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Contents

Self, Sin and Karma in the Sūtrakṛtāṅga <i>Dr Ch Lalitha</i>	1
Archaeological Revaluation of Fatehpur Sikri <i>S. K. Jain</i>	11
Meaning and Typology of Violence <i>Dr Surendra Verma</i>	14
Book Review :	
Riches and Renunciation : Religion, Economy, and Society among the Jains by James Laidlaw <i>Sushil Jain</i>	19
Saṭṭaka Literature : A Study by C.S. Naikar <i>Satya Ranjan Banerjee</i>	23
Religion and Philosophy of the Jains ed by N.J. Shah <i>Satya Ranjan Banerjee</i>	24
Cyclopaedia of Yoga ed by Śrīchand Chorariya <i>Satya Ranjan Banerjee</i>	25
Prākṛta Bhāṣā aur Sāhitya ed by Prem Suman Jain <i>Satya Ranjan Banerjee</i>	25
Jaina Dharma and Jivana by Prem Suman Jain <i>Satya Ranjan Banerjee</i>	26
A Study of the Bhagavati-sūtra by S. Ohira <i>Satya Ranjan Banerjee</i>	26

Book Review

James Laidlaw — *Riches and Renunciation : Religion, Economy, and Society among the Jains*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995. L15.99. ISBN 0-19-828042-4 (Pbk)

Any sociological study of the Jains and the Jain way of life written today will most likely be compared either with Vilas Sangave's classical study on the subject, *Jaina Community : A Social Survey* (Bombay, 1959; rev. ed. 1980) or Balwant Nevaskar's *Capitalists without Capitalism: the Jains of India and the Quakers of the West* (Westport, 1971). Both of these were highly informative and well-written but are a bit dated now.

Since then Marcus Banks has published his doctoral thesis at Cambridge as *Organizing Jainism in India and England* (Oxford, 1992) preceded by the publication of *The Assembly of Listeners : Jains in Society*, edited by Michael Carrithers and Caroline Humphrey (Cambridge, 1991).

This may seem like an impressive array of research and publications but, in my opinion, Jainism still requires more attention at the hands of sociologists and cultural anthropologists. Thus James Laidlaw's *Riches and Renunciation* is a welcome addition to this repertoire.

The Jains are a tiny minority of the total population of India (about one-half of one percent) but they have played a disproportionate role, compared to their numbers, in the country's trade, industry and commerce from ancient to modern times.

Writing in the early nineteenth century, James Tod noted that more than half of the mercantile wealth of India passed through the hands of the Jains.¹ Jains have also been great bankers of India who occasionally funded the State's cause, e.g., the Mathura Seths (Digambara Jains) who provided financial assistance to the British government during the dark days of the Mutiny or India's first War of Independence (1857) and, it was the provision of funds by Bhama Shah that allowed Rana Pratap to raise a new army to resist the Mughal Emperor Akbar (p. 91).

The Jains were also "prominent among the communities of Indian merchants who linked inland agriculture and manufacturing, through the port-cities of western India, to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, and from there to Europe, and also to east Africa, South-east Asia, China and Japan" (p. 87).

1. *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, 1829-32, vol. 1, pp. 413ff.

But they never proceeded overseas in any significant numbers to establish their homes and businesses, that is, not until recently. Now Jains are to be found on almost all continents but especially in North America, in Continental Europe and in Britain, where they are engaged in all sorts of professions, trades and occupations.

However, one business Jains are becoming most prominent in is the diamond trade in cities like Amsterdam and New York.² This is also the case in Jaipur (the locale of Laidlaw's study) where they seem to have a monopoly of this trade.

Many of the Jaipur Jains with whom the author has had some contact, especially in the 'walled city' area, are wealthy but they do not flaunt their riches. In fact their houses, from the outside, look like the rest of the neighbourhood, but once inside the visitor would certainly notice the difference.

Aside from their riches Jains are also noted for their non-attachment to material goods (*aparigraha* — not defined in the glossary) or renunciation of this material world, sometimes by fasting unto death (*sallekhana*). Their *sādhus* (monks) are forbidden by their codes of conduct to possess no more than what is necessary, which is absolutely nothing, except for a peacock fan for the Digambaras and for the Shvetambaras only a sheet of cloth (white) to cover their bodies, a light blanket, three wooden bowls to gather alms, a *muh-patti* or mouth covering (which Laidlaw describes inaccurately as 'face-masks' 'strapped to their faces to cover their mouth and nose', p. 1) and an *ogha* (broom) to brush insects away while walking or to sweep the floor before sitting.

These mendicants have been the subject of numerous studies.³ It is the image of naked Jain monks that sometimes becomes the defining point of Jainism. It goes to the credit of James Laidlaw that he does not zero in on this particular aspect of Jainism (which incidentally is 'no issue' in Jaipur).

The author of the book under review, Senior Research Fellow at King's College, Cambridge, is aptly suited to undertake this study, having already published (with Caroline Humphrey) *The Archtypal*

2. See, for example, Pranay Gupte's "The big money in cheap rock (India's Jains dominate U.S. market for low-priced diamonds)", *Forbes Magazine*, vol. 140, August 10, 1987, pp. 64ff.

3. See, for example : Michael Carrithers, 'Naked ascetics in Southern Digambar Jainism', *Man : the Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, n.s. 24 no. 2 (1990), pp. 219-235; John Cort, 'The Svetambar Murtipukaj Jain mendicant', *Man : the Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, n.s. 26 (1991); Ratna S.A. Goonasekera, 'Renunciation and Monasticism among the Jains of India', Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of California, San Diego, 1986; and J.C. Heesterman, 'Householder and wanderer', in T.N. Madan (ed), *Way of Life : King, Householder, Renouncer*. Delhi : Vikas, 1982.

Actions of Ritual : A Theory of Ritual illustrated by the Jain Rite of Worship (Oxford, 1994). The present work is based on the author's field-work conducted between 1984 and 1990 in the city of Jaipur, where he lived as a family member amongst the Khartar and Tapa Gacchas households.

The book's eighteen chapters are divided into five parts containing information about and discussion of such diverse topics as Jaina doctrine; issues of Jaina identity and relations with the broader Hindu community; the ways a householder practises ascetic routines; inter-relationships between the lay Jains and renouncers; and finally connections between riches and renunciation as celebrated through festivals such as Diwali.

This is a book rich in details, full of information about Jaina way of life and analyses. Throughout the text, through well-chosen words and finely crafted language, Laidlaw looks at his subject(s) sympathetically (quite different from the method employed by Mrs. Margaret Stevenson in her *The Heart of Jainism*, Oxford, 1915), often gathering his evidence by "lur[ing] people into talking about them [selves]" (p. 76).

The focus of Laidlaw's study (an anthropologists's prerogative) is to describe how Jainism is practised in a defined community, in this case in an urban centre of north-west India,⁴ in the city of Jaipur (p.3).

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4. Some of the notable studies on the Jains of Rajasthan are : C. Cottam-Ellis, 'The Jain merchant castes of Rajasthan : some aspects of the management of social identity in a market town', in M. Carrithers and C. Humphrey (eds), *The Assembly of Listeners : Jains in Society* (Cambridge, 1991, pp. 75-108; D.E. Haynes, 'From tribute to philanthropy: the politics of gift giving in a western Indian city', *Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 46 (1987), pp. 339-360; S. Holmstrom, 'Towards a Politics of Renunciation: Jain Women and Asceticism in Rajasthan', M.A. dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 1988; C. Humphrey, 'Fairs and miracles: at the boundaries of the Jain community in Rajasthan', in Carrithers and Humphrey, op.cit., pp. 201-225; K. C. Jain, *Jainism in Rajasthan* (Sholapur, 1963); S. Jain, 'A social anthropological study of Jainism in North India', B. Litt thesis, Oxford, 1971; J.H.M. Jones, 'Jain shopkeepers and moneylenders: rural informal credit networks in south Rajasthan', in Carrithers and Humphrey, op.cit., pp. 109-138; R. Mehta, 'Community, consciousness, and identity: a study of Jains in a village', M.A. thesis, University of Rajasthan, 1986; S. Phoolchandra, *Jaipur (Khaniya) Tattvachāra*, 2 vols., (Jaipur, Pandit Todarmal Granthamala, 1967); J. Reynell, 'Honour, Nurture and Festivity: Aspects of Female Religiosity among Jain women in Jaipur', Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge, 1985; J. Reynell, 'Prestige, honour and the family: laywomen's religiosity amongst the Svetambar murtipujak Jains in Jaipur', *Bulletin d' Etudes Indiennes*, vol. 5 (1987), pp. 313-359; N.K. Singhi, 'A study of Jains in a Rajasthani town', in Carrithers and Humphrey,

The question that Laidlaw has tried to answer in this book is “How it is possible anyway to live by Jain ascetic values?” (p.3) since Jainism lays so much emphasis on ascetic ideals (*ahimsa*, *aparigraha*, etc.).

“The demands of Jain asceticism”, points out Laidlaw, “have a pretty good claim to be the most uncompromising of any enduring historical tradition; the most aggressively impractical set of injunctions which any large number of diverse families and communities has ever tried to live by” (p.7).

Laidlaw further argues that the ‘asceticism which lay Jainism excludes comes not from uniform adherence to a set of socially enforced rules’ (p. 170). ‘There is no single view expressed either in ancient sacred texts or in religious debate and practice today’ (p. 191). The vows of fasting and dietary prohibitions that Jain laity undertake are often voluntary and based on personal decisions ‘which Jain teachers have charted out, and around which contemporary asceticism tends to move’ (pp. 191, 392).

It is this asceticism that the renouncers are obliged to observe as described and detailed in various Shrivakācaras and monastic rules and authority (p. 21). And it is the renouncers, the holy of the holy from the *arihants* to *sādhus*, who are the central figures of veneration in Jainism. It is the ideals of these ascetics which the Jains try to emulate from time to time in their lives especially during the *chaturmas* and *pariyushan*.

But, argues the author, “the self that Jainism proposes for its followers to make of themselves is fragmented and incomplete, torn between conflicting ideals and focused ultimately on an impossible one” (pp. 20-21).

In the words of an informant which Laidlaw quotes, ‘Jainism is the most difficult religion. In fact it is impossible’ (p. 27) not only in prohibited foods (chapter 7) but also in lay vows (chapter 8), necessary duties (chapter 9), fasts and fasting (chapter 10) and gifts and gift-giving (chapter 13).

Renunciation and asceticism is an important part of Jain life as

op.cit., pp. 139-161; and V.K. Srivastava, ‘On religion and renunciation : the case of the Raikas of western Rajasthan’, Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge, 1993.

For Gujarati Jains, see : M. Banks, ‘Competing to give, competing to get: Gujarati Jains in Britain’, in P. Werbner and M. Anwar (eds), *Black and Ethnic Leadership in Britain : The Cultural Dimension of Political Action* (London, 1991); J.E. Cort, ‘Liberation and Wellbeing: A study of the Svetambar Murtipujak Jains of North Gujarat’, Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard, 1989; W. Miles, ‘On the Jains of Gujarat and Marwar’, *Trans of the Royal Asiatic Society of Gt. Britain & Ireland*, vol. 3. pp. 335-371.

can be noticed from the popularity of the *aṇuvrat* movement which is 'a neat reconstruction of lay and monastic ethics' (p. 188). And it is through the practices such as the *baravrats* 'that the asceticism of Jain renunciation enters the lives of lay Jains' (p. 183).

It is these and other critical observations and analyses that are the strong points of this book.

However, the book is not without some minor errors. For example, on page 1, the author states, "neither monks nor nuns are ever to be seen without masks strapped to their faces to cover the mouth and nose", but on page 2 is a photo of a Khatar Gacch nun talking to a layman without any mouth-covering (*muhpatti*). The concept of Mercy is defined as '*day*' on page 28 whereas it should be '*dayā*' (as correctly noted in the index, p. 429); inconsistencies in the use of diacritical marks in the text (pp. 30, 139, 201) but appropriately noted in the glossary; and there is no mention of the author Umāsvāti in the index whereas his classic work *Tattvārtha-sūtra* is mentioned briefly (p. 295).

Apart from these, and other small typographical errors (p. 8), '*makhi-jus*' (p. 103), on p. 24 where 'Jains' should be Jinas, 'Vicakshan Sri-ji' (p. 262), 'mostly unmarried man' (p. 278), 'prestation' (p. 294), etc., *Riches and Renunciation* is an excellent piece of research which contributes substantially to the understanding of Jaina ethics and way of life.

Sushil Jain

Chandramouli S. Naikar— *Saṭṭaka Literature : A Study*, Medhā Publishers, Kalyan Nagar, Dharwad, Karnatak, 1993, pp. x+298, Price Rs. 125.00.

C. S. Naikar is to be congratulated for his study of the *Saṭṭaka literature*. It is perhaps for the first time that we have a detailed study of the Saṭṭaka literature. Of course before him there were two other scholars who had first focused the importance of Saṭṭaka literature in Sanskrit dramas. As far as the chronology goes Chintaharan Chakravarty was perhaps the first scholar who wrote an article on Saṭṭaka literature in the Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol. VII, 1931. p169f. After a few years A.N. Upadhye in the introduction to his *Chandralekhā-Saṭṭakam* (1945) has elaborately discussed the origin and development of the Saṭṭaka literature in Indian drama. It was he who for the first time discovered six Saṭṭaka dramas in Prakrit literature. It was an excellent edition and the editor was extraordinarily lavish in his genius or in his scholarship. After that, of course, Upadhye has edited several other Saṭṭaka dramas, but their introductions are not as elaborate and exhaustive as that of the *Chandralekhā-Saṭṭaka*.

But there was no book for the study of Saṭṭaka literature. It is Dr Naikar who has made this attempt for the first time. His book is divided

into 6 parts. In part one he has discussed the origin of Indian drama and Saṭṭaka. In this section the author is more elaborate on the origin of Indian drama or the Sanskrit drama rather than on the Saṭṭaka. In part two (the extant Saṭṭakas) he has given the available six Saṭṭakas as mentioned by Upadhye in the introduction to his *Chandralekhā-Saṭṭaka*. In part three the author discusses Prakrit dialects and metres of Saṭṭaka. This portion could have been a separate thesis altogether, but the author's discussion was a little different. Mostly what he has discussed in this portion is the different readings concerning different editions. In part four the author has depicted the contemporary social life as reflected in the six Saṭṭakas. This portion is straightforward and nothing in particular can be gleaned out of the study of these Saṭṭakas. The part five gives us the literary value and historical significance of the Saṭṭaka literature. These last two parts are in general straightforward and not, from that point of view, comparative. The part six is practically the conclusion of the study of his findings.

Incidentally it should be mentioned that Sten Know, the first critical editor of the *Karpūramañjarī* has given a nice bibliography available till then (1902) and this is not very much supplemented by Dr Naikar even after a lapse of 90 years of Saṭṭaka studies. In fact bibliography in this book is the weakest point in all his discussions. I believe this study will be welcome by the learned reader and also I hope this book will inspire the younger generation to undertake similar types of works in the field of Prakrit literature.

Saty Ranjan Banerjee

Virchand Raghavji Gandhi—*Religion and Philosophy of the Jainas*, ed by Nagin J. Shah, Jain International, Ahmedabad, 1993, Price Rs. 80.00.

N.J. Shah, former Director of L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, deserves special thanks for editing V.R. Gandhi's *Religion and the Philosophy of the Jains*. Late Virchand Raghavji Gandhi was an outstanding exponent of Jainism at the World Parliament of Religion held at Chicago in 1893. This publication is a part of the centenary celebration of that first Parliament. Gandhi in the first part of his book has discussed the cultural environment in which grew the Jain philosophy. In the subsequent five sections Jain philosophy along with its implication with *karma* is discussed in a sort of detailed way. The book expounds the Jain view with regard to the soul, universe, God, Karma, spiritual evolution and many other sundry things connected with Jain Philosophy. The presentation is authentic and rational, inspiring and thought-provoking, convincing and brief.

I hope the publication of this important work will be of immense value to the keen students of Jain philosophy and will inspire them to further studies.

Satya Ranjan Banerjee

Śrīchandra Chorariya (ed) — *Cyclopaedia of Yoga (Yoga-Koṣa)*, Jain Darśan Samiti, 16 c Dover Lane, Calcutta, 1993, pp. 90+336. Price Rs. 100.00

It is a great pleasure in introducing the first part of the *Cyclopaedia of Yoga (Yoga-koṣa)* by Śrīchand Chorariya who has been known to the scholarly world for his contributions to the different Cyclopaedias of Jainism. Śrī Chorariya in his own scholastic way has divided the text into several divisions as followed normally in the library science. As this is a Cyclopaedia it contains all the references found in the Jain literature. The most important aspect of his collection is that he has given all the references from the Jain texts and not from his own fanciful mind. He has made this book an authentic one. Those who are familiar with his works on Cyclopaedias know that his method is very scientific and lofty. This book will also give us a hint of how to do research on a particular topic of Jainism. R.L. William's *Jaina Yoga* (London, 1962) is a book on the study of Jaina Yoga, but Chorariya's book is a Cyclopaedia on the Jaina Yoga. And naturally the latter will be more exhaustive than the former one.

This *Yoga-koṣa* is well-printed and carefully hard bound. There are exceptionally few printing mistakes which the author himself has pointed out separately. It has elaborate introduction containing about 75 pages. I hope, in future, we will get similar other works from him.

Śrī Chorariya is a good scholar on Jainism and an outstanding laborious researcher for the cause of Jainism. I hope this book will be received well by the scholars of the world.

Satya Ranjan Banerjee

Prem Suman Jain—*Prākṛta Bhāṣā evaṃ Sāhitya*, Prakrit Jñāna Bharati Education Trust, Bangalore, 1993, pp. 158, Price. 140.00.

This book on the *Prakrit language and literature* edited by Dr Prem Suman Jain is a collection of articles in Hindi. There are eighteen articles on various subjects of the Prakrit language and literature, it has material more on literature than on language. This treatise, in general, is a good collection on the theme mentioned above. The article on the origin and development of the Prakrit language is quite good and the author has discussed some new points which were not found earlier. There are some information also in some articles about

the study of Prakrit in different parts of India. Although this book is fused with different ideas, it is a quite handy book for some general information about the Prakrit language and literature.

In one of the articles on *Kundakunda* the author has given some words and their usages, but has not explained, at least, in some cases the origin of that word, though the author considers some of these words very important, e.g., the word *ādā* for *ātmā* is given, but he has not explained the form which could be *ātmā* > *attā* > *ātā* (compensatory lengthening) > *ādā* in Śaurasenī. This word is not really very regular though archaic in form.

On the whole this is a readable book and may be recommended for the reading public.

Satya Ranjan Banerjee

Prem Suman Jain—*Jaina Dharma and Jivana Mūlya*, Sandhī Prakāśana, Mālaviya Nagar, Jaipur, 1990, pp. 128, Price 90.00.

The study of Jainism has been done in various ways. Some give emphasis on the philosophical aspect of Jainism, some on the ethical side of it. To study Jainism in relation to the value of life, is a new contribution by Prem Suman Jain to the field of Jainistic studies. He has looked upon Jainism from the point of view of human life : i.e., how Jainism can regulate the life of man, how *anekānta* philosophy moulds man's process of thinking, how *aparigraha* can be practised in this mundane life, and finally how *ahiṃsā* (non-violence) can lead a man to a peaceful life and how it should be applicable in society and in the world as well. All these points are discussed very carefully with ample quotations in order to substantiate his arguments.

This book is helpful for studying Jainism and for evaluating its application to human life and society. Although the language is Hindi, it is lucid and free of complexities. I recommend this book to the students of Jainism and to those who are interested in the study of Jainism.

Satya Ranjan Banerjee

Suzuko Ohira—*A Study of the Bhagavatī-sūtra, a chronological analysis*, Prakrit Text Society, Ahmedabad, 1994, pp. xi+276, price 130.00.

It is a matter of great satisfaction and pleasure for us that Dr Suzuko Ohira has contributed a great work to the study of the *Bhagavatī-sūtra*. The study of the *Bhagavatī-sūtra* is a painstaking one, and it needs a long standing patience to complete it. She must have spent quite a lot of time for the study of *Bhagavatī-sūtra*. The Prakrit

text society of Ahmedabad deserves special thanks for undertaking such a work.

The *Bhagavati-sūtra* is the fifth Aṅga of the Śvetāmbara canonical literature. It is an important text amongst all the Jaina canonical works. The main theme of this study is the chronological stratification of the first 20 Śatakas of the *Bhagavati*. The main theme of the authoress is to prove which part of the *Bhagavati-sūtra* is the earliest or the oldest one, if not the genuine one. There are 45 chapters. Out of these 45 chapters Dr Ohira has analysed only the first 20 and about the rest she has not endeavoured to do any chronological study except saying that chapters 21-41 are later accretions. She means to say that the first 20 chapters are the earlier compositions than the later ones. In order to substantiate her arguments she has divided her book into 4 chapters, subdivided again into many subsections. The main theme of the *Bhagavati* is the *jīva-ajīva* relations of the Jaina doctrines. She has discussed cosmology, astronomy and mythology as found in the *Bhagavati*. The *karma* and the *bandha* theories are also treated carefully.

A. Weber in his book *The Fragments of Bhagavati* published in 1883 has first observed that the *Bhagavati*, broadly speaking, consisted of 2 different compilations : an earlier part consists of the chapters 1-20 excluding the chapter 15, while the later part is the chapters 21-41. The earlier part is characterised by Śatakas and Uddeśyakas, while the later part consists of *uddeśyakas* only. This type of analysis is also found in W. Schubring's *Doctrines of the Jains* (1935 and 1962). He has followed Weber and has made ample use of the contexts of his *Bhagavati*. Later on, J. Deleu has done a detailed study of the *Bhagavati* giving an exhaustive account of its contexts, and in a sense, he has made a significant improvement upon Weber's model. However, Dr Ohira's monograph is concerned mainly with the nucleus alone and has only made a systematic and historical study of the *Bhagavati-sūtra*.

Without going into details it can be said that her study is not only systematic and exhaustive, but also logical and historical. Of all the general studies on the *Bhagavati* her study is definitely the improved version and for that she deserves special thanks. As the *Bhagavati-sūtra* is a huge work and can be studied from different aspects we hope that in future also some other studies on the *Bhagavati* will be done by her.

As this is an important work her contribution in the annals of the *Bhagavati* will remain superb. And I therefore recommend this book to the Jain scholars.

Satya Ranjan Banerjee

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SELF, SIN AND KARMA IN THE SŪTRAKṚTĀṄGA

DR CH LALITHA

The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* is the second among the eleven extant *Aṅgas* of the Jain Canonical literature. According to the Jain tradition, like the other *Aṅgas*, the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* is also supposed to have been preached by Lord Mahāvīra who lived sometime during 567-487 B.C.* and was put down into writing by Gaṇadharas. This *Aṅga* furnishes its own philosophical doctrines as well as perspectives of the doctrines of different schools and also explains the *jīva*, *aḷīva*, merit, demerit, *āsrava*, *nirjarā*, and *bondāṣe*. It imparts knowledge on Jain doctrines to the novices and also furnishes information about one hundred and eighty *Kriyāvādins*, eightyfour *Akriyāvādins*, sixtyseven *Ajnānavādins* and thirtytwo *Vinayavādins*.

As regards the text of *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, it is divided into two parts which are known as *Śrūtaskandas*, of these the first part consists of sixteen *Adhyāyanas* and the second part comprises of seven. The major part of the first *Śrūtaskanda* is written in verse form and most contents of the second book is composed in prose.

A number of commentaries have been published on the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*. Of these the oldest is Ācārya Bhadrabāhu's *Niryukti*. After this mention may be made of the famous *ṭikā* of Śilāṅka Chāri. Besides these, Jain Ācārya Śrī Jawaharlalji Mahārāj's *Tattvadhan* consisting of Śilāṅka Ācārya *Tikā* and its translation by Sri Ambica Dattaji Ojha in four parts was published. Along with this Jain Ācārya Pandit Munisri Ghasilalji Maharaj's Sanskrit, Hindi-Gujarat *Tikā* has also been published. One of the authentic editions of this Sūtra is done by Amarmuni which was translated and commented by Sri Hemachandraji.

* The general accepted date is 599-527 B.C. – Editor.

The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* is considered by eminent Scholars¹ as an important philosophical treatise. The religious life of a Jain Monk and the refutation of Non-Jain views are the central theme of the text. This sūtra exhorts novices of the Jain monastic Order to keep themselves away from various heretical views.

This text advocates 'Ahimsā' as the quintessence of wisdom. This sūtra warns especially the young monks against the dangers of falling into snares of woman. Another noteworthy feature of this text is the description of suffering in different hells.

I. The Jain Doctrine of Self

According to the Jain conception, it is difficult to obtain human birth frequently since one's mental disposition enables one to hear the *Dharma* and to practise the Law² preached by the Tīrthaṅkaras and others.

Addressing Jambūsvāmin, Venerable Sudharman exhorts that from Venerable Mahāvīra he heard a discourse on merit and demerit. Of these, the former viz., merit, is defined as when the self i.e. (*Ātman*) is at rest (*upasānta*) and the latter viz., demerit, is defined as when the self is in the state of disturbance (*Anupasānta*).³ Since according to the Jain religious tenets ethical perfection can be obtained only during human birth, liberation is possible only through the absolute cessation of *karman*.⁴ For an ignorant person it is almost impossible to obtain human birth as a consequence of which all sentient beings with lesser number of senses miserably suffer similar to the people who suffer from fever.⁵

According to the commentary of the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* the Jains caution those novices on Jain path that they should not fall in the trap of people of misconduct of heretics and such others since they cannot protect them in any way. Those who adhere to the path taught by the Tīrthaṅkaras should think about after how many hurdles the human

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1. Asim Kumar Chatterjee, *A Comprehensive History of Jainism* (Firma KLM Pvt. Ltd., Calcutta, 1978), p. 233. Munisri Hemachandra, Sri Amarmuni and Munisri Nemichandra, *Sūtrakṛtāṅga Sūtra* (Ātma Jñāna Pīṭha Jain Dharmasālā, Manasamandi, Punjab, 1979) p. 26; M. Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. II (Munshiram Manoharlal, New Delhi, 2nd ed. 1972) p. 438.
 2. Hermann Jacobi (Tr.) *Jaina Sūtras*, Part II, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, Reprint, 1973, p. 331. Hereafter Abbreviated as JS.
 3. *Ibid.*, pp. 335-356.
 4. *Ibid.*, p. 331.
 5. *Ibid.*, p. 294.

birth is obtained. Of all the births the human birth is quite rare and best which enables one to attain freedom from the vicious cycle of *saṃsāra*, if one cares to open the eyes and see that human beings are burning in the three types of fires like the people who suffer from fever. Birth, old age, disease and death are different forms of suffering : the whole universe is full of suffering. The ignorant people who crave for happiness in this universe instead find only suffering. By harming creatures for the sake of their own survival and happiness and for the sake of their liberation people kill beings and in spite of their efforts revolve in the unending cycle of existence. Hence keeping this in mind a faithful adherent should aim at nirvāṇic goal.⁶

According to Jain Philosophy all life is transitory and impermanent. Life of living beings will come to an end within a short span of time, such as, children in mother's womb die just as a hawk catches a quail.⁷ Those who dwell in heaven will surely leave it after some-time. Similarly, human beings who live with kith and kin will survive only for a limited time.⁸ According to the noble law preached by Mahāvira there are six kinds of living beings which are formed out of earth, water, fire, air, seed and egg which are to be identified by wise human beings. One should not harm the above either by means of thought, speech and actions.⁹ The six classes of living beings are enumerated and they are born out of the four elements and out of seed and womb.¹⁰ In all the four quarters of the earth the plant life springs by originating in a sixfold manner viz., those which originate from the top of the plant, root, knots, stems, beads and by coalescing articles of the substance such as grass. Those souls which are to be born as trees of different origin as explained above prior to their appearance as trees are embodied in earth which is the doctrine of *karman* preached by Mahāvira.¹¹

The living beings consume the liquid substance (i.e. the sap or humours) of the earth particles which are the origin of different things. These beings nourish in earth, water, fire, wind and plant-bodies. The diversity of life, the bodies of manifold movable and immovable beings and the destroyed bodies which have been nourished before or absorbed by the rind are digested and assimilated by them.

6. Pandit Ratnasri Hemachandraji (Tr. & Commy.) *Sri Sūtrakṛtāṅga Sūtra (Prathama Śrutaskandha)*, p. 156.

7. *JS Part II*, p. 249.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 299.

9. *JS Part II*, p. 302.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 311.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 389.

The tree-bodies which bring forth their various parts possess manifold colours, smells, tastes, touches, forms and the food assimilated by the tree in the material of which its various parts as root, stem, leaves etc., are formed which are of manifold form and colours. These animating trees (beings) come into presence due to their *karman* which is the doctrine taught by the Tirthaṅkaras and others.¹²

There are some beings which are born, initiated and sprung from trees whose birth, origin and growth in earth is impelled due to their *karman*. These beings spring from trees that are initiated in earth and evolve as trees which are originated by trees (i.e. apparently trees sprung from shoots, sprouts, aerial roots etc.). These beings consume the sap of the trees initiated in earth.¹³

There are some beings which are born or originated by trees and grow as their roots, bulb, stem, branches, twigs, leaves, flowers, fruits and seeds. Each tree has its soul and separate souls reside in the roots. These beings feed on the sap of those trees. These beings annihilate earth-bodies, water-bodies, fire-bodies, wind-bodies and bodies of plants and thereby deprive of life the bodies of manifold movable and immovable beings. These beings absorb, digest and assimilate the destroyed bodies which are consumed before. The bodies of the roots, bulb, stem are of many colours, tastes, smells, touches, forms and arranged of corporeal particles and due to one's *karman*, grow in the particles of earth which are the origin of many things and spring forth as trees (*Āya, Kāya, Kuhana, Kandu, Uvvēhaliya, Esava, Sakkha, Khattaga, Vāsāniya*). These living beings consume the sap of the earth particles which are the origin of different things. These beings annihilate earth, water, fire, wind and plant-bodies. The bodies of many movable and immovable beings are deprived of life by these beings. These beings absorb, digest and assimilate the destroyed bodies which are annihilated before. The bodies of these trees (*Āyas*) which spring forth their different parts are of many colours, smells, tastes, touches, forms and are arranged of corporeal particles. According to the Tirthaṅkaras these trees (*Āyas*) come into existence due to one's *karma*.¹⁶ So is the case with other beings.¹⁷

There are some beings which are born or originated and grown in water, have in it one's birth, origin and growth, being impelled by

12. *Ibid.*, p. 390.

13. *Ibid.* p. 390.

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 390-391.

15. Pandit Sri Hemachandraji, *Sūtrakṛtāṅga Sūtra (Dvitiya Śrutaskandha)*, pp. 237-238. Hereafter Abbreviated as *Sūkr* (DVS).

16. JS Part II, p. 391.

17. *Sūkr* (DVS), pp. 241-242.

one's *karman* and spring forth in it due to one's *karman*, grow in the particles of water that are the origin of different things and spring forth as *Udaga*, *Avaga*, a grassy plant growing in marshy land, (*Blyxa octandrapanaga*), *Sevla*, the aquatic plant *Vallisneria*, *Kalambuya* (*Nanilea kadamba*) *Kasēruya* (*Scripus kysoor*) *Kakkhabhāniya*, *Uppala*, *Kumuya*, *Nalina*, *Subhagasōniya*, *Pondariya*, *Mahāpondariya*, *Sayavatta*, *Sahassavatta*, *Kalhāra*, *Kōkanada*, *Tāmarasa* which are all variety of lotus as stalks and fibres of lotus as *pukkhala* (*Pushkarā* and *Pukkkhalatthibaga*). These living beings consume the sap of the earth-particles which are the origin of different things. These beings annihilate earth-bodies, water-bodies, fire-bodies, wind-bodies, bodies of plants and thereby deprive of life the bodies of manifold movable and immovable beings. These beings absorb, digest and assimilate the destroyed bodies which are consumed before. The bodies of the roots, bulb, stem are of many colours, tastes, smells, touches, forms and are arranged of corporeal particles. It is due to one's *karman* these beings come into existence.¹⁸

One is called as a movable being when it gets the character or name through the taking effect of the *karman* relating to the movable being. When the duration of the movable being expires the soul embodied in the movable being leaves its life as such and becomes embodied in an immovable being. One is called as an immovable being when it gets the character through the taking effect of the *karman* relating to immovable being. When the duration of life of an immovable being expires the soul embodied in the immovable being leaves its life as such and takes again a new form of existence and they are then termed as animated beings (animals) of large bodies and who consists of long span.¹⁹

Résumé

Thus the above study of the Jain conception of soul in the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* reveals that each body possesses a different soul and hence, there are numerous souls. The soul is deprived of all colour, taste, smell and touch. Though it is metaphysically formless, it takes the shape of that wherein it happens to dwell by virtue of its own *karma*. The souls lie scattered in every nook and corner of the universe. It is due to the consequences of the good and bad actions, it takes repeated births and deaths according to the merits of its own *karma* and therefore crosses through the different grades of *saṁsāra*, heaven, hell or Purgatory or finally releases itself from the fetters of

18. JS Part II, p. 392.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 424.

bondage by the dissipation of its own *karma* where-upon it becomes pure and perfect and fixed as it were in the regions of *Aloka*.

II. Jain conception of sins

There are thirteen kinds²⁰ of sinful activities namely, (1) Those which are performed in one's interest, (2) Sinful deeds performed for others sake, (3) Acts of slaying, (4) Performed accidentally, (5) Deeds of erroneous perception, (6) Lying, (7) Accepting what is not freely given, (8) Deeds of conceit, and (9) Pride, (10) Ill-treatment of one's friends, (11) Deceitful deeds, (12) Greedy actions, (13) Sinful deeds concerning one's own religious life.

Deeds performed in one's interest²¹ are committed by one's motive. When a man for his own sake or for the sake of his relations or his friends or for the sake of *Nāgas*, *Bhūtas* or *Yakshas* injures to movable or immovable beings or becomes responsible for the performance of sinful deeds by other person. When a man slays movable living beings or lights a heap of grass or responsible for others doing it or giving consent for the same are the sinful deeds not prompted by one's personal interest.²²

When one hurts himself or others including those kith and kin, sentient and immovable beings, his sinful deed is known as slaying.²³ The sinful acts of accidental killing²⁴ are hunting either birds such as partridge, duck, quail or pigeon and animals like monkey by mistaking it as a deer. The sinful deeds of erroneous perception²⁵ are the acts of killing such as mistaking a friend as one's enemy, killing a person mistaking him as robber etc. The sinful deeds of lying²⁶ include those types of lying either for his sake or for the sake of one's kith and kin or for giving consent to others. The sinful deed of that which is not freely given²⁷ is that when one accepts either for his own sake or for the sake of others that which is not freely given or consents others doing the same.

The sinful deed of conceit is that when a person possesses mental state of conceit²⁸ viz. wrath, pride, deceit and greed and consequently

20. JS Part II p. 356.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 357.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 357

23. *Ibid.*, p. 358

24. *Ibid.* p. 358.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 359.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 360.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 360.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 360.

becomes demeritorious. Sinful acts concerning pride²⁹ is that when a person endowed with pride of caste, family, beauty, piety, knowledge, success, power, intelligence etc., and consequently slights, blames, abuses, reviles and despises others due to self-praise. The sinful deed of ill-treatment of one's friends³⁰ is that when a person punishes any of his family members even for their smallest offence his people feel unhappy when he is near and rejoice when he is far away.

A sin committed through deceitful deeds³¹ means concealing one's thoughts, using unworthy speech, claiming himself different from what one really is, when asked responds improperly to others endowed with unworthy speech a person blames and reviles those deceived by oneself, by selfpraise rejoices, without desisting from the vile practices one conceals the wrong deeds done to others. Committing sin through greedy acts³² means being uncontrolled without abstaining from slaying all sorts of living beings, using true as well as false speech and by enjoying sensual pleasures. Sinful deeds concerning one's own religious life³³, it is meant that a person who does not possesses different components of pious religious life such as devoid of control over himself, harming living creatures in different postures of sitting, standing, walking etc., who does not avoid the forty-two faults while receiving alms, why does not perform different operations of nature in isolated places, who never guards his mind, speech and body, does not care to protect his soul from passions etc., who improperly keeps his mouth-cloth, alms, bowl, blanket, broom etc., and consequently accumulates evil *karma*.

Thus the above study of the concept of sins in the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* reveals the fact that co-ordination between the mind and body is considered necessary for the practice of non-violence. This should be accompanied also by proper speech emanating from the heart from which springs only but universal love. This paper further clarifies that in order to eschew from sins the principle of *ahiṃsā* which implies absolute purity of thought, word and deed should be practised, because sympathetic love towards all living beings, howsoever they are in the scale of evolution enables a true spiritual aspirant of the Jaina Path of purification to attain liberation from *saṃsāra*.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 361.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 361.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 362.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 362.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 363.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 364.

III. Heretical doctrines of Karma

According to the Brāhmanical conception when one nourishes two thousand sacred mendicants, it is considered as meritorious action and thereby attains the status of gods which is included in the preaching of the Veda.³⁴

According to the adherents of Sāṅkhya philosophy when one acts or makes another to act, it is not one's soul which acts or makes others to act, it is the *Prakṛti* which acts and the *Puruṣa* looks on.³⁵

According to the Vedāntins those who possess good conduct are included under meritorious and in order to obtain liberation knowledge is essential but Silāṅka ascribes this view to the *Ekadandins*.³⁶

According to the Kriyāvādins those who do not consider the nature of deeds well they experience suffering of worldly existence. Those who merely intend to harm or kill the sentient beings and those without any intention harm or kill the sentient beings although are affected owing to the production of *karma*, yet their souls are merely touched by its effect and are not firmly bound by the same.³⁷

According to the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga Commentary* the *Ekāntakriyāvāda* philosophers like the adherents of Sāṅkhya, never think of *karman*. Similarly, the Buddhists who are also considered as *Ekāntavādins* do not regard the four types of actions (*karmas*) as the cause of bondage. These views of *Ekāntakriyāvādins* involve its adherents into phenomenal existence or *saṃsāra*. Being deluded and owing to their indifference about the principle of *karma* they are subjected to transmigration and unceasing suffering. The Jains who are *Kriyāvādins* are distinguished from the above, because they discuss the eight kinds of *karma* and how the *ātman* is found by the former. They also investigate the path of liberation by which one can be free from the *karmic* bondage.³⁸

Whereas the *Akriyāvādins* are those who deny *karman* and do not concede that the action of the soul is transmitted to the future moments, and Silāṅka ascribes this view to the Buddhists.³⁹ According to Silāṅka the *Sūnyavādins* (i.e. Buddhists) are those who deny all actions which include those that are in the gamut of perception and hence the whole world including the rising and setting of Sun and Moon are unreal.⁴⁰ According to the Buddhists those who nourish

34. JS Part II. p. 417.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 237.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 417.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 242.

38. Sūkṛ (DvS), pp. 181-182.

39. JS Part II, p. 316.

40. *Ibid.*, pp. 316-317.

two thousand virtuous monks gain great merit and thereby become powerful gods in the *Arupadhātu* which is the highest heaven of the Buddhists.⁴¹

The Agnostics (*Ajñānavādins*) are those who stimulate to be clever, do not go beyond the confusion of one's ideas and reason irrationally being unconversant teachers without reflection speak to students untruth.⁴²

According to the Fatalists fate is the cause of everything and they admit two kinds of men. An ignorant man is one who thinks that when one suffers, grieves, blames oneself grows weak, when afflicted or undergoes pain the cause is oneself and when other man suffers, he is responsible for the cause. Therefore, an ignorant man is one who thinks that he or the other man is responsible for one's own cause (fate), whereas a wise man when suffers thinks that neither he nor the other person is responsible for one's cause.⁴³

According to the Nāstikas there are five elements through which it is explained whether a deed is meritorious or demeritorious.⁴⁴ According to them life ends here and there is no world beyond and they cannot understand whether an action is good or bad, meritorious or demeritorious, well-done or not, whether one reaches perfection or not, whether one goes to hell or not. They are one who undertake many tasks, engage in various pleasures and amusements for one's enjoyment which is the doctrine stated in the parable of the Lotus-pool.⁴⁵

According to the adherents of Gosāla and Trairāsikās the world is created and it will not be destroyed and these are unaware of the truth. They say that he who possesses a pure soul is free from *karman* in the same state, it, in turn, becomes polluted due to pleasant excitement or hate. Just as the clear water which is free from defilements gets defiled, so also, a restrained monk who is free from *karman* will get defiled again.⁴⁶

Jain criticism

The Commentator refutes the Buddhist contention that the four types of *karma* will not involve one in *karmic* bondage. Of these the first is an act which is a form of intention only, the second is the

41. *Ibid.*, p. 415.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 241.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 346.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 343.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 341.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 245.

physical act which is absolutely devoid of any intention, the third is the *iryapathika* act and the fourth is the act done in one's dream. From the Buddhist point of view *karman* is not accumulated on the soul in the absence of anyone of the five causes which when combined becomes act of violence. From the Jain standpoint, during the above four types of acts *ātman* gets, a slight contact with the *karman* since the demerit is not fully matured. It is due to the non-ripening of the result of action it does not involve *ātman* in any bondage. Just as when a first of sand is thrown on the wall, it drops out without striking to it despite its touching the wall. Similarly the impact of the consequences of the above four acts will not cling to the *ātman* in the form of *karmic* matter. According to Jain criticism, nevertheless the Buddhists who are *Ekāntakriyāvādins* cannot totally deny the fruits of four kinds of actions. Although the *karman* which is produced does not take a firm hold of the soul, it merely 'touches it'. This is the opinion of the Jains who are *Kriyāvādins*.⁴⁷ According to them suffering is caused by one's own action and not due to the actions of others viz., fate or creator.⁴⁸

Thus the above study reveals the fact that *Śramaṇism* replaced the gods by the force of *karma*. Whatever man obtains is not due to the favour of any god, but only due to one's past actions and efforts. Hence the individual does not depend on any god or gods but is morally free. The individual himself is responsible for one's actions and is bound to get the moral consequences. The force of *karman* is inexorable and impersonal. The Law of moral retribution is eternal and works by itself without being supported by gods. The Jain dialectic is positive and synthetic which holds that *karman* may be looked upon from different points of view, since the soul is identical as the substance (*dravya*) but different as state (*pariyāya*). Hence *karman* may be described as belonging to the agent as well as not belonging to it.

47. *Sūtra* (PrS), pp. 183-185.

48. JS Part II, p. 317.

ARCHAEOLOGICAL REVALUATION OF FATEHPUR SIKRI

(In the light of the latest archaeological findings)

S. K. JAIN

Fatehpur Sikri, the deserted capital of Akbar, has been a source of controversy among the students of History, Architecture and Archaeology.

It will be advantageous to note the location and outer structure of the settlement as exists today. Fatehpur Sikri is a township some 40 Km away from Agra and exists on Agra - Jaipur - Bikaner National Highway. The citywall surrounding the township is rectangular in shape having eight entrance gates also known as Pols. The habitation was mainly in two different directions i. e. (i) paralld to the Arravali Hills which is in North Eastern direction and (ii) a few buildings in North-South direction. The city wall runs in the direction of the hills. Almost parallel to this hill runs another hillock, which seems to be another branch of the Arravalis. In between these hills, there used to be a vast lake on which a dam was built to store water. The dry bed of this lake as also the dam, exist even today.

Surprisingly enough Revenue Records do not show any village or town by the name Fatehpur. They instead record Sikri alone. It seems that Babar after his Victory over the forces of Rana Sanga in the battle of Khanwa, a place in the neighbourhood of present day Fatehpur Sikri, rechristened the town of Sikri as Fatehpur and the people kept on calling this town as Fatehpur Sikrit to distinguish it from other Fatehpurs.. Thus this name seems to have stuck to the town. Akbar's ancestors Babar and Humayun had no time at their disposal to make any construction or renovation of any buildings. The credit of constructing this settlement has been accorded to Akbar by his courtiers, principal of whom Abul Fazl, and this line has been toed by Britishers and is being continued even today.

From the archaeological point of view, this place is a very important site. Explorations and excavations in the recent past have revealed that the place existed even in the stone age. A few rock shelters have been found in the neighbouring hillocks having paintings depicting the hunting scenes and other activities. Painted Grey Wares (P. G. W.) have been found on both-sides of the hillock. These excavations have also given us a proof that settlement continued from stone-

age down to the modern age through pre-historic in a regular sequence in view of the fact that Ochre Colour Pottery (O.C.P.) has also been found. The excavations also indicate that this settlement existed right from the stone age and continues to exist in view of the O.C.P. ; B & R. (Black & Red); P. G. W.; N. B. P. (Northern Black Polished) Pottery; Kushan period pottery and others have been found in proper strata, Expert archaeologists have tested and examined these findings as well as the ten antiquities. Thus this site has become of great interest to the archaeologist for further work. The site is likely to throw enough light on the so called dark period and fill up the gap in our cultural sequence.

In the surveys and excavations conducted at the site, a large number of fragments of stone sculpture and architectural remains of temples have been found, of which Jaina iconographic items carved to 10th to 12th centuries are of importance. At one particular site in the area remains of a Jaina temple alone have been found, that is, parts of Sikhar of the temple pillars, Kichaka (pillar supports) door-sills, figurines of various Yakshas & Yakshinis as also part of Trīthaṅkar idols. Other important specimens found in the survey and explorations include (1) an arm of a goddess carrying a mango bunch, (2) an arm of a goddess holding a baby in her lap, these two can well be described as arms of the Shasan Devī Ambikā, of Tirthaṅkar NemiNātha (3) a Yaksha head carved during 1st century, (4) a pedestal showing the sitting pose (in meditation) called Padmāsan of a Yogin and a bullock mark underneath showing that the image was that of Tirthaṅkar Ādi Nāth. (5) A similar part of a yogin standing in meditation with 'deer' mark on the pedestal depicting the image as that of Shānti Nātha, (6) & (7) Two numbers of Tirthaṅkar heads, (8) a nude human figure without the head depicting a Tirthaṅkar in standing posture or Khadgāsan and (9) A pañchāyatan Shiva Linga - This has been installed in one of the Shiva Temples nearby.

Excavation in and around various buildings in the area reveal that some structures did exist at the site over which the existing buildings have been built. The buildings and structures revealed by the excavation are in perfect harmony with the orientation of the hillock. It is also found that some existing buildings like Raṅg Mahal, Chistis residential complex called Kachahri, Doctor's house, Sukhtal, Baoli, Jahangiri Place, Hathi pol, etc., are in the same orientation. Excavations carried out, in and around the Diwan-e-Am (which building incidentally is not in the same alignment) by the Archaeological Survey of India in collaboration with Aligarh Muslim University has revealed the existence of other buildings underneath the Diwan-e-Am at a depth of about 2 meters following the same

alignment and orientation as the hillock. During excavation near Jodhba... Palace, a house complex was found in the same orientation and alignment. This fact goes on to prove that the present day structures and buildings are standing over a previous settlement which was built by well-qualified architects and town planner of an earlier age and was in existence may be in the shape of ruins, at the time the existing structures were raised.

On a close study of architectural aspect of the existing buildings and structures, one finds that one thing that has suffered the most is the symmetry of planning, design and construction, for the much talked about symmetry of Moghal buildings is totally missing here. The construction is haphazard and is definitely not in any sort of design. The crudity of the constructional aspects is visible every here and there. One can easily see that while each building is a separate unit complete in itself and has a separate design, an attempt has been made to join these buildings together and bring them into an enclosure. The why and wherefore of this is not the subject-matter of this article. The jointing structures are very crude and lack in similarity or resemblance. The jointings appear to have been done without caring for any order or spirit of resemblance at the whim and fancy of the builder. In this hodge-podge jointing the original purpose, planning or design of the building has not been cared for. Also the material used appears to have been brought in to use as and when available. It is evident from the pillars in the Panch Mahal that there is a chaos in design such that no two pillars are of the same design. The carvings on these is exactly like those used in a Hindu Temple. This leads one to believe that these pillars belonged to the razed temples and were subsequently gathered from their original sites for use in the Mahal. This answers for the lack of symmetry and design. As regards Jodhbai Mahal, it looks, as if, it was a temple, or to say the least, old temple material has been used therein. Similarly, the single pillar with symbolical lotus design and a Makar—Torar nearby like a Chhatri called today the Astrolodger's Seat, is singularly Hindu in design.

The view that old existing buildings and structures were destroyed is further strengthened by the evidence of the broken tusks of the elephant design carved on the Hathi Pol, which is a Gateway designed per Rajput structures available in Rajasthan and various Hindu Temples and Palaces. Hathi Pol appears to be the main entrance way to the whole palace-complex as the passage through it leads to the palaces after crossing seven or so thresholds.

It is, therefore, evident that a full-fledged and planned city existed at the site much before Akbar used this place for his capital.

MEANING AND TYPOLOGY OF VIOLENCE

DR SURENDRA VERMA

Johan Galtung, a celebrated peace researcher, in his article "Violence, Peace and Peace Research" has stated that peace is absence of violence. This is, of course, not a definition of peace since it is a clear case of what he calls *obscurum per obscurius*. What is intended is only that the terms 'peace' and 'violence' be linked together in such a manner that peace can be regarded as absence of violence.¹

Peace, of course, is a broad concept and has many dimensions, but when we think of peace-action, or, peace-movement, or, peace-research, the concept of peace must be specific enough to serve as a basis for concrete action. Hence 'peace' is to be specified. Regarding peace as absence of violence is really making peace a little more 'tangible'. Peace-action now will be an action against violence; peace-research will be a research which is conducive in narrowing down the circle of violence in a particular region; and peace-movement will be a movement in the direction of minimizing violence in society in general.

Every thing now hinges on making a definition of violence. Johan Galtung defines violence as "the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual, between what could have been and what is."² According to him, violence, thus, is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations. Suppose a person, belonging to a particular caste, is deprived of higher education, irrespective of his high ability, by virtue of being a member of a particular caste—this, then, will be a case of violence of the caste-system which is the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual of the individual concerned.

The above definition of violence can serve as a good working hypothesis of peace-action/research/movement. In order to make things clearer Galtung has also given various types of violence. The typology of violence indicates very many dimensions of violence. Thus, the distinctions between physical and psychological violence, negative and

1. Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research", a paper published in *Contemporary Peace Research* ed. by Ghanshyam Pardesi, Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1982, p. 94.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 96.

positive violence, violence with or without a subject committing it directly, violence with or without an object suffering it directly, intended and unintended violence, manifest and latent violence and finally, personal and structural violence, are made. The last distinction is very important indeed from the perspective of peace.³

We are not here concerned with the details of these types of violence. What we propose to deal in this paper is, firstly, whether the definition of violence given by Galtung has any relevance to the Jain *Weltanschauung* and secondly, whether his various dimensions of violence correspond broadly with the types of violence mentioned in the Jain Scriptures.

Jainism, as we all know, is a way of life which gives a very high premium to non-violence. But before we examine the meaning and typology of violence in Jainism, it is probably necessary that we make a search into the Jain view of human nature.

In a Jain Text known as, *Bhagavati-Sūtra*⁴, there is a conversation between Lord Mahavira and his disciple, Gautama. Gautama asks Mahavira, "What is the nature of self?" and Mahavira answers, "O Gautama, the nature of self is *Samatva* and *Samatva* is also the ultimate purpose that self has to realize."

Now the concept of *samatva* occupies a very central place in the Jaina philosophy. As a matter of fact the whole of the Jaina thought revolves round this concept. It has many dimensions and many shades of meaning. *Samatva*, on the one hand, has individual and social dimensions and on the other hand, may mean, as per context, equality, harmony, equanimity identity or even perfection.

When Mahāvira says that the nature of self is *Samatva*, he is, of course, trying to emphasize that self is to maintain identity with itself. But unfortunately self, instead of remaining with itself, identifies itself with the 'not-self' or the 'other'. This is a clear-cut violation of the rule; and anything which is responsible for this separating the self from itself can, therefore, be treated as violence. Not that the self has not the potential to identify itself with self. As a matter of fact the self is at peace only when it is 'placed', as if, in its proper place, i.e. in itself. But somehow or other the self is not able to actualize its potentiality. This is, of course, not said in so many words in Jainism. But if the argument is formed in the present form it would be perfectly in tune with the spirit of Jainism.

We, thus, find that violence in the Jaina philosophy also, is nothing but "the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual, between what could have been and what is." Self is, at present,

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 97-102.

4. *Bhagavatisūtra (Bhagavai)*, Jaina Vishva Bharati, Ladnun, 1994.

bond with its own *karmas* and mistakenly identifies itself with the 'not self'. But it has an inherent potential to overcome its weaknesses and actualize itself by identifying itself with itself. This is *samatva*, the identification of self with self. This can be achieved only when the self overcomes its weaknesses. The primary weakness of self is its "attachment" to the 'other' things. This attachment is really violence. That is why in *Tattvārtha-Sūtra* violence is defined as something which is essentially *pramattayogāt*⁵ i.e. 'yoked with attachment'. This attachment identifies the self with the 'not-self' and it is because of this identification with the 'other' that we try to collect and possess as many things or objects as possible. Possession, thus, is also attachment—*murchhā parigrahaḥ*.⁶ Possession is infatuation. Thus, it can safely be said that ultimately that which comes between the potential self to actualize itself is "attachment" and attachment is what makes real violence. Violence is not something somatic only. It is the element of *murchhā* or *pramatta* in the act of hurting which puts it in the category of violence.

As we have already indicated the term *samatva* has more than one connotation. *Samatva* also means tranquility of 'self'; and naturally the tranquility of self can be achieved when mind is not being disturbed with things which are 'not self'. In other words, when mind remains steadfast with itself, it enjoys tranquility. Thus, the state of *samatva* is non-violence and any thing which comes in between the self and its realization is violence or *visamatva* (opp. of *samatva*). *Samatva* and non-violence (*ahiṃsā*) go hand to hand.⁷

If violence is defined as that which causes the potential self not to achieve or actualize itself, violence ceases to be merely a physical entity. Hurting somebody physically in such a manner that it becomes the cause of his non-achievement of something that he could have achieved, is, no doubt, violence by our definition. But, according to Jainism, this violence must have its essential relation with the actor's 'delusion'. This shows that violence is something not merely somatic but has its psychological aspect also.

Jainism, therefore, makes a distinction between *dravya hiṃsā* and *bhāva hiṃsā*—the substantive violence and the dispositional violence. Hurting someone somatically to the point of killing, is, what is called, substantive *hiṃsā*. This type of violence works on the body of the sufferer. But there is also the psychological violence which from the actor's point of view makes the person *franzy* (*pramatta*) with a vio-

5. Pt. Sukhalal Sanghvi, (ed.) *Tattvārtha-Sūtra*, Varanasi, 1985, p. 172.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 178.

7. *Samañasūtram*, Sarva Seva Sangh, Varanasi, 1989, Sūtram 147—*ahiṃsā samayaṃ ceva, eāvante viyāṇiyā*, p. 46.

lent attitude, and from the sufferer's point of view makes the victim fearful and timid.

Jainism also makes a distinction between the three instruments of violence⁸ — *mana*, *vacana* and *kāya*—mind, speech and body. Violence when associated with mind is psychological, when associated with speech is verbal and when associated with body, it is somatic. Mind, speech and body are the three “instruments” through which we commit violence. Hurting bodily is not the only form of violence. Hurting through speech (e.g. abusive language), or, even hurting psychologically are also forms of violence.

The *third* dimension is made in relation to the act of violence itself. There is, first, the intention to undertake violence. This is technically known as *saṃrambha*. Then, secondly, there is the preparation for committing violence, know as, *samārambha*. *Samārambha* refers to the means, the plans and the design to undertake violence; and, finally, there is the actual act of violence itself—*ārambha*. Now this distinction between the intention, the plan and the act itself of violence clearly shows that violence first of all takes places in the mind of the actor. It is his intention to act violently which compels him to plan it and commit it. Violence, worth its name, is never unintentioned.

The *fourth* distinction is made according to the pungent despositions which are essentially and organically related with violence. Thus, there is violence due to anger-*krodha*; due to conceit, *moha*; due to greed, *lobha* and due to crookedness-*māyā*. All these are astringent passions, known as *kaṣāya* in Jainism. Under the influence of these *kaṣāyas* an individual is motivated for violence. These *kaṣāyas* being, as if, ‘agents’ of violence are the real culprits. Violence when gets associated with them becomes the obstruction in the way of self to realize itself.

The obstruction may be overwhelming or mild as per intensity of a given desposition. When the intensity of the passion, say, anger, is very severe (*anantīānubandhī*) it can even obstruct the right attitude of a person. The individual then will not be able to distinguish between what is right and what is wrong; and may not even try for his realization or release. But when the intensity does not blind the one in taking the right attitude, it may obstruct the discipline of the householder partially. This type of violence which deters the householder to follow the required prescriptions necessary for controlling his behaviour is known as *apratyākhyāni* — the violence which compels the householder to go back to a life of indiscipline. This is also quite a

8. See, *Sarvārthasiddhī*, 6.8 and also *Jñānāmava*, 1.8.10 for the typologies of violence.

damaging type of violence. But sometimes the violence, i.e., the intensity involved in the passions, that causes the obstruction, is not so strong as to become a hindrance in taking the right attitude and/or in obeying the prescriptions of the householder, may at the same time be intense enough to create obstructions in the discipline of the monks. This is known as *pratyākhyāni*, i.e. a type of violence that conceals the right vision of the monk and makes him step down from his position. The last but not the least type of violence is of mild intensity which though does not compel the monk to forgo his monkhood, but it surely creates an obstruction in the attainment of liberation, this is known as *sañjavalana*.

Whatever the case may be, violence is characterized in the present typology with the intensity of the *kaṣāya* which obstructs the royal road of realization. It creates a gap between the potentiality and the actuality.⁹

We have tried so far to show that the definition of violence as “the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual, between what could have been and what is” fits well into the scheme of Jain philosophy”. We have also tried to show that in Jainism violence does not mean merely hurting a person somatically but it also involves a psychological factor in the “actor”, the “sufferer” and the “act” of violence. The actor has the desposition, the sufferer is hurt mentally and intention is part of the act of violence. All these aspects or dimensions are to be taken together in order to understand violence as a whole.

The various dimensions of violence enumerated by Johan Galtung correspond roughly with the typologies framed in Jainism. But there is one important difference. Galtung distinguishes between the individual and the structural violence. The structural violence is the built-in violence in the very structure of a given society. It works as an obstruction in the realization of potentialities; but goes unrecognized by both the ‘actor’ as well as the ‘sufferer’.

There is no mention of this type of structural violence in Jainism. As a matter of fact, Jainism is more concerned, or, rather pre-occupied by the conception of *moksha*, or, the realization of self. And, as such, it has emphasized only those agents of violence (*viz. kaṣāya*) which cause hindrance in such a realization. We can very well “See” their role in society also as to how do these despositions are responsible in creating gulf between individual and individual, between individual and Society and so on. But this would be an extension of the Jaina thought. We may hope that some research scholars of peace may take up this aspect and enrich the Jaina Philosophy in its social perspective also.

9. See, Kamala Jain, *The Concept of Pañcaśīla in Indian Thought*, P.V. Research Institute, Varanasi, 1983 p. 54.

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