ISSN 0021-4043

A QUARTERLY ON JAINOLOGY

VOL. XXIV

JANUARY 1990


No. 3

Jain Journa





a quarterly on Jainology





JAIN BHAWAN CALCUTTA

Rupees Five

Copyright of articles, stories, poems, etc. published in the Jain Journal is reserved.

All contributions, which must be type-written, and correspondence regarding contributions and book-reviews should be addressed to the Editor, Jain Journal, P-25 Kalakar Street, Calcutta-7.

For advertisement and subscription please write to the Secretary, Jain Bhawan, P-25 Kalakar Street, Calcutta-7. Subscription for one year: Rs. 15.00: for three years: Rs. 40.00. Foreign: Rs. 70.00 for one year.

Published by Ganesh Lalwani on behalf of Jain Bhawan from
 P-25 Kalakar Street, Calcutta-7 and printed by him at The
 Technical & General Press, 17 Crooked Lane, Calcutta-69.

Editor : Ganesh Lalwani

Contents

Jaina Moksa in the Perspective of Indian Philosophy 70 Ram Jee Singh

Jain Aesthetic Concepts 83 V. M. Kulkarni

Determinism and Indeterminism in Anekanta Philosophy 93 S. C. Jain

An Introduction to Jaina Cakravartis 100 Manorama Jain

The Sociological Approach of the Jaina Ritualistic Study 104 L. K. Bharateeya

Gleanings 110

Books Received 115

SPECIAL DONATION FOR JAIN JOURNAL

KUMAR CHANDRA SINGH DUDHORIA

7 CAMAC STREET, CALCUTTA 700 017 Phone : 44-5234

KASTURCHAND BIJOYCHAND

155 RADHABAZAR STREET, CALCUTTA 700 001 Phone : 20-7713

•

GLOBE TRAVELS

11 HO CHI MINH SARANI, CALCUTTA 700 071 Phone : 44-0190/3944/3955/6028, 43-3995

LODHA CHARITABLE TRUST

14 GOVERNMENT PLACE EAST, CALCUTTA 700 001 Phone : 23-7102

SINGHI FOUNDATION

1/B OLD POST OFFICE STREET, CALCUTTA 700 001 Phone : 28-7530/4573/4577

JAYSHREE SERVICE STATION

RANCHI, HAZARIBAGH, ISHRIBAZAR

BAHADURMULL JASKARAN PRIVATE LIMITED

10 CLIVE ROW, CALCUTTA 700 001 Phone : 25-7731/3154

PUSHRAJ PURANMULL

65 COTTON STREET, CALCUTTA 700 007 Phone : 39-7343/4566

LALITKUMAR YOGENDRAKUMAR 113B MANOHARDAS KATRA STREET, CALCUTTA 700 007

JAIN & CO.

Head Office : P-21/22 RADHA BAZAR STREET CALCUTTA 700 001 Phone : 26-4628/6551/7215/9190 Branch : 4675A 21 DARYAGUNJ NEW DELHI 110 002 Phone : 27-8708



We pay our homage to Moti Chand Bhura who passed away on 11.12.89. He was one of the founders and promoters of Jain Journal. May his soul rest in peace.

Jaina Moksa in the Perspective of Indian Philosophy

Ram Jee Singh

Introductory :

The concept of moksa is perhaps the biggest invention of human ingenuity in its quest of happiness. Sri Ramashankar Bhattacharya says that the science of moksa is an experimental science of mental power.¹ The history of human existence is a history of endless effort to eliminate sorrow and attain happiness. This is human nature. But we do not get what we aspire after. We are a miserable lot. Death alone is the full-stop to our sufferings. But if we accept this idea of death, it would mean a tragic blow to the sense of human adventure, freedom and effort. Thus our ingenuity came across with the idea of Soul-an eternal entity. Let the body perish, Soul is immortal. We are children of immortality. The immortal in man imparts to it its own quality of happiness. This state of eternal joy bereft of all sufferings is regarded as moksa or liberation. This liberation in itself seems to be a purely negative idea but since the search for absolute freedom involves the search for ultimate purpose of the life of the individual (parama purusārtha),² there is a positive aspect also.

The concept of *mukti* roughly distinguishes Indian from Western thought. The reason is to be found in the concept of Soul in Indian philosophy, the basis of bondage and liberation. With the exceptions of Plato and Plotinus, the Western philosophy is quite unaware of a philosophy of Self; on the other hand all Indian systems, both orthodox and heterodox, recognise the idea as the first requisite for any philosophical adventure.³ This is the spiritual basis of our ethical life. All the three pursuits of human life such as *dharma* (virtue), *artha* (wealth) and $k\bar{a}ma$ (enjoyment) are regarded as simply subservient to it. *Mokşa* is the highest pursuit (*mokşa eva parama puruşārtha*). The genesis of the idea of *mokşa* is traced in "the endeavour of man to find out ways and means by which

- ¹ 'Moksa-Darsana', Darsanik, July 1955, p. 63.
- ² Deshmukh, C.D., 'The Concept of Liberation', *Philosophical Quarterly*, July 1937, p. 135.
- * Udyotakara, Nyaya-vartika, p. 366.

he could become happy or at least be free from misery",⁴ or in the state of "sound sleep".⁵ Common people in India however very little bother, whether this state of *mukti* is logical or not, or actual or unreal. They accept it as an article of faith in the nature of religious dogma.

Concept of Moksa in Indian Philosophy :

Just as no school of Indian philosophy, not even the Carvakas, deny the concept of Self, similarly there is absolute unanimity regarding the central conception of moksa as the highest goal of life,⁶ although they differ with regard to the nature of mukti and the means for its realisation, according to their different metaphysical positions and attitudes.

For example, in consonance with their materialistic conception of Soul (caitanya-viśista-deha evaātmā) the Carvakas come to materialistic conception of liberation (dehocchedo moksah or moksastu maraņa ca prāṇavāyu-nivartanam). Similary, in consistence with the doctrine of Middle Path and Dependent Origination the Buddhists reject both eternalism (sāsvatavāda) of the Upanisads and nihitism (ucchedavāda) of the Carvakas. They deny the continuity of an identical substance in man, but not the continuity of the stream of unbroken successive states of the five aggregates (pañca-skandha). The Soul or ego is nothing more than the collection of the five-aggregates and hence, nirvāṇa must be the destruction of the mental continum (cittam vimucyate) or at least the "arrest of the steam or consciousness (santati-anutpāda) leading to the cessation of the possibilities of future experience (anāgatanutpāda)".

In Nyaya, the destiny of the individual Self is determined by the concept of Self and its relation to consciousness which has not been regarded as an essential and inseparable attribute of the Soul. Consciousness arises when the Soul is related to the mind which in turn is related to the senses, and the senses are related to the external objects. So in the disembodied condition, Self will be devoid of consciousness. Release is freedom from pain.⁷

So long as the Soul is related to the body, pain is inevitable and pleasure and pain are produced by undesirable contacts with objects.

⁴ Ramachandran, N., Concept of Mukti in Indian Philosophy.

^b Shyamshastri, R., 'The Concept of Mukti in India', *Proceedings of Indian Philosophical Congress* 1944, p. 243.

⁶ Haribhadra, Yoga-drsti-samuccaya, pp. 129-30; Kundakunda, Bhava-prabhrta.

⁷ Nyaya-bhasya, III. 2,67.

Thus the state of freedom is like the state of deep dreamless sleep, devoid of consciousness⁸ stone-like existence⁹ so much so that people would prefer to be jackal than to attain this lifeless brand of *mukti*. Pleasure and pain go together like light and shade. So absolute cessation of suffering (\bar{a} tyantika-duhkha-niv τ tti) must by implication mean cessation of pleasure too. Now to escape from this dilemma, faced by the majority of the Nyaya-thinkers like Vatsyayana, Sridhara, Udayana, Raghunatha Siromani, there is the opposite thesis of the Nyayaikadesins and other Naiyayikas like Bhasarvajna and Bhusana that freedom is bliss,¹⁰ instead of a state of painless, passionless, unconscious existence free from the spatiotemporal conditions. However, they cannot do it unless they revise their conception of Self and its adventitious relation with Soul.

Like Nyaya, the Self of the Vaisesikas has cognitions of things when it is connected with body.¹¹ So it is only when the Soul is free from the qualities (either pleasure or pain) produced by contact with name and form (\bar{a} *tmavisesa-gunānām atyantocchedah*) or as Sridhara would say *navānām ātmavisesa-gunānām-atyantoccheda mokşa*, that is *mokşa* is the absolute destruction of the nine specific qualities of the Self. To save itself from the charge that this kind of *mokşa* comes perilously near the unconscious condition of a pebble or a piece of stone, the Vaisesikas propound a doctrine of inherent felicity in the state of *mokşa*. But they have yet to say how felicity is unconscious?

The Mimamsakas, like the Nyaya-Vaisesikas, regard the Soul as eternal and infinite, with consciousness as its adventitious attribute, related to the body. It survives death to reap the consequences of action. Since the Mimamsaka school is the outcome of the ritualistic period of the Vedic culture, the final destiny of an individual is regarded as the attainment of heaven—the usual end of rituals (*svarga-kāmo yajeta*). But later on, the idea of heaven is replaced by the idea of liberation, for they realised that we have to fall back on the earth as soon as we exhaust our merit. The concept of heaven was indeed a state of unalloyed bliss (at least temporary). But the state of liberation is free from pleasure and pain, since consciousness is an adventitious quality of the Soul. To the Prabhakaras, *mokşa* is the realisation of the moral imperative as duty

- * Nyaya-sutra, IV. I. 1.163.
- Naisadha, 17.75.
- ¹⁰ Nyaya-sara, pp. 39-41; Nyaya-bhasya, 1.1.22
- ¹¹ Nyaya-kandali, p.57.

72

(*niyoga-siddhi*). To Kumarila, it is the "Soul's experience of its own intrinsic happiness with complete cessation of all kinds of misery",¹² which is very much like the Advaitic conception. However, the general conception of the Bhattas is the realisation of the intrinsic happiness ($\bar{a}tmasau-khyan\bar{u}bh\bar{u}ti$). Parthasarathi Misra¹³ and Gangabhatta deny this. Narayanabhatta, Bhattasarvajna and Sucaritra Misra clearly admit the element of happiness in the state of *mukti*, since to them Soul is consciousness associated with ignorance (*ajñānopihīitacaitanya*).

According to Sankhya, consciousness is not a mere quality but its very essence. It is pure, eternal and immutable. Hence it is not blissful consciousness (ananda-svarupa) or stream of consciousness (caitanyapravāha) or material consciousness (caitanya-dehaviśista). So Self (puruşa) of Sankhya remains "untouched either by joy or sorrow", migration, bondage and liberation.¹⁴ Bondage and liberation are phenomenal, which requires the formal and final cessation of all the three kinds of sufferings without a possibility of return.¹⁵ This neutral and colourless state of kaivalya is again an unattractive picture with no appeal to the aspirant. Similarly, in Yoga, freedom is absolute isolation of matter from Self. It is only that we can effect a cessation of the highest principle of matter (citta-mahat-buddhi) that the state of absolute isolation and redirection of our consciousness is possible which requires an abstruse practical discipline. However, there is clear amvivalence in Sankhya doctrine of release so far as it says that "that it is the spirit (puruşa) that is to obtain release, yet the apparently predominant characterization of spirit is such that it is impossible that it should either be bound or released".¹⁶

Unlike Sankhya-Yoga, the Self in Sankara is not only consciousness but also blissful consciousness, which is the produce of a sense of identification between the Soul and Brahman. Hence unlike Sankhya-Yoga and Nyaya-Vaisesika, there is an *intuition of identity* instead of an *intuition* of difference. Unlike Purva-Mimamsa, moksa, in Advaita Vedanta is not only destruction of individual's relation with the world (prapañcasambandha-vilaya), but dissolution of the world itself (prapañca-vilaya),

- ¹³ Manameyodaya, v. 26.
- ¹⁸ Sastra-dipika, 125-31.
- 14 Isvara Krsna, Sankhya-karika.
- ¹⁵ Sankhya-karika and Sankhya-tattva-kaumudi, 64-68; Sankhya-pravacana-bhasya, 3.65-84.
- ¹⁶ Godwin, W.F., 'Theories of Consciousness and Liberation in the Sankhya Philosophy and the Philosophy of G. Santayana', *Proceedings of Indian Philosophical* Congress 1954, p. 17.

identity and difference between God and Man. Man's body and Soul are real. Then Soul is not pure and impersonal consciousness but a thinking substance with consciousness as its essential attribute. Hence, moksa is not the self-annulment in the Absolute but a self-realisation through self-surrender and self-effacement, the supreme satisfaction of religious emotion. The liberated Soul is not God but neither is he separated from his all-comprehensive existence,¹⁷ even in the kingdom of God (vaikuntha). This is sāyujya-bhakti (unitive devotion). To Madhva, the distinction between God and Self is real.¹⁸ Though the *jivas* are absolutely dependent upon God, they are active and dynamic.¹⁹ Hence moksa is "blessed fellowship" and not a mere identification. Thus in the state of *mukti*, there is not only the utter absence of pain but also the presence of positive bliss. To Nimbarka, with whom the Soul is both different/ non-different form (bhedāveda), complete submission results in both Godship and self-realisation, which is endless joy and bliss. Suddhadvaita school of Vallabha regards the relation between God and Soul as that of whole and part. Duality and distress go together. The moment, the Soul is one with God, we get final release which is utter bliss. To the other Vaisnavites like Sri Caitanyadeva, Jaideva, Vidyapati, Candidasa etc. to whom the ultimate reality is love and grace, liberation means love through divine grace. Bhakti is mukti.

In the $G\bar{\imath}t\bar{a}$ we find the status of Soul as different fragments of God, hence *mokşa* must be the unity with Purusottama, indeed a blissful state. However, it must be equivalence (*sādharmya*) with God and not identity (*sārūpya*). Put in the *Upanişads* as in the Advaita Vedanta, the realisation of the ideal of man, which is a state of ecstasy and ... pture, a joyous expansion of the Soul.

To the Kapalikas, moksa is found in the sweet embrace of Hara and Parvati (*hara-pārvatyālingana*), to the Pasupats, it lies in the holding of all dignity (*parmaiśvaryam*); to the Udasins (atheists), it is in the extinction of egoism (*ahamkāra nivrtti*); to the Vyayakaranas, it is in the power of speech (*brahma rūpya hanya darsanam*); to the Sarvaganas, it is in the eternal continum of the feeling of the highest felicity (*nitya niratiśaya sukha bodh*), etc. Broadly, there are two different approaches to the conception of liberation in Indian philosophy:

¹⁷ Sadhu Santideva, The Critical Examination of the Philosophy of Religion, Vol. II, p. 986.

¹⁸ Madhva, Bhasya on Brahma-sutra, III. 3. 1.

¹⁹ Ibid., II. 3. 38

- 1. Materialistic Conception of moksa of the Carvakas, and
- 2. Non-materialistic conception of others :

(a) Positive Conception : Vedanta and Jainism

- 1. $s\bar{a}r\bar{u}pya$ —Becoming like God in nature and form= $G\bar{i}t\bar{a}$.
- 2. sāmipya—Blessed fellowship—Madhva, Nimbarka, Vallabha, Caitanya, etc.
- 3. sālokya—Residing in the world of God worshipped (Vaikuntha = Ramnujists).
- 4. sāyujya—Becoming one with God=Advaita Vedanta.

(b) Negative Conception : Buddhism

- 1. Uccheda-Nihilism=Madhyamika Buddhism.
- 2. Nirodha—Cessation of suffering=Nyaya-Vaisesikas and Mimamsakas.
- (c) Neutralistic Conception : Sankhya and Yoga.

However, there is ample evidence to prove that some of the Buddhist texts, some Naiyayikas and Mimamsakas go to prove a positivistic conception of liberation.

The Jaina outlook

²⁰ Jain, H.L., 'What Jainism Stands For ?' Jaina Antiquary, Vol. II No. 2 ; cf Shastri, K. C., Jaina Dharma (2nd ed. Hindi), p. 63.

²¹ Reference may be made to Author's article on 'Advaita Trends in Jainism' read before Indian Philosophical Congress 1956 (Nagpur).

an extension of *ahimsā* in intellectual field. Absolutism or imperialism in thought, word and deed is unknown to the Jainas, the spirit of which is a foe to all kinds of force and fanaticism. Jainism has tried to develop a neither-nor attitude by avoiding extremes.

Soul and Karma-The Basis of Freedom and Bondage:

The Jainas believe in the doctrine of Soul as the possessor of material karma²² and in the doctrine of extended consciousness.²³ The Jainas subscribe to the doctrine of constitutional freedom of the Soul and its potential four-fold infinites, meaning thereby that the Soul is intrinsically pure and innately perfect. But Soul and karma stand to each other in relation to beginningless conjunction.²⁴ Karma is an aggregate of very fine imperceptible material particles, which are the crystalised effect of the past activities or energies. The link between the matter and spirit is found in the doctrine of the subtle body (kārman-śarīra or linga-sarīra) a resultant of the unseen potency and caused by a principle of susceptibility due to passions and vibrations. "The Soul by its commerce with the outer world becomes literally penetrated with the particles of subtle-matter."²⁵ Moreover, the mundane soul is not absolutely formless, because the Jainas believe in the doctrine of extended consciousness, like the doctrine of *pudgala* in Buddhism and the *Upanisads*,²⁶ and also to some extent in Plato and Alexander, while the Sankhya, Yoga, Vedanta, and Nyaya-Vaisesikas and the Buddhists kept consciousness quite aloof from matter. The Jainas could easily conceive of the inter-influencing of the Soul and karmic-matter, hence the relation between the Soul and karma became very easy. The karmic-matter mixes with the Soul as milk mixes with water or fire with iron. Thus formless (amūrta) karma is affected by mürta karma, as consciousness is affected by drink or medicine. This is the relation of concrete identity between the Soul and the karma. Logically, if like begets like, and the cause is non-different from the effect, the effect (body) is physical, hence the cause (karma) has indeed a physical form.²⁷ But unless karma is associated with the jiva (Soul), it cannot produce any effect, because the karma is only the instrumental cause and it is the Soul, which is essential cause of all experiences. Hence the doctrine of Soul as the possessor of material karma is inevitable to explain

- ³³ Tattvartha-sutra, V. 16.; Syadavada-manjari, v. 8.
- ²⁴ Nahar & Ghosh, An Epitome of Jainism, p. 285.
- ²⁵ Radhakrishnan. S., Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 319.
- ²⁶ Katha, IV. 12; Chandogya, III. 14.3.; Svetasvatara, I. 16.
- ²⁷ Mehta, M. L., Ibid., p. 63; Nyayavatara-vartika, p. 292.

²² Mehta, M. L., Outlines of Jaina Philosophy, p. 61.

our concept of life. But why the conscious Soul should be associated with the unconscious matter? Unlike Sankhya, in propounding a doctrine of unconscious teleology, the Jainas work out a karma-phenomenology, according to which karma is a substantive force or matter in a subtle form, which fills all cosmic space. It is due to karma that the Soul acquires the conditions of nescience or ignorance. Ignorance or nescience is the "force which prevents wisdom shining from within, that is that which holds it in latency".²⁸ The relation between Souland non-Soul is beginningless and is due to nescience or *avidvā*. This is responsible for the worldly existence, or bondage which is determined by the nature (prakrti), duration (sthiti), intensity (anubhava) and quantity (pradesa)29 of karmas. Jiva takes matter in accordance with his own karma because of self-possession (kasāyas). This is known as bondage,³⁰ the causes of which are delusion (mithyā-drsti), lack of control (avirati), inadvertence (pramāda), passions $(kas\bar{a}va)$ and vibrations (voga).³¹ Nescience is at the root of all evils and cause of all worldly existence. The Jainas do not like to bother about its whence and why. It is regarded as co-eval with the Soul, hence enternal and beginningless. Both the questions of the Self and nescience are accepted as facts on the basis of uncontradicted experience, as the bondage is determined by the nature-karmas, which are of eight fundamental varieties³² with their numerous divisions and sub-divisions. Now as Vidyanandi Svami says that as right attitude, knowledge, conduct constitute the path of liberation, the anti-thesis of this trinity (wrong attitude, knowledge, and conduct) must lead to the bondage. If the very outlook is wrong one cannot expect right knowledge and there cannot be right conduct without right knowledge.33 Theory and practice are interlinked. So, on this realistic ground, the Jainas reject the metaphysical position of all those who subscribe to the unitary principle of the cause of bondage.

- ²⁸ Jain, C. R., The Key of Knowledge, p. 743.
- ²⁹ Tattvartha-sutra, VIII. 3; Dharmasarmabhyudaya, XXI. 108; Pancastikayasara, v. 148; Vardhamana-purana, XIV. 45; Adhyatma-kamala-martanda, IV. 7; Dravya-sangraha, 33. K. G. 16.
- ²⁰ Tattvartha-sutra, VIII. 2.
- ³¹ Ibid., VIII; Dravya-sangraha, 30; Sarvartha-siddhi, p. 374-5.
- ³² Tattvartha-sutra, VIII. 4; 1. 2; Dravya-sangraha, 31.; Umasvati, Prasamaratiprakarana, 34.
- ** Uttaradhyayana Sutra, XXVIII. 30.

Jaina Mokşa

(a) Definition of Moksa :

Moksa, the last of the Jaina moral categories, is the gist of karmaphenomenology and its relation to the science of Soul. Mukti is total deliverance of the Soul from all karmic veil-sarvāvaraņavimuktirmuktih. As Umasvami defines, moksa is the total and final freedom from all karmic-matter, owing to the non-existence of the cause of bondage and the shedding (of all the karmas).³⁴ Asrava is the infiux of the karma-particles into the Soul. It is nothing but the actions of the body, speech and mind. Jīva³⁵ takes matter in accordance with its own karma because of self-possession.³⁶ Now since the karmic-inflow is the principle of bondage and hence its stoppage must be a condition of moksa. So samvara is opposite to asrava.37 Samvara literally means controlling. Samvara only arrests fresh-flow of karma-particles, but what we require is not only stoppage of the fresh-flow but also dissipation of the old one. This shedding or dissipation called *nirjarā* is possible by austerities.³⁸ This scheme of samvara and nirjarā reminds us of the Hindu idea of the different varieties of karma.³⁹ Umasvami has two prefixes-vi (viśesarūpeņa), pra (prakrstarūpeņa)40 in defining moksa, meaning thereby that moksa is the total and exhaustive dissolution of all karmic-particles, which is the condition of omniscience.

(b) The Nature of Moksa :

The Agamic verse 'sukhamātyantikam yatra' etc. admits the experience of eternal bliss in the state of mukti. "It is the safe, happy and quiet place which is reached by the great sages."⁴¹ Some of the Jaina Acaryas regard bliss as an attitude of knowledge.⁴² Buddhists, however, regard them as opposite. In Advaita Vedanta, consciousness and bliss co-mingle

- ⁸⁴ Tattvartha-sutra, X. 2.
- ³⁵ Ibid., VI. 1-2.
- ³⁶ Ibid., VIII. 3.
- ³⁷ Ibid., IX. 1.
- ³⁸ Ibid., IX. 3.
- ³⁹ Devi-bhagavata, 6. 10, 9. 14; Prakarana-pancika, p. 156.
- ⁴⁰ Tattvartha-sutra, X. 1.
- ⁴¹ Sutra-krtanga, I. 1; I. 15. 16.
- 42 Pujyapada, Sarvartha-siddhi, X. 4.

together in the undifferentiated one Brahman. Mallisena⁴³ ridicules the Naiyayikas for reducing mokşa to a state which is indistinguishable from the pebbles etc. He says that our phenomenal-life is better in which happiness comes at intervals, than in the state of mukti, which is emotionally dead and colourless. But the Jaina claim for attaining state of eternal happiness in the state of mokşa faces a serious dilemma. If it is a product (or spiritual sādhanā), it is non-eternal, and if it is not such a product, it must be conceeded that either it is constitutional and inherent or impossible to be attained. Hence, bondage and salvation are indistinguishable. So the very conception of Jaina Self and bondage makes the enjoyment of happiness well-nigh impossible. This might be a logical objection, but the Jaina idea of mokşa is one of infinite bliss, which follows from the doctrine of four-fold infinities of the Soul.

(c) Doctrine of Constitutional Freedom and Four-fold Infinities :

The *jiva* possesses four-infinities (anata catustaya) inherently, which are obscured by the veil of four ghāti (destructive) karmas. But the Jaina doctrine of constitutional freedom of Soul together with four infinities present a difficulty. If Self is inherently good and essentially perfect how can karma be associated with the Soul. If karma is said to be the cause of bondage, and vice versa then there is fallacy of regressus ad-infinitum. But if karma is beginningless, then how Soul can be essentially perfect. All the doctrines of moksa-sādhanā then seem to be quite meaningless attempt since bondage and moksa are both phenomenal and not real as Sānkhya-kārikā says-"Of certainity, therefore, not any (Spirit) is bound or liberated".44 It seems then that moksa is not the product of a new thing but self-realisation. What I feel is that Soul is constitutionally free but it is potential freedom. It cannot be manifest without spiritual discipline. This is in consonance with the Jaina doctrine of satkāryavāda which makes a distinction between the manifest and the unmanifest. Sankhya and Advaita Vedanta hold that moksa is not the attainment of what is unattained but what is already attained (praptasya prāptih). But where as Sankhya stresses the need of 'discrimination', and Advaita Vedanta emphasises 'identification', the Jainas work out a scheme of 'manifestation'. The logic is simple. If : what is non-existent cannot be produced,⁴⁵ hence it follows that the effect is existent even before the operation of the cause.

⁴³ Syadvada-manjari, v. 8.

⁴⁴ Karika, 63.

⁴⁵ Introduction to Samayasara (ed, A. Chakravarti), p. CLV. II

(d) Jivan-Mukti and Videha-Mukti :

The Jainas like the Upanisadic thinkers,46 Buddhists,47 Nyaya-Vaisesikas,48 Sankhyas,49 Yogins,50 Vijnanabhiksu and Vallabha etc., recognise the existence of jivan-mukti together with videha-mukti. But Ramanuj, Nimbarka, Madhva etc. do not accept jivan-mukti. Apart from jivan-mukti and videha-mukti, there is an idea of karma-mukti (gradual salvation) in the Upanisads,⁵¹ which resembles to the gradual ascendence of the stepping stones to higher things (gunasthanakramāroha) or the field of Yogacarya, and the bhūmikā of Vaidika philosophy. However, mukti is mukti-it must be one and indivisible. Any reference to the persistence of body etc. is meaningless. The duality of *mukti* in Jainism is perhaps a legacy of the Upnisadic influence. Since the Jainas like Advaita Vedanta believe through the dawn of wisdom and the annulment of nescience, jivan-mukti is the one and only legitimate concept. Mukti refers to the Soul, not to the body, and the dissolution of the body is neither "an inevitable pre-condition nor an integral feature of mukti".52

(e) Nirvana and Moksa :

Mokşa literally means 'release'—release of the Soul from eternal fetters of karma. Nirvāņa (Buddhist) is derived from the Pali root 'nibuttu', which means 'blowing out'. However, instead of taking it in a metaphysical sense of blowing out of (passions etc.) it is taken in the sense of extinction. However, there is ample evidence to believe that Buddha looked upon nirvāņa as positive state of consciousness. The distinction between sopādhiśeşa and nirupādhiśeşa nirvāņa is a significant one. One refers to the annulment of the dirt of mind, while the other refers to the annulment of the very existence. What all we can say is that Buddhistic nirvāņa is mostly regarded as negative, leading to the extinction of passions.⁵³ However, according to the Vaisesikas, their conception of nirvāņa means the total annihilation of all the attributes of the Soul. Mokşa also refer to the concept of 'migration' and re-birth.

- ⁴⁸ Nyaya-bhasya, IV. 2.2.
- 49 Sankhya-karika, k. 67.
- ⁵⁰ Yoga-sutra, IV. 30.
- ¹¹ Katha, II. 3.5.
- ⁵² S. S. Suryanarayan Shastri, paper on 'Jivaan-mukti', *The Philosophical Quarterly*, January 1939 (Vol. XIV No. IV).
- ⁵³ Tattva-sangraha, p. 184.

⁴⁶ Katha, II, 3.14-15; Manduka, II1.2. 6; Brhadaranyaka, IV. 4. 6-7.

⁴⁷ Visuddhi-magga, 16.73

(f) Bhava-Moksa and Dravya-Moksa :

The jīva attains mok\$a when it is free from the snares of karma (karma-phalavinirmuktah mok\$a). The mok\$a is either bhāva (objective) or dravya (subjective). When the Soul is free from four ghāti karmas (jñānāvaraņīya, daršanāvaraņīya, mohanīya, antarāya), it is bhāva-mok\$a, and when it is free from aghatī karmas (nāma, āyu, gotra, vedanīya) it is dravya-mok\$a. Bhāva-mok\$a is negative since it is in this state the Soul is in the process of nirjarā, of course which is almost complete. But after freedom from aghāti karmas (action-currents of non-injury), the Soul attains a state of never-ending blissful beautitude. A person attains the state of omniscience when mohanīya (deluding), jñānāvaraņīya (knowledge-obscuring), daršanāvaranīya (faith-obscuring) and antarāya (obstructive) karmas are destroyed.⁵⁴ After the attainment of kevala-jnāna, a person is free from all kinds of karmas and attains final liberation.⁵⁵ The Soul comes into its own and regains infinite knowledge, infinite faith, infinite bliss, and infinite power.

(g) The Abode of Moksa :

When the $j\bar{i}va$ attains freedom, it rises higher and higher and reaches the summit of $lok\bar{a}k\bar{a}sa$ which is called $siddhas\bar{i}l\bar{a}$ (region of the free and liberated). It may be pointed out that this is a new conception. The Vedic conception regards $\bar{a}tm\bar{a}$ as all pervasive and the Buddhist do not point any such thing as $\bar{a}tman$, hence they do not posit a locus of moksa (moksa-sthāna). The nature of Soul is ever-progressive and never regressive. The Mandali sect of the Jainas regard that there is no such fixed place of moksa but it is ever-progressing, in the nature of an ideal. But the Jaina concept of dharma and adharma (medium of motion and rest) present in each object leads us to think that there must be a fixed state where the motion must stop. The Hindu conception of vaikumtha or paramadhāma is that of kingdom of God, not of Man.

Conclusion

Moksa in Jainism is not the product of something new. It is a rediscovery of man himself through self-realisation. True happiness lies within. 'Look within'—is what Jainism says. Self-realisation is the

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Tattvartha-sutra, X. 1.

ideal of such systems such as Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Sankhya too.⁵⁶ Advaita Vedanta also is a philosophy of self-realisation par excellence leading to the identification of the Soul and Brahman. Avidyā is the common principle of bondage, so knowledge is essential for *mukti*. The *karma*-phenomenology of the Jainas is the outcome of their realistic and externalistic approach. Constitutional freedom of the Soul is a logical necessity. This is simple *satkāryavāda*. Unless the Soul has got some potentiality, how can it manifest ?

³⁶ T. M. P. Mahadevan, Presidential Address to the Nagpur Session of Indian Philosophical Congress (*Proceeding*), p. 7.

Jain Aesthetic Concepts

V. M. Kulkarni

Jhalakikar,¹ the learned Sanskrit commentator of Kāvyaprakāśa informs us that the four commentators, Bhatta Lollata, Srisankuka, Bhatta Nayaka and Abhinavagupta have explained the Bharata-sũtra (rasasūtra) in accordance with the four systems of philosophy, Mimamsa, Nyaya, Samkhya and Alamkara, respectively. Professor Hiriyanna observes in one of his essays : "When the predominance of rasa came to be insisted upon as indispensable to artistic excellence, many of the systems of philosophy applied their own fundamental principles to its interpretation so that in course of time there came to be more than one theory of rasa",² and elucidates these theories according to two of the chief systems, viz. Vedanta and Samkhya and sums up the essential differences between the Vedanta and the Samkhya aesthetics.³ In keeping with this usage one may speak of Jain aesthetics and Jain aesthetic concepts. On a closer study one would, however, find that it is somewhat misleading to stamp an Alamkarika as a Samkhya or Naiyayika or Vedantin or Mimamsaka simply on the basis of the fundamental principles or technical terms of a particular system of philosophy employed by him in the course of his interpretation of the rasa-sūtra. Bhatta Navaka, for instance uses the Samkhya technical terms moha, sattvodreka, rajas and tamas and bhoga but at the same time compares this bhoga (characterised by a resting in one's own consciousness which is pervaded by beatitude and light) with the tasting of the supreme Brahman (parabrahmāsvāda-savidha), a phrase met within Vedanta-daršana. On the basis of this slender evidence it would be simply incorrect to label Bhatta Nayaka either as a Samkhya or a Vedantin. In fact elsewhere Abhinavagupta himself gives him the title of 'Mimamsakagranih'.4 Acarya Hemacandra, perhaps the greatest Jain Acarya of medieval

¹ Kavyaprakasa, BOR Institute, Poona, 1950, p. 87.

² M. Hiriyanna, Art Experience, Kavyalaya Publishers, Mysore, 1954, p. 7.

^a Ibid., pp. 15-16.

^{*} See Introduction to The Aesthetic Experience according to Abhinavagupta (p. xx, f.n. 1) by R. Gnoli, Varanasi, 1968, (Chowkhambha Sanskrit Studies, Vol. LXII). In the Dhvanyalokalocana (Kashi Sanskrit Series, Banaras, 1940, p. 173) Abhinavagupta censures Bhatta Nayaka thus : "Such discussions are all right in Mimamsa but have no place in poetry." He makes such a remark about Bhatta Nayaka in Abhinavabharati (Vol. III, p. 309) : kevalam jaiminir anusrtah.

India, adopts the entire commentary of Abhinavagupta on the rasasūtra and declares that his authority (or source) is Acarva Abhinavagupta—who is a 'Mahamahesvara'. It would be seen from what has been said that there is no such thing as Hindu or Jain or Buddhist aesthetics. Of course we have some works on poetics and aesthetics by Jain writers : Vagbhata-I (Vāgbhatālamkāra, 1st half of 12th century A.D.), Acarya Hemacandra (Kāvyānuśāsana, 1st half of 12th century A.D.), Maladhari Narendraprabha (Alamkāramahodadhi, 1st half of the 13th century A.D.), Vagbhata-II (Kāvyānuśāsana, 14th century A.D.) and Vijavavarni (Srngārārņavacandrikā, last quarter of the 13th century A.D. ?). These Jain writers accept, generally speaking, all the aesthetic concepts of alamkāra, vakrokti, guņa, rīti, aucitya, rasa, dhvani and the like, as conceived and formulated by master Alamkarikas like Bharata, Bhamaha, Dandin, Vamana, Anandavardhana, Bhoja, Kuntaka, Mammata and others, and presented in their celebrated works. They hardly have anything new to say about these concepts or add any new concepts. They have nothing new to say even about the central aesthetic concept of rasa. But there are two other Jain works which are noteworthy for their views about rasa and problems related to it. The first is Nātyadarpaņa of Ramacandra and Gunacandra, the two remarkable disciples of Acarya Hemacandra, and the second, Kāvyaprakāśakhaņdana, a commentary on Kāvyaprakāśa of Mammata, composed by Siddhicandragani, a contemporary of Panditaraja Jagannatha (17th century A.D.). These two writers depart from the beaten path regarding the nature of rasa and problems related to it. They indeed break fresh ground and their views strike the reader as novel. It is proposed to deal in this paper with their novel views.

In the course of his commentary on the rasa-sūtra Abhinavagupta briefly deals with the Samkhya view of rasa. According to the Samkhyas rasa is of dual nature—of amphibian nature—of the nature of pleasure or pain. But it is the Nāṭyadarpaṇa which for the first time divides the sentiments (rasa) into two distinct groups : 1 Those which are pleasurable ($si_{rng}\bar{a}ra$, $h\bar{a}sya$, $v\bar{i}ra$, adbhuta and $s\bar{a}nta$ —the erotic, the comic, the heroic, and the quietist) and 2 those that are painful or unpleasurable (karuṇa, raudra, bībhatsa and bhayānaka—the sentiment of pathos, the furious sentiment, the disgusting sentiment and the terrifying sentiment), and gives a reasoned exposition of this dual nature of rasa. It takes intensified permanent emotion (sthāyī bhāva), which is of the nature of pleasure or pain, to be rasa (see kārikā III. 7); and in the vivaraṇa (commentary) that follows sets forth arguments in support of the dual nature of rasa. To say that all rasas are pleasurable is against experience. The sentiment of bhayānaka etc., even when presented through poetic description or represented on the stage through four-fold abhinaya (acting) cause indescribable pain to the sahrdayas-sensitive and responsive readers or spectators, not to talk of the emotions of fear (bhava) etc., in actuality ! That is why people simply shudder when they witness plays depicting sentiments like the terrifying. Shuddering and relish of pleasure ill go together. The camatkāra (peculiar delight) experienced by the spectators at the end of the performance of tragic scenes is, however, simply due to the genius or creative imagination of the poet and the high skill of the actors in presenting things faithfully.⁶ The proud are wonderstruck at the sight of an enemy who cuts off the head at one stroke. The wise (Alamkarikas like Abhinavagupta), deceived or misled by this all-delightful camatkāra caused by the display of the poet's genius and the extra-ordinary skill of the actors, regard even these unpleasurable or painful karuna and other rasas as highly pleasurable.7 Spectators too, eager to taste this camatkāra, turn up to witness plays depicting karuna and other painful rasa. Poets portraying the life of Rama, etc., depict it as intermingled with joy and sorrow in accordance with the actual human life which is a mixture of both. Again, pleasures become all the more enjoyable when accompanied by sorrow like the sweetness of a beverage with a hot ingredient like chilly added to it. Tragic events such as the abduction of Sita, Duhsasana dragging Draupadi by her hair and attempting to disrobe her, Hariscandra's serving a Candala as a slave, the death of Rohitasva, Laksmana's being hit by a saktia kind of missle-Aghoraghanta's attempt to kill Malati (in the play Mālatī-Mādhava) when represented on the stage can never cause delight in the hearts of the sensitive and sympathetic spectators (sahrdayas). Again, the emotions of sorrow and other (painful) feelings in the original character cause lamentation, shedding of tears, etc., and are therefore undoubtedly painful. If through imitation by actors these painful feelings are said to become pleasurable, it is obvious that the actor's art is very deficient as it represents things falsely-in their perverted form.⁸ The apparent relish of pleasure by one when a tragic event is being

⁵ Incidentally, it may be noted that *Anuyogadvarasutra*, a sacred work of the Svetambara Jains, which claims to be old (before third century A.D.), contains a Prakrit passage on nine *kavya-rasas*. The list of *rasas* omits '*bhayanaka*' and substitutes in its place '*vridanaka*'. Further, it gives the pride of place to *vira* and not to *srngara*. It is surprising, if not shocking that all Jain writers on poetics and aesthetics completely ignore this passage giving an additional proof that aesthetics is not necessarily related to any religion or system of philosophy.

described or staged is really speaking the relish of pain. An unhappy

- ⁶ Natyadarpana III, p. 141.
- 7 Ibid., p. 141.
- ⁸ Natyadarpana, p. 142.

person alone feels joy or satisfaction on hearing tragic news and is distressed on hearing good news. Thus *karuna* and other painful *rasas* produce sorrow and nothing but sorrow.

The seat of *rasa* is the original character, the spectator, the hearer or the poet himself. Generally speaking, an actor does not experience the aesthetic delight, but it is not an absolute or invariable rule that he never experiences *rasa*. For example, a harlot who, through avarice or cupidity enters into amorous dalliance for the pleasure of others, may at times herself experience great delight; a singer singing to delight others at times himself experiences great delight. Similarly an actor while playing the role of a character may at times be completely absorbed by that role and experience *rasa*.⁹

It is quite clear from the very definition of rasa, given by the $N\bar{a}tyadar-pana$ (III.7), that it holds, like Lollata, that rasa is laukika (as in actuality). It holds rasa to be alaukika only in the sense that the vibhāvas as depicted in a play or poem are not real. In the case of a real man and a real woman the rasa is apprehended vividly because its vibhāvas are actually present; and it is on account of this actuality that the vyabhicārins and anubhāvas produced by rasa are clearly perceptible. In the case of a spectator or an actor however the rasa is apprehended only indistinctly for the vibhāvas portrayed in a play or a poem do not have real existence. Consequently the vyabhicārins and the anubhāvas too which follow rasa are not clearly perceptible. That is why the rasa, apprehended in a spectator is called alaukika (not of actuality, non-worldly, supranormal).¹⁰

It would seem from the above that the authors of the $N\bar{a}tyadarpana$, strongly differ with Abhinavagupta on two points regarding rasa. Abhinavagupta holds all the eight (nine, including $s\bar{a}nta$) rasas to be pleasurable ($\bar{a}nandar\bar{u}pa$) whereas these authors speak of two distinct groups of rasa: 1 $srng\bar{a}r\bar{a}di$ (the erotic and others), which are pleasurable and 2 karu $n\bar{a}di$ (pathos and others), which are unpleasurable or painful. Abhinavagupta locates rasa primarily in the spectator (or hearer) whereas these locate rasa in the original character, the spectator (or the hearer), the poet and at times even the actor.

• Natyadarpana, p. 142.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 143

And now as regards Siddhicandra's view :

Siddhicandra, a contemporary of Jagannatha, first explains the experience of paramānanda, the supreme joy of rasa, according to the doctrine of the Vedantins. His use of terms like 'ratyādyavacchinnam (caitanyam), 'bhagnāvaraņam (caitanyam),¹¹ strongly remind us of Jagannatha's explanation of rasa as ratyādyavacchinna (bhagnāvaraņā cideva rasah), in his Rasagangādhara.¹² As compared with it, a peculiar pleasure which arises on watching a dramatic performance or hearing the recitation of poetry is similar to the pleasure of anointing one's body with sandal-paste or of pressing the breasts of a young beautiful woman is itself rasa-this is the view of the moderns (Navinas) who belong to the 17th century.13 In other words, the Navinas (possibly, the author himself) regard the aesthetic pleasure as on a par with ordinary pleasures of of the sense-as only laukika (worldly). As a corollary to this view they hold that there are only four rasas : the erotic, the heroic, the comic and the marvellous; and reject the claim of the pathetic, the furious, the terrifying and the disgusting to the title of rasas.¹⁴ The pathos (karuna) and others, arising from sorrow (soka) etc., although are revealed with cit (or caitanya)-consciousness consisting of delight, they cannot be called rasa since the sthäyi ania (part) is opposed to the state of rasa. Again, if you argue that they, being revealed by alaukika vibhāvas, etc. deserve to be called rasa like the pleasurable bites inflicted in the course of love game, our reply is 'No'. For following this line of argument you will have to call mental distress caused by hunger, thirst, etc., as new or different rasas. The bites in the course of sexual enjoyment remove the pain caused by overpowering passion and give a sense of relief as when a burden is taken off one's shoulders. But to say that sorrow (soka) etc., like love (rati) etc., consists of (leads to) light, knowledge and joy is simply a madman's prattle.¹⁵ Further, in 'Aja-vilāpa' (Aja's Lament) etc., because of varnaniva-tanmavibhāvanā 'identifying one's self' with the event or situation portrayed, how could there arise the aesthetic joy similar to brahmananda? In the disgusting (bibhatsa rasa) which describes vividly flesh, pus, etc., the reader or spectator does not vomit or spit is itself a matter of surprise ; how could it produce rasa consisting of supreme joy. It may be granted that the santa somehow deserves the title rasa with

87

¹¹ Kavyaprakasakhandana, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1953, p. 16.

¹⁸ Kavyamala 12, Nirnaya Sagar, 1939, p. 27.

¹⁸ Kavyaprakasakhandana, p. 16.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 21

reference to persons who have given up completely all $v\bar{a}san\bar{a}s$ (various instincts) but certainly not with reference to sensualists as in (the $s\bar{a}nta$) involves abstention from all pleasures of the senses. The heroic and the furious do not differ as their *vibhāvas* bear resemblance. Regarding *dāna-vīra*, etc., the poet's chief intention is to describe the supreme generosity, greatness, etc. of the hero. The poets describe 'The Lament of Aja', etc. for pointing out the profound love of Aja, towards Indumati, his beloved queen. So too the *sānta* is described to demonstrate the intense sense of worldweariness of Mumuksus (persons desirous of liberation). So too the terrifying in order to illustrate the tenderness of heart of the heroes concerned. In fact (to tell the truth), poets depict these/various situations to demonstrate the richness of their *pratibhā* (creative imagination) in the same way as they write *padma-bandha* (artificial composition in which the words are arranged in the form of a lotus flower), etc.¹⁶

This point of view that "rasa is *laukika*, is made up of pleasure and pain, and that it in no way differs from other pleasures of the senses", however did not find able advocates among the Alamkarikas and was thrown into background, if not completely eclipsed by the writings of Abhinavagupta, Mammata, Hemacandra, Visvanatha and Jagannatha.

Although the Jain writers do not make any significant or original contribution to the subject of Sanskrit poetics and aesthetics they deserve our gratitude on grounds more than one. They incorporate almost word for word, passages after passages, large and important sections from standard and authoritative works of master minds and preserve them in tact and help us immensely in restoring the corrupt and hence obscure text of Abhinavabhāratī (about which the first editor, Ramakrishna Kavi remarked: ".....even if Abhinavagupta descended from Heaven and saw the Mss. he would not easily restore his original reading"¹⁷ and Locana, the two unique commentaries on Bharata's Nāt valāstra and Anandavardhana's Dhvanyāloka respectively by Abhinavagupta, the greatest authority in Sanskrit literary criticism and aesthetics. These works are the sources of many aesthetic ideas, concepts and famous comparisons of later alamkāra literature. They preserve important passages and sections from authoritative works on alamkāra which are now irretrievably lost. The commentaries of Jain authors utilise earlier works and elucidate the text and help us a good deal to understand better the original works on

¹⁶ Kavyaprakasakhandana, p. 22.

¹⁷ Natyasastra of Bharatamuni (GOS No. XXXVI), Vol. I, Baroda, 1956. Preface to the First Edition, p. 63.

alamkāra that they comment upon. Most noteworthy works which belong to the above categories are Hemacandra's Kāvyānušāsana, Nāţyadarpaņa of Ramacandra and Gunacandra, Kalpalatāviveka of Ambaprasada (?), Namisadhu's Tippaņa (commentary) on Rudrata's Kāvyālamkāra, Manikyacandra's commentary Samketa on Kāvyaprakāśa and Gunaratnagani's Sāradīpikā, another commentary on Kāvyaprakāśa.

Though Hemacandra's Kāvyānuśāsana does not constitute an original contribution to the subject it is not quite correct to describe it as a compilation exhibiting hardly any originality as Kane¹⁸ does or to charge Hemacandra of plagiarism as De¹⁹ does or to label it as 'siksāgrantha' as De, again, does. Instead of briefly summarising or paraphrasing or describing in his own words the theories and doctrines of his great predecessors too illustrious to be mentioned by name, if Hemacandra preferred to present them in their original form we need not find fault with him. Besides we cannot forget the fact that his writing was of a sāstrīya (scientific) nature and in scientific books such quotations are justified. We will only be betraying poverty of our imagination and scant respect for Hemacandra's intelligence if we were to insinuate that Hemacandra pretended that all the passages and sections which he quoted would pass as his own. The truth of the matter is that Hemacandra regards the masterpieces of his worthy predecessors as the property of the entire world. He is a man of *pratibhā* (creative imagination) but his pratibhā is more of the bhāvayitrī (appreciative) and less of the kārayitrī (creative) type. His capacity to select choicest passages from his authorities and to organise them into a homogeneous and organic whole is supreme. Moreover, Hemacandra shows independence of thought and judgement in good many places, refusing to follow blindly his acknowledged authorities.

Hemacandra adopts the entire long section of Abhinavabhāratī on the famous rasa-sūtra of Bharata. He also adopts explanations of Bharata's Dasarūpakādhyāya from Abhinavabhāratī. He also freely incorporates passages after passages from his authorities as shown in my paper "The Sources of Hemacandra's Kavyanusasana".²⁰ If the sections and explanations from Abhinavabhāratī were not preserved in tact by incorporating them in his Kāvyānusāsana, it would have been next to impossible to restore the corrupt text of Abhinavabhāratī on the key

¹⁸ History of Sanskrit Poetics, 1961, pp. 288-89.

¹⁹ Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics, Vol. I, p. 203.

²⁰ Journal, Oriental Institute, Baroda, Vol. XIV, No. 2, December, 1964.

rasa-sūtra. Next to the Rasādhyāya of Nāt yaśāstra, the Bhāvādhyāya is all important. The commentary Abhinavabhāratī on it has been lost. Every student of Sanskrit poetics and aesthetics feels very much the loss of this portion. As late as 1969 A.D. Dr. J. L. Masson and Prof. M. V. Patwardhan observe in their recent work. Santarasa and Abhinayagupta's Philosophy of Aesthetics, "All of the seventh chapter of the Abhinava*bharati* but the very beginning has been lost, which is a great misfortune, since Abhinava refers to it frequently. It must have been a large and important section of the A.Bh." (p. 120 f.n.2). In my paper "Abhinavabharati Ch. VII Recovered ?" I have shown decisively how the portion of the Kalpalatāviveka from p. 2861 22 to p. 3031 3, dealing with the thirty-three vyabhicāri-bhāvas of the Nāt yaśāstra is a straight quotation of the major portion of the original Abhinavabhāratī on the Bhāvādhyāya.²¹ Kalpalatāviveka of Ambaprasada, Nāţyadarpaņa of Ramacandra and Gunacandra and Kāvyānusāsana of Hemacandra have been of great use in recovering the original readings of Abhinavabhāratī and Locana as well. Again, Hemacandra's treatment of gunas is noteworthy: "On gunas Hemacandra is a follower of Anandavardhana and he draws upon Mammata and probably from Rajasekhara also.....As regards the three gunas, Hemacandra considers that mādhurya is of the highest degree in vipralambha, a little less in karuna and still less in sānta.....This is one of the views recorded later by Jagannatha." It is noteworthy for "his reference to strange views on gunas". One view holds that ojas, prasāda, mādhurya, sāmya and audārya are the five guņas (in the sense of the *pāthadharmas*). The other view is these five gunas belong to certain metres. Hemacandra criticises both. What is remarkable is his reference to strange views on gunas which are not mentioned elsewhere by any Alamkarika. Hemacandra's Kāvyānuśāsana and Ambaprasada's Kalpalatāviveka shed abundant light on the vexed problem whether Gnoli's claim that his publication, Udbhata's Commentary on the Kāvyālamkāra of Bhāmaha,²² really represents some fragments of the "lost" Bhāmaha-Vivaraņa. These two texts contain passages which support Gnoli's identification.

Again, Kalpalatāviveka lucidly explains the six verses of Bhamaha ($K\bar{a}vy\bar{a}lamk\bar{a}ra$ V.5-10) which have baffled modern scholars, pandits and commentators alike. In a paper "Kalpalataviveka on Bhamaha's Kavya-lamkara (Chapter V. 5-10)"²³ I have shown how Kalpalatāviveka

²¹ Journal, Oriental Institute, Baroda, Vol. XX No. 3, March, 1971.

²² Roma, Institute Italiano per II, Medio Ed Estremo Oriente, 1962.

²³ Published in my *Studies In Sanskrit Sahitya-Sastra*, B.L. Institute of Indology, Patan, pp. 123-129.

throws a flood of light on the tough verses dealing with Logic and Epistemology.

As poets the Jains have also contributed their share to the literature of the Drama.²⁴ Muni Ramacandra, a wellknown disciple of Acarya Hemacandra wrote a number of plays. It may not be exaggeration to describe him as Bhasa of medieval India. Some years ago I had occasion to read his delightful play of a prakarana type called Mallikämakaranda.25 A common man is puzzled to find a Muni, who has renounced the world, depicting scenes of love between young men and women and describing approvingly the charms of young beautiful damsels. It also seems that some people professing to guard jealously the dignity and high position of Munis, especially Jain Munis, must have severely criticised Ramacandra for writing plays dealing with srigāra and hāsya (the erotic and the comic) sentiments. For peace or quietitude is of the essence of Munis and these sentiments are harmful to maintain and develop the attitude of quietitude. Ramacandra defends himself against this criticism thus : "The whole world knows that sama (peace or quietitude) is of the very essence of Munis. (Don't you however forget the fact that) although gods are born in heaven they move about in all the three worlds." The suggestion is : Munis too should occasionally leave the high pedestal and come down on earth and should write plays and appreciate them when staged. Just as the gods do not lose their divine nature simply because they move about in the three worlds even so the Munis who write plays and aesthetically appreciate them do not lose their sageness or monkhood.

Ramacandra on occasions expresses his views about beauty :

tam ciya paramatthenam ramanijjam jattha hiyayarvāsāmo harisamti asoyalayā jeņam pāyappahārehim

This aesthetic concept strongly reminds us of Abhinavagupta's hrdayaviśrānti or cārurūpani všrāntisthānam (Beautiful means that which gives rise to aesthetic repose).

yad yasya nābhirucitam na tatra tasya sprhā manojñe'pi ramaņiye'pi sudhāmśau na nāma kāmh sarojinyāh

"Whatever one does not like, one has no eager desire or longing for it even if it be beautiful. The lotus-plant has indeed no longing for even the beautiful moon." Ramacandra has; of course, adopted this verse from Bhartrhari's *Srngāraśataka*.

¹⁴ M. Winternitz, A History of Indian Literature, Vol. II, University of Calcutta, 1933, pp. 546-548.

²⁵ Published by L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, 1983.

Finally a word or two about Prakrit examples in Sanskrit works on $alamk\bar{a}ra$: Sanskrit thinkers introduce about 2500 Prakrit verses in their works by way of examples. The principal reason behind such a large number of Prakrit citations is that these thinkers (Alamkarikas) made no difference between Sanskrit and Prakrit literatures. They appreciated both—some of them wrote in both the languages. The norms laid down in their works were equally applicable to both and, indeed till recently to literatures even in our modern languages.

The Prakrit text of many verses is, in many places, corrupt or shows small or big gaps and in some cases it is so hopelessly corrupt that it becomes obscure. The Prakrit languages and literatures have been especially preserved by the Jains.

In some quarters it is alleged that these Prakrit verses are full of obscenity. The Alamkarikas have defined in their works what constitutes the fault of obscenity. Use of words which give rise to feelings of shame, of disgust or convey the sense of inauspiciousness or such words which are taboo in cultured and polite society are condemned by them as obscene. They have, with their sharp intellect, recorded and denounced as obscene even particular combinations of letters giving rise to words meaning the names of private parts of the human body. So there is no question of defending obscenity.

These Prakrit verses fall into two groups : those which are highly erotic and those which portray illicit or clandestine or adulterous love. We must clearly distinguish between the erotic and the obscene. The writings of great poets, both Sanskrit and Prakrit, are highly erotic and artistic. To brand them obscene, as impatient critics do, would mean putting these great works out of the reach of the sensitive readers (sahrdayas). We must not mistake the highly erotic for the obscene.

Indian tradition treats the joys of love and the relations between the two sexes in a frank manner. The explanation for the citing of the second group of verses could be given as follows: "The height of purelove is said to exist in relations with other men's wives or unmarried girls." Naturally, poets, Sanskrit as well as Prakrit, composed verses portraying cauryarata and the Alamkarikas quoted such verses as specimens of dhvani- $k\bar{a}vya$ refusing to be impressed by considerations of morality. In other words, Alamkarikas show a very sensitive understanding of the aesthetics. Their approach to it is strictly a-moral. What they object to is not immorality but whatever is bad in aesthetic taste. To their minds eroticism was not bad in taste ; aesthetically it was most appealing to them.

Determinism and Indeterminism in Anekanta Philosophy

S. C. JAIN

The theories of determinism and indeterminism have been attracting the attention of almost all the thinkers on the problems of philosophy. In spite of their being so old they have not lost their bewildering nature, and have been taking newer turns with the advance of time. By determinism we generally mean that all the events in the world-process are absolutely determined. Regarding the determining factors of an event the answer takes three shapes. First, the events in the world process are determined by their substantial causes ; secondly, they are determined by their helping causes and thirdly, they are the joint effects of their substantial and helping causes. So the general belief is that there is perfect determinism in the world. On the other hand there are thinkers who do not like to uphold such a theory of determinism. According to them this type of determinism is extremely fatal to the ethical concept of moral accountability. If an agent is not free to choose and act, his actions cannot be made subject to moral judgment and he cannot be held responsible for them. If the life-history of *iiya* is totally determined then it is no use of preaching him principles of Ethics and Religion as the events will turn as they are ordained to turn. So in the sphere of morality freedom of will has been admitted by some as a foundational concept. Not only ethically but also metaphysically indeterminism comes out to be a fundamental aspect as reality.

On analysis determinism turns out to be a theory of causation. 'Causality is a relation of determination.'¹ To say that there is determinism in the world means that the events in the world process are determined by their antecedent causes. So the theory of determinism pre-supposes relationism; that is, the entities in the world admit of relations. If the elements in the world process are absolute discrete, the events in the world process will be absolutely different from each other, and the question of their relation of causation and hence of their determination falls to the ground. Dr. Mookerjee observes : "Relations cannot be held between absolutely distinct or absolutely identical facts. Identity and difference both are pre-suppositions of relation."² These relations are

² Ibid., p. 197.

¹ S. Mookerjee, Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism, p. 212.

not purely a product of subjectivism, but have an objective status. Regarding the potency of relations it is said, "Relation, whether internal or external, is integral to the terms and is the result of an internal change in the nature of terms."³ By this we must mean that there is no absolutism of relationism : non-relationism finds an equally significant place in the structure of reality. "If there is absolute relationism, both the terms in the relation stand unproved. If there is absolute non-relationism, a real loses its universality and particularity."⁴ Such is the view of Samantabhadra. It is this relational-cum-non-relational nature of reality on which stands the theory of causation. So causation is not destructive to the independent identity of the entities that come into relation of causation. Hence a valid form of determinism must imply the independence of the determinatum and its dependence on the causal factors. "The effect is a modification of the cause and thus is not absolutely different or identical with the cause. Qua substance the two are the same, qua qualities and modes they are numerically different."⁵ This conception of causation is anekāntika in spirit and well maintains the truth of the two implicates of the theory of causation.

According to indeterminism what we think determination of one event by another is nothing more than a parallelism. The events run parallel to each other and there is nothing like a causal efficacy for mutual determination in them, their coincidence being a chance happening. But a sober thinker must hesitate from holding the supremacy of chance in the world. The universe shows so perfect a design that an inclination to hold it a divine creation is felt by some. The universe is subject to some laws, it is a cosmos not a chaos. Even in the realm of morality indeterminism does not seem to be all valid. The actions which are subject to moral judgment originate from conscious beings. For this reason such actions are psychological, and there are psychologists who think that all psychological phenomena are determined. Thus morality is thought to require free actions while psychology is considered to provide actions. Where to seek for the free actions?

If the entities in the world have nothing in themselves except the determined elements, they become non-entities and there is nothing in them to be determined. Following a similar chain of reasoning in case of all other entities they are found to be contentless. Thus determiniatum with

⁸ S. Mookerjee, Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism, p. 208.

⁴ Samantabhadra, Apta-mimansa, verse 73.

⁵ S. Mookerjee, Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism, p. 213.

all its determining factors vanishes and there is no occasion for any type of determinism. Absolute determinism is self destructive. This leads to the conclusion that the entities must have something in themselves which becomes the object of determination. Such a position cannot distinguish between mechanical and theological types of determination, as the principle applies equally to both of them. This aspect of the entities seems to be the base for the process of determination, and it smells out indeterminism inherent in it. Taking another view of the situation the series of happenings connected with an entity is said to be mainly determined by its inherent nature—its attributes and powers. So every entity is found to be determined by itself. This type of determinism is only gratuitously called so. At the most it can be a self-determinism which is not found incompatible with indeterminism. If an indeterminism of the absolute type is upheld, it would mean the total absence of the regulative principles in the universe, which then will be reduced to a chaos. Indeterminism in the form of self-determinism is not contradictory to moral accountability.6

As we have already seen, the nature of reality is not only relational or non-relational. The relational and the non-relational are the concomitant implicates of reality. A real cannot be identified with its relations alone, nor can it shake them off totally. Relations bring about a change in the nature of the relata. Hence a real must be conceived not in abstraction from its surroundings but along with its setting and field. Martin Heidagger rightly remarks : "The essence of existence is in its existence. The mode of existence of human being has a structure : it is being-in-the world. This being in-the-world which constitutes human being is being of a self in a separable relations with the not-self." Such a conception of reality presupposes its non-relational side without which relationism becomes impossible. Relationism combined with non-relationism gives us a better picture of reality. This again means that a real has its independent existence and this very existence is qualified by its setting or field. Such is the anekāntika conception of reality, and it admits of a theory of causation. When Kundakunda holds that there is not transformation of one substance or attribute into another substance or attribute,⁸ he simply puts a limit to the process of a causation and does not deny it. He seems to hold that with the above limitation the theory of causation can very well flourish. Entities make use of the virtual action (upakāra) done to

- ⁶ Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, p. 328
- 7 H. J. Balkhan, Six Existentialist Thinkers, p. 88.
- * Kundakunda, Samayasara, verses 110, 377.

them by other entities ; and the action is called virtual on account of the limitation referred to above. This is the only manner in which the entities can help or hinder the functions of other entities. So our conclusion in this respect is that every entity has its existence (which is its non-relational side) to make relationism possible within the limit of mutual non-transformation of substances and attributes.

This prescription of a limit to the process of causation has led some thinkers to believe that the theory of virtual action among different substances is a pseudo-concept. By this they mean that we perceive entities as helping or hindering the functions of other entities, but actually speaking every entity is solely responsible for its functions. We must distinguish between the sets of entities, one of which shows such a relation with some entity while the other does not. Let us take an example. According to the Jaina conception a soul does not accept virtual action of the karmamatter lying unbound with it or bound with other souls ; it accepts the virtual action of that karma-matter alone which is bound with it. The same medicine given under different conditions shows different results. The capcity to yield different results is something which gets transformed in different settings, or the prescription of different helping conditions for its use is futile. In a similar way all entities are not seen to establish a relation of causation with an entity. Now if causation is simply a pseudoconcept, both the sets of entities must be ineffective to the entity under consideration. This very difference is suggestive of the efficacy and potency of virtual action. To hold that causation is possible only when there is mutual transformation of substances and attributes of the causes is a piece of unsound reasoning, as nature refuses to admit such a possibility. To view an entity as self centred i.e. as in itself and divorced from all its relations is only a way of approach to reality and can give us only its one sided picture. This does not mean that such viewing of reality is false, but we must admit that it is only a partial comprehension of reality and is based on abstracted process of comprehension.

This position may again be interpreted as leading to perfect determinism of entities by themselves and their setting. But following the true nature of world dynamism one will not find difficulty in ascertaining the elements of determinism and indeterminism in it. We have already quoted the view that self-determinism is not very much incompatible with indeterminism. The recognition of entities to bring about relationism is the undetermined aspect of the world process. To the extent to which these entities admit the virtual action done to them by other entities they are determined. Determinism and indeterminism are interwoven in the very texture of a real. Every real smells out determinism and indeterminism simultaneously. It is upto the observer which smell he should prefer, but a comprehensive view of an entry would not be inclined to one of the other side. It would take cognizance of the two aspects as constituting a whole.

To understand the situation better potentiality may be drawn. An actuality is an actuality in relation to its potentiality; it is a potentiality in relation to its future actuality. If an event is held to be only actual, it cannot lead to future events. If an event is held to be only potential, it cannot be supposed to exist without being actual. Prof. A. N. Whitehead observes, "This extensive continuum is real, because it expresses a fact derived from the actual world... This continuum is itself merely the potentiality for its division, an actual entity effects this division." So far as an entity is capable of atomization, it is a potentiality and is undermined. Its atomization turns it into an actuality. Capacity for atomization and the atomized state are copresent in an entity, we don't require even two distinct moments for their existence. Hence every event has the power of giving out two smells of actuality and potentiality. Its true identity is actuality-cum-potentiality. Potentiality leads to determinism while actuality is the determined state. So the same entity comes out to be determined and undetermined at the same time. Any absolute view in this sphere will prove unfaithful to reality. For this very reason any parallelist theory about the world must come out to be invalid, as the two series of causes and effects cannot be held to be totally independent of each other. Such a modification of parallelism must not be interpreted in favour of interactionism which requires a transformation of the causal conditions into the effect. The way to unearth the secrets of the world process lies between parallelism and interactionism, neither of which taken absolutely will unlock the treasure house of the world process.

We have already referred to the difficulty that ethical judgments require freedom of actions while psychology provides only a series of determined actions. It is in *anekānta* philosophy that a solution of the problem may be found. *Anekānta* philosophy gives us a deeper type of psychology which has been designated as *karma* psychology.⁹ It admits of the freedom of the energies of the agent and their determination by the karmic energies and other conditions helping the causal process. Inspite of this fact the Jaina ethical view, which is termed as the pure point of view, does not take cognizance of relationism in the form of causation and maintains

⁹ S. C. Jain, The Structure and Functions of the Soul in Jainism, p. 259.

the purity of the self all through its existence by emphasizing its independence.¹⁰ Such an ethical point of view must give this picture of the ethical ideal, as its aim is to remind the aspirant of the highest state attainable by him. Moreover we should bear in mind that all partial truths give only abstracted views of reality. So the pure point of view yields only a partial truth about the self. The true way of approach to reality is not identified with such partial comprehensions, nor can it be very distinct from them all : but lies in an impartial attitude of the knower to all of them.¹¹ Another implication of the Jaina ethical point of view is a contented fatalisma surrender to what is destined to happen. To hold that what is to happen must happen is sheer tautology, and it cannot be taken to be a reasonable ground for determinism. The world is a series of events, and the flow of such events must go on incessantly. So to say that something must happen to every entity every next moment does not give us a determinism in the true sense of the term. If this something were absolutely determined, there could have been a sense in the above referred fatalistic view of reality. In nature determinism and indeterminism are peacefully united, and there is no chance for the absolute supremacy of the one or the other. Contented fatalism may carry some value for an aspirant from the ethical point of view, but to say that it is the whole truth is unwarranted.

Generally, omniscience is taken to lead to perfect determinism. No doubt there is a relation between knowledge and its objects, but knowledge has nothing to determine the world process. So also omniscience has no causal efficacy to determine the events of the world, we must seek for the determining factors elsewhere. Knowledge cognizes the events pertaining to past, present and future without contributing towards their determination. A better knowledge of the situation yields a better type of comprehension of the events. So the best possible type of knowledge contained in omniscience only gives a correspondence between itself and the events in the world process. This very characteristic of ominiscience has led some thinkers to believe in perfect determinism whithout which, as they think, perfect knowledge is impossible. Omniscience cannot be supposed to have causal efficacy to determine the world process. It does not care whether the world process is determined, undetermined or determined-cum-undetermined ; but it must cognize it as it exists. Every event

¹⁰ Kundakunda, Samayasara, verses 16, 43.

¹¹ Amrta Candra, Purusarthasiddhyopaya, verse 8

in the world process is an instance of a subtle structure in which determinism and indeterminism are very exquisitely put together. To perceive an aspect of it and to hold it to be the total reality is to resort to an absolute view. Our partial knowledge accepts the dominance of one aspect over another; but when it goes to negate the other aspect completely; it suffers from the fallacy of exclusive predication. Reality is not identified totally either with determinedness or undeterminedness but is something which implies both determinism and undeterminism. Such a view does not only solve an ethical difficulty but also gives us a satisfactory explanation of the causality inherent in the world process.

An Introduction to Jaina Cakravartis

MANORAMA JAIN

For the progress of human race and culture it is necessary that some great men should arise to guide and lead the human race. Such men are called $\frac{\delta a l \bar{a} k \bar{a} - purus as}{\delta a l}$ in Jaina Culture. They are sixtythree in number : 24 Tirthankaras, 12 Cakravartis, 9 Vasudevas, 9 Baladevas and 9 Prati-Vasudevas.

According to Sthānānga and Samavāyānga Sūtra these sixtythree salākāpurusas are born in each utsarpiņī and avasarpiņī period of the time cycle in Bharata-ksetra or Indian sub-continent.

Here, in this article, we will speak of Cakravartis only. The names of the twelve Cakravartis as found in the above *Sūtras* are as follows :

1 Bharata, 2 Sagara, 3 Maghava, 4 Sanatkumara, 5 Santi, 6 Kunthu 7 Ara, 8 Subhuma, 9 Mahapadma, 10 Harisena, 11 Jaya 12 Brahmadatta.

It is said that in whose armoury a *cakra-ratna* appears becomes a Cakri or Cakravarti. Following the *cakra* which moves of its own accord he conquers the six segments of the Bharata-kşetra and for this he is also known as *şatkhanda-bharatesvara*.

More than one Cakravarti may be born at a certain period of time but they are not born in one *kşetra*.

Initiation of Cakravartis

It has been said in Avasyaka Sūtra that all the Cakravartis renounce the world at their own birthplace except Subhuma and Brahmadatta. They do not embrace monkhood also. Bharata and Sagara renounces at Vinita (Ayodhya or Saketa), Maghava at Sravasti, Santi, Ara and Kunthu at Hastinapura, Mahapadma at Varanasi, Harisena at Kampilya and Jaya at Rajagrha. Subhuma was born at Hastinapura and Brahmadatta at Kampilya.

Colour, Height and Age of Cakravartis

The colour of the Cakravartis is bright as pure gold. The height (in *dhanuş*) and age of the Cakravartis are as follows :

S. No	Name	Height	Age
1	Bharata	500	84 lac years
2	Sagara	450	72 ,,
3	Maghava	$42\frac{1}{2}$	5 ,,
4	Sanatkumara	40 <u>1</u>	3 ,,
5	Santi	40	1 ,,
6	Kunthu	35	95 thousand years
7	Aranatha	30	84 ,,
8	Subhuma	28	60 ,,
9	Mahapadma	20	30 ,,
10	Harisena	15	10 ,,
11	Jaya	12	3 ,,
12	Brahmadatta	7	7 hundred years

(A dhanus is equal to 4 ft. in length)

Time of Cakravartis

The first Cakravarti Bharata was contemporary of the 1st Tirthankara Rsabhadeva, the second Cakravarti Sagara was contemporary of the 2nd Tirthankara Ajitanatha, the third Maghava and fourth Sanatkumara happened to be in between the time of Dharmanatha and Santinatha, the 15th and 16th Tirthankaras, Santi, Kunthu and Ara were 5th, 6th and 7th Cakravartis as well as 16th, 17th and 18th Tirthankaras, 8th and 9th Cakravartis Subhuma and Mahapadma were contemporaries of Tirthankara Aranatha and MuniSuvrata, the 10th and 11th Cakravatis, Harisena and Jaya were contemporaries of 21st Tirthankara Nami and 12th Cakravarti Brahmadatta was born in between the period of Aristanemi and Parsvanatha.

Strength of Cakravartis

Due to the destruction of $v\bar{i}ry\bar{a}ntar\bar{a}ya$ karma the Cakravartis are said to be so powerful that even a whole army consisting of elephants, cavalry, chariots and infantry alongwith 32000 kings cannot drag him sitting on the edge of a well bound in a chain but instead he would be able to drag them easily towards himself even with his left hand.

Food of Cakravartis

Food of the Cakravartis consisted of kstr (milk pudding) with high quality of rice and other rich dry-fruits. The milk used for it was milched from the cow which had been fed on the milk of one lac cows. This is the key of his strength. It is said that if an ordinary person happens to have the food prepared for the Cakravarti or his prime queen he will go mad and out of control.

Domain of Cakravartis

A Cakravarti is the lord of nintysix crores of villages, protector of seventytwo thousand large cities and ruler of ninetynine thousand towns accessible both by land and sea. He is supreme lord of fortyeight thousand towns approached by land only or water only and of twentyfour thousand poor towns as well as isolated towns. He is lord of twenty thousand mines of jewels et cetera, a ruler of sixteen thousand towns with earthen walls. He is protector of fourteen thousand grannaries and fiftysix island settlements. He is chief of fortynine poor kingdoms and he enjoyed the rest of six part of Bharataksetra.

Treasury of Cakravartis

The large treasury of the Cakravartis is known as *mahānidhi* and had the area of nine *yojanas*. Besides gold, silver, jewels, ornaments etc. received as presents, he possesses nine special treasures (*navanidhi*) each always attended by one thousand Yaksas viz., Naisarpa, Panduka, Pingala, Sarvaratnaka, Mahapadma, Kala, Mahakala, Manava and Sankha. These are sources of food, grain, ornaments, army, buildingmaterials, jewels, art, agriculture and what not.

Besides these a Cakravarti possesses 14 ratnas of which seven are inanimate and seven animate. Seven inanimate ratnas are : Cakra, Chatra, Danda, Asi, Mani and Kankini. Seven animate ratnas are Senapati (commander), Grhapati (steward who can grow grain, fruit etc. in the evening by sowing it on Carma ratna in the morning), Vardhaki (mason who can build instantly), Purohit (Preceptor), Stri (Wife who removes the fatigue of the Cakravarti), Asva (Horse), and Hasti (elephant).

Wives of Cakravartis

The names of the Stri-ratna of the 12 Cakravartis are as follows : Subhadra, Bhadra, Sunanda, Jaya, Vijaya, Krsnasri, Suryasri, Padmasri, Vasundhara, Devi, Laksmimati, Kurumati. Besides Stri-ratna a Cakravarti possesses 96 thousand queens in his harem.

Names of Fathers and Mothers of Cakravartis

Chronologically these are as follows : Rsabhadeva-Sumangala, Sumitravijay-Vaijayanti, Asvasena-Sahadevi, Visvasena-Acira, Surya-Sri, Sudarsana-Devi, Krtavirya-Tara, Padmottara-Jvala, Mahahari-Mera, Vijaya-Vapra, Brahma-Culini.

Fate of Cakravartis

Eight Cakravartis (Bharata, Sagara, Santi, Kunthu, Ara, Mahapadma, Harisena and Jaya) went to moksa, Maghava and Sanatkumara entered 3rd kalpa (heaven) whereas Subhuma and Brahmadatta went to the seventh Prthvi (hell) as they remained involved in worldly affairs till death.

Future Cakravartis

The names of the future Cakravartis who will be born in the coming *avasarpini* are also found in the Jaina literature. They are Bharata, Drdhadanta, Gudhadanta, Suddhadanta, Sricandra, Sribhuti, Srisoma, Padma, Mahapadma, Vimala, Vimalavahana, and Varistha.

The Sociological Approach of the Jaina Ritualistic Study

L. K. BHARATEEYA

The rituals generally represent human anxiety for the expression of the religious and non-religious sentiments, ideas, assumptions etc. in the symbolic forms and translate them into the social and individual behaviours. The long journey of the rituals starts before the birth of a human being and ends after his death. Several rites take place in this period ; and the religion, either primitive or modern, is a main base of it, on which the ritualism builds its castle. It is, therefore, Durkhiem and others had searched the origin of the religion in the rituals on the one hand and on the other, Jane Harrison viewed that the art too had its origin in the rituals. But it may be said that it is a form of prescribed and elaborated behaviour and occurs both as spontaneous invention of the individual and cultural trait,¹ whereas, in the cultural grade, the ritualism reflects and sustains social organisation with the moral approach. because the morality itself finds its most cogent support in the ritual emphasis.² The ritual makes for morality ; and morality finds its origin and sanction in the religion.³ But vital religion must create and sustain a social relationship,⁴ which can be strengthened through the ritualism. The influence of the religion, sociologically speaking, is two fold⁵ as positive-integrating and as negative-disintegrating. The religion-based rituals always play the role of integrating the groups, as the groupconciousness is emerged from it. In Malinowski's words : "The creative elements in the rites of the religious nature serve to integrate the groups." They (rites) contribute in no small measure in shaping and determining the organisation and the spirit of the groups.⁶ Specially, the family possesses such integrating force, which derives from common religious rites, as the performance of them is always more efficious and significant and the ritual acts connected with the worship etc. meticulously

¹ Beligman Edvin, The Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, pp. 336-97.

² Hastings James, The Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, p. 754.

³ Willis Cook, The Social Evolution of Religion, p. 145.

⁴ Wach Joachim, Sociology of Religion, pp. 27, 29.

[•] Ibid., p. 35

Ibid.

regulated and observed.7 The rituals relate various parts of the group to each other by use of symbols that create an unified whole,⁸ which represents the process of the socialization of a man. It is, therefore, the earlier manifestations of the religion were those of the groups and the individual too recognised himself only in his communal relations. As the primitive religious rituals were under the dramatic representation of the doings of the spirits and gods,⁹ the people of the primitive age were anxious to find out the answers of the problems like how to keep the sun and moon doing their duty etc., because they were the nature-born people. The individual problems like how to meet the needs of the life too were before them and in the magical rites they got their answers. The origin of such rituals lies thus in the attempt to control the unpredictable elements in human experience; and magic took birth from this attempt.¹⁰ The efficacy of the rite, whether for good or for the evil, is due to the magic, which resides in the rites.¹¹ The magic is made up of beliefs and rites¹², but the magical rites do not have any social element, despite its impact on the society. With the growth of the religion under the ritualistic and priestly influence, symbolism, other than magical rites, became the important feature of it as it belongs to the age of rituals. The symbols represent the God in the outward form, as well as He comes, when needed,¹³ but there are rites without God and Gods also derived from them. The rites without Gods may be dependent on the ethical conduct, which prescribe how a man should comfort himself in the presence of the sacred objects.14

The Jainism too does not recognise God, (as generally understood) but it observes such religious rites, which are based on their ethical conduct. The social and individual behaviour plays important role through such rites. In their public performance, they also touch the sociological ground, as the public rites always belong to the religion,¹⁵ which is society oriented. The rites are related with the social organisation, like family, class etc; and the ritual techniques too have been devised to establish efficious relations with the source of the life, wellbeing, stability and equilibrium in the society. The means like dances,

- ⁷ Wach, *Ibid.*, pp. 60, 61
- ^b Ibid. p. 220
- * Willis, Ibid., pp. XVI, XVII, 141.
- ¹⁰ Blackman A. M., Myth and Ritual, pp. 2, 8.
- ¹¹ Barth A., The Religions of India, p. 48.
- ¹² Durkhiem Emil, Elementary Form of Religious Life, p. 42.
- ¹³ Willis, *Ibid.*, p. 143 ff
- ¹⁴ Durkhiem, *Ibid.*, 35, 41.
- ¹⁵ Yust Walter, The Encyclopedia of Britanica, p. 324.

dramas, etc. always utilised for this purpose as the tensions and the strains were relieved ; and human energies were directed in the new hopes and confidence. Their functions are to promote the social intercourse and security, which are needed in the society.¹⁶ In such devices, rituals express most deeply rooted hopes, fears and the emotions of the community. They belong to the same order of reality, as poetry, art and music, and express the inner quality of the life.¹⁷ It is, therefore, the art and rituals were closely linked in Greece and Egypt, as they had social urges. The rite in Greek is called a 'thing done' which involves imitation too.¹⁸ In Indian tradition also, art is linked with the rituals, as changed story of *Vikramorvasiya* reflects the transition from rituals to the drama.¹⁹

All such performances, which represent age of the collective life, can be developed into the scientific social life, processed by the socialization, not harming to the individuality. A ritualist, to a modern mind, is a man concerned perhaps unduly with fixed forms and ceremonies with carrying out the rigidly prescribed ordinances of a church or sect,²⁰ but a scientific approach can create new life in it if the 'form' is not allowed to bypass its 'contents'.

The rites are variously classified as magical religious, positivenegative, attractive-avertive, participative-ascatic etc.²¹ The Jainism too has all sorts of such rites and even might occupies an important place in the Jaina literature. Some of the Jainas of Rajasthan were considered as magicians.²² Every sect of Jainas has its own peculiar rites, just as the Svetambaras have sixteen main marriage rites as well as Digambaras have twenty,²³ apart from other rites. From the birth to death of a Jaina, several types of rites take place individually or socially. For instance, to bind a thread round the neck of a little mite, chatthipũjā hair-cutting (mundana) and other ceremonies, wedding, naming. etc.; and, at last, the death ceremonies are common in them, like Hindus. All the rites are not necessarily religious. Apart from these rites, the conduct-based rites such as the vows, vratas, pratimās etc. are usually

¹⁶ James E. O., Myths and Ritual in Ancient India, pp. 29, 284.

¹⁷ Reik Theodor, Ritual : Psycho-analytic Studies, pp. 305 309.

¹⁸ Harission Jain, Ancient Art and Ritual, pp. 9, 21, 25, 26, 35.

¹⁹ Kosambi D. D., Myth and Reality, pp. 42.

²⁰ Harission, Ibid., 9.

²¹ Hastings, Ibid., (Worship), p. 754.

²² Sangve V. A., Jain community : A Social Survey, p. 257.

²³ Ibid., p. 165.

observed with the strict ritualistic technique and, in fact, they are the essence of the Jainism. Just as thirty five rules of conduct are considered golden way to uplifting a layman. Thus, very minute detail of every ritualistic conduct was given in the code books of them. It is expected that they should follow them according to the status of each part of the organisation.

Other rituals like idol-worship or customs also must be observed according to the traditional ritualistic system. They include from the idol-washing rite to the $\bar{a}rat\bar{i}-p\bar{u}j\bar{a}$ in the temples, different ways of arranging the rice in *akşatapūjā*, fruit offering, according to the traditions of the sects, reciting of *navakāra-mantra* ritually, meditation, *samvatsarī*, bathing of Gomatesvara with special rites etc. According to the *Adipurāņa*, Jainism has enjoined upon a person to perform about fifty three such rites (*kriyās*) and some of them have social outlook like the change of the caste (*varṇa-lābha*).

But the most important element in Jainism is to observe the rules of the conduct ; and all the action of a Jaina are weighed through his conduct.²⁴ Jainism, therefore, may be fairly regarded as a system of ethics, rather than a religion, because the ethical conduct of a Jaina through the ritual procedure is considered to be a source of efficacy.²⁵

Even the emphasis on some ritualistic conduct had changed the structure of Jaina society, as nearly all the Jainas became the traders, due to purely ritualistic reason; and their special manner of trading too was determined by the rituals.²⁶ Some of the Jainas, were in the warrior-class, but only the traders, and not the soldiers could so consistantly observe the religious precepts of Jainism, as its requirements for ritually correct life could be met only in certain profession.²⁷ The Jainism is atheistic (in the sense that the Jaina God is not a creator) and one of their fundamental principles would seem to have been that there is no power higher than man, though in practice, it proved perhaps unworkable.²⁸ Still the attitude, derived from such beliefs, has changed whole outlook and stress was given consistently on the right conduct, guided by the ethical procedure. Jaina ethics took pains to provide for

- ²⁵ Yust, Ibid., pp. 322 B, 323.
- ²⁶ Weiber Max : The Religions of India, p. 200.
- ¹⁷ Wach, *Ibid*, p. 261.

²⁴ Dr. Boolchand, Lord Mahavira, p. 73.

²⁸ Mrs. Stevenson Sinclair, The Heart of Jainism, pp. XIV.

welfare of both the society and the individual.²⁹ If the path is followed with the realization of its true meaning the height of the humanity can be achieved, as Jainism claims that its aim is to reach to the highest stage of the humanity. But in the attempt to reach such humanity, human society cannot be overlooked.

The Jainism lays utmost stress on the personal conduct and his ultimate goal of life can be achieved by observing the ethical code, which contains the religious rites like six daily duties, six daily āvaśyakas etc.³⁰ In one of these āvaśyakas, sāmāyika has a special theoretical status as its aim is to lead a man towards sāmya, the equity, and to discard the worldly passions. The pledge like karemi vante sāmāikam, is, though ritual, significant; and the sense of equity with all the creatures cannot exclude the man and the society in which he exists. If it excludes them, it denies the principle of equity and social significance cannot be attached to it. The ritualistic, abstract sense of equity has no meaning if the human society is not approached. This pledge binds the worshipper with the human society, if the negative attitude does not prevent the way. The process of the socialization of a human being is similar to the attempt to reach the highest humanity, as it can not be achieved without the socialization. In the age of science, no other interpretation could be practical. If God-worship is not there, the transformation of the individual into the society should occur under such pledge with highest stage of the spirituality. The ritual form must not prevent the way of the exploration of its true contents. Other *āvaś yaka kriyās* too support it. If the Jaina system has no room for the bhakti (of God)³¹, the bhakti of a human society can not be avoided. Otherwise, the ritualistic conduct would become merely mechanical.

Ahimsā too is a way of life for a Jaina, but it can be developed in the midst of the society of human beings and the other creatures have no cause to clash with the interests of a man or a society. In fact, man has no envy of other creatures. Why then men is so neglected before them? The simple reason lies in the attempt to reach an imaginary stage, by-passing the human society, which makes the man a social animal. The Jaina rituals supported by $s\bar{a}m\bar{a}yika$ or ahimsā can play a role of integrating the moral force or the human society, if they will be seen in such

²⁹ Sangve, *Ibid.*, p. 229.

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 351, 52, 221-224.


⁸¹ Hastings, Ibid., (Prayer), p. 188.

perspective. The equity and non-violence in the society can create twofold dynamism in the Jainism and through it, the ethical conduct of the ritualist will strengthen the true Sramanic culture, which has a urge for the society. The Jainas believe in the sacrifice of their own through the ritualistic fast etc. and two most essential elements of rituals are prayer and sacrifice.³² But the sacrifice of others for the self is not permitted in any way in Jainism, though the Jaina rituals are closely connected with the Hindu-rituals. But they differ fundamentally in abovementioned respect, as Jainism had never compromised with it, as happened in the case of casteism. After denouncing it too, Jaina society practised it. But it is beyond doubt that *ahimsā* become a life-source for the Jainas, though it is often criticised as a negative doctrine.³³

The ritualistic behaviour may lead them to integrate their group-life under the sectism, and the devotional traditions also could be preserved through the ritualistic conduct, but the creative force of equity and non-violence will not be sustained, if it is not practised in the human society. The ritualistic conduct may lead them toward the body-religion, but the heavy load of the ritualistic structure break the life-line of Jainism, as ritual is after all a form and not the content.

³² Hastings, Ibid., (Worship), p. 787.

³³ Mrs. Stevenson, *Ibid.*, p. 290. ("The ideal of their religion offers them is a ritual rather than a personal holiness. A Jain magistrate once said (to the author) "I call Jainism a dummy religion. Even I took bribes and give false judgements, I should still be considered a holy man, so long as I was careful never to eat after dark.")



Gods and Goddesses : Spiritual Illumination

Gleanings

Marble Marvels of Rajasthan

VIVEK BAMMI

The pleasant train journey to Abu Road, lying on the Delhi-Ahmedabad track, alternates the aridity of Rajasthan with periodic relief in patches of *sarson* (mustard). Vernal stalks and sunny sprouts combine riotously with the magenta of peasant attire. Colour in Rajasthan seems to have defeated not just dryness, but also the chivalric absurdity of Rajput violence.


From Abu Road, a narrow strip clambers up the Aravallis for an hour to Mount Abu. Elevation and leafy greenery make Abu a scenic

counterpoint to most of Rajasthan, but mythology binds it firmly to events below. For it is at the legendary Agni-kund that four great Rajput clans, the Paramaras, Solankis, Pariharas, and Cauhanas, were regenerated by the Gods, appalled at the lack of order that followed Parasurama's slaying of the Ksatriyas. These Agni-kulas restored the partnership of Brahmin and Ksatriya to its fateful role in Indian history. The contemporary fame of Abu, however, rests rightly upon the apogee of refinement in Indian art, the Jain temple complex at Dilwara.

Col. James Tod, the indomitable chronicler of Rajputana and one of the remarkable breed of European Indologists that "rediscovered" India in the nineteenth century, journeyed to Abu in 1822 despite debilitating illness. Dazzled by the marbled splendour of Dilwara, he placed it next to the Taj Mahal among the brightest gems of Indian architecture. They represent two poles of perfection—the Taj unsurpassed in structural conception, the Dilwara incomparable in detail and ornamentation.

The two finest Dilwara temples, the Vimal Vasahi (1031AD) and the Luna Vasahi (1230AD), arose with the patronage of Jain ministers in the courts of Kathiawar and Saurastra. Since most Jainas were merchants by profession, these temple represent the splendid contribution of the third caste, which completed the ruling triumvirate of prayer-war-money in traditional India. Even while supporting the state, however, Jain artisans challenged its violent foundations in their stupendous sculpture. There is conscious exclusion at the Dilwara of the thundery confrontations and blood-curdling feats of gods and goddesses that adorn most Hindu temples. Instead, an atmosphere of peace, gaiety, and gentle humour pervades the ceilings and walls, an essentially "feminine" leavening in a dominantly patriarchal society.

Unlike Buddhism, however, Jainism never lost its intimate symbiosis with Hinduism, borrowing freely from the latter's fund of mythology, while keeping alive its distinct identity through its personalities and ideology. Thus the Tirthankaras or Jaina religious leaders and founders, presiding in meditative benevolence over the sanctums at Dilwara, merge into resplendent Hindu mythical figure in their surroundings. At the Vimal Vasahi, built by Bimal Shah, friezes of horses and dancers mingle with superb portrayals of Sankesvara Devi (Parvati), Narasimha, and Ambika (a variant of Durga, called Arbuda in Gujarati, hence Abu). Krsna frolics with gopis during a frenzied Holi, coloured water spurting from the discarded horns of cows and bulls. Brothers Tejpal and Vastupal, who built the Luna Vasahi, fell victim to another Indian myth, the enduring conflct between their wives. In this case, the egos of both women were satisfied, with a gokhra (enclosure) erected for the Jețhānī (elder sister-in-law) and the Derānī (yonger sister-in-law) outside the sanctum. However, the Jețhānī had the last word, as usual, gaining 25 elephants at the base of her gokhra as opposed to the unfortunate Derānī's 24, and forcing the statue atop the later's to bow in deference to her own upright idol. The carving at Luna Vasahi surpasses even the Vimal Vasahi, the delicacy of the portrayal of the Revati-kuṇḍ (a Junagadh water tank), of sunflowers, and of the vigorous folk-dance garbā, being creations of ineffable genius.



Superbly Sculpted Figure of Krsna with the Gopis : Atmosphere of Peace, Gaiety and Humour

The true centre of the Jaina temple lies not at the sanctum, but on the domed ceiling with its pendant, usually lotus-shaped, that explodes downward toward the viewer, a compelling spark of spiritual illumination. Ranged around the pendant are figures of goddesses in graceful activity and a supporting cast of animals. The circular form confirms the feeling of a complete whole : Man, Animal and Nature united in the unique and immortal Jaina concept of *ahimsā*, respect for all life.

Babul and Eucalyptus trees shade the beautiful hour's drive to, Ranakpur, located in a glen and blessed with plentiful water. The temples nestle on the edge of a jungle, where the handsome langurs complement sturdy men and women of these parts. A brand *bidi*, displayed prominently on the walls, marks the only commercial intrusion here, with no sign even of the red triangle. They all contribute to the remarkable tranquility of Ranakpur.

At the massive Caumukha (four-mouthed) temple, built by minister Dharna Shah in the reign of Rana Kumbha of Mewar (1433) the facade and elevation are handled more impressively than at Dilwara. Airy balconies greet the pilgrim, hinting at the open galleries inside that allow for a scrutiny of pillars, ceilings, and sculpture at contrasting heights. Similar variation on the roof combines rounded domes with sleek spires and lofty sikharas. The friendliest priest that I've ecountered in India conducts me through the halls, pointing to imperial folly in the adhurā kīrti stambha. Rana Kumbha (grandfather of the more illustrious Rana Pratap) built this pillar with the intention of touching the dome, but goddess Ambika intervened to leave it incomplete, since temporal ambition was intruding upon spiritual quest. Actually, the pillar is a masterpiece, its receding edges leading the eye into expanding depth, a conception successfully used by some modern architects. Another dazzling sculpture has the 23rd Tirthankara, Parsvanatha, shadowed by the thousand-hooded snake, coiled in a sinuous maze. Western and eastern cultures alike obsessed with death and reincarnation, have been endlessly fascinated by the serpent that sloughs off its old skin, to be "reborn", a creature of dred and veneration.

At the four domed ceilings of the *Caumukha*, the presiding figure of Vidyadevi or Sarasvati appears in twelve modes of artistic activity : singing, dancing, and sounding a variety of instruments. A glorious celebration of the Muses, Jainism here links aesthetic endeavour and excellence with spiritual fulfilment, a profound philosophical truth from the Jina (root word for both knowledge and Jain). An evening $\bar{a}rati$, where the candled chandeliers flicker their shadows on the majestic walls, completes the emotion of aesthetic bliss.

Two other temples at Ranakpur offer fine diversion. Relieved from more weighty concerns, the Parsvanatha temple features langorous aquisite Apsaras and mildly erotic scenes around the indulgent Tirthankara. The Hindu Surya temple moves across the heavens with its familiar rearing horses. Despite an inferior quality of marble at Ranakpur, its ambience makes it a preferable pilgrimage to the Dilwara, highlighted by a clean and comfortable *dharamśālā* and very satisfying vegetarian cuisine. At sunset, the Aravallis as backdrop create a dramatic communion with the ebb of day. To experience sunset in Ranakpur is to experience mystical longing with an intuitive promise.



Jain Tirthankaras : Immortalising the Concept of Ahimsa

from Express Magazine. June 7. 1987.

Books Received

DHAKY, M.A. & JAIN, SAGARMAL (ed), Pt. Bechardas Doshi Commemoration Volume : Aspects of Jainology, Vol II, P.V. Research Institute, Varanasi, 1987. Pages 4+v+232+140+119. Price Rs. 100.00.

Contains biographical sketch of Pt. Bechardas Doshi and Research Papers in Gujrati, Hindi and English.

JAIN, BIMAL CHANDRA, Jain Dairy (2nd ed.), Jain Dairies, Jaipur, 1989. Pages 148. Price Rs. 11.00.

Contains short descriptions of 232 Digambar places of pilgrimage, names of 121 Jain periodicals, names of Jain organisations and temples abroad with maps etc.

JAIN, PREM SUMAN, Significance of Prakrit Narrative Literature, Department of Jainology and Prakrits, University of Mysore, Mysore, 1985. Pages viii+68. Price Rs. 6.00.

A tract on Prakrit narrative literature, its origin and development.

YUVACARYA MAHAPRAJNA (ed), Navasuttāņi, Jain Visva Bharati, Ladnun, Rajasthan, 1987. Pages 140+812+30+320. Price Rs. 250.00.

It contains the texts of Avassayam, Dasaveāliyam, Uttarajjhayaņāņi, Nandī, Anuogdārāim, Dasāo, Kappo, Vavahāro, Nisīhajjhayaņnam.

YUVACARYA MAHAPRAJNA (ed), Uvangasuttāņi, Vol 1, Jain Visva Bharati, Ladnun, Rajasthan, 1987. Pages 76+774. Price Rs. 200.00.

It contains the texts of Ovāiyam, Rāyapaseņiyam, Jīvājīvābhigame.

YUVACARYA MAHAPRAJNA (ed), Uvangasuttāņi, Vol 2, Jain Visva Bharati, Ladnun, Rajasthan, 1989. Pages 76+1099. Price Rs. 250.00. It contains the texts of Paņņavaņā, Jambuddīvapaņņattī, Candapaņņattī, Sūrapaņņattī, Nirayāvaliyāo, Kappavadimsiyāo, Pupphiyāo, Pupphacūliyāo, Vaņhidasāo.

जैन भवन प्रकाशन

हिन्दी

१.	अतिमुक्त (२य संस्करण)—श्री गणेेश ललवानी				
	अनुः : श्रीमती राजकुमारी बेगानी	5,00			
२.	श्रमण संस्कृति को कविता—श्री गणेश ललवानी				
	- अनुः श्रीमती राजकुमारी बेगानी	३.००			
R .	नीलांजना				
	अनु : श्रीमती राजकुमारी बेगानी	82.00			
۲.	चन्दन मूत्ति-श्री गणेश ललवानी				
	ू अनुः श्रीमती राजकुमारी बेगानी	20.00			
X .	चिदानन्द ग्रन्थावलाँ—श्री केशरीचन्द घूपिया	X.00			
٤.	भगवान महावीर (एलवम्)	80.00			
•	বাংলা				
2.	অতিমুক্ত —শ্রীগণেশ লালওয়ানী	8.00			
٩.	শ্রমণ সংস্কৃতির কবিতা —শ্রীগণেশ লালওয়ানী	O.00			
۰.	ভগবান মহাবীর ও জৈন ধর্ম 🦳 শ্রীপ্রণচাঁদ শ্যামসুথা	২ .00			
	English				
1.	Bhagavati Sutra (Text with English Translation)				
	—Sri K. C. Lalwani				
	Vol. I (Satak 1-2)	40.00			
	Vol. II (Satak 3-6)	40.00			
	Vol. III (Satak 7-8)	50.00			
	Vol. IV (Satak 9-11)	70.00			
2.	The Temples of Satrunjaya				
	—James Burgess	50.00			
3.	Essence of Jainism-Sri P. C. Samsukha				
	tr. by Sri Ganesh Lalwani	1.50			
4.	Thus Sayeth Our Lord-Sri Ganesh Lalwani	1.50			
5.	Verses from Cidananda 5.00				
	tr. by Sri Ganesh Lalwani				

पी-२५ कलाकार स्ट्रीट, कलकत्ता-७०० ००७

SHAH ENTERPRISES

Division of K K Designs (P) Ltd.

18A BRABOURNE ROAD CALCUTTA 700 001

Phone: 26-3150/5152

VIMALADISH TRADING COMPANY

Exporters, Importers & Manufacturers' Representatives

3A POLLOCK STREET

CALCUTTA 700 001

Phone : Off. 26-8879 Resi. 47-0990 Cable : Vitraco—Calcutta Telex : 021-4401 CRYS IN TEA * PACKET TEA * TEA BAGS

PHONE : 20-0646/47

KHEMKA FIBRES

23A N. S. ROAD

CALCUTTA 700 001

Modi Electronics Udyog Pvt. Ltd. 2 INDIA EXCHANGE PLACE CALCUTTA 700001

Phones : 20-1315, 20-7383, 20-0778 Telex : 021-3474 SHEW IN, Cable : HINDEQUIP MFR. OF B & W & COLOUR T. V. the soap for you and for all INSIST ON CALSO PRODUCTS

BANGLA GOLA & CORAL

CALCUTTA SOAP WORKS

CALSO PARK, CALCUTTA 700 039

Phone: 44-7832

Phone: 39-2146

SHANTILAL ABHAYKUMAR

4/5 NOORMAL LOHIA LANE CALCUTTA 700 007

Wholesale Dealers in BOWREAH COTTON MILLS CO. LTD., CALCUTTA

Gram : MABHAPALIM

Telex : 21-7275 DURO IN

MADHYA BHARAT PAPERS LTD.

NICCO HOUSE 2 HARE STREET CALCUTTA 700 001 Phone : 28-0261, 28-0382

JUTEX AGENCIES

9 INDIA EXCHANGE PLACE 3rd Floor CALCUTTA 700 001 Phone : Office : 20-7526, 20-1024 Resi. : 35-9892 Cable : TEKMEK

Phone: 26-8015, 26-3511 26-8214, 26-9794

THE TECHMECH (INDIA)

ELECTRICAL, MECHANICAL & TEXTILE ENGINEERS 54 EZRA STREET, CALCUTTA 700 001

Ask for

Electric Motors of all type, Underground Power Cables, Transformers, Switchgears HT & LT, Switch Boards, Generating Sets, Pumping Sets, Reduction Gear's, Switches & Change-overs, Power & Paper Capacitors, Voltage Stabilisers, Control Panels, Contractors up to 780 Amp.

S. C. SUKHANI

Professional Philatelist

'Shanti Niketan' 4th Floor Room No. 14 8 CAMAC STREET CALCUTTA 700 017

Phone : Office : 44-0525 Resi. : 39-9548

FURNISHING HOUSE

(House of Flonyl Washable Nylon Carpets and Sued Velvets)

Used for manufacturing of Sofa and Car Upholestry, Ladies' Bindis and Bags, Shoes and Chappals

154 DHARAMTALLA STREET, CALCUTTA 700 013

Phone: 26-8523

CHHOGMALL RATANLALL

Jute Merchants & Commission Agents

P-15 KALAKAR STREET

CALCUTTA 700 070

Phone: 39-3512, 39-7255

Phone : Office : 20-4481, 20-5137 Resi. 20-8435, 28-3411

NARENDRA KUMAR DAKALIA & CO.

STOCK & SHARE BROKERS

(Member : The Calcutta Stock Exchange Association Ltd.)

3 INDIA EXCHANGE PLACE 3rd Floor, CALCUTTA 700 001



Neither riches nor relations can protect. Know this and know life and get rid of Karma.

-Lord Mahavir

RAHUL & CO.

Investment Consultants

Krishnayatan, Near A. I. R., M. I. Road JAIPUR 302 001

Phones : 66193, 66939, 79836

MANSUKH & CO. (OVERSEAS)

UNITED METAL INDUSTRIES

Manufacturers of : TENTS, TARPAULINS COMBAT DRESSES & OTHER ALLIED TEXTILE FABRICATED ITEMS

Gram : 'MANSUKO'

14 NOORMAL LOHIA LANE CALCUTTA 700007

Phone : 38-5317 38-4066

Cable : 'Archway' Calcutta Telex : 021 4454 (Minix) Phone : Office : 26-4428 26-1178 Godown : 35-1502 Resi : 57-4396

MINEX AGENCIES

Govt. Recognised Export House

Manufacturer's representatives, exporters & importers

71 GANESH CHANDRA AVENUE

CALCUTTA 700 013

N. K. JEWELLERS

GOLD JEWELLERY & SILVER WARE DEALERS OPP. GANESH TALKIES

2 KALI KRISHNA TAGORE STREET

CALCUTTA 700 007

Phone: 39-4960, 39-5245

ARIHANT FIBRES

P-14 KALAKAR STREET

CALCUTTA 700 007

Drink Kenduguri Tea It is Delicious, Fresh And Flavoury For your requirement of Quality Tea Orthodox, CTC and Green Tea Contact

THE KALYANI TEA CO. LTD.

(Owner of Kenduguri Tea Estate) Nilhat House, 6th Floor

11 R. N. MUKHERJEE ROAD CALCUTTA 700 001

Phone: 20-8281, 28-5926

GREEN TEA TO STAY GREEN FOR EVER

BDTA'S TEAQUEEN Choicest Green Tea Keeps You Evergreen

M/s. Bhutan Duars Tea Association Limited

11 R. N. MUKHERJEE ROAD 'NILHAT HOUSE' (6th floor) CALCUTTA 700 001

Phone : 28-1883 & 28-8582 Gram : QUICKTEA Telex : 21-7052 BDTA IN

> Calcutta Agent M/s. PANCHIRAM NAHATA 177 M. G. Road Calcutta 700 007

SUPERLITE

Lamp Shades Shop

Sat & Sun Open

'Park Center' 24 Park Street, Calcutta 700016

Dealers in

Chandeliers, Pendents, Wall-ceiling-spot, Foot-recess, Gate-, Garden-, Table-lights, Centre-tables, Curtain-rods, Plant-holders, Mirror-frames, Towel-rods, Napkin, Soap, Glass, Toilet-paper, Liquid Soap-holders, Hooks, Door-knobs and Handles in Various Combination

> Finance Your Children for the Educative Hobby of Postage Stamps Collecting

PHILATELIA

ONE MOTI SIL STREET

CALCUTTA 700 013

Phone : 28-8549

A. M. BHANDIA & CO.

JUTE BROKERS

23/24 RADHA BAZAR STREET

CALCUTTA 700 001

PHONE: 26-8054, 26-8368, 27-1042, 27-6466 Resi: 55-1015

Gram : MEETALL

20-7430 Dial : 20-1370 20-1842 20-8719

AAREN EXPORTERS

12 INDIA EXCHANGE PLACE JUTE HOUSE (3rd Floor) CALCUTTA 700 001

Dealers in all types of Jute Goods, Jute Matting, School Matting, Decorative Hessian Cloth

OSATWAL & CO.

Jute Brokers & Commission Agents

9 INDIA EXCHANGE PLACE (3rd Floor) CALCUTTA 700 001

Phone : Office : 20-3185 20-4873 20-5897 Resi : 24-0571 44-4166

J. KUTHARI & CO. 12 INDIA EXCHANGE PLACE CALCUTTA 700 001

PHONE : Office : 20-3142, 20-1059 Resi : 35-2173 Gram: PEARLMOON

20-1958 Phone : 20-3323 20-4110 Resi : 55-7686

CALTRONIX

12 INDIA EXCHANGE PLACE 3rd floor CALCUTTA 700 001

Phone: 26-9226/27-8753

VSD CORPORATION

P-41 PRINCEP STREET ROOM NO. 508 CALCUTTA 700 072

Leading Stockists of Electronic Components viz. Integrated Circuit, Display, L.E.D., Tantalium Capacitor, Zener, Diodes, Scr, Triac Computer Peripherials.

Gram : PENDENT

Phone : 27-4039 27-7423

Electro Plastic Products (P) Ltd.

22 RABINDRA SARANI CALCUTTA 700073

Factory: 45-6504

Phone: 26-5187, 27-5380

STANDARD ELECTRIC COMPANY

49 EZRA STREET

CALCUTTA 700 001

Phone : 52-1083, 52-4447 25-6109, 25-4280

CALCUTTA RIBBON FACTORY

Manufacturers of WOVEN LABEL TAPE 111 COSSIPORE ROAD CALCUTTA 700 002

JOHARMAL AMOLAKCHAND JUTE MERCHANTS

20 MULLICK STREET CALCUTTA 700 007

Phone : $\frac{39-1620}{39-4363}$

APARAJITA

An Exclusive Bombay Dyeing Show Room Air Conditioned Market 1 SHAKESPEARE SARANI CALCUTTA 700 071 Phone: 43-4649

God made man and we made gentleman

SUDHARMA

For Exclusive Suiting, Shirting & Clothing

12B LINDSAY STREET (Opp. Samavayika) CALCUTTA 700 016

Stockists of : RAYMONDS, VIMAL, S. KUMAR'S, GWALIOR, LAJYA, BEEKALENE ETC.

MAGGI DEVI SETHIA CHARITABLE TRUST

23-24 RADHA BAZAR STREET

CALCUTTA 700 001

Phone: 20-4755, 20-4942

MINERAL GRINDING INDUSTRIES

23-24 Radha Bazar Street, Calcutta 700 001

Telegram : WEDOIT ● P.O. Box No. 2576 ● Telex : 2365 MGI PHONE : Office : 26-2884/8667, 27-4431 ● Works : 52-1392 ● Resi : 55-5775

PARSAN BROTHERS

Dealers of Marine Stores, Ship Chandlers and Bond Stores.							
Suppliers, Stockists and Dealers of P. V. C. Pipes and Fittings.							
18B SUKEAS LANE (1st Floor)							
CALCUTTA 700 001			: 27-8621				
		Office	: 26-3870				
Gram : OXFORDCHEM	Dhan		: 26-0958				
	Phone :		: 26-0104				
		Resi.	: 36-1142				
		Resi.	: 36-1142				

Gram : Veervani, Calcutta

Phone : Office : 20-9683 20-8977 Resi : 44-4301

SOBHAGMALL TIKAMCHAND BOROJALINGAH TEA CO.

BURNIE BRAES TEA CO.

12 INDIA EXCHANGE PLACE

CALCUTTA 700 001

Phone : { Office : 20-8166, 20-8143, 20-9839 Resi. : 47-5011, 47-7391

K. C. DUGAR & SONS

12 INDIA EXCHANGE PLACE

CALCUTTA-700 001

DEEKAY COCONUT OIL INDUSTRIES

Manufacturers of

DEVYANI & MILAN BRAND COCONUT OIL


23 Brabourne Road (6th Floor) Calcutta 700 001

Phone: 26-6885, 38-0242, 38-6223

M/s. SUBHAS PROJECTS AND MARKETING LTD.

113 PARK STREET, 3rd Floor

CALCUTTA 700016



SETHIA OIL INDUSTRIES

(Solvent Extraction Plant)

Manufacturers & Exporters of Rice Bran, Groundnut, Salseed, Mahuwa & Neem Extractions

Plant at

Lucknow Road, Sitapur (U. P.) Phones : 2397 & 2505 Gram : Sethia, Sitapur Telex : 534-203 SOI IN

Executive Office :

2 India Exchange Place, Calcutta 700 001 Phones : 20-1001/9146/0248 Telex : 21-3127

Head Office :

143 Cotton Street, Calcutta 700 007 Phones : 38-8471/4329 Gram : Sethiameal, Calcutta

Use Neem Extraction For Increasing Nitrogen Efficiency

SURANA MOTORS PRIVATE LTD.

ASSAM AGARTALA ROAD, AGARTALA (TRIPURA)

Phone Nos, 967 & 977

Authorised Dealers :

TATA DIESEL VEHICLES

Calcutta Office :

84 PARIJAT, 8th FLOOR 24-A SHAKESPEARE SARANI CALCUTTA 700 017

Gram: SURANAS

Phone : Off : 43-5997 Resi: 47-3475

Branches at

HAILAKANDI ROAD SILCHAR (ASSAM) Phone : 421

PALACE ROAD Phone: 487

CIRCULAR ROAD IMPHAL (MANIPUR) DIMAPUR (NAGALAND) Phone : 541

Gram : BRITEROSNI

M. CHANDRA & COMPANY

Manufacturers of Conduit Pipes and Furniture Pipes Hamilton Tubes and Conduit Fittings etc.

Factory :

5 STARK ROAD, LILOOAH HOWRAH

Phone: 66-2460, 66-3184

Branch :

40-F BHANGWADI KALBADEVI ROAD, BOMBAY 400 002

Phone : 31-7391

Office & Show Room : 22 RABINDRA SARANI CALCUTTA 700 073 Phone : 27-1301, 27-3361

METROPOLITAN BOOK COMPANY

93 PARK STREET

CALCUTTA 700 016

Phone: 29-2418



Hansraj Hulaschand & Co. (Pvt.) Ltd.

Α

MEMBER

OF

GOLCHHA ORGANISATION

Head Office

Main Branch

GOLCHHA HOUSE Main Road BIRATNAGAR (NEPAL)

Via JOGBANI, PURNEA

HANSRAJ (Jogbani)

CABLE : NEPSTAR (Biratnagar)

Phones: 22627, 22570, 22022, 22817 & 22728

Ganabahal, Dharhara

Cable: NEPSTAR, Kathmandu

Phones: 221101, 220735 & 223736

Telex: NP 2231 BHUDEO

Branches of Golchha Organisation Concerns : BIRGANJ, SIDDHARTHANAGAR, RAJBIRAJ, RANGELI, BHADRAPUR, GAURIGANJ, NEPALGANJ, LALBANDI

SHANTI ROAD SERVICES

TRUCK FLEET OWNERS & BOOKING AGENTS

Admn. Office :

51 NALINI SETH ROAD (4th Floor, R. No. 8)

CALCUTTA 700 007

The Bikaner Woollen Mills

Manufacturer and Exporter of Superior Quality Woollen Yarn, Carpet Yarn and Superior Quality Handknotted Carpets

> Office and Sales Office : BIKANER WOOLLEN MILLS Post Box No. 24 Bikaner, Rajasthan Phone : Off. 3204 Resi. 3356

Main Office : 4 Meer Bohar Ghat Street Calcutta 700 007 Phone : 39-5969 Branch Office : Srinath Katra Bhadhoi Phone : 378

DUGAR BROS. & CO.

5A N. C. Dutta Street

CALCUTTA 700 001

Phone : 20-4078

के श र

जिसे आप पानी में 'उबालें' या एसिड में 'जलावें' फिर भी उसकी पत्तियाँ शेष तक एक समान लाल रहे तब समफिये कि यह केशर है ।

इस प्रकार के विशुद्ध केशर तथा मैसूर की सुगन्धित चन्दन की लकड़ी तथा चाँदी के बरक, अष्टांग धूप आदि के लिए क्रुपया हमारे बिकी केन्द्र में पधारें।

तीर्थ-दर्शन पुस्तिका, दोनों भाग भी हमारे यहाँ उपलब्ध है।

श्री जैन श्वेताम्बर सेवा समिति

१३ नारायण प्रसाद बाबू लेन, कलकत्ता ७०० ००७

फोन : ३६-१४०५

CREATIVE

12 DARGAH ROAD

CALCUTTA 700 017

Phone : 44-7458

Gram: FETAWALA

KESARIA & COMPANY

Exporters & Importers

Tea Blenders, Tea, Gunny, Spices Merchants & Commission Agents

2 LAL BAZAR STREET

Todi Chamber, 5th Floor

CALCUTTA 700 001

G. P. O. Box No. 2332

Telex : 21-2978 PETA IN Phone : Off. 28-8576 Resi. 29-1783, 26-3514 28-0669, 28-1242

Branches : AHMEDABAD * BOMBAY * GAUHATI * SILIGURI

Gram : ABEEROAVRA

Phone : $\begin{array}{c}
\text{Office : } \begin{cases}
27-492 \\
27-531 \\
\text{Resi : } \\
32-453 \\
32-371
\end{array}$

RELIANCE PRODUCTS PRIVATE LTD.

15 CHITTARANJAN AVENUE CALCUTTA 700 013

Works :

72-A B. T. ROAD, KHARDAH Phone : 58-1368

ALL INDIA TRADING CO. (1959) (Mines & Minerals) Gram : WYOMING Reliance Produce Corporation (Manufacturers & Agencies) Gram: RELPROCORP

HANUMANMALL BENGANI

12 INDIA EXCHANGE PLACE

CALCUTTA 700 001

Phone : Office : 20-9255 Resi : 29-0470 20-5798 29-0694

PRASAN CHAND GAMBHIR CHAND

12 INDIA EXCHANGE PLACE

CALCUTTA 700 001

Phone: 20-2603

B. DUGAR & SONS

JUTE BROKERS

12 INDIA EXCHANGE PLACE

CALCUTTA 700 001

Phone :

Office : 20-6154, 20-7234, Resi. 55-2219

COMPUTER EXCHANGE

24 PARK STREET

CALCUTTA 700 016

Phone: 29-5047

BOYD SMITHS PRIVATE LIMITED

B-3/5 Gillander House 8 Netaji Subhas Road Calcutta 700 001

Gram : BOYDRIVET Telex : BOYD-2597 Phone : Off. : 20-2139 ; Resi : 29-0629, 29-0319

A Pioneer Manufacturer of Steel Plants Equipments, Special Purpose Machines, Spares & Accessories & Various Import Substitute Ancillary Items. Also Leading Manufacturer of Tool Room Items Including Shear Blades, Rolls & Rollers, Cutting Tools, Pneumatic Tools & Tool Accessories etc.

Telex : 021-2405

Phone: 38-5794 38-9235

BANTHIA TEXTILES CORPORATION 12 NOORMAL LOHIA LANE CALCUTTA 700 007

Approved Wholesale Dealers of THE BOMBAY DYEING & MFG. CO. LTD., BOMBAY Registered with the Registrar of Newspapers for India under No. R. N, 12121/66.

Graphite India Limited

31 CHOWRINGHEE ROAD

CALCUTTA 700 016

Phone: 29-4668, 4942, 4943

Tlx. 021-5667

Gram : GRAPHITE : CALCUTTA

PIONEER IN CARBON/GRAPHITE INDUSTRY