

ESSAYS IN
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

By
NAGIN J. SHAH

SANSKRIT-SANSKRITI GRANTHAMĀLĀ 6

GENERAL EDITOR
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FOREWORD

It is a matter of great pleasure for me to offer to the scholars of Indian philosophy the present work entitled 'Essays in Indian Philosophy' as the sixth book in the Sanskrit-Sanskriti Granthamālā. As its title suggests, it examines certain issues of Indian philosophy. It deals with such topics as time, space, nirvāṇa, Īśvara, jñāna-darśana, Dharmakīrti's theory of knowledge, vyāpti and testimony.

The work explains and analyses the relevant texts. Its exposition is text-based and authentic, interpretations though fresh are coherent, and conclusions are impartial and cogent.

The work will be welcomed by all scholars and advanced students of Indian philosophy, embodying as it does a clear and lucid exposition of some of the important issues of Indian philosophy.

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Nagin J. Shah
General Editor

INTRODUCTION

The present work is a study of some problems of Indian philosophy. The first essay gives an account of various Western and Indian views about the nature of time. Some comparisons have been suggested. The Jaina view is extensively dealt with. Some Jaina thinkers maintain that time is an independent substance while others contend that it is nothing but modes or changes of substances. It is argued that the former view is weak and unsound.

The second essay studies the Jaina concept of space. Jainas hold that space is an independent substance existing in its own right. It is regarded as a universal container in which all other substances are contained. Some interesting questions are raised and answered.

The third essay is devoted to the exposition of the Buddhist *nirvāṇa*. According to the Buddhist there is no *ātman* over and above *citta*. For them *citta* itself serves the purpose of *ātman*. *Citta* soiled with adventitious impurities like attachment etc. is caught in the cycle of birth and death. When these impurities are removed from *citta* through spiritual practice, it attains *nirvāṇa* which is nothing but extinction of personality (*pudgala*) – personality constituted of five personality factors (*skandhas*), viz. body and bodily traits, feelings, concepts and images, predispositions, sensory experiences or percepts, which all are due to impurities. In *nirvāṇa* pure *citta* continuum without any personality exists. In this connection, the well-known analogy of extinguished fire is clearly explained in right textual context, and two kinds of *nirvāṇa* viz. *sopadhīṣeṣa* and *anupadhīṣeṣa* are shown to correspond *jīvanmukti* and *videhamukti*.

Here it is brought to our notice that our philosophers are not exact in their use of terms. They do not employ them in their technical sense only. Jainas have used the term 'ātman' for *citta*, thus creating an illusion or misunderstanding that they belong to *ātman* tradition. In fact, they are as *anātmavādin* as the Buddhist. The terms 'ātman', 'citta' and 'manas' are indiscriminately employed by our philosophers, using 'ātman' for *citta* and 'citta' for *ātman* as also 'citta' for *manas* and 'manas' for *citta*. And modern translators have made the situation worse by translating these three terms as mind, blurring all the difference. Lack of exactness in the use of terms has created so many problems which actually do not exist.

The fourth and fifth essays examine the Pātañjala and early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conceptions of *Īśvara* respectively. The relevant texts are analysed and explained independently, without being guided (misguided) by

the Sanskrit commentators and modern exponents. And it has been cogently demonstrated that for Patañjali, Gautama and Vātsyāyana *Īśvara* is nothing but a *jīvanmukta* who is a spiritual teacher (*guru*) or preacher (*upadeṣṭā*) *par excellence*.

The sixth essay deals with the problem of *jñāna-darśana*. One meaning of the term 'darśana' is *śraddhā*. Another meaning of this term is a special type of cognition. It is this meaning that is intended when the terms 'jñāna' and 'darśana' are used side by side. *Jñāna* is a type of cognition and *darśana* is also a type of cognition. So naturally there arises a question as to what distinction between these two types of cognition is. To find answer to this question, the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, Buddhist and Jaina views on the problem of *jñāna-darśana* are extensively and closely studied. That *jñāna* and *darśana* are two fundamentally different faculties is accepted by the thinkers belonging to these three traditions. The Sāṅkhya-Yoga thinkers recognised two fundamentally different *tattvas*, viz. *puruṣa* (= *ātman*) and *citta*. They attributed the faculty of *darśana* to *puruṣa* alone and the faculty of *jñāna* to *citta* alone. The Buddhists rejected *puruṣa* (= *ātman*) altogether and attributed the faculty of *darśana* to *citta*. Thus, the *citta* recognised by the Buddhists possesses both the faculties, viz. *darśana* and *jñāna*. Those very reasons that urged the Buddhists to reject *ātman* urged Jainas also to reject it. Jainas rejected *ātman*, accepting *citta* alone. They too attributed both the faculties to *citta*. Great pains have been taken to bring out clearly the distinction between *jñāna* and *darśana*.

The seventh essay critically expounds Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti's theory of knowledge. The metaphysics of momentarism could not but reject the validity of every cognition that grasps spatial and temporal extension and consequently in that metaphysics can fit only the theory that nothing but pure sensation gives us true knowledge of reality. So, for the Buddhist perception is equivalent to pure sensation which is by nature free from any thought. Thus, the most conspicuous and crucial feature of Dharmakīrti's logic is the sharp distinction drawn between sensory experience and thought. Dharmakīrti assigns an essentially negative rather than positive function to thought; in his eyes, thought is primarily meant to remove an illusion and only incidentally to produce a conviction. However here another line of thought has also been operative. For what thought reveals about an object is what is common to several objects; but Dharmakīrti is of the view that each object has just got one positive nature which it does not share with any other; so according to him what several objects have in common is not any positive feature but just that feature which excludes them from a particular set of objects (i.e. what jars have in common is what excludes them from non-jars). In this way Dharmakīrti also feels justified in maintaining that bare sensory experience reveals the total nature of an object while a piece of thought concerning it reveals only an aspect of this nature. For sensory experience reveals an object as a bare particular,

i.e. as something excluded from everything else, while a piece of thought reveals it as excluded from a particular set of objects; and Dharmakīrti suggests that 'exclusion from everything else' constitutes the total nature of an object while 'exclusion from a particular set of objects' constitutes but an aspect of this nature. Certainly, Dharmakīrti has put right things in odd manner. One can easily see that Dharmakīrti has an almost correct understanding of the relative roles played in the knowledge-situation by bare sensory experience on the one hand and thought on the other, as also of the type of objective features – whether exclusively *negāṭivā* or otherwise – that thought manages to notice.

The eighth essay mainly deals with the problem of the acquisition or grasping of a universal necessary relation obtaining between two things or two features. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Buddhist and Jaina positions are explained. And various solutions offered by different thinkers to solve the problem of grasping the universal necessary relation (*vyāpti*) are presented and their defects are pointed out.

The ninth and last essay expounds Jaina theory of testimony. Keeping in view the main controversy regarding the question as to whether testimony is an independent *pramāṇa*, the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, the Buddhist and the Jaina views are discussed. The Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that words are directly connected with things, of course, through convention. They maintain that as soon as we understand the meaning of words we acquire the knowledge of facts and that the process of understanding the meaning of words is not inferential. So, they believe that the knowledge through testimony is not inferential. The Vaiśeṣikas, on the other hand, maintain that the process of understanding the meaning of words is inferential. Moreover, though they, like the Naiyāyikas, accept that the words are conventionally connected with things, they, unlike the Naiyāyikas, are conscious of the implications of this conventional character of the relation. Words are symbols and not signs. Hence, they contend that words *qua* words enable us to infer only the intension of the speaker and not the fact. But they state that words *qua* utterances of a reliable person enable us to infer facts. This view closely tallies with the view of Dharmakīrti, except the fact that Dharmakīrti goes even a step further and maintains that words are not in any way connected with things. The Jaina logicians refute Dharmakīrti's position that words could not directly lead to the knowledge of things. Jainas also refute the view that testimony is a form of inference. It has been pointed out that all the differences shown by the Jaina logicians between inference and testimony are trivial and do not furnish a sufficient ground for their view that testimony is a source of knowledge independent of inference.

I am sure this work will prove useful to all those interested in the study of Indian philosophy.

Nagin J. Shah

NATURE OF TIME

“As I see it, we are unlikely to reach any definite conclusions on these questions (Determinism vs. Freewill and the problem of causation) until we have a better understanding of the true nature of time”¹—these are the words of Sir James Jean, a great scientist. How can it be possible for a person like me to determine the nature of time ? So, my task here is to study what the great masters have said about the nature of time. While doing so I shall make a special attempt to explain the Jaina view at length.

Western Views :

In the West, Aristotle maintains that time is closely connected with continuous movement. Time is the measure of this continuous movement. In other words, time is a breaking up of continuous movement (*numerus motus*). Movement presents two features : (i) Movement is an uninterrupted progress of the subject from potentiality to actuality. Thus movement bears the characteristic of *unity*. (ii) Movement, on the other hand, is also *virtually multiple*. One can divide it into an indefinite number of parts. “Movement, then, subjected to a simple mental division becomes a number or a multitude.” Thus time is looked upon as made up of two elements, the one *formal* namely number (*numerus*), and the other *material* namely movement (*motus*).

In other words, we may say that according to Aristotle time is motion that admits of numeration.²

In fact, concrete (not-abstracted, rather not subjected to mental division) time and movement are identical. Continuous movement does not at once appear under the formal aspect of temporal order. It has first to submit itself to a process of mental division. This mental division gives rise to the notion of succession. Nevertheless, this division is not a real one, but belongs to the mental order and makes no change in the objective reality of continuous movement.³ I would like to suggest the comparison of this view with the one held by Bergson.

Descartes identified external reality with extension. Extension is not identical with any of the quantitative determinations like shape, size and figure. He, however, did not regard the quantitative differences of physical things as unreal. They are the modes of matter; they are due to the action of *motion* on matter. He thus came to admit the reality of motion. But for him who has identified external reality with extension it was logically impossible to derive it from external reality. So, he maintains that God originally imparted motion to matter. Motion implies change and time. So, he has to admit the reality of time. Since time, like motion, is out of place in his conceptual world view he had no option but to regard time also as a miracle, pointing to the agency of God. Time, according to him, is an infinite atomistic series of moments.⁴ Why was he led to this atomic view of time? "In his anxiety to show that God was the continuous support of the world of flux, Descartes was driven to the atomic view of Time. He felt that if the future of the world depended solely on its antecedent state, there would be nothing for God to do, once the world had been created. Every moment Time seemed to annihilate the world; therefore, continuous creative intervention of God alone could guarantee the conformity of the future to the past."⁵

According to Spinoza there is only one eternal universal substance 'God or Nature'. This substance possesses, among other infinite attributes, extension. Attributes appear in specific ways or modes. Motion, according to him, is the mode of extension since there can be no motion without extension. Logically we cannot deduce this mode from the substance or extension. Hence it is unreal. He seems to have been influenced by the method of geometry. This is the reason why he maintains that things eternally follow from the substance⁶; that causal relation is not temporal relation; that it is the relation between the 'constant and eternal things'.⁷ This rules out all change and evolution and consequently makes time impossible, unwanted and unreal. Thus according to him temporal aspect of things is due to the modification of finite subjectivity. To reach truth means to escape this limitation and see things *sub specie aeternitatis*. In this sense time is unreal, it is the *appearance* which reflective knowledge eliminates. This trend could be traced back in Parmenides and Plato.⁸

Descartes and Spinoza accepted only one ultimate substance and hence they had to maintain that extension (space) is one of the

attributes of the substance. Leibniz ruled out the possibility of this extension (space) by positing many atomic substances (monads) in place of one substance.⁹ Space and time, according to him, are *confused* ideas abstracted from our experience of things known independently of space and time.¹⁰

According to Newton, sensuous time and space are unreal. There are absolute space and time which are not determined by their relation to anything external. Space is characterised by reversibility; time is characterised by irreversibility. In other words, through an act of will we might change our motion through space, yet on the other hand the flowing of time transcends our act of will. Moreover, Newton's this concept of absolute time makes possible the case of absolute simultaneity.¹¹

For Kant space and time are neither confused perceptions nor absolutes. They are the necessary forms of perception. They are not realities or things existing for themselves, nor are they qualities or relations belonging to things as such; they are forms or functions of the senses. We cannot think things without time, though we can think time without things; hence time is the necessary precondition of our perception of things, or of phenomenal world. Thus these forms are not derived from experience, they are *a priori*.¹² Kant demonstrates that space and time are vitiated by 'antinomies'. This means that on the supposition of the reality of space and time, it is possible to prove, with equal cogency, several contradictory pairs of theses and countertheses; such as that space has boundaries and has not, time has beginning and has not, etc.¹³ Bradley traces back all these paradoxes to the fundamental paradox in 'term' and 'relation'. All relations are unreal as they involve infinite regress.¹⁴ According to him space and time are mere appearances and product of nescience, so to say.¹⁵ A. E. Taylor, a follower of Bradley, distinguishes between perceptual space and time on the one hand and conceptual space and time on the other. Perceptual space and time we have in perception; and they have reference to *here* and *now*. Conceptual space and time are constructed from the perceptual data. Neither of them is real. Perceptual space and time are unreal because 'they involve reference to the *here* and *now* of a finite experience'; conceptual space and time are unreal because 'they contain no principle of internal distinction, and are thus not individual.'¹⁶

Time (*durée*) assumes fundamental importance in Bergson. Space and time are, according to him, diametrically opposite in nature. Space is static, while time (*durée*) is the principle of creative evolution. Real time, according to him, is duration and not the juxtaposition of discrete instants. Real time (*durée réelle*) is 'heterogeneous' and 'continuous'. The real temporal process is a multiplicity of 'interpenetration'. Real time flows in an indivisible continuity. This real time we find in our experiences. It is Intellect that makes cuts in it, spatializes it and falsely represents it as a straight line with discrete moments as its points. Thus real time we cannot think, 'we must live it because life transcends intellect.'¹⁷

As against Bergson, Alexander maintains that space and time are so intimately interrelated that one cannot be understood without reference to the other. When viewed thus, the contradictions allegedly found in them would no longer remain. Space-Time, says Alexander, is the 'stuff' of which things are fashioned. This is interpreted in the sense that Space-Time is identical with Pure Motion. This again amounts to saying that a thing is a complex of motions.¹⁸

A. N. Whitehead is a philosopher of change *par excellence*. He agrees with Bergson on the point that our experience is of duration and that instants are the abstractions made by science (i.e. intellect). But he differs from Bergson in not declaring that only duration is real and an 'instant' is a 'fiction' or 'convention' because he feels that in doing so one cuts all connections between experience and science – which he is not prepared to do.¹⁹

Now let us see, in a general way, what Einstein has said about time. Wildon Carr writes : 'The principle of relativity declares that there is no absolute magnitude, that there exists nothing whatever which can claim to be great or small in its own nature, also there is no absolute duration, nothing whatever which in its own nature is short or long. I co-ordinate my universe from my own standpoint of rest in a system of reference in relation to which all else is moving...Space and Time are not containers nor are they contents but variants.'²⁰ 'The chief novelty of Einstein's theory is the conception of the relativity of simultaneity...If we grasp the relativity of simultaneity, there is little difficulty in seeing that the measurable physical duration (or elapsed time) of any event depends upon the velocity of the centre from which it is measured...The theory of

relativity not only takes for granted the irrevocability of the past, that the status of events as past is unalterable but in making the velocity of light a maximum it makes vision or other communication with the past impossible. But it is at first surprising to learn that of two events in distant parts of space, one may precede the other in one physical system and follow it in the measurable determinations of another system that is moving relatively to the first. This seemingly paradoxical situation, that event A may as truly be said to precede B as to follow it, depending on the different referents, is limited by the finite velocity of light as a maximum.²¹

Indian Views (except the Jaina) :

In the oldest times, we find the idea of Time as the highest principle and power governing all things. In the *Atharvaveda* (XIX. 53) we come across a hymn which extols Time as the basis of all things; it creates all things and it destroys all things. The idea of Time further asserted itself. We find discussed in philosophical works the doctrine of Time (*Kālavāda*) which traces all things back to Time. In the mouth of the upholder of this doctrine the following words are put : "Time brings all creatures to ripeness. Time again destroys all things, Time keeps awake among the sleepy. It is hard to transgress Time. Without Time not even a bean is cooked, even when a man has placed the pot in fire; therefore a man knows that it has occurred through Time." (*Śāstravārtāsamuccaya*, 166). Time creates all things, Time ripens all things and Time destroys all things. Time is all powerful. But in the days of philosophical systems the doctrine of Time (*Kālavāda*) remains in the background and loses its importance as the prime ground of all things. Some philosophical systems altogether rejected Time and others that accepted it recognised it not as the prime ground of all things but merely as a condition of their temporal aspect. We undertake the exposition of the various conceptions of Time, found in the different systems of Indian philosophy.

In the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system one finds varied views expressed on the nature of time. Some maintain that time is altogether non-existent²²; some declare that it is an evolute (*pariṇāmaḥ pṛthagbhāvaḥ*) of Primordial Matter (*Prakṛti*)²³; some are of the opinion that Primordial Matter (*Pradhāna*) itself is to be called time²⁴; some expressly state that time is nothing but action.²⁵ Some put forward the

view that time is of two kinds – eternal (*nitya*) and fractional (*khaṇḍa*); that eternal time is no more than *guṇas* of *Prakṛti*; the fractional time, on the other hand, is produced from Ether (*ākāśa*) through various limiting adjuncts.²⁶ Still some others hold that time is nothing over and above the objects spoken of as past, present and future.²⁷ The view found in the *Yogasūtra* of Patañjali is peculiar and explained clearly in the commentaries thereon. According to this view there is no time except moment. What is called time, rather duration, has no factual existence; it is only mental construction. Moment is real, duration is unreal. This has a striking similarity with the Buddhist view that moment is real, the continuum (*santāna*) is unreal. Let us study this view in the words of Sir. B. N. Seal. "Infinite time is a non-entity objectively considered, being only a construction of the understanding (*buddhinirmāṇa*) based on the relation of antecedence and sequence, in which the members of the phenomenal series are intuited to stand to one another. These phenomenal changes as intuited by us in the empirical consciousness fall into a series, which the understanding conceives as order in Time. The Time-series, then, is a *schema* of the understanding for representing the course of Evolution. The *schema* of the understanding supervenes on the phenomenal world as order in Time, and hence in the empirical consciousness the Time-series appears to have an objective reality, and to form a continuum. As there is an ultimate and irreducible unit of extensive quantity (*parimāṇa*) in the *Guṇas* or infinitesimal Reals of *Prakṛti*, which are without constituent parts, so the moment may be conceived as the ultimate and irreducible unit of this Time-continuum as represented in the empirical consciousness. A moment, therefore, cannot be thought of as containing any parts standing in the relation of antecedence and sequence. If change is represented by the Time-series, a moment as the unit of time may be supposed to represent the unit of change. Now all physical change may be reduced to the motion of atoms in space, and we may, therefore, define the moment as representing the ultimate unit of such change – viz., the (instantaneous) transit of an atom (or rather a *Tanmātrā*) from one point in space to the next succeeding point. Even an atom has constituent parts (the *Tanmātrās*), and hence an atom must take more than one moment to change its position. The motion of that which is absolutely simple and without parts from one point in space to the next must be instantaneous, and conceived as the absolute unit of

change (and therefore of time, *kṣaṇa*). If this is held to be an irreducible absolute unit, it will follow that what we represent as the Time-continuum is really discrete. Time is of one dimension. Two moments cannot co-exist; neither does any series of moments exit in reality. Order in Time is nothing but the relation of antecedence and sequence, between the moment that is and the moment that just went before. But only one moment, the present, exists. The future and the past have no meaning apart from potential and sub-latent phenomena. One kind of transformation to which a thing is subject is that it changes from the potential to the actual, and from the actual to the sub-latent. This may be called the change of mark (*lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma*) as opposed to change of quality (*dharmapariṇāma*) and the change due to duration or lapse of time (*avasthā-pariṇāma*). The present is the mark of actuality, the future the mark of potentiality, and the past of sub-latency, in a phenomenon. Only one single moment is actual, and the whole universe evolves in that one single moment. The rest is but potential or sublatent.

Vijñānabhikṣu points out that this does not amount to a denial of Time. It means that Time has no real (or objective) existence apart from the 'moment'. But the latter is real being identical with the unit of change in phenomena (*guṇapariṇāmasya kṣaṇatvavacanāt*). But even this is real only for, our empirical (relative) consciousness (*vyutthitadarsana*), which intuitively the relation of antecedence and sequence into the evolving Reals (*Guṇas*), in the stage of "empirical intuition" (*savicārā nirvikalpaprajñā*). The "intellectual intuition" (*nirvicārā nirvikalpaprajñā*), on the other hand, apprehends the Reals as they are, without the imported empirical relations of Space, Time, and Causality."²⁸

It is interesting to contrast this view with the one upheld by Bergson. According to this Sāṅkhya view, the moment is real while the duration is mental construction. Bergson's view is quite opposite. There moment is unreal and duration is real. Moreover, duration of the Sāṅkhya seems to be a series of discrete moments; there is no real 'interpenetration' between a moment that is and a moment that just went before; that is, one does not 'melt' into the other, so to say. On the other hand in Bergson's *durée* moments are continuous forming one indivisible flow; its moments 'melt' into one another and form an organic whole. I feel that this Sāṅkhya view of time is not in tune with their theory of change (*pariṇāma-vāda*). They maintain

that the states or moments of a particular thing are not discrete but continuous. According to this system, reality is neither a series of discrete momentary states (i.e. mere momentary modes) nor eternally static substance but persistence of an eternal substance through its various changing modes. So if they have declared unrelated solitary moment unreal and a continuous flow of moments one melting into the other real, their view on the nature of time would have fitted well with their theory of change. This view of theirs seems to have been influenced by the Buddhist view that merely object moments are real and the continuum (*santāna*) of these discrete object moments is mental construction.²⁹

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika View : According to this system, Time is a substance. It is one, eternal and all-pervading. It causes movement and change. All perceptible things are perceived as moving, changing, coming into being and passing away. They are produced and destroyed. There must be some Force or Power which thus brings them into existence and moves them all. The things themselves cannot do it. There must, therefore, be something which makes this movement, origination and destruction of things possible. It is this something, this Power or Force, which is Time. As it moves and changes things it gives rise to in the percipient the notions, with regard to those things, of past, present and future, of old and new. This Time substance, though itself static, is the source of all changes and motions. It is devoid of specific physical qualities like colour etc. Hence it is not emanable to perceptual cognition. Nor could it be an object of mental perception because mind cannot function independently of external sense-organs in the case of external things. Its existence is inferred from the facts of consecution and simultaneity between phenomena. Had there been no Time we would have no knowledge of consecution or simultaneity and there would be nothing to account for our time-notions associated with all change.³⁰ Time being one unique substance, name given to it is a proper name and not a general term.³¹ When Time is divided into many different times, it is a metaphor.³² In other words, distinctions in time like a minute, an hour, a day and so on are apparent and due to certain conditions. Similar is the case with the division of Time into past, present and future. In accordance with the changes of things Time reveals itself as past, present and future. Time that is all-pervading partless substance appears as many in association with the changes related to

it. These different times are mere *representations* produced by one single object only. They, being mere representations, are unable to give rise to a general concept.³³ From all this it becomes clear that this system considers Time as all-embracing receptacle containing the entire universe. It is interesting to note Raghunātha Śiromaṇi's view. According to him the essential nature of time is Divinity and nothing distinct from Divinity (Īśvara).³⁴

Mīmāṃsā View : The Bhāṭṭas mainly follow the Vaiśeṣikas in this connection. The Bhāṭṭas too consider Time as a substance, all-pervasive, eternal and devoid of physical qualities like colour etc.³⁵ But as against the Vaiśeṣikas they believe that Time is perceptible by all the six sense-organs.³⁶ One would ask as to how that which is devoid of physical qualities could be perceived by all the six senses. *Śāstradīpikā* solves the difficulty in the following manner. Time is not perceived independently by the senses; but along with the perception of various objects Time is also perceived as their qualification by all the senses.³⁷ On the authority of Rāmānujācārya we can say that the Prabhākaras accept the Vaiśeṣika view of Time *in toto*.³⁸

Advaita Vedānta View : According to this system Time is nothing but nescience (*avidyā*).³⁹

Buddhist View : At a very early stage of Buddhism – when even the Piṭakas were not compiled – a view that there is one unitary immutable Time along with the conditioned empirical time was prevalent, writes Āc. Narendradeva, among the Buddhists. He bases his inference on the fact that those early Buddhists accepted matter (*rūpa*) only as impermanent and all other subtle elements like *citta* and *viññāna* as immutable. He further states that the conception of time as the cause of the production of impermanent things finds support in the early Buddhist literature.⁴⁰

Mahāvibhāṣā refers to a view that regards time as immutable and *saṃskṛta dharmas* as impermanent. Moreover, according to this view time is a receptacle with three divisions – future, present and past – organically continuous; *saṃskṛta dharmas* move in this receptacle; they having come out of the future enter the present and having come out of the present enter the past. Later on the one immutable time seems to have been removed and there remained merely the three 'transitions' (*adhvā*). The Vaibhāṣikas think that all the three transitions – future, past and present – exist. The distinction

among them is based on the causal efficiency (*kāritra*) of an element. Causal efficiency (*kāritra*) is of two kinds - one that determines the general character of the remote fruit (*phalakṣepa*) and the other that actually produces the fruit (*phaladāna*). All the *dharma*s, when they are in a state of *phalakṣepa*, are termed present. The states prior and posterior to this state are devoid of *phalakṣepa-śakti*. Prior non-existence of this power is termed future; and posterior non-existence of this power is termed past. The future and the past exist in the same sense as the present exists. All the three times, rather 'transitions', have the same nature always; merely their efficiency (*kāritra*) differs. While discussing the doctrine of the existence of three times (*adhvā*) it is said, in the *Abhidharmakośa*, that the future (effect) becomes present through *deśāntarakarṣaṇa*. In the Vaibhāṣika list of seventyfive *dharma*s Time finds no mention. But we may surmise that through the back door both the types of time - one unitary immutable and the other conditioned empirical - enter the Vaibhāṣika philosophy. One unitary immutable time is accepted under the name of *Amṛta dhātu* (= *Nirvāṇa dhātu*). The empirical time is accepted in the guise of *saṃskṛta lakṣaṇa*s which together, like Vaiśeṣika time, constitute the general cause of change.⁴¹

The Sautrāntikas deny the objective reality of the *saṃskṛta lakṣaṇa*s viz. production etc. The notions of production etc., they say, refer not to a moment but to a series (of moments) which is a mental construction.⁴² Again, they believe in the present time only, while the other two divisions of time, namely, past and future, are regarded as non-existent. Neither the past nor the future exists.⁴³ Even what is called present is nothing over and above an element (*dharma*). Hence here the moment becomes a synonym of an element.⁴⁴ This is the reason why the author of *Brahmavidyābharaṇa* writes as follows : In the opinion of the Buddhists Time does not exist. A jar etc. which is perishable by nature in the very act of emerging becomes the basis for the assumption of moment (*kṣaṇa*). They assert that moment is nothing over and above the objects such as a jar. There is no independent time such as a *kṣaṇa*.⁴⁵

Nāgasena maintains that time is a product of ignorance. For the enlightened there is no time. In the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaho* we find stated that time is a subjective element, the concept (*kālapaññatti*) by which we in our internal intuition distinguish our first and foremost

states; that it is the *sine qua non* of the succession of mental states.⁴⁶

The Mādhyamikas maintain that even from the empirical point of view Time is unsubstantial. It is admittedly not an object of perception. They – past, present and future – appear to be existences due to our tendency to objectify concepts. It is impossible to conceive time either as a permanent immutable entity causing things or as an existent. The reasons given against the first view are as follows. It cannot be a cause. As the cause of the state of production (of a particular thing) is eternal, that state the thing will have eternally. Again, the thing whose cause is presumed immutable (Time) should really be uncaused or caused at random. It is so because a cause to produce an effect must transform itself into the effect and cease to exist. The arguments adduced against the second view are as follows. The divisions of Time into the Past, Present and Future are vital to its conception. The Present and the Future are what they are in relation to the Past; they should therefore exist in the past, for they are dependent on it. If so, they too would be included in the past, or the latter would be indistinguishable from the present and the future. If, to avoid this, it were held that the present and the future do not exist in the past, relative to what are they the present and the future? A non-relative present or future is not possible; and without distinctions, time too is unavailable. The same arguments may be urged, *mutatis mutandis*, with regard to the existence of the past or the present in the present and the future, etc. Time might be thought to exist in relation to things that change. But as changing things (*bhāva*) are untenable, the reality of Time too is not established.⁴⁷

Kamalaśīla shows the futility of time in the following manner. When the speaker addresses a person with the words 'this is prior', 'this is posterior' with reference to objects or events taking place successively a particular impression (*ābhoga*) is formed in the mind of the latter. This impression gives rise to the knowledge that things thus referred to are prior or posterior. Thus temporal order being otherwise explainable time is not accepted by the Buddhists. Again, as Time is partless according to those who accept it as real, the concept of priority or posteriority is not applicable to it. If this priority or posteriority, as they say, primarily belongs to actions and objects, and only secondarily to time, then too, says Kamalaśīla, time is unnecessary.⁴⁸

Grammarians' View : According to Patañjali, Time is the substratum of the world; it is an eternal (*nitya*), indivisible (*akhaṇḍa*), all-pervading ruling (*vibhu*) principle (*padārtha*). We cannot trace its origin. Nor can we divide it into parts. The principle by which trees, grass, creepers and other corporeal (*mūrtimat*) substances (*dravya*) are seen sometimes to grow, sometimes to decline is called Time. In short, change is due to Time.⁴⁹ How partless Time possibly came to be divided ? Patañjali replies that although it knows no real differentiation yet through the difference of attributes, its differentiation is supposed (*kalpanā*) as is also the case with all-pervading Ether (*ākāśa*). Fractionless unitary time, when all the forms of action (*kriyā*) are associated with it, seems to take different shapes. Associated to a particular form of action Time becomes day; associated to another form of action it becomes night and so on. Associated to different motions of the sun, Time takes different shapes of day, night, etc.⁵⁰

Bhartrihari considers Eternal Verbum or Logos as the Absolute. He maintains that this Absolute has the fundamental Power, Time. The notion of temporal order could not be accounted for without this Power. According to him, thus, Time is not an independent and supersensible substance. It is a Power of the Absolute. But it is to be noted that the Power and the Powerful are essentially identical.⁵¹ This Power has two aspects—*pratibandha* (also called *jarā*) and *abhyanuññā* (also called *krama*). The first is the preventive aspect and the second is the permissive aspect. But for the first there would result chaos, all actions or effects being simultaneous. Thus a seed, a sprout, a stem and a stalk – all would emerge and exist simultaneously. The second makes possible the projection of the sequenceless Absolute into phenomenal sequence of priority and posteriority.⁵² These two aspects, namely, *pratibandha* and *abhyanuññā* correspond more or less to the two aspects, namely *vikṣepa* and *āvaraṇa* ascribed to *Avidyā* by the later writers on Advaita. Time (*kālaśakti*) is looked upon as the efficient cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) or the causal agent (*prayojaka-kartr*) of the phenomenal world in its manifold phases of creation, preservation and dissolution.⁵³ As Time, with the help of its two aspects, makes possible the temporal sequence in phenomenal world, we superimpose on the Time itself the temporal sequence. Succession or simultaneity are the attributes of actions or objects and not of Time

but we superimpose them on Time because it is Time that presents actions or objects in succession or simultaneity.⁵⁴ Again, though Time is unitary we wrongly describe it as manifold after having identified it with the actions and movements which it controls.⁵⁵ Similarly, our description of Time as long or brief is not true. Though it is constant and changeless, it appears to be of greater or shorter duration according as the series of actions brought about by it is long drawn out or cut short.⁵⁶ Moreover, Time, in reality, is not threefold – past, present and future. When an action ceases, Time is described as past, when it is about to happen, it is said to be future; and when it continues to flow on as a current, it is called present. Thus the distinctions into past, future and present naturally pertain to actions, while they are superimposed on Time.⁵⁷ The two aspects *pratibandha* and *abhyānujñā* are eternal.⁵⁸ Hence they co-exist. Co-existence of these two mutually opposite aspects would give rise to the contingency of conflict between the two. The grammarians solve the difficulty by stating that there is a chronological co-existence yet there is a logical sequence between the two and cite a case of three *guṇas* of Sāṅkhya *Prakṛti* in their support.⁵⁹

Astronomers' View : The view that Time is nothing but action is ascribed to astronomers by some modern scholars. But it seems that it is not their view. If at all it is their view, it is not the view of all the astronomers but only of the few. The *Sūryasidhānta* states that Time is of two kinds - the one is rod-like indivisible and inflexible (*akhaṇḍa-daṇḍāyamāna*) and without an end (*akṣayya*), and the other is the one the nature of which is to measure (*kalanātmaka*). The partless rod-like Time is the cause of production, endurance and destruction of the changing world. The measurable Time can be demonstrated (*nidrśya*) and is an object of perception.⁶⁰ This measurable Time is, again, of two kinds – tangible (*mūrta*) and intangible (*amūrta*). The vital breath is taken as the unit of tangible Time. The time necessary in a healthy body for inspiration and expiration is called vital breath (*prāṇa*). One vital breath takes about four seconds (of the Western division of time). The 'time-atom', the '*truṭī*', is the unit of intangible time. It is the 33,750th part of a second.⁶¹

Jaina View :

1. Time and Jaina Āgamic Works

In the *Āvaśyaka Cūṛi*, three different views on the nature of time

are referred to. Some say that time is a quality⁶²; some maintain that it is nothing but modes of the substance;⁶³ still some others opine that it is an independent substance (*dravya*) in addition to the five, namely, *Jiva* (Soul Substance), *Pudgala* (Matter Substance), *Ākāśa* (Space Substance), *Dharma* and *Adharma* (substances serving as the media of motion and inertia respectively)⁶⁴. Out of these three views, the first is, to the best of my knowledge, neither referred to nor explained elsewhere in the whole of the Jaina literature. The last two views are considerably old and find mention in the *Bhagavatisūtra*⁶⁵. The Śvetāmbara philosophers refer to both these views, though they favour either of them. Digambara thinkers state and explain their accepted view only according to which time is an independent substance.

2. Arguments for the Time as an independent Substance

Now let us study the arguments put forward by the Śvetāmbara and the Digambara thinkers to establish time as an independent substance. (1) The existence of real time is established by the incessant minute imperceptible changes (*vartanā*) that go on in the five substances; without it these changes would not take place as it is their auxiliary cause.⁶⁶ To give a concrete example, we might say that the stone under a potter's wheel assists in the movement of the wheel. The stone here does not impart motion to the wheel, but without this stone such a kind of motion would not have been possible. Similarly, time assists or works as an auxiliary cause in the changes produced in substances, though it does not work as a cause proper in their production⁶⁷. (2) Jainas should accept Time as an independent substance. Though spiritual and material substances are regarded capable by nature to move and to rest, yet they have posited two independent substances *Dharma* and *Adharma* serving as the media or auxiliary causes of motion and inertia respectively. Similarly, though the five substances are by nature capable of transforming themselves into their proper modes some auxiliary or general cause like Time should be posited to help them in their transformations. Were they to reject Time as an independent substance, they have no right to posit *Dharma* and *Adharma*. The case of Time is on par with that of *Dharma* and *Adharma*.⁶⁸ (3) Though all the causal conditions are there, the mango-tree, etc. do not bear fruits *all at once*; this suggests that there is Time substance, with varied capacities, which the effects expect for their fruition⁶⁹. (4) Time

substance is a controlling principle. Without it temporal order could not be accounted for. Were it not an independent substance, all serial effects would take place simultaneously and thus there would ensue chaos instead of order.⁷⁰ (5) Without Time substance, how can we have particular divisions of Time ? Divisions imply something of which they are the divisions.⁷¹ (6) Simple uncompounded word 'time' presupposes an independent entity, namely, Time.⁷² (7) Activities like cooking etc. are conventionally referred to as 'cooking time' etc. But in this conventional usage of 'cooking time' and so on, the name of 'time' is superimposed on activity. The term 'time' really signifies the existence of real time which is the basis of this conventional time.⁷³ (8) Those who maintain that time is nothing but movement of the sun and other luminaries are not right. Mere movement of the sun and stars could not account for the changes in substances. Even in regard to movement we say 'it is past', 'it is present', 'it is future'. Movements require the assistance of Time. Without it they are impossible. Minute changes constituting movements could not be explained if Time were not posited as an independent real substance.⁷⁴ (9) It is untenable to maintain that Space (*ākāśa*) can very well perform the function assigned to Time. In other words, to reject Time as an independent substance we cannot legitimately maintain that Space serves as an auxiliary cause of the minute changes (*vartanā*) in the five substances. Space merely contains or gives room to the substances. It cannot be a causal condition of the minute changes in other substances. For instance, a pot can at the most support or contain the rice but it cannot cook the rice; for that we need fire.⁷⁵ (10) Some might even argue that 'Existence' (*Sattā*) itself can perform the function of time; and hence there is no need of positing an independent substance called Time. But this view is not sound. Minute imperceptible changes themselves constitute the nature of 'Existence'. So, how could it be viewed as an auxiliary cause of minute changes.⁷⁶ (11) A theory is propounded by some that time is nothing but activity (*kriyā*). Akalaṅka explains it as follows. Movement of an atom from one spacepoint to the next spacepoint is called an 'instant'. There is nothing like a minute Time over and above this movement to measure the span of this instant. The collection of these instantaneous activities is called *āvalikā*, the collection of these *āvalikās* is called *ucchvāsa* and so on. There is no entity called Time. In our every day usage we say 'he sits as long as the cows are milked.' Here the usage of 'time'

is based on the activities. When one activity is circumscribed or limited by another activity, to the latter is applied the term 'time'. Thus time is nothing but activity.⁷⁷ Akalaṅka refutes this view in the following manner. He admits that the usages like 'he did it within a wink of an eye', 'he did it within a breath' are no doubt based on activities. But he points out that our application of the term 'time' to activities of 'winking', 'breathing' etc. could not be without any ground whatsoever. Take an example of our application of the term 'daṇḍi' ('staff-bearer') to Devadatta. This application of the 'daṇḍi' to Devadatta could not be baseless. Its basis is the relation obtaining between *daṇḍa* (staff) and Devadatta. Similarly, we should maintain that there is something like Time which, being in relation with activity, makes possible our application of the term 'time' to activity.⁷⁸ Moreover, if we were to consider time as identical with activity, the contingency of the absence or non-existence of the present would ensue. How ? In connection with activity there are only two alternative states, namely, activity either done or undone. There is no third state in its connection, namely, activity neither done nor undone. Thus activity is devoid of its present and hence it cannot provide the basis for the usage of present. And past and future being relative to present, in the absence of present they too would be non-existent.⁷⁹ It might be suggested that the collection of activities from the beginning of the effect to its completion is called present. But this stand is very weak. The activities being momentary, how could there be any possibility of their collection ?⁸⁰ Again, if it were argued that time is not accepted independent of activities on the ground that it is not cognised as distinct from activities, Akalaṅka retorts that similar logic should be applied by the opponent to activities. When done so, even activities would suffer the same fate as that of time; they would be nothing over and above agents or substances as they are not cognised as distinct from them.⁸¹ The last argument adduced by Akalaṅka against this theory is that an activity cannot limit or measure another activity. Only persistent or perdurable thing can measure another such thing. But activity being momentary how can it measure another such activity ? A thing which itself is momentary can never measure another momentary thing.⁸²

We have already stated that all the Digambara thinkers and a section of Śvatāmbara thinkers upheld the view that time is an

independent substance. But we should see whether there is any difference of opinion between the Digambara thinkers on the one hand and the concerned Śvetāmbara thinkers on the other. Scholars generally find differences between the two views.⁸³ Let us see what is the real position.

3. Time substance according to Digambaras

According to the Digambara thinkers, time is atomic. There are innumerable time-atoms. Each time-atom occupies one spacepoint of the cosmic space. Thus time-atoms are confined to cosmic space only. They are not present in the space beyond cosmos.⁸⁴ They do not combine to form molecules as the material atoms do. Nor do they constitute one single whole as the spacepoints do. Thus they have no spatial extension (*tiryakpracaya*). Only those substances that have spatial extension are termed *astikāya*. Hence time is not counted among *astikāya*.⁸⁵ Time-atoms go on assuming different modes all the while. All these modes are not measurable. The smallest measurable mode of a time-atom is termed 'samaya' (instant) which is defined as the time taken by a material atom to traverse a unit of space by slow movement.⁸⁶ Each time-atom has infinite such modes.⁸⁷ Though these modes are not simultaneous, a time-atom being a substance pervades all of them. That is, these modes are not discrete, without any permanent substance underlying them. This is the reason why time-atoms are said to have temporal extension or monodimensional order (*ūrdhvacpracaya*).⁸⁸ Time-atoms are motionless⁸⁹ and hence each of them for ever occupy one particular space-point in cosmic space. They are immobile entities arranged in close proximity to one another, each occupying one space-point in cosmic space. They are eternal as they are atomic and do not form aggregates.⁹⁰ Origination, persistence and decay in their case are explained through the origination, persistence and decay of other things.⁹¹ It is also said that they are eternal in the sense that they never give up their own nature and that the origination and decay in their case is due to the rhythmic rise and fall of their *agurulaghuguṇa* (untranslatable term, lit. means neither-heavy-nor-light-quality)⁹². Āc. Kundakunda maintains that a time-atom undergoes origination, persistence and decay at one and the same moment.⁹³

Time-atoms are devoid of physical qualities like colour, etc. and in this sense only they are called *amūrta*.⁹⁴ They are subtle and imperceptible.⁹⁵ Though other substances require time as an auxiliary

cause in the emergence of their modes, time-atoms do not require any other substance as an auxiliary cause in the production of their own modes.

Digambara thinkers recognize two types of Time – Absolute (*mukhya*) and Conventional (*vyāvahārika*). A time-atom with immeasurable minutest modes is Absolute time. In other words, a continuum of immeasurable minutest modes of a time-atom is Absolute time.⁹⁶ But modes of a time-atom, that are measured by motion of a material atom or a heavenly luminary constitute Conventional time.⁹⁷ Absolute time has no reference to motion of a material atom or a heavenly luminary whereas Conventional time has pointed reference to it. So, it is said that Absolute time does not require motion of material atom or a heavenly luminary for its manifestation. Absolute time is the auxiliary cause of the immeasurable minutest modes of substances⁹⁸ whereas Conventional time is the auxiliary cause of the measurable modes of substances. As time-atoms are spread over the entire cosmic space, Absolute time is present everywhere in the cosmic space. As the motion of a material atom is available throughout the cosmic space, *samaya* division of Conventional time is also present in the entire cosmic space. But as the motion of the sun and other heavenly luminaries is not available outside the space inhabited by human beings, the divisions of Conventional Time having reference to this motion are confined only to this portion of cosmic space.⁹⁹ Absolute time being what it is, usage or division of past, present and future is metaphorically or secondarily applicable to it; but it is primarily applicable to Conventional time.¹⁰⁰

4. Time Substance according to Śvetāmbaras

A few out of these Śvetāmbara thinkers who recognise time as an independent substance favour the Digambara view. Āc. Hemacandra is the foremost among them.¹⁰¹ But others reject the Digambara view. According to them time is not atomic. It is not a manifold of atoms. It is one and pervades the entire cosmic space. Though it is one whole, it can be said to have spatial parts. It has extension over the cosmic space and the parts of this space covered by it are obviously understandable in terms of the parts of time substance. Consequently time substance is entitled to being characterised as an extensive substance (*astikāya*). Tradition however restricts the use of this notion to five substances, but this does not

annul its extensity (*tiryakpracaya* or *astikāyatā*).¹⁰² Though it pervades the entire cosmic space, its divisions, viz. day, month, year etc. which depend upon planetary movements are not possible outside human region because planetary movements are available in human region only.¹⁰³ As it pervades the entire cosmic space, it is motionless.

Time substance is constitutionally dynamic in the sense that it continuously undergoes changes by virtue of its intrinsic nature like other substances. Changeless time substance cannot assist changes in other substances. So, time substance is not changeless. Thus time qua substance is one, but time qua modes is many. Though time substance is changing, it never loses its identity. It permeates and pervades all its modes. Thus time qua substance has temporal extension (*ūrdhvapracaya*) also.¹⁰⁴

The ultimate measurable unit of time is called *samaya* (instant). It is measured by the movement of a material atom over the space-point. Hence it is defined as the time taken by a material atom to traverse one space-point by slow movement. Time substance has infinite *samayas*. As a *samaya* is an ultimate measurable unit of time substance, it is devoid of temporal parts. A *samaya* is not bereft of time substance. But the time substance contained in it is indivisible. Hence a *samaya* is devoid of substantial parts also. But as a *samaya* pervades the entire cosmic space of innumerable space-points, it may be conceived as possessed of spatial parts. As it is possessed of a plurality of spatial parts, it is capable of being characterised as an *astikāya*. Again, it has manifold of capacities with which it assists various changes proper to infinite number of substances. These capacities may also be conceived as its parts.¹⁰⁵ All the *samayas* are not absolutely discrete; they are related to one another by an underlying time substance.¹⁰⁶

5. Relative Subtlety of Units of Time, Space and Matter

It is interesting to have some idea of the relative subtlety of units of time, space and matter. A space-point (*pradeśa*) is subtler than a time-point (*samaya*). It is contended that the number of space-points of a small space of one *āṅgula* is equal to the number of time-points of a countless number of cycles of time. But an atom of matter is subtler than even a space-point. An infinite number of atoms can be accommodated in one space-point. Thus a material atom is subtler than a space-point and a space-point is subtler than a time-point.¹⁰⁷

6. Time identical with Change

We have studied the view that Time is an independent substance which assists changes in various substances. But according to the other view time is nothing but modes or changes of substances. In other words, Time is identical with change and nothing over and above change. The minute changes and gross changes are merely the modes of substances. And the Jainas being the upholders of the theory of non-absolutism (*Syādvāda*), believe that there obtains a relation of identity-cum-difference between a substance and its modes. In other words, according to them, modes are in a way identical with the substance. Hence the name 'substance' (*dravya*) is secondarily applied to them also. As a result of this, time which is nothing but modes of substances is also called substance. The statement, occurring, in the *Bhagavatīsūtra*, that *Jīva* and *Ajīva* substances themselves are called Time; Time is nothing over and above these modes.¹⁰⁸ Substances undergo incessant minute changes by virtue of their intrinsic nature. An independent time substance is not required to assist them in their modification or change. These minute changes or modes are not measureable. So, the Jainas seem to have conceived a mode sufficiently thick to be measured. This is called *samaya* or moment, the ultimate measurable mode of a substance.¹⁰⁹ This mode is measured by the slow movement of a material atom over one space-point. Were the movement fast, the thickness of the mode would get reduced to such an extent that it would not remain amenable to measurement. What are called *āvalikā*, *muhūrta*, etc. are merely the long and short series of the ultimate measurable modes.

The argument that the case of an independent Time substance is on par with *Dharma* and *Adharma* is not sound. *Dharma* and *Adharma* are, of course, posited to account for motion and inertia respectively. But motion and inertia of a substance are not eternal. Sometimes we find a substance in motion and sometimes we find it at rest. This suggests that there must be some condition of motion and inertia over and above the substance itself. And hence the Jainas posited *Dharma* and *Adharma* as conditions or media of motion and inertia. Those who posit Time as an independent substance do so to account for mainly the incessant minute changes. But according to the Jainas such changes are eternal – without beginning and end. Hence it is not

necessary to posit a causal condition to account for it. What is eternal – beginningless and endless has no cause whatsoever. Again, the argument that without an independent Time substance the world could not be explained; that in its absence, the seed, the sprout and the fruit would emerge simultaneously – is also very weak. The order of the universe is firmly based on the principle of causality. The temporal order is reducible to causal order. Time as an independent substance is superfluous. The description of Time substance as atomic seems metaphorical. Each and every material atom could be called time-atom. And this very well explains the scriptural statements regarding the absence of its spatial extension (*apradeśī*).¹¹⁰ The conception of Time as an independent substance is vitiated by many contingencies. The main one is as follows : Time is posited to account for the incessant minute changes in other substances, but what would account for the changes in the Time substance itself ? If it be said that the modification of Time substance is natural and hence requires no other causal condition, the same logic should be applied to explain modification of other substances. If some other auxiliary cause is posited to explain changes in Time substance, it would involve infinite regress. Hence the view of an independent Time substance is weak and unsound.¹¹¹

7. Jaina Cycle of Time

According to the Jains, Cycle of Time ceaselessly and eternally moves on. It consists of two halves. One half represents the period of progress (*utsarpiṇī*) with the gradual increase in happiness. And the other half represents the period of decadence (*avasarpiṇī*) with the gradual decrease in happiness. Each period is again divided into six parts (*aras*). The period of decadence has the following six parts :

- (1) The part characterised by the greatest happiness (*susama-susamā*)
- (2) The part characterised by some happiness but absolutely no misery (*susamā*)
- (3) The part characterised by excess of happiness over misery (*susama-dusamā*)
- (4) The part characterised by excess of misery over happiness (*dusama-susamā*)
- (5) The part characterised by some misery but absolutely no happiness (*dusamā*)

- (6) The part characterised by the greatest misery (*dusama-dusamā*)

It is noteworthy that the Jainas have not recognised the possibility of the following two parts : (1) the part characterised by absolute absence of both happiness and misery, (2) the part characterised by exactly equal quantities of both happiness and misery. The abovementioned six parts in the reverse order constitute the six parts of the period of progress. During the period of progress the bodily strength, bodily height and life-span gradually increase. During the period of decadence the living beings gradually lose their bodily strength, bodily height and life-span. Each such period of progress and decadence is ten crores of crores of ocean Time. The two periods together constitute one complete round of Time Cycle. This one round is called *Kalpa*.

Notes

1. *The Mysterious Universe*, p. 20.
2. *History of Western Philosophy* (Bertrand Russel), p. 229.
3. For details one may refer to *A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy* (Cardinal Mercier), Vol. I, pp. 145-150.
4. *History of Philosophy : Eastern and Western* (Radhakrishnan), Vol. II, p. 206.
5. *Philosophy for Pleasure* (Hector Hawton), p. 44.
6. *A History of Philosophy* (Thilly), pp. 324-326.
7. *A History of Modern Philosophy* (Hoffding), p. 305.
8. *Present Philosophical Tendencies* (Perry), p. 250.
9. *History of Philosophy : Eastern and Western* (Radhakrishnan), pp. 215-216.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 242.
11. *The Evolution of Scientific Thought* (d'Abro), p. 72.
12. *A History of Philosophy* (Thilly), p. 421.
13. *Kant's first Critique* (Cassirer), p. 267.
14. *Appearance and Reality* (Oxford, 1959), p. 18.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
16. *Elements of Metaphysics* (Taylor), pp. 243-255.
17. *Hundred Years of Philosophy* (Passmore), pp. 106-107.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 274.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 341.

20. *The Principle of Relativity*, p. 190.
21. *Reason and Nature* (Cohen), pp. 234-236.
22. *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* on *kārikā* 33.
23. *Mrgendravṛttidīpikā*, 10.14.
24. प्रधानवादे पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वैर्बहिर्भूतस्य कालतत्त्वस्याभावात् प्रधानमेव कालशब्देन व्यवहियताम् । *Parāśarasamhitābhāṣya*, I. 20.
25. न कालो नाम कश्चित् पदार्थोऽस्ति । किं तर्हि ? क्रियासु कालसंज्ञा । *Yuktidīpikā* (Calcutta Sk. Series), p. 158.
26. नित्यौ यौ दिक्कालौ तावाकाशप्रकृतिभूतौ प्रकृतेर्गुणविशेषावेव । ..यौ तु खण्डदिक्कालौ तौ तत्तदुपाधिसंयोगाद् आकाशादुत्पद्यत इत्यर्थः । *Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya* (Chowkhamba), p. 82.
27. कालश्च भूतं भवद् भविष्यदिति व्यवहियमाणपदार्थव्यतिरेकेण न स्वतन्त्रोऽस्ति । *Vṛttānta, Mānasollāsa* on Stotra-verse, 41.
28. *The Positive Sciences of Ancient Hindus* (Seal), pp. 19-21.
This exposition is based on *Vyāsaśāstra* and *Vijñānabhikṣu's Vārtika* on III. 52.
29. सन्तानः समुदायश्च पङ्क्तिसेनादिवन्मृषा । *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (Ed. Vaidya), p. 158.
30. *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras* II. ii. 6-9 with *Upaskāra* and *Vivṛti* thereon.
31. आकाशकालदिशामेकैकत्वादपरजात्यभावे पारिभाषिक्यस्तिष्ठः संज्ञा भवन्ति । *Praśastapādabhāṣya* (Vizianagaram Ed.), p. 58.
32. अङ्गसा...कालस्यैकत्वेऽपि सिद्धे नानात्वोपचारः । *Kandalī* (Vizianagaram Ed.), p. 66.
33. आकाशस्य कालस्य दिशश्चैकैकत्वादपरजातिर्नास्ति तस्य व्यक्तिभेदाधिष्ठानत्वात् । *Ibid.*, p. 59.
34. *Journal of The Indian Society of Oriental Art*, Vol. XI (1943), p. 79.
35. कालस्यपि विभुत्वेऽप्युपाधिको भेदव्यवहारोऽस्ति ।
Mānameyodaya (Adyar Ed.), p. 191.
कालस्य च रूपादिहीनस्य मीमांसकादिभिः.....अभ्युपगमात् ।
Advaitasiddhi (Nirnaya. Ed.), p. 319.
36. स च कालः षडिन्द्रियग्राह्यः । *Mānameyodaya*, p. 190.
37. कालो न स्वातंत्र्येणैन्द्रियैर्गृह्यते; अथ च विषयेषु स्वेषु गृह्यमाणेषु तद्विशेषणतया सर्वैरीन्द्रियैर्गृह्यते । *Śāstradīpikā*, I. 1.5.

38. तत्र चाभ्युपगमसिद्धान्तन्यायेन कणादतन्त्रसिद्ध एव प्रमेयवर्गोऽङ्गीक्रियते..... *Tantra-rahasya* (G. O. S., Baroda), p. 17.
39. कालस्त्वविद्यैव..... । *Siddhāntabindu* (G. O. S., Poona), p. 96.
40. *Bauddha-Dharma-Darśana* (Āc. Narendradeva), pp. 574-75.
41. *Ibid.*, pp. 575-582.
42. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, ii. 46 ab.
43. *The Central Conception of Buddhism* (Stcherbatsky), pp. 71-80.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
45. बौद्धानां मते क्षणपदेन घटादिरेव पदार्थो व्यवहियते, न तु तदतिरिक्तः कश्चित् क्षणो नाम कालोऽस्ति...क्षणिकः पदार्थ इति व्यवहारस्तु भेदकल्पनया । II. 2.20.
46. *The Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol. IX (1933), p. 153.
47. *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (Murti), pp. 198-200.
48. *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā on kārīkās* 629-630.
49. येन मूर्तीनामुपचयश्चापचयश्च लक्ष्यन्ते तं कालमाहुः । महाभाष्य (Ed. Kielhorn), Vol. I, p. 409.
50. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 409.
51. *Vākyapadīya* (Banaras Sanskrit Series), I, 2.
52. कालात्मापि भावानामात्मानमनुप्रविश्य प्रतिबन्धाभ्यनुज्ञाभ्यां निमज्जनोन्मज्जने कुर्वन् क्रमं पौर्वापर्यलक्षणं प्रकल्पयति । Helārāja's comm. (Bāṇaras Sk. Series), p. 357.
53. उत्पत्तौ च स्थितौ चापि विनाशे चापि तद्वताम् । निमित्तं कालमेवाहुर्विभक्तेनात्मना स्थितम् ॥ *Vākyapadīya*, III. 9.3.
54. तथा च कार्यनिवेशितः क्रमः काले समारोप्यते न त्वसौ तत्र भाविक इत्यर्थः । Helārāja's comm., p. 352.
एवं यौगपद्यमपि...कार्यगतं काले समारोप्यते । *Ibid.*, p. 353.
55. ...एकत्वेऽपि विभाविते नानात्वमुपाधिभेदनिहितम्... । *Ibid.*, p. 344.
56. दूरान्तिकव्यवस्थानमध्वाधिकरणं यथा । चिरक्षिप्रव्यवस्थानं कालाधिकरणं तथा ॥ *Vākyapadīya*, III. 9.47.
57. क्रियाव्युपपत्तेर्भूतः, सम्भावितायां क्रियायां भविष्यन्, क्षणप्रवाहरूपेण वर्तमानरूपायां तस्यां मुख्य एवायम् । Helārāja's comm., p. 350.
58. प्रतिबन्धाभ्यनुज्ञाभ्यां वृत्तिर्या तस्य शाश्वती । *Vākyapadīya*, III. 9.30
59. *Vākyapadīya*, III. 9.52 and Helārāja's comm., p. 361.
60. लोकानामन्तकृत् कालः कालोऽन्यः कलनात्मकः । स द्विधा स्थूलसूक्ष्मत्वान्मूर्तश्चामूर्त उच्यते ॥ *Sūryasiddhānta* (Kashi Sk. Series), Śl. 10 and the comment thereon.

61. प्राणादिः कथितो मूर्तस्रुट्याद्योऽमूर्तसंज्ञकः । *Ibid.*, Śl. 11.

According to the commentator, Pt. Kapileśvara Chaudhary *truṭi*

$$= \frac{1}{3240000} \text{ second}$$

62. ...कालो गुणः... *Āvaśyaka cūṛṇi* (Ratlam Ed.), 340.

63. ...पुण कालो दव्वस्स चेव पज्जाओ... *Ibid.*, p. 340.

64. अथवा 'कालश्चेत्येके' एस दव्वकालो । *Ibid.*, p. 341.

65. किमिदं भन्ते ! कालो ति पवच्चइ ? गोयमा ! जीवा चेव अजीवा चेव ति । कइ णं भन्ते ! दव्वा पन्नता ? गोयमा ! छ दव्वा पन्नता । तं जहा-धम्मत्थिकाए, अधम्मत्थिकाए, आगासंत्थिकाए, पुगलत्थिकाए, जीवत्थिकाए, अद्दासमये य ।

66. धर्मादीनां द्रव्याणां स्वपर्यायनिर्वृतिं प्रति स्वात्मनैव वर्तमानानां बाह्योपग्रहाद्विना तद्वृत्त्यभावात् तत्प्रवर्तनोपलक्षितः काल इति कृत्वा वर्तना कालस्योपकारः । *Sarvārthasiddhi* (Ed. Pt. Phulacandra), p. 291.

67. स्वकीयोपादानरूपेण स्वयमेव परिणममानानां पदार्थानां कुम्भकारचक्रस्याधस्तन-शिलावत्...पदार्थपरिणतेर्यत् सहकारित्वं सा वर्तना भण्यते ।...वर्तनालक्षणः कालाणुद्रव्यरूपो निश्चयकालः । *Dravyasaṃgrahavṛtti on gāthā* 21.

68. तथा चे वर्तनापर्यायस्य साधारणापेक्षा न कथ्यते तदा तु स्थित्यवगाहनापेक्षासाधारण-कारणत्वेन धर्माधर्मास्तिकायौ सिद्धौ जातौ तत्राप्यनाश्वास आयाति । *Dravyānuyoga-tarkaṇā* (Nirṇayasagar Ed.), p. 175.

69. चूताद्याः शेषहेतूनां सत्त्वेऽपि फलवञ्चिताः ।

*कालद्रव्यमपेक्षन्ते नानाशक्तिसमन्वितम् ॥ *Lokaparakāśa*, XXVIII. 48.

70. असति हि नियामकद्रव्ये किसलय-कलिका-फलप्रसवपरिणतयः सहकारतरोर्युगपदा-विर्भवेयुः, क्रमभाविनी चैषां किसलयादिपरिणतिरुपलभ्यते, ततः शक्यमनुमातुम् — यदनुरोधादेताः कार्यव्यक्तयस्तारतम्येनात्मातिशयमासादयन्ति सोऽस्त्यत्र कोऽपि कालः । *Siddhasenagaṇi-Ṭikā on Tattvārthasūtra*. IV. 15.

71. कालद्रव्ये चांसति तद्विशेषाः समयादयः । कथं नु स्युर्विशेषा हि सामान्यानुचराः खलु ॥ *Lokaparakāśa*, XXVIII. 21.

72. यच्छुद्धपदवाच्यं तत् सद इत्यनुमितेरपि ।

षष्ठं द्रव्यं दधत् सिद्धिं कालाख्यं को निवारयेत् ॥ *Ibid.*, XXVIII. 20.

73. समयादीनां क्रियाविशेषाणां समयादिभिर्निर्वर्त्यमानानां च पाकादीनां 'समयः पाकः' इत्येवमादि स्वसंज्ञारूढिसद्भावेऽपि 'समयः कालः' 'ओदनपाकः कालः' इति अध्यारोप्यमाणः कालव्यपदेशस्तद्व्यपदेशनिमित्तस्य कालस्यास्तित्वं गमयति । *Sarvārthasiddhi*, p. 292.

74. स्यादेतत् – आदित्यगतिनिमित्ता द्रव्याणां वर्तनिति; तन्न; किं कारणम् ? तद्गतावपि तत्सद्भावात् । सवितुरपि ब्रज्यायां भूतादिव्यवहारविषयभूतायां क्रियेत्येवं रूढायां वर्तनादर्शनात् तद्धेतुनाऽन्येन कालेन भवितव्यम् । *Rājavārtika* (Ed. Pt. Mahendrakumar), p. 477.
75. यथा भाजनं तण्डुलानामधिकरणं न तु तदेव पचति, तेजसो हि स व्यापारः, तथाकाशमप्यादित्यगत्यादिवर्तनायामधिकरणं न तु तदेव निर्वर्तयति । कालस्य हि स व्यापारः । *Ibid.*, p. 477.
76. कालानुगृहीतवर्तना हि सत्तेति ततोऽप्यन्येन कालेन भवितव्यम् । *Ibid.*, p. 477.
77. स्यान्मतम् – क्रियामात्रमेव कालः । ...सर्वोऽयं कालव्यवहारः क्रियाकृतः । क्रिया हि क्रियान्तरपरिच्छिन्ना अन्यक्रियापरिच्छेदे वर्तमाना कालाख्या भवति । योऽपि समयो नाम भवद्भिर्रुच्यते स परमाणुपरिवर्तनक्रियासमय एव कालसामानाधिकरण्यात् । न समयपरिमाणपरिच्छेदकोऽन्यः ततः सूक्ष्मतरः कश्चिदस्ति कालः । तत्समयक्रियाकलाप आवलिका, तत्प्रचय उच्छ्वास इत्यादि समयक्रियाकलापपरिच्छिन्ना आवलिका उच्छ्वासपरिच्छेदे वर्तमाना कालाख्या । एवमुत्तरत्रापि योज्यम् । लोकेऽपि तथैव गोदोहेन्धनपाकादिरन्योऽन्यपरिच्छेदे वर्तमानः कालाख्य इति क्रियैव काल इति.....। *Ibid.*, p. 482.
78. सत्यं क्रियाकृत एवायं व्यवहारः सर्वः – उच्छ्वासमात्रेण कृतं मुहूर्तेन कृतमिति, किन्तु समय उच्छ्वासो निश्वासो मुहूर्त इति स्वसंज्ञाभिर्निरूढानां काल इत्यभिधानमकस्मान्न भवति । यथा देवदत्तसंज्ञया निरूढे पिण्डे दण्डचभिधानमकस्मान्न भवति इति दण्डसम्बन्ध-सिद्धिः तथा कालसिद्धिरपि । *Ibid.*, pp. 482-483.
79. तस्य वर्तमानकालाभावः प्रसक्तः । कथम् ? ऊयते पट इति यः प्रक्षिप्तस्तन्तुः सोऽतिक्रान्तः, यः प्रक्षेप्यते सोऽनागतः, न च तयोरन्तरे कश्चिदन्या अनतिक्रान्ताऽनागामिनी क्रियाऽस्ति या वर्तमानत्वेन परिगृह्यते । वर्तमानापेक्षौ च पुनरतीतानागताविष्येते तदभावे तयोरप्यभावः स्यात् । *Ibid.*, p. 483.
80. आरम्भादिरपवर्गान्तः क्रियाकलापो वर्तमान इति ।.....तदप्ययुक्तम्; कुतः ?..... क्षणिकानां क्रियावयवानां समूहाभावाच्च । *Ibid.*, p. 483.
81. यदि व्यतिरेकेणानुपलब्धेः कालो नास्ति इत्युच्यते; ननु क्रियायाः क्रियासमूहस्य चाभावः । कारणानां हि प्रवृत्तिविशेषः क्रिया, न तेभ्यः प्रवृत्तिर्व्यतिरिक्ता उपलभ्यते । *Ibid.*, p. 483.
82. किञ्च, क्रिया क्रियान्तरस्य परिच्छेदिका कालव्यपदेशभागित्यनुपपन्नमनवस्थानात् । स्थितौ हि लोके प्रस्थादिः परिमाणविशेषः ब्रीह्यादेरवस्थितस्य परिच्छेदको दृष्टः । न च तथा क्रियाऽवस्थिता अस्ति क्षणमात्रावलम्बनाभ्युपगमात् । न हि स्वयमनवस्थितः कश्चिदनवस्थितस्य परिच्छेदको दृष्टः । *Ibid.*, p. 483.

83. *Darśana aur Cintana* (Pt. Sukhlalji), p. 332.
84. लोयायासपदेसे इकेके जे डिया हु इकेका । रयणाणं रासीमिव ते कालाणू असंखदव्वाणि ॥
Dravyasaṅgraha, gāthā 22.
85. *Sarvārthasiddhi*, p. 312. *Pravacanasāra-tattvadīpikā*, II. 49.
86. अप्रदेश एव समयो...एकैकमाकाशप्रदेशमभिव्याप्य तस्थुषः प्रदेशमात्रस्य परमाणोस्तदभिव्याप्तमेकमाकाशप्रदेशं मन्दगत्या व्यतिपतत एव वृत्तिः । *Pravacanasāra-tattvadīpikā*, II. 46. तत्र परमसूक्ष्मक्रियस्य सर्वजघन्यगतिपरिणतस्य परमाणोः स्वावगाहनक्षेत्रव्यतिक्रमकालः समय इत्युच्यते । *Tattvārtha-bhāṣya*, IV. 15.
 See also *Vṛtti* on *Dravyasaṅgraha* (Āraḥ Ed.), *gāthās* 21-22.
 The Jains maintain that as soon as the soul is liberated, it travels the whole universe and reaches the Abode of the Liberated *within a samaya*. Again, they believe that the sound-atoms travel the whole universe *within a samaya*. Now, if they define a *samaya* (moment) in terms of movement of an atom from one space-point to the next one, they cannot help qualifying this movement by the term 'slow' (*jaghanya* or *manda*). The Buddhists talk of the speedy motion (*āsugati*) of an atom in this connection. The Yoga system refers simply to motion of an atom without any qualification slow or speedy. *yāvataṁ vā samayena calitaḥ paramāṇuḥ pūrvadeśaṁ jāhyād uttaradeśaṁ upasampadyeta sa kālaḥ kṣaṇaḥ/Yogabhāṣya*, III. 52
87. सौजन्यसमयः । *Tattvārthasūtra*, V. 40.
88. ऊर्ध्वप्रचयस्तु त्रिकोटिस्पर्शित्वेन सांशत्वाद् द्रव्यवृत्तेः सर्वद्रव्याणामनिवारित एव ।..... समयप्रचयः एव कालस्योर्ध्वप्रचयः । *Pravacanasāra-tattvadīpikā*, II. 49.
89. कालाणवो निष्क्रियाः । *Sarvārthasiddhi*, p. 313.
90. कालाणूनां...कायत्वाभावः । अत एव विनाशहेतुत्वाभावाद् नित्याः । *Rājavārtika*, p. 482.
91. परप्रत्ययोत्पादविनाशसद्भावादनित्याः । *Ibid.*, p. 482.
92. ध्रौव्यं तावत् कालस्य स्वप्रत्ययं स्वभावव्यवस्थानात् व्ययोदयौ परप्रत्ययौ, अगुरुलघुगुणवृद्धिहान्यपेक्षया स्वप्रत्ययौ च । *Sarvārthasiddhi*, p. 312.
93. एगमिह सन्ति समये संभवतिदिगाससण्णिदा अट्ठा ।
 समयस्स सब्बकालं एस हि कालाणुसम्भावो ॥ *Pravacanasāra*, II. 51.
94. रूपादियोगाभावाद् अमूर्तः । *Rājavārtika*, p. 482.
95. *Ibid.*, p. 501.
96.वर्तनालक्षणः कालाणुद्रव्यरूपो निश्चयकालः । *Dravyasaṅgrahavṛtti, gāthā 21.*

97. तत्र व्यावहारिकः कालविभागः तत्कृतः समयावलिकादिव्याख्यातः क्रियाविशेषपरिच्छिन्नः अन्यस्यापरिच्छिन्नस्य परिच्छेदहेतुः । *Rājavārtika*, p. 222.
98. तत्र परमार्थकालः...वर्तनाया उपकारकः । *Rājavārtika*, p. 482.
99. एवं सवितुरनुसमयगतिप्रचयापेक्षया आवलिकोच्छ्वास-प्राण-स्तोक-लव-नालिका-मुहूर्ताहोरात्र-पक्ष-मासर्त्वायनादिसवितृगतिपरिवर्तनकालवर्तनया व्यवहारकालो मनुष्य-क्षेत्रे सम्भवतीत्युच्यते तत्र ज्योतिषां गतिपरिणामात्, न बहिः, निवृत्तगतिव्यापारत्वात् ज्योतिषाम् । *Ibid.*, p. 482.
100. तत्र परमार्थकाले भूतादिव्यवहारो गौणः, व्यवहारकाले मुख्यः । *Ibid.*, p. 482.
101. *Yogaśāstra-vṛtti*, I. 16.
102. व्यवहारस्तु रूढ्याऽस्तिकायैः पञ्चभिरेव प्रवचने, न चैतावतैवास्तिकायताऽपह्नोतुं शक्या । *Siddhasenagani-tattvārthāṭikā*, p. 434.
103. सूर्यादिक्रियया व्यक्तीकृतो नृक्षेत्रगोचरः । *Lokaprakāśa*, XXVIII. 105.
104. द्रव्यारूपेण प्रतिपर्यायमुत्पादव्ययधर्माऽपि स्वरूपानन्यभूक्रमाक्रमभाव्यनाद्यपर्यवसानानन्तसङ्ख्यपरिणामपर्यायप्रवाहव्यापिनमेकमेवात्मामातनोति, अतीतानागतवर्तमानावस्थास्वपि काल काल इत्यविशेषश्रुतेः । *Siddhasenagani-tattvārthāṭikā*, pp. 430-431.
105. यथा कालकृतदेशैरनवयव एवं द्रव्यकृतदेशैरपि, क्षेत्रतो भावतश्च सावयव एव । *Ibid.*, p. 434.
106. न पुनरेक एव विच्छिन्नमुक्तावलीमणिवद् विद्यमानपूर्वापरकोटिर्वर्तमानः समयोऽभ्युपेयते । *Ibid.*, p. 434.
107. *Āvaśyaka-Niryukti* (Āgamodaya Ed.), 37
108. अत्राहुः केऽपि जीवादिपर्याया वर्तनादयः ।
कालमित्युच्यते तज्ज्ञे पृथक् द्रव्यं तु नास्त्यसौ ॥
एवं च द्रव्यपर्याया एवामी वर्तनादयः ।
सम्पन्नाः कालशब्देन व्यपदेश्या भवन्ति ये ॥
पर्यायाश्च कथञ्चित् स्युर्द्रव्याभिन्नास्ततश्च ते ।
द्रव्यनाम्नापि कथ्यन्ते जातु प्रोक्तं यदागमे ॥ *Lokaprakāśa*, XXVIII. 5,11-13.
109. *Siddhasenagani-tattvārthā-ṭikā*, IV. 15 (p. 290)
110. *Dravyānuyogatarakaṇā*, X. 18-19
111. *Darśana Aur Cintana* (Pt. Sukhlalji), p. 331-332.

JAINA CONCEPTION OF SPACE

1. Introductory

Regarding primary material elements (*mahābhūtas*), there were two old views. One view recognized five *mahābhūtas* and the other recognized four *mahābhūtas*.

The five *mahābhūtas* recognized by the first view were *ākāśa*, *vāyu*, *tejas*, *ap* and *pṛthvī*. They possessed the five special qualities – *ākāśa śabda*, *vāyu sparśa*, *tejas rūpa*, *ap rasa* and *pṛthvī gandha*. Those who followed this view counted *ākāśa* as a *mahābhūta* with a special quality *śabda*. The Sāṅkhya-Yoga, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā accepted this view.

The old form of this view of five *mahābhūtas* was that the external material world, as also the human body, is composed of the five *mahābhūtas*. The Sāṅkhya adopted this old form of the view. That is, according to the Sāṅkhya the five *mahābhūtas* are the material causes of all the material effect-substances (*bhautika kārya-dravyas*). So, for the Sāṅkhya, *ākāśa*, along with other four *mahābhūtas*, is the material cause of effect-substances. The Vaiśeṣika differs from the Sāṅkhya. The Vaiśeṣika maintains that only four *mahābhūtas* viz. *vāyu*, *tejas*, *ap* and *pṛthvī* are the material causes of material effect-substances. *Ākāśa* is not a material cause of any material effect-substance. It is simply the substratum (*dravya*) of the quality *śabda*. This view of the Vaiśeṣika somewhat undermined the status of *ākāśa* as a *mahābhūta*. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā gave the status of independent substance to *śabda*, thus putting at stake further the existence of *ākāśa* as a *mahābhūta*.

The four *mahābhūtas* recognized by that other old view were *vāyu*, *tejas*, *ap* and *pṛthvī*. Those who followed this view maintained either that *ākāśa* is a form of matter, produced from the four *mahābhūtas* or that *ākāśa* is non-material non-spiritual substance. The Theravādi Buddhists accepted the first alternative. For them *ākāśa* is *samskṛta*, it is produced from the four *mahābhūtas*, thus it is a derived matter (*upādāya rūpa*)¹. But the Vaibhāṣika Buddhists, who too

recognized the abovementioned four *mahābhūtas* only raised *ākāśa* to the status of *asaṁskṛta* (eternal) *dharma* (element),² thus putting at stake its *bhautikatva* (materiality). So, for them, *ākāśa* is a non-material non-spiritual (rather non-psychical) element. Jains too follow this old tradition of four *mahābhūtas* and hence maintain that *ākāśa* is not *pudgala* (matter), it is an independent substance.

The upholders of the view of four *mahābhūtas* maintain that *śabda* is not a quality; it is a mode or an aspect of these four *mahābhūtas*. So, *ākāśa* was not needed as a substratum of *śabdaguṇa*. Hence, before these philosophers there arose a question as to what function the substance *ākāśa* is required to perform. All these philosophers declared that its function is to provide room to all other substances. It functions as a container of all other substances. It offers obstruction to no substance. All bodies can move freely in it:

The first group of philosophers thinks that the *ākāśa-mahābhūta* which is the substratum of *śabda* could not play the entirely different role, viz. to function as a condition of our cognitions of relative spatial positions of material bodies. They seized upon an old idea of *dik* found in the R̥gveda and the Upaniṣads. In the R̥gveda *dik* was regarded as that which made possible our knowledge of relative spatial positions of material bodies and gave rise to the notions of far and near.³ These philosophers accepted *dik* to account for our cognitions of relative spatial positions of material bodies. According to the Sāṅkhya *dik* is produced from *ākāśa* etc.⁴ (i.e. five *mahābhūtas*) along with the material bodies. In the absence of all the material bodies, there is no *dik*. In this sense, *dik* is dependent on material bodies. In other words, we may say that it is an aspect of material bodies. The Sāṅkhya view of *dik*, understood and interpreted in this way, comes very near to the Theravāda view of *ākāśa*. The Vaiśeṣika view of *dik* differs from the Sāṅkhya view of it in that the Vaiśeṣika *dik* is not produced from *ākāśa* etc.; it is an eternal independent non-material substance, it exists even before the production of material bodies i.e. even in *pralaya*.

The second group of philosophers maintains that their *ākāśa* which allows material bodies to occupy their positions in it can very well function as a condition of our cognitions of relative spatial positions of these bodies. So, they have not posited *dik* as an

independent substance besides *ākāśa*. For them the terms '*dik*' and '*ākāśa*' are synonyms referring to the same substance.

2. Jaina Description of *Ākāśa*

As we have already remarked, Jainas do not regard it as a mode or an effect of *mahābhūtas*.⁵ For them it is an independent fundamental substance. It is devoid of colour, odour, taste and touch. According to Jainas *śabda* is a mode of *mahābhūtas* or matter (*pudgala*).⁶ Aggregates (*skandhas*) of atoms strike against one another and *śabda* is produced from them. Hence *śabda* is not the nature of *ākāśa*, nor is it its quality. If *śabda* were its quality, the quality of *ākāśa* being formless or nonphysical, it would not have been heard through the organ of hearing, say the Jainas.⁷ *Ākāśa* is infinite in extent,⁸ it is present everywhere, it stretches not only over the universe but also far beyond it over the non-universe. All other substances are confined to the universe only. Thus no substance is so extensive as *ākāśa* is. The pervasiveness of *ākāśa* is infinite. *Ākāśa* is one in number.⁹ It is a onemembered class, so to say. There is no possibility of increase or decrease in its number. It is one and will remain one for ever.¹⁰ It is eternal in the sense that it never gives up its nature.¹¹ As it is present everywhere in the universe, the possibility of movement from one place to another is rejected in its case.¹²

3. Function of *Ākāśa*

The function of *ākāśa* is to offer room to other substances.¹³ Other substances exist by their own nature. There is no doubt about it. But they require something to exist *in*. They do exist by themselves. But wherein do they exist? They exist in *ākāśa*. Their existence is not the same as *ākāśa*. Nor is *ākāśa* an aspect of them. It is a fundamental substance different from them. Thus *ākāśa* is a universal container in which all other substances are contained.

Some might argue against this Jaina position as follows: if a substance requires another substance to exist *in*, then *ākāśa* itself being a substance will also require some another substance and this substance in its turn will require the third substance to exist *in* and so on *ad infinitum*. If to avoid this contingency the Jainas were to say that *ākāśa* does not require another substance to exist *in*, then they should apply the same logic in the case of other substances also. Thus

the conception of *ākāśa* as a universal container is self-destructive.¹⁴ Again, the Jaina view that *ākāśa* contains itself is beset with another difficulty, viz *kartṛkarmavirodhadoṣa*. It is a rule that in a particular act the subject and the object cannot be one and the same. However sharp a knife may be, it cannot cut itself. However expert an acrobat may be in the art of acrobatics he cannot climb his own shoulder. So, *ākāśa* cannot contain itself.

The Jainas overcome these difficulties as follows : Not all substances require another substance to exist *in*. The less extensive substance is contained in the more extensive one. This is the special relation that obtains between the container and the contained. Hence, if we conceive a substance infinite in extent and maintain that there is no substance more extensive than it – not even as extensive as it –, then this conception logically compels us to conceive this substance as requiring no other substance to contain it because there is no substance more extensive than it to contain it. *Ākāśa* is such a substance.¹⁵ Regarding *kartṛkarmavirodhadoṣa*, it does not arise because the function of *ākāśa* to contain substances is really *passive*.¹⁶ Moreover, that *ākāśa* contains itself is simply a positive statement of the fact that *ākāśa* being of the infinite and the highest extension cannot be contained in any other substance.

Can *ākāśa* function as a condition of motion ? The Jaina answer to this question is emphatic 'no'. They contend that if it be also the condition of motion, then wherever there is *ākāśa*, there should be chance of motion; but neither a single *Jīva*, nor a single body nor a single atom could step beyond the limit of universe (*loka*), though there is *ākāśa* beyond the universe. If *ākāśa* were credited with the function of assisting motion, then it being present in *aloka* (non-Universe) also the division of *loka* and *aloka* would disappear, the *loka* (Universe) would dissipate, the atoms would disperse in the infinite space, they would be very far from one another, they would hardly come in contact with one another to form material bodies.¹⁷

Regarding the capacity of *ākāśa* to contain substances or their instances, one should note that those that obstruct one another cannot be contained in the same portion of space whereas those that do not obstruct one another can be contained in the same portion of space. Though space gives room to all substances or their instances, it never contains the two mutually obstructing things in the same portion.

4 . Units of Space (*ākāśa-pradeśas*)

A primary indivisible atom of matter is the ultimate unit of matter. And the space occupied by a material atom is the ultimate unit of space. It is called *pradeśa* (space-point).¹⁸ Though material atom is physically indivisible, it is amenable to mental division because it possesses *ananta* attributes or modes. As these modes or parts of a material atom are inseparable from it and can only be mentally abstracted from it, they are never found physically discrete in space. So, a part of a material atom cannot serve as the defining measure of the unit of space. The physically indivisible unit of matter, viz. atom being discrete and concrete (as opposed to its abstracted part) serves as a defining measure of the unit of space.

Though *ākāśa* does never accommodate two material bodies in the same spacepoints at a time, it, under certain conditions, can accommodate two upto *ananta* material atoms in one and the same spacepoint at a time.¹⁹ This phenomenon becomes possible because material atoms in their subtle states, are conceived as mutually non-obstructive.²⁰ Again, this phenomenon definitely proves the fact that a material atom is subtler than a spacepoint.²¹

Ākāśa has *ananta* spacepoints.²² But this number *ananta* is fixed in the sense that there is no possibility of increase or decrease of even a single spacepoint.

The spacepoints are conceived as inseparable parts or *avayavas* of *ākāśa*. Thus *ākāśa* is an *avayavī-astikāya*.²³ *Avayavas* or parts (*pradeśas*) of *ākāśa* are as much objectively existent as *ākāśa* of which they are parts. Were it not so, the two cities, say, Ahmedabad and Poona which like the two mountains, the Himavat and the Vindhya, occupy different locations of space, would, the Jainas affirm, tend to be at one location, which is an absurd position.²⁴ They maintain that the partless *ākāśa* can never be a favourable receptacle for the objects having parts. Thus they contend that *ākāśa* too must have parts; for, when the table exists in space, it does not cover the whole space, as in that case other things cannot exist at all anywhere; the table exists not in all space but in that part of space where it does actually exist, leaving room for the other objects to exist elsewhere; all this clearly imply that space too has parts; space is an *avayavī*. To be an *avayavī* does not necessarily mean that it should be produced from its *avayavas* put together at *some point of time*.

5 Divisions of ākāśa

Ākāśa is *ananta* (infinite) in extension. That portion of it, which contains all substances is called *Lokākāśa* (Universe-space) and that portion of ākāśa, which has no substance to accommodate in itself is called *Alokākāśa* (Space-beyond-the-Universe). Ākāśa is one only. *Lokākāśa* and *Alokākāśa* are not two individual ākāśas. Thus this division is not in ākāśa itself but it is due to its relation with other substances.²⁵

6. Lokākāśa

Lokākāśa has *asaṁkhyāta* (innumerable) space-points.²⁶ This number is fixed. That is, there is no possibility of increase or decrease of the space-points of *lokākāśa*. Though *lokākāśa* has *asaṁkhyāta* spacepoints, it accommodates *ananta* material atoms. The number *ananta* is infinite times greater than the number *asaṁkhyāta*. So there arises a question as to how the space of *asaṁkhyāta* space-points can accommodate *ananta* material atoms. The answer to this question is there in the Jain belief that, under certain conditions, one spacepoint can accommodate more than one material atoms.²⁷

There is no possibility of expansion of *lokākāśa* (universe-space). There are two reasons for this. First, the *lokākāśa* has fixed number of spacepoints and these spacepoints cannot expand or contract. Secondly, *lokākāśa* can expand provided *loka* (universe) expands, and *loka* can expand provided the bodies get exploded and thrown into ākāśa which was till then empty; but this possibility has no room in Jainism because according to this system the medium of motion is necessary for bodies to move from one place to another, and this medium of motion is not present in empty space, it is confined to the universe only. So no body crosses the limits of universe set up by the medium of motion. Thus universe is not expanding and hence universe-space is also not expanding.

One may pose here another question – ‘Does the universe as a whole move in the empty space with the result that though universe-space is fixed in its extension this universe-space is not the same for ever?’ He may further ask that as *dharma* (medium of motion) and *adharma* (medium of rest) pervade the universe they cannot move in the Universe, nor do they as individuals peel themselves off the universe into the non-universe because they constitute the nature of

the universe, but what prevents them from moving *with* the universe *in* the empty space ? These questions have not occurred to the Jaina thinkers and hence they have not answered them.

The *loka* (Universe) is of the form of a standing human trunk with two feet apart and two hands on hips.²⁸ So, secondarily the *lokākāśa* (Universe-space) may also be said to possess this form. Usually the formless is said to assume the form of its container. But here the formless container is said to assume the form of its content. Of course, *lokākāśa* cannot be said to assume this form *at some point of time*.²⁹

Like the *aras* (divisions) of Time Cycles, the different regions of *lokākāśa* are characterised by the different degrees of pleasure or happiness. As we go higher from the lowest region of the *lokākāśa* the degree of happiness increases. The degree of happiness in the lowest region of *lokākāśa* is almost nil, whereas the degree of happiness in the highest region of *lokākāśa* is the highest – *ananta*. A living being becomes more and more happy if he enters higher and higher regions of *lokākāśa*, but for the entry he should earn the passport by his meritorious deeds. By good acts a living being earns the passport for the entry into higher regions and by bad acts a living being earns the passport for the entry into lower regions.

7. Alokākāśa

As we know, *ākāśa* as a whole has *ananta pradeśas* (space-points). And *alokākāśa* also has *ananta pradeśas*. Having taken *asamkhyāta pradeśas* of *lokākāśa* from *ananta pradeśas* of *ākāśa* as a whole, the remaining *pradeśas* of *alokākāśa* are still *ananta*.

Alokākāśa is infinite (*ananta*) but this infinity is also fixed in the sense that increase or decrease of a single space-point is an impossibility. Again, no encroachment from *loka* on its infinity is possible.

Has *alokākāśa* any form ? No, it has no form. But it may be conceived as having the form of a parabola. Parabola is a symbol of spatial infinity. So, we may say that infinity of *alokākāśa* is represented by a parabola put on the highest end of *lokākāśa*. And we may further say that its emptiness is represented by a *sūnya* put in the parabola. But we cannot say all this because the Jainas have included the parabola (with a *sūnya* in it) in the *loka* putting a boundary line of *loka* over it.

8. Application of Jaina Criterion of Reality

As *ākāśa* is a real (*sat*), it must conform to the definition of reality. According to Jainism a real must possess a triple character of origination, persistence and decay. Āc. Kundakunda actually applied this criterion of reality to *Jīva*, *Pudgala* and *Kāla*. But *Pūjyapāda*, *Akalanika* and later logicians attempt to apply it even to *Dharma*, *Adharma* and *Ākāśa*. Of course, the *parināmas* or changes of these substances had to be shown not directly but through those of living beings and matter. This difficulty is due to the peculiar nature of *Dharma*, *Adharma* and *Ākāśa* which are one each, without any movement and pervade the whole universe. Their association with the different moments of Time also makes possible their modes or changes running parallel to the moments of Time. A mode of the entire space at time moment t is different from the next mode of the entire space at time moment t_1 because they are associated with two different time-moments. Except this there is no other difference between two modes of space. Some might urge that as there is no substance – not even Time substance – in *alokākāśa*, *alokākāśa* should not undergo changes and consequently should not be regarded as a real. The Jainas contend that *lokākāśa* and *alokākāśa* being not two *ākāśa* individuals, the effect of the time substance is present throughout the one *ākāśa*. Again, they maintain that entire *ākāśa* undergoes changes through the rhythmic rise and fall in its *agurulaghuguṇa* (untranslatable term, lit. neither-heavy-nor-light-quality).³⁰

Notes

1. Introduction to *Abhidharmadīpa*, p. 90
2. *Ibid.*, p. 90.
3. *Rgveda*, I. 31.4, II. 27.11, X. 82.4; I 30.21; VII. 67.2
4. दिक्कालावाकाशादिभ्यः । *Sāṅkhyasūtra*, II. 12
5. अजीवकाया धर्माधर्माकाशपुद्गलाः । द्रव्याणि । *Tattvārthasūtra*, V. 1-2
6. सद्दो सो पोगलो चित्तो । *Pravacanasāra*, II. 40
7. *Pañcāstikāya-tātparyavṛtti, gāthā* 76
8. सर्वतोऽनन्तं हि तत् । *Sarvārthasiddhi*, V. 12.
9. आ आकाशादेकद्रव्याणि । *Tattvārthasūtra*, V. 6
- 10-11. नित्यावस्थितान्यरूपाणि । *Ibid.*, V. 4
12. निष्क्रियाणि च । *Ibid.*, V. 7

13. आकाशस्यावगाहः । *Ibid.*, V. 18.
14. आकाशस्य के आधार इति ? आकाशस्य नास्त्यन्य आधारः । स्वप्रतिष्ठमाकाशम् । यद्याकाशं स्वप्रतिष्ठम्, धर्मादीन्यपि स्वप्रतिष्ठान्येव । अथ धर्मादीनामन्य आधारः कल्प्यते, आकाशस्याप्यन्य आधारः कल्प्यः । तथा सत्यनवस्थाप्रसङ्ग इति चेत् । *Sarvārthasiddhi*, V. 12
15. नैष दोषः, नाकाशादन्यदधिकपरिमाणं द्रव्यमस्ति यत्राकाशं स्थितमित्युच्येत । *Ibid.*, V. 12.
16. *Tattvārthasāra*, 31.
Reals in the Jaina Metaphysics (H. S. Bhattacharya), pp. 85-86
17. यदि हवदि गमणहेदू आगासं ठाणकारणं तेसिं । पसजदि अलोगहाणी लोगस्स य अंतपरिवुड्ढि ॥ *Pañcāstikāya*, 14
18. वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणः परमाणुः, स यावति क्षेत्रे व्यवतिष्ठते स प्रदेश इति व्यवहियते । *Sarvārthasiddhi*, V. 8
19. तस्मादेकस्मिन्नपि प्रदेशे अनन्तानन्तानामवस्थानं न विरुध्यते । *Ibid.*, V. 10.
20. *Bhagavatī*, V. 7.
21. *Āvaśyaka-Niryukti* (Āgamodaya Ed.), 37.
22. आकाशस्यानन्ताः । *Tattvārthasūtra*, V. 9.
23. *Tattvārthasūtra*, V. 1.
24. आकाशस्य...सावयवत्वं घटादेरिवोपपन्नं, सावयवमाकाशं हिमवत्विन्ध्यावरुद्धविभिन्न-देशत्वात् । *Sanmatitarkaprakaraṇa-tīkā* (Gujarat Vidyapith Ed.), p. 641. द्रव्याणां प्रतिनियतदेशावस्थानात् । इहान्येषु आकाशप्रदेशेषु पाटलिपुत्रं स्थितम्, अन्येषु च मथुरा, अतो नाना आकाशप्रदेशाः । यस्यैकान्तेन अप्रदेशमाकाशं तस्य यद्देशं पाटलिपुत्रं तद्देशभाविन्येव मथुरापि स्यात् । *Tattvārtha-Rājavārtitka*, V. 8.
25. आकाशं द्विधा विभक्तं लोकाकाशमलोकाकाशं चेति...। *Sarvārthasiddhi*, V. 12.
धर्मपुद्गलकालजीवा यत्र लोक्यन्ते स लोक इति वा ।...बहिः समन्तादनन्तमलोकाकाशम् । *Rājavārtitka*, V. 12.
26. *Sarvārthasiddhi*, V. 10.
27. स्यादेतदसङ्ख्यातप्रदेशो लोकः अनन्तप्रदेशस्यानन्तानन्तप्रदेशस्य च स्कन्धस्याधिकरणमिति विरोधस्ततो नानन्त्यमिति । नैष दोषः ।... *Sarvārthasiddhi*, V. 10.
28. नरं वैशाखसंस्थानस्थितपादं कटीतटे ।
न्यस्तहस्तद्वयं सर्वदिक्षु लोकोऽनुगच्छति ॥ *Lokaprakāśa*, XII. 3.
29. In the *Bhagavatisūtra* Alokākāśa is conceived as having the form of a hollow sphere. (11-10-420)
30. *Sarvārthasiddhi*, V. 7.

ON BUDDHIST NIRVĀNA

1. Citta

According to Buddhists there is no *ātman* over and above *citta*. For them *citta* itself is *ātman*. Their *citta* is momentary. A continuum of *cittakṣaṇas* maintains its identity. In other words, one continuum remains always different from another; no *cittakṣaṇa* belonging to one continuum can become a member of another continuum. Moreover, there is a strict order of *cittakṣaṇas* of one continuum. No *cittakṣaṇas* belonging to one continuum can exchange their places or points. They are governed by the principle of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*), that is, causation. Thus, a continuum of *cittakṣaṇas* closely resembles what the Jains call *ātmadravya* and *cittakṣaṇas* what they call *ātma-paryāyas*.¹ As a matter of fact, even Jains do not accept *ātma-dravya* over and above *citta-dravya*. What they call *ātman* is *citta* only.² Their *citta* is *pariṇāminitya*³ (variable constant). The classical Sāṅkhya philosophy posited *ātman* over and above *citta*, whereas the Jaina and the Buddhist philosophers did not. The Jaina gave the name '*ātman*' to *citta* while the Buddhist mostly did not give the name '*ātman*' to *citta*. This gave rise to the wrong belief that Buddhists are *anātmavādins* while Jains are *ātmavādins*.

The Buddhist *citta*, like the Jaina *ātman*, is *prakāśasvarūpa*. Again, like the Jaina *ātman*, it is endowed with two faculties - *jñāna* and *darśana* and hence two veils *jñeyāvaraṇa* and *kleśāvaraṇa* are recognised by them.⁴ These two faculties could be regarded as two aspects of its *prakāśarūpatā* which Jains call *upayoga*.

To shine in its own light is natural to *citta*. But the defiling elements like attachment, hatred, etc. are adventitious.⁵ From the beginningless time these defiling elements are mixed with *citta*-continuum blurring its nature. Buddha's preaching is centered on how to remove these defiling elements and establish *citta* in its pristine state. On the removal of defiling elements establishment of *citta* in its natural state is called *mokṣa* or Liberation. Buddhists employ the term *nirvāṇa* for *mokṣa*.

2. Description of Nirvāṇa

Nirvāṇa is 'freedom from all misery.'⁶ It is the highest peace.⁷ On this account it is called the highest happiness.⁸ It is characterised by the destruction of all desires.⁹ Hence it is identical with the complete cessation of attachment (*rāga*).¹⁰ This seems to be the reason why the *citta* attaining *nirvāṇa* becomes 'cool'.¹¹ Thus *nirvāṇa* is unemotional state. It is deliverance from all ties.¹² It is freedom from obsessions of sensuality (*kāmāsava*), of renewed existence (*bhavāsava*), of misconceptions about the world and about oneself (*diṭṭhāsava*) and of ignorance or nescience (*avijjāsava*)¹³. It is cessation of birth, old age and death.¹⁴ It is called purity (*suddhi*)¹⁵ and freedom from defilements (*asaṃkiliṭṭha*).¹⁶ This is the reason why it is identified with 'freedom from disease (*abyādhi*)'¹⁷ or 'health' (*ārogya*)¹⁸. Buddhism aims at purifying *citta*. As soon as the process of purifying *citta* attains its completion, *citta* attains *nirvāṇa* i.e. pure state. This process consists of the cultivation of *śīla*, *saṃādhi* and *prajñā*. It would be interesting to compare this description of *nirvāṇa* with that of *śāntarasa* given below.

*na yatra duḥkhaṃ sukhaṃ na cintā
na dveṣa-rāgaṃ na ca kācid icchā /
rasaḥ sa śāntaḥ kathito munīndraiḥ
sarveṣu bhāveṣu śamapradhānaḥ ||*

3. Nirvāṇa is Extinction of Personality (*Pudgala*)

All pure *citta*-continuums, emancipated from all adventitious defiling elements, are absolutely alike. They have no distinguishing traits. They have no personality or individuality. But when they are not pure, they do have personality which is imparted to them by external factors. These factors are called *skandhas* (personality factors). They are five, viz. *rūpa* (body), *vedanā* (feelings of pleasure or pain), *sañjñā* (ideation, concepts, memory images, thoughts), *saṃskāras* (predispositions or tendencies generated by the impressions of past actions bodily, mental and vocal and experiences) and *vijñāna* (experiences, sensations, percepts). The term '*pudgala*' denotes personality. An impure *citta*-continuum does have personality so long as it is not purified. *Nirvāṇa* being a pure state of *citta*-continuum, in it there are no personality factors and hence no personality. Jainācārya Akalaṅka defines *nirvāṇa* as an absence of five personality factors.¹⁹ Thus *nirvāṇa* is an extinction of personality. Personality is a mask that

a *citta*-continuum wears in a mundane state. Personality is not something over and above the personality factors. This is explained by that famous illustration of a chariot. All the parts of the chariot are taken one by one and it is asked whether they are the chariot. When all the parts are exhausted, there remains nothing that can be called chariot. This shows that there is nothing like chariot over and above the parts. Similarly, personality is not something over and above the five personality factors. Personality factors taken together are called personality.²⁰ This Buddhist contention is in conformity with their doctrine that there is no *avayavī* over and above *avayavas*.²¹ But there flourished some Buddhist philosophers²² who maintained that personality is something above but not independent of the personality factors. The chariot is something above but not independent of the parts. It is above the parts because none of the parts, taken singly, can perform the function of the chariot, not even all the parts taken together can perform that function. Only when they are properly assembled, they can perform the function of the chariot. Though the chariot is something above the parts, its existence is not independent of the existence of its parts. In the absence of parts, there can never exist the chariot. Similarly, personality is somewhat above the personality factors because it is also not the body, not the feeling, not the concepts, etc. but the proper assemblage of them all. Though it is above the factors, its existence is not independent of their existence. It can never exist in the absence of the personality factors. In *nirvāṇa* there is absence of all the five *skandhas* (personality factors) and hence there is absence of personality (*pudgala*).²³ This does not mean that in *nirvāṇa* there is annihilation of a *citta*-continuum. The pure *citta*-continuum without the mask of personality does exist in *nirvāṇa*.²⁴

4. Analogy of Extinguished Fire Explained

In *Majjhima Nikāya* I, p. 486 a question is discussed as to what happens to *Tathāgata* after his death. In this context Buddha compares *Tathāgata* who has attained *nirvāṇa* to fire that is extinguished when there is no more fuel.

Buddha – O ! Vaccha, if somebody asks you in what direction the fire extinguished in front of you has gone from here – east, west, north or south, then what would you answer ?

Vaccha – Dear Gotama ! this is a wrong question. For the fire

that burned because of fuel consisting of straw and wood, has consumed this and not been given anything else is, therefore, called 'extinguished (*nibbuto*) through lack of fuel (*upādāna*).'

Buddha – Similarly, the form by which the *Tathāgata* is being recognised (by the people as 'He is Gotama'), that recognisable (and hence name-bearing) form of *Tathāgata* is annihilated, its roots cut off, uprooted, like a palm tree, from further growth and rebirth in future. *Tathāgata* is free from form and name, he is deep, immeasurable, unfathomable just as a deep ocean.

To understand the above discussion we should first study the Buddhist conception of matter. According to Buddhism, all material bodies consist of the same molecules (*rūpaparamāṇu*). And a molecule (*rūpaparamāṇu*) consists of eight atoms, four primary and four secondary. Primary atoms are the solid atom (*pṛthivyaṇu*), the liquid atom (*jalāṇu*), the hot atom (*tejasāṇu*) and the moving atom (*vāyvaṇu*). The secondary are the atoms of colour, smell, taste and touch. Primary or secondary atoms are not found outside a molecule (*rūpaparamāṇu*). This means that in their original state all *rūpaparamāṇus* are absolutely alike.²⁵ They are homogeneous; there is lack of differentiation. But the *upādānas* (conditions like fuel) impart them different forms, viz. fire-form, water-form, etc. So, when the *upādānas* are removed, destroyed or consumed the different forms disappear and *rūpaparamāṇus* attain their homogeneous state. When the fire is extinguished, the fire-form imparted to *rūpaparamāṇus* by the fuel (*upādāna*) is annihilated and not the *rūpaparamāṇus*. Thus the analogy is complete; the fuel corresponds to personality factors (*skandhas*), the fire-form to personality (*pudgala*), *rūpaparamāṇus* divested of fire-form to the *citta*-continuum free from personality. As the fireform is annihilated in the event of its extinction, the question as to where the fireform goes is wrong; the fireform simply does not exist then. So there arises no question of its going to some place.

This explanation is in harmony with the words of Buddha : "Similarly, the form by which the *Tathāgata* is being recognised (by the people, say, as Gotama), that recognisable (and hence name-bearing) form of *Tathāgata* is annihilated, its roots cut off,.... *Tathāgata* is free from form and name..." By the term 'form' is meant personality (*pudgala*), by the phrase 'its roots' the five personality factors (*skandhas*) which give rise to personality and by the phrase

'*Tathāgata* free from form and name' the pure *citta*-continuum which is free from personality and hence has no name-label that is invariably associated with the personality. Thus the words of Buddha mean: On the death of the *Tathāgata*, the *citta*-continuum becomes free from personality and also from the name associated with the personality because the personality is extinct. The personality has become extinct because its roots viz. five personality factors are cut off. The *citta*-continuum is not annihilated with the annihilation of the personality. It continues to exist in its pure state. This pure *citta*-continuum is like a deep ocean.

As there is no personality in the pure *citta*-continuum that continues to exist after the death of *Tathāgata*, it is not possible to differentiate it from another pure *citta*-continuum, and hence there is impossibility of designating it by the name. Names are given to personalities and not to pure *citta*-continuums which lack differentiating and distinguishing traits. Thus this passage undoubtedly proves that in *nirvāṇa* pure *citta*-continuum does exist but has no personality that can differentiate it from another pure *citta*-continuum. Personality (*pudgala*) is annihilated on the cessation of personality factors (*skandhas*), just as fire-form is annihilated on the consumption of fuel. The *citta*-continuum without personality continues to exist even after the annihilation of personality just as *rūpaparamāṇus* (rather *rūpaparamāṇu*-continuums) without fireform continue to exist even after the extinction of fireform. This is clearly accepted by Buddha when he declares: "*Tathāgata* (after death) is deep like an ocean." Analogy of deep ocean is revealing. A deep ocean is calm, free from waves and agitation (*kṣobha*). Similarly, the *citta*-continuum that attains *nirvāṇa* becomes 'calm' i.e. free from agitations. *Skandhas* can easily be regarded as the agitating waves of *citta*-ocean. In *nirvāṇa* they are completely *niruddha* (destroyed)²⁶. Thus the analogy of deep ocean suggests not only cessation of personality factors entailing extinction of personality but also existence of *citta*-continuum free from personality factors and hence from personality also.

When the fuel is consumed the fireform is extinguished. Similarly, when the five personality factors (of *Tathāgata* Gotama) cease to exist the form or the personality which we recognise by the name *Tathāgata* Gotama become extinct, it does not exist. But if we say, '*Tathāgata* Gotama is extinct', there is a danger of our giving rise to the

misunderstanding that the pure *citta*-continuum which was wearing before the death of *Tathāgata* Gotama, the mask of personality designated by the name *Tathāgata* Gotama is also extinct. And if we say, '*Tathāgata* Gotama is not extinct,' there is a danger of our giving rise to the misunderstanding that even after the death of *Tathāgata* Gotama, in *nirvāṇa*, the *citta*-continuum continues to wear the mask of personality which it was wearing before the death and which was on that account designated by the name '*Tathāgata* Gotama.' This is the reason why Buddha deemed it wise to observe silence when it was asked what happens to the *Tathāgata* after his death.²⁷

5. Two kinds of Nirvāṇa

Buddhism recognises two kinds of *nirvāṇa*, viz. *sopadhiśeṣa* and *anupadhiśeṣa*.²⁸ *Sopadhiśeṣa* means that which is characterised by the *upadhi* (i.e. five *skandhas*) that continues to exist as residue (*śeṣa*). The term '*śeṣa*' suggests that the process of extinction has taken place and as a result something has become extinct. The question arises as to what has become extinct in this kind of *nirvāṇa*. We are told that it is *āsava*s (= *kāmāsava*, *bhavāsava*, *diṭṭhāsava*, *avjāsava*)²⁹ that become extinct. So, it is better to designate this kind of *nirvāṇa* by the term *āsava-nibhāṇa*.³⁰ The person who attains it is called *arahanta*.³¹ He has his body and five sense-organs, experiences external objects or receives sensations, feels pleasures and pain, has impressions of past acts and experiences, and thinks or remembers, etc. Thus he is equipped with all the five personality factors and hence has his own distinct personality. But he being free from *āsava*s, has no desires, no clinging to the world and to the renewed existence in it, no misconceptions about the world and himself, no ignorance and no immoral habits, thoughts and emotions. He is endowed with kindness. He is friendly and compassionate to all living beings and works for their good.³² He is imbued with the basic virtues, viz. *ahimsā*, *staya*, *asteya*, *brahmacharya* and *aparigraha*.³³ He closely corresponds to the *jīvanmukta* of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga and the *tīrthāṅkara* (or *arhat* or *sayoga-kevali*) of the Jaina. The *āsavaśaya* corresponds to the *kleśakṣaya* of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga and the *kaṣāyakṣaya* (or *ghātikarmakṣaya*) of the Jaina. The Buddhist have recognised the possibility of the existence of *nirāsrava skandhas*, just as the Sāṅkhya-Yoga have recognised the possibility of *akliṣṭa cittavṛttis*³⁴ and the Jainas the *niṣkaṣāya yoga* (=activities of body, mind and speech).³⁵

Thus the Buddhist conception of *arhat*, the Jaina conception of *tīrthaṅkara* and the Sāṅkhya-Yoga conception of *jīvanmukta* provide us with the conception of Ideal Man. It is this *āsava-nibbāna* (= *sopadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa*) that is emphasised in an old Buddhist verse quoted by Kamalaśīla in his *Pañjikā* Commentary on *Tattvasaṅgraha* of Śāntarakṣita (kā. 544). The verse in point is as follows :

cittam eva hi saṁsāro rāgādikleśavāsitaṁ !

tad eva tair vinirmuktam bhavānta iti kathyate ॥

Anupadhiśeṣa means that which is characterised by the absence of the *upadhi* (i.e. *skandhas*) that is still existing as residue. Here the five personality factors (= *skandhas*) become extinct. So it is better to call this kind of *nirvāṇa* the *skandha-nirvāṇa* or the *puḍgala-nirvāṇa*. It takes place only on the death of an *arhat*. Thus it necessarily follows the *sopadhiśeṣa* in due course. It is this *nirvāṇa* that is explained by the fire analogy. It corresponds to the *videhamukti* of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga and the *ayoga-kaivalya* (or *kṛtsnakarmakṣayaṁukti*) of the Jains.

Notes

1. *Jaina Darśana* (Hindi) by Pt. Mahendrakumar, p. 148
2. *cittaṁ cetaṇā buddhi, taṁ jīvatattvam eva / Dasakāliyasutta-cūṛṇi* by Agastyasirīṇha, 4.4

It is very important to note, in this context, the frequent use of the terms 'sacitta', 'acitta', 'puḍḍhā-citta', etc., in the Jaina canonical literature.

3. Permanence (*nityatā*) is twofold – the absolutely unchanging permanence (*kūṭastha-nityatā*) and permanence amidst change (*pariṇāmi-nityatā*). The former seems to be an abstraction, the latter to be concrete reality.

According to the Jaina theoreticians, Reality is neither substance alone nor modes alone but is characterised by both. A substance and its modes are not absolutely different, nor are they absolutely identical. There obtains a relation of identity-cum-difference between them. They are identical in so far as one is not found without the other; they are different in the sense that they can be mentally differentiated. The previous mode is related with the posterior mode; between them there obtains a relation of

relative identity as between the cause-continuum and the effect-continuum. One mode cannot be absolutely different from another as there runs through them one and the same substance, a situation which makes possible the psychical phenomena of recognition and memory. There arises a question as to the precise sense in which a substance can be said to be permanent (*dhruva*), for we have been told that it itself changes in a way or that it is identical with its modes in a way. The Jaina thinkers say that a substance is permanent in the sense that it never loses its essence and not in the sense that it is absolutely static. It undergoes change no doubt but it retains its essential nature; it is in this sense that it can be said to be permanent – not in the senses of being absolutely changeless. From this it follows that reality is dynamic, it is always in motion, in flux, it always every moment transforms itself without giving up its essence. The process of transformation involves origination, decay and persistence. Hence reality is said to be of this triple nature.

One may find hard to conceive a thing which is both permanent and changing. The idea seems to be that in an element there are two aspects – one static and the other dynamic. But how can it be visualized that some parts of an element remain static when others are changing? For, certainly all these parts are organically related with one another and they form a unity. It is impossible to point out physically a static part in an element. To avoid this difficulty the Jaina thinkers might say that what is called a static part of an element is not really static but that the element undergoes 'homogeneous change' with respect to this part. But then we have to point out that the expression 'homogeneous change' involves a contradiction in terms. It seems that in Jaina philosophy permanence has negative connotation. It means 'not to cross certain limits in the course of change'.

There are certain limits that an element can never transgress in the course of change. A thing, under appropriate conditions, can change itself into any other thing, provided the latter is not primarily and essentially of a different nature. That a material thing can change itself into any material thing through proper processes but it can never change itself into a conscious entity, is an illustration in point. Viewed in this way, the Jaina theory

of *pariṇāmanavāda* and Buddhist theory of *kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda* are essentially identical.

4. क्लेशज्ञेयावरणप्रहाणतो हि सर्वज्ञत्वम् । तत्र क्लेशा एव रागादयो भूतदर्शनप्रतिबन्धाभावात् क्लेशावरणमुच्यते । दृष्टस्यापि हेयोपादेयतत्त्वस्य यत् सर्वाकारापरिज्ञानं प्रतिपादनासामर्थ्यं च तज्ज्ञेयावरणम् । *Tattvasaṅgraha-pañjikā*, kā. 3337
5. प्रभावस्वरमिदं चित्तं प्रकृत्याऽऽगन्तवो मलाः । *Pramāṇa-vārtika*, I. 210
6. (निब्बानं) सब्बदुक्खपमोचनं । *SaṃyuttaN.* PTS 2. 278
7. ...परमा सन्ति निब्बानं... । *Itivuttaka* PTS, 1.22
8. निब्बानं परमं सुखं । *Dhammapada*, 203 निब्बानसुखा परं नत्थि ।
Therīgāthā, 476 Compare 'अशान्तस्य कुतः सुखम् ?' : *Bagavad-Gītā*
9. अनिच्छो होति निब्बुतो । *Suttanipāta*, 707
10. सब्बतो तण्हानं खया असेसविरागनिरोधो निब्बानं । *Nidāna*, 33
11. सीतिभूतो स्मि निब्बुतो । *MajjhimaN.*, 1.171
12. निब्बानं भगवा आहु सब्बगन्थप्पमोचनं । *SaṃyuttaN.*, I. 210
13. पञ्चापरिभावितं चित्तं सम्मद् एव आसवेहि विमुच्चति सेय्यथीदं कामासवा भवासवा दिट्ठासवा अविज्जासवा । *DighaN.*, 2.81
14. भवनिरोधो निब्बानं । *SaṃyuttaN.*, 2.117
जातिनिरोधा जरामरणनिरोधो । *MajjhimaN.*, 1.49
15. *SaṃyuttaN.*, 4.372
- 16-17. *MajjhimaN.*, 1.173
18. इदं तं आरोग्यं इदं तं निब्बानं ति । *Ibid*, 1.511
19. रूपवेदनासंज्ञासंस्कारविज्ञानपञ्चस्कन्धनिरोधाद् अभावो मोक्षः । *Tattvārtha-Rājavārtika*, p. 2
20. *Tattvasaṅgraha*, with *Pañjikā*, kā. 336-349
Milindapaṇḥa, II, pp. 25-28
For denoting personality terms *attā* (ātman), *satto* (sattva), *puggala* (pudgala), *jīva*, *vedagū* (vedaka) are employed in Buddhist Pāli literature.
21. *Pramāṇa-vārtika*, I. 86-88, II. 150-153
22. These Buddhist thinkers are called Vātsīputriyas.
23. There was a view that personality (*pudgala*) of one *citta*-continuum maintains its identity (of course through its own

continuum which runs closely parallel to its *citta*-continuum) so long as the *citta*-continuum does not attain *nirvāṇa*; as soon as it attains *nirvāṇa* this identical personality (*pudgala*) gets totally extinguished. This idea of *pudgala* (personality) very well corresponds to the Jaina conception of *kārmaṇa-sarīra* and Sāṅkhya conception of *līṅgaśarīra*.

24. Jayanta maintains that there are two views about Buddhist *nirvāṇa*. According to one view, in *nirvāṇa* there is total destruction of the continuum. According to the other view there continues pure *jñāna*-continuum in *nirvāṇa*.

निर्वाणादिपदाख्येयमपवर्गं तु सौगताः । सन्तत्युच्छेदमिच्छन्ति स्वच्छां वा ज्ञानसन्ततिम् ।

Nyāyamañjarī, IX Āhnikā, L. D. Series No 115, p. 333

In fact, these are not two views about *nirvāṇa*. One and the same state of *nirvāṇa* is here viewed from two different angles or described negatively and positively. When described negatively, it is the annihilation of the continuum of personality or *pudgala*. When described positively, it is the continuance of the continuum of pure-*citta*.

Śāntarakṣita in his *Tattvasaṅgraha* (Kā. 543) clearly states that *mukti* (Ultimate Release, *nirvāṇa*) is nothing but purity of *citta* (*dhi*). *Muktir nirmalatā dhiyaḥ*.

25. *Buddhist Logic* by Stcherbatsky, Vol. I, p. 101, 190-191 Mouton & Co., 1958

अपरे (बौद्धाः) आहुः-ककषडतादीनां चतुर्णां भूतानां भौतिकानां च वर्णादीनां विलक्षणानां समुदय एको रूपपरमाणुः । *Tattvārtha-Rājavārtika*, p. 17

26. There is close resemblance between *citta-vṛttis* of Pātañjala Yoga and Buddhist *skandhas*. Yoga philosophy accepts *puruṣa* (soul) over and above and independent of *citta*. *Puruṣa* is absolutely changeless (*kūṭasthanitya*), while *citta* is variable constant (*pariṇāmi-nitya*). *Vṛtti* means mode, transformation, change which *citta* assumes or undergoes. *Citta* assumes the mode of happiness (*sukhākāra-vṛtti*), of unhappiness (*duḥkhākāra-vṛtti*), mode of the form of external object (*jñānavṛtti*, *ghaṭajñāna*, *paṭajñāna*, etc.), mode of concept (*vikalpavṛtti*), mode of memory (*smṛtivyṛtti*), and so on. And so long as there arise *vṛttis* in *citta*, *puruṣa* who is closely associated with *citta* has to bear reflections of *vṛttis*. This is the bondage of *puruṣa*.

Citta without *ṛttis* can never be reflected in *puruṣa*. So, to establish *puruṣa* in its reflectionless pure state, one should effect complete cessation of all *ṛttis* (*ṛttinirodha*). When all the *ṛttis* completely cease to exist, *citta* becomes calm, unagitated, *praśāntavāhi*, and in the absence of *ṛttis* *puruṣa* becomes free from reflections (pure, isolated, *kevala*), and *citta* also becomes pure and isolated having no relation whatsoever with *puruṣa*.

sattva-puruṣayoḥ śuddhi-sāmye kaivalyam / *Pātañjala* *Yogasūtra* 3.55. The Buddhists also talk of cessation (*nirodha*) of *skandhas*. They frequently use the terms *vedanā-nirodha*, etc. They too maintain that when *citta* becomes free from *skandhas*, it becomes pure and is established in its pure and pristine state. As they do not accept *puruṣa*, further processes of reflection of *skandhas* in *puruṣa* and cessation of the reflection are not required in Buddhism and hence are totally absent. For the Buddhist cessation of *skandhas* resulting in the purity of *citta* is itself *nirvāṇa*.

27. *Majjhima-Nikāya, Culamālunkya-Sutta*.

28. The adjectives used to describe *sopadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa* are noteworthy. They are : *sandiṭṭhika*, *ehipassika*, *veditabba*. (*Ang. N. I*, 158f.)

The term used for *nirupadhiśeṣa* or *anupadhiśeṣa nirvāṇa* is *pari-nirvāṇa*.

29. *Patañjali*, the author of *Yogasūtra*, recognises five *kleśas*, viz. *avidyā*, *asmitā*, *rāga*, *dveṣa* and *abhiniveśa*. *Avidyā* corresponds to *avijjāsava*, *asmitā* to *ditṭhāsava*, *rāga-dveṣa* to *kāmāsava* and *abhiniveśa* to *bhavāsava*.

30. द्विविधं निर्वाणमुपवर्णितम्-सोपधिशेषं निरुपधिशेषं च । तत्र निरवशेषस्य अविद्यारागादिकस्य क्लेशगणस्य प्रहाणात् सोपधिशेषं निर्वाणमिष्यते ।...उपधिशब्देन... पञ्चोपादानस्कन्धा उच्यन्ते ।...सह उपधिशेषेण वर्तते इति सोपधिशेषम् । तच्च स्कन्धमात्रकमेव केवलम्... । यत्र तु निर्वाणे स्कन्धमात्रकमपि नास्ति तन्निरुपधिशेषं निर्वाणम् । *Mādhyaṃika-ṛtti*, p. 519

31. *Itivuttaka*.

32. *AṅguttaraN.* I p. 211

33. *MajjhimaN.* I p. 523

34. वृत्तयः पञ्चतय्यः क्लिष्टा अक्लिष्टाः । *Yogasūtra*, I. 5

35. सकषायाऽकषाययोः साम्प्रयायिकेर्यापथयोः । *Tattvārthasūtra*, VI. 5

CONCEPTION OF ĪŚVARA IN PĀTAÑJALA YOGA

Yogasūtra

First we present before the scholars of Indian philosophy our explanation of Patañjali's three aphorisms on Īśvara. While explaining these aphorisms we shall use only those concepts that are found in the *Yogsūtra*. By doing so we intend to keep our explanation as free as possible from the later concepts. Let us take up the concerned aphorisms one by one for explanation.

[1] *kleśa-karma-vipākāśayair aparāmrṣṭaḥ puruṣaviśeṣaḥ īśvaraḥ* | I. 24.

The extra-ordinary person who is untouched by *kleśas*, *karmas*, *vipāka* and *āśaya* is called *Īśvara*. I. 24.

We shall try to explain this aphorism on the basis of the concepts or ideas found in other aphorisms.

Patañjali tells us that during the practice of *samprajñāta yoga* if one does not desire anything (or any *siddhi*) he surely attains infallible perfect *vivekakhyāti*, and as a result of this he attains *Dharmamegha samādhi*;¹ further he says that on the attainment of *Dharmamegha samādhi* follows the destruction of *kleśas* and *karmas*.² From this we deduce that a *viveki* who has attained *Dharmamegha samādhi* is always free from *kleśas* and *karmas*. (Bhāṣyakāra Vyāsa calls this person a *jīvanmukta*.³)

Patañjali states that *kleśas* are the root-cause of *karmāśaya*.⁴ He further declares that so long as the root (viz. *kleśas*) exists, there will be *vipāka*.⁵ These two statements imply that in the absence of *kleśas*, there cannot be *karmāśaya* and *vipāka*.

On the attainment of *Dharmamegha samādhi* a *viveki* becomes free from *kleśas* and *karmas*; and as soon as he becomes free from *kleśas* he becomes free from *vipāka* and *āśaya*. From all this it naturally follows that a *viveki* who has attained *Dharmamegha samādhi* is untouched by *kleśas*, *karmas*, *vipāka* and *āśaya*. Hence this *viveki* can legitimately be called extra-ordinary person. By Īśvara

Patañjali seems to mean this *vivekī*.⁶ We are not warranted by the *Yogasūtra* to go beyond this.

[2] The next aphorism is –

tatra niratiśayaṁ sarvajñabījaṁ | I. 25

In this (=Īśvara) there is infinite (=niratiśaya=ananta) *jñāna* which is the seed or germ of all-comprehending (=sarvajña) *jñāna*. I. 25.

Regarding *ananta-jñāna* and *sarvajña-jñāna* much confusion and misunderstanding prevails among scholars who wrongly identify *ananta-jñāna* with *sarvajña-jñāna*. This aphorism is very important as it removes the mist of misunderstanding and confusion. It clearly suggests that *ananta-jñāna* is not identical with *sarvajña-jñāna*.

We shall have to turn to other aphorisms for the clear understanding of the difference between the two as also for the full explanation of the aphorism on hand.

Patañjali explicitly states that as soon as *kleśas* and *karmas* get destroyed on the attainment of *Dharmamegha samādhi*, all the *āvaraṇas* and *malas* get completely removed and *jñāna* attains its infinity (=ānantya).⁷ Thus *ananta-jñāna* (or *niratiśaya-jñāna*) is nothing but *nirāvaraṇa-jñāna*. *Jñāna* which is free from all obscuring veils and impurities is *ananta-jñāna*.

Ananta-jñāna is not *sarvajña-jñāna*. Patañjali says that all the objects taken together are *alpa* as compared to the *ānantya* of *jñāna* of the person who has attained *Dharmamegha samādhi*.⁸ What Patañjali wants to drive at is that however infinite all the objects taken together may be, their infinity can never coincide with the vast infinity of *jñāna*.

From what we studied above it naturally follows that those who say that *jñāna* is infinite (=ananta) because it knows all things are committing a blunder. Again, our study shows that Patañjali does not want to attach much importance to *sarvajña-jñāna*. As we shall see, he considers it to be simply a *siddhi* which a person who has attained *ananta-jñāna* comes to acquire. And we all know Patañjali's attitude towards *siddhis*.

Dharmamegha samādhi marks the perfection of *vivekajñāna*. So, perfect *vivekajñāna* can be regarded as identical with *ananta-jñāna*. When all the *āvaraṇas* and *malas* get removed the *vivekajñāna*

becomes automatically perfect and when *vivekajñāna* becomes perfect there is removal of all the *āvaraṇas* and *malas*. This means that (perfect) *vivekajñāna* is nothing but *ananta-jñāna*.

Thus to say that *niratisāya-jñāna* (= *ananta-jñāna*) is the seed of *sarvajñā-jñāna* is the same thing as to say that *sarvajñā-jñāna* is *vivekaja*. Another name for *sarvajñā jñāna* is *tāraka-jñāna*. Patañjali explicitly states that *tāraka-jñāna* is *vivekaja*⁹. As he has placed it in his treatment of *siddhis*, it becomes quite clear that he considers it to be simply a *siddhi*.

Why is *ananta-jñāna* i.e. *vivekajñāna* regarded as the seed of *sarvajñā-jñāna* ? There is a good reason for that. Patañjali wants to suggest that *sarvajñā-jñāna* does never automatically follow on the attainment of *ananta jñāna*. As soon as one attains *ananta-jñāna* one acquires the capacity (= *labdhī*) to know all, but he does not actually know all. He knows all provided he performs *saṁyama* (*dhāraṇā*, *dhyāna* and *saṁādhi*) on *kṣaṇa* and *kṣaṇakrama*¹⁰. This means that the capacity to know all functions under a specific condition. If *jñāna* were to become automatically *sarvajñā* on its becoming *ananta*, then *ananta jñāna* would not have been regarded as the seed of *sarvajñā jñāna*; in that case it would have been regarded as identical with *sarvajñā-jñāna*. But this being not the case, *ananta jñāna* is regarded as the seed of *sarvajñā-jñāna*.

On the attainment of *Dharmamegha samādhi* all the *kleśas* and *karmas* get completely destroyed, and as soon as all the *kleśas* and *karmas* are destroyed the *jñāna* becomes *ananta* because all the obscuring veils and impurities have already been destroyed. The person who has attained this *ananta-jñāna* acquires the capacity to know all but this capacity functions only if he performs a special type of *saṁyama*.

All this discussion clearly suggests that a *vivekī* who has attained *Dharmamegha samādhi* is *Īśvara*; and it is he who is described in the aphorism on hand. Thus *Īśvara* is not necessarily *sarvajñā*; he becomes *sarvajñā* only when he performs that *saṁyama*. In other words, he has the capacity to know all, but this capacity functions provided certain conditions are fulfilled. This capacity to know all is a *siddhi* which is the result of his attainment of *anantajñāna*. Thus he is invariably characterized by *ananta-jñāna* but he is not invariably characterized by *sarvajñā-jñāna*.

[3] The next aphorism is –

pūrveṣāṃ api guruḥ kālenānavacchedāt / I. 26

He (=Īśvara) is the spiritual teacher of even the elderly persons because he is not limited by time. I. 26.

- (a) Here the role of Īśvara as *upadeṣṭā* is suggested by the term 'guru'.
- (b) The phrase '*pūrveṣāṃ api guruḥ*' reminds us of that well known verse from the *Dakṣiṇāmūrtistotra* attributed to Āc. Śaṅkara, viz. '*citram vaṭataror mūle vṛddhaḥ śiṣyo gurur yuvā*' etc. This idea is very common in Brahmanic, Buddhist and Jaina religions.
- (c) What is it that qualifies him to be a spiritual teacher of even the elderly persons? The answer to this question is provided in the remaining part of the aphorism viz. '*kālenānavacchedāt*' which being in the fifth case-ending gives the reason for Īśvara's being the spiritual teacher of even the elderly person.

Let us try to understand the idea suggested by the term '*kālenānavaccheda*' on the basis of another aphorism. Patañjali states that for that person whose *kleśas* and *karmas* are destroyed on the attainment of *Dharmamegha samādhi* and as a result of this whose *jñāna* has attained its infinity, *guṇas* come to an end of the sequence of change.¹¹ That is, *guṇas* stop evolving *citta*, *indriya*, *śarīra*, etc. for that person. The series of round of rebirth ends for him. For him the cycle of birth and death ceases.¹² He rises above time. Now he is not limited by time. He becomes *kālānavacchinna*. Thus we equate '*kālenānavaccheda*' with '*guṇānāṃ pariṇāmakrama-samāptiḥ*' (IV. 32).¹³

Now what this aphorism means is this – 'As he (=Īśvara) [having destroyed *kleśas* and *karmas*] has risen above the cycle of birth and death, he is the spiritual teacher of even the elderly persons (who are caught up in the cycle).'

The equation given above suggests that for Patañjali *kāla* is nothing but *pariṇāmakrama*. Hence one who is untouched by *pariṇāmakrama* is untouched by *kāla* or is not limited by *kāla*.

Kālānavaccheda or *pariṇāmakrama-samāpti* is the result of *kleśarāhitya* or *vītarāgatā*. *Kleśarāhitya* is nothing but supreme spirituality. So one who has attained supreme spirituality can be the spiritual teacher of even the elderly persons. It is this supreme

spirituality suggested by *kālānavaccheda* or *pariṇāmakramasamāpti* that qualifies one to be the spiritual teacher of even the elderly persons. Only those who have crossed the ocean of *saṁsāra* can show others how to cross it. Only those who have stopped the cycle of birth and death can show others how to stop it.¹⁴

On our interpretation *Īśvara* according to Patañjali is identical with the *vivekī* who has attained *Dharmamegha samādhi*, *ananta-jñāna* and the capacity to know all and is free from the cycle of birth and death. As we have already seen, this *vivekī*, according to Patañjali, is free from *kleśas*, *karmas*, *vipāka* and *āśaya*. Thus by *Īśvara* Patañjali seems to mean that person whom Vyāsa calls *jīvanmukta*. We repeat again that we are not warranted by the *Yogasūtra* to go beyond this.

Elsewhere¹⁵ we have shown that Nyāyabhāṣyakāra Vātsyāyana's conception of *Īśvara* corresponds to that of *jīvanmukta vivekī*, and it is only Praśastapāda, the author of the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*, who introduced into the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system the conception of *Īśvara* as *nityamukta*. Similarly, we feel that Patañjali's conception of *Īśvara* is identical with that of *jīvanmukta vivekī* and it is only Bhāṣyakāra Vyāsa who introduced into the Yoga system the conception of *Īśvara* as *nitya mukta*.

Yogabhāṣya

Vyāsa, the author of *Bhāṣya* on the *Yogasūtra*, introduces into the Patañjala Yoga philosophy the idea of *nityamukta* one *Īśvara*.

Īśvara is free from bondage in all the three divisions of time. He was not bound in the past, nor is he bound in the present, nor will he be bound in the future. This speciality differentiates him from *kevalins* (the ordinary liberated souls) who have attained freedom from bondage after having severed all bonds of bondage.¹⁶ *Īśvara* is *sadāmukta*.¹⁷

Vyāsa states that *Īśvara*'s *utkarṣa* is eternal. By *utkarṣa* he means *sarvajñatva* (omniscience). *Īśvara* is omniscient always in all the three divisions of time because he possesses always in all the three divisions of time the supremely pure *citta* without any coverings that obstruct knowledge. That he is omniscient is proved by scriptures. And scriptures are authoritative and valid because they are composed by the omniscient *Īśvara*. The interdependence of omniscience of *Īśvara* and authoritativeness of scriptures, being beginningless like the interdependence of a seed and a sprout, is not a logical defect.¹⁸

The *aiśvarya* (pre-eminence) of *Īśvara* is supreme and hence matchless. By *aiśvarya* the unfailing will is here meant. The *aiśvarya* of any other being is not superior to his. Nor is the *aiśvarya* of any other being equal to his.¹⁹ Why ? If the two persons' *aiśvaryas* are equal then when at the same time and with respect to one and the same thing both the persons entertain two contradictory desires – as for example, 'let this be new' and 'let this be old' – one's desire will be fulfilled and the other's desire will remain unfulfilled. As a result of this the latter's *aiśvarya* becomes inferior.²⁰ So, it is impossible for two supreme *aiśvaryas* to be equal. From this it naturally follows that *Īśvara* is one only.

In the world we observe that one person has a certain degree of knowledge, another person has a higher degree of knowledge, the third person has still a higher degree of knowledge, and so on. The progressive development must reach its completion somewhere, because this is the way of all progression. He in whom knowledge which is subject to progressive development reaches the highest limit is omniscient. *Īśvara* is omniscient.²¹

Vyāsa maintains that *Īśvara* who is perfect has no motive for doing anything for his own betterment leading to perfection. But he does have motive for undertaking activity for the betterment of living beings, which ultimately leads to perfection. He imparts instruction in knowledge and in right-living to living beings, with the sole intention of freeing them from the transmigratory wanderings and misery.²²

According to Vyāsa, *Īśvara* is the Teacher of the ancient sages also because he is not limited by time always – even in the past –, while those sages were then limited by time.²³

Thus Vyāsa made *īśvara nityamukta* and consequently *lokottara*. And on the basis of supreme *aiśvarya* he established that he is one only. It is not necessary to make him *nityamukta* in order to differentiate him from other ordinary liberated souls (*kevalins*) because his difference from them is well established on the basis of the well recognised fundamental differentiating characteristic. The other ordinary liberated souls have no *citta* at all. So, how can they have supremely pure (*prakṛṣṭa*) *citta* and consequently the supreme *aiśvarya* which necessarily depends on supremely pure *citta* ? But *Īśvara* does have supremely pure *citta* and consequently supreme *aiśvarya*. It is accepted in the Pātañjala Yoga philosophy that

supremely pure *citta* without any obstructive veil is possible in more individuals than one, they being *jīvanmuktas*. Then, what is the harm in accepting supreme *aiśvarya* in them ? The acceptance of the supremely pure *citta* in *jīvanmuktas* necessarily entails the acceptance of supreme *aiśvarya* in them. Supreme *aiśvarya* is not opposed to the concept of many *Īśvaras*.

It is noteworthy that Vyāsa has not assigned the work of world-creation to *Īśvara*. For him, *Īśvara* is not even the dispenser of the fruits of the past actions performed by living beings. According to him, *Īśvara*'s sole function is to impart instructions of spiritual living which leads to the ultimate Release.

Vācaspati and Vijñānabhikṣu

Now we try to show what new ideas regarding *Īśvara* Vācaspati, the author of the commentary *Tattvavaiśārādī* on *Yogabhāṣya*, and Vijñānabhikṣu, the author of *Yogavārtika*, have introduced into the Pātañjala Yoga philosophy.

Vyāsa is of the view that *Īśvara* is associated with supremely pure *citta* always at all time. But Vācaspati finds some difficulty in accepting this view. So he maintains that at the time of Dissolution the supremely pure *citta* of *Īśvara* gets dissolved into the primordial Matter (*prakṛti*).²⁴ The question arises as to how it again gets associated with *Īśvara* at the end of the period of Dissolution. What is it that associates it with *Īśvara* ? The answer given by Vācaspati is as follows. If is *Īśvara*'s resolve, before the commencement of Dissolution, that he must get associated with the *citta* at the end of Dissolution. Impression of this resolve is there in the *citta* during the entire period of Dissolution. On account of the nature of the resolve the impression is revived at the end of the period of Dissolution and as a result of it the *citta* gets associated with *Īśvara*.²⁵ If *Īśvara*'s *citta* does not get dissolved into *prakṛti* at any time, not even at the time of Dissolution, then it cannot be regarded as an evolute or an effect of *prakṛti* and consequently cannot be included in the fundamental principle/real called *prakṛti*. And it is not the other fundamental principle/real *puruṣa* (sentient principle). Thus it will be neither *prakṛti* nor *puruṣa*. This will give rise to the contingency of its being an independent third fundamental principle/real.²⁶

Vijñānabhikṣu refutes Vācaspati's view. He maintains that *Īśvara*'s *citta* does not get dissolved into *prakṛti* even at the time of

Dissolution. The reason given by him is as follows. If we accept that *īśvara*'s *citta* gets dissolved into *prakṛti* at the time of Dissolution and remains dissolved into *prakṛti* during the entire period of Dissolution then we shall have to accept its conjunction with *īśvara* taking place at the end of the period of Dissolution. But the cause of the conjunction of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* is *avidyā* (Nescience). Thus Vācaspati's view involves contingency of *īśvara*'s being infected with *avidyā*. But Pātañjala Yoga philosophy does not accept the possibility of *kleśas*, viz. *avidyā* etc. in *īśvara*. Again, Vācaspati's attempt to explain the rejoining of the *citta* with *īśvara* with the help of impression of the *citta* is also not proper because Pātañjali has rejected the possibility of any impression (*vāsanā*, *āśaya*) in *īśvara*'s *citta*.²⁷

According to Vācaspati, *īśvara* simply removes obstructions, that are there in the process of proper fruits coming to living beings from their past actions at proper time.²⁸ Even Vijñānabhikṣu seems to agree with Vācaspati on this point. Moreover, Vijñānabhikṣu believes that though *īśvara* has strong desire to remove all miseries of all living beings, he has to take into account deserts or past karmas of living beings.²⁹

Vācaspati introduces the idea of *īśvara* as the creator and destroyer of the world.³⁰ Vijñānabhikṣu supports him.³¹ Again, he clearly states that creative agitation (*kṣobha*) – that is, breaking of *prakṛti*'s state of homogeneous change (*sāmyāvasthābhaṅga*) – takes place as a result of *īśvara*'s will. Someone may here raise a question as to how one can maintain that *prakṛti*'s independence is not at stake even though *prakṛti* starts to evolve into the world at the will of *īśvara*. In answer Vācaspati and Vijñānabhikṣu both state that *īśvara* simply removes obstacles that are there in the process of evolution. In other words, it is only *prakṛti* that has the capacity to evolve into the world, and *īśvara* simply awakens or activates this capacity by removing obstacles. On the removal of obstacles, there takes place heterogeneous change in place of homogeneous change in *prakṛti* giving rise to diverse effects.³²

While presenting the Pātañjala yoga conception of *īśvara*, Vijñānabhikṣu discusses the relation obtaining between *īśvara* and *jīva* (individual ordinary soul). According to him, there obtains the relation of *aṁśa-aṁśin* (part-whole) between them. He gives an illustration of fire and sparks to explain the relation. *Jīvas* are the parts of which *īśvara* is the whole. *Jīvas* are sparks of *īśvara*.³³

Under the influence of Vedānta and later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, Vācaspati and Vijñānabhikṣu have introduced into Pātañjala Yoga philosophy some new ideas regarding *īśvara*. These are the ideas of *īśvara* as the world-creator, as the dispenser of the fruits of past actions and as the whole of which *jīvas* are parts. These ideas are not present even in Vyāsa's *Yogabhāṣya*.

Notes

1. प्रतिसङ्ख्यानेऽप्यकुसीदस्य सर्वथा विवेकख्यातेर्धर्ममेघसमाधिः । *Yogasūtra*, 4.29
2. ततः क्लेशकर्मनिवृत्तिः । *Ibid*, 4.30
3. क्लेशकर्मनिवृत्तौ जीवन्नेव विद्वान् विमुक्तो भवति । *Yoga-bhāṣya*, 4.30
4. क्लेशमूलः कर्माशयः ... । *Yogasūtra*, 2.12
5. सति मूले तद्विपाकः ... । *Ibid*, 2.13
6. Compare : 'अधर्म-मिथ्याज्ञान-प्रमादहान्या धर्मज्ञानसमाधिसम्पदा च विशिष्ट-मात्मान्तरमीश्वरः ।' *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, 4.1.21
(अधर्म=अधर्मप्रवृत्ति = क्लेशयुक्तप्रवृत्ति; धर्म=धर्मप्रवृत्ति=क्लेशरहितप्रवृत्ति)
7. तदा सर्वावरणमलापेतस्य ज्ञानस्य अजन्त्यात् ज्ञेयमल्पम् । *Yogasūtra*, 4.31
8. *Ibid*.
9. तारकं सर्वविषयं सर्वथाविषयमक्रमं चेति विवेकजं ज्ञानम् । *Ibid*, 3.54
10. क्षणतत्क्रमयोः संयमाद् विवेकजं ज्ञानम् । *Ibid*, 3.52
11. तत्र कृतार्थानां परिणामक्रमसमाप्तिर्गुणानाम् । *Ibid*, 4.32
12. कुशलस्य (=धर्ममेघसमाधिसम्पन्नस्य विवेकिनः) संसारचक्रसमाप्तिर्नेतरस्य ।
Yoga-bhāṣya, 4.33
13. 'guṇānām. parīṇāmakramasamāptih' is different from 'guṇānām pratiprasavaḥ' which takes place when the *vīveki's* body falls.
14. जीवन्मुक्तस्यैवोपदेष्टृत्वसम्भवात् । *Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya*, 3.79.
15. Study the next chapter of the present work.
16. कैवल्यं प्राप्तास्तर्हि सन्ति च बहवः केवलिनः । ते हि त्रीणि बन्धनानि छित्त्वा कैवल्यं प्राप्ताः । ईश्वरस्य च तत्सम्बन्धो न भूतो न भावी । *Yogabhāṣya*, 1.24
17. स तु सदैव मुक्तः सदैवेश्वरः । *Ibid*, 1.24
18. योऽसौ प्रकृष्टसत्त्वोपादानादीश्वरस्य शाश्वतिकं उत्कर्षः स किं सनिमित्त आहोस्विन्निर्मित इति ? तस्य शास्त्रं निमित्तम् । शास्त्रं पुनः किंनिमित्तम् ? प्रकृष्टसत्त्वनिमित्तम् । एतयोः शास्त्रोत्कर्षयोरीश्वरसत्त्वे वर्तमानयोरेनादिसम्बन्धः । *Ibid*, 1.24

19. तच्च तत्स्यैश्वर्यं साम्यातिशयविनिर्मुक्तम् । न तावदैश्वर्यान्तरेण तदतिशय्यते । यदेवातिशायि स्यात् तदेव तत् स्यात् । तस्मात् यत्र काष्ठाप्राप्तिरैश्वर्यस्य स ईश्वरः । न च तत्समानमैश्वर्यमस्ति । *Ibid*, 1.24
20. कस्मात् ? द्वयोस्तुल्ययोरेकस्मिन् युगपत् कामितेऽर्थे नवमिदमस्तु पुराणमिदमस्त्वित्येकस्य कामितार्थप्राप्तिर्नास्त्यर्थस्य विरुद्धत्वात् । *Ibid*, 1.24
21. *Ibid*, 1.25
22. तस्यात्मानुग्रहाभावेऽपि भूतानुग्रहः प्रयोजनम् ज्ञानधर्मोपदेशेन कल्पप्रलेयमहाप्रलयेषु संसारिणः पुरुषानुद्धरिष्यामीति । *Ibid*, 1.25
23. *Ibid*, 1.26
24. न चेश्वरस्य चित्तसत्त्वं महाप्रलयेऽपि प्रकृतिसाम्यं नोपैतीति वाच्यम् । *Tattvavaiśārādī*, 1.24
25. सर्गान्तरसमुत्पन्नसंजिहीर्षावधिसमये पूर्णे मया सत्त्वप्रकर्षे उपादेय इति प्रणिधानं कृत्वा भगवान् जगत् संजहार । तदा चेश्वरचित्तसत्त्वं प्रणिधानवासितं प्रधानसाम्यमुपगतमपि परिपूर्णं महाप्रलयावधौ प्रणिधानवासनावशात् तथैवेश्वरचित्तं सत्त्वभावेन परिणमते । *Ibid*, 1.24
26. यस्य हि न कदाचिदपि प्रधानसाम्यं न तत् प्राधानिकम्, नापि चित्तिशक्तिरज्ञत्वादित्यर्थान्तरमप्रामाणिकमापद्येत । *Ibid*, 1.24
27. तच्चायुक्तम् । 'तस्य हेतुरविद्या' इत्यागामिसूत्रेणाविद्याया बुद्धिपुरुषसंयोगहेतुत्ववचनेनेश्वरस्याप्यविद्वत्त्वापत्ते...ईश्वरोपाधौ संस्कारस्य प्रतिषिद्धत्वात् तदभ्युपगमोऽपि तेषामपसिद्धान्त एव । *Yogavārtika*, 1.24
28. ईश्वरस्यापि धर्माधिष्ठानार्थं प्रतिबन्धापनये एव व्यापारो वेदितव्यः । *TattvaV.*, 4.3
29. ईश्वरस्य तु परदुःखप्रहाणेच्छा विद्यमानाऽपि भक्तवशतया कुण्ठिता स्वकार्याय विलम्बत इति सर्वं समञ्जसम्, यच्च सर्वेश्वरस्य कर्मसापेक्षतया वैषम्यं नैर्घृण्यं च ब्रह्ममीमांसासूत्रेणापाकृतं तत्राप्ययमेवाशयः । *Yogavārtika*, 1.25
30. भगवान् जगत् संजहार । *TattvaV.*, 1.24
31. प्रकृतेर्वैषम्यहेतुः क्षोभोऽपीश्वरेच्छात एव । *Yogavārtika*, 1.24
32. ननु प्रकृतिश्चेत् स्वतन्त्रा केन प्रकारेण तर्हि धर्मेश्वरयोगिसङ्कल्पादीनां प्रकृतिपरिणामहेतुत्वमिति पृच्छति – कथं तर्हीति । सूत्रार्थेनोत्तरमाह – वरणभेदस्तु ततः क्षेत्रिकवदिति ।... तथैव प्रकृतिरेव जगत्कारणं कालकर्मेश्वरादयस्तु प्रकृतेः कार्यजननशक्त्युद्बोधकाः ईश्वरस्तु साम्यपरिणामादिरूपाखिलावरणभङ्गेनोद्बोधकः... । *Ibid*, 4.3
33. अत्रोच्यते – जीवेश्वरयोरंशाशिनोस्तावत्...न्यायानुग्रहेण बलवद्भिरग्निस्फुलिङ्गादिभिः सांशदृष्टानैः... । *Ibid*, 1.24

CONCEPTION OF ĪŚVARA IN THE EARLY NYĀYA-VAIŚEŚIKA SCHOOL

I

Does Kaṇāda believe in the existence of Īśvara (God) ?

There is no clear mention of *Īśvara* in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*¹ of Kaṇāda². Hence the author of *Yuktidīpikā*, a commentary on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, explicitly states that according to Kaṇāda there is no *Īśvara* (God)³. And Garbe, a well known modern scholar of Indian philosophy, maintains that the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* originally did not accept the existence of God⁴. But keeping in view the important place accorded to God in the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, the commentators wrongly try to find out in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* some implied acceptance of the existence of God. Take the following two sūtras : *yato 'bhyudayani-ḥśreyasasiddhiḥ sa dharmah /-tadvacanād āmnāyasya prāmāṇyam /* V.S. 1.1.2-3. The straight and clear meaning of these two sūtras is : 'That by which one attains prosperity and beatitude is *Dharma*. Because the Vedas deal with it (= *Dharma*), they are to be regarded as *pramāṇa* (authority or valid)'. But the commentators explain the word '*tadvacanāt*' as meaning 'because the Vedas are the Word of *Maheśvara*'⁵. But this interpretation seems unwarranted and farfetched. In this connection Prof. S. N. Dāsgupta observes : "The sūtra '*tadvacanād āmnāyasya prāmāṇyam* (I.1.3.)' has been explained by *Upaskāra* as meaning 'The Veda being the Word of *Īśvara* (= God) must be regarded as valid,' but since there is no mention of '*Īśvara*' anywhere in the text this is simply reading the later Nyāya ideas into the *Vaiśeṣika*'".⁶ Prof. Erich Frauwallner is of the view that the first four extant aphorisms of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* are not original. Someone has composed them keeping in view the beginning of Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmaśaṅgraha*, and having removed the original ones placed them in their place. Prof. E. Frauwallner has restored the original aphorisms on the basis of Udayana's *Kiraṇāvali* and Jaina Haribhadra's *Nyāya-praveśakavṛtti*. In these restored original aphorisms there is nothing that can be interpreted in favour of the view that Kaṇāda

accepted the existence of *Īśvara*. After quoting the beginning of *Padārthadharmaśaṅgraha* Prof. E. Frauwallner writes : "It has always been noticed that these words echo the beginning of the *Sūtras* but it was seen as *Prasastapāda*'s dependence on the *Sūtras*. Now we would rather judge the relation the other way round."⁷ There is another *sūtra*, viz. '*sañjñākarma tv asmadvīṣiṣṭānām līṅgam*' (2.1.18) where the commentators wrongly find the implied reference to *Īśvara* (=God). They explain the term '*asmadvīṣiṣṭānām*' as meaning '*Maheśvarasya*'. According to *Upaskāra* the meaning of the *sūtra* is : 'Name and effect are the mark of the existence of *Īśvara* (=God).' He explains how naming is a mark of the existence of *Īśvara* as also how effect too is a mark of the existence of *Īśvara*. Earth etc. must have a creator, because they are effects like a pot etc. Thus according to *Upaskāra*, the *sūtra* adduces two logical reasons to prove the existence of God. While criticising the above interpretation presented by *Upaskāra*, Prof. S. N. Dasgupta writes : '*Upaskāra*'s interpretation seems to be far-fetched. He wants to twist it into an argument for the existence of God'.⁸ According to Dasgupta the meaning of the *sūtra* is : 'The existence of others different from us (*asmadvīṣiṣṭānām*) has to be admitted for accounting for the giving of names to things (*sañjñākarma*). Because we find that the giving of names is already in usage (and not invented by us)'.⁹ The *sūtra* has been explained by Candrānanda as meaning 'creation of nine names only by *Maheśvara* serves as a mark of the existence of nine substances only'.¹⁰ Prof. Dasgupta's above criticism applies to this interpretation also. As matter of fact, the term '*asmadvīṣiṣṭānām*' is to be understood in the sense of 'of those distinguished from us' or 'of those superior to us'. In *Prasastapādabhāṣya* at one place we find the term '*asmadvīṣiṣṭānām*' used as an adjective qualifying '*yoginām*'.¹¹ One important tenet upheld by the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers is that the initial motion of atoms is caused by *Īśvara* (God).¹² But Kaṇāda explicitly states that it is caused by *adrṣṭa* (a special quality generated in souls by their own actions).¹³ Another equally important tenet upheld by them is that God gives living beings the fruits of their merits and demerits in the shape of enjoyments and afflictions.¹⁴ But Kaṇāda recognises no intermediary between merits and demerits on the one hand and their fruits on the other. Still another important tenet upheld by them is that the author of the Vedas is *Īśvara* (God).¹⁵ But Kaṇāda says only this much that creation of the Vedas presupposes Intelligence, that is, the Vedas are created by an intelligent

person or persons.¹⁶ Prof. Dasgupta observes : 'It is probable that Kaṇāda believed that the Vedas were written by some persons superior to us (2.1.18, 6.1.1-2)'.¹⁷ It seems to us that Kaṇāda shares the view that the Vedas have been composed by Ṛṣis to whom *Dharma* was revealed (*sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇah*). Prof. Dasgupta rightly concludes : 'As there is no reference to *Īśvara* and as *adrṣṭa* proceeding out of the performance of actions in accordance with Vedic injunctions is made the cause of all atomic movements, we can very well assume that Vaiśeṣika was as atheist or non-theistic as the later Mīmāṃsā philosophers'.¹⁸

II

What does Gautama, the author of the Nyāyasūtra,¹⁹ mean by 'Īśvara' ?

'Gautama makes only a casual mention of God, and some have doubted whether the Nyāya was originally theistic.'²⁰

In Gautama's *Nyāyasūtras*, we find three aphorisms dealing with *Īśvara*. These three aphorisms²¹ explain the function of *Īśvara*, regarding actions and their fruits. First two aphorisms present the views of the opponents while the third one presents Gautama's own view. Let us take them one by one, translate and explain them fully, taking the words in their natural meaning and disregarding the interpretations of the commentators.

Īśvaraḥ kāraṇam puruṣakarmāphalyadarśanāt / (4.1.19)

'Because we see the actions of living beings, bearing no fruits, it is *Īśvara* that is to be regarded as the cause of fruits'.

The cause of fruits is not our actions, but *Īśvara*. There is no necessary cause-effect relation between actions and fruits. Fruits do not depend on actions performed by living beings, but they depend on the will of *Īśvara*. We should maintain this because we see that a human being does not attain fruits even though he performs respective actions. It is *Īśvara* only who puts us in different situations and circumstances, and gives us pleasures and pains, keeps us bound or makes us free. These are not the fruits of our actions, but they are results of *Īśvara*'s will. Our actions have nothing to do with fruits we experience. The theory of Moral Causation (*Karma siddhānta*) is wrong and unfounded. *Baliyāsī kevalam īśvarecchā*.

Na, puruṣakarmābhāve phalāniṣpatteḥ / (4.1.20)

‘No, (*Īśvara* is not the cause of fruits), because if a living being does not perform actions, it cannot attain fruits.’

The principle enunciated in the preceding aphorism is wrong, because if the cause of fruits were not actions, but *Īśvara*, then we should attain fruits without performing actions. We never reach the destination, if we do not walk. We are not cured of the disease if we do not take medicine. So fruits depend on actions and not on *Īśvara*. There is no need of *Īśvara*. Actions done, fruits attained. If a seed of a banyan tree comes in contact of the soil, water, etc., it will definitely grow into a banyan tree; no agent is required. Depending on the cause, the effect comes into being. If a person takes deadly poison, he will certainly die, no agent is required to exert poison to do its work. If one performs an action, he will definitely attain its fruit. Where is the necessity for positing an agent *Īśvara* ?

Tatkāritatvād ahetuḥ / (4.2.21)

‘Because *Īśvara* exhorts one to perform actions and attain their fruits, both the views enunciated in the preceding two aphorisms do not have the support of a logical reason.’

This aphorism presents Gautama’s own view. It is as follows : The two views which we have explained are wrong. One neglects and rejects the necessary relation obtaining between actions and fruits, another neglects and rejects *Īśvara*. As a matter of fact, there does obtain a necessary relation between actions and fruits. If one performs an action, that action does give him its fruit. It is true that for fruition, action does not require *Īśvara*. But one should know as to which action be performed to attain a desired fruit. A person desirous of a particular fruit should have the knowledge as to which action entails which fruit. It is true that deadly poison causes death. But one who wants to commit suicide by taking poison should have knowledge that a particular substance is highly poisonous. If he does not possess that knowledge, and as a result takes any substance, he will not die. A particular medicine is very effective on a particular disease. If with this knowledge a patient takes that medicine, it will cure him of the disease, and it will not require any doctor to exert it to work. The doctor is required only to impart knowledge to the patient as to which medicine he should take for the cure of the disease he is suffering from. The patient earnestly desires to get rid of the disease. But for that, what action is proper, that is, which medicine is to be taken, he does not know. That knowledge is

imparted to him by the doctor. Hence to attain a desired fruit, one should have the knowledge as to which action is proper for that desired fruit. Regarding worldly matters, this knowledge is imparted by the experts of the various subjects. But to become free from internal adventitious impurities, viz. attachment, aversion, etc., one should seek the knowledge as to what actions are to be performed at what stages, from the person who himself has become free from these impurities through spiritual discipline and attained inherent perfection, i.e. *Īśvara*, also called *jīvanmukta*. There is a necessary relation between certain actions and their fruit viz. *mukṭi* (freedom from impurities, liberation), but to know this necessary relation we require *Īśvara* i.e. *jīvanmukta*. Thus the only function of *Īśvara* is to impart knowledge of this necessary relation obtaining between concerned actions and their fruit, viz. *mukṭi*. Thus *Īśvara* is a preacher (*upadeṣṭā*), a guide to show the path of liberation. It is in this sense only that *Īśvara* is regarded *karmakārayitā* (causing one to perform actions). He never forcibly causes one to perform actions. A doctor simply shows the proper medicines, even then we say that the doctor cured us of the disease. Similarly, *Īśvara* too simply shows the remedy (i.e. proper action) to get rid of the impurities, viz. attachment, aversion etc, yet we say that *Īśvara* makes us free from impurities, he gives us fruits, he favours us with his grace. In this sense only, *Īśvara* is *phalakārayitā*. In the context, the desired fruit is *mokṣa* (freedom from impurities). Knowledge of what actions are proper for *mokṣa* is imparted by *Īśvara* to those desirous of *mokṣa* (*mumukṣu*). By doing so, *Īśvara* makes the *sādhānā* of *mumukṣu* fruitful. This is his grace. If he were not to impart this knowledge to *mumukṣu*, the *mumukṣu* will not be able to attain the desired fruit, viz. *mokṣa*.

There is a necessary relation between actions and fruits. One desirous of a particular fruit should know the necessary relation obtaining between that fruit and the proper action. If he performs an action, with that knowledge, he will definitely attain the desired fruit. As for instance, there is a necessary cause-effect relation between smoke and fire. But so long as one does not know this necessary relation, one is not able to infer fire from smoke. Only after acquiring the knowledge of the necessary relation obtaining between smoke and fire, he can infer fire from smoke. Similarly, to attain the desired fruit, viz. *mokṣa*, it is absolutely necessary to acquire the knowledge of the necessary relation obtaining between the desired fruit, viz. *mokṣa* and the proper actions. This knowledge is imparted to living beings by *Īśvara*.

In the systems of Indian philosophy, the ultimate desired fruit is *mokṣa* (freedom from impurities, viz. attachment, aversion, etc.). To attain *mokṣa*, the knowledge as to what actions one should perform at what stage is absolutely necessary; this knowledge is imparted by *jīvanmukta* alone.²² Thus from the explanation of these three aphorisms it naturally follows that according to Gautama *jīvanmukta* himself is *Īśvara*.

In the light of the above explanation, the meaning of the oftquoted following verse becomes very clear :

Īśvaraprērito gacchet svargam vā śvabhram eva vā |

Ajñō jantur anīśo 'yam ātmanah sukha-duḥkhaḥ ||

Mahābhārata, Vānaparva

Translation : Impelled by *Īśvara*, a soul moves to heaven or to hell. No ignorant living being is the master of its pleasure or pain.

The verse is generally quoted in support of the view that God's will is supreme and all-powerful, our pleasure and pain depend on His will and not on our actions or efforts. But this is not the true import of the verse. The true import of the verse is as follows :

The adjective '*ajñā*' (=ignorant) qualifying '*jantu*' (=a living being) is very important as it provides us a key to the true import of the verse.

Pleasure and pain are fruits of actions performed by a living being. If one wants to attain pleasure, one should know the actions that cause pleasure. If one wants to attain (rather to avoid) pain one should know actions that cause pain. But a living being by itself does not possess the knowledge as to which actions lead to pleasure and which actions lead to pain. Therefore, it is believed that a living being by itself is incapable of attaining pleasure or pain, that is, it by itself is not the master of its pleasure or pain. It is *Īśvara* who imparts this knowledge to it. *Īśvara* preaches that these actions entail pleasure and these actions entail pain. This knowledge urges a living being to perform those actions that cause pleasure if it desires pleasure, or this knowledge urges it to perform those actions that cause pain if it desires pain. It is only by imparting this knowledge that *Īśvara* impels a living being to move to heaven or to hell. Heaven signifies pleasure and hell signifies pain.

III

Nature of *Īśvara* according to Vātsyāyana, the author of the *Bhāṣya*²³ on the *Nyāyasūtra* .

As we have seen, Gautama accepted *Īśvara* as one who imparts

knowledge of the necessary relation obtaining between actions and fruits. Vātsyāyanā clearly describes the nature of *Īśvara* (4.1.21). It is as follows :

- (a) *guṇaviśiṣṭam ātmāntaram Īśvaraḥ | tasyātmakalpāt kalpāntarānupapattiḥ | adharmamithyājñāna-pramādahānyā dharma-jñāna-samādhisampadā ca viśiṣṭam ātmāntaram Īśvaraḥ | tasya ca dharma-samādhiphalam aṇimādyasṭavidham aiśvaryam /*

Explanation : *Īśvara* is a soul. He is not an independent substance different from soul-substance. *Īśvara* is like mundane souls. He possesses those very qualities which mundane souls possess, but his qualities have some speciality. In a mundane soul the qualities have become perverse and impure while in *Īśvara* they are found in their pure, pristine state, that is, *Īśvara* has destroyed impurities that perverted these qualities. Let us see how Vātsyāyana puts this. Mundane souls possess wrong cognition/conviction (*mithyājñāna*), vicious activity (*adharma*) and lethargy (*pramāda*), while *Īśvara* has destroyed them. Because he has destroyed them, he comes to possess knowledge/pure cognition (*jñāna*), pure righteous activity (*dharma*) and pure concentration (*samādhi*). Again, he has gained eightfold miraculous powers as a result of his righteous activity and pure concentration. Mundane souls do not possess all these miraculous powers. Thus Vātsyāyana has clearly pointed out as to in what way *Īśvara* is different from mundane souls like us. But he has not stated the difference of *Īśvara* from the liberated souls because it is quite obvious. Liberated souls are devoid of all the nine specific qualities (*viśeṣaguṇas*) of soul-substance, viz *buddhi* (cognition), *sukha* (pleasure), *duḥkha* (pain), *icchā* (will), *dveṣa* (aversion), *prayatna* (volition), *dharma* (merit), *adharma* (demerit), *saṁskāra* (impression), that is, they do not possess even pure cognition, pure activity, pure Concentration and miraculous powers, whereas *Īśvara* does possess pure cognition, pure activity, pure Concentration and miraculous powers.

Thus, according to Vātsyāyana, *Īśvara* is that soul which having destroyed wrong cognition/conviction, vicious activity and lethargy has gained pure cognition, pure activity and pure Concentration. From this it naturally follows that *Īśvara* is not *nitya mukta* i.e. free and liberated for ever in all the three divisions of time - past, present and future. This rightly suggests the possibility of a mundane soul becoming *Īśvara* as also the possibility of there being many *Īśvaras*. From this we can safely deduce that *Īśvara* as described by Vātsyāyana is none but *jīvanmukta*.

In connection with this passage from the text of Vātsyāyana-Bhāṣya, Prof. Ingalls observes '...one will grant that Vātsyāyana's remarks are confusing. God has won his divinity through good works he has performed. We must therefore suppose that there was a time when he was not God'.²⁴ The description of *Īśvara* by Vātsyāyana is regarded by Prof. Ingalls as confusing because it is not in harmony with other aspects of *Īśvara*, as presented by later commentators in their explanation of the following (b) (c) (d) and (e) passages from the text of the Bhāṣya, but as we shall see in due course, the interpretation of the commentators is twisted in the light of the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika idea of *Īśvara* (God).

(b) *saṅkalpānuvidhāyī cāsyā dharmāḥ pratyātmavṛttīn dharmādharmasāñcayān pṛthivyādīni ca bhūtāni pravartayati/evam ca svakṛtābhyāgamasyālopena nirmāṇaprākāmyam īśvarasya svakṛtakarmaphalaṃ veditavyam* |

Explanation : Commentators read in this passage later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika idea of *Īśvara* (God). That is why they interpret the term '*prati*' in the compound '*pratyātmavṛttīn*' as '*pratyeka*' (=each one) as also the term '*nirmāṇaprākāmyam*' as '*jagannirmāṇaprākāmyam*' (unfailing will to create the world). So, according to them, the explanation of the passage is as follows :

The creation starts as soon as he wills to create the world. When he wills to create the world, his merit following his will causes the accumulated merits and demerits in each soul to start giving their fruits as also causes the physical elements (atoms) to integrate and produce effects. His will to create the world is unfailing. This unfailing will of his is the fruit of his past good action.

Prof. Ingalls also accepts this interpretation and hence explains the passage in the following words : 'God acts upon the *karmic* accumulation of each of us as well as upon the gross elements of the universe. Accordingly, his omnipotence is limited by the fact that each of us must receive the results of our former actions. Furthermore, this omnipotence [if one should really grant it such a title] is the result of the *karma* (that is, works) which God himself has accumulated. Finally it is said that all God's wishes are fulfilled...'²⁵

But Prof. Ingalls is puzzled as to how *Īśvara* who causes the accumulated *karmas* in each living being to give their fruits as also creates the world, himself be bound by the Law of *Karma*, and his unfailing will to create the world, itself be the fruit of his past good

action. That is why he finds Vātsyāyana's remarks confusing. He is at sea because he cannot understand how God be regarded as winning his divinity through the good works he performed in the past. This confusion is the result of the wrong interpretation of the abovementioned terms. It will be cleared off if we interpret these terms as follows :

Here the term 'parti' is employed in the sense of 'ābhimukhya' or 'sannikṛṣṭa', as in 'pratyakṣa'²⁶. So 'pratyātmavṛttin' is equivalent to 'ātmāsannikṛṣṭān.' The meaning of the compound 'pratyātmavṛttin' is 'atmānaṁ prati ābhimukhyena samavāyasambandhena yeṣāṁ vṛttiḥ te, tān pratyātmavṛttin.' Thus we explain 'pratyātmavṛttin dharmādharmasāñcayān' as 'accumulations of merits and demerits residing in his soul by samavāya relation.' The term 'nirmāṇa-prākāmyam' is to be regarded as equivalent to 'nirmāṇakāya-prākāmyam' meaning 'unfailing will to create nirmāṇakāya - yogic bodies.'

Thus in this passage two ideas which have reference to jīvanmukta are presented. They are :

(1) A jīvanmukta causes all his accumulated karmas to give their fruits in the present birth which is his last birth. It is maintained that he should experience all the fruits of all his accumulated karmas in his last birth. Vātsyāyana accepts the existence of a jīvanmukta. He says : 'bahiś ca viviktacitto viharanmukta ity ucyate /' (4.2.2.). He accepts that a jīvanmukta should experience all the fruits of all his accumulated past karmas. Study his words : 'sarvāṇi pūrvakarmāṇi hy ante janmani vipacyanta' iti / (4-1-64).

(2) To experience all the fruits of all his accumulated karmas within a short period of time he is required to construct yogic bodies. Vātsyāyana accepts this view. He says : 'yogī khalu ṛddhau prādurbhūtāyām vikaraṇadharmā nirmāya sendriyāṇi śarīrāntarāṇi teṣu yugapad jñeyāny upalabhate/' (3.2.19) Also study Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's words : 'yogī hi yogarddhisiddhyā vihitanikhilaniyadharmaadharmakarmā nirmāya tadupabhogayogyāni teṣu teṣūpapattisthāneṣu tāni tāni sendriyāṇi śarīrāṇi khaṇḍāntaḥkaraṇāni ca muktair ātmabhir upekṣitāni gṛhītvā sakalakarmaphalam anubhavati prāptaiśvarya itīttam upabhogena karmaṇāṁ kṣayaḥ/ (Nyāyamañjarī, Kashi Sanskrit Series, Vol. II, p. 88)

Now we present our explanation of the passage. It is as follows : There inherently resides in him a special merit (dharma). He has acquired this merit through good action performed in the past. This merit has twofold fruit - 1) it causes all the accumulated merits and demerits inherently

residing in his own soul to give their fruits and also 2) causes the physical elements to construct yogic bodies. But when does it give its twofold fruit ? It gives its twofold fruit when he wills to experience all the fruits of all his accumulated merits and demerits and for that purpose also wills to construct yogic bodies. That is why it is said to follow his will. Thus his will to construct yogic bodies is unfailing, and this unfailing will of his is the fruit of some special good action he performed in the past. His unfailing will to construct yogic bodies should be regarded as the fruit of his past action because it is a rule that whatever *karma* one performs is never destroyed so long as he does not experience its fruit.

(c) *āptakalpaś cāyam / yathā pitā apatyānām tathā pītṛbhūta īśvaro bhūtānām /*

Explanation : *Īśvara* is a reliable person (*āpta*). One can trust him, put faith in him, consider him to be an authority. Just as father is an authority for his son, similarly *Īśvara* is an authority for all living beings. Father guides his son. *Īśvara* guides all living beings. Father advises his son as to what is good for him and how to attain it. Similarly, *Īśvara* preaches all living beings as to what is the highest Good (Liberation) and how to attain it. Vātsyāyana intends to show similarity obtaining between father-son-relation and *Īśvara-jīva*-relation with regard to *āptatā* only. This analogy should not be stretched further. As for instance, just as father generates son, similarly *Īśvara* generates *jīvas*, or just as son is an *aṁśa* of his father, similarly *jīva* is an *aṁśa* of *Īśvara*. This is not intended by Vātsyāyana. According to him, *Īśvara* is such a person as one can easily and safely rely on him, especially in matters relating to the path leading to the highest Good. But how has *Īśvara* gained this *āptatā* ? He has gained it by destroying *adharma*, *mithyājñāna* and *pramāda* and thereby attaining *dharma*, *jñāna* and *samādhi*.

Again this proves that *Īśvara* is a *jīvanmukta* who is an *upadeṣṭā par excellence*.

Prof. Ingalls does not understand the intention of Vātsyāyana. Hence he misses the point and criticises Vātsyāyana's this statement. His criticism is as follows : 'Again God is said to act like a father. But who ever heard of a father who in dealing with his children could not transcend their merits and demerits.'²⁶ Prof. Ingalls seems to be obsessed with the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika idea of God who gives to a living being a proper fruit of its past action, who does not transgress the deserts of living beings.

- (d) *na cātmakalpād anyah kalpaḥ sambhavati/na tāvad asya buddhim vinā kaścid. dharmo līṅgabhūtaḥ śakya upapādayitum/āgamāc ca draṣṭā boddhā sarvajñātā īśvara iti / buddhyādibhiś cātmalīṅgair nirupākhyam īśvaram pratyakṣānumānāgamaviśayātītam kaḥ śakta upapādayitum ?*

Explanation : *Īśvara* is *ātman* (soul) only. He is not an independent substance different from *ātman* because he does not possess any such quality other than *buddhi* (intellect, knowledge) as could prove him an independent substance other than soul-substance. *Īśvara* possesses *buddhi* and *buddhi* is a special quality (*viśeṣaguṇa*) of *ātman*. In scriptures too, *buddhi* has been given as a quality of *Īśvara*. Scriptures describe him as *draṣṭā* (seer), *boddhā* (knower) and *sarvajñātā* (omniscient). Thus even scriptures have not mentioned any such quality as could prove him an independent substance. If he were devoid of *buddhi*, etc. which serve as logical reason to prove soul, he will become unreal, non-existent, beyond the ken of perception, inference and scriptural testimony; as a result, who will be able to prove him ?

Here Vātsyāyana has accepted *Īśvara* as *sarvajña*. So the question arises as to whether he regards *jīvanmukta* as *sarvajña*.

The person who knows all substances with all their states - past, present and future, is *sarvajña*. By '*sarvajña*', generally what we mean is this. We cannot definitely say as to whether Vātsyāyana has in mind this meaning of '*sarvajña*' in this context. This much is certain that the meaning of the term '*sarvajña*' is different in different contexts in Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya*. 'Sense-organs grasp their specific respective objects only, that is, eyes grasp *rūpa*, tongue grasps *rasa*, so on and so forth. On the other hand, *ātman* is *sarvajña*, that is, it grasps all the five objects, viz. *rūpa*, *rasa*, *gandha*, *sparsa* and *śabda*. This is the reason why *ātman* is different from sense-organs.' This has been said by Vātsyāyana at one place.²⁸ Here the context is that of fruits and actions. Hence in this context the '*sarvajña*' may mean 'a person who knows the necessary relation obtaining between all *karmas* and their respective fruits' and in this sense a *jīvanmukta* is definitely *sarvajña*. It may be noted that the meaning of the term '*sarvajña*' as 'a person knowing all substances with all their states - past, present and future' is contradictory to *Karma* theory which implies freedom of will.

- (e) *svakṛtābhyāgamalopena ca pravartamānasya yad uktam pratiṣedhajātam akarmanimitte śarīrasarge tatsarvam prasajyate iti/*

Explanation : If we do not maintain that a person who constructs yogic bodies is able to do so on account of some good action performed by him in the past, then it means that past actions are without fruits, that is, no past action is the cause of the creation of yogic bodies. And if we accept that no past action is the cause of the creation of yogic bodies, then all those very defects that vitiate the view that no past action is the cause of the creation of an ordinary body will also vitiate the view that no past action is the cause of the creation of yogic bodies.

Thus according to Vātsyāyana, *Īśvara* is none but *jīvanmukta* who has gained *dharma*, *jñāna* and *samādhi* by destroying *adharma*, *mithyājñāna* and *pramāda*, who clearly knows as to which action entails which fruit, who himself has travelled the entire path leading to liberation and hence has direct knowledge of the path, who is an authority in matters relating to the path, who is an *upadeṣṭā par excellence*, who has risen above the cycle of birth and death, who is not to be born again, who by his unfailing will constructs yogic bodies in order to experience all the fruits of all his accumulated *karmas* and who by his unfailing will causes his accumulated *karmas* to give their fruits.

IV

²⁹Praśastapāda's introduction of God (Maheśvara) into the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school

In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school the idea of *Īśvara* as *nityamukta* and creator of the world is for the first time found in Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*. He uses the term '*maheśvara*' for *Īśvara*. There arises a desire in *Maheśvara* to create worlds so that mundane souls may experience fruits of their past actions. As a result of his desire, the *adṛṣṭas* (i.e. merits and demerits) of all mundane souls become prone to give their respective fruits and come in contact with air-atoms. Due to the contact of *adṛṣṭa* with air-atoms, there arises in air-atoms motion capable of producing effects. By such motion air-atoms come in contact with one another and *dvyāṇukas* are formed and then *tryaṇukas* are formed and thus *vāyumahābhūta* originates. In this very manner, *ap-mahābhūta*, *tejas-mahābhūta* and then *pṛthivimahābhūta* originate. After the origination of these four *mahābhūtas*, by the mere will of *Maheśvara* a Great Egg is created out of the *tejas* atoms associated with *pārthiva* atoms. Then *Maheśvara* creates *Brahmā*, the Great Grand Father of all living beings, along with all the worlds and allots him the task of creating *prajā*

(living beings of various classes). *Brahmā* possesses *jñāna* (knowledge), *vairāgya* (non-attachment) and *aiśvarya* (miraculous powers). Having known the fruits of the actions performed by each and every soul in the past, he creates *prajāpatis*, *manus*, *devarṣis*, *pitṛs*, *Brahmins*, *Kṣatriyas*, *Vaiśyas*, *Sūdras* and all other living beings - all possessing *jñāna*, *bhoga* and *āyus* according to their past *karmas*. Having created them, *Brahmā* joins them with *dharma*, *jñāna*, *vairāgya* and *aiśvarya* according to their past *karmas*³⁰. When there arrives the time for absolution (*mokṣa*) of *Brahmā*, *Maheśvara* desires to destroy the worlds in order that living beings tired of the transmigratory journey may take rest. As soon as he desires to destroy the worlds, all the effects gradually in due order disintegrate into ultimate atoms. Thus *pralaya* (Dissolution) takes place. In *pralaya* there exist disintegrated and discrete atoms as also souls associated with merit, demerit and past impressions.³¹

Thus according to *Ṛaṣastapāda*, Creation and Dissolution take place according to the will of *Maheśvara*. *Maheśvara*'s will is not the direct cause of the initial effect-producing motion generated in atoms. His will simply causes *adrṣtas* to give their fruits, and it is these *adrṣtas* - when come in contact with atoms - that generate such motion. Again, *Maheśvara* having created all the worlds and *Brahmā*, appoints *Brahmā* to create living beings of all classes, to give them fruits according to their past *karmas*, thus to govern them and to dispense justice according to their desert.

By his will *Maheśvara* creates four *Mahābhūtas*, the *bhuvanas* (worlds or dwelling-places) for the living beings to dwell in and *Brahmā*. *Brahmā* creates all the living beings of all the classes and it is *Brahmā* only who allots *jñāna*, *dharma*, *vairāgya*, *aiśvarya*, *bhoga* and *āyus* to these living beings according to their past *karmas*. That is why *Brahmā* is called *sarvalokapitāmaha*. After a definite period of time *Brahmā* attains *mokṣa*. Thus *Brahmā* is different with different Creation (*sarga*), while *Maheśvara* is one and *nitya* and hence common to all the Creations. *Maheśvara* possesses will only, while *Brahmā* possesses knowledge (of the necessary relation obtaining between actions and their respective fruits), non-attachment and miraculous powers. *Maheśvara* does nothing during the long existence of Creation. *Brahmā* governs the creation so long as it exists. In *pralaya* (Dissolution), the activity of giving fruits to living beings according to their past *karmas* stops. Hence there is no need of *Brahmā* in *pralaya*. Neither *Brahmā* nor *Maheśvara* is described as *upadeṣṭā* or as *Vedaḥ kartā*.

Later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers having removed *Brahmā*, allot *Brahmā*'s task also to *Īśvara* (God). Again, they maintain that it is *Īśvara* (God) only who gives fruits to living beings in accordance with their past *karmas*. Moreover, in later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works it is established that *Īśvara* (God) possesses will and knowledge both.

From the above discussion we conclude that upto *Praśastapāda*, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school was atheist and the term '*Īśvara*' was used in the sense of *jīvanmukta* only and not in the sense of God. It is *Praśastapāda* who for the first time introduced the concept of God into the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. There are scholars who agree with us on this point.³² Perhaps to distinguish God from *īśvara* (= *jīvanmukta*) of the early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, *Praśastapāda* employed the term '*maheśvara*' for God, that is, for him *jīvanmuktas* are *īśvaras* while God is *Maheśvara*.

Notes

1. 'We possess the old aphorisms of the school : The *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* of Kaṇāda. Their text or wording is not testified by any old commentary. Numerous quotations in the older philosophical literature testify to a good old kernel. But much old is lost and is also variously changed, new things have also been interpolated.' *History of Indian Philosophy*, Erich Frauwallner, Delhi, 1984, Part II, p. 4.

The kernel seems to belong to c. 300 B.C., while much of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* as we have them seems to belong to c. 300 A.D. Generally scholars agree that the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* are older than the *Nyāyasūtras*.

2. 'There are no references to it (=idea of God) in the *Sūtra* of Kaṇāda, though commentators profess to find them there.' *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, M. Hiriyanna, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1951, p. 242.
3. आचार्येण तु नोक्तं तस्मात् सूत्रकारमते नास्ति ईश्वरः । *Yuktidīpikā*, kā. 5
4. *Philosophy of Ancient India*, p.23.
5. *Upaskāra*, 1.1.3. *Upaskāra* is a commentary on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*, written by Śaṅkara Miśra (1425 A.D.)

तदिति हिण्यगर्भपरामर्शः । हिण्यं रेतोऽस्येति कृत्वा भगवान् महेश्वर एवोच्यते । *Candrānandavṛtti*, 1.1.3.

6. *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, S.N. Dasgupta, Cambridge, 1957, p. 282, fn. 3
7. *Erich Frauwallner's Posthumous Essays*, translated from German by Jayandra Soni, Pub. Aditya Prakashan, New Delhi, 1994, pp. 37-40
8. *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol I, S.N. Dasgupta, p. 288, fn. 1
9. *Ibid*, p. 287-288.
10. अस्मदादीनां सकाशाद् यो भगवान् विज्ञानादिभिर्विशिष्टो महेश्वरस्तदीयं संज्ञाप्रणयनं नवानामेव द्रव्याणां भावे लिङ्गम्, दशमस्य संज्ञाऽनभिधानात् । *Candranandavrtti*, Edited by Muni Shri Jambuvijayaji, Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1961
11. 'अस्मद्विशिष्टानां योगिनां' *Prasastapādashāya*, Sampurnananda Viśva-vidyalaya, Vārānāsi, 1977, p. 464
12. परमाण्वादयो हि चेतनाऽऽयोजिताः प्रवर्तन्ते, अचेतनत्वात्, वास्यादिवत् । *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, 5.4
13. ...अणूनां मनसश्चाद्यं कर्मादृष्टकारितम् । V.S., 5.2.13
14. स हि सर्वप्राणिनां कर्मानुरूपं फलं प्रयच्छन् कथमनीश्वरः स्यादिति भावः । *Kandalī*, Ganganath Jha Granthamālā 1, Vārānaseya Sanskrit Mahāvidyālaya, p. 133
15. वेदस्य पुरुषः कर्ता...त्रैलोक्यनिर्माणनिपुणः परमेश्वरः । *Nyāyamañjarī*, Vol. I, Kāshi Sanskrit Series p. 175
16. बुद्धिपूर्वा वाक्यकृतिर्वेदे । V.S, 6.1.1
17. *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, Dasgupta, p. 234
18. *Ibid*, p. 234

"The *Sūtras* (= *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*) do not as yet recognise the concept of God, nor even Candramati's *Daśapadārthaśāstram*. And in his *Nyāya-vārtikam* Uddyotakara still deals with the *Vaiśeṣika* polemic against *Īśvara*...That it was still known at that time that this was a later interpolation into the old system, is evident from the polemic in the commentary to the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* called *Yuktidīpikā*, which belongs more or less to the same period. After showing in detail that the author of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* does not recognise *Īśvara*, the author concludes with the words : *evam kāṇādānām Īśvaro 'stīti pāśupatopajñam etat*. According to him, then, the doctrine of the supreme God was introduced into the system by Śiva devotees." *Erich Frauwallner's Posthumous Essays*, p. 36

19. The *Nyāyasūtras* have different strata, the oldest belonging to c. 300 B.C. and the latest belonging to c. 400 A.D. Much of the *Nyāyasūtras* as we have them today belongs to c. 400 A.D.
20. *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, M. Hiriyanna, p. 242.
21. These three *Nyāyasūtras* and the commentaries on them were critically examined by Dr. Hermann Jacobi in his *Die Entwicklung der Gottesdee bei den Indern*, Bonn u. Leipzig 1923.
22. जीवन्मुक्तस्यैव उपदेष्टृत्वसम्भवात् । *Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya*, 3.79.
23. 'This commentary presumably belongs to the first half of the fifth century.' *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, Erich Frauwallner, p. 8.
24. 'Human Effort versus God's Effort in the Early Nyāya (N.S. 4.1.19-21)' by Prof. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, *Dr. S. K. Belvalkar Felicitation Volume*, Motilal Banarasidas, Varanasi, 1957, p. 232
25. *Ibid*, p. 231
26. 'प्रति' ग्रहणेन चेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षसूचनात्...। *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī*, Kā. 5 प्रतिराभिमुख्येन वर्तते...। *Nyāyamañjarī*, Vol I, p. 103
27. Prof. Ingalls' paper in *Dr. S. K. Belvalkar Felicitation Volume*, p. 232
28. यस्मात् तु व्यवस्थितविषयाणीन्द्रियाणि तस्मात् तेभ्योऽन्यश्चेतनः सर्वज्ञः सर्वविषयग्राही विषयव्यवस्थितिमतीतोऽनुमीयते । *Nyāyabhāṣya*, 3.1.3
29. '...and the final systematizer of the school, Praśastapāda or Praśastadeva, sporadically also named Praśastakāra, who lived about the second half of the sixth century.' *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, E. Frauwallner, p. 4.
30. ततः पुनः प्राणिनां भोगभूतये महेश्वरसिसृक्षानन्तरं सर्वात्मगतवृत्तिलब्धादृष्टापेक्षेभ्यस्तत्संयोगेभ्यः पवनपरमाणुषु कर्मोत्पत्तौ तेषां परस्परसंयोगेभ्यो द्व्यणुकादिप्रक्रमेण महान् वायुः समुत्पन्नो नभसि दोधयमानस्तिष्ठति ।...एवं समुत्पन्नेषु चतुर्षु महाभूतेषु महेश्वरस्याभिध्यानमात्रात् तैजसेभ्योऽणुभ्यः पार्थिवपरमाणुसहितेभ्यो महदण्डमारभ्यते । तस्मिंश्चतुर्वदनकमलं सर्वलोकपितामहं ब्रह्माणं सकलभुवनसहितमुत्पाद्य प्रजासर्गे विनियुङ्क्ते । स च महेश्वरेण विनियुङ्क्तो ब्रह्मा अतिशयज्ञानवैराग्यैश्वर्यसम्पन्नः प्राणिनां कर्मविपाकं विदित्वा कर्मानुरूपज्ञानभोगायुषः सुतान् प्रजापतीन्...सृष्ट्वा आशयानुरूपैर्धर्मज्ञानवैराग्यैश्वर्यैः संयोजयति इति । *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, p. 127-131

31.ब्रह्मणोऽपवर्गकाले संसारखिन्नानां सर्वप्राणिनां निशि विश्रामार्थं सकलभुवनपतेर्महेश्वरस्य सञ्जिहीर्षासमर्कालं...आपरमाण्वन्तो विनाशः ।...ततः प्रविभक्ताः परमाणवोऽवतिष्ठन्ते धर्माधर्मसंस्कारानुविद्धा आत्मानस्तावन्तमेव कालम् । *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, p. 122-126
32. Bhūmikā (Introduction) by Durgadhar Jha to *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, Ganganath Jha Granthamālā No. 1, Sampurnananda Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya, Varanasi, 1977, p. 4.
 “Just as Praśastapāda introduced Iśvara into the system...” *Erich Frauwallner's Posthumous Essays*, p. 40.

ON THE PROBLEM OF JÑĀNA-DARŚANA

We want to understand as to what the Jaina theoreticians mean by the terms *jñāna* and *darśana* when used side by side. To gain this understanding we should study at least four items - (1) Different meanings of the term '*darśana*', (2) Sāṅkhya-Yoga view of *jñāna-darśana*, (3) Buddhist view of *jñāna-darśana* and (4) Jaina authors on the problem of *jñāna-darśana*.

(1) Different Meanings of the Term '*Darśana*'

(a) *Darśana* means sensory experience which is free from thoughts or concepts (= *vikalparahita* = *ākāra-rahita*). It involves no synthesis of the earlier experiences with the present one. Cognition involving thoughts or concepts (= *savikalpaka* = *sākāra* = *jñāna*) follows this sensory experience. Thus here *jñāna* follows *darśana*.

(b) Immediately after the sensory experience if we stop the operations of the concerned sense-organ and try to see the object of sensory experience through mind we have a clear vision of it before our 'mind's eye'. This vision is regarded as *darśana* so long as it remains free from thoughts or concepts. But as soon as thought enters into it, it no longer remains *darśana* but becomes *jñāna* (cognition involving thought). Here too *jñāna* follows *darśana*.

(c) Vision that a yogī has in non-reflective (*nirvikalpa*) deep meditation is also regarded as *darśana*. This *darśana* is usually described as *sākṣātkāra*. This non-reflective deep meditation invariably follows the reflective one (*savikalpa dhyāna*), if it takes place. Vision that a yogī has in reflective meditation involves thoughts or concepts, hence it is to be regarded as *jñāna*. Here *darśana* follows *jñāna* because non-reflective meditation follows the reflective one.

(d) In Upaṇiṣads,¹ Jainism and Buddhism the term '*darśana*' is also employed in the sense of *śraddhā*. *Darśana* or *śraddhā* means an attitude of the truth-seeker. It is natural inclination of *citta* towards truth. It is manifested on the removal of adventitious defilement of attachment which acts as a great and prime obstruction to the attainment of truth. Thus *darśana* or *śraddhā* here means purity, clarity or transparency of

citta,² resulted from renouncing the attachment to metaphysical views, preconceived notions and inherited doctrines. For the truth-seeker this is the must because only such a clear *citta* can grasp the truth when confronted in the search. In this sense of clarity of *citta*, we may describe this *darśana* as *nirākāra*. It has no content. All the views, notions and doctrines, for the truth-seeker, fall in one category. They all are *sādhya* or *parīkṣya*, none of them is *siddhānta* (final truth).

Let us remember here that it is very difficult to free oneself from the views and doctrines among which one has been brought up and which one has indiscriminately accepted, not only accepted but have been made so deeply rooted in one's being that they have become a part and parcel of one's personality³. So, for truth-seeker the most difficult task is to free himself from them. After freeing himself from them he should examine them and accept them only if he finds them true.

Regarding the doctrines and views of others he should not accept them on authority. That is, he should neither accept them nor reject them. He may accept them provisionally to test and verify them. This is the reason why our Ācāryas appeal to us not to accept their statements on authority, they ask us to examine them and to accept them if they are found true and reject them if they are found false.⁴ This attitude that they demand from their hearers is nothing but *samyag-darśana*. Let me quote here the words of Āc. Haribhadra :

pakṣapāto na me vīre na dveṣaḥ kapilādiṣu ।

*yuktimadṛṣṭvā yasya tasya kāryaḥ parigrahaḥ ॥*⁵

In different words Śāntideva has said the same thing. He says :

*'yat kiñcin, Maitreya, subhāṣitam sarvaṃ tad Buddhabhāṣitam'*⁶

After reasoning and logical thinking if the truth-seeker finds the doctrine or view to be most probably true, his *darśana* (= *drṣṭi* = *śraddhā*) becomes *sākāra*. He is convinced of the truth, but does not see the truth. Mere reasoning and logic is not enough for seeing the truth of the doctrine. For that the truth-seeker should take recourse to meditation on that doctrine. When in meditation he sees the truth of the doctrine his *citta* becomes free from or clear of (*samprasāda*) whatever doubts it had regarding the truth of the doctrine.⁷ Thought (*vitaraka-vicāra*) retires. This clarity, as it is, is free from thought. In this sense we may describe it as *nirākāra*. Thus perfect *drṣṭi* is *nirākāra*, though it has full content (*pūrṇasatya*).

So long as truth-seeker has not seen the truth he has readiness-to-

accept-the-truth-when-confronted-in-the-search-for-truth (*samyagdr̥ṣṭi*), but as soon as he sees the truth directly in deep meditation at the end of his search his readiness-to-accept-the-truth-when-confronted takes leave off as it has fulfilled its mission. So, someone may opine that *samyak-darśana* in the sense of readiness-to-accept-the-truth-when-confronted-in-the-search-for-the-truth ultimately becomes merged in *darśana* in the sense of seeing the truth in deep meditation. Or, one may say that it in the sense of *saṃprasāda* (clarity due to removal of all doubts, resulted from seeing the truth) stays along with *darśana* (seeing the truth). On account of seeing the truth in meditation (*pūrṇasatyadarśana*) this clarity (*pūrṇasamyagdr̥ṣṭi*) is attained. Hence seeing-the-truth (*pūrṇasatyadarśana*) takes place first and clarity (*saṃprasāda* i.e. *pūrṇasamyagdr̥ṣṭi*) follows it. This seems to be the natural order in their connection.⁸ This is one view.

There is another one which is quite right as it stands. Let us see what this another view is. The attitude of the truth-seeker becomes perfect when it becomes completely free from attachment and aversion. It is *rāga* and *dveṣa* that come in the way of his disinterested, dispassionate and impartial search for the truth. Thinner or subtler his *rāga* and *dveṣa* become, more disinterested, dispassionate and impartial his search for truth becomes. Without attaining the perfection (=highest purity) of *dr̥ṣṭi* (attitude) he cannot fully see truth even in meditation. When he attains this perfection of *dr̥ṣṭi* he fully sees the truth or transcendental reality in-trance or meditation. Truth-seeker first becomes *vītarāga*. And as soon as he becomes *vītarāga* he fully sees the truth. A man cannot assume the role of a truth-seeker unless and until he decides to be disinterested, dispassionate, unattached and calm. He becomes truth-seeker only if he determines to be *vītarāga*. To attain the perfection of *dr̥ṣṭi* he strives for getting rid of attachment (*rāga*). Gradually he progresses. He achieves perfection of *dr̥ṣṭi* as soon as he completely destroys *rāga* and becomes *vītarāga*. This is the reason why perfect *dr̥ṣṭi* is equated with *vītarāgatā*. And *vītarāgatā* automatically gives rise to and co-exists with the seeing of the truth (*darśana*). According to this view, seeing-of-the-truth (*pūrṇadarśana*) follows the perfection of *dr̥ṣṭi* (*pūrṇadr̥ṣṭi*).⁹

We shall have no occasion to deal with this *darśana* as there is no difference of opinion regarding it among the Jaina thinkers as also among the thinkers of the Jaina, the Buddhist and the Sāṅkhya-Yoga philosophies. All consider this *darśana* to be the nature of *citta*

(*'tattvapakṣapāto hi dhiyām (= cittasya) svabhāvaḥ'* - *Yogavārtika* 1.8). It gets clouded by *kleśas* or *moha*. Hence Sāṅkhya-Yoga thinkers and Buddhists have recognised *kleśāvaraṇa*, and Jains have recognised *mohanīya karma*. All these three philosophies emphatically declare that *sādhana* is required for the destruction of this *āvaraṇa*, i.e., for the destruction of *moha*, the root-cause of all other *kleśas*. On the destruction of *moha*, knowing of the truth and seeing of the truth automatically follow.

(2) Sāṅkhya-Yoga View of Jñāna-Darśana

According to Sāṅkhya-Yoga *citta* gets transformed into the form of its object. This is called '*knowing by citta*', in other words, *cittavṛtti*. As soon as *cittavṛtti* (= *jñāna*) takes place it is reflected in the *puruṣa* (= Self). This is called '*seeing by puruṣa*'. *Puruṣa* directly sees *cittavṛttis* and only indirectly sees external objects.¹⁰ (Hence sometimes in the first sense *puruṣa* is called *sākṣī* and in the second sense he is called *draṣṭā*.)¹¹ *Puruṣa* is *draṣṭā* (seer), whereas *citta* is *jñātā* (knower). *Puruṣa* can see but can never know. *Citta* can know but can never see. Such a clear-cut dichotomy is found in this system. Though every cognition has both these aspects, viz. seeing and knowing, seeing is attributed to *puruṣa* alone and knowing is attributed to *citta* alone.¹² Knowing and seeing are always simultaneous because no *cittavṛtti* remains unseen, even for a moment, 'by *puruṣa*'.¹³ All the *cittavṛttis* are seen by *puruṣa* as soon as they arise. Though there is no chronological order, logical order is there. From the point of view of logical order, first a *cittavṛtti* (*jñāna*) takes place and then its *darśana* by *puruṣa*.

As we have already said, the object of seeing is, truly speaking, the *cittavṛtti* alone and not the external object. Hence with the complete cessation of all the *cittavṛttis*, achieved by a yogī in the *asamprajñāta-yoga*, the seeing also ceases, and *puruṣa* remains as seer without seeing, he never ceases to be a seer (*draṣṭā*). At this stage though he is *draṣṭā* he does not see because there is no object of his seeing.¹⁴ On the basis of the absence of seeing, we should not think that *puruṣa* ceases to be *draṣṭā* at this stage. The *puruṣa* of the yogī who has attained this stage is described as *svarūpamātrapratiṣṭha*, *kevala*, *mukta*,¹⁵ *darśanaśakti*,¹⁶ etc. From this exposition it follows that this yogī neither thinks nor speaks. He has subtle bodily activities only. (Compare this yogī with the *sayogī kevalī* in the third and fourth stages of *śukla-dhyāna*, of the Jains).

Vivekajñāna is the clear form of *puruṣa* (as distinct from *sattva*),

assumed by *citta*.¹⁷ Just as a *citta* assumes forms of the external objects, even so it assumes the form of *puruṣa* also.¹⁸ By assuming the form of an external object it does not become that external object; similarly, by assuming the form of *puruṣa* it does not become *puruṣa*. When does the *citta* assume the clear form of *puruṣa*? When a yogī stops all the *cittavṛttis* pertaining to external objects as also when he makes his *citta prasanna* (pure) by removing all the *cittamaḥas*, then only his *citta* assumes the perfect form of *puruṣa*.¹⁹ And *puruṣa* sees this perfect form of his assumed by this *citta*. This is called *puruṣadarśana*, *ātmasākṣātkāra*. This stage of yoga in which there is *vivekajñāna* and *puruṣa-darśana* is called *samprajñāta-yoga* because at this stage *citta* clearly knows the *puruṣa* and *puruṣa* clearly sees his own self through *cittavṛtti*. The yogī, in this stage, preaches the path of *mokṣa*.²⁰ From all this it follows that he has all the types of activities, viz. mental, vocal and bodily. (Compare this yogī with the *chadmastha vītarāga* of the Jainas). His *cittavṛtti* are *akliṣṭa* (pure).²¹ His *citta* knows external objects but all its knowledges (*cittavṛttis*) are permeated with *vivekajñāna* or *puruṣadarśana*. In this sense only we should understand the statement of the Bhāṣyakāra that there is a continuous flow of pure *vivekajñāna* in the case of the yogī whose *vivekajñāna* has become *aviplava* (firm and infallible).²²

The *citta* that attains *vivekajñāna* becomes capable of knowing all things with all their modes simultaneously, if it performs *saṃyama* (= *dhāraṇā-dhyāna-samādhi* all the three) on *kṣaṇas* and *kṣaṇakrama*.²³ That is, though *vivekī's citta* attains the capacity (= *labdhi, siddhi*) to know all, this capacity functions only if it performs a special type of *saṃyama*. In other words, two things are necessary for *citta* to become *sarvajña*: (1) *Vivekajñāna* which is regarded as the prime cause because it makes *citta* capable of knowing all. In this sense only *sarvajñatva* is described as *vivekajñāna*. (2) Special type of *saṃyama*. So, Vyāsa, the author of the *Yogabhāṣya*, is absolutely correct when he says that *vivekī* invariably becomes *kevalī* irrespective of his *citta* being actually possessed of the *aśvarya* of *sarvajñatā*.²⁴ For that *vivekī* who assumes the role of *upadeṣṭā* for *loka-kalyāṇa* it is necessary to utilize this capacity in order to generate faith (*viśvāsa*) in the hearers. For other *vivekīs* this is not necessary. (Compare the *vivekī* who has assumed the role of *upadeṣṭā* and hence utilizes the capacity to know all through the performance of *saṃyama* of special type, with the *tīrthaṅkara* of the Jainas). *Vivekī's citta* can know all, if it so desires, because it has attained its true nature of *ānanta* on account of the destruction of all veils as

also because the *jñeyas* are *alpa* as compared with *citta*'s (or *cittavṛtti*'s) *ānantya*.²⁵ When *citta* becomes free from all veils, it being *vibhu*²⁶ (*ananta*) becomes capable of getting transformed into the forms of all objects; and if it so desires, it actually gets transformed into the forms of all objects simultaneously, that is, it knows all (*sarvajñatā*) and hence the *puruṣa* sees all (*sarvadarśana*). Knowing-all (*sarvajñatā*) and seeing-all (*sarvadarśana*) have no chronological order but they do have logical order. From the point of view of logical order, knowing-all is prior to seeing-all. Again, knowing-all belongs to *citta*, while seeing-all belongs to *puruṣa*.

We have already said that *vivekajñāna* is the knowledge of *ātman* alone. In Sanskrit we may say : *kevalasya ātmanah jñānam = kevalajñānam - vivekajñānam*. And there arises *kevaladarśana* as soon as *kevalajñāna* takes place. *Kevalajñāna* and *kevaladarśana* arise first, and *sarvajñatā* and *sarvadarśana* follow them if at all they take place.

Once a person has attained *aviplava vivekajñāna* his *punarbhava* automatically ceases.²⁷ That is, even if he does not assume the role of *upadeṣṭā* and for that purpose does not become *sarvajñā-sarvadarśī* as also even if he does not enter into the *asamprajñāta-yoga*, he is bound to be *videhamukta* when his body falls in due course.²⁸ This is the reason why *vivekaśhyātī* alone is regarded as *hānopāya*.²⁹ Thus *sarvajñatā*, *sarvadarśana* and *asamprajñāta-yoga* are not absolutely necessary for the *vivekī* to attain the state of *videhamukta*. Those *vivekīs* alone who want to destroy the *prārabdha karmas* before their due time enter into *asamprajñāta-yoga*. *Yōga* system has recognised the efficacy of *asamprajñāta-yōga* to destroy the *prārabdha-karmas*.³⁰

(3) Buddhist View of Jñāna-Darśana

In the Buddhist Pāli Piṭakas the occurrence of the phrase '*jānāti passati*' is frequent. 'The knowing and seeing One' (*jānatā-passatā*)³¹ is a remarkable and characteristic description of the Buddha. He himself claims that he both knows and sees (*tam ahaṃ jānāmi passāmi ti*).³² And mostly Noble Truths and (Essence of) all things are given as the objects of his knowing and seeing.³³

This naturally suggests that in the case of the Buddha 'knowing' means 'grasping by reasoning and thought' especially in what is called *śavitarakasavicāradhyāna* (= reflective meditation), and 'seeing' means the clear vision (of truth) which he gets in the following *nirvītarka-nirvicāra dhyāna* (= non-reflective meditation) wherein, as its name

suggests, 'reasoning and thought' are set at rest (*upaśānta*).

The interpretation is corroborated by the statement of *Abhidharmamūṛta* (15.8) : *samādhirin bhāvayato jñāna-darśanalābhaḥ* (By the constant practice of meditation one attains *jñāna* (knowledge) and *darśana* (vision, seeing). Thus knowing and seeing referred to here belong to the yogic state. In Suttanipāṭa 229 we are told that he (Buddha) sees four noble Truths after having known them. Here it is suggested that knowing and seeing are not simultaneous but that first knowing occurs and then seeing follows. In the first *dhyāna* (meditation) the object is known with the help of reasoning and thought. And in the following non-reflective types of meditation the object is directly seen.

At the stage of sensory cognition, *caṅṣu* (eye) sees whereas mind knows (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* 1.42-43). In fact, sensory cognition had through five sense-organs can be called *darśana* (seeing). Bhadanta Ghoṣaka in his *Abhidharmamūṛta* says that five *indriya-vijñānas* (sensory cognitions) cannot discriminate or determine, whereas *manovijñāna* (mental cognition) can do this.³⁴ According to Sthaviras functions of *manovijñāna* are *santīraṇa* (investigating) and *voṭṭhapana* (determining). (*Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha* 3.9-12). From this it follows that five sensory cognitions which are necessarily devoid of thought are *darśana*, while cognition involving thought is *jñāna*.

Later on the Buddhist logicians regarded even the sensations had through not only visual sense-organ but all the sense-organs (including even mind as mind also was recognised as a sense-organ) as *darśana*. They argue that as these cognitions are free from 'reasoning and thought' (= *vikalpa*) they can legitimately be called *darśana*. Even these cognitions grasp directly the thing-in-itself without the help of 'reasoning and thought'. ('*darśanaṃ ca arthasākṣātkaraṇākhyam pratyakṣavyāpāraḥ*'-*Dharmottaratkā* 1.21. '*pratyakṣam kalpanāpōdham*'-*Pramāṇasamuccaya*). In addition to *darśana* had in non-reflective meditation, which exactly corresponds to *yogipratyakṣa* recognised by them, they accept *indriyajapratyakṣa* (= *indriyajadarśana*),³⁵ *mānasa pratyakṣa* (= *manodarśana*) and *svasaṃvedanadarśana*.³⁶

What is *svasaṃvedana*? *Svasaṃvedana* here means *darśana* of 'sva', and by 'sva' are meant 'citta and caittas'. We reserve the discussion on *svasaṃvedana* for the concluding portion of this section on Buddhism.

Buddhist logicians are right in bringing under the head of *darśana* *indriyajapratyakṣa*, *mānasa pratyakṣa*, *svasaṃvedana* and *yogipratyakṣa*

on the ground of their being free from *vikalpa* (= reasoning and thought). But if we view them from another angle we find that only *svasaṃvedana* and *yogipratyakṣa* can truly claim to be *darśana* because therein 'seeing' of the object takes place without the help of sense-organs and/or mind. This is not the case with other two *pratyakṣas*. If we view the situation in this way the early Buddhists seem to be absolutely right in their stand that there is only one case of 'seeing' (*darśana*), and that is 'seeing' in non-reflective meditation which follows the reflective one. Objects of *darśana* mentioned in the Piṭakas betray the correctness of this view. Again, the order of *jñāna* and *darśana*, mentioned in the phrase '*jānāti passati*' clearly suggests the same thing, that is, that *yogidarśana* is the only case of '*darśana*'. (We have kept *svasaṃvedana* out of the purview as it requires special treatment).

Now let us take up the problem of knowing-all (*sarvajñatā*) and seeing-all (*sarvadarśana*). Let us first study Buddha's two statements recorded in the *MajjhimaNikāya*. They are : (1) *natthi so samaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā yo sakideva sabbaṃ ñassati sabbaṃ dakkhiti.....n'tan ṭhānaṃ vijjati*. (II. 127) (Tr. There is no *śramaṇa* or *brāhmaṇa* who knows all things simultaneously and sees all things simultaneously...for such a thing is impossible.) (2) *ye te.....evam āhaṃsu : samaṇo Gotamo evam āha : natthi so samaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā yo sabbaññū sabbadassāvī aparisesaṃ nānadassanaṃ paṭijānissati, n'etaṃ ṭhānaṃ vijjati ti na me te vuttavādinō abbhācikkhanti ca pana maṃ te asatā abhūtenā ti* (loc. cit.). (Tr. Those who say, "Śramaṇa Gotama says thus : there is no *śramaṇa* or *brāhmaṇa* who is all-knower, all-seer and having infinite knowledge and vision, for such a thing is impossible" are not reporting me rightly and are accusing me of saying what is untrue and false.)

From these two statements it becomes quite clear that Buddha explicitly rejects knowing-all-simultaneously and seeing-all-simultaneously, but he accepts knowing-all and seeing-all in some another sense. He has not clearly stated as to in what sense he accepts them. But it is not very difficult to deduce from these two statements the exact sense in which he accepts them. If we keep before our mind's eye these two statements, we at once see that there are only two alternative senses in which he might be accepting them-(1) knowing all in succession and seeing all in succession (2) knowing and seeing whatever one wants to know and see, entering into the proper type of meditation. The first alternative is to be rejected because all objects, being infinite,³⁷ cannot be known or seen in succession one by one. So, it naturally follows that

Buddha accepts knowing-all and seeing-all in the second sense, that is, in the sense of knowing and seeing whatever one desires to know and see by undertaking proper type of meditation. This means that through specific spiritual discipline one develops a capacity (*labdhi* or *siddhi*) to know-all and see-all. But he never knows all things simultaneously, nor does he ever see all things simultaneously. He knows and sees that thing only which he desires to know at a particular time, and that too only if he enters into proper meditation.

Like Patañjali and Vyāsa Buddha accepts that one can attain the capacity (*labdhi*) to know all and see all. But he differs from them in holding that the person who has attained this capacity can never know all things simultaneously, nor can he see all things simultaneously, but he can know and see whatever he wants to know and see at that particular time. As we have already noted, Patañjali and Vyāsa maintained that the person who has attained this capacity can actually know all things simultaneously and can actually see all things simultaneously. But there is one more point of agreement. According to Patañjali and Vyāsa, the person who has attained this capacity knows all things simultaneously and sees all things simultaneously not always but only if and when he performs a special type of *saṃyama* (= *dhāraṇā*, *dhyāna* and *saṃādhi* all the three). Even Buddha seems to maintain that the person who has attained this capacity can actually know and see whatever he wants to know and see at a particular time provided he performs proper meditations. Let us note one more point of agreement. All the three, viz. Patañjali, Vyāsa and Buddha reject the possibility of actually knowing all things successively and actually seeing all things successively.

This interpretation of ours is corroborated by the statements of later Buddhist authors. Nāgasena in his *Milindapañho* says : *bhante, buddho sabbaññū'ti || āma mahārāja, bhagavā sabbaññū, na ca bhagavato satataṃ samitaṃ nānadassanaṃ paccupaṭṭhitaṃ, āvajjanapaṭibaddhaṃ bhagavato sabbaññutaññaṃ, āvajjitvā yad icchitaṃ jānāti'ti* ¹⁸ Again, study the following statement of Śāntarakṣita : *yad yad icchati boddhum vā tat tad veti niyogataḥ | śaktir evaṃvidhā hy asya prahīṇāvaraṇo hy asau ||* (*Tattvasaṅgraha*, *kārikā* 3626).

Buddha and Buddhism do not put undue emphasis on and do not attach undue importance to knowing-all and seeing-all though they accept them in the above sense. They, in opposition to Mīmāṃsā, maintain that man is capable of knowing and seeing *dharma* - spiritual

matters. The Buddhists support their contention by the example of Buddha who knew and saw *dharma* as such in the form of four Noble Truths. Dharmakīrti does not deny the possibility of knowing-all and seeing-all in the sense in which they have been accepted by the Buddha. But he lays emphasis on the need for knowing and seeing the essentials. He little cares whither a person knows-sees or does not know-see the things which are not connected with the religious pursuit.³⁹ This attitude of Dharmakīrti is exactly identical with the one adopted by Vyāsa with regard to knowing-all and seeing-all. Vyāsa explicitly declares that one can become *kevalī* even without actually becoming all-knower and all-seer.

Now we take up the problem of simultaneity or succession of knowing (*jñāna*) and seeing (*darśana*). As we have already said, truly speaking *jñāna* means knowing by reasoning and thought in reflective meditation (*savitarkasavicāra samāpatti*) and *darśana* means seeing in non-reflective meditation (*nirvitarka-nirvicāra samāpatti*). Non-reflective meditation invariably follows the reflective one, if it takes place. So, it naturally follows from this that *darśana* (seeing) always follows *jñāna* (knowing). There is no possibility of their simultaneous occurrence, nor the possibility of their co-existence, nor the possibility of the reverse order, that is, *darśana* preceding *jñāna*.

But, as we know, Buddhist logicians*consider the six thought-free (*kalpanāpodha*) cognitions produced by six organs to be *darśanas* (cases of seeing). So, it is quite natural for them to maintain that if *jñāna* (thought and reasoning = knowing) arises it arises in their wake. But the logicians will not be satisfied with this general statement of the fact. They say that this is true if we have in view the origination of two series – one of seeing and another of knowing; the series of seeing arises first and the series of knowing follows it immediately. That is, in such a situation, in the first moment there takes place seeing only pertaining to that object-series and in the second moment there are both the seeing and knowing of that very object-series. Thus there is a possibility of simultaneous occurrence of both seeing and knowing from the second moment onward even with regard to one and the same object (= object-series). Again, seeing of one thing and knowing (= thought) of another thing can occur simultaneously. Moreover, when the knowing *i.e.* thought with regard to one thing is going on, there can take place seeing of another thing. From this point of view, one may say that even at this level knowing can precede seeing. Taking into account all these cases

the Buddhist logicians declared that knowing and seeing can occur simultaneously at this level.⁴⁰ They have not laid down any condition for their simultaneous occurrence. This suggests that two faculties of seeing and knowing, though quite different, rather being quite different, can operate simultaneously.

Moreover, these Buddhist logicians observe that two or more knowings (= thoughts) can never occur simultaneously,⁴¹ but two or more seeings (*darśana*) due to six organs can occur simultaneously.⁴² Thus they maintain that all the six *darśanas* due to six organs can occur simultaneously. Why so ? It is so because there are six instruments of seeing but only one instrument of knowing. When all the six instruments of seeing operate simultaneously six *darśanas* occur simultaneously. But mind (= *manas*) being the only instrument of knowing (= thought = *jñāna*), only one knowing or *jñāna* can take place at a time. Were there two or more minds (instruments of thought) there would have been a possibility of occurring two or more knowings (= thoughts = *jñāna*) simultaneously.

The six *darśanas* due to six organs can occur simultaneously with the occurrence of *jñāna* and can co-exist with *jñāna*. But *darśana* in non-reflective meditation, being what it is, neither occurs simultaneously with the occurrence of *jñāna* nor does it co-exist with *jñāna*. (Let us remember here that in case of momentary things simultaneous occurrence and co-existence mean one and the same thing).

The Sāṅkhya-Yoga thinkers, as we have seen, maintain that each and every cognition has both the aspects 'seeing and knowing'. Buddhists contend that no cognition has both these aspects. The cognitions that go by the name of knowing (= *jñāna* = *vikalpa*) are totally different from those that go by the name of seeing (= *darśana* = *pratyakṣa*). They do not accept internal fissure or dichotomy in one and the same cognition. Barring non-reflective meditation they accept that seeing and knowing can co-exist, that is, two cognitions of quite different natures can co-exist. But they never accept that seeing and knowing both together constitute one cognition. This characteristic of the Buddhist philosophy has been clearly brought out by the Buddhist logicians in their exposition of *pratyakṣa*.

The Sāṅkhya-Yoga philosophers regard the faculties of seeing and knowing as fundamentally different from one another. Again, they view them so fundamentally different that they could not be attributed to one

and the same principle (*tattva*). Hence they attributed the faculty of seeing to *puruṣa* and the faculty of knowing to *citta*. Even Buddha and the Buddhists regard them as fundamentally different faculties, but they do not consider them to be so fundamentally different that they could not be attributed to one and the same principle (*tattva*). Hence they attributed both these faculties to one and the same principle, viz. *citta*, rejecting *puruṣa* (= *ātman*) altogether.

Again, Buddha and the Buddhists might have thought if *jñāna* (knowing), *karma*, *kleśa*, *bandha* as also *jñānāvaraṇa*, *karmāvaraṇa*, *kleśāvaraṇa* and *mokṣa* belong to *citta*, then why should one not recognise *citta* alone and attribute to it even the faculty of seeing for which alone Sāṅkhya-Yoga thinkers recognise a separate *tattva*, viz. *puruṣa* ? They thought *puruṣa* is metaphysically rather ethically useless. So, they totally rejected *puruṣa*, and attributed the faculty of seeing to *citta*.

We are reminded here of the view that the original Sāṅkhya accepted only 24 *tattvas* among which *puruṣa* finds no place. This makes us think as follows : In the time of Upaniṣads *ātman* tradition became very strong. We are told that *ātman* is a principle even greater than *buddhi* (= *citta*) (*buddher ātmā mahān paraḥ-Kāthopaniṣad*). Under the strong influence of the *ātman* tradition the later Sāṅkhya-Yoga philosophy made room for *puruṣa* in the system; not only that but it accorded the highest place in the hierarchy of *tattvas*. But if we study the Sāṅkhya of 25 *tattvas* we feel that *puruṣa* is only an appendix, it is not an integral part of the system, the role it is assigned to play is quite negligible. The Buddha and the Buddhists seem to have realised this fact, hence they might have re-established in its original pristine state the *anātma* tradition which got corrupted, so to say, by the *ātman* tradition of the Upaniṣads, or, in Buddhism we find a branch of original *anātma* tradition, remaining uncorrupted by *ātman* tradition and attacking *ātman* tradition severely. This seems to me to be the true significance of Buddhist *anātmavāda*. (We can say almost all this even in connection with the Jainas. The Buddhist rejected even the term *ātman* (*puruṣa*) with the rejection of *ātma-tattva*. But the Jainas accepted the term *ātman* even though they rejected *ātman-tattva*. They applied this term to the *citta-tattva*. Doing so they created an illusion that they really belong to the *ātman* tradition. We reserve the full discussion on this point for the next section on Jainism).

Now we have arrived at a stage when we should discuss what the Buddhist logicians call *svasaṃvedana*. In the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, *puruṣa* is described as *prakāśa-svarūpa*. This *prakāśa* of *puruṣa* is absolutely different from that of *citta*.⁴³ It is nothing but his *darśanaśakti* or *draṣṭṛsvarūpatā*. This nature of his is responsible for the phenomenon of seeing. His faculty of seeing (*darśanaśakti*) works provided there is the object of his seeing. That because he is *prakāśasvarūpa* he sees himself directly irrespective of the medium of *cittavṛtti* is not accepted by these philosophers. Though he is *prakāśasvarūpa* he can see himself only through the *cittavṛtti* of his form. Thus they do not accept *svasaṃvedana* (= *svadarśana*). Hence they invariably describe the *puruṣa* as 'buddheḥ pratisaṃvedī'⁴⁴ but never as *svasaṃvedī*. Similarly, they do not maintain that *citta* can direct its faculty of knowing to operate upon itself. Thus there is no possibility of even *sva-jñāna* in the Sāṅkhya-Yoga.

The Buddhists too describe their *citta* (or *viññāna*) as *prakāśasvarūpa*. They declare in its connection : *svayaṃ saiva prakāśate*.⁴⁵ When they say this they do not mean any *grāhya-grāhakabhāva* in it. They mean the same thing by *prakāśasvarūpatā* of *citta* as what the Sāṅkhya-Yoga thinkers mean by the *prakāśasvarūpatā* of *puruṣa* the only difference being that *prakāśasvarūpatā* of the Buddhist *citta* includes both *darśanaśakti* and *jñānaśakti* whereas *prakāśasvarūpatā* of Sāṅkhya-Yoga *puruṣa* is the *darśanaśakti* alone. Thus the thinkers of both these camps maintain that *prakāśasvarūpatā* transcends *grāhya-grāhakabhāva*. *Svasaṃvedana* is quite different from *prakāśasvarūpatā* as it involves *grāhya-grāhaka-bhāva*.

In Sāṅkhya-Yoga all the *cittavṛttis* are seen by *puruṣa* alone. No *cittavṛtti* remains unseen by *puruṣa* even for a moment. As the Buddhists have rejected *puruṣa* altogether, they have no other alternative but to declare that *citta* and *caitta* directly see themselves.⁴⁶ That is, *citta* directs its faculty of seeing (*draśanaśakti*) to operate upon itself. As in Sāṅkhya-Yoga so in Buddhism no *caitta* (= *cittavṛtti*) remains unseen even for a moment but in Buddhism the seer of it is *citta* itself whereas in Sāṅkhya-Yoga the seer of it is *puruṣa*. Thus rejection of *puruṣa* by the Buddhists seems to be the real ground for their acceptance of *svasaṃvedana*.

According to Sāṅkhya-Yoga, in the *samprajñāta-yoga*, *puruṣa* clearly sees himself not directly but through *citta* that has assumed his

clear form. Thus there takes place *puruṣasākṣātkāra* in the *samprajñāta-yoga*. Is there no possibility of *cittasākṣātkāra* which can be considered on par with this *puruṣasākṣātkāra*? According to Buddhism, when *citta* directs its faculty of seeing to operate upon itself in the non-reflective meditation, there arises *cittasākṣātkāra* in the non-reflective meditation. This is also a case of *svasaṃvedana*, but this *svasaṃvedana* falls under the category of *yogi-darśana*. Hence Buddhists have reserved the term 'svasaṃvedana' for that *svasaṃvedana* which is a permanent feature of *citta*.

In Sāṅkhya-Yoga *cittavṛttis* are always objects of *darśana* but never objects of *jñāna*. But the Buddhists find no difficulty in accepting them as objects of *jñāna* too. According to Buddhists *citta* can direct its faculty of knowing (*jñāna*) to operate upon itself just as it directs its faculty of seeing to operate upon itself. Like *sva-darśana* *sva-jñāna* is a possibility in Buddhism, because Buddhism does not recognise the *kartṛkarma-virodhadoṣa* which is recognised by those systems that adopt anthropomorphic way of thinking.

As faculties (*śakti*) *jñāna* and *darśana* are two permanent features of *citta*. From the point of view of the manifestations of the *darśana* faculty we can safely state that *darśana*-manifestations due to six organs do not constitute the permanent feature of *citta* because their occurrence depends upon the operation of these six organs, nor does the *darśana*-manifestation in non-reflective meditation constitute the permanent feature of *citta* as it always follows reflective meditation (*upanidhyāna-pūrvaka*). But the *darśana*-manifestation called *svasaṃvedana* seems to be a permanent feature of *citta* as it never depends, for its occurrence, upon the operation of any organ. As *svasaṃvedana* involves *grāhya-grāhakabhāva* the Vijñānavādin Buddhists do not consider it to be a permanent feature, rather absolute feature, of *citta*. When *citta* transcends even the *grāhya-grāhakabhāva* involved in the *svasaṃvedana* it gets established in its absolute nature which is nothing but *prakāśarūpatā*. From the point of view of manifestations of *jñāna* faculty we can safely state that no *jñāna* manifestation constitutes the permanent feature of *citta* as each and every *jñāna*-manifestation depends upon the operation of *manas* (= mind = organ of thought).

This suggests the possibility of *darśana*-manifestation of the form of *svasaṃvedana* in *Nirvāṇa* and the impossibility of *jñāna*-manifestation in *Nirvāṇa*. As faculty *jñāna* will be there in *Nirvāṇa*. Thus *jñāna* and

darśana are the two faculties constituting the nature of *citta*. Hence as faculties they are always there in *citta*, even in the state of *Nirvāṇa*.

(4) Jaina Authors on the Problem of *Jñāna-darśana*

The hoary antiquity of Jaina conception of *jñānāvaraṇa* and *darśanāvaraṇa*⁴⁷ clearly suggests the antiquity of the distinction between *jñāna* and *darśana*. Again, the Jaina conception of 'four infinities' (*anantacatuṣṭaya*) as the nature of *ātman* (= *citta*) points to their distinction because these four infinities include the infinity due to *jñāna* and the infinity due to *darśana*. These infinities get fully manifest when *ātman* (= *citta*) destroys all the concerned veils of *karmas*. Moreover, the frequent occurrence of the phrases '*jāṇadi passadi*' and '*jāṇamāṇe pāsamāṇe*' in the Jaina Āgamas goes to prove their distinction. Only loosely speaking *darśana* is sometimes regarded as a case of *jñāna* but truly speaking it is a faculty quite distinct from that of *jñāna*.⁴⁸ According to Jainas *ātman* (= *citta*) is *prakāśarūpa*; they use the term *upayoga* for this *prakāśa*. *Jñānaśakti* (faculty of *jñāna*) and *darśanaśakti* (faculty of *darśana*) both together constitute the nature of this *prakāśa*. That is, there is no possibility whatsoever of *prakāśa* being bereft of these two faculties; *prakāśa* cannot be found alone without these two faculties,⁴⁹ nor can these two faculties be found without this *prakāśa*. In this sense only these two faculties are regarded as identical with *upayoga* and hence identical with one another. But as faculties they are always quite distinct from one another.

'Knowing and seeing One' (*jāṇamāṇe pāsamāṇe*) is a characteristic description of *vītarāga Mahāvīra*. The objects of his knowing and seeing are usually *lokāloka*⁵⁰ and *dharmma* (Religion).⁵¹ One of the objects of Buddha's knowing and seeing is, as we know, all *dharmas*. By 'all *dharmas*' is meant the essence (viz. *pratītyasamutpāda*) of all *dharmas* (= elements). Similarly, by *lokāloka* is probably meant the essence (viz. *uppaṇṇei vā vīgamei vā dhuvei vā = utpāda-vyaya-dhauvya*) of all things. Again, Four Noble Truths are recognized as an object of Buddha's knowing and seeing. Similarly, *Dhamma* is recognized as an object of Mahāvīra's knowing and seeing.

The order of the occurrence of knowing and seeing in the case of *vītarāga Mahāvīra* is suggested by the order of their mention in the Āgamas. Again, there is a view that in the case of one who has completely destroyed all the concerned *karmas* *darśana* (= seeing) invariably follows *jñāna* (= knowing).⁵²

If we take into account all this, in the case of *vītarāga* Mahāvīra *jñāna* seems to mean 'cognition involving thought (*vikalpa*) in the *prthaktva-vitārkaśavicāra dhyāna* as also in the former stage of *ekatvavitarkanirvicāra dhyāna*', and *darśana* seems to mean 'cognition free from thought (*vikalpa*) at the highest point of *ekatvavitarkanirvicāra dhyāna* when the mind ceases to function.' To use non-Jaina terminology, in the context of Mahāvīra *jñāna* means 'cognition that a yogī has in *savikalpaka samādhi*' and *darśana* means 'cognition that a yogī has in *nirvikalpaka samādhi*.'⁵³ This suggests us the defining characteristics of *jñāna* and *darśana*. *Jñāna* is that cognition which involves thought (*vikalpa*) whereas *darśana* is that cognition which is free from thought.⁵⁴

But some Jaina thinkers hold that *darśana* grasps the universal (= generic attributes = *sāmānya*) and *jñāna* grasps the particular (= specific attributes = *viśeṣa*).⁵⁵ Upholders of this view have to reject the old traditional view that in the case of Manāvīra *darśana* follows *jñāna* whereas in the case of ordinary persons *jñāna* follows *darśana*.⁵⁶ They declare that in the case of all persons without any exception *jñāna* follows *darśana*. Thus this view comes in conflict with the old traditional view that in the case of *vītarāga* Mahāvīra *darśana* follows *jñāna*. So, we should reject this view. It is interesting to note that this view betrays Vaiśeṣika influence. Other Jaina philosophers criticized this view from a different standpoint. They say : 'A particular without the universal is a figment, and so *jñāna* grasping a particular bereft of the universal is invalid, nay unreal. Similarly, the *darśana* grasping the universal without the particular is also unreal. *Jñāna* and *darśana* both being valid and real must grasp the reality which is of the nature of both particular and the universal. Each of the two, *jñāna* and *darśana*, grasps reality as it is, that is, a complex of universal-cum-particular. So, the view that *darśana* cognizes the universal whereas *jñāna* cognizes a particular is not acceptable.'⁵⁷ These Jaina thinkers maintain that *darśana* cognizes the *ātman* i.e. *citta* (= *sva*) whereas *jñāna* cognizes the external objects (= *para*).⁵⁸ This view also is not satisfactory because almost all the Jaina *ācāryas* are of the view that *jñāna* grasps both *sva* and *para* (*jñānaṃ svapara-prakāśakam*). Each and every cognition, irrespective of its being *jñāna* or *darśana*, grasps both *sva* and *para*. (There are only two exceptions to this general rule. We shall have an occasion to deal with these exceptional cases.) So, we are not in a position to accept even this view that *darśana* grasps *sva* and *jñāna* grasps *para*. As a result of all

this we feel that our interpretation of *jñāna* and *darśana* is correct. Siddhasenagani, the commentator on the *Tattvārthabhāṣya*, accepts this interpretation⁵⁹ but he fails to see the real significance of this interpretation. On our interpretation *jñāna* is that cognition which involves thought (= *vikalpa*), whereas *darśana* is that cognition which is free from thought (= *nirvikalpa*).

We are very often told that in the case of ordinary persons *darśana* is followed by *jñāna*.⁶⁰ Our interpretation does not conflict with this matter of fact. Pure sensations due to sense-organs are free from thought (*nirvikalpa*); hence they can legitimately be described as *darśana*. Cognitions involving thought (*savikalpa*) follow these pure sensations.

Thus, what is called *nirvikalpa pratyakṣa* (= *darśana*) arises first and *savikalpa pratyakṣa* (= *jñāna*), if it arises, arises after *nirvikalpa pratyakṣa*. But in the case of *dhyānas* there is a reverse order. *Savikalpa dhyāna* invariably precedes *nirvikalpa dhyāna*. This is the real significance of the statement that in the case of a *tīrthaṅkara* *jñāna* precedes *darśana* whereas in the case of ordinary persons (= *chandmaṣṭha*) *darśana* precedes *jñāna*. Now we need not dilate upon this point.

We take up the problem of knowing-all (*sarvajñatā*) and seeing-all (*sarva-darśitā*). According to Jainas *ātman* (= *citta*) becomes *vītarāga* as soon as it destroys completely the *mohaniya* (deluding) *karmas*, rather *moha* (Delusion). And on the destruction of *moha* all the veils obscuring the infinity of *jñāna* as also all the veils obscuring the infinity of *darśana* get automatically destroyed without residue. When all the veils obscuring the infinity of *jñāna* are destroyed, the infinity of *jñāna* becomes manifest. (Here we are reminded of Patañjali's declaration that on the removal of the veils of impurities the infinity of *jñāna* gets manifest - *tadā sarvāvaraṇamalāpetasya jñānasya ānantyāt...*) When all the veils obscuring the infinity of *darśana* are completely destroyed the infinity of *darśana* becomes manifest. According to Jainas, all the veils obscuring the infinity of *jñāna* and all the veils obscuring the infinity of *darśana* get destroyed simultaneously.⁶¹ Hence the infinity of *jñāna* and that of *darśana* become manifest simultaneously. That is, both these faculties become pure (*śuddha*, *akliṣṭa*, *nirāvaraṇa*) simultaneously. Thus, *ānanta* of *jñāna* and *darśana* is nothing but their pristine nature free from all obscuring veils. As a result of this *ānanta* of *jñāna* and *darśana*, *ātman* (= *citta*) acquires simultaneously the capacity (*labdhi*, *siddhi*) to know all things and the capacity to see all things. Though these capacities (*labdhi*) are acquired simultaneously they do not operate simultaneous-

ly.⁶² Operation of the capacity to know all invariably precedes the operation of the capacity to see all. The infinity of *jñāna* is neither identical with the capacity to know all nor identical with actually knowing all. The same thing can be said with regard to the infinity of *darśana*. However infinite all the objects taken together may be, their infinity can never coincide with the vast infinity of *jñāna* and *darśana*. (Here again we are reminded of Patañjali's dictum... *jñānasya ānantyāḥ jñeyam alpam*). So, those who say that *jñāna* is infinite because it knows all things as also that *darśana* is infinite because it sees all things are committing a blunder. As a matter of fact, we should say that *jñāna* knows all things and *darśana* sees all things because *jñāna* and *darśana* have attained their infinity on the destruction of all veils.

Now there arises a question as to whether or not such a person actually knows all things simultaneously and sees all things simultaneously. Jainas are of the opinion that he knows all things simultaneously and sees all things simultaneously.⁶³ Thus they differ from the early Buddhists who maintain that such a person does never know all things simultaneously, nor does he see all things simultaneously but he knows and sees that thing which he wants to know and see at a particular time. Jainas agree with the Sāṅkhya-Yoga thinkers on the point that such a person can actually know all things simultaneously and can actually see all things simultaneously. But they differ from them in that they contend that this person knows *always* all things simultaneously and sees *always* all things simultaneously.⁶⁴ The Sāṅkhya-Yoga thinkers, as we know, maintain that he can actually know all things simultaneously and can actually see all things simultaneously provided he performs *saṁyama* (= *dhāraṇā-dhyāna-samādhi*) on *kṣaṇa* and *kṣaṇakārama*. Jainas reject this proviso laid down by the Sāṅkhya-Yoga thinkers. (Even the Buddha and the Buddhists have accepted the proviso for knowing-all and seeing-all though they have accepted knowing-all and seeing-all in a different sense.)

For the Sāṅkhya-Yoga thinkers actual knowing-all and actual seeing-all do not constitute the permanent feature of *vivekī*. But for Jainas they are the permanent features of *vivekī* (= *vītarāga*). This naturally follows from their rejection of the proviso. It is really a problem for us as to why the Jainas have rejected the proviso and as a result of it maintained that their *vivekī* (= *vītarāga*) or *kevalī* knows all things *always* and sees all things *always*. This seems to be the result of their undue emphasis on *sarvajñatā-sarvadarśitā*. They shifted their emphasis

from *vītarāgatā* to *sarvajñatā-sarvadarśitā*. Hence they have gone to the extent of saying that none can become *kevalī* without becoming *sarvajña-sarvadarśī*. Thus they have gone even further than the Sāṅkhya-Yoga thinkers who explicitly declare that it is not absolutely necessary for one to become *sarvajña-sarvadarśī* for becoming *kevalī*. According to the Sāṅkhya-Yoga thinkers *vivekī* who has completely destroyed the veils and in this sense has attained the *ānantya* of *jñāna* can attain the *kevalī*-hood without actually becoming *sarvajña*. Upādhyāya Yaśovijayajī criticizes this Sāṅkhya-Yoga view.⁶⁵

Jainas who value destruction of delusion more than the acquisition of *jñāna* and hence declare that the meagre *jñāna* of *alpāmohī* (= one under the slight influence of delusion) is superior to the vast *jñāna* of *bahumohī* (= one under the strong influence of delusion),⁶⁶ should value *vītarāgatā* more than the *labdhis* which are simply the by-products of this *vītarāgatā*. Their undue emphasis on *sarvajñatā-sarvadarśitā* is not in consonance with their spiritual and ethical outlook. Here the influence of the conception of *nitya jñāna* of *Īśvara* recognized by Pāśupatas and later Vaiśeṣikas seem to be at work. Under the strong pressure of this influence Jainas seem to have made *sarvajñatā-sarvadarśitā* to be a permanent (*nitya*) feature of *vītarāga* and *kevalī*. It is important to note here that *sarvajñatā* (omniscience) in the sense of constant knowledge of all the states - past, present and future - simultaneously of all things necessarily entails strict predeterminism (*niyatīvāda*) which gives no scope to the freedom of will, recognised in all spiritual discipline as also in karma theory.

Their rejection of the proviso has led to the rejection of the distinction between two faculties. viz. *jñāna* and *darśana*. Once it is held that *vītarāga* always knows all things simultaneously and always sees all things simultaneously, that will naturally lead to the simultaneous occurrence of *sarvajñāna* and *sarvadarśana*,⁶⁷ and ultimately to their identity. Here the distinction between *jñāna* and *darśana* gets altogether effaced because they take place irrespective of the concerned meditations, viz. *savikalpaka* and *nirvikalpaka* respectively. On the distinction between these two meditations was based the distinction between knowing-all and seeing-all. When the ground for their distinction is rejected, their distinction cannot stay. It must vanish. Some Jaina logicians contend that knowing-all and seeing-all are identical.⁶⁸ Really speaking, with the rejection of their distinction they are rejecting

both. How can there be knowing-all without *savikalpaka dhyāna* ? And how can there be seeing-all without *nirvikalpa dhyāna* ? With the rejection of these *dhyānas*, there cannot be the functioning of these two *labdhis* at all.

These logicians wrongly ask if there remains anything unknown to *vītarāga*. If yes, then he is not *sarvajña*. If no, then what is the use of seeing-all ? In other words, knowing-all is identical with seeing-all.⁶⁹ But this logic is defective. Knower of all is not necessarily seer of all. We should note that the objects that are grasped by his *jñāna* are the same in number (i.e. *sarva* = all) as those grasped by his *darśana*. Though the objects are the same in number there is a difference in their grasplings by *jñāna* and *darśana*. The grasping of all objects by *jñāna* is not of the nature of *sākṣātkāra* whereas grasping of all objects by *darśana* is of the nature of *sākṣātkāra*. So, logicians should not reject the grasping which is of the nature of *sākṣātkāra*. They should not even reject the grasping of all objects by *jñāna* because it is a necessary previous stage on the basis of which is founded the grasping which is of the nature of *sākṣātkāra*. On studying the arguments given by these logicians for identifying knowing-all and seeing-all we feel that they are obsessed with the idea of *nitya jñāna* of *Īśvara*, recognized in some non-Jain circles.

As Jainas have rejected the proviso, those who strictly follow the āgamic view of their successive occurrence have to declare that their alternative occurrence goes on perpetually, i.e. in all the odd moments will occur knowing-all and in all the even moments will occur seeing-all. (According to those who believe in the reverse order of their occurrence, their alternative occurrence goes on perpetually, i.e. in all odd moments will occur seeing-all and in all the even moments will occur knowing-all).⁷⁰ This position is vulnerable and ludicrous. If they would have accepted the proviso, their position would have become most cogent and logicians would not have dared to attack it.

The yogī having *avadhi-jñāna* and *avadhi-darśana* as *labdhis* does not always know and see all physical things falling within the spatial and temporal boundaries; he knows and sees only that physical object which he wants to know and see at a particular time, having entered into proper meditations (*‘upayoga lagākara’*). This is what the Jainas believe. Even in the case of knowing-all and seeing-all they should accept the same procedure. They should say : In the case of knowing-all and seeing-all there is no *avadhi*. That is, *vītarāga* can know and see

all sorts of things of all times and climes; but he does not know and see all of them always; he knows and sees that thing which he wants to know and see at a particular time and that too after having entered into proper meditations.

Under the wrong conception of *darśana* as *sāmānyagrāhi* and *jñāna* as *viśeṣagrāhi* Jaina authors are compelled to declare that *avadhi-darśana* precedes *avadhi-jñāna*. But as *avadhi-jñāna* and *avadhi-darśana* are the cases of *yogi-jñāna* and *yogi-darśana* respectively, their order of occurrence should be reverse, that is, *avadhi-jñāna* should always precede *avadhi-darśana*. But we should acknowledge the fact that no Jaina work accepts this order of their occurrence. Of course, the order of *jānai pāsai* terms used in connection with *avadhi-jñāna* and *avadhi-darśana* in the *Nandisūtra* corroborates our view.⁷¹

According to Jainas *manahparyāya-jñāna* is that yogic cognition which cognizes the changes that take place in the subtle physical mind-stuff when the *jñāna* faculty of *ātman* (= *citta*) operates. These changes are not thoughts, because thoughts are the *cittavṛttis* (= *jñānaparyāyas*) that occur in the *citta* due to the functioning of mind, the organ of thought. We should bear in mind this distinction between *manahparyāya* and *cittavṛtti*. This means that a yogi can infer the *cittavṛtti* of others by the changes taking place in their mind-stuff; he can never see the *cittavṛttis* of others. Thus, in this sense there is no possibility of *paracitta-darśana*. *Paracitta-jñāna* recognized by the Sāṅkhya-Yoga and the Buddhist thinkers is identical with what the Jainas call *manahparyāya-jñāna*. Now, we understand why the Jainas have not recognized *manahparyāya-darśana*.⁷² By the changes taking place in the mind-stuff of others a yogi can infer *cittavṛttis* (*jñāna paryāyas*) as also the objects of these *cittavṛttis*. A yogi possessed of the capacity of *avadhi-jñāna* and *avadhi-darśana* may know and see the physical mind-stuffs and changes taking place in them but he is not able to infer from those changes the *cittavṛttis* as also the objects of those *cittavṛttis*. This seems to be the true answer to those logicians who are bent on wiping out the distinction between *avadhi-jñāna* and *manahparyāya-jñāna*.⁷³

What are *kevalajñāna* and *kevaladarśana*? *Kevalajñāna* and *kevaladarśana* are mostly taken to mean *sarvajñatā* and *sarvadarśitā* respectively. But *kevalajñāna* seems to be nothing but *sva-jñāna* (= *ātma-jñāna*=*cittajñāna*), and *kevaladarśana* seems to be nothing but *sva-darśana* (= *ātmadarśana* = *cittadarśana*). When the object of *savikalpaka dhyāna* is *ātman* (= *citta*), there takes place *kevalajñāna*. And the

nirvikalpaka dhyāna following this *savikalpaka dhyāna* gives rise to *ātmasākṣātkāra* (= *cittasākṣātkāra*) as its object is *ātman* (= *citta*). This *sākṣātkāra* is really *kevaladarśana*. (Like Buddhists Jainas too maintain that *citta* and its *vṛttis* never remain unseen even for a moment. They are seen by themselves. This is what is called *svasamṣvedana*. But this is not to be regarded as *kevaladarśana*.) Study the following statements- (1) '*na havadi paradavvagayaṃ daṃsaṇamidi vaṇṇidam tamhā*', (2) *ditṭhi appapayāsāyā ceva*'. (*Niyamasāra gāthās* 160-161). We feel that these two statements have in view the *kevaladarśana*. All other *darśanas* see objects other than *sva*. It is only *kevaladarśana* that sees *sva* (= *ātman=citta*). From this it naturally follows that there is a *jñāna* which precedes this *kevaladarśana* and this *jñāna* should be regarded as *kevalajñāna* because its object is *sva*. Like Buddhists Jainas too hold that *citta* can direct its faculties of *jñāna* and *darśana* to operate upon itself.

Avadhi jñāna, *manahparyāya-jñāna*, *sarva-jñāna* and *kevalajñāna* are the cases of *yogi-jñānas*. *Avadhī-darśana*, *sarva-darśana* and *kevaladarśana* are the cases of *yogi-darśanas*. We have an Āgamic statement that a person who has acquired any of the three *jñānas* viz. *avadhijñāna*, *manahparyāyajñāna* and *kevalajñāna* is a *kevalī*.⁷⁴ Hence the dictum '*daṃsaṇapuvvaṃ ṇāṇaṃ chadamatthāṇaṃ*' does not apply to these *jñānas*. These *jñānas*, being *yogi-jñānaḥ* or *kevalijñānas*, invariably precede their corresponding *darśanas*.

Darśanas (rather *darśana*-manifestations) due to six sense-organs (including mind) are to be regarded as thought-free cognitions - pure sensations. *Darśana* due to *caḥṣu* (visual sense-organ) is called *caḥṣudarśana* and *darśanas* due to other sense-organs (including mind) are called *acaḥṣudarśana*. According to Jainas no two or more *darśanas* out of these six can take place at a time.⁷⁵ Thus they differ from the Buddhists on this point and agree with the Vaiśeṣikas. The Vaiśeṣikas could not accept the simultaneous occurrence of even the sensations due to five sense-organs because they regard the contact of atomic mind with the concerned sense-organ as necessary even for the rise of sensation and mind being one in each body as also atomic cannot come into contact with two or more sense-organs simultaneously. But what prevents Jainas from accepting their simultaneous occurrence? The mind of the Jainas is body-sized, it is not atom-sized. Again, what compels the Jainas to accept the operation of mind as necessary even for the rise of these pure sensations due to five sense-organs? We think there is nothing to compel them. In answer to the question as to why two or more *darśanas* due

to sense-organs cannot take place simultaneously Jainas say that there is an Āgamic rule that two *upayogas* cannot take place simultaneously. The term '*upayoga*' yields more than one sense - (1) *prakāśarūpatā* of *citta* (= *ātmā*), (2) *darśanaśakti*, (3) *jñānaśakti*, (4) manifestations of *darśanaśakti*, (5) manifestations of *jñānaśakti*, (6) mental operation or attention or concentration. In this context those who accept *upayoga* in the sense of *darśana*-manifestations seem to be 'wrong'. In this context we should understand *upayoga* in the sense of 'mental attention'. Though mind is body-sized it can concentrate on or attend to one thing only at a time. Mind cannot attend two sensations or things at a time. But this does not mean that there cannot occur two or more sensations simultaneously. Two or more sensations due to sense-organs can occur simultaneously because they do not involve any mental attention. But Jainas have not accepted this. Buddhists seem to be right in their stand. The Vaiśeṣika procedure of the origination of the sensory cognition being what it is the Vaiśeṣika philosophers cannot help rejecting the simultaneous occurrence of two or more pure sensations due to sense-organs. Jainas have not thought over this problem seriously. If they would have done so, they would have been with the Buddhists⁷⁶ because their epistemological foundations are almost identical with those of the Buddhists. This will be clear from the concluding portion of this essay.⁷⁷

Jainas do not accept the simultaneous occurrence of a *darśana* (rather *darśana*-manifestation) and a *jñāna* (rather *jñāna*-manifestation). This view of theirs is not objectionable in the case of *yogi-jñānas* and *yogi-darśanas* (otherwise called *kevali-jñānas* and *kevali-darśanas*). When it is said that in the case of a *kevalī* the two *upayogas* cannot take place simultaneously,⁷⁸ what is meant is that *yogi-jñāna* and corresponding *yogi-darśana* cannot take place simultaneously. This is inevitable because *yogi-jñāna* arises in *savikalpa dhyāna* which invariably precedes *nirvikalpa dhyāna* in which arises the corresponding *yogi-darśana*. But in the case of *jñānas* and *darśanas* of ordinary persons Jainas should have maintained that a *jñāna* and a *darśana* can occur simultaneously. On the contrary, Jaina logicians explicitly reject the possibility of their simultaneous occurrence.⁷⁹ Here again they are influenced by the view of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of mind and its function in the origination of cognitions being what it is, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers reject the possibility of the simultaneous occurrence of any two cognitions.⁸⁰ Jainas are wrong in following the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers in this matter. They should have agreed with the

Buddhists who accept the possibility of simultaneous occurrence of a *jñāna* and a *darśana* of ordinary persons.⁸¹

No two thoughts (*jñānas-vikalpas*) occur simultaneously. The Jaina, the Buddhist and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers accept this.

In *Mokṣa jñāna* and *darśana* become doubly *ananta*. In addition to their being *nirāvaraṇa* they become *nirviṣaya* (= not *paricchinna* by any object = *aparicchinna* = *ananta*). *Sukha* in *mokṣa* is considered to be *ananta* on the ground of its being *nirviṣaya*. The same logic should be applied to *jñāna* and *darśana*. In *Mokṣa citta* is a knower without knowing and a seer without seeing.

The Sāṅkhya-Yoga thinkers recognized two *tattvas*, viz. *puruṣa* (= *ātmā*) and *citta*. They attributed the faculty of *darśana* to *puruṣa* alone and the faculty of *jñāna* to *citta* alone. Buddhists rejected *puruṣa* (= *ātmā*) altogether and attributed the faculty of *darśana* to *citta*. Thus the *citta* recognized by the Buddhists possesses both the faculties, viz. *darśana* and *jñāna*. Those very reasons that urged the Buddhists to reject *ātmā* urged the Jainas also to reject it. Jainas rejected *ātmā*, accepting the *citta* alone. The terms 'sacitta', 'acitta', 'puḍhai citta'⁸² etc. frequently used in old Jaina literature point to this fact. Jainas rejected *ātma-tattva* but retained the name 'ātman' which they gave to the *citta-tattva*. Hence for them 'ātman' and 'citta' became interchangeable terms, synonyms⁸³ meaning that very thing which the Sāṅkhya-Yoga and the Buddhist thinkers mean by the term 'citta' alone. We know that the *citta* of Sāṅkhya is variable constant (*pariṇāminitya*) and body-size (*śarīraparimāṇākāramātram*); it can expand or contract itself according to the size of the body which it inhabits (*saṅkocavikāśi*).⁸⁴ The Jaina description of *ātmā* exactly tallies with this description of Sāṅkhya *citta*. As a matter of fact, Sāṅkhya *citta* is totally accepted by the Jainas without introducing any change in it; of course, they attributed *darśana* of *puruṣa* to *citta* as they have totally rejected *puruṣa* or *ātman*. Thus Jainas are as *anātmavādī* as the Buddhists. But by giving the name *ātman* to the *citta* they have created an illusion that they belong to the *ātman* tradition. This Jaina position will be clear if we contrast it with the Vaiśeṣika and the Śāṅkara Vedānta positions. The Vaiśeṣika thinkers rejected *citta* altogether and attributed its faculty of *jñāna* (along with other *citta-dharmas*) to absolutely changeless *puruṣa*. They neglect the faculty of *darśana*, they do not refer to it, so we can say that they do not accept it. According to them *jñāna* is the quality of *puruṣa*. They maintain that by (*śarīravacchinna*) *ātma-mañah-samyoga* (*nimittakāraṇa*) *jñāna* is

produced in *puruṣa* (*samavāyikāraṇa*). On this account *puruṣa* does not lose its absolute changelessness (*kūṭasthanyatā*) because according to these philosophers *jñāna* (*guṇa*) is different from its substratum (*dravya*) *ātman*. As a result of this view of theirs, though *jñāna* is a quality of *puruṣa* it is absent in *mokṣa* because of the absence of its *nimittakāraṇa*, viz. *śarīrāvacchinna ātmamanah-samyoga*. Śāṅkara Vedāntins rejected both *citta* and *citta-dharmas*. They do not attribute any *citta-dharma* to *puruṣa*. Their *puruṣa* is simply *cit* of the nature of *darsāna* which is loosely called *jñāna*. Thus Jainas and Bauddhas form one group as against the group of Vaiśeṣikas and Śāṅkara Vedāntists. Thus we have before us two clear-cut traditions, viz. *ātman* tradition and *anātman* tradition. Śāṅkhya of 24 *tattvas*, Jainism and Buddhism clearly represent the *anātman* tradition whereas Vaiśeṣika philosophy and Śāṅkara Vedānta represent the *ātman* tradition. Śāṅkhya of 25 *tattvas* represents the compromise of these two fundamentally different traditions.

Notes

1. In Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2.4.5 and 4.5.6 there occurs the famous sentence : *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyaḥ mantavyaḥ nididhyāsitavyaḥ* | It refers to the four stages of *darsāna*, *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana* (= *dhyāna*). Here the term '*darsāna*' is employed in the sense of *śraddhā*. This is corroborated by two trios mentioned in the two sentences (7.18-19 and 7.25) of Chāndogya Upaniṣad. In 7.18-19 there occurs : *nāmatvā vijānāti, matvaiva vijānāti ...nāśraddadhan manute, śraddadhad eva manute*. Thus here the trio of *śraddhā*, *manana* and *vijñāna* is mentioned. In 7.25 we have : *evam paśyan evam manvāna evam vijānan*. Here the trio of *darsāna*, *manana* and *vijñāna* is mentioned. The first trio corresponds to the second one. Hence the first member of the first trio viz. *śraddhā* exactly corresponds to and is identical with the first member of the second trio viz. *darsāna*. *Śraddhā* grows as it passes through the stages of *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*. Thus there are four stages of *śraddhā*, viz. *śravaṇapūrvavartinī*, *śravaṇānuvartinī-mananapūrvavartinī*, *mananānuvartinī-nididhyāsanapūrvavartinī* and *nididhyāsanānuvartinī*. In Upaniṣads we come across sentences and phrases that point to the four stages of *śraddhā*. Jainism explicitly recognises two stages of *śraddhā*, viz. *naisargika* and *ādhigamika*. The first corresponds to *śravaṇapūrvavartinī śraddhā* and the second to

śravaṇānuvartinī-mananapūrvavartinī śraddhā. Jaina Devagupta in his commentary on sambandhakārikā on *Tattvārthabhāṣya* writes : *naisargikād avāptaśraddho* 'dhyayanādibhir ādhigamikam āpnoti | Janias do not talk of the remaining higher stages of *śraddhā*, but they implicitly accept them. In Buddhism we find references to all the four stages of *śraddhā*. In the following passage of *Carṁkisutta* (*MajjhimaN*. 2.173), there is reference to *śravaṇapūrvavartinī śraddhā*. *saddhājāto...dhammaṁ suṇāti* | We have references to *mananānuvartinī-nididhyāsanapūrvavartinī* (the third stage) *śraddhā*. It is called *ākāravatī saddhā* (*MajjhimaN* I. 320). Here the term 'ākāra' is used in the sense of 'supporting logical reasons'. This *śraddhā* is also described as 'āveṭysprasādā' (*Abhidharmakośa* 6.75). In *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (8.7) we have reference to *nididhyāsanānuvartinī śraddhā* (i.e. the fourth stage). The following is the passage in point : *tasmāt tarhi śraddhā prasādaḥ* | 'tasya hi dvitīyādhyānalābhāt samāhita-bhūminihsaraṇe sampratyaya utpadyate so 'dhyātmaprasādaḥ | This *śraddhā* is *adhyātmaprasādā*. It is interesting to note that like many important technical terms, this term 'adhyātmaprasāda' also occurs in *Pātañjala Yogasūtra* I. 47.

2. श्रद्धा चेतसः सम्प्रसादः । *Yogabhāṣya* I. 20; *Puggalapaññitīṭika*, 248;
श्रद्धा चेतसः प्रसादः । *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, II. 25;
सद्धा...सा पेनेसा सम्प्रसादनलक्खणा । *Dhammasaṅgaṇi Aṭṭhakathā*, III. 213.
प्रसादोऽनाम्रत्वम् । *Sphuṭārthā*, VIII. 75;
यद्धि निर्मलं तत् प्रसन्नमित्युच्यते । *Abhidharmadīpavṛtti*, p. 367.
3. Study the Jaina conception of *ābhigrahika mithyātva*.
4. Umāsvāti has in view this stage of *darśana* when he describes it as *apāyarūpa* : उच्यते-अपायसद्द्रव्यतया सम्यग्दर्शनम्, अपायः आभिनिबोधिकम् । *Tattvārthabhāṣya*, I. 8
5. *Lokatattvañirṇaya*, 38
6. *Śikṣāsamuccaya* (Ed. P. L. Vaidya, Buddhist Sanskrit Text Series No. 11), p. 12.
7. यतो यतो इमस्स धम्मपरियायस्स पज्जाय अत्थं उपपरिकखेय्य लभेथेव अत्तमनंतं लभेत चेतसो पसादं । *Majjhima Nikāya*, 1.114.
8. जया से माणावरणं, सत्त्वं होइ खयं गयं । तओ लोगमलोगं च जिणो जाणति केवली ॥८॥
जया से दरिसावरणं सत्त्वं होइ खयं गयं । तओ लोगमलोगं च जिणो पासति केवली ॥९॥

पडिमाए विसुद्धाए मोहणिज्जं खयं गयं । असेसं लोगमलोगं च पासेति सुसमाहिण ॥१०॥
Daśāśrutaskandha, Adhyayana 5

9. मोहक्षयात् ज्ञानदर्शनावरणान्तरायक्षयाच्च केवलम् । तत्त्वार्थसूत्र १०.१ । मोहक्षयादिति पृथक्करणं क्रमप्रसिद्धचर्थम् । यथा-गम्येत पूर्वं मोहनीयं कृत्स्नं क्षीयते । ततोऽन्तर्मुहूर्तं छद्मस्थवीतरागो भवति । ततोऽस्य ज्ञानदर्शनावरणान्तरायप्रकृतीनां तिसृणां युगपत् क्षयो भवति । *Tattvārtha-bhāṣya, X.1.*
10. सा चार्थकारता बुद्धौ परिणामरूपा...पुरुषे च प्रतिबिम्बरूपा । *Yogavārtika, 1.4 Sāṅkhya-Yoga (Gujarati), Nagin J. Shah, pp. 98-100, 109-112, 200-201, 245-246.*
11. अतो बुद्धेरेव साक्षी पुरुषोऽन्येषां तु द्रष्टृमात्रमिति शास्त्रीयो विभागः । *Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya, 1.161.*
12. यो हि जानाति...न तस्य...अर्थदर्शनम्...यस्य चार्थदर्शनं न स जानाति । *Nyāyamañjarī (Kāshi Sanskrit series) p. 4*
13. सदा ज्ञाताश्चित्तवृत्तयस्तत्प्रभोः पुरुषस्य... । *Yogasūtra, 4.18*
14. तदवस्थे चेतसि विषयाभावाद् बुद्धिबोधात्मा पुरुषः किंस्वभाव इति ?-‘तदा द्रष्टृस्वरूपेऽवस्थानम्’ । (भाष्योत्थानिकासहित) । *Yogasūtra, 1.3*
15. ...स्वरूपमात्रप्रतिष्ठोऽतः शुद्धः केवलो मुक्त इत्युच्यते इति । *Yogabhāṣya, 1.51*
16. *Yogasūtra, 2.6*
17. सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताप्रत्ययो विवेकख्यातिः । *Yogabhāṣya, 2.26...पुरुषख्यातेः... । Yogasūtra, 1.16 तथा च साक्षात्कारयुक्तैकाग्रचकाले सम्प्रज्ञातयोगो..... । Yogavārtika, 3.3*
18. यथा च चित्ति बुद्धेः प्रतिबिम्बमेवं बुद्धावपि चित्प्रतिबिम्बं स्वीकार्यमन्यथा चैतन्यस्य भानानुपपत्तेः स्वयं साक्षात् स्वदर्शने कर्मकर्तृविरोधेन बुद्धचारूढतयैवात्मनो घटादिवज्ज्ञेयत्वाभ्युपगमात् । *Yogavārtika, 1.4*
19. योगाङ्गानुष्ठानादशुद्धिक्षये ज्ञानदीप्तिरा विवेकख्यातेः । *Yogasūtra, 2.28*
20. उपदेश्योपदेष्टृत्वात् तत्सिद्धिः (= जीवन्मुक्तसिद्धिः) । *Sāṅkhyasūtra, 3.79; जीवन्मुक्तस्यैवोपदेष्टृत्वसम्भवादिति । Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya, 3.79*
21. वृत्तयः पञ्चतयः क्लिष्टाऽक्लिष्टाः । *Yogasūtra, 1.5; क्लेशहेतुकाः कर्माशयप्रचयक्षेत्रीभूताः क्लिष्टाः, ख्यातिविषया गुणाधिकारविरोधिन्योऽक्लिष्टाः । Yogabhāṣya, 1.5*
22. ...विवेकप्रत्ययप्रवाहो निर्मलो भवति । सा च विवेकख्यातिरविप्लवा हानोपायः । *Yogabhāṣya, 2.26*

23. तारकं सर्वविषयं सर्वथाविषयमक्रमं चेति विवेकजं ज्ञानम् । *Yogasūtra*, 3.54; क्षण-तत्क्रमयोः संयमाद् विवेकजं ज्ञानम् । *Yogasūtra*, 3.52
24. एतस्यामवस्थायां कैवल्यं भवतीश्चरस्यानीश्वरस्य वा विवेकजज्ञानभागिनः इतरस्य वा । न हि दग्धक्लेशबीजस्य ज्ञाने पुनरपेक्षा काचिदस्ति । *Yogabhāṣya*, 3.55
25. तदा सर्वावरणमलापेतस्य ज्ञानस्यानन्त्याद् ज्ञेयमल्पम् । *Yogasūtra*, 4.31
26. Some regard *citta* as *vubhu* whereas others *citta* as body-sized and its *vṛtti* as *vibhu*. (*Yogabhāṣya* 4.10). Those who uphold the first view mean to say that *citta* being *vibhu* knows distant things; not only that but when all impurities are removed from the *citta* it can know all things simultaneously. Those who uphold the second view seem to mean something special by the *vṛtti*. Every now and then Yoga system declares that *citta* resembles a magnet (*cittam ayaskāntamaṇikalpam*). So, here by *vṛtti* they seem to suggest *cetasika* force. A magnet has magnetic force; similarly, *citta* has *cetasika* force. Though *citta* is body-sized, its *cetasika* force (*vitti*) is all-pervasive. Though this *cetasika* force is by nature all-pervasive it is not capable of functioning everywhere if the *citta* is impure. The *cetasika* force becomes capable of functioning everywhere simultaneously as soon as the impurities are removed from the *citta*.
27. तल्लाभाद् (= विवेकदर्शनाभाद्) अविद्यादयः क्लेशाः समूलकाषं कषिता भवन्ति । कुशलाकुशलाश्च कर्माशयाः समूलघातं हता भवन्ति । क्लेशकर्मनिवृत्तौ जीवन्नेव विद्वान् विमुक्तो भवति । कस्मात् ? यस्माद् विषययो भवस्य कारणम् । न हि क्षीणविपर्ययः कश्चित् केनचित् क्वचित् जातो दृश्यते इति । *Yogabhāṣya*, 4.30
28. एतेनासम्प्रज्ञाताभावेऽपि प्रारब्धभोगानन्तरं ज्ञानिनां मोक्षो भवत्येवेति सिद्धान्तो न विरुध्यते । *Yogasārasaṅgraha*, p. 11. । असम्प्रज्ञातयोगस्त्वाशुतरमोक्षार्थमेवापेक्ष्यते इत्याशयः । *Yogavārtika*, 2.15
29. विवेकख्यातिरविप्लवा हानोपायः । *Yogasūtra*, 2.26
30. तत्र चासम्प्रज्ञातयोगेनाखिलसंस्कारदाहकेन प्रारब्धकर्माप्यतिक्रम्यत इति ज्ञानाद् विशेषः । *Yogavārtika*, 1.1
31. *MajjhimaNikāya*, 2.3
32. *MajjhimaNikāya* 1.329
33. अरियसच्चानि अवेच्च पस्सति । *Suttanipāta*, 229 । सब्बेसु धम्मेषु च जाणदस्सी । *Ibid*, 478

Buddhist philosophers declare that *pratītyasamutpādatā*, the nature of all things, is not the object of sense-perception; it is known by reasoning-and-thought and seen in non-reflective meditation.

34. पञ्चविज्ञानानि न शक्नुवन्ति विवेकुम् । मनोविज्ञानं शक्नोति विवेकुम् । 5.10
35. According to Sāṅkhya-Yoga *manas* (= mind) is an organ of knowing = thought = *vikalpa* ('*manah saṅkalpakam*'-Sāṅkhyakārikā 27). In Buddhism it is recognized as an organ of both seeing and knowing. According to Sāṅkhya-Yoga mind is not required for seeing. But according to the Buddhists in all cases of seeing mind is not required (i.e. only in some cases of seeing it is required) whereas in all cases of knowing mind is invariably required. Hence it is primarily the organ of thought. There arises a question as to how one and the same organ can work in the production of two quite heterogeneous effects - seeing and knowing. Logic demands that the Buddhists should not accept seeing due to mind. This seems to be the real ground for the rejection of *mānasa pratyakṣa* by some Buddhists. Jains too regard mind as an organ of both seeing and knowing (= thought). Hence they have recognised seeing due to mind (*manodarśana* falling under the class of *acakṣurdarśana*). We find no Jaina author who rejects *darśana* due to mind whereas we find at least a few Buddhists who are hesitant to accept *darśana* due to mind. It is very important to note that *manas* is not *citta*; it is simply an organ which *citta* utilises for thinking (= knowing).
36. For the details of all these *pratyakṣas* one may refer to '*Akalaṅka's Criticism of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy*' (L. D. Series No. 11), pp. 200-218.
37. It is interesting to note here the declaration of Patañjali that '*jñeya is alpa*' (*Yogasūtra* 4.31).
38. *Milindapanho* (Ed. Vadekar, Bombay, 1940), p. 105.
39. तस्मादनुष्ठेयगतं ज्ञानमस्य विचार्यताम् ।

कीटसङ्ख्यापरिज्ञानं तस्य नः कोपयुज्यते ॥

दूरं पश्यतु वा मा वा तत्त्वमिष्टं तु पश्यतु ।

प्रमाणं दूरदर्शी चेदेते गृध्रानुपास्महे ॥ *Pramānavārtika*, I. 33, 35

[Tr. Therefore, think about his knowledge of what one should do (to remove internal impurities). At what stage is his knowledge of the number of worms useful to us (who desire emancipation)? He may or may not see far but he does see the desired essentials (i.e. essentials desired by those who want to remove impurities). If the far-seeing one is the authority (in these spiritual matters), then we who desire emancipation should worship vultures.]

40. ...विकल्पेन्द्रियज्ञाने...च सहोत्पद्यन्ते । *Manorathavṛtti*, II. 502-503
41. विकल्पाः क्रमभाविनः । *Pramāṇavārtika*, II. 502
42. चक्षुःश्रोत्रादिज्ञाने च सहोत्पद्यन्ते । *Manorathavṛtti*, II. 505-506
यतः समानेन्द्रिययोर्नास्ति, न भिन्नेन्द्रिययोः षण्णां युगपदुत्पत्तिरिति वचनात् । *Nyāyabindu-tīkātippanī*, p. 29
43. जडप्रकाशायोगात् प्रकाशः । *Sāṅkhyasūtra*, 1.145
प्रकाशस्वरूप एव पुरुषः । *Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya*, 1.145
44. *Yogabhāṣya*, 1.7
45. *Pramāṇavārtika*, II. 327
46. सर्वचित्तचैतानामात्मसंवेदनम् । *Nyāyabindu*, I. 10
47. In the Sāṅkhyā-Yoga philosophy *darśana* belongs to *puruṣa*. *Puruṣa* being absolutely changeless nothing can obstruct his *darśana*. Hence these thinkers have not recognized any obstructive veil with regard to *darśana*. They have recognized obstructive veils with regard to *jñāna* which belongs to *citta* alone (*tadā sarvāvaraṇamalāpetasya jñānasya...Yogasūtra* 4.31). The Buddhists have recognized *jñeyāvaraṇa*. The term '*jñeyāvaraṇa*' suggests both the *āvaraṇas*, viz. *jñānāvaraṇa* and *darśanāvaraṇa*. But the Jainas have explicitly posited two *āvaraṇas*, viz. *jñānāvaraṇa* and *darśanāvaraṇa*.
48. औपचारिकनयश्च ज्ञानप्रकारमेव दर्शनमिच्छति । शुद्धनयः पुनरनाकारमेव सञ्चरते दर्शनमाकारवच्च विज्ञानम् । *Tattvārthabhāṣya-Siddhasenagaṇiṭikā* (= TBST), 2.9
49. एतावानुपयोगो भवन् भवेद् यदुत ज्ञानरूपो दर्शनरूपश्चेति, नातोऽन्य उपयोग समस्ति । ननु च ज्ञानदर्शनाभ्यामर्थान्तरभूत उपयोगोऽस्त्येकान्तनिर्विकल्पः...तदेतत् सर्वमयुक्तमुक्तम् । TBST, 2.9
50. तदा लोकमलोगं च जिणो जाणति केवली । *Dasakāliyasutta*, 4.45
51. *Sūyagada*, 1.2.2.31 and 2.6.50
52. अन्यच्च यस्मिन् समये सकलकर्मविनिर्मुक्तो जीवः सञ्जायते तस्मिन् समये ज्ञानोपयोगोपयुक्त एव; न दर्शनोपयोगयुक्तः दर्शनोपयोगस्य द्वितीयसमये भावात्... । *Karmagrantha-svopajñātikā*, 1.3
53. When Up. Yaśovijayaṇī discusses the view of successive occurrence of *kevalajñāna* and *kevaladarśana* he gives this as one of the possible alternatives. He says : अथ निर्विकल्पकसमाधिरूपछद्मस्थकालीनदर्शनात् प्रथमं केवलज्ञानोत्पत्तिः... । *Jñānabinduprakaraṇa* (Singhi Jaina Series-16), p. 38. Up. Yaśovijayaṇī is absolutely right in conceiving this alternative

but he seems to be wrong in rejecting it.

54. स उपयोगो द्विविधः-साकारोऽनाकारश्च । आकारो विकल्पः, सह आकारेण साकारः । अनाकारस्तद्विपरीतः, निर्विकल्प इत्यर्थः । *Tattvārthabhāṣya*, II. 9; *TBST*, II. 9
55. जं सामण्णगहणं दंसणमेयं विसेसियं णाणं । *Sanmatitarkaprakaraṇa*, 2.1
जं सामण्णगहणं भावाणं णेव कट्टुमायारं । अविसेसिदूणं अट्टे दंसणमिदि भण्णए समए ॥
Brhaddravasyasaṅgraha 43; also *Karmaprakṛti*, 43; *Pañcasāṅgraha*, 1.138; *Gommaṭasāra Jivakāṇḍa*, 481.
56. उपयोगक्रमश्च दृष्टव्यः - प्रागनाकारः पश्चात् साकार इति, प्रवृत्तौ क्रमनियमः, यतस्तु नापरिमृष्टसामान्यो विशेषाय धावति । *TBST*, II. 9.
57. न ज्ञानं प्रमाणं सामान्यव्यतिरिक्तविशेषस्यार्थाक्रियाकर्तृत्वं प्रत्यसमर्थत्वतोऽवस्तुनो ग्रहणात् । न तस्य ग्रहणमपि सामान्यव्यतिरिक्ते विशेषे ह्यवस्तुनि कर्तृकर्मरूपाभावात् । तत् एव न दर्शनमपि प्रमाणम् । *Dhavalā*, 1.1.4
58. सामान्यविशेषात्मकबाह्यार्थग्रहणं ज्ञानं, तदात्मकस्वरूपग्रहणं दर्शनमिति सिद्धम् । *Ibid*, 1.1.4
59. See foot-note No. 54
60. दर्शनपूर्वं ज्ञानमिति छद्मस्थोपयोगदशायां प्रसिद्धम् । *Jñānabindu-prakaraṇa*, p. 43
61. ततोऽस्य ज्ञानदर्शनावरणान्तरायप्रकृतीनां तिसृणां युगपत् क्षयो भवति । *Tattvārthabhāṣya*, X.1
62. होउ णाम केवलणाणदंसणाणमक्कमेणुप्पत्ती, अक्कमेण विणट्ठावरणत्तादो, किंतु केवलणाण-दंसणवजोगो कमेण चेव होति । *Kasāyapāhuda* (The D. Jain Sangh Grantha-mala) 352
63. ...केवलिनो युगपत् सर्वभावग्राहके निरपेक्षे केवलज्ञाने केवलदर्शने चानुसमयमुपयोगो भवति । *Tattvārthabhāṣya*, I. 31
64. ...क्षायिकज्ञानमवश्यमेव सर्वदा सर्वत्र सर्वथा सर्वमेव जानीयात् । *Pravacanāsāra-Tattvadīpikā*, 1.47
65. “ईश्वरस्यानीश्वरस्य वा विवेकजज्ञानवतस्तदभाववतो वा ‘सत्त्वपुरुषयोः शुद्धिसाम्ये केवल्यम्’” इत्यप्युक्तम्, विवेकजं केवलज्ञानमन्तरेणोक्तशुद्धिसाम्यस्यैवानुपपत्तेः । *Pātañjalayogadarśana-vyākhyā*, *Vibhūtipāda*.
66. *Pt. Sukhlalji's Commentary on Tattvārthasūtra* (L. D. Series No. 44) pp. 18-19.
67. जुगवं वट्टइ णाणं केवलणाणिस्स दंसणं च तहा ।
दिणयरपयासतापं जह वट्टइ तह मुणेयव्वं ॥ *Niyamasāra*, 159
68. यदेव केवलज्ञानं तदेव केवलदर्शनमिति वादिनां च महावादिश्रीसिद्धसेनदिवाकराणाम्..... । *Jñānabinduprakaraṇa*, p. 33

69. *Sanmatitarkaprakaraṇa*, 2.13
70. एकस्मिन् समये केवलज्ञानोपयोगे वृत्ते ततोऽन्यस्मिन् केवलदर्शनोपयोग इति, एवं सर्वकालमवसेयम्। *TBST*, I. 31
71. ...ओहिणाणेण...जाणइ पसइ। *Nandisutta* (Mahavir Jain Vidyalaya Ed.) p. 11
72. According to the Sāṅkhya-Yoga thinkers, *puruṣa* is the seer and *citta* is the knower. Objects of *puruṣa*'s seeing (*darśana*) are the *cittavṛttis* of his own *citta*. *Puruṣa* can never see the *cittavṛttis* of the *citta* that belongs to another *puruṣa*. This philosophy recognizes the possibility of the *jñāna* of *paracitta* (rather *paracittavṛtti*) but it rejects the possibility of *darśana* of *paracitta* (rather *paracittavṛtti*). Buddhists have attributed both knowing and seeing to *citta*. Yet they seem to hold that one *citta* can know *paracitta* but it cannot see *paracitta*. Seeing of the *citta* amounts to experiencing the *citta* - *svasamvedana*. How can one experience the *paracitta*? This same logic has compelled the Jainas to reject *manahparyāyadarśana*. We feel that the Jaina term '*manahparyāyajñāna*' is somewhat misleading.
73. ज्ञानबिन्दुप्रकरण पृ० १८।
74. ततो केवली - ओहिनाणकेवली, मणपज्जवनाणकेवली, केवलनाणकेवली। *Sthānāṅgasūtra*, 3.4.220
75. फासो रसो यं गंधो वण्णो सहो यं पुगला होति ।
अक्खाणं ते अक्खा जुगवं ते नेव गेहंति ॥५६॥ *Pravacanasāra*, I. See also *Tattvārthasūlokavārtika*, I. 30
76. *Prabhācandracārya*, the author of *Nyāyakumudacandra*, seems to accept the possibility of the simultaneous occurrence of pure sensations (*darśanas*) due to five sense-organs. He says : दीर्घ-शष्कुलीभक्षणादौ युगपदपि ज्ञानोत्पत्तिप्रतिपादनात्। *Nyāyakumudacandra*, p. 271
77. The Sāṅkhya-Yoga thinkers have recognized pure sensations. They do not call them *darśanas*. They call them *indriyavṛttis*. These *indriyavṛttis* are to be regarded as pure sensations so long as they do not give rise to *cittavṛtti* (= *buddhivṛtti* = *adhyavasāya*) and hence do not involve thought due to mental operation. Two or more *indriyavṛttis* due to five *jñānendriyas* can occur simultaneously. This is what they believe.
- श्रोत्रादिवृत्तिरविकल्पिका रूपादिषु पञ्चानामलोचनमात्रमिष्यते वृत्तिः।। *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, 29. क्रमशोऽक्रमशश्चेन्द्रियवृत्तिः। *Sāṅkhyasūtra*, 2.32

78. सव्वस्स केवलिस्सा जुगावं दो नत्थी उवओगा । *ĀvaśyakaNiryukti*, 973

79. *Tattvārthaslokavārtika*, I. 30

Anantavīrya seems to accept the possibility of simultaneous occurrence of a pure sensory cognition and a conceptual cognition. He goes even a step further and declares that there can take place *savikalpaka* perception of one thing and thought of another thing simultaneously. He says : ननु यदा गोविनिश्चयो न तदा अश्वविकल्पना, जैनस्य युगपद् उपयोगद्वयानुपपत्तेरिति चेत्, मानसं सममुपयोगद्वयं नेष्यते न इन्द्रियमानसे... । *Siddhivinīścayaṭīkā*, p. 113

Akalaṅka, the author of *Siddhivinīścaya*, holds this view. See *Siddhivinīścaya* p. 112.

Āc. Hemacandra also accepts this view. He writes in his *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* (I. 1.26) as follows : न पुनरविकल्पकं दर्शनमात्रम् 'अवग्रहः' । न चायं मानसो विकल्पः,.... प्रतिसङ्ख्यानेनाप्रत्याख्येयत्वाच्च । मानसो हि विकल्पः प्रतिसङ्ख्यानेन निरुध्यते, न चायं तथेति न विकल्पः ।

This view of Akalaṅka, Anantavīrya and Hemacandra accepts the possibility of simultaneous occurrence of a *savikalpaka* perception of one thing and a thought of another thing. This practically and theoretically amounts to the acceptance of simultaneous occurrence of two thoughts. This seems to be an objectionable stand that they have taken. They should not have gone to such an extent. But their theory of *pramāṇa* seems to have forced them to do so.

80. *Six Philosophies of India*, Vol. II, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*. (Gujarati), Nagin J. Shah, pp. 170, 467-469.

81. The Sāṅkhya-Yoga thinkers accept the possibility of simultaneous occurrence of a pure sensation (*indriyavṛtti*), a thought (*saṃkalpa=manovṛtti*) and a judgement (*cittavṛtti=buddhivṛtti = adhyavasāya*).

युगपच्चतुष्टयस्य तु वृत्तिः । *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudi*, 30 ...तदा खल्वस्यालोचन-सङ्कल्पाभिमानाध्यवसाया युगपद् एव प्रादुर्भवन्ति ।

82. *Dasakāliyasutta*, 4.4.8

83. चित्तं चेतणा बुद्धिं, तं जीवतत्त्वमेव । *Agastyaśiṃhacūrṇi*, *Dasakāliyasutta*, 4.4

84. घटप्रासादप्रदीपकल्पं संकोचविकासि चित्तं शरीरपरिमाणाकारमात्रमित्यपरे प्रतिपन्नाः ।

Yogabhāṣya 4.10. एवमपरे साङ्ख्या आहुरित्यर्थः । *Yogavārtika*, 4.10

ESSENTIALS OF DHARMAKĪRTI'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

(BASED ON THE PRAMĀNAVĀRTTIKA)

Dharmakīrti (c. 550-600 A.D.) is a brilliant Buddhist logician. In this article we shall study his views regarding the main problems pertaining to his theory of knowledge.

While discussing what constitutes the object of perception, Dharmakīrti considers a *prima facie* view. To put it in simple language, this view maintains that the object of perception is a physical aggregate which is something over and above the individual atoms that constitute it.¹ As against this view, Dharmakīrti submits that the object of perception are these atoms themselves, which as a result of combining with one another develop the capacity to become visible instead of remaining invisible - his point being that a physical aggregate is nothing over and above its constituent atoms². In reply to a query of Dharmakīrti the opponent suggests that a variegated colour-patch which is something over and above its constituent colours is a case of an aggregate standing over and above its constituent elements. Dharmakīrti refuses to agree and argues that a variegated colour-patch too is nothing over and above its constituent colours³. At this stage the opponent raises a point which gives an altogether new turn to the controversy; for he says that if a variegated colour-patch is not something unitary then our cognition of this colour-patch too cannot be something unitary (and it goes without saying that a piece of cognition is something unitary)⁴. Dharmakīrti meets the point by urging that there is something essentially enigmatic about a thing becoming an object of cognition inasmuch as this thing exists outwards while cognition is something oriented inwards⁵. His concluding argument is that since we know one object as different from another on the basis of our cognition of these objects and since our cognition of an object is something essentially enigmatic, there in fact exist neither objects different from one another nor pieces of cognition different from one another, but just something which is essentially single, devoid of any difference (this something to be called *vijñapti* - meaning

“cognition as such”)⁶. This is the ultimate view of reality as Dharmakīrti sees it, and he tells us that if he nevertheless continues to speak of things existing independent of cognition (and pieces of cognition noticing these things), it is because he has deliberately turned a blind eye towards this ultimate view⁷. Elsewhere too he declares that the view according to which there exist no objects independent of cognition is the learned man’s view⁸ (the implication being that the view according to which there exist objects independent of cognition is the common man’s view). And yet the fact remains that Dharmakīrti’s almost entire treatment of logical problems - which practically constitute his one subject-matter - works on the supposition that there exist objects independent of cognition (it is only in the case of a few minor problems that room has been made for alternative theses that do away with this supposition). With a view to demonstrating the validity of this basic assessment of Dharmakīrti’s performance, a summary review of his treatment of logical problems is undertaken in what follows.

Svalakṣaṇa is Dharmakīrti’s word for a thing as a unique-particular — that is, as a particular object existing at a particular place at a particular point of time. And it is Dharmakīrti’s view that *svalakṣaṇas* alone constitute real reality⁹. In most contexts of logical discussion, *svalakṣaṇas* are supposed to be physical, but actually to say that a *svalakṣaṇa* is necessarily physical would mean endorsing materialism, a doctrine refuted at length in the very first chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*. So, a *svalakṣaṇa* can be either a physical object existing at a particular place at a particular point of time or a mental state occurring at a particular place or at a particular point of time. A mental state¹⁰ can be of the form of a cognition, a feeling, a conation or the like; but in a broad sense each is said to be of the form of cognition (*jñānarūpa*) because each is cognised itself (*sva-samvidita*) just like a piece of cognition strictly so called. The mental states belonging to one particular individual form a series where an immediately preceding member acts as chief-cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) in relation to the immediately succeeding one, all members being strictly momentary in duration. A physical object too is of the form of a series of strictly momentary states where the relation of chief-causeship obtains in a similar fashion¹¹. The one common feature of all physical *svalakṣaṇas* - a feature in the absence of which a thing will be no physical *svalakṣaṇa* - is the ‘capacity to act on sense-organs and thus produce sensory experience in the cogniser concerned’¹². By way of contrast a thing could

be a mental *svalakṣaṇa*; but in most cases while contrasting a physical *svalakṣaṇa* to something else what Dharmakīrti has in mind is a different thing altogether. The reason is that for all practical purposes Dharmakīrti understands by *svalakṣaṇa* a physical *svalakṣaṇa* and contrasts it with *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* which is another crucial concept of his logic¹³. If *svalakṣaṇa* alone constitutes real reality then the conclusion is automatic that a *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* lacks real reality¹⁴. But what is *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*? By *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, Dharmakīrti understands an abstract generic feature which real things are found to exhibit now here now there, and he denies real reality to it not because real things do not really exhibit it but simply because it is not itself a real thing - which is a truism. As a matter of fact, Dharmakīrti's own treatment of perception and inference - the only two means of valid cognition recognised by him - goes to make clear as to how vital a role is played by *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* in each. Thus perception is here identified with the bare sensory experience which an object produces in the cogniser concerned, but it is at once admitted that perception thus understood serves no practical purpose unless followed by the attribution of an abstract generic feature - a *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* - to the object perceived. Similarly, inference is an impossibility unless the relation of invariable concomitance is observed to obtain between the probans and the probandum concerned, but this relation obtains not between a probans and a probandum conceived as two particular things but between them as possessed of this or that abstract generic feature - this or that *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. Yet Dharmakīrti feels that there is nothing anomalous about his emphatic denial of real reality to a *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, and there are two reasons for this. First, Dharmakīrti finds it rather easy to point out loopholes in the concept of *sāmānya* as upheld by the philosophers belonging to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā schools, and this misleads him into thinking that all talk about 'an abstract generic feature really characterising a real thing' must be erroneous. Secondly, Dharmakīrti feels, mistakenly of course, that there results nothing incongruous in case an abstract generic feature is conceived negatively rather than positively; e.g. on his view it would be erroneous to suppose that all cows share in common the positive feature 'cowhood' but not at all erroneous to suppose that they share in common the negative feature 'absence of non-cows', a misconceived view.

Some details of Dharmakīrti's treatment of perception (*pratyakṣa*) and non-perceptual cognition (*anumāna*) are also noteworthy. Thus he

defines perception as that type of cognitive activity which is altogether devoid of *kalpanā*. Now *kalpanā* is Dharmakīrti's word for thought and since bare sensory experience (also bare self-cognition) seems to be the only type of cognitive activity altogether devoid of a thought-element the surmise is natural that Dharmakīrti equates perception with bare sensory experience (also bare self-cognition). The surmise is amply confirmed by what Dharmakīrti says in this connection. Here it will be useful for us to confine our attention to the case of bare sensory experience (taking note of the case of bare self-cognition when necessary). Dharmakīrti argues that a *svalakṣaṇa* is really real because it possesses the capacity to perform a function (*arthakriyākāritva*), 'capacity to perform a function' being his equivalent for 'capacity to enter into a causal relationship'.¹⁵ And by way of denying real reality to a *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* he says that it is not possessed of the capacity to cause cognition, the idea being that the capacity to cause cognition is the minimum condition that a really real object must satisfy.¹⁶ A physical *svalakṣaṇa* satisfies this condition by acting on a sense-organ and thus producing sensory experience concerning itself while a *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* fails to satisfy it because it becomes an object of cognition without actually causing cognition.¹⁷ *Kalpanā*, to be equated with thought, is Dharmakīrti's word for the type of cognition which makes a *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* an object of itself, and so the net purport of his argumentation is that thought concerning an object is not caused by this object while sensory experience concerning an object is caused by this object. It can easily be seen that Dharmakīrti is here drawing our attention to the important fact that sensory experience is an essentially physiological process and thinking an essentially psychological one, the former governed by the physiological laws of sense-object interactivity, the latter by the psychological laws of 'association of ideas'. This becomes evident from Dharmakīrti's repeated emphasis that there is much arbitrariness about a piece of thinking and little of it about a piece of sensory experience. Thus two persons even when seated at the same place at the same time will think of very different things depending on their respective life-histories, but they will have the same sensory experience in case the same physical object acts on the same sense-organ of theirs.¹⁸ Dharmakīrti has also given consideration to the nature of cognition as such, a nature to be shared both by sensory experience and thought. In this connection two points have been emphasised and they

need separate treatment :

(1) Thus in Dharmakīrti's view a piece of cognition has impressed upon itself the form of its object; in other words, identity of form (*sārūpya*) is the relation that obtains between a piece of cognition and its object. In the case of sensory experience, the object is active on its part and so it is this object that is supposed to impress its own form on the corresponding piece of cognition; but in the case of thought this much alone can be said that the cognition concerned has somehow got impressed upon itself the form of its object. Here Dharmakīrti has polemised at length against the philosophers who maintain that a piece of cognition is devoid of form in the sense that it has got impressed upon itself no form of its object. His point is that one piece of cognition cannot be distinguished from another unless two happen to bear the form of their respective objects.¹⁹ Dharmakīrti specially emphasises that on the rival view all cases of memory should turn out to be identical; for, so runs his argument, a piece of memory cognises a past cognition, but if one piece of past cognition does not differ from another, one piece of memory too should not differ from another.²⁰

(2) Then Dharmakīrti is of the view that a piece of cognition is necessarily self-cognitive, and this is how he argues his case : 'All our dealing with the things of the world is based on our cognition of these things, but our cognition cannot play this role if it itself remains uncognised. And it will not do to say that one piece of cognition is cognised by a subsequent piece of cognition, for this subsequent piece of cognition too cannot play its role if it itself remains uncognised. So one is bound to face the contingency of an infinite regress unless one concedes that a piece of cognition is necessarily self-cognitive.²¹ Here too Dharmakīrti has polemised at length against the rival philosophers and here too he has made special reference to the phenomenon of memory. Thus he points out that the cognition of a word takes place by way of recalling the earlier heard cognitions of the different letters that go to constitute this word, but that no such recall can take place unless the cognitions in question were cognised at the same time they took place; but, so runs his argument, if each of these cognitions is cognised not by itself but by another cognition, then what should take place, though it never does take place, is that the cognition of the first letter of the word is followed by the cognition of this cognition; then follows the cognition of the second letter to be followed by the cognition of this cognition, and so on and so forth.²²

Besides, another point has been made. Since it is always possible to have memory of a past cognition and since no such memory can take place unless this past cognition was cognised at the time it took place, this past cognition - unless selfcognised - must have been immediately followed by a cognition of itself; and since the consideration that applies to the original cognition also applies to the cognition of this cognition, this second cognition must have been immediately followed by a cognition of itself, and so on and so forth. The result would be, so thinks Dharmakīrti, that on the rival view one should spend one's whole life-time cognising an object, then cognising this cognition, then cognising this new cognition, and so on and so forth.²³

One aspect of Dharmakīrti's discussion on the nature of cognition as such deserves separate consideration. For in the relevant portion of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, *Pratyakṣapariccheda* (vv. 300-541), he has come out with a detailed and repeated defence of idealism²⁴. The venture is rather intriguing because it puts in serious jeopardy the findings in Dharmakīrti's own earlier treatment of logical problems. Thus the most conspicuous and crucial feature of Dharmakīrti's logic is the sharp distinction drawn between sensory experience and thought, a distinction which crucially hinges on a clear-cut admission of the reality of physical objects; on the other hand, the central aim of idealism is to deny that there exist any real physical objects. Little wonder that it is the same language Dharmakīrti uses both when speaking about thought in the context of logical problems and when speaking of sensory experience in the context of his defence of idealism.²⁵ For example, he earlier tells us that the sensory experience of fire is different from the thought of fire because the former takes place when fire as a physical object acts on an appropriate sense-organ while the latter takes place when some association of ideas reminds one of fire; but later he argues that the sensory experience of fire too takes place not because of the presence of fire as a physical object but because of some sort of association of ideas. Likewise, Dharmakīrti earlier makes a serious attempt to distinguish a genuine sensory experience from an illusory one by pointing out that the former takes place in the presence of a corresponding physical object, the latter in the absence of any such object²⁶; but later he argues that an alleged genuine sensory experience too takes place in the absence of any physical object, thus emphatically falling prey to illusory sensory experience²⁷. All this makes it incumbent on a serious student to sharply distinguish Dharmakīrti the logician from

Dharmakīrti the idealist. Tradition itself, Buddhist as well as Brahmanical, distinguishes between Dharmakīrti's theses developed from the standpoint of Sautrāntika realism and those developed from the standpoint of Yogācāra idealism, and broadly speaking it is the former that characterises Dharmakīrti the logician, the latter Dharmakīrti the idealist. Indeed, almost all characteristic theses developed by Dharmakīrti in the field of logic have to be understood exclusively from the standpoint of realism. There is perhaps only one thesis that constitutes an exception in this connection, for in its case Dharmakīrti has thought it proper to formulate an idealist version along with the realist one. This is his thesis on *pramāṇaphalabhāva* i.e. on what constitutes a means of valid cognition and what constitutes its result. It is of a highly technical character but deserves notice because of its availability in two versions. Thus, adopting the realist standpoint, Dharmakīrti argues that since a piece of valid cognition manages to apprehend its object because it bears the form of this object, here the means of valid cognition is 'this piece of cognition bearing the same form as its object (*arthasārūpya*)', and the result produced is 'this piece of cognition apprehending its object (*arthādhigati*)'²⁸. But from the idealist standpoint there exist no objects independent of cognition, while it is owing to the agency of nescience that a piece of cognition gets split into something-that-is-grasped (*grāhya*) and something-that-grasps (*grāhaka*); so that what this piece of cognition apprehends is nothing but itself. Hence, adopting this standpoint, Dharmakīrti maintains that in the case of a piece of cognition the means of valid cognition is 'this piece of cognition assuming the form of something-that-grasps (*grāhakabhāva*)', and the result produced is 'this piece of cognition apprehending itself (*svasaṃvadana*)'²⁹, the object of valid cognition being 'this piece of cognition assuming the form of something-that-is-grasped (*grāhyabhāva*). For the rest, in the manner already hinted, Dharmakīrti the idealist simply seeks to puncture what Dharmakīrti the logician so strenuously seeks to establish. It is difficult to fathom the precise intentions that lay behind Dharmakīrti's adopting so anomalous a procedure, but that there was something essentially extralogical about them seems certain, for otherwise it remains incomprehensible why the master-logician should indulge in the wanton game of intellectual suicide. Within the Buddhist camp idealism was certainly a Mahāyāna novelty, but realism was as old as Buddha himself and its latest outstanding defence had come from the Sautrāntika school. So in defending idealism Dharmakīrti was perhaps only paying homage

to the fashion of the day, but when the question was of raising a well-constituted edifice of logical doctrine he based himself on the solid ground of Sautrāntika realism. But then the realist position itself suffered from an inherent difficulty which idealists exploited to the full. The difficulty pertained to the problem of envisaging a tangible relationship between a piece of cognition and the physical object that serves as its object. If, as was maintained by the realist, cognition and things physical belong to two different realms of reality, it is really difficult to see how the two stand related to each other. The idealist came out with the argument that since all that we know of physical things we know through cognition, there is no warrant to suppose that there at all exist physical things independent of cognition. This was a wreckless solution of a genuinely difficult problem, but the realist alternative virtually amounted to confessing that the relation between cognition and things physical is a relation *sui generis*, an alternative equally suspect. So the controversy went on and on. It is not accidental that in the discussion noticed by us in the beginning of the present investigation, Dharmakīrti deserted the realist position only when he realised that there was something essentially enigmatic about the relation alleged to obtain between a piece of cognition and its object. And in his subsequent defence of idealism he adopts the usual idealist practice of taking full advantage of the very difficulty here brought to light. So Dharmakīrti the logician's account of cognition as such deserves some further consideration.

Dharmakīrti has attributed to cognition two essential characteristics, viz. (1) its bearing the form of the object concerned and (2) its cognising itself. Now cognition being *ex hypothesi* something non-physical and its object being something physical it has to be admitted that cognition can bear the form of its object only in some figurative sense, the net import of Dharmakīrti's thesis being that a piece of cognition must possess some such characteristic as makes it the cognition of this object rather than that; and as thus put, the thesis is thoroughly unexceptionable though also platitudinous. So according to Dharmakīrti the only essential characteristic of cognition is that it cognises itself (Dharmakīrti himself emphasizes the point by saying that the relation of 'bearing the same form' is possible between any two objects whatever, so that this is not what distinguishes a piece of cognition from what is not cognition)³⁰. But the difficulty with this characteristic is that it contains reference to cognition itself and so cannot serve as a defining characteristic of cognition. Thus judged from

the standpoint of formal correctness, Dharmakīrti's definition of cognition turns out to be defective. Yet in the course of describing cognition he has said things that prove to be of material worth in the task of defining cognition. A tolerably correct definition of cognition should be 'the activity on account of which a particular sensory stimulation becomes the signal for a particular motor response.' Thus when, taking its clue from the sensory stimulation caused by a physical object, an organism acts in relation to this object and finds it useful, this clue becomes a confirmed signal for the presence of the object thus proved to be useful; likewise, when under similar conditions the organism finds the object harmful, the clue concerned becomes a confirmed signal for the presence of the object thus proved to be harmful. In both cases appropriate relationships are established between the concerned elements of the sensory-motor apparatus; it is the employment of these earlier established relationships that constitutes memory, an activity which plays so crucial a role in converting a 'trial and error clue' into a confirmed signal. This much is broadly true of all living organisms but in the case of man something qualitatively new emerges as a result of the employment of words. Thus through a mere verbal instruction a man can be taught to treat a particular sensory stimulation as a signal for the presence of a particular object, useful or harmful, though in this case too better results follow when verbal instruction is accompanied by the actual causing of the concerned sensory stimulation. All this is directly relevant for an intelligent appreciation of Dharmakīrti's position. Thus he is of the view that the sensory stimulation produced by an object in a person makes this person cognise this object in its entirety. But Dharmakīrti has himself taught that right cognition is that which enables one to undertake successful activity in relation to its object, while it seems obvious that bare sensory experience enables one to undertake successful activity in relation to its object only when elements of this experience are recognised as a signal for the presence of this object. The anomaly has not escaped Dharmakīrti's own attention but his solution of it is extremely roundabout. For this is how his thought runs : "When an object produces sensory stimulation in a person this person certainly comes to cognise this object in its entirety, but soon after he falls under an illusion and unless this illusion of his is removed he is not in a position to undertake successful activity in relation to this object. Thus after a jar has produced sensory stimulation in a person he falls under an illusion and

says to himself, 'the object lying there is not a jar', this illusion of his is removed by somehow producing in him thought to the effect 'the object lying there is not a non-jar'. Similarly, after seeing smoke-on-the-mountain a person falls under an illusion and says to himself, 'this mountain possesses no fire'; this illusion of his is removed by somehow producing in him thought to the effect 'this mountain is not a non-possessor of fire'. In the former case the illusion is removed by pointing out such elements of sensory experience as signalize the presence of a jar; in the latter case the illusion is removed by pointing out such elements of sensory experience as signalize the presence of smoke and then recalling the universal rule, 'Wherever there is smoke there is fire'. This is the intended meaning of Dharmakīrti's famous couplet : *tasmād dr̥ṣṭasya bhāvasya dr̥ṣṭa evākhilo guṇaḥ / bhrānter niścīyate neti sādhanam sampravartate* //¹, a meaning through which the strength as well as the weakness of his position stand out most conspicuously. Dharmakīrti very correctly realises that sensory stimulation produced by a physical object is the indispensable starting point for all cognition concerning this object, his mistake lies in identifying this sensory stimulation with an all-comprehending cognition concerning this object; similarly, his description of how elements of sensory experience become a signal for the presence of the corresponding physical object is essentially correct, his mistake lies in supposing that this signalling activity is always preceded by an illusion concerning the identity of this object. Here we also get an inkling as to why Dharmakīrti assigns an essentially negative rather than positive function to thought; in his eyes, thought is primarily meant to remove an illusion and only incidentally to produce a conviction. However, here another line of thought has also been operative. For what thought reveals about an object is what is common to several objects but Dharmakīrti is of the view that each object has got just one positive nature which it does not share with any other; so according to him what several objects have in common is not any positive feature but just that feature which excludes them from everything else (i.e. what jars have in common is what excludes them from non-jars). In this way Dharmakīrti also feels justified in maintaining that bare sensory experience reveals the total nature of an object while a piece of thought concerning it reveals only an aspect of this nature. For sensory experience reveals an object as a bare particular, i.e. as something excluded from everything else, while a piece of thought reveals it as excluded from a particular set of objects;

and Dharmakīrti suggests that 'exclusion from everything else' constitutes the total nature of an object while 'exclusion from a particular set of objects' constitutes but an aspect of this nature. All this is very much confusing, but is the true indicator of the somewhat odd workings of Dharmakīrti's mind. Perhaps, the most odd is his contention that bare sensory experience reveals a thing's total nature whose partial aspects are alone revealed by thought, only a little less odd his contention that thought notices as belonging in common to several objects features that are exclusively negative in import. However, reading between the lines one can easily see that Dharmakīrti has an almost correct understanding of the relative roles played in the knowledge-situation by bare sensory experience on the one hand and thought on the other, as also of the type of objective features - whether exclusively negative or otherwise - that thought manages to notice.

Notes

1. PV (= *Pramāṇavārttika*, ed. Rāhul Sāṅkṛtyāyana), II. 194
2. *Ibid.*, II. 195-196
3. *Ibid.*, II. 200-202
4. *Ibid.*, II. 208
5. *Ibid.*, II. 212
6. *Ibid.*, II. 213-214, 217-218
7. *Ibid.*, II. 219
8. *Ibid.*, II. 398
9. *Ibid.*, II. 165-166
10. *Ibid.*, II. 249-280
11. This is the central contention that emerges in the course of all his defence of momentarism. For the momentary character of a mental state is seldom under dispute.
12. PV, III. 166
13. The so important Svārthānumānapariccheda of the *Pramāṇavārttika* and the author's own commentary on it are substantially concerned with the problem of *sāmānya*.
14. PV, III. 166
15. *Ibid.*, III. 165
16. *Ibid.*, II. 5, 50

17. *Ibid.*, II. 39
18. *Ibid.*, II. 175-176
19. *Ibid.*, II. 301-319
20. *Ibid.*, II. 374-387
21. *Ibid.*, II. 423-484
22. *Ibid.*, II. 485-502
23. *Ibid.*, II. 503-541
24. *Ibid.*, II. 320-373, 388-422
25. *Ibid.*, II. 336
26. *Ibid.*, II. 288-300
27. *Ibid.*, II. 361-363
28. *Ibid.*, II. 306
29. *Ibid.*, II. 364
30. *Ibid.*, II. 429-430
31. *Ibid.*, III. 44

Pakṣadharmatā and *Vyāpti* are the two logical grounds of inference. That is to say, in case we happen to possess the knowledge that two objects or objective characters (say, x and y) are such that y exists wherever x does (*vyāptijñāna*) and also the knowledge that a particular thing possesses x (*pakṣadharmatājñāna*), there ensues the inferential knowledge to the effect that this thing possesses y. We infer fire on the hill from the smoke rising from it. Thus for this inferential knowledge viz. 'there is fire on the hill' to be valid we should first be certain that the smoke in question rises from *the hill*; and this knowledge we get through perception. From this it will be clear that *pakṣadharmatājñāna* is usually a judgment of perception. Hence the problem of the acquisition of the knowledge that a particular mark (middle term) resides in the subject or locus (minor term) in which we want to prove the presence of the major term does not present any serious difficulty. But merely this knowledge does not validate inference. In addition to the knowledge of *pakṣadharmatā* we should possess the knowledge of *vyāpti*, that is, the knowledge that the middle term is invariably connected with the major. We can infer fire from smoke only when we know that smoke is invariably connected with fire. An inference requires the knowledge that there obtains a universal relation between the concerned middle term and major term. Now, in connection with *vyāpti* we will have to consider three questions: (i) what do we exactly mean by universal relation (*vyāpti*)?; (ii) how many types of universal relations are there? and (iii) how do we come to acquire the knowledge that a particular relation is universal?

To take the first question, *vyāpti* is the technical name for the relation obtaining between the middle term and the major term while this relation is of such a nature that the middle is never present where major is absent. Thus *vyāpti* is not a simple assertoric judgment but it is a necessary judgment. 'Smoke is accompanied by fire' is an assertoric judgment while 'smoke must be accompanied by fire' is a necessary judgment. *Vyāpti* is a necessary judgment having the form 'this happening that must happen.' If the relation between the middle

and the major terms were not necessary, how can the conclusion be certain ? That the relation between the two terms is necessary implies that it is universal. Thus *vyāpti* is a necessary and universal statement of the relation holding between the middle and the major, e.g. 'all men are mortal.' It is not a summary statement of some totality of observed events. 'All men are mortal' is not the 'short-hand' of 'John is observed to be mortal, Lucy is observed to be mortal, Dick is observed to be mortal, etc.' It does not refer merely to the observed cases but to the unobserved ones as well. *Vyāpti* contains a *leap* from the observed to all, observed and unobserved. It contains a prediction of the unknown events on the basis of the known ones. What is the justification for taking such a leap ? Or how do we acquire the knowledge of all events on the basis of the observation of some of them only ? This is the fundamental problem which has proved 'dispair of philosophy.' Before we take up this problem for discussion it would be proper to consider the second question, viz. whether the number of universal-necessary relations is fixed.

Dharmakīrti holds that there are only two necessary connections – causality and essential identity.¹ What is the logic behind the acceptance of these two necessary connections only ? This logic is as follows. That one thing is necessarily connected with another means that the existence of the former is necessarily dependent upon the existence of the latter. Now one thing's existence could necessarily depend on the existence of another only under two conditions. One thing's existence necessarily depends on another's if the latter causes the former or if the latter is a part of the essence of the former. There is no other condition that makes the existence of one thing necessarily depend on the existence of another thing. Hence Dharmakīrti asserts that the relation of causality and that of essential identity are the only two necessary relations.²

In the Sūtras of Kaṇāda we find a tendency to reduce the necessary connections to a fixed number.³ But it is given up later on.⁴ The established tradition of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools is to regard the necessary connections as innumerable and inexhaustible.⁵ Hence they repudiate the Buddhist view that there are only two necessary connections – that of causality and that of essential identity.

In order to show that there are necessary connections other than those of causality and essential identity they cited many instances of

inference that are ordinarily deemed valid but the relation between the major term and the middle term of which is not ordinarily recognised as either that of causality or that of essential identity. Thus, for example, the rise of the sun in the morning is inferred from its rise on the previous day; high tide in the sea is inferred from the rise of the moon; the forthcoming appearance of the *kṛttikā* constellation is inferred from the appearance of the *bharaṇi* constellation; impending rainfall is inferred from the movements of ants and also from some peculiar overt features manifested by fish, etc. All these are instances of invariable sequence which is not founded on causality. Again, we infer the particular taste of a fruit from its particular colour. Yet the relation obtaining between the two is not founded on causality because they arise simultaneously whereas causality is a relation of necessary sequence. Nor could it be held that in this case there obtains the relation of essential identity because – so would say the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas – the taste in question and the colour in question are two quite *different* qualities residing in one substance.⁶

The Jaina logicians in general and Akalaṅka in particular cite similar cases in order to refute the Buddhist logician's position. Akalaṅka's criticism is based on a general understanding that the simultaneous occurrence of two things does not necessarily suggest that they are essentially identical and that the successive occurrence of two things does not necessarily suggest that they are causally related. As for the *vyāpti* based on essential identity, Akalaṅka does not deny that it is a case of necessary simultaneous existence of *hetu* and *sādhya*. But he goes on to point out that there are cases of necessary simultaneous existence of *hetu* and *sādhya* where the relation between *hetu* and *sādhya* is not that of essential identity; nevertheless these latter are the cases of valid *vyāpti* according to Akalaṅka. Thus Akalaṅka finds out instances where two phenomena are invariably simultaneous but have no relation of essential identity. Though at this juncture he refers to the inference of a particular flavour from a particular colour yet he is conscious of the fact that it could not be of much help to him because on the non-absolutistic theory of Jaina metaphysics he could not deny that there does obtain the relation of identity between the flavour in question and the colour in question. As they are inseparable and are the qualities of one substance they will have to be treated as somewhat identical. So, he gives other instances of inference ordinarily accepted as valid – in which the objects denoted

by the major and the minor, though simultaneous, are not essentially identical. We infer the downward movement of one scale of a balance from the upward movement of the other scale. In this case though the two movements are invariably simultaneous the relation between them cannot be construed as that of essential identity. This seems to be the case because the two movements have different substrata.⁷

Coming to the cases of *vyāpti* based on the relation of necessary succession between *hetu* and *sādhya*, Akalaṅka points out that even if some of these are the cases of causal relationship between *hetu* and *sādhya* the others are not. Thus he finds out instances where though two things are invariably successive yet they are not causally related. Such for example is the inference of the previous appearance of the *bharaṇī* constellation and the forthcoming appearance of the *rohiṇī* constellation from the rise of the *kṛttikā* constellation. The *kṛttikā* appears invariably after the appearance of the *bharaṇī* and the *rohiṇī* appears invariably after the appearance of the *kṛttikā*. Yet they are not causally related with one another. Merely on the ground that the *kṛttikā* appears after the appearance of the *bharaṇī* we could not assert that the *kṛttikā* is caused by the *bharaṇī*. Certainly, the stars forming the constellation *bharaṇī* do not generate the stars forming the constellation *kṛttikā*. Thus Akalaṅka proves the possibility of there being necessary sequence even without causality.⁸ Like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians the Jaina logicians refute the Buddhist position but unlike the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians they recognised only four necessary connections. They are; (1) Relation of simultaneity based on essential identity, (2) Relation of simultaneity which is necessary without any apparent reason, (3) Relation of succession (sequence) based on causality, (4) Relation of sequence which is necessary without any apparent reason.⁹

In reply to this usual criticism the Buddhist logicians point out that the alleged additional necessary relations are traceable to causality, if causality is rightly understood. We infer a particular taste from a particular colour. Here the two are simultaneous, yet there obtains between them no relation of essential identity. The necessary dependence of one on the other and vice versa is due to the fact that both of them are the co-effects of certain causal conditions that are available when the fruit in question attains the requisite stage of ripeness. The necessary sequence of the appearance of the *bharaṇī*, the *kṛttikā* and the *rohiṇī* is caused by certain cosmic changes. The relation between certain overt features manifested by fish and the forthcoming

rain is necessary because they are the co-effects of atmospheric changes. In this manner all these necessary relations can be reduced to that of causality.¹⁰ This shows the insight of the Buddhist logicians into the nature of causality. It is their fundamental tenet that between two independent phenomena there can be no necessary relation other than that of causality. [Dharmakīrti has repeatedly stated this in his *Pramāṇavārtika* as we have seen earlier.] This helps them to be thorough in their study of causality. Moreover, the emphasis put on causality in the Pāli canon might have stimulated the Buddhist philosophers to probe deep into the phenomenon of causality.

As we shall see, this Buddhist position somewhat helps the Buddhists to answer the third and difficult question, viz. how do we acquire the knowledge that a particular relation is necessary and universal.¹¹ Those who posit innumerable necessary connections cannot say that a particular relation is necessary because it is based on either causality or essential identity. Even the Jaina logicians are here not in a better position than their Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika counterparts. The former have accepted two types of necessary connections in addition to those based on causality and essential identity; but the acceptance is without any (apparent) reason. A relation cannot be established as necessary merely by swearing that it is necessary. So, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Jaina logicians have to find out other means of justifying the necessity of a particular connection.

Some hold that the knowledge of necessary connection (*vyāpti*) is acquired by a single act of sense-perception. For example, the necessary connection between smoke and fire is grasped at the time of the very first observation of the two together.¹² On the very face of it this view is untenable. The object of sense-perception is something existing at the present time and place while the necessary connection between smoke and fire expresses their relation in all times and places. So, we cannot grasp the necessary relation between two things at the time of the first observation of the two together.¹³ Some have modified this view. According to them, though it is not possible for a sense-organ to grasp the necessary connection at the first observation, it can do so at the time of the final observation. Why? It is so because at the latter time the capacity of the sense-organ is much more enhanced as a result of repeated observations. Thus at the time of the final observation the relevant sense-organ, assisted by the revival of the memory impressions of previous observations, grasps the necessary connection between two

things.¹⁴ This view also is unsound and for the following reasons. Auxiliary conditions can only enhance the natural capacity of a cause proper to produce the effect concerned but they cannot generate in this cause proper quite a new capacity or nature that may enable it to produce an effect not proper to its type. The nature of perception is to grasp objects here and now. And auxiliary conditions like revival of the memory impressions formed as a result of repeated observations can enhance the capacity of perception to grasp such objects but certainly they cannot change the nature of perception and enable it to grasp objects remote in time and place.¹⁵ According to some, it is mental perception that grasps necessary connections;¹⁶ but this view also fares no better than the one just considered, because in the case of external things mind cannot function independently of the sense-organs while necessary connections (in the case of external things – which are the things usually considered in this connection) are something external.¹⁷ Mind even when assisted by repeated observation cannot perceive necessary connection. Repeated observation may at the most produce in a mind the habit of expecting an event at the time of perceiving its usual attendant. It cannot validate the idea of necessary connections. 'Logically, multiplication of instances is superfluous, for, an inductive inference which cannot be derived from one instance cannot be derived from a thousand instances.' Experiences, positive and negative, cannot establish the necessary connection.¹⁸ Nor could it be held that it is inference that grasps necessary connections. For, it might be asked as to which inference grasps a necessary connection – the inference requiring the knowledge of necessary connection or another one. The first alternative involves the fallacy of mutual dependence; the second involves an infinite regress.¹⁹ The Jaina philosophers opine that reasoning (*tarka*) based on the observation and non-observation of the co-occurrence of two objects together gives us the knowledge of a necessary connection between the two.²⁰ But this opinion could not be justified. How can *tarka* based on a limited number of observations and non-observations of two objects together give us certain knowledge to the effect that one of them *must always* accompany the other? The Jainas seem to have been conscious of this difficulty as they often say that at the time of realising the necessary connection between two objects a man attains the status of a mystic.²¹ Some Naiyāyikas are of the view that a relation must be treated as necessary if our doubt as to its necessity were to bring our everyday behaviour or practice to

a standstill. As for instance, if one doubts that smoke is necessarily produced by fire he would not try to get fire for the purpose of igniting his cigar.²² But this view is not sound because our practice is not based on the absolute certainty of knowledge. Do people have the absolute certainty that the train by which they travel shall not meet with an accident ? They do not have. Yet they travel by the train. This shows that certainty is not essential for our everyday practice.²³ The Naiyāyikas seem to be conscious of the fact that the method of agreement, the method of difference, the joint method of agreement and difference, the non-observation of any contradictory instance (*vyabhicārāgraha*) and even the method of practical contradiction (*tarka*) could not give us the knowledge of necessity or absolute certainty. So, they posited a type of extra-ordinary (*alaukika*) perception which involves no sense-operation and yet grasps the necessary and universal connections. To this perception they give the name *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. This perception enables a cogniser to become directly aware of all the past, future and present instances of a class of objects through observing the 'universal' commonly residing in the objects. When we perceive fire and smoke we also perceive the universals 'fireness' and 'smokeness' and through this latter perception we perceive all the actual and possible instances of fire and smoke.²⁴ But this view of the Naiyāyikas is nothing more than a hypothesis formulated in order to solve the problem of induction. It is not a fact of experience.²⁵ Not only the Naiyāyikas but the Jainas also posit some extra-ordinary experience supposed to grasp necessary connections. Even the Buddhist philosopher Prajñākara-gupta offers a similar explanation. According to him yogic perception is the means of cognising necessary connections.²⁶ We shall call these theories by one name 'intuition theories.' As it was impossible for these ancient philosophers to give up the ideal of certainty and necessity, they took refuge under the shelter of intuition. But to take shelter under intuition is to escape from the difficulty rather than solve it. Again, the intuition of any and every individual person does not possess so much authenticity and universality as to be made the basis of a sound and commonly accepted philosophy. That the connection is necessary cannot be established either by non-observation or by observation – this is endorsed by Dharmakīrti. The observation of positive instances (*sapakṣas*) is not enough to prove that the relation is universal and necessary. The mere non-observation of one object without another in

a limited number of negative instances too cannot assure us that there will be no instance in future of the presence of the former in the absence of the latter. But, he says, when it is known that A is either the cause or the nature of B then, since it is inconceivable that a thing can ever come into existence without its cause or can ever exist without its nature, we know the necessary connection of B with A.²⁷ Here Dharmakīrti assumes two things : (i) Every thing has a cause. (ii) The same cause always uniformly produces the same effect. We may grant that there is a general or broad regularity in the universe, that is, no thing is causeless (or natureless). But even then how are we to know that the cause which we have discovered in a particular instance will necessarily be the cause of similar things also in future ? To be more clear, we may admit that every event has a cause. Every event may have a cause, but the same cause need not always produce the same effect, nor the cause of the same effect be always the same. The human will, for example, is a cause, but it does not always act in the same way under the same circumstances; to-day in a given situation I may act meanly; but it is possible that in a situation of the same kind I may act better to-morrow. To take another instance, it is not logically necessary that heat should cause bodies to expand rather than contract. We may accept that every event has a cause, but whether causes act uniformly, whether the same cause in the same situation always has the same effect can never be determined with *certainty*. Similarly, we can never assert with *certainty* that the specific gravity of mercury will always be 13.6 a number which is found to constitute the nature of mercury in observed cases.

To this Dharmakīrti's reply is as follows. Whatever is a cause of a particular type of thing remains for ever the cause of that type of thing. To think otherwise, namely, that one type of cause does not always produce only one type of effect is to go against logic. Y cannot be treated as an effect of X even in a single case if *all* Y is not an effect of some X. It is so because we call X the cause of Y, only if X invariably produces Y. Moreover, to say that at times Y is produced by X and at times it is produced by something other than X, that is non-X, would mean that Y possesses two contradictory natures. Again, this would suggest that the nature of a thing does not depend on its cause; and to grant this suggestion would mean that the thing comes into existence without any cause. This, in turn, would make it eternal and consequently devoid of efficiency which is the criterion of reality.

So, one type of effect can never be regarded as being produced at times by this type of cause and at times by that type of cause. When we feel that there are instances of one type of effect at times being produced by this type of cause and at times by that type of cause (e.g. scorpions being generated at times by cowdung and at times by scorpion-parents) our feeling is not justified. We commit a fallacy of non-observation. The two effects produced by two different types of cause are not really of one type. We are deceived by their outward similarity. A close scrutiny and examination may reveal the traits which turn them into different types.²⁸

But this does not solve the problem. We ask Dharmakīrti as to how he determines that there obtains a causal relation (i. e. the relation of *necessary* sequence) or an identity relation (i. e. the relation of *necessary* simultaneity) between two things. Experience cannot give us the knowledge of *necessary* sequence or *necessary* simultaneity. It gives us the knowledge of mere sequence or mere simultaneity. Thus the notorious problem of induction remains unsolved. It is not easy for Dharmakīrti to show how one acquires the knowledge of causality or identity, i. e. of necessary sequence or necessary simultaneity. But he does not take recourse to the idea of a direct transcendental perception of these two necessities as was done by other philosophers including even Prajñākara-gupta. Looking to the general trend of his philosophy we may surmise that the following might be the solution at the back of his mind. Buddhist logicians hold that we directly perceive nothing but point instants; thus on their view perception is nothing but a running multiplicity of sensations without any connections or order in them. It is only the Intellect (*vikalpa-buddhi*) that constructs a system or order out of them through the instrumentality of the two necessities in question. Thus these two necessities are not derived from experience but in fact precede experience and make the world orderly and intelligible. In this sense they are *apriori*. This means that according to the Buddhist logicians there is no uniformity, universality and order in the universe. It is the Intellect (*vikalpa-buddhi*) that imparts order and uniformity to the world. They are superimposed by it on the external reality. The universe is really not a cosmos but a chaos, so to say. The pure sensations as such represent what reality is and they being chaotic what they represent should also be regarded as chaotic. Some one might urge here that the Buddhist logician too should be regarded as considering the world to be uniform and regular because

they too uphold that one point instant is always caused by the point instant immediately preceding it. The Buddhist logician would however argue that this is a generalisation which intends to predicate of the unique particulars something that is common to them, while as a matter of fact the particulars being unique have nothing common to them. Thus it involves a selfcontradiction to make any generalisation in the case of the unique particulars, and any attempt to do so should be viewed as futile. The causality (relation of necessary sequence) that is said to obtain between two point instants is as unique as the point instants themselves. In this sense, it seems, causality is not denied by the Buddhist logician. It is rather the empirical causality that he refuses to treat as real. We ordinarily conceive causality as a relation over and above the relata and subsisting in them but in reality – so says the Buddhist logician – causality is identical with the concerned couple of point instants and it does not subsist in the two because the two are never simultaneous.²⁹ The Buddhist logician's denial of causality (empirical) may have a further implication. Causality (empirical) without uniformity and necessity is inconceivable. Causality means the principle that the same cause always produces the same effect on different occasions. But in the world of unique particulars how can this principle have its sway? As soon as we think away the uniformity and necessity suggested by the words 'same' and 'always' occurring in the statement of causal principle causality loses all its meaning. To say that though a thing does have a cause it does not have the same cause always is to give up causation in favour of chance. And as it is impossible to think of any uniformity or necessity in the case of unique particulars it is better to deny causality outright and declare it to be unreal. Causality does not have its sway in the realm of reals – particulars. Could this not be the implication of the Buddhist logician's denial of causality in the case of real things themselves? Thus it is the empirical causality and not the transcendental causality, that is denied by the Buddhist logician.³⁰ Uniformity and order as such are the creation of Intellect (*vikalpa-buddhi*). Intellect creates and superimposes them on the particular discrete reals where they are virtually absent. So, it is only the concepts that are necessarily related with one another and not the external things themselves. And ultimately, what we infer is also a concept. We mistake this concept for something real. Yet this mistake leads to successful purposive action because the concept in question

is generated only by some select individuals and no others, that is, by the individuals that are capable of performing the action in question.

Thus according to Dharmakīrti, the necessities are *apriori*. They are present to the Intellect or mind prior to all experience. He holds that our mind is so made that from the very beginning it faces nature in the expectation that the latter will be uniform. The experience here plays only a psychological part, that is, it simply makes us conscious of a notion which the mind already possessed. In other words, experience is but an occasion for calling forth this notion into consciousness.³¹ This *apriori* view of Dharmakīrti is a natural deduction from the metaphysical doctrine of momentarism and its epistemological counterpart, viz. sensationism.

Notes

1. वस्तुतस्तादात्म्यात् तदुत्पत्तेश्च । *Nyāyabindu* II. 22
2. अतस्त्वभावस्यातदुत्पत्तेश्च तत्राप्रतिबद्धस्वभावत्वात् । *Nyāyabindu* II. 23
See also Dharmottara's comment on the same.
3. अस्येदं कार्यं कारणं सम्बन्धि एकार्थसमवायि विरोधि चेति लौकिकम् । *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*, IX, 18
4. शास्त्रे कार्यादिग्रहणं निदर्शनार्थं कृतम्, नावधारणार्थम् । *Praśastapādabhāṣya* (with *Vyomavatī* etc. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series No. 61) p. 562
5. तस्माद् यो वा स वाऽस्तु सम्बन्धः केवलं यस्यासौ स्वाभाविको नियतः स एव गमको गम्यश्चेतरेः सम्बन्धीति युज्यते । *Nyāyavārtikatātparyāṭikā* (Kashi Sanskrit Series No. 24), p. 165
6. तद्यथा अध्वर्युः ओम् श्रावयन् व्यवहितस्य हेतुर्लिङ्गम्, चन्द्रोदयः समुद्रवृद्धेः कुमुदविकाशस्य च, शरदि जलप्रसादोऽगस्त्योदयस्येति । एवमादि तत् सर्वमस्येदमिति सम्बन्धमात्रवचनात् सिद्धम् । *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, p. 563
See also *Vyomavatī* on the same; *Nyāyavārtikatātparyāṭikā*, pp. 161-163; *Nyāyamañjarī* (Kashi Sanskrit Series No. 106), pp. 113-118
7. तुलोन्नामरसादीनां तुल्यकालतया न हि ।
नामरूपादिहेतुत्वं न च तद्व्यभिचारिता ॥
तादात्म्यं तु कथञ्चित् स्यात् ततो हि न तुलान्तयोः । सास्नादीनां... चन्द्रार्वाक्परभागयोः । *Akalāṅkagranthatraya*, p. 75
See also *Siddhiviniścaya*, 6.15

8. भविष्यत् प्रतिपद्येत शकटं कृत्तिकोदयात् ।
 श्र आदित्य उदेतेति ग्रहणं वा भविष्यति ॥
 तदेतद् भविष्यद्विषयमविसंवादकं ज्ञानं प्रतिबन्धसङ्ख्यां प्रतिरुणद्धि । *Akalaṅkagranthatraya*, p. 5. See also *Siddhivinīścaya* 6.16
9. सहक्रमभावनियमोऽविनाभावः । सहचारिणोः व्याप्यव्यापकयोः सहभावः । पूर्वोत्तरचारिणोः कार्यकारणयोश्च क्रमभावः । *Parīkṣāmukha*, III. 16-18
10. एकसामग्र्यधीनस्य रूपादे रसतो गतिः ।
 हेतुधर्मानुमानेन... ॥
 ...एतेन पिपीलिकोत्सरण-मत्स्यविकारादेः वर्षाद्यनुमानमुक्तम् । तत्रापि भूतपरिणाम एव वर्षाहेतुः पिपीलिकादिसंक्षोभहेतुरिति । *Svārthānumānapariccheda*, p. 5
 See also *Dharmottarapradīpa*, pp. 115-116
11. कार्यकारणभावाद् वा स्वभावाद् वा नियामकात् । अविनाभावनियमो... ॥ *Svārthānumānapariccheda*, p. 13
12. तत्पूर्वकमित्यनेन लिङ्गलिङ्गिनोः सम्बन्धदर्शनं लिङ्गदर्शनं चाभिसम्बध्यते । *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. 1.5 लिङ्गलिङ्गिसम्बन्धदर्शनमाद्यं प्रत्यक्षम्, लिङ्गदर्शनं द्वितीयम् । *Nyāyavārtika* (Ed. Vindhyeshvariprasada Dvivedi, 1916), p. 44
 See also *Nyāyadarśana* (Bengali translation of *Nyāyabhāṣya* with notes etc by Phanibhusana) Vol. I, p. 135
 Read the following passage : अत्रोच्यते वह्निधूमादीनां तावत् संयोगादिसम्बन्धः प्रत्यक्षादिभिरवसीयते । तत्रापि संयोगो विशेषणत्वेन गुणादीनां द्रव्यपरतन्त्रस्वभावत्वात् । विशेष्यतया च स्वतन्त्रभूतं द्रव्यं प्रकाशते । देशकालावपि विशेषणत्वेनैवावभासतः । सन्निहितदेशवर्तमानकालता हि इदंता । सा च विशेषणमेव । एवं च देशकालाभ्यां संयोगादिसम्बन्धेन च विशिष्टौ द्रव्यभूतौ वह्निधूमौ अवगम्येते न पुनर्देशकालाभ्यां सम्बन्धस्य विशिष्टस्यावगतिः । तथा हि संयुक्ताविमाविति प्रतियन्ति न पुनरयमनयोः संयोग इति देशकालावच्छिन्नः प्रथममग्निधूमयोः संयोगलक्षणो सम्बन्धो द्वयोरवगम्यते ।
Prakaraṇapañcikā (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series No 17), p. 70
13. न हि प्रत्यक्षं 'यावन् कश्चिद् धूमः कालान्तरे देशान्तरे च पावकस्यैव कार्यं नार्थान्तरस्य' इति इयतो व्यापारान् कर्तुं समर्थं सन्निहितविषयबलोत्पत्तेरविचारकत्वात् । *Akalaṅkagranthatraya*, p. 5
 See also *Bhāmātī* (Nirṇayasāgara), p. 766
14. ...भूयोदर्शनबलादग्निधूमयोर्देशादिव्यभिचारेऽप्यव्यभिचारग्रहणम् । *Vyomavati*, p. 570
 प्राचीनानेकदर्शनजनितसंस्कारसहाये चरमे दर्शने चेतसि चंकास्ति धूमस्य वह्निनियत-स्वभावत्वम् । *Kāśikā on Śloka-vārtika*, Anumāna., kā. 12

15. न खलु प्रदीपसहकृतं चक्षु रसादौ प्रवर्तमानं प्रतीयते । स्वविषये प्रवर्तमानस्य अतिशयाधानं च अध्यक्षस्य व्याप्तिविषयत्वे सिद्धे सिद्धचेत् । तच्चासिद्धम्, सम्बद्धवर्तमानार्थविषयत्वात् तस्य । न च तत्सहकृतस्यापीन्द्रियजाध्यक्षस्य कश्चन उत्कर्षो जायते, येन स्वविषयाति-क्रमेणाप्यर्थान् गृहणीयात् । *Nyāyakumudacandra*, p. 430
16. तत्र केचिदाचक्षते मानसं प्रत्यक्षं प्रतिबन्धग्राहीति । प्रत्यक्षानुपलम्भाभ्यामनलसहचरितमनग्रेष्ठ व्यावर्तमानं धूममुपलभ्य विभावसौ नियतो धूम इति मनसा प्रतिपद्यते । मनश्च सर्वविषयं केन वा नाभ्युपेयते । असन्निहितमप्यर्थमवधारयितुं क्षमम् । *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 110-111
तस्य ग्रहणं प्रत्यक्षानुपलम्भसहायात् मानसात् प्रत्यक्षात् । धूममग्निसहचरितमिन्द्रियेणोपलभ्य अनग्रेष्ठ जलादेर्व्यावर्तमानमनुपलम्भेन ज्ञात्वा मनसा निश्चिनोति धूमोऽग्निं न व्यभिचरतीति । *Nyāyakalikā* (Prince of Wales Series, Kashi), p. 3
17. प्रत्यक्षं मानसं येषां सम्बन्धं लिङ्गलिङ्गिनोः ।
व्याप्त्या जानाति तेऽप्यर्थेऽतीन्द्रिये किमु कुर्वते ॥
यत्राक्षाणि प्रवर्तन्ते मानसं तत्र वर्तते ।
नोऽन्यत्राक्षादिवैधुर्यप्रसङ्गात् सर्वदेहिनाम् ॥ *Tattvārthaslokavārtika* (Nirnaya-sagara), pp. 179
न चातीतानागतानां व्यक्तीनां मनसा सङ्कलनमिति न्याय्यम्, मनसो बहिरर्थे स्वातन्त्र्ये अन्धबधिराद्यभावप्रसङ्गात् । *Kāṇḍalī* (Vizianagaram), p. 210
नापि मानसम्, मनसो बाह्येन्द्रियनिरपेक्षस्य बहिरर्थे प्रवृत्त्यभावात् । ...व्याप्तिश्च बहिरर्थधर्मत्वाद् बहिरर्थः । *Nyāyakumudacandra*, p. 431-432
18. अविनाभावनियमोऽदर्शनात् न दर्शनात् । *Pramāṇavārtika*, III. 30
19. नानुमानादसिद्धत्वात्... ।
नाप्यनुमानान्तरम्, सर्वत्राविशेषात् । *Akalaṅkagranthatrāya*, p. 5
20. उपलम्भानुपलम्भसम्भवं त्रिकालिकलितसाध्यसाधनसम्बन्धाद्यालम्बनमिदमस्मिन् सति एव भवतीत्याकारं संवेदनमूहापरनामा तर्क इति । *Parīkṣāmukha*, III. 7
सम्भवप्रत्ययस्तर्कः प्रत्यक्षानुपलम्भतः । *Akalaṅkagranthatrāya*, p. 100
21. तस्यापि व्याप्तिग्रहणकाले योगीव भवति प्रमाता सम्पद्यत इति । *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, p. 36
22. व्याघातावधिराशङ्का । *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, p. 23
See also *The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus*, p. 277
23. यत् ताषदुक्तं निश्चयेन प्रेक्षावतां प्रवृत्तिरिति तदसत् । संशयेनापि प्रवृत्तिदर्शनात् । *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* (GOS), p. 3
24. *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, kā. 64

25. तथा च सामान्यलक्षणां विना धूमत्वेन सकलधूमानां वह्नित्वेन सकलवह्नीनां च भानं कथं भवेत् तदर्थं सामान्यलक्षणा स्वीक्रियते । *Ibid*, kā. 65
26. कार्यकारणभावस्य विशेषेण विनिश्चये ।
अतीतानागतज्ञानमस्य भावि परिस्फुटम् ॥ *Pramāṇavārtikabhāṣya*, p. 329
यस्तु मन्यते प्रज्ञाकरगुप्तः योगिज्ञानं व्याप्तिज्ञानमिति । *Siddhivinīścayaṭīkā*, p. 189
27. कार्यकारणभावाद् वा स्वभावाद् वा नियामकात् ।
अविनाभावनियमोऽदर्शानात्र न दर्शनात् ॥ *Pramāṇavārtika*, III. 30 (with Dharmakīrti's Commentary)
28. कस्यचित् कदाचित् कुतश्चिद् भावेऽपि सर्वस्तादृशस्तथाविधजन्मेति कुतः; तथा च नान्वयव्यतिरेकौ इति चेत् । न । अतद्भाविनस्तस्य सकृदपि ततोऽभावात् । परस्परापेक्षया जन्यजनकस्वभावलक्षणे कार्यकारणे । तत्र यदि धूमोऽग्न्यादिसामग्र्या अन्यतोऽपि भवेत् तदा तज्जन्यस्वभावो न भवतीति सकृदपि ततो न भवेत् । अर्थान्तरवत् । नापि सामग्री तं जनयेत्, अतज्जननस्वभावत्वात् । सामग्र्यन्तरवत् । न च धूमस्य तदतज्जन्यः स्वभावो युक्तः । एकस्वभावत्वात् । धूमाधूमजननस्वभावात् भवतो धूमाधूमस्वभावः स्यात् । कार्यस्वभावानां कारणस्वभावकृतत्वात् । अकारणापेक्षणे चाहेतुकत्वप्रसङ्गात् । तस्माद् यो धूमजननः स अग्न्यादिसामग्रीविशेषो भवतीति कार्यकारणयोरेवं स्वभावस्य नियमात् तद्विजातीयाद् उत्पत्तिर्न भवति । तत् यादृशं कार्यं कारणाद् दृष्टमेकदा तत् तत्र व्यभिचरति । तेन सिद्धे कार्यकारणभावे कार्यस्य कारणेन व्याप्तिः सिद्धा भवति । ननु विजातीयादपि किञ्चिद् भवद् दृष्टं तद्यथा गोमयादेः शालूकादिः । न विजातीयाद् उत्पत्तिः । तथाविधमेव हि तादृशामादिनिमित्तमिति न कारणभेदः । प्रबन्धेन उत्पत्तौ शराद् भवति । अस्ति च गोमयेतरजन्मनोः स्वभावभेदः रूपस्याभेदेऽपि, न हि आकारतुल्यतैव भावानां तत्त्वे निमित्तम् । अभिन्नाकाराणामपि केषाञ्चिदन्यतो विशेषाज्जातिभेदो दृश्यते । *Hetubindu*, pp. 63-64
See also (*Pramāṇavārtika*-) *Svārthānumānapariccheda*, p. 15
29. कार्यकारणभावोऽपि तयोरसहभावतः । प्रसिद्धयति कथं द्विष्टोऽद्विष्टे सम्बन्धता कथम् ॥ *Sambandhaparīkṣā*, kā. 7 as quoted in *Prameyakamalamārtāṇḍa*, p. 509
30. *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I, p. 247, 4n
31. *Ibid*, p. 262

JAINAS ON TESTIMONY

The necessity of testimony is felt by all the Indian philosophers because all of them, alike, believe in the objects that are amenable neither to perceptual nor to inferential cognition. All would join hands with Vātsyāyana¹ who observes that objects like *svarga* etc. could be known only through testimony. But this does not mean that testimony cannot give us knowledge of perceptible things. It does. But, then, why should we make use of testimony in objects which are perceptible ? The answer to this question is not a difficult one. Man cannot progress if he were to depend on his own experience in all matters of perceptible objects and were not to accept the results of his predecessors; he would have to start anew every generation. Again, were he dependent upon his own experiences alone for his knowledge, his stock of knowledge would be very meagre, his mental outlook would be narrow and he could neither impart the results of his experiences to others nor could he become acquainted with their achievements. Hence the necessity of testimony to know even objects which are perceptible.

Testimony is defined as a 'word' of an authority.² What are the characteristic features of an authority ? Is it possible to know these features ? Is testimony a form of inference ? If it is, how is it reduced to inference ? If it is not, what are the fundamental differences obtaining between the two that render such reduction impossible ? How do we know the validity (*prāmāṇya*) of testimony ? These are some of the main topics of discussion that will engage one's attention while on an investigation, on testimony. It is intended to discuss the problem concerned under the two main heads : (A) Treatment of testimony upto the time of Jinabhadra, and (B) after the time of Jinabhadra. Under the second head, the views of the non-Jaina schools of Indian philosophy would also be taken into account.

(A) Treatment of Testimony upto the time of Jinabhadra

The *Anuyogadvārasūtra* recognises two types of *āgamas* (scriptures), viz., empirical (*laukika*) and transcendental (*alaukika*). The non-Jaina śāstras like the Vedas, the *Mahābhārata*, the seventytwo sciences and arts are included in the first category. The second type comprises

the Jaina śāstras only. With regard to the first type of śāstras, it is stated that they are the fanciful creation of perverse persons. But the śāstras falling under the head of transcendental āgama are composed by omniscient beings. It seems that in very early times only the words of Jina (omniscient person) were regarded as *pramāṇa* (valid), but gradually even the words of *śrutakevalin* and *daśapūrvī* came to be regarded as *pramāṇa*.³ Of course, the words of the latter were regarded as *pramāṇa* not independently but on the ground that they were always in consonance with the āgamas by Jinas. It is a belief among the Jains that only the *Caturdaśapūrvadhara* and *Daśapūrvadhara* are invariably possessed of the right attitude;⁴ hence there is no possibility of their stating things that may go against the āgamas by Jinas. Eventually, even the instructions of *sthavīras*, not found in the āgamas but visualised by them on the strength of their genius, also came to be regarded as *pramāṇa*.⁵ Thus, the *alaukika āgama* is further divided under two heads, *aṅgapraviṣṭa* and *aṅgabāhya*. One important thing to be noted here is that in the *Daśavaikālika-Niryukti* it is explicitly stated that though the words of a Jina are infallible and valid, one should give logical reason (*hetu*) and illustration (*udāharaṇa*) in their support.⁶

The above discussion shows that the *prāmāṇya-aprāmāṇya* of āgamas depend on the right or wrong attitude of the author. But there is another criterion also for its determination. All words are neutral, that is, neither *pramāṇa* nor *aprāmāṇa*. It is the attitude of the knower that makes them *pramāṇa* or *aprāmāṇa*. Thus, *prāmāṇya* or *aprāmāṇya* of words depends upon the attitude of the knower. If his attitude is right, whatever he knows becomes right and if his attitude is wrong, his knowledge derived from right scriptures also becomes wrong. Similarly, if the result of the knowledge of the *mithyā (laukika) śruta* (false scriptures) by a *mithyā-drṣṭi* (person of perverse attitude) turns out in the end to be the abandonment of the perversity, the *mithyā-śruta* (false scripture) is to be considered as *samyak-śruta* (right scripture).⁷

Umāsvāti gives the following synonyms of *śruta* : *āptavacana*, *āgama*, *upadeśa*, *aitihya*, *āmnāya*, *pravacana* and *Jinavacana*. He recognises two types of scriptures, viz., *aṅgabāhya* and *aṅgapraviṣṭa*. *Sāmāyika* etc. are included in the first type and the twelve *aṅgas* are included in the second type. What is the basis of this distinction ? The distinction is based on the types of teachers.⁸

Regarding āgama, Kundakunda observes : 'He who is free from all defects and is possessed of all pure qualities is the supreme authority.

The defects are hunger, thirst, fear, anger, attachment, delusion, anxiety, old age, disease, death, perspiration, fatigue, pride, indulgence, surprise, sleep, birth and restlessness. One free from all these defects and possessed of sublime grandeur such as omniscience is called the perfect One. Words proceeding from his mouth, pure and free from the flaw of internal inconsistency are called *āgama* (verbal testimony). In that *āgama*, the principles are enunciated.⁹ For him, absence of hunger, thirst and such things constitute some of the marks of an *āpta* (reliable person). Kundakunda's definition of *āpta* is based on the Digambara tradition. It is noteworthy that Kundakunda recognises coherence or internal consistency as the essential feature of a true scripture.

The systematic treatment of Jaina logic starts from Siddhasena Divākara. In his short treatise entitled *Nyāyāvatāra*, he defines *śabda* or verbal testimony as a valid knowledge which arises from a right understanding of the words (*tattvagrāhitayā*) that express the real object and are not contradicted by perception and one's own accepted system.¹⁰ Words characterised by the two above-mentioned characteristics come from the mouth of an *āpta* – authority. And the purpose of verbal testimony is to instruct, to relate the nature of reality, to be beneficial to all and to remove false notions.¹¹

In the *Daśavaikālika-Niryukti*, it is said that *āgama* stands in need of no proof; it is self-established; *hetu* and *udāharaṇa* are necessary only to elucidate the *āgama*. It did not occur to the persons of this period that even the *āgama* needs to be examined. They thought that they were composed by an omniscient person and hence infallible. But how could one know that they were really composed by an omniscient person when the author had left the world long ago? Some such consideration seems to be at the back of Kundakunda's mind when he states that the words of an *āpta* are free from internal inconsistency. He means to say that a particular work should be considered to have been composed by an *āpta* if there do not occur in it contradictory statements. But is it not possible to speak the untruth consistently? Again, is it not possible to have coherence in the body of knowledge in spite of its being wholly wrong? So, it seems that Siddhasena Divākara took a step in the right direction when he stated that verbal testimony to be *pramāṇa* must not be in conflict with perception in addition to its being self-consistent or coherent.¹² Later logicians like Samantabhadra,¹³ Akalaṅka¹⁴ etc. follow him in this matter and add that it should not be contradicted

by reason (*yukti*). Another statement of Siddhasena Divākara is significant. He says : Words expressing the real object and consistent with perception as well as with the whole body of the speaker's knowledge generate valid knowledge in the hearer provided he understands the import rightly. Even the words of an *āpta* may cause wrong knowledge if the hearer is not a proper person. Thus, to generate valid knowledge in the hearer, words should not only come from a reliable person but should also reach a person who is capable of understanding their true import.¹⁵ We surmise that the two ways of determining the validity of *āgama* are assimilated here into one by Siddhasena Divākara in his characteristic style, which renders his definition a considerable advance on the *āgamic* treatment of the problem.

In Jinabhadra little that is important is to be found on the subject. It is indeed surprising that at one place he states explicitly that *āgama* is a case of *anumāna*.¹⁶

(B) Treatment of Testimony after Jinabhadra

In Indian philosophy, there has raged a controversy on the point whether testimony is an independent source of knowledge or is merely a case of inference. The Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist philosophers regard it as a case of inference, while others, including Jaina logicians, consider it to be an independent source.

For a clear understanding of this controversy, it is necessary to know how we derive knowledge by testimony. First, we have the auditory or visual perception of the spoken or written sentence. Then we try to understand the meaning of a sentence. For understanding the meaning of a particular sentence, the knowledge of three things is necessary, *viz.*, that the words constituting it expect one another (*ākāṅkṣā*), that they have mutual fitness (*yogyatā*), and that they are continuous with one another in time and place (*sannidhi*). And, the knowledge of the expectancy, fitness and propinquity of the words in a particular sentence requires the application of general rules for their determination. But the mere understanding of the meaning of a sentence does not lead directly to the knowledge of things. For the knowledge of things what is necessary is the knowledge that the speaker is an authority even if he may not be so actually. As soon as one understands the meaning of a sentence and knows the speaker to be an authority, there arises in him the knowledge of things. Afterwards, if he wants

to ascertain the validity of the knowledge, he will have to examine whether his understanding of the meaning of a sentence is correct and whether his knowledge of the speaker's authoritativeness is true. Of the two, it is the second that requires close scrutiny and critical examination. So, the question as to how we can determine the authoritativeness of a speaker is of prime importance in testimony.

There are four conditions that characterise an *āpta* : (1) He should know correctly the fact stated by him. (2) He should have no desire to deceive others. (3) He should have a desire to speak out the truth. (4) He should have his sense-organs in perfect order. Out of these four, the first two are really important. Capacity to know things as they are and absence of the desire to deceive others are invariably related with freedom from narrow love and hatred.¹⁷ Dharmakīrti is right when he observes that universal love is the prime condition that makes a man reliable and truthful, i.e., *āpta*.¹⁸ A man impelled by universal love would never think of deceiving others and would always exert himself to know as precisely as possible the ways of freeing man from worldly misery. Even the Jainas hold the same view.¹⁹

It is interesting to note that the conditions regarded necessary to make a person an authority are more or less similar in all the systems of Indian philosophy. But opinions are divided on the question as to how to ascertain whether a particular person is an authority or not. A Jaina logician Akalaṅka recognises the possibility of the knowledge of internal quality, viz., absence of narrow love and hatred which, as we have already seen, makes a person an authority. He opines that man's good and bad overt behaviour is governed by and caused respectively by his internal good and bad qualities. And hence from the good overt behaviour we can infer the internal good quality, viz., absence of narrow love and hatred. But Dharmakīrti is of the opinion that the character of man is not easy to discern. The overt behaviour mainly depends on human will, and if a man wills to behave in such a fashion as would not disclose his internal qualities he can do so. He may be a hypocrite. He may put on the air of a righteous man, while he may not be so in reality. Even a villain may pretend to be virtuous. So, overt behaviour cannot always enable us to infer correctly the internal quality and ultimately the reliability or otherwise of a person.²⁰ So, he supplies us with another criterion for the ascertainment of authoritativeness or reliability. It is coherence in the body of what he has said and written,²¹ and non-contradiction of it by perception and inference.²² Even

Akalaṅka accepts this,²³ but he criticises Dharmakīrti's view that internal qualities could never be inferred legitimately from overt behaviour. A well-examined overt behaviour would always enable us to infer its cause, *viz.*, the internal quality. It is a rule that a well-scrutinised effect would never frustrate our efforts to infer its proper cause.²⁴

Of course, votaries of every system regard the scriptures of their faith as valid on the ground that they are not composed by persons smitten with narrow love and selfishness. The Mīmāṃsakas consider the Vedas as authorless and thus above the possibility of composition by a person with defects.²⁵ The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas maintain that they are composed by God who knows things as they are and is beyond attachment and hatred. The Jainas and Buddhists consider their scriptures to be the words of their masters who have freed themselves from the clutches of internal enemies and, as a result, developed transcendental vision.

Now, let us consider the point whether the knowledge derived through testimony is inferential. The Nyāya logicians hold that words are directly connected with things, though this connection with things is conventional or arbitrary. But that does not mean that words do not generate knowledge of things in those who have learnt the convention. They do generate the knowledge of things in persons acquainted with convention.²⁶ But they do not generate valid knowledge. In other words, they are not responsible for the generation of validity or invalidity in the knowledge. Validity and invalidity depend on *guṇa* and *doṣa* respectively. Here in the present context, authoritativeness or otherwise of the speaker constitutes, respectively, the *guṇa* and *doṣa* of the cause of the knowledge.²⁷ Thus, the attitude of the Nyāya logicians is that as soon as we understand the meaning of a sentence, we acquire the knowledge of things and if it is a sentence of an authority, the knowledge is valid. And, as, according to them the process of understanding the meaning of a sentence is not inferential,²⁸ even the knowledge of things through words should not be regarded as inferential. They consider the process of understanding the meaning to be quite different from that of perception, inference and the rest. The knowledge of things through words is an independent source of valid knowledge.

The Vaiśeṣika philosophers consider the knowledge of things through words to be a case of inference on the following grounds.

(1) According to the Vaiśeṣika philosophers, the process by which we understand the meaning of a sentence is inferential. Suppose somebody tells one that 'the river is fordable'. What kind of knowledge does one have when one understands that sentence? Is it inferential? If so, what is the probans? And, what is the probandum? As the syllogism has been stated in the *Dīpikā* in support of the Vaiśeṣika view, it would appear that the probandum is the total meaning of the entire sentence, i.e., of the whole group of words contained in the sentence, 'The river is fordable'. The group of words is the subject (*pakṣa*). The conclusion (*nigamana*) is: 'This group of words possesses a connected meaning, i.e., refers to the connection of the meanings of the words of this group.' The probans or mark is the fact that this is a group of words which have, in respect of one another, expectancy, suitability etc. The universal proposition expressing the invariable concomitance of the mark with the probandum is: 'Whatever is a group of words which have, in respect of one another, expectancy, suitability etc. refers to (or means) the connection of the meanings of these words'. An illustration to show that this universal proposition is true is any sentence employed by the person who attempts to understand the sentence, 'The river is fordable'.²⁹ Thus, it is by the process of inference that, after having heard the sentence, 'The river is fordable', one understands the total meaning of the sentence.

The generally accepted view that we arrive at the meaning of a sentence by applying rules of syntax and grammar, it seems, is here expressed in a different manner. Since the essence of inference is arriving at knowledge through the application of a general rule to a particular instance, this process of understanding the meaning which involves the application of general rules to a particular instance should be deemed inferential.

(2) Like the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas, too, hold that words are directly connected with things and that the connection is conventional. But unlike the Naiyāyikas, they are able to understand the implications of this conventional character of the relation. As the convention is dependent upon or governed by human will or desire, word *qua* word cannot generate the knowledge of things. Word *qua* word can generate only the knowledge of the intention of the speaker to convey a particular information in a person who has learnt the convention. It might be urged that if smoke can generate the knowledge of fire in the person who has learnt that smoke is a sign of fire, why should the word not generate the knowledge of the thing in the person who has learnt that that word

is a symbol of that thing ? This is so because a sign has always a physical and natural connection with the thing it signifies, while the symbol has merely a mental and arbitrary connection with the thing it symbolises. So, the sign gives us the knowledge of the thing, while the symbol gives us the knowledge of mental image or concept of the thing that is in the mind of the speaker. On this account through word *qua* word we cannot have knowledge of a thing, but only the concept of it in the mind of the speaker or, in other words, the intention of the speaker to convey a particular information. And, the word and the concept being invariably related, we infer the concept from the words. That is to say, from words *qua* words we infer only the intention of the speaker to convey a particular information.³⁰

(3) At times, they observe that through words we get the knowledge of things, but they add that this knowledge is inferential. They consider knowledge to be inferential because words give us the knowledge by the force of universal connection just as smoke gives knowledge of fire by the force of universal connection between smoke and fire. Sentences, when understood, serve as invariable marks of external things and facts. Though these marks have no natural relation with things, as shown above, they enable us to infer things, with certain qualifications *viz.*, that they are conventionally connected with things and that they are spoken by an authority. The adding of qualifications to the 'mark' does not prevent the case from being an inference. Even such an inferential mark as smoke used in inferring that there is fire on the hill is a valid mark only with certain qualifications, *e.g.*, the smoke rising upward in an unbroken connection with the ground.³¹

Thus, from all this it follows that according to the Vaiśeṣika philosophers, knowledge through words is inferential. Words *qua* words enable us to infer the intention of the speaker, while the words *qua* utterances of an authority enable us to infer the things. In other words, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, the mere understanding of a sentence cannot lead to the knowledge of things. For that the knowledge of the authoritativeness of the speaker as also the knowledge of the universal rule that the sentences spoken by an authority, when understood, do invariably point to facts, is necessary. Mere statement of an authority, unless we possess the knowledge that it is an invariable mark of the thing, does not generate the knowledge of that thing, just as smoke *qua* smoke does not generate the knowledge of fire unless we know it to be an invariable mark of fire. The Vaiśeṣika view that there are only

two sources of valid knowledge, viz., perception and inference, and that testimony is a case of inference is an original one but their explanation of how testimony can be reduced to inference seems to be borrowed from the Buddhist logicians. The fact that the Vaiśeṣika explanation tallies closely with the Buddhist one and that only in those Vaiśeṣika works that are later than Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti do we find the attempt to explain how testimony be reduced to inference corroborate our presumption.

Let us now see in what ways the Buddhist logicians reduce testimony to inference. For them, words have no connection whatsoever with the external things.³² Were they connected with the things, there would have been the relation either of causality or of essential identity between them. But there obtains neither of the two relations between the two. Words are not even conventionally connected with the things. They are conventionally connected with concepts. That is why it is said that words call forth concepts in the mind and concepts call forth the words. And, it is only on this account that words *qua* words give rise to cognitions that bear no form of the external things at all.³³ For example, the words 'there are hundreds of elephants dancing on a finger-tip' have no corresponding actual fact outside. Of course, the Buddhists would not deny the 'fact' that on hearing these words we are able to form or construct an image or concept, in our mind, of hundreds of elephants dancing on a finger-tip. But this concept or image is not an external fact.

This naturally means that from words we can infer the concept in the mind of the speaker. In other words, though the words and verbal statements are not connected with things and facts, they are invariably connected – for the persons who have learnt the relevant convention – with the concepts, rather the intention of the speaker. The verbal statements are the effects of the intention of the speaker. So, they enable us to infer the intention of the speaker.³⁴ But, do they enable us to infer the intention of the speaker in general or a particular intention? It is said that they enable us to infer both. The verbal statements *qua* verbal statements enable us to infer the intention in general, but the verbal statements *qua* utterances of a normal man enable us to infer the particular intention also. The verbal statements *qua* verbal statements, that is, verbal statements as are not determined to be of normal persons, enable us to infer merely their desire to speak. They cannot enable us to infer the desire to give expression to a particular information. This

is so because there are verbal statements that have no particular intention, *i.e.*, desire to express a particular information, as their cause. For example, a drunken man or a mad person speaks sentences without any particular intention. He has merely the desire to speak but not a particular desire, *i.e.*, the desire to convey a particular information. Thus, verbal statements *qua* verbal statements enable us to infer only the desire of the speaker to speak but the verbal statements *qua* utterances of a normal man enable us to infer his desire to convey a particular thing.³⁵ The desire of the speaker to convey a particular information is not always generated by actual fact. So, the knowledge of intention could not enable us to infer the fact.³⁶

We should note that the inference that enables us to infer only the intention cannot be regarded as a source of knowledge or *pramāṇa*, because it does not give us the knowledge of things and facts while a source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) gives us the knowledge of things and facts. We may call this inference of intention from words a source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) only by way of courtesy, considering the intention itself to be the fact. Thus, on the basis that verbal statements, when understood, enable us to infer the intention of the speaker, the Buddhist logicians could not regard this verbal knowledge to be a case of inference which is a source of knowledge of external things and facts.

The Buddhist logicians know this and are conscious also of the force of the objection. They, therefore, go one step further and observe that words or verbal statements not only indicate the speaker's intention but also enable us to infer the things and facts provided they are known to be spoken or written by an authority because it is a general rule that the words of an authority always correspond to facts.³⁷

They further observe that it is ingrained in man to take for granted the authoritativeness of a person or a scripture whose words are in tune with his desires or interests. Man accepts preceptors and scriptures as authoritative on matters pertaining to heavenly happiness and hellish tortures and the ways and means to attain and avoid them, respectively, because he craves for the one and shivers merely at the thought of the other, and there is no other valid knowledge to contradict them. But if a man is determined to lead his life in accordance with the words of the scriptures or the preceptors (*i.e.*, in accordance with the knowledge derived through those words), he should first examine and ascertain their authoritativeness which has so far been taken for granted.

It is on the authoritativeness that the validity of the knowledge derived through words depends.³⁸

Thus, for the Buddhist logicians, this is the process by which knowledge of facts or things through words and sentences is arrived at. Verbal statements are invariably connected with the intention of the speaker to convey a particular information. So, they enable us to infer merely the intention of the speaker. But as soon as they are known to come from the mouth or pen of an authority, they enable us to infer not only the intention but also facts because the intention of an authority to convey a particular information always coincides with actual facts. Now, the validity of this knowledge can be ascertained only after having examined and ascertained the authoritativeness of the speaker or writer. How the authoritativeness of a speaker or a scripture could be ascertained is an important problem which has already been discussed.

The Jaina logicians refute the Buddhist view that words do not lead directly to the knowledge of things. They observe that words are connected with things. Of course, though words and things, like Kṛttikā and Śakata constellations, are not related by natural and physical relation, they do have some invisible relation between them.³⁹ Again, they observe that though words have neither the relation of causality nor that of essential identity with things, they do have *yogyatā-sambandha* with them. The Buddhist logicians might urge that in the absence of these two relations how even this relation could be possible? The Jaina logicians observe that this relation is seen between the visual sense-organ and its object even in the absence of those two relations. Even the Buddhist logicians have recognised it. Were they to reject this, their position would come in conflict with experience and with their doctrine that the senseorgan is not in bodily contact with its object (*aprāpyakāritā*).⁴⁰ It might be urged that if there is *yogyatā-sambandha* between a word and its object, the object can as well serve as a denoter and the word as a denoted. This objection, say the Jain logicians, is illfounded, because capacities of things are definite.⁴¹ Some might say : If words are inherently capable of generating knowledge of things, they would generate it even in a man innocent of language. In reply, it is said that this does not happen because words generate knowledge of things only in those who have learnt the language or the convention. Convention means the man-made rule that a particular word would denote a particular thing. Just as smoke could not enable a man, who does not know that smoke is an invariable mark of fire, to infer fire, even so a

word could not enable a man who has not learnt the convention to know the thing.⁴² Someone might here insert a suggestion that convention being dependent upon and governed by the human will and human will being free, even the thing may become the denoter and the words the denoted. The Jaina logicians observe that just as an invariable relation between smoke and fire is natural, even so the relation between a word and a thing is natural. Convention merely makes us conscious of that relation in the same way as repeated observation makes us conscious of the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire.⁴³ Granted that there obtains a natural relation between them, one might, here, raise a question as to whether words generate knowledge of certain things or of all things. If the first alternative is accepted, nothing other than those certain things would be cognised through words even if hundreds of conventions are formed. If the second alternative is accepted, then, through a single word all things would be cognised at a time and consequently our activity with respect to a definite object would become impossible because all words would be capable of generating knowledge of all things. The Jaina logicians reply that this difficulty would not arise because though every word is capable of being related to any object, yet it would denote that object only with which it is conventionally connected.⁴⁴ Thus, words being connected with things enable us to know the thing. It might be objected that if the words were having *yogyatā-sambandha* with things, as the visual organ has with its object, then words would generate knowledge of external things without requiring any convention as the visual organ does. In answer, it is said that word is a *jñāpaka-kāraṇa* (revealing cause) and hence it requires the assistance of convention while visual organ is a *kāraka-kāraṇa* (generating cause) and hence it does not require any convention to generate the knowledge of its object. The visual organ, being the *kāraka-kāraṇa* of the knowledge of its object, generates it even when the cogniser has not learnt that there obtains an invariable relation between the organ and the knowledge generated by it. But words, like smoke etc., being just *jñāpaka-kāraṇas* cause the knowledge of objects only when one has learnt that there obtains an invariable relation between the mark and the marked.⁴⁵ The entire trend of the argument makes it clear that even the Jaina logicians, like the Nyāya logicians, are of the opinion that as soon as we hear the word, the knowledge of the thing is generated in us, and if the speaker is an authority, valid knowledge or the knowledge of things as they are is generated.

The Jaina logicians maintain that words enable us to know not only the intention of the speaker but external things also. The mere ground that the knowledge through words does not, at times, correspond to facts is not sufficient to establish that all knowledge through words is such and that words could not enable us to know things at all. They observe that if this be the reason for the Buddhist logician's acceptance of the position that words do not enable us to know things and that they enable us to know only the intentions of the speakers, they are labouring under a misapprehension because, sometimes, words, as in the case of *gotraskhalana* (mistake of pronouncing a different family name from the intended one) etc., are not used by the speaker according to his intention to convey some particular information and hence knowledge derived through words would not then correspond even to his intention to convey some particular information. But the Buddhist logicians deem it possible to know the intention through words inspite of the fact that all words are not used in accordance with the intention of the speaker. Similarly, they should recognise the possibility to know things through words even though all words do not describe the things as they are.⁴⁶ Again, those who think that words enable us to know intentions only, have to face an inconsistency when they state that Sugata is an authority as his words are true to facts, while others are not so as their words are not in accordance with facts, as also when they determine as to what statements are necessary for proving the fact syllogistically and what statements are not necessary for that.⁴⁷ This shows that the Jainas, like the Naiyāyikas, maintain emphatically that words lead to the knowledge of things directly.

But the question remains as to whether this knowledge of things derived through words is inferential. The Jaina logicians do not regard this knowledge to be a case of inference. The reasons given by them are as follow : (1) The objects of inference and testimony are not identical. The object of testimony is an unqualified thing while that of inference is the thing qualified by an attribute desired to be proved in it.⁴⁸ (2) Even their causes are not identical. Presence of the middle term in the minor term etc. (*pakṣadharmatvādi*) that are the necessary conditions of an inference are not applicable in the case of testimony.⁴⁹ (3) The relation that obtains between the probans and the probandum is different from the one that obtains between a word and its object because the former relation necessitates the physical presence of the

probandum where and when its probans is physically present, while the latter relation does not do so. The place where the word resides is not the place where its object resides, and the time when the word exists is not the time when its object exists. Yet, the word invariably points to the object meant. Again, the word of an authority is said to have an invariable relation to the thing or fact only in the sense that the thing is invariably present there and then where and when the word means it to be.⁵⁰ (4) Word is a symbol, while smoke etc. are signs. Word works as a symbol of a particular thing, provided men by common consent will it to be so, while smoke etc. do not work as signs of water etc. even if men by common consent how-so-often will them to be so. This is the difference between symbol and sign.⁵¹ (5) Testimony is not a case of inference because words as spoken of an authority generate valid knowledge, while in inference the mark generates the valid knowledge on the strength of invariable concomitance.⁵²

The grounds on which the Jaina logicians refute the view that considers testimony to be a case of inference are not strong enough. Even they themselves acknowledge that the residence of a logical reason (*hetu*) in the subject of inference (*pakṣa*) etc do not constitute the nature of a valid mark. According to them, the essential nature of a valid mark is its invariable concomitance with the thing it signifies. And, invariable concomitance is the basis of testimony. A word always means its object, and a word of an authority always corresponds to actual fact.

Though this invariable relation is based on convention, it could not prevent testimony from being a case of inference. For inference, it is the invariable relation between the mark and the object it signifies that is necessary and not a particular type of invariable concomitance. Otherwise, there would be as many independent sources of valid knowledge as there are types of invariable relations.

Only the word *qua* utterance of an authority generates knowledge of fact. Thus, here, word serves as a mark of a fact with certain qualification. But on that ground it could not be regarded that testimony is not a case of inference. As a matter of fact, adding of qualifications to the mark could not prevent the case from being an inference as is shown earlier.

All the differences pointed out by the Jaina logicians between inference and testimony are trivial and do not make sufficient ground

for their view that testimony is a source independent of inference. What Akalaṅka, the eminent Jaina logician, has observed in the context of analogy (*upamāna*) applies equally to testimony. He says : If merely on the strength of such trivial differences among various pieces of knowledge we were to regard them as independent sources, then there would be innumerable independent sources.⁵³ This is a healthy attitude and the Jaina logicians should have maintained it even in the case of testimony.

Notes

1. व्यवस्था पुनः 'अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामः' इति । लौकिकस्य स्वर्गे न लिङ्गदर्शनं न प्रत्यक्षम् । *Nyāyasūtra-Bhāṣya*, 1.1.3.
2. आप्तोपदेशः शब्दः । *Nyāyasūtra*, 1.1.7.
3. सुतं गणधरकथिदं तहेव पतेयबुद्धकथिदं च ।
सुदकेवल्लिणा कथिदं अभिण्णदसपुव्वकथिदं ॥ *Mūlācāra*, 5.80.
4. चोदस दस य अभिन्ने नियमा सम्मं... । *Bṛhat-Kalpasūtra (Ātmānanda Jaina Granthamālā)* 132
5. गणहर-थेरकयं वा आदेसा मुक्कवांगरणतो वा ।
धुव-चलविसेसतो वा अंगाऽणंगेसु णाणत्तं ॥ *Ibid.*, 144.
6. जिणवयणं सिद्धं चेव भण्णए कत्थई उदाहरणं ।
आसज्ज उ सोयारं हेऊ वि कहिचि भण्णेज्जा ॥ *Daśavaikālika-Niryakti*, 49.
7. भारहं रामायणं..... चत्तारि अवेआ संगोवंगा, एआइं मिच्छदिट्ठिस्स मिच्छत्तपरिगहिआइं मिच्छासुअं, एआइं चेव सम्मदिट्ठिस्स सम्मत्तपरिगहिआइं सम्मसुअं; अहवा मिच्छदिट्ठिस्सवि एआइं चेव सम्मसुअं, कम्हा? सम्मत्तहेउत्तणओ, जम्हा ते मिच्छदिट्ठिआ तेहिं चेव समएहिं चोइआ समाणा केइ सपक्खदिट्ठीओ चयंति । *Nandisūtra*, 42,
8. *Tattvārthabhāṣya (Devacandra Lālbhāi Series)*, 67, 76) 1. 20.
9. *Niyamasāra (Jaganimaṇḍal Jain Mem. Series)* 5-8.
10. दृष्टेष्टाव्याहताद् वाक्यात् परमार्थभिधायिनः ।
तत्त्वग्राहितयोत्पन्नं मानं शाब्दं प्रकीर्तितम् ॥ *Nyāyāvatāra (Singhi Jain Series, Bombay)*, 8.
11. *Ibid.*, 9.
12. अदृष्टेष्टविरोधकम् । *Ibid.*, 9.
13. स त्वमेवासि निर्दोषो युक्तिशास्त्राविरोधीवाक् । *Āptamīmāṃsā (N. S. Press, Bombay)*, 6.

14. श्रुतेः प्रमाणान्तराबाधनं पूर्वापराविरोधश्च अविसंवादः । *Akalaṅka-Granthatrayam* (Singhi Jain Series 12), p. 24.
15. *Nyāyāvatāra*, 8.
16. सारिक्खविवक्खोभयमुवमागममेव सव्वमणुमाणं । *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* (Yaśovijaya Jain Granthamālā, 35) 470.
17. *Nyāyasūtra-Bhāṣya*, 1.1.7.
18. साधनं । करुणा... *Pramāṇavārttika* (Ed. with *Manorātha-vṛtti* by Rahul Sanskritayana, Patna), 1.36.
सा (करुणा) भगवतः प्रामाण्यस्य साधनम् । *Manorātha-vṛtti* on the above.
19. *Āptamīmāṃsā*, 1. 3-4.
20. चैतसेभ्यो हि गुणदोषेभ्यः पुरुषाः सम्यग्मिथ्याप्रवृत्तयः । ते चातीन्द्रियाः स्वप्रभवकायवागव्यवहारानुमेयाः स्युः । व्यवहाराश्च प्रायशो बुद्धिपूर्वमन्यथापि कर्तुं शक्यन्ते, पुरुषेच्छावृत्तित्वात् तेषां च चित्राभिसन्धित्वात् । तदयं लिङ्गसङ्क्रात् कथमनिश्चिन्तन् प्रतिपद्येत । *Svārthānumāna-Paricchedah* with *Svopajñā-vṛtti* on *Pramāṇa-vārttika* (Nepal Rajya Sanskrit Series, 12), p. 73.
अत्र यथा रक्तो ब्रवीति तथा विरक्तोऽपीति वचनमात्रादप्रतिपत्तिः । नापि विशेषात् । अभिप्रायस्य दुर्बोधत्वात् । व्यवहारसङ्करेण सर्वेषां व्यभिचारात् । *Ibid.*, p. 6.
21. शास्त्रं यत् सिद्धया युक्त्या स्ववाचा च न बाध्यते ।
दृष्टेऽदृष्टेऽपि तद् ग्राह्यमिति चिन्ता प्रवर्तते ॥ *Pramāṇavārttika*, 4.104.
22. प्रत्यक्षेणानुमानेन द्विविधेनाप्यबाधनम् । *Ibid.*, 3.215.
23. *Akalaṅka-Granthatrayam*, p. 14; *Nyāyakumudacandra* of Prabhācandra (*Māṇikacandra Dig. Jain Granthamālā*, 38, 39), p. 634.
24. यत्नतः परीक्षितं कार्यं कारणं नातिवर्तत इति चेत् स्तुतं प्रस्तुतम् । *Aṣṭaśatī*, p. 72; *Akalaṅka-Granthatrayam*, p. 10.
25. वेदे तु प्रणेतुः पुरुषस्याभावाद् दोषाशङ्कैव न प्रवर्तते वक्त्रधीनत्वाद् दोषाणाम्... *Nyāyamañjarī* (Kashi Skt. Series. 166), p. 154.
26. न, सामयिकत्वाच्छब्दार्थसम्प्रत्ययस्य । *Nyāyasūtra*, 2.1.56.
शब्दस्य ज्ञापकत्वात् । ज्ञापकस्य धूमादेरेतद्रूपं यत् सम्बन्धग्रहणापेक्षं स्वज्ञाप्यज्ञापकत्वम् । *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 221.
27. युक्तं चैतदेव यद् दीपवत् प्रकाशत्वमात्रमेव शब्दस्य स्वरूपं न यथार्थत्वमयथार्थत्वं वा विपरीतेऽप्यर्थे दीपस्य प्रकाशत्वानतिवृत्तेः । प्रकाशात्मनस्तु शब्दस्य वक्तृगुणदोषाधीने यथार्थेतरत्वे । *Ibid.*, p. 146.
28. योग्यतार्थगताकाङ्क्षा शब्दनिष्ठितानुभाविता ।
प्रत्येकं वा मिलित्वा वा नैते लिङ्गमसिद्धितः ॥ *Śabdaśakatiprakāśikā*, 4.

29. ननु एतानि पदानि स्वस्मारितार्थसंसर्गवन्ति आकाङ्क्षादिमत्पदकदम्बकत्वात् मद्वाक्यवदित्यनुमानादेव संसर्गज्ञानसम्भवाच्छब्दो न प्रमाणान्तरम् । *Tarkasaṅgraha* of Annambhaṭṭa, (*Bombay Skt. Ser.*, 55), p. 54.
30. वाक्यरूपस्तु शब्दोऽर्थप्रतिपत्तौ समयमपि नापेक्षत इति सम्बन्धबलेनार्थप्रतिपादकत्वमसिद्धम् । न च शब्दस्यानुमानत्वमेव निषिध्यते । विवक्षाकाशाधिगमे लिङ्गत्वात् । यथा ह्याकाशाधिगमे सर्वः शब्दोऽनुमानं विवक्षाकार्यस्तु विवक्षाधिगमेऽपीति । *Vyomavati* p. 574.
31. *Nyāyakandali*, pp. 214-17.
32. न वै शब्दानां काचिद् विषयस्वभावायता वृत्तिः । *Svārthānumānapariccheda*, p. 21. तत्र वाच्येषु पुरुषायत्तवृत्तीनां शब्दानामवस्तुसन्दर्शनां यथाभ्यासं विकल्पप्रबोधहेतूनां प्रवृत्तिचिन्ता, तद्वशाद् वेस्तुव्यवस्थापनं च केवलं जाड्यख्यापनम् । *Ibid.*, p. 23.
33. तस्मान्न स्वलक्षणे समयः । *Ibid.*, p. 29.
विकल्पवासनोद्भूताः समारोपितगमेचराः ॥ *Ibid.*, p. 102.
जायन्ते बुद्धयस्तत्र केवलं नार्थगोचराः ।
नान्तरीयकताऽभावाच्छब्दानां वस्तुभिः सह ।
नार्थसिद्धिस्ततस्ते हि वक्त्रभिप्रायसूचकाः ॥ *Ibid.*, p. 71.
34. तस्मान्न स्वाभाविकः शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धः । तदभिप्रायप्रयोगादुत्पन्नोऽभिव्यक्तो वा शब्दो तदव्यभिचारीति तत्त्वमस्य सम्बन्धः । *Ibid.*, p. 80.
ते हि वक्तुर्विवक्षावृत्तय इति तत्रान्तरीयकास्तामेव गमयेयुः । *Ibid.*, p. 71.
35. *Tattvasaṅgraha* (*Gaek. Or. S.*, 30, 31), *Kārikās* 1515-20.
36. न च पुरुषेच्छाः सर्वा यथार्थभाविन्यः । न च तदप्रतिबद्धस्वभावो भावोऽन्यं गमयति । *Svārthānumānapariccheda*, p. 72.
37. आप्तवादाविसंवादसामान्यादनुमानता ।
बुद्धेरगत्याभिहिता परोक्षेऽप्यस्य गोचरे ॥
तस्यास्यैवंभूतस्याप्तवादस्याविसंवादसामान्याददृष्टव्यभिचारस्य प्रत्यक्षानुमानागम्येऽप्यर्थे प्रतिपत्तेस्तदाश्रितत्वात् तदन्यप्रतिपत्तिवद् अविसंवादोऽनुमीयते । ततः शब्दप्रभवापि सती न शाब्दवदभिप्रायं निवेदयत्येवेत्यर्थाविसंवादादनुमानमपि । *Ibid.*, p. 72.
अथवाऽन्यथाऽऽप्तवचनस्याविसंवादादनुमानत्वमुच्यते । *Ibid.*, p. 72.
38. *Ibid.*
39. यथा कृत्तिकादेः शकटादिज्ञानं स्वभावप्रतिबन्धमन्तरेण तथैवादृष्टप्रतिबन्धार्थाभिधानं ज्ञानमविसंवादकम् । *Akalaṅka-Granthatrayam*, p. 9.
40. तदभावे सोऽपि कथम् ? इत्यप्यवाच्यम्; चक्षूरूपयोस्तदभावेऽपि तद्दर्शनात् । न खलु चक्षुषो घटादिरूपेण सह तादात्म्यं तदुत्पत्तिः संयोगो वा सौगतैरभ्युपगम्यते प्रतीतिविरोधानुषङ्गात्, अप्राप्यकारित्वक्षतिप्रसङ्गाच्च । *Nyāyakumudacandra*, p. 538.

41. ...प्रतिनियतशक्तित्वाद् भावानाम् । *Ibid.*, p. 538.
42. सङ्केतो हि 'इदमस्य वाच्यम् इदं वाचकम्' इत्येवंविधो वाच्यवाचकयोर्विनियोगः, स यस्यास्ति तस्यैव शब्दः स्वार्थं प्रतिपादयति नान्यस्य..... । येनैव साध्यसाधनयोरविनाभावो गृहीतः तं प्रत्येव साधनं साध्यस्य गमकमित्यभ्युपगमे येनैव शब्दार्थयोः सङ्केतो गृहीतः तं प्रत्येव शब्दोऽर्थस्य वाचकः इत्यभ्युपगम्यतामविशेषात् । *Ibid.*, p. 539.
43. ननु सङ्केतः पुरुषेच्छाकृतः, न च तदिच्छया वस्तुव्यवस्था युक्ता अतिप्रसङ्गात्, अतोऽर्थोऽपि वाचकः, शब्दस्तु वाच्यः किन्न स्यात्, तदिच्छया निरङ्कुशत्वात् ? इत्यप्यसुन्दरम् । तत्सङ्केतस्य सहजयोग्यतानिबन्धनत्वाद् धूमाग्नवत् । यथैव हि धूमाग्न्योर्नैसर्गिक एवाविनाभावः सम्बन्धः, तद्व्युत्पत्तये तु भूयोदर्शनादिनिमित्तमाश्रीयते, तथा शब्दार्थयोः स्वाभाविक एव प्रतिपाद्यप्रतिपादकशक्त्यात्मा सम्बन्धः, तद्व्युत्पत्तये तु सङ्केतः समाश्रीयते । *Ibid.*, p. 539.
44.अनेकार्थप्रत्यायनयोग्यस्यापि शब्दस्य प्रतिनियतसङ्केतवशात् प्रतिनियतार्थप्रतिपादकत्वमविरुद्धम् । *Ibid.*, pp. 539-40.
45. यज्ज्ञापकं तत् ज्ञाप्ये प्रतिपन्नप्रतिबन्धमेव प्रतीतिमुत्पादयति यथा धूमादि, ज्ञापकश्च शब्द इति । चक्षुरादीनां तु कारकत्वात् युक्तं स्वार्थसम्बन्धग्रहणानपेक्षाणां तदुत्पादकत्वम् ।शक्तिस्तु स्वाभाविकी यथा रूपप्रकाशने चक्षुरादेः तथा अर्थप्रकाशने शब्दस्य । *Ibid.*, pp. 540-42.
46. *Akalaṅka-Granthatrayam*, p. 9.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
48. अर्थमात्रं हि शब्दस्य विषयः, अनुमानस्य तु साध्यधर्मविशिष्टो धर्मी इति । *Nyāyakumudacandra*, p. 532.
49. पक्षधर्मत्वादिरूपत्रयरूपा हि अनुमाने सामग्री, सा च शब्दे न संभवति । *Ibid.*, p. 532.
50. *Ibid.*, pp. 534-35.
51. इतोऽप्यनुमानमसौ पुरुषैर्यथेष्टं नियुज्यमानस्यार्थप्रतीतिहेतुत्वात्, यत् पुनरनुमानं न तत् तथा यथा कृतकत्वादि, तथा च शब्दः, तस्मान्नानुमानमिति । न च साधनाव्यतिरेकोऽयं दृष्टान्तः इत्यभिधातव्यम्; तथा तैर्नियुज्यमानस्य अस्य साध्यप्रतीत्यजनकत्वात् । न हि कृतकत्वं नित्यत्वसाध्येच्छया धूमत्वादिकं वा जलादिसाध्येच्छया नियुज्यमानं तत्प्रतीतिहेतुः । *Ibid.*, p. 535.
52. कृतकत्वादिसाधनस्य हि साध्येऽव्यभिचारिज्ञानजननेऽविनाभाव एव निमित्तं नाप्नोक्तत्वमनाप्नोक्तत्वं वा, शब्दस्य तु आप्नोक्तत्वमेवेति । *Ibid.*, p. 536.
53. यदि किञ्चिद्विशेषेण प्रमाणान्तरमिष्यते ।
प्रमितोऽर्थः प्रमाणानां बहुभेदः प्रसज्यते ॥ *Akalaṅka-Granthatrayam*, p. 93.

