

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JAINISM

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Jainism has many distinctive characteristics of its own and historically it occupies a place mid-way between Brahmanism on the one hand and Buddhism on the other. The Jaina motto of life is ascetic or stoic. The path to happiness and prosperity lies through self-denial, self-abnegation and self-mortification. The fundamental principle of Jainism is *ahimsā* or non-harming, which is the first principle of higher life, which Mahāvīra inculcated to his disciples and followers. Pārśva laid stress on the doctrine of *ahimsā*. Its visible effect was sought to be shown how the brute creation happily responded to the non-harming and compassionate attitude of men. The attainment of *nirvāṇa* is the highest goal. The practice of *tapas* or austerities marks and characterises all the prescriptions, practices, and disciplines in Jainism. By purity of heart one reaches *nirvāṇa*, which consists in peace.¹ *Nirvāṇa* is freedom from pain and is difficult of approach.² It is the safe, happy, and quiet place which the sages reach. An ascetic will by means of his simplicity enter the path of *nirvāṇa*. He who possesses virtuous conduct and life, who has practised the best self-control, who keeps himself aloof from sinful influences, and who has destroyed 'karma' will surely obtain *mukti* or salvation or deliverance. In Buddhism *nirvāṇa* is declared by the Buddhas as the highest condition (*paramam*). It is the greatest happiness (*paramam sukham*). With the vision of *nirvāṇa*, the sinful nature vanishes for ever (*attham gacchanti āsavā*). With the Jainas *parinirvāṇa* is the last fruit or final consummation of the highest perfection attained by man or attainable in human life.³ But with them *parinirvāṇa* is the same term as *nirvāṇa*,⁴ or *mokṣa* meaning final liberation that comes to pass on the complete waning out or exhaustion, of the accumulated strength or force of *karma*. The liberation is not anything unreal but the best thing. It can be realised by a man in the highest condition of aloofness and transcen-

1. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, I, 8.18.
2. Cf. *Visuddhimagga*, p. 612; *Vinaya*, I, 8; *Ibid.*, II, 156; *Dhammapada*, V. 204.
3. *Kalpasūtra*, Jacobi's Ed., 120—*Tassaṇaṃ .. anuttareṇaṃ nāṇeṇaṃ .. daṃsaneṇaṃ .. caritteṇaṃ .. āloṇaṃ .. vihāreṇaṃ .. virieṇaṃ .. ajjoveṇaṃ .. maddaveṇaṃ .. lāghaveṇaṃ .. khamṭie .. muttie .. guttie .. tuṭṭhīe .. buddhīe .. sacca—saṃyama—tavasucariya—sovaciya—phala—parinivvāṇa ..*
4. *Ibid.*, p. 187—*tammi samae Mahāvīro nivvuo.*

dentiality of himself.¹ *Mokṣa* is the essential point in the teachings of Mahāvīra which is generally understood as emancipation. It really means the attainment of the highest state of sanctification by the avoidance of pains and miseries of worldly life. Even at this stage the soul appears to be the same without the least change in its condition. It is the state of perfect beatitude as attained. It may also mean final deliverance or liberation from the fetters of worldly life and total annihilation or extinction of human passion.²

In Jainism, however, *nirvāna* or *mokṣa* is not a dreadful or terrible term like the Buddhist *parinirvāna* which suggests at once an idea of the complete annihilation of the individuality of a saint after death by the simile of the total extinction of a burning lamp on the exhaustion of the oil and the wick.³ So the point is discussed in the Jaina *Mokṣasiddhi*. "Would you really think (with the Buddhist) that *nirvāna* is a process of extinction of human soul which is comparable to the process of extinction of a burning lamp (on the exhaustion of the oil and the wick)?"⁴ The hearer is advised not to think like that. For with the Jainas *nirvāna* is nothing but a highly special or transcendental condition of human soul in which it remains eternally and absolutely free from passion, hatred, birth, decay, disease and the like because of the complete waning out of all causes of *dukkha* or suffering (*śato vidyamānasya jīvasya viśiṣṭā kācid avasthā. Kathambhūtā? Rāga-dveṣa-janmajarārogādīduḥkhakṣayarūpā.*

Jainism cherishes a theory of soul as an active principle in contradistinction to the Vedānta or Sāṃkhya doctrine of soul as a passive principle. Buddhism repudiates it. The plurality of souls is a point in Jaina philosophy, which is the same as in the Sāṃkhya system. The main point of difference between the two is that in Jainism the souls with consciousness as their fundamental attribute are vitally concerned with our actions, moral and immoral, virtuous and wicked, in which sense they are active principles; while in the Sāṃkhya system the *puraṣas* with consciousness as their fundamental attribute are passive principles in as much as their nature is not affected by any and all of the activities relegated to *Prakṛti* or evolvent. In Jainism the souls or substances do

1. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, I, 10.12.
2. *Uttarādhyāyana Sūtra*, XXVIII, 30
3. Cf. Aśvaghōṣa's *Saundarananda Kāvya*, 16. vv. 28-29.
4. *Mannasi kiṃ dīvaṣṣa ca nāso nivvanam̐ assa jivassa?* quoted in the *Abhidhāna-Rajendra*, *sub voce Nibbāna*,

not undergo any change. They are liable to changes due to changes in circumstances. Both the systems necessitate a careful consideration of the cosmical, biological, embryological, physical, mental and moral positions of the living individuals (*jīvas*) of the world as a whole. These constitute the scientific background of the two systems of thought. These constitute also the scientific background of Vedānta and Buddhism. The Jainas developed a cosmographical gradation of beings, more or less in agreement with those adopted in other systems. But the Jainas followed a tradition of Indian thought which took a hylozoistic view of nature that there is nothing formed even in the world of matter, nothing which exists in space and time, which does not represent some kind or form or type of *jīva*. It is assumed that all of them are in the process of development or evolution in the physical structures, modes of generation, foods, and drinks, deportments, behaviours, actions, thoughts, ideas, knowledge, intelligence and the like. So we need not be astonished when Jainism speaks of earth-lives, water-lives, fire-lives and wind-lives, each with its numerous subdivisions. The *Bhagavatī Sūtra* points out that soul in Jainism as in most of the Indian systems is the factor which polarizes the field of matter and brings about the organic combination of the elements of existence. If the position be that death means an event which takes place when the soul leaves the body, the question arises whether it passes off in some form of corporeality (*asarīrī*) or without any such corporeality (*asarīrī*). Here too the traditional Jaina position is, it may be that it goes out in some form of corporeality and it may equally be that it does so without any form of corporeality (*Siya sarīrī vakkamai, siya asarīrī vakkamai*). With reference to the gross body characterised as *audārika*, *vaikriya* and *āhāraka*, the soul goes out without any corporeality, while with reference to the subtle body characterised as *taijasa* and *kārmaṇa* (*karmic*), it departs in its subtle body. The Jainas deny not the existence of soul but the unalterable character of soul.¹ The Jaina belief is a belief in the transmigration of souls, a point in which it differs from the Buddhist conception of rebirth without any transmigration of soul from embodiment to embodiment.

Puggala, *attā*, *satta* and *jīva* are the four terms which occur in Buddhism in connection with all discussions relating to individual,

1. Cf. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, I, 12.21; *Majjhima*, I, *Sutta* No. XIV; cf. *Sutta* No. LXXVI; *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, I, 6.27; I, 10.17.

individuality, personality, self and soul.¹ As a biological term *puggala* is nowhere used to deny the existence of an individual being or a living person. The particular individual or individuals are beings that exist in fact, grow in time and ultimately die. The individuals are signified by some names arbitrarily fixed. The personal name is only a conventional device to denote an individual and to distinguish him from other individuals. It has no connotation beyond this symbolism. In the Abhidhamma literature of the Buddhists *puggala* is equal to character or soul. According to the Buddhists an individual has no real existence. The term *puggala* does not mean anything real. It is only apparent truth (*sammutisacca*) as opposed to real truth (*paramattha sacca*). A *puggala-vādin's* view is that the person is known in the sense of real and ultimate fact. But he is not known in the same way as other real and ultimate facts are known. He or she is known in the sense of a real or ultimate fact and his or her material quality is also known in the sense of a real or ultimate fact. But it cannot truly be said that the material quality is one thing and that the person another, nor can it be truly predicted that the person is related or absolute, conditioned or unconditioned, eternal or temporal, or whether the person has external features or whether he is without any. One who has material quality in the sphere of matter is a person, but it cannot be said that one who experiences desires of sense in the sphere of sense-desire, is a person. The genesis of the person is apparent, his passing away and duration are also distinctively apparent. But it cannot be said that the person is conditioned.² According to the *Tattvārthādhigama sūtra*, *puggala* is one of the non-soul extensive substances. The other non-soul extensive substances are *dharma*, *adharmā*, *ākāśa* and *kāya*. *Kāya* is taken here in the sense of 'extensive', having extent like the body.

According to the *Bhagavatī Sūtra* (XV. 1), the organic world is characterised by six constant and opposed phenomena, viz., gain and loss, pleasure and pain, life and death. It clearly presupposes the development of atomic theory (*paramāṇuvāda*) in Indian philosophy. Each atom is the smallest unitary whole of matter (*pudgala*). Each of them is characterised by its internal cohesion (*siṅgha*). We cannot speak of half

1. *Kāthāvatthu*, I, p. 26.

2. Cf. *Kāthāvatthu on Puggala*; Law, *Designation of Human Types*, Introduction, P.T.S. publication; Law, *Concepts of Buddhism* Chap. VII.

an atom (*araddha*) since an atom is an indivisible unit of matter. With division it ceases to be an atom (*paramāṇoḥ ardhīkaraṇe paramāṇu-tvābhāvaprasaṅgāt*).

A molecule (*aṇu*) is a combination of more atoms than one. An aggregate of matter (*skandha*) results from an organic combination of five molecules. Disintegration of a corporeal aggregate results from the separation of the molecules and atoms. Here one may realise the force of the Jaina argument for regarding even material beings, the earth-lives, water-lives etc. as distinct forms of life, each appearing as an individual with its internal cohesion so long as it exists as such. So through the process of organic development or evolution, we pass through the different degrees and forms of internal cohesion.

Karma plays an important part in the Jaina metaphysics. In Jainism *karma* may be worked off by austerity, service rendered to the ascetics or to the poor, the helpless and the suffering by giving them food, water, shelter or clothing. It does not mean a deed or some invisible mystical force. It is the deed of the soul. It is a material forming a subtle bond of extremely refined matter which keeps the soul confined to its place of origin or the natural abode of full knowledge and everlasting peace. The Jainas believe *karma* to be the result of actions, arising out of four sources :

(1) The first source of *Karma* is attachment to worldly things.

(2) *Karma* is produced by uniting one's body, mind and speech with worldly things; *karma* is endangered by giving the rein to anger, pride, deceit or greed; and lastly false belief is a fruitful source of *karma*. In Hinduism we find that God inflicts punishment for evil *karma*, whereas in Jainism, *karma* accumulates energy and automatically works it off without any outside intervention. The Hindus think of *karma* as formless while the Jainas think of it as having form. *Karma* is divided in Jainism according to its nature, duration, essence, and content. According to the Jainas there are eight kinds of *karma* : The first kind hides knowledge from us (*Jñānāvaraṇīya karma*); the second kind prevents us from holding the true faith (*darśanāvaraṇīya*); the third kind causes us to experience either the sweetness of happiness or the bitterness of misery (*vedanīya karma*); the fourth kind known as *mohanīya karma* bemuses all the human faculties; it results from worldly attachments and indulgence of the passions; the fifth kind determines the length of time

which a *jīva* must spend in the form with which his *Karma* has endowed him (*āyu karma*). The sixth karma known as the *nāma-karma* decides which of the four states or conditions shall be our particular *gati*. *Nāma karma* has many divisions. The seventh kind is *gotra-karma*. It is the *gotra* or the caste which determines a man's life, his occupation, the locality in which he may live, his marriage, his religious observances and even his food. There are two chief divisions of this *Karma*. It decides whether a living being shall be born in a high or in a low caste family. The *Antarāya* karma is the last and the eighth kind.¹ Here *karma* always stands as an obstacle, e.g., *lābhāntarāya*, *bhogāntarāya*, *upabhogāntarāya* and *vīryāntarāya*.² There are four kinds of *ghātiyakarma* (destructive *karma*) which retain the soul in mundane existence.

The Jainas hold that the soul while on the first step (*mithyātvaguna-sthānaka*) is completely under the influence of *karma* and knows nothing of the truth. The soul whirling round and round in the cycle of rebirth, loses some of its crudeness and attains to the state which enables it to distinguish between what is false and what is true. A soul remains in an uncertain condition, one moment knowing the truth and the next doubting it. A man has either through the influence of his past good deeds or by the teachings of his preceptor obtained true faith. He then realises the great importance of conduct and can take the twelve vows. The Jainas believe that, as soon as the man reaches the state of an *ayogīkevalī-guṇasthānaka*, all his *karma* is purged away and he proceeds at once to *mokṣa* (salvation) as a *siddha* or the perfected one.

The Jaina *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* (1.6.27; 1.10.17) speaks of various types of *kriyāvāda* then current in India. Buddhism was promulgated as a form of *kriyāvāda* or *karmavāda*. According to Mahāvīra, *kriyāvāda* of Jainism is sharply distinguished from *akriyāvāda* (doctrine of non-action), *ajñānavāda* (scepticism) and *vinayavāda* (formalism) precisely as in the words

1. *Aṭṭha kammāṃ vocchāmi āṇupubbim̐ jahakamaṃ
jehim̐ baddho ayaṃ jīvo saṃsāre parivaṭṭai
nāṇassāvaraṇijjaṃ daṃsanāvaraṇaṃ taḥā
veyaṇijjaṃ taḥā moham̐ āukammaṃ taheva ya
nāmakammaṃ ca goyaṃ ca antarāyaṃ taheva ya
evaṃeyāi kammāṃ aṭṭheva u samāsao*

(*Uttarādhyayanasūtra*, xxxiii, 1-3).

Antarāya is fivefold as preventing gifts, profits, momentary enjoyment, continuous enjoyment and power.

§. Stevenson, *The Heart of Jainism*, p. 183.

of the Buddha. The *kriyāvāda* of Buddhism is distinguished from *Sathāyadr̥ṣṭi* involving various types of *akriyā*, *vicikitsā* (scepticism) and *śīlavrataparāmarśa* (Pali *Sīlabbataparāmāsa*, formalism).¹ To arrive at a correct understanding of the doctrinal significance of *kriyāvāda* of Jainism, it is necessary not only to know how it has been distinguished from *akriyāvāda*, *ajñānavāda* and *vinayavāda* but also from other types of *kriyāvāda*. The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* mentions some types of *akriyāvāda* :

(1) On the dissolution of the five elements (earth, water, fire, wind and air), living beings cease to exist. On the dissolution of the body the individual ceases to be. Everybody has an individual soul. The soul exists as long as the body exists.

(2) When a man acts or causes another to act, it is not his soul which acts or causes to act.²

(3) The five elements and the soul which is a sixth substance are imperishable.

(4) Pleasure, pain, and final beatitude are not caused by the souls themselves but individual souls experience them.

(5) The world has been created or is governed by gods. It is produced from chaos.³

(6) The world is boundless and eternal. It may be noted here that all these views which are reduced to four main types correspond to those associated in the Buddhist *Nikāyas* with four leading thinkers of the time, e.g., atheism like that of Ajita, eternalism like that of Kātyāyana, absolutism like that of Kāśyapa and fatalism like that of Gośāla. Makkhali Gosāla was the propounder of the theory of evolution of individual things by natural transformation. Ajita was to point out that the particular object of experience must be somehow viewed as an indivisible whole.⁴ The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* (1.1.13) states that his was really a theory of the passivity of soul. The logical postulate of Kavandin Kātyāyana's philosophy was no other than the Permenedian doctrine of being. Nothing comes out of nothing.⁵ From nothing comes nothing, what is does not perish.⁶

Ātman is a living individual, a biological entity. The whole self does

1. *Suttanipāta*, V. 231 (*Sīlabbatam vā pi yad atthi kiñci*); *Khuddakapāṭha*, p. 5.
2. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, 1.1.3.5-8.
3. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, 1.1.1.13.
4. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* II, 1.15-17.
5. *Noya uppajjae asaṃ*.
6. *asato nacci sambhavo, sato nacci vināso*.

not outlast the destruction of the body. With the body ends life. No soul exists apart from the body. The five substances with the soul as the sixth are not directly or indirectly created. They are eternal. From nothing comes nothing. All things have the *ātman*, self or ego for their cause and object; they are produced by the self; they are manifested by the self; they are infinitely connected with the self, and they are bound up in the self. One man admits action and another does not admit it. Both men are alike. Their case is the same because they are actuated by the same force, i.e., by fate. It is their destiny that all beings come to have a body to undergo the vicissitudes of life and to experience pleasure and pain. Each of these types stands as an example of *akriyāvāda* in as much as it fails to inspire moral and pious action or to make an individual responsible for an action and its consequences.¹ According to the *Uttarādhyayana-sūtra*, *ajñānavāda* is nothing but the inefficiency of knowledge. Some think that the upholders of *ajñānavāda* pretend to reason incoherently and they do not get beyond the confusion of their ideas.² The *Vinayavāda* may be taken to have been the same doctrine as the *sīlabbataparāmāsa* in Buddhism. The *sīlabbataparāmāsa* is a view of those who hold that the purity of one-self may be reached through the observance of some moral precepts or by means of keeping some prescribed vows. According to the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* (1.12.4) the upholders of *Vinayavāda* assert that the goal of religious life is realised by conformation to the rules of discipline.

It is interesting to know the types of *Kriyāvāda* that do not come up to the standard of Jainism. The soul of a man who is pure, will become free from bad *karma* on reaching beatitude but in that state it will again become defiled through pleasant excitement or hatred.

If a man with the intention of killing a body hurts a gourd mistaking it for a baby, he will be guilty of murder. If a man with the intention of roasting a gourd roasts a baby, mistaking him for a gourd, he will not be guilty of murder. Mahāvira holds that the painful condition of the self is brought about by one's own action and not by any other cause. Pleasure and pain are brought about by one's own action. Individually a man is born, individually he dies, individually he falls and individually he rises. His passions, consciousness, intellect, perceptions and impressions belong to the individual exclusively. All living beings owe their present form of

1. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* II. 1.5-34.

2. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* 1.12.2.

existence to their own *karma*. According to the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* (1.12.15), the sinners cannot annihilate their work by new work; the pious annihilate their work by abstention from work. *Karma* consists of acts, intentional and unintentional, that produce effects on the nature of soul. The soul is susceptible to the influences of *karma*. The Jaina doctrine of nine terms (*navatattva*) developed from the necessity for a systematic exposition of *kriyāvāda*, which is in its essential feature only a theory of soul and *karma*. The categories of merit and demerit comprehend all acts, pious and painful, which keep the soul confined to the circle of births and deaths. The *Uttarādhyayanāsūtra* (XXVIII, 11) points out that the wearing out of the accumulated effects of *karma* on the soul by the practice of austerities lies in *nirjarā* (*tapasā nirjarā ca*).

All the Indian systems believe that whatever action is done by an individual, leaves behind it some sort of potency, which has the power to ordain for him joy or sorrow in the future, according as it is good or bad. According to the *Samhitās* he who commits wicked deeds suffers in another world, whereas he who performs good deeds, enjoys the highest material pleasures.¹ According to the popular Hindu belief *karma* is a sum-total of man's action in a previous birth, determining his future destiny which is unalterable. Its effect remains until it is exhausted through suffering or enjoyment. The doctrine of *karma* is accepted in all the main systems of Indian philosophy and religion as an article of faith. The Buddha is generally credited with the propounding of the doctrine, but there is a clear statement in the *Majjhima Nikāya* (Vol. I, p. 483) to show that the doctrine had not originated with the Buddha. It was propounded before his advent by an Indian teacher who was a householder. In the *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* and in the teachings of *Yājñavalkya*, we meet with a clear formulation of the doctrine of *karma*. The Buddhist doctrine of *karma* is nothing but a further elucidation of that in the *Upaniṣad*. According to the *Majjhima Nikāya* (III, p. 203), the doctrine is emphatically formulated thus: 'Karma is one's own, a man is an inheritor of his *karma*, one finds one's birth according to his or her *karma*, *karma* is one's own kith and *karma* is one's own refuge, *karma* divides beings into higher or lower.' The Buddhists approached the problem from a purely mental point of view. The *Mahāniddeśa* (I, pp. 117-118) points out that a man need not be afraid of the vast accumulation of *karma* through a long

1. Das Gupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, pp. 71-72.

cycle of births and deaths. For consideration from the point of view of mind, the whole of such accumulation may be completely undone by a momentary action of mind. Mind is in its own place and as such can make and unmake all such accumulations of *karma*. On the whole Buddhism shifted the emphasis to the action and the state of the mind. Accordingly *karma* came to be defined as *cetanā* or volition. A person cannot be held morally or legally responsible for his own action, if it is not intentional. Thus the Buddhist teachers tried to define *karma* on a rational and practical basis. This viewpoint has been criticised in the Jaina *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*.¹ It is quite clear that in Buddhism the world exists through *karma* and people live through *karma* (*karmaṇā vattati loko, kammaṇā vattati paṭṭhā*).

In the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* (1.12.11) we find that the painful condition of the self is brought about by one's own action; it is not brought about by any other cause, such as, fate, creator, chance or the like (*Sayamkappaṇca dukkham, nāṇṇakappaṇam*). According to Śīlāṅka the kriyāvādins contend that works alone by themselves without knowledge lead to *mokṣa*.² The same idea is found in the Buddhist *Nikāyas*—*Sukhadukkham sayamkatam* in contradistinction to *sukhadukkham paramkatam*. In Buddhism pleasure and pain are brought about by one's own action.³ *Sukha* and *dukkha* (pleasure and pain) are conceived as two distinct principles, one of attraction, integration and concord and the other of repulsion, disintegration or discord. *Sukha* is taken to be the principle of harmony and *dukkha* that of discord. In Buddhism *dukkha* is taken in a most comprehensive sense so as to include in it danger, disease, waste, and all that constitutes the basis or the cause of suffering. *Roga* (disease) which is an instance of *dukkha* is defined as that condition of the self, physical self, when the different organs do not function together in harmony and which are attended with a sense of uneasiness. *Ārogya* or health, the opposite of disease, is defined as that condition of self when all the organs function together in harmony and are attended with a sense of ease. Thus we see that the problem of suffering is essentially rooted in the feeling of discord or disparity. Birth, decay or death is not in itself *dukkha* or suffering. These are only a few contingencies of human experience which upset the

1. *Jaina Sūtras* Part II, S.B.E.

2. *Ibid.*, II, S.B.E., p. 317 n.

3. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, III, 440 (*Sayamkappaṇca param kattaṇca sukhadukkham*); *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, II, p. 22.

expectations of men. From the psychological point of view *dukkha* is a feeling or *vedanā* which is felt by the mind either in respect of the body or in respect of itself and as a feeling it is conditioned by certain circumstances. Whether a person is affected by suffering or not depends on the view he takes of things. If the course of common reality is this that, being once in life, one cannot escape either decay or death and if the process of decay sets in or death actually takes place, there is no reason why that person should be subject to *dukkha* by trying to undo what cannot be undone. Thus we see that *dukkha* is based on the misconstruction of the law of things (*dhammatā*) or the way of happening in life. If the order of things cannot be changed, two courses are open to individuals to escape from suffering: (1) to view and accept the order as it is, and (2) to enquire if there is any state of consciousness, on the attainment of which, an individual is no longer affected by the vicissitudes of life. *Dukkha* is nowhere postulated as a permanent feature of reality. It is entertained only as a possible contingency in life as it is generally lived. Happiness lies in the association with the Elect and in the sight of them. The association with the wise brings happiness. It is always desirable to follow the wise, intelligent, learned, dutiful, the enduring and the Elect (*Dhammapada*, *Sukhavagga*). There is no happiness higher than tranquillity. Health is the greatest gain, contentment is the best wealth, trust is the best of relationships but *nirvāna* is the highest happiness.¹ He is happy who has tasted the sweetness of solitude and tranquillity and who is free from fear and sin.

The Jainas like the Buddhists believe that *himsā* or life-slaughter is the greatest sin. As a man kills a *jīva*, so will he be killed in hell. Dishonesty, covetousness, conceit, avarice, attachment, hatred, quarrelsomeness, slander, fault-finding and lack of self-control are considered as sins in Jainism, which lead people to suffer. *Mokkha* according to the Jainas is the highest happiness. One who has attained it, is called a *siddha* or a perfected one. A *siddha* is a being self-controlled, without caste, unaffected by smell, without the sense of taste, without feeling, without form, without hunger, without pain, without sorrow, without joy, without birth, without old age, without death, without body, without *karma*, enjoying an endless and unbroken tranquillity because of the complete waning out of all causes of suffering or *dukkha*.

1. "Ārogyā paramā lābhā, santuṭṭhi paramaṃ dhanam
viśśāsa puramā nīāti nibbānam paramaṃ sukham." (*Dhammapada*, V. 204).

By performing meritorious deeds (*puṇṇa*) on earth people obtain pleasures and comforts. By giving a seat and a bed (*śayanapunya*) one gets a very high position; by bestowing food (*annapunya*) one secures health and wealth; by the gift of clothes (*vastrapunya*) one acquires good complexion and property; the gift of conveyance procures for the giver special happiness and that of light begets power of vision. Besides there are other kinds of *puṇya*: *pānapunya* (merit acquired by giving water to the thirsty), *layanapunya* (merit acquired by building or lending a house to a monk), *manahpuṇya* (merit acquired by thinking good of everybody), *kāyapunya* (merit acquired by saving a life or rendering service), *vacanapunya* (merit acquired by speech) and *namas-kārapunya* (merit acquired by reverent salutation).

Pāpa (demerit) and *puṇṇa* (merit) are equally reprehensible for the aspirant after the highest stage of saintship and *nirvāṇa*. When the fruits of a good deed are consumed, the man has again to come down to this earth to be buffeted by the waves of *pāpa* and *puṇṇa*.

We may note here that in Buddhism or in Jainism or Brahmanical system and in fact in every Indian religious system, there is no conception of eternal never-ending suffering in hell like the Christian or rather the Hebrew eschatological conception of *Gehenna*, the abode of the wicked, where they suffer endless torments by fire. Some of the Christian fathers hold that ultimately there would be an end to the punishment of the most wicked; but this is not the idea of either the early or mediaeval church, and even Protestant divines stick to the idea of the never-ending punishment of the damned. This is quite foreign to the Indian conception, according to which, every act either good or bad, produces happiness or suffering for a limited period, though the period may be considerably long according to the nature of the deed.

In Jainism *dharma*, *adharmā*, space, time, matter, and soul are the six substances. They are imperishable and eternal by their very nature.¹ Each of them is a substance but time, matter, and soul form an infinite number of substances. The characteristic of *dharma* is motion. That of *adharmā* is immobility,² and that of *ākāśa* (space) is to make room. The characteristic of time is duration, that of soul is a realisation of knowledge, faith, conduct, austerities, energy and realisation of its development.

1. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, I, 1; 1.15-16.

2. *Ibid.*, I, 1.2.3; I, 1.4.2.

These six substances are known as the six *astikāyas* or terms comprehending and characterising the world of existence. The three terms, *dravya*, *guṇa* and *paryāya* characterise the six *astikāyas*.

Under *navatattva* or the doctrine of nine terms come *jīva* and *ajīva*.¹ The *Jivājivābhigama*, which is the third Jaina *Upāṅga*, really contains the doctrine of living and non-living things. It mainly points out the various classifications of *jīva* and *ajīva*. The former comprises all entities endowed with life, while the latter includes those which are devoid of life. These two terms comprehend the world of existence as known and experienced. The world of life is represented by the six classes of living things and beings. The earth-lives, water-lives and plants are immovable beings while the movable beings are the fire-lives, wind-lives and those with an organic body. Through the gradation of living beings and things one can trace the evolution of senses, the lowest form of beings being provided with only one sense, namely the sense of touch.²

In Buddhism *jīva* and *ajīva* convey the same meaning as in Jainism. In the *Mahālisutta* of the *Dīghanikāya* (I. p. 159—*taṃ jīvaṃ taṃ sarīraṃ udāhu aññaṃ jīvaṃ aññaṃ sarīraṃ*), Buddha raises the question whether *jīva* and *sarīra* are the same, but he does not answer the question. He simply leads the discourse upto saintship along with the series of mental states set out in the *Sāmaññaphalasutta* of the *Dīgha*, I. *Jivītindriya* mentioned in the *Pali Vinaya*, III, 73; *Samyutta*, V. 204; *Milinda*, 56, is the faculty of life. *Jīva* in the sense of living being or soul occurs in the *Milindapañha*.³

Jīva (soul), *ajīva* (the inanimate things), the binding of the soul by *karma*, merit (punya), demerit (*pāpa*), that which causes the soul to be affected by sins (*āśrava*), the prevention of sins by watchfulness (*saṃvara*), annihilation of *karma* (*karmakṣaya*) and final deliverance (*mokṣa*) are the nine truths. The nine main terms of Jainism which became widely known as early as the time of the Buddha include *nirjarā* and *mokkha*.

Purāṇānaṃ kammānaṃ tapasā vyantibhāvā, navānaṃ kammānaṃ akaraṇā āyatim anavassavo, āyatin anavassavā kammakkhayo kammakkhayā dukkhakkhayo dukkhakkhayā vedanākkhayo vedanākkhayā sabbam dukkham nijjīṇam bhavissatīti.⁴

1. *Uttarādhyayana*, XXVIII, 14.

2. Cf. *Majjhima* I, 157; *Ānguttara* II, 41.

3. Trenckner Ed. p. 31.

4. *Majjhima*, II, p. 214.

Here *nijjinnaṃ* implies the idea of *nijjarā* (*nirjarā*).

Nirjarā lies in the wearing out of the accumulated effects of *karma* on the soul by the practice of austerities. Austerities are internal and external. Internal austerities are the following :

Expiation, veneration, service to saints, concentration, abandonment of bodily attachment and study.¹ According to the *Tattvārthādhigama sūtra* the external austerities are the following :

Fasting, eating less, sitting and sleeping in a lonely place, mortification of the body, daily renunciation of one or more of the six kinds of delicacies, taking a mental vow to accept food from a householder, if a certain condition is fulfilled.

The ten virtues are the following :

Forgiveness (*uttama-kṣamā*), humility (*uttama-mārdava*), honesty (*uttama-ārjava*), purity (*uttama-śauca*), truthfulness (*uttama-satya*), restraint (*uttama-samyama*), austerities (*uttama tapas*), renunciation (*uttama-tyāga*), selflessness (*uttama-ākiñcanya*) and chaste life (*uttama-brahmacarya*).

The causes of bondage (*bandha*) are the following : (1) wrong belief, (2) perverse belief, (3) doubt, scepticism, (4) veneration, (5) wrong belief caused by ignorance and (6) inborn error.

Samvara is the principle of self-control by which the influx of sins is checked. The category of *samvara* comprehends the whole sphere of right conduct. It is an aspect of *tapas*. Some hold that it is the gradual cessation of the influx into the soul along with the development of knowledge.

Faith is produced by nature (*nisarga*), instruction (*upadeśa*), command (*ājñā*), study of the sūtras, suggestion (*bīja*), comprehension of the meaning of sacred love (*abhigama*), complete course of study (*vistāra*), religious exercise (*kriyā*), brief exposition (*saṃkṣepa*) and reality (*dharma*).² According to the Buddhists, faith is the basic principle of all good deeds. It is the germinating principle of human culture. It is characterised by two marks : (1) tranquilising in the sense of making all obstacles disappear and rendering consciousness clear; and (2) leaping high to achieve what has not been achieved, to master what has not been master-

1. *Uttarādhyaṃyana*, XXVIII, 34.

2. *Uttarādhyaṃyana sūtra*, XXVIII, 16 : *Nisagguvaesaruṃ āṇaruṃ suttaviyaruṃmeva Abhigama—Vitthāraruṃ kiriya—saṃkhevadhammaruṃ.*

Dharma has been translated by Jacobi as 'Law' (*Jaina sūtras*, II, SBE., p. 154).

ed, and to realise what has not been realised. Faith is nothing but trust in the *Buddha*, *Dharma*, (Doctrine) and *San̄gha* (Order). The celebrated Pali Scholiast Buddhaghosa points out that faith is transforming itself into *bhakti* or devotion. It is associated with *prema* or love. The noble eightfold path (*ariya at̄ṭhaṅgiko maggo*) is the development of the five controlling faculties and powers, one of which is faith or *śraddhā*.

In Jainism we find that being possessed of the right view (*Samyak-darśana*), one should bear all disagreeable feeling, giving up everything worldly. *Samyak-darśana* may be understood as right faith which consists in an insight into the meaning of truths as proclaimed and taught, a mental perception of the excellence of the system as propounded, a personal conviction as to the greatness and goodness of the teacher and a ready acceptance of some articles of faith for one's own guidance. It is intended to remove all doubt and scepticism from one's mind and to establish or re-establish faith. It is no doubt a form of faith which inspires action by opening a new vista of life and its perfection. Right faith on the one hand and inaction, vacillation, on the other, are incompatible. Take the Buddhist word *sammādit̄ṭhi* which conveys the sense of faith or belief. It is precisely in some such sense that the Jainas use the term *sammādam̄sana*.¹ There cannot be right faith unless there is a clear pre-perception of the moral, intellectual or spiritual situation which is going to arise. Right faith is that form of faith which is only a stepping stone to knowledge (*paññā*).

Right belief, right knowledge, right conduct, and right austerities are called the *ārādhana*s in Jainism. Some think that right knowledge (*samyak-jñāna*), right faith (*samyak darśana*) and right conduct (*samyak cāritra*) are the three jewels in Jainism.² The *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra* (XXVIII. 2) points out that *jñāna*, *darśana*, *cāritra* and *tapas* together constitute the road to final deliverance (*mokṣamārga*). *Tapas* must be included as a part of *cāritra* or conduct (vide in this connection *Umāsvāti's Tattvārthā-dhigamasūtra*, I.1). Right belief is the belief or conviction in things ascertained as they are. Right belief depends on the acquaintance with truth, on the devotion of those who know the truth and on the avoidance of heretical tenets. There is no right conduct without right belief. It must be cultivated for obtaining right faith; righteousness and conduct originate together.³ The right belief is attained by intuition and acquisition of

1. Cf. *Majjhima*, I. pp. 285 ff.
2. S. Stevenson, *Heart of Jainism*, p. 245.
3. *Uttarādhyayana*, XXVIII, 28.29.

knowledge from external sources. It is the result of subsidence (*upaśama*), destruction-subsidence (*kṣayopaśama*) and destruction of right belief deluding karmas (*darśana-mohanīya-karmopaśama*). The right belief is not identical with faith. It is reasoned knowledge. *Adhigama* is knowledge which is derived from intuition, external sources, e.g., precepts and scriptures. It is attained by means of *pramāṇa* and *naya*. *Pramāṇa* is nothing but direct or indirect evidence for testing the knowledge of self and non-self. *Naya* is nothing but a standpoint which gives partial knowledge of a thing in some of its aspects.

Samyak-darśana is of two kinds : (1) belief with attachment, the signs of which are the following: calmness (*praśama*), fear of mundane existence in five cycles of wanderings (*saṃvega*), substance (*dravya*), place (*kṣetra*), time (*kāla*), thought-activity (*bhāva*), compassion towards all living beings (*anukampā*) and (2) belief without attachment (the purity of the soul itself).

Right knowledge is of five kinds : (1) knowledge through senses, i.e., knowledge of the self and non-self through the agency of the senses of mind; (2) knowledge derived from the study of the scriptures; (3) direct knowledge of matter in various degrees with reference to subject-matter, time, space, and quality of the object known; (4) direct knowledge of the thoughts of others, simple or complex and (5) perfect knowledge. It should be noted here that the Buddhists recognise right knowledge (*sammāñāna*) as one of the additional factors in the noble eightfold path. Obstruction to knowledge is five-fold : (a) obstruction to knowledge derived from sacred books (*sūtra*); (b) obstruction to perception (*ābhinibodhika*); obstruction to supernatural knowledge (*avadhijñāna*),¹ knowledge of the thoughts of others (*manaḥparyāya*) and the highest and unlimited knowledge (*kevala*).²

The first kind of knowledge corresponds to the Buddhist *sutamayāpaññā*; the second kind to *cintāmayāpaññā*, the third kind to *vilokana*; the fourth kind to *cetopariyāyañāna* and the fifth kind to

1. Knowledge of the distant non-sensible in time or space possessed by divine and internal souls. *Antavantajñāna* in Buddhism (*Āṅguttara*, IV, p. 428) is evidently the same term as Jaina *Avadhijñāna* which is knowledge co-extensive with the object rather than supernatural knowledge (*antavantena ñānena antavantam lokam jānam passam*).
2. Vide *Kalpasūtra*, 156-59 *anaṅte aṅuttare nivvāghāe nirāvaraṅe jāva kevala-vara-nāṇadaṃsaṅe samupanne* It is just the synonym of Buddhist *aparisaesa*.

sabbaññutā or omniscience consisting in three faculties : of reviewing and recalling to mind all past existences with details, of seeing the destiny of other beings according to their deeds and of being conscious of the final destruction of sins.¹

Kevala means that which is limited by the object, that which is sufficient to survey the field of observation.² *Manaḥparyāyajñāna* is defined in the *Ācārāṅga Sūtra* (II, 15.23) as a knowledge of the thoughts of all the sentient beings. *Kevalajñāna* is defined in it as omniscience enabling a person to comprehend all objects and to know all conditions of the worlds of gods, men and demons.³ As defined in the *Anuyogadvāra* the *ābhini-bodhika* knowledge is one which is directed to the objects (*atthā-bhimuho*) and determined (*niyao*). It is perceptual in its character in so far as the objects are known through the sense-perception. The *śrutajñāna* is also a kind of *ābhini-bodhika* knowledge which is indirect. The *avadhijñāna* implies the internal perception of the objects from different angles, each implying a particular *modus operandi*. (For further details vide, *Law, Some Jaina Canonical Sūtras*, pp. 105-107).

The different kinds of obstruction to right faith are sleep, activity, very deep sleep, a high degree of activity and a state of deep-rooted greed.

Syādvāda consists of certain *nayas* or viewpoints from which assertions are made as to truth. The number of *nayas* was finally fixed as seven, but the canonical texts are reticent about their exact number. According to the doctrine of *Syādvāda* there are seven forms of metaphysical propositions and all contain the word *Syāt*, e.g., *Syād asti sarvaṃ*, *Syād nāsti sarvaṃ*. In deciding all questions the admirable way was one of *Syādvāda*. If the question was mooted like this : Is the world eternal or not? The Master's advice to his disciples was neither to side with those who maintained that the world is eternal nor with those who maintained that it is not eternal. The reason seems to be this that from neither of these alternatives they could arrive at truth. By proceeding exclusively from either side they would only be led to error. The *syād* mode was the real way of escape from the position of the dogmatist and that of the sceptic, from both of which Maḥāvīra recoiled. *Syāt* means 'may be' and it is explained as *kathamcit* (somehow).

Leśyā is a term signifying colour according to the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*

1. Cf. *Tattvārthādhigama sūtra*, I. 9.
2. Cf. *Kalpasūtra*, 15.
3. *Ācārāṅgasūtra*, II, 15.25.

(1.6.13). The classification of living beings in terms of six colours may be traced in Pārśva's doctrine of six *jīvanikāyas*.¹ *Leśyā* is said to be that by means of which the soul is tinted with merit and demerit. It arises from *yoga* or *kaṣāya*, namely the vibrations due to the activity of body, mind or speech or passions.² Pārśva's doctrine of the six classes of living beings served as the basis of Mahāvīra's doctrine of six *leśyās*. The *leśyās* are different conditions produced in the soul by the influence of different *karma*. They are, therefore, not dependent on the nature of the soul but on the *karma* which influences the soul. They are named in the following order: black, blue, grey, red, yellow and white. The black (*kr̥ṣṇa*) *leśyā* has the colour of a rain cloud, a buffalo's horn. The blue (*nīla*) *leśyā* has the colour of the blue *Aśoka* (*Jonesia Aśoka*) having red flowers. The grey (*kāpota*) *leśyā* has the colour of the flower of *atasi* (*Linum usitatissimum*) having blue flowers. The red (*rakta*) *leśyā* has the colour of vermilion. The yellow (*padma*) *leśyā* has the colour of orpiment. The white (*śukla*) *leśyā* has the colour of conch-shell.³

The taste of the black *leśyā* is more bitter than that of *tumbaka* (*Lagenaria vulgaris*). The taste of the blue *leśyā* is more pungent than black pepper and dry ginger. The taste of grey *leśyā* is more pleasant than that of ripe mango. The degrees of the *leśyās* are three or nine or twenty-seven or eighty-one or two hundred and forty-three. Each of these degrees is threefold: low, middle and high. A man who acts on the impulse of the five sins, who commits cruel acts, who is wicked and mischievous, develops the black *leśyā*. A monk who has anger, ignorance, hatred, wickedness, deceit, greed, carelessness, love of enjoyment etc., develops the blue *leśyā*. A man who is dishonest in words and acts, a thief, a deceiver, develops the grey *leśyā*. A man who is humble, restrained, well disciplined, free from deceit, and law-abiding, develops the red *leśyā*. A man who controls himself, who is attentive to his study and duties, develops the yellow *leśyā*. A man who controls himself, who subdues his senses, who is free from passion, develops the white *leśyā*. The black, blue and grey *leśyās* are the lowest *leśyās*, through them the soul is brought into misery. The red, yellow, and white *leśyās* are the good *leśyās*, through them the soul is brought into happiness. In the first and last moment of all these *leśyās*, when they are joined with the soul, the latter is not born

1. *Ācārāṅga*, II, 15.16.

2. Law, *Mahāvīra, His Life and Teachings*, p. 104.

3. *Vide* in this connection S. Stevenson, *Heart of Jainism*, pp. 102 ff.

into a new existence.¹ Those who cherish right views, do not commit sins and are enveloped in white *leśyā*, will reach enlightenment at the time of death.

The Buddhist idea of contamination of mind by the influx of impurities from outside, illustrated by the simile of a piece of cloth dyed blue, red, yellow or the like, would seem to have some bearing on the Jaina doctrine of the six *leśyās*, which is merely hinted at in the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* (1.4.21), where a Jaina saint is described as a person whose soul is in a pure condition and fully explained in the *Uttarādhyayana* (XXXIV). The Jaina religious efforts are directed towards the acquisition of pure *leśyā*.² The black *leśyā* is the worst of the three bad emotions colouring soul. The blue *leśyā* is an emotion which is less evil than the last. The grey *leśyā* may lead men to do evil. A man under its command becomes crooked in thought and deed. The *tejo leśyā* removes all evil thoughts from the *jīva* under its sway. The *padma leśyā* is good emotion. A man controls anger, pride, deceit and avarice through its power. When a man is under the influence of the white *leśyā*, love and hatred disappear. Black, blue and grey are the three bad emotions; yellow, pink and white are the three good emotions. Cf. Maskarin's division of souls into six colour types (*abhijātis*) reduced according to the *Mahābhārata* (XII, 279, 33-68) into the *Sāṅkhya* division of souls in three colour types, viz., the white, the red and the black. Leumann defines *leśyā* as the soul type.

The *Paṇḥāvāgaranāim* (*Praśna-vyākaraṇāni*), also known as the *Praśna Vyākaraṇadaśā*, which is the tenth *āṅga* of the Śvetāmbara *Āgama*, explains the great moral vows of the Jainas. The first four represented the four principles of self-restraint as prescribed by Pārśva for his followers. Although the enumeration of the principles is somewhat different, they are all important to both the Jaina and Buddhist systems. In the Jaina presentation a greater emphasis is laid on the side of the abstinence from impious acts, while in the Buddhist presentation much stress is laid on the positive aspect of virtues. It is not enough that a person abstains from doing a misdeed in as much as a progressive man is expected to cultivate and develop friendliness, truthfulness, honest life, etc. The difference seems to be one of degree and not of kind. (Vide Law, *Jaina Canonical Sūtras*, pp. 62-63). According to Pārśva there were four vows. To these

1. *Uttarādhyayana*, XXXV.
2. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, 1.10.15.

four vows of Pārśva the vow of chastity was later added by Mahāvīra. This he did by dividing the vow of property into two parts: one relating to women and the other relating to material possessions. The Ājivika leader Gosāla's conduct led Mahāvīra to add the vow of chastity to the four vows of Pārśva.

Cātuyāma or cāujjāma (Pali *cātuyāmasaṃvara*)¹ denoting four vows of Pārśva was undoubtedly a phraseology of the religion of Pārśva, but it acquired altogether a new connotation with the followers of Mahāvīra.

The first great vow of the Jainas is abstinence from killing living beings. (Cf. Buddhist *Pāṇātipātāveramaṇi*) The second great vow is avoidance of falsehood (Cf. Buddhist *Musāvādāveramaṇi*). A Jaina speaks after deliberation. He comprehends and renounces anger, greed, fear and mirth. The third great vow is avoidance of theft (Cf. Buddhist *Adinnādāveramaṇi*). A Jaina begs after deliberation for a limited space. He consumes his food and drink with the permission of his superiors. He who has taken possession of some space should always take possession of a limited part of it, and for a fixed period.² He may beg for a limited space for his co-religionists after deliberation. The next vow is avoidance of sensual pleasures (Cf. Buddhist *Abrahmacariyāveramaṇi*). The last great vow is freedom from possessions (Cf. Buddhist *Jātarūpara-ja-tapaṭiggahaṇāveramaṇi*).³ The non-hankering after worldly possessions may be internal and external. The external hankering is an obstacle to religious practice and the internal hankering leads a person to the incorrectness of method, recklessness, thoughtlessness and moral contaminations according to the *Paṅhāvāgaranāim*.

The *Āvaśyaka sūtra* (*Āvassaya suya*) refers to the *Sāmāyika* vow which means the maintenance of a balanced state of mind with regard to all blamable actions, passions and hatred. The *Sāmāyika* vow as a preliminary to the Jaina religious practices primarily means *virati* or abstinence.

The *Ṭhānaṅga* which is the third Aṅga of the Jain Canon, mentions four kinds of mental concentration (*jhāna*) each with its four varieties. The *jhāna* is defined in Jainism as the resting of consciousness on a single object even for a moment (*anto muhuttamattarṃ cittāvatthānaṃ egavattthummi*). The first is called *artadhyāna* of which the characteristic mark

1. *Cātuyāma saṃvara saṃvuto* (*Saṃ. I, 66; Digha. III, 49*).

2. Cf. *Aṅguttara I, 205*—This is known in southern Buddhism as *Nigaṇṭhūposatho*.

3. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga, II, 7.17*.

is self-mortification or that which is resorted to by a person who is oppressed by the fear of the world. The second is terrific (*raudra*) as it is attended by the worst cruelties to life. The third is *dharmya* or pious, as it is not bereft of the practices of piety as enjoined in the scriptures. The fourth is *śukla* or purificatory, as it serves to purge all impurities due to the karmic effect.

It is interesting to note that in Jainism there are twelve meditations on transitoriness, helplessness, mundaneness, loveliness, separateness, impurity, inflow, stoppage, relinquishment, universe, rarity of right path, and nature of right path.

The *Āvaśyaka sūtra* (*Āvaśyaka sūtra*) refers to *kāyotsarga* which is an ascetic mode of atoning for the excess in sinful indulgences (*aticāra*). It implies the idea of particular bodily postures to be adopted in keeping oneself unmoved on suitable spot. It is a Jaina mode of *dhyāna* (*jhāna*) practice. He who practises this mode is required to keep his body, mind, and speech under perfect restraint. His mind is to be kept intent on the particular object of meditation. Jainism lays stress on the practice of self-mortification as a means of checking one's passion as well as of inducing mental concentration. From *sāmāyika* to *kāyotsarga* all the modes are to be carefully studied and methodically practised with a view to clearing the path of progress of aspirant towards the attainment of emancipation.

There are five *samitis* and three *guptis* which constitute eight means of self-control. They are also known as the eight articles of Jaina creed. In Buddhism the ideas of *samiti* and *gutti* are found to be the same.¹ The *samitis* are the following : (1) going by paths trodden by men, carts, and beasts, etc. and looking carefully so as not to cause the death of living beings; (2) using sweet, gentle and righteous speech; (3) receiving alms in a manner to avoid forty-two faults; (4) receiving and keeping things necessary for religious exercises; and (5) performing the operation of Nature in an unfrequented place.² *Gutti* is vedic *gupti* meaning protection, defence, guard, watchfulness.³ The three *guttis* are the following :— (1) preventing mind from sensual pleasures by engaging it in contemplation, study etc.; (2) preventing the tongue from saying bad things by

1. Cf. *Dīgha*, I, p. 172.

2. *Dīgha*, II, 292.

3. *Ibid.*, III, 148; *Āṅguttara*, IV, 106 ff.; Cf. *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra*, XXIV, 1 : *aṭṭa pavayanamāyāo Samūgutti taheva ya pañceva ya samīo tao guttio āhiyā.*

taking the vow of silence; and (3) putting the body in an immovable posture.¹ The walking of a well disciplined monk should be pure in respect to the ends, time, road and effort. Knowledge, faith and right conduct are the ends; the time is day-time; the road excludes bad ways; the effort is fourfold as regards substance, space, time and condition of mind. A well disciplined monk should work carefully; he should avoid pride, greed, deceit etc. He should use blameless and concise speech at the right time. For a detailed discussion of the subject, vide my 'Some Jaina Canonical Sūtras, p. 204.

In Jainism the five sinful deeds that one commits due to innate proneness to sin stand as opposed to five great vows (*pañcamahāvratas*) that follow from the principle of *saṁvara* or restraint. The five sinful deeds are: (1) harming life (*hiṁsā*); (2) lying (*mosa*); (3) thieving (*adatta*); (4) incontinence (*abambha*), and (5) hankering after worldly possessions (*pariggaha*). The harming of life is deprecated by the Jainas. This sinful deed serves to generate delusion and great fear and brings about mental distress. This is the first road to impiety. The second road to impiety is lying which is defined and characterised as telling an untruth, which makes a person light and fickle. This road to impiety also includes the preaching and promulgation of false doctrines and misleading philosophical views of life. The third door to impiety is taking away what is not given. It is defined as an act of stealing, oppressing, bringing death and fear, a terrifying iniquity and a sinful deed rooted in covetousness and greed. The fourth door to impiety is known as incontinence. It is defined as a sexual dalliance coveted in the worlds of gods, men and demons, which is a net and noose of amour, which is a hindrance to the practice of austerities, self-restraint and chaste life. The fifth and last door to impiety is hankering after worldly possessions, such as, gems, jewels, gold, landed properties, opulence, wealth, etc. It is rooted in greed and it is an expression of craving and thirst for worldly things.

To compress all that is knowable about the following tenets of Jainism as a practical religion within the bounds of a few pages will be welcome.

(1) Longing for liberation (*saṁvega*): By it the soul obtains an intense desire of the law.

(2) Disregard of worldly objects (*nivveḍa*): By it the soul quickly feels disgust for pleasures enjoyed by gods, men and animals.

1. *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra*, Ed. J. Charpentier, pp. 178-181.

(3) Desire of the law (*dhammasaddhā*): By it the soul becomes indifferent to pleasures.

(4) Obedience to co-religionists and to the Guru (*gurusādhammiya-sussūsanā*) : By obedience to them the soul obtains discipline.

(5) Confession of sins before the Guru (*āloyanā*) : By this the soul gets rid of the thorns of deceit, wrong belief, etc.

(6) Repenting for one's sins to oneself : By this the soul obtains repentance and becoming indifferent by repentance he prepares himself for an ascending scale of virtues by which he destroys *karma*.

(7) Repenting for one's sins before the Guru : By this the soul obtains humility.

(8) Moral and intellectual purity of the soul (*sāmāyika*): The soul ceases from sinful occupations by such purity.

(9) Adoration of the 24 Jinas : The soul arrives at purity of faith by this adoration.

(10) Paying reverence to the Guru (*vandanā*) : By this the soul destroys the *karma* leading to birth in low families.

(11) By expiation of sins the soul obviates transgressions of the vows (*paḍikkamana*).

(12) By a particular posture of the body (*kāussagga*) the soul gets rid of past and present transgressions which require expiatory rites.

(13) By self-denial (*paccakkhāṇa*) the soul shuts the doors against sins.

(14) By praises and hymns (*thavathuimaṅgala*) he obtains wisdom consisting in knowledge, faith and conduct.

(15) By keeping the right time he destroys *karma* which obstructs right knowledge.

(16) By practising penance (*pāyacittakarāṇa*) he gets rid of sins and commits no transgressions.

(17) By begging forgiveness he obtains happiness of mind.

(18) By study he destroys *karma* which obstructs right knowledge.

(19) By the recital of the sacred texts he preserves the sacred lore and obtains destruction of *karma*.

(20) By questioning the teachers he arrives at a correct comprehension of the *sūtra* and its meaning.

(21) By repetition he commits the sounds or syllables to memory.

(22) By pondering on what he has learnt, he loosens the firm hold

which the seven kinds of *karma* have upon the soul.

(23) By religious discourses he exalts the creed and by exalting the creed he acquires *karma* for future bliss.

(24) By the acquisition of sacred knowledge he destroys ignorance.

(25) By concentration of his thoughts he obtains stability of the mind.

(26) By control he obtains freedom from sins.

(27) By austerities he cuts off *karma*.

(28) By cutting off *karma* he obtains freedom from actions.

(29) By renouncing pleasures he obtains freedom from false longing.

(30) By mental independence (*appaḍibaddha*) he gets rid of attachment.

(31) By using unfrequented lodgings and beds he obtains conduct.

(32) By turning away from the world he strives to do no bad actions.

(33) By giving up collections of alms in one district only he overcomes obstacles.

(34) By abandoning articles of use he obtains successful study.

(35) By not taking forbidden food he ceases to act for the sustenance of his life.

(36) By conquering his passions he becomes free from passions.

(37) By renouncing activity he obtains inactivity.

(38) By renouncing his body he acquires the pre-eminent virtue of the perfected ones.

(39) By shunning company he obtains singleness and avoids disputes, quarrels, passions, etc.

(40) By giving up all food he prevents his birth many times.

(41) By perfect renunciation he enters the final stage of pure meditation.

(42) By conforming to the standard of a monk's life he obtains ease and will be careful.

(43) By doing service he acquires *karma* which brings about for him the name and family name of a *Tīrthaṅkara*.

(44) By fulfilling all virtues he will not be born again.

(45) By freedom from passions he destroys the ties of attachment and desire.

(46) By patience he overcomes troubles.

(47) By freedom from greed he obtains voluntary poverty.¹

1: *Muttī ṇaṁ bhante jīve kiṁ jaṇayai. Muṁ akiṅcaṇaṁ jaṇayai akiṅcaṇe ya jīve atthalolāṇaṁ apatthāṇijjo bhavai.*

By simplicity he will become upright; by humility he will acquire freedom from self-conceit, by sincerity of mind he will obtain purity of mind; by sincerity in religious practice he will become proficient in it; by sincerity of action he will become pure in his action; by watchfulness of his mind he concentrates his thought; by guarding the speech he will be free from prevarication; by watchfulness of the body he obtains restraint; by discipline of the mind he obtains concentration of his thoughts; by discipline of the speech he obtains development of faith; by discipline of the body he obtains development of conduct; by possession of knowledge he acquires an understanding of words and their meanings; by possession of faith he destroys wrong belief; by possession of conduct he obtains stability; by subduing the organ of hearing he overcomes his delight in all pleasant and unpleasant sounds. There is the subduing of the organs of sight, smell, taste and touch with regard to pleasant colours, smells, tastes and touches. By conquering anger he obtains patience; by conquering pride he obtains simplicity; by conquering deceit he obtains humility; by conquering greed he obtains content; by conquering love, hatred, and wrong belief, he exerts himself for right knowledge, faith and conduct. By the motionless state of the self (*śaliesī*) he first stops the functions of his mind, then those of the speech, then those of the body, at last he ceases to breathe. Freedom from *karma*. The soul after having got rid of *audārika kārmaṇa* bodies takes the form of a straight line, goes in a moment without touching anything and taking up no space, and then the soul develops into the real form and obtains perfection. [*Uttarādhyayana*, XXIX, 73; S. Stevenson, *Heart of Jainism*, p. 206; Cf. the Brahmanical conception of the *sthūla* (gross), *sūkṣma* (subtle or also called *liṅga*) and *kārmaṇa* bodies assumed by the soul].

