EARLY JAINISM

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FOREWORD

The L. D. Institute of Indology has great pleasure in publishing Dr. K. K. Dixit's work entitled 'Early Jainism'. The following pages embody the results of a deep and penetrating study of the early Jaina canonical texts (Āgamas). The author has analysed and evaluated historically the contents of these texts. His observations are dispassionate and critical. He has clarified Āgamic concepts and traced their development. His comparison of some Āgamic terms and concepts with those found in Suttanipāta is revealing. So far as our knowledge goes, perhaps this is the first attempt to evaluate critically the early Jaina canonical texts in historical perspective. We are thankful to Dr. K. K. Dixit for this invaluable study.

It is hoped that the publication of this important work be of immense value to the keen students of Religions.

L. D. Institute of Indology,
Ahmedabad-380009.
1st January, 1978.

Nagin J. Shah
Director

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PREFACE

In the following pages an attempt has been made to present a picture of what might be called 'Early Jainism'. Certainly, in the case of each and every religion that made its appearance in ancient or medieval times it should be possible and necessary to distinguish between its early phase and its later phase. This, for example, is true of Brahmanism, Buddhism, Zoroastherianism, Jewism, Christianity and Islam. Thus to begin with each of these religions was a relatively simple affair as regards its ideology as also as regards its observances but with the passage of time it became a relatively complicated affair as regards its ideology as also as regards its observances. And the explanation of all this lies in the circumstance that each of these religions took its rise under conditions that were relatively simple while its subsequent development took place under conditions that were relatively complicated. Moreover, within the fold of some of these religions such a reform movement was launched in later times as would condemn the complicated ideology and observances of later times and would seek to revert back to those of early times. Such, for example, was the case with Ārya Samāja within the fold of Brahmanism, Protestantism within the fold of Christianity, Wahabism within the fold of Islam, Sthānakavāsism within the fold of Jainism.

Confining our attention to Jainism we note that certain texts belonging to this religion are considerably old while they also describe conditions that are relatively very simple. In view of what was said just above this is as the things should be. But for this very reason the texts in question need to be studied more carefully—attention being particularly paid to their language, their metre (in case of verse-texts) as well as their content. And to put it in a nutshell, something of the sort has been attempted in the following pages where claim is made that this way we are enabled to form a tolerably clear picture of what might be called 'Early Jainism'. Certainly, the language, the metre as well as the content of our texts can be accounted for only on the ground that they were composed by the early Jainas and that they represent an early phase of Jainism. In this background of understanding it should also be possible to undertake a critical appreciation of the phenomenon called 'Sthānakavāsism'. Thus the Sthānakavāsins are correct when they emphasise that a practice like idol-worship was unknown to the early Jainas. They are also correct when they point out that the latter-day commentators read their own views into the early texts and that they thus only too often misinterpret them. But their understanding as to

which Jaina texts are early Jaina texts is faulty inasmuch as they in this connection happen to bracket certain genuinely early texts with certain decidedly late texts. As a result they are forced to explain away those passages of these late texts which incorporate an understanding that is characteristic of late text. Of course, even the late texts which the Sthānakavāsins treat as early are not very late but they are certainly late; and hence the anomaly we have noted.

To our mind the only early Jaina texts available to us today are the texts examined in the following pages. True, even these texts contain more or less considerable material that is a later interpolation but there is little early material that is to be found outside these texts; and that is our point.

For the rest let these pages speak for themselves.

12-12-77
Ajoy Bhavan
New Delhi

K. K. Dixit

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CHAPTER I

SOME NOTEWORTHY FEATURES OF THE JAINA SPECULATION AS OCCURRING IN ĀCĀRĀṄGA I AND SŪTRAKṚTĀṄGA I

Introduction

The Jaina canonical texts Ācārāṅgasūtra and Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtra are each divided into two śrutaskandhas (= chief sections). In each case the first śrutaskandha gives the appearance of being considerably old. But the question is whether anything quite definite can be said about the antiquity of these two śrutaskandhas, and it is this question that has to be considered first of all. [For the sake of convenience we call the first śrutaskandha of Ācārāṅga 'Ācārāṅga I', the first śrutaskandha of Sūtrakṛtāṅga 'Sūtrakṛtāṅga I.]

As regards Ācārāṅga I certain important discoveries of a most fundamental kind were made by Walther Schubring in connection with his editon of the text published in 1910. He showed that the major part of the text is made up of verses, a relatively small part made up of prose-passages; then he pointed out that the verses in question are often incomplete and lastly that they are interspersed with prose-lines which sometimes introduce a verse, sometimes supplement it, sometimes do something else of the sort; as for the original prose-passages of the text he argued that they are accompanied by no outside accessories such as these. Schubring also argued that the passages collected in a chapter or a subdivision thereof often followed an order that was governed by strange considerations; e.g. sometimes a passage followed another simply because it began with the same word with which the latter ended, sometimes this happened even when the words concerned were not the same but just similar sounding. At the same time, Schubring argued that a group of passages scattered in different chapters often exhibited a connectedness of theme. All this was nothing short of revelation to the students of Ācārāṅga I but maybe all was not equally convincing. However, the fact that the text was so much full of verse-composition admitted of no doubt and was a first-rate discovery; for the tradition of regarding this verse-composition as verse-compostion was lost long long ago—so that no medieval commentator of the text ever suspected that what he was commenting on was overwhelmingly a verse-composition. The discovery was doubly important, for not only could Schubring here point out so many verses but it was further found out that the metre of these verses was invariably either Triṣṭubh (including Jagatī) or Anuṣṭubh (the last chapter being in old āryā). Now Triṣṭubh and Anuṣṭubh

were old Vedic metres, and of these the former went out of use in classical Sanskrit itself; on the other hand, Anuṣṭubh was no doubt the most popular metre of classical Sanskrit but the most popular metre of classical Prakrit was Āryā. And here was a Prakrit text containing verses in Triṣṭubh and Anuṣṭubh metres. Schubring is also convincing in his demonstration that editors of Ācārāṅga I have given an orderly arrangement to a mass of miscellaneous verses and that in doing so they have often followed certain strange working principles. Let us see if any far-reaching conclusions can be drawn from all this.

The fact that the verses of Ācārāṅga I are in Triṣṭubh and Anuṣṭubh metres suggests that the authors of these verses were a cultural descendant of the Vedic authors, (the fact that this text (11.7) designates a wise man *'vedavit'* and *'brahmavit'* points out in the same direction). However, it is equally a fact that the social tradition strictly called 'Vedic' upholds the ideal of a man successively belonging to the four āśramas *brahmacarya, gṛhastha, vānaprastha* and *saṅnyāsa* while the social tradition endorsed by Ācārāṅga I upholds the ideal of a man embracing the career of a monk as soon as possible. Now the Ṛgvedic Aryan society is unacquainted with either of these social traditions and the conclusion seems to be that both these traditions got crystallized within the fold of the descendants of the Ṛgvedic Aryans at some fairly early date. Let us call the first of these traditions Brāhmanical, the second monastic (Śramaṇic might be preferable in certain contexts). The Brāhmanical tradition was above all interested in developing a theory of how the Brāhmin should behave in relation to the rest of the society and the monastic tradition in developing a theory of how the monk should do so. Thus strictly speaking, the Brāhmanical social theory of four *āśramas* posed a life-ideal before the Brāhmins who were an elite, a corresponding monastic social theory posed a life-ideal before the monks who were similarly an elite. What this latter theory was remains to be seen.

Chapter 14 of Sūtrakṛtāṅga I renders it likely that the monastic theory too conceived of an initial stage of studentship and it too called it a stage of *brahmacaryavāsa*; (The very first verse of the chapter seems to clinch the issue). And just as in the Brāhmanical theory the stage of studentship or *brahmacaryavāsa* was preparatory for the independent life of a householder, so in the monastic theory the same was preparatory for the independent life of a lonely wandering monk. And just as the Brāhmanical student was given lessons in the principles of priest-craft, so the monastic student was given lessons in the principles of asceticism. For some reason — in all likelihood because the monks mostly originated from the midst of the humbler folk—the monastic tradition adopted Prakrit—

a popular descendant of Vedic Sanskrit—as its language of theoretical discourse, just as the Brāhmanical tradition adopted classical Sanskrit—a refined descendant of Vedic Sanskrit—as its language of theoretical discourse; It seems that the early Prakrit lessons in asceticism were composed in verse and they differed from teacher to teacher, but at a certain stage of development the need was felt for a standard text-book for the purpose. So the old miscellaneous verses were given some sort of arrangement and the result was our Ācārāṅga I whose old name, significant enough, was Brahmacaryāṇi (Bambhacerāiṃ in Prakrit)—roughly meaning 'lessons for the student'. Thus originated the material of Ācārāṅga I might not be all equally old, but certainly it constitutes the oldest portion of the Jaina canon. Schubring's epoch-making discoveries related to Ācārāṅga I all perhaps plausibly accounted for this way.

While Acārāṅga I was being used as a basic text-book for the monastic schools the need must have been felt for elucidating in a systematic fashion the important principles underlying its rather heterogeneous teachings. For this purpose too verses were composed in Prakrit mostly employing the Triṣṭubh or Anuṣṭubh metre. At some late date a standard collection of 16 such verses was made and was appropriately called Gāthāṣoḍaśaka (gāhāsolasaga in Prakrit). It is this that is our Sūtrakṛtāṅga I; (7 of its 16 chapters are in the Anuṣṭubh metre, 6 in Triṣṭubh, one in Vaitāliya, one in old Āryā, while one is anomalously in prose).

Thus really speaking, our present-day Ācārāṅga is made up of the old Brahmacaryāṇi and its relating late Second Śrutaskandha while our present-day Sūtrakṛtāṅga is made up of the old Gathāṣoḍaśaka and its relating late second Śrutaskandha. In all likelihood these two present-day texts were brought into existence at a relalively late date when the need was felt for certain texts—twelve in number—to be called 'Aṅga' and declared to be the basic scriptural texts, (it does not seem likely that Brahmacaryāṇi alone was ever called Ācārāṅga or Gāthāṣoḍaśaka alone Sūtrakṛtāṅga). Be that as it may, a probe into the contents of Acārāṅga I and Sūtrakṛtāṅga I brings to light a good number of truly archaic features. To put in a nutshell they are

(1) Unconditional emphasis on world renunciation,

(2) Extremely Hard Ascetic Life.

(3) *Ārambha* and *Parigraha*, the worst sins.

(4) The Inanimate and Animate objects of *Parigraha.*

(5) The Sixfold objects of *Ārambha.*

(6) *Kaṣāya* and *mahāvrata* no well-established concepts.

(7) *Parīṣaha* and *bhikṣādoṣa* no well-established concepts.

(8) Monastic Jurisprudence not yet formulated.

(9) Karma-Doctrine in a primitive form.

(10) No Special Ontology.

(11) No Special Epistemology.

(12) No Special Mythology.

(13) No Super-Humanization of the Biography of Mahāvīra.

Let these features be considered one by one.

[The following account of the features in question is written in the form of three independent though closely related essays. The first – called 'A general statement'—discusses these features independently, the second – called 'Some Relevant passages from Ācārāṅga I'—discusses them in the light of certain passages from Ācārāṅga I, the third – called 'Some Relevant passages from Sūtrakṛtāṅga I'—discusses them in the light of certain passages from Sūtrakṛtāṅga I. Obviously, this mode of presentation is likely to cause the reader some incovenience in following the trend of an argument, but under circumstances that was unavoidable.]

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General statement

1. *Unconditional Emphasis on World-Renunciation*

The texts extol the life of a monk — and a good monk at that, but they have nothing save condemnation for the life of a householder. Consequently, the possibility of there being a good householder is never envisaged. Even in his capacity as an almsgiver the householder is never praised — he is rather pointed out as a possible source of unauthorzied alms; as for the rest, the householder is a possible source of multifarious dangers and multifarious temptations. Of course, it was the mass of householders which constituted the only possible source of recruitment for the order of monks and so this man had to be approched with appeals for recruitment, but these appeals were always based on a forthright condemnation of the life of a householder. Hence the injunction that alms should not be asked for in exchange for a religious discourse (Sū 7.24) — it being likely that at the time of asking for alms one might become mild in one's criticism of the life of a householder. And with a view to avoiding all chances of developing intimacy with a householder the injunction was laid down that alms-receiving should never be a pre-arranged affair while those who were one's relatives in the pre-monastic career should not at all be approached for alms (Sū. 7. 24). As a matter of fact, the persons who were one's

relative in the pre-monastic career constitute the strongest link between one and the regular society; as such they are most likely to tempt one back to the regular society and so all to be avoided at all cost. Under such conditions it was difficult — if not impossible — for any community of monks to forge special links with any community of householders; (It was only in the course of social evolution that links of this nature were forged and it was then that many — if not the most—of the fundamental monastic rules of these olden times turned into a mere formality.)

*

2. Extremely Hard Ascetic Life

If a monk was to turn proof against the dangers and temptations emanating from the regular society it was necessary for him to steel himself in the fire of severe asceticism. For only then could he reduce to the minimum his dependence on the regular society. Yet the compulsion was that whatever be his requirements—in connections with food, clothing, shelter or the like—a monk was to produce them by way of begging from the regular society, the ideal being that he was not to earn them in return for performing some secular job. The net result was a monk would live in the midst of regular society and leading a life of extreme hardship. His food, clothing and shelter would be of the coarsest sort, medicine he would avoid; additionally, he would often impose on himself a penance in the form of fasting, torturous body exertion or the like.

*

3. Ārambha and Parigraha : the worst sins

That *Parigraha* or attachment for things worldly should in the eyes of an ascetic, be one of the worst sins is easy to understand. The noteworthy thing is that our texts connect *parigraha* with *ārambha* — meaning violence— and treat the two as the most fundamental couple of sins. Viewed thus *parigraha* comprehends those sins which involve a positive attitude towards their respective objects, *ārambha* those which involve a negative attitude towards their respective objects something like *rāga* and *dveṣa* of the later Indian theoreticians. Now it was noted that *parigraha* seems to be no act of doing evil; nay, it rather seems to be an act of doing good to whosoever happens to be the object of one's *parigraha*. It was therefore laid bare that all attitude of *parigraha* towards one must involve—directly or otherwise—an attitude of *ārambha* towards another; one might even say that all attitude of *ārambha* is rooted—directly or otherwise—in some attitude of *parigraha*. Thus the attitude of *ārambha* turns out to be the immediate cause of all sinful activity, the attitude of *parigraha* its proximate cause.

*

4. The Inanimate and Animate objects of Parigraha

The concept of *parigraha* was further clarified by maintaining that an object of one's *parigraha* might be either inanimate or animate. Broadly speaking, the material goods of all sorts are the possible inanimate objects of one's *parigraha*, the social relatives of all sorts are the possible animate objects of one's *parigraha*. The two are not unconnected, for it is in the interests of ones social relatives—just as in the interests of oneself—that one seeks to accumulate material goods. That all accumulation of material goods necessarily involves sinful acts goes without saying — for otherwise there should not be much point in condemning such accumulation. And then it was emphasized that one accumulating material goods in the interests of one's social relatives is in a particular unfortunate position, for the worldly benefits to be derived out of those goods are enjoyed by the relatives in question while the other-worldy evil fruits of the sin incurred by one in this connection are reaped by oneself.

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5. The sixfold objects of Ārambha

That the possible object of *ārambha* is a being belonging to one of the six types is a most noteworthy teaching of our texts; and what these six being-types are is no less noteworthy. Thus we are told that the ordinary world of insects, birds, animals and human beings is a world of just one type of living beings technically called *trasa* or 'mobile'; the other five types of living beings—collectively called '*sthāvara*' or 'static'—are bits of earth, bits of water, bits of fire, bits of air and individual plants. This particular understanding of what constitutes the world of living beings must have accentuated the already strong ascetic tendency of the Jaina speculation. For otherwise, a Jaina could have argued that in case one undertakes such worldly productive activity as involves no employment of human or animal labour but just the manipulation of things like earth, water, fire and air one is indulging in nothing sinful, but as things stood he was bound to condemn even an activity like this as one which involves a lot of *ārambha*—directed against the allegedly living beings like earth, water, fire and air. Even so, nothing prevented a Jaina from characterizing as particularly sinful the acts which involve an employment of human or animal labour. This trend of thought, however, does not appear in our texts; (it gained some sort of prominence in the later Jaina speculation when the concept of 'pious householder' was given currency and a pious householder was defined as one who abstains from all violence done to the *trasa* being though not from that done to the *sthāvara* ones)

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6. Kaṣāya and Mahāvrata : No Well-Established Concepts

Our texts raise the problems of general morals only too frequently but the noteworthy thing is that they are almost innocent of the technical terminologies employed in this connection by the latter-day Jaina speculation. Pretty conspicuous is the absence of the concept of 4 *kaṣāyas* (=passions) and that of 5 *mahāvratas* (=great vows), and they might be considered one by one. (i) The term *kaṣāya* is here never employed though there often jointly appear the four vices known as *kaṣāya*—in Sūtrakṛtāṅga I many times also under very obscure designations, but even on such occasions almost nothing is said by way of describing the vices in question. Of course, this or that from among these vices is found described here and there, but that is a different matter and does not amount to developing the doctrine of 4 *kaṣāyas*. (ii) As for the 5 *mahāvratas* they do not jointly appear even once in Ācārāṅga I. In Sūtrakṛtāṅga I they do thus appear and are also called *mahāvratas* but the whole business has something surreptitious about it; for the treatment here accorded to this so important group of moral virtues is almost perfunctory (at the most one can say that this treatment represents the earliest stage when the Jaina speculation became acquainted with the concept of 5 *mahāvratas*). What is here being said about the treatment of 4 *kaṣāyas* and 5 *mahāvratas* on the part of these texts can be easily appreciated when this treatment is compared with that of *ārambha-cum-parigraha* which we here meet with. Broadly speaking, the concepts of *kaṣāya, mahāvratas* as well as *ārambha-cum-parigraha* are such that each provides a framework for the fundamental classification of normal virtues and vices, and the historical circumstances seems to have been that the first two were used for the purpose by the latter-day Jaina theoreticians, the last by those belonging to the times of Ācārāṅga I and Sūtrakṛtāṅga I.

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7. Parīṣaha and Bhikṣādoṣa : No Well-Established Concepts

The hardships—physical and social—which a monk is expected to suffer were later on technically called *parīṣaha* and were divided into 22 types. Our text do certainly dilate upon the hardships in question but they are unacquainted with the technical concept of 22 *parīṣaha*—this particularly in view of the fact that one whole chapter of Sūtrakṛtāṅga I—viz. the third—is devoted to these very hardships. Somewhat similar is the case with the 'defects of alms' (= *bhikṣādoṣa*) which the later theoreticians devide into 46 types or so. Our texts are acquainted with but few of them under their proper designation but those few seem to be interesting. Thus a monk not allowed to receive as alms (i) something that is reserved for him by

a prior arrangement, (ii) something that is brought to him from a distance by the donor, (iii) something that has been snatched away from its rightful owner, (iv) something that is a common property of more owners than one—not all of whom have sanctioned it to be gifted away, (v) something that has been borrowed on credit, (vi) something that has been purchased. It is somewhat easy to comprehend the first four of these prohibitions, perhaps also the fifth; but the sixth remains intriguing. Sale and credit are two most basic institutions of an urban civilisation and it seems that these early theoreticians were somehow actuated by a feeling of non-cooperation in relation to the urban civilisation along with its basic institutions. The surmise is somewhat confirmed when we further learn that in the later standard list of prohibitions an additional item is 'something that is received by way of barter'; certainely, in the course of social evolution what begins as barter later develops into sale against cash-payment, (or sale on credit). In any case, our texts are un-aquainted with this standard list in its entirety. A subsection (with 16 items) of this list refers to the secular means a monk might (illegitimately) employ in order to procure things needed by him; the items in question are not as such present in our texts but the motif concerned is clearly there in Sūtrakṛtāṅga I.

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8. Monastic Jurisprudence : not yet Formulated

By monastic jurisprudence are to be understood the rules and regulations that guide a monk's functioning inside a church-unit with its appropriate hierarchy. The earliest available most comprehensive formulation of such jurisprudence is to be found in Vyavahārasūtra, but the type of cirumstances usually envisaged there are seldom found depicted in our texts. Most conspicuous in this connection is the absence of all mention of a church-unit with an appropriate heirarchy. The texts do speak of a Śāstā (=instructor) but he seems to be no more than the person who imparts to a young monk his first lessons in matters spiritual and religious; that is to say, he does not seem to be the head of a Church-unit. Some idea of the headship of a church-unit emerges in Sūtrakṛtāṅga I (14-2·3) where it is said about a young monk who has not yet fully assimilated his lessons that in case he sets out to wander alone he will be behaving like the young of a bird who has not yet properly learnt to fly but who yet ventures out in the open. The illustration clearly suggests that the disciple was to stay with the preceptor not beyond a period that was absolutely necessary for his proper spiritual equipment. Certainly, the general practice of a whole group of monks wandering about together under the leadership of a chief with his subordinate staff seems to have been a comaparatively

later growth, a situation reflected in the deliberations of Vyavahāra sūtra. On the other hand, in the series of our texts the general practice seems to have been that of a single monk wandering alone—at the most, that of a small group of young monks wandering in the company of their common preceptor. [Sūtrakṛtāṅga I also envisages the possibility of one monk giving company to another who is sick, but, this seems to be a case of emergency rather than a general case.] Be that as it may, these texts exhibit no acquaintance with the problems of monastic jurisprudence.

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9. The Karma-Doctrine in a Primitive Form

The doctrine of Karma—with the doctrine of rebirth and the doctrine of *mokṣa* as its corollary—is a most prominent feature of these texts. Thus here it is frequently asserted or implied that a more or less inauspicious next birth is in store for the person—whether a householder or a monk—who leads an evil life. And similarly it is here frequently asserted or implied that the monk who leads an ideal life will be born no more. But noteworthy is that these texts are almost absolutely silent about the precise mechanism of rebirth and *mokṣa*, a mechanism which in a particular version is so marked a speciality of the latter-day Jaina speculation. Thus unlike in the later Jaina texts we are not here told how the Karmic physical particles get attached to a soul and how they get loose from it. As a matter of fact, on this question our texts hardly say a thing that would not be endorsed by the Brahmin or Buddhist theoreticians. Then one more point deserves consideration in this connection. These texts never promise an auspicious next birth to the person leading a good life, the idea being that all next birth is more or less inauspicious. This is in contrast to the practice of the later Jaina theoreticians who would promise a more or less auspicious next birth to a pious householder as also to a monk who is good yet not good enough to deseve *mokṣa* at the end of this very life.

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10. No Special Ontology

What is true of the Karma-doctrine in particular is also broadly true of ontology in general. Thus baring one—though noteworthy—exception these texts hardly propound an ontological thesis to which a Brahmin or Buddhist theoretician would take exception. The exception is constituted by the doctrine of six types of living beings, a doctrine already reviewed by us in another connection. All this is particularly striking in view of the fact that Sūtrakṛtāṅga I in its very first Chapter-also elsewhere—takes into consideration so many ontological theses emanating from rival camps. The conclusion seems to be that ontological theses specific to the Jaina camp were not yet formulated when our texts were composed.

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11, No Special Epistemology

In connection with epistemology only two things offered by our texts deserve consideration, one throwing light on the later-day Jaina concept of the Jñāna-types *mati* and *śruta*, the other throwing light on the later day Jaina concept of the cognition-type *darśana* and *jñāna* (rather *kevala-darśana* and *kevala-jñāna*). Let us consider them one by one.

(i) Thus Ācārāṅga I thrice speaks of one knowing (*jānejjā*) something *sahasaṃmaiyāe paravāgareṇaṃ aṇṇesiṃ vā aṃtike soccā* (1.7, 21.18, 28.9) in a similar context Sūtrakṛtāṅga I once says '*sahasaṃmate ṇaccā... sūṇettu vā*' (8.14), another time it says '*sayaṃ sameccā aduvā'pi soccā bhāsejja*' (13.19). Here we have an inkling into the working of the Jaina theoretician's mind at a time when the technical concepts of the jñāna-types *mati* and *śruta* had not yet been formulated but was on way to being formulated. A close examination of these passages suggests that what was later called *mati* was conceived as a type of cognition in which one's own mental effort plays a part and a prominent part; as against this, what was later called *śruta* was conceived as a type of cognition in which communication on someone else's part or talking to somebody on someone else's part plays a part and a prominent part. As a consequence of the first consideration a bare sensory experience—since it involves no mental effort – was kept outside the realm of *mati*. In general, cognition involving no mental effort was called *darśana*, that involving an amount of it was called *jñāna*, and *mati* was classified as *jñāna* precisely because it involved some amount of mental effort. As a consequence of the second consideration just laid bare *śruta-jñāna* would have had two sub-types, but so far as this aspect of the matter was concerned the consideration was not pressed and hence *śruta-jñāna* became just the jñāna-type in which communication on someone else's part plays a part and a prominent part. Viewed in this light *darśana*, *mati* and *śruta* of the Jaina theoreticians should respectively correspond to *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* etc. and *śabda* of the non-Jaina theoreticians; (this becomes particularly evident from a Daśavaikālika verse viz.5.76-where the alternative cognition-types (Called 'Jñāna-types probably because there was no common concept covering both *jñāna* and *darśana*) are *darśana*, *mati*, *pratipṛcchā*, *śravṇa* – here the last two being the two possible subtypes of *śruta* just sopken of).

(ii) We have already spoken enough of the distinction obtaining between *darśana* and *jñāna*, but the word *darśana* occurs in none of the five passages from our texts discussed above. However the occurrence of the word *jāṇejjā* in Ācārāṅga I and *ṇaccā* in Sūtrakṛtāṅga I does suggest that *mati* is a Jñāna-type, and that is important. For Sūtrakṛtāṅga I in its eulogy of Māhvīra spéaks of his *anaṃta-jñāna* and *ananta-darśana* (6.3),

The adjective *ananta* means 'that having everything for its object' and its employment only means that Mahāvīra was considered to be an omniscient. More noteworthy is the distinction here made between *darśana* and *jñāna*; for it is in the light of it that we can argue that if even *mati* is a type of *jñāna* then *darśana* must stand for bare sensory experience. These epistemological implications of certain incidental statements of our texts are significant in their own way; yet it has to be admitted that these texts discuss no epistemological thesis as such and that in their times an epistemology specific to the Jainas was a thing of future.

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12. No Special Mythology

In the sphere of mythology too our texts offer little that is characteristically Jaina. (In the present part of our discussion we are concerned with mythology in its cosmographic aspect—where there is undertaken a delineation of the heavens, the hells, the world-continents and world-oceans.) There is hardly ever a mention of births among gods. For, as is evident from the discussions of the later-day Jaina theoreticians, birth among gods is a case of a particularly auspicious next birth. But (as we have already seen) our texts have no use for the concept of an auspicious next birth. Sūtrakṛtāṅga I does speak of certain bad monk being born among certain bad types of gods, but here the emphesis obviously is not on the gods being gods but on their being bad. As a general rule, these texts promise *mokṣa* to an ideal monk and they threaten an evil person – whether a householder or a monk – with birth among hellish beings, animals and the like. Thus unlike gods the hellish being come within the purview of discussion in an important manner. However, even of hells our texts offer no such account as is typically Jaina, this being true even of that chapter of Sūtrakṛtāṅga I—viz. the fifth—which is exclusively devoted to describing of hells. As for the world-continents and world-oceans there has arisen no natural occasion for describing them but in the course of its eulogy of Mahāvīra Sūtrakṛtāṅga I does offer a detailed account of the mountain Meru (6.10-13). [This account of Meru can well be a late interpolation, for it is somewhat misfit where it appears. Thus employing a long series of similes the author here says about Mahāvīra that he is best among the monks just as Meru is best among the mountains, Nandana best among the forests, Śālmalī best anong the trees, and so on and so forth. It can be easily seen that to offer a detailed account of Meru in this context does not make much sense.]

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13. No Super-Humanization of the Biogarphy of Mahāvīra

The question of super-humanizing the biography of Mahāvīra arose when mythology in its historical aspect came to be elaborated. For it was

in connection with this that the Jainas gave out that Mahāvīra was only the 24th *tīrthaṅkara* of the present *avasarpiṇī*, that 24 *tīrthaṅkaras* are born in each *avasarpiṇī*, and each *utsarpiṇī*, that the time cycle when an *avasarpiṇī* follows an *utsarpiṇī* and *utsarpiṇī* follows an *avasarpiṇī* has been in motion in a beginningless fashion; at the same time it was given out that by the time 24 *tīrthaṅkaras* have been born there also have been born 12 *Cakravartins*, 9 *Baladevas*, 9 *Vāsudevas*, 9 *Prati-Vāsudavas*—this giving the totality of 63 mighty personages adorning each *avasarpiṇī* and each *utsarpiṇī*. Of all this mytholoical thought-spinning there is not a trace in our texts. Ācārāṅga I does speak of the past, present and future *arhats* but here the word '*arhat*' naturally means a great monk; as for the hardships suffered by Mahāvīra in the course of his early monistic career which this text sings of in a saga (Chapter 9), they are superhuman only in the sense that they are beyond the endurance of an ordinary mortal, but then in the eyes of our author Mahāvīra was no ordinary mortal. Even the eulogy of Mahāvīra occuring in Sūtrakṛtāṅga I, though full of hyperboles of all sorts, has little mythological about it—except insofar as it attributes omniscence to Mahāvīra. Similarly, when this text claims for most of its teachings that they have originated from Mahāvīra himself one can doubt the veracity of the claim but one cannot charge the author with having mythologized the doings of Mahāvīra.

Some Relevant Passages From Acārāṅga I Considered

1.

In connection with this feature — as with those detailed in the following —it would be profitable to take into special account certain passages from Ācārāṅga I. So far as the present feature is concerned most important passages occur in chapter 2 contalning a trenchant criticism of the worldly people. Thus in a typical passage (7.7) it is here said of them that thoroughly enamoured of things worldly like fields and buildings, gold and ornaments, women they are eager to live long; on the other hand, the people with steadfast conduct (meaning ideal monks) are perseverent in their career because they know what birth and death are and that death never fails to come. Elsewhere (6.9) a man is exhorted to adopt the career of a monk at a moment when his bodily faculties are yet unimpaired. Then by way of drawing a contrast it is said of a degenerate monk (6,16) that he succumbs to the temptation of worldly pleasures and of an ideal monk (6.21) that he does not do so. But nowhere is a contrast drawn between a degenerate and an ideal householder. The conclusion is inescapable that the text does not welcome the prospect of a man endeavouring to lead a householder's life avoiding its excesses. And that is understandable, for to welcome worldly life

—in however desirable a form —is tantamount to weakening the force of that appeal for recruitment to the monastic order. This whole attitude is in marked contrast to the practice of the later Jaina authors who would prescribe a pious householder's code of conduct to the person who is not too much fond of things worldly but is yet not in a position to embrace monkhood. At one place (19.26) the text says in so many words of an ideal moral performance that it is impossible on the part of those who stay at home; (the passage does contain numerous other condemanatory epithets but they are obviously a consequence of 'homely life' and that is the point). For the rest, the text describes (23.8) how a monk's social relatives seek to tempt him back to the worldly life, (27.28) how a householder might make to a monk the offer of on unauthorized type of alms, (27.29); how there are householders who cause trouble to a wondering monk (19.30. 25.32) and in connection with the account of Mahāvīra's asceticism there is a detailed decsription (35.23 ff.) of how he was actually harassed by ill-managed worldlings.

2.

In this connection our attention is first drawn to a repeated statement (10. 18, 19.28) that the ideal monks make use of things that are coarse and rough (also cf.26.20 where a monk is asked not to be afraid of things rough). At another place (16.10) a monk is asked to thrash down his body, to weaken down himself, to consume down himself—just as fire churns down old stock of wood. One passage (24.25) describes the monks, whose arms have grown weak, whose flesh and blood have grown attenuated—presumably the description of ascetics with permanently upraised arms. And in connection with the account of Mahāvīra's asceticism (36.19) we are told how he suffered hardships in winter and in summer, how he imposed on himself restrictions as to the intake of food and drink. Then take the passages which refer to the procurement of food, clothing, shelter—and to no procurement of medicine. The food is to be consumed irrespective of whether it is good-smelling or bad-smelling (24.11); if one is denied alms one should not get angry, if one is given little one should not make a long face (8.15), and in any case one should be in know of the proper quantity of food to be consumed (9.2). Further, we are told (37.5) what type of coarse food Mahāvīra used to receive in the alms, his self-denying modes of procuring food are described (36.30). As for clothes, they are not to be washed, not to be coloured, and they are to be received, unwashed and un-coloured (29.6). Fire is not to be used by way of shelter against cold (28.32); and we are told how Mahāvīra with no clothes on at all put up with the hardships of winter (34.15,35.10). Some idea of the coarse nature of a monk's shelter can be formed when we are incidentally informed (27.28) of one seated at the

cremation-ground, a quarter lying vacant, a mountain-cave, the root of a tree, a potter's quarter. Coarse quarters sought for shelter by Mahāvīra are described (34.21), his coarse bedding and seating are spoken of (35.21). Cumulative evidence of several passages (26.26,29.13,30.13,31.14) suggests that in the case of sickness reduced diet was the first recommendation, and in the case of sickness proving incurable a fast unto death. About Mahāvīra we are told (36.14) that he would live on reduced diet even when not sick and that he would never take medicine when sick.

3.

Even a cursory glance at the contents of the text would reveal that it only too frequently condemns violence and acquisitiveness (the former usually under the designation *ārambha*, the latter under the designation *parigraha* but also using other designations for both). There are also passages (e.g. 12.5,12.22) where both are condemned at one place; most conspicuous in this connection is the sustained discussion occuring in 5.1-3 where *ārambha*, *anārambha*, *parigraha* and *aparigraha* are treated of in this very order. In view of the fact that the couple *parigraha* and *ārambha* is roughly parallel to the couple *rāga* and *dveṣa* let it also be noted that the triplet *preyas*, *doṣa*, *moha*—parallel to the triplet *rāga*, *dveṣa*, *moha* of the Brahmins and the triplet *lobha*, *devṣa*, *moha* of the Buddhist—also makes its appearance once (14.15) in a rather stray fashion.

4.

A most detailed discussion of the problem of *parigraha* occurs in chapter 2, but the mention of an animate (*cittavat*) and an inanimate (*acittavat*) object of *parigraha* occurs in the discussion of that chapter 5. (18.23). In chapter 2 the whole case is put most vigorously and in a nutshel in two passages —viz. 7.17-25, and 5.15-20,25-28. The first runs roughly as follows : "He takes hold of the cattle-wealth and the slave-wealth and employing the two accumulates riches when these riches have been accumulated in a big mass it might just happen that the relations divide them into shares, a thief steals them away, the kings carry them off, they just perish, or they burn down in fire. Thus it is that these riches prove to be meant for others. The fool has undertaken cruel acts and as a result he finds himself in a state of fall" The second runs roughly as follows : "Here is my mother, father, brother, sister, wife, sons, daughters, daughter-in-law, freinds and relatives, here are my material goods'—thus is the common man entangled. He is in fury day and night, busy in time and out of time, greedy for riches, he undertakes violent acts again and again. ....And then one day it might just happen that the people with whom he lives speak ill of him first and he speaks ill of them in return. Certainly,

they prove to be no protection, no shelter to him; and he too proves to be no protection, no shelter to them."

5.

Whenever the text speaks of violence —and as already noted, it does so frequently enough — it is always understood that the possible victims of violence are the six types of living beings; at times (e.g. 10.1, 33.23) that is even said in so many words. But an elaborate defence of the thesis that the types of living being are just six in number occurs in chapter 1. Naturally, the text here takes pride in the discovery that the rival monastic communities, since they do not uphold the thesis in question, are invariably guilty of so much violence (2.3 etc.); but in the rest of the chapters the point is not made much of.

6.

The four moral vices that were later on called *kaṣāyas* viz. *krodha, māna, māyā* and *lobha* are collectively mentioned at several places (e.g, 14.6, 18.4, 26.22) but they are never given the common designation *kaṣāya* (or any other common designation). Nor are they ever subjected to any detailed description. And though each one of them crops up here or there in connection with some discussion or other, no technical significance attaches to the performance; (e.g. 6.20 mentions *lobha*, 6.33 *māna*, 7.1 *krodha*, 9.19 *māyā*)

And of the 5 moral vices later called *mahā-avrata* it is only *ārambha* (later more usually called *himsā* or *prāṇātipāta*) and *parigraha* which are here treated in details. As for the rest, they occur rarely and in a stray fashion and the impression is created as if they are meant to be of a co-ordinate states with *ārambha* and *parigraha*; (e.g. 8.8, 17,24,20.17 mention *abrahma*, 14.1 *mṛṣāvāda*, 27.8 *adattādāna*).

7.

The 22 hardships of monastic life later called *parīṣaha* are not met with in our text. But four of them— viz. *tṛṇasparśa, śītasparśa, tejaḥsparśa* (= *uṣṇaṣparśa*), *damśamaśakasparśa*–are mentioned repeatedly (e.g. 24.19, 35.18); at some places (e.g. 18.19. 26.1,32.13, 33.17, 35.19) we also hear of *sparśas* in general and from that it can be gathered that the common designation originally intended to be given to the hardships in question was *sparśa* rather than *parīṣaha*. The words *parīṣaha* and *upasarga* too occur there (e.g. the former in 32.19, the latter in 35.22, both in 32.20) but they do not appear to be technical usages.

As for the 'defects of alms' the later authors divide them into several groups but our text is acquainted with just 6 (of the 16 belonging to the

group called) *udgamadoṣas* —i.e. defects originating from the side of the donor. They are *samuddiṣṭa, kṛta, prāmitya, acchedya, anīsṛṣṭa, abhīdṛta* (28.2 Roman text 8.2.1). Our text also speaks of a seventh defect called *samārabhya* but it is to be taken as a common designation for these several defects which the later authors recognize only under separate names and which all somehow involve violence.

That our text has some special kind of antipathy against the act of purchasing is apparent from the fact that at one place (8.25) it is subjected to condemnation all alone.

8.

Two passages of our text seem to have some bearing on the problems of monastic jurisprudence. Thus one (25.1) speaks of the monks who are properly taught day in and day out by the wise ones but who when wandering alone prove unworthy of the task and as a consequence are rude to their former preceptor himself. Another passage (19.30) speaks of the difficulties to be faced by a monk who has only newly started wandering alone. Both give the impression as if the period of a disciple's stay with his preceptor was not much long.

9.

In connection with the karma-doctrine the most noteworthy thing is that our text envisages just two alternative post-mortem states—viz. one awaiting an evil person —a monk or a householder — and involving birth among the hellish beings and animals, the other awaiting an ideal monk and consisting in *mokṣa*. This explains why it describes rebirth not only as a state characterized by a new entry into womb (*garbha*), a new birth (*janma*), a new death (*maraṇa*) but also as one characterized by misery (*duḥkha*), a birth among hellish beings (*nāraka*), a birth among animals (*tiryak*); (this becomes most clear from the following items occuring in a series ennumerating the various misfortunes possible befalling a man : *garbha, janma, māra* (=*maraṇa*), *naraka, tiryak, duḥkha* (14,16,2.10,8.8.) As for *mokṣa*, it is often (e.g. in 7.26) figuratively conceived as a process of crossing over the flood-tide (of misery, rebirth etc.)

10.

In our text all worthwhile ontological discussion is confined to chapter one which first seeks to prove that soul exists and then that it might possibly inhabit six types of living bodies.

11.

In connection with epistemology two more usages of our text deserve consideration. First, it is acquainted with the distinction —whatever it might

be —between *jñāna* and *darśana* (6.23, 27.14). Secondly, it somehow distinguished between *dṛṣṭa, śruta, mata, vijñāta* (15.3, 15.18) —of which the first three seem to be respectively related to the classical concepts *darśana, śruta, mati*, the fourth seems to be generally related to no classical concept.

12.

In connection with mythology we only note that *naraka* is so often (e.g. 2.10,8.8,14.15) mentioned when rebirth is spoken of; (negatively we might note that gods are mentioned never).

13.

The past, present and future *arhats* are mentioned in 4.22. To a period of Mahāvīra's biography —i.e. to the period marking the beginning of his ascetic career and characterized by a practice of very strong asceticism— is devoted the whole chapter 9.

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Some Relevant Passages From Sūtrakṛtāṅga I Considered

1.

In connection with the features under consideration it is also necessary to assess the testimony of Sūtrakṛtāṅga I which quite often acts as a lucid and systematic commentary on the rather obscurely worded and tersely formulated thesis of Ācārāṅga I. Thus so many strands of thought which in Ācārāṅga I appear in a more or less loose fashion have combined into a more or less perfect system in Sūtrakṛtāṅga I. The result is that in a number of important cases we are left in no doubt whatsoever as to what these texts have to say on this question or that. Following the order here adopted by us let us first of all consider the circumstance that our texts lay unconditional emphasis on the desirability of world-renunciation. The question is raised in Sūtrakṛtāṅga I several times but most prominent, perhaps, in chapter 2 which is essentially of the form of an appeal for recruitment to the monastic order. In the very begining (2.1.1-3) the point is stressed that there is no certainty about the length of one's life while one is doomed in case he stays in the company of his parent – the conclusion being that one ought to adopt the career of a monk without a moment's delay. The same conclusion is explicitly drawn in the verses 18-19 of chapter 10 which are strongly reminiscent of certain passages of Ācārāṅga I and which describe the worldling who, oblivious of the surely oncoming death, goes on accumulating wealth that is to be enjoyed by others when he himself is no more. How the social relations of a monk seek to tempt him back to worldly life is

described in 2.1.16-21, a description which in still more graphic details appears in 3.2.1-13; (chapter 4 is exclusively devoted to a depiction of womanly temptation). And 3.2, 15-22 tell us how a monk is saught to be tempted back to worldly life by the leading personalities of the secular society. On the other hand, 3. 1.6-7, 9-11 convey an idea of how certain worldly people speak rudely to the monk, 3. 1. 14-16 an idea of how they torture him physically. In view of all this—particularly in view of the categorical assertion 'knowing all this who will like to stay at home (*iti vijjaṃ ko'gāramāvase*) ? (*2.2.10*)—it is somewhat puzzling that 2.2.13 envisages the possibility of one staying at home, leading a virtuous life and being next born as a God. Such a possibility was certainly and enthusiastically envisaged by the later authors but it was beyond the thought-horizon of the authors of our texts, so in all probability the verse in question is a later interpolation.

2.

A monk's life of extreme physical hardship is extolled under the common designation *rūkṣasevana* (= experiencing things rough) [3. 1-3]. Some detail occur in 3. 1. 4-5, 8, 12-13. while in 2. 2.13-17 is described how a monk fearlessly stays in a vacant quarter with terrific surroundings. In 2. 1. 14 the monk is called upon to weaken his body through fasting, etc., in 2. 2. 5 he is asked to stay steadfast in the midst of 'harsh touches' (= *paruṣasparśa*); ('harsh touch' was a common designation for physical hardships). In 10. 3, 10 a monk is asked not to earn his livelihood through performing a secular job. Injunction similar to these here selected out occur elsewhere too.

3.

The description of moral vices in terms of two basic types — viz. *ārambha* and *parigraha* is a recurring theme of Sūtrakṛtāṅga I. In the very beginning of the text the question is asked as to what is 'bondage' and the answer consists in a description of *ārambha* (here called *prāṇātipāta*) and *parigraha* (1. 1. 1-6). In chapter 7 a bad monk is the topic of description; here the verses 1-22 describe the acts of violence on his part, the verses 23-28 those exhibiting acquisitiveness. In chapter 9 *dharma* (=religion) is the topic of description ; here the verses 2-9 deseribe *ārambha* and *parigraha*. In chapter 11 the topic of discussion is *mārga* (= the right pathway); here the verses 7-12 describe *anārambha* the verses 13-20 *anārambha* and *aparigraha* [There are also numerous stray references to *ārambha, parigraha* and both] A joint study of all these passages gives a clear idea of how the two vices in question were conceived and why they were understood to be the worst types of vices. Taken as a whole *parigraha*—signifies attachment for things worldly—where 'things' include both the material

goods and the social relatives and *ārambha* the acts injurious to others undertaken with a view to satisfying the demands of this attachment.

4

The above referred passages dealing with *parigraha* make it clear that by inanimate (*acittavat*) and animate (*cittavat*) objects of *parigraha* are to be understood the material goods and the social relatives respectively.

5

The above referred passages dealing with *ārambha* make it clear that the possible objects of *ārambha* are the six types of living beings.

6

The moral vices later known as *kaṣāya* are referred to several times though not under the common designation *kaṣāya*. But the noteworthy thing is that if in one verse (6. 26) they are given the ordinary designations *krodha, māna, māyā, lobha* (and a common designation *adhyātma doṣa* i. e. spiritual demerit) in three they are given rather peculiar and obscure designations. Thus in 1.2.12 they are respectively called (in Prakrit) *appattiya, viukkassa, ṇūma, savvappaga*, in 1. 4. 12 *jalaṇa, ukkasa, ṇūma, majjhattha*, in 9.11 *thaṇḍila, ussayaṇa, paliumcaṇa, bhayaṇa*.

As for the 5 *mahā-avratas* they are referred to several times but in most cases in a very cursory fashion. Thus :

(i) in 2.3.3 we have a reference to *mahā-avratas* in general along with *rātribhojana* (=nightly eating).

(ii) in 3.4.8 we have a reference to *mahā-avratas*, in 3. 4. 9–18 a long discourse on *abrahma*, in 3.4.19 a reference to *mṛṣāvāda* and *adattādāna*, in 3. 4. 20 a reference to *himsāviramaṇa*.

(iii) in 8. 19 we have a reference to *prāṇātipāta, adattādāna, mṛṣāvāda*.

(iv) in 9. 2–9 we have a long discourse on *ārambha* and *parigraha* in 9. 10 a reference to *mṛṣāvāda, abrahmamaṇa, adattādāna, prāṇātipāta*.

(v) in 16. 2 we have (as in 9. 10) a reference to *mṛsāvāda etc.*

There is something suspicious about all these references and in all probability they are all a later interpolation; in any case they accord ill with the importance attached to the concept of *mahā-avratas* in the later Jaina speculation.

7

Chapter 3 is devoted to an exclusive treatment of the hardships of monastic life. These hardships are here called *upasarga* and the later technical name for the same is *parīṣaha*. But the noteworthy thing is that hardly few of the 22 *parīṣahas* known to the later authors are recognizable

in the present treatment. Thus we here have *śītasparśa* (3.1.4), *uṣṇa sparśa* (3. 1. 5), *yāñcā* (3. 1, 6) *daṃśamaśaka* (3.1.12) *tṛṇasparśa* (3.1.12), *vadha* (3. 1. 15-16) and maybe a few more - but not always under these precise titles. As already noted, the word *paruṣasparśa* (or simply *sparśa*) is here often used in the general sense of physical hardship while 10.14 refers to those 4 *sparśas* - *tṛṇasparśa, śītasparśa, uṣṇasparśa, daṃśamaśa-kasparśa* found mentioned in Āchārāṇga I.

'Defects of alms' are found referred to at several places and in a stray fashion. Thus we have

(i) *pūtikṛta* (= mixed with defective alms) in 1. 3. 1
(ii) *kṛta* (i.e. not *uddiṣṭa*) in 1.4-4
(iii) *viśuddha uṃcha* (i.e. not *sadoṣa bhikṣā*) in 2. 3. 14
(iv) *uddiṣṭa, krīta, prāmitya, āhṛtya, pūtikṛta* in 9. 14
(v) *samārabhya, uddiṣṭa* in 11. 14, *pūtikṛta* in 11. 15
(vi) *sacitta bīja* and *udaka, uddiṣṭa* in 11. 26

This Suggests that almost the same items which occur in this connection in Ācārāṅga I also occur here (*pūtikṛta* is absent there, *acchedya* and *anisṛṣṭa* are absent here.)

8

The whole of chapter 14 is perhaps relevant for the devepolment of the later monastic jurisprudence; for here we find described a detailed moral code of conduct for one receiving lessons at the feet of his preceptor; (a stray reference to a disciple being rude to his preceptor occures in 13. 2). But the general impression that is created is that the disciple will take to wandering alone as soon as his education is completed - which completion should not take a very long time.

9

The technical terminology of the later karma-doctrine is absent in Sūtrakṛtāṅga I as much as it is absent in Ācārāṅga I. Only 2.3.11 refers to *mohanīya karma* and 7.4 to *bandha* and *vedana* - which are all certain technical terms of the later karma-doctrine. Also noteworthy is the circumstance that in 15. 16, 24 the auspicious post-mortem state is described in terms of an alternative - *mokṣa* or godly birth; (This alternative is very much popular with the later authors but its occurence in Sūtrakṛtāṅga I is rather puzzling.

10

In its very first Chapter - as also in the twelfth - our text takes into consideration a number of rival ontological views but hardly ever does it counterpose a typical Jain thesis against a rival one; (perhaps an exception

occurs in 13.9 where various theories of world-creation are summarily and jointly refuted by asserting that the world never perishes—and so is never created at all). Thus in Sūtrakṛtāṅga I as in Ācārāṅga I the only ontological thesis typical of Jainas is one according to which the types of living beings are six in all.

11

In connection with epistemology nothing is to be added to what has already been said.

12

Sūtrakṛtāṅga I is certainly acquainted with more mythological notions than Ācārāṅga I, but here too certain points are noteworthy:-

(1) The concepts of an auspicious next birth among gods occurs in rather suspicious verses - viz. 2. 3. 13; 15. 16; 15. 24.

(2) The concept of an inauspicious next birth among gods occurs in 1. 3. 16 and 2. 3. 9

(3) In 2. 15 the list of mythological species contains the items *deva, gandharva, rākṣasa, asura,* in 12. 13 it contains the items *sura, gandharva, rākṣasa, yamalokin* - both sets unfamiliar to the later Jaina speculation.

(4) In the course of describing hells (e. g. in 5. 1. 6) *paramādhāmin* gods are mentioned and they are familiar to the later Jaina speculation.

(5) The eulogy of Mahāvīra contains several mythological concepts familiar to the later Jaina speculation, e. g. *Sudarśana (=Meru) parvata* (6. 9), *paṃḍakavana* 6. 10, *Āyataparvata Niṣadha* and *Vartulaparvata Rucaka* (6. 15), *Svayaṃbhū-samudra* and *Nāgendra Dharaṇa* (6. 20) *Lavasaptama deva* and *Sudharmā Sabhā* (6. 24),

For the rest, there is little typically Jaina about the mythological notions — including the so many occuring in the Chapter on hells and that on Mahāvīra - contained in Sūtrakṛtāṅga I

13

So many times does Sūtrakṛtāṅga I attribute a teaching to Mahāvīr (called by the names *Mahāvīra, Kāśyapa, Jñāta, Brāhmaṇa* and the like) either at the begining of a chapter (or section) (e. g. in 5. 1. 1-2, 9. 1, 11. 1), or at its end (e. g. in 1. 1. 27, 2.3. 22, 3.3. 20) or somewhere in the middle of it (e. g in 2.2. 26, 11. 32, 15. 21). It is essentially a question of literary mannerism and means nothing more than that the author believed the teaching concerned to have been originated from Mahāvīra. That is to say, unlike the later Jain authors our text has not developed a special mythological theory as to how Mahāvīra is the source of all that Jainism has to teach on this question or that.

CHAPTER II

A HISTORICAL EVALUATION OF UTTARĀDHYAYANA AND DAŚAVAIKĀLIKA

Uttarādhyayana and Daśavaikālika are two of the four oldest Jaina canonical texts, the other two being Ācārāṅga I and Sūtrakṛtāṅga I. Of these, Ācārāṅga I and Sūtrakṛtāṅga I are oldest, Uttarādhyayana and Daśavaikālika oldest after them. Of course, each of these texts contains material that is relatively old and material that is relatively new, it being of the form of an anthology of independent poetic pieces composed at different dates and by different anthors. Even so, they taken together do not fail to throw considerable light on the earlier stages of the evolution of Jaina thought and practice. To make study of Uttarādhyayana and Daśavaikālika from this standpoint is the purpose of the present note.

As compared to Daśavaikālika Uttarādhyayana is much varied in style as well as contents. The former consists of ten chapters and two appendices, all of the form of a homily addressed to a monk; the latter consists of 36 chapters, of which 12 are of the form of a homily, 11 of the form of a story, 2 of the form of a parable, 11 of the form of a systematic treatment of some topic or group of topics. So it should be profitable to take up for a special treatment Uttarādhyayana first and Daśavaikālika afterwards.

What should strike a reader of Uttarādhyayana is its almost exclusive pre-occupation with the problems of a monk's life and its almost total disregard of those of a pious householder's life. However, since an exclusive pre-occupation with the problems of a monk's life and a total disregard of those of a pious householder's life are also a characteristic features of Ācārāṅga I and Sūtrakṛtāṅga I the few exceptions that occur in this connection in Uttarādhyayana deserve notice. A most clearcut recognition of the honourable status of a pious householder is made in the later half of chapter 5 which is devoted to a comparative consideration of 'death of the ignorant' and 'death of the wise'. The early half of the chapter describes 'death of the ignorant' that is the fate of an ordinary worldling, the later half 'death of the wise' that is the destiny of a pious Jaina-monk or householder. In connection with the latter it is laid down that after his death a pious Jaina householder is next born as a god (v. 24), a pious Jaina monk is either next born as a god or he attains *mokṣa* (v. 25), a position maintained by all later Jaina authors. The fate of a pious householder also finds mention in the later half of chapter 7. This half is

mechanically tagged to the early half which is of the form of a parable and it compares the fate of three types of men to that of three types of traders; thus the man who is next born as a man is like the trader who just manages to save his principle-money, the man who is next born as a god is like the trader who earns a profit, the man who is next born as a hellish being or an animal is like the trader who incurs loss (vv. 14-16). In this analogy there is provided no room for the case of the man who attains *mokṣa* and the conclusion ought to be that it is exclusively concerned with the fate of a householder. An indirect reference to a pious householder occurs in the later half of chapter 3 too; this later half is virtually in the form of a gloss on the general thesis that a pious monk is either next born as a god or he attains *mokṣa* (vv. 12-13), a thesis which in its bare form occurs in the concluding verse of chapter 1. The later half of chapter 3 describes how a pious monk is next born as a god and after that as a prosperous and pious householder who attains mokṣa (v. v. 14-20); Thus what is here described is not a pious householder as such-that is, one who remains a householder for the whole of his life - but one who eventually becomes a monk, monkhood being an indispensable condition for attaining *mokṣa*. Lastly, an incidental reference to a pious householder occurs in Chapter 9, which describes the story of Nami's world-renunciation; here (vv. 41-44), Indra disguiezed as a Brāhmin asks Nami not to become a monk but to lead the life of a pious householder, a suggetion which Nami parries by pointing out that the performance of a pious householder is much too inadequate to lead one to *mokṣa*. These Uttarādhyayana-passages containing a direct, indireet or incidental reference to a pious householder are noteworthy but equally noteworthy is the circumstance that in this text no homily, no story, no parable, no systematic treatment of a topic is exclusively concerned with the problems of a pious householder's life. For baring the exceptions just noted the whole text is devoted to the problems of a monk's life (in a few cases to the problems of general theory).

The Uttarādhyayana treatment of the problems of a monk's life has its own special features. Precisely in the spirit of Ācārāṅga I and Sūtrakṛtāṅga I the text lays unconditional emphasis on the describing of one embracing the career of a monk, an aspect of its teaching we will examine later on. But particularly interesting is its testimony on the question of lonely wandering on the part of a monk and this testimony deserves more than passing notice. In several independent passages it is here categorically asserted that lonely wandering is an ideal monastic practice. Thus in Chapter 35 (verse 6) we have 'In a cremation-ground, in a quarter permanently vacant, under the root of a tree, in an unoccupied quarter built for someone else he should take up residence all alone', in chapter 15 (v. 16) 'A monk is he who having taken leave of home

wanders all alone', in Chapter 2 (v. 18) 'The noble one should wander all alone'. In chapter 19 (vv. 77 etc.) the life of a lonely wandering monk is compared to that of an animal freely loitering in a wilderness. Yet we are elsewhere (11. 14) told 'Only he who permanently stays at the quarter of the preceptor is in a position to receive education.' Here reference could be to the fairly old practice of a student staying with his preceptors for a period that was absolutely necessary for the former's education. But in chapter 17 more advanced conditions seem to have been envisaged, for here some of the epithets ascribed to a bad monk are 'one who does not take proper care of the *ācārya* and *upādhyāya* '(v. 5), 'one who discards his *ācārya*' (v. 17), 'one who wanders from *gaṇa* to *gaṇa* (*gaṇa*=monastic unit)' (v. 17). Certainly, in the course of time it became a common practice for monks to wander about in the form of a unit functioning under the headship of an *ācārya* assisted by a staff made up of *upādhyāya* etc.) this replaced the old practice of a young student staying with his preceptor just for the duration of his education and it is this that seems to be reflected in the chapter in question. Similarly, only in the light of the latter-day practice can one appreciate the following complaint made against bad disciples : 'They have been given lessons, they have been supplied with equipment, they have been nourished with food and drink, and yet they scatter away in all directions as do swans that have grown wings' (27.14). However, an intermediate stage seems to have marked the course of evolution under considration. Thus in Chapter 32 we read: " One should look for food that is measured and acceptable, one should look for a companion who is skilled in matters intellectual. ... But in case one fails to have a companion superior to oneself in merit or equal to oneself then one should wander alone ....." (vv. 4–5). So at some stage the practice must have been for a monk to seek the company of another one superior or equal to himself; (of course, a monk can receive the company of another one superior to himself only if this latter monk consents to have the company of another one inferior to himself, but let us not press that point). But even at this stage the old practice of wandering alone must have appeared to have merits of its own, as is evident from chapter 29, which enumerates (in para 39) the advantages of doing without a companion just as it enumerates (in para 40) those of doing without food (i.e. of fasting); thus runs the former set of advanteges: "One doing without a companion generates loneliness for himself, and a lonely person enjoying his loneliness experiences little noise, little dispute, little quarrel, little passion, little mutual-abuse." Evidently the practice of wandering about along with a companion was not an unmixed blessing; nay, it did not even have much survival value and the disadvantages of

lonely wandering were set aside not by this practice of monks wandering in twos but by that final practice of monks wandering in the form of a unit. This final practice must have grown out of that old practice of the young disciples staying with their preceptor; for this final practice must be the result as soon as disciples make it a point not to take leave of their preceptor even when their education was over. Thus several (two, three, or even more) generations of monks would form a jointly wandering unit where the oldest member was the *ācārya* with other senior members acting as his staff. The disadvantages enumerated by the just quoted Uttarādhyayana-passage in the practice of monks wandering in twos were certainly there—and were there in a gravest form – also in the practice of monks wandering in the form of a unit, but they were more then offset by the advantages offered by this latter practice.

It should now be easy to see how the Uttarādhyayana treatment of the problems of a monk's life moves in the circle of ideas characteristic of Ācārāṅga I and Sūtrakṛtāṅga I. Three most prominent features of this circle of ideas are

(i) a general non-recognition of the problems of a pious house-holders life,

(ii) an unconditional emphasis laid on the desirability of one adopting the career of a monk,

(iii) recommending an extremely harsh monastic code of conduct [Here (ii) is in fact a corollary of (i) it being the positive counterpart of the latter which is essentially negative in character.] We have already seen how scant notice Uttarādhyayana takes of the problems of a pious householder's life and so it should be natural to expect that the text lays unconditional emphasis on the desirabilily of one adopting the career of a monk. The expectation is more than fulfilled, as should be obvious from even a cursory glance at the contents of the text. Most striking in this connection is the fact that as many as of its 11 stories have for their central subject-matter the glorification of a monk's career contrasted to that of a householder's. In three of here— viz. *Iṣukārīya* (ch. 14). *Mṛgāputrīya* (ch. 19), *Samudrapālīya* (ch. 21)—certain young men seek leave of their parents—in the first two through a more or less lengthy argumentation—and adopt the career of a monk—in the first the parents too following suit, in other three —viz. *Cittasambhūtīya* (ch. 13), *Saṃyatīya* (ch. 18), a *Mahānirgranthīya* (ch. 20)—a monk is pitted against a king and preaches to the latter the virtues of a monk's life – in the second the king himself turning a monk, in one – viz. *Namipravrajyā* (ch. 9) – Indra disguised as a Brahmin vainly

seeks to dissuade the king Nami from adopting the career of a monk. [The remaining 4 stories – viz. *Harikeśīya* (ch. 12), *Rathanemīya* (ch. 22), *Keśi-gotamīya* (ch. 23), *Yajñīya* (ch. 25) – raise certain miscellaneous problems of monastic conduct.] In all these stories two points come into picture most prominently, viz.

(1) Why the world has to be renounced,

(2) How harsh is the career of a monk.

[For (1) see 9. 15-16; 13.16-26, 31 – 32; 14. 12-15, 27-28, 39-47, 18.11-17; 19, 10-23, 44-74; 20. 16-37.

For (2) see 19. 24-42, 76-85; 20.38-50; 21. 11-24]

These are the same two points which we have marked out as the two most conspicuous positive features of the circle of ideas characteristic of Ācārāṅga I and Sūtrakṛtāṅga I. And the same two points almost exhaust the contents of the 12 homilis and 2 parables, occuring in Uttarādhyayana some of which — particularly those composed in various non-*anuṣṭubh* metres – are forceful in the extreme; here is a catalogue of them.

12 Homilies : *Vinaya* (ch. 1), *Caturaṅgīya* (ch. 3), *Asaṃskṛta* (Prakrit *Asaṃkhaya*) (ch. 4 – non-*anuṣṭubh*), *Akāmamaraṇa* (ch. 5), *Kṣullakanirgra-nthīya* (ch. 6), *Kāpilīya* (ch. 8-non-*anu.*), *Drumapatraka* (ch. 10-non-*anu.*), *Bahuśrutapūjā* (ch. 11), *Sabhikṣu* (ch-15-non-*anu.*), *pāpaśramaṇīya* (ch. 17), *pramādasthāna* (ch. 32—non-*anu.*), *Anagāramārga* (ch. 31).

2 Parables : *Urabhrīya* (ch. 7), *Khaluṁkīya* (ch. 27). A careful perusal of this much portion of Uttarādhyayana —i. e. of those 7 stories on the one hand and these 12 homilies and 2 parables on the other—should enable one to see clearly how this text carries forward the tradition of Ācārāṅga I and Sutrakṛtāṅga I. Deviations from this traditions here and there certainly are, we have already had occasion to note one or two of them; e. g. we have seen how this text at times considers the problems related to the life of a pious house-holder, and how it at times consider the case of monks wandering about in twos or in the form of a unit – the two considerations which in Ācārāṅga I and Sūtrakṛtāṅga I are conspicuous by their absence. But such deviations, though significant in their own way, are negligible, on the whole.

There yet remains to be considered a group of 11 Uttarādhyayana chapters which are distinguished not so much for their style; for what they seek to undertake is a systematic treatment of some topics. Five of these viz. *Parīsaha* (ch. 2), *Brahmacaryasthāna* (ch. 16), *Pravacanamātṛkā* (ch.24), *Sāmācārī* (ch. 26), *Tapa* (ch. 30) –deal with certain problems of monastic conduct,, one – viz. *Samyaktvaparākrama* (ch. 29) —with a huge conglomerate of 72 miscelleneous items all pertaining to the field of general

conduct, one viz. *caraṇavidhi* (ch. 31)— with another conglomerate of miscellaneous items pertaining to all sorts of fields, four viz. *Mokṣamārgīya* (ch. 28), *Karmaprakṛti* (ch. 33), *Leśyā* (ch. 34), *Jīvājīvavibhakti* (ch. 36)—with certain problems of general theory. All these chapters are more or less relevant for a study of the evolution of the Jaina technical concepts but one is specially relevant also for our present purpose. This is chapter 2 dealing with 22 *parīṣahas*. Under the technical concept of *parīṣaha* the Jaina theoreticians comprehended the physico-social hardships which a monk might possibly encounter in the course of his everyday life. Of course, vividly depicting the hardships of monastic life was an old preoccupation, of the Jaina authors, Sūtrakṛtāṅga I even had one whole chapter devoted to the topic. But the technical concept of *parīṣaha* with its 22 sub-divisions was a relatively late growth. This means that the present chapter of Uttarādhyana was relatively late composition but the noteworthy thing is that the understanding incorporated in it was fairly old; the conclusion aught to be that this old understanding held the field for a pretty long time. To be explicit, we are here referring to the understanding that a monk's life has to be a life of extreme hardships. In a way the root-cause of all extreme hardships that a monk faced was his practice of wandering about all alone — which explains why this practice had to be discarded eventually. But the present chapter of Uttarādhyayana, while dealing with *parīṣaha* - called *caryā* (=wandering about), categorically enjoins "The noble one should wander all alone" (v. 18), a passage we have already considered earlier. Equally revealing is its treatment of the *parīṣaha* called *niṣadyā* (=seating oneself), *śaiyā*(=taking up residence), *roga* (=ailment). Thus in connection with *niṣadyā* we read, " In a cremation-ground, in a quarter permanently vacant, under the root of a tree he should sit all alone and without making any unmannerly gesture '(v. 20). The practice of a monk seating himself in such horrible places was as old as Ācārāṅga I but it did not continue in later times. Similarly, in connection with *Śaiyā* we read: "If he gets for residence an unoccupied quarter then whether it is comfortable or woeful he should put up with it saying to himself what havean will come in one night ? (v. 23) Here reference is to the old monastic practice of staying in a village for not more than one night (and in a town for not more than five), a practice not even considered —let alone endorsed -even in the oldest disciplinary texts though mentioned in passing by a text like *Aupapātika* in the course of a legendary narrative (p. 8). Lastly, in connection with *roga* we read "on knowing that an ailment has arisen, he, tormented by it, should put with it and should not welcome medical treatment" (vv. 32-33). Here again reference is to the old monastic practice of refusing medical care in case one developed bodily ailments, a practice gradually given up as is evident from the lengthy discussions

pertaining to the problem of medical treatment undertaken in the later disciplinary texts. Certainly, the authors of the later disciplinary texts were confronted with the general task of reconciling their own various positions with the harsh injunctions like these laid down in so celebrated a text as Uttarādhyayana. And they came out with the ingeneous suggestion that monks are of two types —those called *Jinakalpikas* who wander about all alone and those called *Sthavirakalpikas* who wander about in the form of a monastic unit, the harsh injunctions of a text like Uttarādhyayana being obligatory on the former, their own relatively mild injunctions on the latter. Be that as it may, the Uttarādhyayana chapter on *parīṣaha*—is of use in assessing the historical value of this text.

Daśavaikālika is a text very different in character from Uttarādhyayana and its historical importance too is very different. As already noted, it consists of ten chapters and two appendices all of the form of a homily addressed to a monk. And its intention seems to be to impart to a monk instructions on elements of monastic ethics and etiquette. However, since with a text like this even items of etiquette must be based on an ethical consideration it should perhaps be better to say that the intention of our text is to impart to a monk instructions on major and minor elements of monastic ethics. It remains to be argued as to what are here taken to be the major elements of monastic ethics and what the minor ones.

The principle of non-violence as practised in relation to the six types of living beings –viz. earth, water, fire, air, plants, and creatures – was a basic ethical principle with the Jaina theoreticions since the days of Ācārāṅga I and Sūtrakṛtāṅga I. It remained so in the days of Daśavaikālika too but in this text it is frequently coupled with the principle of six great vows – viz. non-violence, truth, not accepting what is not donated, continence, not accumulating possessions, not eating during night time. The whole of chapter IV (minus its concluding verses) is denoted to a consideration of these two principles, paras 7–12 taking up the first, paras 1–6 the second, similarly, in chapter VI verse 27–46 take up the first principle, verses 9–26 the second, while in chapter X verses 2-4 take up the first principle, verse 5 the second (here confined to the first five great vows.) Lastly, chapter VIII verses 2–12 explicitly discuss the first principle, verses 17–29 implicitly discuss the second. All this is indicative of the newly realized significance of the principle of six (or five) great vows, a principle which in the old texts like Ācārāṅga I and Sūtrakṛtāṅga I was conspicuous by its absence. Of course, these old texts said a lot about the renunciation of *ārambha* (=violence) and *parigraha* and also enough about that of *mṛṣā, adattādāna, maithuna* but the concept of a collective renunciation of these five under the title 'five great vows' was a relatively late growth; and a relatively late date to be

ascribed to Daśavaikālika is a logical corollary of this circumstance [The same conclusion is to be drawn from the application (in VII. 57, IX (iii). 14, X.6) of the technical name *Kaṣāya* to the four vices *krodha, mada, māyā, lobha* jointly mentioned. Since the days of Ācārāṅga I and Sūtrakṛtāṇga I, for this name too was a relatively late growth.]

Another group of concepts to which significance is attached in Daśavaikālika comes to view when one peruses chapter VI, where besides sixfold non-violence and six vows the following six apparently miscellaneous items are subjected to investigation :

(1) the prohibited (types of alms)
(2) the householder's vessel
(3) an easy-chair
(4) sitting down (while on begging tour)
(5) bathing
(6) non decoration;

(This is how these items are catalogued in VI. 9 while a detailed account of them occurs in VI. 47–50, VI. 51–53, VI 54–56, VI. 57–61, VI. 62–63, VI. 64–67 respectively). Here the importance of item (1) is obvious and perhaps so also that of items (5) and (6) but their juxtaposition with items (2)–(4) is somewhat curious. However, these rather old items too seem to have a history of significance being attached to them. For the old Sūtrakṛtāṅga I takes note of item (2) in 2.2.20 and of items (3)–(4) in 9.21; (as for item (1) it is here noted in 9. 14, item (5) and (6) somehow in 9. 13, 15). Similarly, Daśavaikālika chapter III which contains a lengthy misellaneous list of prohibited items records our item (2) in III.3, our items (3) –(4) in III. 5; (as for our item (1) it is here noted in III.2, our items (1)–(6) somehow in III. 2, 3). In view of the fact that neither Sūtrakṛtāṅga I nor Daśavaikālika chapter III says anything by way of explaining our items (2)–(4), it is fortunate that Daśavaikālika chapter VI elucidates them in the passages already referred to; one might yet remain unconvinced that importance should be attached to these items but one can at least know them for what they are. Also welcome is elucidation here offered of our somewhat obvious items (5) and (6), but the case of our item (1) deserves detailed consideration. For the question as to what constitutes a prohibited type of alms is the most fundamental question of a monastic disciplinary text and as such it has to be examined from all sides.

Since very old days were the Jaina authors interested in compiling an exhaustive list of 'defects of alms', and so such lists occur in Ācārāṅga I, Sūtrakṛtāṅga I and Daśavaikālika. However, the final classical list contains 16 items, of which many are altogether new (while one or two items that

made their appearance in an earlier list are absent in this final one) [Strictly speaking, the final list contains 46 (or 47) items divided into four groups, but since no item of these groups —not at least under its technical designation —appears in an earlier list it would not be improper here to take note of just the first group with its 16 items.] It will be useful to note down these 16 items, they are:

(1) ādhākarma	*(1) auddeśika*
(3) pūtikarma	*(2) miśrajāta*
(5) sthāpanā	*(6) prāmṛtikā*
(7) prāduṣkaraṇa	*(8) krīta*
(9) prāmitya	*(10) parivartita*
(11) abhyāhṛta	*(12) udbhinna*
(13) mālāpahṛta	*(14) ācchedya*
(15) anisṛṣṭa	*(16) ādhyavapūraka*

Now Ācārāṅga I [8.2.1] records the items (2), (8), (9), (14), (15), (11) —as also a new item '*samārabhya*' which might correspond to the above item (1). As for Sūtrakṛtāṅga (19. 14) it records the items (2), (8), (9), (11), (3). The performance of Daśavaikālika has to be reviewed in this background. We have already noted that here both III. 3 and VI. 47–50 record the prohibited types of alms; at both places these types are said to be four in number —i.e. the items (2), (8), (11) of the above list and a new item *nityaka*. But in a similar context VIII. 23 records just 3 items —i. e. the items (2), (8), (11) of the above list. Two things are noteworthy about all these pre-classical lists—viz. (i) that they do not expressly claim to be exhaustive, and (ii) that they are accompanied by no explanation of the items concerned. This is true about the Daśavaikālika lists —with one possible exception. For, as already noted, in VI. 47–50 there are sought to be enumerated the prohibited types of alms and since it is here proclaimed 'There are the four prohibited types of alms enumerated by the great sage' the claim seems to be that the profound list of types is exhaustive. But granting that even this list is not supposed to be exhaustive there yet remains one question to be answered - viz. what position in this connection is taken up by chapter V of Daśavaikālika, a chapter specially concerned with the problem of alms-gathering ? The surprising thing is that this chapter does not at all conduct its discussion within the framework of any particular list of 'defects of alms'. What is still more surprising is that all of a sudden a list makes its appearance in verse 55 [of the first sub-section where the items (2), (8), (3), (11), (16), (9), (4) of the classical list are just mentioned and the matter is considered finished, (on the other hand the single item (13) of the classical list is explained in details in three whole verses 67–69]. The chapter does say good many things about the

problems of alms-gathering (it is pretty lengthy and made up of two subsections, one containing 100 verses the other 50), but the question is whether these things are so much more important than those items that were to appear in the classical list as is suggested by the relative length of space devoted to the two. One possible explanation of the anomaly is that these items were treated as extremely well understood and so no need was felt to dilate on them. In any case, to our understanding of these items Daśavaikālika contributes as little as do those old texts Ācārāṅga I and Sūtakṛtāṅga I, (such contribution is made by a classical text like Piṇḍa-niryukti where the problem of alsms-gathering is discussed within the frame-work of a standard list of 'defect-of-alms', but it is doubtful whether a text like this was in a position to correctly convey the significance that was originally attached to such an item of this list as was of long standing currency).

The above consideration of the Daśavaikālika discussion of the prohibited types of alms-gathering should help us in forming an idea of the precise historical value of this text. The text was chiefly intended to supply a catalogue of prohibitions and injunctions pertaining to the so many situat-ions which a monk had to face in the course of his everday life. The tradition of framing such catalogues was somewhat old. For in Sūtrakṛtāṅga I we have in 9. 12–24 a catalogue dealing with general matters, in 9.25–27 one dealing with the particular problem of a proper employment of speech; and it is the former that is somewhat expanded in Daśavaikālika chapter III while it is the latter that is much expanded in Daśavaikālika chapter VII. Daśavaikālika chapter IX (with four sub-sections) takes up the particular problem of a disciple's proper dealing with his preceptor, a prob-lem that was in a way mooted in Sūtrakṛtāṅga I chapter 14 and had grown in importance as time passed by. And we have already taken note of Daśavaikālika chapter V (with two sub-sections) which discusses the parti-cular problem of alms-gathering. So it is these four chapters –viz. III, V, VII, IX– that constitute the kernel of Daśavaikālika–inasmuch as it is they that bring out what is truly specific to this text. It is in virtue of these chapters that Daśavaikālika acts as a prototype for the later monastic disc-iplinary texts. As for its remaining chapters, they speak of things more or less interesting and more or less important, but they do not add much to the essential worth of the text. Thus chapter IV considers the general ethical problem of sixfold non-violence and the equally general ethical problem of six great vows, while chapter VI considers in addition to these two prob-lems those six miscellaneous items we have already noted in another conne-ction; in all this it is only the six miscellaneous items considered in chapter VI that are an intrinsic part of the specific subject-matter of our text. As

for chapters VIII and X they only lay down certain broad ethical injunctions obligatory on a monk, injunctions too broad to be a part of the specific subject-matter of Daśavaikālika. And the first two chapters—both quite brief—are placed when they are for no apparent reason. Thus chapter I is made up of 5 verses whose central import is that a monk gathers alms without causing any harm to the donor just as a black bee gathers sap from a flower without causing any harm to it. Similarly, chapter II made up of 11 verses upon the problem of worldly temptations in general and womanly temptation in particular but its five verses (6-10) are a literal reproduction from the Uttarādhyayana story of Rājīmaī and Rahanemi (ch.22), a reproduction containing so many specific references to this story that it is incomprehensible to one not already conversant with it. Lastly, there remain two appendices. Of these the first made up of 18 prose-formulae and 17 verses addresses consolations to a depressed monk, the second made up of 17 verses describes a monk in a most general fashion as do chapters VIII and X. This much information should suffice to enable us to form a general idea of the overall contents of Daśavaikālika - as also an idea of what constitutes its kernel and why. The text represents the historical stage of evolution when a clear-cut distinction between the ehical problems of a disciplinary nature and those of a more general nature had begun to dawn on the thought-horizon of the Jaina theoreticians, but the two sets of problems were yet thought to be so closely related to one another that a joint treatment of them was deemed possible and advisable (the same might be said of Uttarādhyayana even if its preoccupation with the ethical problems of a disciplinary nature is relatively meagre). It was only later on that two different sets of texts were devoted to these two sets of ethical problems, and it is viewed in this light that the kernel of Daśavaikālika ought to be those parts of it which make this text a prototype of the later monastic disciplinary texts.

With Uttarādhyayana and Daśavaikālika there comes to an end an important earlier stage in the growth of Jaina thought, a stage whose beginning was marked by the speculations that now stand recorded in Ācārāṅga I and Sūtrakṛtāṅga I. It is in this capacity that these four canonical texts are worthy of a closer study. A number of features pertaining to form as well as content are characteristic of them and it is time that attention be paid to these features. Three of them are outstanding:

(i) Thus a noteworthy thing about our texts is a predominance in them of the old Vedic metres like *Triṣṭubh*, *Jagatī* and *Anuṣṭubh*. As is well known, in classical Sanskrit as well as Pali *Anuṣṭubh* was the metre more

usually employed in texts meant for popular edification, but the classical Jaina authors writing in Prakrit adopted the metre *Āryā* for the purpose. In our texts, on the other hand, it is *Anuṣṭubh* that gradually gains predominence, it being more frequently employed by Uttarādhyayana and almost exclusively in Daśavaikālika; (as for *Āryā* it here occurs thrice—in Ācārāṅga I chapter 9, Sūtrakṛtāṅga I chapter 4, Uttarādhyayana chapter 8 – but in an old form while stray stanzas in classical *Āryā* that make their appearance in Uttarādhyayana are usually interpolations from later texts – as is shown in details by Alsdorf). The conclusion ought to be that in their choice of metre the authors of our texts were yet exhibiting the same tendency as their contemporary Brahmanical and Buddhist counterparts, and the fact that this sharing of a tendency was absent with the later Jaina authors argues the relative antiquity of our texts.

(ii) A second noteworthy feature of our texts is their vigorous advocacy of asceticism. Some sort of vigorous advocacy of asceticism was never to be absent from Jaina speculation, but what makes our texts a class by themselves is their firm rejection of the possibility that pious life might somehow be led by a householder. It seems that in those olden days the intellectual elite of the Aryan community was divided precisely over the question whether a householder can possibly lead a pious life. The Brahmanical authors came out with an answer in the affirmative, the monastic authors like those who composed our texts with an answer in the negative. Eventually Jaina authors made some concession to the rival viewpoint and the conciliatory trend of thought appears in a stray fashion even in Uttarādhyayana, but the very fact that it appears here in a stray fashion argues its relative recency.

(iii) A third noteworthy thing about our texts is their marked unfamiliarity with the Jaina technical concepts so well known to any student of Jainism. In four chapters of Uttarādhyayana –viz. 28, 33, 34, 36 – such technical concepts make their appearance on a mass scale – so to say. But the very fact that hardly few of these concepts are employed elsewhere in our texts argues the relative recency of these concepts. It will not do to say that the early Jaina authors were familiar with these concepts but that they had no occasion to employ them, nor to say that the early passages employing these concepts happened not be transmitted to the later generations. For in these early days of division of camps within the Aryan community it would have been only natural for an author to make a parade of his armory of technical concepts and for a later editor to pounce upon the passages where such a parade was made. It is really remarkable that our texts so free of the Jaina technical concepts were deemed worthy of higher respect by the later authors whose own stock of such concepts was pretty stupendous. This remarkable phenomenon is itself a testimony to the relative antiquity of our texts.

CHAPTER III

SŪTRAKṚTĀṄGA II—A HISTORICAL EVALUATION

Sūtrakṛtāṅga II is proved to be a relatively late text on the basis of the following three criteria :

(i) Its being overwhelmingly a prose composition,
(ii) Its touching upon the problem of a pious householder's duties,
(iii) Its frequent employment of technical concepts.
Let these be considered one by one.

I

In the history of Jaina canon the earliest age – the age of Ācārāṅga I, Sūtrakṛtāṅga I, Uttarādhyayana, Daśavaiālika – can perhaps be called an age of poetic composition, the subsequent age, an age of prose-composition. True, in Ācārāṅga I there occurs a good amount of prose-composition but it is mostly of the form of commendation on verse-passages (while the remaining three texts of the age contain no prose-part worth the name); on the contrary, in the texts written in the age of prose-composition verse-passages occur extremely seldom (and in most cases these passages are composed in *Āryā*—which again is an indication of their relatively late character). However, the mere fact that a canonical text is written in prose would not enable one to make out as to how late it actually is, for the 'age of prose-composition' covers a pretty long period. For example, Sūtrakṛtāṅga II is overwhelmingly a prose-composition, only two of its chapters being in verse (chapter V in *Anuṣṭubh*, chapter VI in *Triṣṭubh*): but this only means that it does not belong to the earlier age witnessed by Jaina canon.

II

The canonical texts belonging to the earliest age exhibit no acquaintance with the problem of a pious householder's duties, their chief preoccupation being what a monk has or has not to do. Even Sūtrakṛtāṅga II contains no systematic exposition of a pious householder's duties, but in two contexts it comes out with assertions which definitely prove that by the time of its composition the concept of a pious householder has emerged on the thought-horizon of the Jaina theoreticians. Thus the chief subject-matter of chapter VII is an opponent taking exception to the standard formulation of a particular vow taken by a pious householder –viz. *the vow to desist* from causing injury to the mobile type of living beings, *it being impossible*

for a householder to desist also from causing injury to the static type of living beings. The details of the opponent's argument and the Jaina's counter-argument need not detain us but the noteworthy thing is that in the course of argumentation there are here incidentally mentioned three increasing mild grades of a pious householder's performance–viz.

(i) that which includes the observance of the regular monthly fast called *pauṣadha*, the desistence from the five basic vices (violence, falsehood etc.) in their gross form, the reduction of one's life–requirements, the fasting unto death (p.410);

(ii) that which includes only the fasting unto death (p.411):

(iii) that which includes the performance of the daily short service called *sāmāyika*, and the desistence from causing injury to the living beings residing within a voluntarily fixed geographical limit (p.417).

[Also noteworthy is the circumstance that all the items occurring here somehow make their appearance in the classical Jaina concept of the twelve duties of a pious householder with fasting unto death as the thirteenth.]

The one context in which a pious householder's performance receives attention occurs in chapter II dealing with 13 *kriyās* – of which twelve are evil acts of various sorts while the thirteenth is the ideal life-activity of a monk. Instances of the twelve evil acts are mostly drawn from a householder's life-routine but that is nothing new; for the tradition of doing so was as old as Ācārāṅga I, Sūtrakṛtāṅga I etc. Noteworthy is a long discussion which occurs when all the 13 *kriyās* have been described and which twice develops three interrelated concepts, –viz. 'life of utter impioushood', 'life of full pioushood', 'life of intermediate pioushood,' (pp. 294 etc.; pp. 309 etc.). Here in the second treatment the instance of the 'life of intermediate pioushood' is yielded by a pious householder's life-routine (p.325). In this context emphasis is laid on (i) a pious householder having firm faith in the Jaina scripture, (ii) his liberal offering of gifts to the monks, (iii) his adopting various restraints and observing the *pauṣadha*–fast, (iv) his fasting unto death. [Here there also occurs in the second place an item speaking of just the *pauṣatha*–fasts in the manner of those passages from chapter VII. It was this item which was enlarged to yield the present item (iii) and the occurrence of both in our passage is anomalous. One of them must be an interpolation.]

These incidental references to pious householder's performance are in striking contrast to the practice of the oldest Jaina texts where such a performance was hardly ever spoken of; (even in his capacity as the donor

of gifts to the monks a householder was not there considered worthy of commendation).

III

Most important conclusion can be drawn from the fact that Sūtrakṛtāṅga II frequently employs such technical concepts as are known to the latter-day Jaina authors. Of course, the text is a miscellaneous collection of seven discussions, of which each is itself more or less miscellaneous; moreover, each of these discussions betrays in a smaller or greater measure features that are characteristic of the earliest Jaina texts Ācārāṅga I, Sūtrakṛtâṅga I etc. This, however, only means that Sūtrakṛtāṅga II is a relatively late text but not a very late text, and it should be advisable to make a special study of its different chapters from this standpoint :

Chapter I

Chapter I begins with an allegory and develops by way of elucidating its purport which consists in refuting four heretical doctrines and presenting forth the Jaina position in contrast to them all. These four doctrines respectively uphold

(i) that soul is identical with body,

(ii) that the five physical elements earth, water, fire etc. are alone real,

(iii) that the whole universe is somehow a transformation of man (-the Supreme Man --i.e. God)

(iv) that everything in this world is predetermined fatally.

The tradition of refuting these four doctrines was somewhat old, for they are some among the rival doctrines refuted in Sūtrakṛtāṅga I (1.1). However, neither there nor here are ontological considerations offered against any of these doctrines - not even against the first three which are obviously ontological in their essence; for in both places what has been urged against each and every one of these is that on accepting it an ethically upright life becomes an impossibility. Again, the Jaina position as presented in the two texts in question (in Sūtrakṛtāṅga I before the rival doctrines have been considered, in Sūtrakṛtāṅga II after that) is exclusively concerned with ethical matters. Even so, it has to be noted that the presentation of the rival doctrines as well as that of the Jaina position are considered more lucid and elaborate in Sūtrakṛtāṅga II than in Sūtrakṛtāṅga I. As for the tradition of considering the rival doctrines it was not carried forward in the later canonical texts and so no technical concepts grew up in connection with it, and the two technical concepts that incidentally occur in this part of Sūtrakṛtāṅga II have both something anomalous about them.

For the second rival is made to say 'these five physical elements are all the *astikāyas* that there are ' (p. 251) while the third is made to say 'false are the 12 Aṅga-texts of the Jainas–i. e. Ācārāṅga,, Sūtrakṛtāṅga up to Dṛṣṭivāda' (p.254); the first statement would suggest that *astikāya* is not a Jaina technical concept but a general concept meaning 'fundamental verity', the second in view of its containing a self–reference to Sūtrakṛtāṅga must be a later interpolation. As for the tradition of presenting the Jaina position on ethical matters it was certainly carried forward in the later canonical texts and a large number of technical concepts grew up in connection with it, but the noteworthy thing is that the Sūtrakṛtāṅga II version of it essentially remains confined to the circle of ideas already developed in the old texts like Ācāraṅga I and Sūtrakṛtāṅga I. Even so, one might take note of the following technical concepts which incidentally make their appearance here: *jīva* and *ajīva* (p. 264), the five vows (p.269), the eighteen evil acts (where, however, the first five items are not the five vows violated but the five sense–desires) (p 270), *Karmanirjarā* (p. 274).

Chapter II

The subject–matter of chapter II are 13 *kriyās*, of which 12 are certain evil acts, the thirteenth the ideal conduct of a monk. The later Jaina authors have classified *kriyās* in various manners but they always understand by it an evil act. In the present chapter too the thirteenth *kriyā* seems to be a later interpolation, for the treatment begins by saying, 'Here begins consideration of evil acts' (p.277 a). In any case, no later canonical text has carried forward the practice of classifying *kriyās* into 12 types as here, and so no technical concepts have grown up in connection with it. Of these twelve *kriyās* the first five are five special cases of violence, the sixth 'falsehood', the seventh 'accepting what has not been donated', the eighth 'the four *kaṣāyas* taken collectively', the nineth to twelfth 'the four *kaṣāyas* taken individually' ;(the term '*kaṣāya*' is not employed here but the qualifying adjective '*adhyātma*' used in connection with the item 8 had been once used by Sūtrakṛtāṅga I (6. 26) to characterize the four evil acts elsewhere called *kaṣāya*). As for the thirteenth *kriyā* called *īryāpathikī*, it is a highly technical concept and its description here too is full of technicality; in addition, here there are enumerated the *guptis* and *samitis* –but the list of *samitis* deviates from its later standard version. As was earlier noted in another connection, the account of 13 *kriyās* is followed by a long digression which twice elaborates three concepts that might be called 'life of utter impioushood', 'life of full pioushood', 'life of intermediate pioushood'. The depiction of the ideal monastic life undertaken in this connection follows that of chapter I and that occurring in connection with the account of *īryāpathikī kriyā*; also noteworthy are the account of hell (p.

316) and that of heaven (p. 323) which appear incidentally and are close to the corresponding standard accounts of later times.

Chapter III

It undertakes the treatment of a topic that was highly technicalized in later times (perhaps, first of all in Prajñāpanā) –viz. 'how the various types of living beings assimilate their nourishment'. A comparative estimate of the two versions reveals that the present one on the whole moves within the circle of ideas that are understandably on a popular, non-technical level. Thus here we are told how plants, men and animals assimilate their nourishment. This account is as much notable for its classification of the types of living beings in question (that of plants being elaborate in the extreme and rather unique, that of men and animals brief and standing pretty close to its later standard version) as for its treatment of the topic of nourishment, but the latter is certainly free from all technicalities. The chapter closes with a summary statement to the effect that there are also living beings of the form of earth, water, fire and air and that they receive their nourishment from the bodies where they take their seats (p. 352); this whole concept is a typical technicality of the Jainas but the noteworhy thing is that the present chapter of Sūtrakṛtāṅga II does not make much of it.

Chapter IV

Here an interesting aspect of a Jaina ethical concept is subjected to examination. As a thesis it has been laid down that one who has not renounced evil acts is an evil-doer even at the time when one is not undertaking an acting through body, speech or mind (p. 356). On cross-examination the explanation is forthcoming that such a one is disposed to act in an evil manner even when he is not actually acting thus and that it is this his disposition which makes him an evil-doer (pp. 357–61). But then arises a different sort of difficulty. For only such a being can be possibly guilty of evil-doing who can distinguish between good and evil, but according to the Jainas there are also living beings of the form of earth, water, fire, air, plants – as also tiny insects – which can make no such distinction and the question is how the present thesis is to be applied to the living beings such as these. The answer forthcoming is that such living beings are to be deemed evil-doers simply in view of the fact that they have not positively renounced evil acts (pp. 362–65). The technical character of the latter question-and-answer is obvious, but it is indicative of a germine apprehension that must have exercised the mind of the Jaina theoretician at an earliest stage; (the question has been often asked and answered in an essentially similar fashion also in Bhagavatīsūtra which is a good repository of fairly old pieces of Jaina theoretical speculation).

Chapter V

This chapter– a verse-composition in *Anuṣṭabh* metre – begins with certain observations, often obscure, where one is enjoined to avoid two extreme positions that can possibly be taken in relation to the topics under consideration. This seems to be an early harbinger of the doctrine of *anekāntavāda* (= non-extremism) so characteristic of later Jainism. Then follows another series of observations where one is enjoined to avoid disbelief in certain concepts – almost always mentioned couplewise. A good number of these concepts are so many technical concepts of later Jainism but the most important of them are those yielded by the following five couples : *jīva-ajīva* (v. 13), *bandha-mokṣa* (v. 15) *puṇya-pāpa* (v. 16.) *āsrava-saṃvara* (v.16), *vedana-nirjarā* (v. 17). For these include the famous 9 *tattvas* of later Jainism and the question arises as to why the tenth was discarded in later times. A comparative study of the two lists suggests that the two are meant to serve two different – though related – purposes. Thus the above list of couples enumerates all that is relevant for an understanding of the doctrine of *karma*; and here it is directly useful to announce that *nirjarā* takes place through *vedana*. On the other hand, the list of nine *tattvas* enumerates all that is relevant for an understanding of the problem of *bandha* and *mokṣa*; here even if it is directly useful to announce that *mokṣa* takes place through *nirjārā*, it is not directly useful to announce that *nirjarā* takes place through *vedana*.

Chapter VI

This chapter—also a verse-composition though in *Triṣṭubh* metre—offers an account of the polemics which a Jaina successively holds with several of his rivals. Generally speaking, the conversation is conducted on a popular level and technicalities are avoided almost always. Thus the first rival levels certain charges against the personal conduct of Mahāvīra–e.g. (i) that he was a solitary wonderer before but addresses crowds now (v. 1), (ii) that for the fear of being defeated in debate he avoids places where competent disputants are to be found (v. 15), (iii) that in the manner of a shrewd businessman he gathers company with a view to earning private profit (v. 19). These charges the Jainas rebuke by saying (i) that Mahāvīra is as much self-controlled now as he was before and this is what matters, (ii) that he is afraid not even of kings but he avoids places where persons loose in faith and conduct are to be found, (iii) that he is after spiritual gains no doubt but it is unfair to compare him with the businessmen who indulge in all sorts of sins. The remaining rivals propound certain positions to which the Jaina takes exception. [Even the first rival had

propounded a position to the effect that there is no harm if a monk enjoys the drinking of cold water, a diet of green seeds, a woman—to which the Jaina replied that in that case the monk would be no better than a householder (vv. 9–10).] Thus the second rival maintains (i) that in case one mistakes an inanimate body to be animate and hits it one commits a sin while in case one mistakes an animate to be inanimate and hits it he commits no sin (vv. 26–27), and (ii) that it is meritorious to invite and feed 2000 competent monks a day (v. 29). To this the Jaina answers (i) that the mistakes here spoken of are difficult to conceive while one commits a sin only in case one hits an animate body, and (ii) that in case a monk accepts invitation for a feast he is participant in all the sins that are incurred when preparations for such a feast are made. Similarly, the third rival maintains that it is meritorious to invite and feed 2000 competent Brahmins a day (v. 43). To this the Jaina answers that one who invites for meals the Brahmins so full of greed rather goes to hell. The fourth rival expresses argument with the Jaina position on condut but goes on to assert that one Supreme person is equally present in all the beings of the universe (vv. 46–47). To this the Jaina replies that on accepting this assertion it should be impossible to distinguish one being from another. The fifth rival maintains that it is proper to kill one elephant a year and feed oneself on its meat, thus avoiding injury to other living beings (v. 53). To this the Jaina replies that this type of behaviour too after all involves violence and so is sinful. In the course of none of these polemics a question has been raised that is of special relevance for the growth of any technical concept, and it is probable that what we are here having before us is an old piece of poetic composition.

Chapter VII

The chief subject-matter of this chapter is the Jaina's reply to an objection that is essentially based on some sort of hair-splitting. Thus a Jaina pious householder is supposed to take a vow to the effect that he would desist from causing injury to the mobile type of living beings, it being impossible for him also to desist from causing injury to the static type of living beings. Against this position it is objected that since a living being that belongs to the static type in this birth could well have belonged to the mobile type in an earlier birth a Jaina pious householder's vow should be to the effect that he would desist from causing injury to the living beings which *now* belong to the mobile type (pp. 396–98). The crux of the Jaina's answer to this objection lies in the analogy of a monk who has gone back to the life of a householder. Thus just as so many *things* that could be said of a person when he was a monk cannot be *said* of him when he is again a householder similarly a being that belonged to the

mobile type in an earlier birth cannot be said to belong to the mobile type in the present birth when it actually belongs to the static type (p. 404). Hence it is that the phrase 'not to injure beings which belong to the mobile type' is absolutely equivalent to the phrase 'not to injure beings which now belong to the mobile type'. In the course of argumentation the life of a pious householder is incidentally described employing good many concepts that are technical; (we have already taken note of these concepts in another connection). An ontologial thesis of some interest is also laid down—viz. that even if any being belonging to the mobile type can be next born as belonging to the static type and vice versa, it will never happen that all the beings of the universe belong to the mobile type or that all of men belong to the static type (p. 422).

This cursory review of the contents of Sūtrakṛtāṅga II should enable one to make a proper assessment of its historical value.

CHAPTER IV

THE FOUR OLD CHEDASŪTRAS

Certain texts belonging to the Jaina canon are designated Chedasūtras. The reason for the designation is not quite clear but maybe it has something to do with the circumstance that these texts deal with the problems of monastic discipline while *'cheda'* is the name of a typical punishment possibly awarded to an erring Jaina monk. In any case, the problems of monastic discipline were bound to attract the attention of Jaina theoreticians and it is in Chedasūtras that these problems have been taken up by them for an elaborate consideration. For within the fold of the monastic religious sects like Buddhism and Jainism the monk occupied the same position as the Brahmin did within the fold of Brahmanism—that is to say, the position of spiritual leadership. As a result, the question as to what an ideal monk should or should not do looms largely in the discussions of social problems undertaken by the Buddhist and Jaina theoreticians just as the question as to what an ideal Brahmin should not do does in those undertaken by the Brahmin theoreticians. The topic as pursued in the Jaina Chedasūtras deserves an independent investigation. [Four Chedasūtras–viz. Daśā, Kalpa, Vyavahāra and Niśitha–are treated as the oldest and most authoritative by the Jaina tradition; they are certainly the oldest and the following remarks mostly refer to them.]

So far as the style of composition is concerned Daśā belongs to one category and the remaining three Chedasūtras to another. Thus in the latter the injunctions and prohibitions obligatory on a monk are explicitly laid down and that is their exclusive subject-matter. Daśā is divided into 10 chapters each pursuing its own course. So let Daśā be disposed of first of all. Here chapter I barely enumerates – under the title *asamādhisthāna* (= case of perturbation) – 20 vices partly vitiating the conduct of a monk, chapter II similarly enumerates – under the title *śavala* (=blemish) – 21 such vices, chapter III similarly enumerates – under the title *āśātanā* (=discesteem – 33 vices which are all so many cases of impertinent behaviour on the part of a disciple in relation to his preceptor. Four things are particularly noteworthy about these chapters—viz.

(i) the fact that they barely enumerate certain qualities of human character.

(ii) the fact that all these qualities are blameworthy.

(iii) the fact that they are possible only in a monk.

(iv) the fact that the number of qualities is found increased as one proceeds from chapter to chapter.

In the next four chapters there are enumerated certain praiseworthy qualities of human character and here too the number of them is found increased as one proceeds from chapter to chapter; the points of contrast are the following two:

(i) the fact that to some extent or other all these chapters deal with the qualities in question going beyand bare enumeration,

(ii) the fact that one of these chapters takes up qualities that are possible only in a householder.

To put it explicitly:

(i) Chapter IV considers - under the title *gaṇi-sampat* (= meritorious qualification of a group-leader)- eight qualities possibly possessed by a monk occupying the part of group-leader (=*gaṇin*).

(ii) Chapter V considers - under the title *citta-samādhisthāna* (=case of mental equanimity)—10 super-ordinary capacities possibly possessed by a worthy monk.

(iii) Chapter VI considers - under the title *upāsaka-pratimā*(=behaviour-pattern of a pious householder)—the 11 stages gradually traversing which a householder makes spiritual progress.

(iv) Chapter VII coniders—under the title *bhikṣu-pratimā* (= behaviour--pattern of a monk) — 12 cases of an increasingly high mode of life which a persevering monk might pursue for the period specific for each case.

The last three chapters are unlike each other and unlike the earlier seven. Thus

(i) Chapter VIII contains three independent parts offering

(a) a biography of the 24 *Tīrthaṅkaras* -detailed and real in the case of Mahāvīra, brief and stereotyped in that of the rest

(b) a chronologically arranged list of the post-Mahāvīra church-leaders

(c) the rules to be followed by the monks stationing during rainy season

(ii) Chapter IX describes —under the title *mohanīya-sthāna* (= case of deluded behaviour)—some 30 items of blameworthy social conduct—possible in the case of a monk, a householder or both

(iii) Chapter X describes - under the title *ājāti-sthāna* (=case of future birth) -nine cases of the desire for an increasingly auspicious

future birth resulting in a corresponding future birth—the tenth case being that of a desire for no future birth resulting in *mokṣa*.

Thus strictly speaking, Daśā is found to touch upon the problems of monastic discipline only in its chapters I, II, III, IV, VII and VIII (iii). Of these too, only chapters VII and VIII (iii) adopt a style of composition that is in line with that of the other Chedasūtras while the rest are essentially of the form of a cataloguing of cardinal points done for the benefit of the beginner. As a matter of fact, it can easily be seen that here chapters I -III have drawn inspiration from Uttarādhyayana chapter XVII which is of the form of an elementary popular exposition of the qualities of a bad monk; what is peculiar to these chapters is the attribution of a fixed number to the concerned sets of qualities and it is as thus enumerated that these sets became familiar to the later generations who were not interested in the question of their historical origins. With a view to better appreciating the point it is necessary to take special note of the style of composition characteristic of the three Chedasūtras Kalpa, Vyavahāra and Niśitha.

In connection with various problems faced by a monk in the course of his everyday career injunctions and prohibitions have been laid down in Kalpa, Vyavahāra and Niśitha. Of these Niśitha takes within its purview a most comprehensive mass of problems - which means that it takes within its purview the problems of a primary importance as well as those of a secondary importance; as contrasted to it, Kalpa and Vyavahāra take up only such problems as are considered by them to be of a primary importance. Then there is another point of contrast between Niśitha on the one hand and Kalpa and Vyavahāra on the other. Thus Niśitha is of the form of a huge compilation of prohibitions whose non-observance on the part of a monk results in his incurring a punishment of one of the four types that might be called

(i) heavy one-month exclusion

(ii) light one-month exclusion

(iii) heavy four-month exclusion

(iv) light four-month exclusion

The prohibitions related to the first type of punishment are enumerated in chapter I, those related to the second type in chapters II-V, those related to the third type in chapters VI-XI, those related to the fourth type in chapters XII-XIX; (chapter XX is concerned with certain general problems arising in connection with the award of punishment—particularly the problem of adding a new punishment to the running one.) The procedure of Kalpa and

Vyavahāra is rather different. For these texts indiscriminately lay down a series of injunctions and prohibitions while in a relatively few cases also mentioning as to what punishment is to be awarded to one who fails to observe the concerned injunction or prohibition. At the same time a certain difference is to be observed between the material collected in Kalpa and that collected in Vyavahāra. Thus Kalpa mostly takes up problems that a monk faces in connection with his dealing with society at large – that is to say, problems arising in connection with his moving about, his begging for alms, and the like; on the other hand, Vyavahāra mostly takes up problems that a monk faces in connection with his dealing with his fellow monks—that is to say, problems arising in connection with settling the question of status within the church hierarchy, those arising in connection with the award of punishment to an erring monk, and the like. Of course, there are obvious cases of overlapping where material characteristic of Kalpa has found place in Vyavahāra or vice versa; but the very fact that a broad subjectwise differentiation of the material contained in these two texts is possible is something noteworthy. In this connection Schubring has applied a formal criterion to distinguish the material characteristic of Kalpa from that characteristic of Vyavahāra. Thus in his introduction to his edition of Vyavahāra und Niśitha (published in 1918, pp. 5-6) he noted that the passages characteristic of Kalpa begins with words where the Jaina monk is referred to as '*nirgrantha*' while those characteristic of Vyavahāra begins with words where he is referred to as '*bhikṣu*'; the former passages he called '*nirgrantha-sūtras*', the latter '*bhikṣu-sūtras*' and it was his contention that the original Kalpa exclusively consisted of the former, the original Vyavahāra exclusively consisted of the latter. [Schubring also speaks of certain other classes of passages – e. g. those which he calls '*śramaṇa nirgrantha-sūtras*' – but let us ignore them for the present.] Then in his introduction to his work on Daśā, Vyavahāra and Niśitha (published in 1966, pp. 2-3) he has further argued that there was an orlginal mass of *nirgrantha-sūtras* composed at a certain place-and-time out of which the presently available *nigrantha-sūtras* have been selected and, similarly, there was an original mass of *bhikṣu-sūtras* composed at a certain place-and-time out of which the presently available *bhikṣu-sūtras* have been selected. All this is apparently marked by much brilliant insight, but perhaps it might be possible to somewhat simplify and somewhat modify the great scholar's thesis. It should certainly be nobody's position that some one author wrote out either Kalpa or Vyavahāra; the two texts are too much unsystematic for that and the conclusion is legitimate that they are of the form of a compilation of certain pre-existing passages composed by different authors at different places and different times. But the impression need not be created that while making compila-

tion deliberate omission was made of passages that were equally available and were deemed equally authoritative. That however is a minor difficulty. A major difficulty with Schubring's thesis is that it does not seem to be impossible that one and the same author should compose a *nirgrantha-sūtra* and also a *bhikṣu-sūtra*. What seems to have happened is that in a passage where the word 'monk' was understood to mean an ideal monk the employment of the honorific epithet '*nirgrantha*' was considered proper but that in a passage where it was understood to mean a monk falling short of the ideal the employment of the neutral epithet *bhikṣu* was considered proper; e.g, in the injunction 'a monk should not accept a raw palm-fruit as alms' (Kalpa 1.1) the word 'monk' means an ideal monk and so is translatable as '*nirgrantha*', but in the injunction 'a monk who has quarelled with his fellow-monks should bury the hatchet' (Kalpa 1. 35) it means a monk falling short of the ideal and so should better be translated as *bhikṣu*.

Perhaps, the process of the growth of the Chedasūtras has to be envisaged somewhat as follows. In the early post-Mahāvīra period there grew up in the different parts of Eastern India different Jaina monastic centres. Now the monks belonging to these different centres must have come to encounter all sorts of disciplinary problems – such as related to their dealing with society at large as also such as related to their dealing with one another. In connection with all these problems rulings must have been given by those occupying the position of leadership in the monastic centres in question. And it was the most important of these rulings that were later on compiled in the form of Kalpa and Vyavahāra—the former mainly governing those related to a monk's dealing with society at large, the latter those related to his dealing with his fellow-monks. Somewhat still later another such compilation was made which also contained rulings related to the questions of a relatively secondary importance; another speciality of this compilation was that in it the rulings whose violation entailed the same punisment were located at one place. It is this compilation that is our present-day Niśītha. Thus emerged, Niśītha must have proved to be an extremely handy guide to the Jaina church functionaries – first because it covered a huge number of likely contingencies, secondly because in the case of each and every ruling it prescribed due punishment for the violators. Hence it was that in certain rulings which were later interpolated in Vyavahāra—they are later interpolations because they contain a reference to Vyavahāra itself—it was held out that a church functionary must be conversant with Niśītha at least (3.3) while in case he had also mastered Kalpa and Vyavahāra he would be entitled to a suitably high post (3.5). The intriguing thing about these rulings is that they mention Niśītha by the title Ācāraprakalpa and

Schubring has even suggested (DC, p.3) that here Ācāraprakalpa should be equated not with Niśītha but with Ācārāṅga II which too is a monastic disciplinary text. This suggestion is based on the consideration that otherwise one will have to concede that the Vyavahāra rulings in question are silent over an important text like Ācārāṅga II. The merit of Schubring's position is that it makes possible the identification of Ācāraprakalpa with a text whose title contains the word 'Ācāra', but otherwise it has its own weakness. For elsewhere (VN, p.9) he has himself argued that Ācārāṅga II in view of its better systematization should be taken to be a text composed later than Niśītha – so that if it be anomalous that the Vyavahāra rulings in question maintain silence over Ācārāṅga II which is a relatively later disciplinary text then it should be still more anomalous that they maintain silence over Niśītha which is a relatively early disciplinary text. Even so, one cannot help wondering why these rulings do not mention Niśītha by the title under which it was known to all later generations. Maybe the text originally called Ācāraprakalpa was later called Niśītha just as the text originally called Vyākayāprajñapti was later called Bhagavatī.

In the case of a Chedasūtra it is also necessary to know as to what sort of church organization it envisages. The earliest Jaina (as well as Buddhist) texts definitely give the impression that their ideal of monastic life was a monk wandering all alone. In the earliest stage of the evolution of the monastic institution – a stage reflected in the texts in question –that should also be natural. But the logic of the situation also demanded that newly ordained monk should have received due instruction at the feet of an experienced teacher who too must have a monk. So what would happen was that only the experienced monks wandered about along with an entourage – that is, in the company of fresh disciples who would take to lonely wandering as soon as their education was over. This much about the earliest stage characterizing the evolution of the monastic institution. As for the concerned latest stage we find it reflected in the commentarial literature devoted to the Chedasūtras; therefrom we learn that by that time the usual practice was for the monks to wander about in the form of a monastic unit called *gaccha* and equipped with a well-ordered administrative staff.

Our Chedasūtras seem to reflect a stage of evolution that is midway between that earliest one and this latest one. In these texts the usual monastic unit is *gaṇa* equipped with a well-ordered administrative staff – this like the latter-day *gaccha*; but a *gaṇa* would not move about in the form of a unit – this unlike the latter-day *gaccha*. For only thus can be understood the practices like *saṃbhoga* (=joint taking of meals) [Kalpa 4.4, Vyav.7.4], *saṃvāsa* (= joint residence) [Kalpa 4.4, Vyav.7.4]

abhiniṣadyā (= joint study) [Vyav.1,21], *abhiniśithikā* (=joint nightly rest) [Vyav. 1.21], *abhinicāra* (=joint wandering about) [Vyav. 4.19] which these texts speak of and for which the concerned group of monks had to seek special permission from the church superiors. Certainly, if it was only used for a *gaṇa* to wander about in the form of a unit such seeking of special permission would have been almost pointless. Of course, the practice in question foreshadowed a latter-day church unit like *gaccha*. Particularly striking in this connection seems to have been the practice of *saṃbhoga* which soon extended much beyond a mere joint taking of meals; for epigraphic evidences are available to the effect that at a certain historical period the monks would refer not only to their appropriate *gaṇa* but also to their appropriate *saṃbhoga* as a sub-unit of the *gaṇa*. [Even the Chedasūtras seem to imply that *saṃbhoga* was a relatively steady church unit. The very frequency of references to it might lead one to think so.] It has nevertheless to be noted that in the commentarial literature devoted to the Chedasūtras the graded hierarchy of church units consists of four members-viz. *gaccha, kula, gaṇa, saṁgha*, where *gaccha* constitutes the lowest unit and *saṅgha* the highest; that is to say *saṃbhoga* as a definite church unit seems to have become obsolete in later times. So in later times *gaccha* was the church unit functioning on a day-to-day basis while *kula, gaṇa* and *saṁgha* were higher standing units taken into reckoning for certain special purposes. And even though the Chedasūtras do not posit so fixed a church unit as *gaccha* functioning on a day-to-day basis they do exhibit a marked tendency to view as a rather odd phenomenon the practice of lonely wandering on the part of a monk; hence their so meagre references to such a practice (e. g. Vyav. 1. 25).

In this connection certain rulings of Vyavahāra are particularly instructive. For here it is laid down that in a quite big town (lit. a town with many walls and many gateways) even an experienced and well-instructed monk should not stay alone (6.6) while in a modestly big town (lit. a town with one wall and one gateway) only that monk might stay alone who is experienced and well-instructed (6.7); still, it is here laid down that even a number of monks with meagre learning might not stay together in a town—of any description – unless they are accompanied by someone who is well-versed in Ācāra-prakalpa (6. 4–5). So it seems that the time-honoured practice of lonely wandering was proving to be out of time with the growing sophistication of the country's social life. It is equally remarkable that the old formula which calls upon a monk to stay for not more than one night in a village and for not more than five nights in a town is nowhere endorsed in the Chedasūtra. They rather came out with the injunction that a monk might stay for one month in a moderately big town (lit. a town without an outside suburb) and for two months in a quite big town; (the period is

doubted in the case of a nun) [Kalpa 1.6–9] (The later commentators of the Chedasūtras understood this to mean that a monk should not stay for less than one month in a moderately big town and for less than two months in a quite big town, an understanding which should enable one to appreciate the direction in which the Jaina theoretician's mind was moving from the oldest days down to the latest.)

The treatment of another problem in Chedasūtra also throws some light on an aspect of the evolution of Jaina thought. This is the problem of *prāyaścitta* or atonement. The problem could not assume a very great importance in the days when a monk would wander about all alone. Not that such a monk was not expected to abide by the rules that were presribed for him by his school, but the only thing that he could do in case he happened to violate such a rule was to see to it that the mistake was not repeated; the task could well have proved arduous enough but this is where matters would end. The things became different when a monk would move about under the spiritual supervision of a gaṇa–leadership; for now in case he happened to violate some rule of conduct he would also be awarded due punishment by this leadership. Two types of punishment were designed by the Jaina theoreticians–one was called '*cheda*' and consisted in an appropriate reduction in the offender's seniority among the church membership, the other was called '*parihāra*' and consisted in the offender being excluded from the rest of the church membership and made to undertake appropriate penances. In the case of very few of their rulings do Kalpa and Vyavahāra make an explicit mention of the atonement due for violation but when they do so their prescription is mostly to the effect that the offender is to be punished either by way of *cheda* or by way of *parihāra*; in several cases (mosty occuring in Kalpa) this prescription is to the effect that the offender is to be punished by way of '*anudghātima parihāra* running for four months', in rare cases it is to the effect that he is to be punished by way of '*udghātima parihāra* running for four months'. What *anudghātima* and *udghātima* mean is explained nowhere though Kalpa 4.1 says about three particular offences that they are of the nature of *anudghātima*. About three other offences Kalpa 4.2 says that they are of the nature of *pārāñcika*, while about three others Kalpa 4.3 says that they are of the nature *anavasthāpya*. In Vyavahāra 2.18-23 things are said about *anavasthāpya* and *pārāmcika* and from them we gather that one undergoing these types of punishment is compelled to lead the life of a householder before he is allowed re-entry in the *gaṇa* but that he might be relived of this obligation by the *gaṇa* concerned, The later commentators of Chedasūtras often speak as if the three offences enumerated in Kalpa 4.2 are the

only cases of *pārāñcika* while the three enumerated in Kalpa 4.3 the only cases of *anavasthāpya* but even they cannot say that the three offences enumerated in Kalpa 4. 1 are the only cases of *anudghātima* for so many other cases of *anudghātima* are cited in Kalpa and Vyavahāra themselves. What is still more noteworthy, Niśītha speaks as if *parihāra* is the only type of punishment; for the total mass of offences catalogued here are distributed among the following four types of punishment:

(i) *anudghātimaparihāra* running for one month
(ii) *udghātimaparihāra* " "
(iii) *anudghātimaparihāra* " four months
(iv) *udghātimaparihāra* " "

The later commentators of Chedasūtras employ the word *guru* for *anudghātima* and *laghu* for *uudghātima* and they also speak of a *parihāra* running for six months; besides they posit a new type of punishment called *mūla* which consists in making a monk start his monastic career de novo. (However *mūla* can easily be treated as an extreme case of *cheda,* for a monk starting his monastic career de novo is equivalent to his seniority being reduced to the minimum.) Thus according to these later commentators there are ten atonement-types in all and as follows :

(1) *laghuparihāra* running for one month
(2) *guruparihāra* " "
(3) *laghuparihāra* " four months
(4) *guruparihāra* " "
(5) *laghuparihāra* " six months
(6) *guruparihāra* " "
(7) *cheda*
(8) *mūla*
(9) *anavasthāpya*
(10) *pārāñcika*

The list merits comparison with that formulated in Jītakalpa, a 7th century work by Jinabhadra specially devoted to the problem of atonement and often counted among Chedasūtras. Here too the total number of atonement -types is ten but as follows :

(1) *ālocana*
(2) *pratikramaṇa*
(3) *ubhaya*
(4) *viveka*
(5) *vyutsarga*
(6) *tapa*

(7) *cheda*
(8) *mūla*
(9) *anavasthāpya*
(10) *pārāñcika*

As can be seen, the items 4-6 of this list are not recognized as such in the Chedasūtra tradition, but the case is somewhat different for the first three items. For even Kalpa and Vyavahāra speak of a set of activities that are supposed to precede the act of underaking atonement. Kalpa 4.25 gives it in full and its first two items are *ālocana* and *pratikramaṇa* which roughly mean 'repeating' and 'repenting' respectively; as for its remaining items their net meaning might be taken to be 'making a resolve not to repeat the offence concerned'. So the items 1 and 2 of the Jitakalpa list are somehow recognized in the Chedasūtra trardition while the third item of this list is a mere combination of the first two and is virtually redundant (for a case of *pratikramaṇa* must necesssarily be a case of both *ālocana* and *pratikramaṇa*). Even so, the discrepancy obtaining on this question between the Chedasūtra tradition and Jītakalpa is remarkable. (The Jitakalpa list also somewhat differs from the corresponding list given in Tattvārthasūtra 9. 22. The first seven items are common to both lists but in place of the last three of the four the latter has two - viz. *parihāra* and *upasthāpana*.) It seems that several independent groups of Jaina theoreticians were working on the problem of atonement and that they felt no particular need to make their findings tally with one another. In his introduction to his edition of Kalpasūtra (published in 1905, pp. 12–15) Schubring explains the 10 items of the Jitakalpa list and concludes his enquiry by asking as to what use is made of these items by the Cheda-texts. His answer to his own question amounts to saying: 'Practically nil, virtually useless being the first five items – in particular, the items 3–5 which are mentioned never. The supposition might be ventured that this list has only a scholastic-schematic, and no practical significance.

Lastly, let us also enter into some details of the social problems taken up in Chedasūtras. As has already been noted, none of these texts presents its subject-matter in a systematic form – so that in each it is found that one and the same topic is treated over and over again. Even so, it should not be difficult to make out as to what questions are uppermost in the minds of authors of these texts. For example, it might legitimately be said that the most important question considered in these texts is as to what is the proper method for a monk to procure things needed by him—first of all food, then shelter, then clothes, and so on and so forth. As regards food four points have received much emphasis -viz. (1) that it should not have been provided by one who has also provided shelter (e: g. Kalpa 2. 13–28)

(2) that its preparation etc. do not involve injury to the living beings of any sort whatsoever (e. g. Kalpa 5. 11–12), (3) that it should not be taken during nighttime (e. g. Kalpa 5. 6–10), (4) that it should not have been provided by the king or any of his high officials; (the last point occurs only in Niśītha though prominently enough – e. g. in 9. 1–5). As regards shelter it is emphasized (e. g. in Kalpa 2. 1-10) that such a one is to be avoided as should somehow entangle in worldly affairs the monk residing there; (naturally, in this connection – e. g. in Kalpa 1.12-13, 22-24 – nuns are placed under heavier restrictions than monks). And as regards the rest of the requisites the cardinal injunction turns out to be (e. g. in Kalpa 3. 5-10, 15-16) that they should not be too much in quantity, too fine in quality; (it is a logical corollary to this that Niśītha–in 3. 16-66 etc. — condemns in so great details all attempts on the part of a monk to decorate himself). A general consideration which is always there in the background – and often enough also there in the foreground – is that the things offered to a monk should not have been procured by the doner specially for the sake of this monk; (it is a logical corollary to this consideration that these texts do not envisage the possibility of there being standing shelter houses specially meant for the residece of Jaina monks). The second most important question belonging to the sphere of monastic discipline considered in these texts relates to the duration etc. of a monk's wandering about and his stationing at one place. Some points pertaining to this question we have already touched upon in another connection. An interesting ruling occurs in Kalpa 1. 31 which calls upon a monk not to proceed beyond the land of Aryans, a land extended upto Aṅga-Magadha in east, upto Kauśāmbī in south, upto Sthūṇā in west, upto Kuṇāla in north; (thence follows an execption –in all probabity a later interpolation –which permits a monk to proceed to any land whatsoever where right cognition, faith and conduct flourish). Another interesting ruling occurs in Niśītha 9. 19 which calls upon a monk not to visit more than twice or thrice a month the following ten capital towns: Campā, Vārāṇasi, Śrāvasti, Sāketa, Kāmpilya, Kauśāmbi, Mithilā, Hastināpura, Rājagṛha. These two rulings incidentally give us an idea of the probable time when the material collected in Chedasūtas was composed; it was the time when the Jainas were yet confined to the areas covered by modern Bihar and U. P.–which means a fairly early time. Two more interesting rulings occur in Kalpa 1. 38 and 3. 34 the former calling upon a monk not to visit too frequently an area that is politically disturbed, the latter calling upon a monk to finish his begging-tour and return back without fail to his village or town of residence in case an army be encamped outside his village or town. The interpretation of all these rulings might be a matter of opinion but they are certainly indicative of a positive attitude—maybe an attitude of anxiety

—shown towards the political developments that were then taking place on the historical scene. [The detailed rules obligatory on a monk while stationing at one place for four months during rainy season are laid down in Daśā chapter VIII (iii).] Lastly, we might note a group of rulings which do not strictly belong to the sphere of monastic discipline—they rather belong to the sphere of general morals—but to which considerable importance is attached in Chedasūtras. These are rulings pertaining to the question of sexual misconduct; so many of them occur even in Kalpa—e. g. 4. 9–10, 5. 13–14—(where, again, nuns are placed under heavier restrictions than monks) but a truly large number of them do so in Niśītha (e.g. the whole chapters VI, VII, VIII).) The bearing of these rulings on the right maintenance of monastic discipline is only too obvious, for after all continence is one thing whose possession so sharply demarcates a monk from a householder. Closely related – because equally intended to counter the spirit of worldliness – are the detailed Niśītha prohibitions against a monk greedily attending to the pleasing spectacles (12. 17–29) and pleasing sounds (17. 135-38) of this or that sort.

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CHAPTER V

ĀCĀRĀṄGA II

Ācārāṅg II- in its chapters 1 and 2- treats the problems of monastic discipline in a considerably systematic and detailed fashion -this in contrast not only to the old Chedasūtras Kalpa and Vyavahāra which deal with these problems in a rather summary fashion but also to the relatively late Chedasūtra Niśitha whose treatment of these problems though detailed is yet unsystematic. As a matter of fact, in spite of much material being common to both Niśitha and Ācārāṅga II the latter is to be regarded as a relatively late composition precisely in view of its relatively systematic form. (The cases are not rare where more than one canonical text contain the same material and the question of chronological relationship between them has to be settled by applying all sorts of criteria.) From this standpoint it should be advisable to examine in some details the contents of the chapters in question of Ācārānga II.

Here chapter one is divided into seven sections, each further divided into sub-sections; this as follows :-

1. Section 1 (with 11 subsections) takes up the problem of procuring food (*piṇḍaiṣaṇā*)
2. Section 2 (with 3 subsections) takes up the problem of procuring shelter (*śayyaiṣaṇā*)
3. Section 3 (with 3 subsections) takes up the problem of moving about (*Īryā*)
4. Section 4 (with 2 subsections) takes up the problem of employment of speech (*bhāṣā*)
5. Section 5 (with 2 subsections) takes up the problem of procuring (clothes *vastraiṣaṇā*)
6. Section 6 (with 2 subsections) takes up the problem of procuring bowl (*pātraiṣaṇa*)
7. Section 7 (with 2 subsections) takes up the problem of procuring miscellaneous requirements available at a place (*avagrahaiṣaṇā*)

Similarly, chapter two is divided into seven sections and as follows :

1. Section 1 takes up the problem of procuring place for bodily posturing (*sthāna*)
2. Section 2 takes up the problem of procuring a place for study (*niśīthikā*)

3. Section 3 takes up the problem of evacuation and urination (*uccāraprasrava*)
4. Section 4 takes up the problem of greed for pleasing sounds (*śabda*)
5. Section 5 takes up the problem of greed for pleasing forms (*rūpa*)
6. Section 6 takes up the problem of one monk taking special care of another's body (*parakriyā*)
7. Section 7 takes up the problem of two monks taking special care of each other's body (*anyonyakriyā*)

It can easily be seen that chapter 1 becomes still more systematic if the last three sections are placed after the second. In any case, the first two and the last three sections consider a problem that was technicalized under the concept *eṣaṇāsamiti* (= caution as regards procuring alms), section 3 a problem that was technicalized under the concept *īryāsamiti* (=caution as regards moving about), section 4 a problem that was technicalized under the concept *bhāṣāsamiti* (=caution as regards employment of speech) (The fourth *samiti uccāraprasrāvasamiti* (=caution as regards evacuation and urination) is covered in chapter two, section 3, while the fifth *samiii*–viz. *ādāñanikṣepasamiti* (=caution as regards receiving and placing things) remains unrepresented in these chapters.] So logic demands that chapter 1 be studied by dividing it into 3 parts–viz.

(1) a part covering sections 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 and dealing with the problem of procuring alms

(2) a part covering 3 and dealing with the problem of moving about

(3) a part covering section 4 and dealing with the problem of employment of speech

[What special contribution to this important treatment of monastic disciplinary problems is made by chapter 2 can be considered in the sequel.]

I. The Problem of Procuring Alms

The Jaina monks — for that matter all monks in ancient India – depended for their 'livelihood' on alms collected from the public at large. It was therefore but natural for them to be very particular about seeing to it that the alms collected by them were proper in their make-up and were properly procured. Injunctions and prohibitions pertaining to the matter must have begun accumulating soon enough. Good many of them are found collected in Kalpa, some also in Vyavahāra, while Niśītha has them in a large number. But in these texts they are scattered in the midst of injunctions and prohibitions of all sorts. The merit of

Ācārāṅga II chapter 1 lies in its collecting at one place a fairly large number of injunctions and prohibitions pertaining to the question. The most important in this connection is section 1 (divided into 11 subsections which is devoted to the most important problem of food-collection; a closer perusal of it should give one a fairly clear idea of the type of scruples developed by the Jaina theoreticians in relation to this problem. Broadly speaking, these scruples fall in two categories-viz. (i) while those which seek to assure that no injury is inflicted on living beings while procuring or taking food and (ii) those which seek to assure that no greediness is exhibited while doing the same.

So far as the call for avoiding injury to the living beings was concerned it was no mere insistence on a vegetarian diet. For the Jainas were of the view that not only are the animals normally slaughtered for food are animate beings but so also are the ordinary particles of earth, water, fire, air and all growing as well as as freshly cut plants. In this background is to be understood the very first prohibition laid down in chater 1, section 1; it is to the effect that one should avoid food that is somehow got mixed up with 'live entities, moss, raw seeds, green vegetables, cold water, dust particles' (523-24). Likewise, there is next prohibited the eating inadequately fried vegetables, beans, rice and the like (525-28). Subsequently, it is said about a large variety of fruits, fibres, leaves and the like that they are not to be consumed in a raw state (601-14). Then there is a prohibition to the effect that things placed at a height and taken out from there should not be accepted as alms; the fear that in his endeavour to dole out such things the donor might slip and fall and might injure himself or the other living beings existing around (587). Similarly, there is a prohibition to the effect that things placed under a clay-lid and taken out from there by breaking open this lid should not be accepted as alms; the fear was that all this might involve injury to the living beings existing around (589). Regard for the safety of the living beings existing around is also had in mind when the monk is asked to so conduct his begging-tour that the obstacles lying on the way are skirted around rather than crossed over (568-71). These illustrations should make possible the appreciation of those injunctions and prohibitions which are aimed at assuring that no injury is inflicted on the living beings while procuring or taking food.

Then there are the injunctions and prohibitions which are aimed at assuring that no greediness is exhibited while procuring or taking food. Thus the monk is asked not to visit for alms a house where on the occasion of some festival food is specially prepared to be doled out to the monk, the brāhmin, the guest, the poor, the begger (540, 543); the fear was

that under such conditions good food in adequate quantity might become available without any special endeavour on the part of the monk. For the same fear it was laid down that a monk was not to specially visit for alms the houses of his former relatives and acquaintances (566, 617). Similarly, repeated prohibitions call upon the monk not to participate in common feasts - where he might doubtlessly receive delicious food and drink but at the cost of spiritual disequilibrium (546-54). Then the monk was asked not to enter for alms a house where others were already seeking alms; the fear was that the donor might override the claim of those early entrants in favour of our monk (573-74). Obvious is the import of the injunction which asks the monk not to select out for himself delicious things out of the food that he has received on behalf of several monks (575)—nor so pick out for himself delicious things out of the food that he is jointly taking with several monks (576). Particulary noteworthy is the rule that a monk is not to receive as alms food that is prepared specially for him—for him personally or for the monks in general (533-36, *samuddeśa* part); an associated rule is that the monk is not to approach for food the person who has already provided him shelter (537 *Puruṣāntarakṛta-bāhyanirhṛta* part), in this as in the earlier case the likelihood being that the monk should get good food without much endeavour. One rule lays down that the high royal officials are not to be approached for food (560); the fear must have been that royal patronage facilitates alms-collection in the domain concerned. The spirit of self-denial lying at the back of all these injunctions and prohibitions is unmistakable.

After food shelter was the next most important requirement of a monk and so chapter 1, section 2 takes up the question of shelter. In this section so many rules are repeated from the earlier in a rather mechanical fashion and they need not detain us. The new point to emerge is that the monk is asked not to accept a shelter where he might be forced to stay alone with the family-members of the host; its import is almost obvious but the noteworthy thing is that it has been worked out in great details (662-65, 685-90).

Two further reqirements of a monk have received attention in Ācārāṅga II. Thus its chapter 1, section 5 takes up the problem of procuring clothes, its chapter 1, section 6 the problem of procuring bowl. Here too so many rules have been repeated from section 1 in rather mechanical fashion. The new point to emerge is that neither the clothes of a monk nor his bowl should be luxurious (for clothes 808, for bowl 845)[chapter 1, section 7 takes up what it calls the problem of procuring *avagraha*. But *avagraha* only means 'domain of ownership'—so that for a monk to procure

avagraha means to procure a place lying in someone's ownership. As thus understood the proplem of procuring *avagraha* is really the old problem of procuring shelter and as a matter of fact much in section 7 (e. g. 874–81) repeats what has been said in section 2. The new point to emerge is that in connection with *avagraha* a monk is said to procure not only shelter but also certain other requisites possibly available nearby (e. g. 872–73, 884–896.]

II. The Problem of Moving About

The problem of moving about was another important problem that had to be faced by a Jaina monk. In this connection the most important rule was that a monk was to lead a stationary life for the four rainy months and a life of constant wandering for the remaining eight months of the year. Ācārāṅga II in its chapter 1, section 3 takes up for consideration the life of constant wandering led by a Jaina monk for the eight non-rainy months of the year. Here too the injuctions and prohibitions that have been laid down fall into two categories—viz. (i) those which seek to assure that the monk while moving about inflicts no injury on the living beings, and (ii) those which seek to assure that he while doing so does not involve himself in worldly affairs. To the first category belongs the rule that a monk is to move about keeping his downcast eyes fixed at a distance of one yoke so that no living creature gets crushed under his feet (718). To the same category belongs the rule that a monk with muddy feet is not to walk trampling down grass under his feet and thus seeking to cleanse his feet of mud (745)—for all injury to grass is to be avoided at all cost. More interesting are the rules that seek to assure that a monk while moving about does not involve himself in worldly affairs. Thus a monk is advised to avoid travelling the regions inhabited by the non-Aryan brigands (720), the politically disturbed regions (721), the places where an army is encamped (748); for in all these cases the monk is likely to be mistaken for a spy and maltreated accordingly. [But in case the monk is actually maltreated thus he is expected not to feel bad about it (749).] Then the monk is asked not to reply to the queries put forth to him by the people meeting him on the way-e. g. a query about the path leading to a particular town (762), one about the number of elephants and horses present in this town (750), one about the quantity of grain and water available in this town (750), and so on and so forth. Similarly, in case a monk is travelling by boat while the boatmen and his fellow travellears ask him to cooperate with them in making the boat proceed smoothly the injunction to him is that he is to refuse cooperation outright (726–31, 733)– even at the risk of being thrown out into the water (734–35). Lastly, in case a monk is robbed of his belongings by thieves he is not to lodge complaint against the miscreants in the criminal court (765).

III. The Problem of Employment of Speech

This rather curious problem is conspicuous by its absence in the old Chedasūtras Kalpa, Vyavahāra and Niśītha; on the other hand, it is present in an essentially similar fashion in Daśavaikālika chapter VII and Ācārāṅga II, chapter 1, section 4. So many things said in this connection are obscure in their import but the general drift of the whole discussion is pretty clear. The following points – easy to follow—are made first :

(1) One must not speak untruths and half-truths (775);

(2) One must not speak such truths as cause pain to others (775);

(3) One must call others by not abusive but endearing names (776–777).

Then there folllows a series of injunctions apparently aimed at avoiding such forms of speech as seem to condone violence. For example, an animal become first to be slaughtered or milked or yoked is not to be described this way (788, 90); what one has to say is that this animal is now full-grown (789, 791). Similarly, a tree become fit to yield wood for furniture is not to be described this way; what one has to say is that this tree is now full-grown (792–93). Lastly, a fruit become fit to be eaten up or a vegetable become fit to be cooked is not to be described this way (794, 796); what one has to say is that this fruit or this vegetable is now full-grown (785, 797).

As can be seen, the most important problems of monastic discipline are considered by Ācārāṅga II in its chapter 1; similar problems, though of a secondary importance, are considered by it in its chapter 2. This chapter is divided into 7 sections, but of these the first two very briefly touch upon an aspect of the problem of procuring shelter—the first saying things about the procurement of a place for bodily posturing, the second about the procurement of a place for study. Nothing particularly noteworthy comes to view in these two sections. But the remaining five sections take up three problems that are of some importance, here section 3 standing alone, sections 4 and 5 going together and sections 6 and 7 again going together.

Thus section 3 takes up the problem of a proper disposal of urine and excreta, a problem much considered in Jaina monastic circles; (it is interesting to recall that the famous Jaina doctrine of 5 *samitis*, in one of its items, has to do with this very problem). The injunctions and prohibitions laid down in this connection are primarily aimed at assuring that the disposal of urine and excreta involves no infliction of injury on the living beings – also that it is performed at no public place. Almost all

these injunctions and prohibitions occur, mostly in this very form and at one place, also in Niśītha (3. 70–79, 15.66–74, 16. 40–50).

Sections 4 and 5 take up two allied problems – the former that of renouncing greed for pleasing sounds, the latter that of renouncing greed for pleasing forms. Section 4 catalogues a few types of sounds likely to be found pleasing (947–50), but for the most part it catalogues general spectacles likely to be accompanied by pleasing sounds (951–64) – the idea being that these spectacles are not to be attended to with a view to enjoying such sounds. Similarly, section 5 catalogues a few types of forms likely to be found pleasing, but for the rest it simply refers to the spectacles catalogued in section 4 – the idea being that these spectacles are not to be attended to with a view to enjoying the pleasing forms accompanying them. Here again, amost all these injunctions and prohibitions occur, mostly in this very form and at one place, also in Niśītha (12.17–29, 17.135–38).

Lastly, sections 6 and 7 again take up two allied problems – the former laying down that a monk is not to get his body beautified or his bodily wounds tended by someone else, the latter laying down that two monks are not to get their bodies beautified or their bodily wounds tended by one another. Almost all these injunctions and prohibitions too occur, mostly in this very form and at one place, also in Niśītha (3. 16–68, 4. 49–101).

Thus it is that Ācārāṅga II in its chapters 1 and 2 undertakes a treatment of the problems of monastic discipline. But it contains two more chapters of an altogether different nature. Thus chapter 3 offers a predominently legendary biography of Mahāvīra to be followed by an exposition of 'the five great vows each along with its appropriate 5 *bhāvanās*; as for chapter 4 it offers a poem of 12 stanzas composed in the metre *Jagatī* and praising an ideal monk in a general fashion. The legendary Mahāvīra-biography here occurring in chapter 3 is the first of its type to occur in a canonical text (a similar version of the same was later on interpolated in Daśā chapter VIII which on this very account came to receive much widespread independent currency – under a misleading title 'Kalpasūtra'.) Similarly, the five great vows each accompanied by its appropriate 5 *bhāvanās* constitute a standard technical concept of classical Jainism and have found the earliest treatment in the chapter 3 of Ācārāṅga II. [Roughly speaking, *bhāvanā* means a strengthening factor – so that the 5 *bhāvanās* of a particular vow are the five factors which lend strength to one in one's endeavour to undertake the observance of this vow.] As for chapter 4 of Ācārāṅga II, Schubring (DC, pp. 3–4) has come out with the surmise that at some stage it got interchanged with Sūtrakṛtāṅga I chapter 16; for if the present chapter 4 of Ācārāṅga II is treated as

chapter 16 of Sūtrakṛtāṅga I the latter becomes a wholly verse-text, somethihing in harmony with its old title Gāthāṣoḍaśaka meaning 'a text made up of sixteen verses'. [No difficulty ensues if the present chapter 16 of Sūtrakṛtāṅga I is treated as chapter 4 of Ācārāṅga II, for the latter remains as miscellaneous in one case as in the other.] Schubring's surmise sounds plausible but even if it is accepted Ācārāṅga II in its chapter 4 would be offering nothing that is of historical importance.

CHAPTER VI

THE FIVE AṄGA TEXTS OF THE FORM OF A STORY-COLLECTION

Five Aṅga-texts—viz. Jñātadharmakathā, Upāsakadaśā, Antakṛddaśā, Anuttaraupapātikadaśā, Vipākaśruta—are of the form of a collection of stories. But with a view to appreciating their proper historical significance certain other canonical texts containing stories too have to be kept in mind. Thus five Upāṅga-texts—viz. Nirayāvalikā, Kalpāvataṃsikā, Puṣpikā, Puṣpacūlā, Vṛṣṇidaśā—are exclusively of the form of a collection of stories while the Aṅga-text Bhagavatī has some 18 stories — big and small—scattered in its different parts. A noteworthy thing about so many of these stories is that they possess virtually no independent plot of their own; sometimes they differ from one another only in having a different name for their heroes, sometimes in respect of a minor detail about the doings of these heroes. Thus these stories are purported to narrate how a particular person renounced the world, became a Jaina monk, studied such and such scriptural texts, performed such and such penances, undertook fast-unto-death for so many days, and eventually attained *mokṣa* or rebirth in a particular heaven. Naturally it would have been tedious to repeat these details in the case of each of the stories in question and as a matter of fact they are actually offered only rarely (e.g. in the Skandaka-story of Bhagavatī, the Meghakumāra-story of Jñātadharmakathā); in the remaining cases these details are just hinted at. Even so, the question remains to be asked as to why these stereotyped stories were composed at all and in so large a number; and the answer to it throws light on certain historical matters.

The stereotyped stories under consideration occur in two Aṅga-texts Antakṛt and Anuttaraupapātika and four Upāṅga-texts Kalpāvataṃsikā, Puṣpikā, Puṣpacūlā, and Vṛṣṇidaśā; (in the Upāṅga-texts Nirayāvalikā the stereotype is altogether different but it is all the same used to yield ten stories on the basis of just one). Thus Antakṛt consists of 8 *vargas* respectively containing 10, 8, 13, 10, 10, 16, 18 stories – so is a text containing 85 stories in all; but of these only the following four are stories with an independent plot :

1. *Gajasukumāra* (*Varga* 3)
2. *Padmāvatī* (*Varga* 5)
3. *Mudgarapāṇi* (*Varga* 6)
4. *Atimukta* (*Varga* 6)

Similarly, *Anuttaraupapātika* consists of 3 *Vargas* respectively containing 10, 13, 10 stories—so is a text containing 33 stories in all; but none of these is a story with an independent plot. As for those of 4 Upāṅga-texts, *Kalpāvataṃsikā* has 10 stories, *Puṣpacūlā* 10, *Vṛṣnidaśā* 12 and they are all stereotyped, while *Puṣpikā* has 10 stories of which only two—viz. *Somila* and *Bahuputrikā* possess an independent plot. In the case of the Upāṅga-texts one might surmise that some later author (or circle of authors) was in possession of just three independent stories, of which one was turned into a stereotype to yield the 10 stories of Nirayāvalikā, two were presented in an independent form, while 40 stereotyped stories of the usual form were superadded to them—thus making up five texts (here called "five *Vargas* pertaining to the *Upāṅgas*") with 52 stories in all. But why should the clumsy practice of presenting 81 stereotyped stories along with 4 independent ones (as is done in *Antakṛt*) or of presenting 33 stereotyped stories all alone (as is done in *Anuttaraupapātika*) should be followed in the case of a text pertaining to the class Aṅga which is the most fundamental class of canonical texts? Perhaps this question can be answered on the basis of a testimony coming from Sthānāṅga chapter 10 where the chapter-titles of 10 texts with a name ending in '*Daśā*' are given out; (as is natural to expect the number of chapter-titles is 10 in each case). Now 4 of these ten texts have not come down to us in any form at all while the following six are somehow recognizable as follows:

(i) *Karmavipākadaśā*	is our *Vipākaśruta* I
(ii) *Upāsakadaśā*	is our *Upāsakadaśā*
(iii) *Antakṛddaśā*	is our *Antakṛddaśā*
(iv) *Anuttaraupapātikadaśā*	is our *Anuttaraupapātikadaśā*
(v) *Ācāradaśā*	is our *Ācāradaśā*
(vi) *Praśnavyākaraṇadaśā*	is our *Praśnavyākaraṇa*

In the case of *Upāsakadaśā* and *Ācāradaśā* the chapter-titles present no anomaly at all, in the case of *Karmavipākadaśā* some very minor anomalies. As for *Praśnavyākaraṇa* it seems to have nothing to do with our *Praśnavyākaraṇa* whose chapter-titles are altogether different from those given in *Sthānāṅga*, but the noteworthy thing is that the same is the case with *Antakṛddaśā* and *Anuttaraupapātikadaśā* which too seem to have nothing to do with our *Antakṛddaśa* and *Anuttaraupapātikadaśā* whose chapter-titles are altogether different from those given in *Sthānāṅga*. As a marter of fact, our *Antakṛddaśā* and *Anuttaraupapātikadaśā* are not at all a text with ten chapters, for they are both divided into *Vargas* which in turn are divided into *Adhyayanas*—so that the former comes to have 85 chapters in all the lattter 33. Under these circumstances it is a matter of minor significance that 2 chapter-titles - viz. *Kiṃkaṃma* and *Sudaṃsaṇa* - are common to the *Sthā-*

nāṅga list and our *Antakṛta* - while 3 chapter-titles – viz. *Dhaṇṇa, Sunakkhatta, Isidāsa*-are common to the *Sthānāṅga* list and our *Anuttaraupapātika*, this is so particularly in view of the fact that the stories going under these titles are as much stereotyped as most others. The conclusion seems to be that the original *Antakṛddaśā* and *Anuttaraupapātikadaśā* were both a text with 10 chapters and that their chapter-titles were broadly the same as are given in *Sthānāṅga*. In the course of time these original *Antakṛddaśā* and *Anuttaraupapātikadaśā* came to be lost - just as did the original *Praśnavyākaraṇadaśā*; then it was thought necessary to compose new *Antakṛddaśā* and *Anuttaraupapātikadaśā* to replace the original ones—just as it was thought necessary to compose new *Praśnavyākaraṇa* to replace the original one. By this time, the practice might have been current to compose story-texts made up of *Vargas* which were further subdivided into *Adhyayanas* and to dole out in this connection a few independent stories along with a huge number of stereotyped ones, a practice followed in the case of those 5 Upāṅga-texts-which are nowadays called the last five of the twelve Upāṅga-texts but which call themselves 'five *Vargas* of the *Upāṅgas*'. And it was this very practice that was followed in the case of the presently available *Antakṛddaśā* and *Anuttaraupapātikadaśā* which came to replace the corresponding original texts that were somehow lost. A further consideration might lend some confirmation to this surmise. For in this very period were composed two more texts containing stereotyped stories and superadded to certain old texts. These are our *Vipākaśruta* II and *Jñātadharmakathā* II. Thus *Vipākaśruta* I contains 10 stories which narrate how a person reaped in this life the unhappy consequences of the evil acts performed in the earlier; (it is these ten stories whose titles are given in *Sthānāṅga* as the chapter-titles of *Karmavipākadaśā*—which is why we have identified *Karmavipākadaśā* with *Vipākaśruta* I). As against this, *Vipākaśruta* II narrates 10 stereotyped stories telling how a person reaped in life the happy consequences of the good acts performed in the earlier; these stories must have been written in the period under consideration and superadded to the old *Karmavipākadaśā* which was then rechristened *Vipākaśruta*. Similarly *Jñātadharmakathā* contains 19 stories, of which some-e.g. *Megha, Śailaka, Malli, Draupadī, Maṇḍuka, Tetaliputra, Puṇḍarīka-Kaṇḍarīka* have a content with an independent religious significance but the rest are thoroughly secular (some are not even stories but bare similes) and assume a religious significance only when a moral is explicitly drawn therefrom. It seems that originally the former type of stories were called *Dharmakathā* (=religious narrative), the latter type *Jñāta* (=illustration) and so it was understood that *Jñātadharmakathā* is a collection of 19 stories of a *Jñāta* type or a *Dharmakathā* type. But in the period under consideration the understanding seems to have been evolved that all these 19 stories belong to the *Jñāta* type (the task

might have been facilitated by explicitly drawing a particular moral even in the case of stories with an independent religious significance) and so the need was felt to compose 206 stereotyped stories supposed to belong to the *Dharmakathā* type; thus it could come about that those 19 original stories were called *Jñātadharmakathā* I, those 206 new stories *Jñātadharmakathā* II (made up of 10 *Vargas* respectively covering 5, 5, 54, 54, 32, 32, 4, 4, 8, 8, *Adhyayanas*).

Many of the points made use of in the above argumentation were first raised by Schubring in his introduction to 'Worte Mahāvīras' (Published in 1926, pp. 5-8). Thus he noticed that so many stories of the *Daśā* texts are no independent stories, that there are discrepancies between the chapter-titles of *Daśā* texts given in *Sthānāṅga* and the chapter-titles of the same as presently available, that in this connection the *Sthānāṅga* list is more reliable, and so on and so forth. But he tended to think that all the cases of stereotyped stories were the cases of replacing some old material by a new one. To us that appears to be the case only with *Antakṛddaśā* and *Anuttaraupapātikadaśā*, for there is little ground to suppose there once existed texts which stood in the place of our 5 *Upāṅga*-texts, our *Jñātadharmakathā* II, or *Vipākaśruta* II.

So much consideration given to the questions of history and text-composition let us next have a close look at the contents of the Aṅga-texts of the form of a story-collection. These Jaina texts have been composed primarily with a view to edifying the laity—just as are the Epics and Purāṇas of the Brahmins and the Jātakas and Avadānas of the Buddhists. Not that these texts are exclusively concerned with the problems arising in connection with the life of a layman, but that is not the point. For compositions coming from a monastic religious sect like Jainism are bound to lay all out emphasis on the problems arising in connection with the life of a monk and our texts are no exception to the rule. What is noteworthy about them is their form rather than their content. The very fact that these texts are story-texts tends to suggest that they are primarily meant for a readership – rather listenership – not versed in the niceties of theory. Of course, a newly converted monk too could read these texts with profit but his studies being oriented towards grasping the essentials of theory he would not linger long with elementary texts such as these; but it was through these very elementary texts that a layman was to be instructed in whatever theoretical matters he was. It is perhaps symptomatic that the study curriculum of a Jaina monk laid down in Vyavahāra (10.20–33), even while mentioning the remaining Aṅga-texts and so many other texts now not available to us, is absolutely silent about these story-texts. Be that as it

may, these story-texts are most suited to impart to an elementary reader certain most fundamental points of the Jaina theoretical thought. Let us see how.

Ever since the days of Ācārāṅga I and Sūtrakṛtāṅga I the Jaina theoreticians had been emphasizing that a person leading the life of an ideal Jaina monk was bound to attain *mokṣa* at the end of his present life, the corollary being that every one else was bound to remain entangled in the cycle of rebirths. The idea that an ideal Jaina monk at the end of his present life would attain not *mokṣa* but rebirth in a heavenly region was not mooted in the beginning, for it must have been considered preposterous that an ideal Jaina monk at the end of his present life should attain anything short of *mokṣa*. But in the course of time this idea was duly recognized and two post-mortem possibilities were granted to an ideal Jaina monk—viz. the attainment of *mokṣa* and rebirth in a heavenly region. As for the householder, he was since ever and for ever denied the possibility of attaining *mokṣa* at the end of his present life; but in the course of time the idea was duly recognized that a person conducting his life according to the prescriptions laid down for a pious householder would be next born in a heavenly region. This whole scheme of thought as it finally evolved has been kept in mind while planning the composition of the story-texts under consideration. Thus *Karmavipākadaśā* (the old name for *Vipākaśruta* I) elucidates how a person acting in an evil fashion in this life reaps an appropriate unhappy consequence in the next, *Antakṛddaśā* elucidates how an ideal Jaina monk at the end of his present life attains *mokṣa*, *Anuttaraupapātikadaśā* elucidates how an ideal Jaina monk at the end of his present life is born in the uppermost heavenly region, *Upāsakadaśā* elucidates how a person conducting his life according to the prescriptions laid down for a pious householder is next born in a heavenly region. [As has been noted, *Antakṛddaśā* and *Anuttaraupapātikadaśā* contain very few independent stories. The point has already explained and is not much relevant for the present part of our discussion. For that matter, the last two stories of even *Upāsakadaśā* are a stereotyped repetition of the first and the likelihood is that they are a substitute-version of some lost original. Only this much can be said that our understanding of the matters under consideration would have been fuller if we were in possession of the texts in question in their complete, original version.] As compared to these four story-texts *Jñātadharmakathā* is different and rather miscellaneous in character; but things most essential for an understanding of its basic character have already been said in an earlier context.

Just above, the Jaina story-texts under consideration were compared with the Brahmanical Epics and Purāṇas and the Buddhist Jātakas and

Avadānas. There is some likelihood of this comparison being misunderstood. For our Jaina texts are too tiny to seem to be any sort of match for those voluminous Brahmanical and Buddhist literary compositions. But these Brahmanical and Buddhist compositions were not the growth of one day and, strictly speaking, they merit comparison not with our Jaina texts but with the entire mass of Jaina story literature at whose head these texts stand. So in the above context the precise point of comparison between the Brahmanical, Buddhist and Jaina texts in question was not their volume but the fact that they are all primarily aimed at edifying the laity. Certainly, the sociocultural evolution of the country had then reached a stage which required that the lay followership of a religious sect be provided with a mode of worship specially suited to its life-circumstances and a literature specially suited to its tastes and intellectual capacities. In the sphere of mode of worship the response of the hour was the cult of image-worship (including stūpa-worship) while in the sphere of literature it was the mass of compositions we are considering now. As time passed on these compositions became more and more ornate in style, a fact signifying the growing maturity of the tastes and intellectual capacities of the Indian people. Confining ourselves to the Jaina camp, we might note that good many stories of *Jñātadharmakathā* (e. g. the very first story) are composed to an extremely ornate style reminisent of such admittedly late texts as Aupapātika, Rājapraśnīya, Jinacarita and the like. A still more masterly employment of literary skill is to be observed in the still later Jaina story-texts composed in verse as well as prose. It is in the background of this entire subseqnent development that judgment has to be passed on the five Aṅga-texts that are of the form of a story-collection.

We have already taken summary note of the content of the Aṅgic story collections, viewing it from the standpoint of the theoretical points elucidated therethrough. Note might also be taken of this content, viewing it from another standpoint. Thus a story appearing here develops either a social theme or a mythological one. By social theme is to be understood a theme exclusively taking up the doings of human beings, by mythological theme one also (or exclusively) taking up the doings of gods and goddesses. Particularly noteworthy in this connection are the stories compiled in Vipākaśruta I (=Karmavipākadaśā) which all develop an almost exclusively social theme. As has been noted, these stories narrate how a person committed some sinful act in his past life and how he reaped the evil consequence of it in his present life. As such they offer an interesting insight into the working of a Jaina author's mind on the questions of what constitutes a sinful act and what constitutes the punishment for such an act. For in these ten stories we come across ten cases of what is considered to be a sinful act and ten cases of what is considered

to be the punishment for such an act. The two sets deserve a separate treatment. Of the ten sinful acts nine somehow involve recourse to violence—the exceptional case being that of the usual sinful life of a prostitute (X). Of the acts involving recourse to violence three have got a pronounced social aspect—two being the cases of misdeed on the part of two public officials, a regional administrator (I) and a prison-in-charge (VI), one being the case of private vengeance on the part of a king who instigated by his favourite wife trapped and killed his other 499 wives along with their mothers (IX). Somewhat class by itself is the case of the Brahmin priest who would resort to human sacrifice and too often (V). The remaining five are the cases of indulging in or encouraging meat-eating; thus we hear of a royal animal-trapper who was exceseively fond of meat-eating (II), an egg-seller (III), a meat-seller (IV), a royal physician who would too often recommend a non-vegetarian diet (VII), a royal cook who would too often serve a non-vegetarian dish (VIII). Then there is the set of ten acts considered to be a punishment for some one or other of the ten sinful acts just catalogued. Of these, four are the cases of a bodily discomfort suffered by the person concerned; thus we hear of a prince who was born with an exceedingly ill-formed body (I), a trader's son who simultaneously developed 16 incurable bodily ailments (VII), a fisherman whose throat was incurably obstacled by the scale of the fish he was eating (VIII), a queen who developed an incurable ailment of the sex-organ (X). The rest six are the cases of legal punishment inflicted on a criminal, four of men having to do with sex: thus we hear of a trader's son punished for contacting a woman reserved for the king (II),a trader's son similarly punished for contacting a woman reserved for the king's minister (IV), a priest punished for contacting the royal lady (V),a queen punished for killing the royal mother whom her husband would serve devotedly and who was therefore considered by her to be the cause of his denying her his company (IX), a prince eager for throne punished for having instigating the royal barber to kill the king (VII), a thief-leader trapped and duly punished (III). All this is interesting and instructive. The cotalogue of sinful acts is remarkable in that as many as five of its ten items have to do with meat-eating. Apparently, their excessive concern for vegetarianism often deprived the Jaina authors of an opportunity to take note of sins with a clear-cut social implication. The catalogue of acts supposed to be a punishment for the sinful acts of the past life has another difficulty. Since the Jaina authors were convinced that punishment for the past sinful acts might possibly ensue in the form of bodily ailment they were bound to describe in this connection the cases of bodily ailment which in their eyes was of the nature of punishment for some past sinful act; but such a description has no direct relevance for a study of the social

scene. Again, it was perhaps natural for these authors to pay special attention to the cases of punishment inflicted on a criminal, for they must have thought that their thesis of rebirth would be vindicated if punishment for a crime of his life was given out as punishment for a sin of the past life. Such an attempt at vindication might fail to convince a plain student of the social scene who would nevertheless be thankful to these authors for having provided him with material relevant for an investigation into the problem of crime and punishment as viewed by the contemporary society. Vipākaśruta II aims at supplying 10 stories which should demonstrate how a virtuous act performed in this life is rewarded in the next. In fact, however, what is forthcoming there is just one story repeated ten times; but even this one story is revealing in its own way. For it tells us how a pious householder properly fed a well-behaved monk and how as a reward for this virtuous act of his he in his next birth had the good opportunity of first becoming a pious householder and then a well-behaved monk who would be next born in the uppermost heavenly region. What is noteworthy is that not only in this story but even elsewhere religious zeal on the part of a Jaina—whether householder or monk—is held out to be his greatest virtue. This attitude is somewhat understandable in the case of a monk who has after all taken leave of the regular society, though in view of the fact that monks are the heroes in our stories in an overwhelming majority of cases that would mean that in an overwhelming majority of cases these stories will not be placing before us the ideal conduct of a morally upright social man. But curiously, when a text like *Upāsakadaśā* which depicts incidents from the life of ideal Jaina householders never depicts an incident that should throw light on the ethico-social attitude of any of these householders. True, these householders are said to be the practisers of the 12 duties prescribed for a pious Jaina householder and many of these duties—particularly what are called the 5 *aṇuvratas*—have obvious social significance, but the point is that a pious householder is extolled in these stories not for his practice of any of these socially significant duties but for his religious zeal. Here three stories—viz. I, IX, X—have got virtually no plot, while the first of these is remarkable rather for its detailed description of the 12 duties of a Jaina householder. In four—viz. II-V—a householder is shown to refuse to renounce faith in Jainism even when threats of all sorts are showered on him by a god; in one story—viz. VI—a householder punctures a god who seeks to convince him of the correctness of the Ājīvaka view, in another—viz. VII—an Ājīvaka householder is converted to Jainism by Mahāvīra, refuses to renounce his new faith even in the face of Gośālaka's own pleadings, and finally remains steadfast even when threatened by a god in the manner described in stories II-V, in a third—viz. VIII—a householder refuses to give up pious meditation even when coaxed and cajoled by his own wife who seeks his company for car-

nal purposes. In this background it comes as a somewhat pleasant surprise when two monks are depicted as behaving in an ideal fashion in relation to their fellow human beings. Thus *Gujasukumāra* the hero of *Antakṛt* III.8 does not lose his balance of mind even when fatally struck by the father of the girl who was to have been married to him but was not; similarly, *Arjuna*, the hero of *Antakṛt* VI-3, who when possessd by a *yakṣa* had tortured citizens of Rājagṛha in various ways but when rid of the malady became a monk, did not lose his balance of mind even when these citizens of Rājagṛha would harass him in all sorts of ways. [In *Gajasukumāra*-story there is also related the moving incident of Kṛṣṇa cleverly relieving an old weakling of the burden of the task of carrying a load of bricks from the street to the inside of his house; later on, *Gajasukumāra*'s preceptor says to Kṛṣṇa that in attaining *mokṣa Gajasukumāra* was assisted by his prospective father-in-law who struck him fatally just as in unburdening himself of the heavy task that old weakling was assisted by Kṛṣṇa.] This relative absence of a depiction of positive moral action on the part of a social man is already striking in itself but it is particularly so in view of the fact that such a depiction is a most conspicuous feature of the Buddhist Jātaka-stories all aimed at demonstrating how Buddha in an earlier life acted as a noble hero in relation to his fellow-beings (they also covering cases when Buddha was an animal-hero of an animal-mass).

In this connection *Jñātadharmakathā* deserves a separate treatment. For unlike *Upāsakadaśa*, *Antakṛddaśā*, *Anuttaraupapātikadaśā* and *Vipākaśruta* it is not a text with a common thread running through the entire body of its inventories. It rather is of the form of a miscellaneous collection of bare similes, illustrative stories and religious narratives. Of these, the both similes and illustrative stories have little about them which might be construed as something typically Jaina; what has happened is that they have been marked with a Jaina stamping suitably as a result of drawing from them a moral appropriate for a Jaina—particularly a Jaina monk. However, this performance is noteworthy for one reason. For it is a testimony to the Jaina author's capacity to portray the details of secular life and to draw upon the currents of secular wisdom flowing all around them. It should therefore suffice for our present purpose if we just mention the subject-matter of the similes and the illustrative stories in question. Thus the similes cover four chapters in all and as follows :

Ch. VI – The simile of gourd-bowl which sinks down to the bottom of water when heavy with clay-smearing and comes up to the surface when rid of this clay-smearing.

Ch. X – The simile of moon which waxes during one half of the month and wanes during the other half.

Ch. XI – The simile of sea-coast trees of which most bloom and some wither when the island-breeze blows, some bloom and most wither when the sea-breeze blows, all wither when neither breeze blows, all bloom when both breezes blow.

Ch. XII – The simile of most obnoxiously polluted water which can nevertheless be purified with efforts.

Similarly, the illustrative stories cover eight chapters in all and as follows:

Ch. II – The story of a trader who in prison shared food with the murderer of his own son.

Ch. III – The story of two friends each of whom had one peahen-egg and of whom one spoiled his egg throgh constant checking while the other did not.

Ch. IV – The story of two tortoises of whom one could manage to protect its body against jackals by remaining well hidden within its shell while the other could not because of its anxious movement of limbs.

Ch. VII – The story of four daughters-in-law, of whom one threw away, the second ate up, the third preserved, the fourth sowed in the field the five paddy-grains offered by the father-in-law.

Ch. IX – The story of two shipwrecked trader brothers stranded in an island, and fallen in the clutches of the island-ogress, of whom one could make good his escape because he paid no heed to the wailings of the ogress the other could not because he succumbed to those wailings.

Ch. XV – The story of a trader's co-travellers, of whom some followed the caravan-chief's instructions and avoided the trees whose leaves, fruits, shadow etc. were to prove harmful eventually; the others did not.

Ch.XVII – The story of horses inhabiting a far-off island, some of whom were trapped because they succumbed to the temptations offered by the trappers while the others were not trapped bedause they resisted those temptations.

Ch.XVIII – The story of a trader and his five sons who managed to survive an ordeal by living upon the dead body of the trader's daughter killed by a thief-kidnapper.

[As can easily be imagined, in most cases these similes and illustrative stories are made use of for contrasting the behaviour of an ideal monk with that of one falling short of the ideal.] The case is somewhat different

with the religious narratives which cover the remaining seven chapters. For these narratives have for their central theme the doings of some Jaina—in most cases a monk, in some cases a householder; this as follows :

Ch. I – The story of Meghakumāra, a prince who overcame his sense of demoralization—born of discomforts usual in monastic life – when told that in a past birth he was an elephant which once kept standing with its one leg upraised for the fear of crushing the rabbit that had sought shelter at that very place at the very moment when the leg was upraised.

Ch. V – The story of Śailaka, a king turned monk who when sick was put up at a royal palace but who was lured by the comforts available there, the situation being saved by Śailaka's own disciple Panthaka who reminded him of his duties as a monk.

Ch.VIII – The story of Mallī, the 19th *Tīrthaṅkara*, who generated the feeling of world-renunciation in the mind of her six suitors by demonstrating to them as to how full of rubbish was the body of even a most beautiful woman.

Ch.XIII – The story of the pond-builder trader who after his death became a frog in the pond built by himself, a frog converted to Jainism and next born as a god after being crushed to death when it was on way to attend a sermon delivered by Mahāvīra.

Ch. XIV – The story of the royal minister *Tetaliputra* who was reluctant to keep a promise earlier given by himself and so became a monk but who embraced monkhood when circumstances were so created that he was humiliated from all sides.

Ch. XVI – The story of *Draupadī*, her *Svayaṃvara*-marriage to the five *Pāṇḍavas* her being kidnapped to a far-off land, her being released by Kṛṣṇa—all this preceded by the stories of two past births of *Draupadī* where in one she acted as a malicious food-donor to a monk, in the other as a nun excessively interested in tending her body.

Ch. XIX – The story of two princely brothers *Puṇḍarīka* and *Kaṇḍarīka* of whom the former became king the latter a monk, but then the latter exhibited weakness in the manner of *Śailaka* (of Ch. V) and so the two exchanged their roles.

This catalogue of subject-matter brings to light the specific religious theme of the chapters in question. But the noteworthy thing is that this theme is here always embedded in a more or less well-structured plot which touches upon so many facets of the human situation. As a matter of fact,

it is this what makes these chapters a close kin of those containing illustrative stories which too are similarly equipped with a more or less well-structured plot. To argue further, so far as depicting the human situation is concerned Jñātadharmakathā with its illustrative stories and religious narratives is even richer than Vipākaśruta I which is the richest of the four Aṅgic story-texts reviewed above. [In passing, let it also be noted that to the original Jñātadharmakathā with its 19 chapters was later on added a new section with 206 stereotyped stories based on just one that tells of a nun excessively interested in tending her body (a motif already present in the Draupadī-story of Ch. XVI), the same story also being the basis of the 10 stereotyped stories collected in the Upāṅga *Puśpacūlā*. As a result, the original *Jñātadharmakathā* came to be called *Jñātadharmakathā* I, this new section *Jñātadharmakathā* II.]

These general observations regarding the socialt hemes developed in the Aṅgic story-texts might be further concretized on the basis of detailed studies but we leave them at that and turn our attention to the mythological themes developed in these texts. In the course of time the Jaina authors came to formulate a whole lot of mythological notions characteristic of their school and it was only natural that a good number of those notions should find expression in the story-literature produced by this school. Perhaps, the most fundamental of these notions was one to the effect that as a result of performing some noble act a person—even an animal—might be next born as a god residing in a particular heavenly region, and this notion is present in our story-texts in a most conspicuous fashion. Thus it is said about the hero of each and every *Upāsakadaśā* story that he will be next born as a god; similarly, it is said about the hero of each and every *Anuttaraupapātika* story that he will be next born as a god residing in the uppermost heavenly region called *Anuttara*. (A statement like this could not have been made about the heroes of *Antakṛddaśā* stories for the obvious reason that they are all said to have attained *mokṣa* at the end of their present life.) And as we have seen, the *Vipākaśruta* I stories are of the form of a doublet narrating two births of the hero concerned, but there is always appended to them a statement regarding the future births of this hero which are often a case of birth in some heavenly region; (in *Vipāka* II too the hero of the story is said to be next born as a god). Lastly in the *Jñātadharmakathā* stories the characters like *Meghakumāra, Draupadī, Puṇḍarīka* and even that frog are said to be next born as a god, *Śailaka*, the five *Pāṇḍavas* and *Tetaliputra* to have attained *mokṣa* at the end of their present life), *Mallī* and her six suitors are said to have been gods in their past births; (in *Jñātadharmakathā* II the very purpose of the story is to describe the past human birth of the female-consorts of the god-chiefs pertaining

to the different heavenly regions). All this is impressive so far as it goes but the fact remains that these references to a godly birth are essentially such as fall outside the body proper of the story concerned. A more intricate part of the story are the godly doings of a particular sort. Thus in the case of some contingency a god might come to the assistance of a man, the two possibly having been friends in some former birth. For example, in the *Meghakumāra* story of *Jñātadharmakathā* a god artificially creates the atmosphere of rainy season because such was the desire of the pregnant queen when *Meghakumāra* appeared in her womb; the assistance of this god was sought by a step-son of the queen, this god and this step-son having been friends in some former birth. Similarly, in the *Draupadī* story of the same text a god kidnap *Draupadī* on the request of a king who was his friend in some former birth, (on Kṛṣṇa's request another god created an oceanic path traversing which on chariot Kṛṣṇa and the five *Pāṇḍavas* reached the capital of this king and released *Draupadī*). There is also another maneuver for a god to intervene in human affairs, for he might appear there to test the worth of some person. Thus in so many *Upāsakadaśā* stories a god applies various strategems with a view to testing the firmness of a character's faith in Jainism, (the motif is also prevalent in the *Mallī* story of *Jñātadharmakathā* where a trader-Jaina traversing the ocean by ship is subjected to a similar testing). An altogether different type of godly participation in things human takes place in the case of a *Tīrthaṅkara*; for the gods are supposed to attend on a *Tīrthaṅkara* when he enters the mother's womb when he is born, when he renounces the world, when he attains omniscience, and when he dies. Since *Mallī*, the heroine of a *Jñātadharmakathā* story, is the 19th of the 24 *Tīrthaṅkaras* we have here an opportunity to learn as to how the gods discharge this part of their responsibility.

Closely related to the mythology of heaven and heavenly beings (and that of hells and hellish beings) is the concept of the cycle of 63 mighty personages posited by the Jaina authors, a cycle supposed to appear here in the world at regular intervals of an astronomical dimension. Of these 63 mighty personages 24 are *Tīrthaṅkaras*, 12 *Cakravartins*, 9 *Vāsudevas*, 9 *Baladevas*, and 9 *Prativāsudvas* - a member of each group possessing a definte set of superhuman capacities. Our story-texts nowhere refer to this whole cycle of 63 personages. And though Mahāvīra and Ariṣṭanemi - two of the 24 *Tīrthaṅkaras* of our part of the world in our times - are often mentioned there we seldom come across any of the biographical details pertaining to them; it is only *Mallī* - another *Tīrthaṅkara* like Mahāvīra and Ariṣṭanemi-who has the details of her biography described in a *Jñātadharmakathā* story. Similarly, though *Vāsudeva* Kṛṣṇa often appears as a character in our stories there are only one or two of his doings which

throw light on the mythological concept of Vāsudeva. Thus in the *Padmāvatī* story of *Antakṛt* Vagga V) we find him lamenting out the fact that he does not have the good fortune of embracing monkhood – listening to which Ariṣṭanemi explains to him that it is in the very nature of things impossible for a *Vāsudeva* to embrace monkhood, he having performed a particular evil act in his past birth; (Kṛṣṇa is however assured that after being next born in a hell he will be born as a person destined to become a *Tīrthaṅkara*. Again, in the *Draupadī*–story of *Jñātadharmakathā* the situation so develops that the arrival of *Vāsudeva* Kṛṣṇa in the world-continent *Dhātaīkhaṇḍa* – a world–continent different from the one called *Jambūdvīpa* in which we live – is somehow noticed by *Vāsudevas* Kapila born in that world-continent; Kapila is astonished because he knows that no two *Tīrthaṅkaras*, two *Vāsudevas* or two *Baladevas* can simultaneously appear in the same world–region, his astonishment subsiding when *Tīrthaṅkara Suvrata* tells him that it was a case of a *Vāsudeva* from another world–region visiting his world–region and that the two *Vāsudevas* in question will not come face to face with one another. Another information often (e.g. in the *Meghakumāra* story of *Jñātadharmakathā* conveyed in this connection is one to the effect that the mother of a *Tīrthaṅkara* or *Cakravartī* when he enters into her womb sees 14 particular dreams, that of a *Vāsudeva* 7 of them, that of a *Baladeva* 4 of them; however, no independent plot of a story is ever constructed on the basis of this piece of information.

Thus viewed the social as well as mythological themes of the Aṅgic story–texts should help one in appreciating the entire body of Jaina story–literature· For themes similar to these are to be met with in this entire body of texts.

CHAPTER VII

PRAŚNAVYĀKARAṆA

Praśnavyākaraṇa today included among the Aṅgas has perhaps only name in common with the text that was originally included there. This conclusion is forced on us when notice is taken of an information conveyed by *Sthānāṅga* chapter 10. For there we are made acquainted with the chapter-titles of ten texts each with ten chapters and one of these texts is *Praśnavyākaraṇa* (really *Praśnavyākaraṇadaśā* where the ending *daśā* signifies that here is a text with ten chapters). But *Praśnavyākaraṇa* with its ten chapters bearing the titles cited in this connection seems to have nothing to do with our text of the same with its two sections, the first expounding what it calls 'five *āsravadvāras* (=gateways of inflow)' the second what it calls 'five *saṁvaradvāras* (= gateways of protection). In the classical Jaina terminology an *āsrava* is so called because it causes the inflow into a soul of the karmic physical particles while a *saṃvara* because it bars this inflow and thus protects the soul by preserving its pristine purity. The same could have been the connotation of these terms in our *Praśnavyākaraṇa*. In any case, under the title '*Āsravadvāra*' this text considers the five vices violence, falsehood, theft, incontinence and acquisitiveness; under the title '*Saṁvaradvāra*' the five corresponding virtues – non-violence, truthfulness non-theft, continence and non-acquisitiveness. In view of the great importance attached by the classical Jaina authors to the five virtues in question which are called by them 'five basic vows (=*mūlavrata*)' one might say that the *Praśnavyākaraṇa* exposition of its subject-matter is significant in its own place even if the text is not as old as might be supposed on the ground of its inclusion among the Aṅgas. That need was felt for substituting a new text for the lost original is obvious but the reason why this text was selected for the purpose is not; maybe it was selected because it could somehow be construed as a text with ten chapters.

However, *Praśnavyākaraṇa* is noteworthy not only on account of its content but also – perhaps even more so – on account of its literary form. For here we come across an extremely ornate style of composition reminiscent of the classical Sanskrit prose authors with their long winding compounds and all that. This style is characteristic of the Upāṅga-texts *Aupapātika*, *Rājapraśnīya Jambūdvīpaprajñapti* etc. —as also of *Jinacarita* (now included in *Ācāradaśā* chapter VIII) which should therefore be contemporary with these texts. As a matter of fact, the style is conspicuously present even in *Jñātadharmakathā* and the conclusion seems inescapable that this text was

heavily retouched in the period in question though its basic content was fairly old. Accordingly, our *Praśnavyākaraṇa* too should be assigned to this very period. In any case, it is always advisable to keep in mind the specific literary form of this text even while proceeding to make a special study of its content.

In this background the two sections of *Praśnavyākaraṇa* should be examined separately.

Section I

As has been said above, this section considers the five vices – violence, falsehood, theft, incontinence and acquisitiveness. In the case of each there are first enumerated what are regarded as its particular cases and then comes an account of the ill consequences to be reaped by one who indulges in it. In connection with the latter point it is always emphasized that the sinner is next born as a hellish being, an animal or an unfortunate man; in the case of theft and incontinence it is also shown as to how he suffers discomfiture in his this very life. To take the vices in question one by one the detailed situation is somewhat as follows:

(i) Violence: While working out the cases of violence it has been found necessary to divide the beings into classes, for the position to be maintained is that one might possibly practise violence in relation to so many classes of living beings. Here is first given a catalogue of the five-sensed beings (further divided into several subclasses) and then that of the four-sensed, the three-sensed and the two-sensed ones; also pointed out are the purposes for which these different classes of living beings are subjected to violence. Finally comes the statement regarding the five subclasses of one-sensed beings – that is, regarding earth, water, fire, air and plants; here mention is made of the different ways of consuming earth, water, fire, air and plants, it being understood that these are so many ways of committing violence in relation to the living beings of the earth-bodied, water-bodied, fire-bodied, air-bodied and plant-bodied types. This enumeration of the cases of violence is followed by an enumeration of the types of persons practising violence; the list includes on the one hand the professionals like hunters, fishermen etc. on the other hand the *mleccha* (=non-Aryan) peoples like Śakas, Yavanas etc. Lastly, by way of enumerating the ill-consequences of violence to be reaped in the next birth there is first offered a detailed account of the hardships to be suffered in hells, then a relatively brief account of those to be suffered by an animal, in the end a very brief account of those to be suffered by an unfortunate man like one born with a deformed body or a defective sense-organ; (the first two types of hardships are the common fate of all

sinners and so they have not been repeated in the case of the remaining four vices, but the third type, though it too is the common fate of all sinners, is described differently in the case of some vices).

(ii) Falsehood : Here is first enumerated the case of ordinary liars, then the case of false philosophers who preach all sorts of faulty doctrines, then the case of those who level a false accusation against others, then the case of those who report to a killer the whereabouts of his prospective victims, then the case of those who utter a speech involving violence. In the end by way of enumerating the ill-consequences of falsehood to be reaped in the next birth there are cited the hardships suffered by unfortunate men like one born with speech-defect or one who is maligned by everybody.

(iii) Theft : Here is first enumerated the case of ordinary thieves, then the case of kings going to war, then the case of seapirates, then the case of forest-dwelling thieves. In the end, by way of enumerating the ill-consequences of theft reaped in this very life there is given a detailed account of the court-punishments meted out to a thief; and by way of enumerating the ill-cosequences to be reaped in the next birth there are cited the hardships suffered by unfortunate men like one born poor or one fallen into slavery.

(iv) Incontinence : Here is first enumerated the case of the luxurious and luxury-loving gods who yet die sex-hungry, and then one by one the similarly fated *Cakravartins* (=world-rulers), *Baladevas*, *Vāsudevas*, *Māṇḍalikas* (=regional rulers) men born in the world-regions called *bhogabhūmi* (= the regions where one enjoys the luxuries of life without doing any work), women born in those regions. In the end, by way of enumerating the ill-consequences of incontinence to be reaped in this very life there are cited the physical and social dangers faced by one mad after sex-pleasure, the historic battles people have waged for the sake of women; (here nothing particular is said about the ill-consequences to be reaped in the next birth).

(v) Acquisitiveness : Here is first enumerated the case of the much-possessing gods who yet die possession-hungry, then in one stretch the case of the similarly fated *Cakravartins*, *Baladevas*, *Vāsudevas* etc. [Nothing particular is said by way of enumerating the ill-consequences of acquisitiveness.]

[This kernel of the *Praśnavyākaraṇa* account of vices is to be separated out carefully, for it is invarlably accompanied by a plethora of details which are often of a purely literary value.]

Section II

As has been noted, this section offers an account of the five virtues—non-violence, truthfulness, non-theft, continence, non-acquisitiveness. In the case of each a virtual eulogy is followed by an account of five *bhāvanās* – translatable as 'factors meant to strengthen the virtue concerned.'

As is usual with most eulogies the eulogy-part of the present account of virtues too contains so much that is of a purely literary value. Only it is noteworthy that in this part too in almost each case somewhere or else occasion has been created to bring to light some specific details of the monastic life. Thus in connection with non-violence it is emphasized that the alms received by a monk should be free from the defects pointed out in the scriptural texts – the understanding being that the concerned scriptural prohibitions are aimed at buttressing the spirit of non-violence. Similarly, in connection with non-theft it is emphasized that a monk should receive all his requirements by way of properly procured alms – the understanding being that alms procured improperly are a case of theft. Again, in connection with continence it is emphasized that a monk should desist from all bodily decoration—the understanding being that such decoration is bound to nurture a spirit of incontinence. Lastly, in connection with non-acquisitiveness it is emphasized that a monk should not possess things whose possession is not sanctioned by the scriptural texts – the understanding being that such possession would argue a spirit of acquisitiveness.

As for the present account of the five sets of five-*bhāvanās*, it is of some interest from a historical angle. The 25-*bhāvanās* are known to the classical Jaina authors in a version that is practically the same as is found in *Ācārāṅga* II chapter 3. E. g. Umāsvāti in his *Tattvārthabhāṣya* differs from *Ācārāṅga* II only in ordering his items differently at a few places. But the present account of *bhāvanās* differs from *Ācārāṅga* II in a more thoroughgoing fashion. Thus apart from the cases of ordering items differently there are also cases where this account seems to be describing the same thing as *Ācārāṅga* II but employing a different technical terminology and even cases where it seems to be describing things not at all envisaged in *Ācārāṅga* II. These discrepancies are observable in connection with the virtues—non-violence, non-theft and continence, and as follows:

(i) Non-violence: Here in *Ācārāṅga* II the items 4 and 5 are *Ādānanikṣepasamiti* and *Ālokitapānabhojana* and the same is the case with Umāsvāti. But in the present account these items ought to be *Āhāraiṣaṇāsamiti* and *Ādānanikṣepasamiti*; so for one thing the former's order is reversed in it but in addition its item *āhāraiṣaṇāsamiti* is somewhat different from the former's item *ālokitapānabhojana.*

(ii) Non-theft : In *Ācārāṅga* II the five items are :

(1) *anuvīci-avagrahayācana* (2) *anujñaptapānabhojana*

(3) *avagrahāvadhāraṇa* (4) *abhīkṣṇa-avagrahayācana*

(5) *sādharmikaanuvīci-avagrahayācana*

In Umāsvāti the items are the same but their order is 1, 4, 3, 5, 2. But in the present account there are so many novelties. Thus its items 2, 4 and 5 can somehow be equated with the items 3, 2 and 5 of the above list, but it has to be noted that though it uses no technical term in connection with its item 2 (somewhat like *Ācārāṅga* II in connection with its corresponding item 3) its titles for its items 4 and 5 are *Sādhāraṇapiṇḍapātalābha* and *Sādharmikavinaya* respectively, titles different from those of the items 2 and 5 of the above list. What is still more noteworthy is that the items 1 and 3 of this account should rather be called *Viviktavāsa* and *Upāśrayadātṛ-śaiyāgrahaṇa* respectively, but items such as these are not provided for in the above list (in return, the items 1 and 4 of the above list are not provided for in the present account).

(iii) Continence : Here Umāsvāti has the same 5 items as *Ācārāṅga* II but its item 5 has been made by him into his own item 1. The present account agrees with Umāsvāti.

All this raises one question : why does *Praśnavyākarana* differ from *Ācārāṅga* II and Umāsvāti on the question of so standarized a concept as 25 *bhāvanās*. One might answer it by saying that *Praśnavyākaraṇa* arose in the midst of a circle of authors different from those who composed *Ācārāṅga* II, the latter being a kin of Umāsvāti. But it is also possible that *Praśnavyākaraṇa* is older than *Ācārāṅga* II and as such presents a pre-classical version of the doctrine of *bhāvanās*. In any case our text must belong to an early enough period when the would-be classical version had possible rivals in the field, rivals on which this text occasionally draws upon.

CHAPTER VIII

ṚṢIBHĀṢITA

Ṛṣibhāṣita is a miscellaneous collection of didactic verses preaching asceticism. The text is divided into 45 sections each attributed to a different person and it is called Ṛṣibhāṣita precisely because it is supposed to contain the utterances of these 45 sagely personages. However, the persons in question are mostly unknown to us from other sources, Jaina or otherwise, though the presence here of a name like Yājñavalkya which is the name of a well-known Upaniṣadic teacher tends to support the surmise that some—even many—of these persons are non-Jaina. In the very nature of things it is impossible to be very certain about that and an altogether different surmise remains equally plausible, viz. that some—even many—of these persons are fictitious. Be that as it may, one thing admits of no doubt. In our text the cases of employing a Jaina technical terminology are quite rare and this rarity might be explained either by supposing that the authors represented here are mostly non-Jaina or by supposing that the discussions collected here mostly belong to a fairly old period when the classical technical terminology of the Jainas had not yet been evolved. The former explanation has the additional merit of suggesting some sort of reason why the text lost currency among the latter-day Jainas living in an atmosphere of acute religious sectarianism and finding it irksome to give publicity to the views of those considered heretic. But this loss of currency remains understandable even on the supposition that only a few of the authors in question are non-Jaina – the rest being either Jaina or fictitious, for in an atmosphere of acute religious sectarianism even a slight admixture of heresy is deemed abhorrable. In any case, it has to be kept in mind that this text continued to be venerated as late as the time of the author of the verses which are now found at the beginning of Āvaśyakaniryukti—rather Āvaśyakaniryukti proper—and which promise the composition of a *niryukti* (= commentary) on the canonical texts – viz. Ācārāṅga, Sūtrakṛtāṅga, Uttarādhyayana, Daśavaikālika, Daśā, Kalpa, Vyavahāra, Ṛṣibhāṣita, Āvaśyaka, Sūryaprajñapti. Most of these texts are admittedly old but that is not the point just now; the point is that the author of the verses in question mostly have come later enough and that Ṛṣibhāṣita was venerated as late as his time. In the subsequent period the text did lose currency and the reason most probably was that it was considered to be somehow tinged with heresy. But even that argues the relative antiquity of this text; for considerable interval may have divided the time when it was composed from the time

when it was deemed part-heretical. These historical considerations apart, Ṛṣibhāṣita throws ample light on the cardinal thesis of all Indian asceticism, thesis which alone must have been emphasized originally and which only gradually came to be accompanied by the sectarian teachings of this or that ascetic school. In view of all this the material contained here deserves a close analysis.

Before the contents of Ṛṣibhāṣita are analyzed in details certain preliminary remarks are in place. The whole lot of teachings presented here is addressed to a world-renouncing monk. This is obviously the case with the passages (e. g. in Sections 12, 25, 41) where a monk is asked to procure his alms in a proper fashion but it is no less the case with the rest. Of course, the teachings which are of a general nature can well be given an elucidation that specially suits the life-circumstances of a householder but the point is that such circumstances had not been kept in mind when the passages collected here were originally composed. Among these teachings of a general nature a specially important place is occupied by those devoted to the karma-doctrine—not only because in the subsequent period the intricacies of this doctrine were zealously sought to be imparted to the plous householders but also because of the intrinsic high significance acquired by this doctrine within the body of the Indian religious thought in general and the Jaina religious thought in particular. In our text five sections– 2, 8, 9, 15 and 30 —are centrally occupied with the karma-doctrine but only two of them—viz. 9 and 15—are detailed in a fair measure. In all these sections the point is emphasized that one involves oneself in the cycle of transmigration as a result of the acts performed by oneself and that one gets rid of this involvement as a result of refraining from acts. As is particularly evident from Section 15 the point makes prefect sense only when 'act' means evil act but it is also often (e. g. in Section 9 and most clearly in Section 30) conceded that good acts lead to a good future fate. Another noteworthy point is that here conspicuous use of the Jaina technical terminology is made just twice in one section. Thus in Section 9, verse 5 enumerates the five causes of karmic bondage–viz. *mithyātva, anivṛtti, pramāda, kaṣāya* and *yoga,* while verse 12 avers that the fruition of a karma can be variously mitigated except in the case of one called *nikācita.* For that matter, in connection with the other teachings as well the Jaina technical terms are conspicuously used anly once—i.e. in section 31 where *loka* is said to consist of *jīva* and *pudgala* and the latter two described in various ways; in a stray fashion such terms are used even elsewhere (e.g. in the very first section an evil act is said to be 'of three types performed in three manners '*trividhaṁ trividhena,*' a typical Jaina way of putting things). This much said the following table of contents should be rather selfobvious ;–

Serial Number	Author	Topic
1.	*Nārada*	One should avoid the five vices, violence etc., of three types performed in three manners
2.	*Vajjiyaputta*	Cycle-of-transmigration when karma, no cycle-of-transmigration when no karma
3.	*Davila* (*Devala*)	The eighteen vices from *prāṇātipāta* down to *mithyādarśanaśalya* conceived as a *lepa* (= smearing) causing cycle-of-transmigration
4.	*Aṅgarisi*	One best judge of one's own mind
5.	*Pupphasāla*	Renounce violence, falsehood, incontinence, acquisitiveness, anger, pride
6.	*Vakkalaciri*	It is not proper to remain unguided by the thread of scripture
7.	*Kummāputta*	One should be patient and persevering
8.	*Ketaliputta*	One free of worldly entanglement is rid of the cycle-of-transmigration
9.	*Mahākāsava*	Pain due to karma, no pain due to no karma; karma got rid of through noble performances like meditation
10.	*Tetaliputta*	Self-lamentation followed by the advice given to him that he receives *pravrajyā* [This is really the concluding part of the *Tetaliputra* story of *Jñātadharmakathā* and is incompre-hensible without a reference to that story.]
11.	*Maṅkhaliputta*	An expert spiritual guide like an expert physician
12.	*Jaṇṇavakka*	Alms are to be procured properly and with a calm mind
13.	*Bhayāli*	One should not seek revenge for the harm done to oneself by others
14.	*Bāhuka*	One free of desires versus one full of desires (?)
15.	*Madhurāyaṇijja*	The worldly pains are due to one's own past misdeeds
16.	*Soriyāyaṇa*	One's five senses are to be kept under control
17.	*Vidu*	The Great-Science (= the spiritual science) cures spiritual ailments just as medicine cures the bodily ones

18.	*Varisava*	The 18 vices from *prāṇātipāta* down to *mithyādarśanaśalya* are to be avoided if *mokṣa* is to be attained
19.	*Āyariyāyaṇa*	The aryan (= noble) deeds are to be performed, the opposite ones to be avoided
20.	*Ukkala* [no name but a concept connoting mighty (= *utkaṭa*)]	Five anti-spiritualist views (?)
21.	*Gāhāvatiputta*	Ignorance the root of all ailment
22.	*Dagabhāla* (*Gaddabha*)	A sense of detachment has to be developed towards things worldly – particularly women
23.	*Rāmaputta*	Bad death (leading to transmigration) versus good death (leading to *mokṣa*)
24.	*Harigiri*	The worldly enjoyments transitory and conducive to a painful future
25.	*Ambaḍa*	Rebirth due to four vices violence, falsehood, misappropriation, incontinence
26.	*Mātaṅga*	The ideal Brahmin and the comparison of noble life with agriculture
27.	*Vārattaya*	The ideal monk detached from all worldly activity
28.	*Addaya*	The worldly desires conducive to an endless cycle-of-transmigration
29.	*Vaddhamāṇa*	The five sense-organs to be kept under control
30.	*Vāyu*	The good and bad experiences are a result of the good and bad acts
31.	*Pāsa*	*Jiva* and *pudgala*—these two types of entities make up the *loka* (2 versions)
32.	*Piṅga*	The noble life compared with agriculture
33.	*Aruṇa*	The good and bad men are to be known from their good and bad behaviour-the former to be saught after, the latter to be avoided
34.	*Isigiri*	The five increasingly noble cases of forbearance
35.	*Addālaya*	One must be ever wakeful as to one's own spiritual interests
36.	*Tārāyaṇa*	Anger is to be suppressed
37.	*Sirigiri*	One must properly conduct one's movements

38.	*Sāiputta*	Good behaviour vs. evil behaviour
39.	*Saṃjaya*	Good behaviour vs. evil behaviour
40.	*Dīvāyaṇa*	The evil fruits of desiring
41.	*Iṃdanāga*	The alms are to be gathered properly not improperly
42.	*Soma*	The sinless man commits no evil
43.	*Jama*	One should not be puffed up with gains, disheartened at losses
44.	*Varuṇa*	One should not succumb to attachment and aversion
45.	*Vesamaṇa*	Preaching against evil acts in general, violence, unsteadiness of religious faith

[The last four names—the names of four *dikpālas* seem to be fictitious. And here are some cases of a stray employment of certain Jaina technical concepts :

(i) 'The 18 vices from *prāṇātipāta* down to *mithyādarśanaśalya* spoken of in sections 3, 18, 24

(ii) 'The four aspects of a phenomenon *dravya, kṣetra, kāla, bhāva* spoken of in sections 9, 32, 39, 40

(iii) The numerically arranged concepts, *catuṣkāya, pañcendriya, ṣaḍjīva* etc. occurring in section 25

(Iv) The concept of *ṣaḍjīva* occurring in secton 26

(v) The concept of 5 *samitis*, 22 *parīṣahas*, 4 *kaṣāyas* occurring in section 35

Besides, there occasionally appear manners of expression well known from other Jaina works—which might be either a later interpolation or an indication that the author concerned is a Jaina. On the whole, however, even such cases are not very many.]

CHAPTER IX

A SPECIAL RELEVANCE OF SUTTANIPĀTA FOR JAINA STUDIES

It is generally conceded that Suttanipāta contains the largest mass of the oldest pieces of Buddhist speculation. Not all passages collected in this text are equally old but a good many of them are certainly very old. In this connection three rather simple criteria should enable one to demarcate the relatively old passages from the relatively recent ones.

(1) The first of these criteria bases itself on the considerations of metre. For triṣṭubh and anuṣṭubh are two metres mostly employed in this text but triṣṭubh is an old Vedic metre that soon became obsolete in classical Sanskrit as well as Pāli. So the conclusion is legitimate that the passages here composed in triṣṭubh are relatively old. As for anuṣṭubh it too is an old vedic metre but far from becoming obsolete in classical Sanskrit and Pāli, it here became the standard metre for purposes of theoretical exposition. Hence in the case of a Suttanipāta passage composed in anuṣṭubh there is almost equal likelihood of its being relatively old and its being relatively recent—so far as the criterion in question is concerned.

(2) Our second criterion bases itself on the considerations of social outlook. For the earlier texts emanating from an ascetic sect like Buddhism are bound to be exclusively preoccupied with the problems of monastic life. Hence the Suttanipāta passages where the problems of the life of a pious householder are touched upon are likely to be relatively recent.

(3) Our third criterion bases itself on the occurrence or otherwise of the standard technical concepts. For it is only natural to expect that in the course of the growth of an ideological tradition newer and newer technical concepts make their appearance with the passage of time. For example, it is easy to note that so many technical concepts appearing in Abhidhammapiṭaka are absent in Sūttapiṭaka or are present there in a rather rudimentary form; in a like manner, so many technical concepts appearing in the other texts of Sūttapiṭaka are absent in Suttanipāta or are present there in a rather rudimentary form. Hence more Suttanipāta passages which exhibit a greater acquintance with the relatively more advanced technical concepts of Buddhist speculation are likely to be relatively recent.

Broadly the same position as is occupied by Suttanipāta in relation to the Buddhist canon is occupied in relation to the Jaina Canon by *Ācā*-rāṅga I, Sūtrakṛtāṅga I, Uttarādhyayana and Daśavaikālika. This means

that the three criteria posed above are applicable in the case of these four Jaina texts almost as much as they are in the case of Suttanipāta; (only we have to remember that the standard metre of classical Prakrit is *āryā* —so that in our Jaina texts a passage composed in anuṣṭubh is less likely to be recent). This aspect of the relationship obtaining between Suttanipāta on the one hand and the Jaina texts in quastion on the other might profitably be made the subject-matter of a detailed investigation; for the present, however, we are interested in another aspect of their mutual relationship. Thus there are Suttanipāta passages which throw interesting light on certain technical concepts of Jainism, concepts which obviously are not current among Buddhists. The supposition ought to be that these passages represent that part of the common ancestral heritage of the Buddhists and Jainas which, for one reason or another, was taken special note of by the latter.

Let the concepts in question and the relevant passages be considered in some details.

(1) The concepts of *āsrava, saṁvara* and *nirjarā* as understood in later Jainism are never elucidated in our old Jaina texts. Even in later texts the first tendency was to couple *āsrava* with *saṁvara, nirjarā* with *vedana,* and it was only in due course that these three concepts *āsrava, saṁvara* and *nirjarā* were understood in terms of the analogy of a leaking boat stranded in the midst of water. Thus ultimately *āsrava* was likened to the act of water entering such a boat, *saṁvara* to the act of closing its leaks, *nirjarā* to the act of emptying it of the water already entered. It is in the same circle of ideas that the following Suttanipāta passage moves.

> *savanti savvadhi sotā sotānaṃ kiṃ nivāraṇaṃ /*
> *sotānaṃ saṃvaraṃ brūhi kena sotā pidhiyyare // V.* 59.

[Here *sravaṇa* is parallel to *āsrava, nivāraṇā* parallel to *nirjarā,* while *saṁvara* effected through *pidhāna* is parallel to *saṁvara.*] The world of transmigration compared to the flooded waters was an extremely favourite theme of our old Jaina texts as well as Suttanipāta, and in the background of this comparison it was not difficult for the later Jaina concepts of *āsrava, saṁvara* and *nirjarā* to make their appearance. Even then, the way these concepts appear in later Jainism has a ring of suddenness about it. The present Suttanipāta passage should render understandable the transition from the old thought-world to the new.

(2) The later Jaina concept of 22 *parīṣahas* is represented in our old Jaina texts under the general title *sparśa.* Soon it was also customary to speak of four *sparśas*-viz. *śītasparśa, uṣṇasparśa, daṁsamaśakasparśa,*

tṛṇasparśa. In the final list of 22 *pariṣahas* all these four appear but the word *sparśa* is appended to the fourth alone; (people even forgot that *sparśa* was in olden times what *pariṣaha* was now). In Suttanipāta *parissaya* (meaning the same thing as *parīṣaha*) is a word of frequent occurrence (e. g. 42, 45, 52; 770, 921, 960, 965, 966 and once (923) we even hear of "*sparśena spṛṣṭasya*". In 52 the following six *parissayas* are enumerated: *śīta, uṣṇa, kṣudhā, pipāsā, vātātapa, daṃśasarisṛpa*; all these except the fifth appear in the final list of 22 *pariṣahas–daṁśasarisṛpa* under the title *daṃśamaśaka*. In 960 the question is posed exactly in the manner of the later Jaina texts: "How many *parissayas* are there ?" The answer is forthcoming in vv. 964–966 and runs roughly as follows: "The monk should not be afraid of the following five things: *daṃśādhipatis, sarisṛpas, manuṣyasparśas, catuṣpadas, paramādhārmika*. He should also put up with the other *parissayas; spṛṣṭa* by *ātaṅka-spraśa* and *kṣudhā* he should reside in *śīta* and *atyuṣṇa* places, *spṛṣṭa* by all these in various manners he should persevere." This answer introduces two more items of the final list of 22 *parisahās*, for *ātaṃkasparśa* is equivalent to *roga* and *manuṣyasparśa* might well be equivalent to *vadha*, (as for the remaining two items–viz. *catuṣpada* and *paramādhārmika*—they are absent in the final list). Even otherwise we here find interesting light thrown on the concepts of *parīṣaha, sparśa* and all that.

(3) A conspicuous injunction of the Jaina disciplinary texts is to the effect that a monk should not beg for alms in return for religious preaching. On the face of it the injunction is rather intriguing, for it is through religious preaching alone that a monk can possibly 'earn' his livelihood. On further consideration it appears that this injunction was formulated at the time when the monastic institution had just taken its rise and the monk was uncompromising in his criticism of the life of a householder. But since a monk must inevitably receive alms from the householders themselves the fear was that just at the time of begging for alms he might become mild in his criticism of the life of a householder. Hence the injunction that a monk must not undertake religious preaching just at the time of begging for alms. Some confirmation of this surmise comes from Suttanipāta 81 where Buddha refuses to receive the professed alms because the donor had earlier entered into disputation with him and had to be silenced by putting records straight; (the same verse recurs as 480 where too the alms has been refused though the 'exchange of words' preceding this refusal is relatively mild.)

(4) A conspicuous feature of the Jaina treatment of ethical problems had been to say about an evil-doer that he either himself commits a particular evil act or gets it committed by someone else or approves of it when committed by someone else. The tradition of saying that one commits an

evil act either through body or through speech or through mind evolved comparatively later. As a matter of fact, this new formulation was meant to replace that original one inasmuch as an evil act committed by oneself was equated with such an act committed through body, an evil act got committed by someone else was equated with it committed through speech, while an evil act approved of when committed by someone else was equated with it committed through mind. In course of time this relationship between the two formulations was forgotten and it became customary to speak of a triple evil act committed in a triple manner–i. e. an evil act committeci through body, speech or mind and in each case it either committed by oneself or committed by someone else or approved of when committed by someone else. As for the standard list of evil acts one that gradually crystallized contained five items–viz. violence, falsehood, theft, incontinence, acquisitiveness; and to it was often added a sixth item in the form of nightly eating. The culmination of this whole development is to be seen in Daśavaikālika Chapter IV where the six evil acts in question are spoken of and in the case of each mention is made of 'a triple evil act committed in a triple manner.' Something like the same development is hinted at in Suttanipāta 393–401. For here in vv. 394–399 five evil acts are spoken of and in each case mention is made of 'an evil act committed by oneself or got committed by someone else or approved of when committed by someone else.' As for the identity of these five evil acts they are the same as those included in the basic Jaina list but with one exception; for here the item 'drinking' takes the place of the item 'acquisitiveness' of that list. This whole treatment seems to be self-closed but in v. 400 a bare mention is made of six evil acts–viz. the five just described and a sixth in the form of 'nightly eating'. This latter too might be a self-closed treatment but maybe it is not so. For v. 401 mentions two more evil acts, viz. 'employment of garlands-and-perfume' and 'sleeping except on bare ground-or-cot', and it concludes by saying, 'This eightfold pious conduct (in the form of desistence from the eight evil acts under consideration) has been made public by Buddha'—so that it might be likely that v. 400 and v. 401 were composed together. Viewing thus one should be in a position to detect in the present section of Sutttanipāta certain tendencies characteristic of Jaina speculation. They are :

(i) To speak of an evil act as committed by oneself or got committed by someone else or approved of when committed by someone else;

(ii) To formulate a basic list of five evil acts —where four items are violence, falsehood, theft, incontinence;

(iii) To add to the basic list of evil acts a supplementary item in the form of 'nightly eating', an item about which it is difficult to be certain why it has been accorded as important a status as the five items of the original list.

[Also to be noted are its two tendencies not characteristic of Jaina speculation ;

(i) To treat 'drinking' rather than 'acquisitiveness' as an item in the basic list of evil acts;

(ii) To add to the basic list of evil acts three items in all about which it is difficult to be certain why they have been accorded as important a status as the five items of the original list.]

(5) At some stage in the growth of Jaina thought the concepts of *gupti* and *samiti* began to be employed and the trend culminated in the final formulation of the technical concepts of 'threefold *gupti*' and 'fivefold *samiti*.' Some sort of distinction between *gupti* and *samiti* is also known to Suttanipāta as is evident from its expression

kāyagutto vacīgutto āhāre udare yato (78)

(That there was a tradition of treating *samita* and *yata* as somehow equivalent can be gathered from that old standing of synonyms '*sahie samie sayā jae*')

(6) *kevala* is a word very frequently employed in the later Jaina texts. When used as an adjective of *jñāna* it means 'all-comprehensive'. So that the word *kevalajñānin* (or simply *kevalin*) means 'omniscient'. The word *kevalin* is also known to Suttanipāta but it generally (e. g. in 82) occurs in the midst of commendatory epithet attributed to some personage or other and it is difficult to make out its precise import. But in one case at least this word occurs in a different sort of context and that proves to be of great help in this connection. Thus in v. 595 two Brahmin youngmen introduce themselves to Buddha by saying *tevijjānaṃ yadakkhātaṃ tatra Kevalino'samase* — meaning 'we are thoroughly conversant with what the three Vedas have to say'. So in respect of any field of knowledge whatsoever that person is to be called *kevalin* who is thoroughly conversant with it. And since in a text like Suttanipāta the chief subject-matter is *mokṣa* the word *kevalin*, when used here as a commendatory epithet without qualification, should usually mean 'one thoroughly conversant with the problem of *mokṣa*'. The same should be the case with the oldest Jaina texts, though the later Jaina authors are unanimous in their understanding that the word simply means 'omniscient'. These later Jaina authors perhaps argued to themselves that one thoroughly conversant with the problem of *mokṣa* must be omniscient. Their argument

might or might not be valid but it certainly resulted in their attributing *to the word kevalin meaning which it did not possess originally. In any case, the word as thus understood remained confined to the Jaina camp;* (the later Buddhist authors simply gave up this word and even when of them would attribute omniscience to Buddha they used in this connection not this word but the simple word *sarvajña.*)

(7) Certain passages of Suttanipāta tend to throw light on an aspect of the growth of Jaina epistemological thought. The later Jaina authors divide cognition into two types—viz. *darśana* and *jñāna* and they divide *jñāna* into an ordinary type and an extraordinary type; the ordinary type of *jñāna* is divided into two sub-types —viz. *mati* and *śruta*. Now the origin of the words *darśana, mati* and *śruta* is to be traced in that old series of adjectives *diṭṭhaṃ, suyaṃ, muyaṃ, viṇṇāyaṃ*—which twice occurs in Ācārāṅga I and the origin of the words *mati* and *śruta* is also to be traced in the expression '*atha puṇa taṃ jāṇejjā sahasammuiyāe paravāgaraṇeṇaṃ aṇṇassa vā antike soccā*' which too occurs twice in the same text. The noteworthy thing is that the series of adjectives *diṭṭhaṃ, sutaṃ, mutaṃ, viññātaṃ,* (wholly or in part) frequently occurs in Suttanipāta IV and V (e. g. in vv. 790, 793, 797, 798, 802, 812,839-40, 887,901, 1078, 1086, 1122) and the word *sammuti* too occurs several times in Suttanipāta (e. g. in 897, 904, 911) while the word *mutīmā* occurs in Suttanipāta 61, 321, 539, 385. Of course, in these Suttanipāta passages the cognition characterized as *diṭṭhaṃ, sutaṃ, mutaṃ, viññātaṃ* has generally come in for condemnation—the one exception occurring in 1122 where such congnition is attributed to Buddha himself: similarly, the cognition called *sammuti* has here always come in for condemnatiou, (on the other hand, *muttimā* is apparently a commendatory epithet). What all this signifies can be a matter of dispute. Maybe the authors of these passages wanted to condemn all humanly attained cognition on account of its vacuity, maybe they wanted to condemn it on account of its relativity. But in any case, they must have meant *diṭṭha, suta, muta, viññāta* possibly qualify humanly attained cognition and that *sammuti* is a possible case of humanly attained cognition, and in this they would be one with the authors of Ācārāṅga I who on their part had no intention to condemn all humanly attained cognition either on account of its alleged vacuity or on account of its alleged relativity. It seems that *diṭṭha* stood for the type of cognition attained through vision, *muta* for the type of cogition attained through one's own cogitation, and *suta* for the type of cognition attained on the basis of someone else's testimony. As for *sammuti* it seems to have been but a later synonym for the *muta* type of cognition; (its lateness is supported by the consideration that by the time it made its appearance *sammuti* perhaps became a better comprehensible word than it and so the

Bnddhist manuscripts begin to have *sammati* as an alternative reading for it [*muttimā*–meaning sagacious—too seems to be a later derivation because in its case too the Buddist manuscripts begin to have *matttimā* as an alternative reading]. Viewed in this light that Ācārāṅga I passage speaking of *sahasammuīyā* etc. turns out to be a considerably precise commentary on the words *muya* and *suya* occurring in that old formula *diṭṭhaṃ, suyaṃ, muyaṃ* etc. A still more precise commentary on the same (more precise because from an unnecessary duplication of *suya*) is to be found in Sūtrakṛtāṅga 8·14 (where the employment of the word *sammai* instead of *sammui* is also noteworthy); on the other hand, Sūtrakṛtāṅga I. 13. 19, though otherwise similar, oddly uses the phrase '*saym sameccā* (=*svayaṃ sametya*') while presumably paraphrasing *saha sammuiyāe*. The word *mai* itself first occurs in Dasavaikālika 5. 1. 76 where *daṃsaṇa* too is taken within the purview but where *suya* is described essentially in the old manner of Ācārāṅga I. Be that as it may, the later Jaina concepts of *darśana, mati* and *śruta* are ultimately traceable to a formula that was as much familiar to the old Buddhists as it was to the old Jainas—this much can be demonstrated with tolerable certainty on the basis of the Suttanipāta passages under consideration,

These are some of the major questions in connection with which a study of the relevant passages of Suttanipāta should facilitate the understanding and appreciation of the concerned Jaina position. An average student of Suttanipāta is more likely to pass over these passages without paying any special attention to them For such a student would be looking here for things essentially Buddhist while it is the very nature of the passages in question—at least of them as viewed from the standpoint of the aspects under consideration–that they bring to light things essentially Jaina rather than more essentially Buddhist. The real value of a study of these passages as has been made here lies in that it contributes towards the settlement of a historical question of some importance. As contrasted to Brahmanism both Buddhism and Jainism are ascetic traditions and both made their appearance near about the same time. It is therefore very natural to expect that the older texts of the two traditions should share such features as pertain to the essentials of asceticism; however, when in addition it is discovered that an old text of one tradition contains ideas which were later given prominence not by this tradition but by the other the presumption is strengthend that the two traditions were particularly close kins in the beginning. It is this latter point that we have sought to underline by making a study of those rather obscure passages of Suttanipāta where such ideas are expressed as were later developed not by the Buddhists but by the Jainas.

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INDEX I

SANSKRIT AND PRAKRIT TERMS

INDEX II

NAMES OF PERSONS WORKS ETC.

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