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OURSELVES

*Kṣāmemi sabbe jībe sabbe jīvā kṣamantu me
Mitti me sabbabhūesu beram mājjham na kenai*

I forgive all creatures
And they all give me back forgiveness.
I have love for all
And no enmity towards any.

This is the Jaina way of greeting after the greatest of their festivals—the *Paryūṣaṇa*. This is perhaps the universal greeting that emanates from the human soul. We send this greeting to all.

By forgiving and asking forgiveness we not only get rid of hatred and jealousy but positively feel the joy of spiritual freedom. In a way it is the sure way to that eternal bliss for which every human soul aspires. Thus wrote Sarat Chandra, the great Bengali novelist, “When I was wandering in the dense forest of distress with my eyes tied and when there was no way out for me except death, I knew not that there was such a sure way to freedom so near at hand. . . . I forgive, I forgive,—beasts, birds, worms, insects, whosoever and wheresoever they may be, I forgive them all. From this day, I have no grievance against anybody and I complain not. From this day, I am free, I am independent, I am all bliss.”

And thus said the great sage-philosopher of China, Lao Tse :
“I have preserved three jewels with care—forgiveness, restraint, absence of aspiration of being first in the world. As I can forgive, I am strong ; as I live a life of restraint, I can be broadminded ; and as I have no aspiration of being first, I am the foremost among the king’s advisers. His victory is assured who can forgive ; well-protected is he who protects himself by forgiveness ; and whom the Heaven protects, protects him by encircling him with forgiveness.” (*Tao-Te-Ching*)

Forgiveness with a Jaina is no empty greeting nor a routine utterance. It gives him the taste of liberation—the ultimate freedom which is the eternal craving of the *jiva*. It is for this that he forgives and desires to be forgiven so that through this act of forgiveness his urge for freedom may increase and one day he may be totally liberated.

The virtue of forgiveness is recognised in all religions ; but the Jainas alone have translated it into practice and used it as an instrument for spiritual uplift.

ANEKANTAVADA in the light of Relativity

KASTUR CHAND LALWANI

“...an emotion which can be destroyed by a little mathematics is
neither very genuine nor very valuable.”

—Bertrand Russell

[It is not intended in this brief study to expound the doctrine of *anekānta*. This has already been done by many competent scholars. It is, however, intended to discover its scientific content and rehabilitate it on a firmer foundation. *Anekāntavāda* is in a sense the philosophical forerunner of scientific relativity and just as in the domain of science, the coming of relativity has been a major blow to the Copernicus-Galileo-Newton stand, so also in the realm of philosophy, *ekāntavāda* which is rooted in emotionalism should have succumbed to *anekāntavāda*. But this did not happen. The *ekāntavādins* who are in the majority all the world over have stuck to their emotional creation and imposed a distortion on *anekāntavāda* on the basis of their own logic, seeking to establish that the logic of *anekāntavāda* is illogical and its philosophy is absurd. Besides, there is the terminological confusion. According to the Jaina view, *ekānta* is one angle of vision, one view-point, and hence by definition it is less than perfect, less than comprehensive, since there may be, and in actuality are, other angles of vision, other view-points. A full and perfect knowledge means a comprehensive knowledge about the most-complicated and many-faceted reality. *Ekānta* in the *Vedāntic* sense, however, signifies a transcendental reality as distinct from the empirical reality—a reality from which the latter emerges and into which the latter merges. Since empirical reality, according to the *Vedāntin*, is only a fractional manifestation of the bigger transcendental reality¹, to know the latter is to know the former, but not just the other way round. The Jainas, however, do not recognise this transcendental reality as a separate and superior entity. And this is at the root of the non-appreciation of the Jaina view-point by the *ekāntavādins* and its distorted presentation by them.]

To a world which is nurtured on the idea of an Absolute², call it God, or X, Y or Z, the notion of *anekānta*, one of the most original contributions of the Jainas, has always appeared no more than a common-

sense point-of-view, a mere explanation of the empirical reality as distinguished from the transcendental, and hence something superficial and second-rate which may be good enough so far as it goes but it does not really go far. To such a world, its logic has seemed illogical, since it does not end in monism, and its philosophy somewhat absurd. From the days of Sankara and Ramanuja, may be even earlier, many have considered it and found it inconsistent with their absolutist view-point and so almost everyone has unceremoniously rejected it. Thus Sankara and Ramanuja have held the impossibility of contradictory attributes co-existing in the same thing, though the Jainas have never implied it. If a jar is made of gold, it is surely not made of silver, copper or brass, but the Jainas never say the absurd thing that it is simultaneously gold, silver, copper and brass. But in the heat of controversy, these subtleties escape comprehension. Thus Ramanuja wrote : “contradictory attributes such as existence and non-existence cannot at the same time belong to one thing, any more than light and darkness”. Ever since this absolutist onslaught on the *anekāntavāda* several centuries back, human knowledge has enormously grown but there has been no material change in the notion about the absolute. If therefore *anekāntavāda* was misunderstood and misrepresented by Sankara and Ramanuja, not because they were small men but because their purposive vision was tied to an emotionalism, it enjoys no better status even now. I give two examples.

To M. Hiriyanna³, *anekāntavāda* has appeared to be an acme of ‘philosophic fastidiousness’ as distinguished from a broad-mindedness as it really is. It is viewed by him as a ‘conception of reality as extremely indeterminate in its nature’ which is the outcome of an ‘extreme caution and signifies an anxiety to avoid all dogmas in defining the nature of reality’. Hiriyanna makes no secret to denounce it as a ‘half-hearted character of Jaina enquiry’ which ‘leaves us in the end with little more than such one-sided solutions’. And this half-hearted character of Jaina enquiry Hiriyanna attributes to two reasons. First, it is the outcome not of a prejudice against absolutism but of a ‘desire to keep close to common beliefs’ ; and second, Hiriyanna says, the Jainas are not bothered about the ultimate solution of the metaphysical problem. “The primary aim of Jainism,” he writes, “is the perfection of the soul rather than the interpretation of the universe—a fact which may be supported by an old statement that *āsrava* and *sambara* constitute the whole of Jaina teaching, the rest being only an amplification of them”.⁴ As to the first attribution, two points need be raised, viz., first, it is difficult to understand wherefrom Hiriyanna derived the notion that Jainism has no prejudice against absolutism, since, clearly enough, this has no place in Jainism; and second, if Jainism had really cared much for keeping

close to common beliefs, it would not have dared to repudiate the very notion of God which is the commonest of all common beliefs. And in his second attribution, Hiriyanna hardly does justice to Jainism ; rather, he has tried not only to relegate a very important item in Jaina religious thought to a mere secondary position, he has even discounted the value of Jainism in the solution of the metaphysical problem.

Coming to my second example, one of the allegations against Jainism made by writers on Indian philosophy, particularly by S. Radhakrishnan⁵, is that the notion of the 'relative' cannot stand in the absence of an absolute and since the Jainas are stuck up in their own *anekānta-vāda*, they are 'untrue to their own logic'. This indeed is a serious charge that needs refutation. According to him, the Jaina logic should logically lead to a monistic idealism but the Jainas do not recognise it. They talk of a law of contradiction according to which a distinction is necessary but they stop with this distinction and do not discover the unity which all distinctions need presuppose. To Radhakrishnan, "the distinction between subject and object is not a relation between two independent entities but a distinction made by knowledge itself within its own field. If the Jaina logic does not recognise the need for this principle which includes within it the distinction of subject and object, it is because it takes a partial view for the whole truth". And then Radhakrishnan asserts in a somewhat dogmatic vein, "Before any question of knowledge arises, this one self must be presupposed as the ultimate and final fact within which follow all distinctions of subject and object. And this self is not a passing feeling or a transient phase of consciousness." Clearly the entire reasoning is based on the assumption of 'one self' to which both subject and object, individual mind and independent reality, belong. But where, as in Jainism, this one self transcending all subjects and objects is not accepted, where 'distinction' does not presuppose 'unity', but is valid throughout, where multiplicity of *jivas* and *ajivas* is not a mere intellectual tool to aid understanding but the major premise, the charge of Jainism being untrue to its own logic does not stand. To all believers in one self the ultimate reality may be a unity, but to those to whom the ultimate reality is a plurality, is it not fantastic to suggest that in their sub-conscious they are still believers in a unity and that in so far as they do not expressly recognise it, they 'exalt a relative truth into an absolute truth'? Whether the ultimate reality is one or many cannot be decided by the vote of the majority ; it is a conviction deep-rooted and may become a fascinating subject for a never-to-end debate. But once it is presumed that reality is not one but many and remains many, everything else that the Jainas have said follows in due course.

But Radhakrishnan's attack does not stop at this point. He tries to assess the value of the Jaina view and assign it a place in the monistic view of things. In the latter view, during the course of the soul's progress toward the ultimate identification with the absolute, Radhakrishnan relegates the Jaina stand to the kindergarten stage. In his words, "The fact that we are conscious of our relativity means that we have to reach out to a fuller conception..... With continuous advance towards fuller and fuller truth, the object itself loses its apparently given character. When we reach absolute knowledge, the distinction between subject and object is overcome. Only in the light of such an absolute standard could we correct the abstractions of the lower. Then we shall see that the several relatives are only stages in a continuous process which has the realisation of the soul's freedom for its determining end. The recognition of every form of knowledge as relative, something bound to pass over into something else, requires us to assume a larger reality, an absolute, into which all the relatives fall..... The Jains cannot logically support a theory of pluralism." Obviously, the whole analysis is so much non-Jaina, an effort to fit in Jainism at some preliminary stage in the monistic view. Once again the assumption of a 'larger reality' looms large into which all subjects and objects merge. In Radhakrishnan's view as quoted above, the greater is the soul's distance from this larger reality, the greater is the dominance of a relativistic outlook. Then as in the course of the soul's progress towards this larger reality, the distance is steadily reduced, the relativistic outlook would gradually fade away until at last it becomes just superfluous totally yielding position to the larger reality. At this end if reality is absolute, transcendental, truth too is absolute, non-relativistic. In this way, the entire Jaina point of view is made to lose in a complicated and abstract maze of monism.

The above logic of the monists reminds me of the pre-relativity notion of contemporaneity in modern science. Let us suppose that two men belonging to a gang of robbers shoot the guard and the engine driver of a train under the cover of darkness. Now an old gentleman who is in a middle compartment hears the two shots simultaneously but the station master who is exactly halfway between the two robbers hears the shot which kills the guard first. Here a very important point of law may be involved provided the guard or the engine driver who dies first inherits a very large fortune. The lawyers on both side with pre-relativity sort of notion are agreed that either the old gentleman or the station master must be mistaken. No modern scientist would however support this view. The train (and likewise the universe) is not static but is moving away from the shot at the guard and towards the shot

at the engine driver. Therefore if the old gentleman is right in saying that he heard the two reports simultaneously, the station master must be right in saying that he heard the shot at the guard first. The logic of *anekāntavāda* is not different from this. Bertrand Russell⁶ has written that when reasoning was limited, logic was supposed to teach us how to draw inferences. Thus animals and children are prone to inferences most, (though in spiritual matters even man presents no significant exception). A horse is used to a particular turning, but if you take an unusual turn, he is surprised beyond measure. The same is true of much of man's emotion which he carries from prehistoric times. But when man, with the growth of scientific outlook, began to reason, the reason clashed with his emotions and then the man's effort was directed not towards rejecting emotion but towards developing some sort of pseudo-scientific arguments to justify the age-old inferences that he or his remote ancestor had drawn unthinkingly. Much of this trash goes by the name of philosophy and science but it is 'bad philosophy' and 'bad science'. Russell says, "Great principles such as the 'uniformity of nature', the 'law of universal causation' and so on are attempts to bolster up our belief that what has often happened before will happen again, which has not better foundation than the horse's belief that you will take the turning you usually take". In the West modern science has already challenged this trash emotionalism and come into a headlong clash with the Church. And the result is queer indeed. Russell gives a nice example. The poet has written :

'One far off divine event
To which the whole creation moves.'

Apparently the notion is a static one, this far-off event may be all right to an observer who is fixedly rooted on the earth's surface. But mind that this far-off event has happened only in relation to our static observer and to him therefore it is an absolute event to which he turns with emotion. But science does not accept this superb nonsense. To one trained in relativity, if the event is sufficiently far off and the creation moves sufficiently quickly, some parts will judge that the event has already happened while others will judge that it is still in the womb of futurity, both being equally correct. Then the above poetry will have to be re-written as follows :

'One far off divine event
To which some parts of the creation move,
while others move away from it.'

Hence what has appeared as an absolute truth to our static observer turns out to be no more than a relative truth because of the complex nature of reality. Apparently then the notion of an absolute is a mere abstraction, the outcome of the frailty of the human mind. In reality it does not exist except in imagination and emotion. And once this scientific truth is digested by all religions, as Jainism did long ago, the human society could get rid of much that is trash emotion and be restored on the right track⁷. But this is no easy job and there are vested interests. Even after the truth has been discovered, it takes millennia before it goes deep. Upto this time we have been arguing, like a rabbit and a hippopotamus, as to whether man is really a large animal, each thinking his own point of view the most natural one and the other a pure flight of imagination. We must realise that each one's experience acquires a definite meaning in relation to a definite observer. The same is true with our experience with reality which "belongs to the subjective part of our observation..... not to the objective part" and the two never merge.

It is because of the complex nature of reality⁸ and the limited horizon of man howsoever great, all the controversy has cropped up. On the one hand, there was the *Upaniṣadic* view (*Vedāntic*) that Being (*sat*) alone was true ; on the other, there was the view also mentioned in the *Upaniṣads*, though with disapproval, that non-Being (*asat*) was the ultimate truth. But these views, according to Jainism, are partially true, true only in relation to the observer and each develops into a dogma as soon as it is asserted that it conveys the whole truth about reality. Equally dogmatic in the eyes of the Jainas are the two other views which also we occasionally come across in the *Upaniṣads* according to which neither Being nor non-Being is the truth and reality must be characterised by 'both' or 'neither', i.e., 'both-is-and-is-not' and 'neither-is-and-is-not'. Likewise, on the nature of things, the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* held that since in all changes the clay-matter remained permanent, that alone was true whereas the change of form and state were but appearances the nature of which was difficult to explain or demonstrate. In this view, therefore, the unchanged substance alone was true while the changing forms were mere name-objects (*nāmarūpa*), a mere illusion of senses. The Buddhists in contrast held that what was conceived as the original clay-matter was itself a specific quality liable to change and hence they reject the notion of permanence outright. The very fact that this sort of controversy is possible and did really crop up indicates that no absolute assertion is correct and yet the upholders of these partial view-points were not loath to press for their recognition as absolute truths. This is an intractable controversy which the Jainas alone sought to resolve.

The Jainas think that the reality is so complex in its nature that while everyone of these views is true as far as it goes, none is completely true. The precise nature of reality baffles all attempts to describe it directly and once for all ; but it is not impossible to make it known through a series of partially true statements without committing ourselves to any one of them exclusively. Hence the notion of *sapta-bhaṅgī* which leaves no room for the charge of dogma in any form. There is some enduring factor (*dravya*) in all the changes with which experience makes us familiar but its modes or the forms it assumes (*pariyāya*) may be of any conceivable variety and they perish indefinitely. Take for instance the soul (*ātma*). If it is presumed that the soul is absolutely permanent (*ekānta nitya*, and not mere *nitya*), then it would mean that it has no change of state or location, that it suffers no change or end. If this be true, then it will never have any experience with pleasure and non-pleasure, virtue and non-virtue. But really it is not so. Not only in the soul but also in any inanimate object, the transformation is continuous and without a break. Every object is susceptible to change because every moment its category changes. If on the other hand it is assumed that the soul is absolutely transcendent (*ekānta anitya* or *sarvathā kṣaṇika*), similar objections will crop up. The soul falls in different states, assumes different categories and yet in all the states and categories it is permanent and undivided (*nitya* and *akhaṇḍa*)⁹. This character is not lost even though the soul passes through different births, just as a man does not lose his character despite all changes in physical form. And because of this, the outcome of all deeds, good as well as bad, appear in time and the ultimate responsibility for all deeds remains unaltered and unalterable till undergone and because of this again there are possibilities of spiritual progress till the attainment of complete liberation (*mokṣa*). But if the soul be an ever-changing category in the Buddhistic sense, then how will the outcome of good and bad deeds fructify ? In absolute transitoriness there will be no scope for memory (*smṛti*) even. Jainism recognises both permanence and change as equally real. Experience shows that in all changes there are three elements : (a) some qualities remain unchanged, (b) some new qualities are generated, and (c) some old qualities are dropped. "All production means that some old qualities have been lost, some new ones brought in and there is some part in it which is permanent. It is by virtue of these unchanged qualities that a thing is said to be permanent though undergoing change. Such being the case the truth comes to this that there is always a permanent entity as represented by the permanence of such qualities as lead us to call it a substance in spite of all its diverse changes. The solution of Jainism is thus a reconciliation of the two extremes of *Vedāntism* and Buddhism"¹⁰ If this notion of reality appears somewhat complicated in com-

parison with the notion of a higher reality, the fault does not lie in the notion but in reality itself. As C. W. Miller says, "It reminds one of a great mountain which represents a particular contour when approached from one direction but an entirely different aspect from another. Only as we live in the many little valleys that nestle into its flanks and as we climb through its ravines and its ridges can we truly say that we know the mountain."¹¹

The main reason why other Indian systems have failed to appreciate the scientific accuracy of *anekāntavāda* is that while the Jainas are viewing reality as it appears to be, most other systems being baffled by its variety and multiplicity have outright rejected it as illusion (*māyā*) and have superimposed on it an imaginary structure called a transcendental reality. As the *Upaniṣad* says, 'one I became many' (*ekoham bahusyām*). If empirical reality is conceived to emanate from a transcendental reality, it is also conceived to terminate in the latter, to re-emanate from it again. In this view, the one thing permanent is the transcendental reality ; all else has genesis and termination and is by nature ever-changing. This sort of view is basically different from the Jaina view of reality which is all a timeless plurality. Even the Jaina notion of the highest knowledge that comes to the free (*kevalajñāna*) which has been wrongly conceived by many as the knowledge of the absolute really stands for a complete and correct knowledge of reality in its multifarious aspects—"the highest form of knowledge as comprehending all things and all their modifications'. In breaking away from the absolutist abstraction, the Jainas have not been a victim of any illogicity ; rather, their whole logic is well-conceived in the very notion of the *jīvas* and the *ajīvas* both of which are innumerable beyond count and are ever-existent in their own right. They have neither emanated from an absolute like a tree from a seed, nor is the end-process in their view a merging in the absolute. Even after the soul attains the highest status, its separate identity is never lost. Even here the monistic writers have tried to put a distorted interpretation of the Jaina view by suggesting that since the entire variety of the physical universe is one kind of substance called matter (*pudgala*) and since all *jīvas* are one kind and since the two are, instead of being two absolutes like the *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* in *Sāṅkhya*, in actual relation with each other, surely there must be a superior third party to establish this relation and to whose generosity and magnanimity the *jīva* must depend for its termination. Some have even gone to the extreme of suggesting that the Jainas conceive of *jīva* being allotted one *ajīva*. Thus for instance Hiriyanna writes, "The necessary implication of Jaina thought in this respect is therefore a single spiritual substance encountering a single material substance. And since these substances are interdependent, the

dualism must in its turn and finally be resolved in a monism". The word 'interdependent' has done the whole havoc here. What the Jainas have conceived is, to my mind, not an interdependence between a *jīva* and an *ajīva* but a sheer contact which itself is timeless and which results in *karma*, rebirth, etc., in brief, in all experiences conceived in the term '*paryāya*'. This contact is terminable by a conscious effort on the part of the *jīva* which when effective makes the *jīva* free and restores it to its pristine purity and divinity. The Jaina logic which deals with relativity and plurality thus stands on an invincible foundation. It is an utter misrepresentation of the Jaina logic and a total misrepresentation of the Jaina view to suggest that since all *ajīvas* are identical and since they are interdependent (in the sense of being inseparable), they, the *jīva* and *ajīva*, can all be jumbled up into an imaginary absolute.

The Jaina view does not believe in God nor does it recognise any divine providence at whose mercy the creation is. In the Jaina view, every soul is divine in its own right. The deviation from the original Godness is the outcome of a contact which itself is separable by conscious effort. It does not believe in creation because creation presupposes a creator and a time-span. What is more, the liberated soul does not lose its identity even after it becomes free. If thus Jainism has escaped from the clutches of a transcendental reality which pervades most other religions, it is not also a victim to the law of causality which engulfs even modern sciences. In so far as the Jainas say that the soul can liberate itself, not by divine mercy, but by its own effort, it is more than anti-deterministic. To a Jaina 'God' and 'liberated soul' are interchangeable terms. Let one not bother about a God above or an external God which may or may not exist ; but God within is sure and certain. This God is attainable. Let one attain it or at least strive for its attainment.

¹ Cf. *ekamsena sthito jagat*, *Gita*, 10/42.

² This is not only true of Hinduism but also of Christianity and Islam among the major religions of the world, though the idea varies in details from one religion to another.

³ M. Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy ; Popular Essays in Indian Philosophy*.

⁴ The old statement quoted by Hiriyanna is :

*asravo bhava hetu syat sambaro moksa karanam
itiam arhati drstirānyadasyah prapancanam.*

⁵ S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I.

- * Bertrand Russell, *ABC of Relativity*.
- 7 Many have debated the question why Jainism failed to spread, as Buddhism did. The reason lies here. Jainism was propounding a scientific truth which was very much ahead even of modern science, what to speak of pseudo-sciences and philosophy current about 3000 years back. Since it cared little for current beliefs and emotions, its mass appeal was bound to be limited.
- 8 Being baffled by its complex nature, even Sankara was obliged to cover the empirical reality under the generic expression 'maya' about which he wrote in *Vivekacudamani* :

*sannapyasannapyubhayatmika no
bhinnapyabhinnapyubhayatmika no
sangapyanangapyubhayatmika no
mahadbhutanirbacaniyarupa.*

- 9 Cf. *nasato vidayte bhabo nabhaho vidyate satah*, Gita, 2/16.
- 10 S. Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I.
- 11 C. W. Miller, *A Scientist's Approach to Religion*.

Yuga-Pradhan Sri Jinacandra Suri

a biographical sketch

Of the Jaina *ācāryas* that flourished in the 16th century, the name of Sri Jinacandra Suri should stand foremost, not only on account of his limitless scholarship but also on account of the profound influence that he exercised on his contemporaries, more particularly on the Mughal emperor Akbar.

The influence of the Jaina teachers on the Court of Akbar has been widely recognised by the historians. Thus Vincent A. Smith writes,

“But the Jaina holy men undoubtedly gave Akbar prolonged instruction for years which largely influenced his actions and they secured his assent to their doctrines so far that he was reputed to have been converted to Jainism.”

Iswari Prasad goes so far as to declare that Jinacandra “is reported to have converted the emperor to Jainism”.

And it was not for nothing that Akbar, so widely known for his love of other religions, was so deeply attracted by Sri Jinacandra. Once when the *ācārya* was approaching Akbar’s Court on invitation, the emperor came forward to welcome the revered guest. But suddenly Jinacandra stopped his steps. When Akbar requested him to come, he said, “I cannot walk over three living beings.” The fact of the case was that in a tunnel which underlay the approach to the Mughal Court, a she-goat had been placed with Akbar’s knowledge. But when Jinacandra said that he could not walk over three living beings, Akbar said that there must be only one. But soon it was discovered to the surprise of all that the she-goat that was carrying had meanwhile given birth to two kids, making a total of three.

Jinacandra was born in A. D. 1538 (Vikram 1595) in Khetsar in Jodhpur. His father Srivant Shah was a wealthy merchant and his mother

Sriya Devi was an exceedingly pious lady. Jinacandra's childhood name was Sultan Kumar. At the age of nine, he was initiated into monkhood by Sri Jinamanikya Suri and on the death of the *guru* became the head of the *Kharatara gaccha* at the age of seventeen. The installation ceremony was performed by Rawal Maladeva. Sri Jinacandra was shocked at the prevailing disorder in the *gaccha*. He first set himself to the task of cleaning it which he did in two years' time. Meanwhile a keen controversy had developed as to whether Sri Abhayadeva Suri belonged to the *Kharatara gaccha*. Sri Jinacandra invited all the Jaina *ācāryas* and the matter was finally settled to his satisfaction and a declaration to that effect was issued under the signature of all. This silenced his opponents for good.

Sri Jinacandra widely travelled in Gujarat and Rajasthan, spending the four monsoon months at various places and enriching thousands of followers and devotees by his religious sermons. It was in 1567 when Jinacandra was staying at Nadolai, the Mughal army was stationed in the vicinity and had become a source of panic to the people living in that city. Many had left in terror. But Jinacandra was undaunted. It was because of his rigorous penance that the Mughal army lost the way and moved away from that place. Between the monsoons of 1571 and 1581, Sri Jinacandra travelled to the eastern provinces and visited Sammet Sikhar, Pawa, Campapuri, Rajagrha and other holy places. In 1587 he along with his innumerable followers that had assembled from all parts of the country visited Siddhachal, the holiest of the Jaina holy places, the land of the Liberated. In the following year he reached Surat and spent the monsoon months there.

Meanwhile his fame had travelled far and wide. Even it had reached the ears of the Mughal emperor Akbar. At the time the emperor was at Lahore while the *ācārya* was at Khambhat on the Bay of Cambay, a distance of several hundred miles. Besides, the monsoonic months were approaching. But the imperial request which was forwarded by Akbar's Jaina minister, Karmacandra, was exceedingly pressing and could not be taken lightly. The *ācārya* thought that if the emperor could be inspired by the teachings of Jainism, it would have great impact on the country. So overlooking difficulties of the journey and the *śāstric* prohibitions he sent his principal disciple Mansingh in haste. A few more *fārmāns* followed and the *ācārya* saw the importance of his own early departure. By the time he reached Ahmedabad, however, a fresh *fārmān* was received expressing that the *ācārya* need not take the trouble of moving during the four-month period but that the emperor would be pleased to receive him as early as possible after that period. Meanwhile Mansingh had



At the Court of Akbar at Lahore

reached Lahore and had impressed the emperor by his discourses and discussions.

After the monsoons the *ācārya* started again followed by innumerable disciples from the four orders and attended by the imperial envoys. On the way he inspired thousands of people and received warm welcome from the royal houses, the nobility and the laity, ultimately reaching Lahore in 1591. It was the day when the Muslims were celebrating the *Id*. Then the two leaders met, Akbar expressing concern over the enormous trouble that the *ācārya* had undertaken in such a hazardous journey, and that *ācārya* in turn expressing unconcern about it, for he was happy about the great mission which would not only satisfy a thirsty soul but would open a great future for the religion which he was marked by destiny to propound. His discourses were arranged at the Court everyday and were well-attended. The emperor was so respectful that he called the *ācārya* a *bade guru*. The four months of restricted movement were spent at Lahore in 1592.

Akbar was so much inspired and impressed by the *ācārya* that he sent orders under his own seal to all provincial governors for the protection of the Jain temples and holy places against Muslim molestation. Twelve *fārmāns*, called *amari*-declaration, were sent out by the emperor totally prohibiting animal slaughter for a week in the month of *āṣāḍh*.

These imperial *fārmāns* exerted great influence on the smaller rulers who too issued similar orders within their own jurisdiction. In 1552 when Akbar marched on Kashmir, some of the disciples of the *ācārya* accompanied him and gave discourses during leisure hours. Of these disciples, our aforesaid Mansingh was there. When Akbar returned after the conquest of Kashmir, he suggested to the *ācārya* that Mansingh be made the *ācārya*. When the *ācārya* agreed, the emperor thought of a higher distinction for the *ācārya* himself and in consultation with his Jaina minister Karmacandra decided to confer on him the most coveted title of '*yuga-pradhān*' or the leader of the age—a title conferred once on Sri Jinadatta Suri by the gods themselves. Since then Sri Jinacandra's influence was on the increase so much so that Akbar issued orders prohibiting animal slaughter for about six months in a year, abolishing tax on the pilgrims going to the Jaina holyplace Satrunjaya and protecting the cows all over his empire. Iswari Prasad has written, "The tax on pilgrims to the Satrunjaya hills was abolished and the holy places of the Jainas were placed under his control. In short, Akbar's giving up of meat, the prohibition of injury to animal life were due to the influence of Jaina teachers."

After leading a very much eventful life when Sri Jinacandra attained loftiest spiritual heights, he laid his body at rest in 1613 at Bilare and entered the domain of the Liberated.

The Jaina *ācāryas* are well-known for their equanimity. These who have no attachment for men and money make no distinction between the rich and the poor. One day the *ācārya* was going to start his discourse. But his devoted disciple Karmacandra, who never missed it, when present, was busy elsewhere. His mother requested the *ācārya* to wait for a few moments. Calmly the *ācārya* said, "For me all are Karmacandras. The discourse cannot wait for anyone." The mother was annoyed at this reply. But when she looked around, she saw thousands of Karmacandras seated all around fully attentive to the discourse.

Based on Nahata, Agarchand, and Nahata, Bhanwarlal '*Yuga-Pradhan Sri Jinacandra Suri*, Calcutta, 1935.

POEMS

Verses from Cidananda

[Cidananda, one of the saint-poets of the Jainas, was born in the middle of the 19th century. His real name was Karpura Candra. We do not know much about his life or activities, but it is said that once he went on pilgrimage with a Jaina devotee from Bhavnagar in Saurashtra to Girnar and from there he disappeared. After that he rarely came to human locality. He died at Pareshnath Hills. His verses reveal his deep knowledge not only of religion and philosophy of the Jainas, but also of other Faiths, more particularly of the Yogic school. Besides theoretical knowledge, it appears that he had intuitive knowledge and supernatural power of a *yogi*. His verses are direct, full of rhythm and excel in poetic vision and beauty.]

5

Now I understand,
Now I realise
How unreal is this mutable world.
Fool, ye talk
'Tomorrow' 'Tomorrow',
When a moment has no certainty.
Remain not unprepared,
For, Death hovers over thy head.
Says Cidananda,
Know these words of mine, my dear,
To be the truth, the only reality.

6

Forsake me not
Leaving me alone, my love,
Forsake me not.
*Pāpiyā*¹ sings '*piu*'², '*piu*', '*piu*'
And thunders the raven-black cloud..
Lightnings flash and crash,
And all the peacocks respond in chorus.
I go upstairs.
The night is dark.

And forlorn, I know not what I do.
Says Cidananda,
I speak this once,
But know it a thousand times.

7

Say not '*piā*'³, '*piā*', '*piā*'
Oh Swallow,
For, when I hear this sound from thy throat
Overwhelmed am I.
If still my heart breaks not,
It has become hard as stone.
My cruel love is one thing that grieves me,
Who was won over by someone else by magic ;
But now, oh sinner bird,
By chanting '*piā*', '*piā*', '*piā*'
Ye give me additional pain.
When these words of thine
enter my ears
Restless becomes my mind,
And pangs of separation are up.
Cidananda says, my lord,
By appearing at this moment
Ye can win lasting fame.

8

Traveller, night is closing fast.
Wake, wake, give up thy sleep
And see what is of worth is being stolen.
Age is growing fast on thee
And immense is the ocean of life and death.
Take to thy heart
This advice of mine,
Says Cidananda,
See Him by opening your inner eyes
Who is all-consciousness.

¹ a sweet singing bird.

² a sound made by the bird but literally meaning 'my love'.

³ as above.

The Indispensable Associates of Caritra

(From the previous Issue)

HARISATYA BHATTACHARYYA

From what has been said above about the nature and features of right faith, one should not consider that it is really based on some previous mode of current knowledge. The *karma* which, according to the Jainas, suppresses true faith and the subsidence of which causes the evolution of it, is different from the *karma* which obstructs the rise of true knowledge. Accordingly, there is a fundamental difference between faith and knowledge. A man of faith is not always a wise man nor is a learned person necessarily a man of correct beliefs. The fact that *samyaktva* presupposes the *labdhis* or attainments described before does not show that it is not an immediate form of apprehension. Nor does the description (e.g. by Samantabhadra) of *samyak darśana* as (*deva-guru-śāstra-śraddhānam*) a belief in the true god, teacher and scripture point in any way to true faith being other than a form of immediate consciousness. It is true that the teachings of the true master and studies of the true scripture are said to generate true faith ; but this also does not show that *samyaktva* is anything other than a form of immediate consciousness. We shall see hereafter how from the 'real' view of the *samyaktva*, it is nothing but *svānubhūti* or self-consciousness itself. Here we are concerned with showing that the belief in the seven kinds of reals which has been called the *samyak darśana* is also an immediate form of consciousness. Even the fact of the *samyaktva* arising from *adhigama* or phenomena, to some extent external to the believer, does not detract from its character of immediacy. The outside factors are only conditions of the evolution of faith, not its productive cause. The faith arises from within the nature of the self, from which the *karma* has fallen off. *Samyaktva* is thus an immediate form of consciousness, just like self-consciousness itself. Teachings have been said to generate true faith ; but the true faith does not arise so long as the matters of the teachings are not identified with the hearer's self. It is only where and when the essence of the teachings is felt to be incorporated in the very being of the hearer that he feels the right faith ; right faith thus really rises from the self of the hearer and not exactly from outside teachings ; this explains cases where teachings fail to evoke any response from the hearer in the form of a correct

faith. The grounds of faith are in the self—not in any external phenomena and faith is an immediate form of consciousness, those external phenomena being only conditions of its evolution.

That the right faith is an immediate form of consciousness not interrupted by nor interfered with by any other consideration or form of cognition is also clear from the Jainas' description of it as consisting in *jñāna-cetanā*. The *cetanā* or consciousness of a being, according to them, is of three modes. In *karma-cetanā*, the consciousness of one's activities and efforts for attaining an object of desire is predominant while the second mode of *cetanā*, the *karma-phala-cetanā* is characterised by a feeling of pleasure or pain which arises from one's coming in contact with the object of his like or dislike. In the *jñāna-cetanā* there is neither of the two preceding modes of consciousness; the *jñāna-cetanā* is a pure consciousness of itself as it is in itself, uncontaminated by any sense of energising towards an object or by any feeling arising from the appropriation or nonappropriation of that object. The *jñāna-cetanā* is thus self-consciousness, pure, simple and above all, immediate; and most of the Jaina thinkers identify *samyaktva* with the *jñāna cetanā* in as much as the *samyaktva* is spontaneous faith which is not mixed up with any form of psychical activity or pleasurable or painful feelings or extraneous consideration. The *samyaktva* is thus a form of immediate apprehension.

Some thinkers, however, point out that while the pure *jñāna-cetanā* alone is applicable to the *vitārāga-samyaktva*, in the *sarāga-samyaktva*, the two forms of the *karma-cetanā* and the *karma-phala-cetanā* are present. The very expression, *sarāga*, implies that the believer, having the *sarāga-samyaktva* has the *rāga* or the feeling of attachment and as such has the consciousness of his activities applied towards the attainment of desirable objects as well as a feeling of pleasure, arising from the attainment thereof. It is urged against this view that the *rāga* affects the nature of one's conduct only; it has nothing to do with the nature of one's faith; so that it is always possible for one to have perfect faith or *jñāna-cetanā*, while conduct may be vitiated by the feelings of attachment or envy. This is one view regarding a person having the *sarāga-samyaktva* and the possibility of his having *jñāna-cetanā*. But the real reply to the objection concerning the *sarāga-samyaktva* and the *jñāna-cetanā* going together is that *samyaktva* and *rāga* cannot really go together. A man having *rāga* or a feeling of attachment for worldly objects cannot have *samyaktva* developed in him. In *sarāga-samyaktva*, the believer is not really *sarāga*; all that is meant is that he moves in the world, the sphere of *rāga*, without any real *rāga* attachment to his nature,

Although living and moving as a *sarāga* being, the man is really *nirāga* ; the passions of *rāga* do not enter into his nature and the *samyaktva* which is devoid of all *rāga*, is evolved in him. Thus, in the cases of *sarāga-samyaktva* also, the faith is immediate, *nirvikalpa* (undetermined), *sūkṣma* (subtle), *vācamagocaram* (incapable of being expressed in words) and *svānubhūti-rūpa* consisting in pure introspective self-apprehension—as variously described by the Jaina philosophers.

Such is *samyaktva* or the *samyak darśana* i. e. right faith, rising spontaneously from within one's self, which is one of the pre-requisites of *samyak cāritra* or good conduct.

Another indispensable condition for the moral-ness of acts is, as we have indicated already, *samyak jñāna* or right knowledge, according to the Jainas. Knowledge and faith, as we have seen, are separate matters ; yet there are cases in which properly developed knowledge helps the development of right faith and cases also where right faith presents the objects of knowledge in an entirely new aspect. It is thus possible for faith and knowledge combining together, as they actually do, in the conduct of a morally disposed man.

Samyak jñāna or valid knowledge has been described as correct (*vyavasāyī*) cognition of one's own self (*sva*) as well as of the non-self (*para*) i.e. the environments surrounding him. The first of the two objects of knowledge is the self, which is characterised by consciousness, while the non-self, so far as it is not a conscious being, may be grouped under the five classes of unconscious objects viz. 'matter', 'time' or the passive condition for the mutation of things, 'space' or the passive condition for the accommodation of substances and the two passive conditions for the 'motion' and the 'stoppage' of things. So, the foregoing six with their qualities and modes are the objects of determination by knowledge and knowledge effects the determination by examining its object under the following six categories viz.—(1) *Nirdeśa* i.e. definition or description of the thing as it is ; thus the *nirdeśa* of a house would be to describe it as a brick-built structure. (2) *Svāmitva* i.e. indication of ownership; in the case of the house, its *svāmitva* would be indicated by saying that it belongs to, say, A. (3) *Sādhana* i.e. the description of the constituent materials ; thus, a house would be described as constituted of bricks, mortar, lime etc. (4) *Adhikaraṇa* or the determination of the locus of the object under observation ; in the case of the house, it may be described as standing on a solid land within a certain village. (5) *Sthiti* or the determination of duration ; house in question may be said to be capable of lasting for, say, 60 years. (6) *Bidhāna* or the determination of the nature

of the thing with reference to the mode of its genesis ; thus in the case of the house, the following three things are relevant. (i) Suppose there was a big cavity in the place where the house was built later on ; a person wanting a temporary shelter, may spread a sheet of canvas over the cavity and may thus make a habitation for the time being within that cavity ; here the cavity is not destroyed but only its absoluteness is mitigated (*upaśama*) by the canvas spread over it and the temporary shelter may be described as the result of the mitigation of that absolute cavity. (ii) In the next place, let us suppose, a person erects a strong room deep down in a part of the cavity ; the room here certainly puts an end to a part of the cavity and yet the entire cavity is not destroyed ; for, over and above the room, there is still a portion of the vacuum left ; the strong room in this case may thus be described as the result of the mitigation (*upaśama*) and the partial destruction (*kṣaya*) of the original cavity. (iii) Lastly, let us suppose that an underground cell is constructed in the place of the cavity, which occupies the entire area of the cavity. Here the entire cavity is destroyed (*kṣaya*) and is replaced by the cell. It is thus the mode of the origin of a thing under observation reveals its nature. In the example of the house, we see that it is either an improvised temporary habitation or a small strong room or a complete underground cell—according as it mitigates or partially fills up or completely replaces the original cavity.

Right knowledge determines the above six aspects of a thing under its scope in the right manner. For the correct determination of the nature of the object, the above six aspects of it may be re-grouped under the following eight considerations. (1) *Sat* or the aspect of 'existence' ; according to the Jainas, the existence of a thing implies that it comes into being (*utpāda*), that it vanishes (*vyaya*) and that its underlying substance persists (*dhrauvya*) through all its modifications, e.g., the processes of continuous origination, annihilation and persistence ; valid knowledge considers the correct manners in which these three aspects of a thing come into operation. (2) *Samkhyā* or 'number' ; the determination of a thing by correct knowledge gives the number of things similar to it. (3) *Kṣetra*—the 'place' or the locus of the thing. (4) *Sparśana* or the 'extent' ; correct knowledge determines the area within which its object may live, move and have its being. (5) *Kāla* or the 'duration' of the existence of a thing. (6) *Antara* or the 'interval' ; it means that a thing may lose its nature and yet regain it after some time ; correct knowledge directs itself to a consideration of this interval between the thing's losing its nature and then regaining it. *Antara*, however, is not confined within the conception of temporal interval between a thing's two particular states only ; it may refer to the interval

between one thing's attaining a state and another thing's attaining that state 'as also to the spatial intervals between two or more things. (7) *Alpa-bahutva* or 'relativity' ; a correct cognition of a thing involves a comparative estimate of it in relation to other things as regards number, magnitude, etc. (8) *Bhāva* or 'modification' ; the nature of a thing is variously modified by its coming in contact with other things ; the Jaina philosophers classify the modifications in a thing generally under five heads which are as follows. (i) First of all, we have the *audayika* or the 'originative' modification, brought about in a thing when it is under the influence of a foreign thing. (ii) When the influence of that foreign thing upon the thing under observation is mitigated to a certain extent, we have a corresponding modification in the latter thing, which is called the *aupaśamika* or 'mitigative'. (iii) The thing under observation has in it the modification called the *miśra* or 'mixed', when the influence of the said foreign thing upon its nature is not only mitigated but is partially destroyed. (iv) The complete elimination of all foreign influences from the nature of the thing under observation gives rise to a state in the latter which is termed the *kṣāyika* or the 'annihilatory'. (v) The nature of a thing is dynamic, according to the Jainas ; its substance is not an unchanged and eternal identity but is essentially self-preservative, through its ceaseless passing modifications ; there are again modifications in the nature of a thing, even when it is established in its own pure nature and these modifications in the substance of a thing continuously evolving from within itself and independently of the influence of anything foreign or external to it are its *pāriṇāmika* or the 'essential' *bhāvas* or modifications.

Now, as regards the processes evolved by knowledge for the determination of its object in its above mentioned aspects, it refers to the *pramāṇa* and *naya*. The former grasps the thing as a whole while the latter confines itself to the consideration of it in one of its particular aspects. The *pramāṇa* is either direct (*pratyakṣa*) arising directly from within the knower's self or indirect (*parokṣa*). Under the direct knowledge come the cognitions known respectively as (1) the *avadhi* or the clairvoyant by which we perceive the non-sensuous aspects of a material thing, (2) the *manah-paryāya* or the telepathic, which gives us the knowledge of other men's minds and (3) the *kevala*, which consists in omniscience, or knowledge of all things, of all times and of all places, with all their attributes and modes. The *parokṣa* knowledge is so-called because besides the internal psychical activity, it is dependent on the operation of other factors also. The indirect knowledge is primarily divided into the *śruta* or knowledge derived from the authoritative sources and the *mati* which is dependent upon sense-operations, either directly or indirectly. The *śruta* refers to knowledge, arising from a study of the

infallible scriptures as well as from hearing the teachings of truly wise persons. The *mati* or the sensuous knowledge is due to the activities of the sense-organs (*indriyas*) as well as of the internal organ (*anindriya*) and is of five modes. The *mati* proper is perception through the senses e.g., the visual, etc., and includes such internal feelings as that of pleasure, pain, etc. The *smṛti* is the second mode of the *mati* or sensuous knowledge which makes us remember an object of previous perception. The *sañjñā* otherwise called the *pratyabhijñā* we perceive the points of similarity or dissimilarity between a thing of present observation and another or a number of them, otherwise observed. The *cintā* or the *uha* or the *tarka* is the fourth form of knowledge which establishes a general relationship between two sensuous phenomena like 'fire' and 'smoke'. Through *abhinibodha* better known as the *anumāna* we derive a particular truth from the more general conception, yielded by the foregoing inductive knowledge.

The *naya* is the second method of knowledge according to the Jainas. Its distinctive feature, as indicated already, is that while a thing in its entirety comes within the purview of the modes of the *pramāṇa*, the *naya* takes up for its consideration such of its particular aspects in their exclusiveness as its universal aspect, general essence, points of its particularity, or individuality etc., etc. The *naya* is subdivided in various manners. One mode of its classification is into the *dravyārthika* consisting in the exclusive consideration of the essential aspect of a thing and the *paryayārthika* which looks to its modalities only.

Knowledge has for its object, the *sva*, or the self and the *para* which is other than self. This is the Jaina view. According to the Buddhists, there is neither any permanent self nor any permanent reality outside it. The *Vedāntists* admit the real existence of a one and the self-same transcendental soul but deny the existence of a real non-self. The *Mīmāṃsā* school acknowledges the reality of the self and of the non-self but contends that an introspective knowledge of the self is never possible. The philosophers of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* school point the reality of an infinite number of selves as well as that of some kinds of the non-self but maintain that the self can be known only indirectly. The thinkers of the *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* school accept the reality of an infinite number of conscious selves and that of one ultimate non-self but they do not admit that the conscious transcendental souls have a real connection with the *prakṛti* or the principle of the non-self. Obviously all these views are opposed to the theories of the Jaina thinkers.

The Jainas hold that the above two objects of knowledge, the self and the non-self have each a number of attributes and that they are cease-

lessly undergoing infinite modifications. The *vastu* or the object of experience is thus possessed of infinite aspects. This, however, does not mean that the object of knowledge is necessarily unknowable. The Jainas, as we have hinted above, believe in the possibility of omniscience. Even when knowledge falls short of omniscience, some sort of true knowledge about the things is still possible. It consists in taking up a particular aspect or quality of the thing under observation and finding out in what relations this stands to the thing. It is obvious that these relationships between a thing and one of its modifications or attributes hold good as regards the thing and its other particularities also. True knowledge culminates in the discovery of these fundamental relationships between an object and its quality or mode. The Jaina investigation of the nature of a thing thus concerns itself with a study of these relationships and finds expression in their famous theory of the *sapta-bhanga* or the seven modes of predication. Shortly speaking, these seven predications consist in relating the thing to one of its given aspects in no less than seven manners. Thus, the first predication shows how, in some respects, that particular aspect can be positively attributed to the thing. The second predication would indicate how, in other respects, that aspect cannot be predicated of the thing. The third predication would consist in a successive affirmation and negation of that aspect in connection with the thing, in some respects while the fourth *bhanga* applies simultaneous affirmation and negation of it to the thing, in some respects. In the next mode of predication the fourth and the first forms of predication are combined and the sixth *bhanga* is similarly a combination of the second and the fourth *bhanga*s. The last form of predication consists in combining the third and the fourth *bhanga*s together. The Jainas point out that *samyak jñāna* or true knowledge about the object involves a correct application of the above *sapta-bhanga* or seven modes of predication in respect of it through the methods of the *pramāṇa* and the *naya*.

All knowledge is evidently not right knowledge, just as all faith is evidently not right faith. Save and except the telepathic and the omniscient forms of knowledge, which by their nature cannot be wrong when they are evolved in a self, all other modes of knowledge are liable to be misleading. Thus clairvoyant cognitions, e.g., in many cases where people think that they are having super-ordinary perceptions are often wrong. Where scriptures themselves are wrong and teachers unreliable, the authoritative knowledge, imparted by them is necessarily wrong. Due to the derangements of the sense-organs or of the internal organ of the mind, perceptions become false. On account of a similar derangement of the mental activities, the ideas recalled in memory and concepts formed from them become wrong while defective observation and wrong

estimation of facts lead to fallacious conclusions. The *samyak-jñāna* or valid knowledge is free from all forms of *samāropa* or mistake. The Jainas characterise right knowledge as *vyavasāyī* or certain, yielding ideas of its objects exactly as they are and as such, being free from all forms of doubt, illusion and inattentive tendencies.

We may conclude our study of the right knowledge of the Jainas by referring to what they call the eight *ācāras* in relation to it. The *ācāras* are looked upon by the Jainas as the eight *aṅgas* or limbs of the *samyak jñāna*. They are practically so many respectful attitudes that one should assume towards that branch of the right knowledge which is known as the *śruta* or the authoritative. The eight *ācāras* refer to a student's conduct towards the scripture and the scriptural teachers. The first of these *ācāras*, the *kālācāra* enjoins that scriptures are to be studied at those times only, which are specified for their study. The *vinayācāra* consists in purity, both outward and subjective. The external *vinaya* or observance of purity at the time of study consists in purifying the body, cleaning the cloth which is put on, seating oneself on a little high and clear spot, bowing to the scripture and so on ; while the internal purity consists in purifying the mind, filling it with feelings of veneration, etc., etc. The *śabdācāra* in connection with the scriptural study consists in using and uttering the words correctly and in accordance with the rules of grammar. The *arthācāra* requires that the correct meanings of words are always to be remembered and on no occasion one should distort them. The *ubhayācāra* insists that both the correct use of words as well as the remembrance of their true meanings are to be kept in view, when studying the scriptures. It would be seen that sometimes the more correct pronunciation of the scriptural words may bring some good ; on some occasions, again, the grasping of correct meaning only of these words may be useful ; it is said that a benefit which is of a different nature from the benefits accruing from the *śabdācāra* alone or from the *arthācāra* alone, is secured when these are combined. The sixth *aṅga* of the right scriptural knowledge is described as the *bahumānācāra* ; it consists in respecting the scriptures, respecting the right knowledge and respecting the teachers, who impart it. The Jainas emphasise the fact that without a respectful attitude on the part of the student towards the scripture and the teachers, the attainment of any right knowledge is impossible. The next is the *upadhānācāra* which consists in ever remembering correctly the verses, the texts and the aphorisms of the scripture and their expositions and, on no account, forgetting any part of them. The last of the *ācāras* is the *aninhavācāra* ; it lays down that one should not conceal the knowledge which he has acquired but should rather impart it to others who want to know it. Nor should he conceal the name of the teacher from whom he is learning or who is

the author of the books he is studying ; neither should one conceal the scriptures from honest enquirers but should always give publicity to them.

May it not be said that the respectful attitudes as described in the above *ācāras* which have been laid down by the Jaina thinkers as essential to the acquisition of the scriptural knowledge are also indispensable for a person interested in the investigation of any kind of truth ?

Firm in faith of the right sort and possessed of correct knowledge about his own self and what is other than it, one becomes competent to lead a truly moral life—a life of right conduct or *samyak cāritra* which yields the *mokṣa*, the blissful final emancipation.

Dhannya Salibhadra

a short story



Srenika goes to Salibhadra's house

There came a trader to the court of Srenika with some jem-blankets. The king took one in his hand and said, "What is to be done with it ? It has got no weight."

"That's true," replied the trader, "but is weight everything ?"

"Then ?" said the king.

The trader laughed. "Then," he said, "these blankets keep one cool in summer and warm in winter."

The king sent the blanket to the queen's apartment. On seeing and hearing everything the queen Celwana sent message through her umbrella-bearer that she must need have one.

But the king was not able to purchase the blanket. The price demanded by the trader was so high that it was beyond the means of the treasury of Magadha even. So Srenika had to say, "I am not able to purchase the blanket."

What else could the trader do ? Disappointed he left the court.

Pacing through all the streets of Rajagriha, towards evening, he went to the house of the merchant Salibhadra.

"I had heard much about the city of Rajagriha," he said, "but there is none who can purchase even one of my blankets."

On hearing this, Bhadra, Salibhadra's mother, came down the stairs.

"Trader, I am taking all your blankets." she said.

The trader was amazed. He thought that there was some mistake somewhere. So, to clarify, he said, "That will cost twenty lakh pieces of gold."

“Nothing to worry.” replied Bhadra.

Really payment was no worry to Bhadra. But she became worried when the trader could give her only sixteen peices of blanket. For her thirty-two daughters-in-law, she needed at least thirty-two pieces. But there was nothing to be done. So she tore each blanket into two and distributed them amongst her daughters-in-law.

In the evening when the king went to the queen’s apartment, he found that there was no light burning and Celwana was without a word.

So he asked, “What’s the matter, my dear ?”

“Nothing.” replied the queen. “Better send me to a cottage.”

“Why ?” said the king.

Celwana did not reply.

The king understood everything in his mind.

“Now I perceive the cause of your anger.” he said. “I am calling the trader back.”

Whatever the price of the blanket, he thought, unless he purchased one, he would loose the peace of his mind.

But the trader was nowhere to be found. And meanwhile the report reached him that Salibhadra had purchased all the blankets.

The king was at a fix. How rich must Salibhadra be !

Next morning the king sent a request to Salibhadra to give one of the blankets to his attendant at a price.

On hearing the request, Bhadra was worried. She said, “There is no question of a price when His Majesty needs a blanket. But they are not in the house.”

“Where are they ?”

There was a sign of irritation on her face. Then she said, “What to say ? My daughters-in-law never use a thing twice. So the blankets have been dumped in the dead-well by this time.”



Salibhadra takes leave of his wives

The attendant came back with the message.

The king was amazed. He thought again, what a fortune !

Then he sent a message back that he would soon come to see Salibhadra.

Then one day the king, followed by his soldiers and attendants, went to see Salibhadra. There were long rows of horses and elephants.

Bhadra received them all. Then she conducted the king into her palace.

It was a seven-storeyed mansion. The first floor was made of pure gold—pillars, roof and everything. It housed the servants.

Srenika was conducted from the first floor to the second, and then to the third, fourth and the fifth, one richer than the other. Here there were set very costly jems, pearls and rubies in wonderous formation and combination.

The king was tired by this time.

“This far,” he said, “I can go no farther.” And he sat down to rest.

So Bhadra went upstairs to call Salibhadra.

Salibhadra never descended from his apartment in his life and had never seen anybody except the members of his household. The business was conducted by Bhadra herself. So seeing Bhadra he said, “Mother, you ?”

“Yes, I. The king has come to see you.”

Salibhadra had never heard of a king. So he said, “King ! What does he want ?”

“He wants nothing. He has come to see you on hearing your fame.”

“To see me ! But if I don’t see him.....”

“No, my boy. He is the king, the lord of the land. He protects everything. So you shouldn’t disobey him.”

“Is he my lord too ?”

Bhadra smiled this time and said, “Yes, my boy.”

Salibhadra was a little annoyed. He thought, then there was a lord over him. He was not the lord of all.

“You silly boy !” said Bhadra.

The king went back after seeing Salibhadra. He saw him as tender as *sephali* (nuctanthes) flowers and of beautiful complexion. He said, “I have never seen like this in my life.”

But Salibhadra’s annoyance persisted—*there was a lord over him.*

Gaiety did no longer appeal to him, nor did women give him pleasure any more. Everything had gone wrong.

One day Salibhadra told his mother, “I do not like to remain a small lord as now ; is it not possible to be one with the Lord of everything ?”

On hearing this Bhadra trembled at heart. It was for some such apprehension that she had kept her son off from everything. She had not forgotten how in this way one day her husband too had renounced this world.

She said, “Why not?” But the path to be trodden is difficult. You won’t be able.”



Salibhadra sets out to receive initiation

“You underestimate my ability, my mother”, said Salibhadra.

“The way is that of renunciation.” said Bhadra. “Thorns will prick in thy feet and your body will be bruised. Will you be able to bear that ?”

She wept bitterly. And then said, “Salibhadra, you want nothing. Wealth of the universe is at your feet. What more do you want ?”

“I want your blessing only.”

“Well” she said, “You cannot leave this world in a day. Try to remove it bit by bit.”

She knew that in this way no one was able to leave the world, for inborn prejudices would stand in the way.

Subhadra, Salibhadra’s sister was massaging the feet of her husband. Unknowingly, a drop of tear fell on his feet. Dhannya was startled. He said, “Subhadra, what has happened ? Why are you weeping ?”

She dried off her tears by the corner of her skirt. And then said, “How shall I break the news ? Salibhadra is renouncing everyday one of his wives for final renunciation.”

On hearing this Dhannya began to laugh. He said, “What do you say ? I have never heard like this. When conscience is aroused, when mind is full of renunciation, one renounces the world in a moment.”

Subhadra was hurt. She thought that Dhannya was belittling Salibhadra. So she said, “It is easy to speak but.....can you do it ? In a moment ?”

“Yes, I can.” So saying he renounced the world in a moment. His wealth and his property, his fame and his riches, even the beauty of Subhadra —nothing was able to detract him. Subhadra with a remorseful heart was left behind like a broken bow of firs in a storm. Entreaties, begging forgiveness and even tears were not able to move him from his path.

When this news reached Salibhadra, he too renounced the world that very moment.

An Epitome of Jainism

DIGEST

PURANCHAND NAHAR &
KSHITISH CHANDRA GHOSH
Calcutta : 1917

It is generally held that dialectic method of reasoning identifying logic with ontology is of Hegelian origin and meaning. But the dialectic method of reasoning identifying logic with metaphysics was not Hegel's own making. It originated with the Jaina sages and omniscient *kevalins* and has been prevalent in the field of philosophy in India from a time when Greece and Rome were steeped in the darkness of ignorance.

With the Jainas the Absolute is but an expression of Unity in Difference as distinguished from the Absolute beyond the Relative of the *Vedāntins*. The world process is viewed by the Jainas as being without beginning and end ; but the soul, according to Jainism, does not remain for ever entangled in the messes of the dialectic process of evolution without knowing any rest or repose anywhere. The Jainas as well as every other system of Indian thought and culture hold that the *jīva* will never remain eternally caught up in the never-ending process of evolution. It is bound to get at that state of being and beatitude which is all free and divine. For freedom is our birth-right. Every soul is constitutionally free and potentially divine and the struggle for existence in this nether world means with the Jainas not only the struggle for bare existence in this mortal coil but for the realisation as well of this Ideal Freedom and Divinity. With this end, the enquiries constituting the Right Vision.

TRIRATNA—Right Knowledge which proceeds from Right Vision is the only process which embraces, concisely or in details, the relations in which the constituent factors of the world stand to soul and the changes as well of these relations in the dialectic movement of thought and being. The Jainas hold that both the soul and the *karma* stand to each other in relation of phenomenal conjunction, which reveals itself in the continuity of the display from time without beginning,

neither soul nor *karma* being either prior or posterior to the other in the order of time, so far as the question of their metaphysical entity is concerned—*anādi-apascānupūrvi saṁyoga saṁbandha prabāha*. The angularities of the *jīva* sunk in the ocean of *saṁsāra* are rubbed off by being driven from womb to womb, from region to region, under the strong pressure of *karma*-causality. When at last the *jīva* gets a comparatively improved vision into its own nature and ideal, it struggles to work out its own emancipation as a free centre of origination.

From Right Knowledge or our ultimate ideal, place and function in the world arises the possibilities of Right Conduct which is imperative in the attainment of the ideal. To have Right Knowledge it is necessary that we have a knowledge of the *mithyātva* which is the prime root of all troubles. It may be mentioned that the theory of *māyā*, resolving into *āvaraṇa* and *vikṣepa* as interpreted by Sankara and others is but a distorted shadow of the Jaina theory of *mithyātva*. For, to deny *māyā* of any positive entity and to posit it at the same time as the great impediment in the way to the true self-realisation is to be guilty of substantialising the abstraction. In order to escape from this difficulty Ramanuja had to draw inspiration from the teachings and writings of the Jaina sages and in consequence had to fall back upon the Jaina doctrine of *bhedābheda* (Unity in Difference). It is interesting that the Jaina sages have made sifting enquiry into the nature and matter of this *mithyātva* and found possibilities of its removal through *sambhara* (stoppage of influx) and *nirjarā* (gradual dissipation). With the completion of dissipation, the soul gets rid of the veil and covering of *karma* and shines in perfect freedom and omniscience enjoying bliss divine (*mokṣa*) for all time to come. But this final and ultimate state of bliss cannot be attained all of a sudden. Great indeed is the vision but only the few behold. Great is the goal but only a few attain. Great really is the struggle but only the few can withstand. For, in fact, the goal is reached by steady and strenuous striving subjecting the self to undergo a series of practical disciplines as laid down in the jural (*carāṇa*) and teleological (*karāṇa*) ethics of the Jainas. And the stages which the *mumukṣin* (one who strives to attain the *mokṣa*) has to pass through are fourteen in number and are called the *guṇasthānas* (stepping stones to liberation) which can be squeezed up into four to suit modern intellect.

According to the Jaina philosophers, freedom is not only our birth-right, it is inherent in man. Feel that you are great and you will be great ; feel that you are free and all quarrels will cease. With the Jainas, it is but a question of realisation in the very heart of hearts where life throbs and the soul of religion dwells in. Unlike in the west, philosophy in India

does not clash with religion ; rather, it serves as the basis for a particular form of religion. This is not only true of all schools of Hindu philosophy ; this is equally true of Jainism. But much more than that, Jainism provides the means to the introduction into this mundane world of a region of peace, ordered harmony and reasonable sweetness which are most wanting in these days of rank materialism and uncompromising self-aggrandisement with which this blessed land of Bharat has become surcharged.

ANTIQUITY & UNIVERSALITY—So far as the antiquity of Jainism is concerned, it is now admitted on all hands, that Jainism is not an offshoot of Buddhism. It has been in existence long before Buddhism was conceived. It is an original system of thought and culture. In the words of Jacobi, “it (the Jaina philosophy) has, truly speaking, a metaphysical basis of its own which secured it a distinct position apart from the rival systems, both of the *Brāhmins* and of the Buddhists.” Jainism is not a monastic religion but truly an evangelic or a missionary religion, religion intended not for the ascetics only but for the world at large in which the majority are lay people. Jainism is a religion universal, its object being to help all beings to salvation and to open its arms to all, high or low, by revealing to them the real truth.

JAINA VIEW OF PHILOSOPHY—The Jainas teach that philosophy consists in the voluntary and consistent striving, intellectual and moral, manifest in the removal of impediments on the way to Right Vision into the metaphysics of things and thoughts leading to Right Knowledge of the world as a whole and of our own function and place, Right Conduct, therein with the express object of realising finally the free and beatific state of our being—the ultimate end and purpose of all life and activity. Three things stand important in the enquiry : (1) cogitative substance or soul (*jīva*), (2) the non-cogitative substance or non-soul (*ajīva*), and (3) the attainment of the freedom of the soul (*mokṣa*).

Nine fundamental categories in Jainism are :

1. Cogitative substance or soul (*jīva*), both freed and fettered, with or without the power of locomotion.
2. Non-cogitative substance (*ajīva*) including *pudgala* (that which develops fully to be dissolved again, *dharma* (motion), *adharma* (rest), *ākāśa* (space) and *kāla* (time).
3. *Punya* (virtue).

4. *Pāpa* (vice).
5. *Asrava* (influx, infection or transmutation of *pudgala*-particles into the soul).
6. *Bandha* (bondage).
7. *Sambara* (stoppage of influx).
8. *Nirjarā* (dissipation).
9. *Mokṣa* (freedom of the soul).

JAINA VIEW OF KNOWLEDGE—Knowledge is knowledge of these categories. When this knowledge is imparted by a teacher, one gets Right Vision and Right Vision is the basis of Right Knowledge without which Right Conduct is impossible. The Jāinas distinguish between five types of knowledge, *mati*, (based on senses), *śruti* (based on verbal testimony of the omniscient), *abadhi* (insight into the past), *manaparyāya* (insight into others' thoughts) and *kevala* (knowledge absolute). A *kevalin* is the ideal of all aspirations, the fountain-head of truth and wisdom, in short, God. The last one is not only a form of knowledge but its very source.

JAINA FORMAL LOGIC—Of the source of knowledge, the *Cārvāka* school admits only one, viz., experience or sensual perception (*pratyakṣa*) but other schools have added inference (*anumāna* by the Buddhists and the *Vaiśeṣikas*), testimony (*śabda* by *Sāṅkhya* school), analogy (*upamā* by the *Nyāya* school), implication (*arthāpatti* by the *Prabhākara* school), non-existence (*abhāva* by the *Mīmāṃsakas*) and tradition and probability (*aitihya* and *sambhāvanā* by the *Paurāṇikas*). The Jāinas, however, admit only two sources, viz., direct or immediate perception and indirect or mediate perception, and they further point out that even the direct knowledge is for all practical purposes indirect because of the existence of five intermediary stages from sense to thought. This brings the Jaina theory of knowledge into headlong clash with the views of the *Cārvāka* school according to which experience or sense perception alone is the source of knowledge. On deeper analysis, however, the *Cārvāka* view does not stand. The Jaina view of indirect or mediate knowledge includes inference, testimony, etc. Such is Jaina logic or the Logic of Consistency.

FROM LOGIC TO ONTOLOGY—Not satisfied with above, the Jainas have carried their analysis on the source of knowledge further giving rise to the doctrines of *nayas* and of *saptabhaṅgī*. The former is the analytical process of ontological enquiry and the latter is the synthetical treatment of things in their versatility of aspects. These two together form, as it were, the very groundwork on which the whole structure of the Jaina metaphysics is safely and securely built up.

NAYAVADA—As said above, *naya* is the analytical process of ontological investigation helping us to dive deep into the network of interrelated parts of the thing through the ordinary means of knowledge and select one or the other attribute for deeper interpretation and understanding. Thus a *naya* predicates one of the innumerable attributes of a thing without denying the rest. Where the rest are denied, it is no longer a *naya* but a *nayābhāsa* or a fallacy involved in the analytical reasoning. The analytical reasoning may either centre round a moumenon of a thing (*dravyārthika*) or round a phenomenon (*paryāyārthika*). Put in another way, a *naya*, is the standpoint of the knower, and, in consequence, these will be as many as the knowers themselves, giving rise to a number of doctrines. Broadly, seven *nayas* are recognised as follows :

1. *Naigama* when the knower takes the most general view of a thing, —this is the viewpoint of the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* schools.
2. *Saṅgraha* when the knower considers only the generic qualities, —this is the viewpoint of the *Sāṅkhya* and the *Advaita* schools.
3. *Vyavahāra* when the knower considers only the specific, not generic qualities, the viewpoint of the *Cārvākas* and also of the modern Positivists and the Pragmatists.
4. *Rjusūtra* when the knower looks straight into the thing as it is—the viewpoint of the Buddhists.
5. *Sābda* or terminological standpoint—the standpoint of Conventionalists, Grammarians and modern Empiricists.
6. *Samabhiruḍha* draws distinction between words of similar character, the standpoint of the *śabda-bādi* philosophers in the East and of the objective-idealists in the West.

7. *Ebambhūta* when the knower is able to designate a thing in strict conformity with the nature and quality as displayed by the thing, —the viewpoint of the Grammarians.

Of these seven, the first three have for their subject-matter *dravya* or substance and the last four have for their subject-matter *paryāya* or phenomenon. The all-comprehensiveness of the *naya* theory should be clear from above.

SYADVADA—Now we turn to the synthetical treatment of things in their versatility of aspects, as distinguished from the analytical treatment. The analytical treatment as such based as it is on the ordinary or naive realistic methods of reviewing a thing suffers from three serious defects. First, we cannot get rid of the material or sensuous origin which consequently tends to betray the mind into illusion or error ; second, it must fail to give the real or organic connection and unity to objects which it deals with ; and third, it is incapable of solving contradiction or reconciling the seemingly antagonistic elements which all thought is found to contain. It was the Jainas alone who realised that no element can be known fully in abstraction or isolation from the rest. What is needed is a new apparatus to see it, the unity which belongs to spiritual things. Hence the *anekānta* form of cognition based on the *sapta-bhaṅgī* which alone gives adequate form of knowledge. *Sapta-bhaṅgī*, in other words, is a spiritual view of things which transcends both above formal logic and *nayabāda* or realistic enquiry. The *sapta-bhaṅgīs* are :

1. *Syāt asti*—may be, partly or in a certain sense a thing (say, a jar) exists.
2. *Syāt-nāsti*—may be, partly or in a certain sense the jar does not exist.
3. *Syāt asti nāsti ca*—may be, partly or in a certain sense the jar exists and in a sense it does not exist.
4. *Syāt abaktabya*—may be, partly or in a certain sense, the jar is indescribable.
5. *Syāt asti abaktabyaśca*—may be, partly or in a certain sense the jar exists as well as in a certain sense it is indescribable.

6. *Syāt nāsti abaktabyaśca*—may be, partly or in a certain sense the jar is not and indescribable in a certain sense as well.

7. *Syāt asti nāsti abaktabyaśca*—may be, partly or in a certain sense the jar is and is not and is indescribable as well in a certain sense.

Basing on a *sūtra* in *Brahmasūtra* which reads *naikasmin sambhabāt* (i.e., coexistence of contradictory attributes abiding in the same substance is an impossibility), Sankara raised his voice against *syādvāda* and demanded its total rejection. All through his argument, Sankara lays great stress on the law of contradiction which, he feels, cannot be transgressed without ourselves committing contradictions and inconsistencies. Sankara's criticism is, however, misplaced ; for, when the Jainas deny the validity of the law of contradiction, they only dispute the claim of absolute validity which tends to exclude the other, specially the opposite, thought. But this is untenable—this is half-truth or only one aspect of the truth, and not the whole truth. The other side of the truth or rather the complementary side of the truth is that every definite thought, by the very fact that it is definite, has a necessary relation to its negative and cannot be separated from it without losing its true meaning. It is definite only by virtue of its opposition with what it is not. So nothing howsoever definite can be conceived as self-identical in the absolute sense of the term. Thus *syādvāda* which lays down that the law of contradiction is the negative aspect of the law of identity stands on merit.

UNITY IN DIFFERENCE—This leads us to another, though allied topic, viz., unity in difference on which the Jainas differ from the *Vedāntins*. In the Jaina view, the Absolute is the ultimate unity of thought which expresses itself as *jīva* on the one side and correlative of the subject as *ajīva* on the other. This unity is all-inclusive which embraces everything that is real. The *Vedāntins*, in contrast, hold that our intellect deals with the relative only and the Absolute therefore lies beyond the world of the relative, beyond the world of phenomena. In the Jaina view, the Absolute is not beyond the phenomena ; rather, all phenomena are but particular aspects of this all-inclusive unity which is Absolute. If the Absolute is the unity and not plurality, how do you explain plurality which is a stupendous fact and which cannot be denied. The *Vedāntins* try to evade the issue by calling plurality an illusion (*māyā*) and not a reality. In doing so, they shirk reality.

In the Jaina view, the Absolute is the Universal. This Universal is not the abstract universal of formal logic, but concrete universal. The

Absolute expresses itself in A but is not limited to A ; it extends to B, C, D and so on. The Universal comes out of itself and particularises Itself in the particular objects of the world system. The Universal of the Jainas thus does not fight shy of the Particulars of the world ; rather it embraces them all into Itself. Such being the Jaina conception of the Absolute, the whole universe of things must needs be ordered in perfect agreement with our cognitions. We are conscious of things as different and non-different at the same time. They are non-different in their causal or universal aspect (*kāraṇātmanā jātyātmanā ca abhinnaṃ*) but are different in so far as viewed as effects or particulars (*kāryātmanā byaktātmanā ca bhinnaṃ*).

(To be continued)

GLEANINGS



Lotus-Gatherer, Sittannavasal

In turning from Tirumayam to Sittannavasal one turns to a different world altogether. It is believed that the rock-cut temple at the latter place was excavated by the first Mahendravarman in his, as he might have considered it later, unregenerate days when he had been a Jaina. Sittannavasal was a strong centre of Jaina influence for no less than fifteen centuries, from the third century B. C. to the thirteenth A.D.

Though it has vanished, that world was artistically gifted. The five images in the sanctum and in the *ardhamandapa* are all majestic and serene. They are deities of a vital religion. It must have been in their honour that the famous murals in this shrine were painted. Originally

the sanctum as well as the porch was fully painted over, and a recent cleaning showed that a later layer had been imposed on an earlier one in the *ardhamandapa*, recalling a similar situation in the Brihadeeswara temple at Tanjore centuries later. It was a vital artistic tradition that chose Sittannavasal for its gallery.

The dates of the murals vary. Practically little has survived in the sanctum, which is believed to have been excavated in the seventh century by or under the auspices of, the first Mahendravarman. The porch, scholars believe, was added two centuries later by a Pandya, Srimara Srivallabha, and it is there that most of the survivals exist. But the difference in the dates, a matter of two hundred years, does not appear to have been very significant.

...Sittannavasal is in the grand Ajanta style. In fact some critics hold it to be superior. There is nothing here like the sublime *Bodhisattva* in the first cave at Ajanta. The artists of Sittannavasal enjoyed a much smaller scope, and there is no reason to believe that this Jaina settlement commanded the large resources of the Buddhist monks at Ajanta, which lay on the highway between Pratisthana and Ujjain and was not very far from the rich marts on the western sea-coast. They also aimed at smaller effects. But the point is they succeeded in what they aimed at. That was due in part to their religious fervour and in part to their technical accomplishments....

—N. S. Ramaswami, '*Jain Hill*', The Sunday Standard, May 8, 1966.

Strangely enough Manbhum is a district where there are Jaina antiquities in abundance lying exposed and neglected. The more one enquires, the more relics come to one's knowledge. The little known village Pabanpur in Barabhum Pargana was obviously an important Jaina centre in olden times. There are a number of ruined temples and broken antiquities. Some of these temples have exquisite carvings. On all sides of the temple there are damaged images of the *Tirthankaras*. Another small village, Par at a distance of four miles from Anara Railway Station, has also certain Jaina antiquities but there has not been any exploration of the area. Some of the antiquities of this area had been sent to Calcutta Museum and are preserved there. One of them is a 2 ft. high image of Santinatha in *khargāsana*. This is slightly damaged.

Probably because the Jaina images, many of which are still unbroken, are lying exposed under trees or on sites which were once temples, very little attention has been paid to them. The cluster of images that the writer saw at various parts of the district in neglected spots remind one as to what a commotion would have been made had they been discovered as a result of a digging. As no state protection has been given, they have been freely utilised on the walls of private houses or temples. Manbhum offers a rich field for research into the evolution of Jainism in this area, its relationship with orthodox Hinduism, Saivism and Vaisnavism. A number of inscriptions on the pedestals of some of the images have been found. They have not yet been properly deciphered or studied. A proper study of the inscriptions and the images supported by some excavations in well identified area of Jaina culture will no doubt throw a good deal of light on the history of culture in this part of the country extending over two thousand years.

—P. C. Roy Chaudhury, '*Jaina Antiquities in Manbhum*',
Amrita Bazar Patrika, Annual Puja Number, 1956.

Books on Jainalogy

BROWN, W. NORMAN, *Manuscript Illustrations of the Uttaradhyayana Sūtra* (American Oriental Series Vol. XXI) with 150 figures on 46 Plates, American Oriental Society, New Haven, 1941. Pages xiii + 54. Price Rs. 18.00.

Introduction and description with illustrations of the discipline of monks, hardships, the four requisites, the past cannot be re-assembled, death against one's will, the false ascetic, the parable of the ram, Kapila, Nami's entry into monkhood, the leaf of the tree, the very learned, Harikesha, Citra-Sambhuta, Isukara, the true monk, the conditions of perfect chastity, the bad monk, Sanjaya, Mrigaputta, the great duty of Jaina monks, the story of Samudrapala, the story of Rathanemi, Kesi & Gautama, the *samitis* or the articles (mothers) of the doctrine, the true sacrifice, correct behaviour; the bulky bullocks, the road to salvation, exertion in righteousness, the road of penance, rules of conduct, the causes of carelessness, the nature of *karma*, the *leśyās*, the houseless monk, living creatures and things without life.

BUHLER, G., *The Life of Hemacandrācārya* (Singhi Jain Series Vol. 11), translated by Manilal Patel with a foreword by M. Winternitz, Singhi Jain Jnanapitha, Santiniketan, 1936. Pages xv + 104.

Sources, Hemacandra's early life, Hemacandra and Jayasingha Siddharaja, Hemacandra's first acquaintance with Kumarapala, Kumarapala's conversion, its consequences, Hemacandra's literary works, stories about Hemacandra and Kumarapala.

JACOBI, Hermann, *Studies in Jainism* (a collection of three original, important and informative articles on Jainism), edited by Jina Vijaya Muni, Jaina Sahitya Samsodhaka Pratisthan, Ahmedabad, 1946. Pages iii + 92. Price Rs. 3.00.

I. Jainism—introductory, Jaina view of its origin, canonical literature of the *Swetāmbaras*, doctrines of Jainism, its present state, history of Jainism.

II. The Metaphysics and Ethics of the Jainas—Jainism an original system, statement of the *Brāhmanic* and Buddhistic doctrines of being, Jaina theory of being, doctrines of *syādvāda* and *nayas*, Jaina philosophy compared with *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga*, it is earlier than *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika*.

III. The Place of Jainism in the Development of Indian Thought—the ancient concept of soul, original non-distinction between spirit and matter.

MISHRA, YOGENDRA, *An Early History of Vaiśālī* (from the earliest times to the fall of the Vajjian Republic, circa 484 B.C.), Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1962. Pages xvii + 302. Price Rs. 15.00.

Deals with its early history from monarchy to the fall of republic of the Vajjians or the Licchavis, refers to Mahavira and Jainism in the Vajjian republic, discusses the date of Mahavira, the birth-place of Mahavira and the progress of Jainism in the Vaisali region in the life-time of Mahavira.

RAMACHANDRAN, T. N., *Jaina Monuments and Places of First Class Importance* (being Presidential Address at the All-India Jaina Sasana Conference, 1944), Vira Sasana Sangha, Calcutta. Pages iv + 71, Plates XLV. Price Rs. 15.00.

Mentions Rajagriha, Barabar Hills (Bihar), Mathura, Udayagiri-Khandagiri (Orissa), Khajuraho, Mount Abu, Taranga, Girnar, Satrunjaya, Ranpur, Parasnath, Pawapuri, Maynamati and Paharpur (East Bengal), Trichinopoly, Tiruparuttikunram, Sittannavasal, Tirumalai, Sravana Belgola. Also discusses Jaina paintings, Jaina iconography and metal images of North and South India.

ROY CHOUDHURY, P. C., *Jainism in Bihar*, Patna, 1956. Pages x + 111, 16 Plates. Price Rs. 5.00.

Discusses Jainism in Bihar, gives a bird's-eye view of religion and its architecture, detailed description of Parasnath Hill, Kuluha Hill and Jaina antiquities of Manbhum, Singhbhum, Gaya, Sahabad, Bhagalpur, Patna, Muzaffarpur with Buchanan's references to Jaina shrines in the province.

STEIN, OTTO, *The Jainist Studies*, edited by Jina Vijaya Muni, with A. S. Gopani, Jaina Sahitya Samsodhaka Pratisthan, Ahmedabad, 1948. Pages vi + 132. Price Rs. 5.00.

Shows the treasure hidden in Jainist writings : inquiries regarding settlements, fortifications, village-authorities, houses, establishments, geography, magistrates, state officials, court officials, king's officials, officials of the queen and her attendants, the servant-girls, etc.

WINTERNITZ, MAURICE, *The Jainas in the History of Indian Literature* (a short outline of the history of Jaina literature), edited by Jina Vijaya Muni, Jaina Sahitya Samsodhaka Pratisthan, Ahmedabad, 1946. Pages vii + 62. Price Rs. 2.00.

Brief survey of the contribution of the Jainas in the field of narrative literature, *kāvya*s and *mahākāvya*s, lyrical and didactic poetry, scientific and technical literature, philosophical and political works. Shows close connection between the Jaina literature and the post-Vedic literature.

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