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SIDDHASENA DIVĀKARA AND HIS NYĀYĀVATĀRA

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1. Siddhasena Divākara

Siddhasena Divākara alias Kṣapaṇaka (c Rica 480-550 A.D.), a celebrated logician, is claimed by both the Digambaras and Śvetāmbaras as one of their own authorities. The earlier eminent authorities before Siddhasena were Kundakunda (1st cent. A.D.), a pupil of Bhadrabāhu II, and his disciple Umāsvāmi or Umāsvāti (1-85 A.D.), Bhaṭṭakerā (1st cent. A.D.) and Kārtūkeyasvāmi (1st cent. A.D.). According to the evidence of Paṭṭāvali's Vṛddhavādin, Pādalipta (=Pkt. Pālītta) and Siddhasena Divākara were contemporaries.

Siddhasena Divākara is famous both as a logician and a lyrical poet. His book, Kalyāṇa-mandira-stotra of 44 stanzas is a hymn-book addressed to Pārśvanātha. His other two books—Dvātriniḥ-sad-dvātriniḥsikā and Sammati-tarka-sūtra—though form a part of his Nyāyāvatāra, exhibit his poetic talent.

The work for which Siddhasena Divākara is famous is his Nyāyāvatāra. It is written in 32 Sanskrit stanzas and is a fundamental work on Jaina logic. The book discusses the means of acquiring right knowledge (pramāṇa) and of methods (naya). In Jaina logic Pramāṇa-Śāstra is necessary to establish the validity of the nine categories (nava-tattva) of Jaina Philosophy.

The Pramāṇa-Śāstra, i.e., the science of right knowledge, discusses mainly the principles of pure logic in order to expound the dogmas of Jaina religion and metaphysics. But, in fact, Siddhasena Divākara and Diṇṇāga, the Buddhist logician, by about 450 A.D., differentiated first the principles of Logic from the domain of religion and metaphysics. Gautama, the ancient logician, enumerates the sixteen categories of

2. All the dates are from Winternitz’s Hist. Ind. Lit. Vol-II (1933), pp. 476-477.
knowledge, of which pramāṇa is one with other fifteen things. But Siddhasena and Dīnāga discuss only one category, i.e., Pramāṇa, in their treatises in order to establish the doctrines of Jainism and Buddhism respectively. They even excluded prameya, the object of knowledge, from their consideration.

The relationship of Logic with the Jaina Philosophy is shown below:

**The Doctrines of Jainism**
(Philosophical and Practical)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philosophical systematic [Metaphysics, Ontology &amp; Study of being]</th>
<th>Practical Ethics [Ethics, Asceticism, Monasticism, &amp; Laity rules]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| A. Metaphysics: (Substance) Navatattva (nine cardinal principles) | For Mokṣa the necessary elements are
| [Jiva, ajiva, āsrava, bandha, punya, pāpa, saṃvara, nirjāra & mokṣa] → | (a) tri-ratna
| to be comprehended by LOGIC                                       | (b) tri-gupti
| B. Philosophy:                                                   | (c) pañca-samiti
| 1. Anekāntavāda                                                   | → application of the Karma theory to Ethics.                      |
| 2. Syādvāda (Sapta-bhangī)                                       |                                                                 |
| 3. Jaina-naya (Sapta-naya)                                       |                                                                 |
| [nātāga, saṃgraha, vijavāhāra, tīra-sūtra, saśāda, samabhīrūdha & evambhūta] |                                                                 |
| C. Karmavāda:                                                    |                                                                 |

Let me discuss the above principles briefly.

**II. The Doctrines of Jainism**

The foundation of Jaina philosophy is mainly based on the conception of the constitution of the world. To the Jains, the world is eternal and vast, it is beginningless and endless. Time is also eternal and is like a wheel with twelve spokes. The wheel of time is divided into two halves: avasarpini (descending order) and utsarpini (ascending order). The present age is the age of avasarpini. This universe is composed of two things: loka and aloka. Loka consists of living and
non-living things and all phenomena around it. Aloka is space which we normally call by the term ākāśa. It is void and empty, "an abyss of nothing". Having given this description of the world, the Jains have considered the nature of matter or substance (padārtha) which is eternal as well as ever-changing. With this idea in their background, they have proceeded to analyse the substance on the one hand and to establish their philosophical speculation on the other. So the doctrines of Jainism will consist of the philosophical and practical utility of their speculations. Jaina philosophy consists of Metaphysics, Ontology and Psychology, while the practical doctrines are concerned with ethics and asceticism, monasticism and the conduct of the laity. Let us first start with Jaina Metaphysics.

In the domain of Loka (or lokāstikāya, as it is often called), all things (i.e. dravya, substance) are classified into 9 categories: jīva, ajīva, āsrava, bandha, punya, pāpa, saṃvaro, nirjarā, and mokṣa. Jīva (lit. ‘lives’) is the soul. There are infinite numbers of souls; the whole world is filled with souls. The souls are eternal, but they can grow, contract or expand according to the necessity of the body in which they are incorporated. The characteristic mark of the souls is intelligence, which is never destroyed, but can be obscured by extrinsic causes.

Jīva is of two kinds: Saṃsārī (mundane) and mukta (liberated). Saṃsārī jīva (mundane souls) are the embodied souls of the living beings in the world and they are subject to the cycle of Birth. Mukta jīvas are liberated souls and so they will not come to this world again. They are free from the bondage of the world. Man is made up with cetanā (consciousness) and jāda (unconsciousness). So long as jādatva in man remains, he will come to this world again and again. If jādatva is removed, he will be free (mukta) and will attain nirvāṇa. Āsrava means flow of Karmic matter into the nature of self or soul. Bandha implies the mixture of the Karmic matter with the nature of the soul on account of which the soul loses its intrinsic purity and brilliance. Saṃvara represents the act of presenting the inflow of the Karmic matter and hence it is the blocking of Āsrava. Nirjarā represents the act of destroying the Karmic matter which may adhere to the soul. Each particular karma has been caused by some action, good, bad or indifferent, of the individual being in question, so that karma in return, produces certain painful, or pleasant, or indifferent conditions and events which the individual in question must undergo. If the condition is good, it is called punya, if it is opposite, it is pāpa.

The conception of Jīva may be said to be the central doctrine of
Jaina philosophy, all the other categories being merely secondary and subsidiary to the central entity. The $sāṁsārü$ $jìva$ is again divided into four classes: $deva$, $manusya$, $tirýak$ and $nāraka$. The $devas$ live in the upper world ($Devaloka$), while the $nārakas$ live in hell. $Manusya$ (men) live in this world along with the $tirýak$ animals belonging to the zoological and botanical kingdoms. All beings of these four different groups are called $sāṁsārü$ $jìvas$, because they are subject to the cycle of birth and death. This $sāṁsārü$ $jìva$ associated with its own $karmic$ bondage and its own corporeal existence is considered to be uncreated and therefore beginningless. For the Jaina metaphysical the question when the soul did get associated with material body is a meaningless question, because they say $saṁsāra$ is anādi (beginningless). At the time of liberation of the soul from material and $karmic$ bondage, it is said to attain $Mokṣa$, i.e. the cycle of births and deaths is stopped for him.

The five categories which are grouped in the $ājīva$ class are distinctly non-spiritual and hence incapable of consciousness. They are therefore $acetana$. These are — $dhárma$, $adhdhárma$, $ākāśa$, $pudgala$ and $kāla$. The inherent character of $dhárma$ is to make move, or to be moved, while $adhdhárma$ is the opposite to it. The idea is that $dhárma$ and $adhdhárma$ are necessary conditions for the subsistence of all other things, viz. souls and matter. $Ākāśa$ is space, while $pudgala$ is matter which is eternal and consists of atoms. There are two kinds of matter: gross ($sthūla$) and subtle ($sūkṣma$). Gross matter are the things which we perceive, while subtle matter is beyond the reach of our senses. Subtle matter is that matter which is transformed into different kinds of $karma$. $Kāla$ (time) is a quasi-substance, and its necessity to accept it as a substance is to explain the changing state of the souls and matter. Now the last substance $mokṣa$.

The path to Salvation ($mokṣamārjga$) is different in Jainism from other religious systems. It is the Right Faith ($samyag dārsana$), Right Knowledge ($Samyag jñāna$), and Right Conduct ($samyak cāṅtrya$). The emphasis is laid on all the three: only when all the three characteristics are combined, they can constitute $Mokṣamārjga$. Each by itself is imperfect and therefore insufficient. To depend on any of them will not lead one to $Mokṣa$. Further, it is emphasized that these three (faith, knowledge and conduct) must be of right type. Hence the word $samyak$ is prefixed to each of these terms. To bring out the force of the meaning of this definition, one metaphorical example is given by the commentator. A person suffering from a disease (if he desires to cure himself of the disease) must have faith in the capacity of a doctor and must know the exact nature of the medicine prescribed by him for his disease and must take the medicine according to the instructions of
the doctor. Mere faith in the doctor will be of no use. Faith in the capacity of the doctor and the knowledge of the nature of the medicine would equally be useless unless the patient takes the medicine. In this case beings in the world of saṃsāra are assumed to be patients suffering from a spiritual disqualification or disease who desire to get rid of this disease and to attain perfect spiritual health. Thus for the purpose of helping such persons this Mokṣamārga is prescribed as a spiritual remedy and the spiritual remedy therefore must be associated with all three characteristics of right faith, right knowledge and right conduct in order to be effective. These three constituent elements of the path to salvation are called Ratna-traya (the three jewels).

To effect this ratna-traya the rules of conduct must be observed and corresponding virtues must be acquired. The Jains have formulated certain vows (ūrtaṇa) for that. These are: pañca mahāvrata (five great vows), pañca anuvrata (five small vows), tri-guṇa vrata (three good qualities) and four śīkṣāvrata (four educational vows). Of these the first five vratas are mainly and strictly to be observed by the monks, while the rest are mainly meant for the laity. The five mahāvrata are—(1) ahiṁsā (abstain from killing), (2) satya (abstain from telling lies), (3) acaurya (abstain from stealing), (4) brahmācarya (abstain from sexual intercourse), and (5) aparigraha (to renounce all interest in worldly things, and not to keep any property). For a monk many rules, which aim at preventing the destruction of the life of any living whatsoever, have been laid down. But for a layman these vows are also applicable, but in a less rigorous way. A layman may, for a limited time, follow a rigorous practice, but that is to regulate his conduct. But a monk on entering the order (dīkṣā), should practise these vows rigorously. To effectuate them, more regulations are required, and these constitute the disciplines of the monk. These are—three guptis (i.e. guarding of body, speech, and mind) and five samitis (i.e. a monk must be cautious in walking, speaking, collecting alms, taking up or putting down things, and voiding the body). Besides these, a monk should practise other conduct, such as, ksamā (forgiveness), mārdava (modesty), ārjava (simplicity), nirlobhata (not to be greedy), akiñcanatā (to consider worldly things insignificant), satya (to speak the truth), tapasyā (penance), śauca (purity) and brahmācarya (abstain from any sexual desire). On the whole, there are innumerable vows laid down for a monk who wants to attain salvation (mokṣa) which is the ultimate object of a monk.

In conclusion, it can be said that Jaina religion is mainly a monastic religion, full of vows and penances, required for a monk as well as for a laity to keep them away from killing of any kind of living beings. Life
is very much respected by the Jains. Character has also been given a
great prominence, and to control mind from every sphere of life is
highly eulogised. The Jains believe that if anybody follows truly their
code of conduct, there will be no violence (hīṃsā) in the world and a
permanent bliss will pervade throughout the world. It is not the Jains
who alone will follow their doctrines, but all the citizens of the world.
The Jains also believe that if the peoples of the world can understand
Jaina religion as such, then we shall be able to broaden our visions
for our future life, to fasten our fraternal ties with our neighbours, to
strengthen our minds with a new vigour for our future activities, to
depen our trenchant ideas and reveted thoughts in human beings, to
enlighten our future generations for the betterment of our life, and to
heighten our ultimate supreme love in mankind. And in this way, we
shall be able to slacken completely our narrow-mindedness at the
altar of our pride and prejudices, to loosen our beastly acrimony and
mental malady for the sake of humanity, and to liken all human beings
as belonging to one chum though separated by their natural qualities
and environments.

After examining the nature of mokṣa, let us explain some of the
fundamental philosophical doctrines associated with it. Let us first
take the doctrine of Reality (Sat).

The definition of sat as given by Umāsvāti is utpāda-uyaya-
dhauvyay-yuktam sat (V. 30) (it is a permanent reality in the midst of
change of appearance and disappearance). This conception of reality
is peculiar to Jainism. An existing reality in order to maintain its
permanent and continued existence must necessarily undergo change
in the form of appearance and disappearance. It seems to us a paradox
at the very beginning. But a closer analysis and minute observation
will help us to appreciate the significance of this description of reality.
For example, let us look at the seed of a plant. When the seed is
planted in the soil it must necessarily break the shell and sprout out.
This is the first step in its attempt to grow. Then the sprouting seed
further undergoes change and some portion of it comes out seeking
the sunlight and another goes down into the earth. That portion of the
sprouting which goes down into the soil will undergo enormous changes
into the root system. Similarly, the portion that shoots up into the air
and sunlight will also undergo enormous change, of sprouting out in
tendrils and leaves finally resulting in branches and stem of the plant
all engaged in the task of procuring nourishment with the help of
sunlight. At every stage thus we find change, the old leaves being
shed off and the new sprouts coming in. This seems to be the general
law of Nature. The life of the seed does never die; it lives even though
it is being constantly changed, and this is what is sat. What is true of a plant, is also true with regard to the basic or fundamental things of Nature. In this respect, I believe, Jaina conception of Reality is different from the other Indian philosophies. Some philosophers would only emphasize permanency as the nature of reality, while others would emphasize change alone as the characteristic of reality. The one-sided emphasis either of permanency or change is rejected by Jaina thinkers. They consider this system as acekānta-vāda, a system which clings to a partial aspect of the reality. So they call their own system as anekānta-vāda, that is to say, a system of philosophy which maintains that Reality has multifarious aspects and that a complete comprehension of such a nature must necessarily take into consideration all the different aspects through which reality manifests itself. Hence the Jaina darśana is technically called Anekāntavāda, often translated as "Indefiniteness of Being". It tells us that any material thing continues for ever to exist as matter, and this matter may assume any shape and quality. Thus mṛttikā (clay) as a substance may be regarded as permanent, but the form of a jar of clay (ghaṭa-paṭṭādi), or its colour, may come into existence and perish.

The doctrine of anekāntavāda is upheld by a logical method called syād-vāda. According to the doctrine, there are seven forms of metaphysical propositions and all contain the word syāt, meaning 'may be'. As it consists of seven propositions, it is known as Saptabhaṅgi. These propositions are—

1. syād asti,
2. syān nāsti,
3. syād asti nāsti ca,
4. syād avyakta�yaḥ,
5. syād asti avyakta�yaḥṣca,
6. syān nāsti avyakta�yaḥṣca,
7. syād asti nāsti avyakta�yaḥṣca.

According to this logical doctrine every fact of reality can be described in two logical propositions—one affirmative and the other negative. We have described before that the ultimate reality is a permanent and changing entity manifesting itself through constant change of appearance and disappearance, then we can understand that a fact of reality when looked at from the underlying permanent substance may be described to be non-permanent and changing. When a substance is described from the aspect of the underlying substance, it is called dravyārthika-naya and when the description is based on the modifications or changes, it is called paryārthika-naya. As a dravya has two aspects, it should be described logically from two points of view : positive and negative. For example, if a jar is made of clay,
then it is possible to describe it as a jar made of clay. But can we describe it as 'a jar made of stone'? Certainly not. But it must be remembered that to describe every fact of reality, four conditions are to be taken into considerations: dravya, kṣetra, kāla and bhāva. Name of the substance, the place where it is, the time when it exists, and characteristics intrinsically presented in it, the time when it exists, and characteristics intrinsically presented in it. Every object from its own dravya admits an affirmative predication and looked at from the parādravya admits of a negative predication. So the example given above from its own substance (clay) admits of affirmative predication, and from the view of parādravya, a negative predication. Similarly, from the point of view of kṣetra, it can be stated in two ways: if a thing is really in the room, then we can say affirmatively it is in the room, and negatively it is not in the verandah. Similarly in other two cases. For want of space I cannot dilate upon this point any more.

Supplementary to the doctrine of syād-vāda is the doctrine of naya-vāda. The nayas are ways of expressing the nature of things. There are seven nayas: naiyāgama, saṃgraha, vyavahāra, rju-sūtra, śabda, samabhīrūḍha and evambhūta. Without going into detail, it can be said that the nayas are necessary in order to understand the partial true nature of a thing.

After having described briefly the doctrines of Jainism, let me now pass on to the subject of logic with particular reference to the Nyāyāvatāra.

Before Siddhasena Divākara, another logician who talked about the subject of logic was Umāsvāti (1-85 A.D.). He, in his Tattvārtha-sūtra, has divided pramāṇa into two categories: parokṣa and pratyakṣa. Parokṣa (indirect knowledge) is of two kinds—mati and śruta. Pratyakṣa (direct knowledge) has three stages: avadhi, manahparyāya and kevala. Parokṣa knowledge is acquired by the soul through external agencies, such as, the organs of sense, whereas the pratyakṣa knowledge is acquired by the soul without external agencies. Of the Parokṣa knowledge, mati is “knowledge of existing things acquired through the senses and the mind,” whereas śruta is “knowledge of things (past, present and future) acquired through reasoning and study”. In the pratyakṣa knowledge again avadhi means “knowledge of things beyond the range of our perception”, whereas manahparyāya means “knowledge derived from reading the thoughts of others, while kevala means “unobstructed, unconditional and absolute knowledge.”

However, before describing the analytical contents, let me give in a chart the contents of the Nyāyāvatāra.

Nine categories of Jaina Philosophy can only be comprehended by

1. **Pramāṇa**
2. **Pratijñāka**
3. **Parokṣa**
4. **Vyāhārīka**
5. **Pāramārthikā**
6. **Aṇumāṇa**
7. **Sādhyā**
8. **Hētu/līṅga**
9. **Śabdā**

### Fallacies of parārthānumāna

1. pakṣābhāsa
2. hetābhāsa
3. drṣṭāntabhāsa
4. duṣanābhāsa

### Effects of pramāṇa

(Mokṣa)

The above chart is explained below.

### III. Analytical Contents of the Nyāyāvatāra

#### I. Pramāṇa—Right knowledge.

1. Perception

Pramāṇa is right knowledge which illuminates itself as well as others.

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1. Adapted from S.C. Vidyābhūṣāṇa’s *A History of Indian Logic*.
things without any obstruction. It is of two kinds: (1) direct valid knowledge or perception (pratyakṣa) and (2) indirect valid knowledge (parokṣa). Direct valid knowledge (pratyakṣa) is twofold: (1) practical (vyāvahārika) which is the knowledge acquired by the soul through the five senses (the eye, ear, nose, tongue and touch) and the mind (manas), and (2) transcendent (pāramārthika) which is the infinite knowledge that comes from the perfect enlightenment of the soul: it is called kevala or absolute knowledge.

2. Verbal testimony

Indirect valid knowledge (parokṣa) is also of two kinds: (1) inference (anumāna) and (2) verbal testimony (śabda). Verbal testimony is the knowledge derived from the words of reliable persons including knowledge from scripture. Suppose a young man coming to the side of a river cannot ascertain whether the river is fordable or not, and immediately an old experienced man of the locality, who has no enmity against him, comes and tells him that the river is easily fordable: the word of the old man is to be accepted as a source of valid knowledge called personal testimony or laukika śābda. Scripture is also a source of valid knowledge for it lays down injunctions on matters which baffle perception and inference: for instance, it teaches that misery is the consequence of vice. Knowledge derived from this source is called scriptural testimony or śāstraśābda. Scripture is defined as that which was first cognised or composed by a competent person, which is not such as to be passed over by others, which is not incompatible with the truths derived from perception, which imparts true instruction and which is profitable to all men and is preventive of the evil path.1

3. Inference

Inference (anumāna) is the correct knowledge of the major term (sādhyā) derived through the middle term (hetu, reason, or līṅga, sign) which is inseparably connected with it. It is of two kinds: (1) inference for one’s own self (svārthānunāna) and (2) inference for the sake of others (parārthānunāna).

The first kind is the inference deduced in one’s own mind after having made repeated observations. A man by repeated observations in the kitchen and elsewhere forms the conclusion in his mind that fire is always an antecedent of smoke. Afterwords, he is not certain whether a hill which he sees has fire on it or not. But, noticing smoke,

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1. āptopajñām anullaṅghyaḥ adṛṣṭeṣṭa-virodhakam/tattvopadesaśakt sārvaṃ śāstraṃ kāpatha-ghattanam. (verse 9, Nyāyāvatāra)
he at once brings to mind the inseparable connection between fire and smoke, and concludes that there must be fire on the hill. This is the inference for one’s own self.

If the inference is communicated to others through words, it is called an inference for the sake of others. A type of this kind of inference is as follows:

1. The hill (minor term or pakṣa) is full of fire (major term or sādhyā);
2. because it is full of smoke (middle term or hetu);
3. whatever is full of smoke is full of fire, as, e.g. a kitchen (example or drṣṭānta);
4. so is this hill full of smoke (application or upanaya);
5. therefore this hill is full of fire (conclusion or nīgamana).

4. Terms of a syllogism

In a proposition the subject is the minor term (pakṣa) and the predicate the major term (sādhyā). The minor term is that with which the connection of the major term is to be shown. In the proposition “the hill is full of fire”, the hill is the minor term and fire major term. The middle term (hetu) is defined as that which cannot occur otherwise than in connection with the major term. Thus in the proposition: “the hill is full of fire because it is full of smoke”, smoke is the middle term which cannot arise from any other thing than fire which is the major term. The example (drṣṭānta) is a familiar case which assures the connection between the major term and the middle term. It is of two kinds. (1) homogeneous or affirmative (sādhrmya), such as, “the hill is full of fire because it is full of smoke, as a kitchen”, and (2) heterogeneous or negative (vaidhrmya) which assures the connection between the middle term and major term by contrariety, that is, by showing that the absence of the major term is attended by the absence of the middle term, such as “where there is no fire there is no smoke, as in a lake.”

In an inference for the sake of others the minor term (pakṣa) must be explicitly set forth, otherwise the reasoning might be misunderstood by the opponent, e.g. This hill has fire because it has smoke.

This instance, if the minor term is omitted, will assume the following form:

Having fire, I Because having smoke.

Here the opponent might not at once recollect any instance in which fire and smoke exist in union, and might mistake a lake for
such an instance. In such a case the whole reasoning will be misunderstood.

If that of which the major term or predicate is affirmed, is opposed by evidence, public opinion, one's own statement, etc., we have that which is known as the fallacy of the minor term (pakṣābhāsa) of which there are many varieties.

5. Fallacies of the minor term

The semblance or fallacy of the minor term (pakṣābhāsa) arises when one attributes to it as a proved fact that which is yet to be proved, or which is incapable of being proved, or when it is opposed to perception and inference, or inconsistent with public opinion or incongruous with one's own statement, thus:

1) "The jar is corporeal (paudgalika)—this is a conclusion which is yet to be proved to the opponent.

2) "Every thing is momentary"—this is a Saugata conclusion which, according to the Jainas, is incapable of being proved.

3) "The general particular (sāmānya viśeṣa) things are without parts, are distinct from each other and are like themselves alone"—this is opposed to perception.

4) "There is no omniscient being"—this is, according to the Jainas, opposed to inference.

5) "The sister is to be taken as wife"—this is inconsistent with public opinion.

6) "All things are non-existent"—this is incongruous with one's own statement.

6. Inseparable connection

Inseparable connection or invariable concomitance (vyāpti) is the constant accompaniment of the middle term by the major term. In the inference: "this hill is full of fire, because it is full of smoke", the connection between fire and smoke, this is, the constant presence of fire with smoke, is called vyāpti or Inseparable Connection. It is of two kinds: (1) Intrinsic, and (2) Extrinsic.

7. Antar vyāpti

Intrinsic inseparable connection (antar-vyāpti) occurs when the
minor term (*pakṣa*), itself as the common abode of the middle term (*hetu*) and the major term (*śādhyā*), shows the inseparable connection between them, thus:

1) This hill (minor term) is full of *fire* (major term);
2) because it is full of *smoke* (middle term).

Here the inseparable connection between fire and smoke is shown by the hill (minor term) in which both of them abide.

8. *Bahir Vyāpti*

Extrinsic inseparable connection (*bahir-vyāpti*) occurs when an example (*dṛṣṭānta*) from the outside is introduced as the common abode of the middle term (*hetu*) and the major term (*śādhyā*) to assure the inseparable connection between them, thus:

1) This hill is full of *fire* (major term);
2) because it is full of *smoke* (middle term);
3) as a *kitchen* (example).

Here the reference to the kitchen is no essential part of the inference, but is introduced from without as a common instance of a place in which fire and smoke exist together, and so it reaffirms the inseparable connection between them.

Some logicians hold that that which is to be proved, that is, the major term (*śādhyā*), can be established by intrinsic inseparable connection (*antar-vyāpti*) only: hence the extrinsic inseparable connection (*bahir vyāpti*) is superfluous.

9. *Fallacies of the middle term*

The semblance of reason or fallacy of the middle term (*hetvābhāsa*) arises from doubt, misconception or non-conception about it (the middle term). It is of three kinds:

1) The unproved (*asiddha*): This is fragrant, because it is a sky-lotus.

Here the reason (middle term), viz. the sky-lotus, is unreal.

2) The contradictory (*viruddha*): “This is fiery, because it is a body of water.”

Here the reason alleged is opposed to what is to be established.

3) The uncertain (*anāikāntika*). “Sound is eternal, because it is always audible.”

Here the reason or middle term is uncertain, because audibleness may or may not be a proof of eternity.
10. Fallacies of homogeneous examples

The Fallacy of example (drṣṭāntābhāsa) may arise in the homogeneous or heterogeneous form, from a defect in the middle term (hetu) or major term (sādhyā) or both, or from doubt about them.

Fallacies of the homogeneous example (sādharmya-drṣṭāntābhāsa) are follows:

1) Inference is invalid (major term), because it is a source of knowledge (middle term), like perception (homogeneous example).
   Here the example involves a defect in the major term (sādhyā), for perception is not invalid.

2) Perception is invalid (major term), because it is a source of valid knowledge (middle term), like a dream (homogeneous example).
   Here the example involves a defect in the middle term (hetu) for the dream is not a source of valid knowledge.

3) The omniscient being is not existent (major term), because he is not apprehended by the senses (middle term), like a jar (homogeneous example).
   Here the example involves a defect in both the major and middle terms (sādhyā and hetu), for the jar is both existent and apprehended by the senses.

4) This person is devoid of passions (major term), because he is mortal (middle term), like the man in the street (homogeneous example).
   Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the major term, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is devoid of passions.

5) This person is mortal (major term), because he is full of passions (middle term), like the man in the street (homogeneous example).
   Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the middle term, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is devoid of passions.

6) This person is non-omniscient (major term), because he is full of passions (middle term), like the man in the street (homogeneous example).
   Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is full of passions and non-omniscient.
It is stated in the Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti that some unnecessarily lay down three other kinds of fallacy of the homogeneous example (sādharmya-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa), viz.:

1) Unconnected (anunyaya), such as: This person is full of passions (major term), because he is a speaker (middle term), like a certain man in Magadha (example).

Here though a certain man in Magadha is both a speaker and full of passions, yet there is no inseparable connection between "being a speaker" and "being full of passions".

(2) Of connection unshown (apradarśitānvaya), such as:

Sound is non-eternal (major term), because it is produced (middle term), as a jar (example).

Here though there is an inseparable connection between "produced" and "non-eternal", yet it has not been shown in the proper form as:

"Whatever is produced is non-eternal, as a jar."

3) Of inverted connection (vīparitānvaya), such as:

Sound is non-eternal (major term), because it is produced (middle term).

Here if the inseparable connection (vyāpti) is shown thus—

"Whatever is non-eternal is produced as a jar", instead of—

"Whatever is produced is non-eternal as a jar", the example would involve the fallacy of inverted connection.

11. Fallacies of heterogeneous example

Fallacies of the heterogeneous example (vaidharmya-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa) are of six kinds, thus:—

1) Inference is invalid (major term), because it is a source of knowledge (middle term): whatever is not invalid is not a source of knowledge, as a dream (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in the major term (sādhyā), for the dream is really invalid though it has been cited as not invalid.

2) Perception is non-reflective or nirvikalpaka (major term), because
it is a source of knowledge (middle term): whatever is reflective or savikalpaka, is not a source of knowledge, as inference (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in the middle term (sadhana), for inference is really a source of knowledge it has been cited as not such.

3) Sound is eternal and non-eternal (major term, because it is an existence (middle term): whatever is not eternal and non-eternal is not an existence, as a jar (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in both the major and middle terms (sādhya and sādhana), for the jar is both “eternal and non-eternal” and “an existence”.

4) Kapila is not omniscient (major term), because he is not a propounder of the four noble truths (middle term): whoever is omniscient is propounder of the four noble truths, as Buddha (the heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a doubt as to the validity of the major term (sādhya), for it is doubtful whether Buddha was omniscient.

5) This person is untrustworthy (major term), because he is full of passions (middle term): whoever is trustworthy is not full of passions, as Buddha (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the middle term (hetu), for it is doubtful whether Buddha is not full of passions.

6) Kapila is not devoid of passions (major term), because he did not give his own flesh to the hungry (middle term): whoever is devoid of passions gives his own flesh to the hungry, as Buddha (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms (sādhya and sādhana), for it is doubtful whether Buddha was devoid of passions and gave his own flesh to the hungry.

It is stated in the Nyāyāvatāra-vivrti that some unnecessarily lay down three other kinds of fallacy of the heterogeneous example (vaidharmya-dṛṣṭantābhāsa), viz.–

(i) Unseparated (avyatireki): This person is not devoid of passions (major term), because he is a speaker (middle term): whoever is devoid
of passions is not a speaker, as a *piece of stone* (heterogeneous example).

Here, though a piece of stone is both “devoid of passions” and “not a speaker”, yet there is no invariable separation (*vyatireka vyāpti*) between “devoid of passions” and “a speaker”.

(ii) Of separation unshown (*apradarśita-vyatireka*):

Sound is *non-eternal* (major term), because it is *produced* (middle term); as *ether* (example).

Here, though there is an invariable separation between “produced” and “eternal”, yet it has not been shown in the proper form, such as: “Whatever is non-non-eternal is not produced, e.g. ether”.

(iii) Of contrary separation (*viparīta-vyatireka*):

Sound is *non-eternal* (major term), because it is *produced* (middle term): whatever is not produced is non-non-eternal, e.g. ether (example).

Here the example has been put in a contrary way, for the proper form should have been:

Whatever is non-non-eternal is not produced, e.g. ether.”

**12. Refutation**

Refutation (*dūṣāṇa*) is the pointing out of defects or fallacies in the statements of the opponent in any of the forms enumerated above. The semblance of a refutation (*dūṣāṇābhāsa*) is the contrivance to allege defects where there are no defects at all.

**13. Consequence of Pramanā**

The immediate effect of *pramanā* (valid knowledge) is the removal of ignorance. The consequence of the transcendent perception (*pāramārthika pratyakṣa pramanā*) is bliss and equanimity consisting in salvation (*Mokṣa* or final emancipation), while that of the other kinds of *pramanā* (direct and indirect knowledge) is the facility which they afford us to choose the desirable and reject the undesirable things.

**II. Naya—the method of description**

*Naya* is the method of comprehending things from particular standpoints. Thus we may conceive rose either as a flower possessing the attributes common to all flowers or as a thing possessing attributes
which are peculiar to the rose as distinguished from other flowers. The Naya is of seven kinds: naigama, sanagraha, vyavahara, rju-sutra, sabda, samabhirittha, and evambhuta.

1. Syadvada

Knowledge which determines the full meaning of an object through the employment, in the scriptural method, of one-sided nayas, is called Syadvada-sruta. It is the perfect knowledge of things taken from all possible standpoints. Thus a thing may be, may not be, both may or may not be, etc., according as we take it from one or other standpoint.

The soul (jiva) is the knower, the illuminator of self and non-self, doer and enjoyer. It undergoes changes of condition and is self-conscious, being different from the earth, water, etc.

This system of pramana and naya, with which all of us are familiar and which serves to perform all practical functions, cannot be traced to its beginning or followed to its end.

A Survey of Jain Logic
(based on S.C. Vidyabhushana's A History of Indian Logic including his dates) compiled by Satya Ranjan Banerjee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates by Centuries</th>
<th>Ancient Indian Logic</th>
<th>Jain Logic</th>
<th>Buddhist Logic</th>
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<td>B.C.</td>
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<td>Indrabhūti Gautama (607-515 B.C.)</td>
<td>Origin of the Buddhist logic (490-76 B.C.)</td>
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<td>Dates by Centuries</td>
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<td>A.D.</td>
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<td>Vātsyāyana's Nyāyabhāṣya (500)</td>
<td>[Bhadrabāhu II (450-520)] Siddhasena Divākara (480-550), Jinabhadra Gaṇi (484-588)</td>
<td>Maitreya (400), Ārya Asaṅga (405-470) Vasubandhu (410-490), Diññāga (450-520)</td>
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<td>Dharmapāla (600-635), Ācārya Śīlabhadra (695), Dharmakirti (635-650), Devendra Bodhi (650), Śākyabodhi (675)</td>
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<td>Hemacandra (1088-1172), Candraprabha Śūri (1102), Nemicandra (1150) Ānanda Śūri and Amarakandra Śūri (1093-1135), Haribhadra Śūri (1120), Pārśvadeva Gani (1133), Śī Candrag (1137-1165).</td>
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<td>Devabhadra (1150), Candrasena Sūri (1150), Ratnaprabha Sūri (1181), Tilakācārya (1180-1240).</td>
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<td>Vardhamāna Upādhyāya (1250), Kesava Mīśra (1275), Tarkabhāsa, Pakṣadhara Mīśra (1275), Vāsudeva Mīśra (1275), Rucidatta Mīśra (1275).</td>
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<td>Rājaśekhara Sūri (1348), Jñānacandra (1350)</td>
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<td>Śrī Kaṇṭha (1409), Abhaya Tilakopādhyāya (1409) Śaṅkara Mīśra (1450), Vācaspati Mīśra (1450) Misaru Mīśra (1475), Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma (1450-1525), Raghunātha Śiromāṇi (1477-1547), Haridāsa Nyāyālaṅkara Bhaṭṭācārya (1480-1540)</td>
<td>Guṇaratna (1409), Śrutasāgara Gaṇi (1493)</td>
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<td>Durgādatta (1550) Jānamātha Śarmā (1550), Kanāda Tarkavāgīṣa (1560), Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭācārya (1560). Devanātha Ṭhākura (1562), Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīṣa (1570),</td>
<td>Dharmabhūṣaṇa (1600)</td>
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<td>Dates by Centuries</td>
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<td>Gaurikānta Sārvabhauma (1725), Rudrarāma (1750), 'Buno' Rāmanātha (1780), Kṛṣṇakānta Vidyāvāgīśa (1780) Mahādeva Puntamkāra (1790)</td>
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<td>19th cent.</td>
<td>Raghunātha Śāstri (Parvata) (1815)</td>
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THE CONCEPTION OF DRAVYAS IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY*

KAMAL CHAND SOGANI

Jainism takes experience as its guide and resolves the whole of the universe of being into two everlasting, uncreated, co-existing, but independent categories of Jīva and Ajīva. The Ajīva is further classified into pudgala (matter), Dharma (principle of motion), Adharma (principle of rest), Ākāsa (space) and Kāla (time). Hence reality is dualistic as well as pluralistic. But according to the Jaina plurality, though an ontological fact, entails unity also, if it is considered from the synthetic and objective point of view of one existence. According to Kunda-kunda, in spite of the unique characteristics possessed by the different substances (Dravyas) existence has been regarded as an all-comprising characteristics of reality which ends all distinctions.1 The Kārttikeyānupreksā recognises that all substances are one from the stand-point of substance, while they are distinct and separate from their characteristic differences.2 Samantabhadra also endorses this view by affirming that in view of the conception of one universal existence all are one, but from the point of view of substances distinctions arise.3 Padmaprabhamaladharideva pronounces that a 'Mahāsattā' pervades all the things in their entirety, but it is always associated with 'Avāntarasattā' which pervades only the particular objects.4 In a similar vein, Amṛtocandra speaks of the two types of Satta, namely, 'Svarupasatta' and 'Sadrasyasatta.' The latter is the same as 'Samanyasatta:'5 In his Saptabhāngitārāngini Vimaladasa discusses the problem of unity and plurality of existence in detail, and concludes that both the postulation of existential identity and the articulation of differences from the stand-point of different substance are logically justifiable.6 Thus Jainism gives credence to the recognition of existential oneness but not exclusively, since it is always bound up with plurality. This is quite consistent with the Anekāntātmaka view

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* Reprinted from C. L. Jain's Felicitation Volume.
1. Prava. comm. Amrta. 11-5
2. Kartti. 236
3. Apta-mimansa-34
4. Niyama. comm. Padmaprabha. 34
of reality propounded by the Jaina philosophers. The sole warrant for the existence of one and many, unity and diversity, is experience which vouches for such a character of reality. Thus, Mahāsattā will be associated with its opposite, namely, Avāntarasattā. It may again be pointed out that this Mahāsattā is not an independent something as may be conceived, but is invariably accompanied by its opposite. Kundakunda holds the nature of existence as one, immanent in the totality of substances constituting the universe, comprehending and summarizing the universe, having infinite modifications, indicative of the triple characteristics of origination, destruction, and persistence and in the last as associated with the characteristics opposite to those mentioned above. Hence unity, duality, and plurality are inseparably and inevitably involved in the structure of reality.

By recognising both Jiva and pudgala as substances Jainism steers clear of the two extremes of materialism and idealism which are radically opposed to each other. Materialism considers the universe as rooted in matter, while idealism imagines the mind or spirit to be the fundamental and primary. The former lays stress on the recognition of the reality of matter and considers the mind to be an incident or accompaniment; the latter affirms that mind or spirit is to be reckoned as real and matter just an appearance. But according to Jainism, both matter and spirit are only partially true, and neither is warrantable unless experience is allowed to be robbed of its significance.

Notwithstanding the mutual interpenetration of the six Dravyas and the accommodative nature of each, they never part with their original nature. This statement is indicative of the fact that these Dravyas are incapable of transgressing their fixed number which is six. Therefore, this reduction or multiplication is an impossibility. With the solitary exception of Kāla Dravya, the remaining five are termed as Pācāṣṭikāya for the simple reason of possessing many Pradesas. The word 'Kāya' should be understood only to connote 'many Pradesas. Jiva, Dharma and Adharma separately own innumerable Pradesas; Akasa possesses infinite ones; Kāla, one; but Pudgala possesses numberable, and infinite Pradesas. All the Dravyas except

7. Panca. comm. Amrata. 8
8. Pancadhya. 1. 15
9. Panca. 8
10. Ibid 7
11. Sarvartha V. 4
12. panca. comm. Amrata. 22 Panca 102; Parva II. 43; Niyama. 34.
14. Dravya 25; Tsu. V. 8, 9, 10; Niama 35, 36. The Space occupied by an atom is called a Pradesa.
Pudgala are pronounced to be bereft of material qualities of touch, taste, smell and colour, and only Jiva is believed to have possessed consciousness. Hence Dharma, Adharma, Kāla and Akasa are destitute of consciousness, as also of material qualities. Thus they should not be misapprehended as being comprised under the category of matter, but under a different category of non-sentiency-cum-non-materiality. As for Dharma, Adharma and Akasa, each of them is considered to be one, while Jiva and Pudgala are infinite; and Kāla is innumerable.\textsuperscript{15} Besides Dharma, Adharma, Akasa and Kāla are by nature non-active and the remaining two are active.\textsuperscript{16}

**Nature of self:**

Having discussed the general nature of the six substances, we now proceed to deal with their specific nature. We start with Jiva (self).

The problem of self is the most fundamental in the domain of philosophy. Since the dawn of philosophical speculation down to the present time it has vexed great philosophers and led them to formulate different conceptions consistent with the metaphysical outlook upheld by them. With Jainism though the probing into the nature of self is not a new enterprise, the special point of the Jaina view consists in substantiating the notion of self without blinking the loftiest mystical heights on the one hand and without condemning the unabstracted experience as sheer illusion on the other. The self, as an Ontologically underived fact, is one of the six substances subsisting independently of anything else. The experience of knowing\textsuperscript{17} feeling\textsuperscript{18} and willing undeniably proves the existence of self. The *Kārttikeyānupreksā* recognises that the self is to be regarded as possessing supreme significance among the substances and as having the highest value among the Tattvas.\textsuperscript{20} It is the repository of excellent characteristics.\textsuperscript{21} It is the internal Tattva. It is to be distinguished from the other substances which are merely external, since they are without any knowledge of things to be renounced and accepted.\textsuperscript{22} Kundakunda in the *Pravacanasāra* calls it Mahārtha (a great objectivity\textsuperscript{23}). It is neither

\begin{itemize}
\item 15. Gomma. Ji 587; Tsu. V. 6.
\item 16. Sarvartha. V 7; Panca. 98.
\item 17. Acaranga 1 1.5 p. 50
\item 18. Kartti. 183.
\item 19. Kartti. 184.
\item 20. Kartti. 204.
\item 21. Ibid....
\item 22. Kartti 205.
\item 23. Parva II. 150.
\end{itemize}
merely an immutable principle as advocated by the Vedānta, the Samkhya-Yoga and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, not merely a momentarily transmutable series of psychical states as recognised by the Buddhist. But, according to the Jaina, it is a synthesis of permanence and change. Consciousness, according to him, is its essential and distinguishing feature. The Jaina, therefore differs from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Pūrva-Mimāṁsā which regard consciousness as an adventitious attribute, as also from the Cārvāka which envisages consciousness as an epiphomenon of matter, something like the inebriating power emerged from the mixing of certain ingredients. The systems of thought like the Sāmkhya-Yoga and the Vedānta of Samkara and Rāmānuja betrays a fair resemblance to the consideration of the Jaina that consciousness is intrinsically associated with the self.

Nature of empirical self:

First the empirical self has been in a state of transmigration since an indeterminable past. It is on this account contended that the self originates and decays. But this is valid only from the Pāryāyārthika point of view and not from the Dravyārthika one which lays down indestructibility and unproductivity of the Self. Secondly, the empirical self is in possession of non-essential vyañjanaparyāya and non-essential arthaparyāya. It illumines the whole of the body by pervading in it, just as the lotus-hued ruby illumines the cup of milk. Thirdly, the empirical self is considered by the Jaina as the doer of evil and good actions. Fourthly, it is also the enjoyer. To sum up, the empirical self is bound by Karmas from an indefinite past, is the enjoyer of the self-performed good and bad actions, is the knower and the seer, and is associated with the triple nature of origination, destruction and continuance. Besides, it possesses the narrowing and dilating characteristics, extends up to the limit of bodily dimensions and owns its specific characteristics of knowledge, bliss etc. It may be noted here that Jainism recognises the metaphysical reality of infinite selves. We may point out in passing that the relation between the empirical self and transcendental one is one of identity-cum-difference, i.e. there is metaphysical identity between the two states (empirical and superempirical) of the same self, but the difference is also undeniable in respect of the Upādhis which have been persisting since an infinite past. The empirical self is potentially transcendental, though this nominal state of existence is not actualised at present; hence the distinction is incontrovertible.

25. Panca. 33.
26. Siddha Bhakti. 2
One sensed empirical selves:

The empirical self is recognised by the Prāṇas it owns. The minimum number of Prāṇas possessed by the empirical self is four (one-sense, one bala, life-limit and breathing), and the maximum number is ten, (five senses, three balas, life-limit, and breathing). However, encumbered by the cruel matter self may be, it cannot obstruct the manifestation of consciousness to the full, just as even the most dense cloud cannot interrupt the light of the sun to its farthest extreme. The lowest in the grade of existence are the one-sensed jivas. They possess four Prāṇas. To make it clear, of the five senses namely the sense of touch, taste, smell, colour and sound, the one-sensed jivas possess only the sense of touch; and of the three balas namely: balas of mind, body and speech, they have only bala of body, and besides they hold life-limit and breathing. These one-sensed jivas admit of five fold classification,28 namely earth-bodied, water-bodied, fire-bodied, air bodied and lastly, vegetable-bodied souls. The recognition of these one-sensed souls is fraught with great difficulty since the four Prāṇas are not explicitly manifested, just as the Prāṇas of a man in the state of numbness, or just as the Prāṇas of a growing soul in the egg of a bird or in the embryonic state cannot be recognised owing to the lack of their explicit manifestation.29

Two-sensed to five sensed empirical souls:

Having pointed out the various forms of existence of one-sensed jivas and the number of Prāṇas upheld by them, we now proceed to the higher grades of existence. The two-sensed Jīvas possess six Prāṇans, i.e. in addition to the four Prāṇas of one-sensed souls, they have two Prāṇas more, namely, sense of taste, and bala of speech; the three-sensed souls have the sense of smell additionally; the four-sensed souls have the sense of colour besides the above; and lastly the five sensed souls which are mindless are endowed with the sense of hearing in addition; and those with mind possess all the the ten Prāṇas.30 Thus the number of Prāṇas, possessed by one-sensed to five-sensed souls are four, six, seven, eight, nine and ten respectively. The illustrations of the two-sensed souls are, sea-snail, cowrie-shell-fish, conch-shell-fish, earth-worm etc31., of the three-sensed souls are louce.

29. Panca. 113.
30. Sarvartha II-14.
bug, ant$^{32}$, of the four-sensed souls are mosquito, fly and butter fly$^{33}$ of the five-sensed souls with ten Pranas are celestial, hellish, and human beings and some sub-human souls$^{34}$; and of the five-sensed souls with nine-prāṇas are only some sub-human souls$^{35}$. All the diverse mundane souls right up to four-sensed ones are designated as non-rational or mindless (Asaṃjñā), whereas the five-sensed sub-human beings may be rational and non-rational, but the celestial, hellish and human beings are necessarily rational$^{36}$. The rational souls may be recognised by the capability of being preached, of receiving instruction, and of voluntary action$^{37}$.

**Spiritual classification of selves:**

Apart from the empirical classification of selves, Jainism gives us a different classification of selves from the spiritual point of view. If the former classification refers to the scientific attitude of the Jains, the latter refers to his spiritual outlook. The three kinds of self which the Jains recognise from the spiritual standpoint are *Bahirātman*, *Antarātman*, and *Paramātman*.

**(a) Bahirātman:**

The attitude of Cārvāka materialist may very well sum up the meaning of the Bahirātman. The characteristics of the Bahirātman may, in the first place, be accounted for by affirming that he identifies himself with the physical body,$^{38}$ wife and children, silver and gold$^{39}$ etc. with the logical consequence that he is constantly obsessed with the fear of self-annihilation of the body and the like.$^{40}$ Secondly, he remains engaged in the transient pleasures of the senses,$^{41}$ feels elated in getting the coveted things of the unsubstantial world, and becomes dejected when they depart. Thirdly, he is drowsy of getting beautiful body and physical enjoyment in the life hereafter as a result of his penances,$^{42}$ and is tormented even by the thought of death.$^{43}$

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32. Ibid. 115.
33. Ibid. 116.
34. Panca. 117 and comm. Amrta.
35. Ibid (In all references from 4 to 5 translation borrowed from Chakravarti’s Pandastikāya)
40. Jñana XXXII. 18.
41. Samadhi 7, 55 pp. 1–84
42. Samadhi–42.
43. Samadhi–76.
(b) Antaratman:

First, he is the spiritually converted self\(^{44}\) who has relinquished the eight kinds of pride\(^{45}\), and reflects on his own self as his legitimate and genuine abode, disparaging the outward physical dwelling places as unnatural and artificial.\(^{46}\) Secondly, he renounces all identification with the animate objects like wife, children etc. and inanimate objects like wealth, property etc. and properly weighs them in the balance of his discriminative knowledge.\(^{47}\) Thirdly, by virtue of the sprouting of profound wisdom in him, he develops a unique attitude towards himself and the world around him. He is the only self that has acquired the right of Mokṣa.\(^{48}\) and consequently he adopts such attitude as is necessary to safeguard his spiritual status and interest. He gets endowed with such type of insight as will enable him resolutely to march for spiritual invasion and then sound the bugle of triumph after defeating the treacherous foes of attachment and aversion assaulting him in his Bahiratman.

(c) Paramatman:

The paramātman is the supreme-self, the consummation of aspirant’s life, the terminus of his spiritual endeavours. The embodied Paramātman is Arhat, while the disembodied one is Siddha.\(^{49}\) The Mokṣa Pāhuda proclaims Paramātman as bereft of collyrium, defects, body, senses and as associated with omniscience, and purity.\(^{50}\) He is free from birth, old age and death; he is supreme, pure, and devoid of eight Karmas; he possesses infinite knowledge, intuition, bliss, and potency; and he is indivisible, indestructible, and inexhaustible.\(^{51}\) Besides, he is super-sensuous and unparalleled; is free from obstructions, merit, demerit, and rebirth; and is external, steady, and independent.\(^{52}\)

Nature and Function of Pudgala (Matter):

Matter, according to Jainism, is not something formless, indefinite.

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44. Mo. Pa-5, Kartti. 194.
45. Kartti–194. The eight kinds of pride are: pride of (1) learning (2) honour (3) family (4) caste (5) power (6) opulence (7) penance and (8) body.
46. Samadhi–73
47. Mo. Pa. 17.
48. Ibid 14, 37.
49. Kartti 198.
50. Mo Pa. 5, 6.
52. Ibid. 177.
and absolutely featureless as conceived by Anaximander, nor is it to be regarded as non-being in the Platonic sense, "a secondary; a dull, irrational, recalcitrant force, the unwilling slave of mind."53 Neither does it admit of its being considered to be a sensation complex, a collection of ideas as signified by the subjective idealism of Barkeley. Apart from this, it is to be distinguished from the Prakṛti of Sāmkhya. Jainism propounds matter in the realistic sense, and so its cognizance is based on its characteristics sense-qualities of touch, taste, smell and colour which are in the relation of invariable concomitance, i.e., one quality is never found in isolation, but always is a group of four, though in varying degrees of intensity.54 The conception of matter is so comprehensive as to comprise under it the five substances of earth, water, air, light and Dravya-mind out of nine substances admitted by the Vaiśeṣika. Hence these five substances are easily assimilable in Pudgala55, since they emerge out of material atoms by varying combinations. The aforementioned four qualities of atom admit of numberable, innumberable and infinite classifications; but the principal kinds are regarded as twenty; namely eight kinds of touch (soft, hard, heavy, light hot, cold, viscous, and dry56); five kinds of tastes (bitter, pungent, sour, sweet, and astringent)57; two kinds of smell (fragrance and the reverse58); five kinds of colour (blue, yellow, white, black and red).59 The functions of Pudgala are: the five types of body, the speech, the mind, the karmic particles, the breathing including exhaling and inhaling the pleasure and the pain, the life and the death, and the five senses.60

Kinds of Pudgala:

The principal forms in which Pudgala (matter) exists are aṇu (atom) and skhandha (aggregate).61 Binary to infinite aggregates are included in skhandha.62 An atom is of only one Pradesa, is the termius of divisibility of matter, is by itself without beginning, end or middle, is destitute of sound and is coupled with the qualities of taste, touch, smell and colour.63 Besides it is indestructible and eternal, is responsible

53. History of Philosophy (Edition 1949) p. 59
54. Tsu. V. 23; Sarvartha V.5.
55. Sarvartha V. 3.
56. Sarvartha V. 23.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Panca 82, Sarvatha. V. 19, 20
61. Tsu V 25; Niyama. 20.
63. Panca 77.
for the disruption of skhandhas by virtue of its segregation from them, is also the substantial cause of them and is the measure of time.\textsuperscript{64} Again it is devoid of sound, but is the cause of sound i.e., the combination of atoms may produce sound when they strike against other aggregates of atoms.\textsuperscript{65} It possesses any one colour, any one taste, any one smell, but a pair of such touches as are not of contradictory nature, namely, cold and viscous, or cold and dry, or hot and viscous or hot and dry.\textsuperscript{66} The remaining touches, namely, soft and hard, light and heavy are only manifested in the skhandha state of matter, and thus are not present in its atomic state. The qualities of viscousness (snigdhatā) and dryness (rūkṣatā) vary in degrees of intensity extending from the lowest limit to the highest, from one point to infinity.\textsuperscript{67} The variation in the degrees of intensity may be ordinarily witnessed in the milk of she-goat, cow, buffalo, and she-camel in point of viscousness, and in dust (pāṃsu), gross-sand (kaṇīkā), and sand (sarkarā) in respect of dryness.\textsuperscript{68} Hence atoms are capable of existing with infinite variability in these two characteristics. These are responsible for atomic linking.\textsuperscript{69} Thus, for explaining the combination of atoms this assumption excludes God or Adraśṭa as recognised by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school of thought, as also the primordial motion of atoms as advocated by Democritus. Though, according to the Jaina, atom is active,\textsuperscript{70} activity is not the cause of combination. It will not be amiss to say that those atoms which are at the lowest in the scale of viscousness and dryness are not given in combination either with one another or with other intensifications.\textsuperscript{71} But atoms which hold two degrees of viscousness and dryness in excess are given to interlinking: i.e. atoms which hold two degrees of viscousness and dryness are interlinkable with four degrees of the same in all respects. Similarly, this law holds good for other interlinkings.\textsuperscript{73} Besides, the atoms which possess four degrees of viscousness or dryness are capable of transforming atoms having two degrees of viscousness or dryness into their own nature.\textsuperscript{74} Similarly, this holds good for all those atoms which have a difference of two degrees of viscousness or dryness. This theory

\textsuperscript{64} Panca. 80.
\textsuperscript{65} Panca. 78, 79; 81.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid. 81., Niyama, 27. comm. Aṃtata.
\textsuperscript{67} Sarvartha V 33,
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid. 33.
\textsuperscript{69} Gomm. Ji 608.
\textsuperscript{70} Panca. comm. Aṃrtā. 98.
\textsuperscript{71} Sarvartha V. 34.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid. V. 35.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid. V. 36.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid. V 37.
thus avoids mere conjunction of atoms, but propounds their synthetic indentification.\textsuperscript{75}

We now proceed to skhandha. The aggregates of atoms exist in six different forms, namely- (1) Gross-gross, (2) Gross, (3) Gross-fine, (4) Fine-Gross (5) Fine and lastly (6) Fine fine.\textsuperscript{76} (1) The class of matter which, when divided, cannot restore its original state without any extraneous help is termed as gross-gross. The examples of which are wood, stone, and the like. (2) That which can be reunited on being divided without the intervention of a third something is called gross, as for example, water, oil, etc. (3) Shadow, Sunshine, etc. which are incapable of distintegration and grasp are subsumed under gross-fine. (4) The object of touch, taste, smell and hearing are called fine gross. (5) The Kārmic matter etc. which are imperceptible by the senses are included into the category of fine. (6) The binary aggregates and the skandhas smaller than the Karmic matter come under the next category of fine-fine. As we have said, the generation of sound is effected by the striking of skandhas against one another. Thus Jainism take exception to the view of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika which calls sound the quality of Akasa, in as much as it is capable of being sensed which would not have been possible had it been the quality of Akasa.

Next comes the reality of Dharma, Adharma, Ākāśa and Kāla. None of the philosophical systems originated in the east and west postulated the independent existence of the principle of motion (Dharma) and the principle of rest (Adharma). Besides, the idealistic thinkers have unhentitatingly brushed aside the reality even of space and time, since they find themselves in the meshes of irreconcilable contradictions. Kant regarded them as the forms of perceptions which are imposed by sensibility upon things. Hence on account of glasses of space and time attached to sensibility, the noumenal reality escapes our grip and its attainment becomes a wild goose-chase. But the Jaina who relies upon the findings of experience absolves us from the creations of \textit{a priori} logic by positing the reality of Dharma, Adharma, Ākāśa and Kāla answering to the experienced motion, rest, allowance of room, and change respectively.

We shall now throw some light on the nature of motion. All the idealists are unanimous in rejecting the reality of motion and in designating it as mere appearance, phenomenal, and unworthy of being intelligibly applied to thing-in itself. The Eleatic philosopher Zeno was the first to raise the voice against the possibility of motion. But Jainism

\textsuperscript{75} Sarvatha. V. 37,
recognises the reality of motion. It is defined as the modification originating from the external and internal inducements which make possible the traversing from one point of space to another.\textsuperscript{77} The substances like Dharma, Adharma, Ākāśa and Kāla are non-active and motionless in this sense, but Jiva and Pudgala are said to be the authors of motion; that is, these two Dravyas are capable of being active to the exclusion of others.\textsuperscript{78} Activity is not a different, independent category, but a special modification of these two substances due to the external and internal causes.\textsuperscript{79} Besides, it should be distinguished from the \textit{Arthaparyāya} which means motionless change possessed by all the six Dravyas. The activity of Jiva is due to the external causal agency of Karman. Thus Siddhas are non-active on account of the absence of Karman.\textsuperscript{80} The activity of Pudgala is due to the external agency of Kāla. It will remain perpetual, since unlike Karmic particles Kāla can never be absent at any time. Thus the Pudgala unlike the Siddhas cannot be non-active.\textsuperscript{81}

\textbf{Akasa:}

That extent of space which is replete with matter, souls, time, principle of motion, and principle of rest is labelled as Lokākāśa, or world space. This distinguishes it from Alokākāśa or empty space wherein none of the five substances abides.\textsuperscript{82} Thus the former is recognised as being capable of providing accommodation to Jivas, Pudgala and to the rest of the Dravyas. That space is in its own base and support, and does not call for any other substance to accommodate. It is evident from the fact that there is no other substance of more vastness than this which may provide room to it. And even if it is conceded, it will implicitly lead us to the fallacy of regress and infinitum.\textsuperscript{83} Besides, it is imperative to note that, considered from the point of view of the thing-in-itself, all substances exist in themselves. It is only regarded from the commonplace point of view that all substances are subsisting in space.\textsuperscript{84} The principles of motion of oil in the seed.\textsuperscript{85} Despite the omnipresence of Dharma and Adharma in the

\textsuperscript{76} Niyama. 21 to 24
\textsuperscript{77} Sarvartha. V. 7; Panca comm. Amrta. 98
\textsuperscript{78} Sarvartha. V. 7.
\textsuperscript{79} Rajava. V. 7/1.2.
\textsuperscript{80} Panca. comm. Amrta 98; Rajava V. 7/14 to 16.
\textsuperscript{81} Panca comm. Amrta 98.
\textsuperscript{82} Dravya. 20; Sarvartha V. 12, Panca. 90, 91.
\textsuperscript{83} Rajava. V. 12/2 to 4.
\textsuperscript{84} Rajava. V. 12/5 to 6.
\textsuperscript{85} Sarvartha V. 13.
Lokākāśa and the existence of Jīva, Pudgala, and Kāla therein they never forfeit their respective specific nature.  

**Dharma and Adharma:**

Dharma and Adharma are the indifferent conditions of movement and rest respectively. Dharmāstikāya is itself incapable of migration and of generating motion in other things, but is the *sine qua non* of the movement of Jivas and Pudgala by its mere existence, just as water assists in spontaneous movement of fish by its mere presence and not as the wind which has the capability to develop activity in certain things. Similarly, Adharmāstikāya does not persuade Jīva and Pudgala in motion to stand still, but becomes the passive cause when they of their own accord discontinue to move, just as the shadow of a tree does not persuade a traveller to take rest under it. Thus neither Dharmāstikāya actuates motion, nor Adharmāstikāya stops it. Both of them are the non-provoking conditions. Besides, these two Principles are also responsible for the demarcation of Lokākāśa and Alokākāśa in as much as they make possible the existence of Jīva and Pudgala only in Lokākāśa. Again, the residence of the Siddhas at summit of the world also proves that space cannot account for motion and rest and different principles like Dharma and Adharma must needs be assumed.

**Kala:**

The underlying assumption of the whole Jaina philosophy is that though reality is incessantly subject to mutation, it sustains its identical character. Thus everyone of the substances without exception is credited with origination, destruction and persistence. In the substances like Dharma, Adharma, Ākāśa and liberated soul and an atom of matter the qualities are continuously changing in themselves. The experience of change, however, in the mundane soul and in the gross matter is omnipresent. And this is of necessity to be accounted for, and should not be speculatively condemned as mere illusion. In view of this, the Jainas realistically confer an existential status on 'time' as substance to answer for the experienced change just as

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86. Rajava. V. 16/10.
87. Panca 85, 88 and comm. Amrta.
88. Ibid. 86.
89. Panca. 87.
90. Ibid. 92, 93 and comm. Amrta.
91. Prava. comm Amrata. II. 1.
92. Niyama. 33.
SOGANI: THE CONCEPTION OF DRAVYAS IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY

Dharma, Adharma and Akāśa have been calculated to throw light on what may be called motion, rest and providing of room.\textsuperscript{93} Kant's statement is worthy to be noted when he affirms that it is impossible to emancipate ourselves from the spatial and temporal ways of thinking and speaking despite our endeavours; but the Jains though honour their thesis, refuse to acquiesce in the fact that space and time are contributed by sensibility, since according to them they are revealed in experience and are objectively and ontologically true. Just as space is its own support, so also real time is conceived to be assisting its own change or modification along with its being the condition of change in other substances constituting the universe. Kāla may be classified into real time (Paramārtha Kāla) and conditioned time (Vyavahāra Kāla).\textsuperscript{94} The former is the substance proper\textsuperscript{95} and Samaya, Āvalī are conditioned time.\textsuperscript{96} The function of Paramārtha kāla is Vartanā; i.e., it passively helps the self-changing substances; and the functions of conditioned time are change, motion and the feeling of being young and old.\textsuperscript{97} As has already been pointed out, Kāla Dravya is deprived of the designation ‘Kāya’ inasmuch as it has only one Pradeśa in the form of Kāla Aṇu. These Kāla aṇus are innumerable and separately exist on each Pradeśa of Lokākāśa without being mixed with one another.\textsuperscript{98} The unit of conditioned time is called “Samaya” which may be defined as the period required by the primary material atom to traverse with slow pace from one Pradesa of Ākāśa to the immediately next.\textsuperscript{99} It is practically inconceivable in life. It should be borne in mind that the innumerable ‘Samayas’ lapse in the opening of an eyelid.

\textsuperscript{93} Niyama. 30.
\textsuperscript{94} Sarvartha. V. 22.
\textsuperscript{95} Tsu. V. 39.
\textsuperscript{96} Niyama. 31
\textsuperscript{97} Sarvartha. V-22.
\textsuperscript{98} Dravya. 22; Niyama. 32.
\textsuperscript{99} Prava. II. 47.
List of Abbreviations

Ācārāṇgā—Ācārāṇgā-sūtra (Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XXII.)
Āptamāṁśā—Āptamāṁśā of Samantabhadhra (Anantakirti Granthamala, Bombay).
Dravya—Dravyasangraha (Sarale Jain Grantha Bhandāra, Jabalpur).
Jñānā—Jñānārnava of Śubhacandra (Rāyacandra Jaina Śāstramālā, Bombay).
Kārtti—Kārttikeyānupreksā (Rāyacandra Jaina Śāstramālā, Bombay).
Mo. Pā.—Mokṣa-Pāhuḍa of Kundakunda (Pātani Digambara Jaina Granthamālā, Mārotha).
Niyama—Niyamasāra of Kundakunda (Sacred Books of the Jainas Vol. IX).
Niyama comm. Padmaprabha—Niyamasāra of Kundakunda along with the commentary of Padmaprabhamaladhāra (Jain Grantharatnākara Kāryālaya, Bombay).
Pañcādhīyi—Pañcādhīyī (Malika Granthaparakāsaka Kārīyālaya, Indore).
Pañca—Pañcāstikāya of Kundakunda (Rāyacandra Jaina Śāstramālā, Bombay).
Pañca comm. Amṛta—Pancāstikāya of Kundakunda along with the commentary of Amṛtacandra (Rāyacandra Jain Śāstramālā, Bombay).
Pancā comm. Jayasena—Pancāstikāya of Kundakunda along with the commentary of Jayasena (Rāyacandra Jain Śāstramālā, Bombay).
Prava—Pravacanasāra of Rāyachandra Jain Śāstramālā, Bombay).
Prava comm. Amṛta—Pravacanasāra of Kundakunda along with the commentary of Amṛtacandra (Rāyacandra Jaina Śāstramālā, Bombay).
If pure music had the power to beckon
Clouds and bring rain,
Pure beauty may, one day, bring back
Light in the blinded eye.

We believe so.
And therefore we try—
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