाणाइवायाओ वेरमणं । सव्वं भंते । पाणाइवायं पच्चक्खामि । से सुद्धमं वा बायरं वा तसं वा थावरं वा, नेव संय पाणे अइवाइज्जा, नेवण्णेहि पाणे अइवायाविज्जा पाणे अईवायंते वि अण्णे न समणुजाणामि । जावज्जीवाए तिविहं तिविहेणं मणेणं, वायाए, काएणं न करेमि, न कारवेमि करंतं पि अन्नं न समणुजाणामि । तस्स भंते.... मह्व्वए उवट्ठिओमि सव्वाओ पाणाइवायाओ वेरमणं । —Daśav. 4.1.

cribed as the vow of non-violence of the monks. They abstain from violence through the three instruments (yoga) of mind, speech and body and three ways of performance (karaṇas). It is therefore said that in the mahāvratā of the monks the principle of samatā culminates.¹

The vow of the monks theoretically announces complete abstention from all types of violence; therefore, whenever in practice the vow is not fulfilled in complete rigidity, the Jaina monks and nuns while reciting the daily prayers in mornings and evenings acknowledge the sins or pollutions committed by them out of negligence. However, this acknowledgement of pollutions in reciting the pratikramaṇa sūtra is sufficient only for ordinary or minor pollutions but not for major transgressions.

This daily prayer is called 'pratikramaṇa', the special text which the monks recite twice a day, and acknowledge the pollution of the vow of non-violence committed by them in the whole day or night (by 'pollution' is meant committing of any type of violence which is already enumerated as of eighty-one types).

The Five Bhāvanās

The Jaina scriptures also discuss the five bhāvanās or the helping devices the monk should have for the perfect maintenance of the vow of complete non-violence. These bhāvanās are not peculiar to the vow of non-violence only, but as shall be seen subsequently, a group of five bhāvanās is meant for each of the other four vows. These bhāvanās are auxiliary to the

1. निम्ममो निरहंकारो, निस्संगो चत्तगारवो;
समो य सव्वभूएणु, तसेसु थावरेसु य ।
लाभालाभे सुहे दुक्खे, जीविय मरणे तहा ।
समो निंदापसंसासु तहा माणावमाणओ ।
अणिस्सिओ इहं लोए, परलोए अणिस्सिओ ।
वासीचंदणकप्पो य, असणे अणसणे तहा ।

—Uttarā. 19.89, 90, 92.

main vows, they can therefore be called the helping devices. These are : (1) iryāsamiti, (2) manogupti, (3) vacanagupti, (4) ādānanikṣepanāsamiti and (5) ālokitapānabhojan.¹

(1) Īriyāsamiti means that the monk or nun should be careful about his sense of sight, because by being negligent to sight, there are chances of the killing of smaller or larger living being. (2) By manogupti is meant that the monk should be careful and be able to control his mind, because uncontrolled mind can prove disastrous at any time. (3) Vacanagupti means the carefulness of the monk about his way of speech; one is fully responsible for violence committed by harsh and frivolous talks and hurting others through one's speech. (4) Ādānanikṣepanāsamiti means a careful handling and use of the begging bowls and other articles. Lastly, (5) ālokitapānabhojana means that the meals etc. should be taken by the monks in proper light where he can see the small insects or other small creatures, which may suddenly fall or drop in the food obtained by him in his begging rounds, because of darkness. These five helping devices are thus meant for the well maintenance and preservation of the vow of non-violence of the monks.

So far, the vow of the monk presents only the negative side of non-violence, i.e. abstention from violence. But a fuller picture of the vow does not imply pure abstention or mere negation only. Though in the sense of liberated state it may mean so, yet the stage of acceptance of the vow by the monks is not identical with the state of liberation or mokṣa and his vow cannot simply mean pure negation. Acceptance of positive aspect of non-violence, therefore, in the manifestation of love, sympathy, pity, compassion, etc., in the vow of the monk, is adequately seen and furnishes an important part of the monk's non-violent life. Certain examples of the monk's positive side of non-violence are, therefore, needed to be quoted here.

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1. 'ईरिआसमिई, मणगुत्ती, वयगुत्ती, आलोयभायणभोयणं आदाण भंडमत्त-
निक्खेवणा समिई' । —Samavāy. 25.

It is said that a monk should try to save himself and others¹ by swimming through the river if faced with such a circumstance, though with extreme cautiousness so that he involves in the least violence. A detailed description of swimming method is given at another place which reveals how cautious a monk should be in doing so.² He is permitted to swim under such circumstances, though under ordinary circumstances he would not even touch a drop of fresh cold water.

It is further said that to save animals and birds from being killed by a hunter the monk should try to dissuade him from hunting by showing him the light of dharma or righteousness.³ Not only this even Mahāvīra saved Gosāla (positively) by directly using his supernatural power of extreme coldness and equanimity called 'Śītalśeṣyā' when the latter was attacked by some one by what is called 'Tejoleśyā' or the supernatural power of heat used in anger.⁴

Exceptions

This study of monk's precept both as positive and negative leads to another important issue of utsarga and apavāda regarding the monk's vow. The vow in general declares that the monk does not indulge in any violence himself, nor does he persuade others, nor does he appreciate such a violence. This is 'utsarga' (general) in its proper form, or the principle adopted by him in ordinary conditions. But the strictest principle of the monk does make allowance for certain excep-

1. Sthān. 5.2

2. Ācār. 2.122

3. जइणं देवाणुप्पिया ! पएसिस्स रण्णो धम्मभाइक्खेज्जा बहु गुणतरं खलु होज्जा, पएसिस्स रण्णो तेसिं च बहुणं दुप्पयच्चउप्पय मियपसुपक्खीसरीसवाणं । —Rājaprasn.; Saddharmamaṇḍanam—Javāhirācārya, p. 283.

4. Bhag. 14; Saddharmamaṇḍanam —Javāhirācārya, p. 284.

tions or some digressions from normal course of conduct in exceptional circumstances; the basis for this digression may lie in any of the two things; either in the positive counterpart, i. e. love, compassion, pity, etc., or in the protection of the monastic discipline. This is called the 'apavāda'.¹ This does not mean a transgression of the vow and thus no atonement (or *prāyaścitta*) is required for it.² Ācāryā Haribhadra says that the code of conduct which is adopted in favourable conditions is called 'utsarga' and the code of conduct adopted under unfavourable or exceptional circumstances with regard to the vow is called 'apavāda'.³ The general or 'utsarga' is abstention in the negative sense whereas exception or *apavāda* is apparent violation of the vow, but the violation is only for a good cause; smaller violence is committed just to avoid greater violence; therefore, it is not the real violation of the vow. It is interesting to take a peep into the cases of 'apavāda' which are elaborately discussed in various Jaina sources. For example, it is said, if a nun is drowning, a monk can plunge into the river and can save the drowning nun.⁴ Here, apparently, the monk commits a twofold offence; firstly, he is not supposed to touch a woman (which is not permitted in the fourth *mahāvratā* of celibacy); secondly, he is not even supposed to touch the fresh cold water (because immovable living beings of water are killed by doing so), but both of them are minor offences as compared

1. उज्जयसग्गुस्सग्गो, अववाओ तस्स चवे पडिवक्खो
उस्सग्गा विनिवतियं धरेई सालंबमववाओ ।

—Bṛh. Kalp. bhā. 319.

2. सब्वत्थ संजमं संजमाउ अप्पाणमेव रत्थिज्जा
मुच्चइ अइवायाओ पुणो विसोही न याविरई ।

—Ogha. 46.

3. दग्गादिएहिं जुत्तस्सुस्सग्गो जदुच्चियं अपुट्ठाण
रहियस्स तमववाओ उच्चियं चियरस्स न उ तस्स ।

—Upadeśapada, 784.

4. Sthān. 5.2.

with the duty of saving the life of the nun, which is rooted in the positive aspect of non-violence.

It is also posited at another place that a monk can eat a fresh mango fruit, which is prohibited under ordinary circumstances, if it helps in the cure of disease, or at the time when he is starving. Under such conditions it is said that the vow of non-violence is not violated.¹

Many more examples of exceptions with regard to the vow of non-violence can be cited, which can show that stringent rules of the Jaina monks could have been elastic as well, if a real situation demanded that. However, undue resort to these exceptions is not regarded as desirable, for it may create laxity and laziness among the monks; nor is overrigidity in rules to the extent of accepting death than resorting to the exceptions is rational and acceptable in the Jaina monastic code of conduct. "What is needed is the relative evaluation of the circumstances under which one happens to be, and the clearcut understanding of the acceptance or non-acceptance of exceptions to a general rule."² Actually, the helping device of manogupti should be the most important means to impose a check upon oneself.

Transgressions, Atonements and punishments

So far the discussion pertained to the general precept of monks' non-violence or 'non-violence as it should be.' The following discussion will deal with the impurities or deviations in the monk's vow of non-violence. Before directly dealing with the transgressions of the vow as such it is

1. वित्तिपदमणप्पज्जे, भुंजे अविकोविए व अप्पज्जे;
जाणंते वा वि पुणो, गिलाण अद्धान ओमे वा ।
खित्तादिगो अणप्पज्जो वा भुंजति, सेहो अविकोवियत्तणओ अजाणंतो
रोगोवसमण्णित्तं वेज्जुवदेसितो गिलाणो वा भुंजे अद्धानोमेसु व असंथं-
रंता भुंजंता विसुद्धा । —Nisītha Bhā. 15.4695
2. Jaina Monastic Jurisprudence—S. B. Deo, p. 15.

important to discuss here the main atonements (*prāyaścittas*) for all major and minor transgressions committed by monks, as available in the Jaina canonical literature. The texts of the Jaina canon give the following ten *prāyaścittas*¹ for all transgressions. These atonements are kept in the ascending order. They begin with the simplest atonement for committing a very mild transgression and proceed to the severer and severer atonements for the graver and graver transgressions. These are as follows :

(1) *Ālocanā*—It is reporting of the transgression to the teacher. Such a confession leads to mental purity of the transgressor, as it also gives him mental courage of confession, which is a great virtue by itself.

(2) *Pratikramaṇa*—condemnation of the transgression committed.

(3) *Tadubhaya*—confession together with condemnation.

(4) *Viveka*—giving up of transgressions like impure food etc.

(5) *Vyutsarga*—practising *kāyotsarga* (temporary renunciation of body).

(6) *Tapas*—penance in the form of fasting or taking a particular kind of food.

(7) *Cheda*—shortening the period of ordination or seniority in the Saṃgha.

(8) *Mūla-mahāvratāropaṇa*—reconsecration. When on account of violation of the earlier accepted mahāvratas, they are accepted *de-novo*—that is called *Mūla-mahāvratāropaṇa*.

(9) *Anvasthāpya*—temporary expulsion.

(10) *Pārāñcika*—complete expulsion.

In the *Tattvārtha Umāsvāti*² has eliminated the last atonement. He recognises only the first nine. In the *Digambara*

1. Sthān. 10.3.355.

2. आलोचनप्रतिक्रमणतदुभयविवेकव्युत्सर्गतपश्छेद पारिहारोपस्थापनानि ।

—Tattvā. 9 22.

texts also this list of atonements is available but with slight differences in the last two. The ninth *prāyaścitta* is called there as 'parihāra' as in the *Tattvārtha*, and the last one is *Saddhāna*.¹

This list of atonements shows that the Jaina code of conduct lays utmost emphasis on mental purity and courage of the monks to admit the faults and on their further effort to abstain from them completely or at least to minimise them. The first four out of ten emphasise only the mental purity and confession of the fault. Whatever be the reason for the committal of the transgression, the basic ingredient for its atonement is the monk's mental purity, confession and courage, whether it is committed deliberately or otherwise, out of pride or carelessness, fear or hatred, he truly endeavours to report it to his elder and has the courage to admit it.

The next two *prāyaścittas*, i. e. *vyutsarga* and *tapas*, though primarily stress the mental purity, mean self assigned physical atonement and development of the practice of mental concentration and control over physical movements.

The last four *prāyaścittas*, i. e. *cheda*, *mūla mahāvratā-ropana*, *anavasthāpya* and *pārāñcika*, are major ones. They are more of the nature of punishments than mere atonements; and in this sense they are very significant. The details of these *prāyaścittas* are not available in the texts of the 'Aṅgas' (the basic Jaina canonicals), though in Buddhism they are available in the main *Vinaya* texts; some of them, however, as for example 'anavasthāpya' and 'pārāñcika', are just hinted at. But the information given is not complete; because they do not give the actual process of bringing them into application. The details regarding these *prāyaścittas* are available only in the *Chedasūtras*, where the reader is abundantly informed about the actual processes of implementation of these *prāyaścittas*.

1. *Mulā*. 5.165.

With this brief sketch of the various atonements discussion on the actual transgression of the vow of non-violence follows. The term 'transgression' is technically called 'aticāra' which simply means transgressions of the limits. But in Jaina terminology it has also got a special connotation. According to Jaina thinkers, transgression takes place in four different stages, viz. 'atikrama', 'vyatikrama', 'aticāra' and 'anācāra'.¹ By 'atikrama' is meant arousal of an intention to transgress the vow; by 'vyatikrama' is meant a keen desire or preparedness to transgress the vow. Aticāra means complete preparation for transgression and an actualized partial transgression. The last stage of anācāra means complete transgression, i. e. fullest materialization of the intention to commit the transgression. Here, it is to be borne in mind that these prāyaścittas do not restrict themselves to transgressions understood in the sense of aticāras only. They pertain to all transgressions and offences ranging from the mildest atikrama to the severest anācāra. The punishment however is inflicted upon the monk according to the severity of the transgression or offence committed by him. Besides, the severity of punishment also depends upon the position held by the transgressor—a monk in the saṃgha, for example an Ācārya would be liable to a severer punishment than an ordinary monk for the same offence committed by both of them. The details of all these transgressions and their corresponding punishments are preserved in the Chedasūtras, specially in Bṛhatkalpa and Niśītha.

A few instances of such transgressions are quoted below : A monk who indulges in transgressions, pertaining to small living beings or insects, or walks over wet ground or green grass or wet mud, or crosses knee-deep water for purposes not allowed by law, or crosses the river in a boat, is to perform a punishment,² the fifth atonement (prāyaścitta) in the list of

1. Jaina Siddhānta Bola Saṃgrah, part I, p. 222; Piṇḍa; Dharma Saṃgraha, Book 3.
2. Jaina Monastic Jurisprudence—S. B. Deo, p. 62.

ten. Then it is said one who sits and sleeps over a place which is full of living beings is given cheda punishment.¹

The severest offences with regard to this vow are, for example, striking somebody with the fist, for which the monk is to undergo anavasthāpya atonement,² and a 'crime' for which the 'pārāñcika' puishment is³ inflicted and the monk is excommunicated (the 'crime' however is an ambiguous term but it means violence of major kind).

This account, thus, throws some light on the stringent discipline (which could be related in really necessary conditions) of the Jaina monk both as an individual and as a member of the saṃgha and also on the social stratum to which he belongs.

Ahiṃsāṇuvrata

The conception of 'aṇuvrata' (or the smaller vow) of the Jaina's befits the common men or the householders. This conception of 'aṇuvrata' of Jainism saves it from the charge that it is purely an ascetic system meant only for monks and nuns. Ahiṃsāṇuvrata is meant for laymen, it makes an allowance for the mild violence unavoidable in the household life. It is in fact a path of less violence or partial non-violence, and is technically called as 'thūlāopāñāivāyāo veramaṇam'.⁴ By 'thūlāo' is meant here major violence and 'sabbāo' means all types of violence. The householder's vow stresses abstinence from major types of violence. The householder clearly enunciates that he abstains from injury to non-offensive two-sensed, three-sensed, four-sensed, and five-sensed movable beings for the whole life. The intentional killing or hurting

1. Ibid., p. 65.

2. Kalp. 4.3.

3. Ibid. 4.2.

4. पढमं अणुव्वयं थूलओ पाणाईवायाओ वेरमणं, तस जीवे बेइदिय तेइदिय चउरिदिय पंचइदिय संकप्पो हणण हणावण पच्चक्खाइ....

—Upāsaka. 1.13; Śrā. Prati. 1.

of such living beings is actually denounced in the precept; unintentional injury to these living beings and the killing of offensive creatures when they prove offensive either to himself or to someone related to him is also not a violation of the vow.¹ The difference between the *ahiṃsāmāhāvratā* and *ahiṃsāṇuvratā* thus lies in the fact that the monk abstains from injury even to one-sensed *sthāvara* living beings, while the householder does not, because he cannot. Further, it is pronounced that the householder abstains from intentional killing himself and does not order any body else to commit such a violence either through mind or speech or through body.² Here again on the practical considerations, one more allowance is made as compared with the vow of the monk, that is he is not expected to abstain from the appreciation (or *anumodana*) of any violence committed by someone else, though the avoidance of it is always good. This is the *Śvetāmbara* version of the vow of the laity, the *Digambara* version of the vow is not much different. The *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvaka-cāra* says, "Refraining from injuring living beings having two or more senses with deliberate act of mind, speech and body in any of the three ways *kr̥ta*, *kārita* and *manonata* is called *ahiṃsāṇuvratā*."³ The *Digambaras*, it depicts, also denounce appreciation of any major violence. Though the relaxations in the *āṇuvratā* as compared with *mahāvratā* are admittedly acts of violence, they are allowed to make life practically possible and easier. This means that urgent necessity is the basis of violence even for the laity and when they cross these said limits, they are said to have transgressed the vow of non-violence. And these

1. स सरीरं स विसेस पीडाकारिणो स सम्बन्धी स विसेस पीडाकारिणो वा वज्जिऊणं, जावज्जीवाए ।
—*Śrā. Prati.*, *Śrāvaka Sūtra* 1.
2. दुविहं तिविहेणं न करेमि न कार्वेमि मणसा वयसा कायसा ।
—*Upāsaka*. 1. 13; *Śrā. Prati*. 1.
3. संकल्पात्कृतकारितमननाद्योगत्रयस्य चरसत्त्वान्,
न हिनस्ति यत्तदाहुः स्थूलवधाद्विरमणं निपुणाः ।
—*Ratnak. Śrā* 53.

transgressions committed deliberately or negligently are to be acknowledged by them while reciting the Śrāvaka-Pratikramaṇasūtra (just as there is the Pratikramaṇasūtra meant for the monks there is also Pratikramaṇasūtra meant for the laity) which they are supposed to recite daily or fortnightly, or at least once a year on the 'samvatsari day' to be held in the month of Bhādrapada. This is the most sacred day of the Jains. If some one does not recite the Pratikramaṇasūtra on this day and does not acknowledge all the transgressions committed by him throughout the year, he does not deserve to be called a śrāvaka. Interestingly enough, in the religion of Parsis a similar acknowledgement of sins is found, though in contents it is somewhat different. Khoradeha Avesta does contain such analogies. The Parsis also acknowledge their offences and repent for them as they say, "I repent for the offence I have committed with the metal or sub-metal, with the earth, or with the water etc...." This prayer of repentance is called 'Patet Erani'.¹ Pollutions are interpreted there as the misuse of any living being or any object.

However, in the Śrāvaka Pratikramaṇasūtra five types of faults are mentioned for each of the five vows of the laity. About ahimsāṇuvrata five faults are discussed which are also given the same nomenclature of 'aticāras'. What an aticāra generally and specially means in Jaina terminology has been already discussed, but the difference to be marked here is that in the Śrāvaka Pratikramaṇasūtra 'aticāra' has been used in its special sense, i. e. the third stage of transgression, not in its general sense of crossing certain limits. The five types of transgressions discussed with regard to each of the vows are of a moderate kind, i. e. they do not indicate complete violation of the vow of the laity which is indicated by 'anācāra'. They are just worth knowing and not worth practising.²

1. The Teachings of Zoraster and the Parasi Religion—
S. A. Kapadia, p. 43.

2. एयस्स थूलग पाणाइवायाओ बेरमणस्स समणोवासेणं पंच अइयारा
जाणियव्वा न समायरियव्वा । —Upāsaka. 1.41.; Śrā. Prati.

The Five Aticāras

These five transgressions are : (1) bandha, (2) vadha, (3) chaviccheda, (4) atibhāra, (5) bhaktapāṇaviccheda.¹ By bandha is meant binding the animals such as cows, buffaloes or even slaves with rope or with some such thing. (2) Vadha does not refer to actual killing as is usually understood. It refers to heavy punishments given by too much beating or heavy corporal punishments, actual killing would amount to an anācāra and would no longer remain an aticāra. What actually will be the position of a householder in the saṃgha who has committed an anācāra ? What type of punishment should be inflicted upon him etc. ? These questions, in so far as they concern the householders, have not been clearly discussed in the Jaina texts, but in so far as they concern the monks, they have been clearly discussed. For committing a complete transgression the monk is accused of pārāṅcika, as has been already discussed, but nothing has been clearly mentioned about the position of the laity in the Jaina texts. (3) Chaviccheda means piercing any of the limbs of the animals or of men or women, but surgery done on the patient's body by the doctor does not come in this category at all, because the doctor has a good motive. However, such an act when it is purposeless does no longer remain an aticāra but changes into an anācāra. (4) Atibhāra means overloading of animals or of the labourers for personal benefit. (5) Bhaktapāṇaviccheda means depriving the living beings of food and water and thus trying with ill intentions to make them starve, but depriving a patient of those things which are harmful to him cannot be categorized in this aticāra. The Digambara set of these five types of aticāras is discussed with almost negligible difference of terminology. According to the Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvākācāra, "Piercing, binding, causing pain, overloading and

1. तं जहा बन्धे, वहे, छविच्छेए, अइभारे, भत्तपण वोच्छेए । —Ibid.

starving or not feeding at proper times are the five offences appertaining to the vow of ahimsāṇuvrata.”¹

As has been already said, these offences are worth knowing but not worth practising, so the layman who wishes to observe ahimsāṇuvrata should avoid them; if at certain times he could not avoid them, he should acknowledge them and say a word of repentance called “micchāmi dukkaṃ” (I am giving up this false self). This atonement is just of the second type of atonement, out of the ten, which includes in itself some other categories of prāyaścittas as kāyotsarga, or temporary renunciation of the body etc. This indicates that according to Jaina canons a householder should always remain alert for the development of right conduct and should not be negligent.

The vow of the laity therefore does have the qualities of a practicable principle and in this sense it is neither too rigid nor too lenient. What in fact matters is the carefulness and alertness on the part of the householder in doing any act in his daily life. It does not mean a narrow attitude to life in general; for example, war is usually considered a prominent example of violence, and also it is correct to some extent, but even in that, the Jaina texts point out that what matters really is the cause of fighting. The Jaina Purāṇas are full of the examples of wars, and they proclaim that many good householders who accepted the āṇuvratas participated in these wars, but they all fought for the right cause.² Whether the living being survives or dies is not much significant, it is his activity with carefulness and right attitude which matters.³

1. छेदनबन्धनपीडनमति भारारोपणं व्यतीचाराः,
आहारवारणापि च स्थूलवघाद्व्युपरते पञ्च । —Ratnak. Śrā. 54.
2. सम्यग्दर्शन-सम्पन्नः शूरः कश्चिदणुव्रती,
पृष्ठतो वीक्ष्यते पत्न्या पुरस्त्रिदशकन्यया ।
Purāṇasārasaṅgraha—Damanandi.
3. मरद व जियदु व जीवो अयदाचारस्से णिच्छिदाहिंसा
पयोदस्स नत्थि बन्वो हिंसा मेत्तेण समिदस्स । —Pravacanasāra.

Non-violence in Buddhism

In the Buddhist ethics non-violence or *pānātipātaveramaṇi* tops the list of *Pañcaśīlas* that are called *gahatṭhasīlas* (those meant for the householders) and *dasasīlas* or *sikkhāpadas* that are called *bhikkhusīlas* by *Buddhaghosa* (those meant for the monks and nuns). The importance of *ahiṃsā*, needless to say, is significantly emphasized in the Buddhist scriptures. So far as the theoretical presentation is concerned, one would hardly be able to apprehend any difference in Jainism and Buddhism, because they have the same approach to the burning problems of life and also they revolted against one and the same trend. But in practice, the difference becomes apparent because the Buddhists were moderate in practical conduct while the Jains were stringent. *Dhammapada* proclaims that only those attain happiness after death¹ or achieve the ultimate end of *Nibbāna* who have established themselves in non-violence.²

The basis of non-violence, though not very explicitly stated in the Buddhist scriptures as such, is something very much akin to the Jaina ideal of 'samatā', i. e. treating all creatures lower or higher as equals which is obvious from the very term 'samaṇa' in Pāli. In Pāli sources, it is said, "Every creature is afraid of punishment, death is the most formidable thing for every living being. Taking oneself as personally involved in the death of another creature, one should himself abstain from killing or pounding badly any living creature, nor should he inspire others for doing so."³ On this basis it

1. सुखकामानि भूतानि यो दण्डेन न हिंसति,
उतनो सुखमेसानो पेच्च सो लभते सुखं । —Dhammapada, 132.
2. अहिंसका ये मुनयो निच्चं कायेन संवुत्ता,
ते यन्ति अच्चुतं ठानं यत्थ गन्त्वा न सोचरे । —Ibid. 225.
3. सब्बे तसन्ति दण्डस्स सब्बे भायन्ति मच्चुनो ।
अत्तानं उपमं कत्वा न हनेय्य न घातये । —Ibid. 129.

is said again, "If you desire to do something pleasing to me, and then desist from hunting for ever, the poor beasts of the forest, being dull of intellect, are worthy of pity for this very reason."¹ Not only in Buddhism but in all the Indian religions man is regarded as solely akin to animals (though man is highly evolved). Therefore compassion to animals is equally necessary. On the other hand, Christianity regards man as the centre of creation as being set apart from all other creations as God's special favourite for whose sake everything else was brought into existence. This laid the foundation for placing the animals outside those on whom sympathy can be bestowed. Buddhism on the other hand promulgates, "Let him not destroy or cause to be destroyed any life at all or sanction the acts of those, who do so. Let him refrain even from hurting any creature, both those that are strong and those that tremble in the world."²

These are the few extracts which tend to show the importance of non-violence, which is based on equality of all creatures in Buddhism, not in the sense of mere abstinence from injury but also in the sense of feeling of love for all living creatures small or large. "Not only do we find in Buddhism the concept of *ahimsā* as a mere negative or abortive principle indicating the avoidance of the vain destruction of animal life but it also regards that it is the duty of every Buddhist to care for the well-being of all animals."³

In the feeling of love, as has been maintained earlier, lies the positive aspect of non-violence. The reasons for this negative nomenclature have already been shown and the same holds good in Buddhism also. A purely negative precept

1. अस्मत्प्रियं चाभिसमीक्षमाणैर्हिंसा भवद्भिर्विषवद्विवर्ज्या ।
—Jātakamāla, Maitribala Jātaka, 60.
2. पाणं न हाणे न च घातये, न चानुजञ्जा हनन्तं परेसं ।
सब्बेसु भूतेसु निघाय दण्डं ये थावरा ये च तसन्ति लोके ।
—S. N. Dhammikasutta, 19.
3. Essence of Buddhism : P. L. Narasu, p. 52.

is only one-sided and partial, its positive counterpart is natural and necessary. Moral values originate from the very psychological make-up in which a predominant place is occupied by 'love'.

The feeling of love designated by various names such as compassion, friendliness (*karuṇā* or *metta*) has been given special favour in Buddhism. The Middle-path theory of Buddhism in this sense has made a more realistic approach to life. For those who are in distress, as the first noble truth points out, compassion is needed to be cultivated. Thus the positive aspect of non-violence in terms of compassion, sympathy, friendliness occurs in a very high degree in Buddhism, even more specially in the Mahāyāna sect. Though in Jainism too, as has already been shown, the positive aspect is seen quite frequently, but its trend towards a little more rigorous asceticism, in a way, deterred it from adopting the positive aspect to the same extent as adopted in Mahāyāna Buddhism, where it has remained not only an ethical principle, but also the basis of even philosophical conceptions, and where the concept of *karuṇā* or 'mahākaruṇā' surpasses all other philosophical or ethical principles. It is regarded as essential not only for those who are in bondage but also for those who are liberated. It is held that Bodhisattva would not consider himself free and satisfied so long as a single soul remains in bondage. It is said that he would preach his doctrine or 'dhamma' again and again to all those who are still in bondage, only out of compassion for them. "Long after Buddha had passed away, in the theological evolutions of Mahāyānism, the conceptions namely of Mañjuśrī and Avalokiteśvara—wisdom and compassion, were personified. And Metteya or Maitreya—the future Buddha has been conceived as one who will revive the spirit of loving kindness among men."¹ Not only in Mahāyāna sect where it reaches its climax, the positive aspect of non-violence can be clearly seen even in the Theravāda.

1. E. R. E., vol. 8, p. 160.

Aśoka also emphasized not only non-injury to life of human beings or animals but also direct loving humanity and other lower creations. The Sacred Edict of Aśoka says, "Every where in the dominions of His Majesty King Priyadarśin and likewise in the neighbouring realms.....every where on behalf of His Majesty King Priyadarśin have two kinds of hospitals been established, hospitals for the men and hospitals for the beasts, healing herbs, medicinal for men, and medicinal for the beasts, wherever they have imported and planted. On the roads trees have been planted and wells have been dug for the use of men and the beasts."¹

Certain examples can be quoted from various Buddhist scriptures, which tend to show the place occupied by the positive side of non-violence. It is said, "Suffuse the the world with friendliness, let all creatures both strong and weak see nothing that will bode them harm and they will learn the way of peace."² It is further said "if a man lives a hundred years and engages the whole of his life and attention in religious offerings to gods sacrificing elephants and horses and other thing, all this is not equal to one act of love in saving life."³ The typical form of intense and self-srruendering devotion is that of mother's love, just as the type of overwhelming sorrow is that of a bereaved mother. It is emphasized that such a type of love and compassion should be developed with a boundless heart and mind for all the creatures of the world, great or small, upward and downward, and thus one should try to disentangle oneself from ill-will and enmity.⁴ Goodwill and friendliness (avyāpāda., adosa

1. 2nd of the Fourteen Rock Edicts of Aśoka.

2. सब्बे सत्ता सब्बे पाणा सब्बे भूता च केवला ।

सब्बे भद्रानि पस्सन्तु मा किञ्चि पापमागमा ।

— Culla. p. 198.

3. Chinese Dhammapada, as quoted by P. L. Narasu
—Essence of Buddhism, p. 51.

4. मातायथा नियं पुत्तं आयुसा एकपुत्तमनुरक्खे
एवम्पि सब्बभूतेसु मानसं भावये अपरिमाणं

or metta) express even more than the word love, the expanded sentiment of amity to all living things,¹ which the average man cherishes only for a personal friend or comrade. The term 'amity' seems to be the substitute for Jaina 'equality' "the cultivation of amity (caritas), pity, sympathetic gladness, and equanimity formed a sort of sublimated or higher sīla or code of moral."² And as Majjhima Nikāya points out, this higher sīla or code of morals, (the essence of which is that the rays of our loving and sympathizing thought would spread all over the world), is far-reaching, and so beyond measure.³

The positive side of non-violence is the practice of four 'brahmavihāras' which in fact is nothing but the psychological analysis of non-violence (this starts with the positive and ends up with the negative). "The first three of them forming a development of that 'vibrating towards' or compassion which is so essential an attitude in Buddhist ethics.....It would be hard to find in ancient literature any exordium so aglow with good will towards men as that of the so-called Brahmavihāras, i. e. Best disposition."⁴ These brahmavihāras are four in number; in other words 'ahimsā' can be divided into four types, viz. metta, karuṇā, muditā and uppekkā. These are the four different mental stages constituting the best purificatory devices for one's ownself.

Buddhaghosa has discussed these 'brahmavihāras' among the forty kammaṭṭhānas or the objects of samādhi or concentration, in his second part of Visuddhimagga. In these-

मेत्तञ्च सब्बलोकस्मि मानसं भावये अपरिमाणं

उद्धं अधो च तिरियं च असम्बाधं अवेरं असपत्तं ॥

—Khu. Pāṭha, mettāsutta, 7,8.

1. E. R. E., vol. 8, p. 161.
2. Ibid.
3. Majjhima, vol. I, p. 170.
4. E. R. E., vol. 4, p. 161.

kammaṭṭhānas ten asubhas etc. are ranked first, and four brahmavihāras are put in this list later, when the adept (one who establishes in samādhi) has already acquired some power of concentration. In this sense it is correct to a very great extent that such abstract objects like friendliness (metta), compassion (karuṇā) etc. are the objects of concentration only when the adept is highly capable of meditation or samādhi, because in the beginning the adept needs some concrete objects like kaṣiṇas (such as water, earth, etc.), to fix his mind. From this the conclusion can be drawn that metta, karuṇā, etc., are the stages of samādhi which comes next to śīla or morality. But actually this is not so; the very observance of the moral precepts indicates a person's mental modifications of metta, karuṇā, etc. As has already been hinted, these moral precepts are not externally imposed, they are not commandments given by the Buddha and therefore the observance of them only indicates one's own inclination towards what is good. Love, non-enmity and compassion induce observance of moral precepts, specially non-violence. They should, therefore, be called the psychological framework of the moral precept of non-violence.

For a clearer picture of these 'brahmavihāras' a little discussion is required as to what they actually are and what they are not. Metta is friendliness in the positive and (adosa) non-enmity in the negative terms. It simply means directing love towards all living creatures. It helps one's own self because it minimises (adosa) hatred, it helps others on whom it is bestowed because he gets something what he lacks. But metta or friendliness is not rooted in rāga or attachment, which is not a help but a hindrance for the proper upliftment. Rāga too has similar characteristic signs in appearance but it lacks the right knowledge (sammādiṭṭhi).

Karuṇā is aroused by seeing someone in distress. It means the identification of the person with him who is in distress. It is the softening of the heart. The desire for violence auto-

matically subsides in this stage, but here too a careful check should be imposed lest karuṇā should change into śoka which is again a hindrance for genuine morality. 'There is suffering' is the generative organ of the feeling of compassion or karuṇā for all sattvas; this is called a sattvāvalambana karuṇā. For Sautrāntika and Yogācāra schools of Buddhism compassion originates from the doctrine of momentariness; this may be called dharmāvalambana karuṇā. According to the extreme Mahāyānists or the Mādhyamikas, Karuṇā is not different from 'śūnya', which is a part of bodhi or Supreme knowledge. Thus compassion is made supramundane by this school of Buddhism. It does not remain only ethical but becomes meta-physical too.

Later commentaries on the Mahāyāna texts have emphasized karuṇā even more. Manorathanandi says that the only way to free oneself from suffering is through the development of karuṇā.¹ Dharmakīrti has pointed out that karuṇā is an evidence of Buddha and can be developed by practice.² Thus in the Buddhist Sanskrit literature compassion is as predominant as 'bhakti' in Bhāgvata cult. Just as 'bhakti' is the means of attaining liberation in Bhāgvata cult so also karuṇā is the essential means of Mahābodhi or liberation.

The third state is 'muditā.' Muditā or goodwill does not explicitly depict itself as a part of non-violence like the previous two brahmavihāras. The symbol of 'muditā' is joy or delight. Muditā is a feeling of disinterested love; when in others certain virtues are seen, one does not feel envious of other's progress and virtues. It, therefore, shows an effort on one's part towards the maintenance of the happiness of others;

1. दुःखाद् दुःखहेतोश्च समुद्धरणकामता करुणा ।

—Comm. on Pramāṇavārtika.

2. साधनं करुणाभ्यासात् सा बुद्धेर्देहसंश्रयात्,
असिद्धोभ्यास इति चेन्नाश्रय प्रतिषेधतः ।

—Pramāṇavārtika, 2.34

this indicates a non-violent attitude towards oneself as well as towards others. The ill passion of hatred is naturally subsided and soft heartedness becomes the prominent feature. However, it is to be distinguished from *rāga* or attachment, or *arati* which is contradictory to *muditā*.

The last state is that of *upekkhā* or indifference. An extreme indifference can be said as equivalent to the final stage of *mokṣa*, which is all negative, but in it culminates the positive effort. It is the state where no question of favourableness or unfavourableness remains. Even in the most extreme circumstances of sorrow or misery one remains totally undisturbed. But this type of indifference or *upekkhā* is to be distinguished from the indifference of those who do not even possess right attitude and are indifferent just owing to their ignorance and absence of knowledge of right and wrong.

In brief, these four brahmavihāras act as an easier of ill mental modifications of four types, *rāga* (attachment), *dosa* (hatred), *isā* (jealousy) and *usuyā* (intolerance), and help in achieving the final goal.

Stages of a Violent Act

A complete act of violence passes through various stages, which may sometimes be so quick that it is not ordinarily apprehensible. At first there is a mental inclination to do a particular act of violence which ends up in finally committing the act of violence, with all its results. These stages are four in number.¹

The first stage is called *prayoga* or inclination. The purely mental aspect indicating, for example, the intention of a person to commit a particular act of violence, viz. the desire of killing an animal. The second stage is called *mūla-prayoga* or actual application. At this second stage the intention of violence takes a practical shape. Here the mental state arouses the vocal or bodily states and moves towards

1. *Bauddha Dharma Darśana*—Narendra Deo, p. 252.

completion of the act of violence. As for example, a person having the intention of killing the animal buys an animal, brings it to his place, treats it badly and tries to injure it with a particular weapon till it dies.

The third stage is called 'mūlakarmapatha', i.e. completion of the violent act. The last stroke that kills the animal is called 'mūlakarmapatha.' The last among these four stages is the stage known as *pr̥ṣṭha* or the back. The after-effects of *mūlakarmapatha* constitute this fourth stage. For example the leather of the dead animal and preparing the leather for sale, washing and tanning of the leather, etc., all come under this category. Though the real act of violence ends up only in the stage called 'mūla-karma-patha', the fourth stage of '*pr̥ṣṭha*' is still attached to it because the killer (of the animal) does not even dissociate himself from the violent act committed by him. The feelings of hatred etc. for the animals, and desire of making profit out of this act of violence are still there. It is, therefore, regarded as a continuation of the act of violence. This stage has got significance; if for example his mind is still occupied by hatred for the dead animal, he intensifies his act of violence; if on the other hand he repents for this act, he minimises the offence.

These four stages of the act of violence can be, to some extent, compared to Jaina classification of violence as consisting of three stages of *saṃrambha*, *saṃārambha* and *ārambha*. These can also be assimilated to the Jaina stages of transgression of the vow of non-violence, viz. *atikrama*, *vyatikrama*, *aticāra* and *anācāra*. The degrees of offence are often found in the Vinaya as '*dukkata*', '*thullaccaya* and '*pārājika*' or '*saṃghādisesa*', indicating somewhat similar stages of an offence.

The Precept of the Buddhist Monk

With the background of non-violence in general in both the aspects—positive and negative—the actual precept of the

Buddhist monk can be discussed. The precept Pāṇātipāta Veramaṇi is negative in nature only but has an equally strong positive implication. The Pāli formula runs as follows : "I solemnly undertake to observe the precept which enjoins abstention from doing injury to any living being."¹ It is included in sīlas which are enumerated almost in a stereotyped form in several discourses. In the Dīgha Nikāya the precept is discussed as the first in the section of minor (cūla) sīlas that are divided there mainly as minor (cūla), middle (majjhima) and major (mahā), of which the minor section contains actual precepts and the middle section discusses them in some detail, while the major one has no connection with these precepts. The precept of non-killing in Dīgha is stated like this : "The monk established in non-killing lays aside rods and weapons and extends kindness, good-will and modesty to all living beings."² It further says that the monk is supposed not to hurt not only bigger living animals etc. but also seeds and plants and shrubs which have life.³ Later in the section of middle (majjhima) sīlas, the discussion on abstinence from injury to seeds, plants, etc., is further amplified; there it is said that five types of seeds and growing plants, whether propagated from roots or cuttings or joints or buddings or seeds (mūlabija, khandabija, phalabija, aggabija and bijabija), are not to be injured by a monk.⁴

1. पाणातिपातवेरमणी सिक्खापदं समादियामि ।

--Khu. Pāṭha, Dasasikkhāpadas.

2. पाणातिपातं पहाय पाणातिपाता पटिविरतो समणो गोतमो निहितदण्डो-
निहितसत्थो लज्जी दयापन्नो सब्बपाण भूत-हितानुकम्पो विहरति ति ।

--Dīgha., part I, Brahmajālasutta, Cūlasīla.

3. बीज-गामभूतगामसमारम्भा पटिविरतो गोतमोः —Ibid.

4. एवं रूपं बीजगामभूतगामसमारम्भं अनुयुत्ता विहरन्ति, सेय्यथीदं
मूलबीजं खन्दबीजं फलुबीजं अगगबीजं बीजबीजं एव पंचमं इति एव
रूपा बीजगामभूतगामसमारम्भा पटिविरतो समणोगोतमो ।

—Ibid. Majjhima Sīla.

Further it says that the monk abstains from taking raw meat.¹ The taking of meat, as shall be seen shortly, is not completely denounced by the Buddha; on the other hand, he allows it on special occasions; but he allows cooked meat only and not raw meat.

This tends to show that the acceptance of the vow of the monks and nuns means avoidance of the killing of all living beings, ranging from the meanest worms to the highest creatures. But the way it is practised (not only practised but also preached as is seen in some other texts) is not so rigid as the way the Jaina vow is practised. Even by seeing certain ritualistic aspects it cannot easily be said that the Buddhist precept is a lax or flabby principle; for example, the use of filter lest the small creatures should be destroyed in drinking; the injunction that one should be careful in throwing away liquid, and that it should be thrown either into water which has no worms or on the ground where there is no grass.² However, it can only be said that it (Buddhism) has not gone to that stringency which the Jainas have.

Another important point which can be adduced regarding the precept of non-killing is that in spite of its being an out and out Śramaṇical concept, Buddhism could not avoid the influence of Brāhṃaṇical thought in certain places, as for example it is said that a horrible torture is to be assigned to the person in hell for millenniums who murders cows or oxen.³ Here it reveals that a special favour to cow is given when every living being is regarded as equal.

1. आमकमंस पटिग्गहणा पटिविरतो समणो गोतमो ।

—Dīgha, part I, Brahmajālasutta, Cūlasīla.

2. Buddhism—R. S. Copleston, p. 185.

3. एसो भिक्खवे, सत्तो इमस्मिं येव राजग्गे गोघातको अहोसि । सो तस्स कम्मस्स विपाकेन बहूनि वस्सानि बहूनि वस्ससतानि बहूनि वस्स-सहस्सानिनिरये पच्चित्वा.... —Samyutta, vol. II, p. 212.

Transgressions, Punishments and Atonements

Here a discussion of the violation of the precept is also required. A detailed account of the transgressions of this vow is available in the Vinaya and the Pātimokkha Code. To what extent the transgression has taken place and what degree of punishment by the saṃgha is needed for the transgression are decided in the Vinaya. In the discussion of the violation of the precept, the Vinaya regards the precept as a law of Saṃgha while its violation as more of the nature of a crime or an offence. The reason of this formalistic limitation lies in the maintenance of social and outer set-up of the Saṃgha, where individual member Bhikkhu is only a part of it. For the proper maintenance of the Saṃgha outer discipline is required and considered sometimes more important in the Vinaya.

Here, it will be interesting to make a general comparison between the Jaina and the Buddhist way of dealing with transgressions and punishments. As against the ten main prāyaścittas of the Jainas, two hundred and twenty seven rules for monks, and three hundred and eleven rules for nuns (according to Theravādins) are grouped under seven categories in the Buddhist literature. The Buddhist texts start with the descending order while the Jaina with the ascending one. The most obvious point of difference, which has already been hinted at, is that the Buddhists deal with all the details of these transgressions and punishments in the original Vinaya, while the Jainas deal with them not so much in the 'Aṅgas' (the basic canons) as in the Chedasūtras which are not so publicly read and discussed. In this sense, therefore, it can be said that for the Buddhists violations and punishments etc. are just a public affair, but for the Jainas they are more of a private affair. The texts of the Jainas are silent on the actual procedure of enacting and enforcing the laws of monastic jurisprudence, while the Buddhist texts deal with the actual procedure of these laws and their formulation of punishment etc. Further, admission of transgressions etc. for the Jaina monks.

does not demand calling up of an assembly of monks to decide the nature of transgressions as it is with the Buddhists, nor is the prosecution of the guilty according to the Jains in such an elaborate affair as it is in the Buddhist jurisprudence.

However, some of the offences committed by the monks and nuns are more or less alike both in the Buddhist and in the Jaina texts. For instance some offences against celibacy and the showing of disrespect to Buddha or Tīrthāṅkara etc. are very much alike in both the systems. Another prominent similarity is that both the systems emphasize non-violence as the primary virtue and incontinence or an offence relating to sex as the greatest vice, as the emphasis laid on this offence in the scriptures of both the systems would reveal.

The violation of the precepts are made known to the Buddhist Saṃgha through the recitation of the Pātimokkha code on fortnightly Uposatha days. It is here only that the confession of the offences takes place, and the Saṃgha gets the knowledge of the intensity of the offence committed by the monk and inflicts the penalties accordingly. It is said that the Saṃgha in cases of offences can inflict the prescribed penalty of 'parivāsa' or 'mannatta' or any other punishment as the case may be, even against the will of the guilty Bhikkhu.¹

Each of the Pātimokkha codes is divided into eight chapters. Out of these eight, seven pertain to the transgression of all the rules about daily life of the monk (which include the five precepts we are mainly concerned). The last, called 'Adhikaraṇasamatha', does not directly relate to the transgression of any of the rules. Offences have been dealt with in the descending order of their seriousness in the chapters of the two codes, that is the first chapter deals

1. यसं भिक्खु अञ्जतरं वा अञ्जतरं वा आपज्जित्वा यावतीहं जानं परिच्छादेति तावतीहं तेन भिक्खुना अकामा परिवत्थब्बं ।

—Pārājika, vol. I, p. 277.

with the gravest, while the last with the least serious offences.

The gravest offences called *pārājikas* in the Vinaya are four in number. They are called *pārājika* because by committing them the monk is no longer held in the communion, he is excommunicated from the Saṃgha.¹ Out of these four, the third *pārājika* pertains to the precept of non-violence. Though non-violence should be observed in all minuteness as is prescribed in the vow, but the offence increases with the size of the creature injured, and in this sense man is regarded as the biggest among all living creatures. Therefore, the code declares, "Whatsoever Bhikkhu shall knowingly deprive a human being of life or searches for an arm like a knife etc. shall utter the praises of death or incite others to self-destruction saying 'Oh my friend what good do you get from this sinful, wretched life ? Death is better to you than life. If so thinking, and with such an aim, he, by various arguments, utter the praises of death or incite other to self-destruction, is excommunicated and no longer held under the communion.'"² This great crime along with the other three is repeated in the formula of warning addressed to the monks at their first admission in Mahāvagga too. Next to the category of *pārājika* comes what are called the 'saṃghādisesa' offences. Out of the thirteen such offences only two, those

1. उद्दिदत्ता खो आयस्मन्तो चत्तारो पाराजिका धम्मा, येसं भिक्खु अञ्जतरं वा अञ्जतरं वा आपज्जित्वा न लभति भिक्खूहि सद्धिं संवासं, यथा पुरे तथा पच्छा, पाराजिको होति असंवासो ।

—Pārājika, vol I, p. 149.

2. यो पन भिक्खु संचिच्च मनुस्सविग्गहं जीविता बोरोपेय्य सत्थहारकं वास्स परियेसेय्य, मरणवण्णं वा संवण्णेय्य, मरणाय वा समादपेय्य-अम्भो पुरिस, किं तुद्धिमिना पापकेन दुज्जीवितेन, मतं ते जीविता सेय्यो ति, इति चित्तमनो चित्तसंकप्पो अनेकपरियायेन मरणवण्णं वा संवण्णेय्य, मरणाय व समादपेय्य-अयं पि पाराजिको होती असंवासो ।

—Bhikkhu Pātimokkha, Pārājikadhamma, Pārājika, vol. I, p. 90.

two in a curious way, are connected with the precept of non-violence. They refer to the prohibition of erection of huts etc. so that no injury is done to any living being like small creatures or insects or even higher animals etc. and they are not inconvenienced or even unintentionally killed.¹ The punishment given for this type of offence is not total excommunication like *pārājika*, but a temporary *parivāsa* may be given when the offences are acknowledged before the *Samgha*. After some time such a monk could be readmitted into the *Samgha*.

Another major offence with regard to non-violence is called *thullaccaya* (major or great offence). This offence does not occur in the *Pātimokkha*, nor is its nature very clearly explained in the *Vinaya*, nor is anything known about it, except that when a monk is guilty of it, whatever he may wish to say, other monks would not speak to him, and he is left in an isolated state. Yet it quite often occurs in the *Vinaya* texts. For example a monk has been told that he has committed an offence; but, if he refuses to accept it, it is said that the monk commits the *thullaccaya* offence. This offence lies between *pārājika* or *saṃghādisesa* and other minor offences. It pertains not only to injury done to animals or small creatures but even to the killing of human beings. Actually there seems to be a big gap in the *Pātimokkha* with regard to non-violence, i. e. from the gravest offence of *pārājika* one finds a comparatively much milder offence pertaining to the violence of small insects etc. as discussed in the *saṃghādisesa*. *Thullaccaya* bridges this gulf; it can also be understood as a stage prior to

1. (i) भिक्खु अभिनेतब्बा वत्थुदेसनाय, तेहि भिक्खुहि वत्थु देसेतब्बं अनारम्भं सपरिक्कमनं सारम्भे चे भिक्खु वत्थुस्मि....कुटिं कारेय्य पमाणं वा अतिक्कामेय्य संघादिसेसो ति ।

—*Pārājika*, vol. I, p. 220.

- (ii) सारम्भं नाम किपिल्लिकानं वा आसयो होति, उपचिकानं वा आसयो होति....आघातनिस्सितं वा होति । —*Ibid.*, p. 222.

pārājika offence. For example, if a monk fully prepares himself to commit a murder, makes everything ready for it, attacks the person or beats him atrociously, till he does not die¹, it is a case of thullaccaya, but when the person dies it no longer remains a thullaccaya but amounts to pārājika. Again a bhikkhu commits a Thullaccaya offence when he is ordered by another bhikkhu to kill someone and the order is carried out by him immediately so that the person is killed instantaneously or grievously wounded to end up in death.² Or, for example, when he tells a person about the approaching death so that he himself inflicts serious injuries upon himself and dies consequently.³ Many more illustrations of this offence of murder can be found in the Buddhaghosa's commentaries on the Vinaya and the Pātimokkha, viz. Samantapāsādika and Kaṃkhāvitaraṇī. Samantapāsādika points out that if a monk orders another monk to commit a murder, the order is carried out accordingly; both the monks are guilty of thullaccaya in the beginning, but if the person dies, both of them are to be accused of pārājika. But if, for example, the second monk murders someone else out of misunderstanding and not the one for whom the order was given, it is said that the first one is not guilty of pārājika but only of 'apūrva' offence.⁴ Here, as has already been pointed out, the difference is made purely on the basis of consequence and not the intention and the intensity of intention. All these details are interesting which show that how for the maintenance of order in the Saṃgha the basic moral principle becomes so formal and outer and how the outer consequence is given importance.

Then comes a still minor category of offences with regard to non-violence. These are called 'pācittiya'. Pācittiya holds

1. Pārājika, pp. 92-94.
2. Ibid., pp. 91,92.
3. Ibid.
4. Bauddha Dharma Darśana—Narendra Deo, p. 253.

the fifth position in the order of the code; there are ninety-two pācittiya rules. Out of these only five are directly or indirectly connected with non-violence.¹ These rules depict more of the ceremonial side of the vow than the real moral one, but they do show consistency between the original precept as discussed in the Dīghanikāya and the violation of the precept (however minor it may be). Among these offences are, for example, the killing of small insects or living beings in digging a plot of land or in drinking unfiltered water which may contain living beings etc.

Thus the discussion of these offences with regard to non-violence in the Pātimokkha and the Vinaya and also in the other allied texts is an interesting one, sometimes the offence is really grave, sometimes it takes the shape of a very formal offence, sometimes it is also noticed that it depends so much on the legal points that the concept of 'virtue' altogether seems to be missing and one does not even feel that a subject of morality is under discussion, as has been seen in the distinction made in apūrva offence and thullaccaya offence. However, the code and the offences reflect the Saṃgha of those times, and a frequent adoption of the middle path in Buddhism, whenever a decision was taken in connection with the violation of the rules and their corresponding punishments.

1. (i) यो पन भिक्खु पथवि खण्येय वा खणपेय्य वा पाचित्तियं ।
- (ii) यो पन भिक्खु जानं सम्पाणकं उदकं तिणं वा मित्तिकं वा सि चेयं सिञ्चापेयं वा पाचित्तियं ।
- (iii) यो पन भिक्खु संचिच्च पाणं जीविता बोरोपेय्य पाचित्तियं ।
- (iv) यो पन भिक्खु जानं संप्पाणकं उदकं परिभु जेय, पाचित्तियं ।
- (v) यो पन भिक्खु भिक्खुस्स कुपितो अनत्तमनो पहारं ददेय्य पाचित्तियं । —Bhikku Pātimokkha, Pācittiyadhamma.

The Precept of Non-killing for the Laity

In the Buddhist scriptures discipline is discussed primarily for the Saṃgha (of monks and nuns), and only secondarily for that of the laity, yet the term 'Pañcaśīla' in general refers to the code of conduct of the laity, as the term 'dasasīla' or 'dasasikkhāpadas' refers to the code of conduct of the monks, where the first precept in both the codes is 'pānātipāta-veramani.' The distinction made by Jainas between 'sabbāo' and 'thūlāo' is not used in the Buddhist texts, but it is upheld at various places and by making a general study of the pertinent texts one can gather the idea that the precept (not only this one but the other four too) is less stringently binding upon the laity. They cannot be expected to totally abstain from taking life¹, while a monk protects all living beings, being basically restrained in conduct. As the peacock never attains the swiftness of a swan so also a householder does not equal a Bhikkhu.² Killing is common among many Buddhist laymen for eating purposes, though it is clearly said that a man has to reap in the future life the fruits or the evil consequences of what he has sowed now. The ideal before Buddhist, however, is 'non-killing'³ in all walks of life. He is supposed to go to the monastery on the 'uposatha' days, where he receives the precept of non-killing, when the monks recite the three saraṇas (Refuge in the three : Buddha, Dhamma and Saṃgha) and the five precepts (pañcaśīla), and he repeats them every time. The idea behind this repetition is to remind him to fulfil the vow in daily life and conduct and not to go astray from the right path. Actually three virtues are supposed to be embedded in the laity : (i) dāna, (ii) sīla, (iii) bhāvanā. Dāna is considered even prior to sīla for the laity. These are the stages which Buddha himself is said to have followed in the course of his previous lives as they are pictured in Jātaka stories. Dāna is

1. Buddhism—R. S. Copleston, p. 204.

2. सिद्धिं यथा नीलगीवो विहंगमो, हंसस्स नोपेति जवं कुदाचनं ।

एवं गिही नानुक्रोति भिक्खुनो, मुनिनो विवित्तस्य वनमिह ज्ञायतो ति ।

—S. N., 1.12.15.

thus the most fundamental virtue even prior to *sīla* and that is why when the lay people visit the monastery, they offer gifts to the monks and then repeat the *saraṇas* and *sīlas* recited by the monk. It is said that the laity try to compensate by *dāna* whatever they lack in their conduct owing to incomplete observance of *sīlas*.

Whatever the case may be killing is frequently denounced in the Buddhist texts meant for the laity. In *Sigālovādasutta* it is accounted as one of the four vices of conduct that they have to put away, as it is said, "The wise do not praise killing, stealing, lying and adultery."¹

The Buddhist texts mention certain special fields to which the moral principle of non-violence is mainly applied; it should be seen, however, that to what extent and degree it has really been employed and how far it has deviated from the main concept.

The first and foremost in these fields is the field of diet, i.e. the question of flesh-eating and abstention from it. This question has become very controversial ever since the days of Buddha.

Aśoka was a staunch follower of Buddhism. His role is extremely significant in this field as his Edicts reveal. He promulgated forcefully : "Here (in my kingdom) no animal shall be slaughtered for sacrifice, nor may holidays feasts be held, for his Majesty King Priyadarśin sees many evils in holiday feasts."² Then in the first Edict of Aśoka we read : "Formerly in the kitchen of His Majesty King Priyadarśin, each day many thousands of living creatures were slain to make curries. At the present moment when this pious edict is being written only three living creatures, namely two pea-

1. पाणातिपातो अदिन्नादानं मूसावादो पवुच्चति,
परदारगमनं चेवा—नप्पसंसति पण्डिता ति ।

—Digha., *Sigālovādasutta*.

2. *Essence of Buddhism*—P. L. Narasu, p. 52.

cocks and one deer, are killed daily and the deer not invariably. Even these three creatures shall not be slaughtered in future.”¹ This shows that great emphasis was laid on vegetarian diet on the basis of non-violence. However, from this it cannot be concluded that the Buddha himself strictly prohibited meat-eating. In *Āmagandhasutta*, a Brāhmin, abstaining from meat on the ground of its defiling him, is told that what defiles a man is not the eating of flesh but a bad mind and the wicked deeds², or a cleaving towards such objects. At other place when schismatic Devadatta requested the Buddha to prohibit his monks from using meat, salt, milk and curd, Buddha refused³ to impose such stringent rules and explained that it was against the theory of Middle Path.

What the Buddha completely forbade was the acceptance of raw meat. He specially denounced the eating of human flesh and elephant’s flesh, those who take such flesh, it is said, are guilty of Thullaccaya offence.⁴ It is further said that the monks should not take such flesh which is purposely prepared for them by killing the animal.⁵ Then it is also held that if

1. Righteousness Edict, *Dhammalipi* (one of the fourteen Rock Edicts).
2. कोधो मदो थम्भो पच्चुट्टापना च माया उसूया भस्ससमुस्सयो च ।
मानातिमानो च असम्भिसन्थवो, एसामगन्धो न हि मंस भोजनं ।
—S. N., *Āmagandhasutta*, 7.
3. यावजीवं मच्छमंसं न खादेद्यु; यो मच्छमंसं खादेद्यु वज्जं नं फुसेय्या ति ।
इमानि समणो गोतमो नानुजानाति । —*Pārājika*, p. 259.
4. न भिक्खवे, भनुस्समंसं परिभुञ्जितब्बं । यो परिभुञ्जेय्य, आपत्ति थुत्सच्च-
यस्स । न च भिक्खवे, अप्परिवेक्खित्वा मंसं परिभुञ्जितब्बं । यो परिभु-
जेय्य दुक्करस्स ।—*Mahā.*, p. 235.
5. न भिक्खवे जानं उट्ठिस्स-कतं नंसं परिभुञ्जितब्बं । यो परिभुञ्जेय्य
आपत्ति दुक्करस्स । अनुजानामि, भिक्खवे तिकोटिं परिसुद्धं मच्छमंसं-
अदिट्ठं असुतं अपरिसंकितं ति ।—*Ibid.*

a monk takes fish and flesh in fit health, he is guilty of *pācittiya* offence.¹ In spite of Buddha's non-attachment to flesh, he sometimes, on special conditions, recommended the use of meat; for example, he said that it could be used as a medicine.² As the *Vinaya* texts reveal, it can also be eaten if it is not prepared for the monk.³ He has announced clearly, "My disciples have permission to eat whatever food it is customary to eat in place or country, provided it is done without indulgence of appetite or evil desire."⁴ Hence, so far as the evidence of the *Vinaya* goes, in brief it can only be said that flesh-eating with attachment was denounced by the Buddha.

As has been pointed out earlier, flesh eating has been a very controversial topic in Buddhism. In spite of the moderate attitude of the *Vinaya*, *Mahāyāna* Buddhism totally denounces flesh eating; even today the Chinese monks totally abstain from flesh eating. *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, a prominent *Mahāyāna* text, has thrown special light on flesh-eating. Here flesh-eating has been directly denounced. The *Sūtra* says that there are infinite reasons for abstinence from flesh-eating for a *Bodhisattva*.⁵ *Karuṇā* or compassion is the essence of *Mahāyāna* Buddhism, and on this basis the eating of flesh is totally condemned. The eating of flesh brings about one's moral downfall. The Buddha is said to have declared: "Meat-eating is forbidden by me everywhere and all time for those who are abiding in compassion; he who eats meat will be born

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1.यानि पणीतानि पणीतभोजनानि सेय्यथीदं दूधं मच्छ मांसं.....यो पन भिक्खु एव रूपानि पणीतभोजनानि अगिलानो अत्तनो अत्थाय विञ्जापेत्वा भुञ्जेय्य, पाचित्तियं ।

—*Bhikkhu Pātimokkha, Pācittiyadhamma.*

2. *Mahā.*, pp. 229-230.

3. *Mahā.*, p. 256.

4. *Ibid.*

5. अपरिमितैर्महामतो कारणैर्मांसं सर्वत्रभक्ष्यं कृपात्मनो बोधिसत्त्वस्य ।

—*Laṅkāvatāra sūtra*, chap. 8

in the same place as a lion, tiger or wolf etc.”¹ Further it is said, “As greed is an hindrance to emancipation so are meat-eating, liquor etc. hindrances.”² Though the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* is much later than the *Vinaya* texts and the flesh eating is disregarded only later on, yet it can also be ascertained that, even in the Buddha’s time, there might have been some monks who were totally against the eating of flesh whose view later on was adopted by the *Mahāyānists*.

Another important issue to be discussed in this light is war. In the scriptures there is no direct reference to this problem, but from certain sources some rational conclusion can be drawn. In the description of the Buddha’s fight with *Māra*, the personification of evil, the Buddha is said to have compared himself with the King, who rules his own kingdom with righteousness (virtue) but cannot tolerate the aggression caused by the envious enemies and goes out to wage war against them. This reflects the idea that undue aggression should not and cannot be tolerated from both social and religious angles. The main emphasis is laid on the cause of the war. Here a famous illustration of *Aśoka* can be cited, who after establishing himself in Buddhism completely withdrew himself from the battle of *Kaliṅga* in which lakhs of people shed their blood, and stopped the war once for all (the reason for this lies in non-violence); but this does not go against the previous view that the waging of war for a right cause is not denounced in Buddhism. *Asoka*’s attitude was not only that of passivity, he in fact tried to check his ambitiousness; this in other words is an illustration of non-attachment for worldly gains for which all *Sramaṇical* systems including Buddhism stand

1. *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra*, 8.23.

2. *Ibid.* 8.20.

CHAPTER III

NON-STEALING

In the list of pañcaśīlas or the five precepts the second position is occupied by non-stealing or 'adattādāna-virati'. The order of the precepts in different systems is not the same. In non-Buddhist systems (the Jaina and the Pātañjala-Yoga) the second precept is 'truth' or abstention from lying. But there does not appear any reason for this difference, and for a philosophical discussion on the precepts it is totally insignificant. 'Adattādāna-virati' is usually understood as abstinence from theft, literally it means abstinence from acceptance of something not given. Actually it is constituted of three terms; viz. adatta, ādāna and virati. Datta means given, 'adattā' therefore means that which is not given, 'ādāna' means acceptance, and virati means abstinence. The whole term thus means abstinence from accepting anything ungiven. In this sense it can be said that the term encloses a wider field than mere non-stealing or abstinence from theft. The term adattādāna-virati is a Śramaṇical contribution because the monks and nuns (the Buddhist or the Jaina) not only abstain from stealing but they do not at the same time take anything ungiven (however small or trivial it may be), in spite of the fact that no body appears to be the true master of it. Abstention from stealing or 'asteya' as a virtue is not new to Śramaṇical culture. The term 'adatta' however has got another meaning, that is a girl who is not given in marriage or an unmarried girl. But this has nothing to do with the precept of adattādāna-virati in any special sense.

Historically speaking, 'adattādāna' is a newer term than 'steya' in Indian Philosophy. The term 'adattādāna' can be properly understood by seeing the various implications

of the term 'datta'. Datta means a thing parted with willingly, and this willingness is threefold. Firstly, a person parts with his belongings and gives to somebody who is held in high esteem, as for example the monks both in the Jaina and the Buddhist systems are held in high esteem and the devotees give them all that they need for their maintenance. Accepting such things is clearly not *adattādāna*. Secondly, parting with a thing out of compassion as giving to beggar is called *karuṇādāna*, that too is not *adattādāna*. Thirdly, exchanging something either in the form of barter or in the form of monetary exchange is also not *adattādāna*. These three are the categories of 'datta'. The term *adattādāna* or 'addiṇṇādāna' (Pāli), it seems, has been used purposely in order to give full recognition to acceptance of food and other necessary things by the monks who depended entirely on begging. However, *adattādāna-virati* includes all that is called abstinence from theft. And many times, in the Jaina and the Buddhist systems, the 'steya' is used to mean the same *adattādāna*. These terms are used in both the senses, those of crime and sin, which are not very easy to distinguish in Indian canonical literature. "Most of the terms designating crime or offence in Sanskrit are essentially religious in their nature and no strict line between sins and punishable offences has ever been drawn."¹

Whether stealing is understood in the sense of a crime or in the sense of a sin, the virtue of non-stealing fundamentally originates in non-violence either in the positive sense of maintenance of social order or in the negative sense of abstinence from hurting others by way of depriving them of their property or other necessary belongings.² But it is only limited or restricted non-violence pertaining to human beings and not to all living creatures. One who observes this precept has a very strong or healthy feeling of social welfare, (which is

1. E. R. E., vol. 4, p. 283.

2. As in Jainism wealth is regarded as the outer vitality of a human being.

rooted in non-violence, love and sympathy); it is therefore not only negative but positive as well. In the Jaina and the Buddhist systems the precept is given recognition only because it is supplementary to the vow of non-violence.

Development of non-stealing as a virtue having its root in non-violence can be traced out from the age of the Ṛgveda, the Brāhmaṇas, the Upaniṣads, etc., down to the age of Buddhism and Jainism.

Stealing in the Ṛgveda is regarded as a grave offence, yet it was one of the commonest crimes in the Ṛgvedic age. "Among the crimes the commonest appears to have been robbery which generally took the form of cattle lifting mostly practised at night. Thieves and robbers are often mentioned, and the Ṛgveda contains many prayers for protection at home, abroad, and on journeys."¹ "...the punishment of the thief seems to have rested with the person wronged. There are clear allusions to binding the thief in stocks, presumably with a view to induce his relatives to pay back to the aggrieved man the loss he has sustained. In one passage of the Ṛgveda there is a probable reference to the employment of trained men to recover the stolen cattle. Just as the khojis of modern Punjab down to modern times were expert at this difficult employment. Of death as a punishment for theft, as in later times and other primitive societies, curiously enough nothing appears in Ṛgveda."²

The term 'taskara'³ is also found in the Ṛgveda which means a thief or a robber, who usually used to hide himself in big forests to find big merchants etc. as his prey. Another term called 'paripanthin' similar to 'taskara' also occurs in

1. History of Sanskrit Literature—A. A. Macdonell, p. 163.
2. Cambridge History of India, vol. I, pp. 86, 87.
3. Vedic Index—Macdonell and Keith, vol. I.

the Ṛgveda¹ which literally means those who are found in way, but it was used for thieves and robbers who were found in the way lying in ambush.

At another place in the Ṛgveda the use of chords etc. is indicated in connection with thieves and robbers but it is not clear as to whether this was used for punishing the thieves or for punishing those who were robbed.² But, usually the job of punishment of the thieves etc. was left in the hands of those who were robbed. This punishment used to be of the type of tying the thieves with the stakes or pillars etc.

The period of the Brāhmāṇas is the period of ceremonies, rites and rituals. "Beneath this formalism of ceremonies, rites and rituals, there works a true spirit of religion and morality in the very sense of duty. It is this ethical basis which has helped the Brāhmaṇical religion with all its weaknesses to endure so long."³ In this spirit of morality certain essentials of good life were inculcated. Among these like the 'love to men', 'kindness to animals' and 'abstinence from theft' were very important ones, and robbery and other similar vices were duly condemned, as in the Ṛgveda, the stealing of gold and drinking of surā were considered as serious crimes.⁴

In the Upaniṣads virtues like 'do not steal' and 'do not murder' are avowedly stated. The Upaniṣads do not, however, confine themselves to such virtues which are just of the nature of outer or external injunctions, they also inculcate and stress the intrinsically valuable virtues like 'do not covet' and 'do not be greedy'.⁵ In fact these are the virtues which form a stepping stone to the virtue of non-stealing. The very idea

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1. Vedic Index—Macdonell and Keith.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Indian Philosophy—S. Radhakrishnan, vol. I, p. 132.
 4. The Cambridge History of India, vol. I, p. 119.
 5. Nārada. 3, 33; Maitri. 1, 3.

of stealing another's property is aroused from covetousness and greed; when these two forces are eradicated the virtue of non-stealing would automatically develop. The emphasis on them by the Upaniṣadic thinkers show that they have gone deeper into the field of morality. The Jaina sources also reveal the fact by saying that whosoever steals is greedy.¹

In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad a mention of five major sins is made, where the first position is occupied by 'the plunderer of gold who sinks downwards in the scale'.² Again the Chāndogya Upaniṣad tells that in case of theft the axe ordeal is applied, apparently under the direction of the king. "But this is the solitary case of an ordeal known in the Vedic literature as a part of criminal procedure. In the sūtras we hear of a king with his own hands striking a confessed thief".³

Manu has explicitly included 'non-stealing' among the fundamental principles of morality.⁴ He regards theft as a very grave crime. "A king when punishing the wicked is comparable to the god Varuṇa, who binds a sinner with ropes. If a king does not strike a thief, who approaches him, holding a club in his hands and proclaiming his deeds, the fault falls on the king, the thief whether he be slain or pardoned is purified of his guilt. The king should first punish by admonition; afterwards by reproof; third, by a fine and after that by corporal chastisement."⁵ Stealing is always condemned in the entire Brāhmaṇical religion as a grave crime which

1. 'लोभाविले आययई अदत्त'

—Uttarā. 32.29.

2. स्तेनो हिरण्यस्य सुरा पिबंश्च गुरोस्तल्पमावसन्ब्रह्महा च ।

—Chāndo, 5.10.9.

3. Cambridge History of India, vol. I, p. 119.

4. अहिंसासत्यमस्तेयं शौचमिन्द्रियनिग्रहः ।

—Manu. 10.66.

5. E. R. E., vol. 4, p. 284.

leads to a chaotic state in the social order. In spite of this the total universality of the principle of non-stealing is questioned in the Mahābhārata, though it is regarded as an essential moral principle. It is secondary to certain primary principles; therefore, it cannot be regarded as an exceptionless principle. A famous parable is related in the Mahābhārata in this context : In a great famine which continued for twelve years sage Viśvāmitra in severe emergency had stolen the dog's flesh from the house of a Sūdra, for this reason he was very much criticised and was called 'pañca pañca nakhā bhakṣyā' (i. e. one who eats the flesh of five types of animals; dog is one of them)¹ but Viśvāmitra defended himself by saying that life is always better than death, because it is only in life that one can establish himself in dharma or righteousness.² What therefore is posited in the Mahābhārata is that in time of real emergency to save one's own life or that of others stealing is no vice. Some of the Western thinkers like Hobbes and J. S. Mill opine very much akin to this. Mill has gone even further by saying that "to save a life, it may not only be allowable but a duty to steal."³ The question of discussion of exceptions in any principle of morality is a very important and difficult task; what is that principle that finally justifies an action ? or what is totally exceptionless ? Such a question should be dealt with independently and elaborately. But it is not only in the Mahābhārata that the room to exceptions in the principle of non-stealing has been given, even the extremely rigorous systems cannot overrule exceptions in the principle of non-stealing, though there is a difference in degree and extent to which exceptions are allowed in different systems.

1. Manu 5.18.

2 जीवितं मरणं श्रेयो जीवनधर्ममेवाप्नुयात् ।

—Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, 141.

3. Utilitarianism—J. S. Mill, chap. V, p. 95.

In the list of five yamas in Pātañjala Yoga Sūtras non-stealing (asteya) occupies the third position. The precept as it is clearly stated is based on non-violence. Theft, it is said, is unlawful making an object one's own or it is an unauthorized appropriation (aśāstrapūrvaka) of things belonging to others. Abstinence from theft consists in the absence of desire thereof.¹ Vācaspati Mīśra points out that actually functioning of the body and speech depends upon the mind, this mental modification is mentioned as the principal factor, as described in the phrase 'absence of desire thereof'. Here, the desire, the eradication of which is to be sought, is 'coveting'. For accepting the principle of non-stealing, freedom from coveting is needed to be cultivated. This strengthens what has already been said that it is really greed or covetousness which is the root of theft. But, how is this desire (of greed or covetousness) to be eradicated? For this, again the 'pratipakṣa bhāvanā' theory of Patañjali fits well, which has already been applied to the cultivation of non-violence. The mental state of the person is the same every time, whenever he is inclined to commit a particular sin; whether he is thinking of an act of violence or committing an act of theft, his method of handling the vicious mental modifications is always the same, though the tools may differ in different mental modifications. Here in the case of theft, the quality which overcomes temptation for stealing is contentment (santoṣa)—the direct opposite of greed or covetousness. The cultivation of such an opposite desire would be very much appropriate psychologically. One cannot always fight with the ill intentions by a frontal attack, i. e. by just trying to suppress it; the more lasting and effective method would be by replacing the ill-intentions by the good ones. Therefore, by contemplating over the dignity and charm of contentment, establishment in non-stealing takes place.

1. स्तेयमशास्त्रपूर्वकम् द्रव्याणां परतः स्वीकरणं तत्प्रतिषेधः पुनरस्पृहारूपमस्तेयमिति ।

—Vyāsa's Comm. on Pāt. Yoga. 2.30.

About the classification or types of theft there is nothing special about it; according to the Pātañjala system, this can be classified into one hundred and eighty varieties like violence. The term 'himsādaya' (violence etc.) in sūtra No. 34 (book 2) pertains to all the rest of the major four types of vices (theft, falsehood, etc.). It therefore needs no repetition.

But what Patañjali says especially about the vow of non-stealing deserves notice. He says, "As soon as one is grounded in abstinence from theft, all jewels approach him."¹ One cannot, of course, logically make such an assertion about the reaching of jewels to one who fulfils his pledge of non-stealing. Nor can one really see such cases happening, that is those who do not steal others' valuables or acquire the riches of the world approach the Yogins by themselves, but this does not underrate the value of this high principle from subjective, spiritual or social point of view. Patañjali calls the fruit of inculcating the vow of non-stealing in life, the attainment of all jewels. Here it may be noted that the term 'attainment of jewels' (sarvaratnopasthānam) has two meanings; literally it means the accumulation of jewels, but really it means the fulfilment of all the material desires by the acquisition of the greatest quality of santoṣa or contentment. Patañjali in his entire work uses the terms with psychological implications. Accordingly attainment in this connection is not physical acquisition but the state of mind acquired through this contentment. This contentment in Pātañjala terminology is a niyama or observance, which is thus grounded in yama of non-stealing. This virtue of contentment has been metaphorically described by Patañjali as jewel, and to this extent it is right.

Jainism

Like the Pātañjala system the precept occupies the third position in the list of vratas in Jainism. Its importance has been

1. अस्तेय प्रतिष्ठायां सर्वरत्नोपस्थानम् ।

—Pāt. Yoga. 2.37.

pronounced in all aspects of life, in this life and the lives beyond, as Subhachandra proclaims : "If you really want to obtain spiritual happiness and to preserve your moral life, fame and character, and above all want to attain the supreme happiness in this life, and the life after, never get entangled in the net of stealing."¹ He repeats the same idea further by saying that one, who really desires riddance from this embroilment, never takes anything ungiven.²

The precept of non-stealing is not in anyway a later introduction. Even before Mahāvīra, in the time of Pārśvanātha, there were only four vows for the monks and nuns; in them 'non-stealing' (Addiṇṇādānāo Veramaṇaṃ) was present as it is.³ At some place there is also a hint of existence of three vows only. However, Mahāvīra also conceived it as essentially important, and he gave it the same place of importance in his fivefold scheme of the vows.

Stealing has been defined by Ācārya Umāsvāti in the Tattvārthasūtra. According to him any thing taken ungiven with attachment or 'pramāda' (inadvertence) is stealing.⁴ Abstinence from this is non-stealing. Pramāda or inadvertence is the essential characteristic of non-stealing.

1. अतुलसुखसिद्धिहेतोर्धर्मयशश्चरण-रक्षणार्थं,
इह परलोकहितार्थं कलयत् चित्तेऽपि मा चौर्यम् ।
—Jñānārṇava, 1.8.19.
2. यः समीप्सति जन्माब्धेः पारमाक्रमितुं सुधीः
स त्रिशुद्धचाति निःशंको नादत्ते कुरुते मतिम् ।
—Ibid. 1.8.2.
3. Sthān. 4.1.266.
4. (i) प्रमत्तयोगात् अदत्तादानं स्तेयं ।
—Tattvā. 7.15.
- (ii) अदत्तंतेणिको ।
—Prašna. 3.

As has already been pointed out, this ethical principle of non-stealing is actually based on the first and foremost principle of non-violence. In Jainism the principle of non-stealing is a moral principle only because it vindicates the principle of non-violence. Ācārya Amritacandra puts this idea in a logical form and explains it by saying that stealing is also violence, because it hurts both apparent (dravya) and real (bhāva) vitalities of the person whose wealth is stolen, which maintains the mental as well as physical equipoise of him.¹ He further elaborates by saying wherever there is stealing there is violence.² Though it cannot be said that the opposite of it is also true, violence and stealing are correlative or coexistent, but this correlation is only one-sided, i. e. where there is stealing there is violence, but not that wherever there is violence there is stealing also. Amritacandra further explains that violence and stealing are not mutually exclusive,³ because by taking anything ungiven others are hurt, and negligence in taking anything ungiven would lead to violence. Thus the Jaina scriptures establish that the vow of non-stealing is not independent, but is dependent on non-violence. Or, it is a corollary of the principle of non-violence.

Kinds of Stealing

'Himsā' has been divided into one hundred and eight kinds, likewise stealing that a monk is supposed to abstain from is classified into fifty four types.⁴ The objects to be

1. अवितीर्णस्य ग्रहणं परिग्रहस्य प्रमत्तयोगाद्यत्,
तत्प्रत्येयं स्तेयं सैव च हिंसा वधस्य हेतुत्वात् ।

—P. S. U. 102.

2. यत्र यत्र स्तेयं तत्र तत्र हिंसा । —Ibid.

3. हिंसायाः स्तेयस्य च नाव्याप्तिः सुघट एव सा यस्मात्,
ग्रहणे प्रमत्त योगो, द्रव्यस्य स्वीकृतस्यान्यै ।

—P. S. U. 104.

4. Śramaṇa Sūtra—Upadhyaya Amarmuni, p. 65.

stolen can be classified into six major varieties. These are : (1) 'alpa' (small in quantity), (2) 'bahu' (large in quantity), (3) 'aṇu' (small in size or value), (4) 'sthūla' (large in size or value), (5) 'sacitta' (animate), and (6) 'acitta' (inanimate). All these six kinds of objects can be stolen through mind, speech or body, so that the stealing of objects is of eighteen kinds. Again, these eighteen types of the acts of stealing can be committed either by one's ownself, or by asking some one else to commit them, or by appreciating some one who has already committed an act of stealing. In this manner the offence of stealing may be committed by the monks in fifty four ways. It is now obvious that the classification is comprehensive enough to include all the types of offences (major or minor or even very trivial) which could be committed by the monks.

The Mahāvratā

Now, the monks being on a higher spiritual platform than the laity, they observe the complete vow of non-stealing, they abstain from all the fifty four types of stealing, major or minor, without making allowance for even the slightest type of stealing, or more appropriately speaking adattādāna. The 'mahāvratā' is thus termed as 'sabbāo-addinnādānāo-veramaṇaṃ', meaning that the monks take the vow to avoid appropriating, or using anything, which they have not been given, or allowed its use by the lawful proprietor. This goes to the extent that the Jaina monk or nun, even if starving, would never pick up even a wild fruit from the ground (of course it implies another sin of hurting the life existent in the vegetable or fruit and thus leading to the violation of the vow of non-violence), nor would he or she use even a blade of dry grass lying about him or her (this does not involve violence because it does not have life), nor even a stone, because he or she finds no one to give these objects to him or her, or a permission to use the objects. If he or she confronts such a situation, it is customary even now that the monk or nun is supposed to get

a permission, though only a formal one, by the Indra.¹ Thus would he or she allow himself or herself to take the required object, though only those objects which do not involve violence at all. This therefore enunciates that he or she cannot even touch anything from pin to crown without getting permission from some one.

Thus, the 'asteya mahāvratā' of the monks or nuns states : Nowhere in a village, city or forest, can a monk take an animate (sacitta) or inanimate (acitta) objects whether small in quantity (alpa), large in quantity (bahu), small in size (aṇu), or large in size (sthūla), without the permission of the owner. He would not only abstain himself from taking any object but also abstain from asking others to take any object; nor would he appreciate some one else bringing the object to him.² The monk is supposed to abstain completely through mind, speech and body and for the whole life.³

Taking into account the strictest form of the precept of the monks, the scriptures have divided 'adattādāna' or stealing into four major categories. Any violation, major or minor, of the precept would fall in any one of the four categories.⁴

This classification of adattādāna strictly relates to the monks' precept and not to that of the laity. The categorization is made, (1) pertaining to the owner (svāmi), (2) pertain-

1. Bhag. 16.2.4.

2. अहावरे तच्चे भंते ! महव्वए अदिण्णादाणाओ वेरमणं । सव्वं भंते । अदिण्णादाणं पच्चक्खामि । से गामे वा नगरे वा, रण्णे वा, अप्पं वा, बहूं वा, अणुं वा थूलं वा चित्तमंतं वा, अचित्तमंतं वा नेव संयं अदिण्णं गिण्हज्जां, नेवऽण्णेहिं अदिण्णं गिण्हाविज्जा, अदिण्णं गिण्हंतेऽपि अण्णे न समणुजाणामि । —Daśav. 4. 9.

3. जावज्जीवाए, तिविहं तिविहेणं मणेणवायाएकायेणं न करेमि न कारवेमि, करंतंपि अणं न समणुजाणामि । —Ibid.

4. Abhidhāna Rājendra Kośa, vol. I, p. 538.

ing to the living being, (jīva), (3) pertaining to the tīrtha, and lastly (4) pertaining to the teacher (guru). (1) Taking anything, even if it is a blade of grass without the permission of the owner, is named as Svāmi-adattādāna. (2) Ordaining a pupil without the consent of the guardians, even though the pupil is desirous of getting himself ordained, is committing Jīva adattādāna. (3) Acceptance of the alms which are made forbidden by the Tīrthaṅkaras or omniscients is called Tīrthaṅkara adattādāna. For instance the food prepared for the monk called 'adhākarmī-ahāra'¹ is not allowed. If the monk accepts such food or any other requisite purposely brought for him, he indulges in the Tīrtha-adattādāna. (4) Lastly if the monk accepts the alms, which are given by the owner without the consent and permission of his preceptor or guru, he is said to be involved in Guru-adattādāna; though they are quite fit and worth using for a monk ('worth-using' means that they are in accordance with the order of the pontiff and do not involve even the slightest violence, nor are they prepared for the monk such as adhākarmī etc.).

The classification of 'adattādāna' (not only 'steaya' in ordinary sense) is quite comprehensive, yet it is not free from the fallacy of overlapping. So far as svāmi-adattādāna is concerned, it clearly emphasizes that a Jaina monk is supposed to abstain from all major or trivial stealing. This rigour in his code of conduct greatly helps him to avoid indulgence in major transgressions. Then again about 'tīrthaṅkara-adattādāna' and 'guru-adattādāna' one can see more a lack of reverence for and faith in the scriptures and the preceptor than the vice of stealing. True adattādāna is therefore 'svāmi-adattādāna', which can be seen further amplified in the bhāvanās pertaining to this vow.

1. Piṇḍa. 92, 93; Dharma Saṃgraha, 3.22.

The Five Bhāvanās

The bhāvanās¹ pertaining to this vow are again five in number like those of non-violence. The first bhāvanā with regard to this mahāvratā is called 'avagrahānujñāpanā'. It concerns accommodation; it suggests that the monk should personally go to the owner of a particular place or an object, or one upon whom the rights of ownership have been conferred, and modestly ask for the permission of a temporary stay in a particular place (where he wants to stay) or that object of which the person is the supposed owner. (2) Then the monk should try to acquire some knowledge of the boundary etc. of the place where he is to stay. This is called as 'avagraha sīmāparijñānata'. (3) Further the monk should specifically state those particular parts which he is going to use or where he is going to reside and for what purposes he is going to use them, and get the permission by the owner or the owners of the house. This is called 'svamevāvagrahānugrahaṇatā.' (4) The Fourth bhāvanā is called 'sādharmikavāgrahānujhāpya paribhojanatā', that is the monk should give the accommodation to the monks of the same order (Sādharmi) and take their meals with their permission. (5) Lastly it is desirable for the monk to get the permission by his preceptor (guru) or elders for taking the food he has brought in his begging rounds. This is called anujñāpyaparibhojanatā. In this way the monk is expected to keep himself away from the slightest touch of stealing in his daily life. Even the requisites should be used by getting the permission from his preceptor or guru. Though these bhāvanās or helping devices are apparently formal and trivial but they are made to restore and enhance proper discipline among the monks and nuns. When the monk, out of negligence, transgresses this rigorous vow, even in the slightest

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1. उग्राह अणुण्णावणया, उग्राहसीमजाणया, सयमेव उग्राहं अणुगिण्हणया, साहम्मिय उग्राहं अणुण्णविय परिभुंजणया, साहारणभत्तपानं अणुण्णविय परिभुंजणया ।—Samavāy. 25.

degree, and is said to have committed some mild offences against the precept of non-stealing, he acknowledges them while reciting his Pratikramaṇa Sūtra in his daily practice performed twice a day.

Exceptions

So far it has been shown that the mahāvratā of non-stealing proclaims that the monk never indulges in any kind of stealing or adattādāna, and it allows no exceptions, but really speaking this is not so, certain exceptions are accepted as legitimate in exceptional circumstances, i. e. in certain cases violation of the rigorous precept is not regarded as immoral, for example, to commit a lesser evil in order to abstain from the higher or greater evil. In this sense casuistry works as a practical guide in all the mahāvratas of the monks.

Under ordinary conditions the monk, as has been shown, abstains from all adattādāna; without proper permission he would not even touch a single thing (however trivial it may be). But in exceptional circumstances, as for example in scorching heat or biting cold in an unknown village, where he reaches by his pedestrian journey, he may stay in some place, mildly sheltered or completely covered just to relax a little, after the tiring journey, without even getting the permission of the owner, and is allowed to take the permission afterwards.¹ The monk violates his precept under such conditions, only with a view to safeguarding his other precepts and avoiding an undue arousal of Kaṣāyas (or passions) which may even be more drastic than the trivial violation. The precept here

1. कप्पई निग्गंथाण वा निग्गंथीण वा पुव्वामेह ओग्गहं अणुण्णवेत्ता तओ पच्छा ओगिण्हित्तए । अहं पुण जाणेज्जा-इह खलु निग्गंथाण वा निग्गंथीण वा नो सुलभे पडिहारिए, सेज्जासंथारए ति कट्ठु एवण्हं कप्पई पुव्वामेह ओग्गहं ओगिण्हित्ता तओ पच्छा अणुण्णत्तए । मा वहउ अज्जो वई अणुलोमेणं अणुलोमेयव्वे सिया ।

—Vyavahāra. 8. 11.

is not made too lax but is made to relax so much as is necessary, taking into consideration the physical limitations of body or mind of a normal human being. As is pointed out in the scriptures such violation is not termed as a transgression or an aticāra but only an apavāda, which is equally a moral path.

Transgressions and Punishments

Against the theoretical acceptance of the vow in this rigorous form, the stealing of the requisities was perhaps a very common offence among the monks, as it is clear from various punishments ascribed to different types of stealing. Though the details, as has been pointed out, are found only in the Chedasūtras, one reference can be cited from Sthānāṅga Sūtra, where anavasthāpya punishment¹ is inflicted upon the monk for stealing. When the monk steals something from his coreligionist, he is punished with anavasthāpya. Even the Ācārya who stole the valuables and ordinary requisites of his coreligionists is said to have been punished;² and a monk was punished who collected for himself excess requisites secretly besides those for the whole sect (or gaccha), and another monk who acquired another set of requisites on a false pretext that his old set of garments, or other things, was burnt or torn was also punished. All these are punished on the charge of committing the offence against non-stealing and are punished according to the gravity of the offence. Another common offence mentioned in the texts is stealing of the requisites of a monk of the rival sect,³ this was deemed a greater offence. If a monk was exposed in this attempt and if a case was filed against him in the court of the Ācārya he is said to have been punished with 'Cheda'.⁴ If on the other

1. Sthan., p. 162 b.

2. Brh. Kalp. Bhā., vol. V, 5064-87.

3. Sthān., p. 162b.

4. Brh. Kalp. Bhā. 5091.

hand the king expelled him from his kingdom on account of this offence then the Saṃgha punished him with 'pārāñcika'.¹

It is, however, difficult to draw conclusions on the basis of such scanty illustrations, yet "it may be noted that the human crave for storage and striving for the beautiful persisted even in monk life in some cases."²

Asteyāṇuvrata

Asteyāṇuvrata for the laity is partial abstention from stealing. Really speaking, the precept of the laity refers to stealing (in the popular sense of the term) than to adattādāna. In technical terms it is called 'thūlao addinnādānao veramaṇaṃ', i. e. abstention from major type of 'adattādāna'. It is said that one who is not fully capable of observing the mahāvratā of the monks should at least observe the aṇuvrata,³ which means that one should give up only major acts of stealing by committing which a person is generally regarded as a thief or a robber,⁴ that means the laity who adopt the aṇuvrata have the liberty to use those things which are open for public use, for example the using of water from public wells or public taps etc., or those which are commonly called public utility services. The major types of stealing are of five types which the lay-people are supposed to abstain from.⁵ These are : (1) to break into the walls and boundaries of a house with the intention of stealing, (2) to open the knot of a

1. Ibid.

2. History of Jaina Monachism—S. B. Deo, p. 435.

3. असमर्था ये कर्तुं निपानतोयादिहरणविनिवृत्तिम्,
तैरपि समस्तमपरं नित्यमदत्तं परित्याज्यम् ।

—P. S. U. 106.

4. Yogaśāstra – Hemacandra, 2.65.

5. तइयं अणुववयं थूलओ अदिण्णादाणाओ वेरमणं । से य अदिण्णादाणे पंचविह पण्णत्ते, तं जहा खत्त खणणं, गंठि भेयणं, जंतुग्घाज्जं पडियवत्थुहरणं ससाभिवत्थुहरणं । इच्चेव माइयस्स थूल अदिण्णादाणस्य पच्चक्खाणं ।

—Upāsaka., 1.15, Śrā. Prati., Śrāvaka Sūtra.

baggage, (3) to break open the locks, (4) to take something lying open on the ground, (5) and lastly to take others' belongings by robbing them. These five are the symbolic representation of all kinds of theft which no householder should indulge in.

The householder, further proclaim the scriptures, abstains himself from such stealing for the whole life. He commits theft neither through his mind, speech or body; nor does he ask others to commit such an act of stealing. Here again like 'ahimsāṇuvrata', the act of stealing is not forbidden to be appreciated by some one through any of the three instruments of mind, speech or body.¹ This may sound strange that the appreciation of stealing is not forbidden for the householder, while doing by himself and making others do such an act is denounced. But the reason of this perhaps lies in the fact that his precept is formed only on a realistic basis and practical considerations. Another reason of this laxity can also be suggested, that is appreciation is only a mental process and it does not disturb social orderliness, whereas the householder's precept stands more for the harmony of society and avoidance of chaos in the society.

The Digambara version of the vow is only slightly different. The Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvākācāra points out, "He who does not appropriate to himself, nor give away to any body else the property of another whether placed or deposited, dropped or forgotten by him, is said to observe the layman's vow of non-stealing."²

The Five Aticāras

For understanding properly the precept of non-stealing of the householder in practical conditions, five major transgres-

1. जावज्जीवाए दुविहं तिविहेणं न करेमि न कारवेमि मणसा वयसा कायसा
—Upāsaka. 1.15.

2. निहितं वा पतितं वा सुविस्मृतं वा परस्वमविसृष्टं ।

न हरति यन्न च दत्तं तदक्लेशचौर्यादुपारमणम् ॥

—Ratnak. Śrā, 57.

sions or aticāras like those of ahimsāṇuvrata¹ are mentioned in the scriptures. The layman acknowledges them if he has committed any while reciting the Pratikramaṇa Sūtra. These are : (1) Buying a stolen article or property, (2) imparting instruction on the method of committing a theft, or engaging thieves, (3) evading the civil laws and political laws, (4) adulteration and selling impure commodities and deceiving the customer and (5) keeping false weights and measures. In these five heads come all the modern businessmen's tacts, of wrong sampling, reducing the quality of the product, getting involved in smuggling markets, buying smuggled goods, helping the smugglers, etc.

So the precept of non-stealing for the laymen like the precept of non-violence, which is a path of less violence, is the path of less adattādāna which does not include the minor or formal types of 'adattādāna' which the monks abstain from, or take the permission even for a very mild use of an article. The Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvākācāra likewise tells of these five aticāras again,² but they are called 'vyatīpātas' which however means the same, i. e. going beyond the prescribed limits.

Buddhism

In the threefold division of śīla, i. e. sammā vācā, sammā kammanā and sammā ājivā, adattādāna-virati occupies a position in sammā kammanā, though indirectly it is also included in sammā ājivā, because it mainly pertains to the acts of a person.

Certain quotations from various Buddhist texts can be quoted in order to show the importance and emphasis given

1. तंजहा तेनाहडे, तवकरप्पओगे, विरुद्धरज्जाईकम्मे, कूडतुल्लकूडमाणे,
तप्पडिस्वगववहारे ।

—Upāsaka. 1.43, Śrā Prati.; Tattvā. 7.27.

2. चौरप्रयोगचौरार्थादानविलोपसदृश्यसन्मिश्राः
हीनाधिकविनिमानं पञ्चस्तेयव्यतीपाताः ।

—Ratnak. Śrā., Stanza 58.

to the precept in Buddhism. In the Vinaya a prominent part is devoted to this precept.

“A disciple knowing the Dhamma should refrain from stealing anything at any place, should not cause another to steal anything, should not consent to the acts of those who steal anything, and should avoid every kind of theft.”¹

“Putting away theft of that which is not his, he abstains from taking anything not given, therewith he is content and he passed his life in honest and purity of heart.”²

“You shall neither rob nor steal, but help every one to be the master of the fruits of his labour.”³

“One who does not take anything ungiven, small or large, major or minor, fateful or unfateful, is called a Brāhmaṇa.”⁴ Brāhmaṇa, according to Buddha, is a person who is established in ‘Dhamma’ or righteousness.

All these passages reveal the significance of the precept of adattādāna-virati. An important point with regard to the precept in Buddhism as distinguished from Jainism is to be noted at the outset, that is, in Buddhism the vices of pariggaha (or possession) and adattādāna (stealing) are usually mixed up as can be seen in the Dīgha Nikāya. It has also been already noted that no precept of aparigraha or non-possession occurs

1. ततो अदिन्नं परिवज्जेय्य, किञ्चि क्वचि सावको बुज्झमानो ।
न हारये हरतं नानुजञ्जा, सव्वं अदिन्नं परिवज्जेय्य ॥
—S. N., Dhammikasutta, 20.
2. अदिन्नादानं पहाय अदिन्नादानां पटिविरतो होति दिन्नादांयी दिन्नापाटि-
करवी अथेनेन सुच्चिभूतेन म अत्तना विहरति । इदं पिस्स होति
सीलस्मि । —Dīgha., vol. I, p. 55.
3. Dīgha., vol. I., p. 55.
4. योष दीघं वा रस्सं वा अणु-थूलं सुभासुभं,
लोके अदिन्नं नादियते तमहं ब्रूमि ब्राह्मणं ।
—Dhammapada, Brāhmaṇavagga, 27.

separately in Buddhism in Pañcasīla for the laity as it does in Jainism. Though both these virtues cannot be regarded as identical in one sense, they should be understood as similar, i.e. the root of both the vices of stealing and possession is greed or covetousness, and in this sense Buddhism is right in regarding them as similar. As soon as this root is eradicated almost both the vices would vanish. This is perhaps the only basis of the mixing of the two in Buddhism. However, it cannot also be thought that Buddhism has over-assimilated the two vices of stealing and possession, and has altogether ignored the difference between the two because in the ten precepts (dasasīlas) of the monks at least Buddhism separately puts the precept of jatarūpa-rajata-pratigrahaṇa-virati, though for the laymen it is not separately stated in the Pañcasīlas. But in short it can be said that it is parigraha which gives rise to 'adattādāna'. In the Dīgha Nikāya¹ parigraha is condemned. Parigrahi (one who has attachment for possession) cannot free himself from hatred (vaira), nor is he free from violence (vyāpāda), at the same time he is filled with afflictions (kleśas) and all things of this kind. On the other hand, an 'aparigrahi' is automatically free from hatred (vaira), violent attitude (vyāpāda), afflictions (kleśas) and all things of this kind. So Buddhism proclaims non-attachment for possession not only for the eradication of the vice of stealing but also for the other basic evils. Wealth and property are not help but hindrance to moral life as such; this is why Buddha never had a deep contempt for wealth. In some places, even in Dhammapada it is said, "one would face several difficulties in old age without wealth, and life would become miserable without it."² Every Buddhist has certainly to acquire some wealth,

1. सपरिग्रहा भो गोतमो सवेरचित्ता.....सव्यापज्जचित्ता भो गोतम....
संकलिट्ठचित्ता.....अवसंवत्ती.....अपरिग्रहो भो गोतमो.....
अवरेचित्तो....अव्यापज्जं....असंकलिट्ठं....वसवत्ती भो गोतमो ।

—Dīgha , Tevijja. Sutta. 28, 45.

2. अचरित्वा ब्रह्मचरियं अलद्धा योब्वने धनं,
सेन्ति चापातिखित्ताव पुराणानि अनुत्थनं ।

—Dhammapada, 156.

but what is condemned is mere accumulation of wealth and property just for its own sake and sheer attachment to it. As Buddha has said to Anāthapiṇḍaka : "It is not life and wealth and power that enslave man but the cleaving, attachment or tanhā towards them. He who possesses wealth and uses it rightly will be a blessing unto his fellow being." The Buddhist aspiration must be "May I obtain wealth and may the wealth obtained by me be for the benefit of others." With this idea of wealth accumulation the Buddhist moral code for monks asserts that the Bhikkhus should not have a property of their own, they themselves should be poor but the Saṃgha or the community may be rich, and have a property of its own. The property of Saṃgha is for general use and is generally accumulated and preserved. In the Vinaya again it is said that the effort put for the maintenance of the property of Saṃgha (either in the form of increasing it or in the form of preserving it) is not for any personal gain but for the Saṃgha alone, so that the monks individually can keep themselves detached from possessing, and even for the Saṃghas it is said that they (Saṃghas) have no right to accumulate much wealth, corn and servants or any other form of possessions while the people around are suffering from want of their necessities. However personal possessions with attachment are totally condemned; in this sense it can rightly be assimilated to stealing. This has also been remarked by I.B. Horner when she says, "It is particularly reprehensible for a Sākyan monk to steal, since at the time of his entry into order he morally renounced his claim to all personal and private possessions..... In addition, it may be urged that if monks were restrained from stealing any tendencies they may have had towards greed...finery and luxury....would have been reduced and perhaps eradicated."¹

So far the didactic or the idealistic version of this precept in Buddhism has been proclaimed, as it is said that nothing, small or great, costly or trivial, śubha or aśubha should be

1. A Book of Discipline—I. B. Horner, part I, Introduction, p. XXII.

stolen, or got stolen by others or should be approved if got by stealing. In practice, however, in accordance with the moderate attitude of Buddhism it takes a different shape not only befitting the laity but also a moderate ascetic, as is seen in the Vinaya, which is full of such details regarding stealing.

Transgressions and Punishments

The Pātimokkha code elaborately explains the legal aspects of stealing and its transgressions and punishments. Buddhaghōṣa's commentaries on the Vinaya and the Pātimokkha, viz. Samantapāsādikā and Kaṃkhavitariṇi are full of numerous details on stealing as an offence. In many places Buddhaghōṣa describes legal procedures vividly and, as has been already seen, sometimes even mentions offences which were not even included in the Vinaya. However, in all the texts gravity of offences regarding stealing and their corresponding punishments are discussed in substantial detail.

Stealing according to Vinaya means taking away an article which may be something as valuable as a precious stone or as insignificant as a blade of grass, without the permission of the owner. The different categories of stolen property or belongings are, as Vinaya points on,¹ a treasure deposited in the earth, an article lying on the ground, on the bed, on the seat, etc., a treasure lying under water or placed in a boat or any other conveyance or vehicle, an article going in the air or an article lying in the vihāra, anything from a field such as corns etc. or from garden such as fruits, flowers etc., and also property from a village or a forest, animate beings, ranging from the meanest worms up to men and beasts, or inanimate objects. All these objects taken away ungiven

1. भूमदं थसदं अकासदं वेहासदं उदकदं नावदं यानदं भारदं आरामदं विरहादं खेतदं वत्थुदं गामदं अरञ्जदं उदकं दन्तेपाणं वनप्पतिहरणकं उपनिधि सुङ्कघातं पाणो अपदं द्विपत चतुप्पद बहुप्पदं ओचरको ओणिरक्खो संविदावहारो संकेतथम्भं निमित्तकम्मंति ।

—Pārājika, p. 58.

amount to stealing. The severity of the offence depends on the situation and circumstances, intention of the wrongdoer and also upon the value of the property.

To start with, the severest offence committed by a monk or nun in this connection is the offence as we already know, 'pārājika'. It is the second pārājika out of the four which pertains to the gravest violation of the precept of non-stealing for which the monk or nun is excommunicated from the Saṃgha, as it has been seen that the third pārājika pertains to non-violence. The Vinaya points out that the gravity of the offence of stealing mainly depends upon the value of the object stolen, though at the same it is held in the Vinaya that even the stealing of a blade of grass may amount to pārājika the gravest offence.¹ However "these inconsistencies doubtless suggest that these rules were drawn up at different times."²

Actually a monk is accused of 'pārājika' offence when he removes the treasure from its place, takes another's treasure for oneself by breaking the seal, opens the mouth of a jar containing either oil or honey and drinks off its contents, orders another monk to steal a particular article and also sees that his order has been fulfilled, hides an article which he knows to be a stolen article, or refuses to give back the stolen article to its owner either in a village or a forest or jungle. The value however of all those objects must be at least five māśakas or a pada³ or above five māśakas, in order to make it a 'pārājika' offence. Thus in a nutshell, as is said in the Pātimokkha code, a monk is accused of 'pārājika' offence when he takes away something ungiven from a village

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1. Book of the Discipline—I. B. Horner, part I, Intro., p. 22.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Five masakas or pada is prevalent coin of those days having least monetary value.

or from a forest, taking away of which is generally regarded as stealing for which the person whosoever takes it would be called a thief or a robber, and for which he is punished, imprisoned or banished. So the monk is totally excluded from the Saṃgha and would never be held in communion again.¹

After pārājika comes the offence of saṃghādisesa; out of thirteen saṃghādisesa offences at least one pertains to the precept of non-stealing, which is actually an offence against property, caused either by 'possession' or by the stealing of a property, that is to build a hut or a vihāra on a place without the permission of the owner.² Then comes a little less severe offence in Vinaya called 'thullaccaya' often translated as a 'grave offence'. This offence in connection with stealing is the severest of all except 'pārājika' and 'saṃghādisesa'. Under this head comes offences like stealing of a major kind not always fully committed but only partially committed and with full intention, as, for example, trying to remove a treasure by shaking something or by scrubbing it, or to annoy an owner by refusing to give back his deposits etc.,³ or by breaking an article or hiding it or rendering it useless by passing urine on it or by throwing leavings of food etc. on it with the intention of stealing it.⁴ But the most popular thullaccaya offence in the

1. यो पन भिक्खु गामा वा अरञ्जा वा अदिन्नं थेय्यसंखातं आदियेय्यु यथारूपे अदिन्नादाने राजानो चोरं गहेत्वा हनेय्युं व वन्धेय्युं..... भिक्खु अदिन्नं आदियमानो अथं पि माराजिकोहोति असंवासो ।

—Bhikku Pātimokkha-pārājika-dhamma.

2. सञ्जाचिकाय पन भिक्खुना कुटिं कारयमानेन अस्साभिकं अत्तुद्देसं पमाणिका कारेतब्बा । भिक्खु वा अनभिनेय्य वत्थुदेसनाय, पमाणं वा अतिककामेय्य, संघादिसेसो ।

—Pārājika, p. 220.

3. अग्घनकं थेय्यचित्तो आमसति, फन्दापेति आपत्ति थुल्लच्चयस्स साभिकस्स विभत्ति-उप्पादेति आपत्ति धुल्लच्चयस्स ।

—Pārājika, p. 63.

4. Samantapāsādikā II, p. 321.

Vinaya is actually the prior stage of pārajika, when he (the monk who has the intention to steal) touches a particular thing so that its position is changed and is made to quiver, the thullaccaya offence is in operation;¹ when the act of stealing is completed it amounts to 'pārajika'. In a way it is an incomplete pārajika. It can also be compared to Jaina aticāra which means partial transgression of the vow. And mere acknowledgement of the offence on the uposatha days would save him from being excommunicated. Strangely enough, this offence is not at all discussed in the Pātimokkha code, it is only discussed in the Vinaya. The reason for this may be that Pātimokkha concerns itself only with the actualized offences and their respective punishments, while the Vinaya on the other hand discusses all the transgressions, incomplete, partial or total and not only outer but mental transgressions as well.

A still minor position is occupied by the offence called dukkata, which is a stage of offence even prior to thullaccaya; 'dukkata' simply means wrongdoing. A monk commits a dukkata offence when he has the intention to commit an act of stealing; with this intention he just touches the place where the object is lying or just touches the object but does not make any change in its position, the thing is lying as it is. This can likewise be compared to atikrama and vyatikrama (taken together) of Jainism which are the stages even prior to aticāra. The monk is also accused of this offence when he tempts another monk to steal something², goes in search of something with the idea of stealing, digs the ground or cuts down trees etc., where the treasure is supposed to be buried, or if he obstructs the path of a vehicle (which contains a treasure) with the intention of stealing the treasure.³ It may also refer to the theft of an object of the value of less than five māśakas; how-

1. Ibid.

2. पुरेभत्तं वा पच्छाभत्तं...तेन संकेतेन तं भण्डं अवहरा ति आपत्तिं
दुक्कटस्स । —Pārajika, p. 65.

3. Ibid.

ever, all this refers to the same thing, i. e. the intention and preparation to commit the offence. This offence too is not found in the Pātimokkha code, but it is even weaker in jurisdiction than pācittiya. In fact it is the mildest of all offences.

'Pācittiya' in connection with the violation of non-stealing is another serious offence. As has been seen it is found in the Pātimokkha, unlike the 'thullaccaya' and 'dukkata' offences. In the Pātimokkha those offences are discussed which are consummated offences and are therefore accompanied by punishments, while dukkata and thullacaya are not always complete offences, they are, as has been seen, just the stages of an offence for which mere acknowledgement would be sufficient, and no concrete punishment is required. It is supposed to be a milder offence than 'thullaccaya' but of course severer than 'dukkata'. Out of ninety-two 'pācittiya' rules some pertain to the violation of non-stealing. As for example, taking something (any eatable) into the mouth ungiven other than toothbrush, water and toothpowder, means offence¹ of stealing which is categorised in 'pācittiya', or to hide or cause others to hide a Bhikkhu's bowl or robe or mat or any other requisite such as needlework case, even in joke.² Then again to continue to make use of the robe even after making it over to a Bhikkhu or Bhikkhuni,³ or picking up and

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1. योपनभिक्षु अदिन्नं मुखं द्वारं आहारं आहारेय्य अञ्जत्र उदकदन्तपोना पाचित्तियं । —Pācittiya., p. 126.
 2. यो पन भिक्षु भिक्षुस्स पत्तं वा चीवरं वा निसीदनं वा सूचीघरं वा कायबन्धनं वा अपनिधेय्य वा अपनिधापेय्य वा अन्तमसो हसापेक्खो पि पाचित्तियं । —Pācittiya., p. 167.
 3. यो पन भिक्षु भिक्षुस्स वा भिक्षुनिया वा.....सामं चीवरं विकप्पेत्वा अप्पच्चुद्धारणं परिभुञ्जेय्य, पाचित्तियं ति । —Ibid.

keeping a jewel which may have been dropped,¹ (though not intentionally stolen), are the examples of *pācittiya*.

All these are the offences discussed in the Vinaya regarding the precept of non-stealing ranging from the severest *pārājika* to the mildest *dukkata*. In the *Pātimokkha* code for nuns these offences are again discussed in a slightly different manner. But with regard to this precept of non-stealing the rules are almost similar. It is therefore unnecessary to discuss the code for nuns in this connection.

However, all acts which appear as acts of stealing are not always so, because sometimes mistakenly or half knowingly thing is taken away; the Vinaya proclaims that such acts cannot be called acts of stealing. It is mainly the intention which makes an act of lifting an object an act of stealing or non-stealing. Even if the article is stolen by the monk but the monk repents for it and acknowledges his offence truly and says that he has done so, and when he is told that it is unworthy of a true monk, he repents for it and seeks for its atonement, he minimises his offence because of his verbal expression and mental purity.²

The Precept of Non-stealing for the Laity

The precepts for the laymen, as has been already told, are not as clearly and precisely stated in Buddhism as in Jainism. "In Vinaya literature that has come down to us Gotama is nowhere shown as legislating for his lay followers, as Mahāvīra did for his."³ However, not only the precept of non-stealing but the other precepts also are less stringently bindings upon them as the precept of 'brahmacarya' or celibacy which for the laity is clearly understood as *kāmamithyācāra-virati*.

1. यो पन भिक्खु रतनं वा रतनसम्मतं वा उग्गण्हेय्य वा उग्गण्हापेय्य वा पाच्चित्तियं । —Ibid., p. 215.
2. Book of Discipline, vol. I, I.B. Horner, Intro., p. XIV.
3. Ibid., p. XVII.

The precept is a part and parcel of the life of a moral householder. It is seen in the scriptures in many places that non-stealing is one of the essential virtues of the laity. The limits, for example, of the objects of the value of five *māsakas* however are much relaxed for the laity as distinguished from those for the monks.

In the *Sigālovādasutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* Buddha in his exhortation to *Sigāla* points out four sins, among which stealing is one.¹

The *Sūta* depicts the whole duty of the Buddhist laymen and is concerned chiefly with the cultivation of virtues necessary for preparing the mind of the householder for righteousness and for release from bondage. At another place Buddha says, in four ways a person is to be reckoned as a foe in the likeness of a friend. Out of these one is that, if he appropriates his friend's wealth, this is stealing. It is further said² that the helper and also he who guards and protects the wealth of the heedless³ should be reckoned as a great friend. Such acts as these may be regarded as acts of non-stealing because they are free from greed and covetousness.

The *Mahāmaṅgala Sutta* (the *Sutta* of happiness or good luck) is also intended for the laity. It commends specially as among the greatest of blessings,ceasing from sin and from intoxicating drink, reverence and humility, contentment and gratitude, patience and pleasant speech,"⁴ Here, an indication to the virtue of contentment underlines that non-stealing and non-possession are among the chief virtues of a householder and carry happiness and good luck. Though the Buddhist canonical literature may lack the systematic presentation of the vow of the laity, yet it is mentioned quite often in a casual manner.

1. *Dīgha.*, vol. I, p. 143.
2. *Ibid.*, vol. III, p. 144.
3. *Ibid.*
4. S. N. 16. 7,8.

In conclusion, it can be said that non-stealing (stealing either taken in the sense of a crime or a sin) has been regarded as an important virtue not only in Buddhism but ever since the time of the Ṛgveda. It is one of the most accepted moral tenets of all civilizations, in a certain sense it is made more important than non-violence because it directly deals with social morality. But the newer approach of Śramaṇical systems (Buddhism and Jainism) lies in the fact that this precept of non-stealing is made to base itself on non-violence, the root of all moral principles.

CHAPTER IV

CELIBACY AND CHASTITY

The third moral precept out of five is sexual or sensual restraint in Buddhism. In Jainism and other Brāhmaṇical systems it is counted as the fourth precept. The technical terms used for it are 'abrahmacarya-virati', 'kāmamithyācāra-virati', 'maithuna-viramaṇa-vrata', and 'brahmacarya' in various systems. These are synonymous terms prevalent in entire Indian religious systems, depicting almost the same phenomenon or moral behaviour, out of which only the term 'brahmacarya' is positive and all others are negative. The difference existing in these terms will also be noted as their occurrence and origin etc. will be discussed in each system separately. The term 'brahmacarya', however, is most popular out of all, and is prevalent not only in the Brāhmaṇical systems but also in Śramaṇical systems of Buddhism and Jainism. The reason for its popularity lies in its very connotation and literal meaning which is comprehensive enough to include in itself all allied moral principles, primary and secondary. However, it literally means more than what it conventionally means.

'Brahmacarya', as it is known, means control or complete renunciation of sexual or sensual desires but this is only what it conventionally means. Etymologically, it means more than this. It is a combination of two terms 'Brahman' and 'carya'. 'Brahman' in brief means the ultimate reality, the supreme being, the ultimate or the final truth in the sense of the highest good or ideal, and 'carya' means 'ācāra', code of conduct or way of living. The combined term 'brahmacarya' thus means code of conduct, actions, or movement in quest of true Brahman or the Ultimate Truth, or the practice for the absorption in Brahman. The ideal of 'brahmacarya' is, therefore, the attainment of the final goal of ultimate truth

by eradicating wrong and superficial notions or ideas and avoiding wrong actions. In this sense, in its etymological meaning the term has a close relationship with the principle of truth as a moral and metaphysical principle; and renunciation of sex or sensual desires would be called only a part of 'brahmacarya' as a whole, in so far as sexual or sensual desire becomes a hindrance to the achievement of final goal; in this sense it does not seem very clear as to how the conventional usage has been derived from the etymological meaning; however, there are certain reasons for the derivation of conventional meaning from the etymological meaning.

The term 'brahmacarya' has been directly translated into English as 'celibacy'. This English term has been derived from the Latin word 'Caelebs' which means 'unmarried', 'single', and signifies a state of living 'unmarried'. "Originally it was applied to virgin or widowed state of either sex, but later usage refers it mostly to a man religiously pledged to a single life."¹ But now wherever the term 'celibacy' is used, it signifies a state or religious sentiment which is also depicted by the Indian term 'brahmacarya'. So far as the etymological meanings of both these terms are concerned they have no resemblance with each other. In Christianity modern Protestant churches denounce complete celibacy as the work of a devil; according to them it is God who ordained marriage. However, now there seem to be certain sects in Christianity² in which there is a trend where celibacy and celibate people are respected as highly religious ones; in them, they say, there is a constant striving for the supreme goal. The term 'brahmacārīn' stands for one who observes 'brahmacarya', just as "celibate" stands for the observer of celibacy.

In order to understand the comprehensive and extensively broad implications of the term 'brahmacarya' a peep into the earliest literary account of the Vedas is to be made. In the

1. E. R. E., vol. III, p. 272.

2. Ibid., p. 275.

Ṛgveda the term occurs more in its etymological meaning than in its conventional meaning, though it can well be ascertained that the conventional usage is implicitly contained in its original usage. A 'brahmacārin' in the Ṛgveda is one who has devoted himself to the acquisition of the knowledge of Brahman or Vedic-lore, and the very devotion to this act of acquisition is an act of 'brahmacarya'. The terms 'brahmacarya' and 'brahmacārin' are found to be existent in the Ṛgveda.¹ In the Atharvaveda too the terms 'brahmacarya' and 'brahmacārin' are used more in their etymological senses. Sāyaṇa while explaining the meaning of the term 'brahmacārin' says: one whose conduct and daily practice is to study the nature of Brahman as given in the Vedas is known as a 'brahmacārin'.² And while defining 'brahmacarya' Sāyaṇa says that the Vedas are equivalent to Brahman or Supreme Knowledge, and the duties or code of conduct which are prescribed as worth observing for studying the Vedas is 'brahmacarya'.³ Here the term code of conduct is understood in a broader sense which also includes in itself, sense or sex control, because it is considered directly essential for the study of the Vedas, though in an explicit manner it does not point out control of sexual activities. There are numerous hymns in the Atharvaveda which praise brahmacarya (taken always in the etymological sense), and brahmacārin. Indeed Sāyaṇa says that the gods like Agni etc. have overcome death only because of their 'brahmacarya'. Indra attained heaven only because he established himself in 'brahmacarya'.⁴

However, the importance and popularity of the concept of 'brahmacarya' is not only credited to its etymological meaning but also to its conventional meaning. In its conventional

1. Ṛgveda, 10. 109. 5.

2. ब्रह्मचारी ब्रह्माणि वेदात्मके अध्येतव्ये चरितुं शीलम् यस्य सः ।

—Atharvaveda, 11.5.1.

3. Ibid., 11. 5. 17.

4. Ibid., 11.5.19.

usage, however, it should be borne in mind that sexual chastity was understood in those days only in the sense of partial chastity and not complete celibacy. This shows that social orderliness in daily life was understood as moral principle. In the Ṛgvedic age “the standard or morality was comparatively high; this may be inferred from the fact that adultery and rape were counted among the most serious offences, and illegitimate births were concealed.”¹ Abstinence from adultery etc. was actually inculcated as essential of a good life.

In the Brāhmaṇas and later Saṁhitās too the terms ‘brahmacarya’ and ‘brahmacārin’ are existent. In the Śātapatha Brāhmaṇa also they are available.² “The ‘brahmacārin’ novice or the student was still subjected to severe regulation of life, characteristic of magical asceticism; particularly sexual asceticism was required. According to ancient conception the novice had to live chastely and by mendicancy the decisive source of power of the full Brāhmaṇa was his learning of the Vedas, (which is the real etymological meaning of brahmacarya) a learning which was viewed as peculiarly charismatic After completing his education and appropriate ceremonies the student was expected to establish a household and become a gṛhastha.”³ By this it can be remarked that the conventional usage is deduced from the way of living of the ‘brahmacārin’ devoted to the study of the Vedas, and that all sense-restraint or sex-restraint practised by the student and his life of simplicity formed an example of the life of mendicancy to the exponents of Śramaṇism too. The difference, however, lies in the fact that in the conventional usage of the term what is only one aspect of the life of brahmacārin (i. e. sex restraint) is mistaken for the whole of brahmacarya.

But in the Brāhmaṇas and the Brāhminical systems the culmination reaches when the student enters into the

1. History of Sanskrit Literature—A.A. Macdonell, p. 164.
2. Śātapatha, 9.5.4.12.
3. The Religion of India—Max Weber, p. 59.

life of a householder, which is the most important phase of life and herein lies the difference between Brāhmaṇism and Śramaṇism. In the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa¹ social morality was considerably high as in the Ṛgveda. "Adultery is condemned as a sin against gods especially Varuṇa. In all cases of evil-doing confession is supposed to make the guilt less."² Many other instances can be found which condemn adultery as the opposite of brahmacarya.

In the Upaniṣads too 'brahmacarya' is an important moral principle. Now, since the āsrama system was in prevalence, brahmacarya is ranked as the first phase of life. In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad it is told that the world of Brahman belongs to those who find it by 'brahmacarya'.³ It further says that the fruits of 'brahmacarya' are not fewer than those of yajñas. It is pointed out that 'brahmacarya' is a discipline a student has to undergo, when studying under a guru, by which is revealed to him the pure and unscarred glimpse of the 'ātman' (the conception which is the contribution of the Upaniṣads); the nature of 'ātman' is revealed to all those who can establish themselves in truth, penance, right-knowledge and 'brahmacarya'.⁴ That which is called iṣṭa or ideal is nothing but 'brahmacarya', and that which is called 'Sattrāyaṇa' is also brahmacarya.⁵ All this has been said with the purpose of showing the importance of 'brahmacarya' as a necessary step for the attainment of final knowledge and emancipation or mokṣa.

At this point one story from the Chāndogya Upaniṣad⁶ can be cited. The story goes like this : when Indra and Virocana were inquisitive about the nature of 'ātman', they observed brahmacarya for thirty-two years and then went to

1. Śatapatha, II, 5.2.20.
2. Indian Philosophy—S. Radhakrishnan, p. 131.
3. Chāndo. 8. 4. 3.
4. Muṇḍako. 3. 1. 5.
5. Chāndo. 8. 5. 1-2.
6. Chāndo. 8. 7-11.

Prajāpati to satisfy their query. Prajāpati answered to both of them, but his answer was partial; Indra found the answer unsatisfactory, though Virocana could not realize the incompleteness of the answer. Indra, therefore, came again to Prajāpati and showed his dissatisfaction and asked him to give a satisfactory answer. Prajāpati was pleased on his inquisitiveness, but for this he asked Indra to observe 'brahmacarya' for another thirty-two years. After this he again went to Prajāpati, but again the answer given by Prajāpati did not appeal to him; therefore Prajāpati further asked Indra to observe 'brahmacarya' for another period of thirty-two years. Thus Indra underwent 'brahmacarya' for one hundred and one years to find out the true nature of ātman in which he was ultimately successful. This reveals that a constant effort by way of 'brahmacarya' helps in the attainment of ultimate knowledge of truth; in other words, truth and 'brahmacarya' can be said to have been related as means and end. By this 'brahmacarya' of Indra both conventional and etymological meanings of the term are to be understood

However, in the sense of sexual continence 'brahmacarya' is mentioned in the Upaniṣads, though not in its extreme sense. In fact the Upaniṣads demand a sort of physical preparation for the spiritual fight for which cleansing, fasting, continence, solitude, etc., as purificatory of the body are enjoined;¹ by continence is meant abstinence from sexual relations with any woman other than one's own wife, and having such relations with one's own wife is nothing but 'brahmacarya'.² It can be seen that continence meant in the Upaniṣads is not complete celibacy but something like kāmamithyācāra-virati of Buddhism. Actually there are two standards of morality, the ideal and the social. The ideal standard is personal, as in the case of non-violence it means abstinence from all types of violence; similarly in the case of brahmacarya also it means complete abstinence from sexual

1. Indian Philosophy—S. Radhakrishnan, vol. I, p. 218.

2. Praśna. 1.13.

indulgence. This standard is ideal, everybody is advised to move towards it. The second standard is called social; it prescribes sex relations of a limited form, as much as it is essential for the preservation of society. Firstly it is restricted to wife only; secondly it is allowed for the sake of progeny, and not for the sake of enjoyment.

In the sense of proper control of sensual desires Manu has used the rightest term. He uses the term 'Indriyanigraha' by which he means control of all desires pertaining to various senses, not particularly sex desire. Manu considers it not a specific duty but a general duty or Sāmānyadharmā of all men, as he says kāma (or sensual desire) is needed to be given up which is against 'dharma'.¹ And that which is in accordance with dharma is not only desirable but a duty.² However, 'brahmacarya' in the conventional meaning has been equally prevalent in the Smṛtis. All secondary sexual activities, it is said, are nothing but sexuality itself, and are therefore against brahmacarya.³ Mahābhārata also says, that kāma, krodha and lobha are the enemies of man, but they are weak enemies and are conquerable, and if they are not conquered the gates of hell are open for the man.⁴

Though, it is seen, the control of sense desires is pronounced in all the Brāhmaṇical literature, the most concrete shape to 'brahmacarya' is given in the Pātañjala-yoga-sūtras, among the five abstentions. Here, the primary importance is given

1. परित्यजेदर्थकामौ यौ स्यातां धर्मवर्जितौ । —Manu. 4. 176.
2. Ibid., 5.56.
3. स्मरणं कीर्तनं केलिः प्रेक्षणं गुह्यभाषणं संकल्पोऽध्यवसायश्च क्रिया-
निवृत्तिरेव च एतन्मैथुनमष्टांगां प्रवदन्ति मणीषिणः विपरीतं ब्रह्मचर्यं
एतदेवाष्टभेदकम् । —Dakṣa Smṛti, 7.32.
4. त्रिविधं नरकस्येदं द्वारं नाशनमात्मनः ।
कामक्रोधस्तथा लोभस्तस्मादेतत् त्रयं त्यजेत् ।
—Mahābhā., Udyoga Parva, 70. 32.

to its conventional usage and not to its etymological meaning. The Yama of brahmacarya plainly implies only the sexual restraint, and all other sensual desires are included in it, in so far as they are connected with sexual desires. Vyāsa in his comment on the Sūtras defines brahmacarya as continence which means control of the hidden organ of generation.¹ Vācaspati Miśra, in his explanation of the same, says that simply control of the hidden organ of generation would not mean 'brahmacarya', for even if the organ of generation is held under control, one becomes attached to the sight of a woman,² or upon hearing her talk, or upon touching her limbs which are the seats of kandarpa (passions), and therefore one cannot be said to have him established in continence. So it is not enough to have a check on physical sex indulgence only; it is also necessary that other organs that are very ardent for this are checked with full watchfulness and mental alertness.

The tendency to indulge in incontinence can be checked by the same method of 'pratipakṣa bhāvanā', i. e. by the cultivation of opposites, as for example the desire 'I will commit adultery with another's wife' can be checked by contemplating over the goodness of celibacy as an important step for liberation.

The special remark which Patañjali makes about 'brahmacarya' in another sūtra underlines the exclusiveness and importance of complete sex restraint that has come anew in the Brāhmaṇical thought. The life of a householder is put on the secondary level, and it is forcefully promulgated that an aspirant of spiritual happiness must be a celibate. The Sūtra declares "as soon as one is grounded in abstinence from

1. ब्रह्मचर्यं गुप्तेन्द्रियस्योपस्थस्य संयमः ।

—Vyāsa's Comm. on Pāt. Yoga, 2. 30.

2. The case is just the same, as the sight of man for women.

incontinence he acquires energy.”¹ In his comment to this sūtra Vyāsa mentions that by the acquisition of this energy the yogin increases his unhindered qualities and when he acquires perfection he is able to transfer his thinking to his disciples. Vācaspati Miśra further interprets in his explanation energy as power, by the acquisition of which the yogin can accumulate qualities like minuteness which are not hindered and when perfected he is endowed with eight perfections which have been discussed in Sāṃkhya system also.² He is also able to transfer his thinking to his pupil which relates to the aids of yoga. All this intends to show that sex restraint would give power and energy to a person which can be applied to various other projects. What the modern psychologists would say might be just the opposite of this, but that is an irrelevant point, and not needed to be discussed here. But the regard which is given to celibacy by Patañjali is novel in the Brāhmaṇical thought.

Jainism

In Jainism the concept of ‘brahmacarya’ in its etymological sense is not far to seek. It is said, samyak-darśana, jñāna and cāritra together as a path of liberation constitute brahmacarya.³ The term indicates all relevant virtues which are auxiliary to liberation. The ninth chapter of Uttarādhyayana-sūtra is called ‘Brahmacaryādhyayana’, in which all moral principles are discussed, a fact that shows the comprehensiveness of the term. In general, therefore, it means the means of liberation; but as a precept its field has been restricted to abstention from sexual indulgence, since sex is considered a

1. ब्रह्मचर्यप्रतिष्ठायां वीर्यलाभः । —Pāt. Yoga. 2.38.
2. Eight perfections : Reasoning, Study, freedom from sufferings etc. —Sāṃkhyakārikā, 51.
3. मौनीन्द्रप्रवचनं ब्रह्मचर्यमित्युच्यते । मौनीन्द्रप्रवचनं तु मोक्षमार्गः हेतुतया सम्यग्दर्शनज्ञाननचारित्रात्मकम् । —Sūtrakṛ. 2.5. 1.

major hindrance to liberation. Umāsvāti defines 'brahmācārya' as abstinence from sex desire and sex indulgence is the opposite of Brahman or 'abrahman'. Another term is used for this sex-indulgence called 'maithuna'.¹ The opposite of 'brahmācārya' is regarded as maithuna or mehuṇa (Prakṛt).

The fourth precept in the fivefold scheme of precepts for the monks and the laity in Jainism is maithuna-viramaṇa-vrata, i. e. the vow of abstention from maithuna. The term 'maithuna' is derived from the term 'mithuna'; 'maithuna' means attachment or cleaving towards 'mithuna'. By mithuna is meant a yugala (a pair) and also an act of a pair usually of two opposite sexes male and female; that means sexual union or the act of cohabitation is maithuna. Pūjyapāda points out that the union and bodily contact between the opposite sexes or a desire of it, due to the arousal of moha or infatuation is called 'maithuna',² which is nothing but 'abrahma'.³ More comprehensive implications of the terms 'mithuna' or maithuna are explained by scholars of great eminence. They point out that by the term 'mithuna' implies not only an act of cohabitation of a pair of opposite sexes—male and female, but also that of a pair either of two males or two females. Even these pairs may not be pairs of the same species only but these of two different species as, for example, pairs consisting of a human female and a male animal or a male human being and a female animal. Thus any act of cohabitation whether mental, vocal or physical prompted by infatuation is 'maithuna' or 'abrahma'.⁴ It is further pointed out that the use of some inanimate object by a person (when he makes it function as an opposite sex-companion) to quench the wild desire of sex, or such acts as masturbation etc. come under this

1. मैथुनमब्रह्म । —Tattvā. 7.11.
2. स्त्रीपुंसयोश्च चारित्रमोहोदये सति रागपरिणामाविष्टयोः परस्परं संस्पर्शनं प्रति इच्छा मिथुनम् । —Sarvārthasiddhi, 7. 16.
3. स्त्रीपुंसयोर्मिथुनभावो मिथुनकर्म वा मैथुनं तदब्रह्म । —Ibid.
4. Tattvārtha Sūtra—Pt. Sukhlalji, p. 280.

category of 'abrahma' or maithuna.¹ Thus 'maithuna viraṇa vrata' means abstention from all such sexual acts and other allied acts or all those acts which stimulate sex.

Besides 'brahmacarya' (amaithuna), there is another term used to mean the same phenomenon of sexual restraint in Jainism, that is 'śīla'; this again is too broad. The term 'śīla' means only conduct, yet conventionally it is used to mean good conduct. The opposite of śīla is signified by the term 'kuśīla' or 'duśīla' which means only bad conduct as such. However, it specially refers² to the act of sexual union or 'maithuna' in the Jaina system.

Before proceeding to the actual vows of the monks or the laity it is to be brought in light that, like other vows, this vow of 'brahmacarya' too is dependent on the vow of non-violence. It is asserted in various texts that the vow is rooted in the vow of non-violence, and 'maithun' is also explained as an act of violence. The vow is therefore a corollary of the vow of non-violence; though the value of brahmacarya is much emphasized because the very institution of asceticism is dependent on it, asceticism is futile in itself without the implementation of celibacy. Actually there are only two strong tenets of asceticism, viz. non-violence and celibacy. However, the Jaina thinkers do not forget the importance and top priority given to the concept of non-violence. The scriptures tell that the very act of sexual union would mean the killing of innumerable sukṣma (invisible) living beings, just as, it is pointed out, a person would destroy a tube of cotton by putting a red hot iron into it.³ Similarly Amṛitacandra has said that there

1. Ibid.

2. Āvaśyaka Nirvyukti—Pratikramaṇādhyayana.

3. मेहुणेणं भंते, सेवमाणस्स केरिसिये असंजमे कज्जई ? गोयमा । से जहा नामए केयो पुरिसे ह्य नालियं वा बूर नालियं वा तत्तेण कणयेणं समविद्धंसेज्जा, एरिसएणं गोयमा मैहुण सेवमाणस्स असंजमे कज्जई ।

—Bhag. 2.5

is always violence in every simple act of cohabitation, just as, he says, if in a tube full of seeds a hot rod is inserted, all the seeds would be roasted.¹

With this concept of brahmacarya based on non-violence, its glory is pronounced in the scriptures in various places. In the Uttarādhyayana it is said that all gods, demons and satans, etc., show respect for him who observes brahmacarya, which is very severe and painstaking.² Ācārya Subhacandra repeats the same idea when he says that in all the three universes the vow 'brahmacarya' is one of the supreme vows, though difficult to observe; the observer is worshipped if he observes it sincerely and wholeheartedly.³ Hemacandra also says that a brahmacārin is revered even by the venerables.⁴

The Mahāvratā

The texts singing the glory of 'brahmacarya' refer to the vow of monks, which enjoins the complete renunciation of sex desire. 'Mithuna' in the case of a monk means not only the act of cohabitation, but also the gratification of all the five senses of hearing, taste, vision, smell and touch,⁵ that is

1. हिंस्यन्ते तिलनाल्यां तप्तायासि विनिहिते यद्वत्,
बहवो जीवा योनौ हिंस्यन्ते मैथुने तद्वत् । —P. S. U. 108.
2. देवदाणव गन्धर्वा जक्सरक्सस किन्नरा,
बंधयारि नमंसन्ति दुक्करं जे करन्ति ते । —Uttarā. 16. 16.
3. एकमेव व्रतं श्लाघ्यं ब्रह्मचर्यं जगत्त्रये,
यद्विशुद्धिसमापन्नाः पूज्यन्ते पूजितैरपि ।
—Jñānārṇava, I. 8, 3.
4. समाचरन् ब्रह्मचर्यं पूजितैरपिपूज्यते । —Yogaśāstra, 2.104.
5. (i) सद्धे रूवे य गन्धे य रसे फासे तहैव य,
पंच विहे कामगुणे निचसो परिवज्जए ।
—Uttarā. 16.10.
- (ii) मा रूपादिरसं पिपाससुदृशां । —Amṭagaḍaṃ, 4.61.

sexual desire is equivalent to sensual desire. The vow of the monks technically termed as 'sabbāo mehuṇāo veramaṇaṃ' means all kinds of sexual acts, great or small. By this the monk or nun promises to avoid even the slightest form of sexual activity. Not only this, the touch of a person of the opposite sex including even the animals of opposite sex would be counted as a kind of transgression. The monk takes the vow so strictly as to anxiously avoid even the indirect contact with a woman such as by carpet or some other removable thing. It is undoubtedly true that in this extremism ritualism is much more predominant than any rationalism, but the underlying idea of this ritual is only the preservation of the vow without even the slightest laxity. Only for this reason it seems that these apparently unimportant and trivial rituals are observed even today by the Jaina monks. It is true, though, any transgressing of these extreme laws is more formal than real.

Restraint of all the five kinds of enjoyment of hearing, taste, vision, etc., is included in this precept, because 'any violation of this is likely to lead to ruffled state of mind which is unbecoming of a true monk, and a digression from equanimity and indifference to worldly objects which is the principal motto of monk's life. It is always likely that he falls a prey to the excitation of any of the sense organs, which may lead to the excitation of other sense organs, as for instance eating spicy food, and the sight of a beautiful woman looking at him with lust, though principally matters of taste and sight, are likely to lead to a constant demand for them, or pondering over them, in case the monk could not get them. The slavery to tasteful food etc. is nothing else but attachment to worldly objects. It is likely to distract his attention from spiritual matters. Subhacandra has enumerated ten types of acts which are hindrances for the observance of perfect celibacy, some of them are : the eating of tasty and spicy food, constantly thinking of women, their beauty and charm, recollecting past life of lust etc.¹

1. Jñānārṇava, l. 8, Brahmacharya Prakaraṇa.

The vow of the monk proclaims¹ the abstention from all forms of sex-indulgence which can broadly be grouped under three heads: (1) that which pertains to the sexual union of gods and goddesses, (2) that which pertains to the union of animals (male and female), (3) that pertaining to the human beings. He abstains from doing or arranging it himself, or getting it done by others, or from its appreciation, through mind, speech and body for the whole life, i. e. by the three instruments (yogas) and three performances (karaṇas). In this manner the monk abstains from twenty-seven kinds of sexual activity without the slightest transgression. At another place it is said that this abstinence from sex indulgence is of eighteen kinds.²

The five Bhāvanās³

It is said that the monk always abstains from all major and minor acts of sexual indulgence. With this end in view he tries with five helping devices to observe the vow: (1) the monk, it is said, should cultivate a bhāvanā of giving up the use of beds and other requisites which are used by men and women; (2) the monk or nun should not relate stories of men

1. अहोवरे चउत्थे भंते । महव्वए मेहुणवरेमणं । सव्वं भंते मेहुणं पचक्खामि । से दिव्वं वा माणुसं वा तिरिक्ख जोणियं वा, नैव सयं मेहुणं सेविज्जा, नेवऽण्णेहिं मेहुणं सेवाविज्जा महुणं सेवंतेऽवि अण्णे समणुजाणामि । जावज्जीवाए तिविहं तिविहणं मणेणं वायाए कायेणं न करेमि न कारवेमि करंतपि अण्णं न समणुजाणामि महव्वए उवट्ठिओमि सव्वाओ मेहुणाओ वेरेमणं । —Daśav. 4.10.
2. दिवा कामरइसुहातिविहं तिविहेणं नव विहा विरई । ओरालिया उवितहातं वंभं अट्टदसमेयं । —Samavāya, 18; Āvaśy. Nir., Pratikramaṇādhyayana.
3. इत्थीपसुपंडगसंसत्तगसयणासणवज्जणया, इत्थीकहाविवज्जणया, इत्थीणं इन्दियाणमालोयणवज्जणया पुव्वरयपुष्वकीलियाणं अणणुसरणया, पणीताहारवज्जणया । —Samavāya, 25.

and women with attachment; not only this, the monk should not even think of the sensual or sexual activities in which he indulged in the past, because they are likely to intensify the sex desire; (3) the monk should also avoid looking at the private parts of women with lust and attachment; (4) then again, the monk should abstain from decorating and embellishing his own body by putting scents, perfumes, etc., which may arouse sensual desires, and (5) the monk, it is said, should not take hot or spicy food etc. which would disturb his peaceful and equanimous state of mind. These five types of helping devices are used in order to preserve the vow bodily, vocally and mentally. In the Sthānāṅga these five bhāvanās are split up into nine and are called places of 'samādhi', which are ordinarily called the Navavādas (the nine boundaries) of 'śīla', or 'brahmacarya.'¹ In the Uttarādhyaṃyana they are described as ten.² However, all of them are basically almost the same, and therefore need no repetition.

Exceptions :

So far the discussion pertained to celibacy observed by the monks and nuns under normal circumstances, when a monk would not even touch his sister or mother. In spite of so much rigidity where even the touch (direct or indirect) of the opposite sex is denounced, sufficient room for exceptions (apavāda) is given, as in the case of other vows in which the monk or nun can violate the precept to a certain extent, for which no purificatory action is required.

It has already been seen that under normal circumstances the monk cannot even touch directly or indirectly a person of the opposite sex. But in exceptional circumstances the monk can touch a nun, for example he can treat her if she is ill and if no other nun is available at that time.³ And also, as has

1. Sthān. 9.3.663.
2. Uttarā. 16.1-10.
3. Bṛh Kalp. 6, Sūtras 7.12

been seen, he can even save the life of a drowning nun by plunging into the river, by doing so he apparently violates both the vows of celibacy as well as of non-violence, yet it requires no atonement. It is obvious that even in the extremely rigid vows in Jainism considerable heed to social morality is paid.

Transgressions and Punishments :

Though a considerable room to the exceptions in this vow has been given, Jaina monastic code is strictly rigid on the question of transgressions of this vow. The transgressions cannot in any case be included in the exceptions (or *apavāda*). And as the texts reveal, strict steps were taken against the transgressors generally and especially of this vow, and the precept is supposed to be accepted in its strictest form. The reason for this is, as has been pointed out, that the very organization of monks and nuns rests for its major part on this very precept; the transgressions pertaining to it are, therefore, most cautiously looked into and the punishments likewise most carefully and rigorously inflicted. The severity of the punishment or the *prāyaścitta* depends on the extent and gravity of transgressions. Certain illustrations of transgressions, their atonements and punishments etc. can be seen to have a glimpse of the problem.

If, for example, a monk becomes passionate when he is on the begging round, the second *prāyaścitta* called '*pratikramaṇa*' (condemnation of the transgression) would suffice as an atonement or purificatory action.¹ But for the graver and graver transgressions the punishments would accordingly be severer and severer. All cases of transgressions of this precept and their respective punishments have been recorded, though not so much in the texts of *Āṅgas* (basic canons) as in *Chedaśūtras*, *Bhāṣyas* and *Cūrṇis*, more particularly in the *Niśītha* and *Bṛhtakalpa*. Dr. S. B. Deo has summarized² such transgres-

1. *Aṃtagaḍaṃ*, pp. 503-4.

2. *Jaina Monastic Jurisprudence*, pp. 61-67.

sions and their respective punishments, as for example if a monk pondering over a nun, or desiring to see her again, gets fever due to this desire, or has burning sensation, or has no taste of food etc., he has to undergo fasting for a certain period (different in different cases of intensity of desire and its manifestation) as prescribed by the texts such as laghumāsa, gurumāsa, catvaramāsa, etc.¹ If, for example, he faints due to lust, he has to undergo cheda²; if he becomes hysterical, mūla punishment is inflicted upon him. Anavasthāpya punishment³ is inflicted upon one who has lost his understanding out of this intensity of lust. The last prāyaścitta, pārāñcika, is inflicted upon the monk if, for example, he dies in this intensest outburst of lust⁴ (after death however whatever punishment is inflicted is immaterial). Then again, if for example the monk develops intimacy with a nun or queen, or murders the king for this cause, or indulges in homosexual activities, he is charged with the same pārāñcika punishment⁵, which is the severest punishment in the Jaina code.

These illustrations, which are only a brief sketch of punishments, would tend to show that in the Jaina monastic community the problem was existent in spite of the rigidity of the disciplinary rules. However, these matters of fact enumerations of the punishment would definitely reveal the functioning of the rules with an adjustment to human psychology.

So far it is all regarding the vow of the monks for complete renunciation of sexual desires, but the vow of the laity, like his other aṇuvratas, meaning partial control of sexual and sensual desires, is to be discussed in the second part of this chapter. Here the desire of the laity is confined to one's wife, this is considered less advanced, but not contrary to spiritual endeavour.

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1. Brh. Kalp. Bhā., III, 2258-62.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Sthān , p. 162 b.

Buddhism

The term 'brahmacarya' as available in the Buddhist scriptures is used in both the senses, in its etymological sense and in its conventional sense. In the etymological sense brahmacarya is used as a fixed path leading to Nibbāna.¹ It is the Dhamma which is constituted of four Noble Truths, twelve-fold chain of causation, etc., depicting the metaphysical truth. And establishment in brahmacarya would mean establishment in Buddha's Dhamma and complete removal of suffering.² "Brahmacarya in Buddhist sense means the moral life, holy life, the religious life as a way to end suffering, renouncing the world, study of Dhamma".³ Though the conception of the nature of Brahman differs from system to system, it is universally accepted as the Ultimate Reality. And it has been accepted everywhere that which leads to Brahman or Ultimate Reality is 'brahmacarya'. In Buddhism the term 'Brahman' also meant a particular type of gods supposed to be higher than ordinary ones. But, it seems that it has nothing to do with this concept of Brahman which means the Ultimate Reality.

In the conventional sense, i.e. in the sense of sexual restraint, it forms the third precept for the Buddhist monks and nuns. Among the ten sikkhāpadas of the monks, abstention from brahmacarya is found presented in a negative manner.⁴ It can be more clearly understood by understanding its counterpart meant for the laity as kāmamithyācāravirati, which means partial control of sex desires or of illicit use of sex desires. In case of monks, since it is complete abstention

1. खीणा जाति वुसितं ब्रह्मचरियं कतं करणीयं ना परं इत्थत्तायोति ।
—Dīgha., vol. I, p. 73.
2. स्वाक्खातो धम्मो चरथ ब्रह्मचरियं सम्मादुक्खस्स अन्त किरियायोति ।
—Mahā., p. 16.
3. Pali Eng. Dictionary—Davids and Stede.
4. अब्रह्मचरिया वेरमणी सिक्खापदं समादियामि ।
—Khu. Pāṭha., Dasasikkhāpadas.

from sexual lust, the term 'abrahmacarya-virati' is used, which includes both kāmamithyācāra-virati and kāma-saccācāra-virati; however the householders are allowed for the latter. By this is meant exactly the same what is meant by the Jaina vow of 'Sabbāo mehanao Vera maṇaṃ'.

Understood thus, various passages from Buddhist texts can be cited which reveal the glory of brahmacarya, which should be adopted by every Buddhist monk and nun. For the laity too, as has been told, a limited form of fulfilment of sex desires is prescribed. This concession is given to the laity not for begetting a male child as suggested by the Brāhmaṇical systems, but for an entirely different reason, namely their mental inability to resort to complete sex-renunciation. The more a monk frees himself from sex desires the higher he reaches in the spiritual field. The instinct of sex is badly condemned by Buddha for he says that it is one of the most impatient passions which a human being suffers from. It is remarked at one place that, "If there were another like this, if two such passions instead of one only, held in lodgement in man, the task of preaching his Dhamma would be a hopeless one; it would be impossible to get men to turn their thoughts towards the path of renunciation."¹ At another place it is said, "there is nothing like lust, which may be said to be the most powerful passion, fortunately we have but one thing which is more powerful. If the thirst for truth were weaker than this lust, how many of us would be able to follow the way of righteousness in this world."² Brahmacharya is praised with other virtues as it is said, "Tapas, damana and brahmacharya are the qualities of a true Brahmana."³ The term Brahman however is taken here in its literal sense.

1. Pañcaśīla—Bhikkhu Silācara, p. 140.

2. Sūtra of forty two sections.

3. तपेन ब्रह्मचरियेन संयमेन दमेन च । एतेन ब्राह्मणो होति ।

—Theragāthā, 634.

“Without observing ‘brahmacarya’, as without earning money in youth, one suffers from sorrows and worries in old age like a bird who lives in a pool without fish.”¹

With so much stress on the principle of ‘brahmacarya’ in Buddhism, the precept of the monk takes its most rigorous form. The monk or nun is not supposed to indulge in any sexual act, great or small, not only pertaining to human females but also to goddesses, fairies etc., beasts and eunuchs.²

Like the five bhāvanās or helping devices of Jaina mahāvratā, the Buddhist texts also speak of certain aids for the cultivation and maintenance of this vow, which point out that personal effort in implementation of the vow is basically important. Here a Japanese proverb may be quoted with aptness. It is said, “We cannot prevent the birds of evil from flying over our heads; but we need not allow them to build their nests in our hair.”

Among these aids the first aid is that the monk or nun should avoid taking supplies of overrich and excessive food, which surpasses the limits of nourishing quality and becomes luxurious. This overplus food stimulates the reproductive functions and thus unnaturally stimulates sex. For this reason it seems that Buddha recommended only one substantial meal within twenty four hours.³

Another aid towards keeping this powerful passion in proper subjection is the keeping of the body busy in wholesome activity by the right use of physical exercises. When the body and mind remain engaged in healthy exercises they will have little opportunity for indulging in unwholesome things.

1. अचरित्वा ब्रह्मचरियं अलद्धा यौवने धनं,
जिण्णकोञ्जा वा ज्ञायन्ति खीणमच्छे व पल्लले ।

—Dhammapada, 155.

2. Pārājika, pp. 35-37.

3. विकालभोजना वेरमणी सिक्खापदं ।

—Khu. Pāṭha, Dasasikkhāpadas.

Hence proper exercises are recommended on the basis of the principle of "a sound mind in a sound body."

Again, for the 'sound mind' it is recommended that proper and healthy literature etc. should be read, so that sex does not get unusual and additional support and insalutary thoughts are not provoked.

The fourth aid is the avoidance of pseudo and misleading companions. The texts denounce bad companions as a major hindrance to the upliftment of any aspirant to spiritual enhancement.

The last aid is spoken as the avoidance of resorting to theatrical performances etc. which arouses attachment to worldliness and is therefore against the principle of asceticism.

All these aids are valuable to the maintenance of outer morality only, but a well maintained outer morality will in the long run prove helpful in the advancement of inner morality.

Transgressions and Punishments

For a monastic life 'celibacy' is the most essential precept and, therefore, in the Vinaya and the Pātimokkha a great deal has been said regarding its various facets and its transgressions. The account regarding this is the most detailed one among all the five precepts. How far is the precept violated? How strong are offences? What are their respective punishments? All these questions with all the minutest details are discussed in the Vinaya at length. The transgressions and offences connected with the violation of this precept are regarded as major, because the violation of it by the monks would mean violation not only of this very precept but of other precepts also, such as truth, non-stealing, non-violence, etc., which are closely related to it. The monk plans for illegitimate sex indulgence in a secret manner because it primarily demands a secluded place (in that sense it includes stealing) and then he does not want to disclose it to any one else, out of shame or

out of some other reason, as for example to avoid the punishment, (and in this way he indulges in falsehood). Thus the violation of this precept carries with it other vices also and therefore its violation is considered to be the greatest offence. Its account is so detailed because it is the most shameful offence out of all the offences caused by the violation of the five precepts, and it is directly against the spirit of asceticism.

The discussion of this topic is informative in many ways; such as one gets the knowledge of the prevalent sex habits of the people of those days; one also comes to know about the cautiousness of the compilers of the Vinaya regarding these habits and breach of the precept of celibacy; and one also learns of the results of the forced celibacy which found outlet through improper channels and which might have been much greater in number if normal freedom had been allowed to them. But to a general reader still it contains a tinge of obscenity and vulgarity at many places. However, it is clear that the Vinaya is clear and distinct on every possible transgression. "Almost all the cases in the Pātimokkha code about celibacy and its violation are drawn up with a view to having a recorded decision on every possible occurrence. They are interesting mainly as evidence of legal acumen and are of value for the history of law."¹ For the study of law it is extremely necessary to go into all the minutest details, but for the present purpose it is not needed to go into all those details, though in brief everything is to be mentioned.

At the outset *pārājika*²—the most rigorous offence committed by the monk in connection with the precept of celibacy—is to be discussed. The monk, as is told, totally abstains from indulging in any major or minor sexual act with human beings as well as beasts. In the category of *pārājika* come all such offences of extreme type committed by a monk against

1. E.R.E., vol. 3, p. 271.

2. यो पण भिक्खु मैथुनं घमं पटिसेवेय्य पाराजिको होति असंवासो ति ।

—*Pārājika*, p. 26.

women, eunuchs, fairies or beasts of the opposite sex¹ or a corpse or a dead body and even homo-sexuality of extreme type. When there is a complete or an incomplete sexual intercourse with full intention of having sexual intercourse sometimes by persuading and convincing the woman, sometimes with a view that it would not lead to drastic consequences, because the other partner is either permanently or temporarily incapable of producing a child and therefore forcibly indulging in it, and getting involved in such acts out of mad passion are the examples of 'pārājika' offence,² which would lead to their excommunication.

In the second category called Saṁghādisesa come offences milder than those of 'pārājika'; these offences pertain to what are called secondary sexual activities. Intentional or unintentional emission of semen,³ coming in close physical contact with a woman, embracing her, holding her hand or plait of hair, praising her beauty out of lust, admiring her organs connected with sex,⁴ addressing a woman in coarse and indecent language which stimulate sexuality,⁵ or persuading a woman and begging for sex relationship and convincing her by saying that sex relations with a religious person would give her religious progeny or will enable her to obtain her husband's love etc. is Saṁghādisesa, in so far as it is not actually committed, but if the act is materialized it is 'pārājika'. However, it is the presence of lust which makes all these acts sexual, if, for example, to explain the doctrine of

1. Ibid., p. 36.

2. Ibid, pp. 37-50.

3. सञ्चेतनिका सुक्कविस्सट्ठि अञ्जत्र सुपिनन्ता संवादिसेसो ति ।

—Pārājika, p. 152.

4. भिक्खु ओत्तिण्णो विपरिणतेन चित्तेन मातुगामेन सद्धि कायसंसग्गं समापज्जेय्य हत्थग्गाहं वा वेणिग्गाहं वा अञ्जतरस्स वा अञ्जतरस्स वा अंगस्स परामसनं संवादिसेसो ति । —Ibid., p. 171.

5. Ibid., pp. 176, 183, 185.

brahmacarya a well-read monk or a 'Vinayadhara' explains certain facts about sex and the beauty of women etc. in order to condemn sexuality, his act would not be considered contrary to celibacy, nor would he be accused of any offence.

In the descending order comes another offence called thullaccaya; this is an offence not existent in the Pātimokkha code, though it is frequently available in the Vinaya. Under this come the offences¹ like performing surgical operations etc. upon the secret parts of the body or touching breasts of the opposite sex, or constantly looking at their sexual organs or homosexuality of a comparatively minor form or taking hot water bath which stimulates sex.

Still less severe offence called pācittiya² includes offences like having appointments with women, getting the undergarments washed by nuns, travelling on high roads or in boat with a woman or a Bhikkhuṇī by special appointments, without the permission of Saṃgha.

The mildest offence called dukkaṭa³ refers to indulgence in passions of a still milder form such as climbing a tree with a woman or having pleasure trips with her in a boat, passing remarks about the dresses of women or touching a female animal with a lustful mind or *matchmaking* etc. Such minor acts, it seems, have been called offences in the Vinaya, because they may lead to actual violation of the proper precept of complete celibacy.

For all these offences ranging from the gravest to the mildest the punishments are inflicted upon the monk only after collecting sufficient evidence against him. Before closing the discussion, however, one remark should be made, i. e. though system and orderliness has been observed in categoriz-

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1. Pārājika, pp. 36-39.
 2. Pācittiya (Bhikkhu-Vibhaṅga), Nos. 26-28, 30.
 3. Pārājika, pp. 182-84, 187.

ing the offences, the categorizing appears less scientific; for it appears to a general reader of the Vinaya that sometimes a very severe offence is placed in a minor category such as dukkaṭa or pācittiya, while a very trivial offence which possesses only a ritualistic significance is included in the higher or rigorous section. As, for example, the use of a decomposed corpse to quench the blind and impatient sex desire is only a dukkaṭa offence, while touching the hair of a woman or praising her beauty is considered to be saṃghādisesa offence.

So far, in the discussion, only the Bhikkhu Pātimokkha is referred to, but in the Bhikkhuni Pātimokkha the precept and its violation are discussed independently and even with more cautiousness. Actually on the ground of this precept only the distinction between the Bhikkhu and the Bhikkhuni Pātimokkha appears to have been made, otherwise the differences in the two codes are almost negligible. The rules regarding nuns however are even more rigid than those regarding the monks; as for example the saṃghādisesa of monks might amount to the pārājika of the nuns.¹ The reason for this is only that women occupied an inferior position in Buddhist community as compared with men. But so far as the legal proceedings of the offences and the transgressions of the precepts are concerned there does not exist much basic difference. Therefore it is not very necessary to discuss all these offences again. The ideal for both Bhikkhus and Bhikkhunis lay in leading a chaste life, which is intrinsically one and the same for both.

1. When a man holds the hand of a nun out of lust, but nun does not get annoyed on this and does not try to run away, on the other hand she enjoys his company, talks with him and goes to a lonely place with him, she is accused of Pārājika offence.—Bhikkhuni Pātimokkha—Pārājika, 8.

On the other hand, in the case of a monk it would be counted as a Saṃghādisesa offence only.

Kāmamithyācāra-virati or Chastity¹ :

The laity's precept of 'kāmamithyācāra-virati' is directly associated with the institution of marriage; in this sense marriage is correlated to the concept of celibacy also. Though it may appear as contrary to the principle, it should be understood as a direct corollary of the principle of brahmacarya, it (marriage) is a middle course between the two extremes of completely celibate life on the one hand and a purely adulterous life on the other. However, the institution of marriage occupies an important place in the whole of Indian culture and religion and therefore tracing out its position historically in different times ever since the age of the Ṛgveda is a part of our discussion of brahmacarya. Not only in the Brāhmanical conception, but also in the Śramaṇical culture, the institution of marriage has its due place, though the aims of marriage in the two cultures however are different. An historical account of the institution of marriage, its aim and development, is very necessary and important in the sense that it gives an idea of relative social habits in different times and cultures, and also an idea of different ethical standards in different times.

Marriage in itself is not an instinct, but an institution based on an instinct or the need to mate. It is a symbol of development of the advanced human make up, which manifests the fulfilment of the basic desire of sex in a controlled and channelized form and stoppage of anti-social outburst of this desire and where 'the adjustment of two personalities to a common way of life is full of delights and difficulties, reconciliations and disagreements.'

2. The term 'brahmacarya' has been translated into English as celibacy which implies total renunciation of sex desire; and the term kāmamithyācāra-virati has been translated here as chastity which implies restriction of sex desire to one's wife, and renunciation of adultery.

It is very difficult to say when the institution of marriage came into evolution, though it may be held that there might have been a period in which it evolved as a reform, a possibility which has been accepted by some Indian scriptures. (However one can take it rather as a mythological account than as a historical fact.)

Marriage was a flourishing institution in the Ṛgvedic society; in the Ṛgveda no such account is available where it is considered an evolvment by any human agency. The institution, it seems, had its roots long before the Vedic age. But in the Mahābhārata, of course, reference is made to a period in which men approached women whenever they felt the urge to mate, which should be supposed to be an age much earlier than the age of the Ṛgveda. According to the Mahābhārata, it was Śvetaketu who introduced the institution of marriage by observing the ill consequences of a free society. In the prevalent custom, with all its restrictions and limitations, marriage may be supposed to be an evolution at a certain time; however, in so far as marriage means constancy in mates, it is difficult to trace out its origin as suggested by the Mahābhārata.

Now, in the Ṛgvedic times, as has been told, the institution of marriage was fully flourishing, and it was given a religious sanctity as well. Though the 'āśrama' system as such was not fully prevalent, the ideality of gṛhastha was accepted, and leading the life of a householder was regarded as the supreme ideal of life and was supposed to be a religious sacrament, which every 'Āryan' had to undergo. Certain important aspects of the Ṛgvedic society can be summarized as follows : (1) Marriage is the most prominent feature of Ṛgvedic India because the number of enemies was much more than the Āryans themselves. So their material prayer was : 'the husband should be the eleventh male member of the family, the rest ten being his sons',¹ but that could have been

1. दशास्यां पुत्रानां धेहि पतिमेकादशं कृषि । —Ṛgveda, 10. 85. 45.

possible only through a permanent wife, (2) at that time there was a stress on the preservation of purity of blood which was solely dependent on marriage, (3) it was a time when nomadic life was over and settled home became an imperative which possibly depended on the institution of marriage.

These points thus show the purpose of Ṛgvedic idea of marriage, the essence of which lay in begetting male children; the wife was expected to bear heroes for the propagation of the race of her husband, this end was not only social but also religious. This is a point which remarkably distinguishes the Vedic conception from the Śramaṇic conception of marriage. While in the Śramaṇic conception marriage and begetting children is only subordinate to ethical code, but in the Vedic society it is the supreme ethics of life. It is not a lesser evil to avoid the greater evil but the supreme good.

The marriage system too was not in the stage of infancy, but was much advanced in the sense that choosing spouses was the responsibility not of the parents but of the boys and girls themselves. The father or the brother of the girl though played the role of a guide, the authority of finally choosing the boy lay in the hands of the girl herself. That means that the girl was not a child but a matured person to be able to think of her own right and wrong. That shows that it was a society in which full freedom was available to boys and girls. However, as seen before, adultery and rape etc. were understood as some of the most serious offences, and consequently illegitimate births were concealed. Here, therefore, lay the essence of the precept of kāmamithyācāra-virati.

In the period of Brāhmaṇas, the life of gṛhastha is given full regard and is understood as of fundamental importance as in the Ṛgvedic age. At one place Sage Nārada addresses King Hariscandra and tells of the importance of having a son, a wife, and the life of a householder. It is said, "Food is man's life, and clothes afford protection, gold gives him

beauty, marriages bring cattle, his wife's a friend, his daughter causes pity, and a son is like the light in the highest heaven."¹

In the Upaniṣads, though both of the last two 'āśramas', that is vānaprastha (a recluse) and saṁnyāsa (renunciation), have been introduced, and also are valued highly, the stage of the householder is presumed to be a very important one; however, while advocating the adoption of a 'gṛhastha' it is pointed out that the ultimate aim of a married life as that of the whole life is spiritual realization. Adoption of a married life is a religious sacrament, a form of divine service. Without the presence of the wife no religious ceremony is considered to be complete in the Upaniṣadic period. Actually this Upaniṣadic period can be conceived as a period of synthesis of the Brāhmaṇical and the Śramaṇical thought.

The circumstances were now changed, everything was more settled than before, philosophical speculations were aroused, there were appreciable changes in other fields too, people were more absorbed in thinking of supramundane goal, renunciation and liberation were for the first time recognised. In spite of this the Upaniṣadic seers could not altogether give up what their ancestors valued so highly. The institution of marriage was held in high esteem and the idea of an institution of begetting children or rather a son for continuing the race is still preserved.² Not only this, in the Praśnopaniṣad it is said that one who indulged in sexual intercourse with his wife according to the prescribed code only to beget children is nothing but brahmacarya.³ Even Gandhiji has said in many places that sex-indulgence in order to preserve the race and family is not abrahmacarya.⁴ He says just as one eats

1. Ait. VIII. 3.

2. Bṛhad. 1.5.16; Chāndo. 7.3.1.

3. Praśno. 1.13.

4. Brahmacarya—Gandhiji, p. 85.

food not for the sake of deriving pleasure out of it, but just to maintain oneself, so that he can serve others, in the self-same manner, one should indulge in sexual activity in order to beget a child (however, he has somewhat modified the past version of the principle by saying that the child can either be a male or a female and the number of children too, he has reduced to one only as compared with ten of the Ṛgveda). Whenever, he points out, it is done without an intention of begetting children and is done only for the sake of pleasure, it is a sin and should be given up.¹ It sounds a little strange that how the two acts of eating food and indulging in sex, former for the service of others and the latter for the procreation of race or begetting children, can be assimilated to each other as Gandhiji had done. However, in the Upaniṣadic era marriage was prevalent not only among the ordinary householders but also among the great grand sages. Yājñavalkya was not only married but had two wives, one of whom shared all her husband's activities, intellectual as well as philosophical.

In the Dharma Śāstras too, marriage is taken to be one of the foremost duties. In the Gṛhya Sūtras especially the greater events like birth of a son, or marriage etc., are described in their religious setting, each with the minutest details. Though Manu has also emphasized Indriya-nigraha as a moral principle, it seems to have been understood only in the sense of partial sense control, as abstinence from adultery. Marriage is regarded by Manu as a very important fact of life; the underlying idea of marriage for him is the same as his predecessors had, that of preservation of the race. Certain so called immoral acts of today have been allowed for begetting a son. The wife can cohabit with another man, as some of the authorities reveal, for begetting children, by her husband's permission, if it is found that the husband is impotent.² So begetting sons was a religious end for which certain relaxa-

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1. Brahmacharya—Gandhiji, p. 17.
 2. E. R. E., vol. 8, p. 452.

tions could also be accommodated. Manu tells as an ecclesiastic doctor that husband and wife are one. He compares the wife to the soil and husband to the seed.¹ All organisms are the products of these two. He further says that the seed is more potential than the soil, so is the husband more potential, powerful and active than the wife; when both are good the product would be the best. Though the basis of marriage is the same throughout, but in form and shape considerable differences had appeared by the time of Manu. In the Vedic times marriages took place among the persons of full maturity, but Manusmṛti approves instances of child marriages on various grounds. Manu declares clearly, "A child may be given away in marriage, before age, if a young man of excellent character, family and physique be found."² It has likewise been proclaimed that no girl should be married so long as a person having good qualities is not found for her.³ There is a mention of certain forms of marriage by Manu, some are considered higher while others are lower. However, whatever the forms of marriage may be, adultery and rape are duly condemned in Manusmṛti and other authoritative texts, in conformity with the spirit of 'indriyanigraha'. But Manu emphasizes only that much of 'indriyanigraha' which does not go against the idea of preservation of race; and sex desire under proper subjugation is fundamentally necessary for the maintenance and continuity of race.⁴

Jainism

Jainism stands more for renunciation or nivṛtti than for activity or pravṛtti, the ideal lies in brahmacharya. Even 'pravṛtti' (activity) should culminate into nivṛtti or renunciation. But the realistic Jaina philosophy does not altogether ignore the institution of marriage. It is also understood as a

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., p. 450.
3. E. R. E., vol. 8, p. 451.
4. Manu. 5.56.

moral course since it provides limitation of sexual desires to one's wife. As a matter of fact, no social activity (as marriage) is condemned so long as it does not hinder the right attitude which one should basically possess, and so long as one does not transgress the vows one has taken.¹ The householder or a gr̥hastha also stands on a spiritual platform, because he too aims at leading a chaste and unadulterous life, though he stands on a lower one than that of the monk.

Sufficient references can be cited from various scriptures which give an idea regarding suitability of the matches in connection with marriage. About marriageable age of the girl it is said that a girl is marriageable when she attains puberty or when her childhood is over;² or one whose reproductive organs are fully developed,³ or those who are fit for any sexual activity.⁴ The Jaina scriptures do not admit of child marriage, as suggested in the Manusmṛti. About the ages of the boy and girl the scriptures tell that there should not be too much age difference between the spouses. The qualities of the girl must be of the same standard as those of the boy. Not only the virtues but also the appearance, looks and family background, etc., should be as compatible as possible.⁵ The barriers of the caste system etc. are not given any recognition in Jainism, nor do they at all influence the setting of marriage. The principles of exogamy and endogamy are found to be frequently exist-

1. सर्व एव हि जैनानां प्रमाणं लौकिको विधिः ।

यत्र सम्यक्त्व-हानिर्न यत्र न व्रतदूषणम् ।

Yaśastilaka—Somadevasūri, part II, p. 373.

2. उम्मुक्क बालभावे —Bhag. 11. 11.

3. णवंगसुत्त पडिबोहिये —Jñā.ā. 1.1.

4. अलं भोगसमत्थे —Ibid.

5. सरिसयाणं सरिसव्वयाणं सरिसतयाणं सरिसलावण्णरुवजोवणगुणोव-
वेयाण । —Bhag. 11.11,

tent, and are much lax. No rigidity is found that a Kṣtriya should marry a Kṣatriya and a Brāhmaṇa should marry a Brāhmaṇa only. Gajasukumāra (Kṛṣṇa's younger brother) was married to a Somil's (Brāhmaṇa) daughter, and Mahāvīra's daughter Darśanā was married to his own nephew named Jamāli. All this discription, however, should not be understood as a positive assertion of the institution of marriage as a religious institution; this simply intends to show that marriage as a lower code of conduct does have its due place in the Jaina system.

The notable difference in the Brāhmaṇical systems on the one hand, and Jaina system on the other, lies in the contrary bases of marriage in the two trends. In Jainism the basis of the institution of marriage does not lie in giving birth to a male child or in the propagation of race or in the establishment of an ideal type of household as suggested by the Brāhmaṇical systems. As has been seen, the valuable achievement for all could only be nivṛtti and not pravṛtti. It means giving up of all desires—instinctive desires such as sex, as well as attachment to the race and the family. The aim of the householder should be not to commit himself to any of these desires and to have the least sense pleasure and the least family attachment. The basis of marriage is simply the incapability of ordinary people of observing complete celibacy like monks. Here a significant example of a married couple¹ can be cited, who observed complete celibacy like that of the monks, ever since the two were married till their death. This remains an ideal for every Jaina householder. Before marriage both the boy called Vijaya and the girl called Vijayā happened to visit a well known monk who had come in their town. On listening to his exhortation, the girl took the vow of observing celibacy for every fortnight after the full moon; accidentally, the boy, after being impressed by the teachings of the monk,

1. Vairāgya Mañjarī—Story of Vijay and Vijayā.

took the vow of observing celibacy for every fortnight before the full moon; all this was just a matter of chance because none of them knew each other. After their marriage both of them came to know each other's vows, but when they came to know all this, none of them repented for what they had done just unknowingly. They were, on the other hand, much pleased to hear each other and decided to remain in the house just like brother and sister; but did not disclose it to anyone else. Keeping this as a secret they observed complete celibacy for more than twelve years after which they renounced the household and adopted monkhood. This example thus underlines the contrast between the Jaina and the Brāhmanical basis of marriage.

The Aṇuvrata

The precept for the laity is partial abstinence from sex-indulgence or abstinence from what is called major types of sexuality or adultery. It is termed as 'thulāo mehuṅāo veramaṇam'. The layman proclaims in this vow to abstain from having sexual relations with any woman other than his own wife and is to live in full contentment with his wife resenting all attempts at sexual attraction by any other woman, not for a temporary period but for the whole life.¹ Further, the vow pertains not only to human beings of the opposite sex,² but also with regard to gods and beasts.

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1. चउत्थं अणुव्वयं थूलओ, मेहुणाओ वेरमणं सदारसंतोसिये, अवसेस मेहुणाविहि पच्चक्खाणं । जावज्जीवाए....

—Upāsaka. 1.16, Śrā. Prati.

2. Here, the term opposite sex has been used to show that for a laywoman the term 'Sabhattara' is used in the place of Sadāra but this seems only the latter introduction, because the main text is meant only for the upāsakas, though in the Pratikramaṇa Sūtra the latter term is always found.

However, with regard to the superhuman beings, fairies, gods and goddesses, the vow is enjoined much more rigorously than with regard to human beings and beasts.¹

In all the previous vows of the laity, as has been seen, the vow is enjoined with three instruments of mind, speech and body and two performances of abstaining from doing oneself and making others do; with regard to the third performance of appreciation (anumodana), however, a layman is not enjoined to abstain from it. A special feature of this particular vow is worth noticing; here, with regard to the gods or super human beings the injunction proceeds in the same manner, that is abstaining from doing oneself and making others do through mind, speech and body (i.e. with three instruments and two performances) because the chances of its violation are just rare and scanty. But with regard to human beings and beasts the householder is enjoined to abstain only from indulging in sexual act, by himself and with his own body (by one performance and one instrument). This clarifies that a special relaxation is made in this particular vow of the householder in order to make it more suitable in the social set up. The householder for example cannot evade involving in the sexual union (by way of marriage) of two human beings which are related to him, or of two animals which are owned by him. He should however abstain from making it a profession. This is where the Jaina and the Brāhmanical approach differs. However, the vow pertains more strongly to one's ownself, it is therefore usually summarized as the vow of 'svadāra santoṣa' and 'paradāra viramaṇa' (i.e. contentment with one's own wife and abstention from visiting another's wife). The Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvākācāra presents the vow in the way which in essence is similar to the Śvetāmbara version. It is

1. दिव्वं दुविहं ति विहेणं, न करेमि न कारवेमि मणसा वयसा कायसा ।
माणुस्सं तिरिक्ख जोणियं एकविहं एगविहेणं, न करेमि कायसा ।

—Upāsaka. 1.16, Śrā. Prati.

said, "He who neither visits nor causes another person to visit another man's wife from fear of sin—the man is said to observe the aṇuvrata known as renunciation of wife of another and contentment with one's own."¹

The Five Aticāras

The 'aticāras' (or partial transgressions) of this vow are again five in number.² These are as follows : (1) *itvarikapari-grhītā-gamana* : visiting a paid woman and keeping her like a wife for a temporary period, (2) *aparigrhīta-gamana* : visiting a paid woman who has not been kept like a wife, as for example a prostitute or an unmarried young girl or a widow, (3) *anaṅga-kriḍā* : sexual intercourse of an unnatural kind with the organs which are not directly the organs of sex; this includes masturbation and homosexuality etc., (4) *paravivāhakarāṇa* is professional matchmaking which does not include the matchmaking of one's own sons or daughters or of the animals owned by the householder whose responsibility lies with him. But this is a simpler type of transgression which is not condemned in ordinary social ethics. The term 'paravivāhakarāṇa' simply means making matches of those who are not directly or indirectly related to the householder and for whom he is not responsible. (5) The last of the transgressions called 'kāmaḥogativrābhilāṣā' means an overwhelming or intense desire of sex and its fulfilment.

These are the five partial transgressions which a householder literally abstains from. The account given in Ratnaka-

1. न तु परदारान् गच्छति न परान् गमयति च पापभीतेर्यत्
सा परदारनिवृत्तिः स्वदारसन्तोषनामापि ।

—Ratnak. Śrā., Stanza 59.

2. तयाणंतरं च णं सदारसंतोसिए पंचअइयारा.....तं जहा इत्तरियपरिग-
हियागमणे, अपरिगहियागमणे अनंगकीड़ाकरणे परविवहाकरणे,
कामभोगतिव्वाभिलासे ।

—Upāsaka. 144.

raṇḍaśravakācāra of these transgressions¹ is very much akin to that given above. These are (1) match making, (2) unnatural gratification of sex desire, (3) indulging in lewd and voluptuous speech, (4) excessive passion even for one's own wife and (5) visiting an immoral woman.

This vow and its aticāras throw some light on the prevalent conditions, when prostitution etc. were not uncommon among the ordinary householders. However, the vow in general gives an account of the status of an ideal householder.

Buddhism

The institution of marriage does occupy an important place in Buddhism, though Buddhism too believes in renunciation. The follower of Buddha, i.e. the householder, is held in high esteem by Buddha himself. When Buddha was asked whether any householder who had not abandoned the bonds of household life reached heaven after death; "Not one hundred," he replied, "nor two hundred, nor three hundred, nor four, five, six but many more have attained heaven after death."² The attainment of heaven is not denied to the married laity by Buddha. He on the other hand promulgated that heaven is attainable by the laity.

Basically, Buddha never condemned marriage as such, what in fact is an hindrance is 'taṇhā' or attachment or craving for enjoyment. Nāgasena is said to have told Milinda³ that household life is no barrier to the achievement of supreme happiness. In some of the later texts like Mañicūḍāvādāna,⁴ marriage is even made compulsory for the Bodhisattva. Such a view might have given rise to married monks in Kashmir at

1. अन्यविवाहाकरणानंगक्रीडाविटत्वविपुल्लतृषः,
इत्वरिकागमनं चास्मरस्य पंच व्यतीचाराः ।

—Ratnak. Śrā., Stanza 60.

2. Buddhism—R. S. Copleston, p. 205.
3. Milinda Questions—part II, tr. I. B. Horner, p. 82.
4. Avadānakalpalatā, 3.

about 500 A. D. "And from about 800 A. D. onwards 'tantra' sanctioned the marriage of monks in the districts which came under its influence. In the left handed Tantra, there was nothing shameful about the sexual intercourse, *it was on the contrary one of the means of winning enlightenment..*"¹ This, however, is something which is compatible with the spirit of early Buddhism, still it does throw light on the institution of marriage in Buddhism in general. In Japan too, the monks of Shin school are openly married, but their motive of marriage is somewhat different. The monks actually think themselves too low and too inferior to follow Buddha's precepts; and therefore, they get married even in monkhood;² but the adoption of such a course openly is much better than what happened in Tibet because of forced celibacy. All the types of people, of lower as well as of higher categories were ordained Lamas, but because of their mental weakness they were not able to fulfil the pledge they took, consequently most of the Lamas fled from Tibet with their paramours or lady-love in order to escape the severe penalties inflicted for the breach of celibacy.³ In this way, they not only violated the precept of celibacy but other precepts as well.

However, Buddhism believes, like Jainism, that the institution of marriage is not contrary to the path of spiritual advancement though only less advanced. Some of the scriptures tell about the proper marriage matches. It is said here also that the age-difference between the boy and the girl should not be so much that one of them may cultivate a sort of envy for the other, or find difficulty in making adjustment with the other.⁴ Still the fact remains that the basis of marriage in Buddhism is not begetting children or enhance-

1. Buddhism—Edward Conze, p. 60.

2. Buddhism—Edward Conze, p. 60.

3. E. R. E., vol. 3, p. 27.

4. अतीतयोब्बनो पोसो आनेति तिवस्त्यानि
तस्सा इस्सा न सुपति तं पराभव तो मुखं ।

—S. N., Parābhavasutta, Stanza 20.

ment of the race as is in the Brāhmaṇical conception, but the lack of capacity of ordinary people to accept such difficult course of conduct as celibacy, leaving aside however the Tantra faith which claims that sexual intercourse is means of enlightenment. The married householder is also supposed to lead a life of chastity.

The third precept of kāmamithyācāra-virati typifies the life of the householder. This precept takes almost the same form as is seen in the fourth vow of 'sthūlamaithuna viramaṇa-vrata' of the Jainas, though Buddhism lacks all those details which are found in the latter. Here, too, kāmamithyācāra virati¹ of the householders means faithfulness to one's wife.² It is said, "A wise man should avoid unchastity, as if it were a burning pit of live coals, one who is not able to live in a state of complete celibacy should not commit adultery, i. e. should not violate the wife of another."³ The householder is asked to be faithful to his own wife both physically and mentally, he should not think of any other woman, "If you speak to a woman, do it with pureness of heart...say to yourself, placed in this sinful world, let me be a spotless lily, unsoiled by the mire in which it grows, is she old, regard her as your mother, is she honourable as your sister, is she of small account as your younger sister; is she a child, treat her with reverence and politeness."⁴ It has further been stressed and pointed out, "One who is mad after a woman or other immoral acts, and is busy all the time in spending his earnings on undesir-

1. अरिय सावको कामेसु मिच्छाचारपटिविरतो होति ।

—Aṅguttara, 5. 179.

2. अयं गृहपति कामभोगी इमेहि द्वीहि ठानेहि गारय्हो इमिना एकेन ठानेन पाससो ।

—Ibid Vol. IV, p. 243.

3. अबह्मचरियं परिवज्जेय्य अंगारकामुं जलितं व विञ्जू ।
असम्भुणन्तो पन बह्मचरियं परस्सदारं नातिक्कमेय ।

—S. N., Dhammikasutta, 21.

4. Sūtra of 42 Sections,

able channels is bound to have his downfall,"¹ and "one who is not satisfied with his own wife and visits the prostitutes or the wife of another or possesses the concubines is sure to have his downfall."² It can be noticed that in the contents of this vow Buddhism is similar to the Jaina vow of the householder of svadāra-santoṣa, and paradāra-viramaṇa.

The value of chastity has been recognised in many other places too. When in Unmādayanti Jātaka the husband of the enchanting woman, who happens to be one of the king's officers voluntarily offers his wife to the king. The king refuses the offer and admonishes the officer thus : "I shall dare throw myself on a sharp sword or into fire, with blazing flames, but I shall not be able to offend against righteousness, which I have always cherished, and to which I owe my royal bliss....If I should lack the power of ruling my own self, say into what conditions would I bring the people who long the protection from my side. Thus I would not allow myself to submit to my passion."³

In Buddhism also, as in Jainism, emphasis is laid on the conduct of the layman, but all this holds good for the laywomen as well. In fact, Buddhism gives woman even a lower status than that given in Jainism. As it is known that Buddha himself was reluctant to admit women even in the Saṃgha. It was after the continued insistence by Prajāpati Gotamī with the help of Ānanda that she got admission to the Saṃgha but only on a lower rank. At places Buddha also condemns women as dangerous. However, it has no justification, it can only be said that as women are dangerous to men, men are to women, and the mixing of the two sexes demands both maturity as well as proper self-restraint among both men and women.

1. इत्थिधुत्तो सुराघुत्तो अक्खधुत्तो च यो नरो,
लद्धं लद्धं विनासेति तं पराभवतो मुखं ।
—S. N., Parābhavasutta, 16.
2. सेहि दारेहि असन्तुट्ठो वेसियासु पदिस्सति
दिस्सति परदारेसु तं पराभव तो मुखं ।
—Ibid., 18.
3. अहं हि शस्त्रं निशितं विशेषं हुताशनं विस्फुरदर्चिषं वा
न त्वेव धर्मादधिगम्य लक्ष्मीं शक्यामि तत्रैव पुनः प्रहर्तुम् ।
—Jātakamālā, Unmādayanti Jataka, Stanza 30.

CHAPTER V

TRUTH

The ethical principle of truth or abstention from falsehood constitutes the fourth śīla in Buddhism, but in non-Buddhist systems it is given second position. Though 'truth' and 'abstention from falsehood' are just positive and negative aspects of one and the same phenomenon, some difference can be marked in the two terms positive and negative. The latter or 'abstention from falsehood' presents a purely ethical principle, while the former, i.e. 'truth', connotes both ethical and metaphysical principles. So, for the sake of precision and clarity wherever the term truth or 'satya' is used it should be pr-supplemented by the term 'metaphysical' or 'ethical'. The negative term, i. e. abstention from falsehood, however, is free from this difficulty, because it only signifies an ethical principle, though this ethical principle may relate to metaphysical. It is needless to say that metaphysical character of this principle is no less important than the ethical, nor is it easy to discuss them (metaphysical and ethical) independently, because metaphysical and ethical concepts are not entirely independent of each other in Indian philosophy; in a way, ethical is dependent on metaphysical. Hence, it has hitherto been attempted not to isolate ethical truth from metaphysical truth, but to deduce ethical truth from metaphysical in various systems, even though truth as one of the five precepts is understood only as a moral or ethical principle.

The term 'truth' or 'satya' has got varied implications. It is derived from 'sat' and 'sat' is more often understood in the sense of the Ultimate Reality. It is that which is never destroyed or destroyable. According to Śaṅkara 'sat' means permanent; that which existed in the past, continues to exist in the present and will exist in the future. All that which is

destroyable is not 'sat' but 'asat'. At the same time 'sat' also means a general adjective goodness, virtue and chastity; besides this, it means genuine, honest, sincere, and faithful etc. It therefore reveals that both ethical and metaphysical aspects of 'satya' are implied in its root 'sat', as the etymological definition of 'satya' shows that the promotion and maintenance of goodness is 'satya'.¹

It is therefore established that satya refers to both the aspects, meta physical and ethical. In the Brāhmaṇical systems also 'satya' indicates both these aspects, but in the Śramaṇical systems 'Satya' or 'Sacca' (Pāli) is more frequently used in metaphysical sense and the negative term Mṛṣāvāda-Virati (abstention from falsehood) is used to suggest the ethical implication.

In the term 'Mṛṣāvāda-Virati', as is already known, 'virati' means abstinence, and 'mṛṣā' means a lie, false or untrue; it also means an absurdity, an impossibility or purposelessness. Vāda means an idea, speech or quotation. Mṛṣāvāda-Virati thus means abstention from false, absurd, impossible and useless statements or speech or conceptions. Mṛṣāvāda-Virati also includes silence, which is explicitly excluded from the positive term 'satya'.

Before proceeding to the actual moral principle and its historical development, one point should be noticed, that is, in Śramaṇical systems non-violence is given top priority and all the other four principles of morality are based on non-violence; truth or any other principle is valuable or moral so long as it conforms to the principle of non-violence. But in the Brāhmaṇical literature truth is understood as the supreme principle.² The importance of 'satya' is therefore underlined in the

1. सत्सु साधु सत्यम् ।

—Aṣṭādhyāyī, 5. 4. 66.

2. न हि सत्यात्परो धर्मः नानृतात् पातकं परम् ।

—Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, 16. 2. 24.

Brāhmanical system when it is said that on truth alone this earth is standing, because of truth only the sun gets the heat and the wind its blowing capacity, and everything else has its existence only because of truth.¹ At another place truth is compared with a sacrifice of a thousand horses but it is described as superior to that.²

To start with the historical account, in the Ṛgvedic ethics the conception of Ṛta is very significant "It is the anticipation of the law of karma". It is this law which is all-pervasive in the whole universe, not only for men, but even for the divine beings.³ Ṛta is supposed to be the sole criterion of morality. It is the law which maintains the movement of the world, hence the essence of everything. It is Ṛta which is satya or truth of things.⁴ 'Disorder or An-Ṛta is falsehood or the opposite of truth.'⁵ This depicts the metaphysical significance of truth in the Ṛgvedic hymns which are technically named Ṛta. From this metaphysical aspect it proceeds to ethical aspect as well. "All those who follow the path of Ṛta are true and ordered, and ordered conduct is called true vrata. Vratani are the ways of life of goodmen who follow the path of Ṛta."⁶ This consistency signified by 'Ṛta' is the central feature of good life according to the Ṛgveda. But the Ṛgvedic Ṛsis however did not confine only to these abstract principles of morality,

1. सत्येन धार्यते पृथ्वी सत्येन तपते रवि
सत्येन वाति वायुश्च सर्वं सत्ये प्रतिष्ठितम् ।
—Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, 16. 2. 24.
2. अश्वमेधसहस्रं च सत्यं च तुल्या धृतम्
अश्वमेधसहस्राद्धि सत्यमेव विशिष्यते ।
—Ibid.
3. सत्येनोत्तमिता भूमिः ।
—Ṛgveda, 10. 85. 1.
4. ऋतञ्च सत्यञ्चाभीद्धत्तपसोऽध्यजायत ।
—Ibid., 10. 190. 1.
5. Ibid., 7. 66. 13.
6. Indian Philosophy —S. Radhakrishnan, p. 110.

the authority of the principles is supplemented by the acceptance of certain gods who check the violation of these moral principles by men. Varuṇa is the god of sky in the Ṛgveda. He is regarded as the omniscient god. He is accepted as ideal and most moral god in the Ṛgvedic hymns. "No creature can even wink without him. As a moral governor Varuṇa stands far above any other deity."¹ Not a single action goes unnoticed by Varuṇa. Being a moral governor he supervises all actions of men, moral and immoral, he can tolerate no such sin which infringes his ordinances. "The fetters with which he binds sinners are often mentioned. He is a dispeller, hater and punisher of falsehood."² He is harsh to the guilty but gracious and merciful to the penitent. All this intends to show that truth is a moral principle in the Ṛgveda for all men who are held under supreme guidance of Varuṇa.

In the age of Brāhmana's godliness is expected to be the first duty, "Truth speaking is an essential part of godliness. It is a religious and moral duty. Agni is the lord of vows and Vāk is the lord of speech, both of them will be displeased if truthfulness is not observed."³ The job of Varuṇa in the Ṛgvedic hymns has been transferred to the gods called Agni and Vāk in this period. But the importance of the job itself has not in any way been reduced. "The divine waters bear away defilement and are even invoked to cleanse from moral guilt the sins of violence, cursing and lying."⁴ Inner purity is more and more respected and truth speaking is recognized as one of the greatest virtues.

The Upaniṣadic conception of truth is most remarkable. "More, however, than any other virtue Truth seems to find a particular favour with the Upaniṣadic seers. Illustrations of

1. History of Sanskrit Literature—Macdonell, p. 75.
2. Ibid.
3. Indian Philosophy—S. Radhakrishnan, vol. I, p. 131.
4. History of Sanskrit Literature—A. A. Macdonell, p. 92.

this virtue are scattered in various Upaniṣads.”¹ In fact truth is inculcated as the supreme virtue by the Upaniṣadic thinkers. A very important and significant parable is found in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, which relates the story of Satyakāma, son of a Jabālā.² Jabālā was a prostitute in her youth, and led a very wanton life. When Satyakāma went to his spiritual teacher to get himself initiated in his order, he was asked who his father was. Satyakāma found himself a little puzzled, because he had never heard of his father from his mother. He immediately ran to his mother and asked her about his father and his whereabouts. The mother very straightforwardly and daringly told him the truth that she had led a very wanton life in her youth and that she herself did not know about the father of her son and she could only tell him that he was her son. The son, Satyakāma, did not feel discouraged, he again went to his preceptor and told him the whole thing and said that he could tell only about his mother Jabālā and not about his father. Hearing all this the teacher exclaimed not because he was the son of a prostitute but because he had spoken such a daring truth before his spiritual teacher. He said immediately, ‘Those words could not come of a man who was not born of a Brāhmin, come I shall initiate you because you have not swerved from the truth.’ This is a glaring example of truth as a virtue for possessing which the son of a prostitute was initiated in the order of the Brāhmins and also elevated to the position of a Brāhmin by birth. Besides, it reveals another salient feature, that is the prevalence of Varṇa (caste) system in the Upaniṣadic times. The difference between the Brāhmaṇical and the Śramaṇical systems can be marked here. The boy Satyakāma is respected more because he is expected to be the son of a Brāhmin father rather than because of his own truthfulness and the daring truthfulness of his mother. Had this example been used in some Śramaṇical

1. A constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy—
R. D. Ranade, p. 311.
2. Chāndo. 4.4.

system the credit would have completely gone to the son alone or to the mother who really told this fact to him. However, the fact remains that full regard is given to truthfulness in the Upaniṣads.

At another place it is said that truth is so powerful and effective that it can arouse men even after death. Bhāradvāja is made to say that if a man tells an untruth he shall be dried up from the very roots, so he dare not tell an untruth.¹ Muṇḍakopaniṣad tells that truth, not lie, is victorious; truth paves the path of gods, by which travel the sages who have all their desires fulfilled, where lies the highest repository of truth.² This corroborates what is said earlier that the ethical truth and the metaphysical truth are related principles, or the former unfolds the latter. At another place a conversation between Sanat Kumāra and Nārada is recorded, when Nārada had gone to his teacher to receive instruction regarding the nature of truth. The teacher answered that it was only when a man had realized the ultimate that he might be said to tell the truth, while the other truths were truths only on sufferance. "Here Sanat Kumāra gives a more philosophical interpretation of it when he says that the Ultimate Truth is found only in the attainment of reality. What people call truth is really no truth at all, it is truth only on sufferance. Thus, it is seen that how the truth is regarded in the Upaniṣads as the ultimate moral correlate of the realization of the absolute."³

In Manusmṛti truth occurs as the second principle of morality.⁴ Manu distinguishes between relative duties and

1. समूलो वा एष परिशुष्यति योजन्तमभिवदति ।

—Prašno. 6.1.

2. सत्यमेवजयति नानृतं.....

—Muṇḍako. 3.1.6.

3. Constructive Survey of the Upaniṣadic Philosophy,

—R. D. Ranade, p. 311.

4. Manu. 10. 63.

common duties. Relative duties are those which are relevant to a particular group of persons, and their stations of life. They are specific to a person's 'varṇa' or 'āśrama'. The universal or common duties on the other hand are duties irrespective of one's age, caste or creed, i.e. they are simply obligatory on a man as a man. The principle of truth is not a specific or relative duty, but it is a common or general duty of man. He has enumerated these common duties as ten.¹ Pṛaśastapāda also classifies duties into generic and specific. He too includes truth or 'satyavacana' into his twelve-fold list of virtues pertaining to mankind in general.

Manu, to emphasize the importance of truth, has said that speech furnishes the most important means of communicating one's thoughts and ideas to others, and there is no other better way to express oneself than to speak out. And one who pollutes his speech by saying an untruth is like one who steals from his own wealth.² Hence, he has declared clearly that only that will be and should be spoken which has been purified by truth.³ In the Mahābhārata Bhīṣma concluded his exhortation to Yudhiṣṭhira by saying that truth is the gist of all duties and dharma of life one has towards others or to his own self; all moral life must be based on truth alone.⁴ And the principle of truth, it is said, is self-explanatory and needs no justification.

So far 'truth' is understood as the highest moral principle, yet it is unthinkable without making allowance for certain

1. धृतिः क्षमा दमोऽस्तेयं शौचमिन्द्रियनिग्रहः
धीः विद्या सत्यमक्रोधो दशकं धर्मलक्षणम् । —Manu. 6. 91.
2. वाच्यार्था नियताः सर्वे वाङ्मूला वाग्विनिसृताः
तांस्तु यः स्तेनयेद्वाचं स सर्वस्तेयकृद्भरः ।
—Manu. 4.256.
3. सत्यपूतां वदेद्वाचं । —Manu. 6.46.
4. सत्येषु यतिताव्यं वः सत्यं हि परमं बलं ।
—Mahābhā., Anuśāsanaparva, 167.49.

exceptions; such exceptions are not only found in practice but even given recognition in the scriptures like Mahābhārata where they are considered imperative in some situations. "In Mahābhārata it is said that five kinds of falsehood are justified and sinless."¹ These are : falsehoods in joke, with women on the occasion of marriage, in a situation when life is in danger, and to save the property. By reflecting upon these exceptions allowed in the Mahābhārata, one can see that some of them do not have a strong ground, as for example it is accepted that telling a lie to women or telling a lie in joke or on the occasion of marriage is no vice; while others really depict that there works a still higher moral principle than truth in a man's moral behaviour. In fact the precept of truth is an abstract principle of morality, and what intrinsic value will it possess in itself without being attached to some other higher principle, such as love of humanity, or more extensively speaking, love of all living beings, which in other words is non-violence ? In this sense it appears to have been accepted by the later Brāhmanical literature that the highest principle is non-violence and not truth. Even the principle of non-violence however is unthinkable without exceptions. In the Mahābhārata a detailed account of exceptions is found. Its approach to the problem of exceptions is realistic where the life of a human being is the basis of exceptions. It is said if a man faces a complicated situation in which two courses are open to him : (i) he can save a life by telling a falsehood and (ii) that he can preserve his truthfulness by failing to save the life, which of these two courses should he select and regard as more moral ? It is clearly stated that the first course should be adopted, i.e. he should save the life by telling an untruth, which is as acceptable as truthfulness itself.

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1. न नर्मयुक्तं वचनं हिनस्ति न स्त्रीषु राज्ञविवाहकाले
प्राणात्यये सर्ववनापहारे पञ्चातृतान्याहुरपातकानि ।

--Mahābhā., Ādiparva., 82. 16;
Manu. 8.110.

Dharmaśāstras and the Mahābhārata discuss this point in a very definite manner. It is said that if someone has approached a person for shelter to avoid the dacoits who are chasing him and the dacoits somehow reach the same place and ask that person the whereabouts of the man they are in search of; the rightful course would be that in the beginning he should try to evade the question, as Manu says that one should not talk unless someone puts a question¹ and if an unjust question is put, one should not answer. In a more advanced situation he should pretend to be a mad person², and should not tell the truth. But if the matter still goes further, he should tell a falsehood and not the truth. This is equal to truth itself. Kṛṣṇa tells to Arjuna and Bhīṣma to Yudhiṣṭhira in the Mahābhārata that it is authentically decided that one should not speak if keeping quiet is advisable; but if this proves harmful one should even tell a lie to save the person.³ This detailed analysis of the situation only reveals that one should abstain from falsehood as far as possible and as long as the principle of non-violence is intact.

However, anticipating the danger of allowing exceptions, these scriptures insist on *prāyaścitta* or purificatory action for those who have somehow transgressed the principle of truth,⁴ lest it should turn out to be too lax a principle; and in spite

1. नापृष्टः कस्यचिद्ब्रूयान्नचान्यायेन पृच्छतः.....

—Manu. 2. 110.

2. जानन्नपि हि मेधावी जडवल्लोक आचरेत् ।

—Ibid.

3. अकूजनेन चेन्मोक्षो नावकूजेत्कथंचन

—Mahābhā., Kārṇaparva, 69. 61.

अवश्यं कूजितव्ये वा शंकेरणाप्यकूजनात्
श्रेयस्तत्रोत्तं वक्तुं सत्योदिति विचारितम् ।

—Ibid., Śāntiparva, 109.15.

4. तत्पावनाय निर्वाप्यश्चरुः सारस्वतौ द्विजैः । Manu. 8.101.

of insistence on the principle of truth the principle of 'sarva-bhūta-hita' (well being of all living being) is emphasized side by side.¹ Tilak has remarked that truth speaking is good, but better is the well being and life of the living beings. "In fact the greatest good of all living beings is the real truth in our opinion." It has also been pointed out that mere congruency of speech with facts does not signify the whole truth. Both speech and meaning of speech should be such that they help others, and do not hurt others. Veracity depends upon the goodness of motive in speech. It is not a motive as is shown in the classical example of Udhīṣṭhira who led Droṇa to believe falsely that the latter's son had died by muttering inaudibly that it was an elephant having the same name that had died.² This was the first and the last falsehood of Udhīṣṭhira which had brought his carriage to the earth which used to be a little above it.

Among the modern Western ethicists both Sidgwick and J. S. Mill, whose criterion of moral act is 'the greatest happiness for the greatest number', accept that in some places falsehood is also acceptable;³ for example, telling the truth to a sick person with regard to his health, which may produce an adverse effect, is not the real truth, and telling a falsehood is no vice in such cases. It is clear, therefore, that Western ethicists also cannot think of an absolute moral principle of truth which is completely exceptionless.

In the Indian scriptures a careful and detailed survey is made of this principle and its exceptions, but one point is obvious, i. e. there works a constant anomaly and ambiguity

1. सत्यस्य वचनं श्रेयः सत्यादपि हितं वदेत्
यद्भूतहितमत्यन्तं एतत्सत्यं मतं मम ।
—Mahābhā., Śāntiparva, 329.13; 287.19.
2. नरो वा कुंजरो वा ।
—Mahābhā., Droṇaparva, 190-191.57.
3. Method of Ethics—H. Sidgwick, Book III, Chap. XI, p. 355.

in the discussion on exceptions. The examples of exceptions, such as falsehood in joke, or with women, are considered no falsehoods. This apparently shows the laxity in morals, but at the same time some stringency is also noticeable at certain other places in the same texts. Mahādeva tells Pārvati that only those who do not tell lies even for their own selfish end or for the interest of others or even in joke are authorized to reach heaven.¹

Now, in the Pātañjala-Yoga Sūtras, truth is the second yama. Vyāsa in his commentary on the Sūtras says that abstinence from falsehood (i. e. satya) means speech and mind such as correspond to the object intended; speech and mind corresponding to what is seen or inferred or heard.² If a speech is made in order that one's own knowledge may pass to some one else, if it is not deceitful or mistaken or barren of information, it would be abstinence from falsehood. Again, it is pointed out that it should be used for the service of all, not for the ruin of all creatures; here the principle of 'sarvabhūtahita' or non-violence is understood as a basis of truth. It is further said that in so far as there would be a false kind of merit and a semblance of merit, it would become the worst of evils; therefore, let the yogin consider first of all what is good of all creatures and then speak with abstinence from falsehood. It is also said that speech and mind should correspond to the object intended, they should not only correspond to the object intended but should also correspond to what is seen, inferred or heard; and the language used should be such as not to make it deceitful as it was in the case

1. आत्महेतोः परार्थे वा नर्महास्याश्रयात्तथा,
ये मृषा न वदन्ति ते नराः स्वर्गगामिनः ।

—Mahābhā., Anuśāsana-parva, 144, 19.

2. सत्यं यथार्थं वाङ्मनसे; यथा दृष्टं यथानुमितं यथा श्रुतं तथा
वाङ्मनश्च ।

—Vyāsa's Comm., on Pāt. Yoga., 2.30.

of Udhiṣṭhira who misled Droṇa; nor it should be barren of information; as for example using such a language which the other person does not understand, and thus making it purposeless for him.

‘An abstinence from falsehood even when it has these distinguishing characteristics, if it results in an injury to another would be a false kind of abstinence from falsehood’, adds Vācaspati Miśra in his explanation of the Sūtras which obviously depict the primacy of non-injury—the main feature of Śramaṇical culture.

About the cultivation of the habit of speaking truth the same pratipakṣa bhāvanā theory holds good. How to root out the temptation to tell a falsehood? The answer is the same, that is by cultivating just the opposite of that very mental modification which tempts him to tell a falsehood. If for example one is tempted to tell a lie out of fear, he should develop courage by way of contemplating over goodness of courage, and overcome fear and thus indirectly overcoming the vice of falsehood.

About the classification of this vice of falsehood, the same classification is used as that used in non-violence, non-stealing etc. It can therefore be understood that falsehood also is of eighty-one varieties, like other vices.

The sūtra having special significance for truth is that “As soon as one is grounded in abstinence from falsehood, actions and consequences depend upon him.”¹ What this means is that if a person who has established himself in truth says to someone, “Be thou Virtuous” or attain thou heaven, the man becomes Virtuous or attains heaven, i. e. what he says come true because of the yogic powers he has attained. The consequences depend just upon his utterances such as ‘right living’ and ‘heaven’ and no ordinary barriers would prevent

1. सत्य प्रतिष्ठायां क्रिया फलाश्रयत्वम् ।

— Pāt. Yoga., 2.36.

the consequences. It is very difficult to justify this point rationally but it cannot be rejected as completely impossible, because an unusual mental power may affect the external world.

Jainism

Truth or 'Saccam' (Prākṛt) as a positive term and 'Mṛṣā-vāda-virati' as a negative term have prominent places in Jainism. The former, as has been pointed out, relates more to metaphysical aspect, while the latter refers mainly to the ethical meaning. In both the aspects moral and metaphysical truth is regarded as highly valuable in Jaina sources. It is considered the true essence of the whole universe¹ and is even more profound than the ocean and more stable than Mount Meru. It is also conceived as God or Bhagawan,² as Mahatma Gandhi conceives it. This, as is apparant, is the metaphysical truth understood as highly important in the Jaina scriptures. As a moral principle also it is considered very significant. It is said that those who have established themselves in truth acquire insurmountable fame, they are appreciated not only by human beings but also by gods.³ Further it is said, "The ground under the feet of those who speak truth rooted in right knowledge and right conduct becomes holy."⁴

Howsoever much the importance and glory of truth is sung, it is only an auxiliary principle to non-violence, as has

1. सच्चं लोगम्मि सारभूयं, गंभीरतरं महासमुद्दाओ थिरतरंगं, मेरुपव्वयोआ ।
—Prašna., Saṃvaradvāra., 24.
2. तं सच्चं खु भगवं । —Ācāra. 1.5.5.
3. चन्द्रमूर्तिरिवानन्दं वद्धयन्ती जगत्त्रये । स्वर्गिभिवियंते मूधर्ना कीर्तिः
सत्योत्थिता नृणाम् । —Jñānārṇava, 1.9.29.
4. ज्ञान चारित्र्योमूलं, सत्यमेव वदन्ति ये,
धात्री पवित्रीक्रियते तेषां चरणरेणुभिः ।
—Yoga Śāstra, 2.63.

already been noted, and whenever it infringes this supreme tenet of morality it no longer remains a moral principle.

Truth, it is said, does not only pertain to our faculty of speech but to mind and body as well.¹ Only that truth in speech is called truth which is coherent with body and mind, as it is sometimes said that the origin of truth lies not in the mouth but in the heart. Whenever a monk or a layman finds that his vow of non-violence is in danger, he has the liberty to tell an untruth.² Though the second mahāvratā of the monk means a promise to avoid telling even slightest untruth, it makes a reservation that by speaking truth the higher interests of non-injury must not be endangered.

The nature of truth can be understood by having a clear idea of falsehood. Umāsvāti has said 'asadbhidhānamanṛtam'³ i. e. falsehood is that which originates from saying 'asat', and not from 'sat' or reality. 'Asat' may mean three things. Firstly to speak about that which is not, secondly to speak out something by changing and altering the facts, and lastly to speak out something with a wrong intention, This wrong intention may presuppose either of the two things, (1) svārtha or selfish tendencies or rāga or attachment and (2) feeling of hatred or dveṣa. A speech is false when spoken with any of these motives. Ācārya Amṛtacandra also pointed out that the origin of falsehood lies in kaṣāyas (passions) only. Where there is kaṣāya there is violence, so in falsehood too there is violence,⁴ and where there is no kaṣāya or violence there is no falsehood in any speech whatsoever. He further

1. मणसच्चे, वायसच्चे, कायसच्चे । —Sthān. 3.

2. जाणं वा णो जाणन्ति वइज्जा । —Ācār. 2.129.

3. असदभिधानमनृतम् । —Tattvā. 7.9.

4. अनृतवचनेऽपि तस्मान्नियतं हिंसा समवरति ।

reaffirms this idea in another sūtra by giving an illustration; he says, a monk who has taken the vow of complete truth, speaks ill of sins. Those who are involved in those sins might ill-take the words of the monk and may be aggrieved by his speech, but these words of the monk, though the others are hurt by them, cannot be called false, because the monk's words are not accompanied by the kaṣāyas or pramāda.¹ On the other hand, his speech is prompted by a good motive. The monk, therefore, cannot be accused of falsehood or violence.

Classifications of Truth and Falsehood

Truth and falsehood have been variously classified in the scriptures, which tend to show clearly the wide sphere of truth and also depict that metaphysical truth and ethical truth are interdependent.

One classification is made according to which truth is of ten kinds.² These are :

1. *Truth pertaining to a country or community* (janapada-satya). An object may have different names in different places, but the name in one place is true in its conditions, and cannot be regarded as false in the other, even if it may mean something else in the other place.

2. *Truth pertaining to convention* (sammata-satya). Use of a term which has been accepted conventionally to mean a particular object is understood as true, though it may mean something else in the etymological sense. For example Brahmacharya etymologically means absorption in Brahman but conventionally it has been accepted as sexual chastity.

3. *Truth pertaining to attribution* (sthāpanā-satya). To call an object by a particular name, whether the name attributed

1. हितौ प्रमत्तयोगे तिदिष्टे सकलवितथवचनाताम्,
हेयानुष्ठानादेरनुवदनं भवति नासत्यम् ।

—Ibid., 100.

2. Sthān. 10.3.741, Comm. on Dharma Saṃgraha, 3.41.

is like or unlike the object. The attributed name should be regarded as true.

4. *Truth pertaining to name* (nāma-satya). Whether the name and the qualities of an object or a person coincide with each other or not, calling the object or person by the name attributed to it or him, is also the truth.

5. *Truth pertaining to appearance* (rūpa-satya). Calling a person by the name which tallies with his appearance only, but does not tally with the inner virtues is also truth.

6. *Truth pertaining to comparison* (apekṣā-satya). Calling an object by a fixed adjective as for example calling an object 'small' or 'large' is truth, though it is only comparatively smaller or larger.

7. *Truth pertaining to practical behaviour* (vyavahāra-satya). Using terms in the popular sense is truth even though in the strict sense they may be faulty.

8. *Truth pertaining to essential nature* (bhāva-satya). Leaving aside the popular usage, emphasis on the intrinsic nature of an object only is another kind of truth.

9. *Truth pertaining to association* (yoga-satya). Associating a person or an object with his or its major quality is also truth.

10. *Truth pertaining to similies* (upamā-satya). Calling something not by the original name but by the name of the object to which it has been assimilated.

This tenfold division of truth mainly pertains to speech. It comprehensively includes all kinds of speech spoken in day life; however it does not concern itself much with the meta-physical aspect of truth.

The knowledge of the nature of truth immediately arouses an inquisitiveness for the nature of falsehood. In the same texts falsehood has also been enumerated as of ten types.¹

1. Sthān. 10.3.741, Com.m. on Dharma Saṃgraha, 3.41.

This discussion on falsehood would clarify the doubts and confusion regarding verbal falsehood and real falsehood. These ten types are : (i) falsehood spoken in anger, (ii) in conceit, (iii) in crookedness, (iv) in greed, (v) in attachment, (vi) in hatred, (vii) in laughter, (viii) in conjectures or fabrication of events, (ix) in fear, and lastly, (x) in violence.

Another classification is made at another place where falsehood is divided into four types.¹ This classification is significant since it reveals that the ethical truth is dependent on metaphysical. These four kinds of falsehoods are (i) *Sadbhāva-pratiṣedha*, i. e. rejecting the very presence of an object which is eternally existent, as for example to say that soul (ātman) is non-existent; (ii) *asadbhāvodbhāvana*, i. e. to accept the presence of non-existent objects or false notions, as to say that God is the creator of the universe, or He punishes those who commit sins; (iii) *arthāntara* means changing the meanings of the terms which they usually connote, e.g. to call a horse a cow; (iv) *garha* means speaking only verbal truth but not pleasing and salutary to the person to whom it is spoken, as for example calling a blind person by that name.

The last kind of falsehood is obviously against the ethical truth which has its origin in violence. Avoidance of this is truth because it tallies with the principle of 'non-violence'. The third type, i.e. 'arthāntara' is a falsehood against convention and experience, abstinence from which is truth. The first two kinds, i.e. 'sadbhāvapratiṣedha' and 'asadbhāvodbhāvana', are in the main the metaphysical falsehoods, the opposite of which refer to the metaphysical truth.

These classifications undoubtedly make the concept of truth clearer, however they are not free from what is called the fallacy of overlapping division. In all these divisions of truth or falsehood, one can clearly behold that one particular kind is somehow included in the other also. If this division is

1. Haribhadra's Comm. on Daśav. 4.4.

made on scientific lines, the number of these types will be much reduced.

However, the principle of truth is depicted in all spheres of Jaina philosophy and religion. The chief doctrines of Syādvāda and Anekāntavāda basically presume the significance of truth. Though the doctrine of non-violence has been said to be the root of these philosophical principles, the principle of truth is profoundly spread over it. The coinage of the term 'syāt' by Jaina thinkers and the use of it in giving any statement is made to preserve and protect the principle of truth. The Jaina thinkers stress that 'ekānta' or single-sided account of something is not truth but falsehood, 'syāt' is the indicator of 'anekānta' or many-sided nature of ultimate reality. A thing should not be considered existing everywhere, at all times, in all ways, and in the forms of every thing. It may exist in one place and not in another at one time. There is no certainty and that we can deal only with probabilities. All that it implies is that every assertion is true only under certain conditions of space, time, etc. Ācārya Siddhasena has said metaphorically that the term 'syāt' is such a strong and powerful ingredient of speech that it can convert iron into gold.¹ Thus, in Jainism the moral and the metaphysical aspects of truth are inseparably connected.

The Mahāvratā

In the scriptural language the vow of truth meant for monks and nuns is called 'sabbāo musāvāyāo veramaṇaṃ'. The monk, like his other vows, takes the precept of complete truth; where there is no room for the slightest falsehood, of course, the term falsehood means only the real falsehood, not the verbal falsehood. He is supposed to speak only pleasing, salutary and helpful words and abstain from unpleasing, disadvantageous, unwholesome and non-salutary words. As it is

1. नयास्तव स्याद् पदलाञ्छिता इमे रसोपदिग्धाइव लोहधातवः ।

—Bṛhatsvayambhūstotra, 65.

proclaimed,¹ his speech should not be accompanied by anger, greed, fear or laughter. He abstains from indulging in such speech with the three instruments (of mind, speech and body) and in three ways of performance (doing oneself, asking others to do it and appreciating it) for the whole life. A classification is therefore found which divides falsehood into thirty-six varieties.² As has been seen, violence has been divided into one hundred and eight kinds, stealing into fifty-four types and falsehood into thirty-six kinds. The classification is derived from the formulation of the precept itself, which finds four major causes of falsehood. These are anger, greed, fear and laughter or joke. By multiplication process, as has been seen in the previous chapters, taking the three instruments of mind, speech and body, falsehood can be understood of twelve different types. Further, these twelve kinds become thirty-six, when multiplied by them the three kinds of performances, namely by one's own self, by asking others, and by appreciating such a falsehood. The vow of monks, as it literally pronounces that he would totally abstain from all thirty six varieties, means complete abstention from falsehood. In the classification, however, one important point seems to be missing, i.e. wrong attitude as a cause of falsehood. It only discusses four major causes, viz. anger, greed, fear and joke, but the most important cause of any major falsehood and which is the most disastrous of all is the wrong attitude (*mithyājñāna*), the opposite of which is the 'right attitude'. In the five *bhāvanās* or the helping devices pertaining to this vow a hint to the 'right attitude' is found in the first *bhāvanā* of 'anuvācibhā-

1. अहावरे दुच्चे भंते ! महव्वए मुसावायाओ वेरमणं । सव्वं भंते ! मूसावायं पच्चक्खामि । से कोहा वा, लोहा वा, भया वा, हासा वा, नेव सयं मुसं वइज्जा, नेवऽण्णेहिं मुसं वायाविज्जा, मुसं वयंतेवि अण्णे न समणुजाणामि । जावज्जीवाए तिविहं तिविहेणं, मणेण वायाए कायेणं, न करेमि, न कारवेमि, करंतपि अण्णं न समणुजाणामि ।.....

—Daśav. 4.8.

2. Śramaṇa Sūtra—Upadhyaya Amarmuni, pp. 62-63.

ṣaṇa', which does not exactly mean the 'right attitude', but somewhat similar to the 'right attitude'; literally it only means speech with carefulness. Omission of 'wrong attitude' as a major cause of falsehood also shows that this classification stresses mainly the ethical principle of truth rather than the metaphysical.

The Five Bhāvanās¹

These five bhāvanās like those of other precepts are meant for exhilarating the monk's vow of truth. These are : (i) anuvīcibhāṣaṇa, (ii) krodha-viveka, (iii) lobha-viveka, (iv) bhaya-viveka, and (v) hāsya-viveka.

The first bhāvanā promulgates that the monk should not speak with a wrong attitude or ignorance or talk abruptly and carelessly, because in such a speech there is always a likelihood of some untruth. The main cause of all vices is pramāda or kaṣāyas, which implicitly or explicitly exists in such a speech, in a mild or intense form.

The second bhāvanā proclaims that the monk should avoid anger which is not only the cause of falsehood but also of violence.

Abstention from greed is another auxiliary condition for truthfulness. In ordinary life greed is one of the major deterrents to truth, for it makes one concoct millions of falsehoods.

It is pronounced further that development of courage and avoidance of fear is a significant device for the maintenance of the vow of truth.

The last bhāvanā enjoins the monk to overcome the tendency of indulging too much in jokes and laughter, which is produced by the passions of attachment or hatred. In the beginning it may be mild but is prone to become intense.

1. अनुवीचीभासणया कोहविवेगे लोभविवेगे, भयविवेगे, हासविवेगे....

—Samavāy. 5.

These bhāvanās reveal that they are not only helpful to this particular vow, but are equally necessary for the other precepts as well. The reason for this is simply that the vows themselves are so interconnected that anything associated with any one of the vows cannot remain totally isolated from the others; for a logical and systematic study however it would appear overlapping and repetitive.

Vimśativimśikā lays down three fundamental requirements regarding speech which are also akin to these bhāvanās. These are : Vacanakṣānti (absence of anger in speech), Vacanārjava (gentleness of speech) and Vacanamukti (non-attachment or absence of kaṣāyas in speech). With these principles the monks abstain from telling lies and using injurious speech. At another place ten moral duties¹ of the monks are enumerated which include these bhāvanās as well as some of the vows themselves. These are (1) riddance from anger, (2) sweet thought and riddance from vanity, (3) simplicity, (4) absence of greed, (5) self-control, (6) truth, (7) penance, (8) cleanliness, (9) non-possession, (10) celibacy.

Exception

The discussion so far pertained to the vow of truth for monks under normal conditions (utsarga), which makes no allowance for any major or minor falsehood. And falsehood is condemned by all because it generates non-confidence², but, as has already been seen with regard to other vows of non-violence or non-stealing etc., under exceptional circumstances, i.e. in apavāda-mārga, the apparent violation of the vow is not regarded as real violation or transgression, taking in view

1. खंत्तीमद्द्वअज्जवमुत्तीतवसंजमे अवबोधब्बं सच्चं सोअं अक्किचणं च बंभं च जइधम्मो ।

—Samavāy. 10; Navatattva, stanza 29.

2. मूसावाओ य लोगम्मि, सब्ब साहुहिं गरिहिओ
अविस्सासो य भूयाणं, तम्हा मोसं विवज्जए ।

—Daśav. 6. 13.

the higher principle of morality; and falsehood is no vice if it safeguards non-violence. As it is said, if a hunter comes to a monk and asks him if he has seen the man or animal he has seen running after, the monk should first try to remain silent in this matter, but if required, he should even tell a lie¹ to save the man or the animal. An almost identical illustration is found in a different place² to prove this. It can be noted here that the process of dealing with the exceptions is very much similar to that found in the Mahābhārata, but the ground of these exceptions in the Jaina canons is free from the inconsistency and ambiguity found in the Mahābhārata and Manusmṛti, especially in the five kinds of falsehoods which are regarded as exceptions and declared sinless.

Transgressions, Atonements and Punishments

In spite of the emphasis laid on the vow and its implications, certain instances of its violation by the monks are not far to seek. "... The 'Gītārthas' themselves violated this rule, when they pretended that they had used pure water to wash their milk-dyed clothes in it."³ Further there is made no room for harsh and indecent or non-salutary speech, but, we find, some harsh and tough words could be used in addressing a novice for doing some grave offence, which made him leave the gaṇa.⁴ There are certain other violations also which are directly regarded as offences against study, such as mixing or adding words, or having wrong faith etc., but they can also be called transgressions of the vow of truth. However, the gravest transgression according to the Jaina texts in this con-

1. तुसीणीए उवेहेज्जा, जाणं वा णो जाणंति वइज्जा ।

—Ācār. 2. 129.

2. "संजमहेउं ति" जई केई लुद्धगादी पुच्छंति "कतो एत्थ भगवं दिट्ठा भिगादि ?"ताहे दिट्ठेसु वि वत्तव्वं...ण वि "पासे" ति दिट्ठति वुत्तं भवति ।

—Niśīthacūrṇi Bhā. 322.

3. History of Jaina Monachism —S. B. Deo, p. 434.

4. Brh. Kalpa Bhā., vol. I, p. 756.

nection is the condemnation of the *tīrthaṅkaras*, *gaṇadhara*s, *gaṇins*, the *āgama* or *saṅgha*. The punishment inflicted for such a transgression is *pārāñcika*.¹ Much similar to this transgression and its corresponding punishment is also available in Buddhism. The reason is that for both the systems the right faith or the right attitude is nothing but the essence of truth.

However, the details of the transgressions and punishments etc. regarding this vow are not as extensively discussed as those with regard to the precept of celibacy; still the importance of truth can very well be apprehended by understanding the ten *prāyaścittas* properly. Out of these ten *prāyaścittas* at least the first five, namely *ālocanā*, *pratikramaṇa*, etc., (which do not carry external punishments) presuppose the necessity of truth, without which acceptance of transgression itself would be impossible. It cannot therefore be supposed that the transgressions regarding truth are understood as a little lax as compared with those regarding other vows.

Satyānuvrata

Satyānuvrata means abstention from major or gross type of falsehood.² An ordinary householder takes the vow of abstention from major falsehoods,³ which are mainly enumerated as of five kinds. These are : (1) *kanyālika*, (2) *gavālika*, (3) *bhūmialika*, (4) *sthāpanamṛṣā*, (5) *kūṭasākṣya*.⁴ (1) *Kanyālika* means falsehood spoken in connection with matrimonial purposes. Sometimes the parents and other relatives keep the defects of

1. Antagadam. 7. 56.

2. भोगोपभोगसाधनमात्रं सावद्यमक्षमा मोक्तुम्,
ये तेऽपि शेषमनृतं समस्तमपि नित्यमेव मुञ्चतु । —P.S.U. 101.

3. बीयं अणुद्वयं थूलाओ मूसावायाओ वेरमणं ।

—Upāsaka. 1. 14, Śrā. Prati.

4. से मूसावाए पंचविहे पण्णत्ते । तं जहा-कण्णालीए, गवालिए, भोमालिए
थापणमोसो कूडसक्खिज्जे । इच्चेव भाइयस्स थूलमूसावायस्स, पच्चक्खाणं ।
—Ibid.

their daughter undisclosed and exaggerate her good qualities and capabilities. This is a typical example of falsehood in a culture in which boys and girls do not choose their spouses by themselves. (2) Gavālika means deception in the exchange of animals such as cows, horses, etc., and giving wrong statements about their strength and potentialities to convince the buyer. (3) By bhūmi-alīka is meant an untruth spoken in connection with the exchange of land, and the production of pseudo documents etc. for it. Both these second and third types of falsehoods symbolically pertain to modern system of commerce and trade, and not only refer to land and animals, but to any commodity having a commercial value. These terms, however, indicate the agricultural economy of India. (4) Sthāpanamṛṣā signifies misusing and misappropriating the deposits made by others and refusing to refund them; here it has been accounted a falsehood. However, it can also be considered an act of stealing as it is understood in Buddhism. (5) Lastly, by kūtasākṣya is meant giving false evidence in the court of law.

The householder abstains from these gross types of falsehoods. Falsehoods, for example, of relating stories, writing works of fiction, diplomacy, etc., are not regarded as violation of this precept. The householder abstains from uttering such major falsehoods himself, and from causing others to utter such falsehoods with the three instruments of mind, speech and body.¹ "Refraining from uttering oneself and from causing others to utter gross falsehood as well as truth which causes affliction to others, is called Satyāṇuvrata by the saints,"² says Ratnakarṇḍasrāvākācāra.

1. जावज्जीवाए, दुविहं तिविहेणं न करेमि न कारवेमि मणसा वयसा कायसा ।

—Upāsaka. I. 14, Śrā. Prati.

2. स्थूलमलीकं न वदति, न परान् वदयति सत्यमपिविपदे यत्तद्वदन्ति सन्तः स्थूलमृषावादवेरमणं ।

—Ratnak. Śrā., Stanza 55.

The Aticāras of the Vow¹

The first 'aticāra' or transgression of this vow is called 'sahasābhyākhyāna'. It means making false accusation rashly and negligently, for instance calling a man thief when actually he is not. The second transgression is called 'rahasyābhyākhyāna', i. e. disclosing the secret and private matters of others and indulging in backbiting etc. 'Svadāramantrabheda' is the third transgression, which means disclosing or divulging the secrets of one's own wife. The fourth transgression called 'mṛṣopadeśa' means giving wrong and faulty suggestions and orders to others. The last transgression called 'kūṭalekhakaraṇa' means making false documents etc. to deceive others. But, so far as this is done carelessly without properly inquiring into the matter, it is partial transgression. For those who pledge to abstain from speaking gross lies, a false document made intentionally is a breach of the vow called *anācāra*. The Digambara version is presented in the 'Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvākācāra'; the five transgressions enumerated there are : spreading false doctrines, revealing the secrets and deformities of others, back-biting, making false documents, and not returning the deposits made by others fully or even partly.² Here a difference can be noted, that is Samantabhadra calls these transgressions vyatikramas, while in the Śvetāmbara texts they are called aticāras. As is noted before vyatikrama is a prior stage of aticāras. But this term seems to have been used simply to mean a transgression and not in this technical sense. Moreover, in this text no such uniformity in using the terms to signify a 'transgression' has been observed in all the vratas. In different vratas different

1. तयाणंतरं च णं थूलगस्स मूसावायवरेमणस्स पंचअइयारा जाणियन्वा न
समायरियन्वा तांजहा, सहसा अब्भक्खाणे, रहस्स अब्भक्खाणे, सदारमन्त-
मेए मोसोवएसे कूडलेहकरणे । —Upāsaka. 1. 42.

2. परिवादरहोभ्याख्या पैशुन्यं कूटलेखकरणं च
न्यासापहारितापि च व्यतिक्रमाः पंच सत्यस्य ।

—Ratnak. Śrā., Stanza 56.

terms are used to mean a transgression, as for example 'vyaticāra' is used in the case of non-violence.

The results of observing this vow are that the person achieves fame, that people trust him and he himself accomplishes his best objects, and then there are good results which come in future life.¹ However, the proclamation of the vow of the householder and its major transgression does not rule out the possibilities of minor falsehoods which are unavoidable in practical life.

Buddhism

The principle of truth has a multilateral value in Buddhism also. It constitutes the essence of all spiritual effort. It is both a means and an end. In fact 'truth' as a precept is only a small fraction of what can be called 'truth' as a principle of reality. The former is dependent on the latter; in other words, ethical truth is a part of metaphysical truth. Buddha tried to find an axiom, a self evident formulation of truth, which could be accepted universally. Though Buddha did not believe in metaphysical philosophizing, he primarily believed in ethical teachings, but while refusing to give answers to the questions on the nature of ultimate reality, which was regarded as ethically irrelevant and intellectually uncertain, Buddha himself established the reality of certain truths. But it is undoubtedly true that his primary aim was not to solve metaphysical problems but to work as an ethical teacher. While devoting himself to this, in his spiritual experience he became convinced of four Noble Truths. This shows that the code of conduct is something which is in conformity with what is ultimate. The discussion of these four noble truths is undertaken in order to have a fuller discussion of the metaphysical truth as well as the ethical truth. These truths are : (1) there is suffering (dukkha), (2) there is a cause

1. सच्चं जसस्स मूलं सच्चं विस्सास कारणं परमं,
सच्चं सग्गवारं सच्चं सिद्धीइ सोपाणं ।

—Comm. on Dharma Saṃgrā. 2. 26.

of this suffering, (3) it is possible to stop suffering, and (4) there is a path leading to the cessation of suffering.¹ Around these four noble truths the entire Buddhist teachings are clustered. This is called by Buddha as 'dhamma' or the fact of things. The first noble truth is about the tyranny of pain. Buddha started with the most universally established principle, based on an experience that is common to all sentient beings. Suffering is existent every where.² There exists no other experience which is equally and universally predominant. All sentient beings are not thinking beings, nor all thinking beings reach the stage in which this faculty conceives its own nature and importance. But all are sentient beings and all sentient beings endure suffering, because all are subject to senility, death and decay. This suffering in Buddhism is not an expression of pessimism but it is the fundament thesis of a world-embracing thought; suffering being the most common factor in the experiences of all creatures in the Universe, it bridges the gulf between human and animal kingdoms. This gives rise to a feeling of universal brotherhood, on which is based the idea of non-violence as Dhammapada³ pronounces. The truth of suffering therefore becomes the starting point of ethical system of Buddha. Analysis of all aspects of life, all stages of life, makes him arrive at the same conclusion that there is suffering,⁴ though it is such a state which differs from

1. इदं खो पनभिक्षवे दुक्खं अरिय सच्चं । ...दुक्खसमुदयं अरियसच्चं...
दुक्खनिरोधं अरियसच्चं, ...दुक्खनिरोधगामिनिपटिपदा अरियसच्चं ।

—Mahā., p. 13.

2. सब्बे संखारा दुक्खा ति.....

—Dhammapada, 278.

3. सब्बे तसन्ति दण्डस्स, सब्बे भायन्ति मच्चुनो
अत्तानं उपमं कत्वा न हनेय्य न घातये ।

—Ibid., 129.

4. जाति पि दुक्खा, जरा पि दुक्खा, व्याधि पि दुक्खो, मरणं पि दुक्खं
अप्पियेहि सम्पयोगो दुक्खो, पियेहि विप्पयोगो दुक्खो यं पिच्छं न लमति
तं पि दुक्खं । संखित्तेन पंचुपादानकल्हवा दुक्खा ।

—Mahā., p. 13.

individual to individual, and it is not possible to have a quantitative discussion of it. But a qualitative discussion is possible and in this sense suffering has been divided into three types, i.e. bodily, mental and spiritual, which cover all kinds and states of suffering existent in all creatures from the lowest to the highest.

This study of suffering as the basic truth (first noble truth) leads Buddha to investigate another noble truth, i. e. there is a cause of suffering (*dukkha samudaya*). In answering the second question of cause of suffering Buddha took recourse to psychological analysis. Accordingly, he gives a list of twelve causes. The mental disharmony is called 'avidyā', ignorance or self-delusion. This 'avidyā' constitutes the root cause of suffering; under its influence everything will be valued from egocentric standpoint of desire (*taṇhā*)¹ which has been divided into three classes in *Mahāvagga*. And this craving or desire leads to rebirth, old age and death and thus suffering becomes unavoidable. Hence to overcome this suffering the very root of 'taṇhā' or ignorance needs to be destroyed.

This idea of cause of suffering leads to the third noble truth, that is there is cessation of suffering.² In general the truth of suffering is represented as the essence or most characteristic feature of Buddhism. But this is only half the truth. Suffering is the starting point of the doctrine and has its axiomatic value, but the end of doctrine which is even more important lies in its antithesis, which is the truth of happiness and removal of suffering. This happiness in nothing but *Nibbāna* or deliverance. From the point of view of ordinary human

1. इदं खो पन भिक्खवे, दुक्खसमुदयं अरियसच्चं, यायंतण्हा पोनोब्भविका
नन्दिरागसहगता तत्रतत्राभिनन्दनी सेय्यथीदं कामतण्हा, भवतण्हा
विभवतण्हा ।
—Mahā., p. 13.

2. इदं खो भिक्खवे दुक्ख निरोधं अरियसच्चं यो तस्सा येव तण्हाय असेस-
विरागनिरोधो, चागो, पटिनिस्सग्गो मुत्ति, अनालयो ।
—Mahā., p. 13.

psychology, it is a state free from all emotions, yet it is not always understood as a 'state' of passive indifference, a negative state of mind, but a very positive and powerful spiritual equilibrium, the beatitude (happiness of the highest kind) of perfect harmony; it is not a happiness of personal satisfaction but rather a happiness of universal character, not subject to individual considerations, but to insight into the laws of reality. This happiness can therefore be termed as a state of 'upekkhā' as already discussed as the highest psychological state of non-violence.

The fourth noble truth, i. e. there is a path leading to the cessation of suffering,¹ serves as a link between the first and the third noble truth or between suffering and happiness. In the path called the eightfold path lies the root of happiness and removal of suffering.

The eightfold path consisting of right views, right resolve, right livelihood, right conduct, etc., is only a detailed version of the threefold scheme of śīla, samādhi and pajñā.

This preliminary discussion on the four noble truths is undertaken here just to show the importance Buddha has given to the very principle of truth. It is said that the very apprehension and understanding of these four truths by an aspirant to bodhi would lead him to the correct path or to the attainment of what is most desirable, and it is the ignorance of these four noble truths or Dhamma that binds him to saṃsāra.

The fundamental belief in truth as a metaphysical principle would necessitate truth as a precept, or an ethical principle, which is binding upon every Buddhist, when he would say, "I

1.दुःखनिरोधगामिनि पटिपदा अरियसच्चं - अयमेव अरियो अटुगिको मग्गो, सेय्यथीदं - सम्मादिट्ठि, सम्मासंकप्पो, सम्मावाचा, सम्माकम्मंतो, सम्माआजीवो, सम्मावायामो, सम्मासत्ति, सम्मासमाधि ।

—Mahā., p. 13.

solemnly undertake to observe the precept which enjoins abstention from falsehood.”¹ This implies an abstention from international deception, and refraining from everything in the nature of wild, unconsidered, exaggerated language, everything in any sense a departure from a trustworthy sober statement of a fact or a thing; and this important aspect of right conduct which includes right speech has been emphasized and stressed in many Buddhist texts, which show that without the observance of this precept other courses in the path of right conduct would be partial and incomplete.

In the Dhammapada and other significant texts various passages are seen which underline the importance of truth-speaking as an important precept.

“One who transgresses the law of truth and tells lies cannot abstain from a single vice of sin,”² and “for one who indulges in falsehood, after committing a sin and would say that he did not do it, the only place left after death is hell.”³ Therefore “he who establishes himself in the truth and non-injurious speech would alone be called a Brāhmin.”⁴

One established in good conduct “puts away lying, abstains from speaking a falsehood, speaks the truth and from the truth he never swerves”, faithful and trustworthy, he injures

1. मुसावादा वेरमणी सिक्खापदं समादियामि ।
—Khu. Pāṭha, Dasasikkhāpadas.
2. एकं धम्मं अतीतस्स मूसावादिस्स जन्तुनो ।
वित्तिण्णपरलोकस्स नत्थि पापं अकारियं ॥
—Dhammapada, 176.
3. अभूतवादी निरयं उपेति यो चापि, कत्वा ‘न करोमीति’ चाह ।
उभोपि ते पेच्च समा भवन्ति, निहीणकम्मा मतुजा परत्थ ॥
—Ibid., 306.
4. अकक्कसं विञ्जापनिं गिरं सच्चं उदीरये ।
याय नाभिसजे किञ्चि तमहं भूमि ब्राह्मणं ॥
—Ibid., 408.

not his fellow-men by deceit.”¹ And “putting away foolish talks, he abstains from vain conversation. In season he speaks, in accordance with the facts, words full of meaning, on religion, on the discipline of the Order. He speaks, and at the right time, words worthy to be laid up in one’s heart, fitly illustrated, clearly divided, to the point.”² Further it is said, “When one comes to an assembly of people, one should not tell lies nor make others tell lies nor approve those who do so; one should avoid every kind of untruth.”³

All these extracts tend to show the importance of truth which has far-reaching implications for other precepts too. Buddhism stressingly denounces not simply the speaking of untruth, but causing others to speak such a falsehood which is harmful and also appreciation of such a falsehood, as can also be seen in Jaina doctrine of abstinence in all the three forms (or *karāṇas*). However, falsehood is condemned only when it is harmful and not spoken ‘with a loving heart and wisdom’. This again means that Buddhism favours only a non-violent truth. It must be spoken only for the benefit of others even if it is attended with injurious consequences for the person who speaks the truth, and it is only in this way that it can be said that ‘truth’ and ‘goodness’ are inseparably united. Non-violence can be said to enter only in this connotation of the term ‘truth.’

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1. मूसावादं पहाय मुसावादा पटिविरतो होति, सच्चवादी सच्चसंधो थेतो पच्चयिको अविसंवादको लोकस्स । इदं पिस्स होति सीलस्मिं
—*Dīgha.*, vol. I, p. 56
 2. सम्फप्पलापं पहाय सम्फप्पलापा पटिविरतो होति कालवादी भूतवादी अत्यवादी धम्मवादी विनयवादी, निधानवर्ति वाचं भासिता होति कालेन सापदेसं परियंतवर्ति अत्यसञ्चितं । इदं पिस्स होति सीलस्मिं ।
—*Ibid.*
 3. समग्ग तो वा परिसग्गतो वा, एकस्स वेको न मूसाभण्येय, न भासये भणतं नानुज्जग्गा, सव्वं अभूतं परिवज्जयेय्य ।
—*S. N., Dhammika Sutta, Stanza 22.*

The field of falsehood, however, is not very narrow. It includes everything such as misuse of confidence and cowardice. Calumny, flattery, perjury, etc., are all different forms of lying. Besides, these invention of evil reports and repeating them is another form of lying which has been condemned in Buddhism.

Abusive language is also considered a form of lying. Apparently, an abuse means uttering of words which are not factual and, at the same time, they hurt the person for whom they are spoken. It is obviously lying. It is said "the fool who is angered and thinks to triumph by the use of abusive language is always vanquished by him whose words are patient."¹ "From evil and abusive words, and an over-bearing and insulting disposition towards others hatred and resentment grow....The future of a man depends upon his words and therefore from evil words comes self-destruction."²

Transgressions and Punishments

The importance of it can further be reaffirmed by a discussion on violations or transgressions of this precept by the monks and punishment inflicted on them as discussed in the Vinaya and the Pātimokkha.

Falsehood according to Vinaya consists not only of simple, deliberate lies and use of abusive language etc. but of many things more. For example, the severer types of falsehoods consist of condemning and ridiculing the Dhamma or the metaphysical truth as preached by Buddha, talking lightly of Buddha and Saṅgha, etc., or showing disrespect to the doctrine or Dhamma, or pretending to have spiritual powers which one does not actually possess, or falsely accusing a monk of a major offence. However, in the Vinaya all major and minor offences are found regarding the violation of mṛṣāvādavirati.

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1. *Essence of Buddhism*—P. L. Narasu, p. 70.
 2. *Ibid.*

Pārājika is the severest offence, committed by a monk. It is the fourth pārājika which deals with the transgression of this precept. As has already been said, that simple, deliberate lies are less severe kinds of falsehood, according to the Vinaya, than showing disrespect and talking lightly of Dhamma, and pretending to possess miraculous powers or other extraordinary qualifications.¹ If a monk boasts of possessing sufficient knowledge and insight though not possessing them fully, yet he says 'I know it or I see this' he is accused of pārājika even if he is desirous of being purified, and is no longer held in the communion.

Next to 'pārājika' but severest of all other offences in the Vinaya is Saṃghādisesa offence. A monk commits a 'saṃghādisesa' offence when he falsely accuses a Bhikkhu of pārājika offence (e. g. of misbehaviour, theft or murder) while he has not committed it or has committed only a minor offence.² Likewise in an opposite case too, the monk commits a saṃghādisesa offence when he tries to hide the offence committed by another monk or even endeavours for the minimization of his punishment.³

Then comes a still less rigorous kind of offence in this connection known as 'pācittiya'. In this category many minor offences are included regarding the violation of this precept. As for example a monk is accused of pācittiya offence when he accuses falsely another monk or nun of a saṃghādisesa offence without any basis;⁴ 'without basis' here means

1. यो पन भिक्खु अनभिजानं उत्तरिमनुस्सधम्मं अत्तपनायिकं अलमरिय वाणदस्सनं समुदाचरेय्य....इति जानामि इति पस्सामिजति ततो.... अजानमेवं आवुसो अवचं जानामि अपस्सं पस्सामि । तुच्छ मुसा विलपि ति अयं पि पाराजिको होति असंवासोजति ।

—Pārājika, p. 113.

2. Pārājika, pp. 244, 253, 254, 255.

3. Ibid., p. 255.

4. यो पन भिक्खु भिक्खुं अमूलकेन संघादिसेसेन अनुद्धंसेय्य पाचित्तियं ।

Pācittiya, 76, p. 199.

that it has neither been seen, nor heard nor even doubted. Then again when the monk slanders, or abuses or speaks disrespectfully of another monk or nun, he is accused of 'pācittiya' offences.¹ A monk consuming another's food and telling a lie deliberately for this is another example of pācittiya offence.² In simple deliberate lies and in teasing a monk there is pācittiya offence.³ And also giving no reply to the Saṅgha when asked about any offence committed by the monk himself or some other monk and thus annoying the authorities is also pācittiya offence.⁴ This though does not apparently show any violation of the vow of truth, indirectly it means concealing the offence committed by the monk himself or some one else. Thus keeping silence is regarded as speaking a falsehood. On the Uposatha days the monks sit together and an authoritative monk recites the Pātimokkha rules and asks all the monks three times whether they are pure and when nobody replies it is taken for granted that all the monks are pure and nobody has committed any violation of Pātimokkha rules. Therefore, keeping silence on such an occasion which gives a false impression of purity means nothing less than telling deliberate lies and hence it is rightly considered pācittiya. But at the same time it is also stated clearly that telling lies in joke or fun is not an offence. Fun and jest, however, are understood as such simple acts, which do not involve any annoyance or disturbance, as for example after telling plainly that a falsehood is going to be uttered, the monk tells a lie.

The discussion so far on truth-as-a-precept in various systems of Indian philosophy shows that it is one of the top ranking tenets of morality, which is subject to the least change

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1. Ibid., pp. 5-6.
 2. Pārājika, p. 72.
 3. ओमसवादे पाचित्तिर्यं । —Pācittiya, p. 10.
 4. Ibid., p. 7.

because of differences in the social set-up. Though it is the most abstract principle, it furnishes the ground of the most concrete tenets of morality. Its validity and universality can be realized as a basic principle of life. If, for example, someone is asked to choose, as a practical principle of life, one of the two principles of truth and falsehood and he selects the principle of 'falsehood' he is always free to tell lies. But, at least, once he will have to assure others that he has chosen the principle of falsehood, and in this sense, he will have to take resort to the principle of truth at least once. Hence the importance of the principle of truth in practical life.

But in practice, however, the principle of truth is given a general relaxation, that is only because of its abstract nature. Political laws are quite emphatic on the maintenance of non-stealing and non-violence at least for mankind, but there is no such stringency against the violation of the principle of truth as such. Though it is expected in the court of law that one should 'speak only the truth and nothing but the truth', if it is confirmed that one had told a lie with regard to some 'offence', he will be punished only for that particular offence but not for the violation of the principle of truth as such or of the oath of speaking the truth and nothing but the truth, and no punishment as such is available for the violation of the principle of truth itself. It has therefore become a recognised vice. A scholar writing on the ethics of conformity says "the student of history sees that hypocrisy and insincere conformity have always been the besetting vices of the religion, and a grave drawback to their moralizing influence, just as lying is the recognised vice of the diplomats, chicanery of lawyers and solemn quackery of physicians." The reason for this lies in two things : Firstly, the nature of the precept, as has already been seen, is very abstract as compared with other precepts, its violation does not lead to such drastic results as the violation of other precepts may do, and for

external harmony and order its violation is not so harmful. Secondly, undue acceptance is given to this vice by society. One would hesitate in committing a murder or in stealing or indulging in illicit sex relations or in drinking but one would not so much hesitate in telling a lie even for a trivial reason.

Application of Truth

In the modern era, Gandhiji is one of the biggest exponents of truth. In numerous places he speaks in the praise of truth. For him, "Truth is perhaps the most important name of God. In fact it is more correct to say that truth is God than to say God is Truth."¹ And there is no other God than Truth. But at the same time he says that in love and non-violence lies the essence of truth. "To see the universal and all-pervading spirit of truth face to face one must be able to love the meanest creations as oneself."² The ideal which Gandhiji has chosen is nothing new, he takes resort to the same old teaching of Gītā and Mahābhārata. But the remarkable thing about him is his application of truth, not only in his personal life, but in the political life too with remarkable success, which is his unique contribution. The concept of 'Satyāgraha' is Gandhi's contribution to international politics, which means nothing but holding to or sticking to the principle of truth. In Heinrich Zimmer's words, "Mahatma Gandhi's programme of Satyāgraha is an attempt to carry this ancient Indo-Aryan idea into play against what would seem to the eye to be the vastly superior powers of the highly mechanized, [and] industrially supported military and political equipment of the Anglo Saxon's victorious machine of universal empire."³ Gandhiji applied his programme of 'Satyāgraha' when the British Govt. in India became untruthful and did not keep its word which it had given at the time of the first World-War

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1. My Experiments with Truth—M. K. Gandhi, p. 79.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Philosophies of India—H. Zimmer, p. 170.

when it needed India's immense co-operation and in the exchange for which it had promised independence to India.

About the results of this Satyāgraha nothing is needed to be said as everything is well known, of which success is the Main theme. Of course in a very short span of time the examples of the mal-utilization of this programme are also seen but the concept is not faulty in itself, the fault lies with the users who make a wrong use of it. This application of the principle of truth has an extreme potentiality in itself, for the cultivation of which certain basic defects such as fear, selfishness, greed and cowardice are needed to be checked.

CHAPTER VI

AVOIDANCE OF INTOXICANTS AND NON-POSSESSION

The last Śīla which Buddhism pronounces is abstinence from strong liquors or intoxicating drinks, i. e. surā-mereya madya pramādashāna-virati. It is worth noticing that how from such abstract and deep implicated virtues Buddhism makes a transition to a concrete and exoteric virtue like this one. It unfolds the following underlying features of the Buddhist ethics : (1) the two counterparts of ethics (social and spiritual) are equally important in Buddhism. (2) The adherents of Buddha belonged to the royal class¹ in which drinking was more popular than in other classes, though it is difficult to find a single class of people who totally abstained from drinking in ancient India. Drinking in India was very popular in those days and the promulgation of the virtue in Buddhism is a protest against this habit. (3) That in a comparatively less stringent Buddhist ethics for the laymen this virtue is promulgated, being moderate in nature as compared with abstinence from possession, as is pronounced in Jainism. Such an esoteric principle of aparigraha for the laity at least could not have been emphasized much by Buddha who adopted the middle path. However, as it shall be seen, condemnation of the use of intoxicants is found, not only in Buddhist scriptures but in other Indian religious scriptures too. The reason why intoxication is denounced in Indian scriptures is always almost the same everywhere, that is, it incapacitates a man for rational deliberation. It not only effects the one who is intoxicated but also others who are somehow related to him. It is the cause of many crimes; "For through intoxication the stupid commits sins and makes others intoxicated. Let him

1. Cambridge History of India, vol. I, p. 241.

avoid this seat of sin, this madness, this folly is delightful to the stupids.”¹

The Indian scriptures talk of various kinds of intoxicating drinks, such as soma, surā, madya, madirā, āsava, etc. All these terms cannot be called exact synonyms. Each one of the drinks differs from the others in percentage of intoxicating elements; some are more aggressive intoxicants, while others are milder, for example āsava is regarded as a milder intoxicant, only to be used as a medicine, whereas surā and madirā are stronger intoxicants. However, abstention from intoxicants refers to those drinks which produce an adverse effect on the mental, physical or spiritual health of a person.

Following the previous method of discussion, we can study the use of intoxicating and spirituous liquors from the Ṛgvedic period onwards. It is extremely difficult to find out when the use of intoxicating drinks began in India, but it can clearly be seen that the use of such drinks was very popular in the Ṛgvedic times, and the use of them is regarded as valuable in the Ṛgvedic social and religious rituals. The Indians of the Ṛgveda were acquainted with two kinds of spirituous liquors, these were soma and surā. The use of soma had a religious and ritualistic value and implied sanctity of the occasion, thus it had a purely religious character. The genuine soma juice was obtainable only from a genuine soma creeper, which occurred only in the mountains.² It was held in high esteem because of its own value in the yajñas as well as its scarcity value, for it became more and more difficult to obtain as the Āryans moved more and more away from the

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1. मदा हि पापानि करोति बाला, करोति जञ्ज्वेपि जने पमत्ते,
एतं अपुञ्जायतनं विवज्जए उम्मादनं मोहनं बालकं तं ।

—S. N., Dhmmika Sutta, 24.

2. सोमस्येव मौजवतस्य भक्षो । —Ṛgveda, 10.34.1.

mountains.¹ Soma deity too is one of the most popular deities in the Ṛgvedic hymns; while drinking the sacrificer is said to experience the most invigorating and exhilarating spirit, which is often described in the hymns attributed to Soma in the Ṛgveda. In some of the hymns Soma is said to exhilarate Varuṇa, Mitra, Indra and some other gods.² Soma is also said to possess all divinely characteristics. It is said to possess the real essence of any sacrifice or yajña or the panacea for all diseases. All gods are said to have drunk soma, not for the well being of themselves alone, but for the prosperity of the whole human race.³ The drinking of soma means the attainment of immortality for both the gods and the human beings.

Soma in the Ṛgveda is described as 'exhilarating' and 'intoxicating'. These adjectives such as 'invigorating', 'exhilarating' and 'intoxicating' refer not to the mundane pleasure derived in ordinary intoxication, but to transcendental joy or happiness derived by performing a yajña. However, this transcendental happiness is to be conceived as only of a conditional nature, which does not imply the infinite joy of emancipation or liberation but only happiness of heaven. Abstinence from this is therefore not promulgated in the Ṛgveda and in this sense it cannot be said that the root of the fifth śīla lies in it, nor can this account be conceived as contradictory to this precept. The use of such intoxicating supernatural drink however is not given recognition in any Śramanic system, because fundamentally they have no faith in the supremacy of the yajñas etc., nor do they have any supramundane value for these drinks.

However, the Ṛgvedic conception of intoxication does not confine itself to a description of soma alone, as has been

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1. History of Sanskrit Literature—A. A. Macdonell, p. 166.
 2. Dictionary of Eastern Religion—Winternitz.
 3. अपाम सोमममृताअभूम । —Ṛgveda, 8.48.3.

already mentioned. Another intoxicating drink is surā, which was more ordinarily used in those days. "The knowledge of it goes back to a much more remote period for its name like that of soma's haoma is found in Avestā literature in the name of 'hura'."¹ When Soma became difficult to procure, its substitutes had to be found out; Surā might have been its substitute, which became even more popular. It was distilled from some kind of grain, like the liquor made from rice in modern India. But the important difference in the Ṛgvedic soma and Ṛgvedic surā lies in the fact that the latter was always condemned whereas the former was always appreciated. Surā was always condemned as an intoxicant for it was connected with the mundane desire of being intoxicated. The Ṛgveda ranks drinking of surā in the vices like anger, dice and gambling, etc.² and surā-drinking is considered as the root of all these vices.³ At one place it is said that surā made men arrogant and revile gods. At another place in Ṛgveda mention is also made of a disease called 'surām' which is caused by the excessive drinking of surā. And even Indra is said to have once become a victim of this disorder.⁴ Drinking of surā is thus condemned in the Ṛgveda.

In the Brāhmaṇas instances of surā drinking are frequently available. It was more popular among the Kṣatriyas than the Brāhmaṇas. The Sūtramaṇi sacrifice⁵ is commended as an expiation for over-indulgence in intoxicants. In the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa surā is condemned and compared to untruth and darkness.⁶ In spite of the condemnation of surā

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1. History of Sanskrit Literature—A.A. Macdonell, p. 166.
 2. Ibid.
 3. सुरामन्युर्विभिदकोऽचित्तिः । —Ṛgveda, 7.86.6.
 4. Vedic Index—Macdonnel and Keith.
 5. Ibid.
 6. सुरा अनृतं पाप्मा तमः सुरा ।
—Śatapatha, 5.1.2.10.

drinking, it is given recognition as a medicine,¹ and is not accounted a vice. For the fulfilment of the urge of being intoxicated, the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa suggests that one should try to achieve fame which is equally intoxicating.² The Atharvaveda too condemns the use of intoxicating drinks just as it condemns flesh-eating or gambling which are called duṣkarmas.

In the Upaniṣads surā drinking has been discussed in an even more explicit manner. It is usually condemned as abhakṣya.³ In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad surā drinking is called a 'mahāpātaka'⁴ (a major sin). Kaivalya points out further that nobody should indulge in surā-drinking because it makes him impure.⁵ At another place it is compared to the stealing of a cow.⁶ The term 'madya' in the sense of intoxicating liquor appears for the first time in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad. However, all these madya, madirā, etc., have been denounced in the Upaniṣads.

In the Smṛtis too, there is an open and strong condemnation of intoxication. From various Smṛtis numerous instances can be cited which denounce heavy drinking. According to Manu there are four major sins (mahāpātakas) and intoxication is among them. Manusmṛti tells of the punishment of making a scar, known as 'surādhvaja', with an iron needle on the

1. अपां च वाऽएष ओषधीनां च रसोयत्सुरा । —Ibid., 12.8.
2. यशो हि सुरा । —Ibid., 12.7.3.14.
3. मद्यं मांसं च लशतुं प्लाण्डु शुगमेव चश्लेषमातकं विडंबाराहमभक्ष्यं वर्जयेन्नरः । —Jābālo, 40.
4. ब्रह्महत्यासुरापानम्..... —Chāndogya, 5.8.10.
5.सुरापानात्पुत्रिर्भवति ।—Kaivalya, 24.
6. गोस्तेयं सुरापानम् । —Mahānārāyaṇa.

forehead of a person who indulged in intoxication. It was the king who possessed the authority of making the scar on the forehead of the person.¹

Atrismṛti points out that a Brāhmin who had just taken some plain water which had been in touch with some intoxicating liquor should purge of his offence by undergoing the 'kṛcchapāda' atonement.² About 'Kṛcchapāda' atonement at another place it is said that a Brāhmin indulging in intoxicating drinks should be very severely punished by forcibly pouring a very hot liquor into his mouth so that he dies instantaneously.³ It is then only he can be purified from such a major sin; but in case he has accidentally or unknowingly drunk the liquor, he should not be given such a drastic punishment; he should just drink ghee, milk and water etc. for three subsequent days for its atonement.⁴ Śātātapasmṛti, however, discusses another way of atonement for intoxication. It says, he who is to be purified for intoxication would chant mantras and offer in the yajña a pitcher full of gold and ghee and half a pitcher of honey to please Varuṇa.⁵

In the Mahābhārata, "as for the prominent sins of royal military caste, they are mentioned as hunting, drinking,

1. 'Surādhvaja', Viṣvakośa, N.N. Vasu, vol. 24, p. 344.
2. मद्यसंप्लुष्ट कुम्भेषु यत्तोयं पिबतिद्विजः
कृच्छपादेन शुद्धयेत पुनः संस्कारमर्हति ।
—Atrismṛti, 20
3. सुरापस्य ब्राह्मणस्योष्णामासिचेयुः सुरामास्ये मृतः शुद्धयेत् ।
—Gautamasmṛti, Chap. 24.
4. अमत्या पाने पयोधृतमुदकं वायुं प्रतित्र्यहं तप्तानि सङ्कच्छस्ततोस्य
संस्कारः..... —Ibid.
5. स्यात्स दद्यात्सर्पिषो घटम्, मधुनोऽर्धघटम्चैव सहिरण्यं विशुद्धये ।
—Śātātapasmṛti, 3.2,3.

gambling, and sensuality".¹ According to the Mahābhārata it was Śukrācārya who first promulgated the abstinence from intoxication. It is said that once the devils (daityas) made Śukrācārya² over intoxicated in order to make him eat the meat of kaca, which they had killed only for Śukrācārya. When Śukrācārya came to know all this, after having overcome the effect of intoxication, he promulgated that no Brāhmin should indulge in intoxication and whosoever did so would be treated as having gone astray from righteousness and would be accused of an offence which was equivalent to the killing of a Brāhmin. He would be defamed not only in this life, but would suffer in the next lives too.

Jainism

Abstinence from intoxicants is often pronounced as an important virtue in Jaina Scriptures, though among the five precepts it has no place as such. Both for the laity as well as for the monks intoxication is forbidden. It is said that the monks who have renounced the world and accepted the vows for their spiritual purification should never indulge in intoxication.³ Any monk whosoever develops the habit of drinking would always find himself like a thief, in a restless condition and his equipoise will be disturbed; and even at the time of death he would be unable to procure right conduct, and contrive the stoppage of karman-particles.⁴

For the laity also, abstinence from intoxication is among the prominent virtues. The Jñātādharmakathā cites in-

1. Mahābhā., XI. 59.60.
2. Gita Rahasya—B.G. Tilak, p. 47; Viśva Kośa—N.N. Vasu, vol. 24, p. 343.
3. सुरं वा मरेणं वा वि अण्णं वा मज्जगं वा रसं ।
ससक्खं न पिवे भिक्खु जसं सारवक्खमप्पणो । —Daśav. 5.38.
4. निच्चुव्विग्गो जहा तेणो, अत्तकम्महि दुम्मई । तारिसो मरणते वि न आराहेई संवरं । —Daśav. 5.41.

toxication as duṣkarma with many other major vices.¹ Vipākasūtra² relates the story of a cook; the cook is said to have a very immoral life. He used to prepare dishes of flesh and fish, and various types of intoxicating liquors, which he used to relish himself, and made others relish. The result of this sinful act and the intensity of appreciation made him go to the sixth hell, where he reaped the fruits of this evil deed.

In the twelfefold scheme of the vows of the householder the seventh vow is called 'bhogopabhoga-parimāṇa-vrata' which enjoins the householder to limit and regulate the objects of use. This vow basically assumes renouncing the objects which are not of use, but it further stresses on limiting even the objects of use. Intoxicating drinks are included in the objects that are discarded and condemned. Hemacandra deals at length with the evils of intoxication.³ Haribhadra also gives a detailed account of the evils of intoxication by enumerating them as follows: (1) it disfigures the body, (2) it is a carrier of various physical disorders, (3) the intoxicated is humiliated at home and outside, (4) he cannot work at proper time, (5) it encourages hatred, (6) it spoils knowledge, memory and wisdom, (7) it discourages good company, (8) it produces harshness in speech, (9) it encourages contacts with the low people, (10) it spoils the reputation of the family, (11) it brings about deterioration of health, (12) it causes loss of good conduct, youth and money.⁴

1. अणिवारिये सच्छंदमई सईरप्पयारी मज्जप्पसंगी, चोज्जप्पसंगी मंसपसंगी जूयप्पसंगी वेसापसंगी परदारपसंगी जाएयावि होत्था । —Jūāta.18.3.
2. अप्पणा वि यणं से सिरीए महाणसिए तेसि च बहुहि जाव जलय-रथलयरखह्यरसेहि रसएहि य हरियसामेहि सोल्लेहि य तलिए हि य मज्जिएहि य सुरं च आसाएमाणे विहरति ।...परमाउं पालइत्ता काल मासे कालं किच्चा छट्टीए पुठवीए उपवन्ने । —Vip. 8.
3. Yoga Śāstra—Hemacandra, 3. 8-12.
4. वैरूप्यं व्यात्रिपिण्डः स्वजन परिभवः कार्य कालातिपातो,
विद्वेषो ज्ञाननाशः स्मृति मति हरणं विप्रयोगश्च सद्भिः
पारुष्यं नीचसेवा कुलबलविलयो धर्मकामार्थं हानिः
कष्टं वैषोडशैते निरूपचयकरा मद्यपानस्य दोषाः
—Aṣṭaka, Haribhadra, 19.

To this vow of the householder are also appended what are called fifteen karmādānas. It is suggested that the householder should abstain from all those types of business which involve more of violence. Among them are included Rasa-Vāñijya and Viṣa Vāñijya.¹ By the former is meant the business of spirituous liquors etc., and by the latter is meant the business of poisonous things. This shows that a householder should not only abstain from intoxication himself but should also refrain from leading others towards it, that is he should also refrain from selling liquors to them. However, sale of such objects for medicinal purposes should not be forbidden.

The basis of condemnation of intoxicants lies, according to the Jaina texts, in the principle of non-violence. Indulging in intoxication would mean violence. It is said, therefore, that whosoever takes up the vow of non-violence should give up wine, flesh, honey, etc.² It is further pointed out that various mental dispositions caused by drinking such as fearfulness, vanity, light mindedness, infatuation etc. are nothing but different names of violence.³ Samantabhadra, therefore, includes abstention from intoxicants among the eight basic virtues of an ideal householder.⁴

The scriptures talk of five kinds or pramādas or negligence or slothfulness.⁵ Negligence or slothfulness means indulgence in

1. कम्मओ णं समणोवासएणं पण्णरस कम्मादाणाइं जाणियव्वाइं न
समायरियव्वाइं, तं जहा इंगालकम्मे, वणकम्मे....रस वाणिज्जे,
विसवाणिज्जे....—Upāsaka. 1.47.
2. मद्यं मासं क्षौद्रं पञ्चौदुम्बरफलानि यत्नेन,
हिंसा व्युपरति कामैर्मोक्तव्यानि प्रथममेव । —P. S. U. 61.
3. अभिमानभयजुगुप्साहास्यारतिशोककामकोपाद्याः,
हिंसायाः पर्यायाः सर्वेऽपि च शरकसन्निहिताः । —Ibid., 64.
4. मद्यमांसं मधु त्यागैः सहाणुव्रतं पंचकम्,
अष्टौ मूलगुणाबाहु गृहिणां श्रमणोत्तमाः । —Ratnak. Śrā. 66.
5. मज्जविसय कसाया निहा विगहा....ए ए पञ्च पमाया....
—Aṣṭaka, Haribhadra.

something that ought not to be done and passivity or indifference towards something that ought to be done. This is the ground of all vices, greater or smaller. Intoxication is the first among them, because it leads one astray from the main objective.

This account shows clearly that abstention from intoxicants is very strongly emphasized in Jainism.

Buddhism

It is seen that the use of intoxicating drinks had been very much in vogue ever since the Ṛgvedic times and their condemnation too had been equally strong in both the trends of Indian Philosophy, Brāhmaṇical as well as Śramaṇical. The purpose of this historical account is just to show that in the Buddhist condemnation of intoxication there is nothing new, it is the same old wine put in the new bottle. However, it has been handled with a new method and force. The Brāhmaṇical approach to the vice of intoxication and the way of its atonement with the help of yajñas or oblations etc. cannot be traced in Buddhism (or in Jainism). The Buddhist literature shows that with textile fabrics, groceries, oil, flowers, perfumes etc. the sale of strong liquors also was quite common in those times. In such conditions Buddhism promulgates abstinence from the use of these drinks. It has been therefore put in the system of basic precepts of conduct of monks and of the laity, and intoxication is regarded as harmful since it may lead to the violation of the other four precepts too.

Buddhism speaks of abstention from all types of intoxicating drinks, surā, mereya, madya, etc., for the same reason as that for which the Brāhmaṇical and Jaina systems denounce it, that is all these strong drinks engender slothfulness or negligence (pramāda); the monks and the laity therefore solemnly undertake the vow of abstinence from them.¹ Surā is an intoxicant which is made after boiling or fomenting

1. सुरामेरेयमज्जपमादद्दान वेरमणी सिक्खापदं समादियामि ।

Khu. Pāṭha—Dasasikkhāpada.

something, some grain or something like it. Surā is of five types¹, namely pitṭhasurā, puvvasurā, odanasurā, kinnapakkhittāsura and sambhārapakkhittāsura. Pitṭhasurā is made from the powdered rice. Puvvasurā is made from baked bread or from something similar to it. Odanasurā is made from boiled rice and sour milk. Kinnapakkhittāsura means surā prepared by boiling some ferment or yeast. By samabhārapakkhittāsura is meant the surā made after boiling sambhara. Mereya, a different kind of intoxicant, has likewise been described as of five types, namely (1) puphāsavo, (2) phalāsavo, (3) guḍāsavo, (4) madhvāsavo and (5) sambhārasamyutto. The difference between surā and mereya is that the latter is not made by boiling or fomenting anything. By madda (madya) is meant in general anything which is intoxicating and creates a general loss of mental or physical balance. Indulgence in drinking all these intoxicants is harmful and is the cause of many physical or mental calamities. As it is said “drunkenness is the cause of loss of wealth and reputation, it is the cause of quarrels, diseases, immodesty of dress, disregard for honour and incapacity for learning.”² Dīgha Nikāya points out that a Brāhmaṇa³ is one who is established in five precepts including this one. Further “abstinence from indulging in vices like intoxication and indulging in religious activities through mind, speech and body are described as auspicious.”⁴

1. Paramatthajotikā Comm. to Khuddakapāṭha, Colombo edition, 1922, p. 12.

2. छ खोमे; गृहपति पुत्त, आदीनवा सुरामेरयमज्जप्पमादट्टानानुयोगे । सन्दिट्टिका धनजानि, कलहप्पवड्ढगी, रोगानं आयतनं, अकित्ति-सञ्जननी, कोपीननिदंसनी, पञ्जाय दुब्बलिकरणीत्वेव छट्ठं पदं भवति । —Dīgha., vol. III, p. 141.

3. यो खो ब्राह्मण, पसन्नचित्तो सिक्खापदानि “सुरामेरयमज्जप्पमादट्टाना वेरमणि” । —Ibid., vol. I, p. 125.

4. आरतिविरतिपापा, मज्जपाना च संयमो
अप्पमादो च धम्मेषु एतं मंगलमुत्तमं ।

—S. N., Mahāmaṅgalasutta, 7.

All these extracts show that effect of heavy intoxication is drastic from spiritual, as well as worldly, point of view. This denunciation of intoxication is emphatically expressed at some places, as in Chinese Brahmajāla Sutta the sale of spirituous liquors by a Buddhist layman is forbidden and even facilitating their sale is also forbidden because it may induce another to a sinful act. This is very much akin to Jaina promulgation of abstinence from sale of spirituous liquors (*Rasa-Vāñijya*) and poisonous objects (*Viṣa-Vāñijya*). However, the early Buddhist texts are not very stringent on the use of intoxicants. As it is said at one place in *Vinaya*, alcohol may be used as a medicine.¹ But, Buddha very clearly states that only that much alcohol should be mixed with the oil to prepare a mixture of medicine as is not even visible in the oil, in the sense that its colour, smell and taste etc. do not change. Thus only mild intoxicants are allowed.

However, on the violation of this precept no such stringency has been observed in the *Vinaya* or the *Pātimokkha* code as has been found with regard to that of other four precepts. R. S. Copleston has even remarked that no emphasis is laid on abstinence from alcohol and the last being treated only as one of the ceremonial restrictions and not among the most important of these. A more important place, however, is given to it in the discourse about the four sins,² where it is classed with sensuality, owning of gold and silver and low ways of earning livelihood. He further points out that in comparison with the real importance of the second, third,

1. अनुजानामि, भिक्खवे, तेलपाके मज्जं पक्खिपितुं ति ।.....न भिक्खवे अतिपक्खित्तमज्जं तेलं पातब्बं । यो पिवेय्य यथाधम्मो कारेतब्बो । अनुजानामि, भिक्खवे, यस्मिं तेलपाके मज्जस्स न वण्णो न गन्धो न रसो पञ्जायति, एवरूपं मज्जपक्खित्तं तेलं पातुं ति ।—*Mahā.*, p. 223.
2. एवमेव खो, भिक्खवे, चत्तारोमे समणब्राह्मणानं उपक्किलेसा,.....कतमे चत्तारो.....एके समणब्राह्मणा सुरं पिवन्ति मेरयं पिवन्ति, सुरामेरयपाना अप्पटिविस्ता.....
—*Culla.*, p. 417.

and fourth and the immense fictitious importance of the first rules of conduct, the emphasis laid on the fifth, which forbids strong drinks, is trifling. He says, "I have already mentioned, it is frequently absent from the list, even in the most exhaustive and systematic Suttas. It is conspicuously absent from the list of things which certainly bring a man to hell (Aṅguttara)."¹ In the latter remark of this scholar there seems a little exaggeration about this neglect or lack of emphasis, but he is not wrong in so far as he says that in the Vinaya rules or in the Pātimokkha Code, this precept is not given the same status. However, the texts do reveal that the monk is deprived of the bright light of the knowledge of truth if he indulges in intoxication² and for the laity too it is said that abstention from it is excellent.

Transgressions and Punishments

When one turns to the transgressions regarding this precept and the type of offence it is understood in the Pātimokkha code, one notices that what has been said above about the trifling nature of the precept is true to a great extent. No monk, according to the Pātimokkha code, would be accused of the biggest of the offences called pārajika, however drastically he violates his precept of abstinence from the different types of intoxicants; but, as has been already seen, he is punished with pārajika punishments on the violation of celibacy, non-stealing, non-violence and truth. It, therefore, reveals that the pārajika rules are concerned only with the main four sīlas, and the fifth one is only an auxiliary virtue. Exactly the same is the case with regard to saṅghādisesa rules, which are next to pārajika; the violation of the fifth precept would not even require saṅghādisesa punishments. Next in importance in the Pātimokkha code come the pācittiya rules, which are ninety-two in number. Out of these ninety-two, some are directed against taking life, as has already been seen; one or

1. Buddhism—R. S. Copleston, p. 189.

2. Culla., p. 418.

two rules are directed against theft, and quite a few are related to sexual offence; some are concerned with falsehood, slander, or pretensions to supernatural powers, but there is only one that forbids spirituous liquors¹ and is followed by several against lack of good manners. It therefore appears that the only ground for forbidding this might have been decorum and sobriety. This lack of emphasis on this precept, as compared with others, can be noticed easily. The warning against the use of spirituous liquors is somewhat like the warning against such ordinary weakness as those of frequenting theatres and dancing and music halls, for these amusements are regarded as forms of idleness, rather than degrading habit or habits leading to mischief. "One can only wonder how a rule so little insisted on and so little observed by the laity except in fulfilment of special vows can have its place in the fivefold code."²

In spite of the leniency about this precept already seen in the Vinaya and the Pātimokkha, Buddhism in some of its important texts shows that this precept, like others, is not only necessary for the monks and nuns but is equally binding upon the laity. It is said that the householder who delights in the dhamma should not indulge in intoxication nor should he sanction the actions of those who drink, knowing that it results in insanity.³ It depicts that the householder is thus expected not only to withhold himself from drinking but also to refrain from asking others to drink or from appreciating those who drink.⁴

However, in spite of the laxity (probably because it was very popular among the people, and it was not easy to check

1. सुरामेरयपाने पाचित्तियं ।

—Pātimokkha, Pācittiya rule No. 51.

2. Buddhism—R.S. Copleston, p. 190.

3. मज्जं न पानं न समाचरेय्य, घम्मं इमं रोचये यो गहट्ठो ।

न पायेय्य पिबतं नानुजञ्जा, उम्मादनं इति नं विदित्वा ।

—S.N., Dhammika Sutta, 24.

4. Cf. Jaina doctrine of three karaṇas and three yogas.

them very rigidly or because it was understood as an indirect vice and not a direct one) regarding the punishments etc., Buddhism denounces indulgence in intoxication unambiguously and completely. Indulgence in it might have been a minor offence, but abstinence from it, however, is accepted as a great virtue.

Bhikku Silacara remarks, "The harm which the man who breaks the fifth precept does to himself is an even more serious matter, for what he does by his indulgence in intoxicating liquors is directly to damage and immediately render incapable of proper action the very instrument by means of which alone he can attain enlightenment, while at the same time he loosens the reins of that control over his passions which every civilized man is unconsciously exercising every moment of his life, and so makes himself terribly liable to break each and all other precepts. Thus all strong drinks are condemnable."¹

Thus, in Indian scriptures the use of intoxicants is condemned in one way or the other, in the Brāhmaṇical literature as well as in Buddhist and Jaina Canons.

Aparigraha or Non-possession

In non-Buddhist scriptures, specially Jaina and Pātañjala yoga systems, the fifth vow is 'aparigraha' which is usually translated into English as 'non-possession'. The term 'aparigraha' is the opposite of 'parigraha', which is constituted of two terms, i. e. 'pari' and 'graha'. 'Graha' is rooted in 'grahaṇa' which means to take hold of, taking or accepting or receiving something. 'Pari' means round or round about, abundantly, richly, but it is usually used to express fullness or high degree. Thus parigraha means acceptance, or taking or receiving gifts or other worldly possessions. Parigraha is also defined as that which entangles one from all sides.²

1. Pañcaśīla – Bhikkhu Silacara, p. 63.

2. परिग्रहणं परिग्रहः । —Pāṇini, Aṣṭādhyāyī, 3.3.58.

'Aparigraha' as a precept or vow in the Brāhmaṇical literature finds occurrence in Baudhāyana Dharma Sūtras. There too it means abstention from taking possession of, refusal to master or overpower. The Sūtras speak of the five vows of the saṃnyāsin; aparigraha is one of them.¹ It is existent in Manusmṛti also. Manu says that a saṃnyāsin should establish himself in non-possession, live in a secluded place and should observe the vow of silence.² In the Mahābhārata also non-possession is considered to be a quality of a recluse (saṃnyāsin).³ Vaikhānasa Dharma Praśna includes aparigraha as one of the essential duties of a recluse.⁴ In some of the later Upaniṣads too, such as Paramahansa Upaniṣad and Nārada-parivrājaka Upaniṣad the term is available, signifying a necessary quality of any saṃnyāsin. In Nārada-parivrājaka Upaniṣad it is said that no saṃnyāsin is supposed to show any attachment to gold, he should not even see it because that may arouse in him greed for gold. However, the recognition was given to it only when the life of a recluse became important and considered a significant part of spiritual life.

Taking the historical sequence of Ṛgveda, Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads, one notices the absence of the precept or vow of aparigraha because the main emphasis there lies on the household life and not on renunciation and therefore all worldly possessions are understood as valuable and renunciation of the world is not regarded as highly desirable; (leaving aside the Upaniṣads which depict a synthesis of Vedic and Śramaṇical thought). However, it is maintained here that the idea of 'aparigraha' does have something in common with the Brāhmaṇical idea of dāna, and it is also tried here to show how closely dāna is related to aparigraha. By dāna is meant a gift or donation. Both dāna and aparigraha imply to some extent the same

1. Baudhāyana Dharma Sūtra, II. 10,18,23; 16-18, 21-22.
2. Manu., 6.43, 49, 60, 69, 75.
3. Mahābhārata, Śānti Parva, 10.25.
4. Vaikhānasa Dharma Praśna, III. 6.1.6.10.

basic intention of the person, i.e. the welfare of human society in general. It may appear a sort of stretching of the two concepts just for the sake of symmetry, but by clearly understanding the two concepts such a doubt can be resolved. While comparing the two concepts of 'dāna' and aparigraha, it can be seen that what is explicit in dāna is implicit in aparigraha, and what is explicit in aparigraha is implicit in dāna. In dāna detachment to objects of the world is implicit whereas well-being of others is explicit. In aparigraha detachment to worldly objects is explicit. In 'dāna' well-being of others is explicit and one's own well-being is implicit in terms of one's personal satisfaction by doing a social good or even heaven. While in aparigraha one's own well-being is explicit (well-being in terms of mokṣa), that of others is implicit.

The point of difference also cannot be overlooked. The concept of dāna in the main emphasizes the act of giving which refers to the object which is given and the person to whom it is given. In this manner it is a social value. The concept of aparigraha on the other hand relates to renunciation and refers to the intention of the giver and to the absence of desire to keep possessions, i. e. it refers to one's desire to part with something not much for the well-being of others but more for the upliftment of one's own self. This is the Śramaṇic ideal of morality or the individualistic morality. This is confirmed by the fact that the very term aparigraha finds existence in religious literature only when Śramaṇical thought was fully prevalent and when the Brāhmaṇical systems also were influenced by it. This assimilation of 'dāna' and 'aparigraha', however, takes in the main the concept of partial aparigraha meant for the laity, as can be seen in Jaina literature, but cannot be compared with the aparigraha of the monks who renounce the world completely.

This term 'dāna' occurs quite often in old Brāhmaṇical literature and is regarded as immensely valuable; every householder is expected to undergo the ritual of dāna. The 'dāna-

stutis' of Ṛgveda¹ reveal that the poets or purohitas were generously gifted by their patrons, and kings were the largest donors to their priests. And in that social set up gifts were said to be made out of personal property. Dānastutis are the compilations of the praises of the gifts by the king to the priestly class where liberality of the princes is commemorated. It should be noted that dāna constitutes a return or reward made for the faithful services performed by the priests or any other employed servant. The receipts of gifts formed a principal source of income to the Brāhmaṇas. "What has once been promised to a Brāhmaṇa may be claimed by him like an outstanding debt. Their greatest means of support consisted in grants of land, including sometimes houses, gardens, tanks, etc., given in perpetuity to gods or priests."² However, according to Ṛgveda dāna is something of supreme importance.³

In the Brāhmaṇas dāna is regarded as one among the three kinds of important duties, i.e. yajña, dāna and svādhyāya. The conception of dāna mainly emphasizes the material act of donation, which is a social value. But the liberality in performing it (dāna) also implies giving up attachment for the possessions by the donors. In this sense it has some resemblance to aparigraha.

In the Upaniṣads also dāna is given an equally important place. It is considered the preliminary virtue of all men. A parable in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad throws light on the meaning of 'da' as dāna. In communicating to men the knowledge which Prajāpati possessed he meant dāna by the term 'da' to be practised by all men, whereas he meant dayā or

1. Cambridge History of India, vol. I, p. 85.

2. E.R.E., vol. 6, p. 214.

3. उच्चा दिवि दक्षिणावन्तो अस्थुः.....

—Ṛgveda, 10.107.2.

compassion for demons and daman or self-control for the gods.¹ This shows that dāna is particularly a human virtue. By 'dāna' or charity he meant equality, and love should be cultivated for all human beings. In the Chāndogya also dāna occupies the foremost position among the three cardinal virtues.² Mahānārāyaṇa also regards dāna equivalent to yajña,³ and it is said that dāna is praised by every living being.⁴

The Upaniṣads speak not only of the value of dāna but also of the aparigraha. The distinction occupied by the worldly possessions in the Vedas and the Brāhmaṇas seems to lose strength in the Upaniṣads. Non-attachment for such possessions gained appreciation. Here a celebrated conversation between Yājñavalkya and his wife Maitreyi may be quoted from Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. When Yājñavalkya wanted to make a partition of his estate between his two wives, Maitreyi is said to have chosen the spiritual portion of his estate, and said "supposing I obtain the possession of the whole earth full of wealth, by that I shall not attain immortality." "Certainly not" replied Yājñavalkya, "Thy life will be only like the life of those who have all kinds of conveniences but there is no hope for immortality by the mere possession of wealth. It is not for its own sake that everything is dear, but for the sake of 'ātman' that everything is dear." This is a clear clue to aparigraha. Even more clear examples of aparigraha are found in the Upaniṣads like Īśāvāsya and Bṛhadāraṇyaka, where Īśāvāsya⁵ says that one should not covet and be greedy for others' wealth; on the other hand,

1. एतन्न्य शिक्षद्मं दानं दयाम् । —Bṛhad. 5.2.3.

2. यज्ञोऽययनं दानमिति प्रथमं । —Chāndo. 2.23.

3. दानं तपो यज्ञस्तपः । —Mahānārāyaṇa, 8.1.

4. दानमिति सर्वाणि भूतानि प्रशंसन्ति दाननातिदुष्करं तस्मारसन्ते ।

—Ibid., 21.2.

5. ईशा वास्यमिदं सर्वं यत्किञ्च जगत्यां जगत्

तेन त्यक्तेन न भुञ्जीथा मा गृधः कस्य सिद्धनम् । —Īśo. 1.

the best use of wealth lies in renouncing it. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka¹ talks of renunciation of the desire of wealth, children and other worldly things.

In the Pātañjala Yoga Sūtras aparigraha is the fifth among the five yamas. Aparigraha is usually translated as non-possession or non-attachment for possessions, specially in Jaina and Buddhist systems. But James Haughton Woods interprets 'aparigraha' of the Pātañjala system as 'abstention from acceptance of gifts'. So far as Yoga Sūtras are concerned, this interpretation is more correct and it would be more favourable in the attempt to compare the two concepts of dāna (giving gifts) and aparigraha (non-possession and non-acceptance of gifts specially in the Pātañjala Yoga sense). Here two interpretations of the term 'aparigraha' can be given—(1) non-possession which also includes giving gifts, and (2) non-possession meaning non-acceptance of gifts. These two versions of aparigraha may appear contradictory to each other, where the first commends giving gifts, the other condemns the acceptance of gifts. It is tried here to justify the two and show that they are not contradictory to each other as they appear to be. Further, the previous view still upheld that dāna and aparigraha are similar concept, though not identical.

Non-acceptance of gifts as aparigraha in Pātañjala Sūtra means non-possession of or non-attachment for something which is not one's own. This moral principle is, therefore, a condemnation of the current evil of acceptance of gifts prevalent in the Brāhmaṇical system. Another underlying idea is that the Pātañjala Sūtras seem to question the supremacy of the three cardinal virtues, that is yajña, dāna and svādhyāya, and establishes the supremacy of yoga; for the yogin acceptance of gifts would prove more of a hindrance than a help; for him the righteous action is the avoidance of acceptance of

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1. वित्तौषणायाः पुत्रौषणायाः लोकौषणायाश्च व्युत्थायाथः भिक्षाचर्यं चरन्ति ।
—Bṛhad. 3.5.1.

gifts. In this sense it therefore means non-possession or non-attachment to possessions. The second meaning of aparigraha, i.e. giving gifts or dāna, to the deserving ones implies at least minimization of attachment to one's own things which are given in dāna. Non-attachment is the common feature in both the concepts, and thus the two implications are not contradictory.

Now taking the concept of 'aparigraha' in Pātañjala sūtras, Vyāsa in his comment says, "Abstinence from acceptance of gifts is abstinence from appropriating objects, because one sees the disadvantages in acquiring them or keeping them or losing them or in being attached to them, or in harming them."¹ The same idea is amplified in Vācaspati Miśra's explanation. He says, "since passions increase because of application to the enjoyments, the skill of the organs also increases. Although obtained without effort, objects, if unauthorized, have disadvantages, when one acquires them, since the acquisition of such things is censured. And even authorized objects, when acquired, are evidently disadvantageous because they are needed to be looked after etc. Therefore, abstinence from acceptance of gifts is the refusal to appropriate them."²

In another sūtra³ Patañjali shows the clear and distinct picture of the condition one may acquire after establishing oneself in aparigraha. He says, "As soon as the yogin is established in abstinence from acceptance of gifts he gets a thorough illumination upon the conditions of birth." Vyāsa points out that the yogin who has established himself in aparigraha would get a clear picture of 'who he was' and 'what he would become' etc. And his desire to know all this would be fulfilled only after establishing himself in this abstention. It is, however, not easy to justify it logically. Yet it cannot

1. विषयाणामर्जनरक्षणक्षयसङ्ग्रहिसादोषदर्शनादस्वीकरणमपरिग्रहः ।
—Vyāsa's comm. on Pāt. Yoga., 2,30.
2. Vācaspati Miśra's explanation of the same.
3. अपरिग्रहस्थैर्ये जन्मकथन्ता सम्बोधः । —Pāt. Yoga. 2,39.

Avoidance of Intoxicants and Non-Possession

simply be rejected as a mere conjecture, because it is incapable of being tested. The climax of yogic practices may bring about extraordinary super-human powers.

About the classification and method etc. of developing the abstention, the same pratipakṣa bhāvanā etc. are applicable, and so they do not need repetition here.

Jainism

The importance of aprigraha in Jainism can be noticed by the very fact that it not only occupies the fifth position in the fivefold scheme of vows of Mahāvīra, but is also accepted in the fourfold scheme of the vows of Pārśvanātha called cāturyāma-dharma. The technical term used for this fourth precept is 'bahiddhādānāo veramaṇam'.¹ By 'bahirdhā' is meant external, ādāna is 'acceptance', and 'veramaṇam' means abstinence. Literally it means, therefore, abstinence from acceptance of something external. The term 'bahirdhā' or 'external' in itself is very comprehensive; while discussing the types of parigraha it would be clear how wide the term 'bahirdhā' or 'external' is; and in Pārśvanātha's code it is even more extensive and comprehensive, since it includes the vow of celibacy too, which is separated in Mahāvīra's fivefold scheme. However, 'bahirdhādāna' is the synonym of parigraha. But the Jaina scriptures clearly point out that sheer non-acceptance of something external is meaningless unless it is dissociated from what is called 'mūrcchā', 'mamatva' or desire, cleaving or attachment. In Daśavaikālika parigraha is identified with 'mūrcchā'.² In the Tattvārthasūtra too Umāsvāti has precisely pointed out that parigraha is nothing but 'mūrcchā'.³ This desire being the root of parigraha is the root of suffering;⁴ as soon as it is overcome suffering would come to an end.

1. Sthān. 4.1.266.

2. मुच्छापरिग्रहो वृत्तो नायपुत्रेण तादृशा । —Daśav. 6.21.

3. मूर्च्छा परिग्रहः । —Tattvā.7. 12.

4. कामे कमाहि कमियं खु दुक्खं । —Daśav. 2.5.

The Uttarādhyayana tells that desires are as endless as the sky;¹ hence instead of trying to satisfy them over and over again, they should be destroyed from their very roots; so mere non-acceptance of external objects is meaningless, if the desire is existent. As Amrita Candra points out, he who is unable to root out mūrccā or attachment to his belongings, cannot be said to have been established in the vow of non-possession, even if he gives up all his belongings, even his clothes. It is only mūrccā which is the true essence of parigraha.² Thus, anything for which one has attachment is parigraha; whether it is a living or non-living being (jaḍa and cetana), visible or invisible (rūpī and arūpī), big or small (sthūla and aṇu). With these broad implications of parigraha it is mainly classified into two kinds, i. e. apparent and real (bāhya and ābhyantara).³ These include all objects of attachment that retard liberation. By real or ābhyantara parigraha is meant the inner attitude of attachment towards worldly objects, living or non-living. This inner attitude may be constituted of various stages such as mithyātva (wrong notions), avirati (reluctance to accept the moral principles), pramāda (negligence) etc. Basically real parigraha arouses from within, it pertains more to thoughts and attitudes than to objects. On the other hand, apparent or bāhya parigraha is aroused from without. External objects are more obvious causes of apparent or bāhya parigraha, they then lead to inner involvement in the objects culminating into ābhayantara parigraha. These external objects (or bāhya parigrahas) are grossly classified into two types, living and non-living (cetana and jaḍa)⁴, jaḍa parigraha means attachment to all

1. इच्छा ह्यु आगासमा अणंतिया । —Uttarā. 9.48.
2. मूर्च्छालक्षणकरणात् सुघटा व्याप्तिः परिग्रहत्वस्य,
सग्रन्थो मूर्च्छवान् विनापि किल शेषसंगेभ्यः । —P. S. U. 114.
3. अतिसंक्षेपाद्द्विविधः स भवेदाभ्यन्तरश्च बाह्यश्च
प्रथमश्चतुर्दशविधो भवति द्विविधो द्वितीयस्तु । —Ibid., 115.
4. अथनिश्चितसच्चित्तौ बाह्यस्य परिग्रहस्य-भेदौ द्वौ । —Ibid, 117.

lifeless objects such as clothes, house, etc., and cetana parigraha means attachment to all living beings (wife, children, servants, etc.). Ābhyantara parigraha is divided into fourteen types.¹ These fourteen types are—wrong notions, attachments for sex, laughter, affliction, fear and disgust, four passions of anger, conceit, crookedness and greed and also four stages of these passions of anantānubandhī etc,

The classification is valuable since it gives an account of the nature of parigraha and its broad perspective, and it also shows that parigraha is inseparably associated with violence; specially the class of ābhyantara parigraha shows that the fourteen causes of ābhyantara parigraha are also the roots of violence or they are different names of violence.² This classification can be criticised; because the very term 'parigraha' has been seen as associated with the term "mūrccā" or 'mamatva', and that means that the inner involvement with certain objects (physical or mental) is necessary in parigraha as such; therefore, bāhya or apparent parigraha is mainly a superficial term, for without some inner involvement in an object, there is no parigraha. Thus either there is ābhyantara parigraha or there is no parigraha at all. This criticism can be answered by a clarification, i. e. that the causes of mūrccā or the essence of parigraha can be of two kinds, (i) inner, such as a wrong notion, reluctance to observe the vows (mithyātva and avirati) etc. and (ii) outer, such as house, money, clothes, etc. In this sense, therefore, this division of parigraha as 'bāhya' or 'ābhyantara' can be understood as fairly logical.³ The Sthānāṅga cites another classification of

1. मिथ्यात्ववेदरागस्तथैव हास्यादयश्च षड्दोषाः ।
चत्वारश्च कषायाश्चतुर्दशाम्यान्तरा ग्रन्थाः ॥ —P. S. U. 116.
2. हिंसापर्यायत्वात्सिद्धा हिंसान्तरंगसंगेषु ।
बहिरंगेषु तु नियतं प्रयातु मूर्च्छैव हिंसात्वम् ॥ —Ibid. 119.
3. यद्येवं भवति तदा परिग्रहो न खलु कोऽपि बहिरंग ।
भवति नितरां यतौजसौ घत्ते मूर्च्छा निमित्तत्वम् । —P. S. U. 113.

parigraha where parigraha is said to be of three kinds,¹ these are : (i) karmanparigraha, (ii) śarīra parigraha and (iii) bhaṇḍopakaraṇa parigraha. The first one can be compared with the ābhyantara parigraha of previous classification while the second and third to bāhya parigraha. However, all these three kinds will mean parigraha, only if they are accompanied by mūrccā, otherwise no karman, śarīra, or bhaṇḍopakaraṇa etc. can be termed parigraha.²

The Mahāvratā

The fifth or the last vow of the monks is 'sabbāo pariggahāo veramaṇaṃ' or abstention from all kinds of possessions. That means the monk promises to give up even the slightest form of attachment to everything, whether it be a trivial lifeless thing or a human being. Practically the vow demands not only the giving up of all property, but also of all family ties, that means the adopting of the life of a mendicant is thus grounded in this vow. Even the present Jain monks and nuns are supposed to observe the vow in such a strict sense. The Digambara monks always roam about all alone without even begging bowls and clothes, and the Śvetāmbara monks with scanty clothes and equipment and requisites, and they do not accept anything but what they require at one time just for the fulfilment of their bare necessities.

The mahāvratā pronounces that the monks abstain from all kinds of possessions, little in quantity or large in quantity, small in size or large in size, living or non-living. They abstain from all these possessions themselves, do not make others keep them, nor do they appreciate any such possessions kept by others. They abstain from them for the whole life with three instruments (yogas) and the three performances

1. Sthān. 3.

2. यस्मादकषायाणां कर्मग्रहणे न मूर्च्छास्ति । —P. S. U. 114.

{karaṇas).¹ Based on the very text of the mahāvratā, as stated in the Daśavaikālika, possessions are described as of fiftyfour varieties. It is said that the monk abstains from six types of possessions—little in quantity, large in quantity, small in size or large in size, living and non-living—with his three instruments of mind, speech and body and abstains from indulging in the violation of the vow in all the three ways of performances, that is he indulges in it neither himself, nor causes others to indulge in it, nor appreciates those who indulge in it. In this manner, the monk abstains from fifty-four kinds of parigraha.² This classification, however, refers mainly to bāhya parigraha.

This apparently shows that the vow of the monks suggests that the monks are not supposed to be equipped with any kind of belongings. But in practice both Śvetāmbara and Digambara monks do possess some requisites for their daily use. (The Digambara monks are even more rigid than the Śvetāmbaras as they do not even possess clothes and begging bowls, though they too possess one or two things for daily use and for the preservation of the fundamental vows). The justification for this restricted number of possessions is made on the basis of a distinction made between desire and necessity. Desire is something which is based on the passion of attachment or mūrccā, but necessity is not, the fulfilment of the latter helps in safeguarding the other vows and leading a good ascetic life. Necessities can be fulfilled even without attachment, therefore the monks can keep certain requisites like clothes, begging bowls etc., and they are not included in the class of

1.सब्वं भंते परिग्गहं पच्चक्खामि । से अप्पं वा बहुं वा अणुं वा थूलं वा चित्तमंतं वा अचित्तमंतं वा, नेव सयं परिग्गहं परिगिण्हिज्जा, नेवण्णेहिं परिग्गहं परिगिण्हाविज्जा, परिग्गहं परिगिण्हंते वि अण्णे न समणुजाणामि । जावज्जीवाए तिविहं तिविहेणं । —Daśav. 4.11.

2. Śramaṇa Sūtra—Upādhyaya Amarmuni, p. 64.

parigraph.¹ Niryuktis and other texts like *Vimśativimśikā* define aparigraha as 'svalpa parigraha' which includes articles allowed for religious purposes or for the maintenance of a perfect mode of life.² Such a list of articles which the monk could use is also given in *Bṛhatkalpabhāṣya* and the *Ācārāṅga* etc. Thus the monk is said to be established in the vow of complete aparigraha (even though he keeps a few possessions for daily use), because he has no attachment for them.

The Five Bhāvanās

The five helping devices or bhāvanās for safeguarding this vow are very simply stated together with the bhāvanās for the other vows in the *Samavāyāṅga Sūtra*. The bhāvanās underline the fact that the root of parigraha lies in the attachment to sensual objects, i. e. objects pertaining to all the senses. It is stressed that the monk should have strong intentions for abstaining from attachment towards all the five objects (*viśayas*) of śabda, rūpa, gandha, rasa and sparṣa (i. e. sound, colour, smell, taste and touch) of the five senses of ears, eyes, nose, tongue and body respectively. Control on each object of each sense is regarded as one helping device. In this way five checks—one on each of the five different senses—become the five helping devices for this vow.³

The Exceptions

So far the discussion pertained to the universal and ordinary circumstances (*utsarga*) in which the monk observes the vow of complete aparigraha which also means that he uses only those things which are prescribed for him and the

1. जं पि वत्थं च पायं वा कंवलं पायपुच्छं ।
तं पि संजम लज्जट्टा धारंति परिहरंति य । —Daśav. 6, 19.
2. History of Jaina Monachism—S.B. Deo, p. 435.
3. “सोइं दियरागोवरई, चक्खिन्दियरागोवरई घणिन्दियरागोवरई जिब्भिन्दियरागोवरई फसिन्दियरागोवरई ।” —Samavāya, 25.

number of all such requisites has been limited to fourteen.¹ This includes his clothes, begging bowls etc. (This is a Śvetāmbara version; the Digambaras being more rigid, have reduced the number of a monk's requisites even further). Anything other than these prescribed requisites is considered parigraha for him. But in exceptional circumstances, as in his other vows, the monk is permitted to relax the limits of his requisites and is allowed to use even those articles which under ordinary circumstances he is not allowed to possess. As for example, the Vyavahāra-Sūtra tells that a capable monk should keep only one begging bowl, but for the purpose of serving or helping other monks he is allowed to possess more than the prescribed number of begging bowls.² Likewise according to the changes in the circumstances etc. certain other relaxations have been made, as for example, it has become the usual practice among the monks now-a-days to use more than one begging bowl, which is simply considered an exception and not a transgression of the precept of aparigraha and for which the monks undergo no punishment, or atonement.

The Transgressions and the Punishments

About the transgression of this precept S. B. Deo remarks, "Even though literary evidence is scanty to prove the violations of this vow by the monks, inscriptions refer to a number of instances in which the monks were given gifts of land by royal patrons in connection with the temples. It is a moot point what kind of ownership was implied by such dedication of lands."³ Further Dr. Deo refers to the studies of Mrs. Stevenson (Heart of Jainism) and others who have

1. Praśna., Saṃvaradvāra, Aparigraha Nirūpaṇa, Pañcavastuka, 771-779.
2. कप्पई निग्गंथाण वा निग्गंथीण वा अहरेपडिग्गहं अण्णमणस्स अट्टाए धारेत्ताए परिग्गहित्ताए वा । —Vyavahāra, 8. 15.
3. History of Jaina Monachism—S. B. Deo, p. 435.

found some Jaina monks using golden spectacles or keeping Bank-notes, but these are the obvious instances of the transgression of this precept. For accepting, for example, a piece of cloth worth Pataliputra rupees 18, the monk has to undergo a punishment called caturguru, and like that more and more severe punishments are inflicted upon him as the objects become costlier and costlier. If he accepts an object costing rupees 50000, he is awarded anavasthāpya punishment and for accepting an object of the cost of rupees 100000, the punishment is pārāñcika.¹ Even for the use of requisites proper rules have been framed; violations of them, i.e. using the requisites etc. negligently or without permission, are also to be understood as transgressions pertaining to this vow.² These are mainly discussed in the Nisītha Sūtra and its bhāṣya.

The Aṇuvrata

The laity's vow of aparigraha is referred to by a few synonyms, such as smaller vow of non-possession (aparigraha-aṇuvrata),³ vow of limitation of possessions (parigraha parimāṇavrata),⁴ vow of abstention from major kinds of possession (sthūlaparigraha viramaṇavrata)⁵ and the vow of limitation of desires (Icchāparimāṇavrata).⁶ All these synonyms help in giving a clear picture of the laity's vow. However 'icchā-parimāṇavrata' used for the partial vow of non-possession is the most proper term, because it depicts the essence of the vow, i. e. the limitation of desires themselves and not merely of possessions, and therefore it gives an esoteric interpretation of the vow. 'Possession' and the 'desire to possess' are inter-related and that is why in the detailed account of this precept

1. Bṛh. Kalp. bhā., IV, 3893-98.
2. Jaina Monastic Jurisprudence—S. B. Deo, p. 75.
3. Śrā. Prati. (5th aṇuvrata).
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Upāsakadaśāṅgasūtra, 1.17; Sthānāṅga, 5.1

of the householder a prescription for the limitation of his worldly possessions is made which restricts the number of possessions to nine types¹. These are : farm and houses (kṣetra-vastu), gold and silver (hiraṇya-suvarṇa), bipeds and quadrupeds (dvipada and catuṣpada) and other requisites such as utensils etc., and other necessary equipment of the household (kūpya dhātu). The aforesaid list includes almost everything a householder needs for his own maintenance, for the maintenance of his family and for a normal living in society. The duty of the householder lies in limiting all his possessions and consequently controlling his limitless desire to possess more and more. It is in this sense of limitation of possessions that it is called the vow of partial limitation of possessions or abstention from major possessions which are endless as the desires are endless.

Further, the householder is enjoined to abstain himself through mind, speech and body² from possessions beyond the prescribed limitation but he is not at the same time enjoined to abstain from asking others for keeping possession, as the Śrāvaka-pratikramaṇa Sūtra suggests that he abstains from major possessions only with one karaṇa and three yogas and not with two karaṇas and three yogas like the other precepts of the householder. Strangely enough, in the Upāsakadaśāṅga this point is missing altogether, it only discusses the limitations of possessions of cows etc. by Upāsaka Ānanda.

This is the Śvetāmbara version of this vow, the Digambara version is almost the same in essence. According to the Ratna-karaṇḍaśrāvaka-cāra parigraha-parimāṇavratā prescribes

1. पंचम अणुव्वयं थूलाओ परिग्गाहाओ वेरमणं । खेत वत्थुणं जहा परिमाणे हिरण्णसुवण्णाण जहा परिमाणं, घण घण्णाणं जहा परिमाणं, दुप्पय चउप्पयाणं जहापरिमाणं कुप्पस्स जहापरिमाणं । एवमए जहा परिमाणं कयं तओ अयरितस्स परिग्गहस्स पच्चक्खाणं ।

—Śrā, Prati. Upāsaka. 1.17-20.

2. जावजीवाए, एकविहं तिविहेणं न करेमि मणसा वयसा कायसा ।

—Śrā. Prati.

limits of one's worldly possessions, cash, grain and the like and then asks one to desire no more than the complete detachment for everything which surpasses the limited amount.¹

The Aticāras of the Vow

The five aticāras of this precept specially mean the trespassing of the explicit limits of the possessions of nine types decided at the time when the vow is taken, because it basically enjoins the householder to limit his possessions. As for example Upāsaka Ānanda had limited his possession of cattle to forty thousand.² Likewise he limited all the other eight types of possessions of the household requisites in size, quality or quantity. Aticāra in connection with this precept simply means crossing negligently or unknowingly the decided limits (or Pramāṇātikrama) of the objects. The term 'pramāṇātikrama' is common to all the five aticāras of this vow. These aticāras are³ : (1) Kṣhetra-vastu pramāṇātikrama—transgressing the said limits of the farm and houses etc., (2) hiraṇya-suvarṇa pramāṇātikrama—transgressing the limits of gold and silver either in loose form or in the form of ornaments, (3) dhan-dhānya-pramāṇātikrama—violating the limits of wealth and corn etc., (4) dvīpada-catuṣpada-pramāṇātikrama—trespassing the limits of servants, children and animals, (5) kupyā-dhātu-pramāṇātikrama—violation of the limits of any other term of the household such as utensils and other requisites.

These five transgressions depict two salient features of the doctrine of aparigraha, (i) the possessions should be limited,

1. धनधान्यादि ग्रन्थपरिमाण ततोधिकेषु निस्पृहता ।
परिमितपरिग्रहः स्यादिच्छा परिमाण नामापि ॥ —Ratnak. Śrā. 61.
2. तथाणंतरं च णं चउप्पयविहिपरिमाणं करेई नन्नत्थ चउहिं वएहिं
दसगोसाहस्सिएणं वएणं अवसेसं सव्वं चउप्पयविहिं पञ्चक्खामि ।
—Upāsaka. 1.18.
3. तंजहा-खेतवत्थुपमाणाईकम्मे, हिरण्णसुवण्णपमाणाईकम्मे, घण-घण्णं
पमाणाईकम्मे, दुप्पयचउप्पयपमाणाईकम्मे, कुवियघातुपमाणाईकम्मे ।
—Ibid., 1.45.

and (ii) the householder should try to reduce even the limited possessions, wherein lies the essence of aparigraha.

The five transgressions given in the Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvākācāra are : (1) Keeping a much larger number of vehicles than required, (2) accumulating unnecessary or even necessary articles in a large quantity, (3) expressing wonder and happiness at the pomp and property of another, (4) excessive greed, (5) over-loading of animals.¹ These five faults point out a little more rigidity of the Digambaras in comparison with the Śvetāmbaras, as the third fault points out that a householder is supposed to abstain from expressing wonder and happiness at the pomp and property of another, which is not included in the Śvetāmbara list of the aticāras. The fifth fault of the over-loading of animals however is actually a transgression of the vow of non-violence rather than that of aparigraha.

Aparigraha of the laity, thus, is the least parigraha, like the least violence, the least falsehood, etc. Not only this, the sixth and seventh precepts of the householder called 'disā-parimāṇa vrata' and 'upabhoga-paribhoga parimāṇa vrata' of the twelvefold list of the vows of the householder are to be included in this vow, because they too refer to the limitation of desires pertaining to movement from place to place and to objects worth using.

So far as the concept of 'dāna' is concerned, it is a significant aspect of the moral behaviour of the householder. In the twelvefold list of vows of the householder, the twelfth vow of 'atithisamavibhāga' (i.e. taking the vow of keeping equal share of food and other necessary requisites for the guests, especially the monks and the nuns), which can to some extent be assimilated with this vow of non-possession in the fivefold scheme of primary vows, fundamentally implies the concept of dāna. Dāna to monks and nuns is specially rewarding according to

1. अतिवाहनातिसंग्रहविस्मयलोभातिभारवहनानि,
परिमितपरिग्रहस्य च विक्षेपाः पंच लक्ष्यन्ति । —Ratnak. Śrā. 62.

the Jains. Even at certain other places, the importance of dāna is obvious. It constitutes the first among the four religious practices.¹ It is said that dāna to one who deserves it is but righteousness or dharma, so it is rewarding.² The Tīrthamkaras start giving in charity one year before they are ordained.³ Further, the Daśavaikālika points out that one who gives in charity without thinking of any reward, and also one who takes anything without attachment will reap good fruits in the next life.⁴ Dāna, therefore, has its due place, but the emphasis laid on aparigraha is unique in Jainism. And the difference between the two however should remain clear; that is, the main figure in dāna is the 'object', while that in aparigraha is the 'subject', the essence of which is 'icchāparimāṇa'.

Buddhism

In Buddhism the fifth precept is not 'aparigraha', yet it has got its significance in many ways, just as in Jainism abstinence from intoxicants occupies a prominent place, even though it is not included among the five precepts. However, for the monks the vow of aparigraha or non-possession is even more explicit and distinct than for the laity. In the ten sikkhāpadas for the monks in Buddhism occurs a precept called 'jāta rūpa rajata patiggahaṇa virati.'⁵ This means that the monk is to abstain from accepting gold and silver and money. If he does not abstain, i. e. if he collects money and gold and silver, or asks others to do so, or uses that which has already been accumulated, he is accused of

1. दाणं सीलं च तवो भावो एवं च उच्चिहो धम्मो । —Śapta. 96.
2. धम्मं सरूवे परिणवइ चाउ वि पत्तहं दिण्णु । —Sāvaya. 91.
3. संवच्छरेण होहिंति अभिक्खमणं तु जिणवरिदीणं ।
तो अस्थि संपदाणं पव्वत्ती पुव्वसूराओ । —Acar. 2.23.112.
4. दुल्लहा हु मुहादाई, मुहाजीवी वि दुल्लहा
मुहादाई मुहाजीवी, दो वि गच्छंति सुग्गइं । —Daśav. 5.100.
5. जातरूपरजतपटिग्गहणा वेरमणी सिक्खापदं समादियामि ।
—Khu. Pāṭha, Dasasikkāpadas.

nissaggiya-pācittiya offence.¹ The monks are not supposed to have any attachment for any worldly possessions, which are only symbolized in gold and silver and coins, that means detachment from all mundane objects, that is everything such as wife, children or servants etc.² However, the difference between the Jaina and the Buddhist stand is obvious; the Jainas include this vow in the aṇuvratas of the laity, while the Buddhists make it exclusively for the monks, though for the laity too attachment for possessions is denounced. It is said that one who has attachment to land and other objects, money, gold and silver, cattle and horses, servants, wife and other relatives, and is obstructed by such desires is to face the dangerous calamities just as a boat with a small hole in it is ultimately to face disaster.³ Dhammapada also pronounces that one who establishes himself in aparigraha and tyāga would be called a Brāhmaṇa.⁴ Sutta Nipāta stresses aparigraha by pointing out that parigraha is an obstacle to 'dhamma'.⁵ But by repeating the term parigraha again and again Buddha only meant an attachment and cleaving towards the objects and not the objects themselves. In his exhortation to Anāthapiṇḍika, Buddha said, "It is not life

1. यो पन भिक्खु जातरूपरजतं उग्गण्हेय्य वा उग्गण्हापेय्य वा उपनिक्खित्तं वा सांदियेय्य, निस्सग्गियं पाचित्तिर्यति । —Pārājika, p. 339.
2. जातरूपरजतपटिग्गहणपटिविरतो समणो गोतमो, आमकघञ्ज, पटिग्गहणा पटिविरतो.....इत्थिकुमारिकपटिग्गहणापटिविरतो....दासदासी पटिग्गहण....अजेलक पटिग्गहण....खेत्तवत्थु पटिग्गहण पटिविरतो.... ।
—Dīgha, vol. I, p. 7.
3. खेत्तं वत्थुं हिरञ्जं वा गवास्सं दास पोरिसं,
थियो बन्धु पुयू कामे, यो नरो अणुगिज्जति ।
—S. N., Kāmasutta, 4, 5.
4.अक्किचनं अनादानं तमहं ब्रूमि ब्राह्मणं । —Dhammapada, 396-
5. निवेसनं यो मनसा अहासि परिग्गहा यस्स न सन्ति केचि,
अनुपादियानो इ घ वा हुरं वा तथागतो अरहति पूरलास ।
—S. N., Sundarikabhāradvājasutta, 16.

and wealth and power that enslave men but the cleaving towards them. He who possesses wealth and uses it rightly will be a blessing for his fellow beings.” In the Vinaya it is declared clearly that a Bhikkhu is allowed to gain profits on behalf of the Saṃgha. Though for the Saṃgha too it is not proper to have great wealth, granaries full of corn, many servants, money and treasury, while people around are suffering from poverty.

Actually the tenth śīla means that the monk should abstains from possessing gold and silver. It is not only the tenth śīla which is comparable to the Jaina vow of aparigraha, but all those śīlas meant for the monks which denounce worldliness, e. g. attending the worldly amusements, music and dances, the use of perfumes etc. Sleeping on luxurious beds¹ comes in the category of parigraha of Jainas; for them, all the five objects of five senses are parigraha. Further, the code of monks in Buddhism would also more explicitly show that aparigraha is an important tenet for the monk in limiting his possessions. He is allowed to have only three cīvaras² and one begging bowl, apart from this, he is not supposed to keep anything for which he may develop attachment. And for having a retreat in the rainy season, the monks are allowed to reside in a sort of monastery which is especially meant for this purpose. After the expiry of this period of four ‘months, they should again start roaming for the remaining eight months of the year. But this small monastery in the time of Buddha was owned by a layman (the tradition is still maintained in Jaina monachism), and not by the monks themselves. But by the time of Aśoka

1. (i) नच्चगीतवादितविसूकदस्सना वेरमणी सिक्खापदं,
(ii) मालागन्धविल्लपनधारणमण्डनविभूसनट्टानावेरमणी, उच्चसयनमहासयना वेरमणी । —Khu. Pāṭha, Dasasikkhāpadas.
2. यत्तुनाहं भिक्खून् चीवरे सीमं बन्धेय्यं, मरियादं ठपेय्यं तिचीवरं अनुजानेय्यति ।न भिक्खवे अतिरेकचीवरं धारेतब्बं । —Mahā.,p. 305.

things were completely changed, and these small houses meant for the monks were converted into big monasteries and the ownership of these monasteries too changed from the laity to the monks. And the monks started living permanently in these monasteries. In this sense it can also be said that the Buddhist Saṃgha changed into parigrahi (or possessive) Saṃgha.

Dāna

Dāna is considered an important moral principle in Buddhist ethics also, more specially in the Mahāyāna sect, where it is regarded as the first stepping-stone to bodhi.¹ For the Mahāyānī aspirant to bodhi, observance of pāramitās is fundamentally necessary. Jātaka stories relate some of the previous births of Buddha; during these births the Bodhisattva was preparing himself to achieve the supreme enlightenment, and was gradually bringing himself to the attainment of certain perfections. It is these perfections which are called the pāramitās or 'Pārami' in Pāli and are supposed to be six in number.² Among these six pāramitās, dāna-pāramitā occupies the first place. It means perfection of generosity for all living beings. One is said to be established in this perfection when he is prepared to give away whatever he has. He does not wish to know about the person whom he is giving, nor does he think of getting its reward, but he only thinks of his well-being. After achieving this perfection other perfections are achieved, such as those of śīla and prajñā etc. This only shows that perfection of dāna is the first stepping-stone to enlightenment. One Jātaka story tells of one of the previous lives of the Bodhisattva who born as a wise hare. He tells his friends, "Gifts should be given, moral conduct guarded and the formal acts of observance carried out."³ He

1. दानं हि बोधिसत्त्वस्य बोधिरिति । —Śikṣāsammuccaya, p. 34.

2. Some texts speak of ten pāramitās.

3. Jataka Stories, vol. III, Jataka No. 316 (Birth story of a hare).

further says, "A gift given by one standing fast in moral conduct is of great value. Therefore, if any beggar comes, you give him to eat of food that have been eaten by you."¹

In Nidānakathā, which serves as an introduction to Jātakāthakathā, the story of Buddha's past lives are related, from his existence as Sumedha up to his acceptance of monastery of Jetavana. Buddha is said to have searched the entire cosmic order in order to investigate the conditions contributory to enlightenment.² While meditating upon them Buddha found out perfection of generosity as the foremost condition to enlightenment, a condition which was preached and practised by the former Bodhisattvas. And he admonished himself thus : "O wise Sumedha, from now onwards you fulfil the first perfection of dāna, just as an overturned waterpot discharges its water holding back nothing, without regard to wealth, fame, wife or child, or one limb or the other of the body, you will become a Buddha seated at the foot of bodhi tree."³ Thus Buddha laid emphasis on the first perfection of dāna as the great highway followed by the Mighty sages of the past.

Dāna thus refers to non-attachment for possessions one has and can be said as akin to aparigraha, but its importance is pronounced more for the laity than for the monks, who already have limited possessions, just as aparigraha pertains more to the monks than to the laity.

However, whatever way it is understood, aparigraha is an accepted virtue in Buddhism also, as it implies both a limitation of desires as well as a spirit of generosity.

To conclude, it is necessary to say that behind the limitation of desires (or icchāparimāṇa)—the essential quality of aparigraha—there works a self-imposed socialistic spirit.

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1. Ibid.
 2. Jātaka Nidānakathā—Jayawickrama, Introduction, p. 31.
 3. Ibid.

Though it makes room for the fulfilment of the needs, it requires desires to be controlled. Here an apparent resemblance can be discovered between aparigraha and the communist belief that everyone should be equal economically, and that one should be given according to one's needs and not according to one's desires; for the staunch communists this ideal of economic equality is to be achieved by a bloody revolution. However, the two ideologies (least parigraha and economic equality) cannot be assimilated to a great extent, but it can be said at the outset that the former would function in a definitely better way than the latter if applied at all, because voluntariness always works better than force. But at the same time one can very well imagine the picture of the new society, which would certainly be different from that of the present society. Here, as the precept declares, the ideal of the monk or the householder is to curtail his desires, limit his possessions and try to remain satisfied with what he has and not always to strive for newer and newer achievements, in terms of physical, social, economic and industrial development. The form of society would be more static than dynamic. All the explorations of science would come to a standstill; scientific inventions or discoveries would lose all their significance. But the increment of wealth may be undertaken for the good of all. The society would thus be different society or a society of spirituals.

However, these are just hypothetical assertions, but for the moral way of living in society partial vow of non-possession of the householder is inevitably necessary. Even from social point of view in the modern world partial non-possession or limited possession would be a great blessing, specially in developing or under-developed countries.

CONCLUSION

It has been seen in the previous chapters that 'Pañcasīla', technically a Buddhist concept, is universal in implications. It constitutes the foundation of all ancient and modern morality. Non-violence, truth, non-stealing, continence and non-possession, the five principles of Indian Ethics, Pañcasīla in Buddhism, Pañcavratas in Jainism, and Pañcayamas in Hinduism constitute the foundation of all ancient and modern morality. Every religious or social system has accepted it as the basic code of conduct for all individuals, in relation either to his own self, or to the society of which he is a part. Whosoever neglects these basic principles, which are both social as well as spiritual, is considered pernicious to himself or to the society, he is a sinner or a criminal.

The universal significance of the five principles for man as an individual, for man as a member of society, for a man of the past, and for a man of the present age, leads us to a positive approach towards the problem. The germ of these five principles can be traced out in the oldest historical evidence available in India—the Ṛgveda. The principles have only been in embryo in the Ṛgveda or literature just adjacent to it—the Brāhmaṇas; though in the Śramaṇic period these principles appear in a manifest form. Actually the problem of morality (as depicted in these principles) concerns the basic rights of human existence. It is therefore unreasonable to suppose that these moral principles originated some day all of a sudden like a volcanic eruption; in some minor or major, implicit or explicit form, they must have been in existence for a long time. Thus it can be reasonably maintained that all moral principles firstly and finally base themselves only upon the enigmatic human nature. The good principles come from nowhere else than from human nature, as the bad principles originate from the devil in man. And as human nature has always been the same, nothing could be fundamentally new about them. However, in the sense of the status they have

assumed in Indian morality they have undoubtedly been modified and redefined in course of time. The shape they assumed in Buddhism and Jainism during the time of Pārśva-nātha (the twenty-third Tīrthaṅkara of Jainas who has even influenced Buddha to a great extent, as Prof. D. D. Kosambi opines), or even in Yoga System of Patañjali, was considerably new in the above sense.

The cause of this transition from the Brāhmaṇical latent principles of morality to the Śramaṇical manifest ones lies in the difference of emphasis laid on the basis of morality; for the former morality is a social affair, as it means the code of conduct of an individual as a member of the society. For the latter, on the other hand, morality is personal affair; here, the individual seeks his own good (not of course in the popular sense of selfishness) while living in the society. As everyone will seek his own happiness (happiness that does not clash with the happiness of others), happiness of all will follow automatically. The problem of emancipation comes along with this current of thought. It is because of this prominent contrast in the two currents that in the former these moral principles are restricted, limited or latent, while in the latter they are extremely extensive in field, unlimited in nature and unrestricted in application.

The first and foremost of these moral principles is the principle of non-violence for the Śramaṇical current of thought which, as mentioned before, can be traced out in some implicit form even in the Vedic literature.

It is maintained that the principle of non-violence basically consists of both the aspects, positive and negative; a mere negative or abortive principle as its nomenclature suggests is partial and incomplete. It is only because of the positive potentiality of love, sympathy, compassion or 'karuṇā' in human nature that the negative aspect of non-violence, i. e. abstention from injury or hatred, can be cultivated. If the positive side is lacking completely, the negative cannot be

evolved. Likewise it is equally difficult to conceive non-violence in a purely positive form. The only justifiable conclusion would be that non-violence is both positive and negative because both these aspects originate in the very moral sense of a human being, the distinguishing feature of humanity, though there might have been certain reasons for this negative nomenclature. However, non-violence in the negative aspect in the Śramaṇical trend is fundamentally based on the principle of equality (or Samatā) for all living beings. No living being, smaller or greater, lower or higher, significant or insignificant, should be injured. The Vedic society allowed violence in some form, as in the form of Yajñas etc., that meant negligence towards the principle of non-violence, but the Śramaṇical tradition remained emphatic on non-violence throughout the history. Not only this, but with the increase of the Śramaṇical influence on the Brāhmaṇical system, it pervaded the entire Indian culture, and violent Yajñas etc. became obsolete.

So far as the implementation of the positive aspect of love and compassion in the form of saving a life is concerned, it cannot be ignored that the Śramaṇical systems give due importance to this positive aspect. And it has also been remarked that the life of a higher living-being is given first preference, as it is natural that the higher the creature the greater the feelings of love and compassion for it. Instances can be found in some scriptures which suggest that for saving a human life the life of a smaller creature may be overlooked. It should be borne in mind, however, that this injuring of the life of smaller creatures is not a negligently performed task. Proper attention and respect are given to the life of these lower creatures.

The second moral principle of non-stealing, it seems, is merely a duplication of the principle of non-violence, at least for the Śramaṇical trend, which itself is very broad and extensive. If the implications of the principle of non-violence are

understood fully, there will be no necessity of having another moral principle like this one. However, its occupying a separate place tends to show that the duties of man towards man should be preserved with special care. And this fact has been given recognition even by the Śramaṇical exponents. At the same time it is also true that it is more a social virtue than a spiritual virtue and that is why it can be seen that the place it occupies in the Brāhmaṇical systems (the Ṛgveda or the Brāhmaṇas) is even more outstanding than that occupied by the principle of non-violence. The vice of stealing has been condemned very openly as can be seen by the punishments etc. inflicted on a thief. But such is not the case about violence, though, of course, the very acceptance of non-stealing as a virtue would imply non-violent attitude for mankind and a desire to protect the social 'life' of man. The Śramaṇical systems condemn stealing on two grounds; one is objective and the other is subjective. Objectively considered, it hurts the person whose wealth is stolen, as it is sometimes said that wealth is the outer vitality of a person and in that way it is violence. Subjectively speaking, it comes out of greed or covetousness and gets outlet through crookedness, all these in themselves are harmful. This interpretation is exclusively Śramaṇical, but in this, of course, there is nothing new except violence. It is, therefore, not wrong to regard it as a mere duplication of non-violence, if only of a restricted form of it.

The precept of celibacy is actually the distinguishing principle of the Śramaṇical Culture. Renunciation of household life, family and wife is typically a Śramaṇical contribution and is understood as the best way for establishing oneself in righteousness or 'dharma'. In the Brāhmaṇical current of thought, on the other hand, household life is considered to have supreme value. Still, the term 'Brahmacarya' is not new to the Śramaṇical trend; in the Brāhmaṇical trend also it occurs, though not in the sense of celibacy but in its etymological sense only, meaning thereby the study of the Vedas or absorption in the nature of Ultimate Reality. The conventional use

of this term as celibacy is only a restricted interpretation of the etymological meaning based on the way of living of the student, his simplicity and his control on the senses (including sex). This restricted interpretation became the chief moral principle for the Śramaṇical thinkers. They profess this ideal not only in its extreme form, for the moderate version of this principle is manifested in the precept of the laity as partial control of sex desire and the restriction of this desire to one's wife only. On this point both the Śramaṇical and the Brāhmaṇical exponents agree. The common ground for this agreement is obvious, i.e. social orderliness. But, for the latter it is supreme righteousness and for the former it is a lesser evil to avoid the greater evil.

The precept of truth, the fourth in Buddhism and the second in non-Buddhist systems, is important for both the Brāhmaṇical and the Śramaṇical trends. This is the only principle which the two trends of thought openly emphasize. It is usually said that out of the five only two are the primary precepts, viz. non-violence and truth. In the earlier Brāhmaṇical trend, however, it seems that truth is understood as even more important than non-violence, though later on, in the Brāhmaṇical trend also, just as in the Śramaṇical system recognition to 'sarvāhita' (well-being of all) was given, and it was considered the inducing force of truth, a fact which can be seen in the Mahābhārata and the Pātañjala-Yoga System.

It appears a little surprising that how a trend (the Brāhmaṇical) insisting so much on the social values could emphatically establish the supremacy of truth which is more an individual virtue, and how the opposite of truth, i.e. falsehood (if it is not in contradiction with non-violence) could at all affect social orderliness. Actually, its impact on social organization is not direct, until and unless it clashes with non-violence. But it can be remarked that the very origin of the Brāhmaṇical 'truth' lies in orderliness or Ṛta as the Ṛgveda points out that disorder or An-ṛta is understood

to be a falsehood. This, therefore, shows that truth is valuable because it is an essential feature of orderliness; though the Śramanīcal exponents also will not refute this point, they will emphasize the principle on subjective grounds. However, the vast and extensive field occupied by this principle is attributed to its twofold implications, viz. ethical and metaphysical. These two cannot be regarded as independent of each other, rather the former is dependent on the latter, and the ethical implications owe their importance considerably to the metaphysical ones. This fact has been accepted by all the systems, specially Buddhism and Jainism. It can also be confirmed by noticing some of the instances of transgressions of the vows and their respective punishments as found in the monastic codes of both Buddhism and Jainism. Lies told about ordinary matters are considered simple falsehoods, but non-recognition or misinterpretation of the Ultimate Reality, as accepted in each system, is understood as a very grave falsehood. As for example, non-belief in the seven or nine tattvas, or ridiculing a Tīrthamkara, is accounted as a major offence in Jainism; likewise, disrespect to Buddha or non-faith in the four-noble truths is a grave offence in Buddhism. As a matter of fact, truth occupies a prominent status in the path of knowledge, but so far as action is concerned it is guided by the principle of non-violence.

On the fifth principle of morality there is difference of opinion among the various systems. According to Buddhism the fifth principle is abstinence from intoxicants, while in non-Buddhist systems, viz. Jaina and Yoga, it is non-possession. So far as intoxication is concerned, it is condemned in entire Indian thought. Buddhism makes no novel approach against the Brāhmaṇical trend, where it has been badly denounced; leaving aside Soma-drinking, which though described as 'exhilarating', 'intoxicating' and 'invigorating', is hailed because it possesses a sanctimonious and divine character. Surā-drinking is censured all over in the Ṛgveda, Brāhmaṇas, Upaniṣads and Smṛtis. It is interesting to note some of the purificatory-actions (prāyaścittas)

for purging of the offence of intoxication as given in various Smṛtis. In Buddhism, the expounder of middle-path, it seems, abstinence from intoxication is pronounced for the laity more than non-possession (as promulgated by Jainas) because it is a simpler and more exoteric virtue.

Non-possession, on the other hand, is fundamentally necessary for any monastic system. The essence of monastic life lies in acceptance of this virtue, even if Buddhism does not admit it as a precept of the laymen, but its spirit has been there in the monastic discipline. It is, however, clear that a virtue like this is difficult to be traced out in the Brāhmaṇical trend which has a socialistic basis of morality. As soon as the cult of renunciation gained strength it also entered into the later developments of Brāhmaṇism. The precept of partial non-possession of the laity as pronounced in Jainism does throw some light on the social organization and gives recognition to possessions. But this recognition of possessions is different from that of the Brāhmaṇical trend which gives supremacy to social organization itself. The householder's precept insists on limitation of possessions, which is the kernel of renunciation. Herein lies the spirit of voluntary socialism rather than forced socialism.

These principles present the universal code of ethics, but in practice it is seen that they remain nothing more than a code of schismatic ethics. Each sect, even if essentially believing in them, differs with all others on certain minor points and this mild difference gains much intensity, sometimes as to create acute conflicts and controversies. In this manner schismatic ethics becomes even more powerful than the universal ethics. The reason of this fact again lies in the enigmatic human nature. The two constituents of human mind, rationality and sensationality, are so curiously mixed that it is difficult to say which of them really justifies an action, and in what circumstances a certain action is justified. The so-called immoral actions may be moral in essence, while the appa-

rently moral may be truly immoral. This can also be ascertained that the universal principles cannot be applied in practical life without giving room to their certain exceptions. None of the five precepts of morality can be thought of without its accompanying exceptions. None of the five precepts of morality can be thought of without its accompanying exceptions. It is recognised that all these moral principles can be violated if a 'real' situation justifies their violation. As it is frankly acknowledged that for preserving the principle of non-violence (specially in the Śramanic trend) the remaining four principles are framed; they can, therefore, be unhesitatingly violated for the preservation of the vow of non-violence. But there are also occasions on which the principle of non-violence can be violated (on the ground of committing a lesser evil to avoid a greater evil). Here the questions arise why the so-called supremely exceptionless principle like non-violence carries exceptions with it, (which may be true and justifiable on many grounds) and which of the two separate constituents of human make-up justifies the actions. To answer these questions is not an easy task.

However, whatever these theoretical problems may be, on practical grounds it can be concluded that these moral principles in each system, which have been guiding human behaviour for thousands of years, may still remain useful to the man of the modern era in the present conditions.

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INDEX

A

- Abhakṣya, 206
 Abhayadāna, 57
 Abhedavādins, 24
 Ābhyantara, 224, 225
 Ābhyantara parigraha, 225
 Abhyudaya, 3, 15
 Abrahmacarya, 153
 Abrahmacarya veramaṇi, 35
 Abrahmacarya virati, 125
 Absolute, 170
 Abstentions, 131, 165
 Abstinence, 21, 245
 Ācāra, 125
 Ācārāṅga, 228
 Ācārya, 67, 110
 Acitta, 105, 106
 Action, 19
 Ādāna, 95
 Ādānanikṣepanāsamiti, 61
 Adatta, 95
 Adattādāna, 95, 96, 105, 111, 115
 Adattādāna-virati, 95
 Ādhakarma-ābhāra, 107
 Ādhibhautika, 16
 Ādhidaivika, 16
 Ādhyātmika, 16
 Ādhyātmika sukha, 3
 Adinnādāna-veramaṇi, 31
 Admonition, 99
 Adosa, 76
 Adultery, 128, 129, 150, 152
 Adultrous, 150
 Affliction, 225
 Āgama, 187
 Aghnya, 42
 Agni, 168
 Ahimsā, 37, 74
 Ahimsāṇuvrata, 68
 Aitareya, 42
 Ājīva-parisuddhi śīla, 35, 37
 Akāyotsarga, 67
 Ālocanā, 65
 Ālokitapānabhojan, 61
 Alpa, 105, 106
 Altruism, 9
 Anācāra, 71, 189
 Ānanda, 164
 Anaṅga-kriḍā, 160
 Ananta-darśana, 17
 Ananta-Jñāna, 17
 Anantānubandhi, 54, 225
 Ananta-śubha, 17
 Ananta-vīrya, 17
 Anāthapiṇḍaka, 235
 Anavasthāpya, 110, 141, 230
 Anekānta, 182
 Anekāntavāda, 52, 182
 Aṅgas, 66, 84, 140
 Anger, 181
 Aṅguttara-nikāya, 35

- Annihilation**, 18
An-Ṛta, 167
Aṇu, 105, 106
Anujñāpyaparibhojanatā, 108
Anukampā, 57
Anumodita, 48
Anuṁcibhāṣaṇa, 183 84
Aṇuvrata, 27, 68, 111, 158, 160
Anvasthāpya, 65, 66, 67
Aparigraha, 114, 115, 221, 228, 229, 232, 233, 234, 236
Aparigraha-aṇuvrata, 230
Aparigṛhīta-gamana, 160
Apavāda, 62, 63, 110, 139, 140
Apavāda-mārga, 185
Apekṣā-satya, 180
Apratyākhyāna, 54
Apūrvā, 88
Ārambha, 53, 55, 81
Arati, 80
Ariṣṭhanemi, 44
Arthāntara, 181
Arūpī, 224
Āryans, 12, 151
Asadbhāvodbhāvana, 181
Āsana, 12
Āsava, 203
Ascetic, 117
Ascetism, 7, 135, 145, 146
Aśoka, 236
Āśrama, 7, 129, 151, 153, 171
Āṣṭāṅgika mārga, 31
Asteya, 95, 101, 106
Asteyāṇuvrata, 111
Asubhas, 78
Atharvaveda, 43, 127
Atibhāra, 71
Aticāra(s), 67, 71, 81, 113, 160, 232, 233
Atikarma, 67, 120
Atithisamavibhāga, 233
Ātman, 129, 220
Ātman yajña, 43
Atonement, 64, 122, 140, 229
Attachment, 15, 37, 80, 116, 134, 139, 161, 181
Atta-dīpa, 9
Atta-śaraṇa, 9
Aṭṭhasīlas, 34
Avagrahānujñāpanā, 108
Avagrahasīmaparijñānata, 108
Avariciousness, 22
Avestā, 205
Avidyā, 12, 192
Avirati, 224, 225
Avyāpāda, 76 •
Ayogin, 25
- B**
- Bādar**, 59
Badidikṣā, 27
Bahirdha, 223
Bahirdhādāna, 223
Bahu, 105, 106
Bāhya, 224, 225
Bāhya parigraha, 227
Bandha, 71
Baudhāyana, 217
Beautitute, 193
Bhādrapada, 70
Bhāgavata, 22
Bhaktapāṇaviccheda, 71
Bhakti, 79

- Bhandopakarāṇa**, 226
Bhandopakarāṇa-parigraha, 226
Bhāṣya, 140, 230
Bhaṭṭa Kumārila, 13
Bhautika sukha, 3
Bhāva, 56
Bhāvanās, 60, 90, 139, 228
Bhāva-satya, 180
Bhāva-viveka, 184
Bhikkhu, 84, 236
Bhikkhu-pātimokkha, 33
Bhikkhuni-pātimokkha, 33
Bhogopabhoga-parimāṇa-vrata, 209
Bhūmialīka, 187
Bliss, 12
Bodhisatva, 11, 75, 237
Bondage, 38, 75
Bosanquet, 39
Brahmacarya, 125, 129, 143, 144, 243
Brahmajāla sutta, 35
Brahman, 16, 125
Brāhmaṇa, 114, 235, 245
Brāhmaṇical, 7, 83, 157, 241, 243
Brahmavihāra(s), 79
Bṛhadāraṇyaka upaniṣad, 46
Bṛhad kalpabhāṣya, 228
Buddhaghoṣa, 30, 34, 73
Buddhi, 16
Buddhist system, 9
- C**
- Cāritra**, 1, 24, 25, 26-29
Cāritra mohaniya karman, 25
Cārvāka, 14
- Carya**, 125
Caste, 169
Caturguru, 230
Catuṣpada, 231
Celibacy, 53, 125, 133, 145, 146, 214, 243
Celibate, 126
Cetana, 224
Chāndogya upaniṣad, 43
Chastisement, 99
Chastity, 123, 128, 163
Chaviccheda, 71
Cheda, 28, 65, 110
Cheda-sūtras, 66, 84, 110
Cittabhāvana, 31
Cīvaras, 236
Cleaning, 116, 134
Cleanliness, 22
Cleaving, 236
Cognition, 13
Compassion, 58, 74, 75, 242
Conceit, 181
Concentration, 21
Conclusions, 164
Confession, 85, 129
Contentment, 22, 100, 101, 102, 123
Continence, 22-23, 130
Covet, 98
Coveteousness, 99, 101, 123
Craving, 161
Crookedness, 181
Cūla, 34, 82
- D**
- Damana**, 143, 220
Dāna, 90, 217, 218, 221, 233, 237, 238

- Dāna-pāramitā, 237
 Dāna stutis, 218, 219
 Darśana, 23, 24
 Dasasikkhāpadas, 35
 Dasāśīlas, 115
 Daśavaikālika, 227, 234
 Dattā, 95, 96
 Dayā, 219
 Deliverance, 192
 Deśa-virati, 27
 Deśa-virati śrāvaka guṇas-
 thāna, 25
 Destruction, 29
 Destruction cum suppression,
 25
 Detachment, 218
 Devotion, 19
 Dhamma, 75, 114, 235
 Dhammapada, 235
 Dhanadhānya-pramāṇāti-
 krama, 232
 Dhāraṇa, 21
 Dharma, 4, 13, 15, 32, 243
 Dharmakīrti, 79
 Dharmāvalambana karuṇā,
 79
 Dhruva, A. B., 52
 Dhutanga, 36
 Dhyāna, 32
 Digambara, 69, 226, 227, 229,
 233
 Dighanikāya, 10, 35
 Diśāparimāṇavrata, 233
 Doṣa, 15, 80
 Dravya, 56, 104
 Dravya-karma, 17
 Dukkata, 81, 120, 148
 Dukkha-nirudha, 31
 Dukkha-samudaya, 192
 Duṣkarmas, 206
 Duśśīla, 115
 Dveṣa, 26, 178
 Dvipada, 231
 Dvipada-catuṣpada-
 pramāṇātikrama, 232
- E**
- Edicts, 91
 Egoistic happiness, 5
 Ekāgra, 21
 Ekānta, 182
 Emancipation, 12
 Embroilment, 103
 Endogamy, 156
 Enlightenment, 162
 Equanimity, 26
 Equilibrium, 193
 Equipose, 104
 Ethical, 165
 Exceptions, 100, 109, 140, 173
 Excommunicated, 86, 118
 Excommunication, 147
 Exogamy, 156
 Exhilarating, 245
 Existence, 12
 Exoteric, 246
- F**
- Falsehood, 164, 178, 199
 Fear, 181
 Felicity, 15
 Flesh-eating, 93
 Friendliness, 75, 76

G

- Gaccha, 110
 Gahaṭṭhasīlas, 73
 Gambling, 208
 Gaṇa, 186
 Gaṇadharas, 187
 Gandha, 228
 Gaṇins, 187
 Garha, 181
 Gassendi, 5
 Gavālika, 187
 Generic, 171
 Generosity, 238
 Ghora Aṅgīrasa, 43
 Gītārthas, 186
 Gosāla, 62
 Gratitude, 123
 Greed, 99, 101, 123, 181
 Greedy, 98
 Gṛhasṭha, 128, 151
 Guḍāsavo, 212
 Guilt, 99
 Guṇasthāna (s), 25, 29, 55
 Guṇasthānakarmāroha, 25
 Guru, 104, 107, 129
 Guru-adattādāna, 107

H

- Haribhadra, 63
 Harmony, 11
 Hāsya-viveka, 184
 Hatred, 181
 Himsā, 8, 37
 Hindrances, 22
 Hinduism, 20
 Hiraṇya suvarṇya, 231, 232

- Hobbes, 5, 100
 Homosexuality, 147
 Householder, 151, 153
 Humility, 123

I

- Ichhāparimāṇa, 234
 Ichhāparimāṇa vrata, 230
 Ignorance, 13
 Ill-intention, 101
 Immanuel Kant, 11
 Immortality, 12
 Incontinence, 85, 132
 Indifference, 80
 Individualistic happiness, 4
 Indra, 129
 Indriyanigraha, 131, 154
 Indriya saṁvara śīla, 35
 Indulgence, 133, 134
 Infatuation, 134
 Injunction, 159
 Instruments, 112, 138
 Intellect, 30
 Intentions, 59
 Intoxication, 211, 245
 Intuition, 30
 Invigorating, 245
 Īryāsamiti, 61
 Īsā, 80
 Īśāvasya, 220
 Iṣṭa, 129
 Īvara praṇidhāna, 22
 Itvara-kālika, 26
 Itvarikapariḡṛhitāgmana,
 160

J

- Jabālā, 169
 Jacobi, Herman, 9
 Jaḍa, 224
 Jaina, 9
 Jainism, 157
 Janapada-satya, 179
 Jātaka, 237
 Jātaka-kathā, 238
 Jātarūparajata patiggahaṇa-
 veramaṇi, 35
 Jātarūparajata pratigrahaṇa-
 virati, 115, 234
 Jetavana, 238
 Jinakalpi, 29
 Jīva, 107
 Jīva-adattādāna, 107
 Jñāna, 24, 32
 Jñāna śakti, 13
 Jñānendriyas, 56
 Jurisprudence, 84-85

K

- Kaivalya, 16
 Kāma, 131
 Kāmabhogatīvrābhilāṣā, 160
 Kāmadhātu, 32
 Kāmamicchācāra veramaṇi,
 31, 35
 Kāmamithyācāra virati, 120,
 130, 142, 150, 152, 163
 Kāma-saccācāra virati, 143
 Kamaṭhānas, 77, 78
 Kaṃkhāvitaranī, 88
 Kaṇāda, 15
 Kandarpa, 132

- Kant, 11
 Kanyālika, 187
 Kapila, 16
 Karaṇas, 60, 138, 227
 Karita, 48, 69
 Karmādānas, 210
 Karman, 226
 Karman-parigraha, 226
 Karmavādins, 24
 Karmendriya, 56
 Karuṇā, 37, 75, 77, 78, 241
 Karuṇādāna, 96
 Kaśayas, 29, 109, 178
 Kāyabhāvanā, 31
 Kāyotsarga, 72
 Kevala jñāna, 32
 Kevalin guṇasthāna, 25
 Khuddakapāṭha, 35
 King Milinda, 18
 Kinnapakkhittāsura, 212
 Kleśas, 115
 Knowledge, 19
 Kosambi, D. D., 9, 241
 Kṛcchapāda, 207
 Krodha, 131
 Krodha-viveka, 184
 Kṛta, 48, 69
 Kṣatriyas, 205
 Kṣaya, 17, 25
 Kṣayopśama, 25
 Kṣetra-vastu, 231
 Kṣetra-vastu pramāṇatikrama,
 231
 Kṣiṇa, 29
 Kṣipta, 21
 Kumārila, 13
 Kupya-dhātu, 230, 232

Kuśīla, 135
 Kuṭalekhakarāṇa, 189
 Kūtasākṣya, 187

L

Laghu-dikṣā, 27
 Layman's vow, 112
 Liberation, 132, 153
 Lobha, 29, 131
 Lobha-viveka, 184
 Lust, 139

M

Madhvāsavo, 212
 Mādhyamika (S'), 79
 Madirā, 203
 Madya, 203, 211
 Mahā, 34, 82
 Mahābhārata, 244
 Mahābodhi, 79
 Mahākaruṇā, 75
 Mahāmaṅgala sutta, 123
 Mahāpātaka, 206
 Mahāvratā, 27, 46, 105, 144,
 178, 226, 227
 Mahāyāna, 75, 237
 Mahāyānī, 237
 Maithuna, 134
 Maithuna-viraṃaṇa vrata,
 125
 Maitreya, 75
 Maitreyī, 220
 Majjhima, 34, 82
 Malla-gandha-vilepaṇa - vera-
 maṇi, 34
 M amatva, 225

Manana, 14
 Manatta, 85
 Manogupti, 61
 Manonata, 69
 Manorathanandi, 79
 Manu, 131
 Māra, 94
 Marriage, 150, 151, 152, 154
 Māsakas, 118, 120
 Meditation, 78
 Mehuṇa, 134
 Mendicancy, 128
 Mereya, 211
 Meru, 177
 Metaphysical, 165
 Metta, 75, 77
 Metteya, 75
 Micchāmi dukkaram, 72
 Milinda, 18
 Mill, J. S., 100
 Mīmāṃsakas, 13
 Misery, 13
 Mithyājñāna, 15, 183
 Mithyātva, 224, 225
 Mithuna, 134
 Mohaniya, 29
 Mokṣa, 4, 12, 13
 Monachism, 236
 Monastic, 246
 Morality, 78, 241
 Mr̥ṣāvāda-virati, 166, 177
 Mr̥ṣopadeśa, 189
 Mūḍha, 21
 Muditā, 77, 79, 80
 Muhurta, 26
 Mukti, 12
 Mūlakarmapatha, 81

Mūla-mahāvratāropana, 65

Mūrcchā, 223, 225, 227

Musāvāda-veramaṇi, 31

N

Nacchagīta vādita vikusadas-
sana veramaṇi, 34

Nāgasena, 18

Naiyāyikas, 14

Nāma-satya, 180

Navavādas, 139

Negligence, 242

Nibbāna, 18, 73

Nidāna-kathā, 238

Nididhyāsana, 14

Nikāya, 30

Nirjarā, 17

Nirodha, 21

Nirvāṇa, 4, 12, 30

Niryuktis, 228

Niśitha sūtra, 230

Nisreya, 3, 15

Nivṛtti, 13, 155

Niyamas, 16, 21, 48, 102

Nomadic, 152

Non-attachment, 94, 222

Non-injury, 21

Non-stealing, 53, 242

Non-violence, 10, 53, 76, 214,
243

O

Odanasurā, 212

Offence, 81, 146

Omniſcient, 25, 168

Order, 195

P

Paccayasannissita śīla, 35

Pācittiya, 88, 121, 148, 197,
214

Pada, 118

Pamsukuliko, 36

Pāṇāivāyāo, 59

Pānātipāta, 82

Pānātipāta veramaṇi, 31, 37

Pañcaśīla, 34, 73, 115

Pañcavratas, 37

Pañcayamas, 37

Paradāra viramaṇa, 159, 164

Pārājika (s), 81, 86, 118, 119,
146, 214

Paramārtha, 5

Pārami, 237

Pāramitās, 237

Pārāñcika, 65, 66, 68, 111, 141,
187, 230

Paravivāha karaṇa, 160

Parigraha, 115, 225, 227, 236

Parigraha parimāṇa vrata,
230, 231

Parigrahī, 115, 237

Parihāra, 66, 71

Parihāra viśuddhicāritra, 28

Parinirvāṇa, 10

Paripanthin, 97

Parivāsa, 85

Pārśvanātha, 223, 241

Pārthasārathī Miśra, 13

Partial abstentions, 27

Passions, 29, 109, 132

Pātañjala-yoga, 37, 244

Patañjali, 21

Patet Erani, 70
 Patience, 123
 Pātīmokkha, 33, 84, 86, 117,
 145, 146, 198, 214
 Pātīmokkha-saṃvaraśīla, 35
 Performances, 138
 Phalāsavo, 212
 Pindapātiko, 36
 Piṭṭhasurā, 212
 Pollutions, 28
 Possession, 115
 Postures, 27
 Prajāpati, 44, 130
 Prajāpati, Gotami, 164
 Prajñā, 30, 32, 237
 Prajñā śikṣā, 30
 Prakṛti, 16
 Pramāda, 57, 103, 179
 Pramāṇātikrama, 232
 Prāṇa, 51, 56
 Prāṇāyāma, 21
 Prapañca sambandhavilaya,
 13
 Pratikramaṇa, 65, 140
 Pratikramaṇa sūtra, 60, 70,
 113
 Pratipakṣa bhāvanā, 23, 39,
 47, 101, 176
 Pratyāhāra, 21
 Pratyākhyānāvaraṇa, 54
 Pravṛtti, 13, 155, 157
 Prāyaścitta (s), 72, 84, 140,
 173
 Prayoga, 80
 Preceptor, 108
 Precepts, 34, 78

Priyadarśin, 76
 Procreation, 154
 Prostitutes, 164
 Pṛṣṭha, 81
 Pūjyapāda, 134
 Punishments, 64, 84, 117, 229,
 245
 Pūphāsavo, 212
 Purificatory, 173, 245
 Puruṣa, 16
 Puvvasurā, 212

Q

Qualitylessness, 15

R

Rāga, 26, 78, 80
 Rahasyābhyākṣhāna, 181
 Rasa, 228
 Rasa-vāñijya, 210, 213
 Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvākācāra,
 231, 233
 Renunciation, 7, 153, 243
 Reproof, 99
 Restlessness, 21
 Reverence, 123
 Ṛgveda, 12, 40, 127, 244, 245
 Riddance, 103
 Righteousness, 94, 114, 143
 Right faith, 24
 Right knowledge, 23, 24
 Ṛta, 167
 Rūpa, 224, 228
 Rūpa-satya, 180

S

Sabbāo, 59, 68
 Sabbāopariggahovera-
 maṇaṃ, 226

- Śabda, 228
 Saccidānanda, 13
 Sacitta, 105, 106
 Sacrifice, 42
 Sadbhāva pratiṣedha, 181
 Sādharmi, 108
 Sādharmikavāgrahānujñāpya-
 paribhojanatā, 108
 Sahasābhyakhyāna, 189
 Samādhi, 18, 30, 32, 78, 139
 Samādhi śikṣā, 30
 Samaṇa, 50, 73
 Samantapāsādika, 88
 Sāmānya dharma, 131
 Samārambha, 53, 55, 81
 Sāmāsika dharma, 45
 Samatā, 10, 24, 73, 242
 Samavāyāṅga sūtra, 228
 Sāmāyika, 10
 Sāmāyika cāritra, 26, 27
 Sambhārapakkhittāsura, 212
 Sambhāva, 24
 Saṃgha, 9, 84, 111, 116, 236,
 237
 Saṃghādiseśa, 81, 86, 119, 147,
 214
 Saṃhitās, 128
 Saṃjvalana, 54
 Sāṃkhyā, 22
 Sāṃkhyakārikā, 16
 Sammādiṭṭhi, 32
 Sammājīvā, 34, 113
 Sammākamma, 34, 113
 Sammata-satya, 179
 Sammāvācā, 34, 113
 Saṃnyāsa, 7, 153
 Saṃparāyas, 28
 Saṃrambha, 53, 55, 81
 Samuccaya, 48
 Saṃvāda, 11
 Saṃvara, 17
 Saṃvatsari, 70
 Samyaka, 23
 Samyakcāritra, 24, 27
 Samyak darśana, 23
 Samyak-jñāna, 32
 Samyaktva, 54
 Saṃyutta nikāya, 30
 Santoṣa, 22, 101, 102
 Sapadanacari, 36
 Śaraṇas, 9, 91
 Śarīra, 226
 Śarīra parigraha, 226
 Sarvabhūtahita, 174, 175
 Sarvahita, 244
 Sarvaratnopasthānam, 102
 Sarva-virati, 27
 Śāstra dīpikā, 13
 Sat, 164, 166
 Śatpatha, 42
 Sāticārachedopasthāpana cāri-
 tra, 28
 Sattvāvalambana karuṇā, 79
 Satya, 95, 96, 166
 Satyāgraha, 200, 201
 Satyakāma, 169
 Śauca, 22
 Sautrāntika, 79
 Sayogin, 25
 Schismatic, 246
 Schopenhauer, 39
 Self-mortification, 36

Sensual, 126
 Sensuality, 208
 Sex-indulgence, 153
 Sexual, 126
 Sexuality, 148
 Sigālovādasutta, 91
 Sikkhāpadas, 234
 Sikṣātrya, 29
 Śīla, 1, 18, 78, 90, 236, 237
 Śīlasikṣā, 30
 Śītalleśyā, 62
 Slothfulness, 210
 Socialistic, 246
 Socialistic-happiness, 4
 Soma, 203, 204, 245
 Sparsā, 228
 Specific, 171
 Spirituous liquor, 215
 Śramaṇa, 10
 Śramaṇical, 7, 83, 94, 124, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 247
 Śramaṇical system, 40
 Śramaṇism, 128
 Śrāvaka, 70
 Śrāvaka pratikramaṇa sūtra, 70, 231
 Stealing, 115, 214
 Sthānāṅga, 26, 110, 225
 Sthāpanamṛṣā, 187
 Sthāpana-satya, 179
 Sthāvara, 59, 69
 Sthiti, 25
 Sthūla, 105, 106
 Sthūla parigraha viramaṇa vrata, 230
 Subhacadra, 103

Sukha, ādhyātmika, 3
 Sukha, bhautika, 3
 Śukla dhyānas, 32
 Sūkṣma, 59, 135
 Sūkṣma-samparāya cāritra, 28
 Sumedha, 238
 Sumum bonum, 1, 18
 Śūnya, 79
 Suppression, 25
 Supramundane, 153
 Surā, 203, 211, 245
 Surādhvaja, 206
 Surāmereyamajjapamādatthāna-veramaṇi, 31
 Sūtramaṇi, 205
 Suttanipāta, 235
 Svabhāva, 24
 Svadāramantrabheda, 189
 Svadāra santoṣa, 159, 164
 Svādhyāya, 22, 219, 221
 Svalpa parigraha, 228
 Svamevāvagrahānugrahaṇatā, 108
 Svāmi, 106
 Svāmi-adattādāna, 107
 Svārtha, 5, 178
 Svarūpa ramaṇa, 17
 Śvetaketu, 151
 Śvetāmbara, 69, 226, 227, 229, 231
 Syādvāda, 51, 182
 Syāt, 52, 182
 Sympathy, 75

T

Tadubhava, 65
 Taittirīya upaniṣad, 45

Tanhā, 17, 30, 116, 161, 192
 Tantra, 162
 Tapas, 22, 65, 143
 Taskara, 97
 Tattvārtha, 23
 Tattvārtha sūtra, 23
 Tattvas, 245
 Tejoleśyā, 62
 Theft, 21
 Theravāda, 75
 Theravādins, 84
 Thulāo, 68
 Thūlāo mehuṇāo veramaṇam,
 158
 Thūlāopāñāivāyāo veramaṇam,
 68
 Thūllaccaya, 81, 87, 119
 Tīrtha, 107
 Tīrthaṅkara, 11, 85, 187, 234,
 245
 Tīrthaṅkara-adattādāna, 107
 Transcendental felicity, 15
 Transgressions, 64, 70, 84, 117
 137, 145, 229, 230, 233,
 245
 Transgressor, 140
 Transmigration, 14, 43
 Trasa, 59
 Triratna, 31
 Truth, 21, 24
 Tyāga, 235

U

Uccāsayanamahāsayana vera-
 maṇi, 35
 Umāsvāti, 23, 51

Universalistic happiness, 5
 Unordained novices, 34
 Upabhogaparibhoga parimāṇa
 vrata, 233
 Upamā-satya, 180
 Upaniṣads, 14
 Upāsaka, Ānanda, 231
 Upāsakadaśāṅga, 231
 Upāsakas, 10
 Upasthāpanā, 28
 Upekkhā, 193
 Uposatha, 33, 34, 90, 198
 Uppekkā, 77, 80
 Usuyā, 80
 Utsarga, 62, 63, 185, 228
 Uttarādhyayana, 224

V

Vacanagupti, 61
 Vacanakāśānti, 185
 Vacanamukti, 185
 Vācaspati, Miśra, 101
 Vadha, 71
 Vaiśeṣika, 15
 Vāk, 168
 Vānaprastha, 153
 Varṇa, 7, 169, 171
 Varuṇa, 99, 129, 168
 Vedānta, 14
 Vedas, 127
 Veracity, 53, 174
 Veramaṇam, 59, 223
 Veramaṇi, 82
 Vibhaṅga, 35
 Vibhāva, 24
 Vice, 243

- Vihāra**, 117
Vikāla bhojana veramaṇi, 34
Vikalpa, 48
Vimśativimśika, 228
Vinaya, 33, 66, 81, 117, 145, 146
Vinayadharas, 10, 148
Violation, 109
Violence, 178, 181
Virati, 95
Virati-pariṇāma, 25
Virocana, 129
Virtue, 89
Viṣa vāṇijya, 210, 213
Viśuddhimagga, 30, 33, 77
Viśuddhimāna, 29
Viśayas, 228
Viśvaprema, 40
Vitalities, 56
Vitarka, 47
Vratas, 21, 27, 102
Vyāpāda, 115
Vyāsa, 222
Vyaticāra, 190
Vyatikrama, 67, 81, 120, 189
Vyatipātas, 113
Vyavahāra-satya, 180
Vyavahāra sūtra, 229
Vyutsarga, 66
- Y**
- Yajñas**, 8, 41, 219, 221, 242
Yājñavalkya, 220
Yamas, 16, 21, 101, 175
Yathākhyāta cāritra, 29
Yāvatkathika, 26
Yoga (s), 8, 16, 60, 138, 226
Yogācāra, 79
Yogāṅgas, 21, 22, 46
Yoga-satya, 180
Yogasūtras, 21
Yugla, 134
Yugpadvādins, 24

ERRATA

<i>Page</i>	<i>Line</i>	<i>Read</i>	<i>For</i>
7	12	or	of
11	11	depicts	is depicted in
20	6	as far as	as far
23	9	is	are
38	4	love,	love;
38	5	as	is
47	13	titled as	entitled
48	1	it by	for it
48	23-24	eighty one	one hundred and eighty
52	19	effort that	effort (as gods etc.) that
57	21	their	then
58	5	characteristic	characterestic
61	23	mere	more
67	31	perform kāyotsarga	perform a
68	10	as a relaxed	related
76	2	directed love for	direct loving
80	16	eraser	easier
85	3	is	in
85	24-25	chapters.	charters.
85	27	precepts with which we	precepts we
85	30	seriousness	seriouness
99	6	this idea	the fact
102	3	eighty one	one hundred and eighty
103	21	stealing	non-stealing
108	17-18	sādharmikā- vagrahānujñ- āpya paribho- janatā	sadharmika- vāgrahanu- ghapya pari- bhojnātā

274 **The Concept of Pañcaśīla in Indian Thought**

<i>Page</i>	<i>Line</i>	<i>Read</i>	<i>For</i>
117	1-2	got stolen by some one	got by stealing
128	5	of	or
135	9	duśśīla	duśīla
142	23	abrahmacarya	brahmacarya
152	32	him	of
161	4	excessive	excessive
162	6	incompatible	compatible
165	11	pre-supplemented	pre-supplemen- ted
193	8	a state	ast ate
194	3	intentional	international
205	18	a mention	mention
214	2	rule	rules
218	12	good	good or even heaven
237	28	who was born	who born
238	3	eat food that would have	eat of food that have

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