A STUDY
OF
JAYANTA BHAṬṬA’S NYĀYAMAṆJARI
A MATURE SANSKRIT WORK
ON
INDIAN LOGIC
PART III

By
NAGIN J. SHAH

SANSKRIT-SANSKRITI GRANTHAMĀLĀ 4
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FOREWORD

It is indeed a matter of great pleasure for me to introduce to the academic world the present work entitled ‘A Study of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s Nyāyamaṇjarī, a mature Sanskrit Work on Indian Logic, Part III.’ With this part a study of the entire Nyāyamaṇjarī is accomplished.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa was a distinguished mature logician. He flourished in the reign of Śaṅkaravarman (885-902 A.D.), a king of Kashmir. His Nyāyamaṇjarī occupies a unique place among the Sanskrit works on Indian logic and philosophy. It evinces his mastery over various branches of traditional learning. Sweetness of language, lucidity of diction, profundity of thought, depth of scholarship and cogency of arguments are the salient features that characterise this remarkable work. Here Jayanta has so arranged his material that he has somehow or other and at some place or other found occasion to discuss whatever most important problems pertaining to logic, ontology, ethics, theology, he had in mind to discuss. Thus he covers all the important problems of Indian philosophy and examines all the important theories formulated by the different systems of Indian philosophy. His acquaintance with the subject is deep and extensive and his treatment is arresting. His thorough grasp of the subject along with his clear presentation makes his Nyāyamaṇjarī a comprehensive handbook on Indian philosophy and logic. So here is a work which no serious student of Indian philosophy and logic can afford to neglect.

The present work is a study of its nine Ānikas, from IV to XII. So, it deals with the problems pertaining to validity of Vedas and other scriptural texts, universals, word-meaning, sentential meaning, soul, liberation, illusionism, steps of inferential demonstration, pseudoprobans. It strongly refutes the Mīmāṃsā theory of authorless Vedas, the Prabhākarite’s theory of anvītābhidhānāvāda, the Sāṅkhya theories of buddhi and causation, the Buddhist theories of ‘exclusion’ (apoha) and momentariness, Vijnānavāda idealism and Brahman-monism. His criticism of rival theories is mostly fair, rational and revealing.

The present study does full justice to Jayanta by presenting his discussions faithfully and lucidly. It tries to evaluate his views logically and historically. It also attempts to assess each and every theory impartially.

I hope that the scholarly world will receive this work with delight.

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General Editor
INTRODUCTION

The present work is a study of the nine Āhnikas, from IV to XII, of Jayanta Bhatta’s Nyāyamañjarī. Jayanta continues his discussion on verbal testimony commenced in the third Āhnik and considers some problems related to it in Āhnikas IV, V and VI. He investigates the category prameya in Āhnikas VII, VIII and IX. And he deals with the remaining fourteen categories satśaya (doubt) etc. in the last three Āhnikas.

In Āhnikas IV Jayanta is exclusively preoccupied with theological matters. He establishes his position that Vedas are valid source of religious duty (dharma) because they are composed by omniscient God. He refutes the Mārtaṇḍaka view that Vedas are valid because they are authorless. The Mārtaṇḍaka held that no person can be omniscient. This led him to formulate the absurd inference that Vedas are an all-valid religious text because they are composed by no author. Here Jayanta considers also the allied problem as to whether word-meaning relationship is eternal or one established by God. Jayanta maintains that word-meaning relationship is established by God at the time of world-creation just as Vedas are composed by Him at that time; against it the Maṇḍuka’s counterpoint is that word-meaning relationship is eternal just as Vedas are eternal. Thus it is that the Maṇḍuka’s atheistic theology claiming a patronage of Vedas is pitted against Jayanta’s God-intoxicated theology claiming a similar patronage. In this very Āhnik, Jayanta discusses the status of Atharvaveda. He is expected to contend that all the four Vedas are a composition by God, but here he develops this point not directly but by way of arguing in details against the prima facie view that Atharvaveda is not on par with the remaining three Vedas. He concludes his enquiry by declaring that only a person who is not afraid of committing the sin called ‘reviling Vedas’ would dare to say that this one or that out of the four Vedas is not authentic. Then he considers the question of the validity of non-Vedic scriptural texts. He suggests some sort of gradation among the non-Vedic scriptural texts. Thus on one extreme stood the scriptural texts coming from quarters like Buddhists, Jainas etc. which openly repudiated the authenticity of Vedas, on the other extreme stood the texts like Purāṇas and Dharmashastras which commanded the loyalty of all the Purāṇists; and in between stood the scriptural texts belonging to the Purāṇist sub-sects like Śaiva, Pāṣupata, Pāñcarātra etc. Jayanta presents before us a Purāṇist’s typical attitude towards three groups of non-Vedic scriptural texts. He reports about three rather liberal attitudes which could have been adopted by certain circles in this connection — one according to which all scriptures are authentic for some reason or other, another according to which all scriptures are authentic owing to their origination from God, a third according to which all scriptures are valid owing to their being based on Vedas. Having finished this topic, Jayanta elaborately defends the efficacy of the cult of Vedic ritual as also the validity of each single word uttered in Vedas. The last question discussed in the present Āhnik is the question whether all Vedic statements are injunctive. The Prabhākarite Mārtaṇḍakas, with a view to emphasising the pan-ritualistic character of Vedas, came out with the view that even such Vedic statements as are apparently descriptive are in fact injunctive. As against this, the Vedāntin maintained that all Vedic statements including even the injunctive ones are in fact descriptive. Jayanta realises that both the positions are extreme and concludes that the question as to which of the two (viz, injunctive and descriptive statements) is sub jëate to which does not interest Naïyāyikas much.
Āhṅika V deals with the question as to what a word stands for and this enquiry is divided into two sections. The first section considers as to what an individual word stands for, while the second considers as to what a sentence stands for. In the first section Jayanta takes up the much debated problem of the reality or otherwise of a 'universal'. The debate had, of course, something to do with the problem of word-meaning. For the Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā thinkers were of the view that a noun-word stands for a 'universal' which is an eternal independent real residing in each of the particular-entities denoted by this word, a view countered by the Buddhist by arguing that a 'universal' thus conceived is something fictitious while a noun-word supposed to stand for such a 'universal' in fact stands for nothing real. For the Buddhist a word stands for 'exclusion from the rest' which is certainly common to all the members of the class concerned. There are the most important considerations urged by the Buddhist by way of criticising the Nyāya-Mīmāṁsā thesis of 'universal'. He sounds convincing when he argues that what is common to all the members of a class is not an eternal independent real called 'universal', but not when he argues that what is thus common is nothing positive but a negative feature of the form of 'exclusion from the rest.' There is no denying that what is common to the members of a class excludes them from things not belonging to this class, but that is no ground for denying that these members share any positive features in common. Jayanta's refutation of the Buddhist's anti-universal argumentation is indeed cogent. Here too he sounds convincing when he argues that what is common to all the members of a class is not a mere 'exclusion-from-the-rest', but not when he argues that what is thus common is eternal independent real called 'universal'. He is certainly right in telling the Buddhist that things real are not exclusively of the form of a unique particular but exhibit well-defined mutual similarities as well. In the second section we are first offered the Kumārilite account of what a sentence means and then its Prabhākarite account, the two accounts being followed by certain independent observations of Jayanta himself. As a matter of fact, the Kumārilite and the Prabhākarite were most interested in enquiring as to how it is that a Vedic injunctive sentence impels one to act in an appropriate fashion; with this end in view they considered the question as to what is the precise import of an injunctive verbal suffix but they talked as if this import is what a sentence as a whole means. Now this was a procedure which Jayanta failed to appreciate, for according to him even about a verb occurring in a sentence – a verb composed of a root and a suffix – it could not be said that its meaning is the meaning of the sentence as a whole. Even so, Jayanta is positively interested in one aspect of the discussion. Thus the Prabhākarite submits that an injunction is followed just because it is an injunction, not because by following it one would get this or that result; this submission is directed against the Kumārilite who would not deny that while following an injunction one is somehow guided by the consideration that one would thereby get this or that result. Now Jayanta emphasises that one follows an injunction never except under the conviction that one would thereby get this or that result, a point which he develops in some details after having reported about the corresponding Kumārilite and Prabhākarite theories.

In Āhṅika VI Jayanta discusses three problems considerably different from each other. Thus here first is refuted the doctrine of sphota upheld by the grammarians, then is explained how a sentence yields meaning, and lastly is vindicated the utility of the science of grammar. Jayanta's criticism of sphota theory is essentially valid - in any case more valid than its criticism on the part of the Mīmāṁsaka who on
certain crucial points himself shares the grammarian’s notions. The section on the utility of the science of grammar begins with a very brief consideration of the objection that it is difficult to ascertain the meaning of a Vedic sentence and while answering this objection Jayanta incidentally remarks that grammar should help one in ascertaining that. But the point is that what is subsequently discussed is not this special question but the general question as to why at all grammar should be studied. In this context the mention is made of the injunction ‘one ought to use correct words, not incorrect ones’ and Jayanta tells us that the science of grammar helps one to correctly differentiate the corrupt words from the correct ones. But the chief problem considered in this Âhñika is as to how a sentence yields meaning. In this connection he does three things, viz. (i) criticises the Kumârilite view that the instrument of sentential meaning are not the words concerned but the word-meanings conceived; (ii) considers various views - all worked out by the Nyâya thinkers - as to how one manages to grasp a sentence along with its meaning; (iii) considers the Kumârilite and the Prabhâkarite views as to what constitutes sentential meaning while offering an alternative view of his own. The Kumârilite maintains that the instrument of sentential meaning are not words concerned but word-meanings concerned mainly on the ground that it will be too much of a burden for the words of a sentence to yield the word-meanings as also the sentential meaning. The Kumârilite’s argument makes just no sense to Jayanta who simply submits that if the words of a sentence are actually found to perform two functions then some explanation will have to be found out for both. Jayanta’s whole criticism is on right lines. Then he considers several views - all maintained by the Nyâya thinkers - as to how one manages to grasp a sentence along with its meaning. Thus here first is presented a view attributed to Âcâryas, then one attributed to Vyâkhyaâtras-cum-Prâvâras, then one attributed to nobody in particular, lastly two alternative views offered by Jayanta himself. The first three views are more or less combersome while the chief merit of those offered by Jayanta is their relative simplicity. All these views seek to explain two things, viz. (1) how a sentence is grasped word by word and a word occurring in this sentence letter by letter, (2) how is grasped the meaning of a sentence and in the course of grasping it are grasped the meanings of the words in this sentence. As to how a word is grasped letter by letter, all agree in accepting the same procedure. But all differ on the second point. Jayanta’s explanation and refutation of all these views are interesting. And the solution offered by Jayanta seems tenable. The third thing done by Jayanta is to report about the Kumârilite and the Prabhâkarite views as to what constitutes sentential meaning while offering an alternative view of his own. The question was as to how the meanings yielded by the words of a sentence stand related to the meaning of this sentence as a whole. In technical language the Prabhâkarite’s answer to the question was in the form : “A sentence denotes things combined (anvitâbhidhânavâda)”, the Kumârilite’s answer in the form : “In connection with a sentence what happens is that things denoted get combined (abhihitaânvayavâda)”. The Prabhâkarite’s point was that the denoter-denoted relationship obtains between a sentence as a whole and the sentential meaning concerned; as against this, the Kumârilite’s point was that the denoter-denoted relationship obtains between individual word and its meaning while the meaning of a sentence is got by combining the meanings yielded by the individual words occurring in this sentence. Jayanta independently argues against the Prabhâkarite view while adding that the Kumârilite alternative too is not to his liking. Really, Jayanta has endorsed the Kumârilite view as against the Prabhâkarite, but his position has the
merit of clearly recognising that words of a sentence yield their own respective meanings as well as the meaning of this sentence, a recognition in connection with which the Kumārilité has some reservations. Jayanta maintains that words of a sentence have two powers, viz. denotative power (abhidhānīta ṣakti) and informative power (tātparya-sakti); by the former power words yield their respective word-meanings while by the latter power they yield the sentential meaning. Again, Jayanta makes the important observation that its denotative power a word exercises singly, while its informative power it exercises in company with the remaining words of a sentence; the Prabhākarite's mistake lies in denying the former power and applying the designation 'denotative power' to the latter (the official Kumārilité position denies the latter power). Jayanta's exposition of the problem is illuminating.

Jayanta devotes Āhika VII to the problem of soul. On the question of soul Indian philosophers were divided into three distinct camps - one represented by the Cārvākās advocating outright materialism, another by the Buddhists advocating the anti-materialist doctrine of no-soul, the third by the rest (including the Naivyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas) advocating the anti-materialist doctrine of soul. The fundamental question that served to divide the materialist from the anti-materialist was whether consciousness can be treated as a property of matter, a question answered in the affirmative by the former, in the negative by the latter. The latter simply argued that if consciousness be a property of matter then all matter should exhibit this property; the materialist's submission that matter organised in a particular fashion is what alone possesses consciousness was rejected as unwarranted. Jayanta's preoccupation with materialist position leads him to say a few things about transmigration and rebirth, for the materialists deny them. In this connection Jayanta recalls that the Nyāyaśūtra aphorist has argued in support of rebirth on the ground that even a new-born babe expresses joy or sorrow, an expression impossible in the absence of a past experience associated with joy or sorrow. The materialist rejects this argument, offering his own explanation of the phenomenon. Jayanta's anti-materialist critique closes with the submission that certain happenings pertaining to the life of a living being remain unexplained in terms of observable factors related to this life, this necessitating the postulating of karma-done-in-a-previous-birth (adṛṣṭa) as the needed explanatory factor. The Mīmāṃsakas and certain Naivyāyikas seek to answer the materialist by arguing that soul is an object of direct perception. Jayanta himself is of the view that soul is known not by way of direct perception but by way of inference and so he criticises the argument in question as offered by the Kumārilité, the Prabhākarite and certain Naivyāyikas themselves. The criticism is sound and interesting. According to Jayanta the phenomena of recognition, desire, aversion and effort necessitate the positing of a soul in the form of an abiding non-bodily agent which on the one hand acquires fresh-cognition and on the other hand applies to new cases a cognition acquired in the past. The noteworthy thing is that this aspect of the matter so much emphasised by Jayanta as by the other non-Buddhist anti-materialist philosophers in the interest of the soul doctrine is an extremely significant aspect of the matter. As against this, the Buddhist conceived the conscious acts in the form of a series running parallel to the bodyseries concerned, rejecting an abiding soul inhabiting the body concerned. This clearly suggests that the controversy around the Buddhist doctrine of no-soul was basically a controversy around the general doctrine of momentarism whose one corollary the former doctrine was. So Jayanta undertakes refutation of momentarism, which is brilliant in its own way. While assailing the doctrine of no-soul, he has made the following chief points: (1) Co-ordination
between present cognition and a past one is impossible unless both cognitions are had by one and the same cogniser. (2) It is an untenable position that one has cognition all the time, that is, even during a state of sleep, swoon or the like. (3) It is impossible for an intangible thing like a cognition-series to get transferred from one body to another at the time of death or even to get transferred from one place to another along with the associated body.

In Āhika VIII Jayanta deals with the ten prameyas, viz. body, sense-organ, objects of sense-organs, cognition, internal cognitive organ, activity, moral defilement, rebirth, fruit of action, and pain. The first five are the ontological topics while the remaining five are the ethical topics. Specially noteworthy is the detailed refutation of the Sāṅkhya metaphysics undertaken by Jayanta while considering the topic cognition (buddhi). The occasion for the refutation arises because unlike the Naiyāyika the Sāṅkhya philosopher does not equate the three words buddhi, upalabdhi and jñāna but attributes to them three different meanings. Jayanta shows how buddhi as conceived by the Sāṅkhya thinker is redundant. To this criticism directly relevant for his purpose Jayanta adds a general criticism of the Sāṅkhya doctrine of prakṛti and its successive transformations and an even more general criticism of the Sāṅkhya doctrine of causation.

Āhika IX discusses the problem of liberation (mokṣa) and refutes three varieties of illusionism. Regarding liberation, Jayanta discusses two questions, viz. (i) what condition characterises the state of liberation and (ii) what means lead to the attainment of liberation. While dealing with the first question, Jayanta refutes the Vedāntic position and establishes his own position. The discussion enables us to form a good idea of how Jayanta on the one hand and his Vedāntist rival on the other conceive liberation as suited to their respective conceptions of soul as such. While dealing with the second question, Jayanta first argues against the position that liberation is impossible and then against the position that the proper means for attaining liberation is not right understanding alone but it coupled with religious ritual. Jayanta’s threefold criticism of illusionism is highly important. He says that one ought to know soul as conceived by the Nyāya authors, not it as conceived by so many advocates of monism, and then one by one assails Brahman-monism, Šābda-monism and Viśiṣṭa-monism.

In Āhika X Jayanta offers an account of five categories, viz. saṃśaya (doubt), prayojana (purpose), dṛṣṭānta (example), siddhānta (established doctrine) and avayava (steps-making-up-an-inferential-demonstration). The problem of avayava is of special interest to logicians as it relates to the problem of inference. The established-Nyāya position is that an inferential demonstration consists of five steps, viz. pratiṣṭhā, hetu, udāharaṇa, upanaya and nīgaman. It is defended by Jayanta against the Buddhist’s criticism that the second and third among these are alone indispensable while the rest redundant. In Āhika XI Jayanta offers an account of seven categories, viz. tarka (reflection), nirvaya (demonstrated conclusion), vāda (honest debate), jalpa (debate possibly dishonest), viṭṭadī (empty objection-mongering), hetvābhāsa (pseudo-probans) and cālaka (quibble). The topic of hetvābhāsa is related to the theory of inference. Here, of special importance is Jayanta’s posure of the problem of a new possible type of hetvābhāsa calledprayojaka, a problem whose discussion constitutes a noteworthy part of Jayanta’s present treatment of hetvābhāsa. In the last Āhika XII Jayanta offers an account of two categories, viz. jāti (faulty counter-argument) and nīgrahasthāna (point-of-defeat).

Nagin J. Shah
VALIDITY OF VEDAS AND OTHER SCRIPTURAL TEXTS

In Āhnikā (Chapter) IV of his Nyāyamaṇjarī, Jayanta is exclusively preoccupied with theological matters. But the performance, though somewhat unusual for a Nyāya author, was not unexpected. For Jayanta has contended that the central aim of the Nyāya school of philosophy is to vindicate the validity of Vedic testimony, and it is this vindication that he undertakes in some details in his present Āhnikā. In this connection Jayanta has to argue not only against the anti-Brahmanical theologians like Buddhists but also against the very much Brahmanical Māṁsā theologians. For in the course of history the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school of philosophy came to be allied with the Purāṇic-Brahminist school of theology which was staunchly theistic and stood opposed as much to the atheistic Brahmanical Māṁsā theology as to all anti-Brahmanical theology. And hence it is that the present Āhnikā of Jayanta enables us to form a clear idea of how a Purāṇic-Brahmanist would look at the problems of theology. This should become evident from a mere look at the titles of the sections into which this Āhnikā might be conveniently divided; they are as follows:

1. Vedas – an authorless composition or a composition by God
2. Atharvaveda on par with the remaining three Vedas
3. The Scriptural texts other than Vedas
4. Objections against Vedas refuted
5. Equal authenticity of the injunctive as well as descriptive parts of Vedas

Here the section (5) takes up an important theoretical problem which however is not considered in much details while section (2) takes up a rather secondary theological problem which somehow divided the Brahmīn theologians irrespective of whether they were Purāṇists or Māṁsakas; but the remaining three sections elaborately treat problems that are typical as well as crucial. Thus the section (1) explicitly tells us how the Purāṇist differs from the Māṁsaka in
his assessment of Vedas, the section (3) implicitly tells us how he differs from the latter in his assessment of the scriptural texts other than Vedas, while section (4) explicitly tells us how both will defend Vedas against rival attacks. In the background of this much general information these sections can be examined one by one.

(1) Vedas – an authorless composition or a composition by God

Jayanta begins by offering the following inference: "Vedic sentential constructions must presuppose an author, because they are sentential constructions found in a non-Vedic text." Against this the Mīmāṃsaka offers a counter-inference as follows: "All study of Vedas must presuppose a prior study by the student's preceptor, because this is what is meant by the phrase 'a study of Vedas', like today's study of Vedas." Jayanta submits that in the Mīmāṃsaka's inference the probans is not relevant for proving the probandum, to which is added that a similar statement can be made also about Mahābhārata. The Mīmāṃsaka pleads that in the case of Mahābhārata it is unanimously recalled that it was composed by Vyāsa; Jayanta retorts that in the case of Vedas too it is unanimously recalled that it was composed by Prajāpati (= God). The Mīmāṃsaka submits that the Vedic references to Prajāpati do not mean to refer to God; Jayanta replies that that way one might as well say that the Mahābhārata references to Vyāsa do not mean to refer to its author – the two references being of the same character. Jayanta’s statements are typical of a Purāṇist who would interpret the Vedic references to Prajāpati as references to God supposed to be the author of Vedas and who would find nothing anomalous about Mahābhārata containing a reference to its own author. On the other hand, the Mīmāṃsaka might have been thoroughly mistaken in his belief that Vedas are an authorless composition but in rejecting Jayanta’s suggestion that they are a composition by God he was on solid grounds. In any case, when the Mīmāṃsaka submits that nobody has come across the author of Vedas, Jayanta asks: "Did your father or grandfather come across Vyāsa?" The Mīmāṃsaka elaborates his point as follows: "Vedas are so important a text that had they been composed by an author he would not have been forgotten by the generations of students-of-Vedas. Moreover, the idea that God composed Vedas at the time of world-creation makes no sense simply because the idea that there ever took place world-creation makes no sense." And even if God
created the world at one time He could not be seen then to be uttering Vedas because He is supposed to have got no body; and even if having a body He was then found to be uttering Vedas, who could say that He was reciting His own composition or an earlier received one — in the latter case Vedas being possibly an eternal text."9 To an atheist like the Mīmāṃsaka this train of thought blasphemous in the eyes of a theist would be plain commonsense, but the question is whether Vedas — for that matter, any text whatsoever — could come into existence without being composed by an author. So from the fact that there was no received tradition as to who, if any one person at all, composed Vedas the Mīmāṃsaka drew the fantastic conclusion that they were composed by nobody while Jayanta drew the equally fantastic conclusion that they were composed by God. Be that as it may, Jayanta charges the Mīmāṃsaka with having shifted his ground, for instead of proving that Vedas are eternal because one cannot study them without one's preceptor having earlier studied them the latter is now seeking to prove that Vedas are eternal because nobody remembers as to who composed them; but he is ready to consider the new argument as well.10 Jayanta points out that his own probans is well competent to prove that Vedas are a composition by somebody; for if a sentential construction could come into existence without needing an author then a piece of cloth could as well be produced out of threads without needing a weaver.11 The Mīmāṃsaka pleads that Vedas are an extra-ordinary type of texts; Jayanta retorts that in that case they should be a composition by some extra-ordinary author and not an authorless composition, just as mountains are created by somebody much superior to the producer of pots, not created by nobody.12 Then Jayanta assails the Mīmāṃsaka's new probans. Thus the Mīmāṃsaka has argued that Vedas are an authorless composition because nobody remembers as to who composed them; Jayanta retorts: "It is not proved that nobody remembers as to who composed Vedas. And even if that is proved that will not imply that Vedas are composed by nobody. For the composition of Vedas took place so long ago while the author concerned was an extra-ordinary personage possessing no fixed body. However, an inference and a scriptural testimony can well prove that such a personage composed Vedas."13 Really, the Mīmāṃsaka is wrong in asserting what he does, right in denying what Jayanta asserts; similarly, Jayanta is
wrong in asserting what he does, right in denying what the Mīmāṃsaka asserts. Jayanta concludes the present phase of his enquiry by arguing that the same God who created the world also composed Vedas because the composition of Vedas requires a knowledge of all the world and all the beings inhabiting this world, also by arguing that the same God who composed one Veda composed all the four because the four Vedas teach interconnected things. By now Jayanta has already discussed the specific problem of the present section, viz. whether Vedas are an authorless composition or a composition by God. But he yet discusses two allied problems, viz. (1) whether word-meaning relationship is eternal or one established by God, (2) how the Naiyāyika and the Mīmāṃsaka respectively vindicate the validity of Vedic testimony.

Thus the Mīmāṃsaka argues that a word possesses an inherent capacity to yield the meaning it does and yet one must learn this meaning from his elders just as smoke possesses the inherent capacity to act as probans for inferring fire and yet one must learn about this capacity somehow or other. This way he repudiates the alternative that the relation between a word and its meaning is established through a convention set up somehow; his point is that it is inconceivable as to who and when will set up such a convention (not, for example, God at the time of world-creation— all which is an unwarranted hypothesis), also that in that case a word would be reduced to the status of certain bodily gestures, physical arrangements etc. that might conventionally be assigned some meaning by somebody. The objection that on the present supposition the same word should not mean two things in two languages is rejected on the ground that all word is capable of yielding all meaning—alternatively on the ground that a word possesses that meaning which is assigned to it by the Aryans in contrast to the Mlecchas. All these positions maintained by the Mīmāṃsaka Jayanta assails one by one. Thus on the latter’s showing there obtains between smoke and fire a natural—objective—relation inasmuch as the former is produced by the latter, but there obtains just a conventional—cognitive—relation between a word and its meaning, for if the latter too were a natural relation then so soon as a word is heard its meaning should be cognised just as so soon as fire is properly set up smoke is produced. The objection that if word-meaning relationship is merely conventional
then a word would be reduced to the status of bodily gesture etc. is rejected on the ground that a word remains a very special means of cognition even if the concerned convention as to word-meaning relationship is to be learnt first just as a probans is a very special means of cognition even if the concerned invariable concomitance is to be learnt first. Then it is argued that word-meaning relationship is conventional because the same word often means two things in two languages. The supposition that all word is capable of yielding all meaning is rejected as groundless, there being no empirical evidence in its support. Similarly is rejected the supposition that a word means what the Aryans – and not Mlecchas – take it to mean, the point being that a word of a Mleccha language is as much capable of yielding a meaning as a word of an Aryan language. Lastly it is conceded that the convention as to word-meaning is set up by God at the time of world-creation, it being recalled that the thesis of world-creation on the part of God has already been demonstrated. The point is emphasised that the Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā positions on the question practically differ little and as follows: (1) According to the former a word has been yielding a meaning ever since the time of world-creation, according to the latter it has been doing so since ever; (2) according to the former what is involved in word-meaning relationship is a word and a meaning, according to the latter here there is involved a third element in the form of a capacity inherent in this word in virtue of which it yields this meaning. In this connection is answered the objection that even God while setting up a convention as to word-meaning relationship must require a prior stock of words; the answer consists in contending that it is we ordinary mortals, who require a prior stock of words while explaining a word-meaning (though we too not always) but that God who is an extra-ordinary personage capable of even world-creation requires no prior stock of words while setting up a convention as to word-meaning relationship. Here again we find a fantastic Mīmāṁsā position pitted against a fantastic Nyāya position. The position that the word-meaning relationship is established through a convention is correct in that different peoples speaking different languages have set up different conventions as to this relationship but the position loses all sense when identified with the contention that God at the time of world-creation has set up convention as to word-meaning
relationship, an identification indulged in by the Naiyāyika while repudiating the absurd Mimāṃsā position that a word is inherently capable of yielding the meaning it does. In any case, we can now see how the controversy as to word-meaning relationship is relevant for the specific problem of Jayanta’s present section. For his point is that word-meaning relationship is established by God at the time of world-creation just as Vedas are composed by Him at that time; against it the Mimāṃsaka’s counter-point is that word-meaning relationship is eternal just as Vedas are an eternal composition.

Lastly to be taken up in this section is the problem as to how the Naiyāyika and the Mimāṃsaka respectively vindicate the validity of Vedic testimony. First is presented the Naiyāyika’s case and then the Mimāṃsaka’s. Thus Jayanta contends that on the showing of his school Vedas are a source of valid cognition because they are composed by an authoritative person, there being an invariable concomitance to the effect that whatever exhibits the feature ‘being composed by an authoritative person (symbolically C)’ exhibits the feature ‘being a source of valid cognition (symbolically S)’. Jayanta feels that his task is to show that Vedas exhibit the feature C and that there obtains an invariable concomitance between the features C and S; how he accomplishes the task is revealing inasmuch as we thereby learn much about his precise understanding of the features C and S. As it turns out, he understands by C ‘being composed by a person who knows everything about the subject-matter concerned’, by S ‘a text enabling us to validly cognize everything about the subject-matter concerned.’ For the following is how he argues that Vedas possess the feature C: “We have already proved that a word is not an eternal verity, that the Vedic sentential constructions must presuppose an author because they are sentential constructions, that there exists an omniscient person (= God) who has created everything whatsoever. Again, the nature of a cause must correspond to the nature of the effect concerned. And we are going to prove that Vedas are free from all those defects which are pointed out in it by our opponents, also that false are the illusionist doctrines like ‘word-nondualism’ ‘Brahma-nondualism’ etc. according to which Vedas are not of the form of an effect.” By refuting the illusionist doctrines and by emphasising that Vedas are a collection of sentences Jayanta makes it doubly sure that they are
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a real composition standing in need of a real author. Again, by
emphasising that Vedas are free from all defects Jayanta means to
suggest that they are composed by an authoritative person, a
suggestion that must be made because presently his very purpose
is to show how Vedas are composed by an authoritative person. [By
emphasising that the nature of a cause must correspond to the
nature of the effect concerned it is hinted that the author of Vedas
must be thoroughly conversent with what constitutes the subject-
matter of Vedas, that is, with man’s religious duty. By emphasising
that God is the creator of everything it is hinted that this author
is God, it being impossible for one to lay down man’s religious
duty unless one knows everything about everything.] And the
following is how Jayanta argues that whatever possesses the feature
C possesses the feature S : “In the texts pertaining to medicine etc.
the feature S is exhibited because of the feature C.²⁸ It cannot be
said that the feature S is exhibited by such a text only to the extent
the cognition conveyed by it is found to be valid; for this validity-
of-cognition itself is due to the feature C.²⁹ Nor can it be argued
that since it is impossible to observe the feature C all that can be
done is to see how far a text exhibits the feature S by seeing how
far the cognition conveyed by it is valid;³⁰ for it is impossible for
one person to find out as to how far valid is the cognition conveyed
by a text, this text being stupendous in the sweep of its subject-
matter.³¹ So it must be admitted that such a text is composed by
a person whose knowledge is all-covering in respect of the subject-
matter concerned.³² Thus for Jayanta the feature C means ‘a text
composed by an all-cogniser’, the feature S ‘an all-valid text.’ This
becomes further evident from the elucidation offered next. Thus the
opponent pleads: “The sciences like medicine etc. are in fact
beginningless so that Caraka etc. are not the originators of these
sciences; it therefore does not matter if Caraka etc. are not found
to be all-cogniser. Nor will it then be a case of a blind tradition
being followed; for the tradition concerned is rooted in the
observation of a concomitance-in-presence and a concomitance-in-
absence just as the science of grammar is rooted in the usage of
the cultured persons”³³ Jayanta retorts: “If a text on medicine etc.
can be composed on the basis of the observation of a
concomitance-in-presence and a concomitance-in-absence then any
of us can compose such a text. So Caraka etc. too have not
composed such a text on that basis. And there is no reason to think that the traditions of medicine etc. are beginningless, for in that case they must be blind traditions. So Caraka etc. must be all-cognising originators of the traditions in question." The opponent pleads: "Let Caraka etc. be very much learned but why all-cogniser?" Jayanta retorts: "Since the texts in question cannot be composed on the basis of the observation of a concomitance-in-presence and a concomitance-in-absence, there is no alternative to admitting that Caraka etc. have composed them not on the basis of inferences related to a part of the subject-matter concerned but on the basis of perceptions related to the whole of this subject-matter." The opponent asks: "But why then Caraka etc. are found to be wrong on this question or that?" Jayanta pleads: "The fault must lie not with Caraka etc. but with those who make mistake in following their instruction just as when a Vedic ritual fails to yield result the fault lies not with Vedas but with those who make mistake in following the instruction." Thus on Jayanta's logic the first text dealing with a science must be an all-valid text and it must be composed by a person who is an all-cogniser in respect of the subject-matter of this science; this implies that all subsequent texts dealing with this science must be essentially of the form of a commentary on that original text. This rather odd way of conceiving how the literature pertaining to a science grows was typical of our authors who would always regard themselves as a more or less learned commentators on an original all-valid text. His own performance was regarded by Jayanta as a commentary on Nyāyasūtra, the alleged all-valid first text of the science of logic allegedly founded by Gautama; similarly, all work on medicine will be regarded by him as a commentary on Caraka's 'Saṁhitā', all work on grammar as a commentary on Pāṇini's 'Āstādhyāyī', and so on and so forth. In any case, it is on the basis of such an understanding that Jayanta contends that the first religious text of Brahmins, viz. Vedas must be composed by a person who is an all-cogniser in respect of religious matters. But then recalling that a religious text has to deal with such supersensuous phenomena as a ritual performed now yielding an otherworldly result later on, he adds that the author of Vedas must be an all-cogniser in respect of all matter whatsoever, and since in his eyes God alone can be such an all-cogniser he comes out with the view that Vedas are
composed by God Himself. Essentially this is why and this is how the Buddhist argued that their scripture was authentic because it was composed by an omniscient like Buddha, the Jaina that theirs was authentic because it was composed by an omniscient like Mahāvīra. Only the Mīmāṃsaka had some qualms about this way of looking at things, for he correctly realised that no man can be an omniscient. However, this realisation led him to formulate the absurd inference that Vedas are an all-valid religious text because they are composed by no author. The nuances of the Mīmāṃsaka’s position became evident from what Jayanta tells us about their way of defending the validity of Vedic testimony.

The Mīmāṃsaka begins by observing that all otherworldly result is to be attained through some ritual performance and the problem is as to how to get reliable information on this matter. The suggestion that perception can yield such information is rejected on the ground that perception has nothing to do with supersensuous phenomena like heaven etc., the suggestion that inference can do so is rejected on the ground that inference can only tell us that some ritual performance must be undertaken to attain this or that otherworldly result but not that this particular ritual performance must be undertaken for the purpose. The suggestion that observation of popular practices will yield the needed information is rejected on the ground that a baseless popular practice is no aphantic source of information, also on the ground that popular practices are often found to be mutually contradictory. Then emphasising the point that in any case an observation of popular practices cannot yield information regarding the details of a ritual performance needed to attain an otherworldly result, the conclusion is drawn that that can be done by an authentic scriptural text alone while Vedaśa alone are an authentic scriptural text. To this is added the argument that since ritual performances have been being undertaken since ever, Vedas must have been there since ever. Jayanta listens to all this and comments: “We also do not deny that the worldly course is beginningless. Where we differ from you is on the question whether world-creation and world-destruction occasionally take place.” On our view God has been undertaking world-creation and world-destruction occasionally and since ever; so in an earlier world-period people learnt from an earlier Veda the details of a ritual performance. You ask why an earlier Veda must
be different from the present one; we ask why it should be one with the latter; certainly, when everything whatsoever perishes the Veda too must perish. As for God, He might compose a new Veda or He might recall an earlier one, but in either case the Veda remains His composition. Thus it is that the Mīmāṃsaka’s atheistic theology claiming a patronage of Vedas is pitted against Jayanta’s God-intoxicated theology claiming a similar patronage; there is obviously no question of choosing from among the two.

(2) Atharvaveda on par with the Remaining Three Vedas

Jayanta was expected to contend that all the four Vedas are a composition by God, but here he develops this point not directly but by way of arguing in details against the prima facie view that Atharvaveda is not on par with the remaining three Vedas. His motives are obscure. For by Jayanta’s time the Puranist Brahmins like him had practically ceased to bother as to what Vedas actually say, their profession being just to declare from the house-top that whatever they stood for had the sanction of Vedas behind it. And what they stood for has to be learnt from Purāṇas and Dharmashāstras rather than Vedas. Thus crucial for an understanding of the Purānist’s theological outlook is the next section where Jayanta speaks about scriptural texts other than Vedas. Little wonder, the section after the next where the rival objections against Vedas are answered closes with an apology: “We have said all these things with a view to vindicating the validity of Vedic testimony, not under the delusion that we will earn fame as a Mīmāṃsaka.” The point was that to preoccupy himself with the details of Vedic utterances was a speciality of the Mīmāṃsaka and not that of a Purānist like Jayanta. So if there was any discipline to discuss the question whether or not Atharvaveda is on par with the remaining three Vedas it was Mīmāṃsā, but such a question never engaged the attention of the Mīmāṃsā specialists. Jayanta himself, who argues in support of Atharvaveda, says that neither the Naiyāyika’s criterion for judging the validity of Vedas nor the Mīmāṃsaka’s is inapplicable to Atharvaveda. Even more pointedly, he refers to Śabara whose commentary on Mīmāṃsāsūtra is the earliest available and who makes use of the Atharvaveda material without any feeling of doubt about its authenticity. Then Jayanta refers to those two verses enumerating fourteen vidyāsthānas, verses
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which must have been fairly popular with an average Brahmin theologian whether Purānist or Mīmāṁsaka; the point is that four of the fourteen vidyāsthānas are four Vedas. In view of all this it must have been some obscure group of Brahmin theologians who raised doubt about the authenticity of Atharvaveda and it seems incomprehensible why Jayanta should make so much fuss about the point; (true, historical research might reveal that Atharvaveda represents a tradition independent of that represented by the remaining three Vedas but Jayanta is not conducting discussion on the level of historical research). Be that as it may, the critic of Atharvaveda bases himself on the following considerations:

1. In a Vedic ritual Atharvaveda has no role to play while each of the remaining three Vedas plays a distinct role of its own.

2. The old list of four ‘learnings’ speaks of ‘trayī (= the three Vedas)’ which means that it does not count Atharvaveda as a Veda.

3. Certain Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads speak of three Vedas while ignoring Atharvaveda.

4. Manu says that one should study Vedas for 36 years devoting 12 years to each Veda, which implies that Atharvaveda is no Veda.

5. Manu says that in a Śrāddha feast should be invited a Brahmin thoroughly learned in three Vedas, viz. Rg, Yajuṣ and Sāman.

Jayanta answers the above criticism of Atharvaveda by first submitting that Atharvaveda has an exclusive role to play in a certain special type of rituals so that it does not matter if it plays no role in a ritual where the remaining three Vedas play a role. In addition he quotes a plenty of theological texts which speak of four rather than three Vedas. It is in this connection that mention is made of the list of fourteen vidyāsthānas as if to counter the critic’s mention of the old list of four ‘learnings’; and it is in this connection that Śabara has been quoted in the manner above referred to; again, it is this quotation of theological texts that is preceded by that reference to the equal applicability to Atharvaveda of the Naiyāyikas’s as well as Mīmāṁsaka’s criterion for judging the validity of Vedas. Later on, Jayanta even argues that in the same ritual in which the remaining three Vedas play a role Atharvaveda too has a role to play. Here Jayanta has submitted that in a Vedic ritual the person acting as Brahmān bases himself
on Atharvaveda; against this the opponent urges that there are also references to the effect that the Brāhmaṇa bases himself on all the three Vedas.\textsuperscript{12} Now in an interesting manner Jayanta argues that in the passages mentioned by the opponent the phrase ‘all the three Vedas’ means ‘the Veda which is the essence of all the three Vedas – that is, Atharvaveda.’\textsuperscript{13} Another suggestion made by him is that the words ṛk, yajus, sāman do not stand for three different texts but for three different types of Vedic composition, so that all the four Vedas might contain each of these three types of Vedic composition.\textsuperscript{14} Then again are urged several points which establish the supremacy of Atharvaveda over the remaining three Vedas - e.g. that one who has received his initiation on the basis of Atharvaveda can study the remaining Vedas but not vice versa.\textsuperscript{15} As regards that injunction of Manu about 36 years to be devoted to the study of three Vedas it is submitted that here any three Vedas might be meant, also that one is not however prevented from devoting 48 years to the study of all the four Vedas.\textsuperscript{16} And if Manu says that in a Śrāddha feast is to be invited a Brahmīn thoroughly learned in the three Vedas ṛk, Yajus, Sāman, Jayanta understands this to mean that in case one has studied any of these three Vedas one earns the title to be invited in a Śrāddha feast only after having thoroughly mastered the Veda of one’s choice while in case one has studied Atharvaveda one earns this title even after having gone through just the first section of this Veda.\textsuperscript{17} Thus Jayanta concludes his enquiry by declaring that only a person who is not afraid of committing the sin called ‘reviling Vedas’ - not a person who is saint-hearted - would dare to say that this one or that out of the four Vedas is not authentic.\textsuperscript{18} No part of the performance needs comment even in its capacity as a theological discussion.

(3) The Scriptural Texts Other Than Vedas

For a Purāṇist like Jayanta the problem of problems must have been how to justify his everyday conduct - secular as well as theological - in terms of his avowed unflinching loyalty to Vedas. For as a matter of fact, in his everyday conduct he was guided not by Vedas - of whose contents he had an extremely faint idea - but by Dharmaśāstra-texts of Manu, Yajñavalkya, etc., the eighteen Purāṇas, the sectarian writings of Śaivas, Vaiṣṇavas etc. – all which breathed an atmosphere very different if m what one comes across
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in the original Vedas. Some idea of the dilemma thus posed and of the attempts made to resolve it we can form from the present section of Jayanta’s Aḥnika IV. Thus he here begins by posing the question as to whether he is interested in vindicating the validity of Vedas alone or also that of the non-Vedic scriptural texts, a question he first answers by asking a counter-question as follows: “Which non-Vedic scriptural texts do you mean? Do you mean texts of the form of Purāṇas, Itihāsas, Dharmasāstras or texts of the form of the sectarian writings of Śaivas, Pāṣupatas, Pāñcarātras, Buddhists, Jainas etc.?" Jayanta’s counter-question is revealing inasmuch as it implies some sort of gradation among the non-Vedic scriptural texts. Thus on one extreme stood the scriptural texts coming from quarters like Buddhists, Jainas etc. which openly repudiated the authenticity of Vedas, on the other extreme stood the texts like Parāṇas and Dharmasāstras which commanded the loyalty of all the Purāṇists; and in between stood the scriptural texts belonging to the Purāṇist sub-sects like Śaiva, Pāṣupata, Pāñcarātra etc. Then there was the Mīmāṃsaka who must be having misgivings about Purāṇas so much permeated by a theistic outlook he so much abhorred; but even he would as a general rule endorse an injunction laid down in a Dharmasāstra-text, that is, he would endorse it unless compelled to repudiate it for one reason or another. Jayanta’s consideration of the question posed before him has to be appreciated in this general background.

Jayanta first takes up the case of Dharmasāstras and says about them: “They are as much authentic as Vedas themselves, for they enjoin certain such acts as stand connected with what Vedas teach.” Jayanta does not pause to consider as to how the acts in question are connected with what Vedas preach, for on the face of it these acts are something new altogether and his very problem is how to reconcile with one another what a Dharmasāstra author like Manu says and what Vedas say; the problem is not so much that the two contradict each other but that the two speak about so different things. In any case, Jayanta first reports how this problem is sought to be solved by the Mīmāṃsaka and then offers his own solution. The problem arises because what Manu etc. say is not said by Vedas at least in so many words, so that one might surmise that Manu etc. suffer from a delusion, or that they have themselves perceived the things concerned; or that they have learnt these things
from some other person, or that they are simply deceiving others; the Mīmāṃsāka rejects the first and the last alternatives on the ground that Manu etc. are revered by those following Vedas, the second and the third on the ground that no person can perceive things religious, his point being that Vedas themselves must somehow be the source of what Manu etc. say. In this connection the Mīmāṃsāka is ready to concede three alternatives, viz.

(1) Some of the available Vedic parts might be construed as implying what Manu etc. say;

(2) It might be supposed that the Vedic parts corroborating what Manu etc. say are lost;

(3) It might be maintained that there are two types of Veda - the remembered one and the inferred one, the former constituting what we ordinarily call Vedas the latter we ordinarily call Sūrīs (= Dharmasūtras); what he would not concede is that Manu etc. have independently perceived what they say, for in that case, what they say and what Vedas say will be of equal authority so that in the case of a conflict between the two it will be impossible to reject the former in favour of the latter. The opponent objects: “But that way even the non-Vedic scriptural texts might claim to be based on Vedas”; the Mīmāṃsāka answers: “That is impossible because our Sūrīs say new things in conjunction with what Vedas say, which is not the case with non-Vedic scriptural texts; e.g. Sūrīs enjoin sipping water, which is something new to them and they enjoin furnishing the sacrificial ground,” which is something said in Vedas.” It can easily be seen that on the Mīmāṃsāka’s own showing apart from paltry things like furnishing the sacrificial ground in connection with a ritual performance there is little common between Manu etc. on the one hand and the Vedas on the other. Jayanta’s own objection against the Mīmāṃsāka’s position is however based on a different consideration, for he would prefer the alternative that Manu etc. have independently perceived the things they speak of, this perception of theirs being not of the ordinary type but of an extra-ordinary yogic type; so he simply reminds the Mīmāṃsāka that the former has demonstrated not only the existence of God but also the possibility of yogic perception. The Mīmāṃsāka objects: “But in that case God will be proved to be non-omniscient because He will be ignorant of what Manu etc. teach, or He will be lacking compassion because He will not be
teaching what Manu etc. teach;” Jayanta replies: “God knows everything; but certain things he teaches Himself, certain others he compassionately causes to be taught by Manu etc. Moreover, Vedas themselves say that sages (meaning Manu etc.) have perceived religious duty and have taught it to the ordinary people.”

The Mimāṃsaka objects: “But in that case, when there will arise a conflict between Manu etc. and Vedas, both will be of an equal authenticity”; Jayanta replies: “So what? After all, in certain cases you too concede two alternatives as of an equal authenticity. Moreover, there really is never a conflict between Manu etc. and Vedas.” Thus on Jayanta’s showing both Vedas and Smṛtis are a source of valid cognition on the ground that both are composed by somebody (God in the former case, Manu etc. in the latter) who is an authoritative person because he has perceived the things concerned. Of course, Jayanta has no serious objection to conceding that what Manu etc. say they have somehow picked up from Vedas; however, while making confession to that effect he introduces a point which was not under discussion until now but which should be vital for him. Thus he says: “There is no use our being a stickler. So let Smṛtis be authentic because they are based on Vedas, and like Smṛtis Purāṇas too.”

Being a Purāṇist Jayanta must have been interested in ensuring that Purānic theology – in fact so markedly different from Vedic theology – is somehow rooted in Vedas themselves. So he decides to take advantage of the Mimāṃsaka’s insistence that Smṛti-ritual – in fact so markedly different from Vedic ritual – is somehow rooted in Vedas themselves. Of course, so far as theology proper was concerned the Mimāṃsaka would actually stand for its Vedic version while somehow explaining away its Purānic version, a procedure just the opposite of that adopted by a Purāṇist like Jayanta. Thus it was that Jayanta found the Mimāṃsaka’s mode of defending the validity of Dharmasāstras even more convenient than his own mode of doing so; for instead of saying that God Himself composed Vedas while caused Purāṇas to be composed by Vyāsa, Jayanta could now say that Vyāsa composed Purāṇas basing himself on Vedas. Be that as it may, Jayanta now feels confident to declare that Dharmasāstras and Purāṇas are as much authoritative a theological text as Vedas themselves. The point is confirmed by recalling the list of fourteen vidyāsthānas which include four Vedas, Dharmasāstras, Purāṇas on
the one hand and six Vedāṅgas, Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā on the other; Jayanta emphasises that the first six vidyāsthānas are cf theological use in a direct fashion, the remaining eight in an indirect fashion.12

Jayanta next takes up the question of the remaining non-Vedic scriptural texts which he divides into a pro-Vedic group and an anti-Vedic group. The former includes the scriptural texts current with the Purāṇist subsects like Śaiva, Pāñcarātra etc., the latter those current with the anti-Vedic sects like Buddhist, Jain etc.13 Taking up the former group first Jayanta says that the texts included here are all authentic, though not as authentic as the texts of Manu etc.14 The reservation thus made is noteworthy. For the deities like Śiva, Viṣṇu etc. which were the presiding deities of sects like Śaiva, Pāñcarātra etc. were so obviously Purānic deities, and so these sects were so obviously sub-sects among the Purāṇists. Hence when Jayanta says that the scriptural texts belonging to these sub-sects are not as authentic as the texts of Manu etc. he can only mean that Dharmaśāstras and Purāṇas are acceptable to all Purāṇists without exception while these texts are acceptable only to this or that sub-sect among the Purāṇists. However; in terms of his own mode of argumentation Jayanta should somehow show that these texts are composed by somebody less authoritative than Manu etc.; but curiously, on this point Jayanta rather says that both the received tradition and inference go to establish that these texts are a composition by God.15 Really, one crucial thing said by Jayanta about these texts applies to Purāṇas as such; thus, we are told ‘these texts, while not contradicting Vedas, recommend certain rituals of their own.’16 For the Purānic ritual was obviously so much different from the Vedic ritual while the ritual practised by the Śaivas etc. was only a variety of Purānic ritual. Jayanta discreetly kept silent about the Purānic ritual as such because that was practised by the Purāṇist camp as a whole; but he could say about the sub-sects like Śaiva etc. that they practised a ritual of their own. Even so, Jayanta should have explained how God could compose texts that were less authentic than those of Manu etc. About Pāñcarātra scriptural texts Jayanta says that they themselves declare themselves to be a composition by Viṣṇu while Viṣṇu is but God Himself;17 from this we can well surmise that about the scriptural texts of Śaivas etc. too Jayanta will say that they themselves declare themselves to be a composition by Śiva etc. while Śiva etc. are but God. He actually
here submits that the same God is called Brahman, Viṣṇu or Rudra (= Śiva) in so far as He creates, sustains or destroys the world,\textsuperscript{18} a typical Purāṇist position and one in virtue of which the Śaivas, Vaiṣṇavas (= Pāñcarātras) etc. are proved to be Purāṇist sub-sects. Jayanta also says that Rudra and Viṣṇu have found mention in Vedas which also tell us how they have to be worshipped – the Śaivas and Vaiṣṇavas only adopting certain new ways of worshipping these very deities,\textsuperscript{19} again a typical Purāṇist procedure and one which conveniently ignores the vast gulf separating the Vedic ritual from the Purānic. Then at one place Jayanta says: “These scriptural texts of Śaivas etc. are authentic because on certain questions they are proved to be true as are Vedas, because they accept the Vedic social principle of varṇa-hierarchy.”\textsuperscript{20} This statement too would be typical of a Purāṇist seeking to defend the pro-Vedic credentials of Purāṇas as such. Lastly, Jayanta once says: “The scriptural texts of Śaivas etc. are authentic because they frequently preach the same salutary message as do Upaniṣads and because the foremost Vedic experts like Vyāsa etc. treat them as authentic”;\textsuperscript{21} essentially the same thing would be said by a Purāṇist in praise of Purāṇas as such, it being further emphasised that Purāṇas are a very composition by Vyāsa. Thus this small sub-section of Jayanta dealing with the scriptural texts of Śaivas etc. is important not as such but because it provides a good clue to the working of the mind of a Purāṇist theologian. Certainly, had Jayanta explicitly discussed the question as to how are Purāṇas an authentic text, he would have said essentially the same things as he says in his present sub-section. For example, he would have said that Purāṇas are not opposed to Vedas but they only recommend certain rituals of their own, that Purānic deities have found mention in Vedas, that on several questions Purāṇas are found to be true as are Vedas, that Purāṇas frequently preach the same salutary message as do Upaniṣads, that Purāṇas accept the Vedic social principle of varna-hierarchy, that they are composed by a foremost Vedic expert like Vyāsa and praised by other such experts, etc. etc.

Lastly, Jayanta takes up the scriptural texts current with the anti-Vedic sects like Buddhists etc. Noteworthy is the logic on which he works in this connection. Thus answering the objection that the Buddhists etc. too might claim that their scriptural texts are composed by an authoritative person Jayanta argues: “Only those
scriptural texts can be said to be composed by an authoritative person which are treated as authentic by mahājana (= 'the majority of people' or 'the noble people'). But mahājana treats as authentic Vedas, the Veda-based Purāṇas and Dharmaśastras, certain such scriptural texts as are not hostile to Vedas but not the scriptural texts of Buddhists etc. which are hostile to Vedas. As a matter of fact, these anti-Vedic scriptural texts have originated not from an authoritative person but from vices like ignorance, greed etc. The opponent asks: "Will you please explain what this 'mahājana' is? What is it, what its shape, what its name, what its number, what its mode of behaving?"22 Jayanta retorts: "The populace adhering to the social principle of four varṇas and four āśramas – a populace to be found in this land of Āryans – is what constitutes mahājana.24 As a matter of fact, 'mahājana' as thus understood is what even the anti-Vedic Buddhists etc. dare not act against; that is why they avoid the touch of a cāndāla, for otherwise a person believing in no caste-principle should find no harm in touching a cāndāla.25 And mahājana as thus understood rejects rather than supports the anti-Vedic scriptural texts.26 Really, so extra-ordinary grand are the texts called Vedas that even those adhering to anti-Vedic sects imitate Vedas, quote Vedas in their support, introduce Vedic material in their scriptural texts."27 Apparently, the arrogant Jayanta is banking on the circumstance that by his time a large majority of Indian people had become Purāṇist in their religious persuasion.

The above is how Jayanta presents before us a Purāṇist's typical attitude towards three groups of non-Vedic scriptural texts, viz. Purāṇas-cum-Dharmaśastras, the scriptures of Śaivas, Vaiṣṇavas etc., the scriptures of Buddhists, Jainas etc. But he then reports about three rather liberal attitudes which could have been adopted by certain circles in this connection – one according to which all scriptures are authentic for some reason or other, another according to which all scriptures are authentic owing to their origination from God, a third according to which all scriptures are valid owing to their being based on Vedas. The following is how one adopting the first attitude argues: "All scriptures are authentic because all are found to be true on this question or that, just like Vedas.28 On some question one scripture might contradict another, but on some question a Vedic statement too might contradict another.29 And then on fundamental questions there is in fact no sort of mutual
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contradiction among scriptures. Thus all scriptures are agreed that mokṣa is man’s summmum bonum, they are even agreed that the chief means of attaining mokṣa is a knowledge of what constitutes the conscious principle – this inspite of the fact that this principle is conceived differently by different scriptures. So what distinguishes one scripture from another is the set of practical measures recommended by the two, and that is not much material; after all, so many different sets of practical measures are recommended by Vedas themselves. Of course, certain practices of certain sects seem abominable to some of their rivals, but then there are people who find abominable even that animal-slaughter which is undertaken in the course of a Vedic ritual. And if a scriptural text recommends some reprehensible practice in connection with some ritual aimed at attaining some worldly success then the fault lies not with this scripture but with the person who seeks this sort of success, just as fault lies with the person who performs a Vedic ritual aimed at killing his enemy. Lastly, if the Buddhist scripture repudiates caste-principle that is done with a view to emphasising its all-compassionate character and is not something to be taken literally; after all, this scripture itself says that one belonging to a mean caste should not be admitted to the monastic Community.” Similarly, the following is how one adopting the second attitude argues: “It is one God who keeping in view the different life-circumstances of different people composes different scriptures through assuming different forms like Arhat, Kapila, Sugata etc. It is no objection that Buddha was no God but Šuddhodana’s son, for even if Šuddhodana’s son Buddha was an incarnation of God. Again, it is no objection that the anti-Vedic scriptures are followed by so few people, for God has composed those scriptures for certain few people. It too is no objection that different scriptures contradict each other, for there are cases when different Vedic statements too contradict each other.” Lastly, the following is how one adopting the third attitude argues: “Whatever be one’s reason for maintaining that Manu etc. are based on Vedas is also the reason why all scriptures are based on Vedas; for after all, we do not actually have before us Vedic statements corroborating Manu etc. It is no objection that other non-Vedic scriptures do not mention any typical Vedic practices along with the typical practices of their own; for such
joint mention takes place only in connection with a hybrid ritual, and it is not necessary that a scripture must recommend a hybrid ritual.\textsuperscript{41} Certainly, a scripture might speak of a ritual exclusive to it just as there are Vedic rituals exclusive to this or that varṇa, to this or that āśrama.\textsuperscript{42} It too is no objection that the followers of Vedas are hostile towards other scriptures, for such hostility is not proper and, moreover, the followers of Vedas are hostile even towards a practice like cow-slaughter which is a very clear Vedic practice.\textsuperscript{43} Then there are actually found Vedic statements which lend support to certain typical views of the Sāṅkhya, Buddhists, Jainas etc.\textsuperscript{44} Lastly, as somebody says, ‘Whatever religious duty is enjoined by Manu is enjoined by Veda, because Veda contains all knowledge’; in this statement the word ‘Manu’ stands not only for the Dharmaśāstra-authors like Gautama, Yama, Āpastamba etc. but also for the non-Vedic sect-leaders like Arhat, Kapila, Sugata, etc.\textsuperscript{45} Of course, this does not mean that even the Lokāyata scripture is based on Vedas, for the so-called Lokāyata scripture is no scripture but a nihilist clap-trap."\textsuperscript{46} But then somebody asks these liberals of various hues: “If all scriptures are authentic then suppose I compose a scripture to-day; will that too become authentic within a short while?”\textsuperscript{47} The liberals answer: “Only those scriptures are authentic which have gained currency with a considerable section of cultured populace, which do not appear to be a novelty of today, which have not originated from vices like greed etc., which people do not find abominable.”\textsuperscript{48} Noble sentiments indeed! But in fact these liberal Brahmins must have realised that it was no use dubbing as anti-Vedic the non-Brahmanical theological sects like Buddhism etc. when the so many Brahmanical sects and sub-sects of the day were themselves as distant as anything could be from what Vedas originally stood for.

(4) Objections Against Vedas Refuted

As was earlier noted in passing, the subject-matter of the present section was no burning concern of a Purāṇist like Jayanta though it was certainly a burning concern of the Mīmāṃsaka. For to defend the efficacy of the cult of Vedic ritual \underline{and} to defend the validity of each single word uttered in Vedas was the be-all and end-all of the Mīmāṃsaka, and it is these two tasks that Jayanta seeks to undertake in his present section. [On his part, a Purāṇist
would be much interested in defending the efficacy of the cult of Purānic ritual and in defending the validity of each single Purānic utterance, but these two tasks Jayanta has evaded even when an occasion was due. And the evasion must have been tactical. For Jayanta has been emphasising that the central aim of Nyāya philosophy is to vindicate the validity of Vedic testimony and he could not but note that to vindicate the validity of Vedic testimony and to vindicate the validity of Purānic testimony are two different propositions altogether.] The two parts of Jayanta’s undertaking can be examined one by one.

Jayanta answers at considerable length the opponent’s objection that a Vedic ritual often fails to yield the result it is supposed to yield while even in case this result is actually forthcoming the cause for that seems to be not the ritual concerned but some secular venture. For example, there is a Vedic ritual called Citrā whose performance is supposed to yield cattle-wealth. Now it often happens that even after having performed this ritual one does not come in possession of cattle-wealth; and even in case one then happens to acquire cattle-wealth it might well be that one has received it in return for some service rendered to somebody. Similarly, there is a Vedic ritual called Putreṣṭi whose performance is supposed to bring about the birth of a son, but here too it often happens that even after having performed this ritual one does not get a son. All these points are made by Jayanta’s present opponent. In his answer to him Jayanta’s central contention is that if a Vedic ritual fails to yield the expected result then there must have been made some error while performing this ritual; however, realising the weakness of his defence he diffidently pleads: “When the hypothesis of ‘error in performance’ can account for the anomaly why posit the hypothesis of ‘falsity of Vedic injunction’?” In this connection Jayanta particularly emphasises the opponent’s objection that a Vedic ritual does not yield the expected result as soon as it is performed; here he takes advantage of the fact that in certain cases (e.g. the birth of a son) it is in the very nature of things impossible for the expected result to appear as soon as the ritual concerned is performed; his point being that if the expected result appears any time after the ritual concerned has been performed validity of the concerned Vedic injunction is vindicated after all; and positively he contends that there are cases when the expected result appears as soon as the ritual
concerned has been performed, his own grandfather having received the donation of a village immediately after having performed the needed ritual, rain often falling immediately after the needed ritual (called Kariri) has been performed. Similarly, Jayanta particularly emphasises the opponent’s objection that even in case the expected result is actually forthcoming the cause for that is not the ritual concerned but some secular venture; here his counter-argument is that since a secular venture is not always successful or successful in the same degree, its success following upon the performance of the ritual concerned must be due to this ritual itself. A curious counter-argument is also advanced. Thus it is contended that an act produces two sorts of result – one immediate and inevitable, the other remote (and may be absent). For example, when a cook prepares food for his master the former’s act immediately and inevitably produces result in the form of ‘food being cooked’ but it remotely (and may be never) produces result in the form of ‘salary being paid’; similarly, a ritual immediately and inevitably produces result in the form of ‘consumption of the material used while performing ritual’ but it remotely (and may be never) produces the expected result associated with the name of this ritual. All this simply shows how shaky Jayanta’s position actually is. In any case, there is no question of putting to the test of empirical verification the points he is making. However, of some interest is Jayanta’s consideration of a rival view according to which the failure of a Vedic ritual, since it is usually performed with utmost care, should not be attributed to an ‘error in performance’; on this view a ritual which fails to yield result in this life does yield it in another. This view presupposes a threefold division of rituals, viz. (1) those inevitably yielding result in this life (e.g. the ritual for rainfall), (2) those inevitably yielding result in another life (e.g. the ritual for attaining heaven), (3) those yielding result in this life or in another (e.g. the ritual for acquiring cattle-wealth). Now from the standpoint of empirical verification it makes little difference whether the failure of a vedic ritual to yield the expected result is accounted for by pleading that there has been an error in performance or by pleading that the expected result will be forthcoming in another life. But for an understandable reason Jayanta decides to reject the view in question; for according to this view there is a class of rituals which must inevitably produce result in this very life, so that if all ritual must be successful because well-
performed then this class of rituals must never be a failure, a thing which Jayanta — or anybody — cannot guarantee. So he first submits that the rival’s talk of a threefold division of rituals is untenable, there being in its support neither a scriptural evidence nor a logical evidence. Jayanta’s one point is that Vedas only say that one performing this ritual will get this result, they do not say when; his other point is more important. Thus the rival has argued that since there are people who acquire cattle-wealth without having performed the ritual-for-cattle-wealth it has to be presumed that they have performed this ritual in an earlier life; Jayanta retorts that on this logic one might as well argue that since people are found to have rainfall without having performed the ritual-for-rainfall it has to be presumed that they have performed this ritual in an earlier life, his point being that this way a ritual belonging to the alleged first category will become one belonging to the alleged third category. After urging several minor difficulties against the rival’s view Jayanta comes to the main question, viz. how is it that on this view a ritual-for-rainfall is ever a failure? Now Jayanta himself has earlier pleaded that one possible reason why a ritual fails to yield the expected result is that some past act is here acting as an obstacle, and he allows the rival to make the same plea in the case under consideration, but then the former’s argument is that since all obstacle must ultimately give way in some life or other the ritual-for-rainfall failing to produce result now must produce result in some life or other, this again meaning that a ritual belonging to the alleged first category will become one belonging to the alleged third category. Apparently, under conditions Jayanta’s stand is more prudent than that of the rival. In this connection Jayanta also briefly considers a rather broader issue, viz. what is the mechanism for a ritual performed now yielding result at a future date more or less remote. Thus on his showing a ritual performed now produces in the soul concerned an ‘impression’ which lasts there till the expected result is actually reaped (in this life or in another), just as on everybody’s admission a cognition had now produces in the soul (or mental-series) concerned an ‘impression’ which lasts there for a longer or shorter while and acts as a cause for occasionally recalling this cognition; such an ‘impression’ produced by an auspicious act like a Vedic ritual is called ‘dharma (= good past-act)’ while the same produced by an inauspicious act like Brahmni-murder is called
‘adharma (= evil past-act’). Contrasted to this Nyāya view and rejected are the following rival views:

(1) The Sāṅkhya view that dharma is of the form of a vṛtti of antahkarana.

(2) The Jaina view that dharma is of the form of a type-of-physical-particles.

(3) The Buddhist view that dharma is of the form of an ‘impression’ created in a mental series.

(4) The old Mimāṁsā view that dharma is of the form of an independent entity (called apūrva) produced by a Vedic ritual.

(5) Śābara’s view that dharma is of the form of a Vedic ritual itself.

(6) The Prabhākara’s view that dharma is of the form of niyoga (= apūrva) which is what a Vedic injunction stands for.

The first three views are rejected because of their inevitable association with a wrong metaphysics, the fourth on the ground that here dharma becomes something hanging in the air, the fifth on the ground that dharma must be something that lasts till the expected result is actually reaped, the sixth on the ground that the concept of niyoga understood as the import of a Vedic injunction is faulty.\cite{13}

This is how Jayanta defends the efficacy of the cult of Vedic ritual and then goes on to defend the validity of each single Vedic utterance. In fact, however, even the above discussion on Vedic ritual has been undertaken in the context of answering the opponent’s objection that Vedas preach a falsity. This objection has two sides – one saying that the Vedic injunctions pertaining to a ritual are often found not to be corroborated in actual practice, the other saying that certain Vedic statements are outright false; the first side we have already considered, the second we might consider now. Thus the opponent cites the Vedic statement to the effect that the dead person in relation to whom a death-rite has been performed goes to heaven equipped with the implements of a ritual; and his point is that this statement is false inasmuch as going to heaven equipped with the implements of a ritual is possible only on the part of the dead person’s body while this body burns into ashes before our very eyes.\cite{14} Jayanta answers that this statement refers to the dead person’s soul going to heaven while figuratively speaking as if this soul is one with the associated body (which was actually once equipped with the implements of a ritual), his another
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point being that even a soul being in fact ubiquitous does not move about from one place to another but is just associated with one body now with another body at a later time.\textsuperscript{15} As can be seen, this side of the objection is not much important, though in the Mīmāṃsā literature it was a consideration of this side that led to an elaborate treatment of the doctrine of soul. Still less important are two more objections raised by the present opponent who first says that several Vedic statements are mutually contradictory and then that several others involve a repetition; thus having first enjoined that a rite has to be performed before dawn, after dawn, at the time of dawn a Vedic passage afterwards condemns one who performs a rite before dawn, after dawn, at the time of dawn.\textsuperscript{16} Similarly, one Vedic injunction lays down that the first and the last of certain eleven hymns have to be recited thrice each.\textsuperscript{17} In defence Jayanta pleads that the first case involves no self-contradiction inasmuch as what is condemned here is the practice of making the resolve to perform a rite at one particular time and actually performing it at another;\textsuperscript{18} similarly, he pleads that the second case involves no undue repetition inasmuch as the ritual concerned requires fifteen recitations while hymns available are only eleven, so that fifteen recitations are made possible by reciting thrice each the first and the last of these eleven hymns.\textsuperscript{19}

Then Jayanta undertakes what we call a defence of the validity of each single Vedic utterance. In fact, however, this is a rather odd sort of undertaking divided into three parts as follows:

(1) a part considering as to what is the practical utility of Vedic descriptions,

(2) a part considering as to whether or not one should take into consideration the meaning of the hymns recited in the course of a ritual,

(3) a part considering as to whether the name given to a ritual is just conventional or it contains a meaning.

Obviously, the three parts raise three very different sorts of issues but they all somehow throw light on a Vedic ritualist’s thought-world. So let us take up these parts one by one.

About Vedic description the opponent first says that they are often enigmatic in their import. For example one says ‘He wept and the weeping is what constitutes Rudra’s Rudra-hood’,\textsuperscript{20} another ‘The mind is thief, the speech is liar’;\textsuperscript{21} a third ‘In the day-time they saw
smoke and hot flame; in the night-time flame not smoke’. 22 a fourth ‘We do not know whether we are Brahmin or non-Brahmin’. 23 a fifth ‘He who knows it his face shines’. 24 a sixth ‘He who offers this last oblation in this ritual all his desires are fulfilled’. 25 a seventh ‘He who performs Asvamedha he wins the whole earth, he overcomes death, overcomes sin, overcomes Brahmin-murder’. 26 an eighth ‘One should not set up sacrificial fire on earth, nor in the middle region, nor in the upper region’. 27 a ninth ‘The client is stone, the sacrificial pillar is the sun’. 28 Apparently, all these are rhetorical expressions and their precise import can be grasped by giving proper consideration to the context in which they occur. But the opponent’s very point is that these expressions make no sense when interpreted literally. 29 So he considers certain possible ways in which they might be used. Thus it might be suggested that one performing the ritual concerned should oneself undertake the act described in an expression like this; the opponent retorts: “That is ridiculous. For example, what is the sense in weeping like Rudra? Certainly, one weeps only when one is in grief.” 30 Then it might be suggested that an expression like this must supply a missing element in some injunction proper; the opponent retorts: “That is impossible inasmuch as a descriptive expression does no enjoining.” 31 Lastly, it might be suggested that on coming across an expression like this one feels encouraged to perform the ritual concerned; the opponent retorts: “One feels encouraged to perform a Vedic ritual because one has faith in Vedas, and for no other reason.” 32 Jayanta in effect answers the opponent by defending the last suggestion. Then the former begins by pointing out that a descriptive expression almost always accompanies an injunction proper and so somehow eulogises this injunction. 33 The opponent asks: “Is an injunction impossible without an accompanying eulogy?”; Jayanta retorts: “Well, it is just a fact that in certain cases an injunction is accompanied by an eulogy.” 34 The opponent asks: “When an injunction is effective even without an eulogy, why an eulogy?”; Jayanta retorts: “What can we do? The eulogy is there. Moreover, it is true that one feels more enthused to perform an enjoined ritual in case the injunction concerned is accompanied by an eulogy just as one is more inclined to buy a cow in case the seller says words in praise of his cow. Hence it is that certain authorities are of the view that an eulogy has to be
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added, to an, injunction even, in case, it is, actually, not, present there. Thus according to Jayanta, all the descriptive expressions quoted above by the opponent have to be interpreted as some sort of eulogy of the ritual concerned. For example, in that description of Rudra's weeping, the tears are compared to silver, and the idea is that one who uses silver (not gold) in the ritual concerned will have weeping in his house, before the year is over. Similarly, when it is said that sacrificial fire is to be set up neither on earth nor in the middle region nor in the upper region, the idea is that it is not to be set upon bare earth, but on earth containing a piece of gold. Jayanta's understanding of the matter is essentially sound inasmuch as it rightly views the expressions in question as rhetorical expressions meant to praise a ritual.

Then the opponent discusses whether or not one should take into consideration the meaning of hymns recited in the course of a ritual. His own view is that one should not do that, and his point is that certain hymns actually describe the ritual act in which they are recited, so that if their meaning too is taken into consideration a separate injunction pertaining to the ritual act in question should be redundant. For example, if a man having eyes is walking under another man's guidance the presupposition is that the former man is blind. To this is added that since the words of a hymn are to be recited in one fixed order there ought to be some super-ordinary efficacy in the very pronunciation of a hymn. Lastly, it is pointed out that certain hymns have apparently no understandable meaning whatsoever. Jayanta, answers the opponent by submitting that it is no use ignoring the meaning of a hymn when it obviously has a meaning; the former would have made exception only in the case of such hymns as are expressly meant to be just muttered. As for the opponent's submission that certain hymns describe the ritual act in which they are recited, Jayanta's reply is that there is no reason why their meaning should be ignored, the latter's point being that a hymn can well repeat what the injunction concerned has already laid down. (His alternative suggestion is that a hymn refers to the concerned ritual act in the same manner as a descriptive expression does, or that it refers to this act by way of supplying some additional information.) As for the opponent's submission that a hymn has to be recited in one fixed order, Jayanta's reply again is that there is no reason why its meaning should be ignored, the
latter's simple point being that a student of Vedas has no right to introduce a change in the word-order pertaining to a hymn or a prose-portion. Lastly, Jayanta refuses to concede that a hymn might possibly lack all understandable meaning, his request to the opponent being that the latter should endeavour to find a meaning where apparently there is none. Really, Vedic hymns as understood by the later-day theists are of the form of magic words whose very utterance in the course of a ritual produces result, and to this extent Jayanta's present opponent has a point; but these hymns have been so composed that what they mean has some obvious bearing on the contents of the ritual in the course of which they are uttered, and to this extent Jayanta has a point. [Historically, these hymns were of the form of magic-songs of the primitive Aryans which the later-day priests converted into magic-words to be of use in the plethora of rituals they invented. But in both cases these hymns had to do with magic — with primitive magic in one case, with advanced magic in the other.]

Lastly, the opponent discusses whether the name given to a ritual is just conventional or it carries a meaning. His own view is that there is a difficulty both ways. For if the name of a ritual (say x) is expressive of a meaning then to say "One ought to perform x in order to get such and such a result" means "one ought to perform a ritual of this description in order to get such and such a result", and then the question remains as to what particular ritual is being thus spoken of; on the other hand, if this name is just conventional then it is virtually meaningless to say "One ought to perform x in order to get such and such a result", for then the question arises as to what is x. The suggestion that the statement in question means both "one ought to perform a ritual of this name etc." as also "one ought to perform a ritual of this description etc." is rejected on the ground that it is one thing to enjoin an act not already known, another thing to describe an act already known, so that both these things cannot be done by one and the same statement. Jayanta, on his part, endorses everything else said by the opponent but defends the alternative that the name of a ritual is just conventional. Really, nothing can be said about a ritual unless a name is given to it conventionally, and to this extent Jayanta's point is valid. But under the impact of his opponent's criticism he concedes that even the conventional name of a ritual somehow hints
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at its specific character. The concession is not logically necessary because even a meaningless conventional name can well serve the purpose for which a name is needed. As a matter of fact, this ought to be the idea behind Jayanta's own answer to the opponent's criticism that a statement mentioning a conventional name must be a meaningless statement; for the former says: "Even a conventional name becomes meaningful when the details of the ritual carrying this name have been properly described." The idea ought to be that even a meaningless conventional name will do provided the details of the ritual carrying this name are properly described.

(5) Equal Authenticity of the Injunctive as well as Descriptive Parts of the Vedas

In this last section too Jayanta discusses a question which has to do with theology, though not with what might be called 'day-to-day theology'. For this question is the rather abstruse question whether all Vedic statements are injunctive in character. On the face of it, the question seems rather pervert inasmuch as there obviously are Vedic statements that are descriptive in character, but it was pushed to the forefront by the Prabhākarite Mīmāṃsakas who with a view to emphasising the pan-ritualist character of Vedas came out with the view that even such Vedic statements as are apparently descriptive are in fact injunctive. Thus it was contended that in an apparently descriptive Vedic statement an implied injunction is 'Understand this to be the case.' The contention was sought to be supported by pointing out that one learns word-meaning by listening to one's elders uttering injunctive sentences to each other and seeing them making corresponding moves, also by pointing out that even an ordinary descriptive sentence implies the injunction 'Understand this to be the case'. It too was submitted that a case of one man speaking to another is not a case of verbal testimony but a case of the hearer inferring the speaker's intention, the point being that the only case of verbal testimony is a Vedic statement inasmuch as it alone brings to light what is inherently incapable of being known through any other means of cognition. All this evoked criticism from various quarters and such criticism looms large in the speculations of Advaita-Vedāntins who came to acquire prominence in later times; for these philosophers stood committed to the other extreme view according to which even
injunctive Vedic statements are to be interpreted as descriptive in character. Even Jayanta in passing refers to the Advaita-Vedânta view in question but his own criticism of the Prabhâkarite is based on the commonsense understanding that in Vedas as well as in common parlance we come across descriptive as well as injunctive statements. So let us see how Jayanta develops this criticism.

Jayanta begins by arguing that if injunctive Vedic statements are alone authentic then the descriptive such statements will have to be dismissed as unauthentic while his purpose was to vindicate the validity of the entire mass of Vedic statements. The opponent submits: "Only an injunctive Vedic statement is authentic because the very meaning of a word is learnt by one by listening to one's elders uttering injunctive sentences; as a matter of fact, to utter a mere descriptive sentence serves no purpose at all. Again, a sentence is incomplete unless it contains a verb while this primacy of verb in a sentence proves that here things existing are mentioned as aimed at bringing about the act mentioned. Lastly, all sentence is injunctive because enjoining an act is one task which no other means of cognition save verbal testimony is in a position to perform; certainly, if a sentence enjoins no act but just describes a situation then it will be doing something which any other means of cognition is in a position to do." Jayanta retorts: "It is our common experience that people utter not only injunctive statements but also the descriptive ones; moreover, one learns the meaning of a word even through somebody uttering to one the descriptive sentence 'this thing is what this word stands for.' Nor is it proper to suggest that while uttering a descriptive sentence one means to say 'Understand this to be the case'; for words to that effect are not actually spoken; nor can this meaning be conveyed by the words actually uttered. Moreover, even through an injunctive sentence what is learnt is not the meaning of the sentence as a whole but the meaning of its individual words, as is evident from the circumstance that one later on follows any sentence in which these words happen to occur." Jayanta's point is that descriptive sentences are as much a means of conveying information as are injunctive statements, so that the opponent's point will not be proved even if it is conceded that the meaning of a word is learnt exclusively through an injunctive sentence. But the opponent has argued that a descriptive sentence conveys what any other means of cognition is in a position to cognise; so Jayanta answers him as
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That rather strengthens the claim of a descriptive sentence to be a means of cognition, for the different means of cognition must cognize one and the same thing.9 Nor can it be said that a descriptive sentence is no means of cognition because it needs the services of other such means, for on this logic even inference will cease to be a means of cognition.10 Then Jayanta emphasizes that if that injunctive sentence alone will be treated as a means of cognition which conveys what no other means of cognition cognizes then a Vedic injunction will alone be a case of verbal testimony because it alone will be satisfying the condition thus imposed, his point being that on the opponent’s logic an ordinary injunctive sentence will cease to be a case of verbal testimony.11 The opponent pleads: “An ordinary sentence is actually no means of cognition because what it conveys is just the speaker’s intention, this in contrast to a Vedic injunction which is impersonal and is actually a means of cognition.”12 Jayanta retorts: “Even a Vedic injunction is not impersonal but one coming from God; but the real point is that even an ordinary sentence does not convey just the speaker’s intention, for in a sentence there is no word standing for ‘intention’, nor any word which implies ‘intention’.13 Nor can it be said that the intention is inferred from the words actually uttered, for to infer intention as such will serve no purpose while intention specific for the sentence concerned cannot be inferred unless the meaning of the sentence is already grasped.15 But if the meaning of a sentence is already grasped there remains nothing to be inferred in the form of ‘intention’.16 Moreover, if an ordinary sentence conveys not information about the things but just the speaker’s intention then being unable to learn the real meaning of a word one must not be in a position to follow the meaning of a Vedic sentence either.”17 Here again is a case of the Prabhakarite borrowing a Buddhist position without any intention of accepting its deeper-lying implications. Thus the Buddhist contends that words have nothing to do with things real, but being a Mimamsaka the Prabhakarite would say that a word is an eternal entity eternally related to the thing meant. Again, the Buddhist contends that a sentence is not as such true but that it conveys just the speaker’s intention. This time again being a Mimamsaka the Prabhakarite would say, that a Vedic sentence is as such true; however, he would endorse the Buddhist stand by further submitting that a human sentence is not as such true but that it conveys just the
speaker’s intention. In the last stage of his present argumentation Jayanta is criticising the Prabhākarite by forcing on him the Buddhist position that words have nothing to do with things real. Then the opponent has argued that since a sentence must contain a verb all sentence enjoins an act; obviously, he is having in mind not an ordinary verb but an injunctive verb, his point being that to utter a sentence will serve no purpose unless it evokes a reaction in the hearer; Jayanta answers by citing a few cases where a descriptive sentence evokes a marked reaction in the hearer.18 Thus, for example, one who is told ‘your virgin daughter is pregnant’ immediately becomes sad, one who is told ‘a son is born to you’ immediately becomes happy, one who is under the mistaken belief that he lies entwined by a serpent feels relieved as soon as somebody says to him ‘you lie entwined by a mere rope’; in these cases it will be unwarranted to suppose that here there stands implied an exhortation to the effect ‘be sad’, ‘be happy’, ‘feel relieved’.19 The opponent pleads that in these cases the speaker in fact intends to exhort the hearer to make an appropriate move; Jayanta replies by pointing out that what move to make on listening to what sentence differs from person to person; e.g. on hearing ‘there lies hidden treasure in that direction’ an ascetic-minded person will avoid rather than approach the direction hinted, on hearing ‘there are serpents in that direction’ a serpent-catcher will approach rather than avoid the direction hinted.20 But then the opponent pleads that all speaker intends to say to the hearer ‘Understand this to be the case’; this too Jayanta refuses to concede, his point being that the hearer seeks to understand the speaker without being asked to do so.21 This time however the opponent seems to be on a stronger ground, for really one would not utter a word unless one means to say to the hearer ‘Understand this to be the case.’ Jayanta is so much confident of the correctness of his stand that quoting an Upaniṣadic injunction (viz. ‘the soul has to be known’) where the verb concerned happens to be ‘to know’ he argues that this sentence is not injunctive at all, his point being that in the case of knowing an injunction is useless.22 Proceeding further Jayanta even says that when one is asked to develop certain specific moral qualities with a view to preparing oneself for the acquisition of self-knowledge, that too is not a case of injunction, his point again being that in the case of something that proves instrumental in the acquisition of self-knowledge an injunction is useless.23 That in all
this Jayanta is indulging in the type of speculation characteristic of Advaita-Vedântins is made clear when he next reports that according to Vedântins not only the act of moral development but even an ordinary Vedic ritual is aimed at self-knowledge. Really the Mîmâṃsakas and Vedântins were fanatically committed to maintain two opposite extreme positions, their common point being an endeavour to champion the cause of Vedas in a literal sense of the term. This was not the case with a Naiyâyika whose loyalty to the cause of Vedas was but skin-deep. Thus the Mîmâṃsaka developed an intricate theology of Vedic ritual making ample use of the original Vedic material while the Vedântins developed an intricate ontology of Brahman-monism similarly making ample use of the original Vedic material. Naturally, the sheet-anchor of the Mîmâṃsaka were the Brâhmaṇa-texts just as the sheet-anchor of the Vedântin were the Upaniṣadic texts, but since both these groups of texts were after all Vedic the problem before the Mîmâṃsaka was how to explain away the Upaniṣadic texts which had little to do with ritualism just as the problem before the Vedântin was how to explain away the Brâhmaṇa-texts which had little to do with Brahman-monism. It was in this context that the Mîmâṃsaka sought to prove that even the descriptive Vedic statements are somehow injunctive in character just as the Vedântin sought to prove that even injunctive Vedic statements are somehow descriptive in character; both were forced endeavours but both were pursued with vigour. However, in the times of Jayanta, Vedânta was not yet the formidable force it became later on, and so it is the Mîmâṃsaka who acts as the chief Vedicist rival for him, though he is also going to undertake a detailed criticism of Brahman-mônism. That is why in the present controversy with the Mîmâṃsaka Jayanta introduces the Vedântin towards the fas end. And though Jayanta seeks some support from the Vedântin on a point maintained by both in common (and maintained wrongly), the former soon realises that the Vedântin was as much maintaining an extreme position as the Mîmâṃsaka. Hence his concluding remark: “Of these two (viz. injunctive and descriptive statements) which is subordinate to which – that question does not interest us much. For we rest content with demonstrating that Vedas as such are an authentic scriptural text.” Really, of course, Vedas have very little to do with what Jayanta stands for in the field of philosophy as in the field of theology-cum-ritual.
PROBLEMS OF UNIVERSALS, WORD MEANING AND SENTENCE MEANING

(1) Introductory

In Āhnicika V Jayanta considers the question as to what a word stands for, and his enquiry is divided into two parts, viz. one considering as to what an individual word stands for, the other as to what a sentence stands for. However, this much should give very little idea of what Jayant precisely does in the present Āhnicika with its two distinct parts. For he evinces clear realisation that neither the problem of word-meaning nor that of sentential meaning is one in connection with which his Nyāya school has made a notable contribution. Thus it is towards the very close of the first part that Jayanta actually discusses as to what different types of meaning are conveyed by the grammatically different types of word, and the enquiry is cut short by confessing that a detailed consideration as to what a word means is the special task of another particular discipline, his point being that that is the special task of the science of grammar. Somewhat earlier Jayanta discusses as to whether a word stands for the corresponding ‘universal’ or for the corresponding configuration or for the corresponding particular-entities, a discussion apparently confined to noun-words but one which was actually undertaken by the Nyāya authors since beginning. But even this discussion is relatively very brief and the real thing is the elaborate discussion which precedes this one, for there Jayanta takes up the much debated problem of the reality or otherwise of a ‘universal’. The debate had of course something to do with the problem of word-meaning. For the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā authors were of the view that a noun-word stands for a ‘universal’ which is an eternal independent real residing in each of the particular-entities denoted by this word, a view countered by the Buddhists by arguing that a ‘universal’ thus conceived is something fictitious while a noun-word supposed to stand for such a ‘universal’ in fact stands for nothing real. Hence Jayanta’s contention that since he is out to maintain that a word is an independent source of valid
cognition. While the Buddhist submits that a word has nothing to do with things real this submission has been refuted by showing that "universal" etc. are the real things a word stands for. Even later on the point is made that the question as to what a word stands for has been discussed by the Nyāya authors with a view to silencing the Buddhist who submits that a word has nothing to do with things real. On this latter occasion Jayanta was actually pleading that the Nyāya authors have not discussed the question as to what a sentence stands for and the opponent had asked: "Why then do they discuss the question as to what a word stands for?" Thus it too is Jayanta's understanding that a detailed consideration as to what a sentence means is the special task of another particular discipline, not that of Nyāya whose own special task is to enquire into the sources of valid cognition. That this time Jayanta has in mind the discipline called Mīmāṃsā becomes evident when we take into consideration what he actually does in the second part of his present chapter, a part devoted to the problem of sentential meaning. Thus in essence we are here first offered the Kumārilite account of what a sentence means and then its Prabhakarite account, the two accounts being followed by certain independent observations of Jayanta himself. As a matter of fact, the Kumārilite and the Prabhakarite were most interested in inquiring as to how it is that a Vedic injunctive sentence impels one to act in an appropriate fashion; with this end in view they considered the question as to what is the precise import of an injunctive verbal suffix but they talked as if this import is what a sentence as a whole means. Now this was a procedure which Jayanta failed to appreciate, for according to him even about the verb occurring in a sentence - a verb composed of a root and a suffix - it could not be said that its meaning is the meaning of the sentence as a whole. Hence it is that after confessing that the Nyāya authors had given no thought to the question as to what a sentence stands for even while saying a few things as to what a word stands for Jayanta went on to add that a tenable position should be that a sentence yields a meaning through the instrumentalities of the meanings appropriate to the individual words composing the sentence; his point being that about none of these words it could be said that its meaning is the meaning of the sentence as a whole. In this connection Jayanta pointedly reminded the Mīmāṃsakas that they after all did concede that the meaning of a sentence is
somehow yielded by the totality of words composing this sentence - this irrespective of what view they maintained as to the import of an injunctive verbal suffix. Not only that, in the next chapter he is going to examine in details the various Mīmāṃsā theories as to how the words of a sentence manage to yield the concerned sentential meaning. All this means that Jayanta's present enquiry into sentential meaning is in fact an enquiry into the various Mīmāṃsā theories as to the import of an injunctive verbal suffix; to be more precise, he here simply tells us what the Kumārilite and the Prabhākarite theories on the question are. Even so, Jayanta is positively interested in one aspect of the discussion. Thus the Prabhākarite submits that an injunction is followed just because it is an injunction, not because by following it one would get this or that result; this submission is directed against the Kumārilite who would not deny that while following an injunction one is somehow guided by the consideration that one would thereby get this or that result. Now Jayanta emphasises that one follows an injunction never except under the conviction that one would thereby get this or that result, a point which he develops in some details after having reported about the corresponding Kumārilite and Prabhākarite theories. However, having done that Jayanta confesses that the question as to what is the import of an injunctive verbal suffix is not as such discussed by the Nyāya authors, but pleads that what he is presently arguing is in line with the Nyāya authors ordinarily saying that one undertakes an action with a view to getting some result or other. This is how Jayanta feels that he has independently worked out a theory as to the import of an injunctive verbal suffix, a theory which in his eyes is a good enough match for the corresponding Kumārilite and Prabhākarite theories. Thinking on the same lines Jayanta later on submits that if one is insistent that the meaning of a sentence must be equated with some one particular element then let it be equated with the result associated with the utterance of this sentence; this way he equips himself with a Mīmāṃsā-like contention according to which the import of an injunctive verbal suffix is what constitutes the meaning of a sentence as a whole. Despite all this, however, the fact remains that in the second part of his present chapter Jayanta is in the main reporting about the Kumārilite and the Prabhākarite theories as to the import of an injunctive verbal suffix. In the background of this
general information it should be possible to fruitfully examine the contents of the present chapter; we take up its two parts one by one. 

(2) The Problem of Word-Meaning

Jayanta begins by saying that he proposes to answer those who would argue that there being nothing real a word might stand for a word has nothing to do with things real — in this connection first seeking to demonstrate as to what an individual word stands for and then as to what a sentence stands for. Then taking up the case of individual words he divides them into those of the form of a verb and the rest, making the point that the former will be considered while discussing the problem of sentential meaning and the latter are to be further divided into four sub-classes, viz. common-nouns, verb-based nouns, adjectives, proper-nouns. Lastly it is said about a common-noun that it stands for a particular thing as possessed of an appropriate 'universal'. To this statement the Buddhist takes exception on the ground that a 'universal' is something fictitious. The stage is thus set for conducting controversy as to whether a 'universal' is something real or something fictitious, a controversy which constitutes the kernel of what we are calling the first part of the present chapter. In order to appreciate the precise point of this controversy let us briefly review it in an independent fashion.

As in so many other cases, here was a controversy in which the rival parties were right in rejecting what they were rejecting, wrong in accepting what they were accepting. Thus in essence the problem of 'universal' was the problem of identifying a thing as belonging to a class. Commonsense suggests that one identifies a thing as belonging to a class as a result of observing in this thing features that are characteristic of this class; a non-human living being learns from its own almost unaided experience how to select only such features and use them as an identification-mark, but in this very task the man can be considerably aided by a fellowman who might orally communicate to him as to what features are to act as an identification-mark in the case of a thing denoted by a particular word and hence belonging to a corresponding class. But this commonsense position was denied by the Buddhists on one ground and by their Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā rivals on another. Thus the Buddhist argued that since whatever is real must be of the form of a unique-particular all attribution of a common set-of-features to a
class of things must be somehow false; however, he conceded that a class of things might share in common a negative feature of the form of ‘exclusion from the rest’. On the other hand, the Naiyāyika and the Mīmāṃsaka contended that what belongs to all the members of a class is not merely a common set-of-features but a ‘universal’ to be conceived as an eternal independent real. Hence in the controversy that ensued the Buddhist criticised the Naiyāyika and the Mīmāṃsaka on the ground that the members of a class do not share in common a ‘universal’ supposed to be an eternal independent real, a criticism correct in the sense that what these members share in common is a set-of-features which is not an independent real and is as much perishable as these members themselves; on the other hand, the Naiyāyika and the Mīmāṃsaka criticised the Buddhist on the ground that the members of a class do not share in common just a negative feature of the form of ‘exclusion from the rest’, a criticism correct in the sense that what these members share in common is a positive set-of-features. All this makes the present controversy virtually a pointless controversy. But let us follow Jayanta who first presents the Buddhist’s case and then assails it.

The Buddhist begins by arguing that a ‘universal’ is not something real because it is not grasped through sensory cognition while the supposition that it is grasped through a post-perceptual thought, an inference or a verbal cognition will not turn it into something real because none of these types of cognition grasps what is real; his point is that a ‘universal’ is supposed to belong to all the members of the class concerned while a sensory cognition grasps only what is immediately present there in its full particularity. Then it is argued that a ‘universal’ is not something real because it is not seen by the side of relevant particular just as one sees two fruits by the side of each other on one’s palm. Lastly, it is argued that a ‘universal’ is not something real because it is not seen unless a relevant particular is also seen, the point being that in the case of two really independent reals it never happens that one is not seen unless the other is also seen. The opponent pleads that a ‘universal’ is not seen unless a relevant particular is also seen because the former resides in the latter; the Buddhist retorts: “It is inconceivable how a ‘universal’ resides in a relevant particular. For if it resides there in its entirety it should not be found in another relevant particular, if it resides there in part
no relevant particular should be the seat of a ‘universal’ in its entirety and so no producer of the cognition of this ‘universal’. Moreover, you yourself do not admit that a ‘universal’ is made up of parts while it is impossible for the whole of a ‘universal’ to reside in each and every relevant particular.” The opponent pleads: “A ‘universal’ resides in a relevant particular by way of samavāya-relation whose very nature it is that it relates the relata concerned without their being conjoined to each other”; the Buddhist retorts: “It is impossible for a relation to obtain between $x$ and $y$ unless $x$ and $y$ are conjoined to each other. Certainly, if $x$ and $y$ are not conjoined to each other and yet stand related to each other then they are not two things but one thing.” Raising another difficulty the Buddhist argues: “A ‘universal’ cannot be ubiquitous, for in that case the universal ‘cowness’ should reside in horses as well.” Moreover, in that case it should be seen to be present everywhere, nor will it do to say that it will be seen when a relevant particular will make it manifest, for even as thus made manifest it should be seen everywhere in case it actually exists everywhere. On the other hand, if it is supposed that a universal resides not everywhere but only where a relevant particular does then the question is how it makes its appearance where a relevant particular firstly comes into existence; for certainly it was not already present there, nor can it come there from somewhere else.” The Kumārilite argues: “Things are found to be similar to each other just as they are found to be dissimilar from each other. And since neither of these findings is a case of illusion a ‘universal’ residing in several things is as much of a reality as the unique particularity exhibited by each of these things. Hence it is that even nirvikalpaka perception reveals not only unique particularity but so also a ‘universal’” the Buddhist retorts: “It is self-contradictory to say that a thing exhibits unique particularity as also a ‘universal’ common to several things.” Nor can it be suggested that both are actually perceived, for what is common to several things can never be an object of perception but always an object of thought; and since what is an object not of perception but of thought must be something false.” The opponent asks: “But unless a ‘universal’ is posited how can one account for the cognition of similarity that arises in respect of all the members belonging to a class ?”; the Buddhist answers: “The cognition in question is of the form of thought and such a
cognition does not require that its object be something real." To this is added that the opponent himself does not posit a 'universal' to account for the cognition of similarity that arises in respect of all the 'universals' that are supposed to be there. The opponent pleads: "That cognition of similarity might be due to some accidental feature common to all the 'universals'"; the Buddhist retorts: "The same should be the explanation for all cognition-of-similarity whatsoever. For example, 'performing the same function x' is the accidental feature common to all the members belonging to the class X." The opponent objects: "But the function performed by one member of a class is numerically different from that performed by another, so much so that even the function called 'producing cognition concerning itself' is different in the case of these different members; the Buddhist answers: "These cognitions-concerning-itself are doubtless numerically different but since each of them gives rise to a cognition-of-sameness they are treated as same — on the basis of which sameness the members in question are themselves treated as same." The opponent pleads: "But unless a 'universal' is posited an inference and a verbal cognition should turn out to be impossible, for both necessarily presuppose the grasping of a universal relationship which must be done through perception if an infinite regress is to be avoided. However, a universal relationship cannot be grasped through perception unless a 'universal' is posited"; the Buddhist retorts: "What inference and verbal cognition cognise is not what constitutes an object of perception but what constitutes an object of thought while this latter object, unlike the former, is something fictitious." The Buddhist point is that a universal relationship necessary for inference and verbal cognition is grasped not through perception but through thought and since what constitutes an object of thought is something fictitious there ought to be no difficulty about maintaining that a 'universal' is something fictitious; the opponent understands him to mean that the object of thought being something fictitious thought grasps no universal relationship, and so asks him: "But whether fictitious or not, the object of thought must be something that is common to all the members of a class"; the Buddhist answers: "An object of thought — which means an object of verbal cognition — is characterised by the feature 'exclusion from the rest' and this feature is certainly common to all the members
of the class concerned. But an object characterised by this feature is "not something real." Then is offered another argument by way of maintaining that a thought grasps not something positive (and hence real) but just an 'exclusion' (and hence something fictitious); thus it is said: "When perception grasps a thing it grasps it in its entirety, so that nothing remains to be grasped by thought. What happens is that even after having grasped through perception a thing in its entirety one harbours an illusion as regards the identity of this thing, an illusion dispelled by a thought through declaring that this thing does not belong to the class to which it is suspected to belong." The suggestion that even after a thing is grasped through perception a property of it might remain to be grasped through thought is rejected on the ground that a property of a thing being nothing over and above this thing to grasp a thing means to grasp this thing along with all its properties. Again this Buddhist thesis on 'exclusion' Kumārila has launched a long tirade as follows: "Since an 'exclusion' is of the form of an absence it must require a locus, but nothing can conceivably act as its locus - not a unique particular because that is not grasped by thought, not a sub-class of the class concerned because in that case the remaining sub-classes will remain uncovered, not the totality of the concerned unique particulars because there can be no 'totality' over and above these unique particulars themselves; so the locus of an 'exclusion' must be something that resides in its entirety in each member of the class concerned, a description applicable to a 'universal' whose reality therefore cannot be denied at all. Again, an 'exclusion' must be an exclusion from something positive while on your showing all class-character whatsoever is of the form of an 'exclusion' and nothing positive. Similarly, on your showing there should be nothing to distinguish one 'exclusion' from another - not the two loci because we have shown that nothing can act as a locus for an 'exclusion', not the two sets of things excluded because an 'exclusion' can have nothing to do with the things excluded. And even granting the possibility of an 'exclusion' any two 'exclusion's must resemble in all respect except one; e.g. 'not-cows' and 'not-horses' resemble each other except in so far as the former include horses while the latter include cows. Nor can it be said that 'not-cows' are what alone exclude all cows, for on your showing that should involve a 'mutual dependence' inasmuch as
cows themselves are but what exclude all not-cows. In answer to all this the Buddhist argues: "Your entire argumentation presupposes that an 'exclusion' is something real but as a matter of fact it is neither a mental-real nor a physical-real but a sheer fiction. And the reason why we yet say that thought-of-x grasps 'exclusion from not-x' is that this thought is incapable of grasping the concerned unique particular while there exists no 'universal' for it to grasp, so that we merely record the fact that this thought does not grasp a non-x. Certainly, this way alone does it become possible to distinguish thought-of-x from thought-of-y, the former grasping 'exclusion from not-x', the latter 'exclusion from not-y'. Moreover, if the object grasped through a thought is neither a mental-real nor a physical-real and yet appears as if something real, then the only tenable supposition is that this object is of the form of an 'exclusion', for an 'exclusion' can in fact characterise a real something as also a fictitious something. Of course, we do not deny that common people behave under the impression that the object of a thought is something as real as the object of a perception, but that does not decide the matter. Certainly, common people fail to distinguish from one another the object of a perception and the object of a post-perceptual thought (it will be wrong to say that they identify the two, for that is beyond their power) and hence act in relation to the latter object as if it were the former; however, this act of theirs proves successful because the latter object is ultimately rooted in the former, just as one mistaking a jewel's ray for a jewel and then proceeding to take hold of it does after all get the jewel while one mistaking a lamp's ray for a jewel and then proceeding to take hold of it does not get a jewel. These are the most important considerations urged by the Buddhist by way of criticising the Nyāya-Mīmāṃsā thesis of 'universal'. As can be seen, he sounds convincing when he argues that what is common to all the members of a class is not an eternal (possibly also ubiquitous) independent real called 'universal', but not when he argues that what is thus common is nothing positive but a negative feature of the form of 'exclusion from the rest'. There is no denying that what is common to the members of a class excludes them from things not belonging to this class, but that is no ground for denying that these members share any positive features in common. The Buddhist himself does not hesitate to
declare that 'performing the same function' is one positive feature common to all the members of a class, but he prefers the negative mode of describing this feature under the misconceived hope that that will enable him to assert that these members share nothing in common (an 'exclusion' being a mere absence is after all nothing!) and that the object grasped by a thought is something fictitious (being of the form of an 'exclusion' this object is after all fictitious!) Really, the root-error of the Buddhist lies in his insistence that things real being of the form of a unique particular share no feature in common and in his insistence that a thought since it cognises not a unique particular but features common to the members of a class cognises something fictitious. Even so, Kumārila's criticism of the Buddhist's thesis on 'exclusion' is largely unjustified, for the former speaks as if it is logically untenable to say about the members of a class that they are excluded from things not belonging to this class. What is worse, he wants to force on the Buddhist the conclusion that what is common to the members of a class is something positive such that it exists in its entirety in each of these members; for the set-of-features which the members of a class share in common is certainly something positive but it makes no sense to say that this set-of-features exists in its entirety in each of these members. Really, Kumārila's idea is that what is common to the members of a class is not a set-of-features but a 'universal' supposed to be an eternal independent real existing in its entirety in each of these members, a fantastic idea. Essentially this very idea is espoused by Jayanta in his criticism of the Buddhist he immediately undertakes.

Jayanta begins by pointing out that the Buddhist himself admits the presence of something common – which the latter calls 'exclusion' – in all the members of a class; the former's submission is that this something common is what he calls 'universal' so that the only question that remains to be decided is whether nirvikalpaka perception does or does not cognise a 'universal'; and as to this question Jayanta's answer is that though it is difficult to directly determine what a nirvikalpaka perception does or does not cognise yet since savikalpaka perception does cognise a 'universal' it seems plausible to maintain that a nirvikalpaka perception too cognises a 'universal'.
conversant with the names concerned immediately notices in things certain similar features just as one notices in them certain dissimilar features.36 Jayanta’s point is that things exhibit similar features as well as dissimilar features while both these types of features are cognised through nirvikalpaka perception as well as savikalpaka perception.37 The Buddhist’s contention that it is self-contradictory to treat things as similar as well as dissimilar is rejected on the ground that the testimony of plain perception reveals things to be similar as well as dissimilar.38 However, one might say to Jayanta that all this only proves that things are similar to each other but not that they are the seat of a common ‘universal’. So, with a view to directly grappling with the problem of ‘universal’ he recalls that according to Kumārila things are different from one another as well as non-different and submits that the latter has adopted this position for the fear of facing the query as to how a ‘universal’ resides in the relevant particulars.39 Really, Kumārila has maintained that two things are non-different in so far as both are a seat of the same ‘universal’, they are different otherwise; similarly, he has maintained that a ‘universal’ is different as well as non-different from the relevant particular in which it is seated. To Jayanta this way of speaking seems illogical, and so he boldly comes out with the assertion that a ‘universal’ is but different from the relevant particulars in which it is seated; to this is added that the difficulties as to how a ‘universal’ manages to get seated in a relevant particular are dispelled on the testimony of perception itself.40 Thus the Buddhist has contended that a ‘universal’ and a relevant particular are not seen by the side of each other as two fruits are seen by the side of each other on one’s own palm; Jayanta similarly retorts that they are so seen.41 Similarly, the Buddhist has contended that a ‘universal’ is not found located at one place and a relevant particular at another; Jayanta retorts that they are not so found because this ‘universal’ is located in this relevant particular itself.42 Again, the Buddhist has argued that a ‘universal’ as a whole cannot reside in each of the relevant particulars because such a residence is impossible; Jayanta retorts that in the present case such a residence is actually seen there whatever name one might choose to confer on this type of residence.43 Then the Buddhist has taken exception to the concept of samavāy -relation supposed to obtain between a ‘universal’ and a relevant particular and conceived so
that it relates two things without their being conjoined to each other; Jayanta retorts that samavāya-relation does obtain when the r̄aṭāta concerned happen to be located at the same place, two other examples of it being the relation obtaining between a composite substance and its component parts and that obtaining between a quality and the substance to which this quality belongs. Lastly, the Buddhist has contended that there are difficulties whether one says that a ‘universal’ is ubiquitous or one says that it exists only where a relevant particular is available; Jayanta retorts that both these alternatives are capable of defence. Thus on the latter’s showing the alternative that a ‘universal’ is ubiquitous can be defended as follows: “Even if a ‘universal’ exists everywhere and always it is made manifest only where and only when a relevant particular is available. And a ‘universal’ doubtless exists everywhere and always, for it does not come into existence where and when a relevant particular is available.” Similarly, the alternative that a ‘universal’ exists only where a relevant particular is available can be defended as follows: “A ‘universal’ gets seated in a relevant particular as soon as the latter comes into existence. However, it would not be proper to suppose that this ‘universal’ already existed at the birth-place of this relevant particular or that it came to this place at the birth-time of this relevant particular; for it is the very nature of this ‘universal’ and this relevant particular to behave in the manner described and there is nothing incongruous about that, just as there is nothing incongruous about a calf being white in colour even if born of a parent-bull which is red and parent-cow which is black and eats green grass.” After having thus defended his own thesis on ‘universal’ Jayanta proceeds to assail the Buddhist’s thesis on ‘exclusion’ and all that; thus according to the former the latter too will have to explain as to how certain things and no other manage to become the seat of ‘exclusion’. The suggestion that it is the very nature of certain things to produce a common-cognition is rejected on the ground that corresponding to this common-cognition there must exist in these things a speciality in the form of an appropriate ‘universal’. Then the Buddhist has pointed out that in certain cases the Naiyāyika himself does not posit a ‘universal’ corresponding to a common-cognition; Jayanta retorts that these exceptional cases should not render invalid the general rule that all common-cognition presupposes an appropriate ‘universal.’ In this
connection the Buddhist has argued that all common-cognition can be accounted for in terms of an appropriate accidental feature belonging to the things concerned, just as according to the Naiyāyika it is accounted for in those exceptional cases; for example, the former has suggested that ‘performing the same function’ is an accidental feature common to all the members of a class, ‘producing a cognition-of-sameness’ an accidental feature common to all cognitions-concerning-itself produced by these members; Jayanta retorts that the commonness-of-an-accidental-feature thus spoken of makes no sense within the Buddhist’s framework of argumentation. Jayanta’s point is that the Buddhist has no right to say that the functions performed by two members of a class are the same function, or to say that cognitions-concerning-itself produced by these two members commonly produce cognition-of-sameness; particularly elaborating the latter part of his point Jayanta contends that cognition-of-sameness cannot arise in respect of certain things unless these things are a common seat of one and the same ‘universal’. Then Jayanta criticises the Buddhist’s argument that since perception cognises a thing in its full particularity there remains nothing in this thing to be cognised by a subsequent thought; the former’s simple point is that it is well possible for a perception and a thought to cognise one and the same thing, also for the latter to cognise a feature of this thing left uncognised by the former. Lastly, Jayanta ridicules the Buddhist’s contention that an ‘exclusion’ which constitutes the object of a thought is neither of the form of a mental-real nor of the form of a physical-real but of the form of a pure fiction; the former’s point is that an object-of-cognition thus conceived makes no sense whatsoever. Thus closes Jayanta’s refutation of the Buddhist’s anti-‘universal’ argumentation. Here too it can be seen that the former sounds convincing when he argues that what is common to all the members of a class is not a mere ‘exclusion-from-the-rest’ – an exclusion which is neither a mental-real nor a physical-real but a fiction – but not when he argues that what is thus common is an eternal (and possibly ubiquitous) independent real called ‘universal’. Jayanta is certainly right in telling the Buddhist that things real are not exclusively of the form of a unique particular but exhibit well-defined mutual similarities as well; and he is also substantially right in supposing that for all practical purposes the
nature of a thing is revealed not in the course of a nirvikalpaka perception but in the course of a post-nirvikalpaka thought. But his understanding that for two things to be similar is for them to be the common seat of a ‘universal’ is fraught with confusion. We already know how this faulty understanding prevents Jayanta from correctly describing a true perception, even if his description of a false perception is broadly correct. For instead of rightly saying that in a true perception a sense-contacted object is correctly identified on the basis of certain observed sensory features he wrongly says that here there takes place a virtually passive cognition of a sense-contacted ‘universal’; on the other hand, he rightly says that in a false perception a sense-contacted object is incorrectly identified on the basis of certain observed sensory features. Be that as it may, Jayanta’s discussion on ‘universal’ thus conducted is his chief performance in connection with the present section of the chapter, whose specific subject-matter is the problem of wordmeaning, a problem to which he directs his attention now.

Let us recall that Jayanta is presently concentrating his attention on common-nouns and it is his understanding that corresponding to each common-noun there is a ‘universal’ and a class of particulars which are a common seat of this ‘universal’. Now his problem arises because he poses the question as to whether a word stands for the ‘universal’ concerned or for the relevant particulars; and in this connection he first reports a view according to which a word stands for the relevant particulars, then the Mimāṃsā view according to which it stands for the ‘universal’ concerned, lastly his own view according to which it stands for both. The discussion becomes a bit complicated because Jayanta’s own school here introduces a third factor in the form of ‘configuration’ and its actual view is that a word stands for the ‘universal’ concerned, the ‘configuration’ concerned, as also the relevant particulars; on the whole however the discussion is essentially misconceived inasmuch as it virtually amounts to considering whether a word possesses a connotation or it possesses a denotation! In any case, the first view begins by rejecting the suggestion that a word stands for the ‘configuration’ concerned on the ground that the things denoted by the same word exhibit multitude of configurations as also on the ground that practical dealing takes place not in respect of a ‘configuration’ but in respect of a relevant particular.\textsuperscript{55} Really, the first ground is the
type of ground on which the second view rejects the first view, the second ground the type of the ground on which the first view rejects the second view, for in connection with the former rejection it is emphasised that there is a multitude of relevant particulars, in connection with the latter rejection that practical dealing takes place not in respect of a ‘universal’ but in respect of a relevant particular. The first view as here presented confesses that the second view has the advantage of establishing a neat one-one relationship between a word and what it stands for (there being just one ‘universal’ corresponding to each word) but it rejects the latter on the ground just mentioned, viz. that practical dealing takes place not in respect to a ‘universal’ but in respect of a relevant particular;\textsuperscript{56} as for the ‘universal’ concerned this view maintains that a word stands for it not directly but by way of implication.\textsuperscript{57} Then comes the second view which is an actual Mīmāṃsā view. According to this view there being just one ‘universal’ but a multitude of relevant particulars corresponding to a word, what a word directly stands for is a ‘universal’ while it stands for a relevant particular not directly but by way of implication.\textsuperscript{58} As for the objection that practical dealing takes place not in respect of a ‘universal’ but in respect of a relevant particular this view tamely pleads that there are cases where even practical dealing takes place in respect of a ‘universal’ rather than a relevant particular; for example, in the Vedic injunction ‘bricks are to be arranged in the form of a kite’ the word ‘kite’ must stand not for a particular kite which is here not required at all but for the ‘universal’ concerned inasmuch as what is here actually required is the bare form of a kite.\textsuperscript{59} Really, a plea like this amounts to urging that there are cases where the connotation of a word is also its denotation; but such anomalies are to be encountered through out the present discussion. Be that as it may, there lastly comes the third view which is an actual Nyāya view. This view first criticises the second view on the ground that a word should stand for something to which a case-ending or a gender might be possibly applied while such an application is actually impossible in the case of a ‘universal’.\textsuperscript{60} According to this third view a word stands for the ‘universal’ concerned as well as the relevant particular (as also for the ‘configuration’ concerned) and it seems to make sense simply because it can be construed as the commonsense saying that corresponding to each word there is a ‘universal’ as well
as a number of relevant particulars (as also a ‘configuration’). Thus when the second view pleads that a word would stand for the relevant particulars not directly but by way of implication, the third view retorts that in that case all use of a word involving reference to a relevant particular will turn out to be a figurative rather than literal use.  

This retort sounds plausible simply because it is here made to appear as if the second view is denying that there are relevant particulars corresponding to a word. Really, the second view only says that it will be too much of a burden for a word to stand for the ‘universal’ concerned as well as the relevant particulars. A statement countered by the third view through arguing that since a ‘universal’ is always perceived in the company of a relevant particular it is only logical that a word should stand for the ‘universal’ concerned as well as the relevant particular. Thus the second view speaks as if it will be too much of a burden for a word to undertake both connotation and denotation while the third view speaks as if a word undertakes both connotation and denotation because a ‘universal’ is always perceived in the company of a relevant particular, in both cases a rather strange procedure. And then even the third view concedes that there are cases where a word chiefly stands for the ‘universal’ concerned, cases where it chiefly stands for a relevant particular, cases where it chiefly stands for the ‘configuration’ concerned, in essence this way of speaking is of the same type as the second view pleading that it will be too much of a burden for a word to stand for the ‘universal’ concerned as well as the relevant particulars.

While closing his above discussion on common-nouns Jayanta says that in the case of a thing which is the only thing of its kind e.g. sky, the word concerned stands not for a ‘universal’ but for this particular thing itself. This leads him to take up the question of proper nouns etc. Thus on his showing a proper noun too is a word which stands for the concerned particular itself, there being no ‘universal’ in its case. As for adjectives, he says that some of them exclusively stand for the quality concerned while some also stand for the thing qualified. Really, the former are nouns denoting a quality, the latter an ambiguous adjective possibly qualifying a quality as also the thing qualified; an example of the former are words like ‘smell’, ‘colour’, ‘taste’ etc., an example of the latter the word ‘white’ which in the phrase ‘white colour’ qualifies the quality.
colour and in the phrase 'white horse' qualifies the thing horse possessing the quality white-colour. As for verbs, he says that some of them stand for the agent, object or instrument of action concerned while some for this action itself. Really, neither of these groups includes verbs proper which are going to be taken up in the next section of the present chapter; for both include just nouns. An example of the former is the word 'pācaka (= cook)' meaning 'one who cooks', an example of the latter the word 'pāka (= cooking)' meaning 'the act of cooking'. Here closes Jayanta’s discussion on nouns. Then after making that promise about a discussion on verbs and throwing in a few sundry observations about prefixes and particles the enquiry into word-meaning is ended rather abruptly on the plea that a detailed consideration as to what a word means is the special task of another particular discipline. And then closes the present section-of-the-chapter itself, a section ostensibly concerned with the problem of word-meaning but actually concentrating its attention on the problem of 'universal'.

(3) The Problem of Sentential Meaning

As has been noted, in this section Jayanta chiefly makes a report about the Kumārilite and Prabhākarite theories as to the import of an injunctive verbal-suffix, theories misleadingly called theories as to sentential meaning. The detailed presentation of the Kumārilite theory is preceded by a summary presentation of certain obscure ones of which a few are mentioned by Kumārila himself while one is later on espoused by Jayanta himself.

The first view reported by Jayanta maintains that a sentence has no meaning over and above the meanings had by its constituent words, its point being that there just arises a cognition to the effect that a sentence has a meaning. The position is supported through arguing that the separate meanings had by the separate words of a sentence do not constitute the alleged sentential meaning while it is inconceivable how these meanings can combine with each other; that these meanings as such do not combine with each other is obvious, but nor can they as cognised do so inasmuch as the cognition of one meaning perishes by the time the cognition of another meaning arises. The second view reported by Jayanta takes exception to this first view on the ground that it makes no sense to deny that a sentence has a real meaning after so much effort has
been made in order to prove that a word has a real meaning. Its simple argument is that since the cognition produced by a sentence is so obviously different from that produced by its constituent words there must be a real sentential meaning over and above the meanings had by the concerned constituent words. To this it is added that the combination into which the meanings of the constituent words of a sentence enter is equally a matter of plain experience, in this connection a promise being made that the question will be considered in details at a later stage. As a matter of fact, the question as to how a sentence yields meaning is one of the chief questions considered by Jayanta in the next chapter, and in that connection he comes out with the view that the meaning of a sentence is of the form of the meanings-of-the-constituent-words as combined with each other; the two other views reported there are the Kumārilite and the Prabhākarite views, and they both too somehow concede the possibility of there being a real sentential meaning. So strictly speaking, the present first view is the real prima facie view of that discussion of the next chapter while the present discussion pertains to a different question altogether. This becomes evident when we look into the fourth view presently reported by Jayanta. [The third view here reported is a version of the second view. Thus according to it the meaning of a sentence does not combine the meanings had by the constituent words but simply establishes that one of these meanings stands excluded from whatever is not the other meaning, something like the Buddhist’s theory on ‘exclusion’ maintained in connection with the question of word-meaning; Jayanta dismisses this view on the ground that the ‘exclusion’ in question comes to be noticed only after the ‘combination’ in question has been already noticed.] Thus the fourth view presupposes that a sentence has a meaning which is something real as well as something positive, but it goes on to enquire as to which word in a sentence plays the primary role and answers that the verb concerned does that. So now onwards Jayanta will be busy with the question as to which word or word-part in a sentence plays the primary role. Of course, in the end he will submit that the question is senseless inasmuch as the meaning of a sentence is yielded by all its constituent words equally playing their respective-roles; but even there he says that if one nevertheless persists in asking this question then this is how
one should be answered. Thus the fourth view begins by pointing out that no sentence is complete without a verb; to this is added that since a verb stands for something to be brought about and the remaining words for something already brought about while it is commonsense that what is something already brought about is but instrumental in bringing about what is to be brought about the conclusion is natural that all the words occurring in a sentence are subordinate to the verb occurring there.\textsuperscript{9} But against all this the fifth view reported by Jayanta – a view which he himself going to adopt as least unsatisfactory – objects as follows: "The verb occurring in a sentence stands for an action, but this action itself is aimed at some result so that the word standing for this result cannot be subordinate to this verb; nor can it be said that as occurring in a sentence the word standing for the result is really subordinate to the verb, for it is altogether inconceivable how the result to be brought about by an action is instrumental in bringing about this action itself.\textsuperscript{10} For example, in the case of the injunction ‘One desirous of heaven ought to perform a \textit{yaj\=na}’ heaven can in no sense be instrumental in bringing about the performance of a \textit{yaj\=na}.\textsuperscript{11} Certainly, one performing a \textit{yaj\=na} does not take hold of heaven as one takes hold of an ordinary implement-of-\textit{yaj\=na}; and it will be far-fetched to suggest that heaven is instrumental in the performance of a \textit{yaj\=na} because the idea of heaven held before mind is thus instrumental."\textsuperscript{12} However, following a similar logic the sixth view reported by Jayanta criticises the fifth view as follows: "If the result to be brought about by an action cannot be instrumental in bringing about this action itself then the person to be benefitted by this result cannot be instrumental in bringing about this result itself, so that in a sentence the chief word ought to be not the verb standing for the action concerned, nor the result to be brought about by this action, but the person to be benefitted by this result."\textsuperscript{13} Taking advantage of the turn thus taken by the controversy the fourth view submits: "But then a person himself is actually instrumental in bringing about the action denoted by the verb occurring in a sentence, so that the chief word in a sentence ought to be nothing save the verb concerned."\textsuperscript{14} Really, all this is but \textit{reductio ad absurdum} of the idea that some one word occurring in a sentence ought to be the chief word and the meaning of this word the meaning of this sentence. But it is in this background that the
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Kumārilite appears on the scene with his following submission: "All this is very much confusing but there is a way out. As for the person concerned it is very much doubtful whether any part of the verb concerned – the root or the suffix – denotes him at all, and so there is no question of his constituting sentential meaning. As for the result concerned, it as something already brought about is not mentioned by a sentence, its mention being as something to be brought about; so it too cannot constitute sentential meaning. But if the result concerned is thus mentioned as something to be brought about then sentential meaning ought to be the operation aimed at bringing about this result." Thus is introduced the Kumārilite thesis that the operation aimed at bringing about the result concerned, an operation technically called 'bhāvanā' (= 'causing', 'bringing into existence'), is what constitutes sentential meaning; in what follows this thesis is elaborated in details.

The Kumārilite begins by submitting that all sentence on account of the inevitable presence of a verb there involves reference to an operation undertaken by the agent concerned with a view to bringing about a result, and since 'an operation undertaken with a view to bringing about a result' is what he understands by 'bhāvanā,' this submission amounts to saying that all sentence involves reference to a 'bhāvanā.' In this connection what is chiefly had in mind are the Vedic injunctive sentences pertaining to yajña-performance, but the submission in question is obviously of a general significance as is explicitly made clear by emphasising that even ordinary verbs in indicative mood like 'cooks', 'reads', 'goes' etc. refer to a 'bhāvanā'; thus, for example, 'cooks' means 'undertakes an operation with a view to bringing about the result called "cooking".' Now a verb is composed of a root-part and a suffix-part, and it is first maintained that 'bhāvanā' is denoted by the suffix-part. But later on it is conceded that there is no harm even in supposing that 'bhāvanā' is denoted by the root-part, the essential point being that a verb as a whole somehow involves reference to a 'bhāvanā.' Then it is contended that all bhāvanā necessarily requires three factors in the form of an objective, an instrument and a manner of doing. The simple point is that about all performance there have to be answered the following three questions:

(1) What is the result to be achieved?
(2) What is the instrument to be employed?
(3) How is the instrument to be employed?

Thus, for example, in the Vedic injunctive sentence 'One desirous of heaven ought to perform a yajña', the objective is heaven, the instrument yajña while the manner of doing has to be learnt from elsewhere. Then begins an elaboration of the nature of an injunction (and a prohibition). Thus we are told that it is in relation to a ‘bhāvana’ as thus understood that there are advanced injunctions and prohibitions. This simply means that even an injunctive sentence involves reference to a ‘bhāvana’, something that should be plain at least by now. But the opponent asks: “Why at all take recourse to an injunction? For even an indicative sentence does involve reference to a ‘bhāvana’ so that even such a sentence can be well employed in order to inform one as to what result is to be achieved in what manner. Nor can it be said that one cannot be impelled to undertake an action through uttering to one an indicative sentence; for even an injunctive sentence would not physically force one to undertake an action.”

The Kumārilite keeps silent about an indicative sentence being well capable of informing one as to what result is to be achieved in what manner, presumably under the belief that such sentences do not occur in Vedas; for he in the end pleads: “You ask, why at all take recourse to an injunction. Well, injunctions are there in Vedas and we have not composed Vedas.”

But he does emphasise that an injunctive sentence is well capable of informing one as to what result is to be achieved in what manner. Again, he emphasises that an injunctive sentence is well capable of impelling one to undertake an action even when one will not undertake this action otherwise. However, even here it is conceded that an injunctive sentence will not physically force one to undertake an action in case one is bent upon not undertaking this action, the point being that the task of an injunctive sentence is not to physically force one to undertake an action but to impel one to undertake an action, an impelling which is made possible just by telling one as to why and how this action is to be undertaken. This is broadly understandable, but in this connection the Kumārilite has developed a whole theory as to how a Vedic injunctive sentence impels one to undertake an action. He begins by contending that in ordinary matters one might be impelled to undertake an action on the basis of so many considerations but that in a supersensuous matter like religious duty nothing save a Vedic injunctive sentence...
can impel one to undertake an action.\textsuperscript{30} Then it is contended that an injunctive sentence not only conveys information as to what action is to be undertaken, how it is to be undertaken, etc. etc. but it also does the impelling.\textsuperscript{31} This contention is equated to saying that a Vedic injunctive sentence conveys information about one type of ‘bhāvanā’ while it itself undertakes another type of ‘bhāvanā’, the former to be called ārthī ‘bhāvanā’ (= a causing pertaining to what a word means), the latter sābdi bhāvanā (= a causing pertaining to a word itself).\textsuperscript{32} Then it is laid down that like all bhāvanā a sābdi bhāvanā too requires three factors in the form of an objective, an instrument, a manner of doing; here the objective invariably is ‘impelling a person to undertake the action concerned’, the instrument ‘all direct information about this action’, the manner of doing ‘all associated descriptive utterance aimed at encouraging a person to undertake this action.’\textsuperscript{33} Usually, however, the word ‘bhāvanā’ is used for what is here called ārthī bhāvanā, the word ‘vidhi’ for what is here called sābdi bhāvanā. Thus it is argued that a vidhi gets associated with a bhāvanā even before the root-part of the verb concerned is comprehended, for both this vidhi and this bhāvanā are denoted by the injunctive verbal-suffix carried by this verb.\textsuperscript{34} The opponent objects: “But then a vidhi should have nothing to do with the objective, instrument and manner-of-doing related to the bhāvanā concerned, for these objective etc. are described not by the injunctive verbal-suffix but by the injunctive sentence as a whole;”\textsuperscript{35} the Kumārilite answers: “Even if a vidhi gets associated with a bhāvanā as such the former waits till the latter becomes equipped with the necessary factors like objective etc., just as the bridgroom waits till the child-bride becomes adult.”\textsuperscript{36} Through all this rigmarole the Kumārilite is making the simple point that a bare look at the injunctive verbal-suffix employed in a sentence enables one to feel sure that this sentence is an injunctive sentence but that the meaning of the whole sentence will have to be grasped if one were to learn as to what the injunction concerned is about. In any case, here closes the Kumārilite’s account of how bhāvanā constitutes sentential meaning. As can be seen, he is chiefly interested in explaining the nature of a Vedic injunctive sentence, but he should find no difficulty in showing how even an ordinary sentence, injunctive or otherwise, describes a bhāvanā as equipped with the necessary factors like objective etc.\textsuperscript{37} For, after all, all
sentence does contain a verb and there is actually some sense in saying that the meaning of a sentence somehow hinges around the meaning of the verb it contains.

The above Kumārilite theory as to sentential meaning is criticised by the Prabhākarite who however solely concentrates his attention on injunctive sentences. In this connection he particularly takes exception to the Kumārilite’s thesis that an injunctive sentence describes an ārthi-bhāvanā by way of undertaking and describing a sābdi-bhāvanā, the former’s point being that this thesis is cumbersome in the extreme while an injunctive sentence actually does some one easily-understandable thing and does it straightway; thus it is argued that if an injunctive sentence requires sābdi-bhāvanā in order to describe ārthi-bhāvanā then it must require something else in order to describe sābdi-bhāvanā, that it is difficult to see whether sābdi-bhāvanā is undertaken first or described first, that it will be too much of a burden for an injunctive suffix to thus do with bhāvanā besides performing its normal grammatical function, that it is difficult to see whether sābdi-bhāvanā is primary or ārthi-bhāvanā, that we have no introspective experience of an injunctive sentence simultaneously performing two functions in the form of sābdi-bhāvanā and ārthi-bhāvanā. By way of developing his own positive view on the question the Prabhākarite submits that a sentence impels one to undertake an action in virtue of itself possessing a verb and this verb possessing an injunctive verbal-suffix so that ‘impelling’ is what an injunctive verbal-suffix stands for, as is corroborated by Pāṇini whose word ‘vidhi (=enjoining)’ employed in this connection is but a synonym for ‘impelling’; the Prabhākarite’s own word ‘niyoga’ (=enjoining) means the same thing as Pāṇini’s word ‘vidhi’ and on the former’s showing it is niyoga that constitutes the meaning of a sentence (rather that of an injunctive sentence). So this is what the Prabhākarite had in mind when he told the Kumārilite that an injunctive sentence does some one easily-understandable thing and does it straightway; for nothing can be simpler than saying that the injunctive sentence does the enjoining. The point is emphasised by submitting that an injunctive sentence first of all brings to light enjoiner–enjoined relationship obtaining between itself and the person enjoined while the discovering that this person is to undertake this action or that is made later on. As we have already noted, this point was made
in his own way by the Kumārilite also, and so the real
distinguishing mark of the Prabhākarite’s position is the gloss put
by the latter on it. Thus the Prabhākarite contends that nīyoga
constituting the meaning of a Vedic injunctive sentence is what is
called dharma (= religious duty), it being what impels one to
undertake an action and what one accomplishes.41 Thereby the
opponent is reminded of the Kumārilite distinguishing between
śābdi-bhāvanā and ārthi-bhāvanā – a distinction in terms of which
an injunctive sentence on the one hand does the impelling and on
the other tells one as to what to do, why to do, how to do; so he
objects: “But then according to you too an injunctive verbal-suffix
will be doing two things, viz. impelling one and telling one what
to do.”42 The Prabhākarite answers: “The same injunction which
impels one is also what one accomplishes. Of course, one cannot
accomplish an injunction without undertaking some action or other,
but that is a different matter. As for whether an injunction is
primarily what impels one and secondarily what is accomplished by
one or vice versa, both alternatives are tenable.”43 The
Prabhākarite’s point is that an injunction is obeyed simply because
it is an injunction, that is, it is obeyed irrespective of what it is
about; however, since it is here explicitly conceded that it is
impossible for an injunction not to be an injunction about
something the point amounts to submitting that an injunction is
obeyed without any consideration of the advantage possibly
accruing from this obeying. This becomes clear from the
Prabhākarite’s account of what according to him are the two
necessary factors involved in all injunction (=nīyoga), particularly
when contrasted with the Kumārilite’s account of what according to
him are the three necessary factors involved in all injunction
(= bhāvanā). Thus according to the Kumārilite all injunction must
refer to an objective, an instrument, a manner-of-doing (it being
understood that it must refer to an agent); on the other hand,
according to the Prabhākarite all injunction must refer to an agent
and an action (it being understood that it must refer to a manner-
of-doing).44 And since what the Kumārilite means by ‘instrument’
is what the Prabhākarite means by ‘action’ the difference between
the two amounts to the former insisting that an injunction must
refer to an objective (= result) to be achieved by the action
concerned and the latter insisting that no such reference is
necessary. As the Prabhākarite puts it: "An injunction does not impel one to undertake an action through pointing out to one a result like heaven etc., for in that case this injunction will be no independent impelling agent. Certainly, the scripture is not so powerless as not to be able to impel one without tempting one with a result." It is not denied that an injunction often refers to the agent concerned in the form of a person desiring such and such a result, but the Prabhākarite's point is that even in such cases the injunction is not to the effect that one ought to desire such and such a result but that one desirous of such a result ought to perform such and such an action; such, for example, is the injunctions 'One desirous of heaven ought to perform a yajña.' So whenever an injunction mentions a result — and usually it must do so — the Prabhākarite will plead that it is so done by way of describing the agent concerned. Thus there is a maxim — called Viśvajīt-maxim — according to which all injunctions which make no mention of a result are to be treated as mentioning heaven as a result; the Prabhākarite says that what is missing in such injunctions is the reference to an agent, a reference made possible by the maxim in question. However, in an injunction like 'One ought to perform a yajña as long as one is alive' the agent concerned is 'one who is alive', and so on the Prabhākarite's showing here is an example of an injunction in whose case no mention of a result is at all possible. Really, however, it is difficult to see why the Viśvajīt-maxim should not apply to an injunction like this. In any case, even the Prabhākarite cannot point out very many Vedic injunctions where the result concerned is not mentioned at all, that is, which are obligatory in an unconditional manner. Then the Prabhākarite thinks that his explanation is particularly suitable to an injunction like 'One desirous of killing an enemy ought to perform the yajña called Śyena'; his contention is that in this case it will be absurd to construe the injunction as saying that one ought to kill an enemy, for as thus construed this injunction will come in conflict with the general injunction 'One ought not to kill any living being.' Here again it is difficult to see why the injunction in question should be construed in the absurd manner suggested, that is, why the mere mention of a result in an injunction should mean that one is thereby called upon to achieve this result. The Prabhākarite is made aware of the difficulty by an opponent who argues: "You say that an
injunction impels one in an unconditional manner, but then that injunction about Śyena-yajña too should impel one in an unconditional manner"; the Prabhākarite pleads: "Yes, this injunction too possesses an impelling power just like any other. But since here is a case where the person concerned has his own motive to undertake the action concerned this injunction suspends its impelling power, for otherwise there will be nothing to distinguish an injunction like this from an obligatory injunction." Thus according to the Prabhākarite the real difficulty about the injunction pertaining to Śyena-yajña is not that it refers to a killing but that it refers to a result at all, that is, that it is not of the nature of an obligatory injunction. The point becomes evident when we recall that he had urged the same difficulty about the injunction 'One desirous of heaven ought to perform a yajña', an injunction which does not refer to a killing or anything of the sort. This means that on the Prabhākarite's own admission a non-obligatory injunction is obeyed by one not simply because it is an injunction but because by obeying it one expects to achieve the result concerned. And that in turn means that he gains nothing substantial by suggesting that the mention of a result occurring in an injunction is in fact a mention not of this result as such but of the person desirous of achieving this result. Some idea of the Prabhākarite's confusion on the point can be formed by taking note of two secular illustrations considered by him in this connection. Thus on his showing a student obeys the preceptor's injunction and a royal servant obeys the king's injunction simply because it is an injunction and not because this or that result will be achieved by obeying this injunction. Really, in both these cases whatever injunction is issued is obeyed because of a deep-lying relationship obtaining between the parties concerned, a relationship invariably based on a consideration of the benefit the subordinate party expects to receive from the superior party; moreover, in both these cases an injunction might possibly be such that the result to be achieved is exclusively a concern of the superior party and hence one which the subordinate party is bound not to care about. All this misleads the Prabhākarite into supposing that all case of y obeying whatever injunction issued by x is a case of y obeying it without caring for the result to be achieved through this obeying. As a matter of fact, in the case of a Vedic injunction – which is the Prabhākarite's sole
field of investigation—it is impossible for the result concerned to be an exclusive or even partial concern of the superior party, for unlike a preceptor or a king Vedas have no interests of their own; this means that all result mentioned in a Vedic injunction must be an exclusive concern of the person obeying this injunction and hence one which this person cannot but care about. However, there is an obvious parallelism between a person unconditionally obeying a preceptor’s or a king’s injunction and a person unconditionally obeying a Vedic injunction; in the former case the obeying is unconditional because the person expects to receive from a preceptor or a king some long-term benefit, in the latter case the obeying is unconditional because the person has unflinching faith in the efficacy of a Vedic injunction. Really, it is a person’s unflinching faith in the efficacy of a Vedic injunction that the Prabhākarite has in mind when he insinuates that this person obeys this injunction without caring for the result; (we have to speak of ‘insinuation’ because instead of saying ‘a person does not obey a Vedic injunction under the temptation of a result’ the Prabhākarite actually says ‘a Vedic injunction does not impel a person through tempting him with a result’). [The Prabhākarite completes his account by saying a few words about prohibition (as contrasted to injunction). Thus his contention is that a Vedic prohibition has to be followed just because it is a prohibition, not because the action prohibited is likely to bring about a bad result.\textsuperscript{53} In this case he feels himself to be on a stonger ground because unlike an injunction a prohibition is usually silent about the result concerned.\textsuperscript{54} As a matter of fact, however, one follows a Vedic prohibition because one’s faith in Vedas inclines one to believe that the prohibited action must bring about some bad result. In this connection the Prabhākarite makes an opponent quote and declare unsatisfactory several farfetched views as to what a prohibition consists in;\textsuperscript{55} but the former himself in the end endorses the rather sensible view that a prohibition enjoins one to refrain from an action just as an injunction enjoins one to undertake an action.\textsuperscript{56}] Thus closing his enquiry the Prabhākarite declares that \textit{niyoga} (= injunction) constitutes sentential meaning because it constitutes the chief element in sentential meaning; o this is added that if an action to be accomplished constitutes . sentential meaning then too \textit{niyoga} is that because \textit{niyoga} is an act. n to be accomplished, if
a result aimed at constitutes sentential meaning then too niyoga is that because niyoga is a result aimed at. All this is understandable in view of what we have been already told.

Having thus reported the well-known Kumārilite and Prabhākarite views as to what constitutes sentential meaning (rather what constitutes import of an injunctive verbal-suffix), Jayanta develops his own independent view on the question chiefly by way of criticising the Prabhākarite. As has been noted, Jayanta’s Nyāya school had no tradition of discussing this question in the manner of the Mīmāṃsāka, but the Nyāya authors did often utter the commonplace that one undertakes an action with a view to getting some result or other. Basing himself on this commonplace, Jayanta criticises the Prabhākarite’s contention that while obeying an injunction one is impelled by this injunction and one accomplishes this injunction; for on the former’s showing what one accomplishes – here as always – is an action, what impels one is the desire for a result. The Prabhākarite asks: “Is there then no difference between one acting as impelled by an injunction and one acting in an ordinary fashion;” Jayanta answers: “It is just a manner of saying that one acts as impelled by an injunction. For what happens is that one takes into consideration a total-situation which might possibly include an uttered sentence, injunctive or otherwise, and then undertakes an action expected to bring about the result one desires.” The Prabhākarite says: “Whatever be the case in other situations and with other sentences, injunctive or otherwise, but since Vedas have got no author when one obeys a Vedic injunction one is impelled not by the desire for a fruit but by this injunction itself.” Jayanta answers: “It is an irrelevant consideration whether or not Vedas have got an author (though they have got one), for the point is that on your own showing a Vedic injunction to the effect that one desirous of such and such a result ought to undertake such and such an action indicates that this action is to bring about this result. And this means that one obeys such an injunction not for the sake of obeying but with a view to getting this result through performing this action. You plead that such an injunction mentions a result just by way of describing the agent concerned while this description implies that the action concerned is to bring about this result; but that does not affect our contention that on your own showing such an injunction indicates that the
action concerned is to bring about the result concerned. Jayanta is making a point we have already made, viz. that the Prabhākarite gains nothing substantial by suggesting that the mention of a result occurring in an injunction is in fact a mention not of this result as such but of the person desirous of achieving this result. Later on the Prabhākarite clarifies his position still further, but in answer Jayanta emphasises his point still more strongly. Thus the Prabhākarite in essence says: “All injunction must mention the agent concerned and if a full description of this agent requires the mention of a result it mentions this result too, but it does not mention a result as such.” Jayanta retorts: “On your showing an obligatory injunction has for the agent ‘one who is alive’, and non-obligatory injunction ‘one desirous of such and such a result’; but if neither of these injunctions mentions a result as such then the latter should not imply that the action concerned is to bring about the result concerned just as the former bears no such implication. You say that it is our common experience that an injunction mentioning the agent concerned in the form ‘one desirous of such and such a result’ does imply that the action concerned is to bring about the result concerned, but then you cannot insist that such an injunction does not mention a result as such. Really, your statement implies and it is a fact that one does not obey an injunction unless this obeying is to bring about an expected result, so that the Kumārilite is right when (applying the Viśvajit-maxim) he posits a result even in the case of an obligatory injunction.” Then Jayanta says something about a prohibition; for the Prabhākarite has contended that a prohibition calls upon one to refrain from an action without mentioning (or implying) that this action brings about a bad result. Jayanta is aware that a prohibition is usually silent about the bad result concerned, but his point is that that does not mean that the prohibited action does not actually bring about a bad result, for otherwise there will be no sense in treating a prohibited action as an irreligious action; so his suggestion is that a bad result has to be posited in the case of a prohibition just as a result has to be posited in the case of an obligatory injunction (which too is silent about the result concerned). Lastly, Jayanta takes exception to the Prabhākarite’s argument that since in the case of a non-obligatory injunction the person concerned has his own motives to undertake the action concerned this injunction suspends
its impelling power and rests satisfied with merely indicating that the action concerned is to bring about the result concerned; the former's simple point is that an injunction with no impelling power is just no injunction. The Prabhākarite objects: "But in that case one would be committing a sin by not obeying a non-obligatory injunction"; Jayanta retorts: "A non-obligatory injunction is addressed to one desirous of a particular result and such a one does obey it; on the other hand, it has nothing to do with one not desirous of that result just as an injunction specifically addressed to a Vaiśya has nothing to do with a Kṣatriya." The argument is resumed later on by emphasising a unanimously held point. Thus everybody conceded that an injunction impels one to undertake an action not by physically forcing one to undertake this action but by telling one that this action is to bring about that result; now Jayanta submits that this amounts to conceding that all obeying of an injunction consists in undertaking the action concerned with a view to getting the result concerned. But the Prabhākarite has contended that if a Vedic injunction must be forced to point out a result then it will cease to be an independed impelling agent; Jayanta retorts: "On the contrary, a Vedic injunction will cease to be an independent impelling agent in case it points out no result; for then no intelligent person will feel like obeying it. True, one might not obey it even after it has pointed out a result, but there is no question of one's obeying it if it does no such pointing-out." Certainly, the fact that one having faith in Vedas follows a Vedic injunction unconditionally (this is the meaning of Vedas being an independent impelling agent) is turned by the Prabhākarite into a fiction that such a one follows a Vedic injunction without any consideration of the likely result. Meanwhile Jayanta has given thought to the secular illustration of a student following the preceptor's injunction. Thus the Prabhākarite has contended that what here impels the student to undertake an action is the preceptor's injunction; Jayanta retorts that introspection reveals that the impelling is here done not by the preceptor's injunction but by the student's own desire to get a result. In this connection Jayanta considers an intermediate position according to which y obeys x's injunction in order to please x; this is an intermediate position because here too y is not interested in his own pleasure even while being interested in x's pleasure, a position rejected by Jayanta as
follows: "y does not act merely in order to please x but in order to please himself through pleasing x. Even Buddha who seeks to benefit all the beings aims at benefiting himself. Moreover, in the case of Vedas it is difficult to make out as to what action will please their author. So what invariably impels one to act is the desire for a result accruing to oneself." Really, the Prabhākarite has significantly drawn our attention towards the cases where one obeys an injunction in an unconditional fashion, but valid is Jayanta's general point that an injunction is never obeyed by one except with a view to getting, immediately or in the long run, a benefit for oneself; similarly, the Prabhākarite has significantly hinted that one obeys a Vedic injunction on account of one's unflinching loyalty to Vedas, but here too valid is Jayanta's general point that a Vedic injunction is never obeyed by one except with a view to getting a benefit for oneself. [Instead of conceding that one obeys a Vedic injunction with a view to pleasing God, the author of Vedas, Jayanta has pleaded that it is difficult to make out as to what will please God !] Having thus propounded in contrast to the corresponding Kumārilite and Prabhākarite views his own view that one invariably undertakes an action as impelled by the desire to get a result Jayanta faces the opponent's query: "What then is it that on your showing constitutes sentential meaning?" Jayanta answers: "Since the old Nyāya authors have actually made contentions like that, we have argued that the desire to get a result is what impels one to undertake an action; but these authors have not at all considered the question as to what constitutes sentential meaning. Even the question as to what constitutes the meaning of a word they have considered just in order to silence the Buddhist who maintains that words have nothing to do with things real. And their implicit understanding has been that just as a word has got an objective real meaning a sentence too has got an objective real meaning. The point is that according to them the meaning of a sentence is nothing apart from the meaning of its constituent words; however, what constitutes a meaning of a sentence is not the meaning of some one of its constituent words but a combination of the meanings respectively yielded by all these constituent words so that in some sense the meaning of a sentence is also something apart from the meaning of its constituent words. So, according to us it makes no sense to say about some one word of a sentence
that its meaning constitutes the meaning of this sentence. As a matter of fact, even those who declare a niyoga, a bhāvanā or an action to be the meaning of a sentence have to admit that there does take place a combination of the meanings respectively yielded by the constituent words of this sentence. However, as we are going to show, even if this combination-of-meanings is what a sentence means this is not what this sentence denotes (denotation being a task specific to a word rather than a sentence). And if one nevertheless insists that some one factor should be declared to be the meaning of a sentence as a whole, then let this factor be the ‘result to be brought about by the action mentioned in this sentence’, for even if all the things mentioned in a sentence are to bring about the action mentioned there this action itself is to bring about a result, whether explicitly mentioned there or not. This whole answer deserves a close reading because we thereby learn how an enquiry into what motivates one to undertake an action is misleadingly called by the Māmāṁsaka an enquiry into what constitutes the meaning of a sentence. Jayanta himself clearly hints as to what issues are actually to be taken up in connection with a real enquiry into sentential meaning, an enquiry promised to be taken up later on (and actually taken up in the next chapter); for there the question considered is as to how a sentence manages to have a meaning of its own, a meaning which is something over and above the meanings of its constituent words. Truely, in connection with that enquiry too the Kumārilite and the Prabhākarite maintain certain highly characteristic views, but the point is that even the enquiry of the present chapter they have chosen to call an enquiry into sentential meaning.

[While closing the Āhnika Jayanta briefly mentions and dismisses two more views as to sentential meaning – one saying that udyoga (= endeavour) constitutes sentential meaning, the other that pratibhā (= intuition) does so. As regards udyoga Jayanta’s point is that properly understood it must be equated with one of the factors already considered, viz. a bhāvanā, a niyoga, an action, a result; as regards pratibhā (= intuition) his point is that a sentence does produce different intuitions in different persons but that these intuitions are not what constitutes the meaning of this sentence, a meaning which must be grasped before this sentence produces a relevant intuition.]
SPHOTĀ THEORY

HOW A SENTENCE YIELDS MEANING
UTILITY OF THE SCIENCE OF GRAMMAR

In Vi Ahnika Jayanta discusses three problems considerably different from each other. Thus here first is refuted the doctrine of Sphota upheld by the grammarian, then is explained how a sentence yields meaning, lastly is vindicated the utility of the science of grammar. These three independent discussions we take up one by one.

(1) The Doctrine of Sphota Refuted

In connection with propounding his doctrine of sphota the grammarian came out with two chief contentions as follows:

(1) A word is of the form of an eternal entity called sphota which is only made manifest when on this or that occasion an appropriate sound is made;

(2) A word – i.e. a sphota – is not something audible, for what is found heard is not this word itself but the sound that makes this word manifest.

Now both the Mīmāṃsaka and the Naiyāyika took exception to the doctrine of sphota, but we might recall that the former himself maintained something very similar to the above contention (1) and so his criticism was virtually confined to the above contention (2). Thus according to the Mīmāṃsaka an appropriate sound makes manifest a word which might be of the form of a letter, a word proper, a sentence and which is heard through ears; on the other hand, the grammarian maintained that an appropriate sound makes manifest a word which might be of the form of a letter, an impartite word proper, an impartite sentence while what is heard through ears is this sound and not this word. Hence the Mīmāṃsaka’s criticism against the grammarian was that a sentence is made up of parts of the form of words, a word made up of parts of the form of letters while what is heard through ears are the letters, words and sentences thus understood, a criticism which was elaborately undertaken by Kumārila from whom Jayanta borrows much. At the same time, the
SPHOTĀ THEORY...

grammarians' above contention (1) is criticised by Jayanta essentially on the same lines on which he criticises the Mīmāṁsaka's contention that a word is of the form of an eternal entity which is only made manifest by an appropriate sound; for according to Jayanta himself a word is nothing apart from the sound which on the showing of the Mīmāṁsaka as well as the grammarian is what only makes this word manifest. Jayanta first presents the grammarian's case and then his own criticism of it.

The grammarian begins by taking exception to Jayanta's simple assertion that the instrument of verbal cognition is a word made up of letters and a sentence made up of words, for according to the former it is impossible for letters to go to compose a word and for words to go to compose a sentence, his point being that the instrument of verbal cognition is a word which is of the form of an impartite entity to be called sphota; but when Jayanta feels inclined to grant this point he is told that a sphota is of the form of an eternal entity (not open to auditory cognition) while according to the Naiyāyika a word is a perishable entity made up of audible letters. That, however, is too much for Jayanta and he objects as follows: "It is our common experience that a word which is the instrument of verbal cognition is something made up of audible letters; on the other hand, a word of the form of sphota as you describe it is neither ever perceived nor can ever be inferred." In answer, the grammarian first contends that it is impossible for certain letters to go to compose a word and then positively describes what a sphota is, how it is made manifest, etc. etc. Thus he argues: "The letters supposed to compose a word, since they are uttered one after another, are never present together, and so it is impossible for them to be perceived together." Nor is it possible for them to be recalled together in a needed form, for in case recalled they must follow no particular order. And if they do follow an order our question would be as to what this order is; if it is nothing apart from the letters concerned then the difficulty urged does not get removed, if it is something apart from these letters then that will be what we call sphota." To this is added that if the instrument of verbal cognition is not a word made up of letters then it must be a word which is something impartite, eternal, orderless and that is sphota. The suggestion that a word must be something audible is rejected on the ground that all sorts of sounds, e.g. the sound made by a
water-stream, that made by a musical instrument, are audible without being a word. The opponent objects: “But verbal cognition never takes place unless certain letters are uttered so that something made up of letters must be the instrument of verbal cognition”; the grammarian answers: “These letters are thus required not because they are the instrument of verbal cognition but because they make manifest the sphota which is actually such an instrument.” The opponent asks: “But if a sphota is something impartite then how can it be made manifest by so many letters uttered one after another?”; the grammarian answers: “The sphota is made manifest even by the first letter uttered but the manifestation becomes clear as more letters are uttered.” This answer presupposes that a letter is something real though perishable, essentially a Nyāya position. But then is offered another answer which in a Mīmāṁsā-like fashion distinguishes between a word and a sound supposed to make this word manifest; however, while the Mīmāṁsaka contends that an eternally existing letter is made manifest by an appropriate sound the grammarian contends that an eternally existing sphota is made manifest by an appropriate sound and that there is nothing like a real letter; thus in the case of an uttered letter all its properties except its being a particular letter are attributed by the Mīmāṁsaka to the sound concerned and the grammarian only adds that its being a particular letter too is to be attributed to the sound concerned. Then it is contended that the testimony of auditory cognition itself proves that a word is something impartite, a sentence is something impartite; the grammarian’s point is that since on listening to one whole word one has the cognition of one single meaning and on listening to one whole sentence one has the cognition of one single meaning this word must be something impartite and this sentence must be something impartite. The opponent objects: “But on your logic a sentence should not be made up of real words just as a word is not made up of real letters”; the grammarian answers: “You are right. For the unit of verbal cognition being a sentence rather than a word it is a mistake to think that a sentence is made up of so many words. And yet if we have endeavoured to show that a word is an impartite something our point simply was that an impartite something can appear to be made up of parts on account of it being made manifest by something made up of parts. For otherwise, if a sentence is made up of real parts, then these parts too must be made
up of real parts, and so on *ad infinitum*.” The opponent argues: “A word must have a meaning of its own, for a word occurring in different sentences appears to have one and the same meaning in each case”; the grammarian answers: “That appearance is illusory and a word has no meaning of its own just as the common word-part ‘ūpa’ occurring in the words kūpa, sūpa, yūpa has no meaning of its own. Not only that, even the root-part and the suffix-part of a word likewise have no meaning of their own, this in spite of what the science of grammar says by way of popular exposition.” The opponent objects: “But on such a logic a sentence too must be something unreal because it is a part of a larger text, and this text something unreal because it is a part of a larger box-of-texts”; the grammarian answers: “You are again right. For really speaking, there exist not so many words but just one word. Not only that, there exists nothing besides one word and whatever appears to be thus there is an illusion born of ignorance.” Really, the grammarian’s present position is not a sober theory of logic but a fantastic metaphysics. For with a view to lending support to the illusionist doctrine of word-monism he has chosen to explain away the division of a sentence into words, the division of a word into a root-part and a suffix-part, the two divisions whose comprehension is so vital for clearly understanding the phenomenon of verbal cognition. One can plausibly argue that since a word yields a meaning in virtue of some humanly established convention nothing objective corresponds to the division of a word into its constituent letters, but that is very different from saying that this division is something illusory. Be that as it may, let us see how Jayanta meets the grammarian’s arguments and objections.

Jayanta begins by considering the grammarian’s argument that since the letters supposed to compose a word are uttered one after another they cannot be cognised in the form of one single word. Jayanta does not deny that these letters are not perceived all together but his point is that an action might possibly be completed through several steps taken one after another just as it is possible to quench hunger by eating morsels of food one after another. The opponent objects: “One’s hunger is quenched more and more as one eats more and more morsels of food, but one does not grasp more and more meaning of a word as one hears more and more letters”; Jayanta answers: “It is not always the case that more and
more steps of an act produce more and more of the total result to be produced by this act. For example, the successive acts of a ritual do not produce more and more of the ultimate result which in fact ensues only when the ritual is complete. Similarly, one does not grasp more and more of the meaning of a word as one hears more and more of its letters. Even so, something is actually contributed towards the grasping of the meaning of a word as more and more of its letters are heard just as one gets nearer and nearer one’s destination as one walks more and more. And in the case of a sentence more and more of its meaning is actually grasped as more and more of its words are grasped along with their respective meanings.” The rather defensive tone of Jayanta’s answer is noteworthy. Thus the grammarian argues that since meaning is yielded by a word as a whole it is wrong to say that this word is made up of parts of the form of letters; and he asks Jayanta to prove the contrary by showing that more and more of the meaning of a word is grasped as more and more of its letters are grasped. The demand is illegitimate inasmuch as letters are combined into a word not with an eye to the meaning of this word but just by way of some arbitrary convention; Jayanta, however, instead of dismissing it as illegitimate seeks to meet it as best as he can. He first offers an answer which we will consider in a moment, but somewhat unaware of his position he brings in the question of a sentence which in fact is not a question under consideration. Thus he says that more and more of the meaning of a sentence is grasped as more and more of its words are grasped. He is correct inasmuch as words are actually combined into a sentence with an eye to the meaning of this sentence, but the point is that nothing corresponding happens in the case of a word. So Jayanta answers the grammarian’s present demand by saying: “As more and more letters of a word are heard more and more of its meaning is certainly not grasped, but there then actually happens more and more something that contributes towards the grasping of this meaning”; his point ought to be that more and more of a word is grasped as more and more of its letters are grasped, but for certain reasons he avoids making it in an outright fashion. So, when the grammarian asks: “What is it that then happens more and more?” Jayanta replies: “A grasping of the letters or a production of the mental impressions.” However, to say that more and more
letters of a word are grasped as more and more of its letters are grasped is plainly tautological; so Jayanta’s real answer is that more and more mental impressions are produced as more and more letters of a word are grasped, and behind this answer there lies a whole story. Really, a word is grasped letter by letter so that the grasping of each letter leaves behind a mental impression while in the end the whole of this word is recalled with the help of these earlier left mental impressions. But since the grammarian is asking how the letters of a word are directly cognised all at once Jayanta avoids saying that they are cognised by way of recall, though in the end he does make that point. So he first says in a rather non-committal fashion that a word is grasped by way of an all-comprehending cognition of its constituent letters; (in this connection he rejects as unwarranted the grammarian’s objection that such an all-comprehending cognition should not exhibit a fixed order, the former’s point being that there should be nothing difficult about this cognition exhibiting the same order as was followed while originally grasping those letters). Then Jayanta endorses the Mīmāṃsāka Śabara’s contention that the direct cognition of the last letter assisted by the mental impressions left by the grasping of the earlier letters is what produces the cognition of the concerned word-meaning. This is virtually to say that a word as a whole is never actually grasped, a statement to which the grammarian objects by way of contending that it is unusual for mental impressions to behave in the fashion described, their sole function being to produce a memory; in defence Jayanta pleads that it is not impossible for mental impression to play an unusual role like that. However, in the end Jayanta does relent and concedes that a word is grasped by way of recalling the earlier grasped letters with the help of the mental impressions earlier left behind. And when the grammarian objects that even the mental impressions in question should not enable one to simultaneously recall the earlier grasped letters, Jayanta pleads that these mental impressions collectively produce in the cognising soul a capacity to that effect. And now we can understand why Jayanta avoided saying that more and more of a word is grasped as more and more of its letters are grasped; for he feels that since a word is grasped only when the earlier grasped letters are recalled and since such a recalling takes place only in the end it is not proper to say that more and more of a
word is grasped as more and more of its letters are grasped. In any case, recalling a criticism to that effect levelled by Kumārila against the grammarian Jayanta submits that even on accepting the hypothesis of sphota one must face the type of difficulties here being urged; for even in that case one must show how one single sphota is made manifest by letters uttered one after another, Jayanta’s point being that the hypothesis in question is an unwarranted hypothesis with no saving grace whatsoever. The grammarian has pleaded that a sphota is made manifest as soon as the first letter concerned is uttered but that the manifestation becomes more and more clear as more and more letters are uttered; Jayanta retorts that such a plea makes sense only in case sphota is something made up of parts so that more and more of its parts are brought to light as more and more letters are uttered. By way of offering an alternative explanation the grammarian has denied the reality of letters while submitting that a sphota is made manifest by certain sounds mistaken to be distinct letters; Jayanta retorts that a sound in which no distinct letters are recognised fails to produce verbal cognition while there is no warrant to suppose that the distinct letters recognised in a sound are an illusory appearance. In passing the grammarian has also contended that if the order exhibited by the letters of a word is something over and above these letters then this order is as good as a sphota; Jayanta retorts: “Order means temporal succession and how can a sphota be equated with something that has to do with time? Moreover, what produces verbal cognition is not an order as such but an order exhibited by certain letters. So a word is of the form of certain letters exhibiting a certain order, and not of the form of a sphota as you describe it.” The grammarian feels that to say that verbal cognition is produced by a word of the form of a single entity is more in conformity to popular usage than to say that it is produced by a word composed of several letters; Jayanta denies that the feeling is justified but goes on to add: “There is no use so pathetically depending on popular usage. Moreover, popular usage knows nothing like a sphota as you describe it.” That a word must be something audible is denied by the grammarian on the ground that there are audible sounds which are not of the form of a word, Jayanta tells him: “Sounds are of two types – that of the form of a letter and that of the form of a mere sound; the former are
what go to compose a word.”30 Then the grammarian has argued that since a word and a sentence each produces a single cognition each is of the form of a single entity, here also suggesting that this conclusion therefore is a finding of auditory cognition itself,31 Jayanta retorts: “Auditory cognition does not reveal that a word exists by the side of the letters concerned just as a ‘universal’ exists by the side of the relevant particulars or just as a composite substance exists by the side of the concerned component parts.32 As for a word or a sentence producing a single cognition, that is not because this word or this sentence is of the form of a single entity but because in each case the concerned object cognised is of the form of a single entity; certainly, two cognitions differ because their objects differ, not because the means-producing-them differ.”33 Lastly, Jayanta assails the grammarian’s contention that it is an illusory appearance that a word is made up of a root-part and a suffix-part and that a sentence is made up of different words. Taking up the question of a sentence first he submits that it is well possible to ascertain the respective meanings of the words that go to constitute a sentence so that the grammarian’s thesis on an impartite sentence makes no sense.34 Jayanta does not deny the grammarian’s point that the unit of verbal cognition is a sentence rather than a word, but he insists that that is no reason why a sentence should be made up of no parts; his point is that a sentence yields a meaning not as an impartite unit but in virtue of its words having whatever meaning they do.35 Jayanta dismisses as unwarranted the grammarian’s fear that if a sentence be treated as made up of words and a word as made up of letters then a letter too must be treated as made up of parts, and so on ad infinitum, the former’s point being that a letter is not made up of parts inasmuch as on being heard it is either comprehended fully or not comprehended at all.36 Then taking up the question of a word Jayanta repudiates the grammarian’s contention that common elements apparent in different words are no real common elements; the former does not deny that there are cases where two words share a common element in an accidental manner, but his point is that there are also cases where two words have in common either their root-part or their suffix-part and that is not something accidental.37 The grammarian’s metaphysical thesis on word-monism Jayanta promises to refute at a later stage.38 As can be seen,
Jayanta's criticism of the grammarian's thesis on *sphota* is essentially valid — in any case, more valid than its criticism on the part of the Mīmāṃsaka who on certain crucial points himself shares the grammarian's so faulty notions.

(2) **How a Sentence yields Meaning**

The second problem considered by Jayanta in this present chapter is the problem of how a sentence yields meaning. In this connection he does three things — themselves considerably different from each other, viz.

(i) criticises the Kumārilite view that the instrument of sentential meaning are not the words concerned but the word-meanings concerned;

(ii) considers various views — all worked out by the Nyāya authors — as to how one manages to grasp a sentence along with its meaning;

(iii) considers the Kumārilite and the Prabhākarite views as to what constitutes sentential meaning, while offering an alternative view of his own.

These three aspects of the problem under consideration we take up one by one.

(i)

The Kumārilite takes his stand on the circumstance that while hearing a sentence one first hears the first word and then recalls its meaning, secondly hears the second word and then recalls its meaning, and thus proceeding lastly hears the last word and then recalls its meaning. And the suggestion that the instrument of sentential meaning are not the words concerned but the word-meanings concerned he makes on the following three grounds:

(a) It will be too much of a burden for the words of a sentence to yield the word-meanings concerned as also the sentential meaning, particularly when it can easily be supposed that the sentential meaning is yielded not by these words but by these word-meanings themselves.¹

(b) By the time one hears the last word one had forgotten, longer or shorter ago, the earlier words, so that these words are in no position to yield sentential meaning.²

(c) Even while hearing the words of a sentence one does not grasp its meaning in case one has not attended to the respective
meanings of these words; on the other hand, one can well grasp the
meaning of a sentence even without hearing the words concerned
provided one has attended to the meanings of these words.3 [This
third ground sounds enigmatic because it hinges on an ambiguity
of the Sanskrit word *padārtha* which means both 'word-meaning'
and 'real entity'. So the Kumārilite is saying that if one somehow
learns about the real entities which jointly constitute the meaning
of a sentence one has grasped the meaning of this sentence without
hearing the words concerned. For example, one can learn about a
white horse galloping over there even without hearing a sentence
to that effect.4]

The objection that if not yielded by the words of a sentence
sentential meaning will cease to be something verbal (= word-based)
is rejected on the ground that even on the present understanding
sentential meaning is ultimately yielded by the words of a sentence.5

The above Kumārilite view is criticised by Jayanta chiefly on
the ground that if sentential meaning is yielded not by a sentence
but by the word-meanings concerned then the word ‘sentential-
meaning’ (=vākyārtha) should be replaced by the word ‘word-
meaning-meaning’ (= padārthārtha), a thoroughly anomalous
replacement.6 His point is that just as certain letters mentally joined
together are called ‘word’ and yield word-meaning, similarly certain
words mentally joined together are called ‘sentence’ and yield
sentential meaning.7 Hence it is that the Kumārilite’s talk about it
being too much of a burden for the words of a sentence to yield
the word-meanings concerned as also the sentential meaning makes
just no sense to Jayanta who simply submits that if the words of
a sentence are actually found to perform two functions then some
explanation will have to be found out for both.8 As for the
Kumārilite’s objection that by the time the last word of a sentence
is heard the earlier words are forgotten so that it is impossible for
these words to jointly yield sentential meaning Jayanta promises to
answer it by way of actually showing how that is possible, it being
his next task in the present section of the Āhnika.9 The Kumārilite’s
plea that even on his understanding sentential meaning does not
cease to be something verbal because it is ultimately yielded by the
words of a sentence is rejected by Jayanta as a lame plea, the
latter’s point being that if the words of a sentence really cease to
operate after yielding their respective meanings then sentential
meaning cannot but cease to be something verbal. Lastly, Jayanta considers the Kumārilite's contention that even while hearing the words of a sentence one does not grasp its meaning in case one has not attended to the respective meanings of these words; the former admits that but adds that one also does not grasp the meaning of a sentence in case one has not heard all the words of this sentence so that in order to grasp meaning of a sentence it is as necessary to hear the words concerned as to attend to the word-meanings concerned. As for the Kumārilite conceding the possibility that one can grasp the meaning of a sentence even in case one has not heard the words of a sentence but has jointly noticed the real entities meant by these words, Jayanta simply ridicules that; for on the latter's showing the case thus envisaged cannot be a case of verbal cognition but one of perception, inference or the like. Really, the whole Kumārilite view presently criticised by Jayanta – and on right lines – is very much untenable.

(ii)

Then Jayant considers several views – all maintained by the Nyāya authors – as to how one manages to grasp a sentence along with its meaning. Thus here first is presented a view attributed to Ācāryas, then one attributed to the Vyākhyātras-cum-Prāvaras, then one attributed to nobody in particular, lastly two alternative views offered by Jayanta himself; (the first view is criticised by those advocating the second, the second by those advocating the third, the third by some independent author). The first three views are more or less cumbersome while the chief merit of those offered by Jayanta is their relative simplicity. All these views seek to explain two things, viz. (1) how a sentence is grasped word by word and a word occurring in this sentence letter by letter, (2) how is grasped the meaning of a sentence and in the course of grasping it are grasped the meanings of the words occurring in this sentence. As to how a word is grasped letter by letter, all are agreed in accepting the following procedure. There is first grasped the first letter and this grasping produces a mental impression, then is grasped the second letter and this grasping produces a mental impression stronger than the first, and thus proceeding there is lastly grasped the last letter and this grasping produces a mental impression strongest of all; now this last mental impression produces a memory
having for its objects all the earlier letters arranged in due order, and this memory added to the direct cognition of the last letter (a cognition that yet persists) is what is called the grasping of the whole word. According to the first view this very procedure is to be accepted for explaining how a sentence is grasped word by word; thus on its showing there is first grasped the first word and this grasping produces a mental impression, then is grasped the second word and this grasping produces a mental impression stronger than the first, etc. etc. so that the memory of the earlier words arranged in due order added to the direct cognition of the last word (a cognition that yet persists) is what is called the grasping of the whole sentence, a grasping that is immediately followed by a grasping of the meaning of a sentence. To this explanation of how are grasped a sentence and its meaning, the second view takes exception on the rather technical ground that it involves a violation of the Nyāya ruling that two cognitions cannot occur together, for according to this explanation at the very moment when there is taking place the memory of the earlier words there must also take place the memory of the needed convention-as-to-word-meanings (this latter memory being indispensable); to surmise that the former memory is delayed by one moment will not do, for then it will be occurring together with the cognition of the concerned word-meanings; to surmise that it is delayed by two moments will not do, for then it will be taking place at a time when the cognition of the last word has passed away (it being a Nyāya position that a cognition lasts for three moments). To this is added that this explanation does not allow for the meaning of a word to be cognised as soon as this word is heard and that if it allows for that then the difficulty just urged in connection with the sentence as a whole will arise in connection with each single word. So this second view offers an explanation according to which the cognition of a sentence and the cognition of the sentential meaning concerned are not two cognitions but somehow one while the cognition of each word is followed by the cognition of the word-meaning concerned. Thus on this view the cognition of a word is followed by the cognition of the word-meaning concerned but this latter cognition has for its object not this word-meaning as such but it-as-qualified-by-the-word-concerned. For the rest this view tallies with the first view; for according to the former there
is first grasped (in the manner just described) the first word-meaning and this grasping produces a mental impression, then is grasped the second word-meaning and this grasping produces a mental impression stronger than the first, etc. etc. so that the last impression produces a memory that has for its object sentential-meaning-concerned-as-qualified-by-the-sentence-concerned.\textsuperscript{17} To this explanation the third view takes exception on the rather technical ground that here nothing can be shown to be the instrument that cognises the word acting as qualifier to the word-meaning concerned, for by the time this word-meaning is cognised the auditory organ has ceased to operate long ago.\textsuperscript{18} So this third view offers an explanation according to which the cognition of a word is immediately followed by a cognition having for its object this-word-as-qualified-by-all-the-earlier-words, and this latter cognition is followed by the cognition of the word-meaning concerned; thus according to it the cognition of the last word is immediately followed by a cognition having for its object the whole of the sentence concerned, and this latter cognition is followed by the cognition of the sentential-meaning concerned; (since this explanation altogether disposes with the concept of ‘mental impression’ it is here emphasised that the type of difficulty urged by the second view against the first cannot be urged against this third view).\textsuperscript{19} Then somebody takes exception to third view itself on the rather technical ground that the cognition of the first word must perish by the time it has managed to produce the cognition of the word-meaning concerned, so the cognition of the second word cannot be followed by a cognition having for its object the second-word-as-qualified-by-the-first (more so because the cognition of the second word will itself take some time).\textsuperscript{20} The third view has criticised the second view by saying that it is an untenable position that a thing-as-qualified-by-the-word-denoting-it is cognised by a determinate perception;\textsuperscript{21} proceeding in the same spirit the present opponent criticises the third view by saying that it is an untenable position that a word-as-qualified-by-the-earlier-cognised-words is cognised while grasping a sentence word-by-word.\textsuperscript{22} To this is added that since a single word denotes a single word-meaning it makes no sense to say that the cognition of a word-as-qualified-by-the-earlier-cognised-words is followed by the cognition of the word-meaning concerned.\textsuperscript{23} In view of the difficulties thus faced by all
the three views under consideration Jayanta modestly comes out with a few suggestions of his own, suggestions which amount to propounding two rather simple sensible alternative views.24 Thus he first suggests that it is no use supposing that the cognition of each word is accompanied by a memory of all the earlier cognised words, it being sufficient if all the words are just once recalled after the last word is cognised (this particularly against the third view).25 Then he suggests that it is no use supposing that at the time of grasping a sentence as a whole the last word is directly cognised while the remaining words are just recalled, it being sufficient if all the words are then equally recalled (this particularly in order to avoid a difficulty above urged against the first view).26 On the other hand, he suggests that it is proper to suppose that after a word is cognised its meaning is immediately recalled (this too in order to make good a deficiency above pointed out in the first view); however, his further suggestion is that there is no harm in supposing that immediately after a word is cognised two things take place simultaneously, viz. the production of a mental impression pertaining to words and the recollection of the concerned convention as to word-meaning, it being well possible that a mental impression and a cognition occur simultaneously even if it is not possible that two cognitions occur simultaneously.27 Thus according to Jayanta's explanation, after a word is cognised there successively take place a mental impression pertaining to words (and the recollection of the concerned convention as to word-meaning), the cognition of the word-meaning concerned, a mental impression pertaining to word-meanings, the two mental impressions being weaker in the case of an earlier occurring word, stronger in the case of a later occurring one; accordingly, after the last word has been cognised there come into existence first a stronger mental impression pertaining to words and then a stronger mental impression pertaining to word-meanings, of which the former becoming active first produces a recollection of the sentence as a whole, the latter becoming active afterwards produces a recollection of the sentential meaning concerned.28 This is Jayanta's one real explanation, but paying some heed (though not much) to the objection that the grasping of sentential meaning should be of the form of a direct cognition rather than a recollection he alternatively suggests that what ultimately take place are not two recollections
as just described but two direct cognitions of a mental variety. As things stood, Jayanta’s explanation is really the simplest, doing ample justice to commonsense as to the technical scruples of a Nyāya author. For the problem presently under discussion is the problem of how a sentence along with its meaning is grasped word by word, word-meaning by word-meaning, and in this connection there does take place something very much like what is being here described by the Nyāya authors in general and Jayanta in particular.

(iii)

The third thing done by Jayanta in the present section of this Āhnikā is to report about the Kumārilite and Prabhākarite views as to what constitutes sentential meaning while offering an alternative view of his own. Certainly, here again was a problem in connection with which definite respective traditions had been established by the Kumārilites and Prabhākarites but not so by the Naiyāyikas. Hence it is that the alternative view here offered by Jayanta is his own independent performance and one virtually the same as that put up by the Kumārilite. Thus the question was as to how the meanings yielded by the words of a sentence stand related to the meaning of this sentence as a whole. In technical language the Prabhākarite’s answer to the question was put in the form: “A sentence denotes things combined \textit{(anvitābhidhānāvāda)}”, the Kumārilite’s answer in the form: “In connection with a sentence what happens is that things denoted get combined \textit{(abhihitānvayavāda)}”. The Prabhākarite’s point was that the denoter-denoted relationship obtains between a sentence as a whole and the sentential meaning concerned; as against this, the Kumārilite’s point was that the denoter-denoted relationship obtains between individual word and its meaning while the meaning of a sentence is got by combining the meanings yielded by the individual words occurring in this sentence. Apparently, the Kumārilite’s point was valid inasmuch as it implied a clear distinction between the role of a sentence and the role of the individual words occurring in this sentence, a distinction which the Prabhākarite tended to blur if not to deny altogether. Jayanta first presents the Kumārilite’s case and then its criticism on the part of the Prabhākarite.

Thus the Kumārilite begins by considering the Prabhākarite’s challenge that if it is proved that individual words are an instrument of learning denoter-denoted relationship then denotative power
belongs to individual words, if it is proved that a sentence is such an instrument then denotative power belongs to a sentence. The former responds by arguing as follows: "One who does not know what the individual words occurring in a sentence mean also does not know what this sentence as a whole means, and this means that an individual word has got a meaning of its own; certainly, if a word has a meaning only as indiscriminately associated with the other words occurring in a sentence then it should be impossible to delimit the precise meaning of this word. Nor can it be said that the meaning of an individual word can be learnt by comparing and contrasting different sentences with each other, for if meaning is really had not by an individual word but by a sentence as a whole then no purpose should be served by such comparing and contrasting. Certainly, in that case it should be impossible to distinguish one sentence from another, for what distinguishes one sentence from another is there occurring two different sets of words in the two. So what is needed is to ascertain as to what individual word possesses what meaning, an ascertainment which should be impossible in case meaning is had not by an individual word but by a sentence as a whole. Thus even when meaning is learnt through listening to the sentences uttered by elderly people what is learnt is the meaning of an individual word, not the meaning of a sentence as a whole; certainly, sentences being infinite in number it should be impossible for one to learn their meaning one by one while as a matter of fact one conversant with the words concerned manages to grasp the meaning even of a sentence fresh from the pen of a poet." All this is understandable and cogent, but the Kumārilite closes his argument with an anomalous statement; thus he says: "So the meanings respectively yielded by the different words of a sentence get associated with one another in accordance with the felt-need, the proximity, the ability. Thus in the case of the sentence ‘A hundred hords of elephants are seated on the finger-tip’ the word-meanings concerned do not get associated with one another because they lack the ability; but, on the opponent’s showing even these word-meanings should get associated with one another, it being his point that a sentence means things-associated-with-one-another." It is difficult to see what the Kumārilite means when he says that in the case of the sentence ‘A hundred hords etc.’ the word-meanings concerned do not get associated with one another.
For the meanings yielded by the words of a sentence get associated with one another in case this sentence is grammatically correct as is actually the case with the sentence in question; but the Kumārjīlīte seems to think that in the case of this sentence the word-meanings concerned do not get associated with one another because it is impossible for a hundred hords of elephants to get seated on the finger-tip – an inclement consideration and one offered as a result of confusing ‘grammatical capacity’ with ‘physical capacity’! So, whatever might be the sin of the Prabhākarite, he will be doing nothing wrong if he says that the sentence in question is a sentence all right. But let us see how he actually pleads his case.

The Prabhākarite presents his basic contention as follows: “Unlike a lamp, a word does not produce cognition unless its meaning is learnt.” But the meaning of a word is learnt through observing the practical dealings undertaken by the elders who however in this connection always speak a sentence as a whole, never individual words. Certainly, a sentence is what one speaks, what one hears, what one observes others speaking and hearing. So what is learnt is as to what meaning is had by what sentence. But then a sentence is of the form of several words grouped together with a view to yielding a common meaning just as fuel etc. jointly undertake cooking, the palanquin-bearers jointly carry the palanquin, the three oven-stones jointly support the cooking plate, so that it is improper to suggest that a single word uncombined with other words is what yields a meaning.” As can be seen, the Prabhākarite does not deny that a sentence is made up of individual words, but he fails to see how these words can yield any meaning other than what is commonly yielded by them in their capacity as a component of one common sentence. So the opponent objects: “But if each word of a sentence yields the meaning appropriate to this whole sentence, then there is no use employing so many words instead of just one”; the Prabhākarite answers: “One word cannot yield the meaning appropriate to a sentence unless this word is combined with the other words belonging to a sentence.” The opponent objects: “But that means the whole meaning of a sentence is not yielded by each word of this sentence”; the Prabhākarite answers: “No, it means that; for the meaning appropriate to this sentence is not yielded unless each word of this sentence is active.” Finding that the Prabhākarite refuses to admit that different words occurring in a
sentence play different roles the opponent searchingly asks: "So on your understanding the whole of the sentence does everything; then why at all posit component parts in a sentence and not say like the grammerian that a sentence is an impartite unit?"; now the Prabhākarite confesses: "No, the words of a sentence taken together yield sentential meaning while each of them yields its own meaning just as fuel etc. taken together do cooking while each of them does burning etc." This confession is wholly in the spirit of the Kumārila and the example of fuel etc. is actually quoted by Kumārila in this very context and for this very purpose. But when the opponent explains to the Prabhākarite "This means that an individual word has got an exclusive denotation of its own" the latter again wriggles out pleading "No, because an individual word is never employed single." It is difficult to see what the Prabhākarite is admitting and what he is denying. Similar is the case with his answer to the objection that the respective meanings of sentences are not learnt one by one; for there too he retorts: "Yes, but nor is meaning learnt word by word; for a word is never employed single." In this connection the Prabhākarite actually submits that a word yields that meaning which is associated with the meanings fulfilling those three conditions of felt-need, proximity and ability; this is mechanically repeating a principle confusingly conceived by our philosophers but in any case that amounts to pleading that a word yields a meaning only as occurring in a sentence, a plea going counter to his just made admission that meaning is not learnt sentence by sentence. The present procedure is particularly anomalous because the Prabhākarite himself soon takes exception to the principle of 'three conditions'. Thus when the opponent says that those word-meanings get associated with one another which fulfil the three conditions of felt-need etc. the Prabhākarite ridicules the concept of 'felt-need' here mentioned; for the latter in essence argues: "Neither a word nor word-meaning feels a need, because both are something inanimate. And the speaker's need can have nothing to do with what words occurring in a sentence do or do not do." Really, when our philosophers were here speaking of a felt-need and an ability what they were having in mind in each case was the grammatical propriety exhibited by the words of a properly constituted sentence (as for proximity it could only refer to the circumstance that the words of
a sentence have to be uttered in close succession, something that goes without saying). So, if the Prabhākarite was now contending that in a properly constituted sentence the word-meanings concerned get associated as a matter of course he was making an absolutely valid point and puncturing the principle of 'three conditions'; but the difficulty is that he once more endorses this principle while once more assailing it, this time concentrating fire on the concept of 'ability' and this time leaving no doubt about his intention. Thus the Prabhākarite, elucidating his basic contention, argues: "So the conclusion is that the words occurring in a sentence denote things-associated-with-one-another; for in no other way can association be made possible here. Certainly, a sentence does not include the word 'association'; and even if it does, the inclusion will be senseless." The opponent asks: "But how is association to be got in a sentence like 'A hundred hords etc.'?"; the Prabhākarite asks in return: "And how is it to be got there on your view?" The opponent answers: "On my view there takes place no association here because the needed 'ability' is absent"; the Prabhākarite retorts: "On my view too the same explanation holds." The opponent argues: "You uphold the doctrine of 'denotation of the things-associated', and so on your view denotation itself will be not there in case association is not there. On the other hand, I uphold the doctrine of 'association of the things denoted', and so on my view there can be denotation even in case there is no association." This argument is revealing because it shows how our philosophers were confusing 'grammatical ability' with 'physical ability'. Thus the opponent is here virtually arguing that in the case of the sentence in question the words concerned lack the grammatical ability to get associated because the things meant by these words lack the physical capacity to get associated. And then he would submit that since 'ability' is one of the necessary condition of 'association' while association is what a sentence means this sentence lacks a meaning; however, he feels that he is in a better position than the Prabhākarite because the latter knows of no word-meanings apart from the sentential meaning concerned so that on the latter's view here is a case of word-employment with no meaning coming in picture! The Prabhākarite's just made plea amounted to saying that according to him too the sentence in question lacks a meaning and that it lacks it precisely for the reason offered by the
opponent. But now that the opponent is charging him with conceiving a situation where words are employed with no meaning coming in picture the latter decides to withdraw that plea. For now he argues as follows: "You are a strange Mīmāṃsaka who does not know how words behave; for it is the very nature of words that they convey our information while this information is true or otherwise according as the speaker concerned is trustworthy or otherwise.\textsuperscript{53} Thus even the sentence 'A hundred hords etc.' exhibits word-based 'association' because it too conveys the information that such and such a thing seated at such and such a place acts in such and such a manner; that the information thus conveyed is objectively false is another matter.\textsuperscript{54} Certainly, if this sentence did not exhibit even a word-based 'association' it would have been of the form of a senseless jumble of words".\textsuperscript{55} This whole argument is of unique importance for having made two points, viz.

(1) All properly constituted sentence belongs to the same category insofar as it is a sentence, and in this respect it is to be contrasted with a senseless jumble of words.

(2) All sentence carries a meaning and so conveys an information, it being a secondary consideration that this information is true in the case of true sentences, false in the case of false ones. [In this connection noteworthy is the distinction explicitly made between a word-based 'association' and an object-based 'association'; a distinction corresponding to a distinction between 'grammatical ability' and 'physical ability'.]

Then Jayanta independently argues against the Prabhākarite view while adding that the Kumārilite alternative too is not to his liking.\textsuperscript{56} Really, Jayanta has endorsed the Kumārilite view as against the Prabhākarite, but his position has the merit of clearly recognising that the words of a sentence yield their own respective meanings as well as the meaning of this sentence, a recognition in connection with which the Kumārilite has some reservations. For officially the Kumārilite maintains that the instrument yielding sentential meaning are not words concerned but the word-meanings concerned. Of course, Kumārila himself has also somewhere said that the words of a sentence yield their own respective meanings as well as the meaning of this sentence just as fuel etc. jointly undertake the operation called cooking and severally the operations like burning
etc. Kumārila’s verse to that effect has been quoted by Jayanta himself towards the close of his present section, 57 but then while polemising against the Kumārilite position that the instrument yielding sentential meaning are not the words concerned but the word-meanings concerned Jayanta had to quote this very verse foreadding the query: “Sir, why have you forgotten what you have yourself said?” 58 Be that as it may, Jayanta begins by conceding to the Prabhākarite several points while offering one major criticism; thus he says: “It is true that the meaning of a word is learnt through observing the practical dealings undertaken by the elders, it again is true that these practical dealings proceed on the basis of whole sentences rather than individual words, it too is true that the words of a sentence jointly undertake an operation just as several palanquin-bearers jointly carry the palanquin.” 59 But the question is whether this learning relates to the meaning of a sentence as a whole or to that of the individual words occurring in this sentence; and here the former alternative is fraught with so many difficulties as has been already pointed out. 60 Certainly, you have yourself admitted that in a sentence different words play different roles of their own, for you do not share the grammarian’s view that a sentence is an impartite unit.” 61 All this is familiar from the earlier discussion. But then Jayanta makes the important observation that its denotative power (abhidhātri sakti) a word exercises singly, its informative power (tātparya-sakti) it exercises in company with the remaining words of a sentence, the Prabhākarite’s mistake lying in denying the former power and applying the designation ‘denotative power’ to the latter (the official Kumārilite position denies the latter power). 62 Lastly, Jayanta levels against the Prabhākarite that misconceived criticism that on the latter’s showing there should be an ‘association’ corresponding to the sentence ‘A hundred hordes etc.’; the correct suggestion that what exists in the case of this sentence is a word-based ‘association’ though not an object-based ‘association’ is rejected on the ground that that would mean that a word lacks objective reference. 63 Really, a sentence lacks objective reference only in case it speaks of fictitious entities, not in case it just happens to be false, the latter and not the former being the case with the sentence in question. Again, the correct suggestion that all sentence conveys an information is rejected on the ground that a senseless jumble of words conveys no information; 64 the correct
suggestion that a senseless jumble of words is no sentence is rejected on the ground that on this logic the sentence in question too should be no sentence.\(^6\) Lastly, the suggestion that the sentence in question is a sentence because it too conveys information that such and such a thing seated at such and such a place acts in such and such a manner is rejected on the ground that this conveying-of-information is illusory (the point being that this information is false).\(^6\) In the face of this barrage of criticism from the side of Jayanta the Prabhākarite asks him: “Do you then mean to say that the word-meanings corresponding to the words of a sentence stand un-associated with each other like bars lying loose?”; Jayanta answers in the negative and pleads that the Kumārilite view too is not to his liking, the insinuation being that the Kumārilite would answer the present question in the affirmative.\(^6\) As a matter of fact, the very title of the Kumārilite’s view viz. abhihitānvayavāda indicates that according to him too the things denoted by the words of a sentence — i.e. the word-meanings concerned — do get associated with each other; even so, Jayanta scores a debating point over him owing to the latter’s reluctance to concede that the words of this sentence have directly anything to do with the things-denoted thus associated with each other. For Jayanta coins a name for the relation which according to him obtains between these words and these things-denoted thus associated with each other; thus on his showing the former ‘inform-about’ (= pratyāyana) the latter so that the former yield sentential meaning in virtue of an informative-power (tātparyāsakti = pratyāyanaśakti) just as they yield their respective meanings in virtue of a denotative power (abhidhānaśakti). These points have been made by Jayanta in the course of answering somebody’s query: “If both the views under consideration are faulty, then how is sentential meaning yielded and through the instrumentality of what?”\(^6\) Jayanta first emphasises that the words of a sentence jointly act with a view to inform about the sentential meaning concerned, which sentential meaning is of the form of some one word-meaning concerned to which the remaining word-meanings have become subordinate.\(^6\) The latter point is obviously addressed to the various theorists who would maintain that in all sentence the chief role is played by some one type of word (by verb, say), but the former point might cause some confusion owing to its apparent similarity with the Prabhākarite’s central point. So,
Jayanta hastens to clarify that according to him the words of a sentence jointly inform about (pratīyāyana) the sentential meaning concerned while according to the Prabhākarite they denote (abhidhāna) this sentential meaning, the former distinguishing between the denotative power of these words and their informative power while the latter knowing only of their informative power and calling it denotative power.30 Jayanta’s word ‘pratīyāyana’ meaning ‘to inform about’ was obviously novel, but he obviously needed such a word in distinction from ‘abhidhāna’ meaning ‘to denote’. For his own Nyāya school had given no special consideration to the problem of sentential meaning in distinction from that of word-meaning, while in the case of a word it seems sufficient and proper to say that it denotes the thing meant. On the other hand, the Kumārilite and the Prabhākarite who had given special consideration to the problem of sentential meaning had two different reasons to feel no need for a new word apart from ‘abhidhāna’. Thus the Prabhākarite would say that the words of a sentence denote the sentential meaning concerned while the Kumārilite would say that the words of a sentence have nothing direct to do with the sentential meaning concerned which is simply brought about by the word-meanings concerned. But Jayanta had to say that the words of a sentence have something direct to do with the sentential meaning concerned just as they denote their own respective meanings; this point is made by way of answering somebody’s query: “How to distinguish from abhidhāna this pratīyāyana supposed to do with the sentential meaning as a whole?” Thus Jayanta says: “Whoever admits the existence of an ‘association’ corresponding to a sentence must grant that the words of this sentence undertake an operation in relation to this ‘association’; it is this operation which we call ‘pratīyāyana’. Certainly, these words undertake no ‘abhidhāna’ in relation to this ‘association’.31 Jayanta’s point is that the Kumārilite as well as the Prabhākarite admit the existence of an ‘association’ corresponding to a sentence, but that the latter mistakenly thinks that this ‘association’ is denoted by the words concerned while the former mistakenly thinks that these words have nothing direct to do with this ‘association’. In this connection Jayanta uses an analogy which rather weakens his case; (really, this analogy is borrowed from Kumārila who had no adequate inkling of the problem Jayanta is grappling with). Thus he says that just as in a word the root-
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and the suffix-part have their own respective denotations and yet they jointly stand for these denotations-as-associated-with-each-other similarly in a sentence the different words have their own respective denotations and yet they jointly stand for these denotations-as-associated-with-each-other; but in the former part of this statement the phrase ‘stand for’ can be easily equated with the word ‘denote’ whereas in the latter part of it such an equation will be suicidal for Jayanta’s case which requires that the phrase ‘stand for’ be here equated with the phrase ‘inform about’.  

Thus closes Jayanta’s threefold enquiry into the question as to how a sentence yields meaning; and then begins one which has to do with a very different question.  

(3) Vindicating the Utility of the Science of Grammar

This is the last section of Jayanta’s Āhnikā VI, the last section of his enquiry into verbal testimony, the last section of his enquiry into pramāṇas in general. But the relation of what is presented here with what has gone before is extremely tenuous. For here is sought to be vindicating the utility of the science of grammar, but Jayanta knows that grammar is an entirely independent discipline. As a matter of fact, there is the plea he had himself offered while cutting short his Āhnikā V enquiry into word-meaning. It is therefore difficult to see why Jayanta should take so great pains by way of extolling virtues of grammar. Of course, the present section begins with a very brief consideration of the objection that it is difficult to ascertain the meaning of a Vedic sentence and while answering this objection Jayanta incidentally remarks that grammar should help one in ascertaining that. But the point is that what is subsequently discussed is not the special question as to how grammar helps one in ascertaining the meaning of a Vedic sentence but the general question as to why at all grammar should be studied. Another anomaly of the present discussion is that here the opponent’s presentation of his case is twice as long as Jayanta’s criticism of this case; what is worse, two of the three most important objections raised by the opponent have been summarily dismissed by saying that they have been answered by the competent authors elsewhere. The first of these objections (running into several pages) is to the effect that the rules and definitions formulated by the grammarians are open to all sorts of objections; the second objection is to the effect that even the most revered authors – not excluding the authors
on grammar itself — have been found committing grammatical mistakes. The third important objection — but one that is relatively less important — is to the effect that there are so many popular languages with which the grammar of Sanskrit has nothing to do. This objection occurs in the context of arguing that it is difficult to follow the injunction ‘One ought to use correct words, not incorrect ones’ because it is difficult to define a correct word; the definition accepted as most sensible is that a correct word is a word that conveys a meaning, and then it is submitted that this definition also applies to the words of popular non-Sanskrit languages. In this connection rejected as merely technical the definition that a correct word is a word that is in conformity to grammatical rules. This whole argumentation Jayanta criticises in details, and here two central points made by him are as follows:

1) The so many popular languages are but a corrupt form of cultured Sanskrit. Thus cultured Sanskrit has retained its purity because generations of students have taken care to preserve this purity; on the other hand, so many popular languages have come into existence because people at large have not taken care to preserve the purity of the language they speak. Certainly, the words of these popular languages, just like the words of non-Aryan languages, have no fixed convention as to their meaning, a convention available only in the case of cultured Sanskrit either in virtue of God having established this convention at the time of world-creation as the Naiyāyikas maintain or in virtue of a natural capacity of these words as the Mimāṃsakas maintain.

2) As for what are and what are not correct words, an ascertainment to that effect is doubtless not possible on the part of a plain person plainly observing the words under use, but such ascertainment becomes well possible for one who has made a proper study of the science of grammar, just as one who has properly studied Vedas can well ascertain as to what is and what is not a religious duty.

The rest of the objections raised by the opponent and answered by Jayanta are even more flimsy and in any case are not relevant for the latter’s main enquiry.
In the first six Āhnikas covering about two-thirds of his whole ext Jayanta discusses the first Nyāya *padārtha* called *pramāṇa*. More than half of the remaining text is devoted to the second *padārtha prameya* and is divided into three chapters, the rest (again divided into three chapters) taking up the remaining fourteen Nyāya *padārthas*. So we have now to examine Jayanta’s consideration of the Nyāya *padārtha prameya*. Really, in the history of Nyāya school a treatment of this *padārtha* has played no role of any fundamental importance. For in order to be logically significant this *padārtha* had to cover ontological topics in an exhaustive fashion, but this was something which it obviously failed to do and for which the Nyāya authors used to depend on their Vaiśeṣika colleagues who had instead posited the basic concept of six *padārthas* *dravya*, *guna*, etc. In all probability the Nyāya category of *prameya* was posited in hoary antiquity by the authors who would pursue an Upaniṣad-type of enquiry but on a logical rather than intuitional basis. So, here we were included six ontological and six ethical topics which were of fundamental importance for those busy with the problem of transmigration and release-from-transmigration — not with the whole gamut of ontological problems. This over-all situation has somehow found reflection in Jayanta’s own enquiry into the *padārtha prameya*. Thus this enquiry is so much important not for what it says about the twelve topics covered under this *padārtha*, for all that is very much brief and a very much a routine stuff. The importance of it rather lies in the way Jayanta here creates occasion for discussing certain most outstanding ontological problems. To be precise, while dealing with the first topic *Ātman* (=soul) he undertakes a masterly refutation of the Buddhist doctrine of momentarism, while dealing with the fifth topic *buddhi* (=cognition) that of Saṅkhya metaphysics in general, while dealing with the last topic *apavarga* (= *mokṣa*, release-from-transmigration) that of the three illusionist doctrines of Brahm-an-monism, Word-monism, Vijñāna-monism. Of course, in connection with the first topic soul and the last topic *mokṣa*
Jayanta's discussion is even otherwise detailed and important; for here were topics that would interest our philosophers in a truly big way. But the point is that the discussion undertaken by him in connection with the remaining ten topics is not much detailed nor much important. Significantly, the whole of Āhnika VII is devoted to the first topic soul, the whole of Āhnika IX to the last topic mokṣa, while the remaining ten topics have been disposed of in the single Āhnika VIII. We presently take up Āhnika VII with its coverage of the first topic soul.

On the question of soul our philosophers were divided into three distinct camps – one represented by the Cārvākas advocating outright materialism, another by the Buddhists advocating the anti-materialist doctrine of no-soul, the third by the rest (including the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas) advocating the anti-materialist doctrine of soul. The fundamental question that served to divide the materialist from the anti-materialist was whether consciousness can be treated as a property of matter, a question answered in the affirmative by the former, in the negative by the latter. The latter simply argued that if consciousness be a property of matter then all matter should exhibit this property; the materialist's submission that matter organised in a particular fashion is what alone possesses consciousness was rejected as unwarranted. However, one point particularly emphasised by the Naiyāyika indicates that he was in some way aware of the fundamental distinction obtaining between living matter and dead matter. Thus on his showing living body undergoes change all the time as a result of digesting the consumed food all the time; this was somehow making the important recognition that metabolism is a characteristic property of living matter. The position in question was a well-known Nyāya position, but its purpose was not to distinguish living matter from dead matter. Jayanta, for example, makes use of this position for arguing that consciousness cannot be a property of a living body because it must be a property of something absolutely changeless while a living body undergoes change all the time. Really, it should have been argued that consciousness is a characteristic property of a living body just as metabolism is. Then Jayanta also incidentally takes note of another characteristic property of a living body. Thus while arguing that consciousness cannot be a property of a body because dead body does not exhibit the property he considers the
objection that itching etc. are a property of a body and yet a dead body does not exhibit this property; in answer Jayanta pleads that itching etc. have got some special cause of their own. This was Jayanta’s encounter with the fact that irritability is the basic form of physiological activity, an activity again characteristic of a living body. And by saying that itching etc. have got some special cause of their own Jayanta virtually concedes that physiological activity is a characteristic property of a living body, but his precise point is that consciousness is not thus a characteristic property of a living body. Really, just as in the case of metabolism so in the case of physiological activity it should have been argued that consciousness is a characteristic property of a living body just as physiological activity is. In any case, Jayanta’s own understanding of the phenomena of metabolism on the one hand and itching etc. on the other should have convinced him that it is possible for a living body to have characteristic properties of its own so that in principle there was nothing wrong for the materialist to suggest that consciousness is a characteristic property of a living body. Not only that, the suggestion was sound even in substance, and this too should become clear from Jayanta’s own understanding of the phenomenon of consciousness. Thus on Jayanta’s showing the chief forms of conscious activity are cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, and it is his submission that the last three necessarily presuppose the application of a past cognition to a present case; thus on cognising a thing and recognising it as one that had produced pleasure in the past one develops a desire to get it and makes an effort to get it while on recognising it as one that had produced pain in the past one develops an aversion towards it and makes an effort to get away from it. As for cognition proper Jayanta would distinguish between fresh-cognition and recognition while submitting that the latter is and the former is not of the form of the application of a past cognition to a present case. Thus according to him the phenomena of recognition, desire, aversion and effort necessitate the positing of a soul in the form of an abiding non-bodily agent which on the one hand acquires fresh-cognition and on the other hand applies to new cases a cognition acquired in the past. The noteworthy thing is that this aspect of the matter so much emphasised by Jayanta as by the other non-Buddhist anti-materialist philosophers in the interest of the soul-
doctrine is an extremely significant aspect of the matter, an aspect underplayed by the Buddhist because of his misgivings about there being any abiding real thing like a soul. For as a matter of fact, all cognition is in essence of the form of recognising (= identifying) a thing on the basis of certain observed sensory features of this thing so that what Jayanta calls cases of fresh-cognition are not at all cases of fresh-cognition but cases of fresh-experience. At the time of such an experience the thing concerned is found to produce either a sensation of over-all comfort (= pleasure) or a sensation of over-all discomfort (= pain) while at the same time certain features of this thing are specially noticed because they are somehow most conspicuous. Now when this thing is encountered for another time these very features act as a mark for its recognition (= identification) which in some measure also revives the sensation of comfort or discomfort that went along with the original experience; in the case of the former sensation the thing is sought to be approached, in the case of the latter it is sought to be avoided. All this (barring that point about fresh-cognition) is in Jayanta’s mind when he is arguing why a soul must be posited, but the question is why all this should not be a characteristic performance of a living body just as (on Jayanta’s own admission) metabolism on the one hand and the physiological acts like itching etc. on the other are such a performance. Jayanta only pleads that the agent engaged in the conscious acts like recognition, desire, aversion, effort must be something absolutely changeless while a, living body is something that changes all the time, but the plea makes no particular sense. For what is required is that the agent engaged in conscious acts (i.e. in cognition and cognition-based acts) must be in a position to experience things, to retain impressions left by an experience, to recognise things with the help of such impressions, and all this seems to be well possible on the part of a living body. Be that as it may, the anti-materialist philosophers found it inconceivable that acts like these could be undertaken by a mere body; and so the Buddhists conceived these acts in the form of a series running parallel to the body-series concerned while the rest conceived them in the form of the performance of an abiding soul inhabiting the body concerned. In his present treatment of soul Jayanta first discusses as to whether or not a soul is a possible object of perception, then argues against the Buddhist position that
conscious acts constitute an independent running-series having nothing to do with an abiding soul, and lastly argues against the materialist position that conscious acts are a performance of a body itself having nothing to do with a soul or anything of the sort. Perhaps, it would have been better if the course of enquiry was just reversed and Jayanta first argued why consciousness cannot be a property of a body, then argued why consciousness should be a property of an abiding soul, and lastly discussed whether or not a soul is a possible object of perception. However, even as it stands the enquiry is illuminating in various ways. Let us see how.

Jayanta begins by quoting the Cārvāka’s basic materialist argument as follows: “The properties like cognition etc. belong to the physical elements themselves which owing to certain special circumstances have come to acquire a special capacity. Thus just as jaggery, grain-paste etc. turning into wine come to acquire an intoxicating power previously absent, similarly earth etc. assuming the form of a living body come to acquire consciousness previously absent. At the time of death these very earth etc. under the influence of disease etc. are rendered void of consciousness, but so long as they retain consciousness they go on performing acts like memory, recognition etc. Why then posit a soul to account for conscious acts like these?” However, a direct and detailed refutation of this argument Jayanta undertakes towards the very close of his present enquiry while for the present his only submission is that the Mīmāṃsakas and certain Naiyāyikas themselves would seek to answer the materialist by arguing that soul is an object of direct perception because a soul is what the common word ‘I’ stands for. Jayanta himself is of the view that soul is known not by way of direct perception but by way of inference and so he criticises the argument in question as offered by the Kumārilite, the Prabhākarite and certain Naiyāyikas themselves. Really, the point of this entire controversy is pretty obscure. For it is difficult to be sure as to what is here to be understood by the idea of a soul being an object of perception. Thus in the case of a physical thing the Naiyāyika maintains that it is an object of perception in case a sensory quality of it is being cognised through the visual or the tactile sense-organ, but this position has obviously no relevance for the question whether a soul is an object of perception. And leaving aside the technical Nyāya
position a physical thing acts as an object of perception only when it is being identified on the basis of certain observed sensory quality of it; however, since it is always understood that a sensory quality belongs to a physical thing even the case of noticing a sensory quality without identifying the concerned physical thing can be said to be a case of perceiving a physical thing in the form of an indeterminate 'something'. But even granting for argument's sake that a soul exists and is possessed of the qualities cognition, desire etc. the fact remains that there is no question of thus identifying a soul on the basis of certain observed qualities of it, so that the sensible position ought to be that a soul is perceived whenever a quality of it is perceived. However, this simple position is conceded by just one of the four parties appearing in the present controversy and that obscures the point of this controversy. Thus the Kumārilite argues that a soul is an object of perception because in the statements like 'I cognise this object', 'I desire this object' etc. the word 'I' stands for a soul; the objection that in a statement like 'I am fat' the word 'I' must stand for a body rather than a soul is rejected on the ground that in this statement a body is figuratively meant by the word 'I' which literally means nothing but a soul. It is difficult to see how this argument has a bearing on the question whether or not a soul is an object of perception; for while criticising it Jayanta submits that the word 'I' stands for a body rather than a soul, so that in the statements like 'I cognise this object', 'I desire this object' etc. a soul is figuratively meant by this word which literally means nothing but a body. Really, the word 'I' occurring in a statement stands for the speaker concerned; but if some philosopher has persuaded himself that a speaker consists of a body and a soul then according to him this word as occurring in a statement which mentions the qualities of a soul stands for a soul while the same as occurring in a statement which mentions the qualities of a body stands for a body. But then Jayanta has also something else to say against the present Kumārilite position. Thus he argues that in the case of a cognition the agent and the object cannot be one and the same thing just as on the Kumārilite's own admission a cognition cannot be its own object. Really, however, if a philosopher is of the view that all cognition is cognition on the part of a soul then he cannot avoid conceding either that a soul cognises itself or that a soul is not cognised at
all, this irrespective of how according to him a cognition itself is cognised. [A relevant point in this connection would have been that since according to the Kumārilite a cognition is something inherently imperceptible he should rather contend that the cognition to the effect 'I desire this object' is a perceptual cognition even if that to the effect 'I cognise this object' is not, but this is a point of which Jayanta has no inkling.] For his criticism of the present Kumārilite position Jayanta seeks support by pointing out that the idealist Buddhist denied the reality of an external object on the ground that a cognition cognises itself (rather than an external object); but one point is that the Sautrāntika Buddhist too says that a cognition cognises itself and yet he does not deny the reality of an external object, the real point is that in the context of the question whether a soul cognises itself or not it is an irrelevant consideration whether a cognition cognises itself or not. Thus we are left in the dark as to why the Kumārilite insists and Jayanta denies that a soul is a possible object of perception.

Then Jayanta criticises the Prabhākarite mode of arguing that a soul is an object of perception. We have already hinted that the real difficulty in this connection is that no particular light on the problem is thrown by a consideration of how perception takes place in the case of a physical object. The difficulty becomes very plain now. For the Prabhākarite has borrowed his so peculiar framework of argumentation from the Buddhists who had said so many odd things about cognition. Thus basing themselves on the trivial circumstance that after having had a cognition nobody can fail to remain aware that he had had this cognition these Buddhists submitted that all cognition necessarily cognises itself. Then the hint was thrown that a cognition cognising itself requires no special endeavour of any sort just as a light reveals itself through its mere coming into existence. Again, it was believed that cognition had by a person must constitute an uninterrupted series, it being thought impossible that if once interrupted this series should start de novo. [To all this the idealists among the Buddhists added that there exist no physical objects by the side of so many cognition-series that are there.] Now what the Buddhists thus said about a cognition-series the Prabhākarite made use of in his description of a soul. Thus he submitted that just as a flame of light burning over there illumines constantly and automatically a soul is something ever conscious and
cognised by way of direct cognition without requiring any additional means-of-cognition; here it was added that this concept of soul was free from the anomaly that a soul makes itself an object of cognition had by itself as also from the anomaly that a soul otherwise as much devoid of consciousness as a physical object happens to acquire consciousness now and then.⁸ Jayanta submits that the former anomaly is here not avoided, the latter anomaly is no anomaly at all. Thus on his showing it is absurd to say that a soul is perceptually cognised though without requiring any additional means-of-cognition, his point being that if really so then all souls should be equally open to perceptual cognition; to this is added that even as thus perceptually cognised a soul does become an object cognised by itself, so that the anomaly feared remains there all the same.⁹ The suggestion that a soul is cognised not through a perceptual cognition but through a non-indirect (= aparokṣa) cognition is dismissed as groundless inasmuch as the two expressions are absolutely equivalent.¹⁰ The Prabhākarite pleads that a soul is cognised automatically because it is of the nature of light; Jayanta retorts that a burning lamp too is of the nature of light and yet it cannot be seen by a blind man, his point being that whatever be the nature of a thing it cannot be cognised without the employment of an appropriate means-of-cognition; an employment which must turn this thing into an object-of-cognition.¹¹ Then Jayanta turns his attention to the Prabhākarite’s claim that on the latter’s supposition a soul is something ever-conscious and not something unconscious in which consciousness is produced now and then; the former simply retorts that the idea of an ever-conscious soul makes just no sense, his point being that to be conscious means to apprehend an object; an apprehension which occurs not all the time but just now and then.¹² Really, the Prabhākarite’s mode of describing a soul became much popular later on when much popularity was gained by the Advaita-vedāntins whose mode of describing a soul it became; but Jayanta rejects it as a plain variety of mystery-mongering (with suspicious Buddhist associations) unworthy of a sober philosopher like Prabhākarite. Thus the Naiyāyika posits a soul because he fails to see how a mere body can perform conscious acts like cognition, desire etc., but he rightly notes that one does not perform such acts all the time. As a result he adopts the position that a soul as such is something unconscious
but that consciousness is produced in it when it performs acts like cognition, desire etc., a position that invited ridicule from the other advocates of soul-doctrine who would have us believe that a soul is somehow ever-conscious. It is this rather unenviable position which Jayanta defends on the one hand against the materialist, on the other hand against the Prabhākarite whose endeavour to demonstrate that soul is something ever-conscious is most fantastic of all and one that came in handy for a school like Advaita-vedānta with its illusionist thesis that there exists nothing but one soul called Brahman.

Lastly, Jayanta criticises those of his own Nyāya colleagues who maintained that a soul is an object of preception. The opponent begins by arguing his case as follows: “If it is really impossible for a soul to act as an agent cogniser as well as an object cognised then an inferential cognition of a soul should be as much impossible as a perceptual cognition of it.”13 Jayanta asks: “But a soul had got what form which one might cognise through a perception?”; the opponent asks in return: “Pleasure etc. have got what form which one cognises through a manas-born perception?”14 Jayanta answers: “Pleasure etc. are obviously of the form of joy etc.”; the opponent retorts: “Likewise, a soul is what acts as a locus for pleasure etc. After all, pleasure etc. are not cognised as something existing all by themselves, so that whatever be cognised in the form of their locus is a soul. Certainly, a pleasure is not cognised in the form ‘this is a pleasure’, just as a jar is cognised in the form ‘this is a jar.’ So, when one cognises ‘I am pleased’ one cognises a pleasure as well as the soul concerned.”15 We have ourselves earlier taken exception to Jayanta’s position on these very lines; in particular, we have suggested that the most sensible position for a Nyāya author to take is that whenever a quality of a soul is perceived the soul concerned too is perceived, a position actually maintained by the present opponent. It is really gratifying that Jayanta is explicitly aware of all this criticism that might possibly be levelled against his own position, but he sticks to this position because the early Nyāya authors have only said that such and such things are to act as a probans for inferring a soul. So the opponent now decides to base his stand on this very statement of the early Nyāya authors. Thus he argues: “Cognition, desire, pleasure, pain etc. have been declared to be a probans for inferring a soul. For as existing in one common
locus they indicate the presence of a ‘co-ordinator (= agent coordinating an earlier experience and a present one).’ But they as existing in a common locus cannot be cognised unless this locus is itself cognised. However, if this locus is already cognised, there remains nothing to be inferred; on the other hand, unless this locus is cognised the inference in question is impossible. So, it is a safer position that a soul is an object of perception.”16 This argument Jayanta answers by explaining how desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain, cognition can be used as a probans for inferring a soul without necessitating the presupposition that a soul is an object of perception. In essence he first contends that desire, aversion, effort, cognition of the form of recognition (though not that of the form of fresh-cognition) all presuppose the coordination of an earlier experience and a present one while being of the form of a quality these desire; aversion etc. must be supposed to be seated in a locus of the form of a substance; and then he concludes that the coordination in question being not possible on the part of body etc. the substance in question must be a soul.17 This way Jayanta seeks to answer the opponent who had argued that a ‘co-ordinator’ in the form of a soul cannot be inferred from desire, etc. unless two experiences as seated in the same locus are first perceived but that to thus perceive these two experiences is already to perceive a soul as their common locus; for the former is now telling the latter that what is here inferred is not ‘coordination’ from ‘co-location’ but vice versa. However, aware of certain difficulties Jayanta does not make this point directly but after some amount of side-talking. Thus he first emphasises that a soul is posited because being of the form of a quality desire etc. need a locus of the form of a substance; to this is added that he here speaks of ‘coordination’ because that is not possible on the part of body etc.18 But the opponent forces Jayanta to pointedly explain how ‘coordination’ is not possible on the part of body etc; the former’s point is that if the latter argues that ‘coordination’ is not possible on the part of body etc. because it has been found possible only on the part of a soul then the latter has already conceded that a soul as undertaking ‘coordination’ has been perceived.19 In a nutshell, Jayanta is being asked as to why ‘coordination’ must imply ‘co-location’. He could have said (in fact, this is what he does say) that on analysis it is found that the concept ‘coordination’ implies the concept ‘co-location’; but the usual practice of Indian logicians
required that he should point out an instance where ‘coordination’ and ‘co-location’ have been perceived together. Sensing that such a pointing out will be suicidal for his case Jayanta, pathetically appealing to a Buddhist precedent, submits that not to find ‘coordination’ present when the cognisers concerned are different is to find it present when the cogniser concerned is the same, just as on the Buddhist’s showing not to find causal efficiency present in things permanent is to find it present in things transient.\textsuperscript{20} The opponent objects: “But that too can be said only in case one perceives oneself to be of the form of the same cogniser all the time; for otherwise it could well be that in one’s own case there is ‘coordination’ and yet the cognisers concerned are different.”\textsuperscript{21} Jayanta answers: “One does not perceive oneself to be the same all the time; what happens is that one does not perceive oneself to be different at different times.”\textsuperscript{22} The opponent objects: “But then there is no guarantee that one is really the same cogniser all the time; for it could well be that here there just arise different cognitions at different times, all forming a causal chain.”\textsuperscript{23} Jayanta knows that the alternative thus suggested is the actual Buddhist alternative, and so he answers: “How that is not the case we are going to demonstrate.”\textsuperscript{24} Really, this whole argumentation boils down to saying that conceptual analysis reveals that ‘coordination’ between two experiences is not possible unless the agent undertaking ‘coordination’ is the same as the agent having had both these experiences. But then Jayanta must also somehow reject the materialist alternative that this common agent is the concerned living body itself: this he does by submitting that a living body is not something that remains the same all the time but something that changes from moment to moment, his chief point being that the very possibility of the consumed food being digested implies that the living body undertaking digestion changes from moment to moment.\textsuperscript{25} In this connection Jayanta reports about a curious point of difference obtaining between the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophers, (usually taking a common position on ontological matters). Thus on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view a physical body made up of the element earth develops new sensory qualities and gives up the old ones as a result of being heated; (since as here conceived most things of our everyday experience are made up of the element earth and since the phenomenon of heating is here understood in a
very broad sense the view in question is of extensive application. However, while the Nyāya philosophers think that it is possible for an earthen body to remain in tact and yet get heated, their Vaiśeṣika colleagues maintain that before being heated an earthen body must break into atoms to be combined back in the old form after the heating process is over. The chief example considered in this connection is that of baking an earthen jar in the potter’s kiln, it being the Vaiśeṣika philosopher’s point that since even the interior-most parts of this jar develop new sensory qualities and since this jar is often found to get deformed there must be a thoroughest break-up of this jar before it gets heated; Jayanta, endorsing the Nyāya position on the question, argues that fire-particles can enter into the interior-most parts of a raw jar just as water seeps out to the surface from within the interior of a baked jar while a jar being heated within a kiln can get deformed owing to an outside pressure.26 Jayanta’s point is that there is nothing incredible about a living body becoming a different body every moment when according to the Vaiśeṣika philosopher even a jar being baked within a kiln becomes a different jar during the process. For otherwise he is rather arguing that a living body is unlike an ordinary physical body like a jar inasmuch as the former undergoes change from moment to moment while nothing of the sort happens to the latter.27 Nor is the significance of this argument to be minimised, for this is Jayanta’s way of recognising that metabolism is a characteristic property of a living body. But paradoxically this highly important recognition is here being made with a view to denying the even more significant fact that consciousness too is a characteristic property of a living body. For Jayanta’s argument is that consciousness is not a property of a living body because ‘co-ordination’ so central to all conscious activity is possible only on the part of something that remains the same all the time while a living body undergoes a change from moment to moment. Be that as it may, here in fact closes the Chapter (Āhnika) VII first section ostensibly devoted to demonstrating that a soul is not an object of perception. As can be seen, Jayanta has so developed his argument that he has been able to offer what according to him are the most important reasons for positing a soul. In the second and the third sections of the chapter are respectively refuted the Buddhist’s doctrine of no-soul and the Čārvāka’s materialist doctrine, where the former refutation includes
a very lengthy criticism of the Buddhist’s general doctrine of momentarism. However, Jayanta has yet to say a few things before he closes his first section, things which were customary for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authors to say. Thus he argues that the reason why an increase or decrease in bodily efficiency results in an increase or decrease in intellectual efficiency is not that consciousness is a property of body but that the sense-organs which are an instrument of acquiring cognition are seated in body.28 Again, it is argued that consciousness cannot be a property of a sense-organ because a conscious activity often involves ‘co-ordination’ between a cognition born of one sense-organ and one born of another, a ‘co-ordination’ not possible on the part of any one sense-organ.29 Similarly, it is argued that consciousness cannot be a property of manas because the only two functions of a manas are to prevent the rise of more than one cognition at a time – this through getting connected with one sense-organ at a time – and to act as an instrument for the cognition of the internal qualities like cognition, desire etc.30 Given Jayanta’s basic reasons as to why a soul has to be posited these arguments are rather easy to follow, but some more light will be thrown on them when we consider the next five prameyas which happen to be body, sense-organ, things-cognised-through-sense-organs, cognition, manas. Lastly, Jayanta submits that the earlier advanced reasons as to why a soul has to be posited are just illustrative while so many more such reasons can be advanced with ease.31 Really, in advancing those reasons Jayanta was dilating upon the relevant Nyāya-sūtra aphorism whereas in referring to those additional reasons he is having in mind the relevant Vaiśeṣika-sūtra aphorisms. Thus adopting the obviously anthropomorphic mode of reasoning characteristic of these Vaiśeṣika-sūtra aphorisms Jayanta summarily tells us that a soul employs a sense-organ just as a man employs an instrument like a sickle, that a soul moves a body in its own interest just as a charioteer moves a chāriot in his own interest, that a soul sets in circulation breaths inside a body, that a soul heals up the wounds suffered by a body just as a man repairs his dwelling.32 To this is added that all perceptual cognition of the form of recognition, all inferential cognition, all cognition of the form of analogy, all cognition of the form of verbal testimony presuppose the ‘co-ordination’ of a past cognition with a present one, a ‘co-ordination’ possible only on the part of a permanent cogniser of the form of a soul.33 Lastly, it is
submitted that a similar ‘coordination’ necessitating the positing of a permanent soul takes place also in the case of everyday practical dealings like study, farming, trade etc. Obviously, all this is but a corollary to the central argument Jayanta has already advanced in support of the soul–doctrine. In any case, with it closes the first section of the present chapter and now comes a refutation of the Buddhist doctrine of no-soul.

The non-Buddhist anti-materialist philosophers like Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas were as much opposed to the Buddhist’s doctrine of no-soul as they were opposed to the Cārvāka’s doctrine of materialism. Nay, in some sense they were more opposed to the former because it had so much currency in academic circles where the latter had got rather few partisans. However, the controversy around the doctrine of no-soul was basically a controversy around the general doctrine of momentarism whose one corollary the former doctrine was. In any case, Jayanta here concentrates his attention on the doctrine of momentarism while treating the doctrine of no-soul as a mere corollary of this former doctrine. But then the doctrine of momentarism had its own history. Thus since very beginning the Buddhists were saying that the things of the world are all transient, and in this connection their emphasis was that things of the external world are all transient; for so far as mental states are concerned it was admitted on all hands that they are all transient. However, since the Buddhists went on to add that there exists no soul over and above the fleeting mental states their pronouncements regarding mental states drew much attention; for denial of soul was something undertaken by the materialists alone while the Buddhists were no materialists. On their part the Buddhists were themselves vociferous in proclaiming their adherence to the doctrine of no-soul, so much so that the assertion that things of the world are all transient was made by them coordinate to the assertion that there exists no-soul. Inheriting this entire ideological tradition the Buddhist logicians worked out the implications of the received assertions that things of the world are all transient and that there exists no-soul. They came to the conclusion that if an external thing (like a jar or a piece of cloth) must be transient then it must undergo change every moment, for otherwise there can be shown no reason why this thing must perish; this was the root contention of their celebrated doctrine of
momentarism. Thus for them everything whatsoever – be it an external thing or a mental state – comes into existence this moment, perishes the next moment. Then speaking the language of cause-and-effect they declared that a thing as it exists at the first moment causes this thing as it exists at the second moment; to this was added that the former while causing the latter is assisted by the available set of accessories, so that in case certain types of accessories are available to the former the latter might be very much dissimilar from the former. For example, normally a jar this moment will cause a jar the next moment but in case the former is in the company of a stick hitting against it there will be caused not a jar but the potsherds the next moment. Hence it was emphasised that the destruction of a thing requires no cause; for all things must perish automatically while what are called the cases of the destruction of a thing are in fact the cases of a thing causing something very much dissimilar from itself. Obviously, all this description was considered applicable to whatever is real; and so it was emphasised that to be real means to perish as soon as born, a statement equivalent to saying that to be real means to cause something. Hence the equation: ‘to be real’ = ‘to be causally efficient’ = ‘to be momentary’. As for a person’s mental world, it was maintained that it is of the form of an uninterrupted series of momentary cognitive states just as an external thing is of the form of an uninterrupted series of momentary physical states, a position that entailed the somewhat odd corollary that a person undertakes some sort of cognitive activity all the time. Then in a broad sense distinction was made between cognition on the one hand and a mental state of the type of pleasure, pain etc. on the other but it was added that a cognition and the associated pleasure, pain etc. occur together – an understanding on the basis of which it too was given that pleasure, pain etc. are somehow of the nature of cognition. Lastly, it was emphasised that within a cognition-series the outgoing state imparts an appropriate ‘impression’ to the incoming one so that at any stage it becomes possible for the person concerned to ‘coordinate’ a present cognition with any past one. Now this entire Buddhist doctrine of momentarism with the doctrine of no-soul as a corollary was opposed tooth and nail by the whole run of Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas whose tradition Jayanta faithfully follows. It should be useful to form some ideas
of the basic difficulty these philosophers had with the Buddhist position. Thus for one thing they saw nothing incongruous about a thing being eternal in the sense of being beginningless and endless, nor could they see why a non-eternal thing must be momentary. But the noteworthy thing is that they too granted that non-eternal thing must be not only a caused something but also a perishing something; in other words, in their eyes too it was a valid generalisation that whatever is a caused entity is a perishing entity. However, they did not pause to consider the implications of this momentous generalisation, implications which constitute the bedrock of the Buddhist’s thesis on momentarism. Thus characteristic is Jayanta’s reaction to the Buddhist’s submission that if a caused thing like a jar does not perish as soon as it is born then it might well be that it never perishes at all; poking fun at the Buddhist Jayanta sermonises: “Heavens would not fall if an humble thing like a jar does not perish. Moreover, a thing like a jar which is made up of parts must disintegrate sooner or later. After all, even jars used for Lord Rāma’s coronation, since they are not seen there today, must have perished somehow or other.” All this makes Jayanta’s refutation of momentarism – brilliant in its own way – so much of a misconceived performance. Be that as it may, he first presents the Buddhist’s side of the story and then his own criticism of it, in both cases mostly confining his attention to the doctrine of momentarism while briefly touching upon the doctrine of no-soul – towards the beginning in the former case, towards the end in the latter. Let us consider the two one by one.

The Buddhist begins by pleading that there is no use positing a soul when the concept of momentary cognitions un-seated in a permanent locus will do as well, also suggesting that the mental states like desire, aversion etc. too are of the form of a type of cognition. As for memory etc. which necessarily require the ‘co-ordination’ of a present cognition and an earlier one, they are declared to be possible by supposing that in the case of the cognitions constituting one series an outgoing one leaves an appropriate ‘impression’ in the incoming one, the conveying of an ‘impression’ from a past cognition to a present one being likened to the conveying of red colour from a cotton-seed to the cotton borne by the plant born of this seed. Lastly, it is contended that a so-called soul can in no way be affected by the occasional
qualities like pleasure, pain etc. or it must be something impermanent just as rain and sunshine do not affect sky even while affecting a piece of leather. The Buddhist's point is that all real thing being momentary in duration, a soul supposed to be permanent in duration cannot be anything real, and this consideration leads him to undertake an elaborate defence of his thesis on momentarism. In this connection he offers four arguments as follows:

(1) First it is argued that a real thing is what exhibits causal efficiency while a non-momentary thing can exhibit no causal efficiency — not successively because it is inconceivable why it should not exhibit it at once, not at once because it is inconceivable what it should be doing after exhibiting it; the suggestion that a non-momentary thing exhibits causal efficiency appropriate to the available accessories is rejected on the ground that a thing exhibits causal efficiency irrespective of what accessories are available to it. This is the crux of an argument which as it stands is replete with so many side-considerations. The Buddhist's point is that each real thing exercises two types of causality, viz. material causality in relation to the incoming member of the series to which it itself belongs, accessory-causality in relation to the incoming members of the so many series existing nearby (in all strictness, of all the remaining series that are there). And since according to him to thus exercise a dual causality is the very nature of a real thing he fails to see why an alleged non-momentary thing should exercise this causality not all at once but successively and partwise (as it must on the first alternative under consideration) or it should exercise this causality all at once but should yet continue to exist (as it must on the second alternative under consideration). And the suggestion that a non-momentary thing successively produces different effects as different accessories are available to it makes no sense to him because he already grants that the net-effect produced by a real thing is different in case different accessories are available to it, his point being that this thing's own role in causation is in no way affected by what accessories are available to it.

(2) Secondly, it is argued that it is a self-contradictory proposition that a thing is real and yet non-momentary. Really, what is thus offered is no new argument but the bold assertion that a real thing must be momentary in duration. The assertion has semblance of argument because it *inter alia* says: 'A real thing
exhibits difference, a non-momentary thing exhibits sameness.\textsuperscript{41} The idea is that a real thing must quit the scene as soon as it is born while an alleged non-momentary thing must continue to exist even after it is born; that may be so, but the point is that the idea is here substantiated by no new argument.

(3) Thirdly, it is argued that even on the admission of the Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas a thing acts as a cause only for the moment when the causation concerned is actually taking place, so that since a real thing is what acts as a cause a real thing ought to be something momentary even according to these philosophers.\textsuperscript{42} The difficulty with this argument is that the opponent would not concede that a thing is real only when it is actually acting as a cause, it being his understanding that a non-momentary thing exists for a longer or shorter duration while acting as a cause only when the needed accessories are available. So, the Buddhist has to convince him that a real thing cannot exist without acting as a cause, a position which is a corollary to the position that a real thing cannot but perish as soon as it is born; for while perishing as soon as born the outgoing member of a thing-series causes the incoming member of this series. Fortunately, the Buddhist’s next argument is actually aimed at establishing the position that a real thing cannot but perish as soon as it is born.

(4) Thus lastly it is argued that a real thing is momentary in duration because it requires no cause for its destruction, the point being that if a thing must perish then it must perish without requiring a cause while the opponent himself concedes that whatever is a produced entity must be a perishing entity.\textsuperscript{43} This most telling argument in support of momentarism is not appreciated by the opponent simply because he does not take seriously his own position that a produced entity must be a perishing entity. Thus he asks the Buddhist that if a jar (for example) must perish automatically then why one has to hit a stick against this jar in order to break it into potsherds; the former has to be told that this jar must break up into potsherds sooner or later while by hitting a stick against it one only hastens this breaking up. The Buddhist’s own usual reply is different and one that clearly explains how destruction and causation are two inseparable aspects of one and the same process. For he says that the case of a stick breaking up a jar into potsherds is a case of a jar-moment producing a potsherds-
moment rather than a jar-moment because of the availability of a new accessory in the form of a stick. It is in this connection that it is argued that if a thing survives the first moment after the moment of its birth it might as well last for ages inasmuch as in that case it has demonstrated that it is not perishable by nature. As we have seen, it is an argument like this that Jayanta has so miserably failed to understand.

These four arguments are followed by two more which are more or less faulty because they are based on epistemological considerations more or less faulty. Thus it is first argued that the testimony of recognition does not refute momentarism because recognition is not a case of valid cognition; then it is argued that the testimony of perception establishes momentarism because perception lasts for a moment and reveals a genuine real. Of course, while advancing the former argument it is rightly emphasised that if momentarism is vindicated with the help of a valid inference then no other type of testimony can undo this vindication. Really, inference is required to establish momentarism precisely because superficial observation as is recognition which we meet with in our everyday experience does not decide the issue. Thus the opponent might be wrong in saying that the testimony of plain recognition refutes momentarism, but the Buddhist is no less wrong when he says that a recognition being both of the form of an amalgam of a perception and a memory is not at all a case of valid cognition; for we know that recognition is not only a case of valid cognition but the model of valid cognition. Again, we know that the Buddhist mistakenly identifies perception with bare sensory experience which in fact is not at all a case of cognition proper, so that it too is wrong on his part to say that the testimony of perception establishes momentarism. True, like all production the production of a bare sensory experience takes place within a moment and the thing acting on a sense-organ in this connection is a real thing, but to admit all this is not to say that the testimony of bare sensory experience (miscalled 'perception') establishes momentarism.

Like the Buddhist’s presentation of his thesis on momentarism Jayanta’s refutation of it too contains much sidetalking; so it is necessary to pick out the crucial elements of this refutation. Jayanta begins by doubting the validity of the definition that a real thing is that thing which is causally efficient, but then grants its validity for
the sake of argument; for his point is that even on this definition a
real thing does not prove to be momentary. Itimitating the Buddhist's
own mode of argumentation he says that a momentary thing cannot
produce an effect — not successively because succession is impossible
in the case of a momentary thing, not all at once because in producing
so many effects this thing will be having a self-contradictory nature. So
Jayanta's real difficulty with momentarism is that a momentary
thing in producing so many effects will be having a self-contradictory
nature. The point is made clear through asking the Buddhist as to
what produces what — one thing produces one thing, or one thing
many things, or many things one thing, or many things many things;
granting that the fourth alternative is the Buddhist's actual alternative
the objection is raised that if one aggregate-of-things produces another
aggregate-of-things then it is difficult to decide as to which thing
belonging to the former aggregate is the cause of which thing
belonging to the latter. The Buddhist's suggestion that each thing
belonging to the former aggregate acts as material cause to a
corresponding thing belonging to the latter and as an accessory cause
to the remaining things belonging to the latter is rejected on the
ground that in thus acting as material cause as well as an accessory
cause the thing will be having a self-contradictory nature. So, this
was what Jayanta had in mind while urging his main difficulty against
momentarism. But for a moment he sets aside even this difficulty; for
now it is contended that it is difficult to understand as to what is
meant by saying that a thing acts as material cause to another thing.
For suppose the aggregate made up of four things x, y, z, w produces
the aggregate made up of four things \(x^1, y^1, z^1, w^1\) and the Buddhist
says that \(x\) acts as material cause to \(x^1\) and as an accessory cause to
\(y^1, z^1, w^1\), \(y\) acts as material cause to \(y^1\) and as an accessory cause
to \(x^1, z^1, w^1\), and so on and so forth; then Jayanta asks as to what
special relation holds between \(x\) and \(x^1\), \(y\) and \(y^1\), etc. In this
connection he in essence rejects three alternative suggestions, viz. \(x\)
and \(x^1\) are absolutely dissimilar but \(x^1\) arises when \(x\)
perishes, that \(x\) and \(x^1\) are absolutely similar, that \(x\) and \(x^1\) are partly
similar. Really, it should not be difficult to watch the progress of
each thing belonging to an aggregate and decide as to when it is
followed by something very much similar to it and when by
something very much dissimilar (there being no question of it being
followed by something absolutely similar). Then Jayanta decides to
ignore even this difficulty and raises an even more fundamental one; for now he says that the Buddhist has no right to talk of causation at all, the former's point being that x causes y by first coming into existence and then undertaking an operation, all which is impossible in case x exists for just one moment. To this is added that the mere fact that x is followed by y will not guarantee that x causes y, there being also possible cases of accidental succession. Here lies a vital point of difference dividing Jayanta from the Buddhist. Certainly, the former is banking on the circumstance that when an aggregate of things is followed by another where all constituent elements are correspondingly similar then in common parlance one does not speak of there being any causation; for it is only in case some new element appears on the scene then one commonly speaks of there being causation. The Buddhist pleads that the former succession of aggregates too is a case of causal succession even if it is usual to treat only the latter succession as such a case; Jayanta retorts that the latter succession alone is a case of causal succession. Thus the Buddhist would say that something new is produced when the concerned material cause happens to acquire a special set of accessories, his point being that otherwise this material cause would have produced something similar to itself; on the other hand, Jayanta would say that something new is produced when all the constituent elements of the concerned causal aggregate gather together, his point being that otherwise these constituent elements would have produced nothing. In this background it should be easy to understand why Jayanta addresses the Buddhist as follows: "Thus a non-momentary thing can exist well before acting as a cause, because the remaining members of the concerned causal aggregate are not yet available to it; similarly, it can exist well after acting as a cause, because these members are again unavailable to it. Nor is it proper to suppose that a causal process must be over within a moment, it being rather necessary for this process to take at least several moments." Thus are refuted two of the four crucial arguments advanced by the Buddhist in support of momentarism. The third so-called argument emphasising that it is a self-contradictory proposition that a real thing is non-momentary is rightly dismissed without much ceremony. But there yet remains the fourth argument emphasising that a real thing is momentary because its destruction requires no cause. While refuting this Jayanta in essence submits that on this logic the Buddhist might as well say that the
production of a thing requires no cause, a misleading submission.59 For to say that the destruction of a produced thing requires no cause is to say that a produced thing must perish, the latter statement being acceptable to Jayanta himself; on the other hand, to say that the production of a thing requires no cause is just senseless. And when the Buddhist argues that if the destruction of a real thing must require a cause then this thing might as well never perish Jayanta trots out those remarks about Lord Rāma’s coronation-jars and all that.60 Really, in an atheistic world-picture as is the one painted by the Buddhist an element of constant change is a logical necessity while a theistic philosopher like Jayanta can console himself with the belief that under God’s over-all supervision world-events can stay static or can make a slow or fast move as might suit the circumstance. In any case, here closes Jayanta’s examination of the four fundamental arguments seeking to vindicate momentarism. Then he considers the observations made by the Buddhist as regards the testimony of recognition and perception. As we have noted, these observations are mostly misconceived. Thus we have been told that the phenomenon of recognition does not go against momentarism because recognition is not a case of valid cognition. So, Jayanta shows at length how recognition is a case of valid cognition.61 The demonstration is essentially valid, but then the Buddhist was right in pleading that if a valid inference establishes momentarism then no sort of testimony can upset momentarism, a plea against which Jayanta offers a lame counter-plea as follows: “There certainly is no general rule to the effect that the testimony of perception is superior to that of inference. For there obviously are cases of illusory perception. But in the present case the testimony of perception-of-the-form-of-recognition does set aside the findings of an inference offered by way of vindicating momentarism.”62 Certainly, the undeniable fact that a thing encountered in everyday life exhibits recognizable similarity for a longer or shorter while does not rule out the possibility that this thing nevertheless undergoes change from moment to moment. Lastly, Jayanta argues that the testimony of perception refutes momentarism because an act of perception having the same thing for its object can last for several moments,63 just as the Buddhist had argued that the testimony of perception vindicates momentarism because an act of perception lasts for just one moment. Since by ‘perception’ the Buddhist understands bare sensory experience and Jayanta perceptual
cognition proper, both are correct in stating their premises but the
desired conclusion follows in neither case. For bare sensory experience
is not at all a case of cognition proper while an ordinary perceptual
cognition lasting for several moments and having the same thing for
its object does not rule out the possibility that this thing undergoes
change from moment to moment.

To his above refutation directed against the doctrine of
momentarism Jayanta appends a brief set of verses seeking to assail the
doctrine of no-soul, but this set is a literal and wholesale borrowing
from Kumārila.64 The chief points made here are as follows: (1)
‘Coordination’ between a present cognition and a past one is impossible
unless both cognitions are had by one and the same cogniser. (2) It is
an untenable position that one has cognition all the time, that is, even
during a state of sleep, swoon or the like. (3) It is impossible for an
intangible thing-like, a cognition-series to get transferred from one body
to another at the time of death or even to get transferred from one place
to another along with the associated body.

Jayanta closes his present chapter with a brief section devoted
to a criticism of the Cārvāka’s materialist position. The occasion for
it arises because certain Cārvākas had conceded that an act of
cognition is undertaken not by the body concerned but by an
unchanging associated element independent of this body and lasting
so long as this body lasts; this way they might have thought possible
to meet Jayanta’s criticism that ‘coordination’ of two experiences is
not possible on the part of a living body inasmuch as this body
changes from moment to moment.65 However, they denied that the
cogniser in question transmigrates from one body to another, their
point being that nobody recalls an experience allegedly had with the
help of a previous body.66 Against all this Jayanta’s simple criticism
is that there is no conceivable reason why a cogniser thus posited
should perish along with the associated body.67 Really, the position
in question is somewhat unusual for a materialist, and Jayanta
advises its advocates that instead of indulging in an oddity like this
they should rather stick to the usual materialist position according to
which consciousness is a property of a living body itself.68 As for
this usual materialist position Jayanta claims that he has already
refuted it.69 Really, he has raised against this position just a minor
objection or two and that too in passing. In any case, his
preoccupation with the present materialist position leads Jayanta to
say a few things about transmigration, for even the position in question after all denies transmigration. Thus he rather unexpectedly concedes that a soul does not transmigrate from one body to another, but his point is that that is so because a soul is something ubiquitous. And this point is buttressed by positively submitting that one is in a position to perform conscious acts wherever one is and negatively that a body-sized soul cannot be something unchanging while a soul confined to some one part of body cannot activise the whole of this body. To this is added that even if ubiquitous a soul can perform conscious acts only at a place where the body available to it happens to be located, this body being an indispensable instrument of conscious activity. In this connection Jayanta recalls that the Nyāyasūtra aphorist has argued in support of rebirth on the ground that even a new-born babe expresses joy or sorrow, an expression impossible in the absence of a past experience associated with joy or sorrow. The materialist’s suggestion that the babe’s expression of joy or sorrow is due to some recent experience of this life itself is rejected as ungrounded. The materialist pleads: “The babe expressing joy or sorrow is a natural process just like the unfolding of the petals of a lotus”; Jayanta retorts: “To say about a process that it is natural is not to explain this process. And the explanation is that the unfolding of the petals of a lotus is a physical process brought about through physical factors while the expression of joy or sorrow is a conscious process necessitating the positing of a soul.” Jayanta’s general understanding as to what a real explanation is and what it is not is unexceptionable, and yet it is a moot point whether conscious activity necessitates the positing of an extra-body soul. His anti-materialist critique Jayanta closes with the submission that certain happenings pertaining to the life of a living being remain unexplained in terms of observable factors related to this life, this necessitating the positing of karma-done-in-a-past-life (= adṛṣṭa, lit. unseen) as the needed explanatory factor. Perhaps, Jayanta has to be reminded of his own recent advice that if in connection with some problem an explanatory factor is not readily at hand then it has to be strenuously looked for, but the difficulty is that he remembers this advice well and in fact claims that it is in conformity to this advice that in connection with the present problem he posits past-life in the form of an explanatory factor.
TEN PRAMEYAS BODY ETC.

Of the twelve topics covered under the second Nyāya padārtha prameya the first called ‘soul’ has been dealt with in Āhnika VII, the last called ‘mokṣa’ will be dealt with in Āhnika IX, and both discussions are somehow important. But the remaining ten topics have been all dealt with in the present chapter (Āhnika VIII) and the discussion connected with them is of a routine type, except for the detailed refutation of Sāṅkhya metaphysics undertaken while considering the topic buddhi (= cognition). So, it will do if we just note as to what questions Jayanta raises in connection with these ten topics and then give thought to his refutation of Sāṅkhya metaphysics. We take up these topics one by one.

(1) Body

The aphorist says that body is the locus of activity, sense-organs, thing-cognised.¹ Jayanta explains that by ‘activity’ is to be understood not any and every activity but that which is undertaken exclusively under the supervision of a soul’s endeavour;² really, the explanation amounts to saying that by ‘activity’ is to be understood the activity undertaken by a living body. Then it is explained that a sense-organ is in fact independent of the body in which it resides but that this body is said to be the locus of this sense-organ because a harm done to this body harms this sense-organ, a favour done to this body favours this sense-organ;³ really, it is a curious Nyāya position that a bodily part ordinarily supposed to constitute a sense-organ is not this sense-organ itself but just the locus of this sense-organ which by itself is something invisible. Lastly, it is explained that by ‘thing-cognised’ are to be understood the five sensory qualities colour, taste, etc. whose locus a body is because these qualities as belonging to this object or that are enjoyed by a soul only when associated with a body,⁴ a curious explanation indeed. To these explanations is added the submission that a human body is made up of just one element earth even if the other four elements water etc. play a role in its construction, just as a jar is made up
of just earth even if water etc. play a role in its construction; in all probability, a submission of this sort has been made with a view to sustaining the general supposition that a composite body cannot be made up of heterogeneous component parts.

(2) Sense-organ

The aphorist says that the five sense-organs nose, tongue, eye, skin, ear are made up of physical elements. By way of explaining Jayanta first submits that the visible body-parts nose, tongue etc. are not themselves the sense-organs in question but are the locus of these sense-organs which are themselves invisible. To this it is added that the sense-organs cannot grasp their respective objects unless it be maintained that they are made up of the physical elements; the understanding is that the four sense-organs nose etc. are made up of the four physical elements earth etc. while the sense-organ ear is of the form of sky confined within the ear-drum. The point is made clear by way of refuting the Sāṅkhya objection that the sense-organs are made up of āhuṁkāra rather than the physical elements because in the latter case a sense-organ like eye should not grasp a distant-lying object; the refutation consists in pointing out that the sense-organ eye is not the visible eye-spot but something invisible made up of fire which actually reacts up to the object grasped through eye. It is granted that a medicine applied to the eye-spot improves the efficiency of the sense-organ eye but the explanation is that that is so because the eye-spot is the locus of the sense-organ eye. The suggestion that the sense-organ eye grasps its object without reacting up to this object is rejected on the ground that no sense-organ can grasp its object without coming in contact with this object. However, the Sāṅkhya position that a sense-organ reacts up to its object because it is made up of āhuṁkāra rather than a physical element is rejected on the ground that in that case nothing should distinguish one sense-organ from another. Essentially on the same ground is rejected an anonymous position according to which all sense-organs are of the form of skin, though different because of being located in different body-parts. Really, this seems to be a sensible enough position, in any case more sensible than the one defended by Jayanta who for some reasons is highly sarcastic in referring to this position calling its advocates ‘gods in the form of men’. Lastly is criticised the Sāṅkhya
practice of applying the designation ‘indriya’ not only to the five sense-organs nose, tongue etc. but also to the five bodily parts hands, feet, etc. the former being called jñānendriya (= cognition-producing indriya), the latter karmendriya (= action-producing indriya); the point of criticism is that on this logic there will be no end to the number of indriyas.  

(3) Objects of sense-organs

The aphorist says that objects of sense-organs are the qualities smell, taste, colour, touch and sound belonging to earth etc. Jayanta explains that smell, taste etc. are alone called ‘objects of sense-organs’ because they alone generate in one attachment for a life of worldly enjoyment and thus involve one in the cycle of transmigration. Really, in this connection any explanation is as good as another, but the noteworthy point is that Jayanta here gets an occasion to inform about his school’s position as to which physical element possesses which of the five qualities in question; thus according to this position earth possesses the four qualities smell, taste, colour, touch, water the last three, fire the last two, air touch alone, while sky possesses sound alone. By way of clarification it is added that generally a physical element is found with some amount of other elements mingled with it but that a sense-organ is exclusively made up of the physical element concerned. All this is broadly understandable except for the purely technical character of the concept of sky.

(4) Cognition

The aphorist says that the words ‘buddhi’, ‘upalabdhi’ and ‘jñāna’ are synonymous. Jayanta explains that thus are criticised the Sāṅkhya philosophers who attribute three different meanings to these three words; his point is that according to his school they all mean ‘cognition’. Then follows a detailed refutation of the whole Sāṅkhya metaphysics, a refutation we intend to examine after all the ten topics under consideration have been reviewed. This refutation over, Jayanta explains as to how cognition is conceived by his school. According to this explanation cognition is an operation of the form of apprehending an object, an operation which is over within no time; again, even if the causal aggregate producing a cognition consists of so many members like an external object, a sense-organ, a manas, a lamp, a word this cognition is a quality not of these
external object etc. but of the concerned soul-acting-as-a-cogniser. To this is added that how a cognition conceived as a quality of a momentary duration can belong to an eternal, ubiquitous soul is to be understood exactly after the manner in which a sound conceived as a quality of a momentary duration belongs to the eternal, ubiquitous sky. Hence is to be understood why two cognitions cannot co-exist in the same soul just as two sounds cannot be uttered by the same speaker, but since even a momentary entity exists for three moments a cognition (or a sound) experiencing its last moment can well co-exist with a cognition (or a sound) experiencing its first moment. All this is interesting, but we already know what the difficulty is with Jayant's notion of a soul or sky.

(5) Manas (= Internal cognitive Organ)

The aphorist says that the absence of a simultaneous origination of numerous cognitions is the ground for positing a manas. Jayanta explains that two sensory cognitions pertaining to two different sense-organs cannot be produced simultaneously because the production of a sensory cognition requires that the manas concerned comes in contact with the sense-organ concerned while a manas cannot simultaneously come in contact with more than one sense-organ. By way of support it is added that manas has a role to play in the production of a sensory cognition because such a cognition can be recalled even in case the sense-organ concerned is permanently damaged. Then it is submitted that in the production of a non-sensory cognition like memory, anticipation, doubt, inference, verbal testimony, cognition of a mental state, the manas concerned plays the role of instrument inasmuch as all production of an effect requires an instrument while nothing else can conceivably play the role of an instrument in the present case. Similarly, it is submitted that in the very production of a mental state (and not only in its cognition) the manas concerned has a role to play inasmuch as all production of an effect requires an asamavāyikārāna while the only thing that can play the role of an asamavāyikārāna in the present case is the contact of the manas concerned with the soul concerned; (asamavāyikārāna is a highly technical concept of the Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika school and can be roughly understood as a certain type of quality residing in the thing acting as the locus of the effect concerned). Lastly, it is submitted
that in the very presence of life the \textit{manas} concerned has a role to play inasmuch as the very definition of a living body is a body possessing \textit{manas} with which the soul concerned is in contact.\textsuperscript{29} The idea is that the birth of a body means the entry into this body of the \textit{manas} associated with the soul concerned, the death of a body means the exit from this body of such a \textit{manas}.\textsuperscript{30} Besides, we are informed that a \textit{manas} is non-ubiquitous (really, atomic) in size because otherwise it should be possible for it to simultaneously come in contact with two sense-organs\textsuperscript{31} and that it is capable of moving about because otherwise it should not be possible for it to guide the functioning of different sense-organs.\textsuperscript{32} It could well be that the concept of \textit{manas} was originally posited in order to account for the function mentioned by the aphorist. But the most understandable function of a \textit{manas} is to act as an instrument for perceiving a mental state, just as eye etc. act as an instrument for perceiving a physical thing (this being the reason why \textit{manas} is also called \textit{antahkarana} or ‘internal cognitive organ’); the other most understandable function of a \textit{manas} is to act as vehicle of transmigration (this being necessary because transmigration is not possible on the part of a soul itself which is conceived as something ubiquitous). And when once posited, \textit{manas} was supplied with a suitable description that should conform to the technical demands posed by the Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika ontology and logic.

Here closes Jayanta’s account of the six ontological topics covered under the \textit{padārthā prameya}, an account which is of some – though minor – importance inasmuch as ontological problems were after all a serious concern of the Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika authors (the Vaiṣeṣika authors being even specialists in such problems); however, this cannot be said about Jayanta’s following account of the six ethical topics (minus one) covered here. For the Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika authors were not so much serious about ethical problems and whatever they had to say in this they would say while dealing with \textit{mokṣa} which also happens to be the last of the six topics in question. The topic \textit{mokṣa} is taken up in the next chapter and here is what Jayanta says about the remaining five.

\textbf{(1) Activity}

The aphorist says that activity is of the form of an operation undertaken through speech, \textit{manas} or body.\textsuperscript{33} Jayanta explains that
an activity might be sinful or virtuous and enumerates ten types of each - in each case four types having to do with speech, three with manas, three with body. More importantly he submits that an activity as thus understood is momentary as is all action but that it leaves behind in the soul concerned an 'impression' which persists there till the fruit of this activity is not reaped, the technical name for this 'impression' being dharma-cum-adharma.

(2) Moral Defilement

The aphorist says that a moral defilement is what gives rise to an activity. Answering an objection Jayanta submits that even if a moral defilement is an object of direct introspection it is here defined so indirectly in order to make clear its role in one's involvement in the cycle of rebirths. To this is added that a moral defilement belongs to one of the three types, viz. attachment, aversion, delusion - specific instances pertaining to each type being enumerated. Lastly it is argued that delusion is the most basic type of moral defilement inasmuch as it initiates the remaining two types.

(3) Rebirth

The aphorist says that being born again is what is called rebirth. Jayanta explains that there is no question of a body being born again but that even a soul is born again only in the sense that it gets associated with a new body. In this connection Jayanta undertakes to vindicate the atomic hypothesis under the pretext of explaining how a body is made up of atoms. His basic argument is that a physical body like a jar can be either not made up of parts, or made up of an infinite number of parts, or made up of a finite number of parts but that the first two alternatives being untenable the last has to be accepted, an acceptance amounting to endorsing the atomic hypothesis. Then it is argued that atoms being inanimate they cannot go to make up things of the world unless they are guided by an omniscient and omnipresent God. Lastly it is submitted that a combination of two invisible particles cannot be visible but that a combination of even three atoms cannot be visible, so that what happens is that two atoms first combine into a dyad and then three dyads combine into a triad which becomes visible.

(4) Fruit of Action

The aphorist says that fruit of action is the thing that results from an activity coupled with a moral defilement. Jayanta explains that
what ultimately results in this connection is pleasure or pain but that
since body etc. which are instrumental in this ultimate result are also
meant to be mentioned here the word ‘thing’ is specially used here.46
Then it is submitted that an activity has an immediate result which
ensues inevitably and a long-term result whose accrual depends on
all sorts of circumstances as earlier explained while defending the
efficacy of a Vedic ritual.47 Lastly is repeated the earlier made point
that an activity leaves behind in the soul concerned an ‘impression’
that lasts there till the result of this activity is not reaped.48

(5) Pain

The aphorist says that pain is what is of the form of
discomfort.49 Jayanta explains that all the things of the world, since
they cause discomfort, are meant to be mentioned here.50 Then by
way of clarification it is added that the intention here is to emphasise
that what apparently yields pleasure is equally a source of pain in
the ultimate count.51 Lastly it is submitted that under the earlier topic
‘fruit of action’ things of the world are described in their capacity
as a result yielded by an activity on a being’s part while under the
present topic they are morally evaluated.52

Having thus disposed of the ten topics covered under the
padārtha prameya and dealt with by Jayanta in the present chapter,
we consider his refutation of Sāṅkhya metaphysics in general which
he undertakes while treating the topic buddhi (= cognition). The
occasion for the refutation arises because unlike the Naiyāyika the
Sāṅkhya philosopher does not equate the three words buddhi,
upalabdhi and jñāna but attributes to them three different meanings.
Of course, Jayanta must have been waiting for an opportunity to
settle accounts with the Sāṅkhya school towards which he, like other
authors on logic, harboured an attitude of ambivalence. For these
authors loved to say things about the Sāṅkhya school because it was
so old and revered while they disdained to say things about it
because having produced no outstanding logicians of its own it was
bogged in a mire of all sorts of archaisms. Jayanta himself has until
now taken notice of a Sāṅkhya position on extremely rare occasions,
and as if by way of compensation he now decides to finish the
matter on a wholesale level.

Jayanta begins by describing in details the whole of the Sāṅkhya
ontological scheme, but since for the most part this description
consists either of dogmatic assertions or childish arguments it occupies not much space and he closes it with the mocking remark: "Oh! our heart having been attracted by the enjoyment produced by the story told by the poet Kapila we have blurted out so many relevant and irrelevant things." Really, much of what Jayanta reports is not directly relevant for his purpose and we too confine our attention to what is thus relevant. Thus according to the Sāṅkhyaite cognition takes place when a sense-organ undergoes a modification corresponding to the object concerned while buddhi too undergoes a corresponding modification which gets linked with the former modification; now this latter modification is what the puruṣa (= soul) concerned sees—which seeing is no form of activity but a mere casting of a reflection; consequently, buddhi which is really devoid of awareness appears to be possessed of awareness while the puruṣa which is really devoid of all activity appears to be possessed of an activity. In this Jayanta particularly notes that buddhi is distinguished from jñāna on the one hand and upalabdhi on the other—‘jñāna’ being the designation for the above described modification undergone by buddhi and ‘upalabdhi’ for the above described seeing on the puruṣa’s part; besides, he notes that buddhi is here conceived as something eternal and hence capable of performing acts like ‘coordinating a past experience and a present one’ which require an eternal agent, also that it is supposed possible that buddhi should cease to function in respect of a puruṣa which has attained mokṣa while continuing to function in respect of one which has not. Obviously, all this is too much for Jayanta who first of all attacks the idea of attributing awareness to a puruṣa and ‘coordination’, cognition, ascertainment etc. to buddhi which moreover is treated as something inanimate, this point being that the functions thus attributed to buddhi are the functions of a soul itself so that it is redundant to posit buddhi by the side of a puruṣa. And granting the validity of this duplication it is argued that if cognition consists in buddhi casting reflection in a puruṣa then it should be impossible to distinguish between buddhi and a puruṣa inasmuch as the two are now never cognised apart from each other; the suggestion that buddhi being something inanimate easily gets distinguished from a puruṣa which is not
something inanimate is rejected on the ground that buddhi, since it performs acts like cognition etc., cannot be something inanimate.\(^{57}\) To this is added that the Sāṅkhyaite himself says that the characteristic attribute of buddhi appears as if present in a puruṣa and vice versa, Jayanta’s point being that it should not be much difficult for the Sāṅkhyaite to do away with the duplication in question; the plea that a puruṣa after all requires an eternal instrument is rejected on the ground that this eternal instrument should be conceived after the manner of manas posited by the Naiyāyika.\(^{58}\) Then Jayanta pointedly asks the Sāṅkhyaite as to why a puruṣa should be treated as something inactive and its apparent activity attributed to the so-called buddhi.\(^{59}\) The latter pleads: “If a puruṣa be something active then its past acts being endless in number it should never attain mokṣa; on the other hand, if activity belongs to prakṛti we can say that it binds a puruṣa through its activity and also releases it when its true nature is realised by this puruṣa”; Jayanta calls this plea ‘idiocy of the whole world’ and retorts: “Mokṣa should rather be impossible if it be due to the activity of an inanimate thing like prakṛti; for about such a thing there can be no knowing as to when it will act, when not, in respect of which puruṣa it will act, in respect of which not.”\(^{60}\) To all this criticism directly relevant for his purpose Jayanta adds a general criticism of the Sāṅkhya doctrine of prakṛti and its successive transformations, and an even more general criticism of the Sāṅkhya doctrine of causation. Thus the whole account of the alleged transformations successively undergone by prakṛti is first summarily dismissed as ‘an utterly blind tradition inherited from the past generations of teachers’, not something based on a solid evidence;\(^{61}\) not much later on, it is pooh-poohed as ‘a new Viśvāmitra-like creation undertaken by the Sāṅkhyaite sage.”\(^{62}\) In this connection a particular butt of criticism is the idea that prakṛti which is the root-stuff of things inanimate is possessed of pleasure, pain and delusion, the point being that it is rather the things inanimate which produce pleasure, pain and delusion.\(^{63}\) Also rejected as plainly ridiculous is the idea that buddhi produces ahaṁkāra (=ego-sense), ahaṁkara the five sense-organs and the five sensory qualities, the five sensory qualities the five physical elements – the point being that buddhi is but cognition, ahaṁkara a type of cognition, while the order-of-production here posited makes no sense at all.\(^{64}\) Then recalling that
it is the Sāṅkhyite’s argument that prakṛti possesses pleasure etc. because things inanimate which are a product of prakṛti cause pleasure etc. – it being his understanding that the cause must possess what the effect exhibits – Jayanta decides to criticise the Sāṅkhya doctrine of causation in general. The Sāṅkhyite’s central point is that if an effect does not already exist in the cause then an attempt to produce this effect should be like an attempt to produce something fictitious while about a fictitious thing there can be no rule that such and such a cause is required to produce it. This whole mode of talking makes no sense to Jayanta who simply wonders how (for example) a jar can be said to already exist in the clay out of which it is subsequently produced; certainly, the jar as such is not present there in the clay while it makes no sense to say that it is present there in the form of clay (for clay is clay, not a jar). But then the Sāṅkhyite has submitted that to produce a non-existing effect is like producing a fictitious thing; Jayanta retorts: “We say that what is something non-existent is produced, not that what is produced is something non-existent. Thus there certainly are non-existent things which are fictitious and hence incapable of being produced, but there are also non-existent things which are not fictitious and hence capable of being produced. As for what non-existent things are produced through what causes, we have been taught that by the generations of our predecessors.” To this is added: “Really, the boot is on the other leg. For there should be no point in producing an effect which already exists. Moreover, since a causal chain can be traced back as long as one wishes any thing can be proved to be the cause of anything. Thus one can say that the riverside sands where sesame-seeds are sown are the ultimate cause of the sesame-oil so that there should be nothing incongruous about expecting the presence of the sesame-oil in sands. Or take another example. The food consumed is ultimately turned into excretion, but it would be abominable to say that excretion is present in this food.” There is much sense in what Jayanta says, particularly in view of the crude way in which the Sāṅkhyite has pleaded his case.
LIBERATION AND ITS MEANS
REFUTATION OF ILLUSIONISM

The twelfth and the last topic covered under the padārtha prameya is apavarga or mokṣa, and it is this that Jayanta takes up in the present chapter (Āhnika IX). Following two relevant aphorisms of Nyāyaśīrṣa he in this connection discusses two questions, viz. (i) what condition characterises the state of mokṣa and (ii) what means lead to the attainment of mokṣa. But to this discussion is appended one which, though very important in itself, has nothing particular to do with the problem of mokṣa. For here Jayanta refutes the illusionist world-outlook as variously presented by three schools of Indian philosophy, an outlook that was a constant menace to all sober philosophising in our country. He would, of course, say that this refutation is relevant for a discussion on mokṣa inasmuch as an advocacy of illusionism is incompatible with a belief in mokṣa, but this sort of thing will be said by all Indian philosopher having one religious persuasion against all his rival having another. Be that as it may, we first examine Jayanta’s discussion of those two questions related to the problem of mokṣa and then his refutation of these three illusionist schools of Indian philosophy.

(1) What Condition Characterises the State of Mokṣa?

The aphorist says that an absolute release from pain is what constitutes mokṣa. Jayanta explains that here pain means all experience of things which is in fact conducive to pain, so that an absolute release from pain means an absolute absence of nine qualities cognition, pleasure, pain etc. which characterise a soul in its embodied state. Really, a philosopher’s concept of mokṣa is logically entailed by his concept of an embodied soul, for mokṣa is after all nothing but the disembodied existence of a soul; and since mokṣa is aspired after because here all misery is supposed to vanish for good, it is natural for one believing in mokṣa to say that all worldly experience is somehow of the form of pain. Now Jayanta has already explained the topic pain by saying that all things of the
world are somehow a source of pain. Similarly, he has already argued that a soul is of the form of a substance which experiences consciousness not always but only when apprehending an object, an apprehension necessarily requiring the aid of a body appropriately equipped with the sense-organs and a manas. It is therefore only logical that Jayanta should evaluate mokṣa as a state in which a soul is rid of all conscious experience. But such a concept of mokṣa was ridiculed by the Vedāntist on the ground that the state of mokṣa in which a soul leads a stone-like existence without experiencing any sort of pleasure is worse than the worldly state where one after all experiences pleasure once in a while, his point being that the state of mokṣa must be characterised by an experience of pleasure and hence by consciousness.  

As we shall learn, this Vedāntist is an illusionist according to whom one soul (called Brahma) ever possessed of consciousness and bliss is alone real, so that in his scheme of things attainment of mokṣa means attainment of the realisation that everything except the one soul thus conceived is an illusion, a realisation accompanied by an ever-present bliss (and, of course, an ever-present consciousness).  

Jayanta was extremely contemptuous of this Vedāntist mode of talking because he found it devoid of all logic. But he knew that the Vedāntist chiefly relied on the Upanisadic passages where a soul experiencing mokṣa is described as blissful; so to the word ‘bliss’ occurring in these passages Jayanta attributed the meaning ‘absence of pain’ and meaningfully added: “Nothing is impossible for Lord Interpretation”, besides he quoted in his support an Upanisadic passage where a soul leading the state of mokṣa is said to experience neither things favourable nor things unfavourable.  

Really, Jayanta had nothing to lose or gain by what an Upanisadic passage said or did not say, but as a loyal champion of Vedic orthodoxy he had to resort to the acrobatic in question. However, this part of the performance over, he mocked at the Vedāntist as follows: “So, according to you there is in a soul an eternal bliss and an eternal consciousness. Why not also posit in it an eternal body and an eternal set of sense-organs? That would make a still more fine state of mokṣa.” And then explaining his point he argues: “You say that no sensible person will aspire after mokṣa if it is conceived as a state devoid of bliss. Well, let him not aspire. But simply in order to attract people we cannot defy logic and say that the state of mokṣa is characterised
by bliss.' In this connection Jayanta criticises another extreme position according to which there is experienced no pleasure even in the worldly state, a position Jayanta does not require; really, this man is only following the example set by Jayanta himself while once interpreting 'bliss' as 'absence of pain' and, moreover, like all believers in mokṣa Jayanta himself is of the view that the entire worldly experience is somehow of the form of pain.8 Lastly, Jayanta has a dig at the Buddhist according to which mokṣa means an interruption, a permanent interruption put to the concerned series of cognitive states; thus the former rightly remarks: "The idea that mokṣa means an interruption put to the concerned series of cognitive states is undesirable even from the standpoint of a Naiyāyika. For then there remains not even something leading a stonelike existence." Really, Jayanta should know from his own experience that one conceives mokṣa as is demanded by the logic of one's over-all position, and the Buddhist’s conception in question does follow from the logic of his over-all position; (the same is true of the Vedāntist, however fantastic might be the logic of his over-all position). Even so, the discussion of the present section enables us to form a good idea of how Jayanta on the one hand and his Vedāntist rival on the other conceive mokṣa as suited to their respective conceptions of a soul as such. Then Jayanta proceeds to enquire as to what means lead to the attainment of mokṣa, an enquiry essentially ethico-theological in character – this in contrast to the present one which is essentially ontological in character.

(2) What Means Lead to the Attainment of Mokṣa

The aphorist says that mokṣa is attained when one after another have vanished wrong understanding, moral defilement, activity, birth, pain.1 Jayanta explains that birth means ‘a soul's association with a body, sense-organs etc.’2 All this gives us some idea as to why some of the topics covered under the padārtha prameya are soul, body, sense-organ, manas, activity, moral defilement, rebirth, fruit of action, pain – they being topics specially relevant for an enquiry into mokṣa which itself is another topic covered under prameya. Offering another explanation Jayanta says that the causal chain under description has wrong understanding for its first item simply because this chain must start somewhere, his point being that otherwise wrong understanding itself is impossible unless birth is there; to this is added
that the chain starts with wrong understanding because it is easy to see that right understanding puts an end to wrong understanding and thus ultimately leads to *mokṣa*. This initiates a long drawn out discussion as to why nothing save right understanding is the proper means for attaining *mokṣa*. In this connection Jayanta first argues against the position that *mokṣa* is impossible and then against the position that the proper means for attaining *mokṣa* is not right understanding alone but it coupled with religious ritual. The noteworthy thing is that the first opponent is not the materialist but some Brahmin (really, some man of straw) who urges two points as follows: (1) Vedas call upon one to perform religious ritual as long as one lives (getting them performed through some one else in case one gets too old for that), but since a religious ritual must yield happy result in a future life this means that Vedas do not envisage the possibility of one’s getting rid of the cycle of rebirths. (2) It is impossible for any one to overcome passions of life, so that impelled by passions one is bound to act and bound to be reborn in order to reap the fruits of one’s past-*karmas*. The suggestion that right understanding can at once put an end to an accumulated mass of past-*karmas* is rejected as groundless, the point being that a past *karma* can come to an end only through yielding its appropriate fruit. This opponent Jayanta answers by submitting that the Vedic passages calling upon one to perform religious rituals throughout one’s life are not to be taken literally, their purport simply being to laud these rituals. To this is added that certain Vedic passages and most clearly *Manu* speak of the fourth life-stage called *sārinyāsa* where religious rituals are to be given up and *mokṣa* exclusively sought after, the latter devoting the whole of his sixth chapter to the duties of a *sārinyāsa*. Not only that, quoting some unidentified source Jayanta even supports the idea that one who is morally strong enough might adopt the career of a *sārinyāsa* without at all leading the life of a house-holder. Then is answered at length the opponent’s objection that it is impossible for any one to overcome passions of life, Jayanta’s central point being that through a constant reflection over the harmful consequences that follow from an indulgence in passions one finds oneself in a position to resist the temptation of passions altogether. However, Jayanta has a lot of difficulty with the objection that a past *karma* can come to an end only through yielding its appropriate fruit so that no amount of constant reflection inspired
by right understanding should put an end to the accumulated mass of one’s past-karmas; this difficulty remains there even on the supposition that an act done by one possessed of right understanding results in no fresh accumulation of karmas. Here Jayanta considers the following four alternative answers while himself lending support to the last one:

(i) A yogin’s good past karmas come to an end through yielding him pleasure of all sorts while the evil ones come to an end through the pain suffered by him in the course of penances.

(ii) The above view is not tenable because an evil past karma can come to an end only through yielding its own appropriate fruit, not through yielding pain suffered in the course of a penance. So, what happens is that a yogin creates numerous bodies for himself equipping them with the manas-s given up by the released souls and lying there defunct, these bodies being an instrument for reaping the fruit of all the past karmas in due fashion.

(iii) It is no use positing this hypothesis of numerous bodies, the correct position being that right understanding is a fit instrument for putting an end to the past karmas all at once; after all, it is scriptural texts that tell us that a past karma comes to an end through yielding its appropriate fruit and again it is a scriptural text like Gitā that tells us that right understanding burns down all the past karmas.

(iv) It is not proper to maintain that right understanding puts an end to all past karmas, the correct position being that after the rise of right understanding a past karma fails to yield fruit just as a seed preserved inside granary (or a damaged seed even if properly sown in a field) fails to produce a sprout; the point is that wrong understanding is a necessary accessory for a past karma yielding a fruit just as proper sowing in a field is a necessary accessory for a seed producing a sprout.

Then Jayanta considers the position of an opponent who rejects all the four alternatives set forth above including the last one which Jayanta himself endorses; this opponent’s objection against the last alternative is that if in the state of moksha a past karma exists all right then there is no guarantee that this karma will never come to acquire the needed accessories and hence yield its fruit. So, his understanding is that a past karma comes to an end only through
yielding its appropriate fruit even if one possessed of right understanding accumulates no fresh karma, to this is added that even such a one ought to perform the obligatory religious rituals—both daily and occasional—so as to avoid a future disaster even while not resorting to a prohibited act or to a religious ritual aimed at a particular desired result. Really, this is Kumārika's own understanding of the matter but on Jayanta's showing it amounts to denying the possibility of mokṣa inasmuch as such a past karma is well possible which in order to yield its appropriate fruit should require hundreds of future births while it is impossible that no fresh karmas be accumulated in the course of these so many births. As for the present opponent's objection urged against the fourth alternative Jayanta answers it as follows: "You say that if in the state of mokṣa a past karma exists all right then there is no guarantee that this karma will never come to acquire the needed accessories and hence yield its fruit. But on this logic you might as well say that if in the state of mokṣa a soul exists all right then there is no guarantee that this soul will never come to acquire the needed accessories and start a worldly career once more. As a matter of fact, desire, aversion, etc. (born of wrong understanding) are the needed accessories in the case of a past karma and they will never be available to a released soul." Lastly, Jayanta takes exception to the present opponent pleading that on the latter's view the means of mokṣa is right understanding coupled with religious ritual; thus the former argues as follows: "What a religious ritual yields must be temporary in duration while mokṣa is something everlasting. Really, mokṣa means a soul existing in its pristine state and such a state cannot be brought about by any religious ritual. Even with a view to avoiding a future disaster a religious ritual is not necessary, for a saṁnyāsin is expressly called upon to give up all religious ritual. So, what happens is that those not in possession of right understanding are possibly aided in acquiring it through the performance of a religious ritual." Really, in arguing that mokṣa is not something brought about because mokṣa means a soul existing in its pristine state Jayanta is talking like the Vedāntist who argues that mokṣa is not something brought about because bondage is something illusory. Jayanta's simple argument ought to be that since right understanding is sufficient to bring about mokṣa it is wrong to insist that mokṣa is brought about by right understanding assisted
by religious ritual. Be that as it may, Jayanta lastly raises the question as to what and on what authority is to be the subject-matter of that right understanding which brings about \textit{mokṣa}. While answering this question he in effect argues that soul is to be such a subject-matter because a statement to that effect has been made by the author of \textit{Nyāyaśūtra} who in turn must have based himself on the \textit{Upaniṣad} injunction ‘One ought to know soul’ and on a relevant descriptive utterance ‘He does not come back.’ To this is added that even if something brought about \textit{mokṣa}, \textit{mokṣa} is by itself something eternal, not something temporary as is heavenly enjoyment. An alternative view is that the \textit{Upaniṣad} injunction ‘One ought to know soul’ is by itself competent to convey the information that the knowledge in question is aimed at attaining \textit{mokṣa}, the point being that \textit{mokṣa} is nothing but a soul itself in its pristine nature. This last stage of Jayanta’s argumentation makes curious reading because he is here employing the \textit{Mīmāṃsā} terminology to discuss a question which had never bothered the \textit{Mīmāṃsāka}. Thus the \textit{Mīmāṃsāka} used to say that all information as to what religious ritual will yield what result is to be gathered exclusively from a Vedic injunction, but he would notice that in certain cases a Vedic injunction was silent about the result to be yielded by the ritual concerned, so that information about this result had to be picked up from some other passage which could often be a passage occurring in the course of some descriptive utterance; besides, he would notice that in certain cases a Vedic injunction was silent about the result concerned because this result was all too obvious. Now adopting this entire pattern of putting things Jayanta is presently submitting that the information that knowledge of soul leads to \textit{mokṣa} is to be gathered exclusively from a Vedic injunction which on his showing is the \textit{Upaniṣad} injunction ‘One ought to know soul.’ But then he notices that this injunction is silent about the result to be yielded by the knowledge of soul, and looking for a source that would supply the needed information he finds that a descriptive utterance says ‘He does not come back’, a statement which according to him is to be construed as meaning that one knowing soul is rid of transmigration. On an alternative view the injunction in question is self-sufficient inasmuch as a soul as such is a soul as it exists in the state of \textit{mokṣa}, so that an injunction about knowing soul already implies that soul is to be known with
a view to attaining mokṣa. Really, this way of talking about knowledge-of-soul and mokṣa was foreign to the Nyāya tradition which in this connection actually said something essentially un-Vedic. For the Naiyāyika’s basic contention was that knowledge of the sixteen padārthas posited by his school is what leads to mokṣa; and even granting that according to him a knowledge of twelve prameyas is what leads to mokṣa the fact remains that soul is just one of those twelve prameyas. Nay, even granting that according to the Naiyāyika a knowledge of soul is what leads to mokṣa the fact remains that he never appealed to the authority of Vedas while making this assertion and not at all while working out the details of the point thus asserted. So, Jayanta is in fact twisting matters when he says that according to the author of Nyāyasūtra the knowledge of soul leads to mokṣa and that this position has been maintained in deference to the Upaniṣadic injunction ‘One ought to know soul.’ Of course, Jayanta himself offers an account of soul and mokṣa that was traditional with the Naiyāyikas since ever, but the question arises as to why he talks the way he presently does. As a matter of fact, this way of talking was characteristic of the Vedāntists and since ever. For it was the Vedāntist’s claim that his school in conformity to the Upaniṣadic tradition attaches central importance to the knowledge of soul, a knowledge exclusively conducive to mokṣa, while offering an account of soul and mokṣa which in all details tallied with what Upaniṣads taught. Not only that, even while discussing the question as to, whether right understanding or religious ritual is the proper means for attaining mokṣa Jayanta was adopting a procedure that was foreign to the tradition of his Nyāya school but was in line with the tradition of the Vedānta school. For when the Naiyāyika said that right understanding is the means for attaining mokṣa he only meant that one not in possession of right understanding would not attain mokṣa. Thus the idea would never occur to him that mere right understanding, that is, right understanding untranslated into practice, leads to mokṣa. Jayanta himself submits that right understanding enables one to undertake a constant reflection about the harmful consequences of indulgence in passions, a reflection which puts one in a position to resist passions and hence to act in a fashion that no fresh karmas are accumulated; and in making this submission he was being faithful to the tradition of his school. There might be two
opinions as to what he says about religious ritual; for he insists that the performance of a religious ritual does not directly contribute towards the attainment of mokṣa, an insistance which might have been absent from the mind of the early Naiyāyikas who could as well concede that the performance of a religious ritual forms part of the right practice that leads to mokṣa. As against all this, the Vedāntist maintained that mere right understanding is the means for attaining mokṣa; for on his showing mokṣa consists in getting rid of the illusion that there exist things beside the one soul (called Brahman), something that requires mere right understanding and no practice of any sort. And while maintaining this position he vehemently quarrelled with the Mīmāṃsakas who were ardent champions of Vedic ritualism and who were told by him that for the purpose of freeing oneself from the illusion in question one requires religious ritual as little as one requires secular practice of any sort. So, when Jayanta pleaded that the proper means for attaining mokṣa is mere right understanding and not it as assisted by religious ritual he was in essence adopting the Vedāntist’s framework of argumentation, a framework with which his own Nyāya school had nothing to do. For as we have just seen, this school had its own manner of developing its position on the question under consideration, a position which Jayanta himself follows as loyally as was possible for him. The impression is inescapable that Jayanta was working under the impact of a growing influence of the Vedānta school, an impression further confirmed by his decision to undertake a detailed refutation of this school’s ontological tenets. For otherwise, a criticism of Vedānta is extremely rare in the Nyāya texts coming either before or after Jayanta – in those coming before him because then this school was so little influential, in those coming after him because then it was so much influential. Thus when a post-Jayanta Nyāya author felt inclined to refute illusionism he would vent his anger against the Buddhist while sparing the Vedāntist, something like flogging a dead horse while doing nothing about the living one. For the post-Jayanta Nyāya authors were mostly living in a land so empty of Buddhists and so full of Vedāntists. Indeed, the last great Nyāya author to feel the physical presence of Buddhists was Udayana who fortunately also devoted one whole text, viz. Ātmatatttvaviveka to a refutation of Buddhist ontology in general and Buddhist illusionism in particular. But child of his times,
Udayana here says that if one at all wishes to espouse illusionism then let one go in for its Vedic (=Vedāntic) rather than Buddhist variety! In Jayanta’s days a Nyāya author had yet to develop this sort of partisan outlook, and so he criticises in one breath the Vedāntist variety of illusionism and its Buddhist variety while placing in between the variety preached by the grammarians. It is this highly important threefold criticism of illusionism that constitutes the subject-matter of the last section of Jayanta’s present chapter. He here begins by saying that one ought to know soul as conceived by the Nyāya authors, not it as conceived by the so many advocates of monism, and then one by one assails Brahman-monism of the Vedāntist, Śabda-monism of the grammarian and Viṣṇā-monism of the Buddhist.

(3) REFUTATION OF ILLUSIONISM

(i) Brahman-monism of the Vedāntist Refuted

Jayanta first presents the Vedāntist’s case and then criticises it. The Vedāntist begins by submitting that it is false to view things as different from one another, not to view them as non-different, and the following is how in support of this submission he offers the testimony of perception, inference as well as scripture: “That form of a thing which is revealed in perception immediately and irrespective of everything else is the real form of this thing, the rest being a product of imagination; and what is thus revealed in perception is the mere existence of a thing while this thing’s difference from other things emerges into view when this thing is set in relation to these other things.” Again, when a lump of clay successively assuming certain intermediate forms ultimately assumes the form of a jar then these so many forms become an object of practical usage without being ultimately real, for what is here ultimately real is but clay; as is said: “The clay alone is real.” However, viewed in relation to existence as such the form of clay is itself devoid of ultimate reality, for existence is what constitutes ultimate reality everywhere; and this existence is what is called Brahma. Then there are scriptural statements like ‘It is one without a second’ “There is no multiplicity anywhere here while he who sees multiplicity proceeds from death to death.” After all, you yourself concede that Vedas are competent also to describe things (not only to issue practical injunctions). Nor can you say that the testimony
of perception contradicts the scriptural statements in question; for perception is competent only to posit the existence of what it cognises and not to deny anything, so that it cannot deny non-difference inasmuch as such a denial will require the cognition of things other than what it actually cognises.” The opponent asks: “If Brahman is alone real then who is involved in world bondage, who attains mokṣa, and where from this multiplicity of the world?”; the Vedāntist answers: “One who aspires after mokṣa seeks to get rid of nescience while the multiplicity of the world too arises from nescience.”

The opponent asks: “But what is this nescience? For if it is something different from Brahman then why preach the doctrine of non-difference, if it one with Brahman then how to get rid of it?”; the Vedāntist answers: “Such difficulties arise only in the case of positive entities, but nescience is a non-entity inasmuch as it is of the form of a non-apprehension of what is real.”

The opponent asks: “Non-apprehension on whose part? For Brahman must be ever all-knowing while there is nothing else to act as the seat of nescience”; the Vedāntist answers: “Nescience belongs to an individual soul, not to Brahman.” The opponent asks: “What are these individual souls? Are they something different from Brahman or something non-different?”; the Vedāntist answers: “The individual souls are nothing different from Brahman just as the sparks scattered by a lump-of-fire are apparently different from this lump-of-fire and yet are themselves of the form of fire.”

The opponent asks: “Then does nescience belong to Brahman itself?”; the Vedāntist answers: “No, take an analogy. The sky is one and yet depending on the coverages like jar, cloth etc. there variously appear sky-confined-to jar, sky-confined-to-cloth etc. while in that state they also experience a defilement caused by dust, smoke etc.; on the other hand, when these coverages are gone the defilement also goes and these various ‘skies’ get dissolved in one great sky. Similarly, the individual souls experience all sorts of defilement caused owing to the difference falsely introduced by nescience while they get dissolved into one great Brahman when nescience is no more.”

The opponent objects: “But that should involve a mutual dependence. For it is nescience that differentiates Brahman into individual souls while it is an individual soul that suffers from nescience”; the Vedāntist answers: “How does that matter? After all, the whole thing is an affair of nescience. As for the series of a nescience and an individual soul being beginningless,
it can well be beginningless like the series of a seed and a sprout. Certainly, nescience is nothing but the cycle-of-rebirths which is something beginningless according to you too." The opponent asks: "But how should an end be put to nescience that is beginningless? True, nescience is beginningless according to us too; but we can conceive of the means which might put an end to it. On the other hand, such a means should be inconceivable on your supposition"; the Vedāntist answers: "Why inconceivable? We say that a product-of-nescience of the form of means-of mokṣa puts an end to nescience and then itself too ceases, just as one poison calms another poison and then itself too calms down." The opponent asks: "But how can nescience perform a real operation when it is itself of the form of a non-entity?"; the Vedāntist answers: "Even an unreal thing can perform a real operation, just as an illusory snake causes real fear, an unreal arrangement-of-lines stands for a real letter 'g' etc." The opponent objects: "But these lines are themselves real"; the Vadāntist answers: "They are not real in the form of the letter which they stand for." The opponent asks: "But how should Brahman which is ever all-knowing be a seat of nescience?"; the Vedāntist answers: "Recall the analogy of sky-confined-to-jar etc. Moreover, a face when reflected in some shining medium exhibits features which do not actually belong to this face; similarly, Brahman when appearing as an individual soul exhibits features which do not actually belong to Brahman." The opponent objects: "But then all individual souls should attain mokṣa when one does"; the Vedāntist answers: "Again, recall the analogy of sky-confined-to-jar etc. Moreover, one actually sometimes experiences cold sensation in one part of body, hot sensation in another; similarly, one individual soul might attain mokṣa, another might continue in bondage." As can be seen, the Vedāntist's position suffers from one major flaw essentially common to all illusionism. Thus according to it the world of everyday experience is all an illusory show while the true reality lying at the back of this show is Brahman conceived as one soul (possessed of consciousness and bliss); but Brahman as thus conceived never becomes an object of experience for a plain man who therefore sees no reason why the world of his everyday experience be dismissed as an illusory show. [The other varieties of illusionism only differ in conceiving what they consider to be the true reality lying at the back of the illusory world of everyday experience.]
The Vedāntist argues that perception reveals *Brahman* because it reveals the bare existence of a thing, *Brahman* being of the form of bare existence; the argument is untenable inasmuch as perception reveals not the bare existence of a thing but its concrete nature. Again, he offers an inference to the effect that *Brahman* is the true reality lying at the back of all things because all things must be essentially one in nature; this inference too is untenable inasmuch as things of the world need not be individually unreal simply because they are essentially one in nature. Lastly, the Vedāntist appeals to the authority of scriptural texts where things of the world are declared to be in essence one and the multiplicity apparently exhibited by them dismissed as something really non-existent; but a scriptural text can be interpreted in all sorts of ways and in any case it constitutes no independent evidence. For the most part, however, the Vadāntist seeks to sustain his position with the help of analogies usually half-baked. As a matter of fact, this was indicative of the logical immaturity of Vedānta as a school of philosophy and was one reason why this school seldom attracted attention of our great authors on philosophy. But in Jayanta’s time certain extra-logical forces were pushing this school to the forefront and so he was forced to bestow on it the criticism we now follow.

Jayanta begins his criticism with a biting general remark as follows: “You are doubtless expert at taking up an array of deceptive positions and concocting appropriate analogies, but you are poor at saying things based on a solid evidence.” Then he submits that the means of cognition like perception etc., far from establishing non-difference, rather necessarily presuppose a difference obtaining among things. Thus on his showing the forms successively assumed by the lump of clay in the course of a jar being produced are proved to be identical qua clay precisely because they are found to be different qua these various forms. As for the testimony of perception, Jayanta recalls that he has already demonstrated that it lends support to the position that things are mutually identical as well as mutually different, pertinently remarking: “The Buddhist says that perception reveals a thing to be different from everything else while its identity with another thing is a matter of relating this thing with this other thing; you say that perception reveals a thing to be identical with everything else while its difference from another thing is a matter of relating this thing with this other thing. Both of you are
blind dogmatists." Then taking exception to the Vedāntist's contention that perception only posits the existence of what it cognises but does not deny anything, Jayanta says: “A perception cannot cognise x as x unless it cognises x as no not-x. And then we have already shown that perception is competent to cognise an ‘absence’. Thus since perception cognises things as different from one another it cannot be said to have non-difference for its object.” To this is added that inference and verbal testimony are not at all possible without there being a real difference among things - inference, for example, relating a probans and the probandum concerned, verbal testimony relating a word and the meaning concerned. Lastly, Jayanta submits that the scriptural statements repudiating multiplicity are not to be taken literally; thus, for example, if the scripture says that a soul is devoid of all multiplicity the meaning might be that a soul remains one in the midst of the multiplicity of its states or that a soul is one even if a multiplicity of things like body, sense-organs etc. belong to it. As for the Vedāntist’s notion of nescience, Jayanta blandly observes: “In this connection what the opponent has said makes sense, what you have said makes no sense.” Then it is argued that if nescience is supposed to be beginningless, capable of concealing a soul’s real nature, capable of being exterminated, then how can it be something unreal? The Vedāntist asks: “But if nescience is something real how can it be exterminated?”; Jayanta answers: “Only a real thing can be exterminated; nobody exterminates a rabbit’s horn. What one can say is that nescience is something non-eternal, not that it is unreal.” As for the Vedāntist's argument that nescience is something unreal because it is of the form of a mere non-apprehension of what is real, Jayanta submits: “Nescience might as well have a positive form, e.g. doubt and false cognition are not a mere ‘absence’. Moreover, since even ‘prior absence’ is something real, non-apprehension too is not something unreal.” To this is added that if nescience is not something unreal then it must be something real, there being no sense in the Vedāntist’s contention that nescience is something indescribable because it is neither something real nor something unreal. So, Jayanta concludes that if nescience is something real then Brahman is not alone real. And then is criticised the Vedāntist’s contention that nescience belongs not to Brahman but to the individual souls which are themselves a false product of nescience ultimately
dissoluble into Brahman like sky-confined-to-jar, sky-confined-to-cloth etc. ultimately dissoluble into sky; Jayanta’s simple argument is that jar, cloth etc. being something real can delimit a sky-part but nescience being something unreal cannot thus delimit Brahman and hence produce individual souls. Similarly, Jayanta dismisses as untenable the Vedāntist’s plea that no ‘mutual dependence’ vitiates the latter’s position inasmuch as the series of a nescience and an individual soul is beginningless just like the series of a seed and a sprout, the former’s point being that such a plea makes sense only in case ‘nescience’ is something real as are a seed and a sprout or nescience as conceived by the non-illusionist schools of philosophy. Then Jayanta considers the Vedāntist’s explanation of how a product of nescience can act as a genuine means of mokṣa, the former’s general point being that in all the analogies cited in this connection the means is as much real as the end sought. Thus, for example, the arrangement of lines standing for a letter is as much real as this letter itself, it being an immaterial consideration that these lines are not themselves this letter; Jayanta’s point is that anything can be made to stand for any thing just as a counterfeit coin passes for a genuine coin (really, he is having in mind the symbol-symbolised relationship). Similarly, on Jayanta’s showing the alleged case of an illusory snake causing real fear is in fact a case of the cognition-of-snake causing fear, the cause being as much real as the effect; citing another case of a cognition causing fear etc. he says that on merely hearing that a lion is coming people develop fear etc. Again, Jayanta concedes that the reflection cast by a thing in a shining medium often exhibits features absent in this thing but his point is that here too the medium is as much real as the thing. Lastly, Jayanta concedes that one can well experience cold sensation in one part of body, hot sensation in another part, but his point is that a body is really divided into various parts so that there is nothing incongruous about one bodily part behaving in one fashion, another in another fashion. Thus concluding his enquiry Jayanta remarks: “If nescience is not something real then the things you describe cannot take place, but if nescience is something real then the doctrine of non-difference holds no water.” In all this what Jayanta is driving at makes perfect sense, but we have to keep in mind that in post-Jayanta period highly subtle texts were composed to defend a case he here presents and criticises in all its crudeness.
(ii) Śabda-monism of the Grammarian Refuted

The doctrine of word-monism was a sort of philosophical curiosity developed by certain grammarians who as such had no interest in philosophical problems. As presented by Jayanta this doctrine has three sub-forms along with a main form which consists in submitting that there is possible no cognition which involves no mention of a word.\(^4\) The first sub-form consists in submitting that in all cognition a word appears as qualifying the thing denoted by this word, the second in submitting that a word here appears as superimposed on this thing;\(^4\) as against these the third sub-form consists in submitting that in all cognition what appears is a word transformed into the thing concerned, there being no thing as such.\(^4\)

The main form is criticised by Jayanta as follows: "Even those not conversant with the word standing for a thing can well have a perceptual cognition of this thing on the basis of observing how there obtain similarities and dissimilarities between this thing and certain other things. Nay, even at the time when the name of a thing is introduced to a novice he has an independent perceptual cognition of this thing while on having subsequently encountered this thing he recalls this word along with this perceptual cognition."\(^4\) About the first sub-form it is recalled that it has already been criticised in connection with offering an account of perception where it was maintained that the object of savikalpaka perception is not a-thing-as-qualified-by-the-word-concerned.\(^4\) The second sub-form is criticised as follows: "For the purpose of cognising one of the so many properties belonging to a thing the word concerned is but a means just as a lamp etc. are a means for perceptually cognising a thing; but a word—just like a lamp etc.—is not one with the thing it enables one to cognise."\(^4\) Moreover, if a word is really one with the thing it denotes then there is no sense in saying that this word is superimposed on this thing.\(^4\) Really, if a word by its very form reveals what it stands for then there should be difficulty about a word that stands for several different things, difficulty about a word that stands for an operation yet to be brought about, difficulty about two words describing the same thing, difficulty about two words standing for the same thing; moreover, in that case there will be no sense in one seeking to learn as o what a word stands for.\(^4\) And then one thing is superimposed \n another on account of
similarity, proximity etc. all which is impossible in the case of a 
word and what it stands for.49 The third sub-form is criticised as 
follows : “It is inconceivable as to how a thing can be said to be 
a transformation of the word concerned. For it cannot be said that 
a word turns into the thing concerned as milk turns into curd, or 
that what a word stands for is something illusory, or that a word 
is illusorily mistaken for the thing concerned, or that a word 
undertakes to create the whole world.”50 As can be seen, the doctrine 
of word-monism was a piece of amateur philosophising on the part 
of certain authors who were expert in the science of grammar but 
no expert in philosophy.

(iii) Vijñāna-monism of the Buddhist Refuted

Unlike Śabda-monism and unlike even Brahman-monism Vijñāna-
monism (tolerably translatable as idealism) of the Buddhist was an 
extremely well-established doctrine. As a matter of fact, whenever the 
great Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā philosophers would attack illusionism they 
would have in mind Vijñāna-monism (or the allied Buddhist doctrine 
of Śūnya-monism). So much importance attaches to Jayanta’s present 
refutation of Vijñāna-monism, a refutation which (like the earlier 
refutation of Śabda-monism) is much indebted to Kumārila. Jayanta 
first presents the idealist’s case and then criticises it.

The idealist begins by arguing that in all cognition there appears 
one and only one form which must belong either to the cognition 
concerned or to the object concerned but that since a cognition must 
be posited in any case and must have a form in any case the idea 
that there also exists an object by the side of a cognition is 
unwarranted as well as untenable.51 Then it is argued that a cognition 
being of the form of an illuminating agent must be cognised along 
with the object illuminated but that since the idea of a cognition 
being cognised by another cognition leads to an infinite regress a 
cognition must be self-cognitive;52 to this is added that a cognition 
must be cognised because one often recognises that such and such 
an object is a cognised one, a recognition impossible unless the 
cognition concerned was cognised at the time of cognising this 
object.53 Here again it is repeated that a cognition has to be cognised 
as bearing one and only one form, a circumstance that renders it 
untenable that an object be posited by the side of the cognition 
concerned;54 to this is added that a cognition must bear a form
because otherwise it should be impossible to distinguish one
cognition from another which both qua a cognition must be
absolutely identical.\textsuperscript{55} Then is refuted the rival assertion that one
cognition cannot be distinguished from another unless the two have
to do with two different objects; the point of the refutation is that
in a cognition there do not appear two forms, that the idea of a
cognition being cognised by another cognition leads to infinite
regress, that if a cognition be conceived as self-cognitive then there
is no warrant for positing an object besides this cognition.\textsuperscript{56} In this
connection it is submitted that one cognition differs from another
because the two are occasioned by two different past impressions,
not because they are produced by two different objects;\textsuperscript{57} to this, is
added that in the case of a hallucination, a memory or a dream there
obviously is no object corresponding to the cognition concerned and
this goes to further refute the hypothesis of an extra-cognitive object;
a hypothesis already refuted owing to all absence of the separate
existence of a cognition and the object concerned.\textsuperscript{58} Lastly it is
argued that since the same object is differently cognised under
different circumstances there is in fact no object apart from the
cognition concerned.\textsuperscript{59} As can be seen, the idealist refuses to
recognise the simple fact that a cognition is by definition the
cognition of an object, a refusal in comparison to which the mistakes
vitiating the details of his account of a cognition are secondary; and
it is on account of the recognition of this very fact that Jayanta’s
refutation of idealism makes so much sense in spite of so many
mistakes vitiating the details of his account of a cognition. Thus,
for example, the discussion as to whether or not a cognition bears
a form and the discussion as to whether or not a cognition is self-
cognitive loom large in the present controversy, but both are in
essence pointless discussions. Be that as it may, Jayanta begins by
submitting that a plain observation of concomitance-in-presence and
concomitance-in-absence establishes that a cognition is one thing the
object cognised by it another.\textsuperscript{60} To this is added that a cognition
is referred to an ‘I’, an object is referred to a ‘this’.\textsuperscript{61} It is conceded
that in a cognition there do not appear two forms, the point being
that this form belongs to the object concerned and not to this
cognition itself.\textsuperscript{62} But the idealist has contended that in a cognition
there appears just one form which is the form of this cognition itself
while there exists no object besides this cognition; Jayanta retorts:
“In the name of positing a means you cannot deny the end itself; for example, an eye reveals a colour and you cannot suggest that this eye reveals itself while there exists no colour. Certainly, an object has got a tangible type of form, a cognition the opposite type of form. Thus a visual cognition is of the form of a revelation, but this revelation reveals an object without revealing itself. Here what makes the revelation is a cognition, what is revealed is the object; and the revelation only requires that this cognition be produced, not also that this cognition be cognised. So, it is utterly untenable to argue that an object cannot be apprehended unless the cognition concerned is apprehended; for a cognition means the apprehension of an object and it does not mean the apprehension of this cognition itself.” Then it is denied that a cognition cognises itself because it is of the form of an illuminating agent, the point being that nothing in the world is found to cognise itself; the suggestion that a cognition, a word, a lamp - these three things cognise themselves is rejected as follows: “Neither a word nor a lamp either cognises itself or is instrumental in cognising something without requiring the aid of certain accessories. Thus a word is cognised through an ear while it is instrumental in cognising the thing denoted only in case the convention concerned is already learnt; similarly, a lamp is visually cognised through an eye while it is instrumental in visually cognising a thing only when an eye is there to do the cognising. [True; the visual cognition of an ordinary thing requires a lamp while the visual cognition of a lamp itself requires no other lamp, but that is not to say that a lamp cognises itself.] As for a cognition, it is found only to reveal an object and not to reveal itself, for at the time when an object is cognised the cognition concerned is not cognised.” Then the idealist has argued that since we often recognise an object as a cognised one a cognition is cognised necessarily; Jayanta retorts that this only means that in the cases in question a cognition too is cognised and not that in every case a cognition is cognised necessarily, adding the point that unlike the Kumārilite he is not of the view that a cognition is necessarily incapable of being perceived. Lastly, Jayanta takes note of the idealist’s emphasis that to posit a cognition without positing the object concerned is a ‘lighter’ hypothesis than to posit both a cognition and the object concerned; in a nutshell, the former’s counter-emphasis is that the important consideration is not whether or not a hypothesis is light
but whether or not it is tenable, his point being that to posit a
cognition without positing the object concerned is an untenable
hypothesis. In this connection the idealist has argued that even if
an object exists besides the cognition concerned this cognition must
bear the form of this object or there will be nothing to distinguish
one cognition from another; Jayanta retorts that even if a cognition
does not bear the form of its object causal analysis well reveals as
to why one cognition has this thing for its object another cognition
that thing; the idealist objects that on the opponent's showing
nothing should decide why some one particular thing from among
the causal aggregate should act as object; Jayanta retorts that this
way even on the idealist's showing nothing should decide why some
one particular thing from among the causal aggregate should impart
its form to the cognition concerned. Really, the controversy as to
whether or not a cognition has got a form is pointless and the
important thing is Jayanta's insistence that a cognition must have
for its object a thing existing independently of this cognition; and
he convincingly shows how concomitance-in-presence and concom-
itance-in-absence enable one to decide as to what cognition has got
what thing for its object. A famous idealist saying is that a
cognition and its object are one because the two are always observed
together; Jayanta retorts that if \( x \) and \( y \) are always observed together
then it is obvious that \( x \) and \( y \) are not one. Then the idealist has
submitted that in the case of a hallucination etc. there is no object
corresponding to the cognition concerned; this leads Jayanta to
undertake a somewhat detailed examination of two idealist theories
of illusion, incidentally remarking that he has already criticised the
corresponding Prabhākarite theory and established the corresponding
Nyāya theory; of these two idealist theories in question one
maintains that in an illusion something utterly non-existing appears
as something existing, the other that here a cognition appears as an
external object. Arguing against the first theory Jayanta notes that
illusions are of two types—one where a sense-organ misperceives
an actually existing thing, the other where mind (= manas) projects
before eyes something while practically nothing actually exists there;
and his point is that in the former case an object besides the
cognition concerned obviously exists while in the latter case too
there often obtains a meagre objective basis and there never is
projected a thing that exists nowhere. The opponent asks: "But how
can a thing existing elsewhere at another time appear here now?"
Jayanta retorts: "On your showing too an utterly non-existing thing like a rabbit's horn does not appear anywhere."\footnote{72} As for the second theory, Jayanta's submission is that it stands refuted by his recent demonstration that a cognition must have an external thing for its object, for otherwise all cognition should have the form 'I am such and such a thing', not the form 'This is such and such a thing.'\footnote{73} The suggestion that what appears to be an external object cognised by a cognition is itself of the form of a cognition is rejected as fantastic on the ground that it is inconceivable as to how there should here arise two cognitions, one acting as a cogniser the other as the object cognised.\footnote{74} Then the idealist has argued that since the same object is differently cognised under different circumstances there in fact exists no object apart from the cognition concerned; Jayanta retorts that there is nothing incongruous about the different aspects of the same object being observed under different circumstances, e.g. owing to different past impressions being aroused.\footnote{75} And this mention of past impression reminds Jayanta of the idealist's submission that two cognitions differ because they are occasioned by two different past impressions, not because they are caused by two different objects; Jayanta retorts: "To say that in the case of certain cognitions past impressions have a conspicuous role to play is not to say that such a cognition has got no object of its own."\footnote{76} Moreover, an impression is left behind by a cognition having an independent thing for its object, but such a leaving-behind should be impossible if there exists no independent object to be cognised by a cognition."\footnote{77} To this is added that the idea that a cognition leaves behind an impression capable of being aroused at a later occasion makes no sense on the momentarist hypothesis.\footnote{78}

To this refutation of idealism Jayanta appends another one which takes into account the idealist's criticism of the Nyāya-Mīmāṁsā concept of a composite substance supposed to exist over and above the concerned component parts, a criticism to which the idealism subjoins his criticism of the atomic hypothesis. [The former refutation is called one that considers the power of a means-of-cognition, the present one that considers the nature of an object cognised. And in connection with the latter the idealist's submission is that an object of cognition cannot be of the form of a physical substance inasmuch as a physical substance can exist, neither in the form of an atom nor
in the form of a composite body.] The opponent first argues that a composite substance is nothing over and above the concerned component parts because it is impossible for two things to exist at one and the same place while a composite substance is supposed to occupy the same place as is occupied by its component parts; to this is added that it is in the very nature of things impossible for one to take note of all the component parts belonging to a composite substance which however cannot be cognised unless all these component parts are taken note of; then it is submitted that there are difficulties whether a composite substance is supposed to exist entirely in each component part or to exist part-by-part in each component part; thus the conclusion is drawn that just as there is no army over and above soldiers concerned, no forest over and above the trees concerned, there is no composite substance over and above the concerned component parts ultimately made up of atoms. However, it too is the idealist’s contention that an atom is nothing real, it being inconceivable how the impartite atoms should combine with one another and how they should become visible at all. Against all this Jayanta’s simple submission is that all this is childish prattle when the existence of a composite substance over and above the concerned component parts is a matter of well-based observation. To this is added that if the unitary observation is found to be false in the case of army, forest etc. then that is no reason why it should be declared to be false even in the case of a composite substance, just as it is not to be declared false in the case of a ‘universal’. Jayanta’s point is that all that he has said by way of demonstrating the reality of a ‘universal’ also applies in the case of a composite substance. By way of concretising his point Jayanta argues that a component substance is not seen apart from the concerned component parts because both occupy one and the same place, the same having had been his argument by way of explaining why a ‘universal’ is not seen apart from the relevant particulars. However, in one respect the two cases are different. For while it has been Jayanta’s position that a ‘universal’ in its entirety exists in each and every relevant particular he now submits that a composite substance exists in each of the concerned component parts separately, it being wrong to raise the two alternatives of entire existence or part-by-part existence in connection with a composite substance. Even so, Jayanta is emphatic that a composite substance exists in the concerned
component parts without itself being made up of further parts (one part supposed to be in touch with one component part), his simple submission being that a composite substance 'just exists' in the concerned component parts.\textsuperscript{88} Jayanta’s present difficulty and its proposed solution are in a way akin to those we have earlier come across in connection with his treatment of ‘universal’. For his position there had been that a ‘universal’ in its entirety exists in each and every relevant particular, a type of existence as unusual as the existence of something in so many loci without itself being made up of parts. And as in that connection so also here Jayanta pleads: “You should not ask for an analogy for the type of existence here posited; for when a thing is there to be plainly perceived there is no use looking for an analogy.”\textsuperscript{89} Really, there are genuine difficulties about Jayanta’s concept of a composite substance just as there are about his concept of a ‘universal’.\textsuperscript{90} Thus having demonstrated the existence of a composite substance Jayanta recalls that he has already demonstrated the existence of an atom, so that it is untenable for the idealist to repudiate the reality of a physical substance either on the ground that there exists no composite substance or on the ground that there exists no atom.\textsuperscript{90}

Thus closes Jayanta’s treatment of Buddhist idealism, his treatment of illusionism in general, his treatment of the topic of mokṣa covered under the padārtha prameya, his treatment of the padārtha prameya. Really, within the range of the two-third of his text devoted to the padārtha pramāṇa and its one-sixth devoted to the padārtha prameya Jayanta has so arranged his material that he has somehow or other and at some place or other found occasion to discuss whatever most important problems pertaining to logic, ontology, ethics, theology he had a mind to discuss. About one-sixth of the text that now remains to be composed is devoted to the remaining fourteen padārthas and in connection with them all he is mostly reporting the traditional Nyāya position on certain miscellaneous topics relevant for a public debate in particular and an inference in general. But then problems connected with inference—minus the very important problem of pseudo-probans which is to be discussed under the padārtha hetvābhāsa and the somewhat important problem of steps-making-up-an-inferential-demonstration which is to be discussed under the padārtha avayava—Jayanta has already discussed threadbare. So for the most part the remaining of Jayanta’s
text is of a mere historical significance. But for this very reason this part has a value of its own; for thereby we learn how the early Nyāya authors were groping towards a path traversing which their school would play its destined historical role. We know that the most outstanding contributions made by the Nyāya school have been made in the course of seeking to solve the most burning problems of logic understood in a broad sense so as to cover the whole theory of knowledge. But as is natural to expect and is amply demonstrated by Jayanta's performance, the problems of logic could be well covered under the single padārtha pramāṇa, and yet the early Nyāya authors were so eager to posit besides this padārtha one—called prameya—that would cover the problems of ontology and ethics and fourteen more that would miscellaneously cover certain problems arising in connection with inferential demonstration in general and public debate in particular. Subsequently, however, the problems of ontology were consciously entrusted to the fellow-Vaiśeṣikas, the problems of ethics were consciously underplayed, while the problems of public debate found no conscious development worth the name. Thus it was that the Nyāya school came to concentrate its attention on the problems of logic pure and simple. So the remaining fourteen padārthas that we have yet to examine are to be viewed as a repository of the seeds which the early Nyāya authors scattered so widely and the later Nyāya authors gradually transferred to the one field their school was destined to cultivate as its own proper field—that is, the field of investigating the problems of logic in all their ramifications.
FIVE PADĀRTHAS SAMŚAYA
PRAYOJANA ETC.

In this chapter (Āhnika X) Jayanta offers an account of five padārthas, viz. samśaya, prayojana, drṣṭānta, siddhānta, avayava, and since they have no apparent logical connection with one another they have to be taken up one by one in the order adopted by Jayanta himself.

(1) Samśaya (Doubt)

The Nyāyasūtra aphorism laying down the definition of samśaya or doubt speaks of five types of it; but the difficulty about it is that four of these types are obscurely worded and in any case they do not seem to be of any fundamental importance. Again, Jayanta’s explanation has become tedious because he reports about certain interpreters who in an ingenious fashion drop out certain words from this aphorism to yield a general definition of doubt while making out that the whole of the aphorism defines the five types of doubt. And to make matters worse, Jayanta here indulges in a long discussion of an ontological problem which has nothing to do with doubt as such but is of use in following an example cited by Vātsyāyana in connection with one of the five types in question. So, let us begin with what constitutes the crux of the Nyāyasūtra understanding of doubt; thus according to it doubt arises when on observing certain features in an entity one is reminded of two things which both share these features while there are not being observed in this entity, any features exclusively belonging to either of these two things, but to this is added that doubt might also arise under the following four conditions:

(i) when one observes in an entity a feature exclusively belonging to a thing but is not sure as to whether or not another feature also belongs to this entity;

(ii) when one learns about a thesis that certain people uphold it while certain others reject it, so that one is not oneself sure whether or not this thesis is valid;

(iii) when one observes a thing but is not sure whether or not
this thing actually exists, it being the case that things observed under an illusion do not actually exist.\(^4\)

(iv) when one fails to observe a thing but is not sure whether or not this thing is actually absent, it being the case that things not observed owing to a concealment actually exist.\(^5\)

As can be seen, the correct and essential definition of doubt is here already given at the outset while the four additional cases add nothing important to this definition. [It is in connection with the first additional case that Vātsyāyana cites an example of one observing that sound is produced by a disjunction but is not sure whether or not it is a quality.\(^6\) The opponent says that since a disjunction is produced by a disjunction and is a quality sound too is a quality.\(^7\) The Naiyāyika replies: “The disjunction produced by a disjunction is of two types, but sound produced by a disjunction follows the pattern of just one of these disjunction-types. So the fact that sound is produced by a disjunction is a unique fact and observing merely this fact one cannot be sure whether or not sound is a quality.\(^8\) And then some of us do not at all admit that there is anything like disjunction produced by a disjunction; and these people will insist that sound alone is what can possibly be produced by a disjunction.\(^9\) Nay, some of us go to the extent of saying that what is ordinarily called disjunction is but the destruction of an earlier obtaining conjunction; so according to them in the expression ‘sound produced by a disjunction’ the word ‘disjunction’ stands for some speciality peculiarly produced in sky where sound is produced, this being why they too would grant that sound alone is what can possibly be produced by a disjunction.”\(^10\) It is this reply given by the Naiyāyika which Jayanta describes in details dilating upon the notoriously obscure controversy as to whether or not disjunction produced by a disjunction is possible; but this whole reply is little relevant for understanding the phenomenon of doubt as such.] Thus in connection with the first additional case the Naiyāyika’s point is that since there can obtain no invariable concomitance between an exclusive quality belonging to a thing and another quality, the presence of this exclusive quality ensures the presence of no other quality in this thing, a point rather understandable but one not generally considered while undertaking a treatment of doubt. Similarly, in connection with the second additional case the Naiyāyika’s point is that different philosophers might uphold even mutually contradictory positions on
one and the same question, in connection with the third and fourth that a mere superficial observation or non-observation does not ensure the existence or non-existence of the thing sought to be observed, all rather understandable points but such as are not generally considered while undertaking a treatment of doubt. Really, in the classical Nyāya logic doubt is defined as is here defined in the original case and the question arises as to why the early Nyāya authors posited the additional four cases in question. What happened was that the early Nyāya authors took interest in the problem of doubt in a context that was different from that faced by the later Nyāya authors. For the later Nyāya authors would define valid cognition and contrast it with invalid cognition on the one hand and doubt on the other; the early Nyāya authors would discuss the role doubt plays in an inferential demonstration in general and a public debate in particular. Naturally, therefore, the later Nyāya authors had use only for the original case envisaged in the Nyāyasūtra aphorism in question while the early Nyāya authors were equally eager to utilise the additional four cases which were even more relevant for the purposes of a demonstration or a debate. Lastly, we might note that ingenious attempt made by certain Nyāya authors to drop certain words from the aphorism to yield a general definition of doubt. Really, the general definition of doubt given above is a definition according to these authors. For this definition says that doubt arises when on observing certain features in an entity one is reminded of two things which both share these features while there are not being observed in this entity any features belonging to either of these two things; but the original aphorism contains no words corresponding to the expression "while there are not being observed in this entity any features belonging to either of these two things", and the authors in question derive this expression from words which naturally (and according to the other interpretation of these authors themselves) describe the third and fourth additional cases, so that dropping the words describing first and second additional cases they formulate a general definition of doubt while utilising the whole of the aphorism for formulating a definition of the five types of doubt. Of course, the difficulty these authors were seeking to meet in this ingenious fashion was a genuine difficulty. For the aphorism in question said that doubt is such and such a cognition produced under these five conditions and since there was given no separate general definition
of doubt such a definition was to be derived from the phrase standing here for 'such and such a cognition.' This phrase was 'viśeṣāpekṣa vimarsa' and this these authors found inadequate for the purpose; and so getting additional elements in the manner described they formulated a general definition of doubt. Jayanta also reports about another group of interpreters who, dissatisfied with this manner of formulating a general definition of doubt (particularly because the words describing the third and fourth additional cases are here given two entirely different meanings in the case of the two interpretations in question) got this definition from the phrase 'viśeṣāpekṣa vimarsa' itself; they on their part exhibited ingenuity in giving a special meaning to the word 'vimarsa' which the former group of interpreters has understood to mean simply 'cognition' or the like.  

The noteworthy thing is that both groups were living in times when the four additional cases in question were not taken into any special consideration when the phenomenon of doubt was under investigation, and so both were having the same general definition in mind, a definition which should suit these later times; but since the early Nyāya authors must have been equally serious about these additional cases they must be having in mind some other general definition somehow to be yielded by the phrase 'viśeṣāpekṣa vimarsa.' As to what this general definition was and how it was to be yielded by this phrase we cannot be very much sure.

(2) Prayojana (Purpose)

The fourth padārtha is prayojana or purpose. Thus the aphorist says that purpose is that thing in respect of which one undertakes an activity. Almost certainly the early Nyāya authors must have paid attention to the problem of purpose because all demonstration or debate aims at serving some purpose, but in Jayanta's explanation of the present aphorism this aspect of the matter comes into picture just in passing when he tells us that even that debater who is interested just in refuting a rival's thesis and not in establishing his own has for his purpose this refutation itself. For the rest he utilises the occasion to discuss a point which he has so prominently emphasised while maintaining that result-of-the-action-concerned is the chief element in a sentential meaning; thus he here notes down that in all activity the chief purpose is the attainment of pleasure or avoidance of pain while a secondary purpose might be the
attainment of a means appropriate for this attainment or avoidance, also that the same thing might be a source of pleasure under one condition, a source of pain under another.\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{(3) Drśānta (Example)}

The fifth padārtha is drśānta or example. The aphorist says that an example is what is commonly understandable to a layman and an expert.\textsuperscript{16} Jayanta explains that by the words ‘layman and expert’ are to be understood ‘both the parties to a debate’\textsuperscript{17} but the explanation seems unnecessary and the old Nyāya authors seem to have simply emphasised that an argument gains in cogency if it is supported by an example drawn from everyday life. That is to say, by submitting that an example is what is commonly understandable to a layman and an expert these authors were only making it clear that an example has to be drawn from everyday life. It also seems evident that the padārtha drśānta is closely connected with the next padārtha siddhānta or established doctrine, the idea being that a doctrine deemed established by a debater is made plain by him to others with the help of a popular example. This is not noticed by Jayanta, but that is not important. However, the point here actually noted by Jayanta is equally not very important. For he says that the present aphorism conveys just one information about example whose full description occurs in connexion with the padārtha avayava, just as an aphorism occurring in connection with the description of inference conveys a particular information about inference whose full description occurs in connexion with the padārtha avayava.\textsuperscript{18} As a matter of fact, the old Nyāya authors emphasised the importance of an example by treating it as an independent padārtha while the avayava drśānta in fact deserves to be called vyāpti-supported-by-a-drśānta, an avayava which in any case is just one of the five avayavas (= steps in an inferential demonstration). [In the case of inference as much too the real description occurs in that earlier aphorism while the avayavas only describe how an inferential demonstration is to be formally presented stepwise.]

\textbf{(4) Siddhānta (Established doctrine)}

The sixth padārtha is siddhānta or established doctrine, and in this connexion one general aphorism is followed by four defining the four types of it. The general aphorism seems to yield no natural meaning and its wording suspiciously contains terms which go to
designate the four types in question, and there actually was one interpretation according to which the general aphorism somehow collectively mentions these four types. This interpretation Jayanta rejects on the understandable ground that such a collective mention of the types to be defined soon afterwards should serve no purpose, and so on his own interpretation the general aphorism defines established doctrine as a proposition having a general and a specific content and one accepted on the basis of an evidence. Then the four types of established doctrine are defined and described as follows:

(i) An established doctrine accepted by one's own system and not going against any other system; e.g. the doctrine that visual perception is a means of valid cognition.

(ii) An established doctrine accepted by an allied system but not by a rival system; e.g. the Sāṅkhya doctrine of Prakṛti equally accepted by the Pātañjala Yoga system but not by the Vaiśeṣika system, the Nyāya doctrine of God equally accepted by the Vaiśeṣika system but not by the Sāṅkhya system.

(iii) An established doctrine on establishing which certain others get established automatically; e.g. on establishing the doctrine that the cognising soul is something separate from the sense-organ inasmuch as the visual and tactile sense-organs manage to cognise one and the same object it automatically gets established that there are a number of sense-organs, that these sense-organs grasp one object each, that a substance is something separate from the qualities which belong to it.

(iv) An established doctrine which is accepted just for the sake of argument so as to say about some desirable thesis that it remains valid even on this supposition; e.g. for the sake of argument the Naiyāyiika might accept the doctrine that a sound is a substance so as to say that a sound remains something non-eternal even on this supposition.

It is obvious to see how this particular padārtha is of use in connection with a demonstration or a debate.

(5) Avayava (Steps-making-up-an-inferential-demonstration)

The seventh padārtha is avayava or steps-making-up-an-inferential-demonstration. The problem of avayava must have interested the early Nyāya authors particularly because they wanted to know how an inferential demonstration has to be offered in the course of a public debate. In the course of time the Buddhists came to deal with this
problem under a separate title pararthānumāna or inference-as-offered-in-the-course-of-a-public-debate as contrasted with svarthānumāna or inference as such. Following the Buddhist practice Jayanta too begins by submitting that the present one is the problem of pararthānumāna.\textsuperscript{24} In any case, it is of some importance to learn as to how many and what steps are deemed necessary by the Naiyāyika for the purpose of stating an inferential demonstration. It is this information that is in the main conveyed by the several aphorisms devoted to the padārtha avayava, though certain other things related to inference too have been said here either in the aphorisms themselves or by Jayanta in the course of his comment. Thus the position is here laid down that an inferential demonstration consists of five steps; viz. pratiṇā, hetu, udāharana, upanaya and nīgama,\textsuperscript{25} and it is defended against the Buddhist criticism that the second and third among these are alone indispensable while the rest redundant. The first avayava pratiṇā consists in mentioning the thesis to be demonstrated,\textsuperscript{26} and the Buddhist dismisses it as redundant on two allied grounds, viz. (1) that one does not start the inferential process with observing what the thesis states – i.e. the locus-of-inference as possessed of the probandum concerned – but with observing the locus as possessed of the probans concerned, (2) that on stating that the locus possesses the probans concerned and that there obtains a relation of invariable concomitance between the probans concerned and the probandum concerned, that is, on stating the avayavas hetu and drṣṭānta, it is automatically understood that the locus possesses the probandum concerned.\textsuperscript{27} In defence Jayanta pleads that the mention of the thesis at the outset is necessary so as to make clear as to what the inference concerned is about and thus to make the hearer better prepared to follow the forthcoming avayavas hetu, drṣṭānta etc.\textsuperscript{28} Really, there is point in what Jayanta says and the Buddhist’s insistence that while stating an inferential demonstration the thesis concerned should never be mentioned is unwarranted though it is true that merely stating the avayavas hetu and drṣṭānta is sufficient to enable one to make out as to what the thesis concerned is. In this connection Jayanta also enumerates several types of pseudo-thesis but he realises that his Nyāya school had no tradition of independently discussing either the topic pseudo-thesis or the topic pseudo-example, and so confessing this to be the case he submits that on the showing of his school a case of pseudo-thesis or pseudo-example too is somehow a case of pseudo-probans; examples of pseudo-thesis are a thesis opposed to the testimony
of perception, inference, analogy or verbal testimony, one where the qualifier-part or qualificand-part is fictitious, one which stands self-proved.\textsuperscript{29}

Then comes the second avayava hetu which consists in stating that the locus-of-inference possesses the probans concerned. But the relevant Nyāyaśāstra aphorisms do not convey this much simple information about this avayava; for here the first aphorism says: “On the basis of observing similarity between the present case and an example, to prove what is to be proved—that is hetu”, to which the second adds: “On the basis of observing dissimilarity between the present case and an example, to prove what is to be proved—that is hetu.”\textsuperscript{30} This is to say that a valid probans is one which on the basis of observing homologue and heterologue instances has been shown to have a relation of invariable concomitance with the probandum concerned. But as a matter of fact, it is the third avayava drṣṭānta that consists in stating the concerned relation of invariable concomitance and quoting an illustrative example. So what Jayanta is presently saying is directly relevant for understanding the third rather than the second avayava, that also being why the account of the third avayava just describes what an example is (the description suited to the actual—though misleading—title of this avayava). But then Jayanta has introduced another complication while interpreting the two aphorisms related to the second avayava. For according to the natural meaning of these aphorisms—which was also their traditionally understood meaning—the first refers to cases where a homologue example is mentioned, the second to cases where a heterologue example is mentioned; but according to Jayanta the first aphorism refers to cases where a homologue example too can be quoted while the second to cases where a heterologue example alone can be quoted, it being understood that in the former cases a heterologue example too can be quoted inasmuch as there are not possible cases where a homologue example alone can be quoted. Really, the alleged cases of inference where a homologue example alone can be quoted and ones where a heterologue example alone can be quoted are both highly artificial but ultimately both came to be accepted by the Nyāya school; Jayanta, however, had qualms about the validity of the former cases and was convinced of the high utility of the latter ones, and so he interpreted the aphorisms in question in the way just described, frankly admitting all this as also that in all this he was deviating from the tradition indicated by Vātsyāyana.\textsuperscript{31} Thus
in place of the original and natural meaning according to which the first aphorism referred to cases where a homologue example was mentioned and the second to cases where a heterologue example was mentioned Jayanta adopted a new and rather unnatural meaning according to which the first aphorism referred to cases where a homologue example too was possible (though a heterologue example was of course possible) and the second to cases where a heterologue example was alone possible. As was to be expected, Jayanta seeks to defend the validity of the inference-type where a heterologue example alone can be quoted; and in a nutshell his point is that in case a unique phenomenon necessitates the positing of a unique entity this positing can only be the result of resorting to the inference-type in question, there obviously not being possible in a case like this a homologue example of any direct sort (though the ultimate inference here has to be preceded by another one where a homologue example is well possible).³² Another point that Jayanta incidentally makes is that in the first aphorism the part expressing the idea ‘to prove what is to be proved’ yields a general definition of a valid probans, that is, the definition that a valid probans is that whose presence somehow necessitates the presence of the probandum concerned; but as is admitted by Jayarāja, this is a point which will be elaborated while arguing that the only type of pseudo-probans is the probans whose presence fails to necessitate the presence of the probandum concerned.³³

After this comes the third avayava dṛśṭānta which consists in stating that a relation of invariable concomitance obtains between the concerned probans and the probandum as is illustrated by a homologue or a heterologue example. But since almost this whole idea has been expressed while defining the second avayava hetu the two aphorisms devoted to the third avayava simply describe what a homologue example and a heterologue example respectively are. Thus the first of these aphorisms in essence says that a homologue example is the entity possessing the concerned probans as well as probandum while the second that a heterologue example is the entity lacking both.³⁴ In this connection Jayanta emphasises that while quotaing a heterologue example the concerned invariable concomitance has to have the form ‘whatever lacks the probandum concerned lacks the probans concerned’ whereas while quoting a homologue example it has to have the form ‘whatever possesses the probans possesses the probandum.’³⁵ The point is understandable. Again,
Jayanta enumerates several types of pseudo-example just as he has enumerated several types of pseudot-thesis, well realising that his Nyāya school had no tradition in either respect; thus on his showing in the case of homologue example a pseudo-example might lack the probans, the probandum or both while in the case of heterologue example it might possess the probans, the probandum or both — again in either case the concerned invariable concomitance might either be not explicitly stated at all or be stated in a wrong way.\textsuperscript{36}

Then comes the fourth avayava upanaya which consists in stating either that the locus-of-inference is possessed of the probans as just described with the help of a homologue example or that it lacks the probandum as just described with the help of a heterologue example.\textsuperscript{37} The Buddhist who recognises the utility of the second and third avayavas alone naturally denies the necessity of the present avayava; the suggestion that one actually resorts to this avayava is rejected on the ground that one resorts to it unnecessarily.\textsuperscript{38} Jayanta's defence amounts to pleading that one's resorting to this avayava is not unnecessary inasmuch as it is natural for one to resort to it, a defence that is certainly weak.\textsuperscript{39}

Essentially the same is the case with the fifth avayava nigamana which consists in reiterating that the locus-of-inference is possessed of the probandum as just described with the help of a homologue or a heterologue example; for here too the Buddhist's objection is that all this is unnecessary while Jayanta's defence is that all this is natural.\textsuperscript{40} Really, even if the Buddhist was wrong in insisting that the first avayava is redundant he is not wrong in insisting that the fourth and the fifth are; for the fourth avayava actually repeats the second, the fifth the first.
SEVEN PADĀRTHAS TARKA
NIRṆAYA ETC

In this chapter (Āhnika XI) Jayanta offers an account of seven padārthas, viz. tarka, nirṇaya, vāda, jalpa, vitanḍa, hetvābhāsa, chala, and they too being logically independent of one another have to be taken up one by one.

(1) Tarka (Reflection)

The eighth padārtha is tarka or reflection. This padārtha is logically related to the earlier treated padārtha samśaya or doubt and the immediately forthcoming padārtha nirṇaya or demonstrated conclusion. For the understanding is that an inferential demonstration beginning with a doubt and ending with a demonstrated conclusion is possibly mediated by a reflection where the likelihood is strengthened that the conclusion to be finally arrived at is true rather than its suggested rival; Jayanta considers the objection that such an intermediate state is never actually experienced and his answer amounts to pleading that such a state is actually experienced sometimes.  

The actual words of the aphorism concerned do not convey all this information in a natural fashion, for they seem to mean: ‘In relation to a subject-matter not known a causal consideration aimed at attaining knowledge about this subject-matter—this is what is called tarka or reflection’; but the above is how the subsequent generations of Naiyāyikas understood these words. In this connection one point was specially emphasised, a point which Jayanta notes. Thus it was said that tarka is not itself a pramāṇa inasmuch as it is simply of the form of a possible aid to an inference. This led to the classical Nyāya practice of contrasting pramāṇā (= valid cognition) to tarka (= reflection) just as the same was contrasted to apramāṇā (= invalid cognition), samśaya (= doubt), smṛti (= memory). Then Jayanta, quoting the example of a smṛti text, notes that the word ‘tarka’ is often used as a mere synonym for ‘anumāṇa’. Similarly, he argues that Mīṃśakā’s concept of utha (a synonym for ‘tarka’) is but a case of inference;
for it consists in filling up the omitted details of a Vadic injunction-as-to-a-ritual with the help of some surmise or other.\(^5\)

(2) Nirnaya (Demonstrated conclusion)

The ninth padārtha is nirnaya or demonstrated conclusion. As was hinted just above and as is natural to expect, an inferential demonstration must have to do with this padārtha inasmuch as all such demonstration is aimed at arriving at some conclusion. Obviously, when a demonstration establishes a conclusion it at the same time refutes the rival ones; but for some reasons the early Nyāya authors were in this connection constantly having in mind the idea of a thesis and a counter-thesis. Hence, their attaching importance to the topic of doubt which consists in entertaining two rival possibilities, hence their attaching importance to the topic of reflection which consists in strengthening one of the rival possibilities, and hence their saying about the present topic that it consists in ascertaining a subject-matter on the basis of considering a thesis and a counter-thesis.\(^6\) Here Jayanta offers an interesting clarification. Thus he submits that when a debate begins the parties concerned are free from doubt as to the correctness of their respective theses but that as this debate proceeds, they begin to have such doubt which is removed by the time the debate is concluded.\(^7\)

(3-5) Vāda (Honest Debate), Jalpa (Debate possibly dishonest), Vitanḍā (Empty Objection-mongering)

The tenth, eleventh and twelfth padārthas are vāda, jalpa and vitanḍā which might be considered together inasmuch as they stand for the three possible types of public debate envisaged by the Nyāya authors. However, even if the problems related to public debate were so much up in the mind of the early Nyāya authors, an investigation into them did not prove to be any fruitful source of further development, a situation reflected in the discussion of these problems on the part of Jayanta who in this connection raises questions that are of no fundamental importance. Thus the real difference between vāda and jalpa on the one hand and vitanḍā on the other is that in the former two one seeks to refute the rival’s case and establish one’s own while in the last one seeks to refute the rival’s case without establishing one’s own; on the other hand, the real difference between vāda and jalpa is that in the former one never resorts to a dishonest debating device while in the latter one might do even
that. On Jayanta’s showing an occasion for vāda arises when with a view to arriving at truth one is discussing a problem with one’s preceptor, one’s disciple or one’s study-colleague, a discussion where no petty motive comes in picture. As for jalpa he admits that since it involves an employment of dishonest debating devices the chances are that the rival might expose one’s game, but he naively pleads that in case no honest argument occurs to one’s mind one has to take recourse to a dishonest argument rather than get defeated at the very outset, so much so that even an otherwise reputable teacher might resort to jalpa if the danger is that a heretic is there to mislead his disciples and cannot be silenced through an honest argument.

As for vītāṇḍā Jayanta admits that in the course of it one has a case of one’s own as against the rival’s case, but the point is that one here does not seek to establish one’s case while seeking to refute the rival’s case. Jayanta also taunts the Buddhist for calling all public debate ‘vāda’ without distinguishing between vāda, jalpa and vītāṇḍā. Really, however, the problem of public debate is in essence the problem of composing a text meant for publication, and it is difficult to see how one can resort to a procedure like jalpa or vītāṇḍā while putting down one’s case in black and white. Again, the aphorist’s emphasis is that vāda, jalpa and vītāṇḍā have to be conducted through demonstration made up of the five avayavas, pratijñā, hetu etc., but the Nyāya authors themselves never do anything of the sort in any of their published texts, for in that case the redundancy of the first two or the last two avayavas will be all too obvious. The conclusion is inescapable that the doctrine of five avayavas as well as the doctrine of threefold public debate were formulated at an early enough period when attention was concentrated on oral debates conducted in obscure country-corners rather than on written texts meant for a countrywide circulation, this being the reason why these two doctrines turned obsolete in the later period when the chief means of conducting public debate were published texts rather than private gatherings. [While interpreting the aphorism related to vāda Jayanta obscurely explains certain minor points. Thus the aphorism says that a demonstration of the form of vāda has to be conducted through pramāṇa and tarka, and the opponent objects that pramāṇas like perception etc. are of no use in a demonstration while tarka is not at all an independent means of valid cognition; Jayanta first pleads that by pramāṇa are here
meant the five avayavas of a demonstration and that they are aided by tarka. 12 But then the opponent points out that the aphorism makes an independent mention of the five avayavas. 13 To this objection one reply is that this mention is there in order to emphasise that in this case too it will be a fault of demonstration not to employ all the five avayavas; to this is added that the aphorism speaks of the thing demonstrated being 'not opposed to an established doctrine' in order to emphasise that here there should be present no pseudo-probans called viruddha. 14 This way of answering the objection raised is rejected by others on the ground that here there should be avoided all the faults of demonstration and all the types of pseudo-probans. 15 So, according to these latter authors the aphorism speaks of pramāṇa and tarka in order to emphasise that here the debater describes as to what perception etc. and what tarka have enabled him to reach the conclusion sought to be demonstrated; similarly, it speaks of the thing demonstrated being 'not opposed to an established doctrine' in order to emphasise that this thing should not go against an established doctrine acceptable to the debater himself. 16 All this shows how certain minor points are obscurely explained by Jayanta in the course of interpreting an aphorism which by his time had lost all its original importance.

(6) Hetvābhāsa (Pseudo-probans)

The thirteenth padārtha is hetvābhāsa or pseudo-probans. Really, the four padārthas now remaining to be treated have to do with some aspect or other of a defective demonstration, and the present one which is the first of these four stands for a defective probans. In the history of Indian logic the concept of pseudo-probans has played a very important role inasmuch as the logical validity of an inferential demonstration crucially hinges on the proper make-up of the probans concerned. But the Nyāya authors seem to have realised the due importance of this topic only in course of time. This perhaps explains why hetvābhāsa is one of the twenty two types falling under the sixteenth padārtha nigrahasthāna or point-of-defeat and also an independent padārtha in its own right; the point is that the list of twenty two nigrahasthānas seems to have been formulated earlier than the list of sixteen padārthas. However, a clear awareness that the problem of pseudo-probans is an integral part of the problem of inference could have dawned on the Nyāya authors under the
influence of Buddhists who came to lay utmost emphasis on this point. For the latter first formulated what according to them were three indispensable characteristics of a valid probans and then submitted that the three types of pseudo-probans result from an absence of this or that from among these three characteristics; imitating this Buddhist procedure the later Nyāya authors too began to say that the five types of pseudo-probans result from an absence of this or that from among the five characteristics of a valid probans, but the fact remains that the Nyāya school had no tradition of first formulating a list of certain indispensable characteristics of a valid probans and then a corresponding list of the types of pseudo-probans. In any case, even after the Nyāya authors began to see some sort of correspondence between the indispensable characteristics of a valid probans and the types of pseudo-probans recognised in their school they continued to bow down to the tradition of treating hetvābhāsa as an independent padārtha rather than a subordinate topic pertaining to the treatment of inference. Much of this is brought to light by the way Jayanta seeks to read an uptodate understanding of the problem into the rather obscure and archaic wording of the relevant aphorisms, an understanding that was yet to undergo modification in the period subsequent to him. Be that as it may, commenting on the aphorism which enumerates the five types of hetvābhāsa Jayanta says that these types result from violating the five conditions of a valid probans; but explicitly noting that the order of enumeration here adopted does not follow the natural order to be adopted while stating these conditions he simply pleads that the aphorist has somehow ignored this order.17 a plea refusing to see that the idea of connecting the types of pseudo-probans with the corresponding conditions of a valid probans was a later growth. Then it is recalled that the Buddhist’s contention that there are just three types of pseudo-probans has already been refuted.18 Really, three of the five hetvābhāsa-types in question somehow correspond to the three types recognised by the Buddhist; but of the remaining two types Jayanta has yet sought to vindicate just one, viz. bādhita while he has yet said nothing by way of vindicating the other, viz. satpratipakṣa. In any case, his present treatment of the problem should enable us to form an idea of how he views it in its totality. Incidentally, Jayanta here makes it clear that a defective probans might possibly belong to more than one
hetvābhāsa-type, but that is not important. Important rather is his posing of the problem of a new possible type of hetvābhāsa called aprayojaka, a problem whose discussion is going to constitute a noteworthy part of Jayanta’s present treatment of hetvābhāsa; as he here hints, the type in question will be shown to be a sub-type of a recognised type. Then are taken up one by one and as follows the five aphorisms devoted to the five hetvābhāsa-types:

(i) Savyabhicāra (= Anvikṣṭika)

The aphorist says that the hetvābhāsa-type savyabhicāra is that probans which is not exclusively confined to one side. As Jayanta explains, what is meant is the probans which exists also in a vipakṣa (= a locus lacking the probandum concerned), it being understood that it already exists in a sapakṣa (= a locus possessing the probandum concerned); an example occurs in the inference ‘Śūnd is non-eternal, because it is cognisable’ inasmuch as the feature acting as probans here is ‘being cognisable’ and this feature is found to exist not only in things possessing non-eternity but also in those lacking non-eternity, ‘being non-eternal’ being the feature acting as probandum here. Now this hetvābhāsa-type, (under the title ‘anvikṣṭika’) is accepted also by the Buddhist who posits three sub-classes of it as follows:

(i) a probans which exists in a part of sapakṣa and in the whole of vipakṣa, one which exists in the whole of sapakṣa and in a part of vipakṣa, one which exists in a part of sapakṣa and in a part of vipakṣa, one which exists in the whole of sapakṣa and in the whole of vipakṣa;

(ii) one which exists neither in a sapakṣa nor in a vipakṣa;

(iii) one which is compatible with another probans necessitating the absence of the probandum concerned.

To this sub-classification Jayanta takes exception offering different grounds in each case. Thus the four case-types covered under the first sub-class being only so many cases of a probans existing in a vipakṣa their separate enumeration is deemed unnecessary, ‘a probans existing in a vipakṣa’ being the essential definition of the hetvābhāsa-type in question; Jayanta’s argument is that since a hetvābhāsa-type can be sub-classified in all sorts of ways no such sub-classification can be exhaustive. Jayanta’s critical consideration of the second and third sub-classes is somewhat
revealing; these sub-classes he dismisses as impossible. Thus he actually rejects the second sub-class on the simple ground that it is not at all a case of a probans existing in a vipaka, but not explicitly stating this ground he argues at length why a case coming under this sub-class is not a case of generating a doubt; the argument is muddled and only towards the end of the whole discussion is it submitted that even if this case (as also a case coming under the third sub-class) is a case of generating a doubt that is no reason why it should be brought under the present hetvâbhâsa-type whose essential definition is 'a probans existing in a vipaka', a definition obviously not fulfilled by this case. The noteworthy thing is that the later Nyâya authors actually bring this case under the present hatvâbhâsa-type and precisely on the ground that it is a case of generating a doubt. Then Jayanta raises an objection against the third sub-type posited by the Buddhist, the former’s simple point being that it is impossible for there to be two valid probantia in the same locus, one necessitating the presence of the probandum concerned the other necessitating its absence. And as just noted, Jayanta in the end submits that even if an alleged case of this sub-type is a case of generating a doubt that is no reason why it should be brought under the present hatvâbhâsa-type whose essential definition is 'a probans existing in a vipaka', a definition hardly fulfilled by this case. However, here again the noteworthy thing is that it is actually the cases belonging to this sub-class that the later Nyâya authors treat as cases of the hetvâbhâsa-type satpratipakṣa (here called prakaraṇasama), a hetvâbhâsa-type understood by Jayanta in an altogether different fashion.

(ii) Viruddha

The aphorism laying down the definition of the hetvâbhâsa-type viruddha is obscurely worded. For it seems to say that a case of viruddha occurs when someone first accepts a doctrine and then says something that opposes this doctrine. This looks like the classical description of the hetvâbhâsa-type satpratipakṣa, and may be some such thing was actually had in mind by the aphorist whose own understanding of satpratipakṣa (here called prakaranaṇasama) was different. In any case, Vâtsyâyana understands the aphorism in question in some such way and in this connection quotes the example of a Sâṅkhya debater arguing that a modification-of Prakṛti
ceases to appear because it is something non-eternal, an argument opposing this debater's accepted doctrine that even while disappearing a modification-of-Praṇātī continues to be there because it is something eternal; Jayanta takes explicit note of Vātsyāyana's understanding of the matter and rejects it on the ground that this way we get some other defect-of-demonstration but not the pseudo-probans viruddha. For following the clear-cut Buddhist practice Jayanta would say that a case of viruddha occurs when the proposed probans succeeds in proving just the opposite of what it is supposed to prove, a statement he reads (at the cost of some violence to vocabulary as well as grammar) into the actual words of the aphorism in question; thus according to him while a valid probans ought to exist in some (or all) sapakṣa and in no vipakṣa a pseudo-probans of the type viruddha exists in no sapakṣa and in some (or all) vipakṣa, thus necessitating the absence rather than presence of the probandum concerned in the locus concerned. Again, keeping in mind the corresponding Buddhist procedure Jayanta offers the clarification that even if the pseudo-probans viruddha violates two conditions of a valid probans, viz. (1) that it should exist in some (or all) sapakṣa and (2) that it should exist in no vipakṣa, what is characteristic to it is the violation of the first of these conditions inasmuch as the second is violated even by the pseudo-probans savyabhicāra. Really, the practice of laying down certain conditions of a valid probans and defining pseudo-probans in terms of the violation on its part of this or that among these conditions was a practice originating in Buddhist circles and borrowed from there by the later Nyāya authors.

(iii) Prakaraṇasama (= Satpratipakṣa)

The aphorism laying down the definition of the hetvābhāsa-type prakaraṇasama (in later times better known as satpratipakṣa) is also worded obscurely; in any case, the rather understandable meaning attributed to this aphorism by Vātsyāyana and following him by Jayanta does not tally with the later Nyāya understanding of the hetvābhāsa-type satpratipakṣa, an understanding according to which a case of it arises when a proposed probans claiming to prove the presence of the probandum concerned in the locus concerned is opposed by another probans proving the absence of this very probandum in this very locus. Jayanta explicitly rejects this
understanding referring to his earlier refusal to treat a case like this as a sub-type of the pseudo-probans *anaikāntika* and to his coming refusal to treat a case like this as a sub-type of the pseudo-probans *bādhita*, his point (already noted by us) being that such a case is an impossibility. So, according to Jayanta (as according to Vātsyāyana) a case of pseudo-probans *prakarānasama* arises when in connection with some point the very circumstance which necessitates the resort to an inference is proposed as a probans supposed to settle this point, something which seems to be the natural meaning of the aphorism in question. The case is illustrated by somebody inferring 'a word is eternal, because there is not observed in it a feature characteristic of things non-eternal' and also 'a word is non-eternal, because there is not observed in it a feature characteristic of things eternal.' Really, it is a very artificial case (in fact, the only case of its type) and Jayanta's only consolation is that this case is not covered by any of the remaining four *hetvābhāsa*-types as understood by him.

(iv) Asiddha

The aphorist says that the *hetvābhāsa*-type *asiddha* is that probans which itself standing in need of demonstration is akin to what is sought to be demonstrated. This statement too creates some difficulty for Jayanta who notes that a probans altogether incapable of being demonstrated should belong to this type but that such a probans cannot be called 'something standing in need of demonstration', and his solution of the difficulty lies in suggesting that a general definition of the *hetvābhāsa*-type *asiddha* should leave out the anomalous part in question; thus according to him a case of *asiddha* arises when the proposed probans either is incapable of being demonstrated or stands in need of being demonstrated, in the latter case one party to debate being doubtful about the presence of this probans in the locus concerned. But then the opponent objects that in all debate the proposed probans must be such that both the parties are agreed as to its presence in the locus concerned; Jayanta replies: "That is true. But suppose a debater proposes a probans and the rival raises doubt about its presence in the locus concerned; then the original debater will have to demonstrate the presence of this probans in this locus. If he succeeds he (otherwise the rival) will score a debating point."
Then Jayanta raises a point which it was not customary to raise in connection with the hetvābhāsa-type asiddha. Thus he notes that there might possibly be a case of pseudo-probans which violates none of the five conditions of a valid probans, but instead of therefrom concluding that there is something wrong about his thesis on ‘five conditions of a valid probans’ he treats this case as a sub-type of asiddha (while for a moment toying with the idea that there is a sixth type of pseudo-probans). The case is illustrated by the inference “The manas-s and atoms are non-eternal, because they are limited-in-size”; the difficulty arises because in Nyāya ontology the manas-s and atoms are eternal as well as limited-in-size so that the proposed probans cannot be found to exist in a locus lacking the probandum concerned and thus evades the chief defect that might possibly invalidate it. Jayanta’s solution of the difficulty lies in suggesting that a thing’s being eternal or otherwise has nothing to do with its being limited-in-size or otherwise, his understanding being that a thing not made up of parts is eternal, one made up of parts is non-eternal; so according to him the probans here is vitiated by the defect called aprayojakatā or ‘irrelevance’ even if it violates none of the five conditions of a valid probans; by way of clarification it is added that when non-eternity is inferred from cognisability then too the probans is aprayojaka but that in that case it is anaikāntika as well while in the case under consideration it is aprayojaka only. As a matter of fact, it is Jayanta’s final position that all pseudo-probans is aprayojaka but that in some cases it is aprayojaka only while in other cases it is anaikāntika etc. as well, this being his way of avoiding the contingency that a sixth type of pseudo-probans called aprayojaka be posited in addition to the five recognised types anaikāntika etc. Really, by thus emphasising the importance of ‘relevance’ as a factor in inferential process Jayanta is virtually endorsing the Buddhist’s contention that all valid invariable concomitance must be based on some causal consideration or other, a contention against which the Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas consciously fought tooth and nail. Thus when Jayanta argues that the feature ‘being made up of parts (= being a produced entity)’ is and the feature ‘being limited-in-size’ or the feature ‘being cognisable’ is not a valid probans (= relevant probans) for inferring the feature ‘being non-eternal’ his real point is that a valid probans (= relevant probans) must be linked with the probandum concerned through the mediation of a causal-analysis: In
SEVEN PADĀRTHAS TARKA

essence, therefore, Jayanta must be arguing that an irrelevant probans is a case of anāikāntika inasmuch as its presence in a vipakṣa cannot be ruled out; but when the argument is actually advanced by the Buddhist Jayanta rejects it on the ground that such cannot be the case with an inference where a vipakṣa is altogether absent, an old point elaborately discussed in connection with theistic proof to which reference is made; (really, in the type of cases had in mind by Jayanta the pakṣa is so cleverly chosen that a vipakṣa becomes an impossibility, a good example being his present illustrative case itself). However, the concept of relevance is made clear once more while answering an opponent who argues that the present illustrative case is a case of the hetvābhāsa-type bādhita because it is contradicted by a valid rival inference; Jayanta first pleads that a case of bādhita arises only when a proposed inference is contradicted by the findings of a preception or a verbal testimony, it being impossible for one inference to be contradicted by another inference; and then granting that the present illustrative case is contradicted by a valid rival inference he argues that that is so precisely because the former has got an irrelevant probans the latter the relevant one, thus seeking to buttress his point that all valid inference must have a relevant probans. Really, the only two conditions that a valid probans must fulfil are that it must exist in the locus concerned and that it must have with the probandum concerned a proper relation of invariable concomitance, the violation of the first condition resulting in the hetvābhāsa-type asiddha, the violation of the second in the hetvābhāsa-type aprayojaka; but loyal to the inherited tradition of his school Jayanta somehow finds use for all the five types of hetvābhāsa here posited while making aprayojaka a sub-type falling under the type asiddha; [by calling 'aprayojaka' 'anythāsiddha' (lit. 'otherwise accounted for') the otherwise incomprehensible inclusion of aprayojaka among the sub-types of asiddha is made to appear plausible].

(v) Kālāṭītta (= bādhita)

The aphorism laying down the definition of the hetvābhāsa-type kālāṭītta (in later times better known as bādhita) is again worded obscurely; for it apparently means that the hetvābhāsa-type kālāṭītta is that probans which is offered after the proper time is past, a meaning as vague as any thing. Thus certain authors suggested that in an inference vitiated by kālāṭītta the five avayavas are not stated
in their proper successive order, a suggestion Jayanta rejects on the
ground that it is of no logical significance and the idea already
stands covered by one of the nigrahasthānas. Similarly, certain
authors suggested that in an inference vitiated by kalātita the
proposed probans occurs at a time which is already past when the
probandum concerned appears there, a suggestion Jayanta rejects on
the ground that the case thus conceived should be a case falling
under the hetvābhāsa-type asiddha. And then comes Jayanta’s own
interpretation according to which a case of kalātita arises when a
probans is offered when there is no time for offering a probans, the
thesis concerned having been already refuted by the findings of a
perception or a verbal testimony. At the very outset of his enquiry
into inference Jayanta has defended the possibility of there being a
hetvābhāsa of this type, a defence to which reference is here
made. Jayanta closes his enquiry into hetvābhāsa by observing that
whatever he had to say in this connection had already been said
while discussing the problem of inference in general, to which
something new has been presently added while discussing the special
problem of an aprayojaka probans.

(7) Chala (Quibble)

The fourteenth padārtha is chala or quibble. The discussion of
this topic raises no important issues. Thus as conceived by the
aphorist and interpreted by Jayanta quibble, a defect of inferential
demonstration, consists in imputing an unintended meaning to the
words of a rival speaker and then seeking to refute him. That might
be done in following three ways:

1. When a word happens to have more than one meaning then
giving it a meaning not intended by the speaker.

2. When the speaker says ‘x does such and such a thing’ then
objecting that x alone does not do that, it being usual that a cause
produces the effect concerned only when aided by certain
accessories.

3. When the speaker uses a word in a figurative sense then
giving it a literal meaning.

In this connection the clarification is offered that the first and
the third cases, though doubtless somehow similar, are also somehow
different, also that in some sense all the three cases are similar.
JĀTI AND NIGRAHASTHĀNA

In this last chapter (Āhnika XII) of his text Jayanta offers an account of the last two padārthas, viz. jāti and nigrahasthānas, both conceived as a defect of inferential demonstration; below they are considered one by one.

(1) Jāti (Faulty Counter-argument)

Jāti is the fifteenth padārtha and is defined by the aphorist as a faulty counter-argument based on a superficial observation of similarities and dissimilarities. The aphorism contains no word for ‘superficial’ and here lies the difficulty; for the Nyāya authors were of the view that an invariable concomitance is based on an observation of the similarity obtaining between the case under consideration and a homologue-example as also on an observation of the dissimilarity obtaining between the case under consideration and a heterologue-example; but they did not precisely define this similarity and this dissimilarity. For example, they argued that ‘a word is non-eternal, because it is produced through an effort, like a jar’; but they did not pose the question as to why a produced entity must be a non-eternal entity – their only plea being that this is the case because things like jar etc. are found to be a produced entity as well as a non-eternal entity while things like sky etc. are found to be both a non-produced entity as well as an eternal entity. This was the question which a later author like Jayanta somehow raised while discussing the problem of ‘relevance’, and if the Nyāya school had an earlier established tradition of discussing this problem the whole set of jātis presently considered could have been dismissed as so many cases of offering an irrelevant counter-argument. But as things stood, the school posited twenty four jātis and tried to understand how each was to be dismissed as a case of faulty counter-argument based on a superficial observation of similarities and dissimilarities. The following is how each was tackled:

(1-2) The opponent might argue that if a word is non-eternal because it is a produced entity like a jar (and unlike sky) then it
must be eternal because it is an impartite entity like sky (and unlike a jar); he is to be told that the similarity obtaining between a word and a jar is deeprooted like that obtaining between two cows while that obtaining between a word and sky is superficial. [The point is that the deep-rootedness and superficiality in question are not precisely defined. Jayanta in his comment brings in the question of ‘relevance’ and that is significant. Another difficulty is that from the Nyāya point of view the chief objection against the opponent’s counter-argument is that a word is not at all an impartite entity, for otherwise the Naiyāyika himself grants the validity of the invariable concomitance ‘whatever is an impartite entity is an eternal entity.’]

(3-8) The opponent might argue that if a word is non-eternal because it is a produced entity like a jar then (i) a word must be a limited-sized substance as is a jar, (ii) a word must not be audible as a jar is not, (iii) a jar must be the chief subject-matter under consideration as is a word, (iv) a word must not be the chief subject-matter under consideration as a jar is not, (v) a jar must be the object of present demonstration as is a word, (vi) a word must not be the object of present demonstration as a jar is not; he is to be told that a word and a jar are not similar in every respect. [The flimsy character of the opponent’s argument is obvious, but the noteworthy thing is that this argument is here being given a serious consideration.]

(9-10) The opponent might argue that if a probands demonstrates the probandum through reaching upto it then it should be difficult to make out as to which one is probans and which one probandum, while it should be impossible for a probans to demonstrate the probandum without reaching upto it; he is to be told that wheel, stick, etc. produce a jar through contacting the lump of clay, an effective ritual kills the enemy from a long distance - the point being that causation is possible both through a physical contacting as also from a distance. [The opponent’s argument is pointless and the answer given to him curious.]

(11-12) The opponent might say (i) that the proposition that a jar is a produced entity should itself be demonstrated, (ii) that sky too is a produced entity (e.g., we make sky when we dig a well) but is eternal; he is to be told (i) that what already stands established should not be demonstrated while it st. r. d. s established that a jar is a produced entity (ii) that he should hit. elf prove why what is a produced entity must be eternal. [The first point is not very
important and might be broadly granted but the second implicitly raises the important question as to what grounds a relation of invariable concomitance, a question which when seriously considered led to the concept of 'relevance'.

(13) The opponent might argue that the probans 'being a produced entity' cannot reside in a word before it is produced and if it can then this word is somehow eternal; he is to be told that a feature belongs only to such a thing as is already there – irrespective of whether this thing is eternal or otherwise. [The opponent's argument is just frivolous.]

(14) The opponent might argue that if a word is non-eternal because it is a produced entity like a jar, then one might doubt whether it is not eternal because it is cognized through a sense-organ like a 'universal'; he has to be told that his doubt is groundless because the former similarity is deep-rooted, the latter not. [The opponent's argument and the answer here given to him have in essence occurred earlier too, and the difficulty with the answer is that the deep-rootedness in question is not precisely defined.]

(15) The opponent might say that the thesis that a word is non-eternal and the counter-thesis that a word is eternal are equally open to acceptance; he has to be told that the thesis is based on a solid probans. [Here Jayanta frankly recognizes that so many jātis are mutually very much similar – and those like the present one have already appeared.]

(16) The opponent might argue that a probans cannot demonstrate the probandum concerned because there are difficulties about all the three possible alternatives – viz. that a cause comes before the effect, that it comes simultaneously with it, that it comes after it; he has to be told that a cause comes before the effect. [Here too is a general argument and one like it has already appeared.]

(17) The opponent might argue that the thesis that a word is non-eternal is based on one similarity and so it implies the counter-thesis that a word is eternal, a counter-thesis based on another similarity; he has to be told that the thesis is well-grounded, the counter-thesis is not. [An old point.]

(18) The opponent might argue that if a word and a jar are non-eternal because of one similarity then all things ought to be one because of all being similarly existent; he has to be told that only
a particular similarity proves a particular character. [Here again is a general point leading nowhere.]

(19) The opponent might argue that both the thesis that a word is non-eternal and the counter-thesis that a word is eternal are equally possible; he has to be told that the thesis is more plausible. [An old point.]

(20) The opponent might argue that a word is said to be non-eternal because it is produced through an effort but that a thing might be non-eternal without being produced through an effort (e.g., lightning is non-eternal without being produced through an effort); he has to be told that a thing might be non-eternal even without being produced through an effort but that it is certainly non-eternal when it is produced through an effort. [Here the real question is as to how an invariable concomitance is to be established, a question not properly posed by the old Nyāya authors.]

(21) The opponent might argue that the non-cognition of the coverage concealing a word is not cognized – which means that this coverage is cognized, this in turn meaning that a word is eternal though usually concealed by a coverage; he has to be told that a non-cognition is a matter of direct introspection, so that there is actually no coverage concealing a word. [Really, here is involved the Mīmāṃsaka’s contention that a word is eternal though usually unmanifest, but the way it is here disposed of is curious.]

(22) The opponent might argue that if a word is non-eternal because of its one similarity with a jar then all things of the world must be non-eternal because of their having some similarity or other with a jar; he has to be told that the former similarity is a well-defined similarity. [The point is that the similarity in question is not defined precisely enough.]

(23) The opponent might argue that if the non-eternity of a word is itself non-eternal then the word must be at times eternal, but that if this non-eternity is itself eternal then too the word which is the seat of this non-eternity must be eternal; he has to be told that to say that a word is eternally non-eternal is to say that it is never eternal, not that it is somehow eternal. [The opponent’s argument is obviously sophistical.]

(24) The opponent might argue that an effort is required not only to produce a thing but also to reveal an already existing thing,
so that it is well possible that the effort made when a word is heard does not produce this word but only reveals it; he has to be told that nothing possibly can act as a coverage to conceal a word. [Here the rival Mīmāṃsā contention is disposed of rightly.]

To this account of 24 types of jāti is appended an elaboration of what might be called the theory of six-rounds-of-discussion, a theory Jayanta elucidates with the help of the above account of the last jāti-type. Thus in the first round of discussion the original debater here argues that a word is non-eternal because it is produced through an effort; in the second round the opponent retorts that since an effort is required not only to produce something but also to reveal a pre-existing though concealed thing the argument is inconclusive. Now if in the third round the original debater shows how his argument is conclusive the matter ends, but suppose he pleads: "Following your 'logic I can say that since some refutation is conclusive some not your refutation is inconclusive.'"; then in the fourth round the opponent says: "What you say about my refutation is true of your refutation as well, so that the latter too is inconclusive"; in the fifth round the original debater says: "But that way too you concede that your refutation is inconclusive"; in the sixth round the opponent says: "The same way you too concede that your refutation is inconclusive." Really, not only a contingency like 'six-rounds-of-discussion' but an occasion for any of the twenty four types of jāti can arise only in a public debate conducted in a private gathering and not in one conducted through written texts. And since in classical times all worthwhile public debate was conducted through written texts the doctrine of jāti then lost all practical significance as did the doctrine of nigrāhasthāna—discussed next—which too had mostly to do with public debate conducted in a private gathering.

(2) Nigrāhasthāna (Point-of-defeat)

The sixteenth and the last padārtha is nigrāhasthāna or point-of-defeat. The aphorist defines it as 'saying what is not worthwhile and not saying what is worthwhile.' His point is that if in the course of a debate a debater says something that is not worthwhile or fails to say something that is worthwhile and if the rival points that out then one is to be declared defeated. The point is understandable but is not formulated in the language of logic, it being rather of the
nature of a practical adage. This becomes clear in the course of a
defence offered by Jayanta in reply to the Buddhist Dharmakīrti’s
charge that to say things that do not contribute to demonstration and
not to point out defects in the rival’s argument—these two are the
only nigrahasthānas; for Jayanta in essence pleads: “The two
elements of your definition properly interpreted simply repeat the
two elements of our definition. As for the twenty two types of
nigrahasthāna posited by us they do not give an exhaustive list but
an illustrative list.” But Dharmakīrti’s very contention is that after
having discussed the logical doctrine of pseudo-probans (pseudothesis and pseudo-example) there is no need for separately discussing
a doctrine of nigrahasthāna, the simple point being that one is
declared defeated in a debate in case one is proved to have offered
a pseudo-probans. It is in the light of this general understanding that
Dharmakīrti raises objections against the Nyāya concept of twenty
two nigrahasthānas, and Jayanta while elaborating this concept seeks,
to meet these objections as best he can. On the whole, however,
the truth lies in what Dharmakīrti says. In any case, barring
exceptions the twenty two nigrahasthāna-types are such that an
occasion for them arises only in the course of a debate conducted
in a private gathering and not in one conducted through written texts;
this should become clear if these types are considered one by one.

1. Pratijñā-hāni (= damaging one’s thesis): When the rival submits
that the homologue example cited by one lacks rather than possesses the
probandum concerned and one concedes the validity of this submission
then one is faced with this nigrahasthāna-type. [As Dharmakīrti rightly
notes, this is a simple case of offering a pseudo-probans.]

2. Pratijñāntara (= changing one’s thesis): When in reply to the
rival’s objection one adds a new element to his original thesis then
one is faced with this nigrahasthāna-type. [This too will be a simple
case of offering a pseudo-probans—unless the additional element in
question only makes explicit what was originally implicit.]

3. Pratijñāvirodha (= contradicting one’s thesis): When the
probans offered by one contradicts one’s thesis one is faced with
this nigrahasthāna-type. [This is obviously a case of offering a
pseudo-probans.]

4. Pratijñāsarinyāsa (= giving up one’s thesis): When in reply
to the rival’s objection one altogether gives up his thesis then one
is faced with this *nigrahasthāna*-type. [This is a simple confession that a pseudo-probans was originally offered.]

5. *Hetvāntara (= offering another probans)*: When in reply to the rival’s objection one adds a new element to the probans originally offered then one is faced with this *nigrahasthāna*-type. [This too is a confession that a pseudo-probans was originally offered.]

6. *Arthāntara (= irrelevant talk)*: When one indulges in an irrelevant talk one is faced with this *nigrahasthāna*-type. [This is hardly a logical point.]

7. *Nirarthaka (= meaningless talk)*: When one utters a jumble-of-letters carrying no meaning one is faced with this *nigrahasthāna*-type. [This too is hardly a logical point.]

8. *Avijñātārtha (= incomprehensible talk)*: When the audience fails to follow one even after one has stated one’s case thrice one is faced with this *nigrahasthāna*-type. [This too is hardly a logical point.]

9. *Apārthaka (= incoherent talk)*: When one utters a jumble-of-words carrying no meaning one is faced with this *nigrahasthāna*-type. [Hardly a logical point.]

10. *Aprāptakāla (= untimely statement)*: When one does not state in their proper order the five *avayava* making up one’s inferential demonstration then one is faced with this *nigrahasthāna*-type. [Even granting the validity of the doctrine of five *avayava* this is hardly a logical point.]

11. *Nyūna (= incomplete statement)*: When one omits to state an *avayava* that should make up one’s inferential demonstration then one is faced with this *nigrahasthāna*-type. [Hardly a logical point.]

12. *Adhika (= redundant statement)*: When one offers more than one probans or more than one example one is faced with this *nigrahasthāna*-type. [There is nothing logically wrong about this.]

13. *Punarvacana (= repetition)*: When one unnecessarily repeats a word or an idea one is faced with this *nigrahasthāna*-type. [Hardly a logical point.]

14. *Ananubhāṣana (= failure-to-repeat)*: When a rival fails to repeat the original debater’s case even after the latter has stated it thrice and the audience had followed it all right this rival is faced with this *nigrahasthāna*-type. [Hardly a logical point.]

15. *Ajñāna (= failure to comprehension)*: When a rival fails to follow the original debater’s case even after the audience has
followed it all right then this rival is faced with this nighrasthāna-type. [Hardly a logical point.]

16. Apratibhā (= failure to reply) : When no reply to the original debater's case occurs to a rival the latter is faced with this nighrasthāna-type. [Hardly a logical point.]

17. Vikṣepa (= practical excuse) : When afraid of defeat one interrupts a debate on some practical excuse one is faced with this nighrasthāna-type. [No logical point.]

18. Matānujiṇa (= implicit confession of defeat) : When one without meeting a rival's objection raises this same objection against this rival and thus implicitly confesses one's own defeat one is faced with this nighrasthāna-type. [At the most a case of offering a pseudo-probans.]

19. Paryanuyojiyopēksana (= failure to object) : When one fails to point out a defect that vitiates the rival's case then one is faced with this nighrasthāna-type. [Hardly a logical point.]

20. Niranuyojănuyoga (= objecting wrongly) : When one attributes to a rival's case a defect that does not in fact vitiate this case then one is faced with this nighrasthāna-type. [Hardly a logical point.]

21. Aparisiddhānta (= deserting one's own doctrine) : When one deserts a doctrine to which one declares one's allegiance one is faced with this nighrasthāna-type. [A case of logical self-contradiction and so a case of offering a pseudo-probans.]

22. Hetvābhāsa (= pseudo-probans) : [Obviously a pseudo-probans.]

Even this bird's eye review of the types of nighrasthāna posited by the early Nyāya authors goes to show that this topic—like the earlier discussed topic of jāti—had little potentiality of giving rise to any fundamentally important discussion of logical problems. Really, so much preoccupation of the early Nyāya authors with the humdrum problems that arise in the course of an oral public debate is a sufficient proof that these authors lived in a primitive enough age when the science of logic was in its infancy, a surmise confirmed by the actual low logical content of their net findings. Pondering over these problems these authors hit upon certain ideas that were to prove logically fruitful in days to come, but in themeselves these problems were no problems of logic proper. Thus all oral public debate being an affair of a reasoned exchange of ideas
a treatment of even practical problems related to such debate was bound to culminate in a serious discussion on inference in particular and the means of valid cognition in general. And this is what actually happened in the history of Nyāya school which soon enough got busy with a discussion like that. Not only that, receiving impetus from the early Nyāya authors certain Buddhists and Mīmāṃsākās too developed a keen interest in the problems of logic and ultimately came out with certain characteristic ideas of their own related to the subject. However, thus appearing on the scene the Buddhist and Mīmāṃsā logicians were somehow in a more favourable position than their Nyāya colleagues who were fated to carry much deadweight inherited from a more or less distant past. For example, this explains why Jayanta cuts such a sorry figure while defending against Dharmakīrti’s attack on the hallowed Nyāya doctrine of nigrahasthāna; similarly poor is the former’s performance in connection with the doctrines of jāti, five avayavas, threesold public debate quibble etc., which were all traditional with the Nyāya school but being organically tied down to the problems of oral public debate had no particular logical significance. As a matter of fact, just one of the fourteen padārthas dealt with by Jayanta in the last one-sixth part of his text has a vital connection with his crucial discussion on the padārtha pramāṇa covering the first two-third of the text; (this padārtha is hetvābhāṣa under which is covered the problem of pseudo-probans so important for all treatment of inference.)
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CHAPTER THREE

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CHAPTER FOUR

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