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An abridged version of the lost *Taramgavai* of Acarya Padalipta (c. 1st century A. D.) prepared by an anonymous author possibly belonging to 10th century A. D. with introduction and translation in Gujarati. It also contains verse index, Bhadresvara’s abridgement of *Taramgavai* and a table demonstrating the verses common to both the Bhadresvara’s *Taramgavai* and *Samkhitta-Taramgavai*.


Being the collection of two lectures on the early period of Jaina Philosophy delivered in commemoration of late Dr. A. N. Upadhye at Sivaji University, Kolhapur.


A collection of 85 inscriptions of the Imperial Paramaras previously scattered in various historical journals with translation, notes and historical introduction in Hindi.


A collection of 20 *Samdhikāvyas* written in Apabhramsa in between 13th to 15th century A. D. with introduction in Gujarati.


Text with Karnataka *Vy̱tti*, Sanskrit *Tīkā Jīvatattvapradīpikā*, and Hindi translation.


Text with introduction, Hindi translation and index of the verses.
An Advaitic Criticism of Jainism
—a Counter-Criticism—

ARVIND SHARMA

I

In the state of salvation, the Jīva who has become a Siddha is described thus in Jainism:

Omniscience, boundless vision, illimitable righteousness, infinite strength, perfect bliss, indestructibility, existence without form, a body that is neither light nor heavy, such are the characteristics of the Siddha.¹

Since all the Siddhas share identical properties, this soteriological situation could invite criticism from Advaitin thinkers of Hinduism. It could be argued that if in the state of liberation all the souls are identical, and reflect the entire universe directly then why should all of them not be visualized as a unity—as one cosmic soul or as a single Jīva? Thus Prof. Hiriyanna argues that:

In the case of Jīvas their empirical distinctions are adequately explained by their physical adjuncts. Even the difference in their moral nature is fully accounted for by them, Jainism electing to explain karma as a form of matter. In these circumstances the intrinsic distinction which is assumed to exist between one Jīva and another, or the plurality of spirit, becomes only nominal. The necessary implication of Jaina thought in this respect is, therefore, a single spiritual substance...²

It is also worth noting that “These freed souls enjoy a kind of interpenetrating existence on account of their oneness of status. Their

soul substance has a special power by which an infinity of souls could exist without mutual exclusion.”\textsuperscript{3} Dr. Radhakrishnan argues that:

When reflection by imperfect abstraction reduces the subject to a finite mind conditioned by an organism, with a particular location in time and space, we get the idea of the independence of the \textit{Jīvas}. In other words, to use Sankara’s famous expression, we have the doctrine of the plurality of \textit{Jīvas} only so long as we treat the subject as an object which can be scrutinized. If we follow the implications of thought and disentangle the subject from embodiment in sensation and feeling, free it from all contact with the object, we shall see that there is only one subject in reality. Jainism did not choose to realize this height or look towards this ideal...\textsuperscript{4}

II

This alleged failure on the part of Jainism is attributed to “immature philosophizing”.\textsuperscript{5} It is the purpose of the rest of this paper to point out that such an assessment seems to reflect a rather partial understanding of the trends which have characterized Indian philosophical thought.

Although it is perhaps true to say that “most Indian philosophy is idealistic in one form or another”,\textsuperscript{6} this should not lead one to ignore the strand of pluralism within the Indian philosophical tradition.\textsuperscript{7} As P. R. Raju says:

If something is to be achieved, man in general thinks that it can be achieved only through action, i.e. by working for it. But action implies a pluralistic universe, the nature of which is to be explained in terms of action and in the philosophy for which action becomes the supreme principle. Such a philosophy is the Mimansa. To understand reality, thought has to work methodically and logically without turning imagination and hopes into methods. Logic

\textsuperscript{4} Ibid., p. 337.
\textsuperscript{5} Ibid., p. 335. M. Hiriyanna speaks of the “half-hearted nature of Jaina inquiry” (op. cit., p. 172) in one context and A. L. Basham refers to the “primitive heritage” of Jainism (R. C. Zaehner, ed., \textit{op. cit.}, p. 262), in another.
\textsuperscript{6} Sarvpalali Radhakrishnan and Charles A. Moore, eds., \textit{A Source Book of Indian Philosophy}, Princeton University Press, 1957, p. xxv.
implies also a plurality; for if all is one, there is no need of thinking. The philosophy in which logic and methodology play the primary role belongs to the Nyaya; and the main defence of pluralism belongs to the philosophy of the Vaisesika. In the basic works of these two schools, logic and method are the main concern of the Nyaya and the defence of pluralism that of the Vaisesika. The philosophy of action of the Mimansa is also pluralistic; but its main purpose is the explanation of right action. Next, understanding oneself can be understanding oneself as apart from that which is not one's self and which can be regarded as one whole massive object. This understanding leads to a kind of qualitative dualism, which we find in the Sankhya and the Yoga. But thought does not stop here. It asks: If the world, the alien object, is an other to oneself, how can one be sure that it permits the realization of one's ideals? Are the ideals empty hopes and longings or are they realizable? They can be realized only if there is a unity underlying oneself and the world. Man has to search for it. The philosophies of such unities are the Vedanta and later Buddhism. Early Buddhism and Jainism are somewhat similar to the Nyaya, the Vaisesika and the Mimansa in their conceptions of the world except for some differences of detail.  

Jainism is regarded as pluralistic because "it recognizes an infinite number of Jivas as well as of material elements". This pluralism of Jainism has been related to its "desire to keep close to common beliefs", or at another level, to its "empirical classification of things". It appears to this writer, however, that in regarding Jaina pluralism as a form of empirical rather than philosophical pluralism, one fails to do full justice to it.

There are many and different objects and subjects in the universe—this may well lead to an obvious kind of a pluralistic view. But to attribute the Jain position to such a view alone is to ignore the fact that Jainism is philosophically and not merely empirically pluralistic. For in Jainism when ultimately "Matter is divided into an infinite number of atoms", they are all "of the same kind, it is impossible to distinguish

8 P. T. Raju, The Philosophical Traditions of India, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971, pp. 16-17.
9 M. Hiriyanna, op. cit., p. 171. S. Radhakrishnan seems to give primacy to the plurality at the spiritual level in the system (op. cit., p. 334 ff.).
10 M. Hiriyanna, op. cit., p. 173.
one from the other". But isn’t this precisely the point as represented by the concept of viśeṣa in Indian philosophy? For viśeṣa is not just what makes two cows different notwithstanding the sameness of their cowness, “It is the differentia of ultimate things which are otherwise alike. Thus two atoms of earth alike in every respect. But if still they should be two, there must be a distinctive feature in each... This differentiating feature is viśeṣa”.

In the case of Jainism this holds not just of earth-atoms but all atoms. This also holds for the Jīvas.

III

To conclude: Jain pluralism should be considered in the light of the fact that both a pluralistic and an idealistic strand run through Indian thought. It needs to be recognised further that this pluralism has a significant philosophical side to it—namely that similarity does not constitute identity, that even perfect uniformity may not mean unity. Thus viewed the pluralism of Jainism does not seem to represent “immature philosophizing” but rather the mature acceptance of pluralism as distinguished from idealism as a guiding principle.

12 M. Hiriyanna, op. cit., p. 172. Note that while “the Nyaya-Vaisesika theory holds that there are as many kinds of atoms as there are elements... the Jainas think that the homogeneous atoms produce different elements by varying combinations (S. Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 318).

The Nature of Substance in Buddhism and Jainism

Bhagchandra Jain

The conception of substance (dravya) has been an important topic for discussion in the field of philosophy. The terms dharma (reality), rūpa (matter) and sanskṛta (phenomena) are mainly used by the Buddhists while sat, dravya, padārtha and tattva are used by the Jainists. Dharma, according to Buddhaghosa, connotes four meanings, i.e., (i) pariyatti or doctrine as formulated, (ii) hetu or condition, casual antecedent, (iii) guna or moral quality or action, and (iv) nissatta—nijavate of the phenomenal as opposed to “the noumenal”, “animistic entity”. Out of these four meanings representing the nature of substance, the last one is more important. Rūpa (matter) is divided into five heads in the Abhidhammatthasangaho, viz., (i) samuddesa, (ii) vibhāga, (iii) samutthāna, (iv) kalāpa, and (v) pravṛttikāma and then subdivided into various types. The sanskṛta has three characteristics, viz., (i) upāda (origin), (ii) vyaya (cessation), and (iii) sthityanyathatvam (change of state).

Quick changes in the sanskṛta padārtha create impression of continuity (anayayā). As a matter of fact, the life itself stands for a moment of thinking and vanishes immediately in next moment. This is called bhedavāda (conception of difference) represented by Buddhist sects. Permanence of a thing is an illusion, like the oneness of the flame or the stream.

Existence is flux. A thing is a point-instant, having neither a “before” nor an “after”; it has no span temporally; there is no duration. Cessation is inherent in things and is entire (ahaituko niranvayo vināśah). In real sense, everything in Buddhism is impermanent, soulless and a cause of pain (sabbam aniccam, sabbam anāttaṃ, sabbam dukkhham). Anityatā (impermanence) is understood as the origination, continuance for a moment and then the cessation as a thing. The conception of anātta or nairātmya establishes asatkāryavāda. Reality is momentary and flexible since it transforms into modes in a moment. The imagination (kalpanā) is the cause of the co-relation of modes which leads to casual efficiency.

1 Anguttaranikāya, 1, p. 152; see also Madhyamikakarikavrtti, p. 145; Catustakavrtti, p. 232.
2 Visuddhimagga, 8.
3 arccisam santane pradipati upacaryate, eka iveti krtva, sa desantaresutpadyamaṇāḥ, santaranupah, tam tam desam gacchatityucyate, evam cittanom santane ityupacaryate, ekam iveti krtva, Abhidharmakosavyakhyā, p. 713.
(arthakriya). The śūnyavāda, kṣaṇikavāda etc. are co-related with this doctrine.

Dravya or padārtha (substance) in Jainism denotes any existence which possesses the significant factor of persistence despite its numerous qualities and modifications. The Jaina theory of reality does not leave room for both, an absolute permanent reality and an ever-changing reality. It accepts only the dynamic reality which has the three fundamental characteristics, viz. utpāda (origin), vyaya (destruction) and dhrauvya (permanence). Dravya is also the substratum of guṇas (qualities) and paryāyas (modes). There is neither quality without substance nor substance without quality. Dravya is one as a class, and is the inherent essence of all things manifesting diverse forms. It can neither be created nor destroyed; it has only permanent substantiality. But through its modes it secures the triple nature in character. Attributes called anvayā and modifications called vyatirekā (productivity and destructivity) constitute the dynamic aspect of an entity and permanence is its enduring factor. This view is a blended form of the completely static view held by the Vedantins and the completely dynamic view held by the Buddhists.

According to Jaina philosophy, an entity consists of infinite characteristics which cannot be perceived by all at once. Therefore one who perceives a thing perceives it partially, and must be regarded as knowing one aspect of truth. Even though he is not in a possession of the entire truth, the aspect he has come to know cannot be altogether regarded as false. The question arises then how to know the whole truth of reality? The Jaina answer is by means of the theory of manifoldness of a thing or anekantavāda. The Jaina philosophers synthesize all the opponents views under this theory.

Having realised the futility of such debates the Buddha became an analyst. In the Dīghanikāya the Buddha is reported to have said that he had taught and laid down his doctrines with categorical (ekānśika) and non-categorical (anekānśika) assertions. The theory of four-noble-truths is an example of the former, and the theory of avyakta is of the latter.

4 Tattvarthasutra, 5.30.
5 Pancastikāya, 10.
6 Ibid., 13.
7 Ibid., 8.
8 Ibid., 10-11.
9 gunaparyayavatdravyam, Tattvarthasutra, 5.38.
The arthakriyākāritva (casual efficiency) is the essence of the doctrines of bhedavāda, abhedavāda and bhedabhedavāda. The satkāryavāda of Sankhyas, Asatkāryavāda of Naiyayikas and the Buddhists and Sadast-kāryavāda of Jainas are well-known. Here we confine ourselves with the views of the Buddhists and Jainas only.

The Buddhists assert that the “particular” is the only real element of an entity characterised as svalakṣaṇa (thing-in-itself). It is supposed to be momentary and a congregation of atoms. A thing accordingly is born and immediately afterwards it is destroyed. The substance is nirhetuka (devoid of causes) in the sense that it originates without the assistance of cause other than its own cause of origination. Each moment produces another moment destroying itself and thus it presents a sort of continuity of existence. Thus it manages to maintain a cause and effect (kāryakāraṇabhāva) relationship.

According to Buddhism, momentariness (kṣaṇabhanguratva) and casual efficiency (kāryakāraṇabhāva) are inseparable. It treated momentariness, efficiency, causality and reality as synonymous, and hence argued that an entity is momentary because it was efficient and it was efficient because it was momentary. On the basis of this idea, the Buddhists criticise causal efficiency in a permanent thing. They say that entities come into being either simultaneously (yugapadena) or successively (krameṇa). But in a permanent thing, both these ways cannot be effective, since they are not able to originate it immediately due to the non-proximity of a cause. In the first alternation, the substance should originate all the possible effects in the very first moment of its existence. As regards the type of causal efficiency that takes place simultaneously, a permanent thing cannot have any effects, because it can be neither perceived nor inferred. As Santarakṣita says, after having brought about all the effects simultaneously, the nature of a thing comprising its capacity for effective action disappears, and therefore the momentary character of a thing is an essential factor for causal efficiency. Furthermore they point out that auxiliaries (sahakārī) must follow the things with which they are connected. These auxiliaries, as a matter of fact, cannot abide with permanent things, because the peculiar condition produced in a thing by auxiliaries would neither be similar nor dissimilar. If they make any difference, the efficiency of the permanent thing in producing the cause is compromised and becomes dependent upon other things in order to be efficient. If, on the contrary, they are not able to make any difference, the arguments for inoperative

10 Prameyaratanamala, p. 4; also see the 8th chapter of the Tattvasangraha.
and ineffective (akincitkara) elements in a thing have no meaning. The Buddhists, therefore, conclude that casual efficiency is the essence of the simple and unique moments each of which is totally different from the other.11

On the other hand, the Jainas believe that a substance is dynamic (parināmi) in character. It means a thing is eternal from the real standpoint (niscayanayena) and momentary from a practical viewpoint (ryavahāranayena). Causal efficiency, according to them, is possible neither in a thing which is of the static nature (kutasthanitya) nor is a thing which is incongruous with the doctrine of momentariness (kṣaṇikavāda), but it is possible only in a thing which is permanent-in-change. To make a clarification of this view, they say that efficiency takes place either successively or simultaneously. Both these alternations cannot be effective in the momentary existence, since the spatial as temporal extension which requires the notion of before and after for efficiency are absent from the momentary thing of the Buddhists. Sanātana (continuous series) is also not effective in this respect, since it is not momentary in the opinion of the Buddhists.12

This view of the Jainas is also recorded by Durveka Misra in the Hetubindutikā. The writer of the Vādanyāya called Syadvadakesari who is supposed to be Akalankadeva, is said to have defeated the opponents and established the Jaina Nyaya. According to Syadvadakesari, DurvekaMisra says, every entity is anaitkāntika (having infinite characters) which is the basis of arthakriyā (casual efficiency). Kulabhushana, a commentator on the Vādanyāya, explains this view that the anayathānupapatti is the main character of reality, and arthakriyā is possible in that character.13 He, then, on the basis of the above view, tries to point out defects in the theory of absolute momentariness and absolute eternalism stating that casual efficiency is possible in either of these theories of reality. Clarifying his own position, Kulabhushana asks whether momentary character has causal efficiency during its own existence or in another. If the first alternative is accepted, the entire universe would exist only for a moment. The effect produced by a certain cause during its own existence would be a cause of others, despite being caused itself and this series will never end. The argument "Cause makes an effect during its own existence and an effect comes into being during

11 Tattvasangraha, 350-546. Also see Hetubindutika, p. 213. The Syadvadamanjari on page 19 refers to a stanza in this respect: yo tatraiva sa tatraiva yo yadaiva tadāiva sah. na desakalayorvavitetbhavanam hi vidyate.
12 Syadvadamanjari, 3.11-12.
13 Hetubindutika, p. 373-4.
the existence of others” is not favoured “since an effect is supposed to be
originated during the existence of its own cause and not of another”. 
Otherwise, an effect cannot take place and there will be the defect of
samanantarapadavirodha, according to which the effects would emerge
in the distant future. The next moment is also not powerful to generate
the thing, since it is not a creator. Otherwise what would be the difference
between sat and asat, and kṣanika and aksanika. We could conclude,
therefore, that arthakriyā is possible only in permanent-in-change chara-
ter.¹⁴

Some schools of thought opposing the doctrine of momentariness
(kṣanikavāda) were rising even within Buddhist system. For instance,
Santaraksita refers to the view of Vatsiputriyas who classified things
under two headings momentary and non-momentary.¹⁵ The conception
of soul, according to them, has also been refuted by Santaraksita. Stcher-
batsky mentions the Vatsiputriyas who admitted the existence of a certain
unity between the elements of a living personality. In all probability
they have been influenced by the Jaina view as their arguments are very
similar to the Jaina arguments raised against the view of kṣanikavāda
and anātmanavāda.

There are, therefore, two important points of difference between
the Buddhists and the Jainas in the meaning they attach to dravyavāda
in their common denunciation of the view which connects this notion of
arthakriyākārītya with dravyavāda. First, the Buddhist is against
dravyavāda. Secondly, the Buddhist attack actually turns out, whatever
his profession may be, to be on the hypothesis of the static (kūta-
sthanitya) dravya whereas the Jaina’s attack is also on the same hypo-
thesis but only as a contrast to his own theory of the dynamic (parināmi)
dravya.¹⁶

Some systems of thought accept only the universal (sāmānya)
character of reality. Advaitavadins and the Sankhyas are the typical
representatives of this view. Some other schools led by the Buddhists
recognise only particular (viśeṣa) character of reality. The third school
of thought belongs to Nyaya-Vaisesikas, who treat universal and parti-
cular (sāmānya and viśeṣa) as absolutely distinctive entities.

According to Jainism, an entity has infinite characteristics which
are divided into two categories, viz. universal and particular. Just

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 374.
¹⁵ Tattvasangraha, 352.
¹⁶ Jaina Theory and Reality of Knowledge, p. 173.
as different colours can exist in a lustrous gem without conflicting with each other, so the universal and particular elements could abide in a reality.\(^{17}\)

We find two kinds of an entity, viz. existence of own nature (svarūpa-astiiva) and existence of the similar nature as others (sadarśa-astiiva). The former tries to separate the similar (svajātitya) and dissimilar (vijātitya) substances and indicates their independence. This is called vertical universal (urdhatāsāmānya), which represents unity (amugatapratyaaya) in plurality of different conditions (vyavrtapratyaaya) of the same individual. In other words, the permanent character of an entity is called urdhatāsāmānya.\(^{18}\) Sadarśa-astiiva, the so-called tīryaka sāmānya (horizontal), represents unity in the plurality of different individuals of the same class.\(^{19}\) The word ‘cow’ is used to denote a particular cow and it also refers to others of the class, because of similarity.\(^{20}\) Likewise, vītega is also of two kinds, paryāya and vyatireka. The former distinguishes the two modes of same entity, while the latter makes a distinction between the two separate entities. Thus each and every reality is universalized-cum-particularized (sāmānya-viśeṣātma) along with substance with modes (dravyaparyāyātma). Here dravya represents the universal character and paryāya represents the particular character of a thing. In support of this dual character of an entity the traditional example of a ‘jar’ has been given. Jar (ghata) made of gold can be changed into several modes while preserving gold as a permanent substance.\(^{21}\) Thus the substance is not totally undifferentiated, as it does become differentiated in the form of the successive factors.\(^{22}\)

If the above doctrine is to be denied, all things would have to be recognized as one. If a certain thing spoken of, for instance, as a jar was not different from other things, such as cloth, then there would be no difference between the jar and sky-flower.\(^{23}\)

If the same entity, jar, was devoid of dissimilarity, then the jar could not be regarded as anything different from the cloth etc. in the form of this is jar, that is cloth, but in fact it does differ from other things. Therefore the particular character is always present in reality.\(^{24}\) All things

\(^{17}\) Tattvasangraha, 1709.

\(^{18}\) Hetubindutikaloka, p. 343 ; cf. Pramanamimansa, 4,5.

\(^{19}\) Hetubindutikaloka, p. 343 ; cf. Pramanamimansa, 4,4.

\(^{20}\) Pramanamimansa, 4,9.

\(^{21}\) Pramaṇa Vartiika Svavrtti Tika, p. 333 ; Hetubindutikaloka, p. 369.

\(^{22}\) Tattvasangraha, 313-315 ; also see HBT, pp. 98.

\(^{23}\) Tattvasangraha, 1712-3.

\(^{24}\) Tattvasangraha Panjika, p. 487.
in the form of entities are not different from one another, their capacity may be regarded as the required “commonality”. This is also called the ‘niyatāvratti’. Without accepting this limitation anything could be transformed into anything else.

Later the Jainas dealt with the difference among things. They say that if a jar were entirely devoid of dissimilarity to those other things, then there being no difference between them, the jar could not be anything different from those things. This would involve a self-contradiction. When one is ready to accept some sort of difference among things, he has also to accept dissimilarity as a particular character.  

On the other hand, the Buddhists deny the universal or identical aspect of things. Each entity is discrete and unique (svalakṣaṇa). The existence of the universal in all the particulars is beset with insuperable difficulties. How can one entity exist in a number of particulars separated by distance of space and time, in entirety, untouched by what happens to the particulars? Moreover, in cognising a thing, we do not certainly cognise it (the particular) and its duplicate (the universal). The polemic of the Buddhist against the universal is too well-known to need any detailed statement. All existence, for the Buddhist, is particular; the universal is a thought-construct, a vikalpa.

The prameya is of two types in Buddhism, viz. pratyakṣa and parokṣa. Svalakṣaṇa is pratyakṣagāmya and sāmānya is anumāna gāmya. The anumāna can be included into parokṣa. Jainism, on the other hand, is of opinion that the prameya is one and that is dravya paryāyatmaka substance. Some one perceives it clearly while other does not. The perception depends on the inner power of perceiver. Therefore, perception (pratiṣṭi) of an object becomes both, pratyakṣa and parokṣa, which can be compared with svalakṣaṇa and sāmānya lakoṣaṇa of the Buddhists respectively. The difference is as follows:

1. Jainism accepts the substance as sāmānya-viśeṣātmaka while Buddhism does not accept it so.

2. Jainism is of opinion that substance with its svārupa and pararūpa is real and relative while Buddhism says that even being an existence of both, the pararūpa is kalpita and vāsanā-janya.

3. The *pararūpa* is related in Buddhism with substance while it is relatively not related with it in Jainism.

4. *Kṣanabhanga* is acceptable to both, but Jainism accepts it with the point of view of its modes which reflect its *utpāda* and *vyaya*.

The dhrauvya of Jainism may be called *santana* of Buddhism. There is neither *svāsvalavāda* or *uccheda* nor *parināmavāda* in the form of *svajātīya* or *vijātīya* dravya. The santana is also connected with its own *niyata pūrvakṣaṇa* and *niyata uttara-kṣaṇa* in the form of *kāryakāraṇa-bhāva*. The difference between dhrauvya and santana is as follows:

1. *Santana* in Buddhism is *kalpita* while dhrauvya in Jainism is paramārthasat.

2. Santana appears to be vanished at the attainment of *nirvāṇa* while dravya gets never vanished. It gets changes in the form of different modes.

3. Dravya, *guṇa* and dhrauvya are synonymous words. The *anvayansa* may be observed in dhrauvya or dravya clearly but not in santana.

4. Buddhism accepts *sāmān ya* as avastusat or *kalpita* while Jainism accepts it vastusat based on *anekāntavāda*. Sāmānya of Jainism is *anitya* and *avyāpaka*.

4. An entity is absolutely momentary in Buddhism based on *pratityasamutpāda*, while Jainism proposes *upādānopādeya-bhāva* in place of *pratityasamutpāda*.

The nature of relation is also a controversial point among the philosophers. For instance, the Naiyayikas, the extreme realists, think that relation is a real entity. According to them, it connects the two entities into a relational unity through conjunctive relation (*samavāya sambandha*). Conjunction is a subject of quite separate, while the other relates with inseparable realities. *Samavāya* is said to be eternal (*nitya*), one (*eka*) and all-pervasive (*sarvavyāpaka*)

The Vedantins and the Buddhists, the idealists, are against the view of the Naiyayikas. The Buddhists assert the subjective view of

27 Tarkabhasa, pt. 1, p. 5.
3. The *pararūpa* is related in Buddhism with substance while it is relatively not related with it in Jainism.

4. *Kṣaṇabhāngavāda* is acceptable to both, but Jainism accepts it with the point of view of its modes which reflect its *utpāda* and *vyāya*.

The *dhrauvya* of Jainism may be called *santana* of Buddhism. There is neither *svāśvatavāda* or *ucchedavāda* nor *parināmavāda* in the form of *svajātya* or *vijātya* *dravya*. The *santana* is also connected with its own *niyata pūrvakṣaṇa* and *niyata uttarakṣaṇa* in the form of *kāryakārañcabhāva*. The difference between *dhrauvya* and *santana* is as follows:

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4. Buddhism accepts *sāmānya* as *avastustatu* or *kalpita* while Jainism accepts it *vastustatu* based on *anekāntavāda*. *Sāmānyā* of Jainism is *anitya* and *avyāpaka*.

4. An entity is absolutely momentary in Buddhism based on *pratityasamutpāda*, while Jainism proposes *upādānopādeya-bhāva* in place of *pratityasamutpāda*.

The nature of relation is also a controversial point among the philosophers. For instance, the Naiyayikas, the extreme realists, think that relation is a real entity. According to them, it connects the two entities into a relational unity through conjunctive relation (*samavāya sambandha*). Conjunction is a subject of quite separate, while the other relates with inseparable realities. *Samavāya* is said to be eternal (*nitya*), one (*eka*) and all-pervasive (*sarvavāyapaka*)\(^{27}\).

The Vedantins and the Buddhists, the idealists, are against the view of the Naiyayikas. The Buddhists assert the subjective view of

\(^{27}\) *Tarkabhasa*, pt. 1, p. 5.
relations. A relation, according to Dharmakirti, is a conceptual fiction (sambandhaḥ kalpanakṛtah), like universal and hence it is unreal. He also rejects the two possible ways of entertaining a relation in universal. They are dependence (parāntrya sambandha) and interpenetration (rūpasileṣasambandha)\(^{28}\)

On the other hand, the Jainas, on the basis of non-absolute standpoint, try to remove the extreme externalism of the Naiyayikas and the extreme illusionism or idealism of Buddhism and Advaitism. They maintain that a relation is a deliverence of the direct and objective experience. Relation is not merely an inferable but also an indubitably perceptual fact. Without recognising relation, no object can be concrete and useful and atoms would be existing unconnected.

As regards the rejection of two possible ways of relation, the Jainas say that they should not be rejected. For, parāntra sambandha is not mere dependence as the Buddhists ascribe, but it unifies the relata.\(^{29}\) Rūpasileṣa is also untenable for the purpose. The two points are here to be noted: the first is that according to Jainism, the relata never lose their individuality. They make internal changes having constant internal relation with the external changes happening to them. In adopting this attitude the Jainas avoid the two extremes of the Naiyayikas’ externalism and the Vedantins’ internalism. Another point is that the Jainas consider relation to be a combination of the relata in it as something unique or suigeneris (jātyantara). It is a character or trait in which the nature of relata have not totally disappeared but are converted into a new form. For instance, nara-sinха is a combination of the units of nara (man) and sinha (lion). They are neither absolutely independent nor absolutely dependent, but are identity-in-difference. Hence the Jainas are of the view that relation is the structure of reality which is identity-in-difference.\(^{30}\)

It may be noted here that the sāmānyavāda of the Jainas is almost similar to parīkṣamāvāda of Sankhyas, cīdvraha of Vedantins and sabdādvaitavāda of Savdabrahma. Śāmāṇya of Naiyayikas is nitya and vyāpaka whereas sāmānya in Jainism is anitya and avyāpaka. The Mimansakas’ sāmāṇya is leaning to ekāntavāda. Buddhists are of opinion that substance is absolutely momentary. But Jainas say that it is not kūṭasthanitya but it is avicchinna with having constant modes.

\(^{28}\) Pramanavartika, 3,237.
\(^{29}\) Nyayakumudacandra, p. 307 ; Jaina Theory of Reality and Knowledge, p. 283.
\(^{30}\) NKC., p. 369.
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²⁸ Pramanavartika, 3.237.
³⁰ NKC., p. 369.
This is urdhatāsāmānya which can be compared with samavāyī karana of Naiyayikas and Vaisesikas.

Thus the nature of substance in Buddhism and Jainism is not much different. The main difference is that substance in Buddhism particularly of Madhyamikas is unreal (niḥsvabhāva, dharma-nairātma) even it is sanskṛta. Śūnyatā is their ultimate reality. The appearance of substance is false (māyā).\(^{31}\)

\[^{31}\text{upadāṣṭhitibhanganam yugapannasti sambhayah,}
kranasah sambhavo nasti sambhavo vidyate kada,
uppadadisu sarvesu sarvesam sambhayah punah,
tasmadupadavat bhango bhangavad drasyate sthitiḥ.}

—Catuḥsatakam, 360-61.
PRABHAVATI

GANESH LALWANI

Hearing the praise of Parsva, prince of Kashi, from the mouth of the Kinnara damsels, Prabhavati, princess of Kushasthala gave her heart to him. If she had to place the wedding garland to anybody’s neck it would be Parsva. Otherwise she would retire to Ramyaka forest and live a recluse’s life.

Prasenajit, king of Kushasthala was in a dilemma. He didn’t know the mind of prince Parsva, but the mind of the king of Kalinga was not unknown to him. His emissary was waiting at the house of his foreign envoy. He had expressed his desire to have the princess as his bride. He had also informed that if his request was not heeded he would forcibly carry her off. He didn’t rest by threatening only. He had arrived at the head of an invincible army and had encircled the fort. Only a month’s time had been given for the final reply.

...But Prabhavati had but one reply. ‘If I have to marry I will marry prince Parsva. Otherwise...’

Grief-stricken was Prasenajit thinking of the situation. It was not possible for Prabhavati at this juncture to retire to Ramyaka forest and live the life of a recluse. She had but two options before her: to be carried away or to court death, as it was plainly impossible for Kushasthala to resist the might of Kalinga.

When the mind of the princess could not be changed, Prasenajit had no other alternative than to send his envoy to Asvasena, the king of Kashi. Stating everything he prayed for his help against the predator.

Asvasena on receiving the message got ready with his cavalry but prince Parsva persuading his father to remain at the capital took over the charge of the squadrons which drummed their hooves with great speed towards Kushasthala.

Prabhavati was looking at the distant horizon from the window of her room. As far as she could see there were camps of the king of Kalinga. In one such camp the king of Kalinga was eagerly waiting for the reply of the king of Kushasthala. If he was refused, in an instant
all the camps would be astir with activity, the sound of war-drums and
the trumpets, the rattle of the sabres and the braying of the horses would
fill the air. And then... and after that...

No, she had no fear in entering the burning fire to end her life.

Like the invaders in the camps she was also waiting. Won't prince
Parsva come to her rescue? She had heard that his father had sent
his special envoy to the court of Kashi. Then why he was delaying
for so long? The month of anxiety and hope was coming to an end.
His father was promise-bound to give a reply within this period.

At the very moment she saw a grey cloud of dust in the distant
horizon. That cloud began to expand and spread around coming
nearer and nearer as if a storm was heading to attack the hot summer
afternoon.

...No, it was not the roar of the storm but the sound of an advancing
cavalry. Then really was he coming to her rescue? Could she shake
off her fears like dead leaves? She fell in a reverie.

'Princess...'

Prabhavati turned her face to look. Near her was standing her
maid Subinita.

'Princess! I have come with good news. Destroying the camps of
the Kalinga king, prince Parsva has arrived at the gate of the fortress.'

Tears rolled down the eyes of Prabhavati in joy. In ecstasy she
embraced her maid. Then taking her own priceless necklace she placed
it on her neck. She said, 'This is a small token of the good news.'

An apartment inside the palace. Prince Parsva was taking rest
after the campaign. He knew not when he fell asleep.

Suddenly he awoke inhaling the scent of a woman's hair. He saw
a woman in white dress whose hair was dark and cloudlike and face
as beautiful as the moon. She was looking intently at him.

'Who are you?', Demanded prince Parsva.

'Prabhavati, princess of Kushasthala.' Rung a sweet voice.
‘Prabhavati, why have you come here?’, The prince asked.

‘Why?’ She was hurt at these words, but she controlled herself. She said, ‘For not any particular reason. Whose praise I had heard from the lips of Kinnara damsels and who had shown his valour in defeating the Kalinga king I could not check myself to look at him from near. If you were not awake I would have returned silently...’ Then after a pause, she said, ‘Prince, I am going now but before that I want to ask you a question, if you permit.’

‘Ask, please.’

‘Prince, when I came here what good dream you were dreaming?’

A smile spread on the lips of prince Parsva. He said, ‘For which I came here I have been able to accomplish, that dream.’

‘Only that!’ Saying so she turned to go away. Her voice hardly concealed a tremor.

But in the midst said prince Parsva, ‘Oh good one, what dream you were expecting?’

With her eyes downcast Prabhavati remained silent. Then she said, ‘Please drop this topic.’

‘But I want to know.’

‘Then hear. If I exceed my limit please forgive me. I was thinking that you were dreaming of her who had given her heart to you, for whose rescue you have rushed from such a distance, that in the dream she was placing the wedding garland on your neck and amongst the sweet hymn and blowing of counc-Shell you were making her your own beloved for ever.’

‘Sweet is your fantasy.... but oh good one, you know that I have not come here to win a bride.’

‘I know....but....say now, after looking at the face of a woman who loves you, are not your lips athirst? Are not your breathings have become rapid? Is not your heart eager to be absorbed in a sweet ecstasy by drinking the nectar of the lips of the damsel of Kushasthala?’

‘No, my fair lady!’
Silently she remained standing with her eyes downcast. The shadow of evening was spreading on the brow of the eastern sky. The darkness was thickening.

'You go back, Prince. Prabhavati will wait for you for ever.' Sobbing out these words she left the place quickly.

Days and months passed by rotation of the sun on its path. In a cottage at the end of the Ramyaka forest Prabhavati was emaciating herself in meditation like the moon day by day attenuating towards the dark fortnight. Similarly the cool particles of the Ganga were not able to soothe the agony of Parsva's heart. The woman in love was calling him to come at her side like a devotee calling his distant god. This call had made him restless. He could see two creeper-like arms were ready in the blue shade of an Ashoka tree to embrace and lift him to heavenly bliss. Two star-like eyes were waiting for him night after night.

Parsva could not remain at the palace. He came out and called his chariooteer. At his command he brought his chariot. And in a few moments after crossing the palace gate and the portals of the city it was running towards the Ramyaka forest.

Parsva arrived at her cottage. He saw her like a recluse deep in meditation with her eyes closed. He was astonished.

'Beloved Prabhavati!' He called her.

But her lips did not quiver, her brows did not expand, her cheeks did not become red.

Parsva called her again, 'Beloved Prabhavati!'

But there was no reply.

Parsva came near her. Taking her lean arms and pressing them eagerly on his heart he said, 'Prabha, my Prabha, I have made you mine for all times.'

Slowly she opened her eyes. Her look was quiet, without desire or pain.

'You have come at last.' She said slowly.
Silently she remained standing with her eyes downcast. The shadow of evening was spreading on the brow of the eastern sky. The darkness was thickening.

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Slowly she opened her eyes. Her look was quiet, without desire or pain.

‘You have come at last.’ She said slowly.
He saw her like a recluse deep in meditation......
‘Yes, I have come Prabha, to make you mine for ever.’

‘My beloved Parsva!’ Her joy was manifest in her voice like a lilt of a flute heard from distance.

Then after closing her eyes she said, ‘Go back, Prince, the Hill of Sammeta was calling you. I am relieving you of the tears of my love.’

Then after a pause she said again, ‘I have got you in the depth of my heart, there is no separation, no pain, no fear of losing anything. There is only a glow of fulfilment. I have known you now, you are merciful, blameless, Lord of your self and of the Universe. You are mine...... and I ...... yours.’

She was silent. But her words vibrated in the cool breeze of the morning, vibrated in the heart of Parsva. A hymn arising from her heart as if enkindled the heart of the prince. The path he was searching all these days suddenly stretched aglow before his eyes.

Parsva came out of the cottage with unaltering steps. Then coming near the chariot he began to throw away his ornaments—the armlets, the necklace and the crown.

Astounded the charioteer cried, ‘Prince!’

Quietly said Parsva, ‘Don’t say anything. With these you return to the capital.’
A Brief Account of the Jaina View of Inference

GOUR HAZRA

The most important method of knowledge is *anumāna* or inference. The inference is so called because it is a kind of knowledge (*māna* which we deduce from prior (*anu*) knowledge. The Jainas hold that *anumāna* is the method of knowing an unperceived object through the perception of a sign (*hetu*) and the recollection of its invariable concomitance with the object.

It is a complex process of knowledge and is accepted by all schools of Indian thought except Carvaka who denies it altogether. To the Naiyayika *anumāna* is a type of secondary knowledge deduced from a prior knowledge. A knowledge of the invariability of concomitance between two things helps to deduce the existence of one of them when the other is perceived. The Bauddhas consider *anumāna* to be a perception of an object which is known to be invariably related to another thing.

Vatsayana in his book *Nyāyabhasya* uses the term *anvikṣā* for the word *anumāna*. *Anvikṣā* literally means knowledge which follows from other knowledge. In the example ‘Fire is inferred from smoke’, first we get ‘knowledge of smoke’ then of ‘knowledge of fire’.

The Jaina logician Acarya Acalanka presents a comprehensive definition of *anumāna* as follows : congnition of *śādhyā* produced by the *sādhana* is called *anumāna* which follows *linga-grahaṇa* and *vyāptisaraṇa*.

Hemacandra defines *anumāna* thus :

\[
\text{sādhana-śādhyā-vījñānam anumānam}
\]

*Anumāna* is the knowledge of *śādhyā* (probandum) from *sādhana* (probane). ‘Fire is inferred from smoke.’ Hence ‘smoke’ is the *sādhna* (probane), and ‘fire’ is the *śādhyā* (probandum).

Inference is thus based on the universal succession of the (probane) *sādhana* by the *śādhyā* (probandum). It is based on *vyāpti* derived from induction (*tarka*), which is the logical ground of inference.
Hence an inference must have two constituents: (1) Smoke must be present in the hill. (2) Smoke must have inseparable relationship with the fire. The first one is called pakṣa-dharmatva and the second one is called vyāpti.

Pakṣa-dharmatva: Pakṣa is that in which the dharma is inferred to exist. In the inference ‘the hill is firey, because it is smoky’, the ‘hill’ is the pakṣa in which the dharma i.e. ‘fire’ is inferred to exist. Now in this inference the hetu is smoke which is found to exist in the hill. This characteristic of the hetu is called its pakṣa-dharmatva. The Buddhist logician Sankara Svamin in his book Nyāya-Pravēṣa first used the term pakṣa-dharmatva. The Jaina logicians did not accept pakṣa-dharmatva as a constituent of inference, they accept only vyāpti as the constituent of inference.

Vyāpti (invariable concomitance) is the main feature of anumāna. The term vyāpti literally means pervasion. Vyāpti is the universal attendance of the probane by the probandum in simultaneity or succession. Thus fire and smoke may abide simultaneously or the latter may follow the former. If the probane and probandum exist simultaneously the former is called avinābhāva. In the early Nyaya literature, the term avinābhāva is frequently used as the equivalent of vyāpti. It was Uddyotakara who first used these two words vyāpti and avinābhāva in his Nyāya-vārtika. We also get the conception of avinābhāva in Vatsayana’s Nyāya-bhāṣya. Uddyotakara, Vacaspatimisra, Jayanta and some other early writers on Nyaya describe vyāpti as an unconditioned or necessary relation which is not brought about by any adventitious circumstance—anaupādikah sambandhah. The early Jaina logicians Siddhasena, Akalanka and Manikya Nandi also used the term vyāpti as synonym for the word avinābhāva.

In western logic, inference is of two kinds: deduction and induction. Indian logicians did not classify inference into deductive and inductive inference, but they classified it as that which is useful for one’s own self and that which is useful for others. The Buddhist philosopher Dignaga first introduced the distinction of inference into inference for oneself and inference for others. Subsequently, this distinction is found in Jayanta’s Nyāyamañjarī. Among the Jaina logicians the above distinction is first made by Siddhasena. Later Jaina logicians like Akalanka, Vidyananda, Mallisena also accept these two kinds of inference: (1) inference for one’s own self (svārthānumāna) and (2) inference for others’ sake (parārthānumāna) or syllogistic inference.
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(1) Inference for one's own self (svārthānumāna): This kind of inference is deduced in one's own mind after having made repeated observations. A man by repeated observation in the kitchen and elsewhere comes to the conclusion that where there is fire there must always be smoke. He is not sure whether the hill he sees has fire or not, but noticing smoke, he at once recollecting the inseparable connection (avinābhāva) between fire and smoke, concludes that there must be fire on the hill. This is the inference for one's own self. It is psychological process of inference.

According to Dharmabhusana there are three organs of svārthānumāna viz. dharmi, sādhyā and sādhana. A thing which is related positively with sādhyā is called sādhana. A dharmi is the abode of the sādhyā. The sādhyā is also called dharma, with reference to its abode (dharmi), and the dharmi and sādhyā are sometimes taken together for the sake of brevity and is called pakṣa. In such a case there are only two limbs of the svārthānumāna syllogism, the pakṣa (thesis) and sādhana (reason).

The sādhana (hetu) is a necessary part of a syllogism, because it is the mark of that which is to be proved, which the dharmi is required to localise in the sādhyā, for otherwise we might have smoke on a hill-top giving rise to an inference of the existence of fire in a lake, which would be absurd. The absence of a dharmi reduces anumāna to tarka, for the absence of an abode, the inference only amounts to a repitition of the abstract relationship between the sādhyā and the sādhana of a syllogism.

(2) Inference for the others sake (parārthānumāna) or syllogistic inference is the result of reasons standing in relation to invariable concomitance (vyāpti) with sādhyā or in other words, it may be said that parārthānumāna is a definite cognition resulting from a statement of probe having the characteristic of necessary concomitance with the probandum. It is a logical form of inference.

Philosophers of different school hold different views as regards the constitution of syllogism. The Sankhya maintains that a syllogism consists of three parts: thesis (pakṣa), reason (hetu) and example (drśtānta). The Buddhist philosopher Acarya Dignaga also holds this view. The Mimansakas assert four parts with the addition of application (upanaya). The Naiyayikas assert five with addition of conclusion (nigamana).

The Jainas hold that the thesis (pakṣa) and reason (hetu) constitute a syllogism adequate for an intelligent person. For a super-intelligent person, the statement of reason only is enough. Thus if an intelligent
man is informed of smoke in a place, he will feel no difficulty in concluding that there must be fire. So it is clear that the Jain theory of two limbed anumāṇa is opposed to all those views. The argument of the Jainas is that, given the thesis and reason, a man of intelligence would safely and surely come to the right conclusion.

Inference, for less-intelligent persons, on the contrary, requires a long chain of premises. To teach such a person, the Jainas accept not only the five premises of a Nyaya syllogism, but they goes even further and accept ten-limbed syllogism.

The Jaina logician Samantabhadra in his Āptamāṇamsā refers to three-limbed syllogism: thesis, reason and example. Hemacandra refers to application and conclusion.

(1) The hill is firey (thesis)  
(2) because of smoke. (reason)  
(3) Wherever there is smoke there is fire, such as the kitchen. (example)  
(4) This hill is smoky (application)  
(5) therefore it is firey. (conclusion)

The ten-limbed syllogism referred above is found in Bhadrabahu’s Daśavaikālikā-niruykti. The ten-limbs are: (1) Pratiṣṭhā (proposition), (2) Pratiṣṭhā-Vibhakti (the limitations of the proposition), (3) Hetu (reason), (4) Hetu-Vibhakti (limitation of reason), (5) Vipakṣa (the counter proposition), (6) Vipakṣa-Pratiṣṭedha (the opposition to the counter proposition), (7) Drśṭānta (the example), (8) Āśankā (doubting the validity of the example), (9) Āśankā- Pratiṣṭedha (removing the doubt), (10) Nigamana (the conclusion).

The Jaina logicians has pointed out that the example-premise is not necessary in the syllogistic inference. It is by the statement of the thesis and the statement of the reason that one may be made to understand the truth of inference. It may be said that the example of kitchen may help us in determing the vyāpti: “Wherever there is smoke there is fire.” They point out that vyāpti is already known through induction (tarka), the use of example is obviously superfluous. They hold that application and conclusion these two, like example-premises, are useless. To convince others, supporting the mark (reason) is essential; without this that is impossible even though the example, application and conclusion may be used. If the reason is not well-established it is impossible to establish the probandum in any way. Hence in an anumāṇa, it is the reason alone
which must be stated and verified. The premises of example, application and conclusion are superfluous.

As regards the aspects of the nature of a hetu (reason), the Buddhist, like the Vaisesikas and Sankhyas assert that there are three aspects of a hetu, viz. pakṣa-dharmatva (presence in the subject) svapakṣa-sattva (presence in homologues), and vipakṣa-sattva (absence from hetralogues). The Naiyayikas accept in addition to the above three, two more aspects viz. avādhita-visayatva (absence of a counter-balancing hetu) and asat-pratipakṣatva. The Jainas criticise both the views of the Buddhists and the Naiyayikas. They admit that only the anyathāmupopannatva, also called avinābhāva or vyāpti is the essential characteristic of a hetu.

ANUMANĀBHASA

Abhāṣa or fallacy is a falsehood which has the appearance of truth. There are many kinds of fallacy—one corresponding to every limb or part of a pramāṇa. According to Siddhasena anumānābhāṣa is of three kinds viz. paksābhāṣa, hetvābhāṣa and drṣṭāntābhāṣa. But the later Jaina logicians Akalanka asserts only two kinds of anumānābhāṣa (1) paksābhāṣa and (2) hetvābhāṣa. According to him drṣṭāntābhāṣa is not very essential, because svārthānumāna consists of two premises viz. pakṣa and hetu.

(1) Siddhasena first divided pakṣābhāṣa into two divisions : (a) siddha and (b) bādhita. Bādhita is again divided into four divisions. In addition of these two variety, Akalanka adds the third variety, which he called aniṣṭa.

(2) A hetvābhāṣa is a semblance of reason. It is a fallacious reason or defective reason. The expression hetvābhāṣa literally means ‘a semblance of reason’ or ‘what appears to be a reason is really not such’.

The Nyaya philosopher Vacaspati and Jayanta classifies hetvābhāṣa under five heads. According to them there are five conditions of good hetu, viz., pakṣa-dharmatva, svapakṣa-sattva, vipakṣa-sattva, abādhita-visayatva and asat-pratipakṣatva. If one or any of these five conditions of a good hetu are vitiated, there is a hetvābhāṣa. Kanada in his Vaiśeṣika-sūtra holds that hetvābhāṣa is of three kinds, viz., asiddha, viruddha and anākāntika. According to Buddhist logician Dignaga reason-fallacy is three fold, in absence of any of the three fold characteristic of hetu.

The early Jaina writer Siddhasena assert that there are three kinds of hetvābhāṣa: asiddha (unproved), viruddha (opposed) and the anākāntika (doubtful).
(1) Asiddha (unproved)—That whose nature (inseparable connection with sādhya) is not determined is unproved. Indetermination of knowledge either through ignorance or through perverseness is asiddha, e.g., ‘This is fragrant because it is a sky-lotus.’ Here the reason, viz., the sky-lotus is unreal.

(2) Viruddha (opposed)—That reason is opposed, the invariable connection of which is known to be with opposite to the sādhya or in other words, which is inseparably connected not with the sādhya, but with its antithesis e.g., ‘This is firey because it is a body of water.’ Here the reason alleged is opposed to what is to be established.

(3) Anaikāntika (doubtful)—A reason, the invariable relationship of which (with the sādhya) is doubted, is doubtful or that whose consistency otherwise is doubted is doubtful. e.g., ‘Sound is eternal because it is always audible.’ Here the reason is uncertain because audibleness may or may not be proved of eternity.

An objection may be raised that if the Jainas believe that there is one and the only characteristic of hetu i.e., anyathānapapannatva or avinābhāva, the fallacy should also be only one, then why Siddhasena consider hetvābhāsa is of three kinds?

As an answer to this objection, Siddhasena points out that the anyathānapannatva or avinābhāva (necessary concomitance) can remain unknown either through indecision or through error or through doubt. (1) If it is through indecision, it is unproved (asiddha), (2) If it is through error, it is opposed (viruddha) and (3) If it is through doubt, it is doubted (anaikāntika).

But the later logician Akalanka says that in fact there is only one fallacy i.e., akiñcitkara, which is classified into three classes (1) asiddha (2) viruddha and (3) anaikāntika.

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4. Jainism in Buddhist Literature by Bhagchandra Jain ‘Bhaskar’
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The Jaina Concept of Karma

J. C. Sikdar

The Buddhist view on the nature of Karma

As in Jaina metaphysics, so in the Buddhist philosophy also it has been accepted that the multifariousness of beings is caused by *karma* (action). Like the Jainas, the Buddhists also admit *lobha* (*rāga*) (greed, attachment), *dveśa* (aversion) and *mohā* (delusion) as the cause of the production of *karma* (action). The being, having been associated with attachment, aversion and delusion, makes mental, vocal and bodily activities and generates attachment, hatred and delusion respectively. Thus the wheel of the world is moving on. There is no beginning time of this wheel; it is beginningless. In reply to the question of king Milinda on the location of the existence of *karma* (action) Acarya Nagasena has explained that it cannot be shown where does *karma* (action) exist. In the *Visuddhimagga* *karma* has been called *aripī* (non-corporeal), but in the *Abhidharmakośa* as *avijñāpti*, i.e. *karma* has been described as *rupa* (matter), and this *rupa* is *apratisa* (non-resisting or penetrable), but not *sapratisa* (resisting or impenetrable). In the Sautrantrika view, *samāveśa* (inclusion) of *karma* is made in *arūpa* (non-matter); it does not accept *avijñāpti* (unmanifested matter). From this it is known that like the Jainas, the Buddhists also admit *karma* as subtle (*sūkṣma*). Mental, vocal and physical activities also are called *karma*. But they are *vijñaptirūpa* (intimation like or perceptible). That is, here the meaning of *karma* is not only perceptible activity, but also is *samskāra* (force) born of perceptible action. In the Buddhist definition it is called *vāsanā* and *avijñāpti*. *Samskāra-karma* produced by mental activity is called *vāsanā* (desire) and *samskāra-karma* produced by vocal and physical activities is *avijñāpti* (unmanifested matter).

If compared, it can be said that the causative attachment, aversion and delusion of *karma* of the Buddhists are *bhāvakarma* of the Jainas. The perceptible action of mind, speech and body is *yoga* (activity) of the

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28 Milindapanho, 3.2; *Abh. K.*, 4.1.
29 Anguttaranikāya, Tikanipata Sutra, 33.1; *Bhaṣa*, 1, p. 134.
30 Samyuttanikāya, 15, 5, 6; *Bhaṣa*, 2, 181-2.
31 na sakka maharaja tani kammani dassetum idha va idha iva tani kammani titthantiti, Milindapanho, 3, 15, p. 75.
33 *Abhidharmakośa*, K., 1, 11.
Jain philosophy and vāsanā born of this perceptible action and avijnāpti (unmanifested matter) are dravyakarma.

The Vijnānavadin Buddhists determine karma by the word vāsanā. Prajnakara opines that whatever kāryasy (effects or actions) are there, all of them are born of vāsanā (desire). It is the root of all these, whether you call it God or Karma, Prakrti or anything else. If one accept just God, as the root of the varieties of the universe even then it would not do without admitting vāsanā. That is to say, the currents of all these rivers like God, Prakrti and Karma become one by uniting into the sea of vāsanā.

In the view of the Sunyavadins the other name of māyā (illusion or anāṇdi avidyā (beginningless ignorance) is vāsanā. In the Vedantic view also the cause of multifariousness of the universe is the beginningless ignorance or illusion.

The Mimansaka view on the nature of Karma

The Mimansakas admit the existence of an entity named apruva which is born of actions like sacrifices, etc. Their argument is this that

Abhidharmakosa, 4 ; Keith's Buddhist Philosophy, p. 203.

karyatvāt sakalākāram karyam vasanabalasambhavam
kumbhakaradikāryam va svapnadalasakāryatvam
pradhanamisvarah karma yadanyadapi kalpyate
vasanasangasadmudhacetah prasyanda eva sah
pradhananam pradhanam tad isvaranam tathesvaram
sarkasya jagatah kartri devata vasana para
asakryamantah kartumatra sakthi kaihim mata
vasanaabālatah so'api tasmadēva pravartate
iti pradhānesvarkartravādanadāya sada sīghravahah pravrattah
visantya eva vāyatam pranyant tadvacanameyasumudraneva

—Pramāṇavārtikākara, A.M.4, p. 75.

Vide also, Nyayavatāravārtika-vṛtti, pp. 177-8. Tippan.

sarvajñasyesvarasyaṁabhute iavidyākālpīte namarupe tattvanyavabhāyanirvacanīye samsaraprapancābhubete sarvajñyesvarasyabhilāpyete, tabhyāmayante sarvajñah isvarah, SBha., 2. 1. 14.

tadevan avidyāmakaṇpadhiparīchedeapamevesvarasvarasvaratvan sarvaśānttvam sarvasaktimattvam ca na pāramarthato vidyapastasasvaropadhisarvape ātmānītrisāvayasa sarvajñatadvādayavahara upapadyate, SBha., 2. 1. 14.

apuruṇa prarastīye arāmbhā hi sisyate “svargakamo yajeteti” itarathā hi vidhānamanarthakamen syat, bhāngitvā yagasya yadvyanadyanipadha yago vinayet, phalamasasti nimitte na syat tasmadupadyatīti, Sabara-Bhasya, 2.1.5.

phalaya vihitam karma kṣaṇikam cira bhavine

tatsiddhirnayantheyavamapurvas pratigamyatitē, Tantravārtika, 2.1.5

evam yogapuruṣaryavargadisadhanaśaktikalpamamahānāyam, Sastrādipika, p. 80.

Vide also Nyayavatāravārtika-vṛtti, p. 179.
whatever performance is made by man becomes momentary because of its being action-like. Hence there takes place the birth of an entity called *apūrva* out of that performance, which gives the fruit of actions like sacrifice, etc. Kumarila, while explaining this entity—*apūrva*, said that the meaning of *apūrva* is capacity. Both the actions, such as, sacrifice, etc., and *Puruṣa* are incapable of producing the heaven-like fruit until the performance of actions like sacrifice, etc., is not made. But after the performance there is born such a capacity by which the doer attains the heaven-like fruit. In this regard one should not be eager to know whether this capacity is of the *Puruṣa* or of the sacrifice; it is sufficient to know that it is born.  

That which is called by other philosophers as *samskāra* (force), capacity, capability and power is expressed by the Mīmāṃsakas with the application of the word ‘*apūrva*’. But they are emphatic that the emergence of *samskāra* (force) or *śakti* (capacity or power) which takes place from *karma* as laid down in the *Vedas* should be called *apūrva*. Any other *samskāra* born of other *karma*, is not *apūrva*.

The Mīmāṃsakas maintain also that the substratum (or abode) of *apūrva* (or power) is Soul and *apūrva* also is non-corporeal like Soul. This *apūrva* of the Mīmāṃsakas can be compared with *bhāvakarma* of the Jains from this point of view that both of them are non-corporeal. *Bhāvakarma*, even being born of *dravyakarma*, is the character of Soul. Just as the Mīmāṃsakas have accepted action as non-different from Soul, so the Jains also have accepted *dravyakarma* somehow non-different. Just as the Mīmāṃsakas regard *apūrva* as being born of *karma* so the Jains also admit *bhāvakarma* as being born of *dravyakarma*. Just as the Mīmāṃsakas accept *apūrva* as capable of producing fruit, so the Jains accept *bhāvakarma* as the producer of particular fruit.

But, in fact, *apūrva* is in the place of *dravyakarma* of the Jains. The Mīmāṃsakas accept the following order: *Karma* (actions like sacrifices, etc.) is produced from *kāmanā* (desire) and *apūrva* is born of *pravrīti* (action) such as, sacrifices, etc. Hence *kāmanā* or *triṣṇā* (thirst) can be

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99 karmabhyāh pragayogasya karmanah purusasya vai
yogyata sastragamyāya para sa apurvamisyate//, *Tantravartika*, 2.1.5

40 yadi hi anhitasamskara eva yā na sasyeyuh, *Tantravartika*, p. 396.

41 Ibīd, p. 308; kriyatmanoratyaantabhedabhavat, *Sastradipika*, p. 80
yadi svasamavetaiva sakтирisyeta karmanam tatadvino tato na syat karttrstrtha
ta na nasyati, Ibīd.

42 *Tantravartika*, p. 398.


called bhāvakarma, pravṛtti (action) like sacrifice, etc., as yōga (activity) of the Jainas, and apūrva as dravyakarma respectively. Moreover, according to the Mimansakas, apūrva is an independent entity. So it seems proper that apūrva should be accepted in the place of dravyakarma. Although dravyakarma is not non-corporeal; nevertheless it is intangible to the sense just as apūrva is.

Kumarila also does not make any earnestness in regard to this apūrva. He has supported it in order to prove the fruit of sacrifice, but he himself has caused the production of the fruit of action without apūrva. He says that the fruit is produced by action as subtle power or capacity. The production of any effect does not take place all of a sudden. It becomes manifest as gross form, after becoming finest, finer and fine as power of capacity. Just as curd is not formed instantly on the mixture of acidic thing in milk, it becomes manifest clearly as curd at a particular time, having passed through the stages of many kinds of fine forms, just so the fruits of sacrificial actions, such as, heaven, etc., being born in subtle form, become manifest as gross form in the cooking (maturity) of time later on.45

Acharya Sankara has refuted the conception of this apūrva of the Minamsakas or the conception of subtle power or capacity and has proved that God gives the fruit according to action. He has supported the view that the attainment of fruit is not possible from action but from God.46

The gist of the above discussion on the nature of karma is this that there is no objection of any philosopher in regard to bhāvakarma. In the opinion of all philosophers rāga (attachment), dveṣa (aversion) and mohā (delusion) are bhāvakarma or they are the causes of karma. That which is called dravyakarma by the Jainas is called karma by other philosophers. Samskāra (force or impression), vāsanā (desire), avijnāpti (unmanifested matter), māyā (illusion) and apūrva (energy) are the different names of it. It has been observed that there is no particular dispute with regard to an entity, although there is the difference of opinions of the philosophers on this point whether karma is material substance or quality or essential character (dharma) or any other independent substance.47

45 yagadeva phalam taddhi saktidvarena siddhyati/suksmasaktyatmakam va tat phalamevopajayate!—Tantavartika, p.395, vide Nyayavataraavartikavritti, p.118.
46 SBha. on BS., 3. 2. 38-41.
47 See Apanimansa, Sri Dalsukh Malvania, pp. 95-110.
Kinds of Karma:

The divisions of karma into puṇya and pāpa (virtue and vice), kusala and akusala (good and bad), subha and asubha (auspicious and inauspicious), dharma and adharma (merit and demerit) are acceptable to all Indian systems of thought. At the initial stage of speculation on karma there appears to be two divisions of it. viz. puṇya and pāpa (virtue and vice) or subha and asubha (auspicious and inauspicious). All Indian systems of thought have accepted these two kinds of karma: puṇya and pāpa (virtue and vice) as bondage and determined their respective objectives to be free from both. Therefore, conscientious man have admitted the favourable feeling (vedanā) produced from karma as only pain without having accepted it as pleasure.

The two divisions of karma into puṇya (virtue) and pāpa (vice) have been made from the points of view of experience or feeling. Besides, having kept in view for understanding karma as good and bad, four divisions of it have been made in the Buddhist and Yoga philosophies, viz. kṣaṇa (black), suklā (white), suklā-kṣaṇa (white and black) and asuklā-kṣaṇa (non-white and non-black). Kṣaṇa (black) is pāpa (vice), suklā (white) is puṇya (virtue), suklā-kṣaṇa (white and black) is the mixture of puṇya and pāpa (virtue and vice) asuklā-kṣaṇa (non-white and non-black) is none of the two, because this karma is of only dispassionate persons, the fruit is neither pleasure not pain. The reason is this that there do not take place rāga (attachment) and dveṣa (aversion) in it.

Besides these, the division of karma has been made from the points of view of kṣaṇa (to be performed), pākādāna (ripening) and pākaphala (ripening fruit). In the Buddhist Abhidharma and Visuddhimagga equally karma has been divided into four kinds from the point of view of kṣaṇa, four from that of pākādāna and four from that of pākaphala i.e. in all twelve kinds of karma. But in the Abhidharma four more divisions of karma have been made from the point of view of pākasthāna (ripening place). On the basis of these views, in the Yogadārśana also

48 Brhadaranyaka, 3, 2, 13; Prasnojaniasad, 3, 7; Pancamakaramgrantha from 15; TS., 8, 21; Sankhyakarika 44; Visuddhimagga, 17, 88; Yogasutra, 2, 14; Yogabhasya, 2, 12; Nyayamanjari, p. 472; PPBhs., p. 637, 643.
49 parinamatapasamkāradukkhairguntavrttirodhaccā dukkhameva sarvam vi-vēkinaḥ, — Yogasutra, 2, 15.
50 Dīghanikāyā, 3, 1, 2; Buddhacarya, p. 496; Yogasutra, IV. 7.
51 Yogasutra, 4, 7.
52 Abhidhammatthasaṅgahā, 5, 19; Visuddhimagga, 19, 14-16.
53 Yogasutra, 2, 12-14.
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49 parinamatapasamkaraṇadukhhaigunavrttivirodhacca duhkhameva sarvam vi-vekinah, — Yogasutra, 2. 15.
50 Dighanikaya, 3. 1. 2; Buddhacarya, p. 496; Yogasutra, IV. 7.
51 Yogasutra, 4. 7.
52 Abhidharmakatva Sangraha, 5. 19; Visuddhimagga, 19. 14-16.
53 Yogasutra, 2. 12-14.
a general discussion is made in regard to karma but the counting is different from that of the Buddhists.

In Jaina philosophy karma is studied from the four point of view, viz. its nature (praktiti), duration (sthiti), intensity (anubhaga) and quantity (pradesha). According to its nature, it is classified into eight fundamental species (mulapraktitis), viz. jnanavaranitya-karma (knowledge obscuring karma), darshanavaranitya-karma (intuition-obscuring karma), vedantya-karma (feeling-producing karma), mohanitya-karma (deluding karma which obscures the right attitude of soul to faith and conduct), ayus-karma (longevity-determining karma), nama-karma (body-making or personality-determining karma with its general and special qualities and faculties), gotra-karma (staus-determining karma, e.g. family, clan, caste, nationality, social standing, etc.) and antaranya-karma (soul's energy-hindering karma). They are divided and sub-divided further into one hundred and fifty eight kinds of karma (i.e. uttaraprapktis of eight basic divisions of karma), with regard to various beings.

Study of Karma from Different Points of View

Karmas are produced or manifested by consciousness, for they are transformed into bad position (sthana), etc., like matters of beings accumulated as food and collected as physical structure, and there arise in one’s mind fear and definite intention for killing a being and putting it to death. This karma is the cause of bondage of soul.

Karmas produce six kinds of state in soul, viz. (1) audayika (the state of soul caused by the unhindered realization of eight karmaprapktis, it consists of all accidental attributes of soul. (2) aupaśamika (the state is produced by the suppression of the mohanitya-karma, though it still continues to exist and may be overcome by proper efforts of self control), (3) pārinnāmika (the essential state comprising the qualities attributed to the soul in itself—the qualities in which nothing is changed through karma), (4) kṣayika (the state produced as a result of annihilation of karma, in this state liberation is attained), (5) kṣayopapaśamika (the mixed state in which some karma is still existing, but some is neutralized and some annihilated. So the existing karma does not realize itself and

54 Bhs., 1.A. 38 ; Pannavana, 1st Uddesaka and Karmagrantha 1-6 ; Gommatasara, Karmakanda.
55 ceyakada karma kajjami, Bhs., 16.2.57 ; Ibid., 17.1594.
56 Bhs., 6.1.230 ; jivaviryam bandhanakramanadinnimittabhutam karmakaranam, Ibid., (Comm).
possesses no intensity), and (6) sannipātikabhāva (the state which consists in the coincidence of several states).

**Karmakaranas (Process of Karma)**

Karmic matter (karma-pudgala) becomes associated with Soul on account of its passions and activities and at certain states of it the passions are completely destroyed, but mental, vocal and bodily activities still continue in causing consequent influx and bondage of *karma*, which require some energy of soul for their origination. There are stated to be four kinds of *karaṇa* (process or organ of energy of soul). *viz.* mana-, vāk-, kāya- and *karma-karaṇas*. The *karma-karaṇa* is the process of energy by which the karmic-matter undergoes various processes as a result of different conditions of the activities. The processes of energy have been divided into eight kinds, *viz.* bandhana (the condition of energy responsible for bondage of soul), sankrāmaṇa (transformation of one *karma* into another—the condition of energy responsible for transformation), udvartana (increased realization of *karmas*—the condition of energy responsible for increased realization) *apavartana* (decreased realization of *karma*—the condition of energy responsible for decreased realization), udṛṭaṇa (premature realization of *karmas*—the condition of energy responsible for premature realization), upasamana (subsidence—the condition of energy responsible for subsidence), nidhātti (the condition that is capable of making *karmas* incapable of all the processes (*karaṇas*) other than the increased realization and decreased realization, and nikācana (the condition that is responsible for making *karmas* incapable of all the processes).

The process of energy (*karaṇa*) produces a corresponding karmic process and vice versa. Thus *karaṇa* is explained from the aspects of substance, space, time, life, condition, body, sense-organ, speech, mind, passion, expansion of soul (*samudghāta*), instinct, condition of soul (*leśyā*), attitude of mind, sex-passion, act of killing, matter and its colour, taste, smell, touch and figure (*sāṃsthāna*). Here *karaṇa* is the means of action “*kriyate anena iti karaṇam***.  

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59 *Bhs.*, 19-9-661.
The Jain Basthi of Vijayamangalam

K. Venkatachari

Vijayamangalam otherwise known as Voyyapadi in Erode Taluk is a humble village of unruffled calm, enjoying a serene tranquility by its strange association with the small Jain shrine situated nearby.

The Vijayamangalam Jain shrine is one of the very few surviving Jain Basthis in Tamilnadu attracting at once the attention of the art lover and the assiduous scholar.

The shrine is dedicated to the worship of Candraprabha Vardhana, the seventh in the order of the twenty four Tirthankaras, most venerated by the Jains, the last among them being Vardhamana Mahavira, the popular founder of the religion. ‘Candraprabha’ is a Sanskrit word which means moonbeam. The Lord is believed to have been baptised after the desire of his mother, who in pregnancy, wished to drink the moon. To gratify her desire, was placed before her a silver plate of water, in which was cast the reflection of moon and she drank of it.

Candraprabha was of immaculately fair complexion and hence the crescent of the moon is associated with him as his symbol. Vardhamana Mahavira is also worshipped together with Candraprabha Vardhana and the two idols made of granite are enshrined in the sanctum sanctorum. Curiously enough the idol of Candraprabha Vardhana, to whom the shrine is dedicated, is smaller than that of Mahavira housed therein. The two granite sculptures mark the high excellence reached by the Jain School in Tamilnadu.

The conception as well as the construction of the temple may look much the same as of the Hindu’s and only a closer examination will reveal the essential differences in its execution. The ‘kalasams’ or ‘kumbhams’, which are an integral part of the Hindu vimānas, are conspicuous by their absence in the tower of the temple. The ‘dhvaja-stambha’ or the sacred column, which is called ‘mānastambha’ by the Jains, overlooking the gateway or the main entrance of the temple cuts through the roof of a small pillard mandapam and tapers abruptly in the azure sky without any horizontal ornamented projection towards the gateway at the top, as in the Hindu temples.
The middle of the courtyard is enclosed by four walls with a flat roof, all made of stone. The entablatures of the exterior are carved with the images of Adisvara, seated cross-legged under the shade of a three-tiered umbrella. There are also figures of the God canopied by the double arch formed by the gracefully lifted trunks of two elephants, one on either side of him. We also find an array of musicians, playing on various instruments, gods riding on different kinds of animals, angels fanning the cross-legged Adisvara seated in meditation, which add to the artistic excellence of the courtyard. Inside the courtyard are carved on the cornice running round the top of the wall, the images of Krsna, treading on the serpent Kaliya, Ganesa, Hanumana and other Hindu gods.

There are also housed in the ardhamandapa of the shrine five idols of granite of what the common man calls the Pancapandavas. But, they really represent only the Five Supreme Ones, known as the "Pancaparamestins", according to Jain Scriptures, viz., (1) Siddhas, (2) Arhatas, (3) Acaryas, (4) Upadhyayas, (5) Sadhus. The absence of Draupadi in the array of the five idols, so called Pandavas, should refute the popular classification of them as the Pandavas.

One is struck with wonder at the catholicity, tolerance and adaptation of the Jain builders of the temple at Vijayamangalam in accommodating niches to the Hindu deities also in their pantheon. It should rather sound strange and paradoxical that history refers to relentless religious feuds between the Jains and the Hindus of Tamilnadu in ancient times, particularly, when we find a Hindu deity and a Jain Tirthankar enshrined together.

The shrine is in charge of a priest belonging to the ‘Digambara’ (skyclad) sect, one of the two sects of the Jainism, the other being ‘Svetambara’ (whiteclad). As such the deity is not apparelled in any kind of cloth, nor any kind of festival is celebrated in the temple, as the Jains are essentially non-believers in rituals. However, the deities are anointed with water, milk, curd, sandal etc.

Outside the shrine is a deep well, believed to have sprung as a result of a single stroke on the ground made by Bhima with his club. The water of the well is said to have medicinal properties.

There are numerous inscriptions on the walls of the temple. Besides the Jain Basthis, there are also two ancient small shrines dedicated to Lord Visnu and Lord Siva which also contain many inscriptions. The construction of the temple dates back of the times of the Ganga kings of Mysore who build the famous Jain colossus at Sravanabelagola.
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