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-The TFIC Team.

Kṣamāśramaṇa Jinbhadra Gaṇi's

GAṆADHARAVĀDA

Along with
Maladhārin Hemacandra Sūri's Commentary

Edited by

Muni Ratna-prabha Vijaya
Disciple of
Śāsana Sāmrāṭ Ācārya Mahārāj Vijaya Nemisūrīśvarajī.

with
Translation, Digest of Commentary
and
Introduction
by

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Price Rupees Four. Foreign 9-s/-
Three Dollars (U. S. A.)

Vīra Samvat 2468 : : Vikrama Samvat 1998
1942

Printed by Gulabchand Lallubhai Shah,
at Mahodaya Printing Press-Bhavnagar.

DEDICATED

INTO

THE LOTUS-LIKE HANDS

OF

MY MOST REVERED GURU

SARVA-TANTRA SVATANTRA, JAGAD-GURU

ŚĀSANA SAMRĀT, SŪRICAKRA CAKRAVARTI

TAPĀGACCHĀDHIPATI. TÎRTHODDHĀRAKA

BHATTĀRAKA

HIS HOLINESS ACĀRYA MAHĀRĀJA

ŚRÍ VIJAYA NEMISŪRÎŚVARAJI

By

His most grateful and obedient

Pupil

RATNAPRABHA VIJAYA.

Introduction

The Text of Gaṇadhara-vāda

(a) Sources

According to the Jainas, the religious principles of the present era came into existence right from the time of *Bhagavān Riṣabhadeva Swāmî*, the first *Tîrthaṅkara.*[1]

After him, the sacred works increased in number and qnality when the religion was exalted to a high rank but they subsided in times of disorder and anarchy. Generally speaking, the preachings of all the *Tîrthaṅkaras* happened to be of the same kind and their biographies almost resembled each other in principal characteristics.

The *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* supports the view that *Riṣabha-deva* was the founder of the present Jaina canon. There is a reference of *Riṣabha-deva, Ajîtanātha* and *Ariṣṭanemî* in *Yajur Veda.*

Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvîra, the elder contemporary of *Buddha,* was not only the last but Supreme *Tîrthaṅkara* in the line of all Jaina *Tîrthaṅkaras.* Like his predecessors, *Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvîra* also had got his preachings composed in books. *His Gaṇadharas* or principal disciples arranged his

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1. It is not only the Jain tradition that ascribes the origin of the religious system to *Riṣabha-deva,* but there is historical evidence also to show that so far back as the first century B. C. there were people who were worshippiug *Riṣabha-deva* the first *Tîrthaṅkara.*

preachings in twelve *Aṅgas*, the twelfth *Aṅga* being divided into fourteen *Pūrvas*. These *Pūrvas* have been accepted by the *Śvetāmbaras* and the *Digambaras* as probably the oldest Sacred Works of the Jaina canon. The tradition of the *Śvetāmbaras* about the fourteen *Pūrvas* is this :—The fourteen *Pūrvas* had been incorporated in the twelth *Aṅga* (the *Dṛiṣṭivāda*) which was lost before 1000 A.V. But a detailed table of its contents and consequently of the *Pūrvas* has survived in the fourth *Aṅga*, the *Samavāyāṅga*, and in the *Nandî Sūtra*.[2]

We are told by the tradition that *Ārya Jambū Swāmî* was the last *Kevalî*. After him, the under-mentioned six Heads of the Church, *viz. Prabhava Swāmî*, *S'ayyambhava Sūri*, *Yas'obhadra Sūri*, *S'ambhūti-vijaya Sūri*, *Bhadrabāhu Swāmî* and *Sthūlabhadra* were *S'ruta-Kevalîs*. Out of these, *Bhadrabāhu Swāmî* was the last *Paṭṭadhara* (Head of the Church) who had all the twelve *Aṅgas* along with the fourteen *Pūrvas*, along with their meanings and explanations of intricate subjects in his memory. *Ārya Sthūlabhadra* had a thorough knowledge of the meanings and explanations of the ten *Pūrvas*, and a knowledge of the remaining four *Pūrvas* (11, 12, 13, 14) but not their meanings and explanations. Besides, he was instructed not to impart the knowledge of the four *Pūrvas* (11, 12, 13, 14) to anyone. Thus, the knowledge of the *Pūrvas* decreased gradually.

After him, there was a line of ten successors who had a thorough knowledge of ten *Pūrvas*. They were known as *Das'apūrvîs*. The last *Das'apūrvî* was *Vajra Swāmî*, after whom the knowledge of *Pūrvas* went on vanishing. The last who had a knowledge of one *Pūrva* was *Devarddhi Gaṇi kṣamās'ramaṇa*.

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2. *Vide* Weber, Indische Studien, XVI p. 341.

The *Śvetāmbaras* accept the existence and validity of the *Siddhāntas* (Sacred Works) but the *Digambaras* believe that the real *s'āstras* or religious works have already vanished and the sacred works, which are accepted by the *Jaina* canon at present, have no validity.

At present, the Sacred Works of the *Ś'vetāmbaras* are forty-five in all. Some of them are written in prose and some in verse. There are eleven *Aṅgas*, twelve *Upāṅgas*, ten *Prakîrṇas*, six *Cheda sūtras*, two *Sūtras*, and four *Mūla-sūtras*.[3]

As seen before, the knowledge of the original preachings of *Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvîra* had begun to fade gradually, and hence it was rightly felt by his successors to arrange the preachings into various books. As a result of their efforts, the religious works mentioned above were composed.

Out of these, the four *Mūla Sūtras* are considered as the Original *Sūtras* or Commandments, as they are primarily needed to guide the *Jaina* monks in their religious practices. The four *Mūla Sūtras* are :—(1) The *Āvas'yaka* (2) *Das'avaikālika* (3) *Uttarādhyana* and (4) *Piṇḍa Niryukti* (or *Ogha Niryukti*). According to Weber, the order of composition of these *sūtras* is this :—(1) *Uttarādhyayana* (2) *Āvas'yaka* (3) *Das'avaikālika* and (4) *Piṇḍa Niryukti*.

Of the four *Mūla Sūtras*, the *Āvas'yaka* as its name suggests–is the most important of all. It is divided into six sections :—(1) *Sāmāyika* (*Sāmāiya*), (2) *Caturvims'ati stava* (*cauvisattho*), (3) *Vandanaka* (*Vandaṇayam*), (4) *Prati-*

3. In addition to the above-named forty-five Sacred Works, some people ennumerate twenty more *Prakîrṇas*, twelve *Niryuktis* and several others arriving at the total number of eighty-four. Again, in order to supplement the information supplied by these eighty-four *Āgamas* there are several other works known as *Nigamas* or *Upaniṣads* which, in turn, are thirty-six in all.

kramaṇa (*Padikkamaṇa*), (5) *Kāyotsarga* (*Kāussagga*), and (6) *Pratyākhyāna* (*Paccakhkhāṇa*). It should be noted that though all these *sūtras* were dedacted into books by *Gaṇadharas*, they were originally preached by *S'ramaṇa Bhagvān Mahāvîra Swāmî.*[4]

The *Niryukti* of the *Āvas'yaka Sūtras* had already been written by *Śrîmān Bhadrabāhu Swāmî* and a number of *cūrṇis* (detailed commentaries) were also composed by various authors as commentaries on the *Āvas'yaka Sūtras.* Still, however, *Jinabhadra Gaṇi kṣamās'ramaṇa* felt the need of ellucidating the original *niryukti.* He, therefore, composed a *bhāṣya* or commentary running in *gāthās* or verses on the original *niryukti* of the *Sāmāyika Sūtras.* Since this was an additional *bhāṣya* to various other *bhāṣyas* prepared by different authors, it was known as *Vis'eṣāvas'yaka Bhāṣya* or an *Additional Bhāṣya* to the *Āvaśyaka* (*Sāmāyika*) *Sūtras.*

The whole work runs into 3603 *Gāthās* or verses. The *Vis'eṣāvas'yaka Bhāṣya* could further be divided into various sub-sections such as—*Pîṭhikā, Varavarikā,* the *Upasargas,* the *Sāmācārî* (of ten varieties), *Gaṇadhara-vāda,* the *Gaṇadharas,* the *Ninhavas, S'eṣa Upodghāta, Niryukti,* and *a-svādhyāya Niryukti.* Of these, *Gaṇadhara-vāda* is one of the most important sub-sections, as it deals with the discussion between *S'ramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvîra Swāmî* and his *gaṇadharas* (or principal disciples) on various philosophical topics such as the existence of *Jîva, Karma, Pāpa, Puṇya* and *Mokṣa* etc.

(b) Commentaries.

Three commentaries are said to have been written on the text of *Vis'eṣāvas'yaka Bhāṣya.* The author himself is

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4. *Vide* केण कयंति य ववहारओ जिणिंदेण गणहरेहिं च ।
तस्सामिणा उ निच्छयनयस्स तत्तो जओऽणण्णं ॥ ३३८२ ॥
(विशेषावश्यकभाष्य)

said to have written a commentary on his own work, but unfortunately, his commentary is not available at present. The second commentary has been written by *Kotyācārya* (or *Śīlāṅkācārya*) the manuscript of which dated 1136 V. S. is preserved in a tattered condition in the *Bhāṇḍārkara* Research Institute, Poona. This commentary has not been published as yet. The only commentary that has been published and popularly accepted at present, is that of *Maladhāri Hemacandrācārya.*

Maladhāri Hemacandrācārya is different from *Kali-Kāla Sarvajña Hemcandrācārya,* the welknown author of *Dvyāśraya.* Originally, he was welknown as *Pandit Svetāmbarācārya Bhaṭṭāraka.* But his worldly name was *Pradyumna* and in the prime of his youth, it is said, he was a minister. By the advice of *Śrī Abhaya-deva Sūri* he renounced the worldly life and having left his four wives, he entered the *ascetic* life. *Siddharāja Jayasinha,* the great monarch of Gujarat, of the twelfth century V. S., was highly impressed by his great personality and wide-spread well-versedness.

(c) Gaṇadharas—their names, lineage etc.

Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra had eleven *gaṇadharas* in all. All except *Indrabhūti Gautama* and *Sudharmā Svāmī* had attained *Nirvāṇa* or Final Emancipation during the life-time of their celebrated preceptor. *Indrabhūti Gautama* and *Sudharmā Swāmī* had attained *mokṣa at Rājagriha,* after the *Nirvāṇa* of *Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra.*

All *gaṇadharas* belonged to the high-born families. Being directly under the guidance of *Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra,* they became wide-read professors and knew all the twelve *Aṅgas* along with fourteen *Pūrvas.*

The Table attached herewith supplies all information about the eleven *gaṇadharas.*

Serial No.	Name of the Gaṇadhara	Parents' Name	Lineage (Gotra)	Place of Birth (Janmasthāna)
1	Indrabhūti ...	Vasubhūti and Pṛithivī	Gautama	The Village of Gobara in Magadha
2	Agnibhūti ...	,,	,,	,,
3	Vāyubhūti ...	,,	,,	,,
4	Vyakta ...	Dharmamitra and Vāruṇi	Bhāradvāja	Kollāga–Sanniveśa
5	Sudharmā ...	Dhammila and Bhadditā	Agnivaiśyāyana	,,
6	Maṇḍika ...	Dhanadeva † and Vijayādevī	Vāsiṣṭha	Mauryasanniveśa
7	Maurya ...	Maurya and Vijayādevī	Kāśyapa	,,
8	Akampita ...	Vasu and Nandā	Hārita	Mithilā
9	Acalabhrātā ...	Deva and Jayanti	Gautama	Kośala
10	Metārya ...	Datta and Varuṇadevī	Kaunḍīya	The Village of Tunsika in Kośāmbī
11	Prabhāsa ...	Bala and Atibhadrā	,,	Rājagṛiha nagar

† After the death of her first husband Dhandeva, Vijayādevī lived with Maurya. This shows that widow-remarriage was in vogue in those days.

Name of Constellation at the time of Birth (Nakṣatra)	Duration of household life (Gṛihavāsa)	Duration of life incognito (Chadmasthaparyāya)	Duration of life in state of Perfect Knowledge (Kevalī Paryāya)	Total age	Remarks
Jyeṣṭhā	50 years	30 years	12 years	92 years	
Kṛitikā	46 years	12 years	16 years	74 years	
Swāti	42 years	10 years	18 years	70 years	
Śravaṇa	50 years	12 years	18 years	80 years	
Uttarāphālgunī	50 years	42 years	8 years	100 years	He was the first Paṭṭadhara of the Jaina-Church. §
Maghā	53 years	14 years	16 years	83 years	
Rohiṇī	65 years	2 years	16 years	95 years	
Mṛigaśirṣa	46 years	12 years	14 years	72 years	
Uttarāṣāḍhā	48 years	9 years	21 years	78 years	
Aśvinī	36 years	10 years	16 years	62 years	
Puṣya	16 years	8 years	16 years	40 years	

§ *Cf.* गुरुपरिवाडीमूलं, तित्थयरो वद्धमाणनामेणं ।
तत्पट्टोदयपढमो, सुहम्मनामेण गणसामी ॥

(Tapāgacchapaṭṭāvalī, Ed-by Kalyāṇavijayaji).

(d) Summary of the Text.

We give below a summary of the text of *Gaṇadharavāda* which is contained in *Gāthās* running from 1549 to 2024 of the *Vis'eṣāvas'yaka Bhāṣya.*

(i) Jîva:-Indrabhūti Gautama, the first *Gaṇadhara*, puts forward his doubt about the existence of Soul and *S'ramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvîra* removes the doubt by means of various evidences and illustrations. Explaining the meaning of the word '*Jîva*' the *Bhagavān* remarks that '*Jîva*' does not signify body-*deha*-but it signifies the soul-*ātmā*-which is full of cognizance. Body is only inanimate.

Smṛti (remembrance), *jijñāsā* (desire for knowledge), *cikîrṣā* (desire for activity), *jigamiṣā* (desire for movements) and *saṃs'aya* (doubt) etc. are the properties of Soul, which being self-evident is *pratyakṣa* or directly apprehended. Since body is corporeal and physically visible, properties like cognizance etc. cannot reside into it. These properties are contained in Soul, because it is *a-mūrta* or incorporeal and *a-cākṣuṣa* or beyond the range of physical sight. This shows that Soul is absolutely different from body.

In reply to the argument of the Vedāntists that Soul, being one and the same everywhere, can never be classified, *Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvîra Svāmî* contends that if the Soul were one absolute entity pervading everywhere, it ought to have been apprehended as one all-pervading element like *ākās'a* even in case of each and every *piṇḍa* or body. But that is not so. The Soul varies with the shape and size of *piṇḍa* or body. Besides, if we deny the existence of Soul, there would be nothing like *sukha-duḥkha* and *Bandha-Mokṣa* in this world.

The Soul is accepted as *vijñānaghana* or an assemblage of many *vijñānas* (cognitions), firstly because it is identical with *vijñāna* which is *upayoga* (attention) either of the type of *jñāna* (knowledge) or that of *dars'ana* (perception) and

secondly because the soul has its each and every *prades'a* (the minutest portion) formed from the assemblage of infinite modifications of *vijñāna*.

According to the *Naiyāyika* School, the Soul is devoid of *vijñāna* and hence inanimate. The *Jaina* Preceptor refutes this theory by arguing that the soul is said to have been produced and destroyed only with regard to *upayoga* or attention but it is indestructible so far as *vijñāna* is concerned on account of its *vijñāna-santati* or the perpetual continuance of cognition.

(ii) Karma: Solving the doubt of *Agnibhūti*, the second *Gaṇadhara*, *S'ramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvîra Swāmî* establishes the existence and significance of *Karma* as follows:—

Just as a sprout has seed as its *hetu* or cause, the pleasure and pain experienced by the people of this world must also have some sort of *hetu*. This *hetu* is nothing but deeds or *Karmas* of the living beings in their past life. Just as the body in youth has the body in childhood to precede it, the body in childhood has also some sort of body to precede it. The body formed of *Karmas* of the past life and hence known as *Kārmaṇa Śarîra*, precedes the body in childhood.

Just as each and every act performed by a living being in this world yields a fruit, as is seen in case of tilling the ground and many other acts, so also the acts of charity etc. undertaken by a living being undoubtedly yield fruit which is nothing but *Karma*.

Since a majority of living beings is found unhappy and only a few of them are found happy, we can easily infer that there are only a few who perform good actions and there are many who perform evil actions. It should be noted that *Karma* here is different from *Kriyā* or action, as *Karma* becomes *Kārya*, and *Kriyā* the *Kāraṇa*.

Since pleasure and pain etc. are the properties of soul,

the soul would become their *samavāyi-kāraṇa* or the intimate cause, and *Karma* a *nimitta* or the external cause. *Karma* is corporeal.

Since *Kārmaṇa S'arîra* is closely connected with *jîva*, it is beyond the power of senses to percive it. But there is no doubt that it is a sort of *sūkṣma* (subtle) *s'arîra* of an interior nature. Consequently, like the variegated transformations found in clouds, *vicitratā* or variegations should be accepted in case of *Kārmaṇa Sarîra* as well.

The Soul is connected with *Karma* as intimately as a *mūrta ghaṭa* is connected with *a-mūrta ākās'a* or a *mūrta* finger is connected with the *a-mūrta* actions of expansion and contraction.

So, like seed and sprout, body and *Karma* are mutually related as *hetu* and *hetumat* rendering thereby the *Karma-saṃtāna anādi* or beginningless.

Finally, by the help of *Veda-padas*, the *Bhagavān* establishes *Karma* as the intervening agent which helps the soul in the production of body. He further explains that *puṇya* is produced by holy deeds and *pāpa* by unholy deeds.

(iii) Relation Between Soul and Body: According to *Vāyubhūti*, the third *Gaṇadhara*, soul and body are identical. But the Great Preceptor explains him the relation between soul and body in details and removes his illusion. According to him, *cetanā* or consciousness is not the property of each one of the five *bhūtas* or principal elements which constitute the body, but *cetanā* is the intrinsic quality of soul residing into a group of *bhūtas*. For, if *cetanā* were the quality of all *bhūtas* taken together, it ought to exist in a dead body as well. But it does not happen so.

Just as *Devadatta*, who recollects an object perceived through the five windows of a palace in the past, is different

from the five windows as well as the palace, so also a person recollecting an object apprehended by the five senses of a body, is different from the body and its five senses.

When *Devadatta* recalls an object seen through a number of windows, even when the windows are closed, it is *ātman* or soul that recollects the object perceived through sense-organs even when the sense-organs have ceased working as in case of benumbed state of blindness, deafness etc. This shows evidently that *ātman* is different from *indriyas*. Or, say, for example, a soul who observes a person eating tamarind by means of eyes, and exhibits *vikāras* or perversion by distilling saliva etc. by means of tongue is decidedly different from eyes as well as tongue. Or, *ātman* is different from *indriyas*, because having seen an object by means of eyes, *ātman* holds it by means of hands.

In reply to the *Buddhistic* theory that like all objects, *jîva* is destructible, it is argued that one who remembers the incidents that happened in former time and place, is existing like *Devadatta* who is able to recollect his experience of childhood. So, the soul also can never vanish on account of its being able to recollect the past life.

Bauddhas advocate the destructibility of *jñāana* (knowledge) by means of statements such as " *Yat sat tat sarvam kṣaṇikam* " and " *Ekavijñānasantatayaḥ sattvāḥ* " etc. But if the destructibility of knowledge were accepted, there would be absolute negation of *smaraṇa*. *Jñāna* of the *pramātā* (or the perceiver) should, therefore, be taken as indestructible. *Jñāna* being a quality could never exist without a substance. This shows distinctly that soul is distinguished from body.

Further, according to *Bauddhas*, *kṣaṇikatā* or impermanence is recognized neither by means of self-perception nor by the help of perception through sense-organs, but by means of *anumāna* or inference only. They further believe that the

earlier moments of apprehension create such a desire during the later moments of apprehension that by virtue of that desire, even a *kṣaṇika vijñāna* having only one support is able to apprehend other *jñānas* and their *viṣayas*. But the theory advanced by *Bauddhas* is fallacious. For, *vāsanā* or desire mentioned above, could be applied only when it is related to *vāsaka* or *vāsanîya* and could never be applied to the knowledge that vanishes immediately after its birth.

Lastly, if *ātman* were taken to be *kṣaṇika*, a number of faults such as production of many objects at a time, retention of *vijñāna*, and violation of the law of cause and effect etc., would crop up. These faults could only be avoided if soul were taken as susceptible to *utpāda* or production, *vyaya* or destruction, and *dhrauvya* or retention.

In addition to all these arguments, the sentences of *Vedas* also lead to establish that *ātman* is different from body.

(iv) Existence of Elements : In course of discussion with the fourth *Gaṇadhara* named *Vyakta*, the *Bhagavān* explains the validity of the view that elements do exist.

Since *jîva* etc. are contained in *bhūtas* or elements, doubt about *bhūtas* gives rise to doubt about the existence of all leading to the idea of all-pervading negation. Consequently, we will be compelled to take the whole Universe as nothing but illusion or dream. And according to this notion of all-pervading negation, there will be no distinction between *sva-mata* or one's own opinion and *para-mata* or another's opinion, *hrasva* or small, and *dîrgha* or long and so on.

Some objects are self-accomplished like a cloud produced as a result of collision, with the element as a cause without the help of any *Kartā* or agent. Some objects are accomplished like *ghaṭa* by means of an outside agent, while some other objects are produced by means of their virtues as well as the outside agents as in the case of a child produced by means

of its parents as well as its own *Karmas*. Lastly, there also exist some objects which are permanently accomplished like sky.

Whatever is accepted and apprehended by us as being produced by means of *sāmagrî* or a group of materials, is nothing but a collection of atoms. This naturally leads us to believe in the existence of atoms.

Out of the five main *bhūtas* or elements, the first four *viz.* *Pṛithvî* (earth), *ap* (water), *tejas* (fire) and *vāyu* are *sa-cetana* or animate because the symptoms of *cetanā* are found in all of them. But the fifth element *viz*, *ākās'a* (sky) being *a-mūrta* or incorporeal, acts only as a support and has no life.[5]

Though distinct from the variations of clouds etc., bodies made of the first four elements are *sa-cetana* only so long as they are unstruck by any implement. These bodies turn lifeless immediately if and when they are struck by some implement.

At this point, the *Bhagavān* explains the important doctrine of *Ahiṃsā* or non-violence. He dictates that according to the specific laws of morality, that which results in evil consequences is called *hiṃsā* and that which results in good fruition is called *a-hiṃsā*.

One does not commit *hiṃsā* in spite of his striking a *jîva* if his motive in doing so is beneficial at the end; on the other hand, a person is said to have committed *hiṃsā* on account of his evil motive. Inspite of his abstention from striking a living being.

All these facts lead to prove that the *bhūtas* do exist, and that out of the five main *bhūtas*, the first four are *sa-cetana*.

(v) Identity of Existence: *Sudharman*, the fifth *Gaṇadhara*, asksd a question as to whether a living being in

5. Vegetables being only a variety of *Pṛthvī* should be included under *Pṛthvī*.

this world lived a similar life in the other world. *S'ramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvîra Swāmî* removes his illusion by the following explanation.—

Attainment of re-birth or existence in the other world depends upon the *Karmas* of an individual. The *Karma-bandha*—which binds the soul to the body—is caused by *mithyātva* (wrong belief), *a-virati* (non-renunciation) ,*pramāda* (carelessness), and *yoga* (vibrations set up in the soul through mind, body, and speech). *Para-bhava*, being dependent upon *Karma*, happens to be *vicitra* like *Karma*. So, if the life in two existences were one and the same, there would be no scope for an increase or decrease in it. In such a case, one who is rich in this life would become rich in the next life also, and a poor man in this life would remain poor in the next life as well. Thus, there would be nothing like progress or retardation, if this and the other life were to be the same or identical. And consequently, there would be no justification for the practice of religious duties and pious deeds in this world.

This shows clearly that similarity or identity between the two *bhavas* or existences would never be possible, and the belief is refuted by means of *Veda-padas* like " *S'rugālo vai eṣa jāyate yaḥ sa-purîṣo dahyate* " etc. also.

(vi) Bandha and Mokṣa: Since body and soul are connected with each other as *hetu* and *hetumat*, they must have perpetual continuance. The tendency of body is such that it becomes the cause of the future body and effect of the past *Karmas*. In case of an *anādi santāna* also, that which is the cause of future body and effect of the past one, becomes decidedly a perpetual continuance of body and *Karma*. This proves the existence of *Karma-bandha*.

The mutual relation between *Jîva* and *Karma* is endless and beginningless (*anādi ananta*) like sky, and at the same time beginningless but limited (*anādi sānta*) like that between

gold and stone. The *anādi ananta* relation exists with regard to *a-bhavya* or mean *jîvas*, and the *anādi sānta* relation exists with regard to *bhavya* or higher souls.

Bhavya means that which is fit for the attainment of *Siddhi*. The group of such *bhavyas* is endless like *ākāś'a*, and hence it could never be destroyed.

Mokṣa means separation or shedding off of the *karma-pudgalas* from soul. *Mokṣa* is neither *kṛitaka* or artificial, nor *a-nitya* or impermanent. It can be said to be *a-nitya* only to the extent that everything is *nitya* or everlasting as *dravya* (substance) and *a-nitya* or impermanent as *paryāya* or modification. Like consciousness movement is also an important property of soul.

Free souls possess movements. But these free souls cannot go beyond *Siddhakṣetra* in absence of *dharmāstikāya*. *Dharmāstikāya* and *Adharmāstikāya* are the only two factors which distinguish *loka* from *a-loka*.

Like *Kāla*, *Muktātmā* is also *anādi*. That is, just as nobody knows which was a first day or a first night, since the stream of *Kāla* flows on from times immemorial, in the same way no body knows when the first free soul came into existence. Innumerable *siddhas* or *mukta* beings could be contained in one *siddha-kṣetra* by virtue of their *a-mūrtatva* or formlessness as the *Siddha-kṣetra* has only limited dimensions.

Bandha and *Mokṣa* are, therefore, laid down as positive factors existing by virtue of *Karmas* as shown above.

(vii-viii) Existence of Devas and Nārakas: Existence of devas or gods and *Nārakas* or hellish denizens could be proved in various ways.

At the time of a *Tîrthaṅkara's* birth, many gods and goddesses come to this world to pay their homages.

Like luminary gods such as Moon etc. other gods are also perceptible. Here if it is said that Moon etc., are not luminary gods but they are mere places of habitation, there ought to exist inhabitants of these places also. And these inhabitants are none but gods.

It is impossible to find people in this world who are cent percent happy or cent percent unhappy. For, in this world, a happiest man is undoubtedly affected by some sort of disease, or old age, and an extremely miserable man will experience the happy breeze of cool wind, and the brightness of light. From this point of view, human beings could never be called cent per cent happy or cent per cent unhappy. It is the *Nārakas* or hellish denizens only who are destined to the cent per cent misery and it is the *devas* or divine beings who enjoy cent per cent happiness. It is true that sometimes a human being is allegorically called a 'god' but we should not forget that unless and until the principal meaning of a word is attained, the secondary meaning could never be attributed to it. All these arguments show that although gods and *nārakas* are *acākṣuṣa i. e.*, beyond the perception of senses, they do exist.

(ix) Pāpa-Puṇya: There are five different theories about the existence of *pāpa-puṇya* :—

(1) There exists *puṇya* alone which increases or decreases causing pleasure or pain. (2) There exists *pāpa* alone which increases or decreases causing pain or pleasure. (3) *Puṇya* and *pāpa* exist in a combined state like *miśrakamaṇi*. (4) *Puṇya* and *pāpa* are independent of each other. (5) There is nothing like *Karma*, and hence there is nothing like *puṇya* and *pāpa* also.

Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvîra Swāmî refutes all the above-mentioned theories and establishes his own in this way :—

Just as a potter accompanied by earth, stick, wheel etc. happens to be the cause of *ghaṭa*, there do exist *puṇya* and

pāpa which are but respectively good and evil forms of *Karma*, that works as the *hetu* or cause in the production of body. Though there exist visible *hetus* like father and mother in the production of body, there do exist invisible *hetus* like *puṇyas* and *pāpas* also, which determine the form proportionate or im-proportionate, beautiful or ugly, according as it is due to *puṇya* or *pāpa*. In other words, *s'ubha s'arîra* is the product of *puṇya karma*, and *a-s'ubha s'arîra* is the product of *pāpa karma*.

Like the *mūrta ghaṭa* which becomes the cause of *a-mūrta jñāna*, the *mūrta karma* is also the cause of *a-mūrta sukha-duḥkha* or pleasure and pain etc. The experience of exquisite happiness is caused by the abundance of *puṇya* and the experience of utmost miseries is due to the abundance of sins.

Puṇya and *pāpa* which thus act as the causes of happiness and misery are independent of each other. Since there is no reason for the *Karma-bandha* of *puṇya* and *pāpa* taken together, they can never exist in a combined state like *mecaka-maṇi*. As seen before, *mithyātva*, *a-virati*, *kaṣāya*, *pramāda* and *yoga* are the main causes of *Karma-bandha*. None of these causes happens to operate in case of the production of a combined state of *mecakamaṇi*.

Fruition of *jîva s'ubha* or *as'ubha* turns the *Karma s'ubha* or *as'ubha* at the time of apprehension.

Food of the same kind produces blood, flesh and saliva etc. in the body on one hand, and results in useful refuge of foeces and urine also on the other hand. In the same way, *Karma* though apprehended in similar ways, results as *s'ubha* or *a-s'ubha* by virtue of *pariṇāma* and *ās'raya*. Thus, according to Jainism, there do exist *puṇya* and *pāpa* as separate entities.

(x) Para-bhava or the Other World: Since *Ātman* is susceptible to production, destruction and retention as seen before, it must have an access to the next world. When *jîva* first apprehends *ghaṭa* and then apprehends *paṭa*, the

apprehension of *ghaṭa*—known as *ghaṭa-cetanā*—is destroyed, that about *paṭa*—or *paṭa-cetanā*—is produced and the *cetanā* is retained in a continuous range of consciousness existing from times immemorial.

The same is the case with *jîvas* which are staying in this world, or which have already passed to the other world. For, since they are susceptible to *utpāda, vyaya,* and *dhrauvya,* they have a natural access to the next world.

Moreover, if there were absolute negation of *para-loka* the commandments of performing *agnihotra* etc. for one desirous of Salvation, and the prescription of the rewards of righteous deeds such as charity etc. would be of no avail.

(xi) Nirvāṇa or Final Emancipation: Buddhistic theory of *Nirvāna* is this:—A lamp, when extinguished, does never fade into any sort of earth, ether or space, but it only pacifies itself; so also, the Soul, when finally liberateed (from body) does never fade into earth or sky, nor does it pass to any of the directions, but it only attains pacification at the removal of worldly bondages of *sukha-duḥkha.*

There is another theory also, which asserts that *mokṣa* or *nirvāṇa* is a peculiar positive condition of the soul, at the attainment of Absolute Knowledge and Perception, when all sorts of miseries such as affection, enmity, pride, avarice, infatuation, birth, death, old age, and diseases etc. have been removed.

Refuting both the above-stated theories, *S'ramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvîra* asserts that *mokṣa* means the entire separation of *Karma* from the region of soul. Since the mundane world has its production due to *Karma,* it vanishes with *Karma.* But *jîvatva* happens to exist from times immemorial, and is not produced by *Karma.* So, *jîvatva,* naturally, can never vanish with *Karma.* It is not proper, therefore, to believe that at the time of *Nirvāṇa, jîva* vanishes like a lamp.

Really speaking, the flame of lamp does not vanish entirely but it only changes its form. Just as milk changes its form into curds, the flame of lamp changes into darkness. The minute particles of the flame of a lamp transform themselves into still more minute particles of darkness which are not perceptible. But that does not mean that they have ceased to exist entirely. As a matter of fact, the light-particles of the flame which were perceptible to the eye would become perceptible to nose when turned into darkness. So, the lamp does not entirely die away, but it only changes from light into darkness which is perceptible. Like a lamp, a *jîva* is also said to have attained *Nirvāṇa* or Final Emancipation, when that *jîva* passes into a new form which is *a-mūrta*, free from *Karma-bandhas* and which is unobstructible. This, therefore, shows that the pure, eternal, positive condition of *jîva* at the removal of obstructions like *sukha-duḥkha* is called the state of *Nirvāṇa* or Final Emancipation to the *jîva*.

Like a sage, engrossed in the highest bliss of Absolute Knowledge, a *Muktātmā* liberated from the bondages of all sorts of worldly miseries like birth, death, and old age etc. enjoys a blissful state of Perfect Knowledge.

Finally, explaining the real interpretation of the sentences of *Vedas* such as " *Na ha vai sas'arîrasya priyā'priyayopahâtirasti* " as well as " *As'arîram vā vasantam priyā'priye na spṛis'ataḥ*" etc., *S'ramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvîra Swāmî* convinces the *Gaṇadhara* of the validity of the theory of *Nirvāṇa* and removes all his doubts. (For further explanation see discusssion with the last *Gaṇadhara*).

II The Author-His Life, Works and Dates.

(a) Life.

Jinabhadra Gaṇi Kṣamās'ramaṇa is the author of this splendid work. Very little is known about his life. Yet,

there is no doubt that the author was a highly-esteemed scholar of his age.[6]

He was the first *Jaina* writer and preacher who had consistently attempted to interprete and explain the principles of the *Jaina* Canon (or the religious principles preached by the great *Jinas*) in such a manner as to appeal to the intellect of the people. That is to say, he did not instruct his pupils or followers only in a traditional artificial way without caring for the inner motive or spirit of the preachings. Though he preached the same old traditional principles of the *Jaina* Canon, he interpreted and explained them in a logical way so as to appeal to their intellect. He was, therefore, accepted by the people as an unparalleled preacher and scholar of the age and hence was awarded the title of **युगप्रधान** "*yugapradhāna*".[7]

His knowledge was not confined to the religious lore, but

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6. Here are the tributes paid to him by several commentators:—

(i) जिनभद्रगणिं स्तौमि क्षमाश्रमणमुत्तमम् ।
यः श्रुताब्धीतमुद्वेग्रे शौरिः सिन्धोः सुधामिव ॥ १ ॥

—*Tilakācārya* in his *Āvas'ayaka Vṛitti.*

(ii) वाक्यैर्विशेषातिशयैर्विश्वसन्देहहारिभिः ।
जिनमुदं जिनभद्रं किं क्षमाश्रमणं स्तुवे ॥

—*Muni Candra Sūri* in *Amara Caritra.*

(iii) जिनवचननतं विषमं भावार्थं यो विविच्य शिष्येभ्यः ॥
इत्थमुपादिशदमलं परोपकारैककृतचेताः ॥
तं नमत बोधजलधिं गुणमंदिरमखिलवाग्मिनां श्रेष्ठम् ॥
चरणश्रियोपगूढं जिनभद्रगणिक्षमाश्रमणम् ॥

—*Malayagiri Sūri* in his Commentary on *Brihat Kṣetra Samāsa.*

7. *Vide* नमह य अणुओग-धरं जुगप्पहाणं पहाण नाणायमयं ।
सव्व-सुइ-सत्थ-कुसलं दंसण-नाणोवओगमग्गम्मिठियं ॥

—*Siddhasena Sūri* in his Cūrṇi on *Jītakalpasūtra.*

he was well-versed in the sciences of mathematics, etymology, prosody, and phonology also.[8]

Still, hower, *Ācārya Jinabhadra Gaṇi* was the staunch and orthodox upholder of the traditional *Jaina* Canon. Though he knew many sciences, his extensive knowledge and intelligence were taken advantage of only for establishing the authenticity and validity of the *Jaina Āgamas.* He is therefore, taken as one of the pioneer *āgama-pradhāna* or orthodox *Ācāryas.*[9]

He used to take the support of logical illustrations and inferences only partially in the sense that such illustrations or inferences were quoted only if they strengthened the view-point of the traditional *Jaina Āgamas,* and were rejected if they went against the traditional preachings The example of his predecessor *Siddhasena Divākara* is welknown. *Siddhasena* was a free-minded but logical interpreter. His works are full of original thoughts and independent ideas irrespective of their being different from or similar to the traditional *Jaina Āgamas.* The theory that Absolute Knowledge and Absolute Perception do not take place simultaneouly but one after the other, has been proved by him by the help of logical inferences and concrete illustrations. *Siddhasea* thus went against the traditional view of the *Jaina Āgamas* according to which the *Kevàla-Jñāna* and the *Kevala-Dars'ana* took place simultaneously. *Jinabhandra Gaṇi Kṣamās'ramaṇa* repudiates the theory

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8. *Vide* स-समय पर-समयागम-लिवि-गणिय-छन्द-सद्दनिम्माओ ।
दससु वि दिसासु जस्स य अणुओगो (अणुवमो) भणइ जसपडहो ॥
(Ibid)

9. *Vide* परसमयागम-निउणं सुसमिय-सुसमण-समाहिमग्गणमयं ।
जिणभद्दखमासमणं खमासमणाणं निहाणमिव एकं ॥
(Ibid)

Also vide *Jītakalpasūtra* (Ed-by *Muni Jinavijayaji*), Editor's Preface, *p.* 7.

of *Siddhasena Divākara* in his *Vis'eṣāvaśyaka Bhās'ya* and re-establishes the original theory of the *Jaina Āgamas* that *Kevala Dars'ana* and *Kevala Jñāna* take place simultaneously.[10]

Jinabhadra Gaṇi is, thus, well-renowned as the preserver of the *Jaina* traditions.

That *Jinabhadra Gaṇi Kṣamā S'ramaṇa* was an orator of established reputation is known from several sources. The commentator *Hemcandrācārya Maladhāri* refers to *Jinabhadra Gaṇi* as "*Upa Jinabhadra Kṣamā S'ramaṇāḥ Vyākhyātāraḥ*". Another commentator named *Koṭyācārya* who has written a commentary on the *Viśeṣāvas'yaka Bhāṣya* pays him a tribute to the same effect in the last verse of his commentary. He says[11]

भाष्यं सामायिकस्य स्फुटविकटपदार्थोपगूढं बृहद्य-
च्छ्रीमत्पूज्यैरकारि क्षतकलुषधियां भूरिसंस्कारधारि ।
तस्य व्याख्यानमात्रं किमपि विदधता यन्मया पुण्यमाप्तं-
प्रेत्याहं द्राग् लभेयं परमपरिमितां प्रीतिमत्रैव तेन ॥

No more information is available about the life of this great *Ācārya.*

(b) Works.

Jinabhadra Gaṇi Kṣamā S'ramaṇa is said to have composed the following works :—

(i) *Vis'eṣāvas'yaka Bhāṣya:* This welknown work has been ranked as one of the most important and highly esteemed works of *Jainism.* The author himself wrote a commentary on this *Bhāsya* in *Sanskrit. Jinabhadra Gaṇi* has earned

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10. *Vide* दंसण-नाणोवओग (मग्गइम) ठियं ।

11. *Vide* "Short History of *Jaina* Literature" Ed. by M. D. Desai, p. 152, foot-note.

the reputation as a commentator mainly from this work. For, wherever he has been referred to as *Bhāṣyakāra*, the references have been quoted from *Vis'eṣāvas'yaka Bhāṣya*. But as has been suggested in the Preface to the *Jîta Kalpa Sūtra*[12] it is not improbable if *Jinabhadra Gaṇi Kṣamā S'ramaṇa* had composed other *bhāṣyas* as well. Take, for example, the following verse from the *Vis'eṣāvas'yaka Bhāṣya*—

पोग्गल-मोदय-दन्ते फरुसगवडसालभंजने चेव ।
थीणाद्धियस्स ए ए दिट्ठंता होंति नायव्वा ॥ २३५ ॥

In this verse, the examples of *poggala* (flesh) *modaya* (sweet-balls) *danta* (teeth) *pharusaga* (a potter) and *vadasāla* (the branch of a tree) have not been explained in details by the commentators. *Ācārya Hemacandra Maladhāri* suggestively remarks that " एतान्युदाहरणानि विशेषतो निशीथादवसेयानि" (These examples should be understood in details from *Nis'eetha*)

Koṭyācārya[13] also leaves the remark unexplained merely by saying " निशीथे वक्ष्यामः" (We shall explain this in *Nis'eetha*)

The question arises as to who is the author of *Nis'eetha*. The tradition does not give the credit of authorship either to *Hemacandrācārya Maladhāri* or to *Koṭyācārya*. So, it is probable that the commentary must have been written by *Jinabhadra Gāṇi* and the sentence " निशीथे वक्ष्यामः" found in the commentary of *Koṭyācārya* might have orginally belonged to the commentary written by *S'rî Jinabhadra Gaṇi kṣamā s'ramaṇa* himself.[14]

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12. *Vide Jita Kalpa Sūtra* Preface Page 9.

13. Whose commentary has not been published, but is preserved in the *Bhāṇḍārkara* Research Institute, *Poona*.

14. *Jinavijayaji* gives another evidence for this belief. In a miscellaneous collection of several stray Commentaries (which he possesses) the compiler gives three verses of *Nis'eetha Bhāṣya* and makes the following remark at the end :—

इति जिनभद्रक्षमाश्रमणकृतनिशीथभाष्यस्याष्टमो-देशकः

(Preface to *Jîta Kalpa Sūtra* pp. 9-10)

Unfortunately these commentaries are not available at present, and we have to depend mostly on conjectures. The commentary of *Koṭyācārya* is preserved in a tattered condition in the *Bhāndārkara* Research Institute, *Poona*. The only available commentary is that of *S'rî Maladhāri Hemacandrācārya*.

(ii) Bṛihat Saṃgrahaṇî—This work runs in almost 500 verses. *Ācārya Malayagiri Sūri* has written a commentary on this work in *Sanskrit*. The work along with the Commentary has already been published.

(iii) Bṛihat Kṣetra-Samāsa—This is also a similar work. *Ācārya S'rî Malayagiri Sūri* and others have written commentaries and the work along with the commentaries is published.

(iv) Jīta Kalpa Sūtra—This work lays down various religious practices to be followed by the *Jaina* monks. The work is also dealing with the ten types of remonstration. The subject of remonstration has already been treated in the *Cheda-sūtras* and other works. *Jinabhadra Gaṇi* seems to have composed this work with a view to treat the subject in a precise and comprehensive manner.

The oldest commentary available on this work at present is the *cūrṇi* of *Siddhasena* in *Prākrit*. In his *Cūrṇi*, *Siddhasena* remarks at one place that there existed some other *cūrṇi*[15] also, before he composed his one, but that is not available at present. On this *Cūrṇi* of *Siddhasena*, *S'rî Candra Sūri* has written explanatry notes in *Sanskrit*.

Besides the *cūrṇi* of *Siddhasena*, there is one more *cūrṇi* available in *Prākrit* verses. It is difficult to say whether it is the same *cūrṇi* that he refers to or it is different from his own. Nothing is known about the author and the date of

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15. अहवा बितियचुन्निकरा-भिप्पाएण चत्त्वारि वि सुत्तेण व गहिया।

composition either from the portion in the beginning or one at the end.[16]

(v) Viśeṣaṇavah:—This book is a miscellaneous work comprised into nearly 400 *Prākrit* verses and is not publishdd as yet.

In addition to the above-mentioned five works, some people consider *Dhyāna-s'ataka* which has been incorporated by *Ācarya Mahāraja Haribhadra Sūri* in his commentary on the *Āvas'yaka Sūtras*, also to be the composition of *Jinabhadra Gaṇi Ksamā-s'ramaṇa.* But there are not sufficient evidences to convince us of his authorship of *Dhayāna-S'ataka.*

(c) Date:—

There are no definite means that help us to fix the exact date of *Jinabhadra Gaṇi kṣamā-s'ramaṇa.* Still, however, the tradition of various *Paṭṭāvalis* throws considerable light on the problem. The tradition of the *Paṭṭāvalis* written after the sixteenth century (V. S.) tells us that *Jinabhadra Gaṇi kṣamās'ramaṇa* flourished 1115 years after the *Nirvaṇa* of *S'ramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvîra.* This fixes the date somewhere about 645 V. S.

There is another theory which assigns to *Jinabhadra Gaṇi* 5oo years earlier than his commentator *Maladhāri Hemacandrācārya* who is said to have flourished in 1175 V. S. According to this theory also, *Jinabhadra Gaṇi kṣamā-s'ramaṇa* must have flourished somewhere about 650-675 V. S.

The author of *Tapāgaccha Paṭṭāvali* places *Jinabhadra Gaṇi kṣamā-s'ramaṇa* as the contemporary of *Ācārya S'rîmān Haribhadra Sūri* who is said to have written a commentary

16. At the end of this *bhāṣya* the only reference is this:—

सं. १७२० वर्षे मार्गशीर्ष शुदि १ शुक्रवासरे अद्येह श्रीपत्तने लि० श्री मोढ ज्ञातिना काशीदासात्मजेन अंबादत्तेन । शुभं भवतु । शिवमस्तु ।

(*Jîta Kalpa Sūtra* Preface P. 17)

on *Dhyāna S'ataka.* According to this view, *Jinabhadra Gaṇi* had lived a long life of 104 years and though *Ācārya Haribhadra Sūri* was senior to him by 60 or 65 years, both of them happened to be contemporaries on account of the long life of *Jinabhadra Gaṇi.*[17] This view is not sound because *Haribhadra Sūri* did not, in fact, flourish in 530 V. S. or 580 V. S. but he flourished between 757 and 875 V. S. as *Muni Jinavijayaji* has suggested. Secondly, *S'rîmān Haribhadra Sūri* has frequently quoted *Jinabhadra Gaṇi's sūtras* in his *Āvas'yaka Vritti.* It is, therefore, clear that *Jinabhadra Gaṇi* did not in any case flourish after *Haribhadra Sūri.*

According to other *Paṭṭāvalis,* all of *Jinabhadra Gaṇi Haribhadra Sūri, Devarddhi Gaṇi kṣamās'ramaṇa, S'ilāṅkācārya* and *Kālakācārya* happened to be contemporaries. But the history of the development of Jainism shows that the theory is wrongly based. The date of *S'rîmān Haribhadra Sūri* has been fixed as the latter half of the eighth and the first half of the 9th century V. S., *Jinabhadra Gaṇi* has been placed in the latter half of the 7th and the first half of the 8th century V. S. *Devarddhi Gaṇi kṣamā s'ramaṇa* and *Kālakācārya* are said to have flourished in the beginning of the 6th century V. S.

Leaving others aside, let us consider if *Jinabhadra Gaṇi* and *S'ilaṅkācārya* happened to flourish at the same time. The tradition says that *S'īlaṅkācārya* was the priest of *Vanarāja,* the king of *Aṇahillapur Pātaṇa.* If this is true the date of *S'îlaṅkāçārya* falls somewhere near 800 V. S. since *Vanarāja* established his kingdom in 802 V. S. This places *S'ilāṅkācārya* undoubtedly as the contemporary of *Ācārya Śree Haribhadra Sūrijî.* Now some of the *Paṭṭāvalis* refer to

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17. *Vide Śrı Tapāgachchha Pattāvali* (Edited by) *Śrī Kalyāṇa Vijayaji* Vol. I. page 98.

S'îlaṅkācārya as the pupil of *Jinabhadra Gaṇi kṣamā s'ramaṇa*. If this *S'îlāṅkācārya* is the same as the commentator *Koṭyācārya* several references about *Jinabhadra Gaṇi* found in his commentary on the *Vis'eṣāvas'yaka Bhāṣya* do not in any way lead us to believe that *S'îlaṅkācārya* was the pupil of *Jinabhadra Gaṇi*. Unfortunately, the first and last portions of this commentary are torn out,[18] but in course of his commentary the commentator refers to *Jinabhadra Gaṇi kṣamā s'ramaṇa* at several places. *e. g.*

(i) जिनभद्रगणिक्षमाश्रमणपूज्यपादैस्तु नोक्तम्।

(ii) अत एव पूज्यपादैः स्वटीकायां प्रायोपग्रहणं कृतम्।

(iii) क्षमाश्रमणटीका त्वीयम्।

(iv) क्षमाश्रमणटीकापीयम्।

(v) श्रीमत्क्षमाश्रमणपूज्यपादानामभिप्रायो लक्षणीयः

Although these references show how much respect the commentatar had for *Jinabhadra Gaṇi kṣamās'ramaṇa*, they do not in any way lead us to believe that *Jinabhadra Gaṇi* was his preceptor. On the contrary, we find a reference which shows a considerable gulf of time between the dates of *Jinabhadra Gaṇi* and *S'îlaṅkācārya*. The reference is this:—

भाष्यानुयायि पाठान्तरमिदं अग्रतः,
एवमनेनैव वृद्धिक्रमेणेत्यादेरर्वाक्,
न चेदं भूयसीषु प्रतिषु दृश्यते ॥[19]

This reference shows that there were various readings of *Vis'eṣāvas'yaka Bhāṣya* in the time of *S'îlaṅkācārya* which means that a considerable period of time must have elapsed after the composition of the *Vis'eṣāvas'yaka Bhāṣya*. This, therefore, prevents us from accepting the view that *Jinabhadra Gaṇi kṣamās'ramaṇa* was the preceptor and hence the contemporary of *S'îlaṅkācārya*.

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18. Vide Jītakalpa Sūtra Preface pp. 14–15.

19. Ibid p. 15.

Thus there are many difficulties in accepting *Jinabhadra Gaṇi* as the contemporary of *Śīlaṅkācārya* or even *Haribhadra Sūrijī* and others as mentioned before.

It is, therefore, proper to believe that unless and until there is no evidence against the belief of the tradition, there is no objection in accepting the date of *Jinabhadra kṣamā-śramaṇa* as roughly *about the second half of the seventh century V. S.*

III Philosophy.

(a) Ethics:

According to Jainism, the main purpose of every living being on this earth. *viz nirvāṇa* or final emancipation is attained in the simultaneous observance of these three main doctrines: (1) Right Belief (Faith in the teachings of *Jinas*) (2) Right knowledge (knowledge of his doctrine) that leads to Salvation and (3) Right Conduct (Perfect Conduct). According to the *Jaina* Philosophy, belief in real existence of *tattvas* is right faith. Knowledge of real nature without doubt or error is right knowledge. An attitude of neutrality without desire or aversion towards the objects of the external world, is right conduct.

Virtue consists of the five-fold conduct of one who has knowledge and faith :—

1. Innocence—or *a-hiṃsā* which is not mere negative abstention but positive kindness to all creation.
2. Charity and truth-speaking.
3. Honorable conduct—such as not stealing.
4. Chastity in word, thought and deed.
5. Renunciation of all worldly interests.

Jaina ethics lay stress on both faith and works. All those actions which lead to peace of mind are *puṇya*. *Hiṃsā* or infliction of suffering is the great sin or *pāpa*.

Untruthfulness, dishonesty, unchastity, covetousness, anger, conceit etc. are other sources of sin. Sin is no offence against God, but only against man according to *Jaina* ethics.

The ethical system of the *Jainas* is more rigorous than that of the *Buddhists*. It looks upon patience as the highest good and pleasure of senses as a source of sin.

The chief feature of *Jainism* is *ahiṃsā* (respect for all and abstention from injuring everything that has life.)

The *Jainas* repudiate the theory of the creation of the world out of nothing or as a series of accidents. According to them, there can neither be destruction of things that do exist nor can there be creation of things out of nothing. So, according to this view, there is no God necessary for creation or destruction.

Jainism looks upon God, nature, and soul, as aspects of the same. According to *Jaina* ethics there is no God except the soul in its ideal integrity.

The *Jaina* philosophy tells us that the life of God in heaven is one of the forms that a soul might assume by the accumulation of *puṇya* (merit). According to them, Gods are only embodied souls like men and animals different from them in degree but not in kind.

The liberated souls are above gods. They are never born again, and they have no connection with the world. Meditation or adoration of the *Jinas* sanctifies the soul.

(b) Theory of Soul: Plurality of spirits.

According to the *Jaina* philosophy, the universe is filled with *jîvas*. *Jîva* means whatever is living and not whatever is mechanical. So, it corresponds to the life-elemant of Bergson. And since it is a subject of experience it also corresponds to the monad of Leibniz.

Jainism does not seem to have made exact distinctions between *jîva* and *Ātman*, *a-jîva* and matter. A *jîva* is a particular kind of existent being. The liberated *jîva* freed from matter, is called the *Ātman*. *Ātman* means pure consciousness untinted by matter. It excludes all space and externality. It is the *jîva* purified and raised to the highest spiritual status, which is mere formless consciousness.

On the other hand, *pudgala* is not pure matter untouched by consciousness. It already bears the impress of spirit. *Ātman* is the spirit of being and matter is the negative principle of non-living. The latter corresponds to the space of Bergson, or the materia prima of Leibniz. The bare materiality of *pudgala* is the direct opposite of spirit. A *jîva* is the combination of the two. It is material-spiritual. A soul loaded with matter is involved in bondage. All *jîvas* in *saṃsāra* are associated with this negative element.

Jainism believes that *Ātman* or the pure spirit, pure matter, and *jîva* which is a combination of the two, are existent, though the first two are imperceptible to us. The *pudgala skandha* which we see, has also an element of consciousness, and is as much a *jîva* as others, so far as the essence is concerned. The *jîva* and the *a-jîva* of the *Jainas* are not empirical abstractions of *Ātman*, or consciousness, and matter or non-consciousness but the products of an interaction between the two. Strictly speaking, *Ātman* and *non-ātman* are the primary elements. *Jîva* possesses more of self, *a-jîva* more of not-self. They represent two orders of arrangement in the whole.

Jainim believes in plurality of spirits. The *jîvas* are many, but are alike eternal. Their characteristic essence is never destroyed, however much it is obscured by external causes. They are regarded as possessing size which is varying in different cases. They contract and expand according to the dimensions of the body with which they are incorporated for

the time being. Truly speaking, the essence of all *jîvas* is consciousness and it is only superficial to advance the theory of plurality of *jîvas*. It is only a relative conception and cannot be taken as an ultimate truth. Still, however, this distinction of spirits is justified in the sense that it distinguishes good from the bad, *Brāhmaṇas*, *Kṣatriyas*, *Vaiśyas*, and *S'ūdras*, from each other, insects, birds, snakes and so on. For, the *Jaina* canon dictates that if there were but one soul common to all beings, they could not be distinguished from one another, nor could they experience different lots; there would not be *Brāhmins*, *Kṣatriyas*, *Vaiśyas* and *S'ūdras*; insects, birds and snakes. All would be men and gods. We make equal both those who lead a blameable life and those who, in this world, practise right conduct.[20]

Thus unlike other systems of philosophy, *Jainism* asserts the doctrine of pluralistic realism.[21]

(c) The theory of Knowledge—

Like the theory of Soul, that of knowledge is also distinctive of *Jainism*. The *Jainas* admit five kinds of knowledge *viz.*, *Mati*, *S'ruti*, *Avadhi*, *Manahparāya*, and *Kevala*.

1. *Mati* is ordinary cognition obtained by normal means of sense-perceptions. We always have sense-perceptions or *dars'ana* prior to the rise of *mati-jñāna*.

2. *S'ruti* or testimony is knowledge derived through signs, symbols, or words. While *mati-jñāna* gives us knowledge by acquaintance, this gives us knowledge by description.

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20. *Vide Sūtrakṛitānga*. ii. 7-48 and 51.

21. Cf Bosanquet–"It is freely admitted that in cognition, the self is universal. It goes out into a world which is beyond its own given being and what it meets there it holds in common with other selves, and in holding, it ceases to be a self-contained and repellant unit."

(Gifford Lectures, Second Series, Chap. II)

3. *Avadhi* is direct knowledge of things even at a distance of time or space. It is knowledge by clairvoyance.

4. *Manāḥparyāya* is direct knowledge of the thoughts of others as in telepathic knowledge of other minds.

5. *Kevala* or Perfect knowledge, comprehends all substances and their various modifications. It is omniscience unlimited by time, space, or object. This knowledge which is independent of the senses, which can only be felt and not described is possible only for purified souls which are perfectly free from bondage.

The first three kinds of knowledge are liable to error, while the last two cannot be wrong.

Knowledge is *pratyakṣa* or direct when it is immediate, and *parokṣa* or indirect when it is mediated by some other kind of knowledge. Of the five kinds of knowledge, *mati* and *s'ruti* are *parokṣa* and the rest *pratyakṣa*.

Cetanā or consciousness is the essence of *jîva* and the two manifestations of *cetana* are perception (*dars'ana*) and intelligence (*jñāna*). In *dars'na* the details are not perceived while in *jñāna* they are. The former is simple apprehension, the latter conceptual knowledge.

The relation between knowledge and its object is an external one with regard to physical objects, though it is not so with regard to self-consciousness. The consciousness of the *jîva* is ever active and this activity reveals its own nature as well as that of the object. *Jñeya* or object of knowledge includes self and non-self. Like light, *jñāna* reveals itself and other objects. The *Nyāya-Vais'esika* theory that knowledge reveals only external relations but not itself is rejected by the *Jainas*. In knowing any object, the self knows itself simultaneously. Knowledge is always apportioned by the self, according to them, and the question as to how consciousness can reveal the unconscious object is dismissed by them as absurd, since it is the nature of knowledge that reveals objects.

With regard to self-consciousness, the relation between *jñāna* and *jñeya* is very intimate. *Jñānin* and *jñāna* are also inseparable though distinguishable. In self-consciousness, the subject of knowledge, the object of knowledge and knowledge itself become different aspects of a single concrete entity.

There are no *jîvas* without *jñāna* since that would take away the *cetanā* or conscious character of the *jîvas* and reduce them to the level of *a-jîva dravyas* and there can be no *jñāna* without selves; for that would make *jñāna* foundationless.

In its perfect condition, the soul is pure. *Jñāna* and *dars'ana* (knowlege and intuition) arise simultaneously or are together. In the mundane *jîvas*, *jñāna* is preceded by *dars'ana*.

Perfect knowledge is free from doubt (*saṃs'aya*) perversity (*vimoha*) and indefiniteness (*vibhrama*)

The *Karmas* which obscure the different varieties of *dars'ana* are *dars'anāvaraṇîya karmas* and those which obscure the different kinds of *jñāna* are *jñānāvaraṇîya karmas*.

These impediments are passions and emotions. All knowledge resides in the soul though it manifests itself when the disturbing media are removed.

(d) Karma :

Karma is another important topic of the *Jaina* philosophy. *Karma*, according to the *Jainas*, is of material nature (*pudgalika*). The kind of matter fit to manifest *Karma* fills all cosmic space. It has the peculiar property of developing the effects of merit and demerit. The soul by its commerce with the other world becomes literally penetrated with the pârticles of subtle matter. These become *Karma* and build up a special body called " *Kārmaṇa S'arîra.*" which does not leave the soul till its Final Emancipation.

Jîvas which are found on this world in infinite number, are of three kinds (1) *Nitya siddha* or the ever perfect (2) *Mukta* or the liberated and (3) the *Baddha* or the bound.

The second variety of *jîvas* does not become embodied. They have achieved their purity and dwell in a state of supermundane perfection unconcerned with worldly affairs. The mundane *jîvas* are a prey to illusion, and are condemned to the yoke of matter through an infinite succession of lines. The freed souls are absolutely pure and free from any tint of matter. They are the *nirupādhi jîvas* leading a life of pure existence and infinite consciousness and possess infinite knowledge, infinite perception, infinite power, and infinite bliss.

Thus, by touching the main distinctive features of the *Jaina* philosophy, we can easily remark like Sir *Radhakṛishanan* that "*Jainism* offers us an empirical classification of things in the universe and so argues for a plurality of spirits.[22] "

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D. P. Thaker

22. *Vide* "Indian Philosophy" by Sir S. Radhākṛishanan.

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Kṣamāśramaṇa Jinbhadra Gaṇi's

GAṆADHARAVĀDA

क्षमाश्रमणश्रीजिनभद्रगणिसन्दृब्धः

॥ गणधरवादः ॥

श्रीमलधारिहेमचन्द्रसूरिकृतटीकासमलङ्कृतः ।

Kṣamāśramaṇa Jinabhadra Gaṇi's

GAṆADHARAVĀDA

Along with

Maladhārin Hemacandra Sūri's Commentary

Chapter I

प्रथमगणधरवक्तव्यता

Discussion with the First Gaṇadhara.

जीवे तुह सन्देहो पच्चक्खं जं न घिप्पइ घडो व्व ।
अच्चन्तापच्चक्खं च नत्थि लोए खपुप्फं व ॥ १ ॥. (१५४९)

Jīve tuha sandeho paccakkham jam na ghippai ghaḍo vva ।
Accantāpaccakkham ca natthi loe khapuppham va ॥ 1 (1549)

[जीवे तव सन्देहः प्रत्यक्ष यद् न गृह्यते घट इव ।
अत्यन्ताप्रत्यक्षं च नास्ति लोके खपुष्पमिव ॥ १ ॥ (१५४९)

Jīve tava sandehaḥ pratykṣam yad na gṛhyate ghaṭa iva ।
Atyantāpratyakṣam ca nāsti loke khapuṣpam iva ॥ 1 (1549)

Translation—1 (O Indrabhūti of Gautama gotra !) You have a doubt about (the existence of) *jīva* (the soul) since it is not directly perceived (by senses) as is the case with a *ghaṭa* (a water-jar). Whatever is absolutely imperceptible, does not exist in the world, *e. g.*, a flower in the sky. (1549)

श्रीमलधारिहेमचन्द्राचार्यकृता टीका—

आयुष्मन् इन्द्रभूते ! तवैषः सन्देहः—किमयमात्माऽस्ति, नास्ति वा, उभयहेतुसद्भावात् ? । तत्र नास्तित्वहेतवोऽमी—नास्त्यात्मा, प्रत्यक्षेणात्यन्तमगृह्यमाणत्वात्, इह यदत्यन्ताप्रत्यक्षं तल्लोके नास्त्येव, यथा खपुष्पम् । यच्चास्ति तत् प्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यत एव, यथा घटः, इत्यसौ व्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तः । अणवोऽपि ह्यप्रत्यक्षाः किन्तु घटादिकार्यतया परिणतास्ते प्रत्यक्षमुपयान्ति; न पुनरेवमात्मा कदाचिदपि भावप्रत्यक्षमुपगच्छति, अतोऽत्रात्यन्तविशेषणमिति ॥ १ (१५४९) ॥

Digest of the Commentary—O long-lived Indrabhūti ! You entertain a doubt about the existence of the soul. For, you come across reasons, some of which lead you to believe that the soul exists, whereas, others make you surmise that the soul does not exist. The latter are as under:—

The soul does not exist; for, it is in no way perceptible by *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* (direct and valid proof) produced by a sense-organ, as is the case with a *ghaṭa*. Whatever is *atyantāpratyakṣa* (absolutely imperceptible) is certainly non-existent in this world, *e. g.*, a flower in the sky. Whatever exists, is certainly perceived-realized by *pratyakṣa pramāṇa*, *e. g.*, a pitcher. This is a *vyatireka dṛṣṭānta* (a negative example).

Some one may here argue, that though *aṇus* (electrons) are not within the range of *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* they are, so to say, invisible; yet they do exist. So, what about them ? The answer is, that no doubt they are imperceptible to us as *aṇus*, but when they are transformed so as to perform the

functions of a pitcher, a cloth, etc., they no longer remain so. Such is not, however, the case with the soul. It never attains a stage when it can be directly perceived. The adjective *atyanta,* is here used on that account.

— Notes —

प्रमाणम् *Pramāṇam* **प्रमीयते अनेन इति प्रमाणम्**—*pramîyate aniena iti pramāṇam.* That by which a correct notion is arrived at, is called a *pramāṇa.* **अर्थोपलब्धिहेतुः प्रमाणम्**—*arthopalabdhi hetuḥ pramāṇam.* Pramāṇa is the means to knowledge.

Pramāṇa is the doctrine of **स्याद्वाद**-*syādvāda* which lays bare the *whole truth,* which is the synthesis of extremes and not absolute extremes or fragmentary truths.

प्रत्यक्षम् *pratyakṣam* **इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजन्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम्**—*Indriyārtha sannikarṣa-janyam jñānam pratyakṣam*—knowledge derived directly from the peripheral contact of the sense-organs with their corresponding objects.

प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम् *pratyakṣa pramāṇam*—**ज्ञानाकरणकत्वे सति ज्ञानत्वम् प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणलक्षणम्**—*Jñānākaraṇakatve sati jñānatvam pratyakṣa-pramānalakṣaṇam.* Sense-perception means direct knowledge.

न य सोऽणुमाणगम्मो जम्हा पच्चक्खपुव्वयं तं पि ।
पुव्वोवलद्धसम्बन्धसरणओ लिङ्ग-लिङ्गीणं ॥ २ ॥ (१५५०)

Na ya so'ṇumāṇagammo jamhā paccakkhapuvvayam tam pi ।
Puvvovaladdhasambandhasaraṇaö liṅga-liṅgīṇam ॥ 2 (1550)

[न च सोऽनुमानगम्यो यस्मात् प्रत्यक्षपूर्वकं तदपि ।
पूर्वोपलब्धसम्बन्धस्मरणतो लिङ्ग-लिङ्गिनोः ॥ २ ॥ (१५५०)

Na ca so'numānagamyo yasmāt pratyakṣapūrvakam tadapi ।
Pūrvopalabdhasambandhasmaraṇato liṅga-liṅginoḥ ॥ 2 (1550)]

Trans.—2 It (the soul) is not an object of *anumāna* (inference); for, this *(anumāna),* too, is preceded by *pratyakṣa* and is the outcome of the recollection of the (inseparable) connection

previously observed in the case of a *liṅga* (a characteristic or an indicatory mark) and a *liṅgin* (one having such a *liṅga*). (1550)

टीका–न चासावात्माऽनुमानगम्यः यस्मात् तदप्यनुमानं प्रत्यक्षपूर्वकं प्रवर्तते । कुतः ? इत्याह–" पुव्वोवलद्धे "त्यादि लिङ्गयते–गम्यतेऽतीन्द्रियार्थोऽनेनेति लिङ्गम् ; अथवा लीनं–तिरोहितमर्थं गमयतीति लिङ्गम्, धूम–कृतकत्वादिकम्, तदस्यास्तीति लिङ्गी वह्न्य-ऽनित्यत्वादिः, तयोर्लिङ्ग–लिङ्गिनोर्यः पूर्वं महानसादौ प्रत्यक्षादिनोपलब्धः कार्य-कारणभावादिकः सम्बन्धस्तस्य यत् स्मरणं तस्मादिति । इदमुक्तं भवति–पूर्वं महानसादावग्नि-धूमयोर्लिङ्गि-लिङ्गयोरन्वयव्यतिरेकवन्तमविनाभावमध्यक्षतो गृहीत्वा तत उत्तरकालं क्वचित् कान्तार-पर्वतनितम्बादौ गगनावलम्बिनी धूमलेखामवलोक्य प्राग् गृहीतं सम्बन्धमनुसरति, तद् यथा–' यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्र प्रागहं वह्निमद्राक्षम्, यथा महानसादौ, धूमश्चात्र दृश्यते, तस्माद् वह्निनापीह भवितव्यम् ', इत्येवं लिङ्गग्रहण-सम्बन्धस्मरणाभ्यां तत्र प्रमाता हुतभुजमवगच्छति । न चैवमात्मना लिङ्गिना सार्धं कस्यापि लिङ्गस्य प्रत्यक्षेण सम्बन्धः सिद्धोऽस्ति, यतस्तत्सम्बन्धमनुस्मरतः पुनस्तल्लिङ्गदर्शनाज्जीवे सम्प्रत्ययः स्यात् । यदि पुनर्जीव-लिङ्गयोः प्रत्यक्षतः सम्बन्धसिद्धिः स्यात् तदा जीवस्यापि प्रत्यक्षत्वापत्त्याऽनुमानवैयर्थ्यं स्यात् । तत एव तत्सिद्धेरिति ॥ २ (१५५०) ॥

D. C.—The existence of the soul, cannot be proved by *anumāna* (inference); for, after all, this *anumāna* is preceded by *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* as is suggested by the second hemistich of this verse.

Whatever reveals an object which is imperceptible to the senses, is called a *liṅga* or whatever throws light on a concealed object is a *liṅga*, and one that has a *liṅga* is called a *liṅgin*. For instance, smoke is the *liṅga*, and fire the *liṅgin*. To give another example *kṛtakatva* (performance of an action) is the *liṅga*, and *anityatva* (impermanence) the *liṅgin*.

An inseparable connection between smoke and fire, in the form of effect and cause – the connection which is directly perceived in a kitchen, etc., can be established in two ways, *viz.*,

by *anvaya* (positively) and by *vyatireka* (negatively). Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, is an example of *anvaya*; and wherever there is non-existence of fire, there is non-existence of smoke, is an example of *vyatireka*.

The recollection of the inseparable connection existing between smoke and fire, helps a man to infer the presence of fire, when he sees clouds of smoke rising to the sky, either in a forest or on the top of a mountain or the like. For, he is then reminded of having seen fire when smoke was found coming out of the kitchen or the like. Thereupon, he works up a syllogism, as under:—

Wherever there was smoke, I previously saw fire there, as in the kitchen and elsewhere. I see smoke here; so, here, there must be fire. Thus, he rightly infers fire in view of his having previously noticed the inseparable connection between smoke the *liṅga*, and fire the *liṅgin*, and on his recollecting this connection while drawing the inference.

But in the case of the soul, a *liṅgin*, no connection of it, whatsoever is directly perceived with any one or more of its *liṅgas*. Such being the case, there is no room left for the recollection of an inseparable connection between the soul and its *liṅga* and hence there is no chance left for establishing the existence of the soul by *anumāna*.

Moreover, if the inseparable connection were to be observed in the case of the soul and its *liṅga*, the soul would be directly perceived, and in that case, there would be no necessity to infer its existence.

— Notes —

अनुमान *anumāna* (from अनु *anu*, after, and मा *mā*, to measure and hence to know) is so called because by means of this particular kind of knowledge, a thing though remote in time, space and nature, is measured out to the mind, after one has recollected the relation of invariable व्याप्ति *vyāpti*, concomitance,

between लिङ्ग *liṅga*, also known as हेतु *hetu*, *e. g.* धूम *dhūma*, smoke and लिङ्गिन् *liṅgin* also known as साध्य *sādhya*, *e.*, *g.*, वह्नि *vahni*, fire.

It is said:

न य जीवलिङ्गसम्बन्धदरिसणमभू जओ पुणो सरओ ।
तल्लिङ्गदरिसणाओ जीवे सम्पच्चओ होज्जा ॥ ३ ॥ (१५५१)

Na ya jīvaliṅgasambandhadarisaṇamabhū jaö puṇo saraö ।
Talliṅgadarisaṇāö jīve sampaccaö hojjā ॥ 3 (1551)

[न च जीवलिङ्गसम्बन्धदर्शनमभूद् यतः पुनः स्मरतः ।
तल्लिङ्गदर्शनाज्जीवे सम्प्रत्ययो भवेत् ॥ ३ ॥ (१५५१)

Na ca jīvaliṅgasambandhadarśanam abhūd yataḥ punaḥ smarataḥ ।
Talliṅgadarśanājjīve sampratyayo bhavet ॥ 3 (1551)]

Trans.—3 There has not been (previously) seen (any) connection between the soul and its *liṅga*, the recollection of which, along with the sight of its *liṅga*, can lead (us) to a conviction about the (existence of) the soul. (1551)

टीका—गतार्था । न च वक्तव्यं सामान्यतोदृष्टानुमानादादित्यादि-गतिवज्जीवः सिध्यति, यथा—गतिमानादित्यः देशान्तरप्राप्तेः देवदत्तवदिति, यतो हन्त ! देवदत्ते दृष्टान्तधर्मिणि सामान्येन देशान्तरप्राप्तिं गतिपूर्विकां प्रत्यक्षेणैव निश्चित्य, सूर्येऽपि तां तथैव प्रमाता साधयतीति युक्तम् । न चैवमत्र क्वचिदपि दृष्टान्ते जीवसत्त्वेनाविनाभूतः कोऽपि हेतुरध्यक्षेणोपलक्ष्यत इति । अतो न सामान्यतोदृष्टादप्यनुमानात् तद्गतिरिति ॥ ३ (१५५१) ॥

D. C.—It is no use arguing that the existence of the soul can be established by an *anumāna* which is ordinarily met with, as in the case of the motion of the Sun. To put it explicitly, the Sun is in motion; for, it reaches another region, as is the case with Devadatta. As regards the Sun, this inference is valid, since we distinctly see that Devadatta, who is here a *dṛṣṭānta-dharmin i. e.*, serving as an illustration, goes like the Sun, to another country after he has resorted to motion. But as

far as the soul is concerned, no *liṅga* (also known as *hetu*) which is inseparably connected with the soul, is directly perceived in any *dṛṣṭānta*, (example) whatsoever. Thus, the *sāmanyatodṛṣta anumāna* is of no avail here.

The existence of the soul cannot be proved by *āgama* (scriptural authority).

नागमगम्मो वि तओ भिज्जइ जं नागमोऽणुमाणाओ ।
न य कासइ पच्चक्खो जीवो जस्सागमो वयणं ॥४॥(१५५२)

Nāgamgammo vi taö bhijjaï jam nāgamo'ṇumāṇāö ।
Na ya kāsaï paccakkho jīvo jassāgamo vayaṇam ॥ 4 (1552)

[नागमगम्योऽपि सको भिद्यते यद् नागमोऽनुमानात् ।
न च कस्यचित् प्रत्यक्षो जीवो यस्यागमो वचनम् ॥ ४ ॥ (१५५२) ·

Nāgamagamyo'pi sako bhidyate yad nāgamo'numānāt ।
Na ca kasyacit pratyakṣo jīvo yasyāgamo vacanam ॥ 4 (1552)]

Trans.—4 It (the soul) is not even within the range of *āgama* (scriptural authority); for, *āgama* is not (quite) distinct from *anumāna.* Moreover, the soul is not *pratyakṣa* (directly perceptible) to any one whose word is *āgama.* (1552)

· टीका–न चागमगम्योऽपि तकः–असौ जीवः यत्–यस्मादागमोऽपि नानुमानाद् भिद्यते, परमार्थतस्तस्यानुमानत्वात्; तथाहि–शाब्दं प्रमाणागम उच्यते, शब्दश्च द्विविधः–दृष्टार्थविषयः अदृष्टार्थविषयश्च । तत्र दृष्टार्थविषया शब्दाद् या प्रतीतिः, सा वस्तुतोऽनुमानसमुत्थैवम्, यतः क्वचित् प्रथमं पृथु-बुध्नोदरोर्ध्वकुण्ड-लोष्टायत-वृत्तग्रीवादिमति घटपदार्थे घटशब्दं प्रयुज्यमानं दृष्ट्वा तदुत्तरकालं क्वापि "घटमानय" इत्यादि शब्दं श्रुत्वा पृथुबुध्नोदरादिमदर्थ एव घट उच्यते, तथाभूतपदार्थ एव घटशब्दप्रयोगप्रवृत्तेः, यथा पूर्वं कुम्भ-कारापणादौ, घटशब्दश्चायमिदानीमपि श्रूयते, तस्मात् तथाभूतस्यैव पृथुबुध्नो-दरादिमतः पदार्थस्य मयाऽऽनयनादिक्रिया कर्तव्या इत्यनुमानं विधाय प्रमाता घटानयनादिक्रियां करोति, इत्येवं दृष्टार्थविषयं शाब्दं प्रमाणं वस्तुतो नानु-

मानाद् भिद्यते। न चैवमसावात्मशब्दः शरीरादृतेऽन्यत्र प्रयुज्यमानः क्वचिदुपलब्धः, यत्र खल्वात्मशब्दश्रवणात् आत्मा इति प्रत्ययो भवेदिति। यदपि स्वर्गनरकाद्यदृष्टार्थविषयं शाब्दं प्रमाणं, तदपि तत्त्वतोऽनुमानं नातिवर्त्तते, तथाहि–"प्रमाणं स्वर्ग-नरकाद्यदृष्टार्थविषयं वचनम्, अविसंवादिवचनाप्तप्रणीतत्वात्, चन्द्रार्कोपरागादिवचनवत्" इत्येवमनुमानादेव तत्र प्रमाणता। न चैवम्भूतमाप्तं कमपि पश्यामः, यस्यात्मा प्रत्यक्ष इति तद्वचनमागम इति 'प्रतिपद्येमहि' इति शेषः ॥ ४ (१५५२) ॥

D. C.—The existence of the soul cannot be established by *āgama*; for, after all, *āgama* cannot be separated from *anumāna*, as, really speaking, *āgama* is (a kind of) *anumāna*.

Āgama is defined as *śābda pramāṇa*, and *śabda* (word) is two-fold, *viz.*, (*i*) *dṛṣṭārtha-viṣaya* (pertaining to an object which is seen) and (*ii*) *a-dṛṣṭārtha-viṣaya* (pertaining to an object which is not seen).

The conviction which is arrived at, by means of a *śabda* and which is associated with an object that is seen, is really an outcome of *anumāna*. For instance, first of all, one notices that the word *ghaṭa* is used for an object whose belly is round and extensive, whose basin is raised up and hollowed out, whose neck is round and which is made up of earth. Thereafter, when he hears "bring a *ghaṭa*" he begins to reflect: None else but an object whose belly is round and extensive, etc., is styled as *ghaṭa*; for, the word *ghaṭa* is reserved for this object only—a fact noticed in the shop of a potter. I hear the word *ghaṭa*; so I should bring an object of that very kind, *viz.*, one which is round, extensive etc. Having so inferred, he brings a '*ghaṭa*'. Hence, it will be seen that the *śābda pramāṇa* which is associated with an object that is seen, is not separate from *anumāna*.

To think of the soul, the word 'soul' is not used for any other object but the body. Had it been, however, so used, one would have been convinced about the existence of the soul.

The *śabda pramāṇa* associated with unseen objects like heaven, hell etc., is also, really speaking, not separate from *anumāna*. For, the knowledge connected with unseen objects such as heaven, hell and the like is *pramāṇa*, as it comes from an *āpta*, a reliable personage whose word is true—a fact noticed when he predicted a lunar eclipse, a solar eclipse and so on. Thus, here, too, the validity or truth rests upon inference.

There is none to whom the soul is an object of direct perception. Had there been any one of that type, his word would have been looked upon as *āgama*, and on the basis of this *āgama*, the existence of the soul would have been admitted.

Besides

जं चागमा विरुद्धा परोप्परमओ वि संसओ जुत्तो ।
सव्वप्पमाणविसयाईओ जीवो त्ति तो बुद्धी ॥ ५ ॥ (१५५३)

Jam cāgamā viruddhā paropparamaö vi samsaö jutto ।
Savvappamāṇavisayāiö jīvo tti to buddhī ॥ 5 (1553)

[यच्चागमा विरुद्धाः परस्परमतोऽपि संशयो युक्तः ।
सर्वप्रमाणविषयातीतो जीवोऽस्ति ततो बुद्धिः ॥ ५ ॥ (१५५३)

Yaccāgamā viruddhāḥ parasparamato'pi saṁśayo yuktaḥ ।
Sarvapramāṇaviṣayātīto jīvo'sti tato buddhiḥ ॥ 5 (1553)]

Tvans.—5 Furthermore, the *āgamas* are mutually contradictory. Consequently, on that account, too, (your) doubt is justifiable. You (therefore) believe that (the existence of) the soul cannot be established by any of the *pramāṇas*. (1553)

टीका–यतश्च तीर्थिकानां सम्बन्धिनः सर्वेऽप्यागमाः परस्परविरोधिनः खलु, अतोऽपि संशय एवात्मनो युक्तः, न तु निश्चयः, तथाहि— केचिदागमा आत्मनो नास्तित्वमेव प्रतिपादयन्ति, यदाहुर्नास्तिकाः—

" एतावानेव लोकोऽयं यावानिन्द्रियगोचरः ।
भद्र ! वृकपदं पश्य यद् वदन्ति बहुश्रुताः ॥ १ ॥ " इत्यादि ।

भट्टोऽप्याह—" विज्ञानघन एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय तान्येवानुविनश्यति, न च प्रेत्यसञ्ज्ञाऽस्ति । "

सुगतस्त्वाह—" न रूपं भिक्षवः ! पुद्गलः " इत्यादि ।

आत्माऽस्तित्ववचनान्यप्यागमेषु श्रूयन्ते तथा च वेदः—" न हि वै सशरीरस्य प्रिया-ऽप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति, अशरीरं वा वसन्तं प्रिया-ऽप्रिये न स्पृशतः " इति; तथा, " अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामः " इत्यादि ।

कापिलागमे तु प्रतिपाद्यते—" अस्ति पुरुषोऽकर्ता निर्गुणो भोक्ता चिद्रूपः " इत्यादि ।

तस्मादागमानां परस्परविरुद्धत्वाद् नागमप्रमाणादप्यात्मसत्त्वसिद्धिः । इदं च वैशेषिकमतेन प्रत्यक्षा-ऽनुमाना-ऽऽगमलक्षणं प्रमाणत्रयमुपन्यस्तम् । एतच्च स्वयं द्रष्टव्यम्—उपमाप्रमाणगम्योऽपि जीवो न भवति । तत्र हि "यथा गौस्तथा गवयः । इत्यादावेव सादृश्यमसन्निकृष्टेऽर्थे बुद्धिमुत्पादयति । न चेहान्यः कश्चित् त्रिभुवनेऽप्यात्मसदृशः पदार्थोऽस्ति, यद्दर्शनादात्मानमवगच्छामः । काला-ऽऽकाश-दिगादयो जीवतुल्या विद्यन्त इति चेत् । न, तेषामपि विवादास्पदीभूतत्वेन तदंहिबद्धत्वात् । अर्थापत्तिसाध्योऽपि जीवो न भवति । न हि दृष्टः श्रुतो वा कोऽप्यर्थ आत्मनमन्तरेण नोपपद्यते, यद्बलात् तं साधयामः । तस्मात् सर्वप्रमाणविषयातीतो जीव इति तव बुद्धिः, भावोपलम्भकप्रमाणपञ्चकविषयातीतत्वात् प्रतिषेधसाधकाऽभावाख्यषष्ठप्रमाणविषय एव जीव इत्यर्थः । इति पूर्वपक्षः ॥ ५ (१५५३) ॥

D. C.—The fact that the *āgamas* of the various expounders of religion, are opposed to one another, justifies one to doubt the existence of the soul, rather than to admit it. For instance, some of the *āgamas* propound the non-existence of the soul.

To cite an example, the *Nāstikas*—the atheists—hedonists say :—

" Etāvān eva loko'yam yāvān indriyagocaraḥ ।
Bhadre ! vṛkapadam paśya yad vadanti bahuśrutāḥ ॥ "

This means :—This world is only as much as is within the range of the senses. My good lady ! see the foot-prints of the wolf. Highly learned individuals also say so.

Bhaṭṭa, too, says :—

" Vijñānaghana evaitebhyo bhūtebhyaḥ samutthāya tānyevānuvinaśyati, na ca pretyasañjñā'sti. "

This means :—This material body which is nothing else but consciousness, after having been generated from the five elements, is dissolved into them, and there is no clear conception for future life.

Sugata says :—

" Na rūpam bhikṣavaḥ ! pudgalaḥ "

This means :—O saints ! *rūpa* (form) is not a soul.

In the *āgamas*, we come across passages which admit the existence of the soul. For instance, in the *Veda*, we hear :—

" Na hi vai sa śarîrasya priyāpriyayoḥ apahatirasti, a śarîraṃ vā vasantam priyāpriye na spṛśataḥ. "

This means :—There is no destruction of *priya* (attachment) and *apriya* (aversion) in connection with the embodied soul. Attachment and aversion do not affect a disembodied soul.

Also *" Agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ "*

This means :—An individual desirous of acquiring heaven, should perform *agnihotra* (a sacrifice to the god Agni).

The *āgama* of the *Kāpilas* says :—

" Asti puruṣo akartā nirguṇo bhoktā cidrūpaḥ. "

This means :—There exists a *puruṣa* (a personal animate

entity) which is not the doer of actions, which is devoid of qualities, which is the enjoyer (of pleasure and pain), and which is the embodiment of consciousness.

Thus, since the various *āgamas* are mutually antagonistic, the existence of the soul cannot be established even by *upamāna pramāṇa* (the proof of analogy). *Yathā gau stathā gavayaḥ,* means that a cow resembles a bos gavaeus, a species of ox.

Here the resemblance helps one to realize a distant object. But, in the entire universe, there is no object whatsoever that resembles the soul. Such being the case, there is no possibility of establishing the existence of the soul, on comparing it with an object resembling it.

It is no use advancing an argument that *kāla* (time), *ākāśa* (space), *diś* (direction) etc., resemble the soul; for, there is no uniformity regarding the exposition of their nature so far as the different systems of philophy are concerned. And hence the same trouble.

Even *arthāpatti* (presumption or implication) does not help us. There does not exist any such object seen or heard whose justification depending upon the *soul,* cannot be established.

Thus, when the existence of the soul cannot be proved by any one of these five *pramāṇas,* each of which establishes the existence of an object, it automatically follows that it comes within the range of *abhāva* (non-existence), the sixth *pramāṇa* whose function is to prove non-existence.

Thus the soul does not exist. This finishes the *pūrvapakṣa* (the view of the opponent).

Now follows the refutation of the argument :—

गोयम ! पच्चक्खु च्चिय जीवो जं संसयाइविन्नाणं ।
पच्चक्खं च न सज्झं जह सुह-दुक्खा सदेहम्मि ॥६॥ (१५५४)

Goyama ! paccakkhu cciya jīvo jam saṁsayāivinnāṇam ।
Paccakkham ca na sajjham jaha suha-dukkhā sadehammi ॥ 6 (1954)

[गौतम ! प्रत्यक्ष एव जीवो यत् संशयादिविज्ञानम् ।
प्रत्यक्षं च न साध्यं यथा सुख-दुःखे स्वदेहे ॥ ६ ॥ (१५५४)

Gautama ! pratyakṣa eva jīvo yat saṁśayādivijñānam ।
Pratyakṣam ca na sādhyam yathā sukha-duḥkhe svadehe ॥ 6 (1554)]

Refutation—

Trans.—6 O Gautama ! the soul is indeed *pratyakṣa* to you also; for, (your) knowledge about it which consists of doubts etc., is itself the soul. What is *pratyakṣa* should not be proved, *e. g.*, weal and woe in one's body. (1554)

टीका—गौतम ! भवतोऽपि प्रत्यक्ष एवाऽयं जीवः, किमन्येन प्रमाणान्तरोपन्यासेन ? । कोऽयं जीवो मम प्रत्यक्षः ? इति चेत् । उच्यते—यदेतत् तवैव संशयादिविज्ञानं स्वसंवेदनसिद्धं हृदि स्फुरति स एव जीवः, संशयादिज्ञानस्यैव तदनन्यत्वेन जीवत्वात् । यच्च प्रत्यक्षं तद् न प्रमाणान्तरेण साध्यम्, तथा स्वशरीर एवात्मसंवेदनसिद्धाः सुख-दुःखादयः । प्रत्यक्षसिद्धमपि सग्राम-नगरं विश्वं शून्यवादिनं प्रति साध्यत एवेति चेत् । नैवम्, " निरालम्बनाः सर्वे प्रत्ययाः, प्रत्ययत्वात्, स्वप्नप्रत्ययवत् " इत्यादेस्तदुद्भावितबाधकप्रमाणस्यैव तत्र निराकरणात्, अत्र त्वात्मग्राहके प्रत्यक्षे बाधकप्रमाणाभावादिति ॥ ६ (१५५४) ॥

D. C.—O Gautama ! the soul is directly cognizable even to you; so what is the use of resorting to other *pramāṇas ?* If you ask a question as to how the soul is *pratyakṣa* (directly cognizable) to you, the answer is this :—

This knowledge of yours, of which the existence is proved by your own experience of it, and which you entertain

in your heart, is the soul itself; for, this knowledge is identical with the soul.

What could be decided by *pratyakṣa* should not be established by any other *pramāṇa*. No proof is required to prove the existence of happiness, misery etc., which one experiences in the body. It is futile to advance an argument that though the existence of the universe consisting of villages and cities, is self-evident, yet it is to be proved so far as a nihilist is concerned. For the argument such as " Nirālambanā sarve pratyayāḥ, pratyayatvāt svapnapratyayavat " that is to say all convictions are devoid of any substratum, since they are convictions, like the conviction of a dream–an argument which can be advanced by a nihilist and which is a *bādhaka pramāṇa* (prejudicing evidence), has already been refuted. And, here there is no *bādhaka pramāṇa* in the case of *pratyakṣa* which reveals the soul.

The existence of the soul is established by *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* for the following reason :—

कयवं करेमि काहं वाहमहं पच्चया इमाउ य ।
अप्पा स प्पच्चक्खो तिकालकज्जोवएसाओ ॥ ७ ॥ (१५५५)

Kayavam karemi kāham vā'hamaham paccayā imāü ya ।
Appā sa ppaccakkho tikālakajjovaesāö. ॥ 7 (1555)

[कृतवान् करोमि करिष्यामि वाहमहम्प्रत्ययादस्माच्च ।
आत्मा स प्रत्यक्षस्त्रैकालिकार्योपदेशात् ॥ ७ ॥ (१५५५)

Kṛitavān karomi kariṣyāmi vāhamahampratyayādasmācca ।
Ātmā sa pratyakṣastraikālikakāryopadeśāt ॥ 7 (1555)]

Trans.—7 ' Or, this soul is *pratykṣa* owing to this *aham-pratyaya* (realization as " I ") in ' I did, I do, and I shall do ' —the *pratyaya* which is associated with functions pertaining to (all) the three tenses. (1555)

टीका–वेत्यथवा 'कृतवानहम्, करोम्यहम्, करिष्याम्यहम्'; 'उक्तवानहम्, ब्रवीम्यहम्, वक्ष्याम्यहम्'; 'ज्ञातवानहम्, जानेऽहम्, ज्ञास्याम्यहम्', इत्यादि प्रकारेण योऽयं त्रैकालिकः कार्यव्यपदेशः, तद्विषयप्रयुज्यमानतया तत्समुत्थो योऽयमहम्प्रत्ययः, एतस्मादपि " प्रत्यक्ष एवाऽयमात्मा " इति प्रपद्यस्व। अयं ह्यहम्प्रत्ययो नानुमानिकः, अलैङ्गिकत्वात्। नाप्यागमादिप्रमाणसम्भवः तदनभिज्ञानां बाल-गोपालादीनामप्यन्तर्मुखतयाऽऽत्मग्राहकत्वेन स्वसंविदितस्य तस्योत्पादात्, घटादौ चानुत्पादादिति ॥ ७ (१५५५) ॥

D. C.—In the expressions such as " *kṛtavān aham* (I did), *karomyaham* (I do) and *kariṣyāmyaham* (I shall do) *uktavān aham* (I spoke), *bravîmyaham* (I speak) and *vakṣyāmyaham* (I shall speak), *jñātavān aham* (I know), *jāne'ham* (I know) and *jñāsyāmyaham* (I shall know), etc.–the expressions which are associated with acts governed by all the three tenses, *viz.*, past, present and future, there is *aham–pratyaya* (the realization as " I "). This *aham–pratyaya*, too, establishes that the soul is *pratyakṣa*. It should be borne in mind that this *aham–pratyaya* is not based on *anumāna*; for, it has no *liṅga*. Moreover, it not even proved by *āgama* etc., for, even children, cowherds and others have the conviction of this *aham–pratyya* based on self-experience, though they are not conversant with *pramāṇas* such as *āgama* etc, and that they have no such conviction regarding a *ghaṭa*, a piece of cloth etc.

Besides

कह पडिवण्णमहं ति यकिमत्थि नत्थि त्तिसंसओ कह णु।
सइ संसयम्मि वायं कस्साहंपच्चओ जुत्तो?॥ ८ ॥ (१५५६)

Kaha paḍivaṇṇamaham ti ya kim atthi natthi tti saṁsao kaha ṇu?।
Sai saṁsayammi vāyam kassāhampaccao jutto ? 8 (1556)

[कथं प्रतिपन्नमहमिति च किमस्मि नास्मीति संशयः कथं नु ?।
सति संशये चायं कस्याहम्प्रत्ययो युक्तः ? ॥ ८ ॥ (१५५६)

Katham pratipannamaham iti ca kimasmi
nāsmīti saṁśayaḥ katham nu ? |
Sati saṁśaye cāyam kasyāham pratyayo yuktaḥ ? || 8. (1556)

Trans.—8 When there is no soul, how do you admit *aham* (the realization as 'I')) ? How can there be a doubt as to whether it (the soul) is or not ? Or, if there is a doubt, in whose case is this *aham-pratyaya* justifiable ? (1556)

टीका–हन्त ! कथमसति जीवे "अहम्" इति प्रतिपन्नं त्वया, विषयाभावे विषयिणोऽनुत्थानप्रसङ्गात् ? । देह एवास्य प्रत्ययस्य विषय इति चेत् । न, जीवविप्रमुक्तेऽपि देहे तदुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । सति च जीवविषयेऽस्मिन्नहम्प्रत्यये 'किमहमस्मि नास्मि' इति भवतः संशयः कथं केन प्रकारेणोपजायते ? अहम्प्रत्ययग्राह्यस्य जीवस्य सद्भावात् "अस्म्यहम्" इति निश्चय एव युज्यत इति भावः । सन्ति वाऽस्मिन्नात्मास्तित्वसंशये कस्यायमहम्प्रत्ययो युज्यते, निर्मूलत्वेन तदनुत्थानप्रसङ्गात् ? इति ॥ ८ (१५५६) ॥

D. C.—Hallo ! when the soul is non-existent, how is it that you admit '*aham*' ? For, it is a settled fact that in the absence of a *viṣaya* (an object), there is no scope for a *viṣayin* (one having an object). If your reply is that this *aham-pratyaya* has the body alone, for, *viṣaya* is confined simply to the body, this *aham-pratyaya* should be possible even in the case of the body which has been given up by the soul.

Moreover, if this *aham-pratyaya* associated with the soul arises, how can you have a doubt as to *kim aham asmi* (am I) or *nāsmi* (am I not) ? For, on the contrary, in such a case, you ought to be in a position to decide that 'I am' owing to the *sadbhāva* (presence) of the soul realized by the *aham-pratyaya*. When there is this doubt about the existence of the soul, is there no scope for such a *pratyaya* owing to its being baseless ?

If the non-existence of the soul is admitted, there is no possibility of a doubt regarding its existence.

जइ नत्थि संसइ च्चिय किमत्थि नत्थि त्ति संसओ कस्स ? ।
संसइए व सरूवे गोयम ! किमसंसयं होज्जा ? ॥९॥ (१५५७)

Jaï natthi saṁsaï cciya kim atthi natthi tti saṁsaö kassa ? ।
Saṁsaïe va sarūve Goyama ! kim asaṁsayam hojjā ? ॥ 9 (1557)

[यदि नास्ति संशयी एव किमस्मि नास्मीति संशयः कस्य ? ।
संशयिते वा स्वरूपे गौतम ! किमसंशयं भवेत् ? ॥ ९ ॥ (१५५७)

Yadi nāsti saṁśayī eva kim asmi nāsmîti saṁśayaḥ kasya ? ।
Saṁśayite vā svarūpe Gautama ! kim asaṁśayam bhavet ?॥9 (1557)]

Trans.—9 If the object about which one has doubt, is certainly non-existent, who has a doubt as to *"kim asmi nāsmi"* (whether I do exist or I do not exist) ? Or, Gautama ! when you (yourself) are doubtful (about yourself), what can be free from doubt ? (1557)

टीका—यदि संशयी जीव एवादौ नास्ति तर्हि " अस्मिनास्मि " इति संशयः कस्य भवतु ? । संशयो हि विज्ञानाख्यो गुण एव; न च गुणिनमन्तरेण गुणः संभवति । देहोऽत्र गुणीति चेत्, न, देहस्य मूर्तत्वाज्जडत्वाच्च, ज्ञानस्य चामूर्तत्वात् बोधरूपत्वाच्च । न चातनुरूपाणां गुणगुणिभावो युज्यते, आकाश-रूपादीनामपि तद्भावापत्त्याऽतिप्रसङ्गप्राप्तेः । " संसइए वेत्यादि " वेत्यथवा संशयिते स्वरूपे गौतम ! किमसंशयं शेषं भवेत् ? । इदमुक्तं भवति —' किमस्मि नास्म्यहम् ' इत्येवं यः स्वरूपेऽपि संशेते—आत्मनिश्चयोऽपि यस्य नास्तीत्यर्थः तस्य शेषं कर्मबन्ध-मोक्षादिकं घट-पटादिकं च किमसंशयम्-असन्दिग्धं स्यात् ? न कश्चित्, सर्वसंशय एव तस्य स्यादित्यर्थः, आत्मास्तित्वनिश्चयमूलो हि शेषवस्तुनिश्चय इति भावः। अहम्प्रत्ययग्राह्यं च प्रत्यक्षमात्मानं निह्नुवानस्य " अश्रावणः शब्दः " इत्यादिवत् प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धो नाम पक्षाभासः, तथा वक्ष्यमाणात्मास्तित्वानुमानसद्भावाद् " नित्यः शब्दः " इत्यादिवदनुमानविरुद्धोऽपि । तथा " अहमस्मि संशयी " इति प्रागभ्युपगम्योरत्र "नास्मि" इति प्रतिजाननस्य साङ्ख्यस्याऽनित्यः कर्ता,

अचेतन आत्मेत्यादिवदभ्युपगमविरोधः। बालगोपालाङ्गनादिप्रसिद्धं चात्मानं निराकुर्वतः " अचन्द्रः शशी " इत्यादिवल्लोकविरोधः। " अहंनाहं वा " इति गदतो " माता मे वन्ध्या " इत्यादिवत् स्ववचनव्याहतिः। एवं च प्रत्यक्षादिबाधितेऽस्मिन् पक्षेऽपक्षधर्मतया हेतुरप्यसिद्धः। हिमवत्पलपरिमाणादौ पिशाचादौ च प्रमाणपञ्चकाभावस्य प्रवृत्तेरनैकान्तिकोऽपि, वक्ष्यमाणानुमानप्रमाणसिद्धे चात्मनि विपक्ष एव वृत्तेविरुद्धश्चेति॥ ९ (१५५७)॥

D. C.—If, after all, there is no one like a soul to entertain a doubt, who can have a doubt as to whether I exist or I do not exist ? Doubt is a *guṇa* (an attribute) known as *vijñāna* (knowledge), and the *guṇa* has no separate existence from its *guṇin* (one having an attribute).

The body cannot become the *guṇin* of doubt ; for it is *mūrta* (corporeal) and *jaḍa* (inanimate), whereas, knowledge is *amūrta* (in-corporeal) and *bodha-rūpa* (an embodiment of consciousness).

The *guṇa* and its *guṇin* cannot have an unlike nature ; otherwise, *ākāśa* (space) will become a *guṇin* of *rūpa* (colour etc).

Furthermore, Gautama ! how can he, who is not sure about his own existence,—who has no self-confidence—say anything definitely about the rest, such as *karma-bandha* (bondage and amalgamation of *karmans* and *mokṣa* (liberation), etc., and also about a *ghaṭa* (a pitcher), *paṭa* (a piece of cloth) and the like ? The answer is obvious that he cannot. For, the decision regarding all things depends upon the decision arrived at, in the case of the soul.

Moreover, one who ignores the self-evident soul, which can be realized by *aham-pratyaya,* sails in the same boat as one who says that sound is always inaudible. He is, then, resorting to a *pakṣābhāsa* (a mock-assertion) which is contrary to direct evidence. His stand is further opposed to valid inference, like one, who may say ' *Nityaḥ śabdaḥ,* ' (sound is eternal)—the valid inference which will be dealt with hereafter.

Further, one who comes forward to say that "I do not exist" after previously admitting that I am one having. a doubt, is contradicting himself like a *Sāṅkhya* (a follower of the Sāṅkhya system of philosophy) who may say "*Anityaḥ kartā*" (the doer is impermanent), "*Acetanaḥ ātmā*" (the soul is inanimate) etc.

Moreover, one, who denies the existence of the soul, which is well-known to children, cow-herds, and women, entertains a belief inconsistent with the popular one and can be compared with the one who says "*Acandraḥ śaśî*" (the moon is devoid of the moon). One, who says "whether I am or I am not" is contradicting oneself like one who says: "*Mātā me vandhyā*" (my mother is sterile).

This view being thus opposed to *pratyakṣa* etc., the *hetu* (the cause) is *a-siddha* (not established) owing to its non-existence in the *pakṣa* (subject of inference).

Besides, this *hetu* is also *anaikāntika* (inconclusive), since none of the five *pramāṇas* has any scope so far as the measure of a *pala* of Mount Himavat and the existence of a *piśāca* (an evil spirit) are concerned.

Moreover, since the existence of the soul can be proved by inference—a topic to be just discussed, the *hetu* is *viruddha* (contrary) too, as it is associated with the *vipakṣa* (dissimilar instance).

The existence of the soul by direct cognizance, is proved in another way:—

गुणपच्चक्खत्तणओ गुणी वि जीवो घडो व्व पच्चक्खो।
घडओ वि घेप्पइ गुणी गुणमेत्तग्गहणओ जम्हा॥ १०॥ (१५५८)

Guṇapaccakkhattaṇaö guṇī vi jīvo ghaḍo vva paccakkho।
Ghaḍaö vi gheppaï guṇi guṇamettagghaṇaö jamhā॥ 10 (1558)

[गुणप्रत्यक्षत्वतो गुण्यपि जीवो घट इव प्रत्यक्षः ।
घटकोऽपि गृह्यते गुणी गुणमात्रग्रहणतो यस्मात् ॥ १० ॥ (१५५८)

Guṇapratyakṣatvato guṇyapi jīvo ghaṭa iva pratyakṣaḥ ।
Ghaṭako'pi gṛihyate guṇī guṇamātragrahaṇato yasmāt ॥10 (1551)]

Trns.—10 The soul which is *guṇin*, is self-evident owing to its *guṇas* being so (self-evident), as is the case with a pitcher. For, on realizing the *guṇas* only, the *guṇin e. g.*, the pitcher, too, is realized. (1558)

टीका–प्रत्यक्ष एव गुणी जीवः, स्मृति–जिज्ञासा–चिकीर्षा-जिगमिषा–संशीत्यादिज्ञानविशेषाणां तद्गुणानां स्वसंवेदनप्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात्, इह यस्य गुणाः प्रत्यक्षाः स प्रत्यक्षो दृष्टः, यथा घटः, प्रत्यक्षगुणश्च जीवः, तस्मात् प्रत्यक्षः, यथा घटोऽपि गुणी रूपादिगुणप्रत्यक्षत्वादेव प्रत्यक्षः, तद्वद् विज्ञानादिगुणप्रत्यक्षत्वादात्मापीति । आह–अनैकान्तिकोऽयम्, यस्मादाकाशगुणः शब्दः प्रत्यक्षोऽस्ति, न पुनराकाशमिति । तदयुक्तम्, यतो नाकाशगुणः शब्दः, किन्तु पुद्गलगुणः, ऐन्द्रियकत्वात्, रूपादिवदिति ॥ १० (१५५८) ॥

D. C.—The *guṇin, viz.*, the soul is certainly *pratyakṣa*, because its *guṇas* such as *smṛti* (remembrance) *jijñāsā* (desire for knowledge), *cikîrṣā* (desire for action), *jigamiṣā* (desire for movements) and doubt, etc., which are kinds of knowledge are self-evident, as they are experienced by oneself. One whose *guṇas* are *pratyakṣa*, is noticed to be *pratyakṣa*; for instance, a pitcher.

The *guṇas* of the soul are *pratyakṣa*. Therefore the soul is *pratyakṣa*. Just as, since *rūpa* (colour) etc., the *guṇas* of of a pitcher, are *pratyakṣa*, the pitcher, too, is *pratyakṣa*.

Such is the case with the soul, as its *guṇas*, *viz. vijñāna*, (knowledge) etc., are *pratyakṣa*.

Some one may say that this argument is *anaikāntika* (vicious); for, the *śabda* (sound) which is the *guṇa* of *ākāśa* (space) is *pratyakṣa* yet *ākaśā* is not *pratyakṣa*. But this

is not correct; for, *śabda* is not the *guṇa* of *ākāśa*, but *śabda* (sound) is rather the *guṇa* of *pudgala* (matter) as it is *aindriyaka* (cognizable by the sense-organs) as is the case with colour, etc.—

When the *guṇas* are *pratyakṣa*, how is it that the *guṇin* is also of this type ?

The answer is :—

अन्नोऽणन्नो व गुणी होज्ज गुणेहिं, जइ नाम सोऽणन्नो ।
ननु गुणमेत्तग्गहणे घेप्पइ जीवो गुणी सक्खं ॥ ११ ॥ (१५५९)

Anno'ṇanno va guṇī hojja guṇehim jaï nāma so'ṇanno ।
Nanu guṇamettaggahaṇe gheppaï jīvo guṇi sakkham ॥ 11 (1559)

[अन्योऽनन्यो वा गुणी भवेद् गुणैः, यदि नाम सोऽनन्यः ।
ननु गुणमात्रग्रहणे गृह्यते जीवो गुणी साक्षात् ॥ ११ ॥ (१५५९)

Anyo'nanyo vā guṇī bhaved guṇaih, yadi nāma so'nanyaḥ ।
Nanu guṇamātragrahaṇe gṛhyate jīvo guṇī sākṣāt ॥ 11 (1559)]

अह अन्नो तो एवं गुणिनो न घडादओ वि पच्चक्खा ।
गुणमेत्तग्गहणाओ जीवम्मि कउ विचारोऽयं ? ॥ १२ ॥ (१५६०)

Aha ânno to evam guṇino na ghaḍādaö vi paccakkhā ।
Guṇamettaggahaṇāö jīvammi kaü vicāro'yam ? ॥ 12 (1560)

[अथान्यस्तत एवं गुणिनो न घटादयोऽपि प्रत्यक्षाः ।
गुणमात्रग्रहणाज्जीवे कुतो विचारोऽयम् ? ॥ १२ ॥ (१५६०)

Athānyastata evam guṇino na ghaṭāḍayo'pi pratyakṣāh ।
Guṇamātragrahaṇājjīve kuto vicāro' yam ? ॥ 12 (1560)]

Trans.—11–12 The *guṇin* may be either distinct from or identical with *guṇas*. If it is really identical (with the *guṇas*), the *guṇin*, the soul, is surely directly realized, on the realization of (its) *guṇas* only. If, however, it (*guṇin*) is distinct, then

the *guṇins* such as a pitcher, etc., are not *pratyakṣa* owing to the realization of merely *guṇas*. (Such being the case), whence is (the scope for) this thought of non-existence as regards the soul ? (1559-1560)

टीका—ननु भवता गुणेभ्यो गुणी किमर्थान्तरभूतोऽभ्युपगम्यते, अनर्थान्तरभूतो वा ? । यदि नाम सोऽनन्यस्तेभ्योऽनर्थान्तरभूतः तर्हि ज्ञानादिगुणग्रहणमात्रादेव गुणी जीवः प्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यत इति सिद्धमेव । प्रयोगः—यो यस्मादनन्तरं स तद्ग्रहणे गृह्यते एव, यथा वाससि रागः। गुणेभ्योऽनर्थान्तरं च गुणी तस्माद् गुणग्राहकप्रत्यक्षेण सोऽपि गृह्यत एवेति। अथ गुणेभ्योऽन्योऽर्थान्तरभूत एव गुणी । तत एवं सति घटादयोऽपि गुणिनो न प्रत्यक्षाः, तदर्थान्तरभूतस्य रूपादिगुणमात्रस्यैव ग्रहणात् । इह यद् यस्मादर्थान्तरभूतं तद्ग्रहणेऽपि नेतरस्य ग्रहणम्, यथा घटे गृहीते पटस्य, अर्थान्तरभूताश्च गुणिनो गुणा इष्यन्ते, अतो गुणग्रहणेऽपि न गुणिग्रहणम् । अतो घटादीनामपि समानेऽग्रहणदोषे कोऽयं नाम भवतः केवल जीवे विचारो नास्तित्वविवक्षा येनोच्यते—" पच्चक्खं जं नं घिप्पइ घडो व " इत्यादि ? । अथ द्रव्यविरहिताः केऽपि न सन्त्येव गुणाः, इत्यतस्तद्ग्रहणद्वारेण गृह्यन्त एव घटादयः । नन्वेतदात्मन्यपि समानमेव । किञ्च गुणिनो गुणानामर्थान्तरत्वेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने गुणी भवतु, मा भूद् वा प्रत्यक्षः, तथापि ज्ञानादिगुणेभ्यः पृथगात्मा गुणी त्वदभ्युपगमेनापि सिध्यत्येवेति ॥(१५५९-१५६०)॥

D. C.—The *guṇin* may be either separate or non-separate from its *guṇas*. If it is non-separate, *i. e.*, identical, then, on realizing knowledge, etc., which are the *guṇas* of the soul, the *guṇin*, the soul, is directly realized. The underlying argument is as follows:—

That which is not separate from another is realized on that another being realized, *e. g.*, colour in a garment. To be explicit, a garment and its colour are not separate; so, when the colour is realized, the garment, too, is realized.

The *guṇin* is non-separate from the *guṇas*. Consequently when the *guṇas* are directly perceived, the *guṇin*, too, is

certainly realized. If the *guṇin* is really distinct from the *guṇas*, then, such being the case, the *guṇins* such as a pitcher and the like, are not *pratyakṣa* when only their *guṇas* like colour, which are separate from the *guṇin*, are realized. That which is distinct from another, is not realized even when another, which is separate from it, is realized. As for example, a pitcher is distinct from a piece of cloth. So, when one is realized, the other is not realized. If it is desired that *guṇas* are to be looked upon as separate from the *guṇin*, then, even when the *guṇas* are realized, the *guṇin* remains unrealized. Hence, when the fault of non-realization is applicable even in the case of pitchers etc., why should the question of non-existence arise only in the case of the soul, to the effect that "*paccakkham jam na ghippaï ghaḍo vva*" etc. ?

There is really no existence of the *guṇas* apart from the substance of which they are the *guṇas*; so, when the *guṇas* of a pitcher are realized, the pitcher, too, is certainly realized. And the case of the soul is parallel.

Furthermore, even though while assuming that the *guṇas* are separate from the *guṇin*, the *guṇin* becomes or does not become *pratyakṣa* (when the *guṇas* become *pratyakṣa*), yet the *guṇin*, the soul which is distinct from its *guṇas* such as knowledge, has its existence proved even by your own admission. Anticipating the opinion of the disputant, the author says:—

अह मन्नसि अत्थि गुणी न य देहत्थंतरं तओ किंतु ।
देहे नाणाइगुणा सो च्चिय तेसिं गुणी जुत्तो ॥ १३ ॥ (१५६१)

Aha mannasi atthi guṇī na ya dehatthantaram taö kintu ।
Dehe nāṇāiguṇā so cciya tesim guṇi jutto ॥ 13 (1561)

[अथ मन्यसेऽस्ति गुणी न च देहार्थान्तरं सकः किन्तु ।
देहे ज्ञानादिगुणाः स एव तेषां गुणी युक्तः ॥ १३ ॥ (१५६१)

Atha manyase'sti guṇī na ca dehārthāntaram sakaḥ kintu ।
Dehe jñānādiguṇāh sa eva teṣām guṇī yuktaḥ ॥ 13 (1561)]

Trans.—13 You may believe that there is the *guṇin,* but that it is not distinct from a body. The *guṇas* like knowledge etc., are observed in a body; so that (body) alone is fit to be their *guṇin.* (1561)

टीका–अथ मन्यसे-अस्त्येव ज्ञानादिगुणानां गुणी, नैव तं प्रत्याचक्ष्महे, एतत् तु नाभ्युपच्छामो यत्–" देहादर्थान्तरं तकोऽसौ " इति, किन्तु देह एव ज्ञानादयो गुणाः समुपलभ्यन्ते, अतः स एव तेषां गुणी युक्तः, यथा रूपादीनां घटः। प्रयोगः–देहगुणा एव ज्ञानादयः, तत्रैवोपलभ्यमानत्वात्, गौर-कृश-स्थूलतादिवदिति ॥ १३ (१५६१) ॥

D. C.—It may be that you admit that there is a *guṇin* for the *guṇas* like knowledge, etc., but you may refuse to believe that this *guṇin* is something else than a body. That is to say, you look upon the body itself as the *guṇin* in question, since the *guṇas* such as knowledge etc., are found in the body only. For example, colour is seen in a pitcher and hence its *guṇin* is a pitcher. The underlying argument is this :—

Knowledge etc., are the *guṇas* of a body, because they are observed there and there only like other attributes of the body, such as its whiteness, emaciation, fatness etc.

The answer is :—

नाणादओ न देहस्स मुत्तिमत्ताइओ घडस्सेव ।
तम्हा नाणाइगुणा जस्स स देहाइओ जीवो ॥ १४ ॥ (१५६२)

Nāṇadaö na dehassa muttimattāïö ghaḍasseva।
Tamhā nāṇāïguṇā jassa sa dehāïö jīvo ॥ 14 (1562)

[ज्ञानादयो न देहस्य मूर्त्तिमत्त्वादितो घटस्येव ।
तस्माज्ज्ञानादिगुणा यस्य स देहाधिको जीवो ॥ १४ ॥ (१५६२)

Jnānādayo na dehasya mūrtimattvādito ghaṭasyeva।
Tasmājjnānādiguṇā yasya sa dehādhiko jīvo ॥ 14 (1562)]

Trans.—14 Knowledge etc., are not the *guṇas* of a body, as it is *mūtra* (corporeal) etc, like a *ghaṭa*. Therefore that (object) which has knowledge etc., as its *guṇas*, is the soul which is separate from the body. (1562)

टीका–प्रयोगः–देहस्य सम्बन्धिनो गुणादयो गुणा न भवन्त्येव, तस्य-मूर्त्तिमत्त्वात् चाक्षुषत्वाद् वा घटवत् । न च द्रव्यरहितो गुणः समस्ति । ततो यो ज्ञानादिगुणानामनुरूपोऽमूर्तः, अचाक्षुषश्च गुणी, स देहातिरिक्तो जीवो ज्ञातव्यः । आह–ज्ञानादयो न देहस्येति प्रत्यक्षबाधितमिदम्, देह एव-ज्ञानादिगुणानां प्रत्यक्षेणैव ग्रहणात् । तदयुक्तम्, अनुमानबाधितत्वादस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य । तथाहि–इहेन्द्रियातिरिक्तो विज्ञाता, तदुपरमेऽपि तदुपलब्धार्थानु-स्मरणात्, यो हि यदुपरमेऽपि यदुपलब्धमर्थमनुस्मरति, स तस्मादर्थान्तरं दृष्टः, यथा–पञ्चवातायनोपलब्धार्थानुस्मर्ता देवदत्त इत्यादि वायुभूतिप्रश्ने वक्ष्याम इति ॥ १४ (१५६२) ॥

D. C.—The *guṇas* such as knowledge, cannot belong to the body; for, the body is *mūrta* and *cākṣuṣa* (visible) as is the case with a *ghaṭa*. Moreover, a *guṇa* cannot exist without a substance. Now knowledge etc., are *a mūrta guṇas*. Therefore their *guṇin*, too, must be *amūrta* etc., and hence it cannot be the body which is *mūrta*. Thus that very *guṇin* is the soul.

It may be argued that we see with our own eyes that knowledge etc., belong to the body. But this is a wrong argument as it is not consistent with the following inference :–

The knower is distinct from senses; for, even when the senses cease (to function), the object realized by means of them is remembered. One who remembers an object realized by means of another, even when that another ceases, is distinct from it, *e. g.*, Devadatta who remembers the object realized by means of the five windows. This we shall expound while answering the question of Vāyubhūti.

Desirous of arriving at a conclusion, the author says :—

इय तुह देसेणायं पच्चक्खो सव्वहा महं जीवो ।
अविहयनाणत्तणओ तुह विण्णाणं व पडिवज्जा ॥ १५ ॥ (१५६३)

Iya tuha desenāyam paccakkho savvahā maham jīvo ।
Avihayanāṇattaṇaö tuha viṇṇāṇam va paḍivajjā ॥ 15 (1563)

[इति तव देशेनायं प्रत्यक्षः सर्वथा मम जीवः ।
अविहतज्ञानत्वतस्तव विज्ञानमिव प्रतिपद्यस्व ॥ १५ ॥ (१५६३)

Iti tava deśenayam pratyakṣaḥ sarvathā mama jīvaḥ ।
Avihatajnānatvatas tava vijñānam iva pratipadyasva ॥ 15 (1563)]

Trans.—15 Thus this (soul) is partially *pratyakṣa* to you and entirely to me, as is the case with your knowledge, owing to (my) knowledge being unobstructed (infinite). (So) accept (the existence of the soul). (1563).

टीका—इत्येवम्-उक्तप्रकारेण स्वशरीरे तवापि देशतः प्रत्यक्षोऽयमात्मा, छद्मस्थत्वेन भवतः सर्वस्यापि वस्तुनो देशविषयत्वात्, घटवत्, तथाहि—सर्वमपि स्व-परपर्यायतोऽनन्तपर्यायं वस्तु, छद्मस्थश्च प्रत्यक्षेण साक्षात् तदेशमिव गृह्णाति । प्रत्यक्षेण च प्रदीपादिप्रकाशेनेव देशतः प्रकाशिता अपि घटादयो व्यवहारतः प्रत्यक्षा उच्यन्त एव । सर्वात्मना च केवलिप्रत्यक्षमेव वस्तु प्रकाशयति । अतो ममाप्रतिहतानन्तज्ञानत्वेन सर्वात्मनाऽपि प्रत्यक्षोऽयं जीवः, यथाऽतीन्द्रियमपि त्वत्संशयविज्ञानमिति प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ॥ १५ (१५६३) ॥

D. C.—In this way, the soul in your body is partially cognizable even to you; for, since you are a *chadmastha* (one under the evil influence of the *mohanîya karman*), every object is known to you only partially. Every object has an infinite number of *paryāyas* (modifications), in case it is examined from the stand-point of its own *paryāyas* and that of the *paryāyas* belonging to the rest. A *chadmastha*, therefore, directly grasps only a portion of it. It is a convention that a *ghaṭa* etc., partially revealed by light, etc., are said to be *pratyakṣa*. Only an omniscient being has a direct perception

of any and every object in toto. I am an omniscient being; for, my knowledge is neither limited by time nor by space. So I directly realize this soul in its entirety, just as I fully realize your knowledge, *viz.*, your doubt about the existence of the soul. Consequently admit that the soul exists.

Then, what about another's body ? —

एवं चिय परदेहेऽणुमाणओ गिण्ह जीवमत्थि त्ति ।
अणुवित्ति-निवित्तीओ विन्नाणमयं सरूवे व्व ॥ १६ ॥ (१५६४)

Evam ciya paradehe'ṇumāṇaö giṇha jīvam atthi tti ।
Aṇuvitti-nivittiö vinnāṇamayam sarūve vva ॥ 16 (1564)

[एवमेव परदेहेऽनुमानतो गृहाण जीवमस्तीति ।
अनुवृत्ति-निवृत्तिभ्यां विज्ञानमयं स्वरूप इव ॥ १६ ॥ (१५६४)

Evam eva paradehe'numānato gṛhāṇa jīvam astīti ।
Anuvritti-nivrittibhyām vijñanamayam svarūpa iva ॥ 16 (1564)]

Trans.—16 Thus do verily accept by means of inference that the soul which is an embodiment of knowledge, exists in another's body (too), owing to (his) indulgence in and cessation from activities, as is the case with one's own soul. (1564)

टीका—यथा स्वदेहे एवं परदेहेऽपि गृहाण जीवमनुमानतः । कथम् ? इत्याह—अस्ति—विद्यत इति । कथंभूतं जीवम् ? इत्याह—विज्ञानमयं—विज्ञानात्मकम् । अनुमानमेव सूचयन्नाह—" अणुवित्ति-निवित्तीओ सरूवे व्व त्ति " इदमुक्तं भवति-परशरीरेऽप्यस्ति जीवः, इष्टाऽनिष्टयोः प्रवृत्ति—निवृत्तिदर्शनात्, यथा स्वरूपे-स्वात्मनि, इह यत्रेष्टा-ऽनिष्टयोः प्रवृत्ति-निवृत्ती दृश्येते, तत्सात्मकं दृष्टम्, यथा स्वशरीरम्, तथा च प्रवृत्ति-निवृत्ती दृश्येते परशरीरे, अतस्तदपि सात्मकम्; आत्माभावे चेष्टा-ऽनिष्टप्रवृत्ति-निवृत्ती न भवतः, यथा घटे, इत्यनुमानात् परशरीरेऽपि जीवसिद्धिः ॥ १६ (१५६४) ॥

D. C.—The soul exists in another's body, too; for, he, too, like yourself performs desirable activities and refrains from

the undesirable ones, and you who act accordingly have a soul. To put it explicitly, one in whom are seen indulgence in desirable acts and non-indulgence in undesirable deeds, has a soul, as is the case with one's (your) body.

The body of another is seen as associated with desirable activities and dissociated from undesirable ones. Hence that body, too, has a soul. If the soul were non-existent, there was no scope for this association and dissociation, as can be seen in the case of a *ghaṭa*. This is followed by inference that there is a soul in another's body, too.

Anticipating doubt in another's mind, the author says :—

जं च न लिंगेहिं समं मन्नसि लिंगी जओ पुरा गहिओ ।
संगं ससेण व समं न लिंगओ तोऽणुमेओ सो ॥१७॥ (१५६५)

सोऽणेगंतो जम्हा लिंगेहिं समं न दिट्ठपुव्वो वि ।
गहलिंगदरिसणाओ गहोऽणुमेओ सरीरम्मि ॥१८॥ (१५६६)

Jam ca na liṅgehim samam mannasi liṅgī jaö purā gahiö ।
Sangam saseṇa va samam na lingaö to'ṇumeö so ॥ 17 (1565)

So'ṇeganto jamhā lingehim samam na diṭṭhapuvvo vi ।
Gahaliṅga darisaṇāö gaho'ṇumeö sarīrammi ॥ 18 (1566)

[यच्च न लिङ्गैः समं मन्यसे लिङ्गी यतः पुरा गृहीतः ।
शृंगं शशेन वा समं न लिङ्गतस्ततोऽनुमेयः सः ॥ १७ ॥ (१५६५)

सोऽनेंकान्तो यस्माल्लिङ्गैः समं न दृष्टपूर्वोऽपि ।
ग्रहलिङ्गदर्शनाद् ग्रहोऽनुमेयः शरीरे ॥ १८ ॥ (१५६६)

Yacca na liṅgaih samam manyase liṅgī yataḥ purā gṛhītaḥ ।
Śṛṅgam śaśena vā samam na liṅgatas tato'numeyaḥ saḥ ॥ 17 (1565)

So'nekānto yasmālliṅgaiḥ samam na dṛṣṭapūrvo'pi ।
Grahaliṅgadarśanād graho'numeyaḥ śarīre ॥ 18 (1566).]

Trans.—17–18 Moreover, that you believe that since the *liṅgin* (*viz.,* the soul) has not been realized formerly (up till now) along with the *liṅgas,* as is the case with the hare and the horn, so it (the soul) cannot be inferred by means of a *liṅga,* is untenable; for, a *graha*[1], that is not formerly seen along with (his) *liṅgas,* is inferred in a body, on perceiving his *liṅga* or *liṅgas.* (1565–1566).

टीका–यच्च " न य जीवलिंगसंबंधदरिसणमभू " इत्यादि पूर्वोक्त–पूर्वपक्षानुसारेण मन्यसे त्वम् । किम् ? इत्याह–ततो न लिङ्गतः—लिङ्गादनुमेयोऽसौ जीवः । यतः किम् ? इत्याह–यतो न खलु लिङ्गैः कैश्चिदपि समं लिङ्गी–जीवः क्वापि केनापि पुरा–पूर्वं गृहीतः । किंवदित्याह–शृङ्गमिव शशकेन समम् । ततो लिङ्ग–लिङ्गिनोः पूर्वं सम्बन्धाग्रहणाद् न लिङ्गाज्जीवोऽनुमीयते । इति यद् मन्यसे त्वं तत्र प्रतिविधीयते–सोऽनेकान्तः, यस्माल्लिङ्गैः सममदृष्टपूर्वोऽपि ग्रहः-देवयोनिविशेषः शरीरे हसन-गान-रोदन-कर-चरण-भ्रूविक्षेपादिविकृतग्रहलिङ्गदर्शनादनुमीयत इति बालानामपि प्रतीतमेवेति ॥ १७–१८ (१५६५–१५६६)॥

D. C.—Just as none has ever seen a horn on the head of a hare, so none has ever seen the *liṅgin, viz.,* the soul as associated with one or more of its *liṅgas.* Such being the case, one cannot infer the existence of the soul. This belief of yours is not right. For, though a *graha* is not previously seen along with his *liṅgas,* even children are convinced about his existence in a body, when they see that body associated with perverse acts such as, laughing, singing, weeping, movements of hands, feet and eye-brows, etc.,—the acts which are the *liṅgas* of the *graha.*

देहस्सत्थि विहाया पइनिययागारओ घडस्सेव ।
अक्खाणं च करणओ दण्डाईणं कुलालो व्व ॥ १९ ॥ (१५६७)

Dehassatthi vihāyā païniyayāgāraö ghaḍasseva |
Akkhāṇam ca karaṇaö daṇḍāīṇam kulālo vva ॥ 19 (1567)

1 A kind of celestial being. An evil-spirit

[देहस्यास्ति विधाता प्रतिनियताकारतो घटस्येव ।
अक्षाणां च करणतो दण्डादीनां कुलाल इव ॥ १९ ॥ (१५६७)

Dehasyāsti vidhātā pratiniyatakārato ghaṭasyeva ।
Akṣāṇām ca karaṇato daṇḍādīnām kulāla iva ॥ 19 (1567)]

Trans.—19 There is a creator of the body, owing to its shape being definite and (its having a beginning) as is the case with a *ghāṭa.* (There is an *adhiṣṭhātṛ* of the organs of sense owing to their being a *karaṇa* (a medium) as is the case with the *adhiṣṭhātṛ* of a stick etc. (1567)

टीका–देहस्यास्ति विधाता–कर्तेति प्रतिज्ञा, आदिमत्प्रतिनियताकारत्वात्, घटवत्, पुनरकर्तृकं तदादिमत्प्रतिनियताकारमपि न भवति, यथाऽभ्रविकारः, यश्च देहस्य कर्ता स जीवः । प्रतिनियताकारत्वं मेर्वादिनामप्यस्ति, न च तेषां कश्चिद् विधाता, इति तैरनैकान्तिको हेतुः स्यात्, अतोऽनुक्तमप्यादिमत्त्वविशेषणं द्रष्टव्यमिति । तथा अक्षाणामिन्द्रियाणामस्ति " अधिष्ठाता " इत्यध्याहारः करणत्वात्, यथा चक्र-चीवर-मृत्-सूत्र-दण्डादीनां कुलालः, यच्च निरधिष्ठातृकं तत् करणमपि न भवति, यथाऽऽकाशम्, यश्चेन्द्रियाणामधिष्ठाता स जीव इति ॥ १९ (१५६७) ॥

D. C.—That there is a creator of the body, is the *pratijñā* (premise); for, it (body) has a beginning and has a definite shape as well, as is the care with a *ghaṭa.* Whatever has no creator whatsoever, has neither a beginning nor a definite shape. The transformation of clouds may be pointed out as a pertinent example. Meru etc., have a fixed form, and even then they have no creator. So, to avoid such a case wherein the *hetu* (cause) becomes *anaikāntika,* the adjective *ādimat* (having a beginning), though not expressed, is to be taken as understood.

The word *adhiṣṭhātṛ* is also understood. Since the organs of sense are *karaṇa,* there must be an *adhiṣṭhātṛ* for them.

A parallel example is furnished by a potter, who is an *adhiṣṭhātṛ* of a wheel, a piece of cloth, clay, thread, a stick, etc., which are *karaṇas*. Whatever has no *adhiṣṭhātṛ*, has no *karaṇa*, *e. g.*, *ākāśa*. Hence it follows that the *adhiṣṭhātṛ* of the organs of sense is the soul.

Moreover,

अत्थिंदिय–विसयाणं आयाणादेयभावओऽवस्सं ।
कम्मार इवादाया लोए सण्डास–लोहाणं ॥ २० ॥ (१५६८)

Atthindiya–visayāṇam āyāṇādeyabhavaö'vassam ।
Kammāra ivādāyā loe saṇḍāsa–lohāṇam ॥ 20 (1568)

[अस्तीन्द्रिय–विषयाणामादानादेयभावतोऽवश्यम् ।
कर्मार इवादाता लोके सन्दंशक–लोहानाम् ॥ २० ॥ (१५६८)

Astindriya–viṣayāṇām ādānādeyabhāvato'vaśyam ।
Karmāra ivādātā loke sandaṁśaka–lohānām ॥ 20 (1568)]

Trans.—20 Just as in this world a blacksmith is the *ādātṛ* (grasper) in the case of a pair of tongs and iron, so there is certainly an *ādātṛ* (*viz.*, the soul) in the case of organs of sense and their objects, since they are related as *ādāna* (means of grasping) and *ādeya* (graspables). (1568)

टीका–इह यत्रादानादेयभावस्तत्रावश्यमादाता समस्ति, यथा लोके सन्दंशक-लोहानां कर्मारोऽयस्कारः, विद्यते चेन्द्रियविषयाणामादानादेयभावः, अतस्तेषामप्यस्त्यादाता, स च जीवः, यत्र त्वादाता नास्ति, तत्रादानदेय-भावोऽपि न विद्यते, यथाऽऽकाश इति ॥ २० (१५६८) ॥

D. C.—If there is a relation of the type of *ādāna* and *ādeya*, then there needs be an *ādātṛ*. A blacksmith is found as the *ādātṛ*; for, we come across a pair of tongs and iron which respectively stand for *ādāna* and *ādeya*. There is a relation of the kind of *ādāna* and *ādeya*, in the case of the organs of sense and sense–objects. Therefore, there must be their

ādātṛ. He is none else but the soul. It may be added that there is no scope for the relation of the sort of *ādāna* and *ādeya*, in case the *ādātṛ* is non-existent, *e. g.*, *ākaśa*.

Also,

भोत्ता देहाईणं भोज्जत्तणओ नरो व्व भत्तस्स ।
सङ्घायाइत्तणओ अत्थि य अत्थी घरस्सेव ॥ २१ ॥ (१५६९)

Bhottā dehāīṇam bhojjattaṇaö naro vva bhattassa ।
Saṅghāyāïttaṇaö atthi ya atthī gharasseva ॥ 21 (1569)

[भोक्ता देहादीनां भोग्यत्वतो नर इव भक्तस्य ।
सङ्घातादित्वतोऽस्ति चार्थी गृहस्येव ॥ २१ ॥ (१५६९)

Bhoktā dehādīnām bhogyatvato nara iva bhaktasya ।
Saṅghātāditvato'sti cārthī gṛhasyeva ॥ 21 (1559)]

Trans.—21 Just as a man is an enjoyer of *bhakta* (food), so there is an enjoyer of body etc., owing to their being objects of enjoyment. Just as there is an owner of a house, owing to its being a *saṅghāta* (collection) etc., so there is an owner of body etc., on account of its being a *saṅghāta*. (1569)

टीका—इह देहादीनां भोक्ता समस्ति, भोग्यत्वात्, यथा शालयादिभक्तवस्त्रादीनां नरः, यस्य च भोक्ता नास्ति तद् भोग्यमपि न भवति, यथा खरविषाणम्, भोग्यं च शरीरादिकम्, ततो विद्यमानभोक्तृकमिति । तथा, अर्थी—स्वामी । ततश्च देहादीनां विद्यते स्वामी, सङ्घातरूपत्वात्, आदिशब्दाद् मूर्तिमत्त्वात्, ऐन्द्रियकत्वात्, चाक्षुषत्वादित्यादयोऽप्यनैकान्तिकत्वपरिहारार्थं सम्भवद्धितविशेषणा हेतवो योजनीयाः, यथा गृहादीनां सूत्रधारादय इति दृष्टान्तः । यत् पुनरस्वामिकं तत् सङ्घातादिरूपमपि न भवति; यथा गगनकुसुमम्, सङ्घातादिरूपं च देहादिकम्, तस्माद् विद्यमानस्वामिकमिति ॥ २१ (१५६९) ॥

D. C.—Just as we find that there is a person to enjoy food etc., so there is an enjoyer of body etc. The underlying reasoning is as follows :—

An object of enjoyment for which there is no enjoyer, does not exist, *e. g.* a horn of an ass. Body etc., exist as objects of enjoyment. So it follows that there is their enjoyer.

Just as a carpenter and others are *svāmins* of a house, etc., so there is a *svāmin* of body etc, since this body and the like are in the form of a collection, have a beginning, are *mūrta*, are objects of sense and are visible etc., A number of similar *hetus* as may be helpful in making this syllogism perfectly logical, may be mentioned:—

One that has no *svāmin*, is not in the form of a collection etc. For instance, a flower in the sky which has no *svāmin* is not in the form of a collection etc. A body etc., are, on the contrary, in the form of a collection etc. So they have a *svāmin viz.*, the soul.

Really, by saying that the body has a creator, one proves that there is a creator etc., for the body. But that is not the soul.

जो कत्ताइ स जीवो सज्झविरुद्धो त्ति ते मई होज्जा ।
मुत्ताइपसंगाओ तं न संसारिणो दोसो ॥ २२ ॥ (१५७०)

Jo kattāi sa jīvo sajjhaviruddho tti te maī hojjā ।
Muttāipasaṇgāö tam na saṁsāriṇo doso ॥ 22 (1570)

[यः कर्त्रादि स जीवः साध्यविरुद्ध इति तव मतिर्भवेत् ।
मूर्तादिप्रसङ्गात् तद् न संसारिणो दोषः ॥ २२ ॥ (१५७०)

Yaḥ kartrādi sa jīvaḥ sādhyaviruddha iti tava matirbhavet ।
Mūrtādiprasaṅgāt tad na saṁsāriṇo doṣaḥ ॥ 22 (1570)]

Trans.—22 You may be thinking that, that soul which is a doer etc., is opposed to what is to be established, owing to its having a chance of being proved *mūrta* etc. But this is not a fault in the case of the mundane soul. (1570)

टीका—यश्चायमनन्तरं देहे-न्द्रियादीनां कर्ता, अधिष्टाता, आदाता, भोक्ता, अर्थी चोक्तः स सर्वोऽपि जीव एव, अन्यस्येश्वरादेर्युक्त्यक्षमत्वेन कर्तृ-

त्वाद्यसम्भवादिति। अथ साध्यविरुद्धसाधकत्वाद् विरुद्धा एते हेतव इति तथ मतिर्भवेत्, तथाहि-घटादीनां कर्त्रादिरूपाः कुलालादयो मूर्तिमन्तः, संघातरूपाः, अनित्यादिस्वभावाश्च दृष्टाः, इत्यतो जीवोऽप्येवंविध एव सिध्यति, एतद्विपरीतश्च किलास्माकंसाधयितुमिष्टः, इत्येवं साध्यविरूद्धसाधकत्वं हेतूनामिति । तदेतदयुक्तत्वाद् न, यतः खलु संसारिणो जीवस्य साधयितुमिष्टस्याऽदोषोऽयम् । स ह्यष्टकर्मपुद्गलसंघातोपगूढत्वात् सशरीरत्वाच्च कथंचिन्मूर्तत्वादिधर्मयुक्त एवेति भावः ॥ २२ (१५७०) ॥

D. C.—Up till now, it has no doubt been proved that it is the soul and the soul alone which is a doer, *adhiṣṭhātṛ*, *ādātṛ*, an enjoyer and the *svāmin* of the body, organs of sense, etc. For God or the like cannot be admitted as a doer etc., of the body, since such a statement will be opposed to reason. But it must be admitted that the *hetus* put forward to prove that the soul is a doer etc., are *viruddha* (contrary) as they establish such a type of the soul which is just the contrary to what is desired. To be explicit, a potter who is a doer of a pitcher has a body, and he is in the form of a collection, and is of an impermanent nature. The same must be the case with the soul. But this type of soul is just opposed to what we are aiming at to establish. And hence these *hetus* lead us to the conclusions we are opposed to. This is not so; for, we are at present establishing the existence of a mundane soul and not that of a liberated one; and that a mundane soul is somehow *mūrta;* for, it is certainly embraced by a collection of eight *karmans*, a kind of matter, and it has a body.

There is another *anumāna* for establishing the existence of the soul.

अत्थि च्चिय ते जीवो संसयओ सोम्म ! थाणुपुरिसो व ।
जं संदिद्धं गोयम ! तं तत्थन्नत्थ वत्थि धुवं ॥ २३ ॥ (१५७१)

Atthi cciya te jīvo saṁsayö somma ! thāṇupuriso vva ।
Jam sandiddham Goyama ! te tatthannattha vatthi dhuvam ॥ 23 (157

[अस्त्येव तव जीवः संशयतः सौम्य ! स्थाणु-पुरुषाविव ।
यत् सन्दिग्धं गौतम ! तत् तत्रान्यत्र वास्ति ध्रुवम् ॥ २३ ॥ (१५७१)

Astyeva tava jīvaḥ saṁśayataḥ saumya ! sthāṇu-puruṣāviva ।
Yat sandigdham Gautama ! tat tatrānyatra vāsti dhruvam ॥23 (1571)]

Trans.—23 O lovely Gautama ! Indeed you have a soul since you have a doubt (about your existence) as is the case with a branch-less trunk of a tree and a man. Whatever is doubted, certainly exists either there or elsewhere. (1571)

टीका—हे सौम्य ! गौतम ! अस्त्येव तव जीवः, संशयतः संशयसद्भावात्, यत्र यत्र संशयस्तत् तदस्ति, यथा स्थाणु-पुरुषौ, संशयश्च तव जीवे, तस्माद-स्त्येवायम्, तथाहि—स्थाणु-पुरुषयोरूर्ध्वत्वारोह-परिणाहाद्युभयसाधारणधर्म-प्रत्यक्षतायां चलन-शिरः कण्डूयनवयोनिलयन-वल्ल्यारोहणाद्युभयगतविशेषध-र्माप्रत्यक्षतायां चोभयगतैतद्धर्मानुस्मरणे च सत्येकतरविशेषनिश्चयचिकीर्षोः " किमिदम् ? इति विमर्शरूपः संशयः प्रादुरस्ति । एवंभूते च स्थाणु-पुरुषा-दिगतसंशये तत् स्थाणु-पुरुषादिकं वस्त्वस्त्येव, अवस्तुनि संशयायोगात् । एवमात्मशरीरयोरपि प्रागुपलब्धसामान्य-विशेषधर्मस्य प्रमातुस्तयोः सामा-न्यधर्मप्रत्यक्षतायां विशेषधर्माप्रत्यक्षत्वेऽपि च तद्विषयानुस्मृतौ सत्यामेकतर-विशेषोपलिप्सोः, " किमयमात्मा किं वा शरीरमात्रमिदम् ? इति विमर्शरूपः संशयो जायते । अयं चात्म-शरीरयोः सत्व एवोपपद्यते, नैकतरस्याऽप्यभावे, अतोऽस्ति जीवः । अथैवं ब्रूषे—अरण्यादिषु स्थाणुपुरुषसंशये तत्र विवक्षित प्रदेशेऽनयोरेकतर एव भवति, न पुनरुभयमपि, तत्कथमुच्यते—' विद्यमान एव वस्तुनि संशयो भवति ' इति ? । तदयुक्तम् अभिप्रायापरिज्ञानात्, न हि वयमेवं ब्रूमः—" तत्रैव प्रदेशे तदुभयमप्यस्ति " इति, किन्तु यद्गतसंदेहस्तद् वस्तु तत्राऽन्यत्र वा प्रदेशे ध्रुवमस्त्येव, अन्यथा षष्ठभूतविषयोऽपि संशयः स्यात् । एतदेवाह—' जं संदिद्धमित्यादि ' तस्मात् संशयविषयत्वादस्त्येव जीव इति स्थितम् ॥ २३ (१५७१) ॥

D. C.—A branch-less trunk of a tree is seen from a distance, as if it were a man. For, certain attributes such as

loftiness etc., which are common to this trunk and a man, are observed, while their distinguishing characteristics, *viz.*, a movement, scratching, dwelling of birds, ascending of creepers etc., are not noticeable. Such being the case, there arises a doubt as to whether this is a trunk of a tree or a person; for, both of these objects exist (though not in the same place). This proves that the doubt can arise only in the case of objects that do exist. You have a doubt as to whether this is a soul or a body, as you realize their common features, but fail to notice their distinguishing characteristics. Such a doubt proves that there is a soul; for, it cannot arise unless there existed two entities *viz.*, a soul and a body. It may be here noted that in order that a doubt may arise, it is not absolutely necessary that the objects about which a doubt arises, must be in one and the same place.

एवं नाम विसाणं खरस्स पत्तं न तं खरे चेव ।
अन्नत्थ तदत्थि च्चिय एवं विवरीयगाहे वि ॥ २४ ॥ (१५७२)

Evam nāma visāṇam kharassa pattam na tam khare ceva।
Annattha tad atthi cciya evam vivariyagāhe vi॥ 24 (1572)

[एवं नाम विषाणं खरस्य प्राप्तं न तत् खर एव ।
अन्यत्र तदस्त्येव एवं विपरीतग्रहेऽपि ॥ २४ ॥ (१५७२)

Evam nāma viṣāṇam kharasya prāptam na tat khara eva।
Anyatra tadastyeva evam viparītagrahe' pi ॥ 24 (1572)]

Trans.—24 Such being the case, an ass will indeed have a horn but certainly he has not. It surely exists somewhere else. So is the case even when the perverse view is taken. (1572)

टीका–हन्त ! यदि यत्र संशयस्तेनावश्यमेव भवितव्यम्, एवं ततः खरविषाणमप्यस्तीति प्राप्तम्, तत्रापि कस्यचित् संशयसद्भावात्। उच्यते— नन्वभिहितमत्र यदुत–तत्रान्यत्र वा विद्यमान एव वस्तुनि संशयो भवति, नाविद्यमाने । खरस्य विषाणं खरविषाणं नास्तीत्यत्र च कोऽर्थः ?। इत्याह-

"न तं खरे चेव त्ति" खर एव तद्विषाणं नास्ति, अन्यत्र गवादावस्त्येवेति न कश्चिद् व्यभिचारः। 'एवं विवरीयगाहे वि त्ति' इदमुक्तं भवति—यदा विपर्यस्तः कश्चित् स्थाणौ 'पुरुष एवायम्' इत्यादिविपरीतग्रहं करोति तदाप्ययमेव न्यायो वाच्यः—सोऽपि विपरीतग्रहो विपरीते पुरुषादिके वस्तुनि सत्येवोपपद्यते, नाविद्यमान इत्यर्थः। एवं भवदभिप्रायेण योऽस्मादृशां शरीर आत्मास्तित्वाभिमानः, नायमात्मनः सर्वथा नास्तित्वे युज्यत इति ॥ २४ (१५७२)॥

D. C.—If it is that the object which is doubted, must be existing in the very place where the doubt arises, then even an ass will have a horn; for, somebody may doubt its existence so far as the ass is concerned. No, this is not true. What we want to imply is that the doubted object exists either in the very place where the doubt arises, or even somewhere else. That an ass has no horns, means that horns are not associated with the ass; but they are found elsewhere, *e. g.*, on the head of a cow. Similar is the case when one object is definitely mistaken for the other. For instance, a man may take a branch-less trunk to be a man. Such a perverse view proves the existence of the object mistaken. Hence Gautama! you may think that we are in the wrong when we admit the existence of a soul in our body. This is our perverse notion according to you. If so, even then it establishes the existence of the soul.

The soul exists, for the following reason, to :—

अत्थि अजीवविवक्खो पडिसेहाओ घडोऽघडस्सेव।
नत्थि घडो त्ति व जीवत्थित्तपरो नत्थिसद्दोऽयं ॥२५॥ (१५७३)

Atthi ajīvavivakkho padisehāö ghaḍo' ghaḍasseva।
Nathi ghaḍo tti va jīvatthittaparo natthi saddo'yam ॥ 25 (1573)

[अस्त्यजीवविपक्षः प्रतिषेधाद् घटोऽघटस्येव।
नास्ति घट इतीव जीवास्तित्वपरो नास्तिशब्दोऽयम् ॥ २५ ॥ (१५७३)

Astya jīva vipakṣaḥ pratiṣedhāt ghaṭo' ghatasyeva ।
Nāsti ghaṭa itīva jīāstitvaparo nāsti śabdo'yam ॥ 25 (1573)]

Trans.—25 Just as there is a *ghaṭa* as opposed to *a-ghaṭa*, so there is an object, *viz.*, the soul, a *vipakṣa* (the opposite) of an inanimate object ! owing to denial. This sentence, *viz.*, 'it does not exist' establishes the existence of the soul, as does the sentence, *viz.*, 'there is no *ghaṭa*' (establish its existence). (1573)

टीका–अत्र प्रयोगः—प्रतिपक्षवानयमजीवः, अत्र व्युत्पत्तिमच्छुद्धपदप्रतिषेधात्, यत्र व्युत्पत्तिमतः शुद्धपदस्य प्रतिषेधो दृश्यते स प्रतिपक्षवान् दृष्टः, यथाऽघटो घटप्रतिपक्षवान्, अत्र ह्यघटप्रयोगे शुद्धस्य व्युत्पत्तिमतश्च पदस्य प्रतिषेधः, अतोऽवश्यं घटलक्षणेन प्रतिपक्षेण भवितव्यम् । यस्तु न प्रतिपक्षवान् न तत्र शुद्धस्य व्युत्पत्तिमतश्च पदस्य प्रतिषेधः, यथाऽखरविषाणम्, अडित्थ इति । अखरविषाणमित्यत्र खरविषाणलक्षणस्याशुद्धस्य सामासिकपदस्य प्रतिषेध इति, अतोऽत्र खरस्य विषाणं खरविषाणमित्यादिव्युत्पत्तिमत्त्वे सत्यपि खरविषाणलक्षणो विपक्षो नास्ति । अडित्थ इत्यत्र तु व्युत्पत्तिरहितस्य डित्थपदस्य प्रतिषेधः, इति समासरहितत्वेन शुद्धत्वे सत्यपि नावश्यमवस्थितो डित्थलक्षणः कोऽपि पदार्थो जीववद् विपक्षभूतोऽस्तीति ।

"नत्थि घडो त्ति व" इत्यादि पश्चार्धम् । "नास्यात्मा" इति च योऽयमात्मं निषेधध्वनिः स जीवास्तित्वनान्तरीयक एव, यथा "नास्त्यत्र घटः" इति शब्दोऽन्यत्र घटास्तित्वाविनाभाव्येव । प्रयोगः—यस्य निषेधः क्रियमाणो दृश्यते तत् क्वचिदस्त्येव, यथा घटादिकम्; निषिध्यते च भवता "नास्ति जीवः" इति वचनाज्जीवः, तस्मादस्त्येवासौ, यच्च सर्वथा नास्ति तस्य निषेधो न दृश्यत एव, यथा खरविषाणकल्पानां पञ्चभूतातिरिक्तभूतानाम्, निषिध्यते च त्वया जीवः, तस्माद् निषेध एवायं तत्सत्त्वसाधक इति ॥ २५ ॥ १५७३ ॥

D. C.—The underlying argument is this that since *ajîva* is a word of which an etymology exists and is furthermore a *śuddha pada* (a pure syllable), it has a *pratipakṣa* (a rival), *viz.*, *jîva*. A *pratipakṣa* exists in the case of the negation of

one which has an etymology or a dissolution, over and above its being a *śuddha pada*. As for example, a *pratîpakṣa, viz., ghaṭa* exists in the case of *aghaṭa* which is a negation of *ghaṭa;* for, there is an etymology of *ghaṭa*, and that it is a *śuddha pada* too. One which has no *pratipakṣa*, has no negation possible as existing, so far as a *śuddha pada* having an etymology is concerned. For instance, *akharaviṣāṇa* is wanting in a *pratipakṣa, viz., kharaviṣāṇa* since *kharaviṣāṇa* is not a *śuddha pada* but is a *sāmāsika* one – is a compound, though, no doubt, there is a dissolution of this compound, and as such it has a *vyutpatti*.

We may now examine the case of *adittha*. *Dittha* is its *pratipakṣa*; but, since this *dittha* is wanting in a *vyutpatti*, it is out of consideration here. For, two conditions must be satisfied :—

(i) It should be a *śuddha pada*.

(ii) At the same time, it must have a *vyutpatti*.

In the case of *kharaviṣāṇa* the first condition is not satisfied, whereas in the case of *dittha*, the second is violated. So there exists neither *kharaviṣāṇa*, a *pratipakṣa* of *akharaviṣāṇa* nor practically *dittha*, a *pratipakṣa* of *aditthha*.

Now the second hemistitch. Just as when one says that 'here there is no *ghaṭa*' establishes the existence of a *ghaṭa* elsewhere, so the statement that there is no soul, proves its existence at least somewhere. The reasoning in this case is as under :—

One of which a negation is being predicated surely exists somewhere, *e. g.*, a *ghaṭa*. You are predicating the negation of a soul etc. So it does exist somewhere. For, what is absolutely non existent has no negative predication. *Khara-viṣāṇa* may be cited as an instance. It is non-existent; so, there is no possibilty for affirming the existence of its negation. The very fact that you predicate negation in the case of the soul, establishes its existence.

This *hetu* is *anaikāntika.*

असओ नत्थि निसेहो संजोगाइपडिसेहओ सिद्धं ।
संजोगाइचउक्कं पि सिद्धमत्थन्तरे निययं ॥ २६ ॥ (१५७४)

Asaö natthi niseho saṅjogāïpadisehaö siddham ।
Saṅjogāïcaukkam pi siddham atthantare niyajam ॥ 26 (1574)

[असतो नास्ति निषेधः संयोगादिप्रतिषेधतः सिद्धम् ।
संयोगादिचतुष्कमपि सिद्धमर्थान्तरे नियतम् ॥ २६ ॥ (१५७४)

Asato nāsti niṣedhaḥ saṁyogādipratiṣedhataḥ siddham ।
Saṁyogādicatuṣkam api siddham arthāntare niyatam ॥ 26 (1514)]

Trans.—26. It is proved that there is no negation in the case of a non-existent object owing to the *pratiṣedha* of *saṁyoga* (connection) etc., Even the quarter union consisting of *saṁyoga,* etc., is certainly proved (to be existing) elsewhere. (1574)

टीका–असतोऽविद्यमानस्य नास्ति न सम्भवत्येव निषेध इति सिद्धम् । कुतः ? इत्याह-संयोगादि प्रतिषेधात्, आदि शब्दात्, समवाय-सामान्य–विशेष-परिग्रहः । एतदुक्तं भवति–इह यत्किञ्चित् क्वचिद् देवदत्तादिकं निषिध्यते तस्यान्यत्र सत एव विवक्षितस्थाने कस्मिंश्चित् संयोग–समवाय–सामान्य–विशेषलक्षणं चतुष्टयमेव निषिध्यते, न तु सर्वथैव देवदत्तादेरभाव प्रतिपाद्यते । तत्र " नास्ति गृहे देवदत्तः" इत्यादिषु गृह-देवदत्तादीनां सतामेव संयोग मात्रं निषिध्यते, न तु, तेषां सर्वथैवास्तित्वमपाक्रियते । तथा, " नास्ति खर-विषाणम्" इत्यादिषु खर-विषाणादीनां सतामेव समवायमात्रं निराक्रियते । तथा "नास्त्यन्यश्चंद्रमाः" इत्यादिषु विद्यमानस्यैव चन्द्रमसोऽन्यचन्द्रनिषेधा-च्चन्द्रसामान्यमात्रं निषिध्यते, न तु सर्वथा चन्द्राभावः प्रतिपाद्यते । तथा " न सन्ति घटप्रमाणा मुक्ताः " इत्यादिषु घटप्रमाणनाममात्ररूपोविशेषो मुक्तानां निषिध्यते, न तु मुक्ताऽभावः ख्याप्यत इति। एवं च सति " नास्त्यात्मा" इत्यत्र विद्यमानस्यैवात्मनो यत्र क्वचन येन केनाचित् सह संयोगमात्रेण त्वया निषेद्धव्यम्; यथा " नास्त्यात्मा वपुसि " इत्यादि न तु सर्वथाऽऽत्मनः सत्त्वमिति ।

अत्राह कश्चित्–ननु यदि यद् निषिध्यते तदस्ति, तर्हि त्रिलोकेश्वरताऽप्यस्ति, युष्मदादिभिर्निषिध्यमानत्वात्; तथा चतुर्णां समवायादिप्रतिषेधानां पञ्चमोऽपि प्रतिषेधप्रकारोऽस्ति, त्वयैव निषिध्यमानत्वात्। तदयुक्तम्, त्रिलोकेश्वरताविशेषमात्रं भवतो निषिध्यते, यथा घटप्रमाणत्वं मुक्तानाम्, न तु सर्वथैवेश्वरता, स्वशिष्यादीश्वरतायास्तवापि विद्यमानत्वात्। तथा, प्रतिषेधस्यापि पञ्चसङ्ख्याविशिष्टत्वमपाक्रियते, न तु सर्वथा प्रतिषेधस्याभावः, चतुःसङ्ख्याविशिष्टस्य तस्य सद्भावात्। ननु सर्वमप्यसम्बद्धमिदम्, तथाहि—त्रिलोकेश्वरत्वं तावदसदेव निषिध्यते, प्रतिषेधस्यापि पञ्चसङ्ख्याविनिष्टत्वमविद्यमानमेव निवार्यते, तथा, संयोग–समवाय–सामान्य–विशेषाणामपि गृहदेवदत्त–खरविषाणादिष्वसतामेव प्रतिषेधः, इत्यतो "यन्निषिध्यते तदस्त्येव" इत्येतत् कथं न प्लवते? इत्याशङ्क्याह–" संजोगाइचउक्कं पीत्यादि "। इदमुक्तं भवति—देवदत्तादीनां संयोगादयो गृहादिष्वेवासन्तो निषिध्यन्ते, अर्थान्तरे तु तेषां ते विद्यन्त एव; तथाहि–गृहेणैव सह देवदत्तस्य संयोगो न विद्यते, अर्थान्तरेण तु क्षेत्र–हट्ट–ग्रामादिना सह तस्यासौ समस्त्येव, गृहस्यापि देवदत्तेन सह संयोगो नास्ति, खट्वादिना तु सह तस्यासौ विद्यत एव, एवं विषाणस्यापि खर एव समवायो नास्ति, गवादावस्त्येव; सामान्यमपि द्वितीयचन्द्राभावाच्चन्द्र एव नास्ति, अर्थान्तरे तु घटगवादावस्त्येव; घटप्रमाणत्वमपि मुक्तासु नास्ति, अर्थान्तरे तु कूष्माण्डादावस्त्येव। त्रिलोकेश्वरताऽपि भवत एव नास्ति, तीर्थकरादावस्त्येव, पञ्चसङ्ख्याविशिष्टत्वमपि प्रतिषेधे नास्ति, अर्थान्तरे त्वनुत्तरविमानादावस्त्येव। इत्यनया विवक्षया ब्रूमः—"यद् निषिध्यते तत् सामान्येनास्त्येव, न त्वेवं प्रतिजानीमहे"—"यद् यत्र निषिध्यते तत् तत्रैवास्ति " इति येन व्यभिचारः स्यात् ॥

वयमपि शरीरे जीवं निषेधयामः, नान्यत्रेति चेत्। साधूक्तम्, अस्मत् समीहितस्य सिद्धत्वात्, जीवसिद्ध्यर्थमेव हि यतामहे वयम्, स चेत् सिद्धः, तर्हि तत्सिद्ध्यन्यथानुपपत्तेरेव तदाश्रयः सेत्स्यति, किं तया चिन्तया? । न च शरीरमन्तरेण जीवस्याश्रयान्तरमुपपद्यते, तत्रैव तदवस्थानलिङ्गोपलब्धेः। न च वक्तव्यम्–शरीरमेव जीवः, "जीवति", "मृतः", "मूर्च्छितः" इत्यादि व्यवस्थाऽनुपपत्तेः इत्यादेरभिधास्यमानत्वादिति ॥ २६ ॥ १५७४ ॥

D. C.—When a negation is predicated in the case of any object, this negation is to be understood regarding *saṁyoga* (conjunction), *samavāya* (inherence), *sāmānya* (generality) or *viśeṣa* (speciality), but, not in one and all the aspects. For instance ' Devadatta is not at home ' means that the *saṁyoga* between a house and Devadatta, each of which exists, is not admitted. This does not mean that the existence of either of them is denied in toto. Similarly ' an ass has no horns ' means the negation of *samavāya* between an existing ass and horns. Similarly ' there is no other moon ' implies that there is a negation of commonness. That is to say, we have only one moon, and that there is no parallel to it.

That ' there are no pearls equal to a *ghaṭa* in bulk ' conveys the idea that the distinguishing feature, *viz.*, a measure equal to that of a *ghaṭa* is denied, and not the non-existence of pearls.

Such being the case, Gautama ! you may refuse to admit only the *saṁyoga* of the existing soul with something in some way, by saying something like this, that the soul does not exist in the body, but you cannot refuse to admit its existence from all other stand-points. Some one may come forward to argue as under:—

If there exists that of which negation is predicated, then, in my case there must be the sovereignty of the three worlds as it is not admitted by you in my case. Furthermore, you refuse to believe a fifth *pratiṣedha*, over and above the four well-known *pratiṣedhas, viz., saṁyoga* etc. So there must be a fifth *pratiṣedha*. These arguments can be refuted as below:—

We do not admit in your case the sovereignty of the three worlds, *i. e.*, only a particular aspect of sovereignty but not your sovereignty which exists owing to your being a master of several pupils of yours. Thus you will see that only a particular

type of sovereignty is not admitted but not all types of it. Similarly, when we refuse to admit the fifth *pratiṣedha*, it is the number 'five' associated with it that is denied, and not a *pratiṣedha* in all its aspects.

Regarding this refutation, it may be argued that this is all moonshine. For, you refuse to admit in me the sovereignty of the three worlds – a thing that does exist in my case. The number 'five' not admitted in the case of *pratiṣedha* is also non-existent. Moreover, *saṁyoga* in the case of a house and Devadatta, which is not admitted, is also non-existent. Same is the case with *samavāya*, *sāmānya* and *vis'eṣa*. Such being the case, how can you say that what is negatived does exist? The answer to this sort of argument may be given as follows :—

That the *saṁyoga* between the house and Devadatta is not admitted, does not mean refusal to admit the *saṁyoga* of Devadatta with a field, a market, a village or the like. Moreover, the house has no *saṁyoga* with Devadatta only; but it has a *saṁyoga* no doubt with a bed-stead or the like.

Similarly the *samavāya* in the case of an ass and horns is not admited; but the *samavāya* in the case of a cow and its horns and the like, is certainly admitted.

Likewise *sāmānya* is not admitted in the case of the moon but it is surely admitted in the case of *ghaṭas*, cows, etc. that are more than one in number.

Similarly the measure equal to a *ghaṭa* is refused so far as the pearls are concerned but it no doubt exists as regards a melton etc. The sovereignty of the three worlds is not admitted, Gautama ! in your case; but it does exist as far as *Tîrthaṁkaras* are concerned.

Similarly the number five is not admitted regarding the *pratiṣedhas*; but it is surely admitted when the question of *anuttaras* is being discussed.

From this, you will see that, what we wish to suggest is this :—

That which is denied, exists ordinarily. By no means we want to convey : ' that about which negation is predicated, exists there and nowhere else '. Thus, there is no *vyabhicāra* (inconsistency) in what we say.

Gautama ! If you wish to retort that you (Gautama) do not admit the existence of the soul in the body only and admit it elsewhere, that is good; for, it establishes what is desired by us. We have been all this while trying simply to establish the existence of the soul. And, if it is thus established, then the *āśraya* (substratum) of the soul will be proved as it is not possible to justify its existence in any other way.

It is not justifiable to admit any other *āśraya* of the soul except the body; for, the *liṅgas* of the soul are seen there. It may be borne in mind that it will not do to say that the body itself is the soul; for, in that case we cannot have a *vyavasthā* (fixity) of the types, *viz.*, he lives, he is dead, he has fainted and the like. Of course, this *vyavasthā* will be expounded hereafter.

For the proof of the existence of the soul, another etymology can be given :—

जीवो त्ति सत्थयमिणं सुद्धत्तणओ घडाभिहाणं व ।
जेण त्थेण सदत्थं सो जीवो अह मई होज्ज ॥ २७ ॥ (१५७५)
अत्थो देहो च्चिय से तं नो पज्जायवयणभेआओ ।
नाणाइगुणो य जओ भणिओ जीवो न देहो त्ति ॥२८॥ (१५७६)

Jīvo tti satthayamiṇam suddhattaṇaö ghaḍābhihāṇam va ।
Jeṇatthena sadattham so jīvo aha maī hojja ॥ 27 (1575)

Attho deho cciya se tam no pajjāyavayaṇabheāö ।
Nāṇāïguṇo ya jaö bhaṇiö jīvo na deho tti ॥ 28 (1576)

[जीव इति सार्थकमिदं शुद्धत्वतो घटाभिधानमिव ।
येनार्थेन सदर्थं स जीवोऽथ मतिर्भवेत् ॥ २७ ॥ (१५७५)

अर्थो देह एव तस्य तद् नो पर्यायवचनभेदात् ।
ज्ञानादिगुणश्च यतो भणितो जीवो न देह इति ॥ २८ ॥ (१५७६)

Jīva iti sārthakam idam śuddhatvato ghaṭābhidhānam iva ।
Yeṇārthena sadartham sa jīvo'tha matir bhavet ॥ 27 (1575)

Artho deha eva tasya tad no paryāyavacanabhedāt ।
Jñānādiguṇaś ca yato bhaṇito jīvo na deha iti ॥ 28 (1576)]

Trans.—27–28 This word " jīva " is significant owing to its being *śuddha,* as is the word *ghaṭa.* That *artha* (meaning) by means of which it is pregnant with a meaning is *jīva.* If you, however, think that that *artha* is only the body, that is not so, on account of a difference in synonymous words; for, *jīva* is said to have *guṇas* such as knowledge, etc., and not that the body (is so said). (1575–1576)

टीका–जीव इत्येतद् वचनं सार्थकमिति प्रतिज्ञा व्युत्पत्तिमत्त्वे सति शुद्धपदत्वात्, इह यद् व्युत्पत्तिमत्त्वे सति शुद्धपदं तदर्थवद् दृष्टम्, यथा घटादिकम्, तथा च जीवपदम्, तस्मात् सार्थकम्, यत्तु सार्थकं न भवति तद् व्युत्पत्तिमत् शुद्धपदं च न भवति, यथा डित्थादिकं खरविषाणादिकं च, न च तथा जीवपदम्, तस्मात् सार्थकम् । यद् व्युत्पत्तिमद् न भवति तच्छुद्धपदमपि सद् न सार्थकं, यथा डित्थादिपदम्, इति हेतोरनैकान्तिकता-परिहारार्थं व्युत्पत्तिमत्त्वविशेषणं द्रष्टव्यम् । यदपि शुद्धपदं न भवति किन्तु सामासिकम्, तदपि व्युत्पत्तिमत्त्वे सत्यपि सार्थकं न भवति, यथा खरविषाणादिकम्, इति शुद्धत्वविशेषणम् ।

अथ मन्यसे—देह एवास्य जीवपदस्यार्थः, न पुनरर्थान्तरम्; उक्तं च—" देह एवाऽयमनुप्रयुज्यमानो दृष्टः, यथैष जीवः, एनं न हिनस्ति " इति, अतो देह एवास्यार्थो युक्त इति । तदेतद् न । कुतः ? इत्याह—देह-जीवयोः पर्यायवचनभेदात्, यत्र हि पर्यायवचनभेदस्तत्रान्यत्वं दृष्टम्, यथा घटा-ऽऽकाशयोः । तत्र घट–कुट–कुम्भ–कलशादयो घटस्य पर्यायाः, नभो–

व्योमाऽन्तरिक्षा–ऽऽकाशादयस्त्वाकाशपर्यायाः। प्रस्तुते च जीवो जन्तुरसुमान् प्राणी सत्त्वो भूत इत्यादयो जीवपर्यायाः, शरीरं वपुः कायो देहः कलेवरमित्यादयस्तु शरीरपर्यायाः। पर्यायवचनभेदेऽपि च वस्त्वेकत्वे सर्वैकत्वप्रसङ्गोऽत्र बाधकम्। यत् पुनरिदमुक्तम्–"देह एवायमनुप्रयुज्यमानो दृष्टः" इत्यादि, तच्छरीरसहचरणा–ऽवस्थानादितः शरीरे जीवोपचारः क्रियते। किञ्च, इत्थमपि श्रूयत एव—'गतः स जीवः' 'दह्यतामिदं शरीरम्' इति। किञ्च "णाणाईत्यादि" यस्माच्च ज्ञानादिगुणयुतो जन्तुः, जडश्च देहः, तत् कथं देह एव जीवः। प्रागिहैव चोक्तम्—'न ज्ञानादिगुणो देहः, मूर्त्तिमत्त्वात्, घटवत्; तथा, देहेन्द्रियातिरिक्त आत्मा, तदुपरमेऽपि तदुपलब्धार्थानामनुस्मरणात्, वातायनपुरुषवदिति'॥ २७-२८॥ १५७५-१५७७॥

D. C.—Here the *pratijñā* is: The word *jîva* is significant. For, over and above this, it has a *vyutpatti* and it is a *śuddha pada*. Whatever is a *śuddha pada* and has a *vyutpatti* is here seen to be one having an *artha* (meaning). *Ghaṭa*, etc., may be mentioned as instances; so is the word *jîva*. Therefore it too, is significant. What is not significant is wanting in *vyutpatti*, and besides, it is not a *śuddha pada*. *Diṭṭha*, *khara-viṣāṇa*, etc., are words of this type; for, the former has no *vyutpatti*, whereas the latter is not a *śuddha pada*. Such is not the case with the word *jîva*. Therefore it is significant. The condition that it should have a *vyutpatti* is stated here to avoid *diṭṭha*, etc., which are *śuddha padas*, but which are not significant; for, they fail to satisfy both the conditions. Same is the case with *khara-viṣāṇa*; for, though it has a *vyutpatti* it is not a *śuddha pada*. And therefore it is not significant.

If you believe that simply the body is the *artha* of *jîva*, because we come across the following line, it is not correct, since there is a difference in the synonyms of the body and *jîva*:

"*Deha evāyam anuprayujyamāno dṛṣṭaḥ yathaiṣa jîvaḥ, enaṃ na hinasti.*"

The words of which the synonyms differ, are seen to be non-identical. For instance, *ghaṭa* is not the same as *ākāśa*

as the synonyms of the former, *viz.*, *ghaṭa*, *kuṭa*, *kumbha* and *kalaśa* differ from those of the latter, *viz.*, *nabhas*, *vyoman*, *antarikṣa*, *ākāśa* and the like. In the pertinent case, the synonyms of *jîva* are *jantu*, *asumat*, *prāṇin*, *sattva*, *bhūta*, etc., and these are by no means the same as *śarîra*, *vapus*, *kāya*, *kalevara*, etc., the synonyms of *deha*. If this difference in synonyms is neglected, anything will be identical with anything else, and this is certainly undesirable.

Now "*deha evāyam anuprayujyamāno dṛṣṭaḥ*". Herein, there is an *upacāra* (metaphorical application) of *jîva* to the body, as it is with the help of the body that the soul walks etc.

Moreover, we do hear; "*yataḥ sa jîvaḥ, dahyatām idam śarîram*", *i. e*, the soul has departed and let this body be burnt.

Furthermore, the soul has an attribute like knowledge, whereas the body is *jaḍa* and has no knowledge. So, how can we equate the body with the soul ?

The reasons why the body is not the same as the soul, have been already mentioned while concluding the commentary on verse 1562.

जीवो त्थि वओ सच्चं मव्वयणाओऽवसेसवयणं व ।
सव्वण्णुवणयओ वा अणुमयसव्वण्णुवयणं व ॥२९॥ (१५७७)

Jīvo tthi vaö saccam mavvayaṇāö'vasesavayaṇam va |
Savvaṇṇuvayaṇaö vā aṇumayasavvaṇṇuvayaṇam va || 29 (1577)

[जीवोऽस्ति वचः सत्यं मद्वचनादवशेषवचनमिव ।
सर्वज्ञवचनतो वाऽनुमतसर्वज्ञवचनमिव ॥ २९ ॥ (१५७७)

Jīvo'sti vacaḥ satyam madvacanadavaśeṣavacanam iva |
Sarvajñavacanato vā'numatasarvajñavacanam iva || 29 (1577)]

Trans.—29 Like my other statement, (*e. g.*, one pertaining to your doubt), the statement (of mine) that the soul exists,

is true, as it is my statement. Or, it is correct owing to its being a statement of an omniscient being, as is the case with the statement of one whom you look upon as omniscient. (1577)

टीका—" जीवोऽस्ति " इत्येतद् वचः सत्यम्, मद्वचनत्वात्, भवत्संशयविषयाद्यवशेषवचनवत्, यच्च सत्यं न भवति तद् मदीयवचनमपि न भवति, यथा कूटसाक्षिवचनम् । अथवा सत्यं " जीवोऽस्ति " इति वचनम्, सर्वज्ञवचनत्वात्, भवदनुमतसर्वज्ञवचनवदिति ॥ २९ (१५७७) ॥

D. C.—Just as my statement about your doubt is correct so this statement of mine that the soul exists is correct; for, it is my statement. The statement which is not correct, is not mine, *e. g.*, the statement of a false witness. Or, the correctness of this statement can be also established as under:—

The statement that the soul exists is correct, because it is the statement of an omniscient being, as is the case with a statement of one whom you look upon as *sarvajña*.

भय-राग-दोस-मोहाभावाओ सच्चमणइवाइं च ।
सव्वं चिय मे वयणं जाणय मज्झत्थवयणं व ॥३०॥ (१५७८)

Bhaya-rāga-dosa-mohābhāvāö saccamaṇaïvāim ca ।
Savvam ciya me vayaṇam jāṇaya majjhatthavayaṇam va ॥30 (1578)

[भय-राग-द्वेष-मोहाभावात् सत्यमनतिपाति च ।
सत्यमेव मे वचनं ज्ञायकमध्यस्थवचनमिव ॥ ३० ॥ (१५७८)

Bhaya-rāga-dveṣa-mohābhāvāt satyam anatipāti ca ।
Satyam êva me vacanam jnāyakamadhyasthavacanam iva ॥30 (1578)]

Trans.—30 Everything that I say, is certainly true and free from any fault, on account of the (complete) absence of fear, attachment, aversion and infatuation (in me) as is the case with the words of an intelligent and impartial person. (1578)

टीका—सर्वमपि मद्वचनं सत्यमनतिपाति च बोधव्यम्, भय-राग-द्वेषा-ऽज्ञानरहितत्वात्, इह यद् भयादिरहितस्य वचनं तत् सत्यं दृष्टम्, यथा

मार्गज्ञस्य भयरहितस्य प्रष्टरि राग-द्वेषरहितस्य मार्गोपदेशवचनम्, तथा च मद्वचः, तस्मात् सत्यमनतिपाति चेति ॥ ३० (१५७८) ॥

D. C.—Whatever I say, should be taken to be true and flawless, as I am (entirely) free from fear, attachment, aversion and ignorance. In this world, it is a matter of common experience that whatever is said by one devoid of fear, etc., is true. For instance, the words spoken to one who has lost his way, by one who knows it, who is fearless and who is devoid of attachment and aversion, are true. My statement belongs to the same category. So it is true and flawless.

The doubt of Gautama svāmin is being answered.

कह सव्वण्णु त्ति मई जेणाहं सव्वसंसयच्छेई ।
पुच्छसु व जं न जाणसि जेण व ते पच्चओ होज्जा ॥३१॥ (१५७९)

Kaha savvaṇṇu tti maī jeṇāham savvasaṁsayaccheī ।
Pucchasu va jam na jāṇasi jeṇa va te paccaö hojjā ॥ 31 (1579)

[कथं सर्वज्ञ इति मतिर्येनाहं सर्वसंशयच्छेदी ।
पृच्छ वा यद् न जानासि येन वा ते प्रत्ययो भवेत् ॥ ३१ ॥ (१५७९)

Katham sarvajña iti matir yenāham sarvasaṁśayacchedī ।
Pṛiccha vā yad na jānāsi yena vā te pratyayo bhavet ॥ 31 (1579)]

Trans.—31 You may be thinking as to how I am omniscient. This is so; for, I can remove all doubts. Or you may ask (me) what you do not know so that you may be convinced (about my omniscience). (1579)

टीका—कथं नाम 'त्वं सर्वज्ञः' इति ते मतिः ? एवं त्वं मन्यसे, तथा भय-राग-द्वेष-मोहाभावश्चासिद्ध इति मन्यसे। तदयुक्तम्, येनाहं सर्वसंशयच्छेदी, यश्च सर्वसंशयच्छेत्ता स सर्वज्ञ एव । दृष्टान्ताभावेनान्वयासिद्धेरनैकान्तिकोऽयं हेतुरिति चेत् । न, सर्वसंशयच्छेत्तृत्वानुपपत्तिरेवेह विपर्यये

बाधकं प्रमाणम्, किमिहान्वयान्वेषणेन ?। यदि वा, पृच्छ्यतां यत् त्रैलोक्यान्तर्गतं वस्तु त्वं न जानासि, येन सर्वज्ञत्वप्रत्ययस्तव जायते। भयाद्यभावोऽपि तल्लिङ्गादर्शनाद् मयि सिद्ध एवेति स्वयमेव द्रष्टव्यम्। कदाचिदपि लिङ्गादर्शने लिङ्गिनोऽस्तित्वशङ्कायामतिप्रसङ्ग इति ॥ ३१ (१५७९) ॥

D. C.—You may be thinking as to how I am omniscient and you may be believing that I am not entirely free from fear, attachment, aversion and infatuation. In that case I reply as under :—

I can remove all doubts. Whoever can do so, is certainly omniscient. So I, too, am omniscient. If you were to argue that this *hetu* is *anaikāntika* (inconclusive) owing to want of an illustration, and impossibility of establishing *anvaya*, it is not so; for, in this *viparyaya* the *anutpatti* (inapplicability) itself of state of removing doubts is a proof that goes against it. What is the use of searching for *anvaya* ? Or you may ask me anything that you do not know so that you may become convinced about my omniscience.

That I am free from fear, etc., is proved in my case, owing to their characteristics being not seen in me. To suspect the existence of a *liṅgin* even when there is a total absence of a *liṅga*, is too much.

Concluding the author says :—

एवमुवओगलिंगं गोयम ! सव्वप्पमाणसंसिद्धं ।
संसारी-यर-थावर-तसाइभेयं मुणे जीवं ॥ ३२ ॥ (१५८०)

Evam uvaögaliṅgam Goyama ! savvappamāṇasaṁsiddham ।
Saṁsārī-yara-thāvara-tasāibheyam muṇe jīvam ॥ 32 (1580)

[एवमुपयोगलिङ्गं गौतम ! सर्वप्रमाणसंसिद्धम् ।
संसारी-तर-स्थावर-त्रसभेदं मुण जीवम् ॥ ३२ ॥ (१५८०)

Evaṁ upayogaliṅgam Gautama ! sarvapramāṇasaṁsiddham ।
Saṁsārī-tara-sthāvara-trasabhedam muṇa jīvam ॥ 32 (1580)]

Trans.—32 Thus Gautama! know the soul as one having *upayoga* (attention) as the characteristic mark, as one proved by all the valid proofs and (also) as one having classifications like *saṁsārīn* (mundane) and *itara* (not mundane) and the mundane having two sub-classifications, *viz.*, *sthāvara* (immobile) and *trasa* (mobile). (1580)

टीका—एवमुक्तेन प्रकारेण जीवमात्मानं गौतम! मुण-प्रतिपद्यस्वेति सम्बन्धः। कथम्भूतम्? उपयोग एव लिङ्गं यस्य स तथा, सर्वैः प्रत्यक्षाऽनुमाना-ऽऽगमप्रमाणैः संसिद्धं-प्रतिष्ठितम्, तथा संसारी-तर-स्थावर-त्रसादिभेदम्। संसारिणश्चेतरे सिद्धाः। आदिशब्दाच्च सूक्ष्म-बादर-पर्याप्ता-ऽपर्याप्तादिभेदपरिग्रह इति ॥ ३२ ॥ १५८० ॥

अत्र वेदान्तवादी प्राह—ननु बहुभेदत्वमात्मनोऽसिद्धम्, तस्य सर्वत्रैकत्वात्, तदुक्तम्—

" एक एव हि भूतात्मा भूते भूते प्रतिष्ठितः।
एकधा बहुधा चैव दृश्यते जलचन्द्रवत् ॥ १ ॥
यथा विशुद्धमाकाशं तिमिरोपप्लुतो जनः।
सङ्कीर्णमिव मात्राभिर्भिन्नाभिरभिमन्यते ॥ २ ॥
तथेदममलं ब्रह्म निर्विकल्पमविद्यया।
कलुषत्वमिवापन्नं भेदरूपं प्रकाशते ॥ ३ ॥
ऊर्ध्वमूलमधःशाखमश्वत्थं प्राहुरव्ययम्।
छन्दांसि यस्य पर्णानि यस्तं वेद स वेदवित् ॥ ४ ॥ "

तथा 'पुरुष एवेदं ग्नि सर्वं, यद् भूतं यच्च भाव्यम्, उतामृतत्वस्येशानः, यदन्नेनातिरोहति, यदेजति, यद् नैजति, यद् दूरे, यदु अन्तिके, यदन्तरस्य सर्वस्य, यत् सर्वस्यास्य बाह्यतः' इत्यादि। इत्येतदेव पूर्वार्धेनाक्षिप्योत्तरार्धेन परिहरन्नाह—

D. C.—In this way, Gautama! admit that there is a soul which has *upāyoga* as its *liṅga*, of which the existence is proved by all the three *pramāṇas.*, viz., *pratyakṣa*,

anumāna and *āgama*, and which can be variously classified. Some of these classifications are :-*saṁsārin* (mundane) and *mukta* (liberated), sūkṣma (subtle) and *bādara* (gross), *paryāpta* (developed) and *aparyāpta* (non-developed), etc. Furthermore, the mundane beings are sub-divided as *sthāvara* (immobile) and *trasa* (mobile).

Here a Vedāntin may say that, many varieties of the soul are unwarranted; for, the soul is everywhere the same. This is corroborated by the following verses :—

" *Eka eva hi bhūtātmā bhūte bhūte pratiṣṭhitaḥ ।*
Ekadhā bahudhā caiva dṛṣyate jalcandravat ॥ 1 ॥

Yathā viśuddham ākāśam timiropapluto janaḥ ।
Saṅkîrṇam iva mātrābhir bhinnābhir abhimanyate ॥ 2 ॥

Tathedam amalam brahma nirvikalpamavidyayā ।
Kaluṣatvam ivāpannam bhedarūpam prakāśate ॥ 3 ॥

Ūrdhvamūlam adhaḥśākham aśvattham prāhur avyayam ।
Chandāṁsi yasya parṇāni yas tam veda sa vedavit ॥ 4 ॥"

And

Puruṣa evedam gni sarvam, yad bhūtam, yacca bhāvyam utāmṛtatvasyeśānaḥ, yadannenātirohati, yad ejati, yad naijati, yad dūre, yadu antike, yad antarasya sarvasya, yat sarvasyāsya bāhyataḥ.

This view of the Vedāntin is now being refuted :—

जइ पुण सो एगो च्चिय हवेज्ज वोमं व सव्वपिंडेसु ।
गोयम ! तदेगलिंगं पिंडेसु तहा न जीवोऽयं ॥३३॥ (१५८१)

Jai puṇa so ego cciya havejja vomam va savvapiṇḍesu ।
Goyama ! tad egaliṅgam piṇḍesu tahā na jīvo'yam ॥ 33 (1581)

[यदि पुनः स एक एव भवेद् व्योमेव सर्वपिण्डेषु ।
गौतम ! तदेकलिङ्गं पिण्डेषु तथा न जीवोऽयम् ॥ ३३ ॥ (१५८१)

Yadi punaḥ sa eka eva bhaved vyomeva sarvapiṇḍeṣu |
Gautama ! tad ekaliṅgam piṇḍeṣu tathā na jīvo'yam ॥ 33 (1581)]

Trans.—33 O Gautama ! if that soul were really one in all the *piṇḍas* (bodies) as is the case with the sky, then that (sky) is (only) of one form in different corporeal *piṇḍas* but such is not the soul. (1581)

टीका—परः प्राह–यदि पुनर्दर्शितन्यायेन स आत्मा सर्वेष्वपि नारक–तिर्यङ्–नरा–ऽमरपिण्डेषु व्योमवदेक एव भवेद् न तु संसारीतरादिभेदभिन्नः, तर्हि किं नाम दूषणं स्यात् ? । एवमुक्ते भगवानाह—गौतम ! तद् व्योम सर्वेष्वपि पिण्डेषु मूर्तिविशेषेषु स्थितमेकलिङ्गं वैसदृश्याभावादेकरूपमेव, इति युक्तं तस्यैकत्वम् , जीवस्त्वयं विचार्यत्वेन प्रस्तुतो न तथा–नैकलिङ्गः सर्वत्र दृश्यते, प्रतिपिण्डं तस्य विलक्षणत्वात् , लक्षणभेदे च लक्ष्यभेदात् , इति न तस्यैकत्वमिति ॥ ३३ (१५८१) ॥

D. C.—Some one may ask a question: What harm is there, if, on the basis of the verses, etc., just quoted, the soul is, on the analogy of the sky, looked upon as one *i.e.* having no such classifications, as mundane and non-mundane and the like, so far as all the *piṇḍas, viz.*, the bodies of a denizen of hell, tiryac, a human being and a celestial being, are concerned ?

The answer is this: As regards the sky, it is alright to say that it is only one; for, the sky, even while permeating all the corporeal *piṇḍas*, is seen to be uniform-free from any distinctions. Such is not, however, the case with the soul in question. It is not observed to be uniform; for, it differs from *piṇḍa to piṇḍa.* Moreover, the difference in characteristics presupposes, the difference in those having these characteristics. Hence, the soul is not one in number.

Here is the illustration :—

नाणाजीवा कुंभादउ व भुवि लक्खणाइभेयाओ ।
सुह-दुक्ख-बंध-मोक्खाभावो य जओ तदेगत्ते ॥३४॥ (१५८२)

Nāṇājīvā kumbhādaü vva bhuvi lakkhaṇāibheyāö ।
Suha-dukkha-bandha-mokkhābhāvo ya jaö tadegatte ॥34(1582)

[नानाजीवाः कुम्भादय इव भुवि लक्षणादिभेदात् ।
सुख-दुःख-बन्ध-मोक्षाभावश्च यतस्तदेकत्वे ॥ ३४ ॥ (१५८२)

Nānājīvāḥ kumbhādaya iva bhuvi lakṣaṇādibhedāt ।
Sukha-duḥkha-bandha-mokṣābhāvaś ca yatas tadekatve ॥34(1582)]

Trans.—34 In this world, there are different souls like (different) water-pots, etc., on account of the difference in their characteristics, etc. For, if they were (only) one, there will be non-existence of *sukha* (happiness), *duḥkha* (misery), *bandha* (bondage) and *mokṣa* (emancipation). (1582)

टीका—नानारूपा भुवि जीवाः परस्परं भेदभाज इत्यर्थः । लक्षणादि-भेदादिति हेतुः, कुम्भादय इवेति दृष्टान्तः, यच्च न भिन्नं न तस्य लक्षणभेदः, यथा नभस इति । सुख-दुःख-बन्ध-मोक्षाभावश्च यस्मात् तदेकत्वे, तस्मात् भिन्ना एव सर्वेऽपि जीवा इति ॥ ३४ (१५८२) ॥

D. C.—The living beings in this world, differ from one another; for, there is a difference in their characteristics etc. As a parallel example may be mentioned water-pots etc. Whatever is not different from another object, does not differ in characteristics from it. As for example, the sky is everywhere the same (since *ghaṭākāśa* does not differ from *maṭhākāśa*). Moreover, if there were only one soul, then, there will be nothing like happiness, misery, bondage and emancipation. But these do exist. Therefore all the souls are different, and their number is not one but many.

How do the characteristics differ in each body ?

जेणोवओगलिंगो जीवो भिन्नो य सो पइसरीरं ।
उवओगो उक्करिसा-वगरिसओ तेण तेऽणंता ॥३५॥ (१५८३)

Jeṇovaögaliṅgö jīvo bhinno ya so paisarīram ।
Uvaögo ukkarisā-vagarisaö teṇa te'ṇantā ॥ 35 (1513)

[येनोपयोगलिङ्गो जीवो भिन्नश्च स प्रतिशरीरम् ।
उपयोग उत्कर्षा-ऽपकर्षतस्तेन तेऽनन्ताः ॥ ३५ ॥ (१५८३)

Yenopayogaliṅgo jīvo bhinnaś ca sa pratiśarīram ।
Upayoga utkarṣā-pakarṣatas tena te'nantāḥ ॥ 35 (1583)]

Trans.—35 That *upayoga* (attention) by means of which the soul has attention as the characteristic mark, is different in every body. The *upayoga* has maximum and minimum scales. Therefore they (souls) are infinite in number. (1583)

टीका—येन ज्ञान-दर्शनोपयोगलक्षणोऽसौ जीवः, स चोपयोगः प्रतिशरीरमुत्कर्षा-ऽपकर्षभेदानन्तभेदः, तेन जीवास्तद्भेदादनन्तभेदा एवेति । तदेवं भावितं " नाणाजीवा " इत्यादि पूर्वार्धम् ॥ ३५ (१५८३) ॥

D. C.—This soul has as its characteristic, *upayoga* (attention) consisting of two kinds of knowledge, *viz.*, differentiated and undifferentiated. This *upayoga* has infinite varieties; for, it differs from body to body, some having the *utkarṣa* (maximum) *upayoga*, some having the *apakarṣa* (minimum) *upayoga* and some having *upayoga* between these two extremes. Therefore the souls are of infinite kinds owing to the infinite varieties of *upayoga*. This has been already alluded to, in the first hemistich of verse 1582.

Now, with regards to happiness, misery, etc., *i. e.*, exposition of the second hemistich of verse 1582, the author says :

एगत्ते सव्वगयत्तओ न मोक्खादओ नभस्सेव ।
कत्ता भोता मंता न य संसारी जहागासं ॥३६॥ (१५८४)

Egatte savvagayattaö na mokkhādaö nabhasseva ।
Kāttā bhottā mantā na ya saṁsārī jahāgāsam ॥ 36 (1584)

[एकत्वे सर्वगतत्वतो न मोक्षादयो नभस इव ।
कर्ता भोक्ता मन्ता न च संसारी यथाऽऽकाशम् ॥ ३६ ॥ (१५८४)

Ekatve sarvagatatvato na mokṣādayo nabhasa iva ।
Kartā bhoktā mantā na ca samsārī yathākā"śam ॥ 36 (1584)]

Trans.—36 On oneness (being accepted in the case of souls) there will not be liberation, etc., owing to (the soul) being all-pervading, as is the case with the space. Moreover, like space, the soul will not be a *kartṛ* (a doer) a *bhoktṛ* (an enjoyer), a *mantṛ* (thinker) and a *saṁsārin* (a mundane being). (1584)

टीका—एकत्वे जीवानां सुख-दुःख-बन्ध-मोक्षादयो नोपपद्यन्ते, सर्वगतत्वात्, नभस इव । यत्र तु सुखादयो न तत् सर्वगतं, यथा देवदत्त इति । किञ्च न कर्ता, न भोक्ता, न मन्ता, न संसारी जीवः, एकत्वात् सर्वजीवानाम्, यच्चैकं न तस्य कर्तृत्वादयः, यथा नभस इति ॥ ३६ (१५८४) ॥

D. C.—If there is only one soul, then there is no scope for happiness and misery, bondage and liberation and the like since one soul will be all-pervading. Space may be here cited as a pertinent case.

One where in there are happiness, misery etc., is not all-pervading. *e. g., Devadatta.*

Further more, since the number of the souls is only one, and not more, the soul cannot be an agent, an enjoyer, a thinker and a mundane being. That which is one in number, is not a doer etc.,—a fact which is corroborated by the example of space.

Besides

एगत्ते नत्थि सुही बहूत्वघाउ त्ति देसनिरुउ व ।
बहुतरबद्धत्तणओ न य मुक्को देसमुक्को व ॥ ३७ ॥ (१५८५)

Egatte natthi suhī bahūvaghāu tti desaniruu vva ।
Bahuttara baddhattaṇao na ya mukko desamukko vva ॥ 37 (1585)

[एकत्वे नास्ति सुखी बहूपघात इति देशनिरुज इव ।
बहुतरबद्धत्वतो न च मुक्तो देशमुक्त इव ॥ ३७ ॥ (१५८५)

Ekatve nāsti sukhi bahūpaghāta iti deśaniruja iva ।
Bahutarabaddhtvato na ca mukto deśamukta iva ॥ 37 (1585)]

Trans.—37 When there is oneness (of the souls), none is (completely) happy on account of many diseases, as is the case with one who is partially free from disease. Furtheremore, none is (entirely) liberated owing to many bondages, as is the case with one who is partially free. (1585)

टीका—इदमत्र हृदयम्—नारक-तिर्यगादयोऽनन्ता जीवा नानाविध-शरीर-मानसोपघातसंपातैर्दुःखिता एव, तदनन्तभागवर्तिनस्तु सुखिनः, एवमनन्ता बद्धाः, तदनन्तभागवर्तिनस्तु मुक्ताः, तेषां च सर्वेषामेकत्वे न कोऽपि सुखी प्राप्नोति, बहुतरोपघातान्वितत्वात्, यथा सर्वाङ्गरोगग्रस्तोऽङ्गुल्येकदेशेन नीरोगो यज्ञदत्तः, एवं न कोऽपि मुक्तस्तत्सुखभाक् च न कोऽपि घटते, बहुतरबद्धत्वात्, यथा सर्वाङ्गकीलितोऽङ्गुल्येकदेशमुक्तः । तस्मादेकत्वे सुखाद्यनुपपत्तेर्नानात्वं जीवानामिति स्थितम् ॥ ३७ (१५८५) ॥

D. C.—There are infinite living beings viz., denizens of hell, *tiryacs* and others, who are certainly unhappy on account of their suffering from various types of physical and mental diseases, and only an infinitesimal portion of them is happy. Similarly infinite beings are tied down by the bondages of *karmans*, and only an infinitesimal part of them is liberated. If all these living beings are not looked upon as different entities, but are considered as only one, then none can be seen happy owing to a great many diseases, as is the case with *Yajñadatta* who has a disease in all parts of the body except in a finger. Similarly none is liberated, and hence none can enjoy the bliss accruing from liberation, since there is a

great deal of bondages. One who has fetters all along his body: except a finger may be mentioned as an illustration.

Thus, owing to oneness there is no possiblity for happiness, etc. So it follows that there are many souls and not only one.

Refutation of the view-point of the *Naiyāyikas*, who admit (the existence of) many souls, but take them to be all-pervading:—

जीवो तणुमेत्तत्थो जह कुंभो तग्गुणोवलंभाओ ।
अहवाऽणुवलंभाओ भिन्नम्मि घडे पडस्सेव ॥३८॥ (१५८६)

Jīvo taṇumettattho jaha kumbho tagguṇovalambhāö ।
Ahavā'ṇuvalambhāö bhinnammi ghade padasseva ॥ 38 (1586)

[जीवस्तनुमात्रस्थो यथा कुम्भस्तद्गुणोपलम्भात् ।
अथवाऽनुपलम्भाद् भिन्ने घटे पटस्येव ॥ ३८ ॥ (१५८६)

Jīvastanumātrastho yathā kumbhastadguṇopalambhāt ।
Athavā'nupalambhād bhinne ghate patasyeva ॥ 38 (1586)]

Transe.—38 The soul permeates the body only, since its attributes are found there, as is the case with a pitcher. Or because it is not found (elsewhere), as is the case with a piece of cloth (which does not permeate), a pitcher is different from it. (1586)

टीका—तनुमात्रस्थो जीव इति प्रतिज्ञा, तत्रैव तद्गुणोपलब्धेः, यथा घटः, 'स्वात्ममात्रे' इति शेषः । "अहवेत्यादि" अथवा, यो यत्र प्रमाणैर्नोपलभ्यते तस्य तत्राभाव एव, यथा भिन्ने घटे पटस्य, नोपलभ्यते च शरीराद् बहिर्जीवः, तस्मात् तस्य तत्राभाव एवेति ॥ ३८ (१५८६) ॥

D. C.—The measure of the soul is only as much as that of the body it occupies. That is to say, there is no soul outside the body it occupies. For, its attributes are found only in that body. To give an illustration, the attributes of a pitcher exist only in a pitcher and not outside it.

As an alternative argument it may be said :—That is non-existent there, where it cannot be realized by any of the *pramāṇas*. As for example, a piece of cloth does not permeate a pitcher which is separate from it.

The soul is not seen outside the body. Consequently it should be taken to be non-existent there.

While concluding the author says :—

तम्हा कत्ता भोत्ता बंधो मोक्खो सुहं च दुक्खं च ।
संसरणं च बहुत्ता–ऽसव्वगयत्ते सुजुत्ताइं ॥ ३९ ॥ (१५७७)

Tamhā kattā bhottā bandho mokkho suham ca dukkham ca ।
Samsaraṇam ca bahutāt'savvagayatte sujuttāim ॥ 39 (1587)

[तस्मात् कर्ता भोक्ता बन्धो मोक्षः सुखं च दुःखं च ।
संसरणं च बहुत्वा--ऽसर्वगतत्वयोः सुयुक्तानि ॥ ३९ ॥ (१५८७)

Tasmāt kartā bhoktā bandho mokṣaḥ sukham ca duhkham ca ।
Samsaraṇam ca bahūtvā'sarvagatatvayoh suyuktāni ॥ 39 (1587)]

Trans.—39 Therefore a doer, an enjoyer, bondage, liberation, happiness, misery, mundane existence and metamorphosis are thoroughly justifiable when the souls are admitted as many and non-all-pervading. (1587)

टीका–तस्माद् बहुत्वा–सर्वगतत्वयोरेव सतोः कर्तृत्वादयो धर्मा जीवस्य युज्यन्ते, नान्यथा, इत्येवंविधं प्रमाणसिद्धं जीवं प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ॥३९(१५८७)॥

D. C.—Therefore it is only when it is admitted that souls are many and that none of them is all-pervading, action etc, which are the attributes of the soul, can have any place. If not, these attributes will be meaningless. So please admit the soul which is thus established by *pramāṇas*.

Now the meaning of the sentences of the Veda which may be troubling you.

गोयम ! वेयपयाणं इमाण अत्थं च तं न याणासि ।
जं विन्नाणघणो च्चिय भूयेहिंतो समुत्थाय ॥ ४० ॥ (१५८८)

मण्णसि मज्जंगेसु व मयभावो भूयसमुदउब्भूओ ।
विन्नाणमेत्तमाया भूएऽणु विणस्सइ स भूओ ॥४१॥ (१५८९)

अत्थि न य पेच्चसण्णा जं पुव्वभवेऽभिहाणममुगो त्ति ।
जं भणियं न भवाओ भवंतरं जाइ जीवो त्ति ॥ ४२ ॥ (१५९०)

Goyama ! Veyapayāṇam imāṇa attham ca tam na yāṇāsi ।
Jam vinnāṇaghaṇo cciya bhūyehinto samutthāya ॥ 40 (1588)

Maṇṇasi majjaṅgesu va mayabhāvo bhūyasamudaübbhūö ।
Vinnāṇamettamāyā bhūe'ṇu viṇassai sa bhūö ॥ 41 (1589)

Atthi na ya peccasaṇṇā jam puvvabhave'bhihāṇamamugo tti ।
Jam bhaṇiyam na bhavāö bhavantaraṃ jāi jīvo tti ॥ 42 (1590)

[गौतम ! वेदपदानामेषामर्थं च त्वं न जानासि ।
यद् विज्ञानघन एव भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय ॥ ४० ॥ (१५८८)

मन्यसे मद्याङ्गेष्विव मदभावो भूतसमुदयोद्भूतः ।
विज्ञानमात्रमात्मा भूतेऽनु विनश्यति स भूयः ॥ ४१ ॥ (१५८९)

अस्ति न च प्रेत्यसंज्ञा यत् पूर्वभवेऽभिधानममुक इति ।
यद् भणितं न भवाद् भवान्तरं याति जीव इति ॥ ४२ ॥ (१५९०)

Gautama ! Veda padānāmeṣāmartham ca tvam na jānāsi ।
Yad vijnānaghana eva bhūtebhyaḥ samutthāya ॥ 40 (1588)

Manyase madyāṅgeṣviva madabhāvo bhūtasamudayodbhūtaḥ ।
Vijñānamātramātmā bhūte'nu vinaśyati sa bhūyaḥ ॥ 41 (1589)

Asti na ca pretyasanjñā yat pūrvabhave'bhidhānamamuka iti ।
Yad bhaṇitam na bhavād bhavāntaram yāti jīva iti ॥ 42 (1590)]

Trans.—40–41–42 Gautama! You do not know the (real) meaning of these sentences of the Veda. For, you believe that none but the assemblage of (the particles of) knowledge, after having arisen from elements, in the way in which intoxication arises, from the sources of spirituous liquors, is a soul consisting of knowledge only–the soul which has sprung up from the collection of elements. It again perishes after the elements (have perished), and that there is no designation in the previous birth to the effect that it was named as such and such in the former birth (existence) and hence it is said that the soul does not go from one *bhava*, to another existence. (1588–1589–1590)

टीका–गौतम ! इत्यामन्त्रणम्, वेदपदानां श्रुतिवाक्यानाममीषां "विज्ञानघन एवैतेभ्यः" इत्यादीनां चेतसि वर्तमानानामर्थं यथावस्थितं त्वं न जानासि नावबुध्यसे। किमिति ? अत आह—यद् यस्मात् त्वमात्माभिप्रायेणैवंभूतमिहार्थं मन्यसे विकल्पयसीति संबन्धः। कथं भूतम् ? इत्याह–"विण्णाणघणो च्चिय त्ति" पृथिव्यादिभूतानां विज्ञानलवसमुदायो विज्ञानघनः पृथिव्यादिविज्ञानांशानां पिण्ड इत्यर्थः, अवधारणं त्वात्मवादिपरिकल्पितस्य भूतसमुदायातिरिक्तस्य ज्ञान–दर्शनादिगुणाश्रयस्यात्मनो निरासार्थम्। भूतेभ्यः पृथिव्यादिभ्यः समुदितेभ्यो न तु व्यस्तेभ्यः, ज्ञानस्य तत्समुदायपरिणामाङ्गीकारादिति भावः, मद्याङ्गेषु मद्यकारणेषु धातक्यादिषु मदभाव इव; कथंभूतो विज्ञानघनः ? इत्याह–" भूयसमुदउब्भूओ विन्नाणमेत्तमाय त्ति " भूतसमुदयादुद्भूतस्तदैव जातो न तु परभवात् कश्चिदायातो विज्ञानमात्ररूप आत्मेत्यर्थः, समुत्थायोत्पद्य ततस्तान्येव पृथिव्यादीनि भूतानि विनाशमश्नुवानान्यनु लक्षीकृत्य भूयः पुनरपि स विज्ञानघनो विज्ञानमात्ररूप आत्मा विनश्यति, न त्वात्मवादिनामिवान्यभवं याति। अत एव न प्रेत्यभवे परभवे संज्ञास्ति, यत् पूर्वभवे नारकादिजन्मन्यभिधानमासीत् तत् परभवे नास्ति, यदुत—अमुको नारको देवो वा भूत्वेदानीं मनुष्यः संवृत इत्यादि, नारकादेः प्रागेव सर्वनाशं नष्टत्वादिति भावः। किमिह वाक्ये तात्पर्यवृत्त्या प्रोक्तं भवति ? इत्याह–" जं भणियमित्यादि " सर्वथात्मनः समुत्पद्य विनष्टत्वाद् न भवाद्

भवान्तरं कोऽपि यातीत्युक्तं भवति ॥ ४०-४१-४२ (१५८८-१५८९ १५९०) ॥

D. C.—By these sentences of the Veda are meant those which Gautama had in his mind.

The assemblage of knowledge consists of the united particles of knowledge arising from elements such as earth etc., combined together.

The restriction, viz., 'none else but', is here mentioned with a view to exclude a soul according to the *Ātmāvādins* (believers in universal soul) is distinct from the collection of elements and which is an abode or substratum of attributes like *jñāna* (knowledge) etc.

The sources of spirituous liquors are *dhātakî* etc.

Gautama believes that the soul has not come from any previous birth but it has been generated by the elements—it has been evolved out of them. So, when these elements perish, the soul, too, perishes; and it is not born once more as the *Ātmavādins* believe. In short, it has neither any incarnation nor any transmigration. Such being the case, it is not possible to say that such and such a one who was previously a denizen of hell or a celestial being, is now born as a human being. For, on the termination of a stage as that of a denizen of hell or the like, everything was over—nothing was left, not even the soul.

Thus, when the soul altogether arises from—gets evolved out of—a collection of elements and completely perishes as soon as these elements perish, there is none who proceeds from one birth to another.

I understand the meaning of these sentences as follows :-

गोयम ! पयत्थमेवं मन्नंतो नत्थि मन्नसे जीवं ।
वक्कंतरेसु य पुणो भणिओ जीवो जमत्थि त्ति ॥४३॥ (१५९१)

अग्गिहवणाइकिरियाफलं च तो संसयं कुणसि जीवे ।
मा कुरु न पयत्थोऽयं इमं पयत्थं निसामेहि ॥ ४४ ॥ (१५९२)

Goyama ! payatthamevam mannanto natthi mannase jīvam ।
Vakkantaresu ya puṇo bhaṇio jīvo jamatthi tti ॥ 43 (1591)

Aggihavaṇāikīriyāphalam ca to saṁsayam kuṇasi jīve ।
Mā kuru na payattho'yam imam payattham nisāmehi ॥ 44 (1592)

[गौतम ! पदार्थ एवं मन्यमानो नास्ति मन्यसे जीवम् ।
वाक्यान्तरेषु च पुनर्भणितो जीवो यदस्तीति ॥ ४३ ॥ (१५९१)

अग्निहवनादिक्रियाफलं च ततः संशयं करोषि जीवे ।
मा कुरु न पदार्थोऽयमिमं पदार्थं निशमय ॥ ४४ ॥ (१५९२)

Gautama ! padārtha evam manyamāno nāsti manyase jīvam ।
Vākyāntareṣu ca punar-bhaṇito jīvo yadastīti ॥ 43 (1591)

Agni havanādi kriyāphalam ca tataḥ saṁśayam karoṣi jīve ।
Mā kuru na padārtho'yamimam padārtham niśamaya ॥ (1592)]

Trans.—43–44 Gautama ! While construing the sentences in this way, you believe that there is no soul. And, in other sentences it is said that there is a soul, and, moreover there is a fructification of an oblation to fire etc. Consequently, you entertain a doubt about (the existence of) the soul ; but do not do it. This is not the meaning of the sentences. But hear : this is the meaning of the sentences. (1591–1592)

टीका--गौतम । अस्य वाक्यस्य दर्शितरूपमेव पदार्थं मन्यमानस्त्वं ' नास्ति ' इत्येवं जीवं मन्यसे । यस्माच्च पुनः " न ह वै सशरीरस्य प्रिया-ऽप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति, अशरीरं वा वसन्तं प्रिया-ऽप्रिये न स्पृशतः " इत्यादिषु वेदवाक्यान्तरेषु " अस्ति " इत्येवं जीवो भणितः प्रतिपादितः । तथा " अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामः " इत्यादिवचनादग्निहवनादिक्रियायाः फलं च पारभविकं श्रूयते । न चेदं भवान्तरयायिनमात्मानमन्तरेणोपपद्यते । अतः

" किं जीवोऽस्ति नास्ति वा ? " इत्येवं संशयं जीवे करोषि त्वम् । तदमुं मा कृथाः, यस्माद् " विज्ञानघन एव० " इत्यादिवाक्यस्य नायमर्थो यं भवानध्यवस्यति, किन्त्वमुं वक्ष्यमाणं पदार्थमिह निशमयाऽऽकर्णयेति ॥ ४३--४४ (१५९१-१५९२) ॥

D. C.—O Gautama ! You interpret this sentence in the way just shown. And hence, you conclude that the soul does not exist. At the same time, you notice that the following sentences of the veda establishing the existence of the soul :—

" *Na ha vai saśarîrasya priyā'priyayor apahatir asti, aśarîrasya vā vasantam priyā'priye na spṛśataḥ.* "

Moreover from the sentences such as

" Agnihotrm juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ "

it follows that there accrues a fruit of an offering, oblation to fire, etc.,-a fruit to be enjoyed during the next birth, and this fruit can have no meaning unless it is admitted that the soul goes in, for another existence or birth.

These various statements lead you to doubt the existence of the soul. But, there is no need of entertaining such a doubt as this doubt is due to your misinterpreting the sentence, viz., " *vijñānaghana eva* " etc.

The real interpretation of this sentence is as follows: please hear it.

विण्णाणाओऽणण्णो विण्णाणघण्णो त्ति सव्वओवावि ।
स भवइ भूएहिंतो घडविण्णाणाइभावेण ॥ ४५ ॥ (१५९३)

ताइं चिय भूयाइं सोऽणु विणस्सइ विणस्समाणाइं ।
अत्थंतरोवओगे कमसो विण्णेयभावेणं ॥ ४६ ॥ (१५९४)

Viṇṇāṇāo'ṇaṇṇo viṇṇāṇaghaṇṇo tti savvaövāvi ।
Sa bhavai bhūehinto ghadaviṇṇāṇāi bhāveṇa ॥ 45 (1593)

Tāim ciya bhūyāim so'ṇu viṇassai viṇassamāṇāim ।
Atthantarovaöge kamaso viṇṇeya bhāve ṇam ॥ 46 (1594)

[विज्ञानादनन्यो विज्ञानघन इति सर्वतोव्यापी ।
स भवति भूतेभ्यो घटविज्ञानादिभावेन ॥ ४५ ॥ (१५९३)

तान्येव भूतानि सोऽनु विनश्यति विनश्यमानानि ।
अर्थान्तरोपयोगे क्रमशो विज्ञेयभावेन ॥ ४६ ॥ (१५९४)

Vijñānādananyo vijñānaghana iti sarvatovyāpī ।
Sa bhavati bhūtebhyo ghaṭavijñānādibhāvena ॥ 45 (1593)

Tānyeva bhūtāni so'nu vinaśyati vinaśyamānāni ।
Arthāntaropayoge kramaśo vijñeyabhāvena ॥ 46 (1594)]

Trans.—45–46 The soul (itself) is the assemblage of *vijñānas* owing to its being non–separate from *vijñāna,* or it is so, on account of its pervasive all around. It arises from elements in the form of the *vijñāna* of a pitcher, etc. When those very elements perish as *vijñeya–bhāvas* (objects coming within the range of *vijñāna*) on the attention being gradually directed to another object, it (the soul) subsequently perishes. (1593–1594)

टीका—इह विज्ञानघनो जीव उच्यते । कथम् ? इति चेत् । उच्यते-- विशिष्टं ज्ञानं विज्ञानं ज्ञान–दर्शनोपयोग इत्यर्थः, तेन विज्ञानेन सहानन्यभूतत्वादेकतया घनत्वं निबिडत्वमापन्नो विज्ञानघनो जीवः, यदिवा " सव्वओवा वि त्ति " सर्वतः प्रतिप्रदेशमनन्तानन्तविज्ञानपर्यायसङ्घातघटितत्वाद् विज्ञानघनो जीवः । एवकारेण तु विज्ञानघन एवासौ, न तु नैयायिकादीनामिव " स्वरूपेण निर्विज्ञानत्वाज्जडोऽसौ, बुद्धिस्तु तत्र समवेतैव " इति नियम्यते । स भवति–उद्यत इति क्रिया । केभ्यः ? इत्याह--" भूएहिंतो त्ति" भूतानीह घट–पटादिज्ञेयवस्तुरूपाण्यभिप्रेतानि, तेभ्यो ज्ञेयभावेन परिणतेभ्यः । केन भवति ? इत्याह--"घटोऽयम्" "पटोऽयम्" इत्यादिविज्ञानभावेन घटादिज्ञान-

पर्यायेण । ततः किम् ? इत्याशङ्क्य "तान्येवानु विनश्यति" इत्यस्यार्थमाह- " ताइं चियेत्यादि " तान्येव ज्ञानालम्बनभूतानि घटादिभूतानि क्रमशः कालक्रमेण व्यवधान स्थगना-ऽन्यमनस्कत्वादिनाऽर्थान्तरोपयोगे सति विज्ञेयभावेन ज्ञानविषयभावेन विनाशमश्नुवानानि, अनु-पश्चात् तद्बोधपर्यायेण, स विज्ञानघनो विनश्यतीति संबन्धः । ज्ञानपर्यायेण घटादिभ्यो ज्ञेयभूतेभ्यो जीवः समुत्थाय कालक्रमाद् व्यवधानादिनाऽर्थान्तरोपयोगे सति ज्ञेयभावेन तान्येव विनाशमश्नुवानान्यनु विनश्यतीति तात्पर्यार्थः ॥ ४५–४६ (१५९३) (१५९४) ॥

D. C.—Here the soul is said to be *vijñānaghana*–an assemblage of *vijñāna* for either of the two reasons viz., (1) the soul is non-separate from—is identical with *vijñāna* which is *upayoga* either of the type of *jñāna* or that of *darśana*, and (2) the soul has each and every *pradeśa* (the minutest portion) of it, formed from a collection of infinite modifications of *vijñāna*.

The word *eva* used in connection with *vijñānaghana* shows that the belief of the *Naiyāyikas* and others conveyed by the following sentence is untenable :

" *Svarūpeṇa nirvijñānatvaj jado'sau, buddhis tu tatra samavetaiva.* "

This soul is evolved out of the elements which are objects fit to be known—the objects like a pitcher, a piece of cloth etc. That is to say, it gets transformed as the knowledge of a pitcher etc., on realizing that this is a pitcher, this is a piece of cloth, etc.

These very elements such a pitcher etc, which had once served as substratum for knowledge, perish; that is to say, they cease to be objects fit to be known when the attention of the soul is directed towards another object when these objects are hidden or concealed from sight or when the mind is working in some other channel. Such being the case, the soul ceases

to know them i. e., ceases to exist as knowledge of these objects. This is here looked upon as its destruction. The sum and substance is this :—

When a soul comes to know any object, it is said to have been produced from that object; but, when it ceases to think of it and directs its attention somewhere else, it is said to have perished; for, the object with which it once identified itself, has perished.

Does the soul perish entirely in this way? The answer is in the negative as suggested in the following verse :—

पुव्वावरविण्णाणोवओगओ विगम–संभवसहावो ।
विण्णाणसंतईए विण्णाणघणोऽयमविणासी ॥ ४७ ॥ (१५९५)

Puvvāvaraviṇṇāṇovaögaö vigama-sambhavasahāvo ।
Viṇṇāṇasantaīe viṇṇāṇaghaṇo' yamaviṇāsī ॥ 47 (1595)

[पूर्वा–ऽपरविज्ञानोपयोगतो विगम–संभवस्वभावः ।
विज्ञानसंतत्या विज्ञानघनोऽयमविनाशी ॥ ४७ ॥ (१५९५)

Pūrvā'para vijñānopayogato vigama–saṁbhava svabhāvaḥ ।
Vijñānasantatyā vijñānaghano'yamavināśī ॥ 47 (1595)]

Trans.—47 This *vijñānaghana* (the soul) has the nature of destruction and that of origination on account of the (corresponding) *upayogas* being associated with the previous *vijñāna* and the subsequent one. It is immortal owing to the continuity of *vijñāna*.. (1595)

टीका—एक एवायमात्मा त्रिस्वभावः । कथम् ? इत्युच्यते–अर्थान्तरोपयोगकाले पूर्वविज्ञानोपयोगेन तावदयं विगमस्वभावो विनश्वररूपः, अपरविज्ञानोपयोगस्तु संभवस्वभाव उत्पादस्वरूपः, अनादिकालप्रवृत्तसामान्यविज्ञानमात्रसंतत्या पुनरयं विज्ञानघनो जीवोऽविनष्ट एवावतिष्ठते । एवमन्यदपि सर्वं वस्तूत्पाद–व्यय–ध्रौव्यस्वभावमेवावगन्तव्यम्, न पुनः किमपि सर्वथोत्पद्यते, विनश्यति चेति ॥ ४७ (१५९५) ॥

D. C.—This very soul, though one, has a three-fold nature. When it is attentive to another object, it has died; for, at that time, its attention to the former object is gone, but it has originated so far as the attention to this new object is concerned. Side by side with its twofold nature pertaining to destruction and origination, it has permanence owing to the continuity of the general *vijñāna* existing from the beginning-less time. Similarly every object has a three-fold nature consisting of *utpāda* (origination), *vyaya* (destruction) and *dhrauvya* (permanence), and that there is nothing which is created in all respects, and that there is nothing which entirely perishes.

न च पेच्चनाणसण्णावतिट्ठए संपओवओगाओ ।
विण्णाणघणाभिक्खो जीवोऽयं वेयपयभिहिओ ॥४८॥(१५९६)

Na ca peccanāṇasaṇṇāvatitthae sampaövaogāö ।
Viṇṇāṇaghaṇābhikkho jīvo'yam Veyapayabhihiö ॥ 48 (1596)

[न च प्रेत्यज्ञानसंज्ञाऽवतिष्ठते सांप्रतोपयोगात् ।
विज्ञानघनाभिख्यो जीवोऽयं वेदपदाभिहितः ॥ ४८ ॥ (१५९६)

Na ca pretyajnāna sanjnā'vatiṣthate sāmpratayogāt ।
Vijnāna ghanābhikhyo jīvo'yam Vedapadābhihitaḥ ॥ 48 (1596)]

Trans.—48 The designation pertaining to former knowledge does not exist owing to the *upayoga* being directed to (a) present object. This soul is named *vijjāṇaghaṇa* as said in the sentences of the *Veda.* (1596)

टीका—न च प्रेत्येति—न चान्यवस्तूपयोगकाले प्राक्तनी ज्ञानसंज्ञास्ति। कुतः ? सांप्रतवस्तुविषयोपयोगात्। इदमुक्तं भवति—यदा घटोपयोगनिवृत्तौ पटोपयोग उत्पद्यते, तदा घटोपयोगसंज्ञा नास्ति, तदुपयोगस्य निवृत्तत्वात्; किन्तु पटोपयोगसंज्ञैवास्ति, तदुपयोगस्यैव तदानीमुत्पन्नत्वात्। तस्माद् विज्ञानघनाभिख्यो वेदपदेष्वभिहितोऽयं जीवः। ततो गौतम ! प्रतिपद्यस्वैनमिति ॥ ४८ (१५९६) ॥

D. C.—When the attention of the soul is diverted from one object to another, *e. g.*, from a pitcher to a piece of cloth, then it ceases to be styled as *ghaṭopayoga* (attention to a pitcher) but acquires a new designation viz., *paṭopayoga* (attention to a piece of cloth). Such being the case, this soul is named as *vijñānaghana* in the Veda. Therefore, Gautama ! admit that the soul exists.

एवं पि भूयधम्मो नाणं तब्भावभावओ बुद्धी ।
तं नो तदभावम्मि वि जं नाणं वेयसमयम्मि ॥ ४९ ॥ (१५९७)

अत्थमिए आइच्चे चंदे संतासु अग्गि–वायासु ।
किंजोइरयं पुरिसो अप्पज्जोइ त्ति निद्दिट्ठो ॥ ५० ॥ (१५९८)

Evam pi bhūyadhammo nāṇam tabbhāvabhāvao buddhī ।
Tam no tadabhāvammi vi jam nāṇam Veyasamayamm ॥ 49 (1597

Atthamie āicce cande santāsu aggi–vāyāsu ।
Kimjoirayam puriso appajjoi tti niddiṭṭho ॥ 50 (1598)

[एवमपि भूतधर्मो ज्ञानं तद्भावभावतो बुद्धिः ।
तद् न तदभावेऽपि यज्ज्ञानं वेदसमये ॥ ४९ ॥ (१५९७)

अस्तंमित आदित्ये चन्द्रे शान्तयोरग्नि–वाचोः ।
किंज्योतिरयं पुरुष आत्मज्योतिरिति निर्दिष्टः ॥ ५० ॥ (१५९८)

Evamapi bhūtadharmo jnānam tadbhāvabhāvato buddhih ।
Tad na tadabhāve'pi yajjñānam Vedasamaye ॥ 49 (1597)

Astamita āditye candre śāntayor–agni–vācoḥ ।
Kimjyotirayam puruṣa ātmajyotiriti nirdiṣṭaḥ ॥ 50 (1598)]

Trans.—49–50 You may think that even in this way, knowledge is the *dharma* of elements owing to its existing when they exist (and that it does not exist when there is their non–existence). This is not proper; for, even

when they are non-existent, knowledge is said to exist in the following doctrine of the *Veda*:—

What *jyotis* (light) has this man when the Sun has set, the Moon has set and when (even) fire and speech are quiet? It is said: that is the light of the soul. (1597–1598)

टीका—" बुद्धी " ति स्याद् बुद्धिः प्रेरकस्य–एवमपि–" स भवइ भूएहिंतो " इत्यादिना युष्मद्वयाख्यानप्रकारेणापीत्यर्थः, पृथिव्यादिभूतधर्म एव ज्ञानं–भूतस्वभावात्मकमेव ज्ञानमिति भावः। कुतः ? इत्याह–" तब्भावभावउ त्ति " " एतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय तान्येवानु विनश्यति "–इति वचनाद् भूतसद्भावे ज्ञानस्य भावात्, तदभावे चाभावादित्यर्थः, यस्य च भाव एव यद् भवति, अभावे च न भवति तत् तस्यैव धर्मः, यथा चन्द्रमसश्चन्द्रिका, तथा च ज्ञानमनुविदधाति भूतान्वय–व्यतिरेकौ, तस्मात् तद् भूतधर्म एव। तदयुक्तम्, विशिष्टमेव हि नील–पीतादिभूतग्राहकं ज्ञानं तदन्वय-व्यतिरेकावनुविदधाति न तु सामान्यं ज्ञानमात्रम्, यस्माद् भूताभावेऽपि वेदलक्षणे समये सिद्धान्ते " सामान्यज्ञानं भणितमेव " इति शेषः। केन वाक्येन ? इत्याह–"अत्थमिए इत्यादि" अस्तमिते आदित्ये, याज्ञवल्क्यः, चन्द्रमस्यस्तमिते, शान्तेऽग्नौ, शान्तायां वाचि, किंज्योतिरेवायं पुरुषः, आत्मज्योतिः सम्राडिति होवाच, ज्योतिरिति ज्ञानमाह। आदित्यास्तमयादौ किं ज्योतिः ? इत्याह–" अयं पुरुष इति ", पुरुष आत्मेत्यर्थः। अयं च कथंभूतः ? इत्याह–"अप्पज्जोइ त्ति" आत्मैव ज्योतिरस्य सोऽयमात्मज्योतिर्ज्ञानात्मक इति हृदयम्, निर्दिष्टो वेदविद्भिः कथितः, ततो न ज्ञानं भूतधर्म इति स्थितम् ॥ ४९–५० (१५९७–१५९८) ॥

D. C.—Gautama may think as under:—

Even in this way—the way in which is interpreted the second hemistich of verse 1593 beginning with " *sa bhavaï bhūehinto* ", it gets proved that knowledge is the *dharma* of elements such as earth etc. For, knowledge exists when the elements exist. This is what follows from " *etebhyo bhūtebhyaḥ samutthāya tānyevānu vinas'yati.* " Furthermore, in the absence of the elements, knowledge does not exist.

That which exists only when another exists and which is non-existent when that another is non-existent, is the *dharma* of that another *e. g.*, the moon-light of the moon. Knowledge is associated with elements both *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. Consequently it is the *dharma* of elements. This thought is unjustifiable; for, only a particular type of knowledge which has for its object, the elements, blue, yellow etc, is associated with these elements by *anvaya* and *vyatireka* and not the entire knowledge in general. For, even when the elements are absent, the *Veda* declares that ordinary knowledge exists. This is what we learn from *yājñavalkya* who says "*Astamite āditye, candramasyastamite, śante'gnau, śāntāyām vāci, kim jyotir evāyam puruṣa ātmajyotiḥ samrāḍ iti hovāca.*" Herein the soul having a flame in the form of knowledge is alluded to. Hence it follows that knowledge is not the *dharma* of elements.

The reason is as under:—

तदभावे भावाओ भावे चाभावओ न तद्धम्मो ।
जह घडभावाभावे विवज्जयाओ पडो भिन्नो ॥ ५१ ॥ (१५९९)

Tadabhāve bhāvāö bhāve cābhāvaö na taddhammo ।
Jaha ghadabhāvābhāve vivajjayāö pado bhinno ॥ 51 (1599)

[तदभावे भावाद् भावे चाभावतो न तद्धर्मः ।
यथा घटभावाभावे विपर्ययात् पटो भिन्नः ॥ ५१ ॥ (१५९९)

Tadabhāve bhāvād bhāve cābhāvato na taddharmaḥ ।
Yathā ghaṭabhāvābhāve viparyayāt pato bhinnaḥ ॥ 51 (1599)]

Trans.—51 One that exists when another does not exist and does not exist when that another exists, is not its *dharma.*

For instance, a piece of cloth is different (from a pitcher) owing to its *viparyaya* regarding the existence and non-existence of the pitcher. (1599)

टीका—न भूतधर्मो ज्ञानम्, मुक्त्यवस्थायां भूताभावेऽपि भावात्, मृतशरीरादौ तद्भावेऽपि चाभावात्, यथा घटस्य धर्मः पटो न भवति, किन्तु तस्माद् भिन्न एव। कुतः ? इत्याह—घटभावाभावे विपर्ययात्–घटभावेऽप्यभावात् तदभावेऽपि च भावादित्यर्थः ॥ ५१ (१५९९) ॥

D. C.—Just as a piece of cloth is not the *dharma* of a pitcher, but is different from it, for, even when a pitcher exists, a piece of cloth does not exist, and that even when that pitcher is non-existent, the piece of cloth exists, so knowledge is not the *dharma* of elements; for, in the liberated state, it exists, even though the elements do not, and that it does not exist even when the elements are present in a dead body etc.

Having explained the meaning of some of the sentences of the *Veda*, the author weile concluding the subject, explains briefly the meaning of the remaining sentences of the *Veda*.

एसिं वेयपयाणं न तमत्थं वियसि अहव सव्वेसिं ।
अत्थो किं होज्ज सुई विण्णाणं वत्थुभेओ वा ॥ ५२ ॥ (१६००)

जाई दव्वं किरिया गुणोऽहवा संसओ तवाजुत्तो ।
अयमेवेति नवायं न वत्थुधम्मो जओ जुत्तो ॥ ५३ ॥ (१६०१)

सव्वं चिय सव्वमयं स–परपज्जायओ जओ नियमं ।
सव्वमसव्वमयं पि य विवित्तरूपं विवक्खाओ ॥ ५४ ॥ (१६०२)

सामण्ण–विसेसमओ तेण पयत्थो विवक्खया जुत्तो ।
वत्थुस्स विस्सरूवो पज्जायावेक्खया सव्वो ॥ ५५ ॥ (१६०३)

Esim Veyapayāṇam na tamattham viyasi ahava savvesim ।
Attho kim hojja suī viṇṇāṇam vatthubheö vā ॥ 52 (1600)

Jāī davvam kiriyā guṇo'havā saṁsaö tavājutto ।
Ayameveti na vāyam na vatthu dhammo jaö jutto ॥ 53 (1601)

Savvam ciya savvamayam sa-parapajjāyaö jaö niyayam ।
Savvamasavvamayam pi ya vivittarūpam vivakkhāö ॥ 54 (1602)

Sāmaṇṇa-visesamaö teṇa payattho vivakkhayā jutto ।
Vatthussa vissarūvo pajjāyāvekkhayā savvo ॥ 55 (1603)

[एषां वेदपदानां न त्वमर्थं वेत्सि, अथवा सर्वेषाम् ।
अर्थः किं भवेत् श्रुतिर्विज्ञानं वस्तुभेदो वा ॥ ५२ ॥ (१६००)

जातिर्द्रव्यं क्रिया गुणोऽथवा संशयस्तवायुक्तः ।
अयमेवेति न वायं न वस्तुधर्मो यतो युक्तः ॥ ५३ ॥ (१६०१)

सर्वमेव सर्वमयं स्व-परपर्यायतो यतो नियतम् ।
सर्वमसर्वमयमपि च विविक्तरूपं विवक्षया ॥ ५४ ॥ (१६०२)

सामान्य-विशेषमयस्तेन पदार्थो विवक्षया युक्तः ।
वस्तुनो विश्वरूपः पर्यायापेक्षया सर्वः ॥ ५५ ॥ (१६०३)

Eṣām Vedapadānām na tvamartham vetsi athavā sarveṣām ।
Arthaḥ kim bhavet śrutir-vijñānam vastubhedo vā ॥ 52 (1600)

Jātir-dravyam kriyā guṇo'thavā saṁśayas tavāyuktaḥ ।
Ayameveti navāyam na vastudharmo yato yuktaḥ ॥ 53 (1601)

Sarvameva sarvamayam sva-para paryāyato yato niyatam ।
Sarvamasarvamayamapi ca viviktarūpam vivakṣayā ॥ (1602)

Sāmānya-viśeṣamayastena padārtho vivakṣayā yuktaḥ ।
Vastuno viśvarūpaḥ paryāyāpekṣayā sarvaḥ ॥ 55 (1603)]

Trans.—52–55 You do not know the *artha* (meaning) of these sentences of the *Veda* or that of all. (Hence you have a doubt.) What can *artha* be ? Is it *śruti*, knowledge,

difference in (*i. e.,* speciality of) an object, a genus, a substance, an action, or an attribute ? Your doubt is ill-based; for, it is not proper to draw a sweeping conclusion regarding the *dharma* of an object that it is only this or that it is certainly not this. For, each and every thing *(sarva)* is certainly all things *(sarvamaya)* from the stand-point of its own modifications and those of the rest, and that *sarva* is *a-sarvamaya* too, from the stand-point of separateness. Therefore, it is proper (to believe) that a substance has a generality and speciality, according to the stand-point taken and that its nature is varried from the view-point of its *paryāyas.* (1600-1603)

टीका—तस्मादेषां पूर्वोक्तानां वेदपदानां यथा मया व्याख्यातोऽर्थस्तथा त्वं न वेत्सि, तेन जीवे संशयं करोषि । अथवा, सर्वेषामप्यशेषवेदपदानामर्थं त्वं न जानासि, यस्मात् सर्वेष्वपि वेदपदेषु विषये तवैवंभूतः संशयोऽस्तीति संबन्धः । कथंभूत ? इत्याह-" अत्थो किं होज्ज सुईत्यादि," किमेतेषां वेदपदानामर्थः श्रुतिः शब्दो भवेत्, यथा भेरी-पटह-ढक्कादीनां शब्दस्य शब्द एवार्थः ?; अथवा यद् घटादिशब्दे समुच्चारिते तदभिधेयार्थविषयं विज्ञानं भवद् दृश्यते, तत् तेषामर्थः ?; किंवा घटशब्दे समुत्कीर्तिते " पृथुबुध्नोदराद्याकारवान् घटलक्षणोऽर्थोऽनेनोक्तः, न तु पटादिः " इत्येवं यो वस्तुभेदः प्रतीयते स एषामर्थ ?; यदिवा, किं जातिरमीषामर्थः, यथा गोशब्दे समुच्चारिते गोजातिरवसीयते ?; यदिवा, किं द्रव्यमेषामर्थः, यथा दण्डीत्यादिषु दण्डादिमद् द्रव्यम् ?; किंवा धावतीत्यादीनामिव धावनादिक्रियाऽमीषामर्थः; अथवा, किं शुक्लादीनामिव शुक्लादिगुण एतेषामर्थः ? इति । अयं च संशयस्तवायुक्तः; यस्मात् " अयमेव, नैव वाऽयम् " इत्येवं कस्यापि वस्तुनो धर्मोऽवधारयितुं न युक्तः । शब्दोऽपि वस्तुविशेष एव, ततः " एवंभूतस्यैवार्थस्यायमभिधायकः, नैव वेत्थंभूतस्यार्थस्यायं प्रतिपादकः " इत्येवमेतद्धर्मस्याप्यवधारणमयुक्तमेव । कुतः ? इत्याह-" सव्वं चियेत्यादि " यस्मात् सर्वमपि वाच्यवाचकादिकं वस्तु नियतं निश्चितं स्व-परपर्यायैः सर्वात्मकमेव सामान्यविवक्षयेत्यर्थः । तथा, सर्वमसर्वमयमप्यस्ति विविक्तरूपं सर्वतो व्यावृत्तम् । कया ? इत्याह-विवक्षया, केवलस्वपर्यायापेक्षयेत्यर्थः,

विशेषविषयेति तात्पर्यार्थः । तस्मात् सर्वेषामपि पदानां विवक्षावशतः सामान्यमयो विशेषमयश्च पदार्थो युक्तः, न पुनरेकान्तेनेत्थंभूत एव, अनित्थंभूत एव वेति। कुतः ? इत्याह–"वत्थुस्सेत्यादि" यस्मात् सर्वोऽपि वाच्यस्य वाचकस्य वा वस्तुनः स्वभावः पर्यायापेक्षया विश्वरूपो नानाविधो वर्तते । ततश्च सामान्यविवक्षया घटशब्दः सर्वात्मकत्वात् सर्वेषामपि द्रव्य–गुण–क्रियाद्यर्थानां वाचकः, विशेषविवक्षया तु प्रतिनियतरूपत्वाद् य एवास्येह पृथुबुध्नोदराद्याकारवानर्थो वाच्यतया रूढस्तस्यैव वाचकः । एवमन्योऽपि शब्दो विशेषविवक्षया या यत्र देशादौ यस्यार्थस्य वाचकतया रूढः स तस्य वाचको द्रष्टव्यः। सामान्यविवक्षया तु " सर्वः सर्वस्य वाचकः, सर्वं च सर्वस्य वाच्यम् " इत्यनया दिशा सकलं स्वधिया भावनियमिति ।

तदेवं तेन त्रिजगत्स्वरूपवेदिना भगवता श्रीमन्महावीरेण निःशेषपरप्रबोधनोपायकुशलतया तीक्ष्णपरशुनेव निपुणयुक्तिप्रबन्धेन गुपिलवल्लीवितान इव मूलाच्छिन्नः समस्तोऽपि तस्य तत्समासन्नपरमकल्याणस्येन्द्रभूतेः संशयः॥ ५२–५५ (१६००–१६०१–१६०२–१६०३) ॥

D. C.—Gautama ! you have not followed my exposition of these *padas* (sentences) of the *Veda*. Hence, you have a doubt regarding the soul. Or, you do not know the meaning of these, as well as, the remaining sentences of the *Veda*.

Consequently, you raise the following queries in connection with all the sentences of the *Veda* :—

1. Just as *śabda* is the meaning of the *śabda* (sound) of a kettle–drum, a tabor, a double drum, etc., so, is the meaning of these sentences *śruti*, *i. e.*, *śabda* ?
2. Is it *vijñāna*–the *vijñāna* which arises and which is associated with the object connoted by it when the word like *ghaṭa* is pronounced ?
3. Do the *padas* of the *Veda* mean *vastu–bhed* of the type noticed when the word *ghaṭa* is pronounced; the type, *viz.*, that this connotes an object which has a wide bottom, an expansive belly, etc., and not a piece of cloth ?

4. Is their meaning *jāti*–the *jāti* (genus) of the kind one realizes when the word *go* (cow) is uttered.

5. Just as when the word *daṇḍin* is pronounced we take it to be a *dravya* having a *daṇḍa*, etc., similarly, does the meaning of the sentences of the *Veda* connote such a *dravya ?*

6. In the words *dhāvati* (runs), etc., we take them to mean the *kriyā* (act) of running, etc., so do these sentences mean any such *kriyā.*

7. Just as the word *śukla* (white) means the *guṇa* (attribute) of being white, so do these sentences convey a meaning of the type of this *guṇa ?*

These seven queries of yours are out of place–are useless. For, it is not possible to say regarding any *vastu* (substance or material) this is only this and nothing else. *Śabda*, too, is certainly a kind of *vastu*, so it is not proper to say that it connotes only this meaning and none else. The reasons are :—

Every *vastu* whether in the form of a *vācya* (direct expression) or a *vācaka* (indicatory word) is *sarvamaya* (representing all objects) from the stand-point of *sāmānya* (generality) when all the *paryāyas* (modifications) including its own *paryāyas* and those of the rest are taken into account. Whereas, every *vastu* is *a-sarvamaya* when examined from the stand-point of its own *paryāyas* which lays stress upon *viśeṣa*.

Consequently, all the sentences either convey a general sense or a particular one, according to the stand-point we take. Hence, it is no use saying that they mean only this and nothing else, for, the nature of every *vastu* whether it is a *vācya* or *vācaka* varies according to the stand-points from which they are viewed.

Thus from the general stand-point, the word *ghaṭa* is the *vācaka* of *dravya, guṇa, kriyā*, etc., since it is then *sarvamaya.*

But, when examined from a special stand-point, it is a *vācaka*, of only the *ruḍha* (conventional) meaning, *viz.*, that it has an expansive bottom, a wide belly, etc., for, this stand-point makes it definite.

Similarly, any other word is a *vācaka* of only that *artha* which is *ruḍha* in that country, etc., when we examine it from the special stand-point.

But from the *general stand-point*, each and every word is a *vācaka* of one and all, and each and every word is a *vācya* of one and all. This is the line one should sensibly follow.

Thus, *Śramaṇa, Bhagvān Mahāvîra* who knew the nature of all the three worlds, completely removed the doubts of *Indrabhūti* who was about to acquire the most excellent merit by advancing clever arguments capable of fully instructing others as is the case with a sharp hatchet which eradicates a cluster of creepers.

छिन्नम्मि संसयम्मि जिणेण जर-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
सो समणो पव्वइओ पंचहिं सह खंडियसएहिं ॥५६॥ (१६०४)

Chinnammi saṁsayammi Jineṇa jara-maraṇa vippamukkeṇam ।
So saṃaṇo pavvaiö pancahim saha khandiyasaehim ॥ 56 (1604)

[छिन्ने संशये जिनेन जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
स श्रमणः प्रव्रजितः पञ्चभिः सह खण्डिकशतैः ॥५६॥ (१६०४)

Chinne saṁśaye Jinena jarā-maraṇa vipramuktena ।
Sa śramaṇaḥ pravrajitaḥ pancabhiḥ saha khandikaśataiḥ ॥56 (16o4)]

Trans.—56 When the doubt was removed by the *Tīrthaṅkara* who was entirely free from old age and death, the saint *Indrabhūti* took दीक्षा *Dikśā* along with his five hundred pupils.

टीका—सुबोधा, नवरं श्राम्यतीति श्रमणः सन्नसौ पापाद् व्रजितः प्रव्रजितो भागवतीं दीक्षां प्रतिपन्न इत्यर्थः । 'संयतः संयतो भवति नासंयतः'

इति निश्चयनयमताश्रयणाच्चेत्थमुक्तमितीह भावार्थः । खण्डिकास्तच्छात्रा इति ॥ ५६ (१६०४) ॥

C. C.—That one who is a *saṁyata* becomes so and not one who is not so, is a statement here made from the transcendental point of view. The rest is easy.

एवं कम्माईसु वि जं सामण्णं तयं समाउज्जं ।
जो पुण जत्थ विसेसो समासओ तं पवक्खामि ॥५७॥(१६०५)

Evam kammāîsu vi jam sāmaṇṇam tayam samāujjam ।
Jo puṇa jattha viseso samāsaö tam pavakkhāmi ॥ 57 (1605)

[एवं कर्मादिष्वपि यत् सामान्यं तत् समायोज्यम् ।
यः पुनर्यत्र विशेषः समासतस्तं प्रवक्ष्यामि ॥ ५७ ॥ (१६०५)

Evam karmādiṣvapi yat sāmānyam tat samāyojyam ।
Yaḥ punar-yatra viśeṣaḥ samāsatastam pravakṣyāmi ॥ 57(1605)]

Trans.—57 Thus, what is applicable to *karman*, etc., (the *Vādas* of the remaining *Gaṇadharas*) should be applied (there). And I shall briefly expound there, that which is a speciality (of it) (1605)

टीका—एवं यदिहात्मवादप्रक्रमे प्रत्यक्षा-ऽनुमाना-ऽऽगमप्रमाणवक्तव्यतादिकं वक्ष्यमाणकर्मादिवादस्थानकैः किमपि तुल्यं तत् स्वधियां तत्र तत्रायोजनीयम् । यस्तु यत्र वादस्थानके विशेषस्तं तत्र संक्षेपतः स्वयमेव वक्ष्यामि ॥ इति सप्तपञ्चाशद्गाथार्थः ॥ ५७ (१६०५) ॥

D. C.—Here, while establishing the existence of the soul, several points have been discussed. Out of them, those that are applicable to the other discussions which are to follow, may be applied there by the reader himself. So, I shall, now, briefly discuss in the remaining *vādas* (discussions) only such points as happen to be their specialities.

End of the Discussion with the First Gaṇadhara.

Chapter 11

द्वितीयगणधरवक्तव्यता

Discussion with the Second Gaṇadhara.

[Arguments advanced to prove the non-existence of Karman and their refutation]

तं पव्वइअं सोउं बीओ आगच्छइ अमरिसेणं ।
वच्चामि णमाणेमी पराजिणित्ता ण तं समणं ॥ ५८ ॥ (१६०६)

Tam pavvaiam söum bîo āgacchai amariseṇam ।
Vaccāmi ṇamāṇemī parājiṇittā ṇa tam samaṇam ॥ 58 (1606)

[तं प्रव्रजितं श्रुत्वा द्वितीय आगच्छत्यमर्षेण ।
व्रजाम्यानयामि पराजित्य तं श्रमणम् ॥ ५८ ॥ (१६०६)

Tam pravrajitam śrutvā dvitīya āgacchatyamarṣeṇa ।
Vrajāmyānayami parājitya tam śramaṇam ॥ 58 (1606)]

Trans.—58 Having heard that he *(Indrabhūti)* had renounced the world, the second *(Gaṇadhara)* comes exasperated. (He thinks):—I may go and having vanquished that asint, I may bring *(Indrabhūti)* back. (1606)

टीका—तमिन्द्रभूतिं प्रव्रजितं श्रुत्वा द्वितीयोऽग्निभूतिनामा तत्सोदर्यबन्धुरत्रान्तरेऽमर्षेणाकुलितचेताः समागच्छति भगवत्समीपम् । केनाभिप्रायेण ? इत्याह—व्रजामि । "ण" इति वाक्यालङ्कारे । आनयामि निजभ्रातरमिन्द्रभूतिं "ततः" इति गम्यते । 'ण' इत्ययमपि वाक्यालङ्कारे । तं श्रमणमिन्द्रजालिकं कमपि पराजित्येति ॥ ५८ (१६०६) ॥

D. C.—On having heard that *Indrabhūti* had taken *dîkṣā*, *Agnibhūti*, his younger brother is exasperated. He comes to *Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvîra* with the object of defeating him and taking *Indrabhūti* back.

Agnibhūti thought—

छलिओ छलाइणा सो मण्णे माइंदजालिओ वा वि ।
को जाणइ कह वत्तं एत्ताहे वट्टमाणी से ॥ ५९ ॥ (१६०७)

Chalio chalāiṇā so maṇṇe māindajāliö vā vi ।
Ko jāṇai kaha vattam ettāhe vattamāṇî se ॥ 59 (1607)

[छलितश्छलादिना स मन्ये मायेन्द्रजालिको वापि ।
को जानाति कथं वृत्तमेतस्माद् वर्तमाना तस्य ॥ ५९ ॥ (१६०७)

Chalitaśchalādinā sa manye māyendrajāliko vāpi ।
Ko jānāti katham vrittametasmād vartamānā tasya ॥ 59 (1607)]

Trans.—59 I think, he has been cheated by *chala* (artful fraud), etc., or he is a clever juggler practising deceit. Who knows as to what happened there ? Consequently, (the world will see) what will happen in his case. (1607)

टीका–दुर्जयस्त्रिभुवनस्यापि मद्भ्रातेन्द्रभूतिः, केवलमहमिदं मन्ये—छलादिना छलितोऽसौ तेन धूर्तेन–च्छल–जाति–निग्रहस्थान–ग्रहणनिपुणेन तेन केनापि दुष्टेन भ्रमितो मद्बन्धुरित्यर्थः । अथवा, मायेन्द्रजालिकः कोऽपि निश्चितमसौ, येन तस्यापि जगद्गुरोर्मद्भ्रातुर्भ्रमितं चेतः । तस्मात् किं बहुना ? को जानाति तद्वादस्थानकं तयोस्तत्र कथमपि वृत्तम्, मत्परोक्षत्वात् ?। इत ऊर्ध्वं पुनर्मयि तत्र गते तस्य तदिन्द्रजालव्यतिकरभ्रमितमानसखचर–नरा–ऽमरव्रातवन्दनमात्रबृंहितचेतसः, श्रमणकस्य " वट्टमाणी त्ति " या काचिद् वार्ता वर्तनी वा भविष्यति तां द्रक्ष्यत्ययं समग्रोऽपि लोक इति ॥ ५९ (१६०७) ॥

D. C.—My brother *Indrabhūti* cannot be defeated by any one in the three worlds, so, I think he has been deceived by

the rogue *Mahāvîra*, who must be an expert in using *chala* (a trick resulting in the destruction of the statement in discussion by use of ambiguities of meaning) *Jāti* (an argument based on the same ground as put forth by the first speaker and *nigraha sthāna* (fallacy) etc. Or this *Mahāvîra* must certainly be a deceitful juggler. That is why he could change his (*Indrabhūti's*) mind. So what more ? I was not present there, so who knows as to what discussion took place between my brother and *Mahāvîra* there ? So let me, first of all, go there and let the world see as to what happens, so far as this saint *Mahāvîra* is concerned—*Mahāvîra* who has been puffed up with pride owing to his being saluted by a collection of *khacaras* (demi-gods) human beings and celestial beings whose minds have been perplexed by jugglery.

While going there, *Agnibhūti* said,

सो पक्खंतरमेगं पि जाइ जइ मे तओ मि तस्सेव ।
सीसत्तं होज्ज गओ वोत्तुं पत्तो जिणसगासे ॥ ६० ॥ (१६०८)

So pakkhantaramegam pi jāi jai me taö mi tasseva ।
Sīsattam hojja gaö vottum patto Jiṇasagāse ॥ 60 (1608)

[स.पक्षान्तरमेकमपि याति यदि मे ततस्तस्यैव ।
शिष्यत्वं भवेयं गत उक्त्वा प्राप्तो जिनसकाशे ॥ ६० ॥ (१६०८)

Sa pakṣāntaramekamapi yāti yadi me tatastasyaiva ।
Śiṣyatvam bhaveyam gata uktvā prāpto Jinasakāśe ॥ 60 (1608)]

Trans.—60 If he clearly understands the weak point of any one of *pakṣas* (premises), I shall become a pupil of his. Having said so, he went and came up into the presence of *Tīrthaṅkara Mahāvīra.* (1608)

टीका—को जानाति तावदिन्द्रभूतिस्तेन कथमपि तत्र निर्जितः ? ।
मम पुनरप्येकमपि पक्षान्तरं प्रक्षविशेषं स यदि यात्यवबुध्यते—मद्विहितस्य

सहेतू-दाहरणस्य पक्षविशेषस्य स यदुत्तरप्रदानेन कथमपि पारं गच्छतीति हृदयम्, ततो 'मि' इति वाक्यालङ्कारे, तस्यैव श्रमणस्य शिष्यत्वेन गतोऽहं भवेयम् इति निश्चयः। तत इत्यादि वाग्गर्जिं कृत्वा जिनस्य श्रीमन्महावीरस्यान्तिकं प्राप्त इति ॥ ६० (१६०८) ॥

D. C.—Who knows how *Indrabhūti* was defeated by him? If however, he gives a satisfactory answer to any one of my *pakṣas* (premises) I shall become a pupil of that saint. He made a firm resolution. Having said so, he went to *Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvîra.*

आभट्ठो य जिणेणं जाइ-जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केण ।
नामेण य गोत्तेण य सव्वण्णू सव्वदरिसी णं ॥ ६१ ॥ (१६०९)

Abhaṭṭho ya Jiṇeṇam jāi-jarā-maraṇa vippamukkeṇa ।
Nāmeṇa ya gotteṇa ya savvaṇṇū savvadarisī ṇam ॥ 61 (1609)

[आभाषितश्च जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ॥ ६१ ॥ (१६०९)

Abhāṣitaśca Jinena jāti-jarā-maraṇa vipramuktena ।
Namnā ca gotreṇa ca sarvajñena sarvadarśinā ॥ 61 (1609)]

Trans.—61. He was addressed by his name and *gotra* (lineage) by the *Tîrthaṅkara* who was free from birth, old age and death, who was all-knowing and who had complete *darśana* (undifferentiated knowledge.) (1609)

टीका-आभाषितश्च संलप्तश्च जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना च जिनेन। कथम् ?-नाम्ना च-हे अग्निभूते ! गोत्रेण च-हे गौतमसगोत्र ! इति। इत्थं च नाम-गोत्राभ्यां संलप्तस्य तस्य चिन्ताऽभूत्-अहो ! नामापि मम विजानाति, अथवा, जगत्प्रसिद्धोऽहम्, कः किल मां न वेत्ति ?। यदि हि मे हृद्गतं संशयं ज्ञास्यति, अपनेष्यति वा, तदा भवेद् मम विस्मयः ॥ ६१ (१६०९) ॥

D. C.—The omniscient *Tîrthaṅkara* addressed the second *Gaṇadhara* by name as *Agnibhūti* and as one having *Gautama,*

as apineage. When he was so spoken of, he was taken aback. But an after-thought came to him as under :—

I am famous in the world, so it is but natural that *Mahāvîra* should be knowing my name and lineage. It will be, however, a matter of surprise to me if *Mahāvîra* comes to know about my doubt or removes it.

When he was thinking so, *Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvîra* said,

किं मन्ने अत्थि कम्मं उयाहु न त्थि त्ति संसयो तुज्झं ।
वेयपयाण य अत्थं न याणासि तेसिमो अत्थो ॥६२॥ (१६१०)

Kim manne atthi kammam uyāhu na tthi tti saṁsayo tujjham ।
Veyapayāṇa ya attham na yāṇasi tesimo attho ॥ 62 (1610)

[किं मन्यसेऽस्ति कर्म उताहो नास्तीति संशयस्तव ।
वेदपदानां चार्थं न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ ६२ ॥ (१६१०)

Kim manyase'sti karma utāho nāstīti saṁśayastava ।
Vedapadānām cārtham na jānāsi teṣāmayamarthaḥ ॥ 62 (1610)]

Trans.—62 You think whether a *Karman* exists or not. This is your doubt. You do not know the (real) meaning of the sentences of the *Veda*. Their meaning is this. (1610)

टीका—हे अग्निभूते ! गौतम ! त्वमेतद् मन्यसे चिन्तयसि यदुत-क्रियते मिथ्यात्वादिहेतुसमन्वितेन जीवेनेति कर्म ज्ञानावरणादिकम् तत् किमस्ति, नास्ति वा ? इति । नन्वयमनुचितस्तव संशयः । अयं हि भवतो विरुद्धवेदपदनिबन्धनो वर्तते, तेषां च वेदपदानां त्वमर्थं न जानासि, तेन संशयं करोषि । तेषां च वेदपदानामयं वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणोऽर्थः इति॥६२(१६१०)॥

D. C.—' O *Agnibhūti* ! of *Gautama* lineage.' You have a doubt as to whether the *Karman* which is being done by the soul under the influence of *Mithyātva* (False Belief), etc., and which is of the type of *Jñānāvaraṇa* (knowledge-obscuring), etc., exists or not. This doubt of yours is based on your un-realization of the exact significance of the sentences of the *Veda*. This significance is what will be just expounded.

कम्मे तुह संदेहो मन्नसि तं नाणगोयराईयं ।
तुह तमणुमाणसाहणमणुभूइमयं फलं जस्स ॥ ६३ ॥ (१६११)

Kamme tuha sandeho mannasi tam nāṇagoyarāîyam ।
Tūha tamaṇumāṇa sāhaṇamaṇubhūimayam phalam jassa ॥ 63 (1611)

[कर्मणि तव संदेहो मन्यसे तज्ज्ञानगोचरातीतम् ।
तव तदनुमानसाधनमनुभूतिमयं फलं यस्य ॥ ६३ ॥ (१६११)

Karmaṇi tava sandeho manyase tajjnānagocarātītam ।
Tava tadanumāna sādhanamanubhūtimayam phalam tasya॥63(1611)]

Trans.—63 You have a doubt about (the existence of) the *Karman.* You think it to be beyond the range of knowledge. That (*Karman*) of which experience is the fruit, is provable (to you) by means of *anumāna.* (1611)

टीका—हे आयुष्मन्नग्निभूते ! ज्ञानावरणादिपरमाणुसंघातरूपे कर्मणि तव संदेहः, यतः प्रत्यक्षा-ऽनुमानादिसमस्तप्रमाणात्मकज्ञानगोचरातीतमेव तत् त्वं मन्यसे, तथा हि—न तावत् प्रत्यक्षं कर्म, अतीन्द्रियत्वात्, खरविषाणवत्, इत्यादि प्रमाणविषयातीतत्वं प्राग्वज्जीवस्येव कर्मणोऽपि समानप्रायत्वाद् भावनीयमिति । तदेतत् सौम्य ! मा मन्थास्त्वम्, यतो मम तावत् प्रत्यक्षमेव कर्म, तवाप्यनुमानं साधनं यस्य तदनुमानसाधनं वर्तते तत् कर्म, न पुनः सर्वप्रमाणगोचरातीतम् । यस्य, किम् ? इत्याह—" अणुभूइमयं फलं जस्स त्ति " सुख-दुःखानामनुभूतिरनुभवनं तन्मयं तदात्मकं फलं यस्य शुभा-ऽशुभकर्मण इति । अनेन चेदनुमानं सूचितम्—अस्ति सुख-दुःखानुभवस्य हेतुः, कार्यत्वात्, अङ्कुरस्यैवेति ।

अथ यदि भवतः प्रत्यक्षं कर्म, तर्हि मयापि तत्प्रत्यक्षं कस्माद् न भवति ? इति चेत् । तदयुक्तम्, न हि यदेकस्य कस्यचित् प्रत्यक्षं तेनापरस्यापि प्रत्यक्षेण भवितव्यम् । न हि सिंह-सरभ-हंसादयः सर्वस्यापि लोकस्य प्रत्यक्षाः, न च ते न सन्ति बालादीनामपि तत्सर्वस्य प्रसिद्धत्वात् । तस्मादस्ति कर्म, सर्वज्ञत्वेन मया प्रत्यक्षीकृतत्वात्, भवत्संशयविज्ञानवदिति ।

न च वक्तव्यम्–त्वयि सर्वज्ञत्वमस्मान् प्रत्यसिद्धम् " कह सव्वण्णु त्ति मई जेणाहं सव्वसंसयच्छेई, पुच्छसु व जं न याणामि " इत्यादिना प्रागेव प्रतिविहितत्वात् । कार्यप्रत्यक्षतया भवतोऽपि च प्रत्यक्षमेव कर्म, यथा घटादिकार्यप्रत्यक्षतया परमाणव इति ॥ ६३ (१६११) ॥

D. C.—O long-lived *Agnibhūti!* You entertain a doubt about the existence of the *Karman*, which is a multitude of *paramāṇus*, in the form of *jñānāvaraṇa*, etc., for you think that its existence cannot be established by any one of the *pramānas* such as *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, etc., the *pramaṇas* which are knowledge. To be explicit, you argue as under:—

Karman is not directly perceived, because it is supersensuous as is the case with the horn on the head of an ass.

Other arguments that you advance are the same as mentioned by your brother in the case of the soul.

But these lines of arguments are faulty. For, this *Karman* is certainly *pratyakṣa* to me. Moreover, its existence is such as can be realized by you, by means of inference. Hence, it is not justifiable to believe that no *pramāṇa* can establish its existence. The *Karman* is either good or bad. The good *Karman* makes us experience happiness, where as, the bad *Karman* misery.

This leads to an inference as under:—

There is a cause for experiencing happiness and misery since it is a *Kārya* (an act) as is the case with a sprout. It is no use arguing that since the *Karman* is *pratyakṣa* to me (*i. e. Mahāvîra*) it should be so to you. For, there is no such rule that what is *pratyakṣa* to one, should be necessarily so to another. A lion, *a śarbha* (a fabulous eight-legged animal a match for lions and elephants), a swan, etc. are not *pratyakṣa* to one and all the beings. But, on that account, it is not that they do not exist, for, even children know them. Therefore, there does exist the *Karman* since

it is *pratyakṣa* to me, an omniscient being just as, your doubt is *pratyakṣa* to me. If you doubt my omniscience, I may repeat what I said to your elder brother, *viz.*,

" *Kaha savvaṇṇu tti maî jeṇāham savva samsayaccheî, pucchasu va jam na yāṇasi* " (verse 1579).

Moreover, this *Karman* is *pratyakṣa* to you too, since you realize its *Kārya* (effect), as is the case with *paramaṇus*, which though not directly realizable to you, are *pratyakṣa* to you, since their *Kāryas* like a pitcher, etc., are directly perceived by you.

अत्थि सुह–दुक्खहेऊ कज्जाओ बीयमंकुरस्सेव ।
सो दिट्ठो चेव मई वभिचाराओ न तं जुत्तं ॥ ६४ ॥ (१६१२)

जो तुल्लसाहणाणं फले विसेसो न सो विणा हेउं ।
कज्जत्तणओ गोयम ! घडो व्व, हेऊ य सो कम्मं॥६५॥(१६१३)

Atthi suha–dukkhaheū kajjāö bīyamaṅkursseva ।
So dittho ceva maî vabhicārāö na tam juttam ॥ 64 ॥ (1612)
Jo tullasāhaṇāṇam phale viseso na so viṇā heum ।
Kajjattaṇaö Goyama ! ghado vva, heū ya so kammam ॥65॥ (1613)

[अस्ति सुखदुःखहेतुः कार्यत्वात् बीजमङ्कुरस्येव ।
स दृष्ट एव मतिर्व्यभिचाराद् न तद् युक्तम् ॥ ६४ ॥ (१६१२)

यस्तुल्यसाधनयोः फले विशेषो न स विना हेतुम् ।
कार्यत्वतो गौतम ! घट इव, हेतुश्च स कर्म ॥ ६५ ॥ (१६१३)]

Asti sukhduhkkhhetuḥ kāryatvāt, bījamaṅkurasyeva ।
Sa dṛiṣta eva matir–vyabhicārād na tad yuktam ॥ 64 (1612)

Yastulyasādhanayoḥ phale viśeṣo na sa vinā hetum ।
Kāryatvato Gautama ! ghaṭa iva, hetuśca sa karma ॥ 65 (1613)]

Trans.—64–65 Just as a sprout has a seed for its *hetu*, (because it is a *kārya*) so, there is a *hetu* for happiness and misery owing to their being a *kārya* (an action)

You may think :—That (*hetu*) is certainly seen. This (thought) is not proper owing to *vyabhicāra* (irrelevancy).

O *Gautama !* That difference which exists in the fructification in the case of those who have equal means is not without a *hetu*, since it is a *kārya*, as is the case with a pitcher. That *hetu* is *Karman*. 64–65 (1612–1613)

टीका–प्रतिप्राणि प्रसिद्ध्योः सुख–दुःखयोर्हेतुरस्ति, कार्यत्वात्, अङ्कुरस्येव बीजमिति। यश्चेह सुख–दुःखयोर्हेतुस्तत् कर्मैव, इत्यस्ति तदिति। स्याद् मतिः–स्रक्–चन्दना–ऽङ्गनादयः सुखस्य हेतवः, दुःखस्य त्वहि–विष–कण्टकादयः, इति दृष्ट एव सुख–दुःखयोर्हेतुरस्ति, किमदृष्टस्य कर्मणस्तद्धेतुत्वकलपनेन ?। न हि दृष्टपरिहारेणादृष्टकल्पना संगतत्वमावहति, अति प्रसङ्गात्। तदयुक्तम्, व्यभिचारात्, तथाहि–' जो तुल्येत्यादि ' इह यस्तुल्यसाधनयोरिष्टशब्दादिविषयसुखसाधनसमेतयोरनिष्टार्थसाधनसंयुक्तयोश्च द्वयोर्बहुनां वा फले सुख–दुःखानुभवनलक्षणे विशेषस्तारतम्यरूपो दृश्यते, नासावदृष्टं कमपि हेतुमन्तरेणोपपद्यते, कार्यत्वात्, घटवत्। यश्च तत्र विशेषाधायकोऽदृष्टहेतुस्तद् गौतम ! कर्मेति प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ॥६४–६५॥ (१६१२-१६१३)

D. C.—Just as a sprout which is a *Kārya*, has a seed for its *hetu*, so happiness and misery, which are well–known to every individual, have a cause, because they are *kāryas*. And this cause is nothing else but *Karman* and so it exists. It may be that you may here raise a question as under :—

A garland, sandal, a woman and the like are the *hetus* of happiness, whereas a serpent, poison, a thorn, etc., are those of misery. All these *hetus* of happiness and misery as well, are seen–are the objects of the sense of sight. So, why should we believe *Karman* to be their *hetu*–the *Karman* which is not seen ? To admit a thing not seen in the place of one that is seen is not justificable, as it out–shoots the mark.

This question is out of place owing to the *vyabhicāra* (irrelevancy). It is a matter of common experience that we

find that persons having the same means for enjoying happiness, do not get the same type of happiness.

Same is the case with those who have the same means to suffer misery.

This difference in each case, cannot be without any *hetu* which is not seen.

This very unseen *hetu* is *Karman.*

बालसरीरं देहंतरपुव्वं इंदियाइमत्ताओ ।
जह बालदेहपुव्वो जुवदेहो पुव्वमिह कम्मं ॥ ६६ ॥ (१६१४)

Bālasarîram dehantarapuvvam indiyāimattāo ।
Jaha bāladehapuvvo juvadeho puvvamiha kammam ॥ 66 ॥ (1614)

[बालशरीरं देहान्तरपूर्वकमिन्द्रियादिमत्त्वात् ।
यथा बालदेहपूर्वो युवदेहः पूर्वमिह कम ॥ ६६ ॥ (१६१४)

Bālaśarīram dehāntarapūrvakamindriyādimattvāt ।
Yathā bāladehapūrvo yuvadehaḥ pūrvamiha karma ॥ 66 (1614)]

Trans.—66 Just as the body in youth is preceded by a body in child-hood so is the body in child-hood preceded by another body, since it has organs of sense etc. Here-in this very body which is prior to that in child-hood is *Karman.* (1614)

टीकाः—शरीरान्तरपूर्वकमाद्यं बालशरीरम्, इन्द्रियादिमत्त्वात्, युवशरीरवदिति, आदिशब्दात् सुख-दुःखित्व-प्राणाऽपान-निमेषो-न्मेष जीवनादिमत्त्वादयोऽपि हेतवो ग्राह्याः । न च जन्मान्तरातीतशरीरपूर्वकमेवेदमिति शक्यते वक्तुम्, तस्यापान्तरालगतावसत्त्वेन तत्पूर्वकत्वानुपपत्तेः । न चाशरीरिणो नियतगर्भ-देश-स्थानप्राप्तिपूर्वकः शरीरग्रहो युज्यते, नियामककारणाभावात् । नापि स्वभावो नियामकः, तस्य निराकरिष्यमाणत्वात् । यच्चेह बालशरीरस्य पूर्वं शरीरान्तरं तत् " कर्म " इति मन्तव्यम्—कार्मणं शरीरमित्यर्थः, " जोएण कम्मएणं आहारेई अणंतरं जीवो " इत्यादि वचनादिति ॥ ६६ (१६१४) ॥

D. C.—The body in childhood must have some body to precede it, since it has organs of sense, happiness, misery, *prāṇa* (sign of vitality) *apāna* (the vital air which goes downwards and out at the *anus*), winking of the eyes, opening of the eyes, life, etc., as is the case with the body in youth. This body which precedes one in child-hood, cannot be the body belonging to the previous birth; for it does not exist in the *apāntarāla gati* (state previous to the interval stage) and so it has no scope here. Moreover, it is not possible for one having no body, to have a body in a particular womb, country, place, etc., as there is none to so direct it. Even nature cannot so direct it as we shall soon prove. So the body which precedes one in child-hood is *Kārmaṇa*—one which is known as a *Kārmaṇa* body, as suggested by "*jeṇa kammaeṇam āhāreî aṇantaram jîvo.*"

There is another inference also,

किरियाफलभावाओ दाणाईणं फलं किसीए व ।
तं चिय दाणाइफलं मणप्पसायाई जइ बुद्धी ॥ ६७॥ (१६१५)

किरियासामण्णाओ जं फलमस्सावि तं मयं कम्मं ।
तस्स परिणामरूवं सुह-दुक्खफलं जओ भुज्जो ॥ ६८॥ (१६१६)

Kiriyā phala bhāvāö dāṇāîṇam phalam kisîe vva ।
Tam ciya dāṇāiphalam maṇappasāyāî jai buddhî ॥ 67 (1615)

Kiriyāsāmaṇṇāö jam phalamassāvi tam mayam kammam ।
Tassa pariṇāmarūvam suha-dukkhaphalam jaö bhujjo ॥ 68 (1616)

[क्रियाफलभावाद् दानादीनां फलं कृषेरिव ।
तदेव दानादिफलं मनःप्रसादादि यदि बुद्धिः ॥ ६७ ॥ (१६१५)

क्रियासामान्याद् यत्फलमस्यापि तद् मतं कर्म ।
तस्य परिणामरूपं सुख-दुःखफलं यतो भूयः ॥ ६८ ॥ (१६१६)

Kriyāphalabhāvād dānādînām phalam kriṣeriva ।
Tadeva dānādiphalam manaḥprasādādi yadi buddhiḥ ॥ 67 (1615)

Kriyā sāmānyād yatphalamasyāpi tad matam karma ।
Tasya pariṇāmarūpam sukha-duḥkha phalam yato bhūyaḥ॥68(1616)]

Trans.—67–68 Just as there is a fruit of agriculture, so there is a fruit of charity, etc., owing to the fructification of an act. If you think that, the fruit of charity, etc., is serenity of mind, etc., then (we say that) that which is its fruit is looked upon as *Karman* owing to the commonness of *kriyā*—the *Karman* from which arises again and again the fructification in the form of happiness and misery which are the results of *Karman.* (1615–1616)

टीका–" दाणाईणं फलं त्ति " इह दानादिक्रियाणां फलमस्ति "किरियाफलभावाओ त्ति" सचेतनारब्धक्रियाणां फलभावात् फलभावदर्शनादित्यर्थः, यथा कृषिक्रियायाः । इह या चेतनारब्धक्रिया तस्या फलं दृष्टम्, यथा कृष्यादिक्रियायाः, चेतनारब्धाश्च दानादिक्रियाः, तस्मात् फलवत्यः, यच्च तासां फलं तत् कर्म । या तु निष्फला क्रिया सा सचेतनारब्धापि न भवति, यथा परमाण्वादिक्रिया, सचेतनारब्धाश्च दानादिक्रियाः, तस्मात् फलवत्यः । स्यादेतत्, अनैकान्तिकोऽयं हेतुः, चेतनारब्धानामपि कासांचित् कृष्यादिक्रियाणां निष्फलत्वदर्शनात् । तदयुक्तम्, फलवत्त्वाभिप्रायेणैव तदारम्भात् । यच्च क्वचिद् निष्फलत्वमपि दृश्यते तत्सम्यग्ज्ञानाद्यभावेन सामग्रीवैकल्याद् द्रष्टव्यम्, मनःशुद्ध्यादिसामग्रीविकलतया दानादिक्रिया अपि निष्फला इष्यन्त एवेत्यदोषः ।

यदि चात्र परस्यैवंभूता बुद्धिः स्यात् । कथंभूता ? इत्याह–"तं चियेत्यादि " तदेव दानादिक्रियाणां फलं यदस्माद्दशामपि प्रत्यक्षं मनः प्रसादादि । इदमुक्तं भवति–कृष्यादिक्रिया दृष्टधान्याद्यवाप्तिफला दृष्टाः, अतो दानादिक्रियाणामपि दृष्टमेव मनःप्रसादादिकं फलं भविष्यति, किमदृष्टकर्मलक्षणफलसाधनेन ? । तत इष्टविरुद्धसाधनाद् विरुद्धोऽयं हेतुः । तर्ह्यत्र वयं ब्रूमः–" किरियासामण्णाओ इत्यादि " अस्यापि मनःप्रसादस्य यत्

फलं तद् मम कर्म संमतम् । ननु मनः प्रसादस्यापि कथं फलमभिधीयते ? इत्याह–" किरियासामण्णाओ त्ति" इदमुक्तं भवति–मनः प्रसादोऽपि क्रियारूप एव, ततश्च यथा दान–कृष्यादिकाः क्रियाः फलवत्यः, तथा क्रियासाम्याद् मनः प्रसादस्यापि फलेन भवितव्यमेव, यच्च तस्य फलं तत् कर्मैव, इति न कश्चिद् व्यभिचारः ।

यतः कर्मणः सकाशात्, किम् ? इत्याह–" सुह-दुक्खफलं जउ त्ति " सुख–दुःखरूपं फलं सुख–दुःखफलं यतो यस्मात् कर्मणः सकाशाज्जायते । कथम् ? भूयः पुनः पुनरपि । कथं भूतं यत् सुख–दुःखफलम् ? इत्याह–तस्यैव कर्मणस्तज्जनकत्वेन यत् परिणमनं परिणामस्तद्रूपमिति । एतदुक्तं भवति–यतः कर्मणः सकाशात् प्रतिक्षणं तत्परिणतिरूपं सुख–दुःखफलं प्राणिनां समुपजायते, तत् कर्म मनः प्रसादादिक्रियाया अपि फलमभिमतम् । आह–नन्वनन्तरगाथायां " दानादिक्रियाफलं कर्म " इति वदता दानादिक्रियैव कर्मणः कारणमुक्ता, अत्र तु मनःप्रसादादिक्रिया तत्कारणमुच्यते, इति कथं न पूर्वापरविरोधः ? इति । सत्यम्, किन्तु मनः प्रसादादिक्रियैवानन्तर्येण कर्मणः कारणम्, केवलं तस्या अपि मनः प्रसादादिक्रियाया दानादिक्रियैव कारणम्, अतः कारणकारणे कारणोपचाराददोष इति ॥ ६७–६८ (१६१५–१६१६) ॥

D. C.—In this world, we find that each and every act performed by a living being, yields a fruit, as is seen in the case of tilling of ground, etc. The acts of charity are undertaken by a living being, so they too, must bear a fruit, and that fruit is nothing else but *Karman*. That act which is fruitless, is not commenced by a living being, *e. g.*, the act of electrons etc; but the acts of charity, etc., are commenced by living beings; so they are fruitful.

It may here be argued that this *hetu* is *anaikāntika*; for, the act like tilling the ground commenced by living beings, is at times seen to yield no fruit. But, this argument is not justifiable since such an act is commenced with the hope that it will be fruitful. Moreover, the failure which occurs sometimes

is due to something wanting in materials—a defect arising from want of real knowledge.

We may add that we are glad to admit that the act as that of charity, if done without the serenity of mind, is fruitless; for, it is an *iṣṭāpatti* (a desirable acquisition) to us.

Some one may here argue as under :—

The act, like tilling the ground, is seen to yield a visible fruit, *viz.*, acquisition of crop. So, the act like charity must yield a visible fruit like the serenity of mind. Such being the case, why should we think of a fruit like *Karman* which is invisible ? Hence this *hetu* is *viruddha* (inconsistent); for, it establishes just the contrary to what is desired.

This argument may be refuted as below :—

Even the serenity of mind is certainly a *kriyā*. So, just as acts like charity yield a fruit, so this serenity of mind, too, must yield a fruit. And that fruit is *Karman* and nothing else. So, there is no *vyabhicāra* (irrelevancy).

It may be here noted that, that *Karman* whence living beings experience happiness and misery which are its *pariṇati* (consequences) is certainly the fruit of the act, *viz.*, serenity of mind.

It may be argued that in the preceding verse (v. 1615) while saying that " *dānādi kriyāphalam Karma* " only the act like charity was mentioned as the cause of *Karman* and here the act like serenity of mind is stated as the cause of *Karman*. So, are not these statements contradictory ? Yes, they are. But, it should be borne in mind that since the act like the serenity of mind is the intermediate cause of *Karman* and that the act like charity is the cause of the act like the serenity of mind, there arises no flaw, because, here, we have an *upacāra* (compliment) of *Kāraṇa* in *Kāraṇa-*

kāraṇa, that is to say, the cause of the cause is here taken to be cause.

होज्ज मणोवित्तीए दाणाइकिए व जइ फलं बुद्धी ।
तं न निमित्तताओ पिंडो व्व घडस्स विन्नेओ ॥ ६९ ॥ (१६१७)

Hojja maṇovittîe dāṇāikie va jai phalam buddhî ।
Tam na nimittatāo piṇdo vva ghadassa vinneo ॥ 69 (1617).

[**भवेद् मनोवृत्तेर्दानादिक्रियैव यदि फलं बुद्धिः ।**
तद् न निमित्तत्वात् पिण्ड इव घटस्य विज्ञेयः ॥ ६९ ॥ (१६१७)

Bhaved manovriter-dānādikriyaiva yadi phalam buddhiḥ ।
Tad na nimittatvāt piṇda iva ghaṭasya vijñeyaḥ ॥ 69 (1617)]

Trans.—69 If you think that only the acts like charity, etc., are the fruits of the mental inclination, it is not (so) owing to there being a *nimitta* (instrumental cause). For instance, a lump (of clay) should be realized as (a *nimitta*) of a pitcher. (1617)

टीका–अत्र परस्य यद्येवंभूता बुद्धिः स्यात् । कथंभूता ? इत्याह–ननु मनोवृत्तेर्मनःप्रसत्त्यादिक्रियाया दृष्टरूपा दानादिक्रियैव फलम्, न त्वदृष्टं कर्मेति भावः । अयमभिप्रायः–दानादिक्रियातो मनःप्रसादादयो जायन्ते, तेभ्यश्च प्रवर्धमानदित्सादिपरिणामः पुनरपि दानादिक्रियां करोति, एवं पुनः पुनरपि दानक्रियाप्रवृत्तेः सैव मनः प्रसादादेः फलमस्तु, न तु कर्मेति भावः, दृष्टफलमात्रेणैव चरितार्थत्वात् किमदृष्टफलकल्पनेन ? इति हृदयम् । तदेतद् न । कुतः ? निमित्तत्वाद्–मनःप्रसादादिक्रियां प्रति दानादिक्रियाया निमित्त-कारणत्वादित्यर्थः, यथा मृत्पिण्डो घटस्य निमित्तं विज्ञेयस्तथा दानादि-क्रियापि मनः प्रसत्तेः । दृश्यन्ते हि पात्रदानादिभ्यश्चित्ताह्लादादयो जायमानाः । न च यद् यस्य निमित्तं तत् तस्यैव फलं वक्तुमुचितम्, दुरविरुद्धत्वादिति ॥ ६९ ॥ (१६१७ ॥

D. C.—Serenity of mind arises from the act of charity and this serenity gives an impetus to give donations and in virtue of this inclination, one goes in for charity.

Thus, the fruit of the serenity of mind is nothing else but the act of charity and not a *Karman*, which is invisible.

But such a belief is untenable; for, just as a lump of clay is the *nimitta* (instrumental cause) of a pitcher, so, the act of charity is the *nimitta* of the serenity of mind.

We see that one gets pleased when a donation is given to a deserving individual.

Such being the case, it won't do to look upon that which is a *nimitta* of something, as its fruit, as it is highly objectionable.

Besides, asserting that all actions are attended by fruits which are seen, as is the case with the tilling of ground, the debator says :—

एवं पि दिट्ठफलया किरिया न कम्मफला पसत्ता ते ।
सा तम्मेत्तफल च्चिय जह मंसफलो पसुविणासो ॥७०॥(१६१८)

Evam pi diṭṭhaphalayā kiriyā, na kammaphalā pasattā te ।
Sā tammettaphala cciya jaha mansaphalo pasuviṇāso ॥ 70 (1618)

[एवमपि दृष्टफला क्रिया न कर्मफला प्रसक्ता ते ।
सा तन्मात्रफलैव यथा मांसफलः पशुविनाशः ॥ ७० ॥ (१६१८)

Evamapi driṣṭaphalā kriyā na karmaphalā prasaktā te ।
Sā tanmātraphalaiva yathā mānsaphalaḥ paśuvināśaḥ ॥ 70 (1618)]

Trans.—70 In this way, too, an act is proved to have a fruit which is seen, and not a *Karman* by way of its fruit. That (act) certainly has a fruit only to that extent, as is the case with (the act of) killing of a beast–the killing which has flesh as its fruit. (1618)

टीका–नन्वेमपि युष्मदुपन्यस्तकृष्यादिक्रियानिदर्शनेनापीत्यर्थः, सर्वा दानादिकापि क्रिया दृष्टफलदैव प्रसक्ता न कर्मफला। इदमुक्तं भवति–यथा कृष्यादिक्रिया दृष्टफलमात्रेणैवावसितप्रयोजना भवति, तथा दानादिक्रियाया अपि श्लाघादिकं किञ्चिद् दृष्टफलमस्तु, किमदृष्टफलकल्पनेन ? किं बहुना ? सा क्रिया सर्वापि तन्मात्रफलैव युज्यते, नादृष्टफला, यथा दृष्टमांसमात्रफला पशुविनाशक्रिया; न हि पशुविनाशनक्रियामदृष्टाधर्मफलार्थं, कोऽप्यारभते, किन्तु मांसभक्षणार्थम्; अतस्तन्मात्रफलैव सा, तावतैवावसितप्रयोजनत्वात्। एवं दानादिक्रियाया अपि दृष्टमात्रमेव श्लाघादिकं किञ्चित् फलम्, नान्यदिति ॥ ७० ॥ (१६१८)

D. C.—Just as the act of tilling the ground has no other fruit than what is seen, so, the act of charity may have a fruit like some sort of praise which can be seen.

What more ? All these acts are such as only visible fruits, and not any invisible one, as is seen in the act of killing a beast. For, the act of killing a beast has no other purpose underlying it except the acquisition of flesh. None kills a beast for some other motive, such as committing a sin which is invisible.

Similarly, the fruit of the act of charity, must be nothing else but some sort of praise which is seen.

Here, another argument is advanced as follows :—

पायं व जीवलोगो वट्टइ दिट्ठफलासु किरियासु।
अदिट्ठफलासु पुण वट्टइ नासंखभागो वि ॥ ७१ ॥ (१६१९)

Pāyam va jīvalogo vattai ditthaphalāsu kiriyāsu।
Aditthaphalāsu puṇa vattai nāsaṁkhabhāgo vi ॥ 71 (1619)

[प्रायो वा जीवलोको वर्तते दृष्टफलासु क्रियासु।
अदृष्टफलासु पुनर्वर्तते नासंख्यभागोऽपि ॥ ७१ ॥ (१६१९)

Prāyo vā jīvaloko vartate dṛiṣṭaphalāsu kriyāsu ।
Adṛiṣṭaphalāsu punar-vartate nāsaṁkhyabhāgo'pi ॥ 71 (1619)]

Trans.—71 Moreover, the people indulge mostly in such acts of which the fruits are seen; and not even an infinitesimal part of them, in acts of which the fruits are not visible. (1619)

टीका—लोकोऽपि च प्रायेण दृष्टमात्रफलास्वेव कृषि-वाणिज्यादि क्रियासु प्रवर्तते, अदृष्टफलासु पुनर्दानादिक्रियासु तदसंख्येयभागोऽपि न वर्तते—कतिपयमात्र एव लोकस्तासु प्रवर्तते, न बहुरित्यर्थः। ततश्च हिंसादीनामशुभक्रियाणामदृष्टफलाभावाच्छुभक्रियाणामपि दानादीनामदृष्ट-फलाभावो भविष्यति। इति पराभिप्राय इति ॥ ७१ (१६१९) ॥

D. C.—People mostly do such acts as agriculture, business, etc., of which the fruits are certainly seen. And only a very negligible number of them, indulges in acts like charity of which the fruits are not seen.

Consequently, just as evil acts such as killing have not got such fruits as are not seen, so must be the case with good acts like charity. That is to say, they too, cannot have such fruits as are not seen.

This is what may be advanced as an argument by *Agnibhūti*.

Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvîra refutes it as under :—

सोम्म ! जउ च्चिय जीवा पायं दिट्ठप्फलासु वट्टंति ।
अदिट्ठफलाओ वि य ताओ पडिवज्ज तेणेव ॥ ७२ ॥ १६२० ॥

Somma ! jau cciya jîvā pāyam diṭṭhaphalāsu vattanti ।
Adiṭṭha phalāö vi ya tāö padivajja teṇeva ॥ 72 ॥ (1620)

[सौम्य ! यत एव जीवाः प्रायो दृष्टफलासु वर्तन्ते ।
अदृष्टफला अपि च ताः प्रतिपद्यस्व तेनैव ॥ ७२ ॥ (१६२०)

Saumya ! Yata eva jîvāḥ prāyo dṛiṣṭaphalāsu vartante ।
Adṛiṣṭaphalā api ca tāḥ pratipadyasva tenaiva ॥ 72 ॥ (1620)]

Trans.—72 O gentle one! By the very fact that the souls are active mostly in (doing) deeds, the fruits of which are visible (in this very life) learn (from me) that by that very (reason) those are also (deeds) the fruits of which are invisible, *i. e.,* to be had in a subsequent birth. (1620)

टीका–सौम्य ! इत्यग्निभूतेरामन्त्रणम्, यत एव प्राणिनः प्रायेण कृषि-वाणिज्य-हिंसादिकास्वेव दृष्टफलास्वशुभक्रियासु प्रवर्तन्ते, अदृष्टफलासु पुनर्दानादिकासु शुभक्रियासु स्वल्पा एव प्रवर्तन्ते, तेनैव तस्मादेव कारणात् ता अपि कृषि–हिंसादिका दृष्टफलाः क्रिया अदृष्टफला अपि प्रतिपद्यस्वाभ्युपगच्छ। इदमुक्तं भवति–यद्यपि कृषि–हिंसादिक्रियाकर्तारो दृष्टफलमात्रार्थमेव ताः समारभन्ते नाधर्मार्थम्, तथापि तेऽधर्मलक्षणं पापरूपमदृष्टफलमश्नुवत एव, अनन्तसंसारिजीवान्यथानुपपत्तेः। ते हि कृषि–हिंसादिक्रियानिमित्तमनभिलषितमप्यदृष्टं पापलक्षणं फलं बद्ध्वाऽनन्तं संसारं परिभ्रमन्तोऽनन्ता इह तिष्ठन्ति, दानादिक्रियानुष्ठातारस्तु स्वल्पा अदृष्टं धर्मरूपं फलमासाद्य क्रमेण मुच्यन्त इति।

ननु दानादिक्रियानुष्ठातृभिर्यददृष्टं धर्मलक्षणं फलमाशंसितं तत् तेषां भवतु, यैस्तु कृषि–हिंसादिक्रियाकर्तृभिरदृष्टमधर्मरूपं फलं नाशंसितं तत् तेषां कथं भवति ? इति चेत्। तदयुक्तम्, न ह्यविकलं कारणं स्वकार्यं जनयत् कस्याप्याशंसामपेक्षते, किन्त्वविकल कारणतया स्वकार्यं जनयत्येव। वप्तुरज्ञातमपि हि कोद्रवादिबीजं क्वचिद् भूप्रदेशे पतितं जलादिसामग्रीसद्भावेऽविकलकारणतां प्राप्तं वप्त्राशंसाभावेऽपि स्वकार्यं जनयत्येव अविकलकारणभूताश्च कृषि–हिंसादयोऽधर्मजनने। अतस्तत्कर्तृगताशंसा तत्र क्वोपयुज्यते ?। न च दानादिक्रियायामपि विवेकिनः फलाशंसां कुर्वते, तथाप्यविकलकारणतया विशिष्टतरमेव ता धर्मफलं जनयन्ति। तस्मात् शुभाया अशुभायाश्च सर्वस्या अपि क्रियाया अदृष्टं शुभाऽशुभं फलमस्त्येवेति प्रतिपत्तव्यम्, अनन्तसंसारजीवसत्तान्यथानुपपत्तेरिति स्थितम् ॥ ७२ (१६२०) ॥

D. C.—O gentle one! Thus *Agnibhūti* is addressed. By the very fact that creatures generally become active in (doing)

evil deeds only, *viz.*, cultivation of land, trading, doing injury to life, etc., the fruits of which are visible; but only a few become active in (doing) good deeds, giving a gift, etc., the fruits of which are invisible—by that same fact, *i. e.*, by that very reason, admit that also those very activities—cultivation of land, injury to living beings, etc., are also activities, the fruits of which are invisible. The substance of what is said is this:—Though the people who do the deeds, cultivation of land, injury to living beings, etc., only for the sake of the reward which is visible (*i. e.*, attained in this very birth) and not for the sin (involved in their performance), yet they do get an invisible fruit of the nature of religious demerit (*adharma*), *viz.*,—the sin (*pāpa*)–because, if it were otherwise, there will be no explanation *(upapatti)* of there being in this world innumerable transmigrating souls. Because, they having earned (*baddhvā*, lit.-having bound) an invisible fruit of the nature of sin (*pāpa*) though not sought by them, accrues to them, due to the activities, *viz.*, cultivation of land, injury to life, etc., exist in this world in an indefinite number (*anantāh tiṣṭhanti*) revolving in the endless cycle of births (*saṁsāra*). But those persons, few in number, who perform the deeds of giving a gift *(dāna)*, etc., attain an invisible reward of the nature of religious merit (*dharma*) and then they are liberated. Such is the sense.

An opponent may argue: Let those (persons) who do the deeds of giving a gift (*dāna*), etc., have that invisible reward of the nature of religious merit (*dharma*) which they expect. But how do those people who do the deeds of cultivation of land, injury to living beings, etc., get that invisible fruit of the nature of sin (*adharma*) which they never wish to get ?

To this doubt the reply is as follows:—That (argument) is improper. For, a cause complete in itself (*avikala*) does not stand in need of a wish or expectation on the part of

anybody (including even the doer of a deed) when it is (in the process of) producing its effect, it rather, never fails to produce *(janayanti eva)* its effect because it is a self-complete cause. For, even though not known to the sower, the seed of *codrava*, etc., fallen in some tract of land and reaching the state of a self-complete cause by the presence of the materials, *viz*, the water, etc., does produce its effect even in the absence of a desire (for that effect) on the part of the sower. And deeds like cultivation of land, injury to living beings, etc., are of the nature *(bhūta)* of self-complete causes in so for as the production of sin (*a-dharma*) is concerned. Hence in such causes, where does the desire (if) present in the performer of those deeds become useful ? On the other hand (meaning of *ca*) the wise (*i. e.*, those who do their duties disinterestedly—*vivekinaḥ*) have no desire for the fruits even in doing such deeds as giving a gift, etc., instead of this, such deeds being of the nature of " self-complete causes " produce the fruit in the form of religious merit (*dharma*) which is only of a superior quality.

Therefore, it must be admitted that there is always an invisible fruit good or bad of any action whatsoever, whether it be good or bad, because otherwise there will be no propriety (*anupapatti*) of the existence of innumerable transmigrating souls.

To demonstrate the same the author says :—

इहरा अदिट्ठरहिया सव्वे मुच्चेज्ज ते अपयत्तेणं ।
अदिट्ठारंभो चेव केसबहुलो भविज्जाहि ॥ ७३ ॥ (१६२१)

Iharā aditṭharahiyā savve muccejja te apayatteṇam ।
Aditṭhārambho ceva kesabahulo bhavijjāhi ॥ 73 ॥ (1621)

[इतरथाऽदृष्टरहिताः सर्वे मुच्येरंस्तेऽप्रयत्नेन ।
अदृष्टारम्भ एव क्लेशबहुलो भवेत् ॥ ७३ ॥ (१६२१)

Itarathā'dṛṣṭarahitāḥ sarve mucyeranste'prayatnena ।
Adṛṣṭārambha eva kleśabahulo bhavet ॥ 73 (1621)]

Trans.—73 Otherwise, they being without an unseen (fruit of their actions viz. cultivation, etc.) will be all of them freed (from transmigration) without any effort (to be free) on their part. And the performance *(ārambha)* of (the good deeds like a gift to a worthy recepient *dāna*, etc., which give the) unseen (good rewards) will be itself *(eva)* the cause of much trouble (lit. that in which there is much trouble). (1621)

टीका—इतरथा यदि कृषि-हिंसाद्यशुभक्रियाणामदृष्टं फलं नाभ्युपगम्येत, तदा ते तत्कर्तारोऽदृष्टफलाभावाद् मरणानन्तरमेव सर्वेऽप्ययत्नेन मुच्येरन्–संसारकारणाभावाद् मुक्तिं गच्छेयुः, ततश्च प्रायः शून्य एव संसारः स्यादित्यर्थः । यश्चादृष्टारम्भोऽदृष्टफलानां दानादिक्रियाणां समारम्भः स एव क्लेशबहुलः संसारपरिभ्रमणकारणतया दुरन्तः स्यात् ; तथाहि–ते दानादिक्रियानुष्ठातारस्तदनुष्ठानेनादृष्टफलानुबन्धं विदध्युः, ततो जन्मान्तरे तद्विपाकमनुभवन्तस्तत्प्रेरिताः पुनरपि दानादिक्रियास्वेव प्रवर्तेरन् , ततो भूयस्तत्फलसंचयात् तद्विपाकानुभूतिः, पुनरपि दानादिक्रियारम्भः, इत्येवमनन्तसंततिमयः संसारस्तेषां भवेत् ।

तत्रैतत् स्यात्, इत्थमप्यस्तु, कात्र किलास्माकं बाधा ? । अत्रोच्यते–इयमत्र गरीयसी भवतां बाधा, यत् कृषि-हिंसाद्यशुभक्रियानुष्ठातॄणामदृष्टसंचयाभावे सर्वेषां मुक्तिगमन एकोऽपि तत्क्रियानुष्ठाता संसारे क्वापि नोपलभ्येत, अशुभ तत्फलविपाकानुभविता चैकोऽपि न दृश्येत, दानादिशुभक्रियानुष्ठातारः शुभ तत्फलविपाकानुभवितारं एव च केवलाः सर्वत्रोपलभ्येरन् , न चैवं दृश्यते ॥ ७३ (१६२१) ॥

D. C.—Otherwise—If no unseen (evil) reward of evil deeds like cultivation of land, injury to living beings etc., be assumed (to accrue to the agent along with their visible reward in the shape of corn) ' They '—those who do those unseen evil deeds. They would be, all of them, freed without

any effort of their own immediately after death, there being no invisible evil fruit (of their evil deeds like cultivation of land), *i. e.*, they will attain Liberation, because there would be no reason for their transmigration. And, then, the author means, the world of transmigration would be mostly empty.

[Now, the latter half of the verse] *Adṛstārambha* the performance of meritorious deeds like '*dāna*' 'a gift to a worthy recepient, etc., the fruits of which are invisible (or the unseen principle). This performance itself would be *kleśabahulaḥ i. e.*, its result will be bad as it will be the cause of wandering in the mundane world. To explain the same— Those who perform the deeds of '*dāna*' 'a gift to a worthy recepient' etc., would by performing them, aim at (*anubandham vidadhyuḥ*) the invisible fruit; then, in a succeeding birth while experiencing the maturity of that fruit (*i. e.*, the object of enjoyment resulting from it) they being propelled by it would be once again active in doing the same deeds of *dāna*, etc., then again by earning their fruit, the experience of its maturity (will result) and once again, the performance of the deeds of *dāna* etc. In this way, they will have transmigratory existence consisting of an endless series.

* (1) Here we beg to differ from the commentator, who seems to us, to have missed the force of *kleśa* in the original verse. The author seems to mean that if we do not assume the evil unseen fruit of the evil deeds of *kṛṣi* etc., then we have one out of two possibilities viz., all souls will be liberated immediately after their death, and (2) if we do not assume the conclusion, then, we shall have to take performance of the good deeds of *dāna* etc., as partly giving their good rewards and also partly but unfailingly giving the bad rewards leading to misery in a succeeding birth in this world. In this latter case, the performance of good deeds alone (*eva* in the verse) will be cause of much misery (*kleśa*). We have to explain the great deal of misery in this world. We take it as an

invisible result of either bad deeds like *kṛṣi* or of good deeds like *dāna* alone. If we do not make either of these two assumptions, then, we should have no misery in the world and every soul should be freed from the world immediately on departure from this world. Thus, the latter half of the verse is meant to lead to the contingency of assuming the good deeds *alone* as the cause of the misery of the soul, and thus the cause of the *saṁsāra* of the soul. The commentator, however, does not seem to us to emphasise the contigency of this assumption, that he takes the good deeds as cause of the worldly existence which may be in the form of repeated enjoyment in a series of successive births of only the good rewards of good deeds, there being no bad rewards of good deeds—*The Translator's Note.*

To the above view of the *Siddhāntin*, an opponent may raise an objection as follows:—Let the case may be as you suggest, *i. e.*, let the good deeds alone be assumed to give an unending series of births and deaths. What inconsistency *(bādhā)* will there be in our system (if the good deeds alone be the cause of transmigration).

To this objection, we reply—the following will be the greatest inconsistency for you:—All souls will attain Liberation there being no collection of (bad) invisible fruit by those who perform the bad deeds viz., cultivation of the land, injury to living beings, etc., and in that case, not a single person performing those (bad) deeds (of cultivation of land etc.) will be found anywhere in the world, and not a single person experiencing the maturity of their rewards which are evil will be seen anywhere; and only persons who perform the good deeds of *dāna* etc., and experience the maturity of their rewards which are good, will be found everywhere. And such is not the world which we see.

(†) In our opinion, this objection and its reply show the weakness of the commentary. The opponent, will receive

the reply as a welcome conclusion (*iṣṭāpatti*) and say that even though we do not at present find the world as occupied only by those who do the good deeds and get the good rewards, let it be so in future according to our assumption, since the assumption leads to a welcome result. Even though no body would get Liberation, the world in any case would be better than it is now. " *Na caivam dṛśyate* " is, in any case not justified by any word in the original verse.—The Translator's Note.

An opponent may ask " What, therefore." So, the author replies :—

जमणिट्ठभोगभाजो बहुतरगा जं च नेह मइपुव्वं ।
अदिट्ठाणिट्ठफलं कोइ वि किरियं समारभइ ॥ ७४ ॥ (१६२२)
तेण पडिवज्ज किरिया अदिट्ठेगंतियप्फला सव्वा ।
दिट्ठाणेगंतफला सावि अदिट्ठाणुभावेण ॥ ७५ ॥ (१६२३)

Jamaṇiṭṭhabhogabhājo bahutaragā jam ca neha maipuvvaṁ ।
Adiṭṭhāṇiṭṭhaphalam koi vi kiriyam samārabhai ॥ 74 (1622)
Teṇa padivajja kiriyā adiṭṭhegantiyapphalā savvā ।
Diṭṭhāṇegantaphalā sāvi adiṭṭhāṇubhāveṇa ॥ 75 (1623)

[यदनिष्टभोगभाजो बहुतरका यच्च नेह मतिपूर्वाम् ।
अदृष्टानिष्टफलां कश्चिदपि क्रियां समारभते ॥ ७४ ॥ (१६२२)

तेन प्रतिपद्यस्व क्रियाऽदृष्टैकान्तिकफला सर्वा ।
दृष्टानैकान्तिकफला साप्यदृष्टानुभावेन ॥ ७५ ॥ (१६२३) ·

Yadaniṣṭabhogabhājo bahutarakā yacca neha matipūrvām ।
Adṛṣṭāniṣṭaphalām kaścidapi kriyām samārabhate ॥ 74 (1622)
Tena pratipadyasva kriyā'dṛṣṭaikāntikaphalā sarvā ।
Dṛṣṭānaikāntikaphalā sāpyadṛṣṭānubhāvena ॥ 75 (1623)]

Trans.—74–75 Since a great majority of souls experience undesired objects, and since none whatsoever is this world,

intentionally performs a deed giving an invisible and undesired reward, therefore, do conclude that all actions (good and bad) invariably give an unseen fruit and that action (which produces a *dṛṣṭa* fruit) does not invariably produce a visible fruit because of the power of the *adṛṣṭa* (the evil)unseen of the doer.†

टीका—यस्मादनिष्टभोगभाजो बहुतरा भूयांसः—अशुभकर्मविपाकजनितदुःखभाज एव प्राणिनः प्रचुरा इहोपलभ्यन्ते, शुभकर्मविपाकनिबन्धनसुखानुभवितारस्तु स्वल्पा एवेति भावः। तेन तस्मात् कारणात् सौम्य ! प्रतिपद्यस्व शुभाऽशुभा वा सर्वाऽपि क्रिया, अदृष्टं शुभाशुभं कर्मरुपमैकान्तिकं फलं यस्याः साऽदृष्टैकान्तिकफलेत्युत्तरगाथायां संबन्धः। इदमुक्तं भवति—येन दुःखिनोऽत्र बहवः प्राणिनो दृश्यन्ते सुखिनस्तु स्वल्पाः, तेन ज्ञायते—कृषिवाणिज्य—हिंसादिक्रियानिबन्धनाशुभकर्मरूपादृष्टफलविपाको दुःखिनाम्, इतरेषां तु दानादिक्रियाहेतुकशुभकर्मरूपादृष्टफलविपाक इति। व्यत्ययः कस्माद् न भवति इति चेत्। उच्यते—अशुभक्रियारम्भिणामेव बहुत्वात्, शुभक्रियानुष्ठातृणामेव च स्वलपत्वादिति।

अत्राह—नन्वशुभक्रियारम्भफलामपि यद्यदृष्टफलं भवति, तत् किमिति दानादिक्रियारम्भक इव तदारम्भकोऽपि कश्चित् तदाशंसां कुर्वाणो न दृश्यते ? इत्याह—"जं च नेहेत्यादि" यस्माच्च नेहाऽदृष्टमनिष्टमशुभं फलं यस्याः साऽदृष्टानिष्टफला तामित्थंभूतां क्रियां मतिपूर्वामाशंसाबुद्धिपूर्विकां कोऽपि समारभते, इत्यतो न कोऽपि तदाशंसां कुर्वाणो दृश्यते। तस्मात् सर्वापि क्रियाऽदृष्टैकान्तिकफलेति प्रतिपद्यस्वेति।

पुनरपि कथंभूताः ? इत्याह—" दिट्ठाणेगंतफल त्ति " दृष्टं धान्यद्रविणलाभादिकमनैकान्तिकमनवश्यंभावि फलं यस्याः कृषिवाणिज्यादिक्रियायाः सा दृष्टानैकान्तिकफला सर्वापि क्रिया। इदमुक्तं भवति—सर्वस्या अपि क्रियाया अदृष्टं फलं तावदेकान्तेनैव भवति, यत्तु दृष्टफलं तदनैकान्तिकमेव—कस्याश्चित् तद् भवति कस्याश्चिद् नेत्यर्थः। एतश्च दृष्टफलस्यानैकान्तिकत्वमदृष्टानुभावेनैवेति प्रतिपत्तव्यम्। न हि समानसाधनारब्धतुल्यक्रि-

† *Vide* our note at the end of the commentary on verse 1621.

याणां द्वयोर्बहूनां चैकस्य दृष्टफलविघातः, अन्यस्य तु न, इत्येतददृष्टहेतुमन्तरेणोपपद्यत इति भावः। एतच्चैवं प्रागुक्तमेवेति ॥७४-७५ (१६२२-१६२३)॥

D. C.—" Since.....objects " means " because in this world innumerable beings are found to be only unhappy due *(janita)* to the maturity of evil actions; " it also means " Only few are those who enjoy happiness which depends upon *(nibandhana)* the maturity of good actions. " *Tena*-because of that reason, O gentle student ! know that (*i. e.* conclude that) each and every action good or bad, is *adṛṣṭaikāntika phala i. e.*, such as gives a reward which is invariably of the form of a (new) action which is unseen and both good and bad. Thus, " *aniṣṭabhogabhājo bahutarakāḥ* " is to be connected with " *tena.....sarva* " the first half of the succeeding verse (v/1623). The sense of the sentence is as follows:—Because in this world we find a great majority of beings to be suffering and only a few to be enjoying, we should infer that in the case of the suffering, the fruit of the unseen principle (*adṛṣṭa*) in the form of " evil *karma* "† based upon *(nibandhana)* activities like cultivation of land, trade, injury to living beings etc., has ripened, but in the case of the rest (the enjoying) the fruit of the unseen principle *(adṛṣṭa)* in the form of good *karma* produced by (*hetuka*) the activities of giving a gift to a worthy recipient has ripened. An opponent may ask " Why not the reverse of what you say ? The reply is as follows:-Just because in the world only those who do evil activities are in a majority and only those who perform good deeds are in a minority.

Here the opponent argues:—If even those who do evil deeds get a fruit in the form of an *adṛṣṭa* (in addition to the *dṛṣṭa* or visible fruit *e. g.*, the crops by means of cultivation of the land), then why is it that, just like one who does

† The word " *karma* " is here used in the sense of *saṁcita karma* which is also called *adṛṣṭa*—Tr.

the deed of *dāna*, that man also who does the evil deed is never found to hold an expectation for that *adṛṣṭa* ?

To this the reply is:—' And since etc. ' And because none in this world does intentionally *i. e.*, with a previous expectation (*āśaṁśa buddhi pūrvikām*) such deed as would give a fruit unseen and evil. It is due to this reason that no body is found to hold an expectation for the evil unseen (*adṛṣṭa*) [while he does the deeds of *kṛṣi* etc]. Therefore, conclude that all actions (good like *dāna* and bad like *kṛṣi*) whatever invariably give a result which is *adṛṣṭa* (unseen).

What other qualifications do actions possess ? To this the reply is:—" *diṭṭhāṇeganta phala tti* " (beginning of the latter half of v. 1623). All actions—cultivation of land, trade, etc., bear a visible fruit *viz.*, the acquision of corn, money etc., which is not absolute *i. e.*, which is not invariably accruing (*anavaśyam bhāvi*). It means that every action *invariably* produces an invisible fruit; but the visible fruit which is to be produced is not absolute or invariably happening *i. e.*, some action produces it and some action does not produce it. And this uncertainty of the visible fruit must be accepted as the effect of the power of an *adṛṣṭa* (a destiny of the man who does the deed of *kṛṣi* etc.,) because when one out of two or many persons who do the same action (*e. g.*, cultivation of land) with the same means, suffers the loss of his visible fruit (crops) while another does not, it never happens without a cause in the form of *adṛṣṭa*, the evil unseen. Moreover, this has been already explained in this very book.†

[The commentator is anxious to explain ' *savva kiriyā* ' as all actions good (like *dāna*) and bad (like *kṛṣi*); but it is very difficult to explain how the good actions (like *dāna*)

† When the crops of a cultivator fails, the failure is due to his *adṛṣṭa* and not to his action of cultivation which is a *dṛṣṭa* or visible deed.

can bear a visible fruit *(diṭṭhāṇeganta phala)*; so even the commentator has somehow to explain it as referring only to the bad actions like *kṛṣi* etc.

We hold that by *savva kiriyā* we should take *only the bad actions* like cultivation of land, trade, etc. The purpose of the verse is to explain how all bad actions bear invariably a bad fruit which is invisible *(adiṭṭha)* and how even the visible fruits which these bad actions bear and which the agent intentionally aims at, are *uncertain* and therefore the result of the man's *adṛṣṭa*, the invisible *karma*. The visible action which a man does *e. g., kṛṣi* bears two kinds of fruits *invisible* and *visible*, both of which are dependent upon the man's *adṛṣṭa* (*adiṭṭhānubhāveṇa*). Since we find most people suffering and since we find that none does any bad action even *e. g. kṛṣi* with the intention that the result be bad and invisible *i. e.* that he may be unhappy in his next life as a result of *kṛṣi*, we must conclude that all bad actions like *kṛṣi* give invariably an *adṛṣṭa* invisible bad result.

Thus, in our opinion the proper conclusion (*paḍivajja*) from the whole of v. 1622 is the first half of v. 1623. The latter half of v. 1623 is only an additional remark. The commentator connects the first half of v. 1623 with first half of v. 1622 and the latter half of the former, with the latter half of the latter. As the latter half of v. 1622 refers only to *adṛṣṭa aniṣṭa*, it cannot be connected with the latter half of v. 1623 which refers only to the *dṛṣṭa* phala and traces it to *adṛṣṭa karmas*. Tr.]

Or, of what avail is this trouble? '*Karma*' is a foregone conclusion. By what argument? He replies :—

अहवा फलाउ कम्मं कज्जत्तणओ पसाहियं पुव्वं ।
परमाणवो घडस्स व किरियाण तयं फलं भिन्नं ॥७६॥ (१६२४)

Ahavā phalāu kammam kajjattaṇao pasāhiyam puvvam ।
Paramāṇavo ghaḍassa va kiriyāṇa tayam phalam bhinnam ॥76 (1624)

[अथवा फलात् कर्म कार्यत्वतः प्रसाधितं पूर्वम् ।
परमाणवो घटस्येव क्रियाणां तत् फलं भिन्नम् ॥ ७६ ॥ (१६२४)

Athavā phalāt karma kāryatvataḥ prasādhitam pūrvam ।
Paramāṇavo ghaṭasyeva kriyāṇām tat phalam bhinnam ॥ 76 (1624)]

Trans.—76 Or rather, '*karman*' is already proved from the fruit (*i. e.,* the special fruit) *i. e.,* from (the fact that, that special fruit is) an effect. Just as the atoms of a pot (are different from a pot) the effect of actions is different from those actions. (1624)

जो तुल्लसाहणाणं फले विसेसो न सो विणा हेउं ।
कज्जत्तणओ गोयम ! घडो व्व, हेऊ य सो कम्मं ॥

Jo tullasāhaṇāṇam phale viseso na so viṇā heūm ।
Kajjattaṇao Goyama ! ghaḍo vva, heū ya so kammam ॥ (verse 1613)

टीका-इत्यस्यां गाथायां प्रागस्माभिः कर्म प्रसाधितमेव । कुतः ? इत्याह-फलात् तुल्यसाधनानां यः फले विशेषस्तस्मादित्यर्थः । ततोऽपि फलविशेषात् कस्मात् प्रसाधितं कर्म ? इत्याह-कार्यत्वात् तस्य फलविशेषस्य, यच्च कार्यं तस्य कारणं भवत्येव, यथा घटस्य परमाणवः, यच्चेह कारणं तत् कर्म। "किरियाण तयं फलं भिन्नं ति" तदेव च कर्म सर्वासामपि क्रियाणाम-दृष्टं फलमित्येवमिहापि साध्यते । कथं भूतम् ? ताभ्यः क्रियाभ्यो भिन्नम्, कर्मणः कार्यत्वात्, क्रियाणां च कारणत्वात्, कार्यकारणयोश्च परस्परं भेदा-दिति भावः ॥ ७६ (१६२४) ॥

D. C.—Or, there is a difference as to the fruit achieved, though those who try to achieve it, use the same and equal means. That difference cannot take place without a cause. *O Gautama !* like the pot, that cause is "*karma*" on account of the fact that that (difference) is an effect.

While explaining this verse we have already proved

" *karma.*" Whence ? He replies—" From the fruit *i. e.*, from that difference in the fruit (achieved by different people with *equal* means)." How is ' *karma* ' proved on the strength of that difference of fruit ? He replies :—

" From its being an effect, " *i. e.*, because that difference of fruit is an effect. There is invariably a cause corresponding to what is an effect, just as atoms of earth are the cause of a pot, " and in this case the cause is an action. " The effect of actions is different from those actions " and it can be proved here that that very ' *karman* ' is the unseen fruit of all actions whatever. What kind of action is it ? It is different from those actions. Since this ' *karman* ' is an effect and since actions are the cause, and since an effect and a cause must be mutually different, the ' *karman* ' is different from those actions. 1624

The author states an objection to this and its reply :—

आह णणु मुत्तमेवं मुत्तं चिय कज्जमुत्तिमत्ताओ ।
इह जह मुत्तत्तणओ घडस्स परमाणवो मुत्ता ॥७७॥ (१६२५)

Āha naṇu muttamevam muttam ciya kajjamuttimattāo ।
Iha jaha muttattaṇao ghaḍassa parmāṇavo mūttā ॥ 77 (1625)

[आह ननु मूर्तमेवं मूर्तमेव कार्यमूर्तिमत्त्वात् ॥
इह यथा मूर्तत्वतो घटस्य परमाणवो मूर्ताः ॥ ७७ (१६२५) ॥

Āha nanu mūrtamevam mūrtameva kāryamurtimattvāt ।
Iha yathā mūrtatvato ghaṭasya parmāṇavo mūrtāḥ ॥ (1625)]

Trans.—77 (The opponent will say,) " Then the action *(karman)* has a physical form *(mūrta)*." We (the *Siddhāntin*) would reply, " The action has indeed a physical form because its effect (*viz.*, the body) has a physical form. In this world the atoms *(paramāṇus)* the cause of the pot, the effect which has a physical form, will have also a physical form." (1625)

टीका–आह प्रेरकः–ननु यदि कार्याणां शरीरादीनां दर्शनात् तत्का–

रणभूतं कर्म साध्यते, तर्हि कार्यस्य मूर्तत्वात् कर्मापि मूर्तं प्राप्नोति। आचार्य उत्तरमाह–" मुत्तं चियेत्यादि " यदस्माभिः प्रयत्नेन साधयितव्यम्, तद्भवतापि परसिद्धान्तानभिज्ञबालबुद्धितयाऽनिष्टापादनाभिप्रायेण साधितमेव, तथाहि–वयमपि ब्रूमः–मूर्तमेव कर्म, तत्कार्यस्य शरीरादेर्मूर्तत्वात्, इह यस्य यस्य कार्यं मूर्तं तस्य तस्य कारणमपि मूर्तम्, यथा घटस्य परमाणवः, यच्चामूर्तं कार्यं न तस्य कारणं मूर्तं, यथा ज्ञानस्यात्मेति। समवायिकारणं चेहाधिक्रियते, न निमित्तकारणभूता रूपाऽऽलोकादय इति। आह—ननु सुख–दुःखादयोऽपि कर्मणः कार्यम्, अतस्तेषाममूर्तत्वात् कर्मणोऽमूर्तत्वमपि प्राप्नोति। न हि मूर्तादमूर्तप्रसवो युज्यते। न चैकस्य मूर्तत्वममूर्तत्वं च युक्तम्, विरुद्धत्वात्। अत्रोच्यते–नन्वत एवात्र समवायिकारणमधिक्रियते, न निमित्तकारणम्, सुख–दुःखादीनां चात्मधर्मत्वादात्मैव समवायिकारणम्, कर्म पुनस्तेषामन्न–पानाऽहि–विषादिवद् निमित्तकारणमेवेत्यदोष इति॥ ७७ (१६२५)॥

D. C.—The opponent asks " If on the ground that we can see (physically) the body, etc., which are the effects, the *karman* is proved to be their cause, then, on the ground that the effect has a physical form, the *karman* also will have to be admitted as something having a physical form. "

The *Ācārya* replies :—" *Karman* has indeed a physical form... " What we intend to prove with great effort, you also have already proved with an intention to lead us to an unacceptable position, because your intelligence is like that of a child (or a fool) who does not know the doctrine of others. To explain the same—We also say " A *karman* is nothing but possessed of a physical form, because its effect, the body, etc., has a physical form. In this world, the causes of the various effects having a physical form are also possessed of a physical form *e. g.*, the atoms which are the cause of a pot. And if an effect is without a physical form, its cause is not possessed of a physical form *e. g.*, *Ātman* which is the cause of knowledge (*jñāna*). And in this discussion the essential cause (*samavāyi*

kāraṇa) is the topic of consideration and not the objects which are only the instrumental causes, such as the form (*rūpa*), the light (*āloka*) etc.

The opponent will argue—" The pleasure, the pain, etc., are also of the nature of effects (like the body, etc.). Hence, since they have no physical form, we would argue that the *karman* is also devoid of a physical form, because the rise of something devoid of a physical form is not possible (or reasonable) as taking place from something which has a physical form. Nor is it possible that one and the same thing be both *mūrta* (possessed of a physical form) and *a-mūrta* (devoid of a physical form) since that would be self-contradictory. "

To this objection we reply :—Indeed, for this very reason, the intimate or essential cause only is taken as the topic of our consideration and we have excluded the discussion of the instrumental cause. As the pleasure, the pain, etc., are the properties of the soul (*Ātman*), the soul alone is their essential cause, while *karman* is only the instrumental cause, while *karman* is only the instrumental cause of the pleasure, the pain, etc., just as are the food, the drink, the poison of a snake, etc. Thus there is no flaw in our doctrine. 1625

The *Ācārya* mentions also other arguments proving the physical nature (*mūrtatva*) of an action (*karman*):—

तह सुहसंवित्तीओ संबंधे वेयणुब्भवाओ य ।
बज्झबलाहाणाओ परिणामाओ य विण्णेयं ॥ ७८ ॥ (१६२६)
आहार इवानल इव घडु व्व नेहाइकयबलाहाणो ।
खीरमिवोदाहरणाइं कम्मरूवित्तगमगाइं ॥ ७९ ॥ (१६२७)

Taha suhasamvittîo sambandhe veyaṇubbhavāo ya ।
Bajjhabalāhāṇāo pariṇāmāo ya viṇṇeyam ॥ 71 (1626)
Āhāra ivānala iva ghaḍu vva nehāi kaya balāhāṇo ।
Khîramivodāharaṇāim kammarūvittagamagāim ॥ 79 (1627)

[तथा सुखसंवित्तेः संबन्धे वेदनोद्भवाच्च ।
बाह्यबलाधानात् परिणामाच्च विज्ञेयम् ॥ ७८ (१६२६) ॥
आहार इवानल इव घट इव स्नेहादिकृतबलाधानः ।
क्षीरमिवोदाहरणानि कर्मरूपित्वगमकानि ॥ ७९ (१६२७) ॥

Tathā sukhasamvitteḥ sambandhe vedanodbhavācca ।
Bāhyabalādhānāt pariṇāmācca vijñeyam ॥ 78 (1626)
Āhāra ivānala iva ghata iva snehādikṛtabalādhānaḥ ।
Kṣīramivodāharoṇāni karmarūpitvagamakāni ॥ 79 (1627)]

Trans.—78–79 Also the fact that the *karman* has a physical form should be admitted because in the association (with the *karman*) the consciousness of pleasure, etc., (becomes possible) and because of the rise of experience of heat (*vedanā*) when one is in association (with the *karman*)† because it is possible to add to the strength of the '*karman*' by external means and because of the fact that *karman* undergoes change.

The following four illustrations are conclusive for the fact that *karman* has a physical form (and are to be taken respectively with each of the four arguments stated in the above verse—(1) Like food, (2) like fire, (3) like the addition of strengh made by means of oil, etc, to a pot of earth, (and) (4) like the (change of) milk. (1626–1627)

टीका—इह प्रथमगाथोपन्यस्तहेतुचतुष्टयस्य द्वितीयगाथायां यथासंख्यं चत्वारो दृष्टान्ता द्रष्टव्याः । तत्र मूर्तं कर्म तत्संबन्धे सुखादिसंवित्तेः, इह यत्संबन्धे सुखादि संवेद्यते तद् मूर्तं दृष्टम्, यथाऽशनाद्याहारः, यच्चामूर्तं न तत्संबन्धे सुखादिसंविदस्ति, यथाऽऽकाशसंबन्धे, संवेद्यते च तत्संबन्धे सुखादि, तस्मात् मूर्तं कर्मेति । तथा, यत्संबन्धे वेदनोद्भवो भवति तद् मूर्तं दृष्टम्, यथाऽनलोग्निः, भवति च कर्मसंबन्धे वेदनोद्भवः तस्मात् तद् मूर्त-

† Thus '*Sambandhe*' is to be construed with both *suhasamvitti* and *veyaṇubbhavā*.

मिति । तथा, मूर्तं कर्म, आत्मनो ज्ञानादीनां च तद्धर्माणां व्यतिरिक्तत्वे सति बाह्येन स्रक्-चन्दना-ऽङ्गनादिना बलस्योपचयस्याधीयमानत्वात्, यथा स्नेहाद्याहितबलो घटः, इह यस्यानात्म-विज्ञानादेः सतो बाह्येन वस्तुना बलमाधीयते तद् मूर्तं दृष्टम्, यथा स्नेहादिनाऽऽधीयमानबलो घटः, आधीयते च बाह्यैर्मिथ्यात्वादिहेतुभूतैर्वस्तुभिः कर्मण उपचयलक्षणं बलम्, तस्मात् तद् मूर्तमिति । तथा, मूर्तं कर्म, आत्मादिव्यतिरिक्तत्वे सति परिणामित्वात्, क्षीरमिवेति । एवमादीनि हेतूदाहरणानि कर्मणो रूपित्व-गमकानीति ॥ ७८-७९ (१६२६-१६२७) ॥

D. C.—The four illustrations stated in the second verse should be respectively taken as those of the four arguments presented in the first verse *viz.*:—The *karman* has a physical form (*mūrtam*) because of the experience of pleasure etc. when one is united with that *karman:* in this world that in association with which the pleasure etc. are experienced is found to be something having a physical form, just as the food one eats etc; and there is no experience of pleasure etc. in association with that which is without a physical shape, just as in connection with the ether.

But in association with that *i. e.*, *karman* we do experience pleasure etc. therefore, the *karman* has a physical form. Similarly, that in association with which a burning sensation arises is found to be something having a physical form, just as in association with the fire, and the rise of a burning sensation, pain occurs when one is in association with the *karman*; therefore, it has a form. Here the author states an objection and its reply:—

अह मयमसिद्धमेयं परिणामाउ त्ति सो वि कज्जाओ ।
सिद्धो परिणामो से दहिपरिणामादिव पयस्स ॥ ८० ॥ (१६२८)

Aha mayamasiddhameyam pariṇāmāu tti so vi kajjāo ।
Siddho pariṇāmo se dahipariṇāmādiva payassa ॥ 80 (1628)

[अथ मतमसिद्धमेतत् परिणामादिति सोऽपि कार्यात् ।
सिद्धः परिणामस्तस्य दधिपरिणामादिव पयसः ॥ ८० ॥ (१६२८)

Atha matamasiddhametat pariṇāmāditi so'pi kāryāt ।
Siddhaḥ pariṇāmastasya dadhipariṇāmādiva payasaḥ ॥ 80 (1628]

Trans.—80 Again (the opponent will say) this (*i. e. Karmarūpatva*) could not be accomplished by (virtue of) the *hetu* that it undergoes change. (But) even that is due to *Kārya*. Just as the mutability of milk is established by the mutability of curds, its mutability could (also) be established (by that of *Kārya*). (1628)

टीका–अथ 'परिणामित्वात्' इत्यसिद्धोऽयं हेतुरिति मतं भवतः । एतदप्ययुक्तम्, यतः सोऽपि परिणामः सिद्धः कर्मणः, 'कज्जाउ त्ति' कर्मकार्यस्य शरीरादेः परिणामित्वदर्शनादित्यर्थः । इह यस्य कार्यं परिणाम्युपलभ्यते तस्यात्मनोऽपि परिणामित्वं निश्चीयते, यथा दध्नस्तक्रादिभावेन परिणामात् पयसोऽपि परिणामित्वं विज्ञायत एवेति ॥ ८० ॥ (१६२८)

D. C.—Again, you would believe that *Karman* is *asiddha* by reason of its *pariṇāma*. But that is not proper. The *pariṇāmitva* of *Karman* is apprehended from the *pariṇāmitva* of its *Kāryas* like *Sarîra* etc. For, when the effect is mutable, mutability of the action is automatically recognized, just as the mutability of milk is recognized from the *pariṇāma* of its *Kārya viz,* curds, in the form of butter-milk.

Agnibhūti asks :—

**अब्भादिविगाराणं जह वेचित्तं विणा वि कम्मेण ।
तह जइ संसारीणं हवेज्ज को नाम तो दोसो ? ॥८१॥ (१६२९)**

Abbhādivigārāṇam jaha vecittam viṇā vi kammeṇa ।
Taha jai saṁsārîṇam havejja ko nāma to doso ? ॥ 81 (1629)

[अभ्रादिविकाराणां यथा वैचित्र्यं विनापि कर्मणा ।
तथा यदि संसारिणां भवेत् को नाम ततो दोषः ? ॥ ८१ ॥ (१६२९)

Abhrādivikārāṇām yathā vaicitryam vināpi karmanā ।
Tathā yadi saṁsāriṇām bhavet ko nāma tato doṣaḥ ॥ 81 (1529)]

Trans.—81 Just as a variety of visible changes in the clouds etc. is apprehended even without (the help of) *Karman* in the same way, what harm is there if it is so in the case of *mundane* souls also ? (1629)

टीका–आह–ननु यथाऽभ्रादिविकाराणामन्तरेणापि कर्म वैचित्र्यं दृश्यते, तथा तेनेव प्रकारेण संसारिजीवस्कन्धानामपि सुख-दुःखादिभावेन वैचित्र्यं यदि कर्मविनापि स्यात्, ततः को नाम दोषो भवेत् ?—न कोऽपीत्यर्थः ॥ ८१ ॥ (१६२९)

D. C.—A variety of various visible changes in the clouds is apprehended even in the absence of *Karman*. In the same way, in the case of *mundane* souls also, there would be no harm if we believe that a variety of *vikāras* like *sukha*, *duḥkha* etc. exists without the help of *Karman*.

The *Ācārya* replies :—

कम्मम्मि व को भेओ जह बज्झक्खंधचित्तया सिद्धा ।
तह कम्मपोग्गलाण वि विचित्तया जीवसहियाणं ॥८२॥(१६३०)

Kammammi va ko bheo jaha bajjhakkhandhacittayā siddhā ।
Taha kammapoggalāṇa vi vicittayā jîvasahiyāṇam ॥ 82 (1630)

[कर्मणि वा को भेदो यथा बाह्यस्कन्धचित्रता सिद्धा ।
तथा कर्मपुद्गलानामपि विचित्रता जीवसहितानाम् ॥ ८२ ॥ (१६३०)

Karmaṇi vā ko bhedo yathā bāhyaskandhacitratā siddhā ।
Tathā karmapudgalānāmapi vicitratā jîvasahitānām ॥ 82 (1630)]

Trans.—82 (Then) what difference (would it make) even in the case of *Karman ?* Just as the variegation of external objects is proved, variegation of the *Karmapudgalas* could also be proved. (1630)

टीका–यद्यभ्रविकाराणां गन्धर्वनगरेन्द्रधनुरादीनां गृह–देवकुल–प्राकार–तरु–कृष्ण–नील–रक्तादिभावेन वैचित्र्यमिष्यते सौम्य! । वाशब्दस्यापि-शब्दार्थत्वात, तर्हि कर्मण्यपि को भेदः को विशेषः, येन तत्र वैचित्र्यं नाभ्युपगम्यते ? । ननु हन्त ! यथा सकललोकप्रत्यक्षाणाममीषां गन्धर्वपुर–शक्रकोदण्डादीनां बाह्यस्कन्धानां विचित्रता भवतोऽपि सिद्धा, तथा तेनैव प्रकारेणान्तराणामपि कर्मस्कन्धानां पुद्गलमयत्वे समानेऽपि जीवसहितत्वस्य विशेषवतो वैचित्र्यकारणसद्भावेऽपि सुख–दुःखादिजनकरूपतया विचित्रता किमिति नेष्यते ? । यदि ह्यभ्रादयो बाह्यपुद्गला नानारूपतया परिणमन्ति, तर्हि जीवैः परिगृहीताः सुतरां ते तथा परिणंस्यन्तीति भावः ॥ ८२ (१६३०)॥

D. C.—O Saumya ! If forms such as a house, a temple, a wall, black, green, red etc. are believed as the variety of visible changes like a *gandharva* city or a rain-bow in the sky, what harm is there if the same kind of variety is accepted in the case of *Karman* also ? Variegation of objects having external forms is admissible to you. Now, the internal *Karma-skandhas* consist of the same substance as the *bāhya skandhas*; and on the top of that, they are alive. Moreover, as they produce *sukha, duḥkha* etc. as their *vikāras* there is all the more reason to admit *vaicitrya* of the *Karma-pudgalas.* Thus when various transformations in the case of lifeless *bāhya pudgalas* are admitted, they are all the more acceptable in the case of *Karma-pudgalas* which are surrounded by the *cetana jîvas.*

बज्झाण चित्तया जइ पडिवन्ना कम्मणो विसेसेण ।
जीवाणुगयस्स मया भत्तीण व सिप्पिनत्थाणं ॥ ८३ ॥ (१६३१)

Bajjhāṇa cittayā jai padivannā kammaṇo viseseṇa ।
Jîvāṇugayassa mayā bhattîṇa va sippinatthāṇam ॥ 83 (1631)

[बाह्यानां चित्रता यदि प्रतिपन्ना कर्मणो विशेषेण ।
जीवानुगतस्य मता भक्तीनामिवि शिल्पिन्यस्तानाम् ॥ ८३ ॥ (१६३१)

Bāhyānām citratā yadi pratipannā karmaṇo viśeṣeṇa ।
Jîvānugatasya matā bhaktînāmiva śilpinyastānām ॥ 83 (1631)]

Trans.—83 If variety (in the case) of external (objects) is established, variety (in the case) of *Karman* which is surrounded by soul should (all the more) be accepted (as positive like the variety of forms laid down in a piece of art. (1631)

टीका–यदि हि जीवापरिगृहीतानामपि बाह्यानामभ्रादिपुद्गलानां नानाकारपरिणतिरूपा चित्रता त्वया प्रतिपन्ना, तर्हि जीवानुगतानां कर्मपुद्गलानां विशेषत एवास्माकं भवतश्च सा सम्मता भविष्यति, भक्तयो विच्छित्तयस्तासामिव चित्रादिषु शिल्पिन्यस्तानाम् । अयमभिप्रायः–चित्रकरादिशिल्पिजीवपरिगृहीतानां चित्र–लेप्य–काष्ठकर्मानुगतपुद्गलानां या परिणामचित्रता सा विस्रसापरिणतेन्द्रधनुरादिपुद्गलपरिणामचित्रतायाः सकाशाद् विशिष्टैवेति प्रत्यक्षतः एव दृश्यते । अतो जीवपरिगृहीतत्वेन कर्मपुद्गलानामपि सुखदुःखादिवैचित्र्यजननरूपा विशिष्टतरा परिणामचित्रता कथं न स्यात् ? इति ॥ ८३ (१६३१) ॥

D. C.—Now that you have accepted *citratā* in the form of manifold transformations in the case of *bāhya-pudgalas* like *abhra* etc. which are not surrounded by *jîva*, you shall have to accept the same in the case of *Karma-pudgalas* also as they have already been surrounded by *jîvas*.

Again, the *citratā* of forms drawn by an artist in painting, sculpturing, carpentry etc. is peculiarly distinct from the *citratā* of the manifold *vikāras* of *bāhya-pudgalas* like rain-bow etc., while in the case of *Karma-pudgalas* also, the *pariṇāmacitratā* is peculiarly distinct from the other two varieties, firstly because it gives rise to alterations like *sukha*, *duḥkha* etc. and secondly because it is aided by *jîva*.

Again, the opponent asks :—

तो जइ तणुमेत्तं चिय हवेज्ज का कम्मकप्पणा नाम ?।
कम्मं पि नणु तणु च्चिय सण्हयरब्भंतरा नवरं ॥८४॥ (१६३२)

To jai taṇumettam ciya havejja kā kammakappaṇā nāma ?।
Kammam pi naṇu taṇu cciya saṇhayarabbhantarā navaram ॥ (1632)

[ततो यदि तनुमात्रमेव भवेत् का कर्मकल्पना नाम ? ।
कर्मापि ननु तनुरेव सूक्ष्मतराभ्यन्तरा नवरम् ॥ ८४ ॥ (१६३२)

Tato yadi tanumātrameva bhavet kā karma-kalpanā nāma ? ।
Karmāpi nanu tanureva sūkśmatarābhyantarā navaram ॥ 84 (1632)]

Trans.—84 Now, if *Karman* is itself the body, why should *Karman* be assumed at all ? That is not proper. In fact *Karman* is also a body though subtle and interior to a great extent. (1632)

टीका–एवं मन्यते परः–यद्यभ्रादिविकाराणामिव कर्मपुद्गलानां विचित्रपरिणतिरभ्युपगम्यते । ततो बाह्यं सकलजनप्रत्यक्षं तनुमात्रमेवेदं सुरूपकुरूप–सुख–दुःखादिभावैः स्वभावत एवाभ्रादिविकारवद् विचित्ररूपतया परिणमति, इत्येतदेवास्तु, का नाम पुनस्तद्वैचित्र्यहेतुभूतस्यान्तर्गडुकल्पस्य कर्मणः परिकल्पना, स्वभावादेव सर्वस्यापि पुद्गलपरिणामवैचित्र्यस्य सिद्धत्वात् ? इति । भगवानाह–" कम्मं पीत्यादि " । अयमभिप्रायः–यद्यभ्रादिविकाराणामिव तनोर्वैचित्र्यमभ्युपगम्यते, तर्हि ननु कर्मापि तनुरेव, कार्मणशरीरमेवेत्यर्थः, केवलं श्लक्ष्णतरा, अतीन्द्रियत्वात्; अभ्यन्तरा च, जीवेन सहातिसंश्लिष्टत्वात् । ततश्च यथाऽभ्रादिविकारवद् बाह्यस्थूरतनोर्वैचित्र्यमभ्युपगम्यते, तथा कर्मतनोरपि तत्किं नाभ्युपगम्यते ? इति भावः ॥८४(१६३२)॥

D. C.—The opponent—Now that *Karma-pudgalas* have been accepted as having variegated transformations like various visible changes in clouds etc. this body also, which is *pratyakśa* to all, can undergo a number of alternations by virtue of its *svabhāva* in the form of *surūpa*, *kurūpa*, *sukha*, *duḥkha* etc. And hence, it is not at all necessary to assume an intervening agent like *Karman* for the production of *śarîra* etc. For, a variety of visible changes in the case of all *pudgalas* is accomplished by its very *svabhāva*.

The *Ācārya*—Because we take the *vaicitrya* of *tanu* as being similar to that of various *vikāras* in *abhra* etc. the *Karman* should also be taken as *tanu*. This *Kārmaṇa* body

is very subtle as it is beyond the cognizance of senses and it is of an interior nature because it is so closely connected with *jîva*. So, *vicitratā* in the case of a *Kārmaṇa śarîra* should be recognized just as variegation of an external gross object is apprehended as that of *vikāras* of the clouds etc.

Again, the author states an objection and its reply :—

को तीए विणा दोसो थूलाए सव्वहा विप्पमुक्कस्स ।
देहग्गहणाभावो तउ य संसारवोच्छित्ती ॥ ८५ ॥ (१६३३)

Ko tîe viṇā doso thūlāe savvahā vippamukkassa ।
Dehaggahaṇābhāvo täu ya saṁsāravocchittî ॥ 85 (1633)

[कस्तया विना दोषः स्थूलया सर्वथा विप्रमुक्तस्य ।
देहग्रहणाभावस्ततश्च संसारव्यवच्छित्तिः ॥ ८५ ॥ (१६३३)

Kastayā vinā doṣaḥ sthūlayā sarvathā vipramuktasya ।
Dehagrahaṇābhāvastataśca saṁsāravyavacchittiḥ ॥ 85 (1633)]

Trans.—85 (The opponent will say—) What harm is there in (believing) its absence ? (The reply is—) It is impossible for (the soul) liberated from a gross body to enter a (new) body in that case; and ultimately a (complete) break-off of the *mundane* world (will follow). (1633)

टीका–प्रेरकः प्राह–ननु बाह्यायाः स्थूरतन्वा वैचित्र्यं प्रत्यक्षदृष्टत्वादेवाभ्रादिविकारवदभ्युपगच्छामः । अन्तरङ्गायास्तु कर्मरूपायाः सूक्ष्मतनोर्वैचित्र्यं कथमिच्छामः, तस्याः सर्वथाऽप्रत्यक्षत्वात् ? । अथ तदनभ्युपगमे दोषःकोऽप्यापतति, ततोऽर्थापत्तेरेव तद्विचित्रताऽभ्युपगन्तव्या, तर्हि निवेद्यतां कस्तया विना दोषोऽनुषज्यते ? । आचार्यः प्राह–मरणकाले स्थूलया दृश्यमानतन्वा सर्वथा विप्रमुक्तस्य जन्तोर्भवान्तरगतस्थूलतनुग्रहणनिबन्धनभूतां सूक्ष्मकर्मतनुमन्तरेणाग्रेतनदेहग्रहणाभावलक्षणो दोषः समापद्यते । न हि निष्कारणमेव शरीरान्तरग्रहणं युज्यते । ततश्च देहान्तरग्रहणानुपपत्तेर्मरणानन्तरं सर्वस्याप्यशरीरत्वादयत्नेनैव संसारव्यवच्छित्तिः स्यात् ॥ ८५ (१६३३) ॥

D. C.—The opponent—We recognize the variety of *sthūla-śarîra* by virtue of its being *pratyakśa*. But we cannot apprehend the variety of a *sūkśma śarîra* as it is absolutely *a-pratyakśa* (imperceptible). Hence, if we do not accept the *sūkśma-śarîra* at all, will you kindly tell me what difficulty would arise ?

Ācārya—If the *sukśma Kārmaṇa śarîra* is not accepted, in its absence the soul when liberated from the *sthūla-śarîra* after death, will not be able to enter the new body at the next birth. For, this *Kārmaṇa śarîra* is the only agency through which a new body could be attained in the next birth. So, in case this *sūkśma kārmaṇa śarîra* is not accepted, *jîva* will not enter a new body after death and ultimately the whole of the *mundane* world will become disjuncted in absence of effort on the part of *jîvas*.

And even if it were so, what would happen ?

सव्वविमोक्खावत्ती निक्कारणउ व्व सव्वसंसारो ।
भवमुक्काणं व पुणो संसरणमओ अणासाओ ॥ ८६ ॥ (१६३४)

Savvavimokkhāvattî nikkāraṇau vva savvasaṁsāro ।
Bhavamukkāṇam va puṇo saṁsaraṇamao aṇāsāo ॥ 86 (1634)

[सर्वविमोक्षापत्तिर्निष्कारणको वा सर्वसंसारः ।
भवमुक्तानां वा पुनः संसरणमतोऽनाश्वासः ॥ ८६ ॥ (१६३४)

Sarvavimokśāpattir-niṣkāraṇako vā sarvasaṁsāraḥ ।
Bhavamuktānām vā punaḥ saṁsaraṇamato'nāśvāsaḥ ॥ 86 (1734)]

Trans.—86 (In that case) all will attain *Mokśa*; the whole of *mundane* world would become useless; those who are exempted from existence will have birth and re-birth; and there will be no consolation for *Mokśa* even. (1634)

टीका—ततः संसारव्यवच्छेदानन्तरं सर्वस्यापि जीवराशेर्मोक्षापत्तिर्भवेत् । अथाशरीराणामपि संसारपर्यटनम्, तर्हि निष्कारण एव सर्वस्यापि संसारः स्यात्, भवमुक्तानां च सिद्धानामित्थं पुनरप्यकस्माद् निष्कारण एव

संसारपातः स्यात्। तथैव च तत्र संसरणम्। ततश्च मोक्षेऽप्यनाश्वास इति ॥ ८६ (१६३४) ॥

D. C.—In that case there is disjunction of the entire *mundane* world; all the living beings will attain *mokṣa*. Again those that are bodiless will also wander in the world along with others that have bodies; the *mundane* world will become *niṣkāraṇa* or good-for-nothing. Moreover, *Siddhas* that are exempted from existence will also have to fall back into *saṁsāra* and hence into the cycle of birth and re-birth. Ultimately there will be no consolation even in *mokṣa*. Thus, along with disjunction of the entire *mundane* world, all the above-stated difficulties will arise if *Karman* is not admitted as the cause of variety.

Again the opponent asks :—

मुत्तस्सामुत्तिमया जीवेण कहं हवेज्ज संबंधो ?।
सोम्म ! घडस्स व नभसा जह वा दव्वस्स किरियाए ॥८७॥(१६३५)

Muttassāmuttimayā jîveṇa kaham havejja sambandho ?।
Somma ! ghaḍassa vva nabhasā jaha vā davvassa kiriyāe ॥ (1635)

[मूर्तस्यामूर्तिमता जीवेन कथं भवेत् संबन्धः ?।
सौम्य ! घटस्येव नभसा यथा वा द्रव्यस्य क्रियया ॥ ८७ ॥ (१६३५)

Mūrtasyāmūrtimatā jîvena katham bhavet sambandhaḥ ?।
Saumya ! ghaṭasyeva nabhasā yathā vā dravyasya kriyayā॥87(1635)]

Trans.—87 " How can the corporeal *(Karman)* be related to the incorporeal *Jîva ?* " (The *Ācārya* replies :-) *O Saumya !* (Their relation is) like the relation of *ghaṭa* with sky or like that of substance *(dravya)* with action *(kriyā)*. (1635)

टीका–ननु मूर्तं कर्मेति प्राग् भवद्भिः समर्थितम्। तस्य च मूर्तस्य कर्मणोऽमूर्तेन जीवेन सह कथं संयोगलक्षणः समवायलक्षणो वा संबन्धः

स्यात् ?। अतः कर्मसिद्धावप्येतदपरमेव रन्ध्रं पश्यामः। भगवानाह–सौम्य ! यथा मूर्तस्य घटस्यामूर्तेन नभसा संयोगलक्षणः संबन्धस्तथाऽत्रापि जीव–कर्मणोः। यथा वा द्रव्यास्याङ्गुलयादेः क्रिययाऽऽकुञ्चनादिकया सह समवायलक्षणः संबन्धः, तथाऽत्रापि जीव–कर्मणोरयमिति ॥ ८७ (१६३५) ॥

D. C.—Agnibhūti–You have already asserted that *Karman* is *mūrta.* Now, how could this *mūrta Karman* be connected with the *amūrta jîva* either by means of the *samavāya* relation or even by *Saṃyoga ?* This is one more difficuly in the way of the accomplishment of *Karman.*

The *Ācārya*—O blessed one ! just as a *mūrta ghaṭa* is connected with the *amūrta ākāśa* by means of *saṃyoga* and an object like finger is connected with *kriyā* like contraction by means of the *samavāya* relation, so, here also *Karman* is connected with *jîva.*

The relation of *jîva* with *Karman* is proved in another way:—

अहवा पच्चक्खं चिय जीवोवनिबंधणं जह सरीरं ।
चिट्ठइ कम्मयमेवं भवंतरे जीवसंजुत्तं ॥ ८८ ॥ (१६३६)

Ahavā paccakkham ciya jîvovanibandhaṇam jaha sarîram ।
Ciṭṭhai kammayamevam bhavantare jîvasanjuttam ॥ (1636)

[अथवा प्रत्यक्षमेव जीवोपनिबन्धनं यथा शरीरम् ।
तिष्ठति कार्मणमेवं भवान्तरे जीवसंयुक्तम् ॥ ८८ ॥ (१६३६)

Athavā pratyakśameva jîvopanibandhanam yathā śarîram ।
Tiśṭhati kārmaṇamevam bhavāntare jîvasaṃyuktam ॥ 88 (1636)]

Trans.—88 Or, just as the (coarse) body being perceptible (to the senses) is connected with the soul (in this world) the *Kārmaṇa* body is connected with the soul in the next world. (1636).

टीका–अथवा, यथेदं बाह्यं स्थूलशरीरं जीवोपनिबन्धनं जीवेन सह संबद्धं प्रत्यक्षोपलभ्यमानमेव तिष्ठति सर्वत्र चेष्टते, एवं भवान्तरं गच्छता जीवेन सह संयुक्तं कार्मणशरीरं प्रतिपद्यस्व । अथ ब्रूषे–धर्माऽधर्मनिमित्तं जीवसंबद्धं बाह्यं शरीरं प्रवर्तते, तर्हि पृच्छामो भवन्तम्–तावपि धर्माऽधर्मौ मूर्तौ वा भवेताम् , अमूर्तौ वा ? । यदि मूर्तौ, तर्हि तयोरप्यमूर्तेनात्मना सह कथं संबन्धः ? । अथ तयोस्तेन सहासौ कथमपि भवति, तर्हि कर्मणोऽपि तेन सार्धमयं कस्माद् न स्यात् ? । अथामूर्तौ धर्माऽधर्मौ, तर्हि बाह्यमूर्तस्थूलशरीरेण सह तयोः संबन्धः कथं स्यात् , मूर्ताऽमूर्तयोर्भवदभिप्रायेण संबन्धायोगात् ?। न चासंबद्धयोस्तयोर्बाह्यशरीरचेष्टानिमित्तत्वमुपपद्यते, अतिप्रसङ्गात् । अथ मूर्तयोरपि तयोर्बाह्यशरीरेण मूर्तेण सहेष्यते संबन्धः, तर्हि जीव–कर्मणोस्तत्सद्भावे कः प्रद्वेषः ? इति ॥ ८८ (१६३६) ॥

D. C.—This *sthūla śarîra*, as it is *pratyakśa* and connected with *jîva*, moves its limbs here and there, in this world, while the *Kārmaṇa śarîra* is connected with *jîva* in the next world.

Here again, if you think that it is the *sthūla śarîra*—with *dharma* and *adharma* as its *nimittas*—that exhibits all movements when conneced with *jîva* I would ask you to consider whether *dharma* and *adharma* are *mūrta* or *amūrta*.

In the first case, if you take *dharma* and *adharma* to be *mūrta* how could they be related to *ātman* which is *amūrta*? But, if their relation to *ātman* is, anyhow, approved of by you, why should you not approve of their relation to *Karman* also? Secondly, if you believe that *dharma* and *adharma* are *amūrta* they could not have any relation with the *bāhya* and *sthūla* body which is *mūrta*. For, according to you, connection between *mūrta* and *amūrta* is improper. Thus, if *dharma* and *adharma* become the *nimitta kāraṇas* of all the gestures of body even though there is no mutual relation between them, the fault of *atiprsaṅga* would arise. Moreover, if these *amūrta dharma* and *adharma* have been believed as being connected with the external *mūrta śarîra*, what objection would there be to assume a similar relation between *jîva* and *Karman* ?

Here there is an objection and its refutation—

मुत्तेणामुत्तिमओ उवघाया–ऽणुग्गहा कहं होज्जा ? ।
जह विण्णाणाईणं मइरापाणोसहाईहिं ॥ ८९ ॥ (१६३७)

Mutteṇāmuttimao uvaghāyā–'ṇuggahā kaham hojjā ?
Jaha viṇṇāṇāîṇam mairāpāṇosahāîhim ॥ 89 (1637)

[मूर्तेणामूर्तिमत उपघाता–ऽनुग्रहौ कथं भवेताम् ? ।
यथा विज्ञानादीनां मदिरापानौ–षधादिभिः ॥ ८९ ॥ (१६३७)

Mūrteṇāmūrtimata upaghātā'nugrahau katham bhavetām ? ।
Yathā vijñānādînām madirāpānau–ṣadhādibhiḥ ॥ 89 (1637)]

Trans.—89 " How could the *amūrta* (soul) be supported or damaged by the *mūrta (Karman) ?* " (The answer is–) In the way as *vijnāna* etc. are (damaged or supported) by a drink of wine, medicine etc. (1637)

टीका–ननु मूर्तेन कर्मणाऽमूर्तिमतो जीवस्य कथमाह्लादपरितापाद्यनुग्रहो–पघातौ स्याताम् ? । न ह्यमूर्तस्य नभसो मूर्तैर्मलयजज्वलनज्वालादिभिस्तौ युज्येते इति भावः । अत्रोत्तरमाह—'जह विण्णाणाईणमित्यादि' यथाऽमूर्तानामपि विज्ञान–विविदिषा–धृति–स्मृत्यादिजीवधर्माणां मूर्तैरपि मदिरापान-हृत्पूर-विष–पिपीलिकादिभिर्भक्षितैरुपघातः क्रियते, पयः–शर्करा–धृतपूर्णभेषजादिभिस्त्वनुग्रह इत्येवमिहापीति । एतच्च जीवस्यामूर्तत्वमभ्युपगम्योक्तम् ॥ ८९ १६३७ ॥

D. C.—*Agnibhūti*—In fact, the *amūrta ātman* cannot feel joy or sorrow as an *anugraha* (favour) or *upaghāta* (offence) by virtue of a *mūrta Karman*, just as the *amūrta ākāśa* is neither supported nor damaged by the *mūrta* sandalwood or fire-flame.

Ācārya—Desire for discussion of *vijñāna*, moral courage, remembrance etc., are the *amūrta* qualities of soul. These qualities are weakened by taking wine, poison, ant, a white thornapple etc.† and, are nourished by taking the *mūrta* drugs which contain

† Popularly known as *dhaturā* in Western India.

milk, *ghee*, sugar-candy etc. So the *amūrta jîva* is also nourished or weakened by the *mūrta Karman*.

अहवा नेगंतोऽयं संसारी सव्वहा अमुत्तो त्ति ।
जमणाइकम्मसंतइपरिणामवन्नरूवो सो ॥ ९० ॥ (१६३८)

Ahavā neganto'yam saṃsārî savvahā amutto tti ।
Jamaṇāikammasantaipariṇāmavannarūvo so ॥ 90 (1631)

[अथवा नैकान्तोऽयं संसारी सर्वथाऽमूर्त इति ।
यदनादिकर्मसन्ततिपरिणामापन्नरूपः सः ॥ ९० ॥ (१६३८)

Athavā naikānto'yam saṃsārî sarvathā'mūrta iti ।
Yadanādikarmasantatipariṇāmāpannarūpaḥ saḥ ॥ 90 (1638)]

Trans.—90 Or, this *mundane* soul is not entirely *amūrta* in the extreme. For, it has attained an alteration in the continuous range of *Karman*, which has no beginning. (1638)

टीका-अथवा, नायमेकान्तो यदुत-संसारी जीवः सर्वथाऽमूर्त इति । कुतः ? । यद् यस्मादनादिकर्मसन्ततिपरिणामापन्नं बह्वयवः पिण्डन्यायेनानादिकर्मसंतानपरिणतिस्वरूपतां प्राप्तं रूपं यस्य स तथा । ततश्च मूर्तकर्मणः कथञ्चिदनन्यत्वाद् मूर्तोऽपि कथञ्चिज्जीवः । इति मूर्तेन कर्मणा भवत एव तस्यानुग्रहो-पघातौ, नभसस्त्वमूर्तत्वात्, अचेतनत्वाच्च तौ न भवत एवेति ॥ ९० (१६३८) ॥

D. C.—Or, this *saṃsārî jîva* is also not wholly *amūrta* because it has assumed an alteration distinct from the expanse of *Karman*. *Ātman* is attached to *Karman* as *agni* is attached to an iron-rod. Now, since *Karman* is *mūtra* and *ātman* is similar to *Karman* to a certain extent, the *ātman* is also *mūrta* to a certain extent even though it is *amūrta* by its *svabhāva*. Consequently, the *amūrta* and lustrous *jîva* feels *anugraha* or *upaghāta* by virtue of a *mūrta Karman* while *ākāśa* being *amūrta* and *acetana* feels neither *anugraha* or *upaghāta*.

Then, how is the *Karma-santāna* born ? The reply is :—

संताणोऽणाई उ परोप्परं हेउहेउभावाओ ।
देहस्स य कम्मस्स य गोयम ! बीयं-कुराणं व ॥९१॥(१६३९)

Santāṇo'ṇāî u paropparam heuheubhāvāo ।
Dehassa ya kammassa ya Goyama ! bîyam-kurāṇam va ॥91(1639)

[सन्तानोऽनादिस्तु परस्परं हेतुहेतुभावात् ।
देहस्य च कर्मणश्च गौतम ! बीजा-ङ्कुरयोरिव ॥ ९१ ॥ (१६३९)

Santāno'nādistu parasparam hetuhetubhāvāt ।
Dehasya ca karmaṇaśca Gautama ! bîjāṅkurayoriva ॥ 91 (1639)]

Trans.—91 And, *O Gautama !* as *Karman* and body are mutually related as the causes of each other like the seed and sprout, the continuous range of *Karman* will have no beginning. (1639)

टीका—अनादिः कर्मणः सन्तान इति प्रतिज्ञा । देहकर्मणोः परस्परं हेतुहेतुमद्भावादिति हेतुः । बीजा-ऽङ्कुरयोरिवेति दृष्टान्तः । यथा बीजेनाऽङ्कुरो जन्यते, अङ्कुरादपि क्रमेण बीजमुपजायते, एवं देहेन कर्म जन्यते, कर्मणा तु देह इत्येवं पुनः पुनरपि परस्परमनादिकालीनहेतुहेतुमद्भावादित्यर्थः । इह ययोरन्योऽन्यं हेतुहेतुमद्भावस्तयोरनादिः सन्तानः, यथा बीजा-ङ्कुर-पितृपुत्रादीनाम्, तथा च देह-कर्मणोः, ततोऽनादिः कर्मसन्तान इति ॥ ९१ (१६३९) ॥

D. C.—The expanse of *Karman* has no beginning, as *deha* and *Karman* are related to each other as *hetu* and *hetumat*. Just as a sprout is born of seed and the seed, in turn, is produced from the sprout; in the same way, *Karman* is also produced from *deha*, and *deha*, in turn, is born of *Karman*. Thus *deha* and *Karman*, are related as the causes of each other like *bîja* and *aṅkura*. So, just as the continuous range of *bîja* and *aṅkura* or *pitā* and *putra* is *anādi*, that of *deha* and *Karman* should also be *anādi*.

Karman can be established by means of *Veda-vacana* also—

कम्मे चासइ गोयम ! जमग्गिहोत्ताइ सग्गकामस्स ।
वेयविहियं विहण्णइ दाणाइफलं च लोयम्मि ॥९२॥ (१६४०)

Kamme cāsai Goyama ! jamaggihottāi saggakāmassa ।
Veyavihiyam vihaṇṇai dāṇāiphalam ca loyammi ॥ 92 (1640)

[कर्मणि चासति गौतम ! यदग्निहोत्रादि स्वर्गकामस्य ।
वेदविहितं विहन्यते दानादिफलं च लोके ॥ ९२ ॥ (१६४०) ॥

Karmaṇi cāsati Gautama ! yadagnihotrādi svargakāmasya ।
Veda-vihitam vihanyate dānādi phalam ca loke ॥ 92 (1640)]

Trans.—92 If, *O Gautama !* the existence of *Karman* is denied, rites like rhe performance of Sacred-fire for a person aspiring for Salvation and the reward of munificence etc. in this world prescribed by the *Veda,* would be refuted. (1640).

टीका–कर्मणि चाऽसति गौतम ! अग्निहोत्रादिना स्वर्गकामस्य वेदविहितं यत् किमपि स्वर्गादिफलं तद् विहन्यते, स्वर्गादेः शुभकर्महेतुत्वात्, तस्य च भवताऽनभ्युपगमात् । लोके च यद् दानादिक्रियाणां फलं स्वर्गादिकं प्रसिद्धं तदपि विहन्येत। अयुक्तं चेदम्, "किरियाफलभावाओ दाणाईणं फलं किसीए व" इत्यादिना प्रतिविहितत्वादिति ॥ ९२ (१६४०) ॥

D. C.—If *O Gautama !* The existance of *Karman* is denied the commandment of *Vedas* that a person desiring to attain Salvation can do so by performing *agnihotra* etc. would be null and void. Again, the wellknown *phalas* like *svarga* etc. prescribed for actions like *dāna* etc. would also be refuted, if you don't believe in *Karman.* But that is not proper as it is opposed by *"Kiriyāphala bhāvāo dānāiṇam phalam kisîe vva†"* etc. Hence you shall have to accept *Karman* with its *anādi santāna.*

† Vide *v.* 1615.

On the non-apprehension of *Karman*, if *Īs'vara* etc. were taken to be the creators of the manifold variations in the world, a number of difficulties would arise,

कम्ममणिच्छंतो वा सुद्धं चिय जीवमीसराइं वा ।
मण्णसि देहाईणं जं कत्तारं न सो जुत्तो ॥ ९३ ॥ (१६४१)

उवगरणाभावाओ निच्चेट्ठा–ऽमुत्तयाइओ वा वि ।
ईसरदेहारंभे वि तुल्लया वाऽणवत्था वा ॥ ९४ ॥ (१६४२)

Kammamaṇicchanto vā śuddham ciya jîvamîsarāim vā ।
Maṇṇasi dehāîṇam jam kattāram na so jutto ॥ 93 (1641)
Uvagaraṇābhāvāo niceṭṭhā'muttayāio vā vi ।
Īsaradehārambhe vi tullayā vā' ṇavatthā vā ॥ 94 (1642)

[कर्मानिच्छन् वा शुद्धमेव जीवमीश्वरादिं वा ।
मन्यसे देहादीनां यं कर्तारं न स युक्तः ॥ ९३ ॥ (१६४१) ॥

उपकरणाभावाद् निश्चेष्टा–ऽमूर्ततादितो वापि ।
ईश्वरदेहारम्भेऽपि तुल्यता वाऽनवस्था वा ॥ ९४ ॥ (१६४२) ॥

Karmānicchan vā śūddhameva jîvamiśvarādim vā ।
Manyase dehādînām yam kartāram na sa yuktaḥ ॥ 93 (1641)]
Upakaraṇābhāvād niśces'ṭā–'mūrtatādito vāpi ।
Īśvaradehārambhe'pi tulyatā vā'navasthā vā ॥ 94 (1642)]

Trans.—93-94 Or, denying (the existence of) *Karman,* you might presume *jîva* itself-pure and simple-or *Īśvara* etc, to be the creator of (the objects like) *deha* etc. But that is not so, since *jîvas* is void of means *(upakaraṇa)* motion *(ceṣṭā)* and form *(mūrtatā)*. Even (in the case of) *deha* etc. being accomplished by *Īśvara* etc. either the same difficulties would arise or there would be disorder. (1641-1642)

टीका–कर्म वाऽनिच्छन्नग्निभूते गौतम ! यं कर्मरहितत्वात् शुद्धमेव जीवमात्मानमीश्वराव्यक्तकाल–नियति–यदृच्छादिकं वा देहादीनां कर्तारं मन्यसे, तत्राप्युच्यते–नासौ शुद्धजीवे–श्वरादिः कर्ता युज्यत इति ॥

टीका–नायमीश्वरजीवादिरकर्मा शरीरादिकार्याण्यारभते, उपकरणाभावात्, दण्डाद्युपकरणरहितकुलालवत्। न च कर्म विना शरीराद्यारम्भे जीवादीनामन्यदुपकरणं घटते, गर्भाद्यवस्थास्वन्योपकरणासंभवात्, शुक्र–शोणितादि ग्रहणस्याप्यकर्मणोऽनुपपत्तेः। अथवा, अन्यथा प्रयोगः क्रियते-"निच्चेट्ठेत्यादि" नाकर्मा शरीराद्यारभते, निश्चेष्टत्वात्, आकाशवत्, तथाऽमूर्तत्वात्, आदि शब्दादशरीरत्वात्, निष्क्रियत्वात्, सर्वगतत्वात्, आकाशवदेव, तथा, एकत्वात्, एकपरमाणुवदित्यादि। अथोच्यते–शरीरवानीश्वरः, सर्वाण्यपि देहादिकार्याण्यारभते। नन्वीश्वरदेहारम्भेऽपि तर्हि तुल्यता पर्यनुयोगस्य, तथाहि–अकर्मा नारभते निजशरीरमीश्वरः, निरुपकरणत्वात्, दण्डादिरहितकुलालवदिति। अथान्यः कोऽपीश्वर स्तच्छरीराम्भाय प्रवर्तते। ततः सोऽपि शरीरवान्, अशरीरो वा ?। यद्यशरीरः, तर्हि नारभते, निरुपकरणत्वात्, इत्यादि सैव वक्तव्यता। अथ शरीरवान्, तर्हि तच्छरीरारम्भे तुल्यता, सोऽप्यकर्मा निजशरीरं नारभते, निरुपकरणत्वादित्यादि। अथ तच्छरीरमन्यः शरीरवानारभते। अतस्तस्याप्यन्यः, तस्याप्यन्य इत्येवमनवस्था। अनिष्टं च सर्वमेतत्। तस्माद् नेश्वरो देहादीनां कर्ता, किन्तु कर्मसद्वितीयो जीव एव। निष्प्रयोजनश्चेश्वरो देहादीन् कुर्वन्नुन्मत्तकल्प एव स्यात्, सप्रयोजनकर्तृत्वे पुनरनीश्वरत्वप्रसङ्गः। न चानादिशुद्धस्य देहादिकरणेच्छा युज्यते, तस्या रागविकल्परूपत्वात्, इत्याद्यत्र बहुवक्तव्यम्, ग्रन्थगहनताप्रसङ्गात्तु नोच्यत इति। अनेनैव विधानेन विष्णु–ब्रह्मादयोऽपि प्रत्युक्ता द्रष्टव्या इति॥ ९३–९४ (१६४१–१६४२) ॥

D. C.—O Agnibhūti Gautama ! Leaving the *Karman* aside, it is absolutely improper to accept any one of *jîva, Īsvara, kāla* (Time) *avyakta* (*Visṇu*) *niyati* (Destiny) or *yadricchā* (self-will) to be the *kartā* of *deha* etc.

It is not possible for *jîva* and *Īsvara* etc, to accomplish *Kāryas* such as *śarîra* etc, without the help of *Karman. Jîva*

cannot accomplish objects like *śarîra* on account of the following reasons :—

(1) If *jiva* is presumed to be the *Kartā* of *śarîra* etc, it must have some means to produce them. Just as a potter cannot produce a *ghaṭa* without the help of an *upakaraṇa* like *daṇḍa*, so also *jîva* cannot accomplish *Kāryas* like *śrîra* in absence of an *upakaraṇa*. Now, *jîva* is not supposed to have any other *upakaraṇa* except *Karman* in producing *śarîra* etc. For, no other *upakaraṇa* except *Karman* can exist in the state of embryo etc.

(2) In the process of accomplishment of *Kāryas* like *śarîra*, *jîva* would not be able to suck up semen, blood etc. without the help of *Karman*.

(3) *Jîva* cannot accomplish *śarîra* etc. on account of its inactive, incorporeal, and all-pervading nature like *ākāśa*.

Again, it is useless to believe that *śarîravān Īś'vara* produces each and every object such as *deha* etc. Because the above-mentioned difficulties are bound to arise in that case also. In absence of an *upakaraṇa*, *Īś'vara* like a potter without a *daṇḍa*, is not supposed to create his own body. Now here, if it is assumed that a second *Īś'vara* creates the body of this *Īś'vara*, consider whether that *Īś'vara* has a body or not. If he has no body it is clear from what has already been discussed that he cannot create *śarîra* in absence of an *upakaraṇa*. But if it is said that a third *Īś'vara* having a body creates the body of this *Īś'vara*, a fourth *Īś'vara* shall have to be supposed to create the body of the third one, and a fifth *Īś'vara* to create that of the fourth one, and so on until ultimately it results in an *anavasthā* which is not at all desirable.

Thus it is clear that *Īś'vara* is not the creator of *śarîra* etc. But in spite of that if it is believed that *Īś'vara* creates *śarîra* etc, consider whether he does so with or without any

purpose. If *Īs'vara* creates body without any purpose he would be taken as frantic, and if he does so with some intention he would lose his *Īs'varatva.* For a *siddha* and *anādi ātman* is not expected to cherish desire for creating *deha* etc, as desire is one of the forms of illusion and so on. A number of such arguments could be advanced in this connection, but for fear of *grantha-vistāra* (extension of the work) they are not stated here. But in line of the arguments stated above it can also be proved that neither *Brahmā* nor *Viṣṇu* nor any one else can be taken as the *Kartā* of *śarîra* etc.

Īs'vara therefore is not acceptable as the creator of *śarîra* etc., from any point of view, but *jîva* accompanied by the *upakaraṇa Karman*, should alone be accepted as the *kartā* of *śarîra* etc.

अहव सहावं मन्नसि विण्णाणघणाइवेयवुत्ताओ ।
तह बहुदोसं गोयम ! ताणं च पयाणमयमत्थो ॥२५॥ (१६४३)

Ahava sahāvam mannasi viṇṇaṇa ghaṇāi Veyavuttāo ।
Taha bahudosam Goyama! tāṇam ca payāṇamayamattho ॥95॥(1643)

[अथवा स्वभावं मन्यसे विज्ञानघनादिवेदोक्तात् ।
तथा बहुदोषं गौतम ! तेषां च पदानामयमर्थः ॥ ९५ ॥ (१६४३)

Athavā svabhāvam manyase vijñānaghanādivedoktāt ।
Tathā bahudoṣam Gautama! teṣām ca padānāmayamarthaḥ ॥95॥(1643)

Trans.—95 Again, *O Gautama !* if you think *svabhāvam* (to be the *kartā* of *śarîra* etc), from the sentences of the *Vedas* such as " *vijñāna ghana* " etc, a number of difficulties will arise. But (*ca*) the real interpretation of those sentences is this.

टीका—अथ "विज्ञानघन एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः" इत्यादि वेदवचनश्रवणात् स्वभावं देहादीनां कर्तारं मन्यसे, यतः केचिदाहु :—

सर्वहेतुनिराशंसं भावानां जन्म वर्ण्यते ।
स्वभाववादिभिस्ते हि नाहुः स्वमपि कारणम् ॥ १ ॥

राजीवकण्टकादीनां वैचित्र्यं कः करोति हि ? ।
मयुरचन्द्रिकादिर्वा विचित्रः केन निर्मितः ? ॥ २ ॥

कादाचित्कं यदत्रास्ति निःशेषं तदहेतुकम् ।
यथा कण्टकतैक्ष्ण्यादि तथा चैते सुखादयः ॥ ३ ॥

तदेतद् यथा त्वं नन्यसे गौतम ! तथाऽभ्युपगम्यमानं बहुदोषमेव; तथाहि —यो देहादीनां कर्ता स्वभावोऽभ्युपगम्यते, स किं वस्तुविशेषो वा, अकारणता वा, वस्तुधर्मो वा, ? इति त्रयी गतिः । तत्र न तावद् वस्तुविशेषः, तद्ग्राहकप्रमाणाभावात् । अप्रमाणकस्याभ्युपगमे कर्मापि किं नाभ्युपगम्यते, तस्यापि त्वदभिप्रयेणाप्रमाणकत्वात् ? । किञ्च, वस्तुविशेषः स स्वभावो मूर्तो वा स्यात् अमूर्तो वा ? । यदि मूर्तः, तर्हि स्वभाव इति नामान्तरेण कर्मैवोक्तं स्यात् । अथामूर्तः, तर्हि नासौ कस्यापि कर्ता, अमूर्तत्वात्, निरुपकरणत्वाच्च, व्योमवदिति । न च मूर्तस्य शरीरादेः कार्यस्यामूर्तं कारणमनुरूपम्, आकाशवदिति । अथाकारणता स्वभाव इष्यते, तत्राप्यभिदध्महे—नन्वेवं सत्यकारणं शरीराद्युत्पद्यत इत्ययमर्थः स्यात्, तथा च सति कारणाभावस्य समानत्वाद् युगपदेवाशेषदेहोत्पादप्रसङ्गः । अपि च, इत्थमहेतुकमाकस्मिकं शरीराद्युत्पद्यत इत्यभ्युपगतं भवेत । एतश्चायुक्तमेव, यतो यदहेतुकमाकस्मिकं न तदादिमत्प्रतिनियताकारम्, यथाऽभ्रादिविकारः, आदिमत्प्रतिनियताकारं च शरीरादि । तस्माद् नाकस्मिकम्, किन्तु कर्महेतुकमेव । प्रतिनियताकारत्वादेव चोपकरणसहितकर्तृनिर्वर्त्यमेव शरीरादिकं घटादिवदिति गम्यत एव । न च गर्भाद्यवस्थासु कर्मणोऽन्यदुपकरणं घटत इत्युक्तमेव । अथ वस्तुनो धर्मः स्वभावोऽभ्युपगम्यते । तथाप्यसौ यद्यात्मधर्मो विज्ञानादिवत्, तर्हि न शरीरादिकारणमसौ, अमूर्तत्वात्, आकाशवत्, इत्यभिहितमेव । अथ मूर्तवस्तुधर्मोऽसौ, तर्हि सिद्धसाध्यता, कर्मणोऽपि पुद्गलास्तिकायपर्यायविशेषत्वेनास्माभिरप्युपगतत्वादिति ।

अपि च, " पुरुष एवेदं सर्वम् " इत्यादिवेदवाक्यश्रवणाद् भवतः

कर्मास्तित्वसंशयः। एषां हि वेदपदानामयमर्थस्तव चेतसि विपरिवर्तते—पुरुष आत्मा, एवकारोऽवधारणे, स च पुरुषातिरिक्तस्य कर्म-प्रकृती-श्वरादेः सत्ताव्यवच्छेदार्थः, इदं सर्वं—प्रत्यक्षं वर्तमानं चेतनाचेतनस्वरूपम्, "यिं" इति वाक्यालङ्कारे, यद् भूतम्-अतीतम्, यच्च भाव्यं-भविष्यद् मुक्तिसंसारावपि स एवेत्यर्थः। उतामृतत्वस्येशान इति। उतशब्दोऽप्यर्थे। अपिशब्दश्च समुच्चये। अमृतत्वस्य च अमरणभावस्य मोक्षस्येशानः प्रभुरित्यर्थः। यदन्नेनातिरोहतीति। चशब्दस्य लुप्तस्य दर्शनाद् यच्चान्नेन-आहारेण, अतिरोहति-अतिशयेन वृद्धिमुपैति। यदेजति-चलति, पश्वादि। यद् नैजति-न चलति पर्वतादि। यद् दूरे मेर्वादि। यदु अन्तिके-उशब्दोऽवधारणे, यदन्तिके समीपे तदपि पुरुष एवेत्यर्थः। यदन्तः-मध्ये, अस्य-चेतनाचेतनस्य सर्वस्य; यदेव सर्वस्याप्यस्य बाह्यतः, तत् सर्वं पुरुष एवेति। अतस्तव्यतिरिक्तस्य कर्मणः किल सत्ता दुःश्रद्धेयेति ते मतिः। तथा, "विज्ञानघन एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः" इत्यादीन्यपि वेदपदानि कर्माभावप्रतिपादकानि मन्यसे त्वम्, अत्राप्येवकारस्य कर्मादिसत्ताव्यवच्छेदपरत्वात्।

तदेवमेतेषां "पुरुष एवेदम्" इत्यादीनां "विज्ञानघन"—आदीनां च वेदपदानां नायमर्थो यो भवतश्चेतसि वर्तते, किन्तु तेषां पदानामयं भावार्थः—"पुरुष एवेदं सर्वम्" इत्यादीनि तावत् पुरुषस्तुतिपराणि जात्यादिमदत्यागहेतोरद्वैतभावनाप्रतिपादकानि च वर्तते, न तु कर्मसत्ता-व्यवच्छेदकानि। वेदवाक्यानि हि कानिचिद् विधिवादपराणि, कान्यप्यर्थ-वादप्रधानानि, अपराणि त्वनुवादपराणि। तत्र "अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामः" इत्यादीनि विधिवादपराणि। अर्थवादस्तु द्विधा-स्तुत्यर्थवादः, निन्दार्थवादश्च। तत्र "पुरुष एवेदं सर्वम्" इत्यादिकः स्तुत्यर्थवादः तथा तत्र "स सर्वविद् यस्यैषा महिमा भुवि दिव्ये ब्रह्मपुरे ह्येष व्योम्नि आत्मासु प्रतिष्ठितस्तमक्षरं वेदयते यस्तु स सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित् सर्वमेवाविवेश" इति; तथा, "एकया पूर्णयाहूत्या सर्वान् कामानवाप्नोति" इत्यादिकश्च सर्वोऽपि स्तुत्यर्थवादः। "एकया पूर्णया" इत्यादिविधिवादोऽपि कस्माद् न भवति? इति चेत्। उच्यते—शेषस्याग्निहोत्राद्यानुष्ठानस्य वैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गादिति। "एषः वः प्रथमो यज्ञो योऽग्निष्टोमः योऽनेनानिष्ट्वाऽन्येन यजते स गर्तमभ्यपतत्" अत्र

पशुमेधादीनां प्रथमकरणं निन्द्यत इत्ययं निन्दार्थवादः ॥ " द्वादशमासाः संवत्सरः " " अग्निरुष्णः " " अग्निर्हिमस्य भेषजम् " इत्यादीनि तु वेदवाक्यान्यनुवादप्रधानानि, लोकप्रसिद्धस्यैवार्थस्यैतेष्वनुवादादिति ।

तस्मात् " पुरुष एवेदं सर्वम् " इत्यादीनि वेदपदानि स्तुत्यर्थवादप्रधानानि द्रष्टव्यानि । " विज्ञानघन एवैतेभ्यः " इत्यत्राप्ययमर्थः— विज्ञानघनाख्यः पुरुष एवायं भूतेभ्योऽर्थान्तरं वर्तते । स च कर्ता, कार्यं च शरीरादिकमिति प्राक् साधितमेव । ततश्च कर्तृकार्याभ्यामर्थान्तरं करणमनुमीयते; तथाहि—यत्र कर्तृ-कार्यभावस्तत्रावश्यंभावि करणम्, यथाऽयस्कारा ऽयःपिण्डसद्भावे संदंशः यच्चात्रात्मनः शरीरादिकार्यनिवृत्तौ करणभावमापद्यते तत् कर्म इति प्रतिपद्यस्व । अपिच, साक्षादेव कर्मसत्ताप्रतिपादकानि श्रुयन्त एव वेदवाक्यानि, तद्यथा-" पुण्यः पुण्येन कर्मणा पापः पापेन कर्मणा " इत्यादि । तस्मादागमादपि सिद्धं प्रतिपद्यस्व कर्मेति ॥ ९५ (१६४३) ॥

D. C.—You, too, *O Agnibhūti!* like others presume *svabhāva* and *svabhāva* only to be the *kartā* of *deha* etc. on hearing the *Vedapadas* such as " *Vijñānaghana evaitebhyo bhūtebhyaḥ* " etc. It is therefore said by some people that—

Sarvahetunirāśamsam bhāvānām janma varṇyate ।
Svabhāvavādibhiste hi nāhuḥ svamapi kāraṇam ॥ 1 ॥

Rājîvakantakādinām vaicitryam kaḥ karoti hi ? ।
Mayūracandrikādirvā vicitraḥ kena nirmitaḥ ॥ 2 ॥

Kādācitkam yadatrāsti niḥśeṣaḥ tadahetukam ।
Yathā kaṇṭakataikśṇyādi tathā caite sukhādayaḥ ॥ 3 ॥

So, *Gautama!* If you also hold the same view., *viz*, that *svabhāva* is the *kartā* of *deha* etc. a number of *doṣas* will crop up. In the first instance, consider whether *svabhāva* is (1) a *vastuvis'esa* (an object in particular) or (2) *a-kāraṇatā* (causelessness) itself or (3) *vastudharma* (quality of an object).

(1) *Svabhāva* can never be recognized as a *vastuvis'eṣa* as there exists no *pramāṇa* (ground of assurance) to prove

that it is a *vastu*. Now here, if you are prepared to accept an *a-pramāṇaka* (unauthorized) *vastu* as the *vastu* itself, you should also accept *Karman* as a *vastu;* for according to you, *Karman* is also *a-pramāṇaka*. Secondly, if that *svabhāva* is *vastuvis'eṣa*, is it *mūrta* or *amūrta* ? If it is *mūrta*, it is nothing but *Karman* with a synonym of *svabhāva*. If it is *amūrta* it is not supposed to have any sort of *upakaraṇa* and hence like *ākās'a* it can never be a *kartā* of any object. Moreover, it is improper to accept an *amūrta svabhāva* to be the *kāraṇa* of a *mūrta kārya* such as *deha* etc. So, it is clear that *svabhāva* is not a *vastuvis'eṣa* in any case.

2. If *svabhāva* were supposed to be *a-kāraṇatā*, all objects will have to be taken as being produced without cause and *Kāraṇa* will be absent uniformly at all places; consequently all objects will have to be supposed to have been produced accidently all at a time. But it would be absurd to believe like that. For one that is produced spontaneously without any reason, does never possess, like the *vikāras* of *abhra* etc, a beginning or a definite form. Objects like *s'asîra* should never be believed to have been born without cause, because they are produced by means of *Karman*, they are *ādimān* and they possess a definite form as that of a *ghaṭa*. This shows that such objects are produced by a *kartā* by means of an *upakaraṇa*, and *Karman* is the only possible *upakaraṇa* in the state of embryo. So, *Karman* ought to be accepted as its real *hetu* and not the *svabhāva*.

3. Now, consider if *svabhāva* can be taken as a *vastu-dharma*. If *svabhāva* is supposed to be the quality of a *vastu* like *ātman* it would be *amūrta* like *ākās'a* and hence it would not become the cause of *s'arîra* etc. But there would be no objection if *svabhāva* were taken to be the quality of a *mūrta* object. For, in that case, *Karman* will become a *paryāya* of the *svabhāva* of a *mūrta* object. So, we have no objection in accepting *svabhāva* as a *dharma* of the *mūrta* object.

Moreover, *O Agnibhūti !* you entertain doubt as regards *Karman* by hearing sentences such as "*puruṣa evedam sarvam*" of the *Vedas*. According to you, the interpretation of those sentences is as follows :—

" Everything that is animate and inanimate, past and future, movable and immovable, distant and near, interior and exterior everything that is nourished by food, and one who is the lord of *mokṣa*—all this is *puruṣa* and *puruṣa* alone. No other object as *Knrman* exists as distinct from this *puruṣa*.

Similarly, according to you, sentences such as " *vijñāna-ghana* " also establish the non-existance of *Karman*. Because, in both the above-mentioned *padas* you interpret " *eva* " as referring to the non-existence of *Karman*.

Your interpretation of the *Veda-padas* is not correct. Sentences like " *puruṣa evedam* " etc are meant to praise the *ātman* and to establish the *advaita—bhāva* in order to avoid the arrogance of *jāti* etc, but they are not meant to establish the non-existence of *Karman*.

Sentences are generally divided into three kinds :—(1) *Vidhivādapara i. e.*, sentences that are laid down as rules. (2) *Arthavādapara i. e.*, sentences that are laid down as the explanatory remarks and (3) *Anuvādapara i. e.*, sentences that are laid down as explanatory repetitions—" *Agnihotram juhuyāt svargakâmaḥ* " is an example of *vidhivâda*. *Arthavâda* is of two kinds :—(1) *Stuti-arthavâda* and (2) *Nindâ artha-vâda*. Sentences such as " *puruṣa evedam sarvam* " etc, as well as those " *Sa sarvavid yasyaiṣa mahimâ bhuvi vivye brahmapure hyeṣâ vyomni âtmâsu pratiṣṭhitastamaks'aram vedyate yastu sa sarvajna sarvavit sarvamevavives'a* " and " *ekayâ pūrṇayâhūtyâ sarvân kâmânavâpnoti* " etc, are also the examples of *stuti-arthavâda*.

Again you may raise a question as to why the sentences like " *ekayâ parṇayâ* " etc. be not taken as the illustrations

of *Vidhivāda*. But if it illustrates *Vidhivāda*, the rest of the *anuṣṭhānas* like *agnihotra* would be of no avail.

In the sentence " *eṣa vaha prathamo yajno yo'gniṣṭomaaḥ, yo'nenāniṣṭavānyena yajate sa gartamabhyapatat* " the sacrifice of animals is censured and hence it illustrates the *nindārthavāda*. Lastly *Veda-vākyas* such as " *dvādaśamāsāḥ saṃvat saraḥ* " " *agniruṣṇaḥ* " " *agni rhimasya bheśajam.* " etc., are *anuvāda pradhāna* as they state mere explanatory repetitions of well-known facts.

It is, therefore, clear that *Vedapadas* like " *puruṣa evedam sarvam* " are meant to illustrate the *stuti-arthavāda*.

" *Vijñāna ghana evaitebhyaḥ* " etc. can be interpreted in this way—*Atman*, as an assemblage of *knowledge* is distinct from *bhūtas* and it itself is the *kartā* of the *kāryas* such as *śarîra* etc. Now that, it has become the *kartā* it must have a *karaṇa* (instrument) to accomplish the *Kāryas*. For, wherever there are *kartā* and *kārya* there ought to be *karaṇa* also. Like a forceps in the case of a blacksmith and iron-rod, *Karman* is used as an instrument in the accomplishment of *Kārays* like *śaîra* by *Ātman*. So, you shall have to accept the existence of *Karman*.

Moreover, *Karman* can be established by the help of *Veda-vacanas* like " *puṇyaḥ puṇyena karmaṇā, pāpaḥ pāpena karmaṇā* " also. Thus *Karman* is proved by means of *āgama* also. Hence, leave all the doubts aside and know it for certain that *Karman* does exist and *Karman* is the only instrument to accomplish *Kāryas* like *śarîra* etc.

छिन्नम्मि संसयम्मि जिणेण जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
सो समणो पव्वइओ पंचहिं सह खंडियसएहिं ॥९६॥ (१६४४)

Chinnammi samsayammi Jiṇeṇa jarā-maraṇavippamukkeṇam ।
So samaṇo pavvaio pancahim saha khandiya saehim ॥96॥(1644)

[छिन्ने संशये जिनेन जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
स श्रमणः प्रव्रजितः पञ्चभिः सह खण्डिकशतैः ॥ ९६ ॥ (१६४४)

Chinne samśaye Jinena jarā-maraṇavipramuktena ।
Sa śramaṇaḥ pravrajitaḥ pancabhiḥ saha khaṇḍikaśataiḥ॥96॥(1644)]

Trans.—96 When the doubt was removed by the *Tîrthaṅkara* who was entirely free from old age and death, the saint *Agnibhūti* accepted *Dîksā* along with his five hundred pupils. (1644).

End of the Discussion with the Second Gaṇadhara.

Chapter III

तृतीयगणधरवक्तव्यता

Discussion with the Third Gaṇadhara.

ते पव्वइए सोउं तइओ आगच्छइ जिणसगासं ।
वच्चामि वंदामी वंदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ॥ ९७ ॥ (१६४५)

Te pavvaie söum taio āgacchai Jiṇasagāsam ।
Vaccāmi vandāmî vandittā pajjuvāsāmi ॥ 97 ॥ (1645)

[तौ प्रव्रजितौ श्रुत्वा तृतीय आगच्छति जिनसकाशम् ।
व्रजामि वन्दे वन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ॥ ९७ ॥ (१६४५)

Tau pravrajitau śrutvā tritîya āgacchati Jinasakāśam ।
Vrajāmi vande vanditvā paryupāse ॥ 97 ॥ (1645)]

Trans.—97 Having heard that both of them *(Indrabhūti* and *Agnibhūti)* had renounced the world, the third *(Gaṇadhara)* comes before the *Tîrthaṅkara.* (He thinks):—I may go, pay my homage and worship him (1645).

टीका—ताविन्दभूत्य—ऽग्निभूती प्रव्रजितौ श्रुत्वा तृतीयो वायुभूतिनामा द्विजोपाध्यायो जिनसकाशमागच्छति सातिशयनिजबन्धुद्वयनिष्क्रमणार्कर्णनाज्झगिति विगलिताभिमानो भगवति संजातसर्वज्ञप्रत्ययः सन्नेवमवधार्यागतः—व्रजामि तत्राहमपि, वन्दे भगवन्तं श्रीमन्महावीरम्, वन्दित्वा च पर्युपासे—पर्युपास्तिं करोमि तस्य भगवत इति ॥ ९७ (१६४५) ॥

D. C.—On having heard that *Indrabhūti* and *Agnibhūti* had accepted the *Dîks'â* (and were defeated,) the third *gaṇadhara* named *Vâyubhūti* approached *Śramaṇa Bhagavân Mahâvîra* with an humble and obedient motive of bowing down to him and worshipping him.

And, what more did he think when he approached ?

सीसत्तेणोवगया संपयमिंद-ग्गिभूइणो जस्स ।
तिहूयणकयप्पणामो स महाभागोऽभिगमणिज्जो ॥९८॥ (१६४६)
तदभिगमण–वंदणो–वासणाइणा होज्ज पूयपावोऽहं ।
वोच्छिण्णसंसओ वा वोत्तुं पत्तो जिणसगासे ॥ ९९ ॥ (१६४७)

Sîsatteṇovagayā sampayaminda–ggibhūiṇo jassa ।
Tihūyaṇakayappaṇāmo sa mahābhāgo' bhigamaṇijjo ॥98॥ (1646)

Tadobhigamaṇa–vandaṇo–vāsaṇāiṇā hojja pūyapāvo' ham ।
Vocchiṇṇa samsao vā vottum patto Jiṇasagāse ॥ 99 ॥ (1647)

[शिष्यत्वेनोपगतौ सांप्रतमिन्द्रा-ऽग्निभूती यस्य ।
त्रिभुवनकृतप्रणामः स महाभागोऽभिगमनीयः ॥ ९८ ॥ (१६४६)

तदभिगमन–वन्दनो–पासनादिना भवेयं पूतपापोऽहम् ।
व्यवच्छिन्नसंशयो वोक्त्वा प्राप्तो जिनसकाशे ॥ ९९ ॥ (१६४७)

Śiṣyatvenopagatau, sāmpratamindrā'gnibhūtî yasya ।
Tribhuvanakritapraṇāmaḥ sa mahābhāgo'bhigamanîyaḥ ॥98॥(1646)]

Tadabhigamana–vandano–pāsanādinā bhaveyam pūtapāpo'ham
Vyavacchinnasamśayo voktā prāpto Jinasakāśe ॥ 99 ॥ (1647)]

Trans.—98–99 " I should approach the revered *Bhagvān Mahāvîra* whom *Indrabhūti* and *Agnibhūti* have recently accepted as their preceptor and to whom (people of) the three worlds pay their obeisances. Having approached him, I shall get myself purged of sins by bowing down to him and worshipping him, and I shall get my doubts cleared." Having said so, he came to *Śramaṇa Bhagvān Mahāvîra* (1646–1647).

Then what next ?

आभट्ठो य जिणेणं जाइ-जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
नामेण य गोत्तेण य सव्वण्णू सव्वदरिसी णं ॥१००॥ (१६४८)

Ābhattho ya Jiṇeṇam jāi-jarā-maraṇavippamukkeṇam ।
Nāmeṇa ya gotteṇa ya savvaṇṇū savvadarisî ṇam ॥ 100 ॥ (1648)

[आभाषितश्च जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ॥ १०० ॥ (१६४८).

Ābhāṣitaśca Jinena jāti-jarā-maraṇavipramuktena ।
Nāmnā ca gotreṇa ca sarvajñena sarvadarsinā ॥ 100 ॥ (1648)]

Trans.—100 He was addressed by his name and lineage by the *Tîrthaṅkara* who was free from birth, old age, and death, who was all-knowing, and who had complete *darśana* (undifferentiated knowledge). (1648).

D. C.—Although thus respectfully and directly addressed by the Lord and seeing the beauty and splendour of his eminence extending over the three worlds, and being unable to disclose the doubt remaining in his mind, out of agitation *Vāyubhūti* remained silent with amazement. But he was again addressed thus :—

तज्जीव तस्सरीरं ति संसओ न वि य पुच्छसे किंचि ।
वेयपयाण य अत्थं न याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो ॥१०१॥(१६४९)

Tajjîva tassarîram ti samsao na vi ya pucchase kimci ।
Veyapayāṇa ya attham na yāṇasî tesimo attho ॥ 101 ॥ (1649)

[तज्जीवस्तच्छरीरमिति संशयो नापि च पृच्छसि किञ्चित् ? ।
वेदपदानां चार्थं न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ १०१ ॥ (१६४९)

Tajjîvastaccharîramiti samśayo nāpi ca pricchasi kimcit ? ।
Vedapadānām cārtham na jānāsi teṣāmayamarthaḥ ॥101॥ (1649)]

Trans.—101 You entertain the doubt as to whether that which is *jîva* is *śarîra* itself and yet you do not ask me (about it). But *(ca)* you do not know the real meaning of *Veda-padas.* Here is their real interpretation. (1649).

टीका–हे आयुष्मन् वायुभूते! "तदेव वस्तु जीवस्तदेव च शरीरम्, न पुनरन्यत्" इत्येवंभूतस्तव संशयो वर्तते, नापिच तदपनोदार्थं किञ्चिद् मा पृच्छसि। ननु यज्ञपाटाद् निर्गच्छता त्वयाऽभिहितमासीत्—"वोच्छिण्णसंसओ वा" इति, तत् किमिति न किञ्चित् पृच्छसि?। अयं च संशयस्तव विरुद्धवेदपदश्रवणनिबन्धनो वर्तते। तेषां च वेदपदानार्थं त्वं न जानासि, तेन संशयं कुरुषे। तेषां चायं वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणोऽर्थ इति ॥१०१॥ (१६४९)

D. C.—You entertain the doubt in your mind as to whether that which is *jîva* be called *sarîra* also. But you do not put any question about it to remove that doubt. This doubt of yours is based upon hearing the *Veda-padas* of contradictory senses. But that is not the correct interpretation. Here is the real interpretation.

Moreover,

वसुहाइभूयसमुदयसंभूया चेयण त्ति ते संका।
पत्तेयमदिट्ठा वि हु मज्जंगमउ व्व समुदाये ॥ १०२ ॥ (१६५०)

जह मज्जंगेसु मओ वीसुमदिट्ठो वि समुदए होउं।
कालंतरे विणस्सइ तह भूयगणम्मि चेयण्णम् ॥१०३॥(१६५१)

Vasuhāi bhūya samudaya sambhūyā ceyaṇa tti te saṅkā।
Patteyamadiṭṭhā vi hu majjaṅgamau vva samudāye ॥ 102 ॥ (1650)

Jaha majjaṅgesu mao vîsumadiṭṭho vi samudae höum।
Kālantare vîṇassai taha bhūya gaṇammi ceyaṇṇam ॥103॥ (1651)

[वसुधादिभूतसमुदयसंभूता चेतनेति तव शङ्का।
प्रत्येकमदृष्टाऽपि खलु मद्याङ्गमद इव समुदाये ॥ १०२ ॥ (१६५०)

यथा मद्याङ्गेषु मदो विश्वगदृष्टोऽपि समुदये भूत्वा।
कालान्तरे विनश्यति तथा भूतगणेऽपि चैतन्यम् ॥ १०३ ॥ (१६५१)

Vasudhādi bhūta samudaya sambhūta cetaneti tava śaṅkā ।
Pratyekamadristā'pi khalu madyāṅgamada iva samudāye ॥102॥(1651)

Yathā madyāṅgeṣu mado viśvagadriṣto'pi samudaye bhūtvā ।
Kālāntare vinaśyati tathā bhūtagaṇe'pi caitanyam ॥103॥ (1651)]

Trans.—102–103 Your presumption is that consciousness *(cetana)* is produced from the collection *(samudaya)* of *bhūtas* like *prithivi* etc. because like intoxication *(mada)* though not found in each separate constituent, it is apprehended in the collection (of those constituents). Just as intoxication, though not present in each separate constituent of wine *(madya)* is produced in the collection of these constituents and disappears after a particular period of time, similarly consciousness *(caitanya)* is also produced in the collection of *bhūtas* and perishes as time passes (1650–1651).

टीका–वसुधा पृथ्वी, आदिशब्दादप्–तेजो–वायु–परिग्रहः, वसुधादय एव भवन्तीति कृत्वा भूतानि वसुधादिभूतानि, तेषां समुदयः परस्परमीलन-परिणतिवसुधादिभूतसभूदयः, तस्मात् प्रागसती संभूता संजाता, चेतनेत्येवं-भूता तव शङ्का । सा च चेतना पृथिव्यादिभूतेषु प्रत्येकावस्थायामदृष्टापि धातकीकुसुम–गुडो-दकादिषु मद्याङ्गेषु मद इव तत्समुदाये संभूतेति प्रत्यक्षत एव दृश्यते । तदेवमन्वयद्वारेण चेतनाया भूतसमुदायधर्मता दर्शिता । अथ व्यतिरेकद्वारेण तस्यास्तां दर्शयितुमाह—" जह मज्जंगेसु इत्यादि " यथा मद्याङ्गेषु मदभावः प्रत्येकावस्थायामदृष्टोऽपि तत्समुदाये भूत्वा ततः कियन्तमपि कालं स्थित्वा कालान्तरे तथाविधसामग्रीवशात् कृतश्चिद् विनश्यति,तथा भूतगणेऽपि प्रत्यकसमचैतन्यं भूत्वा ततः कालान्तरे विनश्यति। ततोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां निश्चीयते–भूतधर्म एष चैतन्यम् ।

इदमत्र हृदयम्–यत् समुदायिषु प्रत्येकं नोपलभ्यते तत्समुदाये चोपलभयते, तत तत्समुदायमात्रधर्म एव, यथा मद्याङ्गसमुदायधर्मो मदः । स हि मद्याङ्गेषु विश्वग्नोपलभ्यते, तत्समुदाये चोपलभ्यते, अतस्तद्धर्मः । एवं चेतनापि भूतसमुदाये भवति, पृथग् न भवति, अतस्तद्धर्मः ।

धर्म–धर्मिणोश्चाभेद एव, भेदे घट-पटयोरिव धर्मि-धर्मभावाप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मात् स एव जीवस्तदेव च शरीरम् । वाक्यान्तरेषु पुनः शरीराद् भिन्नः श्रूयते जीवः, तद्यथा " तहि वै स शरीरस्य प्रियाऽप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति, अशरीरं वा वसन्तं प्रियाप्रिये न स्पृशतः " इत्यादि । ततस्तव संशय इति ॥ १०२–१०३ (१६५०–१६५१) ॥

D. C—According to your presumption *cetanā* is produced from the *samudāya* of *bhūtas* such as *prithvî*, *aptejas*, *vāyu* etc. Just as *mada* cannot be seen in each separate constituent *e. g*, *dhātakî* flower, jaggery etc, of the wine, but it can be produced only when all those constituents are combined together. In the same way, *cetanā* is recognized in the *samudāya* of *bhūtas* only and not in a separate constituent like *prithvî*. So, *cetanâ* becomes the quality of the *samudāya* of *bhūtas*. Again, this *cetanâ*, after being produced in the *samudâya* of *bhūtas* perishes after naving stayed for some time, just as the quality of *mada* after being produced in the combination of the constituents of wine vanishes as time passes. Thus it is proved by means of *anvaya* as well as *vyatireka* in the above two cases that *caitanya* is a *dharma* of the *samudâya* of *bhūtas*.

Again, that which is not present in a constitution of *samudāya* but in the *samudāya* itself becomes the quality of *samudāya* only, and not of a constituent. So, *caitanya* being found only in *samudāya* and not in each of its individual constituents becomes a *dharma* of the *samudāya* of *bhūtas*, as *mada* becomes a *dharma* of the *samudāya* of *madyāṅgas*. Now, there can be no distinction between *dharma* and *dharmin*. For if they were distinct they could not be related as *dharma* and *dharmin*. *Sarîra* is nothing but the *samudāya* of *bhūtas* and *jîva* is formed of *cetanā*. Hence *jîva* and *s'arîra* are nothing but *dharma* and *dharmin* and as such they should be considered as one and the same.

Now, on the other hand there are several *Veda–padas* which establish *jîva* to be distinct from *s'arîra e. g.* " *Na hi*

vai sa-s'arîsya priyâpriyayo r-apahatirasti, a-s'arîram vâ vasantam priyâpriye na spṛs'ataḥ." And that is the reason why you have raised this doubt.

The doubt is refuted as follows :—

पत्तेयमभावाओ न रेणुतेल्लं व समुदये चेया ।
मज्जङ्गेसु तु मओ वीसुं पि न सव्वसो नत्थि ॥१०४॥ (१६५२)

भमि-धणि-वितण्हयाई पत्तेयं पि हु जहा मयंगेसु ।
तह जइ भूएसु भवे चेया तो समुदये होज्जा ॥१०५॥(१६५३)

Patteyamabhāvāo na reṇutellam va samudaye ceyā ।
Majjaṅgesu tu mao vîsum pi na savvaso natthi ॥ 104 ॥ (1652)

Bhami-dhaṇi-vitaṇhayāî patteyam pi hu jahā mayaṅgesu ।
Taha jai bhūesu bhave ceyā to samudaye hojjā ॥ 105 ॥ (1653)

[प्रत्येकमभावाद् न रेणुतैलमिव समुदये चेतना ।
मद्याङ्गेषु तु मदो विष्वगपि न सर्वशो नास्ति ॥ १०४ ॥ (१६५२)

भ्रमि–ध्राणि–वितृष्णतादयः प्रत्येकमपि खलु यथा मदाङ्गेषु ।
तथा यदि भूतेषु भवेच्चेतना ततः समुदये भवेत् ॥ १०५ ॥ (१६५३)

Pratyekamabhāvād na reṇutailamiva samudaye cetanā ।
Madyāṅgeṣu tu mado viṣvagapi na sarvaśo nāsti ॥ 104 ॥ (1652)

Bhrami-dhrāṇi-vitriṣnatādayaḥ pratyekamapi khalu yathā madāṅgeṣu
Tathā yadi bhūteṣu bhaveccetanā tataḥ samudaye bhavet ॥105॥ (1653)

Trans.—104–105 Consciousness *(cetanā)* can never exist in a collection if it is absent in case of (its) individual constituents, just as oil cannot be found in a collection of sands if it is not present in each individual particle of the sand. Again, intoxication *(mada)* is not absolutely absent even in an individual constituent of wine. (For), every constituent (of wine) possesses some capacity or other like that of inducing

insanity, producing satiety and quenching thirst etc. in its individual state. If consciousness were present in (each of the) *bhūtas* (separately), it could be (found) in the collection (also) (1652–1653).

टीका–" न समुदये चेय त्ति " न भूतसमुदयमात्रप्रभवा चेतना, " पत्तेयमभावाउ त्ति " भूतप्रत्येकावस्थायां तस्या अंशतोऽपि सर्वथाऽनुपलब्धेरित्यर्थः । किं यथा किंप्रभवं न भवति ? इत्याह—" न रेणुतेल्लं व त्ति " यथा प्रत्येकं सवर्थाऽनुपलम्भाद् रेणुकणसमुदायप्रभवं तैलं न भवतीत्यर्थः । प्रयोगः—यद् येषु पृथगवस्थायां सर्वथा नोपलभ्यते तत् तेषां समुदायेऽपि न भवति, यथा सिकताकणसमुदाये तैलम्, यत्तु तेषां समुदाये भवति न तस्य पृथग् व्यवस्थितेषु तेषु सर्वथाऽनुपलम्भः, यथैकैकतिलावस्थायां तैलस्य, सर्वथा नोपलभ्यते च भूतेषु प्रत्येकावस्थायां चेतना, तस्माद् नासौ तत्समुदायमात्रप्रभवा, किन्त्वर्थापत्तेरेवान्यत् किमपि जीवलक्षणं कारणान्तरं भूतसमुदायातिरिक्तं तत्र संघट्टितं, यत इयं प्रभवतीति प्रतिपत्तव्यम् । आह— " प्रत्येकावस्थायां सर्वथाऽनुपलम्भात् " इत्यनैकान्तिकोऽयं हेतुः, । प्रत्येकावस्थायां सर्वथाऽनुपलब्धस्यापि मदस्य मद्याङ्गसमुदाये दर्शनात्, इत्याशङ्क्याह—" मज्जंगेसु इत्यादि " धातकीकुसुमादिषु मद्याङ्गेषु पुनर्विष्वक् पृथग् न सर्वथा मदो नास्ति, अपि तु या च यावती च मदमात्रा पृथगपि तेष्वस्त्येवेत्यर्थः । ततो नानैकान्तिकता हेतोरिति ।

टीका–यथा प्रत्येकावस्थायां धातकीकुसुमेषु या च यावती च भ्रमिश्चितभ्रमापादनशक्तिरस्ति, गुड-द्राक्षे-क्षुरसादिषु पुनर्घ्राणिरतृप्तिजननशक्तिरस्ति, उदके तु वितृष्णताकरणशक्तिरस्ति, आदिशब्दादन्येष्वपि मद्याङ्गेष्वन्यापि यथासंभवं शक्तिर्वाच्या, तथा तेनैव प्रकारेण व्यस्तेष्वपि पृथिव्यादिभूतेषु यदि काचिच्चैतन्यशक्तिरभविष्यत्, तदा तत्समुदाये संपूर्णा स्पष्टा चेतना स्यात्, न चैतदस्ति, तस्माद् न भूतसमुदायमात्रप्रभवेयमिति ॥ १०४–१०५ (१६५२–५३) ॥

D. C.—Since *cetanā* is not present in the individual state of a *bhūta*, even to a limited extent, it can never be found in

the combination of the *bhūtas* also, just as oil cannot be found in a *samudāya* of sands when it is not present in each individual particle of sand. From this, a rule can be deduced that whatever is absent in an individual state should be absent in the collective state also, and whatever is present in collection should be present in the individual also, *e. g.*, oil when present its *prithak avasthā* of *sesamum* is found in its collective state also.

In the present case, *cetanā* is not found in the *prithak avasthâ* of *bhūtas* and hence it is improper to accept that *cetanā* is produced in the *samudāya* of *bhūtas*. Really speaking, it is produced by some other cause totally different from *bhūta-samudāya*. That cause is nothing else but *jîva* which is *amūrta* on account of the *amūrta cetanā*.

Here again, the opponent may argue that the above-mentioned rule is wrong. For, *mada* is not found in the individual state of a constituent like *dhātakî puṣpa* of the *madya*; and yet the quality of intoxication does exist in its *samudāya*. But it is not proper to say that *mada-bhāva* is altogether absent from *dhātakî puṣpa* etc. For, *mada* does exist in the individual state to a certain extent. A *dhātakî puṣpa* can induce insanity in its individual capacity; the juice of jaggery, vine, sugar-cane etc. can produce contentment and water can quench the thirst. By the word "*âdi*" other constituents of wine should also be included, as they too, possess some capacity or the other as far as possible. Now, if *caitanya-śakti* were present in the individual *bhūtas* like *prithvî* etc. even to a limitted extent, *caitanya* would certainly have been manifested in their combination also. But when *cetanā* is absent in the very *prithak* state, it can never be produced in the combined state.

Now, what would happen if the constituents of wine had no power of intoxication at all ?

जइ वा सव्वाभावो वीसुं तो किं तदंगनियमोऽयं ।
तस्समुदयनियमो वा अन्नेसु वि तो हवेज्जाहि ॥१०६॥ (१६५४)

Jai vā savvābhāvo vîsum to kim tadaṅganiyamo'yam ।
Tassamudayaniyamo vā annesu vi to havejjāhi ॥ 106 ॥ (1654)

[यदि वा सर्वाभावो विष्वक् ततः किं तदङ्गनियमोऽयं ।
तस्समुदयनियमो वाऽन्येष्वपि ततो भवेत् ॥ १०६ ॥ (१६५४)

Yadi vā sarvābhāvo viṣvak tataḥ kim tadaṅganiyamo'yam ।
Tassamudayaniyamo vā'nyeṣvapi tato bhavet ॥ 106 ॥ (1654)]

Trans.—106 Or, if the power of intoxication were altogether absent from all (the constituents of wine) individually, how could they be called its divisions at all ? and why should there be any rule regarding its collection also ? (For), in that case it must be produced by means of (the collection) other objects also. (1654)

टीका–यदि च मद्याङ्गेषु पृथगवस्थायां सर्वथैव मदशक्त्यभावः, तर्हि कोऽयं तदङ्गनियमः—कोऽयं धातकीकुसुमादीनां मद्याङ्गतानियमः, तत्समुदायनियमो वा–किमिति मद्यार्थी धातकीकुसुमादीन्येवान्वेषयति, तत्समुदायं किमपि नियमेन मीलयति ? इत्यर्थः, नन्वन्येष्वपि च भस्मा-ऽश्म-गोमयादिषु समुदितेषु मद्यं भवेदिति ॥ १०६ (१६५४) ॥

D. C.—If the power of inoxication is denied to exist in the *prithak avasthā* of the constituents like *dhātakî puṣpa* etc, they cannot be called the constituents of wine at all. Again, if *dhātakî puṣpa* etc, had no power of intoxication at all, why should people desirous of wine, collect all the constituents like *dhātakî puṣpa* in order to prepare wine ? and why do they not prepare wine by combining other objects like ashes, stones, cowdung, etc ? This clearly indicates that the power of intoxication does exist in the individual state of constituents like *dhātakî puṣpa* etc, and as a result of that, it appears in wine which is the combined state of all such constituents.

At this point, an opponent may advance the following argument :—

भूयाणं पत्तेयं पि चेयणा समुदए दरिसणाओ ।
जह मज्जंगेसु मओ मइ त्ति हेऊ न सिद्धोऽयं ॥१०७॥(१६५५)

Bhūyāṇam patteyam pi ceyaṇā samudae darisaṇāo ।
Jaha majjaṅgesu mao mai tti heū na siddho'yam ॥ 107॥ (1655)

[भूतानां प्रत्येकमपि चेतना समुदये दर्शनात् ।
यथा मद्याङ्गेषु मदो मतिरिति हेतुर्न सिद्धोऽयम् ॥ १०७ ॥ (१६५५)

Bhūtānām pratyekampi cetanā samudaye darśanāt ।
Yathā madyāṅgeṣu mado matiriti heturna siddho'yam ॥107॥(1655)]

*Trans.*107 Since consciousness is found in the collection of *bhūtas*, if an argument is advanced that consciousness is present in each individual *bhūta* also as intoxication is present in various constituents of wine, it can never be approved of. (1655).

टीका–स्यात् परस्य मतिः—साधूक्तं यत्–पृथगपि मद्याङ्गेषु किञ्चिद् मदसामर्थ्यमस्तीति। एतदेव हि मम भूतेषु व्यस्तावस्थायां चैतन्यास्तित्वसिद्धावुदाहरणं भविष्यति, तथाहि–व्यस्तेष्वपि भूतेषु चैतन्यमस्ति, तत्समुदाये तद्दर्शनात्, मद्याङ्गेषु मदवदिति। यथा मद्याङ्गेषु मदः पृथगल्पत्वाद् नातिस्पष्टः, तत्समुदाये त्वभिव्यक्तिमेति, तथा भूतेष्वपि पृथगवस्थायामणीयसी चेतना, तत्समुदाये तु भूयसीयमिति। अत्रोत्तरमाह–"हेऊ न सिद्धोऽयमिति" "चेतनाया भूतसमुदाये दर्शनात्" इत्यसिद्धोऽयं हेतुरित्यर्थः, आत्मनो भूतसमुदायान्तर्गतत्वेन चेतनायास्तद्धर्मत्वात्, आत्माभावे च तत्समुदायेऽपि तदसिद्धेरसिद्धोऽयं हेतुरिति भावः। यदि हि भूतसमुदायमात्रधर्मश्चेतना भवेत् तदा मृतशरीरेऽप्युपलभ्येत। वायोस्तदानीं तत्राभावात् तदनुपलम्भ इति चेत्। नैवम्, नलिकादिप्रयोगतस्तत्प्रक्षेपेऽपि तदनुपलब्धेः। तेजस्तदानीं तत्र नास्तीति चेत्। न, तत्प्रक्षेपेऽपि तदनुपलम्भात्। विशिष्टतेजो–वाय्व-

भावादनुपलम्भ इति चेत् । किं नामात्मसत्त्वं विहायाऽन्यत् तद्वैशिष्ट्यम् ? ननु संज्ञान्तरेणात्मसत्त्वमेव त्वयापि प्रतिपादितं स्यादिति ॥१०७(१६५५)॥

D. C.—An opponent may advance the following line of argument:—

As *mada* is present in each separate constituent of wine, it is found in the *samudāya* of those *bhūtas* also. In the same way, it can be said that since *cetanā* is completely manifested in the collection of *bhūtas* it should be present in each independent *bhūta* at least to a certain extent. Just as *mada* is not clearly perceptible in its individual state, but distinct in the *samudāya*, so also, *cetanā* is not clearly perceptible in the individual state on account of its minute form, but it is more distinct in the collective state.

But it is not in the fitness of things to state that because *cetanā* is found in the *bhūta samudāya* it should be present in each individual *bhūta* also, as *cetanā* is the quality of Soul and the Soul is contained within (*antargata*) the *bhūta samudāya*. So, if *ātman* is absent from the *bhūta samudāya*, *cetanā* cannot exist in the *samudāya*. Thus, your argument that *cetanā* is found in the collection of *bhūtas* is not valid. For, if *cetanā* were taken to be a quality of mere *bhūta samudāya* it ought to be found in a dead body also. Here again, it is improper to advance an excuse that *cetanā* is absent in a dead body on account of the absence of *vāyu*. For, *cetanā* could never be found in a dead body, even if *vāyu* were made to enter the body by means of a pipe etc. Similarly, if it is argued that *cetanā* does not exist in a dead body due to the absence of *tejas*, *tejas* also could be made to enter the dead body by the same sort of means and proved that *cetanā* is absent in that case also. Lastly, if it is said that on account of the non-existence of a peculiar type of *vāyu* and *tejas*, *cetanā* is absent from a dead body, the peculiarity in the case would be due to nothing else but the excellence of *ātman* which would automatically mean that you admit the existence of *ātman*.

णणु पच्चक्खविरोहो गोयम ! तं णाणुमाणभावाओ ।
तुह पच्चक्खविरोहो पत्तेयं भूयचेयं त्ति ॥ १०८ ॥ (१६५६)

Naṇu paccakkhaviroho Goyama ! tam nāṇumāṇabhāvāo ।
Tuha paccakkhaviroho patteyam bhūyaceyam tti ॥ 108 ॥ (1656)

[ननु प्रत्यक्षविरोधो गौतम ! तद् नानुमानभावात् ।
तव प्रत्यक्षविरोधः प्रत्येकं भूतचेतनेति ॥ १०८ ॥ (१६५६)

Nanu pratyakśavirodho Gautama ! tad nānumāna bhāvāt ।
Tava pratyakśavirodhaḥ pratyekam bhūtacetaneti ॥ 108 ॥ (1656)]

Trans.—108 Certainly *O Gautama !* that is not an evident contradiction (as you think) on account of the existence of *anumāna.* (On the contrary), your assumption that *cetanā* exists in each and every *bhūta* constituents is an evident contradiction. (1656)

टीका–ननु प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धमेवेदं यत्—भूतसमुदाये सत्युपलभ्यमानापि चेतना न तत्समुदायस्येत्यभिधीयते । न हि घटे रूपादय उपलभ्यमाना न घटस्येति वक्तुमुचितम् । तदयुक्तम् , यतो न भू–जलसमुदायमात्रे उपलभ्यमाना अपि हरितादयस्तन्मात्रप्रभवा इति शक्यते वक्तुम् । तद्बीजसाधकानुमानेन बाध्यतेऽसावुपलम्भ इति चेत् । तदेतदिहापि समानम् । एतदेवाह— " गोयमेत्यादि " वायुभूतेरपीन्द्रभूतिसोदर्यभ्रातृत्वेन समानगोत्रत्वाद् गौतम ! इत्येवमामन्त्रणम् , यत्त्वं ब्रूषे—तदेतद् न, भूतसमुदायातिरिक्तात्मसाधकानुमानसद्भावात् , ततस्तेनैव त्वत्प्रत्यक्षस्य बाधितत्वादिति भावः । प्रत्युत तवैव प्रत्यक्षविरोधः । किं कुर्वतः ? इत्याह " पत्तेयं भूयचेयं त्ति " 'ब्रुवतः' इति शेषः । प्रत्येकावस्थायां पृथिव्यादिभूतेषु चैतन्याभावस्यैव दर्शनात् तदस्तित्वं प्रत्यक्षेणैव बाध्यत इति " प्रत्येकं भूतेषु चेतना " इति ब्रुवतस्तवैव प्रत्यक्षविरोध इत्यर्थः ॥ १०८ (१६५६) ॥

D. C.—Vāyubhūti—That *cetanā* though perceived in a collection of *bhūtas,* does not belong to the *bhūta samudāya* seems to be incongruent. For, just as it is improper to assert

that qualities like *rūpa* etc. seen in a *ghaṭa*, do not belong to the *ghaṭa*, so here also, it is not proper to state that *cetanā* though apprehended in a collection of *bhūtas*, does not belong to the *bhūta samudāya*.

Ācārya—The argument advanced by you, *O Gautama !* is absolutely invalid. Just as vegetables etc. found in a collection of earth and water can never be considered to have been produced from the collection of earth and water, since they are produced from their seeds; in the same way, *cetanā* also should never be taken to have been produced from the collection of *bhūtas* though it is found in a body made of *bhūtas* such as *prithvi* etc. For, that *cetanā* is produced from *ātman* which is altogether distinct from the *bhūta samudāya*. Thus, there is no contradiction in my argument. But the contradiction lies in your assertion that *cetanā* is produced in each and every individual *bhūta*.

भूइंदियोवलद्धाणुसरणओ तेहिं भिन्नरूवस्स ।
चेया पंचगवक्खोवलद्धपुरिसस्स वा सरओ ॥ १०९ ॥ (१६५६)

Bhūindiyovaladdhāṇusaraṇao tehim bhinnarūvassa ।
Ceyā pancagavakkhovaladdhapurisassa vā sarao ॥ 109 ॥ (1657)

[भूतेन्द्रियोपलब्धानुस्मरणतस्तेभ्यो भिन्नरूपस्य ।
चेतना पञ्चगवाक्षोपलब्धपुरुषस्येव स्मरतः ॥ १०९ (१६५७) ॥

Bhūtendriyopalabdhānusmaraṇatastebhyo bhinnarūpasya ।
Cetanā pancagavākṣopalabdha puruṣasyeva smarataḥ ॥109॥ (1657)]

Trans.—109 Like a man who perceives (an object) from five windows and recalls (it) to his mind, *cetanā* being itself (the quality) of an object different from them *(i. e., bhūtas)* perceives (an object) by means of sense-organs (in the form) of *bhūtas* and recalls (the object) to his mind. (1657)

टीका–तेभ्यो भूतेन्द्रियेभ्यो भिन्नरूपस्य कस्यापि धर्मश्चेतनेति प्रतिज्ञा ।

भूतेन्द्रियोपलब्धार्थानुस्मरणादिति हेतुः। यथा पञ्चभिर्गवाक्षैरुपलब्धानर्थाननुस्मरतस्तदतिरिक्तस्य कस्यापि देवदत्तादेः पुरुषस्य चेतनेति दृष्टान्तः। अयमत्र तात्पर्यार्थः—इह य एको यैरनेकैरुपलब्धानर्थाननुस्मरति स तेभ्यो भेदवान् दृष्टः, यथा पञ्चभिर्गवाक्षैरुपलब्धानर्थाननुस्मरन् देवदत्तः, यश्च यस्माद् भूतेन्द्रियात्मकसमुदायाद् भिन्नो न भवति, किं तर्हि ? अनन्यः, नायमेकोऽनेकोपलब्धानामर्थानामनुस्मर्ता, यथा शब्दादिग्राहकमनोविज्ञानविशेषः, तैरुपलभ्यानुस्मरतोऽपि च तदनतिरिक्तत्वे देवदत्तस्यापि गवाक्षमात्रप्रसङ्गो बाधकं प्रमाणम्। इन्द्रियाण्येवोपलभन्ते, न पुनस्तैरन्य उपलभत इति चेत्। न, " तदुपरमेऽपि तदुपलब्धार्थानुस्मरणात्, तद्व्यापारे च कदाचिदनुपलम्भात् " इत्यनन्तरमेव वक्ष्यमाणत्वादिति ॥ १०९ (१६५७) ॥

D. C.—The point is that *cetanā* who remembers an object perceived by its sense-organs in the form of *bhūtas*, becomes the quality of something which is different from those *bhūtendriyas*, just as *Devadatta* who remembers an object perceived through five windows by means of five *indriyas*, is distinct from those windows. So, that which is not *bhinna* from the *samudāya* of *bhūtendriyas*, can never remember an object apprehended by more than one means. For, after having perceived an object through a number of means, if *cetanā* were *abhinna* from those means, then *Devadatta* who recognizes an object through a number of windows, would become the window itself.

Again, in recognizing an object it is improper to say that mere *indriyas* (sense-organs) apprehend the object and nothing else. For, even when the *indriyas* have ceased working the object perceived by them is recalled; and sometimes, in spite of their working, the object is not apprehended.

तदुवरमे वि सरणओ तव्वावारे वि नोवलंभाओ ।
इंदियभिन्नस्स मई पंचगवक्खाणुभविणो व्व ॥ ११० ॥ (१६५८)

Taduvarame vi saraṇao tavvāvāre vi novalambhāo।
Indiyabhinnassa maî pancagavakkhāṇubhaviṇo vva ॥ 110 ॥ (1658)

[तदुपरमेऽपि स्मरणतस्तव्यापारेऽपि नोपलम्भात्।
इन्द्रियभिन्नस्य मतिः पञ्चगवाक्षानुभविन इव ॥ ११० ॥ (१६५८)

Taduparame'pi smaraṇatastadvyāpāre'pi nopalambhāt।
Indriyabhinnasya matiḥ pancagavākśānubhavina iva ॥110॥ (1658)]

Trans.—110. As in the case of a person perceiving (an object) from five windows, cognition (in the form of knowledge) is distinct from sense-organs; because an object apprehended by the sense-organs is remembered even when the *indriyas* have ceased working and (sometimes) in spite of their working, the object is not perceived. (1658)

टीका–इन्द्रियेभ्यो भिन्नस्यैव कस्यापीयं घटादिज्ञानलक्षणा मतिरिति प्रतिज्ञा। तदुपरमेऽपि–अन्धत्व–बाधिर्याद्यवस्थायामिन्द्रियव्यापाराभावेऽपि, तद्द्वारेणोपलब्धानामर्थानामनुस्मरणादिति हेतुः। अथवा, अस्यामेव प्रतिज्ञायां तद्व्यापारेऽपि–इन्द्रियव्यापृतावपि कदाचिदनुपयुक्तावस्थायाम्, वस्त्वनुलम्भादित्यपरो हेतुः। यदि हीन्द्रियाण्येव द्रष्टृणि भवेयुः, तर्हि किमिति विस्फारिताक्षस्यापि प्रगुणश्रोत्रादीन्द्रियवर्गस्यापि योग्यदेशस्थितानामपि रूप-शब्दादिवस्तूनामनुपयुक्तस्य अन्यमनस्कस्य शून्यचित्तस्योपलम्भो न भवति ?। ततो ज्ञायते—इन्द्रियग्रामव्यतिरिक्तस्यैव कस्यचिदयमुपलम्भः, यथा पञ्चभिर्गवाक्षैर्योषिदादिवस्तून्यनुभवितुर्दर्शकस्येति दृष्टान्तः।

अत्रापि प्रयोगाभ्यां तात्पर्यमुपदर्श्यते, तद्यथा–इह यो यदुपरमेऽपि यैरुपलब्धानामर्थानामनुस्मर्ता स तेभ्यो व्यतिरिक्तो दृष्टः, यथा गवाक्षैरुपलब्धानामर्थानां गवाक्षोपरमेऽपि देवदत्तः, अनुस्मरति चायमात्माऽन्ध–बधिरत्वादिकालेऽपीन्द्रियोपलब्धानर्थान्, अतः स तेभ्योऽर्थान्तरमिति। तथा, इन्द्रियेभ्यो व्यतिरिक्त आत्मा, तव्यापारेऽप्यर्थानुपलम्भात्, इह यो यद्व्यापारेऽपि यैरुपलभ्यानर्थान् नोपलभते स तेभ्यो भिन्नो दृष्टः, यथाऽस्थगितगवाक्षोऽप्यन्यमनस्कतयाऽनुपयुक्तोऽपश्यंस्तेभ्यो देवदत्त इति॥ ११० (१६५८) ॥

D. C.—Cognition *(mati)* which constitutes the knowledge of *ghaṭa* etc., belongs to something which is distinct from sense-organs. For, even if the senses are benumbed as in the state of deafness, blindness etc., the object perceived by the *indriyas* is remembered, while on the other side, even if the senses are working, the object is not recognized.

Now, if the sense-organ itself were to apprehend an object, how is it that an absent-minded man is not able to apprehend an object even with open eyes, efficient ears and substances of *rūpa* and *śabda* placed at proper places ? It follows, therefore, that some one, who like a person looking at an object like a woman from five windows, is different from the sense-organs, is able to apprehend it. A rule can be deduced from this that one who remembers an object even after its *indriyas* have ceased working is distinct from those *indriyas.* When *Devadatta* recalls an object seen through a number of windows even after the windows are closed, it is *ātman,* who remembers the object perceived by sense-organs even when the sense-organs have ceased working as in the state of blindness, deafness etc. This proves that *ātman* is different from *indriyas.* Again, that which does not recognize an object even if the *indriyas* are working, is different from the sense-organs like an absent-minded *Devadatta* looking through the open windows.

उवलब्भन्नेण विगारगहणओ तद्दहिओ धुवं अत्थि ।
पुव्वावरवातायणगहणविगाराइपुरिसो व्व ॥ १११ ॥ (१६५९)

Uvalabbhanneṇa vigāragahaṇao tadahio dhuvam atthi ।
Puvvāvaravātāyaṇagahaṇavigārāipuriso vva ॥ 111 ॥ (1659)

[**उपलभ्यान्येन विकारग्रहणतस्तदधिको ध्रुवमस्ति ।**
पूर्वापरवातायनग्रहणविकारादिपुरुष इव ॥ १११ ॥ (१६५९)

Upalabhyānyena vikāragrahaṇatastadadhiko dhruvamasti ।
Pūrvāparavātāyanagrahaṇavikārādipuruṣa iva ॥ 111 ॥ (1659)]

Trans.—111 Just as a person apprehending (an object) from an eastward window and perverting himself (due to its sight) at the opposite window, is different from those windows, so also, the soul who apprehends (an object) by means of one (sense-organ) and exhibits perversion by means of another is decidedly different from those sense organs. (1659)

टीका–इह ध्रुवं निश्चितं तदधिकस्तेभ्य इन्द्रियेभ्यः समधिको भिन्नः समस्ति जीवः, अन्येनोपलभ्यान्येन विकारग्रहणात्, इह योऽन्येनोपलभ्यान्येन विकारं प्रतिपद्यते स तस्माद् भिन्नो दृष्टः, यथा प्रवरप्रासादोपरीतस्ततः पदपरिपाटीं कुर्वाणः पूर्ववातायनेन रमणीमवलोक्यापरवातायनेन समागतायास्तस्याः करादिना कुचस्पर्शादिविकारमुपदर्शयन् देवदत्तः, तथा चायमात्मा चक्षुषाऽम्लीकामश्नन्तं दृष्ट्वा रसनेन हृल्लास–लालास्रावादिविकारं प्रतिपद्यते, तस्मात् तयोर्भिन्न इति। अथवा, ग्रहणशब्दमिहाऽऽदानपर्यायं कृत्वाऽन्यथानुमानं विधीयते–इन्द्रियेभ्यो व्यतिरिक्त आत्मा, अन्येनोपलभ्यान्येन ग्रहणात्, इह य आदेयं घटादिकमर्थमन्येनोपलभ्यान्येन गृह्णाति स ताभ्यां भेदवान् दृष्टः, यथा पूर्ववातायनेन घटादिकमुपलभ्यापरवातायनेन गृह्णानस्ताभ्यां देवदत्तः, गृह्णाति च चक्षुषोपलब्धं घटादिकमर्थं हस्तादिना जीवः, ततस्ताभ्यां भिन्न इति ॥ १११ (१६५९) ॥

D. C.—Jīva who apprehends an object by means of one *indriya* and exhibits *vikāras* by means of another, is *bhinna* from both the *indriyas*. Just as *Devadatta* who looks at a woman from an eastward window and exhibits his perversion of the sight of *stanasparśa* etc, by her hands at the other is really speaking different from both the windows; in the same way, the Soul who observes a person eating tamarind by means of eyes and exhibits *vikāras* in the form of distilling *saliva* etc, by means of tongue, is decidedly different from both. Or, *ātman* is different from *indriyas* because having seen an object by means of eyes, *ātman* holds it by means of hands.

Another inference,

सव्वेंदिउवलद्धाणुसरणओ तदहिओऽणुमंतव्वो ।
जह पंचभिन्नविन्नाणपुरिसविन्नाणसंपन्नो ॥ ११२ ॥ (१६६०)

Savvendiuvaladdhāṇusaraṇao tadahio'ṇumantavvo ।
Jaha pancabhinnavinnāṇapurisavinnāṇasampanno ॥ 112 ॥ (1660)

[सर्वेन्द्रियोपलब्धानुस्मरणतस्तदधिकोऽनुमन्तव्यः ।
यथा पञ्चभिन्नविज्ञानपुरुषविज्ञानसंपन्नः ॥ ११२ ॥ (१६६०)

Sarvendriyopalabdhānusmaraṇatastadadhiko'numantavyaḥ ।
Yathā pancabhinnavijnāna puruṣavijnānasampannaḥ ॥112॥ (1660)]

Trans.—112 Just as from five different persons having five different *vijnānas* a sixth person possessing all the five *vijnānas* is different, so also, the soul who remembers an object cognized by all the sense-organs should be inferred as being distinct from them. (1660)

टीका–सर्वेन्द्रियोपलब्धार्थानुस्मरणतः कारणात् तदधिकोऽस्ति जीवः । दृष्टान्तमाह—यथा पञ्च च ते भिन्नविज्ञानाश्च पञ्चभिन्नविज्ञाना इच्छावशात् प्रत्येकं स्पर्श-रस-गन्ध-रूप–शब्दोपयोगवन्त इत्यर्थः, पञ्चभिन्नविज्ञानाश्च ते पुरुषाश्च पञ्चभिन्नविज्ञानपुरुषास्तेषां यानि स्पर्शादिविषयाणि विज्ञानानि तैः संपन्नस्तद्वेत्ता यः षष्ठः पुरुषस्तेभ्यः पञ्चभ्यो भिन्नः । इदमत्र तात्पर्यम्—य इह यैरुपलब्धानामर्थानामेकोऽनुस्मर्ता स तेभ्यो भिन्नो दृष्टः, यथेच्छानुविधायिशब्दादिभिन्नजातीयविज्ञानपुरुषपञ्चकात् तदशेषविज्ञानाभिज्ञः पुमान्, इच्छानुविधायिशब्दादिभिन्नजातीयविज्ञानेन्द्रियपञ्चकाशेषविज्ञानवेत्ता चायमेक आत्मा, तस्मादिन्द्रियपञ्चकाद् भिन्न एवेति। शब्दादिभिन्नविज्ञानपुरुषपञ्चस्येव पृथगिन्द्रियाणामुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गतोऽनिष्टापादनाद् विरुद्धोऽयं हेतुरिति चेत्। न, इच्छानुविधायिविशेषणात्, इच्छायाश्चेन्द्रियाणामसंभवात्, सहकारिकारणतयोपलब्धिकारणमात्रताया इन्द्रियेष्वपि सद्भावात्, उपचारतस्तेषामुप्युपलब्धेरविरोधाददोषः । किञ्च, प्रतिपत्युपायमात्रमेवैतत्, न ह्यतीन्द्रियेष्वर्थेष्वेकान्तेनैव युक्त्यन्वेषणपरैर्भाव्यम्; उक्तं च—

आगमश्चोपपत्तिश्च संपूर्णं दृष्टिकारणम् ।
अतीन्द्रियाणामर्थानां सद्भावप्रतिपत्तये ॥१॥ इति ॥ ११२ (१६६०) ॥

D. C.—Since *jîva* remembers an object perceived by all the sense-organs, *jîva* should be distinguished from *indriyas*. From five different persons possessing five different *vijnānas* such as *sparśa*, *rasa* etc, according to their will, a sixth *puruṣa* having all the five *vijnānas* together is distinguished. In the same way, the Soul that possesses the cognizance of all the five sense-organs, should be distinguished from each of the five sense-organs. In short, one who is the only *anusmartā* of the objects cognized, is distinguished from those by means of which the objects are perceived.

An objection may be raised at this point that like five different *puruṣas* having five different *vijnānas* such as *śabda*, *rasa*, etc, the five *indriyas* should also possess the power of cognizance. For, if they have no cognizance, the argument stated above would be *a-siddha*. But the contention is not *valid*. For, there would be no difficulty in this case by reason of the adjective " *icchāvasāt.* " *Indriyas* are not supposed to have any sort of desire. Or, by way of the co-operative cause the reason of perception lies in *indriyas* and hence there is no harm, if *indriyas* were metaphorically believed to be *jnāna* itself. Or, say, this illustration is nothing but a means to an end. Consequently, for the recognition of objects which are *atîndriya* (beyond perception) *āgama* and *yukti* are the only resorts. For it is said,

Agamaśco'papattiśca sampūrṇam dṛiśtikāraṇam;
Atîndriyāṇāmarthānām sadbhāva pratipattaye.

A few more inferences are laid down in support of the distinction of Soul,

विण्णाणंतरपुव्वं बालण्णाणमिह नाणभावाओ ।
जह बालनाणपुव्वं जुवनाणं तं च देहहिअं ॥ ११३ ॥ (१६६१)

Viṇṇāṇantarapuvvam bālaṇṇāṇamiha nāṇabhāvāo ।
Jaha bālanāṇapuvvam juvanāṇam tam ca dehahiam ॥113॥ (1661)

[विज्ञानान्तरपूर्वं बालज्ञानमिह ज्ञानभावात् ।
यथा बालज्ञानपूर्वं युवज्ञानं तच्च देहाधिकम् ॥ ११३ ॥ (१६६१)

Vijnānāntarapūrvam bālajnānamiha jnānabhāvat ।
Yathā bālajnānapūrvam yuvajnānam tacca dehādhikam ॥113॥ (1661)]

Trans.—113 Just as cognizance in youth is similar to cognizance in childhood, the latter is similar to other cognizances because of its being cognizance. And that (cognizance) is distinguished from *deha.* (1661)

टीका–अन्यविज्ञानपूर्वकमिदं बालविज्ञानम्, विज्ञानत्वात्, इह यद् विज्ञानं तदन्यविज्ञानपूर्वकम् दृष्टम्, यथा बालविज्ञानपूर्वकं युवविज्ञानम्, यद्विज्ञानपूर्वकं चेदं बालविज्ञानं, तच्छरीरादन्यदेव, पूर्वशरीरत्यागेऽपीहत्य-विज्ञानकारणत्वात्, तस्य च विज्ञानस्य गुणत्वेन गुणिनमात्मानमन्तरेणा-संभवात्, तच्छरीरव्यतिरिक्तमात्मानं व्यवस्यामः, न तु शरीरमेवात्मेति । विज्ञानत्वादिति प्रतिज्ञार्थैकदेशत्वादसिद्धो हेतुरिति चेत्। न, विशेषस्य पक्षी-कृतत्वात् । भवति च विशेषे पक्षीकृते सामान्यं हेतुः, यथाऽनित्यो वर्णात्मकः शब्दः, शब्दत्वात्, मेघशब्दवत् । एवमिहापि बालविज्ञानमन्यविज्ञानपूर्वक-मिति विशेषः पक्षीकृतः, न तु सामान्यविज्ञानमन्यविज्ञानपूर्वकमिति पक्षीकृतं, येन विज्ञानत्वादिति प्रतिज्ञार्थैकदेशः स्यात्, यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः, शब्द-त्यादित्वादि ॥ ११३ (१६६१) ॥

D. C.—Here the *bālajnāna* is similar to other *vijnānas* on account of its *vijnānatva.* Just as *yuvajnāna* resembles *bālajnāna,* the *vijnāna* to which the *bāla jnāna* resembles is distinguished from *deha* because it continues to be the cause of *vijnāna* even after it has left the former body. Now, since *vijnāna* is a quality, it cannot remain without a *guṇin viz, ātman;* consequently, we recognize *Ātman* to be distinct from body and not the body itself.

"*Vāyubhūti*—The *hetu vijnānatvāt*" stated by you becomes nothing but a portion of the proposition to be proved in that case.

Ācārya—It is not so. The particular is pointed out in this case; and when particular is emphasized, the *hetu* stated there-in is common *e. g.*, the *varṇātmaka śabda* is *anitya* because of its *śabdatva* as in the case of a *meghaśabda.* Similarly, in the proposition that *bālavijnāna* is similar to other *vijnānas*, only a particular case of *vijnāna* is emphasized and *vijnāna* in general is not emphasized, consequently this does not form a part of the proposition as it forms in the case of "*anityaḥ śabdaḥ śabdatvât.*"

पढमो थणाहिलासो अण्णाहाराहिलासपुव्वोऽयं ।
जह संपयाहिलासोऽणुभूइओ सो य देहाहिओ ॥११४॥ (१६६२)

Paḍhamo thaṇāhilāso aṇṇāhārāhilāsapuvvo'yam ।
Jaha sampayāhilāso'ṇubhūio so ya dehahio ॥ 114 ॥ (1662)]

[प्रथमः स्तनाभिलाषोऽन्याहाराभिलाषपूर्वोऽयम् ।
यथा सांप्रताभिलाषोऽनुभूतितः स च देहाधिकः ॥ ११४ ॥ (१६६२)

Prathamaḥ stanābhilāṣo'nyāhārābhilāṣapūrvo'yam ।
Yathā sāmpratābhilāṣo'nubhūtitaḥ sa ca dehādhikaḥ ॥114॥ (1662)]

Trans.—114 The first desire (of the child) to suck the breasts (of mother) is like the desire in the present case just similar to other desires for food on account of (the same) experience. And that desire is distinct from body. (1662)

टीका—गौतम ! आद्यः स्तनाभिलाषो बालस्यायमन्याभिलाषपूर्वकः, अनुभूतेः—अनुभवात्मकत्वात्, सांप्रताभिलाषवदिति । अथवा, "अभिलाषत्वात्" इत्ययमनुक्तोऽपि हेतुर्द्रष्टव्यः, इह योऽभिलाषः सोऽन्याभिलाषपूर्वको दृष्टः, यथा सांप्रताभिलाषः, यदभिलाषपूर्वकश्चायमाद्यः स्तनाभिलाषः स शरीरादन्य एव, पूर्वशरीरपरित्यागेऽपीहत्याभिलाषकारणत्वात् । ज्ञानगुणश्चा-

भिलाषो न गुणिनमन्तरेण संभवति। अतो यस्तस्याश्रयभूतो गुणी स शरीरातिरिक्त आत्मेति।

आह—नन्वनैकान्तिकोऽयम्, सर्वस्याऽप्यभिलाषपूर्वकत्वानुपपत्तेः। न हि मोक्षाभिलाषो मोक्षाभिलाषपूर्वको घटते। तदयुक्तम्, अभिप्रायापरिज्ञानात्, यो हि स्तनाभिलाषः स सामान्येनैवाभिलाषपूर्वक इत्येतदेवास्माभिरुच्यते, न पुनर्विशेषेण ब्रूमः—" स्तनाभिलाषोऽन्यस्तनाभिलाषपूर्वकः " इति। एवं च सामान्योक्तौ मोक्षाभिलाषपक्षेऽपि घटत एव, मोक्षाभिलाषस्यापि सामान्येनाऽन्याभिलाषपूर्वकत्वादिति॥ ११४ (१६६२)॥

D. C.—The first desire of the child to suck the breasts of the mother is just similar to the other *abhilāṣas* on account of its being an *abhilāṣa*. Now, the desire to which the child's *stanābhilāṣa* resembles is distinct from body, because it continues to be the cause of this *abhilāṣa* even after it has left the body. *Abhilāṣa* is the quality of knowledge which cannot exist without a support, which is nothing but the soul, independent of *deha*.

Vāyubhūti:—The *hetu* stated in the above-named *anumāna* involves the fault of uncertainty as all *abhilāṣas* are not the same. *e. g.*, an *abhilāṣa* for *mokṣa* does not resemble another *abhilāṣa* for *mokṣa*. So, why not to believe the same in the case of this *abhilāṣa* also?

The *Ācārya*:—You have not understood the point, *O Gautama!* The point is that we have compared the desire for breasts only with other desires in general. We have not stated in particular that the desire for breasts is just similar to other desires for breasts. Similarly, in the case of *mokṣābhilāṣa* also, the *mokṣābhilāṣa* should not be compared with other *mokṣābhilāṣas* but only with other *abhilāṣas* in general. (1662)

Another inference,

बालसरीरं देहंतरपुव्वं इन्दियाइमत्ताओ ।
जुवदेहो बालादिव स जस्स देहो स देहि त्ति ॥११५॥ (१६६३)

Bālasarîram dehantarapuvvam indiyāimattāo ।
Juvadeho bālādiva sa jassa deho sa dehi tti ॥ 115 ॥ (1663)

[बालशरीरं देहान्तरपूर्वमिन्द्रियादिमत्त्वात् ।
युवदेहो बालादिव स यस्य देहः स देहीति ॥ ११५ ॥ (१६६३)

Bālaśarîram dehāntarapūrvamindriyādimattvāt ।
Yuvadeho bālādiva sa yasya dehaḥ sa dehîti ॥ 115 ॥ (1663)]

Trans.—115 As the body in youth resembles the body in infancy, the body in infancy is just similar to other bodies because it possesses the sense-organs. One to whom that body belongs is the owner of body (and not the body itself). (1663).

टीका—बालशरीरं शरीरान्तरपूर्वकम्, इन्द्रियादिमत्त्वात्, इह यदिन्द्रियादिमत्, तदन्यदेहपूर्वकं दृष्टम्, यथा युवशरीरं बालदेहपूर्वकम्, यत्पूर्वकं चेदं बालशरीरं तदस्मात् शरीरादर्थान्तरम्, तदत्ययेऽपीहत्यशरीरोपादानात्, यस्य च तच्छशरीरं स भवान्तरयायीशरीरादर्थान्तरभूतो देहवानस्त्यात्मा, न पुनः शरीरमेवात्मेति सिद्धमिति ॥ ११५ (१६६३) ॥

D. C.—Just as a body in youth resembles a body in infancy, the body in infancy is just similar to other bodies because of its possessing the *indriyas*. Now, the body to which this *bālaśarîra* resembles is distinct from the latter, for this body rises up even if the former body has perished. Again, that to whom this body belongs is nothing but Soul, who travels from life to life, and who, being not the body itself, is distinct from this body.

Another inference,

अण्णसुह-दुक्खपुव्वं सुहाइ बालस्स संपइसुहं व ।
अणुभूइमयत्तणओ अणुभूइमओ य जीवो त्ति ॥११६॥ (१६६४)

Aṇṇasuha-dukkhapuvvam suhāi bālassa sampaisuham va ।
Aṇubhūimayattaṇao aṇubhūimao ya jîvo tti. ॥ 116 ॥ (1664)

[अन्यसुख-दुःखपूर्वं सुखादि बालस्य सांप्रतसुखमिव ।
अनुभूतिमयत्वतोऽनुभूतिमयश्च जीव इति ॥ ११६ ॥ (१६६४)

Anyasukha-duḥkhapūrvam sukhādi bālasya sāmpratasukhamiva ।
Anubhūtimayatvato'nubhūtimayaśca jîva iti ॥ 116 ॥ (1664)]

Trans.—116 Happiness in the state of childhood like the present-day happiness resembles happiness, misery etc., in other states. And the Soul is possessed of the faculty of perception because of its being capable of perceptivity. (1664).

टीका-अन्यसुखपूर्वकमिदमाद्यं बालसुखम्, अनुभवात्मकत्वात्, सांप्रतसुखवत्, यत्सुखपूर्वकं चेदमाद्यं सुखम्, तच्छरीरादन्यदेव, तदत्ययेऽपीहत्यसुखकारणत्वात्। गुणश्चायम्, स च गुणिनमन्तरेण न संभवति, अतो यत्तस्याश्रयभूतो गुणी स देहादर्थान्तरम्, इति सुखानुभूतिमयो जीव इति सिद्धम्। एवं दुःख-राग-द्वेष-भय-शोकादयोऽप्यायोजनीया इति ॥ ११६ (१६६४) ॥

D. C.—Happiness in the state of childhood resembles the present-day happiness, because of its *anubhūtimayatva*. Now, the happiness to which this *bālasukha* resembles is distinct from body, because it continues to be the cause of happiness even if a former body has perished. Moreover, *sukha* is a *guṇa* which cannot exist without the support of *guṇin* which, too, is distinct from body. This proves that the Soul is possessed of *anubhūti* of happiness. According to the same argument, we can prove that *ātman* possesses the *anubhūti* of *duḥkha*, *rāga*, *dveṣa*, *bhaya*, *śoka*, etc. Now, the *anumānas* that have already been laid down to establish the existence of *jîva* and *karman* are re-stated here in order to refresh the memory.

**संताणोऽणाई उ परोप्परं हेउ-हेउभावाओ ।
देहस्स य कम्मस्स य गोयम ! बीयं-कुराणं व ॥११७॥(१६६५)†**

† Vide verse 1639.

Santāṇo'ṇāî u paropparam heu-heubhāvāo ।
Dehassa ya kammassa ya Goyama ! bîyam-kurāṇam va ॥117॥(1665)

[सन्तानोऽनादिस्तु परस्परं हेतु-हेतुभावात् ।
देहस्य च कर्मणश्च गौतम । बीजा-ऽङ्कुरयोरिव ॥ ११७ ॥ (१६६५)

Santāno'nādistu parasparam hetu-hetubhāvāt ।
Dehasya ca karmaṇaśca Gautama ! bîjā'ṅkurayoriva॥117॥ (1665)]

Trans.—117 And *O Gautama !* as *Karman* and body are naturally related as the causes of each other like seed and sprout, the continuous range of *Karman* will have no beginning. (1665).

If the relation of *Karman* with body is eternal, how can the existence of *jîva* be established ?

तो कम्म–सरीराणं कत्तारं करण–कज्जभावाओ ।
पडिवज्ज तदब्भहिअं दंड-घडाणं कुलालं व ॥ ११८ ॥ (१६६६)

अत्थि सरीरविहाया पइनिययागारओ घटस्सेव ।
अक्खाणं च करणओ दंडाईणं कुलालो व ॥ ११९ ॥ (१६६७)

अत्थिंदियविसयाणं आयाणादेयभावओऽवस्सं ।
कम्मार इवादाया लोए संडास–लोहाणं ॥ १२० ॥ (१६६८)

भोत्ता देहाईणं भोज्जत्तणओ नरो व भत्तस्स ।
संघायाइत्तणओ अत्थि य अत्थी घरस्सेव ॥ १२१ ॥ (१६६९)

जो कत्ताइ स जीवो सज्झविरुद्धो त्ति ते मई होज्जा ।
मुत्ताइपसंगाओ तं नो संसारिणो दोसो ॥ १२२ ॥ (१६७०)

To kamma–sarîrāṇam kattāram karaṇa–kajjabhāvāo ।
Padivajja tadabbhahiam daṇḍa–ghadāṇam kulālam va ॥118॥ (1666)

[ततः कर्म-शरीरयोः कर्तारं करण-कार्यभावात् ।
प्रतिपद्यस्व तदभ्यधिकं दण्ड-घटयोः कुलालमिव ॥ ११८ ॥ (११६६)

Tataḥ karma-śarîrayoḥ kartāram karaṇa-kāryabhāvāt ।
Pratipadyasva tadabhyadhikam daṇḍa-ghaṭayoḥ kulālamiva॥118॥]

Trans.—118 So, like a potter (to be distinct) from *daṇḍa* and *ghaṭa*, know the creator of *Karman* and *śarîra* to be distinct from both on account of the existence of cause and effect. (1666)

119. (1667) Vide verse 1567.

120. (1668) Vide verse 1568.

121. (1669) Vide verse 1569.

122. (1670) Vide verse 1570.

Since all objects are *kṣaṇika* according to *Buddhistic* theory, an opponent may argue here that *jîva* vanishes with body and hence it is no use trying to prove that Soul is different from body. The *Ācārya* refutes this argument as follows :—

जाइस्सरो न विगओ सरणाओ बालजाइसरणो व ।
जह वा सदेसवत्तं नरो सरंतो विदेसम्मि ॥१२३॥ (१६७१)

Jāissaro na vigao saraṇāo bālajāisaraṇo vva ।
Jaha vā sadesavattam naro saranto videsammi ॥123॥ (1671)

[जातिस्मरो न विगतः स्मरणाद् बालजातिस्मरण इव ।
यथा वा स्वदेशवृत्तं नरः स्मरन् विदेशे ॥ १२३ ॥ (१६७१)

Jātismaro na vigataḥ smaraṇād bāla jāti smaraṇa iva ।
Yathā vā svadeśavritam naraḥ smaran videśe ॥ 123 ॥ (1671)]

Trans.—123 Like a person recollecting (his) childhood (in old age) or recollecting in a foreign country the incident, (that happened) in his own country, the Soul who recollects the former existence does not perish by virtue of (its power of) recollection. (1671)

टीका–इह यो जातिस्मरो जीवः स प्राग्भविकशरीरविगमेऽपि सति न विगत इति प्रतिज्ञा। 'सरणाउ त्ति' स्मरणादिति हेतुः। यथा बालजातौ बालजन्मनि वृत्तं स्मरतीति बालजातिस्मरणो वृद्ध इति दृष्टान्तः। यथा वा, स्वदेशे मालवकमध्यदेशादौ वृत्तं विदेशेऽपि गतो नरः स्मरन् न विगतः। इदमुक्तं भवति—योऽन्यदेश-कालाद्यनुभूतमर्थं स्मरति सोऽविनष्टो दृष्टः, यथा बालकालानुभूतानामर्थानामनुस्मर्ता वृद्धाद्यवस्थायां देवदत्तः। यस्तु विनष्टो नासौ किञ्चिदनुस्मरति, यथा जन्मानन्तरमेवोपरतः। न च पूर्वपूर्वक्षणानुभूतमाहितसंस्कारा उत्तरोत्तरक्षणाः स्मरन्तीति वक्तव्यम्, पूर्व-पूर्वक्षणानां सर्वनिरन्वयविनाशेन सर्वथा विनष्टत्वात्, उत्तरोत्तरक्षणानां सर्वथाऽन्यत्वात्। न चान्यानुभूतमन्योऽनुस्मरति, देवदत्तानुभूतस्य यज्ञदत्तानुस्मरणप्रसङ्गादिति॥ १२३ (१६७१)॥

D. C.—Here, the proposition is that the Soul that remembers former existence, cannot vanish even after the disappearance of the former body by virtue of its *smaraṇaśakti*. Just as an old person who remembers his state of childhood does not himself perish even if childhood has vanished, or just as a person who recollects in a foreign country the incidents that happened in his own country, does not himself perish even if the incidents are no more existing, so also, the Soul that remembers former existence does not vanish even if the body of former existence has already vanished. In short, one who recollects incidents that happened in former time and place is *vidyamāna* (existing) like *Devadatta* who is able to recollect his experiences of childhood in old age. But, if he be only the *anusmartā* nothing can be recollected in the next life as he himself is not alive in that existence.

Again, it is not correct to say that all experiences of former moments are recollected in the later moments, as former moments are absolutely separate from the later moments and they disappear as soon as their relations with the later ones disappear.

Lastly, one can never remember the experience of another. If it were so, *Yajnadatta* would be able to remember the experience of *Devadatta.*

अह मन्नसि खणिओ वि हु सुमरइ विन्नाणसंतइगुणाओ ।
तहवि सरीरादण्णो सिद्धो विण्णाणसंताणो ॥ १२४ ॥ (१६७२)

Aha mannasi khaṇio vi hu sumarai vinnāṇasantaiguṇāo ।
Tahavi sasîrādaṇṇo siddho viṇṇāṇasantāṇo ॥ 124 ॥ (1672)

[अथ मन्यसे क्षणिकोऽपि खलु स्मरति विज्ञानसंततिगुणात् ।
तथापि शरीरादन्यः सिद्धो विज्ञानसंतानः ॥ १२४ ॥ (१६७२)

Atha manyase kṣaṇiko'pi khalu smarati vijnānasantatiguṇāt ।
Tathāpi śarîradanyaḥ siddho vijñānasantānaḥ ॥ 124 ॥ (1672)]

Trans.—124 Again if you believe that (the soul) though transitory, remembers (the former existence) by virtue of its having a continuous range of knowledge, the continuous range of knowledge in that case also, has been proved to be distinct from body. (1672)

टीका—अथैवं मन्यसे त्वम्—क्षणिकोऽपि क्षणभङ्गुरोऽपि जीवः पूर्ववृत्तान्तं स्मरत्येव । कुतः ? इत्याह—विज्ञानानां विज्ञानक्षणानां संततिः संतानस्तस्या गुणस्तत्सामर्थ्यरूपस्तस्मादिति, क्षणसंतानस्यावस्थितत्वात् क्षणनश्वरोऽपि स्मरतीत्यर्थः । अत्रोत्तरमाह—ननु तथाप्येवमपि सति ज्ञानलक्षणसन्तानस्याग्रेतनशरीरसंक्रान्तेर्भवान्तरसद्भावः सिध्यति, सर्वशरीरेभ्यश्च विज्ञानसंतानस्येत्थमर्थान्तरता साधिता भवति, अविच्छिन्नविज्ञानसन्तानात्मकश्चैवं शरीरादर्थान्तरभूत आत्मा सिद्धो भवतीति । तदेवं परभवमङ्गीकृत्याविनष्टस्मरणमावेदितम् ॥ १२४ (१६७२) ॥

D. C.—Vāyubhūti :—Even though the Soul is *kṣaṇika,* it is able to remember the incidents of former life because of the continuous range of the moments of *vijñāna.*

The *Acārya :*—Even in that case, the continuous range of

knowledge extends to the former life and hence its existence is also established in the former life. Thus, *vijñānasantāna* is proved to be distinct from all bodies. Consequently, the Soul that contains this *vijñānasantāna* would also be distinguished from body.

In this way, indestructibility of Soul is apprehended to the expectation of another life. And the same could be established in connection with this life also.

न य सव्वहेव खणिअं नाणं पुव्वोवलद्धसरणाओ ।
खणिओ न सरइ भूयं जह जम्माणंतरविनट्ठो ॥१२५॥ (१६७३)

Na ya savvaheva khaṇiyam nāṇam puvvovaladdhasaraṇāo ।
Khaṇio na sarai bhūyam jaha jammāṇantaravinaṭṭho ॥125॥ (1673)

[न च सर्वथैव क्षणिकं ज्ञानं पूर्वोपलब्धस्मरणात् ।
क्षणिको न स्मरति भूतं यथा जन्मानन्तरविनष्टः ॥ १२५ ॥ (१६७३)

Na ca sarvathaiva kṣaṇikam jñānam pūrvopalabdhasmaraṇāt ।
Kṣaṇiko na smarati bhūtam yathā janmānantaravinaṣṭaḥ ॥ (1673)]

Trans.—125 Or *(ca)*, knowledge is not absolutely indurable *(kṣaṇika)* by (virtue of the power of) recollecting an object apprehended in the past. (For), one that is *kṣaṇika* is, like an object perished after its very birth, not able to remember the past. (1673)

टीका—न च सर्वथैव क्षणिकं ज्ञानं वक्तुं युज्यते । कथञ्चित्तु क्षणिकतां भगवानपीच्छत्येव, इति "सर्वथैव" इत्युक्तम् । कस्मात् पुनर्ज्ञानं न क्षणिकम् ? इत्याह—पूर्वोपलब्धस्य बालकालाद्यनुभूतस्यार्थस्य वृद्धत्वाद्यवस्थायामपि स्मरणदर्शनात् । न चैतदेकान्तक्षणिकत्वे सत्युपपद्यते । कुतः ? इत्याह—"खणिओइ त्यादि" यः क्षणिको नायं भूतमतीतं स्मरति, यथा जन्मानन्तरविनष्टः, एकान्तक्षणिकं चेष्यते ज्ञानम्, अतः स्मरणाभावप्रसङ्ग इति ॥ १२५ (१६७३) ॥

D. C.—Jñāna should never be said to be entirely *kṣaṇika.* It may be *kṣaṇika* to a certain extent. If knowledge were taken to be absolutely transient, there would be no recognition in old age of objects perceived in childhood, as in the case of one who is perished after its birth. Ultimately *smaraṇa* will not exist at all even if *jñāna* were taken to be *kṣaṇika* in every way.

And there is another difficulty also.

जस्सेगमेगबंधणमेगंतेण खणियं य विण्णाणं ।
सव्वखणियविण्णाणं तस्साजुत्तं कदाचिदवि ॥१२६॥ (१६७४)

Jassegamegabandhaṇameganteṇa khaṇiyam ya viṇṇāṇam ।
Savvakhaṇiyaviṇṇāṇam tassājuttam kadācidavi ॥ 156 ॥ (1674)

[यस्यैकमेकबन्धनमेकान्तेन क्षणिकं च विज्ञानम् ।
सर्वक्षणिकविज्ञानं तस्यायुक्तं कदाचिदपि ॥ १२६ ॥ (१६७४)

Yasyaikamekabandhanamekāntena kṣaṇikam ca vijñānam ।
Sarvakṣaṇikavijnānam tasyāyuktam kadācidapi ॥ 126 ॥ (1674)]

Trans.—126 It is never reasonable to accept *vijñāna* (of an object) as *vijñāna* having all-pervading *kṣanikatā,* as it is one independant *vijñāna* exclusively connected with one moment (1674).

टीका–यस्य वादिनो बौद्धस्य 'एकविज्ञानसंततयः सत्त्वाः' इति वचनादेकमेवासहायं ज्ञानं तस्य 'सर्वमपि वस्तु क्षणिकम्' इत्येवंभूतं विज्ञानं कदाचिदपि न युक्तमिति संबन्धः । इष्यते च सर्वक्षणिकतांविज्ञानं सौगतैः, "यत् सत् तत् सर्वं क्षणिकम्" तथा "क्षणिकाः सर्वसंस्काराः" इत्यादिवचनात् । एतच्च क्षणिकताग्राहकज्ञानस्यैकत्वे न संभवत्येव । यदि हि त्रिलोकीतलगतैः सर्वैरपि क्षणिकैः पदार्थैः पुरः स्थित्वा तदेकं विज्ञानं जन्येत, तदा तदेतज्जानीयाद् यदुत—"क्षणिकाः सर्वेऽप्यमी पदार्थाः" इति । न चैवं सर्वैरपि तैस्तज्जन्यते । कुतः ? इत्याह—'एगबंधणं ति' यस्मादेकमेव

प्रतिनियतं बन्धनं निबन्धनमालम्बनं यस्य तदेकबन्धनं ज्ञानम्, अतः कथमशेषवस्तुस्तोमव्यापिनीं क्षणिकतामवबुध्येत ?। अपि च, एकालम्बनत्वेऽपि यद्यशेषपदार्थविषयाणामपि ज्ञानानां युगपदुत्पत्तिरिष्यते, आत्मा च तदर्थानुस्मर्ता, तदा स्यादशेषपदार्थक्षणिकतापरिज्ञानम्। न चाशेषार्थग्राहकानेकज्ञानानां युगपदुत्पत्तिरिष्यते।

किञ्च, तदेकमप्येकार्थविषयमपि च विज्ञानं सर्वपदार्थगतां क्षणिकतामज्ञास्यदेव यद्युत्पत्त्यनन्तरध्वंसि नाभविष्यत्। अविनाशित्वे हि तदवस्थिततयोपविष्टं सदन्यमन्यं चार्थमुत्पत्त्यनन्तरमुपरमन्तं दृष्ट्वा "सर्वमेवास्मद्वर्जमस्मत्सजातीयवर्जं च वस्तुक्षणिकमेव" इत्यवबुध्येत, न चैतदस्ति। कुतः ? इत्याह—"एगंतेण खणियं चेति" यस्य च बौद्धस्यैकान्तेन क्षणिकं क्षणध्वंस्येव विज्ञानं, न पुनश्चिरावस्थायि, तस्य कथं सर्ववस्तुगतक्षणिकतापरिज्ञानं स्यात् ?। तस्मादक्षणिकमेव प्रमातृ ज्ञानमेष्टव्यम्। तच्च गुणत्वादनुरूपं गुणिनमात्मानमन्तरेण न संभवति। अतः सिद्धः शरीराद् व्यतिरिक्त आत्मेति ॥ १२६ (१६७४) ॥

D. C.—According to the theory that there is one and only one continuous range of *vijñāna* to all living beings, the *Bauddhas* believe that *vijñāna* is *eka* (one) and *asahāya* (independent) and hence it can never recognize all objects, as all objects would become *kṣaṇika* according to that theory. *Saugatas* (*Bauddhas*) however try to establish *sarvakṣaṇikatā-vijñāna* by the help of statements such as "all that exists is *kṣaṇika*" and "all *saṃskāras*, are *kṣaṇika*" etc. Now, *jñāna* having all-pervading *kṣaṇikatā* is not possible at all. For, if one were able to produce such *jñāna* in presence of all objects in the Universe, then only it could be apprehended that all these objects are *kṣaṇika*. But *jñāna* could never be produced by means of all those objects in that manner. For, how could *kṣaṇikatā* extended to all objects be recognized when *jñāna* resorts to one and only one *ālambana* ? In such cases, if all *jñānas* of all objects were taken to have been produced at the same time, and if *ātman* were accepted as the *anusmartā* of

all such *jñānas,* then and then only it would be possible to recognize the transitoriness of all objects. But simultaneous production of *jñāna* as regards all objects is never possible and hence the apprehension of *sarvakṣaṇiktāvijñāna* is also impossible.

Again, if *vijñāna* of an object were not to vanish soon after its birth, one might get an opportunity to apprehend *sarvakṣaṇikatā.* For, in that case, *vijñāna* being contained within indestructibility, one could naturally remark at the destruction of all other objects that "every thing except us and those of our class is *kṣaṇika.*" But that is not possible. For, according to *Buddhistic* theory, knowledge being exclusively *kṣaṇika,* cannot last for a long time and hence it is not possible to apprehend *kṣanikatā* in case of all objects. Authentic knowledge should therefore be considered as *a-kṣanika.* This being a *guṇa,* it can never exist without a suitable resort *viz., ātman,* which leads automatically to prove that soul is distinct from body.

जं सविसयनिययं चिय जम्माणंतरहयं च तं किह णु ।
नाहिति सुबहुयविण्णाणविसयखयभंगयाईणि ॥१२७॥ (१६७५)

Jam savisayaniyayam ciya jammāṇantarahayam ca tam kiha ṇu ।
Nāhiti subahuyaviṇṇāṇavisayakhayabhaṅgayāîṇi ? ॥ 127 ॥ (1675)

[यद् स्वविषयनियतमेव जन्मान्तरहतं च तत् कथं नु ।
ज्ञास्यति सुबहुकविज्ञानविषयक्षयभङ्गकादीनि ? ॥ १२७ ॥ (१६७५)

Yad svaviṣayaniyatameva janmāntarahatam ca tat katham nu ।
Jñāsyati subahukavijñānaviṣayakṣayabhaṅgakādîni ? ॥127॥ (1675)]

Trans.—127 How could that (knowledge) which is restricted to its own self and scope and which vanishes soon after its birth understand qualities such as indurability etc., pertaining to the scope of *vijñāna* ? (1675).

टीका–यत् स्वविषयमात्रनियतं जन्मानन्तरहतं च प्रमातृ विज्ञानं, तत्कथं सुबहुविज्ञानविषयगतान् क्षणभंग-निरात्मकत्व–सुखि–दुःखितादीन् धर्मान् ज्ञास्यति ? न कथञ्चिदित्यर्थः ॥ १२७ (१६७५) ॥

D. C.—Pramātṛi jñāna (authentic knowledge) is restricted to its own self and scope. It is destroyed immediately after its own production. So, it could never understand a number of attributes *e. g.* transitoriness, subjectivity, and sense of happiness, misery etc., related to the *viṣaya* (subject) of *vijñāna.*

गिण्हिज्ज सव्वभंगं जइ य मई सविषयाणुमाणाओ ।
तं पि न जओऽणुमाणं जुत्तं सत्ताइसिद्धीओ ॥१२८॥ (१६७६)

Giṇhijja savvabhaṅgam jai ya maî saviṣayāṇumāṇāo ।
Tam pi na jao'ṇumāṇam juttam sattāisiddhîo ॥ 128 ॥ (1676)

[गृह्णीयात् सर्वभङ्गं यदि च मतिः स्वविषयानुमानात् ।
तदपि न यतोऽनुमानं युक्तं सत्तादिसिद्धौ ॥ १२८ ॥ (१६७६)

Gṛihṇîyāt sarvabhaṅgam yadi ca matiḥ svaviṣayānumānāt ।
Tadapi na yato'numānam yuktam sattādisiddhau ॥ 128 ॥ (1676)]

Trans.—128 Again, it is not even proper to believe that *vijñāna* apprehends indurability of all (objects) by means of *anumāna* from its own self and scope. Because, *anumāna* is proper only with regard to the establishment of existence etc. (1676).

टीका–यदि च परस्यैवंभूता मतिः स्याद् यदुत-एकमपि-एकालम्बनमपि क्षणिकमपि च प्रमातृ विज्ञानं सर्ववस्तु गतक्षणभङ्गं गृह्णीयात् । कुतः ? इत्याह—स्वविषयानुमानात् । एतदुक्तं भवति—यस्मादयमस्मद्विषयः क्षणिकः, अहं च क्षणनश्वररूपम्, ततो विज्ञानसाम्यादन्यान्यपि विज्ञानानि क्षणिकानि, विषयसाम्याच्चान्येऽपि विषयाः सर्वेऽपि क्षणिकाः, इत्येवं स्वं च विषयाश्च स्वविषयास्तदनुमानात् सर्वस्यापि वस्तुस्तोमस्य क्षणिकत्वादि गृह्यते। अत्र दूषणमाह–"तं पीत्यादि" तदपि न युक्तं न घटमानकम्। कुतः ? इत्याह–

यतस्तत् स्वविषयानुमानमन्येषां विज्ञानानामन्यविषयाणां च पक्षीकृतानां सत्तादि प्रसिद्धावेव युज्यते। नहि सत्त्वेनाप्यप्रसिद्धेधर्मिणि क्षणिकतादिधर्मः साध्यमानो विभ्राजते। को हि नाम शब्दादिष्वादावेव सत्त्वेनाप्रतीतेषु कृतकत्वादिनाऽनित्यत्वादिधर्मान् साधयति, " तत्र पक्षः प्रसिद्धोधर्मी " इत्यादिवचनात्?। न चेदमेकमेकालम्बनं क्षणिकं च ज्ञानमेतद् वोढुं शक्नोति यदुत—अन्यज्ञानानि सन्ति, तद्विषयाश्च विद्यन्ते, तेषां च विषयाणां स्वविषयज्ञानजननस्वभावादय एवं भूता धर्माःसन्तीति। एतदपरिज्ञाने च कथमेतेषां क्षणिकतां साधयिष्यति, धर्मिण एवाप्रसिद्धेः?।

स्यादेतत्, स्वविषयानुमानादेवान्यविज्ञानादिसत्तापि सेत्स्यत्येव, तथाहि—यथाऽहमस्मि तथान्यान्यपि ज्ञानानि सन्ति, यथा च मद्विषयो विद्यते, एवमन्येऽपि ज्ञानविषया विद्यन्त एव; यथा चाहं मद्विषयश्च क्षणिकः, एवमन्यज्ञानानि तद्विषयाश्च क्षणिका एवेति, एवं सर्वेषां सत्त्वं क्षणिकता च स्वविषयानुमानादेव सेत्स्यतीति। एतदप्ययुक्तम्, यतः सर्वक्षणिकताग्राहकं ज्ञानं क्षणनश्वरत्वाज्जन्मान्तरं "मृत इवाहमस्मि, क्षणिकं च" इत्येवमात्मानमपि नावबुध्यते, अन्यपरिज्ञानं तु तस्य दूरोत्सारितमेव। किञ्च, तत् स्वविषयमात्रस्यापि क्षणिकतां नावगच्छति, समानकालमेव द्वयोरपि विनष्टत्वात्। यदि हि स्वविषयं विनश्यन्तं दृष्ट्वा ततद्गतक्षणिकतां निश्चित्य स्वयं पश्चात् कालान्तरे तद् विनश्येत्, तदा स्यात् तस्य स्वविषयक्षणिकताप्रतिपत्तिः, न चैतदस्ति, ज्ञानस्य विषयस्य च निजनिजक्षणं जनयित्वा समानकालमेव विनाशाभ्युपगमात्। न च स्वसंवेदनप्रत्यक्षेण वा क्षणिकता गृह्यत इति सौगतैरिष्यते, अनुमानगम्यत्वेन तस्यास्तैरभ्युपगमादिति ॥ १२८ (१६७६) ॥

D. C.—An opponent may advance the following objection in this case—

Pramātrivijñāna though *kṣaṇika* and resorting to only one *ālambana* is able to recognize *kṣaṇikatā* of its own self as well as sphere. For, just as the knowledge that we are *kṣaṇika* as our *viṣaya* is *kṣaṇika* is common in other cases also, all other objects and their spheres should also be considered as *kṣaṇika*.

The argument stated above is not correct. *Svaviṣayānumāna* can be applied only in case of establishing the existence etc. of other *vijñānas* and *viṣayas* and not otherwise. Just as in case of *s'abda* etc., which are not accepted as existent, one could not establish properties like *anityatā* by reason of their mere constructive utility; so, in this case also, properties like *kṣaṇikatā* could not be proved to exist in objects which are not known at all.

Moreover, *vijñāna* which is said to be *kṣaṇika* and *ekālambana*, is not able to understand whether there are other *jñānas* and *viṣayas*, and whether those *jñānas* :and *viṣayas* possess the property of producing *jñāna* of its own self and sphere. So, if such *jñāna* could not be produced and if the objects in which *kṣaṇikatā* is to be established are not known, how could *kṣaṇikatā* be proved to exist at all ?

At this point, the opponent may argue that existence etc. of other *vijñānas* could be established by the help of *sva viṣayānumāna*. One would say in this case that " Just as I exist and my *viṣaya* exists, other *jñānas* and their *viṣayas* also exist, and just as I and my *viṣaya* are *kṣaṇika*, other *jñānas* and their *viṣayas* are also *kṣaṇika*. " Thus, existence as well as *kṣaṇikatā* of all the objects could easily be established.

The above objection is entirely fallacious. *Jñāna* which apprehends *sarvakṣaṇikatā* is not able to recognize even its own self after its production on account of its being *kṣaṇika*—as good as dead. Thus, when it is not able to recognise its own self how can it perceive that there are other *jñānas* and their *viṣayas* also ? Such indurable *jñāna* does not recognize *kṣaṇikatā* of its own *viṣaya*, because, according to them, that *jñāna* and *viṣaya* vanish within equally short time. If that *jñāna* ascertains the *kṣaṇikatā* of its own *viṣaya* from its disappearance within a short time before the *jñāna* itself dies away, then and then only would the *kṣaṇikatā* of its

viṣaya be recognized by it. But this argument is not accepted by *Bauddhas*. They believe that *jñāna* and its *viṣaya* disappear at the same time after being produced for a moment.

Moreover, according to *Saugatas, kṣaṇikatā* is recognized neither by means of self-perception nor by the help of perception by sense-organs, but by means of *anumāna* only.

जाणेज्ज वासणा उ सा वि हु वासित्त-वासणिज्जाणं ।
जुत्ता समेच्च दोण्हं न उ जम्माणंतरहयस्स ॥१२९॥ (१६७७)

Jāṇejja vāsaṇā u sā vi hu vāsitta-vāsaṇijjāṇam ।
Juttā samecca doṇham na u jammāṇantarahayassa ॥129॥ (1677)

[जानीयात् वासना तु सापि खलु वासि-वासनीययोः ।
युक्ता समेत्य द्वयोर्न तु जन्मानन्तरहतस्य ॥ १२९ ॥ (१६७७)

Jānîyāt vāsanā tu sāpi khalu vāsi-vāsanîyayoḥ ।
Yuktā sametya dvayorna tu janmānantarahatasya ॥129॥ (1677)]

Trans.—129 Again, the opponent might argue that desire could understand *sarvakṣaṇikatā*; but that also is in fact proper (only) because it is related to both—one that desires and the desired (object), and not in case of that which vanishes soon after (its birth). (1677).

टीका—स्यादेतत् पूर्वपूर्वविज्ञानक्षणैरुत्तरोत्तरविज्ञानक्षणानामेवंभूता वासना जन्यते, ययाऽन्यविज्ञान-तद्विषयाणां सत्त्व-क्षणिकतादीन् धर्मानेकमेकालम्बनं क्षणिकमपि च विज्ञानं जानाति, अतः सर्वक्षणिकताज्ञानं सौगतानां न विरुध्यते । तदप्ययुक्तम्, यतः सापि वासना वासक-वासनीययोर्द्वयोरपि समेत्य संयुज्य विद्यमानयोरेव युक्ता, न तु जन्मान्तरमेव हतस्य विनष्टस्य । वास्य-वासकयोश्च संयोगेनावस्थाने क्षणिकताहानिप्रसङ्गः । किञ्च, सापि वासना क्षणिका, अक्षणिका वा ?! क्षणिकत्वे कथं तद्बलात् सर्वक्षणिकतापरिज्ञानम् ? । अक्षणिकत्वे तु प्रतिज्ञाहानिरिति ॥ १२९ (१६७७) ॥

D. C.—Here, again the opponents may argue that the

earlier moments of apprehension create such a desire during the later moments of apprehension, that by means of that desire even a *kṣaṇikā vijñāna* having only one support is able to apprehend other *jñānas* and their *viṣayas* having existence, transitoriness etc. as their qualities. Consequently, there is no harm in believing that all objects are *kṣaṇika*.

But even that is not correct. For *vāsanā* in the above case, could be applied only when it is related to *vāsaka* and *vāsanîya*; and hence, it could not be applied to the knowledge that vanishes immediately after its birth. Again, in accepting the *avasthāna* (retention) of *vāsya* and *vāsaka* connected together, *kṣaṇikatā* itself would not exist. And is that *vāsanā kṣaṇika* or *a-kṣaṇika*? If it were *kṣaṇika*, it would not be able to apprehend *sarvakṣaṇikatā;* and if it were *a-kṣaṇika* the very proposition that everything is *kṣaṇika* would be violated.

So, the theory of *Bauddhas* that everything is *kṣaṇika* does not fit in, in any way.

Thus, having refuted the opponent's view, the *Ācārya* now illustrates his own.

बहुविण्णाणप्पभवो जुगवमणेगत्थयाऽहवेगस्स ।
विण्णाणावत्था वा पडुच्चवित्तीविघाओ वा ॥१३०॥ (१६७८)

विण्णाणखणविणासे दोसा इच्चादयो पसज्जंति ।
न उ ठियसंभूयच्चुयविण्णाणमयम्मि जीवम्मि ॥१३१॥(१६७९)

तस्स विचित्तावरणखओवसमजाइं चित्तरूवाइं ।
खणियाणि य कालंतरवित्तीणि य मइविहाणाइं ॥१३२॥(१६८०)

Bahuviṇṇaṇappabhavo jugavamaṇegatthayā'havegassa ।
Viṇṇāṇāvatthā vā paḍuccavittīvighāo vā ॥ 130 ॥ (1678)
Viṇṇāṇakhaṇāviṇāse dosā iccādayo pasajjanti ।
Na u ṭhiyasambhūyaccuyaviṇṇāṇamayammi jîvammi ॥131॥ (1679)

Tassa vicittāvaraṇakhaovasamajāim cittarūvāim ।
Khaṇiyāṇi ya kālāntaravittîṇi ya maivihāṇāim ॥ 132 ॥ (1680)

[बहुविज्ञानप्रभवो युगपदनेकार्थताऽथवैकस्य ।
विज्ञानावस्था वा प्रतीत्यवृत्तिविघातो वा ॥ १३० ॥ (१६७८)
विज्ञानक्षणविनाशे दोषा इत्यादयः प्रसजन्ति ।
न तु स्थितसंभूतच्युतविज्ञानमये जीवे ॥ १३१ ॥ (१६७९)
तस्य विचित्रावरणक्षयोपशमजानि चित्ररूपाणि ।
क्षणिकानि च कालान्तरवृत्तीनि च मतिविधानानि ॥ १३२ ॥ (१६८०)

Bahuvijnānaprabhavo yugapadanekārthata'thavaikasya ।
Vijñānāvasthā vā pratîtyavrittivighāto vā ॥ 130 ॥ (1678)

Vijñānakṣaṇavināśe doṣā ityādayaḥ prasajanti ।
Na tu sthitasambhūtac'yutavijñānamaye jîve ॥ 131 ॥ (1679)

Tasya vicitrāvaraṇakṣayopaśamajāni citrarūpāṇi ।
Kṣaṇikāni ca kālāntaravrittîni ca matividhānāni ॥ 132 ॥ (1680)]

Trans.—130–131–132 If *vijnāna* were taken to be *kṣaṇa vināśî* a number of faults such as production of many *vijñānas*, yielding more than one meaning at a time, or, one yielding more than one meaning at a time, retention (*avasthā*) of *vijñāna*, violation of the law of cause and effect etc. would arise. This would not happen only in case of *jîva*, having *vijñāna* which is *sthita* (settled) *sambhūta* (born) and *cyuta* (dropped) being accepted. (For), it manifests various (types of) intellectual forms that are born of various types of diminutions and relaxations and that are *kṣaṇika* as well as permanent. (1678–1679–1680).

टीका–तदेवं विज्ञानस्य प्रतिक्षणं विनाशेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने इत्यादयो दोषाः प्रसजन्ति । के पुनस्ते दोषाः ? इत्याह–" बहुविण्णाणेत्यादि " इत्येवं संबन्धः । क्षणनश्वरविज्ञानवादिना भुवनत्रयान्तर्वर्तिसर्वार्थग्रहणार्थं युगपदेव बहूनां ज्ञानानां प्रभव उत्पादोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः, तदाश्रयभूतश्च तद्दृष्टानाम-

र्थानामनुस्मर्ताऽवस्थित आत्माऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः, अन्यथा "यत् सत् तत् सर्वं क्षणिकम्" "क्षणिकाः सर्वे संस्काराः" "निरात्मानः सर्वे भावाः" इत्यादि सर्वक्षणिकतादिविज्ञानं नोपपद्येत, तदभ्युपगमे च स्वमतत्यागप्रसक्तिः। अथवा, क्षणिकं विज्ञानमिच्छतैकस्यपि विज्ञानस्य युगपदनेकार्थता–सर्वभवनान्तर्गतार्थग्राहिताऽभ्युपगन्तव्या, येन सर्वक्षणिकतादिविज्ञानमुपपद्यते, न चैतदिष्यते, दृश्यते वा। "विण्णाणावत्था व त्ति" यदिवा, अवस्थानमवस्था, विज्ञानस्यावस्था विज्ञानावस्थाऽभ्युपगन्तव्या भवति। इदमुक्तं भवति–विज्ञानस्यानल्पकल्पाग्रशोऽवस्थानमेष्टव्यम्, येन तत् सर्वदा समासीनमन्यान्यवस्तुविनश्वरतां वीक्षमाणं सर्वक्षणिकतामवगच्छेदिति सर्वं प्रागेवोक्तमेव। एवं चाभ्युपगमे विज्ञानसंज्ञामात्रविशिष्टआत्मैवाभ्युपगतो भवति।

अथैतद् बहुविज्ञानप्रभवादिकं नेष्यते, तर्हि प्रतीत्यवृत्तिविघातः प्राप्नोति। इदमत्र हृदयम्—कारणं प्रतीत्याश्रित्य कार्यस्य वृत्तिः प्रवृत्तिरुत्पत्तिरिति यावत्, न पुनः कारणं कार्यावस्थायां कथञ्चिदप्यन्वेति, इत्येवं सौगतेरभ्युपगम्यते। इत्थं चाभ्युपगम्यमानेऽतीतस्मरणादिसमस्तव्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः। एवं हि व्यवहारप्रवृत्तिः स्याद् यद्यतीतानेकसंकेतादिज्ञानाश्रयस्तत्तद्विज्ञानरूपेण परिणामादन्वयी आत्माऽभ्युपगम्यते। तथाभ्युपगमे च सति प्रतीत्यवृत्त्यभ्युपमविघातः स्यादिति। ननु यदि विज्ञानस्य क्षणविनाश एते दोषाः प्रसजन्ति, तर्हि कामी दोषा न भवन्ति? इत्याह—"न उ ठियेत्यादि" न त्वस्मदभ्युपगते जीवेऽभ्युपगम्यमान एते दोषाः प्रसजन्ति। कथंभूते जीवे? स्थितसंभूतच्युतविज्ञानमये—कथञ्चिद् द्रव्यरूपतया स्थितम्, कथञ्चित्तूत्तरपर्यायेण संभूतम्, कथञ्चित्पुनः पूर्वपर्यायेण च्युतं विनष्टं यद् विज्ञानं तन्मय इत्यर्थः। तस्मादमुमेवोत्पाद-व्यय-ध्रौव्ययुक्तं शरीरादर्थान्तरभूतमस्मदभ्युपगतमात्मानं समस्तव्यवहारसिद्धये प्रतिपद्यस्वेति॥ १३०–१३१ (१६७८–१६७९)॥

टीका–मतेर्मतिज्ञानस्य विधानानि नानाभेदरूपाणि तस्य यथोक्तरूपस्यात्मनः प्रवर्तन्ते। कथंभूतानि? इत्याह—विचित्रो योऽसौ मतिज्ञानावरणक्षयोपशमस्ततो जातानि, अत एव स्वकारणभूतक्षयोपशमवैचित्र्याद् विचित्ररूपाणि। तथा, पर्यायरूपतया क्षणिकानि, द्रव्यरूपतया तु नित्यत्वात्

कालान्तरवृत्तीनि । उपलक्षणं च मतिविधानानि, श्रुता-ऽवधि-मनःपर्यायविधानान्यपि यथासंख्यं श्रुता-ऽवधिमनःपर्यायज्ञानावरणक्षयोपशमवैचित्र्याद् विचित्ररूपाणि यथासंभवं तस्य द्रष्टव्यानि । केवलज्ञानं त्वेकमेवाविकल्पं केवलज्ञानावरणक्षयादेव द्रष्टव्यमिति ॥ १३२ (१६८०) ॥

D. C.—If *jñāna* were taken to be *kṣaṇika* as stated before, a number of *doṣas* would get in, in the following manner :—

1. In order that all the objects that pervade the three worlds, should be recognized, a *kṣaṇikatā-vādin* ought to admit that all sorts of *jñānas* are produced at the same time and the Soul that rememebers the objects in which those *jñānas* are produced should be taken to stay on permanently. Otherwise, statements such as " Whatever exists is all *kṣaṇika* " " All *bhāvas* are *kṣaṇika* " etc. that established *sarvakṣaṇikatā* would be futile.

Moreover, when more than one *jñāna* are accepted, the original theory of *ekavijñānasantati* has also been violated.

2. Again, if *kṣaṇa vijñāna* were accepted, another fault would also crop up. In this case, one and the same *vijñāna* would be able to recognize all the objects that exist in all the the worlds. But this could never happen, nor be believed.

3. In order to recognize a number of objects, *vijñāna* must be taken to last for a long time. As a result of this, *vijñāna* would be able to recognize the *kṣaṇikatā* of all as they are *kṣaṇika* also. But believing so, the Soul which is known as nothing but *vijñāna* would have to be accepted, and it would go against the original proposition.

4. Again, if the production of many *vijñānas* were not accepted, there would be violation of *pratityavṛtti*. When *kāraṇa* is not anyhow apprehended in the state of *kārya*, *Bauddhas* call it the violation of *pratityavṛtti*. As the production of a *kārya* depends upon a *kāraṇa* this would gives rise to *doṣa*. If *Baudhas* were to accept this, processes such as that of

remembering the past incident etc. would be abolished. Again, if the soul which is the abode of knowledge such as a number of past allusions etc. were believed to have been related to the *pariṇāma* in the form of *vijñāna*, then also the law of *pratityavritti* would be violated. For, believing so the Soul is taken as related to the *pariṇāma*.

Thus, in case *vijnāna* is accepted as *kṣanika*, all the above mentioned faults would arise. But if the Soul possessing *vijñāna* which is produced anyhow in the form of substance or in any other new equivalent form and which has already ceased to exist as *vijñāna*, the faults ennumerated above would never arise. This proves that *ātman* that has utility, stability and productivity for the sake of all *vyavahāra* is undoubtedly distinct from body. For, such an *ātman* possesses various *matijñānabhedas* produced from various types of diminutions and relaxations of the *matijñāna* itself. These *bhedas* are *kṣaṇika* on account of their wavering nature, and they are everlasting on account of their substantiality.

Again, by means of implication, the soul manifests various types of *jñāna e. g. śruta* (ascertained by intellect); *avadhi* (applied by intellect) and *manahparyāya* (mental perception) etc. are respectively produced from the knowledge ascertained, applied and perceived by mind. 130–131–132 (1678–1679–1680)

The *Kevala jñāna* or Absolute knowledge is attained only when all its interruptions are warded off.

निच्चो संताणो सिं सव्वावरणपरिसंखए जं च ।
केवलमुदियं केवलभावेणाणंतमविगप्पं ॥ १३३ ॥ (१६८१)

Nicco santāṇo sim savvāvaraṇaparisamkhae jam ca ।
Kevalamudiyam kevalabhāveṇāṇantamavigappam ॥ 133 ॥ (1681)

[नित्यः सन्तानः एषां सर्वावरणपरिसंक्षये यच्च ।
केवलमुदितं केवलभावेनानन्तमविकल्पम् ॥ १३३ ॥ (१६८१)

Nityaḥ santāna eṣām sarvavaraṇa parisamkṣaye yacca ।
Kevalamuditam kevalabhāvenānantamavikalpam ॥ 133 ॥ (1581)]

Trans.—133 They (*matijnānādi vidhānas*) have a perpetual continuance (*nitya santāna*)–in the form of *sāmānyajñāna*–which being free from all interruptions is said to be *ananta* (endless) and *avikalpa* (illusionless). *Kevala* (Absolute) exists by (virtue of) its *Kevalabhāva* (Absoluteness) (1681).

टीका–" सिं ति " एतेषां च मतिज्ञानादिविधानानामविशेषितज्ञानमात्ररूपसंतानो नित्योऽव्यवच्छिन्नरूपः । केवलज्ञानं त्वविकल्पं भेदरहितमुदितमाख्यातं भगवद्भिः यतः सर्वस्यापि निजावरणस्य क्षय एव तदुपजायते । अतोऽविकल्पं केवलभावेनानन्तकालावस्थायित्वात्, अनन्तार्थविषयत्वाच्चानन्तमिति ॥ १३३ (१६८१) ॥

D. C.—The *aviśeṣitajñāna or sāmānyajñāna* of an object is the only everlasting offspring of its various expedients like cognizance of memory etc. But the Absolute cognizance which is said to be *ananta* and *avikalpa* by revered preceptors is attained only when it is free from all *āvaraṇas.* Thus *Kevalajñāna* is *avikalpa* (*i. e.* positive and illusionless) because it is *ananta* (endless) because it lasts for ever and concerns the infinite object (*anantārtha*). 1681.

Here again *Vāyubhūti* raises a doubt and the *Tîrthaṅkara* removes it :—

सो जइ देहादन्नो तो पविसंतो व निस्सरंतो वा ।
कीस न दीसइ, गोयम! दुविहाऽणुवलद्धि उ सा य॥१३४॥(१६८२)

So jai dehādanno to pavisanto va nissaranto vā ।
Kîsa na dîsai, Goyama ! duvihā'ṇuvaladdhi u sā ya ॥ 134 ॥ (1682)

[स यदि देवादन्यस्ततः प्रविशन् वा निःसरन् वा ।
कस्माद् न दृश्यते, गौतम ! द्विविधाऽनुपलब्धिस्तु सा च ॥१३४॥(१६८२)

Sa yadi dehādanyastataḥ praviśan vā niḥsaran vā ।
Kasmād na dṛśyate Gautama ! dvividhā'nupalabdhistu sā ca॥134॥(1682)

असओ खरसंगस्स व सओ वि दूराइभावओऽभिहिया ।
सुहुमा-ऽमुत्तत्तणओ कम्माणुगयस्स जीवस्स ॥ १३५ ॥ (१६८३)

Asao kharasangassa va sao vi dūrāibhāvao' bhihiyā ।
Suhumā'muttattaṇao kammāṇugayassa jīvassa ॥ 135 ॥ (1683)

[असतः खरशृङ्गस्येव सतोऽपि दूरादिभावतोऽभिहिता ।
सूक्ष्माऽमूर्तत्वतः कर्मानुगतस्य जीवस्य ॥ १३५ ॥ (१६८३)

Asataḥ kharaśṛṅgasyeva sato'pi dūrādibhavato'bhihitā ।
Sūkśma'mūrtatvataḥ karmānugatsya jīvasya ॥ 135 ॥ (1683)]

Trans.—134–135 If the Soul is different from body, how is it that it is not perceived while entering (the body) or issuing forth (from it)?

But again, *O Gautama !* non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) is of two types :—1. Non-perception of a non-existent object like a *kharaśṛṅga* and 2. Non-perception of an existent object by reason of its distance etc. Non-perception of the Soul which is *karmānugata* is due to its exquisite formlessness (*sūkśmāmūrtatva*) (1682–1683).

टीका–यदि नाम शरीरादन्योऽसौ जीवस्ततो घटे चटक इव शरीरे प्रविशन् निःसरन् वा किमिति नोपलभ्यते ? । भगवानाह–"गोयमेत्यादि" यतो द्विविधाऽनुपलब्धिरस्ति, अतस्तस्यानुपलब्धेः कारणाद् गौतम ! जीवो न दृश्यते । कथं पुनः साऽनुपलब्धिर्द्विविधा ? इत्याह—सा चानुपलब्धेरेकाऽसतो भवति, यथा खरशृङ्गस्य । द्वितीया तु सतोऽप्यर्थस्य भवति । कुतः ? इत्याह–दूरादिभावादिति, दूरात् सन्नप्यर्थो न दृश्यते, यथा स्वर्गादिः, आदिशब्दात्—अतिसंनिकर्षात्, अति सौक्ष्म्यात्, मनोऽनवस्थानात्, इन्द्रियापाटवात्, मतिमान्द्यात्, अशक्यत्वात्, आवरणात्, अभिभवात्, सामान्यात्, अनुपयोगात्, अनुपायात्, विस्मृतेः, दुरागमात्, मोहात्, विदर्शनात्, विकारात्, अक्रियातः, अनधिगमात्, कालविप्रकर्षात्, स्वभावविप्रकर्षाच्चेति।

तत्रातिसंनिकर्षात् सन्नप्यर्थो नोपलभ्यते, यथा नेत्र-दूषिका-पक्ष्मादिः।

अतिसौक्ष्म्यात् परमाण्वादिः । मनोऽनवस्थानात्, सतोऽप्यनुपलब्धिर्यथा नष्टचेतसाम् । इन्द्रियापाटवात् किञ्चिद्बधिरादीनाम् । मतिमान्द्यादनुपलब्धिः सतामपि सूक्ष्मशास्त्रार्थ विशेषाणाम्। अशक्यत्वात् स्वकर्ण-कुकाटिका-मस्तक-पृष्ठादीनाम् । आवरणाद् हस्तादिस्थगितलोचनानां कटकुड्याद्यावृत्तानां वा । अभिभवात् प्रसृतसुरतेजसि दिवसे तारकाणाम् । सामान्यात् सूपलक्षितस्यापि माषादेः समानजातीयमाषादिराशिपतितस्याप्रत्यभिज्ञानात् सतोऽप्यनुपलब्धिः। अनुपयोगाद् रूपोपयुक्तस्य शेषविषयाणाम्। अनुपायात् शृङ्गादिभ्यो गोमहिष्यादिपयःपरिणामजिज्ञासोः। विस्मृतेः पूर्वोपलब्धस्य। दुरागमाद् दुरुपदेशात् तत्प्रतिरूपकरीतिकादिविप्रलम्भितमतेः कनकादीनां सतामप्यनुपलब्धिः। मोहात् सतामपि जीवादितत्त्वानाम् । विदर्शनात् सर्वथाऽन्धादीनाम् वार्धक्यादिविकाराद् बहुशःपूर्वोपलब्धस्य सतोऽप्यनुपलब्धिः । अक्रियातो भूखननादिक्रियाऽभावाद् वृक्षमूलादीनामनुपलब्धिः। अनधिगमात् शास्त्राश्रवणात् तदर्थस्य सतोऽप्यनुपलब्धिः । कालविप्रकर्षाद् भूतभविष्यदृषभदेवपद्मनाभतीर्थकरादीनामनुपलब्धिः । स्वभावविप्रकर्षाद् नभः पिशादीनामनुपलम्भः। तदेवं सतामप्यर्थानामेकविंशतिविधाऽनुपलब्धिः प्रवर्तते । अतोऽस्य कर्मानुगतस्य संसारिणो जीवस्याऽमूर्तत्वाद् नभस इव, कार्मणस्य तु सौक्ष्म्यात् परमाणोरिव सतोऽनुलपलब्धिः, नासतः। कथं पुनरेतज्ज्ञायते—नासत आत्मनोऽनुपलब्धिः, किन्तु सतः ? इति चेत्। उच्यते—अनुमानैस्तत्सत्त्वस्य साधितत्वादिति ॥ १३४-१३५ (१६८२-१६८३)

D. C.—Vāyubhūti—If this soul is different from body, how is it that it is not seen entering or issuing forth from the body like a *cataka* (sparrow) from a *ghata* (vessel) ?

Bhagawān—Because of the two-fold *anupalabdhi, O Gautama!* the Soul is not perceived. These two types are:—(1) *Anupalabdhi* of a non-existent object *e. g.* a *kharaśriga* (horn of an ass) and (2) *Anupalabdhi* of an existent object.

Now, for the non-perception of an existent object there are *twenty-one* reasons.

i. *Atidūratva*(Extreme remoteness)—Places like *svarga*,

do exist. But as they are extremely remote they are not perceivable.

ii. *Atisannikarṣa* (Close vicinity)—Certain objects like eye-lashes and secretion of eyes, though existent, cannot be seen on account of their close vicinity.

iii. *Atisauksmya* (Exquisite fineness)—*Paramāṇus* are imperceptible, because they are exquisitely fine. These *paramāṇus* are so minute in form that they are not perceptible even to the maked eye, even though they are considered to be existent.

iv. *Manònavasthāna* (Instability of mind)—Sometimes even a *mūrta* object is not apprehended by reason of *mano' navasthāna* or the instability of mind as in the case of an insane man.

v. *Indriyāpāṭutva* (Dullness of senses)—Non-perception arises also when a sense or senses are benumbed *e. g.* a deaf man.

vi. *Matimāndya* (Dullness of ntellect)—Certain subtleties of the *s'āstras* are always *anupalabhya* to a dull-witted man due to his *matimāndya*.

vii. *Aśakyatva* (Impossibility)—One can never see his own ear, head or back as it is utterly impossible to do so.

viii. *Āvaraṇa* (Obstruction)—When eyes are covered with hands or when hands are obscured by means of a mat or a wall it is *āvaraṇa* that causes non-perception.

ix. *Abhibhava* (Predominance)—Predominance of Sun in the sky, makes the stars *anupalabhya* on a sun-bright day.

x. *Sāmānya*—(Commonness) When beans are mixed with beans of the same quality there is non-aprehension of beans owing to the *sāmānyatva* present in both.

xi. *Anupayoga* (Lack of Attention)—When an object is touched by a particular *indriya*, say, *Rūpa* (the sense of eye), it is not perceived by the rest of senses because of their *anupayoga* to the object.

xii. *Anupāya* (Want of Means)—If a person wants to take an estimate of milk (contained) in a cow or a buffalo by means of *śṛṅga* etc, he can never do so because there is no such means available.

xiii. *Vismṛti*—(Forgetfulness)—An object perceived before becomes *anupalabhya* afterwards by reason of *vismṛti*.

xiv. *Durāgama*—(Wrong Instruction) When an object like gold is presented in the style of a forged edict, it is not recognized in its true form, because there is *durupadeśa* or wrong instruction as regards its form.

xv. *Moha* (Delusion)—Objects like *jîva* do exist, but they are not perceived due to *moha* (on the part of those who try to perceive them).

xvi. *Vidarśana* (Absence of Sight)—is the absolute cause of *anupalabdhi* in the case of blind persons.

xviii. *Vikāra* (Loss of Health)—Mostly, it so happens that things that are once perceived are not apprehended in later life on account of *vikāras* like *vārdhakya* (old age) etc.

xviii. *Akriyā* (Want of Action)—There is non-perception of roots of trees because of the scarcity of actions like *bhūkhanana* etc.

xix. *Anadhigama* (Non-acquisition)—Owing to the *anadhigama* of *śāstraśravaṇa*, the meaning of *Śāstras* becomes incomprehensible.

xx. *Kāla viprakarṣa* (Remoteness of Time)—*Ṛṣabhadeva* and other *Tîrthaṅkaras* of the past and *Padma Nābha* of future cannot be recognized due to the remoteness of time.

xxi. *Svabhāva viprakarṣa* (Natural Remoteness)—Things like *nabhas* and *piśa*† are non-cognizible by reason of their *svabhāva viprakarṣa.*

In this way, *anupalabdhi* of an existent object takes place in twenty-one different ways.

So, *Jîva* is imperceptible like *nabhas* due to its *amūrtatā*; and *s'arîra* being an assemblage of the *Kārman paramāṇus* is *anupalabhya* because of *s'auksmya* of a *paramaṇu.* Thus, non-perception of the Soul and body is positively the non-perception of an existent object and not of a non-existent one.

An argument may here be advanced that "If you take *Ātman* to be existent, how do you apprehend its existence ?" The reply is:—

The existence of *Ātman* is established by means of *anumāna.* And hence, its *anupalabdhi* is not the *anupalabdhi* of a non-existent object like a *kharas'ṅga,* but it is the *anupalabdhi* of an existent object like *nabhas* and *paramāṇu.* Then, the distinction of Soul from body is established by the help of *Vedavacana.*

देहाणण्णे व जिए जमग्गिहोत्ताइं सग्गकामस्स ।
वेयविहियं विहण्णइ दाणाइफलं च लोयम्मि ॥१३६॥ (१६८४)

Dehāṇāṇṇe va jie jamaggihottāim saggakāmassa ।
Veyavihiyam vihaṇṇai dāṇāiphalam ca loyammi ॥ 136 ॥ (1684)

† The word *Pis'a=ruru,* a kind of deer according to *Sāyaṇācārya.* The deer is called *Pis'a* probably because it is *Pis'a* (reddish) in colour. The *anupalabdhi* of the *Pis'a* deer may be taken to be due to its nature of being always far away from human habitations. The word, however, seems rather improper when placed with *nabhas.* If we read *pis'āca* instead of *Pis'a* it would suit our purpose better.—*Tr.*

[देहानन्ये वा जीवे यदग्निहोत्रादि स्वर्गकामस्य ।
वेदविहितं विहन्यते दानादिफलं च लोके ॥ १३६ ॥ (१६८४)

Dehānanye vā jîve yadagnihotrādi svargakāmasya ।
Vedavihitam vihanyate dānādiphalam ca loke ॥ 136 ॥ (1684)]

Trans.—136 Or, if *Jîva* is (believed to be) identical with *deha* (the body), then, (obstruction of the) rites like *agnihotra* (the worship of sacred-fire) for a person aspiring for Salvation and the reward of munificence etc. (*dānādiphala*) in the world prescribed by the *Vedas*, would be refuted (1684).

टीका–शरीरमात्रे जीवे सति गौतम ! यत् स्वर्गकामस्य वेदविहित-मग्निहोत्राद्यनुष्ठानं तद् विहन्यते, देहस्य वह्निनाऽत्रैव भस्मीकरणात्, जीवा-भावे कस्यासौ स्वर्गो भवेत् ? इति भावः । दानादिफलं चानुभवितुरभावात् कस्य भवेत् ? इति ॥ १३६ (१६८४) ॥

D. C.—O Gautama ! If each and every *s'arîra* is believed to be identical with *jîva*, the commandment of the *Vedas* that a person who desires to attain Salvation should perform the rite of *Agnihotra*, would be null and void. Because, when body is reduced to ashes by fire in this world, the *Jîva* being taken to be identical with body is also supposed to have vanished with the body. And then, who would attain Salvation when *Jîva* itself does not exist ?

Similarly, who would be there to enjoy the fruits of good deeds like *dāna* when there would be none to receive them at all ?

Vāyubhūti entertains doubt as regards the distinction of Soul from body by hearing the various *Veda-padas* bearing contradictory arguments. *Bhagavān Mahāvîra* interprets these *Veda-padas* correctly and clears his doubt.

**विण्णाणघणाईणं वेयपयाणं तमत्थमविदंतो ।
देहाणण्णं मन्नसि ताणं च पयाणमयमत्थो ॥ १३७ ॥ (१६८५)**

Viṇṇāṇaghaṇāiṇam Veyapayāṇam tamatthamavidanto ।
Dehāṇaṇṇam mannasi tāṇam ca payāṇamayamattho ॥137॥ (1685)

[विज्ञानघनादीनां वेदपदानां त्वमर्थमविदन् ।
देहानन्यं मन्यसे तेषां च पदानामयमर्थः ॥ १३७ ॥ (१६८५)

Vijñānaghanādīnām Veda-padānām tvamarthamavidan ।
Dehānanyam manyase teṣām ca padānāmayamarthaḥ ॥137॥(1685)]

Trans.—137 You, not knowing the (real) meaning of sentences like " *Vijñānaghana* " etc. of the *Vedas*, think that the Soul is identical with body. But (*ca*) their real interpretation is this.† (1685).

टीका–विज्ञानघनाख्यः पुरुष एवायं भूतेभ्योऽर्थान्तरमित्यादिव्याख्या पूर्ववदेव । अत एव प्रागुक्तम्–" शरीरतया परिणतो भूतसंघातोऽयं विद्यमानकर्तृकः, आदिमत्प्रतिनियताकारत्वात्, घटवद्, यश्च तत्कर्ता स तदतिरिक्तो जीवः " इति । भूतारिक्तात्मप्रतिपादकानि च वेदवाक्यानि तवापि प्रतीतान्येव । तद्यथा–"सत्येन लभ्यस्तपसा ह्येष ब्रह्मचर्येण नित्यं ज्योतिर्मयो विशुद्धो यं पश्यन्ति धीरा यतयः संयतात्मानः " इत्यादि । तदेवं सर्वेषामपि वेदवाक्यानां भूतातिरिक्तस्य जीवस्य प्रतिपादकत्वाद् भूतेभ्योऽतिरिक्तं जीवं प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ॥ १३७ (१६८५) ॥

D. C.—That the Soul itself is " *vijñānaghana* " and that it is distinct from other *bhūtas* has already been discussed. It has already been said that

Sarîratayā pariṇato bhūtasaṃghāto'yam vidyamānakartṛikaḥ ।
Ādimatpratiniyatākāratvāt ghaṭavat, yaśca tatkartā sa tadatirikto jîvaḥ iti ॥

Moreover, sentences of the *Vedas* that prove *Ātman* to be *atirikta* from *bhūtas*, have not been beyond your comprehension. *e. g.*

† The real interpretation of sentences like " *vijñānaghana* " etc. has already been stated and discussed in the First *Vāda*. *vide* Vs. 1588–1595.

" Satyena labhyastapasā hyeṣa brahmacaryeṇa nityam jyotirmayo ।
Vis'uddho'yam pas'yanti dhîrā yatayaḥ saṃyatātmanaḥ ॥ "

In the same way, all *Veda-padas* have proved that *Jîva* is *atirikta* from *bhūtas*. Hence, you too, shall have to admit that the Soul is distinct from *bhūtas*.

छिन्नम्मि संसयम्मि जिणेणं जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
सो समणो पव्वइओ पंचहिं सह खंडियसएहिं ॥१३८॥ (१६८६)

Chinnammi saṃsayammi jiṇeṇam jarā-maraṇavippamukkeṇaṃ ।
So samaṇo pavvaio pancahiṃ saha khandiyasaehiṃ ॥ 138 ॥ (1686)

[छिन्ने संशये जिनेन जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
स श्रमणः प्रव्रजितः पञ्चभिः सह खण्डिकशतैः ॥ १३८ ॥ (१६८६)

Chinne saṃśaye jinena jarā-maraṇavipramuktena ।
Sa śramaṇaḥ pravrajitaḥ pancabhiḥ saha khaṇḍikaśataiḥ ॥138॥(1686)

Trans.—138 When the doubt was removed by the *Tîrthaṅkara*, who was entirely free from *jarā* (old age) and *maraṇa* (death), the saint *Vāyubhūti* accepted the *Dîkṣā* along with his five hundred followers (1686).

End of the Discussion with the Third Gaṇadhara.

Chapter IV



चतुर्थगणधरवक्तव्यता ।

Discussion with the Fourth Gaṇadhara.

ते पव्वइए सोउं वियत्तु आगच्छइ जिणसगासं ।
वच्चामि ण वंदामी वंदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ॥ १३९ ॥ (१६८७)

Te pavvaie söum Vyattu Vāgacchai jiṇasagāsam ।
Vaccāmi ṇa vandāmî vandittā pajjuvāsāmi ॥ 139 ॥ (1687)

[तान् प्रव्रजितान् श्रुत्वा व्यक्त आगच्छति जिनसकाशम् ।
व्रजामि वन्दे वन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ॥ १३९ ॥ (१६८७)

Tān pravrajitān śrutvā Vyakta āgacchati jinasakāśam ।
Vrajāmi vande vanditvā paryupāse ॥ 139 ॥ (1687)]

Trans.—139 Having heard that they (*i. e. Vāyubhūti* and his fellow-mendicants) had renounced the world, *Vykta* comes before the *Tîrthaṅkara.* (He thinks...) " I may go, pay my homage (to the *Tîrthaṅkara*) and serve him." (1687)

आभट्ठो य जिणेणं जाइ-जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
नामेण य गोत्तेण य सव्वण्णू सव्वदरिसीणं ॥ १४० ॥ (१६८८)

Ābhaṭṭho ya jiṇeṇam jāi-jarā-maraṇavippamukkeṇam ।
Nāmeṇa ya gotteṇa ya savvaṇṇū savvadarisîṇam ॥ 140 ॥ (1688)

[आभाषितश्च जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ॥ १४० ॥ (१६८८)

Ābhaṣitaśca jinena jāti-jarā-maraṇavipramuktena ।
Nāmnā ca gotreṇa ca sarvajñena sarvadarśinā ॥ 140 ॥ (1681)]

Trans.—140 He was addressed by his name and *gotra* (lineage) by the *Tîrthaṅkara* who was free from *jāti* (birth) *jarā* (old age) and *maraṇa* (death), who was *Sarvajña* (omniscient) and who had (attained) complete *darśana.* (1628)

Bhagavān said :—

किं मण्णे अत्थि भूया उदाहु नत्थि त्ति संसओ तुज्झ ।
वेयपयाण य अत्थं न याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो ॥१४१॥ (१६८९)

Kim maṇṇe atthi bhūyā udāhu natthi tti saṃsao tujjha ।
Veyapayāṇa ya attham na yāṇasî tesimo attho ॥ 141 ॥ (1689)

[किं मन्यसे सन्ति भूतान्युताहो न सन्तीति संशयस्तव ।
वेदपदानां चार्थं न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ १४१ ॥ (१६८९)

Kim manyase santi bhūtānyutāho na santîti saṃśayastava ।
Vedapadānām cārtham na jānāsi teṣāmayamarthaḥ ॥141॥ (1689)]

Trans.—141 *O Vyakta* ! What are you thinking of ? You entertain the doubt as to whether *Bhūtas* exist or not. But *(ca)* you have not understood the (real) interpretation of the sentences of the *Vedas.* Here is their (real) interpretation. (1689)

टीका—पृथिव्य-ऽप्-तेजो-वाय्वा-ऽऽकाशलक्षणानि पञ्चभूतानि, तानि च किं सन्ति न वा ? इति त्वं मन्यसे । संशयश्च तवायं विरुद्धवेदपदश्रवण-निबन्धनो वर्तते । तानि चामूनि वेदपदानि—" स्वप्नोपमं वै सकलमित्येष ब्रह्मविधिरञ्जसा विज्ञेयः " इत्यादि, तथा, " द्यावा-पृथिवी " इत्यादि, तथा, " पृथिवी देवता, आपो देवताः " इत्यादि । एतेषां चायमर्थस्तव प्रतिभासते—"स्वप्नोपमम्—स्वप्नसदृशम्, वैनिपातोऽवधारणे, सकलम्-अशेषं जगत्, इत्येष ब्रह्मविधिः—परमार्थप्रकारः, अञ्जसा—प्रगुणेन न्यायेन, विज्ञेयः—ज्ञातव्यः " इति । तदेवमादीनि वेदपदानि किल भूतनिह्नवपराणि, " द्यावा-

पृथिवी " इत्यादीनि तु सत्ताप्रतिपादकानि, अतस्तव संशयः। तदेतेषां वेद-पदानां त्वमर्थं न जानासि, चशब्दाद् युक्तिहृदयं च न वेत्सि। तेन संशयं कुरुषे। तेषां चायमर्थो वक्ष्यमाणलक्षण इति ॥ १४१ (१६८९) ॥

D. C.—This is your querry–" Do the *pancabhūtas* viz. *Pṛthvî* (earth) *āp* (water) *tejas* (fire) *vāyu* (air) and *ākās'a* (ether) exist or not ? This querry is based upon your misapprehension of certain sentences of the *Vedas*, that are mutually contradictory. The sentences are—

(1) " Svapnopamam vai sakalamityeṣa brahmavidhiranjasā vijñeyah " etc.

(2) " Dyāvā–pṛithvî " etc. and

(3) " Prithvî–devatā, āpo devatāh " etc.

Your interpretation of these sentences runs thus :—

All this world is nothing but a dream or illusion. So, one should honestly endeavour to know the *Brahma*, which is the only *paramārthaprakās'a* worth attaining.

Such sentences refute the existence of the five elements while others like *Dyāvā pṛithivî* and " *Pṛithivî devatā, āpo devatāh* " establish the existence of those very elements. These contradicting sentences of the *Vedas* have given rise to your doubt.

Really speaking, you have not understood the real purport of the above sentences. Here I give their correct interpretation. Listen to it.

भूएसु तुज्झ संका सुविणय-माओवमाइं होज्ज त्ति ।
न वियारिज्जंताइं भयंति जं सव्वहा जुत्तिं ॥ १४२ ॥ (१६९०)

Bhūesu tujjha sankā suviṇaya–māovamāim hojja tti ।
Na viyārijjantāim bhayanti jam savvahā juttim ॥ 142 ॥ (1690)

[भूतेषु तव शङ्का स्वप्नक–मायोपमानि भवेयुरिति ।
न विचार्यमाणानि भजन्ति यत् सर्वथा युक्तिम् ॥ १४२ ॥ (१६९०)

Bhūteṣu tava śaṅkā svapnaka-māyopamāni bhaveyuriti ।
Na vicāryamāṇāni bhajanti yat sarvathā yuktim ॥ 142 ॥ (1690)]

भूयाइसंसयाओ जीवाइसु का कह त्ति ते बुद्धी ।
तं सव्वसुण्णसंकी मन्नसि मायोवमं लोयं ॥ १४३ ॥ (१६९१)

Bhūyāisamsayāo jîvāisu kā kaha tti te buddhî ।
Tam savvasuṇṇasankî mannasi māyovamam loyam ॥ 143 ॥ (1691)

[भूतादिसंशयात् जीवादिषु का कथेति ते बुद्धिः ।
त्वं सर्वशून्यशङ्की मन्यसे मायोपमं लोकं ॥ १४३ ॥ (१६९१)

Bhūtādisaṃśayāt jîvādiṣu kā katheti te buddhiḥ ।
Tvam sarvaśūnyaśaṅkî manyase mayopamam lokam ॥143॥ (1691)]

Trans.—142–143 You entertain the doubt about the elements that they are (unreal) like dreams and illusions. And when you question the (existence of) elements (themselves), what to talk of objects like *jîva* etc. ? You being dubious about the existence of everything, believe the whole world to be (as unreal as) *māyā.* (1690–1691).

टीका–आयुष्मन् व्यक्त ! भूतेषु भवतः सन्देहः, यतः स्वप्नोपमानानि मायोपमानानि चैतानि भवेयुरिति त्वं मन्यसे । यथा हि स्वप्ने किल कश्चिद् निःस्वोऽपि निजगृहाङ्गणे गजघटा-तुरगनिवह–मणि-कनकराश्यादिकमभूतमपि पश्यति, मायायां चेन्द्रजालविलसितरूपायामविद्यमानमपि कनक–मणि–मौक्तिक–रजतभाजना–ऽऽराम–पुष्प–फलादिकं दृश्यते, तथैतान्यपि भूतान्येवंविधान्येवेति मन्यसे, यद् यस्माद् विचार्यमाणान्येतानि सर्वथैव न काश्चिद् युक्तिं भजन्ते सहन्ते। भूतेषु च संशये जीव–पुण्य–पापादिषु किल का वार्ता भूतविकाराधिष्ठानत्वात् तेषाम् ? इति तव बुद्धिः । तस्मात् सर्वस्यापि भूत-जीवादिवस्तुनस्त्वदभिप्रायेणाभावात् सर्वशून्यताशङ्की त्वं निरवशेषमपि लोकं मायोपमं स्वप्ने-न्द्रजालतुल्यं मन्यस इति ॥ १४२–१४३ (१६९०–१६९१) ॥

D. C.—Long-lived *Vyakta*! You question the existence of *Bhūtas*. Just as, in a dream, a poor man sees before his own house multitudes of elephants, and horses, or treasures of jewellery and gold, but actually he does not possess them, and just as, under the illusion of the *Indrajāla*, precious things, *e g.*, dishes (made) of gold, silver, jewels etc., or beautiful objects *e. g.*, parks, flowers, fruits etc, are perceived, but really speaking, they are not existing; in the same way, according to your belief, *bhūtas* like *pṛithivî* are perceived by us; but as a matter of fact, they are unreal and illusory like objects seen in a dream or an *Indrajāla*. But this belief of yours is absolutely unfounded.

Again, as you have a doubt in the existence of elements, the doubt is bound to arise in the case of *jîva*, *pāpa* and *punya* also. Because, these objects are contained in the various *vikāras* of the *bhūtas* themselves. It follows, therefore, that, according to you, all *bhūtas* like *Pṛthivî* and all *padārthas* (objects) like *jîva* are *a-vidyamāna* (non-existent). This indicates that you are *sarvaśūnyatāśaṅkî* and according to you, the whole Universe is just like *svapna*, *māyā* or *Indrajāla*.

Now, *Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvîra* gives a number of arguments for doubts which *Vyakta* entertained in his mind :—

जह किर न सओ परओ नोभयओ नावि अन्नओ सिद्धी।
भावाणमवेक्खाओ वियत्त! जह दीह-हस्साणं॥१४४॥ (१६९२)

Jaha kira na sao parao nobhayao nāvi annao siddhî ।
Bhāvāṇamavekkhāo Viyatta ! jaha dîha-hassāṇam ॥144॥ (1692)

[यथा किल न स्वतः परतो नोभयतो नाप्यन्यतः सिद्धिः।
भावानामपेक्षातो व्यक्त ! यथा दीर्घ-ह्रस्वयोः ॥ १४४ ॥ (१६९२)

Yathā kila na svataḥ parato nobhayato nāpyanyataḥ siddhiḥ ।
Bhāvānāmapekṣāto Vyakta ! yathā dîrgha-hrasvayoḥ ॥144॥ (1692)

Trans.—144 Accomplishment of objects, *O Vyakta !* like (the accomplishment of) *hrasva* (short) and *dîrgha* (long) can never be attained by means of itself, through another, by means of both, or through any other object (1692).

टीका–व्यक्त ! भवतोऽयमभिप्रायः—यथा किल न स्वतः, न परतः, न चोभयतः, नाप्यन्यतो भावानां सिद्धिः संभाव्यते । कुतः ? इत्याह—अपेक्षातः—कार्यकारणादिभावस्यापेक्षिकत्वादित्यर्थः, ह्रस्व–दीर्घव्यपदेशवत् । तथाहि—यत् किमपि भावजातमस्ति तेन सर्वेणापि कार्येण वा भवितव्यम्, कारणेन वा । तत्र कार्यं कारणेन क्रियत इति कारणायत्त एव तस्य कार्यत्वव्यपदेशः, न तु कार्यस्य कार्यत्वं स्वतः सिद्धं किमप्यस्ति । एवं कारणमपि कार्यं करोतीति कार्यायत्त एव तस्य कारणत्वव्यपदेशः, न तु तस्य कारणत्वं स्वतः सिद्धं किञ्चिदस्ति । तदेवं कार्यादिभावः स्वतो न सिध्यति । यच्च स्वतो न सिद्धं तस्य परतोऽपि सिद्धिर्नास्ति, यथा खरविषाणस्य । ततश्च न स्वतः कार्यादिभावः, नापि परतः । स्व–परोभयतस्तर्हि तस्य सिद्धिरिति चेत् । तदयुक्तम्, व्यस्तादुभयतस्तत्सिद्धेरभावात् तत्समुदायेऽपि तदयोगात् । न हि सिकताकणेषु प्रत्येकमसत् तैलं तत्समुदाये प्रादुर्भवति ।

अपि च, उभयतः सिद्धिपक्ष इतरेतराश्रयदोषः प्राप्नोति । यावद्धि कार्यं न सिध्यति न तावत्कारणसिद्धिरस्ति । यावच्च कारणं न सिध्यति न तावत् कार्यं सिद्धिमासादयति । अत इतरेतराश्रयदोषः । तस्माद् नोभयतोऽपि कार्यादिभावसिद्धिः । नाप्यन्यतः–अनुभयत इत्यर्थः, स्व–परो–भयव्यतिरेकेणान्यस्य वस्तुनोऽसत्त्वेन निर्हेतुकत्वप्रसङ्गात् । एवं ह्रस्व–दीर्घलक्षणे दृष्टान्तेऽपि "अपेक्षातः" इत्यस्य ह्रस्व–दीर्घत्वासिद्धिलक्षणेन साध्येनान्वयो भावनीयः । तथाहि—प्रदेशिन्या अङ्गुष्ठमपेक्ष्य दीर्घत्वं प्रतीयते । मध्यमां त्वपेक्ष्य ह्रस्वत्वम्, परमार्थेन त्वियं स्वतो न ह्रस्वा, नापि दीर्घा । तदेवं न स्वतो ह्रस्व–दीर्घत्वयोः सिद्धिः । ततः परतः, उभयतः, अनुभयतश्च तत्सिद्ध्यभावो यथोक्तवद् भावनीयः, तदुक्तम्—

न दीर्घस्तीह दीर्घत्वं न ह्रस्वे नापि च द्वये ।
तस्माद सिद्धं शून्यत्वात् सदित्याख्यायते क्व हि ? ॥ १ ॥

" ह्रस्वं प्रतीत्य सिद्धं दीर्घं, दीर्घं प्रतीत्य ह्रस्वमपि ।
न किञ्चिदस्ति सिद्धं व्यवहारवशाद् वदन्त्येवम् ॥ १ ॥ (१६९२)

D. C.—Vyakta ! your argument is this:—Complete attainment of (the existence of) objects is not possible either *svataḥ* or *parataḥ* or *ubhayataḥ* or *anyataḥ* as in the case of (the accomplishment of the existence of) the *hrasva* and *dîrgha*, there being *apekṣikatva* (expectation) of the *Kārya Kāraṇādibhāvas* (*i. e.*, relations like that of cause and effect) of the *padārthas*. Hence, each and every object is expected to be either *kārya* or *kārana*. As every *kārya* is done by *kāraṇa*, its *kāryatva* is subjugated by *kāraṇatva*. But the *kāryatva* of a *kārya* is not *svabhāva-siddha* (self-accomplished).

Similarly, *kāraṇa* accomplishes *kārya*. So that, *kāraṇatva* of *kāraṇa* is subjugated by the *kāryatva* of *kārya*. But *kāṛṇatva* also is not *svataḥ siddha*.

Now, one which is not *Svataḥsiddha* by virtue of its own self cannot be accomplished by means of another also, as in the case of the horn of an ass. So, *kāryādibhāva* is accomplished neither by itself nor by another.

Again, it is improper to consider the possibility of *kāryādibhāvas* even by *sva* and *para* taken together. Because, since *siddhi* is not found in either of them separately, how could it be attained in the *samudāya* of the two ? Take the example of oil and sand. When oil is not present in every single particle of sand, it is not found in the collection of sand also. Thus, the accomplishment of an object by means of *ubhaya*, (both) is also impossible.

In case of accomplishment by means of *ubhaya*, there is another difficulty also. During the process of *siddhi*, so long as *kārya* is not accomplished, there is *kāraṇasiddhi* and so long as *kāraṇa* is not accomplished, there is *kāryasiddhi*. Consequently, *kārya* and *kāraṇa* depend upon each other, and hence there is *itaretarāśrayadoṣa*, or the fault of affecting each other. Thus, it is clear that the *siddhi* of *kāryādibhāva* is not possible even if *sva* and *para* are taken together.

Nor even by any other means-*anubhayataḥ*-the *siddhi* is possible. For, there is no *vastu* (object) available except *sva*, *para* and *ubhhya* in this world. So, even if we presume the accomplishment of *bhāvas anyataḥ* or *anubhayataḥ* (*i. e.*, by means of any object excepting *sva*, *para* and *ubhaya*) the *siddhi* would be *nir-hetuka* (void of cause). To take an example the *pradeśinî* finger (next to thumb) looks *dîrgha* when compared with the thumb and *hrasva* when compared with the middle finger. But the finger by itself is neither short nor long.

Since it is not *hrasva* or *dîrgha* by virtue of itself, it is not so by means of another object, nor by both taken together, nor by any extra means whatsoever. So it is said—

" Na dîrghe'steeha dîrghatvam na hrasve nāpi ca dvaye ।
Tasmādasiddham śūnyatvāt sadityā khyāyate kva hi ? ॥

" Hrasvam pratîtya siddham dîrgham, dîrgham pratîtya hrasvamapi ।
Na kincidasti siddham, vyavahāravaśād vadantyevam ॥ " (1692)

In support of the prima facie assertion that there is *sarvaśunyatā*, a number of examples are given.

अत्थित्त-घडेगाणेगया व सव्वेगयाइदोसाओ ।
सव्वेऽणभिलप्पा वा सुण्णा वा सव्वहा भावा ॥ १४५ ॥ (१६९३)

Atthitta-ghaḍegāṇegayā va savvegayāidosāo ।
Savve'ṇabhilappā vā suṇṇā vā savvahā bhāvā ॥ 145 ॥ (1693)

[अस्तित्व-घटैकानेकता वा सर्वैकतादिदोषात् ।
सर्वेऽनभिलाप्या वा शून्या वा सर्वथा भावाः ॥ १४५ ॥ (१६९३)

Astitva-ghaṭaikānekatā vā sarvaikatādidoṣāt ।
Sarve'nabhilāpyā vā śūnyā vā sarvathā bhāvāḥ ॥ 145 ॥ (1693)]

Trans.—145 Unity or distinction of *astitva* and *ghaṭa* would either give rise to faults like *sarvaikatā* (*i. e.* universal

oneness) or all the objects would become inexpressible (by word or speech) or non-existent in all respects (1693).

टीका–नन्वस्तित्व–घटयोरेकत्वम्, अनेकत्वं वा ? । यद्येकत्वम्, तर्हि सर्वैकता प्राप्नोति–यो योऽस्ति स स घट इत्यस्तित्वे घटस्य प्रवेशात् सर्वस्य घटत्वप्रसङ्गः स्यात्, न पटादि पदार्थान्तरम् । घटो वा सर्वसत्त्वाव्यतिरेकात् सर्वात्मकः स्यात्; अथवा, यो घटः स एवास्तीति घटमात्रेऽस्तित्वं प्रविष्टम्, ततोऽन्यत्र सत्त्वाभावादघटस्य सर्वस्याप्यभावप्रसङ्गतो घट एवैकः स्यात् । सोऽपि वा न भवेत्, अघटव्यावृत्तो हि घटो भवति, यदा च तत्प्रतिपक्षभूतोऽघट एव नास्ति, तदा किमपेक्षोऽसौ घटः स्यात् ?। इति सर्वशून्यत्वमिति । अथ घट–सत्त्वयोरन्यत्वमिति द्वितीयो विकल्पः । तर्हि सत्त्वरहितत्वादसन् घटः, खरविषाणवदिति । अपिच, सतो भावः सत्त्वमुच्यते, तस्य च स्वाधारभूतेभ्यो घटादिभ्यः सद्भ्योऽन्यत्वेऽसत्त्वमेव स्यात्, आधारादन्यत्वे आधेयस्याप्यनुपपत्तेः । तदेवमस्तित्वेन सह घटादीनामेकत्वाऽन्यत्वविकल्पाभ्यामुक्तन्यायेन सर्वैकतादिदोषप्रसङ्गात् सर्वेऽपि भावा अनभिलप्या वा भवेयुः, सर्वथा शून्या वा स्युः, सर्वथैव तेषामभावो वा भवेदित्यर्थः । अपिच, यद् नोत्पद्यते तत्तावद् निर्विवादं खरविषाणवदसदेव, इति निवृत्ता तत्कथा । यदप्युत्पत्तिमल्लोकेऽभ्युपगम्यते, तस्यापि जाता-ऽजातादिविकल्पयुक्तिभिरुत्पादो न घटते, इति शून्यतैव युक्तेति ॥ १४५ (१६९३) ॥

D. C.—(1) If *ghaṭa* and *astitva* are taken to be one, all objects will have to be taken as one. For, when *ghaṭa* is said to be *abhinna* from *astitva*, all objects that have existence will be called *ghaṭa*, and there will be no distinction of objects like *paṭa* etc. Thus there will arise the difficulty of *sarvaikatā* or Universal one-ness. Moreover, *ghaṭa* will become a *sarvātmaka* or all-pervading object, since it is taken as inseparable from the *astitva* of all objects. Again, if *ghaṭa* is believed to be *astitva* itself, existence will be restricted to *ghaṭa* only. All other objects that are not *ghaṭa* will, in that case, have no existence. Consequently *ghaṭa* alone will exist.

Or, say, *ghata*, too, will not exist according to this argument. Whatever is different from *a-ghata* is called *ghata*. Now, since *ghata* and *astitva* go together, *a-ghaṭa* which is opposite to *ghata* will also have no existence. Thus, *a-ghaṭa* does not exist. So, also *ghata* will not exist. For, in comparision with what, will the object be *ghaṭa* if *a-ghata* is absent ?

Hence it is better to resort to *sarvaśūnyatā*.

(2) Now, the second alternative that—*ghata* is distinct from *astitva*–may be considered. If *ghata* is *bhinna* from *astitva*, it is devoid of *astitva* also For, *astitva* being the quality of existence, is the *ādheya*, and *ghaṭa* which contains the quality is *ādhāra*. *Ādheya* is not supposed to exist, when *ādhāra* is away from it. So, *ghaṭa* is devoid of existence and hence it is said to be *a-vidyamāna* like the horn of an ass.

Thus, the above discussion of unity or distinction of *astitva* and *ghata* leads either to the difficulty of *sarvaikatâ* or to the *anabhilāpyatva* and *śūnyatva* as regards each and every object.

Again, that which is not produced is undoubtedly *a-vidyamâna*, like the horn of an ass, and it has already been discussed before With regard to objects that have been produced in this world, it can also be proved that their production is not in the fitness of things, if properly thought of.

जायाऽजायो-भयओ न जायमाणं च जायए जम्हा ।
अणवत्था-ऽभावो-भयदोसाओ सुण्णया तम्हा ॥१४६॥(१६९४)

Jāyā' jāyo–bhayao na jāyamāṇam ca jāyae jamhā ।
Aṇavatthā' bhāvo–bhayadosāo suṇṇayā tamhā ॥ 146 ॥ (1694)

[जाता-ऽजातोभयतो न जायमानं च जायते यस्मात् ।
अनवस्था ऽभावो-भयदोषात् शून्यता तस्मात् ॥ १४६ ॥ (१६९४)

Jātā'jātobhayato, na jāyamānam ca jāyate yasmāt ।
Anavasthā'bhāvo–bhayadoṣāt śūnyatā tasmāt ॥ 146 ॥ (1694)]

Trans.—146 (An object) which has (already) been produced, or which is in both the conditions, or which is (in the state of) being produced, can never be produced on account of faults like disorder, non-entity or both. So, it is non-existent.

टीका–इह तावद् न जातं जायते, जातत्वादेव, निष्पन्नघटवत् । अथ जातमपि जायते, तर्ह्यनवस्था, जातत्वाविशेषेण पुनःपुनर्जन्मप्रसङ्गात् । अथाजातं जायते । तत्रोत्तरमाह–" अभाव त्ति " सूचकत्वात् सूत्रस्य, तर्ह्यभावोऽपि खरविषाणलक्षणो जायताम् , अजातत्वाविशेषात् । अथ जाताजातरूपं जायते । तदप्ययुक्तम् । कुतः ? इत्याह–उभयदोषात् प्रत्येकोभयपक्षोक्तदोषापत्तेरित्यर्थः । किञ्च, एतज्जाताजातलक्षणमुभयमस्ति वा, न वा ? । यद्यस्ति, तर्हि जातमेव तत्, न पुनरुभयम्, तत्र चोक्तो दोषः । अथ नास्ति तथापि नोभयं तत्, किन्त्वजातमेव, तत्रापि चाभिहितमेव दूषणम् । नापि जायमानं जायते, पूर्वोक्तविकल्पद्वयानतिवृत्तेः, तथाहि–तदपि जायमानमस्ति न वा ? । यद्यस्ति, तर्हि जातमेव तत् । नास्ति चेत्, तर्ह्यजातमेव । पक्षद्वयेऽपि चास्मिन्नभिहित एव दोषः । उक्तं च—

गतं न गम्यते तावदगतं नैव गम्यते ।
गतागतविनिर्मुक्तं गम्यमानं न गम्यते ॥ १ ॥

इत्यादि । यस्मादेवम्, तस्मादनवस्थादिदोषप्रसङ्गेन वस्तूनामुत्पादायोगाज्जगतः शून्यतैव युक्तेति ॥ १४६ (१६९४) ॥

D. C.—(1) An object which is once produced has not to undergo the process of production again, just as a *ghata* which has already been *jāta* has not to be produced again. Even then if it is said that objects that have once been produced can be produced again and again, there would be *anavasthā*. Hence *utpatti* of an already *jāta* object is absolutely impossible.

(2) Again, if an *a-jāta* object is believed to be capable of being produced objects like *kharaviṣāṇa*–that have never

been produced so far–should also be taken as capable of being produced. Because, *ajātatva* is present in *kharaviṣāṇa* also. But this is absurd. So, *utpatti* of an *ajāta* object is never possible.

(3) In the case of an object which is both *jāta* and *a–jāta*, the *utpatti* is not possible. Because *dosas* that are found in each one of the above two cases separately are certainly found in the combination of the two also.

Moreover, if an object which is *ubhayarūpa* is taken to be *vidyamāna* it becomes *jāta* and loses its *jātājāta ubhayarūpa*. Similarly, if it is *a–vidyamāna*, it cannot be called *ubhayarūpa*, but *anutpanna* only. Now, when it is *utpanna* or *anutpanna*, *doṣas* like *anavasthā* and *abhāva* do arise.

(4) In the case of a *jāyamāna* object also, the above argument may be applied and the *dosas* like *anavasthā* and *abhāva* arise in that case also, according as it becomes *jāta* or *a–jāta* due to its being *vidyamāna* or *a–vidyamāna*. So, *utpatti* in this case is also impossible.

So, it is said,

" Gatam na gamyate tāvadagatam naiva gamyate ।
Gatāgatavinirmuktam gamyamānam na gamyate ॥ "

Thus, in all the above–mentioned four *avasthās* of an object, it has been clearly pointed out that its *utpatti* is impossible. Hence, it is proper to believe in the Universal non–entity.

हेऊ–पच्चयसामग्गि वीसु भावेसु नो व जं कज्जं ।
दीसइ सामग्गिमयं सव्वाभावे न सामग्गी ॥ १४७ ॥ (१६९५)

Heū–paccayasāmaggi vîsu bhāvesu no va jam kajjam ।
Dîsai sāmaggimayam savvābhāve na sāmaggî ॥ 147 ॥ (1695)

[हेतु–प्रत्ययसामग्री विष्वग् भावेषु नो वा यत् कार्यम् ।
दृश्यते सामग्रीमयं सर्वाभावे न सामग्री ॥ १४७ ॥ (१६९५)

Hetu-pratyayasāmagrî viṣvag bhāveṣu no vā yat kāryam।
Driśyate sāmagrîmayam sarvābhāve na sāmagrî ॥ 147 ॥ (1695)]

Trans.—147 An object is accomplished by means of a group of causes taken together and not by *hetu* or *pratyaya* in its individual capacity. (This) collection of causes cannot be (found) in the (midst of) all-pervading negation.

टीका–हेतवः–उपादानकारणानि, प्रत्ययास्तु निमित्तकारणानि, तेषां हेतु–प्रत्ययानां या सामग्री तस्या विष्वग् भावेषु पृथगवस्थासु यत् कार्यं न दृश्यते, दृश्यते च सामग्रीमयम्–संपूर्ण सामग्र्यवस्थायां पुनर्दृश्यत इत्यर्थः। एवं च सति कार्यस्य सर्वाभाव एव युक्त इति शेषः। सर्वाभावे च न सामग्री–नैव सामग्रीसद्भावः प्राप्नोतीत्यर्थः। ततः सर्वशून्यतैवेति भावः। इदमत्र हृदयम्–हेतवश्च प्रत्ययाश्च स्वजन्यमर्थं किमेकैकशः कुर्वन्ति, संभूय वा ?। न तावदेकैकशः, तथाऽनुपलब्धेः। तत एकैकस्मात् कार्यस्याभावात् सामग्र्यामपि तदभाव एव स्यात्, सिकताकणतैलवदिति। इत्थं च सर्वस्यापि कार्यस्योत्पत्त्यभावे सामग्रीसद्भावो न प्राप्नोति, अनुत्पन्नायाः सामग्र्या अप्ययोगात्। ततश्च सर्वशून्यतैव जगतः। उक्तं च

हेतु–प्रत्ययसामग्री पृथग् भावेष्वदर्शनात्।
तेन ते नाभिलप्या हि भावाः सर्वे स्वभावतः ॥ १ ॥

लोके यावत् संज्ञा सामग्र्यामेव दृश्यते यस्मात्।
तस्माद् न सन्ति भावा भावे सति नास्ति सामग्री ॥ १ ॥

इत्यादि। अस्य च व्याख्या–पृथग् भावेष्वदर्शनात् "कार्यस्य" इति शेषः। तेन ते घटादयो भावा सर्वेऽपि स्वभावतः स्वरूपतो नाभिलाप्याः, पृथगेकैकावस्थायाः कार्यस्यानुत्पादात्, उत्पत्तिमन्तरेण च घटादिसंज्ञाऽप्रवृत्तेः, संज्ञाऽभावे चाभिलप्तुमशक्यत्वादिति। कुतः पुनः पृथगवस्थायां संज्ञाऽप्रवृत्तिः ? इत्याह–"लोके यावदित्यादि" लोके यावत् संज्ञा "घटोऽयम्" इत्यादिसंज्ञाप्रवृत्तिः, तावत् संपूर्णं कार्यं संपूर्णसामग्र्यामेव यस्माद् दृश्यते, पृथगभावे च सामग्र्यामप्यभावात् सिकतातैलवद् न सन्त्येव भावाः, भावासत्त्वे च कुतः सामग्रीसद्भावः ? इति ॥ १४७ ॥ (१६९५) ॥

D. C.—An object is said to have been accomplished only when all *upādāna* and *nimitta* causes are assembled together. But when each one of these causes operates separately, the *kārya* could never be accomplished. In other words, there is *abhāva* of the *kārya* and ultimately there will be *sarvābhāva*. Again, in the midst of *sarvābhāva*, *sāmagrî* cannot exist. Consequently, there will be *sarvas'ūnyatā*.

Moreover, just as oil cannot be found in the collection of sands when it is not present in each individual particle, so also *kārya* cannot be found in the combination of many *kāraṇas* when it is absent in each individual *kāraṇa* separately.

Thus, when the existence and production of all *kāryas* are denied, the existence and production of *sāmagrî* are also denied. So here also, *sarvas'unyatā* is the only resort of belief. Again, it is said that

" Hetu-pratyayasāmagrî pṛthag bhaveśvadarśanāt ।
Tena te nābhilapyā hi bhavaḥ sarve svabhāvataḥ ॥ "

" Loke yāvat saṃjñāsamagryāmeva dṛiśyate yasmāt ।
Tasmād na santi bhāvā, bhāve sati nāsti sāmagrî ॥147॥(1695)"

परभागादरिसणओ सव्वाराभागसुहमयाओ य ।
उभयाणुवलंभाओ सव्वाणुलद्धिओ सुण्णं ॥ १४८ ॥ (१६९६)

Parabhāgādarisaṇao savvārābhāgasuhamayāo ya ।
Ubhayāṇuvalambhāo savvāṇuladdhio suṇṇam ॥ 148 ॥ (1696)

[परभागादर्शनतः सर्वाराद्भागसौक्ष्म्याच्च ।
उभयानुपलम्भात् सर्वानुपलब्धितः शून्यम् ॥ १४८ ॥ (१६९६)

Parabhāgādarśanataḥ sarvarādbhāgasaukṣmyācca ।
Ubhayānupalambhāt sarvānupalabdhitaḥ śūnyam ॥ 148 ॥ (1696)]

Trans.—148 The rear portion (of an object) is not perceptible; and its front-most part is very minute. So, on

account of the non-perception of these two, there is non-perception of all, which results in complete negation.

टीका–इह यत् तावददृश्यं तदसदेव, अनुपलम्भात्, खरविषाणवदिति निवृत्ता तद्वार्ता दृश्यस्यापि च स्तम्भ–कुम्भ–कुड्यादेः पर मध्य-भागयोरसत्त्वमेव, अवाग्भागान्तरितत्वेन तयोरप्यदर्शनात्, आराद्भागस्यापि च सावयवत्वात् पुनरन्यः खल्वाराद्भागः तस्याप्यन्यः पुनस्तस्याप्यन्य इत्येवं तावत्, यावत् सर्वारातीयभागस्य, परमाणुप्रतरमात्रत्वेनातिसौक्ष्म्यात्, पूर्वेषां चाराद्भागानामन्यस्यान्येनान्तरितत्वेनानुपलब्धेः। ततश्चोक्तन्यायेन परभागसर्वारातीयभागलक्षणोभयभागानुपलम्भात् सर्वस्यापि वस्तुजातस्यानुपलब्धेः शून्यं जगदिति। उक्तं च

" यावद् दृश्यं परस्तावद् भागः स च न दृश्यते।
तेन ते नाभिलाप्या हि भावाः सर्वे स्वभावतः॥ १॥"

तदेवमुक्तयुक्त्या सर्वस्यापि भूतादेरभावः प्राप्नोति, श्रूयते च श्रुतौ भूतादिसद्भावोऽपीति संशयः। इति पूर्वपक्षः॥ १४८ (१६९६)॥

D. C.—It has already been discussed that objects like *kharaviṣāṇa* do not exist, because they are non-perceptible. In case of perceptible objects like pillar, jar, wall etc, the rear and middle portions are not perceived because they are screened by the front portion coming in their way. So they are said to be *a-vidyamāna.*

Again, the front portion consists of a number of divisions. Out of all these divisions, every one is screened by the other coming in its immediate front which again is screened by a third one in its immediate vicinity and so on. Ultimately, the front-most particle is left unscreened. But it is extremely small in size and hence becomes non-cognizible. Now, since the rear and front-most parts are non-perceptible, it can be said that objects-and ultimately all the objects in the Universe—are non-cognizable or *śūnya.* Moreover, it is said that

" Yāvad dṛiśyam parastāvad bhāgah sa ca na dṛiśyate ।
Tena te nābhilapyā hi bhāvāḥ sarve svabhāvataḥ ॥ "

So, you have a doubt in the existence of *Bhuta* etc, and according to your belief, they are non-existent. This finishes the *pūrvapakṣa* (the argument of the opponent)

Now follows the refutation of the argument—

मा कुरु वियत्त ! संसयमसइ न संसयसमुब्भवो जुत्तो ।
खकुसुम-खरसिंगेसु व, जुत्तो सो थाणु-पुरिसेसु ॥१४९॥(१६९६)

Mā kuru Viyatta ! samsayamasai na samsayasamubbhavo jutto ।
Khakusuma-kharasingesu va jutto so thāṇu-purisesu ॥149॥ (1697)

[मा कुरु व्यक्त ! संशयमसति न संशयसमुद्भवो युक्तः ।
खकुसुम-खरशृङ्गयोरिव युक्तः स स्थाणु-पुरुषयोः ॥१४९॥(१६९७)

Mā kuru Vyakta ! saṃśayamasati na saṃśayasamudbhavo yuktaḥ ।
Khakusuma-kharaśṛṅgayoriva yuktaḥ sa sthāṇu-puruṣayoḥ ॥149॥]

Trans.—149 *O Vyakta !* Do not entertain doubt. The doubt about non-existent (objects) is improper as in the case of *kha-kusuma* (flower of the sky) and *kharaśṛṅga* (horn of an ass). It is proper (only) with regard to (existent objects like) *sthāṇu* and *purusa.* (1697)

टीका-आयुष्मन् व्यक्त ! मा कृथाः संशयं-मा भूताभावं बुध्यस्व, गतोऽसति भूतकदम्बके संशयः खकुसुम-खरविषाणयोरिव न युक्तः, अपि त्वभावनिश्चय एव स्यात् । सत्स्वेव च भूतेषु स्थाणु-पुरुषादिष्विव संशयो युक्तः । यदि पुनरसत्यपि वस्तुनि संदेहः स्यात् तदाऽविशेषेण खरविषाणादिष्वपि स्यादिति भावः ॥ १४९ ॥ (१६९७) ॥

D. C.—O long-lived *Vyakta !* Don't be dubious about the existence of *bhūtas.* Because the doubt about non-existent objects is totally unjustifiable as in the case of *kha-kusuma* and *kharas'ṛṅga* where *abhāva* is already fixed up. It can be

justified only in the case of existent objects like *sthāṇu* and *puruṣa*. But if you raise any doubt as regards a non-existent object, the doubt will be raised in the case of *kharaviṣāṇa* also, which, too is non-existent in general.

को वा विसेसहेऊ सव्वाभावे वि थाणु-पुरिसेसु ।
संका न खपुप्फाइसु विवज्जओ वा कहं न भवे ? ॥१५०॥ (१६९८)

Ko vā visesaheū savvābhāve vī thāṇu-purisesu ।
Sankā na khapupfāisu vivajjao vā kaham na bhave ? ॥ 150 ॥ (1698)

[को वा विशेषहेतुः सर्वाभावेऽपि स्थाणु-पुरुषयोः ।
शङ्का न खपुष्पादिषु विपर्ययो वा कथं न भवेत् ? ॥१५०॥ (१६९८)

Ko vā viṣeṣahetuḥ sarvābhāve'pi sthāṇu-puruṣayoḥ ।
Śaṅkā na khapuṣpādiṣu viparyayo vā katham na bhavet ? ॥150॥]

Trans.—150 Or, what special reason can there be in (entertaining) doubt about *sthāṇu* and *purusa* and not about *kha-puspa* (flower of the sky) etc, even in (the midst of) all-pervading non-entity? Or, why should not the reverse take place ? (1698)

टीका-को वाऽत्र विशेषहेतुरुच्यतां यत्-सर्वाभावे सर्वशून्यतायाम-विशिष्टायामपि स्थाण्वादिषु संशयो भवति । न खपुष्पादिषु ? । ननु विशेषहेत्वभावादविशेषेण सर्वत्र संशयोऽस्तु, नियामकाभावाद् । विपर्ययो वा भवेत्—खपुष्पादिषु संशयः स्याद् न स्थाण्वादिष्विति भावः॥१५०(१६९८)॥

D. C.—Even when there was all-pervading negation on what special ground could you entertain doubt about existent objects like *sthāṇu* etc, and not about non-existent objects like *kha-puṣpa* etc ? If there is no *viśeṣahetu* on which your belief is based, the *saṃs'aya*, in general, may rise at all places. Or, in absence of clear explanation, reverse may be the case *i. e.* The doubt may arise about non-existent objects like *kha-puṣpa* etc, and not about existent objects like *sthāṇu* etc.

Moreover,

पच्चक्खओऽणुमाणादागमओ वा पसिद्धिरत्थाणं ।
सव्वप्पमाणविसयाभावे किह संसओ जुत्तो ? ॥१५१॥ (१६९९)

Paccakkhao'numānādāgamao vā pasiddhiratthānām ।
Savvappamāṇavisayābhāve kiha samsao jutto ? ॥ 151 ॥ (1699)

[प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुमानादागमतो वा प्रसिद्धिरर्थानाम् ।
सर्वप्रमाणविषयाभावे कथं संशयो युक्तः ? ॥ १५१ ॥ (१६९९)

Pratyakṣato'numānādāgamato vā prasiddhirarthānām ।
Sarvapramāṇavisayābhāve katham saṃśayo yuktaḥ ? ॥151॥ (1699)]

Trans.—151 The accomplishment of objects is (attained) either by (means of) visible evidence (*pratyakṣa*) or by inference (*anumāna*) or by documentary evidence (*āgama*). (But) in absence of all (such) *Pramāṇas* (evidences) and *visayas* (topics) how could the *saṁśaya* be justified? (1699)

टीका–यदा हि प्रमाणैरर्थानां प्रसिद्धिर्जाता भवेत् तदा कथञ्चित् क्वचिद् वस्तुनि संशयो युज्यते । यदा च सर्वेषां प्रमाणानां सर्वेषां च तद्विषयाणामभावस्तदा कथं संशयोऽस्तु, संशयस्य ज्ञातृ–ज्ञेयाद्यर्थसामग्रीजन्यत्वात् ? । सर्वशून्यत्वे च तदभावाद् न संशयोद्भूतिः, निर्मूलत्वादिति भावः ॥ १५१ ॥ (१६९९) ॥

D. C.—When the object is accomplished by means of *pramāṇas* (evidences) a doubt may arise in several objects to a certain extent. But when all such *pramānas* and *viṣayas* are absent, how can the doubt exist ? The doubt springs up from materials like *jñātā* and *jñeya*. But when everything is believed as *s'ūnya*, materials like *jñātā* and *jñeya* are not supposed to exist, and hence, the *saṃs'aya* has also no reason to rise.

जं संसयादउ नाणपज्जया तं च नेयसंबद्धं ।
सव्वन्नेयाभावे न संसओ तेण ते जुत्तो ॥ १५२ ॥ (१७००)

Jam samsayādau nānapajjayā tam ca neyasambaddham ।
Savvanneyābhāve na samsao teṇa te jutto ॥ 152 ॥ (1700)

[यत् संशयादयो ज्ञानपर्यायास्तच्च ज्ञेयसंबद्धम् ।
सर्वज्ञेयाभावे न संशयस्तेन ते युक्तः ॥ १५२ ॥ (१७००)

Yat saṃśayādayo jñānaparyayāstacca jneyasaṃbaddham ।
Sarvajñeyābhāve na saṃśayastena te yuktaḥ ॥ 152 ॥ (1700)]

Trans.—152 Since doubt etc. are the synonyms of *jnāna*, they are related to the *jneya* (cognizable object) also. So, in absence of all *jneyas*, your doubt has also no place (to exist). (1700)

टीका–यस्मात् संशय–विपर्यया–ऽनध्यवसाय–निर्णया विज्ञानपर्यायाः, तच्च ज्ञेयनिबन्धनमेव, सर्वशून्यतायां न ज्ञेयमस्ति, तस्माद् न तव संशयो युक्तः । सति च संशयेऽनुमानसिद्धा एव भावाः ॥ १५२ (१७००) ॥

D. C.—Since doubt, inversion (*viparyaya*) non-apprehension (*anadhyavasāya*) and affirmation (*nirṇaya*) are the (various) synonyms of knowledge, they are automatically connected with the cognizable also. Now, since everything is *s'ūnya*, nothing can be apprehended when there is nothing *jñeya*, there can be no *jñāna* and no *saṃs'aya* also, as *saṃs'aya* is nothing but a *paryāya* of the knowledge.

Still, however, if you insist upon entertaining doubt, *siddhi* of objects will have to be apprehended only by means of *anumāna* and not by virtue of perception as there can be no perception on account of the absolute *abhāva* of everything.

संति च्चिय ते भावा संसयओ सोम्म ! थाणु–पुरिस व्व ।
अह दिट्ठंतमसिद्धं मण्णसि नणु संसयाभावो ॥१५३॥(१७०१)

Santi cciya te bhāvā saṃsayao Somma ! thāṇu-purisa vva ।
Aha diṭṭhantamasiddham manṇasi naṇu samsayābhāvo ॥ 153 ॥

[सन्त्येव ते भावाः संशयतः सौम्य ! स्थाणु–पुरुषाविव ।
अथ दृष्टान्तमसिद्धं मन्यसे ननु संशयाभावः ॥१५३ ॥ (१७०१)

Santyeva te bhāvāḥ saṃśayataḥ Saumya ! sthāṇu-purusāviva ।
Atha dṛṣtāntamasiddham manyase nanu saṃśayābhāvaḥ॥153॥(1701)]

Trans.—153 *O Saumya !* Because of (your) doubt (about them), those objects do exist like *sthāṇu* and *purusa*, But, again, if you believe the example (of *sthāṇu* and *purusa*) to be *asiddha* (i. e. unaccomplished), existence of the doubt will be denied. (1701)

टीका–सौम्य ! सन्ति भवतोऽपि भावाः, संशयसमुत्थानात्, इह यत् संशय्यते तदस्ति, यथा स्थाणु–पुरुषौ; यच्चासद् न तत् संशय्यते, यथा खपुष्प–खरविषाणे। अथ स्थाणु–पुरुषलक्षणं दृष्टान्तमसिद्धं मन्यसे त्वम्, सर्वेषामपि स्थाणु–पुरुषादिभावानामविशेषेणैवासत्त्वाभ्युपगमात्। तदयुक्तम्, यतो ननु सर्वभावासत्त्वे संशयाभाव एव स्यात्, इत्युक्तमेवेति॥१५३॥ (१७०१)

D. C.—O Saumya ! The very doubt that you have raised against the objects proves that the objects are *vidyamāna* like *sthāṇu* and *purusa*. For, there cannot exist any doubt about non-existent objects like *ākās'apuspa* and *kharavisāna*.

Again, if you think that the above example of (the existent objects like) *sthāṇu* and *purusa* is wrong, you are not justified. For, in that case, all objects whether *vidyamāna* as *sthaṇu* etc, or *a-vidyamāna* as *khapuspa* etc. will have to be considered as *a-vidyamāna* according to your belief. So, when the existence of each and every object will be denied, naturally the existence of doubt will also be denied.

सव्वाभावे वि मई संदेहो सिमिणए व, नो तं च ।
जं सरणाइनिमित्तो सिमिणो न उ सव्वहाभावो ॥१५४॥(१७०२)

Savvābhāve vi maî samdeho siminae vva, no tam ca ।
Jam saraṇāinimitto simiṇo na u savvahābhāvo ॥ 154 ॥ (1702)

[सर्वाभावेऽपि मतिः संदेहः स्वप्नक इव, नो तच्च ।
यत् स्मरणादिनिमित्तः स्वप्नो न तु सर्वथाऽभावः ॥१५४॥(१७०२)

Sarvābhāve'pi matiḥ saṃdehaḥ svapnaka iva, no tacca ।
Yat smaraṇādinimittaḥ svapno na tu sarvathā'bhāvaḥ ॥154॥ (1702)]

Trans.—154 It is improper to believe that inspite of all-pervading negation, doubt does spring up in a dream. For, dream consists of (a number of) *nimittas* like remembrance etc. and it is not absolutely non-existent. (1702)

टीका—स्यान्मतिः परस्य—सर्वाभावेऽपि स्वप्ने दृष्टः संशयः, यथा किल कश्चित् पामरो निजगृहाङ्गणे "किमयं द्विपेन्द्रो महीध्रो वा ? इति संशेते, न च तत् तत्र किञ्चिदप्यस्ति, एवमन्यत्र सर्वभावाभावेऽपि संशयो भविष्यति। तच्च न, यद् यस्मात् स्वप्नेऽपि पूर्वदृष्टानुभूतस्मरणादिनिमित्तः संदेहः, न तु सर्वथा भावाभावेऽसौ क्वापि प्रवर्तते। अन्यथा हि यत् षष्ठभूतादिकं क्वचिदपि नास्ति तत्रापि संशयः स्यात्, विशेषाभावादिति। ननु किं स्वप्नोऽपि निमित्तमन्तरेण न प्रवर्तते ? । एवमेतत् ॥ (१७०२) ॥

D. C.—In support of the belief that doubt springs up even in *sarvābhāva*, an opponent may advance an argument as follows—Just as in a dream, a poor pauper raises a doubt and questions whether there is an elephant or a mountain before his house, though, in fact, nothing exists like that; so, also, at other places, doubt can be raised inspite of the absolute *abhāva* of things. Thus we can say that even though, there is *sarvābhāva*, *saṃs'aya* does exist in dream.

But the above argument is totally groundless. In dream, doubt arises on account of various reasons. Say for instance, when an object is seen or experienced, the remembrance of that experience etc. gives rise to the doubt. So, for the rise of doubt in the dream there is some sort of reason which brings the dream—and hence the doubt—into existence. Thus doubt arises from an existent object and not from the absolute *abhāva* of it.

But, suppose, even then, if you believe that the *saṃdeha* springs up from the absolute *abhāva* also, the doubt should

also have to arise from objects like sixth element which have never been existent so far. Because, *abhāva* is present in them also.

अणुहूय-दिट्ठ-चिंतिय-सुय-पयइवियार-देवयाऽणूया ।
सिमिणस्स निमित्ताइं पुण्णं पावं च नाभावो ॥१५५॥(१७०३)

Anuhūya-diṭṭha-cintiya-suya-payaiviyāra-devayā'ṇūyā ।
Simiṇassa nimittāim puṇṇam pāvam ca nābhāvo ॥ 155 ॥ (1703)

[अनुभूत-दृष्ट-चिन्तित-श्रुत-प्रकृतिविकार-देवताऽनूपाः ।
स्वप्नस्य निमित्तानि पुण्यं पापं च नाभावः ॥ १५५ ॥ (१७०३)

Anubhūta-dṛṣṭa-cintita-śruta-prakṛti-vikāra-devatā'nūpāḥ ।
Svapnasya nimittāni puṇyam pāpam ca nābhāvaḥ ॥155॥ (1703)]

Trans.—155 (Previous) experience, observation, attentive consideration, and hearing (of an object), ill-health (*prakrti*) *vikāra*), a deity, watery place, meritorious act and sin-these are the prominent causes (*nimittas*) of dream. So it is not non-existent. (1703)

टीका-स्नान-भोजन-विलेपनादिकमन्यदाऽनुभूतं स्वप्ने दृश्यते, इत्यनुभूतोऽर्थः स्वप्नस्य निमित्तम् । अथवा, करि-तुरगादिकोऽन्यदादृष्टोऽर्थ-स्तन्निमित्तम् । विचिन्तितश्च प्रियतमालाभादिः । श्रुतश्च स्वर्ग-नरकादिः । तथा, वात-पितादिजनितः प्रकृतिविकारः स्वप्नस्य निमित्तम् । तथा, अनु-कूला प्रतिकूला वा देवता तन्निमित्तम् । तथा, अनूपः सजलप्रदेशः । तथा पुण्यमिष्टस्वप्नस्य निमित्तम् । पापं चानिष्टस्य तस्य निमित्तम्, न पुनर्वस्त्व-भावः । किञ्च, स्वप्नोऽपि तावद् भाव एव । ततस्तस्यापि सत्त्वे कथं "शून्यं जगत्" इति भवता प्रतिज्ञायते ? ॥ १५५ (१७०३)

D. C.—The *nimittas* that bring dream into existence are treated as follows :—

1. *Previous experience*—Certain acts like *snāna, bhojana,*

vilepana etc. that have once been experienced are perceived again in dream due to this reason.

2. *Observation*—When objects like elephants, horses etc. are perceived in dream, the dream is said to have been caused by the *dṛṣṭārtha* reason.

3. *Attentive Consideration*—A dream representing acquisition of a beloved etc. is called the dream of *cintitārtha.*

4, *Hearing*—When places like *svarga*, and *naraka*,—which are only heard of, and not seen—are perceived in dream, the *nimitta* is *śrutārtha.*

5. *Disturbance of Health*—Ill health caused by diseases like *vāta* and *pitta* is also one of the *nimittas* of dream.

6. *A deity*—When one beholds a deity-adverse or favourable-in dream, the dream can be called *deva-nimitta.*

7. Watery place—This is also one of the *nimittas* when one dreams in the midst of watery region.

8-9. *Puṇya* and *pāpa*—A dream is said to be good or bad according as there is *puṇya* or *pāpa*, as its *nimitta.*

Thus, it is clear that a *svapna* is brought about by one of the above-mentioned *nimittas.* And hence, *svapna* is nothing but an object which can be brought into existence by means of a *nimitta* or *nimittas.* In this way, when the dream itself is existent, how can you call the world to be non-existent like *svapna* ?

विण्णाणमयत्तणओ घडविण्णाणं व सुमिणओ भावो ।
अहवा विहियनिमित्तो घडो व्व नेमित्तियत्ताओ ॥१५६॥(१७०४)

Viṇṇāṇamayattaṇao ghaḍaviṇṇāṇam va sumiṇao bhāvo।
Ahavā vihiyanimitto ghaḍo vva nemittiyattāo ॥ 156 ॥ (1704)

[विज्ञानमयत्वतो घटविज्ञानमिव स्वप्नको भावः ।
अथवा विहितनिमित्तो घट इव नैमित्तिकत्वात् ॥ १५६ ॥ (१७०४)

Vijñānamayatvato ghaṭavijñānamiva svapnako bhāvaḥ ।
Athavā vihitanimitto ghaṭa iva naimittikatvāt ॥ 156 ॥ (1704)]

Trans.—156 The existence of dream is (apprehended) either because dream is *vijñānamaya* (*i. e.* full of knowledge) like *ghaṭa* or because it is *naimittika* (*i. e.* caused by *nimitta*) like *ghaṭa* as mentioned before. (1704)

टीका—भावः स्वप्न इति प्रतिज्ञा । विज्ञानमयत्वादिति हेतुः । घटविज्ञानवदिति दृष्टान्तः । अथवा, भावः स्वप्नः, नैमित्तिकत्वात् निमित्तैर्निष्पन्नो नैमित्तिकस्तद्भावस्तत्त्वं तस्मादित्यर्थः, घटवदिति । कथं पुनः स्वप्नो नैमित्तिकः ? इत्याह—यतो विहितनिमित्तः, विहितानि—" अणुहूय-दिट्ठ-चिंतिय " इत्यादिना प्रतिपादितानि निमित्तानि यस्यासौ विहितनिमित्त इति ॥ १५६ (१७०४) ॥

D. C.—Existence of dream can be proved in either of these two ways :—

1. Dream is full of cognizance as *ghata* is. So, like *ghaṭa*, dream can also be perceived on account of its being existent.

2. As *ghaṭa* is caused by various *nimittas*, dream is also caused by *nimittas*, like *anubhava*, *smaraṇa*, *cintana* etc. that are mentioned before. So, it is clear that dream is a *mūrta kārya*, and hence existent like *ghaṭa*.

सव्वाभावे च कओ सुमिणोऽसुमिणो त्ति सच्चमलियं ति ।
गंधव्वपुरं पाडलिपुत्तं तत्थो वयारो त्ति ? ॥ १५७ ॥ (१७०५)

कज्जं ति कारणं ति य सज्झमिणं साहणं ति कत्ते त्ति ।
वत्ता वयणं वच्चं परपक्खोऽयं सपक्खोऽयं ? ॥ १५८ ॥ (१७०६)

किं वेह थिर-दवो-सिण-चलया-ऽरूवित्तणाइं नियया ।
सद्दादओ य गज्झा सोत्ताइयाइं गहणाइं ? ॥ १५९ ॥ (१७०७)

समया विवज्जओ वा सव्वागहणं व किं न सुण्णम्मि ।
किं सुण्णया व सम्मं सग्गहो किं व मिच्छत्तं ? ॥१६०॥(१७०८)

किह स-परो-भयबुद्धी कहं च तेसिं परोप्परमसिद्धी ।
अह परमईए भण्णइ स-परमइविसेसणं कत्तो ? ॥१६१॥ (१७०९)

Savvābhāve ca kao sumino'sumiṇo tti saccamaliyam ti ।
Gandhavvapuram Pādaliputtam tattho vayāro tti ? ॥157॥(1705)

Kajjam ti kāraṇam ti ya sajjhamiṇam sāhaṇam ti katta tti ।
Vattā vayaṇam vaccam parapakkho'yam sa-pakkho'yam?॥158॥(1706)

Kim veha thira–davo–siṇa–calayā–rūvittaṇāim niyayāim ।
Saddādao ya gajjhā sottāiyāim gahanāim ? ॥ 159 ॥ (1707)

Samayā vivajjao vā savvāgahaṇam va kim na suṇṇammi ।
Kim suṇṇayā va sammam saggaho kim va micchattam?॥160॥(1708)

Kiha sa–paro–bhaya buddhî kaham ca tesim paropparamasiddhî ।
Aha paramaîe bhaṇṇai sa-paramaivisesaṇam katto ? ॥161॥ (1709)

[सर्वाभावे च कुतः स्वप्नोऽस्वप्न इति सत्यमलीकमिति ।
गन्धर्वपुरं पाटलिपुत्रं तथ्य उपचार इति ॥ १५७ ॥ (१७०५)

कार्यमिति कारणमिति च साध्यमिदं साधनमिति कर्तेति ।
वक्ता वचनं वाच्यं परपक्षोऽयं स्वपक्षोऽयम् ? ॥ १५८ ॥ (१७०६)

किं वेह स्थिर-द्रवो-ष्ण-चलना-ऽरूपित्वानि नियतानि ।
शब्दादयश्च ग्राह्याः श्रोत्रादिकानि ग्राह्याणि ? ॥ १५९ ॥ (१७०७)

समता विपर्ययो वा सर्वाग्रहणं वा किं न शून्ये ।
किं शून्यता वा सम्यक् सद्ग्रहः किं वा मिथ्यात्वम् ? ॥१६०॥(१७०८)

कथं स्व-परो-भयबुद्धिः कथं च तेषां परस्परमसिद्धिः ।
अथ परमत्या भण्यते स्व-परमतिविशेषणं कुतः ? ॥ १६१ ॥ (१७०९)

Sarvābhāve ca kutaḥ svapno'svapna iti satyamalîkamiti ।
Gandharvapuram Pāṭaliputram tathya upacāra iti ? ॥157॥ (1705)

Kāryamiti kāraṇamiti ca sādhyamidam sādhanamiti karteti ।
Vaktā vacanam vācyaṃ para pakśo'yam svapakśo'yam ?॥158॥(1706)

Kim veha sthira-dravo-ṣṇa-calatā-rūpitvāni niyatāni ।
Śabdādayaśca grāhyāḥ śrotrādikāni grāhyāṇi ? ॥ 159 ॥ (1707)

Samatā viparyayo vā sarvāgrahaṇam vā kim na śunye ।
Kim śūnyatā vā samyak sadgrahaḥ kim vā mithyātvam ॥160॥(1701)

Katham sva-paro-bhaya buddhiḥ katham ca teṣām parasparamasıddhiḥ
Atha para-matyā bhaṇyate sva-para-mativiśesaṇam kutah ? ॥161॥]

Trans.—157–161 Again, in case of all-pervading negation how could there be distinction between dream and otherwise? between truth and false-hood ? between (an imaginary) *Gandharva* city and (a real) *Pātliputra?*† between a fact and fancy ? between cause and effect ? between end, means, and (their) agent? between speaker, speech, and (that which is) to be spoken ? between one's own party, and the opposite party ? Or, in such a case, how could (properties like) stability, fluidity, heat, activeness etc. as well as (the rule) that sound etc. are *grāhya* (to be received) and the ear etc. are *grāhakas* (receivers)—be ascertained at all ? Or, why should (faults like) uniformity, contraiety or non-acceptibility of all, not arise in (the state of all-pervading) negation ? And, is this (apprehension of) *śūnaytā* really substantial or worthless ? Moreover, how could *sva, para,* and *ubhaya* be distinguished and how would their mutual accomplishment be possible (in case of all-pervading negation) ? And, if it is said to be due to another's intellect, how could the intellect of *sva* and *para* be distinguished ? (1705–1709).

टीका–सर्वाभावे च सर्वशून्यतायां चाभ्युपगम्यमानायां " स्वप्नोऽयम् " " अस्वप्नोऽयम् " इति कुतः–किंकृतोऽयं विशेषः ? इत्यर्थः । तथा, सत्यमिदम्, अलीकं वाः तथा, गन्धर्वपुरमेतत्, पाटलीपुत्रादि चेदम् ; तथा, " तत्थो वयारो त्ति " अयं तथ्यो निरुपचरितो मुख्यश्चतुष्पदविशेषः सिंहः,

† Known as *Paṭnā* at the present time.

अयं त्वौपचारिको मनुष्यविशेषो माणवकः, तथा, कार्यमिदं घटादि, कारणं चेदं मृत्पिण्डादि; तथा, साध्यमिदमनित्यत्वादि, साधनं कृतकत्वादि, कर्ता घटादेः कुलालादिः; तथा, अयं वक्ता, वादी, वचनं चेदं व्यवयवं पञ्चावयवं वा; इदं च वाच्यमभिधेयमस्य शब्दसंदर्भस्य; तथा, अयं स्वपक्षः, अयं च परपक्ष इति सर्वशून्यत्वे कुतोऽसौ विशेषो गम्यते ?। "किं वेह थिरेत्यादि" पृथिव्याः स्थिरत्वम्, अपां द्रवत्वम्, वह्नेरुष्णत्वम् वायोश्चलत्वम्, आकाशस्यारूपित्वमित्यादयो नियताः सर्वदैवैकस्वभावाः विशेषाः सर्वशून्यतायां कुतो गम्यन्ते ?। तथा, शब्दादयो ग्राह्या एव, इन्द्रियाणि च श्रोत्रादीनि ग्राहकाण्येवेति कुतो नियमसिद्धिः ?।

"समयेत्यादि" ननु सर्वशून्यतायां स्वप्ना-ऽस्वप्न-सत्याऽलीकादीनां विशेषनिबन्धनाभावात् समतैव कस्माद् न भवति-यादृशः स्वप्नः, अस्वप्नोऽपि तादृश एव; यादृशश्चास्वप्नः, स्वप्नोऽपि तादृश एवेत्यादि ?। अथवा, विपर्ययःकुतो न भवति-यःस्वप्नःसोऽस्वप्नः यस्त्वस्वप्नः स स्वप्न इत्यादि ?। यदिवा, सर्वेषामपि स्वप्नाऽस्वप्नादीनां सर्वथाशून्यत्वेऽग्रहणमेव कस्माद् न भवति ?। भ्रान्तिवशादेव स्वप्ना-ऽस्वप्नादिग्रहणमिति चेत्। तदयुक्तम्-देश-काल-स्वभावादिनैयत्येन तद्ग्राहकज्ञानोत्पत्तेः। किञ्च, इयं भ्रान्तिः किं विद्यते, न वा ?। यदि विद्यते, तर्ह्यभ्युपगमविरोधः। अथ न विद्यते, तर्हि भ्रान्तेरसत्त्वाभावग्राहकज्ञानस्य निर्भ्रान्तत्वात् सन्त्येव सर्वे भावाः, न पुनः शून्यतेति। अथवा, अन्यत् पृच्छामो भवन्तम्—ननु सर्वशून्यत्वे शून्यतैव सम्यक्त्वं सतां भावानां ग्रहणं सद्ग्रहः, भावसत्त्वग्रहणं पुनर्मिथ्यात्वमित्यत्र कस्ते विशेषहेतुः ?।

यदुक्तम्—"न स्वतो भावानां सिद्धिः" इत्यादि; तत्प्रतिविधानार्थमाह-"किह स-परो-भयेत्यादि" ननु कथं ह्रस्व-दीर्घो-भयविषये "इदं ह्रस्वम्" "इदं दीर्घम्" "एतत्तु तदुभयम्" इत्येवंभूतो स्व-परो-भय बुद्धिर्युगपदाश्रीयते भवता ? कथं च तेषां ह्रस्व-दीर्घो-भयानां परस्परमसिद्धिरुद्घुष्यते ?—पूर्वापरविरुद्धत्वाद् नैतद् वक्तुं युज्यत इत्यर्थः। अयमत्र भावार्थः—न स्वल्पापेक्षिकमेव वस्तूनां सत्त्वम्, किन्तु स्वविषयज्ञानजननाद्यर्थक्रियाकारित्वमपि। ततश्च ह्रस्व-दीर्घो-भयान्यात्मविषयं चेज्ज्ञानं जनयन्ति, तदा सन्त्येव तानि, कथं तेषामसिद्धिः ?। यदप्युक्तम्-"मध्यमाङ्गुलिमपेक्ष्य

प्रदेशिन्यां ह्रस्वत्वमसदेवोच्यते" इत्यादि; तदप्ययुक्तम्, यतो यदि मध्यमामपेक्ष्य प्रदेशिन्यां स्वतः सर्वथाऽसत्यामपि ह्रस्वत्वं भवति, तदा विशेषाभावात् खरविषाणेऽपि तद् भवेत्, अतिदीर्घेष्विन्द्रियष्ट्यादिष्वपि च तत् स्यात्। अथवा, प्रदेशिन्याः स्वापेक्षया स्वात्मन्यपि ह्रस्वत्वं स्यात्, सर्वत्रासत्त्वाविशेषात्; न चैवम्। तस्मात् स्वतः सत्यामेव प्रदेशिन्यां वस्तुतोऽनन्तधर्मात्मकत्वात् तत्तत्सहकारिसंनिधौ तत्तद्रूपाभिव्यक्तेस्तत्तज्ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते, न पुनरसत्यामेव तस्यामपेक्षामात्रत एव ह्रस्वज्ञानमुपजायते। एवं दीर्घो-भयादिष्वपि वाच्यम्।

अथ "इदं ह्रस्वम्" "इदं दीर्घम्" "एतच्चोभयम्" इत्यादि स्व-परो-भयबुद्धिः परमत्या-पराभ्युपगमेनोच्यते, न पुनः स्वतः सिद्धं स्वविषयज्ञानजनकं ह्रस्वादिकं किञ्चिदस्ति, अतो न कश्चित् पूर्वापरविरोध इत्यत्राह-ननु सर्वशून्यत्वे "इदं स्वमतम्," "एतच्च परमतम्" इत्येतदपि स्व-परभावेन विशेषणं कुतः?-न कुतश्चिदित्यर्थः, स्व-परभावेऽपि "समया विवज्जओ वा" इत्याद्येवावर्तत भावः। स्व-परभावाद्यभ्युपगमे च शून्यत्वाभ्युपगमहानिरिति ॥ १५७-१५८-१५९-१६०-१६१ ॥ (१७०५-१७०६-१७०७-१७०८-१७०९) ॥

D. C.—If the idea of all-pervading negation were taken as true, there would not exist any distinction between dream and reality; truth and falsehood; between an imaginary *Gandharvapura* and a real *Pātaliputra;* between a natural four-legged lion and an artificial man-lion *Māṇavaka;* between *kāryas* like *ghata,* etc. and *kāraṇas* like lump of earth etc. Again, there would be no distinction between *sādhya* (say, *e. g. anityatva*) *sādhana* (say, *e. g.* the artificial instrument-by means of which *anityatva* is brought about) and *kartā* (*e. g.* a potter) who is the doer of the *sādhya.* There would be no distinction between a speaker, his speech (composed of three or five parts) and a number of words that are to be uttered, and there would be no distinction between *svapakṣa* and *parapakṣa* also.

Moreover, properties such as stability of earth, fluidity of water, activeness of wind, formlessness of sky etc. as well as the rule that *śabda, rūpa, gandha* etc. are *grāhya* and ears, eyes, nose etc. are *grāhaka*, could not be established in the midst of *sarvaśūnyatā*.

Again, in the midst of all-pervading negation there being no possibility of distinction between *satya* and *asatya* either (1) there would be uniform apprehension of *svapna* as well as *asvapna*, or (2) there would be inverse apprehension of *svapna* as *asvapna* and *asvapna* as *svapna*, or (3) there would be absolute non-apprehension of *svapna*, *asvapna* and many other things. Here, *O Vyakta !* It is absolutely incorrect to assert that the apprenhension of *svapna*, *asvapna* etc. is due to *bhrānti* (delusion). For, cognizance that apprehends an object is produced only by means of definite ascertainment of time, place and properties.

And is that *bhrānti*, which, according to you, apprehends *svapna*, *asvapna*, etc., *vidyamāna* or *a-vidyamāna ?* If it is *vidyamāna*, then naturally *sarvaśūnyatā* does not exist. If it is *a-vidyamāna* the *jñāna* that apprehends an object being devoid of *bhrānti*, all objects would automatically be taken as *vidyamāna* and there would be nothing like *sarvaśūnyatā* at all.

And, how is it *O Vyakt'a !* that the apprehension of existent objects as *śūnya*, is, according to you, a right apprehension and that which apprehends them as *vidyamāna* is worthless ? Will you tell me what particular purpose do you hold in believing this *sarvaśūnyatā ?*

According to the rule that objects could never be accomplished merely by themselves, you apprehend objects that are short, long, or either, distinctly as short, long, or either. Thus, on one side, you are utilizing your power of discrimination in the apprehension of objects; while on the other side, you are trying to assert the mutual non-accomplishment of those very

objects. This involves self-contradiction in your own argument which, *O Vyakta !* is not at all worthy of you.

The point is that in case of establishing the existence of objects mere *apekṣā* would not do. Quality of undertaking an action in an object which produces *jñāna* about its own self is also an active cause. And that is the reason why *hrasva*, *dîrgha*, and *ubhaya*-each one of which would be producing *jñāna* about its own self-should be taken as existing.

Again, *O Vyakta !* you believe that to the *apekṣā* of the middle finger, the *pradeśinî* finger is considered as *hrasva* even if it does not exist. But your argument is absolutely unfounded. For, in comparision with the middle finger if *pradeśinî* were taken as *hrasva* even though it is *a-vidyamāna* by its very nature, the horns of an ass that are also *a-vidyamāna* should be taken as *hrasva* and a very long substance like *indradhvaja* should also be taken as *hrasva* as the quality of *a-vidyamānatā* is common in all the three cases. But that is not so. Really speaking, *pradeśinî* finger being *vidyamāna* by nature and being possessed of a number of properties by virtue of various co-operative causes, manifests manifold variations along with the corresponding types of cognizance also. So it is not correct to assert that the cognizance of *hrasva, dîrgha* etc. is produced in the absolutely non-existent *aṅguli* only by means of *apekṣā*. You might argue at this point that in such cases also, *dîrgha, hrasva, ubhaya* etc. are apprehended and the intellects as regards *sva para* and *ubhaya* are discriminated only in comparision with another's opinion and further that according to you, *hrasva, dîrgha* etc. that are *svataḥ siddha* and that produce *jñāna* with regard to their own selves are nothing at all. Even if you believe like that, *O Vyakta !* how would you distinguish between your opinion and another's opinion in the midst of all-pervading negation ? Naturally there would be no distinction between *sva* and *para* at all. On the other hand, if you accept this distinction there would be nothing like *śūnyatā* at all. (1705-1709)

जुगवं कमेण वा ते विण्णाणं होज्ज दीह–हस्सेसु ।
जइ जुगवं कावेक्खा कमेण पुव्वम्मि काऽवेक्खा ?॥१६२॥(१७१०)

आइमविण्णाणं वा जं बालस्सेह तस्स काऽवेक्खा ।
तुल्लेसु व काऽवेक्खा परोप्परं लोयणदुगे व ?॥ १६३ ॥(१७११)

Jugavam kamena vā te vinnānam hojja dîha–hassesu ।
Jai jugavam kāvekkhā kamena puvvammi kā'vekkhā ? ॥162॥ (1710)

Āimaviṇṇānam vā jam bālasseha tassa kā'vekkhā ।
Tullesu va kā'vekkhā paropparam loyanaduge vva ? ॥163॥ (1711)

[युगपत् क्रमेण वा ते विज्ञानं भवेद् दीर्घ–ह्रस्वयोः ।
यदि युगपत् काऽपेक्षा क्रमेण पूर्वस्मिन् काऽपेक्षा ? ॥१६२॥(१७१०)

आदिमविज्ञानं वा यद् बालस्येह तस्य काऽपेक्षां ।
तुल्ययोर्वा काऽपेक्षा परस्परं लोचनद्विक इव ॥ १६३ ॥ (१७११)

Yugapat krameṇa vā te vijñānam bhaved drîgha–hrasvayoḥ ।
Yadi yugapat kā'pekṣā krameṇa pūrvasmin kā'pekṣā ? ॥162॥(1710)

Ādimavijñānam vā yad bālasyeha tasya kā'pekṣā ।
Tulyayorvā kā'pekṣā parasparam locanadvika iva ? ॥163॥ (1711)]

Trans.—162–163 Is that *vijñāna* of yours as regards *dîrgha* and *hrasva* (produced) all at once or in regular course ? If (it is produced) all at once, what *apekṣā* (is there) ? (And) if (it is produced) in regular course, to what *apekṣā* is the first produced ? Or, to what *apekṣā* has the first and foremost cognizance of a child been produced ? Or, what mutual *apekṣā* (could there be) in the case of two similar (objects) like a pair of eyes ? (1710–1711)

टीका–ननु मध्यमा–प्रदेशिन्यादिदीर्घ–ह्रस्वयोस्तवाभिप्रायेण स्वाकारप्रतिभासि ज्ञानं किं युगपदेव भवेत्, क्रमेण वा ? यदि युगपत् तर्हि परानपेक्षं द्वयोरपि युगपदेव स्वप्रतिभासिनि ज्ञाने प्रतिभासात् कस्य किल

काऽपेक्षा ? । अथ क्रमेण, तदापि पूर्वमेव स्वप्रतिभासिना ज्ञानेन परानपेक्षमेव ह्रस्वस्य प्रदेशिन्यादेर्गृहीतत्वादुत्तरस्मिन् मध्यमादिके दीर्घे काऽपेक्षा ? । तस्माच्चक्षुरादिसामग्रीसद्भावे परानपेक्षमेव स्वकीयविविक्तरूपेण सर्वभावानां स्वज्ञाने प्रतिभासात् स्वत एव सिद्धिः । अथवा, बालस्य तत्क्षणमेव जातस्य शिशोर्यदिह नयनोन्मेषानन्तरमेवादौ विज्ञानम्, तत् किमपेक्ष्य प्रादुरस्ति ? । यदि वा, ये न ह्रस्वे नापि दीर्घे, किन्तु परस्परं तुल्ये एव वस्तुनी, तयोर्युगपदेव स्वप्रतिभासिना ज्ञानेन गृह्यमाणयोः काऽन्योन्यापेक्षा ?—न काचित्, यथा तुल्यस्य लोचनयुग्मस्य । तस्मादङ्गुल्यादिपदार्थानां नान्यापेक्षमेव रूपम्, किन्तु स्वप्रतिभासवता ज्ञानेनान्यनिरपेक्षा एव ते स्वरूपतोऽपि गृह्यन्ते । उत्तरकालं तु तत्तद्रूपजिज्ञासायां तत्तत्प्रतिपक्षस्मरणादिसहकारिकारणान्तरवशाद् दीर्घ–ह्रस्वादिव्यपदेशाः प्रवर्तन्ते, इति स्वतःसिद्धा एव सन्ति भावा इति ॥ (१७१०–१७११) ॥

D. C—Consider whether *jñāna* in case of objects that are *hrasva* and *dîrgha* is produced at the same time or in regular course. If both the *jñānas* are produced simultaneously, there would be no scope for *apekṣā*, both being recognized in their own form at the same time. On the other hand, if *jñānas* of the two were produced one after another the *hrasva* object would be apprehended by virtue of its own *jñāna;* but later on, to whose *apekṣā* would the *dîrgha* object be apprehended ? This leads us to conclude that in spite of the existence of mediums like eyes etc., in absence of *apekṣā* all objects are apprehended in various forms only by virtue of their individual *jñānas.* This proves that the existence of all objects is very natural.

Again, to whose *apekṣā* is the *jñāna* attained by a child immediately after its birth produced ? And, what mutual *apeksa* could there exist in reflecting a similar cognizance in two similar objects which are neither *hrasva* nor *dîrgha* but exactly identical to each other ? This shows that various forms of objects like fingers etc. are not apprehended by

virtue of their *apekṣā* to others but by means of their corresponding cognizances which are independent of *apekṣā*. Later on, in the curiosity of observing the forms in details, the objects are recognized as *hrasva*, *dîrgha* etc., on account of certain co-operative causes such as recalling the opposite faction etc. Each and every object would therefore be taken as existent by virtue of no other factor but its own *svabhāva*.

Moreover,

किं हस्साओ दीहे दीहाओ चेव किं न दीहम्मि।
कीस व न खपुप्फाउ किं न खपुप्फे खपुप्फाओ ? ॥ १६४ ॥

Kim hassāo dîhe dîhāo ceva kim no dîhammi।
Kîsa va na khapupphāu kim na khapupphe khapupphāo ?॥164॥(1712)

[किं ह्रस्वाद् दीर्घे दीर्घादेव किं न दीर्घे।
कस्माद् वा न खपुष्पात् किं न खपुष्पे खपुष्पात् ? ॥१६४॥(१७१२)

Kim hrasvād dîrghe dîrghādeva kim na dîrghe।
Kasmād vā na khapuṣpāt kim na khapuṣpe khapuṣpāt ?॥164॥(1712)]

Trans.—164 Why (is the knowledge) about *dîrgha* (acquired) from *hrasva* and not from *dîrgha* (itself) ? Or, why not from *khapuspa ?* Or, why not (the knowledge) about *khapuspa* (acquired) from *khapuspa* (itself) ? (1712)

टीका–हन्त ! यदि सर्वशून्यता, ततः किमिति ह्रस्वादेव प्रदेशिनीप्रभृतिद्रव्याद् दीर्घे मध्यमादिद्रव्ये दीर्घज्ञानाभिधानव्यवहारः प्रवर्तते–दीर्घापेक्ष एव दीर्घेन ज्ञानाभिधानेन व्यवहारः किं न प्रवर्तते, असत्त्वाविशेषात् ? इति भावः। एवं " किं दीहाओ हस्से हस्साउ चेव किं न हस्सम्मि " इत्येतदपि द्रष्टव्यम्। तथा, किमिति वा न खपुष्पाद् दीर्घे ह्रस्वे वा तज्ज्ञानाभिधानव्यवहृतिर्विधीयते ?। तथा, असत्त्वाविशेषत एव किमिति खपुष्पात् खपुष्प एव ह्रस्व–दीर्घज्ञानादिव्यवहारो न प्रवर्तते ?। न चैवम्, तस्मात् सन्त्येव भावाः, न तु शून्यता जगत इति ॥ १६४ (१७१२) ॥

D. C.—If everything is *s'ūnya* according to the theory of *sarva s'ūnyatā*, how is it that the cognizance of *dîrgha* is acquired only from its *apekṣā* to *hrasva* as seen in the case of *prades'inî* and *madhyamā* fingers, and not from its *apekṣā* to the *dîrgha* itself? Similarly, why is the practice of apprehending *dîrghatva* from *dîrgha* and *hrasvatva* from *hrasva* not followed? Moreover, the practice of acquiring knowledge of *khapuṣpa* as well as the knowledge of *hrasvatva* and *dîrghatva* in *khapuṣpa* from the *khapuṣpa* itself is not followed even though *s'ūnyatā* is common to all of them. This shows that there is nothing like *sarvas'ūnyatā* in this world.

Moreover,

किं वाऽविक्खाए चिय होज्ज मई व सभाव एवायं ।
सो भावो त्ति सभावो वंझापुत्ते न सो जुत्तो ॥१६५॥ (१७१३)

Kim vā'vikkhāe ciya hojja maî va sabhāva evāyam ।
So bhāvo tti sabhāvo vanjhāputte na so jutto ॥ 165 ॥ (1713)

[किंवापेक्षयैव भवेद् मतिर्वा स्वभाव एवायम् ।
स्वो भाव इति स्वभावो वन्ध्यापुत्रे न स युक्तः ॥ १६५ ॥ (१७१३)

Kimvāpekṣayaiva bhaved matirvā svabhāva evāyam ।
Svo bhāva iti svabhāvo vandhyāputre na sa yuktaḥ ॥165॥ (1713)]

Trans.—165 Or, of what avail is the *apekṣā* at all? (The opponent may argue here that) "Apprehension by means of *apekṣā* is natural." (But) the *bhāva* (existence) of *sva* (one's own self) means *svabhāva*; (and) that does not apply to the son of a barren woman. (1713)

टीका–अथवा, सर्वस्याप्येसत्त्वे ह्रस्वादेर्दीर्घाद्यपेक्षयापि किं कर्तव्यम्, शून्यताप्रतिकूलत्वात् तस्याः, घटाद्यर्थसत्त्ववत् ? । अथ परस्य मतिर्भवेत्–स्वभावादेवापेक्षयैव ह्रस्व–दीर्घादिव्यवहारः प्रवर्तते । न च स्वभावः पर्यनुयोगमर्हति; तथा चोक्तम्–" अग्निर्दहति नाकाशं कोऽत्र पर्यनुयुज्यताम् ?"

इति । हन्त ! इत्थमपि हतोऽसि, यत स्वो भावः स्वभावस्ततः स्व-परभावाभ्युपगमात् शून्यताभ्युपगमहानिः। न च वन्ध्यापुत्रकल्पानामर्थानां स्वभावपरिकल्पना युक्तेति । भवतु वाऽपेक्षा, तथापि शून्यताऽसिद्धिः ॥ १६५ ॥ (१७१३) ॥

D. C—If there is absolute negation in the world, what is the use of *apekṣā* in apprehending *hrasva* etc. to the *apekṣā* of *dîrgha* etc. ? For, the very conception of *apekṣā* is contrary to the absolute negation.

Vyakta :—Apprehending *hrasva*, *dîrgha* etc. by means of *apekṣā* is very natural.

Ācārya :—That is not so, *O Vyakta ! Svabhāva* is the root cause in cases like "fire burns" "The sky does not burn etc. But, that is not applicable to the above-named example of the apprehension of *hrasva*, *dîrgha* etc. Hence, *svabhāva* should not be blamed in such cases. It is absurd to assume *svabhāva* in the apprehension of non-existent objects like *vandhyāputra*.

Svabhāva means existence of one's own self. The rest can be distinguished as *parabhāva*—the existence of everything else. Apart from your belief in *apekṣā*, the principle of *sarvas'ūnyatā* would be violated even from this point of view.

How ?

होज्जावेक्खाओ वा विण्णाणं वाभिहाणमेत्तं वा ।
दीहं ति व हस्सं ति व न उ सत्ता सेसधम्मा वा ॥१६६॥ (१७१४)

Hojjāvekkhāo vā vinṇānam vābhihānamettam vā ।
Dîham ti va hassam ti va na u sattā sesadhammā vā ॥166॥ (1714)

[भवेदपेक्षातो वा विज्ञानं वाभिधानमात्रं वा ।
दीर्घमिति वा ह्रस्वमिति वा न तु सत्ता शेषधर्मा वा ॥१६६॥(१७१४)

Bhavedapekṣāto vā vijnānam vābhidhānamātram vā ।
Dîrghamiti vā hrasvamiti vā na tu sattā śeṣadharmā vā ॥166॥]

Trans.—166 By means of *apekṣā* either *vijnāna* or mere acknowledgment (of an object) as short or long would be (attained) but not the existence of the rest of the properties. (1714)

टीका–अथवा, स्वतः सिद्धे वस्तुन्यपेक्षातो भवेत् । किम् ? इत्याह–विज्ञानमभिधानमात्रं वा । केनोल्लेखेन ? इत्याह–" दीर्घम् " इति वा " ह्रस्वम् " इति वेति । किं पुनर्न भवेत् ? इत्याह–न त्वन्यापेक्षया वस्तूनां सत्ता भवति, नाप्यापेक्षिकह्रस्व–दीर्घत्वादिधर्मेभ्यः शेषा रूप–रसादयो धर्मा अन्यापेक्षया सिद्ध्यन्ति । उत्पद्यन्ते च वस्तुसत्ताग्राहकाणि, रूपादिधर्मग्राहकाणि च ज्ञानानि । अतोऽन्यापेक्षाभावतः कथं स्वतः सिद्धस्य वस्तुसत्तादेरभावः ?, तत्सद्भावे च कथं शून्यता जगतः ? इति ॥१६६(१७१४)॥

D. C.—By virtue of its *apekṣā* to another object, a self-accomplished object would gain either *vijñāna* or the acknowledgment of its own self as *hrasva* or *dîrgha* and nothing more. Neither existence nor qualities such as *rūpa*, *rasa*, *sparśa* etc., that are distinct from *hrasvatva*, *dîrghatva* etc. could be established by the help of *apekṣā*. Now, *jñānas* that enable us to apprehend existence along with those qualities are produced spontaneously. So, how could existence etc. of a self-accomplished object be refuted by means of *apekṣā* ? And when the existence etc. of an object are not denied, how could the principle of all-pervading negation be accepted at all ?

इहरा हस्साभावे सव्वविणासो हवेज्ज दीहस्स ।
न य सो, तम्हा सत्तादयोऽणविक्खा घडाईणं ॥१६७॥(१७१५)

Iharā hassābhāve savvaviṇāso havejja dîhassa ।
Na ya so, tamhā sattādayo'ṇavikkhā ghadāîṇam ॥ 167 ॥ (1715)

[इतरथा ह्रस्वाभावे सर्वविनाशो भवेद् दीर्घस्य ।
न च सः, तस्मात् सत्तादयोऽनपेक्षा घटादीनाम् ॥ १६७ ॥ (१७१५)

Itarathā hrasvābhāve sarvavināśo bhaved dîrghasya ।
Na ca saḥ, tasmāt sattādayo'napekṣā ghatādînām ॥167॥ (1715)]

Trans.—167 Otherwise, in the absence of *hrasva*, there should have been an absolute negation of *dîrgha* also. But that is not so. Hence the existence etc. of *ghata* etc. are (established as) independant of (their) *apeksā* (to other objects). (1715)

टीका–इतरथा–यदि घटादीनां सत्तादयोऽप्यन्यापेक्षया भवेयुः, तदा ह्रस्वाभावे ह्रस्वस्य सर्वविनाशे दीर्घस्यापि वस्तुनः सर्वविनाशः स्यात्, ह्रस्वसत्तापेक्षित्वाद् दीर्घसत्तादीनाम् । न चैवमसौ दीर्घस्य सर्वविनाशो दृश्यते । तस्मात् निश्चीयते–सन्त्यन्यानपेक्षा एव घटादीनां सत्ता–रूपादयो धर्माः, तत्सत्त्वे चापास्ता शून्यतेति ॥ १६७ ॥ (१७१५) ॥

D. C.—If the qualities like existence etc. of the objects such as *ghata* etc., were dependant upon their comparision with other objects, destruction of a *hrasva* object would have effected the destruction of a *dîrgha* object also. But really speaking, existence etc. of a *dîrgha* object are not denied when a *hrasva* object turns into an absolute negation. This leads us to the conclusion that objects like *ghaṭa* etc. have their properties such as existence, *rūpa*, etc., totally independant of their *apekṣā* to other objects and hence the idea of all–pervading negation is automatically refuted

जावि अविक्खाऽविक्खणमाविक्खगोऽविक्खणिज्जमणाविक्ख ।
सा न मया सव्वेसु वि संतेसु न सुन्नया नाम ॥१६८॥ (१७१६)

किंचि सओ तह परओ तदुभयओ किंचि निच्चसिद्धं पि ।
जलओ घडओ पुरिसो तहं ववहारओ नेयं ॥१६९॥ (१७१७)

निच्छयओ पुण बाहिरनिमित्तमेत्तोवओगओ सव्वं ।
होइ सओ जमभावो न सिज्झइ निमित्तभावे वि ॥ १७० ॥

Jāvi avikkhā'vikkhaṇamavikkhago' vikkhaṇijjamaṇavikkha ।
Sā na mayā savvesu vi santesu na sunnayā nāma ॥168॥ (1716)

Kim ci sao taha parao tadubhayao kim ci niccasiddham pi ।
Jalao ghaḍao puriso taham vavahārao neyam ॥ 169 ॥ (1717)

Nicchayao puṇa bāhiranimittamettovao-gao savvam ।
Hoi sao jamabhāvo na sijjhai nimittabhāve vi ॥ 170 ॥ (1718)

[याऽप्यपेक्षाऽपेक्षणमपेक्षकोऽ पेक्षणीयमनपेक्ष्य ।
सा न मता सर्वेष्वपि सत्सु न शून्यता नाम ॥ १६८ ॥ (१७१६)
किञ्चित् स्वतस्तथा परतस्तदुभयतः किञ्चिद् नित्यसिद्धिमपि ।
जलदो घटकः पुरुषस्तथा व्यवहारतो ज्ञेयम् ॥ १६९ ॥ (१७१७)
निश्चयतः पुनर्बहिर्निमित्तमात्रोपयोगतः सर्वम् ।
भवति स्वतो यदभावो न सिध्यति निमित्तभावेऽपि ॥१७०॥(१७१८)

Yā'pyapekṣā'pekṣanamapekṣako'pekṣaṇiyamanapekṣya ।
Sā na matā sarveṣvapi satsu na śūnyatā nāma ॥ 168 ॥ (1716)

Kimcit svatastathā paratastadubhayataḥ kimcid nityasiddhamapi ।
Jalado ghaṭakaḥ puruṣastathā vyavahārato jñeyam ॥169॥ (1717)

Niścayataḥ punar-bahir-nimittamātropayogatah sarvam ।
Bhavati svato yadabhāvo na sidhyati nimittabhāve'pi ॥170॥(1718)]

Trans.—168–169–170 Even *apeksā*–being identical to (the nature of) action *(apeksaṇam)*, agent *(apeksakah)*, and object *(apeksaṇîyam)*—could not be accepted. When all are existing there could not be *śūnyatā* at all. Some are spontaneous *e. g.* a cloud; some (are produced) by means of others as in the case of *ghaṭa*; and Some (are produced) in both the ways. *e. g.* a man; while some are produced even for ever. Again, it is certain that each one (of them) becomes existent by its own self only by resorting to the external

causes. (But) that which is non-existent is not produced even in the presence of external causes. (1716–1717–1718)

टीका–याऽपीयं ह्रस्वादेर्दीर्घाद्यपेक्षा साऽप्यपेक्षणं क्रियारूपम्; तथा, अपेक्षकं कर्तारम्, अपेक्षणीयं च कर्म, अनपेक्ष्य न मता—न विदुषां सम्मता। ततः किम् ? इत्याह–एतेषु चापेक्षणा–ऽपेक्षका–ऽपेक्षणीयेषु सर्वेषु वस्तुषु सत्सु न काचित् शून्यता नाम। अतोऽपेक्षकादिसच्चलक्षणे विपक्ष एवापेक्षालक्षणस्य हेतोर्वृत्तत्वाद् विरुद्धत्वमिति ॥ १६८ ॥ (१७१६) ॥

टीका–इह किञ्चित् स्वत एव सिद्ध्यति, यथा कर्तृनिरपेक्षस्तत्कारण-द्रव्यसंघातविशिष्टपरिणामरूपो जलदः। किञ्चित्तु परतः, यथा कुलालकर्तृको घटः। किञ्चिदुभयतः, यथा माता–पितृभ्यां स्वकृतकर्मतश्च पुरुषः। किञ्चिद् नित्यसिद्धमेव, यथाऽऽकाशम्। एतच्च व्यवहारनयापेक्षया द्रष्टव्यम्। निश्चयतस्तु बाह्यं निमित्तमात्रमेवाश्रित्य सर्वं वस्तु स्वत एव सिध्यति, यद् यस्माद् बाह्य निमित्तसद्भावेऽपि खरविषाणादिरूपोऽभावः कदाचिदपि न सिध्यति। उभयनयमतं च सम्यक्त्वमिति ॥१६९–१७० (१७१७–१७१८)॥

D. C.—Consideration of *dîrgha* etc. in comparision with *hrasva* etc., is itself nothing but *kartā*, *karma* and *kriyā*. Now, when all objects are accomplished as existent by virtue of their being either *karta*, *karma* or *kriyā*, where could the *s'ūnyata* exist at all ?

The existence of all objects is either *svataḥ*, *parataḥ*, or *ubhayataḥ*. There are several objects such as cloud etc. which come into being only by coming into contact with some substance as their *kāraṇa*; some like *ghata* are produced by the help of *kartā*, some like *puruṣa* are produced by both (as *purusa* comes into existence on account of his parents as well as his deeds in the past life). Some objects like *ākāsa* are ever accomplished. Thus, it is seen that various objects come into existence in various ways, according to their usage. But really speaking, all objects are existing by their very *svabhāva* merely by resorting to their external causes. In case of objects that are non-existent, existence could not be brought

about even if the external causes were present because non-existence is innate in them by their very *svabhāva*.

In reply to the question whether *astitva* and *ghaṭa* are one or different, the *Ācārya* argues thus :—

अत्थित्त-घडेगाणेगया य पज्जायमेत्तचिंतेयं ।
अत्थि घडे पडिवन्ने, इहरा सा किं न खरसिंगे ? ॥१७१॥ (१७१९)

Atthitta-ghaḍegāṇegayā ya pajjāyamettacinteyam ।
Atthi ghaḍe padivanne, iharā sā kim na kharasinge ? ॥171॥ (1719)

[अस्तित्व-घटैकानेकता वा पर्यायमात्रचिन्तेयम् ।
अस्ति घटे प्रतिपन्ने, इतरथा सा किं न खरशृङ्गे ॥१७१॥ (१७१९)॥

Astitva-ghaṭaikānekatā vā paryāyamātracinteyam ।
Asti ghaṭe pratipanne, itarathā sā kim na kharaśṛṅge ॥ 171 ॥]

Trans.—171 (The question) whether *ghaṭa* and *astitva* are one or different is (nothing but the question) of synonym when *ghaṭa* is existent. (For,) otherwise why should it not arise in case of *kharaśṛṅga* (also) ? (1719)

टीका–इह " अस्ति घटो न तु नास्ति " इत्येवं पतिपन्ने सति तदनन्तरमेवास्तित्व–घटयोः " किमेकता, अनेकता वा ? " इत्यादिना घटास्तित्वयोरकत्वा–ऽनेकत्वलक्षणपर्यायमात्रचिन्तैव भवता कृता भवति, न तु तयोरभावः सिध्यति । अन्यथा ह्यभावरूपाविशेषाद् यथा घटा–ऽस्तित्वयोः, एवं खरविषाण–वन्ध्यापुत्रयोरप्येकत्वा–ऽनेकत्वचिन्ता भवतः किं न प्रवर्तते ? इति ॥ १७१ (१७१९) ॥

D. C.—After having asserted that " *ghata* ,exists " the question whether *ghata* and *astitva* are identical or not is reduced to the consideration of both as being mere synonyms of each other. Moreover, this question should arise only in case of the existent *ghaṭa*. For, if it were not so, the question of *ekatā-anekatā* would arise in case of non-existent objects like *kharaśṛṅga* and *vandhyāputra* also.

Following the example of *ghaṭa* and *astitva* there would be a probability of *ekata-anekatā* between *ghata* and *śūnyatā* also—

घड-सुन्नयन्नयाए वि सुन्नया का घडाहिया सोम्म ! ।
एगत्ते घडओ च्चिय न सुण्णया नाम घडधम्मो ! ॥१७२॥(१७२०)

Ghaḍa-sunnaynnayāe vi sunnayā kā ghaḍāhiyā somma ! ।
Egatte ghaḍao cciya na sunṇayā nāma ghaḍadhammo ! ॥172॥ (1720)

[घट-शून्यतान्यतायामपि शून्यता का घटाधिका सौम्य ! ।
एकत्वे घटक एव न शून्यता नाम घटधर्मः ! ॥ १७२ ॥ (१७२०) ॥

Ghaṭa-śūnyatānyatāyāmapi śūnyatā kā ghaṭādhikā saumya ! ।
Ekatve ghaṭaka eva na śūnyatā nāma ghaṭadharmaḥ ! ॥ 172 ॥]

Trans.—172 Even in case of *ghaṭa* and *śūnyatā* being different (from each other) what *śūnyatā*, exceeding *ghaṭa* could be (found), *O Saumya ?* In case of similarity also, it is the *ghaṭa* itself (which exists). *Śūnyatā* does never become the property of *ghaṭa* (1720)

टीका-ननु घट-शून्यतयोरप्यन्यता, अनन्यता वा ? । यद्यन्यता, तर्हि " सुन्नया का घडाहिया सोम्म ! त्ति " सौम्य व्यक्त ! शून्यता का घटाधिका नाम ?—ननु घटमात्रमेव पश्यामः, न पुनः क्वचित् शून्यता घटादधिका समीक्ष्यते । अथानन्यता, तथापि सति घटशून्यत्वयोरेकत्वे घट एवासौ युज्यते, प्रत्यक्षत एवोपलभ्यमानत्वात्, न तु शून्यत्वं नाम कश्चित् तद्धर्मः, सर्वप्रमाणैरनुपलब्धेरिति ॥ १७१२ (१७२०) ॥

D. C.—If *ghaṭa* and *śūnyatā* are *bhinna* from each other, exceeding *ghaṭa* what more *śūnyatā !* is required, *O saumya ?* In case of both being similar to each other, *śūnyatā* would be nothing but *ghaṭa* on account of its being perceived by *pratyakṣa pramāṇa*. But *śūnyatā* would never become a property of *ghaṭa* as it could never be accomplished by any possible means whatsoever.

Moreover,

विण्णाण-वयण-वाईणमेगया तो तदत्थिया सिद्धा ।
अण्णत्ते अण्णाणी निव्वयणो वा कहं वाई ? ॥१७३॥ (१७२१)

Viṇṇāna-vayaṇa-vāîṇamegayā to tadatthiyā siddhā ।
Aṇṇatte aṇṇāṇî nivvayaṇo vā kaham vāî ? ॥ 173 ॥ (1721)

[**विज्ञान-वचन-वादिनोरेकता ततस्तदस्तिता सिद्धा ।**
अन्यत्वेऽज्ञानी निर्वचनो वा कथं वादी ? ॥ १७३ ॥ (१७२१)

Vijñāna-vacana-vādinorekatā tatastadastitā siddhā ।
Anyatve'jñānî nirvacano vā katham vādî ? ॥ 173 ॥ (1721)]

Trans.—173 (If) knowledge and speech are identical, then its existence is proved. (But) in case of difference, how could there be a disputant having no khowledge or speech ? (1721).

टीका-" शून्यं सर्वमेव विश्वत्रयम् " इत्येवंभूतं यद्विज्ञानं वचनं च, तेन सह शून्यवादिनो भवत एकत्वम्, अनेकत्वं वा ? यद्येकत्वम्, ततस्तदस्तिता वस्त्वस्तिता सिद्धेति कुतः शून्यता, वृक्षत्व-शिंशपात्वयोरिवैकत्वस्य वस्तुत्वात् ? । अन्यत्वे तु विज्ञान-वचनयोरज्ञानी निर्वचनश्च वादी कथं शून्यतां साधयेत्, शिलासंघातवत् ? इति ॥ १७३ (१७२१) ॥

D. C.—When the knowledge as well as the statement that all the three worlds are *śūnya* are indentical to each other the existence-and not the *śūnyatā*-of an object is established. For, their identity is similar to the identity of *vrikṣatva* and *śinśapātva*. But when *vijñāna* and *vacana* are dissimilar the disputant will either become ignorant or speechless like a rock and hence will be totally unfit to expound the theory of *śūnyatā*.

घडसत्ता घडधम्मो तत्तोऽणण्णो पडाइओ भिण्णो ।
आत्थि त्ति तेण भणिए को घड एवेति नियमोऽयं ?॥१७४॥(१७२२)

Ghaḍasattā ghaḍadhammo tatto'naṇṇo paḍāio bhiṇṇo ।
Atthi tti teṇa bhaṇie ko ghaḍa eveti niyamo'yam ? ॥174॥ (1722)

[घटसत्ता घटधर्मस्ततोऽनन्यः पटादितो भिन्नः ।
अस्तीति तेन भणिते को घट एवेति नियमोऽयम् ? ॥१७४॥ (१७२२)

Ghaṭasattā ghaṭadharmastato'nanyaḥ patādito bhinnaḥ ।
Astīti tena bhaṇite ko ghaṭa eveti niyamo'yam ? ॥174॥ (1722)]

Trans.—174 Existence of *ghaṭa* is a property of *ghaṭa*. So, (it is) non-separable (from *ghaṭa*) (and) distinct from *paṭa* etc. By saying, therefore, that " It exists " how could you frame a rule that there exists *ghaṭa* alone ? (1722)

टीका—घटास्तित्वलक्षणा घटसत्ता घटस्य धर्मः, स च ततो घटादनन्योऽभिन्नः, पटादिभ्यस्तु सर्वेभ्योऽपि भिन्नः । तेन ततो " घटोऽस्ति " इति भणिते ' घट एव ' इति " घट एवास्ति " इति कोऽयं नियम ?—निजनिजसत्तायाः पटादिष्वपि भावात् तेऽपि सन्त्येवेति भावः ॥ १७४ ॥ (१७२२) ॥

D. C.—Astitva is the property of *ghaṭa* and hence it is non-separable from *ghaṭa* but distinct from objects like *paṭa* etc. So, when it is said that " *ghaṭa* exists " you cannot assert that *ghaṭa* alone exists. For, the property of *astitva* is present in objects like *paṭa* also and hence they too are existing.

जं वा जदत्थि तं तं घडो त्ति सव्वघडयापसंगो को ।
भणिए घडोत्थि व कहं सव्वत्थित्तावरोहो त्ति ? ॥१७५॥(१७२३)

Jam vā jadatthi tam tam ghaḍo tti savvaghaḍayāpasaṅgo ko ।
Bhaṇie ghaḍotthi va kahaṁs avvatthittāvaroho tti ? ॥175॥ (1723)

[यद्वा यदस्ति तत्तद् घट इति सर्वघटताप्रसङ्गः कः ।
भणिते घटोऽस्ति वा कथं सर्वास्तित्वावरोध इति ? ॥१७५॥ (१७२३)

Yadvā yadasti tattad ghaṭa iti sarvaghaṭatāprasaṅgaḥ kaḥ ।
Bhaṇite ghaṭo'sti vā katham sarvāstitvāvarodha iti ? ॥175॥ (1723)]

Trans.—175 Or, by saying that whatever exists is *ghaṭa*, how would the occasion of all being *ghaṭa* arise ? Or, by

asserting that *ghaṭa* exists, how would the existence of all be obstructed ? (1723).

टीका–" यद् वा प्रोक्तम्–यद् यदस्ति तत्तत् सर्वं घटः " इति, तत्र कोऽयं सर्वघटताप्रसङ्गः ? । तथा, " यो घटः स एवास्ति " इत्यप्युक्ते कथं सर्वास्तित्वावरोधः–कथं घटस्य सर्वात्मकत्वम् ? इत्यर्थः । यदा हि घटसत्ता घट एवास्ति नान्यत्र, तदा " यत्र यत्र घटास्तित्वं तत्र तत्र घटः " इति न कश्चित् सर्वेषां घटताप्रसङ्गः, तथा, " घटसत्त्वेन घट एवास्ति " इत्येतस्मिन्नप्युक्ते न किञ्चिद् घटस्य सर्वात्मकत्वं प्रतीयत इति भावः ॥ १७५ ॥ (१७२३) ॥

D. C.—Since the *astitva* of *ghaṭa* is restricted to *ghata* only and since *ghata* exists only when *ghaṭāstitva* is present there would be no fear of all objects being considered as *ghaṭa* when we say that " *yad yad asti, tat-tat sarvam ghatah*". Again, *astitva* of other objects would not be injured by the assertion that *ghaṭa* exists. For, the all-pervading nature of *ghaṭa* is not apprehended when we say "*ghaṭasattvena ghata eva asti.*" 175 (1723).

After refuting the opponent's view in this way the *Ācārya* is now asserting his own—

अत्थि त्ति तेण भणिए घडोऽघडो वा घडो उ अत्थेव ।
चूओऽचूओ व दुमो चूओ उ जहा दुमो नियमा ॥१७६॥(१७२४)

Atthi tti teṇa bhaṇie ghaḍo'ghaḍo vā ghaḍo u attheva ।
Cūo'cūo va dumo cūo u jahā dumo niyamā ॥ 176 ॥ (1724)

[अस्तीति तेन भणिते घटोऽघटो वा घटस्त्वस्त्येव ।
चूतोऽचूतो वा द्रुमश्चूतस्तु यथा द्रुमो नियमात् ॥ १७६ ॥ (१७२४)

Astîti tena bhaṇite ghaṭo'ghaṭo vā ghatastvastyeva ।
Cūto'cūto vā drumaścūtastu yathā drumo niyamāt ॥176॥ (1724)]

Trans.—176 Just as from the assertion of " tree " (we understand) a mango tree or any other tree, but from " mango tree " (nothing else but) " tree " is understood, in the same way, by saying that " it exists ", *ghaṭa* or (objects) other than *ghaṭa* (are appreheded), but from ' *ghaṭa,* ' *astitva* alone is understood (1724)

टीका–येन कारणेन घटसत्ता घटधर्मत्वाद् घट एवास्ति पटादिभ्यस्तु भिन्ना, तेन तस्मात् " अस्ति " इत्युक्ते घटः, अघटो वा—पटादिर्गम्यते, निजनिजसत्त्वस्य सर्वेषु पटादिष्वपि भावात् । " घडो उ अत्थेव त्ति " घट इति तु प्रोक्तेऽस्त्येवेति गम्यते, निजसत्त्वस्य नियमेन घटे सद्भावात् । अत्र यथासंख्यमुदाहरणद्वयम् । यथा " द्रुमः " इत्युक्ते चूतः, अचूतो वा निम्बादिर्गम्यते, द्रुमत्वस्य सर्वत्र भावात् । " चूतः " इति तु निगदिते द्रुम एव गम्यते, अद्रुमस्य चूतत्वायोगादिति ॥ १७६ (१७२४) ॥

D. C.—As the quality of *vṛikṣatva* is present in all the trees, when we say " tree " all the trees—whether a mango tree or any other tree—are understood. But when the word " mango tree " is spoken, *vṛikṣatva* alone is understood. For, the mango tree cannot exist without being a *vṛikṣa*. Similarly, here also, existence of *ghaṭa* being the quality of *ghaṭa*, is present in *ghaṭa* only and nowhere else, while the common property of *astitva* is present in all objects. So, when we say ' *asti* ', all objects whether *ghaṭa* or *paṭa*–are recognized, as each one of them has its own property of existence. But when we say " *ghaṭa* " *astitva* alone is apprehended, because *ghaṭa* has its own *sattā*.

Now, the *Ācārya* replies to the argument that what has already been produced, could not be produced and so on—

किं तं जायं ति मई जायाऽजाओ-भयं पि जदजायं ।
अह जायं पि न जायं किं न खपुप्फे वियारोऽयं ॥१७७॥(१७२५)

Kim tam jāyam ti maî jāyā'jāo–bhayam pi jadajāyam ।
Aha jāyam pi na jāyam kim na khapupphe viyāro'yam ॥177॥ (1725)

[किं तज्जातमिति मतिर्जाता-ऽजातो-भयमपि यद्यजातम् ।
अथ जातमपि न जातं किं न खपुष्पे विचारोऽयम् ॥१७७॥ (१७२५)

Kim tajjātamiti matir-jātā'jāto-bhayamapi yadyajātam ।
Atha jātamapi na jātam kim na khapuṣpe vicāro'yam ॥177॥ (1725)]

Trans.—177 If it is believed that neither *jāta* nor *a-jāta* nor *jātājāta* could be produced, what could be produced then ? Again, if *jāta* is not *jāta* (according to you), why not think the same about *kha-puspa* (also) ? (1725)

टीका–प्रष्टव्योऽत्र देवानांप्रियः, कथय–किं तद् वस्तु जातमिति प्रतिपद्यते तव मतिः, यज्जाता-ऽजातो-भयादिप्रकारैरजातं साध्यते—यस्य जाताजातादिप्रकारैर्जन्म त्वया निषिध्यत इत्यर्थः । यदि हि जातं किमपि वस्तु तव सिद्धं, तर्हि तत्सत्त्वेनैव प्रतिहता शून्यता, अतः " किं तज्जातं जायते ? किं तदजातं जायते किं तज्जाताजातं जायते ? " इत्यादयः शून्यतासिद्ध्यर्थमुपन्यस्यमाना निरर्थका एव विकल्पा इति प्रच्छकाभिप्रायः । अथ तदपि जातं जाताजातादिविकल्पाश्रय भूतं जातत्वेन भवतो न सिद्धम्, किन्त्वजातमेव तत्, ननु स्ववचनविरुद्धमिदं–जातमप्यजातमिति । किञ्च, जातस्यासत्त्वे निराश्रयत्वाज्जाताजातादिविकल्पा निरर्थका एव । अथैतदाश्रयभूते जाताख्ये वस्तुन्यसिद्धेऽपि "न जातं जायते" इत्यादिविकल्पविचारः प्रवर्तते, तर्हि खपुष्पेऽप्यसौ किं न विधीयते, असत्त्वाविशेषेण " समया विवज्ञओ वा " इत्यादिव्यक्तदोष प्रसङ्गात् ? । न च वक्तव्यं—परेषां सिद्धं जातमुररीकृत्य विकल्पा विधीयन्ते, स्व-परभावाभ्युपगमे शून्यताहानिप्राप्तेरिति ॥१७७॥ (१७२५) ॥

D. C.—Tell me *O Vyakta !* what object, according to you, could be proved as *jāta* when it has already been denied production as *jāta*, *a-jāta* or both ? If anything that has been produced, is accepted by you *sūnyatā* would be denied on account of its very existence and hence alternative questions whether *jāta a-jāta* or *jātājāta* could be produced or not, would become useless.

Again, if a *jāta* object which gives rise to a number of alternatives like *jāta*, *a-jāta* etc. is not, admissible to you as

jāta and if you take it as *a-jāta* there would be self-contradiction in your argument. Moreover, when existence of a *jāta* object is denied, alternatives like *jāta*, *a-jāta* etc. would become useless in absence of their *āś'rayas*.

Now, if you admit the above-mentioned alternatives in case of non-existent objects also, you shall have to apply those alternatives to the *kha-puspa*, which is also non-existent. Here, it could not be said that all those alternatives were applied by accepting things which were believed as *jāta* by others. Because, it would bring in distinction between *sva* and *para* which violates the principle of *s'ūnyatā*.

Moreover,

जइ सव्वहा न जायं किं जम्माणंतरं तदुवलम्भो ।
पुव्वं वाऽणुवलंभो पुणो वि कालंतरहयस्स ? ॥१७८॥ (१७२६)

Jai savvahā na jāyam kim jammāṇantaram taduvalambho ।
Puvvam vā'ṇuvalambho puno vi kālantarahayassa ? ॥178॥ (1726)

[यदि सर्वथा न जातं किं जन्मानन्तरं तदुपलम्भः ।
पूर्वं वाऽनुपलम्भः पुनरपि कालान्तरहतस्य ? ॥ १७८ ॥ (१७२६)

Yadi sarvathā na jātam kim janmānantaram tadupalambhaḥ ।
Pūrvam vā'nupalambhaḥ punarapi kālāntarahatasya ? ॥178॥ (1726)]

Trans.—178 If (according to you) it is not produced in all respects, why its apprehension after production ? And why not before, or after one has been destroyed in future ? (1726).

टीका–यदि सर्वैरपि प्रकारैर्घटादिकार्यं न जातमिति शून्यवादिना प्रतिपाद्यते, तर्हि मृत्पिण्डाद्यवस्थायामनुपलब्धं कुलालादिसामग्रीनिर्वर्तित-जन्मानन्तरं किमिति तस्मात् तदुपलभ्यते ? । पूर्वं वा जन्मतः किमिति तस्यानुपलम्भः ? । पुनरपि च कालान्तरे लगुडादिना हतस्य किमिति तस्यानुपलम्भः ? । अजातस्य गगननलिनस्येव सर्वदैव घटादेरनुपलम्भ एव

स्यात्, यस्तु कदाचिदुपलम्भः, कदाचित्तु नोपलम्भः, असौ जातस्यैवोपपद्यत इति भावः ॥ १७८ ॥ (१७२६) ॥

D. C.—If according to your *s'ūnyatā-vāda*, objects like *ghata* are not altogether produced, how is it that *ghaṭa* which is not apprehended in the state of a lump of earth, is apprehended when produced by *nimittas* like potter etc ? And why is the *ghaṭa* not apprehended before its production or after its being broken by the hit of a stick etc ? If objects like *ghaṭa* were altogether *a-jāta*, like *khapuṣpa* they would never be apprehended at all. And, the quality of being apprehensible at one time and non-apprehensible at the other, is possible only in case of a *jāta* object. 178 (1726).

Besides,

जह सव्वहा न जायं जायं सुण्णवयणं तहा भावा ।
अह जायं पि न जायं पयासिया सुण्णया केण ? ॥१७९॥(१७२७)

Jaha savvahā na jāyam jāyam sunnavayaṇam tahā bhāvā ।
Aha jayam pi na jāyam payāsiyā suṇṇayā kena ? ॥179॥ (1727)

[यथा सर्वथा न जातं जातं शून्यवचनं तथा भावाः ।
अथ जातमपि न जातं प्रकाशिता शून्यता केन ? ॥ १७९ ॥ (१७२७)

Yathā sarvathā na jātam jātam śūnyavacanam tathā bhāvāḥ ।
Atha jātamapi na jātam prakāśitā śūnyatā kena ? ॥ 179 ॥ (1727)]

Trans.—179 Just as the assertion about *śūnyatā* is *jāta*, even though not produced altogether, so also, other objects (should be taken as *jāta*). Again, if *jāta* were denied to have been produced, by what means would the *śūnyatā* be manifested ? (1727).

टीका–" शून्यं सर्वं जगत् " इत्येवंभूतं यच्छून्यताविषयं विज्ञानं वचनं च तद् यथा जाता-ऽजातादिप्रकारैः सर्वथा जातमप्यजातमपि सत् केनापि प्रकारेण तावज्जातम्, तथा भावा अपि घट-पटादयो जाता एष्टव्या

इत्यतो न शून्यं जगत्। अथ शून्यताविज्ञान-वचनद्वयं जातमप्यजातमिष्यते, तर्हि तद्विज्ञान-वचनाभ्यां विना केनासौ शून्यता प्रकाशिता ?—न केनचिदिति शून्यतानुपपत्तिरिति ॥ १७९ ॥ (१७२७) ॥

D. C.—Just as the statement as well as knowledge that everything is *s'ūnya* are accepted as having been produced in any way whatsoever, in the same way, other objects such as *ghaṭa*, *paṭa* etc. should also be taken as *jāta*. And, if you accept *vijñāna* and *vacana* about *s'ūnyatā* to be *a-jāta*, how would you be able to express *s'ūnyatā* without the help of *vijñāna* or *vacana*, about it ? Hence, *s'ūnyatā* is not acceptible in any way. 179 (1727).

Also,

जायइ जायमजायं जायाजायमह जायमाणं च ।
कज्जमिह विवक्खाए न जायए सव्वहा किंचि ॥१८०॥ (१७२८)

रूवि त्ति जाइ जाओ कुंभो संठाणओ पुणरजाओ ।
जायाजाओ दोहि वि तस्समयं जायमाणो त्ति ॥१८१॥ (१७२९)

पुव्वकओ उ घडतया परपज्जाएहिं तदुभएहिं च ।
जायंतो य पडतया न जायए सव्वहा कुंभो ॥ १८२ ॥ (१७३०)

वोमाइ निच्चजायं न जायए तेण सव्वहा सोम्म ! ।
इय दव्वतया सव्वं भयणिज्जं पज्जवगईए ॥ १८३ ॥ (१७३१)

Jāyai jāyamajāyam jayājāyamaha jāyamāṇam ca ।
Kajjamiha vivakkhāe na jāyae savvahā kimci ॥ 180 ॥ (1728)

Rūvi tti jāi jāo kumbho samṭhāṇao punarajāo ।
Jayājāo dohi vi tassamayam jāyamāno tti ॥ 181 (1729)

Puvvakao u ghaḍatayā para pajjāehim tadubhaehim ca ।
Jāyanto ya paḍatayā na jāyae savvahā kumbho ॥ 182 ॥ (1730)

Vomāi niccajāyam na jāyae tena savvahā somma ! ।
Iya davvatayā savvam bhayanijjam pajjavagaîe ॥ 183 ॥ (1731)

[जायते जातमजातं जाताजातमथ जायमानं च ।
कार्यमिह विवक्षया न जायते सर्वथा किञ्चित् ॥ १८० ॥ (१७२८)

रूपीति जायते जातःकुम्भः संस्थानतः पुनरजातः ।
जाताजातो द्वाभ्यामपि तत्समयं जायमान इति ॥ १८१ ॥ (१७२९)

पूर्वकृतस्तु घटतया परपर्यायैस्तदुभयैश्च ।
जायमानश्च पटतया न जायते सर्वथा कुम्भः ॥ १८२ ॥ (१७३०)

व्योमादि नित्यजातं न जायते तेन सर्वथा सौम्य ! ।
इति द्रव्यतया सर्वं भजनीयं पर्यवगत्या ॥ १८३ ॥ (१७३१)

Jāyate jātamajātam jātājātamatha jāyamānam ca ।
Kāryamiha vivakṣayā na jāyate sarvathā kimcit ॥ 180 ॥ (1728)]

Rūpîti jāyate jātaḥ kumbhaḥ samsthānataḥ punarajātaḥ ।
Jātājāto dvābhyāmapi tatsamayam jāyamāna iti ॥ 181 ॥ (1729)]

Pūrvakṛitastu ghaṭatayā paraparyāyaistadubhayaiśca ।
Jāyamānaśca paṭatayā na jāyate sarvathā kumbhaḥ ॥182॥ (1730)]

Vyomādi nityajātam na jāyate tena sarvathā saumya ! ।
Iti dravyatayā sarvam bhajanîyam paryavagatyā ॥ 183 ॥ (1731)]

Trans.—180–183 *Jāta*, *a–jāta*, *jātājāta*, as well as the *jāyamāna* objects are produced in this world on account of various causes, (but) nothing is produced in perfection. The *jāta (kumbha)* is produced, since it has form; the *a–jāta kumbha* is produced because of shape; the *jātājāta* (is produced) even by both, and the *jāyamāna* (is also produced) because the process of production takes place in the present tense. But a *kumbha* which has been produced before, could never be produced on account of *ghaṭatā* or (by means of) the characteristics of other (objects) or by means of both; and the *jāyamāna kumbha* could also never be produced on occouut

of *paṭatā*. Again sky etc. could also never be produced as they are *nityajāta*. Hence, *O Saumya !* nothing could be produced as a substance (but) everything should be taken according to the surrounding characteristics. (1728–1731).

टीका–इह कार्यं घटादिकं विवक्षया किमपि जातं जायते, किञ्चिद-जातम्, किञ्चिज्जाताजातम्, किञ्चिज्जायमानम्, किञ्चित्तु सर्वथा न जायत इति। अथ यथाक्रममुदाहरणानि—" रूवीत्यादि " रूपितया घटो जातो जायते, मृद्रूपतायाः प्रागपि भावात्, तद्रूपतया जात एव घटो जायते इत्यर्थः। संस्थानतयाऽऽकारविशेषेण पुनः स एवाजातो जायते, मृत्पिण्डा-द्यवस्थायामाकारस्यासंभवात्। मृद्रूपतया, आकारविशेषेण चेति द्वाभ्यामपि प्रकाराभ्यां जाताजातो जायते, तदनर्थान्तरभूतत्वाद् घटस्य। तथा, अती-ता-ऽनागतकालयोर्विनष्टानुत्पन्नत्वात् क्रियानुपपत्तेर्वर्तमानसमय एव क्रिया-सद्भावात् तत्समयं वर्तमानसमयं जायमानो जायते। किञ्चित्तु सर्वथा जाता-ऽजातादिप्रकारैर्न जायते। किं पुनस्तत् ? इत्याह —" पुव्वकओ उ इत्यादि " पूर्वकृतस्तु पूर्वनिष्पन्नो घटो घटतया जाता-ऽजातादिविकल्पानां मध्यादेके-नापि प्रकारेण न जायते, पूर्वमेव जातत्वात्। किं घटतयैव न जायते ?। न, इत्याह–" परपज्जाएहिं ति " तथा, पटादिगतैः परपर्यायैश्च घटो न जायते, स्वपर्यायाणां पूर्वमेव जातत्वात्, परपर्यायैश्च कदाचित् कस्याप्य-भवनात्। स्व-परपर्यायैः पूर्वकृतघटो न जायते, जाता-ऽजातपट–खरविषा-णवदिति भावः।

तथा, जायमानोऽपि वर्तमानक्रियाक्षणसमये पटतया घटो न जायते, पररूपतया कस्याप्यभवनात्। किं पूर्वकृतो घट एवेत्थं न जायते, आहोस्वि-दन्यदपि किञ्चिद् न जायते ? इत्याह—" वोमाईत्यादि " न केवलं पूर्वकृतो घटो घटतया न जायते, तथा व्योमादि च तेन कारणेन सौम्य ! सर्वथा जातादिभिः सर्वैरपि प्रकारैर्न जायते, येन किम् ? इत्याह—येन नित्यजातं सर्वदाऽवस्थितम्, हेतुद्वारेण विशेषणमिदम्, नित्यजातत्वाद् न जायत इत्यर्थः। उक्तस्यैवार्थस्योपसंहारव्याजेन तात्पर्यमुपदर्शयन्नाह–' इयेत्यादि ' इत्युक्त-प्रकारेण सर्वमपि घट–पट–व्योमादिकं वस्तु द्रव्यरूपेण " न जायते "

इतीहापि संबध्यते, तद्रूपतया सदावस्थितत्वादिति भावः। पर्यायगत्या पर्यायचिन्तया पुनः सर्वं भजनीयंविकल्पनीयम्–पूर्वजातं घटादिकं रूपादिभिः स्वपर्यायैरपि न जायते, पूर्वजातत्वादेव, अजातं तु तत् स्वपर्यायैर्जायते, परपर्यायैस्तु किञ्चिदपि न जायते, इत्येवं पर्यायचिन्तायां भजना। एतच्च प्रायो दर्शितमेवेति॥ १८०-१८१-१८२-१८३॥ (१७२८-१७२९-१७३०-१७३१)॥

D. C.—Several objects like *ghata* which have once been *jāta* in this world, could be produced by reason of their *rūpatva*. Before the *rūpa* of *ghaṭa* is produced, the *rūpa* of earth is already there and hence the *ghaṭa* which is *jāta* to the *apekṣā* of *rūpitva* is produced in this way. Thereafter, *ghaṭa* is *a-jāta* as far as shape is considered. When it takes the shape in course of production, the *a-jāta ghata* comes into existence. The *jātājāta ghaṭa* is produced in both the ways–*rūpitva* as well as the *akāra*. Moreover, *ghaṭa* which is *jāyamāna* is produced only during the present tense. The past having already vanished and future having not yet come, the process of being produced takes place only during the present tense.

There are several objects of peculiar types which do not go under any of the above-mentioned categories. *e. g.* A *ghaṭa* which has already been produced in the past, could never be produced as a *ghata* again in any of the above-stated ways. Secondly, *ghata* could not be produced on account of the characteristics of other objects like *paṭa* etc. As *ghaṭa* has its own process of production and characteristics, it could not be produced like an existent *paṭa* or a non-existent *kharas'ṛṅga*. Thirdly, *ghaṭa* which is being produced during the present time, could never be produced as *pata* etc. For, *kārya* which is being produced as *ghaṭa* etc. could never be produced as an absolutely different object like *paṭa*. So, all objects *e. g*, *ghaṭa*, *pata*, *ākas'a* etc., could not be produced in the form of substance as they are primarily made in that state. But, as far as *paryāya* is concerned, all are said to have been produced.

In reply to the question *viz.* "Since everything is made up of some sort of materials, how could those materials exist in the midst of all-pervading negation ?" the *Ācārya* states—

दीसइ सामग्गिमयं सव्वमिह त्थि न य सा, नणु विरुद्धं ।
घेप्पइ व न पच्चक्खं किं कच्छपरोमसामग्गी ? ॥१८४॥ (१७३२)

Dîsai sāmaggimayam savvamiha tthi na ya sā, naṇu viruddham ।
Gheppai va na paccakkham kim kaccaparoma sāmaggî ?॥184॥(1732)

[दृश्यते सामग्रीमयं सर्वमिहास्ति न च सा, ननु विरुद्धम् ।
गृह्यते वा न प्रत्यक्षं किं कच्छपरोमसामग्री ? ॥ १८४ ॥ (१७३२)

Dṛśyate sāmagrîmayam sarvamihāsti na ca sā, nanu viruddham ।
Grihyate vā na pratyaksam kim kacchaparomasāmagrî ? ॥ 184 ॥]

Trans.—184 All (objects) in this world appear as consisting of (some sort of) materials ; but, in fact, reverse is the case, (as) those materials do not exist. Or, if it is accepted, why is the ingredient of the hair of a tortoise not perceptible to the senses ? (1732)

टीका–इह यदुक्तम्—"सर्वमपि कार्यं सामग्र्यात्मकं दृश्यते, सर्वाभावे च नास्ति सामग्री " इति । तदेतद् विरुद्धमेव, प्रस्तुतार्थप्रतिपादकत्वात्, वचोजनककण्ठौ-ष्ठ-तालवादिसामग्र्याः प्रत्यक्षत एवोपलब्धेः ॥ अथ ब्रूषे–अविद्योपप्लवादविद्यमानमपि दृश्यते, यत उक्तम्

काम-स्वप्न-भयो-न्मादैरविद्योपप्लवात् तथा ।
पश्यन्त्यसन्तमप्यर्थं जनः केशेन्दुकादिवेत् ॥ १ ॥ इति ।

यद्येवम्, तर्ह्यसत्त्वे सामान्येऽपि कच्छपरोमजनकसामग्री किमिति प्रत्यक्षत एव नोपलभ्यते ?, समता विपर्ययो वा कथं न स्यादिति वाच्यम् ? इति ॥ १८४ ॥ (१७३२) ॥

D C.—Vyakta :—All objects are composed of some sort of *sāmagrî* in this world. But in the midst of *sarvasūnyatā*,

sāmagrî, too, does not exist, because everything becomes *s'ūnya* at the end.

Bhagavān :—This belief of yours *O Vyakta !* is totally wrong. For, constituents like *kaṇṭha*, *oṣṭha*, *tālu* etc, which form *sāmagrî* as well as *vacana* are directly perceptible. Hence, how could the existence of *sāmagrî* be denied ?

Vyakta :—One could perceive even an *a-vidyamāna* object on account of *kāma*, *svapna*, *bhaya*, *unmāda*, or *a-vidyā*, but in fact that does not exist.

Bhagavān :—If it is so, *O Vyakta !* why is the *sāmagrî* that produces the hair of a tortoise not produced ? *A-vidyamānatā* is common in both the cases. So, either this *sāmagrî* should be apprehended like the *sāmagrî* that produces *vacana* or both should not be apprehended. Or, why should not the fault of *viparyāya* (contrariety) take place when the *sāmagrî* that produces the hair of a tortoise is apprehended and the one that produces *vacana* is not ?

But,

सामग्गिमओ वत्ता वयणं चत्थि जइ तो कओ सुण्णं ।
अह नत्थि केण भणिअं वयणाभावे सुयं केण ?॥१८५॥(१७३३)

Sāmaggimao vattā vayaṇam catthi jai to kao suṇṇam ।
Aha natthi keṇa bhaṇiam vayaṇābhāve suyam keṇa ? ॥185॥(1733)

[सामग्रीमयो वक्ता वचनं चास्ति यदि ततः कुतः शून्यम् ।
अथ नास्ति केन भणितं वचनाभावे श्रुतं केन ? ॥ १८५ ॥ (१७३३)

Sāmagrîmayo vaktā vacanam cāsti yadi tataḥ kutaḥ śūnyam ।
Atha nāsti kena bhaṇitam vacanābhāve śrutam kena ? ॥185॥(1733)]

Trans.—185 And, if the speaker–accompanied by a group of constituent parts–as well as the speech exist, whence is the *śūnyatā* (produced) ? On the other hand, if they do not exist, in absence of (speaker as well as) words, by whom is the *śūnyata* pronounced (and) by whom is (it) heard ? (1733)

टीका-सामग्री-उरः-शिरः-कण्ठौ-ष्ठ-तालु-जिह्वादिसमुदायात्मिका तन्मयः सामग्र्यात्मको वक्ता, तद्ववनं चास्ति न वा ? । यद्यस्ति, तर्हि कुतो जगच्छून्यत्वम्, तद्वक्तृ-वचनसत्त्वेनैव व्यभिचारात् ? । अथ तद्वक्तृवचने न स्तः, तर्हि वक्तृ-वचनाभावे केन भणितं शून्यं जगत् ?—न केनचित् । सर्वशून्यत्वे च प्रतिपाद्यस्याप्यभावात् केन तच्छून्यवचः श्रुतम्? इति ॥१८५॥ (१७३३) ॥

D. C.—Are the speaker-possessed of a group of constituents like heart, head, throat, lips, palate, tongue etc. and the speech, existing or not ? If they are, *sūnyatā* will no more be existing on account of the very fact that they exist. If they are not, in absence of the speaker and speech there will be none to announce that the world is *s'ūnya.* Moreover, in the midst of all being non-existent, neither the object to be proved will exist nor will there be anyone to hear that *s'ūnya vacana.*

Also,

जेणं चेव न वत्ता वयणं वा तो न संति वयणिज्जा ।
भावा तो सुण्णमिदं वयणमिदं सच्चमलियं वा ? ॥ १८६ ॥

जइ सच्चं नाभावो अहालियं न प्पमाणमेयं ति ।
अब्भुवगयं ति व मई नाभावे जुत्तमेयं ति ॥१८७॥ (१७३५)

Jeṇam ceva na vattā vayaṇam vā to na santi vayanijjā ।
Bhāvā to sunṇamidam vayaṇamidam saccamaliyam vā ?॥186॥(1734)

Jai saccam nābhāvo ahāliyam na ppamāṇameyam ti ।
Abbhuvagayam ti va maî nābhāve juttameyam ti ॥ 187 ॥ (1735)

[येनैव न वक्ता वचनं वा ततो न सन्ति वचनीयाः ।
भावास्ततः शून्यमिदं वचनमिदं सत्यमलीकं वा ? ॥ १८६ ॥ (१७३४)

यदि सत्यं नाभावोऽथालीकं न प्रमाणमेतदिति ।
अभ्युपगतमिति वा मतिर्नाभावे युक्तमेतदिति ॥ १८७ ॥ (१७३५)

Yenaiva na vaktā vacanam vā tato na santi vacanîyāḥ ।
Bhāvāstataḥ śūnyamidam vacanamidam satyamalîkam vā ॥186॥]
Yadi satyam nābhāvo'thālîkam na pramāṇametaditi ।
Abhyupagatamiti vā mati r-nābhāve yuktametaditi ॥187॥ (1735)]

Trans.—186-187 (An opponenent may argue that) " Just as a speaker or speech does not exist, the objects (that are) to be expressed will be non-existent (and hence) this (world) is also non-existent. " Is this statement true or false ? If it is true, there will be no negation and if it is false, that will no longer be a ground of assurance.

Or, if you believed that *sūnyatā* is anyhow arrived at, it is not proper (to do so) in (the midst of all-pervading) negation. (1734-1735)

टीका–येनैव न वक्ता, नापि च वचनम्, ततस्तेनैव न सन्ति वचनीया भावा इति, अतः शून्यमिदं जगदिति । अत्रोच्यते–यदेतद् वक्तृ-वचन-वचनीयानां भावानामभावप्रतिप्रादकं वचनं तत् सत्यमलीकं वा ? । यदि सत्यम्, तर्ह्यस्यैव सत्यवचनस्य सद्भावाद् नाभावः सर्वभावानाम् । अथालीकमिदं वचनम्, तर्ह्यप्रमाणमेतत्, अतो नातःशून्यतासिद्धिः । अथ यथा तथा वाभ्युपगतमस्माभिः शून्यताप्रतिपादकं वचनम्, अतोऽस्मद्वचन-प्रामाण्यात् शून्यतासिद्धिरिति तव मतिः । नैवम्, यतः " सत्यम्, अलीकं वा त्वयेदमभ्युपगतम् ? " इत्यादि पुनस्तदेवावर्तते । किञ्च, अभ्युपगन्ता, अभ्युपगमः, अभ्युपगमनीयं चेत्येतत्त्रयस्य सद्भावेऽभ्युपगमोऽप्येष भवतो युज्यते, न च सर्वभावानामभावे एतत्त्रयं युक्तमिति ॥१८६-१८७॥ (१७३४-१७३५) ॥

D. C.—Vyakta—Now that *vaktā* and *vacaña* have been established as *s'ūnya*, the *vacanîya bhāvas* will also be *s'ūnya* on account of the same reason. So, ultimately, the whole world is non-existent in all respects.

Bhagavān:—If it is so, *O Vyakta !* I ask you a question : Is that statement which proves the non-existence of *vaktā*,

vacana, and the *vacanîya bhāvas* true or false ? If it is true, the *abhāva* of the above—mentioned objects could not be attained on account of its own existence. And if it is false, the statement will cease to be a *pramāṇa* to establish *s'ūnyatā*. Thus, it is not possible to establish *s'ūnyatā* in either of the two ways.

Vyakta :—But the statement which establishes *s'ūnyatā* has anyhow been accepted by us. Our *vacana* is therefore authentic and *s'ūnyātā* has undoubtedly been established.

Bhagavān :—That is not true, *O Vyakta!* For, in accepting the above—mentioned statement, the same fault will arise when you ask the question as to whether that *vacana* is true or false and so on. Moreover, you cannot accept the *vacana*, unless the person who accepts the *vacana* to be accepted and the acceptance itself are existent.

The theory of *sarvas'ūnyatā* seems unfounded from this point of view also.

Moreover,

सिकयासु किं न तेल्लं सामग्गीउ तिलेसु वि किमत्थि ?।
किं व न सव्वं सिज्झइ सामग्गीउ खपुप्फाणं ? ॥१८८॥(१७३६)

Sikayāsu kim na taillam sāmaggîu tilesu vi kimatthî ?।
kim va na savvam sijjhai sāmaggîu khapupphāṇam ? ॥188॥(1736)

[सिकतासु किं न तैलं सामग्रीतस्तिलेष्वपि किमस्ति ?।
किंवा न सर्वं सिध्यति सामग्रीतः खपुष्पानाम् ? ॥१८८॥ (१७३६) ॥

Sikatāsu kim na tailam sāmagrîtastileṣvapi kimasti ?।
Kim vā na sarvam siddhyati sāmagrîtaḥ khapuspānām ॥188॥ (1736)]

Trans.—188 Why is the oil not (manufactured) from the materials like sands and why from sesamum seeds only ? Or, why not everything be attained from the materials of *khapuspas* (only) ? (1736).

टीका–सर्वभावानामसत्त्वे सर्वोऽपि प्रतिनियतो लोकव्यवहारः समुच्छिद्यते, तथाहि–भावाभावस्य सर्वत्राविशिष्टत्वात् किमिति तिसिकताकणसामग्रीतस्तैलं न भवति, तिलादिसामग्र्यां वा तत् किमस्ति ?। किं वा खपुष्पसामग्रीतः सर्वमपि कार्यजातं न सिध्यति ?। न चैवम्, तस्मात् प्रतिनियतकार्यकारणभावदर्शनाद् नाभावसामग्रीतः किमप्युत्पद्यते, किन्तु यथा स्वभावसामग्रीतः, तथा च सति न शून्यं जगदिति ॥ १८८ ॥ (१७३६) ॥

D. C.—In case of all objects being taken as non-existent, the entire course of *loka-vyavahāra* will be violated. If all the objects are of the same type—*viz.*, that of absolute negation—how is it that oil is manufactured only from the *sāmagrî* of sesamum seeds and not from the materials like sand-particles etc. ? Or, if there is all-pervading negation, why not all the objects be attained from the *sāmagrî* of *khapuspas* alone ? The fact that it never happens like this in the world, leads us to believe that the world is not *s'ūnya*.

And,

सव्वं सामग्गिमयं नेगंतोऽयं जओऽणुरपएसो ।
अह सो वि सप्पएसो जत्थावत्था स परमाणू ॥१८९॥(१७३७)

Savvam sāmaggimayam neganto'yam jao'nurapaeso ।
Aha so vi sappaeso jatthāvatthā sa paramānū ॥ 189 ॥ (1737)

[सर्वं सामग्रीमयं नैकान्तोऽयं यतोऽणुरप्रदेशः ।
अथ सोऽपि सप्रदेशो यत्रावस्था स परमाणुः ॥ १८९ ॥ (१७३७)

Sarvam sāmagrîmayam naikānto'yam yato'ṇurapradeśaḥ ।
Atha so'pi sa-pradeśo yatrāvasthā sa paramāṇuḥ ॥189॥ (1737)]

Trans.—189 That everything should be produced from a group of materials is not the one inevitable (rule) because atom does not occupy space. But (if even that occupies space according to you) wherever it resides there is a molecule. (1737)

टीका–सर्वं सामग्रीमयं सामग्रीजन्यं वस्त्वित्ययमपि नैवगन्तः, यतो द्व्यणुकादयः स्कन्धाः सप्रदेशत्वाद् द्व्यादिपरमाणुजन्यत्वाद् भवन्तु सामग्रीजन्याः, परमाणुः पुनरप्रदेश इति न केनचिज्जन्यते इति कथमसौ सामग्रीजन्यः स्यात् ? । अस्ति चासौ, कार्यलिङ्गगम्यत्वात्; उक्तं च

मूर्तैरणुरप्रदेशः कारणमन्त्यं तथा नित्यः ।
एकरस–वर्ण–गन्धो द्विस्पर्शः कार्यलिङ्गश्च ॥ १ ॥

अथायमपि सप्रदेशः, तर्ह्येत्प्रदेशोऽणुर्भविष्यति, तस्यापि सप्रदेशत्वे तत्प्रदेशोऽणुरित्येवं तावत्, यावद् यत्र क्वचिद् निष्प्रदेशतया भवद्बुद्धेरवस्थानं भविष्यति, स एव परमाणुः, तेनापि च सामग्रीजन्यत्वस्य व्यभिचार इति ॥ १८९ ॥ (१७३६) ॥

D. C.—There cannot be a general rule that each and every object should be produced from *sāmagrî*. For, objects composed of two or more atoms could be produced from the *sāmagrî* of those atoms, but a *paramāṇu* by itself does never occupy space, and hence could never be produced from any *sāmagrî*. This *paramānu* is produced only from *kārya-liṅga*, as it is said—

Mūrtair-aṇurapradeśaḥ kāraṇamantyam bhavet tathā nityaḥ ।
Ekarasa-varṇa-gandho dvisparśaḥ kāryaliṅgaśca ॥

But if you believe this *paramāṇu* to occupy space, wherever you apprehend *paramāṇu* there would be *aṇu* till ultimately it would be absolutely vacant, where nothing but *parmāṇu* not produced from any *sāmagrî* would be found.

दीसइ सामग्गिमयं न याणवो संति नणु विरुद्धमिदं ।
किं वाणूणमभावे निप्फण्णमिणं खपुप्फेहिं ॥ १९० ॥ (१७३८)

Dîsai sāmaggimayam na yānavo santi naṇu viruddhamidam ॥
Kim vāṇūṇamabhāve nipphaṇṇaminam khapupphehim ॥190॥ (1738)

[दृश्यते सामग्रीमयं न चाणवः सन्ति ननु विरुद्धमिदम् ।
किं वाऽणूनामभावे निष्पन्नमिदं खपुष्पैः ? ॥ १९० ॥ (१७३८)

Dṛiśyate sāmagrîmayam na cāṇavaḥ santi nanu viruddhamidam ।
Kim vāṇūnāmabhāve niṣpannamidam khapuṣpaiḥ ॥190॥ (1738)]

Trans.—190 It is really contradictory (to believe) that what is produced by materials is seen and that atoms do not exist. Or, is it that, in absence of atoms, (all) this is produced by means of (mere) *khapuspa ?* (1738)

टीका–"सामग्रीमयं सर्वं दृश्यते" इति भवतैव प्रागुक्तम्, "अणवश्च न सन्ति" इत्यधुना ब्रूषे, ननु विरुद्धमिदम्, यथा 'सर्वमप्यनृतं वचनम्' इति ब्रुवतः स्ववचनविरोधः, तथाऽत्रापीत्यर्थः। यदेव हि सामग्रीमयं किमपि दृश्यते भवता, तदेवाणुसंघातात्मकम्, अतः स्ववचनेनैव प्रतिपादितत्वात् कथमणवो न सन्ति? इति भावः। किञ्च, अणूनामभाव इदं सर्वमपि घटादि-कार्यजातं किं खपुष्पैर्निष्पन्नम्, परमाण्वभावे तज्जनकमृत्पिण्डादिसामग्र्य-भावात्? इति भावः। तस्माद् यस्मात् सामग्रीमयं दृश्यत इति प्रतिपद्यते भवता,तद्वदेव परमाणव इति ॥ १९० ॥ (१७३८) ॥

D. C.—If you are to state that those that are not *sāmagrîjanya* are not *paramāṇus* at all, your own statement will be contradicting itself. It has already been said that everything which is *sāmagrîmaya* is apprehensible. Again, all that you have accepted as *sāmagrîmaya* or *sāmagrîjanya* in this world, is nothing but a collection of atoms. Thus, when you establish the existence of atoms by your own words, you cannot call them non-existent, in any case. And, if you call those atoms non-existent, should the objects like *ghata*, *paṭa* etc, be taken to have been produced from the non-existent objects like *khapuṣpa* etc. ? Because if *paramāṇu* is absent, a *sāmagrî* like *mṛitpiṇḍa* would also be absent. So, when you assert that *sāmagrîmaya* is apprehended, the *paramāṇus* that form this *sāmagrî* are automatically established as existent.

Now, in reply to the argument prima facie that since

rear portion is not perceptible and since front portion is very minute, everything is *s'ūnya*,† the author indicates—

देसस्साराभागो घेप्पइ न य सो त्ति नणु विरुद्धमिणं ।
सव्वाभावे वि न सो घेप्पइ किं खरविसाणस्स ॥१९१॥(१७३९)

Desassārābhago gheppai na ya so tti nanu viruddhamiṇam ।
Savvābhāve vi na so gheppai kim kharavisāṇassa ॥191॥ (1739)

[देशस्याराद्भागो गृह्यते न च स इति ननु विरुद्धमिदम् ।
सर्वाभावेऽपि न स गृह्यते किं खरविषाणस्य ? ॥ १९१ ॥ (१७३९)

Deśasyārādbhāgo grihyate na ca sa iti nanu viruddhamidam ।
Sarvābhāve'pi na sa grihyate kim kharaviṣāṇasya ? ॥191॥ (1739)]

Trans.—191 To say that the foremost portion of a visible object is perceptible but it does not exist, is really contradictory. (For) even in the midst of all-pervading negation, why is the front part of the horn of an ass not perceived ? (1739)

टीका–यदुक्तम्–" दृश्यस्यापि वस्तुनः परभागस्तावद् न दृश्यते, आराद्भागस्तु गृह्यते, परं सोऽप्यन्यान्यपरभागकल्पनया प्रागुक्तयुक्तितो नास्ति " इति । ननु विरुद्धमिदम्–" गृह्यतेऽसौ, न च समस्ति " इति । सर्वाभावाद् भ्रान्त्याऽसौ गृह्यत इति चेत् । तदयुक्तम्, यतः सर्वाभावे तुल्येऽपि किमिति खरविषाणस्य संबन्धी आराद्भागो न गृह्यते ? । समता विपर्ययो वा कथं न भवति ? इति ॥ १९१ ॥ (१७३९) ॥

D. C.—It has been said before that only a front part of a visible object is perceived and not the rear part. This front part is, in comparision with other parts in the rear, very *sūkṣma* and hence that too becomes non-existent This statement is self-contradicting. For, to say that it is perceptible but it does not exist, is absurd.

Here, if it is said, that in the midst of *sarvābhāva* it is

† Vide verse 1696.

perceptible because of *bhrānti*, that is also not proper. For, since *abhāva* is common everywhere, why is the front part of non-existent objects like the horn of an ass etc., not apprehended ? Or, how does it not happen that the front part of objects like *kharaviṣāṇa* etc. be apprehended and that of objects like *ghaṭa, paṭa* etc. not apprehended ?

Moreover,

परभागादरिसणओ नाराभागो वि किमणुमाणं ति ।
आराभागग्गहणे किं व न परभागसंसिद्धी ? ॥१९२॥ (१७४०)

Parabhāgādarisanao nārābhāgo vi kimaṇumānam ti ।
Arābhāgaggahaṇe kim va na parabhāgasamsiddhî ? ॥192॥ (1740)

[परभागादर्शनतो नाराद्भागोऽपि किमनुमानमिति ।
आराद्भागग्रहणे किं वा न परभागसंसिद्धिः ? ॥ १९२ ॥ (१७४०)

Parabhāgādarśanato nārādbhāgo'pi kimanumānamiti ।
Ārādbhāgagrahaṇe kim vā na parabhāgasaṃsiddhiḥ ? ॥192॥(1740)]

Trans.—192 On account of the rear part being imperceptible, what *anumāna* (is held) in case of even the front part (being imperceptible) ? Or, is it that the rear part is not apprehended when the front part is apprehended ? (1740)

टीका–"परभागमात्रादर्शनादाराद्भागोऽपि नास्ति" इत्यत्र किमनुमानं भवतः ? । एतदुक्तं भवति—यत् प्रत्यक्षेण सकललोकप्रसिद्धं तदग्नेरौष्ण्यमिव कथमनुमानेन बाध्यते ? । आराद्भागस्य ह्यापेक्षिकत्वात् तदन्यथानुपपत्तेः परभागानुमानं तावदद्यापि युज्यते । यस्तु परभागादर्शनमात्रेणैव तन्निह्नवः, सोऽसंबद्ध एव, सत्स्वपि देशादिविप्रकृष्टेषु मेरु-पिशाचादिष्वदर्शनसंभवात् । तस्माद् न परभागादर्शनमात्रेणाराद्भागोऽपह्नोतव्यः । किञ्च, आराद्भागग्रहणे परभागानुमानं युज्येतापीति भाष्यकारोऽप्याह–" आराभागेत्यादि " आराद्ग्रहणे कथं न परभागसंसिद्धिः ? अपि तु तत्संसिद्धिरेव, तथाहि–दृश्यवस्तुनः परभागोऽस्ति, तत्संबन्धिभूतस्याराद्भागस्य ग्रहणात्, इह

यत्संबन्धिभूतो भागो गृह्यते तत् समस्ति, यथा नभसः पूर्वभागे गृहीते तत्संबन्ध्यपरभागः, गृह्यते च घटादेरारद्भागः, अतस्तत्संन्धिभूतः परभागोऽप्यस्ति। यच्चोक्तम्—" आरद्भागस्याऽप्यन्य आरद्भागः कल्पनीयः, तस्याप्यन्य इत्यादि तावत्, यावत् सर्वारातीयभागः" इति। अत्रापि परभागस्यासत्त्वे सर्वारातीयभागपरिकल्पनमुपपन्नमेव स्यात्। तस्मादस्ति परभाग इति ॥ १९२ ॥ (१७४०) ॥

D. C.—What *anumāna* do you hold when you assert that front part is also unapprehensible because of the rear part being so ? For, how could you deny the existence of front part which is *pratyakṣa* to you like the heat of fire ?

It is proper to believe that front portion could exist only if the rear portion be existing and not otherwise. Since the front portion is existent to the *apekṣā* of the rear one, *jñāna* about the rear portion will have to be derived from the front portion by means of *anumāna*. But from this it is absolutely inconsistent to conclude that front portion is not perceived because the rear one is not seen.

Even the commentator asserts in this connection that when the front portion is seen we can infer the rear one *e. g.* A visible object has its rear portion apprehended because its front portion which is connected with the rear one is apprehended. It follows from this that an object which has one portion perceptible contains another portion also. Objects like *ghata, pata* etc., must contain rear portions since their front ones are easily apprehended.

Again, the idea of the foremost part from the successive front portions will not fit your *anumāna*. As the rear part is *a-vidyamāna*, the inference of foremost part being so is absolutely improper. Really speaking, the front part is perceptible in this case, and the inference of rear portion being *vidyamāna* is correct.

Again,

सव्वाभावे वि कओ आरा-पर-मज्झभागनाणत्तं ।
अह परमईए भण्णइ स-परमइविसेसणं कत्तो ? ॥१९३॥ (१७४१)

आर-पर-मज्झभागा पडिवण्णा जइ न सुण्णया नाम ।
अप्पडिवण्णेसु वि का विगप्पणा खरविसाणस्स ? ॥१९४॥(१७४२)

सव्वाभावे वाराभागो किं दीसए न परभागो ।
सव्वागहणं व न किं किं वा न विवज्जओ होइ ? ॥१९५॥(१७४३)

Savvābhāve vi kao ārā-para-majjhabhāganānattam ।
Aha paramaîe bhaṇṇai sa-paramaivisesanam katto ? ॥193॥ (1741)

Āra-para-majjhabhāgā padivaṇṇā jai na suṇṇayā nāma ।
Appaḍivaṇṇesu vi kā vigappanā kharavisāṇassa ? ॥ 194॥ (1742)

Savvābhāve vārābhāgo kim dîsae na parabhāgo ।
Savvāgahanam va na kim kim vā na vivajjao hoi ? ॥195॥ (1743)

[सर्वाभावेऽपि कुत आरात्-पर-मध्यभागनानात्वम् ।
अथ परमत्या भण्यते स्व-परमतिविशेषणं कुतः ? ॥१९३॥ (१७४१)

आरात्-पर-मध्यभागाः प्रतिपन्ना यदि न शून्यता नाम ।
अप्रतिपन्नेष्वपि का विकल्पना खरविषाणस्य ? ॥ १९४ ॥ (१७४२)

सर्वाभावे वाराद्भागः किं दृश्यते न परभागः ? ।
सर्वाग्रहणं च न किं किं वा न विपर्ययो भवति ? ॥१९५॥ (१७४३)

Sarvābhāve'pi kuta ārāt-para-madhyabhāganānātvam ।
Atha paramatyā bhaṇyate sva-paramativiśeṣaṇam kutaḥ ? ॥193॥]

Ārāt-para-madhyabhāgāḥ pratipannā yadi na śūnyatā nāma ।
Apratipanneṣvapi kā vikalpanā kharaviṣāṇasya ? ॥194॥(1742)]

Sarvābhāve vārādbhāgaḥ kim dṛiśyate na parabhāgaḥ ।
Sarvāgrahaṇam ca na kim kim vā na viparyayo bhavati ? ॥195॥]

Trans.—193–194–195 Even in the midst of all-pervading negation, how could the distinction between front, rear and

middle portions exist ? And if it is said so in the opinion of others, whence is the distinction between one's own opinion and another's opinion ? If the front, rear, and the middle portions are accepted as existing, there would be no *śūnyatā* at all. And, if they are not proved (to be existing) why alternatives about (non-existent objects like) *kharaviṣāṇa ?* Or, in the midst of the negation of all objects, why is the front portion apprehended and why not the rear one ? Or, why not absolute non-apprehension of both ? Or, why not the reverse (apprehension) also ? (1741–1743).

Also,

परभागदरिसणं वा फलिहाईणं ति ते धुवं संति ।
जइ वा ते वि न संता परभागादरिसणमहेऊ ? ॥१९६॥(१७४४)

सव्वादरिसणउ च्चिय न भण्णइ कीस, भणई तन्नाम ।
पुव्वब्भुवगयहाणी पच्चक्खविरोहओ चेव ॥ १९७ ॥ (१७४५)

Parabhāgadarisaṇam vā phalihāîṇam ti te dhuvam santi ।
Jai vā te vi na santā parbhāgadarisaṇa maheū ? ॥ 196 ॥ (1744)

Savvādarisaṇäu cciya na bhanṇaikîsa bhanai tannāma ।
Puvvabbhuvagayahāṇī paccakkhavirohao ceva ॥ 197 ॥ (1745)

[परभागदर्शनं वा स्फटिकादीनामिति ते ध्रुवं सन्ति ।
यदि वा तेऽपि न सन्तः परभागादर्शनमहेतुः ॥ १९६ ॥ (१७४४)

सर्वादर्शनत एव न भण्यते कस्मात्, भणति तन्नाम ।
पूर्वाभ्युपगतहानिः प्रत्यक्षविरोधतश्चैव ॥ १९७ ॥ (१७४५)

Parabhāgadarśanam vā sphatikādînāmiti te dhruvam santi ।
Yadi vā te'pi na santaḥ parabhāgādarśanamahetuḥ ॥196॥ (1744)]

Sarvādarśanata eva na bhaṇyate kasmāt, bhaṇati tannāma ।
Pūrvābhyugatahāṇih pratyaksavirodhataścaiva ॥ 197 ॥ (1745)]

Trans.—196–197 Or, since the rear portions of (objects

like) crystal etc. are seen, they exist without doubt. And, if they, too, do not exist (according to you), the proposition will fail, as the rear portion will not be seen. Why is the reason–that nothing could be seen–not stated ? If it is stated, the proposition (which is) accepted before, will (constitute) direct contradiction. (1744–1745)

टीका–ननु येषां स्फटिका-ऽभ्रपटलादीनां भावानां परभागदर्शनमस्ति ते तावद् ध्रुवं सन्त्येव, इति " परभागादर्शनात् " इत्यनेन हेतुना सर्वभावानामसत्त्वं न सिध्यति। अथ स्फटिकादयोऽपि न सन्ति तर्हि " परभागादर्शनात् " इत्ययमहेतुः, त्वदभिप्रेतस्य सर्वभावासत्त्वस्यासाधकत्वात् । अतोऽव्यापकमसुं हेतुं परित्यज्य " सर्वादर्शनाद् न सन्ति भावाः " इत्ययमेव व्यापको हेतुः कस्माद् न भण्यते ? । ' भणइ तन्नाम त्ति ' अत्र पर उत्तरं भणति । किम् ? इत्याह–तन्नामास्तु " सर्वादर्शनात् " इति–अयं हेतुस्तर्हि भवत्वित्यर्थः, यथा तथा शून्यतैवास्माभिः साधयितव्या, सा च "सर्वादर्शनात्" इत्यनेनापि हेतुना सिध्यतु, किमनेनाऽऽग्रहेणास्माकम् ? इति भावः। अथ सूरिराह–" पुव्वेत्यादि " नन्विदानीं " सर्वादर्शनात् " इति ब्रुवतो भवतः " परभागादरिसणओ " इति पूर्वाभ्युपगतस्य हानिः प्राप्नोति। किञ्च, ग्राम–नगर–सरित्–समुद्र–घट–पटादीनां प्रत्यक्षेणैव दर्शनात् सर्वादर्शनलक्षणस्य हेतोः प्रत्यक्षविरोधः । ततः प्रत्यक्षविरोधतश्च " सर्वादर्शनात् " इत्येतदयुक्तमिति ।

अत्र कश्चिदाह–ननु सपक्षस्य सर्वस्याव्यापकोऽपि विपक्षात् सर्वथा निवृत्तो हेतुरिष्यत एव; यथा "अनित्यः शब्दः प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वात् इति, न ह्यनित्योऽर्थः सर्वोऽपि प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकः विद्युद्–घन–कुसुमादिभिर्व्यभिचारात्; तद्वदिहापि यद्यपि सर्वेष्वपि भावेषु परभागादर्शनं नास्ति, यथापि बहुषु तावदस्ति, अतस्तेषु शून्यतां साधयन्नसौ सम्यग् हेतुर्भविष्यति । तदयुक्तम्, यतस्तत्र " यदनित्यं न भवति तत् प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकमपि न भवति, यथाऽऽकाशम् " इत्येवं व्यतिरेकः सिध्यति; इह तु यत्र शून्यता नास्ति, किं तर्हि ? वस्तुनः सत्त्वम्, परभागादर्शनमपि तत्र नास्ति,

किन्तु परभागदर्शनम्, यथा क्व ? इति भवतः सर्वासद्वादिनो व्यतिरेकः क्वचिदपि न सिध्यति, अतोऽहेतुरेवायमिति ॥१९६-१९७ (१७४४-१७४५)॥

D. C.—Non-existence of each and every object could not be proved by virtue of the non-apprehension of rear parts. The rear portions of transparent objects like crystal and mica are apprehended. Existence of those objects has therefore undoubtedly been established. Consequently, non-apprehension of all objects can never be proved by means of the *hetu* that rear portions are not seen.

Here, again, if you contend that *sphatika* etc. also do not exist, your argument that rear portion is not seen will fail and hence be invalid, as the rear portions of those objects are clearly apprehended. In spite of this faulty argument, if you attempt to establish *s'ūnyatā* by means of a widely applicable statement that " Nothing could be proved to exist as nothing is perceived " then also, the previous *hetu* that rear part could not be seen, would be violated. Secondly, since village, town, river, sea, *ghaṭa*, *paṭa* etc. are directly apprehensible, and hence the *hetu* will be evidently invalid in that way also.

The opponent may contend again, that a reason which is not applicable to all the instances on the same side can be called a logical reason if it is absolutely inapplicable to the opposite side. *e. g.*, *s'abda* is *a-nitya* because it is not produced without effort. But this does not mean that all *a-nitya* objects could not be produced without effort. Because objects like lightning, cloud etc. though produced without effort are *a-nitya*. Similarly, here also, rear parts of all the objects are not non-apprehensible but as the rear parts of several objects are not apprehensible, this *hetu* leads us to prove *s'ūnyatā* in them and that is why it is called a correct or logical reason !

But, that is not proper. *O Vyakta !* In the *hetu* mentioned above, pervasion of difference is found Take, for example, the

proposition that " That which is *a-nitya*, is like *ākāśa*, produced without effort. " If *vyatireka vyāpti* is applied in this case, nothing else but *vidyamānatā* of an object is inferred when *śūnyatā* is not found at all. Moreover, rear part is also apprehended in this case. So, *O sarvaśūnyatāvādin !* you shall never be able to obtain the *vyatireka vyāpti*. Your *hetu* will, therefore, not remain as a *hetu* at all.

नत्थि पर-मज्झभागा अपच्चक्खत्तओ मई होज्जा ।
नणु अक्ख-त्थावत्ती अपच्चक्खत्तहाणी वा ॥ १९८ ॥ (१७४६)

Natthi para-majjhabhāgā apaccakkhattao maî hojjā ।
Naṇu akkha-tthāvattî apaccakkhattahāṇî vā ॥ 198 ॥ (1746)

[न स्तः पर-मध्यभागावप्रत्यक्षत्वतो मतिर्भवेत् ।
नन्वक्षा-ऽर्थापत्तिरप्रत्यक्षत्वहानिर्वा ॥ १९८ ॥ (१७४६)

Na staḥ para-madhyabhāgāvapratyakṣatvato mati r-bhavet ।
Nanvakṣā'rthāpattirapratyakṣatvahānirvā ॥ 198 ॥ (1746)]

Trans.—198 If the rear, as well as, middle portions (of an object) are accepted as non-existent on account of their imperceptibility, then either there will be perception of sense-organs, as well as, the objects or imperceptibility (itself) will be violated. (1746)

टीका—अथ स्यान्मतिः—पर-मध्यभागौ न स्तः, अप्रत्यक्षत्वात्, खरविषाणवत् । तदसत्त्वे च तदपेक्षया निर्दिश्यमान आराद्भागोऽपि नास्ति, अतः सर्वशून्यतेत्यभिप्रायः । तदयुक्तम्, यतः—"अक्षमक्षमिन्द्रियमिन्द्रियं प्रति वर्तत इति प्रत्यक्षोऽर्थः, न प्रत्यक्षोऽप्रत्यक्षः. तद्भावोऽप्रत्यक्षत्वम्, तस्मादप्रत्यक्षत्वात्" इत्युच्यमाने नन्वक्षाणामर्थस्य चाऽऽपत्तिः सता प्राप्नोति, तदापत्तौ च शून्यताभ्युपगमहानिः । शून्यतायां वाऽप्रत्यक्षत्वलक्षणस्य हेतोर्हानिः, अक्षा-ऽर्थानामभावे प्रत्यक्षा-ऽप्रत्यक्षव्यपदेशानुपपतेरिति भावः ॥ १९८ ॥ (१७४६) ॥

D. C.—Vyakta:—The rear as well as the middle portions of an object do not exist, because they are imperceptible like *kharaviṣāṇa.* The front parts will also not exist in that case, because their existence depends upon the existence of the rear ones. This will ultimately lead to the idea of *sarvas'ūnyatā.*

Bhagavān:—The argument is not valid. *Pratyakṣa* means existing at each of the sense-organs. So, when the *hetu* of *a-pratpakṣatva* is advanced, there would be apprehension of sense-organs as well as the objects to be apprehended, and in their apprehension, *s'ūnyatā* would never be accepted. For, if *s'ūnyatā* is taken along with the *hetu* of *a-pratyakṣatva,* the *hetu* itself will prove invalid. Or, say in absence of *indriya* and *artha,* the practical usage or *pratyakṣa* and *a-pratyaksa* would never be possible.

Moreover,

अत्थि अपच्चक्खं पि हु जह भवओ संसयाइविन्नाणं ।
अह नत्थि सुण्णया का कास व केणोवलद्धा वा ? ॥१९९॥(१७४७)

Atthi apaccakkham pi hu jaha bhavao samsayāivinnānam ।
Aha natthi suṇṇayā kā kāsa va keṇovaladdhā vā ? ॥199॥ (1747)

[अस्त्यप्रत्यक्षमपि खलु यथा भवतः संशयादिविज्ञानम् ।
अथ नास्ति शून्यता का कस्य वा केनोपलब्धा वा ? ॥१९९॥(१७४७)

Astyapratyakṣampi khalu yathā bhavataḥ saṁśayādivijñānam ।
Atha nāsti śūnyatā kā kasya vā kenopalabdhā vā ? ॥199॥ (1747)]

Trans.—199 Some object does exist in spite of its being imperceptible, just as your apprehension of doubt etc. exist, even though it is imperceptible (to others). And if that (doubt) does not exist, what is that *śūnyatā?* Whose *śūnyatā* (is that) ? And who has apprehended it ? (1747)

टीका–नन्वप्रत्यक्षमप्यस्ति किञ्चिद् वस्तु, यथा भवतः संशयादि-विज्ञानमन्येषामप्रत्यक्षमप्यस्ति, ततो यथैतत्, तथा पर-मध्यभागावप्रत्यक्षौ

भविष्यत इत्यनैकान्तिको हेतुः। अथ भवत्संशयादिविज्ञानमपि नास्ति, तर्हि का नाम शून्यता ? कस्य वाऽसौ ? केन वोपलब्धा ? भवत एवेह तत्र किल संशयः, स चेद् नास्ति, तर्हि कस्यान्यस्य ग्राम-नगरादिसत्त्वे विप्रतिपत्तिः ? इति भावः ॥ १९९ ॥ (१७४७) ॥

D. C.—Just as, your apprehension of doubt etc. exists, even though it is not perceptible to others, in the same way, there are some objects which exist, in spite of their imperceptibility. Middle and rear portions of such objects do exist in spite of their *a-pratyakṣatva*. Your *hetu* will, therefore, involve the fault of *anaikāntikatva*, since it has been applicable to more than one object.

Again, if your apprehension of doubt etc., does not exist, what would be *śūnyatā* then ? To whom does that *śūnyatā* belong ? And, who has apprehended that *śūnyatā* ? The doubt, therefore, must exist. Otherwise, who else will raise the doubt about the existence of *vidyamāna* objects like village, town, etc. ?

After refuting the idea of *śūnyatā*, the *Bhagavān* now tries to establish the existence of elements like *prithvi* etc. in the following way :—

पच्चक्खेसु न जुत्तो तुह भूमि-जला-ऽनलेसु संदेहो ।
अनिलाऽऽगासेसु भवे सोऽवि न जुत्तोऽणुमाणाओ ॥ २०० ॥

Paccakkhesu na jutto tuha bhūmi-jalā'-nalesu samdeho ।
Anilā-"gāsesu bhave so'vi na jutto'ṇumāṇāo ॥ 200 ॥ (1748)

[प्रत्यक्षेषु न युक्तस्तव भूमि-जला-ऽनलेषु संदेहः ।
अनिला-ऽऽकाशयोर्भवेत् सोऽपि न युक्तोऽनुमानात् ॥ २०० ॥ (१७४८)

Pratyakṣesu na yuktastava bhūmi-jalā-'naleṣu saṃdehaḥ ।
Anilā-"kāśayor-bhavet so'pi na yukto'numānāt ॥ 200 ॥ (1748)]

Trans.—200 Your doubt about the objects like earth, water, and fire, is not proper, because they are (directly) per-

ceptible (to the senses). That (doubt) is out of place in the case of wind as well as sky also by virtue of *anumāna.* (1748)

टीका–तस्माद् भूमि–जल–वह्निषु प्रत्यक्षेषु तव सौम्य ! संशयो न युक्तः, यथा स्वस्वरूपे । तथा, अनिलोऽपि प्रत्यक्ष एव, गुणप्रत्यक्षत्वात्, घटवत्, ततस्तत्रापि न संशयो युक्तः । भवतु वा, अनिल–ऽऽकाशयोरप्रत्यक्षत्वेन संशयः, तथाऽप्यसौ न युक्तः, अनुमानसिद्धत्वात् तयोरिति ॥२००॥ (१७४८) ॥

D. C—Just as, in the case of your own body, you cannot raise doubt, so in the case of *pratyakṣa* objects such as *bhūmi* (earth), *jala* (water), and *anala* (fire) also you should not raise doubt. Moreover, you cannot entertain doubt about *vāyu* (wind), and *ākāś'a* (space), also because they are established by means of *anumāna.*

Here is the *anumāna* about wind,

अत्थि अदिस्सापाइयफरिसणाईणं गुणी गुणत्तणओ ।
रूवस्स घडो व्व गुणी जो तेसिं सोऽनिलो नाम ॥२०१॥(१७४९)

Atthi adisāpāiyapharisaṇāînam guṇî guṇattaṇao ।
Rūvassa ghaḍo vva guṇi jo tesim so'nilo nāma ॥ 201 ॥ (1749)

[अस्त्यदृश्यापादितस्पर्शनादीनां गुणी गुणत्वतः ।
रूपस्य घट इव गुणी यस्तेषां सोऽनिलो नाम ॥ २०१ ॥ (१७४९)

Astyadriśyāpāditasparśanādînām guṇî guṇatvataḥ ।
Rūpasya ghaṭa iva guṇî yasteṣām so'nilo nāma ॥201॥ (1749)]

Trans.—201 Just as *ghaṭa* is the object possessing the the property of *rūpa,* wind is said to be (an element) consisting of properties, like a sense of touch, etc. produced by some invisible (force). (1749)

टीका–य एतेऽदृश्येन केनाप्यापादिता जनिताः स्पर्शादयस्ते विद्यमानगुणिनः, गुणत्वात्, आदि शब्दाच्छब्द–स्वास्थ्य–कम्पा गृह्यन्ते, एतेऽपि

हि वायुप्रभवाद् वायुगुणा एव, इह ये गुणास्ते विद्यमानगुणिनो दृष्टाः, यथा घट-रूपादयः, यश्चैषां स्पर्श-शब्द-स्वास्थ्य-कम्पानां गुणी स वायुः तस्मादस्त्यसाविति ॥ २०१ ॥ (१७४९) ॥

D. C.—Properties like *spars'a, s'abda, svāsthya* and *kampā* are produced by means of some invisible force. Now, since these properties appear as existing in *vāyu* (wind), *vāyu* is said to possess those properties, just as *ghaṭa,* possesses the property of *rūpa.*

The *anumāna* to establish *ākās'a* is this :—

अत्थि वसुहाइभाणं तोयस्स घडो व्व मुत्तिमत्ताओ ।
जं भूयाणं भाणं तं वोमं वत्त ! सुव्वत्तं ॥ २०२ ॥ (१७५०)

Atthi vasuhāibhāṇam toyassa ghaḍo vva muttimattāo ।
Jam bhūyāṇam bhāṇam tam vomam Vatta ! suvvattam ॥ 202 ॥

[अस्ति वसुधादिभाजनं तोयस्य घट इव मूर्तिमत्त्वात् ।
यद् भूतानां भाजनं तद् व्योम व्यक्त ! सुव्यक्तम् ॥ २०२ ॥ (१७५०)

Asti vasudhādibhājanam toyasya ghaṭa iva mūrtimattvāt ।
Yad bhūtānām bhājanam tad vyoma Vyakta ! suvyaktam ॥202॥]

Trans.—202 Just as *ghaṭa* becomes the receptacle of of water, so there is a receptacle for earth etc. also. The receptacle of (those) elements is nothing but *ākāśa.* (1750)

टीका-अस्ति वसुधा-जला-ऽनल-वायूनां भाजनमाधारः, मूर्तिमत्त्वात्, तोयस्य घटवत्, यच्च तेषां भाजनं, तदायुष्मन् व्यक्त ! सुव्यक्तं व्योमेति । यदि च साध्यैकदेशतां दृष्टान्तस्य कश्चित् प्रेरयति, तदेत्थं प्रयोगः-विद्यमानभाजना पृथिवी, मूर्तत्वात्, तोयवत्; तथा, आपः, तेजोवत्; तेजश्च वायुवत्, वायुश्च पृथिवीवदिति ॥ २०२ ॥ (१७५०)

D. C.—Earth, water, fire, and wind have their *ādhāras* of the type of the *ghaṭa* full of water on account of their being corporeal. This *ādhāra, O Vyakta !* is well known as *ākās'a.* Since *prithvî*

has its *bhājana vidyamāna* on account of its *mūrtatva* like water, water has also the *bhājana* same as that of fire, and the fire in turn has the one similar to that of wind, which ultimately will have the same one as *prithvî*.

Having established the existence of all the five elements the *Ācārya* now concludes :—

एवं पच्चक्खाइपमाणसिद्धाइं सोम्म ! पडिवज्ज ।
जीव-सरीराहारोवओगधम्माइं भूयाइं ॥ २०३ ॥ (१७५१)

Evam paccakkhāipamāṇasiddhāim somma ! paḍivajja ।
Jîva-sarîrāhāravaogadhammāim bhūyāim ॥ 203 ॥ (1757)

[एवं प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणसिद्धानि सौम्य ! प्रतिपद्यस्व ।
जीव-शरीराधारोपयोगधर्माणि भूतानि ॥ २०३ ॥ (१७५१)

Evam pratyakṣādipramāṇasiddhāni saumya ! pratipadyasva ।
Jîva-śarîrādhāropayogadharmāṇi bhūtāni ॥ 203 ॥ (1751)]

Trans.—203 So, *O Saumya !* accept those *bhūtas* that have *jîva* and *śarîra* as their *ādhāras* along with the property of common usage to have been established by means of evidences such as those perceptible by senses etc.

Now, the *bhūtas* are established as animate in this way:—

किह सजीवाइं मई तल्लिङ्गाओऽनिलावसाणाइं ।
वोमं विमुत्तिभावादाधारो चेव न सजीवं ॥ २०४ ॥ (१७५२)

Kiha sajîvāim maî talliṅgāo'nilāvasāṇāim ।
Vomam vimûttibhāvādādhāro ceva na sa-jîvam ॥ 204 ॥ (1752)

[कथं सजीवानि मतिस्तल्लिङ्गादनिलावसानानि ।
व्योम विमूर्तिभावादाधार एव न सजीवम् ॥ २०४ ॥ (१७५२)

Katham sa-jîvāni matistalliṅgādanilāvasānāni ।
Vyoma vimūrtibhāvādādhāra eva na sa-jîvam ॥ 204 ॥ (1752)]

Trans.—204 (The opponent may ask) How are they animate ? (The answer is)—*Bhūtas* ending at *vāyu* are animate on account of (their possessing) that characteristic. The sky being incorporeal by itself is merely a support (and hence) it is not animate.

टीका–कथं पुनः सह जीवेन वर्तन्त इति सजीवानि भूतानि ? इति परस्य मतिः स्यात्। अत्रोच्यते–तस्य जीवस्य लिङ्गं तल्लिङ्गं तस्मात् तदुपलब्धेरित्यर्थः, सचेतनान्यनिलावसानानि चत्वारि भूतानि। व्योम–आकाशं पुनर्विगतमूर्तिभावमाधार एव, न तु सजीवमिति ॥ २०४ ॥ (१७५२)

D. C.—Vyakta :—How are the *bhūtas sajîva* as they exist along with *jîva ?*

The *Ācārya :—Prithvî, jala, agni,* and *vāyu* are *sa–jîva* because they possess the characteristics of *jîva.* But the sky is not *sa–jîva* since it is *a–mūrta* and hence it acts merely as an *ādhāra.*

The living characteristic of *prithvî* can be laid down as follows :—

जम्म–जरा–जीवण–मरण–रोहणा–हार–दोहला–मयओ।
रोग–तिगिच्छाईहि य नारि व्व सचेयणा तरवो ॥२०५॥(१७५३)

Jamma–jarā–jîvaṇa–maraṇa–rohaṇā–hāra–dohalā–mayao ।
Roga–tigicchāîhi ya nāri vva sa–ceyaṇā taravo ॥ 205 ॥ (1753)

[जन्म–जरा–जीवन–मरण–रोहणा–ऽऽहार–दौहृदा–ऽऽमयतः।
रोग–चिकित्सादिभिश्च नारीव सचेतनास्तरवः ॥ २०५ ॥ (१७५३)

Janma–jarā–jîvana–maraṇa–rohaṇā–"hāra–dauhrudā–"mayataḥ ।
Roga–cikitsādibhiśca nārîva sa–cetanastaravaḥ ॥ 205 ॥ (1753)]

Trans.—205 Trees like woman are living (beings) by reason of (their having) birth, old age, life, death, growth, hunger, desire, disease and its diagnosis etc.

टीका–" सचेतनास्तरवः " इति प्रतिज्ञा । " जन्म–जरा–जीवन–मरण–क्षतसंरोहणा–ऽऽहार–दौहृदा–ऽऽमय–तच्चिकित्सादिसद्भावात् " इति हेतुः । " नारीवत् " इति दृष्टान्तः । आह–नन्वनैकान्तिकोऽयम्, अचेतनेष्वपि जन्मादिव्यपदेशदर्शनात्; तथाहि–" जातं तद् दधि" इति व्यपदिश्यते, न चैतत् सचेतनम्; तथा, " जीवितं विषम् " " मृतं कुसुम्भकम् " इत्यादि । अत्रोच्यते–वनस्पतौ सर्वाण्यपि सचेतनलिङ्गानि जन्मादीन्युपलभ्यन्ते, अतो मनुष्येष्विव तानि तेषु निरुपचरितानि, दध्यादौ तु प्रतिनियत एव कश्चिज्जातादिव्यपदेशो दृश्यते, स चौपचारिक एव–जातमिव जातं दधि, मृतमिव मृतं कुसुम्भकमित्यादि ॥ २०५ ॥ (१७५३)

D. C.—Trees are *sa–cetana* like woman. Because, like woman, they possess the living characteristics such as *janma–jarā–jīvana–maraṇa* etc. Some one might argue that this rule could be applied to the lifeless objects also. Because, several characteristics like life, death, etc. are very well applied to the lifeless objects as well, when it is said that " curds is produced " or " (effect of) that poison is still alive " or (intoxication of) safflower† is dead " and so on even though the objects mentioned there–in, are lifeless.

The argument mentioned above is not justified since all the characteristics of *cetana* are residing in the animate objects as their innate qualities. But in the case of lifeless objects, those characteristics are rarely applied and that too in a particular sense and not as a rule.

छिक्कपरोइया छिक्कमेत्तसंकोयओ कुलिंगो व ।
आसयसंचारओ वियत्त ! वल्लीवियाणाइं ॥२०६॥ (१७५४)

सम्मादओ य साव–प्पबोह–संकायणाइओऽभिमया ।
बउलादओ य सद्दाइविसयकालोवलंभाओ ॥२०७॥ (१७५५)

† Popularly known as *Kasumbā* in *Kāṭhiāwār*.

Chikkaparoiyā chikkamettasankoyao kulingo vva ।
Āsayasancārāo Viyatta ! vallivıyāṇāim ॥ 206 ॥ (1754)

Śammādao ya sāva-ppaboha-sankoyaṇāio'bhimayā ।
Baulādao ya saddāivisayakālovalambhāo ॥ 207 ॥ (1755)

[स्पृष्टप्ररोदिकाः स्पृष्टमात्रसंकोचतः कुलिङ्ग इव ।
आश्रयसंचाराद् व्यक्त ! वल्लीवितानानि ॥ २०६ ॥ (१७५४)

शम्यादयश्च स्वाप-प्रबोध-संकोचनादितोऽभिमताः ।
बकुलादयश्च शब्दादिविषयकालोपलम्भात् ॥ २०७ ॥ (१७५५)

Spriṣtprarodikāḥ spriṣtamātrasankocanataḥ kuliṅga iva ।
Āśrayasancārād Vyakta ! vallīvitānāni ॥ 206 ॥ (1754)]

Śamyādayaśca svāpa-prabodha-sankocanādito'bhimataḥ ।
Bakulādayaśca śabdādiviṣaya kālopalambhāt ॥ 207 ॥ (1755)]

Trans.—206-207 For, sensitive plants *O Vyakta !* contract themselves like worm at the touch (of others); clusters of creepers spread themselves for support; *śami* etc. are supposed to contain the properties of sleeping, waking, contraction, etc and *bakula* etc. contain the properties like *śabda* etc. and (the order of) time also. (1754-1755)

टीका-सचेतनाः स्पृष्टप्ररोदिकादयो वनस्पतयः, स्पृष्टमात्रसंकोचात्, कुलिङ्गः कीटादिस्तद्वत् । तथा, सचेतना वल्ल्यादयः, स्वरक्षार्थं वृत्ति-वृक्ष-वरण्डकाद्याश्रयं प्रति संचरणात् । तथा, शम्यादयश्चेतनत्वेनाभिमताः, स्वाप-प्रबोध-संकोचादिमत्त्वात्, देवदत्तवत् । तथा, सचेतना बकुला-ऽशोक-कुरुबक-विरहक-चम्पक-तिलकादयः, शब्दादिविषयकालोपलम्भात्-शब्द-रूप-गन्ध-रस-स्पर्शविषयाणां काले प्रस्ताव उपभोगस्य यथासंख्यमुपलम्भादित्यर्थः, यज्ञदत्तवदिति । एवं पूर्वमपि दौहृदादिलिङ्गेषु कूष्माण्डी-बीजपूरकादयो वनस्पतिविशेषाः पक्षीकर्तव्या इति ॥ २०६-२०७ ॥ (१७५४-१७५५)॥

D. C.—Plants like *spars'aprarodikā* contract themselves like worm at a slight touch, and hence they are *sa-cetana.*

So are the creepers spreading over a wall, tree or fence, for self-protection. *Sami* etc. are also *sa-cetana*, since they have the tendency to sleep, wake, or feel shy like *Devadatta*. Trees like *bakula*, *as'oka*, *kurabaka*, *viharaka*, *campaka*, *tilaka* etc., are respectively able to feel the sensations of *s'abda*, *rūpa*, *rasa*, *gandha*, *spars'a* etc. Plants like *kusmāṇḍî* and *bîjapuraka* feel the longing of a pregnant woman. It is clear, therefore, that *vanaspati* is *sa-cetana*.

Moreover,

मंसंकुरो व्व सामाणजाइरूवंकुरोवलंभाओ ।
तरुगण-विद्दुम-लवणो-वलादओ सासयावत्था ॥२०८॥(१७५६)

Mansankuro vva sāmāṇajāi-rūvamkurovalambhāo ।
Tarugaṇa-vidduma-lavaṇo-valādao sāsayāvatthā. ॥ 208 ॥ (1756)

[मांसाङ्कुर इव समानजातिरूपाङ्कुरोपलम्भात् ।
तरुगण-विद्रुम-लवणो-पलादयः स्वाश्रयावस्थाः ॥ २०८ ॥ (१७५६)

Mānsāṅkura iva samānajātirūpāṅkuropalambhāt ।
Tarugaṇa-vidruma-lavaṇo-palādayaḥ svāśrayāvasthāh॥208॥(1756)]

Trans.—208 Trees, corals, salts, and stones etc. (are alive) at their own places of production by reason of their having a sprout in the form of common generality, similar to the sprout of flesh (1756)

टीका-तरुगणः, तथा विद्रुम-लवणो-पलादयश्च स्वाश्रयावस्था स्वजन्मस्थानगताः सन्तश्चेतनाः, छिन्नानामप्यमीषां पुनस्तत्स्थान एव समानजातीयाङ्कुरोत्थानात्, अर्शोमांसाङ्कुरवत। आह-ननु पृथिव्यादिभूतानामिह सचेतनत्वं साधयितुमारब्धम्, ततः पृथिव्या एवादौ तत् साधयितुं युक्तम्, तस्या एवादावुपन्यासात्, तत्किमिति " जम्म-जरा-जीवण " इत्यादिना तरूणामेवादौ तत् साधितम्, पश्चात्तु विद्रुम-लवणो-पलादीनामिति ? । सत्यम्, किन्तु पृथ्वीविकारतया पृथ्वीभूत एव तरूणामन्तर्भावो लोकप्रसिद्धः,

सुव्यक्तचैतन्यलिङ्गाश्च यथा तरवो न तथा लवणो-पल-जलादय इति तेषामेवादौ चैतन्यं साधितमिति ॥ २०८ ॥ (१७५६) ॥

D. C.—Trees, corals, salts, and stones etc, are *sa-cetana* at their own places of production. Because, the sprouts of these objects spring up again and again like the sprout of flesh springing up in the case of disease of piles etc.

Vyakta :—Really speaking, you had started to establish *sa-cetanatva* in the elements like *prithvî* etc. Then, what is the idea in proving *sa-cetanatva* first in the case of *vanaspati* and then in the case of *prithvî ?*

Bhagavāna :—Vanaspati is nothing but a form of *prithvî.* Hence, out of the five *bhūtas, vanaspati* resides only in *prithvî.* Moreover, the spirit of life is not so clearly manifested in stones etc. as it has been in case of *vanaspati.* For this reason *O Vyakta ! Caitanya* is established first in *vanaspati* and then in *prithvî.*

Now, the *sa-cetanatva* of water is established—

भूमिक्खयसाभावियसंभवओ ददुरो व्व जलमुत्तं ।
अहवा मच्छो व्व सभाववोमसंभूयपायाओ ॥ २०९ ॥ (१७५७)

Bhūmikkhayasābhāviyasambhavao dadduro vva jalamuttam ।
Ahavā maccho va sabhāvavomasambhūyapāyāo ॥ 209 ॥ (1757)

[भूमिक्षतस्वाभाविकसंभवतो दर्दुर इव जलमुक्तम् ।
अथवा मत्स्य इव स्वभावव्योमसंभूतपातात् ॥ २०९ ॥ (१७५७)

Bhūmikṣatasvābhāvikasambhavato dardura iva jalamuktam ।
Athavā matsya iva svabhāvavyomasambhūtapātāt ॥ 209 ॥ (1757)]

Trans.—209 Water springing up naturally by digging the earth is said to be living like a frog; or, by reason of its falling naturally from the sky, water is living like a fish. (1757)

टीका–भौममम्भः सचेतनमुक्तम्, क्षतभूमिसजातीयस्वाभाविकस्य तस्य संभवात्, दर्दुरवत्। अथवा, सचेतनमन्तरिक्षमम्भः, अभ्रादिविकार-स्वभावसंभूतपातात्, मत्स्यवदिति ॥ २०९ ॥ (१७५७) ॥

D. C.—Water springing from earth when dug out of it, is *sa-cetana* like a frog; or, that which falls from the sky as natural rains, is also called *sa-cetana* since it comes from *vikāras* like cloud etc.

Fire, as well as, wind can also be taken as *sa-cetana* in this way :—

अपरप्पेरियतिरियानियमियदिग्गमणओऽणिलो गो व्व ।
अनलो आहाराओ विद्धि-विगारोवलम्भाओ ॥२१०॥ (१७५८)

Apprapperiyatiriyāniyamiya deggamaṇao'ṇilo go vva ।
Analo āhārāo viddhi-vigārova-lambhāo ॥ 210 ॥ (1758)

[अपरप्रेरिततिर्यगनियमितदिग्गमनतोऽनिलो गौरिव ।
अनल आहाराद् वृद्धि-विकारोपलम्भात् ॥ २१० ॥ (१७५८)

Aparapreritatiryganiyamitadiggamanato'nilo gauriva ।
Anala āhārād vriddhi-vikāropalambhāt ॥ 210 ॥ (1758)]

Trans.—210 Wind is (alive) like a cow on account of its moving to and fro in various directions without being impelled by others. Fire (is *sa-cetana*) because it has attained growth as well as variety of forms by means of food. (1758)

टीका–सात्मको वायुः, अपरप्रेरिततिर्यगनियमितदिग्गमनात्, गोवत्। यथा, सात्मकं तेजः, आहारोपादानात्, तद्वृद्धौ विकारविशेषोपलम्भाच्च, नरवत्। गाथाबन्धानुलोम्याच्च, नरवत्। गाथाबन्धानुलोम्याच्च व्यत्ययेनोपन्यास इति ॥ २१० ॥ (१७५८)

D. C.—Wind has life as it moves in all directions without the help of any external agency. Fire is also *sa-jîva* as it is able to grow and manifest various forms by the help of *āhāra*.

तणवोऽणब्भाइविगारमुत्तजाइत्तओऽणिलंताइं ।
सत्थासत्थहयाओ निज्जीव–सजीवरूवाओ ॥ २११ ॥ (१७५९)

Taṇavo'ṇabbhāivigaramuttajāittao'ṇilantāim ।
Satthāsatthahayāo nijjīva–sa–jīvarūvāo ॥ 211 ॥ (1759)

[तनवोऽनभ्रादिविकारमूर्तजातित्वतोऽनिलान्तानि ।
शस्त्रा–ऽशस्त्रहता निर्जीव–सजीवरूपाः ॥ २११ ॥ (१७५९)

Tanavo'nabhrādivikāramūrtajātitvato'nilāntāni ।
Śastrā–śastrahatā nirjīva–sa–jīva rūpaḥ ॥ 211 ॥ (1759)]

Trans.—211 Bodies (made of the four *bhūtas*) ending at *vāyu* though different from forms like clouds etc. become lifeless when smashed by weapons and alive when free from weapons on account of their corporeal form. (1759)

टीका–पृथिव्याद्यनिलान्तानि चत्वारि भूतानि जीवनिर्वर्तितास्तदाधारभूतास्तनव इति प्रतिज्ञा, अभ्रादिविकारादन्यत्वे सति मूर्तजातित्वात्, गवादिशरीरवत् । अभ्रादिविकारस्तु विस्रसापरिणतपुद्गलसंघातरूपत्वेनाचेतनत्वाद् वर्जितः । ताश्च पृथिव्यादितनवः शस्त्रोपहता निर्जीवाः, अशस्त्रोपहतास्तु सजीवा वर्ण–गन्ध–रसादिलक्षणतः समवसेया इति ॥ २११ ॥ (१७५९)

D. C.—Objects made of *bhūtas* like *pṛithvî jala, tejas*, and *vāyu* are distinguished from objects like clouds etc. on account of their definite corporeal forms. Hence, these bodies are alive when free from the attack of any weapon, but they at once become lifeless when smashed by weapons.

Bhūtas like *pṛithvî* etc. can be proved as living in another way also :—

सिज्झंति सोम्म! बहुसो जीवा नवसत्तसंभवो नवि य ।
परिमियदेसो लोगो न संति चेगिंदिया जेसिं ॥२१२॥(१७६०)
ते सिं भवविच्छित्ती पावइ नेट्ठा य सा जओ तेण ।
सिद्धमणंता जीवा भूयाहारा य तेऽवस्सं ॥ २१३ ॥ (१७६१)

Sijjhanti Somma! bahuso jîvā navasattasambhavo navi ya।
Parimiyadeso logo na santi cegindiyā jesim ॥ 212 ॥ (1760)

Te sim bhavavicchittî pāvai neṭṭhā ya sā jao tena।
Siddhamaṇantā jîvā bhūyāhārā ya te'vassam ॥ 213 ॥ (1761)

[सिध्यन्ति सौम्य ! बहुशो जीवा नवसत्त्वसंभवो नापि च ।
परिमितदेशो लोको न सन्ति चैकेन्द्रियां येषाम् ॥ २१२ ॥ (१७६०)
तेषां भवविच्छित्तिः प्राप्नोति नेष्टा च सा यतस्तेन ।
सिद्धमननन्ता जीवा भूताधाराश्च तेऽवश्यम् ॥ २१३ ॥ (१७६१)

Sidhyanti Saumya ! bahuśo jîvā navasttvasambhavo nāpi ca ।
Parimitadeśo loko na santi caikendriyām yeṣām ॥212॥ (1760)]
Teṣām bhavavicchittiḥ prāpnoti ca sā yatastena ।
Siddhamanantā jîvā bhūtādhārāśca te'vaśyam ॥ 213 ॥ (1761)]

Trans.—212–213 Many a *jîvā, O Saumya !* attains *moksa* and there is no possibility of new *jîvas* (to be born). The world is limited. So, those according to whom, plants *etc.* do not exist, will have the whole mundane world destroyed. But (*ca*) that is not desirable. Hence it is definitely proved that they (*i. e.* plants *etc*) are the endless *jîvas* with *bhūtas* as their supports (1760–1761)

टीका–सिध्यन्ति मुक्तिं यान्ति तावदजस्रं बहुशो जीवा, न च नवसत्त्वोत्पादः केनापीष्यते, परिमितदेशश्च लोकः, ततस्तदाधाराः स्थूलाः स्तोका एव जीवा घटन्ते। एवं च सति येषां मतेन वनस्पत्यादय एकेन्द्रिया जीवा न सन्ति, तेषां भवस्य संसारस्य व्यवच्छित्तिः प्राप्नोति । न चासौ कस्यापि तीर्थान्तरीयस्येष्टा यतः, तेन तस्मात् कारणात् सिद्धं सत्त्वानामानन्त्यम् । ते च संसारित्वादवश्यं भूताधाराः शरीरिण एवेत्यर्थः । न च वनस्पत्यादीनन्तरेणान्यत् तेषां शरीरमुपपद्यते । निवेद्यन्तां वा यच्छरीरास्ते, अभ्युपगम्यतां वा वनस्पत्यादीनां सात्मकत्वमिति भावः ॥ २१२–२१३ ॥ (१७६०–१७६१) ॥

D. C.—Since many *jîvas* attain *mokṣa* there is no possibi-

lity of new *sattvas* to be born. Moreover, this world is limited in space. It is natural, therefore, that there will be a small number of *jîvas* depending upon it. Under these circumstances, if one believes that plants etc. are not *sa-cetana*, the whole of the mundane world will have to cease existing in no time. But that is not desirable in any way. Hence, in order to account for the continuity of the mundane world, the continuity of the living beings is accepted. Now since all these *jîvas* are the mundane *jîvas*, they must have *bhūtas* as their *s'astras* (weapons) and since plants etc. are based on *bhūtas* they should also be undoubtedly taken as *sa-jîva*.

Now, the opponent's objection and its refutation—

एवमहिंसाभावो जीवघणं ति न य तं जओऽभिहिअं ।
सत्थोवहयमजीवं न य जीवघणं ति तो हिंसो ॥२१४॥(१७६२)

Evamahimsābhāvo jîvaghaṇam ti na ya tam jao'bhihiam ।
Satthovahayamajîvam na ya jîvaghaṇam ti to himso ॥214॥(1762)

[एवमहिंसाऽभावो जीवघनमिति न च तद् यतोऽभिहितम् ।
शस्त्रोपहतमजीवं न च जीवघनमिति ततो हिंसा ॥ २१४ ॥ (१७६२)

Evamahimsā'bhāvo jîvaghanamiti na ca tad yato'bhihitam ।
Śastropahatamajîvam na ca jîvaghanamiti tato himsā ॥214॥ (1762)]

Trans.—214 (The opponent may ask that) There is no possibility of *ahiṃsa* in that case on account of the statement that " (the world) is compact with *jivas*." (The reply is—) That is not so. It has already been said that one is rendered lifeless (only) when beaten by weapons. So, *hiṃsā* could never be derived merely from the statement that " (the world) is compact with *jîvas*." (1762)

टीका—नन्वेवं सति लोकस्यातीवपृथिव्यादिजीवघनत्वादहिंसाऽभावः, संयतैरप्यहिंसाव्रतमित्थं निर्वा हयितुमशक्यमिति भावः । तदेतद् न, यतोऽनन्तरमेवाभिहितमस्माभिः—" शस्त्रोपहतं पृथिव्यादिकमजीवं " भवति ।

तदजीवत्वे चाकृता-ऽकारितादिपरिभोगेन निर्वहत्येव यतीनां संयमः । न च "जीवघनो लोकः" इत्येतावन्मात्रेणैव हिंसा संभवतीति ॥२१४॥(१७६२)॥

D. C.—Vyakta :—If the world is packed with *jîvas* such as *prithvî* etc. even an ascetic will not be able to follow the vow of *ahimsā*, as they will least require food etc. which they would not obtain without *himsā*.

Bhagavāna :—For this, it has already been said *O Vyakta !* that *prithvî* etc. become lifeless when beaten by weapons. Thus, when they become *a-jiva* there is no objection for *yatis* to get their food from them. So, it is not proper to deduce *hiṃsā* merely from the statement that the world is full of *jîvas*.

Moreover,

न य घायउ त्ति हिंसो नाघायंतो त्ति निच्छियमहिंसो ।
न विरलजीवमहिंसो न य जीवघणं ति तो हिंसा ॥२१५॥(१७६३)

अहणंतो वि हु हिंसो दुट्ठत्तणओ मओ अहिमरो व ।
बाहिंतो न वि हिंसो सुद्धत्तणओ जहा विज्जो ॥२१६॥ (१७६४)

Na ya ghāyau tti himṣo nāghāyanto tti nicchiyamahimso ।
Na viralajîvamahimṣo na ya jîvaghaṇam ti to himṣo ॥215॥ (1763)

Ahaṇanto vi hu himṣo duṭṭhattaṇao mao ahimaro vva ।
Bāhinto na vi himso suddhattanao jahā vijjo ॥ 216 ॥ (1764)

[न च घातक इति हिंस्रो नाघ्नन्निति निश्चितमहिंस्रः ।
न विरलजीवमहिंस्रो न च जीवघनमिति ततोहिंस्रः ॥२१५॥ (१७६३)

अघ्नन्नपि खलु हिंस्रो दुष्टत्वतो मतोऽभिमर इव ।
बाधमानो नापि हिंस्रः शुद्धत्वतो यथा वैद्यः ॥ २१६ ॥ (१७६४)

Na ca ghātaka iti himṣro nāghnanniti niścitamahimṣraḥ ।
Na viralajîvamhimṣro na ca jîvaghananiti tato himṣraḥ ॥ 215 ॥]

Aghnannapi khalu himsro dustatvato mato'bhimara iva ।
Bādhamāno nāpi himsraḥ śuddhatvato yathā vaidyaḥ ॥216॥]

Trans.—215-216 One who is destructive, is not (necessarily) murderous, and one who is not destructive, is not certainly non-violent. Nor is one having little *jîva, a-himsaka* and one that is packed with *jîvas* accepted as *himsaka.* For, one is murderous, like a hunter, on account of his wicked motive even without killing; while another afflicting others with a good purpose, like a physician, is not murderous. (1763-1764).

टीका-न हि " घातकः " इत्येतावता हिंस्रः, न चाघ्नन्नपि निश्चयनयमतेनाहिंस्रः, नापि "विरलजीवम्" इत्येतावन्मात्रेणाहिंस्रः, न चापि "जीवघनम् " इत्येतावता च हिंस्र इति । किं तर्हि ? अभिमरो गजादिघातकः स इव दुष्टाध्यवसायोऽघ्नन्नपि हिंस्रो मतः । बाधमानोऽपि च शुद्धपरिणामो न हिंस्रो यथा वैद्यः, इति घ्नन्प्यहिंस्रः, अघ्नन्नपि च हिंस्र उक्तः ॥ २१५-२१६ ॥ (१७६३-१७६४) ॥

D. C.—The point is that one committing actual *himsā* is not *himsaka* because of his good motive as in the case of a physician, while another, not actually committing *himsā* but having wicked purpose, is *himsaka* like a hunter.

Also,

पंचसमिओ तिगुत्तो नाणी अविहिंसओ न विवरीओ ।
होउ व संपत्ती से मा वा जीवोवरोहेणं ॥ २१७ ॥ (१७६५)

Pancasamio tigutto nāṇî avihimsao na vivarîo ।
Höu va sampattî se mā vā jîvovaroheṇam ॥ 217 ॥ (1765)

[पञ्चसमितस्त्रिगुप्तो ज्ञान्यविहिंसको न विपरीतः ।
भवतु वा संपत्तिस्तस्य मा वा जीवोपरोधेन ॥ २१७ ॥ (१७६५)

Pancasamitastrigupto jñanyavihiṃsako na viparîtaḥ ।
Bhavatu vā saṃpattistasya mā vā jîvoparodhena ॥217॥ (1765)]

Trans.—217 A wise person, conversant with the five *samitis*† and guarded in three ways (*i. e.*, by mind, speech and body) is *a-hiṃsaka*, but not the one (having) contrary (characteristics). He may or may not attain the fulfilment (of) *hiṃsā* on account of obstruction to *jîvas*. (1765)

टीका–पञ्चभिः समितिभिः समितः, तिसृभिर्गुप्तिभिश्च गुप्तो ज्ञानी जीवस्वरूप–तद्रक्षाक्रियाभिज्ञः सर्वथा जीवरक्षापरिणामपरिणतः तत्प्रयतश्च कथमपि हिंसन्नप्यविहिंसको मतः । एतद्विपरीतलक्षणस्तु नाहिंसकः, किन्तु हिंस्र एवायम्, अशुभपरिणामत्वात् । बाह्यजीवहिंसायास्तु जीवोपरोधेन जीवस्य कीटादेरुपरोधेनोपघातेन संपत्तिर्भवतु, मा भूद् वा 'स' तस्य साध्वादेः, हिंसकत्वे तस्या अनैकान्तिकत्वादिति ॥ २१७ ॥ (१७६५) ॥

D. C.—A person conversant with all the five *samitis* and restraining himself in three ways—*manasā* (by mind) *vācasā* (by speech) and *karmaṇā* (by bodily actions)–is the *jñātā* of actual *jîvasvarūpa* and its protection. Such a person should be taken as *a-hiṃsaka* even if he commits *hiṃsā*. But one who is opposed to the nature of the above-mentioned *jñanî puruṣa*, is *hiṃsaka* as he brings about an *a-s'ubha parināma*. Fulfilment of *hiṃsā* may or may not be attained by him due to *jîvoparodha* or the (natural) obstruction to *jîvas*, but his *hiṃsakatva* is undoubtedly established on account of his bad intention and its inauspicious consequence as laid down below :—

असुभो जो परिणामो सा हिंसा सो उ बाहिरनिमित्तं ।
को वि अवेक्खेज्ज न वा जम्हाऽणेगंतियं बज्झं ॥२१८॥ (१७६६)

Asubho jo pariṇāmo sā himsā so u bāhiranimittam ।
Ko vi avekkhejja na vā jamhā'ṇegantiyam bajjham ॥218॥ (1766)

† Five *Jaina* rules of life.

[अशुभो यः परिणामः सा हिंसा स तु बाह्यनिमित्तम् ।
कोऽप्यपेक्षेत न वा यस्मादनैकान्तिकं बाह्यम् ॥ २१८ ॥ (१७६६)

Aśubho yaḥ pariṇāmaḥ sā himsā sa tu bāhyanimittam ।
Ko'pyapekṣeta na vā yasmādanaikāntikam bāhyam ॥218॥(1766)]

Trans.—218 What is (known as) inauspicious consequence is (itself) *himsā*. But that is an external cause. Some may or may not require (this cause), because the external (cause) is variable. (1766)

टीका–यस्मादिह निश्चयनयतो योऽशुभपरिणामः स एव " हिंसा " इत्याख्यायते । स च बाह्यसत्त्वातिपातक्रियालक्षणं निमित्तं कोऽप्यपेक्षते, कोऽपि पुनस्तन्निरपेक्षोऽपि भवेत्, यथा तन्दुलमत्स्यादीनाम्; तस्मादनैकान्तिकमेव बाह्यनिमित्तम्, तत्सद्भावेऽप्यहिंसकत्वात्, तदभावेऽपि च हिंसकत्वादिति ॥ २१८ ॥ (१७६६) ॥

D. C.—An action having inanspicious consequence is called *himsā*. This sort of *himsā* results from the *nimitta* of *jîvahimsā* while sometimes *himsā* results without the *apeksā* of those *nimittas* as in the case of *tandulamatsya*. As the *bāhya nimitta* is *anaikāntika*, an action is *himsaka* sometimes even in absence of *bāhya nimitta* and *a–himsaka* sometimes even in its own absence.

असुभपरिणामहेऊ जीवाबाहो त्ति तो मयं हिंसा ।
जस्स उ न सो निमित्तं संतो वि न तस्स सा हिंसा ॥२१९॥(१७६७)

Asubhapariṇāmaheū jîvābāho tti to mayam himsā ।
Jassa u na so nimittam santo vi na tassa sā himsā ॥219॥ (1767)

[अशुभपरिणामहेतुर्जीवाबाध इति ततो मतं हिंसा ।
यस्य तु न स निमित्तं सन्नपि न तस्य सा हिंसा ॥ २१९ ॥ (१७६७)

Aśubhapariṇāmahetu r–jîvābādha iti tato matam himsā ।
Yasya tu na sa nimittam sannapi na tasya sā himsā ॥219॥]

Trans.—219 Affliction of *jîvas* as a cause for an evil end is called *himsā*. That which has no such (end), has nothing like *himsā* even if cause is there. (1767)

टीका–ततस्तस्माद् यो जीवाबाधोऽशुभपरिणामस्य हेतुः, अथवा, अशुभपरिणामो हेतुः कारणं यस्यासावशुभपरिणामहेतुर्जीवाबाधो जीवघातः, स एव " हिंसा " इति मतं तीर्थंकर–गणधराणाम् । यस्य तु जीवाबाधस्य सोऽशुभपरिणामो न निमित्तं स जीवाबाधं सन्नपि तस्य साधोर्न हिंसेति ॥ २१९ ॥ (१७६७) ॥

D. C.—One who inflicts pain upon *jîvas* with an evil purpose is said to commit *himsā*; but one who has no such purpose does not commit *himsā* even if he inflicts pain upon *jîvas*.

सद्दादओ रइफला न वीयमोहस्स भावसुद्धीओ ।
जह, तह जीवाबाहो न सुद्धमणसो वि हिंसाए ॥२२०॥(१७६८)

Saddādao raiphalā na vîyamohassa bhāvasuddhīo ।
Jaha, taha jîvābāho na suddhamaṇaso vi himsāe ॥ 220 ॥ (1768)

[शब्दादयो रतिफला न वीतमोहस्य भावशुद्धेः ।
यथा, तथा जीवाबाधो न शुद्धमनसोऽपि हिंसायै ॥२२०॥(१७६८)

Śabdādayo ratiphalā na vîtamohasya bhāvaśuddheḥ ।
Yathā, tathā jîvābādho na śuddhamanaso'pi himsāyai ॥ 220 ॥]

Trans.—220 Just as *śabda* etc do not become the objects of pleasure to a dispassionate saint on account of the purity of (his) mind, affliction of *jîvas* too does not become the cause of *himsā* to a person having pure intention (1768)

टीका–यथेह वीतराग–द्वेष–मोहस्य भगवत इष्टाः शब्द–रूपादयो भावविशुद्धितो न कदाचिद् रतिफला रतिजनकाः संपद्यन्ते, यथा वेह शुद्धात्मनो रूपवत्यामपि मातरि न विषयाभिलाषः संजायते; तथा शुद्ध-परिणामस्य यत्नवतः साधोः सत्त्वोपघातोऽपि न हिंसायै संपद्यते । ततोऽ-

शुभपरिणामजनकत्वे बाह्यं निमित्तमनैकान्तिकमेवेति। तस्माद् व्यक्त! सन्ति पञ्चभूतानि, चेतनानि चाद्यानि चत्वारि, इत्येतत् प्रतीहीति स्थितम्। यच्च "स्वप्नोमयं वै सकलम्" इत्यादि। तत्रापि यस्तव चेतसि वर्तते नासावर्थः, किन्तु भवभयोद्विग्नानां भव्यसत्त्वानां धन-कनक-पुत्र-कलत्राद्यसारतामात्र-प्रतिपादनं तेन विधीयते, येन ते तदास्थां परित्यज्य मुक्तये प्रवर्तन्ते, न पुनस्तत्र भूताभावः प्रतिपाद्यते। इति मुञ्च संशयम्, प्रतिपद्यस्व भूतास्ति-त्वमिति ॥ २२० ॥ (१७६८)

D. C.—To a dispassionate saint, *s'abda, rūpa, rasa* etc. do not become the attractive objects of pleasure because his mind is pure. A pure-minded man does never cherish desire for sensuous pleasure from a beautiful mother. In the same way, a self-restrained and persevering *muni* does never commit *himsā* even if he inflicts pain upon *jîvas* on account of his *s'uddha bhāvas.* It is clear, therefore, that *bāhya nimitta* is *anaikāntika* so far as *himsā* is concerned, and what is required is the intention pure and simple.

Hence *O Bhadra!* accept the existence of the five *bhūtas* and know it for certain that the first four of them *viz, prithvî, jala, agni,* and *vāyu* are *sa-cetana.* Moreover, you have not understood the real meaning of the *Veda-padas* like "*Svano-pamam vai sakalam*" etc. The main object of those sentences is to assert the fragility of wealth, wife, progeny etc. before the high-minded people who have been distressed by the *bhavabhaya,* so that they might abandon their attachment to the worldly *visayas* and strive for the attainment of *moksa.* Leave, therefore, all your doubts aside, *O Saumya!* and admit the existence of *bhūtas.*

छिन्नम्मि संसयम्मि जिणेण जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं।
सो समणो पव्वइओ पंचहिं सह खंडियसएहिं ॥२२१॥ (१७६९)

Chinnammi samsayammi Jinena jarā-maranavippamukkenam।
So samano pavvaio pancahim saha khandiyasaehim ॥221॥ (1769)

[छिन्ने संशये जिनेन जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
स श्रमणः प्रव्रजितः पञ्चभिः सह खण्डिकशतैः ॥ २२१ ॥ (१७६९)

Chinne samśaye Jinena jarā-maraṇavipramuktena ।
Sa śramaṇaḥ pravrajitaḥ pancabhiḥ saha khaṇḍikaśataiḥ ॥221॥]

Trans.—221 When the doubt was removed by the *Tìrthaṅkara,* who was entirely free from old age, and death, the saint *Vyakta* accepted *dìksā* along with his five hundred pupils. (1769)

End of the Discussion with the Fourth Gaṇadhara.



Chapter V

पञ्चमगणधरवक्तव्यता ।

Discussion with the Fifth Gaṇadhara.

ते पव्वइए सोउं सुहुम आगच्छइ जिणसगासं ।
वच्चामि ण वंदामी वंदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ॥ २२२ ॥ (१७७०)

Te pavvaie söum Suhuma āgacchai Jiṇasagāsam ।
Vaccāmi ṇa vandāmî vandittā pajjuvāsāmi ॥ 222 ॥ (1770)

[तान् प्रव्रजितान् श्रुत्वा सुधर्म आगच्छति जिनसकाशम् ।
व्रजामि वन्दे वन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ॥ २२२ ॥ (१७७०)

Tān pravṛajitān śrutvā Sudharma āgacchati Jinsakāśam ।
Vrajāmi vande vanditvā paryupāse ॥ 222 ॥ (1770)]

Trans.—222 Having heard that they (*Vyakta* and others) had renounced the world, *Sudharman* comes before the *Tîrthaṅkara.* (He thinks :-) I may go, pay my homage, and worship him. (1770)

आभट्ठो य जिणेणं जाइ-जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
नामेण य गोत्तेण य सव्वण्णु सव्वदरिसी णं ॥ २२३ ॥ (१७७१)

Ābhaṭṭho ya Jiṇeṇam jāi-jarā-maraṇavippamukkenaṃ ।
Nāmeṇa ya gotteṇa ya savvaṇṇu savvadarisî ṇam ॥ 223 ॥ (1771)

आभाषितश्च जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ॥ २२३ ॥ (१७७१)

Ābhāṣitaśca Jinena jāti-jarā-maraṇavipramuktena |
Nāmnā ca gotreṇa ca sarvajñena sarvadarśinā ॥ 223 ॥ (1771)]

Trans.—223 He was addressed by his name, and gotra (lineage), by the *Tîrthankara* who was free from birth, old age, and death, who was all-knowing, and who had complete *darśana* (undifferentiated knowledge.) (1771)

किं मन्ने जारिसो इहभवम्मि सो तारिसो परभवे वि ।
वेयपयाण य अत्थं न याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो ॥२२४॥ (१७७२)

Kim manne jāriso ihabhavammi so tāriso parabhave vi |
Veya-payāṇa ya attham na yāṇasî tesimo attho ॥ 224 ॥ (1772)

[किं मन्यसे यादृश इहभवे स तादृशः परभवेऽपि ।
वेदपदानां चार्थं न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ २२४ ॥ (१७७२)

Kim manyase yādṛiśa ihabhave sa tādṛiśaḥ parabhave'pi |
Veda-padānām cārtham na jānāsi tesāmayamarthaḥ ॥224॥(1772)]

Trans.—224 Is it your belief that human life even in the next world is the same as it is in this world ? But *(ca)* you do not know the (real) meaning of the sentences of *Vedas*. Here is their (real) interpretation (1772)

टीका–त्वमेवं मन्यसे–यो मनुष्यादिर्यादृश इहभवे स तादृशः परभवेऽपि । नन्वयमनुचितस्ते संशयः, यतोऽसौ विरुद्धवेदपदश्रुतिनिबन्धनो वर्तते । तानि चामूनि वेदपदानि—" पुरुषो वै पुरुषत्वमश्नुते, पशवः पशुत्वम् " इत्यादि, तथा, " श्रृगालो वै एष जायते यः सपुरीषो दह्यते " इत्यादि । एषां च वेदपदानाममुमर्थं मन्यसे त्वम्—"पुरुषो मृतः सन् परभवे पुरुषत्वमेवेत्यादि, अमूनि किल भवान्तरगतजन्तुसादृश्यप्रतिपादकानि; तथा, " श्रृगालो वै " इत्यादीनि तु वैसदृश्यख्यापकानि " इति । अतस्तव संशयः । अयं चायुक्त एव, यतोऽमीषां वेदपदानां नायमर्थः, किन्तु वक्ष्यमाणलक्षण इति ॥ २२४ ॥ (१७७२) ॥

D. C.—O Sudharman ! Do you entertain the belief that

human life in the next world is the same as it is here ? Sentences of *Vedas* having contradictory interpretations have given rise to this illusion of yours. The sentences are as follows :—

(1) "*Puruṣo vai puruṣatvamas'nute, pas'avaḥ paśutvam*" etc. and

(2) "*Śrugālo vai eṣa jāyate yaḥ sa-purîṣo dahyate*" etc.

According to you, interpretations of these two sentences are respectively as follows :—

(1) A man obtains nothing but manhood even after death, in the next world; and animals such as cow etc. become animals after death. Thus, sentences like this suggest that the next life is the same as this.

(2) But the sentences like "*Śrugālo vai* etc." mean to assert that the next life is totally different from the present one.

Such contradicting interpretations have given rise to the misguided belief of yours. Here is their real interpretation. Listen carefully.

कारणसरिसं कज्जं बीयस्सेवङ्कुरो त्ति मण्णंतो ।
इहभवसरिसं सव्वं जमवेसि परे वि तमजुत्तं ॥२२५॥ (१७७३)

Kāranasarisam kajjam bîyassevankuro tti mannanto ।
Ihabhavasarisam savvam jamavesi pare vi tamajuttam ॥225॥ (1773)

[कारणसदृशं कार्यं बीजस्येवाङ्कुर इति मन्यमानः ।
इहभवसदृशं सर्वं यदवैषि परस्मिन्नपि तदयुक्तम् ॥ २२५ ॥ (१७७३)

Kāraṇasadṛiśam kāryam bîjasyevāṅkura iti manyamānaḥ ।
Ihabhavasadṛiśam sarvam yadavaisi parasminnapi tadayuktam॥225॥]

Trans.—225 Just as sprout is similar to seed, the effect is also similar to cause according to you. (And hence), you

believe everything in the next world to be similar to everything in this world. (But) that is not correct. (1773)

टीका–सुधर्माणं प्रति भगवानुवाच—" इह कारणानुरूपमेव कार्यं भवति, यथा यवबीजानुरूपो यवाङ्कुरः, इहभवकारणं चान्यजन्म, ततस्तेनापीहभवदृशेन भवितव्यम् " इत्येवं मन्यमानस्त्वं यदिहभवसदृशं सर्वं पुरुषादिकं परभवेऽप्यवैषि, तदयुक्तमेवेति ॥ २२५ ॥ (१७७३)

D. C.—Since *kāraṇa* is the same as *kārya* according to you, the past life, being the *kāraṇa* of the present life, becomes the same as the present life. That is why you are led to believe that everything in this life is similar to everything in the next one. But this apprehension of yours is not correct.

Because—

जाइ सरो सिंगाओ भूतणओ सासवाणुलित्ताओ ।
संजायइ गोलोमाऽविलोमसंजोगओ दुव्वा ॥ २२६ ॥ (१७७४)

इति रुक्खायुव्वेदे जोणिविहाणे य विसरिसेहिंतो ।
दीसइ जम्हा जम्मं सुहम्म ! तो नायमेगंतो ॥२२७॥ (१७७५)

Jāi saro singāo bhūtanao sāsavāṇulittāo ।
Sanjāyai golomā'vilomasanjogao duvvā ॥ 226 ॥ (1774)

Iti rukkhāyuvvede joṇivihāṇe ya visarisehinto ।
Dīsai jamhā jammam Suhamma ! to nāyameganto ॥227॥ (1775)

[जायते शरः शृङ्गाद् भूतृणकः सर्षपानुलिप्तात् ।
संजायते गोलोमाऽविलोमसंयोगतो दूर्वा ॥ २२६ ॥ (१७७४)

इति वृक्षायुर्वेदे योनिविधाने च विसदृशेभ्यः ।
दृश्यते यस्माज्जन्म सुधर्मन् ! ततो नायमेकान्तः ॥ २१७ ॥ (१७७५)

Jāyate śaraḥ śṛiṅgād bhūtṛiṇakaḥ sarṣapānuliptāt ।
Sanjāyate golomā'vilomasaṃyogato dūrvā ॥ 226 ॥ (1774)]

Iti vṛikṣāurvede yonividhāne ca visadṛiśebhyaḥ ।
Dṛiśyate yasmājjanma Sudharman ! tato nāyamekāntaḥ ॥ 227 ॥]

Trans.—226-227 The *śara* plant is produced from horn; earth-grass[1] is produced by the anointing of mustard,[2] and *dūrvā*[3] is produced by the combination of *goloma*[4] and aviloma plants. Similarly, in the treatise[5] on (planting and cultivation of) trees, production is brought about by the combination of (a number of) dissimilar objects. The rule is, therefore, not exclusive, *O Sudharman !* (1774-1775)

टीका–ततः " कारणानुरूपं कार्यम् " इति सुधर्मन् ! नायमेकान्तः, यतः श्रृङ्गादपि शरो जायते, तस्मादेव च सर्षपानुलिप्ताद् भूतृणकः शष्यसंघातो जायते; तथा, गोलोमा-ऽविलोमाभ्यां दूर्वा प्रभवति, इत्येवं वृक्षायुर्वेदे विलक्षणानेकद्रव्यसंयोगजन्मानो वनस्पतयो दृश्यन्ते । तथा, योनिविधाने च । योनिप्राभृते विसदृशानेकद्रव्यसंयोगयोनयः सर्प-सिंहादिप्राणिनो मणयो हेमादयश्च पदार्था नानारूपाः समुपलभ्यन्ते । अतः केयं कार्यस्य कारणानुरूपता ? इति ॥ २२६-२२७ ॥ (१७७४-१७७५) ॥

D. C.—The rule that *kārya* is similar to *kāraṇa* is not *ekāntika*. Because, the *śara* is produced even by means of *śṛṇga*, by the unction of mustard-seeds the earth-grass is produced and by the combination of goloma and aviloma grasses, the *dūrvā* grass is produced.

Moreover, in the treatise on the planting and cultivation of trees, production of objects such as jewels, gold, etc is

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1. *Bhūtṛinaka* (earth-grass) = A kind of fragrant grass; the plant Androhogon Schoenanthus.

2. *Sarṣapa* = Mustard-seed; popularly known as *sarasava* in Western India; Sinapis Dichotoma.

3. *Dūrvā* = Name of a bent grass; panic grass. Panicum Dactylon;

4. *Goloma, Aviloma* = Two different kinds of bent grass.

5. *Vṛikṣāyu* = Name of a short treatise by *Śūrpāla* on the planting and cultivation of trees.

shown as being brought about by the combination of various dissimilar objects. The rule of similarity between *kārya* and *karaṇa*, is therefore, inapplicable in this case.

Or, say, the life of creatures in the next world is distinguished from their life in this world, on account of similarity between *kārya* and *kāraṇa* in this way:—

अहवा जउ च्चिय बीयाणुरूवजम्मं मयं तओ चेव ।
जीवं गिण्ह भवाओ भवंतरे चित्तपरिणामं ॥२२८॥ (१७७६)

जेण भवंकुरबीयं कम्मं चित्तं च तं जओऽभिहियं ।
हेउविचित्तत्तणओ भवंकुरविचित्तया तेणं ॥ २२९ ॥ (१७७७)

जइ पडिवन्नं कम्मं हेउविचित्तत्तओ विचित्तं च ।
तो तत्फलं वि चित्तं पवज्ज संसारिणो सोम्म ! ॥२३०॥(१७७८)

Ahavā jau cciya bîyānurūvajammam mayam tao ceva ।
Jîvam ginha bhavāo bhavantare cittapariṇāmam ॥ 228 ॥ (1776)

Jeṇa bhavankurabîyam kammam cittam ca tam jao'bhihiyam ।
Heuvicittattaṇao bhavankuraviccittayā teṇam ॥ 229 ॥ (1777)

Jai paḍivannam kammam heuvicittattao vicittam ca ।
To tatphalam vi cittam pavajja samsāriṇo somma ! ॥230॥ (1778)

[अथवा यत एव बीजानुरूपजन्म मतं तत एव ।
जीवं गृहाण भवाद् भवान्तरे चित्रपरिणामम् ॥ २२८ ॥ (१७७६)
येन भवाङ्कुरबीजं कर्म चित्रं तद् यतोऽभिहितम् ।
हेतुविचित्रत्वतो भवाङ्कुरविचित्रता तेन ॥ २२९ ॥ (१७७७)
यदि प्रतिपन्नं कर्म हेतुविचित्रत्वतो विचित्रं च ।
ततस्तत्फलमपि चित्रं प्रतिपद्यस्व संसारिणः सौम्य ! ॥२३०॥(१७७८)

Athavā yata eva bîjānurūpajanma matam tata eva ।
Jîvam gṛihāṇa bhavād bhavāntare cittapariṇāmam ॥ 228 ॥ (1776)

Yena bhavāṅkurabîjam karma citram tad yato'bhihitam ।
Hetuvicitratvato bhāvaṅkuravicitratā tena ॥ 229 ॥ (1777)
Yadi pratipannam karma hetuvicitratvato vicitram ca ।
Tatastatphalamapi citram pratipadyasva saṃsāriṇaḥ Saumya! ॥230॥]

Trans.—228–229–230 Or, because the production (of *kārya*) is similar to the root-cause, according to you, take *jîva* in the next life to be a *pariṇāma* distinct from this mundane world. For, *karman* (which is) the seed of the sprout of life is itself distinct. And, if the effect is established to be distinct because the cause is distinct, know it for certain *O Saumya !* that the mundane Soul has also its *phala* distinct from it. (1776–1777–1778)

टीका–व्याख्या–अथवा, यत एव बीजानुरूपं कारणानुगुणं कार्याणां जन्म मतम्, तत एवेह भवाद् भवान्तरे जीवं गृहाण प्रतिपद्यस्व । कथंभूतम् ? जाति–कुल–बलै-श्वर्य–रूपादिविचित्रपरिणामम् । यदि नाम बीजानुरूपं जन्म, तथापि कथं भवान्तरे विचित्रता जीवानाम् ? इत्याह—" जेण भवंकुरेत्यादि " येन यस्माद् नारक–तिर्यगादिरूपेण भवनं भवः स एवाङ्कुर इवाङ्कुरस्तस्य बीजमिह कर्मैवावसेयम्, तच्च मिथ्यात्वा-ऽविरत्यादिहेतुवैचित्र्याद् विचित्रं यस्माद् मयाऽभिहितम्, तस्मात् तज्जन्यस्य भवाङ्कुरस्यापि जात्यादिभेदेन विचित्रता । ततो यदि त्वया कर्म प्रतिपन्नम्, हेतुवैचित्र्याच्च यदि तद्वैचित्र्यमभ्युपगतम्, ततः संसारिणो जीवस्य तत्फलमपि नारक–तिर्यङ्–मनुष्या–ऽमररूपेण भवनरूपं सौम्य ! विचित्ररूपं प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ॥ २२८–२२९–२३० (१७७६–१७७७–१७७८) ॥

D. C.—The production of various *kāryas* is similar to the corresponding *kāraṇas* according to you. But the *jîva* in the next life is distinguished from this world on account of *jāti, kula, rūpa, bala, aiśvarya* etc. Now if *Kārya* is taken to be similar to the *kāraṇa*, how will the *jîvas* be different in the next life ? The *vicitratā* of *jîva* in the next life is to be accounted for by means of *karman*. For *karman* being the *hetu of saṃsāra*, renders the whole *saṃsāra, vicitra* by reason

of its own self being *vicitra*. So, just as *karman* is *vicitra* by reason of its wrong belief and vowlessness etc, its *Kārya viz, bhava* should also be taken as *vicitra* by reason of *jāti, kula, rūpa, bala* etc. So, if you admit *Karman* and if you believe that *Kārya* is distinguished from *kāraṇa*, then *O Saumya!* know it for certain that the mundane Soul has its *phala* in the form of *vicitratā* as hellish beings, lower animals, human beings, or celestial beings.

चित्तं संसारित्तं विचित्तकम्मफलभावओ हेऊ ।
इह चित्तं चित्ताणं कम्माण फलं व लोगम्मि ॥२३१॥(१७७९)

Cittam samsārittam vicittakammaphalabhavao heū ।
Iha cittam cittāṇam kammāṇa phalam va logammi ॥231॥ (1779)

[चित्रं संसारित्वं विचित्रकर्मफलभावतो हेतोः ।
इह चित्रं चित्राणां कर्मणां फलमिव लोके ॥ २३१ ॥ (१७७९)

Citram samsāritvam vicitrakarmaphalabhāvato hetoh ।
Iha citram citrāṇām karmaṇām phalamiva loke ॥ 231 ॥ (1779)]

Trans.—231 Like the variable result of variable actions (accomplished) in this world, worldliness is variable on account of the *hetu* that (it is also) the result of variable actions. (1779)

टीका-चित्रं संसारिजीवानां नारकादिरूपेण संसारित्वमिति प्रतिज्ञा । विचित्रस्य कर्मणः फलरूपत्वादिति हेतुः । इह यद् विचित्रहेतुकं तद् विचित्रमुपलभ्यते, यथेह कृषि-वाणिज्यादिकर्मणां फलं लोक इति । तदेवं कर्म वैचित्र्याद् भववैचित्र्ये प्रमाणमुक्तम् ॥ २३१ ॥ (१७७९) ॥

D. C.—Just as the results of various actions like ploughing trading etc. are variable, the *saṃsāritva* of the mundane animals is also varied as seen in their hellish experience etc. on account of the fact that *saṃsāritva* is nothing but the result of their *vicitra* actions in the past.

Now, in support of the variable nature of *Karman*, the author states :—

चित्ता कम्मपरिणई पोग्गलपरिणामओ जहा बज्झा ।
कम्माण चित्तया पुण तद्धेउविचित्तभावाओ ॥२३२॥ (१७८०)

Cittā kammapariṇaî poggalapariṇāmao jahā bajjhā ।
Kammāṇa cittayā puṇa taddheuvicittabhāvāo ॥ 232 ॥ (1780)

[चित्रा कर्मपरिणतिः पुद्गलपरिणामतो यथा बाह्या ।
कर्मणां चित्रता पुनस्तद्धेतुविचित्रभावात् ॥ २३२ ॥ (१७८०)

Citrā karmapariṇatiḥ pudgalapariṇāmato yathā bāhyā ।
Karmaṇām citratā punastaddhetuvicitrabhāvāt ॥ 232 ॥ (1780)]

Trans.—232 Just as the outward effect of actions is variable on account of its being the *pariṇāma* of earthly bodies, the variable nature of actions is also due to their *hetu* being variable. (1780)

टीका-इह विचित्रा कर्मपरिणतिः, पुद्गलपरिणामात्मकत्वात्, इह यत्पुद्गलपरिणामात्मकं तद् विचित्रपरिणतिरूपं दृश्यते, यथा बाह्योऽभ्रादिविकारः, पृथिव्यादिविकारो वा, यत्तु विचित्रपरिणतिरूपं न भवति तत् पुद्गलपरिणामात्मकमपि न भवति, यथाऽऽकाशम्, या पुनः पुद्गलपरिणामसाम्येऽपि कर्मणामावरणादिभेदेन विशेषतो विचित्रता सा तद्धेतुवैचित्र्यादवगन्तव्या, विचित्राश्च मिथ्यात्वादयः-प्रद्वेष-निह्नवादयश्च कर्महेतव इति ॥ २३२ ॥ (१७८०) ॥

D. C.—Effect of *Karman* is varied in this world. Only that which is *pudgalapariṇāmātmaka* is known as *vicitra* (as in the case of various transformations of cloud, earth etc.). While that which is not the result of earthly *pudgalas*, is not recognized as a *vicitrapariṇati* (as in the case of *ākāśa*). In case of *Karman* itself being variable, in addition to this *pudgalapariṇāmatva*, *vicitratā* is due to the variable nature of its motives like vanity, hostility, and wickedness etc. by means of which those actions are actually inspired. 232 (1780).

अहवा इहभवसरिसो परलोगो वि जइ सम्मओ तेणं ।
कम्मफलं पि इहभवसरिसं पडिवज्ज परलोए ॥२३३॥ (१७८१)

किं भणियमिह मणुया नाणागइकम्मकारिणो संति ।
जइ ते तप्फलभाजो परे वि तो सरिसया जुत्ता ॥२३४॥(१७८२)

Ahavā ihabhavasariso paralogo vi jai sammao teṇam ।
Kammaphalam pi ihabhavasarisam paḍivajja paralöe ॥233॥ (1781)

Kim bhaṇiyamiha maṇuyā nāṇāgaikammakārino santi ।
Jai te tapphalabhājo pare vi to sarisayā juttā ॥ 234 ॥ (1782)

[अथवेहभवसदृशः परलोकोऽपि यदि संमतस्तेन ।
कर्मफलमपीहभवसदृशं प्रतिपद्यस्व परलोके ॥ २३३ ॥ (१७८१)

किं भणितमिह मनुजा नानागतिकर्मकारिणः सन्ति ।
यदि ते तत्फलभाजः परस्मिन्नपि ततः सदृशता युक्ता ॥२३४॥(१७८२)

Athavehabhavasadṛiśam paraloko'pi yadi sammatastena ।
Karmaphalamapîhabhavasadṛiśam pratipadyasva paraloke ॥ 233 ॥

Kim bhaṇitamiha manujā nānāgatikarmakāriṇaḥ santi ।
Yadi te tatphalabhājaḥ parasminnapi tatah sadṛiśatā yuktā ॥234॥]

Trans.—233–234 Or, if the other life is also taken as the same as this life, (you should) accept the *karma phala* in the other life to be the same as (that in) this life. Has it been said that there exist people in this world doing (various) deeds according to their various tendences ? If they exist, there exist (people) in the next (world) to enjoy their fruits also. Sameness (of both) is, therefore, justified. (1781–1782)

टीका–व्याख्या–अथवा, यदीहभवसदृशः परलोकोऽपि संमतो भवतः, " तेणं ति " ततः कर्मफलमपि परलोक इहभवसदृशमिहत्यविचित्रशुभाऽशुभक्रियानुरूपं विचित्रं प्रतिपद्यस्वेति । एवं मुकुलितं प्रतिपाद्यैतदेव भावयति—" किं भणियमित्यादि " किमेतावता प्रतिपादितं भवति ? ।

इह तावद् मनुष्या नानागतिहेतुविचित्रक्रियानुष्ठायिनः सन्तीति प्रत्यक्षत एव लक्ष्यन्ते। ततो यदि ते परलोके तत्तत्क्रियाफलभाज इष्यन्ते, ततो यथेहत्यक्रियाणामसदृशता, तथा परलोकगतजन्तूनामपि सैव युक्ता, ननु योऽत्र यादृशः स परत्रापि तादृश एव भवति ॥२३३-२३४॥(१७८१-१७८२)

D. C.—If, according to you, next life is the prototype of this one, the *karmaphala* in the next life will depend upon (one's) various good or bad actions in this life. Now, since various people do various deeds as a result of their various tendences in this life, it should be noted that they enjoy fruits of their actions in the next life. So, inclination of one in the present life, depends upon his inclination in the past life also.

Then, anticipating doubts in the opponent's mind, the author states :—

अह इह सफलं कम्मं न परे तो सव्वहा न सरिसत्तं।
अकयागम-कयनासा कम्माभावोऽहवा पत्तो ॥ २३५॥ (१७८३)

कम्माभावे य कओ भवंतरं, सरिसया व तदभावे।
निक्कारणओ य भवो जइ ता नासो वि तह चेव ॥२३६॥(१७८४)

Aha iha saphalam kammam na pare to savvahā na sarisattam।
Akayāgama-kayanāsā kammābhāvo'havā patto ॥ 235 ॥ (1783)

Kammābhāve ya kao bhavantaram, sarisayā va tadabhāve।
Nikkāraṇao ya bhavo jai tā nāso vi taha ceva ॥ 236 ॥ (1784)

[अथेह सफलं कर्म न परस्मिंस्ततः सर्वथा न सदृशत्वम्।
अकृतागम-कृतनाशौ कर्माभावोऽथवा प्राप्तः ॥ २३५ ॥ (१७८३)

कर्माभावे च कुतो भवान्तरं, सदृशता वा तदभावे।
निष्कारणकश्च भवो यदि ततो नाशोऽपि तथैव ॥ २३६ ॥ (१७८४)

Atheha saphalam karma na parasminstataḥ sarvathā na sadriśatvam ।
Akṛitāgama-kṛitanāśau karmābhāvo'thavā prāptaḥ ॥235॥ (1783)]

Karmābhāve ca kuto bhavāntaram sadṛiśatā vā tadabhāve ।
Niṣkāraṇakaśca bhavo yadi tato nāśo'pi tathaiva ॥ 236 ॥ (1784)]

Trans.—235–236 If (the opponent says that) *Karman* is successful here (only), (and) not in the next life, then there will be nothing like sameness at all. The unaccomplished object will crop up and the accomplished one will come to an end Or, there will be (complete) negation of *Karman* itself. In absence of *Karman,* how will the next life come into existence? And in its absence, whence (will) the *sadriśatā* (exist)? And if the (next) life is (taken to have been) produced without any cause, then (its) end will also be so. (1783–1784)

टीका–अथैवं ब्रूषे–इह सफलं कर्मेति–इहभवसंबन्ध्येव कृष्यादिक्रियारूपं कर्म सफलम्, न तु पारभविकदानादिक्रियारूपं कर्म । ततश्च तत्फलाभावाद् न परलोके जन्तुवैसदृश्यम् । अत्रोत्तरमाह—" ततो सव्वहा न सरिसत्तं ति " तत एवं सति यत् तवाभिप्रेतं तत् सर्वथा परभवे जीवानां सदृशत्वं न स्यात् । तद्धि कर्मणा जन्यते, तच्च नास्ति, पारभविकक्रियाणां त्वया निष्फलत्वाभ्युपगमात्, तन्निष्फलत्वे च कर्माभावात् । अथ कर्माभावेऽपि भवेत् सादृश्यम्, तर्ह्यकृतस्यैव तस्य निर्हेतुकस्याऽऽगमः प्राप्नोति, कृतस्य च दान-हिंसादिक्रियाफलरूपस्य कर्मणो नाशः प्रसजति । अथवा, मूलत एव कर्मणामभावः प्राप्तः—दान-हिंसादिक्रियाणां निष्फलत्वाभ्युपगमाद् मूलत एव कर्मणो बन्धोऽपि न स्यादिति भावः । ततः किम् ? इत्याह–कर्माभावे च कारणाभावात् कुतो भवान्तरम्, तदभावे च दूरोत्सारितमेव सादृश्यम् । अथ कर्माभावेऽपि भव इष्यते, तर्हि निष्कारण एवासौ स्यात् । यदि चैवमयमियेत, ततो नाशोऽपि तस्य भवस्य निष्कारण एव स्यात्, अतो व्यर्थस्तपोनियमाद्यनुष्ठानप्रयासः । निष्कारणे च भवेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने वैसदृश्यमपि जीवानां निष्कारणं किं नेष्यते, विशेषाभावात् ? इति ॥ २३५–२३६ ॥ (१७८३–१७८४) ॥

D. C.—Sudharman :—Actions (like ploughing etc.) which are connected with this life are alone fruitful, and those (like munificence etc.) that are connected with the other life, are not fruitful. This is the reason why there is no distinction between the lives of creatures in the two *bhavas.*

Bhagavān :—But *sadṛis'atā* can never exist without cause as *sadṛis'atā* itself is produced from *Karman.* Now, when you take *Karman* (like *dāna* etc.) connected with the other life, to be fruitless, there is no scope for *sadris'atā* to exist.

Sudharman—Sadṛis'atā of *jîvas* could be brought about even in absence of *Karman* as in the case of *ghaṭa* produced from earth.

Bhagavān :—If *sādṛis'ya* exists even in absence of *Karman* there will be *akritāgama* (*i. e.*, springing up of the unaccomplished object), as well as *kritanās'a* (*i. e.* destruction of the accomplished object). Thus the existence of *Karman* itself is denied. When there is no *Karman,* how can the *parabhava* exist ? And when the existence of *parabhava* is denied, the existence of *sādris'ya* between two *bhavas* will automatically be denied.

Sudharman :—The existence of *bhavāntara* could be brought about even in absence of *Karman* as in the case of lifeless objects when *Kārya* and *kāraṇa* are the same.

Bhagavān :—In that case, *O Sudharman !* the production as well as the destruction of *bhavāntara* will also be *niskāraṇa.* Consequently, the practice of austerities, munificence, and vows etc. would be good-for-nothing, as *bhavāntara* will not depend upon those actions, and all people—whether doing good or bad deeds—will have the same prototype life. Moreover, you should also take the *vaisadṛis'ya* or dissimilarity of various *jîvas* from each other to be *nis'kāraṇaka* like *bhavāntara.* For, like *bhavāntara,* there is *kāraṇābhāva* in case of *vaisadṛis'ya* also.

कम्माभावे वि मई को दोसो होज्ज जइ सभावोऽयं ।
जह कारणाणुरूवं घडाइ कज्जं सहावेणं ॥ २३७ ॥ (१७८५)

Kammābhāve vi maî ko doso hojja jai sabhāvo'yam ।
Jaha kāraṇāṇurūvam ghaḍāi kajjam sahāveṇam ॥ 237 ॥ (1785)

[कर्माभावेऽपि मतिः को दोषो भवेत् यदि स्वभावोऽयम् ।
यथा कारणानुरूपं घटादि कार्यं स्वभावेन ॥ २३७ ॥ (१७८५)

Karmābhāve'pi matiḥ ko doṣo bhavet yadi svabhāvo'yam ।
Yathā kāraṇānurūpam ghaṭādi kāryam svabhāvena ॥237॥(1785)]

Trans.—237 Again, the opponent might believe that (the *kārya* could be brought about even in absence of *Karman.* What objection would arise , if it were its very nature as in the case of *kāryas* like *ghaṭa* etc., which bear natural resemblence with their *kāraṇas ?* (1785)

टीका–अथ परस्यैवंभूता मतिः स्याद्; यदुत–कर्माभावेऽपि यदि भवसद्भावरूपः स्वभाव एवायं भवेत् तर्हि को दोषः स्यात् ?—विनापि कर्म यदि स्वभावादेव भवः स्यात् तर्हि किं दूषणं भवेत् ?—न किञ्चिदित्यर्थः । दृष्टान्तमाह–यथा कर्म विनापि मृत्पिण्डादिकारणानुरूपं घटादि कार्यं स्वस्वभावेनैवोत्पद्यमानं दृश्यते, तथा सदृशप्राणिजन्मपरम्परारूपो भवोऽपि स्वभावादेव भविष्यति । अत्रोच्यते–ननु घटोऽपि न स्वभावतः एव जायते, कर्तृ–करणाद्यपेक्षित्वात् तस्य । ततश्चेहापि कर्तुरात्मनः पारभविकस्य च शरीरादिकार्यस्य करणं संभाव्यते, तच्च कर्तृ–कार्याभ्यां भिन्नं लोकेऽपि दृश्यते, कुलाल–घटाभ्यां चक्रादिवत्, यच्चेहात्मनः शरीरादि कार्यं कुर्वतः करणं तत् कर्मेति प्रतिपद्यस्व । स्यादेतत्, घटादेः प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात् भवन्तु कुलालादयः कर्तारः, शरीरादि कार्यं त्वभ्रादिविकारवत् स्वभावतोऽपि भविष्यति, ततो न कर्मसिद्धिः । तदयुक्तम्, यतो न स्वाभाविकं शरीरादि, आदिमत्प्रतिनियताकारत्वात्, घटवदिति । किञ्च "कारणानुरूपमेव कार्यम्" इत्येवं यत्परभवे सादृश्यं त्वयाऽभ्युपगम्यते, तदपि स्वभाववादिनस्तवाभ्रादि-

विकारदृष्टान्ते परिहीयते, अभ्रादिविकारस्य स्वकारणभूतपुद्गलद्रव्यादति-विलक्षणत्वादिति ॥ २३७ ॥ (१७८५) ॥

D. C.—Sudharman :—Just as, it is by virtue of their *svabhāva* that objects like *ghaṭa* etc. are produced as a natural result of their respective *kāraṇas* but without the help of *karman*, the *bhavāntara* is also produced by virtue of its own *svabhāva* even in absence of *Karman*.

Bhagavān—Kāryas like *ghata*, *O Sudharman !* could never be produced merely by virtue of their *svabhāva*, but they have to depend upon *kartā* and *kāraṇa* also. So, in the production of *Śarîra* also, *kartā* and *kāraṇa* are of primary importance. This leads us to believe that in the production of *bhavāntara*, *ātman* which is different from body, is the *kartā*, and *Karman*, the *kāraṇa*, just as potter is the *kartā* and *chakra* etc. act as *kāraṇas*, when *ghata* is produced.

Sudharman :—Since *kāryas* like *ghata* are directly apprehensible, potter and *chakra* etc. may respectively be taken as their *kartā* aud *kāraṇas*. But *kāryas* like *s'arîra* in *bhavāntara* are produced naturally like the multi-coloured changes in clouds etc. It is not, therefore, possible to seek *Karman* as a *kāraṇa*, in the production of *bhavāntara*.

Bhagavān :—Your argument is totally unfounded. *Kāryas* like *s'arîra* etc. are not *svābhāvika* because they have a beginning, as well as, a definite *ākāra* like *ghata*. You have taken the other life to be the same as this, because, according to you, *Kārya* is exactly similar to *karana*. But this principle of *sadṛis'atā* is not applicable in case of *abhrādivikāras*, as they are peculiarly different from the objects having definite *ākāra*.

Moreover,

होज्ज सहावो वत्थुं निक्कारणया व वत्थुधम्मो वा ? ।
जह वत्थुं णत्थि तओऽणुवलद्धीओ खपुप्फं व ॥२३८॥(१७८६

अच्चंतमणुवलद्धो वि अह तओ अत्थि नत्थि किं कम्मं ।
हेऊ व तदत्थित्ते जो णणु कम्मस्स वि स एव ॥२३९॥(१७८७)

कम्मस्स वाभिहाणं होज्ज सहावो त्ति होउ को दोसो ।
निच्चं व सो सभावो सरिसो एत्थं च को हेऊ ? ॥२४०॥ (१७८८)

Hojja sahāvo vatthum nikkāraṇayā va vatthudhammo vā ?
Jaha vatthum ṇatthi tao'ṇuvaladdhîo khapuppham va ॥ 238 ॥

Accantamaṇuvaladdho vi aha tao atthi natthi kim kammam ।
Heū va tadtthitte jo naṇu kammassa vi sa eva ॥ 239 ॥ (1787)

Kammassa vābhihāṇam hojja sahāvo tti hou ko doso ।
Niccam va so sabhāvo sariso ettham ca ko heū ? ॥240॥ (1788)

[भवेत् स्वभावो वस्तु निष्कारणता वा वस्तुधर्मो वा ? ।
यदि वस्तु नास्ति सकोऽनुपलब्धेः खपुष्पमिव ॥ २३८ ॥ (१७८६)

अत्यन्तमनुपलब्धोऽप्यथ सकोऽस्ति नास्ति किं कर्म ।
हेतुर्वा तदस्तित्वे यो ननु कर्मणोऽपि स एव ॥ २३९ ॥ (१७८७)

कर्मणो वाभिधानं भवेत् स्वभाव इति भवतु को दोषः ।
नित्यं वा स स्वभावः सदृशोऽत्र च को हेतुः ? ॥ २४० ॥ (१७८८)

Bhavet svabhāvo vastu niṣkāraṇatā vā vastudharmo vā ? ।
Yadi vastu nāsti sako'nupalabdheḥ khapuspamiva ॥ 238 ॥(1786)

Atyantamanupalabdho'pyatha sako'sti nāsti kim karma ।
Hetu 'r–vā tadastitve yo nanu karmaṇo'pi sa eva ॥ 239 ॥ (1787)

Karmaṇo vābhidhānam bhavet svabhāva iti bhavatu ko doṣaḥ ।
Nityam vā sa 'svabhāvaḥ sadṛiśo'tra ca ko hetuh ? ॥ 240 ॥ (1788)]

Trans.—238–239–240 Is (that) *svabhāva* a (definite) object, or causelessness (itself), or property of an object ? If it is (taken as) a (definite) object, it is not (so) because it is non–perceptible like a *kha–puspa.* In spite of its being non–perceptible, if it exists, why should not *Karman* exist ?

The *hetu* that (works) in its existence, (works) in case of *Karman* also. (Or) what objection (would arise), if *svabhāva* becomes a synonym of *Karman*, and what is the *hetu* (in believing) that *svabhāva* is always the same ? (1786–1787–1788)

टीका–एतद् गाथात्रयमपि प्रायः प्रागेव व्याख्यातार्थम्, नवरं " निच्चं " इत्यादि तृतीयगाथोत्तरार्धम्। इदमत्र हृदयम्–स स्वभावो नित्यं सदृश एव त्वयाऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः, भवान्तरे सदृश्यैव मनुष्यादिभवस्य जननात्, तस्य च स्वभावस्य नित्यं सदृशत्वे को हेतुः ?। न कश्चिदित्यभिप्रायः। स्वभावत एवायं स्वभावः सदृश इति चेत्। ननु भवविसदृशतायामप्येतद् वक्तुं शक्यत एवेति ॥ २३८–२३९–२४० ॥ (१७८६–१७८७–१७८८)॥

D. C.—The point is that since you have taken *svabhāva* to be the same for ever as the same life is repeated in various *bhavas* you should state the reason for its *nityasadṛis'atā*. You might say that there is no *hetu* as such, as *nityasadṛis'a* by virtue of its own self. For, the same argument could be advanced in case of *vaisadṛis'ya* of the *bhavas* as well.

And,

सो मुत्तोऽमुत्तो वा जइ मुत्तो तो न सव्वहा सरिसो।
परिणामओ पयं पिव न देहहेऊ जइ अमुत्तो ॥२४१॥ (१७८९)

उवगरणाभावाओ न य हवइ सुहम्म ! सो अमुत्तो वि।
कज्जस्स मुत्तिमत्ता सुहसंवित्तादिओ चेव ॥ २४२ ॥ (१७९०)

So mutto'mutto vā jai mutto to na savvahā sariso।
Parināmao payam piva na dehaheū jai amutto ॥ 241 ॥ (1789)

Uvagaraṇābhāvāo na ya havai Suhamma ! so amutto vi।
Kajjassa muttimattā suhasamvittādio ceva ॥ 242 ॥ (1790)

[स मूर्तोऽमूर्तो वा यदि मूर्तस्ततो न सर्वथा सदृशः।
परिणामतः पय इव न देहहेतुर्यद्यमूर्तः ॥ २४१ ॥ (१७८९)

उपकरणाभावाद् न च भवति सुधर्मन् ! सोऽमूर्तोऽपि ।
कार्यस्य मूर्तिमत्त्वात् सुखसंवित्त्यादितश्चैव ॥ २४२ ॥ (१७९०)

Sa mūrto'mūrto vā yadi mūrtastato na sarvathā sadṛiśaḥ ।
Parināmataḥ paya iva na dehahetu r-yadyamūrtaḥ ॥ 241 ॥ (1789)

Upakaraṇābhāvād na ca bhavati Sudharman ! so'mūrto'pi ।
Kāryasya mūrtimattvād sukhasaṃvittyāditaścaiva ॥ 242 ॥ (1790)]

Trans.—241-242. Is that *(svabhāva)*, *mūrta* or *a-mūrta ?* If *mūrta*, it is not at all *sadṛiśa* on account of its (having a) *pariṇāma* as in the case of milk. And, if it is *a-mūrta, O Sudharman !* even that *a-mūrta svabhāva* does not become the cause of body in absence of instruments, as well as on account of the corporeal nature of *Kārya* (indicated) by the perception of happiness etc. (1789-1790)

टीका-व्याख्या-स स्वभावो मूर्तः, अमूर्तो वा ? । यदि मूर्तः, तर्हि कर्मणा सह तस्य को विशेषः ? संज्ञान्तरमात्रविशिष्टकर्मैवेत्थमुक्तं स्यादिति । न चासौ सर्वदैव सदृशो युज्यते, परिणामित्वात्, दुग्धादिवत् । अथवा, मूर्तत्वादेवाभ्रादिविकारवदिति । अथामूर्तोऽसौ स्वभावः, तर्हि नैष देहादीनामारम्भकः, अनुपकरणत्वात्, दण्डादिविकलकुलालवत्, अमूर्तत्वादेव वा, आकाशवत् । " न य हवइ सुहम्म ! सो अमुत्तो वि त्ति " किञ्च, सुधर्मन् ! इतोऽपि स स्वभावोऽमूर्तो न युक्तः, शरीरादेस्तत्कार्यस्य मूर्तिमत्त्वात् । न ह्यमूर्तस्य नभस इव मूर्तं कार्यमुपजायते । तथा, सुख-संवित्त्यादेश्च नायममूर्तः । इदमुक्तं भवति—कर्म तावद् भवता नेष्यते, स्वभाववादित्वात् । ततश्च शरीरादीनि, सुख-दुःखसंवित्त्यादीनि च स्वभावस्यैव कार्याण्येष्टव्यानि, तस्य चामूर्तत्वे नैतान्युपपद्यन्ते । ततो यथा द्वितीयगणधरवादे कार्यस्य मूर्तत्वात्, सुखसंवित्त्यादेश्च कर्मणो मूर्तत्वं साधितम्, तथेह स्वभावस्यापि तत् साधनीयम् । तथा च प्रागुक्तम् —

आह नणु मुत्तमेवं मुत्तं चिय कज्जमुत्तिमत्ताओ ।
इह जह मुत्तत्तणओ घडस्स परमाणवो मुत्ता ॥ १ ॥

तह सुहसंवित्तीओ संबंधे वेयणुब्भवाओ य ।
बज्झबलाहाणाओ परिणामाओ य विण्णेयं ॥ २ ॥

इति ॥ २४१-२४२ ॥ (१७८९-१७९०) ॥

D. C.—Consider whether *svabhāva* is *mūrta* or *a-mūrta*. If it is *mūrta*, *svabhāva* will be nothing but a synonym of *Karman*. Moreover, the property of *sadṛis'atā* will never be applied if *svabhāva* is *mūrta*, because like milk, or like the *mūrta* clouds having a number of forms, *svabhāva* will also possess a number of *pariṇāmas*.

If *svabhāva* is *a-mūrta*, then also, like *ākās'a* it does not become the *hetu* of *s'arîra* because of the absence of *upakaranas*. Secondly, an incorporeal *kārana* can never produce a corporeal *kārya*. So, *svabhāva* should not be called *a-mūrta* when the *kāryas* of *svabhāva* such as the perception of *sukha*, *duhkha* etc. are *mūrta*.†

Now the second alternative *viz.* that *svabhāva* is *niṣkāraṇatā* is discussed—

अहवाऽकारणउ च्चिय सभावओ तोवि सरिसया कत्तो ।
किमकारणओ न भवे विसरिसया किं व विच्छित्ती॥२४३॥(१७९१)

Ahavā'kāraṇau cciya sabhāvao tovi sarisayā katto ।
Kimakāraṇao na bhave visarisayā kim va vicchittî ॥243॥ (1791)

[अथवाऽकारणत एव स्वभावतस्ततोऽपि सदृशता कुतः ।
किमकारणतो न भवेद् विसदृशता किं वा विच्छित्तिः ॥२४३॥(१७९१)

Athavā'kāraṇata eva svabāvatastato'pi sadṛiśatā kuṭaḥ ।
Kimakāraṇato na bhaved visadriśatā kim vā vicchittiḥ ? ॥243॥]

Trans.—243 Or, if (*bhavāntara* is produced) by virtue of *svabhāva* (and) without any reason, whence is *sadṛiśatā*

† Vide verses 1625, 1626.

(to be found) ? (And) why (should) not dissimilarity take place without reason ? and why not destruction also ? (1791)

टीका–अथ स्वभावत एव भवोत्पत्तिरित्यत्र " अकारणत एव " इत्ययमर्थोऽभिप्रेतः, " तो वि त्ति " तथापि हन्त ! परभवे सदृशता कुतः ?। कोऽभिप्रायः ? इत्याह–यथाऽकारणतः सदृशता भवति, तथा किमित्यकारणतः एव विसदृशता न स्यात् ?। अकस्माच्चाकारणतो भवविच्छित्तिः कस्माद् न स्यात् ?। अकस्माच्च भवन् खरविषाणादिरपि भवेत् । शरीरादीनां चाकारणतो भवतामभ्रादीनामिव प्रतिनियताकारत्वादिरूपता न स्यात्। तस्माद् नाकारणता स्वभाव इति ॥ २४३ ॥ (१७९१) ॥

D. C.—Sadṛis'atā of *bhavāntara* cannot be established even if you believe that it is produced without reason. For, just as *sadris'atā* is taken to have been produced without reason, *vi-sadṛis'atā* will also take place without reason. Similarly, destruction of *bhava* will also take place without any reason, and following the same procedure, a non-existent object like *kharaviṣāṇa* will also come into existence without any reason. Moreover, objects like *s'arîra* etc. will lose their definite shape and such other characteristics, on account of their resemblance with *abhra-vikāra* in as much as they are produced without reason. Hence, it is not possible to believe *svabhāva* as *niskarānatā* itself.

Taking the third alternative *viz.* that *svabhāva* is *vastudharma*, the author states :—

अहवं सहावो धम्मो वत्थुस्स, न सो वि सरिसओ निच्चं ।
उप्पाय–ट्ठिइ–भंगा चित्ता जं वत्थुपज्जाया ॥२४४॥ (१७९२)

Ahava sahāvo dhammo vatthussa, na so vi sarisao niccam ।
Uppāya-ṭṭhii-bhangā cittā jam vatthupajjāyā ॥ 244 ॥ (1792)

[अथवा स्वभावो धर्मो वस्तुनः, न सोऽपि सदृशको नित्यम् ।
उत्पाद–स्थिति–भङ्गाश्चित्रा यद् वस्तुपर्यायाः ॥ २४४ ॥ (१७९२)

Athavā svabhāvo dharmo vastunaḥ na so'pi sadṛiśako nityam।
Utpāda-sthiti-bhaṅgāscitrā yad vastuparyāyāḥ ॥ 244 ॥ (1792)।

Trans.—244 Or, if *svabhāva* is a property of an object that also will not be always the same. Because, the *paryāyās* of production, retention and destruction of an object are distinct (from each other). (1792)

टीका-अथ वस्तुनो धर्मः स्वभावः, सोऽपि सर्वदैव सदृशो न घटते, इति कथं सर्वदैव शरीरादीनां सदृशतां जनयेत्। कथं पुनरस्य सदैव सदृशता न घटते ? इत्याह-"उप्पायेत्यादि" यद् यस्मादुत्पाद-स्थिति-भङ्गादयश्चित्रा वस्तुपर्यायाः, न च ते सदैवाऽवस्थितसादृश्याः, नीलादीनां वस्तुधर्माणां प्रत्यक्षत एवान्यान्यरूपतया परिणतिदर्शनात्। किञ्च, वस्तुधर्मोऽसौ भवत्स्वभाव आत्मधर्मो वा स्यात्, पुद्गलधर्मो वा ?। यद्यात्मधर्मः, तर्हि नासौ शरीरादीनां कारणम्, अमूर्तत्वात्, आकाशादिवत्। अथ पुद्गलधर्मः, तर्हि कर्मैवासौ, कर्मणोऽपि हि पुद्गलास्तिकायधर्मत्वेनास्माभिरभ्युपगतत्वादिति ॥ २४४ ॥ (१७९२) ॥

D. C.—Svabhāva will not be the same throughout even if you believe that it is a *vastudharma*. Hence, it is not possible to maintain for ever the *sādṛis'ya* of *śarîra* etc. also. For, the three stages of production, existence and destruction are not always the same in case of a single object. Distinction of properties in case of black objects is easily perceived.

Secondly, is this *vastudharma*, a *dharma* of the *ātman* or a *dharma* of the *pudgala* ? If it is the property of *ātman* it can never become the cause of *s'arîra* etc. For, it will be *a-mūrta* like *ākās'a* in that case. On the other hand, if this *vastudharma* is the property of a *pudgala*, then it will become the *Karman* itself, as *Karman* is nothing but a *pudgaladharma* itself.

कम्मस्स वि परिणामो सुहम्म ! धम्मो स पोग्गलमयस्स।
हेऊ चित्तो जगओ होइ सहावो त्ति को दोसो ? ॥२४५॥ (१७९३)

Kammassa vi parināmo Suhamma! dhammo sa poggalamayassa। Heū citto jagao höi sahāvo tti ko doso? ॥ 245 ॥ (1793)

[कर्मणोऽपि परिणामः सुधर्मन् ! धर्म स पुद्गलमयस्य ।
हेतुश्चित्रो जगतो भवति स्वभाव इति को दोषः ॥ २४५ ॥ (१७९३)

Karmaṇo'pi pariṇāmaḥ Sudharman! Dharma sa pudgalamayasya। Hetuścitro jagato bhavati svabhāva iti ko doṣaḥ ॥ 245 ॥ (1793)]

Trans.—245 *O Sudharman!* That *(svabhāva)* being the *pariṇāma* of *Karman* composed of a definite body, (becomes) its *dharma* also. (And), what is wrong if *svabhāva* is taken as the variable cause of the (entire mundane) world? (1793)

टीका–सुधर्मन् ! असौ वस्तुधर्मो भवत्स्वभावो धर्मो भवतु, को दोषः ?—न कश्चित्, युक्तियुक्तत्वात्। किं विशिष्टो धर्मः ? इत्याह—परिणामः। कस्य ?। कर्मणः। कथंभूतस्य ?। पुद्गलमयस्य। कथंभूतो यः कर्मपरिणामः ?। इत्याह–हेतुः। कस्य ?। जगतः–जगद्वैचित्र्यस्य। तदेवं कर्मलक्षणस्य वस्तुनः कर्मपरिणामरूपो धर्मो भवति स्वभावः, नात्र काचिद् दोषापत्तिः। अस्माकमपि संमतोऽयमर्थः, केवलं सर्वदा सदृशोऽसौ न भवति, किन्तु चित्रो मिथ्यात्वादिहेतुवैचित्र्याद् विचित्रो विविध-स्वभावः। अतो न तस्मात् परभवे सादृश्यमेव, किन्तु विचित्ररूपतेति ॥ २४५ ॥ (१७९३) ॥

D. C.—O Sudharman! Since *svabhāva* has been taken as a *vastu–dharma*, it may be taken as a *dharma* of the *pudgalamaya Karman* also. So, there is no objection in admitting *svabhāva* as the *parināma* of *vicitra karman*, and hence as the *hetu* of universal *vicitratā* also.

In other words, it is due to the nature of the *vicitra Karman* that this world is full of varieties. The only point to remember in this case is that it is not always the same, but it is full of varieties on account of various *hetus* such as vanity, hostility etc.

अहवा सव्वं वत्थुं पइक्खणं चिय सुहम्म ! धम्मेहिं ।
संभवइ वेह केहि वि केहि वि तदवत्थमच्चंतं ॥२४६॥ (१७९४)

तं अप्पणो वि सरिसं न पुव्वधम्मेहिं पच्छिमिल्लाणं ।
सयलस्स तिहुअणस्स च सरिसं सामण्णधम्मेहिं ॥२४७॥(१७९५)

Ahavā savvam vatthum paikkhaṇam ciya Suhamma ! dhammehim ।
Sambhavai veha kehi vi kehi vi tadavatthamaccantam ॥ 247 ॥

Tam appaṇo vi sarisam na puvvadhammehim pacchimillāṇam ।
Sayalassa tihuaṇassa ca sarisam sāmaṇṇadhammehim ॥247॥(1795)

[अथवा सर्वं वस्तु प्रतिक्षणमेव सुधर्मन् ! धर्मैः ।
संभवति व्येति कैरपि कैरपि तदवस्थमत्यन्तम् ॥ २४६ ॥ (१७९४)

तदात्मनोऽपि सदृशं न पूर्वधर्मैः पाश्चात्यानाम् ।
सकलस्य त्रिभुवनस्य च सदृशं सामान्यधर्मैः ॥ २४७ ॥ (१७९५)

Athavā sarvam vastu pratikṣaṇameva Sudharman ! dharmaih ।
Sambhavati vyeti kairapi kairapi tadavasthamatyantam ॥ 246 ॥]

Tadātmano'pi sadṛisam na pūrvadharmaiḥ pāścātyānām ।
Sakalasya tribhuvanasya ca sadṛiśam sāmānyadharmaiḥ ॥ 247 ॥]

Trans.—246-247. *O Sudharman !* at every single moment, each and every object (of the Universe) is being produced, destroyed or retained by (virtue of) some property or the other. So, none (of them) has its former properties similar to the latter ones. On the other hand, by virtue of (certain) common properties, all the three worlds are similar. (1794–1795)

टीका–व्याख्या–अथवा, सुधर्मन्! किमेक एव परभवः?, सर्वमेव हि घट–पटादिकं भुवनान्तर्गतं वस्तु कैश्चित् पूर्वपर्यायैः समाना–ऽसमानपर्यायैः प्रतिक्षणमुत्पद्यते, कैश्चित् पुनरुत्तरपर्यायैः समाना–ऽसमानपर्यायैर्व्येति व्युपरमति, कैश्चित्तु तदवस्थमेवास्ते । ततश्चैवं सति तद्वस्त्वात्मनोऽपि पूर्वपूर्वधर्मै-

रुत्तरोत्तरधर्माणां न सदृशम्, किं पुनरन्यवस्तूनाम् ?; सामान्यधर्मैस्तु सर्वस्यापि त्रिभुवनस्य समानम्, किं पुनरेकस्यैव निजपूर्वजन्मनः ? इति ॥ २४६-२४७ ॥ (१७९४-१७९५) ॥

D. C.—Not only the *bhavāntara, O Sudharman !* but each and every object (like *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*) in this Universe, is being produced, destroyed, or retained in its present state at every moment by virtue of a number of similar and dissimilar *paryāyas.* But on the other hand, all the three worlds resemble each other also on account of certain common properties. Consequently, a past life may also resemble the present life on account of some common properties contained in both.

को सव्वहेव सरिसो असरिसो वा इहभवे परभवे वा ? ।
सरिसासरिसं सव्वं निच्चानिच्चाइरूवं च ॥ २४८ ॥ (१७९६)

Ko savvaheva sariso asariso vā ihabhave parabhave vā ? ।
Sarisāsarisam savvam niccāniccāirūvam ca ॥ 248 ॥ (1796)

[कः सर्वथैव सदृशोऽसदृशो वेहभवे परभवे वा ।
सदृशासदृशं सर्वं नित्यानित्यादिरूपं च ॥ २४८ ॥ (१७९६)

Kaḥ sarvathaiva sadṛiśo'sadriśo vehabhave parabhave vā ? ।
Sadṛiśāsadṛisam sarvam nityānityādirūpam ca ॥ 248 ॥ (1796)]

Trans.—248 What (object) is (taken as) completely similar or dissimilar either in this life or in the next life ? Everything is similar as well as dissimilar having permanent as well as transitory forms. (1796)

टीका—को ह्यर्थोऽर्थान्तरैरात्मना वा सहेहभवेऽपि सर्वथा सदृशोऽदृशो वा, किं पुनः परभवे ? । तस्मात् सर्वमपि वस्तु सर्वेणापि सह समाना-ऽसमानरूपमेवेहभवेऽपि, इति कुतः परभवे सादृश्यमेव प्रतिज्ञायते भवता ? इति भावः । तथा, सर्वमपि नित्या-ऽनित्याद्यनन्तधर्मात्मकमिति ॥ २४८ ॥ (१७९६) ॥

D. C.—It is not possible to find an object which is similar or dissimilar to other objects or even to itself even in this life, and much less in the other.

All objects are found to be similar as well as dissimilar to other objects even in this life. So, it is no use holding the view that they are the same in the other life also. Similarly, all objects have permanent as well as transitory forms.

This idea is illustrated by an example stated below—

जह नियएहिं वि सरिसो न जुवा भुवि बाल–वुड्ढधम्मेहिं।
जगओ वि समो सत्ताइएहिं तह परभवे जीवो॥२४९॥ (१७९७)

Jaha niyaehim vi sariso na juvā bhuvi bāla–vuḍḍhadhammehim।
Jagao vi samo sattāiehim taha parabhave jîvo ॥ 249 ॥ (1797)

[यथा निजकैरपि सदृशो न युवा भुवि बाल–वृद्धधर्मैः।
जगतोऽपि समः सत्तादिकैस्तथा परभवे जीवः ॥ २४९ ॥ (१७९७)

Yathā nijakairapi sadriśo na yuvā bhuvi bāla–vriddhadharmaiḥ।
Jagato'pi samaḥ sattādikaistathā parabhave jîvaḥ ॥249॥ (1797)]

Trans.—249 Just as a young man does not resemble his own past and future forms of childhood and old age respectively on (this) earth, but at the same time resembles the whole of earth on account of the property of existing etc., in the same way, *jîva*, too, becomes similar as well as dissimilar in the other life. (1797)

टीका–यथेह युवा निजैरप्यतीता–ऽनागतैर्बाल–वृद्धादिपर्यायै–रात्मनोऽपि सर्वथा न समानः, सत्तादिभिस्तु सामान्यपर्यायैर्जगति न केनचिद् न समानः, तथायमपि जीवः परलोकं गतः सर्वेणापि सह समाना–ऽसमानरूप एव, इति कुतः सर्वथा सादृश्यम्? इति ॥ २४९ ॥ (१७९७)

D. C.—Just as a young man does not resemble his own forms of childhood and old age, but at the same time resembles

all other objects in this world on account of certain common properties like the quality of existing etc., in the same way. *Jîvas* in the other life are not merely similar but dissimilar to other objects also.

Moreover,

मणुओ देवीभूओ सरिसो सत्ताइएहिं जगओ वि ।
देवाईहि विसरिसो निच्चानिच्चो वि एमेव ॥ २५० ॥ (१७९८)

Manuo devîbhūo sariso sattāiehim jagao vi ।
Devāihi visariso niccānicco vi emeva ॥ 250 ॥ (1798)

[मनुजो देवीभूतः सदृशः सत्तादिकैर्जगतोऽपि ।
देव(त्व)ादिर्भिर्विसदृशो नित्यानित्योऽप्येवमेव ॥ २५० ॥ (१७९८)

Manujo devîbhūtah sadṛiśaḥ sattādikair-jagato'pi ।
Deva(tvā)dibhir-visadriśo nityānityo'pyevameva ॥ 250 ॥ (1798)]

Trans.—250 A divine man resembles the whole of mundane world on account of (properties like) existence etc. and is distinguished (from it) as well by means of (his) state of being a deity etc. In the same way, (he) is permanent and at the same time transitory also. (1798)

टीका–मनुष्यो मृत्वा देवत्वमापन्नो जगत्त्रयस्यापि सत्तादिभिः पर्यायैः सदृशः, देवत्वादिभिस्तु विसदृशः, इति नैकान्तेन क्वापि सदृशता । तथा, द्रव्यतयाऽसौ नित्यः, पर्यायतया त्वनित्य इत्याद्यपि वक्तव्यम् । अत्राह— नन्वस्माभिरपि नैकान्तेन परभवे सादृश्यमभ्युपगम्यते, किन्तु समानजात्यन्वयमात्रमेवेष्यते, पुरुषादिर्मृतः पुरुषादिरेव भवतीति । एतदप्ययुक्तम्, कर्मजनितो हि परभव इति साधितम् । तच्च मिथ्यात्वादिविचित्रहेतुजन्यत्वाद् विचित्रमेवेति, अतस्तज्जन्यः परभवो विचित्र एव युज्यते, न तु समानजात्यन्वयः सिध्यतीति ॥ २५० ॥ (१७९८) ॥

D. C.—A person who becomes *deva* after death, resembles all the three worlds, on account of the common characteristics

like existence etc., but, at the same time, he is distinguished from the three worlds on account of his *devatva* etc. This shows that absolute *sadṛis'atā* is not acceptible but *visadṛis'atā* has also equal scope with it. Similarly, all objects are *nitya* on account of their *dravyatva*, and, at the same time, *a-nitya* because of their varied transformations.

Sudharman:—I accept *sadṛisatā* of objects on account of nothing but their relation to the same gender. That is, according to me, *puruṣa* turns out to be a *puruṣa* and animals remain as animals in the *bhavāntara*.

Bhagavān:—Your argument, *O Sudharman!* is fallacious. The next life is attained by virtue of actions accomplished in this life. These actions come into existence on account of various *hetus* such as *mithyātva* etc. Hence, *bhavāntara* which is produced by these actions should also be taken as *vicitratā* on account of the *vicitratā* of actions, but *sadṛis'atā* can never fit in by means of their relation to the *sadṛis'a* gender etc.

For,

उक्करिसा–ऽवक्करिसा न समाणाए वि जेण जाईए ।
सरिसग्गाहे जम्हा दाणाइफलं विहा तम्हा ॥ २५१ ॥ (१७९९)

Ukkarisā–'vakkarisā na samāṇāe vi jeṇa jāîe ।
Sarisaggāhe jamhā dāṇāiphalam vihā tamhā ॥ 251 ॥ (1799)

[उत्कर्षा–ऽपकर्षौ न समानायामपि येन जातौ ।
सदृशग्रहे यस्माद् दानादिफलं वृथा तस्मात् ॥ २५१ ॥ (१७९९)

Utkarṣā–'pakarṣau na samānāyāmpi yena jātau ।
Sadṛiśagrahe yasmād dānādiphalam vṛithā tasmāt ॥251॥ (1799)]

Trans.—251 In (case of) (absolute) sameness, there will be no (scope for) elevation or degradation even in the

same genesis, (and) the fruits of munificence etc. will become futile. (1799)

टीका–सदृशग्रहे समानजातीयताग्रहे सति समानायामपि जातौ येन यस्मादीश्वर-दरिद्र-कुलीना-ऽकुलीनादिरूपेणोत्कर्षा–ऽपकर्षौ न घटां प्राञ्चतः। यो हि यादृश इहभवे, स यदि परभवेऽपि तादृश एव, तर्हि य इहभवे ईश्वरः स परभवेऽपि तादृश एव, एवं दरिद्रादिष्वपि वाच्यम्। ततश्चेहभवात् परभवे सर्वप्रकारैरप्युत्कर्षा–ऽपकर्षौ न स्याताम्, किन्त्वेकान्तसदृशतैव भवेत्। "तम्ह त्ति" तस्माद् मोक्तव्योऽयं सादृश्यग्रह इति प्रक्रमाद् द्रष्टव्यम्। अथेत्थमाचक्षीथाः–मा भूतामुत्कर्षा–ऽपकर्षौ, का नो हानिः ? इत्याह— "जम्हा दाणाइफलं विह त्ति" चकारस्य गम्यमानत्वाद् यस्माच्चेत्थं परत्रोत्कर्षा-ऽपकर्षयोरभावे दानादिफलं वृथा संपद्यते। लोको हि परत्र देवादिसमृद्धि-प्राप्त्याऽऽत्मन उत्कर्षार्थं दानादिप्रवृत्तिं विदधाति। यदि चोक्तयुक्त्योत्कर्षाद्य-भावाद् दरिद्रो दान–तपस्–तीर्थावगाहनाद्यपि कृत्वाऽमुत्र दरिद्र एव स्यात्, तर्हि क्व तद्दानादिफलम् ? इत्यपार्थिका दानादौ प्रवृत्तिः, तस्माद् न विधेयः सादृश्यग्रह इति ॥ २५१ ॥ (१७९९) ॥

D. C.—If you believe in absolute sameness, there will be no scope either for elevation or for degradation even in the same genesis. One who is rich in this life will remain rich in the next life also in spite of his sinful actions, and a poor man will remain poor in the next life even if he performs benevolent duties such as *dāna, tapas, tîrtha–snāna* etc., according to your belief of absolute *sadṛis'atā*. Thus, there will be no reward of either good or evil actions, but the same type of life will go on throughout all the *bhavas*. So, if there is no *utkarṣa* or *apakarṣa* in the next life, there will be no utility for various benevolent actions such as munificence, austerities, ablations in holy waters etc., to be followed by people for the attainment of *Vevatva* etc. To believe in absolute *sadṛis'atā* is, therefore, not proper. 251 (1799).

And the *Vedapadas* will also be wrong if absolute *sādṛis'ya* is accepted—

जं च सिगालो वइ एस जायए वेयविहियमिच्चाइं ।
सग्गीयं जं च फलं तमसंबद्धं सरिसयाए ॥ २५२ ॥ (१८००)

Jam ca sigālo vai esa jāyae Veyavihiyamiccāim ।
Saggîyam jam ca phalam tamasanbaddham sarisayāe ॥252॥ (1800)

[यच्च शृगालो वै एष जायते वेदविहितमित्यादि ।
स्वर्गीयं यच्च फलं तदसंबद्धं सदृशतायाम् ॥ २५२ ॥ (१८००)

Yacca śrigālo vai eṣa jāyate Vedavihitamityādi ।
Svargîyam yacca phalam tadasaṃbaddham sadṛiśatāyām ॥ 252 ॥]

Trans.—252 Statements of *Vedas* such as "*Srigālo vai esa jāyate*" etc., as well as the reward of heaven laid down by *Vedas*, will prove inconsistent in (case of) *sadriśatā* (being admitted). (1800)

टीका–यच्च "शृगालो वै एष जायते यः सपुरीषो दह्यते" इत्यादि वेदविहितं तदपि परभवसदृशताग्रहेऽसंबद्धमेव स्यात्, पुरुषादेरमुत्र शृगालतयानुपपत्तेः । तथा, यदपि "अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामः" तथा, "अग्निष्टोमेन यमराज्यमभिजयति" इत्यादिकं स्वर्गीयफलसूचकत्वात् स्वर्गीयं फलं तदप्यसंबद्धं भवेत्, मनुष्यस्य त्वदभिप्रायेण देवत्वानुपपत्तेरिति । "पुरुषो वै पुरुषत्वमश्नुते, पशवः पशुत्वम्" इत्यादीनां च वेदपदानामयमर्थः–कोऽपि पुरुषः खल्विह जन्मनि प्रकृत्या भद्रको विनीतः सानुक्रोशोऽमत्सरश्च मनुष्य नाम–गोत्रे कर्मणी बद्ध्वा मृतः सन् पुरुषत्वमश्नुते, न तु नियमेन सर्व एव, अन्यस्यान्यकर्मवशगस्यान्यथाप्युत्पत्तेः । एवं पशवोऽपि केचिद् मायादिदोषवशात् पशुनाम–गोत्रे कर्मणी बद्ध्वा परभवे पशवो जायन्ते, न तु सर्वेऽपि, नियमेन कर्मापेक्षित्वाज्जीवगतेरिति । तदेवं तस्यापि च्छिन्नः संशयः ॥ २५२ ॥ (१८००) ॥

D. C.—If it is admitted, O blessed *Sudharman* ! that the next life is exactly similar to this life, the sentences of *Vedas* such as "*Śrigālo vai eṣa jāyate yaḥ sa-purîṣo dahyate*" etc., which tell us that, one who is burnt along with foeces becomes fox

in the next life, will turn to be inconsistent. For, according to you, man should become man only in the next life. Secondly, sentences like "*agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ*" and "*agniṣṭomena yamarājamabhijayati*" which lay down the conditions for the attainment of *svarga*, will also become inconsistent because man does never become deity according to your theory of *sadṛis'tā*.

The real interpretation of *puruṣo vai puruṣatvamas'nute pas'avaḥ pas'utvam*" etc. is this:—A person who is pious, cultured, and self-less, attains the genesis of man when he dies away after having attached his actions to the human name and lineage. But that does not mean that all *puruṣas* attain *puruṣatva* as a rule. By virtue of different types of actions, people are liable to be born in an absolutely different genesis also. The same is the case with animals. On account of certain faults like illusion etc. certain animals remain as animals when they pass away in the next life, having attached their actions to the name and lineage of animals. But all *pas'us* do not attain *pas'utva* as a rule because their movement from one *bhava* to another depends upon their actions.

Thus,

छिन्नम्मि संसयम्मि जिणेण जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
सो समणो पव्वइओ पंचहिं सह खंडियसएहिं ॥२५३॥(१८०१)

Chinnammi samsayammi Jiṇeṇa jarā-maranavippamukkeṇam।
So samaṇo pavvaio pancahim saha khandiyasaehim ॥253॥ (1801)

Trans.—253 When the doubt was removed by the *Tirthaṅkara* who was entirely free from old age and death, that Saint *(Sudharman)* accepted *dîksā* along with his five hundred pupils. (1801)

End of the Discussion with the Fifth Gaṇadhara.

Chapter VI



षष्ठगणधरवक्तव्यता ।

Discussion with the Sixth Gaṇadhara

ते पव्वइए सोउं मंडिओ आगच्छइ जिणसगासं ।
वच्चामि ण वंदामी वंदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ॥ २५४ ॥ (१८०२)

Te pavvaie so um Maṇḍio āgacchai Jiṇasagāsam ।
Vaccāmi ṇa vandāmî vanditā pajjuvāsāmi ॥ 254 ॥ (1802)

[तान् प्रव्रजितान् श्रुत्वा मण्डिक आगच्छति जिनसकाशम् ।
व्रजामि वन्दे वन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ॥ २५४ ॥ (१८०२)

Tān pravrajitān śrutvā Maṇḍika āgacchati Jinasakāśam ।
Vrajāmi vande vanditvā paryupāse ॥ 254 ॥ ((1802)]

Trans.—254 Having heard that they had renounced the world, *Maṇḍika* comes before the *Tîrthaṅkara*. (He thinks) :- I may go, pay my homage, and worship him. (1802)

टीका–व्याख्या पूर्ववत् नवरं मण्डिको नाम षष्ठो द्विजोपाध्यायः श्रीमज्जिनसकाशमागच्छतीति ॥ २५४ ॥ (१८०२)

D. C.—Now the sixth *Gaṇadhara* named *Maṇḍika*, comes before the *Tîrthaṅkara* and starts discussion.

आभट्ठो य जिणेणं जाइ–जरा–मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
नामेणं य गोत्रेण य सव्वण्णू सव्वदरिसी णं ॥२५५॥ (१८०२)

Ābhaṭṭho ya Jiṇeṇam jāi-jarā-maraṇavippamukkeṇam ।
Nāmeṇam ya gotrena ya savvaṇṇū savvadarisî ṇam ॥255॥ (1803)

[आभाषितश्च जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ॥ २५५ ॥ (१८०३)

Ābhāṣitaśca Jinena jāti-jarā-maraṇavipramuktena ।
Nāmnā ca gotreṇa ca sarvajñena sarvadarśinā ॥ 255 ॥ (1803)]

Trans.—255 He was addressed by his name, and lineage by the *Tîrthaṅkara*, who was free from birth, old age, and death, who was omniscient, and who had complete *darśana* (undifferentiated knowledge). (1803)

The *Tîrthaṅkara* then said—

**किं मन्ने बंध-मोक्खा संति न संति त्ति संसओ तुज्झं ।
वेयपयाण य अत्थं न याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो ॥२५६॥ (१८०४)**

Kim manne bandha-mokkhā santi na santi tti saṃsao tujjham ।
Veyapayāṇa ya attham na yāṇasî tesimo attho ॥ 256 ॥ (1804)

[किं मन्यसे बन्ध-मोक्षौ स्तो न स्त इति संशयस्तव ।
वेदपदानां चार्थं न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ २५६ ॥ (१८०४)

Kim manyase bandha-mokṣau sto na sta iti saṃśayastava ।
Vedapadānām cārtham na jānāsi teṣāmayamarthaḥ ॥256॥(1804)]

Trans.—256 What do you think about ? You entertain doubt as to whether *bandha* (worldly bondages) and *moksa* (Final Liberation), exist or not. But *(ca)*, you do not know the (real) meaning of the sentences of *Vedas*. Their (real) interpretation is this. (1804)

टीका-मण्डिक ! त्वमित्थं मन्यसे-किं बन्ध-मोक्षौ स्तो न वा ? इति । अयं चानुचितस्तव संशयः, विरुद्धवेदपदश्रुतिनिबन्धनत्वात्, तथाहि—" स एष विगुणो विभुर्न बध्यते संसरति वा, न मुच्यते मोचयति वा, न वा एष बाह्यमभ्यन्तरं वा वेद " इत्यादीनि वेदपदानि, तथा, " न ह वै सशरीरस्य

प्रिया-ऽप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति, अशरीरं वा वसन्तं प्रिया-ऽप्रिये न स्पृशतः " इत्यादीनि च । एतेषां चार्थं त्वं न जानासि, यतोऽयमेतदर्थस्तव चेतसि वर्तते, तद्यथा-स एषः-अधिकृतो जन्तुः, विगुणः-सत्त्व-रजस्-तमोगुणरहितः, विभुः-सर्वगतः, न बध्यते-पुण्य-पापाभ्यां न युज्यत इत्यर्थः, संसरति वा 'न' इत्यनुवर्तते, न मुच्यते-न कर्मणा वियुज्यते, बन्धस्यैवाभावात्; मोचयति वा नान्यम्, इत्यनेनाकर्तृकत्वमाहः न वा एष बाह्यम्-आत्मभिन्नं महदहङ्कारादि, अभ्यन्तरं-निजस्वरूपमेव, वेद-विजानाति, प्रकृतिधर्मत्वाज्ज्ञानस्य, प्रकृतेश्चाचेतनत्वात् । ततश्चामूनि किल बन्ध-मोक्षाभावप्रतिपादकानि । तथा, न ह वै-नैवेत्यर्थः, सशरीरस्य प्रिया-ऽप्रिययोरपहतिरस्तीति-बाह्या-ऽऽध्यात्मिकानादिशरीरसंतानयुक्तत्वात् सुख-दुःखयोरपहतिः संसारिणो नास्तीत्यर्थः, अशरीरं वा वसन्तं-अमूर्तमित्यर्थः, प्रिया-ऽप्रिये न स्पृशतः, तत्कारणभूतस्य कर्मणोऽभावादित्यर्थः । अमूनि च बन्ध-मोक्षाभिधायकानीति। अतः संशयः । तत्र "स एष विगुणो विभुः" इत्यादीनां नायमर्थः, किन्त्वयं वक्ष्यमाणलक्षण इति ॥ २५६ ॥ (१८०४)

D. C.—O Mandika ! You doubt the existence of *bandha* and *mokṣa*, because you have heard various *Vedapadas* having contradictory meanings.

" *Sa eṣa viguṇvo vibhu r-na badhyate saṃsarati vā na mucyate mocayati vā na vā eṣa bāhyamabhyantaram vā veda* " etc. as well as like,

" *Na ha vai sa-s'arîrasya priyā-priyayorapahatir asti, as'arîram vā vasantam priyā-priye na spṛis'ataḥ* " etc.

You have not grasped the real meaning of these sentences. According to you, the interpretation of the first sentence is this :—The all-pervading Soul, which being free from attributes like *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, is never bound by the clutches of *pāpa* and *puṇya*, nor does it proceed further. Since there is absolute *bandhābhāva*, this (Soul) can neither be detatched from *karma*, nor can it relieve the other from the *bandhas*.

It knows neither the external attributes like pride etc. nor does it recognize its own internal self, on account of *jñāna* being the property of *prakṛiti* which is *acetana* here. So, the statements such as stated above, assert the absolute *abhāva* of *bandha* and *mokṣa* between *jîva* and *Karma*.

On the other hand, sentences such as, "*na ha vai*" etc., would mean quite the reverse (according to you). They assert that there is no *abhāva* of *priya*, and *a-priya*, to one having *sarîra*, while the *a-sarîri ātman* is never touched by them. Since the external, as well as, internal *anādi sarîras* are *saṃtānayukta*, the *samsārî jivas* are not deprived of the experiences of *sukha* and *duḥkha*, while the *a-s'arîri ātman* is never touched by *sukha* and *duḥkha* on account of the absolute *abhāva* of its *Karaṇa*, the *Karman*. Thus, these *Vedapadas* are inclined to assert the existence of *bandha* and *moksa*.

Such sentences have given rise to your doubt, which is not at all proper. Your interpretation of the sentences is not correct. I, therefore, give you their real interpretation. Please listen carefully—

तं मन्नसि जइ बंधो जोगो जीवस्स कम्मुणा समयं ।
पुव्वं पच्छा जीवो कम्मं व समं व ते होज्जा ? ॥२५७॥ (१८०५)

Tam mannasi jai bandho jogo jîvassa kammuṇā samayam ।
Puvvam pacchā jîvo kammam va samam va te hojjā ? ॥257॥ (1805)

[त्वं मन्यसे यदि बन्धो योगो जीवस्य कर्मणा समकम् ।
पूर्वं पश्चाज्जीवः कर्म वा समं वा ते भवेताम् ? ॥ २५७ ॥ (१८०५)

Tvam manyase yadi bandho yogo jîvasya karmaṇā samakam ।
Pūrvam paścājjîvaḥ karma vā samam vā te bhavetām ? ॥ 257 ॥]

Trans.—257 If you believe that *bandha* is the union of *jîva* with *Karma*, will the *jîva* be produced first and then *Karma*, or *Karma* be produced first and then *jîva*, or both together ? (1805)

टीका–' वेयपयाण य ' इत्यत्र चशब्दाद् युक्तिं च त्वं न जानासि। कुतः ? यस्मादायुष्मन् मण्डिक ! त्वमेवं मन्यसे–जीवस्य बन्धो यदि कर्मणा समकं सार्धं योगः संयोगोऽभिप्रेतः स खल्वादिमान् आदिरहितो वा ?। यद्यादिमान्, ततः किं पूर्वं जीवः प्रसूयेत पश्चात् कर्म, पूर्वं वा कर्म पश्चाज्जीवः प्रसूयेत, समं वा युगपद् वा तौ द्वावपि प्रसूयेयाताम् ? इति पक्षत्रयमिति ॥ २५७ ॥ (१८०५) ॥

D. C.—If, O long-lived *Maṇḍika,* you believe that *bandha* means the contact of *jîva* with *Karma,* consider whether that contact is *ādimān* or *ādirahita.* If it is *ādimān* there will be three alternatives: (1) *Jîva* will be produced first and then *Karma* or (2) *Karma* will be produced first and then *jîva* or (3) both of them will be produced simultaneously.

Refuting the first alternative, the author states :—

न हि पुव्वमहेऊओ खरसंगं वायसंभवो जुत्तो ।
निक्कारणजायस्स य निक्कारणउ च्चिय विणासो ॥२५८॥(१८०६)

Na hi puvvamaheūo kharasaṅgam vāyasaṃbhavo jutto ।
Nikkāraṇajāyassa ya nikkāranau cciya viṇāso ॥ 258 ॥ (1806)

[न हि पूर्वमहेतोः खरशृङ्गमिवात्मसंभवो युक्तः ।
निष्कारणजातस्य च निष्कारणक एव विनाशः ॥ २५८ ॥ (१८०६)

Na hi pūrvamahetoḥ kharasṛiṅgamivātmasaṃbhavo yuktaḥ ।
Niṣkāraṇajātasya ca niskāraṇaka eva vināśaḥ ॥ 258 ॥ (1806)]

Trans.—258 Like *kharaśriṅga,* the production of Soul is not justified on account of the absence of *hetu.* And that which is born without any cause, has its end (also) without any cause. (1806)

टीका–"पूर्वं जीवः पश्चात्कर्म" इत्येतदयुक्तम्, यतो न कर्मणः पूर्वं "खरसंगं वायसंभवो जुत्तो" खरशृङ्गस्येवात्मनः संभवो युक्तः, अहेतुकत्वात्,

इह यदहेतुकं तद् न जायते, यथा खरशृङ्गम्, यच्च जायते तद् निर्हेतुकमपि न भवति, यथा घटः, निष्कारणस्य च जातस्य निष्कारण एव विनाशः स्यादिति ॥ २५८ ॥ (१८०६) ॥

D. C.—According to the first alternative stated above, *jîva* is born first and then *Karma*. Now since *Karma* is the *hetu* of *jîvas*, the production of *jîva* is totally unjustified *like* the production of *khara-s'ṛiṅga* on account of its *a-hetuktva*. For, that which has no *hetu*, is never produced like *khara-sṛiṅga*, and that which has already been produced is never *nir-hetuka* as in case of *ghaṭa*. Moreover, that which is born without any cause, has even to meet its end without any end.

Proceeding further the author argues—

अहवाऽणाइ च्चिय सो निक्कारणओ न कम्मजोगो से ।
अह निक्कारणओ सो, मुक्कस्स वि होहिइ स भुज्जो ॥ २५९ ॥

Ahavā'ṇāi cciya so nikkāraṇao na kammajogo se ।
Aha nikkāranao so, mukkassa vi hohii sa bhujjo ॥ 259 ॥ (1807)

[अथवाऽनादिरेव स निष्कारणको न कर्मयोगस्तस्य ।
अथ निष्कारणः सः, मुक्तस्यापि भविष्यति स भूयः ॥२५९॥ (१८०७)

Athavā'nādireva sa niṣkāraṇako na karmayogastasya ।
Atha niṣkāraṇaḥ saḥ muktasyāpi bhaviṣyati sa bhūyaḥ ॥259॥(1807)]

Trans.—259 Or, that (soul) being *anādi*, may be beyond any cause, and (hence) have no connection with *Karma*. If it were beyond any cause, it might have belonged to a *mukta* being also. (1807)

टीका-अथ चेत् कर्मणः पूर्वमात्माऽनादिकालसिद्ध एव, इति किं तस्य सहेतुक-निर्हेतुकचिन्तया ? इति । अत्रोच्यते-"निक्कारणओ इत्यादि" यद्येवम्, ततः "से" तस्य जीवस्य कर्मयोगः कर्मबन्धो न प्राप्नोति, अकारणत्वात्, नभस इव । अथ निष्कारणोऽप्यसौ भवति, तर्हि मुक्तस्यापि

भूयः स भविष्यति, निष्कारणत्वाविशेषात्, ततश्च मुक्तावप्यनाश्वास इति ॥ २५९ ॥ (१८०७) ॥

D. C.—Maṇḍika:—Existence of soul has already been established from times immemorial before *Karma* was produced. It is, therefore, useless to consider whether its production is *sa-hetuka* or *nir-hetuka.*

Bhagavān :—In that case, *O Maṇḍika !* on account of its causelessness, *ātman* will have no bondage with *Karma* as it has no bondage with *ākāś'a.*

Maṇḍika :—No, in spite of its causelessness, the soul is in contact with *Karma.*

Bhagavān :—Then, it will be attached to a *mukta* (liberated) being also. Thus, one that has already been liberated from the worldly bondages, will again come into those bondages on account of the common property, *viz:-niṣkāraṇatā* belonging to both of them. 259 (1807).

होज्ज स निच्चमुक्को बंधाभावम्मि को व से मोक्खो ? ।
न हि मुक्कव्ववएसो बंधाभावे मओ नभसो ॥ २६० ॥ (१८०८)

Hojja sa niccamukko bandhābhāvammi ko va se mokkho ? ।
Na hi mukkavvavaeso bandhābhāve mao nabhaso ॥ 260 ॥ (1808)

[भवेत् स नित्यमुक्तो बन्धाभावे को वा तस्य मोक्षः ? ।
न हि मुक्तव्यपदेशो बन्धाभावे मतो नभसः ॥ २६० ॥ (१८९८)

Bhavet sa nityamukto bandhābhāve ko vā tasya mokṣaḥ ? ।
Na hi muktavyapadeśo bandhābhāve mato nabhasaḥ ॥260॥ (1808)]

Trans.—260 If it is ever liberated in absence of bondage, how will its *moksa* exist ? For, in absence of bondage, attribute of liberation could never be accepted as in the case of *ākāśa.* (1808)

टीका-अथवा, कर्मयोगाभावाद् नित्यमुक्त एवासौ भवेत् । यदिवा,

बन्धाभावे कः किल तस्य मोक्षव्यपदेशः ? । न ह्यबद्धस्य नभसः कस्यापि मुक्तव्यपदेशो मतः, बन्धपूर्वकत्वाद् मोक्षस्य । तस्माद् न "पूर्वं जीवः पश्चात् कर्म" इति प्रथमविकल्प इति ॥ २६० ॥ (१८०८) ॥

D. C.—Maṇḍika :—On account of the *abhāva* of *Karmayoga*, this *ātman* is also *nitya-mukta*.

Bhagavān :—If it is so, *O Maṇḍika*, how will *mokṣa* be attributed to it? For, one that is not susceptible to *bandha*, is never susceptible to *mokṣa* also, as in the case of *ākāś'a*. *Mokṣa* can be attributed only to those that undergo *bandhas*. The first alternative that *jîva* is produced first and then *Karma*, is, therefore, not acceptible. 260 (1808).

Now, the other two alternatives-*viz.*, that *Karma* is produced first and *jîva* afterwards or that both of them are produced simultaneously—are refuted as follows :—

न य कम्मस्स वि पुव्वं कत्तुरभावे समुब्भवो जुत्तो ।
निक्कारणओ सो वि य तह जुगवुप्पत्तिभावे य ॥२६१॥ (१८०९)

न हि कत्ता कज्जं ति य जुगवुप्पत्तीए जीव-कम्माणं ।
जुत्तो ववएसोऽयं जह लोए गोविसाणाणं ॥ २६२ ॥ (१८१०)

Na ya kammassa vi puvvam katturabhāve samubbhavo jutto ।
Nikkāranao so vi ya taha jugavuppattibhāve ya ॥ 261 ॥ (1809)

Na hi kattā kajjam ti ya jugavuppattîe jîva-kammāṇam ।
Jutto vavaeso'yam jaha loe govisāṇāṇam ॥ 262 ॥ (1810)

[न च कर्मणोऽपि पूर्वं कर्तुरभावे समुद्भवो युक्तः ।
निष्कारणकः सोऽपि च तथा युगपदुत्पत्तिभावे च ॥२६१॥ (१८०९)

न हि कर्ता कार्यमिति च युगपदुत्पत्तौ जीव-कर्मणोः ।
युक्तो व्यपदेशोऽयं यथा लोके गोविषाणयोः ॥ २६२ ॥ (१८१०)

Na ca karmaṇo'pi pūrvam karturabhāve samudbhavo yuktaḥ ।
Niṣkāraṇakaḥ so'pi ca tathā yugapadūtpattibhāve ca ॥261॥ (1809)
Na hi kartā kāryamiti ca yugapadutpattau jîva–karmaṇoḥ ।
Yukto vyapadeśo'yam yathā loke goviṣāṇayoḥ ॥ 262 ॥ (1810)]

Trans.—261–262 It is not appropriate (to believe) the production of *Karma* to be first in absence of *Kartā*, nor is it so even it it is *niskāraṇaka.* In case of both being produced simultaneously, the same (difficulties) will arise. Moreover, in (case of) simultaneous production of *jîva* and *Karma,* designation of *kartā* and *kārya* will not properly fit in as found in the propular example of the two horns of a cow. (1809–1810)

टीका–न च जीवात् प्राक् कर्मणोऽपि समुद्भवो युक्तः, कर्तुर्जीवस्य तदानीमभावात्, अक्रियमाणस्य च कर्मत्वायोगात्, निष्कारणश्चेत्थमसौ कर्मसमुद्भवः स्यात्, ततोऽकारणजातस्याकारणत एव विनाशोऽपि स्यादिति। तथा, युगपदुत्पत्तिभावे च "प्रत्येकपक्षोक्ता दोषाः वाच्याः" इति शेषः— निर्हेतुकत्वात् प्रत्येकवदुभयस्यापि समुदितस्यानुत्पत्तिरित्यादि। न च युगपदुत्पन्नयोर्जीव–कर्मणोः कर्तृ–कर्मभावो युज्यत इत्येतदेवाह—"न हीत्यादि" न हि युगपदुत्पन्नयोर्जीव–कर्मणोः "अयं जीवः कर्ता" "इदं वा ज्ञानावरणादिपुद्गलनिकुरम्बं कर्म" इति व्यपदेशो युज्यते, यथा लोके सव्येत्तरगोविषाणयोरिति ॥ २६१–२६२ ॥ (१८०९–१८१०) ॥

D. C.—It is not appropriate to accept that *Karma* is produced first and *jîva* afterwards. For, the production of *Karma* is not possible without *jîva,* which is the *Kartā* at the same time. And if that production of *Karma* is *niṣkāraṇaka,* its end will also be *niṣkāraṇaka.*

It is also not proper to say that *jîva* and *Karma* are produced simultaneously. Because, in that case also, both being *nir-hetuka,* the same difficulties will arise.

Moreover, if *jîva* and *Karma* are produced together, they will no longer be taken as *kartā* and *kārya* but like the two

horns of a cow, they will be taken as twins produced together. 261–262 (1809–1810).

Now, coming to the second alternative at the root, the author proceeds :—

होज्जाणाईओ वा संबंधो तह वि न घडए मोक्खो ।
जोऽणाई सोऽणंतो जीव–नहाणं व संबंधो ॥ २६३ ॥ (१८११)

Hojjāṇāīo vā sambandho taha vi na ghaḍae mokkho ।
Jo'ṇāî so'nanto jîva–nahāṇam va sambandho ॥ 263 ॥ (1811)

[भवेदनादिको वा संबन्धस्तथापि न घटते मोक्षः ।
योऽनादिः सोऽनन्तो जीव–नभसोरिव संबन्धः ॥ २६३ ॥ (१८११)

Bhavedanādiko vā saṃbandhastathāpi na ghaṭate mokṣaḥ ।
Yo'nādiḥ so'nanto jîva-nabhasoriva saṃbandhaḥ ॥263॥ (1811)]

Trans.—263 Or, if the contact (of *jîva* with *Karma*) (taken as) *anādika* (without any beginning), there will nothing like *mokṣa.* That which is *anādi* like the contact *jîva* and *ākāśa*, is *ananta* (endless) also. (1811)

टीका–स्यादेतत्, अनादिरेव जीव–कर्मणोः संबन्धः संयोगः । ननु तथापि मोक्षो न घटते, यस्माद् योऽनादिः संयोगः सोऽनन्तो दृष्टः, यथा जीव–नभसोः । न ह्याकाशेन सह जीवस्य कदाचिदपि संयोगो निवर्तते । एवं कर्मणापि सहासौ न निवर्तेत, तथा च सति मुक्त्यभावप्रसङ्ग इति ॥ २६३ ॥ (१८११) ॥

D. C.—If the contact of *jîva* with *Karma* is *anādika*, it should be even *ananta* like the contact of *jîva* with sky, and in that case there will be no scope for *mokṣa* at all.

इय जुत्तीए न घटइ सुव्वइ य सुईसु बंध–मोक्खा त्ति ।
तेण तुह संसओऽयं न य कज्जोऽयं जहा सुणसु ॥ २६४ ॥

Iya juttîe na ghaṭai suvvai ya suîsu bandha-mokkhā tti ।
Teṇa tuha samsao'yam na ya kajjo'yam jahā suṇasu ॥264॥ (1812)

[इति युक्त्या न घटते श्रूयते च श्रुतिषु बन्धमोक्षाविति ।
तेन तव संशयोऽयं न च कार्योऽयं यथा श्रुणु ॥ २६४ ॥ (१८१२)

Iti yuktyā na ghaṭate śrūyate ca śrutiṣu bandha-mokṣāviti ।
Tena tava saṃśayo'yam na ca kāryo'yam yathā śṛiṇu ॥264॥ (1812)]

Trans.—264 Thus by means of the above-mentioned argument, *bandha* and *moksa* do not fit in. Still however, it is heard in the *Vedas* (that they exist). This doubt of yours —which is (absolutely) improper—is due to that. So, listen to me (now). (1812)

टीका–इत्येवं युक्तयुक्त्या बन्धो मोक्षश्च न घटते, श्रूयते च श्रुतिषु वेदवाक्येष्वसौ । ततस्तव संशयोऽयम् । यथा चायं न कार्यस्तथा श्रृणु सौम्य ! इति । उक्तः पूर्वपक्षः ॥ २६४ ॥ (१८१२) ॥

D. C.—The arguments advanced by you do not lead one to prove the existence of *bandha* and *mokṣa* as seen above. But, since it has already been found in *Vedas* that they exist, your doubt has come into existence, which is totally unworthy of you. Now, listen to me. 264 (1812).

संताणोऽणाईओ परोप्परं हेउ–हेउभावाओ ।
देहस्स य कम्मस्स य मंडिय ! बीयं–कुराणां व ॥२६५॥(१८१३)

Santāṇo'ṇāîo paropparam heu-heubhāvāo ।
Dehassa ya kammassa ya Mandiya ! bîyaṃ-kurāṇām va॥265॥(1813)

[संतानोऽनादिकः परस्परं हेतु–हेतुमद्भावात् ।
देहस्य च कर्मणश्च मण्डिक ! बीजा–ऽङ्कुरयोरिव ॥२६५॥ (१८१३)

Santāno'nādikaḥ parasparam hetu-hetubhāvāt ।
Dehasya ca karmaṇaśca Maṇḍika ! bîjā'ṅkurayoriva ॥265॥ (1813)]

Trans.—265 Since body and *Karma* are mutually related

like seed and sprout as *hetu* and *hetumat,* their expansion, *O Maṇḍika,* is *anādika.* (1813)

टीक–शरीर–कर्मणोरनादिः संतान इति प्रतिज्ञा, परस्परं हेतु–हेतुमद्भावात्, बीजाङ्कुरवदिति । ततश्च " किं पूर्वं जीवः पश्चात् कर्म " ? इत्यादि प्लवत एव, अनादित्वात् तत्संतानस्येति ॥ २६५ ॥ (१८१३) ॥

D. C.—The *santāna* of *s'arîra* and *Karma* is *anādi* because both of them are related to each other as *hetu* and *hetumat* like seed and sprout. On account of this *anāditva* of *santāna*, the argument that *jîva* is born first and *Karma* afterwards, will automatically be null and void. 265 (1813).

अत्थि स देहो जो कम्मकारणं जो य कज्जमण्णस्स ।
कम्मं च देहकारणमत्थि य जं कज्जमण्णस्स ॥२६६॥ (१८१४)

Atthi sa deho jo kammakāraṇam jo ya kajjamaṇṇassa ।
Kammam ca dehakāranamatthi ya jam kajjamaṇṇassa ॥266॥ (1814)

[अस्ति स देहो यः कर्मकारणं यश्च कार्यमन्यस्य ।
कर्म च देहकारणमस्ति च यत् कार्यमन्यस्य ॥ २६६ ॥ (१८१४)

Asti sa deho yaḥ karmakāraṇam yaśca kāryamanyasya ।
Karma ca dehakāraṇamasti ca yat kāryamanyasya ॥ 266 ॥ (1814)]

Trans.—266 The body is such that it becomes the cause of (one) *Karma*, and effect of another, while *Karma* is also the cause of (one) body, and the effect of another. (1814)

टीका–अस्ति स कश्चिद् देहो योऽग्रेतनस्य कर्मणः कारणम्, यश्चान्यस्या तीतस्य कर्मणः कार्यम्। तथा, कर्मापि समस्ति। किं विशिष्टम्? इत्याह–यदग्रेतनस्य देहस्य कारणम्, यच्चान्यास्यातीतस्य देहस्य कार्यमिति । एवमनादौ संसारे न क्वचिद् विश्राम्यति, अतोऽनादिर्देह–कर्मसंतान इति । आह–ननु बन्ध–मोक्षाविह साधयितुं प्रस्तुतौ, ततः कर्मसंतानस्यानादित्वसाधनमसंबद्धमिव लक्ष्यते । तदयुक्तम्, अभिप्रायापरिज्ञानात्, न ह्युक्तं

कर्म संभवति "क्रियत इति कर्म" इति व्युत्पत्तेः, यच्च तस्य करणमसावेव बन्ध इति कथं न तत्सिद्धिः ? ॥ २६६ ॥ (१८१४) ॥

D. C.—Some *deha* is such that it serves as the cause of some future actions, while it itself has already been the effect of some past actions. The *Karma* in turn also serves as the cause of some body to come, while it has itself been the effect of some other body in the past. Thus, in this *anādi saṃsāra* the *santāna* of *deha* and *Karma* is also *anādi* as it never stops to rest.

Maṇḍika:—But it is quite irrelevant to establish the *anāditva* of *Karma-santāna*. For, the point is to establish the existence of *bandha* and *mokṣa*

Bhagavān:—It is not so, *O Maṇḍika* ! "*Kriyate iti Karma*" that which is accomplished is action. So, an unaccomplished action is never possible. In the accomplishment of *Karma*, its *kāraṇa* is nothing but *bandha*, and hence the significance of establishing the *anāditva* of *Karma-santāna*.

Maṇḍika:—If that which has been accomplished is *Karma*, who is the *kartā* of this *deha* ? 266 (1814).

The *Bhagavān* replies—

कत्ता जीवो कम्मस्स करणओ जह घडस्स घडकारो ।
एवं चिय देहस्स वि कम्मकरणसंभवाउ त्ति ॥२६७॥(१८१५)

Kattā jîvo kammassa karaṇao jaha ghaḍassa ghaḍakāro ।
Evam ciya dehassa vi kammakaraṇasambhavāu tti ॥ 267 ॥ (1815)

[कर्ता जीवः कर्मणः करणतो यथा घटस्य घटकारः ।
एवमेव देहस्यापि कर्मकरणसंभवादिति ॥ २६७ ॥ (१८१५)

Kartā jîvaḥ karmaṇaḥ karaṇato yathā ghaṭasya ghaṭakāraḥ ।
Evameva dehasyāpi karmakaraṇasambhavāditi ॥ 267 ॥ (1815)]

Trans.—267 Just as *jīva* happens to be the *kartā* of *karma* as potter (is) of *ghata* by virtue of its instrumentality, so also, (it becomes the *kartā*) of *deha* by virtue of *karma* as (its) instrument. (1815)

टीका–कर्ता चात्र कर्मणो जीवः, करणसमेतत्वात्, दण्डादिकरणयुक्त-कुलालवद् घटस्य, करणं चेह जीवस्य कर्म निर्वर्तयतः शरीरमवगन्तव्यम्। एवं देहस्याप्यात्मैव कर्ता, कर्मरूपं करणं कर्मकरणं तत्संभवात्—तद्युक्त-त्वात्, दण्डादिकरणसमेतकुलालवदिति ॥ २६७ ॥ (१८१५) ॥

D. C.—Just as potter is called the *kartā* of *ghaṭa* because he is accompanied by various *karaṇas* such as *daṇḍa* etc, the Soul will also be called the *kartā* of *deha* by reason of its being accompanied by *Karma* as the *karaṇa*. 267 (1815).

Here, again, the opponent's view is stated and refuted—

कम्मं करणमसिद्धं व ते मई कज्जओ तयं सिद्धं ।
किरियाफलओ य पुणो पडिवज्ज तमग्गिभूइ व ॥२६८॥(१८१६)

Kammam karaṇamasiddham va te maî kajjao tayam siddham ।
Kiriyāphalao ya puno paḍivajja tamaggibhūi vva ॥268॥ (1816)

[कर्म करणमसिद्धं वा तव मतिः कार्यतस्तत् सिद्धम् ।
क्रियाफलतश्च पुनः प्रतिपद्यस्व तदग्निभूतिरिव ॥ २६८ ॥ (१८१६)

Karma karaṇamasiddham vā tava matiḥ kāryatastat siddham ।
Kriyāphalataśca punaḥ pratipadyasva tadagnibhūtiriva॥268॥(1816)]

Trans.—268 Or, (it may be) your belief that *Karma* cannot be proved as *karaṇa*; but it has been proved by (the help of) *kārya*. Moreover, like *Agnibhūti* (you should) accept it by reason of *kriyāphala* also. (1816)

टीका–स्यादेतत्, अतीन्द्रियत्वेनासिद्धत्वात् कर्मणः करणत्वमसिद्धम्। तदयुक्तम्, यतः कार्यतः कार्यद्वारेण तत् सिद्धमेव, तथाहि–विद्यमानकरणं शरीरादि, कृतकत्वात्, घटादिवत्, यच्चास्य करणं तत् कर्मैव, तस्मादस्त्येव

तत् । अथवा, विद्यमानकरणमेवात्मशरीरलक्षणं द्वयम्, कर्तृ–कार्यरूपत्वात्, कुलाल–घटादिवत् यच्च कर्तुरात्मनः शरीरमुत्पादयतः करणं तत् कर्मेति कथं न तत्सिद्धिः ? । तथा, फलवत्यो दानादिक्रियाः, चेतनारब्धक्रियारूपत्वात्, कृष्यादिक्रियावत्, यच्च तासां फलं तत् कर्म । इत्यग्निभूतिरिव त्वमपि प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ॥ २६८ ॥ (१८१६)

D. C.—Maṇḍika:—Since *karma* is *atîndriya* (beyond the perception of sense-organs) it can never be taken as *karaṇa.*

Bhagavān:—It is not so. Since *s'arîra* is susceptible to production like *ghata,* it must have some *karaṇa* to bring its existence This *karaṇa* is *Karma* itself Or, say, there must be some *karaṇa* between *Kartā* like *ātman* and *Kārya* like *s'arîra* as in the case of *ghaṭakāra* and *ghaṭa.* And this can be nothing else but *Karma.* This shows that *Karma* can be brought about even by the help of *Kāryas* like *s'arîra.* Moreover, *Kāryas* like *dāna* etc which are inspired by fruit are also fruitful like *Kriyās* such as *kṛiṣi* etc. So, like *Agnibhūti,* you, too, *O Maṇḍika !* shall have to admit the existence of *Karma.* 268 ॥ (1816) ॥

In reply to the assertion that a *bandha* which is *anādi* is *ananta* also the author states—

जं संताणोऽणाई तेणाणंतोऽवि णायमेगंतो ।
दीसई संतो वि जओ कत्थइ बीयं–कुराईणं ॥२६९॥ (१८१७)

Jam santāno'nāî tenānanto'vi ṇāyameganto ।
Dîsai santo vi jao katthai bîyam–kurāîṇam ॥ 269 ॥ (1817)

[यत् संतानोऽनादिस्तेनानन्तोऽपि नायमेकान्तः ।
दृश्यते सन्नपि यतः कुत्रापि बीजा–ऽङ्कुरादीनाम् ॥२६९॥ (१८१७)

Yat santāno'nādistenānanto'pi nāyamekāntaḥ ।
Dṛiśyate sannapi yataḥ kutrāpi bîjā'-ṅkurādînām ॥ 269 ॥ (1817)]

Trans.—269 An expansion which has no beginning,

cannot exclusively be called endless also. For, the expansions such as that of seed and sprout etc. though void of beginning are sometimes found (as having ends) also. (1817)

टीका–" यद् यस्माज्जीव–कर्मसंयोगसंतानोऽनादिस्तेन तस्मादनन्तोऽपि" इति नायमेकान्तः, यतोऽनादिरपि संयुक्तयोर्वस्तुनोः संतानः सान्तोऽपि क्वचिद् दृश्यते, यथा बीजा–ऽङ्कुरादीनां संतान इति ॥ २६९ ॥ (१८१७)

D. C.—There can never be an exclusive rule that the *anādi santāna* of *jîva* and *Karma* combined together is *ananta* also. For, in some cases, the *santāna* does come to an end inspite of its *anāditva e. g.* the *santāna* of seed and sprout.

Also,

अण्णयरमणिव्वत्तियकज्जं बीयं–कुराण जं विहयं ।
तत्थ हओ संताणो कुक्कुडि–अंडाइयाणं च ॥२७०॥ (१८१८)

Aṇṇayaramanivvattiyakajjam bîyam–kurāṇa jam vihayam ।
Tattha hao santāṇo kukkuḍi–aṇḍāiyānam ca ॥ 270 ॥ (1818)

[अन्यतरदनिर्वर्तितकार्यं बीजा–ऽङ्कुरयोर्यद् विहतम् ।
तत्र हतः संतानः कुक्कुट्य–ऽण्डादिकानां च ॥ २७० ॥ (१८१८)

Anyataradanirvartitakāryam bîjā–ṅkurayoryad vihatam ।
Tatra hataḥ santānaḥ kukkuṭya'–ṇḍādikānām ca ॥ 270 ॥ (1818)]

जह वेह कंचणो–वलसंजोगोऽणाइसंतइगओ वि ।
वोच्छिज्जइ सोवायं तह जोगो जीव–कम्माणं ॥२७१॥ (१८१९)

Jaha veha kancaṇo–valasanjogo'ṇāisantaigao vi ।
Vocchijjai sovāyam taha jogo jîva–kammāṇam ॥ 271 ॥ (1819)

[यथा वेह काञ्चनो–पलसंयोगोऽनादिसंततिगतोऽपि ।
व्यवच्छिद्यते सोपायं तथा योगो जीव–कर्मणोः ॥२७१॥ (१८१९)

Yathā veha kāncano–palasamyogo'nādisantatigato'pi ।
Vyavacchidyate sopāyam tathā yogo jîva–karmaṇoḥ ॥271॥ (1819)]

Trans.—270-271. When either of seed and sprout is destroyed without having accomplished the (desired) effect, its *santāna* is also destroyed. The same is the case with a hen and its eggs also. Or, just as the contact of gold with stone though continued in succession through times immemorial, is cut off, in the same way, the contact of *jîva* with *Karma* (is also cut off). (1818-1819).

टीका-बीजा-ऽङ्कुरयोर्मध्येऽन्यतरदनिर्वर्तितकार्यमेव यद् विहतं व्यवच्छिन्नं तत्रानयोर्हतो व्यवच्छिन्नः संतानः । एवं कुक्कुट्य-ऽण्डकयोः पिता-पुत्रयोरपि च वक्तव्यम् । यथा वा काञ्चनो-पलयोरनादिकालप्रवृतसंतान-भावगतोऽपि संयोगोः सोपायमग्नितापाद्युपायाद् व्यवच्छिद्यते, तथा जीव-कर्मणोरपि संयोगऽनादिसंतानगतोऽपि तपःसंयमाद्युपायाद् व्यवच्छिद्यते, इति न मोक्षाभाव इति ॥ २७०-२७१ ॥ (१८१८-१८१९)

D. C.—If either of *bîja* and *aṅkura* vanishes without accomplishing the desired effect, the same will be true in case of hen and its eggs as well as father and son also. Or, just as the contact between gold and stone could be removed by means of the heat of fire inspite of its *anāditva*, the contact between *jîva* and *Karma* could also be brought to an end by means of *tapas*, *saṃyama* etc., until ultimately the *mokṣa* is attained. ॥ 270-271 (1818-1819) ॥

Anticipating the opponent's objection at this juncture, the author proceeds—

तो किं जीव-नहाण व अह जोगो कंचणो-वलाणं व ? ।
जीवस्स य कम्मस्स य भण्णइ दुविहो वि न विरुद्धो॥२७२(१८२०)

पढमोऽभव्वाणं चिय भव्वाणं कंचणोऽवलाणं व ।
जीवत्ते सामण्णे भव्वोऽभव्वो त्ति को भेओ ? ॥२७३॥ (१८२१)

To kim jîva-nahāṇa va aha jogo kañcaṇo-valāṇam va ? ।
Jîvassa ya kammassa ya bhaṇṇai duviho vi na viruddho ॥272॥(1820)

Paḍhamo'bhavvāṇam ciya bhavvānam kañcaṇo-valāṇam va ।
Jîvatte sāmaṇṇe bhavvo'bhavvo tti ko bheo? ॥ 273 ॥ (1821)

[ततः किं जीव-नभसोरिवाथ योगः काञ्चनो-पलयोरिव ? ।
जीवस्य च कर्मणश्च भण्यते द्विविधोऽपि न विरुद्धः ॥२७२॥ (१८२०)

प्रथमोऽभव्यानामेव भव्यानां काञ्चनो-पलयोरिव ।
जीवत्वे सामान्ये भव्योऽभव्य इति को भेदः ? ॥ २७३ ॥ (१८२१)

Tataḥ kim jîva-nabhasorivātha yogaḥ kāñcano-palayoriva ?
Jivasya ca karmaṇas'ca bhaṇyate dvi-vidho'pi na viruddhaḥ ॥ 272 ॥

Prathamo'bhavyānāmeva bhavyānām kāñcano-palayoriva ।
Jivatve sāmānye bhavyo'bhavya iti ko bhedaḥ ॥ 273 ॥ (1821)]

Trans.—272–273 "Then, does the union of *jîva* and *karma* resemble the union of *jîvā* and *nabhas?* Or, is it similar to that between gold and stone?" "Union in both the ways will not be contrary. The first belongs to the inauspicious only; (contact) of the auspicious resembles (the one) between gold and stone." "What is the distinction between auspicious and inauspicious when the state of existence is common?" (1820–1821).

टीका-आह-जीवस्य कर्मणश्च योऽयं परस्परं योगः सोऽनादिः सन् किं जीव-नभसोरिवानन्तः, अथ काञ्चनो-पलयोरिव सान्तोऽपि स्यात् ? उभयथापि दर्शनात् किमत्र प्रतिपद्यामहे ? । भण्यतेऽत्रोत्तरम-द्विधाऽप्ययमविरुद्धः, तत्र प्रथमोऽनाद्यनन्तरूपोऽभव्यानां द्रष्टव्यः । यस्तु काञ्चनो-पलयोरिवानादिः सान्तोऽसौ भव्यानां विज्ञेयः । आह-ननु जीवत्वसाम्येऽपि "अयं भव्यः" "अयं चाभव्यः" इति किंकृतोऽयं विशेषः ? । न च वक्तव्यम्-यथा जीवत्वे समानेऽपि नारक-तिर्यगादयो विशेषास्तथा भव्या-ऽभव्यत्वविशेषोऽपि भविष्यतीति, यतः कर्मजनिता एव नारकादिविशेषाः, न तु स्वाभाविकाः । भव्या-ऽभव्यत्वविशेषोऽपि यदि कर्मजनितस्तदा भवतु, को निवारयिता ?, न चैवमिति ॥ २७२-२७३ ॥ (१८२०-१८२१) ॥

D. C.—Maṇḍika:—Should the *anādi* contact of *jîva* with

Karma be taken as *ananta* like that between *jîva* and *nabhas* or as *sānta* like that between gold and stone?

Bhagavān:—It is possible in both ways. It is found as *anādi* and *ananta* in case of inauspicious objects, but in case of auspicious objects like gold and stone, it is found as *anādi* and *sānta*.

Maṇḍika:—How could you distinguish between auspicious and inauspicious when the state of existence is the same everywhere?

Moreover, it cannot be argued that just as the experiences of hen and animal life are different from each other even if the state of existence is the same in both, so, also, the distinction between *bhavya* and *a-bhavya* is possible, because, the *nāraka* experiences etc. are produced on account of *Karma* and are not *svābhāvika*.

होउ जइ कम्मकओ न विरोहो नारगाइभेउ व ।
भणह य भव्वाऽभव्वा सभावओ तेण संदेहो ॥२७४॥ (१८२२)

Höu jai kammakao na viroho nāragāibheu vva ।
Bhaṇaha ya bhavvā'bhavvā sabhāvao teṇa samdeho ॥274॥ (1822)

[भवतु यदि कर्मकृतो न विरोधो नारकादिभेद इव ।
भणथ च भव्या-ऽभव्यान् स्वभावतस्तेन संदेहः ॥२७४॥(१८२२)

Bhavatu yadi karmakrito na virodho nārakādibheda iva ।
Bhaṇatha ca bhavyā'bhavyān svabhāvatastena saṃdehaḥ ॥ 274 ॥

Trans.—274 If the distinction is caused by *karma* as in the case of hellish experience etc., there is no objection. But when you say that they are auspicious and inauspicious by their (very) nature, the doubt does arise. (1822)

टीका-भवतु वा यदि कर्मकृतोऽयं भव्याऽभव्यत्वविशेषो जीवानामिष्यते, नात्र कश्चिद् विरोधः, नारकादिभेदवत्, न चैतदस्ति, यतो "भव्याऽ-

भव्याः स्वभावत एव जीवा न तु कर्मतः, " इति यूयं भणथ, तेनास्माकं संदेह इति ॥ २७४ ॥ (१८२२) ॥

D. C.—Maṇḍika:—If you accept that the distinction between *bhavya* and *a-bhavya* is also *karma-janita* (like that between hen and animal life) I have nothing to say, but when you take their distinction to be *svabhāvika*, I raise the doubt ॥ 274 (1822) ॥

Explaining the real cause between *bhavya* and *a-bhavya* the author replies:—

दव्वाइत्ते तुल्ले जीव–नहाणं सभावओ भेओ ।
जीवा–ऽजीवाइगओ जह, तह भवे–यरविसेसो ॥२७५॥(१८२३)

Davvāitte tulle jîva-nahānam sabhāvao bheo ।
Jîvā'jîvāigao jaha, taha bhavveyaraviseso ॥ 275 ॥ (1823)

[द्रव्यादित्वे तुल्ये जीव–नभसोः स्वभावतो भेदः ।
जीवा–ऽजीवादिगतो यथा, तथा भव्ये–तरविशेषः ॥२७५॥ (१८२३)

Dravyāditve tulye jîva-nabhaso svabhāvato bhedaḥ ।
Jîvā'jîvādigato yathā, tathā bhavyetara-vis'esaḥ ॥ 273 ॥ (1823)]

Trans.—275 Just as in (case of) *jîva* and *nabhas* the natural distinction of living and lifeless does exist even in (the midst of) the common element of (their being) *dravya* etc., in the same way, the distinction of auspicious and inauspicious is also natural. (1823)

टीका–यथा जीव–नभसोर्द्रव्यत्व–सत्त्व–प्रमेयत्व–ज्ञेयत्वादौ तुल्येऽपि जीवा–ऽजीवत्व–चेतना–चेतनत्वादिस्वभावतो भेदः, तथा जीवानामपि जीवत्वसाम्येऽपि यदि भव्या–ऽभव्यकृतो विशेषः स्यात्, तर्हि को दोषः ? इति ॥ २७५ ॥ (१८२३)

D. C.—Although *jîva* and *ākās'a* possess the common properties like *dravyatva*, *sattva* (existence), *prameyatva*

(destructibility) *jñeyatva* (cognizibility) etc., distinction such as that of *jîva* and *a-jîva* etc , does exist by its very nature. Similarly, in case of *jîvas* also, even though *jîvatva* is common, the distinction of *bhavya* and *abhavya* remains there as a natural consequence. ॥ 275 (1823) ॥

The pupil objects to this view thus—

एवं पि भव्वभावो जीवत्तं पिव सभावजाईओ ।
पावइ निच्चो तम्मि य तदवत्थे नत्थि निव्वाणं ॥२७६॥ (१८२४)

Evam pi bhavvabhāvo jîvattam piva sabhāvajāîo ।
Pāvai nicco tammi ya tadavatthe natthi nivvānam ॥276॥ (1824)

[एवमपि भव्यभावो जीवत्वमिव स्वभावजातीयः ।
प्राप्नोति नित्यस्तस्मिंश्च तदवस्थे नास्ति निर्वाणम् ॥२७६॥ (१८२४)

Evampi bhavyabhāvo jîvatvamiva svabhāvajātîyaḥ ।
Prāpnoti nityastasmiṅśca tadavasthe nāsti nirvāṇam ॥276॥ (1824)]

Trans.—276 Even in that case, the quality of (being) auspicious being natural like *jîvatva,* will become everlasting; and if it is so, there will be no (scope for) final liberation (at all). (1824)

टीका-नन्वेवमपि भव्यभावो नित्योऽविनाशी प्राप्नोति, स्वभावजातीयत्वात्-स्वाभाविकत्वात् जीवत्ववत् । भवत्वेवमिति चेत् । तदयुक्तम्, यतस्तस्मिन् भव्यभावे तदवस्थे नित्यावस्थायिनि नास्ति निर्वाणम्, "सिद्धो न भव्यो नाप्य भव्यः" इति वचनादिति ॥ २७६ ॥ (१८२४)

D. C.—If the quality of *bhavyatva* is *svābhāvika* as *jîvatva,* as said above, it will become everlasting like *jîvatva* also. Consequently, in the midst of everlasting *bhavyabhāva,* there will be no scope for *mokṣa* at all ॥ 276 (1824) ॥

The author refutes this argument as follows:—

जह घडपुव्वाभावोऽणाइसहावो वि सनिहणो एवं ।
जई भवत्ताभावो भवेज्ज किरियाए को दोसो ? ॥२७७॥(१८२५)

Jaha ghaḍapuvvābhāvo'ṇāisahāvo vi sanihaṇo evam ।
Jaī bhavvattābhāvo bhavejja kiriyāe ko doso ? ॥ 277 ॥ (1825)

[यथा घटपूर्वाभावोऽनादिस्वभावोऽपि सनिधन एवम् ।
यदि भव्यत्वाभावो भवेत् क्रियया को दोषः ॥ २७७ ॥ (१८२५)

Yathā ghaṭapūrvābhāvo'nādisvabhāvo'pi sanidhana evam ।
Yadi bhavyatvābhāvo bhavet kriyayā ko doṣaḥ ॥ 277 ॥ (1825)]

Trans.—277 What harm is there if the (previous) *abhāva* of auspiciousness is possessed of end, like the previous non-existence of *ghaṭa* inspite of its being *anādi* by nature ? (1825)

टीका–यथा घटस्य प्रागभावोऽनादिस्वभावजातीयोऽपि घटोत्पत्तौ सनिधनो विनश्वरो दृष्टः, एवं यदि भव्यत्वस्यापि ज्ञान–तपःसचिवचरणक्रियोपायतोऽभावः स्यात्, तर्हि को दोषः संपद्यते ?–न कश्चिदिति ॥ २७७ ॥ (१८२५)

D. C.—The previous non-existence of *ghaṭa* comes to an end, when *ghata* is actually produced. Similarly, there is no harm if we assume that the *abhāva* of *bhavyatva* comes to an end, when the *bhavytva* is actualiy brought into existence by the process of perception ॥ 277 (1825) ॥

अणुदाहरणमभावो खरसंगं पिव मई न तं जम्हा ।
भावो च्चिय स विसिट्ठो कुंभाणुप्पत्तिमेत्तेणं ॥२७८॥ (१८२६)

Aṇudāharaṇamabhāvo kharasangam piva maî na tam jamhā ।
Bhāvo cciya sa visiṭṭho kumbhāṇuppattimetteṇam ॥278॥ (1826)

[अनुदाहरणभावः खरशृङ्गमिव मतिर्न तद् यस्मात् ।
भाव एव स विशिष्टः कुम्भानुत्पत्तिमात्रेण ॥ २७८ ॥ (१८२६)

Anudāharaṇabhāvaḥ kharaśṛṅgamiva matirna tad yasmāt ।
Bhāva eva sa viśiṣṭaḥ kumbhānutpattimātreṇa ॥ 278 ॥ (1826)]

Trans.—278 (You may believe that) like *kharasriṅga*, this is no (good) example. But it is not so. That is nothing but *bhāva* distinguished by the non-production of *ghata*. (1826)

टीका–स्याद् मतिः परस्य–नन्वनुदाहरणमसौ प्रागभावः, अभावरूपतयैवावस्तुत्वात्, खरविषाणवत् । तन्न, यस्माद् भाव एवासौ घटप्रागभावः, तत्कारणभूतानादिकालप्रवृत्तपुद्गलसंघातरूपः, केवलं घटानुत्पत्तिमात्रेण विशिष्ट इति ॥ २७८ ॥ (१८२६)

D. C.—Maṇḍika:—Like *kharasṛiṅga* previous non-existence cannot be taken as a right illustration, because like *kharasṛiṅga* it is non-existent on account of its *abhāvarūpatā*.

Bhagavān:—It is not so. The previous *abhāva* of *ghata* is itself *bhāva*. The only difference found in it is that, at this stage the production of *ghaṭa* has not yet been brought about from the mass of earth, which has served as its *karaṇa* from times immorial ॥ 277 (1826) ॥

एवं भव्वुच्छेओ कोट्ठागारस्स वा अवचउ त्ति ।
तं नाणंतत्तणओऽणागयकालं–बराणं व ॥ २७९ ॥ (१८२७)

Evam bhavvuccheo koṭṭhāgārassa vā avacau tti ।
Tam nānantattaṇao'ṇāgayakālam–barāṇam va ॥ 279 ॥ (1827)

[एवं भव्योच्छेदः कोष्टागारस्येवापचय इति ।
तद् नानन्तत्वतोऽनागतकाला–ऽम्बरयोरिव ॥ २७९ ॥ (१८२७)

Evam bhavyocchedaḥ koṣṭāgārasyevāpacaya iti ।
Tad nānantatvato'nāgatakālā–mbarayoriva ॥ 279 ॥ (1827)]

Trans.—279 Similarly, it is not (correct) (to believe) the culmination of the auspicious to be similar to the diminution of granery on account of (its) endlessness like the time to come or sky. (1827)

टीका–नन्वेवं सति भव्योच्छेदः–भव्यजीवैः संसारः शून्यः प्राप्नोति,

अपचयात् । कस्य यथा समुच्छेदः ? इत्याह–स्तोकस्तोकाकृष्यमाणधान्यस्य धान्यभृतकोष्ठागारस्य । इदमुक्तं भवति–कालस्यानन्त्यात् षण्मासपर्यन्ते चावश्यमेकस्य भव्यस्य जीवस्य सिद्धिगमनात् क्रमेणापचीयमानस्य धान्यकोष्ठागारस्येव सर्वस्यापि भव्यराशेरुच्छेदः प्राप्नोतीति। अत्रोत्तरमाह–तदेतद् न, अनन्तत्वाद् भव्यराशेः, अनागतकाला–ऽऽकाशवदिति । इह यद् बृहदनन्तकेनानन्तं, तत् स्तोक–स्तोकतयाऽपचीयमानमपि नोच्छिद्यते, यथा प्रतिसमयं वर्तमान तापस्याऽपचीयमानोऽप्यनागतकालसमयराशिः, प्रतिसमयं बुद्ध्या प्रदेशापहारेणापचीयमानः सर्वनभःप्रदेशराशिर्वा। इति न भव्योच्छेदः ॥ २७९ ॥ (१८२७) ॥

D. C.—Maṇḍika:—If the *uccheda* of *bhavya jîvas* is accepted, this world will gradually be deprived of them. Ultimately there will be no *bhavya jîva* existing in the world. For just as a granary of corn, is being exhausted day by day by the gradual decrease of corn, this world will also be losing one *bhavya jîva* at least at the end of say, six months, when he will be attaining *mokṣa*, until ultimately the world will be void of *bhavya jîvas*.

Bhagavān:—Your argument is fallacious, *O Maṇḍika.* The number of *bhavya jîvas* is as endless as the time to come or sky, and hence its absolute *vicchedа* should never be feared.

जं चातीताऽणागयकाला तुल्ला जओ य संसिद्धो ।
एक्को अणंतभागो भवाणमईयकालेणं ॥ २८० ॥ (१८२८)
एस्सेणं तत्तिउ च्चिय जुत्तो जं तो वि सव्वभवाणं ।
जुत्तो न समुच्छेओ होज्ज मई कहमिणं सिद्धं ? ॥२८१॥(१८२९)
भवाणमणंतत्तणमणंतभागो व किह मुक्को सिं ।
कालादओ व मंडिय ! मह वयणाओ व पडिवज्ज ॥२८२॥ (१८३०)

Jam cātîtā'ṇāgayakālā tullā jao ya samsiddho ।
Ekko anantabhāgo bhavvāṇamaîyakālenam ॥ 280 ॥ (1828)

Esseṇam tattiu cciya jutto jam to vi savvabhavvāṇam ।
Jutto na samuccheo hojja maî kahaminam siddham ? ॥281॥(1829)

Bhavvāṇamanantattaṇantabhāgo va kiha mukko sim ।
Kālādao va Maṇḍiya ! maha vayaṇāo va paḍivajja ॥ 282 ॥ (1830)

[यच्चातीता-ऽनागतकालौ तुल्यौ यतश्च संसिद्धः ।
एकोऽनन्तभागो भव्यानामतीतकालेन ॥ २८० ॥ (१८२८)

एष्यता तावानेव युक्तो यत् ततोऽपि सर्वभव्यानाम् ।
युक्तो न समुच्छेदो भवेद् मतिः कथमिदं सिद्धम् ॥ २८१ ॥ (१८२९)

भव्यानामनन्तत्वमनन्तभागो वा कथं वा मुक्त एषाम् ?
कालादय इव मण्डिक ! मम वचनाद् वा प्रतिपद्यस्व ॥२८२॥ (१८३०)

Yaccātîtā'nāgatakālau tulyau yats'ca saṃsiddhaḥ ।
Eko'nantabhāgo bhavyānāmatîtakālena ॥ 280 ॥ (1828)

Eṣyatā tāvāneva yukto yat tato'pi sarvabhavyānām ।
Yukto na samucchedo bhaved matiḥ kathamidam siddham ? ॥281॥

Bhavyānāmanantatvamanantabhāgo vā katham vā mukta eṣām ?
Kālādaya iva Maṇḍika ! mama vacanād vā pratipadyasva ॥282॥]

Trans.—280–281–282 Since the times–past and future–are similiar, an infinitesimal part of the auspicious which has already been liberated in the past will meet liberation in future also. It is not proper therefore to believe in (complete) destination of all auspicious (creatures). (It may be asked) " How is it proved ? Or, how is the endlessness or infinitesimal part of the auspicious (creatures) liberated ? " " Like *Kāla* etc. Or, *O Maṇḍika*, take it (for granted) on my word. " (1828–1829–1830)

टीका-व्याख्या-यस्माच्चातीता-ऽनागतकालौ तुल्यावेव, यतश्चातीतेनापि कालेनैक एव निगोदानन्ततमो भागोऽद्यापि भव्यानां सिद्धः, एष्यतापि भविष्यत्कालेन तावन्मात्र एव भव्यानन्तभागः सिद्धिं गच्छन् युक्तो घटमानकः, न हीनाधिकः भविष्यतोऽपि कालस्यातीततुल्यत्वात् ।

तत एवमपि सति न सर्वभव्यानामुच्छेदो युक्तः, सर्वेणापि कालेन तदनन्त-भागस्यैव सिद्धिगमनसम्भवोपदर्शनात् । अथ परस्य मतिर्भवेत्–तत्कथमिदं सिद्धं यदुत–अनन्ता भव्याः, तदनन्तभागश्च सर्वेणैव कालेन सेत्स्यतीति ? । अत्रोच्यते–काला–ऽऽकाशादय इवानन्तास्तावद् भव्याः, तदनन्तभागस्य च मुक्तिगमनात्, काला–ऽऽकाशयोरिव न सर्वेषामुच्छेद इति प्रतिपद्यस्व, मद्वचनाद् वा मण्डिक ! सर्वमेतत् श्रद्धेहीति ॥ २८०–२८१–२८२ ॥ (१८२८–१८२९–१८३०)

D. C.—As the time, whether past or future is the same throughout, the infinite number of *bhavya jîva*s, or a portion of them attains *mokṣa* during past as well as future times in equal proportion The *uccheda* of all *bhavya jîvas* is, therefore, not acceptible.

Maṇḍika:—But how is it proved that the *bhavyas* are *ananta* and their *anantabhāga* attains *moksa* at all times ?

Bhagavān:—They are *antanta* like *kāla* and *ākās'a.* Even if infinite number of *bhavyas* passes away to *mokṣa*, they remain endless for ever like *kāla* and *ākās'a.* Rely upon my word, *O Maṇḍika,* and accept it. ॥ 280–282 (1828–1830) ॥

If it is asked " How could it be taken as true merely on your words ? " the answer is—

सब्भूयमिणं गिण्हसु मह वयणाओऽवसेसवयणं व ।
सव्वण्णुताइओ वा जाणयमज्झत्थवयणं व ॥ २८३ ॥ (१८३१)

मण्णसि किह सव्वण्णू सव्वेसिं सव्वसंसयच्छेया ।
दिट्ठंताभावम्मि वि पुच्छउ जो संसओ जस्स ॥२८४॥(१८३२)

Sabbhūyaminam giṇhasu maha vayaṇāo'vasesavayaṇam va ।
Savvannutāio vā jaṇayamajjhatthavayanam va ॥ 283 ॥ (1831)

Maṇṇasi kiha savvannū savvesim savvasaṃsayaccheyā ।
Diṭṭhantābhāvammi vi pucchau jo samsao jassa ॥ 284 ॥ (1832)

[सद्भूतमिदं गृहाण मद्वचनादवशेषवचनमिव ।
सर्वज्ञतादितो वा ज्ञायकमध्यस्थवचनमिव ॥ २८३ ॥ (१८३१)

मन्यसे कथं सर्वज्ञः सर्वेषां सर्वसंशयच्छेदात् ।
दृष्टान्ताभावेऽपि पृच्छतु यः संशयो यस्य ॥ २८४ ॥ (१८३२)

Sadbhūtamidam gṛihāṇa madvacanādavas'eṣavacanamiva |
Sarvajñatādito vā jñāyakamadhyasthavacanamiva ॥ 283 ॥ (1831)]

Manyase katham sarvajñaḥ sarveṣām sarvasaṃśayacchedāt ।
Dṛiṣṭāntābhāve'pi pṛicchatu yaḥ saṃśayo yasya ॥ 284 ॥ (1832)]

Trans.—283-284 Like all other statements or like the statement of an impartial observer, take it as a fact from my word, because of my omniscience. (If) you question " How am I to be omniscient ? " (The reply is that) I am Omniscient because I remove the doubts of all. Even in absence of (proper) examples, one who entertains doubts may ask me. (1831-1832)

टीका-व्याख्या-सद्भूतमिदमनन्तरोक्तं सर्वमपीति गृहाण त्वम्, मद्वचनत्वात्, यथा त्वत्संशयादिविषयमवशेषं मद्वचनम्, सर्वज्ञत्वादित्यादिभ्यो वा हेतुभ्यः, आदिशब्दात् वीतरागत्वादिपरिग्रहः, ज्ञायकमध्यस्थवचनवदित्ययमत्र दृष्टान्त इति । अथैवं मन्यसे-कथमिव सर्वज्ञस्त्वम् । अत्रोच्यते-सर्वेषां सर्वसंशयच्छेदात् । अन्यस्य सर्वसंशयच्छेत्तुः कस्याप्यदर्शनात् कोऽत्र दृष्टान्तः ?-न कश्चिदिति । अत्रोच्यते-किमत्र दृष्टान्तान्वेषणेन ? । तदभावेऽपि हि यो यस्य संशयः स तं सर्वमपि पृच्छतु, येन स्वप्रत्ययसिद्ध एव मयि सर्वज्ञत्वनिश्चयो भवतीति ॥ २८३-२८४॥ (१८३१-१८३२)

D. C.—Bhagavān:—Take everything that I speak to be authentic, because I am *sarvajña* and *vîtarāga.*

Maṇḍika:—On what ground are you to be called *sarvajña ?*

Bhagavān:—I am *sarvajña* because I remove the doubts of all. Even though it is not necessary to cite an example in this connection, one who entertains doubts may put a question so that he may be convinced of my *sarvajñatva.* 283-284(1831-1832)

Also,

जह वा स एव पासाण–कणगजोगो विओगजोग्गो वि ।
न विजुज्जइ सव्वो च्चिय स विजुज्जइ जस्स संपत्ती ॥२८७॥(१८३५)

किं पुण जा संपत्ती सा जोग्गस्सेव न उ अजोग्गस्स ।
तह जो मोक्खो नियमा सो भव्वाणं न इयरेसिं ॥२८८॥(१८३६)

Jaha vā sa eva pāsāṇa–kanagajogo viogajoggo vi ।
Na vijujjai savvo cciya sa vijujjai jassa saṃpattî ॥ 287 ॥ (1835)

Kim puṇa jā sampattî sā joggasseva na u ajoggassa ।
Taha jo mokkho niyamā so bhavvāṇam na iyaresim ॥288॥ (1836)

[**यथा वा स एव पाषाण–कनकयोगो वियोगयोग्योऽपि ।**
न वियुज्यते सर्वं एव स वियुज्यते यस्य संप्राप्तिः ॥२८७॥ (१८३५)

किं पुनर्या संप्राप्तिः सा योग्यस्यैव न त्वयोग्यस्य ।
तथा यो मोक्षो नियमात् स भव्यानां नेतरेषाम् ॥२८८॥ (१८३६)

Yathā vā sa eva pāṣāṇa-kanakayogo vıyogayogyo'pi ।
Na vıyujyate sarvam eva sa vıyujyate yasya saṃprāptiḥ॥287॥(1835)]

Kim punaryā saṃprāptiḥ sā yogyasyaiva na tvayogyasya ।
Tathā yo mokṣo niyamāt sa bhavyānām netareṣām ॥288॥ (1836)]

Trans.—287–288 Just as the contact between stone and gold, though susceptible to separation, is not separated, only those that have reached attainment are separated. Similarly, *mokṣa* which is laid down as a rule belongs only to *bhavyas* and not to others. (1835–1836)

टीका–यथा वा स एव पूर्वोक्तः सुवर्णपाषाण–कनकयोर्योगो वियोग-योग्यतान्वितोऽपि सर्वो न वियुज्यते, किन्तु स एव वियुज्यते, यस्य वियोगसामग्रीसंप्राप्तिरिति । किं पुनः ? एतद् भुजमुत्क्षिप्य ब्रूमः–या वियो-गसामग्रीसंप्राप्तिः सा वियोगयोग्यस्यैव सुवर्णोपलस्य भवति, न तु तदयो-ग्यस्य, तथा तेनैव प्रकारेण यः सर्वकर्मक्षयलक्षणो मोक्षः स नियमाद्

भव्यानामेव भवति, नेतरेषामभव्यानामिति भव्या-ऽभव्ययोर्विशेष इति ॥ २८७-२८८ ॥ (१८३५-१८३६) ॥

D. C.—Although the contact between gold and stone is susceptible to separation, it can never be applied to all as a general rule. Because, only that which secures necessary conditions for separation is separable.

Moreover, these necessary conditions which cause the separation, act only upon those that are worthy of separation and not upon others. The same is the case with *mokṣa*. The attainment of *mokṣa* is possible for *bhavyas* only, and not for *a-bhavyas* even if they possess necessary conditions. This is the distinctive feature between *bhavya* and *a-bhavya* ॥ 287-288 (1835-1836) ॥

कयगाइमत्तणाओं मोक्खो निच्चो न होइ कुंभो व्व ।
नो पद्धंसाभावो भुवि तद्धम्मा वि जं निच्चो ॥२८९॥ (१८३७)

अणुदाहरणमभावो एसो वि मई न तं जओ नियओ ।
कुंभविणासविसिट्ठो भावो च्चिय पोग्गलमओ य ॥२९०॥(१८३८)

Kayagāimattanāo mokkho nicco na höi kumbho vva ।
No paddhaṃsābhāvo bhuvi taddhammā vi jam nicco ॥289॥ (1837)

Anudāharaṇamabhāvo eso vi maî na tam jao niyao ।
Kumbhaviṇāsavisiṭṭho bhāvo cciya poggalamao ya ॥290॥ (1838)

[कृतकादिमत्त्वाद् मोक्षो नित्यो न भवति कुम्भ इव ।
नो प्रध्वंसाभावो भुवि तद्धर्मापि यद् नित्यः ॥ २८९ ॥ (१८३७)

अणुदाहरणमभाव एषोऽपि मतिर्न तद् यतो नियतः ।
कुम्भविनाशविशिष्टो भाव एव पुद्गलमयश्च ॥ २९० ॥ (१८३८)

Kritakādimattvād mokṣo nityo na bhavati kumbha iva ।
No pradhvaṃsābhāvo bhuvi taddharmāpi yad nityaḥ ॥289॥ (1837)

Aṇudāharaṇamabhāva eṣo'pi matirna tad yato niyataḥ ।
Kumbhavināśaviśiṣṭo bhāva eva pudgalamayaśca ॥ 290 ॥ (1838)]

Trans.—289–290 " Like *kumbha, moksa* is not *nitya* on account of its artificiality etc. " It is not so. Because, indestructibility is everlasting on this earth inspite of its (possessing) that property. " (But) this negation is void of example also. " That is not true. Destruction of *kumbha* is definite and (hence) (its) positiveness is distinguished by means of *pudgalas.* (1837–1838)

टीका–व्याख्या–ननु मोक्षो नित्यो न भवति, किन्त्वनित्यो विनाशी, कृतकत्वात्; आदिशब्दात् प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वाऽऽदिमत्त्वादिपरिग्रहः। कुम्भवदिति दृष्टान्तः। अत्रोच्यते–अनैकान्तिकता हेतूनाम्, विपक्षेऽपि गमनात्, यस्मादिह घटादिप्रध्वंसाभावः कृतकादिस्वभावोऽपि नित्य एव, तदनित्यत्वे घटादेस्तद्रूपतयैवोन्मज्जनप्रसङ्गादिति। अथैवं परस्य मतिः–न केवलं पूर्वोक्तः प्रागभावः किन्त्वेषोऽपि प्रध्वंसाभावोऽभावत्वेनावस्तुत्वादनुदाहरणमेव। तदेतद् न, यतो यस्माद् नियतो निश्चितः कुम्भविनाशविशेषेण विशिष्टः पुद्गलात्मको भाव एवायमपि प्रध्वंसाभावः। अतो युक्तमेतदुदाहरणमिति। एतच्च मोक्षस्य कृतकत्वमभ्युपगम्योक्तम् ॥ २८९–२९० ॥
॥ (१८३७–१८३८) ॥

D. C.—Maṇḍika—Mokṣa is not *nitya* but it is *a-nitya* like *ghaṭa* as it is artificial and *ādimān* in character like *ghaṭa.*

Bhagavān:—It is not so. The *hetu* advanced by you applies to the *vipakṣa* as well, and hence it is *anaikāntika.* The *pradhvaṃsābhāva,* in case of *ghaṭa,* for example, is *nitya* inspite of its being *kṛitaka.* For, if it were *a-nitya,* objects like *ghaṭa* should have been born in the same form.

Maṇḍika:—But since *pradhvaṃsābhāva* is negative in character, you will not be able to cite an example based on it.

Bhagavān:—It is not negative, *O Maṇḍika!* but positive in character. The definite forms of *pudgalas* found at the

destruction of *ghaṭa* is nothing but *pradhvaṃsābhāva*. The example cited is, therefore, quite proper to the occasion. The same is the case with *mokṣa* also. *Mokṣa* will never be called *a-nitya* even if it is believed to possess the properties like *kṛitakatva*. ॥ 289-290 (1837-1838) ॥

Or, say, *Mokṣa* is not *kṛitaka* at all on account of the following reason:—

किं वेगंतेण कयं पोग्गलमेत्तविलयम्मि जीवस्स ।
किं निव्वत्तियमहियं नभसो घडमेत्तविलयम्मि ? ॥२९१॥ (१४३९)

Kim vegantena kayam poggalamettavilayammi jîvassa ।
Kim nivvattiyamahiyam nabhaso ghaḍamettavilayammi ? ॥ 291 ॥

[किं वैकान्तेन कृतं पुद्गलमात्रविलये जीवस्य ।
किं निर्वर्तितमधिकं नभसो घटमात्रविलये ? ॥ २९१ ॥ (१८३९)

Kim vaikāntena kṛitam pudgalamātravilaye jîvasya ।
Kim nirvartitamadhikam nabhaso ghaṭamātravilaye ?॥291॥ (1839)]

Trans.—291 " At the destruction of mere *pudagalas*, how is *jîva* alone to be affected ? " " At the destruction of mere *ghaṭa*, how is sky affected all the more ? " (1839)

टीका–किमिह पुद्गलमात्रविलये सति समस्तकर्मपुद्गलपरिशाटसमये जीवस्यात्मनः स्वतत्त्वे वृत्तिमादधत एकान्तेन कृतं विहितम्, येन कृतको मोक्षः स्यात् ?। एतदुक्तं भवति–इहात्म–कर्मपुद्गलवियोगो मोक्षोऽभिप्रेतः । तत्र तपःसंयमप्रभावतो जीवात् कर्मणि प्रथग् जायमाने किमात्मनः क्रियते, येन कृतकत्वादनित्यत्वं मोक्षस्य प्रतिपाद्यते ?। अथ स एवात्म–कर्मवियोगः क्रियमाणत्वात् कृतकः, ततोऽनित्य इत्याशङ्क्याह–" किं निव्वत्तियमित्यादि " मुद्गरादिना घटमात्रस्य विनाशे सति किं नाम नभसोऽभ्यधिकं निर्वर्तितम् ? न किञ्चिदित्यर्थः । एवमिहापि कर्ममात्रविनाशे सति किं जीवस्याधिकं कृतम्, येन तदेकाकितारूपस्य मोक्षस्य कृतकत्वेनानित्यत्वं स्यात् ?। स एव कर्मणो विनाशो घटविनाशवत् क्रियमानत्वात् कृतकः, ततः सर्वकर्मक्षय–

लक्षणो मोक्षोऽनित्य इति चेत् । तदयुक्तम्, यतो यथाऽयमेव घटविनाशो यः केवलाकाशसद्भावो न पुनस्ततो विभिन्नोऽसौ, न चाकाशस्य किमप्यधिकं क्रियते, तस्य सदावस्थितत्वेन नित्यत्वात्, एवमिहाप्ययमेव कर्मणो विनाशो यः केवलात्मसद्भावः, न त्वात्मनो विभिन्नोऽसौ, न चात्मनः किञ्चिदधिकं विधीयते, तस्यापि नभोवद् नित्यत्वात् । तस्माद् न मोक्षस्य कृतकत्वमनित्यत्वं वा । कथञ्चिच्चानित्यत्वे सिद्धसाध्यतैव, द्रव्य-पर्यायोभयरूपतया सर्वस्यापि वस्तुनो नित्यानित्यरूपत्वादिति ॥ २९१ ॥ (१८३९) ॥

D. C.—Bhagavān:—Since *Mokṣa* is nothing but the separation of Soul from *Karma-pudgalas*, it cannot be artificial at all. When *Karma* is being separated from *jîva*, how is *Ātmā* to be affected to render the *Mokṣa a-nitya*?

Maṇḍika:—The separation of soul from *Karma* is *kṛitaka* owing to its *kriyamānatvā*. The *Mokṣa* is, therefore, *kṛitaka* and *a-nitya* too.

Bhagavān:—When *ghaṭa* is destroyed by means of hammer etc. the sky is not at all affected. In the same way, when *Karma* is destroyed, *jîva* will also remain unaffected. It is not, therefore, proper to believe that *Mokṣa* is *kṛitaka* and *a-nitya*.

Maṇḍika:—*Karma* being destructible like *ghaṭa*, like *ghaṭa* it is *kṛitaka* also. Now since *Mokṣa* is nothing but the destruction of all *Karmas*, it is also *kṛitaka* and hence *a-nitya* also.

Bhagavān:—Your argument is absolutely false. *O Maṇḍika!* Existence of sky persists even if *ghaṭa* is destroyed The destruction of *ghaṭa* is not *bhinna* from *ākās'a*, but at the same time *ākās'a* is not affected by it also, since it is everlasting. Similarly in case of *Karma* also, although the destruction of *Karmas* is not different from the existence of Soul, the Soul is not affected by it on account of its being *nitya* like *ākās'a*. The *Mokṣa* is, therefore, never *kṛitaka*, *O Maṇḍika*, and never *a-nitya* also, even if it is *a-nitya* to the extent that all objects are *a-nitya* as far as their *dravyatva* and *paryāyas* are concerned.

Maṇḍika:—Since *Karma-pudgalas* abandoned by *jîva* in a worn-out condition, stay on in this world (even in that state) why should the Soul separated from *Karma*, be believed to unite with the worn-out *Karma*, so that, it may be bound by a fresh bondage again ?

Bhagavān:—*Mokṣa* being *nitya*, *O Maṇḍika*, will again be bound by a fresh bondage. ॥ 291 (1839) ॥

The everlasting nature of *mokṣa* is apprehended as follows:—

सोऽणवराहो व्व पुणो न बज्झए बंधकारणाभावा ।
जोगा य बंधहेऊ न य ते तस्सासरीरो त्ति ॥ २९२॥ (१८४०)

So'navarāho vva puṇo na bajjhae bandhakāraṇabhāvā ।
Jogā ya bandha-heū na ya te tassāsarîro tti ॥ 292 ॥ (1840)

[**सोऽनपराध इव पुनर्न बध्यते बन्धकारणाभावात् ।**
योगाश्च बन्धहेतवो न च ते तस्याशरीर इति ॥ २९२ ॥ (१८४०)

So'naparādha iva punarna badhyate bandhakāraṇābhāvāt ।
Yogāśca bandhahetavo na ca te tasyāśarîra iti ॥ 292 ॥ (1840)]

Trans.—292 Like an innocent person, it (*i. e.*, Soul) can never be bound (by *bandhas*) as there is no cause for bondage. On account of its formlessness, it has no cause for bondages. (1840)

टीका-स मुक्तो जीवः पुनरपि न बध्यते, बन्धकारणाभावात्, अनपराधपुरुषवत्, मनो-वाक्-काययोगादयश्च बन्धहेतवोऽभिधीयन्ते, न च ते मुक्तस्य सन्ति, शरीराद्यभावात् । न च कर्मवर्गणागतपुद्गलमात्रसंयोगमात्ररूपोऽत्र बन्धोऽधिक्रियते, अतिप्रसङ्गादिदोषाघ्रातत्वात्, किन्तु मिथ्यात्वादितद्धेतुनिबन्धन इति ॥ २९२ ॥ (१८४०) ॥

D. C.—In absence of (any) cause for (its) *bandha*, like an innocent person, the Soul is free from *bandha*. Unions of mind, speech and body etc. are nothing but the causes for

(its) *bandha*. But due to the *abhāva* of *s'arîra* etc, a free Soul is not able to contain them. So, *bandha* does not take place in absence of *saṃyoga* of the multiplication of *karmas* but it depends upon the *hetus* such as *mithyātva* etc.

Maṇḍika:—Like *bandhas*, you doubt as to whether that free Soul appears in the next life or not. ॥ 292 (1840) ॥

Bhagavān replies:—

न पुणो तस्स पसूई बीयाभावादिहंकुरस्सेव ।
बीयं च तस्स कम्मं न य तस्स तयं तओ निच्चो ॥२९३॥ (१८४१)

Na puṇo tassa pasūī bîyābhāvādihaṅkurasseva ।
Bîyam ca tassa kammam na ya tassa tayam tao nicco ॥293॥ (1841)

[न पुनस्तस्य प्रसूतिबीजाभावादिहाङ्कुरस्येव ।
बीजं च तस्य कर्म न च तस्य तत् ततो नित्यः ॥ २९३ ॥ (१८४१)

Na punastasya prasūtibîjābhāvadihāṅkurasyeva ।
Bîjam ca tasya karma na ca tasya tat tato nityaḥ ॥293॥ (1841)]

Trans.—293. Like a sprout without seed, it has no birth again, since *Karma* is its seed. It no more belongs to that (*muktātmā*) which in that case, becomes everlasting. (1841)

टीका—न तस्य मुक्तस्य पुनरपि भवप्रसूतिरुपजायते, बीजाभावात्कारणस्यासत्त्वात्, यथाऽङ्कुरस्य तदभावाद् न प्रसूतिः । बीजं चास्य कर्मैवावगन्तव्यम्, तच्च मुक्तस्य नास्त्येव, ततः पुनरावृत्त्यभावाद् नित्योऽसाविति ॥ २९३ ॥ (१८४१) ॥

D. C.—Just as a sprout does not grow without seed, the *muktātmā* does not take any birth in absence of *Karma* which acts as its *bîja*. When *muktātmā* is said to have no *janma* (birth), it goes without saying that he is *nitya* also. ॥293 (1841)॥

Also,

दव्वामुत्तत्तणओ नहं व निच्चो मओ स दव्वतया ।
सव्वगयत्तावत्ती मइ त्ति तं नाणुमाणाओ ॥ २९४ ॥ (१८४२)

Davvāmuttattaṇao naham va nicco mao sa davvatayā ।
Savvgayattāvattî mai tti tam nāṇumāṇāo ॥ 294 ॥ (1842)

[द्रव्यामूर्तत्वतो नभ इव नित्यो मतः स द्रव्यतया ।
सर्वगतत्वापत्तिर्मतिरिति तद् नानुमानात् ॥ २९४ ॥ (१८४२)

Dravyāmūrtatvato nabha iva nityo mataḥ sa dravyatayā ।
Sarvagatatvāpattir matiriti tad nānumānāt ॥ 294 ॥ (1842)]

Trans.—294 By substantiality, it is considered as *nitya* like sky, on account of (both) substantiality, as well as, incorporeal nature. The belief that it is all-pervading, is not (acceptible) on account of *anumāna.* (1842)

टीका–स मुक्तात्मा नित्य इति प्रतिज्ञा । " दव्वामुत्तत्तणउ त्ति " द्रव्यत्वे सत्यमूर्तत्वादिति हेतुः । " दव्वतय त्ति " यथा द्रव्यत्वे सत्यमूर्तं नभ इति दृष्टान्तः । अथैवंभूता मति परस्य स्यात्–अनेन हेतुना सर्वगतत्वापत्तिरप्यात्मनः सिध्यति; तथाहि–सर्वगत आत्मा, द्रव्यत्वे सत्यमूर्तत्वात्, नभोवत् । ततश्च धर्मविशेषविपरीतसाधनाद् विरुद्धोऽयम् । तदेतद् न । कुतः ? । अनुमानात्–अनुमानबाधितत्वात् सर्वगतत्वस्येत्यर्थः; तथाहि–असर्वगत आत्मा, कर्तृत्वात्, कुलालवत् । न च कर्तृत्वमसिद्धम्, भोक्तृत्व–द्रष्टृत्वाद्यनुपपत्तेरिति ॥ २९४ ॥ (१८४२) ॥

D. C.—Like *ākās'a, ātmā* is *nitya* on account of its *dravyatva* as well as *a-mūrtatva.* But, it is not appropriate to believe that *ātmā* is all-pervading like *ākās'a.* The soul is *a-sarvagata* like potter, on account of its *kartṛitva.* For, otherwise, it will lose several of its own characteristics like *bhoktṛitva, a-dṛistatva* etc. ॥ 294 (1842) ॥

को वा निच्चग्गाहो सव्वं चिय वि भव-भंग–ट्ठिइमइयं ।
पज्जायंतरमेत्तप्पणादनिच्चाइववएसो ॥ २९५ ॥ (१८४३)

Ko vā niccaggāho savvam ciya vi bhava-bhanga-ṭṭhiimaiyam ।
Pajjāyantaramettappaṇādaniccāivavaeso ॥ 295 ॥ (1843)

[को वा नित्यग्रहः सर्वमेवापि भव-भङ्ग-स्थितिमयम् ।
पर्यायान्तरमात्रार्पणादनित्यादिव्यपदेशः ॥ २९५ ॥ (१८४३)

Ko vā nityagrahaḥ sarvamevāpi bhava-bhaṅga-sthitimayam ।
Paryāyāntaramātrārpaṇādanityādivyapadeśaḥ ॥ 295 ॥ (1843)]

Trāns.—295 Or, what (of) assuming *nityatā ?* Everything is susceptible to the state of production, destruction and existence. Only by the imposition of various methods, attributes like transitoriness etc., are designated (1843)

टीका-गतार्था, नवरं पर्यायान्तरमात्रस्यार्पणं प्रधानभावेन विवक्षणं तस्मादनित्यादिव्यपदेशः, तथाहि-घटःपूर्वेण मृत्पिण्डपर्यायेण विनश्यति, घटपर्यायतया पुनरुत्पद्यते, मृद्रूपतया त्ववतिष्ठते । ततश्च यो विनष्टरूपतादिपर्यायो यदार्पितः प्रधानभूतो विवक्ष्यते, तदा तेनानित्यत्वादिव्यपदेशः । एवमसावपि मुक्तः संसारितया विनष्टः, सिद्धतयोत्पन्नः, जीवत्व-सोपयोगत्वादिभिस्त्ववतिष्ठते, तथा, प्रथमसमयसिद्धतया विनश्यति, द्वितीयसमयसिद्धतयोत्पद्यते, द्रव्यत्व-जीवत्वादिभिस्त्ववतिष्ठते । ततोऽर्पितपर्यायेणानित्यत्वादिव्यपदेश इति ॥ २९५ ॥ (१८४३) ॥

D. C.—It is useless to insist that a free soul is exclusively *nitya* Attributes like *a-nityatā* could be indicated by means of various methods. Before *ghaṭa* comes into existence, its form as a lump of earth vanishes and comes into existence as a particular shape of earth named *ghaṭa*, and continues to exist in that state after its production also.

The same is the case with *muktātmā*. The *muktātmā* also vanishes as a mundane, comes into existence as *mukta* and continues to be in that state by virtue of its life and utility. So, it vanishes at the first time as it is established, comes into existence by virtue of its being established at the second time,

and continues to be in that state on account of its *dravyatva*, *jîvatva* etc.

In this way, by means of different *paryāyas*, the attributes like *a-nityatā*, are imposed.

मुत्तस्स कोऽवगासो सोम्म ! तिलोगसिहरं, गई किह से ?।
कम्मलहुया तहागइपरिणामाईहिं भणियमिदं ॥२९६॥(१८४४)

Muttassa ko'vagāso somma ! tilogasiharam, gaî kiha se ?
Kammalahuyā tahāgaipariṇāmāîhim bhaniyamidam ॥296॥ (1844)

[मुक्तस्य कोऽवकाशः सौम्य ! त्रिलोकशिखरं, गतिः कथं तस्य ?।
कर्मलघुता तथागतिपरिणामादिभिर्भणितमिदम् ॥ २९६ ॥ (१८४४)

Muktasya ko'vakāśaḥ saumya ! trilokaśikharam, gatiḥ katham tasya ?।
Karmalaghutā tathāgatiparināmādibhir bhaṇitamidam ॥296॥ (1844)]

Trans.—296 What is the resort of the free Soul? It is the end of three worlds. *O Saumya !* What is the rate of its movement? It is said that the Soul attains *moksa* at one time by (virtue of) the want of a *Karma*, as well as, by (virtue of) the (natural) tendency of its movement etc. (1844)

टीका–मुक्तस्य क्षीणसमस्तकर्मणो जीवस्य कोऽवकाशः कावस्थानम् ?, इति पृष्टे सत्याह–सौम्य ! त्रिलोकशिखरं, लोकान्त इत्यर्थः । ननु कथं 'से' तस्याकर्मणो जीवस्यैतावद् दूरमितो गतिः प्रवर्तते ?। कर्मनिबन्धना हि जीवानां सर्वापि चेष्टा, ततो विहायोगत्यादिकर्माभावेऽपि गतिचेष्टायामतिप्रसङ्गः प्राप्नोति । अत्रोच्यते–" कम्मलहुय त्ति " कर्मापगमे सति लाघवात् समयमेकं तद्गतिप्रवृत्तिरित्यर्थः, तथागतिपरिणामात्–कर्मक्षये सिद्धत्ववदपूर्वगतिपरिणामलाभादित्यर्थः, यथा हि समस्तकर्मक्षयादपूर्वं सिद्धत्वपरिणामं जीवः समासादयति, तथोर्ध्वगतिपरिणाममपीति भावः। आदिशब्दादपरमपि तद्गतिकारणं समयभणितमिदमवगन्तव्यम्, तद्यथा–लाउ य एरंडफले अग्गी धूमो य इसु धणुविमुक्को । गइ पुव्वपओगेणं एवं सिद्धाण वि गई उ ॥ १ ॥ २९६ ॥ (१८४४) ॥

D. C.—Maṇḍika:—Where do the *Mukta* souls reside ?

Bhagavān:—They reside at the end of the three worlds *O Saumya !*

Maṇḍika:—How do *jîvas* move to such a long distance even if they are unaccompanied by *Karmas ?* All sorts of movements of a *jîva* depend upon *Karma,* and hence, how will extensive movements such as moving in the sky etc. be possible at all ?

Bhagavān:—O Blessed *Maṇḍika* ! just as soul attains an unprecedented achivement when *karma* is destroyed, in the same way, the soul proceeds with the same movement and during the same period (of time).

Moreover, just as gourd, fruit of a castor plant, fire, smoke, arrow wafted from a bow etc. make movements by means of previous impellations, in the same way, a *muktātmā* is also able to make movement by means of previous impellations etc. ॥ 296 (1844) ॥

किं सक्किरियमरूवं मंडिय ! भुवि चेयणं च किमरूवं ?।
जह से विसेसधम्मो चेयन्नं तह मया किरिया ॥२९७॥(१८४५)

Kim sakkiriyamarūvam Maṇḍiya ! bhuvi ceyaṇam ca kimarūvam ?
Jaha se visesadhammo ceyannam taha mayā kiriyā ॥297॥ (1845)

[किं सक्रियमरूपं मण्डिक ! भुवि चेतनं च किमरूपम् ?।
यथा तस्य विशेषधर्मश्चैतन्यं तथा मता क्रिया ॥ २९७ ॥ (१८४५)

Kim sakriyamarūpam Maṇḍika ! bhuvi cetanam ca kimarūpam ?
Yathā tasya viśeṣadharmascaitanyam tathā matā kriyā ॥297॥(1845)

Trans.—297 What is movable (when it is formless) ? And, *O Maṇḍika,* what is living (when it is formless) ? Like consciousness, movement is also the distinctive characteristic of Soul. (1845)

टीका–नन्वाकाश–कालादयोऽमूर्ता निष्क्रिया एव प्रसिद्धाः, तत् किं नाम त्वयाऽरूपममूर्त्तं सद् वस्तु सक्रियं दृष्टं, येन मुक्तात्मनः सक्रियत्वमभ्युपगम्यते ?––ननु निष्क्रिय एव मुक्तात्मा प्राप्नोति, अमूर्तत्वात्, आकाशवदिति भावः । अत्रोच्यते–मण्डिक ! त्वमप्येतत् कथय,–भुवि किमरूपं सद्वस्तु चेतनं वीक्षितम्, येन मुक्तात्मा चेतनोऽभ्युपगम्यते ?–अमूर्तत्वादचेतन एवायं प्राप्नोति, आकाशवदिति । तस्माद् यथा " से " तस्य जीवस्यारूपेभ्य आकाशादिभ्यस्तद्रूपत्वे समानेऽन्योऽपि चैतन्यलक्षणो विशेषधर्मः समस्ति, तथा क्रियापि मता,–सक्रियत्वमपि विशेषधर्मोऽस्तु को विरोधः ? इति भावः ॥ २९७ ॥ (१८४५) ॥

D. C.—Maṇḍika:—The *a–mūrta* (objects like) *ākās'a* and *kāla* are welknown as *niṣkriya.* Then, how did you apprehend a formless object like *muktātmā* to be *sa–kriya ?* Since it is *a–mūtra* like *ākās'a*, it should also be *niṣkriya* like *ākās'a.*

Bhagavān:—What *a–mūrta* object have you seen to be *sacetana* in this world, in order to accept *muktātmā* as *sacetana ?* Just as *ākās'a* is *acetana* on account of its *amūrtatva*, the *muktātmā* should also be *acetana* as a rule. But it is not so. For, although *ātmā* resembles *ākās'a* in respect of *a–mūrtatva*, it possesses a distinct characteristic of *cetanā*, within which *kriyā* is also included. So, *sa–kriyatva* or activeness becomes a distinct peculiarity of *muktātmā* There is no doubt about it. ॥297॥(1845)

Or, leaving that distinction of *mukta* and *a–mukta* aside, it could also be argued that—

कत्ताइत्तणओ वा सक्किरिओऽयं मओ कुलालो व्व ।
देहप्फंदणओ वा पच्चक्खं जंतपुरिसो व्व ॥ २९८ ॥ (१८४६)

Kattāittaṇao vā sakkirio'yam mao kulālo vva ।
Dehapphandanao vā paccakkham jantapuriso vva ॥298॥ (1846)

[कर्त्रादित्वतो वा सक्रियोऽयं मतः कुलाल इव ।
देहस्पन्दनतो वा प्रत्यक्षं यन्त्रपुरुष इव ॥ २९८ ॥ (१८४६)

Kartrāditvato vā sakriyo'yam mataḥ kulāla iva ।
Dehaspandanato vā pratyakṣam yantrapuruṣa iva ॥ 298 ॥ (1846)]

Trans.—298 Like a potter, it is believed as active on account of its being an agent etc, or (it is active) like a mechanical person, on account of the directly perceptible movement of (its) body. (1846)

टीका–अथवा, सक्रियोऽयमात्मा, कर्तृत्वात्, कुलालवत् । आदिशब्दाद् " भोक्तृत्वात् " इति वाच्यम् । अथवा, सक्रिय आत्मा पत्यक्षत एव देहपरिस्पन्ददर्शनात्, यत्रपुरुषवदिति ॥ २९८ ॥ (१८४६) ॥

D. C.—The Soul could be taken as *sakriya* as a potter on account of its *kartṛitva* and *bhoktṛitva*. Or, it is *sakriya* like a *yantra-puruṣa* on account of the *pratyakṣa* movements of its body ॥ 298 ॥ (1846)]

देहप्फंदणहेऊ होज्ज पयत्तो त्ति सो वि नाकिरिए ।
होज्जादिट्ठो व मई तदरूवत्ते नणु समाणं ॥ २९९ ॥ (१८४७)

रूवित्तम्मि स देहो वच्चो तप्फंदणे पुणो हेऊ ।
पइनियपरिप्फंदणमचेयणाणं न वि य जुत्तं ॥३००॥(१८४८)

Dehapphandaṇaheū hojja payatto tti so vi nākirie ।
Hojjāditttho va maî tadarūvatte nanu samānam ॥ 299 ॥ (1847)

Rūvittammi sa deho vacco tapphandane puṇo heū ।
Painiyayaparipphandanamaceyaṇānam na vi ya juttam ॥ 300 ॥

[देहस्पन्दनहेतुर्भवेत् प्रयत्न इति सोऽपि नाक्रिये ।
भवेददृष्टो वा मतिस्तदरूपत्वे ननु समानम् ॥ २९९ ॥ (१८४७)

रूपित्वे स देहो वाच्यस्तत्स्पन्दने पुनर्हेतुः ।
प्रतिनियतपरिस्पन्दनमचेतनानां नापि युक्तम् ॥ ३०० ॥ (१८४८)

Dehaspandanahetur bhavet prayatna iti so'pi nākriye ।
Bhavedadṛiṣṭo vā matistadarūpatve nanu samānam ॥299॥ (1847)

Rūpitve sa deho vācyastatspandane punar hetuḥ ।
Pratiniyataparispandanamacetanānām nāpi yuktam ॥300॥(1848)]

Trans.—299-300 It may be (your opinion) that the effort (on the part of Soul) may be the cause of bodily movements. (But) even that is not (possible) in case of motionless (Soul). Or, (it may be believed that) the *hetu* is invisible and resembles it in formlessness. (If it is said that) by reason of form it is called *deha*, there should certainly be (some) reason behind (its) movement. But the regular movement of lifeless (objects) is not justified. (1847-1848)

टीका-अथैवं ब्रूषे-देहपरिस्पन्दहेतुरात्मनः प्रयत्नो न तु क्रिया, अतो नात्मनः सक्रियत्वसिद्धिरित्यभिप्रायः । अत्रोत्तरमाह-सोऽपि प्रयत्नो नभसीवाक्रिय आत्मनि न संभवति, अतः सक्रिय एवासौ । अमूर्तस्य च प्रयत्नस्य देहपरिस्पन्दहेतुत्वे कोऽन्यो हेतुरिति वाच्यम् ? । अन्यहेतु निरपेक्षः स्वत एवायं परिस्पन्दहेतुरिति चेत् । यद्येवम्, आत्मापि तद्धेतुर्भविष्यति, किमन्तर्गडुना प्रयत्नेन ? । अथादृष्टः कोऽपि देहपरिस्पन्दहेतुः, न त्वात्मा, निष्क्रियत्वात् । ननु सोऽप्यदृष्टः किं मूर्तः, अमूर्तो वा ? । यद्यमूर्तः, तर्ह्यात्मापि देहपरिस्पन्दहेतुः किं नेष्यते, अमूर्तत्वाविशेषात् ? । अथ मूर्तिमानदृष्टः, तर्हि स कार्मणशरीरलक्षणो देह एव, नान्यः संभवति । तस्यापि च बहिर्दृश्यदेहपरिस्पन्दहेतुतया व्याप्रियमाणस्य परिस्पन्दो द्रष्टव्यः, तस्य चान्यो हेतुर्वाच्यः, तस्यापि चान्यः, तस्यापि चान्यः, तस्यापि चान्य इत्यनवस्था । अथ स्वभावादेवादृष्टस्य कार्मणदेहस्य परिस्पन्दः प्रवर्तते, तर्हि बहिर्दृश्यस्यापि देहस्य तत एव तत्प्रवृत्तिर्भविष्यति, किमदृष्टकार्मणदेहपरिकल्पनेन ? । अस्त्वेवमिति चेत् । तदयुक्तम्, अचेतनानामेवंभूतप्रतिनियतविशिष्टपरिस्पन्दनस्य स्वाभाविकत्वानुपपत्तेः, " नित्यं सत्त्वमसत्त्वं वा हेतोरन्यानपेक्षणात्" इत्यादिदोषप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मात् कर्मविशिष्ट आत्मैव प्रतिनियतदेहपरिस्पन्दनहेतुत्वेन व्याप्रियत इति सक्रियोऽसाविति ॥ २९९-३०० ॥ (१८४७-१८४८) ॥

D. C.—Maṇḍika:—The *hetu* for movements of a body is the

effort (on the part) of Soul and not the *kriyā*. It is, therefore, not proper to take *ātmā* to be *sakriya*.

Bhagavān:—If the *ātmā* is *niṣkriya*, the effort cannot exist into it, and hence it is undoubtedly *sakriya*. What other *hetu* is to be understood in accepting the *a-mūrta* effort as a *hetu* for bodily movements ? If it is said that without the *apekṣā* of another *hetu*, this effort itself becomes the *hetu* in the *deha-spanda* the Soul will also be called the *hetu* of these bodily movements. What is the use of intervening *prayatna* in such a case ?

Maṇḍika:—There is some invisible *hetu* in the movements of *deha*, but *ātma* being *niṣkriya* cannot act as *hetu* in those movements.

Bhagavān:—Is that invisible (*hetu*) *mūrta* or *a-mūrta* ? If *a-mūrta*, why not take *ātmā* as *hetu* in the *deha parispanda* since it is also *a-mūrta* ? And if that *a-driṣṭa* is *mūrta*, it is nothing but *kārmaṇa sarîra*. Now, if that *kārmaṇa sarîra* is used as the *hetu* of *bāhya sarîra*, there must be some other *hetu* for the *parispandana* of the above-mentioned *kārmaṇa sarîra* This in turn, will have a third *hetu* for its *parispanda* and that a fourth one and so on until ultimately there is complete disorder. Again, if it is argued at this stage that the movement of an *adṛiṣṭa kārmaṇa sarîra* is caused by no other *hetu* than its own *svabhāva* so that there may not be any sort of *anavasthā*, then *parispanda* of *bāhya sarîras* will also be caused by *svabhāva* so that there may not be any sense in assuming the *adṛiṣṭa kārmaṇa sarîra*.

Maṇḍika:—I dont mind if the *parispanda* is taken to have been caused by *svabhāva*.

Bhagavān:—But it is not reasonable to believe like that. The definite type of the *parispanda* like this is never possible in case of *acetana* objects, because that which is indipendent of any other *hetu* is either everlasting or absolutely transitory.

The only alternative to accept, therefore, is that *ātmā* which is distinguished by *karma* is the *hetu* of *dehaparispanda* and hence *sakriya* also. ॥ 299–300 ॥ (1847–1848)]

होउ किरिया भवत्थस्स कम्मरहियस्स किंनिमित्ता सा ?।
नणु तग्गइपरिणामा जह सिद्धत्तं तहा सा वि ॥३०१॥(१८४९)

Höu kiriyā bhavatthassa kammarahiyassa kimnimittā sā ?।
Naṇu taggaipariṇāmā jaha siddhattam tahā sā vi ॥301॥ (1849)

[भवतु क्रिया भवस्थस्य कर्मरहितस्य किंनिमित्ता सा ?
ननु तद्गतिपरिणामाद् यथा सिद्धत्वं तथा सापि ॥ ३०१ ॥ (१८४९)

Bhavatu kriyā bhavasthasya karmarahitasya kimnimitttā sā ?
Nanu tadgatipariṇāmād yathā siddhatvam tathā sāpi ॥301॥ (1849)]

Trans.—301 Alright ! " How is the action of the *muṇḍane* (Soul) separated from *Karma* to be accounted for ? " " Certainly from their *pariṇāma.* Just as perfection is attributed to it, in the same way, activity is also attributed to it. " (1849)

किं सिद्धालयपरओ न गई, धम्मत्थिकायविरहाओ ।
सो गइउवग्गहकरो लोगम्मि जमत्थि नालोए ॥३०२॥(१८५०)

Kim siddhālayaparao na gaî, dhammatthikāyavirahāo ।
So gaiuvagghakaro logammi jamatthi nālöe ॥ 302 ॥ (1850)

[किं सिद्धालयपरतो न गतिः, धर्मास्तिकायविरहात् ।
स गत्युपग्रहकारो लोके यदस्ति नालोके ॥ ३०२ ॥ (१८५०)

Kim siddhālayaparato na gatiḥ, dharmāstikāyavirahāt ।
Sa gatyupagrahakāro loke yadasti nāloke ॥ 302 ॥ (·1850)]

Trans.—302 Why not the movement (of Soul) (to extend) beyond *Siddhālaya ?* Because, of the absence of the predicament of *dharmāstikāya.* That being the impeller of motion resides in this world, and not in the spiritual world. (1850)

टीका–यद्युक्तन्यायेन मुक्तस्य गतिक्रियया सक्रियत्वमियष्ते, तर्हि सिद्धालयात् सिद्धावस्थितिक्षेत्रात् परतोऽलोकेऽपि किमिति तस्य गतिर्न प्रवर्तते ?। अत्रोच्यते–परतो धर्मास्तिकायविरहात्। तद्विरहोऽपि कुतः ? इत्याह–यद् यस्मादसौ धर्मास्तिकायो लोक एव समस्ति, नालोके। मा भूदसावलोके, किं तेन प्रस्तुतानुपयोगिना कर्तव्यम्, तद्विरहेऽपि भवतु मुक्तस्य तत्र गतिः, नियमाभावात् ?। तदयुक्तम्, यतो जीवानां पुद्गलानां च गतेर्गमनस्योपग्रह उपष्टम्भस्तत्कारी स एव धर्मास्तिकायो नान्यः, ततस्तस्यालोकेऽभावात् कथं लोकात् परतोऽलोकेऽपि मुक्तात्मनां गतिः प्रवर्तते ? इति ॥३०२॥(१८५०)

D. C.—Maṇḍika :—If *mūktātmā* were *sakriya* by virtue of its movement, why should it not move beyond *Siddhālaya* also ?

Bhagavān :—It cannot move beyond *Siddhālaya*, because *dharmāstikāya* or the predicament of motion does not exist in the *a-loka*.

Maṇḍika:—What of that ? Even if *dharmāstikāya* does not exist in the *aloka*, *muktāmā* can acceed to it without *dharmāstikāya*.

Bhagavān:—That is not possible. *O Maṇḍika*. It is the predicament of motion that impels *muktāmā* to move. Hence, if *dharmāstikāya* does not exist in the *aloka*, *muktātmā* is unable to move towards it ॥ 302 (1850)

लोगस्स त्थि विवक्खो सुद्धत्तणओ घडस्स अघडो व्व ।
स घडाइ च्चिय मई न निसेहाओ तदणुरूवो ॥३०३॥ (१८५१)

Logassa tthi vivakkho suddhattaṇao ghaḍassa a-ghaḍo vva ।
Sa ghaḍāi cciya maî na nisehāo tadaṇurūvo ॥ 303 ॥ (1851)

[लोकस्यास्ति विपक्षः श्रुद्धत्वतो घटस्याघट इव ।
स घटादिरेव मतिर्न निषेधात् तदनुरूपः ॥ ३०३ ॥ (१८५१)

Lokasyāsti vipakṣaḥ śruddhatvato ghaṭasyāghaṭa iva ।
Sa ghaṭādireva matir na niṣedhāt tadanurūpaḥ ॥ 303 ॥ (1851)]

Trans.—303 As *ghaṭa* has *a-ghaṭa* (as its opposite) *loka* also has its opposite, because of its etymological distinction. The view that it is nothing but *ghaṭa* etc., is (also) not (acceptible). (For), by means of negation (something) of its own kind (is understood). (1851)

टीका–अस्ति लोकस्य विपक्षः, व्युत्पत्तिमच्छुद्धपदाभिधेययत्वात्, इह यद् व्युत्पत्तिमत्ता शुद्धपदेनाभिधीयते तस्य विपक्षो दृष्टः, यथा घटस्याघटः, यश्च लोकस्य विपक्षः सोऽलोकः । अथ स्यान्मतिः—" न लोकोऽलोकः " इति यो लोकस्य विपक्षः स घटादिपदार्थानामन्यतम एव भविष्यति, किमिह वस्त्वन्तरपरिकल्पनया ? । तदेतद् न, पर्युदासनञा निषेधात् निषेध्यस्यैवानुरूपोऽत्र विपक्षोऽन्यवेषणीयः, " न लोकोऽलोकः " इत्यत्र लोको निषेध्यः, स चाकाशविषयः, अतोऽलोकेनाऽपि तदनुरूपेण भवितव्यम्, यथा " इहापण्डितः ", इत्युक्ते विशिष्टज्ञानविकलश्चेतन एव पुरुषविशेषो गम्यते, नाचेतनो घटादिः, एवमिहापि लोकानुरूप एवालोको मन्तव्यः । उक्तं च—

" नञ्युक्तमिवयुक्तं वा यद्धि कार्यं विधीयते ।
तुल्याधिकरणेऽन्यस्मिंल्लोकेऽप्यर्थगतिस्तथा ॥ १ ॥

" नञ्–इवयुक्तमन्यसदृशाधिकरणे तथा ह्यर्थगति । " तस्माल्लोकविपक्षत्वादस्त्यलोक इति ॥ ३०३ ॥ (१८५१)

D. C—From the point of view of etymology, just as *ghaṭa* has its opposite (word) *a-ghaṭa*, *loka* must also have its opposite word *a-loka*. It is not justificeable to assume that *a-loka* is also the opposite of *ghaṭa*, *paṭa* etc. By means of *niṣedha* something of its own kind is understood. Just as by the word *a-paṇḍita* a living person having no scholarship is meant but not the inanimate objects like *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*, so here also, by the *niṣedha* of *loka*, nothing but *a-loka* should be understood. And it has also been said that.

Nanyuktamiva yuktam vā yaddhi kāryam vidhîyate ।
Tuylādhikaraṇe' nyasminlloke'pyarthagatis tathā.

So, *a–loka* alone is the *vipākṣa* of *loka* ॥ 303 ॥ (1851)

तम्हा धम्मा–ऽधम्मा लोयपरिच्छेयकारिणो जुत्ता ।
इहरागासे तुल्ले लोगोऽलोगो त्ति को भेओ ? ॥३०४॥ (१८५२)

लोगविभागाभावे पडिघायाभावओऽणवत्थाओ ।
संववहाराभावो संबंधाभावओ होज्जा ॥ ३०५ ॥ (१८५३)

Tamhā dhammā'dhammā loyapariccheyakāriṇo juttā ।
Iharāgāse tulle logo'logo tti ko bheo ? ॥ 304 ॥ (1852)

Logavibhāgābhāve padighāyābhāvao'ṇavatthāo ।
Samvavahārābhāvo sambandhābhāvao hojjā ॥ 305 ॥ (1853)

[तस्माद् धर्मा–ऽधर्मौ लोकपरिच्छेदकारिणौ युक्तौ ।
इतरथाकाशे तुल्ये लोकोऽलोक इति को भेदः ? ॥ ३०४ ॥ (१८५२)

लोकाविभागाभावे प्रतिघाताभावतोऽनवस्थातः ।
संव्यवहाराभावः संबन्धाभावतो भवेत् ॥ ३०५ ॥ (१८५३)

Tasmād dharmā–'dharmau lokapariccheda kāriṇau yuktau ।
Itarathākāśe tulye loko'loka iti ko bhedaḥ ? ॥ 304 ॥ (1852)]

Lokavibhāgābhāve pratighātābhāvato'navasthātaḥ ।
Saṃvyavahārārābhāvaḥ saṃbandhābhāvato bhavet ॥305॥(1853)]

Trans.—304–305 Thus (predicaments of) motion and rest are employed as the causes of destruction of *loka.* Otherwise, when the sky is common (everywhere) how are *' loka '* and *' a–loka, '* (to be) distinguished? In absence of the divisions of *loka,* there will be no reaction and hence no (scope for) stability; so also there will be scope for mutual relation as there will be no connection (between them). (1852–1853)

टीका–यस्मादुक्तप्रकारेणास्त्यलोकः, तस्मादलोकास्तित्वादेवावश्यं लोकपरिच्छेदकारिभ्यां धर्मा–ऽधर्मास्तिकायाभ्यां भवितव्यम् ; अन्यथाऽऽकाशे सामान्ये सति " अयं लोकः " " अयं चालोकः " इति किंकृतोऽयं

विशेषः स्यात् ? । तस्माद् यत्र क्षेत्रे धर्मा-ऽधर्मास्तिकायौ वर्तेते, तल्लोकः, शेषं त्वलोक इति लोका-ऽलोकव्यवस्थाकारिणौ धर्मा-ऽधर्मास्तिकायौ विद्येते इति । " लोगेत्यादि " यदि हि धर्मा-ऽधर्माभ्यां लोकविभागो न स्यात्, ततो लोकविभागाभावेऽविशिष्ट एव सर्वस्मिन्नप्याकाशे गति-परिणतानां जीवानां पुद्गलानां च प्रतिघाताभावेन् तद्गत्यवस्थानाभावा-दलोकेऽपि गमनात्, तस्य चानन्तत्वात् तेषां परस्परं संबन्धो न स्यात् । ततश्चौदारिकादिकार्मणवर्गणापर्यन्तपुद्गलकृतो जीवानां बन्ध-मोक्ष-सुख-दुःख-भवसंसरणादिव्यवहारो न स्यात् । जीवस्य च जीवेन सहान्योन्यमी-लनाभावात् तत्कृतोऽनुपग्रहो-पघातादिव्यवहारो न स्यादिति ॥३०४-३०५॥ (१८५२-१८५३) ॥

D. C.—When the existence of *a-loka* is accepted, the existence of the predicaments of motion and rest are also accepted to exist. Otherwise, *ākās'a* being common everywhere *loka* and *a-loka* will not be distinguished from each other. Thus, wherever the predicaments of *dharma* and *a-dharma* exist there is *loka*, and the rest is called *a-loka*. If there were no distinction between *loka* and *a-loka* by means of *dharma* and *a-dharma*, *pratighāta* of various *jîvas* and *pudgalas* in this world, will not be possible. Consequently, there will be no scope for *gati* and *avasthāna* to lead them to *a-loka*. *Jîvas* and *pudgalas* will then become *ananta*; there will be nothing like mutual relation between them, and the attributes of *bandha* and *mokṣa* will also be no longer existing between them ॥ 304-305 ॥ (1852-1853)]

निरणुग्गहत्तणाओ न गई परओ जलादिव झसस्स ।
जो गमणाणुग्गहिया सो धम्मो लोगपरिमाणो ॥३०६॥ (१८५४)

Niranuggahattaṇāo na gaî parao jalādiva jhasassa ।
Jo gamaṇānuggahiyā so dhammo logaparimāṇo ॥ 306 ॥ (1854)

[निरनुग्रहत्वाद् न गतिः परतो जलादिव झषस्य ।
यो गमनानुग्रहीता स धर्मो लोकपरिमाणः ॥ ३०६ ॥ (१८५४)

Niranugrahatvād na gatiḥ parato jalādiva jhaṣasya ।
Yo gamanānugrahitā sa dharmo loka-parimāṇaḥ ॥306॥ (1854)]

Trans.—306 Just as the activity of fish does not extend beyond water, (their) movement also does not extend beyond *(loka)*. The predicament of *dharmāstikāya* which is favourable to (their) movement, becomes the only measuring unit of *loka.* (1854).

टीका–ततो लोकात् परतोऽलोके जीव-पुद्गलानां न गतिः, निरनुग्रहत्वात्—तत्र गत्यनुग्रहकर्तुरभावादित्यर्थः, यथा जलात् परतो झषस्य मत्स्यस्य गतिर्न भवति, उपग्राहकाभावादिति । यश्चात्र जीव-पुद्गलगतेरनुग्रहकर्ता स लोकपरिमाणो धर्मास्तिकाय इति ॥ ३०६ ॥ (१८५४) ॥

D. C.—Just as fish cannot move out of water as there will be no *upagrāhaka* of their movement, so also, *jîvas* and *pudgalas* will have no access to the *a-loka,* as *a-loka* is not favourable to their movement. It is predicament of *dharmāstikāya* which acts as the *upagrāhaka* of the movements of *jîvas* and *pudgalas*, that measures the worth of *loka* ॥ 306 ॥ (1854)]

अत्थि परिमाणकारी लोगस्स पमेयभावओऽवस्सं ।
नाणं पिव नेयस्सालोगत्थित्ते य सोऽवस्सं ॥ ३०७ ॥ (१८५५)

Atthi parimānakārî logassa pameyabhāvao'vassam ।
Nāṇam piva neyassālogtthitte ya so'vassam ॥ 307 ॥ (1855)

[अस्ति परिमाणकारी लोकस्य प्रमेयभावतोऽवश्यम् ।
ज्ञानमिव ज्ञेयस्यालोकास्तित्वे च सोऽवश्यम् ॥ ३०७ ॥ (१८५५)

Asti parimāṇakārî lokasya prameyabhāvato'vaśyam ।
Jñānamiva jñeyasyālokāstitve ca so'vaśyam ॥ 307 ॥ (1855)]

Trans.—307 Just as *jnāna* measures the *jñeya,* similarly, in the midst of (the existence of) *a-loka,* it (*i. e., dharmāstikāya*) also acts undoubtedly as the measuring unit of *loka* on account of its finiteness. (1855)

टीका–अस्ति लोकस्य परिमाणकारी, प्रमेयत्वात्, ज्ञानमिव ज्ञेयस्य। अथवा, जीवाः पुद्गलाश्च लोकोऽभिधीयते, ततोऽस्ति तत्परिमाणकारी, प्रमेयत्वात्, यथा शाल्यादीनां प्रस्थः, यश्चेह परिमाता स धर्मास्तिकायः, स चावश्यमलोकस्यास्तित्व एव युज्यते, नान्यथा, आकाशस्य सर्वत्राविशिष्टत्वात्। तस्माल्लोकाग्रे सिद्धस्यावस्थानमिति प्रस्तुतम् ॥ ३०७ ॥ (१८५५)

D. C.—Since *loka* is susceptible to measure, it must have some sort of measuring unit like *jnāna*, which is the measuring unit of the *jneya*. The measuring unit of *loka* is *dharmāstikāya* or the predicament of motion which exists only if *loka* exists, and not otherwise. So, in the midst of *loka*, the *avasthāna* of *Siddha* or *muktātmā* must necessarily be accepted ॥307॥ (1855)]

पयणं पसत्तमेवं थाणाओ तं च नो जओ छट्ठी ।
इह कत्तिलक्खणेयं कत्तुरणत्थंतरं थाणं ॥ ३०८ ॥ (१८५६)

Payaṇam pasattamevam thāṇāo tam ca no jao chaṭṭhî ।
Iha kattilakkaṇeyam katuraṇatthantaram thāṇam ॥ 308 ॥ (1856)

[पतनं प्रसक्तमेवं स्थानात् तच्च नो यतः षष्ठी ।
इह कर्तृलक्षणेयं कर्तुरनर्थान्तरं स्थानम् ॥ ३०८ ॥ (१८५६)

Patanam prasaktamevam sthānāt tacca no yataḥ ṣaṣṭhî ।
Iha kartṛilakṣaṇeyam karturanarthāntaram sṭhānam ॥308॥(1856)]

Trans.—308 " Falling from (a fixed) position is thus attributed (to it)." It is not so on account of the genitive case which is here used in the sense of Nominative. Location is not different from subject in this case." (1856)

टीका–ननु " स्थीयतेऽस्मिन्निति स्थानम् " इत्यधिकरणसाधनोऽयं शब्दः। ततश्च सिद्धस्य स्थानं सिद्धस्थानमिति समासः। ततश्चैवं सति सिद्धस्य पतनं प्रसक्तम्, स्थानात्, पर्वत–पादपाद्यग्रस्थितदेवदत्तस्येव, फलस्येव वा। यस्य किल क्वापि पर्वतादाववस्थानं, तस्य कदाचित् कस्यापि पतनमपि दृश्यते; अतः सिद्धस्यापि तत् कदाचित् प्राप्नोतीति भावः। तच्च न, यतः

" सिद्धस्य स्थानम् " इतीयं कर्तरिषष्ठी । ततश्च " सिद्धस्य स्थानम् " इति कोऽर्थ ?--सिद्धस्तिष्ठति, न तु तदर्थान्तरभूतंस्थानमस्तीति ॥ ३०८ ॥ (१८५६) ॥

D. C.—Maṇḍika:—Sthāna means place of location. So, when the place of location of a *siddha* being is accepted as existing, the characteristic of falling from that place should also be attributed to it as in the case of *Devadatta* or a fruit falling from the summit of a mountain or tree, as the case may be. Everything is bound to fall from the place of its location and *siddha* is no exception to it.

Bhagavān:—It is not so. The phrase " *Siddhasya sthānam* " shows that the word " *Siddha* " is in the Genitive case used in the Nominative sense, " *Siddhasya sthānam* " means, therefore, the place where *Siddha* resides, but it is not different from *Siddha* ॥ 308 ॥ (1856)

Or,

नहनिच्चत्तणओ वा थाणविणासपयाणं न जुत्तं से ।
तह कम्माभावाओ पुणाक्रियाभावओ वा वि ॥३०९॥ (१८५७)

Nahaniccattanao vā ṭhāṇaviṇāsapayāṇam na juttam se ।
Taha kammābhāvāo puṇṇakkiyābhāvao vā vi ॥ 309 ॥ (1857)

[नभोनित्यत्वतो वा स्थानविनाशपतनं न युक्तं तस्य ।
तथा कर्माभावात् पुनः क्रियाभावतो वापि ॥ ३०९ ॥ (१८५७)

Nabhonityatvato vā sthānavināśapatanam na yuktam tasya ।
Tathā karmābhāvāt punaḥ kriyābhāvato vāpi ॥ 309 ॥ (1857)]

Trans.—309 Neither destruction nor its falling from the place of its location is possible on account of its being *nitya* like *ākāśa*, as well as, due to the absence of *kriyā* or even for want of *Karma.* (1857)

टीका—अर्थान्तरत्वेऽपि स्थानस्य न पतनं सिद्धस्य, यतोऽस्यर्थान्तरं

स्थानं नभ एव, तस्य च नित्यत्वाद् विनाशो न युक्तः, तदभावे च कुतः पतनं मुक्तस्य ? । कर्म चात्मनः पतनादिक्रियाकारणम्, मुक्तस्य च कर्माभावात् कुतः पतनक्रिया ? । या च समयमेकमस्याप्यूर्ध्वं गतिक्रिया, तस्याः कारणं " लाउ य एरंडफले " इत्यादिना दर्शितमेव । पुनःक्रिया च मुक्तस्य नास्ति, कारणाभावात् । निजप्रयत्न-प्रेरणा-ऽऽकर्षण-विकर्षण-गुरुत्वादयो हि पतनकारणम्, तत्संभवश्च मुक्तस्य नास्ति, हेतोरभावात्, इति कुतोऽस्य पतनम् ? । इति ॥ ३०९ ॥ (१८५७) ॥

D. C.—Even if *sthāna* were taken to be distinct from *siddha* it is not proper to believe that *siddha* falls from the *sthāna*, which itself is destructible. Since *sthāna* is *nitya* like *ākās'a*, it would never meet destruction. In the process of falling, *Karma* is the essential factor. Now, since *muktātmā* is free from *Karma*, the process of falling cannot come into existence for want of *Karma* Moreover, impellation by ones' own efforts, attraction, repulsion and weightiness etc. are also important causes of—the *patana kriyā*, but since all of them are absent in *muktātmā*, the *patana* of *muktātina* from its *sthāna* is not possible from that view point also. ॥ 309 ॥ (1857)]

Besides,

निच्चथाणाओ वा वोमाईणंपडणं पसज्जेज्जा ।
अह न मयमणेगंतो थाणाओऽवस्स पडणं ति ॥३१०॥(१८५८)

Niccathānāo vā vomāînampadaṇam pasajjejjā ।
Aha na mayamaneganto thānāo'vassa padaṇam ti ॥ 310 ॥ (1858)

[नित्यस्थानाद् वा व्योमादीनां पतनं प्रसज्येत ।
अथ न मतमनेकान्तः स्थानादवश्यं पतनमिति ॥ ३१० ॥ (१८५८)

Nityasthānād vā vyomādînām patanam prasajyeta ।
Atha na matamanekāntaḥ sthānādavaśyam patanamiti ॥310(1858)]

Trans.—310 Or, if the fall from permanent abode (is admitted) the fall of sky will also be caused. And, if that is

not admitted, the statement that "Falling from the place of location is inevitable" becomes uncertain. (1858)

टीका–ननु च "स्थानात् पतनम्" इति स्ववचनविरुद्धमिदम्, अस्थानादेव पतनस्य युज्यमानत्वात्। अथ स्थानादपि पतनमिष्यते, तर्हि नित्यमेव स्थानाद् व्योमादीनां प्रतनं प्रसज्येत। अथ न तत् तेषां मतम्, तर्हि "स्थानात् पतनम्" इत्यनैकान्तिकमेवेति ॥ ३१० ॥ (१८५८)

D. C.—The statement that everything has to fall from its *sthāna* is self-contradicting. For the action of falling takes place from the *avasthāna* or the abode, and not from the *sthāna*. If falling from *sthāna* were believed, the *nitya* objects like *ākāś'a* will also have to meet *patana*, from their *nitya sthānas*.

On the other hand, if it is not accepted, that falling from the place of location is inevitable, will be *anaikāntika* ॥310॥ (1858)]

भवओ सिद्धो त्ति मई तेणाइमसिद्धसंभवो जुत्तो।
कालाणाइत्तणओ पढमसरीरं व तदजुत्तं ॥ ३११ ॥ (१८५९)

Bhavao siddho tti maî teṇāimasiddhasambhavo jutto।
Kalāṇāittaṇao paḍhamasarîram va tadajuttam ॥ 311 ॥ (1859)

[भवतः सिद्ध इति मतिस्तेनादिमसिद्धसंभवो युक्तः।
कालानादित्वतः प्रथमशरीरमिव तदयुक्तम् ॥ ३११ ॥ (१८५९)

Bhavataḥ siddha iti matistenādimasiddhasaṃbhavo yuktaḥ।
Kālānāditvataḥ prathamaśarîramiva tadayuktam ॥311॥ (1859)]

Trans.—311 It may be argued that the *siddha* (is born) from the *mundane* world and hence the production of the first *siddha* is acceptible. But, like the first *śarîra*, that is not possible on account of the endlessness of times.

टीका–अथ स्याद् मतिः परस्य–यतो भवात् संसारात् सर्वोऽपि मुक्तात्मा सिद्धस्तेन ततः सर्वेषामपि सिद्धानामादिमत्त्वादवश्यमेव केनाप्यादिसिद्धेन भवितव्यम्। तदयुक्तम्, यतो यथा सर्वाण्यपि शरीराणि, अहोरात्राणि

च सर्वाण्यादियुक्तान्येव, अथ च कालस्यानादित्वाद् नाद्यशरीरम्, आद्याहोरात्रं वा किमपि ज्ञायते, तथा कालस्यानादित्वात् सिद्धोऽपि नाद्यः प्रतीयत इति ॥ ३११ ॥ (१८५९) ॥

D. C.—Maṇḍika:—It has already been proved that all *muktāmās* are born of this *saṃsāra*. Hence, there ought to exist some *siddha* who might be called the first of all the *muktātmas*.

Bhagavān:—Your assumption is groundless. For like bodies, nights, and days, the *muktātmā* is also *ādimān*, but owing to the endlessness of *Kāla*, it is not possible to know as to who was the first *siddha* ॥ 311 ॥ (1859)]

परिमियदेसेऽणंता किह माया मुत्तिविरहियत्ताओ ।
नियम्मि व नाणाई दिट्ठीओ वेगरूवम्मि ॥ ३१२ ॥ (१८६०)

Parimiyadese'ṇantā kiha māyā muttivirahiyattāo ।
Niyammi va ṇāṇāî diṭṭhîo vega–rūvammi ॥ 312 ॥ (1860)

[परिमितदेशेऽनन्ताः कथं माता मूर्तिविरहितत्वात् ।
निजके वा ज्ञानादयो दृष्टयो वैकरूपे ॥ ३१२ ॥ (१८६०)

Parimitadeśe'nantāḥ katham mātā mūrtivirahitatvāt ।
Nijake vā jñānādayo dṛiṣṭayo vaikarūpe ॥ 312 ॥ (1860)]

Trans.—312 (Then) how are the numerous *(siddhas)* contained in limited space ? " On account of their formlessness; or like one's own apprehensions, etc, or like (numerous) eyes on one form. " (1860)

टीका–आह–परिमितदेशमेव सिद्धक्षेत्रम्, तत्र कथमनादिकालवर्तिनोऽनन्ताः सिद्धा मान्ति ? । अत्रोत्तरमाह–अमूर्तत्वात् सिद्धाः परिमितेऽपि क्षेत्रेऽनन्तास्तिष्ठन्ति, यथा प्रतिद्रव्यमेवानन्तानि सिद्धानां संबन्धीनि केवलज्ञान–केवलदर्शनानि संपतन्ति, दृष्टयो वा यथैकस्यामपि नर्तक्यां सहस्रशः प्रपतन्ति, परिमितेऽपि वाऽपवरकादिक्षेत्रे बह्वयोऽपि प्रदीपप्रभा मान्ति; एवमिहामूर्ताः सिद्धा कथं परिमितक्षेत्रेऽनन्ता न मास्यन्ति; मूर्तानामपि

प्रदीपप्रभादीनां बहूनामेकत्रावस्थानं दृश्यते, किमुताऽमूर्तानाम् ? इति भावः ॥ ३१२ ॥ (१८६०) ॥

D. C.—Maṇḍika:—The abode of *siddhas* is limited in space. How could the numberless *siddhas* be accomodated in it ?

Bhagāvān.—Siddhas are accomodated even in that limited space on account of their *a-mūrtatva*, just as a number of apprehensions are made upon one object, or just as a number of eyes fall upon one dancer, or just as light of numerous lamps is accumulated in one room of limited space, the *a-mūrta siddhas* are also contained in their limited *kṣetra*. When the accumulation of a number of *mūrta* splendours of lamps in a limited space is possible, why not the collection of *a-mūrta siddhas* be not possible in the *a-mūrta* space ? ॥ 312 ॥ (1860)]

न ह वइ सशरीरस्स प्पिया-ऽप्पियावहतिरेवमाईणं ।
वेयपयाणं च तुमं न सदत्थं मुणसि तो संका ॥३१३॥(१८६१)

तुह बंधे मोक्खम्मि य, सा य न कज्जा जओ फुडो चेव ।
ससरीरे-यरभावो नणु जो सो बंध मोक्खो त्ति ॥३१४॥(१८६२)

Na ha vai sa-śarîrasya ppiyā-'ppiyāvahatirevamāîṇam ।
Veyapayāṇam ca tumam na sadattham munasi to saṅkā ॥ 313 ॥

Tuha bandhe mokkhammi ya, sā ya na kajjā jao phudo ceva ।
Sa-śarîre-yarabhāvo naṇu jo so bandha mokkho tti ॥314॥(1862)

[न ह वै सशरीरस्य प्रिया-ऽप्रिययोरपहतिरेवमादीनाम् ।
वेदपदानां च त्वं न सदर्थं मुणसि ततः शङ्का ॥ ३१३ ॥ (१८६१)

तव बन्धे मोक्षे च, सा च न कार्या यतः स्फुट एव ।
सशरीरे-तरभावो ननु यः स बन्धो मोक्ष इति ॥ ३१४ ॥ (१८६२)

Na ha vai sa-śarîrasya priyā-'priyayorapahatirevamādînām !
Vedapadānām ca tvam na sadartham muṇasi tataḥ śaṅkā ॥313॥(1861)]

Tava bandhe mokṣe ca, sā ca na kāryā yataḥ sphuṭa eva |
Sa-śarîre-tarabhāvo nanu yaḥ sa bandho mokṣa iti ॥314॥(1862)]

Trans.—313-314 Really speaking, you have not understood the real meaning of the sentences of the *Vedas* such as " *Na ha vai sa-śarîrasya priyyā-priyayorapahati* " ete, and hence your doubt as regards *bandha* and *moksa* (has arisen). That doubt should no longer be entertained. For, *bandha* and *moksa* are nothing but the qualities of having a form and formlessness (respectively). (1861-1862)

टीका–व्याख्या–" न हि वै सशरीरस्य प्रिया-ऽप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति, अशरीरं वा वसन्तं वा प्रिया-ऽप्रिये न स्पृशतः " इत्यादीनां च वेदपदानां सदर्थं त्वं न मुणसि । ततो बन्धे मोक्षे च तव सौम्य ! शङ्का, सा च न कार्या, यतो ननु यः सशरीरे-तरभावः स्फुट एव बन्धो मोक्षश्चेति कथं शङ्का युज्यते ? । एतदुक्तं भवति–" स शरीरस्य " इत्यनेन बाह्या-ऽऽध्यात्मिकानादिशरीरसंतानस्वरूपो बन्धः प्रोक्तः, तथा, " अशरीरं वा वसन्तम् " इत्यनेन त्वशेषशरीरापगमस्वभावो मोक्षः प्रतिपादितः । तथा "स एव विगुणो विभुर्न बध्यते " इत्यादीन्यपि पदानि संसारिजीवस्य बन्धमोक्षाभाव प्रतिपादकानि त्वं मन्यसे । तच्चायुक्तम्, मुक्तजीवविषयत्वात् तेषाम् । मुक्तस्य च बन्धाद्यभावेऽविप्रतिपत्तिरेवेति । तदेवं भगवता छिन्नस्तस्य संशयः ॥ ३१३-३१४ ॥ (१८६१-१८६२) ॥

D. C.—You have not grasped the real meaning of the *Vedapadas* such as:—" *Na ha vai sa-śarîrasya priya-'priya yorapahati,*" "*Aśarîram vā vasantam priyā-priye na spriś'atah.*" And that is why, *O Saumya !* you have raised the doubt as regards *bandha* and *mokṣa*. But, this sort of doubt should not be entertained by you. For, it is clear that *bandha* and *mokṣa* are nothing but the qualities of *sa-śarîratva* and *a-s'arîratva* respectively.

By the words *sas'arîrasya* etc. *bandha* which is nothing but the *santāna* of the external, as well as, internal *anādi*

s'arîra, is meant; while by means of "*a–s'arîram vā*" etc *mokṣa* characterized by the removal of entire *s'arîra* is laid down.

Finally, you have apprehended sentences such as *sa eṣa viguṇo vibhurna bhdhyate* etc. to support the *abhāva* of *bandha–mokṣa* to the *mundane* soul But that is not correct. Those sentences are referring to the free soul. *Attributes* such as "*It is never bound*" etc. are directed to nothing but the *muktātmā.*

Thus, the doubts are removed from the mind of *Maṇḍika.* ॥ 313–314 ॥ (1861–1862)]

छिन्नम्मि संसयम्मी जिणेण जर–मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
सो समणो पव्वइओ अद्धट्ठिहि सह खंडियसएहि ॥३१५॥(१८६३)

Chinnammi samsayammi jinena jara maraṇa vippamukkenam ।
So samaṇo pavvaio addhuṭṭhihi saha khandiya saehim ॥315॥(1863)

[छिन्ने संशये जिनेन जरा–मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
स श्रमणः प्रव्रजितोऽर्धचतुर्थैः सह खण्डिकशतैः ॥ ३१५ ॥ (१८५३)

Chinne samśaye jinena jarā–maraṇa vipramuktena ।
Sa śramaṇaḥ pravrajito'rdha caturthaih saha khaṇḍikaśataiḥ ॥315॥

Trans.—315 When the doubt was removed by the *Tîrthaṅkara,* who was entirely free from old age and death, that saint accepted the *Dîksā* along with his four hundred and fifty followers. (1863)

End of the Discussion with the Sixth Gaṇadhara.

Chapter VII

सत्तमगणधरवक्तव्यता ।

Discussion with the Seventh Gaṇadhara

ते पव्वइए सोउं मोरिओ आगच्छई जिणसगासं ।
वच्चामि ण वंदामी वंदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ॥ ३१६ ॥ (१८६४)

आभट्ठो य जिणेणं जाइ--जरा--मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
नामेण य गोत्तेण य सव्वण्णू सव्वदरिसी णं ॥३१७॥ (१८६५)

Te pavvaie söum Morio āgacchai jiṇasagāsam ।
Vaccāmi ṇa vandāmî vandittā pajjuvāsāmi ॥ 316 ॥ (1864)

Ābhaṭṭho ya Jiṇeṇam jāi-jarā-maraṇa vippamukkeṇam ।
Nāmeṇa ya gottena ya savvaṇū savvadarisî nam ॥ 317 ॥ (1865)

[तान् प्रव्रजितान् श्रुत्वा मौर्य आगच्छति जिनसकाशम् ।
व्रजामि वन्दे वन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ॥ ३१६ ॥ (१८६४)

आभाषितश्च जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ॥ ३१७ ॥ (१८६५)

Tān pravrajitān śrutva maurya agaccati jinsakāśam ।
Vrajāmi vande vanditva paryupāse ॥ 316 ॥ (1864)]

Ābhāṣitaśca Jinena jāti-jarā-maraṇa vipramuktena ।
Nāmnā ca gotreṇa ca sarvajnena sarva darśinā ॥317॥ (1865)]

Trans.—316-317 Having heard that they had renounced the world, *Maurya,* comes before the *Tîrthaṅkara.* (He

thinks:—) I may go, pay my homages and worship him. He was addressed by his name and lineage by the *Tîrthaṅkara* who was free from birth, old age and death, who was omniscient, and who had complete *darśana* (undifferentiated knowledge. (1864–1865)

किं मण्णे अत्थि देवा उयाहु नत्थि त्ति संसओ तुज्झ ।
वेयपयाण य अत्थं न याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो ॥३१८॥ (१८६६)

Kim manne atthi devā uyāhu natthi tti samsao tujjha ।
Veyapayāna ya attham na yāṇasî tesimo attho ॥ 318 ॥ (1866)

[किं मन्यसे सन्ति देवा उताहो न सन्तीति संशयस्तव ।
वेदपदानां चार्थं न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ ३१८ ॥ (१८६६)

Kim manyase santi devā utāho na santîti saṃśayastava ।
Vedapadānām cārtham na jānāsi teṣāmayamarthaḥ ॥318॥ (1866)]

Trans.—318 What are you thinking about ? You entertain the doubt as to whether gods exist or not. But *(ca)* you do not know the real interpretation of the sentences of the *Vedas.* Here is their (real) interpretation. (1866)

टीका–हे आयुष्मन मौर्य ! त्वमेवं मन्यसे–किं देवा सन्ति नवेति, उभयथापि वेदपदश्रवणात् ? । तथाहि–" स एष यज्ञायुधी यजमानोऽञ्जसा स्वर्गलोकं गच्छति " इत्यादिः; तथा, " अपाम सोमं अमृता अभूम अगमन् ज्योतिरविदाम देवान्, किं नूनमस्मात् तृणवदरातिः किमु मूर्तिममृतमर्त्यस्य" इत्यादिः; तथा " को जानाति मायोपमान् गीर्वाणानिन्द्र–यम–वरुण–कुबेरादीन्" इत्यादि । एतेषां च वेदपदानामयमर्थस्तव बुद्धौ प्रतिभासते, यथा–स एष यज्ञ एव दुरितवारणक्षमत्वादायुधं प्रहरणं यस्यासौ यज्ञायुधी, यजमानोऽञ्जसा प्रगुणेन न्यायेन, स्वर्गलोकं गच्छति, इति देवसत्ताप्रतिपत्तिः । तथा, अपाम–पीतवन्तः, सोमं लतारसम्, अमृताः–अमरणधर्माणः, अभूम–भूताः स्मः, अगमन्–गताः, ज्योतिः–स्वर्गम्, अविदाम देवान्–देवत्वं प्राप्ताः स्मः, किं नूनमस्मादूर्ध्वं तृणवत् करिष्यतिः कोऽसौ ? इत्याह–अरातिः–व्याधिः,

तथा, किमु प्रश्ने, मूर्तिं–जराम्, अमृतमर्त्यस्येति–अमृतत्वं प्राप्तस्य मर्त्यस्य पुरुषस्येत्यर्थः, अमरणधर्मिणो मनुष्यस्य किं करिष्यन्ति जरा–व्याधयः ? इति भावः। अत्रापि देवसत्ताप्रतिपत्तिः। " को जानाति मायोपमान् " इत्यादीनि तु देवाभावप्रतिपादकानि। अतस्तव संशयः। अयुक्ताश्चायम्, यतोऽमीषां वेदपदानामर्थं त्वं न जानासि, चशब्दाद् युक्तिं च न वेत्सि। एतेषां हि वेदपदानां नायमर्थो यस्तवाभिप्रेतः, किन्त्वयम्–वक्ष्यमाणलक्षण इति ॥ ३१८ ॥ (१८६६)

D. C.—O long-lived *Maurya !* your doubt about the existence of gods is due to your hearing various sentences of *Vedas.*

The sentences are such as—

(1) " Sa eṣa yajñāyudhî yajamāno'ñjasā svargalokam gacchati " etc.

(2) " Apāma somam amṛitā abhūma agaman jyotiravidāma devān kim nūnamasmāt tṛiṇavadarātiḥ kimu murtimamritamartyasya " etc.
As well as,

(3) " Ko jānāti māyopamān gîrvāṇā–nindra–Yama–Varuṇa Kuberādin ? " etc.

According to you, interpretations of these sentences would be as follows:—

(1) This host armed with the weapon of sacrifice reaches the region of heaven immediately. (This leads to prove the existence of gods)

(2) By drinking *soma,* they became gods, went to heaven, and attained the divine status. These divinities will banish maladies and mortality by virtue of their *amṛitatava.* (These sentences are also used in support of the existence of divinites.)

(3) Who knows the illusive gods like *Indra*, *Yama*, *Varuṇa* and *Kubera* etc ? (Sentences like this would deny the existence of gods on the other side)

So, your doubt has sprung up from the sentences such as mentioned above. But that is not justifiable, as you have not understood their real meaning. Here I explain the real interpretation ॥ 318 ॥ (1866)]

Now the author explains the whole proposition in details.

तं मन्नसि नेरइया परतंता दुक्खसंपउत्ता य ।
न तरंतीहागंतुं सद्धेया सुव्वमाणा वि ॥ ३१९ ॥ (१८६७)

सच्छंदयारिणो पुण देवा दिव्वप्पभावजुत्ता य ।
जं न कयाइ वि दरिसणमुवेंति तो संसओ तेसु ॥३२०॥(१८६८)

Tam mannasi neraiyā paratantā dukkhasampauttā ya ।
Na tarantîhāgantum saddheyā suvvamāṇā vi ॥ 319 ॥ (1867)

Sacchandayāriṇo puṇa devā divvappabhāvajuttā ya ।
Jam na kayāi vi darisanamuventi to samsao tesu ॥320॥ (1868)

[त्वं मन्यसे नैरयिकाः परतन्त्रा दुःखसंप्रयुक्ताश्च ।
न शक्नुवन्तीहाऽऽगन्तुं श्रद्धेयाः श्रूयमाणा अपि ॥ ३१९ ॥ (१८६७)

स्वच्छन्दचारिणः पुनर्देवा दिव्यप्रभावयुक्ताश्च ।
यन्न कदाचिदपि दर्शनमुपयन्ति ततः संशयस्तेषु ॥ ३२० ॥ (१८६८)

Tvam manyase nairayikāḥ paratantrā duḥkhasamprayuktāśca ।
Na śaknuvantîhā"gantum śraddheyāḥ śrūyamānā api ॥319॥ (1867)

Svacchandacāriṇaḥ punar-devā divyaprabhāvayuktāśca ।
Yanna kadācidapi darśanamupayanti tataḥ saṃśayastesu॥820॥(1868)]

Trans.—319–320 You think that the denizens of hell (being) subservient and miserable, are not able to come into this world. (So), they are to be trusted (as existing) even

if (they are merely) heard (to be so). But the gods, on the other hand, are free to move and are invested with the celestial splendour also. Still, however, they do not come into the range of (our) sight, and hence, the doubt about them. (1867–1868)

टीका–मौर्य ! त्वमेवं मन्यसे–नारकाः स्वकृतपापनरकपालादिपरतन्त्राः, पराधीनवृत्तयोऽतीवदुःखसंघातविह्वलाश्च न शक्नुवन्त्यत्रागन्तुम्, अतः प्रत्यक्षीकरणोपायाभावात् श्रूयमाणा अपि श्रद्धेया भवन्तु । देवास्तु स्वच्छन्दचारिणो दिव्यप्रभावयुक्ताश्च, तथापि यस्माद् न कदाचिद् दर्शनपथमवतरन्ति, श्रूयन्ते च श्रुति–स्मृत्यादिषु, अतस्तेषु शङ्केति ॥ ३१९–३२० ॥ (१८६७–१८६८)

D. C.—O Maurya ! according to you, the inability of the *Nāraka*–beings to come to this world, is due to their being subservient to their own sins, as well as, due to their miserable condition. So, they might be trusted upon as existing merely by hearing (some thing about) them.

But, the case with gods is different. For, even though they possess free movements and celestial splendour, they would never like to come within the range of our sight.

So, because they are heard of in the *Vedas* and *Smṛitis* etc. you have raised this doubt ॥ 319–320 ॥ (1867–1868)

मा कुरु संसयमेए सुदूरमणुयाइभिन्नजाईए ।
पेच्छसु पच्चक्खं चिय चउविहे देवसंघाए ॥३२१॥ (१८६९)

Mā kuru samsayaméé sudūramaṇuyāibhinnajāîe ।
Pecchasu paccakkham ciya cauvvihe devasanghāe ॥321॥ (1869)

[मा कुरु संशयमेतान् सुदूरमनुजादिभिन्नजातीयान् ।
प्रेक्षस्व प्रत्यक्षमेव चतुर्विधान् देवसङ्घातान् ॥ ३२१ ॥ (१८६९)

Mā kuru saṃśayametān sudūramanujādibhinnajātīyān ।
Prekṣasva pratyakṣameva caturvidhān devasaṅghātān ॥ 321 ॥

Trans.—321 Do not entertain doubt. Look at these four-fold multitudes of gods before your eyes (which are) extremely different from the human beings. (1869)

टीका–मौर्यपुत्र ! देवेषु मा संशयं कार्षीस्त्वम्, एतानेव हि सुदूरमत्यर्थं मनुजादिभ्यो भिन्नजातीयान् दिव्याभरण-विलेपन–वसन-सुमनोमालालङ्कृतान् भवनपति–व्यन्तर–ज्योतिष्क–वैमानिक लक्षणांश्चतुर्विधदेवसंघातान् मम वन्दनार्थमिहैव समवसरणागतान् प्रत्यक्ष एव पश्येति ॥ ३२१ ॥ (१८६९)

D. C.—You should not entertain any doubt about the existence of gods, *O Mauryaputra !* just look at these gods of all the four types–*viz–bhavanapati, vyantara jyotiṣka,* and *vaimānika*–distinguished from the human beings by virtue of (their) celestial ornaments and garlands etc. coming to this *samavasaraṇa* to pay their homages to me. ॥ 321 ॥ (1869)

पुव्वं पि न संदेहो जुत्तो जं जोइसा सपच्चक्खं ।
दीसंति तक्कया वि य उवघाया–ऽणुग्गहा जगओ ॥३२२॥१८७०

Puvvam pi na samdeho jutto jam joisā sapaccakkham ।
Dîsanti takkayā vi ya uvaghāyā–ṇuggahā jagao ॥322॥ (1870)

[पूर्वमपि न संदेहो युक्तो यज् ज्योतिष्काः स्वप्रत्यक्षम् ।
दृश्यन्तें तत्कृता अपि चोपघाता–ऽनुग्रहा जगतः ॥३२२॥ (१८७०)

Pūrvamapi na saṃdeho yukto yaj jyotiṣkāḥ svapratyakṣam ।
Dṛiśyante tatkṛitā api copaghātā–nugrahā jagataḥ ॥322॥ (1870)]

Trans.—322 The doubt is not justified even before (their appearance), since luminaries are self-perceptible. Moreover, injuries or betterments caused by them to the world are also apprehended. (1870)

टीका–इह समवसरणागतदेवदर्शनात् पूर्वमपि तवान्येषां च संशयो न युक्तः, यद् यस्माच्चन्द्रा-ऽऽदित्यादिज्योतिष्कास्त्वया सर्वेणापिच लोकेन स्व-प्रत्यक्षत एव सर्वथा दृश्यन्ते । अतो देशतः प्रत्यक्षत्वात् कथं समस्तामरास्ति-

त्वशङ्का ? । किञ्च, सन्येव देवाः, लोकस्य तत्कृतानुग्रहो-पघातदर्शनात् । तथाहि-दृश्यन्ते क्वचित् केचित् त्रिदशाः, कस्यापि किञ्चिद्विभवप्रदानादिनाऽनुग्रहम्, तत्प्रहरणादिना चोपघातं कुर्वन्तः । ततो राजादिवत् कथमेते न सन्ति इति ॥ ३२२ ॥ (१८७०)

D. C.—Even before they appear at this *Samavasaraṇa*, your doubt about their existence is not justified. For, luminaries like Sun, Moon etc are self-perceptible to you, as well as, to the whole world. So, it is not appriate to doubt their existence.

Moreover, *anugraha* and *upaghāta* caused by gods to this world are also evident to all. Several gods confer their favours upon some people by granting their objects of pleasure etc. while others inflict injuries, like a king, by means of weapons etc. This shows, for certain, that gods do exist ॥ 322 ॥ (1870)

Besides,

आलयमेत्तं च मई पुरं व तव्वासिणो तह वि सिद्धा ।
जे ते देव त्ति मया न य निलया निच्चपरिसुण्णा ॥३२३॥(१८७१)

Ālayamettam ca maî puram va tavvāsiṇo taha vi siddhā ।
Je te deva tti mayā na ya nilayā niccaparisuṇṇā ॥ 323 ॥ (1871)

[आलयमात्रं च मतिः पुरमिव तद्वासिनस्तथापि सिद्धाः ।
ये ते देवा इति मता न च निलया नित्यपरिशून्याः ॥३२३॥ (१८७१)

Ālayamātram ca matiḥ puramiva tadvāsinastathāpi siddhāḥ ।
Ye te devā iti matā na ca nilayā nityapariśunyāḥ ॥323 (1871)]

Trans.—323 The view may be that (luminaries) are mere abodes. Still however, like a city, they, too, have their inhabitants, who are accepted as (none but) gods. For, places of residence cannot be vacant for ever. (1871)

टीका-अथैवंभूता मतिः परस्य भवेत्-आलया एवालयमात्रं चन्द्रादिविमानानि, न तु देवाः, तत् कथं ज्योतिष्कदेवानां प्रत्यक्षत्वमभिधीयते ? ।

किं तद् यथाऽऽलयमात्रम् ? इत्याह–" पुरं ति " यथा पुरं शून्यं लोकानामालयमात्रं स्थानमात्रं, न तु तत्र लोकाः सन्ति, एवं चन्द्राद्रिविमानान्यप्यालयमात्रमेव, न तु तत्र देवाः केचित् तिष्ठन्ति, अतः कथं तेषां प्रत्यक्षत्वम् ? । अत्रोत्तरमाह–तथापि तद्वासिन आलयवासिनः सामर्थ्याद् ये सिद्धास्ते देवा इति मताः संमताः । यो ह्यालयः स सर्वोऽपि तन्निवासिनाऽधिष्ठितो दृष्टः, यथा प्रत्यक्षोपलभ्यमाना देवदत्ताद्यधिष्ठिता वसन्तपुराद्यालयाः, आलयाश्च ज्योतिष्कविमानानि, अत आलयत्वान्यथानुपपतेर्ये तन्निवासिनः सिद्धास्ते देवा इति मताः । आह–ननु कथं ते देवाः सिध्यन्ति ? । यादृशा हि प्रत्यक्षेण देवदत्तादयो दृश्यन्ते तेऽपि तादृशा एव स्युरिति । तदयुक्तम्, विशिष्टा हि देवदत्ताद्यालयेभ्यश्चन्द्राद्यालया इति । अतस्तेन्निवासिनोऽपि विशिष्टाः सिध्यन्ति, ते च देवदत्तादिविलक्षणा देवा इति । अपरस्त्वाह–ननु " आलयत्वात् " इत्ययं हेतुस्तन्निवासिजनसाधनेऽनैकान्तिक, शून्यालयैर्व्यभिचारात् । अत्रोत्तरमाह–" न य निलयेत्यादि " न च निलया–आलया नित्यमेव शून्या भवन्ति । अयमभिप्रायः–ये केचिदालयास्ते प्राग्, इदानीं, एष्यति वा काले ऽवश्यमेव सन्निवासिभिरधिष्ठिता एव भवन्ति न तु नित्यमेव परिशून्याः । ततो यदा तदा वा चन्द्राद्यालयनिवासिनो देवाः सिध्यन्तीति ॥ ३२३ ॥ (१८७१)

D. C.—Maurya:—Luminaries like Sun and Moon mentioned by you, are only the abodes and not the gods themselves. It could not be said, therefore, that the luminary deities are directly perceptible, just as in case of an empty town, the houses are mere places of residence for people but people do not actually reside into them, so also luminarie like moon etc should be taken as absolutely empty bodies and nothing like gods is expected to reside into them.

Bhagavān:—It is not so. *O Maurya !* Existence of the place of residence proves the existence of its residents also. So, these luminaries are not mere *ālayas*, but they have their inhabitants also. For, that which is called an *ālaya* or a house is always occupied by its residents. Like houses in a town

occupied by persons like *Devadatta*, these luminaries are also undoubtedly occupied by devinities.

Maurya.—Like *Devadatta* etc residing in the houses of a city, the gods who are the residents of the luminary bodies should also be perceptible

Bhagavān:—It is not proper to advance such an argument. Because the places of residence are absolutely different from the houses in a city. So, their residents *viz* gods are also characteristically different from *Devadatta* etc. Although they are not apprehended by the *indriyas*, their existence is admitted without doubt.

Maurya:—You cannot assert exclusively that every place of residence is always occupied by a resident For, nobody would reside in a barren house. (It is forbidden to reside in such a house) From the existence of abode, therefore, you cannot infer the existence of the occupant.

Bhagavān:—A residing place is never *śūnya*. It must have been occupied by some person or the other, either in the past or in future or at present. In case of luminary places of resort, gods like moon etc. must have occuplied the places at some time in the past, present, or future ॥ 323 ॥ (1871)

को जाणइ व किमेयं ति होज्ज निस्संसयं विमाणाइं ।
रयणमयनभोगमणादिह जइ विज्जाहराईणं ॥ ३२४॥ (१८७२)

Ko jāṇai va kimeyam ti hojja nissamsayam vimānāim ।
Rayaṇamayanabhogamanādiha jaha vijjāharāînam ॥ 324 ॥ (1872)

[को जानाति वा किमेतदिति भवेद् निस्संशयं विमानानि ।
रत्नमयनभोगमनादिह यथा विद्याधरादीनाम् ॥ ३२४ ॥ (१८७२)

Ko jānāti vā kimetaditi bhaved nissaṃśayam vimānāni ।
Ratnamayanabhogamanādiha yathā vidyādharādînām ॥324॥(1872)]

Trans.—324 " Or, who knows what it is ? " They are

certainly palaces like those of *Vidyādharas* etc., as they are decked with jewels and they fly in the sky. (1872)

टीका–यदिवा, एवंभूता मतिः परस्य भवेद् यदुत–चन्द्राद्यालयत्वेन यद् गीयते भवद्भिस्तदिदं को जानाति किञ्चिद् भवेत्, किं सूर्योऽग्निमयो गोलः, चन्द्रस्त्वम्बुमयः स्वभावतः स्वच्छः, आहोस्विदेवंभूता एवैते भास्वर-रत्नमया गोलका ज्योतिष्कविमानानि ?, अतः कथमेतेषामालयत्वसिद्धिः ?। अत्र प्रतिविधानमाह–निःसंशयं विमानान्येतानि, रत्नमयत्वे सति नभोगम-नात्, पुष्पकादिविद्याधरतपः सिद्धविमानवदिति। अभ्रविकार–पवनादिव्यव-च्छेदार्थं रत्नमयत्वविशेषणमिति ॥ ३२४ ॥ (१८७२)

D. C.—Maurya:—Or, who knows what these luminaries like Sun and Moon, mentioned by you are like ? One that appears as Sun may be a ball of fire, and that which appears as Moon may be a transparent ball of water. Or, it may be that these luminaries be some such bright balls. So, it is not appropriate to believe that they are the abodes of luminary gods.

Bhagavān:—Since they are decked with jewels and they are moving in the sky, there is no doubt that they are actual *vimānas* like *puṣpaka* etc. attained by *vidyādharas* by means of austerites etc. So, take it for certain, that these *vimānas* are also the residing places of the various luminary gods. ॥ 324 ॥ (1872) ॥

Or,

होज्जं मई माएयं तहा वि तक्कारिणो सुरा जे ते ।
न य मायाइविगारा पुरं व निच्चोवलम्भाओ ॥३२५॥ (१८७३)

Hojja maî māeyam tahā vi takkāriṇo surā je te ।
Na ya māyāivigārā puram va niccovalambhāo ॥ 325 ॥ (1873)

[भवेद् मतिर्मायेयं तथापि तत्कारिणः सुरा ये ते ।
न च मायादिविकाराः पुरमिव नित्योपलम्भात् ॥ ३२५ ॥ (१८७३)

Bhaved matirmāyeyam tathāpi tatkāriṇaḥ surā ye te ।
Na ca māyādivikārāḥ puramiva nityopalambhāt ॥ 325 ॥ (1873)]

Trans.—325 It may be argued that this is (all) illusion. But, its creators are gods, and not the perturbations like illusion etc. on account of their being obtained like a town for ever. (1873)

टीका–अथ परस्य मतिर्भवेत्–नैते चन्द्रादिविमानान्यालयाः, किन्तु मायेयं मायाविना केनापि प्रयुक्ता । अत्रोच्यते–मायात्वममीषामसिद्धम्, वाङ्मात्रेणैव भवताऽभिधानात्; तथाप्यभ्युपगम्योच्यते–ये तत्कारिणस्तथाविधमायाप्रयोक्तारस्ते सुराः सिद्धा एव, मनुष्यादीनां तथाविधवैक्रियकरणादर्शनात्। अभ्युपगम्य च मायात्वममीषामभिहितम्। न चैते मायादिविकाराः, नित्योपलम्भात्, सर्वेण सर्वदा दृश्यमानत्वादित्यर्थः, प्रसिद्धपाटलीपुत्रादिपुरवदिति । माये–न्द्रजालकृतानि हि वस्तूनि न नित्यमुपलभ्यन्त इति नित्यविशेषणोपादानमिति ॥ ३२५ ॥ (१८७३)

D. C.—You might argue that *vimānas* like *candra* etc are not actual *ālayas*, but they are mere illusions created by some magician. But the illusionariness of such *vimānas* cannot be admitted by means of mere words. Still, however, if they are assumed as *māyika*, their creators are not magicians or human beings but the gods themselves. This is said only on the assumption that they are *māyika vikāras*. But really speaking, they are not *māyika* as they are ever obtained like towns etc. So, these *vimānas* are nothing but the abodes of luminary gods ॥ 325 ॥ (1873)

जइ नारगा पवन्ना पगिट्ठपावफलभोइणो तेणं ।
सुबहुगपुण्णफलभुजो पवज्जियव्वा सुरगणा वि ॥३२६॥(१८७४)

Jai nārgā pavannā pagiṭṭhapāvaphalabhòino tenam ।
Subahugapuṇṇaphalabhujo pavajjiyavvā sura-gaṇā vi ॥326॥(1874)

[यदि नारकाः प्रपन्नाः प्रकृष्टपापफलभोगिनस्तेन ।
सुबहुकपुण्यफलभुजः प्रपत्तव्याः सुरगणा अपि ॥ ३२६ ॥ (१८७४)

Yadi nārakāḥ prapannāḥ prakṛiṣṭapāpaphalabhoginastena ।
Subahukapuṇyaphalabhujaḥ prapattavyāḥ suragaṇā api ॥326॥]

Trans—326 If the denizens of hell are admitted as the sufferers of the rewards of great sins, gods should be accepted as the enjoyers of the fruits of many good deeds. (1874)

टीका–इह स्वकृतप्रकृष्टपापफलभोगिनस्तावत् क्वचिद् नारकाः प्रतिपत्तव्यास्ते च यदि प्रपन्नाः, "तेणं ति" तर्हि तेनैव प्रकारेण स्वोपार्जित-सुष्ठुबहुकपुण्यफलभुजः सुरगणा अपि प्रतिपत्तव्याः । अत्राह–नन्विहैवाति-दुःखितनरास्तिर्यञ्चश्चातिदुःखिताः प्रकृष्टपापफलभुजो भविष्यन्ति, तथा, मनुष्या एवातिसुखिताः प्रकृष्टपुण्यफलभुजो भविष्यन्ति, किमदृष्टनारक–देव-परिकल्पनया ? इति । तदयुक्तम्, प्रकृष्टपापफलभुजां सर्वप्रकारेणापि दुःखेन भवितव्यम्, न चातिदुः खितानामपि नर–तिरश्चां सर्वप्रकारं दुःखं दृश्यते सुखदर्शनाऽऽलोकादिसुखस्य सर्वेषामपि दर्शनात् । प्रकृष्टपुण्यफल-भुजामपि सर्वप्रकारेणापि सुखेन भवितव्यम्, न चेहातिसुखितानामपि नराणां सर्वप्रकारं सुखमवलोक्यते, पूतिदेहोद्भवस्य रोग–जरादिप्रभवस्य च दुःखस्य तेषामपि सद्भावात् । तस्मात् प्रकृष्टपापनिबन्धनसर्वप्रकारदुःखवेदिनो नारकाः, प्रकृष्टपुण्यहेतुकसर्वप्रकारसुखभोगिनो देवाश्चाभ्युपगन्तव्या एवेति ॥ ३२६ ॥ (१८७४)

D. C.—Bhagavān:—When you believe that *Nārakas* are the sufferers of the rewards of great sins, you should also believe that gods are the enjoyers of the fruits of exalted good deeds and thus they are existing.

Maurya:—Tiryancas, who are excessively miserable, are the sufferers of the reward of great sins, and excessively happy human beings are enjoyers of the fruits of exalted good deeds. So, it is not necessary to assume the existence of *devas* and *Nārakas* at all.

Bhagavān:—Existence of *devas* and *Nārakas* cannot be denied by saying so. Enjoyers of the rewards of great *puṇyas* and *pāpas* are exclusively happy or exclusively miserable, as the case may be. The *manuṣyas* and *tiryancas* cannot be called exclusively happy and exclusively miserable respectively. For, even the happiest human beings are susceptible to the affliction of diseases, old age, etc. while even extremely miserable *tiryancas,* experience the happy touch of cold breeze etc. So, *manuṣyas* and *tiryancas* can never be taken as exclusively happy or exclusively miserable beings, while *Nārakas* who suffer the consequences of *pāpas,* and *devas* who enjoy the fruits of *puṇyas,* can be easily admitted respectively as the exclusively miserable and exclusively happy beings ॥326॥ (1874)

Now, in reply to the question that " Why gods do not visit this world if at all they are existing ? " the author states:—

संकंतदिव्वपिम्मा विसयपसत्ताऽसमत्तकत्तव्वा ।
अणहीणमणुयकज्जा नरभवमसुभं न एंति सुरा॥३२७॥(१८७५)

Sankantadivvapimmā visayapasattā'samattakattavvā ।
Aṇahîṇamaṇuyakajjā narabhavamasubham na enti surā ॥ 327 ॥

[संक्रान्तदिव्यप्रेमाणो विषयप्रसक्ता असमाप्तकर्तव्याः ।
अनधीनमनुजकार्या नरभवमशुभं नागच्छन्ति सुराः ॥३२७॥(१८७५)

Sankrāntadivyapremāṇo viṣayaprasaktā asamāptakartavyāḥ ।
Anadhîṇamanujakāryā narabhavamaśubham nāgacchanti surāḥ॥327॥

Trans.—327 Invested with celestial love and attached to the objects of pleasure, with their duties un-finished, and their deeds independent of human beings, divinities do not come into this inauspicious world. (1875)

टीका–नागच्छन्तीह सदैव सुरगणाः, संक्रान्तदिव्यप्रेमत्वात्, विषय-प्रसक्तत्वात्, प्रकृष्टरूपादिगुणकामिनीप्रसक्तरम्यदेशान्तरगतपुरुषवत्; तथा, असमाप्तकर्तव्यत्वात्, बहुकर्तव्यताप्रसाधननियुक्तविनीतपुरुषवत् । तथा,

अनधीनं मनुजानां कार्यं येषां तेऽनधीनमनुजकार्याः, तद्भावस्तत्त्वं तस्माद् नेहागच्छन्ति सुराः, अनभिमतगेहादौ निःसङ्गयतिवदिति। तथा, अशुभत्वाद् नरभवस्य तद्गन्धासहिष्णुतया नेहागच्छन्ति देवाः, स्वपरित्यक्तकडेवरवदिति ॥ ३२७ ॥ (१८७५) ॥

D. C.—Divinities do not come to this world, because they are invested with celestial love and attached to the various objects of pleasure like a person attached to a beautiful woman possessing high qualities of extreme beauty etc. Secondy, like a great man entrusted with manifold work, these gods have also to perform manifold duties and hence their duties are never over. Thirdly, all their deeds are independent of human beings. So, just as a dispassionate ascetic never comes to an unholy house, these gods also usually abstain themselves from coming to the inauspicious human world as they would not stand even the smell of it. ॥ 327 ॥ (1875)

But this does not mean that they always keep themselves away from this world.

For,

नवरि जिणजम्म–दिक्खा–केवल–निव्वाणमहनिओगेणं ।
भत्तीए सोम्म ! संसयविच्छेयत्थं व एज्जहण्हा ॥३२८॥(१८७६)

पुव्वाणुरागओ वा समयनिबंधा तवोगुणाओ वा ।
नरगणपीडा–ऽणुग्गह–कंदप्पाईहिं वा केइ ॥ ३२९ ॥ (१८७७)

Navari jiṇajamma–dikkhā–kevala–nivvāṇa maha neogeṇam ।
Bhattîe Somma ! saṃsayaviccheyattham va ejjahaṇhā ॥328॥(1876)

Puvvāṇurāgao vā samayanibandhā tavoguṇāo vā ।
Naragaṇapîdā–'ṇuggaha–kandappāîhim vā kei ॥ 329 ॥ (1877)

[नवरं जिनजन्म–दीक्षा–केवल–निर्वाणमहनियोगेन ।
भक्त्या सौम्य ! संशयविच्छेदार्थं वैयुरिहाह्वाय ॥ ३२८ ॥ (१८७६)

पूर्वानुरागतो वा समयनिबन्धात् तपोगुणाद् वा ।
नरगणपीडा-नुग्रह-कन्दर्पादिभिर्वा केचित् ॥ ३२९ ॥ (१८७७)

Navaram jinajanma-dîkṣā-kevala-nirvāṇamahaniyogena ।
Bhaktyā Saumya ! saṃśayavicchedārtham vaiyurihāhnāya ॥328॥
Pūrvānurāgato vā samayanibandhāt tapoguṇād vā ।
Naraganapîdā-'nugraha-kandarpādibhirvā kecit ॥ 329 ॥ (1877)]

Trans.—328–329 Some have to visit this world merely by (way of) duty, at the occasion of birth, *dîksā*, acceptance of absolute apprehension, or final emancipation of some saint, while others (would come) by reason of devotion, *O Saumya !* or in order to remove (their) doubts, or on account of previous attachment. Some (would do so) following the conventional rule, some by virtue of austerities, some to afflict the human beings, some to favour them, or some (would come) out of passion etc. (1876–1877)

टीका-नवरं जिनजन्म-दीक्षा-केवल-निर्वाणमहोत्सवनियोगेन तत्कर्तव्यतानियमेनेह देवा आगच्छेयुः। तत्र सौम्य! केचिदिन्द्रादयो निजभक्त्या समागच्छन्ति, केचित् तु तदनुवृत्त्या, अन्ये संशयव्यवच्छेदार्थम्, अपरे तु पूर्वभविकपुत्र-मित्राद्यनुरागात् । समयनिबन्धः-प्रतिबोधादिनिमित्तः संकेतनिश्चयः, तस्माच्च केचिद् देवा इहागच्छन्ति । अन्ये तु महासत्त्वसाध्वादितपोगुणसमाकृष्टाः, केचित्तुपूर्ववैरिकनरगणपीडार्थम्, अपरे तु पूर्वसुहृत्-पुत्राद्यनुग्रहार्थम्, केचित्तु देवाः कन्दर्पादिभिरिहागच्छन्ति आदिशब्दात् साध्वादिपरीक्षाहेतोरिति द्रष्टव्यमिति । तदेवं निरूपितं देवानामश्रागमन कारणम्, अनागमनकारणं च ॥ ३२८-३२९ ॥ (१८७६-१८७७).

D. C.—Various deities visit this world on various purposes. Some have to attend the occasions of *janma, dîkṣā, kevala-jñāna prāpti* and *nirvāṇa* of a saint. Some like *Indra* are drawn to this world by means of devotion, some to remove their doubts. Several others descend upon this world on account of their previous attachment to relatives like son, friend etc. or by following the previous conventions or by virtue of previous austerities also, some gods come to the human world for the

purpose of afflicting human beings in order to take revenge upon them, while others would be attracted to this world out of passion or in order to test the saints of this world also.

Thus, there are various causes for their visit to this world, while others stated before are the causes of their staying away from this world also. ॥ 328–329 ॥ (1876–1877)

जाइस्सरकहणाओ कासइ पच्चक्खदरिसणाओ य ।
विज्जा--मंतो--वायणसिद्धीओ गहविगाराओ ॥ ३३० ॥ (१८७८)

उक्किट्ठपुण्णसंचयफलभावाओऽभिहाणसिद्धीओ ।
सव्वागमसिद्धीउ य संति देव त्ति सद्धेयं ॥ ३३१ ॥ (१८७९)

Jāissarakahanāo kāsai paccakkhadarisanāo ya ।
Vijjā–manto–vāyaṇasiddîo gahavigārāo ॥ 330 ॥ (1878)
Ukkiṭṭhapuṇṇasamcayaphalabhāvāo'bhihāṇasiddhîo ।
Savvāgamasiddhîu ya santi deva tti saddheyam ॥ 331 ॥ (1879)

[जातिस्मरणकथनात् कस्यचित् प्रत्यक्षदर्शनाच्च ।
विद्या–मन्त्रोपयाचनसिद्धेर्ग्रहविकारात् ॥ ३३० ॥ (१८७८)
उत्कृष्टपुण्यसंचयफलभावादभिधानसिद्धेः ।
सर्वागमसिद्धेश्च सन्ति देवा इति श्रद्धेयम् ॥ ३३१ ॥ (१८७९)

Jātismaraṇakathanāt kasyacit pratyakṣadarśanācca ।
Vidyā–mantropayācanasiddhergrahavikārāt ॥ 330 ॥ (1878)
Utkṛiṣṭapuṇyasaṃcayaphalabhāvādabhidhānasiddheḥ ।
Sarvāgamasiddheśca santi devā iti śraddheyam ॥ 331 ॥ (1879)]

Trans.—330–331 By the statement of some (who are) reminded of (the former) existence by means of direct apprehension, by (virtue of) reciting the chantings, of (various) lores, by the movement of planets, due to the existence of the fruition of the accumulation of highly meritorious deeds, by (virtue of) (their) names, and by (the help of) all *āgamas*, it should be trusted that gods are existing. (1878–1879)

टीका–" सन्ति देवा इत्येतत् श्रद्धेयम् " इति प्रतिज्ञा, जातिस्मरण-प्रत्ययितपुरुषेण कथनात्, नानादेशविचारिप्रत्ययित पुरुषावलोकितकथित-विचित्रबृहद्देवकुलादिवस्तुवत्; तथा, कस्यापि तपः प्रभृतिगुणयुक्तस्य प्रत्यक्ष-दर्शनप्रवृत्तेश्च–केनचित् प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणेनोपलम्भादित्यर्थः, दूरविप्रकृष्टनगरादि-वत्; तथा, विद्या–मन्त्रोपयाचनेभ्यः कार्यसिद्धेः, प्रसादफलानुमितराजादिवत्; तथा, ' गहविगाराउ त्ति ' अत्र प्रयोगः–ग्रहाधिष्ठितपुरुषदेहो जीवव्यतिरि-क्तादृश्यवस्त्वधिष्ठातृकः, पुरुषासंभाव्यविकारवत्क्रियादर्शनात्, संचरिष्णुयत्र-व्यतिरिक्तमध्यप्रविष्टादृश्यमानपुरुषाधिष्ठितयत्रवत्; तथा तपो–दानादिक्रिया-समुपार्जितोत्कृष्टपुण्यसंभारफलसद्भावात्, उत्कृष्टपापप्राग्भारफलसद्भावनिश्चि तनारकवत्, एतच्च प्रागेव भावितम्। तथा, "देवाः" इति तदभिधानं ततोऽपि च देवानां सिद्धिः। एतच्चानन्तरगाथायां व्यक्तीकरिष्यते। तथा, सर्वे च त आगमाश्च सर्वागमास्तेष्वविप्रतिपत्त्या सिद्धत्वाच्च सन्ति देवा इति ॥ ३३०-३३१ ॥ (१८७८-१८७९)

D. C.—Existence of gods could be established in various ways :—

(1) On the recollection of former existence, a person would relate the story of the great family of gods witnessed and believed by him as certain.

(2) Some persons attain directly the *dars'ana* of gods by virtue of their qualities like austerity etc.

(3) Some people attain the accomplishment of their objects by soliciting the favour of gods by means of prayers, and chantings of prescribed *mantras*.

(4) A person in charge of planets is absolutely different from the *jîvas*, because of the *kriyās* that are found as a result of changes in the planets which are never to be found in human beings.

(5) Just as we have accepted the existence of *Nārakas* due to the fruition of great sins, the existence of

gods should also be admitted on account of the *phala* of the accumulation of highly meritorious deeds like *tapas*, *dāna* etc.

(6) The existence of gods is established by their very name *viz*–" *devāḥ* " (This will be explained in the following verse.)

(7) All the *āgamas* admit the existence of gods. ॥ 330–331 (1878–1879) ॥

The epithet " *devāḥ* " is then explained as follows:—

देव त्ति सत्थयमिदं सुद्धत्तणओ घडाभिहाणं व ।
अह व मई मणुउ च्चिय देवो गुण-रिद्धिसंपण्णो ॥३३२॥(१८८०)

तं न जउ तच्चत्थे सिद्धे उवयारओ मया सिद्धी ।
तच्चत्थसीह सिद्धे माणवसीहोवयारो व ॥ ३३३ ॥ (१८८१)

Deva tti satthayamidam suddhattanao ghaḍābhihāṇam va ।
Aha va maî maṇuu cciya devo guṇa riddhi saṃpaṇṇo ॥332॥ (1880)

Tam na jau tacca siddhe uvayārao mayā siddhî ।
Taccatthasîha siddhe māṇavasîhovayāro vva ॥ 333 ॥ (1881)

[देवा इति सार्थकमिदं शुद्धत्वतो घटाभिधानमिव ।
अथवा मतिर्मनुज एव देवो गुण–र्द्धिसंपन्नः ॥ ३३२ ॥ (१८८०)

तद् न यतस्तथ्यार्थे सिद्ध उपचारतो मता सिद्धिः ।
तथ्यार्थसिंहे सिद्धे माणवसिंहोपचार इव ॥ ३३३ ॥ (१८८१)

Devā iti sārthakamidam śuddhatvato ghaṭābhidhānamiva ।
Athavā matirmanuja eva devo guṇar–ddhisaṃpannaḥ ॥ 332 ॥ (1880)

Tad na yatastathyārthe siddha upacārato matā siddhiḥ ।
Tathyārthasiṃhe siddhe māṇavasiṃhopacāra iva ॥333॥ (1881)]

Trans.—332–333 Since the epithet " *deva* " is clear like " *ghaṭa* ", it is significant. Or, it might be believed that man

himself (when) accompanied by the prosperity of merits is god. (But) that is not (correct). (Because) the accomplishment (of the secondary meaning) by means of usage could be brought about (only) when the primary meaning is established, just as the epithet "*siṇha*" or lion could be attributed to *Māṇavaka* by means of usage only, if the primary sense of the word "*siṇha*" is accepted (1889–1881)

टीका–" देवाः " इत्येतत् पदं सार्थकं व्युत्पत्तिमच्छुद्धपदत्वात्, घटादिवत् । तत्र दीव्यन्तीति देवा इति व्युत्पत्तिमत्त्वम्, समासतद्धितरहितत्वेन च शुद्धत्वम् । भावना चात्र प्रागुक्तैव । अथ परस्य मतिर्भवेत्–ननु मनुष्य एवेह दृश्यमानो देवो भविष्यति, किमदृष्टदेवकल्पनया ? । किं सर्वोऽपि मनुष्यो देवः ? इति । न, इत्याह–गुणसंपन्नो गणधरादिः, ऋद्धिसंपन्नश्चक्रवर्त्यादिः। अत्रोच्यते–तदेतद् न, यस्मात् तथ्ये मुख्ये वस्तुनि क्वचित् सिद्धे सत्यन्यत्रोपचारस्तत्सिद्धिर्मता, यथा मुख्ये यथार्थे सिंहेऽन्यत्र सिद्धे ततो माणवके सिंहोपचारः सिध्यति, एवमिहापि यदि मुख्या देवाः क्वचित् सिद्धा भवेयुः, तदा राजादेर्देवोपचारो युज्यते, नान्यथेति ॥ ३३२–३३३ ॥ (१८८०–१८८१)

D. C.—Since the word "*devāḥ*" is void of compound and prefixes, and is explained as *tatra divyantîti devāḥ* (those that shine there, are deities), it is philologically *siddha*, like other padas such as *ghata* etc.

Maurya:—The man himself seen before our very eyes is God. Why to imagine an invisible form for that ? All men are not gods. But those accompanied by high merits and religious prosperity could easily be taken as gods.

Bhagavān:—That is not correct. Unless and until the principal meaning of a word is not accomplished, it could never be attributed to any other object by means of *upacāra*. The epithet of lion could easily be attributed to *māṇavaka* only if the primary sense of the word *siṇha* is accomplished.

Similarly, here also the epithet "*devāḥ*" could be attributed

to king etc. only if the existence of gods is accepted, and not otherwise. ॥ 332–333 (1880–1881) ॥

Now, in case of existence of gods being denied, the uselessness of the rites like *agnihotra* etc. is shown:—

देवाभावे विफलं जमग्गिहोत्ताइयाण किरियाणं ।
सग्गीयं जन्नाण य दाणाइफलं च तदजुत्तं ॥ ३३४ ॥ (१८८२)

Devābhāve viphalam jamaggihottāiyāṇa kiriyāṇam ।
Saggîyam jannāṇa ya dāṇāiphalam ca tadajuttam ॥334॥ (1882)

[देवाभावे विफलं यदग्निहोत्रादिकानां क्रियाणाम् ।
स्वर्गीयं यज्ञानां च दानादिफलं च तदयुक्तम् ॥ ३३४ ॥ (१८८२)

Devābhāve viphalam yadagnihotrādikānam kriyāṇām ।
Svargîyam yajnānām ca dānādiphalam ca tadayuktam ॥334॥(1882)]

Trans.—334 In (case of) non–existence of gods, (award of) heaven laid down (as a result) of (the accomplishment of) the rites like *agnihotra* etc. as well as, the fruition of munificence etc. would be null and void. (1882)

टीका–'वा' इत्यथवा, इदं दूषणम्–देवाभावेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने यदग्निहोत्रादिक्रियाणाम् " अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामः " इत्यादिना स्वर्गीयं फलमुक्तम्, तथा, यज्ञानां च यत् फलमभिहितं, दानादिफलं च यत् समस्तलोके प्रसिद्धम्, तत् सर्वमयुक्तं प्राप्नोति। स्वर्गो ह्येतेषां फलमुक्तम्, स्वर्गिणां चाभावे कुतः स्वर्गः? इति। " स एष यज्ञायुधी " इत्यादीनि च वेदवाक्यानि देवास्तित्वप्रतिपादनपराणि वर्तन्ते । अतः किं तान् न प्रतिपद्यसे?। यद्यपि " को जानाति मायोपमान् गीर्वाणानिन्द्र–यम–वरुण–कुबेरादीन् " इत्यादि वाक्यम्, तदपि न देवनास्तित्वाभिधायकम्, किन्तु सुराणामपि मायोपमत्वाभिधानेन शेषर्द्धिसमुदायानां सुतरामनित्यत्वप्रतिपादकं बोद्धव्यम्; अन्यथा हि देवास्तित्वप्रतिपादकवाक्यानि, श्रुतिमन्त्रपदैरिन्द्रादीनामाह्वानं चानर्थकं स्यात्॥ ३३४ ॥ (१८८२)

D. C.—There will be one more difficulty in case of denying the existence of gods. Because in that case, the award of

heaven laid down as a result of the rites like *agnihotra* etc. in the sentences such as " *Agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ* " etc. as well as, the fruition of sacrifices and meritorious deeds like *dāna* etc prescribed in deeds like *dāna* etc prescribed in this world, would become absolutely futile. Thus, in absence of *svargin*–the inhabitant of *svarga*–how is *svarga* to exist?

Hence *O Maurya!* take it for certain that sentences such as " *Sa eṣa yajñāyudhî* " etc. are laid down to establish the existence of gods, while the sentence " *Ko jānāti māyopamān gîrvāṇānindra–Yama–Varuṇa–Kuberādîn* " etc. does not lead to deny the existence of gods, but it only means to assert the *a–nityatā* of the prosperity of gods and the rest. Otherwise, the sentences which establish the existence of gods, as well as, the invocation of gods like *Indra* by means of reciting the prescribed *mantras*, would be of no avail. ॥ 334 ॥ (1882)

Moreover,

जम–सोम–सूर–सुरगुरु–सारज्जाईणि जयइ जण्णेहिं ।
मंतावाहणमेव य इंदाईणं विहा सव्वं ॥३३५॥ (१८८३)

Jama–Soma–Sūra–Suraguru–sārajjāîṇi jayai jaṇṇehim।
Mantāvāhaṇameva ya Indāîṇam vihā savvam ॥ 335 ॥ (1883)

[यम–सोम–सूर–सुरगुरु–स्वाराज्यादीनि जयति यज्ञैः ।
मन्त्राह्वानमेव चेन्द्रादीनां वृथा सर्वम् ॥ ३३५ ॥ (१८८३)

Yama–Soma–Sūra–Suraguru–svārājyādîni jayati yajnaiḥ ।
Mantrāhvānameva cendrādînām vṛithā sarvam ॥ 335 ॥ (1883)]

Trans.—335 (The statement that) one conquers the regions of (the gods of) Death, Moon, Sun, and *Bṛihaspati* etc, and the invocation of *Indra* etc by reciting the prescribed *mantras* would be absolutely null and void. (1883)

टीका–" जमित्यादि " पूर्वार्धस्यायमर्थः–उक्थषोडशिप्रभृतिक्रतुभिर्यथाश्रुति " यम–सोम–सूर्य–सुरगुरु–स्वाराज्यानि जयति " इत्यादीनि देवास्तित्वसूचकानि वेदवाक्यानि देवाभावे वृथैव स्युः । इह चोक्थषोडशि

प्रभृतयो यज्ञविशेषा मन्तव्याः । सयूपो यज्ञ एव हि क्रतुरुच्यते, यपरहितस्तु दानादिक्रियायुक्तो यज्ञ इति । स्वः-स्वर्गः, तत्र राज्यानि । जयति-उपार्जयतीत्यर्थ इति । तथा, मन्त्रैरिन्द्रादीनामाह्वानं देवास्तित्व एवोपपद्यते, अन्यथा वृथैव स्यात् । इन्द्रादीनां मन्त्रपदैराह्वानमेवमवगन्तव्यम्- " इन्द्र ! आगच्छ मेधातिथे मेषवृषण " इत्यादि । तस्माद् युक्तितो वेदवाक्येभ्यश्च " सन्ति देवा " इति स्थितम् । तदेवं छिन्नो मौर्यपुत्रस्य भगवता संशयः ॥ ३३५ ॥ (१८८३)

D. C.—It has been laid down in the *Sāstras* that—

" *Uktha ṣodas'i prabhṛiti kratubhir yathās'ruti Yama-Soma-Sūrya-Suraguru-svārājyāni jayati* " etc. Sentences like this, lead to prove the existence of gods. But they would prove themselves good-for-nothing, if the existence of gods is denied.

Similarly, the invocation of gods such as *Indra* etc. by means of *mantras* which indicate the existence of gods would also become futile if there were *devābhāva* The sentences of the *Vedas* establish the existence of gods in one way or the other. ॥ 335 ॥ (1883).

The doubt of *Mauryaputra* is thus removed by the preceptor.

छिन्नम्मि संसयम्मी जिणेण जर-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
सो समणो पव्वइओ अद्धुट्ठेहि सह खंडियसएहिं ॥३३६॥(१८८४)

Chinnammi samsayammî Jiṇena jara-maraṇavippamukkeṇam ।
So samaṇo pavvaio addhuṭṭhehim saha khandiyasaehim ॥336॥

[छिन्ने संशये जिनेन जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
स श्रमणः प्रव्रजितोऽर्धचतुर्थैः सह खण्डिकशतैः ॥ ३३६ ॥ (१८८४)

Chinne saṃśaye Jinena jarā-maraṇavipramuktena ।
Sa śramaṇaḥ paavrajito'rdha caturthaiḥ saha khandikaśataiḥ ॥336॥

Trans.—336 When the doubt was removed by the *Tîrthaṅkara* who was entirely free from old age, and death, that saint accepted *dîksā* along with his three hundred and fifty pupils. (1884)

End of the Discussion with the Seventh Gaṇadhara.

Chapter VIII



अष्टमगणधरवक्तव्यता

Discussion with the Eighth Gaṇadhara

ते पव्वइए सोउं अकंपिओ आगच्छइ जिणसगासं।
वच्चामि ण वंदामी वंदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ॥ ३३७ ॥ (१८८५)

Te pavvaie söum Akampio āgacchi Jiṇasagāsam।
Vaccāmi ṇa vandāmî vandittā pajjuvāsāmi ॥ 337 ॥ (1885)

[तान् प्रव्रजितान् श्रुत्वाऽकम्पित आगच्छति जिनसकाशम्।
व्रजामि वन्दे वन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ॥ ३३७ ॥ (१८८५)

Tān pravrajitān śrutvā'kampita āgacchati Jinasakāśam।
Vrajāmi vande vanditvā paryupāse ॥ 337 ॥ (1885)]

Trans.—337 Having heard that they (*i. e. Mauryputra* and others) had renounced the world, *Akampita* comes before the *Tîrthaṅkara.* (He thinks:—) I may go, pay my homage and worship him. (1885)

आभट्ठो य जिणेणं जाइ-जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं।
नामेण य गोत्तेण य सव्वण्णू सव्वदरिसी णं ॥३३८॥ (१८८६)

Ābhaṭṭho ya Jiṇeṇam jāi-jarā-marana vippamukkeṇam।
Nāmeṇa ya gotteṇa ya savvaṇṇū savvadarisî ṇam ॥338॥ (1886)

[आभाषितश्च जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन।
नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ॥ ३३८ ॥ (१८८६)

Ābhāṣitaśca Jinena jāti-jarā-maraṇavipramuktena ।
Nāmnā ca gotreṇa ca sarvajñena sarvadarśinā ॥ 338 ॥ (1886)]

Trans.—338 He was then, addressed by his name and lineage by the *Tîrthaṅkara,* who was entirely free from birth, old age, and death, who was omniscient and who had complete *darśana* (undifferentiated knowledge). (1886)

The *Tîrthaṅkara,* then, says—

किं मण्णे नेरइया अत्थि नत्थि त्ति संसओ तुज्झं ।
वेयपयाण य अत्थं न याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो ॥३३९॥ (१८८७)

Kim maṇṇe neraiyā atthi natthi tti saṃsao tujjham ।
Veyapayāṇa ya attham na yāṇasî tesimo attho ॥ 339 ॥ (1887)

[किं मन्यसे नैरयिकाः सन्ति न सन्तीति संशयस्तव ।
वेदपदानां चार्थं न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ ३३९ ॥ (१८८७)

Kim manyase nairayikāḥ santi na santîti saṃśayastava ।
Vedapadānām cārtham na jānāsi teṣāmayamarthaḥ ॥339॥ (1887)]

Trans.—339 What are you thinking about ? You entertain the doubt as to whether the denizens of hell exist or not. (But) you have not understood the real meaning of the sentences of *Vedas.* Here is their (real) interpretation. (1887)

टीका–किं नारकाः सन्ति न वा ? इति त्वं मन्यसे । अयं च तव संशयो विरुद्धवेदपदश्रवणनिबन्धनः, तथाहि–" नारको वै एष जायते यः शूद्रान्नमश्नाति" इत्यादि–एष ब्राह्मणो नारको जायते यः शूद्रान्नमश्नातीत्यर्थः, इत्यादीनि वाक्यानि नारकसत्ताप्रतिपादकानि, " न ह वै प्रेत्य नारकाः सन्ति " इत्यादीनि तु नारकाभावप्रतिपादकानि । तत्रैषां वेदपदानामर्थं, च शब्दाद् युक्तिहृदयं च त्वं न जानासि, यत एतेषामयं वक्ष्यमाणोऽर्थ इति ॥ ३३९ ॥ (१८८७)

D. C.—What are you thinking about ? your doubt about the existence of *nārakas* is based upon your hearing the

various *Veda-padas* having contradictory senses. The *Veda-padas* are as follows:—

(1) " *Nārako vai eṣa jāyate yaḥ s'ūdrānnamas'nāti* " etc.

(2) " *Na ha vai pretya nārakāḥ santi* " etc.

According to you, the interpretation of these sentences is this—

(1) " A *brāhmaṇa* who eats the food of *s'udras* becomes a *nāraka* " (This proves the existence of hellish denizens.)

(2) " In fact, there is nothing like *nārakas* in the next world "

This refutes the existence of *nārakas*. But you have not grasped the real import of those *Veda-padas*. ॥339॥(1887)

Here I give their full significance--

तं मन्नसि पच्चक्खा देवा चंदादओ तहन्ने वि ।
विज्जा-मंतोवायणफलाइसिद्धीए गम्मंति ॥ ३४० ॥ (१८८८)

जे पुण सुइमेत्तफला नेरइय त्ति किह ते गहेयव्वा ।
सक्खमणुमाणओ वाऽणुवलंभा भिन्नजाईया ? ॥३४१॥ (१८८९)

Tam mannasi paccakkhā devā candādao tahanne vi ।
Vijjā-mantovāyaṇaphalāisiddhîe gammanti ॥ 340 ॥ (1888).

Je puṇa suimettaphalā neraiya tti kiha te gaheyavvā ।
Sakkhamaṇumāṇao vā'ṇuvalambhā bhinnajāîyā ? ॥ 341 ॥ (1889)

[त्वं मन्यसे प्रत्यक्षा देवाश्चन्दादयस्तथान्येऽपि ।
विद्या-मन्त्रोपायनफलादिसिद्धेर्गम्यन्ते ॥ ३४० ॥ (१८८८)

ये पुनः श्रुतिमात्रफला नैरयिका इति कथं ते ग्रहीतव्याः ।
साक्षादनुमानतो वाऽनुपलम्भाद् भिन्नजातीयाः ? ॥ ३४१ ॥ (१८८९)

Tvam manyase pratyakṣā devāścandrādayastathānye'pi ।
Vidyā-mantropāyanaphalādisiddher gamyante ॥ 340 ॥ (1888)
Ye punaḥ śrutimātraphalā nairayikā iti katham te grahītavyāḥ ।
Sākṣādanumānato vā'nupalambhād bhinnajātīyāḥ ? ॥341॥ (1889)]

Trans.—340–341 You believe that deities like moon etc., are (directly) perceptible, so also are others perceptible as a result of religious prayers etc. But how are those denizens of hell that are known merely by hearing, and that belong to a distinct species, to be apprehended either directly or by inference, when they are (absolutely) non-perceptible ? (1888–1889)

टीका–हे आयुष्मन्नकम्पित ! त्वमेवं मन्यसे–देवास्तावच्चन्द्रादयः प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणसिद्धा एव, अन्ये त्वप्रत्यक्षा अपि विद्यामन्त्रोपयाचितकादिफलसिद्ध्याऽनुमानतो गम्यन्ते; ये पुनः " नारकाः " इत्यभिधानमात्ररूपा श्रुतिरेव फलं येषां, न पुनस्तदभिधायकशब्दव्यतिरिक्तोऽर्थः, ते साक्षात्, अनुमानतो वाऽनुपलभ्यमानत्वेन तिर्यग्–नरा–ऽमरेभ्यः सवर्था भिन्नजातीयाः कथं " सन्ति " इति ग्रहीतव्याः, खरविषाणवत् ? इति ॥ ३४०–३४१ ॥ (१८८८–१८८९)

D. C.—Akampita:—Deities like moon etc. are apprehended by concrete authentities, and others which are imperceptible are apprehended by means of inference as a result of religious prayers etc. But how are *nārakas* that are quite different from gods, *tiryancas* and human beings, and whose existence is recognized only by hearing, to be accepted as existing when it is not apprehended by direct perception or even by inference ? ॥ 340–341 (1888–1889) ॥

The reply is—

मह पच्चक्खत्तणओ जीवाई य व्व नारए गिण्ह ।
किं जं सपच्चक्खं तं पच्चक्खं नवरि इक्कं ? ॥ ३४२ ॥ (१८९०)
जं कासइ पच्चक्खं पच्चक्खं तं पि घेप्पइ लोए ।
जह सीहाइदरिसणं सिद्धं न य सव्वपच्चक्खं ॥३४३॥ (१८९१)

Maha paccakkhattanao jîvāî ya vva nārae giṇha ।
Kim jam sapaccakkham tam paccakkham navari ikkam ॥ 342 ॥

Jam kāsai paccakkham paccakkham tam pi gheppai löe ।
Jaha sîhāidarisaṇam siddham na ya savvapaccakkham ॥ 343 ॥

[मम प्रत्यक्षत्वतो जीवादींश्चैव नारकान् गृहाण ।
किं यत् स्वप्रत्यक्षं तत् प्रत्यक्षं नवरमेकम् ? ॥ ३४२ ॥ (१८९०)

यत् कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षं प्रत्यक्षं तदपि गृह्यते लोके ।
यथा सिंहादिदर्शनं सिद्धं न च सर्वप्रत्यक्षम् ॥ ३४३ ॥ (१८९१)]

Mama pratyakṣatvato jîvādînśceva nārakān grihāṇa ।
Kım yat sva-pratyakṣam tat pratyakṣam navaramekam ? ॥342॥(1890)

Yat kasyacitpratyakṣam pratykṣam tadapi grihyate loke ।
Yathā sinhādidarśanam sıddham na ca sarvapratyakṣam ॥343॥(1891)]

Trans.—342–343 Accept the *Nārakas* (as existing) like *jîva* etc. on account of (their) being *pratyakṣa* to me. Is it that only that which is *pratyaksa* to one's own self (could be known as) *pratyaksa* and not anything else ? That which has been *pratyaksa* to any (person) in the world, is accepted as *pratyaksa* by the (whole) world. Just the appearance of *sinha* etc though not *pratyaksa* to all, is accepted (by all as existing). (1890–1891)

टीका–हे आयुष्मन्नकम्पित ! " साक्षादनुपलभ्यमानत्वात् " इत्यसिद्धो हेतुः, यतोऽहं केवलप्रत्यक्षेण साक्षादेव पश्यामि नारकान्, ततो मत्प्रत्यक्षत्वात् " सन्ति " इति गृहाण प्रतिपद्यस्व नारकान्, जीवा–ऽजीवादिपदार्थवत् । अथैवं मन्यसे–ममाप्रत्यक्षत्वात् कथमेतान् गृह्णामि ? । ननु दुरभिप्रायोऽयम्, यतः किं यत् स्वस्यात्मनः प्रत्यक्षं तदेवैकं नवरं प्रत्यक्षमुच्यते ? इति काक्का नेयम् । ननु यदपि कस्यचित् प्रत्ययितपुरुषस्यान्यस्य प्रत्यक्षं तदपि " प्रत्यक्षम् " इति गृह्यते व्यवह्रियते लोके; तथाहि–सिंह–सरभ–हंसादिदर्शनं सिद्धं प्रसिद्धं लोके, न च सिंहादयः सर्वजनप्रत्यक्षाः,

देश-काल-ग्राम-नगर-सरित्-समुद्रादयश्च न सर्वेऽपि भवतः प्रत्यक्षाः, अथ चान्यस्यापि प्रत्यक्षास्ते प्रत्यक्षतया व्यवह्रियमाणा दृश्यन्ते। अतो मत्प्रत्यक्षा नारकाः किमिति प्रत्यक्षतया न व्यवह्रियन्ते ? इति ॥ ३४२-३४३ ॥ (१८९०-१८९१)

D. C.—Bhagavān:—O long-lived *Akampita !* your objection that *Nārakas* do not exist because they have not been apprehended by you, is unfounded. I have perceived those *Nārakas* personally. Accept them, therefore, as existing on account of their being *pratyakṣa* to me, like all other objects animate and inanimate.

Secondly, it is not appropriate to hold the obstinate view that nothing can be said to be *pratyakṣa* in this world, unless and until it has not been witnessed by you. Usually, that which has been witnessed by a trustworthy or respectable person, is accepted as existing in this world. Existence of lion, bear, and swan etc. is universally accepted by all even though those animals have not been *pratyaksa* to each and every person in the world. You have not witnessed all countries, rivers, towns, oceans and times, still however, you do not doubt their existence, because they have already been *pratyakṣa* to other respectable persons.

Similarly, you shall have to accept the existence of *Nārakas* when they have already been *pratyaksa* to me ॥ 342-343 (1890-1891) ॥

अहवा जमिंदियाणं पच्चक्खं किं तदेव पच्चक्खं ?।
उवयारमेत्तओ तं पच्चक्खमणिंदियं तत्थं ॥ ३४४ ॥ (१८९२)

Ahavā jamindiyāṇam paccakkham kim tadeva paccakkham ?।
Uvayāramettao tam paccakkhamaṇindiyam tattham ॥344॥ (1892)

[अथवा यदिन्द्रियाणां प्रत्यक्षं किं तदेव प्रत्यक्षम् ?।
उपचारमात्रतस्तत् प्रत्यक्षमनिन्द्रियं तथ्यम् ॥ ३४४ ॥ (१८९२)

Athavā yadindriyāṇām pratyakṣam kim tadeva pratyakṣam ? | Upacāramātratastat pratyakṣamanindriyam tathyam ॥344॥ (1892)]

Trans.—344 Or, is it that what is perceptible to senses is alone *pratyaksa ?* It is *pratyaksa* by virtue of (mere) usuage. The real *pratyaksa* is beyond (the perception of) senses. (1892)

टीका–अथवा, किं यदिन्द्रियाणां प्रत्यक्षं तदेव प्रत्यक्षमिष्यते भवता, मदीयं तु प्रत्यक्षं नाभ्युपगम्यते, अतीन्द्रियत्वात् ? । ननु महानयं विपर्यासः, यस्मादुपचारमात्रत एव तदिन्द्रियप्रत्यक्षं प्रत्यक्षतया व्यवह्रियते–यथाऽनुमाने बाह्यधूमादिलिङ्गद्वारेण बाह्यमग्नादिवस्तु ज्ञायते, नवमत्र, तत उपचारात् प्रत्यक्षमिव प्रत्यक्षमुच्यते । परमार्थतस्तु–इदमपि परोक्षमेव, यतोऽक्षो जीवः, स चानुमानवदत्रापि वस्तु साक्षाद् न पश्यति, किन्त्विन्द्रियद्वारेणैव, ततोऽतीन्द्रियमेव तथ्यं प्रत्यक्षमवगन्तव्यम्, तत्र जीवेन साक्षादेव वस्तुन उपलम्भादिति ॥ ३४४ ॥ (१८९२)

D. C.—Since, that which is perceived, is beyond the, perception of senses, you do not admit it, as according to you only, that which is *indriya pratykṣa* is *pratyakṣa.* This is a great foly. *Indriya–pratyakṣa* is recognized as *pratyakṣa* by means of *upacāra*, similar to the case of *anumāna*, when objects like fire etc are apprehended by means of external indications of smoke etc. But the *pratyakṣa* in my case is different from this. By means of mere *upacāra*, it is called *pratyakṣa*, but really speaking, it is *parokṣa* as the *akṣa* (*i–e jîva*) does not apprehend the object directly as in the case of *anumāna.*

The *atîndriya* or that which is beyond perception by (means of) sense-organs, should alone be accepted as *pratyakṣa* as in that case, *jîva* directly perceives the object.

Akampita:—Athough in case of *indriya–pratyakṣa*, *jîva* does not apprehend an object directly, *indriyas* are undoubtedly able to recognize the object directly. In such a case, why should we not consider *indriya–pratyakṣa* to be the *pratyakṣa* itself ? ॥ 344 (1892) ॥

मुत्ताइभावओ नोवलद्धिमंतिंदियाइं कुंभो व ।
उवलंभद्दाराणि ताइं जीवो तदुवलद्धा ॥ ३४५ ॥ (१८९३)

Muttāibhāvao novaladdhimantindiyāim kumbho vva ।
Uvalambhaddārāṇi tāim jîvo taduvaladdhā ॥ 345 ॥ (1893)

[मूर्तादिभावतो नोपलब्धिमन्तीन्द्रियाणि कुम्भ इव ।
उपलम्भद्वाराणि तानि जीवस्तदुपलब्धा ॥ ३४५ ॥ (१८९३)

Mūrtādibhāvato nopalabdhimantîndriyāṇi kumbha iva ।
Upalambhadvārāṇi tāni jîvastadupalabdhā ॥ 345 ॥ (I893)]

Trans.—Sense-organs have no power of perception on account of (their being) *mūrta* etc, like *ghaṭa.* They are mere mediums of perception. *Jîva* is their (real) agent of perception. (1893)

टीका–नोपलब्धिमन्तीन्द्रियाणि–न वस्तुज्ञायकानीत्यर्थः, पुद्गलसंघातरूपत्वेन मूर्तत्वात्, आदिशब्दादचेतनत्वात्, कुम्भवत् । नवरमुपलम्भस्य श्रोत्रादिज्ञानस्य द्वाराणि भवन्त्यमूनि, गवाक्षवत्, तत्सापेक्षस्यैव क्षयोपशमस्य प्रबोधात् । जीव एव च तदुपलब्धा वस्तूपलब्धा ॥ ३४५ ॥ (१८९३)

D. C—Since *indriyas* are *mūrta* and *a-cetana* like *ghaṭa,* they are not able to apprehend objects. They are only mediums of apprehension like a window. The real agent of perception is *Atmā* which is altogether different from *indriya* in this way. ॥ 345 (1893) ॥

Besides,

तदुवरमे वि सरणओ तव्वावारे वि नोवलंभाओ ।
इंदियभिन्नो नाया पंचगवक्खोवलद्धा वा ॥ ३४६ ॥ (१८९४)

Taduvarame vi saraṇao tavvāvāre vi novalambhāo ।
Indiyabhinno nāyā pañcagavakkhovaladdhā vā ॥ 346 ॥ (1894)

[तदुपरमेऽपि स्मरणतस्तद्व्यापारेऽपि नोपलम्भात् ।
इन्द्रियभिन्नो ज्ञाता पञ्चगवाक्षोपलब्धेव ॥ ३४६ ॥ (१८९४)

Tāduparame'pi smaraṇatastadvyāpāre'pi nopalambhāt ।
Indriyabhinno jñātā pañcagavākṣopalabdheva ॥ 346 ॥ (1894)]

Trans—346 By virtue of recollection, even (when the the sense-organs) are pacified, and on account of non-perception, even (when the sense-organs) are at work, the agent of perception is (recognized) as different from sense-organs, like an observer from the five windows. (1894)

टीका-इन्द्रियेभ्यो भिन्नो "नाय त्ति" ज्ञाता जीवः तदुपरमेऽपी इन्द्रियोपरमेऽपि तद् द्वारोपलब्धार्थानुस्मरणात्, तद्व्यापारेऽपीन्द्रियव्यापारेऽप्यन्यमनस्कतायामनुपलम्भात्; यथा पञ्चभिर्गवाक्षैरुपलब्धा वस्तूपलम्भकस्तेभ्यो भिन्न इति ॥ ३४६ ॥ (१८९४)

D. C.—Just as a person looking from the five windows, is different from those five windows, the Soul which is the agent of perception is different from the sense-organs. Because even when *indriyas* are not at work, the Soul is able to perceive an object by means of recollection, and if the Soul is absent-minded, the object is not at all perceived inspite of *indriyas* being at work. ॥ 346 (1894) ॥

Moreover,

जो पुण अणिंदिउ च्चिय जीवो सव्वप्पिहाणविगमाओ ।
सो सुबहुयं वियाणइ अवणीयघरो जहा दट्ठा ॥३४७॥ (१८९५)

Jo puṇa aṇindiu cciya jîvo savvappihāna vigamāo ।
So subahuyam viyāṇai avanîyagharo jahā daṭṭhā ॥ 347 ॥ (1895)

[यः पुनरनिन्द्रिय एव जीवः सर्वपिधानविगमात् ।
स सुबहुकं विजानात्यपनीतगृहो यथा द्रष्टा ॥ ३४७ ॥ (१८९५)

Yaḥ punaranindriya eva jîvaḥ sarvapidhānavigamāt ।
Sa subahukam vijānātyapanîtagṛiho yathā draṣṭā ॥347॥ (1895)]

Trans.—347 The Soul, like an observer who is away from the house, being void of sense-organs, apprehends much more on account of all the obstructions (being) removed (1895).

टीका–य पुनरनिन्द्रिय एव केवलज्ञानसंपन्नो जीवःस इन्द्रियज्ञानवतो जीवात् सुबहु विजानातीति प्रतिज्ञा, सर्वपिधानविगमात् सर्वावरण क्षयादित्यर्थः, यथा पञ्चगवाक्षगृहस्थितपुरुषात् सर्वथाऽपनीतगृहः सर्वत एवाऽऽकाशीकृतप्रदेशे स्थितो द्रष्टा पुरुष इति ॥ ३४७ ॥ (१८९५)

D. C.—Just as, a person looking from the open space, apprehends much more than a person looking from the five windows, the soul possessing absolute knowledge apprehends much more than anything that apprehends through *indriyas.* ॥ 347 (1895) ॥

And the *jñāna* obtained by *indriyas* in this way, is not *pratyakṣa*—

न हि पच्चक्खं धम्मंतरेण तद्धम्ममेत्तगहणाओ ।
कयगत्तओ व सिद्धी कुंभाणिच्चत्तमेत्तस्स ॥ ३४८ ॥ (१८९६)

Na hi paccakkham dhammantareṇa taddhammamettagahaṇāo ।
Kayagattao va siddhî kumbhāṇiccattamettassa ॥ 348 ॥ (1896)

[न हि प्रत्यक्षं धर्मान्तरेण तद्धर्ममात्रग्रहणात् ।
कृतकत्वत इव सिद्धिः कुम्भानित्यत्वमात्रस्य ॥ ३४८ ॥ (१८९६)

Na hi pratyakṣam dharmāntareṇa taddharmamātragrahaṇāt ।
Kritakatvata iva siddhiḥ kumbhānityatvamātrasya ॥ 348 ॥ (1896)]

Trans.—348 Like the establishment of mere transitoriness of *ghata* on account of its being factitious, the *indriya-pratyakṣa*, is nòt *pratyaksa* (also), on account of its characteristics being accepted by another characteristic. (1896)

टीका–न भवति प्रत्यक्षम् " इन्द्रियजं ज्ञानम् " इति प्रक्रमाल्लभ्यते । चक्षुरादीन्द्रियस्य रूपादिपरिच्छेदशक्तिविशेषरूपेण धर्मान्तरेण हेतुभूतेन तस्यानन्तधर्मात्मकस्य वस्तुनो यद् रूपादिकमेकं धर्ममात्रं तस्य ग्रहणादिति हेतुः । किं तद् यथा न प्रत्यक्षम् ? इत्याह–यथा कृतकत्वाद् घटानित्यत्वमात्रसिद्धिलक्षणमनुमानमित्येष दृष्टान्तः । इह च यथा परस्मात् साध्यसिद्धौ

नानुमानं प्रत्यक्षम्, तथेन्द्रियजमपि विज्ञानमित्येतावान् भावार्थ इति ॥ ३४८ ॥ (१८९६)

D. C.—Just as *anumāna* capable of attaining the accomplishment of a desired object by means of another object, cannot be called *pratyakṣa jñāna*, so also apprehension by means of *indriyas*, could not be called *pratyakṣa*. Like an inference establishing the *a-nityatā* of *ghaṭa* by means of its *kṛitakatva*, cognizance attained by *indriyas* is not *pratyakṣa Indriya-pratyakṣa-jñāna* is limited to the apprehension of only *rūpa* etc. by means of eye etc. ॥ 348 (1896) ॥

Besides,

पुव्वोवलद्धसंबंधसरणओ वानलो व्व धूमाओ ।
अहव निमित्तंतरओ निमित्तमक्खस्स करणाइं ॥३४९॥(१८९७)

Puvvovaladdhasambandhasaraṇao vānalo vva dhūmāo ।
Ahava nimittantarao nimittamakkhassa karaṇāim ॥ 349 ॥ (1897)

[पूर्वोलब्धसंबन्धस्मरणतो वाऽनल इव धूमात् ।
अथवा निमित्तान्तरतो निमित्तमक्षस्य करणानि ॥ ३४९ ॥ (१८९७)

Pūrvopalabdhasambandhasmaraṇato vā'nala iva dhūmāt ।
Athavā nimittāntarato nimittamakṣasya karaṇāni ॥ 349 ॥ (1897)]

Trans.—349 Or, like the inference of fire from smoke, on account of the recollection by means of (its) relations of the past or on account of any (other) reason, the sense-organs serve as the instrumental cause to the Soul. (1897)

टीका–" वा " इत्यथवा, न प्रत्यक्षमिन्द्रियजं ज्ञानमिति सैव प्रतिज्ञा, पूर्वोपलब्धश्चासौ संबन्धश्च पूर्वोपलब्धसंबन्धस्तत्स्मरणाज्जायमानत्वात् धूमादनलज्ञानवत्; तथाहि–"घटोऽयं, पूर्वसंकेतकाल एवंभूत एव पदार्थे प्रत्ययितामिज्ञपुरुषाद् घटसंकेतस्य मया गृहीतत्वात्"इति पूर्वोपलब्धसंबन्धस्मरणादेव सर्वस्यापि घटादिग्राहकमिन्द्रियज्ञानमुपजायते; अन्यथा नालिकेरद्वीपाद्या-

यातस्याप्यविशेषेणैतत् स्यात्। अभ्यास-पाटवादिभ्यश्चाशुकारितयेन्द्रियज्ञान-प्रवृत्तेः सर्वत्रैतद् न लक्ष्यत इति। अथवा, प्रत्यक्षमिन्द्रियजं ज्ञानम्, पूर्वप्रतिपादितव्युत्पत्त्याऽक्षस्य जीवस्य स्वव्यतिरिक्तनिमित्तविशेषाज्जायमानत्वात्, धूमादग्निज्ञानवत्। स्वव्यतिरिक्तानि च निमित्तान्यक्षस्य जीवस्य करणानीन्द्रियाणि मन्तव्यानि। यच्च प्रत्यक्षं न तज्जीवस्य निमित्तान्तराज्जायते किन्तु जीवस्तत्र साक्षादेव ज्ञेयं पश्यति, यथाऽवधि-मनः पर्याय-केवलज्ञानेष्विति ॥ ३४९ ॥ (१८९७)

D. C.—Like the perception of fire from smoke, the perception due to sense-organs, is also produced from the recollection of the connections of the past. So, it is not *pratyakṣa*. Take the example of *ghaṭa*. The name *ghaṭa* was given to it in the past. We recognize it as *ghaṭa* on the bases of its *pūrvakāla sanketa*. Hence, the knowledge about *ghaṭa* is apprehended by means of *indriyas* from the recollection of its past relations. If it were no so, a person coming from a distant island, who has neither heard nor seen anything about *ghaṭa*, would at once be able to recognize it as *ghaṭa*. This sort of *indriya-jñāna* is produced very quickly from recollection etc. due to constant practice and cleverness, and hence, it is not marked everywhere.

Moreover, just as one apprehends *agni* from *dhūma*, which is absolutely different from himself, the apprehension in this case is also attained by Soul from the *indriyas*, which are absolutely different from the Soul, showing thereby that the knowledge thus obtained is not *pratyakṣa* but *parokṣa*.

Pratyakṣa jñāna is acceptible to Soul directly like the [1]*Avadhi*, [2]*Manaḥ-paryāya* and [3]*Kevala-jñānas* and it is never

1. The first stage of perception when the attention is concentrated.

2. The state of mental perception which precedes the attainment of perfect knowledge.

3. Absolute Perception.

obtained by the Soul from any external *nimitta*. All sorts of *jñāna* except the above-mentioned three, are mere *anumānas* as they apprehend objects indirectly. In case of *jñānas* like *Avadhi* etc, since the Soul apprehends the object directly, the knowledge is called *pratyakṣa*.

केवल–मणो–हिरहियस्स सव्वमणुमाणमेत्तयं जम्हा ।
नारगसब्भावम्मि य तदत्थि जं तेण ते संति ॥३५०॥ (१८९८)

Kevala–Mano–hirahiyassa savvamaṇumānamettayam jamhā ।
Nāragasabbhāvammi ya tadatthi jam teṇa te santi ॥350॥ (1898)

[केवल–मनो–ऽवधिरहितस्य सर्वमनुमानमात्रकं यस्मात् ।
नरकसद्भावे च तदस्ति यत् तेन ते सन्ति ॥ ३५० ॥ (१८९८)

Kevala–Mano–'vadhirahitasya sarvamanumāna mātrakam yasmād ।
Naraksadbhāve ca tadasti yat tena te santi ॥ 350 ॥ (1898)]

Trans.—350 Since everything pertaining to that which is void of *Kevala, Manah–paryāya* and *Avadhi* (sorts of *jnāna*) is mere inference, it is (present) in case of (establishing) the existence of hellish denizens. By (virtue of) that *(anumāna)*, the *Nārakas* are existing. (1898)

टीका–केवल–मनःपर्याया–ऽवधिज्ञानरहितस्य प्रमातुः संबन्धि सर्वमपि ज्ञानं यस्मादनुमानमात्रमेव, परोक्षार्थविषयत्वात् । केवलादिज्ञानत्रयं तु वस्तुसाक्षात्कारित्वात् प्रत्यक्षम् । तदेवमनुमानं प्रत्यक्षं च यस्माद् नारकसद्भावे साध्ये विद्यत एव, तेन ते नारका सन्तीति प्रतिपद्यस्व । तत्र प्रत्यक्षं मदीयमेव केवलज्ञानम् ॥ ३५० ॥ (१८९८)

D. C.—Every sort of knowledge excepting *Avadhi–Manah paryāya* and *Kevala* is mere *anumāna* on account of its being based on the indirect perception of an object. *Jñānas* like *Kevala* etc apprehend the object directly and hence they are called *pratyakṣa*. Since the *anumāna* pertaining to *Nārakas*,

is *pratyakṣa*, the existence of *Nārakas* is established without doubt. The *pratyakṣa jñāna* in this case is my own *Kevala-jñāna* ॥ 350 (1898) ॥

पावफलस्स पगिट्ठस्स भोइणो कम्मओऽवसेस व ।
सन्ति धुवं तेऽभिमया नेरइया, अह मई होज्जा ॥३५१॥(१८९९)

अच्चत्थदुक्खिया जे तिरिय–नरा–नारग त्ति तेऽभिमया ।
तं न जओ सुरसोक्खप्पगरिससरिसं न तं दुक्खं ॥३५२॥ (१९००)

Pāvaphalassa pagiṭṭhassa bhöiṇo kammao'vaṣesa vva ।
Santi dhuvam te'bhimayā neraiyā, aha maî hojjā ॥ 351 ॥ (1899)

Accatthadukkhiyā je tiriya–narā–nāraga tti te'bhimayā ।
Tam na jao surasokkhappagarisasarisam na tam dukkham ॥352॥

[पापफलस्य प्रकृष्टस्य भोगिनः कर्मतोऽवशेष इव ।
सन्ति ध्रुवं तेऽभिमता नैरयिकाः, अथ मतिर्भवेत् ॥ ३५१ ॥ (१८९९)

अत्यर्थदुःखिता ये तिर्यग्–नरा–नारका इति तेऽभिमताः ।
तद् न यतः सुरसौख्यप्रकर्षसदृशं न तद् दुःखम् ॥३५२॥ (१९००)

Pāpaphalasya prakṛiṣṭhasya bhoginaḥ karmato'vaśeṣa iva ।
Santi dhruvam te'bhimata nairayikāḥ atha matîr–bhavet ॥351॥(1899)

Atyarthaduḥkhitā ye tiryag–narā–nārakā iti te'bhimataḥ ।
Tad na yataḥ surasaukhyaprakarṣasadṛiśam na tad duḥkham॥352॥]

Trans.—351–352 Like (the enjoyers of) the rest of *Karmas*, there are (certainly) some who (have to suffer) the result of great sins. They are really known as the denizens of hell. Here, it is not appropriate to assert that extremely miserable *tiryancas* and human beings are the denizens of hell. Because, (their) miseries are not as extreme as the happiness of gods. (1899–1900)

टीका–प्रकृष्टस्य पापफलस्य भोगिनः केचिद् ध्रुवं सन्ति "कम्मउ त्ति"

कर्मफलत्वात् तस्येत्यर्थः, अवशेषवदिति–यथा जघन्यमध्यमपापफलभोगिनः शेषास्तिर्यङ्–नरा विद्यन्त इत्यर्थः दृष्टान्त। " तेऽभिमया नेरइय त्ति " ये प्रकृष्टपापफलभोगिनस्ते " नारकाः" इत्यभिमताः। अथ परस्यैवंभूता मतिर्भवेत्–अत्यर्थं दुःखिता ये तिर्यग्–मनुष्यास्त एवोत्कृष्टपापफलभोगित्वाद् नारकव्यपदेशभाजो भविष्यन्ति, किमदृष्टनारककल्पनया ? इति। तदेतद् न, यतोऽतिदुःखितानामपि तिर्यग्–मनुष्याणां यद् दुःखं तदमरसौख्यप्रकर्षसदृशप्रकर्षवद् न भवति। इदमुक्तं भवति–येषामुत्कृष्टपापफलभोगस्तेषां संभवद्भिः सर्वैरपि प्रकारैर्दुःखेन भवितव्यम्, न चैवमतिदुःखितानामपि तिर्यगादीनां दृश्यते, आलोक–तरुच्छाया–शीतपवन–सरित्–सरः–कूपजलादिसुखस्याति दुःखितेष्वपि तेषु दर्शनात्–छेदन–भेदन–पाचन–दहन–दम्भन-वज्र-कण्टक–शिलास्फालनादिभिश्च नरकप्रसिद्धैः प्रकारैर्दुःखस्यादर्शनात्, इत्यादि प्रागुक्तानुसारेण स्वयमेवाभ्यूह्य वाच्यमिति। आगमार्थश्चायमवगन्तव्य इति।

सततमनुबद्धमुक्तं दुखं नरकेषु तीव्रपरिणामम्।
तिर्यक्षूष्ण–भय–क्षुत्–तृडादिदुःखं सुखं चाल्पम् ॥ १ ॥

सुख–दुःखे मनुजानां मनःशरीराश्रये बहुविकल्पे।
सुखमेव तु देवानामल्पं दुःखं तु मनसि भवम् ॥ २ ॥

इति ॥ ३५१–३५२ ॥ (१८९९–१९००) ॥

D. C.—Bhagavān:—Just as, there are *tiryancas* and *manuṣyas* to enjoy the fruits of moderate sins, there do exist some who have to suffer the consequences of great sins. And take it for certain that they are none but *Nārakas.*

Akampita:—Since the excessively miserable *tiryancas* and *manuṣyas* have to undergo the consequences of great sins, why not to take them as *Nārakas* ?

Bhagavān:—It is not so. Sufferers of the consequences of great sins ought to be miserable in all respects.

Tiryancas and *manuṣyas* cannot be said to be miserable in all respects as required in case of *Nārakas.* They are

entitled to various means of pleasure like light, shades of a tree, cool-breeze, river, and stream etc. On the other hand, various horrors of hell such as those of being killed, pierced, cooked, burnt, pressed, and dashed against stone-slabs are not experienced by *tiryancas* or *manusyas*. Only *Nārakas* are doomed to undergo such afflictions.

It should be noted in the *āgamas* also that:—

Satatamanubadhamuktam duḥkham narakeṣu tîvraparināmam |
Tiryakṣūṣṇa-bhaya-kṣut-tridādiduḥkham sukham cālpam ॥ 1 ॥

Sukh-duḥkha manujānām manaḥ-śarîrā śraye bahuvikalpe |
Sukhameva tu devā nāmalpam duḥkham tu mansi bhavam ॥ 2 ॥

[*Nārakas* have always to undergo the afflictions of excessive effects. *Tiryancas* have greater proportion of afflictions like heat, fear, hunger, and thirst etc and smaller proportion of happiness, *manusyas* have pleasures and pains (almost in equal proportion) pertaining to body and mind while gods have absolute happiness and very little misery] ॥ 351-352 (1899-1900) ॥

सच्चं चेदमकंपिय ! मह वयणाओऽवसेसवयणं व ।
सव्वण्णुत्तणओ वा अणुमयसव्वण्णुवयणं व ॥ ३५३ ॥ (१९०१)

Saccam cedamakampiya ! maha vayaṇāo'vasesavayaṇam va |
Savvaṇṇuttanao vā anumayasavvaṇṇuvayaṇam va ॥353॥ (1901)

[सत्यं चेदमकम्पित ! मम वचनादवशेषवचनमिव ।
सर्वज्ञत्वतो वाऽनुमतसर्वज्ञवचनमिव ॥ ३५३ ॥ (१९०१)

Satyam cedamakampita ! mama vacanādavaśeṣavacanamiva |
Sarvajñatvato vā'numatasarvajñavacanamiva ॥ 353 ॥ (1901)]

Trans.—353 This is true. *O Akampita !* because it is my statement. Or, (it is true) like other statements. Or, by virtue of (my) all-knowing faculty, (it is true) like the statement of an authorized omniscient. (1901)

टीका–" नारकाः सन्ति " इति सत्यमकम्पित ! इदम्, मद्वचनात्, यथाऽवशेषं त्वत्संशयादिविषयं मद्वचनम्। अथवा, "सर्वज्ञवचनत्वात्" इत्येवं हेतुर्वक्तव्यः, त्वदनुमतमनु–जैमिन्यादिसर्वज्ञवचनवदिति ॥३५३॥ (१९०१)

D. C.—Accept the statement that *Nārakas* exist as true. *O Akampita* ! either because it is my statement, or, because it is as real as the other statements like those regarding your doubts etc, or, because it is the statement of an omniscient as great as your high–esteemed *Manu, Jaiminî* etc. ॥ 353 (1901) ॥

भय–राग–दोस–मोहाभावाओ सच्चमणइवाइं च ।
सच्चं चिय मे वयणं जाणयमज्झत्थवयणं व ॥३५४॥ (१९०२)

Bhaya–rāga–dosa–mohābhāvāo saccamanaivāim ca ।
Saccam ciya me vaynam jāṇaya majjhattha vayaṇam va ॥354॥

[भय–राग–द्वेष–मोहाभावात् सत्यमनतिपाति च ।
सत्यमेव मे वचनं ज्ञायकमध्यस्थवचनमिव ॥ ३५४ ॥ (१९०२)

Bhaya–rāga–dveṣa–mohābhāvāt satyamanatipāti ca ।
Satyameva me vacanam jṇāyakamadhyasthavacanamiva ॥354॥(1902)]

Trans.—354 Everything that I say is certainly true and free from faults like words of an intelligent and impartial person, on account of the (complete) absence of fear, attachment, aversion and infatuation (in me). (1902)†

किह सव्वण्णु त्ति मई पच्चक्खं सव्वसंसयच्छेया ।
भय–राग–दोसरहिओ तल्लिंगाभावओ सोम्म ! ॥३५५॥(१९०३)

Kiha savvaṇṇu tti maî paccakkham savvasamsayaccheyā ।
Bhaya–rāga–dosarahio tallingābhāvao Somma ! ॥ 355 ॥ (1903)

[कथं सर्वज्ञ इति मतिः प्रत्यक्षं सर्वसंशयच्छेदात् ।
भय–राग–दोषरहितस्तल्लिङ्गाभावतः सौम्य ! ॥ ३५५ ॥ (१९०३)

† Vide V. 1578.

Katham sarvajña iti matiḥ pratyakṣam sarvasaṃśayacchedāt ।
Bhaya-rāga-doṣarahitastallıṅgā-bhāvataḥ Saumya ॥ 355 ॥ (1903)]

Trans.—355 You might ask " How are you to be (accepted as) omniscient ?" "Evidently because I remove all doubts and and because I am free from even the symptoms of the faults such as fear, attachment etc." (1903)

टीका-इयमपि व्याख्यातार्था । यदपि " न ह वै प्रेत्य नारकाः सन्ति " इत्यादौ नारकाभावः शङ्क्यते भवता, तदप्ययुक्तम्, यतोऽयमत्राभिप्रायो मन्तव्यः-न खलु प्रेत्य परलोके मेर्वादिवच्छाश्वताः केचनाप्यवस्थिता नारकाः सन्ति, किन्तु य इहोत्कृष्टं पापमर्जयति, स इतो गत्वा प्रेत्य नारको भवति, अतः केनापि तत्पापं न विधेयं येन प्रेत्य नारकैर्भूयते। तदेवं छिन्नस्तत्संशयो भगवता ॥ ३५५ ॥ (१९०३)

D. C.—If you doubt about my *sarvajñatva, O Saumya !* you are not justified. For, since I have removed all your doubts and am prepared to remove them at present if you entertain any, I am *sarvajña.*

Moreover, in the sentences such as " *Na ha vai pretya nārakāḥ santi* " etc you have suspected the existence of *Nārakas.* But it is not so. The import of those sentences is that there are no *Nārakas* everlasting like *Meru* etc. in the other world, but those who commit great sins in this world, would become *Nārakas* in the next world. The sentences, therefore, mean to assert that no body should commit such sins lest they might become the denizens of hell after death.

The *Bhagavān* thus removed his doubts ॥ 355 (1903) ॥

So,

छिन्नम्मि संसयम्मी जिणेण जर-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
सो समणो पव्वइओ तिहि ओ सह खंडियसएहिं ॥३५६॥(१९०४)

Chinnami samsayammî Jiṇeṇa jara-maraṇavippamukkeṇam ।
So samaṇo pavvaio tihi o saha khaṇḍiyasaehim ॥ 356 ॥ (1904)

[छिन्ने संशये जिनेन जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
स श्रमणः प्रव्रजितस्त्रिभिस्तु सह खण्डिकशतैः ॥ ३५६ ॥ (१९०४)

Chinne saṃśaye Jinena jarā-maraṇavipramuktena ।
Sa śramaṇaḥ pravrajitastribhistu saha khaṇḍikaśataiḥ ॥356॥(1904)]

Trans.—356 When the doubt was removed by the *Tìrthaṅkara,* who was entirely free from old age and death, that saint accepted the *Dìksā* along with his three hundred pupils. (1904)

End of the Discussion with the Eighth Gaṇadhara.

Chapter IX

नवमगणधरवक्तव्यता ।

Discussion with the Ninth Gaṇadhara

ते पव्वइए सोउं अयलभाया आगच्छई जिणसगासं ।
वच्चामि ण वंदामी वंदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ॥ ३५७ ॥ (१९०५)

Te pavvaie söum Ayalabhāyā āgacchaî Jinasagāsam ।
Vaccāmi ṇa vandāmî vandittā pajjuvāsāmi ॥ 357 ॥ (1905)

[तान् प्रव्रजितान् श्रुत्वाऽचलभ्राताऽऽगच्छति जिनसकाशम् ।
व्रजामि वन्दे वन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ॥ ३५७ ॥ (१९०५)

Tān pravrajitān śrutvā'calabhrātā"gacchati Jinasakāśam ।
Vrajāmi vande vanditvā paryupāse ॥ 357 ॥ (1905)]

Trans.—357 Having heard that they had renounced the world, *Acalabhrātā* comes before the *Tîrthankara.* (He thinks:-) I may go, pay my homage, and worship him. (1905)

आभट्ठो य जिणेणं जाइ-जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
नामेण य गोत्तेण य सव्वण्णू सव्वदरिसी णं ॥ ३५८॥ (१९०६)

Ābhaṭṭho ya Jiṇeṇam jāi-jarā-maraṇavippamukkeṇam ।
Nāmeṇa ya gotteṇa ya savvaṇṇū savvadarisî ṇam ॥ 358 ॥ (1906)

[आभाषितश्च जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ॥ ३५८ ॥ (१९०६)

Ābhāṣitaśca Jinena jāti-jara-maraṇavipramuktena ।
Nāmnā ca gotreṇa ca sarvajñena sarvadarśinā ॥ 358 ॥ (1906)]

Trans.—358 He was, then, addressed by his name and lineage by the *Tîrthankara,* who was entirely free from birth, old age, and death, who was omniscient, and who had complete *darśana* (undifferentiated knowledge.) (1906)

The *Tîrthankara* then said:—

किं मण्णे पुण्ण–पावं अत्थि नत्थि त्ति संसओ तुज्झ ।
वेयपयाण य अत्थं न याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो ॥३५९॥ (१९०७)

Kim maṇṇe puṇṇa–pāvam atthi natthi tti saṃsao tujjha ।
Veyapayāṇa ya attham na yāṇasî tesimo attho ॥ 359 ॥ (1907)

[किं मन्यसे पुण्य–पापे स्तो न स्त इति संशयस्तव ।
वेदपदानां चार्थं न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ ३५९ ॥ (१९०७)

Kim manyase puṇya-pāpe sto na sta iti saṃśayastava ।
Vedapadānām cārtham na jānāsi teṣāmayamarthaḥ ॥359॥(1907)]

Trans.—359 What are you thinking about? You entertain the doubt as to whether *puṇya* and *pāpa* exist or not. But, *(ca)* you do not understand the (real) meaning of the sentences of the *Vedas.* Here is their (real) interpretation. (1907)

टीका–हे आयुष्मन्नचलभ्रातः ! त्वमेवं मन्यसे–किं पुण्य–पापे स्तो न वा ? इति । अयं चानुचितः संशयः, यस्माद् विरुद्धवेदपदनिबन्धनो विरुद्धदर्शनश्रुतिनिबन्धनश्च तव वर्तते । तत्र वेदपदानि तावत्–"पुरुष एवेदं ग्निं सर्वम् "—इत्यादि यथा द्वितीयगणधरे तथा वाच्यानि । तेषां चार्थं त्वं न जानासीत्याद्यपि तथैव व्याख्येयमिति ॥ ३५९ ॥ (१९०७)

D. C.—Your doubt about the existence of *puṇya* and *pāpa* is not justified. It is based on your hearing the sentences of *Vedas* bearing contradictory senses. The sentences are such as " *Puruṣa evedam gnim sarvam* " etc. which have already been mentioned in the Second *Gaṇadharavāda.* You have not grasped the real interpretation of those sentences. I, therefore, give their real interpretation as under :— ॥ 359 (1907) ॥

मण्णसि पुण्णं पावं साहारणमहव दो वि भिन्नाइं ।
होज्ज न वा कम्मं चिय सभावओ भवपवंचोऽयं ॥ ३६० ॥(१९०८)

Maṇṇasi puṇṇam pāvam sāhāraṇamahava do vi bhinnāim ।
Hojja na vā kammam ciya sabhāvao bhavapavanco'yam ॥360॥

[मन्यसे पुण्यं पापं साधारणमथवा द्वे अपि भिन्ने ।
भवेद् न वा कर्मैव स्वभावतो भवप्रपञ्चोऽयम् ॥ ३६० ॥ (१९०८)
Manyase puṇyam pāpam sādhāraṇamathavā dve api bhinne ।
Bhaved na vā karmaiva svabhāvato bhavaprapañco'yam ॥360॥(1908)

Trans.—360 Do you think *puṇya* alone or *pāpa* alone to exist? Or, (do you think them to be) common, or even different? Or, is it that *Karma* itself be absent, and the expansion of the whole of mundane world be natural? (1908)

टीका-इह केषाञ्चित् तीर्थिकानामयं प्रवादः-" पुण्यमेवैकमस्ति न पापम् "। अन्ये त्वाहुः-" पापमेवैकमस्ति न तु पुण्यम् " अपरे तु वदन्ति- "उभयमप्यन्योन्यानुविरुद्धस्वरूपं मेचकमणिकल्पं संमिश्रसुख-दुःखाख्यफल-हेतुः साधारणं पुण्यपापाख्यमेकं वस्तु " इति। अन्ये तु प्रतिपादयन्ति-स्वतन्त्र-मुभयं विविक्तसुख-दुःखकारणं " होज्ज त्ति " भवेदिति । अन्ये पुनराहुः- " मूलतः कर्मैव नास्ति, स्वभावसिद्धः सर्वोऽप्ययं जगत्प्रपञ्चः" । अतस्त्वम-प्येतान् पञ्चविकल्पान् मन्यसे । एतेषां च विकल्पानां परस्परविरुद्धत्वात् संशयदोलामारुढोऽसि त्वमिति ॥ ३६० ॥ (१९०८)

D. C.—There are five different theories about the existence of *puṇya* and *pāpa* as stated below:—

(1) There exists *puṇya* alone and there is nothing like *pāpa.*

(2) There exists *pāpa* alone and there is nothing like *puṇya.*

(3) *Puṇya* and *pāpa* which happen to be the causes of *sukha* and *duḥkha* respectively, exist in a combined state like a dark-blue jewel.

(4) *Puṇya* and *pāpa* are absolutely independent of each other.

(5) There is nothing like *Karma* at all. The expansion of this mundane world is not due to *Karma*, but it is natural.

Now, since you have listened to all the above-mentioned five views, you are wavering between the five and raising the doubt about *puṇya* and *pāpa*. ॥ 360 ॥ (1908)

Each of the above-mentioned views is explained as follows .—

पुण्णुक्करिस्से सुभया तरतमजोगावगरिसओ हाणी ।
तस्सेव खए मोक्खो पत्थाहारोवमाणाओ ॥ ३६१ ॥ (१९०९)

Puṇṇukkarisse subhayā taratamajogāvagarisao hāṇī ।
Tasseva khae mokkho patthāhārovamāṇāo ॥ 361 ॥ (1909)

[पुण्योत्कर्षे शुभता तरतमयोगापकर्षतो हानिः ।
तस्यैव क्षये मोक्षः पथ्याहारोपमानात् ॥ ३६१ ॥ (१९०९)

Puṇyotkarṣe śubhatā taratamayogāpakarṣato hāniḥ ।
Tasyaiva kṣaye mokṣaḥ pathyāhāropamānāt ॥ 361 ॥ (1909)]

Trans.—361 With the (gradual) rise in *puṇyas,* welfare (is obtained). With the gradual diminution, there is destruction. Being similar to the wholesome diet, when it is absolutely destroyed there is (complete) liberation. (1909)

टीका–पुनातीति पुण्यं तस्योत्कर्षलेशतो लेशतश्च वृद्धौ शुभता भवति, सुखस्यापि क्रमशो वृद्धिर्भवति तावत्, यावदुत्कृष्टं स्वर्गसुखमित्यर्थः । तस्यैव पुण्यस्य तर–तमयोगापकर्षतो हानिः सुखस्य–दुःखं भवति । इदमुक्तं भवति–यथा यथा पुण्यमपचीयते तथा तथा जीवानां क्रमेण दुःखमुत्पद्यते, यावत् सर्वप्रकर्षप्राप्तं नरकदुःखम् । तस्यैव च पुण्यस्य सर्वथा क्षये मोक्ष इति । एतच्च सर्वं पथ्याहारोपमानाद् भावनीयम्; तथाहि–यथा

पथ्याहारस्य क्रमेण वृद्धावारोग्यवृद्धिस्तथा पुण्यवृद्धौ सुखवृद्धिः, यथा च पथ्याहारस्य क्रमेण परिहारे सरोगता भवति, एवं पुण्यापचये दुःखोत्पत्तिः; सर्वथा पथ्याहारपरिहारे च मरणवत् पुण्यक्षये मोक्ष इति ॥३६१॥ (१९०९)

D C.—The first case—*viz,* that *puṇya* alone exists and there is nothing like *pāpa*—is discussed as follows:—

That which purifies is called *puṇya.* With the gradual increase in *puṇya,* there is a gradual rise in happiness also, leading ultimately to Salvation which is the highest happiness. On the other hand, when there is a gradual decrease in *puṇya,* happiness also decreases and gradually begins to turn into misery, leading ultimately to the agony of hell. Finally, when there is entire diminution of *puṇya, Jîva* attains complete liberation, *i. e* it dies. This resembles the case of wholesome diet.

Just as, by the gradual increase in wholesome diet, one becomes more and more healthy, so also by the gradual eminence of *puṇyas,* there is a gradual rise in happiness also. On the other hand, just as, when the wholesome diet is abandoned, the disease re-enters the body, and one becomes ill, so also when there is gradual diminution of *puṇya,* there is gradual diminution in happiness and re-generation of misery. Ultimately, by abandoning the wholesome diet entirely, one dies away. In the same way, by the entire destruction of *puṇya, jîva* attains complete liberation from this world. ॥ 361 ॥ (1909)

Taking the second theory of *pāpa,* the author explains:—

पावुक्करिसेऽहमया तरतमजोगावगरिसओ सुभया ।
तस्सेव खए मोक्खो अपत्थभत्तोवमाणाओ ॥ ३६२ ॥ (१९१०)

Pāvukkarise'hamayā taratamajogāvagarisao subhayā ।
Tasseva khae mokkho apatthabhattovamāṇāo ॥ 362 ॥ (1910)

[पापोत्कर्षेऽधमता तरतमयोगापकर्षतः शुभता ।
तस्यैव क्षये मोक्षोऽपथ्यभक्तोपमानात् ॥ ३६२ ॥ (१९१०)

Pāpotkarṣe'dhamatā taratamayogāpakarṣataḥ śubhatā ।
Tasyaiva kṣaye mokṣo'pathyabhaktopamānāt ॥ 362 ॥ (1910)]

Trans.—362 In (case of) the increase in *pāpa*, there is vileness; with gradual diminution (of it), (there is) welfare; and as in the case of the unwholesome diet, there is (complete) liberation (of the *jīva*) when it is absolutely destroyed. (1910)

टीका–इहापथ्याहारोपमानाद् वैपरीत्येन भावना कार्या । तथाहि–यथा क्रमेणापथ्यवृद्धौ रोगवृद्धिः, तथा पांशयत्यात्मानं मलिनयतीति पापं, तस्य वृद्धौ सुखवृद्धिरूपाऽधमता मन्तव्या–क्रमेण दुःखं वर्धते, यावदुत्कृष्टं नारकदुःखम् । यथा चापथ्यत्यागात् क्रमेणारोग्यवृद्धिः, तथा क्रमेण पापस्यापकर्षात् सुखस्य वृद्धिः, यावदुत्कृष्टं सुरसौख्यम् । यथा चापथ्याहारस्य सर्वथा परित्यागात् परमारोग्यमुपजायते, एवं सर्वपापक्षये मोक्ष इति ॥३६२॥ (१९१०)

D. C.—Those, who believe that there exists *pāpa* alone, and nothing like *puṇya*, put forward the same argument but in a reverse manner. According to them, just as disease develops with the increase in unwholesome diet, vileness in the form of miseries etc., also increases with the eminence of sins, leading ultimately to the agony of hell On the other hand, when the unwholesome food is being gradually given up, there is a gradual recovery of health.

Similarly by the gradual diminution of sins there is a gradual re-generation of happiness leading ultimately to Salvation. Lastly, just as complete health is regained at the complete abandonment of the unwholesome food, there is complete attainment of *mokṣa* when the sins are completely removed. ॥ 362 ॥ (1910).

Now, a third belief that *puṇya* and *pāpa* exist as *sādhāraṇa*, is explained :—

साहारणवण्णादि व अह साहारणमहेगमत्ताए ।
उक्करिसा–वगरिसओ तस्सेव य पुण्णपावक्खा ॥३६३(१९११)

Sāhāraṇavaṇṇādi va aha sāhāraṇamahegamattāe ।
Ukkarisā–vagarisao tasseva ya puṇṇapāvakkhā ॥ 363 ॥ (1911)

[साधारणवर्णादीवाथ साधारणमथैकमात्रया ।
उत्कर्षा–ऽपकर्षतस्तस्यैव च पुण्यपापाख्या ॥ ३६३ ॥ (१९११)

Sādhāraṇavarṇādîvātha sādhāraṇamathaikamātrayā ।
Utkarsā–'pakarṣatastasyaiva ca puṇyapāpākhyā ॥ 363 ॥ (1911)]

Trans.—363 Like joint–syllables etc, (*puṇya* and *pāpa*) are combined with each other as one. And, by reason of eminence or diminution of it, it is known as *puṇya* or *pāpa* (respectively). (1911)

टीका–" अह साहारणमिति " अथ साधारणं संकीर्णपुण्यपापाख्यं वस्तु भाव्यत इत्यर्थः । कथंभूतं पुनरिदमवगन्तव्यम् ? इत्याह–" साहारणवण्णादि व त्ति " यथा साधारणं तुल्यं हरितालगुलिकादीनामन्यतरन्मीलितं वर्णकद्वयम् ; आदिशब्दाद् यथामेचकमणिः, नरसिंहादिर्वा, तथेदमपि पुण्यपापाख्यं संकीर्णमेकं वस्त्वित्यर्थः । ननु यद्येकं वस्त्विदम्, तर्हि पुण्यं पापं चेति परस्परविरोधिवस्तुविषयमाख्याद्वयं कथं लभते ? इत्याह–" अहेगमत्ताए इत्यादि " अथ तस्यैवैकस्य संकीर्णपुण्यपापाख्यस्य वस्तुन एकया पुण्यमात्रया–एकेन पुण्यांशेनेत्यर्थः, उत्कर्षतो वृद्धौ सत्यां पुण्याख्या प्रवर्तते; एकया तु पापमात्रया–एकेन पापांशेनेत्यर्थः, उत्कर्षतो वृद्धौ सत्यां पापाख्या प्रवर्तते । अपकर्षेऽपि पुण्यांशस्य पापाख्या प्रवर्तते, पापांशस्य त्वपकर्षे पुण्याख्या प्रवर्तत इति ॥३६३ ॥ (१९११)

D. C.– The theory is that *pāpa* and *puṇya* are not separate entities, but they are infused with each other as one like the two syllables joined together as one. Like a base metal of *haritāla* or *indigo*, wherein there is always one object mixed with two colours or like, the *Mecaka* jewel or *Narasinha* etc,

puṇya-pāpa is also a mixed entity. Here, if some one raises the doubt that if it is one single entity, why is it known by two names–*pāpa* and *puṇya* ? The answer laid down by them is this :—On account of the increase in the constituent *puṇya* of the *puṇya-pāpa* entity, the name *puṇya* is given, while with the diminution of the constituent *puṇya*, the entity is called *pāpa*.

Similarly, when there is predominance of the element of *pāpa* it is called *pāpa* and vice versa. So, *puṇya-pāpa* is one and only one entity and does not exist separately. ॥363॥ (1911)

Now, with regard to the remaining two theories, it has been laid down as follows:—

एवं चिय दो भिन्नाइं होज्ज, होज्ज व सभावओ चेव ।
भवसंभूई, भण्णइ न सभावाओ जओऽभिमओ ॥३६४॥(१९१२)

होज्ज सहावो वत्थुं निक्कारणया व वत्थुधम्मो वा ? ।
जइ वत्थुं णत्थि तओऽणुवलद्धीओ खपुप्फं व ॥३६५॥(१९१३)

Evam ciya do bhinnāim hojja, hojja va sabhāvao ceva ।
Bhavasaṃbhūî, bhaṇṇaî na sabhāvāo jao'bhimao ॥ 364 ॥ (1912)

Hojja sahāvo vatthum nikkāranayā va vatthudhammo vā ? ।
Jai vatthuṃ natthi tao'nuvaladdhîo khapuppham va ॥365॥ (1913)

[एवमेव द्वे भिन्ने भवेतां, भवेद् वा स्वभावत एव ।
भवसंभूतिः, भण्यते न स्वभावाद् यतोऽभिमतः ॥ ३६४ ॥ (१९१२)

भवेत् स्वभावो वस्तु निष्कारणता वा वस्तुधर्मो वा ? ।
यदि वस्तु नास्ति सकोऽनुपलब्धेः खपुष्पमिव ॥ ३६५ ॥ (१९१३)

Evameva dve bhinne bhavetām, bhaved vā svabhāvata eva ।
Bhavasaṃbhūtiḥ, bhaṇyate na svabhāvād yato'bhimataḥ ॥ 364 ॥

Bhavet svabhāvo vastu niṣkāraṇatā vā vastudharmo vā ? ।
Yadi vastu nāsti sako'nupalabdheḥ khapuṣpamiva ॥365॥ (1913)]

Trans.—364–365 Similarly, (some would believe that) both are different (from each other), or that the production of the mundane world would be due to (nothing else but its) *svabhāva* only. (In reply to that), it is said that (the production of the mundane world) by virtue of (its) *svabhāva*, is not believable. And, Is that *svabhāva* a (definite) object ? or causelessness (itself) ? or the property of an object ? If (it is taken as) an object, it is not (an object), because it is non-apprehensible like a *kha-puspa* (1912–1913)

टीका–एवमेव केषाञ्चिद् मतेन द्वे अपि भिन्ने स्वतन्त्रे स्यातां पुण्य-पापे, तत्कार्यभूतयोः सुख–दुःखयोर्यौगपद्येनानुभवाभावात्। अतोऽनेनैव भिन्न-कार्यदर्शनेन तत्कारणभूतयोः पुण्य–पापयोर्भिन्नताऽनुमीयत इति। " होज्ज वेत्यादि " अथवा स्वभावत एव विनापि पुण्य–पापाभ्यां भवसंभूतिः–भव-वैचित्र्यस्य संभवः कैश्चिदिष्यते। तदेवं दर्शिताः पञ्चापि पुण्य–पापविषया विकल्पाः। एतैश्च भ्रमितमनोभिः संशयो न कर्तव्यः, एकस्यैव चतुर्थविकल्प-स्यादेयत्वात्, शेषाणां चानादेयत्वात्। अत एव प्रत्यासत्तिन्यायमङ्गीकृत्य पञ्चमविकल्पं तावद् दूषयितुमाह–" भण्णईत्यादि " भण्यतेऽत्रोत्तरम्–न स्वभावतो भवसंभूतिः, यतः स्वभावो वस्तुरूपो वाभिमतो भवेदिति द्वितीय-गाथायां संबन्धः, निष्कारणता वा, वस्तुधर्मो वा स्वभावोऽभिमतो भवेत् ? इति त्रयो विकल्पाः। तत्र यदि वस्तुरूपोऽयमिति प्रथमो विकल्पः तर्हि तकोऽसौ स्वभावो नास्ति, अनुपलम्भात्, खपुष्पवदिति ॥ ३६४–३६५ ॥ (१९१२–१९१३)

D. C.—According to some, *puṇya* and *pāpa* are independent of each other, because *sukha* and *duḥkha* which are their respective *kāryas* or consequences are not experienced at one and the same time. So, when *kāryas* are found to be independent of each other, their respective causes should also be independent of each other by *anumāna*.

Finally, there is one more theory that the expansion of this mundane world is not due to *Karmas* known as *pāpa* nad

puṇya but on account of its own *svabhāva*. According to this theory, there is nothing like *Karma*.

Your doubt has sprung up from five different opinions stated above. But that is not justifiable. For, out of those five theories, none except the fourth one is acceptible. The expansion of *bhava* by means of its *svabhāva* as laid down in the fifth theory, is also not acceptible. Because, in that case, *svabhāva* should either be a definite object (*vastu*) or causelessness (*niṣkāraṇatā*), or the property of a definite object (*vastu-dharma*). Since *svabhāva* is absolutely imperceptible like a *kha-puṣpa*, it can never exist as a definite object. ॥ 364-365 ॥ (1912-1913)

Then,

अच्चंतमणुवलद्धो वि अह तओ अत्थि नत्थि किं कम्मं ?।
हेऊ व तदत्थित्ते जो णणु कम्मस्स वि स एव ॥३६६॥(१९१४)

कम्मस्स वाभिहाणं होज्ज सभावो त्ति होउ को दोसो ?।
पइनिययागाराओ न य सो कत्ता घडस्सेव ॥३६७॥ (१९१५)

मुत्तो अमुत्तो व तओ जइ मुत्तो तोऽभिहाणओ भिन्नो।
कम्म त्ति सहावो त्ति य जइ वाऽमुत्तो न कत्ता तो ॥३६८॥(१९१६)

देहाणं वोमं पिव, जुत्ता कज्जाइओ य मुत्तिमया।
अह सो निक्कारणया तो खरसिंगादओ होंतु ॥ ३६९ ॥(१९१७)

अह वत्थुणो स धम्मो परिणामो तो स कम्म-जीवाणं।
पुन्ने-ऽयराभिहाणो कारण-कज्जाणुमेओ सो ॥ ३७० ॥ (१९१८)

किरियाणं कारणओ देहाईणं च कज्जभावाओ।
कम्मं मदभिहियं ति य पडिवज्ज तमग्गिभूइ व ॥३७१॥ (१९१९)

तं चिय देहाईणं किरियाणं पि य सुभा–ऽसुभत्ताओ ।
पडिवज्ज पुण्णपावं सहावओ भिन्नजाईयं ॥ ३७२ ॥ (१९२०)

Accantamaṇuvaladdho vi aha tao atthi natthi kim kammam ? ।
Heū va tadatthitte jo naṇu kammassa vi sa eva ॥ 366 ॥ (1914)

Kammassa vābhihāṇam hojja sabhāvo tti höu ko doso ।
Painiyayāgārāo na ya so kattā ghaḍasseva ॥ 367 ॥ (1915)

Mutto amutto va tao jai mutto to'bhihāṇao bhinno ।
Kamma tti sahāvo tti ya jai vā'mutto na kattā to ॥368॥ (1916)

Dehāṇam vomam piva, juttā kajjāio ya muttimayā ।
Aha so nikkāranayā to kharasingādao hontu ॥ 369 ॥ (1917)

Aha vatthuṇo sa dhammo parināmo to sa kamma–jîvāṇam ।
Punne–yarābhihāṇo kāraṇa–kajjānumeo so ॥ 370 ॥ (1918)

Kiriyānam kāranao dehāînam ca kajjabhāvāo ।
Kammam madabhihiyam ti ya padivajja tamaggibhūi vva ॥ 371 ॥

Tam ciya dehāîṇam kiriyāṇam pi ya subhā–'subhattāo ।
Padivajja puṇṇapāvam sahāvao bhinnajāîyam ॥ 372 ॥ (1920)

[अत्यन्तमनुपलब्धोऽप्यथ सकोऽस्ति नास्ति किं कर्म ।
हेतुर्वा तदस्तित्वे यो ननु कर्मणोऽपि स एव ॥ ३६६ ॥ (१९१४)

कर्मणो वाभिधानं भवेत् स्वभाव इति भवतु को दोषः ? ।
प्रतिनियताकाराद् न च स कर्ता घटस्येव ॥ ३६७ ॥ (१९१५)

मूर्तोऽमूर्तो वा सको यदि मूर्तस्ततोऽभिधानतो भिन्नः ।
कर्मेति स्वभाव इति च यदि वाऽमूर्तो न कर्ता ततः ॥३६८॥ (१९१६)

देहानां व्योमेव, युक्ता कार्यादितश्च मूर्तिमत्ता ।
अथ स निष्कारणता ततः खरशृङ्गादयो भवन्तु ॥ ३६९ ॥ (१९१७)

अथ वस्तुनः स धर्मः परिणामस्ततः स कर्म–जीवयोः ।
पुण्ये–तराभिधानः कारण–कार्यानुमेयः सः ॥ ३७० ॥ (१९१८)

क्रियाणां कारणतो देहादीनां च कार्यभावात् ।
कर्म मदभिहितमिति च प्रतिपद्यस्व त्वमग्निभूतिरिव ॥३७१॥ (१९१९)

तदेव देहादीनां क्रियाणामपि च शुभा–ऽशुभत्वात् ।
प्रतिपद्यस्व पुण्य–पापे स्वभावतो भिन्नजातीये ॥ ३७२ ॥(१९२०)

Atyantamanupalabdho'pyatha sako'sti nāsti kim karma ।
Hetur–va tadastitve yo nanu karmaṇo'pi sa eva ॥ 366 ॥ (1914)

Karmaṇo vābhidhānam bhavet svabhāva iti bhavatu ko doṣaḥ ? ।
Pratiniyatākārād na ca sa kartā ghaṭasyeva ॥ 367 ॥ (1915)

Mūrto'mūrto vā sako yadi mūrtastato'bhidhānato bhinnaḥ ।
Karmeti svabhāva iti ca yadi vā'mūrto na kartā tataḥ ॥368॥ (1916)

Dehānām vyomeva, yuktā kāryāditaśca mūrtimaṭṭā ।
Atha sa niṣkāraṇatā tataḥ kharaśriṅgādayo bhavantu ॥369॥ (1917)

Atha vastunaḥ sa dharmaḥ pariṇāmastataḥ sa karma–jîvayoḥ ।
Puṇye–tarābhidhānaḥ kāraṇa kāryānumeyaḥ sa ॥ 370 ॥ (1918)

Kriyāṇām kāraṇato dehādînām ca kāryabhāvāt ।
Karma madabhihitamiti ca pratipadyasva tvamagnibhūtiriva ॥371॥

Tadeva dehādînām kriyānāmapi ca śubhā'–śubhatvāt ।
Pratipadyasva puṇya–pāpe svabhāvato bhinnajātîye ॥372॥ (1920)]

Trans.—366–372 If it is extremely non–perceptible, why is it called *svabhāva* and not *Karma ?* The *hetu* that works in the existence of *svabhāva*, works in case of *Karma* also. Or, what harm is there in taking *svabhāva* as the synonym of *karma ?* And since it has a definite shape like *ghaṭa*, it cannot be a doer just as sky is not (the doer of) bodies. (For), the corporeal nature is justified on account of (its) being *kārya* etc. Now, if that *(svabhāva)* were causelessness (itself), non–existent (objects like) *kharaśṛnga* etc, would come into existence. If it is (taken as) the property of a (definite) object, then it would turn out to be the effect of *Karma* and *jîva,* and would be inferred as *puṇya* and *pāpa* by

means of *kārya* and *kāraṇa*. So, like *Agnibhūti*, you, too, (shall have to) accept (the existence of) *Karma* on account of actions as well as *Kāryas* (in the form of *deha* etc.,) and since *Karma* itself is the cause of good or bad (in case of *deha* etc.), as well as other performances, admit *puṇya* and *pāpa* as belonging to different species by their very *svabhāva* (1914–1920)

टीका–एताश्च गाथाः प्रायोऽग्निभूतिगणधरवादे व्याख्याता एव, सुगमाश्च। नवरं " कारण–कज्जाणुमेओ सो त्ति " स च जीव–कर्मणोः पुण्य–पापाभिधानः परिणामः कारणेन कार्येण चाऽनुमीयते–कारणानुमानात् कार्यानुमानाच्च गम्यत इत्यर्थ। एतदेवानुमानद्वयमाह–"किरियाणं कारणओ इत्यादि" दानादिक्रियाणां हिंसादिक्रियाणां च कारणत्वात् कारणरूपत्वादस्ति तत्फलभूतस्तत्कार्यरूपपुण्य–पापात्मको जीव–कर्मपरिणामः, यथा कृष्यादिक्रियाणां शालि–यव–गोधूमादिकम्; उक्तं च—

" समासु तुल्यं विषमासु तुल्यं सतीष्वसच्चाप्यसतीषु सच्च।
फलं क्रियास्वित्यथ यन्निमित्तं तद् देहिनां सोऽस्ति नु कोऽपि धर्मः ॥१॥"

एतत् कारणानुमानम्। " देहाईणमित्यादि " देहादीनां कारणमस्ति, कार्यरूपत्वात् तेषाम्, यथा घटस्य मृद्–दण्ड–चक्र–चीवरादिसामग्रीकलितः कुलालः। न च वक्तव्यम्–दृष्ट एव माता–पित्रादिकस्तेषां हेतुः, दृष्टहेतुसाम्येऽपि सुरूपे–तरादिभावेन देहादीनां वैचित्र्यदर्शनात्, तस्य चादृष्टकर्माख्यहेतुमन्तरेणाभावात्। अत एव पुण्य–पापभेदेन कर्मणो द्वैविध्यम्, शुभदेहादीनां पुण्यकार्यत्वात्, इतरेषां तु पापफलत्वात्; उक्तं च

" इह दृष्टहेत्वसंभविकार्यविशेषात् कुलालयत्न इव।
हेत्वन्तरमनुमेयं तत् कर्म शुभा–ऽशुभं कर्तुः ॥ १ ॥ "

एतत् कार्यानुमानम्। तथा, मदभिहितमिति च कृत्वाऽग्निभूतिवत् त्वमपि कर्म प्रतिपद्यस्व, सर्वज्ञवचनप्रामाण्यादित्यर्थः। तदपि पुण्य–पापविभागेन विभक्तं प्रतिपद्यस्व, देहादीनां तत्कार्याणां क्रियाणां च तत्कारणभूतानां शुभा–ऽशुभत्वेन तद्द्वैविध्यदर्शनादिति ॥ ३६६–३७२ ॥ (१९१४–१९२०)

D. C—These verses have already been explained in details in the Second *Gaṇadhara—vāda.*† The only point to remember in this connection is that *puṇya* and *pāpa*, the *pariṇama* of *Jîva* and *Karma*, could be inferred from *kāraṇa* and *kārya*.

These two inferences are explained as follows:—

(1) *Kāraṇānumāna*:—Just as in case of working of agriculture, rice, barley, and wheat etc. are reaped as crops (*Kāryas*) at the end, *puṇya* and *pāpa* are also reaped as the *pariṇāmas* of *Jîva* and *Karma* with actions like munificence etc. or violence etc. as their respective causes.

It is, therefore, said that–

" Samāsu tulyam viṣamāsu tulyam satîṣvasaccāpyasatīṣu sacca |
Phalam kriyāsvityatha yannimittam tad dehînām so'stinuko'pi dharmaḥ ॥ "

(2) *Kāryānumāna* .—Just as a potter accompanied by the materials such as earth, stick, wheel etc. happens to be the *Kāraṇa* of *ghata*, so also in case of *Kāryas* like *s'arîra* etc. there is some cause or the other. The cause in this case, is nothing but *puṇya* and *pāpa* in the form of good and bad deeds. In the production of *kāryas* like *s'arîra* etc., parents are no doubt visible causes, but along with them there are invisible causes in the form of good or bad deeds also. Otherwise, ugliness or fairness in various forms—in spite of their *dṛṣṭa hetu, viz*, parents being the same—would never be accounted for. The *karma* therefore has two types :–*Puṇya* and *pāpa*. Good forms are the results of *puṇya* and ugly ones are the results of *pāpa*. Hence it is said :—

" Iha dṛṣṭahetvasaṃbhavikāryaviśeṣāt kulālayatna iva |
Hetvantaramanumeyam tat Karma śubhā'–śubham kartuḥ ॥ "

So, like *Agnibhūti*, you, too, shall have to accept the existence of *Karma* putting faith into the words of me—the

† Vide pp. 86 to 137

omniscient. You shall also have to take it for certain that *Karma* is divided as *puṇya* and *pāpa*, causing a variety of forms in *deha* etc. ॥ 366-372 ॥ (1914-1920)

The existence of *puṇya* and *pāpa* could be established in a different way :—

सुह-दुक्खाणं कारणमणुरूवं कज्जभावओऽवस्सं ।
परमाणवो घडस्स व कारणमिह पुण्ण-पावाइं ॥३७३॥(१९२१)

Suha-dukkhāṇam kāraṇamaṇurūvam kajjabhāvao'vassam ।
Paramāṇavo ghaḍassa va kāraṇamiha puṇṇa-pāvāim ॥373॥ (1921)

[सुख-दुःखयोः कारणमनुरूपं कार्यभावतोऽवश्यम् ।
परमाणवो घटस्येव कारणमिह पुण्यपापे ॥ ३७३ ॥ (१९२१)

Sukha-duḥkhayoḥ kāraṇamanurūpam kāryabhāvato'vaśyam ।
Paramāṇavo ghaṭasyeva kāraṇamiha puṇya-pāpe ॥373॥ (1921)]

Trans.—373 Just as molecules (which act as) the cause of *ghaṭa* resemble *ghaṭa*, in the same way, happiness and misery, the *Kāryas* have also their *kāraṇa viz, puṇya* and *pāpa*, similar, to them. (1921)

टीका-अस्त्यवश्यं सुख-दुःखयोरनुरूपं कारणम्, कार्यत्वात् तयोः, यच्चेह कार्यं तस्यानुरूपं कारणं भवत्येव, यथा घटस्य परमाणवः, तच्च तयोरिहानुरूपं कारणं, सुखस्य पुण्यं, दुःखस्य तु पापमिति ॥ ३७३ ॥ (१९२१)

D. C.—Since *kāraṇa* is similar to *Kārya*, the small particles of earth which make *ghaṭa* resemble *ghaṭa*, and *puṇya* and *pāpa* which are the *kāraṇa* of *sukha* and *duḥkha* would resemble *sukha* and *duḥkha*. ॥ 373 ॥ (1921)

The opponent may now, raise the objection as follows :—

सुह-दुक्खकारणं जइ कम्मं कज्जस्स तदणुरूवं च ।
पत्तमरूवं तं पि हु अह रूविं नाणुरूवं तो ॥ ३७४ ॥ (१९२२)

Suha-duhkhakāraṇam jai kammam kajjassa tadaṇurūvam ca ।
Pattamarūvam tam pi hu aha rūvim nāṇurūvam to ॥374॥ (1922)

[सुख-दुःखकारणं यदि कर्म कार्यस्य तदनुरूपं च ।
प्राप्तमरूपं तदपि खल्वथ रूपि नानुरूपं ततः ॥ ३७४ ॥ (१९२२)

Sukha-duḥkhakāraṇam yadi karma kāryasya tadanurūpam ca ।
Prāptamarūpam tadapi khalvatha rūpi nānurūpam tataḥ ॥374॥]

Trans.—374 If *karma* (were known as) the cause of happiness and misery, and if *Kārya* (were taken as) similar to it, then, that *(i. e. karma)* also would certainly become formless, and if corporeal, it would not resemble (the *Kārya*). (1922)

टीका-ननु यदि सुख-दुःखयोः पुण्य-पापात्मकं कर्म कारणम्, तच्च यदि कार्यस्य सुख-दुःखरूपस्यानुरूपं सदृशमिष्यते, तर्हि सुख-दुःखयोरात्मपरिणामत्वेनारूपत्वात् तदपि पुण्य-पापात्मकं कर्म तदनुरूपतयाऽरूपं प्राप्नोति । अथ रूपवत्, तर्हि नानुरूपं तत्, मूर्तत्वेन विलक्षणत्वादिति ॥ ३७४ ॥ (१९२२)

D. C.—If *Karma* composed of *puṇya* and *pāpa* is accepted as the *Kāraṇa* of *sukha* and *duhkha*, and if *sukha* and *duḥkha* are taken as similar to the *Karma*, *Karma*, which in fact is corporeal, would become formless like *sukha* and *duḥkha*.

On the other hand, if it is taken as corporeal, it will not resemble its *kārya, viz, sukha* and *duḥkha* which are incorporeal. ॥ 374 ॥ (1922)

Then, the *Tîrthaṅkara Bhagavān* replies :—

न हि सव्वहाणुरूवं भिन्नं वा कारणं, अह मयं ते ।
किं कज्ज-कारणत्तणमहवा वत्थुत्तणं तस्स ? ॥३७५॥ (१९२३)

Na hi savvahāṇurūvam bhinnam, vā kāraṇam, aha mayam te ।
Kim kajja-kāraṇattaṇamahavā vatthuttaṇam tassa ? ॥375॥ (1923)

[न हि सर्वथानुरूपं भिन्नं वा कारणं, अथ मतं ते ।
किं कार्य-कारणत्वमथवा वस्तुत्वं तस्य ? ॥ ३७५ ॥ (१९२३)

Na hi sarvathānurūpam bhinnam vā kāraṇam, atha matam te ।
Kim kārya-kāraṇatvamathavā vastutvam tasya ? ॥ 375 ॥ (1923)]

Trans.—375 The *kāraṇa* is neither similar nor dissimilar (to the *kārya*) in all respects. Then, you might contend that " How is its being a *kārya, kāraṇa* or a (definite) object (justified) ? (1923)

टीका-न हि सर्वथा कार्यानुरूपं कारणमिष्यते, येन सुख-दुःखवत् कर्मणोऽप्यरूपत्वं प्रेर्यते। नाप्येकान्तेन सर्वधर्मैः कारणं कार्याद्भिन्नमेष्टव्यम्। " अह मयं ते त्ति " अथ ते तवैतद् मतम्-एकान्तेन सर्वैरपि धर्मैः कारणं कार्यानुरूपमेव, भिन्नं वाऽनुरूपमेवेतिः तर्हि सर्वथाऽनुरूपत्व एकस्य कारणत्वेऽपरस्यापि कारणत्वात्, एकस्य च कार्यत्वेऽन्यस्यापि कार्यत्वात् किं तयोः कार्य-कारणत्वम् ? न किञ्चित्, द्वयोरपिकारणत्वात्, कार्यत्वाद् वेति । अथैकान्तभेदेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने कार्यस्य वस्तुत्वे किं नाम तस्य कारणस्य वस्तुत्वम् ? न किञ्चित्, द्वयोरपि वस्तुत्वे सर्वथा भेदहानिप्रसङ्गादिति। तस्माद् नैकान्तेनानुरूपता, अननुरूपता वा कार्य-कारणयोः ॥ ३७५ ॥ (१९२३)

D. C.—*Kāraṇa* is neither absolutely similar nor absolutely dissimilar to the *Kāryas*. So, *Karma* cannot be called formless like its *Kārya viz, sukha* and *duḥkha*.

Your doubt is based on your assumption that *kāraṇa* is exclusively similar or dissimilar to the *kārya*. But you are not justified in your assumption. For, if *Kāraṇa* were absolutely similar to *Kārya*, it would turn out to be the *kāraṇa* of some other *Kārya* also.

Similarly, a *kārya* taken as similar to a *kāraṇa* in all respects, would also become the *Kārya* of another *kāraṇa*. Consequently, there will be no distinction between *Kārya* and *kāraṇa*, and both would either become *kāraṇa* or *kārya*.

Since there is no difference between *kārya* being a definite

object and a *kāraṇa* being a definite object, the exclusive difference between the two would also be out of place. Hence, *Kārya* and *kāraṇa* are neither absolutely similar nor absolutely dissimilar to each other, but comparatively equal or unequal to each other. ॥ 375 ॥ (1923)

The author states in objection to this and to its reply :—

सव्वं तुल्लातुल्लं जइ तो कज्जाणुरूवया केयं ? ।
जं सोम्म ! सपज्जाओ कज्जं परपज्जओ सेसो ॥ ३७६ ॥(१९२४)

Savvam tullātullam jaí to kajjāṇurūvayā keyam ? ।
Jam Somma ! sapajjāo kajjam parapajjao seso ॥ 376 ॥ (1924)

[सर्वं तुल्या-ऽतुल्यं यदि ततः कार्यानुरूपता केयम् ? ।
यत् सौम्य ! स्वपर्यायः कार्यं परपर्ययः शेषः ॥ ३७६ ॥ (१९२४)

Sarvam tulyā'-tulyam yadi tataḥ kāryānurūpatā keyam ? ।
Yat Saumya ! svaparyāyaḥ kāryam paraparyayaḥ śeṣaḥ ॥376॥(1924]

Trans.—376 "If everything is comparatively equal or unequal, then, in what way is *Kārya* similar (to *kāraṇa*) ? " For, *O Saumya ! Kārya* is the synonym and the rest autonym. (1924)

टीका—न केवलं कार्य-कारणे एव तुल्या-ऽतुल्यरूपे, किन्तु सकलमपि त्रिभुवनान्तर्गतं वस्तु परस्परं तुल्या-ऽतुल्यरूपमेव, न पुनः किञ्चित् कस्याप्येकान्तेन तुल्यमतुल्यं वा । लब्धावकाशः परः प्राह—" जईत्यादि " यद्येवम्, ततः केयं कार्यानुरूपता कारणस्य विशेषतोऽन्विष्यते, येनोच्यते—" सुह-दुक्खाणं कारणमणुरूवं " इत्यादि ? । यदि हि किञ्चिदेकान्तेनानुरूपं स्यात् तदेत्थं वक्तुं युज्यते, यदा त्वेकान्ततो न किञ्चिदनुरूपम्, नाप्यननुरूपम्; किन्तु सर्वं सर्वेण तुल्या-ऽतुल्यरूपमेव, तदा किमनेन विशेषेण ? । अत्रोच्यते—" जमित्यादि " सौम्य ! तुल्या-ऽतुल्यत्वे सर्वगतेऽपि यद् यस्माद् कारणस्य कार्यं स्वपर्यायः, तस्मात् कारणं कार्यस्येहानुरूपमुच्यते, शेषस्त्वकार्यरूपः सर्वोऽपि पदार्थः कारणस्य परपर्यायः, इति

तं प्रति विवक्षितं कारणमसमानरूपमभिधीयते। आह–ननु कथं प्रस्तुते सुख–दुःखे कारणस्य स्वपर्यायः ? । उच्यते–जीव–पुण्यसंयोगः सुखस्य कारणम्, तस्य च सुखं पर्याय एव, दुःखस्यापि जीव–पापसंयोगः कारणम्, अतस्तस्यापि दुःखं पर्याय एव, यथा च सुखं शुभं, कल्याणं, शिवमित्यादीन् व्यपदेशाँल्लभते तथा तत्कारणभूतं पुण्यस्कन्धद्रव्यमपि; यथा च दुःखमशुभम्, अकल्याणम्, अशिवमित्यादिसंज्ञाः प्राप्नोति तथा तत्कारणभूतं पापद्रव्यमपि, इति विशेषतोऽत्र पुण्य–पापे–सुख–दुःखयोरनुरूपकारणत्वेनोक्ते इति ॥३७६॥ (१९२४)

D. C.—Bhagavān :—Not only *kārya* and *kāraṇa*, but all objects of the Universe, are relatively equal and unequal and no object is absolutely equal or absolutely unequal.

Acalabhrātā :—If it is so, then, why do you try to establish particularly the similarity between *kāraṇa* and *kārya* by saying that "*sukha* and *duḥkha* are similar to *kāraṇa* etc. ? Still, however, if some object is absolutely similar to another, it may be justified to say so. But when nothing is similar or dissimilar in all respects, and everything is relatively equal or unequal according to you, then, how could it be said that *Kāraṇa* was similar to *kārya* ?

Bhagavān :—In spite of all objects being relatively equal or unequal, *kārya* resembles *kāraṇa* because it is the synonym of *kāraṇa*, while other objects which are the autonyms of *kāraṇa* are dissimilar to it.

Hence in the present case, *sukha* and *duḥkha* are the synonyms of *Karma* the *kāraṇa*. The combination of *jîva* and *puṇya* is the cause of *sukha*, and that of *jîva* and *pāpa* is the cause of *duhkha*, just as *śiva*, *kalyāṇa*, *s'ubha* etc are the synonyms for *sukha*, the same are the synonyms for the *puṇya–karmas* also.

Similarly, *duḥkha* and its cause, the *pāpa–karmas*, have the same synonyms *viz*, *a–s'iva*, *a–kalyāṇa* and *a–s'ubha* etc.

It is in this way, *O Saumya !* that *puṇya* and *pāpa* are known as the *kāraṇas* resembling their *kāryas viz sukha* and *duḥkha.* ॥ 376 ॥ (1924)

The opponent may here ask as follows :—

किं जह मुत्तममुत्तस्स कारणं तह सुहाईणं कम्मं ।
दिट्ठं सुहाइकारणमन्नाइ जहेह तह कम्मं ? ॥३७७॥ (१९२५)

Kim jaha muttamamuttassa kāraṇam taha suhāîṇam kammam ।
Diṭṭham suhāikāraṇamannāi jaheha taha kammam ? ॥377॥(1925)

[किं यथा मूर्तममूर्तस्य कारणं तथा सुखादीनां कर्म ।
दृष्टं सुखादिकारणमन्नादि यथेह तथा कर्म ? ॥ ३७७ ॥ (१९२५)

Kim yathā mūrtamamūrtasya kāranam tathā sukhādînām karma ।
Dṛiṣṭam sukhādikāraṇamannādi yatheha tathā karma ? ॥ 377 ॥

Trans.—377 Is *Karma* the cause of *sukha* etc, as *mūrta* is the cause of *amūrta ?* (And) is *Karma* apprehended (as the cause) in the same way as food etc, are apprehended as the cause of happiness etc ? (1925)

टीका–किं यथा मूर्तं नीलादिकममूर्तस्य स्वप्रतिभासिज्ञानस्य कारणं हेतुस्तथा सुख–दुःखयोः पुण्य–पापात्मकं कर्मापि मूर्तमेव सत् कारणम्, यथा प्रत्यक्षत एव दृष्टमन्नादिकम्; आदिशब्दात् स्रक्–चन्दना–ऽङ्गना–ऽहि–विष–कण्टकादिकमिह सुख–दुःखयोमूर्तं तत् कारणं तद्वत् कर्मापि तयोरिति भावार्थः ? ॥ ३७७ ॥ (१९२५)

D. C.—Just as a gem, garland, sandal-paste, woman, serpent, or a poisonous sting becomes the *mūrta* cause of the *a-mūrta sukha* and *duḥkha,* should we accept *Karma* also whether good or bad-to be the *mūrta* and *pratyakṣa* cause like food etc. ? ॥ 377 ॥ (1925)

The answer is—

होउ तयं चिय किं कम्मणा, न जं तुल्लसाहणाणं पि ।
फलभेदओ सोऽवस्सं सकारणो कारणं कम्मं ॥३७८॥(१९२६)

Höu tayam ciya kim kammaṇā, na jam tullasāhaṇāṇam pi ।
Phalabhedao so'vassam sakāraṇo kāranam kammam ॥378॥ (1926)

[भवतु तदेव किं कर्मणा, न यत् तुल्यसाधनानामपि ।
फलभेदतः सोऽवश्यं सकारणः कारणं कर्म ॥ ३७८ ॥ (१९२६)

Bhavatu tadeva kim karmaṇā, na yat tulyasādhanānāmapi ।
Phalabhedataḥ so'vaśyam sa-kāraṇaḥ kāraṇam karma ॥378॥(1926)]

Trans.—378 (The opponent may argue further that). "Let that (*i. e.*, food etc.) be the cause of happiness etc." but what (is the use) of *Karma ?* That is proper. In spite of there being equal materials, the difference in results has certainly (some) reason which is (nothing but *Karma.*) (1926)

टीका–ननु तदेव दृष्टमन्नादिकं वस्तु तर्हि सुखादैः कारणमस्तु, किमदृष्टेन तेन कर्मणा परिकल्पितेन, अतिप्रसङ्गात् ? । तदेतद् न, यद् यस्मात् तुल्यान्यन्नादीनि साधनानि येषां ते तुल्यसाधनाः पुरुषास्तेषामपि फले सुखदुःखलक्षणे कार्यभेदः फलभेदो महान् दृश्यते, तुल्येऽप्यन्नादिने भुक्ते कस्याप्याह्लादः, अन्यस्य तु रोगाद्युत्पत्तिर्दृश्यत इत्यर्थः । यश्चेत्थं तुल्यान्नादिसाधनानामपि फलभेदः, सोऽवश्यमेव सकारणः, निष्कारणत्वे नित्यं सत्त्वाऽसत्त्वप्रसङ्गात् । यच्च तत्कारणं तददृष्टं कर्म, इति न तत्कल्पनाऽऽनर्थ्यमिति ॥ ३७८ ॥ (१९२६)

D. C.—Acalabhrātā:—Since food etc are directly apprehended, they could be taken as the causes of *sukha*, *duhkha*, but what is the purpose of assuming *Karma*, which is absolutely imperceptible to be the cause ?

Bhagavān:—Persons having the same *sādhanas* like *anna* etc are found to enjoy different *phalas* like *sukha* and *duḥkha*. In spite of their taking the same food, some people look glad

while others appear gloomy. This sort of *phala bheda* is significant and is due to good or bad *karma*. ॥ 378 ॥ (1926)

The *mūrtatā* of *Karma* is now explained as follows:—

एत्तो च्चिय तं मुत्तं मुत्तबलाहाणओ जहा कुंभो ।
देहाइकज्जमुत्ताइओ व्व भणिए पुणो भणइ ॥ ३७९ ॥ (१९२७)

Etto cciya tam muttam muttabalāhāṇao jahā kumbho ।
Dehāikajjamuttāio vva bhaṇie puṇo bhaṇai ॥ 379 ॥ (1927)

[एतस्मादेव तद् मूर्त्तं मूर्तबलाधानतो यथा कुम्भः ।
देहादिकार्यमूर्तादित इव भणिते पुनर्भणति ॥ ३७९ ॥ (१९२७)

Etasmādeva tad mūrtam mūrtabalādhānato yathā kumbhaḥ ।
Dehādikāryamūrtāditа iva bhaṇite punarbhaṇati ॥379॥ (1927)]

Trans.—379 On account of that reason, it is *mūrta* like *ghaṭa*, on account of its (capacity of) strengthening the body, or on account of the *kāryas* like *deha* etc. being *mūrta*. When thus told, he speaks again. (9127)

टीका–यत एव तुल्यसाधनानां कर्मनिबन्धनः फलभेदः, अत एवोच्यते–मूर्तं कर्म, मूर्तस्य देहादेर्बलाधानकारित्वात्, कुम्भवत्, यथा निमित्तमात्रभावित्वेन घटो देहादीनां बलमाधत्ते एवं कर्मापि, अतो मूर्तमित्यर्थः । अथवा, मूर्तं कर्म, मूर्तेन स्रक्–चन्दना–ऽङ्गनादिना तस्योपचयलक्षणस्य बलस्याधीयमानत्वात्, कुम्भवत्–यथा मूर्तत्वेन तैलादिना बलस्याधीयमानत्वात् कुम्भो मूर्तः, एवं स्रक्–चन्दनादिनोपचीयमानत्वात् कर्मांति मूर्तमिति भावः। यदिवा, मूर्तं कर्म, देहादेस्तत्कार्यस्य मूर्तत्वात्, परमाणुवत्–यथा घटादेस्तत्कार्यस्य मूर्तस्य दर्शनात् परमाणवो मूर्ताः, एवं देहादेस्तत्कार्यस्य मूर्तस्य दर्शनात् कर्मापि मूर्तमित्यर्थः। एवं भणिते पुनर्भणति परः ॥३७९॥ (१९२७)

D. C.—The *mūrtatva* of *Karmas* is explained in various ways–

1. Since the difference in *phalas* in case of those having the same *sādhanas* is due to *Karma*, the *karma* should be taken as *mūrta*.

2. *Karma* is *mūrta*, because like *ghata*, it strengthens the *kāryas* like body etc.

3. Just as *ghaṭa* is *mūrta*, because it is strengthened by the *mūrta* objects like oil, etc, *Karma* is also *mūrta*, because it is also nourished by the objects like flower-garlands and sandal-paste etc.

4. Just as the *pariṇāmas* of *ghaṭa* are *mūrta*, because *ghaṭa* is *mūrta*, the *karma* is also *mūrta*, because its *kāryas* like *s'arîra* etc are *mūrta*. ॥ 379 ॥ (1927)

When thus answered by the *Tîrthaṅkara*, the opponent argues again—

तो किं देहाईणं मुत्तत्तणओ तयं हवइ मुत्तं ।
अह सुह-दुक्खाईणं कारणभावादरूवं ति ? ॥३८०॥ (१९२८)

To kim dehāînam muttattaṇao tayam havai muttam ।
Aha suha-dukkhāînam kāraṇabhāvādarūvam ti ? ॥ 380 ॥ (1928)

[ततः किं देहादीनां मूर्तत्वतस्तद् भवति मूर्तम् ।
अथ सुख-दुःखादीनां कारणभावादरूपमिति ? ॥ ३८०॥ (१९२८)

Tataḥ kim dehādînām mūrtatvatastad bhavati mūrtam ।
Atha sukha-duḥkhādînām kāraṇabhāvādarūpamiti ? ॥380॥(1928)]

Trans.—380 Then does it become *mūrta* because of the corporeal nature, *deha* etc ? Or, is it incorporeal because of *sukha-duhkha* etc, (being incorporeal) ? (1928)

टीका-ततः किं देहादीनां कर्मकार्याणा मूर्तानां दर्शनात् तत् कर्म मूर्तं भवतु, आहोस्वित् सुख-दुःख-क्रोध-मानादीनां जीवपरिणामभूतानां तत्कार्याणाममूर्तानां दर्शनात् तत् कारणभावेनामूर्तमस्तु कर्म ? इत्येवं मूर्तत्वा-ऽमूर्तत्वाभ्यामुभयथापि तत्कार्यदर्शनात् किं मूर्तम्, अमूर्तं वा कर्म भवतु ? इति निवेद्यतामिति ॥ ३८० ॥ (१९२८)

D. C.—By accepting your argument, *Karma* will become

mūrta as well as *a-mūrta*. It will be *mūrta* because its *kāryas* like *deha* etc are *mūrta*. At the same time, it will be called *a-mūrta* also, because its *kāryas* and the *jîva-pariṇāmas* such as *sukha*, *duḥkha*, *krodha*, *māna* etc are *a-mūrta*. In such a case, should we take *Karma* as *mūrta* or *a-mūrta*? ॥380॥ (1928)

Bhagavān replies:—

न सुहाईणं हेऊ कम्मं चिय किन्तु ताण जीवो वि ।
होइ समवाइकारणमियरं कम्मं ति को दोसो ? ॥३८१॥(१९२९)

Na sahāîṇam heū kammam ciya kintu tāṇa jîvo vi ।
Höi samavāikāranamiyaram kammam ti ko doso ? ॥381॥ (1929)

[न सुखादीनां हेतुः कर्मैव किन्तु तेषां जीवोऽपि ।
भवति समवायिकारणमितरत् कर्मेति को दोषः ? ॥३८१॥ (१९२९)

Na sukhādîṇām hetuḥ karmaiva kintu tesām jîvo'pi ।
Bhavati samavāyikāraṇamitarat karme'ti ko doṣaḥ ? ॥381॥ (1929)]

Trans.—381 *Karma* is not the only cause of happiness etc, but *jîva* is also their intimate cause *Karma* is the opposite one. What difficulty will arise (in such a case) ? (1929)

टीका–सुखादीनां कर्मैव केवलं कारणं न भवति, किन्तु जीवोऽपि तेषां समवायिकारणं भवति, कर्म पुनरितरदसमवायिकारणं भवतीति को दोषः ? । इदमुक्तं भवति–सुखादेरमूर्त्तत्वेन समवायिकारणस्य जीवस्यामूर्त-त्वमस्त्येव, असमवायिकारणस्य तु कर्मणः सुखाद्यमूर्तत्वेनामूर्तत्वं न भवती-त्यपीति न दोष इति ॥ ३८१ ॥ (१९२९)

D. C.—*Karma* is not the only cause of *sukha*, *duḥkha* etc. Really speaking, *Jîva* is the intimate cause of *sukha* etc and *Karma* is merely an accidental cause. Hence, on account of the *a-mūrtatva* of the *kāryas*, *viz sukh*, *duḥkha* etc their intimate cause *viz jiva* does become *a-mūrta* but *Kārma* being merely an accidantal cause does not become *a-mūrta*. So, there will be no difficulty as regards *karma* being accepted as *mūrta*. ॥381॥(1929)

Now, refuting the first assertion that the abundance of miseries is due to the diminution of *puṇya*, the author states—

इय रूवित्ते सुह–दुक्खकारणत्ते य कम्मुणो सिद्धे ।
पुण्णावगरिसमेत्तेण दुक्खबहुलत्तणमजुत्तं ॥ ३८२ ॥ (१९३०)

Iya rūvitte suha–dukkha kāranatte ya kammuṇo siddhe।
Puṇṇāvagarisametteṇa dukkhabahulattanamajuttam ॥382॥ (1930)

[इति रूपित्वे सुख–दुःखकारणत्वे च कर्मणः सिद्धे ।
पुण्यापकर्षमात्रेण दुःखबहुलत्वमयुक्तम् ॥ ३८२ ॥ (१९३०)

Iti rūpitve sukha–duḥkhakāraṇatve ca karmaṇaḥ siddhe ।
Puṇyāpakarṣamātreṇa duḥkhabahulatvamayuktam ॥382॥ (1930)]

Trans.—382 When *Karma* is proved to be *mūrta* and (at the same time) established as the cause of *sukha–duḥkha* (the theory that) the abundance of miseries is due to the diminution of virtuous actions, will fail. (1930)

टीका–इत्येवं पञ्चविकल्पोपन्यस्तस्वभाववादनिरासेन पुण्य–पापात्मकस्य कर्मणः सुख–दुःखकारणत्वे रूपित्वे च सिद्धे पुण्यापकर्षमात्रेण यद् दुःखबहुलत्वं प्रथमविकल्पोपन्यासे प्रोक्तं तदयुक्तमिति ॥ ३८२ ॥ (१९३०)

D. C.—Now that the theory of *svabhāva* has been refuted and the existence of a *mūrta karma* as the cause of *sukha* and *duḥkha*, has been established we can easily refute the theory that the abundance of miseries is caused by the diminution of *puṇyas* ॥ 382 ॥ (1930)

कम्मप्पगरिसजणियं तदवस्सं पगरिसाणुभूईओ ।
सोक्खप्पगरिसभूई जह पुण्णप्पगरिसप्पभवा ॥३८३॥ (१९३१)

Kammappagarisajaṇiyam tadavassam pagarisānubhūîo ।
Sokhhappagarisabhūi jaha puṇṇappagarisappabhavā ॥383॥ (1931)

[कर्मप्रकर्षजनितं तदवश्यं प्रकर्षानुभूतेः ।
सौख्यप्रकर्षभूतिर्यथा पुण्यप्रकर्षप्रभवा ॥ ३८३ ॥ (१९३१)

Karmaprakarṣajanitam tadavaśyam prakarṣānubhūteḥ ।
Saukhyaprakarṣabhūtiryathā puṇyaprakarṣaprabhavā ॥ 383 ॥

Trans.—383 Just as the experience of the abundance of happiness is caused by the abudance of virtuous actions, the experience of the abundance of miseries is also produced by the abundance of sinful actions. (1931)

टीका–तद् दुःखबहुलत्वं पुण्यापकर्षजनितं न भवति, किन्तु स्वानुरूपकर्मप्रकर्षजनितम्, प्रकर्षानुभूतित्वात्–वेदनाप्रकर्षानुभवरूपत्वादिति हेतुः, यथा सौख्यप्रकर्षानुभूतिः स्वानुरूपकर्मप्रकर्षप्रभवेति दृष्टान्तः ॥ ३८३ ॥ (१९३१)

D. C.—Abundance of miseries is not due to the want of virtuous actions but it is due to the abundance of sinful actions, just as abundance of happiness is due to abundance of virtuous deeds, and not due to the diminution of sinful deeds. ॥ 383 ॥ (1931)

Moreover,

तह बज्झसाहणप्पगरिसंगभावादिहण्णहा न तयं ।
विवरीयबज्झसाहणबलप्पगरिसं अवेक्खेज्जा ॥ ३८४ ॥ (१९३२)

Taha bajjhasāhaṇappagarisangabhāvādihaṇṇahā na tayam ।
Vivarîyabajjhasāhaṇabalappagarisam avekkhejjā ॥ 384 ॥ (1932)

[तथा बाह्यसाधनप्रकर्षाङ्गभावादिहान्यथा न तत् ।
विपरीतबाह्यसाधनबलप्रकर्षमपेक्षेत ॥ ३८४ ॥ (१९३२)

Tathā bāhyasādhanaprakarṣāngabhāvādihānyathā na tat ।
Viparîtabāhyasādhanabalaprakarṣamapekṣeta ॥ 384 ॥ (1932)]

Trans.—384 It is so on account of the abundance of external elements also. (For), otherwise, it would not require the excessive force of the external (as well as) opposite elements. (1932)

टीका–' तथा ' इत्युपपत्त्यन्तरार्थः । इह देहिनां दुःखबहुलत्वं केवल-पुण्यापकर्षमात्रजनितं न भवति । कुतः ? इत्यत्र हेतुमाह–बाह्यानि यान्यनिष्टाहारादीनि साधनानि तेषां यस्तदनुरूपः प्रकर्षस्तस्याङ्गभावात् कारणभावादिति । विपर्यये बाधकमाह–' इहेत्यादि ' तद् दुःखमन्यथा यदि पुण्यापकर्षमात्रजन्यं भवेत् तदा पुण्यसंपाद्येष्टाहारापचयमात्रादेव भवेत्, न तु पापोचयसंपाद्यानिष्टाहारादिरूपविपरीतबाह्यसाधनानां यद् बलं सामर्थ्यं तस्य स्वानुरूपो यः प्रकर्षस्तमपेक्षेत । इदमत्र हृदयम्–यदि पुण्यापकर्षमात्रजन्यं दुःखं भवेत्, तदा पुण्योदयप्राप्येष्टाहारादिसाधनापकर्षमात्रादेव भवेत्, न चैतदस्ति, इष्ट-विपरीतानिष्टाहारादिसाधनप्रकर्षसामर्थ्यादेव तद्भावादिति ॥३८४॥ (१९३२)

D. C.—Abundance of miseries to the various beings in this world is not merely caused by the diminution of *puṇya-karmas* but by the abundant force of various external elements like forbidden food also. If it were not so, it would have been caused only by the diminution of prescribed food etc (to be attained by *puṇya-karmas*) and would never have depended upon the abundant force of the external but opposite elements like forbidden food etc (to be attained by *pāpa-karmas*)

The main purport of the above argument is this:—If *dehatva* were to be generated by means of the diminution of *puṇya-karmas* only, it would have been produced only on account of the lack of external materials like *iṣṭāhāra* etc. But it is not so, as it is produced by the increasing force of the external but opposite materials like *aniṣṭāhāra* as well. ॥ 384 ॥ (1932)

And,

देहो नावचयकओ पुण्णुक्करिसे व मुत्तिमत्ताओ ।
होज्ज व स हीणतरओ कहमसुभयरो महल्लो य ? ॥३८५॥(१९३३)

Deho nāvacayakao puṇṇukkarise va muttimattāo ।
Hojja va sa hîṇatarao kahamasubhayaro mahallo ya ? ॥385॥ (1933)

[देहो नापचयकृतः पुण्योत्कर्ष इव मूर्तिमत्त्वात् ।
भवेद् वा स हीनतरकः कथमशुभतरो महांश्च ? ॥ ३८५ ॥ (१९३३)

Deho nāpacayakṛitaḥ puṇyotkarṣa iva mūrtimattvāt ।
Bhaved vā sa hînatarakaḥ kathamaśubhataro mahāṅśca ? ॥385॥

Trans.—385 Since body is corporeal like the abundant *puṇya karmas*, it is not produced by (means of) diminution (of *puṇya karmas*). Or, if it is so, it should be small. (For) how is a huge and (at the same time) splendid (body available) ? (1933)

टीका–दुःखितहस्त्यादिदेहः केवलपुण्यापयमात्रकृतो न भवति, मूर्तिमत्त्वात्, यथा पुण्योत्कर्षे तज्जन्योऽनुत्तरसुर–चक्रवर्त्यादिदेहः, यश्च पुण्यापचयमात्रजन्यः स मूर्तिमानपि न भवति, यथा न कोऽपि, यदि च पुण्यापचयमात्रेण देहो जन्येत, तदा हीनतरः शुभ एव च स्यात्, कथं महान्, अशुभतरश्च भवेत्, महतो महापुण्योपचयजन्यत्वात्, अशुभस्य चाशुभकर्मनिर्वर्त्यत्वात् ?। पुण्येन पुनरणीयसापि शुभ एव देहो जन्येत, न तु दुःखितः। अणीयसापि हि सुवर्णलवेनाणीयानपि सौवर्ण एव घटो भवति न तु मार्तिकः, ताम्रादिर्वेति ॥ ३८५ ॥ (१९३३)

D. C.—Since the bodies of *anuttara* gods including the Supreme Ruler of the World are *mūrta*, they are not produced by the diminution of *puṇya karmas*. In the same way, bodies like that of a miserable elephant etc are also not produced by the dimimution of *puṇya karmas* only as they are *mūrta*. For, that which has been produced by the diminution can never be *mūrta*.

Still however, if a body is ever produced by diminution of *puṇyas*, it must be exquisitely feeble and auspicious. Because a body which is huge and at the same time auspicious, is produced by the accumulation of *puṇyas*, while that which is huge but in–auspicious is produced by the accumulation of *pāpas*. Hence, a body produced even by a small quantity of *puṇyas* must necessarily be happy and never unhappy. Just

as, from a small lump of gold a small but golden pot is made but not an earthen or a copper one, similarly, a body produced even from a small accumulation of *puṇyas* is always happy though small in form. ॥ 385 ॥ (1933)

Refuting the second and third theories, the author states—

एवं चिय विवरीयं जोएज्जा सव्वपावपक्खे वि ।
न य साहारणरूवं कम्मं तक्कारणाभावा ॥ ३८६ ॥ (१९३४)

Evam ciya vivarîyam jöejjā savvapāvapakkhe vi ।
Na ya sāhāraṇarūvam kammam takkāraṇābhāvā ॥ 386 ॥ (1934)

[एवमेव विपरीतं योजयेत् सर्वपापपक्षेऽपि ।
न च साधारणरूपं कर्म तत्कारणाभावात् ॥ ३८६ ॥ (१९३४)

Evameva viparîtam yojayet sarvapāpapakṣe'pi ।
Na ca sādhāraṇarūpam karma, tatkāraṇābhāvāt ॥ 386 ॥ (1934)

Trans.—386 The same (argument) should also be applied to the theory of exclusive *pāpas*, (but) in a reverse manner. And, (there is) nothing like a common *karma* (containing *puṇya* and *pāpa* together) because of the absence of its cause. (1934)

टीका–" सर्वं पापमेवास्ति, न तु पुण्यम्, पापापचयमात्रजन्यत्वात् सुखस्य " इत्येतस्मिन्नपि पक्षे एवमेव–केवलपुण्यवादोक्तदूषणाद् विपरीतगत्या सर्वं योजयेत्; यद्यथा–पापापकर्षमात्रजनितं सुखं न भवति, पापास्याल्पीयसोऽपि दुःखजनकत्वात् । न ह्यणीयानपि विषलवः स्वास्थ्यहेतुर्भवति । तस्मात् पुण्यजनितमेवाल्पमपि सुखमित्यादि स्वबुद्ध्याऽभ्यूह्य वाच्यम् । इति पृथग् दुःखयोःकारणभूते स्वतन्त्रे पुण्य–पापे एष्टव्ये । अत एव साधारणेऽपि संकीर्णे पुण्य–पापे नैष्टव्ये । कुतः ? इत्याह–' न येत्यादि ' न च साधारणरूपं संकीर्णस्वभावं पुण्य–पापात्मकमेकं कर्मास्ति, तस्यैवंभूतस्य कर्मणः कारणाभावात् । अत्र प्रयोगः–नास्ति संकीर्णोभयरूपं कर्म, असंभाव्यमानैवंविधकारणत्वात्, वन्ध्यापुत्रवदिति ॥ ३८६ ॥ (१९३४)

D. C.—In case of the theory that everything is *pāpa* and there is nothing like *puṇya* and that *sukha* is also produced by the diminution of *pāpa*, the same argument stated above should be applied but in a reverse manner in this way:—Since even a small portion of *pāpa* produces *duḥkha* like a small particle of poison, it could never be said that *sukha* is produced by the diminution of *pāpa*. Even a fraction of happiness is produced by *puṇya* and never by *pāpa* and so on. These arguments clearly indicate that *puṇya* and *pāpa* are absolutely separate entities producing *sukha* and *duḥkha* respectively.

So, both could never be taken as one combined entity as laid down in the third theory. Such a combined *Karma* has no *hetu* whatsoever. And hence, like a son to a barren woman it is entirely impossible. ॥ 386 ॥ (1934)

In support of the argument, the author continues—

कम्मं जोगनिमित्तं सुभो-ऽसुभो वा स एगसमयम्मि ।
होज्ज न उ उभयरूवो कम्मं पि तओ तयणुरूवं ॥३८७॥(१९३५)

Kammam joganimittam subho'subho vā sa egasamayammi।
Hojja na u ubhayarūvo kammam pi tao tayaṇurūvam ॥387॥ (1935)

[कर्म योगनिमित्तं शुभोऽशुभो वा स एकसमये ।
भवेद् न तूभयरूपः कर्माऽपि ततस्तदनुरूपम् ॥ ३८७ ॥ (१९३५)

Karma yoganimittam śubho'śubho vā sa ekasamaye ।
Bhaved na tūbhayarūpaḥ karmā'pi tatastadanurūpam ॥387॥ (1935)]

Trans.—387 *Karma* is caused by contact which is either auspicious or inauspicious at one time, but never in both the forms. So, *Karma* is also similar to it. (1935)

टीका–मिथ्यात्वा–ऽविरति–प्रमाद–कषाय–योगा बन्धहेतव इति पर्यन्ते योगाभिधानात् सर्वत्र कर्मबन्धहेतुत्वस्य योगाविनाभावाद् योगानामेव बन्धहेतुत्वमिति कर्म योगनिमित्तमुच्यते । स च मनो–वाक्–कायात्मको

योग एकस्मिन् समये शुभोऽशुभो वा भवेत्, न तूभयरूपः, अतः•कारणानुरूपत्वात् कार्यस्य कर्मापि तदनुरूपं शुभं पुण्यरूपं बध्यते, अशुभं वा पापरूपं बध्यते, न तु संकीर्णस्वभावमुभयरूपमेक दैव बध्यत इति ॥३८७॥ (१९३५)

D. C.—Perversion (*mithyātva*) incontinence (*a–virati*) stupidity (*kaṣāya*) idleness (*pramāda*) and contact (*yoga*) are the various causes of *karma–bandha.* Out of these, *yoga* or contact with the outer world is the principal cause. This contact is divided as. 1. Bodily contact, 2 Mental contact and 3 the Contact of Actions. It is either *s'ubha* or *a–s'ubha* at one time, but never in a combined state of *s'ubhās'ubha* at the same time.

Now, since this *yoga* is the *kāraṇa* and *karma*, the *kārya*, the latter shoul be similar to the former. Hence, there cannot exist a *karma* containing *puṇya* and *pāpa* combined together. When there pervades *a–s'ubha yoga* the *s'ubha Karma*–in the form of virtuous deeds–is produced and when there is *a–s'ubha yoga*, the *a–s'ubha karma* of sinful deeds is produced.

But *Karma* could never exist in a combined state of *s'ubhās'ubha* as *yoga* never exists in a combined state. ॥387॥(1935)

Now the author states an objection and its reply—

नणु मण–वइ–काओगा सुभासुभा वि समयम्मि दीसंति ।
दव्वम्मि मीसभावो भवेज्ज न उ भावकरणम्मि ॥३८८॥(१९३६)

Nanu maṇa–vai–kāogā subhāsubhā vi samayammi dîsanti ।
Davvammi mîsabhāvo bhavejja na u bhāvakaraṇammi ॥388॥(1936)

[ननु मनो–वाक्–काययोगाः शुभाशुभा अपि समये दृश्यन्ते ।
द्रव्ये मिश्रभावो भवेद् न तु भावकरणे ॥ ३८८ ॥ (१९३६)]

Nanu mano–vāk–kāyayogāḥ śubhāśubha api samaye dṛśyante ।
Dravye miśrabhāvo bhaved na tu bhāvakaraṇe ॥ 388 ॥ (1936)]

Trans.—388 "Even *śubha* and *a-śubha* contacts pertaining to mind speech and body are perceived at (the same) time." "The state of mixture would be (possible) in (case of) abstract (ones)." (1936)

टीका–ननु मनो–वाक्–काययोगाः शुभाशुभाश्च मिश्रा इत्यर्थः, एकस्मिन् समये दृश्यन्ते, तत् कथमुच्यते–"सुभोऽसुभो वा स एगसमयम्मि" इति ? तथाहि–किञ्चिदविधिना दानादिवितरणं चिन्तयतः शुभाशुभो मनोयोगः, तथा, किमप्यविधिनैव दानादिधर्ममुपदिशतः शुभाशुभो वाग्योगः, तथा, किमप्यविधिनैव जिनपूजा–वन्दनकादिकायचेष्टां कुर्वतः शुभाशुभकाययोग इति। तदेतदयुक्तम्। कुतः ? इत्याह–" दव्वम्मीत्यादि " इदमुक्तं भवति–इह द्विविधो योगः–द्रव्यतः, भावतश्च। तत्र मनो–वाक्–काययोगप्रवर्तकानि द्रव्याणि, मनो–वाक्–कायपरिस्पन्दात्मको योगश्च द्रव्ययोगः; यस्त्वेतदुभयरूपयोगहेतुरध्यवसायः स भावयोगः। तत्र शुभाशुभरूपाणां यथोक्तचिन्ता–देशना–कायचेष्टानां प्रवर्तके द्विविधेऽपि द्रव्ययोगे व्यवहारनयदर्शनविवक्षामात्रेण भवेदपि शुभाशुभत्वलक्षणो मिश्रभावः, न तु मनो–वाक्–काययोगनिबन्धनाध्यवसायरूपे भावकरणे भावात्मके योगे। अयमभिप्रायः–द्रव्ययोगो व्यवहारनयदर्शनेन शुभाशुभरूपोऽपीष्यते, निश्चयनयेन तु सोऽपि शुभोऽशुभो वा केवलः समस्ति, यथोक्तचिन्ता–देशनादिप्रवर्तकद्रव्ययोगाणामपि शुभाशुभरूपमिश्राणां तन्मतेनाभावात्; मनो–वाक्–कायद्रव्ययोगंनिबन्धनाध्यवसायरूपे तु भावकरणे भावयोगे शुभाशुभरूपो मिश्रभावो नास्ति, निश्चयनयदर्शनस्यैवागमेऽत्र विवक्षितत्वात्। न हि शुभान्यशुभानि वाऽध्यवसायस्थानानि मुक्त्वा शुभाशुभाध्यवसायस्थानरूपस्तृतीयो राशिरागमे क्वचिदपीष्यते, येनाध्यवसायरूपे भावयोगे शुभाशुभत्वं स्यादिति भावः। तस्माद् भावयोग एकस्मिन् समये शुभोऽशुभो वा भवति न तु मिश्रः। ततः कर्मापि तत्प्रत्ययं पृथक् पुण्यरूपं पापरूपं वा बध्यते, न तु मिश्ररूपमिति स्थितम् ॥ ३८८ ॥ (१९३६)

D. C.—Acalabhrātā:—The combined state of *s'ubha* and *a-s'ubha* contact of mind, takes place when one thinks of offering munificence etc, but not according to the prescribed

rules. That belonging to speech takes place when the observances of deeds like munificence etc, are advised but against the proper rules.

The *mis'rabhāva* of the bodily contact is apprehended when a person actually performs the ceremony of worship and bowing down etc, to the *Tîrthaṅkaras* without following the prescribed customs.

In this way, it is quite easy to apprehend the three types of *yogas* in a mixed state of *s'ubha* and *a-s'ubha* at the same time.

Bhagavān:—Your assumption is wrongly based. *Yoga* comes into existence in two ways—(1) By virtue of the contact with concrete substance and (2) by means of contact with abstract (objects). The concrete substances that come into contact with mind, speech, and body and the process of arousing mind, speech and body, form the *dravya-yoga;* while the mental effort which acts as the cause of contact on the part of both–*i. e.* substance as well the process–is known as the *bhāva-yoga.*

The composite state of *s'ubha* and *a-s'ubha* taken together is possible is case of *dravya-yoga* of all the three varieties belonging respectively to mind, speech, and body–from the practical point of view. But it is never possible in case of *bhāva-yoga.* It is important to note, therefore, that from the practical point of view, the *mis'rabhāva* of *s'ubha* and *a-subha* combined together may be admitted in case of *dravya-yoga,* but it is never possible in case of *dravya-yoga* of definite assertion.

In case of *bhāva-yoga,* the *mis'rabhāva* is neither possible from the practical point of view nor with regard to definite assertion.

Moreover in *āgamas* also, there is no mention of the composite state of *s'ubhās'ubha-yoga,* as a third variety coming after *s'ubha* and *a-s'ubha* varieties of mental effort. Hence, in case of *bhāva-yoga,* there cannot exist a mixed entity of

s'ubhā's'ubha-yoga but either a *s'ubha-yoga* or *a-s'ubha-yoga* is possible. On account of the same reasons, *Karma* is also formed of *s'ubha* or *a-s'ubha* deeds separately, but never of *s'ubha* and *a-s'ubha* combined together. ॥ 388 ॥ (1936)

And,

झाणं सुभमसुभं वा न उ मीसं जं च झाणविरमे वि ।
लेसा सुभाऽसुभा वा सुभमसुभं वा तओ कम्मं ॥३८९॥(१९३७)

Jhānam subhamasubham vā na u mîsam jam ca jhānavirame vi ।
Lesā subhā'subhā vā subhamasubham vā tao kammam ॥389॥(1937)

[ध्यानं शुभमशुभं वा न तु मिश्रं यच्च ध्यानविरमेऽपि ।
लेश्या शुभाऽशुभा वा शुभमशुभं वा ततः कर्म ॥ ३८९ ॥ (१९३७)

Dhyānam śubhamaśubham vā na tu miśram yacca dhyānavirame'pi ।
Leśyā śubhā'śubhā vā śubhamaśubham vā tataḥ karma ॥ 389 ॥

Trans.—389 Meditation is either auspicious or in-auspicious but never composite (of both). For, even at the end of meditation, the conflict is either *śubha* or *a-śubha.* Hence, *karma* is also either (of) virtuous (type) or (of) evil (type). (1937)

टीका-ध्यानं यस्मादागमे एकदा धर्म-शुक्लध्यानात्मकं शुभम्, आर्त-रौद्रात्मकमशुभं वा निर्दिष्टम्, न तु शुभाशुभरूपम्, यस्माच्च ध्यानोपरमेऽपि लेश्या तैजसीप्रभृतिका शुभा, कापोतीप्रमुखा वाऽशुभैकदा प्रोक्ता, न तु शुभाशुभरूपाः; ध्यानलेश्यात्मकाश्च भावयोगाः, ततस्तेष्येकदा शुभा अशुभा वा भवन्ति न तु मिश्राः । ततो भावयोगनिमित्तं कर्माप्येकदा पुण्यात्मकं शुभं बध्यते, पापात्मकमशुभं वा बध्यते, न तु मिश्रमिति ॥ ३८९ ॥ (१९३७)

D. C.—It has been laid down in the *āgamas* that *dhyāna* is either *s'ubha i. e.* inspired by a religious or guileless motive or *a-s'ubha i. e.* inspired by vile or dreadful motive at one time, but it could never be inspired by both the motives at the

same time. Even at the end of *dhyāna*, the conflict at work is spoken of either as *s'ubha* (*i. e.* dominated by lustrous and such other characterstics) or as *a–s'ubha* (*i. e.* dominated by ill–ominous elements) but it could never be known as *s'ubhā'–s'ubha*.

The *bhāva–yogas* are composed of meditations as well as the conflicts. So, *bhāva–yogas* are also either *s'ubha* or *a–s'ubha* separately but never *mis'ra*. Consequently, *Karma* should also be taken either as *s'ubha* or *a–s'ubha* taken separately and never as *s'ubhā's'ubha* taken together. ॥389॥ (1937)

Moreover,

पुव्वगहियं च कम्मं परिणामवसेण मीसयं नेज्जा ।
इयरेयरभावं वा सम्मा-मिच्छाइं न उ गहणे ॥३९०॥ (१९३८)

Puvvagahiyam ca kammam pariṇāmavaseṇa mîsayam nejjā ।
Iyareyarabhāvam vā sammā–micchāim na u gahaṇe ॥390॥ (1938)

[पूर्वगृहीतं च कर्म परिणामवशेन मिश्रतां नयेत् ।
इतरेतरभावं वा सम्यक्–मिथ्यात्वे न तु ग्रहणे ॥ ३९० ॥ (१९३८)

Pūrvagrihîtam ca karma pariṇāmavaśena miśratām nayet ।
Itaretarabhāvam vā samyak–mithyātve na tu grahaṇe ॥390॥(1938)]

Trans.—390 A pre–apprehended *Karma* may attain the composite state, on account of fruition or may alternately turn itself true or false. But (that is) not (so) at the time of (new) apprehension. (1939)

टीका–'वा' इत्यथवा, एतदद्यापि संभाव्यते यत्–पूर्वं गृहीतं पूर्वं बद्धं मिथ्यात्वलक्षणं कर्म परिणामवशात् पुञ्जत्रयं कुर्वन् मिश्रतां सम्यग्–मिथ्यात्वपुञ्जरूपतां प्रापयेदिति; इतरेतरभावं वा नयेत् सम्यक्त्वं मिथ्यात्वं वेति । इदमुक्तं भवति–पूर्वबद्धान् मिथ्यात्वपुद्गलान् विशुद्धपरिणामः सन् शोधयित्वा सम्यक्त्वरूपतां नयेत्, अविशुद्धपरिणामस्तु रसमुत्कर्षं नीत्वा सम्यक्त्वपुद्गलान् मिथ्यात्वपुञ्जे संक्रमय्य मिथ्यात्वरूपतां नयेत्, इति पूर्वगृहीतस्य

सत्तावर्तिनः कर्मण इदं कुर्यात् । ग्रहणकाले पुनर्न मिश्रं पुण्यपापरूपतया संकीर्णस्वभावं कर्म बध्नाति, नापीतरदितररूपतां नयतीति ॥३९०॥ (१९३८)

D. C.—The composite state of *Karma* could be explained in this way also:—A *Karma* which is apprehended previously may attain *s'ubha*, *a-s'ubha* or *mis'ra* condition or it may also turn itself better or worse. The later pure *pariṇāmas* would purify the previous evil *pudgalas* and turn them right, while on the other hand, impure *pariṇāmas* would spoil the previous virtuous *pudgalas* by means of excessive heights of sentiments etc and turn them guile. Thirdly, the *pariṇāmas* which are half-way between purity and impurity, would turn the *Karma* into a composite state of virtue and vice.

In this way, with regard to *Karma* of former existence, three states-*viz s'ubha*, *a-s'ubha* and *s'ubhās'ubha*—are possible. But, at the time of new apprehension of *Karma*, the *pariṇāma* is not able to form a composite *Karma* of *puṇya* and *pāpa* combined together and hence there are only two states. ॥ 390 ॥ (1938)

Now, the process of changing virtue into vice, and vice versa referred to above, is explained as follows:—

मोत्तूण आउयं खलु दंसणमोहं चरित्तमोहं च ।
सेसाणं पगईणं उत्तरविहिसंकमो भज्जो ॥ ३९१ ॥ (१९३९)

Mottūṇa āuyam khalu daṃsaṇamoham carittamoham ca ।
Sesāṇam pagaîṇam uttaravihisaṃkamo bhajjo ॥ 391 ॥ (1939)

[मुक्त्वाऽऽयुष्कं खलु दर्शनमोहं चारित्रमोहं च ।
शेषाणां प्रकृतीनामुत्तरविधिसंक्रमो भाज्यः ॥ ३९१ ॥ (१९३९)

Muktvā āyuṣkam khalu darśanamoham cāritra moham ca ।
Śeṣāṇām prakṛtînāmuttaravidhisaṃkramo bhājyah ॥ 391 ॥1939)]

Trans.—391 Excepting the (constituents belonging to)

āyuh,† infatuation of *darśana*, (undifferentiated knowledge) and infatuation of *cāritra* (right conduct), transformations of the latter parts of the remaining characteristics should be accepted. (1939)

टीका–इह ज्ञानावरणादिमूलप्रकृतीनामन्योन्यं संक्रमः कदापि न भवत्येव, उत्तरप्रकृतीनां तु निजनिजमूलप्रकृत्यभिन्नानां परस्परं भवतीति । तत्र चायं विधिः–" मोत्तूण आउयं " इति जातिप्रधानो निर्देश इति बहुवचनमत्र द्रष्टव्यम्–चत्वार्यायूंषि मुक्त्वेति । एकस्या आयुर्लक्षणाया निजमूलप्रकृतेरभिन्नानामपि चतुर्णामायुषामन्योयं संक्रमो न भवतीति तद्वर्जनम्। तथा, दर्शनमोहं चारित्रमोहं च मुक्त्वा; एकस्या मोहनीयलक्षणायाः स्वमूलप्रकृतेरभिन्नयोरपि दर्शनमोह–चारित्रमोहयोरन्योन्यं संक्रमो न भवतीत्यर्थः । उक्तशेषाणां तु प्रकृतीनाम्, कथंभूतानाम्? इत्याह–"उत्तरविहि त्ति" विधयो भेदाः, उत्तरे च ते विधयश्चोत्तरेविधय उत्तरभेदास्तद्भूतानामुत्तरप्रकृतिरूपाणामिति तात्पर्यम्। किम्? इत्याह–संक्रमो भाज्यो भजनीयः ।

भजना चैवं द्रष्टव्या–याः किल ज्ञानावरणपञ्चक–दर्शनावरणनवक–कषायषोडशक–मिथ्यात्व-भय–जुगुप्सा–तैजस–कार्मण-वर्णादिचतुष्का–ऽगुरुलघू–पघात–निर्माणा–ऽन्तरायपञ्चकलक्षणाः सप्तचत्वारिंशद् ध्रुवबन्धिन्य उत्तरप्रकृतयः, तासां निजैकमूलप्रकृत्यभिन्नानामन्योन्यं संक्रमः सदैव भवति; यथा ज्ञानावरणपञ्चकान्तर्वर्तिनि मतिज्ञानावरणे श्रुतज्ञानावरणादीनि, तेष्वपि मतिज्ञानावरणं संक्रामतीत्यादि । यास्तु शेषा अध्रुवबन्धिन्यस्तासां निजैकमूलप्रकृत्यभेदवर्तिनीनामपि बध्यमानायामबध्यमाना संक्रामति, न त्वबध्यमानायां बध्यमाना; यथा साते बध्यमानेऽसातमबध्यमानं संक्रामति, न तु बध्यमानमबध्यमाने; इत्यादि वाच्यमिति । एष प्रकृतिसंक्रमे विधिः । शेषस्तु प्रदेशादिसंक्रमविधिः "मूलप्रकृत्यभिन्नासु वेद्यमानासु संक्रमः भवति" इत्यादिना स्थानान्तरादवसेय इत्यलं प्रसङ्गेनेति ॥ ३९१ ॥ १९३९ ॥

D. C—The process of *prakriti saṃkrama* (mutual trans formation of various characteristics) is explained as follows:—

† *Ayuh Karma.*

(1) *Prakṛiti-saṃkrama* is not possible in case of original *prakṛits* like *jñānāvaraṇa* etc. But in case of characteristics which are acquired later on, mutual transition does take place even though they are not different from their respective original characteristics.

(2) Four varieties of the characteristics of *āyuḥ*, and the infatuations of *dars'ana* and *cāritra* (right conduct) are *exceptions* to the above rule. In spite of these *prakṛitis* being *a-bhinna* from their respective original *prakṛitis*, they do not undergo mutual transition.

(3) There are 47 *uttara-prakṛitis*, which undergo mutual transition. They are enumerated as follows:—5 types of *jñānāvaraṇas*, 9 types of *dars'anāvaraṇas*, 16 types of dullness; perversion, fear, contempt, the characteristic of lustre, the *kārmaṇa* characteristic; 4 characteristics of colour etc; one that is neither too long nor too short; characteristics of destruction and construction; and 5 types of obstruction (*antarāya*).

All these 47 *uttara-prakṛitis* of definite *bandha*, always undergo mutual transition *e. g.*, out of five types of *jñānāvaraṇas* noted above, the *s'ruti-jñānāvaraṇa* could be transformed into *mati-jñānāvaraṇa* and vice versa.

In case of other *prakṛitis* that have not been actually bound up, one that has no proper *bandha* may be transformed into one having proper *bandha*, but the process does not work vice versa, *i. e.* a *prakṛiti* of proper *bandha* does not change into a *prakṛiti* without *bandha*.

This is the process of *prakṛiti-saṃkrama*. The process of transition in case of other *prades'as* etc is understood from the sentence:—

" *Mūla prakṛityabhinnāsu vedyamānāsu saṃkramaḥ bhavati* " etc. implying that when they are known to be similar to the original *prakṛitis* they undergo transformation. ॥ 391 ॥ (1939)

The separate characteristics of *puṇya* and *pāpa* are now explained—

सोहणवण्णाइगुणं सुभाणुभावं च जं तयं पुण्णं ।
विवरीयमओ पावं न बायरं नाइसुहुमं च ॥ ३९२ ॥ (१९४०)

Sohanavanṇāiguṇam subhānubhāvam ca jam tayam puṇṇam ।
Vivarîyamao pāvam na bāyaram nāisuhumam ca ॥ 392 ॥ (1940)

[शोभनवर्णादिगुणं शुभानुभावं च यत् तत् पुण्यम् ।
विपरीतमतः पापं न बादरं नातिसूक्ष्मं च ॥ ३९२ ॥ (१९४०)

Śobhanavarṇādiguṇam s'ubhānubhāvam ca yat tat puṇyam ।
Viparîtamataḥ pāpam na bādaram nātisukṣmam ca ॥392॥ (1940)]

Trans.—392 *(A karma)* possessed of properties like bright colour etc and good fruition is called *puṇya*. *Pāpa* is (exactly) opposite to it. (Both of them are) neither too huge nor too subtle. (1940)

टीका-शोभनाः शुभा वर्णादयो वर्ण-गन्ध-रस-स्पर्शलक्षणा गुणा यस्य तच्छोभनवर्णादिगुणम्, तथा यच्छुभानुभावं शुभविपाकमित्यर्थः, तत् पुण्यमभिधीयते । यत् पुनरतः पुण्याद् विपरीतलक्षणम्-अशुभवर्णादिगुणम्, अशुभविपाकं चेत्यर्थः, तत् पापमुच्यते । एतच्चोभयमपि कथं भूतम् ? इत्याह- न मेर्वादिभावेन परिणतस्कन्धवदतिबादरम्, सूक्ष्मेण कर्मवर्गणाद्रव्येण निष्पन्नत्वात्; नापि परमाण्वादिवदतिसूक्ष्ममिति ॥ ३९२ ॥ १९४० ॥

D. C.—A *Karma* having splendid colours, odour, taste, and touch, is known as *puṇya*. *Pāpa* is opposite to *puṇya*. So, its colour etc. are dull and has no good fruition. Both of them are neither too huge like *Meru* etc nor too minute like *paramāṇu*, because they are produced by the multiplication of various *karmas*. ॥ 392 ॥ 1940)

गिण्हइ तज्जोगं चिय रेणुं पुरिसो जहा कयब्भंगो ।
एगक्खेत्तोगाढं जीवो सव्वप्पएसेहिं ॥ ३९३ ॥ (१९४१)

Giṇhai tajjogam ciya renum puriso jahā kayabbhango।
Egakkhettogāḍham jîvo savvappaesehim ॥ 393 ॥ (1941)

[गृण्हाति तद्योग्यमेव रेणुं पुरुषो यथा कृताभ्यङ्गः ।
एकक्षेत्रावगाढं जीवः सर्वप्रदेशैः ॥ ३९३ ॥ (१९४१)

Gṛiṇhāti tadyogyameva reṇum puruso yathā kṛitābhyangaḥ ।
Ekakṣetrāvagāḍham jîvaḥ sarva-pradeśaiḥ ॥ 393 ॥ (1941)]

Trans.—393 Just as a person besmeared with oil, catches dust from the same region, the Soul also catches (a substance) which is worthy of that *(Karma)*, and situated in the same region, by means of all (its) regions. (1941)

टीका–तस्य पुण्य–पापात्मकस्य कर्मणो योग्यमेव कर्मवर्गणागतं द्रव्यं जीवो गृह्णाति, न तु परमाण्वादिकम्, औदारिकादिवर्गणागतं वाऽयोग्यमित्यर्थः । तदप्येकक्षेत्रावगाढमेव गृह्णाति, न तु स्वावगाढप्रदेशेभ्यो भिन्नप्रदेशावगाढमित्यर्थः । तच्च यथा तैलादिकृताभ्यङ्गः पुरुषो रेणुं गृह्णाति तथा राग–द्वेषक्लिन्नस्वरुपो जीवोऽपि गृह्णाति, न तु निर्हेतुकमिति भावः । इदं च सर्वैरिपि स्वप्रदेशैर्जीवो गृह्णाति, न तु कैश्चिदित्यर्थः । उक्तं च—

एगपएसोगाढं सव्वपएसेहिं कम्मुणो जोग्गं ।
बंधइ जहुत्तहेउं साइयमणाइयं वावि ॥ १ ॥

उपशमश्रेणेः प्रतिपतितो मोहनीयादिकं कर्म सादि बध्नाति, शेषस्त्वनवाप्तोपशमश्रेणिर्जीवोऽनाद्येव बध्नातीत्यर्थ इति ॥ ३९३ ॥ (१९४१)

D. C.—The Soul catches only that substance which suits multitudes of *pāpa-karmas* and *puṇya-karmas*. So, it does not apprehend those like *paramāṇus* and *audārika* etc. which are absolutely unfit. Secondly, the Soul accepts those substances only, if they are situated in the same region as that of the Soul and none else. So, just as a person besmeared with oil etc catches dust, the Soul also being affected by *rāga-dveṣa* etc, catches purposely a proper substance by the help of all its regions.

It has therefore been said that—

" Egapaesogāḍham sarvapaesehim kammuṇo joggam ।
Bandhai jahuttaheum sāiyamaṇāiyam vāvi ॥

[Ekapradeśavagāḍham sarvapradesaiḥ karmaṇo yogyam ।
Badhnāti yathoktahetu sādikamanādikam vāpi] ॥ 393 ॥(1941)

At this stage, the opponent raises an objection—

अविसिट्ठपोग्गलघणे लोए थूणतणुकम्मपविभागो ।
जुज्जेज्ज, गहणकाले सुभा–ऽसुभविवेयणं कत्तो ?॥३९४॥ (१९४२)

Avisiṭṭhapoggalaghane löe thūṇatanukammapavibhāgo ।
Jujjejja gahaṇakāle subhā'subhaviveyaṇam katto ? ॥ 394 ॥ (1942)

[अविशिष्टपुद्गलघने लोके स्थूलतनुकर्मप्रविभागः ।
युज्येत, ग्रहणकाले शुभा–ऽशुभविवेचनं कुतः ? ॥ ३९४ ॥ (१९४२)

Aviśiṣṭapudgalaghane loke sthūlatanukarmapravibhāgaḥ ।
Yujyeta, grahaṇakāle śubhā'śubhavivecanam kutaḥ ? ॥394॥(1942)]

Trans.—394 In (the midst of) the world which is crowded with common *pudgalas*, divisions of coarse *(sthūla)* and subtle *(sūksma) karmas* would be justified ; (but) at the time of apprehension, how would the distinction of auspicious and inauspicious be justified. (1942)

टीका–नन्वविशिष्टैः प्रत्याकाशप्रदेशमनन्तानन्तैः शुभा–ऽशुभादिभेदेनाव्यवस्थितैः पुद्गलैर्घनो निरन्तरं व्याप्तोऽयं लोकः । ततश्च ग्रहणकाले गृह्णतो जीवस्य स्थूल–सूक्ष्मकर्मप्रविभागो युज्येत; ततो "न बायरं नाइसुहुमं च " इति विशेषणमुपपन्नम् , एतद्विशेषणविशिष्टादन्यस्य स्वभावत एव जीवैरग्रहणात् । यत्तु शुभाशुभविवेचनं तत् समयमात्ररूपे कर्मग्रहणकाले तत्क्षण एव गृह्णतो जीवस्य कुतः संभाव्यते ?–न कुतश्चिदिति परस्याभिप्रायः । ततश्च " सोहणवण्णाइगुणं " इत्यादि विशेषणं न युज्यत इति प्रेरकाकूतमिति ॥ ३९४ ॥ (१९४२)

D. C.—This world is entirely filled with multitudes of common *pudgalas* scattered in all etherial regions without any distinction of *s'ubha* and *a–s'ubha*. When *jîva* apprehends these *pudgalas* it is able to recognize them as neither too *sthūla*, nor too *sūkṣma*, as *jîva* is not able to recognize *sthūla* and *sūkṣma pudgalas*.

In such a case, it is possible that *jîva* is able to understand the distinction of *sthūla* and *sūkṣma*. But how is the distinction of *s'ubha* and *a–s'ubha* justified when *jîva* tries to apprehend the *Karma-pudgalas?* ॥ 394 ॥ (1942)

The reply is—

अविसिट्ठं चिय तं सो परिणामा–ऽऽसयसभावओ खिप्पं ।
कुरुते सुभमसुभं वा गहणे जीवो जहाहारं ॥३९५॥ (१९४३)

Avisiṭṭham ciya tam so parināmā–"sayasabhāvao khippam ।
Kurute subhamasubham vā gahaṇe jîvo jahāhāram ॥395॥ (1943)

[अविशिष्टमेव तत् स परिणामा–ऽऽश्रयस्वभावतः क्षिप्रम् ।
कुरुते शुभमशुभं वा ग्रहणे जीवो यथाऽऽहारम् ॥ ३९५ ॥ (१९४३)

Aviśiṣṭameva tat sa parināmā"-śrayasvabhāvataḥ kṣipram ।
Kurute śubhamaśubham vā grahaṇe jîvo yathā"-hāram ॥395॥(1943)]

Trans.—395 It is common no doubt. (But) at the time of apprehension, the Soul turns it into *śubha* or *a–śubha* immediately, by virtue of its nature of resort and fruition as in case of food. (1943)

टीका–स जीवस्तत्कर्म ग्रहणे ग्रहणकाले शुभा–ऽशुभादिविशेषणाविशिष्टमपि गृह्णन् क्षिप्रं तत्क्षणमेव शुभमशुभं वा कुरुते–शुभा–ऽशुभविभागेन व्यवस्थापयतीत्यर्थः । कुतः ? इत्याह–"परिणामाऽऽसयसभावउ त्ति" इहाश्रयो द्विविधकर्मणो जीव आश्रयः, कर्म तु शुभाशुभत्वस्य तस्य द्विविधस्याप्याश्रयस्य स्वभाव आश्रयस्वभावः, परिणामाश्चाश्रयस्वभावश्च परिणामा-

ऽऽश्रयस्वभावौ, ताभ्यामेतत् कुरुते जीवः। इदमुक्तं भवति–जीवस्य यः शुभोऽशुभो वा परिणामोऽध्यवसायस्तद्वशाद् ग्रहणसमय एव कर्मणः शुभत्वमशुभत्वं वा जनयति; तथा जीवस्यापि कर्माश्रयभूतस्य स कोऽपि स्वभावोऽस्ति येन शुभा–ऽशुभत्वेन परिणमयन्नेव कर्म गृह्णाति; तथा, कर्मणोऽपि शुभा–ऽशुभभावाद्याश्रयस्य स स्वभावः–स कश्चिद् योग्यताविशेषोऽस्ति, येन शुभा–ऽशुभपरिणामान्वितजीवेन गृह्यमाणमेवैतद्रूपतया परिणमति। उपलक्षणं चैतत्; प्रकृति–स्थित्य–ऽनुभागवैचित्र्यम्, प्रदेशानामल्प–बहुभागवैचित्र्यं च जीवः कर्मणो ग्रहणसमय एव सर्वं करोतीति।

उक्तं च—

गहणसमयम्मि जीवो उप्पाएइ गुणे सपच्चयओ
सव्वजियाणंतगुणे कम्मपएसेसु सव्वेसु ॥ १ ॥
आउयभागो थोवो नामे गोए समो तओ अहिगो।
आवरणमंतराए सरिसो अहिगो य मोहे वि ॥ २ ॥
सव्वुवरि वेयणीए भागो अहिगो उ कारणं किंतु।
सुह–दुक्खकारणत्ता ठिई विसेसेण सेसासु ॥ ३ ॥ इति ॥

॥ ३९५ ॥ (१९४३)

D. C.—Although these multitudes of *Karmas* are not distinguished as *s'ubha* or *a–s'ubha* originally at the time of apprehension, *jîva* immediately turns them *s'ubha* or *a–s'ubha* on account of *pariṇāma* as well as *ās'raya*. *Jiva* is the *ās'raya* of *Karma* which again is the *ās'raya* of *s'ubhatva* and *a–s'ubhatva*. By the help of this *ās'raya svabhāva* as well as the *pariṇāma*, *jîva* apprehends *Karma*. So, at the time ef apprehension, *s'ubhatva* or *a–s'ubhatva* of *Karmas* depends upon *s'ubha* or *a–s'ubha pariṇama* produced by *jîva*.

Jîva apprehends *karma* as *s'ubha* or *a–s'ubha* by virtue of its *ās'raya–svabhāva*. So, when *Karma* is apprehended by *jîva* accompanied by *s'ubha* or *a–s'ubha pariṇāma*, it is recognized either as *s'ubha* or *a–s'ubha karma*. As in the case of *āhāra*,

the *karma-pudgalas* also immediately undergo change in their original nature in the present condition and the future consequences. In the same way, small or big portions of various regions of *Karma-pudgalas* also undergo immediate changes.

It has therefore been laid down that:—

" Gahaṇasamayammi jîva uppāei guṇe sa-paccayao ।
Sarvajiyāṇantaguṇe kammapaesesu savvesu ॥ 1 ॥

Āyuyabhāgo thovo nāme gôe samo tao ahigo ।
Āvaraṇamantarāe sariso ahigo ya mohevi ॥ 2 ॥

Savvuvari Veyanîe bhāgo ahigo in kāraṇam kintu ।
Suha-dukkhakāraṇattā ṭhiî viseseṇa sesāsu ॥ 3 ॥

[Grahanasamaye jîva utpādayati gunān svapratyayataḥ ।
Sarvajitānantaguṇān karma pradeśeṣu sarveṣu ॥ 1 ॥

Āyuṣkabhāgaḥ stoko nāmni gotre samastato'dhikaḥ ।
Āvaraṇe'ntarāye sadṛiśo'dhikaśca mohe'pi ॥ 2 ॥

Sarvopari Vedanîye bhāgo'dhikastu kāraṇam kintu ।
Sukha-duḥkha kāraṇatvāt sthitir viśeṣeṇa seṣāsu ॥3॥395 (1943)]

The example of *āhāra* stated above is explained in details as follows:—

परिणामा–ऽऽसयवसओ धेणूए जहा पओ विसमहिस्स ।
तुल्लो वि तदाहारो तह पुण्णा–ऽपुण्णपरिणामो ॥३९६॥ (१९४४)

Parināmā–"sayavasao dhenūe jahā pao visamahissa ।
Tullo vi tadāhāro taha puṇṇā–'puṇṇa parināmo ॥ 396 ॥ (1944)

[परिणामा–ऽऽश्रयवशतो धेन्वा यथा पयो विषमहेः ।
तुल्योऽपि तदाहारस्तथा पुण्या–ऽपुण्यपरिणामः ॥ ३९६ ॥ (१९४४)

Pariṇāmā–"śrayavaśato dhenvā yathā payo viṣamaheḥ ।
Tulyo'pi tadāhārastathā puṇyā–'puṇyapariṇāmaḥ ॥ 396 ॥ (1944)]

Trans.—396 By virtue of fruition and (the object of) resort, just as the food of cow and serpent although same

results as milk (in case of cow) and as poison (in case of serpent), so also, the result (in case) of *puṇya* and *pāpa* is (different) (1944)

टीका-"तदाहारो त्ति" तयोरहि-धेन्वोराहारस्तदाहारः स तुल्योऽपि दुग्धादिको गृहीतः परिणामा-ऽऽश्रयवशाद् यथा धेन्वाः पयो दुग्धं भवति, अहेस्तु स एव विषं-विषरूपतया परिणमति, तथा तेनैव प्रकारेण पुण्या-ऽपुण्यपरिणामः । इदमुक्तं भवति-अस्ति स कश्चित् तस्याऽऽहारस्य परिणामो येन तुल्योऽपि सन्नाश्रयवैचित्र्याद् विचित्रतया परिणमति; आश्रयस्याप्यहि-धेनुलक्षणस्यास्ति तत्तद् निजसामर्थ्यम्, येन तुल्योऽपि गृहीत आहारस्तत्त-द्रूपतया परिणमते; तथा पुण्यपापयोरुपनययोजना कृतैवेति ॥३९६॥ (१९४४)

D. C.—Although the food of cow and serpent is the same, that of cow results as milk while the same results as poison in case of serpent, on account of the distinction of *pariṇāma* and *āś'raya*. So, in spite of *āhāras* being the same, the result is not the same in both cases, because their *āś'rayas*—Cow and serpent-are different. Like *s'ubhā-s'ubha āś'raya*, it also depends upon *s'ubhā-s'ubha pariṇāma* ॥ 396 ॥ (1944)

Or, it can be explained in this way also:—

जह वेगसरीरम्मि वि सारा-ऽसारपरिणामयामेइ ।
अविसिट्ठो वाहारो तह कम्मसुभा-ऽसुभविभागो॥३९७॥(१९४५)

Jaha vegasarîrammi vi sārā'-sāraparināmayāmei ।
Avisiṭṭho vāhāro taha kammasubhā-'subhavibhāgo ॥397॥ (1945)

[यथा वैकशरीरेऽपि सारा-ऽसारपरिणामतामेति ।
अविशिष्ट इवाहारस्तथा कर्मशुभा-शुभविभागः ॥ ३९७ ॥ (१९४५)

Yathā vaikaśarîre'pi sārā'sāraparinṇāmatāmeti ।
Aviśiṣṭa ivāhārastathā karmaśubhā'-śubhavibhāgaḥ ॥397॥ (1945)]

Trans.—397 Just as the same food results in a substantial or perverted form even in the same body, the distinction of *Karma* as *śubha* and *a-śubha* would also take place. (1945)

टीका–धेनु–विषधरयोर्भिन्ने शरीर आहारस्य परिणामवैचित्र्यं दर्शितम्। 'वा' इत्यथवा, यथैकस्मिन्नपि पुरुषादिशरीरेऽविशिष्टेऽप्येकरूपोऽप्याहारो गृहीतस्तत्क्षण एव सारा–ऽसारपरिणामतामेति–रसा–ऽसृग्–मांसादिरस-परिणामं मूत्र–पुरीषरूपमलपरिणामं च युगपदागच्छतीत्यर्थः, तथा कर्मणोऽप्यविशिष्टस्य गृहीतस्य परिणामा–ऽऽश्रयवशात् शुभा–ऽशुभविभागो द्रष्टव्य इति ॥ ३९७ ॥ (१९४५)

D. C.—Even in case of one and the same body and the same food, the food results either in substantial forms like bile chyle, blood and flesh etc. or in worthless forms like urine, foeces etc. immediately after it has been consumed.

In the same way, *s'ubha* and *a–s'ubha* divisions in case of *Karma*, should also be recognized by reason of distinction of *pariṇāma* and *ās'raya*. ॥ 397 ॥ (1945)

The author now, illustrates the distinction of *puṇya* and *pāpa*, and establishes their existence by means of *āgamas*—

सायं सम्मं हासं पुरिस–रइ–सुभाउ–नाम–गोत्ताइं ।
पुण्णं, सेसं पावं नेयं सविवागमविवागं ॥ ३९८ ॥ (१९४६)

Sāyam sammam hāsam purisa–rai–subhāu–nāma–gottāim ।
Puṇṇam, sesam pāvam neyam sa–vivāgamavivāgam ॥398॥ (1946)

[सातं सम्यक्त्वं हास्यं पुरुष–रति–शुभायु–र्नाम–गोत्राणि ।
पुण्यं, शेषं पापं ज्ञेयं सविपाकमविपाकम् ॥ ३९८ ॥ (१९४६)

Sātam samyaktvam hāsyam puruṣa–rati–śubhāyurnāma–gotrāṇi
Puṇyam, seṣam pāpam jñeyam sa–vipākamavipākam ॥398॥ (1946)]

Trans.—398 Comfort, right belief *(samyaktva)*, mirth, masculine form love, and virtuous life, name and lineage–all these are known as *puṇya (prakṛitis)*. The rest should be known as *pāpa (prakṛitis)*. (Both of them may be) with or without fruition. (1940)

टीका–सातवेदनीयम्, शोधितमिथ्यात्वपुद्गलरूपं सम्यक्त्वम्, हास्यम्, पुरुषवेदः, रतिः, शुभायुः, नाम–गोत्राणि चेत्येतत् सर्वं पुण्यमभिधीयते। तत्र नारकायुर्वर्जं शेषमायुस्त्रयं शुभम्, देवद्विक–यशः–कीर्ति–तीर्थकर नामाद्याः सप्तत्रिंशत् प्रकृतयो नामकर्मणि शुभाः, गोत्रे पुनरुच्चैर्गोत्रं शुभम्। एताः षट्चत्वारिंशत् प्रकृतयः किल शुभत्वात् पुण्यम्। अन्ये तु मोहनीय-भेदान् सर्वानपि जीवस्य विपर्यासहेतुत्वात् पापमेव मन्यन्ते। ततः सम्यक्त्व–हास्य–पुरुषवेद–रतिवर्जा द्विचत्वारिंशदेव प्रकृतयः पुण्यम्; तद्यथा–

सायं उच्चागोयं नर–तिरि–देवाउयाइं तह नामे।
देवदुगं मणुयदुगं पणिंदजाई य तणुपणगं॥ १॥
अंगोवंगाण तिगं पढमं संघयणमेव संठाणं।
सुभवण्णाइचउक्कं अगुरुलहू तह य परघायं॥ २॥
ऊसासं आयावं उज्जोय विहगगई वि य पसत्था।
तस–बायर–पज्जत्तं पत्तेय थिरं सुभं सुभगं॥ ३॥
सुस्सर आएज्ज जसं निम्मिण तित्थयरमेव एयाओ।
बायालं पगईओ पुण्णं ति जिणेहिं भणिआओ॥ ४॥

भणितशेषास्तु या द्व्यशीतिप्रकृतयस्तत् सर्वमशुभत्वात् पापं विज्ञेयम्। सम्यक्त्वं कथमशुभम्–कथं तत् पापम्? इति चेत्। उच्यते–रुचिरूपमेव हि सम्यक्त्वं शुभं तच्चेह न विचार्यते, किन्तु शोधितमिथ्यात्वपुद्गलरूपम्, तच्च शङ्काद्यनर्थहेतुत्वादशुभमेव, अशुभत्वाच्च पापम्। सम्यग्रुचेश्चातिशये-नावारकत्वादुपचारमात्र एवेदं सम्यक्त्वमुच्यते, परमार्थतस्तु मिथ्यात्व-मेवैतत्। इत्यलं प्रसङ्गेन। इदं च पुण्य–पापलक्षणमुभयमपि सविपाकम-विपाकं च मन्तव्यम्–यथा बद्धं तथैव विपाकतः किञ्चिद् वेद्यते, किञ्चित्तु मन्दरसं नीरसं वा कृत्वा प्रदेशोदयेनाविपाकं वेद्यत इत्यर्थः। तदेवं पुण्यं पापं च भेदेन व्यवस्थाप्य निरस्तः संकीर्णपुण्य–पापपक्षः।

इतश्चायमयुक्तः–सर्वस्यापि सन्मिश्रसुख–दुःखाख्यकार्यप्रसङ्गात्; न चैतदस्ति, देवादीनां केवलसुखाधिक्यदर्शनात्, नारकादीनां केवलदुःख-प्राचुर्यनिर्णयात्। न च सर्वथा सन्मिश्रैकरूपस्य हेतोरल्प–बहुत्वभेदेऽपि

कार्यस्य प्रमाणतोऽल्प–बहुत्वं विहाय स्वरूपतो भेदो युज्यते। न हि मेचक-कारणप्रभवं कार्यमन्यतमवर्णोत्कटं घटते । तस्मात् सुखातिशयस्यान्यद् निमित्तम्, अन्यच्च दुःखातिशयस्येति। न च सर्वथैकरूपस्य संकीर्णपुण्यपाप-लक्षणस्य हेतोः सुखातिशयनिबन्धनं पुण्यांशवृद्धिर्दुःखातिशयकारणपापांश-हान्या सुखातिशयप्रभावाय कल्पयितुं न्याय्या, पुण्यांश–पापांशयोर्भेद प्रसङ्गात्; तथाहि–यद् वृद्धावपि यद् न वर्धते तत् ततो भिन्नम्; यथा देवदत्त-वृद्धावप्यवर्धमानो यज्ञदत्तः, न वर्धते च पुण्यांशवृद्धौ पापांशः, तस्मात् ततो भिन्नोऽसाविति । तस्माद् न सर्वथैकरूपता पुण्य–पापांशयोर्घटते । कर्मसामा-न्यरूपतया तु यद्यसौ तयोरिष्यते तदा सिद्धसाध्यता, सात–यशः–कीर्त्यादेः पुण्यस्य, असाता–ऽयशः–ऽकीर्त्यादेस्तु पापस्यास्माभिरपि कर्मत्वेनैकताया अभ्युपगमात् । तस्मात् पुण्य–पापरूपतया विविक्ते एव पुण्य–पापे स्त इति । ततः सुख–दुःखवैचित्र्यनिबन्धनयोः पुण्य–पापयोर्यथोक्तनीत्या साधितत्वाद् न कर्तव्यस्तत्संशयः ॥ ३९८ (१९४६)

D. C.—(1) There are 46 characteristics which are *s'ubha* and are hence known as *puṇya-prakṛitis*. They are enumerated as follows:—

Bestowing of gift; propriety of conduct etc purged of all impurities; mirth; masculine form; affection; the three types of *āyus* (union or connection with body *viz*—divine, human, and *tiryanca*,) thirty-seven *prakṛitis* of *Nāma Karma* (including birth as a *Tîrthaṅkara*) and the noble lineage.

(2) According to others, there are 42 *prakṛitis* under the category of *puṇya*. They insist that *samyaktva*, *purusaveda*, *hāsya* and *rati* are *pāpa-prakṛitis* when they are contrary to the nature of *jîva*. Excepting these four *prakṛitis*, the remaining 42 *prakṛitis* are laid down by them as under—

Sāyam uccāgoyam nara–tiri–devāuyāim taha nāme ।
Devadugam maṇuyadugam paṇinda-jāî ya taṇupaṇagam ॥ 1 ॥

Aṅgovaṅgāṇa tigam paḍhamam sanghayaṇameva santhāṇam ।
Subhavaṇṇāicaukkamagurulahū taha ya paraghāyam ॥ 2 ॥

Ūsāsam ayāvam ujjoya vihagagaî vi ya pasatthā ।
Tasa-bāyara-pajjattam patteya thiram subham subhagam ॥ 3 ॥
Sussara āejja jasam nimmiṇa titthayarameva eyāo ।
Bāyālam pagaîo puṇṇam ti Jiṇehim bhaṇiāo ॥ 4 ॥

[Sātamuccair-gotram nara-tiryag-devāyuṣkāṇi tathā nāmni ।
Devadvikam manujadvikam pancendriyajātiś ca tanupancakam ॥1॥
Aṅgopāṅgānām trikam prathamam sanhananameva sansthāṇam ।
Śubhavarṇādi catuṣkamagurulaghu tathāca parāghātam ॥ 2 ॥
Ucchvāsa ātāpa uddyoto vihāyogatirapi prasastā ।
Trasa-bādara-paryāptam pratyekam sthiram śubham subhagam॥3॥
Susvaramadeyam yaśo nirmāṇam tairthakaramevaitāḥ ।
Dvicatvāriṃśat prakṛitayaḥ puṇyamiti Jinairbhaṇitāḥ ॥ 4 ॥]

The remaining 82 *prakṛitis* are recognized by them as *pāpa-prakṛitis.*

If someone raises a question at this point that how would *samyaktva* be called *pāpa-prakṛti ?* The answer would be this—The virtuous *samyaktva* whose natural inclination is undoubtedly *s'ubha,* is not referred to in this case. The *pudgalas* that are classed under *samyaktva,* though purged out of all perversions, are *a-s'ubha* because of the evil elements like doubt etc. being present in them. So, they come under the category of *pāpa.*

The purified *pudgalas* do not very much obstruct the nature of *samyaktva.* But they are classed under *samyaktva* merely by means of *upacāra,* and really speaking they belong to the category of *mithyātva.*

(3) Both-*puṇya* and *pāpa*-should either have fruition or no fruition. Hence, some *Karmas* are recognized in their original form on account of their *vipākas,* while others have either scanty juice (*rasa*) or no juice at all, and hence have very little *vipāka.* So, *pāpa* and *puṇya* are recognized by virtue of their various regions of *parṇāma,* and are distinguished from each other, on account of their mutually opposite qualities.

(4) The view that *puṇya* and *pāpa* exist in a combined state, is absolutely unfounded. Secondly, if *Karma* which acts as the cause of happiness and misery, was taken to exist in a composite state, all the living beings would undergo happiness as well as misery at the same time. But it does not happen so in reality. For, gods have almost everything of happiness and *nārakas* are always buried in absolute misery. It is clear, therefore, that the reasons of abundant happiness and abundant misery are different from each other Thirdly, if there is one composite entity of *puṇya* and *pāpa*, the theory that increase of *puṇya* causes abundance of happiness or that abundance of happiness is produced by the absolute removal of *pāpa*, would become null and void. Because, that which does not increase with the increase in another, is different from another. *Yajñadatta* who does not grow fat with the growth of *Devadatta* is different from *Devadatta*. The uniform oneness of *puṇya* and *pāpa* is, therefore, not at all proper. If their oneness is believed on the assumption of *Karma* being common in both, there would be no difficulty.

But so far as an individual is concerned, know it for certain that *puṇya* and *pāpa* are separate from each other as proved above, and hence *O Bhadra !* it is not worthy of you to raise any doubt about it. ॥ 398 ॥ (1946)

Referring to the commandments of *Vedas*, the author states—

असइ बहि पुन्न–पावे जमग्गिहोत्ताइं सग्गकामस्स ।
तदसंबद्धं सव्वं दाणाइफलं च लोअम्मि ॥ ३९९ ॥ (१९४७)

Asai bahi punna–pāve jamaggihottāim saggakāmassa ।
Tadasambaddham savvam dāṇāiphalam ca loammi ॥ 399 ॥ (1947)

[असतोर्बहिः पुण्य–पापयोरग्निहोत्रादि स्वर्गकामस्य ।
तदसंबद्धं सर्वं दानादिफलं च लोके ॥ ३९९ ॥ (१९४७)

Asatorbahiḥ puṇya–pāpayoragnihotrādi svargakāmasya ।
Tadasaṃbaddham sarvam dānādiphalam ca loke ॥399॥ (1947)]

Trans.—399 In (case of) *puṇya* and *pāpa* being absent, the commandment of the performance of the sacrifice etc. (prescribed) for one who aspires for Salvation, would become useless. Moreover, all sorts of fruition (of the good turn) like munificence etc, (welknown) in the world would also become null and void. (1947)

टीका–पुण्य–पापयोरसत्त्वे यदेतद् बहिरग्निहोत्राद्यनुष्ठानं स्वर्गकामस्य, यच्च दान–हिंसादिफलं पुण्य–पापात्मकं लोके प्रसिद्धं, तत् सर्वमसंबद्धं स्यात्, स्वर्गस्यापि पुण्यफलत्वात्, पुण्य–पापयोश्च भवदभिप्रायेणासत्त्वात्, तस्माद-भ्युपगन्तव्ये एव पुण्य–पापे। तदेवं वेदवचनप्रामाण्यात्, युक्तितश्च च्छिन्नस्तस्य संशय इति ॥ ३९९ ॥ (१९४७)

D. C.—If there were no *puṇya–pāpa* in this world, the commandment of the *Vedas* that one who aspires for Salvation should perform *agnihotra* etc, would be of no value. Moreover, the results of actions like *dāna* and *hiṃsā* in the forms of *puṇya* and *pāpa* respectively which are welknown in this world, would all be futile. Hence, take it for granted that *puṇya* and *pāpa* are existing, and leave off all your doubts. ॥399॥ (1947)

Thus,

छिन्नम्मि संसयम्मी जिणेण जर–मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
सो समणो पव्वइओ तिहि ओ सहखंडियसएहिं ॥४००॥(१९४८)

Chinnammi saṃsayammî Jiṇeṇa jara–maraṇavippamukkeṇam ।
So samaṇo pavvaio tihi o saha khaṇḍiyasaehim ॥ 400 ॥ (1948)

[छिन्ने संशये जिनेन जरा–मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
स श्रमणः प्रव्रजितस्त्रिभिस्तु सह खण्डिकशतैः ॥ ४०० ॥ (१९४८)

Chinne saṃśaye Jinena jarā-maraṇavipramuktena ।
Sa śramaṇaḥ pravrajitastribhistu saha khaṇḍikaśataiḥ ॥400॥(1948)]

Trans.—400 When the doubt was removed by the *Tîrthankara* who was entirely free from old age and death, that saint accepted the *Dîkṣā* along with his three hundred pupils. (1948)

End of the Discussion with the Ninth Gaṇadhara.

Chapter X

दशमगणधरवक्तव्यता ।

Discussion with the Tenth Ganadhara

ते पव्वइए सोउं मेअज्जो आगच्छई जिणसयासं ।
वच्चामि य वंदामी वंदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ॥ ४०१ ॥ (१९४९)

Te pavvaie söum Meajjo āgacchai Jiṇasayāsam ।
Vaccāmi ya vandāmî vandittā pajjuvāsāmi ॥ 401 ॥ (1949)

[तान् प्रव्रजितान् श्रुत्वा मेतार्य आगच्छति जिनसकाशम् ।
व्रजामि वन्दे वन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ॥ ४०१ ॥ (१९४९)

Tān pravrajitān śrutvā Metārya āgacchati Jinasakāśam ।
Vrajāmi vande vanditvā paryupāse ॥ 401 ॥ (1949)]

Trans.—401 Having heard that they have renounced the world, *Metārya,* comes before the *Tîrthaṅkara.* (He thinks–) I may go, pay my homages, and worship him. (1949)

आभट्ठो य जिणेणं जाइ-जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
नामेण य गोत्तेण य सव्वण्णू सव्वदरिसी णं ॥४०२॥ (१९५०)

Ābhaṭṭho ya Jiṇeṇam jāi-jarā-maraṇavippamukkeṇam ।
Nāmeṇa ya gottena ya savvaṇṇū savvadarisî ṇam ॥402॥ (1950)

[आभाषितश्च जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ॥ ४०२ ॥ (१९५०)

Ābhāṣitaśca Jinena jāti-jarā-maraṇavipramuktena ।
Nāmnā ca gotreṇa ca sarvajñena sarvadarśinā ॥ 402 ॥ (1950)]

Trans.—402 He was addressed by his name and lineage by the *Tîrthaṅkara,* who was entirely free from birth old age and death, who was omniscient, and who had (attained) complete *darśana.* (Undifferentiated knowledge.) (1950)

The *Tîrthaṅkara* then said—

किं मन्ने परलोओ अत्थि नत्थि त्ति संसओ तुज्झ ।
वेयपयाण य अत्थं न याणासि तेसिमो अत्थो ॥४०३॥(१९५१)

Kim manne paralöo atthi natthi tti samsao tujjha ।
Veyapayāṇa ya attham na yāṇasi tesimo attho ॥ 403 ॥ (1951)

[किं मन्यसे परलोकोऽस्ति नास्तीति संशयस्तव ।
वेदपदानां चार्थं न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ ४०३ ॥ (१९५१)

Kim manyase paraloko'sti nāstîti saṃśayastava ।
Veda-padānām cārtham na janāsi teṣāmayamarthaḥ ॥403॥(1951)]

Trans.—403 What are you thinking about ? You entertain the doubt as to whether the next world exists or not. But *(ca)* you have not understood the (real) meaning of the sentences of *Vedas.* Here is their (real) interpretation. (1951)

टीका–आयुष्मन् मेतार्य ! त्वमेवं मन्यसे–किं भवान्तर गमनलक्षणः परलोकोऽस्ति, नास्ति वा ? इति । अयं च संशयस्तव विरुद्धवेदपदश्रुति-निबन्धनो वर्तते । तानि च " विज्ञानघन एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः " इत्यादीनि प्रथमगणधरोक्तानि द्रष्टव्यानि । " तेषां चार्थं न जानासि " इत्यादि तथैवेति ॥ ४०३ ॥ (१९५१)

D. C.—O long-lived *Metārya* ! your doubt about the existence of *para-loka* has arisen from your hearing various *Veda-padas* bearing contradictory senses.

These *Veda-padas* are *"Vijñānaghana evaitebhyo bhūtebhyo"*

etc. which have already been discussed in the First *Gaṇadhara-vāda* ॥ 403 ॥ (1951)

The author now states the arguments advanced by the student as follows—

मन्नसि जइ चेयण्णं मज्जंगमउ व्व भूयधम्मो त्ति ।
तो नत्थि परलोगो तन्नासे जेण तन्नासो ॥ ४०४ ॥ (१९५२)

Mannasi jai ceyaṇṇam majjaṅgamau vva bhūyadhammo tti ।
To natthi paralogo tannāse jeṇa tannāso ॥ 404 ॥ (1952)

[मन्यसे यदि चैतन्यं मद्याङ्गमद इव भूतधर्म इति ।
ततो नास्ति परलोकस्तन्नाशे येन तन्नाशः ॥ ४०४ ॥ (१९५२)

Manyase yadi caitanyam madyāṅgamada iva bhūtadharma iti ।
Tato nāsti paralokastannāśe yena tannāśaḥ ॥ 404 ॥ (1952)]

Trans.—404 If you believe consciousness to be the property of *bhūtas*, just as intoxication is that of the constituents of wine, the destruction of consciousness being consequent at the destruction of the *bhūtas*, the other world will not exist. (1952)

टीका–सौम्य ! त्वमेवं मन्यसे–यदि तावच्चैतन्यं पृथिव्यादिभूतधर्मः—भूतेभ्योऽनर्थान्तरभूतमित्यर्थः, यथा गुड–धातक्यादिमद्याङ्गेभ्योऽनर्थान्तरं मदधर्मः, तर्हि नास्त्यवान्तरगमनलक्षणः परलोकः, येन तन्नाशे भूतनाशे तस्यापि चैतन्यस्य नाशो ध्वंसो जायते । यो हि यदनर्थान्तरभूतो धर्मः स तद्विनाशे नश्यत्येव, यथा पटादिधर्मः शुक्लत्वादिः । ततो भूतैरेव सह प्रागेव नष्टस्य चैतन्यस्य कुतो भवान्तरगमनम् ? इति ॥ ४०४ ॥ (१९५२)

D. C.—When you take *caitanya* as the property of a *bhūta* like *pṛithvî*, it will not be separate from *bhūtas*, just as the constituents of wine such as jaggery and *dhātaki puṣpa* etc. are not different from their property of intoxication. Consequently, when *bhūtas* meet destruction, their property *viz caitanya* will also meet destruction, just as whiteness of cloth

disappears with the cloth. So, when *caitanya* vanishes with the *bhūtas*, how is it to go to the other world ? ॥404॥ (1952)

Even by taking *caitanya* as different from *bhūtas*, the existence of *para-loka* will not be established—

अह वि तदत्थंतरया न य निच्चत्तणमओ वि तदवत्थं ।
अनलस्स वाऽरणीओ भिन्नस्स विणासधम्मस्स ॥४०५॥(१९५३)

Aha vi tadatthantarayā na ya niccattanamao vi tadavattham ।
Analassa vā'raṇîo bhinnassa viṇāsadhammassa ॥ 405 ॥ (1953)

[अथापि तदर्थान्तरता न च नित्यत्वमतोऽपि तदवस्थम् ।
अनलस्येवाऽरणितो भिन्नस्य विनाशधर्मणः ॥ ४०५ ॥ (१९५३)

Athāpi tadarthāntaratā na ca nityatvamato'pi tadavastham ।
Analasyevā'raṇito bhinnasya vināśadharmaṇaḥ ॥ 405 ॥ (1953)]

Trans.—405 And even if it is different, its perpetuality is not (established). Hence, like fire which is transitory and which is different from *araṇi*, it is transitory. (1953)

टीका–अथापि तदर्थान्तरता भूतेभ्योऽर्थान्तरता चैतन्यस्याभ्युपगम्यते, नन्वतोऽपि तदवस्थं भवान्तरगामित्वाभावलक्षणं दूषणम् ; च शब्दो यस्मादर्थे, यतोऽर्थान्तरभूतस्यापि चैतन्यस्य न नित्यत्वम् । कथंभूतस्योत्पत्तिमत्त्वेन विनाशधर्मकस्य । कस्य यथाऽनित्यत्वम् ? इत्याह—अनलस्य । कथंभूतस्य ? भिन्नस्य । कस्य ? । अरणीतोऽरणेः । इदमुक्तं भवति–भूतेभ्योऽर्थान्तरत्वेऽप्यनित्यं चैतन्यम्, उत्पत्तिधर्मकत्वात्, अरणिकाष्टोत्पन्नतद्भिन्नानलवदिति, यच्चानित्यं तत् किमपि कालं स्थित्वाऽनलवदत्रापि ध्वंसते, इति न तस्य भवान्तरयायित्वम्, अत इत्थमपि न परलोकसिद्धिरिति ।

अथ प्रतिपिण्डं भिन्नानि भूतधर्मरूपाणि बहूनि चैतन्यानि नेष्यन्ते, किन्त्वेक एव समस्तचैतन्याश्रयः सर्वत्रिभुवनगतो निष्क्रियश्चात्माऽभ्युपगम्यते; यत उक्तम्—

" एक एव हि भूतात्मा भूते भूते व्यवस्थितः ।
एकधा बहुधा चैव दृश्यते जलचन्द्रवत् ॥ १ ॥ "

॥ ४०५ ॥ (१९५३)

D. C.—Even if *caitanya* were taken to be different from *bhūtas*, it would not be able to go to the other world. For, like fire which is different from *araṇi*, *caitanya* is *a-nitya*, as it dies away after living for sometime.

The existence of *para-loka* is not established from this point of view also.

Some might not admit the existence of plenty of *caitanyas* related to each and every *bhūta*, and might admit the existence of one all-pervading *niṣkriya* soul as said below—

Eka eva hi bhūtātmā bhūte bhūte vyavasthitaḥ ।
Ekadhā bahudhā caiva dṛiśyate jalacandravat ॥

[There exists only one soul pervading each and every *bhūta*. Like moon (reflected in) water, it appears as one, and at the same time in many forms.] ॥ 405 ॥ (1953)

But even in such a case, there is no scope for *para-loka*,

अह एगो सव्वगओ निक्किरिओ तहवि नत्थि परलोओ ।
संसरणाभावाओ वोमस्स व सव्वपिंडेसु ॥ ४०६ ॥ (१९५४)

Aha ego savvagao nikkirio tahavi natthi paralōo ।
Saṃsaraṇābhāvāo vomassa va savvapindesu ॥ 406 ॥ (1954)

[अथैकः सर्वगतो निष्क्रियस्तथापि नास्ति परलोकः ।
संसरणाभावाद् व्योम्न इव सर्वपिण्डेषु ॥ ४०६ ॥ (१९५४)

Athaikaḥ sarvagato niṣkriyastathāpi nāsti paralokaḥ ।
Saṃsaraṇābhāvād vyomna iva sarvapiṇḍeṣu ॥ 406 ॥ (1954)]

Trans.—406 If there exists one, all-pervading, inactive (soul), then also, there would be nothing like *para-loka* because

of the lack of movement (on its part) to all beings (in spite of its being all-pervading) like *ākāśa.* (1954)

टीका-अथैकः सर्वगतो निष्क्रियश्चात्माऽभ्युपगम्यते, ननु तथापि न परलोकगमनसिद्धिः, तस्यात्मनः सर्वेषु गो-मनुष्यादिपिण्डेषु सर्वगतत्वेन निष्क्रियत्वेन च संसरणाभावात्, व्योमवदिति ॥ ४०६ ॥ (१९५४)

D. C.—Even when the existence of one, all-pervading, inactive soul is accepted, the existence of *para-loka* will not be established. For, like *ākās'a,* it is *niṣkriya* in spite of its being spread over all living beings ॥ 406 ॥ (1954)

The existence of *para-loka* can be doubted in this manner also—

इहलोगाओ व परो सुराइलोगो न सो वि पच्चक्खो ।
एवं पि न परलोगो सुव्वइ य सुईसु तो संका ॥४०७॥(१९५५)

Ihalogāo va paro surāilogo na so vi paccakkho ।
Evam pi na paralogo suvvai ya suîsu to sankā ॥ 407 ॥ (1955)

[इहलोकाद् वा परः सुरादिलोको न सोऽपि प्रत्यक्षः ।
एवमपि न परलोकः श्रूयते च श्रुतिषु ततः शङ्का ॥४०७॥ (१९५५)

Ihalokād vā paraḥ surādiloko na so'pi pratyakṣaḥ ।
Evamapi na paralokaḥ śrūyate ca śrutiṣu tataḥ śaṅkā ॥407॥(1955)]

Trans.—407 Or, if there is a world like that of gods etc. other than this world, that is also not directly perceived. So, *para-loka* does not exist even in that way. On the other hand, it has been heard (about *para-loka*) in the *śāstras.* Consequently, the doubt (about *para-loka*) has arisen. (1955)

टीका-अथवा, इहलोकापेक्षया सुर-नारकादिभवः परलोक उच्यते, स च न प्रत्यक्षो दृश्यते, अत एवमपि न परलोकः सिध्यति, श्रूयते चासौ श्रुतिषु शास्त्रेषु, ततस्तच्छङ्का-किमस्ति नास्ति वा ? । इति दर्शितः पूर्वपक्षः ॥ ४०७ ॥ (१९५५)

D. C.—If the existence of some world like that of divine beings or hellish beings, is accepted since they, too, are not *pratyakṣa*, their existence is also not acceptible.

On the other hand, the *S'āstras* refer to them and tell a lot of things about them. Your doubt about the existence of *para-loka* is based upon such mutually contradictory facts. ॥ 407 ॥ (1955)

Here ends the *pūrva-pakṣa* The author now refutes the arguments of *pūrva-pakṣa* one after another—

भूइंदियाइरित्तस्स चेयणा सो य दव्वओ निच्चो ।
जाइस्सरणाईहिं पडिवज्जसु वाउभूइ व्व ॥ ४०८ ॥ (१९५६)

Bhūindiyāirittassa ceyanā so ya davvao nicco ।
Jāissaranāîhim padivajjasu Vāubhūi vva ॥ 408 ॥ (1956)

[भूतेन्द्रियातिरिक्तस्य चेतना स च द्रव्यतो नित्यः ।
जातिस्मरणादिभिः प्रतिपद्यस्व वायुभूतिरिव ॥ ४०८ ॥ (१९५६)

Bhūtendriyātiriktasya cetanā sa ca dravyato nityaḥ ।
Jātismaraṇādibhiḥ pratipadyasva Vāyubhūtiriva ॥ 408 ॥ (1956)]

Trans.—408 Consciousness belongs to (the soul) which is distinguished from elements, as well as, sense-organs. Like *Vāyubhūti,* know it for certain, therefore, that it is more perpetual than *dravya* by virtue of its (power of) remembering the former birth etc. (1956)

टीका–इह भूतेन्द्रियातिरिक्तस्य पूर्वाभिहितानुमानादिप्रमाणसिद्धस्यात्मन एव संबन्धिनी चेतना मन्तव्या, न भूतधर्मः । स चात्मा जातिस्मरणादिहेतुद्रव्यतो नित्य इति वायुभूतिरिव प्रतिपद्यस्व । अतो नैकान्तानित्यत्वपक्षोक्तो दोषः, पर्यायत एवाऽस्यानित्यत्वादिति भावः ॥४०८॥ (१९५६)

D. C.—*Cetanā* is not the property of *bhūtas,* but it is the property of Soul, which is different from *bhūtas,* as well as,

indriyas, and the existence of which has already been established by means of *anumānas* and other evidences. This soul has already by accepted by *Vāyubhūti* † as more *nitya* than *dravya* on account of its power of remembering its (previous) existence etc. You too, shall have to accept its *nityatva*, so that the fault of exclusive *nityatva* alleged by you does not arise. ॥ 408 ॥ (1956)

And,

न य एगो सव्वगओ निक्किरिओ लक्खणाइभेआओ ।
कुंभादउ व्व बहवो पडिवज्ज तमिंदभूइ व्व ॥ ४०९ ॥ (१९५७)

Na ya ego savvagao nikkirio lakkhanāibheāo ।
Kumbhādau vva bahavo padivajja tamindabhūi vva ॥409॥ (1957)

[न चैकः सर्वगतो निष्क्रियो लक्षणादिभेदात् ।
कुम्भादय इव बहवः प्रतिपद्यस्व तदिन्द्रभूतिरिव ॥ ४०९ ॥ (१९५७)

Na caikaḥ sarvagato niṣkriyo lakṣaṇādibhedāt ।
Kumbhādaya iva bahavaḥ pratipadyasva tadinadribhūtiriva ॥409॥

Trans.—409 It is neither one, nor all-pervading, nor inactive. Like *Indrabhūti*, believe it as many (in number) like *ghaṭa* etc. by reason of various characteristics. (1957)

टीका—न चास्माभिरेक आत्मेष्यते, किन्तु बहवः—अनन्ताः । कुतः ? । लक्षणभेदात् । उपयोगलक्षणो हि जीवः, स चोपयोगो राग—द्वेष—कषाय—विषयाध्यवसायादिभिर्भिद्यमान उपाधिभेदादानन्त्यं प्रतिपद्यत इत्यनन्ता जीवाः, लक्षणभेदात्, घटादिवदिति । तथा, न सर्वगत आत्मा, किन्तु शरीरमात्रव्यापकः, तत्रैव तद्गुणोपलब्धेरित्यादिशब्दोपात्तो हेतुः, स्पर्शनवदिति दृष्टान्तश्च । एवं न निष्क्रिय आत्मा, भोक्तृत्वात्, देवदत्तवदिति । तदेतदिन्द्रभूतिप्रथमगणधरवत् प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ॥ ४०९ ॥ (१९५७)

D. C.—According to us, Soul is not one, but infinite in

† Vide Chap III

number, by virtue of its different characteristics. Like *ghaṭa, paṭa* etc, the Soul has various forms on account of various *lakṣaṇas* such as *rāga, dveṣa, kaṣāya* etc. Secondly, Soul is not all-pervading, but it pervadas the body alone. Thirdly, because it is the enjoyer like *Devadatta,* it is not *niṣkriya.* Thus, like *Indrabhūti,*† you, too, shall have to admit ॥409॥ (1957)

In reply to the argument that the existence of *para-loka* is denied because of the divine and hellish beings being *a-pratyakṣa,* the author states—

इहलोगाओ य परो सोम्म ! सुरा नारगा य परलोओ ।
पडिवज्ज मोरिआ-ऽकंपिउ व्व विहियप्पमाणाओ ॥४१०॥ (१९५८)

Ihalogāo ya paro Somma ! surā nāragā ya paralöo ।
Padivajja Moriā-'kampiu vva vihiyappamānāo ॥ 410 ॥ (1958)

[इहलोकाच्च परः सौम्य ! सुरा नारकाश्च परलोकः ।
प्रतिपद्यस्व मौर्या-ऽकम्पितावित्र विहितप्रमाणात् ॥४१० ॥ (१९५८)

Ihalokācca paraḥ Saumya ! surā nārakāsca paralokaḥ ।
Pratipadyasva Maurya'kampitāviva vihitapramāṇāt ॥410॥(1958)]

Trans.—410 Believe the world other than this, *O Saumya !* to be that of gods and *Nārakas* on account of evidences that have been advanced (in case) of *Maurya* and *Akampita.** (1958)

The opponent will argue at this point that—

जीवो विण्णाणमओ तं चाणिच्चं ति तो न परलोगो ।
अह विण्णाणाद्दण्णो तो अणभिण्णो जहागासं ॥४११॥(१९५९)

इत्तो च्चिय न स कत्ता भोत्ता य अओ वि नत्थि परलोगो ।
जं च न संसारी सो अण्णाणा-ऽमुत्तिओ खं व ॥४१२॥(१९६०)

† Vide Chapter I

* Vide chapters VII and VIII.

Jîvo viṇṇāṇamao tam cāṇiccam ti to na paralogo ।
Aha viṇṇāṇādaṇṇo to aṇabhinno jahāgāsam ॥ 411 ॥ (1959)

Itto cciya na sa kattā bhottā ya ao vi natthi paralogo ।
Jam ca na samsārî so annānā-'muttio kham va ॥ 412 ॥ (1960)

[जीवो विज्ञानमयस्तच्चानित्यमिति ततो न परलोकः ।
अथ विज्ञानादन्यस्ततोऽनभिज्ञो यथाऽऽकाशम् ॥ ४११ ॥ (१९५९)

इत एव न स कर्ता भोक्ता चातोऽपि नास्ति परलोकः ।
यच्च न संसारी सोऽज्ञाना-ऽमूर्तित खमिव ॥ ४१२ ॥ (१९६०)

Jîvo vijñāmayastaccānityamiti tato na paralokaḥ ।
Atha, vijñānādanyastato'nabhijño yathā'-kāśam ॥ 411 ॥ (1959)]

Ita eva na sa kartā bhoktā cāto'pi nāsti paralokaḥ ।
Yacca na saṃsārî so'jnānā-murtitaḥ khamiva ॥ 412 ॥ (1960)]

Trans.—411-412 *Jîva* is (said to be) *vijñānamaya* and *vijnāna* is *a-nitya.* So, there cannot be *paraloka.* If it is (said to be) different from *vijnāna,* then also, *jîva* being ignorant like sky, it will neither be a doer nor an enjoyer, and then also, there will be no *paraloka.* (For), that which is ignorant and incorporeal like *ākāśa,* cannot belong to the mundane world. (1959-1960)

टीका-व्याख्या-जीवो विज्ञानमयस्तावद् युष्माभिरिष्यते विज्ञानादभिन्न इत्यर्थः । तच्च विज्ञानमनित्यं विनश्वरम्, अतस्तद भिन्नस्य जीवस्यापि विनश्वरत्वाद् न भवान्तरगमनलक्षणः परलोकः । अथ विज्ञानादन्यो जीवस्ततोऽनित्ये विज्ञाने जीवाद् भिन्ने सति स्वयं नित्योऽसाविति न परलोकाभावः । यद्येवम्, तर्हि अनभिज्ञो जीवः, विज्ञानादन्यत्वात्, आकाशवत्, काष्ठादिवद् वा । अत एव च नित्यत्वादेवासौ जीवो न कर्ता, नापि भोक्ता । नित्यस्य कर्तृत्वाद्यभ्युपगमे हि सर्वदैव तद्भावप्रसङ्गः, तस्य सदैवैकरूपत्वात् । कर्तृत्वाभावे च न परलोकः, अकृतस्य तस्याभ्युपगमे सिद्धानामपि तत्प्रसङ्गात् । भोक्तृत्वाभावेऽपि न परलोकः, अभोक्तुः परलोकहेतुभूतकर्मभोगायोगात् । इतोऽपि च न परलोकः । कुतः ? इत्याह-" जं चेत्यादि " यस्माच्च नासौ

संसारी, नास्य ज्ञानाद् भिन्नस्य जीवस्य भवाद् भवान्तरगमनलक्षणं संसरण-मस्तीत्यर्थः । कुतः ? इत्याह–स्वयमज्ञानत्वात्, काष्ठखण्डवत् । तथा, अमूर्तत्वात्, आकाशवदिति ॥ ४११–४१२ ॥ (१९५९–१९६०)

D. C.—Metārya:—You believe *jîva* to be *vijñānamaya*. Now, since *vijñāna* is *a-nitya*, *jîva* will also be *a-nitya*. Consequently, there will be no possiblity of going to the other world and there will be no *para-loka* also. On the other hand, if you take *jîva* to be different from *vijñāna*, *jîva* will not be *a-nitya*, but being different from *vijñāna*, it will be ignorant, or dull like sky or wood. Consequently, the soul will neither be *kartā* (doer) nor *bhoktā* (enjoyer). In absence of *kartṛitva*, existence of *para-loka* will be denied. For, if *para-loka* is taken as existing even in absence of *kartṛitva*, the *Siddha* beings that have already attained absolute Liberation will attain *para-loka*. In absence of *bhoktṛitva* also, there will be no *para-loka*, because the soul which is *nitya* but not *bhoktā*, will not be able to attain *para-loka* in absence of *Karma*, which acts as the cause of passing to the other world. This *jîva*, therefore, being distinguished from *jîvana* does not belong to the mundane world, as it has no passage to the other world on account of its ignorance like that of wood, and *a-mūrtatva* like that of *ākās'a*. ॥ 411–412 ॥ (1959–1960)

The reply is—

मन्नसि विणासि चेओ उप्पत्तिमदादिओ जहा कुंभो ।
नणु एयं चिय साहणमविणासित्ते वि से सोम्म ! ॥४१३॥ (१९६१)

Mannasi viṇāsi ceo uppattimadādio jahā kumbho ।
Naṇu eyam ciya sāhaṇaviṇāsitte vi se Somma ! ॥ 413 ॥ (1961)

[मन्यसे विनाशि चेत उत्पत्तिमदादितो यथा कुम्भः ।
नन्वेतदेव साधनमविनाशित्वेऽपि तस्य सौम्य ! ॥ ४१३ ॥ (१९६१)

Manyase vināsi ceta utpattimadādito yathā kumbhaḥ ।
Nanvetadeva sādhanamavināśitve'pi tasya Saumya ! ॥413॥(1961)]

Trans.—413 You take consciousness to be destructible like *ghaṭa* on account of its (having) production etc. (Because) in (case of) its indestructibility also, the same is the cause, *O Saumya !* (1961)

टीका–ननु " जीवो विण्णाणमओ तं चाणिच्चं " इति ब्रुवाणो नूनं त्वमेवं मन्यसे–विनाशि विनश्वरं चेतश्चेतना चैतन्यं विज्ञानमिति यावत् । उत्पत्तिमत्त्वादिति हेतुः । यथा कुम्भ इति दृष्टान्तः । आदिशब्दात् " पर्याय-त्वात् " इत्यादिकोऽपि हेतुर्वक्तव्यः । यो हि पर्यायः स सर्वोऽप्यनित्यः, यथा स्तम्भादीनां नव–पुराणादिपर्यायः । ततश्चानित्याच्चैतन्यादभिन्नत्वे जीवस्या-प्यनित्यत्वात् परलोकाभाव इति तवाभिप्रायः। न चायं युक्तः, यतो हन्त ! नैकान्तेन विज्ञानमनित्यम्, यतोऽविनाशित्वेऽपि " से " तस्य विज्ञानस्यै-तदेव सौम्य ! त्वदुक्तं साधनं प्रमाणं वर्तते । ततोऽनैकान्तिकस्त्वदुक्तो हेतुरिति भावः । इदमुक्तं भवति–उत्पाद–व्यय–ध्रौव्यात्मकं वस्तु । ततश्च यथोत्पत्तिमत्त्वाद् विनाशित्वं सिध्यति तथा ध्रौव्यात्मकत्वाद् वस्तुनः कथञ्चिद् नित्यत्वमपि सिध्यति । ततश्चेदमपि शक्यते वक्तुम्–नित्यं विज्ञा-नम्, उत्पत्तिमत्त्वात्, घटवत् । ततश्च कथञ्चिन्नित्याद् विज्ञानादभिन्नस्य जीवस्य नित्यत्वाद् न परलोकाभाव इति ॥ ४१३ ॥ (१९६१)

D. C.—Since *caitanya* is susceptible to production, and exists in various forms due to various specific characteristics, you have accepted it to be *a–nitya*. That which exists in various forms due to various *paryāyas*, is *a–nitya* like *paryāyas* as in the case of old and new *paryāyas* of pillar etc. Thus, the Soul which is *a–bhinna* from the *a–nitya caitanya*, is taken as *a–nitya* by you, who have denied the existence of *para–loka*. But that is not correct. *Caitanya–vijñāna* is not exclusively *a–nitya*, but any how, it is *nitya* to a certain extent also.

Every object is susceptible to three conditions—production, destruction and perpetuality. So, just as *a–nityatā* is established by you on account of *utpatti*, *nityatā* could also be established by means of the condition of perpetuality. It could easily be stated, therefore, that *vijñāna* is *nitya* like *ghata*, and on

account of the *nityatva* of *jîva*, there is no *a-bhāva* of *para-loka*. ॥ 413 ॥ (1961)

Or,

अहवा वत्थुत्तणओ विणासि चेओ न होइ कुंभो व ।
उप्पत्तिमदादित्ते कहमविणासी घडो, बुद्धी ? ॥४१४॥ (१९६२)

Ahavā vatthuttaṇao viṇāsi ceo na höi kumbho vva ।
Uppattimadāditte kahamaviṇāsî ghaḍo, buddhî ? ॥ 414 ॥ (1962)

[अथवा वस्तुत्वतो विनाशि चेतो न भवति कुम्भ इव ।
उत्पत्तिमदादित्वे कथमविनाशी घटो, बुद्धिः ? ॥ ४१४ ॥ (१९६२)

Athavā vastutvato vināśi ceto na bhavati kumbha iva ।
Utpattimadāditve kathamavināśî ghaṭo, buddhiḥ ? ॥414॥(1962)]

Trans.—414 Or, consciousness does not become destructible like *ghaṭa* on account of its being a (definite) object. (The question may be that) "How could *ghaṭa* be indestructible when it is suceptible to production etc ?" (1962)

टीका–एकान्तेन विनाशि विनश्वरं चेतो विज्ञानं न भवति, वस्तुत्वात्, कुम्भवत् । ततोऽस्य प्रत्युनुमानस्योपस्थापनाद् विरुद्धाव्यभिचार्यप्युत्पत्तिमत्त्वलक्षणो हेतुः । यदुक्तम्–"णणु एयं चिय साहणमविणासित्ते वि" इत्यादि, तत्र परस्येवं बुद्धिः स्यात् । कथंभूता बुद्धिः ? इत्याह–कथमुत्पत्तिमत्वाद् दृष्टान्तत्वेनापन्यस्तो घटोऽविनाशी सिध्यति ?–न कथञ्चित्, घटस्य विनाशित्वेन सुप्रतीतत्वात् । ततश्च दृष्टान्तेऽविनाशित्वस्यासिद्धेर्दार्ष्टान्तिके विज्ञाने तद् न सिध्यतीति परस्याभिप्राय इति ॥ ४१४ ॥ (१९६२)

D. C.—Consciouness is never destructible exclusively on account of its being a definite *vastu* like *ghaṭa*

Metārya:—When *ghaṭa* is susceptible to production etc, how should it be considered indestructible ? It is recognized as destructible by all. Thus when indestructibilty of *ghaṭa* is

not proved in the illustration stated above, indestructibility (in case) of *vijñāna* also, will not be proved. ॥ 414 ॥ (1962)

Bhagavān replies—

रूव–रस–गंध–फासा संखा संठाण–दव्व–सत्तीओ ।
कुंभो त्ति जओ ताओ पसूइ-विच्छित्ति-धुवधम्मा ॥४१५॥(१९६३)

Rūva–rasa–gandha–phāsā samkhā saṇṭhāna–davva–sattîo ।
Kumbho tti jao tāo paṣūi–vicchitti–dhuvadhamṁā ॥ 415 ॥ (1963)

[रूप–रस–गन्ध–स्पर्शाः संख्या संस्थान–द्रव्य–शक्तयः ।
कुम्भ इति यतस्ताः प्रसूति–व्यवच्छित्ति–ध्रुवधर्माणः ॥४१५॥(१९६३)

Rūpa–rasa–gandha–sparśāḥ saṃkhā saṃsthāna–dravya–śaktayaḥ ।
Kumbha iti yatastāḥ prasūti–vyavacchitti–dhruvadharmāṇaḥ ॥415॥

Trans.—415 Form, taste, odour, touch, number, configuration, matter, and energy form *kumbha.* For, all of them possess the characteristics of production, destructibility and perpetuality. (1963).

टीका–इह रूप–रस–गन्ध–स्पर्शलक्षणो गुणसमुदायः, एकलक्षणा संख्या, पृथुबुध्नोदराद्याकारलक्षणं संस्थानम्, मृद्द्रव्यम्, जलाहराणादि-शक्तिश्चेत्येतानि समुदितानि यतः कुम्भ इत्युच्यते, ताश्च रूप–रस–गन्ध–स्पर्श–संख्या–संस्थान–द्रव्य–शक्तयः प्रसूति–विच्छित्ति–ध्रौव्यधर्मिण्य उत्पा-दव्यय–ध्रौव्यस्वरूपाः, तत उत्पत्तिमत्त्वादविनाश्यपि घटः सिध्यति ॥४१५॥ (१९६३)

D. C.—A group of properties such as form, taste, odour, and touch; the number one etc., configuration like that of broad portion from the middle etc; matter (in the form) of earth; and capacity for holding water; all these properties combine together and form *ghaṭa.* Each one of these properties is again perceptible to production, destructibility and perpetuality. *Ghaṭa* is, therefore, *nitya* inspite of its being *utpattimat.* ॥415॥ (1963)

Explaining the same in details the author proceeds—

इह पिण्डो पिण्डागार–सत्तिपज्जायविलयसमकालं ।
उप्पज्जइ कुंभागार–सत्तिपज्जायरूवेण ॥ ४१६ ॥ (१९६४)
रूवाइं दव्वयाए न जाइ न य वेइ तेण सो निच्चो ।
एवं उप्पाय–व्वय–धुवस्सहावं मयं सव्वं ॥ ४१७ ॥ (१९६५)

Iha piṇḍo piṇḍāgāra–sattipajjāyavilayasamakālam ।
Uppajjai kuṃbhāgāra–sattipajjāyarūveṇa ॥ 416 ॥ (1964)

Rūvāim davvayāe na jāi na ya vei teṇa so nicco ।
Evam uppāya–vvaya–dhuvassahāvam mayam savvam ॥417॥ (1965)

[इह पिण्डः पिण्डाकार–शक्तिपर्यायविलयसमकालम् ।
उत्पद्यते कुम्भाकार–शक्तिपर्यायरूपेण ॥ ४१६ ॥ (१९६४)
रूपादिद्रव्यतया न जायते न च व्येति तेन स नित्यः ।
एवमुत्पाद–व्यय–ध्रौव्यस्वभावं मतं सर्वम् ॥ ४१७ ॥ (१९६५)

Iha piṇḍaḥ piṇḍākāra–śaktiparyāyavilayasamakālam ।
Utpadyate kumbhākāra–śakti paryāya rūpeṇa ॥ 416 ॥ (1964)]

Rūpādi dravyatayā na jāyate na ca vyeti tena sa nityaḥ ।
Evamutpāda–vyaya–dhrauvyasvabhāvam matam sarvam ॥417॥(1965)]

Trans—416–417 The lump (of earth) in this case, is produced in the specific characteristics of the shape and capacity of *kambha* at the same time when it is destroyed in the specific characteristics of its (own) shape and capacity. It is produced and destroyed neither by (virtue of) its form etc nor by (virtue of) its matter. It is, therefore, (called) *nitya*. Everything is thus believed to possess the conditions of (being susceptible to) production, destructibility and perpetuality. (1964–1965)

टीका–इह मृत्पिण्डः कर्ता । योऽयं वृत्तसंस्थानरूपः स्वकीयो मृत्पि-

ण्डाकारः, शक्तिश्च या काचिदात्मीया, एतदुभयलक्षणो यः पर्यायस्तस्य यो विलयो विनाशस्तत्समकालमेवासावुत्पद्यते मृत्पिण्डः। केन ? इत्याह–पृथुबुध्नोदरादिको यः कुम्भाकारः, तच्छक्तिश्च या जलाहरणादिविषया, एतदुभयलक्षणो यः पर्यायस्तेनोत्पद्यते। रूप–रस–गन्ध–स्पर्शरूपतया मृद्द्रव्यरूपतया चासौ मृत्पिण्डो न जायते, नापि व्येति विनश्यति। ततस्तद्रूपतया नित्योऽयमुच्यते, तेन रूपेण तस्य सदैवावस्थितत्वात्। तदेवं मृत्पिण्डो निजाकारस्वशक्तिरूपतया विनश्यति, घटाकार–तच्छक्तिरूपतयोत्पद्यते, रूपादिभावेन मृद्द्रव्यरूपतया चावतिष्ठत, इत्युत्पाद–व्यय–ध्रौव्यस्वभावोऽयमुच्यते। एवं घटोऽपि पूर्वपर्यायेण विनश्यति, घटाकारतया तूत्पद्यते, रूपादित्वेन मृद्द्रव्यतया चावतिष्ठत इत्यसावप्युत्पाद–व्यय–ध्रौव्यस्वभावमेवाभिमतं तीर्थकृताम्। ततश्च यथोत्पत्तिमत्त्वाद् विनाशित्वं घटे सिध्यति तथाऽविनाशित्वमपि। तथा च सति साध्यधर्मिणि चैतन्येऽपि तत्सिद्धिरिति। तदेवं चैतन्याद्व्यतिरिक्तोऽपि जीवः कथञ्चिद् नित्य एव ॥ ४१६–४१७ ॥ (१९६४–१९६५)

D. C.—Properties like the shape and capacity of the lump of earth, vanish and at the same time, *ghaṭa*-having its peculiar shape and its capacity of holding water-is produced. The lump of earth is neither produced nor destroyed in the form of *rūpa-rasa-gandha-spars'a* or *dravya*. It continues to exist perpetually in these forms. Thus, the lump of earth vanishes in the form of the shape and capacity of *ghaṭa*, and exists for ever in the form of *rūpa, rasa, gandha, spars'a* and *dravya*. Similarly, *ghaṭa* also vanishes in the form of its former *paryāyas*, and comes into existence with new *paryāyas* of *ghaṭākāra*, and lasts for ever in the form of *paryāyas* of *rūpa* etc. as well as *dravya* Consequently, it has also the *svabhāva* of *utpatti, vyaya* and *dhrauvya*. Such is not the case with *ghaṭa* only, but it is the nature of each and every object of the Universe. So, like destructibility, in-destructibility of *ghaṭa* is also due to the *hetus* like *utpattimattva* etc. Consequently, in case of *caitanya* and *ātmā* also, the *nityatā* shoud be admitted. ॥ 416-417 ॥ (1964–1965)

Indicating the existence of *para-loka* thereby, the author states—

घडचेयणया नासो पडचेयणया समुब्भवो समयं ।
संताणेणावत्था तहेह-परलोअ-जीवाणं ॥ ४१८ ॥ (१९६६)

मणुएहलोगनासो सुराइपरलोगसंभवो समयं ।
जीवतयाऽवत्थाणं नेहभवो नेय परलोओ ॥ ४१९ ॥ (१९६७)

Ghaḍaceyaṇayā nāso padaceyaṇayā samubbhavo samayam ।
Santāṇeṇāvatthā taheha-paralöa-jîvāṇam ॥ 418 ॥ (1966)

Manuehaloganāso surāiparaloga sambhavo samayam ।
Jîvatayā'vatthāṇam nehabhavo neya paralöo ॥ 419 ॥ (1967)

[**घटचेतनया नाशः पटचेतनया समुद्भवः समकम् ।**
संतानेनावस्था तथेह-परलोक-जीवानाम् ॥ ४१८ ॥ (१९६६)

मनुजेहलोकनाशः सुरादिपरलोकसंभवः समकम् ।
जीवतयाऽवस्थानं नेहभवो नैव परलोकः ॥ ४१९ ॥ (१९६७)

Ghaṭacetanayā nāśaḥ paṭacetanayā samadbhavaḥ samakam ।
Santānenāvasthā tatheha-paraloka-jîvāṇām ॥ 418 ॥ (1966)

Manujehalokanāśaḥ surādiparalokasambhavaḥ samakam ।
Jîvatayā'vasthānam nehabhavo naiva paralokaḥ ॥ 419 ॥ (1967)]

Trans.—418-419 Destruction of the cognizance of *ghata*, production of the cognizance of *paṭa*, and retention of their continuous range, are (apprehended) all at a time. The same is the case with this world, the other world, and the *jîva*. Vanishing of this human world and coming into existence of the world like that of divine beings are simultaneous. Retention in (the state of) *jîva* is neither this world nor the other world. (1966-1967)

टीका-घटविषयं विज्ञानं घटचेतनोच्यते, पटविषयं तु विज्ञानं पटचेतना।

यदा च घटविज्ञानानन्तरं पटविज्ञानमुपजायते जीवस्य, तदा घटचेतनया घटविज्ञानरूपेण तस्य नाश उच्यते, पटचेतनया तु पटविज्ञानरूपेण "समयं" युगपदेव समुद्भव उत्पादः, अनादिकालप्रवृत्तेन तु चेतनासंतानेन निर्विशेषणेन जीवत्वमात्रेणावस्थानमिति । एवं च यथेहभवेऽपि तिष्ठतो जीवस्योत्पाद-व्यय-ध्रौव्यस्वभावत्रयं दर्शितम् ; तथा परलोकं गता जीवाः परलोकजीवास्तेषामप्येतत् स्वभावत्रयं दृष्टव्यम् ; तद्यथा-यदा मनुष्यो मृत्वा सुरलोकादावुत्पद्यते तदा मनुष्यरूप इहलोको मनुष्येहलोकस्तस्य नाशः, तत्समकालमेव च सुरादिपरलोकस्य संभव उत्पादः, जीवतया त्ववस्थानम् । तस्यां च जीवत्वावस्थायां विवक्षितायां नेहभवो विवक्ष्यते, नापि सुरादिपरलोको विवक्ष्यते, किन्तु निष्पर्यायं जीव-द्रव्यमात्रमेव विवक्ष्यते । तदेवमुत्पाद-व्यय-ध्रौव्यस्वभावत्वे जीवस्य न परलोकाभाव इति ॥ ४१८-४१९ ॥ (१९६६-१९६७)

D. C.—Cognizance about *ghaṭa* is called *ghaṭa-cetanā*, and that about *paṭa* is called *paṭa-cetanā*. When *jîva* acquires the cognizance of *paṭa* after that of *ghaṭa*, vanishing of *ghaṭa*, production in the form of *paṭa*, and retention in the form of eternal *jîva*, are simultaneous.

Utpāda, *vyaya* and *dhrauvya* are therefore, the three generic characteristics of *jiva*, as well as, of those who have passed to the other world.

When a person is born in *deva-loka* after death, he undergoes the state of destruction as regards this world, production as regards *deva-loka*, and permanent *avasthāna* as regards *jîva*. When a person is said to exist in the state of *jîvatva*, it is neither said to exist in this world nor in the other world like that of gods etc. *Jîva* is called mere *dravya* without any sort of *paryāya*. Thus, since *jîva* has the tendency of undergoing *utpāda*, *vyaya* and *dhrauvya*, there is no *abhāva* of the other world. ॥ 418-419 ॥ (1966-1967)

In reply to the question whether all objects possess all the three characteristics, the author states—

असओ नत्थि पसूई, होज्ज व जइ, होउ खरविसाणस्स ।
न य सव्वहा विणासो सव्वुच्छेयप्पसंगाओ ॥ ४२० ॥ (१९६८)
तोऽवत्थियस्स केणवि विलओ धम्मेण भवणमन्नेण ।
सव्वुच्छेओ न मओ संववहारोवरोहाओ ॥ ४२१ ॥ (१९६९)

Asao natthi pasūî, hojja va jai, hõu kharavisānassa ।
Na ya savvahā vināso savvuccheyappasangāo ॥ 420 ॥ (1968)

To'vatthiyassa keṇavi vilao dhammena bhavaṇamannena ।
Savvuccheo na mao samvavahārovarohāo ॥ 421 ॥ (1969)

[असतो नास्ति प्रसूतिः, भवेद् वा यदि, भवतु खरविषाणस्य ।
न च सर्वथा विनाशः सर्वोच्छेदप्रसङ्गात् ॥ ४२० ॥ (१९६८)
ततोऽवस्थितस्य केनापि विलयो धर्मेण भवनमन्येन ।
सर्वोच्छेदो न मतः संव्यवहारोपरोधात् ॥ ४२१ ॥ (१९६९)

Asato nāsti prasūtiḥ, bhaved va yadı, bhavatu khara-viṣāṇasya ।
Na ca sarvathā vināśaḥ sarvocchedaprasaṅgāt ॥ 420 ॥ (1968)

Tato'vasthitasya kenāpi vilayo dharmeṇa bhavanamanyena ।
Sarvocchedo na mataḥ saṃvyavahāroparodhāt ॥ 421 ॥ (1969)]

Trans.—420–421 The non-existant has no production. If it has, there would be production of the horn of an ass (also). Nor, is there exclusive destruction. (For), it would result in destruction of all. Consequently, there would be destruction of all. Consequently, there would be destruction of an object existing in a perpetual range by one means and production (of the same) by other means. For fear of obstruction to the mutual usage, exclusive destruction (of everything) is not acceptible. (1968–1969)

टीका–इहैकान्तेन सर्वथाऽसतो वस्तुनः प्रसूतिरुत्पत्तिर्नास्ति न घटते। अथ भवति, तर्हि खरविषाणस्यापि भवतु, असत्त्वाविशेषात्। तस्मात् केनापि रूपेण सदेवोत्पद्यते। न च सतः सर्वथा विनाशः, क्रमशः सर्वस्यापि

नारक–तिर्यगादेरुच्छेदप्रसङ्गात् । ततस्तस्मात् तस्यावस्थितस्य जीवादेरस्ति केनापि मनुष्यत्वादिधर्मेण विलयो विनाशः, अन्येन तु सुरादिरूपेण भवनमुत्पादः, सर्वोच्छेदस्तु न मतस्तीर्थकृताम्, संव्यवहारोपरोधात्–अन्यथा व्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गादित्यर्थः; तथाहि–राजपुत्र्याःक्रीडाहेतुभूतं सौवर्णकलशकं भङ्क्त्वा राजतनयस्य क्रीडार्थमेव कन्दुको घटितः; ततो राजपुत्र्याः शोकः, कुमारस्य तु हर्षः, सुवर्णस्वामिनश्च नरपतेरौदासीन्यम्, सुवर्णस्योभयावस्थायामप्यविनष्टत्वात्, इत्यादिको योऽसौ लोकव्यवहारस्तस्य सर्वस्याप्युत्पाद–व्यय–ध्रौव्यात्मकवस्त्वनभ्युपगमे समुच्छेदः स्यात् । तस्मात् कथञ्चिदवस्थितत्वे जीवस्य न परलोकाभाव इति ॥ ४२०–४२१ ॥ (१९६८–१९६९)

D. C.—An object which is absolutely *a–vidyamāna* can never undergo production. For, if the production of an *a–vidyamāna* object is admitted, non–existent objects like *khara–viṣāṇa* will also come into existence, which is utterly impossible. It is only a *vidyamāna* object that undergoes production. Secondly, there is no exclusive destruction of a *vidyamāna* object If there were absolute destruction of everything, even *nārakî* and *tiryanca* beings would be absolutely destroyed. *Jîva* etc. which are always *avasthita*, undergo *vināś'a* by means of characteristics such as that of *manuṣyatva* etc. On the other hand, they undergo production by means of characteristics like that of divine beings etc. But exclusive destruction of all, is never possible for fear of the violation of usual *vyavahāra*. Take an example to understand it more clearly :—Having broken a golden jar belonging to a princess, a ball was made of gold for a prince. On account of that, sorrow on the part of the princess, joy on the part of the prince, and gold being retained in the same quantity in the form of ball as well as jar, indifference on the part of king who is the owner of gold, constitute *loka–vyavahāra*. If we do not accept *utpāda*, *vyaya* and *dhrauvya* in case of all objects, violation of this *loka–vyavahāra* will undoubtedly take place. In case of *jîva* being *avasthita*, there is no *para–lokābhāva*. ॥ 420–421 ॥ (1968–1969)

And,

असइ व परम्मि लोए जमग्गिहोत्ताइं सग्गकामस्स ।
तदसंबद्धं सव्वं दाणाइफलं च लोअम्मि ॥ ४२२ ॥ (१९७०)

Asai va parammi löe jamaggihottāim saggakāmassa ।
Tadasaṃbandham savvam dāṇāiphalam ca löammi ॥422॥ (1970)

[असति वा परस्मिँल्लोके यदग्निहोत्रादि स्वर्गकामस्य ।
तदसंबद्ध सर्वं दानादिफलं च लोके ॥ ४२२ ॥ (१९७०)

Asati vā parasminlloke yadagnihotrādı svargakāmasya ।
Tadasaṃbaddham sarvam dānādıphalam ca loke ॥ 422 ॥ (1970)]

Trans.—422 In case of the other world being absent (the commendment of the performance of) sacrifice etc. for a person aspiring for Salvation, would be useless. Moreover, the fruition of (goon turns like) munificence etc. (welknown) in this world, would also be null and void. (1970)

छिन्नम्मि संशयम्मी जिणेण जर-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
सो समणो पव्वइओ तिहि ओ सह खण्डियसएहिं ॥४२३॥(१९७१)

Chinnammi saṃsayammî Jiṇena jara-maraṇavippamukkeṇam ।
So samaṇo pavvaio tihi o saha khaṇḍiyasaehim ॥ 423 ॥ (1971)

[छिन्ने संशये जिनेन जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
स श्रमणः प्रव्रजितस्त्रिभिस्तु सह खण्डिकशतैः ॥ ४२३ ॥ (१९७१)

Chinne saṃśaye Jınena jarā-maraṇa vipramuktena ।
Sa śramaṇaḥ pravrajıtastribhistu saha khaṇḍıkaśataiḥ ॥423॥(1971)]

Trans.—423 When the doubt was removed by the *Tîrthankara,* who was entirely free from old age and death, that saint accepted the *Dîksā* along with his three hundred pupils. (1971)

End of the Discussion with the Tenth Gaṇadhara.

Chapter XI

एकादशगणधरवक्तव्यता

Discussion with the Eleventh Gaṇadhara

ते पव्वइए सोउं पहासो आगच्छई जिणसयासं ।
वच्चामि ण वंदामी वंदिता पज्जुवासामि ॥ ४२४ ॥ (१९७२)

Te pavvaie söum Pahāso āgacchaî Jinasayāsam ।
Vaccāmi na vandāmî vanditiā pajjuvāsāmi ॥ 424 ॥ (1972)

[तान् प्रव्रजितान् श्रुत्वा प्रभास आगच्छति जिनसकाशम् ।
व्रजामि वन्दे वन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ॥ ४२४ ॥ (१९७२)

Tān pravrajitān śrutvā Prabhāsa āgacchati Jinasakāśam ।
Vrajāmi vande vanditvā paryupāse ॥ ॥ 424 ॥ (1972)]

Trans.—424 Having heard that they had renounced the world, *Prabhāsa*, comes before the *Tîrthankara.* (He thinks–) I shall go, pay my homages, and worship him. (1972)

Then,

आभट्ठो य जिणेणं जाइ–जरा–मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
नामेण य गोत्तेण य सव्वण्णू सव्वदरिसी णं ॥४२५॥ (१९७३)

Ābhaṭṭho ya Jiṇeṇam jāi–jarā–maraṇavippamukkeṇam ।
Nāmeṇa ya gotteṇa ya savvaṇṇū savvadarisî ṇam ॥425॥ (1973)

[आभाषितश्च जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ॥ ४२५ ॥ (१९७३)

Ābhāṣitaśca Jinena jāti-jarā-maraṇavipramuktena ।
Namnā ca gotreṇa ca sarvajñena sarvadarśinā ॥ 425 ॥ (1973)]

Trans.—425 He was addressed by his name and lineage by the *Tîrthankara*, who was entirely free from birth old age and death, who was omniscient, and who had complete *darśana* (undifferentiated knowledge). (1973)

Having thus addressed him, the *Bhagavān* said—

किं मन्ने निव्वाणं अत्थि नत्थि त्ति संसओ तुज्झ ।
वेयपयाण य अत्थं न याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो ॥४२६॥(१९७४)

Kim manne nivvānam atthi natthi tti samsao tujjha ।
Veyapayāna ya attham na yāṇasî tesimo attho ॥ 426 ॥ (1974)

[किं मन्यसे निर्वाणमस्ति नास्तीति संशयस्तव ।
वेदापदानां चार्थं न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ ४२६ ॥ (१९७४)

Kim manyase nirvāṇamasti nāstîti saṃśayastava ।
Veda-padānām cārtham na jānāsi teṣāmayamarthaḥ ॥426॥ (1974)]

Trans.—426 What are you thinking about ? You entertain the doubt as to whether *nirvāṇa* (final emancipation) exists or not. But *(ca)* you have not understood the (real) meaning of the sentences of *Vedas*. Here is their (real) interpretation. (1974)

टीका—हे आयुष्मन् ! प्रभास ! त्वमेवं मन्यसे—किं निर्वाणमस्ति न वा ? इति । अयं च संशयस्तव विरुद्धवेदपदश्रवणनिबन्धनः । तानि चामूनि वेदपदानि—" जरामर्यं वैतत् सर्वं यदग्निहोत्रम् " । तथा, " सैषा गुहा दुरवगाहा " । तथा, " द्वे ब्रह्मणी परमपरं च, तत्र परं सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तरं बह्म " इति । एतेषां चायमर्थस्तवचेतसि वर्तते—यदेतदग्निहोत्रं तज्जरामर्यमेव

यावज्जीवं कर्तव्यमिति। अग्निहोत्रक्रिया च भूतवधहेतुत्वाच्छबलरूपा। सा च स्वर्गफलैव स्याद् नापवर्गफला। " यावज्जीवम् " इति चोक्ते कालान्तरं नास्ति यत्रापवर्गहेतुभूतक्रियान्तरारम्भः स्यात्। तस्मात् साधनाभावाद् मोक्षाभावः। ततश्चेत्यादिकानि किल मोक्षाभावप्रतिपादकानि। शेषाणि तु तदस्तित्वसूचकानि, यतो गुहाऽत्र मुक्तिरूपा, सा च संसाराभिनन्दिनां दुरवगाहा, दुष्प्रवेशात्। तथा, परं ब्रह्म सत्यं मोक्षः, अनन्तरं तु ब्रह्म ज्ञानमिति। ततो मोक्षास्तित्वं नास्तित्वं च वेदपदप्रतिपादितमवगम्य तव संशयः। तत्रैषां वेदपदानामर्थं त्वं न जानासि, यतस्तेषामयमर्थो वक्ष्यमाणलक्षण इति ॥ ४२६ ॥ (१९७४)

D. C.—O long-lived *Prabhāsa!* your doubt about the existence of *mokṣa* is based upon your hearing various *Veda-padas* of contradictory senses. These *Veda-padas* are as follows:—

(1) " *Jarā-maryam vaitat sarvam yadagnihotram.* "

(2) " *Saisā guhā duravagāhā* "

(3) " *Dve brahmaṇî paramaparam ca, tatra param satyam jñānamantaram brahma* " etc.

These *Veda-padas* are interpreted by you as follows:—

(1) *Agnihotra* should be practised as long as life persists.

The performance of *agnihotra* constitutes the sacrifice of animals which would turn it *subha* or *a-s'ubha*. But that would award the attainment of *svarga* alone and not *mokṣa*. Since by this commandment, performance of *agnihotra* is advised to be practised throughout life, there would be no other period of time during which some other performance for the attainment of *mokṣa* could be advised. In absence of *sādhana*, therefore, the *sādhya* (*viz mokṣa*) does not exist. In this way, this sentence proves the *abhāva* of *mokṣa*.

The other two *padas* try to establish the existence of *mokṣa* in this way—

(2) The cave of *mokṣa* is difficult to be entered by the *saṃsārīs.*

(3) There are two types of *Brahma:*—

1. The *Param Brahma* or principal *Brahma* is *mokṣa* and *a-param* or subordinate *Brahma* is *jñāna.*

Your doubt has sprung up from these *Veda-padas* which bear contradictory senses. But you have not grasped their real interpretation. Here, I give their correct interpretation. Please listen carefully. ॥ 426 ॥ (1974)

Bhagavān now states the opponent's view and refutes it,

मन्नसि किं दीवस्स व नासो निव्वाणमस्स जीवस्स ? ।
दुक्खक्खयाइरूवा किं होज्ज व से सओऽवत्था ? ॥४२७॥(१९७५)

Mannasi kim dîvassa va nāso nivvāṇamassa jîvassa ?
Dukkhakkhayāirūvā kim hojja va se sao'vatthā ? ॥ 427 ॥ (1975)

[मन्यसे किं दीपस्येव नाशो निर्वाणमस्य जीवस्य ?
दुःखक्षयादिरूपा किं भवेद् वा तस्य सतोऽवस्था ? ॥४२७॥(१९७५)

Manyase kim dîpasyeva nāśo nirvāṇamasya jîvasya ?
Duḥkhakṣayādirūpā kim bhaved vā tasya sato'vasthā ?॥427॥(1975)]

Trans.—427 Do you think the *nirvaṇa* (extinction of life) to be similar to the extinction of lamp ? Or, would the positive existence of soul in the form of diminution of miseries etc. be its extinction ? (1975)

टीका–आयुष्मन् ! प्रभास ! त्वमेवं मन्यसे–किं दीपस्येवास्य जीवस्य नाशो ध्वंस एव निर्वाणम् ? यथाऽऽहुः सौगतविशेषाः केचित्, तद्यथा—

दीपो यथा निर्वृतिमभ्युपेतो नैवावनिं गच्छति नान्तरिक्षम् ।
दिशं न काञ्चिद् विदिशं न काञ्चित् स्नेहक्षयात् केवलमेति शान्तिम् ॥१॥

जीवस्तथा निर्वृतिमभ्युपेतो नैवावनिं गच्छति नान्तरिक्षम् ।
दिशं न काञ्चिद् विदिशं न काञ्चित् क्लेशक्षयात् केवलमेति शान्तिम् ॥२॥

इति । किं वा यथा जैनाः प्राहुस्तथा निर्वाणं भवेत् ? । किं तत् ? इत्याह–सतो विद्यमानस्य जीवस्य विशिष्टा काचिदवस्था । कथंभूता ? राग–द्वेष–मद–मोह–जन्म–जरा–रोगादिदुःखक्षयरूपा । उक्तं च—

केवलसंविद्–दर्शनरूपाः सर्वार्तिदुःखपरिमुक्ताः ।
मोदन्ते मुक्तिगता जीवाः क्षीणान्तरारिगणाः ॥ १ ॥

इति ॥ ४२७ ॥ (१९७५)

D. C.—Like the *Buddhists*, do you believe *mokṣa* to be nothing but the extinction of *jîva*, like that of a lamp ? For the *Buddhists*, assert that:—

"Dîpo yathā nirvṛitimabhyupeto naivāvanim gacchati nāntarikṣam ।
Diśam na kāncid vidiśim na kāncit snehakṣayāt kevalameti śāntim ॥1॥

Jîvastathā nirvritimabhyupeto naivāvanim gacchati nāntarikṣam ।
Diśam na kāncid vidiśim na kāncit kleśakṣayāt kevalameti śāntim ॥2॥

Or, do you accept *moksa*, like *Jainas* who believe the state of *nirvāṇa* (final emancipation) as a peculiar state of the existent *jîva* constituting the removal of *rāga*, *dveṣa*, *mada*, *moha*, *janma*, *jarā*, *roga*, and *duḥkha* etc ?

It has been laid down by them that—

" Kevalasaṃvid–darśanarūpāḥ sarvārtiduḥkha parimuktāḥ ।
Modante muktigatā jîvāḥ kṣîṇāntarāriganāḥ " ॥1॥ 427 (1975)]

Also,

अहवाऽणाइत्तणओ खस्स व किं कम्म–जीवजोगस्स ।
अविओगाओ न भवे संसाराभाव एव त्ति ? ॥४२८॥(१९७६)

Ahavā'ṇāittaṇao khassa va kim kamma–jîvajogassa ।
Aviogāo na bhave saṃsārābhāva eva tti ? ॥ 428 ॥ (1976)

[अथवाऽनादित्वतः खस्येव किं कर्म-जीवयोगस्य ।
अवियोगाद् न भवेत् संसाराभाव एवेति ? ॥ ४२८ (१९७६)

Athavā'nāditvataḥ khasyeva kim karma-jîvayogasya ।
Aviyogād na bhavet saṃsārābhāva eveti ? ॥ 428 ॥ (1976)]

Trans.—428 Or, is it because *Karma* and *jîva* (which are) united together eternally do not undergo separation like *ākāśa*, that there is absence of mundane world ? (1976)

टीका-अथवा, त्वमेवं मन्यसे-नूनं संसाराभाव एव न भवेत् । कुतः ? । अवियोगात्-वियोगायोगात् । कस्य ? । कर्म-जीवयोः संयोगस्य । कुतः ? । अनादित्वात् ; खस्येव । इह ययोरनादिःसंयोगस्तयोर्वियोगो नास्ति, यथा जीवा-ऽऽकाशयोः, अनादिश्च जीवकर्मणोः संयोगः, ततो वियोगानुपपत्तिः, ततश्च न संसाराभावः; तथा च सति कुतो मोक्षः ? इति ॥ ४२८ ॥ (१९७६)

D. C.—There is another ground also, upon which your doubt is based. Objects that are united with each other from time immemorial, could never undergo separation. Just as *jîva* and *ākāś'a* are never separable from each other on account of their *anādi samyoga*, *jîva* and *karma* will also never undergo separation on account of their *anādi saṃyoga*. When *Karma* is not separated, *saṃsāra* will also never be separable. On account of the absence of separation from *saṃsāra*, the absence of *mokṣa* will also be established. ॥ 428 ॥ (1976)

But,

पडिवज्ज मण्डिओ इव वियोगमिह कम्म-जीवजोगस्स ।
तमणाइणो वि कंचण-धाऊण व णाण-किरियाहिं ॥४२९॥(१९७७)

Padivajja Maṇḍio iva viyogamiha kamma-jîvajogassa ।
Tamaṇāiṇo vi kancaṇa-dhāūna va nāna-kiriyāhim ॥429॥ (1977)

[प्रतिपद्यस्व मण्डिक इव वियोगमिह कर्म-जीवयोगस्य ।
त्वमनादेरपि काञ्चन-धात्वोरिव ज्ञान-क्रियाभ्याम् ॥४२९॥ (१९७७)

Pratipadyasva Maṇḍika iva viyogamiha karma-jîva yogasya ।
Tvamanāderapi kāncana-dhātvoriva jñāna-kriyābhyam ॥429॥1977)]

Trans.—429 In this case, you (shall have to) admit the separation of *Karma* and *jîva*, in spite of their eternal union on account of cognizance and action, as in the case of gold and metal. (1977)

टीका–" अणाइणो वि त्ति " अनादेरपि जीव–कर्मसंयोगस्य ' तं ' इति त्वं प्रतिपद्यस्व वियोगम्, बन्ध–मोक्षवादे मण्डिकवत् । कयोरिव यो वियोगः ? । काञ्चन–धातुपाषाणयोरिव । किं निर्हेतुक एव जीव–कर्मणो-र्वियोगः ? । न, इत्याह–ज्ञान–क्रियाभ्याम् । इदमुक्तं भवति–नायमेकान्तो यदनादिसंयोगो न भिद्यते, यतः काञ्चन–धातुपाषाणयोरनादिरपि संयोगोऽग्न्यादिसंपर्केण विघटत एव, तद्वज्जीव–कर्मसंयोगस्यापि सम्यग्ज्ञान–क्रियाभ्यां वियोगं मण्डिकवत् त्वमपीह प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ॥ ४२९ ॥ (१९७७)

D. C.—Even the strongest affinity between gold and metal is broken by the help of heating etc. The same is the case with that between *Karma* and *jîva* also. Separation of *Karma* and *jîva* is accomplished by means of *jñāna* and *kriyā* in spite of their eternal union. It is not true, therefore, to say that the separation of objects joined together by *anādi saṃyoga*, is not possible. Like *Maṇḍika* you, too, shall have to admit that *Karma* and *jîva* are separable from each other in spite of their eternal union. ॥ 429 ॥ (1977)

Also,

जं नारगाइभावो संसारो नारगाइभिण्णो य ।
को जीवो तं मन्नसि तन्नासे जीवनासो त्ति ॥४३०॥ (१९७८)

Jam nāragāibhāvo saṃsāro nāragāibhinṇo ya ।
Ko jîvo tam mannasi tannāse jîvanāso tti ॥ 430 ॥ (1978)

[यद् नारकादिभावः संसारो नारकादिभिन्नश्च ।
को जीवस्त्वं मन्यसे तन्नाशे जीवनाश इति ॥ ४३० ॥ (१९७८)

Yad nārakādibhāvaḥ saṃsāro nārakādibhinnasca ।
Ko jîvastvam manyase tannāśe jîvanāśa iti ॥ 430 ॥ (1978)]

Trans.—430 Since *samsāra* includes hellish denizens etc. what *jîva* do you mean to be different, from hellish denizens etc ? With their destruction, (there will be) destruction of *jîva* also. (1978)

टीका–यद् यस्माद् नारक–तिर्यग्–नरा–ऽमरभाव एव नारकादित्वमेव संसार उच्यते नान्यः, नारकादिपर्यायभिन्नश्च कोऽन्यो जीवः ? । न कोऽपीत्यर्थः, नारकादिभावादन्यत्वेन कदाचिदपि जीवस्यानुपलम्भादिति भावः । ततस्तन्नाशे नारकादिभावरूपसंसारनाशे जीवस्य स्वस्वरूपनाशात् सर्वथा नाश एव भवति; ततः कस्यासौ मौक्षः ? । इति त्वं मन्यसे ॥४३०॥ (१९७८)

D. C.—Since *saṃsāra* consists of *nāraka, tiryanca,* human and divine beings, *jîva* cannot exist as different from any one of them. So, when *saṃsāra* of *nārakas* and others, vanishes, *jîva* will also vanish as it is contained in *saṃsāra.* Thus, when *jîva* vanishes, who would attain *mokṣa ?* ॥430॥ (1978)

This belief is refuted in this way—

न हि नारगाइपज्जायमेत्तनासम्मि सव्वहा नासो ।
जीवद्दव्वस्स मओ मुद्दानासे व हेमस्स ॥ ४३१ ॥ (१९७९)
कम्मकओ संसारो तन्नासे तस्स जुज्जए नासो ।
जीवत्तमकम्मकयं तन्नासे तस्स को नासो ? ॥४३२॥ (१९८०)

Na hi nāragāipajjāyamettanāsammi savvahā nāso ।
Jîvaddavvassa mao muddānāse va hemassa ॥ 431 ॥ (1979)

Kammakao saṃsāro tannāse tassa jujjae nāso ।
Jîvattamakammakayam tannāse tasya ko nāso ? ॥ 432 ॥ (1980)

[न हि नारकादिपर्यायमात्रनाशे सर्वथा नाशः ।
जीवद्रव्यस्य मतो मुद्रानाश इव हेम्नः ॥ ४३१ ॥ (१९७९)

कर्मकृतः संसारस्तन्नाशे तस्य युज्यते नाशः ।
जीवत्वमकर्मकृतं तन्नाशे तस्य को नाशः ? ॥ ४३२ ॥ (१९८०)

Na hi nārakādiparyāyamātranāśe sarvathā nāśaḥ ।
Jîvadravyasya mato mudrānaśa iva hemnaḥ ॥ 431 ॥ (1979)

Karmakritaḥ saṃsārastannāśe tasya yujyate nāśaḥ ।
Jîvatvamakaramakṛitam tannāśe tasya ko nāśaḥ ? ॥432॥ (1980)]

Trans.—431–432 Like gold at the destruction of a ring, the substance of *jiva* is not believed to vanish entirely at the destruction of *nārakas* and other. *Saṃsāra* is based on *Karma.* Hence, its destruction with *Karma* is justified. (But) *jîvatva* is not based on *Karma.* Hence, how could it vanish with *Karma ?* (1979–1980)

टीका–नारक–तिर्यगादिरूपेण यो भावः स जीवस्य पर्याय एव । न च पर्यायमात्रनाशे पर्यायिणो जीवद्रव्यस्यापि सर्वथा नाशो मतः, कथञ्चित्तु भवत्यपि । न हि मुद्रापर्यायमात्रनाशे हेम्नः सुवर्णस्य सर्वथा नाशो दृष्टः । ततो नारकादिसंसारपर्यायनिवृत्तौ मुक्तिपर्यायान्तरोत्पत्तिर्जीवस्य, मुद्रापर्याय-निवृत्तौ कर्णपूरपर्यायान्तरोत्पत्तिरिव सुवर्णस्य, न किञ्चिद् विरुध्यत इति । ननु यथा कर्मणो नाशे संसारो नश्यति तथा तन्नाशे जीवत्वस्यापि नाशाद् मोक्षाभावो भविष्यति । एतदप्यसारम् । कुतः ? इत्याह–"कम्मकओ इत्यादि" कर्मकृतः कर्मजनितः संसारः, ततस्तन्नाशे कर्मनाशे तस्य संसारस्य नाशो युज्यत एव, कारणाभावे कार्याभावस्य सुप्रतीतत्वात् । जीवत्वं पुनरनादि-कालप्रवृत्तत्वात् कर्मकृतं न भवति, अतस्तन्नाशे कर्मनाशे तस्य जीवस्य को नाशः ?–न कश्चित्; कारण–व्यापकयोरेव कार्य–व्याप्यनिवर्तकत्वात्; कर्म तु जीवस्य न कारणं नापि व्यापकमिति भावः ॥ ४३१–४३२ ॥ (१९७९–१९८०)

D. C.—Existence of *jîva* as *nārakas* or *tiryancas* is merely one of the forms of *jîva*. So, when these *paryāyas* of *jîva* vanish, the substance of *jîva* or *jîvatva* does not vanish entirely but only partially, just as gold as a *dravya* does not

entirely vanish when ring etc, are destroyed. When the *nāraka paryāyas* of *saṃsāra* are destroyed, *jîva* vanishes as a *saṃsārî* and comes into existence as the *paryāya* of *mokṣa e. g.* in case of gold, when one *paryāya*, say ring, is destroyed, another *paryāya*, say ear-ring, is produced.

Prabhāsa:—But like *saṃsāra*, *jîva* will also have to vanish with *Karma*, and hence, there will be nothing like *mokṣa*.

Bhagavān:—It is not so. *Saṃsāra* is generated by means of *Karma*, and hence it would vanish with *Karma*. But, *jîvatva* being at work from times immemorial, cannot be called *Karmajanya*. So, *jîva* will not vanish with *Karma*, since *Karma* is neither the cause of *jîvatva* nor is it invariably concomitant with *jîvatva*. ॥ 431-432 ॥ (1979-1980)

न विगाराणुवलंभादागासं पिव विणासधम्मो सो ।
इह नासिणो विगारो दीसइ कुंभस्स वाऽवयवा ॥४३३॥(१९८१)

Na vigārāṇuvalaṃbhādāgāsam piva viṇāsadhammo so ।
Iha nāsiṇo vigāro dîsai kuṃbhassa vā'vayavā ॥ 433 ॥ (1981)

[न विकारानुपलम्भादाकाशमिव विनाशधर्मा सः ।
इह नाशिनो विकारो दृश्यते कुम्भस्येवावयवाः ॥ ४३३ ॥ (१९८१)

Na vikarānupalaṃbhādākāśamiva vināśadharmā saḥ ।
Iha nāśino vikāro dṛśyate kuṃbhasyevāvayavāḥ ॥433॥ (1981)]

Trans.—433 It (*i. e. jîva*) is immortal like sky on account of the non-apprehension of changes. In case of a destructive (object), a change is visible like the (various) parts of *ghata* (1981)

टीका—न विनाशधर्मा जीव इति प्रतिज्ञा । विकारानुपलम्भादिति हेतुः । इह यो विनाशी तस्य विकारो दृश्यते, यथा मुद्गरादिध्वस्तस्य कुम्भस्य कपाललक्षणा अवयवाः; यस्त्वविनाशी न तस्य विकारदर्शनम्, यथाऽऽ-

काशस्येति । ततो मुक्तस्य जीवस्य नित्यत्वाद् नित्यो मोक्ष इति ॥ ४३३ ॥ (१९८१)

D. C.—The Soul is immortal like *ākāśa*, because it does not undergo any *vikāra*. That which is destructible has undoubtedly to undergo *vikāras* like the different parts of *ghaṭa*. *Muktātmā* being, thus immutable, *mokṣa* is also immutable. ॥433॥ (1981)

Also,

कालंतरनासी वा घडो व्व कयगाइओ मई होज्जा ।
नो पद्धंसाभावो भुवि तद्धम्मा वि जं निच्चो ॥ ४३४ ॥(१९८२)

Kālantaranāsî vā ghaḍo vva kayagāio maî hojjā ।
No paddhamsābhāvo bhuvi taddhammā vi jam nicco ॥434॥ (1982)

[कालान्तरनाशी वा घट इव कृतकादितो मतिर्भवेत् ।
नो प्रध्वंसाभावो भुवि तद्धर्मापि यद् नित्यः ॥ ४३४ ॥ (१९८२)

Kālāntaranāśî vā ghaṭa iva kṛitakādito matirbhavet ।
No pradhvaṃsābhāvo bhuvi taddharmāpi yad nityaḥ ॥434॥ (1982)]

Trans.—434 Or, the belief may be that it is destructible at a (certain) period of time like *ghata* on account of its being factitious etc. (But) it is not so. Indestructibility is everlasting on this earth in spite of (its) having (destructible) characteristics. (1982)

The author then states the opponent's view and its reply—

अणुदाहरणमभावो खरसंगं पिव मई न तं जम्हा ।
कुंभविणासविसिट्ठो भावो च्चिय पोग्गलमओ सो ॥४३५॥(१९८३)

Aṇudāharaṇamabhāvo kharasangam piva maî na tam jamhā ।
Kumbhavināsavisiṭṭho bhāvo cciyya poggalamao so ॥435॥(1983)

[अनुदाहरणमभावः खरशृंगमिव मतिर्न तद् यस्मात् ।
कुम्भविनाशविशिष्टो भाव एव पुद्गलमयः सः ॥ ४३५ ॥ (१९८३)

Anudāharaṇamabhāvaḥ kharaśṛṅgamiva matir na tad yasmāt ।
Kumbhavināśaviśiṣṭo bhāva eva pudgalamayaḥ sah ॥435॥ (1983)]

Trans.—435 (The opponent might say that) " It has no illustration. *Abhāva* is non-existent like *kharasṛṅga.*" (But) it is not so. The quality of *pudgala* characterized by the destruction of *ghaṭa*, is itself (indestructibility). (1983)

Or,

किं वेगंतेण कयं पोग्गलमेत्तविलयम्मि जीवस्स ? ।
किं निव्वत्तियमहियं नभसो घडमेत्तविलयम्मि ? ॥४३६॥ (१९८४)

Kim vegaṇteṇa kayam poggalamettavilayammi jîvassa ? ।
Kim nivvattiyamahiyam nabhaso ghaḍamettavilayammi ? ॥ 436 ॥

[किं वैकान्तेन कृतं पुद्गलमात्रविलये जीवस्य ? ।
किं निर्वर्तितमधिकं नभसो घटमात्रविलये ? ॥ ४३६ (१९८४)

Kim vaikāntena kṛitam pudgalamātravilaye jîvasya ? ।
Kim nirvartitamadhikam nabhaso ghaṭamātravilaye ? ॥436॥(1984)]

Trans.—436 Or, at the destruction of mere *pudgalas*, how is *jîva* to be affected ? At the destruction of *ghaṭa*, how is sky affected all the more ?† (1984)

The author proves immortality of *muktātmā* by another inference also,

दव्वामुत्तत्तणओ मुत्तो निच्चो नभं व दव्वतया ।
नणु विभुयाइपसंगो एवं सइ, नाणुमाणाओ ॥४३७॥(१९८५)

Davvāmuttattaṇao mutto nicco nabham va davvatayā ।
Naṇu vibhuyāipasango evam sai, nāṇumāṇāo ॥ 437 ॥ (1985)

[द्रव्यामूर्तत्वतो मुक्तो नित्यो नभ इव द्रव्यतया ।
ननु विभुतादिप्रसङ्ग एवं सति, नानुमानात् ॥ ४३७ ॥ (१९८५)

† Vide v. 1839.

Dravyāmūrtvato mukto nityo nabha iva dravyatayā |
Nanu vibhutādiprasaṅga evam sati, nānumānāt ॥ 437 ॥ (1985)]

Trans.—437 The free (soul) is everlasting like sky on account of the incorporeal nature of (its) substance. (The opponent might object here that) "in that case, there would be all-pervading characteristic etc as well." (But) it is not so, because of (an opposite inference). (1985)

टीका-नित्यो मुक्तात्मा, द्रव्यत्वे सत्यमूर्तत्वात्; " दव्वतय त्ति " यथा द्रव्यत्वे सत्यमूर्तत्वाद् नित्यं नभः । आह-नन्वनेन दृष्टान्तेन व्यापकत्वाद्यपि सिध्यति जीवस्य; तथाहि-विभुर्व्यापकः सर्वगतो जीवः, द्रव्यत्वे सत्यमूर्तत्वात्, यथा नभः । तदेतद् न । कुतः ? । सर्वगतत्वबाधकानुमानसद्भावात्; तथाहि-त्वक्पर्यन्तदेहमात्रव्यापको जीवः, तत्रैव तद्गुणोपलब्धेः, स्पर्शनवत्, इत्युनुमानाद् बाधते सर्वगतत्वं जीवस्य । एवं " न बध्यते नापि मुच्यते जीवः द्रव्यत्वे सत्यमूर्तत्वात्, नभोवत् " इत्याद्यपि दूषणं, " बध्यते पुण्य-पापकर्मणा जीवः, दान-हिंसादि क्रियाणां सफलत्वात्, कृष्यादिक्रियावत्, तथा, विघटते सम्यगुपायात् कोऽपि जीव-कर्मसंयोगः, संयोगत्वात्, काञ्चन-धातुपाषाणसंयोगवत् " इत्याद्यनुमानात् परिहर्तव्यमिति ॥ ४३७ ॥ (१९८५)

D. C.—Like *ākāś'a dravya, jîva dravya* of a free soul is also *nitya,* because it is *a-mūrta* as a *dravya.*

Prabhāsa:—As you proved *nityatva* (in case) of *muktātmā* by the help of the example of sky, the example will lead to prove other characteristics of sky in *muktātmā,* say for example, like sky, *muktātmā* is all pervading due to its *a-mūrtatva.* Similarly, it can also be said that *jîva dravya* has neither *bandha* nor *mokṣa* just as *ākāś'a dravya* has none due to *a-mūrtatva.*

Bhagavān:—It is not proper to establish other characteristics such as *vibhutā* etc in *muktātmā* by the help of the example of sky. Because, there is another inference opposite

to it which contradicts the existence of those characteristics. Say, for example, *jîva* is pervading only upto the skin of body like the sense of touch, because the *jîvatva* is found only in body.

This *anumāna* refutes the all-pervading nature of *jîva*. Similarly, the *anumānas* that *jîvas* are formed by means of *puṇya* and *pāpa*, and that the combination of *jîva* and *Karma* could any how be brought about like the combination of gold and stone, refute the assertion that *jîva* has neither *bandha* nor *mokṣa* due to the *a-mūrtatva* of its *dravya* like *ākāś'a*. ॥ 437 ॥ (1985)

Or,

को वा निच्चग्गाहो सव्वं चिय वि भव-भङ्ग-ठिइमइयं ।
पज्जायंतरमेत्तप्पणादनिच्चाइववएसो ॥ ४३८ ॥ (१९८६)

Ko vā niccaggāho savvam ciya vibhava-bhanga-ṭhiimaiyam ।
Pajjantaramettappaṇādiniccāivavaeso ॥ 438 ॥ (1986)

[**को वा नित्यग्रहः सर्वमेवापि भव-भङ्ग-स्थितिमयम् ।**
पर्यायान्तरमात्रार्पणादनित्यादिव्यपदेशः ॥ ४३८ ॥ (१९८६)

Ko vā nityagrahaḥ sarvamevāpi bhava-bhaṅga-sthitimayam ।
Paryāyāntaramātrārpaṇādanityādivyapadeśaḥ ॥ 438 ॥ (1986)]

Trans.—438 Or, why insist upon immutability (at all) ? Everything is suceptible to the state of production-break-and retention. Only by (means of) imposition of various methods, attributes like mutability etc, are designated.† (1986)

टीका-अथ कथञ्चिदनित्यत्वेऽपि मोक्षस्य न किञ्चिद् नः क्षूयत इति भावः । इह "कालंतरनासी वा घडो व" इत्यादिगाथाः प्रागपि षष्ठगणधरे बन्ध-मोक्षविचारे व्याख्याता एव । ततो यदिह न व्याख्यातं तत् ततोऽवगन्तव्यमिति ॥ ४३८ ॥ (१९८६)

† Vide v. 1843.

D. C.—It is no use insisting exclusively upon *nityatā* of *muktātmā*. Its *a-nityatā* could also be admitted to a certain extent by means of various methods. But, realy speaking, all objects are susceptible to *utpāda-vyaya*-and *dhrauvya* ॥ 438 ॥ (1986)

For a detailed discussion of *bandha* and *mokṣa*, see Chap. VI.

Now, in reply to the assertion that the extinctien of soul resembles that of lamp etc, the author states—

न य सव्वहा विणासोऽणलस्स परिणामओ पयस्सेव ।
कुंभस्स कवालाण व तहाविगारोवलंभाओ ॥४३९॥ (१९८७)

Na ya savvahā vināso'ṇalassa pariṇāmao payasseva ।
Kumbhassa kavālāna va tahāvigārovalaṃbhāo ॥ 439 ॥ (1987)

[न च सर्वथा विनाशोऽनलस्य परिणामतः पयस इव ।
कुम्भस्य कपालानामिव तथाविकारोपलम्भात् ॥ ४३९ ॥ (१९८७)

Na ca sarvathā vināso'nalasya pariṇāmataḥ payasa iva ।
Kumbhasya kapālānāmiva tathāvikāropalaṃbhāt ॥439॥ (1987)]

Trans.—439 Fire being mutable like milk does not vanish entirely, because of the apprehension of changes like those (in case) of the pieces of *ghaṭa*. (1987)

टीका–न प्रदीपानलस्य सर्वप्रकारैर्विनाशः, परिणामत्वात्, पयसो दुग्धस्येव; अथवा, यथा मुद्गराद्याहतस्य कपालतया परिणतस्य घटस्य, यथा वा चूर्णीकृतानां कपालानाम् । कुतो न सर्वथा विनाशः ? । इत्याह–तथा तेन रूपान्तरप्रकारेण विकारस्य प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणोपलम्भादिति ॥ ४३९ ॥ (१९८७)

D. C—When a lamp is extinguished, its fire does not enirely vanish. It is only *mutable* like milk. So, like milk turning into curds or like *ghaṭa* changing into various pieces

by means of a stick etc light changes into darkness, but it does not vanish absolutely. ॥ 439 ॥ (1987)

Again, there is an objection and its reply—

जइ सव्वहा न नासोऽणलस्स किं दीसए न सो सक्खं ? ।
परिणामसुहुमयाओ जलयविगारंजणरउ व्व ॥ ४४० ॥ (१९८८)

Jai savvahā na nāso'ṇalassa kim dîsae na so sakkham ? ।
Pariṇāmasuhumayāo jalayavigāranjaṇarau vva ॥ 440 ॥ (1988)

[यदि सर्वथा न नाशोऽनलस्य किं दृश्यते न स साक्षात् ? ।
परिणामसूक्ष्मतातो जलदविकारोऽञ्जनरज इव ॥ ४४० ॥ (१९८८)

Yadi sarvathā na nāśo'nalasya kim dṛiśyate na sa sākṣāt ।
Pariṇamasūksmatāto jaladavikāro'ñjanaraja iva ॥ 440 ॥ (1988)]

Trans.—440 " If there is no absolute extinction of light, why it is not seen before our eyes ? " " Because of the subtlety of fruition as in the case of a change in cloud or dust particle. (1988)

टीका–यदि सर्वथाऽनलस्य न नाशः, तर्हि विध्यातानन्तरं किमित्यसौ साक्षाद् न दृश्यते ? । अत्रोत्तरमाह–" परिणामेत्यादि " विध्याते प्रदीपेऽनन्तरमेव तामसपुद्गलरूपो विकारः समुपलभ्यत एव, चिरं चासौ पुरस्ताद् यद् नोपलभ्यते, तत् सूक्ष्म–सूक्ष्मतरपरिणामभावात् । तथाहि–विशीर्यमाणस्य जलदस्यापि यः कृष्णाभ्रपुद्गलविकारः स परिणामसौक्ष्म्याद् नोपलभ्यते । तथा, अञ्जनस्यापि पवनेन ह्रियमाणस्य यदुत्कृष्टरज उड्डीयते तदपि परिणामसौक्ष्म्याद् नोपलभ्यते, न पुनरसत्त्वादिति ॥ ४४० ॥ (१९८८)

D. C.—Prabhāsa:—If there were no absolute extinction of fire, why is it not perceived before our eyes ?

Bhagavān:—The *vikāra* of the light extinguished *viz* darkness–is not directly perceptible, because its *pariṇāma* is very subtle in form. Changes in a black cloud at the time of dissolution of a cloud, are not perceived because of their very

subtle *pariṇāma*, and the pollen of a collyrium also blown away by wind is not directly perceived, because it is very minute. But in no way, it means that it does not exist. So, the *vikāra* of darkness in case of light is also non-apprehensible, not because it is non-existent but because its *pariṇāma* is *sūkṣma*. ॥ 440 ॥ (1988)

Also,

होऊण इंदियंतरगज्झा पुणरिंदियंतरग्गहणं ।
खंधा एंति न एंति य पोग्गलपरिणामया चित्ता ॥४४१॥(१९८९)

Hoūṇa indiyantaragajjhā punarindiyantaraggahanam ।
Khandhā enti na enti ya poggalaparināmaya cittā ॥ 441 ॥ (1989)

[भूत्वेन्द्रियान्तरग्राह्याः पुनरिन्द्रियान्तरग्रहणम् ।
स्कन्धा यान्ति न यान्ति च पुद्गलपरिणामता चित्रा ॥४४१॥(१९८९)

Bhūtvendrıyāntaragrāhyāḥ punarindrıyāntaragrahaṇam ।
Skandhā yānti na yānti ca pudgalaparıṇāmatā citrā ॥441॥ (1989)]

Trans.—441 (Some) objects apprehensible by (one group of) sense organs, are again apprehended by (another group of) sense-organs, while others are not apprehended (by another set of sense-organs). Manifold is the nature of their fruitions. (1989)

टीका–इह सुवर्णपत्र–लवण–सुण्ठी–हरीतकी–चित्रक–गुडादयः स्कन्धाः पूर्वमिन्द्रियान्तरग्राह्याश्चक्षुरादीन्द्रियविषया भूत्वा पुनर्द्रव्य–क्षेत्र–कालादि सामग्र्यन्तरं प्राप्य पुद्गलपरिणामवैचित्र्यादिन्द्रियान्तरग्रहणं स्पर्शन–रसनादीन्द्रियग्राह्यतामायान्ति; तथाहि–सुवर्णं पत्रीकृतं चक्षुर्ग्राह्यं भूत्वा शोधनार्थमग्नौ प्रक्षिप्तं भस्मना मिलितं सत् स्पर्शनेन्द्रियग्राह्यतामेति, पुनः प्रयोगेण भस्मनः पृथक्कृतं चक्षुर्विषयतामुपगच्छति । लवण–सुण्ठी–हरीतकी–चित्रक–गुडादयोऽपि प्राक् चक्षुरिन्द्रियग्राह्या भूत्वा पश्चात् रूपाद्यन्ते बह्वौषधसमुदाये च क्वाथ–चूर्ण–ऽवलेहादि परिणामान्तरमापन्नाः सन्तो रसनेन्द्रियसंवेद्या भवन्ति । कर्पूर–कस्तूरिकादीनामपि पुद्गलाश्चक्षुर्ग्राह्या अपि वायुना

दूरमुपनीता घ्राणसंवेद्या भवन्ति। योजननवकात्तु परतो गतास्तथाविधं कञ्चित् सूक्ष्मपरिणाममापन्ना नैकस्यापीन्द्रियस्य विषयतां प्रतिपद्यन्त इति। अनया दिशाऽन्यापि पुद्गलपरिणामता चित्रा भावनीयेति ॥४४१॥ (१९८९)

D. C.—The manifold nature of *pudgala-pariṇāmas* is explained by means of the following example. Substances such as a sheet of gold, salt, ginger, *harîtakî* (yellow myrobalans), *citrakavela*, jaggery etc–are first apprehended by sense–organs like eye etc, and then they undergo apprehension by means of other sense-organs such as that of touch, taste etc, when accompained by different substances, fields, and times etc. A sheet of gold is first apprehended by eyes, but when passed through fire and mixed with ashes for purification, it is apprehended by the sense of touch as well. Afterwards when it is separated from it, again it becomes apprehensible by eyes. The same is the case with objects like salt, ginger, green vegetables, jaggery etc. They are also *caksurgrāhya* at the first instance, but when mixed with ashes or other groups of medicines or when turned into liquid, powder or paste, they are perceived by the sense of touch. *Pudgalas* like camphor and musk although perceptible by eyes at first, undergo perception by the sense of smell when carried by wind to a long distance.

On the other hand, some *pudgalas* when carried to a distance longer than nine yojanas† do not undergo perception by means of any sense–organ on account of their subtle changes. In all these cases, variegated nature of the changes of pudgalas, is the main cause. ॥ 441 ॥ (1989)

Besides,

एगेगेंदियगज्झा जह वायवादओ तहग्गेया।
होउं चक्खुग्गज्झा घाणिंदियगज्झयामेंति ॥ ४४२ ॥ (१९९०)

† One *Yojana*=Four *Kos'as* or 9 miles (approximately)

Egegendiyagâjjhā jaha vāyavvādao tahaggeyā ।
Höum cakkhuggajjhā ghāṇindiyagajjhayāmenti ॥ 442 ॥ (1990)

[एकैकेन्द्रियग्राह्या यथा वायव्यादयस्तथाऽऽग्नेयाः ।
भूत्वा चक्षुर्ग्राह्या घ्राणेन्द्रियग्राह्यतां यान्ति ॥ ४४२ ॥ (१९९०)

Ekaikendriyagrāhyā yathā vāyavyādayastathā"gneyāḥ ।
Bhūtvā cakṣurgrāhyā ghrāṇendriyagrāhyatām yānti ॥442॥ (1990)]

Trans.—442 Just as (the particles of) wind etc, are perceptible by each single sense-organ (one by one), (those) of fire also undergo perception by means of the sense of smell after being perceptible by eyes. (1990)

टीका-वायुः स्पर्शनेन्द्रियस्यैव ग्राह्यः, रसो रसनस्यैव, गन्धो घ्राणस्यैव, रूपं चक्षुष एव, शब्दस्तु श्रोत्रस्यैव ग्राह्यः । तदेवं यथा वायाव्यदयः पुद्गला एकैकस्य प्रतिनियतस्येन्द्रियस्य ग्राह्या भूत्वा पश्चात् परिणामान्तरं किमप्यापन्ना इन्द्रियान्तरग्राह्या अपि भवन्तीति स्वयमेव गम्यते, तथा प्रस्तुता अपि प्रदीपगता आग्नेयाः पुद्गलाश्चक्षुर्ग्राह्या भूत्वा पश्चाद् विध्याते तस्मिन् प्रदीपे त एव तामसीभूताः सन्तो घ्राणेन्द्रियग्राह्यतामुपयान्ति, तत् किमुच्यते-" किं दीसए न सो सक्खं " इति ?। ननु घ्राणेन्द्रियेणोपलभ्यत एव विध्यातप्रदीपविकार इति ॥ ४४२ ॥ (१९९०)

D. C—Wind is perceptible by the sense of touch, juice by that of taste alone, odour by that of smell alone, form by that of eyes alone, and sound by that of ears alone. The particles of *vāyu* are thus apprehended by one particular sense only. Still however, these *pudgalas* are apprehended by other sense-organs also when they undergo changes.

In case of light, particles of flame are perceptible by eyes. When light is extinguished, these particles change into darkness and are perceived by the sense of smell. Light, therefore, does not turn into nothingness, but its change into darkness is apprehended. ॥ 442 ॥ (1990)

जह दीवो निव्वाणो परिणामन्तरमिओ तहा जीवो।
भण्णइ परिनिव्वाणो पत्तोऽणाबाहपरिणामं ॥ ४४३ ॥ (१९९१)

Jaha dîvo nivvāno pariṇāmantaramio tahā jîvo।
Bhaṇṇai parinivvāno patto'ṇābāhaparināmam ॥ 443 ॥ (1991)

[यथा दीपो निर्वाणः परिणामान्तरमितस्तथा जीवः।
भण्यते परिनिर्वाणः प्राप्तोऽनाबाधपरिणामम् ॥ ४४३ ॥ (१९९१)

Yathā dîpo nirvāṇaḥ pariṇāmāntaramitastathā jîvaḥ।
Bhaṇyate parinirvāṇaḥ prāpto'nābādhaparināmam ॥443॥ (1991)]

Trans.—443 Just as light changed into another form, is said to have attained *nirvāṇa* (final extinction) the Soul also, is said to have attained *nirvāṇa* (final liberation) when it has turned into a faultless form. (1991)

टीका–यथऽनन्तरोक्तस्वरूपपरिणामान्तरं प्राप्तः प्रदीपो "निर्वाणः" इत्युच्यते तथा जीवोऽपि कर्मविरहितकेवलामूर्तजीवस्वरूपभावलक्षणमबाधं परिणामान्तरं प्राप्तो निर्वाणो निर्वृतिं प्राप्त उच्यते। तस्माद् दुःखादिक्षयरूपा सतोऽवस्था निर्वाणमिति स्थितम् ॥ ४४३ ॥ (१९९१)

D C.—Just as light is said to have atained *nirvāṇa* when it changes into darkness, the Soul is also said to have attained *nirvāṇa* when it has changed into a form which is void of *Karma*, and which possesses absolutely *a-mūrta* characteristics of the form and nature of the Soul. This shows that *moksa* is nothing but the pure eternal positive condition of *jîva* when miseries etc are exterminated.

Prabhāsa:—If *mokṣa* is nothing but the pure eternal positive condition of *jîva*, at the removal of miseries etc, then, in absence of objects of pleasure like *s'abda* etc, the free Soul will have no happiness. ॥ 443 ॥ (1991)

Bhagavān replies:—

मुत्तस्स परं सोक्खं णाणाणाबाहओ जहा मुणिणो ।
तद्धम्मा पुण विरहादावरणा–ऽऽबाहहेऊणं ॥ ४४४ ॥ (१९९२)

Muttassa param sokkham nānāṇābāhao jahā muṇino ।
Taddhammā puna virahādāvaranā–"bāhaheūṇam ॥ 444॥ (1992)

[मुक्तस्य परं सौख्यं ज्ञानानाबाधतो यथा मुनेः ।
तद्धर्मा पुनर्विरहादावरणा–ऽऽबाधहेतूनाम् ॥ ४४४ ॥ (१९९२)

Muktasya param saukhyam jñānanābādhato yathā muneḥ ।
Taddharmā punarvirahādāvaraṇā–"bhādhahetūnām ॥444॥ (1992)]

Trans.—444 Like a sage, the free soul (enjoys) perfect happiness by (virtue of) its (high) knowledge, in absence of (all) obstructions. In absence of interruptions and obstructions, it (enjoys) (all) its qualities. (1992)

टीका–मुक्तस्य जन्तोःपरं प्रकृष्टमकृत्रिममिथ्याभिमानजं स्वाभाविकं सुखमिति प्रतिज्ञा । " णाणाणाबाहउ त्ति " ज्ञानप्रकर्षे सति जन्म–जरा–व्याधि–मरणे–ष्टवियोगा–ऽरति–शोक–क्षुत्–पिपासा–शीतो–ष्ण–काम-क्रोध-मद–शाठ्य–तृष्णा–राग–द्वेष–चिन्तौत्सुक्यादिनिः शेषाबाधविरहितत्वादिति हेतुः । तथा विधप्रकृष्टमुनेरिव । यथोक्ताबाधरहितानि काष्ठादीन्यपि वर्तन्ते, परं तेषां ज्ञानाभावाद् न सुखम्; अतस्तद्व्यवच्छेदार्थं ज्ञानग्रहणम् । कथं पुनरसौ प्रकृष्टज्ञानवान्, आबाधरहितश्च ? इत्याह–" तद्धर्मेत्यादि " तद्धर्मा–प्रकृष्टज्ञाना–ऽनाबाधवान् मुक्तात्मा । कुतः ? । विरहात्–अभावात् । केषाम् ? । आवरणहेतूनाम्, आबाधहेतूनां च । एतदुक्तं भवति–क्षीणनिः शेषावरणत्वात् प्रकृष्टज्ञानवानसौ, वेदनीयकर्मादीनां च सर्वेषामप्या बाधहेतूनां सर्वथाऽपगमात् सर्वाऽऽबाधरहितोऽयमिति । प्रयोगः–स्वाभाविकेन स्वेन प्रकाशेन प्रकाशवान् मुक्तात्मा, समस्तप्रकाशावरणरहितत्वात्, तुहिनांशुवत् । तथा चाह—

स्थितः शीतांशुवज्जीवः प्रकृत्या भावशुद्धया ।
चन्द्रिकावच्च विज्ञानं तदावरणमभ्रवत् ॥ १ ॥

इति । तथा, अनाबाधसुखो मुक्तात्मा, समस्ताबाधहेतुरहितत्वात्, ज्वराद्यपगमे स्वच्छाऽऽतुरवत् । तथा चोक्तम्—

स व्याबाधाभावात् सर्वज्ञत्वाच्च भवति परमसुखी ।
व्याबाधाभावोऽत्र स्वच्छस्य ज्ञस्य परमसुखम् ॥ १ ॥
इति ॥ ४४४ ॥ (१९९२)

D. C.—Muktātmā enjoys a perfect but natural happiness. When there is no *āvaraṇa*, it attains high cognizance and when there is absolute *abhāva* of *Karma*, which is nothing but a cause of un-happiness, it is free from all sorts of miseries. So, like a sage, *muktātmā* enjoys the delight of high cognizance. It enjoys perfect happiness as it is free from the miseries of birth, old age, disease, death, separation from the beloved, absence of love, sorrow, hunger, thirst, cold, heat, desire, anger, pride, passion, hatred, anguish, wickedness, and eagerness etc. Lik the Sun, the free soul shines by its own lustre.

It has therefore been said that—

Sthitaḥ śitānśuvajjîvah prakityā bhāvaśuddhayā ।
Candrikāvacca vijñām tādāvaraṇamabhravat ॥ 1 ॥

With reference to the unobstructed happiness, it has also been said—

Sa vyābādhābhāvāt sarvajñatvācca bhavati paramasukhî ।
Vyābādhābhāvo'tra svacchasya jñasya paramasukham ॥2॥444(1992)]

The opponent, then, asks and *Bhagavān* replies—

मुत्तो करणाभावादण्णाणी खं व, णणु विरुद्धोऽयं ।
जमजीवया वि पावइ एत्तो च्चिय भणइ तन्नाम ॥४४५॥(१९९३)

Mutto karaṇābhāvādaṇṇāṇî kham va, naṇu viruddho'yam ।
Jamajîvayā vi pāvai etto cciya bhaṇai tannāma ॥ 445 ॥ (1993)

[मुक्तः करणाभावादज्ञानी खमिव, ननु विरुद्धोऽयम् ।
यदजीवतापि प्राप्नोत्येतस्मादेव भणति तन्नाम ॥ ४४५ ॥ (१९९३)

Muktaḥ karaṇābhāvādajñānî khamiva, nanu viruddho'yam ।
Yadajîvatāpi prāpnotyetasmādeva bhaṇati tannāma ॥445॥ (1993)]

Trans.—445 " A free (soul) is ignorant like the sky, in absence of senses." " This is really fallacious. Because, in that case, it would attain lifelessness as well." " Let it (attain lifelessness.)" (1993)

टीका-नन्वज्ञानी मुक्तात्मा, करणाभावात्, आकाशवत् । अत्राचार्यः प्राह—ननु धर्मिस्वरूपविपरीतसाधनाद् विरुद्धोऽयं हेतुः । तथाहि—अनेनैतदपि सिध्यति-अजीवो मुक्तात्मा, करणाभावात्, आकाशवत् । अत्र परः सोत्कर्षं भणति—" तन्नाम त्ति" 'नाम' इत्यभ्यनुज्ञायाम्-अस्त्वेतत्, न नः किमपि क्षूयते । न हि मुक्तात्मनामजीवत्वेऽस्माकं किञ्चिद् नश्यति, येन हेतोर्विरुद्धता प्रेर्यमाणा शोभेत । अत्राह कश्चित्-ननु मुक्तस्याजीवत्वमार्हतानामप्यनिष्टमेव; ततश्चैतद् दूषणमाचार्येणापि परिहर्तव्यमेव, यच्चात्मनोऽपि दूषणं समापतति तत् कथं परस्यैवैकस्योद्भाव्यते ? । सत्यमेतत्, किन्तु परशक्तिपरीक्षार्थं प्रेर्यमाचार्यः कृतवान्, कदाचित् क्षोभाद् विगलितप्रतिभः परोऽत्रापि प्रतिविधाने स्खलितस्तूष्णीं विदध्यात् । परमार्थतस्तु जीवस्याजीवत्वं कदाचिदपि न भवत्येव ॥ ४४५ ॥ (१९९३)

D. C.—Prabhāsa:—When a *muktātmā* is free from sense-organs, it will be called ignorant like *ākās'a*.

Bhagavān:—It is not so. The argument advanced by you, proves even a contrary *paryāya* of soul. It will prove *muktātmā* to be lifeless in absence of *indriyas*.

Prabhāsa:—Well, what is wrong if *muktātmā* is taken as lifeless ? ॥ 445 ॥ (1993)

Bhagavān replies—

दव्वा-ऽमुत्तत्त सहावजाइओ तस्स दूराविवरीयं ।
न हि जच्चंतरगमणं जुत्तं नभसो व्व जीवत्तं ॥ ४४६ ॥ (१९९४)

Davvā-'muttatta sahāvajāio tassa dūravivarîyam ।
Na hi jaccantaragamaṇam juttam nabhaso vva jīvattam ॥446॥(1994)

[द्रव्याऽमूर्तत्ववत् स्वभावजातितस्तस्य दूरविपरीतम् ।
न हि जात्यन्तरगमनं युक्तं नभस इव जीवत्वम् ॥ ४४६ ॥ (१९९४)

Dravyā'mūrtatvavat svabhāvajātitastasya dūraviparîtam ।
Na hi jātyantaragamanam yuktam nabhasa iva jīvatvam॥446॥(1994)]

Trans.—446 By virtue of its natural genesis like *dravyatva* and *a-mūrtatva*, it is far the most fallacious. Like life to sky, its transgression to the other genesis, is not proper. (1994)

टीका–तस्य मुक्तात्मनो हि यस्मात् कारणाद् न युक्तमिति संबन्धः । किं तद् न युक्तम् ? इत्याह–एकस्या जीवत्वलक्षणाया जातेर्यदजीवत्वलक्षणं जात्यन्तरं तत्र गमनं जात्यन्तरगमनम्, तन्न युक्तम् । कथंभूतं जात्यन्तरम् ? इत्याह–दूरमत्यर्थं विपरीतं दूरविपरीतम् । कस्या दूरविपरीतम् ? इत्याह — " सहावजाइउ त्ति " जीवत्वलक्षणा या स्वाभाविकी स्वभावभूता जातिः स्वभावजातिस्तस्याः । किंवद् या स्वभावजातिः ? इत्याह––उपमानप्रधानत्वाद् निर्देशस्य, द्रव्या–ऽमूर्तत्ववदिति द्रव्यत्ववदमूर्तत्ववच्चेत्यर्थः । स्वभावजातेर्दूरविपरीतं सत् कस्य यथा किं न युक्तम् ? इत्याह––नभस इव जीवत्वम् । इदमत्र हृदयम्—द्रव्यत्वम्, अमूर्तत्वं च जीवस्य तावत् स्वभावभूता जातिः, तस्याश्च यद् दूरविपरीतं जात्यन्तरमद्रव्यत्वम्, अमूर्तत्वं च, तत्र गमनं तस्य कस्यामप्यवस्थायां न भवति । एवं जीवत्वमपि जीवस्य स्वभावभूतैव जातिः, ततस्तस्या अपि स्वभावजातेर्यद् दूरविपरीतम जीवत्वलक्षणं जात्यन्तरं तत्र गमनं मुक्तावस्थायामपि तस्य न युज्यते । न ह्यजीवस्य सतो नभसः कदाचिदपि जीवत्वाप्राप्तिर्भवति । तस्माद् मुक्तो जीवो यथाऽद्रव्यं मूर्तश्च न भवति, तद्विपक्षस्वभावत्वात्; एवं जीवस्वाभाव्याद् जीवोऽप्यसौ कदाचिदपि न भवति; अन्यथा नभः–परमाण्वादीनामपि स्वस्वभावत्यागेन वैपरीत्यापत्त्याऽतिप्रसङ्गादिति ।

अत्राह–यद्येवम्, तर्हि यद् भवतैवोक्तम्–"अजीवो मुक्तात्मा, कारणाभावात्, आकाशवत्" इति, तत् कथं नेतव्यम् ?। अत्रोच्यते––परस्य प्रसङ्गापादनमेव तदस्माभिः कृतम्, तत्करणे च कारणमुक्तमेव, न पुनरनेन हेतुना मुक्तस्याजीवत्वं सिध्यति, प्रतिबन्धाभावात्; तथाहि–यदि करणैर्जीवत्वं

कृतं भवेत्, यथा दहनेन धूमः, व्यापकानि वा जीवत्वस्य करणानि यदि भवेयुः, यथा शिंशपाया वृक्षत्वम्, तदा करणनिवृत्तौ भवेज्जीवत्वनिवृत्तिः, यथाऽग्नि–वृक्षत्वनिवृत्तौ धूम–शिंशपात्वयोः; न चैतदस्ति, जीवत्वस्यानादि-पारिणामिकभावरूपत्वेनाकृतकत्वात् । व्याप्य–व्यापकभावोऽपीन्द्रियाणां शरीरेणैव सह युज्यते, उभयस्यापि पौद्गलिकत्वात्, न तु जीवत्वेन, जीव-स्यामूर्तत्वेनात्यन्तं तद्विलक्षणत्वात् । तस्मात् करणनिवृत्तावप्यनिवृत्तमेव मुक्तस्य जीवत्वमिति ॥ ४४६ (१९९४) ॥

D. C.—Bhagavān:—Your statement is absolutely fallacious. Just as *drayatva* and *a–mūrtatva* are the innate characteristics of a soul, and just as that genesis of *jîva* never exists in any condition in a genesis having contrary characteristics like *a–dravyatva* and *a–mūrtatva*, *jîvatva* is also the innate and natural characteristic of *jîva*, and that genesis of *jîva* never exists in a genesis having opposite characteristics. Consequently, in the state of *muktātmā*, *jîva* does never become *a–jîva*.

Just as a free soul never attains the condition of *a–dravyatva* and *mūrtatva*, it never reaches a life–less state leaving aside its own innate living characteristics. For, if it leaves its own *svabhāva*, the sky and molecules will also leave their innate characteristics and accept the unnatural tendency.

Prabhāsa:—If it is so, how do you explain your statement that *muktātmā* is *a–jîva* like *ākās'a*, on account of the *abhāva* of sense–organs.

Bhagavān:—The statement was made by me only to refute the opponent's view. In doing so, the reason has already been explained, but this argument does not lead to prove *mūktātmā* to be lifeless, as there is no *pratibandha* for it For, if *jîvatva* is established by the existence of *indriyas*, it goes without saying that in absence of sence–organs, *jîva* will also be absent, as in the cases of fire and smoke, and *As'oka* and *vṛkṣatva*. But it does not happen actually. The sense–organs

are connected with body by the relation of part and whole, but they are not connected with *jîva* because of its *a–mūrtatva*. It is not correct, therefore, to say that with the *abhāva* of *indriyas*, there is *abhāva* of *jîvatva* in *muktātmā*.

Prabhāsa:—But, even in that case, how will you answer my contention that *muktātma* is ignorant like sky in absence of sense–organs ?

The reply is—

मुत्ताइभावओ नोवलद्धिमंतिंदियाइं कुंभो व ।
उवलंभद्दाराणि उ ताइं जीवो तदुवलद्धा ॥ ४४७ ॥ (१९९५)
तदुवरमे वि सरणओ तव्वावारे वि नोवलंभाओ ।
इंदियभिन्नो आया पंचगवक्खोवलद्धा वा ॥ ४४८ ॥ (१९९६)

Muttāibhāvao novaladdhimantindiyāim kumbho vva ।
Uvalambhaddārāni u tāim jîvo taduvaladdhā ॥ 447 ॥ (1995)

Taduvarame vi saraṇao tavvāvāre vi novalambhāo ।
Indiyabhinno āyā pancagavakkhovaladdhā vā ॥ 448 ॥ (1996)

[मूर्तादिभावतो नोपलब्धिमन्तीन्द्रियाणि कुम्भ इव ।
उपलम्भद्वाराणि तु तानि जीवस्तदुपलब्धा ॥ ४४७ ॥ (१९९५)

तदुपरमेऽपि स्मरणतस्तद्व्यापारेऽपि नोपलम्भात् ।
इन्द्रियभिन्न आत्मा पञ्चगवाक्षोपलब्धेव ॥ ४४८ ॥ (१९९६)

Mūrtādibhāvato nopalabdhimantîndriyāṇi kumbha iva ।
Upalambhadvārāṇi tu tāni jîvastdupalabdhā ॥ 447 ॥ (1995)

Taduparame'pi smaranastadvyāpāre'pi nopalaṃbhāt ।
Indriyabhinna ātmā pancagavākṣopalabdheva ॥ 448 ॥ (1996)]

Trans.—447–448 On account of their (qualities like) *mūrtatva* etc like *ghaṭa*, sense–organs do not attain apprehension, but they are mere mediums of apprehension. Their

(real) agent of apprehension is *jîva*. Because of (its power of) recollection, even when they cease to work and for want of apprehension even when they are working, the soul is distinguished from sense-organs like an observer from the five windows. (1995-1996)

टीका-अनयोर्व्याख्या पूर्ववत् । केवलं प्रस्तुते भावार्थ उच्यते-यदीन्द्रियाण्युपलब्धिमन्ति भवेयुस्तदा तन्निवृत्तावप्युपलब्धिनिवृत्तिर्भवेत्, न चैतदस्ति, अन्वय-व्यतिरेकाभ्यां जीवस्योपलब्धिमत्त्वनिश्चयादिति ॥ ४४७-४४८ ॥ (१९९५-१९९६) ॥

D. C.—If the *indriyas* were the real agents of apprehension, there would have been no perception when they ceased to work. But it does not happen so. On the other hand, when they worked, perception should positively take place, but due to the absent-mindedness of the observer it does not happen so. The power of *jîva* is thus established from the positive as well as negative point of view. ॥447-448॥ (1995-1996)

Indicating that *jñāna* would not vanish with *indriyas*, but it is the very innate nature of *jîva*, the author states—

नाणरहिओ न जीवो सरूवओऽणु व्व मुत्तिभावेणं ।
जं तेण विरुद्धमिदं अत्थि य सो नाणरहिओ य ॥४४९॥ (१९९७)

Nānarahio na jîvo sarūvao'ṇu vva muttibhāveṇam ।
Jam tena viruddhamidam atthi ya so nāṇarahio ya ॥449॥ (1997)

[ज्ञानरहितो न जीवः स्वरूपतोऽणुरिव मूर्तिभावेन ।
यत् तेन विरुद्धमिदमस्ति च स ज्ञानरहितश्च ॥ ४४९ ॥ (१९९७)

Jñānarahito na jîvaḥ svarūpato'ṇuriva mūrtibhāvena ।
Yat tena viruddhamidamasti ca sa jñānarahitaśca ॥449॥ (1997)]

Trans.—449 Like an atom, *jîva* as such is not void of cognizance, because of its corporeal nature. Hence, the statement that it is void of cognizance is incorrect. (1997)

टीका–यद् यस्माज्ज्ञानरहितो जीवः कदाचिदपि न भवति, ज्ञानस्य तत्स्वरूपत्वात्, यथा मूर्तिभावेन रहितोऽणुर्न भवति, तेन तस्माद् कारणाद् विरुद्धमेतत्–" अस्ति चासौ मुक्तो जीवः, अथ च स ज्ञानरहितः" इति। न हि स्वरूपस्याभावे स्वरूपवतोऽवस्थानं युज्यते, तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्य तस्यासत्त्वात्, तथा चानन्तरमेवोक्तम्–" न हि जच्चंतरगमणं जुत्तं नभसो व जीवत्तं " इति ॥ ४४९ (१९९७) ॥

D. C.—Just as an atom cannot exist without a finite form, *jîva* could also never exist without cognizance, as cognizance is the very nature of *jîva*. Since a corporeal body cannot exist without a finite form, your statement that *muktātmā* is void of *jñāna*, is absolutely incorrect. ॥ 449 ॥ (1997)

Again there is a question and its reply—

किह सो णाणसरूवो णणु पच्चक्खाणुभूइओ नियए।
परदेहम्मि वि गज्झो स पवित्ति-निवित्तिलिंगाओ ॥४५०॥ (१९९८)

Kiha so nāṇasarūvo naṇu paccakkhānubhūio niyae।
Paradehammi vi gajjho sa pavitti–nivittilingāo ॥ 450 ॥ (1998)

[**कथं स ज्ञानस्वरूपो ननु प्रत्यक्षानुभूतितो निजके।**
परदेहेऽपि ग्राह्यः स प्रवृत्ति–निवृत्तिलिङ्गात् ॥ ४५० ॥ (१९९८)

Katham sa jñānasvarūpo nanu pratyakṣānubhūtito nijake।
Paradehe'pi grāhyaḥ sa pravritti–nivrittilingāt ॥ 450 ॥ (1998)]

Trans.—450 " How does it exist in the form of cognizance ? " " By direct apprehension, it is cognizible in case of its own body, and in the capacity of engagement and retirement in case of another's body." (1998)

टीका–ननु कथमसौ जीवो ज्ञानस्वरूप इति निश्चीयते ?। अत्रोत्तरमाह–' ननु ' इत्यक्षमायाम्, ननु निजे देहे तावत् प्रत्यक्षानुभवादेव ज्ञानस्वरूपो जीव इति विज्ञायते, इन्द्रियव्यापारोपरमेऽपि तद्व्यापारोपलब्धार्थानुस्मरणात्, तद्व्यापारेऽपि चान्यमनस्कतायामनुपलम्भात्,

अदृष्टा-ऽश्रुतानामपि चार्थानां तथाविधक्षयोपशमपाटवात् कदाचिद् व्याख्यानावस्थायां चेतसि स्फुरणात् । एतच्च स्वसंवेदनसिद्धमपि भवतः प्रष्टव्यतां गतम् । तथा, स जन्तुः परदेहेऽपि ज्ञानस्वरूप एवेति ग्राह्यः । कुतः ? । तथाविधप्रवृत्ति-निवृत्तिलिङ्गादिति ॥ ४५० ॥ (१९९८) ॥

D. C.—Prabhāsa:—With what authority can you say that *Jîva* is *jñānasvarūpa ?*

Bhagavān:—That *jîva* exists as cognizance in its own body is seen by means of direct apprehension. Even when sense-organs cease to work, the object perceived by sense-organs, is recollected, while sometimes the object is not apprehended even when the sense-organs are working because of absent-mindednes-sometimes perception crops up in the mind due to the relaxation of their destruction at the time of explanation.

In case of another's body also, *jîva* is known to be *jñānasvarūpa* on account of its inclination (to the desirable objects) and aversion (from the undesirable ones). ॥450॥(1998)]

And,

सव्वावरणावगमे सो सुद्धयरो भवेज्ज सूरो व्व ।
तम्मयभावाभावादण्णाणित्तं न जुत्तं से ॥ ४५१ ॥ (१९९९)

Savvāvaraṇāvagame so suddhayaro bhavejja sūro vva ।
Tammayabhāvābhāvādaṇṇāṇittam na juttam se ॥ 451 ॥ (1999)

[सर्वावरणापगमे स शुद्धतरो भवेत् सूर इव ।
तन्मयभावाभावादज्ञानित्वं न युक्तं तस्य ॥ ४५१ ॥ (१९९९)

Sarvāvaraṇāpagame sa śuddhataro bhavet sūra iva ।
Tanmayabhāvābhāvādajñānitvam na yuktam tasya ॥451॥ (1999)]

Trans.—451 At the removal of all interruptions, that *(muktātmā)* would be purer like the Sun. It is not, therefore, proper to attribute ignorance to it. (1999)

टीका–सेन्द्रियो जन्तुर्देशतोऽप्यावरणक्षये तावत् तारतम्येन ज्ञानयुक्त एव भवति, यस्य त्वनिन्द्रियस्य सर्वमप्यावरणं क्षीणम्, स निःशेषावरणापगमे शुद्धतर एव भवति–संपूर्णज्ञानप्रकाशयुक्त एव भवतीत्यर्थः; यथा समस्तावरणापगमे संपूर्णप्रकाशमयः सूर्यः। ततस्तन्मयभावस्य प्रकाशमयत्वस्य करणाभावेनाभावाद् हेतोः "से" तस्य मुक्तस्य यदज्ञानित्वं प्रेर्यते भवता, तद् न युक्तम्, आवारकाभावे तस्यैव प्रकर्षवतो ज्ञानप्रकाशस्य सद्भावादिति ॥ ४५१ ॥ (१९९९) ॥

D. C.—Muktātmā possesses the power of complete cognizance. A soul having sense-organs is cognizant but to a more or less extent on account of its *āvaraṇas* being removed partially Since all the *āvaraṇas* are removed in case of a *muktātmā*, it is completely cognizant

Just as the Sun becomes completely resplendent with lustre when all the *āvaraṇas* like clouds etc are removed, the *muktātmā* is also completely resplendent with the lustre of cognizance when all *āvaraṇas* of *indriyas* have been removed. ॥ 451 ॥ (1999)

एवं पगासमइओ जीवो छिद्दावभासयत्ताओ ।
किंचिम्मेत्तं भासइ छिद्दावरणपईवो व्व ॥ ४५२ ॥ (२०००)

सुबहुयरं वियाणइ मुत्तो सव्वप्पिहाणविगमाओ ।
अवणीयघरो व्व नरो विगयावरणप्पईवो व्व ॥ ४५३ ॥ (२००१)

Evam pagāsamaio jîvo chiddāvabhāsayattāo ।
Kincimmettam bhāsai chiddāvaraṇapaîvo vva ॥ 452 ॥ (2000)

Subahuyaram viyānai mutto savvappihānavigamāo ।
Avanîyagharo vva naro vigayāvaraṇappaîvo vva ॥ 453 ॥ (2001)

[एवं प्रकाशमयो जीवश्छिद्रावभासकत्वात् ।
किंञ्चिन्मात्रं भासते छिद्रावरणप्रदीप इव ॥ ४५२ ॥ (२०००)

सुबहुतरं विजानाति मुक्तः सर्वपिधानविगमात् ।
अपनीतगृह इव नरो विगतावरणप्रदीप इव ॥ ४५३ ॥ (२००१)

Evam prakāśamayo jîvaśchidrāvabhāsakatvāt |
Kiṁcinmātram bhāsate chidrāvaraṇapradîpa iva ॥452॥ (2000)]

Subahutaram vijanāti muktah sarvapidhānavigamāt |
Apanîtagriha iva naro vigatāvaraṇapradîpa iva ॥ 453 ॥ (2001)]

Trans.—452–453 The soul is thus lustrous. It shines only a little, like a lamp (shining) under a porous obstruction on account of its shining through holes. (But) like a person relieved from home or like a lamp shining without obstructions, the *muktātmā* perceives completely, when all its interruptions have been removed. (2000–2001)

टीका–तदेवं सति सर्वदा प्रकाशमयः प्रकाशस्वभाव एव जीवः, केवलं संसार्यवस्थायां छद्मस्थः किञ्चिन्मात्रमवभासयति, क्षीणाऽक्षीणावरणच्छिद्रैरिन्द्रियच्छिद्रैश्चावभासनात्, सच्छिद्रकुट–कुड्याद्यन्तरितप्रदीपवदिति । मुक्तस्तु मुक्तावस्थायां प्राप्तो जीवः सुबहुतरं विजानाति–यदस्ति तत् सर्वं प्रकाशयतीत्यर्थः, सर्वपिधानविगमात्–सर्वावरणक्षयादित्यर्थः, अपनीतसमस्तगृहः पुरुष इव, विगतसमस्तकुट–कुड्याद्यावरणप्रदीप इव वेति । यो हि सच्छिद्रावरणान्तरितः स्तोकं प्रकाशयति स निःशेषावरणापगमे सुबह्वेव प्रकाशयति । न तु तस्य सर्वथा प्रकाशाभाव इति भावः । तस्मात् "मुत्तस्स परं सोक्खं णाणा–ऽणाबाहओ" इत्यादि स्थितम् ॥ ४५२–४५३ ॥ (२०००–२००१)

D. C.—*Jîva* is thus shown as lustrous with complete perception. In the mundane life, *jîva* is obstructed by various *āvaraṇas* and hence it will be able to perceive through the holes of indriyas to a certain extent like a lamp shining through a porous wall.

But in the *mukta* state, the free soul illumines everything perfectly with its power of cognizance like a lamp shining

without any obstruction or like a man relieved of all household worries.

This proves, therefore, the assertion that a free soul enjoys perfect happiness by means of perfect perception, when all its obstructions have been removed. ॥ 452-453 ॥ (2000-2001)]

Then doubting the existence of happiness to a free soul, the opponent argues—

पुण्णा–ऽपुण्णकयाइं जं सुह–दुक्खाइं तेण तन्नासे ।
तन्नासाओ मुत्तो निस्सुह–दुक्खो जहागासं ॥४५४॥ (२००२)

अहवा निस्सुह–दुक्खो नभं व देहें–दियादभावाओ ।
आधारो देहो च्चिय जं सुह–दुक्खोवलद्धीणं ॥ ४५५॥ (२००३)

Puṇṇā–'puṇṇakayāim jam suha–dukkhāim teṇa tannāse ।
Tannāsāo mutto nissuha–dukkho jahāgāsam ॥ 454 ॥ (2002)

Ahavā nissuha–dukkho nabham va dehe'ndiyāi bhāvāo ।
Ādhāro deho cciya jam suha–dukkhovaladdhînam ॥455॥ (2003)

[पुण्या–ऽपुण्यकृते यत् सुख–दुःखे तेन तन्नाशे ।
तन्नाशाद् मुक्तो निःसुख–दुःखो यथाकाशम् ॥ ४५४ ॥ (२००२)

अथवा निःसुख–दुःखो नभ इव देहे–न्द्रियाद्यभावात् ।
आधारो देह एव यत् सुख–दुःखोपलब्धीनाम् ॥ ४५५ ॥ (२००३)

Puṇyā–'puṇyakṛite yat sukha–duḥkhe tena tannāśe ।
Tannāśād mukto niḥsukha–duḥkho yathākāśam ॥ 454 ॥ (2002)

Athavā niḥsukh–duḥkho nabha iva dehe–ndriyādyabhāvāt ।
Ādhāro deha eva yat sukha–duḥkhopalabdhînām ॥455॥(2003)]

Trans.—454–455 Since happiness and misery are the products of *puṇya* and *pāpa* (respectively), the *mukta* (soul) will be free from *puṇya* and *pāpa* like *ākāśa*, because it vanishes with them. Or, since body (itself) is the means of

apprehension of happiness and misery, it is free from happiness and misery like the sky, in absence of body as well as sense-organs. (2002–2003)

टीका–पुण्यात् सुखमुपजायते, पापाच्च दुःखम्, इति भवतामपि संमतम्, तेन तस्मात् तयोः पुण्य–पापयोः कारणभूतयोर्नाशे सुख–दुःखयोः कार्य-रूपयोर्नाशाद् निःसुख–दुःख एव मुक्तात्मा प्राप्नोति, तत्कारणाभावात् आकाशवदिति । अथवा, निःसुख–दुःखोऽसौ, देहे–न्द्रियाभावात्, नभोवत्, यद् यस्माद् देह एव, तथेन्द्रियाणि च सुख–दुःखोपलब्धीनामाधारो दृश्यते, न पुनर्देहाभावे सुख–दुःखे दृश्येते, नापीन्द्रियाभावे ज्ञानं क्वाप्युपलभ्यते । ततः सिद्धस्य कथं तदभावात् तानि श्रद्धीयन्ते ? इति ॥ ४५४–४५५ ॥ (२००२–२००३)

D. C.—Prabhāsa.—That happiness is born of *puṇya* and misery of *pāpa*, has already been accepted by you. Now, when *puṇya* and *pāpa* vanish, happiness and misery being their *kāryas*, will naturally vanish Hence, like the sky *muktātmā* will be free from *sukha–duḥkha*. Or, it will be free from *sukha–duḥkha* in absence of *deha* and *indriyas*.

Since *deha* is an active means of apprehending *sukha–duḥkha* there will be no apprehension of *sukha–duḥkha* in absence of *deha* In absence of *indriyas*, there will be no cognizance. Consequently, a *mukta* (being) can never experience *sukha–duḥkha*. ॥ 454–455 ॥ (2002–2003)

Bhagavān replies—

पुण्णफलं दुक्खं चिय कम्मोदयओ फलं व पावस्स ।
नणु पावफले वि समं पच्चक्खविरोहिआ चेव ॥४५६॥ (२००४)

Puṇṇaphalam dukkham ciya kammodayao phalam va pāvassa ।
Naṇu pāvaphale vi samam paccakkhavirohiā ceva ॥ 456 ॥ (2004)

[पुण्यफलं दुःखमेव कर्मोदयतः फलमिव पापस्य ।
ननु पापफलेऽपि समं प्रत्यक्षविरोधिता चैव ॥ ४५६ ॥ (२००४)

Puṇyaphalam duḥkhameva karmodayataḥ phalamiva pāpasya । Nanu pāpaphale'pī samam pratyakṣavirodhitā caiva. ॥456॥(2004)]

Trans.—456 " On account of (the rise of) *Karma,* the fruition of virtuous deeds is even distressful like the fruition of sins. The same is really the case with the fruition of sins also. " And it is (nothing but) clear contradiction. (2004)

टीका–चक्रवर्तिपदलाभादिकं पुण्यफलं निश्चयतो दुःखमेव, कर्मोदयजन्यत्वात्, नरकत्वादिपापफलवत्। परः प्राह–ननु पापफलेऽपि समानमिदम्, तथाहि–अत्रापि वक्तुं शक्यत एतत्–उक्तं पापफलं दुःखत्वेनाभिमतं परमार्थतः सुखमेव, कर्मोदयजन्यत्वात्, पुण्यफलवत् । एवं च वदतां प्रत्यक्षविरोधिता, स्वसंवेद्यसुख–दुःखयोर्वैपरीत्येन संवित्त्यभावादिति ॥ ४५६ ॥ (२००४)

D. C —Bhagavān:—Like *pāpa phalas,* the *puṇya phalas* like that of attaining *cakravarti pāda* (sovereignty of the world) etc, are also distressful on account of their being produced by *Karma.*

Prabhāsa:—The same could be said of *pāpa-phalas* as well. The *pāpa-phalas* although known as distressful are in reality happy, on account of their being produced by *Karma.*

Bhagavān:—Since you have not understood the real sense of *sukha-duḥkha,* you have said so. But it is really contradicting. ॥ 436 ॥ (2004)

जत्तो च्चिय पच्चक्खं सोम्म ! सुहं नत्थि दुक्खमेवेदं ।
तप्पडियारविभत्तं तो पुण्णफलं ति दुक्खं ति ॥४५७॥(२००५)

Jatto cciya paccakkham Somma ! suham natthi dukkhamevedam
Tappadiyāravibhattam to puṇṇaphalam ti dukkham ti ॥457॥ (2005)

[यत एव प्रत्यक्षं सौम्य ! सुखं नास्ति दुःखमेवेदम् ।
तत्प्रतीकारविभक्तं ततः पुण्यफलमिति दुःखमिति ॥४५७॥ (२००५)

Yata eva pratyakṣam Saumya ! sukham nāsti duḥkhamevedam ।
Tatpratīkāravibhaktam tataḥ puṇyaphalamiti duḥkhamiti ॥457॥]

Trans.—457 That which is directly perceived as happiness is not happiness, *O Saumya !* but it is only misery. It has been distinguished (from *duhkha*) only as its resistance. The fruition of virtuous deeds is, therefore, (nothing but) *duḥkha.* (2005)

टीका–सौम्य ! प्रभास ! यत एव दुःखेऽनुभूयमाने कस्याप्यविपर्यस्तमतेः सुखं प्रत्यक्षं नास्ति, सुखानुभवः स्वसंविदितो न विद्यते, अत एवास्माभिरुच्यते–" दुक्खमेवेदं " इति, यत् किमप्यत्र संसारचक्रे स्त्रक्–चन्दना–ऽङ्गनासंभोगादिसमुत्थमपि विद्यते तत् सर्वं दुःखमेवेत्यर्थः, केवलं तस्याङ्गनासंभोगादिविषयौत्सुक्यजनितारति रूपस्य दुःखस्य प्रतीकारोऽङ्गनासंभोगादिकस्तत्प्रतीकारस्तेन तत्प्रतीकारेण दुःखमपि सद् विभक्तं मूढैर्भेदेन व्यवस्थापितम्–तत्प्रतीकाररूपं कामिनीसंभोगादिकं पामाकण्डूयनादिवत् सुखमध्यवसितम्, शूलारोपण–शूल–शिरोबाधादिव्याधि–बन्ध–वधादिजनितं तु दुःखमिति। रमणीसंभोग–चक्रवर्तिपदलाभादिसुखं स्वसंविदितं "दुःखम्" इति वदतां प्रत्यक्षविरोध इति चेत् । तदयुक्तम्, मोहमूढप्रत्यक्षत्वात् तस्य, तल्लाभौत्सुक्यजनितारतिरूपदुःखप्रतीकाररूपत्वाद् दुःखेऽपि तत्र सुखाध्यवसायः, पामाकण्डूयना–ऽपथ्याहारपरिभोगादिवत्; तथा चोक्तम्—

नग्नः प्रेत इवाविष्ट क्वणन्तीमुपगृह्य ताम् ।
गाढायासितसर्वाङ्गः स सुखी रमते किल ॥ १ ॥

औत्सुक्यमात्रमवसादयति प्रतिष्ठा क्लिश्नाति लब्धपरिपालनवृत्तिरेव ।
नातिश्रमापगमनाय यथा श्रमाय राज्यं स्वहस्तगतदण्डमिवातपत्रम् ॥ २ ॥

भुक्ताः श्रियः सकलकामदुधास्ततः किं संप्रीणिताः प्रणयिनः स्वधनैःस्ततः किम ?
दत्तं पदं शिरसि विद्विषतां ततः किं कल्पं स्थितं तनुभृतां तनुभिस्ततः किम् ॥ ३ ॥

इत्थं न किञ्चिदपि साधन–साध्यजातं स्वप्नेन्द्रजालसदृशं परमार्थशून्यम् ।
अत्यन्तनिर्वृतिकरं यदपेतबाधं तद् ब्रह्म वाञ्छत जनाः ! यदि चेतनास्ति ॥४॥

इत्यादिना । " पुण्यफलं ति दुक्खं ति " यत एवमुक्तंप्रकारेण दुःखेऽपि सुखाभिमानः, तस्मात् पुण्यफलमपि सर्वं तत्त्वतो दुःखमेवेति ॥ ४५७ ॥ (२००५)

D. C.—Bhagavān:—Pleasure afforded by objects like garlands, sandal-wood, and woman etc is, in reality, nothing but misery in this world. This *sukha* has been distinguished from *duḥkha* (in the form) of passions generated from the eagerness to enjoy sexual pleasures with woman etc. Only ignorant people call it happiness.

But really speaking, such sorts of happiness are only temporarily pleasant like the scratching of herpes.

While, putting to the gallows, aching in the stomach, headache, and the fetters of imprisonment etc, are known as miseries.

Prabhāsa:—It is evidently contradictory to say that, *sukha* of the enjoyment with woman etc. and of the attainment of the sovereignty etc. are *duḥkha.*

Bhagavān:—It is not contradictory to say so. It is perceived as *sukha* only to those who are disillusioned by ignorance. There will be establishment of *sukha* similar to the scratching of herpes or enjoying the forbidden food even in misery as they act as resistance against the distress of passions produced by eagerness to attain pleasure.

So, it has been said—

Nagnaḥ preta ivāviṣṭaḥ kvaṇantīmupgrihya tām ।
Gāḍhāyāsitasarvāṅgaḥ sa sukhî ramate kila ॥ 1 ॥

Autsukyamātramavasādayati pratiṣṭhā kliśnāti labdha
paripālanavrittireva ।
Nātiśramāpagamanāya yathā śramāya rājyam svahastagata
daṇḍamivātapatram ॥ 2 ॥

Bhuktaḥ śriyaḥ sakalakāmadudhāstataḥ kim samprīṇitāḥ
praṇayinaḥ svadhanaistataḥ kim ? |
Dattam padam śirasi vidviṣatām tataḥ kim kalpam sthitam
tanubhritām tanubhistataḥ kim ? ॥ 3 ॥

Ittham na kincidapi sādhana-sādhyajātam svapnendrajāla-
sadriśam paramārthaśūnyam |
Atyantanirvritikaram yadapetabādham tad Brahma vānchata janāḥ |
yadi cetanāsti ॥ 4 ॥

The *puṇya phalas* awarding the attainment of *viṣaya sukhas* are thus proved as nothing but *duḥkhamaya* in reality. ॥ 457 ॥ (2005)

विसयसुहं दुक्खं चिय दुक्खपडियारओ तिगिच्छ व्व ।
तं सुहमुवयाराओ न उवयारो विणा तच्चं ॥ ४५८ ॥ (२००६)

Visayasuham dukkham ciya dukkhapadiyārao tigiccha vva |
Tam suhamuvayārāo na uvayāro viṇā taccam ॥ 458 ॥ (2006)

[विषयसुखं दुःखमेव दुःखप्रतीकारतश्चिकित्सेव ।
तत् सुखमुचाराद् नोपचारो विना तथ्यम् ॥ ४५८ ॥ (२००६)

Viṣayasukham duḥkhameva duḥkhpratīkāratašcikitseva |
Tat sukhamupacārād nopacāro vinā tathyam ॥ 458 ॥ (2006)]

Trans.—458 The sensuous pleasure is distressful like medicine on account of its being a resistance against distress. It is (known as) happiness by (virtue of) usage (only). And there is no usage without fact. (2006)

टीका-विषयसुखं तत्त्वतो दुःखमेव, दुःखप्रतीकाररूपत्वात्, कुष्ठ-गण्डाऽर्शोरोग-क्काथपान-च्छेदन-दग्धनादिचिकित्सावत् । यश्च लोके तत्र सुखव्यपदेशः प्रवर्तते स उपचारात् । न चोपचारस्तथ्यं पारमार्थिकं विना क्वापि प्रवर्तते, माणवकादौ सिंहाद्युपचारवदिति ॥ ४५८ ॥ (२००६)

D. C.—Since *viṣaya sukha* is after all a resistance against *duḥkha*, it is nothing but *duḥkha*. For the removal of diseases like leprosy, boil, or piles, just as a dose of decoction and

cutting off or burning some rotten part, are considered as pleasant inspite of their causing pain, the *viṣaya sukhas* are also considered as *duḥkhamaya* inspite of their affording pleasure.

The *visaya sukha* is known as *sukha* by means of *upacāra* only. This *upacāra* is not reality but its existence is based on real objects. Without the existence of a real lion, the attribute of lion could never be given to *māṇavaka*. ॥ 458 ॥ (2006)

तम्हा जं मुत्तसुहं तं तच्चं दुक्खसंखएऽवस्सं ।
मुणिणोऽणाबाहस्स व णिप्पडियारप्पसूईओ ॥४५९॥ (२००७)

Tamhā jam muttasuham tam taccam dukkhasaṃkhae'vassam ।
Muṇiṇo'ṇābāhassa va nippadiyārappasūīo ॥ 459 ॥ (2007)

[तस्माद् यद् मुक्तसुखं तत् तथ्यं दुखसंक्षयेऽवश्यम् ।
मुनेरनाबाधस्येव निष्प्रतीकारप्रसूतेः ॥ ४५९ ॥ (२००७)

Tasmād yad muktasukham tat tathyam duḥkhasaṃksaye'vaśyam ।
Muneranābhādhasyeva niṣpratīkāraprasūteḥ ॥ 459 ॥ (2007)]

Trans.—459 Hence, at the removal of (all) miseries, happiness of a free (soul) being produced unresisted and unobstructed like a sage, is undoubtedly a real (happiness) (2007)

टीका–तस्माद् यद् मुक्तस्य संबन्धि तदेव सुखं तथ्यं निरुपचरितम् । कुतः ? । स्वाभाविकत्वेन निष्प्रतीकाररूपस्य तस्य प्रसूतेरुत्पत्तेः । कथम् ? । अवश्यम् । क्व सति ? । दुःखसंक्षये । सांसारिकं हि सर्वं पुण्यफलमपि दुःखरूपतया समर्थितम्, ततः पापफलम्, इतरच्च सर्वं दुःखमेवेहास्ति नान्यत्, तच्च मुक्तस्य क्षीणम् ; अतस्तत्संक्षयेऽवश्यंतया यत् तस्य निष्प्रतीकारं स्वाभाविकं निरुपमं सुखमुत्पद्यते तदेव तथ्यम् । कस्येव ? । विशिष्टज्ञानवतोऽनाबाधस्य मुनेरिव उक्तं च—

" निर्जितमद–मदनानां वाक्–काय–मनोविकाररहितानाम् ।
निवृत्तपराशानामिहैव मोक्षः सुविहितानाम् ॥ १ ॥

इति ॥ ४५९ ॥ (२००७)

D. C.—Happiness enjoyed by a *mukta* being is real, and is not based upon *upacāra* because it is naturally generated without any resistance. Like that of a learned sage, having no obstacle in his way, this *sukha* is free from all sorts of miseries found in the mundane world.

It has been said, therefore, that,

Nirjitamada-madanānām vāk-kāya-manovikārarahitānām ।
Vinivṛittaparāśānāmihaiva mokṣaḥ suvihitānām ॥ 459 ॥ (2007)]

Also,

जह वा नाणमओऽयं जीवो नाणोवघाइ चावरणं ।
करणमणुग्गहकारिं सव्वावरणक्खए सुद्धी ॥ ४६० ॥ (२००८)

तह सोक्खमओ जीवो पावं तस्सोवघाइयं नेयं ।
पुण्णमणुग्गहकारिं सोक्खं सव्वक्खए सयलं ॥ ४६१ ॥ (२००९)

Jaha vā nāṇamao'yam jīvo nāṇovaghāi cāvaraṇam ।
Karaṇamaṇuggahakārim savvāvaranakkhae suddhī ॥460॥ (2008)

Taha sokkhamao jīvo pāvam tassovaghāiyam neyam ।
Puṇṇamaṇuggahakārim sokkham savvakkhae sayalam ॥461॥(2009)

[यथा वा ज्ञानमयोऽयं जीवो ज्ञानोपघाति चावरणम् ।
करणमनुग्रहकारि सर्वावरणक्षये शुद्धिः ॥ ४६० ॥ (२००८)

तथा सौख्यमयो जीवः पापं तस्योपघातिकं ज्ञेयम् ।
पुण्यमनुग्रहकारि सौख्यं सर्वक्षये सकलम् ॥ ४६१ ॥ (२००९)

Yathā vā jñānamayo'yam jīvo, jñānopaghāti cāvaraṇam ।
Karaṇamanugrahakāri sarvāvaraṇakṣaye śuddhiḥ ॥ 460 ॥ (2008)

Tathā saukhyamayo jīvaḥ pāpam tasyopaghātikam jñeyam ।
Puṇyamanugrahakāri saukhyam sarvakṣaye sakalam ॥461॥ 2009)]

Trans.—460–461 Or, just as since this soul is full of knowledge, (any sort of) interruption is an obstacle to (the apprehension of) knowledge, sense-organs are helpful (to it) (and just as), at the destructiou of all interruptions, (there is) pure (cognizance), the soul is full of happiness. Sinful deed is (its) obstruction, a virtuous deed is (the) helpful (element) and at the destruction of all deeds, there is perfect (apprehension of) happiness. (2008–2009)

टीका–व्याख्या–यथा वाऽनन्तज्ञानमयोऽसौ स्वरूपेण जीवः। तदीयज्ञानस्य च मत्यावरणादिकमावरणमुपघातकं मन्तव्यम्। करणानि त्विन्द्रियाणि तज्ज्ञानस्य, सूर्यातपस्य तदावारकमेघपटलच्छिद्राणीवोपकारकाणि। सर्वावरणक्षये तु ज्ञानशुद्धिर्निर्मलता सर्वथावभासकत्वलक्षणा भवति। प्रकृतयोजनामाह–तथा तेनैव प्रकारेण स्वरूपतः स्वाभाविकानन्तसौख्यमयो जीवः, तस्य च सुखस्यैवोपघातकारकं पापकर्म विज्ञेयम्। पुण्यं त्वनुत्तरसूरपर्यन्तसुखफलंतस्य स्वाभाविक सुखस्यानुग्रहकारकम्। ततः सर्वावरणापगमे प्रकृष्टज्ञानमिव समस्तपुण्यपापक्षये सकलं परिपूर्णं निरुपचरितं निरुपमं स्वाभाविकमनन्तं सुखं भवति सिद्धस्येति ॥४६०–४६१॥ (२००८–२००९)

D. C.—The soul is full of infinite knowledge of which *Mati-jñāna* etc are the obstructions, and sense-organs are the supporting agents like the holes in a cluster of clouds covering the sun-shine. When all the obstructions are removed, there is absolute apprehension of pure cognizance.

Similarly, the soul possesses infinite happiness of which *pāpa* is the obstructive element, and *puṇya* the helping element. When all sorts of *pāpa* and *puṇya* are removed, the *muktātmā* attains perfect happiness which has neither obstructions nor *upacāras*. ॥ 460–461 ॥ (2008–2009)

Or,

जह वा कम्मक्खयओ सो सिद्धत्ताइपरिणइं लभइ ।
तह संसाराईयं पावइ तत्तो च्चिय सुहं ति ॥ ४६२ ॥ (२०१०)

Jaha vā kammakkhayao so siddhattāiparinaim labhai ।
Taha saṃsārāīyam pāvai tatto cciya suham ti ॥ 462 ॥ (1020)

[यथा वा कर्मक्षयतः स सिद्धत्वादिपरिणतिं लभते ।
तथा संसारातीतं प्राप्नोति तत एव सुखमिति ॥ ४६२ ॥ (२०१०)

Yathā vā karmakṣayataḥ sa siddhatvādipariṇatim labhate ।
Tathā saṃsārātītam prāpnoti tata eva sukhamiti ॥ 462 ॥ (2010)]

Trans.—462 Just as it attains the form of *siddhatva* etc, on account of the destruction of *Karma*, it attains the celestial happiness also, due to the same reason. (2010)

टीका–यथा वा सकलकर्मक्षयादसौ मुक्तात्मा सिद्धत्वादिपरिणतिं लभते, तत एव सकलकर्मक्षयात् संसारातीतं वैषयिकसुखाद् विलक्षणस्वरूपं निरुपमं तथ्यं सुखं प्राप्नोति । एतेन यदुक्तम्–" क्षीणपुण्य–पापत्वेन कारणाभावाद् निःसुख–दुःखो मुक्तात्मा, व्योमवत् " इत्येतदपि प्रत्युक्तं द्रष्टव्यम्, " कारणाभावात् " इत्यस्य हेतोरसिद्धत्वात्, सकलकर्मक्षयलक्षण-कारणजन्यत्वेन सिद्धसुखस्य सकारणत्वादिति ॥ ४६२ ॥ (२०१०)

D. C.—Just as a *muktātmā* attains *siddhatva* etc when it is free from the bondages of *Karma*, it attains celestial happiness also due to the same reason. So, your argument that since *muktātmā* is free from *pāpa–puṇya*, it has no *sukha–duḥkha* also like sky, proves itself absolutely unfounded. ॥ 462 ॥ (2010)

Now, in *reply* to the argument that ' *deha* is the only agent of perceiving *sukha–duḥkha*, the author states—

**सायाऽसायं दुक्खं तव्विरहम्मि य सुहं जओ तेणं ।
देहिं-दिएसु दुक्खं सोक्खं देहिं-दियाभावे ॥ ४६३ ॥ (२०११)**

Sāyā'-sāyam dukkham tavvirahammi ya suham jao teṇam ।
Dehin–diesu dukkham sokkham dehin–diyābhāve ॥ 463 ॥ (2011)

[साता-ऽसातं दुःखं तद्विरहे च सुखं यतस्तेन ।
देहे-न्द्रियेषु दुःखं सौख्यं देहे-न्द्रियाभावे ॥ ४६३ ॥ (२०११)

Sātā-'sātam duḥkham tadvirahe ca sukham yatastena ।
Dehe-ndriyeṣu duḥkham saukhyam dehe-ndriyābhāve ॥463॥(2011)]

Trans.—463 Results of sinful and virtuous deeds are only distressful. And since happiness is (attained) in their absence, (there is) misery (in case of) body and sense-organs existing, (and) (there is) happiness in absence of body and sense-organs. (2011)

टीका-ननु यत् पुण्यफलं सातं सुखतया लोकव्यवहारतो रूढं तत् सर्वं दुःखमेवेत्यनन्तरमेव समर्थितम्, असातं तु पापफलत्वाद् निर्विवादं दुःखमेव । एवं च सति सर्वं दुःखमेवास्ति संसारे, न सुखम् । तच्च दुःखं सिद्धस्य सर्वथा क्षीणम् । अतस्तद्विरहे यद् यस्मात् सिद्धस्य स्वाभाविकं निरुपमम्, अनन्तं च युक्ति सिद्धमेव सुखम् तेन तस्मात् कारणात् पारिशेष्यन्यायात् संसारिणामेव जीवानां देहे-न्द्रियेष्वाधारभूतेषु यथोक्तस्वरूपं दुःखम्, सुखं तु देहे-न्द्रियाभाव एव, सिद्धस्य क्षीणनिःशेषसुख-दुःखत्वेन तस्य तत्र युक्तिसिद्धत्वादिति ॥ ४६३ ॥ (२०११)

D. C.—It has already been proved that even *puṇya-phalas* are *duḥkhamaya* in this mundane world. And *pāpa-phalas* are undoubtedly *duḥkhamaya*. This shows that everything in this world is full of misery. This sort of *duḥkha* can never affect *muktātmās*.

Muktātmā being free from such *duḥkhas*, enjoys perfect and infinite happiness showing there-by that *duḥkha* exists only where *deha* and indriyas exist; and real *sukha* is always found in a *siddha* being who is free from *deha* and *indriyas*. ॥463॥ (2011)

Or,

जो वा देहिं-दियजं सुहमिच्छइ तं पहुच्च दोसोऽयं ।
संसाराईयमिदं धम्मंतरमेव सिद्धिसुहं ॥ ४६४ ॥ (२०१२)

Jo vā dehiṁ-diyajam suhamicchai tam paducca doso'yam ।
Samsārāîyamidam dhammantarameva siddhisuham ॥464॥ (2012)

[यो वा देहे-न्द्रियजं सुखमिच्छति तं प्रतीत्य दोषोऽयम् ।
संसारातीतमिदं धर्मान्तरमेव सिद्धिसुखम् ॥ ४६४ ॥ (२०१२)

Yo vā dehe-ndriyajam sukhamicchati tam pratîtya doṣo'yam ।
Saṃsārātîtamidam dharmāntarameva siddhisukham ॥464॥ (2012)]

Trans.—464 Or, according to one who believes in the happiness (afforded) by body and sense alone, this (may involve) a difficulty. But this celestial happiness is far above the mundane world and has (perfectly) different characteristics. (2012)

टीका-यो वा कश्चित् संसाराभिनन्दी मोहमूढः परमार्थादर्शी विषयामिषमात्रगृद्धो देहे-न्द्रियजमेव सुखं मन्यते, न तु सिद्धिसुखम्, तस्य तेन स्वप्नेऽप्यदर्शनात्, तस्य वादिनः संसारविपक्षे मोक्षे प्रमाणतः साधिते सति " निःसुखः, सिद्धः, देहे-न्द्रियाभावात् " इत्ययं दोषो भवेत्; न त्वस्माकं संसारातीतं पुण्य-पापफलसुख-दुःखाभ्यां सर्वथा विलक्षणं धर्मान्तरमेवाऽनुपममक्षयं निरुपचरितं सिद्धिसुखमिच्छतामिति ॥ ४६४ ॥ (२०१२)

D. C—According to one who is disillusioned by the infatuation of this mundane world and its sensuous pleasures, the happiness of *deha* and *indriyas* would be the only happiness and there would be nothing like *mokṣa-sukha* in his view-point. He would, therefore, find fault with our belief by saying that *muktātmā* can never experience *sukha* as it has no *deha* and *indriyas*.

But those like us who recognize the existence of *muktātmā* and its uncomparable infinite happiness, understand that *mokṣa-sukha* being *saṃsārātîta*, has absolutely different characteristics and hence, there is no *doṣa*. ॥ 464 ॥ (2012)

Here again, there is a question and its reply—

कह णणु मेयं ति मई णाणा-णाबाहउ त्ति णणु भणियं ।
तदणिच्चं णाणं पि य चेयणधम्मो त्ति रागो व ॥४६५॥ (२०१३)

Kaha naṇu meyam ti maî naṇā-'nābāhau tti naṇu bhaṇiyam ।
Tadaṇiccam ṇāṇam pi ya ceyanadhammo tti rāgo vva ॥465॥ (2013)

[कथं ननु मेयमिति मतिर्ज्ञाना-ऽनाबाधत इति ननु भणितम् ।
तदानित्यं ज्ञानमपि च चेतनधर्म इति राग इव ॥ ४६५ ॥ (२०१३)

Katham nanu meyamiti matirjñānā-'nābādhata iti nanu bhaṇitam।
Tadānityam jñānamapi ca cetanadharma iti rāga iva ॥ 465 ॥ (2013)]

Trans.—465 (The question may be that). " How could it really be taken like that ? (The reply is)-" It has already been said that (it is so) on account of the uninterrupted cognizance. " Then, even cognizance being a quality of consciousness, it will be *a-nitya* like affection. (2013)

टीका-अत्रैवंभूता मतिः परस्य भवेत्-नन्विच्छन्ति भवन्तः सिद्धस्य यथोक्तं सुखम्, किन्तु नेच्छामात्रतो वस्तुसिद्धिः, अपि तु प्रमाणतः; ततो येन प्रमाणेन तत् सिध्यति तद् वक्तव्यम्। अनुमानेन तदनुमीयत इति चेत्। तर्हि केनानुमानेन तदनुमेयम्-अनुमीयत इत्यर्थः ? इत्याह-" णाणा-ऽणाबाहउ त्ति णणु भणियं ति " ननु भणितमत्रार्थे प्रागनुमानम्-सिद्धस्य प्रकृष्टं सुखम्, ज्ञानत्वे सत्यनाबाधत्वात्, मुनिवदिति । पुनरपि परः प्राह-यद्येवम्, तर्ह्यनित्यं सुखं ज्ञानं च सिद्धस्य, चेतनधर्मत्वात्, रागवदिति ॥ ४६५ ॥ (२०१३)

D. C.—Prabhāsa:—With what *pramāṇa* or *anumāna* do you establish the existence of the above-mentioned *mokṣasukha ?*

Bhagavān:— The *anumāna* has already been stated that, like a sage, *muktātmā* enjoys perfect happiness by virtue of its uninterrupted cognizance.

Prabhāsa:—In that case, as happiness and cognizance on, the part of free soul are *cetana-dharmas*, they would be *a-nitya* like *rāga*. ॥ 465 ॥ (2013)

There is another inference also—

कयगाइभावओ वा नावरणा–ऽऽबाहकारणाभावा ।
उप्पाय–ट्ठिइ–भङ्गस्सहावओ वा न दोसोऽयं ॥४६६॥(२०१४)

Kayagāibhāvao vā nāvaranā"bāhakāraṇābhāvā ।
Uppāya–ṭṭhii–bhangassahāvao vā na doso'yam ॥ 466 ॥ (2014)

[कृतकादिभावतो वा नावरणा–ऽऽबाधकारणाभावात् ।
उत्पाद–स्थिति–भङ्गस्वभावतो वा न दोषोऽयम् ॥ ४६६ ॥ (२०१४)

Kritakādibhāvato vā nāvaraṇā"bhādhakāranābhāvāt ।
Utpāda–sthiti–bhaṅgasvabhāvato vā na doṣo'yam ॥466॥ (2014)]

Trans.—466 " Or, is it *a–nitya* because of (its) being factitious etc ? " It is not so, as there is no cause for (the production of) obstacles and interruptions. Or, this fault (of *a–nityatā*) does not arise (at all) on account of its nature of being susceptible to production, retention and destruction. " (2014)

टीका–अथवा, अनित्ये सिद्धस्य सुख–ज्ञाने, तपःप्रभृतिकष्टानुष्ठानेन क्रियमाणत्वात्, आदिशब्दादभूतप्रादुर्भावात्, घटवदिति । अत्रोत्तरमाह– " नावरणेत्यादि " न सिद्धस्यानित्ये ज्ञान–सुखे । कुतः ? । आवरणं चाबाधश्चावरणा–ऽऽबाधौ, तयोः कारणं हेतुस्तस्याऽभावात्, आकाशवदिति । इदमुक्तं भवति–सिद्धस्य ज्ञानं सुखं च यद्यपगच्छेत् तदा स्यादनित्यम्, अपगमश्च ज्ञानस्यावरणोदयात्, सुखस्य त्वाबाधहेतुभूतादसातवेदनीयोदयादिकारणाद् भवेत्; आवरण–वेदनीयादीनि च मिथ्यत्वादिभिर्बन्धहेतुभिर्बध्यन्ते, ते च सिद्धस्य न विद्यन्ते, ततस्तदभावाद् नावरणा–ऽऽबाधाकारणसद्भावः, तदभावाच्च न सिद्धस्य ज्ञान–सुखापगमः, तदसत्त्वे च तयोः सदाऽवस्थितत्वात् कथमनित्यत्वम् ? । न च चेतनधर्माः सर्वेऽप्यनित्या भवन्ति, जीवगतद्रव्यत्वा–ऽमूर्त्तत्वादिभिर्व्यभिचारात् । ततश्च " चेतनधर्मत्वात् " इत्यनैकान्तिको हेतुः । तथा, कृतकत्वादिरप्यनैकान्तिकः, घटप्रध्वंसाभावेन व्यभिचारात् । असिद्धश्चायम्, सिद्धस्य ज्ञानसुखयोः स्वाभाविकत्वेन कृतकत्वाद्ययोगात्, आवरणा–ऽऽबाधकारणाभावेन च तत्तिरोभावमात्रमेव निवर्तते, न पुनस्ते क्रियेते, घटादिवत्; नाप्यभूते प्रादुर्भवतः, विद्युदादिवत्, येन तयोर-

नित्यत्वं स्यात् । न हि घनपटलापगमे चन्द्रज्योत्स्नायाः सूर्यप्रभाया वा तिरोभावमात्रनिवृत्तौ कृतकत्वम्, अभूतप्रादुर्भावो वा वक्तुं युज्यत इति ।

अथ तेनाविर्भूतेन विशिष्टेन रूपेण कृतकत्वादनित्ये सिद्धस्य ज्ञान-सुखे; प्रतिक्षणं च पर्यायरूपतया ज्ञेयविनाशे ज्ञानस्य विनाशात्, सुखस्यापि प्रतिसमयं परापररूपेण परिणामादेतयोरनित्यत्वमुच्यते । तर्हि सिद्धसाध्यता, इति दर्शयति-"उप्पाय-ट्ठिईत्यादि" इत्थमात्माऽऽकाश-घटादिरूपस्य सर्व-स्यापि वस्तुस्तोमस्य स्थित्यु-त्पाद-प्रलयस्वाभाव्याभ्युपगमात् सिद्धसुख ज्ञानयोरपि कथञ्चिदनित्यत्वाद् नायं तदनित्यत्वापत्तिलक्षणो ऽस्माकं दोष इति ॥ ४६६ ॥ (२९१४)

D. C.—Prabhāsa:—Jñāna and *sukha* of a *siddha* being, are *a–nitya* firstly because they are produced by means of the painful observance of penances etc, and secondly, because they are susceptible to production like *ghaṭa.*

Bhagavān:—Your argument is absolutely unfounded. *O Prabhāsa ! Jñāna* and *sukha* of a *muktātmā* would be *a–nitya* only if they vanished. By means of *jñānāvaraṇas, jñāna* would be obscured and hence destroyed and with the rise of sinful deeds, *sukha* would vanish. Both these obstructions *jñānāvaraṇas* and *pāpa-karmas* are bound by the *hetus* of *mithyātva* etc, *muktātmā* being free from such *hetus* it is free from *jñānāvaraṇas* and *pāpa-karmas* also. Consequently, its *jñāna* and *sukha* do not meet destruction and hence they are never called *a–nitya.*

Secondly, all the qualities of *cetana* are not *a–nitya. Dravyatva* and *a–mūrtatva* are *nitya.* Therefore, the argument that *jñāna* and *sukha* are *a–nitya* because they happen to be *cetana–dharmas*, is *anekāntika* Similarly, the *hetu* of *kṛitakatva* etc is also *anekāntika.* Indestructiblity of *ghata* is *a–siddha* inspite of its being *kṛitaka* This hetu is *a–siddha* also, because *jñāna* and *sukha* of a *siddha* being are natural. Since there is no reason for the existence of *āvaraṇas* and *bādhās,* that which is in obscurity becomes manifest. Thus, they are not factitious

like *ghaṭa* etc. nor are they produced like lightning etc. The moonlight and sun-shine obscured by clouds are not said to have been produced when the obstruction of the clouds has been removed. They are only said to have been manifested in a particular way.

Still however, *jñāna* and *sukha* of a *muktātmā* could easily be considered as *a-nitya* by virtue of their being *kṛitaka*. Because, at every time when *jñeya* vanishes, *jñāna* is also vanishing and *sukha* also comes into existence in various forms at various times. So, there is no difficulty in taking both of them to be *a-nitya* to a certain extent as all objects like soul, sky, *ghaṭa*, and *pata* etc are susceptible to *utpāda*, *vyaya* and *dhrauvya* after all. ॥ 466 ॥ (2014)

Establishing the existence of *mokṣa* and *mokṣa-sukha* by the help of *Veda-vacanas*, the author proceeds—

नह वइ ससरीरस्स प्पिय-ऽप्पियावहतिरेवमादि व जं ।
तदमोक्खे नासम्मि व सोक्खाभावम्मि व न जुत्तं ॥४६७॥(२०१५)

Na ha vai sasarîrassa ppiya'-ppiyāvahatirevamādi va jam ।
Tadamokkhe nāsammi va sokkhābhāvammi va na juttam ॥467॥

[न ह वै सशरीस्य प्रिया-ऽप्रियापहतिरेवमादि वा यत् ।
तदमोक्षे नाशे वा सौख्याभावे वा न युक्तम् ॥ ४६७ ॥ (२०१५)

Na ha vai sa-śarîrasya priyā-'priyāpahatirevamādi vā yat ।
Tadamokṣe nāśe vā saukhyābhāve vā na yuktam ॥467॥ (2015)]

Trans.—467 (The sentence of *Vedas* that) " One having body has no likes and dislikes etc " would become worthless in (case of) accepting the negation or destruction of *moksa* and absence of (absolute) happiness. (2015)

टीका-" न ह वै सशरीरस्य प्रिया-ऽप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति " "अशरीरं वा वसन्तं प्रिया-प्रिये न स्पृशतः " इति च यद् वेदोक्तम्, तदप्यमोक्षे मोक्षाभावे-जीव-कर्मणोर्वियोगेऽनभ्युपगम्यमान इत्यर्थः, तथा, "मतिरपि न

प्रज्ञायते" इति वचनाद् मुक्तावस्थायां सर्वथा नाशे वा जीवस्याभ्युपगम्यमाने, सत्त्वेवामुक्तात्मनः सुखाभाव इष्यमाणे न युक्तं प्राप्नोति–अभ्युपगमविरोधस्तवेत्यर्थः। अनेन हि वाक्येन किल यथोक्तो मोक्षः, मुक्तौ च निष्कर्मणो जीवस्य सत्त्वम्, निरुपमसुखं च तस्य, एतानि त्रीण्यप्यभ्युपगम्यन्ते। एतच्च पुरस्ताद् व्यक्तीकरिष्यते। ततोऽस्य त्रितयस्य निषेधं कुर्वतस्तवाभ्युपगमविरोध इति भावः॥ ४६७॥ (२०१५)

D. C.—The sentences of *Vedas* such as "*Na ha vai sa-sarîrasya priyā' priyayo-rapahatirasti*" and "*Aśarîram vā vasantam priyā'priye na spṛis'ataḥ*" etc would prove themselves futile if the existence of *mokṣa, jîva* and *mokṣa-sukha* were denied. Because, the existence of *mokṣa*–separating *jîva* and *Karma* from each other–existence of pure soul in the *mukta* state and the attainment of perfect and infinite happiness by a *mukta* being, have already been established by the *Veda–padas*. ॥ 467 ॥ (2015)

The opponent then asks—

नट्ठो असरीरो चिय सुह–दुक्खाइं पिय–ऽप्पियाइं च।
ताइं न फुसंति नट्ठं फुडमसरीरं ति को दोसो?॥ ४६८॥(२०१६)

Naṭṭho a-sarîro cciya suha-dukkhāim piya'-ppiyāim ca।
Tāim na phusanti naṭṭham phudamasarîram ti ko doso?॥468॥(2016)

[नष्टोऽशरीर एव सुख–दुःखे प्रिया–ऽप्रिये च।
ते न स्पृशतो नष्टं स्फुटमशरीरमिति को दोषः? ॥ ४६८॥ (२०१६)

Naṣṭo'śarîra eva sukha-duḥkha priyā'priye ca।
Te na spṛiśato naṣṭam sphutamaśarîramiti ko doṣaḥ? ॥468॥(2016)

Trans.—468 One who is dead, is bodiless. Happiness and misery, likes and dislikes do not touch him. (Then) what harm is there in taking a bodiless person to have been distinctly destroyed? (2016)

टीका–" न ह वै० " इत्यादिवेदवाक्यस्य किल परोऽमुमर्थं मन्यते–शरीरसर्वनाशेन नष्टः खरविषाणकल्प एवोच्यते, तमेवंभूतम शरीरं नष्टं प्रिया–

ऽप्रिये सुख-दुःखे यद् न स्पृशतः, तत् स्फुटमेव बुध्यत एवेदम्, नष्टस्य सुख-दुःखस्पर्शायोगात्, अशरीरशब्देन च जीवनाशाभिधानात्। एवंभूते चास्य वाक्यस्यार्थे मुमुक्षुजीवस्य निर्वाणप्रदीपस्येव सर्वनाशमभ्युपगच्छतां कोऽस्माकमभ्युपगमविरोधलक्षणो दोषः?-न कश्चिदपीति पराभिप्राय इति ॥ ४६८ ॥ (२०१६)

D. C.—Prabhāsa:—Since a bodiless person is absolutely perished, it is not-existent like *khara-s'ṛṇga.* It is, therefore, clear that sueh bodiless persons are not affected by happiness or misery and likes or dislikes. Consequently, there would be no harm in accepting the absolute destruction of a soul which has attained *mokṣa.* ॥ 468 ॥ (2016)

In reply to this, *Bhagavān* explains the real interpretation of the *Veda-padas* such as "*Na ha vai*" etc and proceeds.

वेयवयाण य अत्थं न सुट्ठु जाणसि इमाण तं सुणसु ।
असरीरव्ववएसो अधणो व्व सओ निसेहाओ ॥ ४६९ ॥(२०१७)

ननिसेहओ य अन्नम्मि तव्विहे चेव पच्चओ जेण ।
तेणासरीरग्गहणे जुत्तो जीवो न खरसिंगं ॥ ४७० ॥ (२०१८)

Veyavayāṇa ya attham na suṭṭhu jāṇasi imāna tam suṇasu ।
Asarîravvavaeso adhaṇo vva sao nisehāo ॥ 469 ॥ (2017)
Nanisehao ya annammi tavvihe ceva paccao jeṇa ।
Teṇāsarîraggahane jutto jîvo na kharasingam ॥ 470 ॥ (2018)

[वेदपदानां चार्थं न सुष्ठु जानास्येषां तं शृणु ।
अशरीरव्यपदेशोऽधन इव सतो निषेधात् ॥ ४६९ ॥ (२०१७)
नञ्निषेधतश्चान्यस्मिंस्तद्विध एव प्रत्ययो येन ।
तेनाशरीरग्रहणे युक्तो जीवो न खरशृङ्गम् ॥ ४७० ॥ (२०१८)

Veda-padānām cārtham na suṣṭhu jānāsyeṣām tam śruṇu ।
Aśarîravyapadeśo'dhana iva sato niṣedhāt ॥ 469 ॥ (2017)]
Nanniṣedhataścānyasminstadvidha eva pratyayo yena ।
Tenāśarîragrahaṇe yukto jîvo na kharasṛṅgam ॥ 470 ॥ (2018)]

Trans.—469-470 You do not properly understand the (real) meaning of those sentences of *Vedas*. It is this. Hear please. Like '*a-dhana*,' the word *a-śarîra* is meant to denote the negation of an existent object. By (means of) negation due to '*na*', (its) existence would be found in another of the same type. In understanding the word '*a-śarîra*', it is better, therefore, to accept (the existence of) *jîva* and not (its non-existence like) *kharaśṛṅga*. (2017-2018)

टीका-आयुष्मन् ! प्रभास ! न केवलं युक्तिम्, वेदपदानाममीषामर्थं च त्वं सुष्ठु न जानासि, ततस्तं शृणु " न ह वै०" इत्यादि पूर्वार्धं सुगमत्वादत्र गाथाद्वये न व्याख्यातम्, तदपि सुखप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं व्याख्यायते-' न ' इति निपातो निषेधार्थः। ' ह ' ' वै ' इत्येतदपि निपातद्वयं हिशब्दार्थत्वाद् यस्मादर्थे। सह शरीरेण वर्तत इति सशरीरो जीवस्तस्य सशरीरस्येत्यत्रैवकारो द्रष्टव्यः। ततश्चायमर्थः-यस्मात् सशरीरस्य जीवस्य प्रिया-ऽप्रिययोः सुख-दुःखयोरपहतिर्विघातोऽन्तरं नास्ति, न त्वशरीरस्य; तस्मादशरीरं शरीररहितं मुक्त्यवस्थायां वसन्तं लोकान्तस्थितं जीवं प्रिया-ऽप्रिये सुख-दुःखे न स्पृशतः। इदमुक्तं भवति-यावदयं जीवः सशरीरः, तावत् सुखेन दुःखेन वाऽन्यतरेण कदाचिदपि न मुच्यते; अशरीरस्त्वसौ क्षीणवेदनीयत्वात् सुख-दुःखाभ्यां कदाचिदपि न स्पृश्यत इति। एवंभूते चास्य वाक्यस्यार्थे सति योऽयमशरीरव्यपदेशः, असौ सत एव विद्यमानस्यैव जीवस्य मुक्त्यवस्थायां विधीयते, न तु सर्वथा नष्टस्य। कुतः ? इत्याह-निषेधात्। इह यो यस्य निषेधः स तस्य सत एव विधीयते, न त्वसतः, यथाऽधन इति, अत्र सत एव देवदत्तस्य धननिषेधो विधीयते, न त्वसतः खरविषाणस्य।

आह-न विद्यते शरीरं यस्येत्येवं निषेधादन्यपदार्थे जीव एव कथं प्रतीयते ? इत्याह-" ननिसेहओ य इत्यादि "-व्याख्यातो विशेषप्रतिपत्तेः पर्युदासवृत्तिना नञा निषेधो नञ्निषेधस्तस्माद् नञ्निषेधात् कारणात् सशरीरादन्यस्मिंस्तद्विध एव शरीरसदृशे कस्मिंश्चिदन्यपदार्थे संप्रत्ययो विज्ञेयः, यथा " न ब्राह्मणोऽब्राह्मणः " इत्युक्ते ब्राह्मणसदृशः क्षत्रियादिरेव गम्यते, न

तु तुच्छरूपोऽभावः । उक्तं च–" नञिवयुक्तमन्यसदृशाधिकरणे लोके तथा ह्यर्थगतिः " इति । इह च शरीरसदृशोऽशरीरो जीव एव गम्यते, द्वयोरप्युपयोगरूपत्वेन सदृशत्वात् । न चेह शरीरं सादृश्यबाधकम्, तस्य जीवेन सह क्षीर-नीरन्यायतो लोलीभूतत्वेनैकत्वादिति । तदेवं येन यस्मात् कारणात् नञ्निषेधादन्यस्मिंस्तद्विध एवान्यपदार्थे संप्रत्ययो भवति, तेन तस्मात् कारणात् " अशरीरं वा वसन्तं " इत्यत्राशरीरग्रहणे जीव एवाशरीरो युज्यते, न तु खरविषाणं तुच्छरूपोऽभाव इत्यर्थः । तदेवमशरीरमिति व्याख्यातम् ॥ ४६९-४७० ॥ (२०१७-२०१८)

D. C.—Bhagavān:—O Prabhāsa! Really you do not understand the proper meaning of the sentences such as " *Na ha vai* " etc. In this sentence, the particle '*na*' denotes negation and the particles '*ha*' and '*vai*' are used in the ablative sense. " *Sa-s'arîrasya* " means to a soul having a body and " *priyā-'priyayorapahatirasti* " denotes the destruction of happiness and misery. The whole sentence will be interpreted as follows:—

Jîva being possessed of a body, has no *abhāva* of *sukha-duḥkha*. In the same way, *Jîva* existing in a bodiless state of *mokṣa*, never undergoes *sukha-duḥkha i. e.* As long as soul is encompassed in a body, it has to undergo *sukha-duḥkha*, but as the bodiless *muktātmā* is free from *Karma*-good or bad-it is never affected by *sukha-duḥkha*.

In the word " *a-s'arîra* " here, there is a negation of the body and not of the soul. In the expression " *Adhano Devadattaḥ* " the riches are denied to the *vidyamāna Devadatta* and not to an *a vidhamāna kharas'ṛṅga*. Similarly, here also the existence of soul is not denied, but only that of body is denied. That which is denied must belong to an existent source and not to a non-existent source.

Prabhāsa:—How could it be believed that that which is denied at one place must be found at another?

Bhagavān:—Just as by the word "*na-brāhmaṇa*" a non-brahmin like a *kṣatriya* or a *vaiśya* is understood, but the absolute *abhāva* of *brāhmaṇa* as a whole, is not meant. So also, the expression "*a-śarîra*" signifies a bodiless *mukta jîva* of the type of *mukta jîva* having body, but that does not absolutely deny the existence of soul. There is resemblance in both owing to the common property of *upacāra*.

Moreover, "*śarîra*" does not come in the way of resemblance. As body is mixed with soul like milk and water, it is one and the same as soul. Thus, by the denial of the particle '*na*', the same soul is apprehended at another place but the existence of soul is never denied thereby. So, the word '*a-śarîra*' denotes nothing but *jîva* which is *vidyamāna* like *Devadatta*, and not *a-vidyamāna* like *kharaśṛṅga*. ॥ 469-470 ॥ (2017-2018)

The expression "*Vā vasantam*" is now explained:—

जं व वसंतं संतं तमाह वासद्दओ सदेहं पि ।
न फुसेज्ज वीयरायं जोगिणमिट्ठे-यरविसेसा ॥ ४७१ ॥(२०१९)

Jam va vasantam santam tamāha vāsddaö sadeham pi ।
Na phusejja vîyarāyam joginamiṭṭhe-yaravisesā ॥ 471 ॥ (2019)

[यद् वा वसन्तं सन्तं तमाह वाशब्दतो सदेहमपि ।
न स्पृशेयुर्वीतरागं योगिनमिष्टे-तरविशेषाः ॥ ४७१ ॥ (२०१९)

Yad vā vasantam santam tamāha vāśabdato sadehamapi ।
Na spṛśeyur vitarāgam yoginamiṣṭe-taraviśeṣāḥ ॥ 471 ॥ (2019)]

Trans.—471 Happiness and misery do not affect him who is existing in a free state and also by the word '*vā*' (they do not affect) a dispassionate ascetic having a body. (2019)

टीका-यस्माच्चाशरीरम् । कथंभूतम् ? । वसन्तं लोकाग्रे निवसन्तं तिष्ठन्तमिति यावत् । अनेन वसनविशेषणेन तमशरीरशब्दवाच्यमर्थं सन्तं

विद्यमानमाह, न त्वसद्भूतम्, वसनस्य सद्धर्मत्वात् । तस्मात् कथं जीवनाश-रूपं निर्वाणं स्यात् ?, न केवलमशरीरं मुक्तम्, किन्तु वाशब्दात् सदेहमपि सशरीरमपि वीतरागं-क्षीणोपशममोहयोगिनं परमसमाधिमन्तं भवस्थमपि न स्पृशेयुः । के ? । इष्टे-तरविशेषाः सुख-दुःखभेदा इत्यर्थः ॥४७१॥ (२०१९)

D. C—A bodiless *mukta* being is not affected by the *sukha-duḥkha bhedas*. The word '*vā*' includes dispassionate ascetics having bodies. ॥ 471 ॥ (2019)

Also,

वाव त्ति वा निवाओ वासद्दत्थो भवंतमिह संतं ।
बुज्झाऽव त्ति व संतं नाणाइविसिट्ठमहवाह ॥४७२॥ (२०२०)

Vāva tti vā nivāö vāsaddattho bhavantamiha santam ।
Bujjhā'va tti va santam nānāivisiṭṭhamahavāha ॥ 472 ॥ (2020)

[वावेति वा निपातो वाशब्दार्थो भवन्तमिह सन्तम् ।
बुध्यस्वाऽवेति वा सन्तं ज्ञानादिविशिष्टमथवाऽथ ॥ ४७२ ॥ (२०२०)

Vāveti vā nipāto vāśabdārtho bhavantamiha santam ।
Budhyasvā'veti vā santam jñānādiviśiṣṭamathavā'tha ॥472॥(2020)]

Trans.—472 Or, "*vāva*" is a particle meaning "Or", and '*santam*' means a soul existing (in the *mukta* state). Or, take '*ava*' as a particle and '*santam*' meaning (a soul) characterised by (the qualities of) knowledge, etc. (2020)

टीका-'वा' इत्यथवा, 'वाव' इत्ययं शब्दो निपातः, स च वाशब्दार्थः । ततश्चाशरीरं सन्तं भवन्तं मुक्तौ विद्यमानं जीवं प्रिया-ऽप्रिये न स्पृशतः, वाशब्दात् सशरीरमपि वीतरागं न ते स्पृशतः । यदिवा, 'वसन्तम्' इत्यन्यथा व्याख्यायते-" बुज्झाऽव त्ति वेत्यादि " " वा " इत्यथवाऽयमर्थः । " वाव संतं ति " रक्षण-गति-प्रीत्यादिष्वेकोनविंशता-वर्थेष्ववधातुः पठ्यते । गत्यर्थाश्च धातवो ज्ञानार्था अपि भवन्ति । ततश्चाह-विनेय ! त्वमेवं बुध्यस्व । किं तत् ? इत्याह-अशरीरं सन्तं मुक्त्यवस्थायां

विद्यमानं जीवम्; अथवा, ज्ञानादिभिर्गुणैर्विशिष्टं सन्तमित्याह ब्रूते, प्रिया-ऽप्रिये न स्पृशतः; वाशब्दात् सशरीरमपि वीतरागमिति तथैवेति ॥ ४७२ ॥ (२०२०)

D C.—The expression " *vā vasantam* could be dissolved as *vāva santam*, the particle *vāva* meaning " or " and *santam* meaning a bodiless *jîva* existing in the *mokṣa* state. The word *vāva* here will signify that *sukha-duḥkha* do not touch not only a bodiless *jîva* existing in a *mokṣa* state, but also the dispassionate ascetics having bodies.

Or, the expression could be dissolved as *vā ava santam* also. The prefix *ava* has nineteen different meanings such as to protect, to go, to love etc. Since a root signifying motion signifies knowledge also, a bodiless soul existing in the *mukta* state and characterized by the qualities of cognizance etc, is not affected by *sukha-duḥkha.* Here also, the word ' *vā* ' brings in the dispassionate *sa-dehi* ascetic. ॥ 472 ॥ (2020)

The opponent asks—

न वसंतं अवसंतं ति वा मई नासरीरगहणाओ ।
फुसणाविसेसणं पि य जओ मयं संतविसयं ति ॥४७३॥ (२०२१)

Na vasantam a-vasantam ti vā maî nāsarîragahaṇāö ।
Phusaṇāvisesaṇam pi ya jaö mayam santavisayam ti ॥473॥ (2021)

[न वसन्तमवसन्तमिति वा मतिर्नाशरीरग्रहणात् ।
स्पर्शनाविशेषणमपि च यतो मतं सद्विषयमिति ॥ ४७३ ॥ (२०२१)]

Na vasantamavasantamiti vā matirnāśarîragrahaṇāt ।
Sparśanāviśeṣaṇamapi ca yato matam sadviṣayamiti ॥473॥(2021)]

Trans.—473 Or, it may be dissolved as " *na vasantam iti avasantam* " meaning thereby ' not existing (anywhere). ' (But) it is not proper. (Since) *jîva* is understood from ' *a-śarîra.* ' Moreover, the adjective ' *sparśanā* ' is also accepted with regard to existent objects (only). (2021)

टीका–" अशरीरं वावसन्तं " इत्यत्र लुप्तस्याकारस्य दर्शनाद् " न वसन्तमवसन्तं क्वाप्यतिष्ठन्तम् " इति व्याख्यानतो नास्ति मुक्त्यवस्थायां जीवः, क्वाप्यवसनात्, असत्त्वादेव च नामुं प्रिया–ऽप्रिये स्पृशत इति परस्य मतिर्भवेत् । तदेतद् न । कुतः ? इत्याह–अशरीरग्रहणात् । एतदुक्तं भवति– " न विद्यते शरीरं यस्य " इत्यत्र पर्युदासनिषेधात् पूर्वोक्तयुक्त्या मुक्त्यवस्थायामशरीरो जीवो गम्यते, इत्यतोऽत्राकारप्रश्लेषव्याख्यानं कर्तुं न पार्यते, अशरीरग्रहणाद् मुक्तौ जीवसिद्धेः । किञ्च, ' प्रिया–ऽप्रिये न स्पृशतः ' इति यदशरीरस्य स्पर्शनाविशेषणं तदपि यस्मात् सद्विषयमेव मतम्, तस्माद् न मुक्तौ जीवस्याभावः । यदि ह्यशरीरशब्दस्य जीवाभावो वाच्यः स्यात् तदा तं प्रिया–ऽप्रिये न स्पृशत इति विशेषणमनर्थकं स्यात् । न हि " वन्ध्यापुत्रं प्रिया–ऽप्रिये न स्पृशतः " इति विशेष्यमाणं विराजते । तस्माद् मुक्त्यवस्थो जीव एवाशरीरशब्दवाच्यः, न पुनस्तदभावः । ततो नाकारप्रश्लेषव्याख्यानं युज्यत इति । तदेवं "अशरीरं वा वसन्तं" इत्यनेन जीवकार्मणशरीरवियोगलक्षणस्य मोक्षस्य मुक्तजीवसत्त्वस्य चाभिधानात् तन्निषेधं कुर्वतस्तवाभ्युपगमविरोध एवेति ॥ ४७३ ॥ (२०२१)

D. C.—Prabhāsa·—If you can dissolve the expression as done above, I can also dissolve the expression at my will and pull the meaning in my favour. This, in no way, leads to establish the existence of *mokṣa*. For, by dissolving " *a–s'arîram vā vasantam* ' as ' *a–s'arîram vā a–vasantam* ' I can interpret it as a bodiless (soul) not existing at any place, and thus prove *jîva* to be absent from *muktāvasthā*, proving thereby the the negation of *mokṣa* as well as *jîva*

Bhagavān:—Your interpretation does not fit in properly. By interpreting '*a–s'arîrî* ' as one having no body, *vidyamānatā* of *jîva* in the *muktāvasthā* is clearly understood. It is not proper, therefore, to interpret it in another way by prefixing "a".

Secondly, in the sentence " *Sukha–duḥkhe na spṛis'ataḥ* " *spars'anā* becomes the adjective of ' *as'arîra* '. If ' *as'arîra* ' were meant to denote the negation of soul, the adjective

would have lost its sense as found in the case of assertions like " *Sukha-duḥkha* do not affect the *vandhyāputra*." The adjective, therefore, is befitting '*aś'arîra*' only if it means "*mukta-jîva*". Your interpreting the expression by dissolving it as '*vā a-vasantam*' is thus useless, while our interpretation is perfectly proper. This proves the existence of *mokṣa* which separates *jîva* and *kārmaṇa śarîra* and that of *mukta-jîva* also. If the existence of *jîva* were denied, *Veda-vacanas* would prove worthless as shown above. ॥ 473 ॥ (2021)

The opponent said—

एवं पि होज्ज मुत्तो निस्सुह-दुक्खत्तणं तु तदवत्थं ।
तं नो पिय-ऽप्पियाइं जम्हा पुण्णे-यरकयाइं ॥४७४॥(२०२२)

नाणाऽबाहत्तणओ न फुसंति वीयराय-दोसस्स ।
तस्स प्पियमप्पियं वा मुत्तसुहं को पसंगोऽत्थ ? ॥४७५॥ (२०२३)

Evam pi hojja mutto nissuha-dukkhattaṇam tu tadavattham ।
Tam no piya-'ppiyāim jamhā puṇṇe-yarakayāim ॥ 474 ॥ (2022)
Nāṇā'bāhattaṇaö na phusanti vīyarāya-dosassa ।
Tasya ppiyamappiyam vā muttasuham ko pasaṅgo'ttha ? ॥475॥

[एवमपि भवेद् मुक्तो निःसुख-दुःखत्वं तु तदवस्थम् ।
तद् नो प्रिया-ऽप्रिये यस्मात् पुण्ये-तरकृते ॥ ४७४ ॥ (२०२२)

ज्ञानाऽनाबाधत्वतो न स्पृशतो वीतराग-द्वेषस्य ।
तस्य प्रियमप्रियं वा मुक्तसुखं कः प्रसङ्गोऽत्र? ॥४७५॥ (२०२३)

Evamapi bhaved mukto niḥsukha-duḥkhatvam tu tadavastham ।
Tad no priyā'-priye yasmāt puṇye-tarakṛite ॥ 474 ॥ (2022)]
Jñānā'nābādhātvato na spriśato vîtarāga-dvesasya ।
Tasya priyamapriyam vā muktasukham kaḥ prasaṅgo'tra ? ॥475॥

Trans.—474-475. Such being a *mukta* soul, it will have no happiness and misery. (But) it is not (so), as likes and

dislikes are produced from sinful or virtuous deeds. Moreover, likes and dislikes cannot affect a dispassionate (person) owing to his (high) knowledge and irresistability. He enjoys natural and perfect happiness. So, what is the sense in asserting the negation of happiness ? (2022–2023)

टीका–एवमुक्तप्रकारेण मुक्तो जीवो भवेदित्यकामैरप्यभ्युपगतमस्माभिः, तथा च सति जीवस्य कर्मवियोगलक्षणो मोक्षः, तत्र जीवसत्त्वं च सिद्धम्। यत्तु निःसुख–दुःखत्वं सिद्धस्य मया प्रेरितं तत् " प्रिया–ऽप्रिये अशरीरं न स्पृशतः " इति वचनात् तदवस्थमेव। अत्रोत्तरमाह–तदेतद् न, यस्मात् पुण्य–पापकर्मजनिते एव जीवानां प्रिया–ऽप्रिये सांसारिकसुख–दुःखे भवतः। ते च तं क्षीणनिःशेषपुण्य–पापकर्माणं सकलसंसारार्णवपारप्राप्तं मुक्तात्मानं न स्पृशत इत्युत्तरगाथायां संबन्धः। न चैतावता तस्य निःसुखत्वमिति स्वयमेव द्रष्टव्यम्। कुतः ? इत्याह–" नाणेत्यादि " ज्ञानत्वे सत्यनाबाधरूपत्वादित्यर्थः। यच्च तद् मुक्तस्य सुखं मुक्तसुखं स्वाभाविकं निष्प्रतीकारं निरुपमं च। " मुत्तस्स परं सोक्खं णाणा–ऽणाबाहओ जहा मुणिणो " इत्यादिना प्रागेव साधितम्, तत् तस्य वीतराग–द्वेषस्य मुक्तात्मनो न प्रियं न पुण्यजनितं सुखं भण्यते, न चाप्रियं न पापजनितं दुःखं भण्यते, किन्त्वेताभ्यां सर्वथा विलक्षणम्, अकर्मजनितत्वेन स्वाभाविकत्वात्, निष्प्रतीकाररूपत्वात्, निरुपमत्वात्, अप्रतिपातित्वाच्चेति।

अथ " को पसंगोऽत्थ त्ति " " अशरीरं प्रिया–ऽप्रिये न स्पृशतः " इत्युक्ते कोऽत्र मुक्तात्मनि मुक्तसुखाभावप्रसङ्गः ?–न कश्चिदित्यर्थः, पुण्य–पापजनितप्रिया–ऽप्रिययोरभावे तस्य सुतरामेव भावात्। तस्मात् " न ह वै सशरीरस्य० " इत्यादिवेदपदैर्यथोक्तनीत्या जीव–कार्मणशरीरविरहलक्षणो मोक्षः, मुक्तावस्थस्य च जीवस्य सत्त्वम्, तथा, " अशरीरं प्रिया–ऽप्रिये न स्पृशतः" इत्यतोऽपि वचनात् पुण्य–पापक्षयसमुत्थं स्वाभाविकम्, अप्रतिपाति सुखं चास्य, इत्येतत्त्रितयं सिद्धम्। अत एतदनभ्युपगच्छतस्तवाभ्युपगमविरोध इति स्थितम्।

यदपि "जरामर्यं वैतत् सर्वं यदग्निहोत्रम्" इत्येतस्माद् वाक्याद् मोक्ष-

हेतुक्रियारम्भयोग्यकालाभावाद् मोक्षाभावं शङ्कसे; तदप्ययुक्तम्, तदर्थापरिज्ञानात्। तस्य ह्ययमर्थः–यदेतदग्निहोत्रं तद् यावज्जीवं सर्वमपि कालं कर्तव्यम्, वाशब्दाद् मुमुक्षुभिर्मोक्षहेतुभूतमप्यनुष्ठानं विधेयमिति। इत्येवं वेदपदोक्तद्वारेण युक्तिभिश्च प्रसाधितो मोक्षः। छिन्नश्च प्रभासस्य तत्संशयः ॥ ४७४–४७५ ॥ (२०२२–२०२३)

D. C.—Prabhāsa:—I grant the existence of *muktātmā*, *mokṣa*, and soul as such. But according to the *Veda–vacanas* that *siddha* beings are free from happiness and misery, likes and dislikes will not affect the bodiless soul; consequently, a *muktātmā* will have no experience of happiness.

Bhagavān:—*Priya* and *a–priya* and hence *sukha* and *duḥkha* are produced by *puṇya–pāpas* from which *muktātmā* is free. But this in no way, means that *muktātmā* has no scope for the experience of happiness. Since *muktātmā* is highly cognizant and perfectly irresistible owing to its being free from *rāga–dveṣa*, it enjoys the highest and most natural happiness which never vanishes.

Or, it is no use discussing about the negatiou of happiness to a *mukta* being, by saying that likes and dislikes do not affect the bodiless. *Muktātmā* will thus have no experience of the mundane *sukha–duḥkha*, because it is always free from likes and dislikes. Thus, the sentences of *Vedas* such as *Na ha vai sa–s'arîrasya* etc establish, O blessed *Prabhāsa!* the existence of *mokṣa*, *jîva*, and the immutable happiness of *muktātmā* at the removal of *puṇya–pāpa*.

Lastly, the sentence that "*Jarāmaryam vaitat sarvam yadagnihotram*" means that one should practise *agnihotra* etc, till the end of life.

Your suspicion about the existence of *mokṣa* generated from this sentence (as the time of beginning the performance has not been mentioned in it) is out of place. The sentence really means as follows:—

One should perform sacrifice throughout the life at all times. The word '*vā*' here signifies that he who aspires for *mokṣa* should also perform the sacrifice, which acts as the *hetu* of their *mokṣa*. Thus, the *Tîrthaṅkara* removes the doubt of *Prabhāsa*. ॥ 474-475 ॥ (2022-2023)

Then,

छिन्नम्मि संसयम्मी जिणेण जर-मरणविप्पमुक्केण ।
सो समणो पव्वइओ तिहि ओ सह खंडियसएहिं ॥४७६॥(२०२४)

Chinnammi saṃsayammî Jiṇeṇa jara-maranavippamukkeṇam ।
Sō samaṇo pavvaiö tihi o saha khaṇḍiyasaehim ॥ 476 ॥ (2024)

[छिन्ने संशये जिनेन जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
स श्रमणः प्रव्रजितस्त्रिभिस्तु सह खण्डिकशतैः ॥ ४७६ ॥ (२०२४)

Chinne saṃśaye Jinena jarā-maraṇavipramuktena ।
Sa śramaṇaḥ pravrajitastribhistu saha khaṇḍikaśataiḥ ॥476॥(2024)

Trans.—476 When the doubt was thus removed by the *Tîrthankara* who was entirely free from old age and death, that saint accepted *dīksā* along with his three hundred pupils. (2024)

End of the Discussion with the Eleventh Gaṇadhara.

