

The Humanism of Haribhadra

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1. In a modern world of chaos, where intolerance and superstition are often marketed as religion, where ignorance and political correctness too easily masquerade as reason, and where hypocrisy presides proudly and unopposed on the throne of humanity and humility; in a world where pristine ideals of virtue and honour, and of beauty no less than of nobility, are regularly held up to common ridicule and vilification—and such is the modern world of the profiteering mentality and the vulgarity of the mass media—in such a world, some solace and strength, I find, may be sought from the ancient sources of Greek and Indian philosophy.

In the last hundred years or more, Western society has been infiltrated by a corruption so pernicious as now to pose a severe threat to the very foundations of European culture. Never before in history, perhaps, has the call for individuals with a sense of loyalty, honesty, and duty—the hallmarks of the Indo-European character—been so urgent if the total disruption of Western civilisation is to be averted.

It is seldom realized that human dignity is a matter of participation in the life of reason and the quest for virtue. And when it comes to human freedom, *licentia* is, by and large—following upon the failures of reason—mistaken for *libertas*.

When we study the ancients, we find ourselves in good company. The study of the languages of old serves, in itself, to sharpen our faculty of discrimination. All over the world, the arts and the humanities are now in a phase of decline, in some places they are long extinct, to most places they never even reached out. Our universities have become breeding grounds for mass education, or even indoctrination, that leaves less and less room for the aristocratic pursuits for which the academies, in the interest of

the public weal, were originally designed by the rare species of men of virtue and talent.*

The common ideal of the ancient Greek, Roman, and Indian philosophers was freedom of mind through spiritual purification and the ceaseless exertion of the faculty of reason. When the Western philosophers spoke of *virtus* and *ratio*, their Indian colleagues spoke of *dharma* and *buddhi* (*dhī*, *matī*, *prajñā*, etc).

We here can speak of the common ideals of Aryan humanism.

In today's world, this aristocratic ideal is being revolted against on several fronts.

First, there is the ignorance of the masses. There is no reason naïvely to assume that the masses today are less prone to superstition or more inclined to enlightenment than they have been in the past. It is as if the masses simply *want* to be deceived, and the mass media as a rule serve their interests well in this regard.

No less ferocious is the threat against Aryan humanism posed by the educated minorities that are now haunting our universities on a global scale.

Part of the reason for this sad state of affairs are the events that took place in 1968 and the years that followed. This was the period of the student revolts, the main purpose of which was to abolish the authority of traditional European ideals of science and culture. The minds behind this academic revolution apparently addressed themselves to the majority of students who had little or no academic experience. To deceive them was easy enough. They considered themselves Marxists, their mentality was proletarian, and their purpose was, as said, to eliminate and replace the traditional European ideals, which were, undoubtedly, those of the élite and largely based on authority. The old academic élite found itself belonging to a minority, and in our modern "democratic" society where numerical majority proves decisive when it comes to political power, scholars of the old school soon found themselves reduced to silence and deprived of influence. Gradually, the old territories of the arts and humanities were occupied by the so-called

★ We fully agree with the author in everything he said.

— *Editors.*

social sciences, and by psychology, etc. Largely responsible for this revolution were various representatives of the Frankfurt school. The revolution in 1968 was to a considerable extent a continuation of the bolshevik revolution half a century earlier. Marx and Freud were the founding fathers. It was a revolution that was largely a revolt against reason. Adorno expressed it neatly defining “philosophy” as “eine Art von rationalem Revisionsprozess gegen die Rationalität” (Rolf Wiggershaus, *Die Frankfurter Schule*, München 1986, p.12). What he meant to say, of course, was that this was a political revolt against reason by *unreason*. In sum, the academic revolution of 1968 was a movement against the authority of reason, and what moved it were largely myths and messianic hopes with a Judaic origin.

Thirdly, Christian dogmatism and Christian theology can also be seen as movements against reason. Christianity, too, (like Islam) has, of course, partly Judaic roots. True, some of the most honest theologians in the academic world now admit that, much of what we read in the Bible, is nothing more than myths having little or nothing to do with actual history. Though thus paying at least lip service to reason, many of them still insist, against reason, that certain myths or dogmas can be justified by “mere faith”. But, of course, a mere confession of faith has nothing to do with scientific validity.

Against this background we can speak of the three Abrahamic religions as opposed to what I would, as said, call the Aryan humanism of the ancient Indian and Greek philosophers, and of traditional European science, spiritual as well as physical.

Science looks for historical explanations, it researches the true and natural causes of events that took and that take place in time and in space. Science wants to know what actually happens by tracing events back to their natural causes. It, therefore, does not accept magic and miracles, nor does it accept any explanation presupposing creation out of nothing. Without the concept of true and natural causes, there is no concept of science.

The traditional conflict between science and religion, between knowledge and faith, thus basically reflects entirely diverse attitudes to the problem of natural causality. The focus of science is on nature, on growth in time and space. The dogmas and myths of Abraham’s religions fail to respect all natural limitations and, therefore, also the limits of reason.

This, of course, is not a new observation. The great Roman Emperor, Julian, for instance, in his *Against the Galilaeans* (39 A), wrote : “It is, I think, expedient to set forth to all mankind the reasons by which I was convinced that the fabrication of the Galilaeans is a fiction of men composed by wickedness. Though it has in it nothing divine, by making full use of that part of the soul which loves fable and is childish and foolish, it has induced men to believe that the monstrous tale is truth.”

One thing that should be a cause of alarm, and of which the reader is perhaps not aware, is the fact that “enlightened” nations such as Germany and France, today have laws that impose restrictions upon the freedom of speech and research. It is, for instance, deemed a crime if a scholar in public questions or denies certain officially accepted views concerning recent European history. A free and open scientific discussion about certain events will not be tolerated. Numerous excellent scholars have already been severely punished for violating these suppressive laws, which obviously are in conflict with fundamental and internationally accepted principles about freedom of research and speech. But the most disturbing aspect of this is, in my opinion, that such suppression of academic freedom is allowed to pass without hardly any single individual or institution raising its voice in protest.

It is a matter of common knowledge that, after a war, the victors write history as they wish it to be seen. Thus truth invariably suffers. This also happened after World War II. Many myths and lies were concocted, as always in such cases. Even today, more than half a century after the events, it is, as said, punishable by law in several European countries to question or reject these myths and lies in public. In general the masses are ignorant of the deceptions, whereas the educated élite dares not to speak out. History is being perverted, and with the distortion of history there is a distortion of the human mind. Reason is being replaced by myth. The circle is vicious. This is sick and it is ridiculous.

Thus, we are today experiencing a common revolt against reason. Of course, this development was anticipated long ago by many a keen observer. The warnings though, were hardly heeded. Who, for instance, today is aware of a prophetic book such as *The Revolt against Civilisation* by Lothrop Stoddard (1883-1950), who saw the main reason for the revolutionary unrest of our century in the gradual biological

deterioration of the human stock that also in the past brought great civilisations to an end. In Europe there is, as said, a current ban on academic freedom. Socrates was charged with impiety, for corrupting young men and for introducing new gods. His real offence was rather that he was too reasonable. In my opinion, it is our duty to resist those who wish to impose limitations upon the freedom of science and research. A scholar must, with Descartes, be permitted to insist : *de omnibus dubitandum*. He must have the courage to resist the ignorance and superstition of the masses, and the treason of the educated pseudo-intellectuals.

Under these circumstances, we must cherish the efforts of all those rare individuals who, often with considerable personal sacrifice, devote their lives to making the sources of ancient wisdom easier of access to us. Our obligation to the past generations of Indologists and Classical philologists is enormous, and will always serve as a source of edification and inspiration to those who cherish the freedom of the human spirit.

For this very reason it is a rare pleasure for me to contribute to a felicitatory volume now offered to the distinguished savant, Muni Jambūvijaya. His many learned works are well-known and duly appreciated by his grateful colleagues or students all over the world. Even here, in the old kingdom of Denmark, Muni Jambūvijaya's editions of Hemacandra, Candrānanda, etc. have been studied, if only by one or two Sanskrit scholars. His monumental edition of the Sanskrit text of Hemacandra's celebrated *Yogaśāstra* forms the indispensable basis of my Swedish student, Dr. Olle Qvarnström's heavily annotated English translation (forthcoming). Following the gracious advice of my Jaina friend, I myself first published some brief selections (I. 1-46; II. 1-17; IV. 1-5) from that important book in 1984. This was the first translation of an ancient Jaina text to appear in the Danish language, but, no matter how limited the readership may be, it will not be the last.

2. From our point of view, one of the most interesting ancient Jaina savants is the philosopher Haribhadra Sūri, the celebrated author of texts such as the *Śāstravārtāsamuccaya*, the *Yogabindu*, the *Yogaḍṛṣṭisamuccaya*, the *Yogaśataka*, the *Śaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, the *Anekāntajayapatākā*, the *Sarvajñasiddhi*, the *Lokatattvanirṇaya*, the *Śoḍaśakaprakaraṇa*, the *Lalitavistarā*, etc. (for further details, see H. R. Kapadia (Ed.),

Anekāntajayapatākā I-II, Baroda 1940-1947, and R. Williams in BSOAS 28/1 (1965), pp. 101-106). His *Dharmabindu* and the *Pañcasūtraka* are available in the excellent critical editions of Muni Jambūvijaya.

The situation outlined above is made even more complicated by the fact that the fundamental harmony between Greek and Indian philosophy is often overlooked. Those who read Greek seldom read Sanskrit. Those who read Sanskrit seldom read Greek. Those who read Greek are rare, those who read Sanskrit are even rarer.

That the most recent results of modern scholarship are not necessarily the most reliable, and that even our greatest authorities can commit the grossest errors on the most fundamental issues, can be illustrated by the following quotation from the second volume of W.K.C. Guthrie's monumental, *A History of Greek Philosophy* (Cambridge 1965, p. 53, n. 1) : "But in truth the motives and methods of the Indian schools, and the theological and mystical background of their thought are so utterly different from those of the Greeks that there is little profit in the comparison."

According to my experience, Guthrie's view is shared by most students of Classical philology and Greek philosophy. And yet it is as wrong as can be. And, what is more, the practical consequences of this error are very serious for reasons I shall come back to, and for reasons already suggested above. Had Guthrie and other students of Greek philosophy taken the trouble to consult e.g. the old *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie* of Paul Deussen, they would probably not have exposed themselves to the error of discarding the achievements of ancient Indian philosophy.

As suggested e.g. by Haribhadra in his *Śāstravārtāsamuccaya* 23, with the auto-commentary, there is, in spite of terminological differences, a certain unity of thought shared by all the classical *darśanas* of Indian philosophy. The key term is 'dharma.' This fundamental concept has two aspects, a practical and a theoretical. We may here also speak of yoga, one aspect has to do with *karma*, another with *jñāna*. The difference is largely one of degrees of purity. Through moral purification one prepares oneself for intellectual purity. Yoga brings about clarity and peace of mind. Otherwise it is impossible for a yogin to see how things really are. It is only by seeing for oneself (*tattvajñāna*, *tattvadarśana*, etc.) how things really are that one's mind becomes free. Moral purity may bring about

the happiness of rebirth in heaven, but intellectual purity, which is tantamount to omniscience, or perfection of scientific knowledge, is essential for the attainment of the highest good : the freedom of mind, spiritual and physical liberation. The common goal of classical Indian philosophy, then, is beatitude (*sukha*), either in heaven or in liberation. The method is purification, first moral, then intellectual.

True, all the classical *darśanas* disagree on what *tattva* is. But they all agree that the highest goal is freedom, and that this can only be achieved through a scientific knowledge of true causes. They also agree that moral purity is a prerequisite for the achievement of the *summum bonum*.

When it comes to the question about the source of dharma, some schools call upon the authority of the Vedas and those great men who follow the Vedas, others refer to the authority of a Bhagavat, such as Kṛṣṇa, the Buddha, or Mahāvīra. Corresponding to the double dharma, such a Bhagavat invariably has two bodies, a physical and a spiritual, or rather : to his devotees, he seems to have two bodies. He is, at the same time, Brahman as well as Brahmā, a god and a creative human being.

A Bhagavat, naturally, deserves the *bhakti* of his devotees; the reason for this is that he takes upon himself the arduous task of explaining, as a human, the dharma that he himself, as a divine being, has realized for himself. Bhakti then, is love and loyalty to the Bhagavat and his dharma.

In order to be considered worthy of the unconditional loyalty of his devotees, a Bhagavat must not only be compassionate—this is the motive for his taking upon himself the task of a teacher—but also he must be omniscient (*sarvajña*). If not, how could one be sure that he really knew what he was talking about ?

The contradiction posed by the dogma of a Bhagavat's omniscience created a certain rivalry between the various Bhagavat movements. This was only natural. Some would point out various contradictions and flaws in the scriptures of rival schools, others would insist that all contradictions were only apparent, as the words of the Bhagavat would depend on the capacities of the different audiences addressed. In any case, each of the Bhāgavat schools would agree in defending themselves against the attacks of the Brahmins upholding the authority of the Vedas, as against

the Word of the natural fallibility of a human Bhagavat. Defending their faith, they were forced, little by little, to extol and eventually apotheosize their Bhagavat to a status where man has become god. Haribhadra, accordingly, addresses Mahāvīra as Mahādeva.

In spite of his apotheosis, a Bhagavat remains a human ideal, suitable for the imitation of man. Ultimately, a Bhagavat is pure science, pure reason, and as such within the reach of human efforts in terms of dharma and yoga.

Now, dharma has to do with good and evil, with happiness and with suffering. That happiness (*sukha*) is good, and that suffering (*duḥkha*) is evil, is never questioned. On this issue there is a universal consensus among all philosophers. When it comes to deciding the number and the nature of the various principles endorsed by the various schools, however, there is room for disagreement, but there is no room for disagreement on how the variance should be handled. This should happen (not by suppression of the freedom of science and speech, of course) but by an open and public debate in which one supports one's theses by having recourse to the authority of "means of cognition" (*pramāṇa*) accepted by all parties. One's position must not be contradicted by perception, inference, etc.

The appeal to reason and tolerance is expressed well in a verse quoted in the commentary to Haribhadra's *Śaddarśanasamuccaya* (Ed. Luigi Sualì, p. 110), the source of which is the Buddhist Śaṃkarasvāmin's *Devātīśayastotra* 17 :

pakṣapāto na me Vīre na dveṣaḥ Kapilādiṣu |
yuktimad vacanam yasya tasya kāryaḥ parigrahaḥ ||

This readiness to discuss any dogma with arguments *pro et contra*, can only meet with our approval, and in the current academic atmosphere of European and American institutions of higher learning, it is something we can only benefit from taking to our hearts. Only on one issue, however, there was no debate. Those who rejected dharma were also excluded from debate, as "nihilists", or madmen. Kṛṣṇa (BG 4.8) and Manu, leave us in no doubt that society was not prepared to tolerate such criminals. Likewise, even certain Buddhist sources condemn such individuals as *asaṃvāśya* and *akathya*, people you cannot live together with, and people whom you cannot

communicate with. Man derives his dignity not through his mere birth and existence, but through his participation in dharma. A man without dharma is but a mere beast, a common Indian adage sums up.

Turning to the classical Greek and Roman sources, we discover that the goals and methods are, in principle (but not in all its ramifications and details), similar to those that characterize classical Indian philosophy. Here, too, the ideal is that man should seek happiness through moral and intellectual purification. The normal life of the common, credulous and ignorant populace is considered unsatisfactory, much like a disease.

Taking Cicero as our eloquent and well-informed guide, we observe that *virtus*—the closest Latin equivalent to dharma—comprises the four “cardinal virtues”—*scientia*, *justitia*, *fortitudo*, and *temperantia*. In reality virtue—like dharma—is one. For practical purposes it can be said to have four aspects. These four aspects, furthermore, can be reduced to two, namely *actio vitae* and *cognitio veri*—or, if we were to translate into Sanskrit : *karmayoga* and *jñānayoga* (or *tattvajñāna*, etc.).

As opposed to mere brutes, observes Cicero, men are endowed with reason (*ratio*), and among all the properties and inclinations of men, there is none more natural and peculiar to them than an earnest desire and search for truth, and so they esteem the knowledge of things secret and wonderful as a necessary ingredient of a happy life. And he goes on (*de officiis* i. 15) : “Thus, son Marcus, have I given you a rough draught, and just the outlines, as it were, of honesty; which, could she be seen in her full beauty with mortal eye, would make the whole world (as Plato has said) be in love with wisdom (*sapientia*). Now whatever is contained under the notion of honesty (*honestum* = *virtus*) arises from one of these four heads; first, a sagacious inquiry and observation for finding out of truth; second, a care to maintain that society and mutual intercourse which is between them; to render to every man what is his due; and to stand to one’s words in all promises and bargains; which we call justice; third, the greatness and unshaken resolution of a truly brave and invincible mind; and last, a keeping of our words within the due limits of order and decency; under which are comprehended temperance and moderation. Now, every one of these several heads, though they all have a mutual connection and dependence on one another, has yet its peculiar class, as it were, and respective set of duties

arising from it. From that, for example, which is mentioned first, and under which prudence and wisdom are contained, arises the duty of seeking, contemplating, and finding out truth, which is the proper and peculiar business of those virtues : for it is then, and then alone, that we justly esteem a man prudent and wise, when we find that he is able to see and discover the truth of things; and of an active, vigorous, and penetrating mind, to give an account of the reasons of them; so that it is truth that is the proper object of both these virtues, and that about which they are only concerned. The other three heads more peculiarly belong to the active life, and their business lies in procuring and keeping what is necessary for the preservation of it; as in holding up mutual love and correspondence among mankind; in an elevated greatness and strength of mind; which appears, as in getting things profitable and pleasant for ourselves and dependents, so more especially in despising and being above them. Then, as for the last, namely order, uniformity, moderation, and the like, it is plain that they belong not only to contemplation, but have also a respect to our outward actions; since from keeping of these within the bounds and limits of order and moderation, we are said to observe what is virtuous and becoming” (Thomas Cockman’s 1699 translation, with slight changes).

A happy life, our ancient authorities agree, is a life of virtue and honesty. And such a life is also a life in love of truth. For further details I may refer the Latin reader to the philosophical works of Cicero, for as the Great Frederick once said—*die sind alle sehr gut*—they are all very good !

3. This, finally, brings us back to Haribhadra. The reader will have understood that I have thought it necessary, or at least useful, to introduce this great philosopher to persuade the reader that his work is not merely of antiquarian interest, but that modern academics can indeed benefit greatly from the study of his writings. And it is as a helping hand to those that would read his *Aṣṭaka* (and *Lokatattvanirṇaya*) in the original Sanskrit that this work is here offered—as far as I am aware—for the first time in a modern translation. While it goes without saying that a reading of a translation will never replace the study of the original, it also seems evident that at least a brief survey of the basic ideas of the original may well serve to improve its proper understanding.

Some repetitions of what was said above are unavoidable. Here is a survey of the main arguments of Haribhadra's *Aṣṭaka*, I-XXXII :

I. Mahādeva deserves our *bhakti*, not only because he himself is omniscient and free from all moral and intellectual impurities, but also because he has taught us a scientific method that enables us also to destroy the obvious sufferings of *saṃsāra* completely.

II. It is by following the rules of dharma, and by avoiding vices such as *himsā*, etc., that we may purify our body and our soul.

III. Also, by worship of Mahādeva, we may purify ourselves. External worship leads to *svarga*, whereas spiritual worship leads to *mokṣa*, or *nirvāṇa*, the total extinction of karma.

IV. One should employ *dhyāna* on dharma as a sort of fire to burn away the impurities of karma. Liberation, or *mokṣa*, is the result of *jñāna* and *dhyāna*.

V-VII. Among the three kinds of alms, the most perfect one is the one associated with pure intentions. A mendicant prefers to enjoy his meals in private.

VIII. Renunciation (*pratyākhyāna*) can be either material or spiritual. The latter consists in the correct mode of behaviour (*cāritra*), and it is conducive to *mukti*.

IX. Of the three kinds of *jñāna*, the one aware of *tattva* is the highest. It is described in the *āgama*, and it brings about great prosperity (*mahodaya*), i.e. liberation from the bonds of karma.

X. Among the three kinds of *vairāgya*, the third is associated with *sajjñāna*, or *tattvaparijñāna* and, as such, it is one of the means also conducive to the attainment of *siddhi*, i.e. liberation.

XI. The term *tapas* may be ambiguous; austerity may be painful, surely, but properly understood (i.e. according to *yukti* and *āgama*), *tapas* consists of a special kind of *jñāna*, *saṃvega*, and *śama*. As such *tapas* serves to destroy the impurity of karma, and to bring about true happiness (*sukha*).

XII—XIII. When it comes to the various kinds of debate (*vāda*), the one on dharma presupposes a serious interest in the real truth (*tattva*). Its

purpose is to sharpen one's understanding of what the scriptures have to say about dharma, i.e. *ahimsā*, etc. Naturally, *āgama*, our source of dharma, must not be contradicted by perception or by reasonable arguments. There is, to be sure, no point in trying to prove the validity of these means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*). This would only lead us to absurdities. Their validity is a matter of common consent (*prasiddhi*). When all scriptures ("science") agree on dharma, we can safely rely on their authority.

XIV—XVI. There being various one-sided views about the nature of the soul, it is important—also in order to uphold the doctrine of *ahimsā*—to understand that the soul is, depending on various points of view, permanent as well as impermanent, etc. It must never be forgotten that *ahimsā* is fundamental for bringing about *svarga* as well as *mokṣa*. The Jaina view of the soul is established not only by *lokaprasiddhi*, but also by *sadbuddhi*.

XVII—XVIII. As opposed to the Bauddhas and Brahmins who follow Manu, etc., an orthodox Jaina mendicant, true to the ideal of *ahimsā*, abstains from eating meat altogether.

XIX—XX. Likewise, he abstains from drinking liquor, and from sexual intercourse, both of which are sources of corruption, and thus in conflict with the laws of dharma.

XXI. It is far from sufficient merely to learn about dharma from *āgama*, or *śāstra*. There must also be room for *dharmavāda*, as said, and one must always try to understand dharma with *sūkṣmabuddhi*.

XXII. An advanced student understands the value of purity of character (*bhāvaviśuddhi*, cf. the *Bhagavadgītā* 17.16 : *bhāvasaṁśuddhi*).

XXIII. A word of warning to those who vilify the dharma of Jainism.

XXIV—XXV. The results of following dharma are always positive. Virtuous behaviour brings about rebirth in heaven, and in the end, through *jñāna*, ultimate happiness, namely liberation.

XXVI—XXVII. A clarification of some moot points concerning the generosity and compassion of the Bhagavat.

XXVIII. It may be a virtuous thing for a ruler to abandon his kingdom.

XXIX. Equanimity (*sāmāyika*) is also a factor of *mokṣa*, being a benevolent attitude that purifies all activities. It is a sort of longing,

or striving (*prārthanā*) for *bodhi*, etc. (and as such, we may add, comparable to the *bodhicitta* of the Bauddhas, see e.g. my *Nagarjuniana*, p. 183).

XXX. Thanks to its *sāmāyika*, *tapas*, etc. the soul finally becomes absolutely pure, omniscient and illuminated. In this state it illuminates, or cognizes, everything, including itself.

XXXI. Due to a particular sort of karma the liberated soul of the Lord still goes on with its *dharmadeśanā*, adapting the teachings according to the capacity and demands of the various audiences (—again, exactly like the *bodhisattva* of the Bauddhas).

XXXII. To be sure, liberation is due to the extinction of all karmas. It is freedom from rebirth, and absolute happiness. It is bliss, and it is entirely good, etc. Most scholars would agree with Haribhadra about this, he concludes, even though it cannot really be expressed in words. A final *punya-pariṇāmanā* (to use the Bauddha term).

4. Clearly, Haribhadra is anything but a narrow-minded sectarian. When it comes to scholastic details he is undoubtedly a Jain, but on fundamental issues he is so openminded and catholic that he almost stands out as a spokesman of classical Indian philosophy in general. He was naturally aware of this, for instance when he appeals to the authority of *sarvāśāstrasamsthiti*, when he rejects internal disputes as matters of mere *saṃjñā*-, *nāma*-, or *abhidhānabheda*, when he advises us to reject *pakṣapāta*, and when he insists on our taking on an attitude of *mādhyasthya*.

The concept of dharma is, as it were—not only for Haribhadra—the cardinal point that lends a certain unity and coherence to his manifold views. It therefore seems reasonable to collect some of his most significant remarks from his authentic works, showing his views on dharma and various concepts closely related to dharma.

1. First of all, dharma consists in practice, or activity, *anuṣṭhāna* (DB 1.3). It is something we have to do, *dharmah kāryaḥ* (DB 1. 64). Another most frequent term for activity is yoga, and all purposeful human activity should focus on dharma—*dharmottaro yogaḥ* (DB 5.73; Comm : *dharmaphalaḥ sarva eva yogo vyāpāraḥ*). Yoga is a particular form of dharma, a *dharmaviśeṣaḥ* (Comm. to YS 2 : *anuṣṭhāna* is a *kriyārūpa* having to do with *vidhi* and *pratisedha*). Understandably, compounds such as

or *dharmānuṣṭhāna*, and *dharmayoga* (AP 27.8; YBD 3) and the like, are typical. The best translation of dharma is thus duty or virtue, *officium* or *virtus*.

2. There are two kinds of dharmic activity, moral practice (*karma*), and scientific knowledge (*jñāna*, *saṃjñāna*) (ŚVS 1 ff; DB 1.2-3). Corresponding to this, one may also speak of two kinds of yoga, or even of three kinds of yoga (*yogatraya*), namely the activity of mind, language, and body (DB 6.12). From various other points of view, there are three or eight kinds of yoga, etc. Still, yoga is basically an activity that leads to *mokṣa* : *mukkheṇa joyaṇāo jogo savvo vi dhammavāvāro* (YV 1).

3. Corresponding to the two kinds of dharma and yoga, there are two kinds of results (*phala*, DB 7.5). Both are satisfactory (*sukha*), only in differing degrees. The first consists in the happiness of rebirth in *svarga*, the second in the bliss of *nirvāṇa* (DB 4.83 & 8.64). The latter is a yoga without any further activity, i.e. yoga as a result, as opposed to yoga as an instrumental activity, or means (DB 8.67). It is also defined as *apavarga* (DB 2.77-78), or as Brahman (YB 506), as purification, *viśuddhi* (ŚVS 11). This is the ultimate goal of all human endeavour : *nirvāṇaphalam atra tattvato' nuṣṭhānam* (DB 6.19). In other words, yoga is *mokṣahetu* (YB 3 & 301), as is dharma. When it is said that *ahimsā* brings about *svarga* and *mokṣa* (AP 30.2), *ahimsā* then means moral and intellectual "innocence". As such, *ahimsā* is the best form of activity, it is the very essence of dharma, or yoga.

Verily, dharma is one, the difference between practice and theory being but a difference of purity (*śuddhi*, *viśuddhi*). Purity, again, is omniscience (AP 30.2).

The double aspect of one and the same Dharma is also suggested by a celebrated verse in the *Bhagavadgītā* 5.5cd (cf. 3.3), a scripture to which Haribhadra frequently alludes :

ekam sāmukhyam ca yogam ca yaḥ paśyati sa paśyati

Understandably, Haribhadra praises the *dharmamāhātmya* (YDS 163). Considering this fact (according to the consensus of *sarvaśāstra*), no benefit in this world is as great as that of *dharmadeśanā*, and dharma is our only true friend, dearer than life (YDS 58 ff). Normal life is like a great disease, *mahāvāyādhī*, Haribhadra often reminds us.

4. Our knowledge of dharma—which is also defined as *śrutacāritrātmaka* (Comm. ad DB 3.69)—is derived from science, *dharmastu na vinā śāstrāt* (YB 222 ff). Or, according to the fragmentary *Brahmasiddhāntasamuccaya* (BSS) 143 :

dharmādharmāvyavasthāyāḥ śāstram eva niyāmakam |
taduktasevanād dharmah, adharmas tadviparyayāt ||

Exactly the same view is expressed in the *Bhagavadgītā* 16.24 :

tasmāc chāstram pramāṇam te kāryākāryavyavasthitau ||

Experience shows, however, that only some individuals are capable of receiving the *dharmadeśanā* (DB 2.40 & 2.81; LTN 2 ff.). Not all human beings can receive the *saddharmabīja* (DB 2.1), they are *apātra*, or *abhavya* (DB 2.81).

It is because they teach us authoritatively, that we must have *bhakti* to *sadyogaśāstreṣu* (YDS 110; cf. YB 222 ff). Also, we must have *bhakti* to a *sarvajña*, a Bhagavat who is *dharmadeśaka* (DB 6.48). He teaches the truth, for *na dharme māyā* (DB 4.31).

Truth is intimately related to dharma. Along with *yajña*, *tapas*, and *dhyāna*, *satya* is thus said to be *dharmasādhana* (BSS 114). Otherwise, the main “causes” of dharma are the five *mahāvratas*, which include *satya* and *ahiṃsā*, etc. (ŚVS 5).

That *satya* and *dharma* are intimately related is a common notion of Indian philosophy and law. When the Bauddhas, for instance, propagate the four Aryan Truths, these truths are truth *about* Dharma and about the dharmas (manifesting the Dharma, in the singular) i.e. about *tad ekam* as opposed to *idaṃ sarvaṃ*—the *dharmādhātu* as opposed to the *sattvadhātu*. There are four Aryan truths in order to be complete, for Dharma must stand firmly on four feet. This, as known, is an old Indo-European notion. Manu 1.81 is almost too famous to quote :

catuspāt sakalo dharmah satyam caiva kṛte yuge |
nādharmenāgamah kaścīn manuṣyān prati vartate ||

More precisely, that the source of dharma is science (*śāstra*, *sadyogaśāstra*), means that the source of dharma is the *āgama* of a Bhagavat who is *sarvajña*. Only a Bhagavat who is omniscient knows what he is

talking about. To others he teaches the dharma that he himself has discovered. In reality there is only one *sarvajña*, though there appears to be many (such as Mahāvīra, Buddha, etc.). What a Bhagavat teaches others is something—namely dharma—that in a sense transcends our senses, it is *atīndriyārtha* (YDS 98 & 144; YB 425 ff). The dharma that a Bhagvat has seen personally is not within the field (*viṣaya*) of *anumāna* (YDS 144). Not even a Bhagavat can communicate true knowledge—it remains a matter of personal practice—but as a teacher he can teach a method of obtaining knowledge for one self. He can speak the truth, however.

Even though we must “take his word for it”, his words must nevertheless not be in conflict with the common means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). As a rule, *āgama* must be supported by *yukti* (LTN 16 & 18) :

*yac cintyamānaṃ na dadāti yuktīm
pratyakṣato nāpyanumānataśca |
tad buddhimān ko nu bhajeta loke
goṣṇigataḥ kṣīrasamudbhavo na ||*

*āgamenā ca yuktyā ca yo 'rthaḥ samabhogamyate |
parīkṣya hemavad grāhyaḥ pakṣapātāgrahena kim ||*

Needless to say, this method of scientific investigation is an old one in India. Already in the *Carakasamhita*, as known, we read : *dvidvidham eva khalu sarvaṃ—śac-cāśac ca—tasya caturvidhā parīkṣā : āptopadeśaḥ pratyakṣaṃ anumānaṃ yuktiśceti*.

Therefore, to conduct a scientific *parīkṣā*, Haribhadra repeatedly emphasizes the need of the development of intelligence, *dhī*, *buddhi*, *prajñā*, *mati*. One of his favourite terms is *sūkṣmabuddhi*, the subtle intelligence necessary for understanding dharma. Intelligence enables us to discern truth from falsehood, and without the faculty of discrimination there is no true knowledge. Man is a rational creature. To attain the highest form of yoga a philosopher must employ his intelligence in three ways :

*āgamenānumānena dhyānābhyāśarasena ca |
tridhā prakalpayān prajñāṃ labhate yogaṃ uttamam ||*

The verse is found in YB 412, and repeated in YDS 101 and BSS 62 (with the variants *yogābhyāśarasena* in b, and *tattvam uttamam* in d). It is

also found in Vyāsa's commentary to *Yogasūtra* 1.48. (In Buddhism and in Vedānta, of course, the same distinction is to be found.) If we translate *prajñā*, *buddhi*, *mati* or *dhī* with reason, *ratio*, and if we keep in mind that the ultimate meaning of reason has to do with the realization of dharma, then it is clear that philosophy always has a moral or a religious background.

It would be superfluous to mention that all other classical *darśanas* constantly emphasize the need of reason (*buddhi*, *prajñā*, *mati*, *dhī*, etc.) as the instrument that brings about *tattvajñāna*. (A statistical investigation would undoubtedly show that these synonyms for reason are most frequently employed in the instrumental case.)

It should be clear in our minds that dharma has to do with *itikartavyatā*, our duties : it tells us what to do, and what not to do. The knowledge of dharma, therefore, is direct, and thus dharma is not a direct object of *anumāna* or any other *pramāṇa*, with the possible exception of *yogipratyakṣa* (which is, however, only a *pramāṇa* figuratively speaking, for in action the distinction between means and goals of knowledge are obliterated). In other words, dharma tells us what to do, it has to do with *values*, whereas a *pramāṇa* has to do with "facts", it is a means of deciding what is and what is not. We can speak of *dharmajñāna*, but it would be odd to say that we possess *dharmapramāṇa*. We cannot "hold" an activity in our hands, so to speak : *scimus, quia facimus*.

Scientific statements must never be contradicted by perception or inference. Also, dry logic, *śuṣkatarka*, or bad logic—*kutarka*—may lead us astray (YDS 86-152). Spiritual liberation presupposes true science. It is a knowledge that cannot be communicated, but it is also a knowledge that cannot be contradicted. It transcends reason without being in conflict with reason. Dharma, therefore, is also a matter of wisdom, not merely of dry erudition.

It is in this sense (to avoid "scientific religion" or "religious science") I here suggest that we may speak of the *humanism* of Haribhadra. At the root of true humanism we find a deep desire for clarity and purity.

Why this is so, is in itself a scientific question *sui juris*. It is, perhaps, only in the light of modern biology that we can hope for an answer to this difficult question—if ever.

5. Finally a word about Haribhadra's philosophical syncretism. If he himself had a word for "syncretism", it is suggested by the term *samuccaya*—often found in the title of several of his works, such as *Śāstravārtāsamuccaya* (ŚVS), *Yogaḍṛṣṭisamuccaya* (YDS), and *Śaḍdarśanasamuccaya* (SDS). In these treatises Haribhadra provides a systematic review of the main views of various opponents, rejects some as illogical, and accepts others as partly true from his own Jaina standpoint of *anekāntavāda*, or *syādvāda*.

In SDS 2, for instance, Haribhadra claims that there are only six classical systems of Indian philosophy. Their fundamental differences (*mūlabheda*) have to do with the *devatā* and the number and nature of *tattvas* accepted by them. Otherwise, they all agree that *sukha*—that of *svarga* and that of *mokṣa*—is the outcome of dharma, just as *duḥkha* is the result of *pāpa* (ŚVS 2). (True, there are also some Nihilists such as the Lokāyata or Cārvāka, known to maintain that dharma and adharma do not exist at all. For them *kāma* is the highest dharma, a position that men of wisdom must reject as absurd (SDS 81-87).)

Haribhadra is aware that the common ideal of a double dharma is expressed in different terms in different texts (ŚVS 23) :

bhogamuktiphalo dharmah sa pravṛttitarātmakah |
samyagmithyādirūpaś ca gītas tantrāntareṣv api ||

In his commentary to ŚVS 23, Haribhadra adds that others prefer the terminology *abhyudaya* and *niḥśreyasa*. Needless to say, the earliest classical sources for this is *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1.1.2 : *yato 'bhyudayaniḥśreyasasiddhiḥ sa dharmah*.

Before Haribhadra, Buddhist scholars had adopted this terminology. Thus Śāntarakṣita, in his *Tattvasaṃgraha* 3486 (known to Haribhadra, who mentions Śāntarakṣita) writes :

yato 'bhyudayaniṣpattir yato niḥśreyasasya ca |
sa dharma ucyate tādrk sarvair eva vicakṣaṇaiḥ ||

And already many centuries before Śāntarakṣita, Nāgārjuna, in the introduction to his *Ratnāvalī* 1. 2-4, had also adopted the terminology of Vaiśeṣika (often mentioned by him) when he presented the Buddhist Dharma to his reader :

dharmam ekāntakalyāṇam rājan dharmodayāya te |
vakṣyāmi, dharmah siddhiṃ hi yāti saddharmabhājane ||
prāg dharmo 'bhyudayo yatra paścān naiḥśreyasodayaḥ |
saṃprāpyābhyudayaṃ yasmād eti naiḥśreyasaṃ kramāt ||
sukham abhyudayas tatra mokṣo naiḥśreyaso mataḥ |
asya sādhanasamākṣepaḥ śraddhāprajñe samāsataḥ ||
śraddhatvad bhājate dharmam prajñātvād vetti tattvataḥ |
prajñā pradhānam tv anayoḥ śraddhā pūrvamgamāsyā tu ||

Mahāyāna not only makes the distinction between *abhyudaya*/*naiḥśreyasa*, or between *śraddhā*/*prajñā*, but also between *punya*-and *jñānasambhāra*. So Mahāyāna obviously also recognizes the double dharma of *karma* and *jñānakāṇḍa*.

On the other hand, there was no universal agreement about the source, or root of dharma. Some would find the *dharmamūla* in the eternal Word of the Veda, insisting that no human being could have any knowledge about what was *atīndriya*. This position was taken by Kumārila and others. The Jainas and the Buddhists, on the other hand, would reject the authority of the Veda, replacing it with that of a compassionate and omniscient Bhagavat. Since, in the end, a Bhagavat is a body of knowledge, the difference, after all, may not be that great. Passages such as Manu 2.6 ff :

vedo 'khilo dharmamūlam smṛtiśīle ca tadvidām |
ācāraś caiva sādḥūnām ātmanas tuṣṭir eva ca ||

reflect a later period where an attempt has been made to combine the authority of the impersonal Vedic Word with that of an authoritative human/divine Bhagavat etc.

When the Buddhists and the Jainas replaced the Word of the Veda with the Word of their omniscient Bhagavat, they faced a new problem. Which Bhagavat was the true and omniscient Bhagavat ? Some Buddhists and some Jainas, identifying Bhagavat with Brahman, would opt for a syncretistic solution claiming that one and the same Bhagavat/ Brahman actually *appeared* in different forms, as Buddha, Viṣṇu, Mahāvīra, etc. Early evidence for such a syncretistic tendency is found in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*

(p. 192), and this standpoint is also taken by Haribhadra (who, incidentally knows this *sūtra*, see AP 17.8). This is what Haribhadra says in YDS 128 :

eka eva tu mārgo 'yam teṣāṃ śamaparāyaṇaḥ

The great Nyāya philosopher, Jayantabhaṭṭa, in his *Āgamaḍambara* 4.57, is of the same opinion :

*ekas śivaḥ paśupatiḥ kapilo 'tha viṣṇuḥ
saṃkarṣaṇo jīnamuniḥ sugato manur vā |
saṃjñāḥ paraṃ pṛthag imās tanavo 'pi kāmam
avyākṛte tu paramātmāni nāsti bhedaḥ ||*

(For further evidence of such syncretism, see Kamaleswar Bhattāchārya, “Religious Syncretism in Ancient Cambodia”, in *Dharmadūta. Mélanges offerts au Vénérable Thich Huyên-Vi*, Paris 1997, and Kameshwar Nath Mishra (Ed.), *Glimpses of the Sanskrit Buddhist Literature*, Varanasi 1997, pp. 47-56.)

Another noteworthy feature that Haribhadra shares with several other classical Indian philosophers concerns the relationship between *āgama* and *anumāna/tarka*. As said, once we have learned about dharma from *āgama/śāstra* it is also our duty critically to analyse and understand what we have read or studied. To avoid misunderstandings, *anumāna/tarka* is indispensable. Some intellectuals, however, go too far failing to see that dharma is not within the *viśaya* of *anumāna/tarka*. (This would reduce dharma, which consists, in practice, of a purely “academic” matter, so to speak.) Hence we find authorities such as Manu, Bhartṛhari, Kambala, Bhavya, Śaṅkara and Haribhadra warning their readers against *kutarka*, against placing too much emphasis on *anumāna*, or on dry logic, *śuṣkatarka*. (See my paper “Linking up Bhartṛhari and the Bauddhas” in *Asiatische Studien* 47/1 (1993) for references.) Even though their *devatā* (*iṣṭa-deva*) and their *tattvas* differ, all these authorities agree that dharma should be supported by but never contradicted by *anumāna/tarka/yukti*. In ŚVS 210 we find Haribhadra quoting Manu 12.106 with approval (with the var. *dharmaśāstram* for *dharmopadeśam*). Dharma, in other words, must be accepted on the basis of faith and reason. Those who simply reject dharma (and, consequently, adharma) must be rejected as Nihilists.

Another odd group is represented by the *saṃsāramocaka*. Perhaps the first author to refer to those who endorse murder (i.e. *hiṃsā*) as a means of liberating others from the sufferings of *saṃsāra*, is Kumārila (see Wilhelm Halbfass, *India and Europe*, Albany 1988, p. 329, with ref.). An echo of Kumārila (ŚV 5.5) is found in Bhavya's *Madhyamakāhṛdaya* 9. 35. The argument is that if *āgama* without reason were sufficient to establish dharma, then even the *saṃsāramocaka* would be justified in killing other living beings in order to "liberate" them, for this is what their scriptures command them to do. The otherwise rare term is also found in Śaṅkara and in Haribhadra (ŚVS 150). The *saṃsāramocaka* violates the common opinion that defines dharma as *ahiṃsā* (some ref. in Halbfass, *op. cit.*, p. 554). A mere appeal to *āgama* thus proves nothing as it would have too many absurd consequences.

When Haribhadra mentions the ten causes (*hetu, sādhana*) of dharma (as opposed to the ten causes of *pāpa*), he again reflects *sarvaśāstrasamsthiti* (ŚVS 4-5). Similar lists are found in Buddhist *sūtras* and in Manu 12.3-7, q.v., etc. They have to do with the purification of mind, speech, and body, i.e. with the two kinds of yoga.

Included in this list are the five virtues of *ahiṃsā, satya, asteya, brahmacarya* and *aparigraha*. The Jaina sources have much to say about these (see e.g. R. Williams, *Jaina Yoga*, London 1963, pp. 55—99). They are also listed in the *Yogasūtra* 2.30; Gauḍapāda *ad* SK 23, etc. Interestingly, a Buddhist author describes the *saddharma* of Śākyamuni as consisting of *satya*, honesty (*mi bslu*), *brahmacarya*, discipline (*dul ba*), and love (*brtse*) (see Johannes Schneider, *Udbhaṭasiddhasvāmins Viśeṣastava*, Bonn 1993, p. 68, v. 65). Summarized under the twin concept of *śraddhā* and *prajñā* (corresponding to the double dharma) similar lists may be found in Nāgārjuna's celebrated *Ratnāvali*, which, as said, also refers to the definition of dharma given in *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1.1.3.

When it comes to psychology (in the most literal sense of the word), Haribhadra, too, by his own admission, takes a syncretistic stand. It is the nature of the soul to get to know itself by its own innate light. Only the defects of karma prevent it from always grasping itself in that original state of omniscience. It can be directly perceived through yogic perception (ŚVS 86-87) :

ātmanātmagrahe tasya tatsvabhāvatvayogataḥ |
 sadaivāgrahaṇam hy evaṁ vijñeyam karmadoṣataḥ ||
 ataḥ pratyakṣasaṁsiddhaḥ sarvaprāṇabhṛtam ayam |
 svayaṁjyotiḥ sadaivātmā tathā vede 'pi paṭhyate ||

So he shares a standpoint also often expressed by other Jaina and Bauddha savants. And Śāṅkara expresses himself in almost the same words when speaking of an *avagati* that is *kūṭasthaḥ svayaṁsiddhātma-jyotiḥ-svarūpeti ca* (*Upadeśasāhasrī* 2.107, etc.). Dharmakīrti (quoted by Śāṅkara, US 18.142) is basically of the same opinion when speaking of the undivided *buddhi* which only experiences itself and *svayaṁ saiva prakāśate* (*Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1.38). In Bhartrhari, one of Haribhadra's other authorities, we come across expressions such as *punyatamaṁ jyotiḥ*, *tamaṁ jyotiḥ śuddham*, etc. (see *Vākyapadīya* 1.12, 18, etc.). As Haribhadra points out (above), this is an old Vedic idea, for as e.g. Frauwallner observed : "...die alte Vorstellung des Ātman als leuchtend und glanzend, ein altes Erbstück aus einer Agnilehre, ist auch der Yājñavalkyalehre geläufig" (*Kleine Schriften*, Wiesbaden 1982, p. 110). Numerous other sources could be quoted to the effect that Haribhadra's doctrine of *ātman as svayaṁjyotiḥ* is shared by the *āgama* of many other classical Indian philosophers ("psychologists").

(The notion of the natural luminosity of reason is common in Europe, too. Descartes, for instance, often speaks of man's *intellectus* as a *lumen naturale* and he is, in the *Meditationes de Prima Philosophia*, aware that *mens, dum intelligit, se ad se ipsam quodammodo convertit*.)

It is thus a common Indian ideal that, even if the source of Dharma is *āgama*, still *āgama* is no *āgama* if contradicted by perception or reason.

For long all civilized Romans and Greeks rejected the Christian innovations as pure superstition, but in the long run, as known, the myths and the miracles found more attentive ears than the wisdom of the Greeks. Politics and propaganda proved stronger than truth and science. The sway of *lokapakti* was successful.

Haribhadra, then, is a noble Indian spokesman of a universal humanism that crusades not only against those that seek freedom through *kriyāmātra*, but also against those who propagate, in various ways, *dharmadvesa*.

It is, in short, as if the modern apostles of sociology and psychology etc. have succeeded in reducing the four traditional *puruṣārthas* to two, namely *artha* and *kāma*, leaving out *dharma* and *mokṣa*. They have thus failed to realize that the rejection of *dharma* and *mokṣa* reduces man's pursuit of *artha* and *kāma* to that of a mere beast. (On the four kinds of life there is a good discussion by Aristotle, in his *Nicomachean Ethics* (1095b), to which I invite the Aryan reader's attention.)

What the world needs today is a new aristocracy of virtue and talent (Jefferson). If the study of the writings of Haribhadra may serve as one of the many means to that end, then no further apology is needed for bringing out his nice little book on the causes and effect of *dharma*, of which even a small drop can provide the student who is *bhavya* with some nourishment.

Chapters (*prakaraṇa*) 17 and 18 of the *Aṣṭaka* were translated into French by W.B. Bollée as "Le Végétarisme défendu par Haribhadrāsūri contre un bouddhiste et un brahmāna", in N. K. Wagle and F. Watanabe (Eds.), *studies on Buddhism in Honour of Professor A. K. Warder*, Toronto 1993, pp.22-28. I am not aware of any other modern translations. The text used was published in Ahmedabad *saṃvat* 1968 (1911), with the commentary of Jineśvara/Abhayadeva. An edition of the text from 1941, with a translation into Gujarātī, was also consulted. Minor misprints and errors, all obvious, were tactically made.

A translation of the *Lokatattvanirṇaya* is also appended. It, too, will provide the reader with an arsenal of arguments against some obvious modern articles of superstition. I could here use the text published (with an Italian translation) by Luigi Suali in 1905, in the *Giornale della Societa Asiatica Italiana*, vol. 18, pp. 263-319. The text seems first to have been published in Bhavnagar 1902. I could also consult the reprint from 1921, with a Gujarātī translation. A brief discussion is found in Kapadia, *op. cit.*, II, pp. xxxiv-xxxv. See also Karl H. Potter (Ed.), *Bibliography of Indian Philosophies*, Delhi 1970, pp. 130-132.

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A TREATISE OF OCTADES

I. Eight Verses in Honour of Mahādeva

1. [Jina] certainly has absolutely none of the desire that [normally] creates impurities. Nor does he have any of the hatred towards living beings that is [like] a forest fire having tranquillity as its fuel.
2. Nor does he have the delusion that covers true cognition and causes impure behaviour. His greatness is celebrated in the three worlds. He is called Mahādeva !
3. He is free from desire, he is omniscient, a master of eternal bliss, beyond even a little bit of impure karma, and he is absolutely undivided.
4. All the gods find him worthy of honour, and all the yogis meditate upon him. He is the author of all the rules of wisdom. He is called Mahādeva !
5. Being thus in possession of virtuous conduct, he has launched a science that is a path to bliss, the highest light, [and] free from the three kinds of blemish.
6. Moreover, the method to propitiate him is, of course, simply always to try hard to serve him, to the best of one's ability according to rule. Such [devotion] will necessarily grant good results !
7. By following the advice of a good doctor one may get totally rid of one's disease. Likewise, by following the words of [Mahādeva] one may certainly destroy saṃsāra completely !
8. With true devotion (*bhakti*), I will always keep on paying homage to Mahādeva who is thus [as described above], who is tranquil, who has done his duty, and who is a man of intelligence (*dhī*) !

II. Eight Verses on Ablution

1. There is said to be two kinds of ablution [in Jainism] : One is physical, and one is spiritual. Others speak of an external and an internal [kind of ablution to much the same effect].

2. To clean a part of one's body with water for a moment, mostly without disturbing others, is called physical ablution.
3. If a person engaged in something unclean has done so, and then, according to rule, pays homage to sacred images and guests, then this [kind of ablution] will also purify him [spiritually].
4. [It purifies him] because it actually is experienced to do so since it is a cause of spiritual purification. This is because it brings about new good qualities even if some [of the old] blemishes are still present.
5. In science the set of rules for bringing about virtue (*dharma*) depends on a person possessing authority. It must be understood [that this set of rules] has to do with virtue and vice. It can be compared to a remedy against a disease.
6. Spiritual ablution is said always to purify the soul with the help of the water of contemplation (*dhyāna*). The impurity it refers to is karma.
7. The foremost among sages have stated that this ultimate kind of ablution for sages increases their vows and good behaviour when they have abstained from vices [such as] violence.
8. Having performed ablution properly in this way, one gets rid of all impurities. One will not become defiled again. Thereby one has performed ablutions in the real sense of the term !

III. Eight Verses on Worship

1. The [worship] of "eight flowers" is said to produce heaven and liberation. There are, according to those who see the truth of the matter, two kinds : An impure and the opposite [i.e. a pure form of worship].
2. [When one worships Mahādeva] with flowers, small or abundant, of various sorts, of pure origin, just as it happens to be, fresh, in pure pots...
3. [And then] offers them to the God of gods, who is free from the eight kinds of decay, and who has the wealth of virtues arising from that, [then] this [sort of worship] is called impure.
4. By nature this kind [of worship] is mixed, because spiritual [purification] is a result of physical [purification, as suggested above].

[This kind of worship] must be understood to bring about heaven (*svarga*).

5. But there is also [a kind of worship having to do with] spiritual “flowers” that consists of the virtues of scientific statements. They never wither, for [science] is full of them, and so they are [always] fragrant.
6. These are the real [spiritual] flowers : Non-violence, honesty, not stealing, chastity, non-attachment, devotion to one’s guru [or parents], penance, and insight.
7. A [worship] offered to the God of gods with such [“flowers”], full of respect and out of piety—such a [worship] is said to be pure.
8. By such [worship] a spiritual attitude is commended. From this the extinction of karma will surely result. Nirvāṇa follows from the extinction of karma. So this kind [of worship] is approved by good men.

IV. Eight Verses on Making a Fire

1. Using his [eight kinds of] karma as fuel, a consecrated [monk] should, with the fire of meditation on dharma (*dharmadhyāna*), try to make a solid fire with true imagination as oblation.
2. Consecration [i.e. monkhood] is said to be for the purpose of liberation. Since this [namely liberation] in the scripture is said to be the result of insight and meditation, therefore there is this aphorism in the *Śivadharmottara* [or *Nandikeśvarasamhitā*] :
3. “By worship [of a god, one may attain] an abundant kingdom. By making a fire [one attains] wealth. Austerity is for the clearing of bad karma. Insight and meditation bring about liberation”.
4. But bad karma can take place when one is in possession of kingdom and riches. Therefore, recourse to the two causes of these [namely kingdom and riches, i.e. worship and making a fire] is not blameless. This must be considered correctly !
5. Since the clearing of such [bad karma] takes place by means of austerities, and not by means of gifts etc., therefore it is not possible in

any other way. Also, a great soul [Vyāsa] has said so [in the *Mahābhārata* 3.2.47] :

6. “If one desires wealth for the sake of dharma, then it would be far better not to have any desire at all. Of course, it is far better not to touch mud than only having to wash it off again”.
7. But by resorting to the road to freedom, these [good results of making a fire of *dharmadhyāna*] will in all probability become even more splendid on earth. They will, in fact, become beneficial. There is a consensus about this in all good [and sound] scriptures.
8. Sacrifice and pious works, as prescribed for one having desires, do not lead to freedom. However, if one has no desire, they do. This is the only suitable way of making a fire !

V. Eight Verses on Alms

1. Those who know the truth have said that there are three kinds of alms : The first is the one that produces all perfections. The second destroys manliness. [The third] is alms for subsistence [or survival].
2. When an ascetic has attached himself to meditation (*dhyāna*), etc., when he remains loyal to the orders of his guru, and when he never undertakes [anything bad], then [this kind of alms] is considered to bring about all perfections.
3. Out of a pure intention [the first kind of alms] is prescribed for the benefit of the body of householders so that an unattached ascetic roaming about like a bee can prolong his life, etc.
4. If a religious mendicant behaves against this and involves himself in bad karma, then [this sort of alms] is said to destroy his manliness.
5. A fat and foolish [mendicant] piteously fills his belly with alms, [thus] degrading dharma. He simply destroys his manliness.
6. [When mendicants] who are destitute, blind or lame, and incapable of doing anything else, roam about for alms just to survive, then this is called alms for subsistence.

7. It could not be so bad [to give] such alms to such [miserable people] for, of course, in this way they do not cause derogation of dharma, for they merely awaken our compassion.
8. Also, it must be understood, that those who give [alms] to them will get a reward that depends on the field [i.e. the kind of person who receives the alms], or on the intention [on the part of the donor]. This is a pure and rewarding [kind of alms].

VI. Eight Verses on Alms that Produce All Perfections

1. When the food [offered] to an ascetic is not made, not ordered to be made by others, and not at all prepared [for him, only then] is it declared to be pure [and] purifying.
2. *Opponent* : But if [the food] is not prepared [for him] in advance, then how can one give it [to him] with the intention of offering it ? So it is wrong to say that it is pure !
3. *Reply* : This is not the case, for alms should only be received in the house of good householders. There is no other place that one could otherwise strive for the good of oneself and others.
4. *Opponent* : But when the [food] is spoiled, then, in particular, there is an intention !—*Reply* : Such a refutation would not be correct as long as [we are] speaking of beggars !
5. We should also mention the object of such an [intention] : It is for the sake of good karma, and it has to be due to the impossibility of naming the [mendicant] in question. [This is what a pure intention must be like]. Otherwise a “competent” [person], is not [really] competent.
6. If one has an intention, for one’s own enjoyment of a thing, where the gift is parted out, then, at the time of action, it is bad as an object of both [persons involved].
7. But, in the case of an undertaking suitable to oneself, a corresponding intention is under no circumstances bad. This is because it is a pure attitude; it is like association with something else that is pure.

8. Thus there is also a clear advantage [to be had from giving food] not prepared [for a particular guest]. So it has not been said to be an impossibility. This is perfection of competence. The religion of an ascetic is exceedingly difficult !

VII. Eight Verses on Meals in Private

1. In order to avoid good and [bad karma, a mendicant] who has turned away from all [bad] undertakings, who wants to be free and who has developed himself spiritually, prefers to take his meals in private.
2. When a miserable [mendicant], for instance, suffers from hunger and notices someone eating a meal, and then asks for something, one may, out of compassion, give him something. This is generally said to be a bond of good karma.
3. However, [philosophers] who speak of liberation do not approve of this sort of [bond], because it is the cause of rebirth. This is because the sacred scriptures agree that liberation is due to the extinction of good and bad karma.
4. In most cases a humane person will not fail to give such a [miserable mendicant a meal to eat]. Since it is his nature to do like that he is also capable of remaining at ease.
5. If, however, one fails to give [a meal] to a miserable [mendicant] etc., then enmity will certainly be the result. From that follows hatred towards the teachings, and from that a long line of bad rebirths.
6. In this case [those who know the truth] have spoken of a bond of bad karma which is in conflict with the intention of the scriptures. This is because it would be the cause of such [bad karma not to give a meal to a mendicant] out of negligence when one has the means to do so.
7. Of course, the intention of the scriptures must always be effected strenuously as far as possible by a [mendicant] who wants to be free and who is concerned with no other occupations.
8. Since it has thus been shown in the scriptures that in both cases it is a bad thing to take a meal in public, therefore, it is reasonable to give it up.

VIII. Eight Verses on Renunciation

1. There are two kinds of renunciation, a material and a spiritual. The first one, of course, has to do with attention etc., the other is considered to be quite different from this.
2. [There are several] hindrances for renunciation : Attention, lack of order, and lack of ripening as well. Another [hindrance] is lack of energy.
3. It sometimes happens that incapable [students are full] of attention to profit and other [material values]. But, according to the scriptures, this is not worth anything. Therefore, attention is blameworthy in such cases.
4. Just as people normally do not grasp science, etc., because of lack of order [in their studies], thus this must also be considered a result of there being something wrong.
5. Likewise, if one is not ripe enough for renunciation [even though one observes that things] cease being permanent, this is also a bad [renunciation]. This is due to one's lack of devotion to the orders of Jina, and to one's lack of longing for liberation.
6. When [one's renunciation] is disturbed by the arising of impure karma—due to lack of exalted energy—this is still called material renunciation.
7. As opposed to this, Jina has spoken of spiritual renunciation. It consists in the correct mode of behaviour. It is necessarily a means of bringing about liberation.
8. When one, with true devotion, understands what the Jina says, then, even if it is disturbed by something material, it still will be a cause of spiritual renunciation.

IX. Eight Verses on Knowledge

1. The great sages say that there are [three kinds of] knowledge (*jñāna*) : One that [merely] reflects an object, one that changes with the soul, and one that is aware of true reality (*tattva*) :

2. The one that reflects an object can be compared to the delusions of [foolish] children etc. with regard to poison, thorns, jewels etc. It is not aware that these [dangerous things etc.] must be avoided, etc.
3. Such [wrong knowledge] is said to be characterized by careless activity etc. It ends in obstruction in the form of ignorance. It is the cause of great harm.
4. [When the knowledge] of one just about to fall, etc. is not in doubt about such problems, etc., [then] it is considered to be related to a change of the soul when applied to the attainment of misfortune, etc.
5. [When such a knowledge] can be made manifest through a corresponding mode of activity, etc., when it is connected with something real, and when it arises from a decrease of the obstructions of knowledge, then, as a rule, it is the cause of dispassion.
6. [When knowledge that] is correctly aware of the truth means that a healthy and calm [person] is as sure as one can be about certain things having to be avoided, etc., [then it is] fruitful.
7. It is said that it can be obtained by means of a pure mode of behaviour with regard to [things that are] right, etc. It means the end of [all] obstructions of true cognition, and it is the cause of great prosperity.
8. Those who are devoted to the scriptures should always strive for this by rigorously abandoning bad beliefs with the sincerity of faith etc. in the path [of Jainism].

X. Eight Verses about Dispassion

1. There are, according to tradition, three kinds of dispassion (*vairāgya*) : The first is called meditation on suffering, the second has delusion as its origin (*mohagarbha*), the [third] is associated with true knowledge.
2. [The first] is mostly the cause of separation, etc. from something being the opposite of what one likes. It is not [quite] free from what one should, to the best of one's ability, try to renounce, etc.
3. It creates disgust, it is full of despair, [and it may be] the cause of suicide, etc. Such meditation on suffering is normally considered the first [and fundamental kind of] dispassion.

4. When one is certain that the soul here [in this world] is either entirely one, eternal and unbound, or, momentary [and] unreal, [and one] therefore regards normal life as being without value...
5. Then this kind of dispassion is said to have delusion [about the soul] as its origin. [It applies to a person] who is calm so as to abandon this [i.e. normal life], and who also sincerely behaves in a good way.
6. Most of these souls, as they transform, are, of course, bound by external desire, etc. Due to this, woe ! the souls remain in the normal cruel life.
7. Those who see the truth say that dispassion associated with true knowledge consists in having understood so [i.e. in knowing] how to abandon this [namely saṁsāra], and in its total abandonment.
8. This necessarily comes about as a result of a complete understanding of the truth. So, this [dispassion associated with cognition of reality] is the means of attaining perfection, as the Jinas have, in fact, declared !

XI. Eight Verses on Austerity

1. Some [ignorant people] think that austerity (*tapas*) consisting in suffering [may bring about *mokṣa*], but this is not logical. This is because it is the nature of this [sort of *tapas*] to arise as karma, just as in the case of the suffering of a bull, for instance..
2. If it were so, then all who practise *tapas* would have to suffer. This is because they are characterized by the specific property [namely suffering] of that [namely *tapas*], just like a rich man is [characterized] by a large amount of riches.
3. Also, if so, according to your interpretation, great practitioners of *tapas* would have to belong in hell, etc. [which is, of course, characterized by suffering]. Since the most important thing for them is the happiness of equanimity, yogis are, however, not afflicted by suffering.
4. Therefore, intelligent people must abandon this kind [of bad *tapas*] as being foreign to logic and to the scriptures. Since it produces a kind of *dhyāna* that is not recommended, it mostly causes injury to oneself.
5. Since the Jinas have urged us never to relinquish the activity (*yoga*) of our mind and our senses, how, therefore, could it [namely *tapas* = *yoga*] possibly have the nature of suffering ?

6. Sometimes there may be a little bit of pain in the body from not eating, etc. This is just like the behaviour of an ailment. It does not contradict the point we here wish to make.
7. Surely, when looked upon in [the perspective that] one's desired aims are fully achieved, torment of the body (= *tapas*) is not painful. In this case one can also compare it to [the trouble and the final profit] of those who are traders of precious stones, etc.
8. So, it must be known, *tapas* essentially consists of a special kind of insight, longing for liberation (*saṁvega*) and calmness. It is a purity by destruction of karma, and it consists of pleasure without any pain !

XII. Eight Verses on Debate

1. The greatest sages have declared that there are three kinds of debate (*vāda*) : A dry debate, a controversy, and a moral debate.
2. When an ascetic has [a debate] with a foolish [opponent] who is exceedingly arrogant, who has a most ferocious mind, and who really hates dharma, then this is called a dry [or useless] debate.
3. This kind [of debate] has two aspects : If [the opponent] triumphs, dharma will be neglected, etc. If he is defeated, [dharma] will be degraded. So [this kind of debate] really increases misfortune.
4. Again, [if one has a debate] devoted to quibble and futile rejoinders with a wretched mean person only interested in profit and fame, this is traditionally called a controversy.
5. In this case it is very difficult for an honest man to remain true to his own principles. But even if he does win [the debate], imperfections such as karma that restricts, etc., will impede his [good] fate.
6. [A moral debate] is a debate on dharma that one has with an intelligent person who is interested in the next world, who is impartial, and who really understands the truths in his [or one's] own scriptures.
7. If one wins, the result is a blameless comprehension of dharma, etc. If one is defeated [the result is also positive, for then] one's personal delusion is necessarily destroyed.

8. Here, moreover, a learned [student] should [only] take up a debate after he has decided whether the place, the time, the participants, etc. are important or unimportant, and after he has become familiar with the philosophy of the Jina.

XIII. Eight Verses on a Debate about Dharma

1. The scope of a moral debate is simply to acquire [an understanding] of the meaning [of the scriptures etc.] in question, based on various texts. It can be defined as a means of producing dharma.
2. These are the five means of purifying oneself accepted by all moral persons : Non-violence, truth, not stealing, liberality and avoidance of sexual intercourse.
3. Where these five reasonably belong in their fundamental sense, and where they do not [belong], this is something that should be considered scientifically based on a text by means of an interpretation of that text.
4. Moral people, however, are not required to provide a definition of the means of knowledge, etc. This is because it would not serve any purpose etc. Accordingly, the great sage [Siddhasena] has said [in his *Nyāyāvatāra* 2 :]
5. "The sources of valid knowledge are already well-known, and so is the conduct based upon them. It, therefore, serves no purpose to provide a definition [or proof] of the sources of valid knowledge."
6. Surely, one may try to establish [a *pramāṇa*] either by proving it by means of [another] *pramāṇa*, or without doing so. But [in the first case], how can one logically give a reasonable proof of the [pramāṇa that has to be established] by one that has not yet been defined [or ascertained to exist] ?
7. Alternatively, what is the point of providing a definition [of a *pramāṇa*], if the [pramāṇa] has been established by another *pramāṇa* that has not been ascertained to exist ? It is simply mental blindness !
8. Moral persons should, therefore, free from desire, simply consider [moral] matters as they are stated [in the scriptures] with diligence, for this is [the only way] to perfect one's desired aims.

XIV. Eight Verses Crushing the Thesis of an Absolutely Permanent [Soul]

1. Some people have the one-sided view that the soul is absolutely permanent. But how can they, in the original meaning of the word, logically maintain [that a permanent soul] is subject to violence, etc. ?
2. [Since a permanent soul is also] one without activity, it is clear that it can never kill anybody, nor can it be killed by anybody. Thus it has nothing to do with violence!
3. But if there is thus no violence at all, then non-violence cannot be anything real. Furthermore, truth and all the other [virtues mentioned above] are also [not real], because they were supposed to produce non-violence [which, as said, apparently does not exist].
4. So, if this were a correct interpretation [of the status of the soul] and these [virtues] did not exist, then the entire practice of observances, etc. would be good for nothing. It would simply be a matter of delusion !
5. Also, [a permanent soul] could not possibly be united with a physical body. If it could, it would also be omnipresent, and therefore saṁsāra could not be conceived.
6. As a result of this [absurdity] all the words [of Jina] would be but empty talk : Good rebirth as a result of good karma, bad rebirth as a result of bad karma, insight and liberation.
7. The same mistake occurs if one assumes that the [soul] has a place of enjoyment as its object, for how could [a soul] without activity enjoy [any object] when it is quite different from that [object which is not without activity] !
8. If one accepts that the [soul] can be active, then all this is possible. [If one wants everything] to be blameless in the fundamental sense of the word [soul], then one must resort to another philosophical system.

XV. Eight Verses Crushing the Thesis of an Absolutely Impermanent [Soul]

1. If one [e.g. a Bauddha] assumes that the “soul” is a kind of continuum of [momentary] instants of cognition, then, no doubt, violence, etc., is

nothing real, for that is contradicted by the [Buddhist's] own philosophical position.

2. [A "soul"] held to be momentary will continue [unchanged] when it is not connected to a cause of destruction. And if there is no destruction [of the soul] from any other [external cause] then violence also can have no cause.
3. Therefore [violence] either always exists or never exists. An occasional existence would, of course, have to depend on a prime cause.
4. Nor can [someone] who interrupts the continuum [of the "soul"] actually cause harm [to the "soul"]. This is because such a ["soul"] cannot be produced since [according to the Bauddhas] it only exists in a relative sense.
5. Nor can a particular moment [of the "soul" be produced] by the [very] same [moment], for that would create uncertainty. Thus, in fact, the [moment to be produced] would [have to] be considered [the same as] the one producing, because it serves as material cause.
6. And if the given [moment] has the status of producing harm [upon another moment of the soul], then there would be no [moment] that did not produce harm. Thus it would never stop doing so, because it is invariably producing [harm].
7. It must be considered carefully why there is a mentioning of this [namely non-violence] in the scripture. The object to which it refers must, indeed, be meaningful !
8. If there is no such thing as [non-violence], then truth, etc. are not really possible, for our Muni has said that the [other virtues] are there to protect this [namely non-violence, *ahimsā*].

XVI. Eight Verses Adorning the Thesis that [the Soul] is Permanent and Impermanent

1. Only if the soul is in fact permanent and impermanent, different from and not different from the body, will violence and so on make sense, for there is [only] then no contradiction.

2. When a person causes harm [to someone] with the intention of causing damage to his body, he says, due to his wretchedness : "I am going to kill !". Such violence has a cause !
3. When, due to causal necessity, there is a maturation of the karma [accumulated from killing the victim that had] to be killed, then the killer will be responsible for his deed. It [namely violence] will be evil, for it is the result of an evil [intention on his part].
4. So, by abstention from what, according to the good teaching, is impure karma, one can, alas, stop such [violence] simply by always having good intentions !
5. Such non-violence is considered fundamental for producing heaven and freedom. In order to take good care of this [namely non-violence], it is reasonable that one protects truth, etc.
6. So the [soul] is proved to be permanent and [impermanent], etc., because it can remember, recognize, and because it can touch and feel the body. It is also [considered to be permanent and impermanent, etc.] because it is established to be so by common opinion.
7. Assuming the [soul] has the size of the body, and that it has attributes such as contraction, etc., then, due to good karma, it can go upwards [to good rebirth], etc. So everything is exactly as it should be !
8. With a good mind this should be considered by a man whose soul is impartial. It simply must be understood. For good men there is no other valid interpretation [of the soul] !

XVII. Eight Verses Reprehending the Enjoyment of Meat

1. [An opponent], too much of a disputant, says that a good man is allowed to enjoy meat, as he may [enjoy] rice, etc., for meat is only a small part of a living being.
2. *Reply* : Since the decision about what one may and may not eat actually entirely depends on the scriptures and on [what] mankind in general accepts, therefore this [opinion] is improper.
3. According to these [sources] one may consume one part of a living being, but not certain other parts. From this point of view it is all right [to consume] e.g. the good milk [but not the] blood of a cow etc.

4. When we think that [certain things] should not be consumed, it is not because they are “parts of a living being”. It is rather because they belong to another soul, for this is generally accepted to be so in the scriptures.
5. [If the opponent’s reason for prohibiting the enjoyment of meat was true] then it would not at all be reasonable to prohibit [the enjoyment] of the flesh of a [Buddhist] monk ! It would even be permitted to eat his bones, for they are, without exception, simply “parts of a living being” !
6. If, based on a somewhat similar argument, [our opponent] accepts the practice of [eating meat], then you could also treat your wife and your mother in the same way, for both of them are women ! [i.e. living beings partly to be eaten] !
7. Hence an intelligent person [only] expresses an opinion based on science as well as on [the common opinion of] mankind. In this way he is intelligent in all matters. Otherwise he would be like a crazy fool !
8. But, by the way, has not [the enjoyment of meat] already been carefully prohibited by a competent [authority] in your own texts, e.g. in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* ? So does it not mean anything ?

XVIII. Eight Verses Reprehending the Enjoyment of Meat

1. Another [opponent Manu], forgetting all about the proper meaning of the word [namely *māṁsa*] that he himself has expressed, has said something about this matter, thus [inadvertently] bringing the former and the latter meaning in mutual contradiction :
2. [*Manusmṛti* 5.56 :] “There is nothing wrong in eating meat, there is nothing wrong in drinking or in having sexual intercourse. This is the normal behaviour of living beings. It is, however, very good to abstain from all this”.
3. [*Manusmṛti* 5.55 :] “Me he will eat in the next world, whose meat I eat in this world. Wise men say this is what it means to eat meat”.
4. Thus the fault here simply consists in being born !—There is no eating [of meat] foreign to the book [of Manu] ! The prohibition [above] is

based on common opinion, but according to the meaning of another statement [in the same book], it is justified [to eat meat] :

5. If the priests desire so, a duly authorized [priest] may eat consecrated meat even if he has to kill living beings.
6. If [the opponent says] that there is nothing wrong in this, [then we reply] that it does not follow that he abstains from doing so [i.e. from eating meat] by not eating meat on other occasions. This is because it has been proclaimed as a fault not to eat [meat] in this [book, namely *Manusmṛiti* 5.35 :]
7. “If a duly authorized priest does not eat meat, then, after his death, he will become an animal for twenty-one rebirths”.
8. If to abstain from [eating meat] is the same as being a religious mendicant, then the lack of [positive] result coming from not understanding this, is a fault of his. He is certainly not free from faults [if he does not abstain from eating meat] !

XIX. Eight Verses Reprehending Drinking Liquors

1. Moreover, liquor is a cause of heedlessness and at once destroys a sound mind. It is like a disorder of friendly relations. To object that there is nothing wrong with this is outrageous !
2. There is no need to waste many a word on this, for it can be seen with one's own eyes. Even at present the problem with [alcohol] is that it also makes one look like a big fool.
3. According to tradition also, a sage who had reached the inner light and whose *tapas* was great, nevertheless, due to liquor, was seduced by some heavenly maidens. So, like a fool, he went to hell.
4. A certain sage practised *tapas*, but then Indra became afraid and sent some goddesses to seduce him. And so they approached him...
5. Politely they propitiated him as he stood there facing the women. They told him to enjoy either liquor and meat or sex, according to choice.
6. Thus addressed by them he saw that both were causes of hell : The [evil] in the form of liquor [at least] was preceded by a pure motive.

7. He then chose liquor, but by enjoying it he lost his peace in dharma because of intoxication. By killing a goat for the sake of spice he in fact did all the things [he should not have done].
8. And thereby he lost his power. When he died he went to hell. Thus it is good for moral people to know that liquor is a source of corruption !

XX. Eight Verses Reprehensive of Copulation

1. Since copulation is necessarily the result of desire, how then, can one say that it is not a sin ? Hence it is prohibited in the sacred texts.
2. *Opponent* [objection] : But there is no sin in [copulation] if a man desires a son for the sake of dharma, and if he only is occupied with his own wife [and only engages in this practice] at the suitable time and in a proper way ?
3. *Reply* : It is inconsistent, for [the prohibition] is not absolute, for [you are only] like one who blames [copulation]. Since [it is said] that one should bathe after having studied the Veda, [copulation] is approved after one has studied.
4. Since [the text], however, does not say [that copulation is approved of] only after one has performed the ceremony of bathing, therefore the stage of a householder is inferior. Also, at that [stage] such [copulation is practised], so, logically, it is not reasonable to applaud it.
5. *Opponent* : The applause [of copulation] just means that it is not a sin !—*Reply* : How can that be ? For when one praises it for not being a sin, this implies that it [in other cases and in general] self-evidently is full of sin !
6. Since the cause of one's engagement in such [copulation, is, as said, desire], and since there is no possibility of having the intention to give it up, therefore it is not good to speak about providing rules in order to justify matters of simple desire.
7. The great sages have declared, in the holy scriptures, that such [copulation] is harmful for living beings. And this is because they have understood [copulation to be as dangerous as] going into burning sparks in a tube.

8. Also [copulation] is the root of bad dharma. It increases existence in saṃsāra. If one does not want to die [and be reborn] one must avoid it like poisoned food !

XXI. Eight Verses on Having Recourse to a Subtle Intelligence

1. Men interested in dharma must always try to understand dharma with an intelligence that is subtle. Otherwise, if they do so with a [weak] moral intelligence, it will follow that it is impeded.
2. It is like someone who receives a prescription [from a doctor who] wants to give him a medicine for his ailment. But he does not accept it and so, in the end, he will really regret it :
3. “Once I received a very good prescription, but I did not at all feel ill. O, how unfortunate am I ! Woe ! I have failed to achieve [the freedom from disease] I wanted so much !”
4. Likewise, of course, this “prescription” [of dharma] has to do with a state of being “sick”. Since this is considered to be so by good men, should great souls then think that it is bad ?
5. Even certain ordinary people, from another point of view, have seen this point, with an eye for subtle matters. For this reason they have declared as follows :
6. “Let the good that you have done to me ripen in your limbs ! In misfortune a man receives the fruit [of good karma] in return for what good he has done”.
7. Thus it must be understood that a moral obstruction or dilemma always depends on one’s understanding of what is inferior and superior in regard to conflicting prescriptions, etc. Also, when dealing with rules for ascetics, etc., [i.e. rules] in conflict with the principles stated in the holy texts...
8. [Then] it must be known that the moral dilemma depends on different kinds of substances, etc. [So, to avoid moral obstructions,] one must resort to true impartiality, paying attention to the dharma of the scriptures [with a subtle intelligence].

XXII. Eight Verses Examining the Purity of Character

1. One must also understand the purity of character that follows this path [of Jainism]. It is always pleased to attain insight, but in itself it is never selfish.
2. Desire, hatred, and delusion are the [three main] causes of impurity of a man's character. It must be known that the more they increase, the more will his [impurity of character] actually increase.
3. So, when [the impurity of one's character] has thus increased, "purity" is merely an empty word. Being fabricated by the skill of one's personal intellectual constructions, it will be without meaning.
4. When there is no longer any delusion left over, selfishness will not occur any more. To depend on something that has good qualities, is, of course, a means of preventing such [bad things] from increasing further.
5. Therefore, the sage who knows the sacred scriptures, has also said that with regard to all actions such as consecration, offerings, etc., [one must certainly perform them] with the hand of a patient ascetic with equanimity.
6. A person who has not got this cannot even act in an expedient manner. If one does not know the value, etc. of a pure character for oneself and for others—how can one have it ?
7. Therefore, [purity of character as stated] belongs to an advanced and capable student who by nature has a pure mind, a man who can distinguish the [right] places and measures [from the wrong ones], a man who respects virtuous men...
8. Purity of character, as stated, belongs to a man who acts decently, a man who, by abandoning wrong beliefs without hesitation, is totally devoted to the sacred scriptures.

XXIII. Eight Verses Rejecting Slander of the Doctrine

1. A [rogue] who, even quite relaxed, is busy slandering the doctrine [of the Jainas] will certainly also cause harm to other living beings, for such [slander] is the cause of wrong belief.

2. Moreover, it may well be a major cause of life in saṃsāra which is terrible in its ripening, something cruel that increases all the bad things.
3. If a [good man] on the other hand does all he can to extol the doctrine, he will also restore the right belief here [in Jainism] for the benefit of others. Such a [behaviour] achieves the unsurpassed [stage].
4. [The highest stage] is free from the intense impurities, it is associated with virtues such as mental calm etc., it is the cause of all kinds of happiness and, it brings about the bliss of perfection.
5. For this reason, an intelligent person should be very careful not to slander the doctrine, [for such slander] is a major means of producing bad karma.
6. The blame [that incurs] from such slandering of the doctrine in one rebirth after another can always banish one's soul, because it is so important [and serious].
7. If one has the energy to do so, one must certainly try to extol [the doctrine] here. This is because such an [elevation] is really a successful seed of all kinds of success.
8. Therefore one achieves an elevation that produces welfare in one rebirth after another. It will necessarily bring slander of all things to an end.

XXIV. Eight Verses Explaining how Good Karma Follows from Good Karma

1. Just as a man goes from one good house to another [good] house, thus [one may go] from one [good] rebirth to [another] rebirth due to one's good karma (*dharma*).
2. Just as a man goes from a good house to another house [that is not so good], thus [one may go] from a [good] rebirth to a [bad] rebirth due to one's bad karma (*dharma*).
3. Just as a man may go from a bad house to another house that is even worse, thus [one may go from a bad] rebirth to another rebirth that is even worse due to one's very bad karma.

4. Just as a man may go from one bad house to another house [that is not bad], thus [one may go from a bad] rebirth to another rebirth [that is not so bad] due to one's good karma.
5. Therefore [good] men must always perform good karma that is connected with good karma, due to the power of which all kinds of success will arise without failing.
6. This is something that is done with a will that [has been made] pure by sacred scriptures that are true. Moreover, it arises from [men] who are experienced in insight. It never comes from any other source.
7. That one follows the path [of Jainism] is a good thing that certainly comes about quite naturally. [It is, however,] due to the kindness of [elders who are] experienced in insight (*jñāna*) that one achieves a success that is unsurpassed.
8. Kindness towards living beings, dispassion, honouring of one's guru [or parents] according to rule, and a pure moral behaviour—this is good karma that is connected with [even more] good karma.

**XXV. Eight Verses on the Major Result of Good Karma Connected
with Good Karma**

1. So one must understand that the highest result is due to one's achievement of excellence. Making one a worthy person through one's good and decent behaviour is a means of producing liberation.
2. Since the good and decent behaviour in this case is something hereditary, it is, of course, according to the tradition of the Guru of the world, something that one should also reasonably be grateful for [or : resolute about].
3. According to the tradition of the Jinās, [a good man], in order not to alarm his parents [and], in order to secure the stability of important matters so that good things can flourish, is like this [in his way of thinking] :
4. "As long as my parents are living in this house, I will also live in this house, according to their wish !"
5. "My parents may live in the house of their obedient [son]. I can join the order of ascetics later on when it is finally suitable".

6. Such an abstention from all bad karma is fully accepted by good men. Therefore a [mode of behaviour] that alarms one's parents is not at all suitable.
7. To be obedient to one's parents is certainly a very auspicious commencement of such [good and decent behaviour] : One's parents are a great object of worship for men who are engaged in dharma.
8. If a man loves his parents he is considered a grateful person, a person who worships the dharma and his parents. He is a man who participates in the pure dharma.

XXVI. Eight Verses to Establish the Greatness of the Gifts of the Ascetic

1. It is not correct if one thinks that the great gift of the Guru of the world can be calculated. A sacred text which starts with 3.000.000.000 [gifts and goes on may here] be mentioned.
2. *Objection* : In the appropriate texts of others, the [number of gifts] is described by others as innumerable. This—i.e. the [term “innumerable”]—is precisely suitable here [in our scriptures], for it fits with the meaning of the word “great”.
3. Therefore, because of their great dignity, as a whole, the status of Gurus of the world here [in our scriptures] logically belongs to these [Jinas] only. Everything, of course, is great to great [men] !
4. *Reply* : One [Bauddha] may argue thus out of delusion, not being able to determine the meaning of the *sūtra* properly. From this one can see how limited this [man's sense of] logic is !
5. Strictly speaking, it is of course true that the great gift [or generosity] of the Guru of the world can be calculated. Hence it is set out in the *sūtra* that the number can be increased and increased.
6. How can [his great generosity] be expressed in a precise number ! That would be due to an error ! Therefore the concept of a number should be understood in the sense as expressed [as “infinite”].
7. This is also [a token of his] great authority. If people in most cases are not interested in its presence, it is because it is associated with a very special kind of pleasure [unknown to them].

8. If, however, they have studied dharma, then, by its yoga, they will come to see the truth. This is his great greatness. He is the only guru of the world !

XXVII. Eight Verses Refuting that Jina's Gift is without Value

1. An opponent may object : What, exactly, is the benefit to be established from his gift so that one may with certainty obtain liberation in this very rebirth ?
2. *Reply* : It is because such karma responsible for the incarnation of an ascetic (*tīrthakṛnnāmakarma*) arises in heaven only that he is active in the welfare only of all living beings.
3. Also, a great soul [is active] in demonstrating the factors of dharma and of his gift. He does so by means of [factors] properly belonging to various stages [of virtue], and this is because he has compassion for each and every [living being].
4. [His gift] produces a pure mental attitude, and it cuts down pertinacity. It is a vital factor for true elevation, and it generates compassion.
5. Also, it generates insight.—Even though Bhagavat here, in his second birth, puts on a divine cloth, he still has a generous mind. This is due to his extraordinary compassion.
6. So, his task of duty [i.e. generosity and compassion] cannot therefore be considered a matter of a different attitude. On the other hand it is true that one stage of virtue is conditioned by another [stage of] virtue.
7. As to the *sūtra* that begins : “Those, however, who praise the gift...”, great souls must look upon this as referring to different stages [of virtue].
8. So, there is really no new meaning of this to be established from that. It is, in fact, as before. Thus karma is cast off.

XXVIII. Eight Verses showing it not to be Wrong for an Ascetic to give away even his Kingdom etc.

1. Another opponent objects : It is certainly a fault of his to give away his kingdom, etc., for as a king he has a great responsibility. [If he gives it away] he does not understand the path to truth.

2. *Reply* : Surely, if he does not give away his kingdom, then his people—since he may not be the [right] leader—will, due to the evil of the times, start fighting with one another about the borders.
3. Since they will destroy a lot in this world and in the one to come, and since it will not be possible for a great soul [i.e. the king] to remain indifferent [as he wants to] if he has the [military] power [to engage in a war]...
4. Therefore, in order to help them, it would be a virtuous thing on his part to give away his kingdom—especially if he is a guru of the world who is consecrated for the welfare of others !
5. Likewise, with regard to the rules, of wedding, etc., and with regard to determining works of art. It would not be wrong [for him to give up these things]. It would, in fact, turn out to be the best form of good karma.
6. On the other hand, it is a very useful thing to protect living beings from even greater evils. It is something that is good for them as well as for him.
7. Just as it is not wrong of him to protect elephants, etc. by pulling them into holes, etc., thus he [can do what seems necessary to protect other living beings] if there is no other alternative.
8. This is also something that must be maintained here [when talking about giving away his kingdom]. Otherwise the instruction [for a king] may well result in moral evil, since it is the cause of bad karma (*dharma*), etc.

XXIX. Eight Verses Showing the Nature of Equanimity

1. The Omniscient [Jinas] have also said that equanimity is a most important factor for liberation. It is said to belong to great souls who are [pure] like sharp knives and sandalwood.
2. It must be understood that it is really absolutely blameless. This is because it has the nature of a sound mentality that is the result of a [spiritual] purification by means of all kinds of yoga.

3. On the other hand, the kind of mind that people in general consider sound is, if one considers it closely, not of the same sort, even if it can be related to a similar dignity.
4. “May this [equanimity] fall to my lot, and [may I take all] the bad karma of the world [upon myself] ! May all the living beings also achieve liberation by means of my good deeds !”
5. *Opponent* : Since this is an impossibility because [authoritative] tradition has it that the buddhas [= the Jinas] are in Nirvāṇa, then, if it were possible, it would also presuppose that at least one [of these Jinas] was not in liberation !
6. *Reply* : To think so may seem logical, but it is in fact quite wrong. The good [state of Nirvāṇa] must be understood to be quite another state. [Here we are dealing with something] that is like striving etc. for enlightenment etc. [that one does not have].
7. A kind mind towards a mischievous [person] is due to [one’s wish] to bring about something extraordinary. One that is mischievous due to selfishness does not care about such a misfortunate [person].
8. Thus a mind that is different from equanimity may be happy at another [spiritual] level. But the one that is [the result] of absolute purification must be known to be absolutely happy.

XXX. Eight Verses on Omniscience

1. A soul that has been purified through equanimity by the destruction of all obstructing karmas obtains an absolute [knowledge, or omniscience] that illuminates the inhabited and the desolate world..
2. It [namely omniscience] can only arise when one’s insight, *tapas* and good behaviour are [perfect]. So, the [omniscience] of the [soul] is the same as its purity. Here [in Jainism] it is held to be obtained thus :
3. This is the real nature of the soul. [Normally], however, it is covered by impurities without [temporal] beginning. It is as with the rays from a precious jewel [in mud] : Thanks to the destruction of the [impurities] it may become [clear and shining] by means of this [omniscience :]

4. It is because the soul has the nature of this [namely omniscience] that it illuminates the inhabited and the empty world. So, as soon as it arises, it is as explained.
5. [When omniscience is present] in the soul it is also maintained to be aware of itself, for this [awareness of itself] is an attribute of the soul. Its reality never changes, for it cannot possibly move, etc.
6. Also, the light of the moon etc. cognized here [in the soul] is only something that is known, for the light in the form of matter is not an attribute of the [soul itself].
7. Therefore it also illuminates everything it reaches, for it cannot logically be otherwise. So, according to sound reason, it can also be cognized by self-cognition.
8. In the empty world there is no attribute without a substance, nor is there any lord where the principle of movement (motion, *dharma*) ends. If one gets one's soul from going there, it cannot be. So [it must be] as explained.

XXXI. Eight Verses on the Teaching of the Ascetic

1. Though the [Jina] is free from desire, he still goes on teaching the *dharma*. This is due to the arising of the Ascetic's karma of personal incarnation, experienced as something good.
2. Aiming at enlightenment as the best, he is, of course, totally devoted to the welfare of others. This man, a splendid character, undertakes karma accordingly.
3. As long as he abides by this it will keep on taking place. The Guru of the world [is active in] teaching the *dharma*, for it is his nature to do so.
4. Though his teaching is [really] one, still it is capable of producing a salutary understanding, referring to many things, in many living beings.
5. This is so because of the power of an inconceivable quantity of good karma. And so there is nothing in the three worlds that cannot be achieved by those of superior good karma.

6. The reason that the ultimately true [teaching] is not given to incapable [students] is, one must know, due to their bad qualities. It is not due to [those] of Bhagavat !
7. Also, it is a fact that, at sunrise, owls cannot see anything. This is due to their karma, by nature impure. One must understand [the problem of teaching] to be the same.
8. Likewise, this [teaching] will also, (indeed) certainly delight living beings—then as now—provided they are capable and pure in their minds.

XXXII. Eight Verses on Liberation

1. Liberation is due to the extinction of all karmas. It is free from rebirth, death, etc. It is entirely free from any kind of suffering. It is full of absolute happiness.
2. It must be understood that the highest state has no contact with suffering. Nor is it separated from it without interval. It is removed from desire.
3. Someone may object : It is impossible for the Lords of perfection to be happy when they cannot [in their state of perfection] enjoy food, drinks etc. !—We must ask this person this question :
4. What is [normally] the purpose of enjoying food etc. ?—To stop hunger etc., of course.—And what is the result of stopping it ?—That they always enjoy [the best of] health.
5. In fact one gives medicine to an unhealthy person, not to a healthy one. Those who have obtained an endless abundance of health do not need to enjoy food, etc.
6. For them, it must be understood, even sexual enjoyment, etc. is of no significance at all, because they have no delusions.
7. The happiness in this state is a natural one, it depends on nothing else, it is free from desire, it is without opposition, and it is always free from saṃsāra.
8. Other intelligent men say that it has the form of ultimate bliss. Since it thus has the form of being entirely good, this is, of course, suitable [from the Jaina point of view also].

9. This is something that yogis must experience personally. For other [common people, however, Nirvāṇa] is something they may hear about from the sacred texts. Since it cannot be compared to anything, it cannot, obviously, be spoken about.
10. The good karma I have acquired by composing this text called “*Eight Verses*”—may all people become happy by being free from bad karma thanks to that !

Appendix

A Settlement with Popular Principles

(*Lokatattvanirṇaya*)

1. With devotion I first bow down before [Mahāvīra] who is one, and not one, who by nature is absolute [knowledge], the supreme among Jinas. In order to enlighten capable students, I will now describe the principal doctrines of common people.
2. It is, of course, quite correct that [good men] engaged in favouring [all other people] should not discriminate between [students] who are capable and incapable [of achieving liberation]. Nevertheless, an intelligent [teacher] must first investigate the kind of audience [he has to address].
3. [An incapable student] whose mind during the sermon is hard as a thunderbolt/diamond, who is as void as a sieve, who creates dust like a buffalo, and who absorbs impurity like a filter...
4. To preach [anything] to such [an incapable student], who is like a deaf person, is just as useless as to churn water. Also, [preaching to him would be like] dancing before a blind man. In fact, only a capable student can understand [what he is told].
5. *Opponent* : If a student cannot be enlightened it is only due to the stupidity of his teacher ! When [students] are turned down by a bad teacher, he is like [a bad] cowherd [leading astray his] cattle.
6. *Reply* : But what can even an eloquent teacher do about [stupid students] who are not Aryans ? Even if a carpenter may have a sharp axe, he still will spoil wood that is of bad quality.

7. Any attempt of impressing the truths of science upon a mind that is not quite tranquil will have a bad consequence. It would be [as silly as to apply] a soothing [medicine] against a fever that has newly arisen. [The patient will only get worse].
8. When the moon or the sun has arisen, then even ten millions of pure flaming lamps will be of no use to a blind man. Likewise [it is useless] to teach [students] blinded by the darkness of ignorance.
9. A snake and a cow may drink pure water from the same pond. In the snake, however, it is changed into poison, but in the cow it becomes milk !
10. When good men and bad men drink the water of knowledge from the pond of true knowledge [i.e. Jainism], then that ["water"] is transformed into something true in good men, and into something bad in bad men !
11. Water with the same taste [as rain] falls from the sky and reaches the earth. But then it changes its taste due to the many different repositories [in which it is imbued].
12. The word that emerges from the mouth of a [Jaina] preacher may have one and the same "taste" [or meaning]. Nevertheless, it will be perceived in different ways depending on the different attitudes of [the different listeners].
13. An example : Due to its own fault an owl cannot see when the sun is shining. Also, it happens that a *kaṅkaṭuka*-bean is not prepared [for being consumed], even though it has become ripe, like any other [edible]. In the same way evil men may have been in touch with the Jaina doctrine—which really makes sense of all fundamental concepts—but still, with their evil minds, do not understand it, even though they have the same opportunity [to listen] to its preaching [as other students do].
14. As a horse may leap up towards another horse, and as a boat may be tied to another boat in the midst of the ocean, thus modern society, clever in matters of public opinion only, roams wildly about on the waters of heedlessness [or superstition].

15. As long as one only thinks of what public opinion requires, one will be concerned with practical means [only]. It is, however, necessary to deepen one's mind based on facts, for competent [or original] opinions do not simply fall down from the sky !
16. If [a thing] that one considers in the light of perception and inference, does not give any logical meaning, what intelligent person in the world would then accept it ! Surely, milk cannot be had from the horn of a cow !
17. Only those [students] who are *capable* of being educated (*vaineaya* = *bhavya*) by skilled educators can, in fact, be educated. Those who are not capable of being educated *cannot* be educated [even] by skilled educators. By burning etc., gold that is impure can become gold that is pure. A lump of iron, however, can never become gold even through a process of breaking and burning it.
18. When [a capable student] analyses and understands the meaning [of what he is told] with the help of tradition (*āgama*) and reason (*yukti*), then he may accept it as gold. What would be the point accepting it merely out of partiality ?
19. When children receive sweetmeat from their mother without considering its bad effects, they will, later on, very much regret having done so—just like a man who receives [false] gold.
20. Ears are made for hearing, language and intellect are there for critical analysis. If a man does not critically analyse what he has heard, how can he figure out what he ought to do ?
21. When a man with his eyes notices poison, thorns, snakes or mosquitos, he turns the right way in avoiding all these [obstacles]. Thus you must analyse the mistakes relating to wrong knowledge, wrong traditional learning, wrong views and wrong ways. How can any opponent deny this ?
22. "Lords" [such as] Ṛṣabha, Viṣṇu, Hara and Hiranyagarbha have never been experienced [by any person] through the senses. One should learn about their personal virtues from scriptural tradition and then analyse [whether it all makes sense, cf. 18]. Who could have any objection to this ?

23. Viṣṇu, in his terrible hand, bears a raised club. Śiva wears a lolling garland of skulls, bones and heads of men. Mahāvīra, on the other hand, has an abundance of absolutely calm behaviour. Which one of them should we honour—the one who is calm, or the one whose nature is violent ?
24. Viṣṇu is supposed to have destroyed the family of Duryodhana and many others. Hara [i.e. Śiva] is supposed to have destroyed [the citadel of] Tripura. Moreover, Guha [or Skanda] deprived [the mountain] Krauñca of its firm strength. Mahāvīra, however, only does what is good for the entire world !
25. It is certainly not the supreme religion [when Viṣṇu etc.,] says : “This one I must torment, this one I must protect, this one I must kill”. Mahāvīra, whose mind is set on the bliss and benefit of *summum bonum* and worldly success, also has enemies, surely, but not ones that can be deceived by him.
26. The words of Viṣṇu create sins such as desire, etc. the words of Śiva makes one behave like a madman. Those of the Muni [Mahāvīra] alleviate all sins. So you must consider who is worthy of true adorableness !
27. One is prepared to kill others without mercy, another tries to offer refuge for the protection of the world. One has desire, another is free from desire. Consider this carefully and tell me which one of the two is worthy of honour !
28. Which intelligent person can honour Indra who carries a thunderbolt, Bala who holds a plough, Viṣṇu who carries a discus, Skanda who bears a spear, and Rudra [or Śiva] who dwells in cemeteries and carries a trident as his weapon, [when he also sees that] they are tormented by faults and fears, that they lack compassion, are fools, carry various arms, and that they are engaged in combat with all kinds of living beings !
29. I seek refuge with that sage [Mahāvīra] who provides protection for [all] creatures, who is absolutely free from all vices, and whose mind strives for the welfare of others. He does not carry a spear, nor does he

carry an enamoured youth on his lap. He carries no spear, no discus, no plough or any other weapon as, for instance, a staff.

30. Under the influence of desire, the violent Rudra without shame seduces a woman. Viṣṇu is even more cruel. Skanda behaves ungratefully when he personally kills his own kinsmen. Pārvatī killed Mahiṣa when she was sick of desire for the bones, the flesh and the fat of a man. Gaṇeśa loves to drink liquors. In the best among the Jinas, however, there is not even a very tiny fault.
31. Brahmā had his head cut off, Hari had pain in his eyes, Hara [or Śiva] was emasculated, the Sun was wiped away, Agni is omnivorous, and Soma is branded by a spot. The Lord of heaven [or Indra] is also said to have become unsteady when influenced by some sexual organs of beautiful appearance. So, for the most part, even the gods run into misfortune due to aberration from the right path.
32. This Bhagāvat [Mahāvīra] is not {necessarily} our friend, nor are the others {necessarily} our enemies. We have never seen any one of them personally, directly with our own eyes. However, when we hear how extraordinary his words and his fine behaviour actually are, we rely on Mahāvīra out of eagerness (*lolatā* = *bhakti*) for the eminence of his moral virtues.
33. Sugata [i.e. Mahāvīra] is not our father, nor are the [Jaina] ascetics our enemies. They have not given us any property, nor has Jina, nor has Kaṇāda, etc., taken anything from us. Bhagavat Mahāvīra, however, is only concerned about the welfare of the world. His pure preaching removes all impurities. It is for this reason that we are devoted (*bhakti*) to him !
34. [Mahāvīra] is always [a master] of good intentions, who constantly supports the world. He is the one who has rendered this world, sick in so many ways, healthy again. He knows everything that one can know as clearly as something in the palm of one's hand. With devoted minds good men should seek refuge with the unequalled Sugata !
35. Those who honour Thee, O moon among the leaders of Munis,—even if they do so without complete sincerity, by chance, just to imitate others, or out of doubt—still, they will attain divine success !

36. Out of desire and hatred, in order to steal the riches of the *asuras* and the gods, [Hari] once committed fraud with his mind intent on taking away the earth. Nevertheless, Hari is still to be hailed as worthy of honour even though he is not at all free from unsteadiness. People who do not honour [Mahāvīra], who is totally free [from such defects], must be full of delusion !
37. If he—be it Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Varada, Śaṅkara or Hara—has given up selfishness and delights in the welfare of others, and if he always knows everything, in all its forms, in all its aspects, variously and unequalled, then I honestly seek refuge in such an unequalled [hero] whose mode of behaviour is inconceivable.
38. I have no predilection for Mahāvīra, nor do I hate Kapila, etc. What one must do is to embrace [a hero] whose words are *reasonable* !
39. Surely, some of all these must be omniscient and in possession of the illustrious doctrine of absolute altruism. Such a one must be followed by a man with the subtle eye of intelligence. What is so special about the words of useless pundits !
40. He who has no fault at all, he who has all the good virtues—to him I pay homage—be it Brahmā, Viṣṇu, or Maheśvara !
41. Disputants discuss various matters with regard to the actual truth about the creation of the world. Those to whom it is not known in advance, may have to have the truth decided by means of discussion (*vāda*) [or by means of *syādvāda*].
42. Those who believe in creation maintain that the entire world is created. The adherents of Maheśvara [or Śiva say] that the world as a whole has a beginning and an end.
43. Some say that the world can only have been created by Īśvara, others say that it was created by Soma or Agni. Some maintain that the world is made up of six things, i.e. substance, etc. :
44. The truth, according to Kaṇāda, etc., is substance, quality, motion, generality, inherence, and particularity. This is Vaiśeṣika, and the world, by the large, goes along with it [or consists of it].

45. Some maintain that the entire world, including human beings, is created by Kāśyapa. Some maintain that the three worlds are created by Dakṣa and Prajāpati.
46. Some say that Hari [or Viṣṇu], Śiva and Brahmā constitute one trinity : Śiva is the seed of the world, Viṣṇu its creator and Brahmā its activity.
47. Some say that the entire world is created by Viṣṇu, some say that it is created by Time. Some say that it was produced by Īśvara, some say that it was created by Brahmā.
48. The followers of Kapila maintain that everything arises from the unmanifest [nature]. The opinion of Śākya [i.e. Mahāyāna] is that [everything] is mind—only and empty.
49. Some say that it was produced by Puruṣa, others say that it was produced by fate or by nature. Some say that it was created from Brahmā, or from the Egg.
50. Others say that everything takes place accidentally [or at random]. Some say that everything is produced through change of the elements. Some say that it has many forms. So there are many opinions.
51. [Those who believe in Viṣṇu, say :] Viṣṇu is in the water, Viṣṇu is in the ground, he is in space encircled by Viṣṇu. There is nothing without Viṣṇu in the world which is full of the lines of Viṣṇu.
52. [As is said in the *Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad* 3.16 :] “Everywhere He is hands and feet, everywhere He is eyes, head and face. Everywhere in the world He has ears. He is related to everything”.
53. [*Bhagavadgītā* 15.1 :] “They speak of the undying fig-free that has its roots above and its boughs beneath. Its leaves are the Vedic hymns. He who knows this knows the Veda”.
54. [From a Purāṇa :] “When everything was changed into one ocean, when [everything] immovable and movable had perished, when the gods and men had perished, when snakes and demons had perished...”
55. “When it had been entirely transformed into an abyss of darkness without any of the great elements, then the inconceivable omnipresent Soul, who was resting there, devoted himself to austerities”.

56. "As He was resting there a lotus expanded in his navel. Like the disc of the lately risen sun it was charming with its golden pericarp".
57. "Here Brahmā was born with his staff, water-pot, sacrificial thread and garment of antelope-hide. He created the mothers of the world :"
58. "Aditi was the mother of the crowds of Gods, Diti of the Asuras, Manu [the father] of men, Vinatā [was the mother] of all the various kinds of birds,"
59. Kadrū was the mother of the serpents, Sulasā the mother of the various kinds of Nāgas, Surabhi the mother of the quadrupeds, Ilā of all the seeds".
60. Some maintain that their creation went even further. Some say that the [world] was created without caste. Some say that it [was created] with castes, etc.
61. [Those who believe in Time, say :] "Time produces all creatures, and Time takes living beings back again. Time is awake when others are asleep. Time is certainly most difficult to overcome".
62. [Those who believe that Īśvara creates the world, say :] "Here [in this world] it is the duty of a king to protect his subjects. Likewise, the great Īśvara, the Lord of everything, takes care of everything in the world".
63. "When man is ignorant he is not at all master of his own happiness and suffering. Forced by Īśvara he goes either to heaven or to hell".
64. "Īśvara is subtle, inconceivable, without all the usual organs of sense, omniscient, the creator of everything. He can be achieved in ecstasy (*dhyāna*) by the yogic striving of yogis whose minds are pure. Those who are desirous of perfection, and who love the bliss of peace should always meditate upon Īśvara in the form of the moon, sun, fire, earth, water, wind, a consecrated person, and space".
65. [Those who believe in Brahmā, say, in the *Manusmṛti* 1.6 and 1.7 :] "[In the beginning] there was a sort of darkness. It could not be discerned, it was without marks, it could not be figured out, it could not be known, it was, as it were, entirely asleep".

66. "Then the self-existent Lord, unmanifest, caused [the world] to become manifest. He put his energy into the four great elements, etc., became visible and dispelled the darkness".
67. In order to let the world grow he created his mouth, arms, thighs and feet [the four castes :] priests, warriors, workers and servants".
68. [Sāṃkhya :] Some say that the world arises from the unmanifest [nature]. It consists of the five elements that have various bodies, names and forms.
69. The primary cause of everything is called "nature". It is omnipresent, universal, permanent, subtle, without marks, without consciousness, without activity, one.
70. [Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī 22 and 23 :] "From nature comes the Great. From that selfconsciousness. From that the group of sixteen. From the five that come from this group of sixteen, the five elements".
71. "The fundamental nature has no modifications. The seven beginning with the Great, etc., are modifications of nature. The group of sixteen are modifications. The spirit is not nature, nor is it a modification".
72. It cannot be defined as the *guṇas*, nor can it be defined as effect or cause. Therefore, the spirit is quite different [from nature, etc.]. It [seems to] enjoy the results [of its karma], but it is, in fact, not active at all.
73. As long as the *guṇas* of nature are active, the spirit [identifying itself with them] is perverted because it is enveloped in darkness. As long as it is unenlightened it thinks that it is active, but actually it cannot even break a blade of grass.
74. [The Buddhists say, in *Viṃśatikā* 1 :] "All this is mind-only, because the "things" that appear, are actually unreal. [Normal experience] is like the experience of one suffering from cataract has of [unreal] cocoon [making insects] (*kośakārakīṭaka*), etc."
75. When [people are] afflicted by anger, sorrow, intoxication, madness, desire and such faults, they "see" unreal things as being present right before their eyes".

76. [Those who believe in Puruṣa, say in the *Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad* 3.15 :]
“Everything is Puruṣa, everything that has been, and everything that will be. Also, he rules over immortality, for by food he springs up”.
77. [*Īśa-Upaniṣad* 5 :] “That which moves, that which moves not, that which is far away, that which is close by, that which is inside all this, that which is outside all this”.
78. [*Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad* 3.9 :] “Nothing is greater than this, nothing is smaller or mightier than this. It stands like a tree sustained in heaven, alone. The entire universe is full of Puruṣa”.
79. [*Brahmabindu-Upaniṣad* 12 :] “It is one only, the true soul. Then everything is dissolved [in it]”.
80. [*Bhagavadgītā* 15.16 :] “There are two “persons” in the world. One is perishable and one is imperishable. The perishable is all creatures. The imperishable is said to be aloof”.
81. [Others say :] “Even though scientific books are available, even though [competent] speakers are still left, nevertheless, if they do not know the Self, men are certainly killing themselves”.
82. “The Self is certainly the divinity, it is everything. Everything consists in the Self. It is, of course, the Self that produces karmic activity of embodied beings”.
83. “The Self is the creator, the Self is the bestower of happiness and suffering. The soul is heaven and hell. The soul is this entire world”.
84. [*Bhagavadgītā* 5.14 :] “The Lord does not create the activity and the actions of the world. The bond between one’s actions and their result takes place as a result of nature”.
85. “Since the nature of the Self is knowledge, it arises by itself as cognition. Therefore, and also because it arises by its own activity, the Self is called ‘self-existent’”.
86. [*Bhagavadgītā* 2.23 and 2.24 :] “Swords cannot cut it, fire cannot burn it, water cannot wet it, wind cannot dry it...”
87. “It cannot be cut, it cannot be broken, it is said to be indescribable. It is permanent, omnipresent, firm, unmoved and primeval”.

88. "It is imperishable, it is the elementary Self, it is called the bestower. It is breath, it is the highest Brahman, it is the "goose", and it is Puruṣa".
89. "There is no other seer, listener or thinker higher than this. Nor is there any agent, enjoyer or speaker [apart from this]".
90. "The conscious [Self] is bound by karma, i.e. by steady application. In this way it comes to exist. By getting rid of it [it attains] the highest stage".
91. [*Bhagavadgītā* 6.5 :] "One should save oneself by one's own Self. One should not disappoint one's own Self. The self is the only friend of oneself. The self is also the only enemy of itself".
92. "My friends may be very pleased with me, and my enemies may be very angry with me. They cannot, however, do anything to me that I have not already done myself previously".
93. Incarnate [Selves] perform good and bad actions personally. They also enjoy good and bad results personally.
94. In the forest, in combat, in the midst of foes, water or fire, on the ocean, or on the top of a mountain—one's previous good actions protect one whether one is asleep, heedless, or in a difficult position.
95. [The fatalists say :] "Surely, wealth, virtue, and knowledge do not depend on one's own free will. Nor does moral conduct, happiness or suffering. Having mounted the vehicle of Death, being forced by the charioteer, I[have to] go along the path that Fate leads me."
96. "Whenever the result of a formerly done action is, so to speak, remaining in deposit, then mind, with a lamp in its hand, as it were, will always be ready, eager to receive it."
97. "Law, order, necessity, nature, time, the constellations, Īśvara, Karma, fate, fortunate actions, Yama, death - [they are all] synonyms of an action formerly done."
98. "Most excellent of Pāṇḍavas! when people do not remember an action formerly done, then it is called 'fate'".
99. [Those who believe in nature, say :] "Who is the cause of the sharpness of thorns, and who is responsible for the diversity of beasts and birds ? Everything is due to nature. There is no freedom of action. Effort of will is nothing."

100. "The thorn of the jujube tree may be sharp, straight or curved. Also, its fruit is round. Please tell me, who made it so ?"
101. [Those who believe in the imperishable Brahman, say :] "Time emanated from the imperishable. Therefore it is held to be pervading. This creation is said to begin with the pervading, and to end with nature."
102. [Others say : First there was] a part of the imperishable. From that [came] wind. From that fire; from that water; from water earth came forth. This is how the elements came into being".
103. [Those who believe in the cosmic egg, say :] "Nārāyaṇa is higher than the unmanifest. From the unmanifest the [cosmic] egg came forth. Inside the egg [all] these [empirical] distinctions belong, and so does the earth with its seven continents".
104. "The water within [the earth], the oceans, the caul [of foetus], the mountains; in this egg the fourteen worlds have their foundation".
105. [*Manusmṛti* 1.12 :] "He, the Lord, stayed in that egg for a whole year. Then, by contemplating upon himself, he sliced that egg into two".
106. [*Manusmṛti* 1.13 :] "Out of the two fragments he created the sky and the earth", etc.
107. [Those who believe that creation has no cause, say :] "The manifold things that come into being every moment, surely come into being without a cause. Without being [there already] nothing can come into being. Something lacking the possibility of coming into being is as [unreal] as a flower [growing] in the sky".
108. [Those who believe in necessity, say :] "A thing that must occur based on the power of necessity will necessarily be good or bad for human beings. Even if people make a great deal of effort, that which shall not be will not be. Nor can that which must be fail to be".
109. [The evolutionists say :] "At every moment and in regard to the individual of all things, evolution takes place. It does not depend on one's free will, for one's free will develops gradually".
110. "It is true that we Piśācas live in the forest, but we never ever touch a drum even with our fingers. Still the rumour has spread all over the earth that Piśācas beat the drum !"

111. [The materialists say :] “Earth, water, fire and wind are [the four elements, or] principles. Bodies, senses, objects and ideas are based on their union. Consciousness is like the power of an intoxicating draught. Souls are like bubbles on water. The spirit is a body with consciousness.”
112. “Bodies, objects and senses are material. Nevertheless, stupid [teachers] teach [their students] that it is something else [namely an ‘immaterial soul’] that is an active principle”.
113. “This world only extends as far as do the objects of our senses. So, charming young lady, it is a foot-mark of a wolf [made in the snow by some deceitful villagers] that those who have not learned very much are talking about”.
114. “Austerities, various [self-]torments, self-control, fraud with regard to eating, rituals such as Agnihotra are [all] seen to be like childish play”.
115. [Those who believe in plurality, say :] “Causes are quite different, and effects are also different. Therefore, for sure, karma has no meaning in the three periods of time”.

Refutation :

1. The opinions of those who believe in the creation [of the world] are not alike. They themselves cannot reach an agreement. I will now show how [all their opinions] are in conflict with logic.
2. The origin of the world that exists and does not [yet] exist would have to be from a previous cause. However, there cannot be [a creator of a world that already] exists, nor can there be a creator of one that does not exist. This is because being and non-being cannot occur together.
3. The creation of something that does not exist certainly cannot take place in any of the three periods of time. An example [of something unreal would be] the horn of an ass. Therefore the world is a natural one [the causes of which cannot be explained in terms of time].
4. [The opinion] of the Jainas : As a whole no material and immaterial thing really suffers destruction or change. However, in a certain sense one can say that a thing usually does change its mode of being.

5. Those in the opinion of whom the world is [the creation] of Kāśyapa, Dakṣa, etc.—how can they [explain that there] suddenly is an existence [of the world] when the world was not there [to begin with] ?
6. When everything, including the earth, the sky, etc., is destroyed, what, then, is the world ? Is it intellect ? Something unmanifest that is deposited ? But what form does it have ?
7. [The Buddhists who are supposed] to have the best of all instructions, have explained that everything [= the entire world] is the product of something individually unique (*svalakṣaṇa*), immaterial or material, that exists in its own unique way.
8. But this means that all things in this world, material and immaterial, must have the same individuality. Anything that does not have that individually must therefore be held to be as unreal as the son of a barren woman ! [In other words : Many individuals cannot make a real whole].
9. If the horn of a horse cannot arise [or be created] from the horn of an ass, then, likewise, for certain, real things cannot arise from unreal things.
10. Here [some people think] that something sometimes can manifest itself from something unmanifest that is lacking characteristics. But if Soma, etc., already have bodies, then the elements do not exist [since Soma etc. can do without them].
11. But if the group of great elements does not exist then they [namely Soma, etc.,] cannot have any bodies ! [And that goes for *all* the gods :] Soma, the Egg, Pitāmaha, Hari as well as Paśupati and Dinapati.
12. And when they do not have any bodies, it is impossible to make any distinction between intelligence and mind. When they are absent, reflection and certainty cannot come into being : it is not possible !
13. When they are absent there can be no will. When there is no will, then action has no value. To do something makes no sense because actions have no value.
14. [A new argument :] If the world is created by such a [god], who, then, created *him* ? Or is it your opinion that he is uncreated ? It must be understood, if this is the case, that the entire universe here likewise [must be uncreated].

15. Let us discuss [the concept of a creator] assuming for a while [that god is responsible] for the creation of the world ! First of all, he cannot have done his duty with regard to the human aims of existence : A competent [or trustworthy god] does not make a dirty mess of the world !
16. What have the ghosts, etc., or gods, etc., done to offend him, since he has assigned them to pleasures and sufferings that they are not responsible for themselves ?
17. And, again, assuming he has the power required to do so, why has he not made the world a prosperous one ? He is responsible for the fact that the world suffers enormously on the path of rebirth, old age and death !
18. If he has created the world, then why does he destroy it again ? Why did he create it if it was his intention to destroy it again ?
19. What is the good of having destroyed or created the world ? Or what is the point of forcing living beings to suffering such as rebirth, etc. ?
20. A potter may suddenly break e.g. a pot the body of which is made up of elements. Likewise, the creator [suddenly may kill his own] creatures without mercy.
21. Which great scholar (*sūri*) would, for the sake of his felicity, seek refuge with such an extremely evil [god] who makes all kinds of living beings suffer, and who always, and without good reason, is hostile towards the world !
22. When he destroys the world that he himself has created he is not bound by any affection for others. But does a [normal] father, even with a violent mind, not feel bound [by compassion not] to kill his son ?
23. If the world was created in the past thanks to the power(*vigraha*) of a creator, how come it is not created *now* thanks to the power of that very same creator?
24. At present living beings are created in many different wombs. It has *always* been like that say the perfected [Jinas], who know the way the world works.

25. If one thus analyses the various [theories about] creation, in conflict with one another as they are, they must all be abandoned, because they are void of reason, just like the [absurd] speculations about both Viṣṇu and Śiva.
26. [There are various possibilities :] The creator can be free, unfree, he can have a body or [he may be without a body], he can create [a world] that exists or does not exist. But none of these arguments make any sense at all.
27. If he is free he does not create the world, because, being free from desire, he is not bound by karma. When a [creator] is subject to desire, etc., he has a body and is necessarily bound by his karma.
28. The [Jinas] who have perfected themselves by virtues such as [correct] knowledge, behaviour, etc., are eternal and blissful in their perfection. They are, most of them, free from the karma of bodily activities. They do not have any lord above them.
29. To be lord in *saṃsāra* is the result of karma, and it differs from one country to another. A single lord, being a creator without a body, is not to be found anywhere in the world.

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