Exposition of Šabda-Saktis by Siddhicandragani

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Siddhicandra, a contemporary of the Emperor Akbar received an epithet ‘Khushfaham’ from the king due to his extraordinary intelligence. He was not only a renowned commentator on the classical works like Kādāmbarī, Jain Stotra literature, dictionaries, roots etc. but also wrote original works like Bhānučandra caritam etc. and compiled anthologies of Sanskrit and Prākrit literature.

His work Kāvyaprakāśakhaṇḍana, although not original in nature, refutes the renowned work by Mammāta i.e. Kāvyaprakāśa. While refuting Kāvyaprakāśa he has refuted the uncertain power of words viz. vyañjanā. This refutation is based on logical ground which has a harmony with Jain thought and philosophy.

After accepting three categories of meaning viz. vācya, laksya and vyangya, Siddhicandra skips over to sankṣeta viz. (सांकेतिकता ज्ञात्वमिति स बाचकः। संकेतितत्त्वमेदं ज्ञात्वमिति तत्त्वेदं संकेतविद्यते वा) VII. (2) and VIII. Siddhicandra does not quote the original). He has quoted a verse that vācakatva has a power and this power is found in the genus (and not in individual (स्पष्टतः ज्ञात्तत्वमेदं बाचकत्वमेदं ज्ञात्तत्वीति संकेतविद्यते बा) and the Abhidhā as it is explained by some that it is a desire of the God. That a particular word should convey a particular meaning, in the opinion of Siddhicandra, is incorrect. He thinks that it is absolutely a different substance. (ईश्वरेद्धातविषयेऽऽपि पदार्थार्थसम्बन्धम् स) ।

Individual or genus : The discussion raised by Siddhicandra is that of connoration of individual or genus. In his opinion, the power should lie with expression that conveys the meaning (वाचकत्वम्). Following this logic the power should lie with individual which expresses the meaning and not with genus. But transgressing this norm of logic he supports the Jātivāda and thinks that individual is qualified by the genus. By accepting power in individual, three defects come into existence :

i. Multiplicity of Individuals.
ii. Infinitude.
iii. Fallacious argument.

But where anantya (infinitude) and vyabhicāra defects do not exist, it may be accepted in individual also e.g. the sky where both these defects do not appear. It appears Siddhicandra does not believe in comprehension qualified by genus because it involves a long procedure of comprehension through laksanā or ākṣepa or vyañjanā which in itself requires a fiction of cause and effect relationship without which it is impossible. Siddhicandra believes in direct comprehension of words and not the indirect fictitious procedure. The follower of the direct procedure, Siddhicandra lays a stress on abhidhā. He accepts the traditional
definition of abhidhā viz. this word shall express this meaning which is associated with the desire of God or a natural and direct meaning associated with the word.

Another problem raised by Siddhicandra pertains to the words which express their meaning through Lakṣaṇā only. Following these two categories of the words i.e. the abhidhā and Lakṣaṇā, there shall be no consistency in reasoning. But in the opinion of Siddhicandra when the word Gaṅgā (e.g. in Gaṅgāyām goṣaṇā) expresses the meaning 'stream', it is also the wish of God (tāvarecchā) which is qualified with special form (viśeṣaṇāpā). Such like words are corroborated by the use of technical grammatical terms also. For example, the terms ghu, ghi etc. in grammar have no meaning through Abhidhā but their direct meaning is conveyed by the real meaning i.e. dādāhāyadāp (Pāṇi 1.2.20) which qualifies the abhidhā. Similarly the word kākṣā : in the notion kākṣāyā dviṇi raśvavāṃ does not express crow at first meaning but all the other animals from whom the protection is sought. The word used in plural expresses all of them at first instance and the meaning of the word kākā becomes secondary. Siddhicandra’s approach is not to widen the semantic categories of words but to delimit it to the meaning which is desired by the speaker. This approach resembles those of Mimāṃsakas who associate a new power tātparya (purport) with the word and reject the other powers viz. Lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā. But in nomenclature Siddhicandra accepts abhidhā whereas Mimāṃsakas accept tātparya.

Siddhicandra gives only casual remarks about the categories of Lakṣaṇā.

Process of comprehension in ‘Gaurvāhikāḥ’

There is a difference of vocabulary in the comprehension of ‘Gaurvāhikāḥ’ between Mammaṭa and Siddhicandra. Mammaṭa has quoted the opinion of some scholars (Kecī) in whose opinion the cow qualified by foolishness etc. (Jāyamāṇḍya) identifies itself with Vāhika. The instrumentality of identity are the qualities foolishness etc. Siddhicandra has also quoted the opinion of a few scholars. The cow qualified by the qualities of foolishness etc. equates itself with Vāhika consisting of similar qualities. Siddhicandra almost follows Mammaṭa verbatim.

Another opinion quoted by Mammaṭa (ityanye) is that in procedure both cow and Vāhika eliminate from the picture and the only remenant object is foolishness. But in the opinion of Siddhicandra cow and Vāhika are not eliminated but it is only through their existence that the word cow expresses Vāhika. It is not only the quality foolishness etc. but the really existent substance that is qualified by the quality foolishness. To illustrate he has quoted another example मुख चन्द्र : where beauty is expressed and the substance face and moon do not disappear from the picture.

Another opinion quoted by Mammaṭa is that only the qualities like foolishness exist and not the real substance which is an instrument only and does not exist on the picture at all.

In the opinion of Siddhicandra juxtaposition (yogātā) is a pre-requisite qualification for the identity of knowledge. To join cow with Vāhika, the joining substance is foolishness. Otherwise there shall be no relationship of cow and Vāhika which are absolutely separate entities. Moreover, to elaborate his thesis, Siddhicandra has taken the resort of a dictum (nāyā) that the comprehension of knowledge can be created by the word even if the exact meaning is not communicated by it.² It means the words cow and

1. Siddhicandra (K. P. Kh. p. 7.) gives only the line श्रवण्यातात्त्वात्त्वादि प्रमाणस्वायत्त ।
2. K. P. Khaṇḍana, p. 8. अप्रत्यास्त्त्विता ह्यमेव हार ब्रह्म: करोति ।

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Vāhika definitely communicate their own meaning; they may or they may not communicate the desired meaning of foolishness which is desired from it. Hence the existence of the substance which is an instrument for the expression of meaning does not at all eliminate from the picture.

Refuting Laksanā, Siddhacandra has first taken an argument about Sādṛśya which was used in the Kārikā of Kāvyaprakāśa (II. 12). In his opinion the substitute of Laksanā is “imposition of meaning” (आयुर्वैतिक प्रत्यय वा तत्सम्बन्ध). It is not necessary that the possibility of Laksanā is through “Similarity” (sādṛśya) only. Beyond similarity or non-similarity, there exists another relationship of cause and effect etc. For example in ‘Āyurghṛtām’ or Āyurvedam, the relationship of Ayu and gṛha is that of cause and effect relationship. Their relationship comes into existence not due to an uncertain power but due to an extraordinary definite power.¹

It appears that Siddhacandra is in favour of a definite word power which is related to the words and has its logical and rational explanation. It is not an arbitrary power, which, when applied, conveys any meaning desired by the speaker. This arbitrariness which is communicated by Laksanā has been refuted by Siddhacandra on the ground of uncertainty in it.

Vyañjanā : Why? Siddhacandra has refuted vyañjanā on the ground that it has no logical evidence (Pramanābāhāvat). The need of vyañjanā has been negated ab initio on the ground that wheresoever Laksanāmūladhāvanī exists, there will be no rational explanation of the words which will result in the expression of a special meaning, e.g. in ग्रहयात्र चाल: the coldness and sacredness which is related to the words through denotation (Laksanā) shall appear automatically and will express its deeper meaning. If the meaning is communicated through Laksanā, what is the need of the assumption of Vyañjanā?

The second ground of refutation of vyañjanā is its application in dramatic literature. “For the suggestion of Rasa, Vyañjanā must be accepted” is the opinion in prima-facie.²

In the opinion of Siddhacandra, it is a very weak argument. Infact, aesthetic enjoyment comes into existence from the pleasure of dramas etc. directly and has no indirect channel like vyañgya interferes in it. The perceptive object is not to be interpreted by an inferential logic.³

In the interpretation of the verses like भग चतुर्दश वाक्यं च and हम गते सम্ভवति क्रोणिन्यताम्, etc., the meaning that this place is not worth walking shall be obtained by inference (अनुमान) and hence there is no need of vyañjanā. Moreover, in his opinion, the indirect channels like inference and suggestions are not to be brought in this context because the meaning is directly obtained. Moreover, Siddhacandra has corroborated his argument by the Mimāmsakas who accept tātparya (purport) as the power of the word and in his opinion there is no contradiction of tātparya with lakṣyārtha. Refuting that vyañjakatā exists in the gestures etc., Siddhacandra propounds that the gestures express their meaning only through inference because each and every gesture has a definite meaning which is attributed to it and is comprehended through inference at a later stage. Siddhacandra does not accept any other power called vyañjanā. Infact, he accepts only six categories of lakṣanā which are propounded by Mammaṭa (KP. II. 12). In his opinion vyañjanā is such a deep imagination that may attract the objects other than desired. The argument in

¹ ibid., p. 8 अनुमानवैवेद्यविषयें च बाय्यविभारिण च तत्कारितव वल्मिक।
² K. P. Khandana, p. 9, रसयज्ञकार्त्य व्याज्ञानअवधारणाय प्रवृत्ति।
³ ibid., p. 9, रसयज्ञकार्त्या व्याज्ञानकार्त्यावसायस्य प्रवृत्ति वद्वोक्तुवैकृतम् अनुपुस्तायश्रयहितान्तर। वस्तुतत् नाद्यातिर्दर्शन-वयमुख विवेशस्वेत् रसस्वयमाणिः तथा आयुर्वैतिकान्तर। भविष्यता वायकार्तिकायतः।

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prima facie that the power which generates sacredness in the phrases like Gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ is vyañjanā. It is different from Abhidhā; it consists of a relationship of meaning viz. comprehension through binding (bādhitabodhakatva) which is not present in abhidhā.

But Siddhicandra refutes it on the ground that the relationship of ‘Bādhitabodhakatva’ may be derived from the abhidhā itself. The dictum that the imagination of characteristics (yām kānno) should be lesser than the object itself (yām kānnaṁ yām kānno lābhasatīti nītyaṁ). Only the change of nomenclature cannot prove the different object (nāmānātāravartanī vasānāravatānāṁ).

Another argument laid down to prove vyañjanā is that when we use two different expressions “Anenedamukta” i.e. it has been said by this or vyāñjitam i.e. suggested, both of them express different meanings (Pratityorvailakṣaṇāt). In other words we have to accept both Abhidhā and vyañjanā as different powers.

But in the opinion of Siddhicandra, in both the above cases viz. anenedamukta or vyāñjitam, there is no difference in the comprehension of the meaning. The same meaning can be comprehended if we apply the power Lakṣaṇā or inference.

Another argument put forth by prima facie that if there is no need of vyañjanā and everything is proved by inference (anumāṇa), the whole of the procedure of comprehension of knowledge should be different. The comprehension is, “ghaṭam ānaya” (bring the jar) should not be through Ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā etc. but should have a full procedure following inference only. To explain, the procedure should not be directly related to comprehension of ‘a jar’ through perception but should be comprehended through inference only in order to establish the harmony in the system.

Siddhicandra has accepted this challenge in order to establish inference. In his opinion juxtaposition (yogyatā) has no special definition and it communicates only an unqualified doubtful knowledge. For the comprehension of knowledge, doubt is an obstruction. Inference in one of the means of removing the doubt when the words are the referents, there is no need of any type of application of vyāpti. In agnīnā śīnçati, there is no semantic juxtaposition and we can infer the incorrectness of the use although grammatically it is correct. In the opinion of Siddhicandra, even by the application of inference we do not reach a different conclusion. So the validity of the comprehension of words through inference is also correct. Hence there is no need of far-fetched power vyañjanā.

Conclusion:

Siddhicandra believes in the direct and definite meaning of speech. The uncertainty of speech in vyañga does not suit him. In his opinion words express definite meaning. The meaning through inference is nearer to the denotative meaning because it has a relevance to the words used whereas vyañjanā has no certainty. The uncertainty in meaning would perhaps, bring anarchy not only in the language but also in the society which would apply it for its own profit and would defeat the fundamental purpose of language by false and incorrect subjective interpretations. It was against the norms of ‘satya’ in Jain ethics. It appears in order to bring harmony of language with Jain ethics, Siddhicandra preferred to accept ‘inference’ as the medium for correctness of words and gave up the conceitful expression vyañjanā.

1. K. P. Khaṇḍana p. 11.

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