

A STUDY
OF
JAYANTA BHATTA'S NYĀYAMAÑJARI
A MATURE SANSKRIT WORK
ON
INDIAN LOGIC

PART II

By
NAGIN J. SHAH

SANSKRIT-SANSKRITI GRANTHAMĀLĀ 3

GENERAL EDITOR
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FOREWORD

It is a matter of great pleasure for me to offer to the scholars of Indian logic and philosophy the present work entitled 'A study of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's Nyāyamañjarī - A Mature Sanskrit Work on Indian Logic Part II' as the third book of Sanskrit-Sanskriti Granthamālā.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa was a Kashmiri pundit deeply learned in the traditional systems of Indian philosophy. He flourished in the reign of king Śaṅkaravarman (885-902 A.D.). His Nyāyamañjarī occupies a unique place among the Sanskrit works on Indian logic and philosophy.

The present work is a study of its second and third Āhnikas (chapters). So it deals with perception, inference, analogy, verbal testimony, validity of cognition - intrinsic or extrinsic, theories of error (*khayātivāda*), existence of God, nature of a word. In Jayanta's times a triangular contest among the Nyāya, Buddhist and Mīmāṃsā schools of logic dominated the Indian philosophical scene, and of this contest one can form a very precise idea from Jayanta's treatment of various problems. His presentation creates a clear picture of the problems of Indian logic and philosophy and their solution offered by the said schools. His discussions are penetrating, pregnant and profound. As for example, his criticism of the Buddhist theory of perception and the Mīmāṃsā theory of intrinsic validity of cognition is deep and searching. His explanation of the import of each and every term occurring in the Nyāyasūtra definition of perception is lucid and revealing.

This study is intelligible and clear presentation of the discussions conducted by Jayanta. Again, it is impartial in its assessment of each and every theory, whoever be its propounder — the Nyāyāyika, the Buddhist or the Mīmāṃsaka. It demonstrates its strong and weak points all right. It attempts to bring out the contribution that the three schools made to Indian logic.

The two appendices are valuable. The first explains

Dharmakīrti's theory of knowledge and the second clearly demonstrates as to how the concept of God as world-creator and *nitya-mukta* is a later introduction into the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school by Praśastapāda in the second half of the sixth century A.D.

I hope this work, since it is a study of the two very important chapters of Nyāyamañjarī, will be of considerable value to the scholars of Indian logic. I have no doubt that the scholarly world will receive it with delight.

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Nagin J. Shah
General Editor

INTRODUCTION

The present work is a study of the second and third Āhnikas of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's Nyāyamañjarī, one of the maturest texts produced by the Nyāya school of Indian philosophy. The second Āhnika is devoted to perception, inference and analogy while the third to verbal testimony, validity of a cognition – extrinsic or intrinsic, theories of error, existence of God and nature of a word. Thus these two chapters are immensely important for the students and scholars of Indian logic. In these two Āhnikas Jayanta has so conducted his discussions that he has been able to include within their scope some of the most burning philosophical problems of his times. Here his principal adversary is the Buddhist logician.

The first chapter (a study of the second Āhnika) is divided into three natural sections — the first devoted to perception, the second to inference and the third to analogy. The first section deals with four definitions of perception—one by the author of the Nyāyasūtra, another by the Buddhist, the third by Kumārila and the fourth by the Sāṅkhya. While explaining the Nyāyasūtra definition Jayanta considers various issues and his discussion of them is highly competent. The definition runs as follows : Perception (*pratyakṣa*) is that cognition (*jñāna*) which is born of a sense-object contact (*indriyārthasannikarṣotpanna*), is non-verbal (*avyapadeśya*), is non-erroneous (*avyabhicārin*), is certain (*vyavasāyātmaka*). Jayanta takes up one by one the different words occurring in the definition and considers their precise import. While considering the significance of the word '*jñāna*' he states that since the mental states like pleasure etc. too are possibly born of a sense-object contact they will not be excluded from the purview of the present definition unless it explicitly describes perception as a type of cognition. This gives rise to an important discussion primarily because the Buddhist maintains that pleasure etc. are of the nature of cognition. Again, Jayanta's consideration of the significance of the word '*avyapadeśya*' is noteworthy. The precise import of the word is obscure but this very circumstance led to a lively controversy as to what it means; this controversy Jayanta reports in considerable details and is truly revealing in its own manner. The divergent views cited in this connection are four. All these views commonly maintain that the word '*avyapadeśya* (non-verbal)' is aimed at eliminating from the

purview of the definition something that is born of sense-object contact and yet somehow verbal; but as to what this something is they differ widely. Jayanta's criticism of the Buddhist definition of perception is penetrating. According to the Buddhist, perception is that type of cognition which is devoid of all thought while thought is a cognition capable of being associated with words. For him thought is no *pramāṇa* (valid cognition). Jayanta asks him, "Granted that thought is that type of apprehension-of-an-object which is capable of being associated with a word, why should it be denied the status of *pramāṇa*?" The whole reply the Buddhist gives is somewhat strange. For what it is able to prove is that sensory experience and thought are two distinct types of process, each produced by its own distinct type of causal aggregate, so that even when the two are produced together a sensory experience is a sensory experience, a thought is a thought. Not that to prove this was a mean performance, for thus to distinguish between sensory experience and thought was in a way high water-mark of the Buddhist's speculation on logical problems; certainly, the distinction is not only very important but is also drawn correctly.

The second section deals with inference. Therein Jayanta discusses fivefold nature of a probans, the problem of invariable concomitance, possibility of inference, the Nyāyasūtra definition of inference and cognition of time and space. Jayanta defends his school's thesis on the fivefold nature of a probans against the Buddhist thesis on its threefold nature; but it is a weak defence. Regarding invariable concomitance, Jayanta maintains that it should suffice to say that the relation between the probans and probandum is the relation of invariable concomitance while the Buddhist further demands that one must precisely define the conditions that make possible this relation of invariable concomitance. The Buddhist is of the view that *x* can act as a probans for inferring *y* only in case either *x* is identical with *y* or *x* is produced by *y*. When the Buddhist says that the probans and probandum are identical with each other what he means is that they are two features of an identical object. This happens in what the Buddhist calls *svabhāva-anumāna*. In the cases of *svabhāva-anumāna* the concerned invariable concomitance is established not on the basis of a causal experimentation but on the basis of a conceptual analysis. Jayanta's polemic against *svabhāva-anumāna* is a good example of an anti-Buddhist logician's blindness to great discovery made by the Buddhist while positing *svabhāva-anumāna* as a distinct type of

inference. While discussing the Nyāyasūtra definition of inference Jayanta offers two sets of interpretations of the terms, viz. *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* occurring in the definition and standing for the three types of inference.

The third section is devoted to the exposition of *upamāna* (analogy). According to the Naiyāyika a case of *upamāna* arises when an expert tells a novice that such and such an unfamiliar thing is similar to such and such a familiar thing and the latter later on coming across this unfamiliar thing recognizes it as similar to that familiar thing and says to himself : "So this is what the word concerned stands for." Jayanta criticises the Mīmāṃsaka's view of *upamāna*. According to the Mīmāṃsaka a case of *upamāna* arises when an expert tells a novice that such and such an unfamiliar thing is similar to such and such a familiar thing and the latter later on coming across this unfamiliar thing recalls that that familiar thing is similar to this unfamiliar thing now encountered. Jayanta contends that this is a case of simple memory.

The second chapter (a study of the third Āhnikā) first deals with verbal testimony. Jayanta states and explains the Nyāyasūtra definition of verbal testimony which runs as follows : 'Verbal testimony (*śabda*) is the teaching (*upadeśa*) of an authoritative person (*āpta*).' In the course of his discussion he makes two pertinent refutations, both directed against the Buddhist. Thus it is first argued that the Buddhist is wrong to maintain that verbal testimony is a case of inference, then that he is wrong to maintain that a word has nothing to do with things real. In connection with the question as to how verbal testimony is a *pramāṇa*, the Mīmāṃsakas have raised the question as to whether the validity of a cognition is intrinsic or extrinsic. So, Jayanta next begins his discussion of this question. The Mīmāṃsā thesis that all cognition is intrinsically valid is defended by the Kumārīlite and the Prabhākarite in two very different ways; so Jayanta first presents and criticises its Kumārīlite version and then the Prabhākarite version. While presenting his own case the Prabhākarite criticises rival theories which somehow or other grant the possibility of a false cognition and elaborates his own theory which grants no such possibility. Jayanta's criticism of both the versions is sustained, penetrating and brilliant. He strongly demonstrates that no cognition whatsoever has a right to be declared valid without being tested through the application of the criterion of successful practice. Having completed his discussion of

the question whether the validity of a cognition is intrinsic Jayanta has to make transition to his discussion of the question whether God exists and to his discussion of the question whether a word is an eternal verity. This transition is made by way of arguing that a cognition born of verbal testimony is valid not intrinsically but only in case the speaker concerned is an authoritative person. More particularly it is argued that a Vedic testimony is valid because the author of Vedas is God. Hence the need for demonstrating the existence of God. Again, the Mīmāṃsaka has argued that Vedic testimony is valid because Vedas are an authorless text existing since ever, and he has sought to buttress his argument by maintaining that all word is an eternal verity. Hence the need for demonstrating that a word is no eternal verity. Jayanta's demonstration of God's existence should not be dismissed off-hand. But as things stand, this demonstration is considerably fallacious. Regarding eternity of a word, according to the Mīmāṃsaka when a letter is heard on two occasions it is one and the same letter that is made manifest twice. Jayanta tells him, "On your logic one can as well say that there exists one eternal cow, while two particular cows appear to be different because two different manifesting agents make manifest the one eternal cow." Jayanta is right in pointing out that this Mīmāṃsaka view runs counter to his acceptance of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of universal.

The two appendices—one on Dharmakīrti's theory of knowledge and the other on the conception of Īśvara in the early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school—given at the end of the work enhance the value of the work as they critically expound two important topics.

Every care has been taken to see that the study is objective, authoritative and critical. The author will deem his labour repaid and rewarded if the work succeeds in arousing the interest of its readers in Indian logic.

Nagin J. Shah

A STUDY OF JAYANTA BHATTA'S NYĀYAMAÑJARĪ,
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PART II

PERCEPTION INFERENCE ANALOGY

As has been noted in details, Āhnikā I is devoted to a commentation on the single Nyāyasūtra aphorism which simply lays down that the four *pramāṇas* are perception, inference, analogy and verbal testimony. And in this connection Jayanta has so conducted his discussion that he has been able to include within its scope some of the most burning philosophical problems of his times. Essentially the same is his procedure in Āhnikā II where he comments on the three Nyāyasūtra aphorisms formulating a definition of the three *pramāṇas* perception, inference and analogy. As a result, this Chapter (a study of Āhnikā II) gets divided into three natural sections each devoted to one *pramāṇa*; and these sections we take up for examination one by one.

SECTION ONE : PERCEPTION

The section on perception can be conveniently divided into four subsections as follows : (a) On the Nyāyasūtra definition of perception (b) On the Buddhist definition of perception (c) On the Kumārila definition of perception (d) On the Sāṅkhya definition of perception.

Below they are considered in this very order.

(a) On the Nyāyasūtra definition of Perception

The following is how Nyāyasūtra defines perception :

Perception (*pratyakṣa*) is that cognition (*jñāna*) which is born of a sense-object contact (*indriyārthasannikarṣotpanna*), is non-verbal (*avyapadeśya*), is non-erroneous (*avyabhicārin*), is certain (*vyavasāyātmaka*). By way of elaborating and defending this definition Jayanta successively tells us why it includes the word 'indriyārthasannikarṣotpanna', why the word *jñāna*, why the word 'avyapadeśya', why the word 'avyabhicārin', why the word 'vyavasāyātmaka'; but before all he considers the question as to what the word 'pratyakṣa' here stands for. The question arises because the present one is supposed to be a definition of the *pramāṇa* called *pratyakṣa* while by the word 'pramāṇa' the later Nyāya authors understand 'something that causes valid cognition'. Jayanta's own

understanding being that the word means 'the total causal aggregate that produces valid cognition'; but this definition says that *pratyakṣa* is the cognition of such and such a description, and that at once creates a difficulty which Jayanta seeks to obviate in his own manner. Thus he in essence considers three alternatives, viz.

- (i) the word '*pratyakṣa*' here means something that causes perceptual cognition;
- (ii) it means the total causal aggregate that produces perceptual cognition;
- (iii) it means perceptual cognition itself.¹

Against the first alternative Jayanta's first objection is that on adopting it we should be left in the dark about so many other things — e.g. a sense-organ or a cognition not covered by the description in question — that certainly go to produce valid cognition (in fact, about the whole of the concerned causal aggregate except the cognition here described); to this is added that the cognition here described might go to produce a mnemonic cognition, a doubtful cognition, an erroneous cognition, or it might even go to produce no cognition at all, and that in none of these cases will it deserve to be called '*pramāṇa* (=something that causes valid cognition)'.² Against the second alternative Jayanta's objection is that on adopting it the words actually employed here will have to be subjected to a tortuous interpretation (for as they naturally stand they hardly yield a description of the total causal aggregate that produces perceptual cognition).³ Against the third alternative Jayanta's objection is that on adopting it the definition in question fails to become, as it should, a definition of something that causes perceptual cognition (for now it will be a definition of perceptual cognition itself).⁴ And Jayanta's way out of the difficulty is to place a forced interpretation on the original aphorism so that instead of meaning "perception is that cognition which is etc." it should mean "perception is what goes to produce that cognition which is etc."; (in Sanskrit the result comes about by treating as understood a single word '*yataḥ* (=from which)').⁵ As a matter of fact, unlike the later Nyāya authors the original aphorist understood by the word '*pramāṇa*' not something that causes valid cognition but just valid cognition; and Jayanta's solution of a difficulty which is virtually his own creation is nothing short of verbal jugglery.⁶ However, the solution of the same difficulty was sought for in another direction also, and the search is highly revealing though not for the reasons actually adduced by the Nyāya

authors. Following Jayanta let us see how.

Thus it was argued that the definition in question is a definition of perceptual cognition and yet a definition of something that causes perceptual cognition, the reason being that the epithet 'perceptual cognition' can be attributed not only to the cognition which results from a sense-object contact but also to the subsequent cognition which is to the effect that the object concerned is worthy of acquisition or avoidance⁷; the suggestion was that the definition in question defines the former cognition in its capacity as something that produces the latter cognition. This new solution of the problem was almost as much foreign to the intention of the original aphorist as that earlier solution proposed by Jayanta, but the endeavour to work out the former solution gave rise to an interesting inner family controversy which Jayanta reports in some details. The broadly common understanding was that following events take place following the order given : (i) a sense-organ coming in contact with an object; (ii) the perceptual cognition concerning this object; (iii) the recollection that in past an object of this sort produced pleasure etc.; (iv) the cognition that this object is likely to produce pleasure etc.; (v) the cognition that this object is worthy of acquisition etc.; and since the further understanding was that the step (ii) is itself of the form of perceptual cognition as also something that produces the step (v) which too is of the form of perceptual cognition the problem was how the step (ii) causes the step (v) which comes so much later on.⁸ As is reported by Jayanta, the problem was sought to be solved by two parties in two different ways; (they differed not on any material point but on certain very minor points; but we are told a lot about their difference). In essence the solution was that here each step was *pramāṇa* in relation to the immediately succeeding step and *pramāṇaphala* (=valid cognition caused by a *pramāṇa*) in relation to the immediately preceding one, but since it was believed that what causes memory does not deserve to be called *pramāṇa* the step (ii) was not treated as *pramāṇa* (moreover, the second party combined into one the steps (iv) and (v)); again, both parties admitted that the passage from the step (ii) to the step (iv) is an inferential process like inferring fire on the ground of perceiving smoke (however, the first party posited in between the step (iii) and step (iv) an additional one to the effect 'the realization that this present object is akin to that past object', a trivial point about which Jayanta's report makes so much fuss).⁹

[The first party justified the positing of a new step in between (iii)

and (iv) on the ground that otherwise the step (iv) should be a step referring to a past object, not one referring to a present one¹⁰; the second party feared no such contingency¹¹. In fact, since it is commonsense that the memory concerned is not evoked for its own sake the latter attitude is as much understandable as the former. However, the second party next resorts to a lengthy frivolous argumentation and submits that an intermediate step as here suggested is in principle impossible where the step (ii) is of the form of an inferential cognition rather than perceptual cognition, his point being that in that case nothing corresponds to the step (i)¹²; really, the passage from the step (ii) to (iv) takes place in an essentially similar fashion irrespective of whether the passage from the step (i) to step (ii) is an inferential or a perceptual process.]

In any case, Jayanta next offers certain points which should hold good in the eyes of both the parties in question. Thus the opponent objects : "The topic under discussion is perceptual cognition, but on your own showing the step (iv) is of the form of inferential cognition. How then is all this presently relevant ?"; Jayanta replies : "In the case of this inferential cognition too the relation of invariable concomitance is established with the help of perception; so at the time of establishing that relation the step (iv) is of the form of perceptual cognition."¹³ The difficulty with this reply is that on the occasion envisaged there arises no question of the step (v) taking place. Jayanta actually considers this difficulty in a somewhat different form, viz. "Why should the step (iv) not always be of the form of perceptual cognition ?"; to this he in essence replies : "When the step (iv) is obviously of the form of inferential cognition it would be improper to treat it as being of the form of perceptual cognition."¹⁴ (In the meanwhile Jayanta has argued that the relation of invariable concomitance between the thing perceived and the pleasure etc. produced by this thing is established through mental perception, one of the relata being a mental state.)¹⁵

Viewed as a whole Jayanta's present discussion throws light on a question of most fundamental importance. Thus when a living organism physically encounters an object it finds the experience either comforting or discomfoting in a specific way; and a result of this experience is that when on another occasion this organism has even a superficial observation of this object it is reminded of the past comfort or discomfort, a memory which in turn generates in this organism a

tendency to acquire this object or to avoid it. Thus a distinction has to be drawn between a fullfledged experience of an object and a superficial observaton of it and, as a matter of fact, the essence of cognizing an object lies in treating the superficial features of this object as a signal for the presence of this object. Jayanta has much of this in mind when he tells us that at the time of a first encounter with an object one has perception of pleasure etc., at the time of a later encounter one infers the possibility of pleasure etc. But he leaves us in doubt as to wherein according to him lies the essence of cognizing an object. For he just takes it for granted that an object is cognized and then argues that the cognition evokes a memory of past pleasure etc. Really, an evocation of past pleasure etc. takes place only after the object concerned has been identified, for which identification the superficial features of this object act as a signal. True, in the case of all organism other than man the fact that an object has been identified is to be gathered from the post-identification behaviour of the type Jayanta has in mind, but in the case of man this fact can also be gathered from the words uttered on the occasion; however, in both cases the fact makes its appearance in an essentially similar fashion and that makes clear as to wherein lies the essence of cognising an object. The distinction between having the sensory experience of an object and identifying this object as belonging to this class or that is neatly made by the Buddhist who, attributing the epithet '*pratyakṣa* (=perception)' to the former process and the epithet '*vikalpa* or *kalpanā* (=thought)' to the latter, emphasizes that all perception is devoid of thought. But such a fundamental twofold distinction of factors within the knowledge-situation ever remained foreign to the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā authors even after they, drawing upon the performance of the Buddhist, began to say that there takes place first *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* (=perception devoid of, *vikalpa*) and then *savikalpaka-pratyakṣa* (=perception possessed of, *vikalpa*). Little wonder, in his present distinction Jayanta makes just no use of his own school's concept of a twofold perception thus formulated. Even so, his making room for certain inference-like steps within the body of perceptual process is noteworthy, for it was the detection of such steps that enabled the Buddhist to distinguish those two fundamental factors within the knowledge-situation. Certainly, to observe certain sensory features in an object and then to identify it as belonging to this class or that is the same sort of process as to identify an object and then to recognize it as a source of pleasure etc. But the

fact remains that in Jayanta's Nyāya school perceptual cognition proper was always looked upon as a process of bare passive inspection while the inference-like steps here under consideration were noticed in the context of solving a rather secondary problem, viz. in the context of looking for a process in relation to which perceptual cognition proper could be said to act as a cause.

Jayanta has been discussing the question as to what in perceptual cognition constitutes *pramāṇa* and what *pramāṇaphala*; he is, therefore, reminded of a Buddhist position maintained in this connection, a position only briefly touched upon by him while treating the problem of *pramāṇa* in general. The noteworthy point is that both Jayanta and the Buddhist hold broadly the same view as to how perceptual cognition is generated; for according to both it is generated when the object concerned acting on a sense-organ enables the cognizer concerned to identify this object as of this type or that (i.e. as belonging to this class or that). Both also agree in supposing that a cognition is a mental state generated under the conditions just described, again in supposing that a cognition is of the form of an apprehension of the object concerned. But to the question as to what acts as *karāṇa* (=instrumental cause) in relation to a cognition - i.e. as to what constitutes *pramāṇa* - the two give very different answers because they view the matter from very different angles. The Buddhist emphasizes that the *karāṇa* of a cognition ought to be what is engaged in producing the apprehension of the object concerned, just as the *karāṇa* of a cut-in-the-tree is the axe which is engaged in producing this cut; but then realizing that a cognition is itself of the form of the apprehension of the object concerned he feels that the *karāṇa* of a cognition cannot be anything other than this cognition-itself, which in turn means that the alleged *karāṇa* of a cognition must be a *karāṇa* just in appearance. Hence his thesis that a cognition in so far as it is apparently engaged in producing the revelation (=apprehension) of the object concerned is a *karāṇa*, the same in so far as it is of the form of the apprehension of this object is the resultant.¹⁶ However, even while thus virtually recognizing the exceptional nature of the notion of *karāṇa* as applied to the case of a cognition, the Buddhist goes on to add that his explanation has an advantage in that according to it a *pramāṇa* and the concerned *pramāṇaphala* are not located in two different seats (they being in fact one and the same thing viewed from two sides).¹⁷ This entire argumentation of the Buddhist is thoroughly foreign to Jayanta's mode

of thinking. Thus to the latter it makes absolutely no sense that the *karāṇa* of an act and this act itself are one with each other; so citing an illustration he points out that just as in the act of reaping a paddy-plant the reaper is the agent, the paddy-plant the object, the sickle the instrument so also in the act of visual perceptual cognizing a jar the cognising soul is the agent, the jar the object, the eye the instrument.¹⁸ Similarly is found senseless the Buddhist insistence that a *pramāṇa* and the *pramāṇaphala* concerned cannot be located in two different seats. To make some sense out of this insistence Jayanta first interprets it to mean that a *pramāṇa* and the *pramāṇaphala* concerned cannot have to do with two different objects, something which he concedes as plainly understandable inasmuch as a *karāṇa* of perceptual cognition like eye works on the same object which happens to be the object of this cognition itself.¹⁹ But then taking the words in question in their usual meaning the Buddhist's position is refuted on three grounds, viz. (1) on the Buddhist's showing nothing acts as seat to anything, (2) fuel acts as *karāṇa* in the act of cooking but the seat of fuel and the seat of the act of cooking are obviously different, (3) when one cognition acts as *karāṇa* in relation to another inasmuch as the former is a member of the causal aggregate that produces the latter the concerned cognizing soul is a common seat of both these cognitions, but this consideration is irrelevant for the present purpose, there being nothing corresponding to it when (for example) a sense-organ acts as *karāṇa* in the act of perceptual cognition.²⁰ Lastly it is argued that the different members of the causal aggregate that produces a cognition might be said to have the same seat inasmuch as they produce the same result, but that it will be senseless to say that such a member and this result itself produce the same result.²¹ At this stage Jayanta is naturally reminded of the Buddhist's contention that a cognition produced by the concerned causal aggregate apparently undertakes an operation in order to produce a result (the operation being only apparent inasmuch as the instrument and the result are one and the same thing). The Buddhist bases himself on the consideration that on the one hand a cognition apparently undertakes an operation in the form of grasping its object (apparently because the object is actually no more there when the cognition is there) while on the other hand this cognition is of the form of an apprehension of its object; thus it is that a cognition which is itself a result produced through the operation of a causal aggregate apparently undertakes an operation called 'grasping its object' in order to produce the result

called 'apprehending its object.'²² Jayanta objects to this Buddhist position on the simple ground that an operation and the result concerned ought to be different from one another and that the former should temporally precede the latter, neither being possible in the case under consideration on the Buddhist's own showing; (Jayanta feels justified to ignore the Buddhist's supposition that the operation in question is just an apparent operation, for then there will be nothing worthwhile for the former to argue against).²³ Hence Jayanta's final conclusion that a cognition is a result produced by the *karāṇa* concerned (=the concerned causal aggregate) but not itself a *karāṇa*;²⁴ (that one cognition can act as *karāṇa* to another Jayanta grants, what he objects to is that a cognition can act as *karāṇa* to itself). Appealing to popular usage Jayanta argues : "We say 'one cognizes through eye', 'one cognizes through probans', we never say 'one cognizes through cognition'."²⁵ The opponent pleads : "But a *karāṇa* is never called *karāṇa* unless it is actually producing a cognition"; Jayanta retorts : "That is true, but this does not mean that when a *karāṇa* is actually producing a cognition what happens is that this cognition is acting as *karāṇa* in relation to itself."²⁶ In conclusion the Buddhist is advised to concede that *karāṇa* is what produces a cognition and that therefore one and the same cognition cannot be a *karāṇa* as also the result produced by this *karāṇa*.²⁷ (In passing Jayanta here refers to the idealist position according to which a cognition acts not only as a *pramāṇa* as well as *pramāṇaphala* but also as its own object, but the refutation of this position is just promised.)²⁸

Here closes Jayanta's consideration of the preliminary question as to how the Nyāyasūtra aphorism under consideration is to be understood as yielding a definition of what causes perceptual cognition, not a definition of perceptual cognition itself. As can be seen, this question is apparently unimportant and the various issues discussed by Jayanta in this connection make their appearance in a rather unexpected manner, but these are important issues and Jayanta's discussion of them is highly competent. He next takes up one by one the different words occurring in the aphorism in question and considers their precise import. This too was a common practice of Indian commentators but Jayanta's pursuance of it has an attraction of its own, for here again we find him discussing rather unexpectedly so many important issues in so competent a fashion.

(1)

Jayanta first of all considers the significance of the word *indriyārthasannikarṣotpanna* (=born of a sense-object contact) occurring in the present description of perceptual cognition. In this connection he gives thought to the following seven questions :

- (1) What is a sense-organ ?
- (2) What is an object ?
- (3) How many types of sense-object contact are there ?
- (4) Why is sense-object contact necessary for perceptual cognition ?
- (5) How is perceptual cognition caused by a sense-organ and an object ?
- (6) How to cover under this description the perception of a mental state ?
- (7) How many conjunctions between cognitive organs take place in a process of perception ?

All these questions are of a most fundamental importance, but the noteworthy thing is that Jayanta's treatment of them is extremely summary (it taking up hardly two pages of the printed text). About the first two questions it might legitimately be pleaded that they are later on answered while covering the second Nyāya topic *prameya* (which includes both a sense-organ and an object), but the remaining questions deserved a detailed treatment here and now. True, certain aspects of the remaining questions too will be incidentally touched upon in the course of the commentation that immediately follows and is fairly lengthy, but the point is that they deserved a more than incidental treatment. Be that as it may, it is very necessary to be clear as to what the Naiyāyika understands by 'perceptual cognition of an object'. In one word, it means that cognition of an object which takes place as a result of this object coming in contact with an appropriate sense-organ (of which there are five, viz. eye, ear, nose, tongue, skin). Here by 'object' is to be understood a physical substance or a property of it while a property is supposed to be of several sub-types, viz. quality, action, 'universal', 'absence'; (a 'universal' or an 'absence' might reside in a physical substance but it might as well reside in a quality or an action which itself resides in a physical substance). Thus, for example, when an eye comes in contact with a jar, the 'object' of perceptual cognition is the substance jar; when with the colour of this jar, it is

colour; when with the 'universal' jarness residing in this jar, it is this jarness; when with 'absence of cloth' residing in this jar, it is this 'absence of cloth'; when with the 'universal' colourness residing in the colour of the jar it is this colourness; when with 'absence of cloth' residing in the colour of the jar it is this 'absence of cloth'. Then it is maintained that one substance gets related to another substance by way of the relation called conjunction; a quality, an action or 'universal' resides in its locus by way of the relation called 'inherence'; an 'absence' resides in its locus by way of the relation called 'qualifier-and-qualificand'. Now a sense-organ is itself a physical substance and so it can get related to a physical substance by way of conjunction, but its relation to a quality, action, 'universal' or 'absence' must be mediated through the relation of conjunction that obtains between it and the substance concerned. The various types of sense-object contact posited by the Naiyāyika are the various types of relation — direct or mediated — obtaining between a sense-organ and an 'object of perception'. These are the most vital points covered by Jayanta's extremely brief report on the matter.²⁹ Then the opponent asks: "Why at all posit a 'contact' between a sense-organ and an object?", Jayanta replies: "A sense-organ cannot grasp an object that lies separated by a distance."³⁰ The opponent asks: "Then why not simply say that a sense-organ and the object lie close to each other?"; Jayanta replies: "A sense-organ and an object are two members of the causal aggregate that produces perceptual cognition while the different members of a causal aggregate must not just lie close to each other but be in contact with each other (in the case of touch and taste the contact concerned is all too obvious)".³¹ The opponent pleads: "But then merely to say that a sense-organ and an object produce perceptual cognition should imply that the contact concerned takes place"; Jayanta replies: "An explicit mention of contact has to be made so that one might learn that there are six types of it."³² The opponent asks: "But how are we to be sure that the object that is a member of the causal aggregate produces perceptual cognition?"; Jayanta replies: "The concomitance in presence and concomitance in absence prove that perceptual cognition is never produced unless the object concerned is present there just as a mat is never produced unless the needed raw fiber is present there; (in no other way can it be explained why perceptual cognition of x relates to x, e.g. not on the ground that this cognition bears the form of x as the Buddhist will have us believe)."³³ The opponent asks: "How

can the relation of concomitance be established between a perceptual cognition and its object when the two are never grasped apart from one another?" Jayanta replies: "To notice that a perceptual cognition never arises unless its object is present there is to grasp the two apart from one another; (this idealist objection will be considered in details later on)."³⁴ To this is added that an object is proved to be a cause of perceptual cognition exactly in the same manner as a sense-organ is proved to be such a cause, that is, on the basis of concomitance-in-presence and concomitance-in-absence.³⁵ Lastly the opponent objects: "But this definition of perception fails to cover the cases of perception having pleasure etc. for its object"; Jayanta replies: "Pleasure-etc. are grasped through *manas* which too is a sense-organ though not of the physical type."³⁶ The topic is closed by observing that in the case of the perception of a physical object there take place three conjunctions, viz.

- (1) that of the cognizer soul with its *mānas*,
- (2) that of this *manas* with a sense-organ,
- (3) that of this sense-organ with its object.

In the case of the perception of pleasure etc. there take place the first two of these conjunctions; in the case of a *yogin's* perception of his soul there takes place just the first of these conjunctions. This introduces us to the basic circle of ideas that interested a Naiyāyika in connection with the problem of perceptual cognition; an assessment of these ideas remains to be made.

As can be easily seen, the Naiyāyika chiefly concentrates on describing as to how many types of object there are to be perceived and how many types of contact there are to take place between a sense-organ and an object. But this virtually amounts to expressing in the technical terminology of the Nyāya school (rather, that of the Vaiśeṣika school whose specialized findings in the field of ontology the Naiyāyika borrows almost wholesale) the simple fact that a thing becomes an object of perceptual cognition as a result of coming in contact with an appropriate sense-organ. That is to say, here there is involved no deeper analysis of what perceptual cognition consists in, an analysis which should reveal that it consists in first observing certain sensory features of a thing and then using these features as a signal to identify this thing as belonging to this class or that. Of such an analysis rudiments at least are clearly formulated by the Buddhist with his

distinction between what he calls perception and what he calls post-perceptual thought. This way we are enabled to see that perceptual cognition, like all cognition, is an active thought-process rather than a process of bare passive inspection as the Naiyāyika would have us believe. Paradoxically, a certain short-coming of the Buddhist's technical terminology goes to create just the opposite impression. For the Buddhist gives the name 'perception' to what is in fact the passive process of bare sensory experience, while on the other hand the Naiyāyika contends that perception essentially consists in a full-fledged identification of the object concerned. But the point is that the Buddhist clearly distinguishes between the bare sensory experience produced by a thing and the identification of this thing on the part of thought ; on the other hand, the Naiyāyika talks as if to identify a thing through perception is just to inspect it in a passive fashion. Thus according to the latter when an eye comes in contact with a jar it sees this jar (as a substance), when it comes in contact with the colour of this jar it sees this colour, in the former case the contact being of the form of 'conjunction', in the latter case it being of the form of 'inherence-in-a-thing-conjoined'; as a matter of fact, to notice the colour of a jar is a passive process of bare sensory experience, to identify this jar as a jar is an active thought-process, a distinction made by the Buddhist with tolerable clearness. However, the Buddhist was also involved in another confusion. For he believed that perception (bare sensory experience) and thought being two independent cognitive processes the two cannot have to do with one and the same object, a belief which led to an essentially misconceived search for what might act as an object in one case and what in the other; as a matter of fact, the same thing which produces bare sensory experience is identified by means of the immediately following thought. But the Buddhist's strong point was that his description of perception (= bare sensory experience) was a tolerably clear description of bare sensory experience, his description of thought a tolerably clear description of thought. On the other hand, the Naiyāyika ever failed to appreciate this vital distinction made by the Buddhist so that even when he, in obvious imitation of the Buddhist, began to say that in perception a *nirvikalpaka* (= thought-free) stage is followed by a *savikalpaka* (= thought-possessed) stage he was in no position to identify the former stage with bare sensory experience, the latter with thought. As a matter of fact, how the two stages in question are to be distinguished is an enigma of the Nyāya theory of

perception. Had this distinction of stages any major significance in Jayanta's eyes, he should have talked about it by now, but has chosen to keep silent on the matter. True, he will soon discuss a point where much incidental reference will be made to the *nirvikalpaka* - *savikalpaka* distinction and stray incidental references will be made to it subsequently too, but the point remains that all these are incidental references and ones which leave us virtually in the dark as to where the distinction in question actually lies. This much by way of a basic assessment of Jayanta's present discussion. Then we might note his endeavour to prove that the object concerned constitutes a member of the causal aggregate which produces a perceptual cognition. The point was conceded by the Buddhist too, but he went on to add that unless this cognition bears the form of this object it cannot refer to this object, a requirement Jayanta deems superfluous ; again, arguing from the idealist standpoint the Buddhist repudiated the reality of external objects, a repudiation which stands rejected by Jayanta's present argumentation. To both these aspects of the question Jayanta refers all right, but he also adds that they have been properly dealt with elsewhere. Really, the question as to how a cognition is produced by its object is an important question deserving an independent treatment. Thus it was a Buddhist contention that perception is a cognitive process which is produced by its object, thought a cognitive process which is not so produced ; liberally understood, it meant that perception (= bare sensory experience) is a cognitive part-process in which the cognizer plays a passive role the object an active role, thought one in which the opposite happens. Naturally, this mode of argumentation was foreign to the Naiyāyaka but Jayanta has made some use of it too. Thus we have found him distinguishing memory from non-mnemonic cognition on the ground that the latter is and the former is not produced by its object ; in fact, it is difficult to see how any cognitive process save bare sensory experience can be said to be produced by its object. Certainly, if perceptual cognition consists in identifying an object on the basis of its observed sensory features then it is misleading to say that this cognition is produced by this object (for what has been produced by this object is the bare sensory experience which constitutes just the starting-point of this cognition); to say that an inferential cognition or the like is produced by its object is even more misleading. In any case, the consideration whether a cognition is or is not produced by its object is not a consideration of major significance even in

Jayanta, as it certainly is in Buddhist logic. Lastly comes what Jayanta says about the perception of pleasure etc. Really, the question as to what constitutes pleasure etc. and what the perception of pleasure etc. is another important question deserving an independent treatment. Fortunately, for a certain reason Jayanta is going to take up this question immediately afterwards, and so we might make only preliminary observations just now. The Naiyāyika, the Buddhist, the Kumārilite as well as the Prābhākārite sharply distinguished between a living organism's physical states and its mental states. Thus the colour, touch, smell, movement etc. of an organism were supposed to constitute its physical states, its pleasure, pain, desire, effort, cognition etc. its mental states; the chief distinction between the two sets was that the former was supposed to be noticeable to an outside observer, the latter not so noticeable. The Buddhist explained all this by maintaining that a living organism's mental states constitute an uninterrupted series running parallel to the series of its bodily states, the Naiyāyika etc. by maintaining that they are of the form of occasional qualities produced in the soul which is allotted to this organism along with a body. Then it was realized that for a mental state (barring cognition whose status was somewhat exceptional) it is impossible that it should arise and yet not be noticed by the organism concerned; so the Buddhist maintained that a mental state necessarily perceives itself, the Naiyāyika etc. that it is necessarily perceived by a cognition arising immediately afterwards. As regards a cognition, the Buddhist and the Prābhākārite maintained that it necessarily perceives itself, the Naiyāyika that it might possibly be perceived by a cognition arising immediately afterwards, the Kumārilite that it can never be perceived but can be inferred by a cognition arising any time afterwards. The precise import of these observations will become clear when we follow Jayanta's enquiry that is soon forthcoming. So for the present we might only note his consideration of the question as to how the definition of perception under examination covers the case of a perception of pleasure etc. On Jayanta's showing pleasure etc. are just a particular type of objects of perception, they being the qualities of a substance called soul just as colour, touch etc. are the qualities of a substance called jar. Then he has to explain as to how pleasure etc. are perceived as a result of a sense-organ coming in contact with them; his position is that the needed sense-organ is *manas* which is of the form of a non-physical organ allotted to each organism so that pleasure etc. are

perceived when the *manas* concerned comes in contact with them. Again, the *manas* is also assigned a role in external perception; for the supposition is that even when a sense-organ is in contact with an external object, the soul concerned will not perceive this object unless the *manas* concerned is in contact with this sense-organ on the one hand and this soul on the other. Lastly, the *manas* is supposed to be not only the organ of perceiving pleasure etc. but also the organ of producing pleasure etc.; for the position is that pleasure etc. are produced in a soul only after the *manas* concerned has been appropriately active. Really, pleasure etc. are supposed to be produced only after the object concerned has been cognized and in all cognition - perceptual or otherwise - *manas* has a role to play; however, what cognition will be followed (if at all) by what pleasure, pain etc. depends on some further activity on the part of the *manas* (a non-perceptual cognition itself must be a result of some full activity on the part of the *manas*). Thus it is that the Naiyāyika has made the phenomenon of 'internal perception' correspond the phenomenon of external perception. Obviously, the correspondence in question is merely a formal correspondence, that is, a correspondence that just shows how the Naiyāyika notions of 'object-of-perception' and 'contact' are valid not only in the case of the perception of a physical body but also in the case of the perception of a mental state. A material probe into the nature of a mental state Jayanta undertakes in the course of the enquiry he conducts next.

(2)

Jayanta has finished his consideration of the significance of the word '*indriyārthasannikarṣotpanna*' occurring in the definition of perception under examination; he now considers the significance of the word '*jñāna*' (=cognition) occurring there. He first submits that this definition includes so many adjectives which must be attributed to some noun and this noun is the word '*jñāna*'.³⁷ But the question is why '*jñāna*'? So it is next argued that since the mental states like pleasure etc. too are possibly born of a sense-object contact they will not be excluded from the purview of the present definition unless it explicitly describes perception as a type of cognition.³⁸ This gives rise to an important discussion primarily because the Buddhist has maintained a rather odd position on the question, that is, the position that pleasure etc. are of the nature of cognition; thus he argues that pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort etc. are so many types of cognition itself because whatever causal aggregate produces cognition produces pleasure etc.

too.³⁹ It is difficult to see the precise point of the Buddhist's argument; for after all he does distinguish between pleasure etc. on the one hand and cognition on the other. As a matter of fact, one of his most crucial consideration is that it is impossible for cognition to arise and not be perceived just as it is impossible for pleasure etc. to arise and not be perceived. However, the Buddhist's insistence on the point is so emphatic and Jayanta cannot be accused of misunderstanding him in this respect at least. In any case, Jayanta counters the Buddhist by submitting that pleasure etc. cannot be of the nature of cognition because the former are directly perceived as being of the form of enjoyment etc., the latter as being of the form of apprehension of an object.⁴⁰ The Buddhist pleads that cognition itself appears in the form of subspecies like pleasure, pain etc. ; Jayanta retorts that cognition is and pleasure etc. are not of the form of apprehension of an object.⁴¹ The Buddhist argues that pleasure, pain, etc. are subspecies of cognition just as doubtful cognition, erroneous cognition etc. are; Jayanta retorts : "Doubtful cognition, erroneous cognition, etc. are certainly, subspecies of cognition because they are so many sorts of apprehension of an object; on the other hand, pleasure, pain, etc. are not at all of the form of apprehension of an object. As a matter of fact, pleasure etc. are certain internal qualities which are exclusively an object of cognition just as a jar is exclusively an object of cognition, neither being of the nature of cognition in the manner doubtful cognition, erroneous cognition, etc. are."⁴² The Buddhist argues that pleasure, etc. are not exclusively an object of cognition because being self-revelatory they grasp themselves by themselves and whatever grasps itself by itself is of the nature of cognition; Jayanta retorts : "So far as the character of being self-revelatory is concerned it is not exhibited even by a cognition, to say nothing of pleasure etc.; but in any case, nobody experiences a pleasure as something that grasps an object in the manner a cognition grasps an object."⁴³ The Buddhist argues that if pleasure etc. are not something self-revelatory then it should be immaterial whether they are born or not, so that one must either always experience them or never ; Jayanta retorts : "It is the very nature of pleasure etc. that as soon as they are born a cognition arises to grasp them. Rather, if they are something self-revelatory then one man's pleasure, etc. should be experienced by everybody, just as a lamp which is something self-revelatory reveals itself to everybody."⁴⁴ Here Jayanta elaborately reiterates his earlier point that in cognition of pleasure pleasure plays

the same role as jar plays in cognition of jar, his point being that a pleasure is made an object by a cognition which is something different from this pleasure just as a jar is made an object by a cognition which is something different from this jar.⁴⁵ Then Jayanta argues as follows against the Buddhist's contention that pleasure, etc. are of the nature of cognition because both are produced by the same causal aggregate : "Yes, both do have the same *samavāyikāraṇa* and the same *asamavāyikāraṇa*, the former being the soul concerned, the latter the conjunction of this soul with the *manas* concerned. But they have got different *nimittakāraṇas*, e.g the *nimittakāraṇa* of pleasure is the universal 'pleasure-ness', that of cognition the universal 'cognition-ness'".⁴⁶ Lastly Jayanta works out another difference between pleasure, etc. on the one hand and cognition on the other; this as follows: "All pleasure, etc. necessarily presuppose a cognition, a cognition does not necessarily presuppose a cognition. Even in case there takes place no perceptual cognition to produce pleasure, etc. there does take place memory — or anticipation — to secure that purpose. Nor will it do to say that a cognition too necessarily presupposes a cognition, for a cognition that arises after the state of sleep, swoon, etc. has ended does not do that."⁴⁷ This controversy deserves a most careful examination. Thus the Buddhist is emphasizing the following four points :

- (1) Both pleasure, etc. and a cognition are a mental state.
- (2) A cognition must be perceived necessarily just as a mental state like pleasure, etc. must be perceived necessarily.
- (3) A mental state like pleasure etc. as also a cognition must be perceived by itself, otherwise the perception of pleasure etc. as also the perception of a cognition must lead to an infinite regress.
- (4) The same causal aggregate which produces a cognition also produces the concerned pleasure, etc.

As against these Jayanta emphasizes the following four points :

- (1) Both pleasure, etc. and a cognition are a mental state.
- (2) An external object is cognized first and the concerned pleasure, etc. are produced in the wake of this cognition.
- (3) Pleasure, etc. are necessarily perceived and by a cognition arising in the wake of these pleasure etc. just as an external object is possibly perceived and by a cognition that is something different from this object.

- (4) A cognition is possibly perceived and by a cognition arising in the wake of this cognition.

As a matter of fact, a cognition is the only type of state deserving to be called 'mental' and its essence lies in identifying an object on the basis of certain observed sensory features; on the other hand, pleasure, etc. are of the nature of a physiological state generated in a living organism just as is the bare sensory experience which constitutes the starting point of a cognition proper. Hence both the Buddhist and Jayanta are wrong when they maintain that both pleasure, etc. and a cognition are a mental state. Again, Jayanta is wrong when he contends that pleasure, etc. arise in the wake of a cognition, for the opposite is what happens; on the other hand, the Buddhist is wrong when he contends that pleasure, etc. arise along with a cognition, for what arises along with pleasure, etc. is not a cognition but the bare sensory experience which constitutes the starting-point of this cognition. Then Jayanta is right to maintain that pleasure, etc. are as much exclusively an object of cognition as an external object, neither being of the nature of cognition; but he is wrong to concede to the Buddhist the point that pleasure etc. are necessarily an object of perception. As a matter of fact, in their capacity as a physiological state pleasure, etc. are so complex an object that a cognition of them can hardly be called perceptual. Similarly, Jayanta is right to refuse to concede to the Buddhist the point that a cognition is necessarily an object of perception; but he is wrong to concede that it is possibly an object of perception. For in this respect what is true of pleasure, etc. is still more true of a cognition which in its capacity as a mental state is so much more complex an object that a cognition of it can hardly be called perceptual. In view of all this it can easily be seen that when the Buddhist says that pleasure, etc. are of the nature of a cognition he virtually only means that both pleasure, etc. and a cognition are of the nature of a mental state, a point which Jayanta himself readily concedes, though wrongly. Again, when the Buddhist contends that the same causal aggregate which produces pleasure, etc. also produces a cognition, he is identifying cognition with bare sensory experience that actually arises along with pleasure, etc. and is of the nature of a physiological state as are pleasure, etc. Similarly, when Jayanta contends that a cognition is and pleasure, etc. are not of the nature of apprehension of an object he is identifying cognition with cognition proper which is actually of the nature of a mental state and is to be

distinguished from pleasure, etc. that are of the nature of a physiological state. Lastly, when both the Buddhist and Jayanta contend that pleasure, etc. must be perceived necessarily they are identifying the concept 'undergoing the physiological state called pleasure, etc.' with the concept 'perceiving the physiological state called pleasure, etc.' so that the very being of pleasure, etc. means their being perceived; similarly, when the Buddhist contends that a cognition must be perceived necessarily he is identifying the concept 'undertaking a cognition' with the concept 'perceiving a cognition' so that the very being of a cognition means its being perceived. Really, the concept 'perception' should be reserved for the cases of perceiving an external object, it being understood that neither pleasure, etc. (that is, a physiological state) nor a cognition (that is, a mental state) can be perceived though both can be cognized in the sense that a causal analysis can be undertaken in order to reveal how the two come into being. Let it however be noted that historically our philosophers got interested in the problem of physiological and mental phenomena by way of seeking to show how their respective definition of perception apply to the cases of perceiving these phenomena which they indiscriminately called 'mental phenomena' even while often drawing a line of distinction that was actually a line dividing what is physiological from what is mental. Some interesting light on the problem is thrown by a curious discussion which Jayanta next undertakes, a discussion which another opponent soon ridicules as 'children's quarrel'.

Jayanta's problem was to justify the employment of the word '*jñāna*' in the definition of perception under examination, and he solved it by submitting that this way pleasure, etc. which too are something born of a sense-object contact are eliminated from the purview of this definition. Now the opponent says that this definition already contains the adjective 'nonerroneous' which can be attributed to cognition but not to pleasure, etc. so that the very employment of this adjective eliminates pleasure, etc. from the purview of the definition in question.⁴⁸ Jayanta replies that the adjective 'non-erroneous' can be attributed to pleasure etc. as well,⁴⁹ and this gives rise to a controversy. The opponent's point is that a cognition is non-erroneous when it identifies its object correctly, it is erroneous when it identifies it incorrectly, a distinction to which nothing corresponds in the case of pleasure, etc.; Jayanta retorts that a pleasure is non-erroneous when it is generated by a scripturally non-prohibited object, it is erroneous

when it is generated by a scripturally prohibited object.⁵⁰ Jayanta's point is really childish, for the fact that a pleasure is generated by a scripturally prohibited object in no way affects the essential character of this pleasure as a physiological state which the organism concerned finds comforting. But the point is pursued relentlessly and in the course of doing so certain important revelations are made unwillingly as it were. The following is a bare report of the duel.

Opponent : What is erroneous about a pleasure ?

Jayanta : What is erroneous about a cognition ?

Opponent : To identify an object as it is in fact not.

Jayanta : To treat as pleasure what is no pleasure is a case of erroneous pleasure.

Opponent : Is the pleasure produced by a prohibited object no pleasure ?

Jayanta : Is the cognition of x as not- x no cognition ?

Opponent : It is a cognition but wrong cognition.

Jayanta : That too is pleasure but wrong pleasure.

Opponent : Even this wrong pleasure is of the form of enjoyment.

Jayanta : Even wrong cognition is of the form of apprehension of an object.

Opponent : Even if it is of the form of apprehension of an object it is false of its object.

Jayanta : That too is of the form of enjoyment but is false of its object.

Opponent : Is that pleasure generated by what is not a source of pleasure ?

Jayanta : Is wrong cognition generated by what is not a source of cognition ?

Opponent : It is generated by what is a source of cognition but by a false such source which stands contradicted by perception.

Jayanta : That too is generated by a source of pleasure but by a false such source which stands contradicted by a scripture.

Opponent : Is that source of pleasure not something real ?

Jayanta : Is that source of cognition not something real ?

Opponent : Yes, it is not real inasmuch as it stands contradicted by perception.

Jayanta : That source of pleasure too is not real inasmuch as it stands contradicted by a scripture.

Opponent : But what is contradicted here by the scripture?

Jayanta : What is contradicted there by perception ?

Opponent : Perception decides that the object of that cognition is false.

Jayanta : The scripture decides that the source of this pleasure is false.

Opponent : Is this no source of pleasure.

Jayanta : Just as that object produces a defiled cognition this source of pleasure produces a defiled pleasure conducive to disaster.⁵¹

In spite of Jayanta's own endeavour to the contrary this dialogue makes it amply clear that 'erroneous' and 'non-erroneous' are adjectives that are appropriate attributes to a cognition but not to pleasure, etc. Really, what Jayanta calls erroneous and non-erroneous pleasure, etc. are what might be called improper and proper pleasure, etc. Thus it is the essential nature of a cognition that it identified its object in this manner or that so that it is non-erroneous in case this identification is correct, erroneous in case otherwise. On the other hand, it is the essential nature of pleasure, etc. that they as produced by an object are undergone by a living organism, they being deemed proper in case their acquisition is socially approved, improper in case otherwise. Jayanta, on the other hand, speaks as if both a cognition and pleasure, etc. might be erroneous or otherwise, and both produced by the object concerned. In fact, it makes no sense to say that a cognition is produced by the object concerned just as it makes no sense to say that pleasure, etc. might be erroneous or otherwise. For to cognize an object means to identify it on the basis of certain observed sensory features, and this means that a cognition is produced not by this object but by the cognizer concerned; what the object produces is the bare experience of the concerned sensory features, an experience which is not a cognition proper but just the starting-point of a cognition. Thus when the Buddhist says that perception is the type of cognition which is produced by its object he is correct simply because he in effect identifies perception with bare sensory experience; on the other hand, when Jayanta says that all cognition which is not of the nature of memory is produced by its object his statement makes no sense simply because non-mnemonic cognition as understood by him can in no sense

be identified with bare sensory experience. Hence when Jayanta presently argues that even erroneous pleasure is pleasure because it is produced by an object capable of producing pleasure just as even erroneous cognition is cognition because it is produced by an object capable of producing cognition he is doubly mistaken ; for a pleasure cannot be called erroneous or otherwise and a cognition is not produced by its object. Then a word about how according to the Buddhist and Jayanta pleasure, etc. are produced. Really, pleasure, etc. are of the nature of a total reaction of the organism concerned that takes place at the time when this organism is experiencing certain sensory features of an object. Hence the Buddhist is correct when he contends that an object produces pleasure, etc. along with a perceptual cognition concerning itself, provided it is remembered that he in effect identified perceptual cognition with bare sensory experience. But, when Jayanta says that an object produces pleasure, etc. only after it has been cognized — by way of memory or anticipation if not by way of perception — his statement makes no sense simply because an object produces pleasure, etc. irrespective of whether it is cognized or not and even in case it is cognized it produces pleasure, etc. before it is cognized. We have found Jayanta emphasizing that perception of an object evokes the memory of pleasure, etc. this object produced in past; but for certain reasons the opponent asked him to show how perception of an object is accompanied by a perception of pleasure, etc. Jayanta then contended that when an object is encountered for the first time a perception of this object and a perception of the concerned pleasure, etc. take place together. But as a matter of fact, to perceive an object is to identify it on the basis of certain observed sensory features and perception as thus understood does not take place in relation to an object when this object is encountered for the first time. For what then takes place is an all-round sensory experience of this object along with an experience of the concerned pleasure, etc.; at the same time, depending on the specifics of the circumstance certain sensory features of this object are particularly noticed so that when this object is encountered for the second time it is identified on the basis of an observation of these very sensory features, an identification which evokes a memory of those pleasure, etc. that were experienced at the time of the first encounter. It is in this sense that at the time of the first encounter pleasure, etc. are produced but there takes place no perceptual cognition, at the time of the second encounter there takes place a

perceptual cognition but no pleasure, etc. are produced (barring those produced along with the signalizing sensory experience). As Jayanta's account shows, perceptual cognition of an object might evoke a memory of pleasure, etc. produced by this object in past; but this will not be a case of this object producing pleasure, etc. as a result of being perceptually cognized. As a matter of fact, memory of pleasure, etc. produced by an object in past might be evoked in so many ways, e.g. through a perceptual cognition or memory or anticipation of this object, through a perceptual cognition or memory or anticipation of another object somehow got related to this object by way of association of ideas; but in all such cases what is produced is memory of pleasure, etc., not pleasure, etc. themselves. True, in some sense (important for certain considerations) even memory of pleasure etc. might become a derivative source of pleasure, etc. but the primary source of pleasure etc. remains a physical object at the time of actually producing a certain ensemble of sensory experience; in any case, it is pleasure, etc. produced by such an object under such a circumstance that the Buddhist as well as Jayanta exclusively have in mind while investigating into the nature of pleasure, etc. Coming to the original point, Jayanta should have realized that his insistence that pleasure, etc. can be erroneous or otherwise in the same manner as a cognition can be so would play into the hands of the Buddhist with his thesis that pleasure etc. are of the nature of cognition. This thesis was countered by Jayanta by submitting that a cognition is and pleasure etc. are not of the nature of apprehension of an object, a submission which will get strengthened if it is pointed out that a cognition can and pleasure, etc. cannot be erroneous or otherwise; for apprehension of an object can be erroneous or otherwise in so natural a sense while forced maneuvering of the type just met with must be resorted to if one were to demonstrate that pleasure, etc. too can be erroneous or otherwise.

Be that as it may, another opponent of Jayanta now comes to dismiss as 'children's quarrel' the disputation just reported, his point being that the definition of perception under examination contains another word which really applies to a cognition but not to pleasure, etc. ; the word in question is *vyavasāyātmaka* (=certain) and it is his contention that a cognition can and pleasure, etc. cannot be certain or otherwise.⁵² It was not impossible for Jayanta to enter into another 'children's quarrel' on this new score, but mercifully, he concedes the opponent's point while reiterating his own original submission that

definition in question must after all contain a noun to which must be attributed the so many adjectives here inserted.⁵³ The submission as such is trivial but it has occasioned an important discussion as to what constitutes cognition and what does not. Even so, it would have been more straightforward for Jayanta to simply say that the word '*jñāna*' occurring in the definition in question means this and does not mean that.

(3)

Jayanta next considers the significance of the word '*avyapadeśya* (=non-verbal)' occurring in the proposed definition of perception. The precise import of the word is obscure but this very circumstance led to a lively controversy as to what it means; this controversy Jayanta reports in considerable details and is truly revealing in its own manner. The divergent views cited in this connection are four in all, the first attributed to a body of persons called 'old Naiyāyikas', the second to one called 'Ācāryas', the third to one called 'Vyākhyāt-*ĉum*-Pravaras', the fourth to no one in particular. All these views commonly maintain that the word '*avyapadeśya* (=non-verbal)' occurring here is aimed at eliminating from the purview of the proposed definition something that is born of sense-object contact and is yet somehow verbal; but as to what this something is they differ widely. The precise points of difference are in brief as follows :

(1) The upholders of the first view note that a perceptual cognition born of sense-object contact is often given the designation 'cognition of colour', 'cognition of taste' or the like. And it is their contention that this perceptual cognition as thus verbally designated is what the word 'non-verbal' seeks to eliminate from the purview of the proposed definition.

(2) The upholders of the second view note that when a thing is shown to a novice and its name told the resulting cognition, even if born of sense-object contact, is of the nature of verbal testimony. And it is their contention that this cognition is what the word 'non-verbal' seeks to eliminate from the purview of the proposed definition.

(3) The upholders of the third view note that sense-object contact immediately produces a cognition which involves no employment of words but that this cognition is followed by another one which does involve employment of words. And it is their contention that this latter cognition is what the word 'non-verbal' seeks to eliminate from the purview of the proposed definition.

(4) The upholders of the fourth view note that a perceptual cognition might involve no employment of words or it might involve it; again, it might involve employment of words in one of so many ways; but they emphasize that in all cases a perceptual cognition is something different from verbal testimony. And it is their contention that the word 'non-verbal' occurring in the proposed definition is aimed at emphasizing this very point.

Also noteworthy is Jayanta's manner of reporting. Thus first of all the first view is mentioned briefly. Then the upholder of the second view criticizes the first view and presents his own, then the upholder of the third view criticizes the second view and presents his own, then the upholder of the second view criticizes the third view, then the upholder of the third view answers this criticism, lastly the upholder of the second view criticizes this answer. After this the second view is criticized independently and the first view defended as a better alternative; then the fourth view is mentioned briefly. The whole enquiry closes with a request made to the reader that he may choose from among the traditionally current authoritative views in question whichever one sounds plausible to him.⁵⁴ A consideration of certain details of Jayanta's report should go some way to account for his procedure. Thus he begins by observing that since the Buddhists contend that words have nothing to do with things real and since his school counters them by demonstrating that certain types of valid cognition involve employment of word, the present aphorism, by using the word 'non-verbal', intends to emphasize that there is also a type of valid cognition that involves no employment of words. But to his chagrin Jayanta finds that both the second and the third views, which seem to have been most widely current, play into the hands of the Buddhist, one in one manner the other in another. Hence his inclination to support the first view which is in fact most odd, as also his coverage of the fourth view which too is odd enough and in any case does not seem to have been much current; for both these views allow one freedom to pay just lip-service to the concept of *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*, the type of perceptual cognition supposed to involve no employment of words. Really, Jayanta's problem was to explain away the word 'non-verbal' occurring in the proposed definition of perceptual cognition, for his own understanding was that for all practical purposes the only type of perceptual cognition is one that involves employment of words. As he flamboyantly remarks : "*Savikalpaka-pratyakṣa* is the very life-breath of the Naiyāyikas";⁵⁵

he could even say that the Naiyāyikas have no use for *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*, but he did not say that because by his time the concept of *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* had after all become a recognized concept of the Nyāya school. Nevertheless, the tendency to underplay the importance of *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* is obviously there in Jayanta, a tendency which was in no way hindered if the first or the fourth view was endorsed. But then there arises another question, this time a question of history. For if the concept of *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* was late to gain recognition in the Nyāya camp, why does the Nyāyasūtra definition of perceptual cognition says that this type of cognition is non-verbal? For it seems odd to say about *savikalpaka-pratyakṣa* that it is a type of cognition that involves no employment of words. The solution of the anomaly is at hand if close attention be paid to the first view which Jayanta attributes to old Naiyāyikas. That Jayanta's 'old-Naiyāyikas' are actually early Nyāya authors is proved from the fact that Vātsyāyana upholds a view like the present first view as also from the fact that the present second and third views which were the fashionable views of later times take no serious note of this first view. That Vātsyāyana on his part misunderstood the intention of the original aphorist is not impossible but not much likely, in this connection an interesting grammatical evidence adduced by Jayanta being significant. Thus on Jayanta's showing the word '*vyapadeśya*' means 'that which is designated by a word' and so the phrase '*avyapadeśyam jñānam*' should mean 'that cognition which is not designated by a word'; but this phrase has this meaning naturally only in the case of the first view, not in the case of the rest.⁵⁶ Of course, even when proved to be the actual view of the aphorist and the early Nyāya authors the first view does not cease to be an odd view. For this view makes a gratuitous distinction between perceptual cognition as such and perceptual cognition given the designation 'cognition of colour', 'cognition of taste' or the like while contending that the former is and the latter is not covered by the proposed definition of perceptual cognition.⁵⁷ The upholder of the second view asks in bewilderment: "If this latter cognition is not perceptual cognition, what is it? Is it a fifth type of cognition besides perception, inference, analogy and verbal testimony?"⁵⁸ Jayanta, pleading on behalf of the first view, submits that the latter cognition is not a fifth type of cognition because it is being viewed not at all as a type of cognition but as an object of cognition.⁵⁹ The plea is palpably weak; for the definition of a type of cognition

should seek to eliminate from its purview a type of cognition, not a type of object of cognition. As a matter of fact, Jayanta should be the first person to realize the weakness of his plea, but he lends support to the first view because he is disgusted with the second and third views and here is a view with a hallow of ancientness about it. Even so, the question remains as to why the original aphorist maintained the odd view that perceptual cognition is that cognition which is born of sense-object contact but one which is not given the designation 'cognition of colour', 'cognition of taste' or the like. In all probability the man has confusedly borrowed a contemporary Buddhist position that was destined to play a tremendous role in days to come. Thus early enough the Buddhist began to distinguish between 'cognizing blue (= *nīlaṁ jānāti*)' and 'cognizing blue as blue (= *nīlam iti jānāti*)', a distinction which ultimately crystallized in the form of the famous distinction between *pratyakṣa* and *vikalpa*, the former identified with some sensory experience, the latter with thought. Thus the Buddhist distinction between *nīlaṁ jānāti* and *nīlam iti jānāti* — the former involving no employment of words, the latter involving it — must have been in the air when the Nyāyasūtra aphorism under consideration was composed; the aphorist adopted this distinction but gave it a curious meaning. For instead of saying that *nīlaṁ jānāti* is a bare sensory experience of blue and hence involves no employment of words while *nīlam iti jānāti* is a thought-based ascertainment of blue and hence involves an employment of words, he said that *nīlaṁ jānāti* is having a cognition of blue while *nīlam iti jānāti* is designating this cognition 'cognition of blue'. It was a really curious statement and in any case contained no answer to the question whether a cognition of blue does or does not involve an employment of words. Hence it was that the upholders of the second and third views who were genuinely interested in this question — a question forced on them by the Buddhist speculation on the problem — took no serious note of the first view; but for this very reason Jayanta who somehow found this question embarrassing took a serious note of it. Jayanta's own position was that *savikalpa-pratyakṣa* is the type of perceptual cognition that really matters, and the first view, being actually silent on the question, allowed him full freedom to maintain that position; the fourth view too did the same but difficulty with it was that it was not an old established view and so Jayanta did not think prudent to make much of it. However, inspite of his own misgiving about the propriety of

the second and third views Jayanta reports them at due length because they were the views so much current in his times. So we might now follow him in his account of these two views.

The upholders of the second view, called 'Ācāryas', submit that when an elderly person shows to a novice the entity possessing branches, etc. of a certain type and says to him 'here is a jack-fruit tree' the cognition had by the novice is certainly produced through the instrumentality of a sense-organ but since it is also produced through the instrumentality of a word it is classified as a verbal cognition; thus on their showing, it is such a cognition which though born of a sense-object contact is in fact verbal is eliminated from the purview of the proposed definition of perception through the insertion of the word 'non-verbal'.⁶⁰ To this they add that the verbal cognition in question is a plain case of verbal testimony — a recognized *pramāṇa* — inasmuch as the novice in question tells others : 'Through the words of that person have I learnt that here is a jack-fruit tree'; thus on their showing, had it been a case of perceptual cognition he would have said : 'Through my eyes have I learnt that here is a jack-fruit tree'.⁶¹ Lastly they argue that this is why the Nyāyasūtra definition of verbal testimony does not say that a sense-organ must not have been employed in its case while the present definition of perception says that a word must not have been employed in its case.⁶²

The upholders of the third view; here called 'Vyākhyātṛs' (they being later called 'Pravaras'), oppose the second view on the ground that a cognition which is produced through the instrumentality of a sense-organ as well as a word should be called either both perception and verbal testimony or neither, their point being that since both the alternatives are absurd the line dividing perception from verbal testimony should be drawn somewhere else.⁶³ On their part the Vyākhyātṛs submit that the proposed definition of perception contains the word 'non-verbal' with a view to repudiating the suggestion that all cognition born of a sense-object contact, since it necessarily involves an employment of words, is verbal, a suggestion implying that there is nothing called perceptual cognition; the opponent's point is that whenever an object is cognized as x or y it is always cognized as accompanied by the word 'x' or 'y', the word concerned being either actually heard or just recalled; and then he goes on to argue that even when eyes are employed to see the thing and ears to hear the word

concerned the resulting cognition is not perceptual because two sense-organs cannot go to produce one perceptual cognition, this time his point being that the cognition in question is verbal inasmuch as its instrument is a word also acting as an object.⁶⁴ The Vyākhyāṭṛs concede the opponent's point that sense-object contact might produce a cognition where the object concerned is accompanied by the word concerned is cognized in the manner described, but they submit that in between sense-object contact and this cognition there takes place another cognition where no words are employed, their point being that it is this intervening cognition which is defined by the proposed definition and called 'non-verbal'; (since this non-verbal cognition is expressly characterized as *avikalpaka* — whatever it might mean — the clear implication is that *savikalpaka* perception is an impossibility).⁶⁵

Then comes the criticism Ācāryas level against Vyākhyāṭṛs. In order to appreciate it, certain things might be noted. As can be seen, taking shelter behind the obscure word '*avyapadeśya*' Vyākhyāṭṛs have formulated a theory of perception that is essentially Buddhist. Certainly, equating the words '*avyapadeśya*' and '*avikalpa*' and submitting that all perception is necessarily *avyapadeśya* they have virtually endorsed the Buddhist thesis that all perception is necessarily *nirvikalpaka*. However, unlike the Buddhists the Naiyāyikas had no fixed tradition of understanding what *vikalpa* is; hence it is that the shell of their essentially Buddhist theory of perception Vyākhyāṭṛs have filled up with an *ad hoc* material that makes strange reading. The most monstrous is their contention that in post-perceptual cognition what is cognized is the object concerned along with the word concerned, a contention assailed by Ācāryas in the early major part of their present criticism. The contention being so absurd its refutation too is not of a fundamental importance and so we might note just the salient points of this refutation which stand as follows : "In post-*nirvikalpaka* cognition there is cognized no word concerned — this even if it is conceded that the object concerned is here cognized through the instrumentality of the word concerned; for here nothing can possibly act as an instrument for the cognition of the word concerned.⁶⁶ It cannot be said that the word concerned acts both as an instrument and as an object just as when the sun is seen it acts both as an instrument and as an object; for the sun acts as an instrument and not as an object in the cognition of other things, it acts as an object

and not as an instrument in the cognition of itself.⁶⁷ And if the word concerned is actually cognized why not grant that the instrument of this cognition is a sense-organ like eye; it cannot be said that an eye cognizes just a coloured object with which it comes in contact, for in illusory perception it cognizes an object with which it does not come in contact while it cognizes time, etc. which are no coloured object.”⁶⁸ However, in the course of this refutation one important objection has been made, and that deserves serious notice. Thus Ācāryas taunt Vyākhyāṭṛs : “If the cognition which necessarily requires the services of a sense-organ you treat as a verbal cognition simply because the services of a word too have been drawn upon, then you must be a great Naiyāyika.”⁶⁹ Really, the Naiyāyikas had no tradition of dividing sense-born cognition into an early stage of the form of bare sensory experience and a late stage of the form of word-based identification and then saying that the former stage alone is what constitutes perception; for this was a characteristic Buddhist procedure which Vyākhyāṭṛs in essence borrowed wholesale. Hence the ridicule to which they were subjected by Ācāryas. However, even Ācāryas did not dare say that the Naiyāyikas had no tradition of instituting the present twofold division of stages itself, for by their time this division had become an established practice of this school. We do not know how Ācāryas themselves conceived *nirvikalpaka* perception, for we are only told how they understood the word ‘*avyapadeśya*’, an understanding according to which this word has nothing to do with the question of *nirvikalpaka-savikalpaka*. But in the later minor part of their present criticism they say something which throws light on this question too. For they argue : “The meaning of a word must be learnt through a non-verbal type of cognition, otherwise there will result the fallacy of mutual dependence. But *nirvikalpaka* perception has nothing to do with words so that if this be the only type of perception then the learning of word-meaning ought to be impossible.”⁷⁰ The difficulty is that Ācāryas have themselves maintained that when an object is shown to a novice and the corresponding word introduced to him the resulting cognition is not perceptual but verbal, so that on the present logic they should themselves find it impossible to explain how word-meaning is learnt. As a matter of fact, at the time of learning word-meaning the novice is told that certain sensory features he is observing are the characteristic sensory features of the object denoted by the word concerned so that it is a case of

nirvikalpaka perception and verbal testimony combined; on the other hand, perceptual cognition of this object takes place when at a later occasion this novice comes across this object and identifies it on the basis of having observed the sensory features in question. Ācāryas vaguely felt that sensory experience and a word play one sort of role at the time of learning word-meaning, another sort of role at the time of perceptual cognition proper; but certainly they lacked a clear realization of this distinction, a lack of clarity which led Jayanta to complain that on their understanding too *savikalpaka* perception becomes an impossibility. We shall come to that point later on, but here too Ācāryas once more resort to their old criticism against Vyākhyātṛs and contend that post-*nirvikalpaka* cognition does not cognize the object concerned as accompanied by the word concerned. They first argue that a word is just an instrument of cognizing the object concerned while an instrument of cognition is not itself cognized at the time of cognizing the object concerned just as in an inference the probans is not cognized at the time of cognizing the probandum.⁷¹ Then they submit that if 'being denoted by the word concerned' were a property of the object concerned then just like the sensory features of this object 'this property too should be noticed at the time of *nirvikalpaka* perception itself.'⁷² Both points are valid so far as they go, but the exact role played by a word in the knowledge-situation remains to be positively determined. Lastly Vyākhyātṛs are charged with being in no position to criticise the Buddhist and with treading the slippery path that should lead to word-monism. Thus the Buddhists argue that words have nothing to do with things real because perception has nothing to do with words, an argument which on the showing of Ācāryas cannot be countered by Vyākhyātṛs who themselves hold that perception has nothing to do with words.⁷³ Really, the basic error of the Buddhist is to hold that perception has one type of things for its object, thought another type of things, as compared to which the error of regarding the former type of things as real the latter type as unreal is rather secondary. And so when Vyākhyātṛs share the first error, it is a rather secondary consideration whether they do or do not share the second. In fact, Vyākhyātṛs have their own version of the second error in the form of the monstrous thesis that perception grasps an object as such, post-perceptual cognition an-object-as-denoted-and-accompanied-by-the-word-concerned. It is the monstrosity of this thesis that Ācāryas have in mind when they submit that

Vyākhyāṭṣ are treading the slippery path that should ultimately lead to wordmonism.⁷⁴ Certainly, the word-monist begins by saying that an object is never cognized except in the company of the word concerned and he ends by saying that there exists no object besides the word concerned, just as the idealist begins by saying that an object is never cognized except in the company of the cognition concerned and ends by saying that there exists no object besides the cognition concerned.

The case of Vyākhyāṭṣ is next defended by Pravaras. Thus they argue that *nirvikalpaka* cognition cannot at all differ from post-*nirvikalpaka* cognition unless the two have two different types of things for their respective objects.⁷⁵ This is a famous Buddhist argument and is thoroughly misconceived. For the fact of the matter is that the same thing which produces sensory experience is identified by post-experiential thought; and since it is the identification of a thing on the part of post-experiential thought that is properly called cognition, it is a misleading question as to what type of things are cognized by sensory experience and what type by post-experiential thought. But since both the Buddhist and Pravaras are of the view that sensory experience is one type of cognition and post-experiential thought another type of it, it was natural for them to enquire as to how the two types of cognition deal with their respective objects. Even so, it was not inevitable that they should come out with the view that one type of things are exclusively an object of sensory experience, another type of things exclusively an object of post-experiential thought. But as a matter of fact both did come out with a view like that, a view opposed by the orthodox Naiyāyikas like our Ācāryas who too would somehow distinguish between *nirvikalpaka* cognition and post-*nirvikalpaka* cognition. The Buddhists contended that a unique particular is cognized by sensory experience, a class character by post-experiential thought; Pravaras contended that an object as such is cognized by the former, an object-as-denoted-and-accompanied-by-the-word-concerned by the latter. Both were mistaken in an essentially similar fashion but the two argued their case in their own ways. So our Pravaras here argue that when two cognitions differ from one another they must have two different things for their object; e.g. a man becomes staff-holding man as a result of getting associated with a staff.⁷⁶ The point is buttressed by speaking of entities like space, time, *samavāya*-relation whose very existence is controversial⁷⁷ but

in fact no weight is added to the point by this sort of talk; for even granting that all these entities exist it does not follow that a thing as such is grasped through sensory experience, a thing-as-associated-with-the-name-concerned through post-experiential thought. Nor does this conclusion follow from the fact — cited last of all — that more and more particulars become apparent in the same thing as it approaches closer and closer.⁷⁸ The suggestion that the same thing is cognized differently under different conditions is rejected by Pravaras on the ground that that would require that at the time of cognizing an object the cognition concerned too should be cognized, a position that a Naiyāyika cannot grant.⁷⁹ As a matter of fact, the question whether at the time of cognizing an object the cognition concerned is cognized or not has nothing to do with the problem under consideration, this being the central point urged by Ācāryas by way of dismissing the argumentation here indulged in by Pravaras.⁸⁰ But then Ācāryas are themselves faced with the question as to what is the precise import of the word 'non-verbal' occurring in the proposed definition of perception. They have already answered the question by saying that when an elderly person shows a thing to a novice and tells him its name the cognition generated in the novice is born of sense-object contact and is yet a case of verbal testimony, this being the type of cognition eliminated from the purview of the proposed definition through inserting in it the word 'non-verbal'; to this is now made a clarificatory addition that there are also other possible ways of learning word-meaning, an addition whose significance will become clear in a moment.⁸¹ For now a new opponent appears on the scene who takes exception to the position maintained by Ācāryas themselves and ultimately lends support to the first view; (in view of this somewhat anomalous re-appearance of a view attributed to old Naiyāyikas we have been saying that this opponent is Jayanta himself). This opponent argues that if the cognition had by a novice at the time when a thing was first introduced to him and its name told is of the form of verbal testimony then so also must be the cognition had by him when this thing is encountered another time, the reason being that on this later occasion too the novice after all recalls that this thing along with its name was introduced to him by such and such a person at such and such a time.⁸² The plea that at the later occasion what acts as an instrument of cognition is not a word itself but memory of this word is rejected on the ground that on the first occasion too

memory plays a big role when the word is heard.⁸³ The suggestion that at the later occasion a single word acts as an instrument of cognition while on the first occasion a whole sentence does so is rejected on the ground that on both occasions a whole sentence does so.⁸⁴ The opponent's final conclusion is that on the logic adopted by Ācāryas all *savikalpaka* perception becomes a case of verbal testimony, while a Nyāya position with no scope for *savikalpaka* perception is something anomalous.⁸⁵ As for learning word-meaning his submission is that it can take place through the instrumentality of perceptual cognition as through that of verbal testimony, so that when a thing is first introduced to a novice and its name told it is a case of learning word-meaning through perceptual cognition rather than verbal testimony.⁸⁶ [At this stage the opponent says that the view maintained by old Naiyāyikas seems to be a better alternative.⁸⁷ The two new points raised by him here in this connection we have already covered earlier incidentally.] This criticism of the view maintained by Ācāryas raises certain issues that are of a fundamental importance. For here under consideration are three questions, viz. (1) what role a word plays in the knowledge-situation ? (2) what are the ways of learning word-meaning ? (3) what constitutes perceptual cognition ? Really speaking, words are an instrument of acquiring knowledge concerning things even without physically encountering things. Thus through words can a human being be informed as to how a thing will behave when physically encountered. And the perceptual cognition of a thing consists in identifying this thing on the basis of having observed in it certain characteristic sensory features about which information has been earlier gathered somehow or other. So Ācāryas are correct in their submission that when a thing is shown to a novice and its name told he is learning the meaning of a word through verbal testimony; and by adding that there are also other ways of learning word-meaning they have made a major correction in their position. For the cases of learning word-meaning through the method just described are relatively few, in most cases words being introduced to a novice through words uttered in the absence of the things talked about. But the essential point is that all cases of learning word-meaning are cases of verbal testimony, a point correctly grasped by Ācāryas. The present opponent, on the other hand, wrongly thinks that the cases of learning word-meaning through the method just described are cases of perceptual cognition, he being strengthened in his conviction by the

fact that cases of this type are relatively few. As a matter of fact, these cases are not cases of perceptual cognition simply because perceptual cognition consists in identifying an object on the basis of having observed in this object sensory features about which information has been gathered earlier, a point which too is correctly grasped by Ācāryas though not expressed in this language. Certainly, it is the present opponent's failure to realize this point that is responsible for his talking as if a word plays the same role in the case when the concerned sense-object contact takes place for the first time and in the case when it takes place another time; in fact, in the former case the meaning of this word is understood, in the latter case the understanding thus acquired is put to use. This point too Ācāryas grasp most clearly of all; but here was a point whose significance was often missed by our logicians for the simple reason that their attention was exclusively confined to the cases of human cognition where employment of words plays so crucial a role. For otherwise it can easily be seen that the essence of perceptual cognition lies not in recalling the word that denotes the thing concerned but in recognizing that certain observed sensory features are the characteristic features of the thing concerned, the recollection of the word concerned being but a means of recalling these sensory features. Only the Buddhist had some inkling into the true position when he described thought not as an actual case of employment of words but a potential such case. However, even he had no mind to extend his analysis to the cases of animal-cognition (what he had in mind was the cases of child-cognition). Even so, Ācāryas were essentially correct when they drew distinction between the cases when on the occasion of sense-object contact the meaning of a word is learnt and the cases when on such an occasion this word is applied, a distinction the present opponent seeks to obliterate. Lastly, a word about the present opponent's so much concern for *savikalpaka* perception. Really, the distinction between *nirvikalpaka* perception and *savikalpaka* perception has sense only in case the former is equated with bare sensory experience, the latter with a thought-based identification of the object concerned, an equation which somehow clearly emerges only in Buddhist logic and one which the Naiyāyika always failed to appreciate. However, Ācāryas by drawing particular attention to the cases when on the occasion of sense-object contact the meaning of a word is learnt somehow did justice even to this equation; for on their clear showing what happens

on this occasion is that certain sensory features are noticed as constituting the characteristic mark of the object concerned which on later occasion of sense-object contact is identified on the basis of these sensory features. Not that Ācāryas themselves would equate *nirvikalpaka* perception with a bare noticing of sensory features. For they will adopt some such definition of *nirvikalpaka* perception as should not cover the cases when on the occasion of sense-object contact the meaning of a word is learnt, cases which according to them are not cases of perception but those of verbal testimony; but certainly sensory features are noticed even on such an occasion. The present opponent on his part puts such an interpretation on the position maintained by Ācāryas that what they consider to be cases of perception turn out to be cases of verbal testimony; and then he laments that on this logic *śavikalpaka* perception is no more. But on this logic *nirvikalpaka* perception too is no more, for it is commonsense with the Naiyāyika that *nirvikalpaka* perception is what immediately precedes *śavikalpaka* perception. In fact what *nirvikalpaka* perception is according to the Naiyāyika is a veritable enigma. Be that as it may, Ācāryas have hit upon certain ideas that are truly pregnant; only we have to remember that these ideas have been developed in the course of inventing a meaning for the word 'non-verbal' occurring in the Nyāyasūtra definition of perception, a word which in all probability originally meant not what they say but what old Naiyāyikas of Jayanta say. To this extent the present opponent is justified in lending support to the way old Naiyāyikas understand this word, but this is a relatively secondary consideration. For the tragic implication of his stand is that on the logical problems under discussion he is endorsing a rather primitive view which was as much innocent of the *nirvikalpaka-śavikalpaka* distinction evolved by the Buddhist as of the distinction Ācāryas drew between learning the meaning of a word and applying this word.

Lastly, let us examine the fourth view reported by Jayanta. On this view the proposed definition of perception includes the word 'non-verbal' with the intention of emphasizing that perceptual cognition is not a case of verbal testimony, the need for this emphasis arising because *śavikalpaka* perception after all involves an employment of words.⁸⁸ The point is that *śavikalpaka* perception is a case of perceptual cognition, not a case of verbal testimony, because the former does and the latter does not invariably require the services of a sense-organ.⁸⁹ By way of elaboration it is added that in

savikalpaka perception the memory of a word comes to the assistance of a sense-organ just as a lamp comes to the assistance of an eye.⁹⁰ Lastly, it is argued that to say all this is not to keep silent about *nirvikalpaka* perception because the point is implicitly made that *nirvikalpaka* perception, since it involves no employment of words at all, is not a case of verbal testimony.⁹¹ It is almost certain that this way of looking at the problem could not be the way of the original aphorist. For the question whether all perception or just a sub-type of it involves an employment of words was forced on the Naiyāyikas in later times and by the Buddhist with his contention that perception is that type of cognition which is devoid of all element of thought and hence devoid of all employment of words. So far as the early Naiyāyikas were considered they would simply say that to perceive a thing is to perceive this thing while the consideration that this thing happens to be denoted by a word is an irrelevant consideration in this connection. It was with a view to meeting the Buddhist challenge that the later Naiyāyikas began to speak of a *nirvikalpaka* perception that involves no employment of words and a *savikalpaka* perception that involves it. But as we have seen, the precise manner in which perceptual cognition involves an employment of words remained a debated question. And on this question the fourth view of Jayanta is silent, its attention having been shifted to another question as was also somehow the case with the first view of Jayanta. True, the upholder of the fourth view does say that a word is an accessory cause in all production of *savikalpaka* perception just as a lamp is in the production of visual perception, but how to understand the phenomenon is the real question. Among the Naiyāyikas Ācāryas maintained on the question a position that came nearest to being correct but even they had their limitations. As for the Buddhist, he exhibited still keener insight than they but his speculation was much marred by his pro-idealist proclivities.

(4)

Jayanta next considers the significance of the word '*avyabhicārin* (=non-erroneous)' occurring in the proposed definition of perception. Quoting the instance of desert-sands which, when seen from a distance in summer sunshine, are mistaken for water Jayanta submits that a mistaken cognition like this which, though born of sense-object contact, is erroneous inasmuch as it is not true of the object concerned is eliminated from the purview of the proposed definition of perception

by inserting in this definition the word 'non-erroneous'.⁹² Here Jayanta incidentally refutes two contentions made by the Buddhist, viz. (1) that all *nirvikalpaka* cognition is necessarily non-erroneous and (2) that post-*nirvikalpaka* cognition, which might doubtless be erroneous or otherwise, is not of the form of perception inasmuch as it is not immediately born of sense-object contact; against the former contention Jayanta remarks that even *nirvikalpaka* cognition might be erroneous or otherwise, against the second that post-*nirvikalpaka* cognition is of the form of perception.⁹³ Jayanta's point is that all cognition born of sense-object contact, whether *nirvikalpaka* or *savikalpaka*, is erroneous in case it is not true of its object.⁹⁴ It can easily be seen that the Buddhist is identifying *nirvikalpaka* cognition with bare sensory experience, post-*nirvikalpaka* cognition with thought-based identification of the object concerned; and his one mistake lies in calling the former 'perceptual cognition', his another mistake lies in not calling the later 'perceptual cognition'. On the other hand, it is difficult to see what Jayanta understands by *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*, for on his showing it too must somehow identify the object concerned; even so, he is correct in maintaining that a cognition born of sense-object contact which identifies the object concerned is perceptual cognition.

Then Jayanta opens another big question. For the opponent submits that since the sense-born mistaken cognition of *x* as not-*x* is not born of a sense-organ's contact with not-*x* this sort of cognition is already eliminated from the purview of the proposed definition through its including the word 'born of sense-object contact'; Jayanta replies that even a mistaken cognition of this sort is born of a sense-organ's contact with *x* and so cannot be eliminated that way.⁹⁵ In this connection Jayanta makes a distinction between what produces a sense-born mistaken cognition and what is referred to in such a cognition; and he informs us that the latter has been conceived by the Nyāya authors in three ways.⁹⁶ Thus some maintain that the referent in question is 'x which has concealed its own form and assumed the form of not-x'⁹⁷, some that it is 'not-x recalled owing to its similarity with x'⁹⁸, some that it is *x* itself but that what is reflected in this cognition is not *x* but not-*x*.⁹⁹ These are all highly important considerations but Jayanta promises to take up them in details later on,¹⁰⁰ so we also postpone our examination of them.

Lastly, Jayanta concedes that there are certain cases of mistaken

cognition which is not at all born of a sense-object contact; he obviously has in mind the cases of hallucinatory vision and his point is that they well stand eliminated from the purview of the proposed definition through its including the word 'born of sense-object contact'.¹⁰¹ Jayanta's general understanding is that in such cases the object appearing there is an object recalled in memory, while the concerned memory itself might be generated through all sorts of causes.¹⁰²

(5)

Jayanta lastly considers the significance of the word '*vyavasāyātmaka* (=certain)' occurring in the proposed definition of perception. Thus on his showing when a thing coming in contact with a sense-organ is found to exhibit what happen to be the common features of *x* and *y* but not either what are the specific features of *x* or what are the specific features of *y* then there arises a doubtful cognition to the effect 'this thing might be *x* or it might be *y*'; this sort of cognition, though born of sense-object contact, is not certain and so is eliminated from the purview of the proposed definition of perception by inserting in this definition the word 'certain'.¹⁰³ Jayanta concedes that there might be cases of doubtful cognition which is not born of sense-object contact but informs that there are also cases when such a cognition is actually so born; e.g. when one sees a distant thing and says 'this thing might be a stump of tree or it might be a man' the cognition concerned is certainly sense-born.¹⁰⁴ But then the opponent submits that a case of doubtful cognition is in fact a case of erroneous cognition; for here too a thing which is either '*x* not *y*' or '*y* not *x*' is identified as 'either *x* or *y*' (something like identifying *x* as not-*x*).¹⁰⁵ Jayanta replies that the distinction between a doubtful cognition and an erroneous cognition is too marked to be missed; for in the latter one definitely says about *x* 'this thing is not-*x*', in the former one hesitantly says about *x* 'this thing might be *x* or it might be *y*'.¹⁰⁶ Then the opponent raises a point whose consideration is revealing for some reason. Thus he says that on the view maintained by Pravaras all perception being necessarily *nirvikalpaka* there is no question of perception being either erroneous or doubtful; Jayanta tersely replies that that view has been already refuted by demonstrating that a post-*nirvikalpaka* cognition involving employment of words is also of the form of perception.¹⁰⁷ This at once shows how heretically crypto-Buddhist the view maintained by Pravaras was. Moreover, Jayanta

says that this view has been already refuted; but in his presentation this view has been refuted by Ācāryas. But then the view maintained by Ācāryas was itself refuted by somebody who ultimately came out in support of the alternative view maintained by old Naiyāyikas; the conclusion is almost inescapable that Jayanta would sympathize with this somebody whose favourite view alone is what stands unrefuted. Be that as it may, the opponent persists in his objection and argues that since sense-object contact is followed by a relevant memory which in turn is followed by a doubtful or erroneous cognition (as the case might be) this cognition is not something born of sense-object contact; this again is an essentially Buddhist argument and Jayanta tells the opponent as he would tell the Buddhist that all cognition which emerges while sense-object contact persists will have to be treated as a cognition born of sense-object contact.¹⁰⁸

Here practically closes Jayanta's consideration of the Nyayasūtra definition of perception. By way of concluding he raises certain grammatical points with a view to deciding what the word '*pratyakṣa*' means; his net conclusion is that the word is an adjective meaning 'something that has to do with (=something that is born of) a sense-organ'.¹⁰⁹

(b) On the Buddhist Definition of Perception

Jayanta first presents the Buddhist's case on the question of perception and then refutes it. On the Buddhist's showing perception is that type of cognition which is devoid of all thought and is non-illusory; Jayanta finds fault with both these elements of the definition but his discussion is largely concerned with the first.¹ *Kalpanā* (=vikalpa) is the Buddhist's word for thought and Jayanta asks him : "Granted that *kalpanā* is that type of apprehension-of-an-object, which is capable of being associated with a word, why should it be denied the status of a *pramāṇa* (=valid cognition) ?"² The Buddhist replies : "A true cognition is that which does not deal with things unreal but what a word stands for is not something real. For a word stands for a definite class of objects, but a unique particular, which alone is real, is different from everything else - whether belonging to its own class or belonging to an alien class."³ This reply is most crucial for an understanding of the strong as well as weak points of the Buddhist's position. Thus even while granting that there are classes to which a unique particular belongs and classes to which it does not he speaks as if there is something fictitious about granting that there

are classes and that a unique particular belongs to them. Now to identify a unique particular as belonging to a class is to observe in this unique particular certain sensory features that are characteristic of this class. Naturally therefore a living organism, in order to identify a unique particular as belonging to a class, must observe in this unique particular certain sensory features and recall the past understanding that these sensory features are the characteristic features of this class. In human beings this recollection is facilitated through the employment of words, for with the help of words a thing can be defined in terms of certain sensory features even in case there takes place no simultaneous observation of these sensory features; thus a human being is in a position to identify a unique particular as belonging to a class (= as denoted by the word concerned) even in case he had not earlier observed a unique particular belonging to this class but in case he was earlier informed that such and such sensory features are the characteristic features of this class. The Buddhist's *kalpanā* is the process of identifying a unique particular as belonging to a class, and since all class can be assigned a corresponding word even if there are classes which are not assigned - or are not known to be assigned - a corresponding word he defines *kalpanā* as that type of apprehension-of-an-object, which is capable of being associated with a word (the emphasis being on 'capable'). And his *pratyakṣa* is the process of bare sensory experience through whose instrumentality sensory features are observed in a unique particular. Thus it should be a very correct proposition that *pratyakṣa* followed by *kalpanā* is the sole instrument of cognizing objects. For all practical purposes the Buddhist even says just that, but he involved himself in a highly misconceived theory according to which *pratyakṣa* is the type of cognition that cognizes unique particulars which are the only type of real things there are, while *kalpanā* is the type of cognition that cognizes class-characters which are something unreal and are somehow falsely superimposed on unique particulars. And all sorts of misleading arguments have been concocted with a view to buttressing this misconceived theory. Of all that we have a fore-taste in the two-sentence reply given by the Buddhist to Jayanta's simple query as to why *kalpanā* (= thought) should be denied the status of a *pramāṇa* (= valid cognition). Thus we are here being told that *kalpanā* is no case of valid cognition because it has to do with words while a word stands for something unreal, the point being that a word stands for a class-character which

is something unreal superimposed on a unique particular which is alone real and is something different from everything else whether belonging to its own class or belonging to an alien class. Then comes the following piece : "A cognition of the form of *kalpanā* does not invariably follow in the wake of sense-object contact. For it might possibly arise even in the absence of sense-object contact, and even in case it arises in the wake of sense-object contact it invariably requires the memory of an earlier learnt word ; certainly, if it were a product of sense-object contact it would have arisen as soon as this contact took place. The conclusion is that the cognition in question is not at all a product of sense-object contact.⁴ Certainly, if even after encountering the object concerned a sensory cognition must require the services of the memory of an earlier learnt word, there will arise a gap between this cognition and this object.⁵ Nor can it be said that the memory of an earlier learnt word-meaning comes to the assistance of a sense-organ in cognizing its object; for apart from the consideration that the concept of an assistant cause is untenable, the fact remains that this memory, its application to the present case and all that is a time-consuming process while a sense-organ cognizes its object through a *nirvikalpaka* cognition as soon as this sense-organ encounters this object."⁶ The whole argumentation makes strange reading. For what it is able to prove is that sensory experience and thought are two distinct types of process, each produced by its own distinct type of causal aggregate, so that even when the two are produced together a sensory experience is a sensory experience, a thought is a thought. Not that to prove this was a mean performance, for thus to distinguish between sensory experience and thought was in a way the high water-mark of the Buddhist's speculation on logical problems; certainly, the distinction is not only very important but is also drawn very correctly. The difficulty rather is with the insinuation – nay, open declaration – that sensory experience has to do with something that is real, thought to do with something that is unreal. So using the standard terminology of Indian logic it was proclaimed that *pratyakṣa* (= bare sensory experience) is a *pramāṇa* (= valid cognition), *kalpanā* (= thought) is no *pramāṇa*. His old question as to why *kalpanā* is no *pramāṇa* Jayanta repeats, this time elaborating it a bit; thus he says : "May be *kalpanā* is of two sorts - one that is of the form of building castle in the air, the other that grasps a present object like a blue patch. Nobody cares if the former is said to be no

pramāṇa, but why should the latter be no *pramāṇa* when it does not arise except in the presence of the object concerned ?” The query is very pertinent not only because a thought might possibly be true of its object, but because the question of being true or otherwise arises only in the case of a thought, not in the case of a bare sensory experience. On the other hand, the Buddhist's position is that a bare sensory experience is all *pramāṇa*, a thought is no *pramāṇa* even when true. So let us see how he answers Jayanta's present question; thus he argues : “Really, no thought whatsoever has anything to do with things real which are cognized in all fullness by *nirvikalpaka* cognition. The point is that a thing has but one nature and when this nature has been grasped by perception there remains nothing to be done by another *pramāṇa*. As for the circumstance that in certain cases a thought appears to be grasping things real and to be lucid in character, that is because this thought arises in the wake of a *nirvikalpaka* cognition and so gets coloured by this cognition, not because this thought really grasps things real which in fact are grasped by a *nirvikalpaka* cognition alone.”⁷ This again is a crucial pronouncement of the Buddhist, and again a highly misconceived pronouncement. For to cognize a thing means to identify it on the basis of its observed sensory features and in this sense a bare sensory experience is not at all a case of cognizing a thing (though certainly an indispensable starting point for cognizing a thing) while a thought alone is a case of cognizing a thing (though on the basis of features observed in the course of the preceding sensory experience). And here the Buddhist is saying something just the opposite. Thus on his showing bare sensory experience not only cognizes a thing but cognizes it in all fullness so that nothing remains to be cognized by the forthcoming thought; hence even while distinguishing between a thought arising in a baseless fashion and one arising in the wake of a sensory experience with a view to identifying the object concerned he would not admit that the latter is a case of truly cognizing this object, it being according to him a case of something mistakenly appearing to be a true cognition of this object on account of its proximity to the preceding sensory experience which is really a true cognition of this object. In this connection the Buddhist has also worked out a fivefold classification of *kalpanā* and his contention is that each type of *kalpanā* either mistakenly differentiates things which are in fact identical or mistakenly identifies things which are in fact

different. Thus on his showing when a class-character, a quality or an action is attributed to a thing it is a case of differentiating things which are in fact identical (a class-character, a quality or an action being nothing different from the thing concerned) and when a name or the possession of another thing is attributed to a thing it is a case of identifying things which are in fact different (a name or a thing possessed being in fact different from the thing concerned).⁸ This too is a considerably confused thesis. Really, all thought identifies a thing as belonging to a class and this it does through observing in this thing features that are characteristic of this class, these features being called a quality if they stand for some static aspect of the nature of this thing, an action if they stand for some dynamic aspect of it; in fact, even to attribute a quality or an action to a thing is to identify it as belonging to a relatively simple class, but there is some point in distinguishing between an individual quality or action and a class-character which is essentially an ensemble of certain qualities and actions. And all names attributed to a thing are attributed to it either because of its possessing a class-character or because of its possessing a quality or an action; even a proper name attributed to a thing becomes a reminder of the qualities and actions characteristic of this thing. Lastly, the case of one thing possessing another is a case of these two things entering into a relation where each has its own distinctive role; and a name attributed to a thing might also be a name attributed to it because of its entering into a relation with another thing. All these aspects of the true situation are at the back of the Buddhist's mind when he works out his thesis on a fivefold *kalpanā*, but his misguided conviction that a *kalpanā* must somehow falsify the nature of things real has played havoc with all this. A detailed comparison between what is the case and what he says is the case is futile, but a point or two might be noted profitably. Since all *kalpanā* is to be conceived as a case of attributing - potentially if not actually - a name to a thing the fourth *kalpanā*-type is to be understood as a case of attributing a proper name to a thing. Again, the Naiyāyika posits a class-character, a quality or an action as an independent real existing besides the thing to which it belongs, and the Buddhist's impatience with this sort of proliferation of independent reals is somewhat understandable; but the latter's own understanding that a class-character, a quality or an action is a false imposition on the thing to which it allegedly belongs is a remedy worse than the disease. In any case, Jayanta lastly puts another pertinent

question to the Buddhist as follows : "If the attribution of a class-character, etc. to a thing is a case of false cognition, then why does this cognition not get cancelled as does the mistaken cognition of nacre as silver ?"⁹ The Buddhist's reply is again revealing even if again misconceived. For the following is what he says : "The mistaken cognition of x as not-x gets cancelled in case not-x is something apart from x, but a class-character, etc. are nothing apart from the unique particular to which they allegedly belong. That is why the mistaken cognition of a class-character, etc. is not cancelled, and that is why a thought is neither a case of true cognition (= *pramāṇa*) nor a case of false cognition but a third sort of something."¹⁰ Really, this argument is neither here nor there. The Buddhist realizes that a correct identification of a thing on the part of thought cannot be dismissed as a case of false cognition, but he has also persuaded himself that bare sensory experience is alone *pramāṇa*. He therefore says that a thought is neither a case of *pramāṇa* nor a case of false cognition but a third something, a statement which as it stands is senseless. It is correct to argue that a thought as such is neither a case of true cognition nor a case of false cognition, because a thought might be either of the form of true cognition or of the form of false cognition; but what is thus argued is very different from what the Buddhist actually says.

After thus presenting the Buddhist case as defended by the Buddhist himself Jayanta begins his own criticism of this case. He first enumerates the several grounds on the basis of which the Buddhist has declared *kālpānā* to be no *pramāṇa* and then considers them one by one. He begins by assailing the Buddhist's argument that *kālpānā* is no *pramāṇa* because it has for its object what a word stands for, that is, something unreal; on Jayanta's showing what a word stands for, viz. a 'universal', is cognized by *nirvikalpaka* perception as much as by *savikalpaka* perception.¹¹ Really, on the question as to what is cognized by *nirvikalpaka* perception both the Buddhist and Jayanta are wrong; for *nirvikalpaka* perception being, in fact, the physiological process of sensory experience and not cognition proper, there arises no question as to what is cognized by *nirvikalpaka* perception. Moreover, Jayanta's position that a 'universal' exists in the form of an independent real by the side of particular things is of doubtful validity. But liberally understood his present contention is that whatever object produces *nirvikalpaka* perception is the object cognized by *savikalpaka* perception, and that is substantially sound;

for there are not two sorts of object, one producing *nirvikalpaka* perception and the other cognized by *savikalpaka* perception. In this connection Jayanta reminds the Buddhist that on the latter's own showing *kalpanā* is not a case of false cognition in the manner the mistaken cognition of nacre as silver is.¹² Then it is submitted that *savikalpaka* perception does not cease to be a cognition born of sense-object contact simply because it requires the services of a word learnt in past, Jayanta's point being that the concerned sense-object contact persists even while the services of a word are being availed of.¹³ This submission too is substantially sound, for if anything can be called perceptual cognition it is what the Naiyāyika calls *savikalpaka* perception, and it is called perceptual cognition precisely because it consists in the identification of an object with which a sense-organ is in contact; by the same token, essentially mistaken is the Buddhist's counter-submission that it is not this cognition (which he calls 'post-perceptual thought' and treats as no *pramāṇa*) but the preceding sensory experience that is to be called perceptual cognition. The Buddhist has elaborately argued that a word can render no services to a sense-organ in the production of perceptual cognition, but this argument is valid only because he has arbitrarily chosen to equate perceptual cognition with bare sensory experience; certainly, in the production of bare sensory experience a sense-organ does not need the services of a word. Jayanta's refutation of the argument in question is equally elaborate but its details cease to be much noteworthy once the basic fallacy vitiating this argument is kept in mind. Thus he contends that there is nothing incongruous about the causal aggregate of *savikalpaka* perception including a word recalled, that the memory of a word creates no gap between a sensory cognition and its object, that *savikalpaka* perception in spite of being a time-consuming process is of the form of perceptual cognition.¹⁴ All this is plainly understandable. Then Jayanta takes exception to the Buddhist's argument that a thing in all its fullness having been cognized by *nirvikalpaka* cognition nothing new remains to be cognized by post-*nirvikalpaka* thought, the former's point being that the same thing can well be cognised by two cognitions.¹⁵ But as has already been noted, on this question both the Buddhist and Jayanta are wrong simply because *nirvikalpaka* perception is not at all a process of the form of cognition. Lastly, Jayanta refutes the Buddhist thesis on a fivefold *kalpanā*. In a nutshell his point is that a class-character, a quality and

an action are each an independent real located is the thing to which they belong while nobody ever identifies a name with the thing to which this name is attributed or a thing with another thing which possesses this thing.¹⁶ The point is substantially sound but for the fact that a quality, an action or a class-character even if really belonging to a thing are not an independent real existing besides this thing. In this connection Jayanta welcomes the Buddhist's declaration that a thought is not a case of false cognition but he disputes the latter's declaration that it is also not a case of *pramāṇa*.¹⁷ Jayanta concedes that a thought might often be false but adds that a *nirvikalpaka* perception too might often be false; e.g. the *nirvikalpaka* perception of one moon as two moons is false.¹⁸ Correct is his implication that all thought cannot be dismissed as no *pramāṇa* simply on the ground that a thought is often false, but the fact remains that there is no question of a *nirvikalpaka* perception being true or false, it being not at all a case of cognition; thus the mistaken cognition of one moon as two moons is not a case of false *nirvikalpaka* perception but a case of false thought. Here Jayanta again distinguishes between a thought arising in a baseless fashion and one arising in the wake of a *nirvikalpaka* perception, his point being that the former is not but the latter certainly is a case of *pramāṇa*.¹⁹ Really, Jayanta should say that the latter, if it is true of its object, is a case of *pramāṇa*; but he is right in rejecting as invalid the Buddhist's plea that such a thought is not actually a case of *pramāṇa* but appears to be so because it follows in the wake of a *nirvikalpaka* cognition which is actually a case of *pramāṇa*, the former's point being that this consideration is irrelevant so far as *pramāṇa*-ship of the thought in question is concerned.²⁰ Jayanta cannot say that but the real point is that the question of being or not being *pramāṇa* arises only in the case of a thought, not in the case of a *nirvikalpaka* cognition; even so, his point is substantially valid inasmuch as a thought even when following in the wake of a *nirvikalpaka* cognition is true not for that reason but for the reason that it correctly identifies the object concerned. Here actually closes Jayanta's consideration of the points raised by the Buddhist in the course of the defence of his case. What follows is a rambling sort of discussion interesting in its own manner. So let it be examined separately.

Jayanta begins by referring to the Buddhist's contention that a thing in all its fullness having being cognized by a *nirvikalpaka*

cognition there remains nothing to be cognized by a post-*nirvikalpaka* cognition. Here is first repeated the old point that the same thing can well be cognized by two cognitions but then a new point is raised.²¹ Thus Jayanta laments : "It is difficult to say as to what is cognized by a *nirvikalpaka* perception. You say it is a unique particular that is thus cognized, some say it is the Grand Universal, some say it is Being-as-such, some say it is Speech, some say it is a thing in the form of a commingled mass of qualities, actions, class-characters, etc. Certainly, on questions related to knowledge, perception is the last court of appeal, but when there is a dispute about perception itself oath seems to be the only court of appeal."²² However, from all this Jayanta does not draw the correct conclusion that *nirvikalpaka* perception is not at all a case of cognition but a misleading conclusion that whatever is cognized by *savikalpaka* perception is also cognized by *nirvikalpaka* perception.²³ And then he in essence argues that since a *savikalpaka* perception does not cognize a unique particular, the Grand Universal, Being-as-such, Speech, or the commingled-mass of qualities, actions, etc. the hypothesis that either of these things is cognized by *nirvikalpaka* perception is false.²⁴ Of the several hypotheses in question the last alone receives a somewhat sympathetic consideration at the hands of Jayanta, for the rest are simply so many illusionist hypotheses current in his times while he was an uncompromising opponent of all illusionism. Thus the advocates of these hypotheses appealed to the authority of *nirvikalpaka* perception and dismissed as a *vikalpā*-born illusion the world of our day-to-day experience; (we have already some idea of how that was done by the Buddhist and the procedure was essentially similar with his comrades-in-arms). As directed against these hypotheses Jayanta's present argument has the important meaning that what is revealed in *savikalpaka* perception is not an illusion but a verity; but for reasons we have already noted he was prevented from further arguing that *nirvikalpaka* perception is not at all a case of cognition. As for the last hypothesis it was a Kumārilite position as much opposed to illusionism as Jayanta's own position. So against it Jayanta raised a relatively secondary objection. Thus the Kumārilite maintained that qualities, actions, class-characters, etc. exhibited by a thing are somehow identical with this thing though also somehow different from it; on the other hand, Jayanta maintained that these qualities, etc. are absolutely different from this thing, so that if the Kumārilite agrees

with him on this point the two will have nothing to differ on the question of *nirvikalpaka-savikalpaka*.²⁵ It is in this background that Jayanta concludes his present enquiry by emphasizing that whatever is cognized by *savikalpaka* perception is also cognized by *nirvikalpaka* perception; and since it is his understanding that all sorts of independent reals in the form of substances, qualities, actions, class-characters, etc. are cognized by *savikalpaka* perception he contends that the same are cognized by *nirvikalpaka* perception as well.²⁶ But this time Jayanta clarifies his position by further noting that even if the same set of entities are cognized by *nirvikalpaka* perception and *savikalpaka* perception the latter does and the former does not involve an employment of words.²⁷ However, we already know that on the question as to how an employment of words is involved in *savikalpaka* perception, there was a lot of confusion in the Nyāya camp, but the point needs no repetition.

As was noted in the beginning, the Buddhist definition of perception contained two elements in the form of saying that perception is devoid of all thought and is non-illusory. Uptil now Jayanta was peroccupied with the first element of this definition, now he briefly criticizes its second element. Thus he submits that on the logic adopted by the Buddhist there can be no perception that is illusory.²⁸ The plea that a case like cognition of two moons is a case of illusory perception is rejected on the ground that in such a case too there is nothing illusory about the concerned *nirvikalpaka* cognition which alone is what the Buddhist calls perception; thus on the Buddhist's logic a *nirvikalpaka* cognition cognizes but one moon which the concerned post-*nirvikalpaka* thought misinterprets as two moons just a *nirvikalpaka* cognition cognizes but mirage-sands which the concerned post-*nirvikalpaka* thought misinterprets as water.²⁹ The Buddhist pleads that in the former case the eye has been rendered so defective that it cannot see one moon but must see two moons; Jayanta retorts that on this logic it too might be said that in the latter case the eye has been rendered so defective that it cannot see mirage-sands but must see water.³⁰ The Buddhist agrees to Jayant's point, but then he is told that in that case he has no right to say that a valid post-perceptual thought rightly interprets what the preceding *nirvikalpaka* cognition has cognized, an invalid post-perceptual thought interprets it wrongly.³¹ This exchange of arguments is important because it throws enough light on how our philosophers grappled with the rather

ticklish problem of *nirvikalpaka-savikalpaka* distinction. Thus the Buddhist came nearest to maintaining that what he called perception and defined as a sense-born *nirvikalpaka* cognition is in fact the physiological process of bare sensory experience; hence it was that so many lines of argumentation adopted by him led to the conclusion that there can be no illusory perception. For certainly, there is nothing illusory or non-illusory about bare sensory experience which just takes place when the appropriate causal aggregate is duly operative; thus, for example, the causal aggregate which includes a normal eye as a member produces the sensory experience which the post-experiential thought interprets as the perception of one moon, while the causal aggregate which includes a defective eye as a member produces the sensory experience which the post-experiential thought interprets as the perception of two moons. So when Jayanta suggests that in both these cases the concerned *nirvikalpaka* cognition cognizes one moon he is as much wrong as the Buddhist when he suggests that in the former case it cognizes one moon while in the latter case two moons. Jayanta pertinently points out that the Buddhist himself adopts another line of argumentation while explaining the case of a mistaken cognition of mirage-sands as water; thus on the latter's showing the concerned *nirvikalpaka* cognition here cognizes mirage-sands which the post-*nirvikalpaka* thought misinterprets as water, essentially the same sort of explanation as Jayanta suggests for the case of a mistaken cognition of two moons. Really, in his explanation of the mistaken cognition of x as not- x the Buddhist is bound to have a difficulty whether he maintains that here the concerned *nirvikalpaka* cognition and the post-*nirvikalpaka* thought both cognize not- x or that the former cognizes x the latter not- x ; actually, he adopts the former alternative in certain cases and calls them the cases of illusory perception (e.g. the mistaken cognition of two moons), adopts the latter alternative in certain other cases and calls them the cases of illusory thought (e.g. the mistaken cognition of mirage-sands as water). Jayanta asks the Buddhist to be consistent but mere consistency will be of no help to the latter inasmuch as both the alternatives in question are fraught with difficulty; the real solution of the problem lies in confessing that what the Buddhist calls perception is not at all a process of cognition, so that there arises no question of its being illusory or otherwise. The real merit of the Buddhist case lies in his realization that what he calls perception and what he calls thought are two distinct ways of dealing

with things; he also virtually realized that the latter alone is the process of cognizing things, but his failure to see as to what the former could be if not a process of cognizing things misled him in so many ways. Thus even while his own description of it clearly implied that what he calls perception is the physiological process of undergoing sensory experience, he went on speaking as if it is a process of cognizing things in this way or that. As for Jayanta, his criticism of the Buddhist on this score is certainly penetrating and yet his own understanding of what *nirvikalpaka* perception is is almost as useless as that of any other Naiyāyika, an understanding much inferior (because much less provocative of thought) to that evinced by even an average Buddhist.

(c) On the Kumārilite Definition of Perception

Jayanta's criticism of the Kumārilite definition of perception does not raise very many issues of a fundamental importance. For this definition is virtually the same as Jayanta's own. Thus it in essence says that perceptual cognition is that type of cognition which is born of a sense-object contact; and against it Jayanta's only criticism is that it contains no word that should eliminate from its purview the cases of erroneous or doubtful cognitions that are born of a sense-object contact.¹ In view of what he has already said about his own definition of perception the point of this criticism is easily understandable. In this connection Jayanta rejects two attempts to make good the suggested deficiency. Thus it is so possible to interpret the proposed definition that instead of saying 'born of a sense-object contact' one says 'born of a proper sense-object contact', and the opponent feels that on this understanding this definition will not remain open to Jayanta's criticism; but Jayanta argues that since a sense-object contact is something open to observation this way of meeting his criticism is not justified, an argument which is unnecessarily round about, for his simple contention ought to be that the properness in question must be explicitly mentioned in the definition itself.² Another rather forced way of interpreting the proposed definition is such that instead of saying 'cognition which is born of a sense-object contact' one says 'cognition of *x* which is born of a sense-organ's contact with *x*', and the opponent feels that on this understanding this definition will eliminate the cases of erroneous cognition; but Jayanta emphasizes that even then the cases of doubtful cognition will remain un-eliminated.³ However, these preliminary skirmishes do not constitute the heart of Jayanta's criticism of the Kumārilite definition

of perception; for what he is now onwards preoccupied with is another important aspect of the Kumārilite understanding of the phenomenon of perception. Thus the Kumārilite submits that he is not interested in offering a fool-proof definition of perception but in just arguing that since all perception is born of a sense-organ's contact with a present object no perception can grasp what constitutes one's religious duty, a duty enjoined by such imperative Vedic sentences as 'One ought to perform *yajña*', 'One ought to offer donation', 'One ought to perform *homa*' and not confined to some one period of time.⁴ Obviously, the argument was theologically motivated but it involved an important question of logic, viz. whether it is possible for perceptual cognition to take place without a sense-organ coming in contact with the object concerned. Really, even the Nyāyasūtra definition of perception should rule out such a possibility, but in the course of time the Naiyāyikas began to grant it. And so Jayanta finds fault with the present Kumārilite argument on the basis of considerations that are largely sophistical.

Jayanta begins by asking the Kumārilite as to whose perception it is that is incapable of grasping religious duty; for the former himself would concede that an ordinary man's perception is incapable of that, it being his understanding that things past, future, distant, etc. are grasped by the extraordinary perception of a *yogin* or the like.⁵ However, if the Kumārilite says that a *yogin*'s perception is incapable of grasping things past, etc. Jayanta would retort that one not believing in the possibility of yogic perception has no right to argue anything about yogic perception, a sophistry made possible because of the Kumārilite's own faulty understanding that in an inference the subject of the thesis proposed must be a thing whose reality is granted by both the parties to dispute.⁶ The Kumārilite pleads that his argument is of the form of pointing out an undesirable contingency that follows in case the possibility of yogic perception is granted, a procedure not requiring that he himself believes in the possibility of yogic perception; Jayanta retorts that the procedure in question is logically impermissible, again a sophistry based on some queer understanding of Jayanta as to the nature of inference.⁷ And then granting the tenability of this procedure Jayanta taunts: "How will you establish the invariable concomitance that all perception is incapable of grasping things past, etc. ? For in case you can do that you are yourself a veritable *yogin* who says things about perceptions that are past,

future, distant, etc.''.⁸ Here again Jayanta is indulging in a sophistry based on the mistaken belief that in an inference the relation of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum is established as a result of actually perceiving all the cases where this probans and this probandum are found. After so much negative criticism of the Kumārilite's argument Jayanta proceeds to positively establish that a *yogin* can perceive things past etc. In this connection his simple contention is that such a perception is not impossible just as it is not impossible that unlike an ordinary man a cat sees things in darkness, the legendary vulture-prince Samṛpāti (a Rāmāyaṇa character) saw things lying at a distance of hundred *yojanas*.⁹ The opponent does not dispute the validity of Jayanta's contention proper, but he goes on to submit that a religious duty is not at all a possible object of perceptual cognition; Jayanta, again citing those two illustrative cases, retorts that though not an object of an ordinary man's perceptual cognition a religious duty can well be an object of a *yogin*'s perceptual cognition.¹⁰ The Kumārilite pleads that it is in the very nature of things impossible for a perceptual cognition to grasp a religious duty which is necessarily of the form of an obligation not confined to a particular period of time; Jayanta's retort : "This talk about a religious duty not being confined to a particular period of time is senseless. What has to be learnt here is that such and such a religious performance leads to such and such a result, just as physical motion leads to a thing's contact with a new space-point. And learning this much is possible on the part of a *yogin*'s sense-organs though not on the part of an ordinary man's sense-organs."¹¹ Jayanta's point is that basing himself on an extraordinary sense-perception a *yogin* established the relation of invariable concomitance between a religious performance and its future result. Then relenting a bit Jayanta concedes that this relation of invariable concomitance is established not through a perception on the part of external sense-organ but through that on the part of *manas*; but he still insists that what is here had is a case of perception, just like the case of a man in excessive mental excitement 'seeing' before his eyes things which are not present there.¹² Jayanta concedes that the illustrative case is a case of hallucination but that does not disturb him, his point being that it is nevertheless a case of 'seeing' brought about through *manas*.¹³ The point is made clear by emphasizing that such a 'seeing' is made possible through a repeated meditation over the object concerned.¹⁴

The Kumārilite submits that even the repeated performance of an act should not lead to a limitless result, just as no amount of repeated exercise of long-jump should enable one to cross the ocean.¹⁵ Jayanta replies : "The repeated exercise of long-jump simply removes certain disabilities of the body which is thus enabled to undertake a somewhat longer jump but no jump beyond a limit. On the other hand, the repeated exercise of cognitive act brings about a cumulative result which in principle knows no limit."¹⁶ As a matter of fact, inspite of all that Jayanta says the idea that a past or a future thing can be made an object of external sense-perception remains a fantastic idea; (as for the cited case of 'internal' perception it is simply no case of sense-perception but pure hallucination). Sensing this Jayanta lastly makes a valiant effort to vindicate the possibility of the perception of a future thing, this time citing the case of a man saying 'my brother will come home tomorrow' and his brother actually coming home the next day; this according to Jayanta is a case of what he calls 'intuitive cognition'.¹⁷ In this connection Jayanta's central point is that intuitive cognition is a type of perceptual cognition inasmuch as it is a cognition brought about through a sense-organ; but the sense-organ he has in mind is the internal sense-organ called *manas*.¹⁸ So what Jayanta succeeds in proving is that one can imagine one's brother coming home next day; but imagining is not a case of cognizing for the simple reason that a cognition must be capable of proving true or false while there is just no sense in saying that an imagination is capable of proving true or false. Jayanta argues that in the cited case the concerned intuitive cognition is proved true when one's brother actually comes home the next day; and he hastens to insist that that would not be a matter of chance-coincidence.¹⁹ Really, that cannot but be a matter of chance-coincidence. One can doubtless anticipate a future event and the anticipation can well prove true or false; but anticipation is a case of inference and Jayanta's very point is that the case in question is not a case of inference, etc. but a case of perception.²⁰ Jayanta also seeks to prove that intuitive cognition is a cognition produced by the object concerned, but we know that on the question as to how a cognition is produced by its object his understanding is very much confused. For he simply has no realization that in cognition-situation the only element that can be said to be produced by the object concerned is the concerned bare sensory experience. Thus here he laboriously argues that the intuitive cognition

in question is a cognition produced by the brother to come home the next day because this brother is after all in existence at the time when this cognition takes place.²¹ As a matter of fact, a past or a future object can produce nothing at present, and so not being in a position to produce bare sensory experience it is in no position to become an object of perceptual cognition. Jayanta does consider the Kumārilite's objection that what is not present cannot be an object of perceptual cognition, but he dismisses it as invalid on the ground that the latter himself elsewhere says that when an object is perceived it is perceived as a long-standing object.²² Actually, the Kumārilite has only argued that the continuous perception of an object proves that this object is not momentary; this argument might be invalid but it does not imply that a past or a future thing can be an object of perception. Be that as it may, Jayanta concludes that a *yogin* can perceive future religious duty just as one can perceive one's brother coming home the next day.²³ Nay, he now contends that a *yogin* can be omniscient even. The Kumārilite objects : "If a *yogin* perceives all future things at once he must simultaneously perceive all sorts of mutually contradictory things that are likely to occur sometime or other; if he perceives them one after another his perception should never come to an end."²⁴ Jayanta replies : "The *yogin* perceives all future things at once while the simultaneous perception of mutually contradictory things is not an impossibility, just like the perception of a variegated patch of colour, or like the simultaneous perception of hot sunshine over head and ice-cold water under feet."²⁵ The Kumārilite asks : "Then how does a *yogin* differ from God whose speciality too lies in being omniscient?"²⁶ Jayanta replies : "Omniscience in God is something natural; the same in a *yogin* is something acquired."²⁷ The Kumārilite objects : "But a religious duty can be learnt from Vedas alone, so that even a *yogin* cannot learn it in any other way;"²⁸ Jayanta replies : "No, the *yogin* does learn it in another way. Moreover, Vedas themselves are composed by God, so that it is in the very nature of things impossible for God to acquire from Vedas the knowledge of a religious duty."²⁹ This way the polemic has entered another field altogether, a field covered by Jayanta in the course of his treatment of verbal testimony.

(d) On the Sāṅkhya Definition of Perception

Jayanta closes his section on perception with a very brief critical reference to the Sāṅkhya definition of perception. According to this

definition as formulated by Īśvarakṛṣṇa perception is of the nature of the ascertainment of the object concerned; Jayanta objects that this definition would apply to inference, etc. as well inasmuch as they too are after all of the nature of the ascertainment of the object concerned.¹ Some commentator understood this definition to say that perception is of the nature of the ascertainment of a front-lying object; Jayanta objects that on this understanding too the definition would apply to inference, etc. inasmuch as they too are often of the nature of the ascertainment of a front-lying object.² Then Jayanta independently observes : "So far as lucidity is concerned it is present there in all cognition in respect of the object concerned."³ This implies that somebody had defined perception as a cognition that is lucid in character, a well known procedure of the Buddhists and one that amounts to dogmatically asserting that perception is perception; so understandable is Jayanta's present dissatisfaction with this procedure. Lastly Jayanta considers the following plea offered by the Sāṅkhya philosopher : "Ascertainment of the object concerned is what is common to all types of cognition, so that the non-perceptual types of cognition can be defined by adding appropriate qualifications to the present definition of perception;"⁴ Jayanta retorts : "Then why at all offer a definition of perception and not say that perception is that type of cognition which is different from the so many non-perceptual types of cognition."⁵ Here too Jayanta's attitude is understandable.

SECTION TWO : INFERENCE

Having completed his treatment of the problem of perception Jayanta takes up the problem of inference. Here too he bases himself on the relevant Nyāyasūtra aphorism but here too his treatment of the problem is highly independent. However, in connection with the problem of inference one more point is to be noted. For as things stood certain important topics connected with this problem Jayanta was bound to discuss elsewhere. E.g., *avayava* and *hetvābhāsa* are two independent Nyāya *padārthas*, the former meaning 'the steps to be employed while offering inference in the course of a debate', the latter meaning 'pseudo-probans'; and these two important topics connected with the problem of inference Jayanta discusses while coming to cover

the two Nyāya *padārthas* in question. With this much kept in mind his present section on inference can be conveniently divided into five sub-sections as follows :

- (a) the fivefold nature of a probans
- (b) the problem of invariable concomitance
- (c) vindicating the possibility of inference
- (d) the Nyāyasūtra definition of inference
- (e) the cognition of time and space

Below these subsections are considered in this very order.

(a) The Fivefold Nature of a Probans

The question as to whether the nature of a probans is threefold or fivefold was forced by the Buddhist on the Naiyāyika who had no independent tradition of discussing this question. Thus on the Buddhist's showing a valid probans must exhibit the following three characteristics :

- (i) presence in the *pakṣa*
- (ii) presence in a *sapakṣa*
- (iii) absence in all *vipakṣa*;

again, on his showing a proposed probans is a pseudo-probans (invalid probans) belonging to one of the three types in case it fails to exhibit one of the above three characteristics. Thus a pseudo-probans of the type *asiddha* fails to exhibit the first characteristic, that of the type *viruddha* the second, that of the type *anaikāntika* the third. As against this, the Naiyāyikas had the tradition of positing five types of pseudo-probans which included these three plus two more, viz. *bādhita* and *satpratīpakṣa*; of these two, the former stood contradicted by the testimony of perception etc., the latter by the testimony of an inference. Hence in later times the Naiyāyikas, obviously imitating the Buddhist's corresponding procedure, began to say that a valid probans must exhibit the following five characteristics :

- (i) presence in the *pakṣa*
- (ii) presence in a *sapakṣa*
- (iii) absence in all *vipakṣa*
- (iv) no cancellation on the part of perception etc.
- (v) no counterbalancing on the part of an inference;

similarly, they began to say that a proposed probans is a pseudo-probans belonging to one of the five types in case it fails to exhibit

one of the above five characteristics. Thus in their scheme of things a pseudo-probans of the type *asiddha* fails to exhibit the first characteristic, that of the type *viruddha* the second, that of the type *anaikāntika* the third, that of the type *bādhita* the fourth, that of the type *satpratipakṣa* the fifth. This is how the Buddhist thesis on a threefold nature of probans and the Nyāya thesis on a fivefold nature of probans came to be pitted against each other. [In both cases – particularly in the latter case – the finally emergent thesis betrayed marks of an earlier undergone course of evolution, and some aspects of the matter we too will have to take into consideration. But it will be conducive to clarity if comparison is made between these two theses as they stood in their final form.] Let us follow Jayanta's presentation of the controversy.

Jayanta begins by defining inference as 'that cognition relating to the probandum not in contact with a sense-organ which emerges when the probans exhibiting a fivefold nature is grasped and there is recalled a relevant relation of invariable concomitance obtaining between the probans and the probandum'.¹ Then employing the language of '*pramāṇa* and *pramāṇaphala*,' he tells us that in this case the knowledge of the probans (or the probans as known) along with the memory of an invariable concomitance acts as *pramāṇa*, the knowledge of the probandum acts as *pramāṇaphala*;² but that is not much important. Really important is the next given account of the five characteristics of a valid probans, accompanied by an account of how a proposed probans is a pseudo-probans belonging to one of the five types when it fails to exhibit one of these five characteristics.³ This account ends with the declaration that if a probans exhibits the five characteristics in question the needed relation of invariable concomitance stands established.⁴ Really, the first characteristic has nothing to do with invariable concomitance while the remaining ones must have to do with invariable concomitance. Now the Buddhist is of the view that what a valid probans requires in addition to the first characteristic are just the two characteristics posited by him and not the four posited by the Naiyāyika; but since the first three characteristics are common to both the schemes the Buddhist is in effect saying that the fourth and fifth characteristics posited by the Naiyāyika are not necessary for the establishment of an invariable concomitance, his point being that if a probans exhibits the second and third characteristics it cannot fail to exhibit the fourth and fifth.

In Jayanta's presentation the Buddhist remains silent about the fifth characteristic but a long polemic is waged by him against the latter's contention that the fourth characteristic posited by the Naiyāyika is redundant.⁵ The polemic is revealing in so many ways. Thus on Jayanta's showing the following is an inference where the probans exhibits the first three characteristics but not the fourth : "The composite fire is not-hot, because it is a produced entity, just like a jar"; (by 'composite fire' is understood the visible fire supposed to be made up of fire-atoms which are invisible and are not a produced entity).⁶ Here probans is the feature 'being a produced entity', probandum the feature 'being not-hot', *pakṣa* the thing 'composite fire', *sapakṣa* 'anything that is not-hot', *vipakṣa* 'anything that is hot'; and the following is how the probans is supposed to exhibit the first three characteristics but not the fourth :

(1) It exhibits the first feature because the composite fire is a produced entity.

(2) It exhibits the second feature because there are homologue instances (i.e. not-hot things), e.g. a jar, which are found to be a produced entity.

(3) It exhibits the third feature because there are no heterologue instances (i.e. hot things) which are found to be a produced entity.

(4) It fails to exhibit the fourth feature because perception reveals that the composite fire is hot.

As against all this the Buddhist raises several objections. He even says that the probans in question fails to exhibit the first characteristic,⁷ but that is a secondary and a rather technical matter. For the Sanskrit word *pakṣa* means the thesis of an inference as also the locus of an inference; and when as exhibiting the first characteristic a probans is said to exist in the *pakṣa* the word has the second meaning. This means that the probans in question exhibits the first characteristic all right inasmuch as composite fire is here the locus of inference and this locus does possess the feature 'being a produced entity'. But the Buddhist has a technical theory about *pakṣa* understood as the thesis of an inference, a theory according to which a thesis that stands contradicted by perception is a pseudo-*pakṣa*. In this sense the Buddhist would say that the inference in question has a *pakṣa* which is a pseudo-*pakṣa*. And then he says that the probans in question fails to exhibit the first characteristic because here there is no genuine *pakṣa* to which this

probans might belong; but in this statement the word *pakṣa* is given the first meaning while the meaning required is the second meaning. For the rest, the Buddhist hammers the point that the probans in question fails to exhibit the second and third characteristics, and that is important. Thus he says that in order to exhibit the second characteristic a probans must be such that wherever it exists the probandum must exist while in the present case fire itself is the thing where the probans exists but not the probandum.⁸ To this is added that since the third characteristic follows when the second is already exhibited here there can be no question of the former being exhibited because here there is not exhibited the latter.⁹ Then it is argued that since a heterologue instance is a thing which lacks the probandum, fire itself is a heterologue instance in the present case, so that the probans here exists in a heterologue instance and thus fails to exhibit the third characteristic.¹⁰ These three observations are of a crucial importance though there yet follows a fourth which too is somehow revealing. Thus the Naiyāyika is addressed as follows: "And how will you be sure that the probans does not stand contradicted by perception, etc.? For the observation of a few cases will not generate the needed surity while the observation of all the cases should be possible only on the part of a *yogin*."¹¹ Thus on the Buddhist's showing the second characteristic does not mean that the probans is found to exist in one or two homologue instances but that wherever the probans is found to exist is a homologue instance. In other words, he is saying that the second characteristic is not that the probans must exist in a *sapakṣa* but that the probans must exist in a *sapakṣa* alone. Then is to be noted his contention that the third characteristic follows when the second has already been exhibited; his meaning ought to be that the second characteristic as understood by him is identical with the third. For the third characteristic is that the probans must be absent in all *vipakṣa* but to say that the probans must exist in a *sapakṣa* alone (the meaning given to the second characteristic by the Buddhist) is already to say that the probans must be absent in all *vipakṣa* (the meaning unanimously given to the third characteristic). Lastly is to be noted the Buddhist's understanding that a thing lacking the probandum is to be called a *vipakṣa* even in case it happens to be the *pakṣa*. This understanding makes sense in one context, makes no sense in another. Thus if it is maintained that invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum is established on the basis of enumerating

cases where the two are present or absent the opponent has a right to say to the Buddhist : "Leave aside the *pakṣa* which is a disputed case. But then point out a case where the probans is present while the probandum absent." On the other hand, if it is maintained that invariable concomitance is established not on the basis of enumerating cases but on the basis of certain principles then the Buddhist has a right to say to the opponent : "In the light of that principle it is proved that where your probans is present your probandum might be present or might not be present. And here it is irrelevant as to what your *pakṣa* happens to be." The first procedure was the usual procedure of the Indian logicians, that being the reason why it was always granted that while examining the validity of a proposed invariable concomitance the *pakṣa* must be left outside the purview, the second procedure was the Buddhist's novelty though he too frequently succumbed to the pressure of the first. For example, in Jayanta's representation the Buddhist is speaking as if invariable concomitance between the features 'being a produced entity' and 'being not-hot' is established on the basis of enumerating cases and yet declaring that it is irrelevant as to what here happens to be *pakṣa*; (a confusion of this sort is not being foisted by Jayanta on the Buddhist but is to be met with in the Buddhist texts themselves). But the Buddhist's real position would be better appreciated if it is constantly kept in mind that according to him invariable concomitance is established on the basis of certain fixed principles. In the next subsection of this section on inference Jayanta himself is going to devote to this very question and there we would learn that this way of looking at the problem of invariable concomitance was one of the most conspicuous features of the Buddhist theory of inference. The important thing to realize is that the Buddhist's thesis on a threefold nature of probans – particularly his understanding of the second and third characteristics – has to be appreciated in the light of this way of looking at the problem of invariable concomitance. Thus we have found the Buddhist arguing that the second characteristic means not that the probans has been found to coexist with the probandum in one or two *sapakṣas* but that it should be found to coexist with the probandum in *sapakṣas* alone, a demand that cannot be fulfilled if invariable concomitance is to be established on the basis of enumerating cases. The point becomes further clear when we find the Buddhist arguing that the second and third characteristics mean one and the same thing; for about the third

characteristic it was vaguely realized by everybody that its presence in a probans cannot be demonstrated on the basis of enumerating cases. Certainly, on the basis of enumerating cases one cannot establish that the probans is absent in all *vīpakṣas*, and it was as a result of seriously taking into consideration this circumstance that the Buddhist came out with the thesis that invariable concomitance has to be established on the basis of certain fixed principles, a thesis which his opponents like Jayanta failed to appreciate even in case their own understanding of the third characteristic was virtually the same as the Buddhist's. That the Buddhist should equate the second and third characteristic was a natural corollary of this understanding, for in the form that the probans must coexist with the probandum in one or two *sāpakṣas* this characteristic was practically useless. The anti-Buddhist logicians, on the other hand, were prevented from sharing this realization partly because of a lack of clear vision, partly because they found that the Buddhist himself was emphatic that in spite of everything the second and third characteristics were after all two separate characteristics; (as a matter of fact, a separate mention of the second and third characteristics on the part of the Buddhist was a hangover of that very common tradition of Indian logicians from which he was so strenuously seeking to break loose). Even presenting the Buddhist as reported by Jayanta gives an inkling into this aspect of the matter but in a rather narrow context. Thus he is made to argue that it should be impossible for the Naiyāyika to be sure that the probans is not contradicted by perception, etc. because an observation of several relevant instances will be of no avail while an observation of all such instances should be impossible. His real point ought to be that what is required is to establish on the basis of certain principles an invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum, so that there will remain no need to be sure that the presence of the probandum in the *pakṣa* is not contradicted by perception etc. (Here difficulty arises from an obscure side. For the Buddhist himself maintained that a thesis is to be dismissed as pseudo-thesis in case it is contradicted by perception, etc.—as if this can and should be done without examining the concerned invariable concomitance.) All this should help us in following Jayanta's criticism of the Buddhist's position here laid down.

Jayanta first considers the Buddhist's objection that in connection with the inference under examination when one proceeds to see

whether wherever the probans exists the probandum also exists one notices that the *pakṣa* itself is a thing where the probans exists but not the probandum.¹² Jayanta understands the Buddhist to mean that in an inference it is required that all those cases be observed where the probans and the probandum exist together, and then retorts that on this logic all inference should be a futile performance inasmuch as now regarding every relevant locus it is already known beforehand that it possesses the probans as well as the probandum; for example, on this logic there should be no need to infer in a locus fire from smoke inasmuch as now it must already be known beforehand that this locus possesses smoke as well as fire. Jayanta's point is that in an inference what is required is the general assurance that wherever the probans exists the probandum also exists; e.g. in order to infer in a locus fire from smoke what is required is the general assurance that wherever smoke exists fire also exists. As a matter of fact, Jayanta's point is the Buddhist's own point but the latter has rendered himself open to Jayanta's attack by speaking as if an invariable concomitance is established on the basis of enumerating cases. For the 'general assurance' Jayanta refers to can be had only in case it is recognized that invariable concomitance is established on the basis of certain principles, a recognition present in the Buddhist and absent in Jayanta. Thus one has general assurance that wherever smoke exists fire also exists because one knows that the two are causally related while wherever an effect exists the cause must also exist; this is the Buddhist's explanation and not that of Jayanta whose present talk of 'general assurance' hangs in the air, so to say. This should become further clear from Jayanta's explanation of the inference under examination. Thus he says that one has general assurance that whatever is a produced entity is not-hot, without caring as to what is the case with fire (which happens to be the *pakṣa* concerned).¹³ As a matter of fact, the general assurance Jayanta here has in mind is fictitious, it being based on no principle but on the clever choice of a *pakṣa* so that no thing except this *pakṣa* possesses the concerned probans and probandum both. As Jayanta himself soon smugly notes: "Fire-atoms are the only hot thing besides composite fire, but they are not a produced entity. And if one denies that there exist any fire-atoms then all the better. For then no thing is hot besides composite fire, so that there arises no question of seeing whether a thing besides composite-fire is or is not a produced entity."¹⁴ The Buddhist suspects

something fishy about Jayanta's performance, for he rightly feels that the alleged invariable concomitance between 'being a produced entity' and 'being not-hot' is based on no principle. So having in mind the obvious fact that fire is something hot he protests to Jayanta : "But here fire itself is a *vipakṣa* (= something lacking the probandum)"; Jayanta retorts : "The *pakṣa* (= the locus of inference) itself cannot be a *vipakṣa* also."¹⁵ The Buddhist's point is that while establishing an invariable concomitance nothing whatsoever – not even the *pakṣa* – can be treated as an exception; Jayanta's point is that here the *pakṣa* has to be treated as an exception. This shows how superficial Jayanta's understanding was when he recently insisted that in an inference what is required is the general assurance that wherever the probans exists the probandum also exists. For it is difficult to see what sort of general assurance one has while saying 'whatever is a produced entity is not-hot'. Really, since fire is the only hot thing there one can easily counter this statement by asking : "Why should fire not be a produced entity ?" The understanding behind this interrogation is that in all inference a reason must be offered why the probans must not exist where the probandum does not exist, a characteristic Buddhist understanding. Jayanta on the other hand feels no need to indulge in the interrogation in question; that is why his submission that in the inference under examination the probans exhibits the third characteristic sounds so hollow. For this probans can exhibit the third characteristic only if it can be shown that a produced entity cannot be hot. Really, Jayanta is banking on the idea that in an inference invariable concomitance is established on the basis of enumerating cases while he has a right to demand that the *pakṣa* must be kept outside the purview of this enumeration. As we have already noted, this was the usual idea entertained by our logicians and the Buddhist himself often succumbed to it. Hence it is that in the subsequent exchange of arguments presently reported the Buddhist falters not unoften. Thus he clarifies his point as follows : "Since a thing cannot have two natures there is really nothing like a *pakṣa*; for if a thing possesses the probandum it is a *sapakṣa*, if it lacks the probandum it is a *vipakṣa*."¹⁶ This is a confused way of saying that while establishing an invariable concomitance nothing can be treated as an exception on the plea that it happens to be the *pakṣa*. Exploiting the confusion Jayanta lectures the Buddhist : "True, a thing cannot have two natures; but all inference requires a *pakṣa*. As a matter of fact, it is in relation to a *pakṣa* that

things are called *sapakṣa* or *vipakṣa*.¹⁷ This is a clearer way of pleading that while establishing an invariable concomitance the *pakṣa* must be treated as an exception. Further exploiting the Buddhist's confusion Jayanta argues : "If the *pakṣa* can be treated as a *vipakṣa* on the ground that it lacks the probandum then even the ordinary inference in a mountain of fire from smoke should be impossible; for after all the mountain is not known to possess fire. Nor can it be argued that the existence of fire in the mountain is doubtful while (in the inference under examination) the existence of hotness in fire certain. For a probans becomes invalid even in case it is found to exist in a suspected *vipakṣa*. The conclusion is that the *pakṣa* must not be treated as a *vipakṣa*."¹⁸ Really, the Buddhist was handicapped owing to the tradition which sharply distinguished from one another a *pakṣa*, a *sapakṣa*, a *vipakṣa* and understood the third characteristic of a probans as absence in all *vipakṣa* as thus sharply demarcated from *pakṣa*. For owing to his new way of looking at the problem the Buddhist badly needed a word for 'a thing lacking the probandum' and a word for 'a thing possessing the probandum', it being immaterial that either of these things also happened to be the *pakṣa*; (as a matter of fact, in a valid inference the *pakṣa* is proved to be 'a thing possessing the probandum', in an invalid one 'a thing lacking the probandum', but as such this *pakṣa* is neither one nor the other of these two things). Hence it was that when he used the word *sapakṣa* for 'a thing possessing the probandum' and the word *vipakṣa* for 'a thing lacking the probandum' he found himself involved in confusions of all sorts. On the other hand, a logician like Jayanta who was alien to the new way of thinking evolved by the Buddhist found himself favoured by the traditional terminology in all sorts of ways.

Lastly, Jayanta considers two objections raised by the Buddhist that are of a secondary importance. Thus the Buddhist has argued that since in the inference under examination the *pakṣa* is a pseudo-*pakṣa*, the probans concerned fails to exhibit the first characteristic; and as we have seen, that argument involves a confusion between two meanings of the word '*pakṣa*', a confusion noted by Jayanta in his own way.¹⁹ Understanding the word *pakṣa* to mean 'thesis' the Buddhist submits that in the inference under examination the *pakṣa* is pseudo-*pakṣa* inasmuch as the thesis to be proved is contradicted by perception; Jayanta concedes the point but adds that the fault of the thesis here also vitiates the probans, so that what we are here

having is a new type of pseudo-probans as well. As a matter of fact, the inference in question was considered to be invalid by both the Buddhist and Jayanta, but taking advantage of the traditional understanding of the concepts *pakṣa*, *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* Jayanta could show that the probans here satisfies the second and third characteristics, that is, that the concerned invariable concomitance is here valid; on the other hand, the Buddhist felt that the probans here does not exhibit the second and third characteristics but since the traditional terminology stood in his way he could not convincingly demonstrate his point. Thus the Buddhist was unable to say that the probans in question is a pseudo-probans of the type *viruddha* or *anaikāntika*, the two types traditionally supposed to be related to the second and third characteristics respectively; and taking advantage of the Buddhist's discomfiture Jayanta suggested that the probans in question is a new type of pseudo-probans called *bādhita*. Then the Buddhist had another tradition of calling certain types of thesis pseudo-thesis and he found that in the inference in question the thesis is a type of a pseudo-thesis inasmuch as it stands contradicted by perception. Thus the same reason which impelled the Buddhist to call the inference in question a case of one type of pseudo-thesis impelled Jayanta to call it a case of the *bādhita* type of pseudo-probans. The Naiyāyika had no tradition of positing and classifying pseudo-thesis but Jayanta saw no harm in conceding that in the inference in question the thesis is a wrong type of thesis, provided the Buddhist conceded in return that here the probans too is a wrong type of probans. Really, the Buddhist's concept of pseudo-thesis is of no logical importance (and in fact a product of much confusion), and so he thought that he must prove to Jayanta that in the inference in question the probans is a type of pseudo-probans recognized in Buddhist logic. Hence resorting to a quibble he contended that this probans fails to exhibit the first characteristic inasmuch as this characteristic requires that the probans exists in the *pakṣa* while here the *pakṣa* is a pseudo-*pakṣa* (the former word *pakṣa* meaning 'locus of inference', the latter 'thesis of an inference'); the Buddhist point is that as thus understood the probans in question is an *asiddha* type of pseudo-probans, a type supposed to be related to the first characteristic. Jayanta sees through the game and simply points out that this probans is not an *asiddha* type of pseudo-probans because it does exist in the *pakṣa* (= locus of inference).²⁰ His own point is that this probans is a new type of pseudo-

probans related to the fourth characteristic, a point of doubtful validity made possible because the traditional terminology favoured his rather than the Buddhist's understanding of the second and third characteristics. Then Jayanta answers the Buddhist's query as to how one would be sure that the probans does not stand contradicted by perception etc. Jayanta first retorts by way of posing a counter-query : "And how would one be sure that the thesis does not stand contradicted by perception etc. and so is not a case of pseudo-thesis ?"²¹ Really, the Buddhist's concept of pseudo-thesis is as much misconceived as Jayanta's concept of the *bādhita* type of pseudo-probans. For both are based on the common faulty understanding that in order to examine the validity or otherwise of an inference something else has to be done besides seeing as to whether the probans concerned does or does not exhibit the three characteristics. In this connection the Buddhist has contended that a case by case observation will not demonstrate whether the probans concerned is or is not contradicted by perception etc.; but this should only mean that such observation will not establish the concerned invariable concomitance. For otherwise Jayanta is right in submitting that the difficulty thus urged against his concept of the *bādhita* type of pseudo-probans equally vitiates the Buddhist's own concept of thesis-contradicted-by-perception. Jayanta also suggests a way out of this difficulty but that is just no way. For he says that a probans 'has to be treated as practically non-contradicted if no contradiction on the part of perception etc. is detected even after a long effort.'²² Really, all effort should be made to establish the concerned invariable concomitance, so that no independent effort is required in order to observe whether the probans concerned does or does not receive contradiction on the part of perception etc. Fortunately, the problem of invariable concomitance itself is discussed by Jayanta in his next sub-section to which we turn next.

(b) The Problem of Invariable Concomitance

It is admitted on all hands that all inference requires that there must obtain between the concerned probans and probandum a relation in virtue of which the probans is probans the probandum is probandum. It is this relation that we have been calling 'invariable concomitance', and it is this which Jayanta calls *vyāpti*, (lit. pervasion), *avinābhāva* (lit. absence in the absence of), *nityasāhacarya* (lit. invariable concomitance).¹ The etymology of these so many words is interesting, but the real question is as to what conditions *x* and *y* must fulfill so

that they might enter into a relation of invariable concomitance, that is, so that x might act as probans, y as probandum. Jayanta answers this question by way of criticising the corresponding Buddhist answer which he tauntingly characterizes as 'subtle-witted' in contrast to his own 'gross-witted' one.² Jayanta's point is that it should suffice to say that the relation between the probans and probandum is the relation of invariable concomitance while the Buddhist further demands that one must precisely define the conditions that make possible this relation of invariable concomitance.³ To Jayanta the demand seems unwarranted, and hence his taunt. Any way, the Buddhist is of the view that x can act as a probans for inferring y only in case either x is identical with y or x is produced by y ; e.g. the feature 'being *Śimśapā* (a tree)' is identical with the feature 'being tree' and hence the former feature is a valid probans for inferring the latter feature while smoke is produced by fire and hence smoke is a valid probans for inferring fire, his point being that a feature cannot be present there unless there is also present the feature with which the former feature is identical, while an effect cannot be present there unless there is also present the cause which has produced this effect.⁴ Jayanta feels that it is impossible to thus reduce to just two types all invariable concomitance whatsoever, and he is particularly critical of the Buddhist's thesis on 'identity', a thesis he examines in great details; (besides, he briefly criticizes the Buddhist thesis on 'causation' and then demonstrates how so many additional types of invariable concomitance are equally possible).

Jayanta begins by arguing that if x and y are identical with each other it is in the very nature of things impossible for x to act as a probans for inferring y , his point being that the probans and probandum must be different from each other.⁵ The Buddhist pleads: "Even if x and y are identical with each other it might become necessary to infer y from x because there has been a false conceptual superimposition concealing the nature of y as y "; Jayanta retorts: "If the nature of y has been already grasped then there is no question of any false conceptual superimposition concealing this nature. Certainly, if the bodily parts of a man are recognized to be what they are then there is no question of mistaking him for a not-man. In any case, there is no question of mistaking the nature of y if x and y are identical while x has been already grasped."⁶ Then it is argued that it might be possible for one to recognize a thing as tree though not as *Śimśapā*

but it is impossible for one to recognize a thing as *Śimsapā* though not as tree.⁷ Lastly, it is argued that if x and y are identical with each other then either might act as a probans for inferring the other.⁸ Jayanta's polemic yet goes on but it should be useful to take stock of what he has already said. Really, in the present context when the Buddhist says that the probans and probandum are identical with each other what he means is that they are two features of an identical object. This is a misleading use of the word 'identical' but that is no reason why one should not keep in mind this strictly technical use of the word. Thus are answered all those parts of Jayanta's criticism which presuppose that in the present context the Buddhist is saying that the probans and probandum are identical with each other in a literal sense of the term. Even so, Jayanta has a right to ask the Buddhist : "An object naturally possesses so many features which on your showing are all identical with each other; why then is it that not all these features are a probans for inferring each other ?" And unless this question is answered satisfactorily it is immaterial whether Jayanta takes the word 'identical' in its literal sense or in its Buddhist technical sense. The Buddhist actually maintains that when x and y are two such features of an object that the presence of x necessitates the presence of y without needing any further cause then x is a probans for inferring y ; (the technical name for this type of probans is *svabhāva-hetu* and for the type of inference concerned *svabhāva-anumāna*). This way of putting matters somewhat obscures the great significance of the Buddhist's own thesis that all inference is either a case of *svabhāva-anumāna* or a case of *kārya-anumāna*, the thesis presently under attack from the side of Jayanta. For as a matter of fact, the Buddhist has distinguished between the cases of inference where one feature of a thing acts as probans for inferring another feature of this thing and those where one thing acts as probans for inferring another thing, the former being called cases of *svabhāva-anumāna* and the latter those of *kārya-anumāna*. Now the latter cases are called cases of *kārya-anumāna* because here the concerned invariable concomitance is established on the basis of a causal experimentation which reveals that the thing acting as probans is an effect of the thing acting as probandum; on the other hand, the former are a different type of cases which are likely to be confused with the latter if defined in the way the Buddhist actually defines them. For as was just noted, he actually maintains that x is a *svabhāva-hetu* for inferring y when x is such a

feature of a thing that its presence necessitates the presence of the feature *y* in this thing without needing any further cause. As a matter of fact, *x* is a *svabhāva-hetu* for inferring *y* when *x* is such a concept that it already involves the concept *y*, this meaning that in the cases of *svabhāva-anumāna* the concerned invariable concomitance is established not (as in the cases of *kārya-anumāna*) on the basis of a causal experimentation but on the basis of a conceptual analysis which reveals that the concept acting as probans already involves the concept acting as probandum. As we know, the concept *x* involves (\equiv implies) the concept *y* when *x* is the defining character of the class *X* and *y* the defining character of the class *Y* while *X* is either a sub-class of *Y* or an equivalent class of *Y*. All this was more or less clearly present in the Buddhist's mind when he worked out his thesis on *svabhāva-anumāna*, but his terminology was faulty and he was living in the midst of adversaries for whom all this was an utterly alien line of thinking. Jayanta's present polemic is a good example of an anti-Buddhist logician's blindness to the great discovery made by the Buddhist while positing *svabhāva-anumāna* as a distinct type of inference. For example, the feature 'being *Śimśapā*' is a *svabhāva-hetu* for inferring the feature 'being tree' because conceptual analysis reveals that the concept '*Śimśapā*' already involves the concept 'tree'; Jayanta takes exception to this on the ground that one who recognizes a thing as *Śimśapā* cannot fail to recognize it as tree, so that there is no question of the feature 'being *Śimśapā*' acting as a probans for inferring the feature 'being tree'. Jayanta's point is that while inferring fire from smoke – the Indian logician's model case – one is certain about the presence of smoke but is doubtful about the presence of fire. As a matter of fact, there might be all sorts of psychological motives for inferring fire from smoke as for inferring the feature 'being tree' from the feature 'being *Śimśapā*', but that is a logically irrelevant consideration and the real question is whether inferences based on a conceptual analysis are not a distinct class of inferences. Really, most inferences considered by our logicians were inferences based on a conceptual analysis even if their model case was an inference based on a causal experimentation. The model itself was understood confusedly so that it was virtually made out that in all inference the concerned invariable concomitance is established on the basis of a mere enumeration of cases, an understanding palpably mistaken when applied to the cases of inference based on a conceptual analysis.

Certainly, it makes no sense to argue : "This thing is called 'tree' because it is called '*Śimśapā*', it having been found on such and such an occasion that the thing called '*Śimśapā*' was called 'tree' ". Or take another illustration which Jayanta is going to take into consideration next. Thus it was unanimously admitted that whatever is a produced entity is a perishing entity, it being also understood that whatever is a perishing entity is a produced entity. But there was no question of establishing this invariable concomitance except on the basis of a conceptual analysis. The Buddhist, further emphasising that a produced entity might be produced either voluntarily or naturally, made an important use of the illustration in question with a view to elucidating his thesis on *svabhāva-anumāna*. Thus he in effect argued that the class defined by the feature 'being a produced entity' and the class defined by the feature 'being a perishing entity' are equivalent classes so that either feature is a valid probans for inferring the other; on the other hand, the class defined by the feature 'being a voluntarily produced entity' (or the class defined by the feature 'being a naturally produced entity') is a subclass of the class defined by the feature 'being a perishing entity' so that the former feature is a valid probans for inferring the latter but not *vice versa*. But Jayanta, presupposing that in a *svabhāva-anumāna* the probans and probandum must be identical with each other in a literal sense of the term enquires : "If the feature 'being a voluntarily produced entity' is a valid proban for inferring the feature 'being a perishing entity' why not *vice versa* ? And why say that the feature 'being a produced entity' is present in all those cases where the feature 'being a perishing entity' is present while the feature 'being a voluntarily produced entity' is present in only some of such cases ?" The Buddhist pleads : "There is a difference between an ordinary relation and the relation called invariable concomitance. For in the case of an ordinary relation if *x* is related to *y* then *y* too is related to *x*, but in the case of the relation called invariable concomitance if *x* is probans and *y* probandum then *x* cannot be probandum and *y* probans. Thus the feature 'being *Śimśapā*' is a probans for the feature 'being tree' but not *vice versa*, the feature 'being a voluntarily produced entity' is a probans for the feature 'being a produced entity' but not *vice versa*, just as smoke is a probans for fire but not *vice versa*."¹⁰ Jayanta replies : "But that only means that there obtains between the features in question an invariable concomitance, not an identity. Certainly, if the feature 'being tree'

were identical with the feature 'being *Śimsapā*' then just as the latter feature is not found except in a *Śimsapā* the former too should not be found except in a *Śimsapā*; but as a matter of fact, in trees like *Khadira* (a tree) etc. the former feature is found even in the absence of the latter feature. Similarly, in lightning etc. the feature 'being a perishable entity' is found in the absence of the feature 'being a voluntarily produced entity', something which would not have happened if the two features were identical with each other."¹¹ To this is added: "Since smoke and fire are different from each other, it can be said that the former acts as a probans for the latter but not *vice versa*; but that cannot be said about two features which are alleged to be identical with each other. So either give up this talk of identity or be ready to infer the feature 'being *Śimsapā*' from the feature 'being tree', the feature 'being a voluntarily produced entity' from the feature 'being a perishing entity'. There is no middle course open."¹² It can easily be seen that Jayanta has completely failed to grasp the idea lying at the back of the Buddhist's concept of *svabhāva-anumāna* though the latter's own faulty formulations on the subject are at least partly responsible for this unfortunate situation. This should become somewhat evident from the long criticism and counter-criticism in which the Buddhist and Jayanta indulge in connection with the invariable concomitance "whatever is a produced entity is a perishing entity". Thus Jayanta asks the Buddhist to prove that the features 'being a produced entity' and 'being a perishing entity' are identical with each other;¹³ the Buddhist in effect replies that since the latter feature signifies existence-associated-with-a-beginning-and-an-end while the former feature signifies existence-associated-with-a-production, the two are identical with each other inasmuch as both signify existence;¹⁴ Jayanta remains unconvinced saying that in that case the invariable concomitance in question should have the form "whatever exists exists."¹⁵ As a matter of fact, the invariable concomitance in question could not be established so cheaply as is presently attempted by the Buddhist, and he should have known it. For the famous controversy on momentarism into which the Buddhist on the one hand and the Nyāya-Mīmāṃsā philosophers on the other entered was virtually hinged on how to vindicate this very invariable concomitance. The Buddhist was provoked into undertaking the childish performance here reported because he often did talk as if in a *svabhāva-hetu* the probans and probandum are identical with each

other in a literal sense of the term. Really, the Indian philosophers were almost always engaged in offering definitions and counter-definitions and in this connection they would take extreme care to demonstrate that their cherished definitions were neither too narrow nor too wide; all this was in essence nothing but a long sustained exercise in what the Buddhist called *svabhāva-anumāna*. Be that as it may, Jayanta next assails the Buddhist concept of *kārya-anumāna*.

Jayanta's criticism of the Buddhist thesis on *kārya-anumāna* is again based on a serious misunderstanding. Thus he begins by showing that on accepting the hypothesis of momentarism as the Buddhist does it becomes impossible to speak of anything acting as cause in relation to any other thing.¹⁶ To this is added that if smoke acts as probans for inferring fire because it is an effect produced by fire then any and every property possessed by smoke should act as a probans for inferring fire inasmuch as smoke in its entirety is produced by fire.¹⁷ The Buddhist pleads : "Even if smoke in its entirety is produced by fire, only those properties of smoke act as probans for inferring fire which are found exclusively in smoke and in all smoke"; Jayanta retorts : "In that case you should only say that there obtains between smoke and fire an invariable concomitance, not that this invariable concomitance obtains because smoke is produced by fire."¹⁸ The Buddhist pleads : "But you Naiyāyika too admit the validity of an inference where an effect acts as probans for inferring the cause concerned. Similarly, the Vaiśeṣikas have enumerated effect among the five possible things that can act as probans";¹⁹ Jayanta replies : "That Vaiśeṣika list is not exhaustive but just illustrative, there being even other things that can act as probans. As for the Naiyāyikas, admitting the validity of inferring the cause concerned from an effect, that is because there obtains between an effect and the cause concerned a relation of invariable concomitance."²⁰ To this it is added : "Certainly, there are so many things that can possibly act as probans. For example, the sunset acts as probans for the rise of stars, full moon for sea-tide, the rise of the constellation *Agastya* for the onset of autumn, the movement of ants carrying their eggs for the oncoming rains. In one word, the Buddhist should not insist in a childish manner that a probans must either be something identical with the probandum concerned or something produced by the probandum concerned."²¹ Lastly is answered the Buddhist query as to what makes possible an invariable concomitance; Jayanta in effect says : "That is a senseless

question. For one might similarly ask as to what makes possible the 'identity' or the 'production' the Buddhist speaks of in this connection."²² We have now before us a full picture of how Jayanta views the phenomenon of invariable concomitance, as also of what is his chief difficulty with the rival concept upheld by the Buddhist. Thus Jayanta repeatedly emphasizes that an invariable concomitance is just an invariable concomitance, his point being that if *x* is found to exist along with *y* in several cases and not found to exist without *y* in any case then *x* is a valid probans for inferring *y*. As a matter of fact, this was how the matter was understood by the entire camp of non-Buddhist logicians, the very terminology of Indian logic carries a clear imprint of this understanding of the matter. We have seen how an Indian logician would insist that while examining the validity of an invariable concomitance the *pakṣa* concerned must be left out of purview, the only necessary thing for him being to show that the probans concerned does not exist in a thing 'which lacks the probandum concerned but is something different from the *pakṣa* concerned'. Such an understanding of the matter precluded the possibility of the validity of an invariable concomitance being examined in the light of certain fixed principles. Really, our philosophers were primarily engaged in coining definitions related to all sorts of topics and in this task the thing to be done was to add a new word to an originally proposed definition or to subtract a word from it if it was otherwise found to be too narrow or too wide. This misled them into thinking that all invariable concomitance is established on the basis of enumerating cases. Properly speaking, all this was an exercise in what the Buddhist called *svabhāva-anumāna*, for here what was being done was to see whether the definiendum concerned does or does not fall under this class or that. As for an observation-based invariable concomitance, our philosophers were not much concerned with it, notwithstanding their model of inferring fire from smoke. Really, this model in a way aggravated the original malady, for some sort of enumeration of cases is after all undertaken while establishing invariable concomitance between smoke and fire. But about the precise nature of the enumeration-of-cases here involved our philosophers were delightfully vague; nor was their complacency at once broken when the Buddhist came to insist that this enumeration-of-cases is invariably aimed at establishing a causal relationship between the probans and probandum. Hence their Jayanta-like dogged

refusal to concede that all invariable concomitance between one thing and another is established on the basis of a causal experimentation, their point being that such an invariable concomitance is possible even between such things as are causally related in no way whatsoever. So here again what mattered with our philosophers was that cases are enumerated and an invariable concomitance established on the basis of this enumeration. However, in due course the realization did dawn on them that a really valid invariable concomitance between two things must be based on a causal consideration; and then was formulated the concept of a pseudo-probans variously designated as *aprayojaka*, *anyathāsiddha*, *sopādhika* etc. Thus an *aprayojaka-hetu* is that probans which exhibits all the three classical characteristics (let us not speak of five) and is yet invalid precisely because its relationship with the probandum concerned is not based on a causal consideration. Really, this *hetu* did not exhibit the third characteristic, but it was made to exhibit it by the time-honoured device of leaving the *pakṣa* concerned outside the purview of the concerned invariable concomitance. Be that as it may, Jayanta's present outburst is fully representative of the muddled understanding of the phenomenon of invariable concomitance, had by the entire camp of non-Buddhist logicians.

(c) Vindicating the Possibility of Inference

The problem of vindicating the possibility of inference was forced on Jayanta because in our country there were circles which, for one reason or another, stood to repudiate such possibility. Some idea of the grounds on which the repudiation was made we can form from Jayanta's presentation of the *prima facie* view which he considers worthy of refutation. The opponent begins by urging a formal difficulty against the logician's concept of inference. Thus taking his stand on the fact that in an inference the probans is supposed to exist in the *locus* concerned and to be related to the probandum concerned by way of invariable concomitance, he says : "It is impossible to point out as to what constitutes the object proper of an inferential cognition. It cannot be the probandum concerned because in that case the probans fails to fulfil the condition that it must exist in what constitutes the object of the concerned inferential cognition, it cannot be the *locus* concerned because in that case the probans fails to fulfil the condition that it must be related by way of invariable concomitance to what constitutes the object of the concerned inferential cognition, it cannot

be both the probandum concerned and the locus concerned — either taken independently or with the former qualifying the latter — because in that case the probans fails to fulfil either of the conditions in question.¹ Really, this objection is not important and is based on an exploitation of the ambiguity of the Sanskrit word *pakṣa* which means both 'the locus of an inference' and 'the thesis of an inference', so that if this word is given one of these meanings (say, the former) and another word (say, *pratijñā*) is coined to express the other meaning (i.e. the latter) the difficulty urged just vanishes. For then it can be said that the object of inferential cognition is the *pratijñā* concerned, that the probans exists (not in this object but) in the *pakṣa* concerned, that the probans is related by way of invariable concomitance (not to this object but) to the probandum concerned. More or less formidable are the difficulties urged next. Thus taking his stand on the fact that in an inference an earlier grasped general rule is applied to a new particular case, the opponent says : "If the new particular case was not cognized at the time of grasping the general rule how can it be cognized now by the concerned inferential cognition, if it was cognized at that time what new is cognized by the concerned inferential cognition ?"² This is posing the intricate problem of how an invariable concomitance is established and how it is applied in the course of an inferential cognition. As the opponent sees it, the most difficult thing in this connection is to be sure that the probans will be never and nowhere found to exist except in the company of the probandum; for on his showing such an assurance can be had only by an omniscient, but then an omniscient will not need the services of an inference.³ The suggestion that invariable concomitance obtains between a universal residing in the probans and one residing in the probandum (e.g. between the universal 'smokeness' and the universal 'fireness') is rejected on the ground that there exist nothing like a universal.⁴ The suggestion that an invariable concomitance is established on the basis of frequent observation is rejected on the ground that however frequent an observation future exceptions are yet possible.⁵ The point is emphasized that invariable concomitance between *x* and *y* is established only after being sure that *x* will be found to be absent in all those places where *y* is absent, an assurance which can be had only by an omniscient with his knowledge of all places.⁶ Then it is pointed out that in all cases of inference a counter-inference is always possible.⁷ So quoting certain authorities the

opponent draws the general conclusion that one who relies on inference cannot avoid failure just as the blind man who rushes forth relying on the touch of hand etc. cannot avoid stumbling on the way.⁸ Here again it is emphasized that an inference formulated however diligently can always be refuted by a more competent disputant.⁹ In view of what Jayanta has said in the course of his refutation of the Buddhist thesis on invariable concomitance it should be very difficult for him to properly meet the objections thus raised by the opponent. For Jayanta has virtually maintained that an invariable concomitance is established as a result of finding in several cases that the probans concerned exists along with the probandum concerned while finding in no case that this probans exists in the absence of this probandum, this being the crux of his contention that invariable concomitance cannot be reduced to the two types posited by the Buddhist. Consider the case of these two types one by one. Thus the Buddhist has argued that one type of invariable concomitance is met with when x and y are two objective features such that things possessing x are by definition things possessing y , but this argument is dismissed by Jayanta as being over-subtle, a dismissal which can only mean that according to him an invariable concomitance between objective features is established on the basis of enumerating cases; similarly, the Buddhist has argued that the other type of invariable concomitance is met with when x and y are two independent things such that x is an effect produced by y , but this argument too is dismissed by Jayanta as over-subtle, a dismissal which again can only mean that according to him an invariable concomitance between things is established on the basis of enumerating cases. Both points can be concretized. Thus Jayanta has argued that there obtains an invariable concomitance between the feature 'being a produced entity' and the feature 'being not-hot' and his ground was that in the inference then under consideration there was besides the *pakṣa* no thing which could be a produced entity without being not-hot; (this inference was declared invalid on another ground precisely because Jayanta saw nothing wrong in the concerned invariable concomitance). Again, Jayanta has quoted several cases where according to him there obtains between two things an invariable concomitance without those things being causally related; e.g. sunset followed by the rise of stars, the rise of full-moon followed by sea-tide, the rise of the constellation *Agastya* followed by the onset of autumn, the movement of ants carrying their

eggs followed by rains. As a matter of fact, in all these cases two phenomena occur jointly because the circumstance that causes one also causes the other, the precise determination of the circumstance being possible with the aid of the sciences of astronomy, meteorology, biology and the like. Rejecting this essentially Buddhist explanation Jayanta can only say that in all these cases two phenomena occur jointly because it has been never found that one occurs without the other occurring as well, a virtual tautology. Significantly Jayanta thinks it necessary to tell the present opponent that the Buddhist's vindication of invariable concomitance is no better than the former's own. In any case, let us see how Jayanta actually meets the objections raised by this opponent.

Jayanta begins by asking the opponent as to whether he denies the very possibility of inference or just takes exception to the logician's concept of inference.¹⁰ The first alternative is disposed of first briefly but in a manner that is incidentally revealing. Thus it is contended that the phenomenon of inference is too widespread to be denied.¹¹ Then the point is elaborated as follows : "Even women, children, cowherds, ploughmen, etc. doubtless seek knowledge of one thing on the basis of a knowledge of another thing invariably associated with this thing. As a matter of fact, if the possibility of inference is denied then the popular intercourse will become impossible on the basis of perception even, with the result that people will look immovable like a painted picture. Certainly, even a thing cognized through perception is sought to be acquired or rejected by people on the ground of being recognized as a cause of pleasure, etc. or as a cause of something else."¹² Really, the phenomenon of inference is even more widespread than Jayanta consciously realizes but in the present argumentation he seems to evince a vague inkling into the true situation. For to recognize a presently perceived thing as a cause of pleasure, etc. or as a cause of something else is certainly a case of inference, but even to recognize a presently perceived thing as a thing involves some sort of inference. As we have already learnt, to perceptually cognize a thing is to observe in this thing certain sensory features and hence to identify it as belonging to this class or that; this essentially is a process of inference. Then a word about the role of word-employment in perceptual cognition. A non-human living organism exclusively banks upon its own past experience while identifying a presently perceived thing but a human being can identify even such a thing as is perceived for the

first time, provided he has earlier received verbal communication regarding the nature of this thing. This aspect of the matter escapes Jayanta's notice simply because he views perceptual cognition as a passive process of noticing a thing and its features. As a matter of fact, this way of looking at the matter throws clearer light not only on the nature of perceptual cognition but also on that of what the Buddhist calls *svabhāva-anumāna*, for *svabhāva-anumāna* is essentially a process of detecting an implicational relation between the respective connotations of two words, a process which on an advanced level assumes the form of formulating a fool-proof definition of some technical concept. However, the Buddhist thesis on *svabhāva-anumāna* was a much misunderstood thesis, and so we better leave it at that. The more important is Jayanta's present reference to causal process. He correctly emphasizes that even on everyday level we take note of the fact that a thing causes pleasure etc. or that one thing causes another thing, a note-taking which must involve inference. What he fails to realize is that all inference of one thing from another presupposes a causal experimentation, a realization the Buddhist had in so clear a fashion. Really, in the absence of this realization the objections presently raised by Jayanta's opponent cannot be answered satisfactorily. Thus this opponent is asking Jayanta : " Granted that the probans has never been found except in the company of the probandum; but what is the guarantee that it will never be so found ? " The same question will be asked by the Buddhist, but unlike Jayanta's opponent he will be asking it in a constructive spirit. For on the Buddhist's showing, it is guaranteed that *x* will never be found except in the company of *y* in case an experimentation has demonstrated that *x* and *y* are causally related. And in a nutshell the following is how a causal experimentation is conducted : "Let there be present neither *x* nor *y*. Then bring *x* and see if *y* follows; if it does not then *x* is no cause of *y*, if it does then continue the experiment. Now remove *x* and see if *y* disappears, if it does not then *x* is no cause of *y*, if it does then it is demonstrated that *x* is a cause of *y*." Superficially viewing one might say that here there take place just three observations – that of absence-of-*x* and absence-of-*y*, that of *x* and *y*, that of absence-of-*x* and absence-of-*y*; but it is these three observations that will demonstrate for ever that *x* is a cause of *y*. Jayanta who lacked this essential Buddhist understanding of a causal experimentation as also the realization that all invariable concomi-

tance between two things is established on the basis of a causal consideration answers his opponent in a manner that is very much unconvincing. Let us recall that the task in which Jayanta is now engaged is to vindicate the validity of the logician's concept of inference, he having already shown that inference does take place in everyday life.

Jayanta begins by arguing as follows: "Not any and every thing can be inferred from any and every thing, but just a certain thing from a certain thing. And it will not do to say that it is the very nature of a certain thing that a certain other thing is inferred from it. For the cause of this inference is the relation of invariable concomitance obtaining between two things. Of course, we too do not say that this relation is either of the form of 'identify between the things in question' or 'production of one thing out of the other'. Even so, one should not ask as to what makes possible the invariable concomitance thus spoken of, for one can as well ask as to what makes possible the 'identify' or 'production' there spoken of."¹³ It can easily be seen that Jayanta is simultaneously waging fight on three fronts. Thus the opponent who says that inference is not at all possible is told that it is possible; the opponent who says that inference is possible without there obtaining any relation between the probans and probandum is told that there obtains such a relation which is to be called 'invariable concomitance'; the Buddhist who says that two specific conditions make possible the relation of invariable concomitance is told that all such talk of specific conditions is senseless. Jayanta's point against the Buddhist is that one does not ask as to why smoke is produced out of fire and not out of water and one should not ask as to why invariable concomitance obtains between these two things and not between those two things.¹⁴ Jayanta has to be told that smoke is produced out of fire and not out of water because a causal experimentation demonstrates that, the general point being that invariable concomitance obtains between two things only in case an experimentation demonstrates that the two are causally related. Be that as it may, Jayanta on his part offers so many alternative views as to how an invariable concomitance is established, if not on the basis of a causal experimentation.¹⁵ Having no idea of a causal experimentation Jayanta believes that invariable concomitance between smoke and fire is established on the basis of observing in several cases that smoke is accompanied by fire and not observing in a single case that smoke

is not accompanied by fire, so that his only problem is as to how under such conditions one becomes sure that smoke will never be found not accompanied by fire. It is really difficult to see how passive observation and non-observation thus spoken of should ever assure one that smoke will never be found unaccompanied by fire. So let us examine one by one the alternative views on the question reported by Jayanta.

(1) On one view the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire is grasped through a *manas*-born perception assisted by the observation and non-observation in question, it being argued that a *manas* can obviously take into cognizance things past, future, distant, etc.; the point is further buttressed by contending that invariable concomitance obtains between the universal 'smokeness' residing in all smoke and the universal 'fireness' residing in all fire, so that for the purpose of establishing an invariable concomitance it is not required that all smoke and all fire be actually observed.¹⁶ In this connection the promise is made that the reality of a universal will be demonstrated in the sequel.¹⁷

(2) Then it is realized that the first view involves one difficulty. For one can say that a thing possessing the universal 'smokeness' is accompanied by a thing possessing the universal 'fireness', but this way one cannot express the fact that smoke is absent in all not-fire, there being no universal 'not-fireness'. So the second view maintains that invariable concomitance is grasped by a near-yogic perception which notes both that all smoke is accompanied by fire and that smoke is absent in all not-fire.¹⁸

(3) However, certain logicians wish to avoid positing a thing like near-yogic perception. So they say that for the purpose of establishing an invariable concomitance between smoke and fire it is enough if it is grasped that a thing possessing the universal 'smokeness' is accompanied by a thing possessing the universal 'fireness', there being no further need to grasp that smoke is absent in all not-fire. On this third view if smoke has not been so far found to be not accompanied by fire then it is unwarranted to suspect that it might be so found in future.¹⁹ (Jayanta takes exception to this view – a Kumārilite view – by saying that this way invariable concomitance remains but half-grasped, it being a part of the meaning of invariable concomitance that the probans is never found where the probandum is absent.)²⁰

(4) Certain other logicians too avoid positing a thing like near-yogic perception, but they deem it necessary that the absence of smoke in all not-fire must be grasped, a grasping which according to them is possible on the part of a *manas*-born perception itself. Thus on their showing even if there is no universal 'not-fireness' the absence of smoke in all not-fire is grasped through grasping its absence in all things that lack the universal 'fireness'²¹.

Of these four views each is as curious as another and each a standing *reductio ad absurdum* of the Nyāya-Mīmāṃsā thesis on 'universal'. Each claims to be an explanation of how observation and non-observation confined to a limited number of cases make possible the formulation of an invariable concomitance valid for all possible cases, but each amounts to dogmatically asserting that such a formulation is somehow made, their mutual differences having nothing to do with the problem at hand. For the question whether the presence of the universal 'smokeness' in the company of the universal 'fireness' is perceived through a *manas*-born perception or a near-yogic perception as also the question whether the absence of the universal 'smokeness' in the company of all not-fire is required to be grasped or not – and if required then whether it is grasped through a *manas*-born perception or a near-yogic perception, are just pseudo-questions in so far as this problem is concerned. The Buddhist with his thesis on *kārya-anumāna* was really crying in the wilderness. Here really closes Jayanta's answer to the opponent's really serious objection, but the answer yet continues for a while. Thus that objection based on an exploitation of the ambiguity of the word *pakṣa* is answered practically in the same way as earlier suggested by us.²² Similarly, answering another objection it is said that an inference cognizes neither a general rule nor a particular case but a general rule as applied to a particular case.²³ That too is understandable and not much important. But there are taken into consideration several objections which are all based on the consideration that an inference made now can be refuted in future.²⁴ Really, that is an old difficulty assuming a new garb, viz. the difficulty that it is impossible to formulate an invariable concomitance valid for all time to come. Naturally, Jayanta dismisses this difficulty as ungrounded but two phrases used by him in this connection are noteworthy. Thus he says that the difficulty in question does not arise in the case of a probans that is *prayojaka*²⁵ and then that it does not arise in the case of a probans

that is *supratibaddha*²⁶. Here the word *supratibaddha* simply means 'well related through a relation of invariable concomitance' but the word '*prayojaka*' apparently meaning the same thing became a technical concept. For as we have already hinted in passing, the later Nyāya authors introduced the concept of *prayojaka* and the like with a view to implicitly conceding the Buddhist's point that all invariable concomitance between two independent things must be based on a causal consideration. But this aspect of the matter we will touch upon while examining Jayanta's concept of the pseudo-probans called *aprayojaka*.

Jayanta closes this subsection with his consideration of the objections raised by a new opponent who distinguishes between a concept in the validity of which one's belief is natural and one in the validity of which it is acquired — an example of the former being the concepts like smoke, fire etc.; an example of the latter the concepts like soul, God, omniscient, after-life etc.; and his contention is that things corresponding to the former set of concepts are a proper subject-matter of inference, things corresponding to the latter set not.²⁷ In all probability this opponent is a materialist but as presented by Jayanta his view seems to be that there exist no things not open to gross external perception, a view according to which not only soul, God etc. but even physical atoms etc. turn out to be fictitious things. In any case, Jayanta answers him by pointing out that different sorts of things are inferred with the help of different sorts of invariable concomitance, in this connection particularly promising that the existence of God he is going to demonstrate taking recourse to inference.²⁸

(d) The Nyāyasūtra Definition of Inference

The Nyāyasūtra definition of inference runs as follows :

"Preceded by it an inference is of three types, viz. *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*."

But the most fundamental topics connected with the problem of inference Jayanta has already considered, and so his discussion of the wording of the above definition does not raise very many important issues; even so, it has a value of its own. Thus Jayanta begins by saying that the word 'it' here means perception and refers to the two perceptions necessarily required by each and every inference, viz. the perception of the probans taking place at the time the inference is actually made and the perception of the probans and probandum taking place at the time the concerned invariable concomitance is estab-

lished.¹ In this connection it is argued that if the concerned invariable concomitance is established not on the basis of perception but on the basis of inference, etc. then an infinite regress is inevitable, so that not less than two perceptions will do if an inference is to be made.² Then it is argued that the proposed definition will not illegitimately apply to the cases of invalid inference because the required perception properly takes place only in the case of a valid inference, also because the words '*arthotpannam* (=born of the object concerned)', '*avyabhicārin* (= non-erroneous)', '*vyavasāyātmakam* (=certain)' can be borrowed from the preceding definition of perception, so that the cases of invalid inference will stand automatically eliminated.³ Here it is emphasized that the word '*avyapadesya* (=non-verbal)' has not to be borrowed from the preceding definition of perception, it being in the very nature of things impossible for a verbal cognition and an inferential cognition to take place simultaneously, so that there is no question of there arising the contingency that a cognition might be both verbal and inferential.⁴ Then is considered the objection that on this understanding the proposed definition will fail to cover the cases of inference based on scriptural knowledge (instead of perception); the answer is that even scriptural knowledge is ultimately based on perception - alternatively, that the proposed definition takes into consideration only the chief variety of inference (while leaving scope for secondary varieties like the one presently spoken of).⁵ Lastly the question is considered whether the word 'it' stands for a perceptual cognition as such or for a means of such a cognition, also whether the word 'inference' stands for an inferential cognition as such or for a means of such a cognition; by way of answering it, all the possibilities are conceded, certain possibilities even being conceded in more than one way.⁶ As we know, a question like the last one arises because the early authors understood by the word '*pramāṇa*' a cognition as such, the later authors a means of cognition (while a whole technique had been evolved by the later authors to read their own meaning into an old text where the other meaning was in fact intended).

Then Jayanta proceeds to interpret the three words which in the *proposed definition stand for the three types of inference*, viz. *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*. He in fact offers two sets of interpretations, but before doing that he briefly mentions and ridicules a curious interpretation that was advanced by somebody. Thus this author maintained that the three words in question stand not only for

the three types of probans but also for those three characteristics of a probans, viz. presence in the *pakṣa*, presence in a *sapakṣa*, absence in all *vipakṣa*. For he argued that the word *pūrva* (lit. early) means *pakṣa* because in a debate the *pakṣa* is mentioned first of all, so that *pūrvavat* means 'one that is present in the *pakṣa*'; similarly, the word *śeṣa* (lit. remainder) means *sapakṣa* because whatever remains after the *pakṣa* is *sapakṣa*, so that *śeṣavat* means 'one that is present in a *sapakṣa*'; lastly, the word *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, by being read as *sāmānyato'dṛṣṭa* (lit. not seen even in a general fashion), means 'one not seen (in a *vipakṣa* — *pakṣa* and *sapakṣa* having been already mentioned) even in a general fashion.'⁷ Jayanta dismisses this whole performance as attributing to the aphorist something that is not worthy of him.⁸ To this he adds that a Nyāya author should not rest content with mentioning just three characteristics of a probans but should also mention the remaining two.⁹ Jayanta's point is that the performance in question is a forced performance and one that fails to bring to light the total situation alleged to be depicted.

As already hinted, Jayanta interprets the three words in question in two ways, first giving one set of three interpretations, then another set. Let the two sets be considered one by one.

In connection with the first set of interpretations the word '*pūrva*' means a cause, so that the word *pūrvavat* means 'a probans that possesses the attributes of a cause (i.e. is of the form of a cause)'; e.g. from the appearance of clouds overhead one infers the coming rain.¹⁰ Here Jayanta considers several objections which are all more or less flimsy and have mostly come from the side of the Buddhist who for strange reasons came out with the view that even if it is proper to infer a cause from an effect the opposite course is not proper. Thus the latter first submitted that an effect can be inferred not from one or two members of the concerned causal aggregate but from the whole of this aggregate. But when the point was conceded he pleaded that even a total causal aggregate might be prevented from producing the effect concerned, so that what can be inferred is not this effect itself but the capacity-to-produce-this-effect inherent in the concerned causal aggregate. And when this point too was conceded he trotted the argument that then this will be a case of *svabhāva-anumāna* inasmuch as a capacity inherent in a thing is a part of this thing's nature. Viewed in this background it can be seen that the objections presently considered by Jayanta have mostly a Buddhist ring about

them, objections which he rightly dismisses by saying that they can be advanced only by one who does not know what an inference is.¹¹ Thus it is first assumed that the inference here has the form : "The effect exists, because the cause concerned exists"; and then are put forward the following objections :

(1) If the effect is not already something known, it cannot act as *pakṣa*; if it is already something known, there is no need for an inference.¹²

(2) A probans must exist in the *pakṣa*, but here the probans is 'existence of the cause' and that does not exist in the *pakṣa* which is 'effect'.¹³

(3) It is in principle impossible for 'existence' to act as probandum; for in its case a probans which exclusively belongs to existent things will be something un-established, one which exclusively belongs to non-existent things will be something contradicted, one which belongs to both existent and non-existent things will be something doubtful.¹⁴

All these objections deserve a summary dismissal for the simple reason that the inference here has the form : "This locus possesses the effect, because it possesses the cause concerned." Then it is argued that a cause cannot act as probans for inferring the effect concerned because some obstacle is always likely to prevent this effect from being produced, it being also impossible to point out in a cause any feature which must ensure that the effect concerned will be produced; to this is added that if a causal aggregate as it exists just on the eve of producing the effect concerned is to act as probans then the effect will be already produced by the time the inference is made.¹⁵ In this connection the suggestion is repudiated that the Buddhist himself grants the validity of inferring an effect from the cause concerned, this on the ground that according to him what is inferred is not the effect concerned but the relevant capacity inherent in the cause while thus to infer a capacity is a case of *svabhāva-anumāna*.¹⁶ Jayanta undertakes a brief but telling refutation of this whole array of objections. Thus he first lays down as to what according to him is the form of inference in the illustrative case; on his showing it is : "These clouds will produce rain, because they possess features causative of rain", it being like inferring : "This smoke is accompanied by fire, because it possesses features indicative of the

company of fire.’’¹⁷ On the face of it the intended analogy seems unconvincing inasmuch as smoke is not a cause but an effect of fire; but Jayanta’s virtual point is that an invariable concomitance is alone sufficient to constitute an inference. This is a wholesome point and one which should have convinced our logicians – Jayanta not excluded – that it was pointless on their part to insist that the *pakṣa* concerned must be left out of the purview of a proposed invariable concomitance. Of course, one could also here infer : ‘That sky-portion will soon possess rain, because it possesses rain-causing clouds’; that will easily satisfy the condition demanded by our logicians, but that is not indispensable and the noteworthy thing is that Jayanta himself thinks so. [Here Jayanta also answers another objection (not noted above). Thus the opponent argues that since the word ‘*pūrva*’ means a cause the word ‘*pūrvavat*’ ought to mean an effect (= that which possesses the cause concerned), so that what must be covered by this title are the cases of inferring cause from effect, not *vice-versa*.¹⁸ Jayanta answers that the word *pūrvavat* means ‘a locus possessing causative features’; (he could also say that the word means ‘a locus possessing the cause’ but his answer conforms to the form he has given to the inference under consideration).] Then it is argued that what acts as probans is not a cause as such but it as possessing features which must ensure that the effect concerned will be produced, it being not impossible to point out in a cause features of this kind.¹⁹ Similarly is dismissed as frivolous that objection about the effect concerned being already produced by the time the inference is made.²⁰ The objection is really frivolous; for an effect is inferred from the cause concerned in all sorts of circumstances, not only when this cause is just on the eve of producing the effect. Lastly, Jayanta considers the Buddhist’s submission that what is inferred from a cause is not the effect concerned but the relevant capacity inherent in this cause, the latter’s further point being that this inference is a case of *svabhāva-anumāna*; the former retorts that the concept of *svabhāva-anumāna* is itself untenable and that in any case one infers from a cause the effect concerned itself, not the relevant capacity.²¹ Jayanta’s prejudice against the concept of *svabhāva-anumāna* is certainly unwarranted but his other point is valid. As a matter of fact, one solid reason why prejudice was created against the Buddhist’s concept of *svabhāva-anumāna* must have been his misguided attempt to bring under it the cases of inferring an effect from the cause concerned; for logically

these cases must go along with the cases of inferring a cause from the effect concerned.

Then continuing his first set of interpretations Jayanta comes to the second word *śeṣavat*. Thus on his showing the word *śeṣa* means an effect, so that the word *śeṣavat* means 'a probans that possesses the attributes of an effect (i.e. is of the form of an effect)'; e.g. from the appearance of flooded waters in a river one infers that its upper reaches have received rain.²² Here again the form of inference is supposed to be : "This river has received rain in its upper reaches, because its water over here is flooded"²³, that is, a form which shows that an invariable concomitance is alone sufficient to constitute an inference. Naturally, Jayanta has again in mind those flimsy objections raised in connection with the type *pūrvavat*²⁴; but the noteworthy thing is that this time the Buddhist himself has nothing to object against the type of inference under consideration, it being his own view that an effect is a valid probans for inferring the cause concerned. So, Jayanta here answers an objection of a rather general type. Thus, the opponent says that the water of a river can well be flooded owing to causes other than rain (something like the earlier objection that the gathering clouds might well not rain); Jayanta replies that one can note the distinguishing marks that the flooded water of a river exhibits when there has been rain recently.²⁵

Lastly, in connection with his first set of interpretations Jayanta comes to the third word *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* (lit. 'observed in a general fashion'). Thus on his showing a case of this type of inference arises when the probans and probandum are not causally related, the first two types having covered all the cases where they are causally related; e.g. the taste of *Kapittha* (a fruit) can be inferred from its colour.²⁶ Jayanta notes that the Buddhist too does not say that in the present illustrative case the taste concerned is a cause of the colour concerned;²⁷ but he does not report that the Buddhist treat the taste and colour concerned as two co-effects of the same cause, thus not giving up his insistence that a valid invariable concomitance between two things (as colour and taste are) must be based on some causal consideration or other. In any case, Jayanta here takes exception to the illustrative case quoted by Vātsyāyana where the sun's motion is inferred from its having been noticed at a place other than the place where it was noticed earlier; Vātsyāyana must have thought that in this inference no causal consideration is involved while Jayanta argues

that the sun's motion is actually the cause of its being noticed at a new place.²⁸ Jayanta elaborates his point at considerable length, but that is not much important.²⁹ For the real difficulty lies with the point which is the common point of Vātsyāyana and Jayanta and is directed against the Buddhist, viz. that there can obtain between two things an invariable concomitance without being based on some causal consideration or other.

After thus offering his first set of interpretations Jayanta comes to the second. Those advocating this second set of interpretations feel dissatisfied with the so must importance attached to causal consideration in connection with the first.³⁰ So on their showing the three types of inference in question have to be understood as follows :

(1) When an invariable concomitance is once established between x and y then a thing similar to x acts as probans for inferring another thing correspondingly similar to y ; e.g. when invariable concomitance has been once established between smoke and fire then any particular smoke acts as probans for inferring a concerned particular fire. This is the type of inference *pūrvavat* (lit. 'like the earlier one').

(2) When a situation can obtain in several alternative ways and it is noticed that in a particular case it does not obtain in any of those ways except one, then it can be inferred that in this case it obtains in this remaining way ; e.g. fire can be hay-fire, leaf-fire, wood-fire, cowdung-fire so that if it is noticed that a particular fire is neither hay-fire, nor leaf-fire, nor wood-fire then it can be inferred that it is cowdung-fire. This is the type of inference *śeṣavat* (lit. 'like the remaining one').

(3) If x is somehow similar to x^1 and x^1 is invariably accompanied by y^1 , then x is inferred to be accompanied by y which is correspondingly similar to y^1 even if y is something inherently imperceptible; e.g. an act like cutting etc. is invariably accompanied by (i.e. executed through) an instrument like axe etc. while perception is an act, so that it can be inferred that perception is accompanied by (i.e. executed through) an instrument of the form of a sense-organ even if a sense-organ is something inherently imperceptible. This is the type of inference *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* (lit. 'observed in a general fashion').

In connection with the second set of interpretations Jayanta considers an objection, and the consideration is somewhat revealing.

Thus the opponent argues that since in all inference something similar is inferred from something similar there is no sense in further classifying inference into types; in reply Jayanta offers a plea which in effect concedes that the first and third types here spoken of differ from each other only in that the probandum is something perceptible in the former something inherently imperceptible in the latter while the second type is a different proposition altogether.³¹ Really, the second type of inference here spoken of is based on the same logical principle as one type of *arthāpatti* posited in Mīmāṃsā logic, but here there seems to be no realization that in such a type of inference no conclusion can be validly drawn unless the alternatives concerned are enumerated exhaustively. For example, in the illustrative case quoted by Jayanta there are enumerated several alternative forms of fire, but here no conclusion can be validly drawn unless the alternatives concerned are enumerated exhaustively. In any case, Jayanta requires to feel assured that an inference-type is at hand which should enable one to infer things inherently imperceptible and his third inference-type is exclusively such a type while the second too can be gainfully employed for the purpose; (let us recall that while vindicating the possibility of inference Jayanta had lastly encountered an opponent who while not denying the possibility of all inference denied the possibility of all such as would seek to demonstrate the existence of things inherently imperceptible like soul, God etc.). Thus on Jayanta's showing, the first inference-type is meant for demonstrating the existence of things perceptible, the third for demonstrating the existence of things inherently imperceptible, the second for demonstrating the existence of both. This point as pertaining to the relative worth of the second and third types is explicitly emphasized once more.³² Here really closes Jayanta's consideration of the Nyāyasūtra definition of inference, but by way of continuing the topic he undertakes a long refutation of the view that the third inference-type is to be employed in order to demonstrating the existence of a motion, the understanding being that motion is something inherently imperceptible, an understanding which Jayanta does not share. In brief, the opponent's point is that when *x* moves relative to *y* what is directly perceived is not *x*'s motion itself but *x*'s conjunction now with this constituent part of *y* now with that, on the basis of which perception one argues that since all effect requires a cause the perceived successive conjunctions have for their cause a motion belonging to

x; Jayanta retorts that on this understanding it should be impossible to distinguish between the case when x moves relative to y and the case when y moves relative to x, his point being that what is directly perceived is x's motion relative to y or y's motion relative to x (as the case might be).³³ In this connection Jayanta insists that when a bird is seen flying in the sky or a glowworm flitting in darkness there is perceived no conjunction of the bird with the sky or of the glowworm with darkness, his point again being that what is directly perceived is the bird's motion in the first case, the glowworm's motion in the second.³⁴ All this is interesting but is a matter of details so far as the logical principle under examination is concerned. However, living in the times of Einstein one might hazard the suggestion that even the opponent has a point after all.

(e) The Cognition of Time and Space

The topic of the present subsection is indeed related to the problem of inference in a very remote fashion. Thus Jayanta happens to emphasize that with the help of inference one can cognize not only things present but also things past and future (though here too he does not forget to recall that an extraordinary type of perception - e.g. a *yogin's* perception - is equally competent to cognize things past and future, nor to assail the Mīmāṃsaka's contention that a religious duty, since it has to do with things past and future, can be cognized exclusively through a scriptural injunction).¹ Now Jayanta's word for past, present and future is *tri-kāla* (lit. three times = three phases of time); this impels an opponent to argue that all talk about past, present and future is untenable because time is something fictitious.² And when Jayanta has answered this opponent by proving that time is an independently existing real substance he summarily adds that what is true of time is also true of space (= *dik*, lit. direction).³ So let us go through the whole performance hurriedly.

The opponent argues that time as an independent existing real substance is neither perceived nor inferred, so that all reference to time must be a reference to some aspect of the concerned acts themselves; to this is added that if time is in fact one independently existing real substance then it should be impossible for it to be divided into three phases like past, present and future.⁴ This argument is countered by Jayanta by quoting two distinct views, both positing time as an independent real substance but one considering it to be a possible object of perception, the other considering it to be a possible object

of inference alone. Thus on the former view the temporal features like succession, simultaneity, swiftness, slowness, etc. cannot be perceived to be present there in objects unless time too is perceived along with objects.⁵ The objection that something lacking colour (as time is) cannot be an object of visual perception is rejected by pointing out that colour itself lacks colour and is yet an object of visual perception, that atoms are possessed of colour and yet are no object of visual perception, that in any case the temporal features succession etc. are not perceived with eyes closed.⁶ The query as to why time is not perceived independently like a jar etc. is answered by maintaining that it is the very nature of time that it is perceived only when qualifying a coloured object, it thus being unlike a staff which as qualifying the staff-holder is perceived independently.⁷ The objection that even as qualifying a coloured object a thing can be perceived only in case it is itself coloured is rejected by pointing out that a 'universal' is perceived as qualifying a coloured object and is yet not something coloured; the clarification that this objection must hold in the case of a qualifier that is of the form of a substance (as time is supposed to be) is rejected on the old ground that whether substance or no substance what cannot be perceived with eyes closed must be an object of visual perception.⁸ Then is presented the second view according to which time is a possible object of inference alone. Here it is conceded that time is not perceived along with the object qualified by it, as staff is perceived along with the staff-holder or blue colour along with the blue lotus; and yet it is insisted that time is nevertheless a reality as is the nether part of the earth, the yonder part of the moon; thus on this view time, even if itself imperceptible, assists a sense-organ in perceiving the features like successive, etc. just as 'impressions', even if themselves imperceptible, assist a sense-organ in now recognizing things perceived in past.⁹ Then it is argued that since the same causal aggregate produces the same effect swiftly in one case, slowly in another there must be a thing like time operating differently in those two cases.¹⁰ The suggestion that swiftness and slowness in question are due to the act concerned being different in those two cases is rejected on the ground that acts themselves are found to be swift, slow, etc.¹¹ The clarification that the act concerned means the motion of astronomical bodies is rejected on the ground that this motion too is found to be swift, slow, etc., while it will lead to an infinite regress if a motion belonging to another set of astronomical

bodies is posited in order to account for this swiftness, slowness etc.¹² The opponent objects : "But what about the succession belonging to time itself. If that requires no other time then why the succession belonging to jar, etc. should require time ? If that does require another time then why no infinite regress ?"; he is answered : "This is like asking why white colour requires no other white colour in order to make it a white colour. The point is that it is the very nature of time that it exhibits succession without requiring another time."¹³ Lastly it is argued that since temporal proximity and remoteness are obviously something distinct from spatial proximity and remoteness (one standing nearer might be older, one standing farther might be younger) time must be something distinct from space.¹⁴ It can easily be seen that both the views in question posit time as an independently existing substance because according to them the presence in objects of the features like succession, simultaneity, swiftness, slowness, etc. remains unaccounted for unless time is thus posited. The objection that the succession exhibited by time itself should require another time was just rejected on the ground that that would lead to an infinite regress. The same objection is once more considered in a slightly different form. Thus the opponent asks as to what is the ground for dividing time into the three phases past, present and future, his point being that if time is really one such a division should be impossible.¹⁵ Jayanta replies that there is no real division within the body of time itself but that such a division is practically attributed to time owing to a corresponding division observable somewhere else, that is, owing to a threefold division exhibited by the acts going on there.¹⁶ The opponent objects : "But an act too does not exhibit a threefold division all by itself, and if it really does then why posit time ?"¹⁷ Jayanta replies : "No, an act is of three types according as it has produced the result due to it, is actually producing this result, or is yet to produce this result, it being called 'past' in the first case, 'present' in the second, 'future' in the third. And as associated with an act as thus exhibiting a threefold division time too is said to exhibit a corresponding threefold division, just as the sky, even if in itself one and impartite, is said to exhibit a multifarious inner division according as it is associated with one thing here, with another thing there."¹⁸ In this connection Jayanta answers somebody's objection that in a leaf falling from the tree what is observed is the time revealed through the past course and the time revealed through the future course but

not the time revealed through the present course; thus the former submits : "Time is not revealed through courses like that, but through the features past, future and present exhibited by an act in the manner just described."¹⁹ To this is added that the measurement of time in terms of the conventional units like *kṣaṇa*, *lava*, *kāsthā*, etc. (so many Indian units) is made on the basis of an observation of certain acts themselves (—not on the basis of an observation of time as such).²⁰ Really, this whole argumentation of Jayanta himself should convince him that there is no need to posit time as an independent substance over and above the acts whose exhibition of the features succession, simultaneity, etc. it is supposed to account for. For if the features past, present and future can be distinguished in an act in the manner suggested by Jayanta (and on this question he sounds convincing) then the features succession, simultaneity etc. too can be well distinguished in it in an essentially similar manner. For example, *x* and *y* are simultaneous in case while *x* is present *y* is present as well, *y* succeeds *x* in case *y* becomes present as soon as *x* becomes past, *x* is swifter than *y* in case first *x* and *y* are both present and then *x* becomes past while *y* continues to be present, *x* is slower than *y* in case first *x* and *y* are both present and then *x* continues to be present while *y* becomes past. That the conventionally standardised time-units are measured in terms of the acts exhibited by certain bodies (he must be meaning astronomical bodies) is also a correct position hinted by Jayanta. So viewed in the light of his final reply Jayanta's entire present polemic seems to be a polemic with no point at all. Perhaps, the Naiyāyika was constitutionally incapable of thinking of a distinct type of objective feature without at the same time thinking of a corresponding type of independent real.

The same sort of situation obtains in the case of Jayanta's treatment of space which immediately follows his treatment of time. Thus on his showing space too is one impartite substance existing independently which in the light of the sun's situation in the various parts of a day is contentially divided into ten units east, southeast, south, southwest, west, etc., his point being that two things taken as such cannot be said to be lying east, etc. of one another unless space is thus posited.²¹ The opponent objects : "As soon as one proceeds to look for space in the manner suggested by you yourself one finds that it is multifariously divided (the same thing also happening in the

case of time). Why then do you say that space is one (and that time is one) ?”²² Jayanta replies : “Space is one because the mode of distinguishing spatial features is invariably one (just as time is one because the mode of distinguishing temporal features is invariably one). Again, space is one because what is east in relation to one thing is west in relation to another (just as time is one because what is prior in relation to one act is posterior in relation to another).²³ Again, Jayanta’s own argumentation implies that space cannot be an independent substance (just as time cannot be one). For what he means is that a universally valid definition can be formulated in terms of which two things can be said to be lying east, etc. in relation to each other just as a universally valid definition can be formulated in terms of which two acts can be said to be occurring simultaneously, etc. in relation to each other; but certainly the former circumstance does not imply that space is an independent substance and the latter that time is an independent substance.

Here closes Jayanta’s account of inference (while certain topics related to it remain to be discussed in connection with certain other Nyāya *padārthas*).

SECTION THREE : ANALOGY

The third *pramāṇa* enumerated by the Nyāya authors after perception and inference is *upamāṇa* roughly translateable as analogy, roughly because the concept is rather technical. The Nyāyasūtra definition of this *pramāṇa* runs as follows :

On the basis of a known similarity, to bring about what has to be brought about — that is called *upamāṇa*.

The words of this definition as it stands are rather obscure, so what is to be understood is its traditionally given interpretation. Two alternative such interpretations are reported by Jayanta, one attributed to the old Naiyāyikas, the other to the ‘moderns’. Both, of course, agree that a case of *upamāṇa* arises when an expert tells a novice that such and such an unfamiliar thing is similar to such and such a familiar thing and the latter later on coming across this unfamiliar thing recognizes it as similar to that familiar thing and says to himself : “So this thing is what the word concerned stands for.” On the old Naiyāyika’s showing *pramāṇa*-ship here belongs to the expert’s

sentence uttered at the time of instructing the novice; the objection that what we thus have is a simple case of verbal testimony is rejected on the ground that the novice here does not exclusively rely on the expert's words but does his own observation, just as when one listens to an inference made by another person one does not exclusively rely on this person's words but does one's own observation.¹ On the other hand, the moderns maintain that *pramāṇa*-ship here belongs to the perception had by the novice at the time of noticing in the concerned unfamiliar thing the similarity-to-the-concerned-familiar-thing earlier spoken of, just as in inference *pramāṇa*-ship belongs to the perception of the probans concerned recognized as related to the probandum concerned through an invariable concomitance established earlier.² The opponent objects : "But *upamāna* as thus understood is just one of the so many ways of learning word-meaning on the authority of an expert, and so just a case of verbal testimony. Certainly, presently pointing out a thing as denoted by the word concerned is not the only means of teaching to a novice the denotation concerned. Thus for example the novice might be told : 'Do you remember that animal seen there then; that is called "antelope"'; or he might be told : 'Whenever you come across a man of such and such description know that he is Caitra.' In neither of these cases is the novice shown the thing denoted by the word concerned. Nor can it be said that the instruction received through the method of *upamāna* is of a doubtful import; for whatever doubt there might have been at the time of receiving the instruction vanishes as soon as the concerned unfamiliar thing is actually perceived."³ Jayanta refuses to concede the last point and argues that the perception which here puts an end to the earlier lingering doubt plays in the case of *upamāna* the same role as the perception of probans does in the case of inference, his point being that a case of *upamāna* is nevertheless not a case of perception just as inference is not a case of perception; to this is added that in spite of this its similarity with a case of inference, a case of *upamāna* is not a case of inference either.⁴ Jayanta's understanding of what constitutes *upamāna* betrays his lack of clarity on the question as to how the meaning of a word is learnt and how the knowledge of word-meaning thus acquired is put to use at the time of a subsequent perceptual cognition. He primarily thinks of the cases when a thing is pointed out to the novice and its name told, and he is ready to bracket with these the cases when a thing is just described to the novice and

its name told; but he treats as a class apart the cases when a thing is described to the novice in terms of its bare similarity to a familiar thing. Hence it is that the case of a perceptual cognition where there is put to use the knowledge of word-meaning acquired in the first two ways is treated by him as a case of perceptual cognition, while the case where there is put to use the knowledge of word-meaning acquired in the third way is treated by him not as a case of perceptual cognition but as a case of *upamāna*. As a matter of fact, the third class of cases is a minor sub-class of the second class which goes to cover the large majority of cases of a man learning word-meaning. For to say that *x* is similar to *y* is useless unless the similarity concerned is precisely defined in terms of certain features belonging to both *x* and *y*; but to thus describe *x*'s similarity to *y* is to describe *x* in terms of certain features belonging to *x*, which will be our second way of describing *x*. In any case, it is difficult to attribute the same fundamental importance to what the Naiyāyika treats as cases of perception, inference and verbal testimony and what he treats as cases of *upamāna*. Jayanta himself roundly says that the cases of *upamāna* are treated by the aphorist separately because being a compassionate personage he wanted to impart whatever information was useful to man in however a fashion.⁵ It seems that the early Nyāya authors attached so much importance to the cases of *upamāna* because inference itself was understood by them as essentially a process of knowing something about *x* as a result of knowing something about things similar to *x*, an understanding which somehow lingered in the Nyāya school throughout its history and which explains the Naiyāyika's resistance to attaching due importance to causal experimentation as the prime method of establishing an invariable concomitance. The surmise is somewhat confirmed when we learn that the Mīmāṃsakas too posited *upamāna* as an independent *pramāṇa* by the side of perception, inference etc. How they viewed the matter should become clear from Jayanta's criticism of the Mīmāṃsā concept of *upamāna-pramāṇa*.

On the Mīmāṃsāka's showing a case of *upamāna* arises when an expert tells a novice that such and such an unfamiliar thing is similar to such and such a familiar thing and the latter later on coming across this unfamiliar thing recalls that that familiar thing is similar to this unfamiliar thing now encountered; his understanding is that this is not a case of perception because the concerned familiar thing is not present

there, it is not a case of memory because the concerned familiar thing as similar to the concerned unfamiliar thing was not perceived earlier, while it is not a case of inference because nothing can here possibly act as *pakṣa*, probans, probandum.⁶ To all this Jayanta objects as follows : "It is proper to say that an unfamiliar thing is cognized as similar to a familiar thing, not *vice versa*, as is being done here; and granting the possibility of the latter cognition it should still be a case of simple memory.⁷ It will not do to argue that *x* as similar to *y* cannot be recalled unless *x* as similar to *y* was perceived earlier, while in the present case the concerned familiar thing as similar to the concerned unfamiliar thing was not perceived earlier; for unless the points of similarity obtaining between the two things in question were noticed when the concerned familiar thing was perceived earlier, this thing would not at all have been recalled at the time the concerned unfamiliar thing was perceived later.⁸ And certainly the points of similarity obtaining between *x* and *y* can be noticed even when *x* alone is perceived and not also *y*."⁹ The Mīmāṃsaka pleads : "Just as you Naiyāyikas say that in a case of *upamāna* the knowledge of word-meaning which was doubtful earlier becomes confirmed at the time of later perception, we say that here the knowledge of similarity which was vague earlier becomes clear at the time of later perception."¹⁰ Jayanta retorts : "Just as you Mīmāṃsaka say that the alleged confirmation in question is a result of later perception itself, we say that the alleged clarification in question is a result of later perception itself."¹¹ Really, both the Mīmāṃsaka and Jayanta are right in rejecting what they are rejecting, both wrong in endorsing what they are endorsing; for the former's concept of *upamāna-pramāṇa* is faulty broadly for the same reasons as are advanced by the latter, the latter's concept of *upamāna-pramāṇa* is faulty broadly for the same reasons as are advanced by the former. Thus if one already somehow knows that an unfamiliar thing *x* is similar to a familiar thing *y* then on encountering *x* and noticing its similarity to *y* one can say without much ado, "Here is *x* and this is what is denoted by the word concerned" as well as "Here is *x* and this is to which *y* is similar"; the Naiyāyika submits that the latter is a case of memory (at the most a case of perception) but the former a case of *upamāna-pramāṇa*, the Mīmāṃsaka submits that the former is a case of perception but the latter a case of *upamāna-pramāṇa*, both right and both wrong in the manner hinted.

Thus in Āhnikā II Jayanta completely covers his treatment of the three *pramāṇas* perception, inference and analogy posited by the Nyāya school; there now remains to be covered just verbal testimony which is the fourth *pramāṇa* posited here. And their fourth *pramāṇa* is somehow going to engage Jayanta's attention throughout the space of Āhnikas III-VI which he yet devotes to the first Nyāya *padārtha pramāṇa*; (in Āhnikas VII-XII there are taken up the remaining fifteen *padārthas*). Really, however, the most important things to be said about verbal testimony will be said towards the beginning of Āhnikā III itself, and if to them is added the immediately forthcoming discussion on intrinsic-vs-extrinsic validity of cognition Jayanta will then be finishing his coverage of the most important logical problems. For what thereafter follows is a discussion either on a relatively minor logical problem or on an ontological problem or on an ethico-theological problem. Each set of discussions has its own value, but this much advance information should facilitate our task of assessing the performance Jayanta puts up in the various parts of his text.

VERBAL TESTIMONY VALIDITY GOD WORD

As has been noted, Jayanta devotes to the problem of verbal testimony as many as four Āhnikas (Chapters) of his text; and yet he has really very little to say about the essential nature of verbal testimony. Most important things said in this connection are said in the first few pages of Āhnika III, and there too so much is of secondary importance. So it is necessary to distinguish out as to what Jayanta has primarily to say about the nature of verbal testimony.

(i) Nature of Verbal Testimony

The following is how the Nyāyasūtra definition of verbal testimony runs :

Verbal testimony (*śabda*) is the teaching (*upadeśa*) of an authoritative person (*āpta*).

Jayanta begins by considering as to what is meant by *upadeśa* and what by *āpta*. Thus he defines *upadeśa* as *abhidhāna* (= verbal communication) and then defines *abhidhāna* as 'apprehension of an object by means of something which is grasped through ears and which denotes this object.'¹ This so much roundabout definition of *abhidhāna* Jayanta adopts because he has in mind the theory of *sphoṭa* according to which a word is an eternal self-existing verity which is only made manifest at the time when a speaker speaks and a listener listens to him; hence it is emphasized that in conformity to popular usage the word 'word' is to mean something that is grasped through ears and not *sphoṭa* allegedly not grasped through ears, also that a word as thus understood is what acts as a means for apprehending the object concerned.² To this it is added that if *abhidhāna* is defined merely as 'apprehension of an object (brought about through whatever means)' then this definition will cover even inference which is of the form of apprehension of an object brought about by means of a probans.³ At the same time it is made clear that a word which is heard all right does not cease to be a word even in case it does not act as a means

of apprehension of an object — because, for example, the listener is not conversant with the meaning of this word.⁴ The opponent objects that since apprehension of an object means simply cognition of an object, *abhidhāna* too means just that⁵; Jayanta grants the first equation but adds that cognition of an object is of three types, viz. perceptual cognition that is brought about through a sense-organ, inferential cognition that is brought about through a means other than a word, cognition of the form of verbal testimony (which is what constitutes *abhidhāna*) that is brought about through a word.⁶ In passing Jayanta makes another clarification; thus he says that a word acts as a probans all right when the speaker's intention or the like is to be inferred.⁷ This clarification is directed against those who would argue that an alleged case of verbal testimony is but a case of inference where the word listened acts as probans for inferring the speaker's intention; Jayanta does not deny the possibility of such an inference but insists that the word listened is at the same time an independent means for producing the type of cognition called verbal testimony. He, of course, implies that a word is of the form of verbal testimony only in case it comes from the mouth of an authoritative person, but the point is made explicit while explaining as to what is meant by the word *āpta* occurring in the proposed definition of verbal testimony. In this connection Jayanta bases himself on Vātsyāyana who says : "An authoritative person is one who has a direct knowledge of what constitutes religious duty (*dharma*), who is desirous of telling others what he knows, who does the speaking".⁸ Thus putting a gloss on Vātsyāyana's words Jayanta submits that by 'religious duty' is to be understood a subject-matter worth communicating, by 'direct knowledge' authentic cognition of any type — not of the perceptual type alone, by 'one who is desirous of telling others what he knows' one who is devoid of all attachment, by 'one who does the speaking' one who is an expert expositor.⁹ By way of further clarification it is added that an authoritative person has to be devoid of all attachment only so far as the subject-matter under exposition is concerned, it being impossible for any man to be altogether devoid of all attachment and it being intended that the present description of an authoritative person should equally apply to a sage, an *āryan*, a non-*āryan*.¹⁰ Then recalling that certain others define authoritativeness as 'vanishment of all defilement' Jayanta emphasizes that those people too must be having in mind vanishment of defilement only so far as the subject-matter

under exposition is concerned.¹¹ Lastly, a new point is raised as follows : "Or since the present discipline is aimed at vindicating the validity of Vedic testimony while God is the author of Vedas the present description of an authoritative person literally applies to this author of Vedas. For God actually has a perceptual cognition of religious duty. And when he is said to be one desirous of telling others what he knows the meaning is that he is compassionate. Similarly, when he is said to be one who does the speaking, the meaning is that he is the author of the entire body of scriptural texts like Vedas, etc."¹² These preliminary observations made by way of introducing the Nyāyasūtra definition of verbal testimony set the tone for Jayanta's long-ranging investigation into all sorts of topics that follows. Thus at some place or other he is going to argue at length that a word is not of the form of *sphoṭa* supposed to be an eternal verity not grasped through ears, that it is also not of the form of an eternal verity grasped through ears, that a word denotes also a 'universal' which is an eternal verity, that God exists, that Vedas are not an *authorless composition* but a composition by God, that Vedas suffer from no deficiency of any sort, that there are also texts other than Vedas that have to be treated as scriptural texts—a formidable array of ontological and theological topics; somewhat closely related to logic will be the consideration of the question as to how a sentence though listened word-by-word is grasped all at once, even more so that of the question as to how a sentence yields meaning; a class by itself will be the elaboration and refutation of the contention that the science of grammar is all useless. However, before undertaking this rather rambling voyage of discovery Jayanta creates an occasion for discussing one very important question of logic, viz. whether all cognition is intrinsically valid, a question whose relevance for the problem of verbal testimony is nevertheless not apparent at once. All this is preceded by two relatively brief but pertinent refutations, both directed against the Buddhist. Thus it is first argued that the Buddhist is wrong to maintain that verbal testimony is a case of inference, then that he is wrong to maintain that a word has nothing to do with things real. Jayanta's entire performance deserves a consideration that befits its worth.

First to be considered is Jayanta's refutation of the Buddhist view that verbal testimony is a case of inference; (this refutation heavily draws upon Kumāṛila's corresponding refutation). The Buddhist's

central argument is that since a word enables one to cognize the thing-meant in virtue of one's earlier acquired knowledge of the concerned word-meaning relationship just as a probans enables one to cognize the probandum in virtue of one's earlier acquired knowledge of the concerned invariable concomitance, verbal testimony is a case of inference.¹³ And even granting that a word somehow yields meaning even without resorting to inference his firm contention is that the knowledge that what is thus meant is the case is a result of an inference where the authoritative character of the speaker concerned acts as probans.¹⁴ To this is added that as a general rule what is inferred from a word is the speaker's intention to convey the information concerned and not that this information is true.¹⁵ While answering the Buddhist Jayanta first makes a distinction between a sentence and a single word and argues that since a sentence conveys a meaning even when heard for the first time the deriving of this meaning cannot be a case of inference; on the other hand, recalling the earlier acquired knowledge of the meaning had by an individual word cannot be a case of inference because the knowledge had through inference is always expressed in the form of a sentence rather than an individual word.¹⁶ The suggestion that in the case of an individual word what is inferred is the proposition 'This word is possessed of the thing meant' is rejected on the ground that no conceivable sense can be attributed to the phrase 'a word being possessed of the thing meant' - the three alternative senses considered and found wanting being 'a word physically possesses the thing meant', 'a word possesses the capacity to inform about the thing meant', 'a word possesses information about the thing meant'.¹⁷ To this is added that one proceeds in one manner while inferring, in an altogether different manner while learning a word-meaning or putting to use one's knowledge of a word-meaning.¹⁸ The opponent argues : "While learning the meaning of a word a child does apply the joint method of concomitance-in-presence and concomitance-in-absence, a method characteristic of inference. Thus it learns this meaning through watching that its elders behave in one way when the word x is uttered and not the word y, in another way when the opposite happens."¹⁹ Jayanta largely concedes the point but insists that what the child thus learns is the conventional meaning of the word concerned and not any invariable concomitance.²⁰ Then is answered the Buddhist's contention that a sentence conveys a true information only in virtue of an inference where the authoritative character of the speaker concerned

acts as probans; Jayanta's simple point is that it is one thing to learn the meaning of a sentence, another thing to infer that what is thus meant is the case, so that the former is not a case of inference as the latter doubtless is (in fact, the former is presupposed by the latter).²¹ Similarly is answered the Buddhist's contention that what is inferred from a sentence is the speaker's intention and not the truth or otherwise of what this speaker says; again, Jayanta's point is that it is one thing to learn the meaning of a sentence, another thing to infer that what is thus meant is what the speaker intends to say, so that the former is not a case of inference as the latter doubtless is (in fact, the former is presupposed by the latter).²² As can be seen, both the parties to the present controversy admit that a sentence cannot convey its meaning to the listener unless he is already conversant with the meaning of the words concerned (as also with the concerned rules of syntax). But they differ as to whether or not the listener in thus putting to use an earlier acquired knowledge is taking recourse to inference. Really, all case of putting to use an earlier acquired knowledge must essentially be a case of inference. This is true not only of the case where one seeks to understand the meaning of a sentence listened but also of the case where one seeks to identify a thing come in contact with one's sense-organs. The Naiyāyika felt that these two cases were not obviously similar to the standard case of inferring fire from smoke and so concluded that the former represents a new *pramāṇa* called verbal testimony, the latter another new *pramāṇa* called perception. So far as the latter case was concerned the Buddhist too did not insist that it is a case of inference, for he had chosen to call it a case of post-perceptual thought ('perception' being his word for bare sensory experience); in fact, this only meant that the case in question is a case of inference though not obviously like the case of inferring fire from smoke. On the other hand, the former case was actually declared by the Buddhist to be a case of inference; but since it too was not obviously like the case of inferring fire from smoke the Naiyāyika quarrelled in a big way with him on this score. The Buddhist emphasized that what a sentence conveys is the intention of the speaker concerned and that a sentence is proved to be true when the speaker concerned is proved to be an authoritative person; the Naiyāyika conceded both the points and yet insisted that that does not mean that to understand the meaning from a sentence is a case of inference. Really, in the case of understanding the meaning of a

sentence as also in the case of perceptual cognition the real problem was not to deny the presence of an inferential factor operative there but to precisely define the nature of this inferential factor, a task which proved beyond the competence of our logicians largely because they had conceived in a rather narrow fashion what inference consists in. The following, for example, is how the process of understanding the meaning of a sentence could be shown to involve an inferential factor : "When the words *x*, *y*, *z* are joined according to this rule of syntax the sentence means that the things denoted by *x*, *y*, *z* stand related in this manner, and the words *x*, *y*, *z* denote these and these things."

Having completed the above refutation Jayanta undertakes a refutation of the Buddhist view that a word has nothing to do with things real. Really, the Buddhist has a theory according to which perception understood as bare sensory experience is what alone grasps things real; and in line with this theory he declares that no thought whatsoever—neither post-perceptual thought, nor an ordinary inference, nor an understanding of the meaning-of-a-sentence — has anything to do with things real. Hence his view is presently refuted by Jayanta. Thus the Buddhist argues : "The words of a sentence do not acquaint one with things real; having little to do with things real they are a product of mere thought. And what they do is to naturally generate certain thought type of cognitions irrespective of how real things behave. For example, the sentence 'a hundred hordes of elephants are seated on the finger-tip' has nothing to do with things real."²³ Jayanta pleads : "That way even eye, etc. often produce a false cognition, but from this you do not conclude that eye, etc. have nothing to do with things real"; the Buddhist retorts : "Eye, etc. are not in themselves an instrument of false cognition, they become so in case they are defective."²⁴ Jayanta pleads : "Even words produce a false cognition only in case they are uttered by a faulty person;" the Buddhist retorts : "Even a faulty person produces no false cognition if he just keeps silent while a sentence like 'a hundred hordes etc.' will produce a false cognition even when uttered by a faultless person. Moreover, eye etc. cease to perceive the wrong way as soon as the falsity of the cognition concerned is realized, but a sentence like 'a hundred hordes etc.' will produce a false cognition even when listened for the hundredth time."²⁵ Jayanta pleads : "Your conclusion follows if words were never to produce a true cognition. But as a matter of fact, when a faultless person says 'there are fruits on the river-bank'

the cognition generated is a true cognition;" the Buddhist retorts by asking: "But what about the case when a faultless person utters a sentence like 'a hundred hordes etc.'?"; Jayanta snubs him: "A faultless person would not indulge in a frivolity like that."²⁶ The Buddhist pleads: "Granted that a faultless person would not utter a frivolous sentence like that. Even then one would remain in doubt whether no false cognition is generated because the person concerned is faultless or because no words are uttered"; Jayanta retorts: "When a sentence like 'there are fruits etc.' is uttered by a faulty person, the people deceived thereby blame this person, not his words; when the same sentence is uttered by a faultless person, the people correctly informed thereby praise this person, not his words. From this it follows that words are not in themselves a means of false cognition, what makes them such a means are the faults vitiating the speaker."²⁷ The Buddhist pleads: "What words do, they do by themselves irrespective of who utters them"; Jayanta retorts: "This means that when words produce a true cognition they do so by themselves, so that it is wrong for you to say that words are by nature a means of false cognition."²⁸ As a matter of fact, words are by nature neither a means of false cognition nor a means of true cognition, just as a lamp is by nature neither; the only difference between the two is that a lamp produces a cognition - false or true - by its sheer presence while words produce a cognition - false or true - only when understood."²⁹ As can be seen, misguided by his pervert understanding that words have nothing to do with things real the Buddhist is bent upon proving that white is black. The endeavour is particularly tragic because he himself normally distinguish between a true sentence and a false one, it being his own famous argument that a sentence is proved to be true in case it is proved that the speaker concerned is an authoritative person. Jayanta, on the other hand, is straightaway endorsing the essentially sound position that a sentence is true in case uttered by an authoritative person, false otherwise. Here really closes the most important part of Jayanta's thesis on the question of verbal testimony. But at this stage he is reminded of a queer position adopted on this question by the Mīmāṃsaka. Thus the Mīmāṃsaka submits that a sentence is true not only in case it is uttered by an authoritative person but also in case it happens to be a sentence uttered by nobody, it being his belief that the Vedas have the unique distinction of being a text composed by no author. And this position maintained by the Mīmāṃsaka is a

corollary to his general position that all cognition is intrinsically valid. So keeping all this in mind Jayanta says :“In connection with the question as to how verbal testimony is a *pramāṇa*, the Mīmāṃsakas have raised the question as to whether the validity of a cognition is intrinsic or extrinsic. And this latter question is discussed by them not for its own sake but for the sake of throwing light on the former question.”³⁰ Thus begins Jayanta’s discussion of what really constitutes the second independent topic of Āhnika III, this Āhnika having four such topics in all and as follows :

- (i) The Nature of Verbal Testimony (a topic already covered in our examination)
- (ii) The Validity of Cognition - Intrinsic or Extrinsic
- (iii) The Existence of God
- (iv) The Eternity or Otherwise of a word

So it is these last three topics that we now examine one by one.

(ii) The Validity of Cognition – Intrinsic or Extrinsic

The Mīmāṃsā thesis that all cognition is intrinsically valid is defended by the Kumārilite and the Prabhākarite in two very different ways; so Jayanta first presents and criticizes its Kumārilite version and then its Prabhākarite version.

The Kumārilite begins by posing four alternatives in this connection, viz, (1) both the validity and invalidity of a cognition are intrinsic, (2) both are extrinsic, (3) the invalidity is intrinsic, the validity extrinsic, (4) the validity is intrinsic, the invalidity extrinsic.¹ The position that the validity of a cognition is intrinsic is rejected on the ground that in that case it should be impossible for one to be deceived in the activity one undertakes in the light of an invalid cognition, for in that case one should be automatically assured that the cognition in question is not valid; the position that the invalidity of a cognition is intrinsic is rejected on the ground that in that case it should be impossible for one to undertake an activity in the light of an invalid cognition, for in that case one should be automatically assured that the cognition in question is invalid. These two points are made by way of dismissing the first alternative.² But then the natural conclusion ought to be that the second alternative is worthy of acceptance ; and since this conclusion is not actually drawn while the second point is repeated while dismissing the third alternative,³ it is clear that the first point is here made inadvertantly. Certainly it cannot

be a Kumārilite's contention that a cognition is not intrinsically valid. While dismissing the third alternative the second point is further buttressed by arguing that the invalidity of a cognition cannot be intrinsic because this invalidity is caused when a defect is present in the concerned causal aggregate and it is known when the cognition concerned is contradicted by a subsequent cognition;⁴ in this connection the above first point is expressly repudiated by promising that it will be later argued in details why the validity of a cognition cannot be extrinsic,⁵ a repudiation further confirmed while dismissing the second alternative (which itself endorses the above second point).⁶ Then begins a detailed repudiation of the first point, that is a detailed vindication of the thesis that the validity of a cognition is intrinsic. But before all that is examined let a brief review be made of what has already been said. Thus since the first three alternatives are rejected in the above manner, the fourth turns out to be the Kumārilite's own alternative. Then what is said by way of arguing that the validity of a cognition cannot be intrinsic is something that the Kumārilite is expected to argue against; for he has to show how one is deceived in practice in case the preceding cognition happens to be invalid, it being his contention that the validity of a cognition is intrinsic. However, some clue to the working of his mind is given by how he argues that the invalidity of a cognition cannot be intrinsic. Thus to him the very fact that one undertakes activity in the light of a cognition seems to suggest that the validity of a cognition is intrinsic, a surmise to be confirmed by his detailed argumentation that is forthcoming. Then we already have some idea of what is here meant by the qualification 'extrinsic' as attributed to the validity or invalidity of a cognition. Then we have been told how the invalidity of a cognition is caused and how it is known; since this causation requires an additional factor in the form of defect the invalidity is extrinsic in one sense, since this knowledge requires the services of a subsequent cognition the invalidity is extrinsic in another sense. So the Kumārilite is expected to argue that since the causation of the validity of a cognition requires no additional factor this validity is intrinsic in one sense, since the knowledge of this validity requires no services of a subsequent cognition this validity is intrinsic in another sense, an expectation to be fulfilled by his detailed argumentation that is forthcoming. And now we can take up this argumentation itself with a view to evaluating its worth.

The Kumārilite begins by defining valid cognition (= *pramāṇa*) as 'that which reveals an object as it is', so that validity of a cognition (= *prāmāṇya*) is defined as 'being true of the object cognized'; and then it is argued that the validity of a cognition, as thus understood, is to be called extrinsic only in case it depends on something else but that in fact it does not depend on anything else.⁷ In this connection dependence on something else is sought to be understood in three senses, viz. such dependence in respect of causation, it in respect of functioning, it in respect of own-cognition;⁸ and the point is made that the validity of a cognition cannot be dependent on something else in any of these three senses. The three alternatives are considered one by one.

First is considered dependence in respect of causation. Thus one might argue that the validity of a cognition depends on something else because this cognition is produced by a causal aggregate that is something different from this cognition itself; or one might argue that the validity of a cognition depends on something else because this validity is produced by a 'merit' that is something different from the causal aggregate which goes to produce this cognition itself.⁹ The former argument will not prove that the validity of a cognition is extrinsic, for as here conceived this validity and this cognition are produced by the same 'causal aggregate'; the latter argument is untenable.¹⁰ Really, it is the latter argument that presents the *prima facie* view the Kumārilite is arguing against. Thus on his showing the 'merit' here spoken of is mythical inasmuch as the causal aggregate which produces a cognition will produce a valid cognition in case it just happens to be free of ail defect, not in case it also happens to be equipped with an alleged 'merit'.¹¹ The Kumārilite's point is that there are no three entities - viz. a cognition as such, a valid cognition, an invalid cognition - requiring three separate sorts of causal aggregate, for on his showing the same causal aggregate which when vitiated by a defect produces invalid cognition produces valid cognition when vitiated by no defect.¹² Thus the same consideration which demonstrates that the validity of a cognition is intrinsic also demonstrates that its invalidity is extrinsic.

Next is considered dependence in respect of functioning. Here the Kumārilite's simple point is that a cognition when once produced performs its proper function, viz. apprehension of the object concerned,

without requiring anything else.¹³ The point is not much important and has played no conspicuous role in the present controversy.

Lastly is considered dependence in respect of own-cognition and the most important observations are made in this connection. Here the question is whether the validity of a cognition is itself cognized through a subsequent cognition, and the Kumārilite contention is that it is not.¹⁴ For on his showing this subsequent cognition alleged to cognize the validity of a cognition could be one of the three things, viz. (1) the cognition of a 'merit' belonging to the concerned causal aggregate, (2) the cognition of an absence of contradiction, (3) the cognition of the form of confirmation.¹⁵ The first alternative is rejected on two grounds - viz. (1) there exists no 'merit' thus spoken of, (2) even if a cognition is inferred to be possessed of a merit in case it is found to produce the proper apprehension of an object, such an inference will serve no purpose if the proper apprehension of an object has already taken place while to say that this inference itself produces this proper apprehension of an object will involve mutual dependence.¹⁶ The second alternative is rejected on the ground that a temporary absence of contradiction will serve no purpose while an all time absence of contradiction can be available only to an omniscient person.¹⁷ The third alternative is rejected on three grounds, viz. (1) If by cognition of the form of confirmation is understood a subsequent cognition of the original object itself, the new cognition will be in the same boat as the original cognition and so will not go to confirm it. (2) If by cognition of the form of confirmation is understood a subsequent cognition of another object, the new cognition will have nothing to do with the original cognition and so will not go to confirm it. (3) If by cognition of the form of confirmation is understood a subsequent cognition of practical success related to the object concerned then there will arise an infinite regress inasmuch as the latter cognition will need confirmation at the hands of a third cognition and so on and so forth, there being no reason why the second cognition should require no confirmation if the first does.¹⁸ Really, the third ground considered in connection with the third alternative is most important; for a cognition is in fact proved to be valid only in case the practical activity undertaken in relation to the object concerned is found to be successful. So the Kumārilite pays special attention to this ground. Thus he is ready to give thought to the suggestion that

there is something exceptional about the cognition of successful practice, so that it stands in no need of further confirmation; but the suggestion is rejected on the ground that in dream too there takes place cognition of successful practice, a cognition so obviously illusory.¹⁹ And granting that the cognition of successful practice stands in no need of further confirmation, the point is made that this cognition serves no purpose if the original cognition without waiting for a confirmation well leads one to undertake a practical activity.²⁰ The opponent pleads : “Practical activity undertaken in the wake of a cognition is of two types—that undertaken when this cognition is had for the first time and that undertaken when it is had for another time; the former is what goes to confirm the earlier had cognition, the latter is not that. This is like a farmer first sowing a few paddy-seeds in an earthen bowl and on finding them fit later on sowing a good number of them in the open field;”²¹ the Kumārilite fails to be convinced and retorts that a cognition had for the first time and the same had for another time are absolutely in the same category so far as their alleged confirmation at the hands of a subsequent practical activity is concerned.²² The opponent pleads : “One has a cognition that is doubtful, then makes a move and then finds one’s cognition practically confirmed. For example, one hears a sound coming from a particular direction and is in doubt whether it is a singer singing or a black bee humming; then proceeding in that direction one finds that a singer is singing there;”²³ repeating his old point the Kumārilite retorts : “But in this case too the practical move is made without waiting for a confirmation which therefore serves no purpose.”²⁴ Thus the Kumārilite concludes that the validity of a cognition does not depend on something else even in respect of its own-cognition;²⁵ and since he has already proved that it does not depend on something else in respect of causation or in respect of functioning, his grand conclusion is that the validity of a cognition does not at all depend on something else.²⁶ To this is added that the invalidity of a cognition does depend on something else both in respect of causation and in respect of own-cognition ; for an invalid cognition is produced when the concerned causal aggregate is possessed of a ‘defect’ while the invalidity of this cognition is cognized when a subsequent cognition either reveals that the concerned causal aggregate is possessed of a ‘defect’ or directly contradicts the original cognition.²⁷ This is how the Kumārilite endorses the last of the four alternatives posed at the beginning of this

present enquiry – that is, the alternative that the validity of a cognition is intrinsic, its invalidity extrinsic.²⁸

In spite of all this the opponent once more pleads : “When a cognition arises it is just of the form of apprehension of an object, a form which is common to valid cognition and invalid cognition. So there does then arise a doubt as to whether this cognition is valid or invalid, and this doubt will not go unless a subsequent cognition confirms the matter one way or the other. And that means accepting the second of those four alternatives, that is, the alternative that both the validity and invalidity of a cognition are extrinsic.”²⁹ The Kumārilite remains unconvinced and retorts : “Since all cognition is in a position to impel one to undertake a practical activity without a moment’s doubt, all cognition is valid cognition as a general rule; and when a subsequent cognition proves the original cognition to be invalid it only proves that this original cognition constitutes an exceptional case.³⁰ True, there are obvious cases of doubtful cognition, but it will be unwarranted to hold that all cognition remains a doubtful cognition until confirmed by a subsequent cognition.³¹ Nay, there are even cases when one doubts whether the subsequently arisen cognition which contradicted the original cognition and thus proved it to be invalid is itself valid or not; but in such cases too a third cognition will normally decide the matter one way or the other through confirming either the original cognition or the second one; and if there is a doubt whether the third cognition is valid or not a fourth one will certainly decide the matter through confirming either the second cognition or the third one.”³² Lastly, his thesis that all cognition is intrinsically valid the Kumārilite applies to the cases of verbal testimony in general and Vedic testimony in particular. In this connection he cogitates as follows : “All cognition remains valid unless a defect is proved to have vitiated the causal aggregate that produced it. But in the case of verbal testimony the only possible defect is a defect belonging to the speaker concerned. On the other hand, the Vedas are a text that have existed there since ever without a speaker having uttered them. So what the Vedas say is automatically true.”³³ As can be seen, the whole edifice of the thesis that all cognition is intrinsically valid has been erected by the Kumārilite just to accommodate his dogma that Vedas are an absolutely infallible text. For otherwise the thesis is so palpably absurd. Certainly, it makes no sense to say that a cognition remains valid until proved to be

invalid, but this is what turns out to be the central import of the Kumārilite thesis under examination. What can at the most be said is that a cognition is believed to be valid until proved to be invalid, but even that is not correct unconditionally, as is conceded by the Kumārilite himself when he admits the possibility of cases when a cognition is believed to be doubtful. But let us see how Jayanta argues against the Kumārilite.

Jayanta begins by drawing a distinction between the everyday objects cognized through perception, inference etc. and the supersensuous objects cognized through Vedic testimony. Apparently his point is a theological point. For he insists that a decision must be made as to what ensures the validity of Vedic testimony while one might well leave undecided the question as to what ensures the validity of a perceptual cognition or the like; and he informs us that he is going to demonstrate that the validity of Vedic testimony is ensured not automatically but because of its particular origin.³⁴ However, Jayanta's present pose of modesty is deceptive inasmuch as he is now going to concentrate all attention on the question as to what ensures the validity of a perceptual cognition or the like, and this question he decides by way of refuting the Kumārilite contention that all cognition is intrinsically valid. Thus the Kumārilite has argued that the validity of a cognition is intrinsic because it cannot be extrinsic either in respect of causation or in respect of functioning or in respect of its own-cognition. Jayanta considers all the three aspects of this argument but before doing that he has undertaken an independent discussion that throws much light on the third of these aspects which is the most important one. For he asks the Kumārilite as to whether according to the latter all cognition just is valid or all cognition is cognized to be valid; the first alternative is postponed for a subsequent consideration which takes the form of meeting the Kumārilite's objections following the latter's own order of succession, the second alternative is considered here and now.³⁵ Now the Kumārilite has virtually argued (1) that all cognition is valid because all cognition is of the form of apprehension of an object and (2) that all cognition is valid because all cognition is in a position to impel one to undertake a practical activity without a moment's doubt; but he develops his case in such a manner that these arguments so crucial for the purpose are smuggled in rather than thrust to the forefront. Jayanta's present discussion has the merit of punching these two arguments in a most effective manner.

Thus he asks the Kumārilite : "When through perception a blue-patch is cognized as a blue-patch what it is that cognizes that the cognition concerned is a valid cognition ?"³⁶ On Jayanta's showing this instrument must be either a perception or an inference;³⁷ he first argues as to why it cannot be a perception, then as to why it cannot be an inference. Both arguments are formulated in terms of certain technicalities of the Kumārilite notion of *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇaphala* but their sum and substance is simple as also telling. For if the Kumārilite were to maintain that all cognition automatically grasps itself as a valid cognition then he must at least grant that all cognition automatically grasps itself, a point actually conceded by the Buddhist and the Prabhākarite and hotly contested by the Naiyāyika and the Kumārilite. Nay, while the Naiyāyika granted the possibility that a cognition can be perceived the Kumārilite did not do even that and insisted that a cognition can be cognized only by way of inference with the concerned object-cognizedness acting as probans. Keeping all this in mind Jayanta urges against the Kumārilite the following points :

- (1) A cognition cannot be perceived at all.
- (2) The concerned object-cognizedness can be cognized neither through sense-born perception nor through a *manas*-born one, and even if it is cognized through the latter that will not be a case of automatic self-cognition.
- (3) Even a *manas*-born perception of the concerned object-cognizedness cannot guarantee that the cognition concerned is valid.³⁸
- (4) There can be pointed out no probans to infer the concerned object-cognizedness in such a manner that the cognition concerned is guaranteed to be valid.
- (5) The concerned object-cognizedness can at the most act as probans for inferring the bare existence of the cognition concerned but never for inferring that this cognition is valid.³⁹

The Kumārilite pays no serious thought to these points and glibly remarks : "Experience reveals that a cognition of blue is a cognition of blue, this being all that is meant when this cognition is declared to be valid."⁴⁰ Jayanta retorts : "On this logic the cognition of nacre as silver too should be declared to be valid, for this cognition is after all a cognition of silver."⁴¹ The Kumārilite pleads : "This cognition is doubtless invalid because a subsequently arisen cognition contra-

dicts it. But owing to that it will not be proper to entertain doubt about the validity of any and every cognition.”⁴² Jayanta retorts : “That means that the cognition of the validity of a cognition is not something automatic but something dependent on the cognition of an absence of contradiction. Certainly, if a cognition is cognized to be valid as soon as it is born, then we should never be deceived in our practice undertaken on the basis of this cognition. But since we are actually often thus deceived, it means that a cognition is not cognized to be valid as soon as it is born, while we undertake practice on the basis of a cognition while doubt yet persists about its validity.”⁴³ This is the most crucial consideration and should refute the Kumārilite’s argument that all cognition is cognized to be valid because all cognition can possibly impel one to undertake practical activity. But he pleads : “One does not experience doubt when one cognizes nacre as silver and undertakes activity on the basis of this cognition, it being impossible to undertake activity on the basis of a cognition that is recognized to be doubtful. Why then unnecessarily posit doubt in a case where no doubt is actually experienced ?”⁴⁴ Thus for the Kumārilite a cognition is valid simply in case no doubt happens to be entertained about its validity. So Jayanta proceeds to explain : “True, a doubt generally involves a consideration of two possibilities, which is not the case when nacre is cognized as silver. But since subsequent practice proves this cognition to be invalid, the presumption is necessary that this practice was undertaken when there was yet doubt about the validity of this cognition. Certainly if this cognition when it was born was valid and was cognized to be valid then the subsequent deception in practice would have been impossible; on the other hand, if it was then cognized to be invalid then no practice would have been possible at all.”⁴⁵ Jayanta’s point is that in case a cognition is neither cognized as valid nor cognized as invalid the meaning is that it is cognized as doubtful; (while making this point Jayanta refers to the Kumārilite’s own contention that a cognition at the time when it is born is cognized neither as valid nor as invalid, a contention partly a product of inadvertence).⁴⁶ Jayanta concedes that the doubt concerned is not experienced consciously but he insists that, objectively speaking, not to be sure about the validity of a cognition is to be doubtful about its validity; on his showing, the ground for this doubt is the circumstance that a cognition, whether valid or otherwise, is of the form of apprehension of an object while at the

time this cognition is had there are noticed in it no features which should mark out a valid cognition from an invalid one.⁴⁷ The Kumārilite feels otherwise and submits that there are certain features specific to valid cognition which are noticed as soon as it is born; Jayanta challenges him to point out a single such feature.⁴⁸ As Jayanta in effect argues, such a feature cannot be 'lucidity', 'absence of a feeling of doubt', 'not encountering a contradiction', or 'being true of its object', for the first two might be present in all cognition whether valid or not while the last two are not noticed at the time when a cognition is born.⁴⁹ To this is added that if there really were any features that are specific to valid cognition one should never act on the basis of an invalid cognition and find oneself deceived.⁵⁰ This is how Jayanta argues that practical activity is well possible on the basis of a doubtful cognition.⁵¹ But he hastens to add : "Of course, we too do not advocate an all-out prevalence of doubt. For our only point is that it is impossible to cognize the validity of a cognition at the very time when it is born."⁵² Thus closes Jayanta's independent discussion of the Kumārilite thesis that all cognition is intrinsically valid; then comes a discussion of the same following the Kumārilite's own order of exposition.

Jayanta undertakes to refute the three aspects of the Kumārilite's contention that the validity of a cognition cannot be extrinsic; for the latter has argued that it cannot be extrinsic in respect of causation, in respect of functioning, in respect of own-cognition. Thus Jayanta argues that the validity of a cognition is extrinsic in respect of causation because the causal aggregate which produces a cognition produces a valid cognition when containing a 'merit', just as on the Kumārilite's own showing it produces an invalid cognition when containing a 'defect'.⁵³ The argument is of doubtful cogency because a 'merit' thus spoken of is really mythical, as the Kumārilite has pointed out for his own reasons. Really, both the Kumārilite and Jayanta are conceding that there are only two types of cases when a cognition is produced, both calling them the cases of valid cognition and the cases of invalid cognition and both maintaining that the latter type of cases presuppose the presence of a 'defect' in the concerned causal aggregate. But from the fact that there are no third type of cases when a cognition as such is produced, the Kumārilite draws the false conclusion that a cognition as such is a valid cognition. For 'a cognition as such' thus spoken of is mythical. On the other hand,

from the fact that in the cases of invalid cognition the concerned causal aggregate contains a 'defect' Jayanta drawn the false conclusion that in the cases of valid cognition the concerned causal aggregate contains a 'merit'. For a 'merit' as thus spoken of is mythical. As a matter of fact, the concerned causal aggregate produces valid cognition when it happens to be free from all defect, it produces invalid cognition when it happens to be suffering from a defect. Then Jayanta argues that the validity of a cognition is extrinsic in respect of functioning because each member of the concerned causal aggregate depends on every other member of this aggregate, he having conceded that this aggregate as a whole does not depend on anything else.⁵⁴ It is doubtful whether the Kumārilite had all this in mind when he spoke of the validity of a cognition being not extrinsic in respect of functioning. For his only point was that a cognition when once produced performs its proper function - viz, apprehension of the object concerned - without requiring anything else, a point Jayanta concedes without fearing any danger to his own position.⁵⁵ In any case, the point is not important. Lastly Jayanta argues that the validity of a cognition is extrinsic in respect of its own-cognition because this validity is cognized through the instrumentality of another cognition arisen subsequently. This is the most important aspect of the problem and is developed in details, but this aspect was already well covered by Jayanta's earlier independent discussion of the problem. So picking up his threads Jayanta now argues that if it is granted that the validity of a cognition is cognized not at all then there is no option to further granting that it is cognized through the instrumentality of another cognition arisen subsequently, his point being the old point that a cognition at the very time when it arises is not cognized to be valid.⁵⁶ This time Jayanta explicitly contends that a cognition is cognized to be valid when it is found to give rise to successful practice.⁵⁷ But then the Kumārilite has argued against a contention like that, and Jayanta proceeds to argue against his argument. First of all, a flimsy point is disposed of. Thus the Kumārilite says : "A cognition being something momentary it is already past when its validity is sought to be tested; so whose validity it is that is being tested ?"; Jayanta retorts : "That is childish talk. For the same thing can be said also about the testing of the invalidity of a cognition, a testing which you yourself consider possible."⁵⁸ Then begins a serious consideration of the difficulties urged by the Kumārilite. Thus the Kumārilite has argued that if one already

undertakes an activity on the basis of a cognition, then a subsequent testing of its validity serves no purpose; Jayanta retorts : "Yes, one can undertake an activity even on the basis of a doubtful cognition. But by realizing that the validity of a cognition is not automatic but is tested on the basis of some criterion one becomes convinced that the validity of a verbal testimony in general and Vedic testimony in particular is to be tested on the basis of whether the speaker concerned is or is not an authoritative person."⁵⁹ Jayanta's point is essentially valid but its theological motivation is noteworthy. Really, a cognition derived from verbal testimony is no exception to the general rule that in the final count its validity has to be tested by applying the criterion of successful practice. But a theologian inevitably deals with so many supersensuous things in whose case there arises no question of applying the criterion of successful practice. So Jayanta the theologian argues that in the case of verbal testimony the criterion for testing the validity of a cognition is whether the speaker concerned is an authoritative person, just as in the case of perception, inference etc. it is whether the concerned subsequent practice is successful. However, another noteworthy thing is that throughout the present discussion Jayanta is concentrating his attention on the cases of everyday cognition had through perception, inference etc. In any case, Jayanta next considers the Kumārilite's objection that if all cognition is to be tested by applying a criterion then the cognition of successful practice too should be tested likewise, which will lead to an infinite regress; Jayanta retorts : "It goes counter to all common experience that the cognition of successful practice too should stand in need of further testing. For certainly, at the time of experiencing successful practice in relation to an object one has no doubt whatsoever that one is actually experiencing successful practice. So there arises no question of testing the validity of a cognition having successful practice for its object, just as it arises in the case of the cognition of an original object."⁶⁰ Towards the close of his argumentation Jayanta says that the cognition of successful practice is such a distinct type of cognition that its validity is self-obvious.⁶¹ The Kumārilite asks : "What is distinctive about this cognition ?"; Jayanta replies : "Such a cognition is never had in the presence of illusory objects"; the Kumārilite objects : "But one does have such a cognition during a dream where the objects cognized are all illusory"; Jayanta retorts : "During waking time one has an indubitable realization that one is

not dreaming but is wide awake. And the cognition of successful practice had during that time is really of a distinct type inasmuch as such a cognition is never had in the presence of illusory objects.”⁶² To this is added that the cognition of successful practice can be proved to be valid also as a result of examining the causal aggregate that produced this cognition and finding it all proper, in this connection quoting the Kumārilite’s own contention that one should not doubt the validity of a cognition in case even best efforts reveal no defect in the causal aggregate that produced the cognition.⁶³ The Kumārilite asks : “Then why not test the validity of the original cognition itself rather than that of the cognition of successful practice ?”; Jayanta taunts : “Will that prove that the original cognition was valid automatically ? The fact of the matter is that people do not pause to test the validity of a cognition as it arises but straightaway undertake an activity on its basis and then see whether this activity is successful or not.”⁶⁴ Lastly, it is argued that since all are agreed as to what distinguishes a valid cognition from an invalid cognition it should not be impossible to decide about a given cognition whether it is valid or invalid, this being Jayanta’s answer to the Kumārilite who has argued that an infinite regress must be the result in case one cognition is tested by another, the second by a third and so on and so forth.⁶⁵ Thus closes Jayanta’s criticism of the Kumārilite thesis that all cognition is intrinsically valid. On the whole, he has been able to demonstrate that no cognition whatsoever—not certainly any and every cognition,—has a right to be declared valid without being tested through the application of an appropriate criterion (in the final count, the criterion of successful practice).

Jayanta next criticizes the Prabhākarite version of the Mīmāṃsā thesis that all cognition is intrinsically valid. Here again the Prabhākarite’s case is presented first and refuted afterwards. But the Prabhākarite himself presents his case after having first criticized the rival alternatives – first of all, the Nyāya alternative. Thus the Prabhākarite begins by complaining against the Kumārilite that the latter plays into the hands of the Naiyāyika by granting the possibility of there being cases of invalid cognition, the former’s own position being that all cognition is valid in the literal sense of the term and not in the Kumārilite sense that it is valid until proved to be invalid.⁶⁶ In this connection the Prabhākarite’s word for invalid cognition is *bādhya-bodha* which might be literally translated as cognition liable

to cancellation; so he is presently contending that there is nothing like a cognition liable to cancellation. The opponent asks : "Why so ? After all, there are so many cognitions which stand cancelled at the hands of a subsequent cognition; e.g. the cognition of nacre as silver (symbolically Cs) is cancelled by the subsequent cognition of nacre as nacre (symbolically Cn)."⁶⁷ The Prabhākarite answers by considering several alternative senses in which cancellation can be understood and arguing that in none of these senses can Cs receive cancellation at the hands of Cn; (for the sake of convenience let us presume that Cn arises immediately after Cs).⁶⁸ This as follows :

- (1) Cs is destroyed by Cn : Being momentary every cognition is destroyed by the immediately forthcoming cognition.⁶⁹
- (2) Cs does not co-exist with Cn : Being momentary no cognition can co-exist with another cognition.⁷⁰
- (3) The impression left by Cs is destroyed : That might possibly happen in the case of any cognition; again, that might possibly not happen in the case of Cs itself.⁷¹
- (4) The object of Cs is taken away : That is impossible; for the object of a cognition is what is reflected in it and the rise of Cn cannot bring it about that what was reflected in Cs was not reflected in it.⁷²
- (5) The absence of the object of Cs is cognized : It is not always the case that the cognition of absence of x cancels the cognition of x ; for x might exist at the time t_1 and absence of x at the time t_2 . And even if one cognition is to the effect that x exists at the time t_1 and another to the effect that absence of x exists at the time t_1 then too it might be that both x and absence of x exist at the time t_1 .⁷³
- (6) The result associated with Cs is taken away : (i) If by the result is understood Cs itself inasmuch as it is a result produced by the *pramāṇa* concerned then there is no question of this result being taken away, for Cs has already come into existence. (ii) If by the result is understood the activity undertaken on the basis of Cs then even if this activity is taken away in the sense that it proves fruitless the character of Cs is not affected thereby.⁷⁴

While considering the above alternatives the Prabhākarite has generally argued that no cognition can be said to be cancelled by

another cognition (that Cs is not cancelled by Cn is a corollary of this general argument). So to all this is added the consideration that if two cognitions pertain to the same object then too the later one does not cancel the earlier one while if they pertain to two different objects then there is no question of the later one cancelling the earlier one.⁷⁵ Similarly it is added that it might make some sense to say that an earlier cognition cancels the later one because the earlier one is well established by the time the later one arrives on the scene but that it makes no sense to say the opposite—which is what is said usually.⁷⁶ The opponent feels unconvinced by what the Prabhākarite has thus argued at so much length; so the former simply asks : “If there is no cancellation of one cognition at the hands of another, then do you mean to say that the false cognitions like Cs remain ever uncanceled ?”⁷⁷ The Prabhākarite coolly replies : “There exists nothing like a false cognition, because nothing conceivably can produce such a cognition. Certainly, sense-organs etc. produce a cognition in case they are non-defective, they do not produce a cognition in case they are defective, but there is no question of their producing a thing like false cognition, just as a paddy-seed produces a paddy-plant in case it is non-defective, it does not produce a paddy-plant in case it is defective, but there is no question of it producing a barley-plant.”⁷⁸ The opponent still asks : “Does this mean that Cs is a case of true cognition ?”⁷⁹ The Prabhākarite replies : “That too is not correct. For as a matter of fact, Cs is not one cognition but an amalgam of two cognitions – one of the form of a fresh cognition, the other of the form of a memory. The fresh cognition in question has for its object the before-lying ‘it’ which happens to be a glittering object; but this fresh cognition generates a memory of silver which too was earlier cognized as associated with a glittering appearance. That this cognition of silver is a case of memory is proved from the fact that it does not occur in the case of a person who has never cognized silver, nor in the case of one who is not presently cognizing something similar to silver. However, even if actually a case of memory this cognition does not reveal itself as a case of memory and so is to be treated as a case of nullified-memory. And when there arises such a case of nullified-memory its distinction from the simultaneously occurring fresh cognition fails to be apprehended (hence the feeling that ‘it’ as well as ‘silver’ are an object of fresh cognition).”⁸⁰ Here we get in a nutshell what the Prabhākarite has to say against the rival theories of what according to them

constitutes false cognition, as also what he has to say about his own positive theory according to which an alleged case of false cognition is a case of not apprehending the distinction between a fresh cognition and a memory. But before presenting the details of his theory the Prabhākarite subjects to some further criticism the rival theories, this time using a technical terminology that was then current. Thus according to one theory a false cognition cognizes as one thing what is in fact another thing, according to another it cognizes as something what is in fact nothing, according to a third it cognizes as an external object what is in fact a mental state. In technical language the first was called *viparītakhyāti* (= apprehension of something different), the second *asatkhyāti* (= apprehension of something nonexistent), the third *ātmakhyāti* (= apprehension of something mental); and to them was to be added the Prabhākarite's own theory called *akhyāti* (= non-apprehension).⁸¹ The first theory was advocated by the Naiyāyika while the other two came from the illusionist-idealist circles. The Prabhākarite here criticises the first theory and then adds that the other two are also not satisfactory, he having a theory of his own; Jayanta, on his part, will answer the criticism thus levelled against the first theory.

His criticism of the first theory according to which a false cognition cognizes x as not- x , the Prabhākarite begins by referring to the already made point that nothing conceivably can produce a false cognition.⁸² Then he considers three ways in which this theory can conceive false cognition understood as a cognition of x as not- x , viz. (i) it cognizes a not- x existing at another place and time, (ii) it cognizes x which has concealed its own form and assumed the form of a not- x , (iii) it cognizes x but what is reflected in it is a not- x .⁸³ The first alternative is dismissed on the ground that it virtually amounts to accepting the second theory according to which a false cognition cognizes something non-existent; for after all a not- x is something non-existent where it is cognized to exist.⁸⁴ The plea that a not- x exists at another place and time is rejected on the ground that what matters is that a not- x does not exist where it is cognized to exist, also on the ground that difficulties arise whether it is admitted that the place and time in question are cognized or it is admitted that the new place and time are cognized.⁸⁵ The plea that a not- x is recalled is rejected on the ground that in that case there is nothing false about this cognition, also on the ground that to admit that a recalled

not- x is cognized here and now again virtually amounts to accepting the second theory.⁸⁶ Then criticism is directed against the second alternative according to which a false cognition cognizes x which has concealed its own form and assumed the form of a not- x . There it is asked as to what is revealed in this cognition – x or not- x ; if x then this is no false cognition, if not- x then there is no use saying that this not- x is in fact x .⁸⁷ The suggestion that the subsequently arising cognition which cancels this cognition proves that this not- x is in fact x is rejected on the ground that this later cognition might well prove that a not- x did not exist there when that earlier cognition took place but it cannot prove that a not- x was not revealed in that earlier cognition, also on the ground that on this logic one cannot point out the object of a false cognition which happens not to be cancelled by a later cognition.⁸⁸ Lastly is criticized the third alternative according to which a false cognition cognizes x but what is reflected in it is a not- x . Thus it is argued that a cognition cognizes what is reflected in it and not what just happens to be nearby when this cognition takes place, so that if a not- x is reflected in a cognition a not- x it is that this cognition cognizes even if x happens to be nearby at the time.⁸⁹ Thus on the Prabhākaraite's showing, since the first theory maintains that a false cognition cognizes a non-existent not- x where x in fact exists it is no better than the second theory.⁹⁰

Then is criticized the second theory according to which a false cognition cognizes as something what is in fact nothing. The opponent is asked as to whether a false cognition cognizes something that does not exist at all or something that exists elsewhere; in the latter case his theory becomes one with the first theory, in the former case it is palpably untenable inasmuch as one cannot cognize a thing like sky-lotus that does not exist at all.⁹¹ The suggestion that a past 'impression' might make possible the cognition of an utterly non-existent thing is rejected on the ground that an 'impression' itself is always generated by a cognition that has got something existent for its object.⁹² And granting that a past impression might make possible the cognition of an utterly non-existent thing it is argued that in that case one must sometimes have a false cognition of sky-lotus just as one sometimes has a false cognition of silver.⁹³

Lastly is criticized the third theory according to which a false cognition cognizes as an external object what is in fact a mental state.

Thus the opponent is told that in that case a false cognition should be to the effect 'I am such and such a not- x ' – not to the effect 'This thing is such and such a not- x '.⁹⁴ To this is added that this third theory becomes one with the first if expressed in the form 'a false cognition cognizes a mental state as an external object', it becomes one with the second if expressed in the form 'a false cognition cognizes a mental state as having become an external object though in fact a mental state never becomes an external object';⁹⁵ the second contingency cannot be avoided by pleading that a mental state exists after all, for what matters is whether it exists as an external object.⁹⁶

Thus after criticizing the three current theories which somehow or other grant the possibility of a false cognition (and having shown that the three involve each other) the Prabhākarite elaborates his own theory which grants no such possibility.⁹⁷ Thus on the Prabhākarite's showing, in an alleged case of false cognition there really takes place a fresh cognition and a memory but owing to the circumstance that this memory is not recognized as a memory there is not apprehended the distinction obtaining between this memory and this fresh cognition, with the result that the whole operation assumes the form of two fresh cognitions not distinguished from one another. So he begins by pointing out that his thesis on 'non-apprehension' is somehow or other accepted by the advocates of the other three theories as well.⁹⁸ For example, in an alleged case of false cognition there is involved according to the third theory a non-apprehension of the distinction that obtains between a mental state and an external object, according to the second theory a non-apprehension of the distinction that obtains between an utterly non-existent thing and an existent thing, according to the first theory a memory that is not apprehended as a memory; certainly, the first theory must admit that the cognition of x as a not- x is impossible unless this not- x is recalled while at the same time it is not realized that this not- x is something just recalled, not something freshly cognized.⁹⁹ The opponent pleads : "In a false cognition there might be no conscious realization that a not- x is something just recalled but here there is a conscious realization that a before-lying object is freshly cognized. Why then say that here there is not apprehended the distinction obtaining between a fresh cognition and a memory ?"¹⁰⁰ The Prabhākarite replies : "Here there is no clear realization that a before-lying object is freshly cognized, for in that case x would have been cognized as x inasmuch as the before-lying

object is *x*. So what happens is that *x* is freshly cognized and a not-*x* is recalled while there is not apprehended the distinction obtaining between this fresh cognition and this memory.”¹⁰¹ The opponent pleads : “To say that the distinction in question is not apprehended is to say that *x* is cognized as not-*x*.”¹⁰² The Prabhākarite replies : “To admit that would amount to accepting the first theory. So let us only admit that here the distinction is not realized that *x* is something freshly cognized, not-*x* something just recalled. That is why mistaken are those of our own colleagues who submit that here there ultimately takes place a single consideration to the effect ‘this thing is a not-*x*’; for to submit that would amount to accepting the first theory.”¹⁰³ The opponent asks : “But then how to explain the fact that a subsequent cognition of *x* as *x* cancels the earlier cognition of *x* and a not-*x* ?”¹⁰⁴ The Prabhākarite replies : “There takes place no cancellation that way. What happens is that the distinction which was earlier not apprehended is apprehended subsequently and one says : ‘So this thing is not a not-*x*. This thing is this thing, a not-*x* is a not-*x*’.”¹⁰⁵ Lastly, the opponent asks : “But how will that sort of explanation apply to a case like dream-cognition ?”¹⁰⁶ The Prabhākarite replies : “In dream there just takes place a memory which is not apprehended as a memory. Certainly, an appropriate cause can generate memory during sleep too.”¹⁰⁷ The opponent objects : “But even this sort of explanation will not apply to the cases of there being seen two moons, sugar tasting bitter, etc. etc.”¹⁰⁸ The Prabhākarite replies : “Even in such cases what happens is that owing to some reason or other there fails to take place the usually expected cognition. Thus an eye might become defective so that instead of seeing oneness belonging to the moon it sees twoness belonging to its own ‘emanation’, a tongue might become so defective that instead of tasting sweetness belonging to sugar it tastes bitterness belonging to the bile present in this tongue itself.”¹⁰⁹ This whole enquiry the Prabhākarite concludes by arguing that since there thus exists nothing like a false cognition all cognition is intrinsically valid, so that the cognition generated by a Vedic sentence too is intrinsically valid.¹¹⁰ This Prabhākarite version of the thesis that all cognition is intrinsically valid is as much bewildering as was its Kumārilite version. That both versions are theologically motivated goes without saying, the thesis itself being so motivated. But the way empirical evidence is adduced by way of vindicating the two versions is noteworthy. For the present we confine our attention to the

Prabhākarite version. The Prabhākarite divides all cases of cognition into the cases of fresh cognition and the cases of memory, and then divides the former into cases of perception, those of inference, those of verbal testimony etc. But in all this the Naiyāyika and the Kumārīlīte too will agree with him; the difference arises when unlike those two he refuses to grant that a fresh cognition might be true or false. Thus he would have us believe that a case of perception, inference, verbal testimony or the like is necessarily a case of true cognition. This stand of his is obviously untenable inasmuch as perception, inference, verbal testimony or the like might be true or it might be false. The anomaly remains somewhat concealed because in this connection all attention is devoted to the cases of perception and it is really somewhat of a problem as to how a true perceptual cognition differs from a false one; even so, it has to be kept in mind that the Prabhākarite stands committed to maintain that not only a case of perception but so also a case of inference, verbal testimony or the like is necessarily a case of true cognition. However, the Prabhākarite is wrong also in denying that there are perceptions that are false, but in this connection his task was somewhat facilitated by the way the problem was viewed by the Naiyāyika and the Kumārīlīte. For the latter submitted that true perception takes place when a sense-organ comes in contact with an object which might be of the form of a substance, quality, action or the like and notices the 'universal' concerned residing in this object; but this way of looking at things prevented them from offering a corresponding explanation for false perceptions. For they could not say that in a false perception too there is noticed a 'universal' residing in the object with which a sense-organ comes in contact; thus they would maintain that in a false perception a sense-organ comes in contact with the object x and then for certain definite reasons recalling an object not- x perceives x as not- x . Now the Prabhākarite took advantage of this discrepancy and contended that 'perception of x as not- x ' thus spoken of is a myth. In this connection he totally endorsed the above account of true perception but argued that this precisely is the reason why the 'perception of x as not- x ' is an impossibility; so what others called 'perception of x as not- x ' he called 'an indiscriminate amalgam of a semi-perception of x and a semi-memory of not- x '. The only way to repudiate this mumbo-jumbo of his was to recognize that 'perception of x as x ' and 'perception of x as not- x ' are two essentially similar processes, that precisely being

why both are to be called 'perception' even if the former 'true perception' the latter 'false perception'. Thus when in the object x there are observed certain features which are characteristic of x and x alone and on the basis of this observation this object is identified as x we have a case of 'perception of x as x (= true perception of x)'; on the other hand, when in the object x there are observed certain features which are characteristic not only of x but also of a not- x and on the basis of this observation this object is identified as this not- x we have a case of 'perception of x as a not- x (=false perception of x = false perception of a not- x)'. The fact that the Naiyāyika and the Kumārīlite gave due importance to the role of memory while explaining a case of false perception but not while explaining a case of true perception emboldened the Prabhākārite to contend that an alleged case of false perception is not at all a case of perception but a case of 'a perception and a memory not distinguished from one another.' Be that as it may, let us see how Jayanta meets the Prabhākārite's challenge.

Jayanta begins by arguing that 'perception of x as x ' and 'perception of x as not- x ' both are a unitary cognition and both are of the form of a perception, thus taking exception to the Prabhākārite's contention that 'perception of x as not- x ' is an amalgam of a perception of x and a memory of not- x where the memory fails to be recognized as a memory; Jayanta's point is that even in this case immediate introspection reveals that what is being experienced is a unitary cognition of the form of perception, this cognition being a cognition to the effect 'the before-lying object which exhibits such and such features is not- x '.¹¹¹ Jayanta thus evinces clear enough realization as to where lies the crux of the problem - that is, in admitting that true perception and false perception are an essentially similar sort of cognitive operations; (the only pity is that his own account of perception does not clearly bring out that 'perception of x as x ' is a cognition to the effect 'the before-lying object which exhibits such and such features is x ', for in that connection his emphasis would be on the idea that here the word concerned is recalled and the 'universal' concerned is noticed). However, before developing his argument based on this consideration Jayanta thinks it profitable to remind the Prabhākārite that on the latter's showing all cognition is necessarily self-cognition, so that it should be impossible for a memory not to be recognized as a memory.¹¹² Really, the thesis of

self-cognitive cognition has been adopted by the Prabhākarite in imitation of the Buddhist but without any intention of drawing from it so many far-reaching conclusions in the manner of the Buddhist; even so, Jayanta's point has its own weight. Then coming to the main point Jayanta asks the Prabhākarite that if perception of x has really taken place, then where is the occasion for a memory of a not- x and that even if for some reason such a memory takes place where is the occasion for saying about x that it is a not- x .¹¹³ The Prabhākaritē pleads that here perception of x takes place in the form of 'perception of a something' not in the form of 'perception of x as possessed of its characteristic features'; Jayanta retorts : "This means that here there are first noticed features common to x and a not- x , then the not- x is recalled, and lastly there results a false cognition to the effect 'the before-lying object is a not- x '. Apparently, this cognition is a unitary cognition. And it is of the form of a perception because while acting on its basis one acts under the impression that one has perceived a not- x ."¹¹⁴ The Prabhākarite pleads : "One here acts as a result of having failed to distinguish between the memory concerned and the fresh cognition concerned"; Jayanta taunts : "This idea you have stolen from the house of Dharmakīrti who says that one acts as a result of having identified the thing perceived with the thing thought. But this theft would serve no purpose. For one might ask Dharmakīrti as to how one can act unless one realizes that one has cognized the perceived object, and one might ask you as to how one can act unless one realizes that one has cognized a before-lying not- x . So what here takes place is 'perception of a not- x ' not just 'memory of a not- x '".¹¹⁵ Jayanta's reference to Dharmakīrti is somewhat pertinent, for as in several other cases here too the Prabhākarite has worked under the shadow of a corresponding Buddhist speculation. The Buddhist draws a sharp distinction between things perceived and things thought and then contends that ordinary people act as if there exists no such distinction; the Prabhākarite contends that in an alleged case of false perception there is a distinction between the thing perceived and the thing recalled even if the person concerned acts as if there exists no such distinction. For the rest, the two lines of thought have been pursued in two very different contexts and with a view to serving two very different purposes. In any case, the Prabhākarite pleads : "But while explaining what you call 'perception of x as not- x ' you too assign a role to memory"; Jayanta retorts : "Yes, here there does take place a memory

of the specific features of a not-*x*, just as when one is in doubt whether the before-lying object is *x* or a not-*x* there take place a memory of the specific features of *x* and a memory of the specific features of a not-*x*. That is why this mis-perception or this doubt fails to arise in one who has no prior cognition of the not-*x* concerned. However, it is not enough to say that a memory takes place in all case of misperception (or doubt); for what is necessary is to show how this memory gives rise to a unitary cognition of the form of misperception (or doubt)".¹¹⁶ Jayanta's point is almost all valid; but he has to realize that the sort of explanation he is here offering for the cases of misperception and doubt should have been offered also for the cases of true perception. For 'true perception of *x*' takes place when there are observed in a before-lying object features exclusive to *x* and on the basis of this observation this object is identified as *x*, 'perception of *x* as a not-*x*' when there are observed in a before-lying object features common to *x* and a not-*x* and on the basis of this observation this object is wrongly identified as a not-*x* (in this case even if the object is identified as *x*, that will be a case of 'true perception of *x*' by accident); 'doubtful perception of either *x* or a not-*x*' when there are observed in a before-lying object features common to *x* and a not-*x* but on the basis of this observation this object is not identified either as *x* or as a not-*x* while leaving both possibilities open. Had Jayanta put matters in this way he could convincingly say to the Prabhākarite : "The mere occurrence of a memory does not convert a case of misperception into a case of memory just as it does not convert a case of true perception into a case of memory"; but as things stood, both Jayanta and the Prabhākarite shared a view of true perception that underplayed the role of memory. This becomes further evident from Jayanta's consideration of another objection raised by the Prabhākarite. Thus the latter argues : "The causal aggregate which, when free from defect, produces a true perception will fail to produce it in case it happens to suffer from a defect. But there is no sense in saying that in the latter case there is produced a false perception"; this argument clearly presupposes that a sense-organ produces true perception without the involvement of an element of memory but this presupposition is shared by Jayanta himself and so he has to reply by saying : "A defective sense-organ, even while coming in contact with *x*, produces false perception of a not-*x* when assisted by the memory of this not-*x*, which memory in turn takes place on account

of there being noticed in x certain features which it shares with this not- x .”¹¹⁷ The Prabhākarite could argue back with some plausibility : “Since true perception involves no element of memory, a cognitive operation that involves an element of memory is no sort of perception.” As a matter of fact, even a true perception is not caused by a sense-organ alone but by it as assisted by a relevant memory; on the other hand, even a non-defective sense-organ might produce a false perception in case there has been made no proper use of a relevant memory. So what is essential to all perception is the memory-based identification of sense-contacted object; in the case of true perception this identification is correct, in the case of false perception it is incorrect. And it is a relatively minor matter that in the case of a false perception the sense-organ is often defective. But since Jayanta virtually treats a non-defective sense-organ as the sole cause of true perception he is bound to speak as if a false perception must be produced by a defective sense-organ; on the other hand, in the case of a false perception he assigns a role to memory because that seems unavoidable, but in the case of true perception he does nothing of the sort. Little wonder, citing an illustration the Prabhākarite argues : “A defective paddy-seed certainly fails to produce a paddy-plant but that does not mean that it will produce a barley-plant;” and citing a counter-illustration Jayanta retorts : “A defective paddy-seed might not produce a paddy-plant but it will certainly produce a cake though not much tasty.”¹¹⁸ Clearly, the Prabhākarite demands a closer similarity between a true perception and a false perception than Jayanta is ready to concede; and the remedy lies in properly correcting the faulty view of true perception that is common to both the Prabhākarite and Jayanta.

Then Jayanta criticizes the Prabhākarite understanding of a case of false cognition like dream, seeing of two moons, finding sugar bitter in taste, etc. Thus the Prabhākarite says that in dream there takes place a memory which is not recognized as a memory; Jayanta retorts : “Even such things are seen in dream as were never experienced earlier; so how can that be a case of memory ?”¹¹⁹ Similarly, the Prabhākarite says that an eye that sees two moons becomes so defective that instead of seeing oneness belonging to the moon it sees twoness belonging to its own ‘emanation’; Jayanta retorts : “An eye’s ‘emanation’ is something inherently imperceptible and so the explanation offered is no proper explanation. Moreover, do you mean

to say that an eye that sees one moon, sees not the moon but its own 'emanation' ? (That at the time of seeing, an 'emanation' proceeds from the eye towards the thing seen is a position common to both the Prabhākarite and Jayanta).¹²⁰ Lastly, the Prabhākarite says that the tongue that finds sugar bitter in taste becomes so defective that instead of tasting sweetness belonging to sugar it tastes bitterness belonging to the bile present in the tongue itself; Jayanta retorts : "One can understand if bitterness belonging to the bile is not tasted as belonging to this bile; but why is it tasted as belonging to sugar ? Moreover, the bile produces illusory cognition without itself being tasted just as fever produces headache without itself being experienced."¹²¹ Really, in all case of false perception a sensory experience is made the basis for wrongly identifying the object concerned; when the concerned physical conditions are somehow abnormal (e.g. when the sense-organ concerned is defective) the root of wrong identification lies in the abnormal nature of the concerned sense-experience itself, but wrong identification is well possible even in case there is nothing abnormal about the concerned sensory experience. Viewed in this light there is nothing mysterious about the cases of false perception just as there is nothing mysterious about the cases of true perception; but the former cases have assumed the appearance of a mystery simply because both the Prabhākarite and Jayanta conceive them as so much unlike the latter cases.

Jayanta next answers the Prabhākarite's criticism of those three alternatives in terms of which the Naiyāyika explains a case of 'false cognition of *x* as not-*x*';¹²² each alternative is taken up by turn and each defended as follows :

- (i) It cognizes a not-*x* existing at another place and time : You object that this amounts to saying that it cognizes an utterly non-existent thing, but there is an obvious difference between a thing existing at another place and time and an utterly non-existent thing.¹²³ Then you say that a not-*x* not present there cannot produce cognition concerning itself, but there is no need for this not-*x* to be present there; what happens is that on account of a similarity obtaining between this not-*x* and *x* which is actually present there this not-*x* occurs to mind when *x* is observed.¹²⁴
- (ii) It cognizes *x* which has concealed its own form and assumed the form of a not-*x* : You say that such a thing is impossible, but there is nothing impossible about it.¹²⁵ It cognizes *x* because

x is present there, but since x is not cognized as x we say that x has concealed its own form; similarly, since x is cognized as a not- x we say that x has assumed the form of this not- x .¹²⁶ This is what obviously takes place whenever x is misperceived to be a not- x .¹²⁷

- (iii) It cognizes x but what is reflected in it is a not- x : You say that such a thing too is impossible, but there is nothing impossible about it too. It cognizes x because x is what is pointed out – not because x is what just happens to be present nearby; (and since x is cognized as a not- x we say that what is reflected in it is a not- x).¹²⁸

Jayanta's defence is essentially valid but the Prabhākarite's criticism is very much misconceived; for the latter just refuses to see that there are cases of false cognition.

Lastly, Jayanta answers the objections raised by the Prabhākarite against the very possibility of one cognition being cancelled by another. In this connection the latter had considered so many alternative meanings possibly attributed to the word 'cancellation', but Jayanta refuses to take notice of them all except one.¹²⁹ Thus on Jayanta's showing when the cognition C_s is cancelled by the later arisen cognition C_n the latter takes away what happens to be the former's object – where 'taking away' does not mean the undoing of the fact that the former cognition had cognized its object, but the establishment of the fact that this object is something non-existent; again, what is established is not the fact that this object does not exist at the time when C_n occurs but that it did not exist at the time when C_s occurred – moreover, this non-existence then was such that it ruled out the possibility of a simultaneous existence as well.¹³⁰ The suggestion that a present cognition cannot establish a past non-existence is dismissed as obviously untenable – a further criticism of it promised while refuting momentarism.¹³¹ The suggestion that an earlier cognition since it is something already well-established cannot be cancelled by a later coming new cognition is dismissed on the ground that the later cognition is in a better position to take note of the situation concerned.¹³² In all this again Jayanta is making an essentially valid defence while the Prabhākarite's original criticism is very much misconceived. For the simple fact is that there are cases of one cognition cancelling another.

[In passing Jayanta refutes a fantastic view upheld by certain Mīmāṃsakas according to which the nacre-mistaken-to-be-silver is really silver though of an extraordinary type contrasted to the ordinary type of silver.¹³³ The refutation obviously makes sense, but the mere existence of a view like that goes to show that their infatuation with the dogma that all cognition is intrinsically valid misled the Mīmāṃsakas to commit all sorts of ideological follies.]

By now Jayanta has completed his discussion of the question whether the validity of cognition is intrinsic (and with it his discussion of the most important problems of logic), but he has yet to make transition to his discussion of the question whether God exists and to his discussion of the question whether a word is an eternal verity – two considerably lengthy ontological discussions covering the rest of Āhnika III. This transition is made by way of arguing that whatever be the case with the other types of cognition, a cognition born of verbal testimony is valid not intrinsically but only in case the speaker concerned is an authoritative person.¹³⁴ More particularly it is argued that a Vedic testimony is valid because the author of Vedas is God, the supreme authority on matters religious.¹³⁵ Hence the need for demonstrating the existence of God. Again, the Mīmāṃsaka has argued that a Vedic testimony is valid because Vedas are an authorless text existing since ever¹³⁶, and he has sought to buttress his argument by maintaining that all word is an eternal verity. Hence the need for demonstrating that a word is no eternal verity.

(iii) The Existence of God

Unbelievable though it might appear, not only the major rivals of Jāyanta but even his minor rivals stood committed to repudiate the dogma of God. Thus, this was the case with the Buddhist and the Mīmāṃsaka who were his major rivals and this was the case with the Sāṅkhya, the Cārvāka, the Jaina who were his minor rivals; (to complete the list let us mention the Advaita-Vedāntin who was another minor rival of Jayanta but whose attitude on the question of God as on all questions of everyday experience was, to say the least, ambiguous). It would, however, be wrong to think that on the question of God Jayanta represented a minority trend; for theism was the basic world-outlook of the Purāṇic-Brahmanist while Purāṇic-Brahmanism was the dominant theological trend in the medieval India. So Jayanta's attitude on the question of God deserves a close study in all its nuances,

because here is how a learned and logical-minded spokesman of Purāṇic-Brahmanism would defend his case in the face of attacks coming from the side of his equally learned and logical-minded powerful adversaries like Buddhists and Mīmāṃsakas. We have already learnt that in Jayanta's eyes the chief aim of the Nyāya school of philosophy is to vindicate the validity of Vedic testimony and this aim it seeks to achieve through demonstrating that Vedas are a composition of God. Naturally, therefore, it is incumbent on Jayanta that he should prove that God exists and that it is He who composed Vedas; and in this connection he will argue against the Mīmāṃsaka who believes that there is no God and that Vedas are an authorless composition. Then there are Buddhists who not only deny the existence of God but repudiate the validity of Vedic testimony itself; and Jayanta will seek to convince them that Vedas are free from all possible defect. Lastly, there was a huge mass of post-Vedic theological literature espoused by the Purāṇist-Brahmin (Purāṇas themselves constituting its chief sector); and Jayanta will seek to convince everybody that all this too is authentic scripture. All these theological questions Jayanta takes up in Āhnika IV which on this very account has become a chapter of exceptional significance; and our own examination of this chapter will be moulded accordingly. But the question of God's existence itself—an ontological question—Jayanta takes up in Āhnika III itself and now; (the chapter takes up one more question – another ontological question – and it is whether a word is an eternal verity, but the ultimate occasion for discussing this question too was the need to convince the Mīmāṃsakas that Vedas are no eternal text). In this background let us see how Jayanta grapples with the problem of God's existence.

Jayanta begins by presenting in details the atheist's own case. Thus the latter first contends that God is not cognised through perception – through no sense-born perception because He is no physical entity, through no *manas*-born perception because He is no mental state, through no yogic perception because there is no such perception.¹ To this is added that for this very reason a perception-based invariable concomitance too cannot establish the existence of God.² But all this might be conceded by the theist himself; so more noteworthy are the following two objections raised against an analogy-based invariable concomitance seeking to establish the existence of God³ :

(1) It is invalid to argue that the earth etc. need a voluntary producer because they are of the form of an effect; for it is unproved that the earth etc. are of such a form.⁴

(2) It is invalid to argue that the earth etc. need a voluntary producer because they exhibit an arrangement of parts; for the earth etc. do not exhibit that type of arrangement of parts which is found to be due to a voluntary producer.⁵ And granted that the earth etc. exhibit the said type of arrangement of parts, the fact remains that things like self-grown grass exhibit it and are yet found to come into existence without requiring a voluntary producer; certainly, it will be unwarranted to suppose that these grass etc. require an invisible cause in addition to the visible ones like soil, water etc.⁶ Thus the inference in question will be like inferring 'Brahminhood' from 'manhood'.⁷ And granting the validity of this inference, what it will prove is that the voluntary producer in the case of earth etc. is non-omniscient, embodied, miserable etc. just like a potter who here serves as an illustrative instance; for if He is not all this, the potter will not here serve as an illustrative instance.⁸

Lastly, the following four objections are raised independently :

- (i) God cannot produce earth etc. without having a body, nor can He produce a body for Himself, nor can another producer produce a body for Him.⁹
- (ii) God cannot create earth etc. through undertaking physical operation because that will require endless time, nor can He create them through mere wishing because it is impossible for inanimate atoms to act according to His wish.¹⁰
- (iii) God must have a purpose behind creating earth etc. but no such purpose is conceivable.¹¹ It cannot be compassion for the beings, because before creation the beings must be free from all misery; moreover, in that case the world should not exhibit so much misery as it does.¹² Nor can it be said that God does not know how to create a world free from misery, for He is supposed to be omnipotent.¹³ And if while creating the world God has to take into account the past acts of the beings, then His role is redundant.¹⁴ Nor can it be said that these acts being inanimate must require the guidance of a conscious agent, for such guidance can well be provided by the soul to which these acts

belong.¹⁵ God cannot undertake creation out of playfulness either, for that would mean that before creation He lacks something; moreover, it is not proper for Him to indulge in a play that involves so much misery.¹⁶

- (iv) God cannot also destroy the entire world all at once, for that cannot happen so long as past acts of the beings are there to play their role; and if He can really create and destroy the entire world at His mere wish, why posit past acts?¹⁷ Nor can the concept of past acts be actually discarded, for that will entail three undesirable contingencies : (1) God will be proved devoid of compassion, for He will be creating a miserable world; (2) Vedic injunctions and prohibitions will prove redundant; for all happiness and misery will be due to God's wish; (3) there will be likelihood of the state of *mokṣa* coming to an end, for God will be in a position to bring that about.¹⁸

While proceeding to assail the atheist's case Jayanta himself concedes that no perception or a perception-based inference can establish the existence of God.¹⁹ But he criticises at length the two objections raised by the atheist against analogy-based inference.²⁰ Thus he first formulates an inference as follows : "The earth etc. are caused by a voluntary producer who knows how to produce them, when to produce them, and the like, because they are of the nature of an effect, just like a jar etc."²¹ Here with a view to convincing them that the earth etc. are really of the nature of an effect three rivals are addressed in three ways. Thus the Cārvāka is told : "Even Vedas which are so much unlike other texts are considered by you to be of the nature of an effect. How can then you deny that the earth etc. are of the nature of an effect ?"²² [Jayanta's point is obscure. The Mīmāṃsaka has certainly argued that Vedas are eternal because they are so much unlike other texts, but that cannot be Jayanta's argument.] Then the Mīmāṃsaka is told : "You admit that on observing a thing to be destroyed it is proper to infer that it was once produced. But then during heavy rains a mountain on its sides is observed to be denuded of a rock or two. This proves that things like a mountain were once produced."²³ Lastly, the Buddhist is told : "Even in joke you would not say about a thing that it is eternal. How can then you deny that the earth etc. are of the nature of an effect ?"²⁴ But then with a view to offering a probans whose presence in the *pakṣa* is beyond doubt

Jayanta changes his above probans into a new one, viz. 'exhibiting an arrangement of parts.'²⁵ While presenting his case the atheist too had attacked this probans in details, and so Jayanta undertakes an elaborate defence of it. Thus the atheist submits : "If a thing exhibits an arrangement-of-parts of the type found in a jar etc. then it is proper to infer a voluntary producer for this thing. But what is found in the earth etc. is an arrangement-of-parts just in name."²⁶ Jayanta retorts : "On this logic one cannot infer in a mountain fire from the observed smoke which, unlike that earlier observed in the kitchen, is so huge in the mountain. As a matter of fact, there obtains an invariable concomitance between the general features 'exhibiting an arrangement of parts' and 'being caused by a voluntary producer' just as it obtains between smoke in general and fire in general."²⁷ As for the commonness of name, that is found only when the things named are similar in some definite respect."²⁸ Then the atheist has pointed out that self-grown grass etc. are actually observed to be caused without requiring a voluntary producer; Jayanta retorts : "But these grass etc. are a part and parcel of the *pakṣa* in our inference. And no inference will remain valid if the absence of probandum in the *pakṣa* itself be a proper ground for invalidating the inference concerned."²⁹ The atheist pleads : "Leave aside the case of earth etc. which were produced we do not know when. But grass etc. are born before our very eyes without requiring the services of a voluntary producer"; Jayanta retorts : "In the case of grass etc. a voluntary producer is not unavailable but he is invisible by nature. And a thing invisible by nature cannot be proved to be non-existent on the ground that it is not seen."³⁰ The atheist pleads : "But why posit an invisible cause when the visible ones like soil, water etc. are adequate for the purpose ?", Jayanta retorts : "All those who believe in rebirth must posit an invisible cause in the form of past acts. And all must believe in rebirth."³¹ The atheist pleads : "Past acts have to be posited because otherwise the diversity of world-phenomena remains unaccounted for"; Jayanta retorts : "Similarly, a voluntary producer has to be posited because otherwise all causation remains unaccounted for."³² Then the atheist objects : "Your plea that the *pakṣa* must be left out of purview when the validity of a probans is being tested is not proper; for under its cover all invalid probans can be made to appear valid"³³; Jayanta retorts : "You fear that on accepting our plea any *vipakṣa* can be made a part and parcel of the

pakṣa. But this fear is groundless, for what is definitely known to be *vipakṣa* can never be made a part and parcel of the *pakṣa*. For example, while invalidly inferring 'Brahminhood' from 'manhood' or 'being eternal' from 'being cognisable' one cannot turn a definitely known *vipakṣa* into *pakṣa*.³⁴ The atheist pleads : "Even if self-grown grass etc. are made into *pakṣa* they do not cease to be *vipakṣa*; for nothing is *pakṣa* by nature, so that everything must be either *sapakṣa* or *vipakṣa*"; Jayanta retorts : "True, nothing is *pakṣa* by nature; but for the duration of an inference something is to be treated as *pakṣa* and that cannot be counted among *vipakṣas*."³⁵ The atheist pleads : "But self-grown grass etc. are suspected to be a *vipakṣa*, and a probans must not reside in what is suspected to be a *vipakṣa*"; Jayanta retorts : "On this logic, at the time of inferring in a mountain fire from smoke the mountain too is suspected to be a *vipakṣa*"³⁶. The opponent pleads : "One might be in doubt whether the *pakṣa* possesses probandum or does not, but the concerned invariable concomitance has been established on the basis of observing other cases"; Jayanta retorts : "That is true of our inference as well."³⁷ The atheist pleads : "But an invariable concomitance must cover all possible cases while yours does not cover mountains, trees etc."; Jayanta retorts : "An invariable concomitance is not established on the basis of a case-by-case enumeration. Moreover, on this logic you cannot infer : 'A sense-perception must require a sense-organ in the form of an instrument, because it is an activity, just like cutting-down-a-tree which is an activity requiring an axe in the form of an instrument.'"³⁸ The atheist has objected that God is not absolutely similar to the potter who is an illustrative instance in the theist's inference; Jayanta retorts : "In all inference probans and probandum always coexist but they coexist differently in different cases. For example, a sense-organ is not absolutely similar to an axe."³⁹ The atheist pleads : "What an act requires is just an instrument, not an instrument of a particular type"; Jayanta retorts : "Similarly, an arrangement of parts requires just a voluntary producer, not a voluntary producer of a particular type."⁴⁰ To this is added that the details of God's nature can be gathered from scriptural texts or they can be surmised on the basis of the consideration that the voluntary producer responsible for the creation of earth etc. must be an extra-ordinary person of such and such a nature.⁴¹ All this constitutes Jayanta's logically most weighty

argumentation in defence of theism and it deserves examination before note is taken of the rest of his performance. Really, Jayanta divides all produced things into two exclusive and exhaustive classes – one (symbolically, U) containing those seen to require the services of a voluntary producer, the other (symbolically, \bar{U}) containing those not thus seen; and in terms of its logical essence his inference amounts to boldly saying that a thing belonging to the class \bar{U} (symbolically, \bar{u}) requires the services of a voluntary producer because a thing belonging to the class U (symbolically, u) does so. But in order to give this statement the semblance of a real inference Jayanta actually says : “A \bar{u} requires the services of a voluntary producer, because it possesses the feature x , just like a u ;” in this pseudo-inference any feature whatsoever that is common to all produced things can act as x . Actually, the first feature to act as x is ‘being of the nature of an effect’—a feature obviously common to all produced things; the second feature to act as x is ‘exhibiting an arrangement-of-parts’ which too is a feature common to all produced things (for in Jayanta’s scheme of things this feature is not exhibited by the non-produced things like soul, sky, atom etc. and even otherwise it is too commonplace to be denied to a produced thing). This is the solid logical ground for Jayanta’s feeling of self-assurance in face of the atheist’s attacks. Further aid comes from the Indian logician’s general readiness to exclude the *pakṣa* of an inference from the purview of the concerned invariable concomitance. Now in Jayanta’s argument probandum is the feature ‘requiring the services of a voluntary producer’ (symbolically r), so that a *vipakṣa* will be a thing which is other than a \bar{u} and which lacks r ; and the atheist is expected to point out the presence of x in such a *vipakṣa*. As can be seen, under the conditions given no thing can possibly act as a *vipakṣa*. For a thing other than \bar{u} will be a u , that is, a thing seen to require the services of a voluntary producer, while a thing lacking r will be a thing not requiring the services of a voluntary producer; obviously, no thing can exhibit both these features. Aware of all this Jayanta feels sure that his inference is invulnerable whatever be his probans (in terms of our symbolism, whatever be the value of x). Thus the opponent says : “ x exhibited by a \bar{u} is not of the same type as x exhibited by a u ”; Jayanta retorts : “ x is x wherever it is exhibited”. The opponent says : “Such and such a \bar{u} does not exhibit r ”, Jayanta retorts : “That is because in

that case r is something invisible by nature. Moreover, all \bar{u} is my *pakṣa*, so that it is yet undecided whether \bar{u} pointed out by you exhibits r or does not." The opponent says : "But all things lacking probandum (i.e. lacking r) you have converted into your *pakṣa*"; Jayanta retorts : "I have done nothing of the sort. Moreover, in a really invalid inference it is impossible to convert into *pakṣa* all things lacking probandum." This retort is crucial as well as invalid. For as already shown, Jayanta has really converted into *pakṣa* all things lacking probandum; so his present retort amounts to saying : "I have so cleverly chosen my *pakṣa* and probandum that nothing can act as a *vipakṣa* (let us ignore Jayanta's 'non-produced things'). All those offering an invalid inference are not so clever." The opponent says : "But an invariable concomitance between x and r must cover all relevant cases while in your inference it does not cover such and such a \bar{u} "; Jayanta retorts : "Well, all \bar{u} is my *pakṣa*, so that an invariable concomitance between x and r must be established ignoring all \bar{u} ; and that is what the inference does alright." This retort is, again, crucial as well as invalid. Really, to establish an invariable concomitance between x and r means to show that r is present wherever x is present while x is absent wherever r is absent; but things where r is absent are all \bar{u} (here too let us ignore Jayanta's 'non-produced things'), so that the invariable concomitance in question cannot be established ignoring all \bar{u} . Hence Jayanta's present retort amounts to saying : "I have so cleverly chosen my *pakṣa* and probandum that any feature belonging to both u and \bar{u} will act as a valid probans for inferring my probandum." [Jayanta's last argument is based not on a formal consideration but on a material one. For he submits that the procedure adopted by him while inferring God as a voluntary producer in the case of the causation of earth etc. is essentially the same as adopted even by the opponent while inferring a sense-organ as an instrument in the case of the causation of sense-perception. The only difficulty is that the causation of sense-perception is admittedly a voluntary act and so the idea of it requiring an instrumental cause sounds tenable, but the causation of earth etc. is not admittedly a voluntary act and so the idea of it requiring a voluntary producer requires demonstration. That, however, is no reason why Jayanta's demonstration of God's existence should be dismissed off-hand. But as things stand, this demonstration is considerably fallacious]

Jayanta next answers those four objections which the atheist has raised independently; but before doing that he briefly considers as to how many qualities are possible in God. Thus the Nyāya philosopher posits in a soul the following nine qualities : 1. *jñāna* (= knowledge), 2. *sukha* (= pleasure), 3. *duḥkha* (= pain), 4. *icchā* (= desire), 5. *dveṣa* (= aversion), 6. *prayatna* (= effort), 7. *dharma* (= good past act), 8. *adharma* (evil past act), 9. *bhāvanā* (mental impression). And on Jayanta's showing five of these, viz. those numbering 1,2,4,6,7 are possible in God, the rest not.⁴² The point is rather understandable and in any case not much important; but be it noted that to attribute pleasure and good past act to God is Jayanta's novelty. Really, the word *dharma* usually translateable as 'good past act' is used by Jayanta in the popular sense of 'auspicious inclination'; thus he says : "God who is full of compassion for the beings naturally possesses *dharma* which has for its result the attainment of *summum bonum*."⁴³ As for pleasure, we are told : "God's pleasure is eternal, because the scriptures attribute to him an eternal bliss. Certainly, one not possessed of pleasure will not undertake the type of endeavour He does."⁴⁴ As for God's knowledge, it is said to be something operative all the time, unitary, taking in its sweep everything whatsoever—past, present, future—and possessing a perception-like directness.⁴⁵ As for God's desire, it is said to be something eternal but having for its object different things at different moments, bringing about at each moment what happens at that moment.⁴⁶ As for effort, we are told : "God's effort is of the form of a particular volition. For the scriptures say about Him, 'His desire is true, His volition is true.'⁴⁷

Lastly, Jayanta disposes of those four independent objections. Thus the atheist had asked whether God possesses a body or does not; and he is told that He does not.⁴⁸ Then he had asked whether God acts through undertaking a physical operation or through mere wishing; and he is told that he acts through mere wishing.⁴⁹ The answers to these two questions are inter-related. For God is said to be active through mere wishing because He is supposed to be devoid of a body. But there is required a corroborative instance where one is active without needing a body; and so it is pointed out that a soul acts without needing a body.⁵⁰ The idea is that the body with which a soul is associated is set to motion by this soul through its mere wishing and without needing another body. Thus the atheist had asked : "Unless God operates like a potter, how will it be possible for

inanimate things to act in accordance with His wish ?"; and he is told : "Just as the inanimate body acts in accordance with the concerned soul's wish, so also atoms act in accordance with God's wish."⁵¹ The atheist's third question was as to what is God's purpose behind world-creation. He is first told that it is the very nature of God that He now creates the world, now destroys it just as it is the very nature of the sun to daily rise in time and set in time.⁵² Then it is even conceded that God acts out of playfulness, this involving no sort of lack on God's part.⁵³ Lastly, it is likewise conceded that God acts out of compassion for the beings. The suggestion that before creation the beings stand in no need of compassion is rejected on the ground that the world-course being beginningless the beings always stand in such a need, the idea being that the world is created so that the beings might enjoy off their accumulated past acts and thus attain *mokṣa*, while the world is destroyed from time to time so that they might get occasional rest.⁵⁴ The atheist's fourth question was as to how God can create the entire world all at once and destroy it all at once so long as past acts of the beings are there to play their role. He is told that at the time of world-destruction these past acts are brought to suspense by God while they are reactivated by Him at the time of the next world-creation.⁵⁵ In this connection the general rule is formulated that the past acts being something inanimate they need being guided by a conscious agent like God.⁵⁶ The suggestion that these past acts can be guided by the concerned soul itself is rejected on the ground that so many souls as there are cannot coordinate their acts unless working under over-all guidance of a super-Soul like God, just as worldly people work under the over-all guidance of a leader or a king, building-workers under that of a chief mason.⁵⁷ To this is added that thus is also explained why there ought to be not more than one God.⁵⁸ Lastly, it is argued that not only at the time of world-destruction and world-creation but at other times too souls act only under the guidance of God.⁵⁹ The objection that in that case the hypothesis of past acts becomes redundant is rejected on the ground that the diversity of world-phenomena remains unaccounted for unless past acts are posited—even if God's omnipotence is in no way limited by the circumstance that He naturally acts taking into consideration these past acts.⁶⁰ This last set of arguments is not logically much weighty but it is this that gives a real clue to the working of the Purāṇic-Brahmanist's mind. For Purāṇic-Brahmanism was essentially a theological movement while

the question as to what is God's purpose behind occasionally creating and destroying the world was essentially a theological question. Certainly, the theologian is most vitally interested in ascertaining as to how God's existence or otherwise affects man's destiny. In the present set of arguments, Jayanta fervently seeks to vindicate the basic theological stand adopted by his school, but he knew that his performance as a logician would be primarily judged by the amount of success gained by him in first demonstrating the existence of God. Hence his all-out endeavour to undertake that demonstration, and hence his relatively summary manner of working out the present set of arguments.

(iv) The Eternity or Otherwise of a Word

The Mīmāṃsā thesis that Vedas are an authorless composition was obviously absurd, but this theological thesis was somehow made to hinge on the ontological thesis that a word is an eternal verity. So in the present last section of Āhnika III, Jayanta argues at great length against this ontological thesis while in the first section of Āhnika IV he argues in a relatively brief fashion against that theological thesis.

Now commonsense suggests that a sentence is made up of words and a word made up of letters, while a letter is a particular type of sound produced by a man with the help of his vocal apparatus; and it is difficult to see as to what can be eternal about a word as thus understood. But the Mīmāṃsaka distinguished between a word as such (we might call it 'word-in-itself') and a word as pronounced by some man on some occasion (we might call it 'word-for-us'), and he came out with the view that the former is an eternal verity which is simply made manifest by the latter, the latter itself being supposed to be some sort of air-vibration. The Sanskrit word *śabda* means both a word and a sound, but when the Mīmāṃsaka said that a *śabda* is eternal he meant that a word as also the individual letters composing it are eternal; on the other hand, the Naiyāyika made no distinction between a word as such and a word as pronounced, and so when he said that a *śabda* is non-eternal he meant that a word-sound as also the individual letter-sounds composing it are non-eternal. And in this Mīmāṃsā-versus-Nyāya controversy the most important ontological considerations were urged in connection with the question whether a letter is eternal or otherwise, the most important logical considerations in connection with the question whether a word is eternal or otherwise (also in

connection with the question whether a Vedic sentence is eternal or otherwise). In his present refutation of the Mīmāṃsaka's case Jayanta himself is going to concentrate on the ontological aspect of the matter, and so he will endeavour to demonstrate that a letter is not eternal (the question whether a word or a Vedic sentence is not eternal he will take up elsewhere). Even so his present first elaboration of the Mīmāṃsaka's case itself covers the question of the eternity or otherwise of a word as also the question of the eternity or otherwise of a letter, the reason being that in the Mīmāṃsaka's own eyes the thesis that a letter is eternal is but a means for proving the thesis that a word is eternal while the latter thesis but a means for proving that a Vedic sentence is eternal.

The Mīmāṃsaka begins by refuting the following five grounds on which a word might be said to be non-eternal :

(1) Since a word is heard only after the speaker has made due effort, a word is a produced entity and whatever is a produced entity is a perishing entity; moreover, we actually see that a word, after it has been pronounced and heard, does not stay even for a while.¹

(2) We actually say things like 'make a word' 'do not make a word'; (these are a literal rendering of the Sanskrit sentences 'pronounce a word', 'do not pronounce a word').²

(3) The same word is simultaneously heard at different places.³

(4) One letter is transformed into another; for example, the combination of the words *dadhi* and *atra* is *dadhyatra*, which means that the letter *i* is here transformed into *ya*.⁴

(5) A word pronounced with a greater effort is louder, that pronounced with a smaller effort slower.⁵

Here is how these grounds have been refuted successively :

(1) An effort is required to make a word manifest, not to produce it; and after the effort ceases the word ceases to remain manifest.⁶

(2) 'Make a word' means 'pronounce a word' just as 'make cowdung' means 'gather cowdung' (Sanskrit allows both).⁷

(3) A word is heard wherever there is available the sound required to make it manifest, and yet it is one just as the sun is one even while simultaneously seen at various places.⁸

(4) To say the words *dadhi* and *atra* combine into one word

Jadhyatra simply means that the latter word can be used in place of the former two.⁹

(5) When pronounced with a greater effort a word does not become bigger; what becomes bigger is the sound that makes it manifest.¹⁰

Then it is argued that a child learns word-meaning by observing how his elders behave differently when different words are pronounced in their presence, and since such learning is a time-consuming process the words in question cannot be fleeting entities.¹¹ And granting that the same word continues to exist for the entire period that is required to learn its meaning, this meaning cannot be put to use at a later occasion unless this very word is pronounced and heard at that occasion.¹² The suggestion that the later heard word is just similar to that originally heard one – not the same as the latter—is rejected on the ground that in that case a word must change beyond recognition within the space of several generation.¹³ To this is added that in that case the use of the same word at two occasions should be a case of error, just like inferring fire from vapour which just happens to be similar to smoke that is the actual probans needed.¹⁴ The opponent pleads : “A smoke is different at different places and yet it everywhere acts as probans for inferring fire; similarly, a word is different when heard on different occasions and yet it always conveys the same meaning”; the Mīmāṃsaka retorts : “The two cases are not similar. For there is the universal ‘smokeness’ to reside in all smoke, but there is no universal to reside in all cases of a pronounced word. Take for example the word ‘go’ (Sanskrit for cow). In its case a universal like ‘wordness’ will obviously not do, but a universal like ‘go-(word)-ness’ is likewise inconceivable. For in this word one letter is gone while another is pronounced, so that here there is no composite whole where the proposed universal might be said to reside; certainly, the universal ‘cloth-ness’ cannot reside in the individual threads that go to constitute a piece of cloth. Nor can it be said that an appropriate universal reside in the individual letters that go to constitute the word ‘go’. For a letter is absolutely the same whenever and by whomsoever it is pronounced, it thus being unlike, for example, cows which are different in different cases and yet a common seat of the same universal ‘cowness’. Nay, even when the same speaker pronounces a letter twice (e.g. the letter *ga* in the word *garigā*) what he pronounces is the very same letter and

not two letters happening to be a seat of the same universal."¹⁵ This is the most crucial piece of argumentation and is further elucidated as follows : "Even when a letter is pronounced slowly in one case fast in another, slowness and fastness do not belong to this letter itself but to the sound that makes this letter manifest. Really, even granting that a common universal resides in two cases of the pronunciation of a letter, one cannot say that slowness and fastness belong to this letter itself but must allow that they are due to some accidental adjunct; so why not grant that the very wordness in question is due to a similar adjunct ? Moreover, a consonant sounds different when pronounced in association with a different vowel; hence if a vowel sounds different that too must be due to its association with some accidental adjunct, so that, for example, it is not proper to speak of the vowel 'a' having eighteen types."¹⁶ Thus it is concluded that a word cannot possibly yield a meaning (that is, cannot perform its sole function), unless it is something eternal.¹⁷ The point that a letter is something eternal is explained once more. This time it is argued that a thing perishes either when its component parts perish or when its locus perishes, but neither is possible in the case of a letter; that a letter is not made up of parts is proved on the ground that it is pronounced not partwise but either not at all or in full; to this is added that a letter requires no locus and even if the sky is supposed to be its locus this locus can never perish.¹⁸ Then it is pointed out that the usage is to the effect 'such and such a word is pronounced so many and so many a time', a usage that makes sense only in case one and the same word is pronounced on several occasions.¹⁹ Lastly, it is submitted that to view a word as the same on the different occasions when it is pronounced is an indubitable case of recognition, it being maintained by the Naiyāyika himself (as against the Buddhist) that recognition is a perfectly legitimate case of valid cognition.²⁰ In this connection it is said that a word is made manifest within a moment by a fleeting air-mass just as things are made manifest within a moment by the flash of lightning appearing in a pitch-dark rainy night.²¹ This immediately leads to the discussion as to how an eternally existing word is made manifest by an appropriate sound on this occasion or that.

The opponent objects : "On your showing, a sound supposed to make a word manifest is of the form of air."²² Now if such a sound

produces some speciality in the auditory organ, e.g. a speciality in the form of expelling the becalmed air from within this organ, then this organ should be in a position to hear all word whatsoever just as the removal of a curtain reveals whatever there is on the drama-stage.²³ Again, on your view the auditory organ is of the form of the sky which is one and impartite, so that once a speciality is produced in this organ all men should be in a position to hear whatever there is to hear.²⁴ On the other hand, if a sound produces some speciality not in the auditory organ but in the word itself, then too since a word is supposed to be one, impartite and ubiquitous a word which is in a position to be heard at one place should be heard at every place; nor can it be said that a speciality is produced not in the word itself but in its locus, for if anything can act as a locus of a word it must be the sky which itself is one, impartite and ubiquitous, so that the difficulty urged remains as before.²⁵ Then it is inconceivable how on the hypothesis of 'manifestation' a word should be loud or slow or how one word should suppress another, for these features cannot characterise a word supposed to be thoroughly uniform in nature, nor the 'speciality' alleged to be produced by a sound;²⁶ and if they are supposed to characterise the sound concerned itself, then the difficulty is that this sound being of the form of air they in that case cannot be grasped by ear.²⁷ The Mīmāṃsaka replies : "Let us say that speciality in question is produced in the auditory organ, and yet one type of sound produced by one type of vocal effort produces one type of speciality just as on your view one type of vocal effort produces one type of word.²⁸ Nor is it proper to say that everything that exists at the same place and is grasped by the same sense-organ should be made manifest all at once, for there is no such rule; for example, all smell exists in earth and is grasped through the olfactory sense-organ, and yet one smell is made manifest through a touch of fire, another through a touch of the sun's rays, a third through water-drenching.²⁹ Certainly, by the speciality in question we do not mean a mere expelling of the becalmed air from within the auditory organ but some such speciality as is specific for the hearing of a specific word.³⁰ Again, even if the auditory organ is of the form of sky, one man's auditory organ differs from another's depending on each man's good and evil past acts just as on your view; nay, we Mīmāṃsakas are not committed

to the position that the auditory organ is of the form of sky, so that for us any plausible view of the matter will do—even Bhartṛmītra's view that the auditory organ is of the form of a speciality produced by air (for this speciality can well differ from man to man).³¹ Nor is there any difficulty in supposing that the speciality in question is produced in the word itself even if a word is one, impartite and ubiquitous; for even such a word is made manifest not everywhere but only where the needed sound is produced just as a universal which on your view too is one, impartite and ubiquitous is made manifest not everywhere but only where a relevant particular is available.³² As for the features like loudness, slowness etc. even if they do not belong to the word itself but to the sound concerned they can seem to belong to the former just as features like sturdiness, leanness, etc., even if they do not belong to a universal itself but to a relevant particular, can seem to belong to the former.³³ Or we might even say that features like loudness, slowness etc. do not at all belong to a word but to the sound concerned, so that suppression of one another too takes place not on the part of words themselves but on the part of the sounds concerned just like suppression of a weaker light on the part of the stronger one.³⁴ To this general argumentation is added a criticism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Jaina and Buddhist views according to which all a word is something of the form of a produced entity, also a positive account of how the Mīmāṃsaka views the phenomenon of a word being made manifest by a sound which is of the form of air.

The following criticism is urged against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view : "On this view a word is produced in sky at one place through a conjunction or a disjunction and from there it spreads out in all directions in the form of a wave-like series of words till it reaches the hearer's ear where the last member of the series is produced and heard.³⁵ All this is unwarranted gossip, and there seems to be no reason why such a series of words should ever stop from being propagated further or why it should be checked by an obstacle like a wall etc.; certainly, a wave-like formation is impossible in an intangible entity like sky.³⁶ Then it is argued that a word produces another word in a series-form because it is a quality just like colour (which too produces another colour); but it is not our experience that a word is a quality belonging to some substance."³⁷ Then the following criticism is urged

against the Sāṅkhya view : “On this view an ‘emanation’ from the auditory organ reaches the place where there exists the word to be heard; there this word produces a due transformation in this ‘emanation’ and is heard as a result thereof.”³⁸ Here too it seems inconceivable why the ‘emanation’ in question should ever be stopped anyway from reaching anywhere.³⁹ And curiously, this view entails the absurdity that a word should be heard better when the wind is blowing towards the word and away from the ear rather than *vice versa*.⁴⁰ Similarly, the following criticism is urged against the Jaina view : “On this view a word is made up of subtle physical particles which proceed from the speaker and reach upto the hearer.”⁴¹ Here it is inconceivable as to what sort of physical particles are being spoken of, how they go to make up a word; why they are not stopped by so many sorts of rough obstacles; how they are received by another man’s ear when one man’s ear has already received them.”⁴² Lastly, the Buddhist view is criticised on the simple ground that since according to it an ear hears a word without coming in contact with this word it is inconceivable why an ear should not hear all the words that are there to be heard.⁴³ Against these rival views is counterposed the following Mīmāṃsā view⁴⁴ : “The desire to speak produces an effort which sends out air from within the speaker’s abdomen; this air—an object of perception or of inference—moving about in all directions reaches the hearer’s auditory organ which is of the form of sky confined to the ear concerned and the becalmed air already present in which is bestirred by the incoming air in question; hence is generated in this auditory organ the capacity to hear the word concerned.”⁴⁵ Depending on the intensity of the effort concerned the word is heard as loud or slow.⁴⁶ Since the air thus moving about possesses a definite momentum, it does not proceed beyond a certain limit; since it is something tangible it is checked by an obstacle like a wall etc.⁴⁷ Whatever be the spot from which this air is coming is falsely supposed by the speaker to be the sole spot of the word itself.⁴⁸ As for the air propagated when conch-shell is blown it makes manifest a word not of the form of a letter; or since there exists no word satisfying this description we might say that the air in question makes manifest the universal ‘wordness’.⁴⁹ Towards the end a passing reference is made to the view upheld by the Śikṣā-specialists, a view

according to which a word is of the form of air; this view is criticised by saying that it is open to the same difficulties as the Jaina view according to which a word is made up of physical particles.⁵⁰ This defence offered by the Mīmāṃsaka in support of his thesis that a word is an eternal verity makes one thing clear. Thus he pays utmost attention to the circumstance that a letter pronounced on one occasion and the same pronounced on another differ from one another in little save their loudness, quickness etc. Even so, his insistence that they do not at all differ thus is dogmatic; but the noteworthy thing is that the dogmatisation in question is essentially of the same nature as that exhibited by the Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya philosophies while propounding their thesis on a 'universal'. For a 'universal' is supposed to represent an absolutely similar trait characterising all the members belonging to a class; as a matter of fact, it is on account of the supposed absoluteness of the similarity in question that a 'universal' is said to be of the form of one common entity belonging to all these members. Really, this is where lies the logical essence of the concept of a 'universal' while the supposition that a 'universal' is something eternal, ubiquitous, impartite is of the nature of an ontological accretion more or less arbitrary. We know how this understanding of a 'universal' misleads Jayanta into thinking as if true-perception is a passive process of just noticing a 'universal' in a sense-contacted object. It is only about a false perception that Jayanta would say that a sense-contacted object is here misidentified on the basis of certain observed features while in fact even in a true perception what happens is that a sense-contacted object is correctly identified on the basis of certain observed features. In this background it should be natural for Jayanta to say that when a letter is heard on two occasions what is noticed is the 'universal' concerned belonging to the two letter-sounds concerned just as when two cows are seen what is noticed is the universal 'cowness' belonging to these two particular cows. The intriguing thing is that the Mīmāṃsaka denies the validity of Jayanta's first explanation even while endorsing the second, the former's point being that the letter-sounds in question are absolutely similar while two cows are not. This way of looking at things cuts at the very root of the concept of 'universal', for two cows are in fact supposed to be absolutely similar in so far as the same universal 'cowness' resides in them both; this is going to be Jayanta's complaint against the

Mīmāṃsaka who would be charged by him with repudiating the very logic on which the concept of 'universal' is based. The Mīmāṃsaka's defence is that differing features can be pointed out in two cows but not in two sounds made to pronounce the same letter; as regards the differing features like loudness, quickness etc. he says that the Naiyāyika himself does not take them into consideration while arguing that the sounds in question are somehow different because they are two different seats of the same 'universal'. Jayanta would plead that these two sounds must be somehow different even if their mutual difference is not noticeable, a plea the Mīmāṃsaka rejects as ungrounded. Thus the Mīmāṃsaka would argue that when a letter is heard on two occasions it is one and the same letter that is made manifest twice just as when two cows are seen it is one and the same universal 'cowness' that is made manifest twice, an argument Jayanta rejects as ungrounded. Thus the gravamen of the Mīmāṃsaka's charge against Jayanta is that the latter is seeing a non-existent difference between two sounds that are made to pronounce the same letter; and the gravamen of Jayanta's charge against the Mīmāṃsaka is that on the latter's logic one might as well say that the case of seeing two cows is a case of seeing one cow twice. The only way to set this controversy at rest will be to reject the very concept of a 'universal' supposed to be an entity standing over and above the relevant particulars. And then one can naturally maintain that two letter-sounds, which are doubtless numerically different, are qualitatively the same in so far as they are mutually similar and qualitatively different in so far as they are mutually dissimilar; by positing an eternal ubiquitous 'universal' to account for this qualitative sameness Jayanta plays into the hands of the Mīmāṃsaka who posits an eternal ubiquitous 'letter' to account for this very qualitative sameness. But let us see how Jayanta actually argues against the Mīmāṃsaka.

Jayanta begins by throwing to the Mīmāṃsaka a challenge as follows : "If you can prove that there exists no 'universal' corresponding to a letter, then we are defeated; otherwise you are defeated. For here lies what constitutes a vital point for us. Certainly, if there exists no 'universal' corresponding to a letter then one cannot find anything common between two cases of pronouncing this letter and hence between two cases of pronouncing a word containing this letter, so that there will be no sense in saying that a word yields the

same meaning whenever it is uttered; and in that case there will be no alternative to admitting your thesis that a letter is an eternal verity which is only made manifest whenever it is pronounced."⁵¹ Since neither Jayanta nor Mimāṃsaka concede the possibility of accounting for an observed similarity without positing an appropriate eternal ubiquitous entity Jayanta's challenge makes sense; for he is only pleading that if an appropriate 'universal' can account for the similarity observed in other cases why not for that observed in two cases of pronouncing the same letter. Further elucidating his point Jayanta says : "When the same letter 'g' is pronounced on two occasions, are there then pronounced two 'g's or is there then made manifest twice the one letter 'g' ? The latter alternative should be rejected, for that way one can even maintain — as the grammarians actually do—that when the different letters 'y', 'r', 'l', 'v' etc. are pronounced there is then only made manifest so many times the one entity called 'word'.⁵² The Mimāṃsaka pleads : "The letters y, r, l, v etc. appear distinct from one another but not so the two pronunciations of the letter g"; Jayanta retorts : "Two pronunciations of the letter g might not appear distinct from one another, but they do appear different from one another."⁵³ Jayanta's point is that the numerical difference between x and y can be noticed even while there is noticed no qualitative difference between the two. The Mimāṃsaka pleads : "There can be no numerical difference without there also being a qualitative difference. For example, two cows are numerically different precisely because they are also qualitatively different in so many ways; but two pronunciations of the same letter are qualitatively different in no way whatsoever."⁵⁴ Jayanta replies by making a distinction between 'qualitative difference being there' and 'qualitative difference being noticed there', and submits that there are cases when the numerical difference between x and y is noticed before there is noticed any qualitative difference between the two, it being not denied that a qualitative difference of some sort is actually present there; (Jayanta gives the example of a heap of grains where the individual grains are noticed to be numerically different without being noticed to be qualitatively different).⁵⁵ When the Mimāṃsaka insists on his point Jayanta gives the example of an act of motion which is seen to be different every moment without any particular difference

being noticed there every moment.⁵⁶ The contrary seems pointless because what should have been Jayanta's point has here become the Mīmāṃsaka's point. For Jayanta should have simply argued that two pronunciations of the same letter must be qualitatively different because they are numerically different. In any case, under constant pressure from the Mīmāṃsaka Jayanta ultimately does say something like that. For when the Mīmāṃsaka pleads that even an act of motion is somehow qualitatively different every moment Jayanta retorts : "Well then two pronunciations of the same letter too are qualitatively different."⁵⁷ And now the Mīmāṃsaka raises a new point, for he says : "Two pronunciations of a letter are different not because this letter is different in these two cases but because the same letter is associated with two different accidental adjuncts in these two cases, this being like a white crystal appearing red in the proximity of a red-coloured body."⁵⁸ Jayanta in effect answers : "A white crystal is cognised even independently, but a letter is never cognised except in the company of an accidental adjunct of the type alleged, just as a cognition is never cognised except as a cognition grasping this or that object."⁵⁹ Or we might say that two pronunciations of the same letter are mutually different just as white colour bright in one case dull in another."⁶⁰ Really, Jayanta is labouring an obvious point; for two pronunciations of the same letter are doubtless different from one another. But this talk of 'accidental adjunct' introduces us to a new circle of ideas essentially foreign not only to the Naiyāyika but to the Mīmāṃsaka himself. For there were then current in our country so many 'non-dualist' doctrines which say about this or that entity that it alone is really real while it appears to have become this thing or that on account of its association with an accidental adjunct; somewhat less sweeping was the doctrine that there exists only one soul which appears to be different on account of its association with this body or that. Now Jayanta warns the Mīmāṃsaka that his present mode of argumentation is dangerously similar to that adopted by the advocates of this latter doctrine—nay, to that adopted by the advocates of those various non-dualist doctrines.⁶¹ In this connection Jayanta particularly refers to the three instances just considered by him; thus he says that on the logic presently adopted by the Mīmāṃsaka one might as well say that there is one eternal act which appears to be different from moment to moment, that there is one eternal cognition which appears to be

different from object to object, that there is one eternal white colour that appears to be different from shade to shade.⁶² The only pity is that Jayanta's own doctrine of a 'universal' which he so emphatically shares with the Mīmāṃsaka is an ominous step in the same dangerous direction. Little wonder, Jayanta clashes with the Mīmāṃsaka on the question of a 'universal' itself. Thus he tells the latter : 'On your logic one can as well say that there exists one eternal cow, while two particular cows appear to be different because two different manifesting agents make manifest this one eternal cow.'⁶³ The Mīmāṃsaka pleads : "But there is nothing to make manifest the two particular cows which are rather what make manifest the universal 'cowness' ".⁶⁴ Jayanta retorts : "You cannot be allowed to say that, because you do not allow us to say that two pronunciations of a letter make manifest the universal concerned. As for a particular cow, it can be cognised through an eye-operation etc."⁶⁵ The Mīmāṃsaka pleads : "But a particular cow appears to be different from another as soon as an eye is just directed that way,"⁶⁶ Jayanta retorts : "No. What first appears to be there is a cow as such while a particular cow appears to be there after an eye-operation etc. has taken place. Moreover, if you allow that a particular cow as different from another is cognised first of all why not allow that a letter-pronunciation as different from another is cognised first of all."⁶⁷ As can be seen, Jayanta and the Mīmāṃsaka are absolutely agreed so far as their acceptance of the 'universal'-doctrine is concerned, but they differ as regards their understanding of the phenomenon of letter-pronunciation. Thus basing himself on the consideration that two pronunciations of the same letter are not so strikingly different from each other as are two particular cows the Mīmāṃsaka comes out with the suggestion that what is common to two pronunciations of the same letter is the particular letter itself and not the 'universal' concerned; according to Jayanta, on the other hand, what is common to two pronunciations of the same letter is the 'universal' concerned just as what is common to two particular cows is the universal 'cowness'. Hence it is that Jayanta concludes the present phase of his enquiry by thus admonishing the Mīmāṃsaka : "So this is the sum and substance of the matter. Either ignore altogether how universal-particular relationship is grasped or say that there is a universal 'g-ness' common to all 'g's just as there is a

universal 'cowness' common to all cows."⁶⁸ In this connection Jayanta considers an objection which is not much important in itself but has the merit of provoking him to make significant observations. Thus the opponent argues : "Leave aside the case of an individual letter; there is no universal 'letter-ness' common to all letters even. For a 'universal' is posited in those cases where the observation of one relevant particular brings to mind another relevant particular; e.g. the observation of one particular cow brings to mind another particular cow. But the observation of one letter (say, 'g') does not bring to mind another letter (say, 'v')⁶⁹. As for the feeling that all letters are of the form of a letter, that is there because all letters are an object of auditory cognition."⁷⁰ Jayanta retorts : "For the purpose of positing a 'universal' it is an immaterial consideration whether the observation of one relevant particular does or does not bring to mind another relevant particular. Certainly, that often happens even when a 'universal' is not to be posited, and that often does not happen even when a 'universal' is to be posited. For the observation of *x* brings *y* to mind when *x* and *y* are somehow similar, like two cows, like a cow and a *gavaya*; on the other hand, no such similarity obtains between one letter and another. But to identify a 'universal' with the similarity concerned is a Sāṅkhya position, not a Nyāya-Mīmāṃsā position. Similarly to say that all letters are called a letter because all are an object of auditory cognition is like the Buddhist saying that a common name is applied to two things not because a common 'universal' resides in both but simply because the two happen to perform the same function."⁷¹ Really, crucial to the Nyāya-Mīmāṃsā doctrine of a 'universal' is the understanding that a common 'universal' is to be posited as residing in several things only when they are called by the same name; (there are a few and relatively obscure exceptions to the rule that a common 'universal' is to be posited as residing in several things whenever they are called by the same name). But commonsense suggests that a common word is applied to several things when they all exhibit either some similarity of structure or some similarity of function; the former aspect of the matter finds recognition in the Sāṅkhya identification of a 'universal' with the similarity concerned, the latter in the Buddhist contention that a common name is applied to two things when they happen to perform the same function. Now

Jayanta's present Mīmāṃsaka opponent points out that letters do not exhibit a similarity of structure, and Jayanta tells him that that is the Sāṅkhya way of speaking and also that a similarity of structure might be exhibited even by two such objects as bear no common name (e.g. by a cow and a *gavaya* in whose case there arises no question of one 'universal' being shared in common). Then this opponent argues that letters are called by the name 'letter' simply because they are all an object of auditory cognition, and Jayanta tells him that that is the Buddhist way of speaking—'to be an object of auditory cognition' being the common function performed by all letters. But then Jayanta is left with no alternative but to say in a dogmatic fashion that a 'universal' is posited to reside in several things when they happen to be called by the same name; however, since exceptions are allowed in this general rule his present Mīmāṃsaka opponent would plead that no universal 'letter-ness' resides in letters even though they all happen to be called by the common name 'letter'. Jayanta would, of course, say that the present one is not an exceptional case, but the point is that there is no logic behind the talk of the rule and an exception indulged in by him in this connection. Thus he here says : "A 'universal' is to be posited in the case where a uniform cognition arises in an uncontradicted fashion;⁷² this is to say practically nothing. Logically, the question whether there does or does not exist a 'universal' corresponding to a class of things is the question whether or not these things can be defined in terms of some class-character or other, and this question has to be answered in the affirmative in the case of all class-of-things. To this extent Jayanta might be correct when he insists that there exists a 'universal' corresponding to an individual letter as also to all the letters taken together. But in fact neither Jayanta nor his present Mīmāṃsaka opponent is interested in this logical aspect of the matter. For with both a 'universal' is an eternal ubiquitous independent real which exists in all the members of the concerned class-of-things and which is taken note of as soon as such a member is encountered; and certainly, a 'universal' as thus conceived can be said to be possessed neither by an individual letter nor by all the letters taken together. And when the present Mīmāṃsaka denies that there exists a 'universal' corresponding to all the letters taken together his intention simply is to lend some extra plausibility

to his contention that there exists no 'universal' corresponding to an individual letter, a contention itself aimed at proving that an individual letter is an eternal ubiquitous entity which is only made manifest when this letter is pronounced on this or that occasion. All this makes the present controversy virtually an exercise in futility. In any case, by all this Jayanta closes what he rightly regards as the most vital phase of this controversy; in what follows he takes up the remaining minor questions.

Thus Jayanta answers the Mīmāṃsaka's argument that the usage 'such and such a word is pronounced so many and so many a time' makes sense only in case one and the same word is pronounced on so many occasions. The former's simple submission is that such a usage is possible also otherwise; e.g. we say about an act 'it was performed so many times', a statement not implying that this act was numerically the same act whenever performed, the point being that similar is the statement 'that word was pronounced so many times'.⁷³ Then is considered the Mīmāṃsaka's submission that a word is recognised as the same whenever it is pronounced while recognition is a case of valid cognition. Jayanta concedes that it is a case of valid cognition when a thing like standing wall is recognised as the same whenever it is seen; but his contention is that such is not the case with a word which is actually seen to perish as soon as it is pronounced.⁷⁴ The argument that an eternal word is made manifest within a moment by a fleeting air-mass just as things are revealed within a moment by a flash of lightning is rejected on the ground that the flash of lightning does not reveal a thing as perishing then and there and so is not an apt illustrative case.⁷⁵ The Mīmāṃsaka argues that when a word is recognised as the same on several occasions and when it is also cognised as perishing on each occasion then this cognition of destruction should be treated as cancelled by this recognition, the reason being that what perishes is not the word itself but the concerned manifesting agent; Jayanta retorts that here the recognition should be treated as cancelled by the cognition of destruction, the reason being that two pronunciations of the same word are a seat of the same 'universal' (or that they are mutually similar) and so are falsely recognised as the same.⁷⁶ Jayanta next considers the Mīmāṃsaka's plea that even if all words are equally eternal ubiquitous some reason

can be found out why one is made manifest on one occasion; the former's submission is that no such reason can be actually found out.⁷⁷ In this connection rejected as sophistical is the Mīmāṃsaka's submission that this is like all smell existing in earth and yet one smell being made manifest this way another that way; Jayanta's point is that one and the same smell does not exist everywhere on earth and so is not analogous to the Mīmāṃsaka's allegedly ubiquitous word.⁷⁸ Jayanta points out that the same place where one word is pronounced now another can be pronounced on another occasion, a situation understandable only in case the two words are produced on the two occasions; certainly, we do not find the same smell to exist in this flower now in that on another occasion (perhaps, it would have been better if it was said that we do not find one smell to exist in a flower now another on another occasion).⁷⁹ The suggestion that some 'unseen' factor might account for the situation is rejected on the ground that the rival hypothesis requires no such factor.⁸⁰ Then Jayanta argues that if the features like loudness etc. belong not to a word itself but to the sound which manifests this word, then these features should not be cognised through an ear, for on the Mīmāṃsaka's showing sound is of the form of air while air cannot be cognised through an ear.⁸¹ The suggestion that this is like the properties belonging to a relevant particular being cognised as belonging to the 'universal' concerned is rejected on the ground that a relevant particular and the 'universal' concerned are both cognised through the same sense-organ but not a word and air.⁸² In this connection Jayanta particularly ridicules the Mīmāṃsaka's account of what is heard when a conch-shell is blown. For according to the Mīmāṃsaka, whatever is heard is heard as a result of an air-mass making manifest an eternally existing word, but no word is heard when a conch-shell is blown; so he suggests that what is heard here is a word-not-of-the-form-of-a-letter. But then realising that the idea of such a word makes little sense he suggests that what is heard here is the universal 'word-ness'. Jayanta says that it is fantastic that a 'universal' be cognised except as seated in a relevant particular; to this is added that the universal 'word-ness' cannot reside in the concerned air-mass, also that here there are heard no letters while there can be nothing like a word-not-of-the-form-of-a-letter.⁸³

Jayanta now recalls that the Mīmāṃsaka has poked fun at the

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thesis of a word-sound being a quality of the sky; the former now first assails the alternative Mīmāṃsā thesis of an air-mass making manifest an eternally existing word and then defends the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thesis in question. The following difficulties have been urged against the Mīmāṃsā thesis :

(1) Air moves exclusively in a horizontal direction, but a word can be heard as coming from any direction whatsoever.⁸⁴

(2) Even when one's face is tightly covered from all sides so that no air coming out of the mouth leaks away, a hearer can well hear what one says.⁸⁵

(3) Within the stomach of a man with weak digestion there is produced a gurgling sound which an outside hearer can hear; in this case no air comes out of the body—except that coming out through the body-pores which must be too weak to stir the outside air.⁸⁶

(4) Since even a weak outside air must be stronger than that coming out of the body, no word should be heard when even a weak air is blowing there; it will be unwarranted to say that another sort of air conceals the word existing there, and even if that be so this air must be weaker than the ordinary air which should always be in a position to displace this weak air and thus uncover the underlying word.⁸⁷

Then follows a positive defence of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thesis that word-sound is a quality of sky. The Mīmāṃsaka has argued that an intangible entity like sound cannot produce another sound with the process proceeding on in a wavelike fashion; Jayanta points out that a colour is an intangible entity and yet produces another colour, a cognition is an intangible entity and yet produces another cognition—in the latter case a new cognition arising at a new place if the person concerned happens to be walking.⁸⁸ Then the Mīmāṃsaka has contended that a sound-series thus conceived should never come to an end nor even slow down; Jayanta pleads that such a cessation or slowing down is well possible when due 'unseen' factors cease to operate.⁸⁹ In this connection Jayanta offers the clarification that to say that a sound-series proceeds in a wave-like fashion does not mean that this series exhibits all the features of a water-wave or the like.⁹⁰ Lastly, the Mīmāṃsaka has contended that a sound-series thus conceived should not be checked by an obstacle like a wall etc; Jayanta pleads

that that is possible because a sound is produced not in a concealed sky-portion but in an unconcealed one.⁹¹

The Mīmāṃsaka has also contended that a word cannot be a quality of some substance; by way of countering this Jayanta shows how so many positions maintained by his school on the question are mutually interconnected and yet do not involve a mutual dependence. Thus he argues that a sound is a quality because it resides in one substance viz. sky and produces another sound; for all this precludes the possibility that a sound is either a substance or an action—not a substance because a substance is either independent or it resides in more than one substance, not an action because an action does not produce another action.⁹² The opponent objects : “Thus while seeking to prove that a sound is a quality you already presuppose that it resides in sky; but it is by presupposing that a sound is a quality that you argue that it must reside in sky because it cannot reside in earth etc.”⁹³ Similarly, you argue that a sound produces another sound because it is a quality—while a quality produced here cannot be cognised at another place unless it moves upto that place in a wave-like fashion; but it is by presupposing that a sound producing another sound proceeds in a wave-like fashion that you preclude the possibility that a sound is an action, it being impossible for an action to produce another action.”⁹⁴ Jayanta replies : “Neither ‘mutual dependence’ thus urged vitiates our position. For we do not argue that a sound resides in sky because it is a quality, nor that a sound producing another sound proceeds in a wave-like fashion because it is a quality. Thus according to us a sound resides in sky because it is grasped through ear which is itself of the form of a sky-portion, it being impossible for ear thus conceived to grasp a sound unless it resides in sky; similarly, according to us a sound producing another sound proceeds in a wave-like fashion because it cannot be grasped by ear thus conceived unless it proceeds from the place where it is produced upto the ear which grasps it.”⁹⁵ Thus Jayanta starts with the supposition that ear is of the form of a sky-portion, then argues that an ear thus conceived cannot grasp a sound unless a sound resides in sky and a sound producing another sound proceeds in a wave-like fashion, and lastly concludes that a sound thus behaving must be a quality of sky. Thus for Jayanta the very fact that a sound is an object of auditory cognition implies his whole thesis on the question; and if we recall that he has argued that

a letter is non-eternal because two pronunciations of it are two seats of the 'universal' concerned we can understand why he approvingly quotes Uddyotakara who argues : "A word is non-eternal, because it is possessed of a 'universal' and is an object of sensory cognition, like a jar."⁹⁶ But Kumārila has taunted : "The features like 'possessing a universal', 'being an object of sensory cognition' etc. belong to whatever is a real entity, and one inferring from them the non-eternity of a word must be no logician"; this evokes the following protest from the side of Jayanta : "This can be said only by one who does not know what it is to be a logician. As for an irrelevant probans here is an example : 'The word "cow" pronounced yesterday exists even today, because it is an object of the cognition-grasping-the-word-"cow", like the word "cow" grasped today'. Certainly, the feature 'being an object of a cognition' belongs to whatever is a real entity, and it has nothing to do with whether an entity is eternal or non-eternal. Thus on the one hand you yourself declare that a probans like this is an irrelevant probans, on the other hand you yourself offer such a probans. What is all this ?"⁹⁷ Meanwhile, Jayanta has argued that a sound is to be proved to be a quality of sky in the very same manner in which desire, aversion etc. are proved to be a quality of a soul.⁹⁸ This last phase of Jayanta's argumentation pertaining to the nature of a word too deserves some consideration. Thus the Mīmāṃsaka's thesis that a word is an eternal ubiquitous entity was certainly misconceived, but his understanding of how air plays a role in auditory cognition was essentially sound; (still more sound seems to have been Śikṣā-specialists' view which was above referred to in passing and according to which a word itself is of the form of air). So on this count it is rather Jayanta's criticism of the Mīmāṃsaka which is essentially misconceived. Rightly convinced that a word is actually produced (and not just made manifest) at the time of being spoken but failing to see how it can have anything to do with air which is no object of auditory cognition the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authors developed a highly imaginary hypothesis according to which a word at the time of being spoken is produced in the form of a momentary quality of an eternal ubiquitous sky and propagated in a wave-like fashion from the speaker's mouth upto the hearer's ear which itself is of the form of sky-confined-within-the-ear-drum. As formulated in terms of the fundamental ontological

categories posited by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authors this hypothesis was logically self-consistent, but that was its almost sole merit. For otherwise it is plainly impossible to give it any sensible meaning whatsoever. In working out the details of this hypothesis the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authors were considerably guided by the analogy of mental states like cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion etc. supposed to be produced in an eternal ubiquitous soul in the form of a momentary quality. But the very fact that the phenomenon of a sound and the phenomenon of a mental state are so much unlike each other precluded the possibility of any material light being thrown on the nature of one as a result of comprehending the nature of the other.

Here ends Jayanta's enquiry into the question whether or not a word is an eternal verity, and with it his Āhnika III.

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CHAPTER ONE

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- 2 तत्र स्वरूपविशेषणपक्षे...प्रमाणत्वं प्राप्नोति फलस्याविशेषितत्वात् । 2
- 3 नापि सामग्रीविशेषणपक्षः ।...विलिष्टकल्पना । 2
- 4 फलविशेषणपक्षोऽपि न सङ्गच्छते।...कथमैकाधिकरण्यम् । 3
- 5 अत्रोच्यते । स्वरूपसामग्रीविशेषणपक्षौ तावद् यथोक्तदोषोपहतत्वाद् नाभ्युप-गम्येते । फलविशेषणपक्षमेव संमन्यामहे ।...यत एवंविधविशेषणविशिष्टं ज्ञानाख्यं फलं भवति तत् प्रत्यक्षमिति सूत्रार्थः । 3
- 6 ननु समानाधिकरणे एव ज्ञानप्रत्यक्षपदे कथं न व्याख्यायेते ?...फलकरणयोश्च स्वरूपभेदस्य सिद्धत्वात् । 3
- 7 प्रमाणतायां सामग्र्यास्तज्ज्ञानं फलमिष्यते ।
तस्य प्रमाणभावे तु फलं हानादिबुद्ध्यः ॥ 3
- 8 ननु स्मृत्याद्यनेकबुद्धिव्यवधानसम्भवात् कथम्... नावशिष्यते इति कथमस्य तत्फलत्वमिति । 4
- 9 The first party view : अत्र आचार्यास्तावदाचक्षते...जनयत् प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणं भवति । 4-5 Who were Ācāryas ? Cakradhara in his Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga [L. D. Series p. 44] writes :
इह च सर्वत्र 'आचार्य'शब्देन उद्योतकरविवृतिकृतो रुचिकारप्रभृतयो विवक्षिताः ।
The second party view : व्याख्यातास्तु ब्रुवते । नायमिदृशो ज्ञानानां क्रमः ।...किमसम्बद्धमानज्ञानकन्याकल्पनेनेति । 5-6
About Vyākhyātr̥s Cakradhara (p. 44) says :
'व्याख्यातृ'शब्देन च भाष्यविवरणकृतः प्रवरप्रभृतयः इति ।
- 10 ननु परामर्शज्ञानमनुभूयते एव, न तु कल्प्यते, ... 'अयमग्निमान्' इति । 6
- 11 लिङ्गज्ञानं च विनश्यदवस्थमनुभेयप्रतीतौ व्याप्रियमाणं प्रमाणतां प्रतिपत्स्यते ।...वक्तुं युक्तेति । 7

- 12 अपि च अनुमेयविषये...किमनेन शिखण्डिना ॥ 7-9
- 13 ननु च प्रत्यक्षफलमिह मीमांस्यं वर्तते...वर्णितवानिति । 10
- 14 ननु च सम्बन्धग्रहणकाले यदि...भवेयुरित्यलं प्रसङ्गेन । 13
- 15 ननु कपित्थादिकार्यस्य...मनसैवावगम्यते ॥ 12
- 16 प्रमाणादभिन्नमेव फलमस्तु ।...कथ्यताम् । 14
- 17 इत्थं च प्रमाण-फले न भिन्नाधिकरणे भविष्यतः, अन्यत्र प्रमाणमन्यत्र फलमिति । 14
- 18 तदिदमनुपपन्नम्...न दर्शनं करणमेवेति । 14
- 19 यत्तु न भिन्नाधिकरणे...यद्विषयं हि दर्शनं स एव चक्षुरादेः करणस्य विषयः । 15
- 20 आश्रयोऽस्त्वधिकरणमिति...चक्षुरादावनिर्वहणात् । 15
- 21 अथैकफलनिष्पत्तौ...पृथग्भूतफलनिर्वृत्तावेवेति । 15
- 22 ननु वस्तुस्थित्या फलमेव ज्ञानं...सव्यापारो भवति । 15
- 23 कोऽयमभिमानो नाम ?...तत्कृतश्चाभिमानः । 16
- 24 इति फलमेव ज्ञानमवकल्पते न करणमिति । 16
- 25 तथा च लोकः...कश्चिद् दृश्यते । 16
- 26 ननु च सत्स्वपि चक्षुरादिषु...करणकारकं भवति । 16-17
- 27 तेन चक्षुरादेर्ज्ञानक्रियामुपजनयतः करणत्वं, ज्ञानस्य फलत्वमेवेति युक्तस्तथा व्यपदेशः ।...तदसम्भवात् । 17
- 28 यस्तु मूढतरः प्रमाणप्रमेयफलव्यवहारमेकत्रैव ज्ञानात्मनि निर्वाहयितुमुद्यच्छति... निर्भर्त्सयिष्यामहे । 17
- 29 इन्द्रियाणि घ्राणरसनयनस्पर्शनश्रोत्राणि...तद्विशेषणौभूतश्चाभाव इति । 19-20
- 30 ननु सन्निकर्षावगमे किं प्रमाणम् ?...तस्मादस्ति सन्निकर्षः । 20
- 31 नन्वव्यधानमेवास्तु...तत्सामान्यादिन्द्रियान्तरेष्वपि कल्पनीयमिति । 20
- 32 नन्वेवं सत्यर्थाक्षिप्तः...षड्विधत्वज्ञापनार्थमित्युक्तम् । 21
- 33 नन्वर्थस्य ज्ञानजनकत्वं कुतोऽवगम्यते ? ...तत्करणतां प्रतिपद्यते । 21
- 34 ननु वीरणकटयोः ...भविष्यत्येतदवसर इति । 22
- 35 यथा चेन्द्रियाणां...एवमर्थस्य कर्मणोऽपि । 22
- 36 ननु 'इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्न'पदेन सुखादिविषयं प्रत्यक्षं न संगृहीतम् । ...मनस इन्द्रियत्वात्, सुखादेरर्थस्य तद्ग्राह्यत्वात् । 22
- 37 'ज्ञान'ग्रहणं विशेष्यनिर्देशार्थम् ।...कस्य विशेषणानि स्युरिति । 23
- 38 अथ वा सुखादिव्यावृत्त्यर्थं 'ज्ञान'पदोपादानम्... 'ज्ञान'ग्रहणम् । 23

- 39 अत्र शाक्याश्चोदयन्ति—न 'ज्ञान'पदेन सुखादिव्यवच्छेदः कर्तुं युक्तः शक्यो वा, सुखादीनामपि ज्ञानस्वभावत्वात् ।...तदुक्तम्—
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तत्सुखादि किमज्ञानं विज्ञानामिन्नहेतुजम् ॥ [प्रमाणवार्तिक]
तस्माद् ज्ञानरूपाः सुखादयः, तदभिन्नहेतुजत्वादिति । 23
- 40 तदिदमनुपपन्नम्, प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धत्वाद्धेतोः ।...कथमभेदे अनुमानं क्रमते । 24
- 41 अत एव इदमपि न वचनीयं...न सुखं दुःखं वा । 24
- 42 यस्तु सुखज्ञानं...विपर्ययज्ञानमिति वत् । 24
- 43 तत्रैतत् स्यात्...न हि ग्रहणस्वभावं कश्चित् सुखमनुभवति ज्ञानवदिति । 25
- 44 नन्वस्य प्रकाशत्वाभ्युपगमे...सुखं नोत्पन्नमिति । 25-26
- 45 किञ्च किमेकमेव ज्ञानं...तस्मान्न बोधरूपाः सुखादयः । 26
- 46 अभिन्नहेतुजत्वादिति चायमसिद्धो हेतुः ।...भिन्नत्वात् । 26
- 47 अपि च ज्ञानमिच्छन्ति...ज्ञानान्तरपूर्वकं भवतीति वक्ष्यामः । 27-28
- 48 व्यभिचाराव्यभिचारौ हि ज्ञानस्य धर्मौ, न सुखादेः ।...किं 'ज्ञान'ग्रहणेन ? 29
- 49 नैतदेवम्, सुखस्यापि सव्यभिचारस्य दृष्टत्वात् । 29
- 50 किं पुनः सुखं व्यभिचारवद् दृष्टम् ? यदेतत् परदाराभिर्मर्शादिनिषिद्धाचरणसम्भवं सुखं तद् व्यभिचारि । 29
- 51 ननु सुखस्य कौटुशो व्यभिचारः ?...तथाविधं सुखमपि व्यभिचारि भवत्येव । 29-30
- 52 अपर आह—किमनेन डिम्भकलहेन ?...असम्भवादिति । 31
- 53 तदेवं सिद्धेऽपि...युक्तं 'ज्ञान'पदम् । 31-32
- 54 इत्याचार्यमतानीह दर्शितानि यथागमम् ।
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- 55 नैयायिकानां च सविकल्पप्रत्यक्षमयाः प्राणाः । 53
- 56 तत्र तावत् कर्मणि कृत्ये कृते 'व्यपदेश्य'शब्दः यथार्थतरो भवति । 53
- 57 तत्र वृद्धनैयायिकास्तावदाचक्षते...व्यपदेश्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षफलं मा भूदिति 'अव्यपदेश्य'ग्रहणम् । 32
- 58 तदिदमनुपपन्नम् । न हि नामधेयव्यपदेश्यत्वमप्रामाण्यकारणं भवति ।...तस्मादपव्याख्यानमेतदिति । 33
- 59 ननु तत्र चोदितम्—न तादृशं ज्ञानमप्रमाणं, न पञ्चमं प्रमाणमिति ...पञ्चमप्रमाणप्रसङ्ग इति । 54-55
- 60 व्यवच्छेद्यान्तरम् 'अव्यपदेश्य'पदस्य वर्णयांचक्रुराचार्याः ।...उभयजमिदं ज्ञानं व्यपदेशाज्जातमिति व्यपदेश्यमुच्यते । तद् 'अव्यपदेश्य'पदेन व्युदस्यते । 33

- 61 न चेदं पञ्चमं प्रमाणमवतरति किन्तु शाब्दमेवैतदनुमन्यते लोकः ।...शब्द एवात्र करणम् । 33-34
- 62 अत एव सूत्रकृता...न प्रत्यक्षफलमेतद् ज्ञानम् । 34
- 63 तदेतद् व्याख्यातारो नानुमन्यन्ते ।...शब्दं चोभयजं चेति विरुद्धमभिधीयते । 34-35
- 64 असम्भवदोषव्यवच्छेदार्थम् 'अव्यपदेश्य'पदोपादानम् ।... तदेवं स्मृतिविषयी-
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- 65 तस्मात् प्रत्यक्षस्य लक्ष्यस्य...इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षैककरणमविकल्पं प्रत्यक्षम् । 37
- 66 तदेतदाचार्या न क्षमन्ते ।...अन्धाद्यभावप्रसङ्गात् । 40
- 67 ननु शब्द एव करणमित्युक्तम् ...कर्मभावमनुभवेत् । 40-41
- 68 ननु शब्दावच्छिन्नमर्थं...तदा शब्दानुरक्तोऽपि किमित्यर्थो न चाक्षुषः । 43-44
- 69 अपि च गौरित्यादिज्ञानम्...अहो नैयायिको भवान् । 41
- 70 अपि चामुष्य शब्दत्वे सम्बन्धग्रहणं कथम् ?...भवेदन्योन्यसंश्रयः । 44-45
- 71 यदि च स्वानुरागेण...गवादिर्नैव गम्यते । 45
- 72 न चास्ति वस्तुनो धर्मो...प्रतिभासेत रूपवत् । 45
- 73 अर्थासंस्पर्शिनः शब्दान्...शाब्दीकृतं त्वया ? । 45
- 74 अपि च विषयभेदेन...प्रपातं नैव पश्यसि इति । 45
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CHAPTER TWO

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- 2 तत्र द्वयमपि स्वत इति तावदसांप्रतम्, प्रवृत्तस्य विसंवाददर्शनात् ।...अप्रामाण्यगृहीतौ वा तस्मिन् कस्मात् प्रवर्तते ॥ 23
- 3 एतेन तृतीयोऽपि पक्षः प्रत्युक्तः ...स्वतो ह्यप्रामाण्ये निश्चिते प्रवृत्तिर्न प्राप्नोतीति । 23
- 4 किञ्च अप्रामाण्यमुत्पत्तौ कारणदोषापेक्षम्, निश्चये च बाधकज्ञानापेक्षम् । तत् कथं स्वतो भवितुमर्हति । 23
- 5 परतस्तु प्रामाण्यं यथा नावकल्पते तथा विस्तरेणोच्यते । 23
- 6 एवं चायं द्वयमपि परत इति द्वितीयपक्षप्रतिक्षेपोऽपि भविष्यति । 23
- 7 अर्थतथात्वप्रकाशकं हि प्रमाणमित्युक्तम् ।...उदकाहरणे त्वस्य तदपेक्षा न विद्यते ॥ 24-26
- 8 सा हि भवन्ती उत्पत्तौ वा स्यात् स्वकार्यकरणे वा प्रामाण्यनिश्चये वा । 24
- 9 उत्पत्तौ कारकस्वरूपमात्रापेक्षा तदतिरिक्ततदगतगुणापेक्षा वा ? 24
- 10 कारकस्वरूपमात्रापेक्षायां सिद्धसाध्यत्वम् ।...कारकातिरिक्ततदधिकरणगुणापेक्षणं तु दुर्घटम् । 24
- 11 अप्रामाणिकत्वेन कारकगुणानामाकाशकुशेशयसदृशवपुषामपेक्षणीयत्वाभावात् । 24 । यथार्थबुद्धिसिद्धिस्तु निर्दोषादेव कारकात् । 24
- 12 यदि हि यथार्थत्वायथार्थत्वरूपद्वयरहितं...तत्रायथार्थोपलब्धिस्तावद् दुष्टकारककार्यैव दृष्टा । 25 । अयथार्थोपलब्धौ...न गुणकल्पनायै प्रभवति । 25
- 13 नापि स्वकार्यकरणे किञ्चिदपेक्षते, अर्थप्रकाशनस्वभावस्यैव तस्य स्वहेतोरुत्पादात् । अर्थप्रकाशनमेव च प्रमाणकार्यम् । 26
- 14 नापि प्रामाण्यनिश्चये किञ्चिदपेक्षते, अपेक्षणीयाभावात् । 27
- 15 तथा ह्यस्य कारणगुणज्ञानाद् वा प्रामाण्यनिश्चयो भवेद् बाधकाभावज्ञानाद् वा संवादाद् वा ? 27
- 16 न तावत् कारणगुणज्ञानात्...प्रामाण्यनिश्चयात् प्रवृत्तिरिति । 27-28
- 17 नापि बाधकाभावपरिच्छेदात् प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः ।...सर्वदा तदभावस्तु नासर्वज्ञस्य गोचरः । 28
- 18 अथ संवादात् प्रामाण्यनिश्चय उच्यते...कश्चार्थक्रियाज्ञानस्य पूर्वस्माद्विशेषो यदेतदायत्तस्तस्य प्रामाण्याधिगमः । 29

- 19 अर्थक्रियाज्ञानत्वमेव विशेष इति चेत्...किञ्च चरमधातुविसर्गोऽपि स्वप्ने सीमन्तिनीमन्तरेण भवतीति महानेष व्यभिचारः । 29-30
- 20 तस्मादर्थक्रियाज्ञानव्यभिचारावधारणात्...नक्षत्रपरीक्षावदफल एवेत्युक्तम् । 30-31
- 21 तत्रैतत्स्याद् द्विविधा हि प्रवृत्तिः ...न सर्वात्मना वैयर्थ्यमिति । 31
- 22 विषमोऽयं दृष्टान्तः ...नायं परिहृतिक्रमः । 31-32
- 23 किलातिविकसितकुसुममकरन्दपानमुदितमधुकरकुले...प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः । 32
- 24 तत्रापि नाप्रवृत्तस्य हेतुसामर्थ्यदर्शनम् ।
एवमेव प्रवृत्तौ तु निश्चितेनापि तेन किम् ॥ 33
- 25 तदेवं न कुतश्चिदपि प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः ...अतः प्रामाण्यनिश्चयेऽपि न किञ्चिदपेक्षते प्रमाणम् । 33
- 26 ततश्चोत्पत्तौ स्वकार्यकरणे स्वप्रामाण्यनिश्चये च निरपेक्षत्वादपेक्षात्रयरहितत्वात् स्वतःप्रामाण्यमिति सिद्धम् । 33
- 27 अप्रामाण्यं तूत्पत्तौ दोषापेक्षत्वात् स्वनिश्चये बाधकप्रत्ययादिसापेक्षत्वात् उभयत्रापि परत इत्युक्तमेव । 33
- 28 तस्मात् पक्षत्रयस्यानुपपत्तेः चतुर्थ एवायं पक्षः श्रेयान्-प्रामाण्यं स्वतः, अप्रामाण्यं परत इति । 33
- 29 ननु चोत्पत्तिवेलायां...अतश्च परतो द्वयम् ॥ 34
- 30 तदेतदचतुरस्रम् ।...अप्रामाण्ये चावश्यंभावी अपवादः । 34
- 31 कश्चिदुत्पन्न एवेह स्वसंवेद्योऽस्ति संशयः ।...हठादुत्पद्यमानस्तु हिनस्ति सकलाः क्रियाः । 36
- 32 यत्रापि क्वचिद् बाधकप्रत्यये संशयो जायते तत्रापि तृतीयज्ञानापेक्षणान्नान-वस्थां ।...स्वतःप्रामाण्यमब्रूते । 36
- 33 तदेवं सर्वप्रामाणानां स्वतः प्रामाण्ये सिद्धे...इति निरपवादं वेदप्रामाण्यम् । 37
- 34 अत्राभिधीयते...तत्र परत एव वेदस्य प्रामाण्यमिति वक्ष्यामः । 38
- 35 स्वतःप्रामाण्यमिति कोऽर्थः ?...अप्रामाणिकत्वात् । 39
- 36 यदेतन्नीलप्रकाशने प्रवृत्तं प्रत्यक्षं...प्रामाण्यपरिच्छेदे तु किं तत्प्रमाणमिति चिन्त्यताम् । 39
- 37 प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं वा ? प्रमाणान्तराणामनाशङ्कनीयत्वात् । 39
- 38 न तावत् स्वप्रामाण्यपरिच्छेदे तत्प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणं...तस्मान्न प्रत्यक्षस्यैष विषयः । 40
- 39 अनुमानेनापि कस्य प्रामाण्यं निश्चीयते ज्ञानस्य फलस्य वेति पूर्ववत् वाच्यम् ।...फलगतयथार्थपरिच्छेदोपायाभावादित्युक्तम् । 40

- 40 ननु स्वानुभव एवात्रोपायः । तद्धि नीलसंवेदनतया फलं स्वत एव प्रकाशते । नीलसंवेदनत्वमेव चास्य यथार्थत्वं, नान्यत् । 41
- 41 यद्येवं शुक्तिकायामपि रजतसंवेदने समानो न्यायः । न हि रजतसंवेदनादन्या यथार्थत्वसंवित्तिरिति । 41
- 42 ननु तत्र बाधकप्रत्ययोपनिपातेनायथार्थत्वमुपनीयते ।...तदसत्त्वे न तच्छङ्का युक्तिमतीत्युक्तमेव । 41
- 43 सत्यमुक्तमयुक्तं तु ।...तेन मन्यामहे न निश्चितं तत्प्रामाण्यं, संशयादेव व्यवहराम इति । 42
- 44 ननु संशयोऽपि तदा नानुभूयते...किमननुभूयमान एवारोप्यते संशयः । 42
- 45 एकतरग्राह्यविषयोऽयं प्रत्ययः ...अप्रमाणतया तु गृह्यमाणः कथं पुमांसं प्रवर्तयेत् । 42
- 46 उभाभ्यामपि रूपाभ्यामथ तस्यानुपग्रहः ।
सोऽयं संशय एव स्यादिति किं नः प्रकुप्यसि ॥42
- 47 यत्तु नानुभूयते संशय इति सत्यम् ।...सा संशयजननी सामग्री सन्निहितैवेति कथं तज्जन्यो संशयो न स्यात् ? 43
- 48 ननु प्रमाणभूते प्रत्यये जायमान एव तदर्गतो विशेषः परिस्फुरतीति ...न हि वयमनुपदिष्टं कृशमतयो जानीमः । 43
- 49 यदि तावत् स्पष्टता विशेषः...स तदानीं नावभासते इत्युक्तम् । 43-44
- 50 अपि च यदि तथाविधोऽपि विशेषः समस्ति...कथं विप्रलभ्येतेत्युक्तम् । 44
- 51 तेनैव व्यवहारस्य सिद्धत्वात् सर्वदेहिनाम् ।
अतश्च संशयादेव व्यवहारं वितन्वताम् ॥44
- 52 न च सर्वथा संशयसमर्थनेऽस्माकमभिनिवेशः ।...तस्मात् स्वयं प्रामाण्यं गृह्यते इत्येष दुर्घटः पक्षः । 45
- 53 सम्यग्ज्ञानोत्पादकं कारकं धर्मि...मिथ्याज्ञानवत् । 46
- 54 यदपि च स्वकार्यकरणे प्रमाणस्य परानपेक्षत्वमुच्यते...एकस्मात् कारकात् कार्यनिर्वृत्यभावात् । 47
- 55 ज्ञानं फलमेव, न प्रमाणमित्युक्तम् । न च फलात्मनस्तस्य स्वकार्यं किञ्चिदस्ति, यत्र सापेक्षत्वमनपेक्षत्वं वाऽस्य चिन्त्येत । 47
- 56 यदपि प्रामाण्यनिश्चये नैरपेक्ष्यमभ्यधायि...न तु तत्र नैरपेक्ष्यम् । 47
- 57 प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्याधीनत्वात् तन्निश्चयस्य । 47
- 58 ननु क्षणिकत्वात् कालान्तरे ज्ञानमेव नास्ति...ज्ञानस्यातीतत्वात् । 48

- 59 यत्पुनः कालान्तरे तन्निश्चयकरणे...सार्थकतामवलम्बते इत्यदोषः । 48-49
- 60 यत्पुनरर्थक्रियाज्ञानस्यापि पूर्वस्मात् को विशेषः ?...विचारस्य संशयपूर्वकत्वात् । 49-50
- 61 विशेषदर्शनाद्वा फलज्ञाने प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः । 50
- 62 कः पुनरयं विशेष इति चेत्...तद्विशेषदर्शनात् सुज्ञानमर्थक्रियाज्ञानप्रामाण्यम् । 50
- 63 कारणपरीक्षातो वा तस्मिन् प्रामाण्यं निश्चेष्टव्यम् । यथोक्तं भवद्भिरेव 'प्रयत्नेनान्विच्छन्तो न चेद् दोषमवगच्छेम तत्प्रमाणाभावाददुष्टमिति मन्येमहि' इति । 50
- 64 यद्येवं प्रथमे प्रवर्तके एव प्रत्यये कस्मात् कारणपरीक्षैवेयं न क्रियते ? ...कश्च नाम निकटमुपायमुपेक्ष्य दूरं गच्छेदिति ? 51
- 65 बोधरूपत्वस्य...सर्वथा सिद्ध्यत्यव्यभिचारित्वनिश्चयः । 52
- 66 सुशिक्षितास्त्वाचक्षते...निश्चलं स्वत एव प्रामाण्यमवतिष्ठते । 55
- 67 कथं पुनर्बाध्यो नाम नास्ति बोधः ।...बाध्यमाना दृश्यन्ते । 56
- 68 अनभिज्ञो भवान् बाधस्य, न हि ते बाध्याः प्रत्ययाः । इदं हि निरूप्यतां क इवोत्तरज्ञानेन पूर्वज्ञानस्य बाधः । बाधार्थमेव न विदमः । 56
- 69 यदि तावन्नाश एव बाधः, स न तेषामेव, बुद्धेर्बुद्ध्यन्तराद्विरोध इति सकलबोधसाधारणत्वात् । 56
- 70 अथ सहानवस्थानं तदपि समानम्, अबाधितानामपि ज्ञानानां सहावस्थाना-संभवात् । 56
- 71 अथ संस्कारोच्छेदो बाधः, सोऽपि तादृगेव, सम्यक्प्रत्ययोपजनितसंस्कार-स्याप्युच्छेददर्शनात्...तत्कारणकतद्विषयस्मरणदर्शनात् । 56
- 72 अथ विषयस्यापहारो बाधः, सोऽपि दुर्घटः, प्रतिभातत्वेन विषयस्यापहर्तुमशक्य-त्वात् । न हि बाधकज्ञानमित्यमुत्तिष्ठति-यत् प्रतिभातं तन्न प्रतिभातमिति । 56
- 73 अथ तदभावग्रहो बाधः...किं कस्य बाध्यं बाधकं वा । 56
- 74 (1) अथ फलापहारो बाधः, सोऽपि न सम्भवति...वदति बाधकः । 56
(2) अथ हाभादिफलापहारो बाधः...न तेनापहृतेनापि प्रमाणं बाधितं भवेत् ॥ 56
- 75 तस्मान्न बाधो नाम कश्चित् ।...किमिति बाधितमुच्यते । 57-58
- 76 अपि च पूर्वस्मिन्प्रत्यये प्राप्तप्रतिष्ठे सति आगन्तुरुत्तरः प्रत्ययो बाधितुं युक्तः, न पूर्वो, न चैवं दृश्यते । 58
- 77 नन्वेवं बाधे निराक्रियमाणे किममी शुक्तिकारजतादिग्राहिणो विपरीतप्रत्यया अबाधिता एवासताम् । 58
- 78 नामी विपरीतप्रत्ययाः ।...तस्मात् कारणाभावादपि न विपरीतप्रत्ययास्ते । 58

- 79 तत् किं सम्यक्प्रत्यय एव शुक्तिकायां रजतप्रतिभासः । 59
- 80 नायमेकः प्रत्यय इदं रजतमिति, किन्तु द्वे एते ग्रहणस्मरणे ।...सादृश्यदर्शनाद्विना न भवतीति । 59
- 81 तथा हि भ्रान्तबोधेषु प्रस्फुरदवस्तुसंभवात् ।
चतुष्प्रकारा विमतिरुदपद्यत वादिनाम् ॥
विपरीतख्यातिः असत्ख्यातिः आत्मख्यातिरख्यातिरिति । 59
- 82 तत्र विपरीतख्यातिस्तावत्कारणाभावादेव निरस्ता । 60
- 83 अपि च विपरीतख्यातौ त्रयी गतिः ...प्रतिभाति । 60
- 84 तत्र यदि रजतमालम्बनं तदियमसत्ख्यातिरेव, न विपरीतख्यातिः, असतस्तत्र रजतस्य प्रतिभासात् । 60
- 85 अथान्यदेशकालं तदस्त्येवेत्यभिधीयते ।...असन्तौ तूभावपि रजतवन्मालम्बनं भवितुमर्हतः । 60
- 86 अथ स्मृत्यारूढं रजतमस्यां प्रतीतौ परिस्फुरतीत्युच्यते... विपरीतख्यातिरसत्ख्यातेर्न विशिष्यते एव । 60
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- 91 यत्तु कुड्यादिव्यवधाने किमिति...नाकाशमात्रस्येति । 171
- 92 किमेतर्हि शब्दस्य गुणत्वे प्रमाणम् ?...सामान्यादित्रयप्रसङ्गेऽस्य नास्ति । 173
- 93 ननु गुणत्वसिद्धौ सत्यामाकाशाश्रितत्वं शब्दस्य भविष्यति...गुणत्वमितीतरेतरा-
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- 94 तथा च समानजातीयारम्भकत्वमपि गुणत्वसिद्धिमूलमेव ।...गुणत्वसिद्धि-
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- 95 नोभयत्राप्येष दोषः ।...न तु गुणत्वादिति नेतरेतराश्रयत्वम् । 174
- 96 वार्तिककृता शब्दानित्यत्वे साधनमभिहितम् 'अनित्यः शब्दो जातिमत्त्वे सति
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- 97 तेन यदुच्यते-जातिमत्त्वैन्द्रियत्वादि...हेतुत्वेनेति किं न्विदम् ॥177-178
- 98 यथाऽऽत्मगुणता हीच्छाद्वेषादंरूपपत्स्यते ।
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APPENDIX I

ESSENTIALS OF DHARMAKĪRTI'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

(BASED ON THE PRAMĀNAVĀRTTIKA)

Dharmakīrti (c. 550-600 A.D.) is a brilliant Buddhist logician. In this article we shall study his views regarding the main problems pertaining to his theory of knowledge.

While discussing what constitutes the object of perception, Dharmakīrti considers a *prima facie* view. To put it in simple language, this view maintains that the object of perception is a physical aggregate which is something over and above the individual atoms that constitute it¹. As against this view, Dharmakīrti submits that the object of perception are these atoms themselves, which as a result of combining with one another develop the capacity to become visible instead of remaining invisible - his point being that a physical aggregate is nothing over and above its constituent atoms². In reply to a query of Dharmakīrti the opponent suggests that a variegated colour-patch which is something over and above its constituent colours is a case of an aggregate standing over and above its constituent elements. Dharmakīrti refuses to agree and argues that a variegated colour-patch too is nothing over and above its constituent colours³. At this stage the opponent raises a point which gives an altogether new turn to the controversy; for he says that if a variegated colour-patch is not something unitary then our cognition of this colour-patch too cannot be something unitary (and it goes without saying that a piece of cognition is something unitary)⁴. Dharmakīrti meets the point by urging that there is something essentially enigmatic about a thing becoming an object of cognition inasmuch as this thing exists outwards while cognition is something oriented inwards⁵. His concluding argument is that since we know one object as different from another on the basis of our cognition of these objects and since our cognition of an object is something essentially

enigmatic, there in fact exist neither objects different from one another nor pieces of cognition different from one another, but just something which is essentially single, devoid of any difference (this something to be called *vijñapti*- meaning "cognition as such")⁶. This is the ultimate view of reality as Dharmakīrti sees it, and he tells us that if he nevertheless continues to speak of things existing independent of cognition (and pieces of cognition noticing these things), it is because he has deliberately turned a blind eye towards this ultimate view⁷. Elsewhere too he declares that the view according to which there exist no objects independent of cognition is the learned man's view⁸ (the implication being that the view according to which there exist objects independent of cognition is the common man's view). And yet the fact remains that Dharmakīrti's almost entire treatment of logical problems – which practically constitute his one subject-matter – works on the supposition that there exist objects independent of cognition (it is only in the case of a few minor problems that room has been made for alternative theses that do away with this supposition). With a view to demonstrating the validity of this basic assessment of Dharmakīrti's performance, a summary review of his treatment of logical problems is undertaken in what follows.

Svalakṣaṇa is Dharmakīrti's word for a thing as a unique-particular – that is, as a particular object existing at a particular place at a particular point of time. And it is Dharmakīrti's view that *svalakṣaṇas* alone constitute real reality⁹. In most contexts of logical discussion, *svalakṣaṇas* are supposed to be physical, but actually to say that a *svalakṣaṇa* is necessarily physical would mean endorsing materialism, a doctrine refuted at length in the very first chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*. So, a *svalakṣaṇa* can be either a physical object existing at a particular place at a particular point of time or a mental state occurring at a particular place or at a particular point of time. A mental state¹⁰ can be of the form of a cognition, a feeling, a conation or the like; but in a broad sense each is said to be of the form of cognition (*jñānarūpa*) because each is cognised by itself (*sva-samvidita*) just like a piece of cognition strictly so called. The mental states belonging to one particular individual form a series where an immediately preceding member acts as chief-cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) in relation to the immediately succeeding one, all members being strictly momentary in duration. A physical object too is of the form of a series of strictly momentary states where the relation of chief-

causeship obtains in a similar fashion¹¹. The one common feature of all physical *svalakṣaṇas* – a feature in the absence of which a thing will be no physical *svalakṣaṇa* – is the ‘capacity to act on sense-organs and thus produce sensory experience in the cogniser concerned’¹². By way of contrast a thing could be a mental *svalakṣaṇa*; but in most cases while contrasting a physical *svalakṣaṇa* to something else what Dharmakīrti has in mind is a different thing altogether. The reason is that for all practical purposes Dharmakīrti understands by *svalakṣaṇa* a physical *svalakṣaṇa* and contrasts it with *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* which is another crucial concept of his logic¹³. If *svalakṣaṇas* alone constitute real reality then the conclusion is automatic that a *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* lacks real reality¹⁴. But what is *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*? By *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, Dharmakīrti understands an abstract generic feature which real things are found to exhibit now here now there, and he denies real reality to it not because real things do not really exhibit it but simply because it is not itself a real thing – which is a truism. As a matter of fact, Dharmakīrti’s own treatment of perception and inference – the only two means of valid cognition recognised by him – goes to make clear as to how vital a role is played by *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* in each. Thus perception is here identified with the bare sensory experience which an object produces in the cogniser concerned, but it is at once admitted that perception thus understood serves no practical purpose unless followed by the attribution of an abstract generic feature – a *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* – to the object perceived. Similarly, inference is an impossibility unless the relation of invariable concomitance is observed to obtain between the probans and the probandum concerned, but this relation obtains not between a probans and a probandum conceived as two particular things but between them as possessed of this or that abstract generic feature – this or that *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. Yet Dharmakīrti feels that there is nothing anomalous about his emphatic denial of real reality to a *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, and there are two reasons for this. First, Dharmakīrti finds it rather easy to point out loopholes in the concept of *sāmānya* as upheld by the philosophers belonging to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā schools, and this misleads him into thinking that all talk about ‘an abstract generic feature really characterising a real thing’ must be erroneous. Secondly, Dharmakīrti feels, mistakenly of course, that there results nothing incongruous in case an abstract generic feature is conceived negatively rather than positively; e.g. on his view it would be erroneous to suppose that all cows share in

common the positive feature 'cowhood' but not at all erroneous to suppose that they share in common the negative feature 'absence of non-cows', a misconceived view.

Some details of Dharmakīrti's treatment of perception (*pratyakṣa*) and non-perceptual cognition (*anumāna*) are also note-worthy. Thus he defines perception as that type of cognitive activity which is altogether devoid of *kalpanā*. Now *kalpanā* is Dharmakīrti's word for thought and since bare sensory experience (also bare self-cognition) seems to be the only type of cognitive activity altogether devoid of a thought-element the surmise is natural that Dharmakīrti equates perception with bare sensory experience (also bare self-cognition). The surmise is amply confirmed by what Dharmakīrti says in this connection. Here it will be useful for us to confine our attention to the case of bare sensory experience (taking note of the case of bare self-cognition when necessary). Dharmakīrti argues that a *svalakṣaṇa* is really real because it possesses the capacity to perform a function (*arthakriyākāritva*), 'capacity to perform a function' being his equivalent for 'capacity to enter into a causal relationship'.¹⁵ And by way of denying real reality to a *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* he says that it is not possessed of the capacity to cause cognition, the idea being that the capacity to cause cognition is the minimum condition that a really real object must satisfy.¹⁶ A physical *svalakṣaṇa* satisfies this condition by acting on a sense-organ and thus producing sensory experience concerning itself while a *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* fails to satisfy it because it becomes an object of cognition without actually causing cognition.¹⁷ *Kalpanā*, to be equated with thought, is Dharmakīrti's word for the type of cognition which makes a *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* an object of itself, and so the net purport of his argumentation is that thought concerning an object is not caused by this object while sensory experience concerning an object is caused by this object. It can easily be seen that Dharmakīrti is here drawing our attention to the important fact that sensory experience is an essentially physiological process and thinking an essentially psychological one, the former governed by the physiological laws of sense-object interactivity, the latter by the psychological laws of 'association of ideas'. This becomes evident from Dharmakīrti's repeated emphasis that there is much arbitrariness about a piece of thinking and little of it about a piece of sensory experience. Thus two persons even when seated at the same place at the same time will think of very different things depending on their respective life-histories, but they will have

the same sensory experience in case the same physical object acts on the same sense-organ of theirs.¹⁸ Dharmakīrti has also given consideration to the nature of cognition as such, a nature to be shared both by sensory experience and thought. In this connection two points have been emphasised and they need separate treatment :

(1) Thus in Dharmakīrti's view a piece of cognition has impressed upon itself the form of its object; in other words, identity of form (*sārūpya*) is the relation that obtains between a piece of cognition and its object. In the case of sensory experience, the object is active on its part and so it is this object that is supposed to impress its own form on the corresponding piece of cognition; but in the case of thought this much alone can be said that the cognition concerned has somehow got impressed upon itself the form of its object. Here Dharmakīrti has polemised at length against the philosophers who maintain that a piece of cognition is devoid of form in the sense that it has got impressed upon itself no form of its object. His point is that one piece of cognition cannot be distinguished from another unless two happen to bear the form of their respective objects.¹⁹ Dharmakīrti specially emphasises that on the rival view all cases of memory should turn out to be identical; for, so runs his argument, a piece of memory cognises a past cognition, but if one piece of past cognition does not differ from another, one piece of memory too should not differ from another.²⁰

(2) Then Dharmakīrti is of the view that a piece of cognition is necessarily self-cognitive, and this is how he argues his case : 'All our dealing with the things of the world is based on our cognition of these things, but our cognition cannot play this role if it itself remains uncognised. And it will not do to say that one piece of cognition is cognised by a subsequent piece of cognition, for this subsequent piece of cognition too cannot play its role if it itself remains uncognised. So one is bound to face the contingency of an infinite regress unless one concedes that a piece of cognition is necessarily self-cognitive.²¹ Here too Dharmakīrti has polemised at length against the rival philosophers and here too he has made special reference to the phenomenon of memory. Thus he points out that the cognition of a word takes place by way of recalling the earlier heard cognitions of the different letters that go to constitute this word, but that no such recall can take place unless the cognitions in question were cognised at the same time they took place; but, so runs his argument, if each of these cognitions

is cognised not by itself but by another cognition, then what should take place, though it never does take place, is that the cognition of the first letter of the word is followed by the cognition of this cognition; then follows the cognition of the second letter to be followed by the cognition of this cognition, and so on and so forth²².

Besides, another point has been made. Since it is always possible to have memory of a past cognition and since no such memory can take place unless this past cognition was cognised at the time it took place, this past cognition – unless selfcognised – must have been immediately followed by a cognition of itself; and since the consideration that applies to the original cognition also applies to the cognition of this cognition, this second cognition must have been immediately followed by a cognition of itself, and so on and so forth. The result would be, so thinks Dharmakīrti, that on the rival view one should spend one's whole life-time cognising an object, then cognising this cognition, then cognising this new cognition, and so on and so forth.²³

One aspect of Dharmakīrti's discussion on the nature of cognition as such deserves separate consideration. For in the relevant portion of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, *Pratyakṣapāriccheda* (vv. 300-541), he has come out with a detailed and repeated defence of idealism²⁴. The venture is rather intriguing because it puts in serious jeopardy the findings in Dharmakīrti's own earlier treatment of logical problems. Thus the most conspicuous and crucial feature of Dharmakīrti's logic is the sharp distinction drawn between sensory experience and thought, a distinction which crucially hinges on a clear-cut admission of the reality of physical objects; on the other hand, the central aim of idealism is to deny that there exist any real physical objects. Little wonder that it is the same language Dharmakīrti uses both when speaking about thought in the context of logical problems and when speaking of sensory experience in the context of his defence of idealism²⁵. For example, he earlier tells us that the sensory experience of fire is different from the thought of fire because the former takes place when fire as a physical object acts on an appropriate sense-organ while the latter takes place when some association of ideas reminds one of fire; but later he argues that the sensory experience of fire too takes place not because of the presence of fire as a physical object but because of some sort of association of ideas. Likewise, Dharmakīrti earlier makes a serious attempt to distinguish a genuine sensory experience

from an illusory one by pointing out that the former takes place in the presence of a corresponding physical object, the latter in the absence of any such object²⁶; but later he argues that an alleged genuine sensory experience too takes place in the absence of any physical object, thus emphatically falling prey to illusory sensory experience²⁷. All this makes it incumbent on a serious student to sharply distinguish Dharmakīrti the logician from Dharmakīrti the idealist. Tradition itself, Buddhist as well as Brahmanical, distinguishes between Dharmakīrti's theses developed from the standpoint of Sautrāntikā realism and those developed from the standpoint of Yogācāra idealism, and broadly speaking it is the former that characterises Dharmakīrti the logician, the latter Dharmakīrti the idealist. Indeed, almost all characteristic theses developed by Dharmakīrti in the field of logic have to be understood exclusively from the standpoint of realism. There is perhaps only one thesis that constitutes an exception in this connection, for in its case Dharmakīrti has thought it proper to formulate an idealist version along with the realist one. This is his thesis on *pramāṇaphalabhāva* i.e. on what constitutes a means of valid cognition and what constitutes its result. It is of a highly technical character but deserves notice because of its availability in two versions. Thus, adopting the realist standpoint, Dharmakīrti argues that since a piece of valid cognition manages to apprehend its object because it bears the form of this object, here the means of valid cognition is 'this piece of cognition bearing the same form as its object (*arthasārūpya*)', and the result produced is, 'this piece of cognition apprehending its object (*arthādhigati*)'²⁸. But from the idealist standpoint there exist no objects independent of cognition, while it is owing to the agency of nescience that a piece of cognition gets split into something-that-is-grasped (*grāhya*) and something-that-grasps (*grāhaka*); so that what this piece of cognition apprehends is nothing but itself. Hence, adopting this standpoint, Dharmakīrti maintains that in the case of a piece of cognition the means of valid cognition is 'this piece of cognition assuming the form of something-that-grasps (*grāhakabhāva*)', and the result produced is 'this piece of cognition apprehending itself (*svasaṃvedana*)'²⁹, the object of valid cognition being 'this piece of cognition assuming the form of something-that-is-grasped (*grāhyabhāva*). For the rest, in the manner already hinted, Dharmakīrti the idealist simply seeks to puncture what Dharmakīrti the logician so strenuously seeks to establish. It is difficult to fathom the precise intentions that lay behind Dharmakīrti's adopting

so anomalous a procedure, but that there was something essentially extralogical about them seems certain, for otherwise it remains incomprehensible why the master-logician should indulge in the wanton game of intellectual suicide. Within the Buddhist camp idealism was certainly a Mahāyāna novelty, but realism was as old as Buddha himself and its latest outstanding defence had come from the Sautrāntika school. So in defending idealism Dharmakīrti was perhaps only paying homage to the fashion of the day, but when the question was of raising a well-constituted edifice of logical doctrine he based himself on the solid ground of Sautrāntika realism. But then the realist position itself suffered from an inherent difficulty which idealists exploited to the full. The difficulty pertained to the problem of envisaging a tangible relationship between a piece of cognition and the physical object that serves as its object. If, as was maintained by the realist, cognition and things physical belong to two different realms of reality, it is really difficult to see how the two stand related to each other. The idealist came out with the argument that since all that we know of physical things we know through cognition, there is no warrant to suppose that there at all exist physical things independent of cognition. This was a wreckless solution of a genuinely difficult problem, but the realist alternative virtually amounted to confessing that the relation between cognition and things physical is a relation *sui generis*, an alternative equally suspect. So the controversy went on and on. It is not accidental that in the discussion noticed by us in the beginning of the present investigation, Dharmakīrti deserted the realist position only when he realised that there was something essentially enigmatic about the relation alleged to obtain between a piece of cognition and its object. And in his subsequent defence of idealism he adopts the usual idealist practice of taking full advantage of the very difficulty here brought to light. So Dharmakīrti the logician's account of cognition as such deserves some further consideration.

Dharmakīrti has attributed to cognition two essential characteristics, viz. (1) its bearing the form of the object concerned and (2) its cognising itself. Now cognition being *ex hypothesi* something non-physical and its object being something physical it has to be admitted that cognition can bear the form of its object only in some figurative sense, the net import of Dharmakīrti's thesis being that a piece of cognition must possess some such characteristic as makes it the cognition of this object rather than that; and as thus put, the thesis is

thoroughly unexceptionable though also platitudinous. So according to Dharmakīrti the only essential characteristic of cognition is that it cognises itself (Dharmakīrti himself emphasizes the point by saying that the relation of 'bearing the same form' is possible between any two objects whatever, so that this is not what distinguishes a piece of cognition from what is not cognition)³⁰. But the difficulty with this characteristic is that it contains reference to cognition itself and so cannot serve as a defining characteristic of cognition. Thus judged from the standpoint of formal correctness, Dharmakīrti's definition of cognition turns out to be defective. Yet in the course of describing cognition he has said things that prove to be of material worth in the task of defining cognition. A tolerably correct definition of cognition should be 'the activity on account of which a particular sensory stimulation becomes the signal for a particular motor response.' Thus when, taking its clue from the sensory stimulation caused by a physical object, an organism acts in relation to this object and finds it useful, this clue becomes a confirmed signal for the presence of the object thus proved to be useful; likewise, when under similar conditions the organism finds the object harmful, the clue concerned becomes a confirmed signal for the presence of the object thus proved to be harmful. In both cases appropriate relationships are established between the concerned elements of the sensory-motor apparatus; it is the employment of these earlier established relationships that constitutes memory, an activity which plays so crucial a role in converting a 'trial and error clue' into a confirmed signal. This much is broadly true of all living organisms but in the case of man something qualitatively new emerges as a result of the employment of words. Thus through a mere verbal instruction a man can be taught to treat a particular sensory stimulation as a signal for the presence of a particular object, useful or harmful, though in this case too better results follow when verbal instruction is accompanied by the actual causing of the concerned sensory stimulation. All this is directly relevant for an intelligent appreciation of Dharmakīrti's position. Thus he is of the view that the sensory stimulation produced by an object in a person makes this person cognise this object in its entirety. But Dharmakīrti has himself taught that right cognition is that which enables one to undertake successful activity in relation to its object, while it seems obvious that bare sensory experience enables one to undertake successful activity in relation to its object only when elements of this experience are recognised as a

signal for the presence of this object. The anomaly has not escaped Dharmakīrti's own attention but his solution of it is extremely roundabout. For this is how his thought runs : "When an object produces sensory stimulation in a person this person certainly comes to cognise this object in its entirety, but soon after he falls under an illusion and unless this illusion of his is removed he is not in a position to undertake successful activity in relation to this object. Thus after a jar has produced sensory stimulation in a person he falls under an illusion and says to himself, 'the object lying there is not a jar', this illusion of his is removed by somehow producing in him thought to the effect 'the object lying there is not a non-jar'. Similarly, after seeing smoke-on-the-mountain a person falls under an illusion and says to himself, 'this mountain possesses no fire'; this illusion of his is removed by somehow producing in him thought to the effect 'this mountain is not a non-possessor of fire'. In the former case the illusion is removed by pointing out such elements of sensory experience as signalize the presence of a jar; in the latter case the illusion is removed by pointing out such elements of sensory experience as signalize the presence of smoke and then recalling the universal rule, 'Wherever there is smoke there is fire'. This is the intended meaning of Dharmakīrti's famous couplet : *tasmād dṛṣṭasya bhāvasya dṛṣṭa evākhilo guṇaḥ / bhrānter niściyate neti sādhanam sampravartate* /³¹, a meaning through which the strength as well as the weakness of his position stand out most conspicuously. Dharmakīrti very correctly realises that sensory stimulation produced by a physical object is the indispensable starting point for all cognition concerning this object; his mistake lies in identifying this sensory stimulation with an all-comprehending cognition concerning this object; similarly, his description of how elements of sensory experience become a signal for the presence of the corresponding physical object is essentially correct; his mistake lies in supposing that this signalling activity is always preceded by an illusion concerning the identity of this object. Here we also get an inkling as to why Dharmakīrti assigns an essentially negative rather than positive function to thought; in his eyes, thought is primarily meant to remove an illusion and only incidentally to produce a conviction. However, here another line of thought has also been operative. For what thought reveals about an object is what is common to several objects; but Dharmakīrti is of the view that each object has just got one positive nature which it does not share with any other; so according to him what

several objects have in common is not any positive feature but just that feature, which excludes them from everything else (i.e. what jars have in common is what excludes them from non-jars). In this way Dharmakīrti also feels justified in maintaining that bare sensory experience reveals the total nature of an object while a piece of thought concerning it reveals only an aspect of this nature. For sensory experience reveals an object as a bare particular, i.e. as something excluded from everything else, while a piece of thought reveals it as excluded from a particular set of objects; and Dharmakīrti suggests that 'exclusion from everything else' constitutes the total nature of an object while 'exclusion from a particular set of objects' constitutes but an aspect of this nature. All this is very much confusing, but is the true indicator of the somewhat odd workings of Dharmakīrti's mind. Perhaps, most odd is his contention that bare sensory experience reveals a thing's total nature whose partial aspects are alone revealed by thought, only a little less odd his contention that thought notices, as belonging in common to several objects, features that are exclusively negative in import. However, reading between the lines one can easily see that Dharmakīrti has an almost correct understanding of the relative roles played in the knowledge-situation by bare sensory experience on the one hand and thought on the other, as also of the type of objective features – whether exclusively negative or otherwise – that thought manages to notice.

REFERENCES

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2. *Ibid.*, II. 195-196
3. *Ibid.*, II. 200-202
4. *Ibid.*, II. 208
5. *Ibid.*, II. 212.
6. *Ibid.*, II. 213-214, 217-218
7. *Ibid.*, II. 219.
8. *Ibid.*, II. 398.
9. *Ibid.*, III. 165-166
10. *Ibid.*, II. 249-280
11. This is the central contention that emerges in the course of all his defence of momentarism. For the momentary character of a mental state is seldom under dispute.

12. *PV*, III. 166
13. The so important Svārthānumānapariccheda of the *Pramāṇavārttika* and the author's own commentary on it are substantially concerned with the problem of *sāmānya*.
14. *PV*, III. 166
15. *Ibid.*, III. 165
16. *Ibid.*, II. 5, 50
17. *Ibid.*, II. 39
18. *Ibid.*, II. 175-176
19. *Ibid.*, II. 301-319
20. *Ibid.*, II. 374-387
21. *Ibid.*, II. 423-484
22. *Ibid.*, II. 485-502
23. *Ibid.*, II. 503-541
24. *Ibid.*, II. 320-373, 388-422
25. *Ibid.*, II. 336
26. *Ibid.*, II. 288-300
27. *Ibid.*, II. 361-363
28. *Ibid.*, II. 306
29. *Ibid.*, II. 364
30. *Ibid.*, II. 429-430
31. *Ibid.*, III. 44

APPENDIX II

CONCEPTION OF ÍSVARA IN THE EARLY NYĀYA- VAIŚEŚIKA SCHOOL

I

Does Kaṇāda believe in the existence of Ísvara (God)?

There is no clear mention of *Ísvara* in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*¹ of Kaṇāda². Hence the author of *Yuktidīpikā*, a commentary on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, explicitly states that according to Kaṇāda there is no *Ísvara* (God)³. And Garbe, a well known modern scholar of Indian philosophy, maintains that the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* originally did not accept the existence of God⁴. But keeping in view the important place accorded to God in the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, the commentators wrongly try to find out in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* some implied acceptance of the existence of God. Take the following two *sūtras* : *yato 'bhyudaya-niḥśreyasasiddhiḥ sa dharmah / tadvacanād āmnāyasya prāmāṇyam* | V.S. 1.1.2-3. The straight and clear meaning of these two *sūtras* is : 'That by which one attains prosperity and beatitude is *Dharma*. Because the Vedas deal with it (= *Dharma*), they are to be regarded as *pramāṇa* (authority or valid)'. But the commentators explain the word '*tadvacanāt*' as meaning 'because the Vedas are the Word of *Maheśvara*'. But this interpretation seems unwarranted and farfetched. In this connection Prof. S. N. Dasgupta observes : "The *sūtra* '*tadvacanād āmnāyasya prāmāṇyam* (I.1.3.)' has been explained by Upaskāra as meaning 'The Veda being the Word of *Ísvara* (=God) must be regarded as valid', but since there is no mention of '*Ísvara*' anywhere in the text this is simply reading the later Nyāya ideas into the *Vaiśeṣika*'.⁶ There is another *sūtra*, viz, '*sañjñākarma tv asmadviśiṣṭānām liṅgam*' (2.1.18) where the commentators wrongly find the implied reference to *Ísvara* (=God). They explain the term '*asmadviśiṣṭānām*' as meaning '*Maheśvarasya*'. According to Upaskāra the meaning of the *sūtra* is : 'Name and effect are the mark of the existence of *Ísvara*

(=God)'. He explains how naming is a mark of the existence of *Íśvara* as also how effect too is a mark of the existence of *Íśvara*. Earth etc. must have a creator, because they are effects like a pot etc. Thus according to Upaskāra, the *sūtra* adduces two logical reasons to prove the existence of God. While criticising the above interpretation presented by Upaskāra, Prof. S. N. Dasgupta writes : 'Upaskāra's interpretation seems to be farfetched. He wants to twist it into an argument for the existence of God'.⁷ According to Dasgupta the meaning of the *sūtra* is : 'The existence of others different from us (*asmadviśiṣṭānām*) has to be admitted for accounting for the giving of names to things (*sañjñākarma*). Because we find that the giving of names is already in usage (and not invented by us)'.⁸ The *sūtra* has been explained by Candrānanda as meaning 'creation of nine names only by *Maheśvara* serves as a mark of the existence of nine substances only'.⁹ Prof. Dasgupta's above criticism applies to this interpretation also. As a matter of fact, the term '*asmadviśiṣṭānām*' is to be understood in the sense of 'of those distinguished from us' or 'of those superior to us'. In *Prāśastapādabhāṣya* at one place we find the term '*asmadviśiṣṭānām*' used as an adjective qualifying '*yoginām*'.¹⁰ One important tenet upheld by the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers is that the initial motion of atoms is caused by *Íśvara* (God).¹¹ But Kaṇāda explicitly states that it is caused by *adrṣṭa* (a special quality generated in souls by their own actions).¹² Another equally important tenet upheld by them is that God gives living beings the fruits of their merits and demerits in the shape of enjoyments and afflictions.¹³ But Kaṇāda recognises no intermediary between merits and demerits on the one hand and their fruits on the other. Still another important tenet upheld by them is that the author of the Vedas is *Íśvara* (God).¹⁴ But Kaṇāda says only this much that creation of the Vedas presupposes Intelligence, that is, the Vedas are created by an intelligent person or persons.¹⁵ Prof. Dasgupta observes : 'It is probable that Kaṇāda believed that the Vedas were written by some persons superior to us (2.1.18, 6.1.1-2)'.¹⁶ It seems to us that Kaṇāda shares the view that the Vedas have been composed by *Rṣis* to whom *Dharma* was revealed (*sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇaḥ*). Prof. Dasgupta rightly concludes : 'As there is no reference to *Íśvara* and as *adrṣṭa* proceeding out of the performance of actions in accordance with Vedic injunctions is made the cause of all atomic movements, we can very well assume that Vaiśeṣika was as atheist or non-theistic as the later Mīmāṃsā philosophers'.¹⁷

II

What does Gautama, the author of the Nyāyasūtra,¹⁸ mean by 'Īśvara' ?

'Gautama makes only a casual mention of God, and some have doubted whether the Nyāya was originally theistic.'¹⁹

In Gautama's Nyāyasūtras, we find three aphorisms dealing with *Īśvara*. These three aphorisms²⁰ explain the function of *Īśvara*, regarding actions and their fruits. First two aphorisms present the views of the opponents while the third one presents Gautama's own view. Let us take them one by one, translate and explain them fully, taking the words in their natural meaning and disregarding the interpretations of the commentators.

Īśvaraḥ kāraṇaṁ puruṣakarmāphalyadarśanāt | (4.1.19)

'Because we see the actions of living beings, bearing no fruits, it is *Īśvara* that is to be regarded as the cause of fruits'.

The cause of fruits is not our actions, but *Īśvara*. There is no necessary cause-effect relation between actions and fruits. Fruits do not depend on actions performed by living beings, but they depend on the will of *Īśvara*. We should maintain this because we see that a human being does not attain fruits even though he performs respective actions. It is *Īśvara* only who puts us in different situations and circumstances, and gives us pleasures and pains, keeps us bound or makes us free. These are not the fruits of our actions, but they are results of *Īśvara*'s will. Our actions have nothing to do with fruits we experience. The theory of Moral Causation (*Karma siddhānta*) is wrong and unfounded. *Baliyasī kevalam Īśvarecchā*.

Na, puruṣakarmābhāve phalāniṣpatteḥ. | (4.1.20)

'No, [*Īśvara* is not the cause of fruits], because if a living being does not perform actions, it cannot attain fruits'.

The principle enunciated in the preceding aphorism is wrong, because if the cause of fruits were not actions, but *Īśvara*, then we should attain fruits without performing actions. We never reach the destination, if we do not walk. We are not cured of the disease if we do not take medicine. So fruits depend on actions and not on *Īśvara*. There is no need of *Īśvara*. Actions done, fruits attained. If a seed of a banyan tree comes in contact of the soil, water, etc., it will definitely grow into a banyan tree; no agent is required. Depending on the cause,

the effect comes into being. If a person takes deadly poison, he will certainly die, no agent is required to exert poison to do its work. If one performs an action, he will definitely attain its fruit. Where is the necessity for positing an agent *Īśvara* ?

Tatkāritatvād ahetuḥ | (4.1.21)

‘Because *Īśvara* exhorts one to perform actions and attain their fruits, both the views enunciated in the preceding two aphorisms do not have the support of a logical reason.’

This aphorism presents Gautama’s own view. It is as follows : The two views which we have explained are wrong. One neglects and rejects the necessary relation obtaining between actions and fruits, another neglects and rejects *Īśvara*. As a matter of fact, there does obtain a necessary relation between actions and fruits. If one performs an action, that action does give him its fruit. It is true that for fruition, action does not require *Īśvara*. But one should know as to which action be performed to attain a desired fruit. A person desirous of a particular fruit should have the knowledge as to which action entails which fruit. It is true that deadly poison causes death. But one who wants to commit suicide by taking poison should have knowledge that a particular substance is highly poisonous. If he does not possess that knowledge, and as a result takes any substance, he will not die. A particular medicine is very effective on a particular disease. If with this knowledge a patient takes that medicine, it will cure him of the disease, and it will not require any doctor to exert it to work. The doctor is required only to impart knowledge to the patient as to which medicine he should take for the cure of the disease he is suffering from. The patient earnestly desires to get rid of the disease. But for that, what action is proper, that is, which medicine is to be taken, he does not know. That knowledge is imparted to him by the doctor. Hence to attain a desired fruit, one should have the knowledge as to which action is proper for that desired fruit. Regarding worldly matters, this knowledge is imparted by the experts of the various subjects. But to become free from internal adventitious impurities, viz. attachment, aversion, etc., one should seek the knowledge as to what actions are to be performed at what stages, from the person who himself has become free from these impurities through spiritual discipline and attained inherent perfection, i.e. *Īśvara*, also called *jīvanmukta*. There is a necessary relation between certain actions and their fruit viz. *mukti* (freedom from impurities,

liberation), but to know this necessary relation we require *Īśvara* i.e. *jīvanmukta*. Thus the only function of *Īśvara* is to impart knowledge of this necessary relation obtaining between concerned actions and their fruit, viz. *mukti*. Thus *Īśvara* is a preacher (*upadeṣṭā*), a guide to show the path of liberation. It is in this sense only that *Īśvara* is regarded *karmakārayitā* (causing one to perform actions). He never forcibly causes one to perform actions. A doctor simply shows the medicines, even then we say that the doctor cured us of the disease. Similarly, *Īśvara* too simply shows the remedy (i.e. proper action) to get rid of the impurities, viz. attachment, aversion etc. yet we say that *Īśvara* makes us free from impurities, he gives us fruits, he favours us with his grace. In this sense only, *Īśvara* is *phalakārayitā*. In the context, the desired fruit is *mokṣa* (freedom from impurities). Knowledge of what actions are proper for *mokṣa* is imparted by *Īśvara* to those desirous of *mokṣa* (*mumukṣu*). By doing so, *Īśvara* makes the *sādhana* of *mumukṣu* fruitful. This is his grace. If he were not to impart this knowledge to *mumukṣu*, the *mumukṣu* will not be able to attain the desired fruit, viz. *mokṣa*.

There is a necessary relation between actions and fruits. One desirous of a particular fruit should know the necessary relation obtaining between that fruit and the proper action. If he performs an action, with that knowledge, he will definitely attain the desired fruit. As for instance, there is a necessary cause-effect relation between smoke and fire. But so long as one does not know this necessary relation, one is not able to infer fire from smoke. Only after acquiring the knowledge of the necessary relation obtaining between smoke and fire, he can infer fire from smoke. Similarly, to attain the desired fruit, viz. *mokṣa*, it is absolutely necessary to acquire the knowledge of the necessary relation obtaining between the desired fruit, viz. *mokṣa* and the proper actions. This knowledge is imparted to living beings by *Īśvara*.

In the systems of Indian philosophy, the ultimate desired fruit is *mokṣa* (freedom from impurities, viz. attachment, aversion, etc.). To attain *mokṣa*, the knowledge as to what actions one should perform at what stage is absolutely necessary; this knowledge is imparted by *jīvanmukta* alone.²¹ Thus from the explanation of these three aphorisms it naturally follows that according to Gautama *jīvanmukta* himself is *Īśvara*.

In the light of the above explanation, the meaning of the oftquoted following verse becomes very clear :

*Íśvaraprerito gacchet svargam vā śvabhram eva vā |
Ajño jantur anīśo'yam ātmanah sukha-duḥkhayoḥ ||*

Mahābhārata, Vanaparva

Translation : Impelled by *Íśvara*, a soul moves to heaven or to hell. No ignorant living being is master of its pleasure or pain.

The verse is generally quoted in support of the view that God's will is supreme and all-powerful, our pleasure and pain depends on His will and not on our actions or efforts. But this is not the true import of the verse. The true import of the verse is as follows :

The adjective '*ajña*' (=ignorant) qualifying '*jantu*' (=a living being) is very important as it provides us a key to the true import of the verse.

Pleasure and pain are fruits of actions performed by a living being. If one wants to attain pleasure, one should know the actions that cause pleasure. If one wants to attain (rather to avoid) pain one should know actions that cause pain. But a living being by itself does not possess the knowledge as to which actions lead to pleasure and which actions lead to pain. Therefore, it is believed that a living being by itself is incapable of attaining pleasure or pain, that is, it by itself is not the master of its pleasure or pain. It is *Íśvara* who imparts this knowledge to it. *Íśvara* preaches that these actions entail pleasure and these actions entail pain. This knowledge urges a living being to perform those actions that cause pleasure if it desires pleasure, or this knowledge urges it to perform those actions that cause pain if it desires pain. It is only by imparting this knowledge that *Íśvara* impels a living being to move to heaven or to hell. Heaven signifies pleasure and hell signifies pain.

III

Nature of *Íśvara* according to Vātsyāyana, the author of the *Bhāṣya*²² on the *Nyāyasūtra*

As we have seen, Gautama accepted *Íśvara* as one who imparts knowledge of the necessary relation obtaining between actions and fruits. Vātsyāyana clearly describes the nature of *Íśvara* (4.1.21). It is as follows;

- (a) *guṇaviśiṣṭam ātmāntaram Íśvaraḥ |
tasyātmakalpāt kalpāntarānupapattiḥ |
adharma-mithyājñāna-pramādahānyā*

*dharmajñāna-samādhisampadā ca
viśiṣṭam ātmāntaram Īśvaraḥ | tasya
ca dharmasamādhiphalam aṇimādy-
aṣṭavidham aiśvaryam |*

Explanation : *Īśvara* is a soul. He is not an independent substance different from soul-substance. *Īśvara* is like mundane souls. He possesses those very qualities which mundane souls possess, but his qualities have some speciality. In a mundane soul the qualities may become perverse and impure while in *Īśvara* they are found in their pure, pristine state, that is, *Īśvara* has destroyed impurities that perverted these qualities. Let us see how Vātsyāyana puts this. Mundane souls possess wrong cognition/conviction (*mithyājñāna*), vicious activity (*adharma*) and lethargy (*pramāda*), while *Īśvara* has destroyed them. Because he has destroyed them, he comes to possess knowledge/pure cognition (*jñāna*), pure righteous activity (*dharmā*) and pure concentration (*samādhi*). Again, he has gained eightfold miraculous powers as a result of his righteous activity and pure concentration. Mundane souls do not possess all these miraculous powers. Thus Vātsyāyana has clearly pointed out as to in what way *Īśvara* is different from mundane souls like us. But he has not stated the difference of *Īśvara* from the liberated souls because it is quite obvious. Liberated souls are devoid of all the nine specific qualities (*viśeṣa-guṇas*) of soul-substance, viz *buddhi* (cognition), *sukha* (pleasure), *duḥkha* (pain), *icchā* (will), *dveṣa* (aversion), *prayatna* (volition), *dharmā* (merit), *adharma* (demerit), *saṁskāra* (impression), that is, they do not possess even pure cognition, pure activity, pure Concentration and miraculous powers, whereas *Īśvara* does possess pure cognition, pure activity, pure Concentration and miraculous powers.

Thus, according to Vātsyāyana, *Īśvara* is that soul which having destroyed wrong cognition/conviction, vicious activity and lethargy has gained pure cognition, pure activity and pure Concentration. From this it naturally follows that *Īśvara* is not *nitya mukta* i.e. free and liberated for ever in all the three divisions of time—past, present and future. This rightly suggests the possibility of a mundane soul becoming *Īśvara* as also the possibility of there being many *Īśvaras*. From this we can safely deduce that *Īśvara* as described by Vātsyāyana is none but *jīvanmukta*.

In connection with this passage from the text of Vātsyāyana-Bhāṣya, Prof. Ingalls observes: '.... one will grant that Vātsyāyana's

remarks are confusing. God has won his divinity through good works he has performed. We must therefore suppose that there was a time when he was not God'²³. The description of *Īsvara* by Vātsyāyana is regarded by Prof. Ingalls as confusing because it is not in harmony with other aspects of *Īsvara*, as presented by later commentators in their explanation of the following (b) (c) (d) and (e) passages from the text of the Bhāṣya, but as we shall see in due course, the interpretation of the commentators is twisted in the light of the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika idea of *Īsvara* (God).

- (b) *saṅkalpānuvidhāyī cāśya dharmah
pratyātmavṛttin dharmādharma-
sañcayān pṛthivyādīni ca bhūtāni
pravartayati/evam ca svakṛtābhyā-
gamasyālopena nirmāṇaprākāmya-
yam Īśvarasya svakṛtakarma-
phalaṁ veditavyam ।*

Explanation : Commentators read in this passage later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika idea of *Īsvara* (God). That is why they interpret the term '*prati*' in the compound '*pratyātmavṛttin*' as '*pratyeka*' (=each one) as also the term '*nirmāṇaprākāmyam*' as '*jagannirmāṇaprākāmyam*' (unfailing will to create the world). So, according to them, the explanation of the passage is as follows :

The creation starts as soon as he wills to create the world. When he wills to create the world, his merit following his will causes the accumulated merits and demerits in each soul to start giving their fruits as also causes the physical elements (atoms) to integrate and produce effects. His will to create the world is unfailing. This unfailing will of his is the fruit of his past good action.

Prof. Ingalls also accepts this interpretation and hence explains the passage in the following words : 'God acts upon the *karmic* accumulation of each of us as well as upon the gross elements of the universe. Accordingly, his omnipotence is limited by the fact that each of us must receive the results of our former actions. Furthermore, this omnipotence [if one should really grant it such a title] is the result of the *karma* (that is, works) which God himself has accumulated. Finally it is said that all God's wishes are fulfilled....'²⁴

But Prof. Ingalls is puzzled as to how *Īsvara* who causes the

accumulated *karmas* in each living being to give their fruits as also creates the world, himself be bound by the Law of *Karma*, and his unfailing will to create the world, itself be the fruit of his past good action. That is why he finds Vātsyāyana's remarks confusing. He is at sea because he cannot understand how God be regarded as winning his divinity through the good works he performed in the past. This confusion is the result of the wrong interpretation of the abovementioned terms. It will be cleared off if we interpret these terms as follows :

Here the term '*prati*' is employed in the sense of '*ābhimukhya*' or '*sannikṛṣṭa*', as in '*pratyakṣa*'²⁵. So '*pratyātmavṛttin*' is equivalent to '*ātmasannikṛṣṭān*.' The meaning of the compound '*pratyātmavṛttin*' is '*atmānaṁ prati ābhimukhyena samavāyasambandhena yeṣāṁ vṛttiḥ te, tān pratyātmavṛttin*.' Thus we explain '*pratyātmavṛttin dharmādharmasañcayān*' as 'accumulations of merits and demerits residing in his soul by *samavāya* relation.' The term '*nirmāṇaprākāmyam*' is to be regarded as equivalent to '*nirmāṇakāyaprākāmyam*' meaning 'unfailing will to create *nirmāṇakāya* —yogic bodies.'

Thus in this passage two ideas which have reference to *jīvanmukta* are presented. They are:

- (1) A *jīvanmukta* causes all his accumulated *karmas* to give their fruits in the present birth which is his last birth. It is maintained that he should experience all the fruits of all his accumulated *karmas* in his last birth. Vātsyāyana accepts the existence of a *jīvanmukta*. He says : '*bahiś ca viviktacitto viharanmukta ity ucyate*' (4.2.2.). He accepts that a *jīvanmukta* should experience all the fruits of all his accumulated past *karmas*. Study his words : '*sarvāṇi pūrvakarmāṇi hy ante janmani vipacyanta*' *iti*/(4-1-64).
- (2) To experience all the fruits of all his accumulated *karmas* within a short period of time he is required to construct yogic bodies. Vātsyāyana accepts this view. He says : '*yogī khalu ṛddhau prādurbhūtāyāṁ vikarāṇadharmā nirmāya sendriyāṇi śarīrāntarāṇi teṣu yugapad jñeyāṇy upalabhate*' (3.2.19) Also study Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's words : '*yogī hi yogarddhisiddhyā vihitanikhilanija-dharmādharmakarmā nirmāya tadupabhogayogyāṇi teṣu teṣūpattisthāneṣu tāni tāni sendriyāṇi śarīrāṇi khaṇḍāntaḥkaraṇāṇi ca muktair ātmabhir upekṣitāni grhītvā sakalakarmaphalam anubhavati prāptaiśvarya itīttham upabhogena karmaṇāṁ kṣayaḥ*' / (Nyāyamañjarī, Kashi Sanskrit Series, Vol. II, p. 88)

Now we present our explanation of the passage. It is as follows : There inherently resides in him a special merit (*dharma*). He has acquired this merit through good action performed in the past. This merit has twofold fruit — 1) it causes all the accumulated merits and demerits inherently residing in his own soul to give their fruits and also 2) causes the physical elements to construct yogic bodies. But when does it give its twofold fruit. It gives its twofold fruit when he wills to experience all the fruits of all his accumulated merits and demerits and for that purpose also wills to construct yogic bodies. That is why it is said to follow his will. Thus his will to construct yogic bodies is unfailing, and this unfailing will of his is the fruit of some special good action he performed in the past. His unfailing will to construct yogic bodies should be regarded as the fruit of his past action because it is a rule that whatever *karma* one performs is never destroyed so long as he does not experience its fruit.

(c) *āptakalpaś cāyaṁ / yathā pitā apatyānām*
tathā pitrbhūta īśvaro bhūtānām/

Explanation : *Īśvara* is a reliable person (*āpta*). One can trust him, put faith in him, consider him to be an authority. Just as father is an authority for his son, similarly *Īśvara* is an authority for all living beings. Father guides his son. *Īśvara* guides all living beings. Father advises his son as to what is good for him and how to attain it. Similarly *Īśvara* preaches all living beings as to what is the highest Good (Liberation) and how to attain it. Vātsyāyana intends to show similarity obtaining between father-son-relation and *Īśvara-jīva*-relation with regard to *āptatā* only. This analogy should not be stretched further. As for instance, just as father generates son, similarly *Īśvara* generates *jīvas*, or just as son is an *aṁśa* of his father, similarly *jīva* is an *aṁśa* of *Īśvara*. This is not intended by Vātsyāyana. According to him, *Īśvara* is such a person as one can easily and safely rely on him, especially in matters relating to the path leading to the highest Good. But how has *Īśvara* gained this *āptatā* ? He has gained it by destroying *adharma*, *mithyājñāna* and *pramāda* and thereby attaining *dharma*, *jñāna* and *samādhi*.

Again this proves that *Īśvara* is a *jīvanmukta* who is an *upadeśṭā par excellence*.

Prof. Ingalls does not understand the intention of Vātsyāyana. Hence he misses the point and criticises Vātsyāyana's this statement.

His criticism is as follows : 'Again God is said to act like a father. But who ever heard of a father who in dealing with his children could not transcend their merits and demerits.'²⁶ Prof. Ingalls seems to be obsessed with the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika idea of God who gives to a living being a proper fruit of its past action, who does not transgress the deserts of living beings.

- (d) *na cātmakalpād anyah kalpaḥ
sambhavati/na tāvad asya buddhiḥ
vinā kaścid dharmo līṅgabhūtaḥ
śakya upapādayitum/ āgamāc ca
draṣṭā boddhā sarvajñātā Īśvara
iti / buddhyādibhiḥ cātmalīṅgair
nirupākhyam Īśvaram partyakṣā-
numānāgamaviśayātītaḥ kaḥ
śakta upapādayitum ?*

Explanation : *Īśvara* is *ātman* (soul) only. He is not an independent substance different from *ātman* because he does not possess any such quality other than *buddhi* (intellect, knowledge) as could prove him an independent substance other than soul-substance. *Īśvara* possesses *buddhi* and *buddhi* is a special quality (*viśeṣaguṇa*) of *ātman*. In scriptures too, *buddhi* has been given as a quality of *Īśvara*. Scriptures describe him as *draṣṭā* (seer), *boddhā* (knower) and *sarvajñātā* (omniscient). Thus even scriptures have not mentioned any such quality as could prove him an independent substance. If he were devoid of *buddhi*, etc. which serve as logical reason to prove soul, he will become unreal, non-existent, beyond the ken of perception, inference and scriptural testimony; as a result, who will be able to prove him ?

Here Vātsyāyana has accepted *Īśvara* as *sarvajña*. So the question arises as to whether he regards *jīvanmukta* as *sarvajña*.

The person who knows all substances with all their states —past, present and future, is *sarvajña*. By '*sarvajña*', generally what we mean is this. We cannot definitely say as to whether Vātsyāyana has in mind this meaning of '*sarvajña*' in this context. This much is certain that the meaning of the term '*sarvajña*' is different in different contexts in Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya. 'Sense-organs grasp their specific respective objects only, that is, eyes grasp *rūpa*, tongue grasps *rasa*, so on and so forth. On the other hand, *ātman* is *sarvajña*, that is, it grasps all the

five objects, viz. *rūpa*, *rasa*, *gandha*, *sparsa* and *śabda*. This is the reason why *ātman* is different from sense-organs.' This has been said by Vātsyāyana at one place²⁷. Here the context is that of fruits and actions. Hence in this context the '*sarvajña*' may mean 'a person who knows the necessary relation obtaining between all *karmas* and their respective fruits' and in this sense a *jīvanmukta* is definitely *sarvajña*. It may be noted that the meaning of the term '*sarvajña*' as 'a person knowing all substances with all their states – past, present and future' is contradictory to *Karma* theory which implies freedom of will.

(e) *svakṛtābhyāgamalopena ca*
pravartamānasya yad uktam
pratiṣedhajātam akarmanimitte
śarīrasarge tatsarvaṁ prasajya-
te iti/

Explanation : If we do not maintain that a person who constructs yogic bodies is able to do so on account of some good action performed by him in the past, then it means that past actions are without fruits, that is, no past action is the cause of the creation of yogic bodies. And if we accept that no past action is the cause of the creation of yogic bodies, then all those very defects that vitiate the view that no past action is the cause of the creation of an ordinary body will also vitiate the view that no past action is the cause of the creation of yogic bodies.

Thus according to Vātsyāyana, *īśvara* is none but *jīvanmukta* who has gained *dharma*, *jñāna* and *śamādhi* by destroying *adharma*, *mithyā-jñāna* and *pramāda*, who clearly knows as to which action entails which fruit, who himself has travelled the entire path leading to liberation and hence has direct knowledge of the path, who is an authority in matters relating to the path, who is an *upadeśā par excellence*, who has risen above the cycle of birth and death, who is not to be born again, who by his unfailing will constructs yogic bodies in order to experience all the fruits of all his accumulated *karmas* and who by his unfailing will causes his accumulated *karmas* to give their fruits.

IV

²⁸**Praśastapāda's introduction of God(Maheśvara)into the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school**

In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school the idea of *īśvara* as *nityamukta* and creator of the world is for the first time found in Praśastapāda's

Padārthadharmasaṅgraha. He uses the term '*maheśvara*' for *Īsvara*. There arises a desire in *Maheśvara* to create worlds so that mundane souls may experience fruits of their past actions. As a result of his desire, the *adr̥ṣṭas* (i.e. merits and demerits) of all mundane souls become prone to give their respective fruits and come in contact with air-atoms. Due to the contact of *adr̥ṣṭas* with air-atoms, there arises in air-atoms motion capable of producing effects. By such motion air-atoms come in contact with one another and *dvyanukas* are formed and then *tryanukas* are formed and thus *vāyumahābhūta* originates. In this very manner, *ap-mahābhūta*, then *tejas-mahābhūta* and then *pṛthivi-mahābhūta* originate. After the origination of these four *mahābhūtas*, by the mere will of *Maheśvara* a Great Egg is created out of the *tejas* atoms associated with *pārthiva* atoms. Then *Maheśvara* creates *Brahmā*, the Great Grand Father of all living beings, along with all the worlds and allots him the task of creating *prajā* (living beings of various classes). *Brahmā* possesses *jñāna* (knowledge), *vairāgya* (non-attachment) and *aśvarya* (miraculous powers). Having known the fruits of the actions performed by each and every soul in the past, he creates *prajāpatis*, *manus*, *devar̥ṣis*, *pitṛs*, *Brahmins*, *Kṣatriyas*, *Vaiśyas*, *Sūdras* and all other living beings—all possessing *jñāna*, *bhoga* and *āyus* according to their past *karmas*. Having created them, *Brahmā* joins them with *dharma*, *jñāna*, *vairāgya* and *aśvarya* according to their past *karmas*²⁹. When there arrives the time for absolution (*mokṣa*) of *Brahmā*, *Maheśvara* desires to destroy the worlds in order that living beings tired of the transmigratory journey may take rest. As soon as he desires to destroy the worlds, all the effects gradually in due order disintegrate into ultimate atoms. Thus *pralaya* (Dissolution) takes place. In *pralaya* there exist disintegrated and discrete atoms as also souls associated with merit, demerit and past impressions.³⁰

Thus according to *Prāsaṭapāda*, Creation and Dissolution take place according to the will of *Maheśvara*. *Maheśvara*'s will is not the direct cause of the initial effect-producing motion generated in atoms. His will simply causes *adr̥ṣṭas* to give their fruits, and it is these *adr̥ṣṭas* — when come in contact with atoms — that generate such motion. Again, *Maheśvara* having created all the worlds and *Brahmā*, appoints *Brahmā* to create living beings of all classes, to give them fruits according to their past *karmas*, thus to govern them and to dispense justice according to their desert.

By his will *Maheśvara* creates four *Mahābhūtas*, the *bhuvanas*

(worlds or dwelling-places) for the living beings to dwell in and *Brahmā*. *Brahmā* creates all the living beings of all the classes and it is *Brahmā* only who allots *jñāna*, *dharma*, *vairāgya*, *aśvarya*, *bhoga* and *āyus* to these living beings according to their past *karmas*. That is why *Brahmā* is called *sarvalokapitāmaha*. After a definite period of time *Brahmā* attains *mokṣa*. Thus *Brahmā* is different with different Creation (*sarga*), while *Maheśvara* is one and *nitya* and hence common to all the Creations. *Maheśvara* possesses will only, while *Brahmā* possesses knowledge (of the necessary relation obtaining between actions and their respective fruits), non-attachment and miraculous powers. *Maheśvara* does nothing during the long existence of Creation. *Brahmā* governs the creation so long as it exists. In *pralaya* (Dissolution), the activity of giving fruits to living beings according to their past *karmas* stops. Hence there is no need of *Brahmā* in *pralaya*. Neither *Brahmā* nor *Maheśvara* is described as *upadeṣṭā* or as *Vedakartā*.

Later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers having removed *Brahmā*, allot *Brahmā*'s task also to *Īśvara* (God). Again, they maintain that it is *Īśvara* (God) only who gives fruits to living beings in accordance with their past *karmas*. Moreover, in later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works it is established that *Īśvara* (God) possesses will and knowledge both.

From the above discussion we conclude that upto Praśastapāda, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school was atheist and the term '*Īśvara*' was used in the sense of *jīvanmukta* only and not in the sense of God. It is Praśastapāda who for the first time introduced the concept of God into the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. There are scholars who agree with us on this point.³¹ Perhaps to distinguish God from *Īśvara* (= *jīvanmukta*) of the early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, Praśastapāda employed the term '*maheśvāra*' for God, that is, for him *jīvanmuktas* are *īśvaras* while God is *Maheśvara*.

REFERENCES

1. 'We possess the old aphorisms of the school : The Vaiśeṣikasūtras of Kaṇāda. Their text or wording is not testified by any old commentary. Numerous quotations in the older philosophical literature testify to a good old kernel. But much old is lost and is also variously changed, new things have also been interpolated.' History of Indian Philosophy, Erich Frauwallner, Delhi, 1984, Part II, p. 4.

The kernel seems to belong to c. 300 B.C., while much of the Vaiśeṣikasūtras as we have them seems to belong to c. 300 A.D. Generally scholars agree that the Vaiśeṣikasūtras are older than the Nyāyasūtras.

2. 'There are no references to it (=idea of God) in the Sūtra of Kaṇāda, though commentators profess to find them there.' Outlines of Indian Philosophy, M. Hiriyanna, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1951, p. 242.
3. आचार्येण तु नेते तस्मात् सूत्रकारमते नास्ति ईश्वरः । युक्तिदीपिका, कारिका ५.
4. Philosophy of Ancient India, p. 23.
5. Upaskāra, 1.1.3. Upaskāra is a commentary on the Vaiśeṣikasūtras; written by Śaṅkara Miśra (1425 A.D.)
तदिति हिरण्यगर्भपरामर्शः, हिरण्यं रेतोऽस्येति कृत्वा भगवान् महेश्वर एवोच्यते ।
चन्द्रानन्दवृत्ति 1.1.3.
6. A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, S.N. Dasgupta, Cambridge, 1957, p. 282, fn. 3
7. Ibid, p. 288, fn. 1
8. Ibid, p. 287-288.
9. अस्मदादीनां सकाशाद् यो भगवान् विज्ञानादिभिर्विशिष्टो महेश्वरस्तदीयं संज्ञा-
प्रणयनं नवानामेव द्रव्याणां भावे लिङ्म्, दशमस्य संज्ञाऽनभिधानात् । चन्द्रा-
नन्दवृत्ति, Edited by Muni Shri Jambuvijayaji, Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1961
10. 'अस्मद्विशिष्टानां योगिनां' प्रशस्तपादभाष्य, संपूर्णानन्द विश्वविद्यालय, वाराणसी,
१९७७, पृ० ४६४
11. परमाणवादयो हि चेतनाऽऽयोजिताः प्रवर्तन्ते, अचेतनत्वात्, वास्यादिवत् ।
न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलि, ५.४
12. ... अणूनां मनसश्चाद्य कर्मादृष्टकारितम् । वै०सू० ५.२.१३
13. स हि सर्वप्राणिनां कर्मानुरूपं फलं प्रयच्छन् कथमनीश्वरः स्यादिति भावः । कन्दली,
गंगानाथझाग्रंथमाला १, वाराणसेयसंस्कृतमहाविद्यालय, पृ० १३३
14. वेदस्य पुरुषः कर्ता...त्रैलोक्यनिर्माणनिपुणः परमेश्वरः । न्यायमंजरी, मा०१,
काशीसंस्कृतसिरिङ्ग १०६, १९३४-३६, पृ० १७५
15. बुद्धिपूर्वा वाक्यकृतिर्वेदे । वै०सू० ६.१.१
16. A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, Dasgupta, p. 234
17. Ibid, p. 234

18. The Nyāyasūtras have different strata, the oldest belonging to c. 300 B.C. and the latest belonging to c. 400 A.D. Much of the Nyāyasūtras as we have them today belongs to c. 400 A.D.
19. Outlines of Indian Philosophy, M. Hiriyanna, p. 242.
20. These three Nyāyasūtras and the commentaries on them were critically examined by Dr. Hermann Jacobi in his *Die Entwicklung der Gottesdee bei den Indern*, Bonn u. Leipzig 1923.
21. जीवनमुक्तस्यैव उपदेष्टृत्वसम्भवात् । सांख्यप्रवचनभाष्य, 3.79.
22. 'This commentary presumably belongs to the first half of the fifth century.' History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, Erich Frauwallner, p. 8:
23. 'Human Effort versus God's Effort in the Early Nyāya (N.S. 4.1.19-21)' by Prof. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Dr. S. K. Belvalkar Felicitation Volume, Motilal Banarasidas, Varanasi, 1957, p. 232
24. Ibid, p. 231
25. 'प्रति' ग्रहणेन चेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षसूचनात्....। सांख्यतत्त्वकौमुदी, कारिका ५
प्रतिराभिमुख्येन वर्तते....। न्यायमंजरी, भाग १, पृ०१०३
26. Prof. Ingalls' paper in Dr. S. K. Belvalkar Felicitation Volume, p. 232
27. यस्मात् तु व्यवस्थितविषयाणीन्द्रियाणि तस्मात् तेभ्योऽन्यश्चेतनः सर्वज्ञः सर्वविषयग्राही विषयव्यवस्थितिमतीतोऽनुमीयते । न्यायभाष्य ३.१.३
28. '... and the final systematizer of the school, Praśastapāda or Praśastadeva, sporadically also named Praśastakāra, who lived about the second half of the sixth century.' A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, E. Frauwallner, p. 4.
29. ततः पुनः प्राणिनां भोगभूतये महेश्वरसिसृक्षानन्तरं सर्वात्मगतवृत्तिलब्धादृष्टा-
पेक्षेभ्यस्तत्संयोगेभ्यः पवनपरमाणुषु कर्मोत्पत्तौ तेषां परस्परसंयोगेभ्यो द्व्यणुकादिप्रक्रमेण
महान् वायुः समुत्पन्नो नभसि दोधूयमानस्तिष्ठति ।... एवं समुत्पन्नेषु चतुर्षु महाभूतेषु
महेश्वरस्याभिधानमात्रात् तैजसेभ्योऽणुभ्यः पार्थिवपरमाणुसहितेभ्यो महदण्डमा-
रभ्यते । तस्मिंश्चतुर्वदनकमलं सर्वलोकपितामहं ब्रह्माणं सकलभुवनसहितमुत्पाद्य
प्रजासर्गे विनियुङ्क्ते । स च महेश्वरेण विनियुङ्क्तो ब्रह्मा अतिशयज्ञानवैराग्यैश्वर्यसम्पन्नः
प्राणिनां कर्मविपाकं विदित्वा कर्मानुरूपज्ञानभोगायुषः सुतान् प्रजापतीन्... सृष्ट्वा
आशयानुरूपैर्धर्मज्ञानवैराग्यैश्वर्यैः संयोजयति इति । प्रशस्तपादभाष्य, पृ०१२७-१३१

30. ... ब्रह्मणोऽपवर्गकाले संसारखिन्नानां सर्वप्राणिनां निशि विश्रामार्थं सकलभुवनपते-
महेश्वरस्य सज्जिहीर्षासमकालं...आपरमाण्वन्तो विनाशः ।... ततः प्रविभक्ताः
परमाणवोऽवतिष्ठन्ते धर्माधर्मसंस्कारानुविद्धा आत्मानस्तावन्तमेव कालम् ।
प्रशस्तपादभाष्य, पृ० १२२-१२६
31. Bhūmika (Introduction) by Durgadhar Jha to Praśastapāḍabhāṣya,
Ganganath Jha Granthamālā No. 1, Sampurnananda Sanskrit
Vishvavidyalaya, Varanasi, 1977, p. 4.

