

ILLUMINATOR OF JAINA TENETS

English Rendering of
Jaina-Siddhānta-Dīpikā

by

Prof. Satkari Mukherjee



ACHARYA TULSI

The Book

The *Illuminator of Jaina Tenets* is the English version of *Jaina-Siddhānta-dīpikā* composed in Sanskrit by Ācārya Śrī Tulsī in *sūtra*-style with an auto-commentary. The renowned Indologist Prof. Satkari Mookerjee very highly appreciated the work and spontaneously decided to render it into English. The translation was finished by 1958, but the publication was delayed as the thoroughly revised edition of the original text was published in the mean time. The task of making necessary additions and alterations was entrusted to the editors who also added new notes, keeping in view new studies on the subject in recent years.

The earliest work on this subject was composed by Vācaka Umāsvāti in Sanskrit with an auto-*bhāṣya*.

The present work gives the fundamentals of Jainism in a nutshell. The treatment of topics is lucid and and critical throughout and summarizes the development of the concepts through the ages.

The editors have attempted at throwing a new light on the ancient Jaina doctrines like *paryāpti*, types of birth, vertebrates, invertebrates, etc., and some aspects of the Jaina doctrine of *karman*. A modern student of Jainism will be able to get a correct idea of the basic principles of Jainism in modern perspectives.

The Introduction gives a new treatment to the topics like substance and attribute, space and time, materialistic concept of *karman* in relation to the modern science of genetics and the two deadly sins of the civilized man, viz. *ārambha* (the aggressive urge) and *parigraha* (the possessive instinct) as explained in the ancient Jaina scriptures.]

ILLUMINATOR OF JAINA TENETS

(JAINA-SIDDHĀNTA-DĪPIKĀ)

ĀCĀRYA TULSI

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PUBLISHER'S NOTE

Anekānta Śodha-Pīṭha, the Research Division of Jain Vishva Bharati, has been publishing critically edited texts of the Jaina Āgamas and comparative studies in Jainism in the form of monographs. It has already published scholarly works like *Aspects of Jaina Monasticism*, *New Dimensions in Jaina Logic*, etc

The present publication is the English rendering of the *Jaina-siddhānta-dīpikā* of Ācārya Śrī Tulsi, by the late Prof. Dr. Satkari Mookerjee who was a very eminent scholar not only of Jainism but also of Buddhism and Hinduism in their different ramifications. Dr. Mookerjee was a great devotee and admirer of Ācārya Tulsi. As early as 1949, giving a vivid picture of what he saw and felt about Terapantha Order and its Head, His Holiness Ācārya Tulsi, he observed, "It was a revelation to me that such a mighty spiritual power was let loose in a corner of Rajasthan which, I hope and believe, will one day overwhelm the whole of India and therefrom the rest of the world in course of time."

This translation entitled *Illuminator of Jaina Tenets* was completed by Dr. Mookerjee long ago. But as the original Sanskrit text was revised to contain the modern studies in Jainism, and a new edition was published in the mean time, the task of recasting the English translation and notes was assigned to Dr. N. Tatia and Muni Mahendrakumar. We are, however, happy that the book is being published on the occasion of Amṛta Mahotsava, marking the completion of 50 years of Ācārya Tulsi's pontificate dedicated to the well-being of mankind.

The logical explanations and the manner in which the subject-matter has been critically expounded deserve careful attention of the readers. The strenuous task of presenting the Jaina biological tenets in such a comprehensive and scientific way will inspire scholars for further investigations in the field of the Sciences of Life.

I am thankful to the editors for their onerous task in providing new material in their Notes. I am sure, this treatise will prove to be a very useful research guide for the beginners as well as advanced research students of Jainism. The Contents and the Indexes have no doubt enhanced its utility, and the Introduction will, I am sure, provide new matter that would provoke further thinking in the modern scientific studies.

I should also thank Shri R.S. Soni, Research Officer, for going through the proofs which too was no doubt an arduous work.

Ladnun,
22nd Sept., 1985.

—Shreechand Bengani
Secretary, Jain Vishva Bharati

P R E F A C E

The idea of the English translation of the *Jaina-siddhānta-dīpikā* originated as early as 1949 when Professor Dr. Satkari Mookerjee made pilgrimage, at the instance of Seth Chandmull Batia, to Jaipur to pay homage to Ācārya Śrī Tulsī. Professor Mookerjee was very much impressed by the depth and lucidity of the *sūtras* and the auto-commentary of the *Jaina-siddhānta-dīpikā*. Giving his impression of his erudition, Professor Mookerjee observed : “Ācāryasrī is a man of extraordinary learning. He is master of the Jaina Āgamas and of Jaina logic and metaphysics. And his knowledge of the rival schools of thought is of the same high order.”

At the initial stage Seth Chandmull Batia took great interest in the English translation of the *Jaina-siddhānta-dīpikā* and wished to publish it in the Batia Series under the auspices of the Parasnath Jaina Library at Jaipur, managed by the Trustees of Seth Chandmull Batia Trust. Shri Poonam Chand Batia and Padam Chand Batia, the worthy sons of Seth Chandmull Batia, also showed interest in the publication. But unfortunately, on account of inordinate delay in completing the translation and preparing the press copy, the book could not be published in the Batia Series.

The English translation was completed long ago. But when it was ready to be committed to the press, the message came that the original edition of the book had undergone change and that the translation needed a thorough revision. Ultimately, this work was assigned to me in collaboration with Muni Mahendra Kumar. We did the work, and on many an occasion we had to consult Ācāryasrī and Yuvācāryasrī for clarification of obscure points. The romanization of the text and writing of new notes also took some time before the final press copy could be prepared.

The scholars of Jaina philosophy have been eagerly waiting for this translation since long and sometimes they expressed their impatience for the inordinate delay. The book is now before the readers. The authorities of Jain Vishva Bharti, specially its Secretary, Shri S.C. Bengani, took keen interest in the publication and tried their best to expedite it. Shri R S Soni, Research officer, took great pains in going through the proofs, which was a hard task indeed.

It is now for the scholars of Indology in general, and Jainology in particular, to judge the merits of the work.

Jain Vishva Bharati,
Ladnun (Rajasthan)
September 22, 1985,

Nathmal Tatla

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INTRODUCTION

The *Jaina-siddhānta-dīpikā* is a concise treatise composed in *sūtras* with a brief auto-commentary. It is a lucid exposition of some of the essential tenets of Jaina philosophy. It is suitable for a beginner as well as an advanced student of Jainism. The basic tenets of Jaina ontology, epistemology and ethics have been expounded comprehensively and critically, throwing light on the features that distinguish them from similar concepts in other branches of Indian philosophy. Very valuable notes have been added by Professor Mookerjee at a number of places, which put the Jaina concepts in a comparative perspective.

While editing the book, I had occasions to discuss some fundamental problems of Jaina philosophy with Ācāryaśrī and Yuvācāryaśrī and as a result, I selected some issues for further discussion in the Introduction. A brief survey of these issues is attempted below.

I. THE SEVEN TATTVĀRTHAS

The Jaina doctrine of seven *tattvārthas* or *tattvas* (categories of truth) has a prototype in the four *arthapadas*, namely, *heya* (the avoidable), *heya-nirvartaka* (the basic cause of the avoidable), *hāna* (avoidance), and *hānopāya* (the way of avoidance), a right knowledge of which was considered as leading to emancipation.¹ Even as the medical science has four limbs, namely, *roga* (disease), *roga-hetu* (cause of disease), *ārogya* (cure), and *bhaiṣajya* (remedy), the spiritual science too has four parts, namely, *saṃsāra* (transmigration in the world), *saṃsāra-hetu* (cause of transmigration), *mokṣa* (emancipation), and *mokṣopāya* (the path leading to emancipation).² The four *arthapadas*, asserts Uddyotakara, are expounded by all the *ācāryas* in all their treatises concerned with the science of spiritualism.³ The famous four noble truths of Buddhism, namely, suffering, cause of suffering, emancipation, and the path leading to emancipation also confirm the universal rule enunciated by Uddyota-

1 ND, p. 33.

2 YBh, II. 15.

3 ND, pp. 34-5 : *etāni catvāry arthapadāni sarvāṣv adhyātmavidyāsu sarvācāryair varṇyanta iti*. Also see ND, p. 11,

kara. In the *Ratnagotravibhāga*,¹ it is said “Even as the disease is to be known, the cause of disease is to be avoided, health is to be attained, and medicine is to be tried, exactly so the suffering is to be known, the cause of suffering is to be removed, emancipation is to be realized, and the path of emancipation is to be practised.”

The seven *tattvas* of Jainism can similarly be divided into four groups, namely, *jīva-aḥjīva*, *āsrava-bandha*, *saṁvara-nirjarā*, and *mokṣa*. Here the first group stands for the *saṁsāra* consisting of the interaction between *jīva* (sentient principle) and *aḥjīva* (non-sentient principle), the second represents the basic cause of *saṁsāra*, the third explains the way of disentanglement from transmigration in *saṁsāra*, and the fourth stands for emancipation from suffering.

The above-mentioned fourfold division of the spiritual science in the different schools of Indian philosophy clearly demonstrates that there was a common undercurrent of metaphysical thinking in Indian thought.

Of the seven *tattvas*, the *āsrava* (influx) stands for the innate predispositions, instincts, habits, tendencies, and passions that determine the personality of the soul and are responsible for its good and bad behaviour. It is an inheritance of the past life, and also the creator of a new life in the future. The resultant of *āsrava* is *bandha* (bondage). The *āsravas* find expression in our thought, word, and deed that lead to *bandha*. The antidotes to *āsrava* and *bandha* are *saṁvara* and *nirjarā*. *Saṁvara* is inhibition of instincts and impulses. The *nirjarā* is total uprooting of the instincts and impulses. The result of *saṁvara* and *nirjarā* is *mokṣa* (emancipation).

Almost all Indian philosophers are mostly agreed about the first two *tattvas*, namely, *saṁsāra* and *saṁsāra-hetu*. There are, however, different opinions regarding the nature of *mokṣa* (emancipation) and the *mokṣopāya* (the path leading to *mokṣa*). These topics have been discussed by eminent scholars in their accounts of Indian philosophy, and therefore we do not feel any need to discuss them here.

1 IV. 52 :

vyādhir jñeyo vyādhihetuḥ praheyah
svāsthyam prāpyam bheṣajam sevyam evam /
duḥkham hetuḥ tannirodho'tha margo
jñeyam heyah sparśitavyo niṣevyah //

II. SUBSTANCE, QUALITIES, MODES

—*DRAVYA, GUṆA, PARYĀYA*

A substance has been defined as the substratum of qualities and modes. The qualities and modes cannot be imagined as attributes without any support. Such support is the substance. The qualities are the attributes that are the permanent features of a substance, whereas the modes are the passing features of it. The relation between a substance and its qualities has been thoroughly discussed in all the branches of Indian philosophy.

The problem of the relation between a substance and its attributes received the serious attention of all western philosophers too since the time of Aristotle. Various criteria of substance are found in Aristotle's works. These criteria are embodied in the notions of substance as (i) the concrete individual, (ii) a core of essential properties, (iii) what is capable of independent existence, (iv) a centre of change, (v) a substratum, and (vi) a logical subject. The crucial issue however is whether there is an independent entity underlying the sensible attributes. We perceive qualities and modes but do we perceive the substratum underlying those qualities?

Kaṇāda defines substance as that which possesses qualities and actions, and is an inherent cause. The most important part of this definition is the concept of substance as the inherent or material cause (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*). An effect must have a substratum and this substratum is necessarily a substance. Umāsvāti defines *dravya* (substance) as that which is possessed of *guṇas* (qualities) and *paryāyas* (modes).¹ And subsequently he defines a *guṇa* as that which has substance as its substratum and is not itself the substratum of any other quality.² Here substance and quality are defined as relative to each other so that the explanation is circular and tautologous : qualities are what qualify substances and substances are what have qualities. But at another place Umāsvāti gives a definition of substance which avoids this fallacy of circularity. Here substance is defined as what is existent (*sat*, real) and the existent is defined as what is subject to origination, cessation and continuity.³ A substance, according to this definition, is a real that endures through its different transformations and transmutations. In other words, that aspect of a real is substance which never ceases to

1 TSū, V. 37.

2 Ibid., V. 40.

3 Sarvārthasiddhi, V. 29-30 : sad dravyalakṣaṇam; utpāda-vyaya-dhauvya-yuktaṁ sat.

exist while passing through phases that appear and disappear. A real, however, is an entitative whole that changes as well as endures. The differentiation between *dravya* and *pariyāya* is ultimately an intellectual device for the enlightenment of a beginner. It is not true, according to the Jaina logician, that the modes alone are subject to change, while the substance is static and unchanging. The truth is that the substance also is liable to change, though not to absolute cessation and disappearance like the modes. This is confirmed by Siddhasenagaṇī in the following verse :

abhinnāṁśaṁ mataṁ vastu tathobhayamayātmakam /
pratipatter upāyena nayabhedena kathyate //¹

That is, an entity is a single whole and it has the dual aspect of change and permanence. The division of it as substance (*dravya*) and mode (*pariyāya*) is only a device for the enlightenment of the tyro.

The *Yoga-Bhāṣya* also agrees with this analysis of the nature of substance when it asserts : *paramārthatas tv eka eva pariṇāmaḥ. dharmisvarūpamātro hi dharmah, dharmivikriyaivaiśā dharmadvārā prapañcyata iti.*² That is, the change is virtually of only one kind; the attribute (*dharmā*) is identical in nature with the substance (*dharmīn*). It is change of the substance itself that is explained as the change of attributes.

III. THE FIVE *ASTIKĀYAS* AND *KĀLA*

The Jaina philosopher postulates six *dravyas* (substances) of which the five, namely, *jīva*, *dharmā*, *adharma*, *ākāśa* and *puṅgava* are *astikāyas*, and the sixth, namely, *kāla* is not an *astikāya*. *Astikāya* means a substance that has an extended body. *Kāla* has no extension in space, because it is atomic in magnitude. Siddhasenagaṇī has given a novel interpretation of the term *astikāya*. The particle *asti* indicates the persistent nature of a substance, whereas the expression *kāya* stands for the aspects of *utpāda* (origination) and *vyaya* (cessation).³

The purpose of the expression *kāya* in *astikāya*, according to Umāsvāti, however, is to indicate the plurality of *pradeśas* (points) in the substances, namely, *jīva*, *dharmā*, *adharma* and *ākāśa* and the plurality of *avayavas* (parts) in the material bodies, another purpose being the

1 TSū, Vol I, p. 394.

2 YBh, III. 13.

3 TSū, Vol I, pp. 317-8 : *kāyaśabdenāpattir abhidhitisitā'stiśabdena dhrauvyam iti. (āpatti=āvirbhāvatirobhāvau, vastuna utpāda-vināśāv iti yāvat).....asti cāsau kāyaś cety astikāyaḥ. dhruvaś cāśāv utpādavinaśāvāmś cety arthaḥ.*

exclusion of *kāla* from the category of *astikāya* because it has neither *pradeśas* nor parts.¹ A material atom (*paramāṇu*) is also conceived as possessed of parts, inasmuch as it has taste, smell, colour, and touch which are conceived as its parts in the scriptural tradition; a material atom has indeed no physical parts (*dravyāvayava*), but it has indeed logically intelligible parts (*bhāvāvayava*).²

In this connection it is necessary to explain the nature of a *pradeśa* with reference to the substances. The *jīva*, *dharma*, *adharma* and *lokākāśa* (cosmic space) have each an equal number of *pradeśas* which are numerically innumerable. Now the problem is—how can a *jīva* which has different magnitudes co-extensive with the body that it might happen to occupy have the same number of *pradeśas* as that in the *dharmāstikāya* or *adharmāstikāya* that spread over the whole of the cosmic space? The Jaina conception of *pradeśa* explains the problem. A *pradeśa* has dimensions, and a standard *pradeśa* is the *pradeśa* of *dharmāstikāya*, *adharmāstikāya* or *ākāśastikāya*. Thus the cosmic *ākāśa* is conceived as having an innumerable number of *pradeśas*. In other words, the dimension of a standard *pradeśa* is the volume of the cosmic *ākāśa* divided by an innumerable number. This is about the standard *pradeśa*. The *pradeśa* of the soul (which, according to Jainism, has demensions) is, however subject to contraction and expansion.³ The soul is neither atomic nor ubiquitous in size according to Jainism. A *pradeśa* of a soul in its maximum expansion is coextensive with the standard *pradeśa* of *dharmāstikāya*, *adharmāstikāya* and *ākāśa*. The dimensions of the soul, however, vary in accordance with the dimensions of the body it might happen to occupy, but the number of its *pradeśas* remains fixed, being innumerable in number, there being only contraction and expansion of the *pradeśas* according to necessity.

The upshot is that a *pradeśa* of Jaina philosophers is not like the Euclidean point that has no dimension. It is perhaps comparable to the

1 Ibid., p. 316 : kāyagrahaṇaṃ pradeśāvayava-bahutvārtham addhāsamayapratīṣedhārthaṃ ca.

2 Ibid., pp. 318-9 : nanu caiko'pi paramāṇuḥ pudgaladravyam eva. sa katham bahvavayavo bhavet ? kimatra pratipādyam ? nanu prasiddham evedam eka-rasa-gandha-varṇo dvisparśaś cānūr bhavati, bhāvāvayavaiḥ sāvayavo dravyāvayavair niravayava iti. āgamaś ca : “kaivihe ṇaṃ bhaṃte bhāvaparamāṇū paṇṇatte ? Goyamā cauvihe bhāvaparamāṇū paṇṇatte...taṃ jahā—vaṇṇamaṃte, rasamaṃte, gaṇḍhamamaṃte phāsamaṃte iti”.

3 TSū, V. 16 : pradeśa-saṃhāra-visargābhyāṃ pradīpavat,

point in the Gaussian system of Geometry used by Einstein.

The Jaina concepts of *ākāśa*, *dharma* and *adharma* are very peculiar. The *ākāśa* is infinite. It is divided into cosmic *ākāśa* and a cosmic *ākāśa*. The cosmic *ākāśa* is finite. It is that portion of the infinite *ākāśa*, which is occupied by *dharma*, *adharma*, *jīva* and *pudgala*.

The basic property of *ākāśa* is to provide place for the other substances. *Ākāśa*, as penetrated by *dharma* and *adharma* (which are the mediums of motion and rest respectively), accommodates the *jīvas* and *pudgala* whether they are in motion or in rest.²

As regards *pudgala*, namely, material bodies and atoms, they have the qualities of colour, taste, odour and touch. The Jaina philosopher does not believe in class distinctions of atoms like earth, air, fire, and water as the Vaiśeṣika philosopher does. The atoms give rise to different species of matter. It should be noted in this connection that a material atom has no physical parts (*pradeśa*), whereas a material body necessarily has.³ Another peculiar feature of the Jaina atomic theory is that an infinite number of atoms can find room in the same space-point that is occupied by a single atom.⁴

Now we come to the substance called *kāla*. The Jaina philosophers are not agreed about the substantial nature of *kāla*. Some say that it is a quality; some again are of the view that it is a mode. But there is also a scriptural tradition that *kāla* is a substance.⁵ According to the Digambara tradition there are as many time-atoms as there are *pradeśas* in the cosmic space, a single *pradeśa* being occupied by one time-atom.⁶

1 cf. Basham : "Jainism and Buddhism" in William Theodore de Bary, ed, *Sources in Indian Tradition*, Vol. I, Page 77, n. 3.

2 TSū, Vol I, p. 332 : avagāhinām anupraveśavatām avagāhaḥ praveśaḥ pratiṣṭhā pudgalādīnām dharmādharma-dravya-dvayāvagādhe vyomni bhavati.

3 Ibid., p. 328 : sarveṣāṃ pradeśāḥ santi, anyatra paramāṇoḥ. avayavās tu skandhānām eva.

4 Ibid., p. 333 : paramāṇor ekasminn eva pradeśe, dyaṇukasyaikasmin dvayoś ca, tryaṇukasyaikasmin dvayos triṣu ca, evaṃ caturaṇukādīnām saṃkhyeyāsaṃkhyeya-pradeśasyaikādisu saṃkhyeyeṣu asaṃkhyeyeṣu ca, anantapradeśasya ca.

5 Ibid., pp. 429-433.

6 Sarvārthasiddhi, 602 : lokākāśasya yāvantaḥ pradeśās tāvantaḥ kālāṇavo niṣkriyā ekaikākāśa-pradeśe ekaikavṛtīyā lokam vyāpya vyavasthitāḥ. uktaṃ ca—

logāgāsapadese ekkekke je tṭhiyā hu ekkekka /
rayaṇāṇaṃ rāsī viva te kālāṇū muṇeyavvā //

INTRODUCTION

In the light of the above-mentioned concepts of *ākāśāstikāya*, *dharmāstikāya*, *adharmāstikāya* and *kāla*, a complete description of any thing or event, in motion or in rest, would depend on a proper reference to the specific space-point and time-point related to the thing or event. The oft-mentioned Jaina formula that the determination of any thing should be made with reference to the *dravya*, *kṣetra* (place), *kāla* and *bhāva* (attribute) of that thing is to be understood in the light of this mutual relationship between space and time, as well as a substance and its attributes.

A short account of the concepts of space and time in western and modern thought will help the reader in appreciating the Jaina concepts.¹ Space is popularly thought of as an all-pervading ether or as some sort of container allowing a thing to move from one place to another. The concept of empty space was not generally entertained, though Democritus and the atomists clearly distinguished between the atoms and the void which separated them. Lucretius wrote of space as though it were a container. Plato thought of space as a receptacle, the foster-mother of all becoming. Aristotle tried to define place by reference to the cosmos as a whole. He thought of the cosmos as a system of concentric spheres, and the outermost sphere of the cosmos would, in his view, define all other places in relation to itself. Descartes held that the essence of matter is extension, and so, there can be no such thing as a vacuum. Leibniz held a relational theory of space. Space is merely a system of relations in which indivisible substances, or "monads", stand to one another. Kant argued against both a naive absolute theory of space and a relational view. He held that space is something merely subjective. Newton held absolute theories of space and time. What is important in Newtonian dynamics is not the notion of absolute space but that of an inertial system. Psychologically, it was convenient for Newton to think of inertial axes as though they were embedded in some sort of ethereal jelly—absolute space. Newton could equally have taken up the position, later adopted by Mach, that inertial systems are determined not by absolute space but by the large-scale distribution of matter in the universe.

The theory of relativity certainly forces us to reject an absolute theory of space, if by this is meant one in which space is taken as quite

1 What follows is based on the articles on "Space" and "Time" in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Macmillan Publishing Co., New York, 1972).

separate from time. Observers in relative motion to one another will take their space and time axes at different angles to one another; they will, so to speak, slice space-time at different angles. The special theory of relativity, at least, is quite consistent with either an absolute or a relational philosophical account of space-time, for the fact that space-time can be sliced at different angles does not imply that it is not something on its own account.

Some philosophers felt that time was incapable of rational discursive treatment and that it was able to be grasped only by intuition.

Augustine was puzzled by how we could measure time. He seems to have been impressed by the lack of analogy between spatial and temporal measurement.

We commonly think of time as a stream that flows as a sea over which we advance. The two metaphors come to much the same thing, forming part of a whole way of thinking about time which D.C. Williams has called "the myth of passage." If time flies past us or if we advance through time, this would be a motion with respect to a hypertime. The idea of time as passing is connected with the idea of events changing from future to past. We think of events as coming from the future and caught in the spotlight of the present and then receding into the past.

The philosophical notion of duration seems to be heavily infected with the myth of passage. Thus, Locke says that "duration is fleeting extension." More recently, Bergson has made the notion of duration (*durée*) central in his philosophy. According to him, physical time is something spatialized and intellectualized, whereas the real thing, with which we are acquainted in intuition (inner experience), is duration. Unlike physical time, which is always measured by comparing discrete spatial positions—for example, of clock hands—duration is the experienced change itself, the directly intuited nonspatial stream of consciousness in which past, present and future flow into one another. Bergson's meaning is unclear, partly because he thinks that duration is something to be intuitively, not intellectually, grasped. It is closely connected in his thought with memory, for in memory, he says, the past survives in the present. Here he would seem to be open to the objection, urged against him by Bertrand Russell in his *History of Western Philosophy*, that he confuses the memory of the past event with the past event itself or the thought with that which is thought about.

The theory of relativity illustrates the advantage of replacing the

separate notions of space and time by a unified notion of space-time. In particular, Minkowski showed that the Lorentz transformations of special relativity correspond to a rotation of axes in space-time. He showed how natural the kinematics of special relativity can seem, as opposed to Newtonian kinematics, in which, in effect, we should rotate the time axis without correspondingly rotating the space axes. Since the theory of relativity it has become a commonplace to regard the world as a four dimensional space-time manifold. Nevertheless, even in the days of Newtonian dynamics, there was nothing to prevent taking this view of the world, even though it would not have been as neat as it is in relativity theory. If we pass to the four-dimensional way of looking at things, it is important not to be confused about certain conceptual matters. Confusion will arise if we mix the tenseless way of talking appropriate to the four-dimensional picture with our ordinary way of talking of things as enduring substances, "the permanent in change."

Isaac Newton held to an absolute theory of space and time, whereas his contemporary Leibniz argued that space and time are merely sets of relations between things which are *in* space and time. Newton misleadingly and unnecessarily expressed his absolute theory of time in terms of the myth of passage, as when he confusingly said, "Absolute, true and mathematical time, of itself and from its own nature, flows equably without relation to anything external." The special theory of relativity has made it impossible to consider time as something absolute; rather, it stands neutrally between absolute and relational theories of space-time. The question as between absolute and relational theories of space-time becomes especially interesting when we pass to the general theory of relativity. According to this theory, the structure of space-time is dependent on the distribution of the matter in the universe. In most forms of the theory there is nevertheless a residual space-time structure which cannot be thus accounted for. A curvature is usually attributed to space-time even in the complete absence of matter, and the inertia of a body, according to this theory, depends in part on this cosmological contribution to the local metrical field and hence not solely on the total mass of the universe, as a purely relational theory would require. Research on this question is still going on, and until it has been decided, Mach's principle (as Einstein called it), according to which the spatio-temporal structure of the universe depends entirely on the distribution of its matter, will remain controversial. But even if Mach's principle were upheld, it might still be possible to interpret matter, in a

metaphysical way, as regions of special curvature of space-time.

It is sometimes thought that the picture of the world as a space-time manifold is incompatible with free will. It is thought that if one of my future actions exists (tenselessly) in the space-time manifold, then it is fated that I will do this action, and I cannot be free not to do it. To evade this conclusion, philosophers have sometimes been inclined to reject the theory of the manifold and also to deny that propositions about the future have to be either true or false. This view can be contested at several levels. First, the fact that one of my future actions exists in the space-time manifold does not mean that I am fated to do it, in the sense that I come to do it independently of what I do in the mean time. It will still be my choice. Second, the doctrine of the space-time manifold does not even imply the weaker doctrine of determinism. Determinism asserts that the laws of nature connect earlier and later spatial cross sections of the manifold in a determinate way, whereas indeterminism denies this. Thus, according to determinism, a complete knowledge of one spatial cross section of the universe would enable a superhuman calculator (who knew enough law of nature) to deduce what other spatial cross sections would be like. Indeterminism, being only a denial of a certain sort of connectedness between elements of the manifold, is quite compatible with the theory of the manifold as such. Third, it could be argued that free will is perfectly compatible with determinism anyway. On three counts, therefore, we may assert that the theory of space-time has, in fact, nothing at all to do with the question of free will.

IV. THE JAINA DOCTRINE OF *PARINĀMA*

Parināma or change is a fundamental philosophical problem that has received the keen attention of all thinkers. There are two fundamentally opposed views of reality, namely the view that (i) only what is eternal and unchanging is the real, and that (ii) only what is incessantly changing is the real. The former is called "the Philosophy of Being" and the latter "the Philosophy of Becoming". In the former, change is considered as absolutely unreal, while in the latter change is the essence of things; according to the former, it is only the *dravya* or substance that is real, in the latter it is only the *pariyāyas* or modes that are real.

The upholders of the Philosophy of Being explain change as only an illusion created by our ignorance or nescience. On the other hand, the supporters of the Philosophy of Becoming regard an eternal sub-

stance as only a figment of our imagination due to attachment to the self and worldly possessions.¹

In Indian thought the Philosophy of Being is called *ātmavāda* (the doctrine of an abiding entity) and the Philosophy of Becoming *anātmavāda* (the doctrine of the denial of an abiding entity).

The principal supporter of the Philosophy of Being is the Vedāntic monist who considers the *Brahman* as eternal, immutable and one, and considers plurality as unreal. The *puruṣa* of Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophy is also eternal and unchanging. The principle opposed to *Brahman* in Vedānta is *māyā* or illusion, whereas the principle distinguished from the *puruṣa* in Sāṃkhya-Yoga is the *prakṛti* or primordial matter that undergoes change in the interest of the *puruṣa*. The change of *prakṛti* is reversible inasmuch as the evolutes can return to the state of *prakṛti*. Buddhism believes in change which is irreversible because what is past is past for ever. The *prakṛti* of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophy is a compromise between the immutable *Brahman* of the Vedāntin and the ever-changing aggregates of the Buddhist fluxist. In technical terms, the change of the Vedāntin is called *vivarta* (apparent origination), that of the Buddhist *pratītyasamutpāda* (dependent origination), and that of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga *pariṇāma* (transformation). There is another theory of change, called *ārambhavāda* (doctrine of novel origination of effect) which is propounded by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. Apart from the *ārambhavāda* (*asat-kāryavāda*, the doctrine of the pre-nonexistence of effect in the cause) and *pariṇāmavāda* (*sat-kāryavāda*, the doctrine of pre-existence of the effect in the cause), there is another theory of change called *sadasat-kāryavāda* (the doctrine of the existence-cum-nonexistence of the effect in the cause) propounded by the Jaina philosophers. According to the Jaina theory, the change is irreversible, as the mode that has passed away does never return. The substance that underlies the modes is however eternal in the sense that it never loses its essence.² Both the substance and the modes are real. The substance also, like the modes or attributes, is undergoing change incessantly.³ There is a constant renewal of the substance. An unchanging substance

1 Pramāṇavārtika, I. 202:

sukhī bhaveyaṃ duḥkhī vā mā bhūvaṃ iti tṛṣyataḥ /
yavāham iti dhīḥ saiva saha jaṃ sattvadarśanam //

2 TSū, V. 30 : tadbhāvāvyayaṃ nityam. See also the Bhāṣya and Tīkā. Cf. Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya (Paspāṣā) : tad api nityaṃ yasmiṃś tattvaṃ na vihanyate,

3 Vide supra, p. xvi.

is an illusion according to Jainism. This theory should be distinguished from the theory of the Buddhist fluxist who does not believe in a substance, changing or unchanging Phenomena, according to the Buddhist, float without any support, there being no independent and self-existent reality underlying them. There is also a fundamental difference between the Jaina doctrine of *pariṇāma* and the Sāṃkhya-Yoga one. In the Sāṃkhya-Yoga doctrine the substance is absolutely constant while the attributes change.¹ In the Jaina doctrine, the substance too is renewed like the attribute as we have already explained.²

Now let us see how the problem of change is dealt with in western and modern thought.³

Parmenides of Elea denied both change and diversity in the name of the unity and immutability of the First Principle. This principle, according to him, is Being. Nonbeing, or the void, does not exist. Change is impossible because it would require conversion of Being into Nonbeing; nor can the absolute continuity of Being be broken into "many" by the nonexistent void.

But it was impossible completely to deny change as long as one continued to speak of changing appearances. Thus, neither change nor diversity could be completely eliminated, though they both remain logically underivable from the First Principle.

Empedocles and Anaxagoras made a concession and considered the elements qualitatively diverse, though persistent immutably through their various combinations. In other words, diversity was

1 YBh, III. 13 : avasthitasya dravyasya pūrva-dharma-nivṛtttau dharmāntarotpattih pariṇāmaḥ. Also cf. *Yuktidīpikā* on *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, 9 :

jahad dharmāntaram pūrvam upādatte yadā param /
tattvād apracyuto dharmī pariṇāmaḥ sa ucyate //

2 Also cf. TSū, V. 41 : tadbhāvaḥ pariṇāmaḥ. Also cf. its Ṭikā (p. 438) : athavā kaiścit pariṇāma-lakṣaṇam uktam- "avasthitasya dravyasya dharmāntaranivṛttir dharmāntara-prādurbhāvaś ca pariṇāma" iti. tadapākaraṇāyāvāci—tadbhāvaḥ pariṇāmaḥ. tatrāvasthitam yadi kūṭastham vivakṣitam, tatas tasya ye dharmā utpāda-vināśa-lakṣaṇās tadākāreṇa tan notpadyate sthitatvād eva. tādr̥g apy astīti śraddhayā pratipattavyam dharmā evotpadyante vinaśyanti vā vyatirekiṇaḥ. athā'nanye dravyād dharmās tato dharmotpāde dharma-vināśe cā'nanyatvād eva dravyeṇāpi tathaiva bhavitavyam iti nāsty avasthitatvam. atas tadbhāvalakṣaṇa eva pariṇāmo'bhyupeyaḥ. tad eva dravyam tathā bhavati, guṇo vā. svabhāvaḥ svatattvam pariṇāmaḥ pariṇāmino dravyasyeti niravadyam pariṇāmalakṣaṇam iti.

3 What follows is based on the article on "Change" in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

upheld, but qualitative change was denied or rather reduced to change of place.

Unlike Parmenides, the atomists accepted the reality of the void in order to explain motion. Atomism was a synthesis of Eleatic monism and Pythagorean pluralism. Change was admitted by the atomists only as a change of position. By this view of change, as well as by their anticipation of the law of constancy of matter, the atomists greatly strengthened substantialist modes of thought.

The antisubstantialist trend in Greek philosophy was represented by Heraclitus of Ephesus. Heraclitus argued "All change is contradictory; therefore contradiction (the unity of opposites) is the very essence of reality." The world of Heraclitus was the dynamic unity of process, in which each momentary phase was continuously transformed into its "opposite", that is, into a subsequent qualitatively different phase.¹ Heraclitus, in insisting on the fluidity of everything, virtually rejected the existence of any unchanging substrate or vehicle of motion. He also held that becoming is irreversible : "You cannot step twice into the same river."

The subsequent development of Greek, medieval, and, to a considerable extent, modern philosophy was dominated by the antinomy of Being and Becoming. In most philosophical systems Being was given prominence while Becoming was placed in an inferior and subordinate role.

In modern philosophy, the Greek and medieval pattern of two realms, eternal and temporal, was retained in various systems of pantheistic monism. The transcendent eternity of the medieval God was replaced by an impersonal immanent order of nature that was devoid of change as the Parmenidean Being, Aristotle's God, Plato's Ideas, and Plotinus' One. From Giordano Bruno to F.H. Bradley this basic pattern remained the same.

Denial of change is not always coupled with denial of diversity as various instances of static pluralism show.

Other thinkers, more interested in concrete empirical features of change than in its ultimate ontological status, began to explore psychologically the perception of change, which could not be separated from

1 Compare the Yogācāra philosopher Sthiramati's definition of *pariṇāma* : *kāraṇa-kṣaṇa-nirodha-samakālaḥ kāraṇa-kṣaṇa-vilakṣaṇaḥ kāryasyātmalābhaḥ pariṇāmaḥ* —Bhāṣya on *Triṃśikā*, 1.

the problem of temporal awareness in general.

The absolute theory of time, represented by Isaac Newton, claimed that time is independent of change; even empty time would flow, and did flow before the creation of the world. Berkeley and Leibniz adhered to Aristotle's view that time is inseparable from its concrete changing content and that to speak of empty time as "flowing" is meaningless. But while Berkeley claimed that the infinite divisibility of change and time (both being inseparable) is a mere fiction because mathematical instants are never perceived and consequently are unreal, Leibniz, influenced by his own discovery of the infinitesimal calculus, applied the concept of infinite divisibility to change and time.

By 1900, after the spectacular triumphs of the corpuscular-kinetic models in physics, the final victory of Democritus over Aristotle and Heraclitus seemed assured. At the same time the law of conservation of matter and energy was hailed by Spencer and others as an empirical confirmation of the traditional idea of permanence of substance; the equality of cause and effect was seen as a mere consequence of the equivalence of successive forms of energy, whose permanence in successive transformations provided the causal link for which Hume had looked in vain. This tendency to reduce the successive causal relation to the identity of a single basic stuff revealed the affinity between modern classical science and the static monism of traditional metaphysics. Change exists only on the surface and does not affect the immutability and unity of the underlying substrate.

After 1900, physics seemed to point in the very opposite direction. Although the existence of elementary particles was verified beyond doubt, it was also shown that their properties are altogether different from those of the classical Lucretian atom. They were deprived of all the intuitive features with which they had been endowed from the time of Democritus to that of Lorentz—even constancy of their mass, their precise locations, and their permanence (identity through time). The very distinction between "full" and "empty" on which the classical concept of corpuscle was based was challenged by the general theory of relativity, while the close association of mass and energy prevents us from regarding the mass total of an aggregate as a mere sum of its constituent parts. Moreover, the elements of matter combine in a paradoxical way the properties of particles and waves so that they are neither particles nor waves in the traditional sense, and the word "events", which is free of the substantial connotations of

"elements", is much more appropriate to them. Not only was mass fused with energy but space was merged with time into space-time. The latter fusion means, contrary to popular misunderstanding, a dynamization of space rather than a spatialization of time. Space and time cease to be immutable containers of motion, and matter ceases to be its substantial vehicle; thus the whole classical concept of motion as a displacement of a substantial entity in static space yields to a more comprehensive and less intuitive notion of change that has some affinities with the Heraclitean concept of irreversible change without vehicle and without container.

The reaffirmation of change and the exploration of its structure is a salient feature of contemporary thought. The continuity of the concretely experienced "stream of thought" was stressed against the discontinuity resulting from its artificial conceptualization. Bergson applied the results of his introspective analysis of psychological duration to duration in general. Whitehead's metaphysics of events, with its emphasis on "the creative advance of nature" and on "the immortality of the past" (from which the irreversibility of becoming follows), as well as its denial of durationless instants was very close to Bergson's views.

It is true that it is very difficult to synthesize conceptually the continuity of becoming and the individuality of events. This antinomy is probably a new form of the Heraclitean "unity of opposites" and may be related to the present "wave-corpuscle" antinomy. In most instances resistance to a genuine acceptance of change and novelty stems from the failure to overcome the deeply ingrained habits of spatialization and from the often unconscious commitment to traditional patterns of thought, especially to the metaphysics of Being. Although the dialogue between Parmenides and Heraclitus is still going on, the former is now much less favoured than the latter. However, a systematic exploration of the various aspects of the problem of change has only begun.

V. THE JAINA DOCTRINE OF *KARMAN* AND THE SCIENCE OF GENETICS

The Jaina doctrine of *karman* is of uncommon interest as it postulates a concrete, realistic, physical nature of *karman*. Nowhere in any other philosophy has the physical nature of *karman* been asserted with such stress as in Jainism. A moral act, good or bad, produces a psycho-

physical state that is a real, not merely symbolical, mark, a characteristic in the most literal sense, affecting the soul in its physical nature. As regards the age of this doctrine, R. Zimmermann observes : "Though the doctrine has been developed with a minuteness in detail, a care in classification, a definiteness in statement, which would do credit to the most methodical modern system, yet here again the question about its age remains, for the time being, an open one. At least one thousand years before the Christian era, the *karman* tenet is said to have been in vogue. This is of course supposed to be the lower limit, the higher one possibly lying much further back in antiquity. But the fact is significant that it cannot be shown where precisely and when a doctrine of such central position as that of the *karman* originated. That the fundamental idea of *karman* is part and parcel of the Jaina canon may be as readily accepted as the assumption that later writers have developed the theory in detail and expressed in technical terms what the elders implicitly had taught and believed. But if neither Jainism, nor Buddhism, nor Hinduism has got to show a definite date of origin for a doctrine that with all of them is a pivot of their beliefs, might it not be assumed that this doctrine of the *karman* in its various shades is an inheritance of old, a technical expression of the universally acknowledged law of moral retribution ?"¹

The soul is an ever-changing real by its own nature and, in the state of worldly existence, this change is determined by the nature of the karmic matter (*karma-pudgala*) that is associated with it. The nature of the associated karmic matter is determined by the nature of the passions (*kaṣāyas*) of the soul and the nature of the passions is determined by the nature of the karmic matter. This mutual determination has no beginning in time. The beginninglessness is a perennial problem of philosophy that has baffled human reason. Matter influences soul and the soul influences matter. The Jaina philosopher accepts this process without any further thought about it. There is an intimate relationship between the sentient soul and the insentient matter, both of which are concrete reals. The concrete and material *karman* is responsible for the multifold predispositions and tendencies (physical and mental), the aggressive and sexual urges, and the possessive and other instincts that constitute the personality of the soul. It is not possible to know the exact nature and function of the material *karman* as to how it builds up

1 From the Foreward to *The Doctrine of Karman in Jaina Philosophy* by Helmuth Von Glasenapp, Bombay, 1942.

the body and directs the various functions of the physical organs including the brain and the nervous system. The Jainas have a vast literature on the doctrine of *karman*, and it may be possible to discover important data in them that will throw light on the problem. What is most striking is the fact that the Jaina philosophers tried to understand the psychosomatic personality through the functioning of the material *karman*. Their doctrine of *karman* may be considered as anticipating, though in a very primitive way, the findings of the modern science of genetics sans its Darwinian background. We give below a brief description of the nature of genes that determine the life-cycle and inheritance of all living beings.

Today we know that every living thing consists of cells. Some organisms have just one cell. But most are made up of millions upon millions of cells. Every typical cell has a nucleus. Within this round nucleus lie a number of rod or sausage-shaped objects called chromosomes. The chromosomes, important though they are, are not the basic units of inheritance. They act merely as a fleet of carriers for the fundamental hereditary particles, which are called genes. A chromosome carries a "crew" of genes, which lie along the length of chromosomes in single file—rather as though the crew were on inspection.

Each gene or group of genes carries within its chemistry the potential to recreate a trait which was present in a parent. All the genes together on all the chromosomes carry the potential to recreate an entire individual. The chemistry of the gene is the key to inheritance. A gene consists of a compound called deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) which possesses the astonishing ability to copy itself. But that is not all : DNA contains a number of compounds called bases, arranged at regular intervals along the coiled chain-like length of the molecule. These bases determine gene action.

The totally different forms and functions that animals like insects adopt at different phases of their life-cycle constitute a special form of the phenomenon known as polymorphism.

Thus each animal's life-cycle, which makes it uniquely different from other animals, is the result of different permutations of its genes being switched on and switched off throughout its life.

The information that nitrogen-containing molecules are exuded by potential prey animals is encoded in the hydra's genes; it stretches towards such molecules because it has inherited the behavioural mech-

anism that makes it do so. Its knowledge and activity are purely *instinctive*. But the mouse cannot be born with knowledge of the exact position of its burrow and the objects around it. It *acquires* this knowledge through the agency of its senses, particularly its eyes and nose, and stores it in its brain. The process of acquiring knowledge in this way, through the agency of the nervous system, is known as *learning*.

The Dutch biologist Hugo de Vries (1848-1935) showed that chance occurrences (induced by radiation or other means) can produce marked changes in the genetic make up of an individual.

Darwin's theory of natural selection (survival of the fittest) could account for small changes within species, but mutations were needed to explain how the large changes leading to the establishment of new groups of animals could occur. So in the 1930's, the modern theory of evolution (often called the Synthetic Theory) was proposed. This theory is based upon the theory of natural selection, but includes the concepts of mutation and genetic inheritance.

It is interesting to note in this connection that an evil act committed in this life by a person, according to Manu, produces its result either in this very life or in the life of the progeny, namely, the sons and the grandsons; but it is never unproductive.¹ This observation of Manu is in essential agreement with the doctrine of genes, which asserts that progeny inherits the behavioural pattern of the parents.

Each person's life-cycle is determined, according to the majority of Indian thinkers, by the cumulative potencies of *karman* performed in the previous birth. The instinctive behaviour of the living being also owes its origin to the past life. It is believed that the whole behavioural mechanism is in accordance with the species in which a soul takes birth. Suppose a soul is born as a cat. In this case the predispositions and instincts stored in the past by that soul in its previous life of a cat come up and start functioning and the process continues till the end of that life.² The intervening temporal or spatial gap between the past life and the present one is no obstacle, because the past experiences remain

1 Manusmṛti, IV. 173 :

yadi nātmani putreṣu na cet putreṣu naptreṣu /
na tv eva tu kṛto'dharmah kartur bhavati niṣphalaḥ //

2 Cf. YBh, IV. 8 : yajjātīyasya karmaṇo yo vipākaḥ tasyānugūṇā yā vāsanāḥ karma-vipākam anuśerate tāsām evābhivyaktiḥ. na hi daivam karma vipacyamānam nāraka-tīryam-manuṣya-vāsanābhivyakti-nimittam sambhavati, kintu daivānugūṇā evāśya vāsana vyajyante.

stored up in the mind and become effective at the proper moment, even as the past impressions can give rise to the memory of a past event in the present.¹

It should be noted here that the Indian thinkers generally did not believe in the Darwinian theory of evolution. But it was accepted by them all that the instincts of fear, anger, greed, food, sex, etc., constituted the inheritance derived from past life. Another important aspect, namely, the possibility of improvement on the inherited behaviour also received the attention of Indian thinkers. Sometimes such improvement was effected by circumstances attending one's birth, but it could also be achieved by means of medicine, *mantra*, penances and meditation.²

In the modern science of genetics, the question of improving mankind has received careful consideration. We quote below, from the article on "Heredity" in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, an extract dealing with the problem.

"Man is the only organism on earth who is aware that he is a product, and even the crowning achievement so far, of the evolutionary process. The past evolution was a product of natural selection, a certain pattern of blind forces of nature. Can man gather enough knowledge and enough wisdom to substitute for these blind forces a conscious control of the ongoing evolution of mankind? The central idea of eugenics is that such a control is feasible. Negative eugenics is primarily directed toward elimination of hereditary defects and diseases, in other words, toward control of the genetic load of mankind. Positive eugenics favours increasing the frequencies of superior hereditary endowments. Mankind, like any other biological species, has carried a genetic load since the dawn of time. It is claimed, however, that civilized living, technology, medicine, maintenance of the genetically handicapped, etc., increase man's genetic load.

"A variety of proposals have been advanced to decrease the genetic load, or at any rate to check its increase. It is evident that one way to decrease the frequency of mutation is by avoiding all unnecessary exposure to high-energy radiations and other mutagens. Genetic

1 Cf. YD, IV. 9 : jāti-deśa-kāla-vyavahitānām apy ānantaryam smṛtiśaṃskārayor ekarūpatvāt. See also the Bhāṣya.

2 YD, IV. 1. There are manifold processess of the spiritual energy that can transform the effects of the past *karman*, vide *Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, pp. 254 ff.

counselling could be quite important if it were to become widespread or universal.

“Eugenical measures leading to genetic improvements must be accompanied by improvement of the environment in both physical and cultural aspects (euthenics), and by management of the developmental patterns of individual humans (euphenics). No genetic endowment can produce optimal results regardless of the environments in which its carriers are placed. The spectacular advances of the biological sciences have produced optimistic expectations of even more splendid advances to come. Several possibilities can be mentioned, although it is impossible to predict when, if at all, they will be realized. One has been labelled algeny, or “genetic surgery”, i.e., deliberate modification of specific genes, or implantation of desired new genes into chromosomes. Transformation and transduction have, indeed, been realized in some microorganisms, and it is possible, at least in principle, that this kind of directed genetic change may someday be practicable in higher organisms, including man. The potency of genetic surgery for genetic improvement of mankind may, indeed, permit achievements far beyond the reach of the genetic techniques presently available. A variety of instruments for euphenic betterment (developmental engineering) may conceivably become available in the near future. Suppression of the action of undesirable genes and stimulation of that of desirable genes may be a most powerful means for controlling phenotypes that develop from genetically defective genotypes, or for stimulating genotypes whose potentialities are hidden. Transplantation of organs to replace those injured by accidents or worn out is another possibility. Such organs may be taken either from people who die accidentally or because of faults in other organs, or conceivably from animals bred especially for that purpose. Mechanical aids or prostheses (substitutes) for human organs or limbs may be improved. All this may increase human longevity and decrease the deterioration now unavoidable with aging. Last but not least, and probably the most urgent, is management and regulation of population growth by reliable, as well as emotionally and aesthetically acceptable, family planning techniques. It is arguable that the avoidance of a disastrous “population explosion” is the prime necessity to make any genetic improvement of mankind really beneficial.”

In Jaina terminology, *saṃvara* can function as negative eugenics and spiritual penances as positive eugenics. The ethical code of the Jainas gives a proper place to euthenics and euphenics. Algeny or genetic

surgery was not known to the ancients. But meditation very well served the purpose of it. Suppression of the action of undesirable genes was achieved by means of *saṁvara* and the stimulation of the action of desirable genes was done by means of the cultivation of the cardinal virtues like *maītrī* (fellow-feeling or friendliness), *karuṇā* (compassion), *muditā* (sympathetic joy or freedom from envy), and *upekṣā* (equanimity or freedom from anger). The possibility of improvement of the behavioural pattern was considered feasible by the Jaina thinkers through the processes of the spiritual energy that could effect colossal change in the fruition of the past *karman*.

VI. THE TWO DEADLY SINS : *ĀRAMBHA* AND *PARIGRAHA*.

The aggressive and possessive urges have no doubt a survival value at the animal level but they lose their justification in human behaviour. For the human species they are unpardonable sins and are sure means to its annihilation. The Sanskrit equivalents of aggression and possessiveness are *ārambha* and *parigraha*. We quote below a passage from the *Thāṇaṃ* where *ārambha* and *parigraha* are denounced as the archenemy of the civilized man in his scientific and spiritual pursuits. The passage is reproduced below in English version (abridged).

“In the absense of the wise control over and abstinence from the two deadly sins of violence (*ārambha*) and possessiveness (*parigraha*), one cannot even have (i) the willingness to hear the discipline propounded by the omniscient, much less (ii) the attainment of right knowledge. In the presence of the two deadly sins one cannot (iii) practise renunciation, nor can one (iv) live a pure life of celibacy. In the presence of the two deadly sins one cannot (v) cultivate restraint (*saṁyama*) and (vi) inhibition (*saṁvara*). In the presence of the two deadly sins one cannot acquire (vii) pure empirical knowledge, or (viii) pure scriptural knowledge, or (ix) pure clairvoyance, or (x) pure power of thought-reading, or (xi) omniscience.

“In the absence of the two deadly sins one can achieve all the eleven excellences listed above.”¹

It is evident from the above-quoted passage that the urge for aggression and the urge for possessiveness are the two deadly enemies that are detrimental to the improvement of the behaviour of mankind and attainment of cultural and spiritual freedom.

1 *Thāṇaṃ*, II. 41-62.

A crucial issue that arises here is whether it is possible to eradicate the “aggressive urge” that has been bred into human beings over tens of thousands of years. The instinct theorists argue that the inherited dispositions are in our makeup and impossible of elimination. Some argue that human beings instinctively band together in groups to fight outsiders. They see in wars the fusion of the aggressive (*ārambha*) and the territorial urges (*parigraha*) describing them in what they call a “biological perspective.”

The Indian thinkers, however, unanimously hold that the absolute elimination of the passions of attachment and hatred, greed and anger, is not impossible. In fact, the spiritual disciplines propounded in Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism—the three principal religions of India—are in perfect agreement on this issue. And meditation, in some form or other, is considered by them as the only way to such elimination.

NATHMAL TATIA
MUNI MAHENDRA KUMAR

ABBREVIATIONS

- Āyā Āyāro* (Jain Vishva Bharati edition).
AK Abhidharmakośa, Bauddha Bharati Series, Varanasi.
BhĀ Bhagavatī-Ārādhana
JC Jhīnī Carcā (Jain Vishva Bharati edition).
Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism by Prof Satkari Mookerjee, M.A., Ph. D.
JK Jñātṛdharmakathā, (*Aṅga Suttāṇi*, Vol. III, JVB edition).
Karmaprakṛti by Śivaśarman (Malayagiri's annotation).
Mind Alive, The Marshal Cavendish Encyclopaedia, Hamlyn Publishing Group Ltd, 1970, Feltham, Middlesex England.
MuUp Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad
Mūl Mūlācāra's commentary by Vasunandi.
Nyāyadarśana—Edited by Taranath Nyāyatarkatīrtha, The Calcutta Sanskrit Series, No. XVIII, Metropolitan Printing and Publishing House, Ltd., Calcutta, 1936.
Nayas—Ways of Approach and Observation, Dr. N. M. Tatia.
Navapadārtha Cauṣaī by Ācārya Bhikṣu.
NBT Nyāyabinduṭīkā.
OVS Ovavāiyasutta (Suttāgame edition).
(The) Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus by Dr. Brajendra Nath Seal.
PS Pañcasamgraha, Vol I, Mehsana, 1971.
PMi Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā of Ācārya Hemacandra (Singhi Jain Series).
(The) Principal Upaniṣads by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan.
(The) Problem of Epistemology by James Willard Oliver.
Śāntiparva of Mahābhārata, Poona, 1932.
Studies in Jaina Philosophy by Dr. N.M. Tatia, Jain Cultural Research Society, Varanasi, 1951.
Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama with *Dhavalā* commentary, Amraoti, 1939.
SSi Sarvārthasiddhi of Pūjyapāda Devanandī, a commentary on *TSū*.
Suśruta-saṃhitā, Vol. I, Choukhambha edition.
Śrāvaka-Prajñapti, ṭīkā by Haribhadra.
Thānam—JVB Publication.
TSū Tattvārthādhigamasūtra with *Bhāṣya* and Siddhasenaganiś *Ṭīkā*, Seth Devchand Lalbhai Jain P. Fund Series. No. 57 and 76, Vol. I & II.
UtSū Uttarādhyayana-sūtra.
ViBh Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya (with Śiṣyahitā commentary), Yaśovijaya Jain Granthamālā, No. 35).
YD Yagadarśana of Patañjali, with Vyāsa-Bhāṣya and Tattvavaiśārādī, Bhartiya Vidya Prakashan, Varanasi.
YBh Vide YD.
Yuktidīpikā A commentary on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (Calcutta, 1938).

प्रथमः प्रकाशः
LUSTRE ONE

१. धर्माधर्माकाशपुद्गलजीवास्तिकाया द्रव्याणि ।

अस्तिकायः प्रदेशप्रचयः । धर्मादयः पञ्चास्तिकायाः सन्ति ।

1. *dharmādharmākāśa pudgala-jīvāstikā) ā dravyāṇi.*

astikāyaḥ pradeśapracayaḥ. dharmādayaḥ pañcāstikāyāḥ santi.

(Aph.) The *astikāyas* (homogeneous continuums), viz. *dharma* (medium of motion), *adharma* (medium of rest), *ākāśa* (space), *pudgala* (matter) and *jīva* (sentient beings) are the substances. (I)

(Gloss) An *astikāyā* is a homogeneous continuum of indivisible space-points (*pradeśas*). There are five *astikāyas*, viz. *dharma* etc.

२. कालश्च ।

जीवाजीवपर्यायत्वादौपचारिकं द्रव्यमसावित्यस्य पृथग्ग्रहणम् । क्षण-
वर्तित्वान्न चास्तिकायः ।

2. *kālaś ca.*

*jīvājīvaparyāyatvād aupacārikaṃ dravyam asāv ity asya pṛthag gra-
haṇam. kṣaṇavartitvān na cāstikāyaḥ.*

(Aph.) *Kāla* (time) also. (II)

(Gloss) The *kāla* (time) is a substance only metaphorically, being a mode of the (substances falling under the categories of) soul and non-soul, and as such it has been counted separately. Being only momentary in nature, it is not an *astikāya*, that is, a conglomeration of parts.

(Note) The expression *astikāya* is significant. The five *dravyas*, viz. *dharma* etc. are eternal entities, and this aspect of their un lapsing existence is indicated by the particle *asti*. All existents are possessed of three characteristics viz. *utpāda* (origination), *vyaya* (extinction) and *dhrauvya* (persistence). *Kāya* means an aggregate. As has been ingeniously suggested by Siddhasenagaṇiṇi, the commentator on Umāsvāti's *Bhāṣya* (V. 1), *kāya* typifies the first two characteristics. It thus transpires that though these substances are eternally existent, they are subject to change, and are not absolutely static entities like the *ātman* of the Sāṃkhya and *Brahman* of the Vedānta, nor are they momentary events as the Buddhist fluxist maintains. Because they are susceptible of change, that is origination and extinction, they can exercise

causal efficiency. Thus *dharma* becomes conducive to the movement of a particular individual or object when the latter is apt to move, and ceases to exercise this function when these objects come to a stop. The adjective *astikāya* thus comes to mean not only an entity possessed of an aggregate of parts or space-points as an inalienable characteristic, but also an entity susceptible of change and adaptation involved in it.

३. गुणपर्यायाश्रयो द्रव्यम् ।

गुणानां पर्यायाणां चाश्रय आधारो द्रव्यम् ।

3. *guṇaparyāyāśrayo dravyam.*

guṇānām paryāyāṇām cāśraya ādhāro dravyam.

(Aph.) What is the substratum of attributes (*guṇa*) and modes (*paryāya*) is substance. (III)

(Gloss) The substratum, *i.e.*, the receptacle of attributes and modes is the substance.

४. गतिसहायो धर्मः ।

गमनप्रवृत्तानां जीवपुद्गलानां गतावुदासीनभावेनाऽनन्यसहायकं द्रव्यं धर्मास्तिकायः । यथा मत्स्यानां जलम् ।

4. *gatisahāyo dharmah.*

gamanapravṛttānām jīvapudgalānām gatāv udāsīnabhāvenānanyasahāyakam dravyam dharmāstikāyaḥ. yathā matsyānām jalam.

(Aph.) *Dharma* is the auxiliary cause of motion. (IV)

(Gloss) The aggregate called *dharma* is the substance which renders direct assistance, without however exercising any activity, to movement of sentient beings and of matter when they have developed the tendency to move, as water is in regard to the movement of fish.

५. स्थितिसहायोऽधर्मः ।

स्थानगतानां जीवपुद्गलानां स्थितावुदासीनभावेनाऽनन्यसहायकं द्रव्यमधर्मास्तिकायः । यथा पथिकानां छाया ।

जीवपुद्गलानां गतिस्थित्यन्यथानुपपत्तेः, वाय्वादीनां सहायकत्वेऽनवस्थादिदोषप्रसंगाच्च धर्माधर्मयोः सत्त्वं प्रतिपत्तव्यम् । एतयोरभावादेवालोके जीवपुद्गलादीनामभावः ।

5. *sthitisahāyo' dharmah.*

sthānagatānām jīvapudgalānām sthitāv udāsīnabhāvenānanyasahāyakam dravyam adharmāstikāyaḥ. yathā—pathikānām chāyā.

jīvapudgalānām gatisthityanyathānupapattēḥ, vāyvādīnām sahāyakatve'navasthādidoṣaprasaṅgācca. dharmādharmayoḥ satṭvaṃ pratipattavyam. etayor abhāvād evāloke jīvapudgalādīnām abhāvaḥ.

(Aph.) *Adharma is the auxiliary cause of rest.* (V)

(Gloss) An aggregate called *adharma* is the substance which renders direct assistance, without however exercising any activity, to the repose of the sentient beings and matter, when they have developed the tendency to come to a halt, as the shadow (of a tree) is in regard to the halt of a traveller. The existence of *dharma* and *adharma* has to be admitted inasmuch as the movement and repose of both sentient beings and matter would otherwise become impossible of explanation; and also because the postulation of air and the like as the helping condition (of movement and rest) would make *regressus ad infinitum* inevitable. And it is because of the absence of these two substances in the supra-cosmic space that the existence of sentient beings and of matter is not possible there.

(Note) *Dharma* is the ultimate principle which makes movement possible though by itself it is unmoved. In other words it is the 'unmoved mover' of things. *Adharma* also is equally an unmoved entity.

६. अवगाहलक्षण आकाशः ।

अवगाहः—अवकाशः, आश्रयः । स एव लक्षणं यस्य स आकाशास्तिकायः । दिगप्याकाशविशेषो न तु द्रव्यान्तरम् ।

6. *avagāhalakṣaṇa ākāśaḥ.*

avagāhaḥ—avakāśaḥ āśrayaḥ. sa eva lakṣaṇaṁ yasya sa ākāśāstikāyaḥ. dig apy ākāśaviśeṣo na tu dravyāntaram.

(Aph.) *Ākāśa (space) is a substance, the distinguishing characteristic of which is the act of accommodation.* (VI)

(Gloss) Accommodation is (the act of affording) location or receptacle, and it is this alone which is the distinguishing characteristic of the aggregate called *ākāśa*. Directions (points of compass) are but specific determinations of space and do not constitute a different substance.

(Note) All the five substances, *dharma* etc., exist and have accommodation in cosmic space. Space (*ākāśa*) however is not contained in anything, but is self-subsistent. It has been conceived as containing six substances because it is the locus of all the five substances and also of itself. Space is locus of itself from the conceptual standpoint but of others in the literal sense of the term. *Dharma* and *adharma*, although they exist in the entire extent of cosmic space, are not independent of their locus. It is space which is the ultimate locus of everything.

७. लोकोऽलोकश्च ।

7. *loko'lokaś ca*

(Aph.) It is again (of two kinds viz.)—*loka* (cosmic) and *aloka* (supra-cosmic). (VII)

८. षड्रव्यात्मको लोकः ।

अपरिमितस्याकाशस्य षड्रव्यात्मको भागो लोक इत्यभिधीयते । सः च चतुर्दशरज्जुपरिमाणः^१ सुप्रतिष्ठकसंस्थानः^२ तिर्यग् ऊर्ध्वोऽधश्च । तत्र अष्टादशशतयोजनोच्छ्रितोऽसंख्यद्वीपसमुद्रायामस्तिर्यक् । किञ्चिन्न्यूनसप्त-
रज्जुप्रमाण ऊर्ध्वः । किञ्चिदधिकसप्तरज्जुप्रमितोऽधः ।

8. ṣaḍdravyātmako lokaḥ.

aparimitasyākāśasya ṣaḍdravyātmako bhāgo loka ity abhidhīyate. sa ca caturdaśarajjuparimāṇaḥ,¹ supratisthakasamsthānaḥ,² tiryag ūrdhvo'dhaś ca. tatra aṣṭādaśaśatayojanocchrito'samkhyadvīpa-samudrāyāmas tiryak. kiñcinnyūnasaptarajjupramāṇa ūrdhvaḥ. kiñcidadhikasaptarajjupramito'dhaḥ.

(Aph.) That (space) which comprises (and accommodates) the six substances is called *loka* (cosmic). (VIII).

(Gloss) Space is infinite and immeasurable in itself. That part of it which consists of (the aforementioned) six substances is called cosmic space. In height it is of fourteen *rajjus*.³ In shape it resembles a *supratisthaka*.⁴ It again consists of three parts—(1) horizontal (mid-region), (2) upper vertical and (3) lower vertical. Of them, the mid-region is, in elevation, eighteen hundred *yojanas* and in extension, equivalent to the dimension of innumerable continents and oceans. The upper vertical is a little less than seven *rajjus* in dimension (height) and the lower vertical is a little more than seven *rajjus* in dimension (depth).

९. जीवपुद्गलयोर्विविधसंयोगैः स विविधरूपः ।

इयं विविधरूपता एव सृष्टिरिति कथ्यते ।

१ असंख्ययोजनप्रमिता रज्जुः

1 asaṃkhyayojanapramitā rajjuḥ.

२ त्रिशरावसम्पुटाकारो यथा एकः शरावोऽधोमुखस्तदुपरि द्वितीय ऊर्ध्वमुख- स्तदुपरि पुनश्चैकोऽधोमुखः ।

2 trīśarāvasamputākāro yathā ekaḥ śarāvo'dhomukhas tadupari dvitīya ūrdhva-mukhas tadupari punaś caikodho'mukhaḥ.

3 A *rajju* is a conceptual measure consisting of innumerable *pramāṇa yojanas*, each *pramāṇa yojana* being almost equivalent to eight thousand miles.

4 A *supratisthaka* is a configuration obtained by conjunction of three conical bowls with the shape of chopped off pyramids in the following manner—one bowl placed convexwise (that is, upside down) at the bottom, the second bowl placed concavewise (that is, with the face upward) above it, and the third one placed convexwise (like the bowl at the bottom) upon the second. The resultant configuration arising from the abovesaid adjustment is styled *supratisthaka*.

9. *jīvapudgalayor vividhasamyogaiḥ sa vividharūpaḥ.*
 iyaṃ vividharūpataiva sṛṣṭir iti kathyate.

(Aph.) *Loka* is multiform on account of the multiformity of the relationship between the sentient beings and matter. (IX)

(Gloss) This multifoldness itself is called creation.

(Note) Here the word “creation” is used without its implication of “creation”.

१०. संयोगश्चापश्चानुपूर्विकः ।

10. *samyogaś cāpaścānupūrvikaḥ.*

(Aph.) This multiformity is devoid of priority and posteriority. (X)

११. कर्म-शरीरोपग्रह-रूपेण त्रिविधः ।

उपग्रहः—आहार-वाङ्-मन-उच्छ्वासनिःश्वासाः ।

11. *karma-śarīropagraha-rūpeṇa trividhaḥ.*

upagrahaḥ—āhāra-vāñ-mana-ucchvāsaniḥśvāsāḥ.

(Aph.) The relationship is three-fold, viz. (1) karma, action, (2) body, (3) the auxiliary powers. (XI)

(Gloss) *Upagraha* means auxiliary powers, viz. aliment, speech, mind and respiratory system.

१२. चतुर्धा तत्स्थितिः ।

यथा आकाशप्रतिष्ठितो वायुः, वायुप्रतिष्ठित उदधिः, उदधिप्रतिष्ठिता पृथिवी, पृथिवी प्रतिष्ठितास्त्रसस्थावरा जीवाः ।

12. *caturdhā tatsthitih.*

yathā ākāśapratisthito vāyuḥ, vāyupratisthita udadhiḥ, udadhipratisthitā pṛthivī, pṛthivīpratiṣṭhitās trasasthāvarā jīvāḥ.

(Aph.) In respect of structure, it (*loka*) consists of fourfold layers. (XII)

(Gloss) Thus space sustains gas, gas sustains water, water sustains earth, and earth sustains sentient beings, mobile and immobile.

१३. शेषद्रव्यशून्यमाकाशमलोकः ।

13. *śeṣadravyaśūnyam ākāśam alokaḥ.*

(Aph.) Owing to the absence of the *dharmāstikāya* and the rest, the pure empty space is called *aloka* (supra-cosmos). (XIII)

(Note) Space is infinite because we cannot conceive of any limit beyond which space does not exist. But it is divided in Jaina cosmology into two parts—cosmic and supra-cosmic. The cosmic space is one in which the sentient and the insentient can find accommodation. There can be no movement without *dharma* and no rest without *adharmā*. That part of space in which *dharma* and *adharmā* are spread out is called cosmic space. The remaining space is simply empty. It cannot be questioned why *dharma* and *adharmā* should not occur in supra-cosmic space. It is an ultimate fact which is to be accepted on the authority of scriptures which are again confirmed and attested by the experience of the omniscient saints.

१४. स्पर्शरसगन्धवर्णवान् पुद्गलः ।

पूरणगलनधर्मत्वात् पुद्गल इति ।

14. *sparsa-rasa-gandha-varṇavān pudgalaḥ.*

pūraṇagananadharmatvāt pudgala iti.

(Aph.) *Pudgala* (matter) is what is possessed of touch (*sparsa*), taste (*rasa*), odour (*gandha*) and colour (*varṇa*). (XIV)

(Gloss) *Pudgala* is so called because it has a property of synthetic composition and analytic decomposition. (This is the etymological meaning of the term).

(Note) Composition and decomposition are predicable only of matter. They cannot be affirmed of the other *dravyas* (substances).

All matter down to atoms is characterized by these fourfold qualities *viz.* touch, taste, odour and colour. Here lies the difference of the Jaina metaphysics from that of the Vaiśeṣika. The former does not believe in class distinctions of atoms like earth, air, fire and water. The atoms are homogeneous and give rise to different species of matter like earth, air, etc. on account of the manifestation and cessation of qualities. In this connection *varṇa* (colour) requires an elucidation. In the *Tattvārthasūtra* (V. 4), the *pudgalas* (material bodies down to atoms) are said to be possessed of *rūpa* and here *rūpa* means colour (*varṇa*) as well as form (*saṁsthāna*). (See *Bhāṣya* and commentary). Even if the structural formation be regarded as distinct from colour, they go together as a matter of necessity. The Buddhist also does not believe in the possibility of geometrical form independently of colour and vice versa (*na varṇavyatirekeṇa saṁsthānam upapadyate—Tattvasaṁgraha*). Thus the distinction of primary and secondary qualities, as has been done by Locke, is not endorsed as a tenable hypothesis by the Jaina metaphysician.

१५. शब्द-बन्ध-सौक्ष्म्य-स्थौल्य-संस्थान-मेद-तमश्छायातपोद्द्योतप्रभावांश्च ।

संहन्यमानानां भिद्यमानानां च पुद्गलानां ध्वनिरूपः परिणामः

शब्दः । प्रायोगिको वैस्रसिकश्च । प्रयत्नजन्यः प्रायोगिकः, भाषात्मको-
ऽभाषात्मको वा । स्वभावजन्यो वैस्रसिकः—मेघादिप्रभवः । अथवा जीवा-
जीवमिश्रभेदादयं त्रैधा । मूर्तोऽयं नहि अमूर्तस्याकाशस्य गुणो भवति,
श्रोत्रेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वात्, न च श्रोत्रेन्द्रियपमूर्तं गृह्णातीति ।

संश्लेषः—बन्धः । अयमपि प्रायोगिकः सादिः, वैस्रसिकस्तु सादिरना-
दिश्च ।

सौक्ष्म्यं द्विविधम्—अन्त्यमापेक्षिकञ्च । अन्त्यं परमाणोः, आपेक्षिकं
यथा—नालिकेरापेक्षया आम्रस्य ।

स्थौल्यमपि द्विविधम्—अन्त्यमशेषलोकव्यापिमहास्कन्धस्य, आपेक्षिकं
यथा—आम्रापेक्षया नालिकेरस्य ।

आकृतिः—संस्थानम् । तच्च चतुरस्त्रादिकमित्थंस्थम्, अनियताकारम-
नित्थंस्थम् ।

विश्लेषः—भेदः । स च पञ्चधा—(१) उत्तरः—मुद्गशमीभेदवत् ।
(२) चूर्ण—गोधूमचूर्णवत् । (३) खण्डः—लोहखण्डवत् । (४) प्रतरः—
अभ्रपटलभेदवत् । (५) अनुतटिकः—तटाकरेखावत् ।

कृष्णवर्णबहुलः पुद्गलपरिणामविशेषस्तमः ।

प्रतिबिम्बरूपः पुद्गलपरिणामश्छाया ।

सूर्यादीनामुष्णः प्रकाश आतपः ।

चन्द्रादीनामनुष्णः प्रकाश उद्योतः ।

मण्यादीनां रश्मिः प्रभा ।

सर्व एव एते पुद्गलधर्माः । अत एतद्बानपि पुद्गलः ।

15. śabda-bandha-saukṣmya-sthaulya-samsthāna-bheda-tamaśchāyātapod- dyotaprabhā-āms ca.

saṃhanyamānānām bhidyamānānām ca pudgalānām dhvanirūpaḥ
pariṇāmaḥ śabdaḥ, prāyogiko vaisrasikaś ca. prayatnajanyaḥ prā-
yogikaḥ bhāṣātmako'bhāṣātmako vā. svabhāvajanyo vaisrasikaḥ—
meghādiprabhavaḥ. athavā jīvājīvamiśrabhedād ayaṃ traidhā.
mūrto'yaṃ na hy amūrtasyākāśasya guṇo bhavati, śrotrendriyagrā-
hyatvāt, na ca śrotrendriyam amūrtam gṛhṇāīti.

saṃśleṣaḥ—bandhaḥ. ayaṃ api prāyogikaḥ sādiḥ, vaisrasikas tu
sādir anādiś ca.

saukṣmyaṃ dvidvidham—antyaṃ āpekṣikañca. antyaṃ paramāṇoḥ,
āpekṣikaṃ yathā—nālikerāpekṣayā āmrasya.

sthaulyam api dvividham — antyam aśeṣalokavyāpimahāskandhasya,
āpekṣikaṃ yathā—āmṛāpekṣayā nālikerasya.

ākṛtiḥ—saṃsthānam. tacca caturasrādikam itthamstham, aniyatā-
kāram anitthamstham.

viśeṣaḥ—bhedaḥ. sa ca pañcadhā —

1. utkaraḥ—mudgaśamībhedaḥ.
2. cūrṇaḥ—godhūmacūrṇaḥ.
3. khaṇḍaḥ—lohaḥkhaṇḍaḥ.
4. prataraḥ—abhra paṭalabhedaḥ.
5. anutaṭikā—taṭākarekhāḥ.

kṛṣṇavarṇabahuḥ pudgalapariṇāmaviśeṣaḥ tamāḥ.

pratibimbarūpaḥ pudgalapariṇāmaś chāyā.

sūryādīnām uṣṇaḥ prakāśa ātapaḥ.

candrādīnām anuṣṇaḥ prakāśa uddyotaḥ.

maṇyādīnām raśmīḥ prabhā.

sarva eva ete pudgaladharmāḥ. ata etadvān api pudgalaḥ.

(Aph.) It (*pudgalāstikāya*) is also possessed of the following attributes : sound, integration, subtlety, extensivity, configuration, disintegration, darkness, reflection, hot effulgence, cold effulgence and lustre. (XV)

(Gloss) Integration or disintegration of material bodies occasions an evolute called sound which is again of two kinds (in respect of genesis) : (1) produced by conscious exertion and (2) natural and spontaneous. Of these, the first is produced by effort, and is again of two kinds, viz, linguistic and extra-linguistic. The natural and spontaneous (*vaisrasika*) sound is produced by (unconscious) natural conditions such as the sound produced by clouds and the like. On a different basis of classification, it may again be considered as of three kinds, viz., (1) produced by a sentient being, (2) produced by an insentient object and (3) produced jointly by the two. Being possessed of a finite dimension, it cannot be a quality of *ākāśa* (space) which is devoid of dimension. It also follows from the consideration that it is cognizable by means of the auditory organ. Assuredly the auditory organ is incapable of apprehending anything which is devoid of dimension.

Bandha (integration) is combination. This also is of two kinds : (1) produced by conscious exertion, which has a definite beginning in time, and (2) natural, which may have a beginning or also be devoid of beginning.

Subtlety is of two kinds : (1) ultimate and (2) relative. Of these (1) the ultimate (subtlety) belongs to the atom, while (2) the relative (subtlety) is exemplified by the magnitude of a mango with respect to that of a coconut.

Extensity also is of two kinds. Of these, the ultimate (extensity) belongs to the great aggregate (*mahāskandha*) which pervades the whole cosmic space from end to end. The relative (extensity) is illustrated in the magnitude of a coconut with respect to that of a mango.

Configuration is shape and may be (1) definite, as illustrated in a four-sided geometrical figure and the like, and (2) indefinite, that is, possessed of an irregular shape.

Disintegration means disjunction. It is of five kinds (according as it is produced by) : (1) splitting as a pod of beans, 2) pounding as flour, (3) breaking into pieces as an iron-piece, (4) separation into layers as piercing through mica layers and (5) cleft as on the muddy bottom of a pond.

Darkness is a kind of transformation of material bodies, with the preponderance of black colour.

Reflection is a kind of transformation of material bodies, which is of the nature of an image of an object (e.g. in mirror).

Hot effulgence (*ātapa*) is the hot illumination of the sun and the like.

Cold effulgence (*uddyota*) is the cold illumination of the moon and the like.

Lustre is the ray emitted by gems and the like.

All these are the attributes of matter, and conversely matter is one that is possessed of these attributes.

१६. परमाणुः स्कन्धश्च ।

16. *parmāṇuḥ skandhaś ca.*

(Aph.) (*puḍgala* has two forms) : atom and aggregated compounds (bodies). (XVI)

१७. अविभाज्यः परमाणुः ।

उक्तञ्च – कारणमेव^१ तदन्त्यं, सूक्ष्मो नित्यश्च भवति परमाणुः ।

एकरसगन्धवर्णो, द्विवस्पर्शः कार्यलिङ्गश्च^२ ॥

१ तेषां पौद्गलिकवस्तूनामन्त्यं कारणमेव ।

२ कार्यमेव लिङ्गं यस्य स कार्यलिङ्गः ।

17. *avibhājyaḥ paramāṇuḥ*

uktaṁ ca—

kāraṇam eva¹ tad antyaṁ sūkṣmo nityaś ca bhavati paramāṇuḥ.
ekarasa-gandha-varṇo, dviśparśaḥ kāryaliṅgaś ca.²

(Aph.) An atom is (an) indivisible particle (of matter). (XVII).

(Gloss) It is said “The atom is the only ultimate cause³ of them (*viz.* material bodies) and is subtle and eternal. It has one kind of taste, one kind of smell, and one kind of colour, and two kinds of touch (tactile properties), inferred from its products (*viz.* the material bodies).⁴

(Note) The concept of the indivisibility of an atom is entirely in agreement with that of the Vaiśeṣika school. It is to be posited owing to the impossibility of matter being infinitely divisible. Division of matter ultimately stops at this limit. Were matter infinitely divisible, the number of units would be the same in all, bodies small and great. And hence the relative magnitude would not be susceptible of a rational explanation. According to this atomic theory, the difference in the number of atoms as constituent elements would make the difference in magnitude possible of an explanation. It is by its very nature not amenable to perception and so it is said that it is inferred from its products.

Taste has five varieties, *viz.*, (1) bitter (*tikta*), (2) acrid (*kaṭu*), (3) astringent (*kaṣāya*), (4) sour (*amla*) and (5) sweet (*madhura*). Saltish taste recognized by the Vaiśeṣika as a separate type is included under sweet (*madhura*) or regarded as a synthetic product (*saṁsargaja*).

Smell has two varieties, *viz.*, (1) agreeable, (2) disagreeable.

Colour is of five kinds, *viz.*, (1) black (*kṛṣṇa*), (2) blue (*nila*), (3) red (*lohita*), (4) yellow (*pīta*) and (5) white (*śukla*).

There are eight types of touch, *viz.*, (1) hard (*kaṭhina*), (2) soft (*mṛdu*), (3) heavy (*guru*), (4) light (*laghu*), (5) cool (*śīta*), (6) warm (*uṣṇa*), (7) viscous (*snigdha*) and (8) dry (*rūkṣa*). Among these, only four, *viz.*, viscous, dry, cool and hot touches are possible in the atom. Of these four, again, only two, mutually compatible, unfold themselves at a time (*vide* Siddhasenagaṇin's commentary on TS, V. 25).

१८. तदेकीभावः स्कन्धः ।

तेषां द्व्याद्यनन्तपरिमितानां परमाणूनामेकत्वेनावस्थानं स्कन्धः ।
यथा—द्वौ परमाणौ मिलितौ द्विप्रदेशी स्कन्धः, एवं त्रिप्रदेशी, दशप्रदेशी,
संख्येय-प्रदेशी, असंख्येयप्रदेशी, अनन्तप्रदेशी च ।

18. *tadekībhāvaḥ skandhaḥ*.

teṣāṁ dvyaḍyanantaparimitānāṁ paramāṇūnām ekatvenāvasthānaṁ
skandhaḥ. yathā—dvau paramāṇū militau dvipradeśī skandhaḥ,

1 teṣāṁ paudgalikavastūnām antyaṁ kāraṇam eva.

2 kāryam eva liṅgaṁ yasya sa kāryaliṅgaḥ.

3 Atoms are necessarily the ultimate constitutive cause of compounded material bodies.

4 A material body is the product of atoms and hence serves as the logical ground of the inference of atoms. It is a case of the inference of the cause from the effect.

evam tripradeśī, daśapradeśī, saṃkhyeyapradeśī, asaṃkhyeyapradeśī, anantapradeśī ca.

(Aph.) A *skandha* or an aggregated compound consists in the integration of these (viz. atoms). (XVIII)

(Gloss) An aggregated compound is the integrated conglomeration of these atoms of any number beginning from two upto infinity. For instance, the conglomeration of two atoms gives rise to a compound of two *pradeśas* (atomic points). In the same way, we can get the compounds of three or ten or countable or uncountable or infinite number of atoms.

१९. तद्भेदसंघाताभ्यामपि ।

स्कन्धस्य भेदतः संघाततोऽपि स्कन्धो भवति, यथा—भिद्यमाना शिला, संहन्यमानास्तन्तवश्च ।

अविभागिन्यस्तिकायेऽपि स्कन्धशब्दो व्यवह्रियते, यथा—धर्माधर्माकाश-जीवास्तिकायाः स्कन्धाः ।

19. *tadbhedasamghātābhyām api*

skandhasya bhedataḥ samghātato'pi skandho bhavati, yathā—bhidyamānā śilā, saṃhanyamānās tantavaś ca.

avibhāginy astikāye'pi skandhaśabdo vyavahriyate, yathā—dharma-mādharmākāśajivāstikāyāḥ skandhāḥ.

(Aph.) (An aggregate can be produced) also by the disintegration and redintegration of it (viz. another aggregate). (XIX)

(Gloss) A *skandha* (aggregate) can also be produced by the disintegration and the redintegration of another compound, for instance, a slab of stone broken (into pieces) and the yarns redintegrated (into a textile). The term *skandha* (aggregate) is applicable also to the indivisible *astikāyas* (homogeneous continuums). For instance, the *astikāyas*, viz. *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa* and *jīva* are called *skandhas* (of course metaphorically).

A lesser compound can be created by the disintegration of a bigger compound, and conversely a bigger compound may be made by the coalescence and redintegration of smaller compounds.

२०. स्निग्धरूक्षत्वादजघन्यगुणानाम्^१ ।

अजघन्यगुणानाम्—द्विगुणादिस्निग्धरूक्षाणां परमाणूनां तद्विषमैः समैर्वा द्विगुणादिस्निग्धरूक्षैः परमाणुभिः समं स्निग्धरूक्षत्वाद्धेतोरेकीभावो

१ अविभागी प्रतिच्छेदः, अविभाज्योऽंशः गुणः ।

भवति न त्वेकगुणानामेकगुणैरेकाधिकगुणैर्वा सममित्यर्थः ।

अयं हि विसदृशापेक्षया एकीभावः ।

20. *snigdharūkṣatvād ajaghanyaguṇānām*.¹

ajaghanyaguṇānām – dviguṇādisnigdharūkṣāṇām paramāṇūnām tad-
viṣamaiḥ samair vā dviguṇādisnigdharūkṣaiḥ paramāṇubhiḥ samam
snigdharūkṣatvāddhetor ekībhāvo bhavati na tu ekaguṇānām eka-
guṇair ekādhikaguṇair vā samam ity arthaḥ.
ayaṁ hi viśadṛśāpekṣayā ekībhāvaḥ.

(Aph.) (Only those atoms which are) possessed of more units² of viscosity (*snigdha*) or dryness (*rūkṣa*) than the minimum (can combine into aggregates) because of their viscosity and/or dryness. (XX)

(Gloss) Atoms 'possessed of more units than the minimum', that is, atoms possessed of the two or more units of viscosity and/or dryness can combine or conglomerate with the atoms possessed of the same number or different number of units of viscosity and/or dryness on account of their viscosity and dryness; but atoms of minimum (*i.e.* single unit of) intensity can never combine with any other atom irrespective of the fact whether the latter are of minimum or more than minimum intensity. This rule applies to the combination of dissimilar atoms (that is, combination of viscous and dry atoms).

(Note) Only such atoms which possess more units of viscosity or dryness than the minimum, *i.e.*, such atoms whose viscosity or dryness is greater than one unit can unite and combine (to form aggregates), while those with one unit of viscosity or dryness can never do so.

This aphorism as well as the next one specify the conditions which prevent the union of atoms into aggregates. First, this aphorism lays down that the union will never take place, if the participating atoms are possessed of a single unit of viscosity or dryness. This is universal condition of non-union irrespective of the fact whether the participating atoms are of dissimilar quality (*i.e.*, dry with viscid) or of the same kind. Then, the next aphorism lays down an additional condition concerning the union of atoms of the same kind (dry with dry, viscid with viscid).

२१. द्व्यधिकादिगुणत्वे सदृशानाम् ।

अजघन्यगुणानां सदृशानां स्निग्धैः सह स्निग्धानां रूक्षैः सह रूक्षाणां च परमाणूनामेकत्र द्विगुणस्निग्धत्वम्, अन्यत्र चतुर्गुणस्निग्धत्वमितिरूपे द्व्यधिकादिगुणत्वे सति एकीभावो भवति, न तु समानगुणानामेकाधिकगुणानाञ्च । उक्तञ्च—

निद्वस्स निद्वेण दुआहियेण, लुक्खस्स लुक्खेण दुआहियेण ।

निद्वस्स लुक्खेण उवेइ बंधो, जहन्नवज्जो विसमो समो वा ॥

[पन्नवणा, पद १३]

1 avibhāgi praticchedaḥ, avibhājyo' mso guṇaḥ.

The unit (*jaghanya guṇa*) of any quality such as viscosity or dryness is the measure of its intensity which is further indivisible.

21. *dvyadhikādiguṇatve sadṛśānām.*

ajaghanyaguṇānām sadṛśānām – snigdhaiḥ saha snigdhanām rūk-
ṣaiḥ saha rūkṣānām ca paramāṇūnām ekaṭra dviguṇasniḥgḥatvam,
anyatra caturguṇasniḥgḥatvam itirūpe dvyadhikādiguṇatve sati
ekībhāvo bhavati, na tu samānaguṇānām ekādhikaguṇānāñ ca.
uktañ ca –

niddhassa niddheṇa duāhiyeṇa, lukkhassa lukkheṇa duāhiyeṇa/
niddhassa lukkheṇa uvei bandho, jahannavajjo visamo samo vā//

(*Pannavaṇṇā, pada 13*)

(Aph.) Conglomeration (between atoms) of the same kind is possible only if the difference in their intensities is two or more units. (XXI)

(Gloss) (This aphorism deals exclusively with the union of atoms of the same kind and specifies an additional condition of their union).

Atoms of the same kind possessed of more units (of viscosity or dryness) than the minimum can unite together to form aggregates provided the difference between the intensities (dryness or viscosity) of participating atoms is two or more than two units. In other words, if there are atoms whose intensity is two units (of dryness or viscosity) on one side and those with four (or more) on the other side, the union may take place, but if the atoms on both the sides have the same intensity or the difference is only one unit, then the union is not possible.

It has been said—

“A viscid atom can conglomerate with another viscid atom, if they differ in intensity by (at least) two units (of viscosity). (Similarly) a dry atom can conglomerate with another dry atom, if they differ in intensity by (at least) two units (of dryness). There can however be no integration, both in the case of atoms of the same kind or of the opposing kind, if the participating atoms are possessed of the minimum unit of intensity.”—*Pannavaṇṇā*, XIII.

The following chart makes clear the union or non-union of atoms :

Units of intensity	Same kind	Opposing kind
1. 1+1	No	No
2. 1+2	No	No
3. 1+3	No	No
4. 1+n	No	No
5. 2+2	No	Yes
6. 2+3	No	Yes
7. 2+4	Yes	Yes
8. 2+m	Yes	Yes

Notation : $n > 3$, $m > 4$

२२. कालः समयादिः ।

निमेषस्यासंख्येयतमो भागः समयः, कमलपत्रभेदाद्युदाहरणलक्ष्यः ।
आदिशब्दात् आवलिकादयश्च ।

उक्तञ्च—

समयावलिमुहुत्ता, दिवसमहोरत्तपक्वमासा य ।

संवच्छरजुगपलिया, सागर ओसपि परियट्टा ॥

[अनुयोगद्वार, 365, gāthā 103].

22. *kālah samayādiḥ*

nimeṣayāsaṁkhyeyatamo bhāgaḥ samayaḥ, kamalapatrabhedā-
dyudāharaṇalakṣyaḥ. ādiśabdād āvalikādayaś ca.

uktañ ca—

samayāvaliyamuhuttā, divasamahorattapakḥamāsā ya/

saṁvaccharajugapaliyā, sāgara osappi pariyattā//

(Anuyogadvāra, 365, verse 103)

(Aph.) An instant¹ and the like are called time. (XXII)

(Gloss) an instant is the innumerablth fraction of a twinkling (*nimeṣa*) of the eye. It (in its minuteness) is to be inferred from such instances as the perforation of the petals of a lotus.² It has been said :

A *samaya* (instant), *āvalikā*, *muhūrta*, *divasa* (day), *ahorātra* (day and night), *pakṣa* (a fortnight), *māsa* (a month), *saṁvatsara* (a year), *yuga* (a cycle of twelve years), *palya*, *sāgara*, *avasarpinī*, and *pudgala-parāvartana* are the traditional divisions of time. (*Anuyogadvāra*, 365, verse 103).

(Note) The real time-unit is different from the specious time-unit. It is, therefore, a matter of inference. though a span of time is perceptible.

Time is infinite by itself and consists of innumerable parts which are indivisible instants (*samaya*). Just as an extended body admits of division and the minimal part which repels division is called an atom, so also the atomic indivisible part of time is to be admitted for parity of reasoning.

Time as a philosophical concept and an ontological reality has been a centre of interminable controversy. This is one and at the same time many, and the combination of unity and plurality has been a puzzle to many a philosopher. Now time is a substance according to Jaina ontology. It must, therefore, be amenable to

1 The term *samaya* is translated here as instant. *Samaya*, being the smallest indivisible quantum of time, can perhaps be appropriately called time-point. Although immeasurably small and numerically inexpressible, it is a finite unit.

2 The minimum unit of time called *samaya* (instant) is inferable from the perforation of a large number of petals of lotus placed one above another in a single stock by one stroke of a needle. It appears that all the petals are perforated at one time, but this is by its nature impossible. The successive perforation of the plurality of petals implies successive instants.

the criterion of reality, viz. origination (*utpāda*), cessation (*vyaya*) and persistence (*dhrauvya*). Regarded as a continuum (*santati*), it admits of parts, but is not regarded as an *astikāya* because of the impossibility of coexistence of these parts. Now the minutest part of time as the mathematical instant exists as the present. The past and future are conceptual aggregates of an infinite number of instants intercepted by the present instant. Time viewed as one instant is numerically different from the other instants. But viewed as a continuum, it is one consisting of an infinite number of discrete instants. As each instant is called time, the totality of instants may be viewed as one entity.

२३. वर्तना-परिणाम-क्रिया-परत्वापरत्वादिभिर्लक्ष्यः ।

वर्तमानत्वम्—वर्तना । पदार्थानां नानापरायेषु परिणतिः—परिणामः ।
क्रिया—चक्रमणादिः । प्राग्भावित्वम्—परत्वम् । पश्चाद्भावित्वम्—
अपरत्वम् ।

23. *vartanā-pariṇāma-kriyā-paratvāparatvādibhir lakṣyaḥ.*

vartamānatvam—vartanā. padārthānām nānaparyāyeṣu pariṇatiḥ—
pariṇāmaḥ. kriyā—camkramaṇādiḥ. prāgbhavitām—paratvam.
paścādbhāvitvam—aparatvam.

(Aph.) It (viz. time) is to be inferred from duration, change, action, priority and posteriority. (XXIII)

(Gloss) Duration means existence. Change means transformation of things into various modes. Action means movement, and the like. Priority means antecedence. Posteriority means succession.

२४. आद्यत्रिणि एकद्रव्याणि अगतिकानि ।

आकाशपर्यन्तानि त्रीणि एकद्रव्याणि—एकव्यक्तिकानि, अगतिकानि—
गतिक्रियाशून्यानि ।

24. *ādyatrīṇi ekadravyāṇi agatikāni.*

ākāśaparyantāni trīṇi ekadravyāṇi—ekavyaktikāni, agatikāni—
gatiakriyāśūnyāni.

(Aph.) Each of the first three substances is a single entity and devoid of motion. (XXIV)

(Gloss) The three, i.e., upto *ākāśa* are (each) single entity, forming a homogeneous continuum, that is, each is a numerical identity. “Devoid of motion” means “devoid of the act of movement.”

(Note) The entire space continuum is a single entity. It means that the connotation of it does not subsist in any other individual numerically different from it. So with regard to the rest, viz. *dharma* and *adharmā*. *Dharma* is one substance because there is no other substance which possesses the attribute connoted by the former, and similarly the *adharmā*.

२५. असंख्येयाः प्रदेशा धर्माधर्मलोकाकाशैकजीवानाम् ।

25. *asamkhyeyāḥ pradeśā dharmādharmalokākāśaīkajīvānām.*

(Aph.) There are innumerable *pradeśas* (indivisible points) in *dharmā, adharma, cosmic ākāśa, and each jīva* (soul). (XXV)

२६. अलोकस्यानन्ताः ।

26. *alokasyānantāḥ*

(Aph.) The supra-cosmic space has infinite *pradeśas*. (XXVI)

२७. संख्येयाऽसंख्येयाश्च पुद्गलानाम् ।

चकारादनन्ता अपि ।

27. *saṃkhyeyā'samkhyeyāś ca pudgalānām.*
cakārād anantā api.

(Aph.) Material bodies have also countable (numerically expressible) and innumerable (number of) indivisible *pradeśas*. (XXVII)

(Gloss) The term 'also' (in the aphorism) implies (that) the material bodies can have infinite number (of indivisible points) as well.

२८. न परमाणोः ।

परमाणोरेकत्वेन निरंशत्वेन च न प्रदेशः ।

28. *na paramāṇoḥ.*

paramāṇor ekatvena niramśatvena ca na pradeśaḥ.

(Aph.) An atom has no *pradeśa* (XXVIII)

(Gloss) An atom has no indivisible point, because it is itself unitary and indivisible.

२९. कालोऽप्रदेशी ।

29. *kālo'pradeśī*

(Aph.) *Kāla* (time) has no *pradeśa*. (XXIX)

३०. बुद्धिकल्पितो वस्त्वंशो देशः ।

वस्तुनोऽपृथग्भूतो बुद्धिकल्पितोऽंशो देश उच्यते ।

30. *buddhikalpito vastvaṃśo deśaḥ.*

vastuno'pṛthagbhūto buddhikalpitom'śo deśa ucyate.

(Aph.) A fragment of an entity, constructed by the imagination, is called *deśa* (fraction). (XXX)

(Gloss) The fragment of an entity which is incapable of being actually sundered (and hence an inalienable element of it) is only an intellectual construction. This is called fraction (*deśa*).

३१. निरंशः प्रदेशः ।

निरंशो देशः प्रदेशः कथ्यते । सोऽपि बुद्धिकल्पित एव । परमाणु-परिमितो वस्तुभाग इत्यर्थः । अविभागी परिच्छेदोऽप्यस्य पर्यायः । पृथग्वस्तुत्वेन परमाणुस्ततो भिन्नः ।

31. *niraṁśaḥ pradeśaḥ.*

niraṁśo deśaḥ pradeśaḥ kathyate. so'pi buddhikalpita eva. paramāṇu-parimito vastubhāga ityarthāḥ. avibhāgī paricchedo'pyasya paryāyaḥ. prthag vastutvena paramāṇus tato bhinnaḥ.

(Aph.) *A pradeśa is the indivisible unit (of a substance). (XXXI)*

(Gloss) The smallest *deśa* (fragment) which is further indivisible is called *pradeśa* (point). Like *deśa*, *pradeśa* is also an intelligent imagination. In other words, (it is) an undetached part of a thing whose dimension is identical to that of an atom. The term *avibhāgī pariccheda* (indivisible fragment) is a synonym of it. An atom, however, being a separate entity, is different from it (viz. *pradeśa*).

(Note) An atom (*paramāṇu*) and a point (*pradeśa*) should not be confounded. The former is an objective entity, whereas the latter is only an ideal construct.

३२. कृत्स्नलोकेऽवगाहो धर्माधर्मयोः ।

धर्माधर्मास्तिकायौ सम्पूर्णं लोकं व्याप्य तिष्ठतः ।

32. *kṛtsnaloke'vagāho dharmādharmaayoḥ.*

dharmādharmaāstikāyau sampūrṇaṁ lokaṁ vyāpya tiṣṭhataḥ.

(Aph.) *The dharma and adharma pervade the entire cosmic space. (XXXII)*

(Gloss) The continuum called *dharma* and *adharma* each exists all over the cosmic space.

(Note) As has been said before, *dharma* is a minimum necessary condition of motion and *adharma* of rest. Both motion and rest are interrelated. Had everything been in perpetual motion, the postulation of *adharma* would have been superfluous. So also in regard to rest. As things are seen to move and also cease to move, both these substances are necessarily postulated in order to account for alternate motion and rest. As there is no point of cosmic space which is free from movement or rest of bodies, both the substances are coextensive with cosmic space. As for extra-cosmic space, it is a pure vacuum where nothing exists and so nothing moves and ceases to move therein. *Dharma* and *adharma*, in Jaina ontology, are untranslatable terms. To some extent *dharma* is comparable to Newtonian concept of ether.

३३. एकप्रदेशादिषु विकल्प्यः पुद्गलानाम् ।

लोकस्यैकप्रदेशादिषु पुद्गलानामवगाहो विकल्पनीयः ।

33. *ekapradeśādiṣu vikalpyaḥ pudgalānām.*

lokasyaikapradeśādiṣu pudgalānām avagāho vikalpanīyaḥ.

(Aph.) The spatial extension of *pudgalas* varies from a single to innumerable space-points. (XXXIII)

(Gloss) The accommodation of material bodies is possible in any number of space-points of the cosmic space, the minimum extent being one space-point.

३४. असंख्येयभागादिषु जीवानाम् ।

जीवः खलु स्वभावात् लोकस्य अल्पादल्पं असंख्येयप्रदेशात्मक-
मसंख्येयतमं भागमवरुध्य तिष्ठति, न पुद्गलवत् एकप्रदेशादिकम्, इति
असंख्येयभागादिषु जीवानामवगाहः ।

असंख्येयप्रदेशात्मके च लोके परिणतिवैचित्र्यात् प्रदीपप्रभा-
पटलवदनन्तानामपि जीवपुद्गलानां समावेशो न दुर्घटः ।

34. *asamkhyeyabhāgādiṣu jīvānām.*

jīvaḥ khalu svabhāvāt lokasya alpād alpaṁ asamkhyeyapradeśātma-
kam asamkhyeyatamaṁ bhāgam avarudhya tiṣṭhati, na pudgalavad
ekapradeśādikam, iti asamkhyeyabhāgādiṣu jīvānām avagāhaḥ.

asamkhyeyapradeśātmake ca loke pariṇatīvaicitryāt pradīpaprabhā-
paṭalavad anantānām api jīvapudgalānāṁ samāveśo na durgḥaṭaḥ.

(Aph.) The spatial extension of the *jīvas* varies from minimum to the entire cosmic space. The minimum extension would consist of innumerable space-points, although it is an *asamkhyeyath* fraction of the cosmic space. (XXXIV)

(Gloss) The *jīva* indeed, by nature, exists by occupying, at the minimum, an immeasurably small portion of the cosmic space, consisting of an innumerable number of space-points corresponding to innumerable *pradeśas* constituting it. It cannot, like a material body, exist in one space-point and the like. The extension of the *jīvas* thus is possible in any portion of space, the minimum measure of which covers a number of innumerable points (of the cosmic space). It is on account of the peculiar nature of transformation of *jīva* and *pudgala* that the accommodation of even an infinite number of souls and *pudgalas*, like the multitude of lamp-lights, is not impossible in the cosmic space which has only an innumerable number of space-points.

३५. कालः समयक्षेत्रवर्ती ।^१

१ व्यावहारिककालो हि सूर्याचन्द्रमसोर्गतिसम्बन्धी । सूर्यचन्द्राश्च मेरुं प्रदक्षिणीकृत्य समयक्षेत्रमेवं नित्यं भ्रमन्ति । ततोऽग्रे च सन्तोऽपि अवस्थिता, तस्मात् समयक्षेत्रवर्ती कालः ।

जम्बूद्वीपे द्वौ द्वौ सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ । लवणसमुद्रे चत्वारः । घातकीखण्डे द्वादश । कालोदधौ द्वाचत्वारिंशत् । अर्धपुष्करद्वीपे द्विसप्ततिः । सर्वे मिलिता द्वात्रिंशदुत्तरशतं सूर्याचन्द्राश्च । घातकीखण्डात् सूर्याचन्द्राश्च त्रिगुणिताः पूर्ववर्तिभिश्च योजिता अग्निमस्य संख्यां सूचयन्ति । एषा पद्धतिः स्वयं-भूतमणान्तं प्रयोज्या ।

जम्बूघातकीखण्डार्धपुष्कराः समयक्षेत्रमसंख्यद्वीपसमुद्रेषु ।

सर्वाभ्यन्तरो मेरुनाभिर्वृत्तो योजनलक्षविष्कम्भो जम्बूद्वीपः ।

तत्र भरतह्रिमवतहरिविदेहरम्यकहैरप्यवर्त रावतवर्षाः सप्तक्षेत्राणि ।

तद्विभाजिनश्च पूर्वापरायता हिमवन्महाहिमवन्निषधनीलरुक्मिशिखरिणः षड्वर्षं धरपर्वताः ।

घातकीखण्डे वर्षादयो द्विगुणाः ।

तावन्तः पुष्करार्धे ।

भरतैरावतविदेहाः कर्मभूमयः ।

शेषा देवोत्तरकुरवश्चाकर्मभूमयः ।

The relative time relates to the motion of the sun and the moon. The suns and the moons always revolve round the Mt. Meru in the *samayakṣetra*. Beyond that, though existent, they are stationary. And, therefore, time exists only in the *samayakṣetra*.

There are two suns and two moons in the Jambūdīpa. There are four suns (and four moons) in the Lavaṇasamudra. In the Dhātākikhaṇḍa there are twelve suns (and twelve moons). In the Kālodadhi, the number of the suns is fortytwo (and that of the moons is also fortytwo). In the Ardha-puṣkara island there are seventytwo suns (and seventytwo moons). In all, there are thus one hundred thirtytwo suns and the same number of moons. In the region that lies beyond the Dhātākikhaṇḍa, the number (of suns and moons) is equal to three times the suns and the moons of the Dhātākikhaṇḍa plus their number in the preceding regions. This process is to be followed upto the region called Svayambhūramāṇa.

Among the innumerable continents and oceans, Jambū, Dhātākikhaṇḍa and the half of the Puṣkara constitute the *samayakṣetra* (time-region).

Jambūdīpa is the innermost (of the continents) and has the Meru at its centre. It is circular in shape and has a diameter of one lac *yojanas*.

Therein exist the seven regions, viz. Bharata, Haimavata, Hari, Videha, Ramyaka, Hairaṇyavata and Airāvata.

There are six *varṣadhara*s (upholding the *varṣas* or the seven regions)—mountains running lengthwise from east to west and demarcating them (viz., the seven regions). They are styled Himavat, Mahāhimavat, Niṣadha, Nīla, Rukmi and Śikharin.

In (the second continent, viz.) Dhātākikhaṇḍa, the *varṣas* etc. are twice (than those of Jambūdīpa).

In Puṣkarārdha (half Puṣkara) there is the same number (of regions and mountains as in the Dhātākikhaṇḍa).

Bharata, Airāvata and Videha are the *karmabhūmis*, (that is, the regions where life is sustained by agriculture, trade and socio-economic security organization).

The rest including Devakuru and Uttarakuru are *akarmabhūmis*,

समयक्षेत्रं—मनुष्यलोकः । तत्रैव सूर्यचन्द्रप्रवर्तितो व्यावहारिकः
कालो विद्यते । नैश्चयिकस्तु प्रतिद्रव्यं वर्तते, तेन तस्य सर्वव्यापित्वम् ।

35. *kālah samaya-kṣetravartī.*

samaya-kṣetraṁ—manuṣyalokaḥ. tatraiva sūryacandrapravartito
vyāvahārikaḥ kālo vidyate, naiścayikas tu pratidravyaṁ vartate, tena
tasya sarvavyāpitvam.

(Aph.) Time exists (only) in the *samaya-kṣetra* (region of time).
(XXXV)

(Gloss) The region of time stands for the world inhabited by human beings. It is only there that the relative time caused by (the movement of) the sun and the moon exists. The absolute time, however, exists in each and every substance, and as such it is all-pervading.

३६. सहभावी घर्मो गुणः ।

“एगदव्वस्सिमा गुणा” इत्यागमवचनाद् गुणो गुणिनमाश्रित्यैव
अवतिष्ठते, इति स द्रव्यसहभाव्येव ।

36. *sahabhāvī dharmo guṇaḥ.*

“egadavvassiā guṇā” ityāgamavacanād guṇo guṇinam āśrityaiva
avatiṣṭhate; iti sa dravyasahabhāvy eva.

(Aph) The concomitant characteristic is called *guṇa* (quality).
(XXXVI)

(Gloss) From the statement in the scriptures ‘Qualities rest on the substance’, it follows that a quality can subsist only by depending upon its locus (*guṇin*) and, therefore, it is concomitant with the substance.

३७. सामान्यो विशेषश्च ।

द्रव्येषु समानतया परिणतः सामान्यः ।
व्यक्तिभेदेन परिणतो विशेषः ।

37. *sāmānyo viśeṣaś ca.*

dravyeṣu samānatayā pariṇataḥ sāmānyaḥ. vyaktibhedena
pariṇato viśeṣaḥ.

(Aph.) It (viz. quality) is (of two kinds viz.) generic and specific. (XXXVII)

(Gloss) That which evolves itself as a singular characteristic in a number of substances is (a) generic (quality). What is evolved as a different attribute in each different individual is called (b) specific (quality).

३८. अस्तित्व-वस्तुत्व-द्रव्यत्व-प्रमेयत्व-प्रदेशवत्त्व-अगुरुलघुत्वादिः सामान्यः ।

विद्यमानता—अस्तित्वम् । अर्थक्रियाकारित्वम्—वस्तुत्वम् । गुण-पर्यायाधारत्वम्—द्रव्यत्वम् । प्रमाणविषयता—प्रमेयत्वम् । अवयव-परिमाणता—प्रदेशवत्त्वम् । स्वस्वरूपाविचलनत्वम्—अगुरुलघुत्वम् । यतो द्रव्यस्य द्रव्यत्वं गुणस्य गुणत्वं न विचलति स न गुरुरूपो न लघुरूपोऽगुरुलघुः ।

38. *astitva-vastutva-dravyatva-prameyatva-pradeśavatva-agurulaghutvādīḥ sāmānyāḥ.*

vidyamānatā—astitvam.

arthakriyākāritvam—vastutvam.

guṇaparyāyādhāratvam—dravyatvam.

pramāṇaviśayatā—prameyatvam.

avayavaparimānatā—pradeśavattvam.

svasvarūpāvicalanatvam—agurulaghutvam.

yato dravyasya dravyatvaṁ guṇasya guṇatvaṁ na vicalati sa na gururūpo na laghurūpo'gurulaghuḥ.

(Aph.) Being, entityhood, substancehood, objectivity, possession of space-points, neither-heavy-nor-light (*agurulaghutvam*), and the like are (general qualities). (XXXVIII)

(Gloss) Of these, 'being' means continuous duration (by reason of which an entity maintains its existence and never meets extinction). 'Entityhood' means causal efficiency. 'Substancehood' means the characteristic of being a substratum of qualities and modes. 'Objectivity' means the possibility of becoming an object of knowledge. 'Possession of space-points' means a quality which makes measurement of parts feasible. 'Neither-heavy-nor-light' means steadfastness in its own nature.

(Note) *Agurulaghutvam* literally means 'being neither heavy nor light'. It is precisely the quality which prevents a substance from surrendering its substancehood and a quality from abandoning its qualityhood. This quality is not capable of being characterized in terms of specific gravity. It ensures the uniformity and continuity of an entity in respect of its distinctive character as substance or quality.

३९. गतिस्थित्यवगाहवर्तनाहेतुत्व-स्पर्शरसगन्धवर्ण-ज्ञानवर्शनमुखवीर्य-चेतनत्वाऽ-चेतनत्व-मूर्तत्वाऽमूर्तत्वादिविशेषः ।

गत्यादिषु चतुर्षु हेतुत्वशब्दो योजनीयः ।

एतेषु च प्रत्येकं जीवपुद्गलयोः षड्गुणाः, अन्येषां च त्रयो गुणाः ।

स्पर्शः—कर्कश-मृदु-गुरु-लघु-शीतो-ष्ण-स्निग्ध-रूक्ष-भेदादष्टधा ।

रसः—तिक्त-कटु-कषाया-म्ल-मधुर-भेदात् पंचविधः ।

गन्धो द्विविधः—सुगन्धो दुर्गन्धश्च ।

वर्णः—कृष्ण-नील-रक्त-पीत-शुक्ल-भेदात् पंचधा ।

39. *gatisthityavagāhavartanāhetutva-sparśarasagandhavarna-jñānadārśana-sukhavīrya-cetanatvā'cetanatva-mūrttatvā'mūrttatvādir viśeṣaḥ.*

gatyādiṣu caturṣu hetutvaśabdo yojanīyaḥ.

eteṣu ca pratyekaṁ jīvapudgalayoḥ ṣaḍguṇāḥ, anyeṣāṁ ca trayo guṇāḥ.

sparśaḥ—karkaṣa-mṛdu-guru-laghu-śīto-ṣṇa-snigdha-rūkṣa-bhedād aṣṭadhā.

rasaḥ—tikta-kaṭu-kaṣāyā-mṛla-madhura-bhedāt pañcavidhaḥ.

gandho dvidividhaḥ—sugandho durgandhaś ca.

varṇaḥ—kṛṣṇa-nīla-rakta-pīta-śukla-bhedāt pañcadhā.

(Aph.) The characteristic of being the cause of motion, rest, accommodation and duration, as also touch, taste, smell and colour, knowledge, intuition, joy and energy, consciousness, unconsciousness, corporeality and incorporeality, and the like belong to (the category of) specific qualities. (XXXIX)

(Gloss) The expression 'the characteristic of being the cause of' should be construed with the four beginning with 'motion'. Of these, six attributes belong to each of (the substances known as) soul and matter, and three attributes belong to the other (four substances). Among these, touch is eightfold viz. hard, soft, heavy, light, cold, hot, viscous and dry; taste is fivefold viz. pungent (for instance, dehydrated ginger), bitter (e.g. quinine), astringent, (e.g. myrobalan), acid (e.g. tamarind) and sweet (e.g. sugar); smell is twofold viz. good and bad; colour is fivefold viz. black, blue, red, yellow, and white. [Dharma is the condition of motion; adharma of rest; ākāśa (space) of accommodation; kāla of endurance; touch, taste, smell and colour of pudgala (matter); knowledge, intuition, joy, energy and consciousness of jīva; unconsciousness is the specific attribute of the five substances except soul, corporeality of matter, and incorporeality of the remaining substances].

४०. पूर्वोत्तराकारपरित्यागादानं पर्यायः ।

“लक्षणं पञ्जवाणं तु, उभयो अस्मिया भवे” इत्यागमवचनात् द्रव्यगुणयोर्यः पूर्वाकारस्य परित्यागः, अपराकारस्य च आदानं स पर्यायः ।

जीवस्य नरत्वामरत्वादिभिः पुद्गलस्य स्कन्धत्वादिभिः, धर्मास्ति-कायादीनाञ्च संयोगविभागादिभिर्द्रव्यस्य पर्याया बोध्याः ।

ज्ञानदर्शनादीनां परिवर्तनादेर्वर्णदीनां च नवपुराणतादेर्गुणस्य
पर्याया ज्ञेयाः ।

पूर्वोत्तराकाराणामानन्त्यात् पर्याया अपि अनन्ता एव ।

40. *pūrvottarākāraparityāgādānam paryāyah.*

‘lakkhaṇam pajjavāṇam tu, ubhao assiyā bhavē’ ity āgamavacanād
dravyaguṇayor yaḥ pūrvākārasya parityāgaḥ, aparākārasya ca ādā-
nam sa paryāyah.

jīvasya naratvāmaratvādibhiḥ, pudgalasya skandhatvādibhiḥ, dhar-
māstikāyādīnāṃ ca saṃyogavibhāgādibhir dravyasya paryāyāḥ
bodhyāḥ.

jñānadarśanādīnāṃ parivartanāder varṇādīnāṃ ca navapurāṇatāder
guṇasya paryāyā jñeyāḥ.

pūrvottarākārāṇām ānantiyāt paryāyā api anantā eva.

(Aph.) Mode means forfeiture of the precedent and appropriation of
the succeeding state. (XL)

(Gloss) From the scriptural proposition ‘the defining characteris-
tic of modes is this that they subsist in both’, it follows that the forfei-
ture of the precedent state and appropriation of the succeeding state by
both substance and quality is mode. The transition of the soul from a
human to a divine life and so on (are the modes of the soul-substance);
the changes of matter are into aggregates and the like; the changes
entailed in the *dharmāstikāya* etc. by the conjunction and disjunction
(with soul and matter) are illustrations of the (transitional) modes of
substances of *dhārma* and *adharma*. The modes of qualities are illus-
trated by the modification and the like of consciousness and intuition
as well as newness and oldness of colour and the like. The modes are
infinite on account of the infiniteness of the preceding and the succee-
ding forms.

४१. व्यञ्जनार्थभेदेन स्वभाव-विभावभेदेन चास्य द्वैविध्यम् ।

41. *vyāñjanārthabhedena svabhāva-vibhāvabhedena cāsyā dvaividhyam.*

(Aph.) The modes again are twofold as explicit (*vyāñjana*) and
implicit (*artha*), or as intrinsic and extrinsic. (XLI)

४२. स्थूलः कालान्तरस्थायी शब्दानां संकेतविषयो व्यञ्जनपर्यायः ।

42. *sthūlaḥ kālāntarasthāyī śabdānāṃ saṃketaviṣayo vyāñjanaparyāyah.*

(Aph.) The explicit mode is gross, lasting for some time and
amenable to verbal expression. (XLII)

४३. सूक्ष्मो वर्तमानवर्त्यर्थपरिणामः अर्थपर्यायः ।

43. *sūkṣmo vartamānavarty arthapariṇāmaḥ arthaparyāyaḥ.*

(Aph.) The subtle and instantaneous modification of the object is the implicit (*artha*) mode. (XLIII)

४४. परनिमित्तानपेक्षः स्वभावपर्यायः ।

44. *paranimittānapekṣaḥ svabhāvaparyāyaḥ.*

(Aph.) What occurs independently of anything else is called an intrinsic mode. (XLIV)

४५. परनिमित्तापेक्षो विभावपर्यायः ।

45. *paranimittāpekṣo vibhāvaparyāyaḥ.*

(Aph.) What depends for its occurrence on conditions which are external is called an extrinsic mode. (XLV)

४६. एकत्व-पृथक्त्व-संख्या-संस्थान-संयोग-विभागास्तल्लक्षणम् ।

एतैः पर्याया लक्ष्यन्ते ।

एकत्वम्—भिन्नेष्वपि परमाण्वादिषु यदेकोऽयं घटादिरिति प्रतीतिः ।

पृथक्त्वम्—संयुक्तेषु भेदज्ञानस्य कारणभूतं पृथक्त्वं यथा—अयमस्मात् पृथक् ।

संख्या—द्वौ त्रय इत्यादिरूपा ।

संस्थानम्—यथा इदं परिमण्डलम् ।

संयोगः—अयमंगुल्योः संयोगः ।

विभागः—वियुक्तेषु भेदज्ञानस्य कारणभूतो विभागः, यथा—अयमितो विभक्तः ।

46. *ekatva-prthaktva-saṁkhyā-saṁsthāna-saṁyoga-vibhāgās tallakṣa-
nam.*

etaiḥ paryāyā lakṣyante.

ekatvaṁ—bhinneṣv api paramāṇvādiṣu yad eko'yaṁ ghaṭādir iti pratītiḥ.

prthaktvaṁ—saṁyukteṣu bhedaññānasya kāraṇabhūtaṁ prthaktvaṁ yathā—ayam asmāt prthak.

saṁkhyā—dvau traya ityādirūpā.

saṁsthānam—yathā idaṁ parimaṇḍalam.

saṁyogaḥ—ayam aṅgulyoḥ saṁyogaḥ.

vibhāgaḥ—vīyukteṣu bhedaññānasya kāraṇabhūto vibhāgaḥ, yathā—ayam ito vibhaktaḥ.

(Aph.) Unity, separateness, number, configuration, conjunction and disjunction are the distinguishing characteristics of modes. (XLVI)

(Gloss) The modes are characterized by these : unity is (the cause of) such cognition as 'this is a jar', even though the atoms of which the jar is made are discrete and separate. Separateness is the quality which occasions distinction in things joined together. It is the cause of such judgment as 'this is separate from that'. Number is the cause of such judgment as 'this is one', 'these are two', 'these are three', etc. Configuration is responsible for such judgment as 'this is round'. Conjunction is the cause of such judgment as 'this is the conjunction of two fingers'. Disjunction makes possible the knowledge of difference in things which are disjoined from one another. It is responsible for such judgment as 'this is disjoined from that', and the like.

इति द्रव्य-गुण-पर्याय-स्वरूपनिर्णयः

iti dravya-guṇa-paryāya-svarūpanirṇayaḥ.

This is (the first lustre) called "the Determination of the Nature of Substance, Quality, and Modes".

द्वितीयः प्रकाशः LUSTRE TWO

१. जीव-अजीव-पुण्य-पाप-आश्रव-संवर-निर्जरा-बन्ध-मोक्षास्तत्त्वम् ।

तत्त्वं पारमार्थिकं वस्तु ।

1. *jīva-ajīva-puṇya-pāpa-āsrava-saṁvara-nirjarā-bandha-mokṣās tattvam*,
tattvaṁ pārmāthikam vastu.

(Aph.) Soul, non-soul, merit, demerit, cause of influx (of *karman*), stoppage of cause of influx (of *karman*), dissociation (of *karman*), bondage (of *karman*) and emancipation are the *tattvas*. (I)

(Gloss) 'Tattva' means a real entity.

(Note) Strictly speaking, *jīva* and *ajīva* (soul and non-soul, the sentient and the non-sentient) are the two ultimate principles. The rest are consequential events which occur on the cooperation of these two principles. Thus merit and demerit lead to the soul's loss of freedom. The fifth is a condition of the soul, brought about by the action and reaction of the soul and non-soul on each other. The sixth is a negative condition of the soul achieved by partial or total obstruction of the accession of alien *karmic* matter into the soul. The seventh is the purification of the soul on the expulsion of *karmic* matter from the soul and thus the soul is partially purged of the contamination induced by the accession of foreign matter. The eighth again is induced by the closest possible association of the soul and *karmic* matter. The ninth is the condition of absolute freedom achieved by the gain of intrinsic purity resulting from the expulsion of all *karmic* matter and its consequences. The third, fourth, fifth and eighth principles are the conditions of *saṁsāra*, the transmigration of the soul from the condition of one painful existence to another. The sixth and the seventh are the essential conditions of emancipation. The last is the most important of all, which is the ultimate goal. There is every justification, therefore, for the inclusion of all these principles of ultimate categories. The pursuit of philosophy cannot be a barren procedure. Its purpose is to know the truth because the knowledge of the ultimate truth is conducive to the achievement of perfection. This perfection is constituted by absolute freedom gained by the dissolution of all limitations and bonds which are the impositions of foreign matter.

Though *sub specie aeternitatis*, the categories other than the first two are not ultimate *qua* eternal, they are coeval with the duration of the world process and hence *sub specie temporis* they are of a status coordinate with the first two.

२. उपयोगलक्षणो जीवः ।

2. *upayogalakṣaṇo jīvaḥ*.

(Aph.) The defining characteristic of a soul is consciousness (cognitive activity). (II)

(Note) *Upayoga* is cogitation or rather cogitative activity. A *jīva* is never devoid of this activity. It is the inalienable characteristic of the *jīva*, however undeveloped it may be. *Karmic* matter veils the light of consciousness. This is called *jñānāvaraṇīya karma*. However much the *karmic* matter may obscure the consciousness of a soul, it cannot obliterate it altogether or make it absolutely inoperative. So this consciousness is found also in the *nigoda* state and through progressive development reaches its maximum in the omniscience of the perfect soul.

३. चेतनाव्यापार उपयोगः ।

चेतना ज्ञानदर्शनात्मिका । तस्या व्यापारः प्रवृत्तिरुपयोगः ।

3. *cetanāvyāpāra upayogaḥ.*

cetanā jñānadarśanātmikā. tasyā vyāpāraḥ pravṛttir upayogaḥ.

(Aph.) Consciousness (cognitive activity) is the activity of sentience. (III)

(Gloss) Sentience consists of knowledge and intuition. Consciousness is the activity, that is, the application of the same (viz. sentience).

४. साकारोऽनाकारश्च ।

4. *sākāro'nākāraś ca.*

(Aph.) It (viz. consciousness) is determinate as well as indeterminate. (IV)

५. पर्यायग्राहित्वाज् ज्ञानं साकारः ।

उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्यात्मकस्य द्रव्यस्य ध्रौव्यं गौणीकृत्य उत्पादव्यययो-
ग्रहिकं ज्ञानं साकार उपयोग इत्युच्यते । अयमाकारेण पर्यायेण सहितत्वात्
साकारः । सविकल्प उपयोग इत्यस्य पर्यायः ।

5. *paryāyagrāhitvāj jñānaṁ sākāraḥ.*

utpādayayadhrauvyātmakasya dravyasya dhrauvyaṁ gaunīkṛtya utpādayayayor grāhakaṁ jñānaṁ sākāra upayoga ity ucyate. ayam ākāreṇa paryāyeṇa sahitatvāt sākāraḥ. savikalpa upayoga ity asya paryāyaḥ.

(Aph.) Knowledge is determinate, because it cognizes the modes.

(Gloss) Knowledge is called determinate consciousness because of its being the cognizer of the origination and cessation by means of subordinating the permanence of the substance which embodies origination, cessation and permanence. The expression 'conceptual consciousness' is synonymous with it (viz. determinate consciousness).

६. ध्रौव्यग्राहित्वाद् दर्शनमनाकारः ।

उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्यात्मकस्य द्रव्यस्य उत्पादव्ययात्मकं पर्यायं गौणी-
कृत्य ध्रौव्यस्य ग्राहकं दर्शनमनाकार उपयोग इत्युच्यते । निर्विकल्प
उपयोग इत्यस्य पर्यायः ।

6. dhrauvyagrāhitvād darśanam anākārah.

utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvyātmakasya dravyasya utpādayayātmakaṁ
paryāyaṁ gauṇīkṛtya dhrauvyasya grāhakaṁ darśanaṁ anākāra
upayoga ity ucyate. nirvikalpa upayoga ity asya paryāyaḥ.

(Aph.) Intuition is indeterminate, because it cognizes the permanence.

(Gloss) Intuition is indeterminate consciousness, because of its
being the cognizer of the permanence, subordinating the modes of origi-
nation and cessation of the substance which embodies origination,
cessation and permanence. The expression 'non-conceptual conscious-
ness' is synonymous with it (viz. indeterminate consciousness).

७. मति-श्रुत-अवधि-मनःपर्याय-केवलानि ज्ञानम् ।

7. mati-śruta-avadhi-manahparyāya-kevalāni jñānam.

(Aph.) Knowledge is of five kinds, viz. perceptual cognition, verbal
knowledge, clairvoyance, mind reading and pure and perfect knowledge.
(VII)

८. इन्द्रियमनोनिबन्धनं मतिः ।

अभिनिबोध इत्यस्य पर्यायः ।

8. indriyamanonibandhanam matiḥ.

abhinibodha ity asya paryāyaḥ.

(Aph.) Perceptual cognition is the knowledge due to a sense-organ
and the mind. (VIII)

(Gloss) The expression 'objective cognition' is synonymous with it.

(Note) Perceptual cognition (*mati*) takes stock of a present objective datum;
recollection (*smṛti*) has reference to a datum perceived in the past; recognition
(*saṁjñā*) is the cognition of the identity of a past object of perception with the
present; thought (*cintā*) is the cognition of a future event. All these different varie-
ties of cognition are regarded as identical in spite of the difference of determinations,
because the substantive object is the same. *Abhinibodha* is a cognition competent to
take stock of an object with all its temporal determinations as past, present and
future. The different varieties are only so many synonyms because they all agree in
respect of the identical object. *Matijñāna* is a comprehensive class which includes a
large variety. Thus, for example, there are purely sensuous cognitions, purely mental

cognitions and cognitions which are generated by both the senses and the mind. The sensuous cognition of animals, beginning with the one-sensed and ending with the five-sensed, but destitute of the mind, are purely sensuous. Recollection and instinctive intuition (*ogha-jñāna*) are purely mental. The normal cognitions of beings endowed with the mind are generated by the co-operation of the mind and the senses.

६. श्रुतनिश्चिते तरे ।

सा मतिर्द्विधा भवति—श्रुतनिश्चिता अश्रुतनिश्चिता च ।

9. *śrutaniśritetare.*

sā matir dvidhā bhavati—śrutaniśritā aśrutaniśritā ca.

(Aph.) It is (of two kinds)—‘depending on the verbal symbol’ and ‘what is other than that’. (IX)

(Gloss) The perceptual cognition is twofold, namely, ‘depending on the verbal symbol’ and ‘what is other than that’.

१०. अवग्रह-ईहा-अवाय-धारणाभेदात् श्रुतनिश्चिता चतुर्धा ।

10. *avagraha-ihā-avāya-dhāraṇābhedaāt śrutaniśritā caturdhā.*

(Aph.) The (perceptual cognition) ‘depending on verbal symbol’ is of four kinds—sensation, speculation, judgment and retention. (X)

११. इन्द्रियार्थयोगे दर्शनानन्तरं सामान्यग्रहणमवग्रहः ।

इन्द्रियार्थयोरुचितदेशाद्यवस्थानरूपे योगे सति दर्शनम्—अनुल्लिखित-विशेषस्य सन्मात्रस्य प्रतिपत्तिः । तदनन्तरम्—अनिर्देश्यसामान्यस्य (वस्तुनः) ग्रहणमवग्रहः ।

11. *indriyārthayoge darśanānantaram sāmānyagrahaṇam avagrahaḥ.*

indriyārthayor ucitadeśādy avasthānarūpe yoge sati darśanam—anullikhitaviśeṣasya sanmātrasya pratipattiḥ. tadanantaram—anirdeśyasāmānyasya (vastunaḥ) grahaṇam avagrahaḥ.

(Aph.) Sensation means cognition of a generic character in the wake of the intuition of the contact between the sense and the object. (XI)

(Gloss) There occurs sensation, that is, cognition of the pure general character without the manifestation of any particular characteristic on the contact due to the situation of the sense-organ and the object at a proper place etc. In the wake of this there occurs the indeterminate cognition of the general character (of the) object. This is called ‘*avagraha*’ or sensation.

१२. व्यंजनार्थयोः ।

व्यंजनेन—इन्द्रियार्थसम्बन्धरूपेण, व्यंजनस्य—शब्दादेरर्थस्य ग्रहणम्—
अव्यक्तः परिच्छेदो व्यंजनावग्रहः^१ । ततो मनाग् व्यक्तं जातिद्रव्यगुण-
कल्पनारहितमर्थग्रहणम्—अर्थावग्रहः^२, यथा एतत् किञ्चिदस्ति ।^३

12. *vyañjanārthayoḥ*.

vyañjanena—indriyārthasambandharūpeṇa, *vyañjanasya*—śab-
dāder arthasya grahaṇam—avyaktaḥ paricchedo *vyañjanāvagrahaḥ*.¹
tato manāg vyaktaṁ jāti-dravya-guṇa-kalpanārahitam arthagraha-
ṇam—arthāvagrahaḥ², yathā etat kiñcid asti.³

(Aph.) (The sensation is) in respect of the *vyañjana* and the *artha*.
(XII)

(Gloss) The *vyañjana-avagraha*⁴ means the indeterminate cognition of the objects such as sound and the like through *vyañjana* which is of the nature of the contact between the object and the sense-organ. There occurs in the trail of this sensation another sensation called *artha-avagraha*⁵, which cognizes the object a little more distinctly, though devoid of the concepts of class, substance and attributes. This is a judgement like 'there exists something'.⁶

(Note) The term *vyañjana* bears two senses. The first is 'contact of the object with the external sense'. This has been stated in the gloss. On account of this contact with the object qua touch, smell, colour etc., fit to be perceived, there takes place an indeterminate cognition. This contact is also a sort of indistinct sensation and as such must be cognizant of an object. The object is also called *vyañjana*. So, the expression *vyañjanāvagraha* is to be expounded as the cognition of a *vyañjana*, that is, a perceptible object, such as sound, colour, etc. through *vyañjana*, that is, the

१ व्यंजनेन व्यंजनस्य अवग्रहः—व्यंजनावग्रहः । अत्र मध्यमपदलोपी समासः । अयमास्तमो हूतिकः ।
२ एकसामयिकः । ३ अनध्यवसायो न निर्णयोन्मुख इति न प्रमाणम् । अवग्रहस्तु निर्णयोन्मुख इति
प्रामाण्यमस्य ।

1 *vyañjanena vyañjanasya avagrahaḥ*—*vyañjanāvagrahaḥ*. atra madhyamapadalopī samāsaḥ. ayam āntarmauhūrtikaḥ.

2 *ekasāmayikaḥ*.

3 *anadhyavasāyo na nirṇayonmukha iti na pramāṇam*. *avagrahas tu nirṇayonmukha iti prāmāṇyam asya*.

4 *Vyañjana-avagraha* means *avagraha* of *vyañjana* through *vyañjana*. It is an example of a grammatical compound where the expression (viz. *vyañjana*) which occurs in the middle of the expounding sentence is omitted. The duration of the *vyañjana-avagraha* is less than a *muhūrta* (forty-eight minutes).

5 The *artha-avagraha* is instantaneous.

6 This judgement is not pure absence of determination (*anadhyavasāya*) which, not being decisive, is not a case of valid cognition. The *avagraha*, however, is definitely set about the determination of the object and, as such, is a category of valid cognitions.

contact of the sense with the object. The expression *vyāñjanāvagraha* thus means the cognition of *vyāñjana* through *vyāñjana*.

The idea is that a material object first comes into contact with the sense-organ and this evokes corresponding consciousness. This is called contact. It is the condition of the object-perception which, though slightly more developed than the former, is indistinct and indeterminate as it does not take note of the specific characteristic of the object. This specific perception is perceptual judgment, say of eye. To sum up, first, there is sense-object contact which is also a kind of cognition. The second stage is the perceptual intuition of the object in its generic character. The cognition is of the form—"It is something". The third stage is speculation. The fourth is perceptual judgment, that is, cognition of the object with its specific character. This is called the determinate cognition by the Naiyāyika and the Buddhist. It is further to be noted that *vyāñjana qua* sense-object contact is regarded as the condition of cognition and not a sort of cognition in the Nyāya school. In Jaina epistemology, this contact is also regarded as cognitive. This is the peculiar theory of Jaina epistemology.

१३. अमुकेन भाव्यमिति प्रत्यय ईहा ।

अमुकस्तदितरो वेति संशयादूर्ध्वमन्वयव्यतिरेकपूर्वकम् "अमुकेन भाव्यमिति" प्रत्यय ईहा, यथा—शब्देन भाव्यम् ।

13. *amukena bhāvyam iti pratyaya ihā.*

amukas taditaro veti saṁśayād ūrdhvam anvayavyatirekapūrvakam "amukena bhāvyam iti" pratyaya ihā, yathā—śabdena bhāvyam.

(Aph.) Speculation consists in the experience "This must be that."
(XIII)

(Gloss) Speculation is an experience which brings up the rear of doubt "this is that or anything else", through agreement and difference in respect of a characteristic feature, for example, "it must be a sound."

(Note) This speculation constitutes the intermediate stage between indeterminate perception and determinate perceptual judgment. On the intuition of the generic character of the object, there arises an enquiry about the specific nature of the same. It occurs in the shape of a problem, e.g. "Is it the touch of a snake or of a lotus-stalk?" But it ought not to be regarded as a case of doubt. Doubt is indecisive in its result. But speculation is an attitude of the mind which leads to the determination of the specific character of the object by laying emphasis upon the real characteristics that are perceived and the elimination of the unreal attributes that are not cognized.

१४. अमुक एवेत्यवायः ।

यथा—अयं शब्द एव ।

14. *amuka eva ity avāyah.*

yathā—ayaṁ śabda eva.

(Aph.) Perceptual judgment is the specific determination (of the object), viz. 'this is that'. (XIV)

(Gloss) For instance, 'it is a sound indeed'.

१५. तस्यावस्थितिर्धारणा ।

वासना, संस्कार इत्यस्याः पर्यायः । प्रत्येकमिन्द्रियमनसावग्रहा-
दीनां संयोगात्, नयनमनसोर्व्यजनावग्रहाभावाच्च मतिज्ञानमष्टाविंशति-
भेदं भवति ।

15. tasyāvasthitir dhāraṇā.

vāsanā, saṁskāra ity asyāḥ paryāyāḥ. pratyekam indriyamanasā-
vagrahādīnāṁ saṁyogāt, nayanamanasor vyañjanāvagrahābhāvāc
ca matijñānam aṣṭāviṁśatibhedam bhavati.

(Aph.) The persistence of the same (viz. perceptual judgment) is called retention. (XV)

(Gloss) The synonyms of *dhāraṇā* are predisposition, trace, etc. As sensation and the like (which are four in number) are related to each of the (five) senses and the (sixth) mind, and as there is no contact-perception in the case of the eye and the mind, there can be twenty-eight ($5 \times 6 - 2 = 28$) types of perceptual cognition.

(Note) There are four varieties of perceptual cognition viz, *avagraha*, *īhā*, *avāya*, and *dhāraṇā*. Each of them is occasioned by each of the five organs and the mind. This gives us twenty-four kinds. Contact-sensation is possible only of the four senses excepting the visual organ and the mind. This gives four kinds which added to the first twenty-four give the total as twenty-eight varieties.

१६. औत्पत्तिकी-वैनयिकी-कर्मिकी-पारिणामिकी इति चतस्रो बुद्धयश्चतुर्निधिताः ।

16. autpattikī-vainayikī-kārmikī-pāriṇāmikī iti catasro buddhayaśrutaniśritāḥ.

(Aph.) The perceptual cognition not depending on verbal symbol falls under four categories—intellect of instantaneous comprehension, intellect born of faithful service, intellect developed by practical experience and intellect of mature experience. (XVI)

१७. अदृष्टाश्रुतार्थग्राहिणी औत्पत्तिकी ।

प्रतिभाप्रातिभमित्यस्याः पर्यायः ।

17. adṛṣṭāśrutārthagrahīṇī autpattikī.

pratibhā prātibham ityasyā paryāyāḥ.

(Aph.) The instantaneous comprehension apprehends the unseen and the unheard of objects. (XVII)

(Gloss) The terms *pratibhā* and *prātibha* are its synonyms,

१८. विनयसमुत्था वेनयिकी ।

विनयः शिक्षा, तज्जनिता बुद्धिर्वेनयिकी ।

18. *vinayasamutthā vainayikī.*

vinayaḥ śikṣā, tajjanitā buddhir vainayikī.

(Aph.) The *vainayikī* is so called because it is (an intellect) born of training (in modesty, humility and loyalty to the teacher). (XVIII)

(Gloss) *Vinaya* means training (in modesty etc.) and the *vainayikī* intellect is born of it (namely, training).

१९. कर्मसमुत्था कर्मिकी ।

कर्मणाऽभ्यासेन जनिता बुद्धिः कर्मिकी कर्मजा वा ।

19. *karmasamutthā karmikī.*

karmanā'bhyāsenā janitā buddhiḥ karmikī karmajā vā.

(Aph.) The *karmikī* is so called because it is (an intellect) developed by practical experience. (XIX)

(Gloss) Practical experience means repeated practice, and the intellect born of such practice is called *karmikī*.

२०. परिणामजनिता पारिणामिकी ।

वयः-परिणतिः परिणामः ।

20. *pariṇāmajanitā pāriṇāmikī.*

vayaḥ-pariṇatiḥ pariṇāmaḥ.

(Aph.) The *pāriṇāmikī* is so called because it is (the intellect) born of maturity. (XX)

(Gloss) Maturity means maturity in respect of age.

२१. जातिस्मृतिरपि मतेर्भेदः ।

संज्ञिजीवस्य तथाविधशुभपरिणामेन लेश्यायां विशुध्यमानायां किञ्चिन् निमित्तमासाद्येहापोह-मार्गणा-गवेषणां कुर्वतः पूर्वजन्मनः स्मृतिरुत्पद्यते सा जातिस्मृतिः ।

21. *jātismṛtir api mater bhedaḥ.*

saṃjñijīvasya tathāvidhaśubhapariṇāmena leśyāyām viśudhya-mānāyām kiñcin nimittam āsādyehāpoha-mārgaṇā-gaveṣaṇāṃ kurvataḥ pūrvajanmanaḥ smṛtir utpadyate sā jātismṛtiḥ.

(Aph.) The memory of past lives is also a kind of perceptual cognition. (XXI)

(Gloss) The memory of past lives arises in a rational being, engaged in speculation, discrimination, investigation and research, inspired by a particular occasion, on the purification of his *leśyā* (aural colouration) on account of the requisite auspicious transformation.

२२. मनोवाक्कायप्रवर्तकं निश्चयात्मकं ज्ञानं चित्तम् ।

22. *manovākkāyapravartakaṁ niścayātmakaṁ jñānaṁ cittam.*

(Aph.) The *citta* is definite knowledge that activates the mind, speech and the body. (XXII)

२३. द्रव्यश्रुतानुसारि परप्रत्यायनक्षमं श्रुतम् ।

द्रव्यश्रुतं शब्दसंकेतादिरूपम्, तदनुसारेण परप्रत्यायनक्षमं ज्ञानं श्रुतमभिधीयते ।

23. *dravyaśrutānusāri parapratyāyanakṣamaṁ śrutam.*

dravyaśrutam śabdasaṁketādirūpaṁ, tadanusāreṇa parapratyāyanakṣamaṁ jñānaṁ śrutam abhidhīyate.

(Aph.) The cognition capable of communicating (itself) to others (in the way of instruction) by means of material symbols is called verbal knowledge (*śrutajñāna*). (XXIII)

(Gloss) 'Material symbols' mean word, gesture and the like. The cognition capable of communicating itself to others by means of these (symbols) is called verbal knowledge.

२४. अक्षर-संज्ञि-सम्यक्-सादि-सपर्यवसित-गमिकांगप्रविष्टानि सप्रतिपक्षाणि ।

24. *akṣara-saṁjñi-samyak-sādi-saparyavasita-gamikāṅgapraviṣṭāni sapratipakṣāṇi.*

(Aph.) (There are fourteen varieties of *śrutajñāna* which are concerned with) linguistic symbols, rational beings, authentic knowledge, what has a beginning, what has an end, *gamika*, what is included in the *aṅgas*, and the opposites (of all these seven). (XXIV)

(Note) There are fourteen kinds of *śruta*, viz.

1. Linguistic symbols (*akṣara*) by means of which knowledge is communicated, such as words, and the like.
2. Non-linguistic (*anakṣara*), i.e., knowledge communicated by gestures and other symbolic expressions.
3. Relating to rational beings (*saṁjñin*).
4. Relating to irrational beings (*asaṁjñin*).
5. Authentic (*samyak*) knowledge leading to emancipation.
6. Spurious (*asamyak*) knowledge which consists of faulty doctrines and views detrimental to emancipation.
7. That which has a beginning (*sādi*).

8. That which is without a beginning (*anādi*).
9. That which is with an end (*saparyavasita*).
10. That which is without an end (*aparyavasita*).

These last four divisions of scripture are relative to the actual treatises which have been necessarily written by some persons, and as such have a definite beginning in time. But the knowledge recorded therein is without a definite beginning and is also without any definite end as the world process is eternal at both extremes.

11. *Gamika śruta* stands for the twelfth *aṅga* called *Drṣṭivāda* in which the texts are interwoven and some portions are repeated *mutatis mutandis* in accordance with the context.
12. *Agamika śruta* stands for the scripture that does not repeat analogical passages.
13. Scriptures which are included in the *aṅgas* composed by the *gaṇadharas*, the direct disciples of Mahāvīra, *aṅgapraviṣṭa*.
14. The opposite of No. 13 which have been composed by authors other than the *gaṇadharas*, *aṅgabāhya*.

२५. आत्ममात्रापेक्षं रूपिद्वयगोचरमवधिः ।

अवधानं अवधिः ।

25. *ātma-mātrāpekṣaṁ rūpīdvayagocaram avadhīḥ.*
avadhānam avadhīḥ.

(Aph.) Clairvoyance is (the knowledge) dependent on the self alone and takes stock of material substances as its objects. (XXV)

(Gloss) *Avadhi* stands for *avadhāna* (limited cognition).

२६. भवप्रत्ययो देवनारकाणाम् ।

26. *bhava-pratyayo devanāra-kāṇām.*

(Aph.) It is congenital (immediately caused by genesis) in the case of the denizens of heaven and hell. (XXVI)

(Note) Divine beings and also beings born in hell are born along with this clairvoyance. It does not require the good offices of the visual organ but emerges in the soul directly and immediately. As a matter of fact knowledge can emerge only if the veil which prevented its emergence is removed and the other obscuring *karmans* are held in check and so the genesis of this type of supersensuous cognition also takes place by this process. It is, however, affiliated to birth as its condition in the case of the denizens of heaven and hell. Their very birth brings about the relevant destruction-cum-suppression which is thus regarded as the direct cause of the knowledge in question.

२७. क्षयोपाशमनिमित्तश्च शेषाणाम् ।

27. *kṣaya-opaśamanimittaś ca śeṣāṇām.*

(Aph.) In the case of others (beings other than denizens of heaven and hell i.e., men and lower animals), it is due to the (occasional) destruction-cum-suppression of the relevant (obscuring) *karmans*. (XXVII)

२८. अनुगामि-अननुगामि-वर्धमान-होयमान-प्रतिपाति-अप्रतिपातिभेदादसौ षोढा ।

28. *anugāmi-ananugāmi-vardhamāna-hīyamāna-pratipāty-apratipātibhe-dād asau ṣoḍhā.*

(Aph.) It (clairvoyance) is sixfold, viz.

1. What follows the clairvoyant,
2. What doesn't follow the clairvoyant,
3. Expanding (clairvoyance),
4. Contracting (clairvoyance),
5. Vulnerable (to loss),
6. Invulnerable. (XXVIII)

२९. मनोद्रव्यपर्यायप्रकाशि मनःपर्यायः ।

29. *manodravayaparyāyaprakāśi manaḥparyāyah.*

(Aph.) Mind-reading (cognition of mental modes) is the revealer of the modes of the mental substance. (XXIX)

३०. ऋजु-विपुलमती ।

साधारणमनोद्रव्यग्राहिणी मतिः ऋजुमतिः ।^१ तद्विशेषग्राहिणी मति-विपुलमतिः ।^२

30. *rju-vipulamati.*

sādhāraṇamanodravayagrāhīṇī matir rjumatiḥ.¹ tadviśeṣagrāhīṇī matir vipulamatiḥ.²

(Aph.) (The mind-reading is twofold, viz.) straight or plain, and expansive. (XXX)

(Gloss) (1) Straight and plain³, that which cognizes the general feature of the mental substance and (2) expansive⁴ that which cognizes (also) the particular characteristics of it.

१ घटोऽनेन चिन्तित इत्यध्यवसायनिबन्धनं मनोद्रव्यपरिच्छित्तिरित्यर्थः ।

1 *ghaṭo'nena cintita ity adhyavasāyamibandhanam manodravayaparicchittirityarthah.*

२ घटोऽनेन चिन्तितः स च सौवर्णः पाटलिपुत्रकोऽद्यतनो महान् इत्यध्यवसायहेतुभूता मनोद्रव्यविज्ञप्तिरिति ।

2 *ghaṭo'nena cintitah sa ca sauvarṇah pāṭaliputrako'dyatano mahān ityadhyavasāyahetubhūtā manodravayavijñaptir iti.*

3 The plain cognition takes stock only of the generic character of the mental substance; for instance, when one cognizes the mental condition of another in such general terms as 'he knows a jar'.

4 It knows the details of the contents, such as 'the jar known is made of gold, made at Pataliputra, made today and has a big size'.

३१. विशुद्धि-क्षेत्र-स्वामि-विषयभेदादवधेर्भिन्नः ।

31. *viśuddhi-kṣetra-svāmi-viśayabhedād avadher bhinnah.*

(Aph.) It (viz. mind-reading) is different from the clairvoyance on account of its difference in respect of purity, scope, knowing subject and content. (XXXI)

(Note) *Viśuddhi* (purity) is that quality of the soul which makes possible the knowledge of a multitude of specific characters. The mind-reading takes cognizance of a large number of details than the clairvoyance (*avadhi*). The clairvoyance raised to perfection embraces the whole world whereas the mind-reading is limited to the abode of human beings. The clairvoyance is possible in all the four states of existence, that is to say, all the four kinds of beings—men, gods, animals and the denizens in hells. The mind-reading, on the other hand, is possible only for self-restrained persons. *Viśaya* (the object) of clairvoyance consists of all the material objects possessed of colour and shape, whereas that of mind-reading is limited to an infinitesimal part of the substances known by the former.

३२. निखिलद्रव्यपर्यायसाक्षात्कारि केवलम् ।

32. *nikhiladravyaparyāyasākṣātkāri kevalam.*

(Aph.) That which directly cognizes all the substances with all their modes is omniscience (pure and perfect knowledge). (XXXII)

३३. मति-श्रुत-विभंगा मिथ्यात्वसाहचर्यादज्ञानम् ।

विभंगोऽवधिस्थानीयः । मिथ्यात्विनां ज्ञानावरणक्षयोपशमजन्योऽपि बोधो मिथ्यात्वसहचारित्वादज्ञानमुच्यते^१ । तथा चागमः^२—

“अविसेसिया मई—मइनाणं च मइअन्नाणं च ।

विसेसिया सम्मद्दिट्ठिस्स मई मइनाणं ।

मिच्छादिट्ठिस्स मई मइअन्नाणं ।”

यत्पुनर्ज्ञानाभावरूपं औदयिकमज्ञानं तस्य नात्रोल्लेखः । मनःपर्याय-केवलयोऽस्तु सम्यग्दृष्टिष्वेव भावाद्, अज्ञानानि त्रीणि एव ।

33. *matī-śruta-vibhaṅgā mithyātvasāhacaryād ajñānam.*

*vibhaṅgo*¹ *vadhīsthānīyaḥ*. *mithyātvinaṁ jñānāvaranaḥkṣayaopashamajanyo'pi bodho mithyātvasahacāritvād ajñānam ucyate*². *tathā cāgamah*³—

१ विविधा भंगाः सन्ति यस्मिन् इति विभंगः ।

1 *vividhā bhaṅgāḥ santi yasmin iti vibhaṅgaḥ.*

२ कुत्सार्थे नञ् समासः । कुत्सितत्वं चात्र मिथ्यादृष्टेः संसर्गात् ।

2 *kutsārthe nañ samāsaḥ. kutsītatvaṁ cātra mithyādṛṣṭeḥ saṁsargāt.*

३ नन्दिसुत्तं, ३६ ।

3 *Nandīsuttam, 36. (Jaina Vishva Bhārati edition),*

avisesiyā maī—maināṇaṁ ca maiannāṇaṁ ca.
 visesiyā sammadiṭṭhissa maī maināṇaṁ.
 micchādiṭṭhissa maī maiannāṇaṁ.

yatpunar jñānābhāvarūpam audayikam ajñānaṁ tasya nātrollekhaḥ.
 manaḥparyāyakevalayos tu samyagdr̥ṣṭiṣv eva bhāvād ajñānāni
 trīṇy eva.

(Aph.) Perceptual cognition (*mati*), verbal knowledge (*śruta*) and para-clairvoyance (*vibhaṅga*) are nescience on account of their association with perverse faith. (XXXIII)

(Gloss) *Vibhaṅga*¹ refers to the category of *avadhi* or super-sensuous cognition of matter.

The experience, even consequent upon the destruction-cum-subsidence of the knowledge-covering *karman*, of a person possessed of perverted faith (*mithyātva*) is called nescience (*ajñāna*)² on account of its association with the perversion. There is the following scriptural text³ in support of our contention :

* The generic *mati* is (twofold) : *mati*-knowledge and *mati*-nescience.

* The specific *mati* of the person of right faith is *mati*-knowledge.

* The *mati* of the person of perverted faith is *mati*-nescience.

The ignorance and complete absence of knowledge consequent upon the rise of the relevant *karman* is, however, not referred to here. The types of nescience are only three in number inasmuch as the remaining two varieties of knowledge, viz. the mind-reading and pure (and perfect) knowledge can be possessed only by a person of right faith and as such are necessarily varieties of knowledge and not nescience.

(Note) The three varieties of cognition may be authentic as well as unauthentic. On account of the emergence of a wrong belief and perverted faith, these cognitions are vitiated. The aberration of *avadhi* is called *vibhaṅga* (the prefix *vi* has the value of *viparīta*, contrary). We have coined the word para-clairvoyance for the Sanskrit expression *vibhaṅga*, using *para* in the sense of perverse. It is called so because the variety of *avadhi* which goes wrong under the influence of perverted faith gives only a wrong view that is opposed to the reality as it is in itself. The prefix *vi* in *vibhaṅga* may also be interpreted in the sense of variety. Thus *vibhaṅga* is the kind of varieties of *bhaṅga*, implying indecision and doubt.

1 *Vibhaṅga* means 'what is possessed of different aspects'.

2 The term *ajñāna* is a negative compound, the negative particle *nañ* is substituted by *a* in the compound, standing for the sense of 'demeritorious'. The knowledge here is demeritorious because of its association with a perverted faith.

3 *Nandisuttam*, 36, (Jaina Vishva Bhārati edition),

३४. चक्षुरचक्षुरवधिकेवलानि दर्शनम् ।

चक्षुषः सामान्यावबोधश्चक्षुर्दर्शनम् ।

शेषेन्द्रियमनसोरचक्षुर्दर्शनम् ।

अवधिकेवलयोश्च अवधिकेवलदर्शने ।

मनःपर्यायस्य मनसः पर्यायविषयत्वेन सामान्यबोधाभावान्न दर्शनम् ।

34. *cakṣuracakṣuravadhikevalāni darśanam.*

cakṣuṣaḥ sāmānyāvabodhaś cakṣurdarśanam.

śeṣeन्द्रियमानसोरचक्षुर्दर्शनम्.

avadhikevalayoś ca avadhikevaladarśane.

manahparyāyasya manaṣaḥ paryāyaviṣayatvena sāmānyabodhābhā-vān na darśanam.

(Aph.) Intuition is (possible in the case of) ocular and non-ocular cognitions as well as clairvoyance and omniscience (pure and perfect knowledge). (XXXIV)

(Gloss) Of these, the indeterminate cognition by the eye is ocular intuition. Such cognition by the other sense-organs as well as the mind is non-ocular intuition. Such cognitions in the case of clairvoyance and omniscience (perfect knowledge) are respectively known as *avadhidarśana* and *kevaladarśana*. The cognition of mental modes has no *darśana* because it never cognizes the general feature inasmuch as it has the mental modes (which are particular) as its object.

३५. प्रतिनियतविषयग्राहि इन्द्रियम् ।

प्रतिनियतान् शब्दादिविषयान् गृह्णातीत्येवंशीलं प्रतिनियतार्थग्राहि इन्द्रियं भवति ।

35. *pratiniyataviṣayagrāhi indriyam.*

pratiniyatān śabdādiviṣayān grhṇātītyevamśīlān pratiniyatārtha-grāhi indriyam bhavati.

(Aph.) The *indriya* (sense-organ) means an organ that comprehends a specific object. (XXXV)

(Gloss) The *indriya* is so called because it is possessed of the nature of comprehending specific objects, such as the sound and the like.

३६. स्पर्शन-रसन-घ्राण-चक्षुः-श्रोत्राणि ।

36. *sparsana-rasana-ghrāṇa-cakṣuḥ-śrotrāṇi,*

(Aph.) The instruments of touch, taste, smell, sight and hearing (are the sense-organs). (XXXVI)

३७. द्रव्यभावभेदानि ।

37. *dravyabhāvabhedāni.*

(Aph.) They are different quā physical and quā psychical. (XXXVII)

३८. निर्वृत्युपकरणे द्रव्येन्द्रियम् ।

कर्णशष्कुल्यादिरूपा बाह्या, कदम्बकुसुमादिरूपा चाभ्यन्तरीया पौद्गलिक-
आकाररचना—निर्वृतिः ।

तत्र श्रावणाद्युपकारिणी शक्तिरुपकरणम् ।

38. *nirvṛtṭyupakaraṇe dravyendriyam.*

karnaśaṣkulyādirūpā bāhyā, kadambakusumādirūpā cābhyanta-
rīyā paudgalika-ākāraranā—nirvṛtṭiḥ.
tatra śrāvaṇādyupakāriṇī śaktir upakaraṇam.

(Aph.) The organic structure and its efficiency constitute the sense-organ quā physical. (XXXVIII)

(Gloss) The material structure of the external organ in the form of orifice of the ear and the like, and the internal organ in the shape of globular *kadamba-flower* and the like are typical of the sense-organ quā organic structure or *nirvṛtṭi*, and the capacity which makes it responsive to auditory perception and the like is the sense-organ quā efficiency (*upakaraṇa*).

३९. लब्ध्युपयोगौ भावेन्द्रियम् ।

ज्ञानावरणादिकर्मक्षयोपशमजन्यः सामर्थ्यविशेषो—लब्धिः । अर्थग्रहण-
रूप आत्मव्यापार—उपयोगः । सत्यां लब्धौ निर्वृत्युपकरणोपयोगाः ।
सत्यां च निर्वृत्तौ उपकरणोपयोगौ । सत्युपकरण उपयोगः ।

39. *labdhyupayogau bhāvendriyam.*

jñānāvaraṇādikarmakṣayopasaṃjanyah sāmāthyaviśeṣo—labd-
hiḥ. arthagrahaṇārūpa ātmavyāpāra—upayogaḥ. satyām labdhau
nirvṛtṭyupakaraṇopayogaḥ. satyām ca nirvṛttau upakaraṇopayo-
gau. satyupakaraṇa upayogaḥ.

(Aph.) The sense-organ quā psychical is (of two kinds, viz.) attain-ment and conscious activity. (XXXIX)

(Gloss) The sense-organ quā attainment is a particular kind of capacity due to the destruction-cum-subsidence of the knowledge-cove-

ring and the other relevant *karmans*. The activity of the soul, which is of the nature of the cognition of an object, is the sense-organ *quâ* conscious activity. There can be organic structure, efficiency and conscious activity only if there is attainment. There can be efficiency and conscious activity only if there is organic structure, and there can be conscious activity only if there is efficiency.

(Note) *Labdhi* is a peculiar term and concept. It is a capacity of the soul which emerges when the obstructive *karmic* veils are in the state of destruction-cum-subsidence. This is regarded as an organ *par excellence*, because the cognition of objects takes place only if it is in operation. The soul becomes invested with the capacity for knowing an object on account of the *karmic* veils being put out of commission. It may be translated literally as attainment of the capacity arising from the inoperative condition of the obscuring *karmans*.

४०. स्पर्श-रस-गन्ध-रूप-शब्दास्तद्विषयाः ।

40. *sparśa-rasa-gandha-rūpa-śabdās tadviṣayāḥ.*

(Aph.) Touch, taste, odour, sight and sound are (respectively) the objects of them (viz. the sense-organs). (XL)

४१. सर्वार्थग्राहि त्रैकालिकं मनः ।

सर्वे न तु इन्द्रियवत् प्रतिनियता अर्था गृह्यन्ते येन तत् सर्वार्थग्राहि त्रिकालविषयत्वात् त्रैकालिकं मनः । तदनिन्द्रियम्—नोइन्द्रियमपि उच्यते ।

मनस्त्वेन परिणतानि पुद्गलद्रव्याणि द्रव्यमनः, लब्धयुपयोगरूपं भावमनः ।

41. *sarvārthagrāhi traikālikam manaḥ.*

sarve na tu indriyavat pratiniyatā arthā gṛhyante yena tat sarvārthagrāhi trikālavīṣayatvāt traikālikam manaḥ. tad anindriyam noindriyam api ucyate.

manastvena pariṇatāniipudgaladravyāṇi dravyamanah, labdhyupayogarūpaṁ bhāvamanah.

(Aph.) The mind is the organ of apprehension of all objects (of all the sense-organs) of the three periods of time. (XLI)

(Gloss) That which apprehends all the objects—and not specifically determined objects as is done by a sense-organ—is the mind. As it can comprehend the objects belonging to the three periods of time, it is called *traikālika*. It is also called ‘*anindriya*’ and also ‘*no-indriya*’ or ‘quasi-sense’. Moreover, the matter transformed into mind is mind

quâ physical, while the attainment (of efficiency) and conscious activity, constitute the mind *quâ* psychical.

(Note) The mind is called quasi-sense because it is not restricted, like the sense-organs, to specific objects. Another explanation of this nomenclature may be that it is not a sense-organ because it has no independent jurisdiction over the external perceivable objects, and this lack of independent capacity disqualifies it from attaining the status which the sense-organ has.

४२. कर्मण उदयविलयजनितः चेतनापरिणामो भावः ।

कर्मणः क्षयोपशम-उपशम-क्षय-अवस्था विलय इत्यभिधीयते ।

42. *karmaṇa udayavilayaajanitaḥ cetanāpariṇāmo bhāvaḥ.*

karmaṇaḥ kṣayopāśama-upāśama-kṣaya-avasthā vilaya ity abhidhīyate.

(Aph.) The *bhāva* is a transformation of sentience on account of the rise and cessation (*vilaya*) of *karman*. (XLII)

(Gloss) Such states of the *karman* as destruction-cum-subsidence, subsidence and destruction are called *vilaya*.

४३. परिणमनं वा ।

43. *pariṇamanam vā.*

(Aph.) Also change (is called *bhāva*). (XLIII)

(Note) Change also is a transformation of the soul, which occurs even in the disembodied state called *siddhatva*.

४४. औपशमिक-क्षायिक-क्षायोपशमिका भावाः स्वरूपं जीवस्य ।

44. *upāśamika-kṣāyika-kṣāyopāśamikā bhāvāḥ svarūpaṁ jīvasya.*

(Aph.) The states produced on account of the subsidence, destruction, and destruction-cum-subsidence (of the *karmans*) constitute the nature of the soul. (XLIV)

४५. औदयिकपारिणामिकावपि ।

उदीरणाकरणेन स्वभावरूपेण वाऽष्टानामपि कर्मणामनुभवावस्था उदयः । तेन निवृत्तो भाव औदयिकः ।

स्वस्वभावे परिणमनं परिणामः । तेन निवृत्तः स एव वा भावः पारिणामिकः ।

45. *audayikapāriṇāmikāv api.*

udīraṇākaraṇena svabhāvarūpeṇa vā'ṣṭānām api karmanām
anubhavāvasthā udayaḥ. tena nirvṛtto bhāva audayikaḥ.

svasvabhāve pariṇamanaṁ pariṇāmaḥ. tena nirvṛttaḥ sa eva vā
bhāvaḥ pāriṇāmikaḥ.

(Aph.) Also those produced on account of fruition (of *karman*s) and the intrinsic change (constitute the nature of the soul). (XLV)

(Gloss) *Udaya* (that is rising) means the state of rising and being experienced of all the eight *karman*s through special effort (*udīraṇā*) or normally in their proper time. The state of *karman* which is produced in this way is called *audayika*. *Pariṇāma* means transformation in its own nature. The consequential state of *soul* or the transformation itself is *pāriṇāmika-bhāva*.

४६. मोहकर्मणो वेद्याभाव उपशमः ।

उदयप्राप्तस्य मोहकर्मणः क्षयः शेषस्य च सर्वथा अनुदय उपशमः । स
चान्तर्मुहूर्तावधिकः । तेन निष्पन्नो भाव औपशमिकः ।

46. *mohakarmanṇo vedyābhāva upaśamaḥ.*

udayaprāptasya mohakarmanṇaḥ kṣayaḥ śeṣasya ca sarvathā anu-
daya upaśamaḥ. sa cāntarmuhūrtāvadhikaḥ. tena niṣpanno bhāva
aupāśamikaḥ.

(Aph.) *Upaśama* (subsidence) means the absence of realization of the deluding *karman*. (XLVI)

(Gloss) *Subsidence* means the cessation of the deluding *karman* that was due to arise and is the total non-rising of others.

The duration of this (*subsidence*) is less than a *muhūrta* (48 minutes).

The state consequent upon this is called *aupāśamika* (related to subsidence).

४७. निर्मुलनाशः क्षयः ।

ज्ञानावरणाद्यष्टानामपि कर्मणां सर्वथा प्रणाशः—क्षयः । तेन निर्वृत्तो
भावः क्षायिकः ।

47. *nirmūlanāśaḥ kṣayaḥ.*

jñānāvaraṇādyāṣṭānām api karmanām sarvathā praṇāśaḥ—
kṣayaḥ. tena nirvṛtto bhāvaḥ—kṣāyikaḥ.

(Aph.) The 'destruction' means total cessation. (XLVII)

(Gloss) The destruction means total cessation of all the *karmans* namely knowledge-covering, and the like.

The state (of the soul) consequent upon such cessation is called *kṣāyika* (resulting from cessation).

४८. घातिकर्मणो विपाकवेद्याभावः क्षयोपशमः ।

उदयप्राप्तस्य घातिकर्मणः क्षयः, अनुदीर्णस्य च उपशमः, विपाकतः
उदयाभाव इति क्षयोपलक्षित उपशमः क्षयोपशमः । तज्जन्यो भावः—
क्षायोपशमिकः ।

उदयप्राप्तक्षयस्योभयत्र समानत्वेऽप्युपशमे प्रदेशतोऽपि नास्त्युदय
इत्यनयोर्भेदः ।

48. *ghātikarmaṇo vipākavedyābhāvaḥ kṣayopāśamaḥ.*

udayaprāptasya ghātikarmaṇaḥ kṣayaḥ, anudīrṇasya ca upāśamaḥ, vipākataḥ udayābhāva itī kṣayopalakṣita upāśamaḥ kṣayo-
pāśamaḥ. tajjanyo bhāvaḥ—kṣāyopāśamikaḥ.

udayaprāptakṣayasyobhayatra samānatve'py upāśame pradeśato'pi
nāsty udaya ity anayor bhedaḥ.

(Aph.) The destruction-cum-subsidence consists in the absence of realization of the fruit of the destroying-*karman*. (XLVIII)

(Gloss) The destruction-cum-subsidence means the subsidence marked by destruction. This can be analysed as the destruction of the destroying *karman* that was due to arise and subsidence of the *karman* that has not arisen, that is, absence of rising *quā* realization of the fruit. The state of the soul resulting from this is called *kṣāyopāśamika* (concerned with destruction-cum-subsidence).

The difference between *kṣayopāśama* and *upāśama* is that there is absolutely no rise of *karman* even virtually (*pradeśato'pi*) in the latter although the destruction of the *karmans* that have arisen is a common feature of both¹.

४९. वेद्यावस्था उदयः ।

उदीरणाकरणेन स्वभावरूपेण वाष्टानामपि कर्मणामनुभाववस्था
उदयः । तज्जन्यो भावः औदयिकः ।

¹ See note on IV. 5.

49. *vedyāvasthā udayaḥ.*

udīraṇākaraṇena svabhāvarūpeṇa vāṣṭānām api karmanām
anubhavāvasthā udayaḥ. tajjanyo bhāvaḥ audayikaḥ.

(Aph.) Rising means the state of realization. (XLIX)

(Gloss) Rising is the state of the experience of all the eight *karman*s spontaneously or by means of premature fruition. The state consequent upon such rising is called *audayika* (occurrence on account of rising).

५०. स्वस्वभावे परिणमनं परिणामः ।

परिणामाज्जन्यः स एव वा भावः पारिणामिकः, सादिरनादिश्च ।
गतिबन्धसंस्थानादयः सादिः, जीवत्वभव्यत्वाभव्यत्वादिरूपः अनादिः ।

50. *svasvabhāve pariṇamanam pariṇāmaḥ.*

pariṇāmāj janyaḥ sa eva vā bhāvaḥ pāriṇāmikaḥ, sādir anādīś ca.
gatibandhasamsthānādayaḥ sādiḥ, jīvatva-bhavyatvābhavyatvādi-
rūpaḥ anādīḥ.

(Aph.) Transformation means change in its own nature. (L)

(Gloss) That which is produced on account of transformation or the state *quā* itself is called *pāriṇāmika*. Such transformation is with beginning or without beginning. Movement, bondage, configuration etc. are with beginning whereas soulhood, fitness for emancipation (*bhavyatva*), unfitness for emancipation (*abhavyatva*), etc. are without beginning.

५१. औपशमिकस्य सम्यक्त्वचारित्रे ।

51. *aupaśamikasya samyaktvacāritre.*

(Aph) The subsidential (*aupaśamika*) state is of two kinds, (subsidential) right attitude and right conduct. (LI)

५२. क्षायिकस्य ज्ञान-दर्शन-सम्यक्त्व-चारित्र-अप्रतिहतवीर्यादयः ।

52. *kṣāyikasya jñāna-darśana-samyaktva-cāritra-apratihatavīryādayaḥ.*

(Aph.) The varieties of *kṣāyika* are perfect knowledge, perfect intuition, right attitude as the result of complete destruction of *darśana-mohanīya karman*; perfect conduct as the result of complete destruction of *cāritramohanīya karman*, unobstructed power, etc. (LII)

५३. क्षायोपशमिकस्य ज्ञानाऽज्ञान-दर्शन-दृष्टि-चारित्र-संयमासंयम-वीर्यादयः ।

53. *ksāyopasaṃikasya jñānā jñāna-darśana-dṛṣṭi-cāritra-saṃyamāsaṃyama-vīryādayaḥ.*

(Aph.) The varieties of *ksāyopasaṃika* are knowledge, nescience, intuition, attitude, renunciation, partial renunciation, energy and the like. (LIII)

५४. औदयिकस्य अज्ञान-निद्रा-सुख-दुःख-आश्रय-वेद-आयुर्गति-जाति-शरीर-
लेश्या-गोत्र-प्रतिहतवीर्यत्व-छद्मस्थ-असिद्धत्वादयः ।

54. *audayikasya ajñāna-nidrā-sukha-duḥkha-āśraya-veda-āyurgati-jāti-śarīra-leśyā-gotra-pratihata-vīryatva-chadma-stha-asiddhatvādayaḥ.*

(Aph.) The varieties of *audayika* are the following : partial absence of knowledge, sleep, pleasure, pain, influx, sex, life-span, the form of existence, the condition of existence, body, aural colouration, high and low status, the obstruction of power, non-omniscience and the states of non-emancipation etc. (LIV)

इति जीवस्वरूपनिर्णयः ।

Here ends the Second Lustre, called the "Ascertainment of the Nature of Soul", of the *Jaina-siddhānta-dīpikā*, composed by Ācārya Tulasī.

तृतीयः प्रकाशः
LUSTRE III

१. जीवा द्विधा ।

1. *jīvā dvidhā.*

(Aph.) Souls are classifiable under two heads. (I)

१. संसारिणः सिद्धाश्च ।

संसरन्ति भवान्तरमिति संसारिणः, तदपरे सिद्धाः ।

2. *saṃsāriṇaḥ siddhāś ca.*

saṃsaranti bhavāntaram iti saṃsāriṇaḥ, tadapare siddhāḥ.

(Aph.) Subject to metempsychosis and emancipated (from it). (II)

(Gloss) Those which move from birth to birth are subject to metempsychosis. The others are emancipated.

३. संसारिणस्त्रसस्थावराः ।

हिताहितप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्यर्थं गमनशोलास्त्रसाः, तदितरे स्थावराः ।

3. *saṃsāriṇas trasa-sthāvarāḥ.*

hitāhitaprayavṛttinivṛttyartham gamanaśīlās trasāḥ, taditare sthāvarāḥ.

(Aph.) (Souls) subject to metempsychosis can be mobile as well as immobile. (III)

(Gloss) Those which can move for the sake of accepting what is wholesome, and rejecting what is unwholesome are mobile. The others are called immobile.

(Note) The word 'saṃsārin' is derived from *saṃ* + \sqrt{sr} + *in*. *Sam* means again and again; *sr* means to go or move, and thus 'saṃsārin' literally means that which is capable of repeated movement—voluntary or involuntary. The word, on the whole, stands for those individual souls which move from one birth to another. Birth is followed by death, and death again by birth until the *karmic* bondage is exhausted. There are individuals in transmigration who are found to be confined in a physical organism which is fixed, stationary, and incapable of locomotion, though they need

to quit their position being subject to natural afflictions. Those again which have mobile body can move away from a position of disadvantage to one of advantage. They are called *trasas*, being derived from \sqrt{tras} , to move.

४. पृथिवी-अप्-तेजो-वायु-वनस्पतिकायिका एकेन्द्रियाः स्थावराः ।

पृथिवी कायो येषां ते पृथिवीकायिका इत्यादि । एते च एकस्य स्पर्श-
नेन्द्रियस्य सद्भावादेकेन्द्रियाः स्थावरसंज्ञां लभन्ते ।

पञ्चस्वपि स्थावरेषु सूक्ष्माः सर्वलोके, बादराश्च लोकैकदेशे ।

सर्वेऽपि प्रत्येकशरीरिणः, वनस्पतिस्तु साधारणशरीरोऽपि ।

4. *prthivī-ap-tejo-vāyu-vanaspatikāyikā ekendriyāḥ sthāvarāḥ.*

prthivī kāyo yeṣāṃ te prthivīkāyikā ityādi. ete ca ekasya sparśanendriyasya sadbhāvād ekendriyāḥ sthāvarasamjñāṃ labhante.

pañcav api sthāvāreṣu sūkṣmāḥ sarvaloke, bādarāś ca lokaikadeśe. sarve'pi pratyekaśarīriṇaḥ, vanaspātis tu sādharmaṇaśarīro'pi.

(Aph.) The one-sensed beings viz. earth-bodied, water-bodied, fire-bodied, air-bodied and plants are immobile beings. (IV)

(Gloss) The earth-bodied are those which have earth as their body, and so on. They are one-sensed because they have only one sense viz. touch, and are designated as immobile beings.

Among the five kinds of immobile beings, again, the subtle ones are spread over the whole of the cosmic space while the gross ones occupy only a part of it.

All these have their own individual bodies. Plants and trees, however, can possess a common body as well,

(Note) The common body, though inhabited by a number of living beings each having a distinct individuality of its own, serves as the common medium of inspiration and respiration, assimilation of food and the like.

५. द्वीन्द्रियादयस्त्रसाः ।

कुमि-पिपीलिका-भ्रमर-मनुष्यादीनां क्रमेण एकैकेन्द्रियवृद्ध्या द्वीन्द्रिया-
दयस्त्रसा ज्ञेयाः ।

क्वचित् तेजोवायु अपि ।

पृथिव्यादिषु प्रत्येकमसंख्येया जीवाः । वनस्पतिषु संख्येय-असंख्येय-
अनन्ताः । द्वीन्द्रियादिषु पुनरसंख्येयाः ।

समानजातोयांकुरोत्पादात्, शस्त्रानुपहतद्रवत्वात्, आहारेण-

वृद्धिदर्शनात्, अपराप्रेरितत्वे तिर्यगनियतगतिमत्त्वात्, छेदादिभि-
र्गलन्यादिदर्शनाच्च क्रमेण पृथिव्यादीनां जीवत्वं संसाधनीयम् ।

आप्तवचनाद्वा, तथा चागमः—

“पुढविकाइया णं भन्ते ! किं ! सागारोवउत्ता अणागारोवउत्ता ?
गोयमा ! सागारोवउत्ता वि अणागारोवउत्ता वि ।”

5. *dvīndriyādayas trasāḥ.*

kṛmi-pipīlikā-bhramara-manuṣyādīnāṃ krameṇa ekaikendriyavṛ-
ddhyā dvīndriyādayas trasā jñeyāḥ.

kvacit tejovāyū api.

prṥthivyādiṣu pratyekam asaṃkhyeyā jīvāḥ. vanaspatiṣu saṃkhyeya-
asaṃkhyeya-anantāḥ. dvīndriyādiṣu punar asaṃkhyeyāḥ.

samānajatīyāṅkurotpādāt, śāstrānupahataadvratvāt, āhāreṇa
vṛddhidarśanāt, aparāpreritātve tiryag aniyatagatimattvāt chedā-
dibhir glānyādidarśanāc ca krameṇa prṥthivyādīnāṃ jīvatvaṃ
saṃsāadhanīyam.

āptavacanād vā, tathā cāgamah—

“puḍhavikāiyā ṇaṃ bhante ! kiṃ sāgārovauttā aṇāgārovauttā ?
Goyamā ! sāgārovauttā vi aṇāgārovauttā vi.”¹

(Aph.) The beings possessed of two or more sense-organs are under
the category of the *trasa* (mobile). (V)

(Gloss) Worms, ants, black-bees, human beings and the like are
possessed of two, three, four or five sense-organs respectively.

These are to be known as *trasa* (mobile).

According to some, the fire and air-bodied are also called *trasa*.

In each of the earth-bodied etc., the number of *jīvas* is innumera-
ble. In vegetable-bodied, the number may be numerable, innumerable or
infinite. In the beings possessed of two or more sense-organs, the
number, however, is innumerable.

The animate nature of the one-sensed earth-bodied beings and the
like is to be proved respectively by means of the probantia, viz. replica-

१ पन्नवणा पद २६ ।

१ Pannavaṇā pada XXIX.

tion¹, 'fluidity in the absence of injury by any weapon', 'nourishment on account of food' and 'unrestricted horizontal motion which is not effected from outside' and 'the perception of withering on account of being pierced (by weapon)'.

Their animate nature can be proved also by the testimony of the omniscient. Thus runs the scripture—

"Are the earth-bodied beings and the like, O Lord, possessed of determinate consciousness or indeterminate consciousness!" "They are, O Gotama, possessed of determinate consciousness as well as indeterminate consciousness."²

(Note) The attribute of locomotion is of two kinds—(i) spontaneous and unde-liberate, and (ii) deliberate and voluntary. The former is a purely physical motion and is present in fire-bodied and air-bodied living beings though they are possessed of one sense only. The latter is possible only in beings which are possessed of two or more senses and is due to the acquisition of independent capacity for such. It should be observed that this differentiation of souls as immobile and mobile holds good in the case of souls in bondage and has no relevancy so far as the emancipated souls are concerned.

६. समनस्काऽमनस्काश्च ।

समनस्कादीर्घकालिकविचारणात्मिकया संज्ञया युक्ताः संज्ञिन इति ।
असंज्ञिनोऽमनस्काः ।

6. *samanaskā'manaskāś ca.*

samanaskādīrghakālikavicāraṇātmikayā saṁjñayā yuktāḥ saṁjñīna
iti.
asaṁjñīno'manaskāḥ.

(Aph.) Souls are again classifiable under two heads viz. (i) endowed with mind and (ii) unendowed with mind. (VI)

(Gloss) 'Endowed' with mind' means equipped with *saṁjñā*, that is, possessed of *saṁjñā* which is of the nature of thought relating to the past, present and future. (The souls which are) devoid of *saṁjñā* are without mind. ('Endowed with mind' means equipped with capacity

1 Cf. "Not only do living things feed and grow; they also reproduce almost exact copies of themselves. To do this, they must pass on information which can be used to direct the building of the copies; this is the process of genetical inheritance, the information being contained and passed on in a genetic code. The copies will be built from materials in the environment that are absorbed and reformed into the materials of the living body"—*Mind Alive*, Vol. I, p. 22.

2 *Paṇḍitavāṇā*, pada XXIX.

for thought. The souls which are possessed of the capacity of sustained thought-activity are those which are endowed with mind. Other souls which are devoid of thought-activity are regarded as destitute of mind).

(Note) *Samjñā*, thought-capacity, is the faculty which is possessed by beings which have developed a modicum of rational power. Ordinarily it means consciousness which is possessed by all souls. This thought-capacity is exemplified in the recollection of the past, anticipation of the future and determination of the proper line of action. This is called capacity for sustained thought (*dīrghakālikī samjñā*). This capacity is also illustrated by the discrimination of good and evil (*hetuvādikī*).

७. नारकदेवा गर्भजतिर्यङ्मनुष्याश्च समनस्काः ।

7. *nārakadevā garbhajatiryaṅmanuṣyāś ca samanaskāḥ.*

(Aph.) The denizens of hell and heaven as well as the vertebrate animals, and human beings are endowed with mind. (VII)

८. अन्येऽमनस्काः ।

संमूर्च्छंजास्तिर्यञ्चो मनुष्याश्चामनस्का भवन्ति ।

8. *anye'manaskāḥ.*

sammūrchajās tiryāñco manuṣyāś cāmanaskā bhavanti.

(Aph.) Others are without mind. (VIII)

(Gloss) The invertebrate animals and human beings born asexually are without mind.

९. पर्याप्ताऽपर्याप्तादयोऽपि ।

जीवाः पर्याप्ता अपर्याप्ताश्च । आदिशब्दात् सूक्ष्मवादर-सम्यग्दृष्टि-
भिण्यादृष्टि-संयतासंयत-प्रमत्ताप्रमत्त - सरागवीतराग - छद्मस्थकेवलि-
सयोग्ययोगि-वेदत्रय-गतिचतुष्टय-जातिपञ्चक - कायषट्क - जीवस्थान-
चतुर्दशक-जीवभेदचतुर्दशक-दण्डकचतुर्विंशतिप्रभृतयो भूयांसो भेदा जीव-
तत्त्वस्य भावनीयाः ।

9. *paryāptā'paryāptādayo'pi,*

*jīvāḥ paryāptā aparyāptāś ca. ādiśabdāt sūkṣmabādara-samyag-
dṛṣṭimithyādrṣṭi-saṁyatasāmyata-pramattāpramatta-sarāgavītarāga-
chadmasthakevali-sayogyayogi-vedatraya-gaticatuṣṭaya-jātipañcaka-
kāyaṣaṭka-jīvasthānacaturdaśaka-jīvabhedacaturdaśaka- daṇḍakaca-
turviṁśatiprabhṛtayo bhūyāṁso bhedā jīvatattvasya bhāvanīyāḥ.*

(Aph.) (The souls) can also be classified as 'developed' and 'undeveloped' and the like. (IX)

(Gloss) The souls may be 'developed' as well as 'undeveloped'. The expression 'and the like' refers to the following and many other classifications of the soul-principle : subtle, gross; possessed of right attitude, possessed of wrong attitude; possessed of self-control and devoid of self-control; remiss and spiritually alert; possessed of attachment and devoid of attachment; non-omniscient and omniscient; possessed of activities and devoid of activities; three-fold sex characteristics; four forms of existence; five classes; six types of bodies; fourteen stages of spiritual development; fourteen types of souls; twenty-four *daṇḍakas*, and the like.

(Note) : The beings who have accomplished the *paryāpti*s available to them are 'developed' and those who have not done so are 'underdeveloped'. See aphs. 10, 11.

१०. भवारम्भे पौद्गलिकसामर्थ्यनिर्माणं पर्याप्तिः ।

10. *bhavārambhe paudgalikasāmarthyānirmāṇam paryāptiḥ.*

(Aph.) Bio-potential (*paryāpti*) means the building up of material forces at the very beginning of rebirth. (X)

११. आहार-शरीरेन्द्रियोच्छ्वासनिःश्वास-भाषा-मनांसि ।

आहारप्रायोग्य - पुद्गल - ग्रहण-परिणमनोत्सर्गरूपं पौद्गलिक-सामर्थ्यो-त्पादनमाहारपर्याप्तिः । एवं शरीरादिपर्याप्तयोऽपि भावनीयाः ।

षण्णामपि प्रारम्भ उत्पत्तिसमये, पूर्तिस्त्वाहारपर्याप्तेरेकसमयेन, शेषाणां च क्रमेणैकैकेनान्तर्मुहूर्तेन ।

यत्र भवे येन यावत्यः पर्याप्तयः करणीयास्तावतीष्वसमाप्तासु सोऽपर्याप्तः, समाप्तासु च पर्याप्त इति ।

11. *āhāra-śarīrendriyocchvāsaniḥśvāsa-bhāṣā-manāṁsi.*

āharaprāyogya-pudgala-grahaṇa-pariṇamanotsargarūpaṁ paudgalikasāmarthyotpādanam āhāraparyāptiḥ. evaṁ śarīrādiparyāptayo'pi bhāvanīyāḥ.

ṣaṇṇām api prārambha utpattisamaye, pūrtis tv āhāraparyāpter ekasamayena, śeṣāṇām ca krameṇaikaikenāntarmuhūrtena.

yatra bhava yena yāvatyaḥ paryāptayaḥ karaṇīyās tāvatīṣv asamāptāsu so'paryāptaḥ, samāptāsu ca paryāpta iti.

(Aph.) The *paryāpti* is six-fold, viz. aliment, body, sense-organ, inhaling and exhaling, speech, and mind, (XI)

(Gloss) The alimentary bio-potential (*āhāra-paryāpti*) means the

production of material capacity functioning as appropriation, transformation and elimination of alimentary matter. The bio-potentials of body etc. are also to be understood similarly. All the six bio-potentials come into existence at the time of rebirth, but the development of the alimentary bio-potential takes place in one instant and of the rest within one *muhūrta* gradually. An organism born in a particular state of existence is *developed* or *underdeveloped* in respect of bio-potentials according as the development of its relevant bio-potentials has reached completion or remains incomplete.

१२. तदपेक्षिणी जीवनशक्तिः प्राणः ।

12. tadapekṣiṇī jīvanaśaktiḥ prāṇaḥ.

(Aph.) *Prāṇa* means the bio-energy which is dependent upon *pariāpti* (bio-potentials). (XII)

(Note) In connection with the Jaina concepts of *prāṇa* and *pariāpti*, there are special considerations in the light of the modern conception of life as ‘an energy capable of organising matter gathered from outside into the body of a living organism.’

In modern terms *pariāpti* means the power of “organisation” of material from the environment into special pattern.

“All living things are ‘organised’, even if, like a virus, they consist of little more than protein and nucleic acids.....This ‘organisation’ is a highly improbable state for matter to be in. All inanimate matter—and dead matter—tends to become more and more disordered and randomly scattered. To a physicist, this is known as the tendency to increase ‘entropy’, for entropy is simply a measure of disorder. To counter this probable tendency, energy is required, so living things can only retain their organised state—of low entropy—by respiration and the production of energy.” *Mind Alive*, Vol. I, p. 22.

The Jaina conception of *prāṇa* and *pariāpti* comes very near the modern idea of ‘energy’ mentioned in the above quotation. It has already been mentioned in the present aphorism that the bio-energy is *prāṇa* needed for *pariāpti*. The *pariāptis* are bio-potentials that are brought to their proper functioning by the power of *prāṇa*, in the absence of which they are incapable of attaining their maturity.

१३. इन्द्रियबलोच्छ्वासनिःश्वासाऽऽयुषि ।

पञ्च इन्द्रियाणि मनोवाक्कायरूपं बलत्रयम् उच्छ्वासनिःश्वासाऽऽयु-
श्चेति दशविधाः प्राणाः ।

पर्याप्तोनां प्राणानां च योग एव जीवनं, तेषां वियोगश्च मृत्युः ।

13. indriyabalo'cchvāsaniḥśvāsā'yūṁṣi.

pañca indriyāṇi manovākkāyarūpaṁ balatrayam ucchvāsaniḥśvāsā-

yuś ceti daśavidhāḥ prāṇāḥ.

paryāptīnām prāṇānām ca yoga eva jīvanam, teṣāṁ viyogaś ca mṛtyuḥ.

(Aph.) (They are) the sense-organs, power, respiration and life-span. (XIII)

(Gloss) The *prāṇas* are tenfold: the five sense-organs, the three powers of mind, speech and body; the respiration; and life-span.

The combination of the bio-potentials and the bio-energies is indeed life, and their disjunction is death.

१४. गर्भोपपातसंमूर्च्छनानि जन्म ।

जन्म, उत्पत्तिः, भव इति पर्यायाः ।

14. *garbhopapātasamūrcchanāni janma.*

janma, utpattiḥ, bhava iti paryāyāḥ.

(Aph.) Birth can be (of three kinds according as it is) vertebrate (*garbhaja*), spontaneous and accomplished (*upapātaja*) or invertebrate (*samūrcchima*). (XIV)

(Gloss) Birth, origination and worldly life are synonymous.

(Note) The Jain conception of *samūrcchima* includes *rasaja*, *saṁsvedaja* and *udbhijja*¹. The earliest classification of animals in the Brāhmaṇical literature is found in the *Suśruta-saṁhitā* where the *jaṅgamas* are classified as *jarāyuja*, *aṇḍaja*, *svedaja* and *udbhijja*. In the Buddhist tradition, four *yonis* viz. *aṇḍaja*, *jarāyuja*, *saṁsvedaja* and *upapāduka* are recognised². There is no *yoni* ascribed to the vegetable kingdom. In the *Suśruta-saṁhitā*³, the vegetable kingdom is comprised under four-fold *sthāvara* viz. (i) *vanaspatī* (producing fruit without flower), (ii) *vykṣa* (producing both flower and fruit), (iii) *vīruda* (creepers) and (iv) *auśadhi* (which die after producing fruit). In the *Manusmṛti*⁴, the *sthāvaras* are included under *udbhijja* unlike the *Suśruta-saṁhitā*, which places *īndragopa* (snail), *maṇḍuka* (frog) etc. under *udbhijja*.

Samūrcchima—That which is not vertebrate and not born in womb is *samūrcchima*.

१५. जराय्वण्डपोतजानां गर्भः ।

जरायुजाः—नृ-गवाद्याः । अण्डजाः—पक्षि-सर्पाद्याः । पोतजाः—

1 Āyāro 1/118 (J.V.B.).

2 Abhidharmakośa, III/8. (p. 40 of vol. II, Bauddha Bhāratī Series, Varanasi)

3 Vol I, p. 7. (Choukhambha ed.).

4 1/46.

५ यज्जालवत् प्राणिपरिवरणं विततमांसशोणितं तज्जरायुः, तज्जाता जरायुजाः ।

६ पोता एव जाता इति पोतजाः शुद्धप्रसवाः, न जरायवादिनां वेष्टिता इति यावत् ।

कुञ्जर-शशकादयः ।

15. *jarāyvaṇḍapota-jānām garbhaḥ.*

jarāyujāḥ¹—nṛ-gavādyāḥ. aṇḍajāḥ—pakṣi-sarpādyāḥ. potajāḥ²—kuñjara-śaśakādayaḥ.

(Aph.) The vertebrate are threefold, viz. those born with membranous envelope called 'placenta', 'oviparous', and those born without any covering. (XV)

(Gloss) Human beings, cows and the like are born with membranous envelope called 'placenta' (*jarāyuja*)³. 'Oviparous' animals, i.e. birds, reptiles and the like are born from eggs. Elephants, hares and the like are born uncovered (*potaja*)⁴

१६. देवनारकाणामुपपातः ।

16. *devanārakāṇām upapātaḥ.*

(Aph.) (The birth) of the denizens of heaven and hell is called spontaneous and accomplished (in the sense that they are born suddenly from non-living things and with all their limbs and the body completely developed and grown-up). (XVI)

१७. शेषाणां सम्मूर्च्छनम् ।

17. *śeṣāṇām saṁmūrcchanam.*

(Aph.) (The birth) of the rest is *saṁmūrcchana*. (XVII)

(Note) The one-, two-, three-, and four-sensed beings are, as a rule, invertebrates whereas the five-sensed are necessarily vertebrates, if not *saṁmūrcchima*.⁵

- 1 yajjālavat prāṇiparivaraṇaṁ vitatamāmsaśoṇitaṁ tajjarāyuh, tajjātā jarāyujāḥ.
- 2 potā eva jātā iti potajāḥ śuddhaprasavāḥ, na jarāyvādinā veṣṭitā iti yāvat.
- 3 The *jarāyu* (placenta) is like a net consisting of flesh and blood, and the embryo is enveloped in it. The beings that are born with placenta are called *jarāyuja*.
- 4 *Potaja* beings are those which are of pure origin like *pota* (foetus which has no enveloping membrane like a young animal or plant). They are not covered by net of flesh and blood (*jarāyu*) and the like. *Potaja* is a class of placental mammal comprising the desiduata with the exception of Man, the Apes and Carnivora. The term *potaja* is intended to signify that these animals are born without the placenta which is thrown off as an after-birth. (Cf. Dr. Brajendra Nath Seal : *The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus*, p. 188).
- 5 All beings born through asexual reproduction are necessarily *saṁmūrcchima*. With reference to the "asexual reproduction" it is said that, it is the rule in the simple animals.The cells of the adult animal merely split into two, each

In the Buddhist¹ tradition it is recognised that humans can be born of egg and of moisture, and also in a spontaneous accomplished form.

In the Brāhmaṇical² tradition also, human beings are believed to be produced otherwise than *jarāyuja* (born with placenta) by the power of merit (*dharma*) as in the case of Droṇa, Kṛpa, Kṛpi, Dhṛṣṭadyumna etc.

१८. सचित्ता^३सचित्त-शीतो^४ष्ण-संवृत^५-विवृता^६स्तन्मिश्राश्च योनयः ।

योनिः—उत्पत्तिस्थानम्, तन्मिश्राः—सचित्ताचित्ताः शीतोष्णाः संवृत-विवृताः ।

18. *sacitta*³ *citta-sīto*⁴ *ṣṇa-saṁvṛta*⁵ *-vivṛtāś*⁶ *tanmiśrāś ca yonayaḥ*.

yonih—utpattisthānam; tanmiśrāḥ—sacittācittāḥ, śitoṣṇāḥ saṁvṛta-vivṛtāḥ.

(Aph.) The birth-places can be animate³ or inanimate, cold⁴ or hot, covered⁵ or uncovered⁶ as well as endowed with plausible combinations. (XVIII)

(Gloss). Birth-place means the place of origination. 'Plausible combination' means combination of animate and inanimate, cold and hot, covered and uncovered.

producing two identical 'daughter'-cells, which, then, separate to live as two new individuals—*Mind Alive*, vol. IV, p. 889.

It should be noted here that some higher species (also) use asexual reproduction. As the phrase implies, this form of reproduction is achieved without the sexual paraphernalia of 'sperms' and 'eggs'. Asexual reproduction is the ability of an individual to produce offsprings without the fusion of sperms and eggs. A potato plant is a good example.

"Asexual reproduction is a common feature from the top to the bottom of the plant kingdom, although astonishing variety of methods is used."—*Ibid*, p. 904. "Asexual reproduction is a good deal less common among members of animal kingdom than it is among plants."—*Ibid*, p. 904

1 Abhidharmakośa, III/9

2 *Yuktidīpikā* on *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, 39. (Origin and Development of the Sāṃkhya System of Thought, p. 281).

३ जीवच्छरीरम्

3 jīvaccharīram (living body).

४ शीतस्पर्शवत्

4 śītasparśavat (possessed of cold touch).

५ दिव्यशय्यादिवत्

5 divyaśayyādivat (like a divine bed and the like).

६ जलाशयादिवत्

6 jalāśayādivat (like a lake and the like).

(Note) *Sacitta*—the body of a living animal.

Acitta—the place of birth of gods and hellish beings is *acitta*, i.e., inanimate.

Śita—‘having cold touch’. It is where hellish beings are born.

Uṣṇa—It is where fire-bodied beings originate.

Samvṛta—It is like the bed of gods, in which gods, hellish creatures and one-sensed beings are born.

Vivṛta—It is like a lake. This is the place of origin of beings with mutilated organs, and also brutes and a species of men, who are not born in any restricted region, nor are conceived in the mother’s womb.

१९. अचेतनोऽजीवः ।

यस्मिन् साकाराज्ञाकारलक्षण उपयोगो नास्ति सोऽजीवोऽचेतन इति ।

19. *acetano’jīvaḥ.*

yasmin sākārā’ñākāralakṣaṇa upayogo nāsti so’jīvo’cetana iti.

(Aph.) Absence of consciousness is the defining characteristic of non-soul. (XIX)

(Gloss) An entity which is devoid of determinate or indeterminate consciousness (in one word, cognitive activity) is called non-soul. It is also designated as inanimate.

२०. धर्माधर्माकाशकालपुद्गलास्तद्भेदाः ।

एतेषां लक्षणानि प्राङ् निरूपितानि ।

20. *dharmā’dharmākāśa-kāla-pudgalās tadbhedāḥ.*

eteṣāṃ lakṣaṇāni prañ nirūpitāni.

(Aph.) *Dharma* (substance which is the condition of motion), *adharma* (substance which is the condition of rest), space, time and matter are the varieties of it (viz. non-soul). (XX)

(Gloss) The defining characteristics of these have been set forth before.

इति जीवाजीवभेदनिर्णयः ।

iti jīvājīvabhedanirṇayaḥ.

Here ends (the Third Lustre called) “The Ascertainment of the Classification of Soul and Non-soul” (of the *Jaina-siddhānta-dīpikā* compiled by Śrī Tulasīgaṇin).

चतुर्थ प्रकाशः LUSTRE IV

१. आत्मप्रवृत्त्याकुष्टास्तत्प्रायोग्यपुद्गलाः कर्म ।

आत्मनः प्रवृत्त्या आकुष्टाः कर्मप्रायोग्याः—चतुःस्पर्शिनः अनन्तप्रदेशिनः
कर्मवर्गणास्कन्धाः कर्मसंज्ञामश्नुवते । लोके प्रवृत्तिरपि कर्मशब्देन
व्यपदिश्यते ।

1. *ātmapravṛtṭyākṛṣṭās tatprāyogyapudgalāḥ karma.*

ātmanah pravṛtṭyā ākṛṣṭāḥ karmaprāyogyāḥ—catuḥsparsīnaḥ anan-
tapradeśīnaḥ karmavargaṇāśkandhāḥ karmasamjñām āśnuvate.
loke pravṛttir api karmasābdena vyapadiśyate.

(Aph.) Material aggregates attracted by the activities of the soul and
fit for it (that is, for being transformed into different varieties of *karman*)
are called *karman*.¹ (I)

- 1 The term *karman* is mostly used as standing for the *karmic* matter that is attract-
ed by the activity of the soul (*ātmapravṛtṭi*). This is, exactly speaking, the defini-
tion of *dravya karman*. So far as *bhāva karman* is concerned, it is identical with
the activity of the soul, under the influence of the predispositions, good and bad,
consequent upon the functioning of the past *karman* in the form of rising (*udaya*)
and subsidence or destruction or destruction-cum-subsidence of the *nāma karman*,
mohanīya karman and *antarāya karman*.

In this connection an analysis of the functioning of the soul in respect of
worldly activities is felt necessary. The ultimate source of any activity, whether
of mind or speech or body, is fundamentally due to the rise of *nāma karman* and
the subsidence-cum-destruction or destruction of the *vīryāntarāya karman*, and
the rise or subsidence/destruction/subsidence-cum-destruction of the *mohanīya*
karman. The rise of the *nāma karman* is, in a sense, invariably necessary for the
materialization of activity, though it is only an auxiliary condition, and not as
fundamental as the rise etc. of *mohanīya* and the *antarāya karman*. Thus, while
the *bhāva karman* relates to the soul itself, the *dravya karman* is identical with the
karmic bodies attracted on account of the three-fold activity (which is also called
karman) that originate from the soul quā *bhāva karman*.

In this way, though *karman* stands for the *bhāva karman* as well as the
dravya karman, in popular Jaina parlance, *karman* stands for *dravya karman*, and
this has been followed by the author in the exposition of the Jaina doctrine of
karman in the present treatise.

(Gloss) There is the series of material aggregates possessed of the potentiality of getting transformed into *karman*, that constitute the *karma-vargaṇā*¹ bodies. Such series is possessed of infinite space-points and four kinds of touch². These bodies are attracted on account of the (good and bad) activities of the soul and are known as *karman*³ (i.e.

- 1 The Jainas conceive an infinite number of groups, called *vargaṇās*, of atoms. The first *vargaṇā* is conceived to contain only such atoms as remain alone and solitary and have not formed composite bodies with others. The second group contains composites of two atoms. The third group contains composites of three atoms. And so on. By this process, we arrive at a group which contains composites of an infinite number of atoms, which is fit for the making up of the *audārīka* (gross) body such as of men and animals. This group is followed by an infinite number of groups which are all competent for making the stuff of *audārīka* body. Then follows a number of groups which are incompetent for any kind of body. Again, by the same process we reach an infinite number of groups which are competent to form the stuff of the *vaīkriya* (subtle) body such as of celestial beings. And by following the same process as above, another infinite number of groups are reached which are capable of forming the stuff of *āhāraka* body such as of an ascetic having special powers. Similarly by repeating the same process we obtain groups which are competent for *taijasa* (luminous) body, *bhāṣā* (speech), *ānāpāna* (respiration), *manas* (mind) and *karman*. It is to be noticed in this connection that a composite body of the group that follows consists of greater number of atoms but occupies less space in comparison with a composite body of the group that precedes. Thus a composite body of the *karma-vargaṇā* consists of more atoms but occupies less space in comparison with a composite body of *mano-vargaṇā*, which, again consists of more atoms but occupies less space in comparison with a composite body of the *ānāpāna-vargaṇā*. And so on.—*Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, p. 65.
- 2 The particles of *karmic* matter are possessed of four kinds of touch—cold, hot, viscous and dry.
- 3 The Jaina philosophers believe in the law of *karman* in common with the other schools of Indian philosophy. The whole world of living beings exists from beginningless time and the conditions of their career, good or bad, are not due to accident or chance or the arbitrary will of a despotic ruler of universe. They are what they are as the result of moral values of their own actions—good or bad. Though there is a common agreement in this respect, the Jainas differ from other philosophers in their conception of *karman* as material bodies which become moral forces after being integrated with the soul. The soul is thus not entirely amorphous, because it has points. There are infinite varieties of material bodies from atoms to gross bodies of varying magnitudes. Those material bodies, as explained in footnote 1, which are capable of being transformed into moral forces and tendencies are called *karmic* matter, the power of transformation issuing forth exclusively from the soul. The bondage of the soul is thus literal and not figurative. It is the actual relationship of foreign *karmic* matter attached to the being of the self. The total elimination and expulsion of *karmic* matter from the inner constitution of the self is called emancipation.

karmic matter). In common parlance the activity itself is designated by the word '*karman*'.

२. तच्चावरणविकारप्रतिघातशुभाशुभहेतु ।

तत्कर्म ज्ञानदर्शनयोरावरणस्य दृष्टिचारित्रयोर्विकारस्य शक्तेः प्रति-
घातस्य वेदनीयादिना शुभाशुभस्य च हेतु भवति ।

2. *taccāvaraṇa-vikāra-pratighāta-śubhāśubhahetu*.

tatkarma jñānadarśanayor āvaraṇasya dṛṣṭicāritrayor vikārasya
śakteḥ pratighātasya vedanīyādinā śubhāśubhasya ca hetu bhavati.

(Aph.) That (namely, the *karman*) is the cause of covering, distortion, destruction, and good and bad states. (II)

(Gloss) That *karman* is the cause of the covering of knowledge and intuition, distortion of faith and conduct, obstruction of power, and the states that are good and bad on account of the feeling-producing *karman* and the like.

३. ज्ञानदर्शनावरणवेदनीयमोहनीयायुष्कनामगोत्रान्तरायभेदादष्टधा ।

ज्ञानदर्शनयोरावरणम्—ज्ञानावरणं दर्शनावरणं च ।

सुखदुःखहेतु—वेदनीयम् ।

दर्शनचारित्रयोर्विकारापादनाद् मोहयत्यात्मानमिति मोहनीयम् ।

एति भवस्थिति जीवो येनेति आयुः ।

चतुर्गतिषु नानापार्यायप्राप्तिहेतु नाम ।

उच्चनीचभेदं गच्छति येनेति गोत्रम् ।

शक्तिप्रतिघातकमन्तरायः ।

3. *jñānadarśanāvaraṇa-vedanīya-mohanīyā - yuṣka-nāma-gotrā-ntarāya-bhedād aṣṭadhā*.

jñāna-darśanayor āvaraṇam—jñānāvaraṇam darśanāvaraṇam ca.
sukhaduḥkhaḥetu—vedanīyam.

darśanacāritrayor vikārāpādanād mohayaty ātmānam iti mohanīyam.
eti bhavasthitim jīvo yeneti āyuh.

caturgatiṣu nānāparyāyaprāptihetu nāma.

uccānīcabhedam gacchati yeneti gotram.

śaktipratighātakam antarāyaḥ.

(Aph.) There are eight types of *karman* : knowledge-obscurant, intuition-obscurant, feeling-determining, deluding, life-span-determining, body-determining, rank-determining and hindrance-producing. (III)

(Gloss) There are eight fundamental types of *karman*. The two that obscure knowledge and intuition are respectively known as knowledge-obscurant and intuition-obscurant.

The feeling-determining *karman* is the cause of pleasures and sufferings.

The deluding (*karman*) is so called because it deludes the soul by distorting its (faculty of) enlightened faith and volitional attitude and conduct.

Āyus (life-span-determining *karman*) is so called because it determines the soul to have a fixed term of life in its worldly career.

The body-determining *karman* is the cause of the attainment of different forms in the four realms of existence (viz. hellish, animal, human, celestial).

On account of the rank-determining *karman* one comes to possess high or low status (in society).

Hindrance-producing *karman* causes obstruction to the exercise of the inherent powers (of making gifts and the like).

४. घाति अघाति च ।

ज्ञानावरण-दर्शनावरण-मोहनीयान्तरायचतुष्कं घाति, शेषचतुष्कं च अघाति ।

4. *ghāti aghāti ca.*

jñānāvaraṇa-darśanāvaraṇa-mohanīyāntarāyacatuṣkaṁ ghāti, śeṣacatuṣkaṁ ca aghāti.

(Aph.) It is twofold, namely destroying and non-destroying. (IV)

(Gloss) The destroying are knowledge-covering, intuition-covering, deluding and obstructing, the remaining four, namely *nāma* (body-making), *āyuṣya* (life-span-determining), *gotra* (status-determining) and *vedanīya* (feeling-producing) *karman*, are non-destroying.

(Note) The *ghātin karmans* are so called because they obstruct the rise of *kevalajñāna* and *kevaladarśana* on account of their destroying (*ghāta*) the power of the soul to manifest omniscience. The *ghāti karmans* have, moreover, been designated as *bijabandhana* (*bandhana* quā seed) as distinguished from the *aghāti karmans* that have been designated as *phalabandhana* (*bandhana* quā effect). In other words the

efficacy of producing fresh *bandha* belongs to the *ghāti karmans* whereas the *aghāti karmans*, being resultant, pure and simple, are devoid of such efficacy,

Another problem incidental to the concept of *ghātin* and *aghātin karman* is the nature of infinite bliss in the absence of the *ghāti karmans*. So long as the *aghāti karmans* are there, physical joy and suffering continue along with the infinite bliss consequent upon the destruction of the *ghāti karmans*, specifically the category of *mohaniya karman*. The physical joy and suffering, in this case, should be considered as only *upādhi* of the *jīva*, that does not essentially affect the nature of the infinite bliss. The *jīva*, however, is freed from this *upādhi* on the attainment of disembodied emancipation i.e. *siddhatva*. The infinite bliss the freed from *upādhi* is technically called *avyābādha sukha* on account of the absence of *upādhi* which acted as an impediment (*vyābādha*) that hindered the manifestation of the perfect state of the bliss.

५. बन्ध-उद्धर्तना - अपवर्तना - सत्ता-उदय-उदीरणा-संक्रमण-उपशम-निघत्ति-निकाचनास्तदवस्थाः ।

एतासु अष्टौ करणशब्दवाच्याः । यदाह^१—

“बन्धसंकमणुवट्टणा, अववट्टणा उदीरणया ।

उवसामणा निहत्ति निकायणा चत्ति करणाइ ॥”

बन्धोऽनन्तरं वक्ष्यते ।

कर्मणां स्थित्यनुभागवृद्धिः—उद्धर्तना ।

स्थित्यनुभागहानिः—अपवर्तना ।

अबाधाकालो विद्यमानता च—सत्ता ।

उदयो द्विविधः । यत्र फलानुभवः स विपाकोदयः । केवलं प्रदेशवेदनम्—प्रदेशोदयः ।

नियतकालात् प्राक् उदयः—उदीरणा, इयं चापवर्तनापेक्षिणी ।

सजातीयप्रकृतीनां मिथः परिवर्तनं संक्रमणा^२ ।

उदयोदीरणानिघत्तिनिकाचनाऽयोग्यत्वम्—उपशमः ।

उद्धर्तनापवर्तनं विहाय शेषकरणायोग्यत्वम्—निघत्तिः ।

समस्तकरणायोग्यत्वम्—निकाचना ।

१ शिवशर्मकृत ‘कर्मप्रकृतिः’, मलयगिरिकृत टीका सहित, देवचन्द लालभाई पुस्तकोद्धार फंड प्रकाशन, बम्बई, १९१२ ।

२ यथा—अध्यवसायविशेषेण सातवेदनीयम् असातवेदनीयरूपेण; असातवेदनीयं च सातवेदनीयरूपेण परिणमति ।

आयुषः प्रकृतीनां दर्शनमोहचारित्रमोहयोश्च मिथः संक्रमणा न भवति ।

5. *bandha-udvartanā-apavartanā-sattā - udaya - udīraṇā - saṁkramaṇa-upaśama-nidhatti-nikācanās tadavasthāḥ.*

etāsu aṣṭau karaṇaśabdavācyaḥ. yadāh¹—

“bandhaṇa-saṁkamaṇuvvattāṇā, avavattāṇā udīraṇayā/
uvasāmaṇā nihatti, nikāyaṇā catti karaṇāim”//

bandho’nantaraṁ vakṣyate.

karmaṇāṁ sthityanubhāgavṛddiḥ—udvartanā.

sthityanubhāgahāniḥ—apavartanā.

abādhākālo vidyamānatā ca—sattā.

udayo dvididhaḥ. yatra phalānubhavaḥ sa vipākodayaḥ. kevalaṁ pradeśavedanam—pradeśodayaḥ.

niyatakālāt prāk udayaḥ—udīraṇā, iyaṁ cāpavartanāpekṣiṇī.

sajātīyaprakṛtīnaṁ mithaḥ parivartanaṁ saṁkramaṇā.²

udayodīraṇā-nidhatti-nikācanā’yogyatvam—upaśamaḥ.

udvartanāpavartanaṁ vihāya śeṣakaraṇāyogyatvam—nidhattiḥ.

saṁstakaraṇāyogyatvam—nikācanā.

(Aph.) Bondage, augmentation, attenuation, existence, realization, premature realization, transference, subsidence, *nidhatti* or incapability of all these processes excepting augmentation and attenuation, and *nikācanā* or incapacitation of all these processes—these are the various states of it (viz. *karman*). (V)

(Gloss) These are the states of *karman*. Of these, eight are to be designated by the term ‘operation’ (*karaṇa*). Thus it is said—“Bondage, transference, augmentation, attenuation, premature realization, subsidence, *nidhatti* and *nikācanā* are the operations.”

Bondage will be explained immediately (in the next aphorism). Augmentation is the increase in the duration and intensity (productive capacity) of *karman*. Attenuation is the decrease in the duration and intensity of *karman*. Existence is the time of non-fruition and presistence. Realization is two-fold. When the effect is enjoyed it is a case of realization of the fruit, while the enjoyment of the (innocuous) space-

1 *Karmaprakṛti* by Śiṣaśarman, with annotation by Malayagiri; Devacanda Lāla-bhāi Pustakodhāra Fund Prakāśana, Bombay, 1912.

2 yathā—adhyavasāyaviśeṣeṇa sātavedaniyaṁ asātavedaniyarūpeṇa; asāta-vedaniyaṁ ca sātavedaniyarūpeṇa pariṇamati.

ayuṣaḥ prakṛtīnāṁ darśanamohaçāritramohayoś ca mithaḥ saṁkramaṇā na bhavati.

points (of the *karmic* matter) is realization of the space-points, such enjoyment being only virtual and not factual. Premature realization is the realization before the fixed time and presupposes (the operation of) attenuation. Transference is the mutual transformation of the subtypes belonging to the same genus.

The subsidence is the process which makes deluding-*karman* unfit for self-realization, premature realization and *nidhatti* and *nikācanā*. *Nidhatti* is the process which makes the deluding-*karman* incapable of all these processes except augmentation and attenuation. The condition which renders such *karmic* matter incapable of all these operations is called *nikācanā*.

(Note) "It is of course not possible to find exact parallels of these states and processes in the non-Jaina systems. It is, however, possible to interpret some ideas of the Yoga school in terms of the Jaina conception. And this has been done by Upādhāyaya Yaśovijaya, the great Jaina scholar of modern times. He has suggested such comparisons in his brief Commentary on Patañjali's *Yogadarśana*. Thus, he says that the five afflictions of nescience (*avidyā*), egohood (*asmittā*), attachment (*rāga*), repulsion (*dveṣa*), and will to live (*abhiniveśa*) are the particular states of rise (*udaya*) of the deluding-*karman*. He interprets the dormant (*prasupta*) state of these (afflictions) as the period of non-production (*abādhakāla*) of the Jāinas. The insipient (*tanū*) state is interpreted as the state of subsidence (*upaśama*) or dissociation-cum-subsidence (*kṣayopaśama*) of the Jāinas. The interrupted (*vicchinna*) state is interpreted as the interruption of a particular *karman* on account of the rise of a *karman* of the opposite nature. The operative (*udāra*) state is interpreted as the state of rise (*udaya*) of the Jāinas. The Yoga school recognizes some traces of *karman* whose fruition is not certain (*anīyata-vīpākā*) inasmuch as such traces may perish before the time of their fruition, or may merge into a more powerful *karman*, or they may remain ineffective for ever being overpowered by the more powerful *karman*. This Yoga conception can be roughly compared with the Jaina conception of the process of transformation (*saṃkramaṇa*). The *karman* with unfailing fruition (*nīyata-vīpākā*) of the Yoga can be compared with the *nikācīta karman* of the Jāinas." —*Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, 259-60.

६. कर्मपुद्गलादानं बन्धः ।

जीवस्य कर्मपुद्गलानामादानम्—क्षीरनीरवत् परस्पराश्लेषः—बन्धोऽभिधीयते । स च प्रवाहरूपेण अनादिः, इतरेतरकर्मसम्बन्धरूपेण सादिः । अमूर्तस्यापि आत्मनः अनादिकर्मपुद्गलसम्बन्धवत्त्वेन कथंचिद् मूर्तत्वस्वीकारात् कर्मपुद्गलानां सम्बन्धो नासम्भवी ।

6. karmapudgalādānam bandhaḥ.

jīvasya karmapudgalānām ādānam—kṣīranīravat parasparāśleṣaḥ—bandho'bhīdhiyate. sa ca pravāharūpeṇa anādīḥ, itaretarakarma-saṃbandharūpeṇa sādīḥ.

amūrtasyāpi ātmanaḥ anādi-karmapudgala-sambhādhavattvena
kathañcin mūrtatvasvīkārāt karmapudgalānām sambandho nāsam-
bhavi.

(Aph.) Bondage is the acceptance of *karmic* matter. (VI)

(Gloss) Assimilation of *karmic* matter by the soul, that is, the mutual coalescence like the relation between milk and water, is called bondage.

It is beginningless from the viewpoint of unbroken continuity, but can be said to have beginning from the viewpoint of the bondage of different *karman*s (at different times). The coalescence of *karmic* matter (with the self) should not be deemed impossible on the ground of the amorphous nature of the self. Though the self is amorphous by itself, the relation with *karmic* matter is an ultimate fact which has no beginning in time. This relation makes the self subject to morphological determination.

(Note) The relation of 'self and *karman* is an ultimate fact which is accepted as a postulate because of the inescapable necessity of the admission of the law of *karman*. The law of *karman* explains the diversities and inequalities that undeniably exist in the world. Once the existence of *karman* is admitted, the problem of its relation with the self is only consequential.

७. प्रकृतिस्थित्यनुभागप्रदेशास्तद्भेदाः ।

7. *prakṛti-sthity-anubhāga-pradeśās tadbhedāḥ.*

(Aph.) Bondage is considered from four points of view viz. type, duration, intensity, and mass (of *karmic* matter). (VII)

८. सामान्योपात्तकर्मणां स्वभावः प्रकृतिः ।

सामान्येन गृहीतेषु कर्मसु एतज्ज्ञानस्य आवारकम्, एतच्च दर्शनस्य
इत्यादिरूपः स्वभावः प्रकृतिः ।

ज्ञानावरणाद्यष्टौ मूलप्रकृतयः । तासामुत्तरप्रकृतयः, यथा—ज्ञानावरणस्य
पञ्च, दर्शनावरणस्य नव, वेदनीयस्य द्वे, मोहनीयस्य दर्शनचारित्र्य-
भेदादष्टाविंशतिः, आयुषश्चतस्रः, नाम्नो द्विचत्वारिंशत्, गोत्रस्य द्वे,
अन्तरायस्य च पञ्च । सर्वा मिलिताः सप्तनवतिः ।

8. *sāmānyopāttakarmaṇām svabhāvaḥ prakṛtiḥ.*

sāmānyena gr̥hīteṣu karmasu etaj jñānasya āvāraḥ, etac ca dar-
śānasya ityādirūpaḥ svabhāvaḥ prakṛtiḥ.

jñānāvaraṇādyasṭau mūlaprakṛtayaḥ. tāsām uttaraparakṛtayaḥ, yathā-

jñānāvaraṇasya pañca, darśanāvaraṇasya nava, vedanīyasya dve, mohanīyasya darśanacāritrabhedād aṣṭāvimśatiḥ, āyusaś catasraḥ, nāmno dvicatvāriṃśat, gotrasya dve, antarāyasya ca pañca. sarvā militāḥ saptanavatiḥ.

(Aph.) The specific nature of the groups of *karmic* matter acquired wholesale (by the soul) constitutes the type (of bondage). (VIII)

(Gloss) Among the *karmans* that are acquired wholesale, the specific nature (of the different classes of *karmic* matter) such as “this is obscurant of knowledge,” “this of intuition” and the like makes up (i.e. is the basis of its classification under varying) types.

The knowledge-obscurant and the like are the eight fundamental types.

Their subtypes are as follows :—

The knowledge-obscurant has five (subtypes). The intuition-obscurant has nine (subtypes). The feeling-producing has two (subtypes). The two subdivisions, viz. faith-deluding and conduct-deluding of the deluding *karman* have (in total) twenty-eight (subtypes). The life-span-determining *karman* has four (subtypes). The body-determining *karman* has forty-two (subtypes). The family-determining has two (subtypes). The hindrance-producing *karman* has five (subtypes). In total, there are ninety-seven subtypes.

(Note) The different subtypes are enumerated in the Pannavaṇā, XXIII and Tattvārthadhigama-Sūtra, Chapter VIII.

६. कालावधारणं स्थितिः ।

यथा ज्ञानदर्शनावरणवेदनीयान्तरायाणां त्रिंशत्कोटिकोटिसागरोपमाणि परा स्थितिः । मोहनीयस्य^१ सप्ततिः । नामगोत्रयोर्विंशतिः । त्रयस्त्रिंशत्सागरोपमाणि आयुषः ।

अपरा—द्वादशमुहूर्त्ता^२ वेदनीयस्य । नामगोत्रयोरष्टौ । शेषाणां चान्तर्मुहूर्त्तम् ।

एकसागरकोटिकोटिस्थितिमनु वर्षशतं अबाधाकालः^३ ।

७. kālavadhāraṇam sthitiḥ.

yathā jñāna-darśanāvaraṇa-vedanīyāntarāyāṇāṃ trimśatkoṭikoṭi-

१ दर्शनमोहनीयापेक्षया चारित्रमोहनीयस्य तु चत्वारिंशत् कोटिकोटिसागरोपमाणि स्थितिः ।

२ संपरायसातवेदनीयमाश्रित्य ।

३ आयुषोऽपवादः ।

sāgaropamāṇi parā sthitiḥ. mohaniyasya¹ saptatiḥ. nāmagotrāyor viṃśatiḥ. trayastrimśat sāgaropamāṇi āyusaḥ.

aparā—dvādaśamuhūrttā² vedanīyasya. nāmagotrāyor aṣṭau. seṣā ṇām cāntarmuhūrttam.

ekasāgarakoṭikoṭisthitim anu varṣaśatam abādhākālah³.

(Aph.) Duration is the determination of the length of time. (IX)

(Gloss) For instance, the maximum duration of the knowledge-obscuring, intuition-obscuring, feeling-producing and the hindrance-producing *karman* is thirty *sāgaropama-koṭi-koṭi*; that of the deluding-*karman*⁴ is seventy (*sāgara-koṭi-koṭi*); that of the body-determining and family-determining *karmans* is twenty; and that of life-span-determining *karman* is thirty-three *sāgaropamas*; the other (viz. the minimum) duration of the feeling-producing, however, is twelve *muhūrttas*;⁵ that of the body-determining and family-determining is eight and that of the rest is less than a *muhūrtta*. For every *sāgara-koṭi-koṭi* of duration there is a hibernation period of one hundred years (during which the *karman* remains unrealized)⁶.

१०. विपाकोऽनुभागः ।

रसोऽनुभागोऽनुभावः फलम्—एते एकार्थाः । स च द्विधा—
तीव्राध्यवसायनिमित्तस्तीव्रः, मन्दाध्यवसायनिमित्तश्च मन्दः ।

कर्मणां जडत्वेऽपि पथ्यापथ्याहारवत् ततो जीवानां तथाविधफलप्राप्तिर-
विरुद्धा । नैतदर्थमीश्वरः कल्पनीयः ।

10. *vipāko'nubhāgaḥ*.

raso'nubhāgo'nubhāvaḥ phalam—ete ekārthāḥ. sa ca dvidhā—tivrā-
dhyavasāyanimittas tivrāḥ, mandādhyavasāyanimittas ca mandāḥ.

karmanāṁ jaḍatve'pi pathyāpathyāhāravat tato jīvanāṁ tathā-
vidhaphalaprāptir aviruddhā. naitadartham īśvaraḥ kalpanīyaḥ.

(Aph.) Intensity is (intensity of) fruition. (X)

1 darśanamohaniyāpekṣayā cāritramohaniyasya tu catvāriṃśat koṭikoṭisāgaropamāṇi sthitiḥ.

2 samparāyasātavedanīyam āśritya.

3 āyuso'pavādaḥ.

4 This is with reference to the faith-deluding *karman*. That of the conduct-deluding is, however, forty *sāgaropama-koṭi-koṭi*.

5 This is with reference to pleasure-feeling-producing *karman* which is responsible for worldly life.

6 There is an exception in the case of life-span-determining *karman*.

(Gloss) Taste, intensity, influence and fruition are synonyms. It (viz. intensity) is twofold (viz. strong and mild). That which is due to a strong passion is strong and that which is due to a mild passion is mild. Although the *karman* is a material entity, yet, as in the case of wholesome and unwholesome diet, there is no inherent impossibility in the soul's attainment of the proper fruits through it. There is no necessity of postulating God for the purpose.

११. दलसंचयः प्रदेसः ।

दलसंचयः—कर्मपुद्गलानामियत्तावधारणम् ।

11. *dalasañcayaḥ pradeśaḥ.*

dalasañcayaḥ—*karmapudgalānām iyattāvadhāraṇam*.

(Aph.) Accumulation of (*karmic*) aggregates (or the identification of the *karmic* matter with the soul) is the (bondage of) *karmic* mass. (XI)

(Gloss) 'Accumulation of aggregates' means the determination of the quantum of *karmic* matter.

(Note) Thus it is said : 'Nature' determines the type, determination of time is 'duration', taste is the 'intensity' and 'accumulation of (material) aggregates' is the (bondage of) *karmic* mass.

१२. शुभं कर्म पुण्यम् ।

शुभं कर्म सातवेदनीयादि पुण्यमभिधीयते ।

उपचाराच्च यद्-यन्निमित्तो भवति पुण्यबन्धः सोऽपि तत्तच्छब्दवाच्यः, ततश्च तन्मवविधम्, यथा संयमिनेऽन्नदानेन जायमानं शुभं कर्म अन्न-पुण्यम्, एवं पान-लयन^१ शयन^२-वस्त्र-मनो-वाक्-काय-नमस्कार-पुण्यान्यपि भावनीयानि ।

12. *śubham karma puṇyam.*

śubham karma sātavedanīyādi puṇyam abhidhīyate.

upacārāc ca yadyannimitto bhavati puṇyabandhaḥ, so'pi tattat-śab-davācyaḥ, tataś ca tan navavidham, yathā saṁyamīne annadānena jāyamānaṁ śubhaṁ karma annapuṇyam, evaṁ pāna-layana¹-śayana²-vastra-mano-vāk-kāya-namaskāra-puṇyāny api bhāvanī-yāni.

१ लयनम्—आलयः ।

१ *layanam*—*ālayaḥ*.

२ शयनम्—पट्टादि ।

२ *śayanam*—*paṭṭādi*.

(Aph.) The auspicious *karman* is (called) merit. (XII)

(Gloss) Actually the auspicious *karman* such as that which produces the feeling of pleasure and the like is called merit (*puṇya*), but metaphorically whatever causes lead to the bondage of *puṇya* are also called (*puṇya*). And, therefore, (on account of the ninefold such causes) it becomes ninefold. Thus the good act consequent upon offering of food to the monks is a merit due to giving food; similarly, the offer of drink, shelter, bed, cloth, meritorious thoughts, words and physical activities, and also offering of homage are to be considered as kinds of merit—which make a total of nine.

(Note) Here the effect aspect of *puṇya-bandha* is defined. The cause aspect is going to be explained in the next *sūtra*.

१३. तच्च धर्माविनाभावि ।

सत्प्रवृत्त्या हि पुण्यबन्धः, सत्प्रवृत्तिश्च मोक्षोपायभूतत्वादवश्यं धर्मः,
अतएव धान्याविनाभावि-बुसवत् तद् धर्मं विना न भवतीति मिथ्यात्विना
धर्माराधकत्वमसम्भवं प्रकल्प्य पुण्यस्य धर्माविनाभावित्वं नारेकणीयं,
तेषामपि मोक्षमार्गस्य देशाराधकत्वात् । निर्जराधर्मं विना सम्यक्त्व-
लाभाऽसम्भवाच्च ।

13. *tacca dharmāvinābhāvi.*

satpravṛtṭyā hi puṇyabandhaḥ, satpravṛttiś ca mokṣopāyabhūtatvād
avaśyaṁ dharmāḥ, ata eva dhānyāvinābhāvi-busavat tad dharmam
vinā na bhavatīti mithyātvinaṁ dharmārādhakatvam asambhavam
prakalpya puṇyasya dharmāvinābhāvitvaṁ nārekaṇīyam, teṣām api
mokṣamārgasya deśārādhakatvāt. nirjarādharmam vinā samyakṭva-
lābhā'sambhavāc ca.

(Aph.) That (viz. the *puṇya-bandha*) is necessarily concomitant with *dharma* (as its cause). (XIII)

(Gloss) The binding of merit is exclusively due to good activity. A good activity, being a means to the attainment of emancipation, is, of necessity, *dharma*. (Here *dharma* stands for penance which is the *sine qua non* of the activity capable of producing merit. The function of penance is primarily the production of purity by elimination of *karmic* matter). Merit is an incidental product that accompanies the spiritual

1 This is also the view of Akalaṅka who considers *nirjarā* and *niḥśreyasā* as the principal result of *tapas*, the attainment of heavenly life being only a subsidiary effect of *tapas* (*Tattvārtha-Vārtika*, 9/3).

purity, exactly as chaff is an incidental growth accompanying the corn which is the essential product of the seed¹. And, therefore, it is not proper to contend the necessary concomitance of merit with *dharma*. The contention that it is impossible, on the part of a perverse person, to practise the *dharma*, is untenable. Such persons also do practise partially the path of emancipation. The attainment of *samyaktva* is also impossible in the absence of the shaking off of the *karman*.

(Note) The argument that *dharma* in the form of shaking off the *karman* is not possible without the inhibition of the *karman* is also not tenable, because penance (*tapas*) is designated as the path of emancipation and an essential feature of *dharma*. In the same way, the belief that *punya* without *dharma* (i. e. penance) is possible in mundane acts is not consistent with the above-mentioned facts.

A mundane act unaccompanied with any kind of penance at its source cannot be considered as an act producing merit (*punya*). On the other hand, even acts of physical self-torture by persons of perverted religious faiths can acquire merit (*punya*), provided that it involves any kind of penance as its cause. This is supported by the description of the *bālatapaḥ* and its meritorious results in the Jain canon¹ where '*aśamkiliṭṭha pariṇāma*' is given as the cause of meritorious bondage. Some sort of *samyama* is a common feature of the *bālatapaḥ* although it is done out of sheer ignorance and perverted knowledge. This has been made clear by the great Digambara logician, Akalaṅka in his *Tattvārtha-Vārtika*².

१४. अशुभं कर्म पापम् ।

अशुभं कर्म ज्ञानावरणादि पापमुच्यते । उपचारात् तद्देतवोऽपि तत् शब्दवाच्याः । ततश्च तद् अष्टादशविधम्, यथा—प्राणातिपातजनितमशुभं कर्म प्राणातिपातपापम्, एवं मृषावादा-उदत्तादान-मैथुन-परिग्रह-क्रोध-मान-माया-लोभ-राग-द्वेष-कलहा-ऽभ्याख्यान-पंशुन्य-परपरिवाद-रत्यरति-माया-मृषा-मिथ्यादर्शनशल्यपापान्यपि भावनीयानि ।

व्याख्यानन्तरेण—

यदुदयेन भवेत् अशुभा प्रवृत्तिः, तन्मोहनीयं कर्मापि तत्तत् क्रियाशब्देनोच्यते । यथा—प्राणातिपातजनकं मोहनीयं कर्म प्राणातिपातपापमित्यादि ।

14. aśubhaṁ karma pāpam.

aśubhaṁ karma jñānāvaraṇādi pāpam ucyate. upacārāt tad hetavo'pi tat śabdavācyaḥ, tataś ca tad aṣṭādaśavidham, yathā—prāṇātipāta-janitam aśubhaṁ karma prāṇātipātapāpam, evaṁ mṛṣāvādā-dattā-dāna-maithuna-parigraha-krodha-māna-māyā - lobha - rāga - dveṣa-

¹ *Oṣavāliya Sutta (Suttāgame ed.)*, p. 25.

² *Tattvārtha-Vārtika*, 6/20.

kalahā'bhyākhyānapaiśunya - paraparivāda - ratyarati - māyāmṛṣā -
mithyādarśanaśalyapāpāny api bhāvanīyāni.

vyākhyāntareṇa—

yadudayena bhavet aśubhā pravṛttiḥ, tan mohanīyaṁ karmāpi tattat
kriyāśabdenocyate. yathā—prāṇātipātajanakaṁ mohanīyaṁ karma
prāṇātipātapāpam ity ādi.

(Aph.) The inauspicious *karman* is demerit. (XIV)

(Gloss) The inauspicious *karman*, namely the knowledge-obscurant and the like, is called demerit. Metaphorically, even those that are the causes are also designated by those terms (which stand for the results of those causes), and as such the inauspicious *karman* is of 18 kinds (on account of 18 causes), e.g. the demerit of *prāṇātipāta* is the inauspicious *karman* resulting from *prāṇātipāta* (injury to life). Similarly, falsehood, stealing, sexual activity, possession, anger, pride, deceit, greed, attachment, hatred, quarrel, abuse, backbiting, censure, perverse indulgence in respect of non-restraint and restraint, deceitful-untruthfulness, the thorn of perverted faith¹—are all demerits.

On another interpretation, the deluding-*karman*, the emergence of which is responsible for different sinful activities, is also designated by the names of those different activities. For instance, the deluding-*karman* which is the cause of (the activity of) injury to life is called the demerit of injury to life, and so on.

१५. द्रव्यभावभेदादेते बन्धाद् भिन्ने ।

द्रव्यं तत्क्रियाविरहितम्, भावश्च तत्क्रियापरिणतः ।

अनुदयमानाः सदसत्कर्मपुद्गला बन्धः—द्रव्यपुण्यपापे, तत्फलानर्हत्वात् ।
उदयमानाश्च ते क्रमशो भावपुण्यपापे, तत्फलानर्हत्वाद्—इत्यनयोर्बन्धाद्
भेदः ।

15. *dravyabhāvabhedād ete bandhād bhinne.*

dravyaṁ tatkrīyāvīrahitaṁ, bhāvaś ca tatkrīyāpariṇataḥ.

- 1 Perverted attitude is compared to a piercing thorn because it is the cause of excruciating pain for the aspirant who ceaselessly struggles to get over it by spiritual exertions which are ingrained in him. It bemuddles the spiritual vitality of a person and perpetuates his ignorance and leads him to incur heinous sins. Deceitfulness, greed and perversity are so many thorns that must be rooted out by a spiritual aspirant in order to be able to adopt the life of an ascetic, that presupposes right vision of truth.

anudāyamānāḥ sadasatkarmapudgalā bandhaḥ—dravyapuṇyapāpe, tatphalānarhatvāt. udayamānāś ca te kramaśo bhāvapuṇyapāpe, tatphalārhatvād ity anayor bandhād bhedaḥ.

(Aph.) These two (merit and demerit) are to be distinguished from bondage on the basis of (the bondage) *quā* substance and *quā* function. (XV)

(Gloss) What is devoid of the relevant activity is 'substance' and what is undergoing the relevant activity is 'function'. The auspicious or inauspicious *karmic* material aggregates in the state of *non-emergence* and non-realisation constitute bondage, that is, merit and demerit *quā* substance, because they are not capable of producing their effects. When they emerge into activity, they are called respectively merit and demerit *quā* function, because (then) they are capable of producing the effect. This is the difference of merit and demerit from bondage.

१६. कर्मकर्षणहेतुरात्मपरिणाम आस्रवः ।

परिणामोऽव्यवसायोऽव्यवसानं भाव इत्येकार्थाः ।

आस्रवन्ति—प्रविशन्ति कर्माणि आत्मनि येन परिणामेन स आस्रवः—
कर्मबन्धहेतुरिति भावः ।

“आस्रवद्वाराणि” इत्यपि प्रयोगो लभ्यते । तत्र आस्रवणम्—आस्रवः,
कर्मप्रवेश इति भावः । तस्य द्वाराणि—उपायाः आस्रवद्वाराणि—
कर्मबन्धहेतूनि इति ।

16. *karmākaraṇahetur ātmapariṇāma āsravaḥ.*

pariṇāmo'dhyavasāyo'dhyavasānaṁ bhāva ity ekārthāḥ.

āsravanti—praviśanti karmāṇy ātmani yena pariṇāmena sa āsravaḥ
—karmabandhaḥhetur iti bhāvaḥ.

'āsravadvārāṇi' ity api prayogo labhyate. tatra āsravaṇam—āsravaḥ,
karmapraveśa iti bhāvaḥ. tasya dvārāṇi—upāyāḥ āsravadvārāṇi—
karmabandha-hetūni iti.

(Aph.) Influx¹ is an intrinsic mutation of the soul, responsible for the attraction of *karmic* matter. (XVI)

(Gloss) Mutation, thought², thinking² and becoming are synony-

1 We have used the word 'influx' in the sense of 'cause of influx'. Influx is the entering of *karmic* matter into the soul on account of the activation of the causes of the influx, metaphorically called 'influxes'.

2 The words 'thought' and 'thinking' are used in a wider sense covering their instinctive and/or rational phases.

mous expressions. The state of the soul which is responsible for the entry of *karmic* matter into the soul is called *āsrava* (influx), i.e., the cause of the bondage of *karma*.

We also find the expression “doors of *āsrava*”. In that case *āsrava* means the flow, i.e., the entry of *karman*. The doors of that (entry), i.e., the means thereto are called the “doors of *āsrava*” meaning ‘the conditions of the *karmic* bondage’.

(Note) The Sanskritization of *āsava* (Pkt.) into *āsrava* is problematic. To us, *āsava* appears to be a *tatsama* word, identical with Sanskrit *āsava*—which stands for spirituous liquor in general.

The term *āsava* is used in the *Ardhamāgadhī āgamas* and Pali *tipīṭakas* in the sense of what intoxicates, bemuddles and befuzzles the soul or the mind so that it cannot rise to spiritual pursuits. This connotation of the word is quite in consonance with the constituents of the *āsava*, viz. *mithyātva*, *avirati*, *pramāda* and *kaṣāya*. *Yoga* which is also enumerated as *āsava*, is not so in essence, as even an *arhat* who is *vītarāga*, has also *Yoga* in the sense of pure physical activity completely immune from any emotional or passionate background.

१७. मिथ्यात्वमविरतिः प्रमादः कषायो योगश्च ।

मिथ्यात्वं प्रथमतृतीयजीवस्थाने आपञ्चममविरतिः । आषष्ठं प्रमादः ।
दशमान्तः कषायः । आषष्ठमशुभयोगः । शुभयोगश्चात्रयोदशम् ।

17. *mithyātvam aviratiḥ pramādaḥ kaṣāyo yogaś ca*.

mithyātvam prathama-tṛtīya-jīvasthāne. āpañcamam aviratiḥ. āṣaṣṭham pramādaḥ. daśamāntaḥ kaṣāyaḥ. āṣaṣṭham aśubhayogaḥ. śubhayogaś cātrayodaśam.

(Aph.) (These are the five types of influx) perversity, non-abstinence, remissness, passion and activity. (XVII)

(Gloss) Perversity persists in the first and the third stage of spiritual development; non-abstinence, upto the fifth; remissness, upto the sixth; passion, upto the tenth; the inauspicious activity, upto the sixth; and the auspicious activity, upto the thirteenth (stage of spiritual development).

१८. अतत्त्वे तत्त्वभ्रद्धा मिथ्यात्वम् ।

दर्शनमोहोदयाद् अतत्त्वे तत्त्वप्रतीतिमिथ्यात्वं गीयते ।

18. *atattve tattvaśraddhā mithyātvam*.

darśanamohodayāḍ atattve tattvapratītir mithyātvam gīyate.

(Aph.) Perversity is mistaken faith considering non-truth as truth. (XVIII)

(Gloss) Comprehension of the untruth as truth, consequent upon

the emergence of faith-deluding *karman* (which creates intellectual aberration) is known as perversity.

१९. आभिग्रहिकमनाभिग्रहिकं च ।

आभिग्रहिकम्—अभिनिवेशात्मकम् ।

अनाभिग्रहिकम्—अनाभोगादिरूपम् ।^१

19. ābhigrahikam anābhigrahikam ca.

ābhigrahikam—abhiniveśātmakam.

anābhigrahikam—anābhogādirūpam.

(Aph.) (Perversity is twofold) : deliberate and non-deliberate. (XIX)

(Gloss) 'Deliberate' is of the nature of bias. 'Non-deliberate' is of the nature of inattentive ignorance and the like.

(Note) 'Non-deliberate' is that which is found in the state of ignorance and the like. Perversity may be due to adherence to false doctrine and also want of knowledge, weakness of faith and addiction to pleasures of the senses. Want of knowledge and lack of discrimination of truth from untruth are responsible also for an attitude of complaisance towards all sorts of doctrines and their adherence. It indicates the want of firm conviction on the part of the man who pays a sort of acquiescence to all for acquiring cheap merit.

२०. अप्रत्याख्यानमविरतिः ।

अप्रत्याख्यानादिमोहोदया^२दात्मन आरम्भादेरपरित्यागरूपोऽध्यवसायः
अविरतिरुच्यते ।

20. apratyākhyānam aviratiḥ.

apratyākhyānādīmohodayā^२ātmana ārambhāder aparitāgarūpo'-
dhyavasāyaḥ aviratiḥ ucyate.

(Aph.) Non-abstinence means non-renunciation. (XX)

(Gloss) The condition of the soul, which is totally disposed towards non-renunciation of violent activities and the like,^३ on account of the rise of the deluding-*karman* that hinders the (attitude for) renunciation and the like, is called non-abstinence.

१ अज्ञानाद्यवस्थम् ।

1 ajñānādyavastham.

२ द्रष्टव्यम् ४/२४

2 draṣṭavyam 4/24

३ See 4/24

(Note) The delusion is due to influx of what is called deluding-*karman*. It incapacitates the victims from resisting evil tendencies and leads him to indulge in sinful activities.

२१. अनुत्साहः प्रमादः ।

अरत्यादिमोहोदयादध्यात्मं प्रति अनुत्साहः प्रमादोऽभिधीयते ।

21. *anutsāhaḥ pramādaḥ.*

aratyādīmohodayād adhyātmaṁ prati anutsāhaḥ pramādo'bhīdhīyate.

(Aph.) 'Remissness' means absence of vigour. (XXI)

(Gloss). The absence of vigour and enthusiasm in the soul in respect of spirituality on account of the rise of the deluding-*karman* such as 'perverse indulgence in respect of restraint' and the like is called 'remissness'.²

२२. रागद्वेषात्मकोत्तापः कषायः ।

22. *rāga-dveṣātmakottāpaḥ kaṣāyāḥ.*

१ न तु मद-विषय-कषायादिबाह्यप्रवृत्तिरूपः, तस्य अशुभयोगरूपत्वात् ।

1 na tu mada-viṣaya-kaṣāyādibāhyapravṛttirūpaḥ, tasya aśubhayogarūpatvāt.

2 Here *pramāda* does not mean intoxication, sensuality, passion, and the like, which being external activities are counted in bad activities.

The concept of *pramāda* appears to have undergone a gradual change. Originally, it had a very wide scope in that it included (i) ignorance (*ajñāna*), (ii) doubt (*saṁśaya*), (iii) basic wrong notions (*mithyā jñāna*), (iv) attachment (*rāga*), (v) hatred (*dveṣa*), (vi) lack of self-awareness (*smṛter anavasthānam*), (vii) repugnance towards virtues (*dharmaṣu anādaraḥ*) and (viii) perverse mindfulness (*duṣprañidhāna*) (*T.Bh.Ṭ*, Vol. I, p. 65). This wide connotation was abridged by Umāsvāti and restricted to only three factors viz. (i) lack of self-awareness, (ii) repugnance to virtues and (iii) perverse mindfulness (*Ibid.*, p. 123). At this stage *pramāda* is clearly separated from *kaṣāyas* and other factors. Ultimately, *pramāda* was narrowed down to the single factor of lack of enthusiasm for spiritual discipline.

At a comparatively later stage, intoxication (*mada*), sensuality (*viṣaya*), passions (*kaṣāya*), sleep (*nidrā*) and idle talk (*vikathā*)—these five factors which were implied in the concept of *pramāda* were assigned to *āśrava* called *yoga*—Jayācārya, *Jhīṇī Carcā*, XXII/33; *Nandī Vṛtti*:

majjamaṁ viṣayakasāyā, niddā vigahā ya pañcamī bhāṇiyā |
ee pañca pamāyā jīvaṁ pāḍenti saṁsāre ||

The concept of *pramāda* was thus gradually accepted as standing for remissness or lack of spiritual enthusiasm, pure and simple, its other components being converted into the categories of *kaṣāya* and *yoga*.

(Aph.) Intemperance of the nature of attachment and hatred is passion. (XXII)

२३. क्रोधमानमायालोभात्मा ।

23. *krodha-māna-māyā-lobhātmā.*

(Aph.) Anger, pride, deceit and greed (are the varieties of passion). (XXIII)

२४. प्रत्येकमनन्तानुबन्धि-अप्रत्याख्यान-प्रत्याख्यान-संज्वलनभेदाच्चतुर्धा ।

एते क्रमेण सम्यक्त्व-देशविरति-सर्वविरति-यथाख्यातचारित्र्यपरिपन्थिनः ।
पर्वत-भूमि-रेणु-जलराजिस्वभावः क्रोधः ।

शैल-अस्थि-दारु-लतास्तम्भस्वरूपो मानः ।

वंशमूल-मेषविषाण-गोमूत्रिका-उल्लिख्यमानवंशच्छलिसदृशी माया ।

कृमिराग-कर्दम-खञ्जन-हरिद्रारागसन्निभो लोभः ।

24. *pratyekam anantānubandhi-apratyākhyāna-pratyākhyāna-samjvalana-bhedāccaturdhā.*

ete krameṇa samyaktva-deśavirati-sarvavirati-yathākhyātacāritra-paripanthinaḥ.

parvata-bhūmi-reṇu-jalārājīsvabhāvaḥ krodhaḥ,

śaila-asthi-dāru-latāstambha-svarūpo mānaḥ.

vaṁśamūla-meṣaviṣāṇa - gomūtrikā - ullikhyamāna - vaṁśacchallī - sadṛśī māyā.

kṛmirāga-kardama-khañjana-haridrārāga-sannibho lobhaḥ.

(Aph.) Each (of these varieties) has these four sub-varieties—‘cause of endless transmigration’, ‘cause of non-renunciation’, ‘cause of partial renunciation’ and ‘flaming up’. (XXIV)

(Gloss) These respectively obstruct ‘right faith or attitude’, ‘partial renunciation’, ‘full renunciation’ and the ‘perfect conduct’. (The four sub-varieties of) anger are (respectively) like a scratch on stone, a scratch on earth, a scratch on dust and a scratch on water. (Those of) pride are (respectively) like a column of mountain, a column of bone, a column of wood and a column of creeper. (Those of) deceit are (respectively) like a bamboo-knot, a ram-horn, cow’s urine and bamboo-bark. (Those of) greed are (respectively) like colouring of the (silk) worm, of mud, of safflower, and of turmeric.

(Note) : Anger, pride, deceit and greed are the four passions, each of which admits of four varieties according as they vary in intensity and duration. The first is one which entails an indefinite series of birth and rebirth. It affects throughout the series of lives of the person subject to it. The second is that which makes a man unfit for pursuit of vows even in a partial manner. The third prevents the cultivation of the totality of the vows. The fourth precludes the cultivation of the full course of ascetic life. Like a sudden blast of wind, it upsets even an ascetic who has succeeded in restraining himself from all sorts of sinful tendencies.

The first variety of anger is comparable to a scratch on stone which persists for an indefinitely long time; the second variety is comparable to a scratch on earth which is less persistent than the first; the third is like a scratch on sand, which endures for a short time; the fourth is like a scratch on water which is immediately obliterated.

The first variety of pride is compared to a hard stone which does not bend. The second is like a bone pillar which bends to slight degree. The third is like a pillar of wood because of its flexibility and intensity. The fourth is like a bower of creepers, which is easily flexible.

Deceit also has four varieties respectively comparable to the root of a bamboo tree, horn of a ram, the line of urine left by a walking bull and the skin of a bamboo peeled off.

The four kinds of greed are comparable to the colour of a silk worm, of mud, safflower and turmeric which differ in inverse degree in respect of intensity and duration.

२५. काय-वाङ्-मनो-व्यापारो योगः ।

वीर्यन्तराय-क्षय - क्षयोपशम - शरीरनामकर्मोदयजन्यः कायभाषामनो-
वर्गणापेक्षः कायवाङ्मनःप्रवृत्तिरूपः—आत्मपरिणामः योगोऽभिधीयते ।

25. *kāya-vāñ-mano-vyāpāro yogaḥ.*

vīryāntarāya- kṣya - kṣayopaśama - śarīranāmakarmodaya - janyaḥ
kāyabhāṣāmanovargaṇā¹pekṣaḥ kāyavāñmanahpravṛtti - rūpaḥ—
ātmaperiṇāmaḥ yogo'bhidhīyate.

(Aph.) 'Activity' consists in the operation of body, organ of speech, and the mind. (XXV)

(Gloss) The mutation of the soul—which is of the nature of the operation of body, organ of speech and mind, depending (respectively) upon the material aggregates constituting body, speech and mind, and is produced on account of the destruction or destruction-cum-subsistence of the energy-obstructing *karman* as well as the rise of the body-making (which is a subtype of) *nāma karman*—is called activity.

१ सजातीयपुद्गलसमूहो वर्गणा ।

1 sajātyapudgalasamūho vargaṇā.

(Note) : A material aggregate means a collection of homogeneous particles of matter (forming one group).

२६. शुभोऽशुभश्च ।

शुभयोगः— सत्प्रवृत्तिः, स च शुभकर्मपुद्गलान् आकर्षति ।

अशुभयोगः— असत्प्रवृत्तिः, स च अशुभकर्मपुद्गलान् आकर्षति ।

मिथ्यात्वादयश्चत्वारः अशुभकर्मस्रवाः पापबन्धहेतवः । तेषु मिथ्यात्वादिः आभ्यन्तरोऽशुभव्यापारः प्रतिक्षणं पापबन्धहेतुर्भवति मनोवाक्कायानां च तेषु^१ हिंसादिषु वा प्रवर्तनं बाह्याशुभव्यापारः, स च^२ व्यापारकाले ।

यद्यपि सर्वेऽप्यास्रवाः कर्मबन्धहेतवो भवन्ति, किन्तु कर्मपुद्गलानामाकर्षणं योगादेव जायते । तेषां स्थितेर्दीर्घतापादनमनुभागस्य तीव्रता च कषायाज्जायते ।

26. śubho'śubhaś ca

śubhayogaḥ—satpravṛttiḥ, sa ca śubhakarma-pudgalān ākarṣati.

aśubhayogaḥ—asatpravṛttiḥ, sa ca aśubhakarma-pudgalān ākarṣati.

mithyātvādayaś catvāraḥ aśubhakarmāsravāḥ pāpabandhahetavaḥ. teṣu mithyātvādiḥ ābhyantaro'śubhavyāpāraḥ pratikṣaṇam pāpabandhahetur bhavati, manovākkāyānām ca teṣu¹ himsādiṣu vā pravartanam bāhyāśubhavyāpāraḥ, sa ca² vyāpāra-kāle.

yadyapi sarve'pyāsravāḥ karmabandhahetavo bhavanti, kintu karmapudgalānām ākarṣaṇam yogād eva jāyate. teṣāṃ sthiter dīrghatāpādanam anubhāgasya tīvratā ca kaṣāyāj jāyate.

(Aph.) (The activity is) auspicious and inauspicious. (XXVI)

(Gloss) The auspicious activity means good actions. Such activity attracts auspicious *karmic* matter. Inauspicious activity means bad actions. Such activity attracts inauspicious *karmic* matter.

The four types of inauspicious influx, namely perversity and the like, are the causes of demeritorious bondage. Of these, the perversity and the like are the internal inauspicious operation that becomes the

१ मिथ्यात्वादिषु ।

१ mithyātvādiṣu.

२ पापबन्धहेतुः ।

२ pāpabandhahetuḥ.

cause of demeritorious bondage every moment. The application of mind, speech and body to perversity and the like or to violent activities and the like, is the external inauspicious operation which becomes the cause of demeritorious bondage only at the time of operation.

Although all the types of influx are the causes of *karmic* bondage, yet the attraction of the *karmic* matter is affected exclusively on account of the activity (*yoga*). The lengthening of the duration and the intensity of the fruition is, however, due to rise of the passion (*kaṣāya*).

२७. यत्र शुभयोगस्तत्र नियमेन निर्जरा ।

शुभयोगः कर्मबन्धहेतुरिति न्यायादेव आस्रवभेदः किन्तु नियमतः अशुभ-
कर्माणि त्रोटयतीति निर्जराकारणं तु समस्त्येव । उदयक्षयोपशमादिरूप-
तादृक्कारणद्वयपूर्वकत्वात् शुभयोगः नानाद्रव्यसंभूतैकोषधेन जायमान-
शोषणपोषणवत् क्षयबन्धात्मककार्यद्वयसम्पादनार्हः । तथा चागमः—

‘वन्दणं भन्ते जीवे किं जणयइ ?’ ‘गोयमा ! वन्दणं नीया कम्मं
खवेइ, उच्चागोयं कम्मं निबन्धइ,’ इत्यादि ।

विस्तरेच्छुभिरत्र भिक्षुरचित ‘नवपदार्थं चौपई’ निरीक्षणीया ।

27. yatra śubhayogastatra niyamena nirjarā.

śubhayogaḥ karmabandhahetur iti nyāyād eva āsraṇabhedaḥ, kintu
niyamataḥ aśubhakarmāṇi troṭayatīti nirjarākāraṇaṁ tu samast-
tyeva. udayakṣayopāśamādirūpa-tādrīkkāraṇadvayapūrvakatvāt śu-
bhayogaḥ nānādravyasambhūtaikoṣadhena jāyamāṇaśoṣaṇapoṣaṇa-
vat kṣayabandhātmake-kāryadvayasampādanārhaḥ. tathā cāga-
maḥ¹—

‘vandanāṇaṁ bhante jīve kiṁ jaṇayai ?’ ‘Goyamā ! vandanāṇaṁ
nīyā kammaṁ khavei, uccāgoyam kammaṁ nibandhai’, ityādi.

vistareccchubhir atra Bhikṣuracita ‘Navapadārtha Caupai’ nirīkṣa-
ṇīyā.

(Aph.) Wherever there is auspicious activity, there is, of necessity, shedding off (*nirjarā*) of *karmic* matter. (XXVII)

(Gloss) Auspicious activity is the cause of auspicious bondage, and, as such, is a variety of influx. But as it also necessarily destroys the inauspicious *karma*; it is also the cause of shedding off of *karmic* matter. The auspicious activity, being a two-fold product, viz. a result of rise

१ उत्तराध्ययन, २६/१०

1 Uttarādhyayana, 29/10.

and destruction or destruction-cum-subsidence of the *karman*, has correspondingly two-fold causal function, namely the destruction as well as bondage of *karman*, exactly as the selfsame medicine which is a compound of many ingredients is capable of two-fold function, viz. curing the disease and nourishing the body. There is a scriptural passage that embodies the truth of the two-fold function in an act of spiritual discipline. The text runs as follows :

“What does a person, O Lord, produce by means of obeisance ?”

“By means of obeisance, O Gotama, a person destroys his *karman* leading to low social status and also binds the *karman* leading to a high social status.”

For details, one should consult the *Navapadārtha Caupāi* by Ācārya Bhikṣu.

२८. योगवर्गणान्तर्गतद्रव्यसाचिव्याद् आत्मपरिणामो लेश्या ।

मनोवाक्कायवर्गणापुद्गलद्रव्यसंयोगात् संभूत आत्मनः परिणामो
लेश्याऽभिधीयते ।

उक्तञ्च—

कृष्णादिद्रव्यसाचिव्यात्, परिणामोऽयमात्मनः ।

स्फटिकस्येव तत्रायं लेश्याशब्दः प्रवर्तते ॥

तत्प्रायोग्यपुद्गलद्रव्यम्—द्रव्यलेश्या, क्वचिद् वर्णादिरपि ।

28. *yogavargaṇāntargata-dravyasācivyād ātmapariṇāmo leśyā.*

manovākkāyavargaṇā-pudgaladravya-saṁyogāt sambhūta ātmanah
pariṇāmo leśyā'bhidhiyate.

uktañ ca—

kṛṣṇādīdravyasācivyāt, pariṇāmo'yam ātmanah /
sphatikasyeva tatrāyam, leśyā-śabdaḥ pravartate //

tatprāyogyapudgaladravyam—dravyaleśyā, kvacid varṇādir api.

(Aph.) *Leśyā*, that is, aural coloration, is a transformation of the soul consequent upon the association with the material substance constituting the material aggregates quā activity (*yoga*). (XXVIII)

(Gloss) The transformation of the soul following upon the association with the material aggregates constituting the mind-stuff, the vocal organ and the body is called aural coloration (*leśyā*). It is said ;

“It is a transformation of the soul in association with the black and the like material substance, analogous to that of a crystal (reacting to light) and this is designated by the term *leśyā*.”

The material substance capable of producing the transformation of the soul is called physical *leśyā*, and sometimes the colour etc. are also called *leśyā*.

(Note) When the *karmic* matter enters into the soul and becomes integrated with it on account of the dispositional attitudes entailed by the action of the mind, the soul undergoes transformations. These transformations are of various kinds according to the qualitative difference of the *karmic* matter. Thus it becomes black just like a piece of glass covered with soot. It also becomes blue when dyed with blue substance and so on. The transformation of the soul, though primarily psychological, becomes physical on account of the duration of the *karmic* matter which imparts its coloration to it (i.e. soul). This is a peculiar conception of the Jaina metaphysical ethics and the aural coloration is not merely metaphorical but actual transformation.

२९. कृष्ण-नील-कापोत-तेजः-पद्म-शुक्लाः ।

आद्यास्तिस्रः अशुभाः पराश्च शुभाः ।

29. *kṛṣṇa-nīla-kāpota-tejaḥ-padma¹-śuklāḥ*.

ādyās tisraḥ aśubhāḥ parāś ca śubhāḥ.

(Aph.) (The *leśyās* are) black, blue, pigeon-coloured (grey), luminous as rising sun (red), filament (of a flower)-coloured (yellow), and white. (XXIX)

(Gloss) The first three are inauspicious, and the rest are auspicious (in character and function).

(Note) *Leśyā* is the transformation of the soul dependent upon *yoga*—the activity of mind, speech and body. There is *leśyā* as long as there is any one of these activities.

It is to be noted in this connection that a soul inherits *leśyā* at the time of birth, which continues till death. This is virtually *dravya leśyā*, being a category of *nāma karmān*. In addition to this, on account of the activity of the soul, there arise different *leśyās* in the life-span of a person, in accordance with his *yoga* that he is engaged in at the moment. This is essentially *bhāva leśyā* with its counterpart of appropriate *dravya leśyā*. There is no conflict between the fresh *leśyā* that arises from time to time and the inherited *leśyā* that lasts from birth to death.

The specific spiritual nature of a soul determines the nature of the *leśyā* which is

- 1 The corresponding Prakrit word is *pamha* which has come from *pakṣma*, standing for filament. The later Jain authors rendered the word as *padma*, perhaps dropping the second component of the word *pauma-pamha* meaning lotus-filament. This is corroborated by the unanimous tradition that the colour meant by the word '*padma leśyā*' is yellow which is also the colour of the lotus-filament.

as a matter of fact the colour-index of the soul, represented by the aura that manifests itself at the physical level.

Three alternative theories have been proposed by commentators to explain the nature of *leśyā*. In the first theory, it is regarded as a product of passions (*kaṣāya-nisyanda*), and consequently as arising on account of the rise of the *kaṣāya-mohanīya karmān*. In the second, it is considered as the transformation due to activity (*yoga-pariṇāma*), and as such originating from the rise of *karmān* which produce three kinds of activity (physical, vocal and mental). In the third alternative, the *leśyā* is conceived as a product of the eight categories of *karmān* (*jñānāvaraṇīya* etc.), and as such accounted as arising on account of the rise of the eight categories of *karmān*. In all these theories, the *leśyā* is accepted as a state of the soul, accompanying the realization (*audayika-bhāva*) of the effect of *karmān*.¹

Of these theories, the second theory appears plausible. The *leśyā*, in this theory, is a transformation (*pariṇati*) of the *śarīra-nāmakarmān* (body-making *karmān*),² effected by the activity of the soul through its various gross and subtle bodies—the physical organism (*kāya*), speech-organ (*vāk*), or the mind-organ (*manas*) functioning as the instrument of such activity.³ The material aggregates involved in the activity constitute the *leśyā*. The material particles attracted and transformed into various *karmic* categories (*jñānāvaraṇīya* etc.) do not make up the *leśyā*. There is presence of *leśyā* even in the absence of the categories of *ghāti-karmān* in the *sayogi-kevalin* stage of spiritual development, which proves that such categories do not constitute *leśyā*. Similarly, the categories of *aghāti-karmān* also do not form the *leśyā* as there is absence of *leśyā* even in the presence of such categories in the *ayogi-kevalin* stage of spiritual development.⁴ The *leśyā*-matter involved in the activity aggravates the *kaṣāyas* if they are there.⁵ It is also responsible for the *anubhāga* (intensity) of *karmic*

1 For the refutation of the theory propounding *leśyā* as *karma-nisyanda*, vide Malayagiri's Commentary on *Pannavaṇḍa*, pada XXVII.

2 Ibid : *iyam (leśyā) ca śarīranāmakarmāpariṇatirūpā yogāpariṇatirūpāt*.....

3 Ibid : *yogāpariṇāmo leśyā, katham punar yogāpariṇāmo leśyā, yasmāt sayogikevali śuklaśyāpariṇāmena vihrtyāntaramuhūrte śeṣe yoganirodham karoti tato'yogit-vamaleśyātvaṃ ca prāpnoti, ato'vagamyate'yogāpariṇāmo leśye'ti. sa punar yogaḥ śarīranāmakarma-pariṇativiśeṣaḥ, yasmād uktam—'karma hi kārmaṇasya kāraṇam anyeṣāṃ ca śarīrāṇāṃ iti' tasmādaudārikādiśarīrayuktasyātmano vīryāpariṇativiśeṣaḥ kāyayogaḥ(1), tathaudārika-vaikriyāhāraka-śarīra-vyāpārāhṛtavāgdra-vyasamūhasācivyāt jīva-vyāpāro yaḥ sa vāgyogaḥ(2), tathaudārikādi-śarīravayā-pārāhṛtamanodravya-samuhasācivyāt jīvavyāpāro yaḥ sa manoyoga iti(3), tato yathaiva kāyādikarāṇa-yuktasyātmano vīryāpariṇatir yoga ucyate tathaiva leśyāpīti.*

4 Ibid : *kiṃ yogāntargata dravyarūpā yoganimittakarma-dravyarūpā vā ? tatra na tāvad yoganimittakarmadravyarūpā vikalpadvayānatikramāt, tathāhi—yoganimitakarmadravyarūpā satī ghātikarmadravyarūpā aghātikarmadravyarūpā vā ? na tāvad ghātikarmadravyarūpā, teṣāṃ abhāve'pi sayogikevalini leśyāyāḥ sadbhāvāt, nāpi aghātikarmarūpā, tatsadbhāve'pi ayogikevalini leśyāyā abhāvāt, tataḥ pāriśeṣyāt yogāntargatadravyarūpā pratyeyā.*

5 Ibid : *tāni ca yogāntargatāni dravyāṇi yāvat kaṣāyās tāvat teṣāṃ apyudayopabṛṃhakāṇi bhavanti,*

bondage.¹

इति बन्ध-पुण्य-पाप-आस्रवस्वरूपनिर्णयः ।

iti bandha-punya-pāpa-āsrava-svarūpa-nirṇayaḥ.

Thus ends the fourth lustre called “The Ascertainment of the Nature of Bondage, Merit, Demerit and Influx”.

1 Ibid : tena yaḥ sthitipākaviśeṣo leśyāvaśād upagīyate śāstrāntare sa samyagupa-pannaḥ, yataḥ sthitipāko nāmānubhāga ucyate, tasya nimittam kaṣāyodayāntar-gata-kṛṣṇādileśyāpariṇāmāḥ, te ca paramārthataḥ kaṣāyasvarūpā eva, tadantar-gatatvāt.

पञ्चमः प्रकाशः

LUSTRE V

१. आस्रवनिरोधः संवरः ।

आस्रवस्य निरोधः कर्मगमद्वारसंवरणात् संवर उच्यते ।

1. *āsravanirodhaḥ saṁvaraḥ.*

āsravasya nirodhaḥ karmāgamadvāra-saṁvaraṇāt saṁvara ucyate.

(Aph.) Inhibition¹ is the arrest of 'influx'. (I)

(Gloss) Arrest of the 'influx' is called 'inhibition' inasmuch as it shuts the doors of the ingress of *karman*.

२. सम्यक्त्वं विरतिरप्रमादोऽकषायोऽयोगश्चेति पञ्चधा ।

2. *samyaktvaṁ viratir apramādo'kaṣāyo'yogaś ceti pañcadhā.*

(Aph.) (Inhibition is five-fold, viz.) right faith, abstinence, absence of remissness (vigilance), absence of passion and absence of activity. (II)

३. तत्त्वे तत्त्वश्रद्धा—सम्यक्त्वम् ।

तस्य भावः तत्त्वम् । तस्मिन् तत्त्वस्य प्रतीतिः सम्यक्त्वम् ।

3. *tattve tattvaśraddhā—samyaktvam.*

tasya bhāvaḥ tattvam. tasmin tattvasya pratītiḥ samyaktvam.

(Aph.) 'Right faith' consists in firm conviction in the truthfulness of the truth. (III)

(Gloss) Truth means the state of being true.

Right faith consists in the unerring belief in the truthfulness of that (truth).

1 The word 'inhibition' for *saṁvara* has been purposely chosen. It is an act of restraining. Another connotation of the word is 'the blocking of a mental or psycho-physical process by another set-up at the same time by the same stimulus'. This connotation is most relevant with reference to *saṁvara* which consists of *śaṁyama* and *tapas*, the former being passive and the latter active in nature.

(Note) In this *sūtra*, the nature of right faith is defined as the conviction of the truthfulness of the truth, propounded by the Omniscient Lord. Truth is the object of right faith. The omniscient knows the truth directly and propounds it to the world at large, who accepts the validity of the omniscient's perception as a matter of faith. The ultimate verification of the faith is possible only for a person who eradicates his *karmic* bondage and attains omniscience. In Jainism, as in other Indian schools of thought, faith or firm conviction is considered the starting point of the religious discipline. This faith finds its verification at the highest spiritual state called *kaivalya* in Jainism, *viveka-khyāti* in Sāṃkhya-Yoga and *bodhi* in Buddhism. No Indian school of thought believes in blind faith that is not subject to verification by any means. In the *sūtra* under discussion *tattva* or truth is defined in its ontological aspect.

४. औपशमिक-क्षायिक-क्षायोपशमिक-सास्वादन-वेदकानि ।

सम्यक्त्वं पञ्चा भवति—अनन्तानुबन्धचतुष्कस्य दर्शनमोहनीयत्रिकस्य चोपशमे—औपशमिकम् । तत्क्षये—क्षायिकम् । तन्मिश्रे च क्षायोपशमिकम् । औपशमिकसम्यक्त्वात् पततः मिथ्यात्वं च गच्छतः—सास्वादनम् ।^१ मिश्रात् क्षायिकं गच्छतः तदन्त्यसमये तत्प्रकृतिवेदनात्—वेदकम् ।

4. *aupaśamika-kṣāyika-kṣāyopāśamika-sāsvādāna-vedakāni*.

samyaktvaṃ pañcadhā bhavati—anantānubandhicatuṣkasya darśanamohanīyatrikasya copāśame—aupaśamikam. tatksaye—kṣāyikam. tanmiśre ca kṣāyopāśamikam. aupāśamikasamyaktvāt patataḥ mithyātvam ca gacchataḥ—sāsvādanam¹. miśrāt kṣāyikam gacchataḥ tadantyasamaye tatprakṛtivedanāt—vedakam.

(Aph.) (Right faith is of five kinds, viz.)

1. due to subsidence (of the relevant *karman*);
2. due to destruction (of the relevant *karman*);
3. due to subsidence-cum-destruction (of the relevant *karman*);
4. due to residual tasting (of the right faith); and
5. due to enjoyment (of the relevant *karman*). (IV)

(Gloss) Right faith is of five kinds. (Right faith) 'due to subsidence' occurs on the subsidence of the four *anantānubandhi* (passions that cause endless transmigration) and the three categories of attitude-

१ सह आ ईषत् सम्यक्त्वरसास्वादनेनेति सास्वादनम् ।

1 saha ā īṣat samyaktva-rasāsvādaneneti sāsvādanam.

deluding *karmans*¹ ; one 'due to destruction' occurs on the destruction of the same ; and one 'due to subsidence-cum-destruction' occurs on the joint operation (viz. subsidence-cum-destruction) of the same. One 'due to residual tasting'² occurs when (the soul) falls down from the right faith 'due to subsidence', and goes towards 'perversity'. One 'due to enjoyment' is so called because the soul, while moving from (the right faith) 'due to the joint operation (viz. subsidence-cum-destruction)' to (the right faith) 'due to the destruction (of the relevant *karmans*)', enjoys the (innocuous) *karmic* matter in the last instant of it (viz. the right faith due to the joint operation).

(Note) Three varieties of *samyaktva* are usually mentioned in connection with its attainment. Sometimes five varieties of it are also referred to, by adding *sāsvādana* and *vedaka* varieties to the usual three, namely *upaśamika*, *kṣāyopaśamika* and *kṣāyika*.

The *upaśamika* type of *samyaktva* is attained due to complete subsidence of the four *anantānubandhī* passions and the three categories of *darśana-mohanīya* (attitude-deluding) *karman*. In the *kṣāyopaśamika samiyaktva*, the *mithyātvavedanīya karman* that has already arisen is 'suppressed'. The suppression (*upaśama*) here stands for (1) the prevention (*viṣkambhana*), which may be treated as subsidence, of the rise of the *mithyātvavedanīya*, and also (2) purging the same of its *mithyātvā* and thus converting it into pure matter technically called *samyaktva-vedanīya* or simply *samyaktva*. The *kṣāyopaśamika* state of the soul materializes when there is destruction of the *mithyātvavedanīya karman* that has already arisen and the same that was to arise is forestalled allowing only the rise of the *samyaktva-vedanīya karman* after it has been purified by purging. The *kṣāyopaśamika* state is consequently characterised by the rise of the *samyaktva-vedanīya* accompanying the destruction-cum-subsidence of the *mithyātvavedanīya*.

It should be noted in this connection that the rise of the *samyaktva-vedanīya* does not radically affect the experience of *samyaktva* which however is made unsteady (*cala*), stained (*malina*) and shallow (*agāḍha*) on account of that rise, according to the Digambara tradition.

The *kṣāyika* type of *samyaktva* is attended with a complete destruction of the four *anantānubandhī* passions and the three categories of *darśana-mohanīya karman*.

The *sāsvādana samiyaktva* is experienced when the soul falls down from the state of *upaśamika samiyaktva*. The experience is identified with the memory of the

- 1 The three attitude-deluding *karmans* are :

- (1) what induces right faith (*samyaktva*) on account of the *kṣāyopaśama* of the *darśana-mohanīya* accompanied with the rise of *samyaktva*,
- (2) what produces a mixed state of right and wrong faith by its rise, and
- (3) what produces perversity (*mithyātvā*) by its rise.

- 2 It is called *sāsvādana* which is equivalent to *saha+ā+svādana*; the prefix *ā* means 'faint'; the word thus means faint tasting of the right attitude which is passing away.

samyaktva attained in the past, that is destined to vanish as the soul goes down to the level of the first *guṇasthāna* called *mithyātva*.

The *vedaka samyaktva* is experienced in the last moment of the *kṣāyopaśamika samyaktva*. By the Digambara authors, it is identified with the last stage of *kṣāyopaśamika samyaktva*, immediately preceding the attainment of *kṣāyika samyaktva* and called *kṛtakṛtya-vedaka*.

It is here necessary to distinguish the *kṣāyopaśamika* state of the *jñānāvaraṇīya karman* from that of the *darśana-mohanīya karman*. In the former case the power of knowledge is adversely affected while in the latter there is no mutilation of the *samyaktva* according to the Śvetāmbara authors.

For further information on the subject, consult the following : Haribhadra's *ṭīkā* on *Śrāvaka-prajñapti*, 44; *Tattvārtha-Bhāṣya-Ṭīkā* VIII. 10; *Jñānabindu-prakaraṇa*, pp. 3-6; *Jainendra-siddhānta-kośa*, IV, p. 371.

५. निसर्गजं निमित्तजञ्च ।

प्रत्येकं सम्यक्त्वं निसर्गजं निमित्तजञ्च भवति ।

गुरुपदेशादिनिरपेक्षं निसर्गजम् । तदपेक्षञ्च निमित्तजम् ।

5. *nisargajam nimittajaṇ ca.*

pratyekaṁ samyaktvaṁ nisargajam nimittajaṇ ca bhavati. gurū-padeśādi-nirapekṣaṁ nisargajam. tadapekṣaṇ ca nimittajam.

(Aph.) (The right faith can be) spontaneous as well as conditioned by other ways and means. (V)

(Gloss) Each (kind of) right faith can be spontaneous as well as conditioned by other ways and means. That which is independent of the instruction of the preceptor and the like is spontaneous. What is dependent upon them is conditioned by other ways and means.

६. द्वयञ्च करणापेक्षमपि ।

6. *dvayaṇ ca karaṇāpekṣam api.*

(Aph.) *Karaṇa* (operation of spiritual energy) is necessary in both the cases (spontaneous as well as 'conditioned'). (VI)

७. परिणामविशेषः करणम् ।

7. *pariṇāma-viśeṣaḥ karaṇam.*

(Aph.) A *karaṇa* (operation of spiritual energy) is a particular transformation (of the soul). (VII)

८. यथाप्रवृत्त्यपूर्वाऽनिवृत्तिर्भेदात् त्रिधा ।

अनाद्यनन्तसंसारपरिवर्ती प्राणी गिरिसरिद्ग्रावघोलान्यायेन आयुर्वर्ज-
सप्तकर्मस्थितौ किञ्चिन्न्यूनैककोटिकोटि-सागरोपममितायां^१ जातायां
येनाध्यवसायेन दुर्भेद्यरागद्वेषात्मकग्रन्थिसमोपं गच्छति, स यथाप्रवृत्ति-
करणम् । एतद्धि भव्यानामभव्यानां चानेकशो भवति ।

येन अप्राप्तपूर्वाध्यवसायेन ग्रन्थिभेदनाय उद्युङ्क्ते, सोऽपूर्वकरणम् ।
अपूर्वकरणेन भिन्ने ग्रन्थौ येनाध्यवसायेन उदीयमानाया मिथ्यात्वस्थिते-
रन्तर्मुहूर्तमतिक्रम्य उपरितनीं चान्तर्मुहूर्तपरिमाणामवरुध्य तद्दलिकानां
प्रदेशवेद्याभावः क्रियते सोऽनिवृत्तिकरणम् ।

तद्देद्याभावश्चान्तरकरणम् ।^२

तस्य प्रथमे क्षणे आन्तर्मुहूर्तिकमौपशमिकसम्यक्त्वं भवति ।

कश्चित् पुनः अपूर्वकरणेन मिथ्यात्वस्य पुञ्जत्रयं^३ कृत्वा शुद्धपुञ्ज-
पुद्गलान् वेदयन् प्रथमत एव क्षायोपशमिकं सम्यक्त्वं लभते ।

कश्चिच्च मिथ्यात्वं निर्मूलं क्षपयित्वा क्षायिकं प्राप्नोति ।

8. yathāpravṛtṭy-apūrvā'nivṛtti-bhedāt tridhā.

anādyananta-saṁsāra-parivartī prāṇī girisarid-grāva-gholanā-
nyāyena āyurvarja-saptakarmasthitau kincinnyūnaikakoṭi-koṭi-
sāgaropama-mitāyām¹ jātāyām yenādhyavasāyena durbhedya-rāga-
dveṣātmake-granthisamīpaṁ gacchati, sa 'yathāpravṛttikaraṇam.
etaddhi bhavyānām abhavyānām cānekaśo bhavati.

yena aprāptapūrvādhyavasāyena granthibhedanāya udyuṅkte,
so'pūrvakaraṇam.

apūrvakaraṇena bhinne granthau yenādhyavasāyena udiyamā-
nāyā mithyātvasthiter antarmuhūrtam atikramya uparitanīm cāntar-
muhūrtaparimāṇām avarudhya taddalikānām pradeśavedyābhāvaḥ
kriyate so'nivṛttikaraṇam.

tadvedyābhāvaś cāntarakaraṇam².

१ पत्योपमासंख्येयभागन्यूनैककोटिकोटिसागरोपममितायां ।

1 palyopamāsaṁkheyabhāga-nyūnaikakoṭikoṭi-sāgaropamamitāyām.

२ उपशमसम्यक्त्वात् प्राग्वेद्योत्तरवेद्यमिथ्यात्वपुञ्जयोरन्तरकारित्वाद् अन्तरकरणम् ।

2 upaśamasamyaktvāt prāgvedyottaravedya-mithyātvapuñjayor antarakāritvād
antarakaraṇam.

३ शुद्धम्, अर्धशुद्धम्, अशुद्धं च क्रमशः सम्यक्त्वमोहनीयम्, मिश्रमोहनीयं, मिथ्यात्व-
मोहनीयमिति नामकं पुञ्जत्रयम् ।

tasya prathame kṣaṇe āntarmauhūrtikam aupāśamikasamyaktvaṁ bhavati.

kaścit punaḥ apūrvakaraṇena mithyātvasya puñjatrayaṁ¹ kṛtvā śuddhapuñjapudgalān vedayan prathamata eva kṣāyopāśamikaṁ samyaktvaṁ labhate.

kaścic ca mithyātvam nirmūlaṁ kṣapayitvā kṣāyikaṁ prāpnoti.

(Aph.) It is threefold on account of (its) differentiation into the (characteristics of) 'automatic', 'unprecedented' and 'unamenable to lapse'. (VIII)

(Gloss) The automatic spiritual operation is that natural 'pull' or 'vis a tergo' (*adhyavasāya*) of the soul by dint of which it, transmigrating in the world without beginning or end, arrives at the invincible Gordian knot consisting in attachment and hatred. This is achieved in due course just like the rounding off of the pebbles of a mountain-stream. At this stage, the length of the seven types of *karman*, with the exception of life-span-determining *karman*, is reduced to a little less² than one *koṭi-koṭi*³ *sāgaṇopama* years. Both the *bhavyas* and the *abhavyas* undergo this (operation) on many an occasion.

The hitherto unattempted operation whereby the soul prepares for cutting the Gordian knot is the 'unprecedented operation'.

The state (of the soul), which arises when the knot has been cut by the 'unprecedented operation', is responsible for the obstruction of the vision-deluding *karmic* matter rising in the immediately succeeding *antarmuhūrta*. The complete subsidence of the same that is to rise in the second *antarmuhūrta* effects the total absence of even the virtual realization of the *karmic* matter. Such state of the soul is an operation that is 'unamenable to lapse.'

The total 'absence of the enjoyment of *karmic* matter' is the 'operation of intercalation'.

In the first instant of the intercalated period begins the (dawn of) right faith due to subsidence (of the relevant *karmans*), lasting less than a *muhūrta*.

(This is the common rule but) in special circumstances the person

1 śuddham, ardaśuddham, aśuddham ca kramaśaḥ samyaktvamohanīyaṁ miśra-mohanīyaṁ mithyātvamohanīyaṁ iti nāmakam puñjatrayaṁ

2 'Little less' stands for innumerable part of a *palyopama*.

3 *Koṭi-koṭi* means *koṭi* × *koṭi* (= 10¹⁴).

may begin his spiritual career of a *samyaktvin* with the attainment of right faith characterized by the destruction-cum-subsidence of the faith-deluding *karman*. The operation in such circumstance has a peculiar feature in that the aspirant divides, by means of the 'unprecedented operation', the deluding *karmic* matter into three sets (viz., pure, semi-pure and impure) and begins to enjoy the *karmic* matter of the 'pure set' and thus attains right faith due to destruction-cum-subsidence (of the relevant *karmic* matter).

Some souls, however, destroy the faith-deluding *karman* absolutely and attain right faith due to the destruction (of the relevant *karmans*)

६. शम-संवेग-निर्वेदा-नुकम्पा-ऽऽस्तिक्यानि तल्लक्षणम् ।

शमः—शान्तिः ।

संवेगः—मुमुक्षा ।

निर्वेदः—अनासक्तिः ।

अनुकम्पा—करुणा ।

आस्तिक्यम्—सत्यनिष्ठा ।

9. śama-saṁvega-nirvedā-nukampā'stikyāni tallakṣaṇam.

śamaḥ—śāntiḥ.

saṁvegaḥ—mumukṣā.

nirvedaḥ—anāsaktiḥ.

anukampā—karuṇā.

āstikyam—satya-niṣṭhā.

(Aph.) Tranquillity, (fear of transmigration and) desire for salvation (from worldly miseries), detachment, compassion, and spiritual belief—these constitute the defining characteristics of it (the right faith). (IX)

(Gloss) 'Tranquillity' means quiescence (of passions such as anger and the rest). *Saṁvega* means (fear of transmigration and the resultant) desire for final emancipation (from all the worldly miseries). 'Detachment' is dispassionateness. 'Compassion' means fellow-feeling. 'Belief' means faith in the reality (of the self, the law of *karman* and the like.)

(Note) Originally the word *saṁvega* stood for the fear of transmigration, although in later time it came to mean the desire for spiritual emancipation. In support of the original connotation of the word we refer to the following discussion in the *Uttarā-dhyayana-sūtra* (XXIX, 1) :

What does, O Lord, a *jīva* produce by means of *saṃvega* ?

By means of *saṃvega*, he produces transcendental faith in the *dharmā* (*dharmā-saddhā*),

The *saṃvega* attains its fulfilment in the transcendental faith in the *dharmā*. The power of the infinite anger, pride, deceit and greed is reduced on account of *saṃvega*, and the basic perversity vanishes to give rise to the right faith.

Umāsvāti in his *Bhāṣya* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, VII. 7, has explained *saṃvega* as *saṃsārābhīruṭva* (fear of worldly life). In his *Śrāvaka-prajñāpti*, 56, also, he says that *saṃvega* is appreciation of all types of worldly joy as nothing but suffering, that gives rise to the desire for nothing else than emancipation.

Siddhasena Gaṇin (TSū Bhṭ, part I, p. 34) has explained *saṃvega* as *sambhīti*, that is, fear as the result of understanding the miseries of hellish life as explained in the Jaina Scripture.

Pūjyapāda in his *Sarvārthasiddhi* (VI, 24) and Akalaṅka, in his *Vārtika* on *Tattvārthasūtra* (VII. 12), have also given the same meaning of *saṃvega*.

The connotation of *saṃvega* appears to have changed since the time Haribhadra who, in his commentary on *Śrāvaka-prajñāpti*, *gāthā* 53, explains *saṃvega* as *mokṣā-bhilāṣaḥ* (desire for emancipation). At another place in the same treatise, *gāthā* 3, he gives kindheartedness (*āudrāntaḥkaraṇatā*) as the connotation of *saṃvega*. The *Dhavalā* (VIII. 3) explains *saṃvega* as joy (*harisa*, Skt. *harṣa*) on the attainment of right faith, knowledge and conduct.

१०. शंका-कांक्षा-विचिकित्सा-परपाषण्डप्रशंसा-संस्तवास्तदतिचारः ।

शंका—लक्ष्यं प्रति सन्देहः ।

कांक्षा—लक्ष्यविपर्ययाभिलाषः ।

विचिकित्सा—साधनेषु संशयशीलता ।

परपाषण्ड-प्रशंसा—लक्ष्यप्रतिगामिनां प्रशंसा ।

परपाषण्ड-संस्तवः—लक्ष्यप्रतिगामिनां परिचयः ।

10. śaṃkā-kāṃksā-vicikitsā-parapāṣaṇḍapraśaṃsā-saṃstavās tadaticā-rah.

śaṃkā—lakṣyaṃ prati sandehah.

kāṃksā—lakṣyaviparyayābhilāṣaḥ.

vicikitsā—sādhaneṣu saṃśayaśīlatā.

parapāṣaṇḍa praśaṃsā—lakṣyapratigāmināṃ praśaṃsā.

parapāṣaṇḍa-saṃstavāḥ—lakṣyapratigāmināṃ paricayaḥ.

(Aph.) Sceptis, perverse proclivity, doubt, admiration for heretics, and cultivation of familiarity with them are infringements of that (right faith). (X)

(Gloss) Sceptsis means doubt about the ultimate goal. Perverse proclivity means craving for false goal. Doubt here means hesitancy in respect of the means to the goal. Admiration for heretics means praise for the opponents of the goal. Cultivation of familiarity means association with the opponents.

११. निःशंकित-निष्कांक्षित-निर्विकित्सित-अमूढदृष्टि-उपबृंहण-स्थिरीकरण-वात्सल्य-प्रभावनास्तदाचारः ।

निःशंकित-निष्कांक्षित-निर्विकित्सितानि—लक्ष्ये साधने च स्थैर्यम् ।

अमूढदृष्टिः—जिनप्रवचने कौशलम् ।

उपबृंहणस्थिरीकरणे—तीर्थ-सेवा ।

वात्सल्यम्—भक्तिः ।

प्रभावना—जिन-प्रवचनस्य प्रभावनाकरणम् ।

11. *niḥśaṁkita-niṣkāṁkṣita-nirvicikitsita-amūḍhadṛṣṭi-upabṛṁhaṇa-sthirīkaraṇa-vātsalya-prabhāvanāś tadācāraḥ.*

niḥśaṁkita-niṣkāṁkṣita-nirvicikitsitāni—lakṣye sādhanē ca sthairyam.

amūḍhadṛṣṭiḥ—jinapravacanē kauśalam.

upabṛṁhaṇa-sthirīkaraṇe—tīrtha-sevā.

vātsalyam—bhaktiḥ.

prabhāvanā—jina-pravacanasya prabhāvanākaraṇam.

(Aph.) The fulfilment of that (right faith) consists in (the following):—absence of sceptsis, absence of perverse proclivity, absence of doubt, unblurred vision, strengthening (of the faith), stabilization (within the faith), regard, and exaltation. (XI)

(Gloss) The freedom from sceptsis, perverse proclivity and doubt foster steadfastness in respect of the ends and the means. Unblurred vision means deep insight into Jaina scripture. The strengthening and stabilization (of the faith) means service to the path and the four-fold Order. Regard means devotion. Exaltation means generation of high esteem in other for the Jaina scripture.

१२. सावद्यवृत्तिप्रत्याख्यानं विरतिः ।

सावद्ययोगरूपाया अन्तर्लालसारूपायाश्च सावद्यवृत्तेः प्रत्याख्यानं विरतिः ।

अंशतः पञ्चमजोवस्थाने सर्वतश्च षष्ठजोवस्थानात् प्रभृतिः ।

12. *sāvadya-vṛtti-pratyākhyānaṁ viratiḥ.*

sāvadyayogarūpāyā antarlālasārūpāyāś ca sāvadyavṛtteḥ pratyākhyānaṁ viratiḥ. amśataḥ pañcama-jīvasthāne sarvataś ca ṣaṣṭha-jīvasthānāt prabhṛti.

(Aph.) Renunciation of the sinful propensities is abstinence. (XII)

(Gloss) Abstinence consists in the renunciation of the sinful propensities which are of the nature of sinful activities or of the nature of internal craving. It is possible only partially in the fifth stage of spiritual development, while in the higher stages beginning from the sixth stage of spiritual development it is possible in full.

(Note) A clear distinction between the fifth and the sixth stages of spiritual development is necessary here. Renunciation starts at the fifth stage and gets its fulfilment at the sixth. The fifth stage is a stage of renunciation only provisionally, inasmuch as the presence of non-renunciation as a vitiating force is still a predominant feature of the aspirant at that stage. Spiritual purification in the true sense of the term is possible only at the sixth stage, which is possible only in the life led by the monastic order. It is on account of their absolute detachment from worldly affairs that the monastic order alone, as distinguished from the laity involved in worldly affairs, are entitled to religious offering of the bare necessities of life. Any charity offered to the laity or any other person does not deserve to be called a religious act, as that promotes only the cause of mundane existence which, of necessity, is detrimental to the interests of spiritual life.

१३. अध्यात्मलीनता—अप्रमादः ।

अध्यात्मं प्रति लीनता—स्वभावं प्रति परिपूर्णा जागरूकता अप्रमादोऽभिधीयते । अयं सप्तमजीवस्थानादारभ्य ।

13. *adhyātmalīnatā—apramādaḥ.*

adhyātmaṁ prati līnatā—svabhāvaṁ prati paripūrṇā jāgarūkatā apramādo'bhidhīyate. ayaṁ saptama-jīvasthānād ārabhya.

(Aph.) Absence of remissness means self-absorption.

(Gloss) Absorption in the self, that is full awareness of oneself is called absence of remissness. This is possible only in the higher stages, beginning from the seventh, of spiritual development.

(Note) In the context of the *guṇasthānas* the term *apramāda* appears to have a special significance. In the sixth *guṇasthāna*, the perfection of *saṁyama* is attained. For the preservation of this perfection, a special effort is necessary. This effort presupposes self-vigilance and self-awareness (*apramāda*). Absolute immunity from all sorts of infringements and transgressions of the religious vows undertaken at the sixth

guṇasthāna is possible only by means of the cultivation of *apramāda*. Not only this, but the warding off of the passions that are likely to arise is possible only by the practice of *apramāda*, which, in fact, is a vital condition of further spiritual progress to the eighth *guṇasthāna* and onwards. This aspect of *apramāda* becomes clear in the description of a soul at a higher plane as cultivating *kaṣāya-apramāda* and *joga-apramāda* (*Abhidhāna Rājendra*, vol. I, page 597).

Apramāda is closely associated with *ghaṭanā* (exertion), *yatanā* (carefulness), and *parākrama* (vigour). In the *Thāṇam* (VIII. 111), eight principal activities are counted about which the monk should behave and exert himself with extreme caution and perseverance and without any sort of remissness (*pramāda*). These activities are— (i) acquisition of new knowledge, (ii) retention of the knowledge acquired, (iii) cultivation of self-restraint *quā* not binding new *karman*, (iv) purging of the old *karman* by means of penance, (v) admission of new disciples, (vi) acquainting the tiroś properly with the discipline, (vii) unremitting care for the sick, and (viii) impartial and amicable settlement of disputes between the monks of the Order. Here the practical application of *apramāda* to the activities of the monastic order is exemplified.

१४. क्रोधाद्यभावोऽकषायः ।

असौ वीतरागावस्थायामेकादशजीवस्थानमारभ्य ।

14. *krodhādyabhāvo'kaṣāyaḥ*.

asau vītarāgāvasthāyām ekādaśa-jīvasthānam ārabhya.

(Aph.) Absence of passions consists in the absence of anger and the like. (XIV)

(Gloss) This is possible only in the stage of *vītarāga* and occurs and persists in the higher stages, beginning from the eleventh, of spiritual development.

(Note) A saint becomes *vītarāga* when he has perfectly conquered all the four masterful passions in their various ramifications and acquired perfect self-mastery. He has, of course, not yet become perfect like the emancipated soul who is free from all *karmic* entangles (of foreign matter). This will become clear from what follows.

१५. अप्रकम्पोऽयोगः ।

असौ शैलेश्यवस्थायां चतुर्दशजीवस्थाने ।

यश्च संयमिनां ध्यानादिना शुभयोगावरोधः, सोऽपि अयोगसंवरांश एव ।

अप्रमादादयः त्रयोऽपि प्रत्याख्यानानपेक्षाः, आन्तरवैशद्यसाध्यत्वात् ।

15. *aprakampo'yogaḥ*.

asau śaileśyavasthāyām caturdaśa-jīvasthāne.

yaśca saṁyamināṁ dhyānādinā śubhayogāvardohāḥ, so'pi ayoga-saṁvaraṁśa eva.

apramādādayaḥ trayo'pi pratyākhyānānapekṣāḥ, āntaravaiśadya-sādhyaṭvāt.

(Aph.) Absence of activity consists in the absence of vibration. (XV)

(Gloss) This happens in the state of *śaileśī* (wherein the soul is as firm as a rock) which occurs in the fourteenth stage of spiritual development. The arrest, by means of meditation and the like, of the auspicious activities by the ascetics is also a part of the inhibition quā 'absence of activity'. All the (other) three viz. 'absence of remissness' and the like are not due to renunciation, being exclusively due to the internal spiritual purity.

१६. तपसा कर्मविच्छेदादात्मनैर्मल्यं निर्जरा ।

16. *tapasā karmavicchedād ātmanairmalyam nirjarā.*

(Aph.) Falling off (*nirjarā*) is the purification of the soul on account of the separation of *karmic* matter by means of penance. (XVI)

१७. उपचारात्तपोऽपि ।

कारणे कार्योपचारात्तपोऽपि निर्जराशब्दवाच्यं भवति, तत एव द्वादश-विधाऽसौ ।

17. *upacārāt tapo'pi.*

kāraṇe kāryopacārāt tapo'pi nirjarā-śabda-vācyaṁ bhavati, tata evā dvādaśavidhā'sau.

(Aph.) Penance also (is known as 'falling off') by way of transference of epithet. (XVII)

(Gloss) By means of the transference of (the characteristic of) the effect to the cause, penance (which is the cause of 'falling off') can also be expressed by the term 'falling off'. Consequently that (viz. 'falling off') is twelvefold (because penance is twelvefold).

१८. सकामाऽकामा च ।

सकामाकामभेदादसौ द्विधा—

सह कामेन मोक्षाभिलाषेण विधीयमाना निर्जरा—सकामा, तदपरा अकामा ।

द्विधापि इयं सम्यक्त्विनां मिथ्यात्विनां च ।

18. *sakāma'kāmā ca.*

sakāmākāma bhedād asau dvidhā—

saha kāmēna mokṣābhilāṣeṇa vidhīyamānā nirjarā—sakāmā, tada-
parā akāmā.

dvidhāpi iyaṁ samyaktvināṁ mithyātvināṁ ca.

(Aph.) (The 'falling off' is) voluntary or involuntary. (XVIII)

(Gloss) It is twofold, being voluntary as well as involuntary. The voluntary is one that is effected by volition, i.e., a desire for spiritual emancipation. The other (viz. what is not effected by volition) case is 'involuntary'. Both these two kinds (of 'falling off') are possible in the persons possessed of right as well as wrong faith.

(Note) *Nirjarā* is of two kinds—*vipākajātā* (or *vipākajā*), and *avipākajātā* (or *avipākajā*). The *vipākātā nirjarā* is so called because it takes place on the maturity (*vipāka*) of *karman* at the scheduled time. The *avipākajā nirjarā* is one that takes place before the scheduled time on account of penances which may be involuntary as well as voluntary. In the case of involuntary penances the *nirjarā* is called *akāma-nirjarā*, whereas in voluntary penances it is called *sakāma-nirjarā*.

In their due course only, the *karman*s that have ripened fall off from the soul. But all types of *karman* can be subjected to premature fruition by means of penances. Of course, no *karman* can pass off without being enjoyed, actually or virtually though it can be destroyed by the fire of penance at any time.

In this connection it is necessary to explain the motivated and unmotivated nature of penances. The unmotivated penance is an involuntary undertaking in the absence of any idea of its result. The falling off of *karman* that results from such penance is called *akāma-nirjarā*. On the other hand, the falling off of *karman* that takes place on account of the motivated or voluntary type of penance is called *sakāma-nirjarā*, because the *kāmā* or the will of the person is responsible for the penance that effects the 'falling off' before the schedule of its maturity.

In brief, the unmotivated *nirjarā* is *akāma*, whereas the motivated one is *sakāma*.

For further information, refer to *Bhagavatī Ārādhana*, *gāthās* 1841 to 1844; TSū Bhṭ. VI/20, VIII/24; *Bhagavatī Sūtra*, VIII/428; *Thāṇaṁ*, IV, 613; *Sarvārthasiddhi*, VIII. 23.

१६. कृत्स्नकर्मक्षयादात्मनः स्वरूपावस्थानं मोक्षः ।

कृत्स्नकर्मणामपुनर्बन्धतया क्षयात्, आत्मनो ज्ञानदर्शनमये स्वरूपेऽवस्थानं
मोक्षः ।

अनादिसंश्लिष्टानामपि आत्मकर्मणां पार्थक्यं न संदेश्वयम् । दृश्यन्तेऽ
नादिसंबद्धा धातुमृदादयः पृथक् संभूयमानाः ।

19. *kṛtsnakarmakṣayād ātmanah svarūpāvasthānam mokṣaḥ.*

kṛtsnakarmaṇām apunarbandhatayā kṣayāt, ātmano jñānadarśana-

maye svarūpe'vasthānam mokṣaḥ.

anādisaṁśliṣṭānām api ātmakarmanām pāṛthakyam na saṁdegdhavayam. dṛśyante'nādisambaddhā dhātumṛdādayaḥ pṛthak sambhūyamānāḥ.

(Aph.) Emancipation means the establishment of the soul in its own nature on account of the destruction of all the *karmans*. (XIX)

(Gloss) The establishment of the soul in its own nature which consists in (pure) knowledge and intuition, on the total destruction of *karman*, thus making fresh bondage impossible, is emancipation. The mutual separability of soul and *karmans*, which are in union from the beginningless past, should not be questioned inasmuch as the metal and its ore, though eternally intermixed, are separable.

(Note) The soul and the material *karmans* are two ontologically distinct principles. There is, therefore, no inconsistency in accepting their separability by means of spiritual effort.

२०. अनावृतज्ञानदर्शनो निर्धूतमोहो विदेह आत्मा सिद्धः ।

20. *anāvṛta-jñāna-darśāno nirdhūtamoho videha ātmā siddhaḥ.*

(Aph.) The liberated (soul) is the disembodied soul whose knowledge and intuition are (completely) uncovered, with delusion completely dispelled. (XX)

२१. सिद्धो बुद्धो मुक्तः परमात्मा परमेश्वर ईश्वर इत्यन्यन्तरम् ।

21. *siddho buddho muktaḥ paramātmā paramēśvara īśvara ity anarthāntaram.*

(Aph.) The terms liberated, enlightened, emancipated, Great Soul, Great Lord and Lord are synonyms. (XXI)

२२. ते चानन्ता अणुनरावृत्तयश्च ।

संसारिणां सर्वदा तेभ्योऽनन्तानन्तगुणत्वात् न जीवशून्यसंसारत्वापत्तिः ।

22. *te cānantā aṇunarāvṛttayaś ca.*

saṁsāriṇām sarvadā tebhyo'nantānantaguṇatvāt na jīvaśūnyasaṁsāratvāpattiḥ.

(Aph.) The number of the emancipated souls is infinite and they are never-returns. (XXII)

(Gloss) (There are innumerable emancipated souls who are not subject to reincarnation, that is, worldly life). The number of transmigrating

souls always remains 'infinite multiplied by infinite' times the number of them (viz. the emancipated souls) and hence the contingency of the world being emptied of souls would never arise.

२३. तीर्थातीर्थ-तीर्थङ्करातीर्थङ्कर-स्वान्य-गृह-स्त्रीपुंनपुंसकलिङ्ग-प्रत्येकबुद्ध-
स्वयंबुद्ध-बुद्धबोधितैकानेक-भेदात् पञ्चदशधा ।

23. *tīrthātīrtha-tīrthanīkarātīrthanīkara-svānya-gr̥ha-stṛīpuṇnapuṃsaka-
liṅga-pratyekabuddha-svayambuddha-buddhabodhitāikāneka-bhedāt
pañcadaśadhā.*

(Aph.) (The emancipated souls can be described from fifteen stand-points and hence are said to be) fifteen-fold because of the fifteen categories (in which they fall) viz. (i) (emancipated during) the dominance of the doctrine, (ii) (emancipated during) the disappearance of the same, (iii) (emancipated as a) founder of the doctrine, (iv) (as a) non-founder of the same, (v) (in) orthodox outfit, (vi) (in the) outfit of a heretic, (viii) (in the) outfit of a householder, (viii) (in the) state of a woman, (ix) (in the) outfit of a man, (x) (in the) stage of an (artificial) eunuch, (xi) enlightened isolately (and spontaneously at the sight of a specific sign or object), (xii) self-enlightened, (xiii) enlightened by a *buddha* (*tīrthanīkara*), (xiv) emancipated alone, and (xv) emancipated along with others. (XXIII)

२४. मुक्त्यनन्तरमेकसमयाद् ऊर्ध्वं गच्छन्त्यालोकान्तात् ।

मुक्त्यनन्तरमेव सिद्धात्मानोऽविग्रहगत्या एकसमयेन उपरि गच्छन्ति
लोकान्तपर्यन्तम्, धर्मास्तिकायाभावाद् नालोके ।

तथा च—

“औदारिकतैजसकर्मणानि संसारमूलकारणानि ।
हित्वेह ऋजुश्रेण्या, समयेनैकेन याति लोकान्तम् ॥
नोर्ध्वमुपग्रहविरहात्, अधोऽपि वा गौरवाभावात् ।
योगप्रयोगविगमाद् न तिर्यगपि तस्य गतिरस्ति ॥
लाघवयोगाद् घूमवद् अलाबुफलवच्च संगविरहेण ।
बन्धनविरहादेरण्डवच्च सिद्धस्य गतिरूर्ध्वम् ॥
सादिकमनन्तमनुपममव्याबाधं स्वभावजं सौख्यम् ।
प्राप्तः स केवलज्ञान-दर्शनो मोदते मुक्तः ॥

24. *muktyanantaram ekasamayād ūrdhvaṃ gacchanty ālokāntāt.*

*muktyanantaram eva siddhātmano'vighrahagatyā ekasamayena upari
gacchanti lokāntaparyantaṃ, dharmāstikāyābhāvād nāloke,*

tathā ca—

audārika-taijasa-kārmaṇāni saṁsāra-mūla-kāraṇāni/
hitveha ṛju-śreṇyā, samayenaikena yāti lokāntam//
nordhvam upagraha-virahāt, adho'pi vā gauravābhāvāt/
yoga-prayoga-vigamān na tiryag api tasya gatiḥ asti//
lāghava-yogād dhūmavad alābu-phalavac ca saṁga-virahēṇa/
bandhana-virahād eraṇḍavac ca siddhasya gatiḥ ūrdhvam//
sādikam anantam anupamam avyābādhaṁ svabhāvajaṁ saukhyam/
prāptaḥ sa kevalajñāna-darśano modate muktaḥ//

(Aph.) Just after emancipation, (the souls) move up to the end of the cosmic universe, in one instant. (XXIV)

(Gloss) Just after emancipation the emancipated souls move upward, without any turn, (and reach) the end of the cosmic universe in one instant. (They) do not (cross) into the supercosmic space, because of the absence of *dharmāstikāya* (the medium of movement). Thus (it is said) :

“(The emancipated souls) go straight upward in one instant to the top of the cosmic universe, leaving behind the gross, luminous and *karmic* bodies, which are the basic condition of worldly existence.

“They (*viz.* the emancipated souls) can neither move still further (beyond the cosmic space), because of the absence of the necessary medium (of movement), nor move downward because of masslessness. Nor has it any horizontal motion because of the absence of activity and consequent lack of gravitation.

“The movement of the emancipated (soul) is upwards like that of smoke because of lightness, like that of a bottle-gourd (floating over water) because of the absence of coating, like that of a castor-oil seed (springing from a pod) because of being freed from bondage.

“Being emancipated and possessed of pure knowledge and intuition, it now delights in having manifested the inherent bliss which, though having a beginning, is endless, peerless and unobstructed.”

(Note) This account of the upward movement of emancipated souls is based mainly on *Bhagavatī Sūtra*, VII/10-15.

२५. ईषत् प्राग्भारा पृथ्वी तन्निवासः ।

सा च समयक्षेत्रसमायामा, मध्येऽष्टयोजनबाहुल्या, पर्यन्ते मक्षिकापत्रतो-
ऽप्यतितन्वी, लोकाग्रभागसंस्थिता, समच्छत्राकृतिः अर्जुनस्वर्णमयी ।

मुक्ति-सिद्धालयादयोऽस्याः पर्यायाः ।

25. *īṣat prāgbhārā prthvī tannivāsaḥ.*

sā ca samayakṣetra-samāyāmā, madhye'ṣṭa-yojana-bāhulyā, paryante makṣikā-patrato'pyatitanvī, lokāgra-bhāga-samsthītā, samacchatrā-kṛtiḥ arjuna-svarṇamayī.

mukti-siddhālayādayo'syāḥ paryāyāḥ.

(Aph.) The dwelling place of them (viz. the emancipated souls) is known as *īṣatprāgbhārā* (slightly concave) land. (XXV)

(Gloss) This (land) is equal to the *samaya-kṣetra* (region of time) in dimensions and is eight *yojanas* in thickness in the middle. At the extremities it is more tenuous than even the wing of a fly. It is situated at the extremity of the cosmic space, resembles the concave shape of an (stretched out) umbrella upside down and is made of white gold (platinum ?). (The land of) 'emancipation', 'abode of the liberated' and the like are its synonyms.

२६. तत्त्वद्वयां नवतत्त्वावतारः ।

वस्तुतो जीवाजीवरूपा तत्त्वद्वयी विद्यते, पुण्यादीनां च तदवस्थाविशेष-
रूपत्वात् तत्रैवान्तर्भावः ।

क्वचिदात्मना सम्बध्यमानाः, अवरुद्ध्यमानाः, निर्जीयमाणाश्च पुद्गलाः
क्रमेण द्रव्यास्रवसंवरनिर्जरा इति गीयन्ते ।

26. *tattva-dvayāṃ nava-tattvāvatāraḥ.*

vastuto jīvājīva-rūpā-tattva-dvayī vidyate, puṇyādīnāṃ ca tad-avas-thā-viśeṣa-rūpatvāt tatraivāntarbhāvaḥ.

kvacid ātmanā sambadhyamānāḥ āvaruddhyamānāḥ, nirjīyamāṇās ca pudgalāḥ krameṇa dravyāsrava-samvara-nirjarā iti gīyante.

(Aph.) The nine categories are covered under the two categories (viz. soul and non-soul). (XXVI)

(Gloss) In fact, there are only two categories viz. soul and non-soul, merit and the like having been included in them inasmuch as they are of the nature of specific states of the same. Sometimes, the material (*kārmic*) bodies—'attracted', 'inhibited' and 'shed off'—are respectively known as 'material influx', 'material inhibition' and 'material falling off.'¹

२७. अरूपिणो जीवाः ।

27. *arūpiṇo jīvāḥ.*

(Aph.) The souls are immaterial (i.e., devoid of the qualities of matter, such as touch, taste, etc.). (XXVII)

1 See note on 2/1 (page 26).

२८. अजीवा रूपिणोऽपि ।

अजीवा धर्माधर्माकाशकाला अरूपिणः । पुद्गलास्तु रूपिण एव ।
तत्पर्यायभूताः पुण्यपापबन्धा अपि रूपिणः ।

नवापि पदार्था ज्ञेयाः, संवरनिर्जरामोक्षास्त्रय उपादेयाः, शेषाश्च षड्
हेयाः । जीवस्यापि संसारावस्थापेक्षया हेयत्वमविरुद्धम् ।

अथ नवतत्त्वपरमार्थावेदको भिक्षुदर्शितस्तटाकदृष्टान्तो निदर्श्यते ।

तथा हि—

जीवस्तटाकरूपः ।

अतटाकरूपोऽजीवः ।

बहिर्निर्गच्छजलरूपे पुण्यपापे ।

विशदाविशदजलागमनमार्गरूप आस्रवः ।

जलागमनमार्गविरोधरूपः संवरः ।

जलनिष्कासनोपायरूपा निर्जरा ।

तटाकस्थितजलरूपो ब्रम्हः ।

नीरविनिर्मुक्ततटाक इव मोक्षः ।

28. *ajīvā rūpiṇo'pi.*

ajīvā dharmādharmākāśakālā arūpiṇaḥ pudgalās tu rūpiṇa eva.
tatparyāyabhūtāḥ puṇya-pāpa-bandhā api rūpiṇaḥ.

navāpi padārthā jñeyāḥ, saṁvara-nirjarā-mokṣāstraya upādeyāḥ,
śeṣāś ca ṣaḍ heyāḥ. jīvasyāpi saṁsārāvasthāpekṣayā heyatvam avi-
ruddham.

atha nava-tattva-paramārthāvedako Bhikṣu-darśitas taṭāka-dr̥ṣṭānto
nidarśyate. tathā hi—

jīvas taṭāka-rūpaḥ.

ataṭāka-rūpo'jīvaḥ.

bahir nirgacchaj-jalarūpe puṇya-pāpe.

viśadāviśada-jalāgamana-mārga-rūpa āsraṇaḥ.

jalāgamana-mārgāvarodha-rūpaḥ saṁvaraḥ.

jala-niṣkāsanopāya-rūpā nirjarā.

taṭāka-sthita-jala-rūpo bandhaḥ.

nīra-vinirmukta-taṭāka iva mokṣaḥ.

(Aph.) Among (the constituents of the category of) non-soul, some
are material too. (XXVIII)

(Gloss) *Dharma*, *adharma*, space and time which fall in the category of non-soul are (immaterial). The material aggregates, however, are material, and merit and demerit *quā* modes of material bodies are also material. All the nine real entities are worthy of being known, and of them, the three only, viz. 'inhibition', 'falling off' and 'emancipation' are worthy of acceptance while the remaining six are worthy of rejection. It is not improper to regard even the soul as an object worthy of rejection in its aspect of being subject to transmigration.

We shall now cite the example of a pool, as exposed by Ācārya Bhikṣu, revealing the essence of the nine categories. Thus—

The 'soul' is like a pool.

The 'non-soul' is like the non-pool (i.e. what is other than pool).

'Merit' and 'demerit' are like water gushing out

'Influx' is like a conduit through which pure and impure water passes in.

'Inhibition' is like the block in the conduit.

The 'falling off' is like the means of emptying (the pool of its) water.

'Emancipation' is like the pool emptied of all its water.

इति संवरनिर्जराभोक्षस्वरूपनिर्णयः ।

iti samvara-nirjarā-mokṣa-svarūpa-nirṇayaḥ.

Thus ends "The Determination of the Nature of Inhibition, Falling off and Emancipation."

षष्ठः प्रकाशः
LUSTRE VI

१. सम्यग् दर्शन-ज्ञान-चारित्र-तपांसि मोक्षमार्गः ।

1. *samyag darśana-jñāna-cāritra-tapāṁsi mokṣamārgaḥ.*

(Aph.) Right faith, right knowledge, right conduct and right penance constitute the path to emancipation. (I)

२. यथार्थदृष्टिः सम्यग्दर्शनम् ।

सम्यक्त्वं, श्रद्धाः, रुचिः, दृष्टिरित्येकार्थः ।

ओपशमिक-क्षायिक-क्षायोपशमिक-सास्वादन-वेदकात्मका अस्य भेदाः प्रागुक्ताः ।

2. *yathārthadr̥ṣṭiḥ samyagdarśanam.*

samyaktvaṁ, śraddhā, ruciḥ, dr̥ṣṭir ity ekārthāḥ.

aupaśamika-kṣāyika-kṣāyopāśamika-sāsvādana-vedakātmakā asya bhedāḥ prāg uktāḥ.

(Aph.) Right faith is true view. (II)

(Gloss) Right faith, belief, conviction (love of truth), view are synonymous. The following which have already been mentioned (*supra*, pp. 85-7) are its sub-types:—(i) *aupaśamika*, (ii) *kṣāyika*, (iii) *kṣāyopāśamika*, (iv) *sāsvādana* and (v) *vedaka*.

३. यथार्थबोधः सम्यग्ज्ञानम् ।

मति-श्रुतावधि-मनःपर्याय-केवलात्मका अस्य भेदाः प्रागुक्ताः ।

3. *yathārthabodhaḥ samyagjñānam.*

mati-śrutāvadhi-manahparyāya-kevalātmakā asya bhedāḥ prāguktāḥ.

(Aph.) The right knowledge is true cognition (understanding, comprehension and perception).

(Gloss) The types of it that have already been mentioned (*supra*, pp. 28ff) are as follows :—

mati, śruta, avadhi, manahparyāya and kevala.

(Note) The relative importance of *darśana*, *jñāna*, *cāritra* and *tapas* may be considered here. The spiritual journey starts with *samyag darśana* which means right world-view and appreciation of ethical values. The soul is inherently moving towards *samyag darśana* though his conquest of the *mithyā darśana* is problematic ; some souls, in fact, would never do it. Our main issue here is, however, the nature of *samyag darśana* and its function in the later stages of spiritual development, technically called *jīvasthāna* (or *guṇasthāna*).

Samyag darśana is a kind of purity or lucidity of the soul. It is, in fact, the enlightenment called *bodhi* which is the antidote of the passions of infinite intensity (*anantānubandhī*), their attenuation being the necessary condition of that enlightenment. Such enlightenment is explained as the appreciation of the transitoriness of things in Buddhism, and the distinction between the *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* in *Sāṃkhya-Yoga*. But in Jainism, the essential features of *bodhi* are ethical instead of being merely ontological as in Buddhism and the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga*. In theistic philosophies, enlightenment stands for 'consciousness of Divine presence.'¹ None of these philosophies gives ethics its due. Jainism, unlike them, by considering the ethical virtues (viz. *śama*, *saṃvega*, etc.) as the necessary outcome of enlightenment, gives a philosophy of life that is meant for worldly peace as well as spiritual advancement. Religious fanaticism is also inhibited by the cultivation of these virtues, which have already been explained by us in connection with the aphorism 5/9.

The purity of the power of knowledge (*jñāna*) and detachment (*vairāgya*) is considered as possible on account of the purity of *darśana*. The reason is that our knowledge of things and ethical conduct are mostly governed by our inner propensities [likes and dislikes, in one word, passions (*kaṣāyas*)] which need purity for functioning in a right manner. To be more exact, our knowledge and conduct are always biased and prejudiced, and utility-oriented, unless and until they get purity consequent upon the subjugation and sublimation of the passions that underlie them. This is the reason why *samyag darśana* is considered as a *sine quā non* of the purification of right knowledge and right conduct (leading to detachment). "The power of knowledge and detachment is possible only on the dawn of *samyag darśana* ; it is also a concomitant of the latter", says Amṛtacandra.²

४. महाव्रतादीनामाचरणम्—सम्यक् चारित्रम् ।

आदिशब्दात् समिति-गुप्ति-अनुप्रेक्षाणां परिग्रहः ।

4. mahāvratādīnām ācāraṇam—samyak cāritram.

ādiśabdāt samiti-guṇti-anuprekṣāṇām parigrahaḥ.

(Aph.) Right conduct means the practice of the great vows and the like. (IV)

(Gloss) "And the like" stands for right comportment, self-protec-

¹ *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, 2/2/8.

² *Samayasāra-kalāśa*, 4/136.

tion (in respect of thought, word and deed by withdrawing oneself from all activities) and self-contemplation.

५. सामायिक-छेदोपस्थाप्य-परिहारविशुद्धि-सूक्ष्मसंपराय-यथाख्यातानि ।

सर्वसावद्ययोगविरतिः—सामायिकम् ।

छेदेन—विभागेन महाव्रतेषु उपस्थाप्यते इति छेदोपस्थाप्यम् ।

द्वे अपि षष्ठात् नवमजीवस्थानान्तवर्तिनी ।

परिहारेण—तपोविशेषेण विशुद्धिरूपम्—परिहारविशुद्धिः ।

इदं सप्तमषष्ठयोः ।

दशमस्थम्—सूक्ष्मसंपरायः ।

वीतरागावस्थम्—यथाख्यातम् ।

इदं एकादशात् चतुर्दशान्तम् ।

5. *sāmāyika-chedopasthāpya parihāraviśuddhi-sūkṣmasamparāya-yathākhyātāni.*

sarvasāvadyayogavīratih—sāmāyikam.

chedena—vibhāgena mahāvrateṣu upasthāpyate iti chedopasthāpyam.

dve api ṣaṣṭhāt navamajīvasthānāntavarttinī.

parihāreṇa—tapoviśeṣeṇa viśuddhirūpam—parihāraviśuddhiḥ.

idaṁ saptamaṣṣṭhayoḥ.

daśamastham—sūkṣmasamparāyaḥ.

vītarāgāvastham—yathākhyātam.

idaṁ ekādaśāt caturdaśāntam.

(Aph.) (Preliminary) initiation, (confirmation by) ordination, purificatory conduct (through intensive penance), conduct attended with subtle passions, and perfect conduct (conformable to the norm). (V)

(Gloss) Of these (five types of conduct),

(i) (Preliminary) initiation consists in abstinence from all sinful activities.

(ii) (Confirmation by) ordination consists in final admission (into the order) by means of detailed instructions in the individual *mahāvratas* one by one.

Both these types (of conduct) are possible for the aspirants in the sixth and the higher stage (of spiritual development) upto the ninth.

(iii) Purificatory conduct consists in a special penance conducive to the purification of the soul.

This is possible in the seventh and even in the sixth stage.

(iv) Conduct attended with subtle passions is possible only in the tenth stage.

(v) Perfect conduct is possible only for a person free from passions, in the 11th to the 14th stages.

(Note) In our note on the sūtra No. 3, we explained the importance of *samyag darśana* in the development of spirituality, identified with enlightenment (*bodhi*) in the fourth stage. From the fifth stage and onward upto the 12th stage, the most predominant factor is the purification of the conduct by means of *saṁnyama*, *saṁvara* and *tapas*. The perfection of conduct achieved in the 12th stage is necessarily followed by *kaivalya* in the 13th stage, which is the state known as '*jīvan-mukta*' in Indian thought.

In this connection, the role of knowledge in the spiritual journey of a soul is worthy of mention.

The minimum requirement of the spiritual journey is the understanding of the "eight spiritual matrices" (*aṣṭa pravacana-mātā*), which may dawn spontaneously (*nisargād*) or through the instruction from an enlightened person or his disciples (*abhiḡamād*). In both these cases, the special *kṣayopāśama* of the *jñānāvaraṇīya karman* is the essential condition of such understanding.

In the former case, the aspirant's spiritual journey is tortuous inasmuch as proper guidance is not available to him. In such cases the aspirant himself is the teacher. As a result, he has to pass through what is called the state of *vibhaṅga jñāna* attained by a long course of penances, the *vibhaṅga jñāna* ultimately changing into *avadhi* at a certain stage. His spiritual journey is now straightforward. The aspirant of the second category reaches this state directly on account of the initial advantage derived from the spiritual master's instructions.

The role of knowledge practically ends here.

६. अहिंसा सत्यमस्तेयं ब्रह्मचर्यमपरिग्रहश्च महाव्रतम् ।

मनोवाक्कायकृतकारितानुमत्या हिंसा-असत्य-स्तेय-अब्रह्म-परिग्रहेभ्यो
विरतिर्महाव्रतम् ।

6. *ahiṁsā satyam asteyaṁ brahmacaryam aparigrahaś ca mahāvratam.*

manovākkaikāyākṛtakāritānumatyā hiṁsā-asatya-steaya-abrahma-pari-grahebhya viratir mahāvratam.

(Aph.) The great vows are non-injury, truthfulness, non-stealing, celibacy and non-possession. (VI)

(Gloss) The great vows consist in abstinence from injury, untruth,

stealing, non-celibacy, and possession, as committed by oneself, got done by others and approved of by means of mind (thought), speech (word) and body (deed) (thus, making a total of nine varieties).

७. प्राणानामनतिपातः सर्वभूतेषु संयमः अप्रमादो वा अहिंसा ।

7. *prāṇānām anatipātaḥ sarvabhūteṣu saṁyamah apramādo vā ahimsā.*

(Aph.) Non-injury consists in not hurting the life (the *prāṇas*), restraint in respect of all living beings or absence of remissness. (VII)

८. सद्भावोद्भावनं सत्यम् ।

सद्भावः—काय-भाव-भाषाणामृजुता, अविसंवादिप्रवृत्तिश्च ।

तस्य उद्भावनं—प्रकाशनं सत्यमभिधीयते ।

8. *sadbhāvodbhāvaṇam satyam.*

sadbhāvaḥ—kāya-bhāva-bhāṣāṇām rjutā,¹ avisamvādiravṛttiś ca.
tasya udbhāvaṇam—prakāśanam satyam abhidhīyate.

(Aph.) Truthfulness is the revelation of the truth. (VIII)

(Gloss) Truth means the straight-forwardness in deed (physical movement), intention and word, and non-discrepant behaviour. The revelation (disclosure) of that truth is called truthfulness.

(Note) Here 'truth', as an ethical principle, is defined and explained. Umāsvāti,² however, has included revelation of ontological reality also as an aspect of truthfulness.

९. अदत्ताग्रहणमस्तेयम् ।

9. *adattāgrahaṇam asteyam.*

(Aph.) Non-stealing consists in non-acceptance of what is not given.

(IX)

१०. इन्द्रियमनःसंयमो ब्रह्मचर्यम् ।

10. *indriya-maṇaḥ-saṁyamo brahmacaryam.*

(Aph.) Celibacy (continence) consists is the restraint of the senses and the mind. (X)

११. ममत्वविसर्जनमपरिग्रहः ।

11. *mamatvavisarjanam aparigrahaḥ.*

1 The order of the items of *rjutā* as given here is according to *Uttarajjhayaṇāṇi*, 29/48. The *Ṭhāṇaṇ* (4/102), however, gives the usual order of body, speech and mind.

2 *Tattavārtha-bhāṣya*, 7/9.

(Aph.) Non-possession consists in relinquishment of possessiveness (the instinct 'to have' or the 'having mode'). (XI)

१२. ईर्या-भाषा-एषणा-आदाननिक्षेप-उत्सर्गः समितिः ।

चौरित्रानुकूला प्रवृत्तिः समितिः ।

12. *īryā-bhāṣā-eṣaṇā-ādānanikṣepa-utsargāḥ samitiḥ.*

cāritrānukūlā pravṛttiḥ samitiḥ.

(Aph.) (Now we come to *samiti* (comportment), which is a part of *caritra* as set forth in aph. 4). Comportment (consists in careful) movement, speech, begging, using and laying (of paraphernalia) and disposal (of excreta). (XII)

(Gloss) The activity that is congenial to the right conduct is called comportment.

(Note) *Samiti* (comportment) is a comprehensive concept which covers all aspects of active life. Although it is generally understood as concerned with the life of the monastic order, it has a wide connotation in that it is applicable to the life of the householder also. *Samiti* is a discipline that is meant for governing all our activities by giving a definite moral purpose to them. The moral principle that lies at the root of *samiti* is *saṃyama* in its different aspects. A true religious life is that which is permeated by a feeling of reverence for life and the independence of all living beings. The less one interferes with the life of others, the more purposeful and moral is his behaviour and conduct. *Samiti*, in essence, is a purposeful life dedicated to universal welfare without any kind of selfish motives and cultivation of complete self-awareness and absence of remissness.

१३. युगमात्रभूमिं चक्षुषा प्रेक्ष्य गमनमीर्या ।

13. *yugamātrabhūmiṃ cakṣuṣā prekṣya gamanam īryā.*

(Aph.) Careful movement consists in walking after careful observation of the yoke-length of ground in front. (XIII)

(Note) The implication is that one should exercise circumspection in one's movements of all kinds in order that injury or harm is not done to any creature. 'īryā' in its wider connotation covers all sorts of human behaviour that is likely to harm the feelings of others and prove detrimental to the interest of fellow-beings.

१४. अनवद्यभाषणं भाषा ।

14. *anavadya-bhāṣaṇam bhāṣā.*

(Aph.) Careful speech consists in sinless utterance. (XIV)

(Note) Circumspection in speech is as important as that in physical movement. Sometimes bad words may hurt the feelings of others more deeply than physical behaviour.

१५. निर्दोषान्नपानादेरन्वेषणं एषणा ।

एषणा त्रिधा—गवेषणा, ग्रहणैषणा, परिभोगैषणा ॥

15. *nirdoṣānnapānāder anveṣaṇam eṣaṇā.*

eṣaṇā tridhā—gaveṣaṇā, grahaṇaiṣaṇā, paribhogaiṣaṇā ca.

(Aph.) Proper alms-begging consists in search for food, drink, and the like, which are free from blemishes. (XV)

(Gloss) Proper alms-begging is threefold—(a) *gaveṣaṇā*—examination of the acceptability of food (with reference to donor and the receiver of the alms), (b) *grahaṇaiṣaṇā*—examination of the alms itself, and (c) *paribhogaiṣaṇā*—examination of the mode of consumption of the alms received.

(Note) : Of the three *eṣaṇās*, the *gaveṣaṇā* is concerned with the *udgama* and *utpādana* of the alms. The *udgama* is the source or the donor. The *utpādana* is related to alms-taker or the monk. Both *udgama* and *utpādana* fall under *gaveṣaṇā*, that is, search for acceptable alms. This is also called *aśana* in the Digambara tradition¹. The *grahaṇaiṣaṇā* is concerned with alms itself and *paribhogaiṣaṇā* is the mode of consuming the alms by the monk.²

The blemishes of alms-begging are given here.

Sixteen Udgamadoṣas—Blemishes relating to origination:

1. *Ādhākarma* (i) The food etc. produced with a view to entertaining a monk and, which is impure on account of injury to living beings.
(ii) Preparing of food, shelter, etc. for a particular monk.
2. *Auddeśika* Food etc. prepared for distribution among heretical monks or orthodox monks.
3. *Pūtikarma* The mixing up of pure food with impure one on account of *ādhākarma*, thus making the entire food impure.
4. *Miśrajāta* Food prepared for both householders and monks.
5. *Sthāpanā* Food deposited in another vessel from the cooking pot specially for offering it to monks is subject to this blemish. The reason is that the dispute may arise among the members of family regarding the article or the quantity so deposited,³ or the food itself may become unacceptable on account of its being rotten or infested with living beings.⁴
6. *Prābhṛtika* Anything presented in honour is called *prābhṛta*. For

1. Vasunandi, *Mulācāra* Commentary, VI. 2.

2. *Uttarādhyaṇa*. XXIV, 12.

3. *Mulācārā*. VI/11; *Anagāradharmāmṛta*, V. 12.

4. *Piṇḍaniryukti*, 277-284.

example, early or late celebration of marriage in view of the assemblage of monks before or after the appointed day, with a view to entertaining the latter. As distinguished from the above circumstance which is called *bādara*, there is another instance called *sūkṣma* when householder asks his son to wait till the monk came. Such postponing of allowing the child to consume food makes the offer unacceptable to the monk, because the child may run to the monk and drag him to his house for offering food to him in order to satisfy his own desire for the same.

7. *Prāduṣkaṇa* Exhibition of food by transferring the container or food from the dark place or by the light of a lamp or a jewel or the removing the barrier or the curtain. The blemish lies in the fact that movements are involved for the offering.
8. *Kṛita* Food purchased for the monk. A feeling of excessive compassion for the monk is responsible for this kind of blemish.
9. *Prāmitya (Prakṛit—Pāmicca)* Food borrowed for a monk on promise of return with interest or otherwise.
These two are blemishes on account of their causing inconvenience to donor.
10. *Parivartita* Food exchanged for a monk.
11. *Abhihṛta* What is brought by householder from a place beyond the range of three or seven houses in an avenue is subject to this blemish, because this is unusual, not approved by the norm, and is likely to involve injury to creatures.
12. *Ubdhinna* Ghee, oil, molasses etc. offered by breaking the lid or unsealing the cask.
13. *Mālāpahṛta* Food brought down from an elevated place on which it was stored. The reason for this being a blemish is that the donor may fall down while climbing the elevated place on a staircase.
14. *Ācchedya* Food offered out of fear of the king or another powerful person entails this blemish.¹ According to the *Piṇḍaniryukti*, food snatched by force from others and offered as alms was subject to this blemish.²
15. *Ānirṣṭa* Alms owned by a company of persons and given by one of the owners without consent of the co-partners. The reason for this being a blemish is that a dispute may arise among the company who owned the articles.
16. *Adhyavapūraka* Food put in excess in a cooking vessel in view of the arrival of monks.

1 *Mūlācāra*, VI. 24.

2 *Piṇḍaniryukti*, verses 366-376,

Sixteen Utpādanadoṣas—Faults pertaining to the ways adopted in obtaining food :

1. *Dhātrī* Alms given to a monk in return for the nursing work done by him.
2. *Dūṭī* Alms given to a monk who runs on errands for the householder.
3. *Nimitta* Alms obtained by fortune-telling such as foretelling happenings and reading omens and bodily science.
4. *Ājīva* Alms secured by mentioning caste, family, clan, profession, etc., of the donor for rousing his sympathy. The reason for this being a blemish is that the monk belittles himself.
5. *Vanīpāka* Food obtained by servile supplication by approving of the act of offering to dogs, crows, lepers etc. on the part of donor.
6. *Cikitsā* Alms obtained by offering medical service, treatment etc.
7. *Krodha* Alms obtained by expressing one's power of anger.
8. *Māna* Alms obtained by displaying one's false pride or vanity.
9. *Māyā* Alms obtained by trickery.
10. *Lobha* Alms obtained by displaying one's excessive greed for the alms offered.
11. *Pūrvapaścāt-samstava* Alms received by praising the donor or reminding him of his past donations is vitiated by this blemish, which also occurs if the monk praises the donor after donation. The blemish occurs if the monk refers to his old acquaintance with the donor.
12. *Vidyā* Alms obtained by displaying or promising the gift of an occult science, acquired by monk by special effort.
13. *Mantra* Alms obtained by giving charms and spells, or displaying their efficacy.
14. *Cūrṇā* Alms obtained by an offer of charmed powder for beautifying the body and cleansing the eyes. The charmed powder may also be promised for making the donor invisible.
15. *Yoga* Alms obtained by offering an ointment for the feet to enable the donor to walk on water or fly in the air.
16. *Mūlakarma* Alms obtained by such devices as prevention of conception, or conferment of fecundity, restoration of virginity etc. The act of restoring conjugal relationship or restoring control over what has got out of it also falls in this blemish.

Ten Eṣaṇā¹ (grahaṇaiṣaṇā)— Blemishes pertaining to the alms :

1. *Śaṃkita* Food suspected of any one of the blemishes.

1. In fact, *eṣaṇā* here stands for *aśana* as explained by Vasunandi in *Mūlācāra* Commentary (VI. 2). It is a blemish sometimes due to the alms-giver and sometimes to the alms-recipient.

2. *Mrakṣita* Pure food contaminated by live article on account of serving it with a hand besmeared with impure or unfit articles.
3. *Nikṣipta* Pure food placed upon live article.
4. *Pihita* Pure food covered by live or even lifeless cover, if the latter is too heavy in weight.
5. *Samhṛta* Putting of pure food in a vessel from which live food has been cast out with a view to give pure food to a monk.¹ According to *Mūlācāra*,² such blemish takes place if he accepts alms offered in hot haste and without proper inspection by the donor.
6. *Dāyaka* Food obtained from unfit donor such as a child, an old man, drunkard, lunatic, and the like.
7. *Unmiśra* Pure food mixed up with live food.
8. *Apariṇata* Food not fully cooked and made lifeless.
9. *Lipta* Food offered by hands or from pots besmeared with live article such as water, vegetable, etc.
10. *Chardita* Food of which a part has fallen on the ground while offering it to the monk, because the dropped food is the potential or actual cause of injury to living beings.

Five blemishes of *grāsaiṣaṇā*, also called *paribhogaiṣaṇā*, which relates to the mode of consuming the food :

1. *Samyojanā* This blemish occurs when the monk mixes up items like milk, yoghurt with molasses, ghee etc. in order to convert them into delicious food.
2. *Āhāra-pramāṇa* This blemish pertains to the quality and quantity of food and drink. If a monk consumes more than 32 morsels, and a nun more than 28, the blemish in respect of quantity is incurred. If they continue this habit of over-eating, the blemish is called *nikāma* as distinguished from casual over-eating called *prakāma*. Partaking of food containing profuse ghee or oil is the cause of this blemish called '*praṇīta*' (rich and heavy) food.
3. *Aṅgāra* Attachment to food for its flavour.
4. *Dhūma* Condemning food for its bad flavour.
5. *Kāraṇa* Six causes for acceptance and six for abstinence from food :—
Six occasions for acceptance of food—(1) hunger, (2) service to the elder and the sick, (3) proper deportment, (4) self-restraint, (5) maintenance of life, and (6) practice of the discipline. Six occasions for abstinence from food—(1) remedy of illness, (2) natural or man-made calamities, (3) the strengthening of continence, (4) compassion to living beings, (5) practice of penance, and (6) giving up of the body.

1 *Pinḍaniryukti*, verse 565.

2 *Mūlācāra*, VI. 48.

Alms-begging as reflected in the above-mentioned rules and regulations is a very difficult and onerous task. Both the giver and the receiver should be extremely careful so that there is no infringement of the principles of alms-giving and alms-begging. The monk should see that nothing is being offered to him under any kind of favour conferred on the alms-giver. He should also be careful in his sermons or talks not to exert any kind of influence on the giver to induce liberality in him. These are the pit-falls which a monk should always avoid in order to maintain his life in a perfectly pure manner.

The principal quality of the alms-giver and the alms-taker is clearly defined in the following dictum of *Dasaveāliya* :

“An unambitious giver is as rare as an unambitious receiver. Both of them qualify themselves for higher forms of existence.”¹

The most fundamental blemish is *āhākamma*, the Skt. equivalent of which, as proposed by Leumann, is *yāthākāmyam*, meaning “prepared for a monk as satisfying the wish of the alms-giver”.

The other blemishes such as *auddeśika* and the like are to be considered in the light of the blemish of *āhākamma*. For instance, if an article of food is prepared for oneself, and then divided into portions earmarked for different classes of prospective alms-takers, there arises the likelihood of the occurrence of a blemish. The divided portions may be further embellished for a particular monk or a particular group of monks. In this case, the blemish of *auddeśika* may arise.

The blemishes are broadly classified into (i) *viśuddhakoṭi* and (ii) *aviśuddhakoṭi*. The alms unpolluted by *āhākamma* fall under the first *koṭi*, while those that are polluted by *āhākamma* fall under the second. Thus scrutinized, the *āhākamma* is an absolutely polluted blemish, and the other five viz. *auddeśika*, *miśrajāta*, *bādara prābhṛtika*, *pūti* and *adhyavapūraka*, are considered polluted on account of their being vitiated by the background of *āhākamma*.

१६. उपध्यादेः सयत्नं व्यापरणं आदान-निक्षेपः ।

16. *upadhyādeḥ sayatnam vyāparaṇam ādāna-nikṣepaḥ*.

(Aph.) The ‘careful using and laying (of paraphernalia)’ consists in meticulous manipulation of paraphernalia (i.e. articles for regular and occasional use). (XVI)

१७. उच्चारदेः सविधि परिष्ठापनमुत्सर्गः ।

सविधीति—प्रत्युपेक्षितप्रमार्जितभूम्यादौ । परिष्ठापनम्—परित्यजनम् ।

17. *uccārādeḥ savidhi pariṣṭhāpanam utsargaḥ*.

savidhīti—pratyupekṣita-pramāṛjita-bhūmyādau. pariṣṭhāpanam—parityajanam.

1 5/1/100 : dullahāo muhādāi, muhājivī vi dullahā /
muhādāi muhājivī, do vi gacchaṃti soggaṃp //

(Aph.) Careful disposal means disposing of excreta and the like in the manner prescribed (in the scripture). (XVII)

(Gloss) 'As prescribed' means 'on the ground and the like carefully observed and cleansed' (of living animalcules). Disposing means relinquishing.

१८. मनोवाक्कायसंवरो गुप्तिः ।

मोक्षसाधने प्रवृत्तिप्रधाना समितिः, निवृत्तिप्रधाना च गुप्तिः, समितौ गुप्तिरवश्यंभाविनी, गुप्तौ समितिर्भजनया इत्यनयोर्भेदः ।

18. *manovākkāyasamvaro guptiḥ.*

mokṣasādhane pravṛttipradhānā samitiḥ, nivṛttipradhānā ca guptiḥ, samitau guptir avaśyambhāvinī, guptau samitir bhajanayā ity anayor bhedah.

(Aph.) Self-protection means the inhibition of mind, speech and body. (XVIII)

(Gloss) Right comportment (*samiti*) is predominantly a positive act in the achievement of emancipation, whereas self-protection (*gupti*) is predominantly negative (in nature). Inhibition is a necessary concomitant of right comportment, but the latter may or may not accompany the former.

(Note) Right comportment entails as a matter of fact self-protection from evil propensities. But self-protection from evil propensities may or may not be attended with positive acts of right behaviour. A person of reserved nature cultivates inhibition of evil thoughts and activities beneficial to himself and the religious order. The monk engaged in the necessary duties of the order follows the rules of *samiti* and also practises inhibition by desisting from such activities as are detrimental to himself and the order.

१९. मनःस्थैर्याय अनित्याद्यर्थानुप्रेक्षणं अनुप्रेक्षा ।

अनुप्रेक्षणम्—अर्थविमर्शनम् ।

19. *manah-sthairyāya anityādy-arthānuprekṣaṇam anuprekṣā.*
anuprekṣaṇam—arthavimarśanam.

(Aph.) Self-contemplation consists in contemplating upon the transitoriness (of things), and the like for the steadiness of the mind. (XIX)

(Gloss) 'Contemplating' means 'pondering over'.

(Note) Contemplation is a philosophic mode of life, withdrawal from the affairs of man and the market-place. It is knowing for the sake of knowledge. It is vision or intuitive knowledge as distinguished from discursive knowledge.

२०. पुनःपुनरासेवनमभ्यासो वा भावना ।

20. *punaḥpunar āsevanam abhyāso vā bhāvanā.*

(Aph.) Or, Anuprekṣā is meditation (*bhāvanā*), that is, repeated exercise meaning practice. (XX)

२१. अनित्य-अशरण-भव-एकत्व-अन्यत्व-अशौच-आस्रव-संवर-निर्जरा-धर्म-
लोक-बोधिदुर्लभताश्च ।

21. *anitya- aśaraṇa- bhava- ekatva- anyatva- aśauca- āsrava- samvara-
nirjarā-dharma-loka-bodhidurlabhatāś ca.*

(Aph.) (Moreover, the objects of contemplation are)—impermanence, helplessness, transmigration, loneliness, distinctness (of soul from body), impurity (of the body), influx (of karmans), inhibition (of karmans), shedding (of karmans), righteousness, (the metaphysical nature of) cosmos (as consisting of five *astikāyas*), and the difficulty of the attainment of enlightenment. (XXI)

(Note) These contemplations and meditations are meant for the purity of the soul, and protection from the evils of worldly life.

(1) Thus, the contemplation on the “transitoriness of things” is conducive to the renunciation of the worldly ties and consequential release from sufferings caused by those ties. A worldly tie, however slender or weak, is detrimental to the attainment of emancipation. Says St. John of the Cross : “The soul that is attached to anything, however much good there may be in it, will not arrive at the liberty of divine union. For whether it be a strong wire rope or a slender and delicate thread that holds the bird, it matters not, if it really holds it fast; for until the cord be broken, the bird cannot fly. So the soul, held by the bonds of human affection, however slight they may be, cannot, while they last, make its way to God.”¹

(2) For further strengthening the spirit of detachment, contemplation on “utter helplessness” is the second step. “*nālaṃ te tava tāṇāe vā saraṇāe vā, tumam̐pi tesim̐ nālaṃ tāṇāe vā saraṇāe vā.*” “Neither are they competent to protect you, nor are you to do so”, says the *Āyāro*.²

(3) At the third stage of contemplation, the practiser realises the nature of endless transmigrations and reflects upon the world as nothing but a place of suffering, where he finds himself puzzled and lost. As a result of this contemplation, a strong sense of detachment arises in him which compels him to get rid of the world.

(4) The aspirant next contemplates on himself as a solitary pilgrim, and reflects—“Alone am I, without any fellow traveller, nor am I a fellow of another.” Thus does he realise himself as deserted and lonely.

As a result of this contemplation, he is freed from attachment to his own people and hatred against others. Thus, being free from attachment and hatred, he en-

1 Quoted from *The Principal Upaniṣads* (By Dr. S. Radhakrishnan), p. 106 n,

2 II. 20.

joys perfect detachment to be able to exert for attainment of emancipation.

(5) The fifth contemplation is concerned with the self as eternal, imperishable, without beginning and end, as distinguished from the body which is impermanent, perishable and ever-changing. Consequently he loses all bondage to the body and exerts himself for the highest aim of emancipation.

(6) The sixth contemplation is concerned with the impurity and loathsome character of the body which is born in impurity, lives in impurity and dies in impurity. It is impossible to remove the repugnant and foul nature of the body by any means such as bathing, perfuming and the like. This *aśuci bhāvanā* is an integral part of spiritual discipline in Buddhism and Sāṃkhya-Yoga also. Here the utility of the body for religious life is not denied. What is discouraged is only the excessive attachment to it and the exclusive stress on its nourishment and embellishment, as was done by the materialists in ancient days.

(7) The seventh contemplation is concerned with the evilness of the *āsravas* (influxes) which are like the currents of great rivers emptying the good propensities and filling up the bad ones. The sources of *āsravas* are senses, the passions and attachment to worldly things. The result of this contemplation is the inhibition of the influx of *karmans*.

(8) The next contemplation is on the 'inhibition of the influxes'. This contemplation is like plugging the hole in the keel of a vessel sailing on the ocean.

(9) The ninth contemplation is on the *nirjarā* (shaking off the *karmans*). This shaking is twofold : (i) Involuntary or unmotivated that is effected in due course, and (ii) Voluntary or motivated. The contemplation on the first type convinces the practiser of the nature of suffering as due to past accumulated *karmans*. Contemplation on the second type which is affected by means of penances and tolerance of hardships, troubles and tribulations, generates in the practiser the spiritual vigour and final enlightenment that leads to emancipation.

The *nirjarā* is usually identified with *vedanā* (suffering) and *vipāka* (fruition) which are nothing but unalloyed suffering. The contemplation on *nirjarā* is, on this account, contended as possessed of a pessimistic tone. But the final end of this contemplation being spiritual light the contention stands refuted.

(10) The tenth contemplation is concerned with the *dharma*, the Doctrine. The enlightenment is its door ; the five *mahāvratas* constitute the path ; its essence is contained in the twelve *aṅgas* ; the eight matrices (viz. three *guptis* and five *saṃitis*) constitute its body ; it is the supreme saviour, leading its practiser to emancipation. Contemplation on these five integral qualities of the Doctrine convinces the contemplator of the "well propounded character" of the Doctrine. Four excellences of the Doctrine are : (i) its capacity to lead to liberation (*nairyātrika*), (ii) ultimacy of its truth on account of its relativistic approach (*satyātā*), (iii) its absolute authenticity (*saṃśuddhatā*) because of its being devoid of attachment, aversion and delusion, and lastly, (iv) its instantaneous capability of checking the influx (*āsrava*). These qualities of the Doctrine are comparable to the six qualities of *Dhamma* propounded in Buddhism. The *Dhamma* is : (i) *svākhyāto*—well propounded, (ii) *saṃdiṭṭhiko*—realizable in this life, (iii) *akāliko*—devoid of any time-gap for the generation of its result of purity, (iv) *ehi-passiko*—its openness to all (lit. come and see), (v) *opana-*

yiko—gradually leading to emancipation, and lastly (vi) *paccattam vedītavvo viññūhi*—to be practised and comprehended completely by oneself who is wise and detached.

The contemplation of the Doctrine is the most important part of the *anuprekṣā* discipline which is the gate-way to higher spirituality.

(11) The purpose of the eleventh *anuprekṣā* called '*lokānuprekṣā*' reminds one of the variegated changes consisting of rise, continuity and cessation of things, resulting in a clear perception of the nature of things. The practiser of this contemplation develops the understanding that everything is changing and nothing continues for ever—"*savvāiṃ thānāiṃ asāsayaṃ*". One seeks in vain a permanent shelter in this world and ultimately finds consolation in the spiritual pursuit of emancipation. The only thing that is important in worldly existence is a constant exertion for creating an environment that is peaceful and congenial to the spiritual endeavour of individuals who live together. This spiritual sense will result in beneficial ecological results for all living creatures.

(12) The contemplation on the difficulty of attaining enlightenment (*bodhi*) generates a sense of urgency in the practiser and does away with his remissness and lethargy in the cultivation of the path of enlightenment. There is nothing higher than enlightenment, and there is no endeavour more worthy of making than the endeavour for attainment of enlightenment.

२२. देशतरचाणुव्रतशिक्षावते ।

22. *deśataś cāṇuvrata-śikṣāvrate.*

(Aph.) Partial abstinence consists in (observance of) smaller vows and the supplementary vows. (XXII)

२३. स्थूलहिंसा-मृषा-स्तेयाऽब्रह्मविरतिः इच्छापरिमाणं च अणुव्रतम् ।

23. *sthūlahimsā-mṛṣā-steya'brahmaviratiḥ icchāparimāṇam ca aṇuvratam.*

(Aph.) Abstinence from gross violence, falsehood, stealing and incontinence, and limitation of desire for possession constitute smaller vows. (XXIII)

(Note) The *aṇuvrata* concerned with *ahimsā* is to be carefully understood. The householder desists from violent activities as far as it is practicable for him. The main emphasis of the Jaina scripture in this connection is on the intention of the layman. Suppose a Jaina cultivator has taken the vow of abstaining from doing injury to mobile beings. Now suppose, while cultivating his land with utmost caution and care, he happens to cause injury to a mobile living being, though he had no intention to do so, he is not considered as guilty of violating his vow. Similarly, if he has taken the vow of not causing injury to any kind of vegetation, but happens to do so unintentionally while cultivating his land, he is not considered to have broken his vow. The deeply ethical character of the vows of the layman is sufficiently brought to light by the above clarifications recorded in the *Bhagavatī Sūtra*.¹

२४. दिग्-उपभोगपरिभोग-अनर्थदण्डविरति-सामायिक-देशावकाशिक-पौष-
धोपवास-यथासंविभागाः शिक्षाव्रतम् ।

एषु शेषचतुष्कमेव भूयोऽभ्यासात्मकत्वात् शिक्षाव्रतम् । आद्यत्रयञ्च
अणुव्रतानां गुणवर्धकत्वाद् गुणव्रतम्—क्वचिदित्यपि व्यवस्था ।

24. dig-upabhogaparibhoga-anarthadaṇḍavirati-sāmāyika-deśāvakāśika-
pauśadhopavāsa-yathāsaṁvibhāgāḥ śikṣāvratam.

eṣu śeṣacatuṣkam eva bhūyo'bhyāśātmakatvāt śikṣāvratam. ādyatra-
yañ ca aṇuvratānāṁ guṇavardhakatvād guṇavratam—kvacid ity api
vyavasthā.

(Aph.) Spatial limitation, abandonment and limitation of articles of food, drink, etc., and categories of professions, avoidance of any purposeless act of violence, abstinence from all sinful activities for a fixed intended period (say, one *muhūrta*), further curtailment of distance (undertaken by the first *guṇavrata*) for a limited time, observance of *upavāsa* on sacred days, and parting with food and the like by offering them to monastic order—these constitute the supplementary vows. (XXIV)

(Gloss) Among these, the last four are called practical vows because they are to be practised repeatedly. The first three are called qualifying vows, because they are calculated to promote the excellence of the smaller vows. This division is made in some treatises.

(Note) The *aṇuvratas* are more or less general principles which are to be supplemented by the *śikṣāvratas*. These *śikṣāvratas* are also called *śīla* and *śikṣāpadas*. The *śīlas* strengthen the *aṇuvratas*. The *guṇavratas* are cultivated for promoting the efficacy of the *aṇuvratas* and are to be practised for the whole life like the *aṇuvratas*. Of the four *śikṣāvratas*, the two viz. *sāmāyika* and *deśāvakāśika* are to be observed daily, while *pauśadhopavāsa* and *yathāsaṁvibhāga* are observed occasionally, the former on the sacred days and the latter when opportunities present themselves.

By practising the first supplementary vow, viz. *digvrata*, the *śrāvaka* imposes upon himself the limitation of movement in space, thus reducing the scope of plausible violence.

Similarly, by means of the second supplementary vow, viz. *upabhoga-paribhoga vrata*, limitation is imposed on *upabhoga* such as consumption of food, drink etc. and *paribhoga* such as semi-permanent articles like clothes, ornament, vehicles etc. In this *śikṣāvrata*, the articles and activities that involve injury to life on a large scale are completely discarded, and those which entail insignificant injury to life are delimited. Sinful professions (*karmādāna*) which are fifteen in number are to be totally discarded by the observer of this *śikṣāvrata*.

In the third supplementary vow, the *śrāvaka* desists from all kinds of purposeless acts of violence. Indulgence in an act that is not conducive to any of the ends of

dharma, artha, kāma and *mokṣa* is a case of *anarthadaṇḍa*.

The *sāmāyika* has a negative as well as a positive aspect, the former standing for abstinence from all sinful activities and the latter for the practice of such activities as are free from any kind of violence.

The *deśavakāśika* is to be distinguished from the *digvrata* in that the former is done daily afresh, while the latter is undertaken for a longer period of time, or for the whole life. The word *pauṣadha* is derived from Skt. *upavasatha* (cf. Pali *uposatha*). Originally it stood for a disciple sitting beside his teacher for instruction in spirituality. In course of time the word came to stand for the sacred days of a fortnight, such as the new and full moon days including the fourteenth day, and later on, the eighth and other days also. Fasting in some form or other was observed on the sacred days.

The Jaina and Buddhist conceptions of *pauṣadha* are to be understood in this background. In Buddhism, the monks did not fast on the *uposatha* day, but it was compulsory for them to assemble and recite the *pātimokkha*, a Buddhist counterpart of Jaina *pratikramaṇa* text, which perhaps served as a model for the Buddhists.

Abstaining from the pleasure of the five senses such as sounds, and dwelling in the self in deep concentration is *upavāsa* or fasting, wherein one gives up food and drink for one or more days, and does not take bath or avoids cosmetics and garlands, and desists from all sinful activities thereby spending the time in yogic posture. He remains vigilant and self-aware during the whole length of fastings. He observes strict celibacy.

The last supplementary vow prescribes that the *śrāvaka* should offer food, drink, etc., to the monastic order avoiding all blemishes of *piṇḍaiṣaṇā*.

२५. दर्शन-व्रत-सामायिक-पौषध-कायोत्सर्ग-ब्रह्म-सचित् तारम्भप्रेष्योद्दिष्ट-
वर्जन-श्रमणभूताश्च प्रतिमाः ।

द्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावैः प्रतिमोयमानः साधनाविशेषः प्रतिमा ।

25. *darśana-vrata-sāmāyika-pauṣadha-kāyotsarga-brahma-sacittārambha-preṣyoddiṣṭavarjana-śramaṇabhūtāś ca pratimāḥ.*

dravyakṣetrakālabhāvaiḥ pratimīyamānaḥ sādhanāviśeṣaḥ pratimā.

(Aph.) The intensive courses also (prescribed for a layman) are : (i) faith, (ii) vows, (iii) *sāmāyika*, (iv) *pauṣadha*, (v) *kāyotsarga*, (vi) celibacy, (vii) abstinence from live food, (viii) abstinence from activities involving injury to life, (ix) abstinence from activities through deputies, (x) abstinence from food prepared for oneself, and (xi) conduct like that of a monk. (XXV)

(Gloss) *Pratimā* is an intensive discipline which is measured in point of excellence by means of stages attained by the practiser in respect of his personal ability (*dravya*), place (*kṣetra*), time (*kāla*) and his mental dispositions (*bhāva*).

(Note) A brief description of *pratimās* seriatum will be useful here :

- (1) *Darśana pratimā* : Duration : 1 month.
Method : Firm faith in discipline in its entirety, purity of faith and avoidance of the blemishes of faith.
- (2) *Vrata pratimā* : Duration : 2 months.
Method : Observance of five *aṇuvratas* and three *guṇavratas* and "fasting" on sacred days.
- (3) *Sāmāyika pratimā* : Duration : 3 months.
Method : Observance of the vows of *sāmāyika* and *deśāvakāśika*.
- (4) *Pauṣadha pratimā* : Duration : 4 months.
Method : Observance of *pauṣadha* on all the sacred days without any exception.
- (5) *Kāyotsarga pratimā* : Duration : 5 months.
Method : *Kāyotsarga* in the night. Also abstinence from bath, eating after sunset, using unfolded *dhotī* (loin-cloth) ; and strict celibacy in the day, and desisting from incontinence in the night as far as possible.
- (6) *Brahmacarya pratimā* : Duration : 6 months.
Method : Complete celibacy.
- (7) *Sacitta-varjana pratimā* : Duration : 7 months.
Method : Abstinence from live food.
- (8) *Ārambha-varjana pratimā* : Duration : 8 months.
Method : Not to engage oneself in activities involving injury to life.
- (9) *Preṣya-varjana pratimā* : Duration : 9 months.
Method : Abstinence from any injurious activity done through deputies.
- (10) *Uddiṣṭa-varjana pratimā* : Duration : 10 months.
Method : Abstinence from food prepared for oneself. In addition to this, he shaves his head with razor or keeps a tuft. His response to queries about household affairs should be simply "I know, I do not know."
- (11) *Śramaṇabhūta pratimā* : Duration : 11 months.
Method : Imitation of monastic life. He may use razor or pluck up his hair. He imitates monastic life in respect of garments and other outfit. He restricts his begging tour to his relatives, as he has not severed his attachment to them.

२६. मारणान्तिकी संलेखना ।

अन्तिमसमयाराधनां प्रतिपन्नः श्रावकः अनशनात् पूर्वं क्रमिकतपसा शरीरं संलिखति—कृशो करोति ।

26. mārāṇāntikī saṁlekhanā.

antima-samayārādhanāṁ pratipannaḥ śrāvakaḥ anaśanāt pūrvam kramikatapasā śarīraṁ saṁlikhati—kṛśīkaroti.

(Aph.) *Samleghanā* is scraping penance unto death. (XXVI)

(Gloss) A layman engaged in the last stage of discipline (*ārāadhanā*) scrapes, that is, emaciates his body by a graded course of penance that precedes his (final) fasting (unto death).

(Note) The layman like the monk engages himself at the end of the *pratimās* in emaciating his passions and his body in preparation for fasting unto death, when the opportunity presents itself. *Samleghanā* is a preparation that reaches its height in 'fast unto death', which is not courted under any passion or ill-will against self or anybody else. It is, therefore, not suicide in the usual sense of the term, which is committed under the impulses of attachment or aversion.

२७. परिग्रहविसर्जन-प्रव्रज्या-भक्तपानप्रत्याख्यानविषये पर्यालोचनं महा-
निर्जराहेतु ।

27. *parigrahavisarjana-pravrajyā-bhaktapānapratyākhyāna-viṣaye paryālocanam mahānirjarāhetu.*

(Aph.) The condition of great falling off (of *karman*) is the contemplation on the renunciation of (all) possessions, acceptance of monkhood, and abstinence from food and drink. (XXVII)

(Note) This contemplation pertains to the householder who cherishes these three ambitions for spiritual elevation. These ambitions are also conducive to a good social life that is bound to lead to the spiritual reform of the householder.

२८. इन्द्रियमनोनिग्रहकारकमनुष्ठानं कर्मशरीरतापकत्वात् सम्यक्तपः ।
एतत् कर्मशरीरतापकत्वादेव आत्मनो वैशद्यापादकं भवति ।

28. *indriyamanonigraha-kāra-kam anuṣṭhānam karmaśarīratāpakatvāt-ṣamyaktapaḥ.*

etat karmaśarīratāpakatvād eva ātmano vaiśadyāpādakaṁ bhavati.

(Aph.) The right penance consists in the (spiritual) activity that subdues the senses and the mind, (and is so called) because it heats up the *karmic* body (resulting in its melting away finally). (XXVIII)

(Gloss) This (penance) becomes the purifier of soul on account of its heating up the *karmic* body, resulting finally in its melting (away).

२९. अनशन-ऊनोदरिका-वृत्तिसंक्षेप-रसपरित्याग-कायक्लेश-प्रतिसंलीनता
बाह्यम् ।

एते षट् मोक्षसाधने बहिरंगत्वाद् बाह्यं तपः ।

29. *anaśana-ūnodarikā-vṛttisaṁkṣepa-rasaparityāga-kāyakleśa-pratisaṁlīnatā bāhyam.*

ete ṣaṭ mokṣasādhane bahirangatvād bāhyaṁ tapaḥ.

(Aph.) Fasting, semi-fasting, conditional acceptance of alms, abstinence from the delicacies, austerity, and seclusion constitute the external penance. (XXIX)

(Gloss) These six are external penances (in the sense of being preliminary and preparatory) inasmuch as they are externals of the means of emancipation. (These are indispensable, though sometimes they result as incidental occurrences at the higher stages of penance such as *dhyāna* and *kāyotsarga*.)

३०. आहारपरिहारोऽनशनम् ।

अन्न-पान-खाद्य-स्वादरूपचतुर्विधस्याहारस्य परित्यागः—अनशनम् ।
तच्च द्विधा—इत्वरिकम्—उपवासादारभ्य आषण्मासम् । यावत्-
कथिकम्—आमरणम् । तत्रिधा—भक्तप्रत्याख्यानमिङ्गिणमरणं
प्रायोपगमनञ्च ।

30. āhāraparihāro'naśanam.

anna-pāna-khādyā-svādyarūpa-caturvidhasyāhārasya parityāgaḥ—
anaśanam. tac ca dvidhā—itvarikam—upavāsād ārabhya āṣaṇm-
āsam. yāvatkathikam—āmarāṇam tat tridhā—bhaktapratyākhyā-
nam iṅgiṇimaraṇam prāyopagamaṇaṁ ca.

(Aph.) Fasting means avoidance of aliments. (XXX)

(Gloss) Fasting means giving up of fourfold aliments viz. food such as cereals and pulses, drink, dry fruits and the like, and spices. It is two-fold : (i) short-term fasting which lasts from one day upto six months; (ii) life-long fasting which is undertaken to be observed upto death. The latter is threefold : (i) *bhakta-pratyākhyāna*—giving up of food till death. In this penance, the practiser can move in a restricted place fully in accordance with the rules of *samitis* (comportments); (ii) *iṅgiṇi maraṇa*—in this, the movement is further restricted to the place he occupies for the purpose of fasting. Here, he can move his limbs, but the movement should be as less as possible; (iii) *prāyopagamana*—here the movement is completely stopped till the end of the penance, which continues till death.

३१. अल्पत्वमूनोदरिका ।

अल्पत्वञ्च—अन्नपानवस्त्रपात्रकषायादीनाम् । उपवासात् प्राग्
नमस्कारसहितादीनामत्रान्तर्भावः ।

31. *alpatvam ūnodarikā.*

alpatvañ ca—anna-pāna-vastra-pātra-kaṣāyādīnām.
upavāsāt prāg namaskārasahitādīnām atrāntarbhāvaḥ.

(Aph.) 'Semi-fasting' means reduction. (XXXI)

(Gloss) Reduction means the reduction in food, drink, cloth, utensils and also attenuation of passions and the like. This penance also comprises the preparatory stage for fasting such as abstinence from food and drink for a *muhūrta* or more after sunrise.

३२. नानाभिग्रहाद् वृत्यवरोधो वृत्तिसंक्षेपः ।

भिक्षाचरिकेति नामान्तरमस्य ।

32. *nānābhigrahād vṛtyavarodho vṛtti-samkṣepaḥ.*

bhikṣācaṛiketi nāmāntaram asya.

(Aph.) (Abstinence from alms by way of) 'conditional acceptance of alms' means the restriction of the acceptance of alms by means of various self-imposed resolves (to be satisfied before receiving alms). (XXXII)

(Gloss) A synonym for this penance is 'the act of begging in its various modes'.

३३. विकृतेर्वर्जनं रसपरित्यागः ।

विकृतिः—घृतदुग्धदध्यादिः ।

33. *vikṛter varjanam rasaparityāgaḥ.*

vikṛtiḥ—ghṛta-dugdha-dadhyādiḥ.

(Aph.) 'Abstinence from the delicacies' consists in giving up the 'stimulating products' (called *vikṛti*). (XXXIII)

(Gloss) 'Stimulating product' refers to clarified butter, milk, curd and the like.

(Note) They are called *vikṛti*, because they are conducive to excitement of passions.

३४. कायोत्सर्गाद्यासनकरणं कायक्लेशः ।

34. *kāyotsargādyāsanakaraṇaṁ kāyakleśaḥ.*

(Aph.) Austerity means undertaking postures such as *kāyotsarga* and the like. (XXXIV)

३५. इन्द्रियादीनां बाह्यविषयेभ्यः प्रतिसंहरणं प्रतिसंलोचनम् ।

इन्द्रिय-योग-कषायनिग्रह-विविक्तशय्यासनभेदादसौ चतुर्धा । अकुशल-
व्यापारान्निवृत्तिः कुशलप्रवृत्तिश्च निग्रहः । विविक्तशय्यासनं एकान्त-
वासः ।

35. *indriyādīnāṁ bāhyaviṣayebhyaḥ pratisamharaṇaṁ pratisamlīnatā.*

indriya-yoga-kaṣāyanirgraha-viviktaśayyāsana-bhedād asau cat-
urdhā. akuśalavyāpārān nivṛttiḥ kuśalapravṛttiś ca nigrahaḥ. vivikta-
śayyāsanam ekāntavāsaḥ.

(Aph.) Seclusion means withdrawal of the sense-organs and the like from the external objects. (XXXV)

(Gloss) The 'seclusion' is fourfold, viz. seclusion in respect of the control of the senses, activities and passions, and retirement to a secluded place. 'Control' means avoidance of vicious activities and performance of the virtuous ones. 'Secluded place' means lonely living.

३६. प्रायश्चित्त-विनय-वेद्यावृत्त्य-स्वाध्याय-ध्यान-व्युत्सर्गश्चाभ्यन्तरम् ।

एते षट् मोक्षसाधने अन्तरंगत्वादाभ्यन्तरं तपः ।

36. *prāyaścitta-vinaya-vaiyāvṛtṭya-svādhyāya-dhyāna-vyutsargāś cābhyantaram.*

ete ṣaṭ mokṣasādhane antaraṅgatvād ābhyantaram tapāḥ.

(Aph.) Atonement, reverence, service, scriptural study, concentra-
tion and abandonment constitute the internal (penance). (XXXVI)

(Gloss) These six are internal penances inasmuch as they are the inner and essential means of the attainment of spiritual emancipation. (They are the *tapas* proper.)

३७. अतिचारविशुद्धये प्रयत्नः प्रायश्चित्तम् ।

आलोचन-प्रतिक्रमण-तदुभय-विवेक'-व्युत्सर्ग'-तपः-छेद-मूल-अनवस्थाप्य-
पाराञ्चित' भेदाद् दशप्रकारम् ।

37. *aticāraviśuddhaye prayatnaḥ prāyaścittam.*

ālocana-pratikramaṇa-tadubhaya-viveka¹-vyutsarga²-tapaḥ-cheda-
mūla-anavasthāpya-pārāñcita³-bhedād daśaparakāram.

(Aph.) Atonement is the striving for the rectification of the transgression in the religious discipline. (XXXVII)

(Gloss) It is of ten kinds, viz. (i) confession, (ii) repentance, (iii) the combined performance of both these two, (iv) discrimination⁴, (v) separation⁵, (vi) expiatory penance⁶, (vii) reducing (the standing of a saint), (viii) re-initiation, (ix) temporary expulsion, and (x) re-initiation after rebuke or reproach.⁷

३८. अनाशातना-बहुमानकरणं विनयः ।

असद्व्यवहार आशातना, तद्वर्जनमनाशातना । ज्ञान-दर्शन-चारित्र्य-
मनो-वचन-कायोपचारभेदात् सप्तधा ।

38. *anāśātana-bahumānakaraṇaṁ vinayaḥ.*

asadvyavahāra āśātana, tadvarjanam anāśātana. jñāna-darśana-
cāritra-mano-vacana-kāyopacārabhedāt saptadhā.

(Aph.) Reverence consists in not doing discourtesy and doing profound respect. (XXXVIII)

(Gloss) 'Discourtesy' means impolite behaviour. Avoidance of doing such discourtesy amounts to "non-discourtesy". Reverence is sevenfold, viz. (reverence for) knowledge, faith and conduct, (modesty of) thought, speech and physical movement and observance of proper etiquette (in the presence of superiors).

१ आगतास्याशुद्धाहारादेः परिष्ठापनम् ।

1 āgatāsyāśuddhāhārādeḥ pariṣṭhāpanam.

२ कायोत्सर्गः ।

2 kāyotsargaḥ.

३ अवहेलनापूर्वकं व्रतारोपणम् ।

3 avahelanāpūrvakaṁ vratāropanam.

4 Abandonment of impure food and the like which come unsolicited.

5 Abandonment of the body accompanied with the recital of hymns to the twenty-four tīrthaṅkaras.

6 Called *parihāra* in earlier literature, meaning segregation.

7 It means re-instatement of a delinquent monk in the Order after fresh initiation attended with severe admonition and rebuke.

(Note) Proper etiquette means getting up from the seat, offering of seats and the like to the teacher and superiors. These are small acts of respectful behaviour *de rigueur*.

३९. परार्थव्यापृतिर्वैयावृत्त्यम् ।

तच्च आचार्य-उपाध्याय-स्थविर-तपस्वि-ग्लान-शैक्ष-कुल-गण-संघ-साध-
मिकभेदाद् दशविधम् ।

39. *parārthavyāptir vaiyāvṛtṭyam.*

tac ca ācārya-upādhyāya-sthavira-tapasvi-glāna-śaikṣa-kula-gaṇa-
saṁgha-sādharmikabhedād daśavidham.

(Aph.) Service consists in the exertion for aid and relief to others.
(XXXIX)

(Gloss) It is tenfold inasmuch as it can be in respect of (these ten) : the pontiff, the preceptor, elder, mortifier, the sick, a novice, the company, the commune, the order, and companions.

४०. श्रुतस्याध्ययनं स्वाध्यायः ।

स च वाचना-प्रच्छना-परिवर्तना-अनुप्रेक्षा-धर्मोपदेशभेदात् पञ्चविधः ।

40. *śrutasyā'dhyayanam svādhyāyaḥ.*

sa ca vācanā-pracchanā-parivartanā-anuprekṣā-dharmopadeśa-
bhedāt pañcavidhaḥ.

(Aph.) Scriptural study means an educational course in scriptures.
(XL)

(Gloss) It is of five types, viz. (i) imparting training in scripture and its meaning, (ii) inquiry about the word and meaning for clearing doubts, (iii) recapitulation of text learnt by rote, (iv) contemplation of the text and the meaning, (v) preaching the discipline through various *anuyogas* (disquisitions).

४१. एकाग्रे मनःसन्निवेशनं योगनिरोधो वा ध्यानम् ।

केवलानां योगनिरोध एव, एकाग्रे मनःसन्निवेशनस्य तत्राज्ञावश्यक-
त्वात् । एतच्छब्दस्थानामन्तर्मुहूर्तविधिकं भवति ।

41. *ekāgre manasanniveśanam yoganirodho vā dhyānam.*

kevalinām yoganirodha eva, ekāgre manasanniveśanasya tatrā'-
nāvaśyakatvāt.

etac chadmasthānām antarmuhūrtāvadhikam bhavati.

(Aph.) Fixing of mind (thought) on a particular object or the arrestation of the activities (of mind, speech and body) is called concentration. (XLI)

(Gloss) (Concentration means) fixing of mind (thought) in the case or those who are non-omniscient, and (it means) arrestation of activities in the case of the omniscient, there being no necessity of the concentrated thought in the latter case. It (*viz.* concentration) can last for a period less than a *muhūrta* (forty-eight minutes) in the case of the non-omniscients.

४२. धर्म्यशुक्ले ।

42. *dharmya-śukle.*

(Aph.) (Concentration *quā tapah* is of two types) :

1. *dharmya* (pertaining to the nature of the reality), and 2. *śukla* (pure). (XLII)

४३. आज्ञा-अपाय-विपाक-संस्थानविचयाय धर्म्यम् ।

विचयो विपश्यना प्रेक्षा इत्यनर्थान्तरम् । वस्तुस्वभावो धर्मः । धर्मादिनपेतं धर्म्यम् । ध्येयभेदादेतच्चतुर्धा—१. आज्ञा—आगमश्रुतम् २. अपायः—दोषः । ३. विपाकः—कर्मफलम् । ४. संस्थानम्—द्रव्याणामाकृतिः, उपलक्षणत्वाद् अशेषाः पर्यायाः ।

43. *ājñā-apāya-vipāka-saṁsthānavicayāya dharmyam.*

vicayo vipaśyanā prekṣā ity anarthāntaram. vastusvabhāvo dharmah. dharmād anapetaṁ dharmyam. dhyeyabhedād etac caturdhā : 1. ājñā—āgama-śrutam, 2. apāyah—doṣah, 3. vipākaḥ—karmaphalam, 4. saṁsthānam—dravyānām ākṛtiḥ, upalakṣaṇatvād aśeṣāḥ paryāyāḥ.

(Aph.) Concentration directed on the analysis of (i) the scriptural revelation, (ii) passions, (iii) *karmic* fruition, and (iv) forms is one pertaining to the nature of the reality. (XLIII)

(Gloss) The words analysis, introspection and perception are synonyms. *Dharma* means the nature of the real ; what pertains to the nature of the real is *dharmya*.

This (concentration) is fourfold on account of the four varieties of

the concentratum, which are : 1. Scriptural revelation : the Scriptural Law, 2. Passions : the causes of rise and cessation of passions. 3. Fruition : the results of the *karmans*, 4. Forms : forms of the substances and, figuratively, the entire range of the modes.

(Note) The *dharmya dhyāna* and *śukla dhyāna* are explained with reference to their varieties (*paḍoyāra*), their *lakṣhaṇa*—the predilections (*rui*) of their meditators, their *ālambana*—the sources exposing the nature of concentrata, and their *aṇuppehā*—the reflections as the bridge between two sessions of meditation.

We have already described the four varieties of each of the *dharmya* and the *śukla dhyāna*. The varieties indicate the nature of the concentrata at the time of actual concentration, while *lakṣhaṇa*, etc., define the pre-requisite background of the concentration.

The first pre-requisite of the *dharmya* concentration is the cultivation of faith in and love for truth. Such faith has four aspects, which are the four *lakṣhaṇas* viz., (i) *āṇaruī* (*ājñāruī*)—predilection for revelation, (ii) *nīsaggaruī* (*nīsarga-ruci*)—natural predilection for truth, (iii) *suttaruī* (*sūtra-ruci*)—predilection for the scriptures, (iv) *oghāḍharuī* (*avagḍāḍha-ruci*)—predilection that is deep, comprehensive and steadfast.

At the second stage, the basic supports called *ālambana* of the faith are cultivated. These supports are : (i) *vāyaṇā* (*vācanā*)—imparting training in scripture and its meaning; (ii) *paḍipucchaṇā* (*pratiprechanā*)—inquiry about the word and meaning for clearing doubts; (iii) *parivaṭṭaṇā* (*parivartanā*)—recapitulation of text learnt by rote and (iv) *aṇuppehā* (*anuprekṣa*)—intellectual analysis and understanding of contents of the scripture through ratiocination (*aṇuppehā*).¹

At the third stage, the following four *aṇuprekṣās* are practised :

- (i) *egāṇuppehā*—reflection on solitariness.
- (ii) *aniccāṇuppehā*—reflection on transitoriness of things.
- (iii) *asaraṇāṇuppehā*—reflection on utter helplessness.
- (iv) *saṃsārāṇuppehā*—reflection on nature of transmigration.

This third stage is immediately followed by the actual concentration in its four varieties already explained in the aphorism.

४४. पृथक्त्ववितर्कसविचार-एकत्ववितर्काऽविचार-सूक्ष्मक्रियाऽप्रतिपाति-समुच्छिन्नक्रियाऽनिवृत्तीनि शुक्लम् ।

निर्मलं प्राणिधानं शुक्लम् । तच्चतुर्विधम्—१. पृथक्त्वम्—भेदः । वितर्कः—श्रुतम् । विचारः—अर्थव्यञ्जनयोगानां संक्रमणम् । २. एकत्वम्—अभेदः । अविचारः—असंक्रमणम् । ३. सूक्ष्मक्रियाऽप्रतिपातिनि केवलं सूक्ष्मा उच्छ्वासनिःश्वासक्रियैव अवशिष्यते । ४. समुच्छिन्नक्रियाऽनिवृत्तौ तस्या अपि निरोधो जायते ।

1 This *aṇuppehā* appears to be slightly different from the twelve higher *aṇuppehās* which are precursors of the actual state of concentration in its *dharmya* as well as *śukla* types.

44. *prthaktvavitarkasavicāra-ektvavitarkā'vicāra - sūkṣmakriyā'pratipāti-samucchinna-kriyā'nivṛttīni śuklam.*

nirmalaṁ praṇidhānaṁ śuklam. tac caturvidham—1. prthaktvaṁ—bhedaḥ. vitarkaḥ—śrutam. vicāraḥ—arthavyaṅjana-yogānāṁ saṁkramaṇam. 2. ektvaṁ—abhedāḥ. avicāraḥ—asaṁkramaṇam. 3. sūkṣmakriyā'pratipātiṇi kevalaṁ sūkṣmā ucchvāsa-niḥśvāsa-kriyāiva avaśiṣyate. 4. samucchinna-kriyā'nivṛttau tasyā api nirodho jāyate.

(Aph.) The pure concentration comprises four varieties—(i) **multiple-verbal-transitive**; (ii) **single-verbal-intransitive**; (iii) **characterized by subtle action and infallibility**; (iv) **characterized by cessation of all action and infallibility**. (XLIV)

(Gloss) Pure concentration is taintless attention. This is fourfold :

(i) 'Multiple' = differentiated, verbal = pertaining to scripture, transition = movement from one entity to another, from one verbal symbol to another and from one activity to another.

(ii) 'Single' = undifferentiated, intransitive = without transition.

(iii) In the concentration characterized by 'subtle activity' and 'infallibility', there is only the residuum of subtle respiration.

(iv) In the concentration characterized by 'cessation of activity' and 'infallibility', even the subtle respiration comes to a dead stop.

(Note) As in the case of *dharma dhyāna*, here also the meditator has to pass through three stages in order to be able to enter into the concentration. The three stages, which are the essential pre-requisites, are as follows in respect of *lakṣhaṇa*, *ālambana* and *aṇuppehā*.

At the first stage, the meditator has to develop the four qualifications viz. (i) *avvaha* (*avyatha*)—freedom from all kinds of agitations and distractions, (ii) *asammoha*—freedom from subtle delusions, (iii) *vivega* (*viveka*)—perception of the otherness of the soul from the body, and (iv) *viussagga* (*vyutsarga*)—abandonment of the body.

At the second stage, as supports to the factors of the first stage, the meditator has to cultivate the virtues of (i) *khamṭi* (*kṣānti*)—forbearance, (ii) *mutti* (*mukti*)—release (from greed), (iii) *ajjava* (*ārjava*)—straightforwardness, and (iv) *maddava* (*mārdava*)—humility.

At the third stage, the four special *aṇuppehās* to be practised are :

(i) *anantavattiyā* (*anantavṛttā*)—reflection on the endless transmigrations.

(ii) *vipariṇāma*—reflection on change and impermanence.

(iii) *aśubha*—reflection on the loathsome nature of the internal body.

(iv) *apāya*—reflection on the bad consequences of passions.

The 'pure concentration' requires an absolute placidity of the mind and absolute

detachment from worldly things. The placidity is attained by the cultivation of the virtues of *maitrī* (friendliness), *karuṇā* (compassion), *mudita* (appreciative joy), and *upekṣā* (indifference to the wicked).

These virtues are called '*appamāṇa*' (Skt. *apramāṇa*) in Buddhism because their reference is to infinity (*ananta*), and not to any particular part. As such, these virtues are in respect of the *ananta*. The Prakrit word '*anantavattiyāṇuppehā*' may be construed as reflection on the immeasurable virtues like *maitrī*, etc. The remaining three reflections in connection with the pure concentration are for the inculcation of the highest detachment, called *para-vairāgya* in Patañjali's system, which is immediately followed by *kaivalya*. The second stage of pure concentration is necessarily followed by the thirteenth *guṇasthāna* exactly as *para-vairāgya* is followed by *kaivalya* in the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* system.

The Jaina system of concentration has some special features which distinguish it from Pātañjala and Buddhist systems. The Jaina path of concentration begins with an analytical view of reality (*vicaya*), whereas the other two systems start with the concentration of the mind on a particular object with a view to tranquillize the mind. There is, however, a fundamental difference between the Pātañjala and the Buddhist approach. In the latter, the psychical factors of *vitarka*, *vicāra*, *prīti* and *sukha* are serially eliminated as the meditator advances towards the goal of *samādhi*. In the Pātañjala system, the meditator along with the elimination of the factors of *vitarka*, *vicāra*, *ānanda* and *asmitā* gradually, one by one, establishes his hold upon the gross and subtle evolutes upto the *asmitā* element. Such hold is absent in the Buddhist conception. Buddhism, however, prescribes another course of concentration which is called *vipaśyana* i.e. analytical introspection of the nature of the mental and physical phenomena (*dharma*). It is this *vipaśyanā* which leads the meditator to the path of emancipation.

In the Jaina view of concentration, the starting point is not tranquillization of mind. It starts right from the analytic perception called *dharma-vicaya*. The factors of *vitarka* and *vicāra* come at a later stage. Unlike in the Pātañjala and the Buddhist systems, the *vicāra*, i.e., transition of thought is eliminated in the beginning, followed by the elimination of *vitarka* which is concerned with the verbal element in the process of concentration. It appears that according to the Jaina system, the concepts are to be eliminated in order to be able to eliminate the verbal content of the concentrative process.

In this connection, the explanation of the connotation of the words *vitarka* and *vicāra*, which are common to all the above-mentioned three traditions, is felt necessary. *Vitarka* in the Pātañjala and the Buddhist traditions stands for the gross application of mind and *vicāra* for the subtle one. There is, however, difference in their meaning. In Buddhism, *vitarka* and *vicāra* are purely psychological factors, with practically no reference to the object of concentration. In the Pātañjala system, however, the *vitarka* has the gross things as its object, while *vicāra* lays hold on the subtle elements. Thus, in the Pātañjala system, the object of concentration changes when the meditator passes on from the *vitarkānugata* stage to the *vicārānugata* one. There is no such change in the case of Buddhist meditation, wherein the meditator eliminates *vitarka* in order to be firmly established in *vicāra*.

In Jainism, the terms *vitarka* and *vicāra* have slightly different connotations.

Here *vitarka* means concentration attended with verbal activity, and *vicāra* with the conceptual one. Unlike in the Buddhist and the Pātañjala systems, the meditator here does away with the conceptual activity (*vicāra*) at the outset, which is followed by the stoppage of the verbal association (*vitarka*). Now the meditator is completely free from the conceptual thinking impregnated with linguistic medium.

The third stage of *śukla dhyāna* may be compared with the “*dharmamegha-samādhi*” of the Pātañjala system, and the fourth stage with the *kaivalya* of the same system.

४५. नार्त्तरीद्रे तपः ।

एकाग्रमनःसन्निवेशनात्मकत्वेन आर्त्तरीद्रे अपि ध्यानसंज्ञां लभेत्,
तथापि नैते तपः ।

45. nārtta-raudre tapaḥ.

ekāgramanaḥsanniveśanātmakatvena ārtta-raudre apī dhyāna-samjñāṁ labhete, tathāpi naite tapaḥ.

(Aph.) The concentration due to anguish and anger is not penance.
(XLV)

(Gloss) Such concentration, though it is of the nature of being directed on a particular object, does acquire the designation of concentration; it is, however, not a variety of penance (because it is not conducive to the development of the self).

४६. प्रियाप्रियवियोगसंयोगे चिन्तनमार्त्तम् ।

प्रियाणां शब्दादिविषयाणां वियोगे तत्संयोगाय, अप्रियाणां च संयोगे तद्-
वियोगाय यदेकाग्रमनःसन्निवेशनम्, तद् आर्त्तध्यानमुच्यते ।

46. priyāpriya-viyoga-saṁyoge cintanam ārttam.

priyāṇāṁ śabdādiviṣayāṇāṁ viyoge tatsaṁyogāya, apriyāṇāṁ ca saṁyoge tadviyogāya yad ekāgramanaḥsanniveśanam, tad ārtta-dhyānam ucyate.

(Aph.) The concentration due to anguish consists in thought directed on the separation from the desired and union with the undesired. (XLVI)

(Gloss) The concentrated thought for the attainment of the covetable objects such as agreeable sound and the like on the occasion of separation from them, and for the separation from the uncovetable (objects) on the occasion of their attainment is called concentration due to anguish.

४७. वैदनायां व्याकुलत्वं निदानं च ।

रोगादीनां प्रादुर्भावे व्याकुलत्वम्, वैषयिकसुखाय दृढसंकल्पकरणमपि आर्तध्यानम् ।

47. *vedanāyām vyākulatvaṃ nidānaṃ ca.*

rogādīnāṃ prādurbhāve vyākulatvaṃ. vaiṣayikasukhāya dṛḍha-saṃkalpakaraṇam api ārttadhyānam.

(Aph.) The uneasiness during pain and hankering (for the desired object) are also cases of concentration due to anguish. (XLVII)

(Gloss) The uneasiness on the occasion of disease and the like, and the determination for the attainment of sensual pleasure are also (instances of) concentration due to anguish.

४८. हिंसा-अनृत-स्तेय-विषयसंरक्षणार्थं रौद्रम् ।

48. *himsā-anṛta-steṇa-viṣayasamrakṣaṇārthaṃ raudram.*

(Aph.) (The concentration) due to anger is (the concentrated thought) for the purpose (of perpetrating) violence, falsehood, stealing and the preservation of worldly things. (XLVIII)

४९. शरीरकषायादेः परित्यागो व्युत्सर्गः ।

शरीर-गण-उपधि-भक्तपानभेदाच्चतुर्विधो द्रव्यव्युत्सर्गः ।

कषाय-संसार-कर्मभेदात् त्रिविधो भावव्युत्सर्गः ।

49. *śarīra-kaṣāyādeḥ parityāgo vyutsargaḥ.*

śarīra-gaṇa-upadhi-bhaktapānabhedāc caturvidho dravyavyutsargaḥ. kaṣāya-saṃsāra-karmabhedāt trividho bhāvavyutsargaḥ.

(Aph.) 'Abandonment' is the giving up of the body, the passions and the life. (XLIX)

(Gloss) (This abandonment may be material as well as spiritual). The material abandonment pertains to four things, viz. the body, the commune, the paraphernalia as well as food and drink. The spiritual abandonment relates to three items, (the giving up of) viz. passions, the worldly life and the *karma* (bondage).

इति मोक्षमार्गनिर्णयः ।

iti mokṣamārganirṇayaḥ.

Thus ends the sixth lustre called "Ascertainment of the Path of Emancipation."

सप्तम प्रकाशः LUSTRE VII

१. कर्मविशुद्धेर्मागणापेक्षाणि चतुर्दशजीवस्थानानि ।

धर्म-धर्मिणोरभेदोपचारात् जीवस्थानानि कर्मक्षयोपशमादिजन्य-गुणा-
विभारूपक्रमिकविशुद्धिरूपाणि गुणस्थानानि उच्यन्ते ।

1. *karmaviśuddher mārgaṇāpekṣāṇi caturdaśajīvasthānāni.*

dharmā-dharmiṇor abhedopacārāt jīvasthānāni karma-kṣayopa-
śamādi-janya-guṇāvīrbhāva-rūpa-kramika-viśuddhi-rūpāṇi guṇa-
sthānāni ucyante.

(Aph.) There are fourteen states of the soul with reference to the consideration of the purification of *karman*. (I)

(Gloss) By a figurative identification of the attribute and the possessor of the attribute, the states of the soul are called stages of spiritual development. These stages are of the nature of purification due to the manifestation of the quality, consequent upon the destruction-cum-subsistence and the like of *karman*.

(Note) The plan of the 14 states of the soul is based on the presence or absence of the five causes of influx of *karman* viz., perversity, non-abstinence, remissness, passions and activity. All these factors are present in the first and the third *jīvasthānas*; the first is absent in all others, while both the first and the second are absent in the sixth and above, the second being only partially absent in the fifth. The first three causes of influx are absent in the seventh state and above; the first four are absent in the eleventh state and above, and all in the fourteenth.

२. मिथ्यादृष्टि-सास्वादनसम्यग्दृष्टि - सम्यग्मिथ्यादृष्टि - अविरतसम्यग्दृष्टि-देशविरत-प्रमत्त-अप्रमत्तसंयत-निवृत्ति-अनिवृत्तिबाधर-सूक्ष्मसम्पराय-उपशान्त-क्षीणमोह-सयोगि-अयोगिकेवलिनः ।

2. *mithyādr̥ṣṭi-sāsvādanasamyagdr̥ṣṭi-samyagmithyādr̥ṣṭi-aviratasamyagdr̥ṣṭi-deśavirata-pramatta-apramattasamyata - nivṛtti - anivṛttibādhara-sūkṣmasamparāya-upaśānta-kṣīṇamoha-sayogi-ayogikevalinaḥ.*

(Aph.) The soul in these states is designated as possessed of (i) perverted belief, (ii) lingering relish of right belief (while falling down from some higher spiritual state to the lowest), (iii) right-cum-wrong belief, (iv) right belief attended with non-abstinence, (v) right belief with partial

abstinence, (vi) self-restraint unexempted from remissness, (vii) self-restraint with freedom from remissness, (viii) dissimilar coarse passions, (ix) similar coarse passions, (x) subtle passion (sc. 'flaming up' greed), (xi) subsidence of delusion (including even flaming up greed), (xii) extirpation of delusion, (xiii) omniscience with activities, and (xiv) omniscience with total cessation of activities. (II)

(Note) In this connection, the relationship between faith (*darśana*) and knowledge (*jñāna*) deserves special attention. In the Jaina tradition, faith and knowledge are two absolutely different functions of the soul. This is attested by the Jaina doctrine of *karman* which distinguishes the *mohanīya karman* from the *jñānāvaraṇīya karman*. The rightness or wrongness of the faith is determined by the processes of the *mohanīya karman*, while the processes of the *jñānāvaraṇīya karman* are responsible for the perfection or imperfection of the faculty of knowledge. The basic perversity or otherwise of knowledge is, however, due to the rise or subsidence and the like of the *mohanīya karman* which is a decisive factor for the nature of faith. The cases of ordinary epistemological errors are exclusively due to the function of the *jñānāvaraṇīya karman*. The implication is that the subsidence of passions is necessary for giving right direction to the cognitive faculty, which follows from the Jaina view that the subsidence of the *anantānubandhī* passions is a necessary auxiliary condition of the lucidity of knowledge, leading to basically right cognition of reality, the soul now being released from perverse proclivities and idola.

In the light of the intimate influence of right faith on the faculty of cognition, we shall now consider the point of contact between faith and knowledge. Siddhasenagani,¹ after stating the traditional view that faith and knowledge are two absolutely separate properties of the soul refers to an ancient view that the *samyagdarsana* is a variety of *matijñāna* in its stage of *apāya* (perceptual judgement) of the nature of 'belief' or 'conviction'. This is characteristic of the *sarāga samyag-darśana* where the cognitive faculty retains its opacity which debars the cognition from direct and immediate cognition of the reality. In fact, at the stage of *sarāga samyaktva*, the perceptual judgement is indirect (*parokṣa*) and mediate as distinguished from the cognition that arises when the soul attends *vītarāga samyaktva*.² The latter has the nature of the absolute transparency of the soul, on account of the total elimination of the *mohanīya karman* in its both varieties of *darśana-mohanīya* and *cāritra-mohanīya*.

The upshot is that the perfection of the cognitive faculty of the soul is dependent on the purification of the faith and the elimination of the passions. In other words, it is not possible to attain perfect knowledge in the absence of the complete eradication of the emotions that distort our conduct and the perversities that pollute our basic attitude and vision. To be precise, *rāga* and *dveṣa* and also the delusion that lies at their root are to be eradicated totally for perfect cognition of reality. Perfection of knowledge without perfection of conduct is neither possible nor conducive to human welfare. In this connection, it may be noted that in Patañjali's philosophy

1 *Tattvārtha-bhāṣya-ṭīkā*, Vol. I, p. 29 : "matijñānasyaiva rucirūpo yo-'pāyaṃśaḥ tat samyag-darśanam, jñānādṛte anyat samyag-darśanam na samasti."

2 *Sarvārthasiddhi*, 1/2 : tad (samyag-darśanam) dvividham : sarāga-vītarāga-viṣaya-bhedāt. praśama-samvega-anukampā-āstikyādyabhiviyakti-lakṣaṇam prathamam. ātma-vīruddhi-mātram itarat. Also cf *Tattvārtha-bhāṣya-ṭīkā*, Vol I, p. 66.

omniscience (*vivekajñā jñānam*) appears to be possible even in the absence of *viveka-khyati* which is followed by *kaivalya* attended with total elimination of the five *kleśas*. Vācaka Vošovijaya ¹ has taken strong exception to this conception of the Yoga philosophy.

३. तत्त्वं मिथ्या श्रद्धधानो मिथ्यादृष्टिः ।

तत्र मिथ्यादृष्टेर्दर्शनमोहक्षयोपशमादिजन्या विशुद्धिः—मिथ्यादृष्टि-
गुणस्थानम् । विपरीत-दृष्ट्यपेक्षयैव जीवो मिथ्यादृष्टिः स्यात्, न तु
अवशिष्टाऽविपरीत-दृष्ट्यपेक्षया । मिथ्यादृष्टौ मनुष्यपश्वादिप्रतिपत्ति-
रविपरीता समस्त्येवेति तद् गुणस्थानमुक्तम् । किञ्च नास्त्येतादृक्
कोऽप्यात्मा, यस्मिन् क्षयोपशमादिजन्या नाल्पीयस्यपि विशुद्धिः स्यात्,
अभव्यानां निगोदजीवानामपि च तत्सद्भावात्, अन्यथाऽजीवत्वापत्तेः ।

3. *tattvaṁ mithyā śraddadhāno mithyādr̥ṣṭiḥ.*

tatra mithyā-dr̥ṣṭer darśana-moha-kṣayopāśamādi-janyā viśuddhiḥ—
mithyādr̥ṣṭi-guṇasthānam. viparīta-dr̥ṣṭyapekṣayaiva jīvo mithyā-
dr̥ṣṭiḥ syāt, na tu avaśiṣṭā viparīta-dr̥ṣṭyapekṣayā. mithyādr̥ṣṭau
manuṣya-paśvādipratipattir aviparītā samasty eveti tad guṇasthānam
uktam. kiñ ca nāsty etādr̥k ko'pyātmā, yasmin kṣayopāśamādi-
janyā nālpīyasy api viśuddhiḥ syāt, abhavyānām nigoda-jīvānām
api ca tatsadbhāvat, anyathā jīvatvāpatteḥ.

(Aph.) A soul possessed of perverted belief is one who holds a per-
verse notion about truth. (III)

(Gloss) The state of the soul possessed of perverse belief consists in
(modicum of) purity resulting from the destruction-cum-subsidence (and
the like) of faith-deluding *karman*. The soul is (said to be) possessed
of wrong belief only with reference to his perverse attitude, and not with
reference to the residuum of his right attitude (which is always there).
Even in a soul possessed of perverse belief, there exists the right appraisal
of truth such as of human and sub-human existences. And this is the
reason why such state of a soul is designated as the state of spiritual
development. Moreover, there does not exist a single soul that does
not possess even the least purity resulting from the destruction-cum-
subsidence and the like (of the *karman*). Even the soul absolutely un-
fit for emancipation (*abhavya*) and the soul in the *nigoda* state also
possess that sort of purity, because without this the soulhood itself
would be denied to them.

(Note) : According to Jainism, even in the least developed soul such as the
nigoda (unicellular organism), the trace of 'faith', like the trace of 'cognition', is pre-

1 *Vyākhyā on Pātāñjala Yoga*, 3/52.

sent. "In the absence of such traces," it is said in the *Nandī Sūtra*, "the very existence of soulhood will be difficult of recognition." From this it would also follow that the destruction-cum-subsidence of the faith-deluding *karman* even in the least developed soul results in the modicum of right attitude of the soul. The '*samyaktva*' here is a spiritual spark which is an eternal possession of the soul.

४. सम्यक्त्वाच्चयवमानः सास्वादनसम्यग्दृष्टिः ।

4. *samyaktvāc cyavamānaḥ sāsvādanasamyagdr̥ṣṭiḥ.*

(Aph.) (The state of) the soul possessed of 'lingering relish of right belief' is one of downfall from that of right belief (from higher state of spiritual progress to the lowest). (IV)

(Note) This lingering taste of right belief is destined to vanish and the aspirant is bound to fall down to the first stage of *mithyātva*, though only temporarily. As regards the qualitative difference between his original *mithyātva* and this secondary state, it is difficult to define it *prima facie*. The *mithyātva* now will not take a fresh root which was finally destroyed in the initial ascent to the state of *samyaktva*. It may be noted here that there is the rise of *anantānubandhī kaṣāyas* at the stage of *sāsvādana samyagdr̥ṣṭi*. The soul is however not in grip of *mithyātva* because there is no rise of any of the three sub-types of *darśana mohaniya karman*.

The soul can fall down to this state from any of the states beginning from fourth upto the eleventh.

५. मिश्रित-सम्यग्मिथ्यारुचिः सम्यग्मिथ्यादृष्टिः ।

यस्य सम्यग् मिथ्या च रुचिर्मिश्रिता भवति मिश्रितदधिशर्करा-रसानुभूतिरिव न च सर्वथा पृथक् कर्तुं शक्यते, स सम्यग्मिथ्यादृष्टिरुच्यते ।

5. *miśrita-samyagmithyāruciḥ samyagmithyādr̥ṣṭiḥ.*

yasya samyag mithyā ca rucir miśritā bhavati miśrita-dadhi-śar-karā-rasānubhūtir iva na ca sarvathā pṛthak kartum śakyate, sa samyagmithyādr̥ṣṭir ucyate.

(Aph.) A soul possessed of right-cum-wrong belief is he who has an inclination to a mixture of right and wrong views. (V)

(Gloss) A person who has an inclination to the right and the wrong mixed together exactly like the inseparable taste of the mixture of curd and sugar, is called a person possessed of right-cum-wrong belief.

(Note) The implication of the simile of curd and sugar, which is found both in the *Svetāmbara* and the *Digambara* traditions, is that the taste of the mixture is neither that of curd nor that of sugar, but a new taste devoid of both. In other words, a soul in the mixed state neither approves nor disapproves of the tenets of the *Jina*, embodying the true nature of reality.

So far as the *karmic* process is concerned in the attainment of the mixed state, the

reader may refer to our note on pp. 89-90, where we have explained the division of the deluding *karmic* matter into three sets viz. pure, semi-pure and impure. Now, if the soul starts enjoying the set of semi-pure *karmic* matter, it is in the mixed state of spiritual development.

The mixed state is so called because he is now devoid of lack of love of truth, and at the same time also devoid of love of truth. In other words, the aspirant has neither taste for truth nor distaste for it. He is neutral so far as love of truth is concerned. To be more explicit, the person is now bereft of perverse attitude and also not possessed of the right one. Technically speaking he is now free from *mithyātva*, but not established in *samyaktva*.

६. असंयतस्तत्त्वं श्रद्धाधानं च अविरतसम्यग्दृष्टिः ।

सकलमपि जीवाजीवादिकं तत्त्वं सम्यक् श्रद्धते, किन्तु संयमाभावाद् अविरतोऽसौ भवति, तेन सोऽविरतसम्यग्दृष्टिरुच्यते । मिथ्यादृष्ट्यादि-जीवानां तत्त्वश्चिरपि क्रमेण मिथ्यादृष्टिः सम्यग्मिथ्यादृष्टिः सम्यग्दृष्टिश्चेति प्रोच्यते ।

6. *asamyatas tattvaṃ śraddadhānaś ca aviratasamyagdr̥ṣṭiḥ.*

sakalam api jīvājīvādikam tattvaṃ samyak śraddhatte, kintu saṁyamābhāvād avirato'sau bhavati, tena so'viratasamyagdr̥ṣṭir ucyate. mithyādr̥ṣṭyādijīvānām tattvarucir api krameṇa mithyādr̥ṣṭiḥ samyagmithyādr̥ṣṭiḥ samyagdr̥ṣṭiś ceti procyate.

(Aph.) The soul possessed of right belief attended with non-abstinence is one who does not observe abstinence but holds a right belief.

(Gloss) He rightly believes in all the ultimate principles viz, *jīva* (soul), *ajīva* (non-soul) etc., but on account of the absence of self-restraint he is non-abstinent, and so he is called one who is possessed of right belief attended with non-abstinence. The interest, in ultimate reality, of perverted person and the like (viz. right-cum-wrong believer and right believer) is also respectively called perverted attitude, right-cum-wrong attitude and right attitude.

७. संयताऽसंयतो देशविरतः ।

देशेन—अंशरूपेण व्रताराधक इत्यर्थः । पूर्णव्रताभावोऽविरतोऽप्यसौ कथ्यते ।

7. *saṁyatā'saṁyato deśavirataḥ.*

deśena—amśarūpeṇa vratārādhaka ity arthaḥ. pūrṇavratābhāve-

'virato' py asau kathyate.

(Aph.) The partially abstinent is one who is (partially) restrained and partially unrestrained. (VII)

(Gloss) 'Partially' means the observer of the vows 'in part'. He is also called non-abstinent owing to his failure to observe the vows in full.

(Note) The fifth state of spiritual development is exemplified in the life of a Jaina layman. He does not observe the vows in full in the sense that he does not take the vow of complete abstinence in respect of the threefold activities of mind, speech and body, nor to do those activities himself, or get done, or approve of them. The householder's vows are partial also in the sense that they do not cover their entire subject-matter. For instance, a householder does not take the vow of abstaining from injury to one-sensed living beings that include the vegetable life also. For a detailed account of the nature of the partial vows undertaken by the layman, vide supra p. 117.

The vows are essentially negative. Thus a householder takes the vow of abstaining from violence to the living beings possessed of two or more sense-organs, technically called *trasakāya*. The vow is not taken in the positive form, viz. "I shall limit my violent activities only to one-sensed living beings". Such positive form of vow has been condemned as *duppacakkhāna*¹ (Skt. *duṣpratyākhyāna*, bad abstinence).

In fact, it is only abstinence or restraint or control that is *dharma* (righteousness). Any kind of act of commission, whatever its implication, is not righteousness. Righteousness means dissociation from sinful activities to the best of one's capacity. Such dissociation alone is righteousness. In other words, any activity so far as it is an attempt at abstinence or self-restraint is religious, the other aspects of it are outside the scope of religion. Self-restraint also is religious life in the true sense of the term—*saṁnyamaḥ khalu jīvanam*.

८. प्रमादयुक्तः सर्वविरतः प्रमत्तसंयतः ।

प्रमादास्त्रयो न संयमावरोधकः । प्रवृत्तिरूपश्च प्रमादः । स एवात्र विवक्षितो यो मलोत्पादको न तु संयमविनाशकः ।

8. *pramādayuktaḥ sarvavirataḥ pramattasaṁyataḥ.*

pramādāsravo na saṁyamāvarodhakaḥ. pravṛttirūpaś ca pramādaḥ. sa evātra vivakṣito yo malotpādako na tu saṁyamavināśakaḥ.

(Aph.) The (absolutely) self-restrained (but) unexempt from remissness is one who is totally abstinent but subject to remissness. (VIII)

(Gloss) The influx of remissness does not obstruct self-restraint. Remissness is of the nature of an activity. Such remissness alone is

1 *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, 2/7/10.

intended here, which, though a producer of taint, is not the producer of self-restraint.

(Note) See note on the next aphorism.

६. प्रमादवियुक्तो ध्यानलीनः अप्रमत्तसंयतः ।

9. *pramāḍaviyukto dhyānalīnaḥ apramattasamyataḥ.*

(Aph.) The absolutely self-restrained and totally exempt from remissness is one who is completely free from remissness and fully absorbed in concentration. (IX)

(Note) : In the ancient scheme of the *āsravas* (influx), *pramāḍa* (remissness) was not explicitly mentioned, being considered only as an aspect of *kaṣāyas*.

In the scheme of the *guṇasthānas* (states of spiritual development), *pramāḍa*, in its sense of remissness has a special significance in that it is only the subjugation of it that is necessary for a monk to practise meditation. It is in view of this aspect of *pramāḍa* that a separate state of spiritual development called *apramatta samyata* has been recognized. (For a detailed exposition of the concept of *pramāḍa*, vide supra, p. 75),

It may be mentioned in this connection that the seventh state of spiritual development along with the states that follow upto the last are the stages of meditation, gradually leading the soul to final emancipation. They are states of meditation because the soul is now free from *vikṣepa* which is the result of *pramāḍa*. It has now unwavering faith in and perception of the goal. This is explained in the following *sūtra* of the *Āyāro*:¹ "That is why a *trividyā* (i.e., a person knowing three sciences) after having perception of the goal (*parama*) becomes equanimous. The equanimous person does not commit sin, such as indulging in violence etc."

In another place in *Āyāro*,² it is said: "After extirpating all outwardly oriented tendencies of the senses, one perceives *niṣkarma* (salvation) in this mortal world."

१०. निवृत्तियुक्तो बादरकाशयो निवृत्तिबादरः ।

निवृत्तिः—समसमयवर्तिजीवानां परिणामविशुद्धे विसदृशता^३ । बादरः स्थूलः । इदमपूर्वकरणमपि उच्यते ।

10. *nivṛttiyukto bādarakaśāyo nivṛttibādarah.*

1 3/28.

2 4/50.

३ निर्भेदेन वृत्तिः निवृत्तिः ।

४ निवृत्तिबादरजीवस्थाने भिन्नसमयवर्तिजीवानां परिणाम-विशुद्धिविसदृशी भवति, समसमयवर्तिजीवानां च विसदृशी सदृशी चाऽपि । (षट्खण्डागम, १, पृ० १८४)

*nivṛttiḥ*¹—*samasamayavartijivānām pariṇāmaviśuddher viśadṛśatā*².
bādarah—*sthūlah*. *idam apūrvakaraṇam api ucyate*.

(Aph.) A soul possessed of dissimilar (*nivṛtti*) coarse passions is one possessed of coarse passions with dissimilarity (in respect of their purification.) (X)

(Gloss) The word *nivṛtti*³ means dissimilarity in the purity of transformations of different souls existing at the equivalent point of time. The word *bādara* (coarse) means gross.⁴ This state is also called *apūrvakaraṇa* (that is, a stage the like of which was never attained before).

(Note) See note on aph. 11 and 13.

११. अनिवृत्तियुक्तो बादरकषायः अनिवृत्तिबादरः ।

अनिवृत्तिः—समसमयवर्तिजीवानां परिणामविशुद्धेः सदृशता^१ ।
 अनयोरुभयोरपि जीवस्थानयोर्बादरकषायत्वं दशमजीवस्थानापेक्षया
 ज्ञातव्यम् ।

11. *anivṛttiyukto bādarakaṣāyaḥ anivṛttibādarah*.

anivṛttiḥ—*samasamayavartijivānām pariṇāmaviśuddheḥ sadṛśatā*².
anayor ubhayor api jivasthānayor bādarakaṣāyatvaṁ daśamajīva-
sthānāpekṣayā jñātavyam.

(Aph.) The state of soul possessed of similar (*anivṛtti*) coarse passions is one possessed of coarse passions with similarity in respect of their purifications. (XI)

(Gloss) The word *anivṛtti* means similarity in the purity of transfor-

1 *nir bhedena vṛttiḥ nivṛttiḥ*

2 *nivṛtti-bādara-jivasthāne bhinna-samayavarti-jivānām pariṇāma-viśuddhir viśadṛśi bhavati, sama-samaya-varti-jivānām ca viśadṛśi sadṛśi cāpi*. (*Śaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, vol. I, p. 184)

3 The prefix *ni* (in *nivṛtti*) means 'dissimilarity' and *vṛtti* means 'existence'. The whole word *nivṛtti*, therefore, means 'existence in dissimilarity'.

4 In the state of *nivṛtti bādara* the purifications of the transformations of the souls existing at different points of time are dissimilar. These purifications may, however, be dissimilar as well as similar in the souls existing at the equivalent (say *nth*) point of time. (*Śaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, vol. I, p. 184).

५ अनिवृत्तिबादरजीवस्थाने भिन्नसमयवर्तिजीवानां परिणाम-विशुद्धिर्विसदृशी भवति, किन्तु समसमयवर्तिजीवानां सदृश्येव । (षट्खण्डागम, १, पृ० १८४).

6 *anivṛtti-bādara-jivasthāne bhinnasamaya-varti-jivānām pariṇāmaviśuddhir viśadṛśi bhavati. kintu sama-samaya-varti-jivānām sadṛśy eva*. (*Śaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, vol. I, p. 184).

mations of different souls existing at the equivalent point of time.¹ In the above two states of spiritual development the state of being possessed of coarse passions is to be understood in comparison with the tenth state of development (where passions are subtle).

(Note) The above-noted interpretation of the nature of the eighth and the ninth states appears clumsy, if not artificial. We, therefore, propose another interpretation which may appear to the reader more logical in the present context. In the eighth state viz. *nivṛtti bādara*, the aspirant has dispensed with the major portion of his coarse passions, and is known as *nivṛtti bādara*. Here the eradication (*nivṛtti*) of coarse passions is of extremely limited extent. It is styled as eradication by way of emphasis as a sort of euphemism. The prominence is given to eradication, though quantitatively inappreciable, in order to mark out the progress from the state of the "total reign of passions". This state has also been called *apūrva* or 'unprecedented' in the history of the soul, because it is the first and the most unique state forward in spiritual career.

The term *anivṛtti bādara* is the state of the non-eradication (*anivṛtti*) of the slight residue of coarse passions. This state constitutes an appreciable advance in respect of eradication of coarse passions over the antecedent states. It is still called a state of 'non-eradication', because there is a *soupcōn* of the category of the coarse passions which is yet to be eradicated. The designation is prompted by the intention to emphasize the unaccomplished task, and also perhaps to preclude a sense of self-complacency on the part of the spiritual aspirant.

The nomenclature of these two states (viz. 8th and 9th) reminds one of the designations *apratyākhyānāvaraṇīya* and *pratyākhyānāvaraṇīya kaṣāyas* pertaining to second and third categories of passions.²

In this connection it may be mentioned that the attainment of the first vision is preceded by three kinds of operations viz. *yathā pravṛtti* (automatic) *karāṇa*, *apūrva-karāṇa* (unprecedented) and *anivṛtti karāṇa* (unamenable to lapse).³ Of these three, the last two processes are to be distinguished from the operations at the eighth and the ninth states which have also been designated as *apūrvakarāṇa* and *anivṛttikarāṇa*. The latter two are concerned with the repression or the extirpation of the conduct-deluding *karmans* other than the "endless", whereas the former two were concerned with the "endless passions".

See also note on aph. 13.

१२. उपशमकः क्षपकश्च ।

निवृत्तिबादरजीवस्थानात् श्रणिद्वयं जायते—उपशमश्रेणिः क्षपकश्रेणिश्च ।

12. *upaśamakāḥ kṣapakāś ca.*

¹ In the state of *anivṛtti bādara* the purifications of the transformations of the souls existing at different points of time are dissimilar; they are necessarily similar at the equivalent (say nth) point of time (*Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, vol. I, p. 184).

² Vide supra p. 76.

³ Vide supra, p. 89.

nivṛttibādara-jīvasthānāt śreṇidvayaṁ jāyate—upaśamaśreṇiḥ kṣapa-
kaśreṇiś ca.

(Aph.) (There are two ladders of ascent to higher states viz.) “repre-
ssing” and “extirpating”. (XII)

(Gloss) A pair of ladders originates from the eighth state (viz. *nivṛtti-bādara*)—the ladder of repression and the ladder of extirpation.

(Note) See note on aph. 13.

१३. सत्संज्वलनसूक्ष्मलोभांशः सूक्ष्मसंपरायः ।

13. *satsamjvalana sūkṣmalobhāṁśaḥ sūkṣmasamparāyaḥ.*

(Aph.) A soul possessed of subtle passion is one in which there still
persists a trace of subtle greed of ‘flaming up’ type. (XIII)

(Note) The seventh state as already noted is the state of meditation (*dhyāna*) where remissness is totally absent. In the states that follow, the passions (*kaṣāyas*), coarse and subtle, are gradually either repressed or extirpated. At the eighth state two different courses of development of spiritual progress are open to the soul. These are the ladders of ‘repression’ and ‘extirpation’. These courses are determined by the past spiritual life of the soul at the time of his acquisition of the right vision. If the vision was due to the subsidence of the faith-deluding *karman*, the soul necessarily selects the ladder of repression. But if the first vision was due to the destruction, both the courses are open to him. In other words, such soul is free to proceed on either of them. The soul possessed of right vision due to the subsidence-cum-destruction is not able to go beyond the seventh *guṇasthāna*.¹

In the eighth state, the coarse passions are repressed or extirpated. Of the nine *no-kaṣāyas*² the following six are repressed or extirpated at this state : joking, liking, disliking, sorrow, fear and disgust. Of the principal *kaṣāyas* only the ‘flaming up’ ones persist.

In the ninth state, the remaining three *no-kaṣāyas* viz. the three sexes, as well as the ‘flaming up’ anger, pride, and deceitfulness are also repressed or extirpated.

1 *Pañcasamgraha*, Vol. I, p. 115, Mehsana, 1971.

2 The quasi-passions are nine in number viz. (i) joking (*hāsyā*), (ii) liking for non-restraint (*rati*), (iii) disliking for restraint (*arati*), (iv) sorrow (*śoka*), (v) fear (*bhaya*), (vi) disgust (*jugupsā*), (vii) masculine sex-passions (*puruṣa-veda*), (viii) feminine sex-passions (*strī-veda*), and (ix) dual sex-passions (*napuṃsaka-veda*). These are quasi-passions, because they subsist with the passions (*kaṣāya*) and are inspired by them.

The ancient categorization of passions was into attachment (*rāga*) and aversion (*dveṣa*). Of the nine quasi-passions, the first two and the last three are based on *rāga* and the others on *dveṣa*. Sexuality is a variety of *rāga* which has a very wide connotation, the subtlest expression of it being the ‘flaming up’ greed which is the last passion to be repressed or extirpated by the spiritual aspirant.

In the tenth state, the remaining 'flaming up' greed, even in its subtle (unconscious or sub-conscious) mode, is repressed or extirpated. The soul is now in the position to rise up to the eleventh state of absolute subsidence of passions if he has selected the ladder of repression, or directly to the twelfth state if he has selected the ladder of extirpation.

The ascent to the ladders is possible only by the 'pure concentration' in its first two varieties, specially by the *anuprekṣās* prescribed there. The *anuprekṣās*, it may be noted here, do the function of *pratiprasava*¹ (final elimination) of the passions and quasi-passions, coarse and subtle, including the sub-conscious and the unconscious ones.

१४. सर्वथोपशान्तक्षीणकषायो उपशान्तक्षीणमोहो ।

उपशमश्रेण्यारूढो मुनिर्मोहकर्मप्रकृतीरुपशमयन् एकादशे सर्वथा उपशान्त-
मोहो भवति । क्षपकश्रेण्यारूढश्च ताः क्षपयन् द्वादशे सर्वथा क्षीणमोहो
भवति । उपशमश्रेणिमान् स्वभावात् प्रतिपात्येव, द्वितीयस्तु
अप्रतिपाती ।

14. *sarvathopāśāntakṣīṇakaṣāyau upāśāntakṣīṇamohau.*

upaśamaśreṇyārūḍho munir mohakarmaprakṛtīr upāśamayan ekā-
daśe sarvathā upāśāntamoho bhavati. kṣapakaśreṇyārūḍhaś ca tāḥ
kṣapayan dvādaśe sarvathā kṣīṇamoho bhavati. upāśamaśreṇimān
svabhāvāt pratipāty eva, dvitīyas tu apratipātī.

(Aph.) The souls with repressed or extirpated (conduct-) delusion are (so called, according as) their passions stand absolutely repressed or extirpated. (XIV)

(Gloss) The monk climbing up the ladder of repression by absolutely suppressing all types of (conduct-) deluding *karmic* forces, reaches the eleventh state wherein he attains the state of repressed (conduct-) delusion. One mounted on the ladder of extirpation, by totally eradicating the same (conduct-deluding *karmic* forces), reaches the twelfth state wherein he attains the state of 'absolutely extirpated (conduct-) delusion'. Of the two categories of soul mentioned above, the one in the ladder of repression is by nature liable to downfall while the other is exempt from it.

१५. क्षीणघात्यचतुष्टयः प्रवृत्तिमान् सयोगिकेवलो ।

15. *kṣīṇaghātyacatuṣṭayah pravṛttimān sayogikevalī.*

1. Cf. Pātañjala Yoga-Sūtra, II/33, II/2; II/10; IV/34; I/50.

(Aph.) The omniscient with 'activities' is one who has destroyed all the four destructive *karmans* and is engaged in 'action' (that is auspicious, free from any desire and for the emancipation of all living beings). (XV)

१६. शैलेशीं प्रतिपन्नः अयोगिकेवली ।

16. *śaileśīm pratipannaḥ ayogikevalī.*

(Aph.) The state of 'omniscience with total cessation of all activities' is the attainer of the state of absolute motionless condition like that of the chief of the mountains (viz. the Meru Mountain). (XVI)

१७. स्थितिरेषामनेकधा ।

प्रथमम् अनाद्यनन्तम्, अनादिसान्तम्, सादिसान्तञ्च । द्वितीयं षडावलि-
कास्थितिकम् । चतुर्थं साधिकत्रयस्त्रिंशत्सागरमितम् । पञ्चमषष्ठत्रयो-
दशानि देशोनपूर्वकोटिस्थितिकानि । चतुर्दशं पञ्चह्रस्वाक्षरोच्चारण-
मात्रम् । शेषाणामन्तर्मुहूर्त्ता स्थितिः ।

17. *sthitir eṣām anekadhā.*

prathamam-anādyanantam, anādisāntam, sādīsāntaṁ ca. dvitīyaṁ
ṣaḍāvalikāsthītikam. caturthaṁ sādhiakatrayastriṁśatsāgaramītam.
pañcama-ṣaṣṭha-trayodaśāni deśonapūrvakoṭisthītikāni. caturdaśam
pañcabrasvākṣarocārāṇa-mātram. śeṣāṇām antarmuhūrttā sthitiḥ.

(Aph.) The (maximum) duration of these (states of soul's develop-
ment) is manifold. (XVII)

(Gloss) The first state is (threefold in respect of duration)—(i) with-
out beginning and end, (ii) without beginning but with end, (iii) with
both—beginning and end.

The second state endures for six *āvalikās*. The duration of the
fourth state is a little over thirty-three *sāgaras*. The duration of the
fifth, sixth and thirteenth states is a little less than ten million *pūrvas*¹.
The duration of the fourteenth state covers only the time taken by the
utterance of five short vowels (sc. *a-i-u-r-l*). The duration of the rest is
less than one *muhūrtta*.

(Note) The duration of the *guṇasthānas* is considered with reference to its
beginning and end.

Thus the first *guṇasthāna* may be without a beginning or with a beginning. The
soul that has not achieved *samyag-darśana* has his *mithyātva* without beginning, but
one who has attained *samyag-darśana* and fallen back to *mithyātva*, has his fresh

¹ *pūrvakoṭi*=10 million *pūrvas*.

mithyātva with beginning, and also an end, the maximum duration between such beginning and end being *ardha-pudgala-parāvarta*.

In the case of the soul who will never attain *samyag-darśana*, the *mithyātva* is beginningless and endless. Such souls are called *abhavya*. There is also a category of souls who are not *abhavya*, though they will never attain *samyag-darśana*, because condition favourable to *samyag-darśana* would never be available to them, in spite of the inherent potentiality (*laddhi*) for that. Such souls are called *bhavya* only formally and not materially. The *mithyātva* of a soul who is destined to attain *samyag-darśana* is without beginning but with an end. Such souls are called *laddhiṃ paḍucca bhava-siddhika* on account of their such potentiality (*laddhi*) which is destined to become an actuality.¹

The duration of the second *guṇasthāna* is six *āvalikās*, one *āvalikā* being equal to 45 seconds/262144.²

The third *guṇasthāna* lasts for an *antarmuhūrta*, after which the soul rises to the fourth or falls down to the first. A soul cannot die in this state, unlike as in the second state.

The maximum duration of the fourth *guṇasthāna* is stated to be 'a little over 33 *sāgaras*'.

According to another tradition recorded in the *Tattvārtha-bhāṣya*, the figure '33' is replaced by '66'.³ Siddhasenagaṇī⁴ explains how the number 66 is arrived at by pointing out that if the soul goes to the *anuttara vimāna* (enjoying the life-span of 33 *sāgaras*) twice, or to the *acyutakālpa* (having the life-span of 22 *sāgaras*) thrice, the total duration comes to 66 *sāgaras* in both cases. The additional duration in the first case will be two *pūrvakoṭis* less by 8 years and in the latter three *pūrvakoṭis* less by the same number. This calculation is based on the *Āgamika* tradition, as distinguished from the tradition of 33 *sāgaras* based on the literature on the doctrine of *karman*, both Śvetāmbara and Digambara.

The duration at the 5th, the 6th and the 13th is a little less than one *pūrva koṭi*. In the 5th, it may be less by *antarmuhūrta* and in the 6th and 13th by 8 years because the latter is the minimum age of initiation into the monastic order.

The duration of the other states (viz. from 7th to 12th) is less than one *muhūrta*. That of the 14th state is as long as the utterance of five short vowels as already noted.

१८. सम्यग्दृष्टि - देशविरत - सर्वविरत - अनन्तवियोजक- दर्शनमोहक्षपक-
उपशमक-उपशान्तमोह-क्षपक-क्षीणमोह-जिनानां क्रमशोऽसंख्येयगुणा
निर्जरा ।

18. *samyagdṛṣṭi-deśavirata-sarvavirata-anantaviyojaka - darśanamohakṣa-
paka - upaśamaka - upaśāntamoha - kṣapaka - kṣīṇamoha - jinānāṃ
kramaśo'saṃkheyagunā nirjarā.*

1 *Bhagavatī Sūtra*, 6/32.

2 Muni Mahendra Kumar. *Viśva Prahelkā*, page x.

3 1/7,8.

4 *Tattvārtha-bhāṣya-ṭīkā*, Part I, p. 60.

(Aph.) The following states are attended with shedding off (the *karmic matter*) which is progressively innumerable times the preceding one : (the *karmic* shedding off in) the *samyag-dr̥ṣṭi* (i.e., the fourth state) (is innumerable times that in the last instant of the *apūrva-karaṇa* process in the first *guṇasthāna* called *mithyādr̥ṣṭi*); (the fifth *guṇasthāna* of) the partially abstinent; the destroyer of endless passions; the destroyer of faith-deluding *karman*; one who is repressing conduct-deluding *karman*; one who has repressed (conduct-) deluding *karman*; one who is destroying (conduct-) deluding *karman*; one who has destroyed (conduct-) deluding *karman*; the omniscient. (XVIII)

(Note) The starting point of the spiritual development is the weakening or eradication of the endless passions. This is effected by means of penance. It consists in their repression or repression-cum-extirpation or extirpation. After the achievement of this weakening or elimination, it becomes easier for the aspirant to rectify his world-view called *darśana*. Under the influence of the passions the soul fails to get vision of truth. And the endless passions are incapable of elimination without right type of penances. It should be noted here that concentration (*dhyāna*) is an essential part of penance. It is rather the apex. The repression or the extirpation of the endless passions confers a purity on the soul, consequent upon the shedding off (*nirjarā*) of *karmic matter* due to penance. This is the minimum *nirjarā* for a spiritual aspirant. This has been called the *nirjarā* of *samyāgdr̥ṣṭi*, i.e., the fourth state. Now, the *nirjarā* is gradually higher in the fifth and sixth/seventh states.

The *nirjarā* in the case of the extirpation of the endless passions is higher than in the state of complete abstinence (in the sixth and the seventh state) attained by means of the subsidence-cum-destruction of the (conduct-) deluding *karman*.

१६. सूक्ष्मसंपरायान्तः सांपरायिको बन्धः ।

सकषायस्य शुभाशुभकर्मबन्धः सांपरायिकं उच्यते, स च सप्तकर्मणा-
मानवमजीवस्थानम्, आयुर्बन्धकाले तृतीयवर्जमासप्तममष्टकर्मणा-
मपि, आयुर्मोहौ विना षट्कर्मणां च दशमे ।

16. sūkṣmasamparāyāntaḥ sāmparāyiko bandhaḥ.

sakaṣāyasya śubhāśubhakarmabandhaḥ sāmparāyika ucyate. sa ca saptakarmaṇām ānavamajīvasthānam, āyurbandhakāle tṛtīyavarjam āsaptamam aṣṭakarmaṇām api, āyurmohau vinā ṣaṭkarmaṇām ca daśame.

(Aph.) The transmigrative (—leading to transmigration) bondage (of *karmans*) continues upto the (tenth) state of subtle passions (XIX)

(Gloss) The bondage of auspicious and inauspicious *karmans* by a person swayed by passions is called transmigrative. This bondage consists in the accession of seven types of *karman* up to the ninth state. At the

time of binding the age-determining *karman*, there is accession of all the eight types of *karman* upto the seventh state excepting the third. In the tenth state there is the accession of only six types of *karman* excepting the age-determining and the deluding ones.

२०. ईर्यापथिको वीतरागस्य ।

ईर्या—योगः, पन्थाः—मार्गो यस्य बन्धस्य स ईर्यापथिकः । अयञ्च सात-वेदनीयरूपः द्विसमयस्थितिको भवति ।

20. *īryāpathiko vītarāgasya*.

īryā—yogaḥ, panthāḥ—mārgo yasya bandhasya sa *īryāpathikaḥ*. ayañ ca sātavedanīyarūpaḥ dvisamayasthitiko bhavati.

(Aph.) The karmic bondage in the case of *vītarāga* is 'instantaneous'. (XX)

(Gloss) The word *īryāpathika* (rendered 'instantaneous') means the bondage due to activity (*īryā*). It is of the nature of pleasurable feeling, (is occasioned by mere activity,) and endures only for two instants. (It is bound in the first instant, enjoyed in the second, and shed off in the third).

(Note) So long as there is activity, pure or impure, there must be accession of *karman*. This comes to an end only in the fourteenth stage. But this *karmic* action does not produce any deleterious effect, because there is absence of accompanying passions.

२१. अबन्धोऽयोगी ।

21. *abandho'yogī*.

(Aph.) One in the state (of omniscience) with total cessation of activities does not incur bondage. (XXI)

(Note) It is worthy of note that there is a process of transition from the thirteenth to the fourteenth state. "Before entering into the.....fourteenth stage....., the soul prepares for the stoppage of all activity, gross and subtle. The stoppage of an activity requires another activity as the instrument. And so the soul first stops the gross activities of the sense-organ of speech and the mind by the gross activity of the body. Then it stops the gross activity of the body as well as the subtle activities of the sense-organ of speech and the mind by the subtle activity of the body. The soul then... stops the subtle bodily activity by means of the activity itself for there is none other than itself.....The soul then enters the stage.....which is bereft of all vibration (*samucchinakriya*) and infallible (*apratipātin*). It is now as motionless as a moun-

tain rock (*śaileśa*).....This state of absolute motionlessness is the fourteenth stage, called *ayogikevalin*.—*Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, p. 279.

२२. अकेवली छद्मस्थः ।

घात्यकर्मोदयः—छद्म, तत्र तिष्ठतीति छद्मस्थः । असौ द्वादशजीवस्थान-
पर्यन्तवर्ती ।

22. *akevalī chadmasthaḥ.*

ghātyakarmodayaḥ—chadma, tatra tiṣṭhatīti chadmasthaḥ. asau dvādaśajīvasthānaparyantavartī.

(Aph.) (Of the fourteen states, the last two are of the omniscient, the other twelve being of the non-omniscient *akevalin*, which are now being defined). The non-omniscient is one who is enveloped (in ignorance) (*chadma*). (XXII)

(Gloss) The 'envelope' means the *emergence* of the destructive *karmic* forces (viz. knowledge-obscuring, intuition-obscuring, deluding and obstructive). One who is stationed in such a situation is called 'enveloped' (in ignorance) (*chadmastha*). One continues in this situation till the twelfth state (inclusive).

२३. चतुर्दशापि शरीरिणाम् ।

अशरीरिणां विशुद्धेस्तारतम्यस्याभावात्, एतानि चतुर्दशापि जीवस्थानानि शरीरभाजां भवन्ति ।

23. *caturdaśāpi śarīriṇām.*

aśarīriṇāṃ viśuddhes tāratamyasyābhāvāt, etāni caturdaśāpi jīvasthānāni śarīrabhājāṃ bhavanti.

(Aph.) All these fourteen (states of soul's development) pertain to the embodied (souls). (XXIII)

(Gloss) There being absence of gradation in the purity of the disembodied souls, all the (above-mentioned) fourteen spiritual states relate to the embodied souls.

२४. सुखदुःखानुभवसाधनं शरीरम् ।

24. *sukhaduḥkhānubhava-sāadhanam śarīram.*

(Aph.) The body is the instrument for the experience of pleasure and pain. (XXIV)

(Note) Being composed of gross and subtle aggregates of matter, it is liable to

perish every moment, and so it is called *śarīra* (etymologically, what perishes every moment—*śīryate iti śarīram*).

२५. औदारिक-वैक्रिय-आहारक-तैजस-कर्मणानि ।

स्थूलपुद्गलनिष्पन्नं रसादिद्रातुमयम्—औदारिकम्, मनुष्यतिरश्चाम् ।
विविधरूपकरणसमर्थम्—वैक्रियम्, नारकदेवानां, वैक्रियलब्धिमतां
नरतिरश्चां वायुकायिकानाञ्च ।

आहारकलब्धनिष्पन्नम्—आहारकम्, चतुर्दशपूर्वधराणाम् ।
तेजःपरमाणुनिष्पन्नं—तैजसम्, तेजोलब्धि-दीप्ति-पाचन-कारकम् ।
कर्मणां समूहस्तद्विकारो वा कर्मणम् ।
एते च सर्वसंसारिणाम् ।

25. audārika-vaikriya-āhāraka-taijasa-kārmaṇāni.

sthūlapudgala-niṣpannam rasādihātumayam—audārikam, manuṣyatiraścām.

vividharūpa-karāṇa-samartham—vaikriyam, nāraka-devānām, vaikriyalabdhimatām naratiraścām vāyukāyikānāñ ca.

āhārakalabdhiniṣpannam—āhārakam, caturdaśapūrvadharāṇām.

tejahparamāṇu-niṣpannam—taijasam, tejolabधि-dīpti-pācana-kāra-kam.

karmaṇām samūhas tadvikāro vā kārmaṇam.

ete ca sarvasaṁsārīṇām.

(Aph.) (The bodies are of five kinds, viz.) (i) the gross, (ii) the protean (capable of transformation at will), (iii) the communication (created *ad hoc*), (iv) the luminous, and (v) the *karmic*. (XXV)

(Gloss) Of these, (i) the gross body is made of gross matter composed of the (seven) corporeal ingredients such as post-alimentary juices (blood, etc.); such is the body of men and animals. (ii) The protean body is the one capable of assuming diverse forms, such as the bodies of the denizens of heavens and hells, of men and animals possessed of the supernatural power of transformation, and of the air-bodied beings. (iii) The communication body is the result of the supernatural power called *āhāraka*; it is possible only for the ascetics with the knowledge of the fourteen *pūrvas*. (iv) The luminous body is composed of the luminous atoms. It makes possible the supernatural power of thermolu-

minescence, effulgence and digestion. (v) The *karmic* body is the aggregate of the *karmans* or their resultant. These (the last) two are common to all worldly beings.

२६. उत्तरोत्तरं सूक्ष्माणि पुद्गलपरिमाणतश्चासंख्येयगुणानि ।

26. *uttarottaram sūkṣmāṇi pudgalaparimāṇataś cāsaṁkhyeyaguṇāni.*

(Aph.) (Of the first three bodies) the succeeding one is progressively subtler (than the predecessor), and in respect of number of material particles each surpasses its predecessor by innumerable times in quantity. (XXVI)

२७. तेजसकर्मणे त्वनन्तगुणे ।

27. *taijasakārmaṇe tv anantaḡuṇe.*

(Aph.) The luminous and the *karmic* bodies are possessed of material atoms which are infinite times greater in number than those of their predecessors. (XXVII)

२८. एते चान्तरालगतावपि ।

अन्तरालगतिर्द्विविधा—ऋजुविग्रहा च । एकसामयिकी ऋजुः, चतुः-
समयपर्यन्ता च विग्रहा ।

तत्रापि द्विसामयिकमनाहारकत्वम् ।

अनाहारकावस्थायां च कर्मणयोग एव ।

28. *ete cāntarālagatāv api.*

antarālagatir dviddhā—r̥jur vighrahā ca. ekasāmayikī r̥juḥ, catuḥ-
samayaparyantā ca vighrahā.

tatrāpi dvisāmayikam anāhāratvam.

anāhārakāvasthāyām ca kārmaṇayoga eva.

(Aph.) These two bodies continue even in the transition passage (to another birth). (XXVIII)

(Gloss) The transition passage is twofold—rectilinear without or with turns. Of these the former endures for one instant, and the latter may endure up to four instants. In the latter, the individual does not take aliment for two instants. During the absence of aliment, there is only the activity of the *karmic* body.

२९. वेदनादिभिरेकीभावेनात्मप्रदेशानां तत इतः प्रक्षेपणं समुद्घातः^१ ।

29. *vedanādibhir ekībhāvenātmapradeśānām tata itaḥ prakṣepaṇam samudghātaḥ*.¹

(Aph.) Expansion (*samudghāta*)² is the projection, in diverse directions, of the points (*pradeśas*) of the soul, completely engrossed in the experience of distress and the like. (XXIX)

(Note) The soul has three dimensions, and it occupies a portion of space. The number of points in the soul are innumerable and fixed. Each point expands in the process of *samudghāta* which may be due to many causes to be enumerated in the next *sūtra*.

In this connection, it should be noted that the soul has a shape which is not like that of a material body. It is like a field of energy, which is not identical with shape. In *samudghāta*, there is the expansion of the field of spiritual energy. The Jaina conception of soul as co-extensive with the body is to be understood in terms of the field of spiritual energy. The soul pervades the body in the sense that it can feel any sensation in any part of the body. It does not extend beyond the body in the sense that it cannot feel an event occurring outside the body, though it has a capacity to feel anything in any part of the cosmos by developing the relevant power. In other words, the soul can catch the signals emanating from the cosmic events. Jainism does not feel the necessity of the expansion of the spiritual energy-field for coming into contact with events at remote places outside the body.

Jainism, however, does not deny the possibility of the soul, expanding itself to any part of the universe, if and when necessary. Such expansion and projection of parts of a soul are discussed under the concept of *samudghāta*.

Samudghāta is not essentially a voluntary phenomenon, as it occurs on certain occasions spontaneously.

३०. वेदना-कषाय-मारणान्तिक-वैक्रिय-आहारक-तैजस-केवलीनः ।

असद्वेद्यकमश्रियः—वेदना । कषायमोहकमश्रियः—कषायः । अमृतमृ-
हूर्तशेषायुः कमश्रियः—मारणान्तिकः । वैक्रिय-आहारक-तैजसनाम-
कमश्रियाः—वैक्रिय-आहारक-तैजसाः । आयुर्वर्जिष्ठात्यकमश्रियः—
केवली ।

१. सम् इति एकीभावेन, उत् प्राबल्येन, घात इति हस्तेर्गत्यर्थकत्वाद् आत्मप्रदेशानां बहिर्निस्सरणम्, हिंसार्थकत्वाच्च कर्मपुद्गलानां निर्जरणं समुद्घातः ।

1. *Sam* iti ekībhāvena, ut prābalyena, *ghāta* iti hanter gatyarthakatvād ātmapradeśānām bahir nissaraṇam, himsārthakatvāc ca karmapudgalānām nirjaraṇam *samudghātaḥ*.

2. The word *samudghāta* consists of *sam*+*ut*+*ghāta*. *Sam* means complete unification ; *ut* stands for intensity ; *ghāta* is derived from *han* meaning 'movement' and also 'destruction'. The whole word (*samudghāta*), therefore, has two meanings : (i) outward projection of the points of the soul with intense feelings, and (ii) the vigorous shedding off of *karmic* matter from the soul.

सर्वेष्वपि समुद्घातेष्वात्मप्रदेशाः शरीराद् बहिर्निस्सरन्ति तत्तत् कर्मपुद्गलानां विशेषपरिशाटश्च भवति । केवलिसमुद्घाते चात्मा सर्वलोकव्यापी भवति, स चाष्टसामयिकः । तत्र च केवली प्राक्तने समयचतुष्टये आत्मप्रदेशान् बहिर्निस्सार्य क्रमेण दण्ड-कपाट-मन्थान-अन्तरावगाहं कृत्वा समग्रमपि लोकाकाशं पूरयति । अग्रेतने च समय-चतुष्टये क्रमेण तान् संहर्न् देहस्थितो भवति । अष्टसमयेषु प्रथमेऽष्टमे च औदारिकयोगः, द्वितीये षष्ठे सप्तमे च औदारिकमिश्रः, तृतीये चतुर्थे पञ्चमे च कर्मणः ।

30. *vedanā-kaṣāya-māraṇāntika-vaikriya-āhāraka-taijasa-kevalinaḥ.*

asadvedyakarmāśrayaḥ—vedanā. kaṣāyamohakarmāśrayaḥ—kaṣāyaḥ. antarmuhūrtaśeṣāyuhkarmāśrayaḥ—māraṇāntikaḥ. vaikriya-āhāraka-taijasa-nāmakarmāśrayaḥ—vaikriya-āhāraka-taijasaḥ. āyur-varjā'ghātyakarmāśrayaḥ—kevali.

sarveṣv api samudghāteṣv ātmapradésāḥ śarīrād bahir nissaranti, tattatkarmapudgalānāṃ viśeṣapariśātaś ca bhavati. kevalisamudghāte cātmā sarvalokavyāpī bhavati, sa cāṣṭasāmayaikāḥ. tatra ca kevali prāktane samayacatuṣṭaye ātmapradésān bahir nissārya krameṇa daṇḍa-kapāṭa-manthāna-antarāvagāhaṃ kṛtvā sāmagram api lokākāśaṃ pūrayati. agretane ca samayacatuṣṭaye krameṇa tān saṃharan dehaṣṭhito bhavati. aṣṭasamayeṣu prathame'stame ca audārikayogaḥ, dvitīye ṣaṣṭhe saptame ca audārikamiśraḥ, tṛtīye caturthe pañcame ca kārmaṇaḥ.

(Aph.) (Expansion is of seven different kinds, viz.) one related to distress, passions, death-proximity, protean-body, communication-body, luminous body, and the omniscient. (XXX)

(Gloss) Distress (expansion) is dependent on the karmic matter productive of unhappiness. Passions (-expansion) is dependent on the deluding karmic matter resulting in passions. The death-proximity (-expansion) is dependent on the residual life-span-determining *karman* during the one *antarmuhūrta* before death. Protean-, communication-, and luminous-(expansions) are dependent upon the corresponding body-determining *nāma-karman*. (The expansion related to) the omniscient is dependent upon the non-destroying *karmic* forces except the life-span-determining one.

In all kinds of expansion, the points of the soul project themselves outside the body, and thereby the shedding off of the relevant karmic matter is effected in large measure. In the expansion related to the

omniscient, the soul pervades the whole cosmic space, enduring for eight instants. In this process, in the first four instants, the omniscient projects its points outside the body and successively assumes the shape of (vertical) column, door-panel and churning device and fills up the interspaces (by rotation), thus covering the whole cosmic space. In the succeeding four instants, the soul withdraws to the original shape of the body in the reverse order (i.e., in the fifth instant it reverts to the shape of churning device by withdrawing the points from the interspaces by anti-rotation, in the sixth to that of door-panel, in the seventh to column and finally in the eighth to the original shape).

Of the eight instants, the first and the eighth are attended with corporeal gross activity; the second, sixth and seventh with the gross-mixed; and the third, fourth and fifth with the *karmic* one.

३१. औपपातक-चरमशरीर-उत्तमपुरुष-असंख्येयवर्षायुषो निरुपक्रमायुषः ।

उपक्रमः—अपवर्तनमल्पीकरणमित्यर्थः । निबिडबन्धनिमित्तत्वात् तद्-रहितायुषो निरुपक्रमायुषः । औपपातिकाः—नारकदेवाः । चरम-शरीराः—तद्भवमुक्तिगामिनः । उत्तमपुरुषाः—चक्रवर्त्यादयः । असंख्य-वर्षायुषः—योगलिका नरास्तिर्यञ्चश्च ।

31. *aupapātika-caramaśarīra-uttamapuruṣa-asamkhyeyavarṣāyūṣo nirupakramāyūṣaḥ.*

upakramah—apavartanam alpikaraṇam ity arthaḥ. nibiḍabandhani-mittatvāt tadrāhitāyūṣo nirupakramāyūṣaḥ. aupapātikāḥ—nāraka-devāḥ. caramaśarīrāḥ—tadbhavamuktigāmināḥ. uttamapuruṣāḥ—cakravartyaḍayaḥ. asamkhyavarṣāyūṣaḥ—yauḡalikā narās tiryāñ-cāś ca.

(Aph.) The following are not subject to abrupt end of life-span : beings of spontaneous birth (*aupapātikas*), human beings in their last birth, extraordinary personalities and those enjoying a life-span of innumerable years. (XXXI)

(Gloss) abrupt end (*upakrama*) means reduction, i.e., shortening (of the life-span). Such persons are not subject to abrupt end because their life-span is unamenable to reduction on account of the high density of the bondage of the span-determining *karman*. The *aupapātikas* comprise the denizens of hells and heavens. The human beings in their last birth comprise those who are destined to attain the emancipation in that very birth. The extraordinary personalities comprise universal monarchs (*cakravartī*) and the like (viz. the 63 *śalākā puruṣas*).

The beings enjoying a life-span of innumerable years comprise the primitive twin (male and female) *yaugalika* human and animal.

३२. शेष्ठाः सोपक्रमायुषोऽपि ।

32. *śeṣāḥ sopakramāyūṣo'pi.*

(Aph.) The rest (of the beings) are subject to abrupt end also. (XXXII)

३३. अध्यवसान-निमित्त-आहार-वेदना-पराघात-स्पर्श-उच्छ्वास - निःश्वासा उपक्रमकारणानि ।

अध्यवसानम्—रागस्नेहभयात्मकोऽध्यवसायः । निमित्तम्—दण्ड-
शस्त्रादि । आहारः—न्यूनोऽधिको वा । वेदना—नयनादिपीडा ।
पराघातः—गर्तपातादि । स्पर्शः—भुजङ्गादोनाम् । उच्छ्वासनिः-
श्वासौ—व्याधिरूपेण निरुद्धौ ।

33. *adhyavasāna-nimitta - āhāra-vedanā - parāghāta-sparśa-ucchvāsaniḥś-
vāsā upakramakāraṇāni.*

adhyavasānam—rāga-sneha-bhayātmako'dhyavasāyaḥ. nimittam—
daṇḍaśastrādi. āhārah—nyūno'dhiko vā. vedanā—nayanādīpīḍā.
parāghātaḥ—garttapātādīḥ. sparśaḥ—bhujaṅgādīnām. ucchvāsaniḥś-
vāsau—vyādhirūpeṇa niruddhau.

(Aph.) The causes of the abrupt end (of life-span) are emotional impulses, weapons, food, distress, accident, contact and suffocation. (XXXIII)

(Gloss) Emotional impulse is one of the nature of attachment, affection and fear. Weapon means stick, arms and ammunition etc. Food here stands for too much or too little (alimentation). Distress means excruciating pain in the eye etc. Accident means fall in the ditch and the like. Contact means contact with snake and the like. Suffocation means arrestation of respiration caused by disease.

इति जीवस्थानस्वरूपनिर्णयः ।

iti jīvasthānasvarūpanirṇayaḥ.

Here ends the seventh lustre called the “Nature of Spiritual Development.”

अष्टमः प्रकाशः LUSTRE VIII

१. अर्हन् देवः ।

अर्हन्ति तीर्थप्रवर्तनमिति अर्हन्, सर्वातिशयसम्पन्नः केवली, जिनस्तीर्थंकर इति ।

1. *arhan devaḥ.*

arhati tīrthapravartanam iti arhan, sarvātiśayasampannaḥ kevalī, jīnas tīrthaṅkara iti.

(Aph.) The *Arhan* is the deity. (I)

(Gloss) The *Arhat* is so called because he is competent (*arhati*) to establish a discipline. He is an omniscient endowed with all the extraordinary glories, a victor (*jina*), and the founder of discipline (*tīrthaṅkara*).

१. निर्ग्रन्थो गुरुः ।

अर्हतां प्रवचनानुगामो बाह्याभ्यन्तरग्रन्थिविप्रमुक्तः निर्ग्रन्थः ।

2. *nirgrantho guruḥ.*

arhatām pravacanānugāmī bāhyā-bhyantara-granthi-vipramuktaḥ nirgranthaḥ.

(Aph.) One free from fetters is the *guru*. (II)

(Gloss) The one free from fetters is he who is a follower of the precepts of the *Arhat* and enjoys freedom from the external and internal fetters.

३. आत्मशुद्धिसाधनं धर्मः ।

3. *ātmaśuddhi-sādhanam dharmah.*

(Aph.) The means to the purification of the soul is righteousness (*dharma*). (III)

४. विवक्षाभेदादसावनेकविकल्पः ।

4. *vivakṣābhedād asāv anekavikalpaḥ.*

(Aph.) It (righteousness) is of many types on account of the manifoldness of the intentions (of the propounder). (IV)

(Note) Righteousness can be viewed in different perspectives, each giving rise to a unique class consisting of subdivisions. Thus, if the whole concept of righteousness is to be expressed in a single category, it is represented by *ahimsā* as stated in the *sūtra* that follows.

५. अहिंसा ।

5. *ahimsā*.

(Aph.) Non-violence (is one such type).

(Note) *Ahimsā* comprises the entire range of righteousness, all moral and religious principles being representative of the one or the other aspect of it.

Similarly, if the entire concept of righteousness is to be expressed in two parts, it consists of *śruta* (lore) and *cāritra* (conduct) (as in aph. VI).

६. श्रुत-चारित्रे ।

श्रुतं—ज्ञानात्मको धर्मः । चारित्र्यम्—आचारात्मको धर्मः ।

6. *śruta-cāritre*.

śrutam—jñānātmako dharmah. cāritram—ācārātmako dharmah.

(Aph.) The lore and the conduct (are the two types of righteousness).

(VI)

(Gloss) The lore is the righteousness (*dharma*) quā knowledge. Conduct is the righteousness quā behaviour.

(Note) In Jainism *kriyā* is as important as *jñāna*, practice is as important as theory. This dual aspect of righteousness is expressed in a different way, in the perspective of the *mārga* (or the path), as in aph. VII.

७. संवर-निर्जरे ।

संवरः—निवृत्त्यात्मको धर्मः । निर्जरा—सत्प्रवृत्त्यात्मको धर्मः ।

7. *saṁvaraḥ—nivr̥tṭyātmako dharmah. nirjarā—satpravṛtṭyātmako dharmah.*

(Aph.) Inhibition and shedding off (constitute another class). (VII)

(Gloss) Inhibition means righteousness quā abstinence. Shedding off is righteousness quā good activity.

(Note) Righteousness is neither absolute life-negation nor absolute life-affirmation. It is both viz. *saṁvara* that is negative in essence, and *nirjarā* that is positive in nature.

The next classification is made with reference to the three stages of learning and practice of righteousness. The three stages are : study, rational appreciation and realization of the truth through concentration. These three stages are known in Buddhism and Pātañjala Yoga as *śrutamayī*, *cintāmayī* and *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*. The next *sūtra* (aph. VIII) introduces righteousness in this perspective.

८. स्वधीत-सुध्यात-सुतपस्यितानि ।

स्वधीतम्—स्वाध्यायात्मको धर्मः । सुध्यातम्—ध्यानात्मको धर्मः ।
सुतपस्यितम्—तपस्यात्मको धर्मः ।

8. svadhīta-sudhyāta-sutapasyitāni.

svadhītaṁ—svādhyāyātmako dharmah. sudhyātaṁ—dhyānātmako dharmah. sutapasyitaṁ—tapasyātmako dharmah.

(Aph.) The well-learned, the well-concentrated and the well-practised through penance (are the three types of righteousness). (VIII)

(Gloss) The well-learned is the righteousness qua scriptural study. The well-concentrated is the righteousness qua concentration. The well-practised through penance is the righteousness qua penance.

९. ज्ञानदर्शनचारित्र्यतपांसि ।

9. jñāna-darśana-cāritra-tapāṁsi.¹

(Aph.) Knowledge, faith, conduct and penance (constitute four types of righteousness).²

१०. अहिंसा-सत्य-अस्तेय-ब्रह्मचर्य-अपरिग्रहाः ।

10. ahimsā-satya-asteya-brahmacarya-aparigrahāḥ.

(Aph.) Non-injury, truthfulness, non-stealing, celibacy and non-possession (constitute the five types of righteousness). (X)

(Note) This is the most popular classification of righteousness, which is accepted in almost all the schools of Indian philosophy. These are also called *yamas* or *yāmas*.

१ चतुर्विधो वा धर्मः, ज्ञानम्—तत्त्वनिर्णयः, दर्शनम्—तत्त्वश्रद्धा, चारित्र्यम्—संयमः,
तपः—अनशनानि ।

1 caturvidho vā dharmah, jñānam—tattvanirṇayaḥ, darśanam—tattvaśraddhā, cāritram—saṁyamah, tapaḥ—anaśanādi.

2 By another mode of classification righteousness is held to be fourfold viz. (1) knowledge, that is, the determination of truth; (2) faith, that is, belief in truth; (3) conduct, that is, self-restraint; (4) penance, that is fasting and the like.

११. क्षान्ति-मुक्ति-आर्जव-मार्दव-लाघव-सत्य - संयम-तपः-त्याग-ब्रह्मचर्याणि वा ।

क्षान्त्यादिभेदेन दशविधो वा धर्मः । तेषु मुक्तिः—निर्लोभता, लाघवम्—अकिञ्चनता, त्यागो—धर्मदानम् । शेषं स्पष्टम् ।

11. *kṣānti-mukti-ārjava-mārdava-lāghava-satya - saṁyama-tapaḥ - tyāga-brahmacaryāṇi vā.*

kṣāntyādibhedena daśavidho vā dharmāḥ. teṣu muktiḥ—nirlobhatā, lāghavam—akiñcanatā, tyāgo—dharmadānaṁ, śeṣaṁ spaṣṭam.

(Aph.) Alternately, forgiveness, release (from greed), straightforwardness, gentleness, lightness, truthfulness, self-restraint, penance, renunciation and celibacy (constitute righteousness). (XI)

(Gloss) By yet another mode of classification, righteousness is of ten kinds viz. forgiveness and the like. Among these, *mukti* means release from greed or greedlessness ; lightness means absolute non-possessiveness ; renunciation means imparting instruction in righteousness. The rest are easy (and hence, do not require elucidation).

(Note) *Tyāga* is not charity in the usual sense. It is essentially concerned with the mental disposition of the giver. *Tyāga* is possible even without offering anything to anybody. For instance, the cultivation of this virtue is perfect in the life of a monk who possesses nothing. Righteousness begins with this virtue.

The common feature of all the above-mentioned types of righteousness is their conduciveness to the purity of the soul, and shedding off the karmic matter, ultimately leading to emancipation. The worldly prosperity is an incidental resultant of righteous life. No religious activity is meant for the achievement of any worldly end. The exclusive end of religious life is emancipation. Considered from this perspective and keeping in view the ordinary conception of religion as leading to worldly happiness and prosperity, Jainism distinguishes two kinds of religion, viz. religion proper and religion popular (*lokadharmā*). This is explained in the following *sūtra*.

१२. आत्मोदयकारकत्वेन लोकाधर्मादसौ भिद्यते ।

12. *ātmodayakāratvena lokādharmād asau bhidyate.*

(Aph.) It (righteousness proper) is to be distinguished from the righteousness popular on account of the former's instrumentality to the purification of the soul. (XII)

१३. अपरिवर्तनीयस्वरूपत्वेन सर्वसाधारणत्वेन च ।

लोकधर्मो देशकालादिभिः परिवर्तनीयस्वरूपः, वर्गविशेषविभेदमापन्नश्च । धर्मस्तु आत्मोदयकारकः, अपरिवर्तनीयस्वरूपः, सर्वसाधा-

रणश्च इत्यनयोर्भेदः ।

गृहस्थानगारयोर्धर्मः केवलं पालनशक्त्यपेक्षया महाव्रताऽणुव्रत-
भेदेन द्विधा निर्दिष्टः— इति धर्मस्य सर्वसाधारणत्वे नास्ति कश्चिद्
विरोधः ।

13. *aparivartanīya-svarūpatvena sarvasādhāraṇatvena ca.*

lokadharmo deśakālādibhiḥ parivartanīyasvarūpaḥ, vargaviśeṣair
vibhedam āpannaś ca. dharmas tu ātmodayakāraḥ, aparivartanīya-
svarūpaḥ, sarvasādhāraṇaś ca ity anayor bhedaḥ.

gr̥hasthānagārayor dharmāḥ kevalam pālanaśaktyapekṣayā mahā-
vratā' ṇuvratabhedenā dvidhā nirdiṣṭaḥ—iti dharmasya sarvasādhā-
raṇatve nāsti kaścīd virodhaḥ.

(Aph.) (Righteousness proper differs) also in respect of its immutable
nature and universality. (XIII)

(Gloss) The righteousness popular undergoes change in accordance
with place, time and the like, and is susceptible to alteration by different
classes (of people). Righteousness (proper), however, is the cause of the
purification of the soul and is immutable and universal. This is the
fundamental difference between the two.

The differentiation of righteousness into “major vows” and “minor
vows” to be followed respectively by a monk and a householder has
been made only in view of their different capacities of fulfilment. Thus
there is no contradiction of the universality of righteousness being uni-
versally and uniformly valid.

१४. ग्राम-नगर-राष्ट्र-कुल-जाति-युगादीनामाचारो व्यवस्था वा लोकधर्मः ।

ग्रामादिषु जनानामौचित्येन वित्तार्जनव्ययविवाहभोज्यादिप्रथानां पार-
स्परिक-संहयोगादेर्वा आचरणम्—आचारः । तेषां च हितसंरक्षणार्थं
प्रयुज्यमाना उपायाः— व्यवस्था । सा च कौटुम्बिकी, सामाजिकी,
राष्ट्रिया, अन्तराष्ट्रिया चेति बहुविधा । ते च लोकधर्मः—लौकिको
व्यवहार इत्युच्यते, आगमेऽपि तथादर्शनात् यथा—“गामधम्मे, नगर-
धम्मे, रट्ठधम्मे, कुलधम्मे, गणधम्मे” इत्यादि ।

लोकधर्मेऽपि क्वचिद्विहासदीनामाचरणं भवति, तदपेक्षयाऽनेन धर्मस्य
भिन्नता न विभावनीया, किन्तु भोगोपवर्धकवस्तुव्यवहारापेक्षयैव ।

14. *grāma-nagara-rāṣṭra-kula-jāti-yugādīnām ācāro vyavasthā vā loka-
dharmāḥ.*

grāmādiṣu janānām aucityena vittārjana-vyaya-vivāha-bhojyādi-pra-thānām pārasparikasahayogāder vā ācāraṇam—ācāraḥ. teṣāṃ ca hitasaṃrakṣaṇārthaṃ prayujyamānā ūpāyāḥ—vyavasthā. sā ca kauṭumbikī, sāmājikī, rāṣṭriyā, antārāṣṭriyā ceti bahuvīdhā. te ca lokadharmāḥ—laukiko vyavahāra ity ucyate, āgame'pi tathādarśa-nāt, yathā—“gāmadhamme, nagardhamme, raṭṭhadhamme, kula-dhamme” ity ādi.

(Aph.) The righteousness popular consists in the custom or convention of a village, city, nation, race, caste, age and the like. (XIV)

(Gloss) Custom means such practices as the mores of honestly earning and spending money, marriage, feasting and the like, or mutual co-operation and the like, prevalent among the people of a village and the like. 'Convention' consists in the means employed for the protection of their (of village, town and the like) interests. The convention is manifold, being related to family, society, nation or nations interrelated. The customs and convention constitute righteousness (popular), that is popular mores as the word *dhamma* is used in the sense of righteousness popular in the scripture also. “Righteousness prevalent in a village, righteousness prevalent in a city, righteousness prevalent in a nation, righteousness prevalent in a race, righteousness prevalent in a group, and so on.”

In some cases of even the righteousness popular, non-violence and the like are practised, and as such, the righteousness proper is not different from the former. But (righteousness proper is to be distinguished) only in respect of the utilisation of the objects that augment (the craving for) enjoyment.

(Note) Even in the execution of righteousness popular a genuine type of non-violence and the like may be practised. In such case there is coincidence of righteousness popular and righteousness proper, so far as the particular act of non-violence is concerned. The difference between righteousness proper and righteousness popular lies in those acts that are practised exclusively for the promotion of worldly prosperity. The act of genuine righteousness involved in righteousness popular are to be distinguished with reference to the result of purification of the soul achieved by those acts.

१५. प्रेयःसंपादनमपि ।

प्रेयःसंपादनं बाह्योदय-कारकमस्ति, तेनैतदपि लोकधर्मकक्षायां प्रविशति ।

15. *preyaḥsānpādanam api.*

preyaḥ sampādanaṁ bāhyodaya-kāraṁ asti, tenaitad api loka-dharmakakṣāyāṁ praviśati.

(Aph.) The accomplishment of the worldly good (happiness) is also (known as righteousness popular). (XV)

(Gloss) The accomplishment of the worldly good is conducive to external prosperity, and as such this also falls in the orbit of righteousness popular.

इति देवगुरुधर्मस्वरूपनिर्णयः ।

iti deva-guru-dharma-svarūpanirṇayaḥ.

Here ends the eighth Lustre called “The Ascertainment of the Nature of (true) Deity, Preceptor and Righteousness”

नवमः प्रकाशः
LUSTRE IX

१. पापाचरणादात्मरक्षा दया ।

पापहेतुकमाचरणम्—प्राणातिपातादि, आर्त्तध्यानादि वा पापाचरणम्, तस्मात् स्वस्य परस्य वा आत्मनो रक्षणम्—ततो निवर्तनं दयाऽभिधीयते । यत्र अहिंसा तत्रैव दया, यत्र नाहिंसा न च तत्र दया, इत्यन्वय-व्यतिरेकाद् द्वयोर्नित्यसम्बन्धित्वेऽपि लौकिकदयातः पार्थक्यप्रकाशनार्थमेव अस्याः पृथक् व्याख्यानम् ।

1. pāpācaraṇādātmarakṣā dayā.

pāpahetukam ācaraṇam—prāṇātipātādi, ārttadhyānādi vā pāpācaraṇam; tasmāt svasya parasya vā ātmano rakṣaṇam—tato nivartanaṁ dayā'bhidhīyate. yatra ahiṁsā tatraiva dayā, yatra nāhiṁsā na ca tatra dayā, ity anvaya-vyatirekādvayor nityasambandhitve'pi laukikadayātaḥ pāṛthakyaprakāśanārtham eva asyāḥ pṛthak vyākhyānam.

(Aph.) Protection of the soul from sinful activity is compassion. (I)

(Gloss) Sinful activity consists in activities leading to sin, for instance, killing and the like or concentration due to anguish and the like. The protection, that is, dissuasion of one's own self or others from this is called compassion. Only where there is non-violence there is compassion. In the absence of non-violence there cannot be compassion. In spite of this universal concomitance in agreement and difference between the two, it (viz. compassion) has been separately explained in order to show its distinction from the compassion popular.

२. सदुपदेशविपाकचिन्तनप्रत्याख्यानदयोऽस्या उपायाः ।

2. sadupadeśa-vipākacintana-pratyākhyānādayo'syā upāyāḥ.

(Aph.) The instruments for (the cultivation of) compassion are : right persuasion, deliberation on karmic fruition (of violent indulgence), administering vows of abstinence from causing injury to living beings. (II)

३. लोके प्राणरक्षापि ।

शरीरेण सह प्राणानां यः संयोगस्तस्य देशतः सर्वतो वा रक्षणमपि लोके

दया प्रोच्यते । संयमानुकूला प्राणरक्षा तु अहिंसापरिप्लुतत्वात् पर-
मार्थतोऽपि दयैवेति नात्र तद्ग्रहणम् ।

3. *loke prāṇarakṣāpi.*

śarīreṇa saha prāṇānām yaḥ saṁyogastasya deśataḥ sarvato vā
rakṣaṇam api loke dayā procyate. saṁyamānukūlā prāṇarakṣā tu
ahiṁsāpariplutavāt paramārthato'pi dayaiyeti nātra tadgrahaṇam.

(Aph.) In popular parlance protection of life also (is called compa-
ssion). (III)

(Gloss) In popular parlance the partial or full protection of life is
also called compassion. Protection of life conducive to (and compa-
tible with self-) restraint, on account of its being non-violence, is how-
ever (a case of) compassion proper, and so it is not implied in this *sūtra*
(i.e., it is not an instance of compassion popular).

(Note) Protection of life as involving an activity on the part of the protector is a
case of compassion proper, provided the protector does not involve himself in any kind
of violent activity, and at the same time promotes the cause of *saṁyama*.

४. मोहमिश्रितत्वान्नात्मसाधनो ।

अनन्तरोक्ता दया मोहमिश्रितत्वात् आत्मसाधनायै नालम् । आत्म-
शुद्धयर्थं दयामधिकुर्म; नैयं तत् कार्यक्षमेति वस्तुवृत्त्या न दया । न च
दया वस्तुतो द्वयात्मिका भवितुमर्हति । तथापि तादृगनादिवासनावशात्
लोकानामत्र दयेति प्रतीतिः । जिनरक्षिताऽभयकुमार^१-मित्रदेवयोः,
अरिष्टनेमि^२-मेरुप्रभहस्तिनो^३श्चागमोदाहरणानि लोकदयाया दयायाश्च
भेदं स्पष्टयन्ति ।

4. *mohamiśritatvānnātmasādhani.*

anantaroktā dayā mohamiśritavāt ātmasādhanāyai nālam. ātma-
śuddhyartham dayāmadhikurma ; neyam tat kāryakṣameti vastuvṛ-
tṭyā na dayā. na ca dayā vastuto dvayātmikā. bhavitumarhati,
tathāpi tādṛganādivāsanāvaśāt lokānāmatra dayeti pratītiḥ. jinara-
kṣitā^१ bhayakumāra^२-mitradevayoḥ ariṣṭanemi^३-meruprabhahastino^४
cāgamoḍāharaṇāni lokadayāyā dayāyāś ca bhedaṁ spaṣṭayanti.

१ ज्ञातृघर्मकथा, अध्यायन ६

२ उत्तराध्यायन, अध्यायन २२

३ Jñātrdharma-kathā, adhyayana 9

४ Uttarādhyayana, adhyayana 22

२ ज्ञातृघर्मकथा, अध्यायन

४ ज्ञातृघर्मकथा, अध्यायन

२ Jñātrdharma-kathā, adhyayana

४ Jñātrdharma-kathā, adhyayana

(Aph.) It (i.e., compassion popular) being intermixed with delusion, is not a means to the purification of the soul. (IV)

(Gloss) Compassion described in the preceding *sūtra* is not capable of fulfilling the end of the purification of soul, on account of its being intermixed with delusion. We resort to compassion in order to purify the soul, but as this (viz. compassion popular) is not capable of serving this purpose, it is not compassion as a matter of fact. Although really speaking compassion cannot be of a dual nature. Yet the common people, because of their beginningless predisposition, believe it (compassion popular) to be a genuine compassion.

Āgamika examples of (i) Jinarakṣita¹, (ii) Abhayakumāra², with their respective celestial friends, (iii) Ariṣṭanemi³ and (iv) the elephant Meruprabha⁴ clearly exhibit the distinction between the compassions, popular and proper.

(Note) The following stories are recorded in the *Jñātṛdharmakathā* and *Uttarādhayanāsūtra* which carry a moral :—

The first story is of Jinapāla and Jinarakṣita. They were two brothers, sons of a merchant called Mākandī in the city of Campā. They were enterprising and well-skilled in trade. They had acquired large fortune by maritime trade. They had made eleven voyages before and proposed to take the twelfth one. Their parents gave their consent with reluctance. They set out in a ship laden with merchandise. But as ill luck would have it, they were caught in a gale and the ship foundered on a submarine rock. Luckily they got hold of a raft and reached an island. The ruler of the island was a demoness. She approached them with a sword in her hand and menacingly demanded them to agree to live with her as her lovers. They gave their consent on pain of death. They lived together for a long time in enjoyment of all sorts of sensual pleasure in the company of the demoness. An occasion arose when she was called upon by the god of the sea to clean the royal household. She could not decline the order. She, however, admonished the two brothers to beguile their tedium by visiting the gardens on the borders of the island except the one in the south. It was alleged that there was a basilisk which would reduce them to ashes by his very look. They, however, did not find a diversion and then visited the southern garden. It was emitting horrible stench. They, however, proceeded and found a man impelled on a stake. The unfortunate man told his sad story. He was seduced by the ruling demoness when he reached the island after ship-wreck. She was offended with him for some slight aberration and punished him to die on the stake. He also warned them of a similar fate unless they sought refuge with a benevolent spirit dwelling in the eastern part of the forest. They found him out and prayed for safety.

1 Vide *Jñātṛdharmakathā* (Vide appended Story No 1).

2 „ Ibid, Ch. I („ „ „ „ 2).

3 „ *Uttarādhayanā Sūtra*, XXII, (Vide appended Story No. 3).

4 „ *Jñātṛdharmakathā*, Ch. I, („ „ „ „ 4).

The spirit assumed the form of a horse and carried them on the back. He, however, took an undertaking from the brothers that they must not be moved to pity at the entreaties of the demoness. The demoness returned and found the brothers on the horse-back and held out threats. Finding them unmoved she began to lament. One of the brothers yielded to her plaintive cries and was moved to pity, and was therefore immediately overthrown. The demoness caught hold of him and cut him to pieces.

—*Nāyādharmakahāṇo*, IX.

The moral of the story is that the brother who was moved to pity of popular conception by the grief of the demoness cannot be supposed to have felt mercy in the true sense.

King Śreṇika of Rājagṛha had a queen Dhārānī by name and Abhayakumāra as his Prime Minister. The queen was enceinte. She developed a queer desire that she would ride on an elephant with king sitting behind her holding the parasol on her head and go through the heart of the city when it would rain. But it was not the rainy season. She was, however, languishing as her desire could not be fulfilled. She kept her counsel. The king noticed her in distress and pressed hard for revealing her secret. On learning her caprice, the king promised to do his best. But he was at a loss. Prince Abhayakumāra came and saw him in a pensive mood. He entreated the king to acquaint him with his problem. The king gave the secret to the Prime Minister. The latter thought that it was not easy to bring about a rain-fall out of season. He, however, had a powerful god as his friend. He invoked his help by fasting for three days and observed strict continence. The god showed pity by sending down a shower and the queen's desire was fulfilled.

—*Nāyādharmakahāṇo*, I. 32-71.

Ariṣṭanemi was a cousin of Śrī Kṛṣṇa. One day he went in the armoury and blew the conch of Śrī Kṛṣṇa, called *Pāñcajanya*. The whole city of Dvārikā quivered as if an earthquake had occurred. Śrī Kṛṣṇa came to the armoury and found Ariṣṭanemi in the act of blowing the conch. They were all pleasantly surprised to discover his wonderful prowess. They made a proposal for celebrating his marriage. After a great deal of persuasion, Ariṣṭanemi accepted the proposal. The marriage was settled with a princess of Mathurā. The bridal party went there in great pomp. Ariṣṭanemi heard the pitious shrieks of birds and beasts. He made an inquiry and came to know that all those unfortunate creatures were kept in pen to provide food for the marriage party. He was stricken with mercy for the helpless mute animals and declined to marry.

—*Uttarājñhayaṇa*, XXII.

The mercy of Ariṣṭanemi was genuine mercy since it was made for the purification of his own soul.

There was an elephant called Meruprabha, the leader of the herd, living in a forest near a hill. A conflagration broke out in the forest. The elephants of the herd ran helter-skelter. Meruprabha remained alone terribly suffering from hunger and thirst. He saw a tank but it was almost dry, full of mire and with a little water. He entered into it and was caught up in the bog. There was another young elephant who had been turned out by Maruprabha for some offence. The latter revenged upon the former. He battered and bruised him and the result was that he died of starvation and excruciating pain. Meruprabha was again born as an elephant on the

bank of the river Ganges at the foot of the Vindhya hill. In his youth he inherited the lordship of the herd from his deceased parent. In the summer there was a conflagration. He was visited with the reminiscence of the past. He hit upon a plan to clear the big area in the forest of all trees, bushes and bamboos so that forest fire could not prevail in that area. All the elephants laboured hard and cleared the area. Next Summer there was another conflagration in the forest. All the animals of the forest took refuge within that area to escape from death. The elephant, the hero of the story, also went there with his retinue. He raised his foot to stretch his body and when he was going to plant it back on the ground, he saw a hare sitting there. He held up his leg in order that he may not kill the hare and thereby protect the self. He remained in that state for two whole days and a night. The fire ceased. All the refugee animals left the area. But with his leg suspended in the air for such a long period, he was seized with palsy and he dropped down dead.

—*Nāyāḍhammkahāo*, I, 156-78.

For this act of mercy (in the real sense) even in the midst of terrible suffering, he acquired prodigious merit and was born in next life as the son of King Śreṇika.

५. असंयमपोषकत्वाद् बलप्रयोगादेः सम्भवाच्च ।

यत्रासंयमपोषणं, बलप्रयोगः, विवशताप्रलोभनादयोऽपि च सम्भवन्ति,
तत्र नात्मसाधना भवितुमर्हति ।

5. asaṁyama-poṣakatvāḍ bala-prayogādeḥ sambhavāc ca.

yatrāsaṁyama-poṣaṇam, bala-prayogaḥ, vivaśatā-pralobhanādayo'pi
ca sambhavanti, tatra nātma-sādhana bhavitum arhati.

(Aph.) (It is not a means to self-purification) also because it nourishes non-restraint and may involve coercion and the like. (V)

(Gloss) As there is the possibility of the encouragement of non-restraint, coercion, unaviodability, and temptation and the like in such compassion, it cannot be a means to self-purification.

६. क्वचिदियं प्रसंगजापि ।

क्वचिदात्मरक्षायां प्रासंगिककार्यरूपेण देशतः सर्वतो वा प्राणरक्षापि
भवत्येव । यद् यस्य प्रासंगिकं, नहि तत्तद्वस्तुस्वरूपानुप्रवेशीति प्रसंग-
जप्राणरक्षया नहि आत्मरक्षाया आत्मसाधकत्वं विभावनीयम्, एवं सति
क्वचित् प्रसंगजहिंसया तस्याः सदोषत्वमपि भवेत् । विवेचनीयात्र
भिक्षुस्वामिप्रदर्शिता दृष्टान्तत्रयी ।

6. kvacid iyaṁ prasaṅgajāpi.

kvacid ātma-rakṣāyāṁ prāsaṅgikakāryarūpeṇa deśataḥ sarvato vā
prāṇarakṣāpi bhavaty eva. yad yasya prāsaṅgikam, nahi tat tad-
vastu-svarūpānupraveśīti prasaṅgaja-prāṇa-rakṣayā nahi ātma-

rakṣāyā ātma-sādhakatvaṁ vibhāvanīyam, evaṁ sati kvacit prasaṅ-
gajahimsayā tasyāḥ sadoṣatvam api bhavet. vivecanīyātra bhikṣu-
svāmipradarśitā dṛṣṭānta-trayī.

(Aph.) Sometimes it (viz. protection of life) can be incidental as well.
(VI)

(Gloss) Sometimes, while *protecting the soul*, the *protection of life*, partially or fully, indeed takes place as an incidental result. However, what is only incidental (casual, not causal) to something is not an essential characteristic thereof, and so the incidental *protection of life* should not be considered as conducive to self-purification on a par with the *protection of soul*. If the incidental *protection of life* were considered to be an essential characteristic of compassion proper, then an incidental injury to life (which may take place) should also be considered as essential characteristic of compassion proper which will be tantamount to accepting compassion proper as contaminated by violence. (This will be a contradiction in terms. The upshot is that the incidental result, good or bad, is not the determinant of an act, being not related causally with the main act). The three examples given by Bhikṣu-svāmin¹ should be carefully understood in this connection.

(Note) Examples given by Bhikṣusvāmin :—

(1)

A burglar broke into a shop at dead of night where monks had a night stay, put all the valuables in a bag and was on the point of coming out. Three monks came to the thief and accosted him. Seeing that they were saints, the thief made clean breast of the whole thing. There was long dialogue between one saint and the thief, the former dwelling on the sins of theft and the latter explaining the situations which compelled him to resort to that bad profession. The saint's admonition produced a change in the thief. In course of the discussion, dawn broke out. The owner of the shop came in. The thief reassured the owner by showing the bag in which he put all the valuables stolen from the shop. He (the owner) remarked that but for the admonition by the monks, he would have been robbed of all the valuables and made a pauper. The shop-keeper duly thanked the monks.

Now we have to draw the moral from the story. Whether it was turning away of the thief from the profession of theft or the recovery of the stolen property by the merchant that is to be regarded as meritorious from the religious point of view? The answer is obvious. The thief's soul was saved and here lies the merit. The restoration of the wealth of the merchant is only an incidental result which has value only for well-ordered social life.

(2)

Once a butcher was driving a group of goats and sheep with a view to slaughter

1 For the examples vide the stories appended as note.

them and selling their meat. On the way some saints met him. One of them asked the butcher "Is not a goat afraid of death as you are?" The butcher gave the reply in the affirmative. The saint lectured the butcher on the sins of killing living animals and he was made to realise the gravity of the sins he was incurring. He gave up his profession and become a changed man.

Now the question is : Which of the two acts, the conversion of the butcher to pure life or the saving of the lives of innocent animals constitute spiritual merit ? The answer is that merit lies in the purification of the butcher's heart, and the saving of the lives of animals is only a consequence which has no spiritual value by itself.

(3)

It was midnight. Three saints were having a night stay in a shop in a market and were reciting scriptures. By a coincidence three young men were coming around the corner. The saints interrogated the young men "Why are you moving about in this unearthly hour and what is your objective?" They were frightened. But finding that the interrogators were saints, they were reassured. However, after deliberation they told the truth that they were going to visit a hetaera to keep a tryst. The saints said, "You are men of good dispositions since you have spoken the truth. It does not become you to be engaged in such an ignoble work. You cannot hope to get rid of passion by indulgence. Self-restraint is the means to it." After a good deal of expostulation the young men were converted to righteousness. They gave up the idea of visiting the hetaera. But the woman in question was waiting for them, and finding them late came out in search of the young men and by chance saw them seated near the ascetics. She remonstrated them and wanted to take them to her residence. But they declined. The woman held out a threat that in case they turned a deaf ear to her overtures, she would jump into the well and put an end to her life. The youths were adamant. The woman was as good as threats. She committed suicide by jumping into a well.

Now we have to ponder over the morals of the stories. In the last one, three young men were saved from a life of infamy. But it led to the eventual death of a public woman. In the story of the thief the merchant's property was restored and the thief was turned to a better life. In the story of the butcher, the butcher underwent a change of heart and gave up his vile profession and the brutes were saved. Wherein lies the spiritual merit ? According to Jaina ethics it is the purification of the heart which is entitled to rank as righteousness. As regards the death of the hetaera, the sin accruing from it cannot be laid at the door of the young men or the saints. These stories have been employed to throw light on the ethical judgment of the Jaina philosophers.

The faultless and immaculate compassion is one that does not entail any kind of violence for observing it. The incidental, that is causally unrelated, protection of life or injury to it, does not affect the genuineness of the compassion. The motive behind compassion is the promotion of self-restraint (*sahyama*) and abstinence from any type of injury to life, even at the cost of supreme sacrifice, resulting in end of one's own life. The essence of compassion is refraining from all types of victimization of any kind of living being, gross or subtle. Violence for the promotion of non-violence is an absurd concept. It entails a chain of violence without end.

Weapons of violence instigate creation of more powerful weapons of violence. But non-creation of weapons of violence does not inspire creation of further weapons, because it is an end in itself. Says the *Āyāro* :¹ “There is always a weapon mightier than another one ; whereas there is no weapon mightier than the state of disarmament.”

The word *moha* (in aphorism no. 4), rendered delusion, has an epistemological as well as an ethical application. In the present context, *moha* is primarily used in its ethical sense. This is explained in the next aphorism.

७. रागद्वेषपरिणतिमोहः ।

7. *rāga-dveṣa-pariṇatir mohah.*

(Aph.) Attachment and hatred are states of delusion (of the soul).
(VII)

८. नायं स्वपरप्रतिबन्धी ।

रागात्मा मोह आत्मोयेष्वेव, द्वेषात्मा च परकीयेष्वेवेति प्रतिबन्धो न विचारक्षमः । स्वकुटुम्बस्य पोषणमेव मोहो नान्यस्य, इत्यपि न युक्तम् । उभयत्रापि असंयमाऽविशेषात् ।

8. *nāyam sva-para-pratibandhī.*

rāgātmā moha ātmīyeṣv eva, dveṣātmā ca parakīyeṣv eveti pratibandho na vicāraṁśamaḥ. svakuṭumbasya poṣaṇam eva moho nānasya ity api na yuktam. ubhayatrāpi asaṁyamā'viśeṣāt.

(Aph.) It (delusion) is not necessarily restricted to one's own (relatives) or to others. (VIII)

(Gloss) The formulation of such restriction by way of a universal proposition that the delusion of the nature of attachment is possible in respect of one's own relatives only, while the delusion of the nature of hatred is possible in respect of others exclusively does not stand the scrutiny of reason. It is also not proper to say that only the maintenance of one's own relatives is delusion quā attachment and not the maintenance of others, because the absence of self-restraint is common to both.

९. स्वसामग्रीसापेक्षाऽस्य वृत्तिः ।

मनोज्ञस्थितिवस्तुवृत्तादिरूपां दीनावस्थादिरूपां वा रागोद्दीपिकाम्, अमनोज्ञस्थितिवस्तुवृत्तादिरूपां च द्वेषोद्दीपिकां सामग्रीमपेक्षमाण एव मोहो वर्तते । न रागोत्पत्तौ परिचितत्वमेव हेतुः । यदि अपरिचितानां

1 *Āyāro*, 3/82

दृश्यमाने स्फुटमैश्वर्ये भवति द्वेषस्तदा तेषां कारुण्यावस्थायां भवन् रागः
केन निवारयितुं शक्येत । दृश्यश्रव्यकाव्येषु प्रेक्षकश्रोतॄणां तत्तद्भावानु-
रूपरसोत्पत्तिदर्शनात्, तदनुगामिप्रवृत्तिदर्शनाच्च ।

9. *sva-sāmagrī-sāpekṣā'sya vṛttiḥ.*

manojña-sṭhiti-vastu-vṛttādi-rūpām dīnāvasthādi-rūpām vā ragoddī-
pikām, amanojña-sṭhiti-vastu-vṛttādi-rūpām ca dveṣoddīpikām
sāmagrīm apekṣamāṇa eva moho vartate. na rāgotpattau paricitat-
vam eva hetuḥ yadi aparicitānām dṛśyamāṇe sphuṭam aiśvārye
bhavati dveṣas tadā teṣām kāruṇyāvasthāyām bhavan rāgaḥ kena
nivārayitum śakyeta. dṛśya-śravya-kāvyēsu-prekṣaka-śrotṛṇām tat-
tad-bhāvānurūpa - rasotpattidarśanāt, tad-anugāmi-pravṛtti-darśa-
nāc ca.

(Aph.) Its (delusion's) manifestation is dependent upon the conditions conducive to it. (IX)

(Gloss) Delusion arises on the fulfilment of the following twofold collocation of conditions : (1) the collocation which augments the attachment and is of the nature of agreeable environment, things, events and the like as well as pitiable condition and the like (results in manifestation of *moha* quā attachment), and (2) the collocation which augments hatred and is of the nature of disagreeable environment, things, events and the like (results in manifestation of *moha* quā hatred). Familiarity alone is not the condition of the rise of attachment. If there can surely arise hatred at the sight of the magnificence of unfamiliar persons, then who can prevent the rise of attachment at the sight of their pitiable condition? And also because it is seen that there is the rise of corresponding sentiments and volitional activities in the spectators of a dramatic performance and the audience of a poetical recitation.

१०. व्यष्टिसमष्ट्यादिष्वपि ।

व्यष्टयै समष्टयै च क्रियमाणेष्वपि कार्येषु अहिंसाद्याचरणमन्तरा
मोहस्य वृत्तिर्विभावनीया । परमार्थस्त्वहिंसादीनामाचरणमेव ।

10. *vyasṭi-samaṣṭyādiṣv api.*

vyasṭyai samaṣṭyai ca kriyamāṇeṣv api kāryeṣu ahiṁsādyācāraṇam
antarā mohasya vṛttir vibhāvanīyā. paramārthas tv ahiṁsādīnām
ācāraṇam eva.

(Aph.) Even in the case of (act done for) an individual or group (there is the possibility of the manifestation of delusion). (X)

(Gloss) Even in acts done for an individual or a group, in the absence of observance of genuine non-injury and the like, the manifestation of delusion is discernible. It is only the observance of non-injury and the like, which can be regarded as a spiritual activity.

११. असंयमसुखाभिप्रायो रागः ।

असंयममयस्य सुखस्याभिकांक्षणम्— रागोऽभिधीयते ।

11. *asaṁyama-sukhābhiprāyo rāgaḥ.*

asaṁyamamayasya sukhasyābhikāṁkṣaṇam—rāgo'bhidhīyate.

(Aph.) The desire for happiness informed with non-restraint is (delusion quā) attachment. (XI)

(Gloss) The craving for happiness informed with non-restraint is called (delusion quā) attachment.

१२. दुःखाभिप्रायो द्वेषः ।

12. *duḥkhābhiprāyo dveṣaḥ.*

(Aph.) The desire for (inflicting) suffering is hatred. (XII)

(Note) A person can desire suffering out of hatred for his own life, or life of others whom he wants to get rid of. Sometimes a person inflicts suffering on himself in order to make others unhappy. All such acts are informed with the *moha* quā hatred,

It will not be out of place to mention here the intimate relationship between attachment and hatred. Wherever there is hatred, there must be attachment. Attachment, however, can be with or without hatred.

१३. रागद्वेषराहित्यं माध्यस्थ्यम् ।

माध्यस्थ्यम्, उपेक्षा, औदासीन्यम्, समतेति पर्यायाः ।

13. *rāga-dveṣa-rāhityam mādhyasthyam.*

mādhyasthyam, upekṣā, audāsīnyam, samateti paryāyāḥ.

(Aph.) The absence of attachment and hatred is impartiality.

(Gloss) Impartiality, indifference, detachment and equanimity are synonymous.

१४. हिंसादेरनिवृत्तिरसंयमः ।

हिंसाऽनृतस्तेयान्ब्रह्मपरिग्रहाणामनिवृत्तिरसंयम उच्यते, सपापप्रवृत्तेर-
प्रत्याख्यानमिति यावत् ।

14. *himsāder anivṛttir asaṁyamaḥ.*

himsā'nṛta-steyābrahma-parigrahāṇām anivṛttir asaṁyama ucyate, sapāpapravṛtter apratyākhānam iti yāvat.

(Aph.) Non-abstinence from (acts of) injury, and the like is non-restraint. (XIV)

(Gloss) Non-abstinence from injury, falsehood, stealing, non-celibacy and possession is called non-restraint. In other words, (it consists in) the non-renunciation of sinful activities.

(Note) This non-restraint prevails upto the fifth state (inclusive) of the soul's development (*jīvasthāna*). The fifth state, although technically known as *saṁyamā-saṁyama*, is virtually a state of *asaṁyama*.

१५. तद्विरतिः संयमः ।

हिंसादेविरतिः संयमः ।

15. *tad-viratiḥ saṁyamaḥ.*

himsāder viratiḥ saṁyamaḥ.

(Aph.) Abstinence from the same is restraint. (XV)

(Gloss) Abstinence from (acts of) injury and the like is restraint.

(Note) This restraint is achieved at the sixth state and continues onwards.

Our discussion on the concept of compassion proper terminates here. Another important concept concerned with charity is explained in the next *sūtra*.

१६. स्वपरोपकारार्थं वितरणं दानम् ।

स्वस्य परस्य चोपकारार्थं स्वकीयवस्तुनो वितरणं दानम् ।

16. *sva-paropakārārtham vitaranam dānam.*

svasya parasya copakārārtham svakīya-vastuno vitaranam dānam.

(Aph.) Charity consists in offering food, drink, etc., for the benefit of one's own self as well as others. (XVI)

(Gloss) Offering of one's own articles for the benefit of one's own self and others is charity.

(Note) Charity may be pure as well as impure.

१७. संयमोपवर्धकं निरवद्यम् ।

येन स्वस्य परस्य वा संयम उपचयं याति तन्निरवद्यदानम्—धर्मदान-मिति । तच्च संयमिने यथोचितान्नपानादेवितरणम्—संयतिदानम्,

धर्मोपदेशादेवितरणम्—ज्ञानदानम्, हिंसानिवृत्तिः—अभयदानमित्यादिरूपम् । असंयमिदानं सावद्यमिति पारिशेष्यात् सिद्धमेव । लोकव्यवहारोपयोगित्वेन लोकैराश्रितमित्येव नास्ति तस्य निरवद्यत्वम्, अन्यथा कृषि-वाणिज्य-विवाहादीनामपि निरवद्यत्वप्रसक्तेः ।

17. *saṁyamopavardhakam niravadyam.*

yena svasya parasya vā saṁyama upacayaṁ yāti tan niravadya-dānam—dharmadānam iti. tac ca saṁyamine yathocitānna-pānāder vitarāṇam—saṁyati-dānam, dharmopadeśāder vitarāṇam—jñāna-dānam, hiṁsā-nivṛttiḥ—abhaya-dānam ityādirūpam. asaṁyami-dānam sāvadyam iti pāriśeṣyāt siddham eva. loka-vyavahāropayo-gitvena lokair āśritam ity eva nāsti tasya niravadyatvam, anyathā kṛṣi-vāṇijya-vivāhādīnām api niravadyatva-prasakteḥ

(Aph.) The pure (charity) is one that promotes self-restraint. (XVII)

(Gloss) What is conducive to the progressive advancement of self-restraint of either one's own self or another is called pure charity, that is, righteous charity. It (righteous charity) is (manifold, viz.) (i) charity for the self-restrained person, that is, the offering of proper food, drink and the like to the self-restrained person (monk or nun); (ii) charity of knowledge, that is, imparting religious instruction and the like; (iii) charity of fear-freedom (*abhaya*) (generating a sense of freedom from fear-complex) i.e. abstinence from perpetrating injury and the like, etc. It now follows, by implication, that charity for the unrestrained person is impure. Such (charity) cannot be proved to be irreproachable on the ground that common people approve of it because of its utility for popular ends, for in that case the cultivation of land, trade, marriage and the like should also be regarded as (religiously) irreproachable (activities).

(Note) The concept of charity is not free from misconception which has resulted in various dubious activities both institutional and private. According to the standard of Jaina ethics which may seem rigorous, real charity consists in such beneficial acts as conduce to the spiritual freedom of the beneficiary. Charity is a mental disposition which has to be controlled by logos. It must not be allowed to develop into a pathological attitude. Charity which serves to promote the power and advancement of a wicked man is apt to result in the promotion of injury and suffering of righteous men. It also tends to increase the unrestrained impulse of a morally degraded person for inflicting harm and the promotion of unfit persons to position of power. In one word, uncontrolled charity helps to promote evil disposition and thus spells spiritual degradation. It has also the tendency to put a premium on idleness, fraud and irresponsibility. Undiscriminating charity makes the unworthy beneficiary a parasite and a liability on society. The best and the purest charity consists in

making the beneficiary independent of it not merely economically but intellectually and spiritually. A person who has adopted the career of a saintly monk must dedicate all his time and energy to spiritual development. If such a person is hampered by the want of barest necessities for preservation of life, his spiritual development will necessarily suffer a set-back. The aspirant to spiritual life must not take anything surplus or make a saving for the next day. Suffering of a fellow creature or even a lower animal may excite the pity of a charitably disposed person. This may have a social value, that is, it may conduce to the promotion of social solidarity. But judged by the moral standard, it may not have any spiritual value. Misplaced charity also produces positive disvalue. The best and the worthiest act of charity is one which leads to a pure life of abstinence from injury to others and also from self-aggrandizement.

It may not be out of place to observe that India in ancient times was extremely fastidious in respect of charity. Beggars and robbers were put on the same level. In the time of the *Mahābhārata*, only students who were leading celibate life and monks who had renounced all worldly ties were declared as fit recipients of alms (*Śāntiparva*, chap. 78, verse 22). Of course it is the duty of the state to help people who are victims of natural calamities such as earthquake, flood, cyclones and the like. But these acts of relief have more of social value and utility than spiritual worth. At any event, spiritual charity and secular charity must not be measured by the same yardstick.

१८. सहयोगदानमुपकारः ।

18. *sahayogadānam upakāraḥ.*

(Aph.) Beneficence consists in offering cooperation. (XVIII)

१९. लौकिको लोकोत्तरश्च ।

19. *laukiko lokottaraś ca.*

(Aph.) It can be mundane as well as supra-mundane. (XIX)

२०. आत्मविकासकृत्लोकोत्तरः ।

लोकोत्तरः—पारमार्थिक उपकारः, धर्मोपदेशादिरूपो निरवद्यदानादिरूपो वा ।

20. *ātmavikāśakṛtlokottaraḥ.*

lokottaraḥ—pāramārthika upakāraḥ, dharmopadeśādirūpo niravadya-dānādirūpo vā.

(Aph.) The supra-mundane (beneficence) is for the uplift of the soul. (XX)

(Gloss) The supra-mundane, that is, the spiritual beneficence is of the nature of religious instruction and the like, or irreproachable charity and the like.

२१. तदितरस्तु लौकिकः ।

लौकिकः—अपारमार्थिक उपकार इत्यर्थः ।

21. taditaras tu laukikaḥ.

laukikaḥ—apāramāṛthika upakāra ity arthaḥ.

(Aph.) What is other than this is mundane. (XXI)

(Gloss) The mundane means the unspiritual beneficence (that does not serve the cause of self-restraint).

(Note) Here ends the discussion of the concept of charity. Now the concepts of happiness and suffering mentioned in connection with the definition of *rāga* and *dveṣa* are defined.

२२. इष्टसंयोगाऽनिष्टनिवृत्तेराह्लादः सुखम् ।

इष्टम् धनमित्रादि ज्ञानदर्शनादि वा, अनिष्टम्—शत्रुदौस्थ्यदि कर्माणि वा ।

22. iṣṭasamyogā'niṣṭānivṛtter āhlādaḥ sukham.

iṣṭam—dhana-mitrādi jñāna-darśanādi vā, aniṣṭam—śatru-daus-thyādi karmāṇi vā.

(Aph.) Happiness consists in delight on account of the union with the desired and separation from the undesired. (XXII)

(Gloss) 'The desired' means wealth, friends and the like or knowledge, intuition and the like. 'The undesired' means enemy, poverty and the like, or the (acquisition of eight types of) *karmans* (such as knowledge-obscuring and the rest).

२३. तद्विपर्ययो दुःखम् ।

तस्याह्लादस्य विपर्ययो ग्लानिर्दुःखमभिधीयते ।

23. tad-viparyayo duḥkham.

tasyāhlādasya viparyayo glānir duḥkham abhidhīyate.

(Aph.) The opposite of that is suffering. (XXIII)

(Gloss) The opposite of happiness, that is, gloom, is called suffering.

२४. तच्चात्मविकासावरोधि हेयम् ।

यत्-सुखदुःखमात्मविकासावरोधं कुरुते तद् हेयम् ।

24. *tac cātma-vikāsāvarodhi heyam.*

yat sukha-duḥkham ātma-vikāsāvarodham kurute tad heyam.

(Aph.) That (happiness or suffering) which arrests the upliftment of the soul is worthy of abandonment. (XXIV)

(Gloss) The happiness or suffering which arrests the upliftment of the soul should be abandoned.

इति अहिंसादयादानोपकारादिस्वरूपनिर्णयः ।

iti ahimsā-dayā-dānopakārādi-svarūpa-nirṇayaḥ.

Here ends the ninth lustre called "The Ascertainment of the Nature of Compassion, Charity, Beneficence and the Like".

दशमः प्रकाशः
LUSTRE X

१. तत्त्वानि प्रमाण-नय-निक्षेपादिभिरनुयोज्यानि ।

1. *tattvāni pramāṇa-naya-nikṣepādibhir anuyoḥjyāni.*

(Aph.) The reals are to be understood through valid cognition, ways of approach, transferred epithet, etc. (I)

२. यथार्थज्ञानं प्रमाणम् ।

प्रकर्षेण—विपर्ययाद्यभावेन मीयतेऽर्थो येन तत् प्रमाणम् ।

2. *yathārthajñānaṁ pramāṇam.*

prakarṣeṇa—viparyayaḍyabhāvena mīyate'rtho yena tat pramāṇam.

(Aph.) Valid cognition is a cognition which takes stock of reality as it is in itself. (II)

(Gloss) (The expression) '*pramāṇa*' (etymologically) means that by which the entity is cognised fully, that is, as free from perversion and the like.

३. प्रत्यक्षं परोक्षं च ।

3. *pratyakṣaṁ parokṣaṁ ca.*

(Aph.) (It is of two kinds, viz.) immediate (intuitional) and mediate (non-intuitional, other than the intuitional). (III)

४. स्पष्टं प्रत्यक्षम् ।

4. *spaṣṭaṁ pratyakṣam.*

(Aph.) (The cognition) which is vivid is immediate (intuitional). (IV)

(Note) Vivid cognition means one which apprehends an object with its distinctive individuality constituted by the specific attributes which exclusively belong to it.

५. पारमार्थिकं सांख्यवहारिकञ्च ।

5. *pāramārthikaṁ sāṁkhyavahārikaṁ ca.*

(Aph.) (Immediate intuition is of two kinds, viz.) transcendental (met-empirical) and empirical. (V)

६. आत्ममात्रापेक्षत्वेन केवलज्ञानं पारमार्थिकम् ।

6. *atmamātrāpekṣatvena kevalajñānaṁ pāramārthikam.*

(Aph.) The intuition of the omniscient, because it depends upon the self alone (being self-sufficient and not requiring the good offices of an extra condition), is transcendental. (VI)

७. विकलञ्चावधिमनःपर्यायावपि ।

7. *vikalañ cāvadhi-manahparyāyāv api.*

(Aph.) *Avadhi* (clairvoyance) and *manahparyāya* (mind reading) are two (inferior) varieties (of transcendental intuition), being deficient (*vikala*). (VII)

(Note) These two kinds of intuition also participate in the characteristic of transcendental intuition being independent of external aid and conditioned by the self itself. But both of these are imperfect in that they cannot take stock of all the attributes belonging to an entity. The perfect transcendental intuition is one which is unfettered by an external and internal deficiency and as such is conversant with the entire gamut of reality along with all its specific attributes to the fullest extent. Empirical intuition is limited by an external organ and is capable of taking note of only those characteristics which are competent to the organ.

८. इन्द्रियमनोऽपेक्षमवग्रहादिरूपं सांख्यवहारिकम्^१ ।

8. *indriyamano'pekṣam avagrahādirūpaṁ sāṁkhyavahārikam¹.*

(Aph.) The empirical intuition is dependent upon the sense-organs and the mind, and is manifested in different varieties such as determinate perception and the like. (VIII)

(Note) Empirical intuition means the perceptual cognition of practical life which is common to all sentient beings. The perceptual cognition as classified under determinate perception etc. is designated as immediate intuition, though it is dependent upon the services of an external condition such as the sense-organ. Being dependent upon an external condition, it cannot be properly assessed as immediate cognition. But compared with other varieties of empirical cognition such as inference and verbal knowledge, it has relative independence. And also because of its relative vividness, it approximates to transcendental intuition, and therefore is called immediate intuition.

९. अस्पष्टं परोक्षम् ।

9. *aspaṣṭaṁ parokṣam.*

(Aph.) (Cognition) which lacks in vividness is mediate. (IX)

१०. मतिश्रुते ।

१ व्यवहारप्रत्यक्षम् ।

1 *vyavahārapratyakṣam.*

10. matiśrute.

(Aph.) Sensuous cognition and verbal testimony (are mediate). (X)

(Note) *Matijñāna* (sensuous cognition), in so far as it is directly conditioned by senses, is regarded as immediate intuition from the conventional point of view. And we have already, in note on Aph. VII, pointed out this feature of sensuous cognition. In the present aphorism, however, it is placed under the category of mediate cognition, along with verbal testimony. This is justifiable only from the point of view of transcendental intuition. In later works on epistemology, the sensuous cognition is placed in a class apart, and is called empirical intuition in contradistinction to transcendental intuition.

११. स्मृति-प्रत्यभिज्ञा-तर्का-नुमाना-गमाश्च ।

11. *smṛti-pratyabhijñā-tarkā-numānā-gamāś ca.*

(Aph.) Recollection, recognition, inductive reasoning, inference and verbal testimony also (are varieties of mediate cognition). (XI)

१२. संस्कारोद्बोधजात तदित्याकारा स्मृतिः ।

यथा स जलाशयः ।

12. *saṃskārodbodhajātā tadityākārā smṛtiḥ.*

yathā sa jalāśayaḥ.

(Aph.) Recollection is the kind of cognition which is conditioned by the stimulation of the memory trace (and delivers itself) in the form 'that thing'. (XII)

(Gloss) For example, *that lake* (that is, the one which was perceived in the past).

(Note) Here 'that' means a datum of past perceptual cognition. Recollection has necessarily a reference to a past sense-datum, and usually also to the spatio-temporal context in which the datum was perceived in the past. There are, however, cases of recollection which do not refer to the spatio-temporal context of the thing remembered. Such is the case with the recollection of the meaning of words in which the original context in which the object (meaning) was perceived and understood is not recollected. It is called truncated recollection with the element of thatness (that is, the spatio-temporal context) left out of view (*pramuṣṭatattvāka-smṛti*).

१३. स एवायमित्यादिसंकलनात्मकं ज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञा ।

13. *sa evāyam ityādisaṃkalanātmakam jñānam pratyabhijñā.*

(Aph.) Recognition is a synthetic cognition of the form 'this is indeed that'. (XIII)

(Note) A recognition is the cognition of the identity of the presented datum with the past. The past is represented by a latent memory-act, and is felt as identical with the presented datum. In 'this is that' this stands for the present datum, and 'that' for the past, and the copula 'is' stresses the identity of the two; in other words, it brings to focus the continuity of the past in the present.

१४. व्याप्तिज्ञानं तर्कः ।

साध्यसाधनयोनित्यसम्बन्धः व्याप्तिः । यथा—यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्र वह्निः ।

14. vyāptijñānam tarkaḥ.

sādhyaśādhana-yor nityasambandhaḥ vyāptiḥ. yathā—yatra yatra dhūmas tatra tatra vahnīḥ.

(Aph.) Inductive reasoning is (the condition of) the knowledge of universal and necessary concomitance. (XIV)

(Gloss) Concomitance is the necessary and universal relation of the probans (middle term) with the probandum (major term). For example, wherever there is smoke, there is fire.

१५. साधनात् साध्यज्ञानमनुमानम् ।

साध्ययितुं योग्यं—साध्यम् । निश्चितसाध्याऽविनाभावि—साधनम् । यथा—पर्वतोऽयं वह्निमान् धूमात् ।

15. sādhanāt sādhyajñānam anumānam.

sādhayitum योग्यं—sādhyaṁ. niścitasādhyā'vinābhāvi—sādhanaṁ. yathā—parvato'yaṁ vahnimān dhūmāt.

(Aph.) The knowledge of the probandum (emerging) from (that of) the probans is inference. (XV)

(Gloss) The probandum is the fact which is capable of being (and sought to be) proved. The probans is the fact which is definitively known to stand in necessary concomitance with the probandum. For example, the hill is possessed of fire, being possessed of smoke.

(Note) Smoke is necessarily bound up with fire as the latter is the cause of the former. The effect cannot come into existence without the cause. Being a case of causality, the relation between smoke and fire is irreversible. It must, however, be noted in this connection that a quantity of smoke may be stored in a vessel, but it will not be correct to infer the presence of fire in the vessel. So it must be understood that the smoke which is uninterruptedly and without intermission issuing forth from a place is the ground of inference of fire,

Fire is the efficient cause of smoke and there is no necessity that the effect should be associated with the efficient cause throughout its carrier. But the effect is necessarily bound up with the efficient cause in the stage of inception. The smoke which is actually originating should, therefore, be the logical ground for inference.

१६. आप्तवचनादर्थज्ञानमागमः ।

यथावस्थितवस्तुविद् तथोपदेशकश्च आप्तः ।

16. *āptavacanād arthajñānam āgamah.*

yathāvasthitavastuvid tathopadeśakaś ca āptaḥ.

(Aph.) Verbal testimony is the knowledge of the meaning of a statement made by a person of unimpeachable authority. (XVI)

(Gloss) A person of unimpeachable authority is one who has knowledge of an object as it is and who states it in strict conformity with his knowledge.

१७. प्रश्नवशादेकस्मिन् वस्तुन्यविरोधेन स्याल्लाङ्घिता विधिनियेषधल्पना सप्तभङ्गी ।

यथा स्यादस्त्येव घटः । स्यान्नास्त्येव घटः । स्यादस्त्येव, स्यान्नास्त्येव घटः । स्यादवक्तव्यमेव घटः । स्यादस्त्येव, स्यादवक्तव्यमेव घटः । स्यान्नास्त्येव, स्यादवक्तव्यमेव घटः । स्यादस्त्येव, स्यान्नास्त्येव, स्यादवक्तव्यमेव घटः ।

17. *praśnavasād ekasmīn vastuny avirodhena syāllāñchitā vidhiniṣedha-kalpanā saptabhaṅgī.*

yathā syād asty eva ghaṭaḥ. syān nāsty eva ghaṭaḥ. syād asty eva, syān nāsty eva ghaṭaḥ. syād avaktavyam eva ghaṭaḥ. syād asty eva, syād avaktavyam eva ghaṭaḥ. syān nāsty eva, syād avaktavyam eva ghaṭaḥ. syād asty eva, syān nāsty eva, syād avaktavyam eva ghaṭaḥ.

(Aph.) The affirmation of a positive and a negative predicate in respect of an identical subject, in pursuance of an enquiry, without incurring logical contradiction, and prefixed by the proviso *syād* (that is, in different contexts) constitutes sevenfold predication. (XVII)

(Gloss) For example, (i) 'In a particular context, the jar exists as a matter of factual necessity'. Similarly, (ii) 'In another context, the jar does not exist as a matter of factual necessity'. (iii) 'In another context, the jar both does exist and does not exist as a matter of factual necessity'. (iv) 'In another context, the jar is inexpressible as a matter of factual necessity'.

ssity'. (v) 'In another context, the jar both does exist and is inexpressible as a matter of factual necessity'. (vi) 'In another context, the jar both does not exist and is inexpressible as a matter of factual necessity'. (vii) 'In another context, the jar both does exist, does not exist, and is inexpressible as a matter of factual necessity'.

(Note) For an elaborate exposition of the different propositions in the sevenfold predication, the reader is referred to *The Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism* by Dr. S. Mookerjee.

१८. अनिराकृतेतरांशो वस्त्वंशग्राही प्रतिपत्तुरभिप्रायो नयः ।

अनन्तधर्मात्मकस्य वस्तुनो विवक्षितमंशं गृह्णन्, इतरांशान् अनिरा-
कुर्वंश्च ज्ञातुरभिप्रायः—नयः ।

18. anirākṛtetarāṁśo vastvaṁśagrāhī pratipattur abhiprāyo nayaḥ.

anantadharmātmakasya vastuno vivakṣitam aṁśam gṛhṇan, itarāṁśān anirākurvaṁś ca jñātur abhiprāyaḥ—nayaḥ.

(Aph.) The intention of a knowing subject to take cognizance of a particular aspect of reality without repudiation of the other aspects is called *naya* (that is, a way of approach and observation). (XVIII)

(Gloss) A '*naya*' means the intended purpose of the knower, which comprehends the intended part of the entity possessed of infinite number of attributes without discarding the other parts (of the entity).

(Note) It cannot be considered as a valid cognition since it takes cognition of a part of the real, nor can it be regarded as invalid cognition being conversant with an actually real part of an objective fact. It is called a fragment of a valid cognition.

१९. नेगम-संग्रह-व्यवहार-ऋजुसूत्र-शब्द-समभिरुद्धै-वंभूताः ।

19. naigama-saṁgraha-vyavahāra - ṛjusūtra-śabda - samabhirūḍhai - vaṁbhūtāḥ.

(Aph.) (The ways of approach and observation are sevenfold, viz.) (i) pantoscopic (figurative and conventional), (ii) synthetic, (iii) analytic (and particularistic), (iv) straight (and direct), (v) verbalistic, (vi) etymological, and (vii) actualistic. (XIX)

२०. संकल्पग्राही नेगमः ।

निगमः देशः संकल्प उपचारो वा, तत्र भवो नेगमः ।

20. saṁkalpagrāhī naigamaḥ.

nigamaḥ deśaḥ saṁkalpa upacāro vā, tatra bhavo naigamaḥ.

(Aph.) The *naigama (naya)* is cognizant of the intention (of the speaker). (XX)

(Gloss) *Nigama* is a word having several meanings : (i) country, (ii) intention, and (iii) a figurative usage. That which has reference to these meanings is called *naigama*.

(Note) (i) The first meaning has reference to the use of a word in the sense which is endorsed by the convention of the country. Thus the word *ghaṭa* (jar) is used in the sense of jar in a particular locality. This conventional meaning of the word has validity in that area. This is nothing but the usual acceptance of a word understood by the people speaking a common dialect. In this way, words having specialized meanings in the market also may be regarded as a case of *naya*, that is, an angle of vision.

(ii) When an intended act is given out as the actual fact, it becomes a case of this *naya*. When a man, with an axe and a basket, proceeding to a forest, is asked about his activity, he may reply that he is fetching faggots for cooking. Here the act intended is given out as an actualized fact. Again, a person who is lighting a stove may say in reply to a question about his activity that he is cooking his meal. Here the persons are only making necessary preparation with a view to a particular end, and the intended end is given out as the actual operation they are engaged in. In all these cases the intention and the execution of it are identified by the speaker and also understood as such by the interlocutor. It is not a case of false representation or an erroneous statement, because there is no intention to deceive the interlocutor, and the person actually implements his intention.

(iii) All these usages are figurative and not to be understood in their literal meaning.

The *naigama-naya* as understood in the senses given above has very little logical significance and it does not give a glimpse of a real aspect of a fact. As defined by Umāsvāti (*Tattvārthabhāṣya*, I. 35), it is the use of a word for a general concept or a class and also the specific varieties (*deśasamagragrāhin*). In other words, the *naigama* is a way of observation which takes stock of both the general and the particular aspects of a real. It is thus neither specifically generic nor particularistic in its approach, but takes stock of both in succession. In philosophy, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysical approach is characterized by this angle of vision. And this has been set forth in the *Viśeṣāśyaśyabhāṣya*. The distinctive character of this way of observation consists in its comprehensive cognizance of all the traits of a real, but it is not considered to be possessed of complete validity, since it keeps these diverse traits, generic and specific, in mutual isolation. It is thus found to give only glimpses of unintegrated aspects. We therefore propose to designate it as pantoscopic view of things.

२१. सामान्यग्राही संग्रहः ।

तत्र सत्तामात्रग्राही परः । यथा—विश्वमेकं सतोऽविशेषात् । द्रव्यत्वाद्य-
वान्तरसामान्यग्राही अपरः । यथा—धर्मादीनां षड्द्रव्याणामेकं द्रव्य-
त्वाविशेषात् ।

21. *sāmānyagrāhī saṁgrahaḥ.*

tatra sattāmātragrāhī paraḥ. yathā—viśvam ekaṁ sato'viśeṣāt. dravyatvādyavāntara-sāmānyagrāhī aparāḥ. yathā dharmādīnām śaḍḍ-ravyānām aikyaṁ dravyatvāviśeṣāt.

(Aph.) The unitive apprehension of the common character (in disregard of its specific features) is called the synthetic approach (XXI)

(Gloss) (It has two grades, viz. (i) higher and (ii) lower). The higher takes cognizance of the *summum genus*, existence as such; for example, the proposition, "The universe is one, being inseparable from existence". The lower one takes cognizance of the less comprehensive genera. Thus it puts all classes of substances—*dharma*, *adharma*, space, time, matter and soul—under one class, viz. substance on the basis of the common character 'substancehood'. (It thus takes note of the unity of all the different substances in respect of their common character of substancehood).

(Note) The monistic Vedānta emphasizes the unitive character of all that exists by regarding existence as the one character of entities. If the assertion of the unity and the identity of all things in disregard of their variations and differences is a case of this way of approach *in excelsis*, the recognition of other subclasses in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics is also inspired by this way of approach. The distinctive mark of this approach is its concentration on the aspect of unity in disregard of diversity.

२२. संगृहीतार्थानां यथाविधि विभेदको व्यवहारः ।

यथा—यत्सत्, तत् द्रव्यं पर्यायो वा ।

22. *saṁgrhītārthānām yathāvidhi vibhedako vyavahārah.*

yathā—yat sat, tat dravyaṁ paryāyo vā.

(Aph.) The systematic differentiation of the synthetic class-concepts is (effected by) the analytic approach. (XXII)

(Gloss) For example, what is existent is either an (enduring) substance or a (transitional) mode.

२३. वर्तमानपर्यायग्राही ऋजुसूत्रः ।

यथा—सुखमयोऽयं समयः ।

23. *vartamānaparyāyagrāhī ṛjusūtraḥ.*

yathā—sukhamayo'yaṁ samayaḥ.

(Aph) The way of observation which takes cognizance of the actually present mode is called the straight and direct approach. (XXIII)

(Gloss) For example, the present is a pleasant time.

(Note) This way of approach characterizes the Buddhist philosophical orientation, particularly the doctrine of flux. The analytic approach envisaged in the third *naya* is carried on to its extreme limit in Buddhist philosophy. The immediate present is asserted to be the only reality, and the past and future are declared to be fictitious. It is literally called the method of the straight line (*rjusūtra*). It concentrates on the immediate present and is practically blind to the antecedent and subsequent aspects. It is purely particularistic in approach and the concepts of genus and species are dismissed as hypostatized abstractions.

२४. कालादिभेदेनार्थभेदकृच्छन्दः ।

यथा—बभूव, भवति, भविष्यति सुमेरुरिति भिन्नकालाः शब्दा भिन्नार्थस्य बोधकाः ।

24. *kālādibhedena ārthabhedakṛc chabdaḥ.*

yathā—babhūva, bhavati, bhaviṣyati sumerur iti bhinnakālāḥ śabdā bhinnārthasya bodhakāḥ.

(Aph.) The verbalistic approach takes cognizance of the entitative difference of things on the basis of distinction of tense (gender, number) and so on. (XXIV)

(Gloss) For example, the sentences 'There was the Sumeru (the Golden Mountain)', 'There is the Sumeru' and 'There will be the Sumeru' express three different facts, as they have reference to different times.

(Note) "The advocate of this *naya* goes one step further in the process of particularization. He agrees with the advocate of the previous approach in the assertion that the present alone is real. But as the real is expressed and characterized by word, and words are significant and not unmeaning symbols, the real must be understood in the light of the connotation of the term that stands for it. Each term designates an action, being derived from a verbal root, and it is this action which stamps the fact meant with its distinctive character. And so the word *ghaṭa* (jar), which is derived from the root *ghaṭa* 'to exert', stands for the thing which is capable of action, viz. drawing water, etc. This is the case with all words. The king is one who is possessed of sovereign power. If a man is called by the name 'King', it has not the word meaning of 'king'. Similarly the portrait or the statue of the man is loosely identified with the man. The heir apparent to the throne is addressed by the sycophants 'Your Majesty'. These are all unmeaning expressions because they do not possess the function which the word connotes. Of course this constitutes the difference of this *naya* from the previous one.

"This view also maintains that the connotation of the terms is bound to differ if they differ in gender and number. The terms with different number and gender cannot be identical. They are as different as their antonyms. The verbal expression is not an external label but has a definite connotation which is bound to differ when the number or gender differs. Man and woman are different because they differ in gender. It is expressive of an entitative difference. Of course the advocate of this *naya* makes concession in favour of synonyms. The synonyms have different connotation no doubt, but as the denotation is identical the reality is not made different by them. The other terms only signify the different attributes and functions which however belong to the same substratum. This is called *śabda-naya*, the verbalistic approach."—*Nayas—Ways of Approach and Observation* (by Dr. N. Tatia), p. 79.

२५. पर्यायरथभेदकृत् समभिरुढः ।

यथा, इन्दनात्—इन्द्रः; शकनात्—शक्रः ।

25. *paryāyair arthabhedakṛt samabhirūḍhaḥ.*

yathā—indanāt—indrah, śakanāt—śakraḥ.

(Aph.) The etymological approach takes cognizance of the difference of words, even synonym. (XXV)

(Gloss) For instance, the word *indra* means a person who is the supreme ruler (*idi paramaiśvarye*) or shines in full splendour; the word *śakra* stands for one who possesses power.

(Note) "This *naya* goes one step further in the process of specification by identifying the etymological meaning (*vyutpattinimitta*) with the real meaning (*pravṛttinimitta*). Each word has got a distinctive connotation of its own. So there can be no synonyms in the true sense of the term."—*Nayas—Ways of Approach and Observation* (by Dr. N. Tatia), p. 79.

२६. क्रियापरिणतमर्थं तच्छब्दवाच्यं स्वीकुर्वन्नेवम्भूतः ।

यथा—इन्दनक्रियापरिणत इन्द्रः ।

एष्वान्नास्त्रयो द्रव्यार्थिकाः शेषाश्च पर्यायार्थिकाः ।

26. *kriyāpariṇatam arthaṁ tacchabdavācyaṁ svīkurvann evambhūtaḥ.*

yathā—indanakriyāpariṇata indrah.

eṣv ādyās trayo dravyārthikāḥ śeṣāś ca paryāyārthikāḥ.

(Aph) The actualistic approach takes cognizance of a real, actually exercising the activity connoted by the word, as the true meaning of it. (XXVI)

(Gloss) For example, the word '*indra*' stands for the individual who is actually performing the function of overlordship or who shines in full glory of sovereignty.

Of them (viz the seven *nayas*), the first three focus attention on the unitive aspect of things *quā* substance. The last four have reference to the variation of modes.

(Note) This *naya* “affirms that only the actualized meaning of the word is the real meaning. The word signifies an action and the fact which actually exercises the action should be regarded as the real meaning. So the *ghaṭa* should mean the jar which actually draws water and not the jar which remains idle in a corner of the room. The latter does not possess the connotation and so cannot be designated by the word. Thus the king is the person who actually exercises sovereignty, the minister is one who actually exercises the function of a counsellor and framer of state policy. So when the king is engaged in domestic affairs or talking to his wife, he is not the king proper. The exponent of the preceding approach hits upon the truth that difference of words entails difference of meaning, but he fails to grasp the real significance of connotation when he affixes the word to the fact which is bereft of the action connoted by it. The idle jar is as different and distinct from the water-carrying jar as the pen. If, however, the word could signify a fact devoid of the connotation there is no logic why it would not be labelled upon a different fact having a different connotation. Light, for instance, means an entity which actually illuminates. If it could be affixed to a lamp which has gone out it could with equal logical propriety be affixed to an opaque stone.”—*Nayas—Ways of Approach and Observation* (by Dr. N. Tatia), p. 80.

२७. निश्चयो व्यवहारश्चापि ।

तात्त्विकार्थाभिधायी निश्चयः । यथा—भ्रमरः पञ्चवर्णः । लोक-
प्रतीतार्थान्नायो व्यवहारः । यथा—भ्रमरः कृष्णवर्णः ।

27. *niścayo vyavahāraś cāpi.*

tāttvikārthābhidhāyī niścayaḥ. yathā—bhramaraḥ pañcavarṇaḥ.
lokapratītārthāmnāyī vyavahāraḥ. yathā—bhramaraḥ kṛṣṇavarṇaḥ.

(Aph.) (The *naya* is also divided into two varieties, viz.) scientific (appraisal) and popular (estimate). (XXVII)

(Gloss) The scientific appraisal gives expression to the real nature of the thing; for instance, the black bee (*bhramara*) is said to possess five colours. The popular estimate takes cognizance of the character of a real as it is understood by common people; for instance, *bhramara* is popularly called a black bee.

तत्त्वार्थं निश्चयो वक्ति व्यवहारस्तथोदितम् ।

tattvārthaṁ niścayo vakti vyavahāras tathoditam.

The scientific appraisal gives out the real nature of a thing as it is, whereas a popular estimate is guided by common sense.

२८. द्रव्यपर्यायात्मकं वस्तु प्रमेयम् ।

प्रमाणविषय इति यावत् ।

28. *dravyaparyāyātmakam vastu prameyam.*

parmāṇaviṣaya iti yāvat.

(Aph.) The (cognizable) object is a real (analysable into) substance and modes. (XXVIII)

(Gloss) That is to say, (a real is) a (possible) object of valid cognition.

(Note) The Buddhist who follows the standpoint of *jūsūtra*, straightline approach, only believes in modes and not substance. So also among European philosophers, there are many who hold that a real is only an aggregate of qualities without any supporting medium, that is, substance. They contend that no residuum apart from the attributes is open to inspection. Substance as a substratum of qualities is thus figment of imagination which is hypostatized by the realistic bias of the human mind. This is the contention of Hume, Berkely and empiricists in general. The Jaina philosopher does not believe in homeless qualities floating about in the air without a local habitation. "Is substance felt or not? Is there the notion of substance?" That there is such an idea accompanying all knowledge of qualities and modes is not susceptible of denial. The notion cannot be dismissed as subjective idea because that will lead to subjectivism and further will end in nihilism. The Jaina accordingly asserts that a real must be posited as what it is felt to be. A realist cannot admit the objectivity of the qualities without the objectivity of substance. This will amount to making fish of one and fowl of another, which is an unreasonable proposition. The Jaina defines a real accordingly as one which originates, ceases and continues.

२९. सामान्यविशेष-सदस-न्नित्यानित्य-वाच्याऽवाच्याद्यनेकान्तात्मकम् ।

29. *sāmānyaviśeṣa-sadasan-nityānyitya-vācyāvācyādy-anekāntātmakam.*

(Aph.) (The cognizable object is) universal-cum-particular, existent-cum-nonexistent, eternal-cum-non-eternal, expressible-cum-nonexpressible and is thus indeterminate (in terms of formal contradiction).

(Note) *Anekānta* means not *ekānta*. *Anta* literally means end or extreme. Thus 'being' is one extreme and 'non-being' is the other extreme of predication. This also holds good of eternal and non-eternal, and so on, which are given in formal logic as contradictories. According to pure logic these opposites are exclusive of one another and they cannot be combined in any one substratum. The opposition is absolute and unconditional. This may be called the absolutistic logic. The Jaina is non-absolutistic, and so also all philosophers like the Sāṃkhya, the Vaiśbhāṣika, the Mīmāṃsist and the non-monistic schools of Vedānta are non-absolutists inasmuch as they do not believe in the absolute opposition of the logical extremes, e.g., being and non-being, eternal and non-eternal, and so on. According to the Jaina, opposition is understandable only in the light of experience. We know that light and darkness are opposed because we do not see them together. No *apriori* knowledge of such opposition is possible. Accordingly the non-absolutist contends that if being and non-being are found together, and this finding is not contradicted by subsequent experience, we must conclude that there is no opposition between them. In other words, one is not exclusive of the other. We see a jar existing in its place and not existing in

another. Existence and non-existence are thus both predicable of the jar. The concept of change or becoming involves that a thing continues and maintains its identity in spite of its diversity of qualities. The unbaked jar is black, but becomes red when baked and yet continues as the jar. The Jaina thus maintains, in strict conformity with the dictates of experience, that all reals are possessed of a nature which is not determinable in the light of formal logic. Everything is eternal as substance, but perishable *quā* modes. The Jaina does not consider the position of the Naiyāyika to be sound logically when he makes substance and modes different entities which however are somehow brought together by a relation called *samavāya* (inherence). But inherence as an independent relation is only a logical makeshift which will not work.

३०. तुल्या प्रतीतिः सामान्यम् ।

30. *tulyā pratītiḥ sāmānyam.*

(Aph.) The universal is (what gives rise to) the notion of similarity. (XXX)

३१. भिन्ना प्रतीतिविशेषः ।

31. *bhinnā pratītir viśeṣaḥ.*

(Aph.) The particular is (what gives rise to) the notion of dissimilarity. (XXXI)

३२. उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्यात्मकं सत् ।

32. *utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvyātmakam sat.*

(Aph.) A real is that which has origin, cessation and continuity (all the while). (XXXII)

३३. तदितरदसत् ।

33. *taditarad asat.*

(Aph.) Whatever is other than (and the opposite of) that (sc. the real) is unreal (fiction). (XXXIII)

३४. सतोऽप्रच्युतिर्नित्यम् ।

34. *sato'pracyutir nityam.*

(Aph.) The want of lapse from existence constitutes eternity (of the real). (XXXIV)

३५. परिणमनमनित्यम् ।

35. *pariṇamānam anityam.*

(Aph.) Change connotes non-eternity. (XXXV)

३६. वागोच्चरं वाच्यम् ।

36. *vāggocaram vācyam.*

(Aph.) What comes within the province of speech is expressible (or speakable). (XXXVI)

३७. वागविषयमवाच्यम् ।

37. *vāgaviṣayam avācyam.*

(Aph.) Whatever is beyond the province of speech is inexpressible (or unspeakable). (XXXVII)

३८. अपेक्षाभेदादेकत्र संगतिः ।

नहि येन रूपेण सामान्यं, तेनैव रूपेण विशेषः, किन्तु अपेक्षाभेदेनेति सर्वत्र गम्यम् ।

38. *apekṣābhedād ekatra saṁgatiḥ.*

nahi yena rūpeṇa sāmānyam tenaiva rūpeṇa viśeṣaḥ, kintu apekṣābhedaneti sarvatra gamyam,

(Aph.) The reconciliation (of the opposite traits by one act of synthesis in one unitary real) is made possible by the diversity of relations. (XXXVIII)

(Gloss) (The opposition does not become possible because) the real is not particular in the same character and reference, as it is a universal (which has a different character and reference). But they are so only by virtue of different references and nature.

३९. फलमज्ञाननिवृत्तिरर्थप्रकाशो वा ।

प्रमितिरित्यस्य पर्यायः ।

39. *phalam ajñānanivṛttir arthaprakāśo vā.*

parmitir ity asya paryāyaḥ.

(Aph.) The result (of valid cognition) is the cessation of ignorance or the illumination of the cognizable object. (XXXIX)

(Gloss) Authentic knowledge (*pramiti*) is a synonym of it (viz. result).

(Note) According to the Jaina, *pramāṇa*, that is, the condition of valid cognition, is not a non-cognitive fact, but cognition itself. Cognition is the condition and also the result. It is a question of emphasis. The cognition makes the object known

and hence is a referent of behaviour (*pravṛtti*). The object may be avoided or accepted according as it affects the interests of the knower. The knowing subject has consciousness as its intrinsic character and the act of cognition (*upayoga*) is only a transition (*pariṇāma*) of it. This cognitive act has necessary reference to an object and when it emerges, it makes the referent an object of pragmatic activity. The difference between the act of cognition and the fact of illumination is only one of point of view.

Ācārya Hemacandra took note of this apparent inconsistency and gave his solution from the non-absolutist point of view which also is in accordance with the standpoint of Dharmakīrti. The cognition which is of the nature of the activity (*upayoga*) of the subject is *pramāṇa* (organ of valid cognition). The knowledge as an act having reference to the object is the result (*phala*). But after all, there is only one cognitive act which is made the condition (*pramāṇa*) as well as the resultant (*pramīti* or *phala*). Apparently it is a case of causal relation and the cause and effect cannot be identical. Hemacandra answers the objection by pointing out that the relation of *pramāṇa* (the condition of cognition) and *pramīti* (the result of cognition) is not one of causality but one between determinant and determinatum. The relation of determination is not incompatible with the identity of the cognition and the result of cognition. Though numerically, it is the self-same cognition which is said to function as condition and result both, there is no contradiction in it, as the relation is not one of efficient causality, but logical and epistemological. The relation between the condition and the result partakes of the dual character, being itself determinant and determinatum, and this is in consonance with the non-absolutistic standpoint in logic. It is summed up in the following words. "A non-entity cannot be a cause, nor can the existent cause be itself the resultant. This charge would apply if it were a case of efficient causation, but a case of determination (which it is held to be) is not liable to such accusation."—*Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* I. 1.34. Also cf. *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, I. 21.

४०. हेयोपादेयोपेक्षाबुद्धयश्च ।

तत्र केवलज्ञानस्य फलमुपेक्षा, शेषाणाञ्च तिस्रोऽपि । इदञ्च प्रमाणाद् भिन्नाभिन्नं प्रमाणफलत्वादन्यथानुपपत्तेः ।

40. heyopādeyopekṣābuddhayaś ca.

tatra kevalajñānasya phalam upekṣā, śeṣāṇāṃ ca tiso'pi, idaṃ ca pramāṇād bhinnābhinnam pramāṇaphalatvā'nyathānupapatteḥ.

(Aph.) Alternatively, the knowledge of the object as worthy of avoidance or acceptance or of unconcern (is the result). (XL)

(Gloss) Of these (threefold results), that of the transcendental intuition of the omniscient partakes of the character of unconcern (since no volitional effort comes out of it). Of other subjects, it may assume any one of the threefold character. The relation of the condition and the result is one of identity-cum-difference, because otherwise the relation of condition and result will not be intelligible.

(Note) The alternative explanation holds good on the assumption of a volitional reaction consequent upon cognition. In that case, the relation is perfectly intelligible. Without reference to volitional reaction, the relation can be understood only in the light of the non-absolutist approach as explained in our note under the aphorism no. 39 (*supra*).

४१. प्रत्यक्षादिप्रसिद्ध आत्मा प्रमाता ।

41. *pratyakṣādiprasiddha ātmā pramātā.*

(Aph.) The subject is the self which is attested by intuition and other sources (of knowledge). (XLI)

४२. शब्देषु विशेषणबलेन प्रतिनियतार्थप्रतिपादनशक्तेर्निकषेपः ।

प्रत्येकस्मिन् शब्दे असंख्याऽर्थवाचकशक्तिः समस्ति । तत्र विशेषणबलेन संकर^१-व्यतिकर^२-रहितेन प्रतिनियतार्थवाचकशक्तेर्भ्यासो निधानं वा निकषेप उच्यते ।

अप्रस्तुतार्थाऽपाकरणं प्रस्तुतार्थव्याकरणं चास्य फलम्^३ ।

42. *śabdeṣu viśeṣaṇabalena pratiniyatārtha-pratipādanaśakter nikṣepa-
naṁ nikṣepaḥ.*

pratyekasmin śabde asaṁkhyā'rthavācakaśaktiḥ samasti. tatra viśeṣaṇabalena saṅkara¹-vyatikara²rahitena pratiniyatārthavācakaśa-
kter nyāso nidhānaṁ vā nikṣepa ucyate.

aprastutā'rthā'pākaraṇaṁ prastutā'rthavyākaraṇaṁ cāsy phalam.³

(Aph.) The depositing of the power of expressing the specific meaning in words through the strength of qualifying adjuncts is *nikṣepa* (transferred epithet). (XLII)

(Gloss) In each word there exists the power of expressing innumerable meanings. The storing or putting of the power of expressing the specific meaning to the exclusion of overlapping⁴ or intermingling⁵

१ सर्वेषां युगपत्प्राप्तिः सङ्करः ।

1 *sarveṣāṁ yugapat prāptiḥ saṅkaraḥ.*

२ परस्परविषयगमनं व्यतिकरः ।

2 *parasparaviśayagamaṇaṁ vyatikaraḥ.*

३ अव्युत्पन्नस्य कृते द्वयार्थमेव, पूर्णव्युत्पन्नांशव्युत्पन्नयोश्च संशयानयोः संशयापनोदनार्थं, तयोरेव विपर्ययतोः प्रस्तुतार्थाविधारणार्थं च निकषेपः क्रियते ।

3 *avyutpannasya kṛte dvayārtham eva, pūrṇavyutpannāṁśavyutpannayor ca saṁśayā-
nayor saṁśayāpanodanārthaṁ, tayor eva viparyasyatoḥ prastutārthāvadhāranārthaṁ
ca nikṣepaḥ kriyate.*

4 The overlapping means the simultaneous occurrence of all (meanings).

5 Intermingling means the confusion of meaning.

through the strength of qualifying adjuncts is called *nikṣepa* (transferred epithet). The result of this (*nikṣepa*) is the exclusion of unwanted meaning and the exposition of the intended sense.¹

४३. नाम-स्थापना-द्रव्य-भावाः ।

यावन्तो हि वस्तुविन्यासक्रमास्तावन्त एव निक्षेपा व्यासतः । समासतश्च-
त्वारस्तु अवश्यं कार्याः ।

तथा च—

जत्थ य जं जाणेज्जा, निक्खेवं निक्खिदे निरवसेसं ।

जत्थ वि य न जाणेज्जा, चउक्कगं निक्खिदे तत्थ ॥

43. *nāma-sthāpanā-dravya-bhāvāḥ*.

yāvanto hi vastuvinyāsakramās tāvanta eva nikṣepā vyāsataḥ.
samāsataś catvāras tu avaśyaṁ kāryāḥ.

tathā ca—

jattha ya jaṁ jāṇejjā, nikkhevaṁ nikkhive niravasesaṁ.

jattha vi ya na jāṇejjā, caukkagaṁ nikkhive tattha.

(Aph.) (It is of four kinds, viz.) (i) name labelled arbitrarily, (ii) name labelled on a representation, (iii) name labelled on a substance with potentiality and (iv) name labelled on an actual fact. (XLIII)

(Gloss) Elaborately speaking, there are as many *nikṣepas* as there are ways of speaking about a thing. Briefly speaking, however, the four ways are to be adopted necessarily, as has been said—One should fully apply to a subject, whatever *nikṣepas* are known about the subject; and to those (subjects) whose *nikṣepas* are not known, one should apply the four (viz., *nāma*, *ṭhavaṇā*, *ḍavva* and *bhāva*).

(Note) There is a progressive justification of the affixing of a name in the succeeding instances, whereas the first process is only effected by a fiat of arbitrary will, which may be as anomalous as naming a blind man by the epithet “X-rayed”. The Jaina epistemologist has taken account of these various processes of naming because of their occurrence in popular statements. It is, however, desirable that clear literal statements should be the concern of the epistemologist. Metaphors and far-fetched figurative expressions, though they may have poetic charm, should be studiously avoided in philosophical literature. Philosophy is not poetry. The poet is more interested in his imaginary creations which are apt to possess an emotional appeal.

¹ Both of these (viz. exclusion & exposition) are meant for the untrained; the exclusion of doubt is for the fully or partially trained who are in doubt; the determination of intended meaning is for those (viz. fully or partially trained) who are mistaken.

Whitman says, "It (grass) is the handkerchief of the Lord"; the hymnal says, "God is love", and Croce maintains that "art is vision or intuition". These are, apparently, statements, but there is a good reason why an epistemologist should say neither that such sentences ought to be believed nor that they ought not to be believed." (James Willard Oliver: "The Problem of Epistemology", *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. LVII, No. 9, p. 299).

४४. तदर्थनिरपेक्षं संज्ञाकर्म नाम ।

जातिद्रव्यगुणक्रियालक्षणनिमित्तमनपेक्ष्य संकेतमात्रेणैव संज्ञाकरणं नाम भण्यते, यथा—अनक्षरस्य उपाध्याय इति नाम ।

44. tadarthanirapekṣaṁ saṁjñākarma nāma.

jāti-dravya-guṇa-kriyālakṣaṇanimittam anapekṣya saṁketamātreṇai-va saṁjñākaraṇaṁ nāma bhāṇyate, yathā—anaṁkṣarasya upādhyāya iti nāma.

(Aph.) The act of labelling a name irrespective of its connotation is a case of a name labelled arbitrarily. (XLIV)

(Gloss) The assignment of a name merely as a symbol irrespective of the conditions (of nomenclature) such as the characteristics of class, substance, quality and action, is called a case of name for instance, the name 'dean' applied to an illiterate person.

४५. तदर्थशून्यस्य तदभिप्रायेण प्रतिष्ठापनं स्थापना ।

तदर्थविरहितस्य द्रव्यस्य 'सोऽयम्' इत्यध्यवसायेन व्यवस्थापनं स्थापना । यथा—उपाध्यायप्रतिकृतिः स्थापनोपाध्यायः । मुख्याकारसमाना सदभावस्थापना, तदाकारशून्या चासदभावस्थापना ।

45. tadarthaśūnyasya tadabhiprāyeṇa pratiṣṭhāpanaṁ sthāpanā.

tadarthavirahitasya dravyasya "so'yam" ity adhyavasāyena vyavasthāpanaṁ sthāpanā. yathā—upādhyāyapratikṛtiḥ sthāpanopādhyāyaḥ. mukhyākārasamānā sadbhāvasthāpanā, tadākāraśūnyā cāsadbhāvasthāpanā.

(Aph.) The labelling of a name on the representation though without the attributes connoted by the word with a view (to its identification with the real object) by an arbitrary will is an illustration (of the second kind) of transference. (XLV)

(Gloss) *Sthāpanā* means the determination of a substance which is devoid of the meaning (expressed by the predicate) through propositions like "He is this (person)." For instance, the image of a dean is a *sthāpanā* dean. (The *sthāpanā* is of two kinds, viz.) (i) *sthāpanā* of the

real, that imitates the form (of the object), (ii) *sthāpanā* of the unreal, which is devoid of the form of the object (represented).

(Note) One instals an image or a portrait purporting to be the representation of a divine being, say *Mahāvīra*, the last *Tīrthaṅkara*, as an object of reverence. The image or the portrait is called by the name *Mahāvīra*. It is only a case of transferred epithet. This process, however, is not a case of an entirely arbitrary nomenclature inasmuch as the representation attempts to typify the characteristic attributes of the original object.

४६. भूतभाविभावस्य कारणमनुपयोगो वा द्रव्यम् ।

यथा—अनुभूतोपाध्यायपर्यायोऽनुभविष्यमाणोपाध्यायपर्यायो वा द्रव्यो-
पाध्यायः । अनुपयोगावस्था क्रिया द्रव्यक्रिया ।

क्वचिदप्राधान्येऽपि, यथा—अङ्गारमर्दको द्रव्याचार्यः, आचार्यगुणरहित-
त्वात् ।

अयं च आगमे^१ द्विधा उक्तः—आगमतः^२ नोआगमतश्च^३ । आगमतः—
जीवादपदार्थज्ञोऽपि तत्राऽनुपयुक्तः । नोआगमतस्त्रिधा—ज्ञातृशरीरः,
भाविशरीरः, तदव्यतिरिक्तश्च^४ ।

46. *bhūtabhāvibhāvasya kāraṇam anupayogo vā dravyam.*

yathā—anubhūtopādhyāyaparyāyo 'nubhaviṣyamāṇopādhyāya-
paryāyo vā dravyopādhyāyaḥ.

anupayogā'vasthā kriyā dravyakriyā. kvacid aprādhānye'pi, yathā—
aṅgāramardako dravyācāryaḥ ācāryaguṇarahitātvaṭ.

ayaṁ ca āgame¹ dvidhā uktaḥ—āgamataḥ² noāgamataś ca.³
āgamataḥ-jīvādipadārthañño'pi tatrā'nupayuktaḥ. noāgamatas
tridhā—jñātṛśarīraḥ, bhāviśarīraḥ, tadvyatiriktaś ca.⁴

१ अनुयोगद्वारनाम्नि सूत्रे ।

1 *anuyogadvāranāmnī sūtre.*

२ आगमो ज्ञानम्, तदाश्रित्य—आगमतः ।

2 *āgamo jñānam, tadāśritya—āgamataḥ.*

३ आगमाभावमाश्रित्य नोशब्द आगमस्य सर्वथाऽभावे देशभावे च । तत्र ज्ञातृभावि-
शरीरे सर्वथाऽभावः । अनुपयुक्तश्च यां क्रियां कुरुते, तस्यामागमस्याऽभावात्
देशभावः । क्रियालक्षणे देश एव निषेधः ।

3 *āgamābhāvam āśritya nośabda āgamasya sarvathā'bhāve deśābhāve ca. tatra jñātṛ-
bhāviśarīre sarvathā'bhāvaḥ. anupayuktaś ca yaṁ kriyāṁ kurute, tasyāṁ āgamasya'
bhāvāt deśābhāvaḥ. kriyālakṣaṇe deśa eva niṣedhaḥ.*

४ यत्र ज्ञातृशरीरभाविशरीरयोः पूर्वोक्तं लक्षणं न घटते, तत् ताभ्यां व्यतिरिक्तम् ।

4 *yatra jñātṛśarīrabhāviśarīrayoḥ pūrvoktaṁ lakṣaṇaṁ na ghaṭate, tat tābhyāṁ
vyatiriktaṁ.*

(Aph.) The *dravya* stands for the cause (substratum) of a past or future mode, or absence of attention. (XLVI)

(Gloss) For instance, a *dravya* dean is he who enjoyed the status of a dean in the past or shall enjoy such status in future.

Dravya activity is that which is a state of absence of attentive exertion. Sometimes (this *nikṣepa* is used to denote) also a secondary status. For instance (the monk) Aṅgārmardaka is a *dravya* preceptor on account of lacking in the qualities of a preceptor. This *nikṣepa* has been explained as of two kinds in the scripture¹ : (i) (with reference to a person) with scripture,² and (ii) without scripture.³ (The example of) with scripture : a person who although conversant with the meaning of the entities like the soul etc. is not mindful about them. The category 'without scripture' is threefold—(i) body of the knower, (ii) would-be knower, and (iii) other than the two.⁴

४७. विवक्षितक्रियापरिणतो भावः ।

अयमपि आगम-नोआगमभेदाद् द्विधा—तत्र उपाध्यायार्थज्ञस्तदनुभव-परिणतश्च आगमतो भावोपाध्यायः । उपाध्यायार्थज्ञः अध्यापनक्रिया-प्रवृत्तश्च नोआगमतो भावोपाध्यायः ।

एषु नामादित्रयं द्रव्यार्थिकनयस्य विषयः, भावश्च पर्यायार्थिकस्य ।

47. *vivakṣitakriyāpariṇato bhāvaḥ.*

ayam api āgama-noāgamabhedād dvidhā—tatra upādhyāyārthajñas tadanubhavapariṇataś ca āgamato bhāvopādhyāyaḥ. [upādhyāyārthajñas adhyāpanakriyāpravṛttaś ca noāgamato bhāvopādhyāyaḥ. eṣu nāmāditrayaṁ dravyārthikanayasya viśayaḥ, bhāvaś ca paryāyārthikasya.

(Aph.) The *bhāva* (*nikṣepa*) stands for the actualized state of the intended activity. (XLVII)

1 This has reference to the *Anuyogadvāra Sūtra*.

2 The scripture means knowledge; 'with scripture' means depending on knowledge.

3 This means absence of the scripture. The expression 'no' (in the word '*No-Āgama-taḥ*', without scripture) stands for the absolute absence or partial absence of the scripture. There is absolute absence in the body of the knower 'at the moment' or his would-be body. There is however only partial absence in the activity of the person unmindful of the knowledge. There is always a partial absence of knowledge in activity.

4 The substance where the characteristics of the body of the knower or his would-be body do not apply, illustrates the category of 'other than those bodies'.

(Gloss) This also is two-fold viz. (i) with scripture and (ii) without scripture. A person is an actual dean with scripture when he is cognizant of the meaning of word 'dean' and is experiencing the deanship; (however) a person cognizant of the meaning of word 'dean' and engaged in the act of teaching is an actual dean without scripture (inasmuch as he is not experiencing deanship at that time).

Of the above four *nikṣepas*, the first three are concerned with the standpoint of substance while the last with the standpoint of modes.

४८. निक्षिप्तानां निर्देशादिभिरनुयोगः ।

48. *nikṣiptānām nirdeśādibhir anuyogaḥ.*

(Aph.) (The entities) that have been subjected to *nekṣepa* are to be explained through description etc. (which are enumerated as follows). (XLVIII)

४९. निर्देश-स्वामित्व-साधना-धार - स्थिति-विधान-सत्-संख्या-क्षेत्र-स्पर्शन'- काला-न्तर-भावा-ल्पबहुताः ।

निर्देशः—नामकथनम् । विधानं—प्रकारः ।

सत्—अस्तित्वम् । अन्तरम्—विरहकालः ।

भावः—औदयिकादिः । अल्पबहुता—न्यूनाधिकता ।

49. *nirdeśa-svāmitva-sādhana-dhāra-sthiti-vidhāna-sat-samkhyā-kṣetra-sparśana¹-kāla-ntara-bhāvā-lpabahutāḥ.*

nirdeśaḥ—nāmakathanam. vidhānam—prakāraḥ. sat—astitvam. antaram—virahakālaḥ. bhāvaḥ—audayikādiḥ. alpabahutā—nyūnādhikatā.

(Aph.) Description, ownership, cause, resting place, duration, division, being, number, place, contact¹, time, interval, state, (numerical mode of) being more or less.

(Gloss) Description means statement of the name. Division means variety. Being means existence. Interval means the span of separation.

१ यत्र अवगाढस्तत् क्षेत्रमुच्यते । यत्तु अवगाहनतो बहिरपि अतिरिक्तं क्षेत्रं स्पृशति, सा 'स्पर्शना'ऽभिधीयते, इति क्षेत्रस्पर्शनयोर्विशेषः ।

1 *yatra avagāḍhas tat kṣetram ucyate. yat tu avagāhanato bahir api atiriktam kṣetram spṛśati, sā "sparśanā" bhidhiyate, iti kṣetra-sparśanayor viśeṣaḥ.*

1 The place occupied by the soul is called 'place' (*kṣetra*). The space which exists outside the place of occupation and with which soul is in touch is called contact (*sparśana*). This is the difference between place (*kṣetra*) and contact (*sparśana*).

State denotes the states like the rising, subsidence, etc. Being more or less means the inferiority or superiority in number.

इति प्रमाणनयनिक्षेपस्वरूपनिर्णयः ।

iti pramāṇa-naya nikṣepasvarūpanirṇayaḥ.

Thus ends the lustre called the “Ascertainment of the Nature of Valid Cognition, Ways of Approach and Transferred Epithet”

प्रकाशैर्दशभिः स्पष्टैः, मिथ्याध्वान्तप्रणाशिभिः ।

तत्त्वज्योतिर्मयी जीयाज्जैनसिद्धान्तदोषिका ॥

prakāśair daśabhiḥ spaṣṭaiḥ, mithyādhvāntapraṇāśibhiḥ /
tattva-jyotirmayī jīyāj Jaina-siddhānta-dīpikā //

The *Jaina-siddhānta-dīpikā* (Illuminator of the Tenets of Jainism) which is full of the light of the truth may live long with its ten lucid lustres which destroy the darkness of perverted belief.

प्रशस्तिश्लोकाः
THE EULOGISTIC VERSES

१. व्यपाकुर्वन्नुर्वीप्रथिततरमिष्यामततपं
वितन्वानः शैत्यं कलिकलुषसंतप्तहृदये ।
चिदासारेः सिञ्चन् भविजनमनोभूतलमलं—
सतां शान्तिं पुष्यात् सपदि जिनतत्त्वाम्बुदवरः ॥

1. *vyapākurvannurvīprathitatara-mithyāmata-tapaṃ
vitanvānaḥ śaityaṃ kalikaluṣa-santapta-hṛdaye.
cidāsāraiḥ siñcan bhavijanamanobhūtalamalaṃ
satām śāntim puṣyāt sapadi jinatattvāmbudavaraḥ.*

By eliminating the heat of false doctrines widespread in the world, by spreading coolness in the hearts of persons tormented with (the heat of) the sins of the Iron Age, by washing away the earthly dust from the minds of worldly creatures by showers of spiritual enlightenment, let the excellent cloud of the truth propounded by the *Jina* (*Tīrthaṅkaras*) foster peace of the noble souls. (I)

२. न विद्युद् यच्चिह्नं न च तत इतोऽभ्रे भ्रमति यो
न सौवं सौभाग्यं प्रकटयितुमुच्छेः स्वनति च ।
पराद् याच्न्यावृत्त्या मलिनयति नाङ्गं क्वचिदपि,
सतां शान्तिं पुष्यात् सपदि जिनतत्त्वाम्बुदवरः ॥

2. *na vidyud yac cihnaṃ na ca tata ito'bhre bhramati yo
na sauvaṃ saubhāgyaṃ prakṭayitum uccaiḥ svanati ca.
parād yācñāvṛtṭyā malinayati nāṅgaṃ kvacid api
satām śāntim puṣyāt sapadi jinatattvāmbudavaraḥ.*

Let the excellent cloud of the truth propounded by the *Jina*, which is not marked by lightning, which does not wander to and fro in the firmament, which does not roar loudly in order to exhibit its heavenly glory, which does not soil its limbs by begging favours from others, foster the peace of the noble souls. (II)

३. न वर्षतविव प्रतिपलमहो वर्षणपरः
खरांशुं ह्याच्छाद्योद्गमयति ततो ज्ञानतरणिम् ।

जवासाभान् जन्तूनपि सृजति प्रोत्फुल्लवदनान्,
सतां शान्तिं पुष्यात् सपदि जिनतत्त्वाम्बुदवरः ॥

3. *na varṣariāv eva pratipalam aho varṣaṇaparah
kharāṁsurū hy ācchādyodgamayati tato jñānatarāṇim.
javāsābhān jantūn api sṛjati protphullavadanān
satām śāntim puṣyāt sapadi jinatattvāmbudavarah.*

Let the excellent cloud of the truth propounded by the *Jina*, which rains every moment unlike the cloud which rains only in the rainy season, which while covering the scorching rays of the sun reveals the sun of Enlightenment, and which makes the grass-hued living creatures shine with blooming face like red flower, foster the peace of the noble souls. (III)

४. जैनं मतं ह्युपकृतं सुतरां यकेन
स्वाचारशीलनिरूपणकोशलेन ।
तेरापथाद्यपुरुषः प्रथितः पृथिव्यां
संस्मर्यते प्रतिपलं किल भिक्षुराजः ॥

4. *jainam matam hy upakṛtam sutarām yakena
svācāraśīlananirūpaṇakauśaleṇa.
terāpathādyapuruṣaḥ prathitaḥ pṛthivyām
saṁsmaryate pratipalam kila bhikṣurājaḥ.*

Śrī Bhikṣu, widely known in the world, the chief among monks, the founder of the *Terāpantha* Order, who has benefited the Jaina religion by his dexterity in the practice of proper conduct and its exposition is being always remembered in this world (by all). (IV)

५. सप्ताचार्या भारमल्लादयो ये
शश्वद् ध्येया ध्येयबुद्ध्या स्वसिद्धये ।
तत्राप्यासन्नोपकारी ममेति
भूयो भूयो मूलसूनुं स्मरामि ॥

5. *saptācāryā bhārmallādayo ye
śaśvad dhyeyā dhyeyabuddhyā svasiddhyai.
tatrāpy āsannopakārī mameti,
bhūyo bhūyo mūlasūnurū smarāmi.*

The seven pontiffs beginning with Bhāramalla should be constantly meditated upon in true faith as proper objects of meditation for one's own perfection. Among them, I again and again recite the name of

Kālūrāmājī, the son of Mūlacānda jī, as he was my immediate benefactor. (V)

६. विलोक्यमानः सकृपैः समस्तैः
प्राग्वतिरेरापथपूज्यपादैः ।
प्रतीक्ष्यभिक्षोर्नवमासनस्थो,
रामोत्तरोऽहं तुलसी प्रणेता ॥

6. *vilokyamānaḥ sakṛpaiḥ samastaiḥ*
prāgvartī terāpatha-pūjyapādaiḥ.
prātīkṣyabhikṣor navamāsanaṣṭho
rāmottaro 'haṁ Tulasī prañetā

Being constantly watched with mercy by all the worshipful preceding Ācāryas of the Terāpantha order, I, Tulasīrāma, the ninth pontiff in the order of respectable Bhikṣu, am the author hereof. (VI)

७. आर्हन्त्यतस्वाङ्गदीपिकायाः
श्रीजेनसिद्धान्तसुदीपिकायाः ।
जिज्ञासुभावं भजतां नितान्तं
हिताय संक्षिप्तकृतिर्मदीया ॥

7. *ārhanṭyatattvāṅgaṇa-dīpikāyāḥ,*
śrījainasiddhāntasudīpikāyāḥ.
jijñāsuhāvaṁ bhajatāṁ nīṭāntaṁ,
hitāya saṁkṣiptakṛtir madīyā.

This short work entitled *Śrī Jaina-siddhānta-dīpikā*, which enlightens the courtyard of the Jaina principles has been composed by me for the benefit of those who entertain an ardent desire for knowledge. (VII)

८. अङ्घ्रि^२-गगन^०-घनवर्त्म^०-दृष्टि^२युतेऽब्दे सुमाधवेमासे ।
सम्पूर्णाऽसितपक्षे, चूरूपुर्या त्रयोदशीदिवसे ॥

8. *aṅghri²-gagana⁰-ghanavartma⁰-dṛṣṭi²yute'bde sumādhave māse.*
sampūrṇā'sitapakṣe cūrūpurīyāṁ trayodaśīdivase.

In the year 2002, on the thirteenth lunar day of the dark fortnight of the auspicious month of Vaiśākha, this work was completed in the town of Chūrū. (VIII)

९. द्वितीयावृत्तिरेतस्याः, शोधिता परिवर्तिता ।
दक्षिणप्रान्तयात्रायां, बंगलोरपुरे वरे ॥

9. *dvitīyāvṛttir etasyāḥ śodhitā parivartitā,
dakṣiṇaprāntayātrāyām bangalorapure vare.*

Necessary additions and alterations were carried out in the second edition at Bangalore during my *padayātrā* (visit) of southern India. (IX)

१०. यावन्मेरुधरामध्ये व्योम्नि चन्द्रविवाकरो ।
तावत्तेरापथाम्नाये जैनसिद्धान्तदीपिका ॥

10. *yāvan merur dharāmadhye vyomni candradivākarau.
tāvat terāpathāmnāye jaina-siddhānta-dīpikā.*

As long as the Mount Meru exists on earth and the sun and the moon adorn the firmament, so long will the *Jaina-siddhānta-dīpikā* continue in the sacred lore of the *Terāpantha* Order. (X)

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
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The Author

Birth	: 1915
Initiation & Ordination	: 1926
Accession to Ācāryaship	: 1936
Launching the <i>Aṇuvrata</i>	
Movement	: 1949
Honoured with the status of <i>Yugapradhāna</i>	: 1971

Ācārya Śrī Tulsi is a prolific writer with more than 100 books to his credit. His early compositions on Jaina Logic, Epistemology, Ethics and Yoga were written in classical Sanskrit.

As early as 1955, at Ujjain, Ācāryaśrī decided on a Synod (*vācanā*) to critically edit the entire corpus of the Jaina *āgamas*. He appointed a band of monks and nuns of his Order to do the work. A rapid success was achieved and all the 32 texts of the *Ardha-māgadhī* canon were edited with complete word index, ten volumes also having already been published, by 1981.

Ācāryaśrī is not only a voluminous writer, he is also a religious leader of international repute. His concept of ethics is not limited to the exaltation of an individual, but it envisages a national and international ethics for ushering in world peace. His *Aṇuvrata* Movement is basically a step in that direction.

