

A STUDY
OF
JAYANTA BHATṬA'S NYĀYAMANJARĪ
A MATURE SANSKRIT WORK
ON
INDIAN LOGIC
PART I

By
NAGIN J. SHAH

SANSKRIT-SANSKRITI GRANTHAMĀLĀ 1

GENERAL EDITOR
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FOREWORD

It gives me great pleasure in offering to the scholars of Indian philosophy the present work entitled 'A study of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's Nyāyamañjarī – A Mature Sanskrit Work on INDIAN LOGIC Part I' as the first book of Sanskrit-Sanskriti Granthamālā.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, a Kashmiri pundit of ninth century A.D., was an astute logician and an able philosopher. His Nyāyamañjarī occupies a unique place among the Sanskrit works on Indian philosophy. It bears testimony to Jayanta's philosophical acumen and intellectual powers. It forcefully establishes Nyāya theories after critically examining the rival ones, mainly the Buddhist and the Mīmāṃsaka. Therefore, it is a 'must' for any one interested in Indian philosophy. It is an introductory window to many fascinating intra-Indian philosophical controversies which obviously deserve attention.

I hope this work, since it is a study of the first chapter of the Nyāyamañjarī, will be of considerable use to the scholars of Indian philosophy in general and Indian logic in particular. I have no doubt that the scholarly world will receive it with delight.

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Nagin J. Shah
General Editor

PREFACE

When I was reading for my Doctorate in the years 1961-63, I had an opportunity to consult the *Nyāyamañjarī* and to study some portion of it. My guide was Dr. Pt. Sukhlalji. It was he who initiated me to the *Nyāyamañjarī*. Then in the year 1972 I was fortunate enough to find the manuscript of the *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* of Cakradhara (10th century A. D.), the only available commentary on the *Nyāyamañjarī*. I critically edited it with elaborate foot-notes and introduction. This provided me an opportunity to study closely the entire *Nyāyamañjarī*. This opened before me the treasure of Indian philosophy. I made up my mind to translate the *Nyāyamañjarī* into Gujarati, my mother tongue. This translation up to the ninth āhnika has already been published. At last, I thought it worthwhile to prepare a chapter-wise study, in English, of the *Nyāyamañjarī*. The present book is the result of this resolve. It contains the study of the first chapter of the *Nyāyamañjarī*.

The author of the *Nyāyamañjarī* is Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, a Kashmiri pundit deeply learned in the traditional systems of Indian philosophy. He flourished in the reign of King Śaṅkaravarman (A. D. 885-902). His great-grand father was a minister of King Lalitāditya (A. D. 750). And Abhinanda, a son of Jayanta, is the author of *Kādambarīkathāsāra*.

Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's three works have so far been recovered and published. They are *Nyāyakalikā*, *Āgamaḍambara* and *Nyāyamañjarī*. *Nyāyakalikā* is a short commentary on the *Nyāyasūtra*. *Āgamaḍambara* is a Sanskrit drama. And the *Nyāyamañjarī*, though a commentary on the *Nyāyasūtra*, is of the nature of an independent *Nyāya* work.

Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī* is one of the three invaluable jewels of Indian philosophy, the remaining two being Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārtika* and Kuṇḍarīla's *Ślokaṇvārtika*. If we acquaint ourselves with these three mature philosophical works written during the period between the 7th and 9th centuries A.D., the golden

period of Indian Philosophy, we shall find that in that period the contest was triangular i. e. among the Buddhist, the Mīmāṃsaka and the Naiyāyika. The main targets of Dharmakīrti's attack are the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas. Similarly, Kumārila's attacks are mainly directed against the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas. And even Jayanta, a Naiyāyika, severely and mainly attacks the Buddhists and the Mīmāṃsakas. These giants of Indian philosophy mostly ignore others. This triangular contest of the period has yielded very good results. It has made Indian philosophy deep, sharp and thought-provoking.

Jayanta wrote his Nyāyamañjarī while in prison. He was imprisoned in a Khasa region in Kashmir at the instance of King Śaṅkaravarman whom he served as a minister. Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī is a unique Nyāya work. The maturity of discussion is evident at every stage. Its Sanskrit is sweet and lucid. It is written in prose and verse style. Though it is known as a commentary on the Nyāyasūtra, it is really an independent work on the Nyaya philosophy. As we have already stated, in this Nyāyamañjarī one finds the triangular contest among the Naiyāyika, the Mīmāṃsaka and the Buddhist. Its study gives us a clear idea of the problems of Indian philosophy and their solution offered by the three main branches of Indian philosophy.

The only extant commentary on the Nyāyamañjarī is the Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga by Caṅradhara, a Kashmiri pundit of 10th century A.D. But the Nyāyamañjarī had attracted the attention of many other scholars even prior to Caṅradhara. Some of them had composed commentaries which are not extant now. Caṅradhara had consulted them. So he in his commentary gives different interpretations, offered by other commentators, of the textual portions of the Nyāyamañjarī and records different readings accepted by them.

At the end I express my wish in the words of Jayanta :

परमार्थभावनाक्रमसमुन्मिषत्पुलकघ्राञ्छितकपोलम् ।

स्वकृतीः प्रकाशयन्तः पश्यन्ति सतां मुखं धन्याः ॥

Nagin J. Shah

INTRODUCTION

Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta is one of the maturest texts produced by the Nyāya school of Indian philosophy, a school whose role (together with that of its sisterschool Vaiśeṣika) in the development of philosophical speculation in ancient India has been truly catalytic. For all mature – that is, systematic, rational and advanced – philosophical speculation that took place in ancient India took place under an impetus somehow received from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school (to call by one name the two sister-schools in question). The exact origins of this school – as of so much that is ancient Indian – are shrouded in mystery but one thing seems to be certain, and it is this that the circles amidst which it made its appearance were considerably free from theological prepossessions. Thus the Nyāya authors were preoccupied primarily with the problems of logic and secondarily with those of metaphysics, ethics and the like while the Vaiśeṣika authors were preoccupied primarily with the problems of metaphysics and secondarily with those of logic, ethics and the like, but both pursued their respective enquiries in a manner that was rational to a very large extent. Hence it was that when certain Buddhists prompted by the spirit of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school themselves undertook rational enquiries in the field of logic and metaphysics they spoke a language thoroughly understandable to their Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika adversaries; the two camps thus formed got engaged in a battle of wits that continued for centuries and constitutes a most glorious chapter in the history of Indian philosophy. A similar interest in the problems of logic and metaphysics was similarly generated in the Mīmāṃsakas who were originally and primarily priests obsessed with the problems of Vedic ritualism. True, even the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers soon became – if they were not already from the beginning – a champion of one version of Vedic orthodoxy, a version different from that upheld by the

Mīmāṃsakas; and all Buddhists were a champion of Buddhist orthodoxy in one version or another. But the point to be noted is that these Nyāya – Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā and Buddhist philosophers could manage to pursue rational enquires with the problems of logic and metaphysics in a manner considerably unhindered by their respective theological affiliations. These were the three trends that dominated the scene in the period when the country witnessed a genuine bloom in philosophical activity, but three more deserve notice for one reason or another. Thus Sāṅkhya was a venerated school of hoary antiquity but its history exhibits no phase that bears a genuine impact of the radical ways of thought introduced by the Nyāya – Vaiśeṣika philosophers; so in the period of mature philosophization this school invariably attracted passing attention but never more than passing attention. Then there was the Advaita Vedānta school of Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara. It appeared on the scene somehow late but was destined to grow considerably influential as days went by. However, its arsenal of arguments was essentially a borrowing from Buddhist idealism and so whatever was ever said about the latter essentially applied to it too. But as a matter of fact, even in the later works of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā schools—schools which had been uncompromising in their criticism of Buddhist idealism — polemics against Advaita Vedānta are a rare occurrence. Lastly, there was the Jaina school in whose history too a phase ensued when rational enquiries into the problems of logic and metaphysics were undertaken in right earnest. This phase appeared somewhat late but not very late, and yet the fact remains that the Jaina works representing even this phase were left almost entirely unnoticed by the other schools. Of this over all situation as it developed in the field of Indian philosophical speculation Jayanta in his Nyāyamañjarī has drawn a very reliable picture so full of invaluable details.

Jayanta has composed his work by way of commenting on certain selected aphorisms of Nyāya-sūtra, the basic text of his school—to be precise, on those so few aphorisms of the first chapter where the sixteen padārthas (= fundamental topics) posited

by this school have been defined (as also on those quite few aphorisms of the fifth chapter where the sub-classes of the last two padārthas have been defined). This way Jayanta allows himself full freedom to say whatever he likes in connection with any of the topics in question, and as [a matter of fact his is a thorough-going discussion taking within its purview a host of issues raised by the Nyāya school in the course of its age-long history. However, the way Jayanta deals with his subject-matter has a story to tell. For Nyāyasūtra was composed (rather composed out of a pre-existing material) at a period when the Nyāya school was in its utter infancy while Nyāyamāñjarī was composed at a period when it had reached fullest adulthood. Thus we are in considerable darkness as to the circumstance that gave rise to the Nyāya school with its sixteen padārthas but we can see with considerable clarity as to why Jayanta says what he says. In Jayanta's times a triangular contest between the Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Buddhist schools of logic dominated the Indian philosophical scene, and of this contest one can form a very precise idea from his treatment of the first Nyāya padārtha, viz. pramāṇa (= means of valid cognition, also just valid cognition). This treatment comes about twothirds of Jayanta's work and constitutes its cream. As for the remaining one-third, about half of it is devoted to the second Nyāya padārtha, viz. prameya (= object of valid cognition) and the rest to the fourteen padārthas that are then left. The padārtha prameya has got twelve sub-classes as follows : soul, body, sense-organ, thing-to-be-cognized, cognition, manas (=internal cognitive organ), activity, moral defilement, rebirth, fruit-of-action, pain, release-from-transmigration. It can easily be seen that the first six of these are ontological topics, the last six ethical topics, but neither ontology nor ethics ever constituted a distinct subject-matter of Nyāya philosophy—its one distinct subject-matter being logic. And yet there must have been something in the circumstances of the time that the founding fathers of Nyāya school thought it worthwhile to treat prameya as one of their sixteen padārthas and to divide it into twelve sub-classes as described. Vātsyāyana argues that but for its treatment

of the fourteen padārthas saṁśaya (= doubt) etc. — that is, of the sixteen padārthas minus pramāṇa and prameya — the philosophy of his school would be reduced to the status of mere adhyātmavidyā (= spiritual science) just like Upaniṣads; elsewhere too he attributes to this philosophy the generic designation 'adhyātmavidyā'. From this one can surmise that the ethical problem of worldly bondage and release along with the allied ontological problems was considered to be the specific subject-matter of the discipline called adhyātmavidyā and that Upaniṣads were considered to be the model texts devoted to this discipline. So on Vātsyāyana's reasoning his school was a school of adhyātmavidyā — though one with a distinction. Not that Vātsyāyana could not be mistaken about the intentions of the original Nyāya authors, but some reasoning like his will alone explain why prameya is one of the sixteen Nyāya padārthas and in the manner described. But whatever might have been the intentions of the original Nyāya authors, the subsequent history of the Nyāya school is the history of a school of logic pure and simple. True, even this school of logic subscribed to a very definite ontology but the details of this ontology were primarily formulated by the sister-school of Vaiśeṣika; hence it is that the exact nature of the six prameyas that constitute ontological topics has to be comprehended in the light of what the Vaiśeṣika school says on the question. Similarly, this school of logic subscribed to a very definite ethico-theology but the details of this ethico-theology were primarily formulated by the Purāṇa specialists; hence it is that the exact nature of the six prameyas that constitute ethical topics has to be comprehended in the light of what the Purāṇa specialists say on the question. However, even as a school of logic the Nyāya school seems to have had a somewhat chequered history. For as Jayanta's procedure convincingly demonstrates, all the problems of logic could be well discussed under the padārtha called pramāṇa; and so if an exception be made of the padārtha called prameya the question naturally arises as to what significance for a school of logic could be had by the fourteen padārthas saṁśaya etc. The following is the catalogue of these padārthas : saṁśaya (=doubt), prayojana

(=purpose), *dr̥ṣṭānta* (= example), *avayava*(=steps in a syllogism), *siddhānta* (= established doctrine), *tarka* (= reflection), *nirṇaya* (=demonstrative conclusion), *vāda* (= honest debate), *jalpa* (=debate possibly dishonest), *vitandā* (= empty objection-mongering), *hetvābhāsa* (= pseudo-probans), *chala* (= quibble), *jāti* (= faulty counter-argument), *nigrahasthāna* (=point of defeat). It can easily be seen that these fourteen *padārthas* are a random collection of topics relevant for an understanding of the phenomenon of public debate, and the conclusion is almost inescapable that the problems of public debate were the primary concern of the original Nyāya authors. But from the standpoint of logic the essence of a public debate lies in a reasoned exchange of arguments, and so it was gradually realized that only those among the fourteen topics in question are of logical significance which have some bearing or other on the problem of inference. Three of these topics as such became three technical topics connected with the problem of inference; they were *dr̥ṣṭānta*, *avayava* and *hetvābhāsa* (*dr̥ṣṭānta* also occurring as a part of *avayava*). The rest continued to be discussed in a rather perfunctory fashion and as a legacy of the days when not the problems of logic but those of public debate were the Nyāya authors' primary concern. This explains why just one-sixth of Jayanta's work is sufficient to cover the fourteen topics in question—where too real problems of logic are directly taken up only in connection with those three topics *dr̥ṣṭānta*, *avayava* and *hetvābhāsa*. Be that as it may, *Nyāyamañjarī* can be best studied by being divided into three parts—viz. the first two-thirds devoted to the *padārtha pramāṇa*, the second one-sixth devoted to the *padārtha prameya*, the third one-sixth devoted to the fourteen *padārthas saṁśaya* etc. As was just argued, the third part takes up certain miscellaneous problems related to logic and public debate, the second part certain miscellaneous problems related to ontology and ethics, but it is not the case that the first part exclusively takes up the problems related to logic. For in the first part too there are discussed certain important ontological problems and certain important ethico-theological problems. Thus it is in this part that Jayanta defends theism, defends the thesis that a word (rather sound) is

not a real-eternal substance but a momentary quality of sky, defends the thesis that a universal is not something imaginary but a real-eternal entity. What is still important, it is in this part that Jayanta defends his fundamental ethico-theological conviction which in a way acts like a running thread throughout Nyāyamañjarī in general and its first part in particular. Now it might sound odd that the author's fundamental ethico-theological conviction should act like a running thread in a text devoted to logic, and so the point as applied to Jayanta's performance deserves a serious consideration. Fortunately, for this purpose interesting and important material is provided by the opening section of Nyāyamañjarī where Jayanta discusses the question as to what is the precise utility of studying Nyāya philosophy. Let us see how.

Jayanta takes his stand on the medieval Brāhmaṇical theologian's contention that the following fourteen are what might be called 'vidyāsthānas (= means of learning)' : four Vedas, six Vēdāṅgas, Purāṇas, Dharmaśāstras, Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā. The marked contrast between an ancient Vedic phase and a medieval Purāṇic phase is a characteristic feature of Brāhmaṇical theology. Thus Vedic theology and the allied ritual constitute one world, Purāṇic theology and the allied ritual constitute another world altogether. However, even in the medieval Purāṇic phase lip-loyalty was invariably paid to Vedas – so much so that a medieval Purāṇist Brāhmaṇical theologian would proudly call himself a Vedicist (never a Purāṇist) in contrast to the anti-Vedic heretics like Buddhists, Jainas, etc. True, Vedic ritual went out of use only gradually but that it went out of use is indisputable. The catalogue of 14 vidyāsthānas is a typical product of the medieval Purāṇic phase of Brāhmaṇical theology. That is why it includes 4 Vedas and 6 Vēdāṅgas all right but significantly adds to them Purāṇas and Dharmaśāstras, on the one hand, Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā on the other. This was so far as verbal proclamation went; in point of fact the study of Vedas was gradually neglected, the five Vēdāṅgas had become purely secular disciplines of grammar, phonetic, etymology, prosody, astronomy (the sixth in the form of Vedic ritual met the fate of Vedas themselves, in the form of

domestic ritual became a part of Purāṇic ritual, in the form of ethics was replaced by Dharmaśāstras). Thus for all practical purposes the medieval Purāṇist Brāhmin would learn all his theological ritual from Purāṇas, his ethics from Dharmaśāstras. It was in this background that Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā were cultivated, the former with a view to developing proficiency in theological disputation, the latter with a view to acquiring something more than a nodding acquaintance with Vedas and Vedic ritual. Jayanta decides to make a partisan use of this over-all situation. So like a typical medieval Purāṇist Brāhmin he begins by declaring that Vedas are the basic source of all knowledge-worth-having and then goes on to show as to how Purāṇas-and-Dharmaśāstras, Vedāṅgas, Nyāya-and-Mīmāṃsā stood related to Vedas. Jayanta must have known that theology and ritual as propounded in Vedas were markedly different from the same as propounded in Purāṇas and Dharmaśāstras. So he simply says that Vedas enjoin the performance of a ritual like agnihotra, the acquisition of knowledge-concerning-Soul, Dharmaśāstra enjoins the performance of certain rituals of their own, while Purāṇas taking recourse to story-telling etc. develop the Vedic themes themselves.¹ To this is added that 5 Vedāṅgas (the sixth is omitted) are ultimately of use in comprehending the meaning of Vedas.² Then comes the contention that Mīmāṃsā is directly of use in comprehending the meaning of Vedas.³ Lastly, it is argued that Nyāya is the most fundamental of all vidyāsthānas inasmuch as it is aimed at vindicating the validity of Vedic testimony without which vindication none will care to study Vedas or to take recourse to the rest of vidyāsthānas.⁴ It is Jayanta's understanding that Nyāya is aimed at vindicating the validity of Vedic testimony that acts as a running thread throughout Nyāyamañjarī in general and its pramāṇa-part in particular.

Jayanta has quoted two verses which catalogue the 14 vidyāsthānas, and he argues that his school is mentioned in one of these by the word 'tarka', in the other by the word 'nyāyavistara' because both these words mean inference while it is his school alone which develops a doctrine of inference.⁵ In this connection

Jayanta notes that the Sāṅkhyas, Jainas and Kṣapaṇakas have too meagre a knowledge of inference, that the Buddhists though claiming a lot are in fact deficient in their knowledge of inference, that the Cārvākas are pitifully devoid of all knowledge of inference; and granting that the Buddhists have an adequate knowledge of inference the charge levelled against them is that they being anti-Vedic this knowledge of theirs is of no avail while vindicating the validity of Vedic testimony.⁶ About the Vaiśeṣikas it is said that they are the Nyāya philosopher's own camp-followers,⁷ the point being that it is immaterial whether they do or do not have an adequate independent knowledge of inference. Jayanta thus makes clear that the chief preoccupation of a Nyāya philosopher is to master the doctrine of inference and that the Buddhists constitute his chief rival in this field. (Jayanta is here ominously silent about the Mīmāṃsakas but the meaning of this silence we will learn after a while.) Concretely speaking, his meaning was that the Nyāya philosopher was alone willing and in a position to supply a knowledge of inference adequate for vindicating the validity of Vedic testimony. Now the realization that Nyāya philosophy had *something* special to do with the doctrine of inference was somehow there since very beginning (this was an obvious implication of the marked interest shown by the early Nyāya authors in the problems related to public debate). On the other hand, there was also always a realization that Nyāya philosophy was not a mere doctrine of inference (this was an obvious implication of the inclusion of prameya among the sixteen Nyāya padārthas). But Jayanta's way of arguing that Nyāya philosophy was not a mere doctrine of inference because it was a doctrine of inference aimed at vindicating the validity of Vedic testimony was typical of a medieval Puraṇist Brahmin whose zeal to champion the cause of Vedas was in inverse proportion to his actual acquaintance with the contents of Vedas. In any case, we have yet to learn of the special sense in which on Jayanta's showing Nyāya philosophy is aimed at vindicating the validity of Vedic testimony. But before answering this question Jayanta raises two more which are of some historical significance.

Thus parallel to the medieval Purāṇic list of 14 vidyāsthānas which included Nyāya, there was an ancient list of 4 'learnings' (vidyā) which included ānvikṣikī. The three other items of the latter list were trayī, vārtā and daṇḍanīti respectively standing for Vedic theology-cum-ritual, economics and politics; and it was given out that ānvikṣikī acted as a lamp in relation to all these three. Vātsyāyana submits that ānvikṣikī as thus understood is but Nyāya philosophy—to be precise, the Nyāya type of adhyātmavidyā. The concept of four 'learnings' and the verse praising ānvikṣikī quoted by Vātsyāyana also occur in Kauṭilya's Arthaśāstra (the verse in a slightly different form), but the intriguing thing is that this text speaks of a triple division of ānvikṣikī into Sāṅkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata. Maybe, Kauṭilya was following a later verified tradition according to which Yoga was a name for Nyāya, but even then Vātsyāyana's identification of ānvikṣikī with Nyāya remains anomalous. If report from Kauṭilya is reliable then ānvikṣikī should mean 'a system of philosophy inclusive of a doctrine of inference'—so that on this understanding Nyāya philosophy should be just one type of ānvikṣikī and not the sole type of ānvikṣikī. In any case, if ānvikṣikī was to act as a lamp in relation to the remaining 'learnings' it could do so only in its capacity as a doctrine of inference. Jayanta, following in the footsteps of Vātsyāyana and the like, identifies ānvikṣikī with Nyāya and offers an etymology of the word 'anvikṣā' which should make it a synonym for 'anumāna' (Sanskrit for 'inference')—so that ānvikṣikī means 'a doctrine of inference'. Thus on his showing anvikṣā (as also anumāna) is the type of cognition that arises in the wake of a perceptual or a scriptural type of cognition⁸. However, even granting the validity of the proposed etymology of the word 'ānvikṣikī' the question remains whether it was a generic name or a proper name, if a generic name what type of discipline it stood for. Be that as it may, Jayanta's next query is as to how the 14 vidyāsthānas of his list are to tally with the 4 'learnings' of that ancient list; in one word, his problem was as to why the 14 vidyāsthānas included nothing parallel to vārtā and daṇḍanīti.

Jayanta's solution of his problem lies in suggesting that the four 'learnings' included theological as well as secular disciplines (along with *anvikṣikī*) while the fourteen *vidyāsthānas* included only theological disciplines (along with *Nyāya*)⁹. Even then it is noteworthy that the ancient authors thought it worthwhile to contend that *ānvikṣikī* acts as handmaid to theological as well as secular disciplines while Jayanta that *Nyāya* acts as handmaid to theological disciplines alone.

Then Jayanta raises the somewhat ticklish question of the relationship of his school with the *Mīmāṃsā* school. Thus the medieval *Purāṇist* Brahmin would declare from the house top that Vedas are his ultimate source of authority but his real source of authority were *Purāṇas*; nevertheless, he represented the dominant trend of the Brahmanical theology of the time and the *Nyāya* authors were the philosophical spokesmen of this trend. However, there also then existed a minority trend of Brahmanical theology whose preoccupation with the problems of Vedic ritualism was all-absorbing, and the *Mīmāṃsā* authors were the philosophical spokesmen of this trend. So the question before Jayanta was as to why the task of vindicating the validity of Vedic testimony should be entrusted to his *Nyāya* school and not to the *Mīmāṃsā* school.¹⁰ Jayanta first seeks to dismiss the question by submitting that the primary concern of the *Mīmāṃsā* school is to conduct an investigation with the meaning of Vedas and not to vindicate the validity of Vedic testimony — the latter being the primary concern of the *Nyāya* school.¹¹ As a matter of fact, originally neither the *Mīmāṃsā* school nor the *Nyāya* school was primarily interested in vindicating the validity of Vedic testimony—not the former because it was not at all interested in the problems of logic, not the latter because its interest in the problems of logic was of a general nature and not specially directed towards vindicating the validity of Vedic testimony. It was only in due course that the *Mīmāṃsā* school developed a serious interest in the problems of logic and by that time the different schools of logic were passionately defending their respective cherished theologies. And since now both a *Mīmāṃsā* philosophy and a *Nyāya* philo-

sophy could designate their theology 'vindicating the validity of Vedic testimony' it was natural that one would dismiss as fake the other's vindication of the validity of Vedic testimony. It was in line with this attitude that Jayanta, even while conceding that the Mīmāṃsā school does undertake a vindication of the validity of Vedic testimony, declares that this vindication is nevertheless faulty.¹² The gravamen of his charge is that this school treats Vedas as an authorless composition while no composition can be deemed authoritative unless it is the composition of an authoritative person.¹³ As it stands Jayanta's complaint makes sense but according to his school too Vedas are composed not by any human being but by God; and certainly the position that Vedas are composed by God is no less fantastic than the position that they are composed by nobody. But it is the contest between these two fantastic positions that is the central feature of Jayanta's treatment of verbal testimony, a treatment occupying about two-thirds of the space devoted by him to the *padārtha pramāṇa*. Thus after having investigated in the first chapter the nature of *pramāṇa* in general and in the second chapter that of perception, inference and analogy—the three *pramāṇas* posited by the Nyāya school in addition to verbal testimony—Jayanta discusses in the Chapters third to sixth various questions related to verbal testimony. And this discussion on verbal testimony is so conducted that barring stray exceptions where the Buddhist or the like is the rival party the confrontation is always against some position or other maintained by the Mīmāṃsā school; (the fourth Chapter is of exceptional significance inasmuch as it for the most part seeks to vindicate the authoritative character of Vedas on the basis of an actual examination of their contents, also inasmuch as it seeks to adjudge as to which other theological texts, pro-Vedic or otherwise, are worthy of a respectful consideration). To be fair to Jayanta, let it however be conceded that barring that fourth chapter even his treatment of verbal testimony raises genuine philosophical issues from beginning till end. A perusal of the bare catalogue of these issues should suffice to convince the sceptic; taken in order they stand as follows :

- Chapter III :** (1) The definition of verbal testimony
 (2) Verbal testimony is not a case of inference
 (3) Verbal testimony is a genuine means of valid cognition
 (4) Refutation of the Mīmāṃsā thesis that all cognition is intrinsically valid
 (5) Defence of theism
 (6) Refutation of the Mīmāṃsā thesis that a word is an eternal substance
- Chapter IV :** (7) Refutation of the Mīmāṃsā thesis that Vedas are an authorless composition
- Chapter V :** (8) Refutation of the Buddhist thesis that a 'universal' is something imaginary
 (9) Determination as to whether a word denotes a 'universal', a particular, or both
 (10) Determination as to wherein lies the meaning of a sentence
- Chapter VI :** (11) Refutation of the 'doctrine of sphoṭa (according to which a word is an eternal, incomposite something standing over and above the concerned constituent letters)
 (12) Determination as to how a sentence is made of the concerned constituent words
 (13) Determination as to how the sentential meaning is yielded by the meaning of the concerned constituents
 (14) The science of grammar is competent to enable one to distinguish between proper and improper words.

This catalogue deserves careful study so as to see how unjust Jayanta is being to himself and his school when he gives out that their primary concern is to vindicate the validity of Vedic testimony. For hardly few of the issues here enumerated have any direct bearing on this vindication; (that the subject-matter of the first two Chapters – for that matter, also that of the Chapters

seventh to twelfth – has still less to do with this vindication goes without saying). Hence it is that even while taking due notice of it much should not be made of the fact that Jayanta's own understanding that the primary concern of Nyāya philosophy is to vindicate the validity of Vedic testimony acts as a running thread throughout Nyāyamañjarī in general and its pramāṇa-part in particular. Even less should be made of Jayanta's further contention that Nyāya philosophy aimed at vindicating the validity of Vedic testimony has been in currency ever since the beginning of creation — when God composed Vedas.¹⁴ Equally worthy of neglect is Jayanta's rejoinder-to-an-objection that Akṣapāda — the fabled founder of the Nyāya school — could well have acquired the necessary wisdom through performing a penance, worshipping a deity, or studying a text already current.¹⁵ For all this simply shows that Jayanta was just incapable of having any historical understanding of how Vedas came to be composed or how his own Nyāya school came into existence and grew.

After making preliminary remarks, of which the most significant ones we have just considered, Jayanta proceeds to offer comment on the first aphorism of Nyāyasūtra. This aphorism enumerates the sixteen padārthas and declares that a knowledge regarding their essential nature leads to the attainment of mokṣa. And while commenting on it Jayanta does the following things : (1) argues that even a bare mention of the subject-matter of a text rouses in the reader a curiosity to go through it, (2) frames a one-sentence description of each of the sixteen padārthas, (3) settles grammatical part, and (4) argues why a text aimed at vindicating the validity of Vedic testimony should think it worthwhile to declare that a knowledge regarding the essential nature of the sixteen padārthas in question leads to the attainment of mokṣa. Of those the point (4) is alone important and deserves some consideration, for it provides an interesting clue to the working of Jayanta's mind on certain fundamental questions of philosophy. In this connection the formulation of the opponent's objection is brief but pointed; it runs as follows : "How is the knowledge regarding the essential nature of the sixteen padārthas

a means of attaining mokṣa ? Moreover, the present discipline being aimed at vindicating the validity of Vedic testimony it is this vindication that ought to be undertaken and there is no use indulging in the jumbled task about sixteen padārthas".¹⁶ The first part of the objection could be addressed to a Nyāya author at any time, the second part to a medieval Nyāya author like Jayanta according to whom the primary concern of his school was to vindicate the validity of Vedic testimony. Thus it was a common understanding in ancient and medieval India that topics like soul, body, bondage were relevant for comprehending the problem of mokṣa but it required some argumentation in order to prove that logical topics too were thus relevant. But the Nyāya authors were always emphasizing that a discussion of logical topics was a speciality of their school; at the same time they pointed out that topics proper to the problem of mokṣa were covered by them under the padārtha prameya. Their point was that the latter topics were better understood in case they were studied in the light of the former topics. Essentially all this is said by Jayanta too while answering the objection under consideration – but in such a manner that the task of vindicating the validity of Vedic testimony equally comes in limelight. Thus he begins by declaring that the knowledge of the twelve prameyas is directly a means of attaining mokṣa.¹⁷ This was understandable, but instead of next submitting that the knowledge of the remaining fifteen padārthas is of help in comprehending the nature of the twelve prameyas he gives a certain twist to his argument. So what we are actually told next is that the knowledge of the twelve prameyas is derived from scripture alone.¹⁸ Coming from a Nyāya author this is a somewhat puzzling remark, for it was rather the strength of the Nyāya school that it discussed metaphysico-ethical problem in the light of logical principles – not on the basis of an appeal to scriptural authority (as did the Vedānta school, say). Jayanta's own treatment of these twelve prameyas is a strong confirmation of that, for, it is almost altogether independent of any scriptural props. The simple fact was that being a typical medieval Purāṇist Brāhmin, Jayanta would appeal to the authority of Vedas in season and out of season; hence his present submission that the

knowledge of the twelve prameyas posited by his school is derived from scripture alone. What follows is still more curious. For now Jayanta proceeds to underline the utility of the padārtha pramāṇa. But instead of simply saying that the four pramāṇas posited by his school are an authentic means of valid cognition, he argues that the authoritative character of a scripture is established with the help of an inference while the formulation of a relation of invariable concomitance so essential for all inference inevitably requires the help of perception so that the three pramāṇas verbal testimony, inference and perception hinge together; to this is added that the fourth pramāṇa analogy too is of use in certain practical cases.¹⁹ Here again Jayanta is presenting his case in a rather topsyturvy form. For his own treatment of pramāṇa makes an orderly progress by first covering perception, then inference, then analogy and lastly verbal testimony – while handling scripture as a particular case of verbal testimony. True, Jayanta's coverage of verbal testimony is inordinately lengthy and in the course of it there appears that theologically motivated fourth Chapter, but even then no impression is here created as if the investigation into perception, inference and analogy is just preparatory to the investigation into verbal testimony. Nor is an impression created as if the investigation into verbal testimony is primarily aimed at demonstrating that Vedas are a composition by God and not an authorless composition. As a matter of fact, the demonstration in question (occurring towards the beginning of the fourth chapter) is of a modest bulk; (significantly the demonstration of the allied metaphysical thesis that God exists and that a word is not an eternal substance – a demonstration occurring in the third Chapter—is much more lengthy and that unmistakably proves that Jayanta's genuine interest lies in philosophical rather than theological problems). The simple reason why Jayanta is presently over-emphasizing the importance of the problem of verbal testimony in general and scriptural testimony in particular is that he has persuaded himself that the primary concern of the Nyāya school is to vindicate the validity of Vedic testimony. The same attitude leads him to say that the fourteen padārthas samśaya etc. are posited by his school because they are of help

in all process of demonstration — while demonstrating the validity of Vedic testimony is so vital a human concern.²⁰ That the parenthetic clause in question is just an irrelevant proclamation of faith is proved from Jayanta's own treatment of those fourteen topics which has nothing special to do with the task of vindicating the validity of Vedic testimony. Thus the contrast between the proposition Jayanta makes in the present introductory part of his text and the performance he actually puts up within the body of this text is too important and conspicuous to be missed. For if exception be made of its fourth Chapter this text preaches no theology but offers a rational account of certain important logical problems and allied metaphysical problems (the problems of ethics too being touched upon while investigating the last six of the twelve prameyas). This account certainly draws upon the entire past tradition of the Nyāya school but that was only natural, what is noteworthy is that the author's assimilation of the traditional material is so masterly. As things stood, this assimilation required a thorough acquaintance with the logical findings of two rival schools, viz. Buddhist and Mīmāṃsa, and this acquaintance too our author exhibits in good measure. An additional attraction is his highly ornate style of writing, a style that has turned his philosophical masterpiece into a veritable literary masterpiece. All this should become evident as we gradually familiarize ourselves with the contents of Nyāyamañjarī following the original order of exposition. As has already been noted, the first Chapter investigates pramāṇa in general, the second Chapter perception, inference and analogy, the third to sixth Chapters verbal testimony, the seventh to ninth Chapters investigate the padārtha prameya, the tenth to twelfth Chapters the remaining fourteen padārthas saṁśaya etc. [The already examined introductory discussion is a part of the first Chapter itself.] We take these Chapters one by one, introducing sub-divisions as need arises.

CHAPTER 1

PRAMĀṆA ARTHĀPATTI AND ABHĀVA

In this Chapter Jayanta offers comment on the single Nyāya-sūtra aphorism which is to the effect that perception, inference, analogy, verbal testimony are (four) pramāṇas. And he accomplishes his task by way of doing the following four things :

(1) formulating his own definition of pramāṇa and criticising the rival definitions advanced by the Buddhists, Mīmāṃsakas and Sāṅkhyas,

(2) criticizing the Buddhist position that there are only two pramāṇas, viz. perception and inference,

(3) criticizing the Mīmāṃsā position that arthāpatti is an additional pramāṇa,

(4) criticizing the Kumarilite Mīmāṃsā position that abhāva is an additional pramāṇa.

The four points deserve separate consideration inasmuch as each has to do with a distinct aspect of the general problem of pramāṇa. We take them up one by one.

(1) On Defining Pramāṇa

The early Nyāya authors were keenly interested in determining as to how many types of cognition there are. They came to the conclusion that these types are four in all, viz. perception, inference, verbal testimony, analogy; (the first three are naturally understandable, the fourth is somewhat technical.) It was understood that cognition might be valid or invalid, but the importance of the former was emphasized by talking of valid cognition rather than cognition in general (the word for valid cognition being pramāṇa, that for cognition in general jñāna). Again, it was understood that one type of valid cognition differs from another because the two have got different causes, but the concept 'cause of valid cognition' was not made a distinct topic of discussion. But it was this concept that became central in the

logical enquiries of the later Nyāya authors with whom the word 'pramāṇa' stood not for valid cognition as such but for cause of valid cognition. The reason for this shift of usage was that the later Nyāya authors were not satisfied with a mere classification of valid cognition but wanted to determine the precise conditions under which the different types of valid cognition took their rise. This often created a technical problem when a later Nyāya author would assign to the word 'pramāṇa' occurring in an old text the meaning 'cause of valid cognition' whereas the originally intended meaning was 'valid cognition' as such. However, that was not a much serious consequence; serious aspects of the problem came to light when a deep probe was undertaken into the concept 'cause of valid cognition'. For in this connection distinction began to be made between cause and chief-cause (lit. the most efficacious cause) and it was given out that pramāṇa means not just cause of valid cognition but chief-cause of valid cognition. The distinction in question is ultimately traceable to the grammarians' discussion on nominal cases— in Sanskrit called *karaka* (lit. cause-of-action). The theory was that in a sentence a noun could be related to the verb in seven ways inasmuch as the thing denoted by a noun could in seven ways act as a cause to the action denoted by the verb; the seven *karakas* are seven cause-of-action as thus understood. And then it was maintained that the *kāraka* called *kaṛaṇa* (lit. instrument) is the chief (= most efficacious) cause-of-action. When the Nyāya authors drew a distinction between cause and chief cause they had in mind this whole discussion undertaken by the grammarian. But the fact was that the grammarian had not formulated a full-fledged theory of causation which is what the Nyāya authors really needed; (not that the grammarian's discussion had no bearing on the problem of causation, but it was not itself a discussion of this problem). So these authors made their own analysis of the cases of causation met with in everyday life. Thus from their point of view all causation requires an agent, an instrument and an objective. For example, when a wood-cutter produces with his axe a cut-in-the-tree, the woodcutter is the agent, the axe the instrument, the cut-in-the-tree the objective; similarly, when

a potter produces a jar with his wheel-cum-stick the potter is the agent, the wheel-cum-stick the instrument, the jar the objective. Then it was noticed that here the instrument is set in operation on some raw material; e.g. the wood-cutter's axe operates on the tree, the potter's wheel-cum-stick operates on clay. Keeping all this in mind an instrument (karaṇa) – which in line with the grammarians' usage pertaining to the kāraṇa (=cause-of-action) designated karaṇa (= instrument) was called the chief (= most efficacious) cause – was defined as 'the cause which exhibits an operation¹'. This model of causal analysis where an instrument was understood to be the chief (= most efficacious) cause and the cause exhibiting an operation the Nyāya authors applied to the cases of causing valid cognition. As a general rule, pramāṇa was defined as 'the chief cause (= instrument) of valid cognition' and in the case of each of the four types of valid cognition the search was for an 'instrument' and an 'operation'. The difficulty with the Nyāya authors' model was that it was suitable (if at all) for a study of physical operations while cognition is an essentially mental operation. Hence it was that its employment for the study of perception, which is somehow a physical operation made some sense while its employment for the study of inference etc. which are largely a mental operation remained more or less a technicality. Thus perception takes place when a sense-organ comes in contact with a physical object; so the Nyāya author could say that here the cognizer soul (the agent) produces perceptual cognition (=objective) using the sense-organ as 'instrument' and its contact-with-the physical-object as 'operation'. However, perceptual cognition as thus described will rather be the physiological process called sensory experience whereas according to the Nyāya author such cognition also includes the mental process called 'identification of the object perceived,' a mental process which remains unaccounted for in terms of the proposed model of causal analysis. On the other hand, in the case of inferential cognition it just makes no sense to speak of an 'instrument' and an 'operation'; even then we are told that here 'cognition of probans' acts as 'instrument' while 'cognition that the probans belongs to the locus and stands

related to the probandum by way of invariable concomitance' acts as 'operation,' a statement which is purely technical. [In this connection an anomalous situation sometimes arose when an author would speak as if 'operation' is 'instrument'. Such an author would define an instrument not as 'the cause which exhibits an operation' but as 'the cause which immediately brings forth the effect' Thus on this understanding, in the case of perceptual cognition the 'instrument' is sense-object-contact (not the sense-organ), in the case of inferential cognition it is 'cognition that the probans belongs to the locus and stands related to the probandum by way of invariable concomitance' (not cognition of probans'). This way of looking at things was the result of clean forgetting the historical origins of the concept of 'instrument'; what was remembered was that an instrument is the chief cause, what was not remembered was that an instrument is something set in operation on a raw material.]

In the history of Nyāya school Jayanta is famous for his outright rejection of this whole approach towards the problem of defining 'pramāṇa'. He conceded that 'pramāṇa' means not valid cognition as such but cause of valid cognition. But he refused to distinguish between a chief cause and the subsidiary causes and maintained that the total causal aggregate—inclusive of factors physical as well as mental—which produces valid cognition is to be called 'pramāṇa'; (by the way he also defined valid cognition as 'that apprehension of an object, which is free from error and free from doubt' but this is an element in his definition of pramāṇa to which no colleague of his — as a matter of fact, no logician — would take exception.²)

Jayanta considers three objections that might possibly be urged against his definition. Thus one might argue that since pramāṇa means instrument of valid cognition while an instrument has to be chief cause the total causal aggregate of valid cognition cannot be called pramāṇa because there is nothing subsidiary in relation to which this aggregate acts as chief; again, one might argue that since pramāṇa means instrument of valid cognition while an

instrument is what the agent concerned applies to the object concerned, the total causal aggregate of valid cognition cannot be called *pramāṇa* because the agent concerned and the object concerned are already a part of this aggregate; lastly, one might argue that the total causal aggregate of valid cognition cannot be the instrument of valid cognition because about an instrument all must be in a position to say that the action concerned is performed through it while nobody says that valid cognition is performed through the concerned total causal aggregate.³ The following is how these objections are answered.

(1) Jayanta considers three alternative senses in which a thing might be called chief cause, and his understanding is that in all those senses the concerned total causal aggregate alone deserves to be so called. Thus one might say that a chief cause is that thing in the absence of which the effect concerned would not come into existence; Jayanta replies that since the effect concerned would not come into existence in case the concerned causal aggregate is deficient even by a single element no such element rather than any other can be called a chief cause while this causal aggregate taken as a whole can be called a chief cause.⁴ Again, one might say that a chief cause is that thing whose immediate presence brings into existence the effect concerned; Jayanta replies that each and every member of the concerned causal aggregate is such that its immediate presence brings into existence the effect concerned (he first argues that a member of this causal aggregate which is present there since long is as much necessary as the one which is present there just immediately).⁵ Lastly, one might say that a chief cause is that thing whose sudden presence (while other members of the concerned causal aggregate are already present) brings into existence the effect concerned; Jayanta once more replies that the description applies to each and every member of the concerned causal aggregate.⁶ It can easily be seen that the three senses under consideration are closely interrelated and each is based on the understanding that some one member of the concerned causal aggregate is somehow a chief cause. This understanding Jayanta explodes by simply arguing that one member of this aggregate

is as much indispensable as another so that if anything is at all to be designated 'chief cause' it is this aggregate itself.⁷ But then Jayanta is confronted with the objection that a chief cause is so called in relation to something that is called subsidiary cause while nothing can act as subsidiary to the concerned causal aggregate as a whole; he replies that this aggregate acts as chief cause in relation to each of its individual members taken singly, his point being that this aggregate can and an individual member of it cannot bring into existence the effect concerned.⁸ In this connection Jayanta thinks it necessary to emphasize that even if a causal aggregate does not stand over and above the concerned individual members as does a composite substance over and above its component parts the appearance of this aggregate on one hand and the concerned individual members on the other is a plain fact.⁹ Obviously, it is on this supposition that he feels justified to posit the relation of chief- and - subsidiary between a causal aggregate and its individual members¹⁰ and it is on this very supposition that he answers the second objection.

(2) The second objection was one to the effect that if the instrument be identical with the total causal aggregate then since the agent concerned and the object concerned too would now be a part and parcel of the instrument concerned it should not be possible to say that the agent concerned applies the instrument concerned on the object concerned. Jayanta's reply emphasizes that the agent concerned and the object concerned do not cease to be distinctly visible even within the body of the concerned causal aggregate, so that there is nothing incongruous about saying that the agent concerned applies the instrument concerned on the object concerned.¹¹ The difficulty with this reply is that it seems to be the very nature of an instrument that the agent concerned and the object concerned be two entities absolutely apart from it. Even earlier Jayanta has contended that an agent is called a cognizer and an object a thing cognized only when the two form a part and parcel of the causal aggregate that produces cognition.¹² But to say that the agent concerned and the object concerned form a part and parcel of the causal aggregate that produces cognition is not

to say that they are a part and parcel of the instrument that produces cognition. As a matter of fact, Jayanta's thesis on causal aggregate is strongly reminiscent of the Buddhist way of looking at things while his thesis on instrument is the usual Nyāya way of looking at things, and the two ways are in a way incompatible with one another. Thus while explaining any case of causation - voluntary or otherwise - the Buddhist would speak of a causal aggregate producing an effect and he would make no fundamental distinction within the body of this aggregate. On the other hand, the Nyāya author would exclusively speak of voluntary causation (as a result of espousing theism he even believes that all causation is voluntary causation) and in this connection he would speak of an agent applying an instrument on an object. Thus even if the Nyāya author could see the point of speaking about a causal aggregate producing an effect he would include within this aggregate the agent, the object as well as the instrument; but for this very reason he would refuse to concede that this causal aggregate is to be called instrument. That Jayanta was somehow aware of this difficulty will become evident soon, but before coming to that point let us consider his reply to the third objection urged against his position.

(3) The third objection is one to the effect that in common parlance we never say that one cognizes an object through the concerned causal aggregate. Jayanta replies that that is so because this aggregate being but of the form of a totality of its constituent members it is not spoken of in common parlance.¹³ This reply is patently dogmatic and as a matter of fact Jayanta should have reported: "No, we say that one cognizes through the concerned causal aggregate." Even so, Jayanta does make an important point: for he in essence submits that about each and every member of the concerned causal aggregate we can say that one cognizes an object through it. [He was not categorical about the point because of his old difficulty that the statement in question cannot be made about the agent concerned and the object concerned.]¹⁴ Jayanta's argumentation clearly implies that in his view his Nyāya colleagues have been misled by the grammarian's

talk of seven *kāra*kas. Thus he points out that not only do we say 'one sees through a lamp', 'one sees through eyes' but we also say 'one cooks through the cookingpan'. This way the orthodox Nyāya authors are told that there is no sense in maintaining that eyes are and a lamp is not the 'instrument' of perceptual cognition. Similarly, they are told that from the point of view of causal analysis it is a sheer grammatical accident that one noun in a sentence occurs accompanied by the instrumental case-ending, another accompanied by the locative case-ending or the like; e.g. from this point of view the statement 'rice is boiled in the cooking pan' is equivalent to the statement 'rice is boiled through the cookingpan', the idea expressed being that the cookingpan is a member of the causal aggregate that brings about boiling-of-rice.

After thus disposing of the three objections urged against his position, Jayanta adopts a rather curious course. For now he quotes without refuting the view of 'certain others' according to whom not the total causal aggregate that produces cognition but this aggregate minus the agent concerned and the object concerned constitutes instrument, their point being that it is incongruous to call the same thing an agent or an object in one capacity, an instrument in another capacity.¹⁵ [Since no other hitherto available Nyāya work defends on the question under consideration a position like that of Jayanta, it is to be surmised that in this connection he was a member of some obscure small circle which had its own inner-differences on secondary points.] Obviously, on this view one can be categorical that about each and every thing constituting instrument—not about any one particular such thing—it can be said that one cognizes an object through it, a point Jayanta hastens to make.¹⁶ Here again an implicit reference is made to the grammarian's theory of seven *kāra*kas though criticism against it is levelled in a rather subdued tone. Thus it is argued that the act of producing cognition requires just three *kāra*kas, viz. agent, object and instrument even if an act like cooking might require an additional *kāra*ka in the form of locus

or the like.¹⁷ Thus instead of insisting that in the case of the act of cooking the cooking pan is to be called an instrument rather than anything else it is now conceded that it might be called a locus and not an instrument. The concession is not warranted, because an act of voluntary causation really does not require more than three factors – viz. an agent, an object (=raw material), an instrument; (that the instrument might be a complex made up of several sub-factors does not affect the main point). In any case, the noteworthy thing is the insistence that the act of producing cognition requires just three factors, viz. an agent, an object, an instrument. Lastly, Jayanta notes that on this new view it becomes easy to answer the old question as to what it is in relation to which the instrument is to act as chief cause; the answer obviously is that it acts as chief cause in relation to the agent and the object, an answer buttressed by emphasizing the earlier skirted point that even while saying 'one cognizes through the instrument' we never say 'one cognizes through the agent', 'one cognizes through the object'.¹⁸

After thus formulating a definition of pramāṇa and chiefly defending it against the objections coming from the side of his own Nyāya colleagues, Jayanta proceeds to examine certain rival views maintained in this connection, viz. the Buddhist view (considered in two separate instalments), the Mīmāṃsā view, the Sāṅkhya view (considered just in passing). These views as examined by Jayanta deserve a close study because they throw important light on the ontological presuppositions of the logical doctrines developed by the schools in question. Certainly, in broad essentials these schools were agreed not only as to what cognition means but also as to what the chief cognition-types perception, inference and verbal testimony mean, and yet they differed rather violently so far as it concerned the question of determining the ontological status of cognition. For example, the Buddhists, Naiyayikas as well as Kumārīlite Mīmāṃsakas maintained that cognition is a mental phenomenon like pleasure, pain, desire, effort etc., but they drew very different conclusions from this very position. Thus the Buddhists argued that just as it is impossible

for pleasure, pain etc. to arise and yet remain unperceived, it is impossible for cognition to do so. On the other hand, the Naiyāyika even while conceding that pleasure, pain etc. cannot remain unperceived saw no difficulty about supposing that cognition might remain unperceived; however, they too held that it is in principle possible for cognition to be made an object of perception. Lastly, the Kumārīlite Mīmāṃsakas agreed with the Buddhists and Naiyāyikas that pleasure, pain etc. cannot remain unperceived and yet they declared that it is in principle impossible for cognition to be made an object of perception. Then take another point of difference obtaining between these three groups of logicians. Thus the Buddhists, Naiyāyikas as well as Kumārīlite Mīmāṃsakas maintained that cognition, being a mental phenomenon, is no property of a body or of a bodily organ. However, the Buddhists further opined that the mental world of a person constitutes an uninterrupted series of momentary states each possibly an amalgam of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, effort etc. On the other hand, the Naiyāyikas held that cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, effort etc. are specific qualities of an abiding substance soul which might possibly be devoid of all such specific qualities and in which not more than one such specific quality can be born at one and the same time. Lastly, the Mīmāṃsakas broadly shared the Naiyāyika's view just set forth but they held a characteristic position as regards cognition; thus according to them cognition is an operation undertaken by a soul, an operation which results in the object concerned becoming cognized just as cooking is an operation which results in the raw rice becoming cooked rice. This much preliminary information should enable one to better appreciate Jayanta's forthcoming polemic against the Buddhists and Mīmāṃsakas.

Jayanta begins by launching a series of attacks against the Buddhist thesis on *pramāṇa*. Let us recall that Jayanta defines *pramāṇa* as the total causal aggregate – inclusive of factors physical as well as mental – which produces valid cognition. We have hinted that this definition heretical from the standpoint of Nyāya is strongly reminiscent of the Buddhist way of looking at things.

And yet this definition is not acceptable to the Buddhist because he has chosen to give the name *pramāṇa* to a different thing altogether. Thus according to him a cognition bears the form of its object while it is of the nature of an apprehension of this object; and he maintains that this cognition insofar as it bears the form of its object is *pramāṇa*, the same insofar as it is of the nature of an apprehension of this object is *pramāṇaphala* (= the result produced by *pramāṇa*). While defending this rather odd position the Buddhists make two points as follows :

(1) *Pramāṇa* and *pramāṇaphala* are not different from one another because they are two aspects of one and the same cognition:

(2) the designation '*pramāṇa*' cannot be attributed to anything but a cognition.

These two points Jayanta seeks to demolish one after another and his intention is tolerably clear. Thus according to Jayanta *pramāṇa* is something that includes factors physical as well as mental. Now his word for mental factor is '*bodha*' which can be better translated as 'cognition' (but has been translated as 'mental factor' because its antonym '*abodha*' must be translated as 'physical factor'). And then his opening sentence can be translated in two ways so that both those Buddhist points can be covered simultaneously even if they are criticized one after another (where some text-part which should initiate the criticism of the second point is missing).¹⁹ When translated one way the sentence means 'those according to whom cognition itself is *pramāṇa* are not subtle-witted' and this will initiate the criticism of the first Buddhist point; when translated another way it means 'those according to whom cognition alone is *pramāṇa* are not subtle-witted' and this will initiate the criticism of the second Buddhist point. The following is how Jayanta argues against the two points in question.

(1) It is argued that the resulting cognition itself should not be called *pramāṇa* because the very etymology of the word sugg-

ests that *pramāṇa* is what causes valid cognition – not this valid cognition itself.²⁰ Jayanta knows that an appeal to etymology will not help him much inasmuch as the word *pramāṇa* can also rightly mean valid cognition itself.²¹ So the real difference between him and the Buddhist is simply technical and nothing can be done about that; for the two have exercised their right to define the word ‘*pramāṇa*’ in anyway they like. Even so, the fact remains that the Buddhist definition is pretty odd.

(2) Since the Buddhist attributes the designation ‘*pramāṇa*’ to an aspect of the resulting valid cognition itself, the contention that nothing that is not a cognition can be *pramāṇa* ought to be a platitude on his part. But he also intends to imply that nothing that is not a cognition can be *pramāṇa* even in the Naiyāyika’s sense of the term. And this implication Jayanta contends by pointing out that the causal aggregate that produces valid cognition can well include non-cognitive (=physical) factors; thus on his showing a word is such a factor in the case of verbal testimony, a lamp or a sense-organ in the case of perception, a probans in the case of inference.²² By the way, Jayanta also quoted examples of cognitive factors that might be included in a *pramāṇa*; thus knowledge-of-the-qualifier is such a factor in the case of perception, knowledge of, probans in the case of inference, perception of similarity in the case of analogy, hearing of words in the case of verbal testimony.²³ [As will become clear there, this part of Jayanta’s argumentation can be better appreciated when viewed in the context of examining the Buddhist contention that the only two *pramāṇas* are perception and inference].

Jayanta next criticizes a Buddhist position which is rejected by the school of Dinnāga – Dharmakīrti itself, a school that alone matters for our purpose. Thus according to this school a perceptual cognition manages to grasp its object because it is produced by this object, to be more precise, because this object happens to be a member of the causal aggregate that produces this cognition. But according to the position under consideration a cognition and its object come into existence simultaneously – so that

it must offer some other explanation of how this cognition manages to grasp this object. As Jayanta presents it the explanation consists in submitting that this cognition and this object have got the same causal aggregate whose two members are the object as occurring at the immediately preceding moment and the cognition as occurring at the immediately preceding moment, it being the case that in the production of this cognition the latter acts as chief cause and the former as subsidiary cause while in the production of this object the opposite happens.²⁴ Really speaking, this is simply repeating in the technical language of Buddhist momentarism the contention that a cognition and its object come into existence simultaneously – and no explanation of what enables this cognition to grasp this object. Jayanta rejects this alleged explanation on the ground that a cognition and its object cannot come into existence simultaneously, the same ground on which it was rejected by the school of Dinnāga – Dharmakīrti; but curiously, instead of saying – as was done by this school – that it is understandable if this cognition comes into existence immediately after this object, Jayanta actually says that it is understandable if this cognition comes in to existence immediately before this object.²⁵ Jayanta also rejects this explanation on more general ground that if the same causal aggregate produces x as well as y , x and y cannot be distinguished from one another – so that the opponent should be in no position to tell as to what distinguishes a cognition from its object; but this criticism of his stands or falls with his general criticism of Buddhist momentarism, as he actually confesses.²⁶

Lastly, Jayanta criticizes the famous Buddhist position that a cognition bears the form of its object. This criticism has a deep import and is logically connected with the forthcoming criticism of the corresponding position maintained by the Kumārilite Mīmāṃsaka. Thus when a cognitive organ is appropriately applied on an object x cognition-of- x takes place and after that has happened the cognizer concerned is in a position to deal with x more effectively than before. This fundamental situation is under-

stood differently by the Buddhist, the Naiyāyika and the Kumārīlite Mīmāṃsaka. The Buddhist says that x is cognized not directly but by way of cognizing cognition-of- x and finding that it bears the form of x . The Naiyāyika and the Kumārīlite Mīmāṃsaka find this stand untenable, for with them cognition-of- x is itself a cognizing of x and not something which when cognized results in a cognizing of x . It is essentially this criticism that Jayānta presently advances against the Buddhist even if his words seem to relate to a different subject-matter. For he first takes exception to the Buddhist contention that unless a cognition bears the form of its object there will be no way to distinguish cognition-of- x from cognition-of- y (the suggestion that the two cognitions will differ inasmuch as the former is caused by x the latter by y is rejected on the ground that the causal aggregate of a cognition includes not only its object but so many other factors whose form this cognition does not bear). Jayānta remarks that this whole position the Buddhist maintains with a view to leading support to idealism and that it will be considered while refuting idealism.²⁷ But towards the end he actually hints at his line of attack. For he argues that the fact that cognition-of- x is caused by x while cognition-of- y is caused by y should suffice to distinguish these two cognitions just as according to the Buddhist this fact suffices to explain why the former cognition bears the form of x , the latter bears the form of y , his point being that the thesis of 'formed' cognition possesses no advantage over the rival thesis of 'unformed' cognition.²⁸ And Jayānta's submission that the thesis of 'formed' cognition has been maintained with a view to leading support to idealism is valid inasmuch as that is one serious use that the Buddhists have made of this thesis: for supporting the idealist standpoint they have actually argued that there is no warrant to posit an external object when all that we ever cognize is not this object itself but a cognition bearing the form of this object. However, from the standpoint of logical studies the more particular criticism against the Buddhist stand is that it makes no sense to say that x is cognized not directly but by way of cognizing cognition-of- x . This criticism too Jayānta levels but again in words that seem to relate to a different

subject-matter. Thus he submits that the Buddhist claiming to be realist has no right to posit an external object inasmuch as on the latter's supposition such an object can be cognized neither through inference, nor through perception, nor through implication – not through inference because inference of x presupposes perception of x , nor through perception because that is denied by the Buddhist himself, nor through implication because that way too an object is cognized not directly but by way of cognizing the cognition concerned.²⁹ The submission is not made by Jayanta in these very words but this is what it virtually amounts to. Even so, the difficulty with it is that the Buddhist will retort that it is the very nature of cognition that no type of it – whether perception, inference or implication – can ever cognize an object directly but always by way of cognizing itself and finding itself to bear the form of this object. Hence it is that criticism should have been pointedly directed against this basic Buddhist understanding of the phenomenon of cognition.

Thus closes the first instalment of the criticism Jayanta directed against the Buddhist definition of *pramāṇa*. In this connection he has taken exception to the following four positions :

- (1) that *pramāṇa* is one with *pramāṇaphala*
- (2) that no non-cognitive factor can act as *pramāṇa*
- (3) that a cognition and its object come into existence simultaneously
- (4) that a cognition bears the form of its object.

The position (1) has been attributed to the advocate of the position (3) as also to that of the position (4).³⁰ And it is referring to this position (1) that Jayanta makes transition to his criticism of the Kumārilite *Mīmāṃsā* definition of *pramāṇa*. As was noted above, when a cognitive organ is appropriately applied to an object x cognition-of- x takes place. We have also seen how Jayanta criticizes the Buddhist understanding of this phenomenon, a criticism that the Kumārilite *Mīmāṃsaka* shares. But then arises a point where the Kumārilite *Mīmāṃsaka* parts com-

pany with the Nyāya fellow-fighter. For the former attributes the designation 'cognition' not to what results from the operation of a cognitive organ but to this operation itself, whereas according to the latter cognition is a quality produced in the soul concerned as a result of this operation. Again, on the Kumārilite's showing what results from the operation in question is a property called 'cognizedness' belonging to the object concerned. Lastly, it is his understanding that the operation in question is not something observable but posited by way of implication in order to account for this 'cognizedness' which in its turn is something observable. This whole position maintained by the Kumārilite Jayanta seeks to assail. Against the Buddhist, Jayanta had argued that the former attributes the designation 'pramāṇa' not to what produces valid cognition but to the resultant valid cognition itself; the Kumārilite now dissociates himself from the Buddhist by pointing out that according to the former too the designation 'pramāṇa' is to be attributed to valid cognition itself but that this valid cognition is not a result but an operation whose own result is 'cognizedness' produced in the object concerned.³¹ In this connection he elaborates his general theory of 'operation' and applies it to the case of cognition.³² Thus on his showing in the case of all operation the different members of the concerned causal aggregate act in their respective ways in order to bring about the result concerned, it being further maintained that this operation is something different from the observable acts of the different members of the concerned causal aggregate, is itself not something observable, and is to be inferred from the result concerned. For example, cooking is an operation as a result of which raw rice becomes cooked rice, and in the course of it the causal elements like fuel, cooking-pan, raw rice etc. act in their respective ways; similarly, cognition is an operation as a result of which a hitherto uncognized object becomes a cognized object, and in the course of it the causal elements like eye, light, object etc. act in their respective ways. And just as the cooking operation is itself not something observable and is to be inferred from the fact that raw

rice has become cooked rice, similarly the cognitive operation is itself not something observable and is to be inferred from the fact that a hitherto uncognized object has become a cognized object. The Kumārilite thesis on operation in general and cognitive operation in particular Jayanta suspects to be a product of fear against Buddhist idealism.³³ Thus beginning with the position that an object is cognized, not directly but by way of cognizing a cognition that bears the form of this object the Buddhist ended with the position that there is no object apart from cognition; to Jayanta it seems that the Kumārilite fondly seeks to avoid such a degradation by maintaining that a cognition is cognized not directly but by way of drawing an inference from the fact that the object concerned has become a cognized object (it is a fond endeavour because an object cannot be cognized as something cognized unless the cognition concerned is already cognized). Jayanta perhaps correctly fathoms the psychological motivation of the Kumārilite, but logically the latter's position seems to be more tenable. Thus as was noted above, as a result of cognizing an object the cognizer concerned is in a position to deal with this object better than before; it is this property of an object that is to be called cognizedness and the cognition concerned is cognized only to the extent this property is cognized. This is the logical crux of the Kumārilite contention that a cognition is cognized not by way of perception but by way of drawing an inference from object-cognizedness. The Nyāya authors, on the other hand, believe that a cognition can be perceived as soon as it is born in the form of a quality of soul, just as pleasure, pain etc. can be thus perceived; but such an instantaneous inspection of a cognition can at the most consist in the bare realization that this cognition has taken place, a realization that is no cognition of this cognition in any worthwhile sense. Be that as it may, the present contest is between the Kumārilite position that cognition is an unobservable operation undertaken by the concerned causal aggregate with a view to producing the property cognizedness in the object concerned and the Nyāya position that it is

an observable quality produced in the soul concerned by the concerned causal aggregate.

Jayanta begins by arguing that even if cognition be of the form of an operation – that is, action – it should not be something unobservable because it is the Kumārilite's own position that an action belonging to an observable substance (like soul) is something observable; to this it is added that if all action is of the form of an unobservable operation undertaken by a causal aggregate then an infinite regress is unavoidable inasmuch as the action of a member of this causal aggregate will require another causal aggregate and so on ad infinitum.³⁴ The opponent pleads that the members of a causal aggregate come together to bring about something and that this something is the operation concerned; Jayanta replies that these members bring about nothing save the result concerned.³⁵ The opponent insists that the members of a causal aggregate come together to bring about an action; Jayanta first replies that these members do not come together to bring about something unobservable, the point being that they come together to bring about the result itself which is something observable, but then he goes on to add that each of these members does bring about an action which is specific to it and is something observable, the point being that these members bring about no action that is something unobservable.³⁶ Now the opponent submits that the members of a causal aggregate bring about something that is over and above their respective actions and that this something is the operation concerned; Jayanta in essence replies by way of posing a dilemma: if this operation is brought about by these members acting together then each of them must be inactive unless all come together – e.g. in that case fuel should not burn unless it is cooking rice, if this operation is brought about by these members acting singly then it should be brought by each acting singly – e.g. in that case rice should be cooked by burning fuel alone.³⁷ This reply of Jayanta is based on the consideration that the members of a causal aggregate are said to bring about an operation in the form of something new while he sees there nothing

apart from the respective actions of these members themselves; so when the opponent pleads that fuel burns even taken singly but cooks rice only in the company of other members of the concerned causal aggregate Jayanta retorts that even in their company fuel does nothing save burning, his point being that the result concerned is the new thing that is jointly brought about by the members of a causal aggregate.³⁸ Then it is the opponent who poses a dilemma : If the result is something already accomplished there is no sense in bringing it about, if it is something to be accomplished then it must be of the form of an operation; Jayanta retorts that the result is something to be accomplished and yet not of the form of an operation (the opponent is however allowed the freedom to define operation as 'something to be accomplished' and then call the result an operation in his own technical sense).³⁹ In desperation the opponent asks : "What then constitutes cooking ? Certainly, the verb 'to cook' cannot be meaningless." Jayanta replies that the respective actions of the members of the concerned causal aggregate are themselves what constitutes cooking but these actions as determined by (= as aimed at) the result concerned (the reply is buttressed by the consideration that about each of these members it can be said that it is undertaking cooking).⁴⁰

Jayanta sums up the above general discussion by examining the specific case of cognition which he considers to be a quality of soul and the Kumārīlite an operation undertaken by soul. He begins by emphasising the established position of his school that a soul undertakes no action but just possesses qualities like cognition, pleasure, pain etc.⁴¹ Then an appeal is made to the circumstance that one is often in a position to say "I cognize such and such an object"; his point is that here cognition is being referred to as something perceived but that since cognition conceived as an operation is something imperceptible on the opponent's own showing cognition here referred to must be a quality rather than operation.⁴² Jayanta knows that the opponent will plead – and not implausibly – that here is a case of an

object being perceived as something cognized, and so he seeks support in another direction. For now he quotes the Mīmāṃsā stalwart, Śābara as mentioning cognition and action together, which means that according to the latter cognition is not of the form of action.⁴³ Now it is not improbable that to view cognition as an operation is a post-Śābara development in the history of Mīmāṃsā school; but to view it as something essentially unobservable seems to be as old as Śābara. So Jayanta lastly directs his attack against this latter position itself. His first argument is that if x is never an object of perception it can also never be an object of inference.⁴⁴ But realizing the weakness of such an argument (which should make it impossible for a philosopher to posit anything imperceptible) he next submits that an 'operation' over and above the respective actions of the members of the concerned causal aggregate is an untenable concept.⁴⁵ This is no new submission, as is confessed. So, lastly is examined the argument actually most favourite of the Kumārīlite. The argument is that the fact that an object is found to be something cognized remains unaccounted for unless it is posited that the cognition concerned has taken place, this being called cognizing this cognition by way of implication; Jayanta in essence replies that the fact in question can be accounted for even on his supposition about the nature of cognition.⁴⁶ He is correct as we ourselves pointed out when he himself argued that this fact can be accounted for even on his supposition about the nature of cognition. But the question is which accounting is more tenable—Jayanta's or the Kumārīlite's; and viewed thus it seems a better course that cognition be treated as an operation which results in the object concerned being cognized, a result manifested in the circumstance that the cognizer concerned is in a position to deal with the object concerned more effectively than before. It is this course which the Kumārīlite in essence recommends and which Jayanta rejects in the name of arguing that the Kumārīlite concept of object-cognizedness is untenable. Thus on his showing this concept might mean that the object concerned has been made an object of cognition or that some new property has been pro-

duced in this object; the former alternative is rejected on the ground that in that case object-cognizedness cannot be cognized without cognition itself being cognized, the latter on the ground that in that case object-cognizedness should be a public property.⁴⁷ As a matter of fact, object-cognizedness is a property not of the object concerned as such but of it as related to the cognizer concerned; but this alternative is rejected by substituting for the phrase 'object-cognizedness' the phrase 'object-revealedness' and then arguing that a revealer like lamp must reveal a thing for everybody (the fact that cognition, unlike a lamp, is a subjective type of revealer is just ignored).⁴⁸

Towards the end of his present discussion Jayanta briefly criticizes the Prabhākarite Mīmāṃsaka's position on the question, a position which has affinities with the Buddhist, Kumārīlite as well as Nyāya positions. Thus the Prabhākarites maintain that pramāṇaship belongs to jñāna which is something unobservable and is to be inferred from the result produced by it, a position apparently the same as the Kumārīlite position presently under attack from the side of Jayanta. But the two positions are only apparently the same, because the Prabhākarite's word for cognition is 'saṃvedana' while his word 'jñāna' means the operation undertaken by the causal aggregate that produces saṃvedana. So Jayanta's only criticism against the Prabhākarite is that the operation undertaken by the concerned causal aggregate is not something unobservable but he also points out that the words 'jñāna' and 'saṃvedana' are in fact synonymous.⁴⁹ Then the Prabhākarite is of the view that cognition is self-cognitive, a view also maintained by the Buddhist who draws from it far-reaching conclusions not shared by the Prabhākarite. Since according to Jayanta a cognition is perceived not by itself but by an immediately emerging cognition he criticizes the Buddhist as well as Prabhākarite theses on self-cognitive cognition; but presently his attack is directed against the Prabhākarite alone. Thus he reminds the Prabhākarite that his theory of error requires that a memory be cognized but not as memory, a requirement that cannot be fulfilled if all cognition is self-cognitive; again he reminds

him that since he does not share the Buddhist view that a cognition bears the form of its object (for that view ultimately leads to idealism) no purpose of his is served by maintaining that all cognition is self-cognitive.⁵⁰ This last lap of Jayanta's argumentation provokes some re-capitulation. Thus the Buddhist, the Kumārilite, the Prabhākārite as well as Jayanta are basing themselves on the consideration that after an object has been cognized the cognizer concerned cannot fail to realize that the cognition concerned has taken place. Nay, they are also virtually agreed as to defining the causal aggregate that goes to produce cognition. But the true position that to cognize a cognition means to rationally understand how the concerned causal aggregate produces this cognition finds clearest recognition in the Kumārilite way of looking at things.

Then Jayanta considers an altogether different aspect of the Kumārilite definition of *pramāṇa*. Thus according to this definition the object of *pramāṇa* must be something that was hitherto uncognized, a stipulation which Jayanta finds untenable.⁵¹ Unfortunately, here again the Kumārilite is and Jayanta is not on the right track. For it is the very nature of cognition that it must take note of some new feature in an object so that what takes note of some old feature in an object is called not cognition but recognition. Somewhat aware of all this Jayanta begins by considering the question as to what is the use of cognizing something that has already been cognized; his first answer is that a cognition should not cease to be cognition simply because it is useless, his second answer is that the repeated cognition of an object enables one to handle this object more effectively.⁵² The second answer has an implication that goes against Jayanta's own position for the repeated cognition of an object enables one to handle this object more effectively precisely because on each occasion some new feature of this object comes to light, an objection noted by Jayanta.⁵³ But difficulty arose because of an odd case considered by our logicians. Thus they considered it possible that one might go on cognizing one and the same object (meaning one and the same objective feature) for a long time, and Jayanta asks the

Kumārīlite as to what should be the latter's explanation for that.⁵⁴ Jayanta should have been told that after initial cognition has taken place the case in question becomes a case of recognizing an earlier cognized object. But then the difficulty was that recognition itself was treated by the Kumārīlite as a case of *pramāṇa* and this difficulty too Jayanta exploits.⁵⁵ The Kumārīlite suggests that in recognition an earlier cognized object is cognized in a new temporal context, but since that goes without saying the suggestion cuts no ice with Jayanta.⁵⁶ Jayanta should have been frankly told that recognition is not a case of cognition. But lastly Jayanta is himself faced with a difficulty. For his school too refused to treat memory as a case of *pramāṇa* and he had to find an explanation for this refusal. Obviously, he could not argue that memory is no *pramāṇa* because it cognizes an already cognized object; so he argued that memory is no *pramāṇa* because it is not caused by what constitutes its object.⁵⁷ But really speaking, it is only perceptual cognition that is produced by what constitutes its object while an inference, verbal testimony or the like might well have for its object a past or a future thing which can in no way go to produce a cognition. Jayanta does consider two cases where a past feature or a future feature is cognized in an object, but since in both cases the object itself is a present thing he feels that they do not invalidate his present contention; thus on his showing, on finding a river flooded one might validly infer that its upper reaches had had rains in past and, similarly, one might validly anticipate that one's brother would come home next day, but since in the first case the river and in the second case one's brother are a present thing both are a case of a cognition being produced by what constitutes its object.⁵⁸ Even granting the validity of Jayanta's understanding of his two cases (though the second is of extremely doubtful import) the fact remains that it is not at all necessary for the object of a non-perceptual type of cognition to be something present, which means that Jayanta should find some other explanation for his school's refusal to treat memory as a case of *pramāṇa*. The simple fact is that the reason why recognition is not a case of cognition is also (rather all the more) the

reason why memory is not a case of cognition, never being a case of noticing a hitherto uncognized objective feature.

After having thus disposed of the Mīmāṃsā definition of *pramāṇa* Jayanta once more grapples with an aspect of the Buddhist definition. Thus the Buddhist defines valid cognition as that cognition which receives confirmation in practice, e.g. if a cognition identifies an object as *x* and if in subsequent practice this object is found to behave as *x* then this cognition is valid cognition. By way of clarification it is added that a cognition can be valid cognition even in case relevant practice is not actually undertaken, for the necessary thing is that this cognition should receive confirmation in case such practice is actually undertaken.⁵⁹ All this seems sound commonsense and yet Jayanta takes exception to it because he feels that the Buddhist in view of his advocacy of momentarism and all that has no right to say all this. The difficulty is that the Buddhist's case crucially depends on the consideration whether a cognition identifies its object rightly or otherwise, but he is also of the view that all identification of an object, being a task performed by thought, is somehow false of this object; and against thought as thus understood is pitted perception – that is, bare sensory experience – which is supposed to reveal an object in all its true particularity. As a result, his explanation of how perception and inference, the two types of valid cognition admitted by him, manage to be true of their respective objects is extremely cumbersome; this becomes at once clear from Jayanta's presentation which is fairly trustworthy. According to this explanation what a perception cognizes now is not what is an object of practice later on (for an object is necessarily momentary) but the two belong to the same 'series' which might be identified by thought rightly or otherwise, in the former case this identification being confirmed in subsequent practice; again, what an inference cognizes is not at all something being perceived but something identified by thought, but this identification can be possibly right in case the thing identified stands appropriately related to something that is being perceived.⁶⁰ Against this explanation, Jayanta's simple objection is that if the identification of an object on the

part of thought is not true of this object then as here conceived an inference is not at all, true of its object while for all practical purposes a perception too is not true of its object.⁶¹ The Buddhist pleads that a distinction be made between a real ultimately speaking and a real practically speaking, so that Jayanta's objection ceases to hold in case the 'series' here spoken of is treated as a real practically speaking even if not a real ultimately speaking; Jayanta dubs this stratagem escapist and emphasizes that what thought reveal is something ultimately real, not something just practically real, further adding that if the 'series' posited by the Buddhist is something practically real why not 'universal' etc. posited by the Nyāya philosophy.⁶² There is much point in what Jayanta says and yet the fact remains that the Buddhist's declaration that a perception is all true of its object while a thought is all false of it is a highly technical proposition; thus for all practical purposes a perception as here conceived is neither true nor false of its object in the ordinary sense while a thought as here conceived is true or false of its object in the ordinary sense. And then there is nothing seriously objectionable about the Buddhist contention that if the identification of its object on the part of a cognition is right this cognition is valid, otherwise not.

Incidentally, Jayanta here raises a relatively minor point which however leads to an important discussion. Thus the Buddhist has spoken of a cognition receiving confirmation in subsequent practice. Now Jayanta objects that the question of practice arises only in case the object concerned happens to be favourable or unfavourable but not at all in case it happens to be neutral; the suggestion that the category 'neutral' be included under the category 'unfavourable' is rejected as being akin to the suggestion that the category 'neuter' be included under the category 'female' (or under the category 'male').⁶³ The Buddhist pleads that Jayanta's present objection is not important inasmuch as a cognition can well be valid or otherwise even in case relevant practice is not actually undertaken (an old point); Jayanta understands it to mean that a cognition is valid without requiring to

be tested in practice (something like the Mīmāṃsā thesis that all cognition is valid), and this gives rise to a controversy.⁶⁴ For the Buddhist now makes the important distinction that thought arising in the wake of perception and identifying the object concerned might be true, false or just absent; e.g. when a blue particular object is perceived it is perceived in all its particularity and yet when the subsequently arising thought identifies this object as something blue it is true thought, when it identifies this object as something static (= non-momentary) it is false thought, while non-identification of this object as something momentary is a case of absence-of-thought.⁶⁵ The Buddhist's reference to a fundamental metaphysical point reminds Jayanta of another fundamental metaphysical point, for he says: "But then the identification of several momentary objects as a 'series' must be equally a case of false thought, just like the identification of mirage-sands as water"; Jayanta's implication is that the question of identification arises only in the case of a 'series' not in the case of a momentary object, so that if a 'series' is something unreal all thought whatsoever must be false.⁶⁶ Jayanta closes the present discussion by emphasizing that a definition of *pramāṇa* should make no reference to practice which after all depends on the will of the cognizer concerned; thus on his showing this definition should only say that *pramāṇa* stands for such, and such a type of apprehension-of-an-object (as is the case with Jayanta's own definition.)⁶⁷ However, Jayanta's own account of the Nyāya Vs Mīmāṃsā controversy on whether the validity of cognition is intrinsic or extrinsic will make it clear that according to his Nyāya school too it is a very important consideration that a valid cognition is and an invalid cognition is not confirmed in practice.

Lastly, Jayanta makes a few critical remarks against the Sāṅkhya definition of *pramāṇa*, in this connection promising that a refutation of the whole Sāṅkhya metaphysics will be undertaken at a future occasion.⁶⁸ The promise is necessary because barring an exception or two Jayanta nowhere takes a serious note of the Sāṅkhya position on a question of logic. Be that as it may, on the Sāṅkhya view a sense-organ undergoes transformation-bearing-

the-shape-of-the-object-concerned and in its wake the buddhi undergoes a corresponding transformation while the buddhi thus undergoing a transformation colours the puruṣa; here the buddhi as thus undergoing a transformation is pramāṇa, the puruṣa as thus coloured is pramātr.⁶⁹ Jayanta's difficulty with this whole theory is that here the entire cognitive operation of the form of pramāṇa is attributed to the buddhi which is something unconscious while the puruṣa (which is something conscious) is declared to be the pramātr even if it has nothing to do with the cognitive operation in question.⁷⁰ The suggestion that for some reason or other the buddhi and the puruṣa share each other's characteristic features is rejected on the ground that such sharing must be something illusory and so can constitute no real explanation of any sort.⁷¹ Lastly, it is pointed out that the thesis on the buddhi undergoing transformation-bearing-the-shape-of-the-object-concerned is akin to the Buddhist thesis on 'formed' cognition and is open to similar difficulties; (as a matter of fact, this Sāṅkhya thesis is too crude to bear comparison with that highly refined Buddhist thesis).⁷²

(2) On the Buddhist Twofold Classification of Pramāṇa

After dealing with the problem of defining pramāṇa Jayanta proceeds to defend the Nyāya position that there are just four pramāṇas-viz. perception, inference, analogy and verbal testimony. This he does by way of criticizing the Buddhist position that there are just two pramāṇas-viz. perception and inference, the Kumārilite-cum-Prabhākarite position that arthāpatti is an additional pramāṇa, the Kumārilite position that abhāva is a further additional pramāṇa. He begins with the Buddhist position in question. Now this Buddhist position is important not so much because it rejects verbal testimony, analogy etc. as additional pramāṇas as because it conceives the nature of perception and hence of inference in a radically novel fashion. Thus according to the Buddhist, perception is the type of cognition that involves no element of thought whatsoever; and since his word for thought is kalpana or vikalpa the idea was technically explained by saying that pratyakṣa is the type of cognition that is kalpana-

poḍha or nirvikalpaka (both meaning 'devoid of thought'). Under the impetus of this Buddhist idea the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā authors too began to posit a sub-type of perception called nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa but in their logic this remained a virtually foreign concept precisely because they had nothing corresponding to the full-fledged Buddhist thesis on kalpanā; (as a matter of fact, these authors found this Buddhist thesis to be so absurd that they felt no need for formulating a rival thesis of their own). The Buddhist thesis doubtless had its shortcomings but it was rooted in the recognition of a vital logical distinction. For cognition essentially consists in determining the nature of its object and this precisely was how the Buddhist defined thought; but there arose the question as to what is perception. Paradoxically, the vague realization that perception is not a cognitive process led the Buddhist to maintain that perception is a cognitive process par excellence. Thus on his showing perception results when a physical object acts on a sense-organ and produces sensory experience; but instead of admitting that perception as thus understood is a physiological rather than cognitive (= mental) process he declared it to be a distinct type of cognitive process in addition to thought. And then various attempts were made to distinguish perception from thought; for example, sometimes it was emphasized that the former grasps its object fully, the latter partly; sometimes that the former grasps a particular, the latter a class-character; sometimes that the former grasps a particular that is something real, the latter a class-character that is something unreal. All these attempts were more or less misguided but it is they that loom large in the Buddhist's controversy with his rivals on this question, so much so that the fact that he had hit upon the vital logical distinction that obtains between the physiological process called sensory experience on the one hand and the mental process called thought (= cognition) on the other virtually got lost sight of. Jayanta's present polemic against the Buddhist is no exception to the rule. This polemic is preceded by a fairly detailed presentation of the Buddhist's case and here except towards the end the whole emphasis is on the idea that perception and

thought have got two distinct types of object to deal with. Let us see how.

The Buddhist begins by arguing that there are just two types of pramāṇa because there are just two types of object-to-be-cognized, his point being that corresponding to a type of pramāṇa there must be a type of object-to-be-cognized.¹ That the objects-to-be-cognized are of just two types is sought to be proved through a dichotomy alleged to be established on the basis of perception itself; thus it is contended that an object-to-be-cognized must be either something sense-cognized or something not-sense-cognized, either something of the form of a unique particular or of the form of a class-character, it being further claimed that both these dichotomies are revealed in perception (just like the dichotomy that an object must be either blue or not-blue).² The idea is that when a colour-patch is perceived as blue it is also realized that it is not something not-blue and that there can be nothing that is neither blue nor not-blue; similarly, when a thing is perceived as something sense-cognized (or something of the form of a unique particular) it is also realized that it is not something not-sense-cognized (or something of the form of a class-character) and that there can be nothing that is neither something sense-cognized nor something not-sense-cognized (or neither something of the form of a unique particular nor something of the form of a class-character).³ The difficulty with this sort of argument is that on the Buddhist's own showing an object is identified as belonging to a class not through perception but through thought so much so that even to identify a colour-patch as blue is an act of thought rather than perception. Hence it is added that the identification in question is made not by perception itself but by thought arising in the wake of perception.⁴ However, even then the understanding remains that this identification is made by perception (for that is the whole point of the present argumentation); so it is next added that when perception has shown that the objects-to-be-cognized are of just two types, inference too lends support to the same basing itself on the consideration that what is *x* cannot be not-*x* and that nothing can be neither *x* nor

not- x .⁶ Really speaking, the Buddhist has not proved that the objects-to-be-cognized are of just two types, what he has proved is that if they are of just two types and if one of the types is x then the other must be non- x ; (that the latter proof is virtually useless is demonstrated through the consideration that it remains valid whatever be the value of x). So he considers the objection that nothing prevents the types in question from being more than two; his reply amounts to saying that when x is cognized it is automatically realized that not- x is its opposite (e.g. existent and not-existent, eternal and not-eternal, successive and not-successive are each a couple of mutually opposite properties).⁶ But the question is what is x supposed to be the type of object cognized through perception and why should not- x be cognized through just one *pramāṇa* inference; this question is answered by dogmatically asserting that the object which is something sense-cognized and something of the form of a unique particular is cognized through perception, the object which is something not-sense-cognized and something of the form of a class-character is cognized through inference, it being further added that verbal testimony etc. cannot cognize what is already cognized through inference just as inference cannot cognize what is already cognized through perception.⁷

We are not yet told why perception must have for its object a unique particular and inference a class-character. This question is answered by submitting that a unique particular stands unrelated to everything else and so cannot be grasped by inference which must be based on a relation of invariable concomitance, while, on the other hand, perception must grasp a unique particular because as it is bound to have to do with things real it cannot have anything to do with the class-characters which are a false imposition of thought⁸. Thus we are told that unique particulars which alone are things real are grasped by perception alone while class-characters in terms of which an inference is conducted are falsely imposed by thought on things real. Thus is obscured the correct position that a particular thing as really possessed of these and those class-characters produces sensory experience (= perception) and is truly cognized by thought in

general and inference in particular, both possibly arising in the wake of sensory experience. Certainly, the Buddhist rightly notes that sensory experience and thought are two fundamentally distinct types of processes, but instead of realizing that the former is a physiological process, the latter a cognitive (= mental) process he views them as two types of cognitive processes, the former having for its object unique particulars supposed to be something real, the latter class-characters supposed to be something unreal. Be that as it may, the Buddhist closes the present presentation of his case by emphasizing that sensory experience and thought are two fundamentally distinct types of processes. First is cited an analogy where the latter is compared to the light emitted by stars and the moon, the former to that emitted by the sun.⁹ Then it is pointed out that one lacking a sense-organ cannot have the corresponding sensory experience related to an object but he can well have verbal knowledge (= thought type of cognition) about this object.¹⁰ Lastly comes the contention that burning experienced through the torch of fire is one thing, burning learnt of through the word 'burning' is an altogether different thing.¹¹ All this should leave one in no doubt that perception as understood by the Buddhist is the process of bare sensory experience, the implication being that all that deserves to be called 'cognition' comes under what he calls 'thought'. Jayanta, however, attacks the Buddhist position from his own angle; to that we turn next.

Jayanta begins by taking exception to the Buddhist's contention that perception itself decides that there are two types of cognition with their respective types of object-to-be-cognized. He pertinently remarks that such a decision should in no case be possible on the part of perception as conceived by the Buddhist, a perception devoid of all thought; to this is added that the decision in question should be possible neither on the part of thought which on the Buddhist's showing has nothing to do with things real.¹² Jayanta further concludes that simple perception might decide whether a thing is blue or not-blue but that it cannot decide whether it is sense-cognized or not-sense-cognized.¹³ In this connection he rejects two alternatives and as follows :

(1) The alternative that perception reveals that a sense-organ has been employed with a view to cognizing an object is rejected on the ground that such a revelation is the task not of the perception itself but of a subsequent inference.

(2) The alternative that perception reveals that an object has been cognized through the perceptual type of cognition is rejected on the ground that a cognition while cognizing its object does not cognize itself as well.¹⁴

The consideration of the second alternative leads to an independent examination of the famous Buddhist position that all cognition of an object presupposes self-cognition on the part of this cognition. Jayanta's central point is that at the time of cognizing an object one does not have the feeling that one is having two cognitions – a cognition of the object concerned and a cognition of this cognition, itself.¹⁵ The alternative that this cognition is cognized by a subsequent cognition is rejected on the ground that that will lead to an infinite regress; the alternative that this cognition cognizes itself (an alternative actually adopted by the Buddhist) is rejected on the ground that nothing that is cognized cognizes itself just as a physical object does not cognize itself.¹⁶ Then is considered a point of fundamental importance.¹⁷ Thus the Buddhist has argued that all mental state, unless it is cognized and cognized by itself, is as good as not arisen. Jayanta on his part distinguishes between cognition on the one hand and the remaining mental states like pleasure, pain etc. on the other and argues that the essence of the latter lies in that they are enjoyed and in order to be enjoyed they must be perceived; however, according to him even they are not perceived by themselves but by a subsequent cognition. On the other hand, on Jayanta's showing the essence of a cognition lies in apprehending its object and this essence remains unimpaired even if this cognition remains uncognized; however, unlike the Kumārilite Mīmāṃsaka, the concedes that a cognition might be perceived by a subsequent cognition just as pleasure, pain etc. are. [That pleasure, pain etc. are perceived by a subsequent cognition is conceded even by the Kumārilite. We have not yet considered the question

as to how pleasure, pain etc. are enjoyed but we have already opined that the Kumārīlite position that a cognition is cognized by a subsequent cognition not by way of perception but by way of implication (or even inference) makes better sense than Jayanta's present position.] After thus rejecting what the Buddhist calls the perceptual evidence for a twofold division of objects-to-be-cognized, Jayanta off-hand dismisses the inferential evidence that follows; for he rightly notes that the latter offers nothing new¹⁸. Lastly, Jayanta argues that even if the objects-to-be-cognized are of two types it is not necessary that each type must be exclusively cognized through just one type of pramāṇa; he is thus preparing the ground for his own position that there are all sorts of objects-to-be-cognized and all sorts of pramāṇas to cognize them, a position which has its own difficulties¹⁹.

The point raised last of all Jayanta reopens in a somewhat new context. Thus the Buddhist has argued that what constitutes an object of perception cannot also constitute an object of inference; Jayanta retort that all inference requires the establishment of a relation of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum and unless that is done with the help of perception an infinite regress must be the result, his point being that logic demands that the probans and the probandum must be a possible object of perception as well as inference.²⁰ The Buddhist virtually concedes Jayanta's point by attributing the epithet 'perception-like' to the thought that arises in the wake of perception and identifies as belonging to this class or that the object that was earlier perceived (in brief, post-perceptual thought); thus instead of saying, as Jayanta would, that the probans and the probandum must at some time be made an object of perception, the Buddhist says that they must at some time be made an object of post-perceptual thought (which is something perception-like.)²¹ However, the real difficulty lies not with the Buddhist's nomenclature but with his understanding that all thought is somehow false of things real, a difficulty which Jayanta exploits to the full. Thus the Buddhist was bound to say that even a true post-

perceptual thought and a valid relation of invariable concomitance established with its help are somehow false of things real, they being likened to a person mistaking a jewel's rays for a jewel inasmuch as this person will get at a jewel in case he proceeds to get at what he mistakenly considers to be a jewel.²² Jayanta's simple point is that if a relation of invariable concomitance obtains between things real and is established with the help of post-perceptual thought then this thought must be competent to deal with things real.²³ To this is added that if perception and thought are so unlike each other as the Buddhist makes out then no thought can possibly be perception-like.²⁴ Jayanta concludes by posing before the Buddhist a dilemma: either the post-perceptual thought that establishes the relation of invariable concomitance is *pramāṇa* or inference is no *pramāṇa*; the confession that inference is actually somehow false of things real is rejected on the ground that in that case the Buddhist should not insist that the relation of invariable concomitance obtains between things real.²⁵ As a matter of fact, the Buddhist's insistence that all thought is false of things real is as much half-hearted as his insistence that inference is (and post-perceptual thought is not) a type of *pramāṇa*. Be that as it may, Jayanta next points out that perception of the probans as seated in the locus-of-inference so necessary for all inference, is equally impossible on the Buddhist's presupposition; his point is that this perception cannot be the perception of a unique particular but of a particular possessed of an appropriate class-character.²⁶ Here too the Buddhist will seek to substitute 'perception-like post-perceptual thought' for Jayanta's 'perception', and here too he will receive from the latter the same old retort. Clinching his point Jayanta says that the possibility that the same thing is cognized through perception as well as inference cannot be denied without denying the possibility of inference itself.²⁷ Really, in order to vindicate the possibility of inference the Buddhist only requires that the same thing is cognized through post-perceptual thought as well as inference, a requirement his theory well fulfills. On the other hand, his contention that it is not possible for the same thing to be cognized through perception as well as thought is a highly

misleading way of saying that perception and thought are two incommensurate processes inasmuch as the former is a physiological process, the latter a mental process. This should become further evident from a perusal of certain things Jayanta says while concluding the topic.

The Buddhist maintains that a unique particular to be exclusively grasped through perception is something necessarily sense-cognized, a class-character to be exclusively grasped through thought is something necessarily not-sense-cognized. As a matter of fact, a class-character is not something over and above the concerned particular objects but merely a behaviour-pattern of these objects. But Jayanta subscribes to an ontology according to which particular substances are one type of reals, 'universals' another type, qualities a third type, action a fourth type, and so on and so forth. Hence he argues that even if there are two types of objects-to-be-cognized it should be possible for both to be an object of perception as well as inference inasmuch as the same thing might be sense-cognized under one condition, not-sense-cognized under another condition.²⁸ Then he recalls that according to the Buddhist the thing that is perceived now and the corresponding thing that is made an object of parctice later on are not the same thing but two things belonging to the same 'series', this meaning that despite the Buddhist's insistence to the contrary these two things are an object of perception as well as thought ('series' being an object of thought).²⁹ Jayanta suspects that the Buddhist draws a sharp contrast between perception and thought with a view to dismissing as something thought-cognized and hence something unreal the Nyāya categories like 'universal' etc.; he considers this endeavour futile inasmuch as according to him these categories are well established.³⁰ Again, Jayanta finds ungrounded the Buddhist's fear that to cognize the same thing through two types of cognition should be futile or self-contradictory; for according to him it is well possible to cognize something that has already been cognized, it being further pointed out that two types of cognition cognizes a thing in two different manners.³¹ Lastly, Jayanta repudiates the Buddhist's argument that perception and

thought deal with two different types of object because the perception-type of cognition is so different from the thought-type of cognition. In this connection two replies are offered. Thus according to one, the same thing can be cognized differently when the means of cognition are different; according to the other, different means of cognition cognize different aspects of one and the same thing. [Jayanta promises to examine these two views later on, and presently only remarks that even the second view stands opposed to the Buddhist position under consideration.]³⁷ The fact of the matter is that the Buddhist has landed himself in unnecessary troubles by talking as if perception and thought are two types of cognition (the former dealing with one type of objects the latter dealing with another type of them); for as conceived by him perception is not at all a type of cognition but bare sensory experience while thought is the only type of cognition, both having to do with the only type of things there are, viz. the particular things possessed of these or those class-characters. For the rest, the Buddhist has correctly distinguished two elements in the knowledge situation viz. bare sensory experience and thought. Again, he has correctly realized that thought essentially consists in bringing a particular thing under an appropriate class, also that thought might be aimed either at identifying a present object (and then called post-perceptual thought) or at inferring an absent object (and then called inference). Of all these important aspects of the problem so neatly brought to light by the Buddhist the Nyāya authors have very inadequate realization. This should gradually become evident as we go through Jayanta's treatment of the various types of *pramāṇa* posited by his school; but one thing can be noted even now. Thus we have found Jayanta saying that the causal aggregate which produces valid cognition (and which according to him is what constitutes *pramāṇa*) includes physical as well as mental factors. In terms of the Buddhist theory the physical factors in question ought to be the factors that go to produce sensory experience—i. e. factors such as a sense-organ, a physical object-to-be-cognized, a set of accessories like light etc.—while the mental factors in question ought

to be the concerned cognizer's past stock of knowledge and its proper employment so as to enable thought to determine the nature of the object-to-be-cognized. But Jayanta's own list of these factors makes a curious reading; thus here the physical factors are a word, a probans, a lamp, a sense-organ, the mental factors knowledge-of-the-qualities, knowledge of probans, perception of similarity, hearing of words. Obviously, Jayanta has in mind his school's position that there are four types of pramāṇa, viz. perception, inference, analogy, verbal testimony, and he has to point out as to what can possibly be a physical factor and what a mental factor in the case of each type. But this theory of fourfold pramāṇa obscures the important point that in all knowledge situation two necessary elements are sense-experience and thought (both to be essentially conceived after the Buddhist fashion), this obscuration remaining there even after a subtype of perception called nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa has been posited in imitation of the Buddhist. Some idea of all this can be formed from Jayanta's consideration of his last point. For quoting Vātsyāyana he enumerates three cases where just one pramāṇa is properly applicable and a case where three pramāṇas are properly applicable, thus seeking to refute the Buddhist's contention that not more than one pramāṇa can cognize one and the same thing. The three pramāṇas in question are perception, inference, verbal testimony and we are told that one's knowledge of one's own two hands can be had through perception alone, the knowledge of what has caused a cloud-thunder that is heard can be had through inference alone, the knowledge that the performance of Agnihotra sacrifice leads to heaven can be had through verbal testimony alone, the knowledge that there is fire on the yonder mountain can be had through perception, inference as well as verbal testimony.³² Fortunately, Vātsyāyana is silent about analogy which is the fourth type of pramāṇa posited by his school, but as a matter of fact even verbal testimony, in order to be a source of valid cognition, must be treated as a case of inference. So the real question is as to when perception is to be had and when inference; and the answer is that a thing that is something present (i. e. something in contact with a sense-organ) is to be

cognized through perception not through inference while in the case of a thing that is something absent (i. e. something not in contact with a sense-organ) the opposite is to happen. It is this consideration that makes Vātsyāyana's case of exclusive-perception and his case of exclusive-inference the cases as claimed by him, but this very consideration should convince him that the case when fire on the yonder mountain is cognized through perception is a case of exclusive-perception, when it is cognized through inference is a case of exclusive-inference. All this is made crystal-clear in the Buddhist theory of thought, where, however, the designation 'post-perceptual thought' is given to the process Vātsyāyana is here calling 'perception.'

(iii) On arthāpatti

Jayanta next undertakes a criticism of the Mīmāṃsā position that arthāpatti is an additional pramāṇa. The criticism is not of a fundamental importance simply because the position in question is not a fundamental position of Mīmāṃsā logic. And it stands criticized at so early a stage for the simple reason that Jayanta is here settling account with his rivals who would posit either a lesser or greater number of pramāṇas than his school while arthāpatti is a pramāṇa which the Mīmāṃsā school posits and his school does not. Even so, the present discussion is not altogether devoid of importance, for in the course of it certain significant aspects of the problem of inference are brought to light. The fact was that for our logicians the model of inference was one where the concerned relation of invariable concomitance is established on the basis of a frequent observation of instances where the probans and the probandum are present together, there being observed no instance where the probans is present while the probandum absent. But there occur cases-of-inference where the concerned relation of invariable concomitance is established in virtue of some logical principle and it was somewhat unnatural to seek to understand these cases after the standard model. One important group of cases covered by the Mīmāṃsaka's arthāpatti were some

cases of this sort, and the Nyāya authors criticized him on the ground that these were but ordinary cases of inference. Obviously, both the parties were partly right and partly wrong, for the cases in question were certainly cases of inference but no ordinary cases of inference. Again, the Mīmāṃsaka's arthāpatti covered another group of cases-of-inference where the probandum was inherently imperceptible, so that there was no question of establishing on the basis of observation a relation of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum. Even the Nyāya authors realized that these cases-of-inference were not provided for by their standard model, but they treated them as an extraordinary type of cases where the concerned relation of invariable concomitance was established after the analogy of an observation-based such relation; the Mīmāṃsakas themselves did not in principle reject this sort of explanation but they would treat as cases of arthāpatti rather than inference those of such cases where this sort of explanation sounded inconvenient (often indiscriminately treating a case as either a case of arthāpatti or a case of inference). In the light of these preliminary remarks we can follow Jayanta's polemic against the Mīmāṃsaka where he first elaborately presents the Kumārīlite case and then criticizes it (incidentally also taking critical note of certain Prabhākara-rite positions.)

The Kumārīlite begins by submitting that a case of arthāpatti arises when a piece of knowledge had through any of the six pramāṇas (posited by his school) remains unaccounted for unless another piece of knowledge is posited, this new piece of knowledge being one had through the pramāṇa called arthāpatti.¹ As here illustrated the six subtypes are to be divided into three groups as follows : (1) In the case of the first four sub-types a 'capacity' is posited by way of accounting for something that is cognized through perception, inference, analogy or arthāpatti itself. For example, the perceptual cognition of fire as hot remains unaccounted for unless the 'capacity' to produce hot touch is posited in fire, the inferential cognition of the sun as moving from place to place remains unaccounted for unless the 'capacity' to undertake

motion is posited in the sun, and so on and so forth, the point being that a cause cannot produce the effect concerned unless it possesses the 'capacity' to produce this effect; (that a 'capacity' thus posited is not open to perception is understood but from this very understanding it follows that it is not open to inference either, an inference always requiring an invariable concomitance established on the basis of perception).² (2) The fifth sub-type is illustrated by the case where the knowledge that a certain person (named Caitra, say) is alive and yet absent inside his house remains unaccounted for unless it is posited that he is present somewhere outside his house; (this is a case where a piece of knowledge had through the *pramāṇa* called 'abhava (=absence)' remains unaccounted for unless another piece of knowledge is posited).³ (3) The sixth sub-type is illustrated by the case where the heard sentence 'fat Devadatta does not eat during day time' necessitates the positing of the sentence 'Devadatta eats during night-time'; (this is a case where a piece of knowledge had through verbal testimony remains unaccounted for unless another piece of knowledge is posited).⁴ Of these three groups the first is essentially described by what has been just said about it, but the remaining two are further elaborated at considerable length. They might be taken up one by one. Thus it is argued in various ways that the knowledge that Caitra is alive and yet absent inside his house necessitating the knowledge that he is present somewhere outside his house is not a case of inference. First it is contended that in this case it is impossible to point out as to what can be the locus-of-inference, what the probans, what the probandum (various alternatives are considered and rejected).⁵ As a matter of fact, the difficulty thus urged is flimsy; for one can easily infer : 'x is present somewhere outside his house, because x is alive and yet absent inside his house.' The real difficulty is that here the concerned relation of invariable concomitance is not an ordinary one, that is, not one based on observation but one based on logical principle; and when the *Mīmāṃsaka* comes to that point he actually says that he is ready to treat the present case as a case of inference provided it is conceded that the concerned

relation of invariable concomitance is established through arthāpatti.⁶ Then it is argued that the present case is not a case of inference because here the very knowledge of the alleged probans includes the knowledge of the alleged probandum, something that never happens in a genuine case of inference; the argument runs as follows : ' In this case it is necessary to know that Caitra is alive (for otherwise the suggested new knowledge will not follow). But to know that Caitra is alive is to know that he exists somewhere. And when to this knowledge is added the further knowledge that Caitra does not exist inside his house the knowledge is inevitable that he exists outside his house. This is something that does not happen in a genuine case of inference; e. g. the knowledge that the mountain possesses smoke does not make inevitable the knowledge that the mountain possesses fire.'⁷ The Mīmāṃsaka is thus confusingly giving utterance to the true position that the knowledge that *x* is alive and yet absent-inside-his-house leads to the knowledge that *x* is present somewhere outside his house in virtue of a logical principle, not in virtue of a relation of invariable concomitance established on the basis of observation; (the logical principle in question is that when a situation can obtain in just three ways then the knowledge that it does not obtain in two ways implies that it obtains in the third way; e. g. the knowledge '*x* must be either dead or present inside his house or present outside his house' coupled with the knowledge '*x* is neither dead nor present inside his house' implies the knowledge '*x* is present outside his house'). The confusion contains in the Mīmāṃsaka's further argumentation. Thus it is submitted that the essence of arthāpatti lies in reconciling two mutually contradictory pieces of knowledge; e. g. the knowledge that Caitra is alive and the knowledge that Caitra is not present inside his house are mutually contradictory and are reconciled by arthāpatti through positing the knowledge that Caitra is present somewhere outside his house.⁸ And here comes that earlier quoted contention that the present case might well become a case of inference provided it is conceded that here the concerned relation of invariable concomitance is established through arthāpatti. Then is

advanced a curious argument in order to prove that this relation is not established on the basis of observation.⁹ The Mimāṃsaka was expected to consider the invariable concomitance : "whenever x is absent inside his house x is present outside his house", but he actually considers the reverse invariable concomitance : "whenever x is present inside his house x is absent outside his house." For he was out to prove that there is not a single instance where the probans and the probandum are found to be present together, something he hoped to do in the case of the former concomitance but not in the case of the latter. Thus he argues that one must be an omniscient to observe together x 's presence inside his house and x 's absence everywhere else; (on the other hand, in case x is standing just outside his door one can observe together x 's absence inside his house and x 's presence somewhere else). In this connection too it is pointed out that the present case is unlike that of inferring fire from smoke, it being easily possible to come across instances when smoke and fire are present together. The opponent pleads : "Having observed a place lying near the place where Caitra is present and having observed that Caitra is absent at the former place one can conclude that Caitra is likewise absent at every other place"; the Kumārilite retorts : "About every place other than the former place you cannot say that Caitra is absent there, for the place where Caitra is present is also a place other than the former place."¹⁰ The whole performance seems so frivolous but is a good specimen of how our logicians were handicapped owing to their failure to distinguish between an invariable concomitance established on the basis of observation and one established on the basis of logical (=conceptual) analysis. Thus the Mimāṃsaka refuses to concede that the present case is a case of inference because he rightly feels that the concerned invariable concomitance is not established on the basis of observation; on the other hand, Jayanta will endeavour to prove that this invariable concomitance is established on the basis of observation because he rightly feels that the present case is a case of inference. In both cases the conclusion is invalid, the premises valid.

Lastly, the Kumārilite elaborates his sixth sub-type of arthāpatti illustrated by the case when the heard sentence 'fat

Devadatta does not eat during daytime' necessitates the positing of the sentence 'Devadatta eats during night-time.' Despite the fanfare accompanying this elaboration the concept in question is of extremely doubtful validity and is theologically motivated. Thus the Kumārīlite is not arguing that the knowledge had through hearing the former sentence necessitates the knowledge had through hearing the latter sentence; for then the present case will be logically similar to the one just considered, so that one can submit that the knowledge 'x must be either lean and thin or eat during day-time or eat during night-time' complied with the knowledge 'x is neither lean and thin nor eats during day-time' implies the knowledge 'x eats during night-time'. What he is arguing is that on hearing the former sentence one must posit the latter sentence if one is to have the knowledge had through the latter sentence. So he first submits that the new knowledge had here is not a case of perception, inference or the like but a case of verbal testimony.¹¹ To this is added that this knowledge is not the meaning of the heard sentence itself, the point being that the corresponding sentence must be got from somewhere.¹² Lastly, it is contended that this new sentence cannot be got through perception or inference, obviously not through perception but not through inference either because nothing can act as probans for that (various suggested alternatives being rejected.)¹³ The conclusion is that this new sentence is got by way of arthāpatti, with the heard sentence acting as the starting point.¹⁴ It is at this stage that the suggestion is rejected that here the knowledge had through the heard sentence necessitates the knowledge had through the implied sentence, the ground of rejection being that the knowledge had through a sentence cannot be true unless the corresponding sentence is there.¹⁵ The point is buttressed by arguing that a situation of the type under consideration often arises while interpreting a Vedic sentence which, being incomplete, necessitates supplementation but that this supplementation will cease to be something Vedic in case what is newly posited is not a sentence but merely its meaning.¹⁶ Really, it is impossible to make head or tail of this whole piece of argumentation. Implicational relation holds between one piece of knowledge and another where it

is immaterial as to how the former piece of knowledge is got. But the Kumārīlite speaks as if the case where this piece of knowledge is got through a heard sentence is of a radically distinct sort inasmuch as here the implied piece of knowledge cannot be had unless the corresponding sentence is also there before the mind's eye, a requirement that makes no sense. The Kumārīlite felt that on his explanation the implication of a Vedic sentence proves to be a sentence and hence something Vedic; it is difficult to see how. For a Vedic sentence must be a sentence actually occurring in Vedas and this description does not apply to the sentence alleged to be implied by a Vedic sentence. There is, however, no doubt that the present consideration must have been uppermost in the mind of the Kumārīlite when he propounded his thesis under examination. For taking his stand on it he could boast to his rivals : "On our explanation even such sentences as do not actually occur in Vedas be proved Vedic sentences." Be that as it may, here closes Jayanta's presentation of the Kumārīlite case on the question of arthapatti, and now begins his refutation of it.

Jayanta begins by submitting that arthapatti is nothing different from inference inasmuch as knowledge of x cannot lead to knowledge of y unless there obtains between x and y a relation of invariable concomitance.¹⁷ To this is added that here this relation of invariable concomitance must itself be known first, this is why a newborn babe is in no position to make use of this relation.¹⁸ Then it is emphasized that even when a relation of invariable concomitance is not established between x and y as such it must be established between X and Y which are such that x is a sub-class of X and y a corresponding subclass of Y .¹⁹ Lastly it is argued that to say that x remains unaccounted for unless y is posited is to say that a concomitance-in-absence obtains between x and y so that wherever y is absent x is absent, a concomitance which necessitates a concomitance-in-presence to the effect that wherever x is present y is present.²⁰ After these preliminary observations Jayanta specially criticizes those six subtypes of arthapatti as divided into three groups.

The first group comprising the four subtypes where a 'capacity' is posited are on the whole criticized not on the basis of some logical consideration but on the ontological consideration that the concept of 'capacity' is untenable.²¹ Jayanta's basic contention is that an effect is produced by a cause accompanied by the appropriate accessories but not possessed of a so-called 'capacity' supposed to be something supersensuous.²² The Mīmāṃsaka argues that a 'capacity' is to be posited for the following reasons :

(1) Otherwise, any thing might produce any thing inasmuch as all things are similar qua a substance;

(2) While under the influence of a spell a thing apparently remaining the same and remaining accompanied by the appropriate accessories fails to produce the effect concerned, and this happens because this thing is now deprived of the 'capacity' concerned;

(3) When the same act on the part of a person happens to produce different results in the case of different persons the Nyaya authors too posit a supersensuous causal factor in the form of dharma (= spiritual merit accumulated owing to past acts) etc., and a 'capacity' has to be posited analogically.²³

In reply to all this Jayanta first argues that the determination as to what cause accompanied by what accessories produce what effect is made on the basis of an observation of concomitance-in-presence and concomitance-in-absence, there being nothing incongruous about these accessories including a supersensuous factor like dharma etc. but there being no need to posit 'capacity' as such a factor.²⁴ As to why under the influence of a spell a cause even when accompanied by the appropriate accessories fails to produce the effect concerned, the reason suggested is that the accessories are now no more appropriate accessories, for in order to be appropriate they must include a special factor in the form of 'absence of an obstructing factor like spell etc.'²⁵ to this is added that the same ought to be the Mīmāṃsaka's explanation of the inhibiting activity of a spell or

the like even if according to him a causal aggregate includes an additional factor in the form of 'capacity', the point being that the positing of 'capacity' is superfluous.²⁶ Then Jayanta argues that the alleged 'capacity' cannot be something eternal because that would mean that the cause concerned always goes on producing the effect concerned; but that it can also not be something transient because then it will itself require a cause and that will lead to an infinite regress.²⁷

The Mīmāṃsaka pleads : "A 'capacity' has to be posited because that is unavoidable, and then it has to be conceived in such a manner that an infinite regress is avoided."²⁸ Jayanta retorts : "To posit a 'capacity' is not unavoidable, it rather is an unnecessary duplication."²⁹ Lastly, Jayanta recalls the Mīmāṃsaka's position that a cause produces the effect concerned by way of undertaking an 'operation' that is something essentially unobservable, and so he asks : "Why posit an unobservable 'capacity' and an unobservable 'operation' when either should do ?"³⁰; when the Mīmāṃsaka pleads that even when possessed of a 'capacity' a cause is never found to produce the effect concerned unless it undertakes an 'operation' Jayanta retorts : "But that means that an 'operation' is not something essentially unobservable"³¹. After this much refutation of the concept of 'capacity' based on an ontological consideration there comes a summary criticism based on a logical consideration; thus it is suggested that even if it becomes necessary to posit a 'capacity' in the form of an additional member of the normal causal aggregate this positing can well be treated as an ordinary case of inference.³² The difficulty with this suggestion was that our logicians allowed for a case of inference where the concerned relation of invariable concomitance was established on the basis of a direct observation as also for a case of inference when it was established on the basis of an analogous observation, but the case of inferring a 'capacity' was a rather third type of case – something like the modern scientific method of formulating a hypothesis by way of accounting for an observed phenomenon. It was this consideration that constituted the strong point of the Mīmāṃsaka who would plausibly make out that the case of

inferring a 'capacity' was not an ordinary case of inference and so not at all a case of inference but a case of arthāpatti. But Jayanta had his own point when he meant that to posit an unobservable member in a causal aggregate is a case of inferring an unobservable cause – that is, a case of inferring something on the analogy of observable causes.

Jayanta next considers the case when Caitra's absence inside his house necessitates the positing of Caitra's presence outside his house. The Mīmāṃsaka has argued that this cannot be a case of inference because here it is impossible to point out as to what is the locus of inference, what the probans, what the probandum. Jayanta answers him by formulating an inference as follows : "Caitra's absence-inside-house is characterised by Caitra's presence-outside-house, because it is a living person's absence-inside-house, just like that earlier observed person's absence-inside-house"; with a view to emphasizing that here is an ordinary case of inference it is added that this is exactly like inferring in a locus fire from smoke.³³ It can easily be seen that an invariable concomitance established on the basis of conceptual analysis is here sought to be understood after the manner of an invariable concomitance established on the basis of observation, an essentially misleading endeavour. Then the Mīmāṃsaka had argued that since the very knowledge of Caitra's absence-inside-house coupled with the knowledge that Caitra is alive includes the knowledge of Caitra's presence-outside-house, there could be no question of inferring the latter from the former; Jayanta retorts that neither the knowledge of Caitra's absence-inside-house nor the knowledge that Caitra is alive includes the knowledge of Caitra's presence-outside-house, for what happens is that the former two pieces of knowledge taken together act as probans for the last piece of knowledge.³⁴ The Mīmāṃsaka makes his point clear by suggesting that the former two pieces of knowledge taken together constitute the last piece of knowledge; Jayanta retorts that the knowledge of probans does not constitute the knowledge of probandum, just as knowledge of smoke does not constitute knowledge of fire.³⁵ To this is added that on the

Mīmāṃsaka's own showing the former two pieces of knowledge taken together make possible the positing of the last piece of knowledge (this being his account of how the present one is a case of arthāpatti), the point being that the difficulty just urged against the present one being a case of inference also apply to it being a case of arthāpatti.³⁶ We have already remarked that the Mīmāṃsaka is confusingly saying that the present one is a case of one piece of knowledge leading to another piece in virtue of a conceptual analysis, not in virtue of an observation; this is his intention where he points out to the Nyāya author that here the former piece of knowledge includes (or is one with) the latter piece of knowledge. Exploiting the Mīmāṃsaka's confusion Jayanta submits that if one piece of knowledge includes (or is one with) another piece of knowledge the latter's mention apart from the former should be an impossibility. Thus lacking a terminology that should do justice to the phenomenon of conceptual analysis, the Mīmāṃsaka and Nyāya authors fought a battle that was partly just and partly unjust on the part of either. Under the title 'Svabhāva-anumāna' the Buddhist too was really describing such cases of inference as are based on a conceptual analysis rather than observation, but like the Mīmāṃsaka he too was much confused on the question though in his own manner. Jayanta, who had no sympathy either with the Mīmāṃsaka thesis on arthāpatti or with the Buddhist thesis of svabhāva-anumāna, reminds the Mīmāṃsaka that the former thesis is substantially open to the same charge as the latter thesis.³⁷

Incidentally, Jayanta criticizes the Prabhākara's understanding of arthāpatti in general and the present case in particular. Thus on the Prabhākara's showing in inference the 'instrumental knowledge' remains unaccounted for unless the 'resultant knowledge' is posited, in arthāpatti the opposite happens.³⁸ For example, when fire is inferred from smoke the knowledge of smoke remains unaccounted for unless the knowledge of fire is posited; on the other hand, in the present case of arthāpatti the knowledge of Caitra's presence-outside-house remains unaccounted for unless the knowledge of his absence-inside-house coupled with

his being alive is posited.³⁹ Jayanta ridicules this whole understanding by pointing out that if the resultant knowledge alleged to be something unaccounted for is already had, nothing further remains to be done.⁴⁰ The opponent suggests that what is already had is not the resultant knowledge as a particular case but it in its general nature; Jayanta retorts that that means that this knowledge is already had as standing in a relation of invariable concomitance, his point being that in that case arthāpatti is nothing different from inference.⁴¹ Lastly, Jayanta cogitates as follows : "The knowledge of presence-outside-house remains unaccounted for unless the knowledge of absence-inside-house coupled with being alive is posited — what does it mean? If it means that the former knowledge necessitates the latter knowledge it will be an ordinary case of inference where the knowledge of probans (of smoke, say) necessitates the knowledge of probandum (of fire, say). If it means that absence-inside-house (coupled with being alive) produces presence-outside-house, that will lead to the absurdity that for one moment our man will be neither inside house nor outside (for it will require a moment for him to be produced). Thus are refuted those too who make out that in inference instrumental knowledge necessitates resultant knowledge, in arthāpatti the object of the former knowledge produces the object of the latter knowledge."⁴² The fact of the matter is that conceptual analysis often yields two equivalent concepts which, for that very reason, can act as probans for one another; and the present case is actually such a case. Then we can say "If *x* is alive and absent-inside-house, *x* is present-outside-house" and also "If *x* is present-outside-house, *x* is alive and absent-inside-house." The Prabhākariite labours under the misconception that all cases of arthāpatti are of such a type; and this misleads him into speaking as if in all cases of arthāpatti the resultant knowledge can act as the knowledge of probans does in an inference. As a matter of fact, inference and arthāpatti (=implication) are one and the same logical process, so that what is instrumental knowledge or resultant knowledge in the case of one is also the same in the case of the other. Linguistic convention demands

that the instrumental knowledge be called 'knowledge of probans' in the case of inference, 'knowledge acting as implier (=implier knowledge)' in the case of arthāpatti, and that the resultant knowledge be called 'knowledge of probandum' in the case of inference, 'knowledge acting as implied (=implied knowledge)' in the case of arthāpatti; but it is nothing more than linguistic convention. Hence it is that it is wrong for the Prabhākarite to contend that in inference the instrumental knowledge remains unaccounted for unless the resultant knowledge is posited while in arthāpatti the opposite happens. What is possible is that there are cases of inference where the probans and the probandum can act as probans to each other; but even in such cases what is probans for the time being is probans alone, what is probandum for the time being is probandum alone, so that it cannot be said that the thing which is probans from the standpoint of inference becomes probandum from the standpoint of arthāpatti or vice versa. Then a word might be said about a knowledge necessitating another knowledge and the object of the former knowledge producing the object of the latter knowledge, the former supposed to take place in inference, the latter in arthāpatti. If we keep in mind the fact that inference and arthāpatti are the identical processes, then the Prabhākarite thus appears to be saying that in inference the knowledge of probans necessitates the knowledge of probandum, in arthāpatti the probans produces the probandum. Really, the cases of inference where the probans happens to be the cause of the probandum are a class not clearly recognized by our logicians whose standard case had an effect (viz. smoke) for the probans and its cause (viz. fire) for the probandum. But this class is an ordinary class of inference provided care is taken to specify that a cause in order to act as probans must be a total cause (a cause acting as probandum can well be a part-cause). Even so, the inferences based on a causal consideration are precisely those where the concerned relation of invariable concomitance is established by way of making an observation, and they have to be distinguished from those where it is established by way of making a conceptual analysis. Thus even if it is granted that an inference where the probans is a cause and the probandum its effect is to

be called arthāpatti, the fact remains that to infer Caitra's presence-outside-house from Caitra's absence-inside-house (coupled with his being alive) is not at all an inference based on a causal consideration but one based on a conceptual analysis. But the Prabhākarite speaks as if this inference is a case of arthāpatti and that for the reason that Caitra's presence-outside is produced by Caitra's absence-inside-house. Jayanta has taken pains to show how Caitra's absence-inside-house cannot go to produce Caitra's presence-outside-house, but that is something self-obvious. What is noteworthy is that Jayanta himself does not realise that the concerned relation of invariable concomitance is here arrived at by way of a conceptual analysis; for we have already found him arguing that it is arrived at by way of frequent observation. But the method of frequent observation is solely the method of establishing causal relationship so that in a way the Prabhākarite's mistake is Jayanta's mistake also. The anomaly remains hidden from Jayanta because he is under the mistaken impression that all sorts of relationship (all involving an invariable concomitance) can be established on the basis of frequent observation. For the rest, the most important valid point of Jayanta's present criticism of the Prabhākarite position is that arthāpatti is nothing different from inference.

After thus incidentally disposing of the Prabhākarite understanding of the arthāpatti-case under consideration, Jayanta resumes his criticism of the corresponding Kumārīlite understanding. Thus the Kumārīlite has argued that the invariable concomitance between absence-inside-house and presence-outside-house cannot be established on the basis of observation, but in this connection he has actually considered not this invariable-concomitance but one between presence-inside-house and absence-outside-house. We have already noted this anomaly and Jayanta makes a skilful use of it. Thus he submits that the needed invariable concomitance can well be established with the help of observation.⁴⁸ Not that it can actually be so established, but it can certainly be established in the sense in which this Kumārīlite understands it. So Jayanta first argues that by directing his criticism not

against the invariable concomitance that is actually needed but on one that is not needed the Kumārāilite has virtually deserted the arthapatti sub-type under consideration.⁴⁴ And again he says that the criticism in question is in any case perverted. Jayanta's line of attack is revealing in its own way. Thus he points out that in the case of a non-ubiquitous substance its presence at a particular place establishes without effort (*akleṣena*) its absence at every place other than this place.⁴⁵ By using the phrase 'without effort' Jayanta in effect concedes that what is thus established is a finding of conceptual analysis rather than of frequent observation. But his conscious understanding nevertheless remains that here too invariable concomitance is established on the basis of observation. Thus he asks the Kumārīlite : "If a thing's absence at every place other than the place of its actual location cannot be grasped through observation, what about the absence of smoke at every place where fire is absent?"⁴⁶ Jayanta's point is that the latter absence must be grasped through observation or all inference becomes impossible. The Kumārīlite pleads that on having observed that x is accompanied by y in so many cases and unaccompanied by y in not a single case one concludes that x is a valid probans for y ; Jayanta retorts : "But the requirement of a valid probans is that x must be unaccompanied by y in not a single case observed or otherwise."⁴⁷ Jayanta promises to develop his point at a later stage but his meaning must be that even without observing all cases where x occurs it should be somehow possible to say that x never occurs unaccompanied by y . Really speaking, all establishment of a relation of invariable concomitance is aimed at rendering unnecessary all further observation, but the question is whether this establishment itself does or does not necessarily require observation. Under the title 'arthāpatti' the Kumārīlite is in fact drawing our attention to such cases of inference where the concerned relation of invariable concomitance is established not through observation but through conceptual analysis. As a matter of fact, it is this peculiarity of these cases that misleads him into thinking that these are cases not of inference but of arthāpatti. Jayanta, on his part, is right when he treats these cases as cases of inference,

but essentially misconceived is his endeavour to show that here too the concerned relation of invariable concomitance is established through observation rather than conceptual analysis. So far as observation-based invariable concomitances are concerned the Kumārīlite and Jayanta understand them in an essentially identical fashion, and on this question they both rather markedly differ from the Buddhist who insists that the obtaining of such an invariable concomitance between the two things must necessarily mean the obtaining of a causal relationship between them. So the question above posed by Jayanta before the Kumārīlite should be answered in a radically new way not by the latter but by the Buddhist who would say: "When x and y are proved to be causally related then and then alone does it become possible to say that x never occurs unaccompanied by y ."

Lastly Jayanta criticizes the sixth subtype of arthāpatti posited by the Kumārīlite and one where a sentence is alleged to imply another sentence. Jayanta's general contention is that like all sub-types of arthāpatti it too is a case of inference, but he particularly objects to the suggestion that here it becomes necessary to posit first a sentence and then its meaning; his simple point is that in all inference the knowledge of probans necessitates the knowledge of probandum, and a case like the present one where the former knowledge is had through verbal testimony poses no new problem, so that it should not be impossible here to have the latter knowledge without having before the mind's eye a corresponding sentence.⁴⁸ The Kumārīlite pleads that the sentence concerned, being incomplete, must be completed first and then the meaning of the supplemented sentence must be added to that of the original sentence; Jayanta retorts: "There is nothing incomplete about the original sentence. What has to be done is to understand its meaning and then draw the inference that might be necessary. And even granting that the original sentence is incomplete there is no need to add a further sentence to it, it being sufficient to add to the meaning of this sentence whatever new meaning that might seem necessary."⁴⁹ Then is dismissed as unfounded the fear that adding a new meaning without adding the corresponding sentence should turn

this new meaning into something non-Vedic; thus Jayanta says : "The new meaning should be something non-Vedic rather in case a new sentence is also posited, for this sentence must obviously be absent in Vedas. And if it is pleaded that a sentence implied by a Vedic sentence must itself be something Vedic, then why not grant that the meaning implied by the meaning of a Vedic sentence must itself be something Vedic, thus avoiding an unnecessary step in the form of positing a new sentence."⁵⁰ What Jayanta says obviously makes sense, but he goes on to report that the present Kumārīlite position has been criticized by the Prabhākārite also, though in his own manner; (at the close of his enquiry Jayanta even confesses that this manner of solving the problem is as worthwhile as his own.⁵¹) The Prabhākārite begins by submitting that the meaning implied by the meaning of a sentence is also to be treated as a meaning yielded by this sentence on the ground that this implied meaning is yielded never except in the presence of the sentence in question⁵². In this connection he bases himself on the consideration that the practical exigencies of priestly ritualism often require that a word not present in a Vedic sentence be treated as present there, a word present there be treated as not present there, a word present there in one form be treated as present there in another form; and his argument is that if despite all this the resultant meaning is treated as a meaning yielded by this sentence itself then the meaning implied by this resultant meaning should likewise be treated as a meaning yielded by this sentence itself, it being immaterial that the words expressing this implied meaning are not present there in this sentence; (in this connection a passing reference is made to the Prabhākārite theory that the meaning of a sentence is yielded by this sentence as a whole so that it should not be much emphasized as to what words are used in a sentence, what words not used, what words used in this way rather than that).⁵³ Then a dig is made of the Kumārīlite by adding that this way even the implied meaning becomes a direct meaning of the sentence concerned, and not an indirect meaning (as it should be on the showing of the Kumārīlite who derives the implied meaning only after having first posited the corresponding sentence.)⁵⁴

The Kumārīlite pleads that a meaning cannot be posited unless the corresponding word is somehow present there; the Prabhākarite retorts that even when a word is present there in a Vedic sentence it is given only such meaning as suits the total sentential meaning required by the concerned ritual context, his point being that a sentence yields the necessary meaning irrespective of whether the corresponding word is present there or not.⁵⁵ The Kumārīlite argues that on the opponent's understanding all meaning yielded by a word should have the same status, so that there should be, for example, no difference between the literal and the figurative meaning of a word; the point is supported by referring to the circumstance that the Mīmāṃsā rules of Vedic interpretation require that a sentence yielding its meaning in one manner is more authoritative than one yielding its meaning in another, which rules should lose all sense on the opponent's understanding according to which all meaning yielded by a word has the same status.⁵⁶ The Prabhākarite replies that even if a word can yield all sorts of meaning depending on the sentential context it does have a nuclear meaning comparing with which differentiation and classification can be made among the meanings yielded by this word in different contexts; e.g. the word 'lion' (possessed of a nuclear meaning) means one thing when referring to the beast called by this name, another thing when referring to a brave man.⁵⁷ This explanation allows the Prabhākarite to do justice to those Mīmāṃsā rules of Vedic interpretation appealed to by the Kumārīlite; for the former too can now distinguish between a Vedic sentence yielding meaning in one manner and the same yielding meaning in another manner.⁵⁸ This Kumārīlite-versus-Prabhākarite controversy should make it clear that the sixth sub-type of arthāpatti posited by the Kumārīlite is in the main theologically motivated.

Here closes Jayanta's consideration of the Mīmāṃsā thesis on the pramāṇa called arthāpatti; now he proceeds to undertake a similar consideration of the Kumārīlite thesis on the pramāṇa called abhava.

(iv) On Abhāva

Jayanta's consideration of the *pramāṇa* called *abhāva* (meaning absence, also called *anupalabdhi* meaning non-cognition) which the Kumārīlite alone posits is important because in this connection certain such issues have been raised as were a topic of animated controversy among our philosophers. Thus the Kumārīlite and the Naiyāyika were of the view that 'absences' constitute a group of independent reals existing by the side of positive reals, but they differed among themselves as to how the direct cognition of an 'absence' takes place. That an 'absence' can be indirectly cognized through inference was conceded by both, but while the Naiyāyika held that an 'absence', just like a positive real, is directly cognized through perception the Mīmāṃsaka held that an 'absence', unlike a positive real, is directly cognized never through perception and always through an independent *pramāṇa* called *abhāva*. This difference of opinion is at the centre of Jayanta's attention in the present part of his text, but he also incidentally considers at due length the corresponding positions maintained by the Buddhist and the Prabhākarite. Thus both the Buddhist and the Prabhākarite denied that 'absences' constitute a group of independent reals and the former developed an elaborate theory as to how an 'absence' as understood by him is cognized directly and how it is cognized indirectly. All this Jayanta subjects to criticism after having disposed of the Kumārīlite thesis on the *pramāṇa* called 'abhāva'. [The criticism of Kumārīlite and the Buddhist is preceded by a lengthy presentation of their respective cases, the criticism of the Prabhākarite case is pretty brief.]

The Kumārīlite submits that when no *pramāṇa* is found to operate with a view to cognizing *x* we have a case of cognizing 'absence of *x*' through the *pramāṇa* called 'abhāva' (i. e. absence of all *pramāṇa*).¹ Then realizing that a *pramāṇa* must be a state of the concerned cognizing soul (preferably, a positive such state) it is given out that *abhāva* as thus understood is of the form of 'non-production of a corresponding transformation in the concerned cognizing soul' or 'cognition pertaining

to something else'; the meaning of the former expression is understandable, that of the latter is 'cognition pertaining to the locus of the absence concerned' (Jayanta is wrong when he explains the latter as 'cognition of the absence concerned').² The Kumārilite's point is that when x is not cognized while the locus concerned is cognized we have a case of cognizing 'absence of x ' through abhāva. And such an odd type of pramāṇa is posited by him because he is convinced that an 'absence' cannot be grasped through perception; this he seeks to demonstrate by arguing that no sort of contact can take place between a sense-organ and an 'absence'.³ The demonstration, in fact, amounts to arguing that no sort of relation obtains between an 'absence' and its locus; for according to the standard Nyāya formula (not as such rejected by the Kumārilite) it should always be possible to tell as to what sort of contact takes place between a sense-organ and an object of preception once it is found out as to what sort of relation obtains between this object and its locus. As a general rule (to which there is an above exception) an object-of-perception is either a physical substance or something inhering in a physical substance or something inhering in a thing that inheres in a physical substance, and the Kumārilite is in essence saying that an 'absence' belongs to none of these three categories. The Naiyāyika, with a view to coining a new category, submits that an 'absence' qualifies its locus, so that 'something qualifying a physical substance' should be the description of an 'absence' in its capacity as an object-of-perception. The Kumārilite pooh-poohs this stratagem by insisting that x cannot qualify y unless x stands related to y either through the relation called conjunction or through the relation called inherence, and an 'absence' stands related to its locus through neither of these relations, nor does he himself posit any relation between an 'absence' and its locus. However, from all this the Kumārilite does not draw the conclusion that an 'absence' is no independent real but just that it is not an object of perception.

The Kumārilite does not deny that the locus of an 'absence' must be made an object of perception, but this precisely is why

he refuses to concede that this 'absence' itself is an object of perception; thus he argues that the locus of an 'absence' is an object of perception but not this 'absence' itself just as the colour of a distant column of fire is an object of perception but not its touch.⁴ It is admitted that in the cited illustration the touch of fire is an object of inference,⁵ but the implication is not that an 'absence' is cognized through inference. For a little later on it is argued that an 'absence' cannot be cognized through inference because in this case it cannot be ascertained as to what acts as the locus-of-inference, what as the probans, what as the probandum, also because here it is impossible to formulate the needed relation of invariable concomitance (which formulation requires that at some stage an 'absence' must have been made an object of perception).⁶ Let us recall that somewhat similar was the Kumārilite's mode of arguing when he was out to demonstrate that a case of arthāpatti is not a case of inference. But this time the suggestion that an 'absence' is cognized through arthāpatti is rejected even without being given a moment's thought.⁷ And yet what actually happens is that if x and y are such that they are either both cognized together or both not-cognized together then in case x is cognized but not y this cognition-of- x implies the cognition-of-'absence of y '. This in essence is how the Buddhist puts the matter when he would submit that here 'absence of y ' is cognized through an inference of the svabhāva-anumāna type where 'cognition of x ' acts as probans; (svabhāva-anumāna essentially covers the same ground as the Mīmāṃsā's arthāpatti and the Buddhist is also of the view that an 'absence' is no independent real, so that what is here inferred is not an 'absence' as such but an usage as to absence). In any case, we have thus seen how on the Kumārilite's showing the cognition of an 'absence' is not a case of perception and not a case of inference. In the meantime he has considered a case which to him appears to clinch the matter decisively. Thus when one observes a place without particularly noticing whether x is present there or not, one can later on rightly say that x was absent there at that earlier occasion; the Kumārilite argues that this later cognition of 'absence of x ' is obviously not had

through perception but nor is it had through memory or inference both necessarily requiring a prior perception which here obviously did not take place.⁸ As a matter of fact, here the place concerned and x are such that if cognized together they must be recalled together, so that the fact that the place is recalled but not x implies that x was not cognized along with the place; (really, the possibility is not ruled out that x was present there but was not noticed, but let us ignore that possibility.) Thus this case is essentially of the same type as the case when a floor is perceived and 'absence of jar' on this floor is cognized through implication, a cognition which according to the Kumārīlite is had neither through perception nor through inference but through a new pramāṇa called abhāva.

Jayanta begins his refutation of the Kumārīlite case by arguing that the perceptual cognition 'the jar is absent on the floor' is of the same type as the perceptual cognition 'curd is present in the bowl', so that just as both curd and bowl are an object of perception both 'absence of jar' and floor are an object of perception.⁹ His point is that here an employment of eyes at once reveals both floor and 'absence of jar', this unlike the case of inferring fire from smoke where smoke is revealed to eyes but not fire.¹⁰ To this is added that the present case is also unlike the case where the colour of a distant fire is perceptually cognized through eyes but not its touch, the point being that it is impossible for eyes to cognize touch but not to cognize an 'absence'.¹¹ Really, Jayanta is simply taking for granted that an 'absence' is an independent real and that it is an object of perception; in point of fact, the first proposition which is basic is of extremely doubtful validity. However, he does consider the objection that an 'absence' which is devoid of colour should not be an object of visual perception; his answer is that an atom even while possessed of colour is not an object of perception.¹² Similarly, the objection that an 'absence' which does not come in contact with an eye should not be an object of perception is answered by saying that sky even while coming in contact with an eye is not an object of perception.¹³ Both these answers are

invalid and the simple fact is that the normal mode of a sense-organ producing perceptual cognition just makes no sense in the alleged case of the perceptual cognition of an 'absence'. In any case, Jayanta next frankly admits that the rule that a sense-organ must come in contact with the concerned object-of-perception holds true only when the object happens to be a positive entity and not when it happens to be an 'absence'.¹⁴ The objection that in that case an 'absence' existing anywhere in the world should become an object of perception is rejected on the ground that an 'absence' in order to become an object of perception must reside in a locus which is itself such an object.¹⁵ To this is added that the needed contact too can be well conceived if it is granted that an 'absence' is related to its locus by way of the relation called qualifier-and-qualificand, it being promised that the reality of this relation as something distinct from the famous relation conjunction and inherence will be demonstrated not much later on.¹⁶ At this stage the Mīmāṃsāka objects that the contact-types in question posited by the Naiyāyika are all fictitious, it being his point that all that a sense-organ requires is the ability to perceive its appropriate object; Jayanta replies first by saying that a sense-organ can well have the ability to perceive an 'absence' and then by saying that the contact-types in question are but a detailed description of a sense-organ's ability to perceive its appropriate object.¹⁷ Really, an 'absence' conceived as an independent real is a highly untenable concept and so Jayanta's position that an 'absence' thus understood is a possible object of perception is as much misconceived as the Kumārīlīte's counterposition that it is not a possible object of perception. However, interesting is Jayanta's consideration of that case where having perceived a vacant place one later on rightly says that x was absent there at that earlier occasion; on Jayanta's showing, all 'absences' existing at the place in question were perceptually cognized through a mixed-cognition that also perceptually cognized this place itself, so that the later cognition of one of these 'absences' is a case of memory plain and simple.¹⁸ In this connection the Kumārīlīte is reminded that since he too grants that the place in question is cognized as a vacant place he in effect

grants that all the 'absences' occurring at this place are cognized when this place is cognized (for 'a vacant place' meaning 'a place accompanied by all the "absences" that occur at this place'). However, the Kumārilite has a point when he insists that the case in question is not a case of simple memory; for to cognize 'absence of x ' is to cognize it consciously (just as to cognize x is to cognize it consciously) while it is admitted on all hands that in this case 'absence of x ' was not cognized consciously at the time when the place was cognized, so that in this case there can take place at a later occasion no simple memory of 'absence-of- x '. This is not to say that the Kumārilite is also right when he insists that in this case 'absence of x ' is cognized through a new pramāṇa called adhāva; for as has already been shown, here the earlier 'absence of x ' is an implication of the fact that at a later occasion x is not recalled even while the place is being recalled.

Having thus disposed of the Kumārilite case on the question of the alleged new pramāṇa abhāva, Jayanta directs his attention towards the corresponding Buddhist case. The peculiarity of the Buddhist case is that here 'absences' are not posited as a group of independent reals existing by the side of positive entities; even so, a view is here formulated as to what is meant when one says that one is cognizing an 'absence'. These two aspects of the Buddhist case Jayanta presents one by one and then criticizes them both from his own standpoint.

The Buddhist begins by submitting that an 'absence' is not something real, so that it is pointless to consider whether it is an object of this type of pramāṇa or an object of that type of it.¹⁹ It is then argued that an 'absence' is doubtless not cognized independently as a positive entity, nor is it cognized as related to the place concerned, the time concerned, the counterpositive concerned.²⁰ The suggestion that the relation of qualifier-and-qualificand obtains between an 'absence' and its locus is rejected on the ground that y cannot act as qualifier to x unless there already obtains between y and x either the relation called conjunction or that called inherence, it being further added that all relation of qualifier-and-qualificand is a subjective imposition on things rather than an objective property of things.²¹

The Buddhist is somehow referring to his famous position that the properties of a thing are nothing over and above this thing, so that even if an 'absence' is a qualifying property of the thing acting as its locus it can be nothing over and above this thing; (however, this important point is here developed just in passing and not in a clear-cut fashion). Then is considered the question whether a relation can possibly obtain between an 'absence' and its counterpositive. The suggestion that an ordinary positive relation obtains between the two is rejected on the obvious ground that the two do not exist simultaneously, but on the same ground is rejected the suggestion that there obtains between the two the relation called 'opposition', that is, the type of relation that obtains between a jar and the stick that breaks up this jar.²² Thus it is argued that 'absence of a jar', since it is something incapable of performing a function, cannot break up a jar.²³ The Buddhist's point here is that an 'absence', since it is not an independent real, cannot act as a cause, but he soon goes on to argue his famous position that even a positive thing supposed to be a cause of destruction is never actually such a cause inasmuch as all thing automatically undergoes destruction as soon as it is born.²⁴ However, even this position is in a way relevant for the present discussion, for destruction is supposed to be an important type of 'absence' (so-called 'posterior absence') and the Buddhist is here telling us as to how destruction is nothing over and above the concerned positive things. Thus on his showing the stick falling on a jar does not bring about an 'absence' called 'destruction of jar' but the positive entities called 'potsherds', his point being that if 'destruction of jar' is something apart from this jar then this jar should be visible there even after 'destruction of jar' has been brought about.²⁵ The opponent pleads that the potsherds are themselves what constitutes 'absence of jar'; the Buddhist retorts that in that case the destruction of these potsherds, being a destruction of 'absence of jar', must mean re-emergence of the jar.²⁶ The opponent's plea is based on the consideration that 'absence of jar' occurs precisely at the place where the potsherds occur, the Buddhist's retort is based on the consideration that 'absence of jar' is nothing apart from the

potsherds. The Buddhist buttresses his point by saying that if the potsherds, even while doing nothing to the jar, are to be called 'absence of jar' they might as well be called 'absence of cloth'.²⁷ Then the opponent is asked whether an 'absence' is something of the form of being or something of the form of non-being; in the former case it becomes absolutely akin to a positive entity, in the latter case it becomes something eternal and something lacking all reason why it should be an absence of this thing rather than that.²⁸ The opponent pleads that two different things should become identical with each other unless it is conceded that they are characterized by each other's 'absence'; the Buddhist retorts that on this logic another series of 'absences' will be required to distinguish a positive entity from an 'absence', a third series to distinguish one 'absence' from another, nothing of the sort being actually posited by the opponent.²⁹ Lastly, the opponent asks the Buddhist as to what according to the latter is the meaning of the word 'not'; the Buddhist first submits that in any case this meaning is not an 'absence' conceived as something independently real, and then says : "When added to a noun it means a thing different from the thing denoted by this noun, when added to a verb it means non-occurrence of the act denoted by this verb; (e. g. 'not-house' means a thing other than a house, 'not-going' means not undertaking the act of going)."³⁰

At this stage a somewhat new topic is introduced. For the opponent argues that if an 'absence' is nothing real then the eleven types of 'non-cognition' posited by the Buddhist logicians ought to be devoid of a proper object³¹. In this connection the eleven types of non-cognition are enumerated as follows (each being supposed to make possible the cognition of 'absence of x ') :

- (1) non-cognition of x
- (2) non-cognition of a cause-of- x
- (3) non-cognition of a superimplicant-of- x
- (4) non-cognition of an effect-of- x
- (5) cognition of a contradictory-of- x
- (6) cognition of an effect-of-a-contradictory-of- x
- (7) cognition of a subimplicant-of-a-contradictory-of- x

- (8) cognition of a contradictory-of-an-effect-of- x
- (9) cognition of a contradictory-of-a-subimplicant-of- x
- (10) cognition of a-contradictory-of-a-cause-of- x
- (11) cognition of an effect-of-a-contradictory-of-a-cause-of- x ³²

The Buddhist replies that the eleven types of non-cognition make possible not a cognition-concerning-absence but a dealing-concerning-absence.³³ His point is that when a non-cognition takes place there arises a case of practically treating as absent the thing not-cognized, not a case of cognizing as an independent real the 'absence' of this thing. The opponent reminds the Buddhist that according to the latter a non-cognition leading to a dealing-concerning-absence is a case of *svabhāva-anumāna*, while in such an *anumāna* (=inference) the probans and the probandum are one with each other, which is not the case with the probans and the probandum in question; the Buddhist replies that what a non-cognition leads to is not actual dealing-concerning-absence but the ability for such dealing while this ability is certainly one with this non-cognition.³⁴ But then the opponent objects that a non-cognition which must be something negative cannot be one with an ability which must be something positive; the Buddhist replies that a non-cognition is not a mere absence of cognition but a cognition of something else, that is, it being something positive.³⁵ To this is added that thus is also answered the objection that a non-cognition, being itself of the form of an 'absence', will require for its own cognition another non-cognition and that will lead to an infinite regress (for a non-cognition is now of the form of a positive cognition).³⁶ These questions-and-answers constitute the essence of the Buddhist's case on the question as to how an 'absence' is cognized, but they are couched in a highly technical terminology and one which is partly misleading. For otherwise what the Buddhist is saying is very much tenable. Put in plain language, his contention is that a case of non-cognition of x is a case of absence-of- x , so that wherever one fails to cognize x one has the right to say that x is absent. So, we here have an equation whose two sides represent two equivalent (equiextensive) concepts, something which always happ-

ens when one concept is defined in terms of another. And the cases of svabhāva-anumāna are cases of inference where the probans and the probandum are two such concepts that the former implies the latter or the two imply each other. This means that the cases of one concept being defined in terms of another are cases of svabhāva-anumāna where the probans and the probandum are two such concepts that they imply each other (for two equivalent concepts do imply each other). Hence it is that according to the Buddhist the case of a non-cognition making possible dealing-concerning-absence is a case of svabhāva-anumāna where this non-cognition is the probans and this dealing the probandum; (here by speaking of 'dealing-concerning-absence' instead of 'cognition-concerning-absence' it is emphasized that the present is a case of just defining the concept 'absence' and not of asserting that an 'absence' is an independent real). Lastly, by emphasizing that a non-cognition here spoken of is not a mere absence of cognition but a positive cognition it is made out that an 'absence' is noticed never except in a noticed locus. As put thus all this sounds quite plausible, but the Buddhist's technical terminology—partly misleading—considerably obscures all this. Thus it is difficult to see what he means by saying that in a case of svabhāva-anumāna the probans and the probandum are one with each other and how in the present case this identity is not retained when the probandum is 'dealing-concerning-absence' but retained when it is 'ability for dealing-concerning-absence'. So we must remember that the fact that a svabhāva-anumāna is a case of one concept implying another is expressed by the Buddhist by saying that in a svabhāva-anumāna the probans and the probandum are one with each other. Again, it is realized that even when two concepts are actually equivalent they are so treated only by one to whom the equivalence concerned is evident; hence it is contended that a case of non-cognition is not actually but only potentially a case of dealing-concerning absence.

Lastly, the Buddhist raises a point which is in fact a common point of all logicians. Thus, it is stressed that the non-cognition of a thing for whose cognition conditions are not available will

not mean an absence of this thing; (in Jayanta's presentation the distinction is made between things inherently imperceptible and things otherwise, but even a thing not inherently imperceptible might at times be in no position to be cognized even when present).³⁷ In this connection an exception is made in the case of 'absence of identity'; thus the fact that x is different of y is noticed as soon as x is noticed irrespective of whether y is something inherently imperceptible or otherwise.³⁸

Then begins Jayanta's refutation of the above Buddhist case. Thus he submits that the cognition ' x is present' is absolutely on a par with the cognition ' x is absent', so that the Buddhist should either treat both as genuine or dismiss both as illusory but he should not treat the former as genuine and dismiss the latter as illusory.³⁹ What Jayanta here has in mind is the Buddhist position that all determination of the nature of a thing on the part of thought is something illusory, and his point is that on this logic a positive determination should be as much illusory as a negative determination.⁴⁰ But the Buddhist is also of the view that there exist only positive things and no 'absences'. So, directing his criticism against this view Jayanta argues that when a jar is present on the floor we say 'jar exists on the floor', when a jar is absent on the floor we say 'absence of jar exists on the floor'; the Buddhist's plea that in the latter case we observe floor-devoid-of-jar is rejected on the ground that 'being devoid of jar' can mean nothing but 'being possessed of "absence of jar"'.⁴¹ The Buddhist's point is that when we cognize x and not y we say ' x is present and y is absent' or ' x is characterised by "absence of y "' but that there do not then exist two things, viz. x and 'absence of y '; thus on his showing 'absence of y ' is just an aspect of the nature of x as determined by the appropriate thought-activity. With this sort of argumentation Jayanta's difficulty is that he readily grants that more than one thing might exist at one place at one time; e. g. where a jar exists there also exist its colour, its touch, its action, its 'universal', and so on and so forth, so that here there might also exist 'absence of cloth' 'absence of cow' and so on and so forth. These so many things co-existing with the jar are for Jayanta so many independent reals, for the Buddhist they are so

many aspects of the jar's nature as revealed by thought. However, the Buddhist also somehow distinguish between a thing's positive feature of the form of quality, action etc. and its negative feature of the form of 'absence' and suggests that the latter is even less independent than the former; it is this distinction that Jayanta doggedly refuses to grant. Thus the Buddhist submits that the cognition of 'absence' is a mere thought-born cognition, his point being that it is not a cognition rooted in a perception (i. e. a physical encounter with things real); Jayanta retorts that this cognition arises in the wake of perception exactly as does a positive type of thought-born cognition.⁴² The Buddhist seeks to wriggle out of the difficulty by suggesting that a thought-born cognition is after all not of the form of pramāṇa; Jayanta reminds him that on the latter's own showing a perception is pramāṇa precisely to the extent that the concerned post-perceptual thought is authentic, Jayanta's point being that this consideration applies irrespective of whether the thought concerned is positive or negative.⁴³ The Buddhist pleads that acting in accordance with a positive thought one gets at a real positive thing; Jayanta retorts that acting in accordance with negative thought one gets at a real 'absence', particularly emphasizing that, on the Buddhist's own showing 'to be *x*' itself means 'not to be not-*x*'.⁴⁴ In this connection Jayanta quotes several instances where an 'absence' is of practical significance in our everyday life, his point being that it will not do to dismiss 'absence' as a phenomenon of no consequence.⁴⁵ It can easily be seen that the Buddhist is denying that an 'absence' is an independent thing, he is admitting that it is an aspect of the nature of an independent thing. Now for him it is the very definition of an independent real thing that it produces perceptual cognition concerning itself, and so he argues that an 'absence' is not something independent real because it does not produce perceptual cognition concerning itself.⁴⁶ To this Jayanta first replies that since the Buddhist's momentarism would not allow that a thing should become object of a perceptual cognition through producing this cognition, the latter can only say that this thing somehow becomes object of this cognition, something that can be said about an 'absence' as about a positive thing; and then he goes on

to add that according to his Nyāya school an 'absence', just like a positive thing, is well capable of producing a perceptual cognition concerning itself.⁴⁷ As a matter of fact, the Buddhist is very particular about insisting that a real, independent, physical thing acting on a sense-organ produces a perceptual cognition concerning itself, and since such acting is not possible on the part of a feature positive or otherwise of this thing he avers that such a feature is not a real, independent, physical thing; on the other hand, Jayanta's theory of 'contact' allows all sorts of features of a thing to become an independent object-of-perception. But here again one noteworthy point is that Jayanta would not let the Buddhist make a fundamental distinction between a positive feature and a negative one. Thus the Buddhist argues that if an 'absence' too can produce a perceptual cognition concerning itself then nothing should distinguish an 'absence' from a positive thing; Jayanta retorts that an 'absence' produces one sort of perceptual cognition, a positive thing another sort of it, just as a colour produces one sort of perceptual cognition, a taste another sort of it.⁴⁸ In this connection an incidental anomaly of the Buddhist's stand deserves notice. Thus according to him a physical thing is in fact a conglomerate of its five sensory features so that when he speaks of a physical thing acting on a sense-organ he thinks of the colour, taste etc. of this thing acting on an appropriate sense-organ; as for the rest of this thing's features, positive or otherwise, they, according to him, are but different aspects of this thing's nature. So when he argues that unlike a positive thing an 'absence' does not produce a perceptual cognition concerning itself he wishes to emphasize that an 'absence' is not an independent thing; Jayanta understands him to argue that a positive feature of a thing does and an 'absence' does not produce a perceptual cognition concerning itself because the two are so unlike each other, and retorts that both do so just as both colour and taste do so even if colour and taste are so unlike each other. On his own presuppositions, the Buddhist should plead that a colour or a taste can produce a perceptual cognition concerning itself because it is an independent thing but that neither a positive feature nor an 'absence' characterising this colour or this taste should produce a perceptual cognition concerning itself because neither is an independent thing. Not that this way

of putting things will convince Jayanta that a feature positive or otherwise of a thing cannot be an independent object of perceptual cognition (for he has his own view of the matter), but it will make the Buddhist's position clearer. Actually, Jayanta concludes by saying that an 'absence' has its own way of producing a perceptual cognition concerning itself just as a positive thing has its own,⁴⁹ it being his further understanding that a positive thing might be of the form of a substance, a quality, an action, a universal, or what not.

Jayanta next considers the Buddhist's objection that no conceivable relation obtains between an 'absence' and its locus, it being the latter's point that the proposed relation called qualifier-and-qualificand presupposes either of the recognized relations conjunction and inherence. As a matter of fact, the Nyāya school came to posit 'absence' as an independent real rather late; and when it was posited no particular thought was given to the question as to how it should stand related to its locus. Otherwise, inherence was the school's standard relation supposed to relate things belonging to all sorts of categories (an exception being the relation conjunction supposed to relate two substances), and so it could be easily maintained that an 'absence' resides in its locus by way of inherence. Hence it was that the later Nyāya authors began to say that an 'absence' resides in its locus by way of the relation called qualifier-and-qualificand. But since wherever x and y stand related x can be called a qualifier and y a qualificand (or vice versa) the opponents objected that the relation in question, unless strictly defined, is no particular relation. It is this objection as raised by the Buddhist that Jayanta is considering presently. Thus he begins by pleading that the rule that the relation qualifier-and-qualificand presupposes another recognized relation does not hold good when one relatum happens to be an 'absence'.⁵⁰ To this is added that the rule does not necessarily hold good even in case both the relata are something positive, the point being that x and y might be related without one being a qualifier and the other a qualificand while, on the other hand, x might be a qualifier to y without any other relation obtaining between x and y ; the former aspect is illustrated by saying that one is not called

a staff-holder (=one qualified by a staff) in case one tramples a staff under foot or places a staff on one's head, the latter by saying that the relation *samavāya* qualifies its locus and is not yet related to this locus by any other relation.⁵¹ Then it is argued that the relation qualifier-and-qualificand does not presuppose another relation just as the relation invariable concomitance or the relation denoter-and-denoted does not.⁵² Lastly, it is contended that the relation qualifier-and-qualificand can obtain between *x* and *y* even if the two relata are such that either can be called a qualifier and the other a qualificand.⁵³ Thus is concluded that the relation obtaining between an 'absence' and its spatial locus, as also between it and the time-of-its-occurrence, is to be called 'qualifier-and-qualificand'.⁵⁴ The issue is reopened by referring to two cases where the relation concerned has to be given the name 'qualifier-and-qualificand', there being no other conceivable relation in picture; thus an action is related to the agent-of-action as also to the object-of-action by way of the relation thus named (for this action is related by way of inference to the bodily organs of the agent but not to this agent himself who must be the soul concerned, nor to the object-of-action).⁵⁵ The whole discussion is a clear proof of the ad hoc character of the Nyāya thesis under defence. The sub-topic is closed by contending that the relation between an 'absence' and its counter-positive is one called 'opposition' which consists in the fact that the two do not exist together (the Buddhist had demanded that in all relation the relata concerned must exist simultaneously).⁵⁶

Jayanta next considers the Buddhist's objection that an 'absence' can be neither something of the form of being nor something of the form of non-being. He begins by contending that it is something of the form of non-being,⁵⁷ his point being that its essence lies in the fact that the counterpositive concerned does not exist. But soon it is argued that an 'absence' is of the form of being because it requires a cause, it being emphasized that it does not thereby turn into a positive entity.⁵⁸ This occasions a consideration of the famous Buddhist thesis that the destruction of all thing is uncaused. Thus on Jayanta's showing the destruction of a jar requires a cause like stick etc. just as its production

requires a cause like lump-of-clay etc.⁵⁹ The Buddhist pleads that the stick causes not destruction of the jar but production of the potsherds; Jayanta retorts that even in that case the stick must cause destruction of the capacity-to-produce-jar (for otherwise, the jar must be seen to exist alongside the potsherds).⁶⁰ The Buddhist pleads that the jar possesses the capacity to produce both jar and potsherds; Jayanta retorts that even in that case the services of the stick are after all required (for otherwise both jar and potsherds should be seen to exist there from the very beginning or potsherds should not be seen to exist there even after the stick has been applied).⁶¹ The Buddhist pleads that the jar possesses the capacity to produce potsherds; Jayanta retorts that in that case the role of the stick remains enigmatic (for the fact is that the jar is replaced by potsherds never except after the stick has been applied).⁶² The Buddhist pleads that after the stick has been applied the jar ceases to be there; Jayanta retorts that the statement 'jar ceases to be there' is absolutely equivalent to the statement 'absence-of-jar has come about'.⁶³ The Buddhist protests: 'At that time nothing happens to the jar, what happens is that the jar is not there'; Jayanta retorts: "To say that the jar is not there is to say that the absence-of-jar is there".⁶⁴ The Buddhist denies the validity of the equation in question; Jayanta retorts: "In the statement 'the jar is not there' there occurs the word 'jar' and the word 'not'; we know what the former word means, the latter word means 'absence'".⁶⁵ Here again the crux of the controversy lies in the circumstance that according to the Buddhist a causal relationship obtains only between independent things, not between their features positive or otherwise, while according to Jayanta it might obtain between all sorts of things and all sorts of features-of-a-thing. Thus when a stick applied to a jar breaks it into potsherds there does come into existence 'absence of jar' according to the Buddhist as well as Jayanta; but the former will say that this 'absence' is just a negative feature of the potsherds which are what has been really caused, the latter will say that this 'absence' is what has been really caused while the potsherds just happen to be the locus of this 'absence.' [The important question as to why according to the Buddhist the 'absence' of a thing must come about as

soon as this thing is born is left unconsidered here, though Jayanta promises a consideration of it too.⁶⁶]

Jayanta closes his consideration of the Buddhist's case with a brief critical reference to the latter's contention that non-cognition of x leading to a cognition of absence-of- x is a case of *svabhāva-anumāna*. The Buddhist has argued that an 'absence' being no independent real what the others call 'cognition-of-absence' he calls dealing-concerning-absence, and this dealing-concerning-absence (rather ability for such dealing) is nothing different from the non-cognition concerned, that being the reason why this non-cognition making possible this dealing-concerning-absence (rather ability for such dealing) is a case of *svabhāva-anumāna*. Jayanta's refutation of all this is hinged on his understanding that an 'absence' is an independent real.⁶⁷ He would not mind if ten out of the eleven types of non-cognition spoken of by the Buddhist in this connection are a case of an 'absence' being inferred rather than perceived, but he is emphatic that the first type, viz. the bare non-cognition of x making possible the cognition of 'absence-of- x ' is a case of an 'absence' being perceived rather than inferred⁶⁸. Really, it is the cases covered by his first type of non-cognition that the Buddhist treats as cases of *svabhāva-anumāna*, and it will be useful to recall that it is these very cases which the Kumārilite treats as cases of the *pramāṇa* called *abhāva*; for this way we can clearly see where the three parties in dispute stand vis-a-vis each other.

At this stage Jayanta briefly considers the Prabhākarite understanding of the matter, and the consideration is revealing in its own manner. Like the Buddhist the Prabhākarite too is of the view that an 'absence' is no independent real, a situation Jayanta finds so shocking, it being his belief that this view goes counter to an established Mīmāṃsā position.⁶⁹ Jayanta's puzzlement is somewhat understandable, for as in the case of his thesis on self-cognitive cognition here too the Prabhākarite has borrowed a position from the Buddhist without any intention of drawing from it the so many far-reaching conclusions the latter has drawn. And in both cases Jayanta seeks to press home to the Prabhā-

karite just this point. Thus the Prabhākarite shares with the Naiyāyika and the Kumārīlite a basic framework of thought according to which the various categories represent so many types of independent real; to put it concretely, they all would say that substances are a type of independent real but that so also are qualities, actions, 'universals' etc. But then the Prabhākarite makes an exception in the case of 'absences' and declares in a Buddhist-like fashion that they are no independent real, an attitude which Jayanta proceeds to criticize. He first takes exception to the Prabhākarite saying "What happens is that a jar is not cognized, not that 'absence of jar' is cognized", the latter's point being that in such a case to speak of 'absence of jar' is a mere manner of speaking; Jayanta retorts that by arguing this way the Prabhākarite is suggesting that whenever x is not cognized 'absence of x ' is posited, a suggestion which is untenable in the cases where x happens to be something inherently imperceptible or something imperceptible for the time being, even if it is tenable in the cases where x happens to be something utterly unreal.⁷⁰ The difficulty is that the point thus urged by Jayanta was a common point of Indian logicians and has nothing to do with whether an 'absence' is or is not an independent real; (we have actually found the Buddhist making this point all right, and yet according to him an 'absence' is not independent real). Jayanta next argues that to say that 'absence of x ' is unreal is to say that x is something everlasting, but since he soon goes on to add 'After all, you do not subscribe to the view that a thing lasts for one moment only' it is difficult to see his point.⁷¹ For dissociating oneself from the Buddhist's momentarism one might concede that a thing perishes only when a cause-of-destruction is available, and yet one might share the Buddhist's view that an 'absence' is no independent real. So keeping in mind some such defence from the Prabhākarite's side Jayanta asks: "When a stick falls on the jar, what is produced?", the answer that potsherds are then produced is dismissed by saying: "But then the jar should be available there as before."⁷² Jayanta's point is that unless the answer asked for is that 'absence of jar' is thus produced the contingency cannot be avoided that the jar should

be available there as before. Jayanta thus refuses to concede that 'absence of jar' is not something independently real but just an aspect of the nature of potsherds, but to be fair to him it must be admitted that this mode of arguing is something natural to a Buddhist, something foreign to a Prabhākarite. Lastly, Jayanta raised a point basing himself on the consideration that the meaning of a word must represent something real, a consideration broadly valid in the eyes of a Prabhākarite, a Kumārīlite, a Naiyāyika even if not so in the eyes of a Buddhist; thus the Prabhākarite is asked: "Since unlike the Buddhist you do not hold that a word represents a mere idea, please tell what according to you is the meaning of the word 'not.'"⁷⁸ Here again, Jayanta will receive an answer where the mode of arguing followed will be something natural to a Buddhist, something foreign to a Prabhākarite; for this answer will consist in contending that the word 'not' does possess a meaning but that this meaning represents nothing that is independently real.

Jayanta closes the topic by reporting as to how 'absence' was classified into types variously by various authorities, a point not of much fundamental importance. For the really fundamental question was as to whether an 'absence' is or is not an independent real existing by the side of the thing characterised by this 'absence', a question answered in the negative by the Buddhist and the Prabhākarite, in the affirmative by the Naiyāyika and the Kumārīlite. Even so, let it be noted that the types here spoken of are six in all and as follows :

- (1) 'prior absence' or absence before coming into existence
- (2) 'posterior absence' or absence after going out of existence
- (3) 'mutual absence' or absence of identity
- (4) 'absolute absence' or utter absence
- (5) 'relative absence' or temporary absence
- (6) 'absence of a capacity'

(the sixth type is obscure and might cover those cases where the Mīmāṃsaka would speak of 'destruction of a capacity')

Towards the fag end of this chapter Jayanta refers to the view which considers Sambhava and Aitihya to be independent pramāṇas. But Jayanta contends that Sambhava is not different from Anumāna (Inference) and that Aitihya is but Āgama (Verbal Testimony). He rejects Cārvāka view that it is impossible to determine the number of pramāṇas. All this Jayanta has done within a very short space of hardly a page.

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- 1 एते चत्वारो वेदाः... प्रायेण प्रतन्यते । 4 (page No.)
- 2 अङ्गानि व्याकरण-कल्प-ज्योतिः-शिक्षा-छन्दोनिरुक्तानि वेदार्थोपयोगिपदा-
दिव्युत्पादनद्वारेण विद्यास्थानत्वं प्रतिपद्यन्ते । 4
- 3 विचारमन्तरेणाव्यवस्थितवेदवाक्यान्निवधारणाद् मीमांसा वेदवाक्यार्थविचारा-
त्मिका वेदाकरस्येति कर्तव्यतारूपमनुबिभ्रतीति विद्यास्थानतां प्रतिपद्यते । 4
- 4 न्यायविस्तरस्तु...परं विद्यास्थानम् । 5
- 5 पूर्वत्र तर्कशब्देनोपात्तमुत्तरत्र च न्यायविस्तरशब्देनैतदेव शास्त्रमुच्यते । न्यायस्त-
र्कोऽनुमानम् । सोऽस्मिन्नेव शास्त्रे व्युत्पाद्यते । 6
- 6 साङ्ख्याहृतानां तावत् क्षणकानां कीदृशमनुमानोपदेशकोशलं कियदेव
तत्कर्णेन वेदप्रामाण्यं रक्ष्यते इति नासाविह गणनार्हः ...गणनावसरः । 6
- 7 वेशेषिकाः पुनरस्मदनुयायिन एव... । 6
- 8 इयमेवान्वीक्षिकी...तद्व्युत्पादकं शास्त्रमान्वीक्षिकी । 6
- 9 ननु चतुर्लक्षेद् विद्या तत्कथं चतुर्दशं दर्शिताः ? नैष विरोधः । वार्ता-
दण्डनीत्योर्दण्डकप्रयोजनत्वेन सर्वपुरुषार्थोपदेशिविद्यावर्गे गणनानर्हत्वात् त्रया-
न्वीक्षिकयोश्च तत्र निर्देशाच्चतुर्दशैव विद्याः । 7
- 10 ननु वेदप्रामाण्यनिर्णयप्रयोजनश्चेन्न्यायविस्तरः, कृतमनेन, मीमांसात एव
तत्सिद्धेः । तत्र ह्यर्थविचारवत् प्रामाण्यविचारोऽपि कृत एव । 7
- 11 सत्यम्, स त्कानुषङ्गिकः । तत्र मुख्यस्त्वर्थविचार एव । पृथक्प्रस्थाना
हीमा विद्याः । सा च वाक्यार्थविद्या, न प्रमाणविद्या । 7
- 12 न च मीमांसकाः सम्यग् वेदप्रामाण्यरक्षणक्षमां सरणिमवलोकयितुं कुशलाः ।
कुतर्ककण्टकनिकरनिबद्धसञ्चारमार्गाभासपरिभ्रान्ताः खलु ते इति
वक्ष्यामः । 7
- 13 न हि प्रमाणान्तर..शास्त्रे व्युत्पादयिष्यते । 8
- 14 नन्वक्षपादात् पूर्वं कुतो वेदप्रामाण्यनिश्चय आसीत् ? ...आदिसर्गात् प्रभृति
वेदवदिमा विद्याः प्रवृत्ताः । संक्षेपविस्तरविवक्षया तु तांस्तांस्तत्र कर्तुं नावक्षते । 8

- 15 कुतः पुनरस्यर्वैरपि निश्चितमतिर्त्वं जातम् ? उच्यते । भवति तावदेष निश्चितमतिः, स तु तपःप्रभावाद् वा देवताराधनाद् वा शास्त्रान्तराभ्यासाद् वा भवतु । 9
- 16 ननु षोडशपदार्थतत्त्वज्ञानस्य कथं निःश्रेयसाधिगमहेतुत्वमिति वक्तव्यम् । वेद-प्रामाण्यसिद्धयर्थं चेदं शास्त्रमिति तावन्मात्रमेव व्युत्पाद्यतां, किं षोडशपदार्थ-कस्याप्रत्ययेन । 17
- 17 उच्यते । आत्मापवर्गपर्यन्तद्वादशविधप्रमेयज्ञानं तावदन्यज्ञानानौपयिकमेव साक्षा-दपवर्गसाधनमिति वक्ष्यामः । तत्त्वज्ञानान्मिध्याज्ञाननिरासे सति तन्मूलः संसारो निवर्तते इति प्रमेयं तावदवश्योपदेश्यम् । 17
- 18 तस्य तु प्रमेयस्यात्मादेरपवर्गसाधनत्वाधिगम आगमैकनिबन्धनः । 17
- 19 तस्य प्रामाण्यनिर्णीतिप्रमेयवदुपदेष्टव्यम् । 17
- 20 संशयादयस्तु पदार्था यथासम्भवं प्रमाणेषु प्रमेयेषु चान्तर्भवन्तोऽपि न्यायप्रवृत्ति-हेतुत्वात् पृथगुपदिश्यन्ते । न्यायश्च वेदप्रामाण्यप्रतिष्ठापनपूर्वकत्वेन पुरुषार्थोपयोगित्वमुपयातीति दर्शितम् । 18

References : On Defining Pramāṇa pp. 17-43

- 1 व्यापारवत् कारणं करणम् ।
- 2 अव्यभिचारिणीमसन्दिग्धामर्थोपलब्धिं विदधती बोधाबोधस्वभावा सामग्री प्रमाणम् । 25
- 3 (i) ननु च प्रमीयते...अतिशयं ब्रूमः ? 25
(ii) अपि च, कस्मिन्...तद् व्याहन्यते । 26
(iii) न च लोकोऽपि...इत्याचक्षते । 26
- 4 यत एव साधकतमं करणं करणसाधनश्च प्रमाणशब्दः, तत एव सामग्र्याः प्रमाणत्वं युक्तम् । तद्व्यतिरेकेण कारकास्तरे क्वचिदपि तमवर्थसंस्पर्शानुपपत्तेः । अनेककारकसन्निधाने कार्यं घटमानमन्यतरव्यपगमे च विघटमानं कस्मै अतिशयं प्रयच्छेत् ? न चातिशयः कार्यजन्मनि कस्यचिदवधार्यते, सर्वेषां तत्र व्याप्रियमाणत्वात् । 26
- 5 सन्निपत्यजनकत्वमतिशय इति चेत्, न, भारद्वाजकरकाणामपि कारकत्वान-पायात् । ज्ञाने च जन्ये किमसन्निपत्यजनकम्, सर्वेषामिन्द्रियमनोऽर्थादीना-मितरेतरसंसर्गे सति ज्ञाननिष्पत्तेः । 26
- 6 अथ सहसैव कार्यजननमतिशयः । सोऽपि...करणं स्यात् । 27
- 7 तस्मात् फलोत्पादाविनाभावस्वभावत्वमवश्यतया कार्यजनकत्वमतिशयः । स च सामग्र्यन्तर्गतस्य न कस्यचिदेकस्य कारकस्य कथयितुं पार्यते । सामग्र्यास्तु

- सोऽतिशयः सुवचः । सन्निहिता चेत् सामग्री सम्पन्नमेव फलमिति सैवाति-
शयवती । 27
- 8 यत्तु किमपेक्षं सामग्र्याः करणत्वमिति तदन्तर्गतकारकापेक्षमिति ब्रूमः । 28
- 9 समग्रसन्निधानाख्यधर्मस्य प्रत्यक्षोपलम्भात् । पृथगवस्थितेषु हि स्थाली-जल-
ज्वलन-तण्डुलादिषु न समग्रताप्रत्ययः, समुदितेषु तु भवतीत्यतस्तन्तुपटल-
परिघटितपटाद्यवयविवत् कारककलापनिष्पाद्यद्रव्यान्तराभावेऽपि समुदायात्मिका
सामग्री विद्यते एव । 29
- 10 कारकाणां धर्मः सामग्री न स्वरूपहानाय तेषां कल्पते, साकल्यदशायामपि
तत्स्वरूपप्रत्यभिज्ञानात् । 28
- 11 तस्मान्न परिचोदनीयमिदं...विद्याचतुष्टयं समाहितम् । 29
- 12 साकल्यप्रसादलब्धप्रमितिसम्बन्धनिबन्धनः प्रमातृप्रमेययोर्मुख्यस्वरूपलाभः ।
साकल्यापचये प्रमित्यभावाद् गौणे प्रमातृप्रमेये सम्पद्यते । 28
- 13 यत्त्वभ्यधायि सामग्र्याः करणनिर्देशो न दृश्यते इति तत्रोच्यते । सामग्री हि
संहतिः । सा हि संहन्यमानव्यतिरेकेण न व्यवहारपदवीमवतरति । तेन
'सामग्र्या पश्यामि' इति न व्यपदेशः । 29
- 14 यस्तु दीपेन्द्रियाणां तृतीयानिर्देशः स फलोपजननाविनाभाविवस्वभावत्वाख्य-
सामग्रीस्वरूपसमारोपणनिबन्धनः । अन्यत्रापि च तद्रूपसमारोपेण 'स्थाल्या
पचति' इति व्यपदेशो दृश्यते एव । 29
- 15 अपरे पुनराचक्षते...कारकं करणमुच्यते । 30
- 16 तदेव च तृतीयया व्यपदिशन्ति, 'दीपेन पश्यामि', 'चक्षुषा निरीक्षे', 'लिङ्गेन
बुध्ये', 'शब्देन जानामि' 'मनसा निश्चिनोमि' इति । 30
- 17 ननु त्रीण्येव कारकाण्यस्मिन् पक्षे भवेयुः । ज्ञानक्रियायां तावदेवमेवैतद् यथा
भवानाह । पाकादिक्रियासु क्रियाश्रयधारणाद्युपकारभेदपर्यालोचनया भवत्व-
धिकरणादिकारकान्तरव्यवहारः । प्रमिती तु मनोदीपचक्षुरादेर्न लक्ष्यते
विशेष इति तत् सर्वं करणत्वेन सम्मतम् । 30
- 18 कस्तेषु तमवर्थं इति चेत्...तेषामतिशय इति । 30
- 19 ये तु बोधस्यैव प्रमाणत्वमाचक्षते, न सूक्ष्मदर्शिनस्ते । 31
- 20 बोधः खलु...प्रामाण्यमनुमन्यन्ते । 31
- 21 यस्तु प्रमा प्रमाणमिति प्रमाणशब्दः स प्रमाणफले द्रष्टव्यः । 31
- 22 तदप्युक्तम्, सकलजगद्विदितबोधेतरस्वभावशब्दलिङ्गदीपेन्द्रियादिपरिहार-
प्रसङ्गात् । 32

- 23 तस्मात् सामग्र्यनुप्रविष्टबोधो विशेषणज्ञानमिव क्वचित् प्रत्यक्षे, लिङ्गज्ञानमिव लिङ्गिप्रमितौ, सारूप्यदर्शनमिवोपमाने, शब्दश्रवणमिव तदर्थज्ञाने प्रमाणतां प्रतिपद्यते । 32
- 24 अन्ये तुल्यसामग्र्यधीनयोः...तत्र प्रामाण्यमिति । 32
- 25 स चायमर्थक्षणो ज्ञानसमकालस्ततः पूर्वाम्यां ज्ञानार्थक्षणाभ्यामुपजनित इति तत्कर्मतां प्रतिपद्यतां, न पुनः स्वसमानकालप्रसूतज्ञानक्षणकर्मतामिति । 33
- 26 हन्त तर्हि सहोत्पन्नयोः समानसामग्रीकयोः...निराकरिष्यमाणत्वात् । 33
- 27 ये हि निराकारस्य बोधरूपस्य...वक्ष्यते । 34
- 28 प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्था तुल्यजनकत्वनिबन्धना भविष्यति, वस्तुस्वभावस्यापर्यनुयो-
ज्यत्वात् । साकारपक्षेऽपि पर्यनुयोगसाम्यमित्यादि सर्वमुपरिष्ठात् सविस्तर-
मभिधास्यते । 35
- 29 अर्थस्तु साकारज्ञानवादिनो न समस्त्येव...अवशिष्यते । 34
- 30 (i) अफलजनकस्य प्रमाणत्वापत्तेरित्युक्तत्वात् । 33
(ii) साकारपक्षेऽपि च न प्रमाणाद् व्यतिरिक्तं फलमुपदर्शितमित्यसत्पक्ष
एवायम् । 35
- 31 शाबरास्तु ब्रूवते य एते बोधप्रामाण्यवादिनो विज्ञानादभिन्नमेव फलमभिदधति
ते बाढं निरसनीया भवन्त्येव, वयं तु विज्ञानाद् भिन्नमेव फलमर्थदृष्ट-
ताख्यमभ्युपगच्छामः । 36
- 32 ज्ञानं हि नाम क्रियात्मकं...फलेन कल्प्यते । 36
- 33 अहो बत इमे केभ्यो विभ्यतः श्रोत्रियाः परं किमपि वैकल्यमुपगताः ।
न खलु नित्यपरोक्षं ज्ञानं भवितुमर्हति, 'ज्ञातोऽर्थः' इति क्वचित् तद्विशिष्टार्थ-
प्रत्यवमर्शदर्शनाद् विशेषणाग्रहणे 'शुक्लः पटः' इतिवद् विशिष्टप्रतीतेर-
नुत्पादात् । कश्चायमियान् सन्त्रासः । विषयग्रहणकाले विज्ञानाग्रहणमात्रकेण
बाह्यार्थनिह्वववादिनः शाक्याः शक्याः शमयितुम् । 37
- 34 यत्तु क्रियास्वभावत्वात् तस्य परोक्षत्वं...किं क्रियया ? 37
- 35 ननु करोतीति कारकम् । क्रियावेशमन्तरेण कारकत्वानुपपत्तेः । सत्यम्,
करोतीति कारकम्, तत्तु फलमेव करोति, न क्रियाम् । 38
- 36 ननु करोतीति यद् ब्रूषे...व्यापारो नास्तीति ब्रूमहे । 38-40
- 37 ननु पाको नाम...पिठराद् विना । 40-41
- 38 ननु पिठराद् विना काष्ठानि ज्वलन्ति, न तु पचन्ति । मैवम् । सत्यपि पिठरे
ज्वलन्त्येव काष्ठानि, नान्यत् कुर्वन्ति दृश्यन्ते । तस्मात् क्रियान्तराभावात्
फलमेवोररीकृत्य कारकाणि संसृज्यन्ते । 41

- 39 ननु फलमपि सिद्धं चेत् ...न विवदामहे । 41
- 40 ननु पाक इदानीं कः...इति व्यपदेशो दृश्यते । 42
- 41 न हि पुरुषव्यापारः कश्चिदुपलभ्यते । विशिष्टगुणसमवाय एवास्य कर्तृत्वम् ।
न च ज्ञानादयो गुणा एव व्यापारसंज्ञावाच्याः, सिद्धस्वभावत्वात् । 43
- 42 अपि च 'घटमहं जानामि' इत्यत्र भवतः किं प्रतिभासते ? घटमिति तावद्
विषयः, अहमित्यात्मा, जानामीति तु चिन्त्यम्-किमत्र प्रकाशते इति । न
व्यापारः, परोक्षत्वात् । फलं तु यद्यत्र प्रकाशते तदेव तर्हि धातुवाच्यमभ्यु-
पगतं भवति । तस्मात् न क्रियात्मकं ज्ञानम् । 43
- 43 यदि च क्रियात्मकं ज्ञानमभविष्यन्न भाष्यकारः क्रियातः पृथगेनं निरदेक्ष्यत ।
निर्दिशति च 'बुद्धिकर्मणी अपि हि प्रत्यभिज्ञायेते, ते नित्ये प्राप्नुतः' इति । तस्माद्
अन्यत् ज्ञानम्, अन्या च क्रियेति, न क्रियास्वभावत्वान्नित्यपरोक्षं ज्ञानम् । 43
- 44 यदि च नित्यपरोक्षो ज्ञातृव्यापारः, स तर्हि प्रतिबन्धाग्रहणादनुमातुमपि न
शक्यः । 43
- 45 क्रियाविशिष्टबाह्यकारकसिद्धान्तस्य निरस्तत्वात् । आत्माद्यनुमाने का वार्तेति
चेत्, न, तत्र सामान्यतो व्याप्तिग्रहणस्य सम्भवादिति वक्ष्यामः । इह
तु बाह्यकारकेष्वपि न तत्पूर्वकं फलं दृष्टम् ।
- 46 न चार्थापत्तिरपि ज्ञातृव्यापारकल्पनायै प्रभवति, इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षवशादेवार्थ-
दृष्टताया घटमानत्वात् । 44
- 47 का चेयमर्थदृष्टता नाम, किं दर्शनकर्मता, किं प्रकाशस्वभावतेति ? तत्र
दर्शनस्य परोक्षत्वात् कथं तत्कर्मताऽर्थस्य दृष्टता गृह्येत ? विशेषाग्रहणे
विशिष्टप्रतीतेरनुत्पादात् । अर्थप्रकाशतायास्तु, सर्वान् प्रत्यविशेषात् सर्वे
सर्वज्ञाः स्युः । 45
- 48 न स्युः, सम्बन्धितयोत्पादादिति चेत्, अकारणमेतत् । अर्थस्यैव हि प्रकाश-
स्वमतिशयो दीपादेरिव, न पुरुषनियमेन व्यवतिष्ठते । 45
- 49 संवेदनमपि प्रज्ञैः कस्यातिशय उच्यते ? ।
ज्ञातृश्चेदन्तराज्येन व्यापारेणास्य को गुणः ? ॥
ननु नैव क्रियाशून्यं कारकं फलसिद्धये ।
उक्तमत्र क्रिया ह्येषा यथादर्शनमिष्यताम् ॥
ज्ञानं संवेदनं चेति विद्मः पर्यायशब्दताम् ।
संवेदनं तु ज्ञानस्य फलत्वेन न मन्महे ॥ 46
- 50 स्वसंवेद्या च संवित्तिरुपरिष्ठान्निषेत्स्यते ।...
स्वप्रकाशमते युक्तं न फलं संविदात्मकम् ॥ 46

- 51 यदपि प्रमाणविशेषणमनधिगतार्थग्राहित्वमभिधीयते परैस्तदपि न साम्प्रतम् ।
प्रमाणस्य गृहीततदितरविषयप्रवृत्तस्य प्रामाण्ये विशेषाभावात् । 48 90
- 52 (i) ननु गृहीतविषये...तदप्रमाणमिति व्यवस्थापयामः । 48
(ii) न च सर्वात्मना वैफल्यम्, हेये अहि-कण्टक-वृक-मकर-विषधरादौ
विषये पुनःपुनरुपलभ्यमाने मनःसन्तापात् सत्वरं तदपहानाय प्रवृत्तिः,
उपादेयेऽपि चन्दन-वनसार-हार-महिलादौ परिदृश्यमाने प्रीत्यतिशयः
स्वसंवेद्य एव भवति । 48
- 53 यत्रापि स्यात् परिच्छेदः प्रमाणरुत्तरैः पुनः ।
नूनं तत्रापि पूर्वोक्तं सोऽर्थो नावधृतस्तथा ॥ 48
- 54 नैवाधिरूपपरिच्छेदः प्रमाणरुत्तरैर्ध्रुवम् ।
धारावाहिकबोधेषु कोऽधिकोऽर्थः प्रकाशते ॥
न हि स्वहस्ते शतकृत्वोऽपि परिदृश्यमाने केचन विशेषाः परिस्फुरन्ति ।
- 55 यदि चानुपलब्धार्थग्राहि मानमुपेयते ।
तदयं प्रत्यभिज्ञायाः स्पष्ट एव जलाञ्जलिः ॥ 50
- 56 यश्चेदानीं तनास्तित्वप्रमेयाधिक्यलिप्सया ।
तस्याः प्रमाणतामाह सोऽपि वञ्चयतीव नः ॥ 50
- 57 नन्वेतस्मिन् परित्यक्ते प्रामाण्यं स्यात् स्मृतेरपि ॥
न स्मृतेरप्रमाणत्वं गृहीतग्राहिताकृतम् ।
अपि त्वनर्थजन्यत्वं तदप्रामाण्यकारणम् ॥ 50
- 58 कथं तर्हि...प्रातिभम् । 51
- 59 अपरे मुनिरविसंवादकत्वं प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणमाचक्षते ।...
प्रदर्शितं वस्तु प्रापयतः प्रमाणत्वव्यवहारः । 52
- 60 तच्च प्रापकत्वं...यथाऽध्यवसितप्रापकं च प्रमाणमिति मतम् । 52
- 61 तदेतदनुपपन्नम् । इदमेव तावत् भवान् व्याचष्टाम्—प्रदर्शितप्रापकं प्रमाण-
मुत्पाद्यवसितप्रापकमिति ? तत्रानुमाने तावत् प्रदर्शनमेव नास्ति, का
कथा तत्प्रापणस्य ! प्रत्यक्षे तु बाढं प्रदर्शनमस्ति, न तु प्रदर्शितं
प्राप्यते । 53
- 62 ननु काल्पनिकेऽपि सन्ताने...इति कदाशालम्बनमेतत् । 54
- 63 अव्यापकं चेदं लक्षणम्...तथोपलम्भादिति । 55-56
- 64 ननु यावान् प्रमाणस्य व्यापारः प्रापणं प्रति ।
तावानुपेक्षणीयेऽपि विषये तेन साधितः ॥

उक्तं हि राज्ञामादेश्टृत्वमेव हन्तृत्वम्, प्रदर्शकत्वमेव ज्ञानस्य प्रापकत्वमिति ।
मेवम्—

एव प्रदर्शकत्वं स्यात् केवलं तस्य लक्षणम् ।

तच्च प्रचलदकांशुजलजानेऽपि दृश्यते ॥ 56

65 ननु तत्र विपरीताध्यवसायजननादप्रामाण्यम् ।...स्थैर्यं तु तदप्रमाणम्, विप-
रीताध्यवसायकलुषितत्वादिति । 57

66 यद्येवमस्मिन् प्रक्रमे...अप्रमाणीभवेदिति । 58

67 अपि च प्राप्त्यप्राप्ती पुरुषेच्छामात्रहेतुके भवतः ।

अर्थप्रतीतिरेव प्रमाणकार्याऽवधार्यते तस्मात् ॥

मानस्य लक्षणमतः कथयद्भिस्तद्विशेषणं वाच्यम् ।

न पुनः प्रापणशक्तिः प्रामाण्यं कथयितुं युक्तम् ॥ 58

68 निरसिष्यते च सकलः कपिलमुनिप्रक्रियाप्रपञ्चोऽयम् । 60

69 साङ्ख्यवास्तु बुद्धिवृत्तिः प्रमाणमिति प्रतिपन्नाः । विषयाकारपरिणतेर्द्विधा-
दिवृत्त्यनुपातिनी बुद्धिवृत्तिरेव पुरुषमुपरञ्जयन्ती प्रमाणम् । तदुपरक्तो हि
पुरुषः प्रतिनियतविषयद्रष्टा सम्पद्यते । 59

70 तदेतद्बुद्धयङ्गमम् । यो हि जानाति बुद्धयतेऽध्यवस्यति न तस्य तत्कलमर्थ-
दर्शनमचेतनत्वान्महतः । यस्य चार्थदर्शनं न स जानाति न बुद्धयते नाध्य-
वस्यतीति भिन्नाधिकरणत्वं प्रमाणफलयोः । जानादिधर्मयोगः प्रमाणं पुंषि
न विद्यते, तत्कलमर्थदर्शनं बुद्धौ नास्तीति । 59

71 अयं स्वच्छतया पुंसो बुद्धिवृत्त्यनुपातिनः ।

बुद्धेर्वा चेतनाकारसंस्पर्श इव लक्ष्यते ॥

एव सति स्ववाचैव मिथ्यात्वं कथितं भवेत् ।

चिद्धर्मो हि मृषा बुद्धौ बुद्धिधर्मश्चित्तो मृषा ॥ 59

72 साकारज्ञानवादाच्च नातीवैष विशिष्यते ।

त्वत्पक्ष इत्यतोऽमुष्य तन्निषेधान्निषेधनम् ॥ 60

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pp. 43-54

1 नन्वेतद् भिक्षवो न क्षमन्ते—

ते हि प्रमेयद्वैविध्यात् प्रमाणं द्विविधं जगुः ।

नान्यः प्रमाणभेदस्य हेतुविषयभेदतः ॥ 64

2 विषयश्च प्रत्यक्षपरोक्षभेदेन स्वलक्षणसामान्यभेदेन वा द्विविध एव, परस्पर-
परिहारव्यवस्थितात्ममु पदार्थेषु तृतीयराशयनुप्रवेशाभावात् ।

तृतीयविषयासत्त्वपरिच्छेद एव कुतस्त्य इति चेत् प्रत्यक्षमहिम्न एवेति
ब्रूमः । 64-65

- 3 नीले प्रवर्तमानं...सूचयतीत्येकप्रमाणव्यापारः । 65
- 4 यद्यपि निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष...व्यवहाराभावात् । 66
- 5 एव च परस्परपरिहार...अप्रतिभासमानत्वात् । 66
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- 59 घटो हि मृत्पिण्डदण्डादीनिव जन्मनि विनाशोऽपि मुद्गरादीननुवर्तते हेतून् । 134
- 60 विजातीयसन्ततिजननपक्षेऽपि सदृशसन्तानजनिकायाः शक्तेरभावः क्रियते एव,
अन्यथा मुद्गराद्युपनिपातेऽपि विजातीयेव सजातीयसन्ततिरपि जायेत । 134
- 61 सजातीयविजातीयोभयसन्ततिजननशक्तियुक्तो घट इति चेद् पूर्वमपि कपाल-
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- 62 विजातीयक्षणोत्पादनस्वभावे च घटे मुद्गरादेर्वैयर्थ्यमेव स्यात् ।
तदुत्पादस्वभावे हि न किञ्चिन्मुद्गरादिना ।
अतदुत्पादकत्वेऽपि न किञ्चिन्मुद्गरादिना ॥
मुद्गरोरुपनिपाताच्च यद्युत्पन्नं क्षणान्तरम् ।
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- 63 नन्वस्याभवनं वृत्तां स एवार्थोऽयमुच्यते ।
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- 64 ननूक्तं न तस्य किञ्चिद् भवति, न भवत्येव केवलम् । तदयुक्तम्, यदसौ
न भवति स एवास्याभावः । 136
- 65 ननु स न, न तु तस्याभावः । मैत्रम्, स नेतिशब्दयोर्ज्ञानयोश्च विषयभेदात् ।
स इति ज्ञानस्य स्मर्यमाणो घटादिविषयः, नेति तु ज्ञानस्याभावो
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- 66 या चेयमेकादश... क्षणमङ्गमङ्गे दूषयिष्यते । 136-137
- 67 तस्मादित्थमभावस्य प्रमेयत्वोपपादनात् ।
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APPENDIX

ON THE PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL

The question as to how we can know reality is of the utmost importance. Are there any means with whose help we can know reality ? If there are, how many are they and on what ground can we consider them to be valid ? In what way can we know knowledge itself and especially its validity (*prāmāṇya*) ? These are some of the problems regarding knowledge. We present in brief the various views adopted by the different systems of Indian philosophy on the problems of knowledge in general.

Definition of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa* = *pramā*) : Kaṇāda considers only that cognition to be valid whose cause is free from defects.¹ Vātsyāyana's word for cognition is *upalabdhi* and he defines *pramāṇa* as the means of *upalabdhi*.² But he is not unmindful of the fact that not every cognition but only that which presents an object as it is, is valid (*arthavat pramāṇam*). Vācaspati explains the word '*arthavat*' as 'non-contradictory to the nature of the object concerned' (*arthāvyabhicāri*). Vācaspati clearly explains what he means by the non-contradictory character of valid knowledge.³ He puts this characteristic in the very definition of valid knowledge.⁴ The later Naiyāyikas follow him and observe that the cognition that presents an object with a character which it really has is valid. Nor would the Naiyāyikas hesitate to regard the coherence between the cognitive and conative activities as one of the characteristics of valid knowledge.⁵ Thus with the Naiyāyikas the presentativeness, the non-contradictoriness (i. e. the correspondence between a cognition and its object) and the coherence between the cognitive and the conative activities are the essential defining characteristics of valid cognition. The Prābhākaras define valid knowledge as immediate experience (*anubhūti*).⁶ The Bhāṭṭas, under the influence of the Buddhists, hold that valid cognition invariably pertains to a novel object.⁷ They follow Kaṇāda when they maintain that valid cognition is that cognition which originates from a non-defective cause.⁸ It was perhaps Dīnāga who for the first time pointed out that valid

cognition is self-revelatory. In addition, he observed that valid cognition should represent the form of the object concerned (*viṣayākāra*).⁹ Dharmakīrti defines true knowledge as harmonious or nondiscrepant (*avisamvādi*) in the sense that there is no conflict between the cognition of an object and the practical activity meant to obtain it.¹⁰ Some may point out that according to Buddhism things being momentary an object indicated (apprehended) by a piece of cognition and an object attained (reached or determined) by us in the wake of this cognition could never be the same; thus there would arise the impossibility of there being a harmony between the cognitive and conative activities and consequently no knowledge would be considered to be valid. Dharmottara solves the difficulty by suggesting that while defining valid knowledge Dharmakīrti has kept before his eyes the object-continuum and not the momentary members of this continuum. He has tackled the problem of valid cognition from the empirical or worldly viewpoint that accepts a thing as durable. Moreover, for Dharmakīrti valid cognition is a new cognition, the cognition of an object not yet cognised.¹² It might be urged that on this definition even the cognition of the universal (*sāmānyavijñāna*) arising in the wake of the cognition of the unique particular would become valid because the former cognises an object not yet cognised by a previous cognition.¹³ But Dharmakīrti in this connection declares that what he means is that the cognition grasping the ungrasped unique particular¹⁴ is valid. For, by means of valid knowledge people seek to acquire unique particulars only, because none but they lead to successful purposive activity.¹⁵ Inasmuch as things, according to Buddhism, are momentary, two cognitions can never arise with regard to one and the same object. And so, to be consistent with the prime doctrine of momentarism Dharmakīrti deems it proper to put down 'grasping-the-hitherto-ungrasped-object' as a differentiating mark of valid cognition. In the Jaina tradition Siddhasena Divākara and Āc. Samantabhadra define valid cognition by pointing out that it is its nature to reveal itself as well as its object.¹⁶ Akalaṅka, although he accepts this as one of the defining characteristics of valid cognition,¹⁷ considers harmony or

non-discrepancy (*avisamvāda*) to be the true mark of valid cognition.¹⁸ For him non-discrepancy of cognition means its not being sublated by other valid cognitions as also its self-consistence.¹⁹ By non-discrepancy he also means the correspondence of cognition with the nature of its object.²⁰ Sometimes he also means by non-discrepancy the coherence between the cognitive and conative activities. In addition to non-discrepancy, definiteness or determinateness is regarded by him as one of the essential characteristics of valid cognition.²¹ He observes that even non-discrepancy of cognition is impossible without its possessing a determinate nature.²² He has also introduced in his definition of valid cognition the adjectival phrase – 'grasping-the-hitherto-ungrasped' in order to qualify valid cognition.²³ The influence of Dharmakīrti is evident here. It might be said that for the Buddhists who are momentarists it is alright to consider valid cognition to be a cognition pertaining to quite a new object. But for the Jainas reality is relatively permanent. Hence it is not proper for Akalaṅka to insert the adjectival phrase 'pertaining to a novel object' in his definition of valid cognition. Akalaṅka replies that reality, since it is relatively permanent, possesses innumerable modes. Hence even if two or more cognitions could operate in relation to one and the same thing, they would always determine the mode or an aspect of it, not determined by the other. So, for us, says Akalaṅka, the phrase 'grasping-the-hitherto-ungrasped' means 'determining-the-hitherto-undetermined-mode'.²⁴ Akalaṅka seems to relax this condition in the case of memory.²⁵ Thus he is not serious about this condition. So, it ultimately boils down to this that the essential characteristics of valid cognition, according to Akalaṅka, are its non-discrepancy, its ability to enable us to attain the object capable of purposive activity, and its determinate nature. It is interesting to note that to be consistent with the doctrine of non-absolutism Akalaṅka considers all empirical cognitions to be valid as well as invalid. No empirical cognition is absolutely valid or absolutely invalid. Yet we call a cognition valid if it by far corresponds with the concerned external object and we call it invalid if it is mostly not in consonance with the form of the concerned external object.²⁶ The realisation that the powers of the sense-organs are limited seems to have led Akalaṅka to formulate such a view.

But Akalaṅka would not deny the absolute validity of the highest transcendental perception called *Kevala-jñāna* which requires no media of sense-organs and mind to grasp its object. This suggests that the theory of non-absolutism is not to be applied without discrimination. For if it were so applied even the perfect knowledge of an omniscient being would have to be regarded as partly valid and partly invalid. But here the operation of non-absolutism ceases. Hence, it is said that even *Anekānta* itself is *anekānta*, that is, in certain spheres it operates and in certain others it does not.²⁷

Nature of the source of valid knowledge : We have discussed the definitions of valid cognition. But what is the instrument or source of valid cognition ? It is said by Vātsyāyana that the cause of valid cognition (*upalabdhi-hetu*) is its instrument.²⁸ But can any cause of such a cognition be its instrument ? Not any cause but the one which is the most efficient (*karana*) is its instrument. But how can we know that a particular cause out of many is the most efficient ? Some Naiyayikas consider sense-organs to be the instrument of valid perceptual cognition. From this it becomes clear that for them the thing possessed of a function (*vyāpāraavat*) is the most efficient cause. Function here means the action which is immediately and invariably followed by the effect concerned. Some other Naiyayikas consider the sense-object contact (*sannikarṣa*) to be the instrument of valid perceptual cognition. So, for them the function itself is the efficient cause. For Jayanta Bhaṭṭa neither the thing possessed of a function nor this function itself is the efficient cause. He emphatically holds that it is the aggregate (*sāmagrī*) of all conditions—physical as well as psychological—that is the most efficient cause of a valid cognition.²⁹ The aggregate is devoid of a function.³⁰ It is the most efficient in comparison to the particular factors (viz. subject, object, sense-organ etc.) included in it.³¹ It is noteworthy that Kumārila, in his *Śloka-vārtika*, has for the first time hinted at this view while enumerating all the possible views as regards the instrument of knowledge.³²

As for the question of identity or difference between the resultant cognition and its instrument, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas consider the two to be absolutely different. This view of theirs

seems to be a corollary of their fundamental position according to which an effect is quite different from its cause (*ārambhavāda*). One thing to be noted here is that they regard each stage in the process of cognition as an instrument as well as a resultant cognition—an instrument with respect to the succeeding stage that is generated by it and a resultant cognition with respect to the preceding stage whose result it is.³³

Dharmakīrti maintains that nothing but cognition (*jñāna*) deserves to be called an instrument of valid cognition because it is the most efficient cause required to generate valid cognition. This is so for two reasons: (i) Sense-organs being non-conscious, it is impossible for them to generate cognition. (ii) It is mainly cognition that can enable us to attain the desirable and to avoid the undesirable.³⁴ From this it can be deduced that out of the four causal conditions (*pratyaya*) it is the *samanantara pratyaya* (the immediately preceding cognition-moment) that is considered by him to be the main or the most efficient cause of valid cognition. Here by the word *pramāṇa* he means the main or the most efficient cause required to generate the resultant cognition. But elsewhere he goes even a step further and considers the formal similarity obtaining between a piece of valid cognition and its object to be the instrument of this piece of valid knowledge. Thus he observes that because a particular piece of knowledge is determined to be (say) 'knowledge of the blue' or 'knowledge of the yellow' on the basis of the form it bears, it is this form that should be regarded as a *pramāṇa* (an instrument).³⁵ Here he seems to have given up the idea of calling the main or the most efficient cause of a particular piece of valid cognition its *pramāṇa* (its instrument). In its stead he now deems it quite proper to call the form that determines a particular piece of knowledge to be 'knowledge of the blue' or 'knowledge of the yellow' its *pramāṇa* (its instrument). And a particular piece of knowledge and its form being absolutely identical, he regards the resultant cognition and its instrument as identical. As a Vijñānavādin he observes that the capacity of cognition to cognise itself is the instrument and its actual cognition of itself (*svasamvedana*) is the resultant cognition.³⁶

Even Akalaṅka agrees with Dharmakīrti in so far as he holds that it is a cognition that should be regarded as *pramāṇa* (instrument). The reasons why he upholds this view are the same as those advanced by Dharmakīrti.³⁷ But this view of his means that the quality called knowledge is the main or the most efficient cause of a particular mode of this quality knowledge. Here by *pramāṇa* he means the main or the most efficient cause of the resultant cognition. And because particular piece of valid cognition is a mode of the quality knowledge (a quality which belongs to the substance soul), the two are regarded by him as identical as well as different.³⁸ It is interesting to note that Akalaṅka for the first time takes clear note of and endorses the relativistic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position according to which the intermediary links in the causal chain of a cognitive process are, each of them, a *pramāṇa* as well as an effect of *pramāṇa*.³⁹ Later on, a Jain logician like Hemacandra goes one step further and observes that because knowledge is determined to be 'knowledge of the blue' or 'knowledge of the yellow' on the basis of its mode it is this mode that should be regarded as the *pramāṇa* and the knowledge as a whole of that particular time as the resultant cognition. Here the word '*pramāṇa*' means the determinant of a particular piece of valid cognition. The influence of Dharmakīrti is evident here. Āc. Hemacandra follows Dharmakīrti in positing the relation of the determinant and the determined (*vyavasthāpya-vyavasthāpakubhāva*) between the instrument and the resultant cognition.⁴⁰ But prior to Āc. Hemacandra, the Jaina logicians have criticised Dharmakīrti for having done so.

How do we know knowledge ? : The Buddhists, be they realists or idealists, consider cognition to be self-revelatory.⁴¹ The Jainas, the Prābhākaras⁴² and the Vedāntins agree with the Buddhists; but the Bhāṭṭas and the Naiyāyikas uphold some peculiar views. According to the Bhāṭṭas a cognition is not only not self-revelatory but is not even perceptible. It is inferred from the result of cognition, that is, from the cognisedness or manifestness (*jñātata*) produced by cognition in the object cognised. For example, when we know a jar we have an apprehension that the jar is cognised by us; and from this cognisedness of the object we infer the existence of cognition; a cognition is inferred from the cognised-

ness of its object.⁴³ The Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that though every cognition is perceptible it is perceived by a cognition other than itself which is called 'after-cognition' (*anuvyavasāya*).⁴⁴ Dharmakīrti and Akalaṅka both criticise this peculiar Nyāya view.⁴⁵ They observe that if cognition is not self-revelatory but requires another cognition to reveal itself, it would involve us in an infinite regress. Akalaṅka has refuted the Bhāṭṭa view also.⁴⁶ Thus all philosophers except the Bhāṭṭa and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas "are unanimous in holding that cognition as such is self-perceptible (*svaprakāśa*), that is, that all cognition, whether acquired through perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), verbal testimony (*śabda*) or memory (*smṛti*), notices its own nature by way of direct observation [*(sākṣātkāra)* while it is called 'inferential,' 'verbal,' 'mnemonic' etc. owing to the nature of the object grasped (*grāhya*). In other words, even though differing as regards their respective generating conditions (*sāmagrī*) and pertaining to objects that are differently characterised 'as capable of being perceived', 'capable of being inferred', 'capable of being recalled' etc., the various types of cognition, like perception, inference, memory etc. are, all of them, perceptually cognisant of their own nature (i. e. of themselves)."⁴⁷

How do we know the validity of knowledge? For the Bhāṭṭas the validity of cognition is self-evident.⁴⁸ Its invalidity is known only when it is contradicted by some other strong cognition.⁴⁹ The Naiyāyikas maintain that neither the validity nor invalidity of cognition is self-evident. The two are inferred from its capacity or non-capacity to produce successful activity.⁵⁰ The extant Sāṅkhya texts give no indication as to what stand it takes on the question under consideration; but the statements of its critics suggest that according to the Sāṅkhyas both the validity and invalidity of cognition are self-evident.⁵¹ Dharmakīrti holds that cognition is alone self-cognised. Its validity is known through the subsequent successful activity.⁵² Manoratha commenting on this observes that the validity of cognition is self-evident in the case of repeated acquaintance (*abhyāsa*) but that in the case of first acquaintance (*anabhyāsa*) it is known through the subsequent successful activity (*arthakriyājñānena*).⁵³ In the *Pramāṇavartika* or in the *Manoratha* nothing is said regarding the question as to how one knows the

invalidity of cognition. Śāntarakṣita maintains that both the validity and invalidity of cognition are self-evident in the case of repeated acquaintance while they are known through subsequent successful volitional experiences in the case of first acquaintance. This view is termed by him the *anīyamapakṣa*.⁵⁴ Th. Stcherbatsky⁵⁵ and Prof. S. C. Chatterjee⁵⁶ record the Buddhist view which is quite different from the one given by Śāntarakṣita. According to this view the invalidity of cognition is self-evident while its validity is known by the subsequent successful activity. Both these scholars seem to have before them the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* where this view is ascribed to the Buddhists.⁵⁷ May be this view was held by a section of the Buddhist philosophers. Or, may be it is a misrepresentation of the Buddhist view on the part of the author of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*.

It seems that Akālaṅka has bodily taken, of course with a slight change, a quarter of a verse – *pramāṇyam vyavahārādhi*⁵⁸ – from the *Pramāṇavārtika*. Akālaṅka, with Dharmakīrti, holds that validity of cognition is known through subsequent successful activities. Like Dharmakīrti, he says nothing regarding the question as to how the invalidity of cognition is known. The later Jaina logicians maintain that both the validity and invalidity of cognition are self-evident in the case of repeated acquaintance while they are known through subsequent successful activities in the case of first acquaintance.⁵⁹ Thus the Jaina view exactly tallies with the Buddhist view recorded by Śāntarakṣita.

Number of the sources of knowledge accepted by the different systems of Indian philosophy : In the West logicians generally recognise only two sources of knowledge – perception and inference. But Indian philosophy presents a variety of views on the question. The Carvākas admit only one source of valid knowledge viz. perception. The Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas recognise only two such sources—viz. perception and inference. To these the Sāṅkhyas add a third one—viz. authority or verbal testimony. The Naiyāyikas admit a fourth way of knowing—viz. analogy (*upamāna*)—in addition to these three. The Prābhākaras, again, add to these four sources a fifth one—viz. implication (*arthāpatti*). The Bhāṭṭas and monistic Vedāntins, however, recognise six sources of knowledge, adding non-cognition (*abhava-anupalabdhi*) to the five already mentioned. The

Paurāṇikas add two more – viz. *sambhava* (probability) and *aitihya* (tradition) – to those six. In the Maṇimekhalāi it is said that according to Vedavyāsa, Kṛtakoṭi and Jaimini there are ten sources of knowledge. Here we get two new designations, namely, *svabhāva* and *pariśeṣa*.⁶⁰ These two independent *pramāṇas* recognised by these authors seem to be what others have treated as two particular types of *anumāna* – viz. *svabhāvānumāna* and *śeṣavat anumāna*. Th. Stcherbatsky notes that the followers of Caraka increase the number of the sources of knowledge upto eleven.⁶¹ The Jaina logicians accept only two sources of knowledge – viz. direct and indirect.⁶²

Principles that determine the different numbers of the types of the sources of knowledge : Here the question naturally arises as to what are the different principles that determine the different numbers of the types of the sources of knowledge. Dinnāga, Dharmakīrti and their followers declare that as many are the types of the sources of knowledge as are the types of the objects of knowledge.⁶³ For these Buddhists there are only two types of objects viz. the unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) and the universal (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). The Mīmāṃsakās seem to hold that not only the types of objects but also the types of the causal aggregates of knowledge determine the number of the types of the sources of knowledge.⁶⁴ To this position the Naiyāyikas add that the types of the results of knowledge also determine the number of the types of the sources of knowledge.⁶⁵ The Jainas are of the opinion that it is only the different natures of knowledge that determine the number of the types of the sources of knowledge. The knowledge possesses either of the two natures – vividness and blurredness. Hence even the sources of knowledge are two – direct and indirect.⁶⁶

Rejection or inclusion of the sources not independently accepted : Those who accept a lesser number of the types of the sources of knowledge than the one accepted by others will have to answer two questions : (i) as to whether for them those other types of sources are no sources at all and (ii) if they are sources but not independent ones they are to be brought under which accepted type.

For the Cārvākas perception alone is an independent source of knowledge. All other sources are no sources at all. The Budd-

hist logicians consider verbal testimony (*śabda*) to be a form of inference. As for analogy (*upamāna*) they identify it with memory and memory being not a source of valid knowledge according to them, they do not at all regard *upamāna* as a source of knowledge.⁶⁷ Again, implication⁶⁸ (*arthāpatti*) and non-cognition (*anupalabdhi*) are reduced to inference by them. The Vaiśeṣikas also recognise only two independent sources of knowledge—viz. perception and inference. They reduce analogy (*upamāna*), implication and verbal testimony to inference. They consider even non-cognition to be a case of inference.⁶⁹ The Sāṅkhyas reduce analogy (*upamāna*) either to perception or to verbal testimony.⁷⁰ Again, according to them implication is a form of inference.⁷¹ And they regard non-cognition as a form of perception.⁷² The Naiyāyikas reduce implication to inference⁷³ and non-cognition to perception.⁷⁴ The Prābhākaras too regard non-cognition as a case of perception.⁷⁵ For the Jains inference and testimony are two species of the indirect source. Again, according to them analogy (*upamāna*) is a form of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*)⁷⁶ which is a species of the indirect source of knowledge. Similarly, they consider cogitation (*tarka*) to be one of the species of the indirect source of knowledge.⁷⁷ As for non-cognition and implication they are both reduced to inference by them.

Pramāṇa-Saṃplava Vs. Pramāṇa-Viplava : There arises the question as to whether more than one organs of knowledge operate with regard to one and the same object or each organ has its own specific object. As the Buddhists uphold the doctrine of momentarism and reject the substance as unreal, there is no possibility, on their view, of object being grasped even by two perceptions. This being the case no question arises of there taking place a co-operation of two quite different organs of knowledge—perception and inference—in the cognition of one and the same object. Again, they hold that perception and inference have their own special fields of action inasmuch as the former grasps the particulars only and the latter universals only.⁷⁸ And there is no third type of object that might be supposed to be common to both. So, perception can never grasp what is grasped by inference. The co-operation of different organs of our knowledge in the cognition of one and the same object is impossible.

As against this none of those who repudiated momentarism and believed in the reality of the substance could rule out the possibility of the co-operation of the different organs of knowledge in the cognition of one and the same object (*pramāṇa-saṃplava*). Thus Gautama, the author of the Nyāyasūtra, seems to concede the possibility of *pramāṇa-saṃplava*. This is suggested by the term *pramāṇataḥ* used in the sūtra *pramāṇataḥ ca arthapratipattiḥ*.⁷⁹ Vātsyāyana clearly states that there are objects that could be grasped by all the organs of knowledge while there are other objects that could be grasped by some one organ only. As instances of the objects of the first type are cited *Ātman* and fire; they are cognised by the verbal authority, inference and perception successively. Then he gives instances of the objects in whose case only one organ can operate. The knowledge of Heaven could be acquired through verbal testimony only; the knowledge of clouds, after having heard the rumbling sound, could be had through inference only and the knowledge of one's own hand could be had through perception only.⁸⁰ Uddyotakara too accepts both *pramāṇa-vyavasthā* and *pramāṇa-saṃplava*. To give an illustration, he says that only visual sense organ grasps the quality colour, only auditory sense organ grasps the quality sound and so on yet all the sense-organs grasp the Universal Being and the Universal Quality. Again he observes that though only visual sense organ cognises colour and only tactual organ cognises touch, yet both these organs cognise the solid body pot.⁸¹

Someone might urge that if all the organs were to grasp one and the same object then there would be no need of all these organs except one, Uddyotakara replies that though all organs co-operate in the cognition of one and the same object, they grasp this object differently, that is, in their own way; and what is to be borne in mind is that even if all the organs of knowledge operate in the cognition of the same object not one of them does so with reference to that entire object.⁸²

The Jainas too accept both *pramāṇa-saṃplava* and *pramāṇa-viplava*. They accept momentarism from the point of view of modes. From this point of view a thing changes perpetually and hence no source of knowledge grasps what is grasped by another

source. Thus according to the Jainas *pramāṇa-viplava* is self-evident. But they are not absolutists. They give equal importance to the point of view of substance. So, the Jainas accept even *pramāṇa-samplava*. From the point of view of substance things are permanent. Hence it is possible for several different sources of knowledge to co-operate in the cognition of one and the same object. But to the Jainas, *pramāṇa-samplava* is acceptable only in case a newly utilised source of knowledge adds something to the previously-acquired knowledge of the object concerned. To illustrate, having known that there is fire there on the mountain through the statement of a passerby, if a person desires to know the same fire through inference he can do so, but the distinction of this inferential cognition of fire from the verbal cognition of it would be that in the latter case the person knows merely the general nature of fire while in the former case he knows it as connected with smoke. And if this person wants to know this fire through perception after having known it through inference, he may go to the place where the fire is actually present. The special feature of this perceptual cognition would be that the person grasps the specific characteristic of that fire viz. whether it is produced by hay or leaves etc. Thus even if these so many sources of knowledge co-operate in the cognition of one and the same thing fire each of them has its special sphere; this shows that *pramāṇa-samplava* and *pramāṇa-viplava* are not mutually contradictory as it would at first sight seem.⁸³

Thus we finish our rapid survey of the different views adopted by the different systems of Indian Philosophy.

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तेन अव्यभिचारीत्यर्थः । इयमेव चार्थाव्यभिचारिता यद् देशकालान्तरावस्थान्तरा विसंवादोऽर्थस्वरूपप्रकारयोस्तदुपदिशितयोः । न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यटीका (काशी संस्कृत सिरिक्ख) पृ. 5
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प्राप्तं सामान्यविज्ञानं [प्रमाणमिति शेषः] । प्रमाणवार्तिक, 178
Bracked portion is vṛtti.
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ततो व्यवसाय एवाविसंवादनियमोऽधिगमश्च निश्चेतव्यः तत्रैव तद्भावात् तद्वशादेव तत्प्रतिष्ठानात् । सिद्धिविनिश्चयवृत्ति, पृ० 114
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प्रवृत्तेस्तत्प्रधानत्वात् हेयोपादेयवस्तुनि ॥ प्रमाणवार्तिक, 1.5
कस्मात् पुनर्धियः प्रमाणतेष्यते नेन्द्रियादेः ? हेयोपादेयवस्तुविषयायाः प्रवृत्ते-
स्तत्प्रधानत्वात् धिय एव प्रामाण्यम् । न हीन्द्रियमस्तीत्येव प्रवृत्तिः । किं
तर्हि ? ज्ञानसद्भावात् । साधकतमं च प्रमाणम्, तस्याव्यवहितव्यापारत्वात् ।
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ज्ञानं प्रमाणं नाज्ञानमिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षादि । प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति 1.3
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फलत्वम् । सत्यम्, अस्त्ययं दोषो जन्मनि, न व्यवस्थायाम् । प्रमाणमीमांसा
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मनोग्राह्यं सुखं दुःखमिच्छा द्वेषो मतिः कृतिः । कारिकावली, 57
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कारिका 56

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'प्रामाण्यं व्यवहारेण' अर्थक्रियाज्ञानेन । यस्य साधनज्ञानस्य तादात्म्यात् अनुभूतेऽपि प्रामाण्ये साशङ्का व्यवहर्तारोऽनभ्यासवशात् अनुत्पन्नानुरूप-
निश्चयास्तत्र अर्थक्रियाज्ञानेन प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः, अन्यत्र तु विश्रमशङ्कासङ्को-
चात् उत्पत्तावेव स्वरूपस्य प्रामाण्यस्य स्वतो गतिरित्युक्तम् ।
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तदुभयमुत्पत्तौ परत एव ज्ञप्तौ तु स्वतः परतश्चेति ।
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- 63 मानं द्विविधं विषयद्वैविध्यात्...। प्रमाणवार्तिक, II.1
- 64 तस्मादननुमानत्वं शब्दे प्रत्यक्षवत् भवेत् ।
शैरूप्यरहितत्वेन तादृग्विषयवर्जनात् ॥
श्लोकवार्तिक, पृ० 370
- 65 अथवा सत्यपि विषयद्वैविध्ये सामग्रीभेदात् फलभेदाच्च प्रमाणभेदो भवन्
कथमपाक्रियते ? न्यायमञ्जरी पृ० 30
- 66 यदेकलक्षणलक्षितं तद् व्यक्तिभेदेऽपि एकमेव यथा वैशद्यैकलक्षणलक्षितं
चक्षुरादिप्रत्यक्षम्, अवैशद्यलक्षणलक्षितं शब्दादि इति । चक्षुरादिसामग्रीभेदेऽपि

हि तज्ज्ञानानां वैशद्यैकलक्षणलक्षितत्वेनैवाभेदः प्रसिद्धः प्रत्यक्षरूपताऽनति-
क्रमात्, तद्वत् शब्दादिसामग्र्यभेदेऽपि अवैशद्यैकलक्षणलक्षितत्वेन एवाभेदः
शब्दादीनाम् परोक्षरूपत्वाविशेषात् । प्रमेयकमलमार्तण्ड, पृ० 192

67 तत्त्वसङ्ग्रह, 1547-1549

68 एवं सति अनुमाने एवान्तर्भावात् न प्रमाणान्तरत्वं स्यादित्यभिप्रायः । तत्त्व-
सङ्ग्रहपञ्जिका, पृ० 465

69 प्रशस्तपादभाष्य (चौखम्बा सं. सि. No 61) पृ० 576-577

70-72 साङ्ख्यतत्त्वकौमुदी, कारिका 5

73 न्यायमञ्जरी, पृ० 36

74 अभावप्रत्यक्षस्य आनुभविकत्वात् अनुपलम्भोऽपि न प्रमाणान्तरम् । न्याय-
सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली, कारिका 144

75 प्रकरणपञ्चिका (चौखम्बा सं. सि. No 17) पृ० 118-124

The Six Ways of Knowing (D. M. Dutt), p. 164

76 अकत्रय, पृ० 7-8

77 अकत्रय, पृ० 5 तथा 100

78 स्यान्मतिरेषा विशिष्टविषयाणि प्रमाणानि । विशेषविषयं प्रत्यक्षं सामान्य-
विषयमनुमानमिति । न्यायवार्तिक, पृ० 4

79 Nyāyadarśana (Bengali), Vol. I, p. 87

The comment of Udyotakara on the word 'pramāṇataḥ' used
by Vātsyāyana is noteworthy. It is : tatra pramāṇata iti
tasirvacanavibhaktivyāptipradarśanārthaḥ.....vacanavyāptyā
sāmplavo vyavasthā ca Nyāyavārtika, p. 4

80 न्यायभाष्य I. 1.3

81 न्यायवार्तिक, पृ० 5

82 स्यान्मतं यदि संकीर्येन् प्रमाणानि ननु एकैकं प्रमाणेनाधिगतेऽर्थे द्वितीयं
प्रमाणं व्यर्थम् आपद्येत ।.....न च सर्वस्मिन्नर्थे संप्लवोऽस्तीति अतो
न व्यर्थम् । न्यायवार्तिक, पृ० 5

83 Pt. D. Malvania's notes on the Nyāyāvatāravārtikavṛtti,
p. 215

