

The Jaina Conception of Logic : Some Comments*

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When one begins to investigate the Jaina Conception of Logic and methodology, a two-fold task seems to invite one's attention : (a) to spell out suggestions of the Jaina Logical Analysis for formal studies of conceptual and methodological framework, and (b) to bring out some important hints of the Jaina investigations towards conceptual foundations of social sciences-especially the Jaina Action Theory and analysis of the concept of action it offers. A detailed account and analysis of both these issues is a matter for a monograph on the subject. We do not wish to embark upon such a massive investigation here. Instead we wish to highlight some useful hints important in the study of the kind.

Background Remarks

In any methodological and/or conceptual investigation into Jaina thought certain problems and issues need to be clearly formulated. For, a clearer formulation and understanding of them is likely to help us in more than one way in a methodological study. It is no use neglecting paying due attention to them on the ground that they are either too general or perhaps ambiguously considered. Some of them are : (1) The Jaina view seems to be bipolar in its perspective--*Darśana* (Philosophy) and *Dharma* (way of life). It needs to be investigated how far, deep and wide this bipolarity is. A study of this kind is likely to shed some light on the Jaina Action Theory, granting that it has one (2) : Jainism does not accept the world to be merely permanent but benefit of change. Nor does it take the world to be merely changing but lacking permanence. It rather accepts change and continuity both to be important features of the world. It needs to be examined whether they are considered to be structural features of the world or functional ones and the possible grounds of considering the case to be so need to be spelt out. Moreover, implications of the acceptable view need to be brought out. (3) Jainism accepts two main kinds of reals : *Jiva* (living) and *Ajiva* (non-living). It needs to be studied whether these kinds are merely commonsensical or whether they really are non-discontinuous and independent ones. Likewise, the grounds of their being taken to be so need to be explained and examined. (4) It also

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needs to be considered whether both *Jiva* and *Ajiva* are real in the same sense, whether both of them are rightly capable of being characterised by *Utpada* (emergence), *vyaya* (degeneration/decay) and *Dharavvya* (continuity) and if so on what ground/s. Similarly it needs to be studied whether both of them have spatiality and/or temporality and that too in the same sense. Consideration of problems of this kind, it needs to be noted, has an important bearing even on methodological and conceptual investigations. (5) It is often held that *Anekantavada* and/or *Nayaada* bring forth plurality of perspectives. But it is of great significance to explicate how and why subscription to plurality of perspectives is both methodologically and conceptually rewarding. It also needs to be considered whether and to what extent the different perspectives are consistent with one another. Their consistency needs to be established, not merely to be assumed. (6) *Ahimsa* is said to be a structural principle of social organization. It also is said to emphasize the need of co-existence rather than of competition. But it needs to be brought out whether it was accepted as a policy or ideology or out of some other pressing need action-theoretic or otherwise. (7) Regarding *Syadvada* it is held that it establishes compatibility of various statements. But compatibility, cotenability, consistency etc. are logical issues and it needs to be shown that the propositions under consideration are logically compatible, cotenable, consistent etc. We should not elevate our policy of academic accommodatinity or even methodological helplessness to the level of consistency. (8) It is claimed that *Syadvada*, *Anekantavada* and *Nayavada* have important bearings of conceptual and methodological significance upon one another. This needs to be spelt out and the issues involved, at least, need to be stated as clearly and as precisely as possible. We do not wish to add more points on this count. The points are made here with the intention of bringing them to the notice of persons concerned with methodological investigations.

The Jaina logical and methodological investigation has three principal pillars. *Syadvada* or *Saptabhangi*, *Nayavada* and *Anekantavada*. Some remarks seem to be in order before we proceed, although in our comments we wish to continue attention only to some issues. On the Jaina view, number of things are real and each one of them has number of dispositions (*Paryayas*) and properties (*Gunas*), some of which decay and vanish in course of time but some others emerge through course of time. Neither all the things nor their dispositions and properties—even all the dispositions and properties of any one of them—are given simultaneously. This situation brings forth number of issues : (1) Are the various things said to be real or existent in the same sense? That is, can they be captured as values of the same kind of bound variable? If this is neither feasible nor defensible, then, does Jainism assume starata of reals? If so, on what basis? If, on the contrary, they could be said to be values of the same kind of bound variables, would this be consistent and defensible? (2) If the dispositions and properties of a thing emerge in course of time and if they are not given simultaneously then this brings in an important distinction between potential and actual. How does Jaina thought account for it? Likewise, if some things emerge later

in course of time then that brings in the distinction between actual and possible. Does Jaina account turn out to be satisfactory and consistent on this count ? (3) It is claimed that a thing has, as pointed out above, dispositions and properties. The question that arises is : are they the structural features of things ? What is the ground to say so ? Are such structural features too destroyed and if they are, would a certain thing be that even while its structural features are destroyed ? Basically, questions of the kind we have mentioned here figure in the Jaina ontological investigation, no matter whether the real that is considered is Jiva or Ajiva. But they are not free from having impart on methodological inquiry as well.

Syadvada or Saptabhāgi

Syadvada or Saptabhāgi is a theory that raises host of methodological and/or conceptual issues, and we wish to draw attention to some of them : (1) It is often said that *Syadvada* is more a matter of language and expression rather than of knowledge and ontology. But it is also said that '*Sya*' means *Anekanta* and *Anekanta* is explicitly ontological and epistemological. Hence, the justifiability of the former claim needs to be examined. (2) The notion of '*bhāga*' needs to be analysed properly in order to point out whether it means modality or a type of proposition of anything else as also to show whether and if yes on what ground, some of the '*bhāgas*' are basic and others are derivative. An examination and analysis of this kind, further, needs to be shown to be consistent with the doctrine of *Syadvada*. (3) It needs to be explored whether and how far possibilistic claims have a bearing on the Jaina distinction between *Jiva* and *Ajiva*, for such claims have a principal point where a contest between actually real and an hypothetically possible prevails. It needs to be brought out, through examination of the Jaina theory of reality, whether the Jaina view expects to augment the realm of what is or what does happen by what can or what might happen. Such hypothetical reach lack an objective foundation in the existential order and they cease to be independently of conceiving mind. Are some of the reals, then, considered to be mind-dependent, or at least thought-dependent ? Is this contention an intended or an unintended consequence of the theory ? For, the claim 'x' is possible but not actual may be understood propositionally or ontologically. In the latter case it raises the question of the existential status of what is asserted by propositions. Further, ontological issues regarding possibility are those posed by modality of *de re* type. But unactualized possibles do not belong to the real world, though they can be conceived, entertained. Thus they exist not unqualifiedly but in a realtivated manner, as objects of certain intellectual processes. The possible, albeit unrealized, states of affairs or things obtain an ontological footing. That is, they can be said to exist appropriately in so far as they lie within *generic* province of minds which conceive them. The analysis of the concept demands reference to workings of mind. It, at least, demands reference to thought process. The question is : have the Jaina thinkers to say something of this kind ? Possibilities could be said to be mind-dependent as the essential purport of the very conception of possibility is mind-

involving, as unrealized possibilities can only be imagined, supposed, but not handled, seen or located. Hypothetical possibilities are mind involving not by way of their internal and constitutive properties but by way of external and regulative facts about them. The very distinction between actual and hypothetically possible ceases to be operative in a mindless world. This is, perhaps how the distinction seems to bear on that between Jiva and Ajiva unless of course the distinction is very common-sensical and naive or linguistic. The domain of the possible is a realm that is accessible to intelligence organisms alone. The robust realism of physical objects just will not extend into the area of the hypothetical. The existential objectivity and autonomy of the real world does not underwrite that of the hypothetical possibility. The distinction between hypothetical real and actual real may in a sense remind us of the distinction between attribution of a property to and possessing a property by a thing. The conditions of possibility seem to exceed the bounds and limits of factuality, the former being anchored in conceivability. Do, thus, Jainas mean to hold that reality of certain possible states of affairs resides in the reality of possibility-involving process? Construction of verbal expressions and assumption of either their reference or existence of reference are quite different and the former does not entail the latter. When possibility of a thing is its only reality, this reality inheres in a possibilistic intellectual process and here actuality (of intellectual process) is prior to possibility as its conceivability. Dependence of unrealized possibilities of language seems to give them objective ontological foothold. This is how 'possibility existed but nobody thought of it at the time' (*Syat asti avaktavyah*) or 'there are possibilities no one will ever conceive of' (*Syat avaktavyah*) would make sense. Actuality is prior to potentiality or even to possibility in an important sense. But possibility of a thing is posterior to possibility of a process or of a thought-conceptual possibility. But substantive possibility is conceptually consequent upon functional possibility, and functional possibility of this kind is a contingent possibility. Even if existential possibility is a hard case, it should lie grounded in the former. Perhaps, unrealized possibility is identified by defining description while existential possibility by ostensive process. By way of individuation, however, the former is descriptively incomplete. Unrealized possibilities exist merely as actual potential objects of thought. They cannot be picked nor can they be identified in this world. The question is: is something of this kind that jainas want to uphold? It needs to be investigated. But so understood, Jainism turns out to be a conceptualist view where to be is to be conceived. Hence, to say that 'Something is possible but not conceived' is viable, but 'something is possible but not conceivable' is not. (4) Consider another issue. It is too well-known that Jainism accepts rebirth. The question is: does this raise a problem of transmundane identity? At least of transmundane sameness? Intramundane and transmundane identifications are not the same, though there are obvious similarities between the two. For, in both identifications are made within some context and for some purpose. There is, however, a difference. Intramundane identifications apply to commensurable objects, but transmundane

identifications to incommensurable objects. Is Jainism aware of this? This could perhaps be taken to be an unintended consequence of the theory. But it needs to be established that such in fact in the case. Further, two incompatible proportions are incommensurable but not conversely. Two objects are, on the contrary, incommensurable if and only if they are correctly described by two incommensurable propositions. In transmundane identification of incommensurable objects belonging to different possible worlds their differences seem purposefully to be ignored. Does Jainism do something of this kind—say for being able to uphold its doctrine of *Moksa*? Moreover, transmundane identification seems to bring in relative essentialism, an outcome of moderate proginatism. Does Jainism subscribe to relative essentialism and in consequence also to moderate proginatism? Was this, again, intended or unintended consequence of the theory? What ground is there to hold whatever view that seems plausible? Has this further any connection with *Ahinsa* brought into epistemology and logic from social theory? For, toleration of views might pass for academic accommodation but that can hardly be taken to be the ground for their contentability. Even if transmundane interrepresentability relation is admitted this does not lead to identity of objects. But then did Jainism countenance between transmundane interrepresentability with identity? If so, the confusion, however unintended, is inexcusable. For while transmundane interrepresentability is a teleological and non-logical relation between incommensurable individuals, identity is a non-teleological and logical relation.

Now, take two statements: (1) necessarily everything is identical with itself $x = x$ or $\Box (Vx) (x = x)$ and (2) the given thing is identical with itself: $e = e$ —Even if $e = m$ holds, it is a contingent fact and hence the argument $\Box e = e$

$$m = e / \therefore \Box m = e$$

is clearly invalid. Moreover, representability relation and its cognates relate not only synchronic objects but also diachronic objects. Is this what seemed to have misled Jainas? Again, diachronic objects lead to the formulation of attributes which characterise objects changeable in more than one way. Is this what led Jainas to talk in terms of alternative number of ways in which a thing can change? What is the evidence for saying so? (5) Lastly, to hold that objects have some of their properties essentially while others contingently leads to the thesis that some objects exist in more than one possible world. This, in turn, also leads to the fact that there is no reason to hold that objects exist only in one world. The thesis that every object has every property essentially is a theory of world-bound individuals along with the counter part theory as a version of it. Jainism does not seem to hold that every object has every property essentially. But every object has every property essentially, But then does Jainism accept the theory of world-bound individuals? If so, is such a theory methodologically tenable?

Many issues of this kind crowd the head of an investigator intending to undertake methodological examination of some of the important Jaina theories and their

statements. To the extent to which they have not been resolved, it is very difficult to say in advance anything pertaining to the role of the Jaina logical analysis for formal studies of conceptual framework as also of its implications for social sciences- especially action theory and analysis of conception of action. Earlier, we start realising and attempting to answer problems of this kind the better; otherwise there seems to be no way of getting out of the cobweb of confusions.

लेखसार

तर्कशास्त्र सम्बन्धी जैन धारणायें : कुछ विचार

डा० एम० पी० मराठे, पूना विश्वविद्यालय

तर्कशास्त्रसे सम्बन्धित जैन धारणाओंपर विचार करनेपर दो महत्वपूर्ण बातोंपर ध्यान जाता है : जैन धारणाओं एवं विधाओंका तार्किक विश्लेषण और कर्मवादके समान समाज-विज्ञानोंकी मौलिकताके विषयमें अनुसन्धान । इन्हीं विषयोंसे सम्बन्धित कुछ विचार इस निबन्धमें दिये गये हैं ।

जैन विचारधाराका अध्ययन करनेपर अनेक समस्याओंपर ध्यान जाता है । सर्वप्रथम तथ्य तो यह है कि यह विचारधारा दर्शन और धर्मके रूपमें द्विध्रुवी है । इस द्वि-ध्रुवताका क्षेत्र क्या है, इसका अध्ययन आवश्यक है जैनदर्शन विश्वको ध्रुवपर परिवर्तनशील मानता है । क्या यह धारणा विश्वकी रचनासे सम्बन्धित है या विश्वकी क्रियात्मकतासे सम्बन्धित है ? जैन मान्यता जीव और अजीव तत्वोंको स्वीकार करती है । क्या ये दोनों तत्व व्यावहारिक दृष्टिसे माने गये हैं और क्या ये दोनों ही सन्तत और स्वतन्त्र द्रव्य हैं ? इन मान्यताओंका आधार क्या है ? इनकी वास्तविकताका आधार क्या है ? अनेकान्त बादके रूपमें दृष्टियोंकी विविधताकी स्वीकृति कितनी तर्कसंगत है ? ये दृष्टिकोण एक-दूसरेसे कितनी सीमातक संगत हो सकते हैं ? अहिंसाका सिद्धान्त जैनदर्शनका मूल आधार है । इस विषयमें यह जानना आवश्यक है कि इस आदर्शकी धारणा क्या आदर्शके लिये स्वीकृत की गई थी या कर्म-सिद्धान्तकी प्रतिष्ठाके लिये ? स्याद्वादकी मान्यता विभिन्न तथ्योंको संगत एवं सहावस्थानके लिये स्वीकृत की गई है । पर क्या ये तथ्य तार्किक दृष्टिसे भी सम्भव हैं ? इसी प्रकार, स्याद्वाद, अनेकान्तवाद और नयवादको तत्वविद्याके लिये आवश्यक अंग बताया जाता है । इसपर गम्भीरता पूर्वक विचार करनेकी आवश्यकता है । लेखकने इन्हीं कुछ प्रश्नोंको लेकर अपने विचार प्रकट किये हैं जो मननीय हैं । लेखकने अपने तीक्ष्ण चिन्तनके आधारपर जैन तर्कशास्त्रकी कुछ विसंगतियोंपर प्रकाश डाला है जिनका निराकरण और संशोधन गहन अध्ययनके बिना सम्भव नहीं है ।