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JAINA PLURAL PERSPECTIVE: A HANDY RESOURCE TO THE MINISTRY OF DIALOGUE AND RECONCILIATION

Vincent Sekhar, S.J.

Introduction: Religion and society constantly shape each other in history. Otto Maduro, a renowned sociologist, contends that it is mainly the structure of the society that will define what forms of religious or moral activity that is beneficial for them to develop. In a class/caste structure, the dominant class develops and exercises its material power in the economic, political, military, moral, educational, literary, artistic and religious spheres. It will also have the material means to achieve their interest with good chances of success.

Such a dynamics normally leads to polarisation of groups against one another, resulting in hidden and open conflicts, and even violence. Religions play at times an ambiguous role in class/caste society. But the same religion has a moral force to unite its followers under several banners. The gods and goddesses, their worship and other rituals and celebrations gather people, provoke a relationship, even urge them to live in harmony and peace. It awakens humans to what is good and correct, eliminating evils in individual and society. A society that is conscious its religious dimension can creatively engage in its own integral development and overall welfare.

Building up a New Humanity and creating a New Environment seems to be the major aim of all religions. But every religion has its own focus and basic ethos. For instance, Jaina Dharma upholds the sanctity of life and urges that life should be preserved and promoted. Jainism, sometimes known as the Religion of Ahiṃsā, has given new thrust and meaning to this vital principle particularly in the social and

political planes. As the Jains believe that it is hiṃsā or injury to life, which is the root cause of all evils, they offer the contrary, namely, ahiṃsā as the method and means of salvation.

Problems of Fundamentalism and Exclusivism: All religions acknowledge oneness of the source, plurality of paths, and advocate respect, openness and understanding: Hinduism reveals the One Being behind the diversity of gods. “They have called him Indra, Mitra, Varuna, Agni, and the divine fine winged Garuda; They speak of Indra, Yama, Mātarisvan: the One Being sages call by many names.” Another Hindu text Śrīmad Bhāgavatam says that “Truth has many aspects. Infinite truth has infinite expressions. Though the sages speak in divers ways, they express one and the same Truth.” It is the ignorant who says, “What I say and know is true; others are wrong. It is because of this attitude of the ignorant that there have been doubts and misunderstandings about God. This attitude it is that causes dispute among men. But all doubts vanish when one gains self-control and attains tranquillity by realizing the heart of Truth. Thereupon dispute, too, is at an end.” Hence the text exhorts all to “shun all pride and jealousy. Give up all idea of me and mine.......As long as there is consciousness of diversity and not of unity in the Self, a man ignorantly thinks of himself as a separate being, as the “door” of actions and the experiencer of effects, he remains subject to birth and death, knows happiness and misery, is bound by his own deeds, good or bad.” And a person should act like the wise. He should, “Like the bee, gathering honey from different flowers, the wise man accepts the essence of different scriptures and sees only the good in all religions.”

Islam believes that there is no compulsion in religion. It goes on to say that it was God who had ordained for each one a path. “To

3. Śrīmad Bhāgavatam 11.15 Ibid. p. 39
4. Ibid. 11.4 on p. 291
5. Ibid. 11.3 on p. 40
each of you we have appointed a right way and an open road. If God had willed he would have made you one community, but that he may try you in what is given to you. So be you forward in good works; unto God shall you return altogether and he will tell you of that wherein you good works; unto God shall you return altogether and he will tell you of that wherein you were at variance.” 7 “Will you then compel mankind, against their will, to believe?” Questions thus, it says that “No soul can believe, except by the will of God.” 8 Finally Islam advises people not to dispute with one another on the matter of religion, but to summon unto the Lord. 9

The Adi Granth of the Sikhs acknowledges the Lord’s secrets in each one: “Some call on the Lord, Rāma, some cry, Khudā, some bow to Him as Gosain, some as Allah; He is called the Ground of Grounds and also the Bountiful, The Compassionate One and Gracious. The Hindus bathe in holy waters for his sake; Muslims make the pilgrimage to Mecca. The Hindus perform pūjā; others bow their heads on namāz. There are those who read the Vedas and others--Christians, Jews, Muslims--who read the Semitic scriptures. Some wear blue, some white robes, some call themselves Muslims, others Hindus. Some aspire to bahishat (Muslim heaven), some to svarga (Hindu heaven). Says Nānak, Whoever realizes the will of the Lord, he will find out the Lord’s secrets!” 10 And hence it asks, “The Hindus and the Muslims have but one and the same God, What can a mullah or a Sheikh do?” 11

Jainism too believes that all the doctrines are right in their own respective spheres. But if they encroach upon the province of other doctrines and try to refute their views, they are wrong. “A man who holds the view of the cumulative character of truth never says that a particular view is right or that a particular view is wrong.” 12 And hence, “those who praise their own doctrines and disparage the doctrines of

7. Quran 5,48, Ibid. p. 37
8. Qur’an 10.99-100, Ibid. p. 39
9. Qur’an 22.67, Ibid. 36
11. Adi Granth, Bhairo, p. 1158, Ibid. p. 35
others do not solve any problem.”¹³ And Buddhism too holds a similar thought. “To be attached to a certain view and to look down upon others’ views as inferior--this the wise men call a fetter.”¹⁴ In this context, one is too familiar with the old story of the Six Blind Men and the Elephant, narrated in Jain and Buddhist texts.¹⁵

The Gleanings from the Writings of Baha’u’llah points out that “there can be no doubt that whatever the peoples of the world, of whatever race or religion, derive their inspiration from one heavenly source, and are the subjects of one God. The difference between the ordinances under which they abide should be attributed to the varying requirements and exigencies of the age in which they were revealed. All of them, except for a few which are the outcome of human perversity, were ordained of God, and are a reflection of His Will and Purpose.”¹⁶ Confucius also said, “In the world there are many different roads but the destination is the same. There are a hundred deliberations but the result is one.”¹⁷

While this is true, exclusive truth claims are also found across all religions. For example, the Catholic Church remarks that the non-Christian religions are ‘incomplete’ in their search for God (Evengelii Nuntiandi or Evangelisation in the Modern World, No. 53). Though the Church acknowledges that non-Christian religions “are all impregnated with innumerable seeds of the Word and can constitute a true preparation for the Gospel” (53), yet the Church also says that “our religion effectively established with God an authentic and living relationship which the other religions don’t succeed in doing, even though..... their arms stretched out towards heaven” and it is the “religion of Jesus that objectively places man in relation with the plan

¹³. Sūtrakritāṅga 1.1.50, Ibid. p. 39
¹⁴. Suttanipāta 798, Ibid. p. 39
¹⁶. Baha’i Faith: Gleanings from the Writings of Baha’u’llah 111, Ibid. p. 35
¹⁷. I Ching, Appended Remarks 2.5, Ibid. p. 34
of God with his living presence and with his action.” (53) The more recent document *Dominus Iesus* itself is a declaration on the “Unicity and Salvific Universality of Jesus Christ and the Church.”

The Hindu text *the Bhagavad Gītā* too claims exclusivity. Lord Kṛṣṇa says, “As men approach Me, so I receive them. All paths, Arjuna, lead to Me.” (Gītā 4. 11) Similar passages are in plenty: “Some with faith may offer worship to other gods as devotees but that is only me they worship....” (9:23) Chapter 12 of the Bhagavad Gītā speaks about those who are ‘dear to’ the Lord: those “who fix their minds on me” (Gītā 12:2), “who cast their works on me” (12:6), etc. The Lord further declares, “From me alone all states of beings derive in their diversities” (10:4).

Such and other Exclusivists claims—their religion/ideology is unique/superior and all other revelations are secondary and inadequate—have caused conflicts and violence in religious history. It is a cause of concern even more, today. It has repercussions both at the sociological as well as theological levels. The phenomenon of fundamentalism has become a threat to communal harmony and peace. The fundamentalists defend an absolute truth that provides a sense of identity and that must be protected from all compromise. It has encouraged revivalist movements in every religion. Religious feelings and structures are often manipulated by political, economic, cultural or ethnic power groups in order to safeguard their vested interests.

Though seemingly correct in a way (after all, to each, his/her mother is unique), Fundamentalism is considered a narrow affirmation of truth. It derives from a self-sufficient attitude, which often looks at

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18. By the Congregation for the Doctrine of faith, Published by Pauline Publications, Bandra, 2000. This document had evoked controversies and comments from different quarters. Fr. S. Arockiasamy, S.J. says that “the Declaration, because of its specific limited objective, is not ecumenically formulated not does it have a language of ecumenical promotion........ (it) would have been differently expressed in a language and with a sensitivity embodying the long experience of dialogue.......” See his reflections on *Dominus Iesus* in *Sampriti*, December 2000, p.3
the speck in another's are eye unmindful of one's own defects. We often do not know the faiths of other believes and their practices. This type of ingorance sometimes leads us to petty quarrels, fights and other harmful relationship. At times, it takes the form of a tolerance, which almost negates the other or at the most, ignores the other. It sabotages seriousness in mutual learning and relationship. As one affirms one's own faith or ideology to be the only truth there is neither openness nor healthy encounter. Fundamentalism is a form of closure. The eyes are turned inside and there is a refusal to see the world at large.

While fundamentalism often refers to religious fundamentalism, it is also seen in other spheres of life like politics, where political ideologies do not make easy way to encounter the rest. Today inter-religious/cultural or inter-ideological dialogue is useful and necessary not only for coming to know the other better, for dispelling prejudices, etc. but also for a healthy collaboration between religious communities and ideological parties in order to promote common humanity based on values of eqality, justice and freedom.

Stanley Samartha\textsuperscript{20}, one of the leading Asian Christian theologians, suggests that exclusivism needs to be re-examined "as it puts fences round the Mystery. It divides people into 'we' and 'they' ............ (making) it almost impossible to live together with neighbours of their faiths except on very superficial social terms." Acknowledging the menace of religious exclusivism and fundamentalism, the Christian theologians came up with a Statement\textsuperscript{21} in the context of Hindutva's challenges, emphasising the need for dialogues and collaboration: "We invite all Christians to build up a positive relationship with our Hindu brothers and sisters and those of all other religious by means of healthy


dialogue and collaboration. Moreover, we would like strongly to dissociate ourselves from all those fundamentalist (groups)......"

All religions have a similar trend of thought especially at the wake of religious resurgence and religious conflicts. What does Jain religion say about these and such other claims? Do they have resources to say that their thinking is beyond all limiting boundaries? How do they tackle fundamentalism and exclusivism.....? While searching for answers to these and such other questions, the Jains propose ahimsā (non-violence) and anekānta (plural view) as cardinal life-principles, providing an ethical and a rational platform for dialogue. The Jain vision of ahimsā is comprehensive in its meaning. The Jains hold that ahimsā in thought is anekānta, an attitude of accommodation of the multifarious experiences of reality and life. Ahimsā in word or speech is syādvāda, a doctrinal acknowledgement of the saying 'truth is two-eyed.' Syādvāda implies that knowledge and understanding of an issue, idea, etc, vary with the person and the context. Finally, Ahimsā in deed is aparigraha, an attitude of detachment and renunciation. Having said this in summary form, I would like to go into the details about the rich resources available in Jain philosophical and religious traditions, bringing out their contribution to the field of dialogue.

**Jaina resources to Dialogue and Religious Tolerance:**

Jainism regards all religions as mystery. Its manifestations could be many. The cardinal Jain prayer, addressed to the Five-fold deities,22 is a good example of this belief. Praise to the Arhats, Siddhas, Ācāryas, Upādhyāyas, and all Sādhus. They are the liberated souls, not necessarily belonging to a particular religion or sect. As religion is a mystery, one need not be attached to any one form. Ācārya Hemacandra says that God is one although he may appear in any form or at any time, provided one is able to see devoid of all attachment: "My Lord! you are one although variously appearing.”23 Ācārāṅgasūtra says that the Supreme Soul (Paramātman) is where all voices get reflected: "There exists no simile to comprehend him. He is formless existence. He is what baffles all terminology. There is

23. Anyayogavyavyacchedikā, 29, Quoted in Muni Nathamal, Shramana Mahavira, trans. Dineshchandra Sharma, Mitra Parishad, 1976
no word to comprehend him.”24 These and such other religious statements acknowledge the presence and functioning of many religions and ideologies.

Jainism is clear about the root cause of evil, especially division, disunity and conflict among people. It is carnality: “Stupefied by the acute torments caused by tempting passions, a sensual person dwells in mundane existence.25 The self suffers from the five causes of bondage: “the absence of right faith, discipline, negligence, passions and receives into itself physical particles liable to become karma.”26 Hence a Jain could only be compassionate to all living beings, a needed attitude for any social engagement.

The Jaina community is aware that the goal and function of their religion is liberation. They believe that their religion is the religion of the Tīrthaṅkara or Supreme Lord, “who is adorable, endowed with omniscience, uncontaminated by human infirmities, immaculate and pure, devoid of any desire whatsoever, without beginning, middle, or end, and uniquely benevolent. And true scripture, which flows spontaneously out of the Supreme Lord, is irrefutable, is salutary for the well-being of all kinds of beings, is capable of undermining the perverse path, and reveals the objective nature of things.”27 Hence the Tīrthaṅkaras are a boon not only to the Jains but also for all.

Their religion is for the loving service of humanity. Hence it would advocate “benevolence towards all living beings, joy at the sight of the virtuous, compassion and sympathy for the afflicted, and tolerance towards the indolent and ill-behaved.”28 It would hail charity as the spring of virtue: “to be moved at the sight of the thirsty, the

24. Ācārāṅgasūtra 5. 123-40, Quoted in Muni Mahendra Kumar, trans. Acarangasutra, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1081
25. Ācārāṅgasūtra 2.1-3, Ibid.
27. Samantabhadra, Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakaṇḍaśāra 7-10, Quoted in K.C. Sogani, Ethical Doctrines in Jainism, Jain Sam. Samraksaka Sangh, 1967
hungry, and the miserable and to offer relief to them out of pity.\(^{29}\)
This could be the reason why a Jain is philanthropic in one’s life.

The \(\text{Ācārāṅgasūtra}\)\(^{30}\) advises one to comprehend one’s philosophical views through comprehensive study of another one. Hence rationality plays a prominent role in any analysis. Haribhadra\(^{31}\) would say that he would neither favour Mahāvīra, nor be averse to Kapila or other teachers. And he would be committed to the preaching that is truly rational. This makes a Jain truly compassionate and accommodative, while not sacrificing objectivity and rationality.

**Dialogue and the Spirit of Anekānta:**

The above ideas on *religious tolerance* imply the faith in the *doctrine of pluralism (Anekāntavāda).*\(^{32}\) The Jains believe that all their spiritual deities, the Tīrthaṅkaras, were full of compassion towards all living beings. Looking on them equally, they had a sense of harmony in themselves and also nurtured the same in their environment. To them, all living beings were endowed with the same basic life-force (Jīva), which sustained life on earth. The spiritual masters knew that life in all forms was never single, and hence were naturally prone to an Anekānta spirit, a spirit of accommodation.

This *spirit of anekānta* sustained life without doing any harm or damage to the living beings.\(^{33}\) They were sympathetic to note the differences in their nature and function, differences in their existence,


\(^{30}\) Ācārāṅgasūtra 5.113, Quoted in Muni Mahendra Kumar, Op. Cit.


\(^{32}\) *Anekānta* or the doctrine of relative pluralism was originally propounded in order to strike a balance between two extreme philosophical views, between ‘monism’ (the ‘being’ of the Vedantins) and ‘nihilism’ (the ‘becoming’ of the Buddhists). The Jains viewed that “all utterances made on something” do not have “an absolute value, but only a relative one and are, therefore, valid only under certain conditions and with certain restriction ....” See Helmuth Von Glasenapp, *Jainism --- An Indian Religion of Salvation,* Motilal Banarsidass Pvt. Ltd., Delhi, 1999, p. 170

sustenance, knowledge and vision, etc. They knew that due to the nature of their embodiment and bondage with karma the living beings were not able to see the Reality as such. Hence any study on a particular aspect of life will have its own reference points, given the limited grasping power of a living being. And from those reference points or points of view, their assertions may be true. But looking from a different angle, those assertions may be lapse or might be enriched. In brief, one cannot give a final answer to any problem.\textsuperscript{34} Realisation of such a truth was a motivation factor for understanding the limited thoughts and actions of a living being, which further evokes sympathy, compassion, concern, etc. over all that survives under the cosmos.

Pluralism comes to the aid of Jaina belief and practice whenever internal contradictions needed to be resolved. For instance, the niścaya and vyavahāra points of view make distinction between the two levels of understanding and experiencing. Say, for instance, the code of conduct for achieving the end of life: Jaina ethics propounds and absolute way for the ascetic way of life and a practical way for the lay persons, as the latter are bound by family and social circumstances, responsibilities and obligations. Thus, there are pluralistic life-structures, within which right action could be viewed from two different angles.

The same pluralistic theory comes to the aid of the Jains when they are to justify morally any action. The anekānta attitude takes into account the intention of the doer, the act proper, the effects of the act, and all the circumstances that enabled the person to act, besides

\textsuperscript{34} John E. Cort uses the term ‘anekāntavāda’ in a post modern perspective allowing the possibility of no single final answer. He points out the difference between the post modern usage and the traditional Jain usage of the term: the Jain insist on the possibility of a single true vision of the absolute truth perceived by the Jina in his ‘all-knowing’ infinite perception (anantadarśana) and infinite knowledge (anantajñāna). All Jains strive for this vision through right perception (samyagdarśana) and right knowledge (samyagjñāna). See John E. Cort (ed.): Open Boundaries --- Jain Communities and Cultures in Indian History, State University of New York Press, New York, 1998, Footnote 5 on p.14
the formation of one’s character etc. Yet, it gives more importances to the act proper. Pluralism or implied wholeness has thus penetrated deep into epistemological and ethical veins of the Jain system, based on which, several important concepts like Jiva, Karma, etc. are to be understood and morality prescribed or practised.

But in a world of dogmatism and absolutism, Jain ahiṁsā is a vital contribution to an attitude of openness to multiple perspectives. This attitude views a reality from a rational point of view without prejudice or bias. The simple reason behind this vision is that reality is complex and any of its description has infinite aspects, and each aspect can be predicated in several ways. Our limited knowledge, grasping one fraction of these infinite aspects, tries to build a system. Such an ekānta attitude (one-sided, dogmatic and absolutist position) is naturally compelling. Ekāntavāda or one-sided approach or one way track is not inherent in the reality but in our mind. Whereas, the theory of anekānta seeks to present a comprehensive picture about reality.

Jeyendra Soni is of the view that the theory of manifoldness is an effective philosophical tool not only to indicate the intended particular stand point of view of the speaker, but also to show the limitedness of other’s views and perspectives. And that it optimally lends itself to such plural interpretations is indeed its merit, with obvious opportunity for discourse and debate. In other words, anekānta is the spirit of accommodation, a needed path to end violence in thought, word and deed. Dayānanda Bhārgava says that anekānta demonstrates a spirit of toleration, understanding and respect for the

35. A multi-dimensional outlook and approach to life is necessary to understand the issues, problems, etc. Tackling them from different angles will speed up the solutions possible. This has been presented in Vincent Sekhar, ‘Dynamic Pluralism --- A Vision toward Conflict Resolution and Cosmic Integration’, Interfaith Formation, Madras 1993


views of others. All knowledge would be fruitless in the absence of equanimity and no amount of reading of the sacred texts would lead one to any fruitful result. The logical expression of such a comprehensive attitude is further explained in the Jaina theory of Syādvāda and Nayavāda. Persons like Vinobha Bhave stressed the need to understand Syādvāda for the sake of world peace.

Anekānta does not discard any point of view nor does it give exclusive importance to a particular point of view. It is opposed to dogmatism, which gives exclusive importance to a particular point of view. In Jain logic any particular assertion as absolute is called durnaya, a product of loose intelligence and insufficient articulation, which is incorrect and hence needs to be attended to. Applying this principle in the context dialogue or any peaceful negotiation, it is reasonable to hold the opponent's views equally important, even if they may be wrong or unjustified. No one's view is sidelined or, much less, discarded. There is an effort at seeding the Truth on both sides. Both the parties seek the truth in what the other claims, and both try to accommodate one another. Muni Sri Nyāyavijayaji contends that aspects of truth could be still there in differences and contradictions, and they could be harmonized and synthesized into an organic whole.

This is the toughest part in any reconciliatory process. Persons do not normally accept others and their views, and especially when

38. Tattvārthasūtra, 8
39. Two immediate examples of mutual listening: Nicodemus defends Jesus before the Jewish authorities: "According to our Law we cannot condemn a man before hearing him and finding out what he has done." (Good News Bible, Catholic Edition, John 7: 50-51). Gamaliel advises the furious Council, which wanted to put the apostles to death: "I tell you, do not take any action against these men....... If what they have planned and done is of human origin, it will disappear, but if it comes from God, you cannot possible defeat them. You could find yourselves fighting against God." (Ibid., Acts 5: 38-39)
one party was the victim of violence and had sustained anger, hurts and wounds. Moreso when “the wrongdoers still remain in power or threaten to tip the delicate balance of peace if they are pressed in any uncomfortable direction.” 41 But knowing that “reconciliation is more a spirituality than a strategy,” 42 one should learn to train oneself and others in the practice of Anekanta. Anekanta attitude is the basis for all types of mediation, arbitration, and negotiation. There is no reconciliation whatsoever when one side is dogmatic about its assertions in any field, be it politics or religion 43. A non-dogmatic approach life promotes relationship and reconciles the seeming conflicting views, which looked at from different standpoints.

Some people comment on the doctrine of Anekānta as an attitude or an act of indifference, holding or saying “yes or no” to both sides. But Jain epistemology defines what is meant by rightness (Samyaktva) of any assertion. The way to the final goal depends on professing the right type of knowledge, vision (or faith), and conduct. And rightness has certain distinguishing marks: the seeker of truth should possess the spiritual calmness or serenity and detachment, moved by compassion. 44 Only a person with such a mind-set will be able to discern the truth and make the right choice. And this mind-set does not eliminate other attitudes or choices. On the other, it seeks to understand and accommodate them in the best way one can.

Conclusion:

No one denies the importance of dialogue in resolving conflicts. In all human and social interaction, dialogue gives a positive meaning to ahimsā as love. The only condition that is required in all dialogue efforts is that one should be free from prejudice. One does not cherish selfishness in oneself and evil thoughts upon the other. Both the parties

42. Ibid., p. 16
43. Sūtrakrātiṅga, I. 102, 21-23
44. Pandit Sukhlalji’s commentary on Tattvārthasūtra of Vacaka Umasvāti, Op. Cit., pp. 8-9
have equal share in the proceedings and its results. Dialogue trains one in discipline, self-suffering and the acceptance of the other. In Gandhi's opinion, it is only a prayerful spirit that would bring peace and goodwill among religions: "I am convinced that we shall find neither peace nor good will among men through strife among men of different religions, through disputation among them. We shall find truth and peace and goodwill if we approach the humblest of mankind in a prayerful spirit." In today's context of violence and religious tensions, efforts taken to end war and conflicts and to restore peace, and the efforts taken to avert religious tensions, etc. are only glimpses of the world's acceptance of the significance of Non-violence and open-mindedness.

And we see these principles openly professed in Jain philosophy and culture. Ahiṃsā or non-injury to self and others is the quintessence of all dharma (Ahiṃsā paramo dharmaḥ) and it is relevant in the context of world peace. The contemporary relevance of Jaina dharma is seen in this prime virtue, which in all its expressions, mediates relationships and helps in promoting and building a cosmic society of love and mutual trust, justice and peace. At the best, this and other such values and ideals have enhanced the pluralistic culture of the world, especially India.

45. See Collected works of Mahatma Gandhi, Publication Division of the Ministry of the Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India, Vol. 64, p. 291
JAIN SOURCES FOR THE STUDY OF PRE-CĀRVĀKA
MATERIALIST IDEAS IN INDIA

Ramkrishna Bhattacharyya

Jain canonical texts and their commentaries often shed welcome light on the philosophical systems prevalent in ancient and medieval India. For example, we come to know from the Śūtrakṛtaṅgasūtra (SKS) that there were at least two materialist approaches in India before the seventh century CE\(^1\). This view is corroborated by some Buddhist and Brahminical sources as well. In what follows I propose to deal with some such evidence and then try to locate the points of difference between the two materialist theories mentioned by Jacobi.

The SKS begins with an attack on the opponents of Jainism:

\begin{verbatim}
  ee gāṃthe viuikkamma, ege samāṇamāhanā/
  dīyāṇamītā viussiitā, sattā kāmehi māṇavā//
\end{verbatim}

\[1.1.1.7\]

Some men, Śramaṇas and Brāhmaṇas, who ignore and deny these true words [said in 1.1.2-5], adhere (to their own tenets), and are given to pleasures.\(^2\)

Śīlāṅka (ninth century) in his commentary glosses on the word sāmaṇa as the Buddhists, etc. (śākyādayo) and the māhanā as those who follow the doctrines of Brhaspati (bṛhaspatya-matānusārīnaśca brāhmaṇāḥ).\(^3\) He also mentions the followers of Sāmkhya, Nyāya, and Mīmāṁsā and finally the Cārvakas and Lokāyatikas who do not believe in the soul that goes to the other world, but think that the soul is nothing more than the five elements. The Cārvakas, he says, do not believe in virtue and vice (puṇyapāpe).

The next couple of verses in the SKS mention several other philosophical schools:

\begin{verbatim}
  saṁti paṁca mahābhūyā ihamegesimāhiyā/
  puḍhvi āu teu vā, vāu āgāṣapaṁcamā//
  ee paṁca mahābhūyā tebho egotti āhiyā/
  aha tesim viṇāsenāṁ, viṇāso hoi dehino//
\end{verbatim}

\[1.1.7-8\]

Some profess (the exclusive belief in) the five gross elements: earth, water, fire, air and space.
These five gross elements (are the original causes of things), from them arises another thing (viz. ā t m a n) ; for on the dissolution of the (five elements) living beings cease to exist. Śīlāṅka explains the term egesi (ekeśām in Sanskrit) as referring to the bhūtavādin-s (literally, elementalists) and identifies them as the followers of the doctrine of Bṛhaspati (bhūtavādibhir bārhaspatyamatānusāribhirākhyaṭāni). He takes this doctrine to be identical with the Cārvāka/Lokayata and says that the Lokāyatikas recognize these five elements as the basis of everything, even of the soul.

This identification of the bhūtapañcakavādins with the Lokāyata, however, is open to question. I shall come back to this issue soon. Let us now look at Śīlāṅka’s commentary on SKS, 1.1.15, the first line of which is almost identical with that of 1.1.7 (quoted above). The verse explains the differences of these theories with regard to the number of elements:

\[
\text{sāmāṇa mahabbhūyā ihamegesi āhiyā/
āyachaṭṭho puṇo āhu, āyā loge ya sāsāe/}
\]

Some say that there are five elements and that the soul is a sixth (substance), but they contend that the soul and the world (i.e., the five elements) are eternal. Instead of referring to the materialists Śīlāṅka glosses egesi in this verse as the Vedists, Sāṃkhyas and Śaivas.

The verse that follows continues to speaks in the the same vein:

\[
duhao ṇa viṇassāṁti, no ya uppajaye asaṁ/
savve 'vi savvahā bhāvā, niyattiḥbhāvamāgayā/\] 1.1.16

These (six substances) do not perish, neither (without nor with a cause); the non-existent does not come into existence, but all things are eternal by their very nature.⁴

The SKS then takes a fling at the Buddhists, who, as opposed to the eternalists, believe in the momentariness of everything, including the soul:

\[
pāṁca khaṇḍhe vayaṁtege, vālā u khaṇaṁjojno/
anno aṇṇo nevāhu, heuyāṁ ca aheuyāṁ/\] 1.1.17

Some fools say that there are five s k a n d h a s of momentary
existence. They do not admit that (the soul) is different from, not identical with (the elements).

In his interpretation of the term, *anāṇyo* (Skt. *ananyā*, identical), Śīlāṅka again refers to the *ātma-śaṣṭhavādin*-s, Sāṃkhyaṇas as well as the Cārvākas, who consider the soul to be a product of the elements.

The problem is that the elementatists mentioned in *SKS* 1.1.7 and 1.1.16 cannot be equated with the Cārvākas/Lokāyatikas. The reason is quite simple: the Cārvākas accept only four elements, namely, earth, air, fire and water, but not the fifth, ether or space (*ākāśa*). An oft-quoted Cārvāka aphorism states: “Earth, water, fire and air the (only) principles,” *prthivyāpastojavāyur iti taṣṭvāni.* This is why the Cārvākas are often referred to as *bhūtacatusṭaya-vādins*. *SKS* 1.1.18 mentions them to be so:

*pudhavā āu teu ya, tahā vāu ya egao/**
cattāri dhauṇo rūvant evamāhānśu āvare//
(for āvare some MSS have jāṇagā or jāṇayā)
The Jāṇayas say that there are four elements: earth, water, fire and air which combined form the body (or soul?).

Are the *SKS* and *SKSV*r all wrong then? Not quite. Here is the first hint of a materialist theory which admitted four elements, rather than five, as the basis of its system. We hear more of them in *SKS* 2.1.15-17. It is necessary to quote the whole passage:

Upwards from the soles of the feet, downwards from the tips of the hair on the head, within the skin’s surface is (what is called) soul, or what is the same, the Ātman. The whole soul lives; when this (body) is dead, it does not live. It lasts as long as the body lasts, it does not outlast the destruction (of the body). With it (viz. the body) ends life. Other men carry it (viz. the corpse) away to burn it. When it has been consumed by fire, only dove-coloured bones remain, and the four bearers return with the hearse to their village. Therefore there is and exists no (soul different from the body). Those who believe that there is and exists no (such soul), speak the truth.

This murderer says: ‘Kill, dig, slay, burn, cook, cut or break to pieces, destroy: Life ends here; there is no world beyond.’

These (Nāstikas) cannot inform you on the following points: whether an action is good or bad, meritorious or not, well done or not
well done, whether one reaches perfection or not, whether one goes
to hell or not. Thus undertaking various works they engage in various
pleasures and amusements for their own enjoyment.

The first part is strikingly akin to what Ajita Kesakambala, a
senior contemporary of Mahāvīra and the Buddha taught. The
Sāmaṇṇa-phalasutta (SPhSu) records his teachings as follows:

This being is but a compound of the four great primary elements:
after that, the earth-element (or element of extension) returns and goes
back to the body of the earth, the water-element (or element of
cohesion) returns and goes back to the body of water, the fire element
(or element of thermal energy) returns and goes back to the fire, and
the air element (or element of motion) returns and goes back to the
body of air, while the mental faculties pass on into space.7

The number of elements ("great primary elements",
maḥābhūta-s) is mentioned as four, but space too is admitted in
relation to the mental faculties, as opposed to the merely physical.
The rest of the passage speaks of a materialist doctrine that denies
the concepts of religious merits, need for offerings (dāna), etc.:

... The four pall-bearers and the bier (constituting the fifth) carry
the corpse. The remains of the dead can be seen up to the cemetery,
where bare bones lie greying like the colour of the pigeons. All alms-
giving ends in ashes. Fools prescribe alms-giving; and some assert
that there is such a thing as merit in alms-giving; but their words are
empty, false and nonsensical. Both the fool and wise are annihilated
and destroyed after death and dissolution of their bodies. Nothing
exists after death.

SKS 1.1.11-12 seem to echo Ajita's words:
patteāṁ kasīṇe āyā, je bālā je a paṁdia/
saṁti piccā na te saṁti, naththi sattovavāiyā//
naththi puṁse vā pāve vā, naththi lōe ito vare/
sarīrasa viṁśeṇaṁ viṁśo hōi dehiņo//

Every body, fool or sage, has an individual soul. These souls
exist (as long as the body), but after death they are no more:
there are no souls which are born again.
There is neither virtue nor vice, there is no world beyond; on
the dissolution of the body the individual ceases to be.
Śīlāṅka does not identify this doctrine with the Cārvāka/ Lokāyata. He uses a very different term for it, namely, *tajjīva-taccharira-vāda*, i.e., the body and the soul are not two different entities, but one. It is to be noted that the doctrine of Ajita is called *ucchedavāda*, annihilationism in the Pali Buddhist literature. Apparently Ajita’s denial of almost everything under the sun, particularly of the concept of the other-world and the transmigration of the soul, is responsible for the name given to this doctrine by the Buddhists. Śīlāṅka, on the other hand, picks up another aspect of the doctrine, namely, the denial of an immortal soul, which, he believes, can and does exist without the mortal body.

Not satisfied with mentioning two different materialist thoughts, the *bhūtavādin*-s and the *tajjīvatacchariravādin*-s, Śīlāṅka resorts to the doctrine of *svabhāva* (lit. own being, meaning ‘inherent nature’) and associates the doctrine enunciated in *SKS* 1.1.11-12 with *svabhāva*. Utpalabhaṭṭa (tenth century), too, preferred to identify the doctrine of *svabhāva* with that of the Lokāyatikas (whom Śīlāṅka calls *bhūtavādin*-s). By whatever name one may prefer to call them—Bārhaspatya, *bhūtavādin*, Cārvāka or Lokāyatika—all the names refer to the followers of the same materialist doctrine.

In *SKS* 2.2 we hear again of the materialist and three more persons who hold heretical views. “The second man” is a *bhūtapāñcakavādin*, for he mentions five elements instead of four (2.1.20). Śīlāṅka evidently does not know who this “second man” is. He offers two alternatives: the Lokāyatika or the Śāṅkhya. In *SKS* 2.2.22 we again hear of some men who say: “There is a self besides the five elements. What is, does not perish; from nothing nothing comes.” Thus we have here a rehash of *SKS* 1.2.7-8 and 16.

The mention of more than one materialist school in the *SKS* was noted long ago. H. Jacobi (see n1 above), in the introduction to his English translation of the *SKS*, alludes to ‘two materialist theories’ in *SKS* 2.2.15 and 21 f. respectively. He notes that both “have much in common” and compares the first with the views of Puraṇa-Kassapa and Ajīta Kesakambala as found in the *SPhSu*. He further notices the image of the corpse being carried away by four bearers for burning
and the dove - coloured bones that remain. These are also mentioned in Ajita’s exposition of this doctrine in the \textit{SPhSu}.

The \textit{SPhSu} represents Ajita as a \textit{bhūtacatuṣṭayavādin} whereas in the \textit{SKS} the first school of materialists is said to be \textit{bhūtapaṇcavakavādin}. Jacobi points out that ākāśa “is not reckoned as a fifth element in the Buddhist literature but it is so in that of the Jainas...”\(^{13}\) He, however, summarily dismisses this discrepancy as “a verbal, rather than a material difference.”

The difference, I would humbly submit, is material, not merely verbal. There are reasons to believe that before the seventh century CE there did exist two distinct materialist schools in India. We may cite a few instances from both Buddhist and Brahmanical sources in support of this view.

\textit{Manimekalai}, the only extant Tamil Buddhist poem (written between the third and seventh centuries CE) mentions \textit{bhūtavāda} as a philosophical system distinct from the Lokāyata. It says:

Passing on to the Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika pandits, at last she (sc. Manimekalai) came to a \textit{Bhūta-Vādi}. The \textit{Bhūta-Vādis} held that the world is formed out of the five elements alone, without any divine intervention. We agree with the Lokāyata, the sage said, and believe that when the elements combine together, a material body and a spirit come into existence. That is all. We believe that perception alone is our means of knowledge and nothing else. We recognise only one birth, and we know that our joys and pains end on earth with this one life.\(^{14}\)

The basic philosophical position of the \textit{bhūtavādin-s} and the Lokāyatikas indeed does not seem to differ in any major respect. Echoes are heard of some well-known Čārvāka aphorisms, e.g., consciousness arises out of matter as does the intoxicating power of wine from non-toxic objects; it is all a matter of combination of a particular kind; perception is the instrument of knowledge; and, there is no rebirth.\(^{15}\)

That there was a school of materialist thinkers called \textit{bhūtacintaka} (he who thinks in terms of the elements), who recognized
five elements instead of four, is attested, however obliquely, by the Mahābhārata (Mbh.). The following verse (Śāntiparvan, 267.4) may be cited as a case in point:

\[\text{yebhyāḥ sṛjati bhūtāṇi kāle bhāvaprācodayitaḥ/ mahābhūtāni paśceti tānyāhur bhūtacintakāḥ//} \]

These (elements) from which Time, moved by the desire of bringing forth physical forms, creates all beings, are called ‘the five great elements’ by those who think (in terms) of the elements.\(^{16}\)

In another passage in the MBh. we read an account of cosmogony beginning and ending with five elements.\(^{17}\) The word bhūtacintā also occurs in the Suśrutasaṁhitā (SSaṁ).\(^{18}\)

Guṇaratna (fourteenth century) most probably has this school of bhūta pañcakavādin-s in mind when he speaks of “some sections of the Čārvāka-s who consider space as the fifth element.”\(^{19}\) The nāstika-s in general are said to have believed in the existence of four elements only. However, every other Jain writer, right from Haribhadra, Hemacandra and Prabhācandra, down to Vidyānandin and Vādidevasūri mention the Lokāyatikas as bhūtacatuṣṭayavādin-s.\(^{20}\) But none of them refers to any other school as ‘another section of the Čārvāka-s’ as Guṇaratna does. In this respect he stands alone among the Jains. The fact is that the bhūta pañcakavādin-s belong to another materialist school. They are not just Čārvākaikadeśīya-s.

The difference of the two schools of materialists is not confined to the difference in the number of elements (four or five?) admitted by them. There was another difference in their attitudes towards puruṣakāra (lit. manliness), human endeavour vis-à-vis daiva or niyati, destiny or fate, yadrechā (chance, accident), etc.

The elementalists in the MBh. are shown to be accidentalists (non-believers in causality) and hence inactivists, since human efforts are futile:

\[\text{devā manuṣyā gandharvāḥ piśācāsurarākṣasāḥ/ sarve svabhāvataḥ sṛṣṭā na kriyābhyo na kāraṇāḥ//} \]

Elsewhere in the MBh. the word svābhāva is used to suggest denial of causality, animittatā.\(^{22}\) It is in this sense that svābhāva recurs
in Buddhist Sanskrit literature, right from Śāvaghoṣa’s *BC (Buddhacarita)* (first century CE). In the Nyāya tradition, too, the pet example of the sharpness of the thorn used by the *svabhāvādin-* is cited to suggest *nirnimittatā* (the absence of any efficient cause), or even *ahetu* (absence of any cause, efficient or material) whatsoever.

Did the Cārvāka-s adhere to this view? Somadevasūri suggests just the opposite. A Cārvāka minister in the *Yāśastilaka-campū* upholds human endeavour over fate.

In Sāyaṇa-Mādhava (fourteenth century)’s representation of the Cārvākas, too, the Lokāyatika positively refuses to accept the concept of a lawless world. He recognises *svabhāva* as the cause behind all phenomena:

\[*nanvadṛṣṭāniṣṭau jagad-vaicitryam ākasmikām syāditi cet na tad bhadrāṁ, svabhāvādeva tadupapatteḥ.*

But an opponent [of the Cārvāka] will say, if you do not thus allow *adrṣṭa*, the various phenomena of the world become destitute of any cause. But we (*sc.* the Cārvākas) cannot accept this objection as valid, since phenomena can all be produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things.

Thus, in both the domains, cosmogony as well as attainment in human life, the Cārvāka is represented as non-accidentalist and activist — quite different from the elementalist mentioned in the *Mbh*.

The existence of an elementalist-cum-inactivist/accidentalist school prior to the Cārvāka may also account for the identification of the Cārvāka and *svabhāvavāda* by quite a number of Vedāntins, Naiyāyikas and others. Such an identification may be traced back to the anonymous commentary on the *Sāmkhyakārikā*, v.27 (available in a Chinese translation by Paramārtha) in the sixth century and more explicitly in Utpalabhaṭṭa’s (tenth century) commentary on *Br.S* I.7. Other writers, such as Haribhadra and Śāntarakṣīta, however, treat the Cārvāka and *svabhāvavāda* as two independent doctrines, having no connection with each other.

The confusion of terms, e.g., *svabhāva* as distinct from *yadrečchā* (as in the *Śv. Up.* 1.2 and as lucidly explained by Amalānanda in the thirteenth century) and *svabhāva* as a synonym for *yadrečchā* (as in
Aśvaghosa and others) is a stumbling block in the way of determining the significance of the word svabhāva in various contexts. But here we are concerned with the indirect evidence of the existence of two schools of materialists in India: one was the proto-materialist trend which seems to have been bhūtapañcaçakavādin as well as akriyavādin; the other was the deuto-materialist trend, which was both bhūtacatusṭayavādin and kriyavādin. Both trends appear to have co-existed (if the evidence of Manimekalai is accepted). The proto-materialist trend presumably withered away. It is also probable that it never developed into a full-fledged philosophical system with its own sūtra-work, commentaries, etc. The deuto-materialist trend, on the other hand, evolved from the doctrine of bhūta mentioned in the Śv. Up. 1.2., was preached by Ajita Kesakambala and finally took the shape of the Carvāka system. The earliest Jain reference to the doctrine of five elements is found in the Vasudevahīndī;31 the Mbh. and the SKS, too, record the view of these proto-materialists.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

2. I have used the text of the SKS and its commentary by Śilānka as given in the MLBD ed. Jacobi’s English translation has been cited with some minor changes, e.g. ‘air’ for ākāśa has been replaced by ‘space’, for vāyu ‘wind’ has been replaced by ‘air’.
3. SKSVr, p.9.
4. The lines contain the seeds of materialism and atheism in particular. Lucretius (c. 99-55 BCE) takes this idea as his starting point:

   Nothing can ever be created by divine power out of nothing. The reason why all mortals are so gripped by fear is that they see all sorts of things happening on the earth and in the sky with no discernible cause, and these
they attribute to the will of a god. Accordingly, when we have seen that nothing can be created out of nothing, we shall then have a clearer picture of the path ahead, the problem of how things are created and occasioned with the aid of the gods. (Book 1, p. 31).

The proposition is said to have been advanced first by Melissus (fifth century BCE), a Greek philosopher. See Rosenthal and Yudin, p. 492.

5. Cārvāka Fragment, I.2. For sources etc. see Ramkrishna Bhattacharya 2002e. p. 603.

6. The word jāñayā has been explained by the Dipikā as jñānakā = pañḍitammanya, one who considers himself to be a scholar (but is not). There is a variant reading: āvare for jāñayā / jāñagā. Commentators take this to mean another sect of Buddhists, but the doctrine is more akin to materialism than Buddhism. Śīlāṅka glosses on āvare, but also refers to the reading jāñagā and explains it as follows: tatrāpyayam artho 'jānakā' jñānino vayāṁ kiletyabhimānāgnidagdhāḥ santa evam āhuriti saṁvandhanīyam (p.18)

7. DN, part I., p. 48; trans. TSDN, p.83.

8. SKSVṛ, p.p. 13-14. Śīlāṅka also refers to a passage from Br.Up. (2. 4. 12) : vijñānahagana evaitebhyo bhūtebhyaṁ samutthayaṁ tānyevānu vinaśyati, na pretyasamājñāsti, “The pure Intelligence comes out of these elements and is destroyed with them, there is no awareness after death.” The same passage has been quoted among others by Jayantabhaṭṭā, NM, part 1, ch. 3, pp. 387-88 and Sāyaṇa in SDS, ch.1, p.4. See C/L, pp. 157, 248.


10. SKSVṛ, p. 14. Śīlāṅka also quotes a verse attributed to the svabhāvavādin-s :

kañṭakasya ca ikṣṇatvam, mayūrasya vicitrataḥ/
varṇāśca tāmracudānāṁ, svabhāvena bhavanti hi//

The sharpness of the thorn, the variety of the peacock
and the colour of the cocks are (due to) natural development.

For various readings of this verse and their sources see Ramkrishna Bhattacharya, 2002c, pp. 77-78.

11. See SVi on BrS, 1.7. For further details see Ramkrishna Bhattacharya, 2002c, p. 84. Śīḷāṅka defines the bhūtavādins as follows (on SKS, 1.1.1.11):

bhūtavādino bhūtānyeva kāyākārāparinātani dhāvanavā laganādikāṁ kriyāṁ kurvanti, asya tu kāyākārāparinātebhyo bhūtebhyaścaitanyākhya ātmotpadyate bhivyajyate va, tebhyaścābhinna ityayāṁ viśeṣāḥ (p.14).

12. See n4 above.

13. See Jacobi (n1 above), pp. xxiv and nn 1-2


15. See Ramkrishna Bhattacharya, 2002c, pp. 603-05, aphorisms 1.3-5 and III.1.

16. The same verse occurs in the Vulgate edition, 274.4. The verse may be related to the doctrine of Time (kālavāda) which is first mentioned in the Śv. Up., 1.2:

kālaḥ svabhāvo niyatir yadrechā/
bhūtāni yonih puruṣa iti cintyam...//

Whether Time, or inherent, or destiny, or accident, or the elements, or God is the (first) cause is to be considered.

The distinction between kālavāda and svabhāvavāda, as mentioned in several chapters of the Mbh., Sāntiparvan, Mokṣadharmaparvādhyāya, is merely that Time is considered to be the Creator of all things instead of svabhāva. Both are atheistic and accidentalist (non-causationist, casualist). See Bedekar for further details.

17. Āśvamedhikaparvan, Crit. ed., 50.10 (Vulgate 51.10). The bhūtacintaka-s are mentioned in Śānti. 224.50 (Vul.231.51) and Āśva. 48.24 (Vul. 49.12).

18. Sūtrasthāna, 3.15; Śārīrasthāna, 1.1. For further details see my paper in the Halbfass Memorial Volume (forthcoming).

20. Sometimes the position of some Jain authors is not clear. Jina-bhadra Gaṇi, speaking of *tajjīva-tacchārīravāda*, merely mentions the production of consciousness “from the collection of elements like the earth, etc.” (*vasuhaha bhūyasamudaya sambhūya ceyana tti te samkā, 3.102 (1650), p.143), without specifying how many elements he has in mind, four or five.


24. *NS* 4.1. 22-24 and Tarkavāgīśa, part 4, pp. 183-91. The position of the commentators is not uniform. For details see Tarkavāgīśa, part 4, p.179.


27. Ānandagiri on Śaṅkara’s commentary on the *Br Up.* 4.3.6., p.554; Vidyāraṇya, *VPS*, pp. 201-11; Agnīcīt Puruṣottama, Rāmatīrtha and Nṛsiṁha Āśrama on the *SS*, 1.528; *KB* on *NK*, 1.5.

28. *SKVr*, p.36; *SVi*, p.9.
30. Amalānanda on Śaṅkara’s commentary on *BS*, 2.1.33: *niyatinimittamanapekṣa yadā kadācitrpravṛtytyudayo yadṛcchā, svabhāvastu sa eva yāvadvastubhāvi, yathā*
śvāsādau. “Yadṛcchā means random occurrence without regard for the law of fixed causation; by contrast svabhāva is that which exists as long as the thing exists, for example, respiration, etc. (in the case of living beings)”. Cf. TRD, pp. 13-15.

31. Vasu., pp.169, 275. See also Jamkhedkar, p.184. The theory is called nāhiyavāda (matthiyavāda or nāstikavāda) (Vasu., ibid.). It is both bhūtapañcavakādīn and accidentalist (jahicchā = yadṛcchā). Haribhadra (eighth century CE) also calls the materialist Piṅgakesa nāhiyavādi (SKa 3, p. 164). Piṅgakesa too is a bhūtapañcavakādīn (ibid.).

ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY


**C/L**  *Cārvāka/Lokāyata*. Chattopadhyaaya, Debiprasad and Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaaya (ed.). Calcutta: Rddhi India, 1990.


**JAS(B)**  *Journal of the Asiatic Society (Bengal)*, Kolkata (formerly Calcutta).

**JIP**  *Journal of Indian Philosophy* (Dordrecht)


Manorathanandin. See *PV*.


*NS* *Nyāyasūtra*. see Tarkavāgīśa.


*SBh* Śāriṇakabhāṣya by Śaṅkara on *BS* (q.v.).


*SPhSu* *Sāmaṇa-phala-sutta* in *DN*, Part 1.

*SŚ* *Samkṣepa-Śārīraka* with the commentaries by Agnicit


SVi See BrS.


VK Amalānanda. Vedānta-kalpataru. See BS.


UNDERSTANDING JAIN RELIGION
IN A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE *

Satya Ranjan Banerjee

I normally study any kind of religion from a historical point of view, because, I believe, if you understand the history of any religion, you would be able to get a better appreciation of any religion whatsoever. So is the case with Jainism. Jainism is a very old religion. There were 24 Tīrthaṅkars in Jainism. The first was known as Ādinātha or Rśabhadeva and the 24th Tīrthaṅkara was Bhagavān Mahāvīra. The period of Mahāvīra is established as the 6th century B.C (599-527B.C). Mahāvīra lived for 72 years. During these 72 years Mahāvīra had brought about some revolutionary changes in the then society of India. This is a very important period in history as it was during this period that Zoroastrianism also developed in Iran. Their original language was called Avestan. This language was not known to a lot of people before the 18th century when the Avestan literature was deciphered and we came to know the contents of the text. Again it was the period of Pythagorus (6th/5th century B.C.) in Greece who started his philosophy of life in Greece around the same period. In China too it was the period when Lao-tse (6th century B.C.) developed Taoism, and Confucius (551-478 B.C.) preached his doctrines of morality known as Confucianism. In India the period saw the activities of Lord Mahāvīra and also of Lord Buddha. In a sense the 6th century B.C. was the turning point in the philosophical ideas of human beings in most parts of the world. If Lord Mahāvīra is attributed to the 6th century B.C, surely Rśabhadeva, the 1st Tīrthaṅkara, must have belonged to a much earlier period. It is to be noted that the name Rśabha is found in the Āryaveda, which dates back to 1500 B.C. It is, however, much later, around the 8th-10th centuries A.D. that the lives of Tīrthaṅkars were all compiled.

The reason why I give emphasis to dates and history is to make it easy to understand religion by relating the circumstances under

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which any action would have taken place. It is said that Rṣabhadhāva taught us many things, but unfortunately all of them were found in books written in some 1000-1500 years later. We do in fact find the life sketch of Rṣabha in the *Kalpasūtra*, one of the Agama texts of the Śvetāmbara Jains. So also the life of Pārśvanātha, the 23rd Tīrthaṅkara, is depicted in the *Kalpasūtra*. The date of Pārśvanātha is considered as 817 B.C. There is reference to Arīṣṭanemi in the same text that dates his life to 1000 B.C. In the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, Arīṣṭanemi, among others, is also mentioned. So if we take 1500 B.C. as the starting point of the 1st Tīrthaṅkara and the culmination of the 24th Tīrthaṅkara to 600 B.C., it would be easy to say that that was the period when Jainism started to develop.

Man has been trying his best to understand religion for over 3500 years. The English word religion is equated with the Indian term *dharma*. But the two terms have some differences in meaning and outlook. In fact, the basic meaning of religion (< Latin religiōn, substantive of religiō, French religion, Middle English religioun) is piety, care, “the performance of duties to God and man”. The word religion is not to be derived from Latin religāre, to bind, as it is normally done in common parlance, and states that religion means that which binds you or holds you. The word is connected with Greek alegō I care (< inf. alegein “to have a care for, to heed” cf. Greek algos, care, from the same root leg-). Homer has used the word in this sense in his Iliad (xvi. 388)—*theōn opin ouk alegontes* “not regarding the vengeance of the gods”, where the word indicates “fearing the gods”. Gradually this meaning was shifted and relegated to the idea of what exists beyond the visible world of which human beings have no control. At a later time, this idea was nurtured through faith, belief, ritual, prayer, spiritual exercises and so on for guiding the everyday conduct of human beings. The religious activities are not guided by reason as is done in philosophy. In course of time, people are strictly adhered to the validity of religious beliefs and practices. The Indian term *dharma* (derived from the root dhr, to hold, with the suffix ma) means the norms for living in a society. The original sense is ‘dhāranād dharma ityāhāḥ, dharma dhārayate prajāḥ’ i.e. that which holds the prajās or people together are actually the social order. In the Indian context more emphasis is given on the social order of a place. It is for that reason that we find in the *Manusamhitā* that the ten inner qualities of man constitute the characteristics of *dharma*. These are—
dhṛtyḥ kṣamā damo śteyaṁ śaucam indriya-nigrahaḥ /
dhir vidyā satyaṁ akrodho daśakaṁ dharma-lakṣaṇam// [6.92]

“Contentment, forgiveness, self-control, non-stealing, purity
(of mind), controlling of senses, intellect, knowledge, truth, non-anger
(calmness) are the ten features of religion.”

And the same Manu in other context states briefly the essence
of dharma which includes
ahimsā satyam asteyaṁ śaucam indriya-nigrahaḥ/
evam sāmāsikam dharmam cāturvarṇye’ bravīn Manuḥ//[10.63]

“Non-violence, truth, non-stealing, and purity (of mind), are, in
brief, the basis of religion as said by Manu in the context of four
castes.”

The above mentioned qualities of religion are also propagated
by the Jains in the forms of pāṇca-mahāvratas (ahimsā, non-injury, satya,
truth, acaurya, non-stealing, brahmaçarya, celibacy and aparigraha,
onnon-accumulation of things), triguṇṭis (vag-guṇts, control of speech,
kāya-gupti, control of body, and manogupti, control of mind), and
pāṇca-samitis (īryā, care in walking, bhāṣā, care in speaking, eṣaṇā,
care in accepting alms, ādāna-nikṣepa, care in taking up and setting
down, and utsarga, care in excreting). These and many others are the
basic things of Jain religion which one must acquire through right vision
(or faith), right knowledge, and right conduct.

In the Mahābhārata also we often hear the terms like ‘this is your
dharma’ and ‘that is what you need to do as per your dharma’ etc.

Every religion has its own beliefs or ways of living and that is
what moulds one’s life. It is to be noted in this connection that if you
follow the doctrines of a particular group, then you belong to that
faith. So whatever Mahāvīra and the later Jain teachers have put forth,
they all come under the purview of Jainism, and if you believe in this
philosophy, you are a Jain. This has been the cases throughout the
ages. They were all kings or Kṣatriyas, but during the course of their
life they became disenchanted with their life and kingly status, and
renounced this material world, crowning their sons as kings, who, in
turn, also became Jain saints/monks in their life time.
At the very outset, it is to be noted that some basic Vedic thoughts and ideas which had come down to us from the time of the Rgveda (i.e. 15th cent. B.C.) to that of Mahāvīra (i.e. 6th cent. B.C.), were prevalent at the time of Mahāvīra who, by means of his convincing arguments, had tried his best to transform some of these ideas of the people into the realm of reality. For example, according to the Vedas, God, the Supreme Power, created the world. Mahāvīra did not preach that God created the world. The Sūtrakṛtāṅga (I.3.64-68), one of the Āgama granthas of the Śvetāmbaras, says that some people say that Brahma created the world, but it is false (Bamho is the word used in Prakrit). It says that people do not know that the world was never created by God and it is eternal. This was the first revolutionary idea that was preached by Mahāvīra in the 6th century B.C.

The second revolutionary idea was that the life of all beings are very sacred and naturally they should not be killed, but should be protected. All animals wish to live, and not to be slain; therefore, the Jain monks must relinquish the dangerous killing of animals.

Thirdly, the Vedic concept of Ātman (self) is challenged. According to the Vedic Upaniṣads, Ātman is permanent, without beginning, change or end. Mahāvīra opposed this view and said— "Reality (sat) is not permanent, unchangeable or endless". What is the actual construction of Ātmā which we call soul? In general, according to Indian Philosophy, the Ātmā of the human beings is ultimately connected to the Paramātmā, which is the Supreme Authority or the Supreme Soul. In between there are intermediary stages. But what the Jains call as Ātmā and Parmātmā is different, because the Jains do not believe in an outside Absolute power, their interpretation of Ātmā (i.e. jīva), is different.

Fourthly, about the origin of the idea of Ahimsā. In India, the cult of ahiṁsā is very old. It is found in Vedic as well as in Buddhist religions. In the Rg-veda we have lots of passages on Ahimsā— mā hiṁsīḥ’. Buddhism too deals with Ahimsā. But since it was only the Jains who philosophized Ahimsā or made it a part of their philosophy, Ahimsā becomes a property of Jainism. In most of the Indian literature, whatever be the language— be it Māraṭhi, Gujarāti, Bengali, Hindi, Telugu, Tāmil, Kannada, or Mālayālam, —you will see that they deal with some aspects of Ahimsā in their writings.
There is a Tamil book, ‘Tolkāppiyam’, which is one of the oldest Tamil literary works belonging to about the 3rd century B.C., speaks about ahiṁsā. It is in three parts. The first deals with phonology of centamiz, that is, the letters (ezuttu) of Tamil. The second deals with words, forms and inflections (col) and the third has literature (porul), and ‘alaṅkāra’ as well. In this literature too there are some passages on Ahiṁsā. I have read a translation of the ‘Kura!’ belonging to the 3rd or 4th cent. A.D., a very famous Tamil literature, which, some claim, was written by the Jains; and I find that it describes Ahiṁsā as one of the great domestic and ascetic virtues.

So when the Jains started establishing the truth in accepting Ahiṁsā as fundamental of human life, they started philosophizing it, prepared a logic and ultimately tried their best to establish Ahiṁsā as a kind of philosophy. That is why whenever we talk of Jainism, we relate it to Ahiṁsā. It is thus described or delineated by almost all types of people.

Finally, another important aspect of Jainism is the ‘karma’ theory. Why does any life, be it human or animal, get rebirth? According to Buddhism, it is because we have taṇhā (tyṣṇā) ‘desire’. When this desire is not fulfilled in this life we are reborn again to fulfill our desires. In Hinduism many reasons are given for rebirth. One of them is that as the Cittāsuddhi has not been done in this life, we are reborn. It is the Jains who say that we are born again and again, because our ‘karmakṣaya’ is not yet done completely. It is because you have not completely eradicated the effect of karma that you have done in this life, you are bound to take your birth again. So rebirth is common to all philosophies, but the reasons of rebirth are different. It is only the Jains who believe that as long as karma is not destroyed, beings are bound to come back again.

When someone starts preaching, even if it be the basic truth, if it is not currently popular, then one meets with lots of resistance. This has happened all over the world. For example, the whole of Greece once thought that Socrates was mad, because the ideas he had put forth were very new to the then existing society. Similarly, Mahāvīra also encountered with lots of oppositions when he started preaching his ideas. The first encounter that Mahāvīra met with was Lord Buddha.
Buddha and Mahāvīra met each other many times. They held lots of discussions on soul, life after death, existence of Hell and Heaven and so on. In the Pāyāsi-sutta of the Dīghanikāya No. 23, the existence of a soul substance is denied by Pāyāsi as it was done by Buddha himself. In the Majjhima-nikāya in the Upāli-sutta (No. 56) there is a dialogue between Buddha and Mahāvīra with regard to the practice of asceticism. In this way, we can see lots of references to the views of Mahāvīra in the Buddhist literature. I have a feeling from the pages of history that perhaps Buddha could not stand the arguments of Mahāvīra, as Buddha’s arguments were all refuted, while Mahāvīra’s arguments were very poignant and logical. As a result, Buddhism could not stay in India for a long time. And in the 3rd century B.C., at the time of Asoka (273-236 B.C.), though he was a Buddhist, he sent his missionaries to other parts of India, even to Śrī Lanka. Once Buddhism went out of India, and started spreading outside, it never came back. There are, of course, some followers even today in Magadha, Nalanda and in Chattagong, apart from China, Tibet, South-East Asiatic countries outside India. Another encounter which Mahāvīra had to face was with the Ājīvika sampradāya which was very famous at that time. Gosāla Maṅkhaliputra had an encounter with Mahāvīra, which is described in the 7th chapter of the Upāsakadasā-sūtra of the Śvetāmbara canonical literature. Like the Ājīvikas, there was another group in the south called ‘Yāpaniya’ which was also very famous. Amulya Chandra Sen in his book Schools and Sects in Jaina Literature (Viṣva-Bhāratī, Sāntiniketan, 1931) describes the Jain sects in the canonical literature. This book is not available now, but may be traced in some library.

During the time of Lord Mahāvīra, some of his ardent disciples, later on came to be known as Gaṇadhāras (gaṇa means ‘a group of people’ and dhara means ‘one who holds it together’) were perplexed with some of the thoughts and ideas of Mahāvīra which were antagonistic to the then existing Vedic ideas of India. In order to dispel their notions about certain existing ideas, these disciples asked Mahāvīra certain straightforward things which were the burning questions of the day. At the time of Mahāvīra, these ardent disciples, eleven in number, were at a loss to know the real nature of Soul, Karma, Jīva, basic five elements (pañca mahābhūtas), birth in the same form in the next birth, Bondage and Deliverance, Existence of
Heaven and Hell, existence of Pāpa and Punya, existence of the other world, and finally Mokṣa. These eleven Gaṇadharas had asked Mahāvīra any one of these questions for clarification and understanding. In course of time, these eleven basic questions formed the eleven salient doctrines (tattvas) of Jainism. Indrabhūti had the doubt regarding the existence of soul; while Agnibhūti had the doubt regarding Karma whose existence could not be visible. Vāyubhūti was poignant in asking Mahāvīra about Jīva. His doubt was whether the body itself was the Jīva (soul) or whether it was different from the Jīva. Vyakta’s question was based on the five elements (pañca mahabhūtas) of the world. He asked whether the basic five elements (pañca mahabhūtas) were real or unreal. Sudharmā asked Mahāvīra whether the Jīva would be the same kind or different in the next birth. Maṇḍita had the doubt regarding bondage and deliverance. The doubt of Mauryaputra was whether the deities and heaven exist at all or not. Akampita had the doubt regarding the existence of Hell. Acalabhṛāta’s doubt was regarding the existence of punya and pāpa. Metārya’s doubt was regarding the existence of the other world; whereas Prabhāsa’s doubt was whether there could be anything like Mokṣa.

These questions of the eleven Gaṇadharas are of a crucial nature, and ultimately formed the basic profound philosophical doctrines of Jainism. In course of time, the followers of Mahāvīra developed these ideas in different ways by their incisive intellectual analysis. At a much later time, people posed such questions like - what is sat? What is the ultimate goal of a thing? - so on and so forth. It was in the 3rd century A.D., a philosopher called Umāsvāti, in his book Tattvārthaśūtra or Tattvārthādhiṃśaśūtra, first defined ‘sat’, based on the canonical literature of the Śvetāmbaras. That which is reality is ‘sat’ - that which exists. It has ‘utpāda’ (origin), vyaya (deviation from the original) and dhrauvya (permanent). So in Jainism we consider ‘sat’ - reality as having three points. That is, it has an origin and a deviation, but at the same time it is fixed.

The question that comes to our mind from the above is how can a fixed thing be changed? If it is fixed, it cannot be changed, and if it changes, it cannot be fixed. Let me give you an example. Let us take the case of a seed of a plant. When you plant the seed, it sprouts out after a
few days and a little later becomes a tree with branches, leaves etc. In
course of time, it decays and dies. So it has three stages, but the basic
seed is the same, it never dies. Let us take another example of clay—‘mṛttikā.
A potter makes a pot out of clay and when the pot is destroyed, it once
again turns into earth, so, in fact, the clay is never destroyed. It remains
only mud; that which is made out of clay is destroyed. This was the idea
put forth by Umāsvāti in the 3rd century A.D.

These ideas over a period of time became their philosophy too.
Originally it was only an idea and then became a philosophy. So what
is philosophy in the real sense of the term? When does a statement
turn into a philosophy? Sometimes it is difficult to define exactly
what we talk about. When we study certain things systematically,
with an objective behind it, giving it a causal relationship between
the subject and the effect, then it automatically comes under the
purview of philosophy. Every incident in one’s own life has a
philosophy of its own. When I say that this is how I do something,
then that becomes my philosophy. We very often ask, what is your
philosophy in life? - May be to earn money, or to be kind to others
etc. Throughout the history, the Jains have tried to prove how Ahiṃsā
could become a religio-philosophy of life. People will not find fault
with philosophy, because it gives a cause and effect relationship.
Sometimes it is based on one’s own experience.

In establishing Ahiṃsā as a valid philosophy, we will have to
depend on Logic. The basic question of Logic is—in what way do
we consider something as right or wrong? We have five senses—cakṣu,
karma, jihvā, nāsikā and tvak - and whatever we sense through them
we believe them. Some philosophies claim that what we see may or
may not be true, but these five senses are our basic instruments of
cognizance for pratyakṣa. Some philosophies claim that our mind
can be one of the organs by which we perceive a thing—knowledge.
What is knowledge? Knowledge is a word we often use almost
everyday. We often talk about the right knowledge, as Jainism does.

Actually, knowledge is a system of ideas corresponding to a
system of things and involving a belief in such correspondences. There
are basically three systems of ideas. You have an idea, say, of a chair or
of a table, but if you have never seen one in your life you cannot have
an idea, because you have no knowledge of either a table or a chair. So you must have some idea corresponding to a system of things, in this case a chair or a table to be able to say, “this is a chair or this is a table”. Then you believe, depending on this idea, that this is indeed a chair or a table. These are the definitions that are given in the books of Logic.

In Jainism knowledge has a distinctive role to play and right knowledge is greatly emphasized. Right knowledge helps us examine the matter by right conviction. In every human being (Jīva), there is some sort of knowledge latent in him. But as long as that knowledge in not testified with right conviction that knowledge is not a right knowledge. It is considered as false knowledge (mithyā-jñāna). Knowledge is a mental process, it is normally accompanied with conviction. For example, if I see a nurse with a boy on the street, I have the right conviction that there are a woman and a boy outside. This conviction is further enhanced with the idea that the woman is a nurse. Uptil now our knowledge is not complete. But if we know the full details about the nurse and the boy, their whereabouts, their locality, their positions and so on, then we can say that we have a right knowledge about them. That is why, in Jainism right knowledge (samyag jñāna) is greatly emphasized. This knowledge must be free from doubts.

Knowledge is of five kinds; Mati-jñāna, Śrutra-jñāna, Avadhi-jñāna, Manahparyāya-jñāna and Kevala-jñāna. Mati-jñāna is acquired by means of the five senses, or by means of the organ of thinking. Śrutra-jñāna is based on the interpretation of words and their meanings, writings, signs and gestures, etc. It is related to mati-jñāna. Avadhi-jñāna is the knowledge of the past; it is the transcendent knowledge of material things; it is obtained with the help of higher perception. It can be acquired by austerities. It is acquired by celestial and infernal souls. Manahparyāya-yānā is the knowledge of the thoughts and feelings of others. Only human beings possess it and they obtain it by means of higher perfection. Kevala-jñāna is the perfect knowledge which is acquired in its pure and undefiled condition by the perfect ones.

But the knowledge of the first three types is considered as bad, as long as it does not come from perfect believe, whereas the last two types of knowledge are perfect only among human beings having
proper belief. But knowledge is bad when one understands sat and asat without any distinction, his knowledge is bad knowledge (ajñāna), and bad knowledge leads to mithyātva. But for the Jains, falsehood has no place, and cannot be considered as jñāna in the real sense of the term. But in Indian philosophy even mithyātva, falsehood, is also a type of knowledge. Even Buddhism says that what we see cannot be denied, and this is similar to the Vedantic idea of Māyā. For example, you see a rope in the dark and you mistake it for a snake. For that duration of time, the rope becomes the snake. But when we recognize the rope for a rope, the illusion (māyā) is over and the illusion becomes mithyā (false) and is naturally wrong. So we can see that falsehood is also a form of knowledge though lived for a short while.

As I mentioned earlier, Jainism had its origin in Bihar. But later on, Jainism spread far and wide from there to different parts of India. In the 4th century B.C., during the period of Chandragupta Maurya (324-300 B.C.), there was a famine in Magadha, and it lasted for over 12 years. (There is reference to this famine in the inscriptions of Śravaṇabelagola in Karnataka). During this period the Jains found it very difficult to beg alms from door to door, because of various restrictions and taboos. So a group of Śādhus migrated to the South after travelling through the Vindhyas and other places and finally settled down in Śravaṇabelagola. These Śādhus then started preaching Jainism there. This is the reason why Jainism spread in the south. So there were many Śādhus and Monks in the south.

Historically the division of the original sect into Śvetāmbara and Digambara started when the people who had gone down to the south returned to the north in Magadha, where they perceived the differences between the two sects. This I would say is the basic turning point. Each claimed that theirs was the authentic teachings of Mahāvīra, while the other was mutilating it. But they lived side by side and it was only in the 1st century A.D., that is, the 79 A.D., or may be even the 4th or 3rd century B.C. that they started splitting up and by the 5th century A.D., they became completely different. When the people from the north migrated to the south came back to Magadha, they started looking at the differences between their ācāras or vyavahāras (conducts). For
example, the Digambaras say that Mahāvīra did not wear any clothes, whereas the Śvetāmbaras insist that he did. But if you see the statues of Mahāvīra belonging to the period from 1st century B.C. down to 13th-14th centuries A.D. they are all naked. So this becomes a point in favour of the Digambaras. Another difference is that the Śvetāmbaras believe that women can also get renunciation or nirvāṇa, but, according to the Digambaras, women cannot get nirvāṇa at all. According to the Śvetāmbaras, Mahāvīra was married and had a daughter before he renounced the world, but, according to the Digambaras, Mahāvīra was not married at all. The canonical literature of the Śvetāmbaras is 45 in number which are not accepted by the Digambaras who have three different texts divided into 45 books. The Digambaras place the date of Mahāvīra between 659 and 587 B.C., whereas the Śvetāmbaras place Mahāvīra between 599 and 527 B.C.

In course of time, there arose many Saṅghas, groups of people, in the South. According to the Digambara tradition, the Mūla-saṅgha (the original community) was divided into four groups, such as, Nandi-saṅgha, Śīṅha-saṅgha, Deva-saṅgha, and Sena-saṅgha,—all groups that propagated the Jaina culture and the names normally took the name of the person who founded the Saṅghas. Again, in contrast to the above four saṅghas of the Mūlasaṅgha a few more sects came up and they were-Yāpaniya-saṅgha, Drāvīda-saṅgha, Mathurā-saṅgha and Kāṣṭhā-saṅgha. Out of these saṅghas, in modern times, the Digambara sects are-Bispanthīs, Terapanthīs, Gumānpanthīs and so on. In the north Jainism flourished from Magadh in Bihar to Rajasthan, Gujarat, Mahārāṣṭra, Bengal, Orissa, Madhya-Pradeśa, Uttara-Pradeśa, Punjab and Kāśmir. Just as in the South we have many Saṅghas of the Digambaras, so also in the North, we have many gacchas of the Śvetāmbaras, and these are Kharataragaccha, Tapāgaccha, Upakesāgaccha, Pārśvacandragaccha, Āṅcalagaccha, Paunṛṇanayakagaccha, Āgamikagaccha and so on. Latter on, there evolved Lompākagaccha, Sthānakavāṣīs, Terāpanthīs, Veṣadhāras and Vandhyas.

For over 2000 years, different philosophers in India have propagated Jainism in different ways. We will, therefore, talk of Jainism with this historical background. What are the books upon which all our
arguments will be based? We will primarily depend upon the canonical literature of the Jains. The Jains were divided into two groups — the Śvetāmbara and the Digambara. In course of time, we found that the two groups had different sets of literature as well. The Śvetāmbara canonical literature is popularly known as Āgama grantha or Siddhānta. Āgama refers to ‘that which has come down’ to us from Lord Mahāvīra. It is called Siddhānta because that is the essence (conclusion) of the speeches of Lord Mahāvīra. But in 1939 the canonical literature of the Digambaras was discovered in Moodbidri and the first publication (edited by Hiralal Jain) started from Amaravati. In course of time, the Digambara canonical literature, such as, the Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama, Kasāyapāhuḍa, and Mahābandha were all published.

Among the Digambara scholars, some are worth mentioning. It was probably in the early centuries of the Christian era that we have some Digambara writers who contributed a lot to the cause of Jainism. The first among them was Kundakunda (1st or 3rd century A.D.) who wrote many books, Pravacanasāra, Niyamasāra, Samayasāra, Pañcāstikāyasāra, Prābhṛta-traya or Sāra-traya and so on. These books of Kundakunda were, of course, the earliest, while the other literature followed him. This was the first secular Digambara literature as far as we know. Today, of course, many Digambara literature like ‘Kaṭṭigeyānuvekkhā’ and Vaṭṭakeras’s Mūlācāra, Sivārya’s Bhagavati-ārādhana, Yativṛṣabhācārya’s Tiloyapannatti were published from many places and Jainism spread throughout the length and breadth of South India. Starting from Karanataka, it spread to Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Mysore and Kerala as well. The Jain influence had not been very appreciable in Kerala till then.

It is to be noted in this connection that enormous literature in different languages had been developed in the south. Starting from the literature in the Prakrit language, we have the Jain literature in Kannada, Telugu and in Tamil. Tamil and Kannada have a lot of literature on Jainism. Most of the Kannada literature till very recently was founded on Jainism and also on Jain philosophy. Till about the 10th century A.D. there was no separate Mālāyālam Jain literature, but
subsequently we did have some Mālāyālam literature as well. It was after the 8th century that Ādi Śaṅkara introduced many Sanskrit words into Mālāyālam and the languages like Telugu and Kannada started having the influence of ‘Maṇipravālanaya’. Tamil, however, has retained its original identity even till today, though the Sanskrit influences on Tamil can be found even now. It is this background that we need to understand the Jain religion in the South.

At a much later time, three of the Digambara writers became famous, and they were Pūjyapāda Devanandin, Samantabhadra and Akalaṅkadeva.

Pūjyapāda Devanandin (6th cent. A.D.) wrote a commentary on Umāsvāti’s Tattvārtha-sūtra, known as Sarvārtha-siddhi. Samantabhadra (600 A.D. or 8th cent. A.D.) also wrote a commentary on Umāsvāti’s Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra, the introduction to which is known as Devāgama-stotra or Āptānimāṁsa in which the Jainistic philosophy of Śyādvāda is explained. His Yuktānusāsana is also another philosophical work. Almost at the same time was Akalaṅka (10th cent. A.D.) who also wrote a commentary on the Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra, known as Tattvārtha-rāja-vārttiṣṭika. He also wrote a commentary on Samantabhadra’s Āpte nimāṁsa, known as Aṣṭaṣṭati. Akalaṅka is also the author of Nyāya-viniścaya, Laghīyastraya, Svarūpa-sambodhana. and Prāyaścittagrahaṇa. Akalaṅka’s views were opposed by Kumārila, while Vidyānanda Pātrakesarīn and Prabhācandra defended Akalaṅka.

In this connection I would like to state the importance of the three eminent Śvetāmbarā Jain writers who contributed a lot to the cause of the spread of Jainism through their writings. These authors are, in a sense, pioneers in the field of Jainism. Their enormous compositions on different subjects have enriched the Jain literature to a great extent. There is a gap of nearly five hundred years from each other. They are Haribhadra, Hemacandra and Yaśovijaya.

Haribhadrasūri, the most distinguished and prolific Jaina writer of the 8th century (705-775 A.D.), is credited with having written the philosophy of Anekānta first. While there were others who also wrote,
it was Haribhadrasūri who wrote Anekāntayapatatākā to establish the philosophy of manysidedness for judging a thing. Later, of course, there were many Jain scholars who had written on this philosophy following Haribhadrasūri. There were some very powerful authors on both sides, but it was the Digambaras who had contributed a lot to the Anekāntavāda philosophy. It explains how an object or idea can be judged from all possible angles of vision. It is a fact worth noting that according to the Jains a substance has two opposite characters---permanence and change, universality and particularity, similarity and dissimilarity. The Jain authors like Samantabhadra, Akalanka, Vidyānātha and Yaśovijaya laid a firm foundation of Anekāntavāda and established a grand superstructure of Anekānta doctrine. The Anekāntayapatatākā of Haribhadrasūri is a standard work on the subject and is the most solid contribution to the treasure house of Jain philosophy.

Haribhadra was the first to write commentaries on the Jaina Āgama texts of which again Āvassaya and Dasaveāliya have come down to us. In Haribhadra’s commentaries many interesting tales are found. In his Sanskrit commentaries he retained the narratives in their original Prakrit form. Hemacandra has taken some of his stories in his Sthavirāvali-carita. Haribhadra is also the author of Unadesapada and 32 Aśatakāṇi. In his famous book on general philosophy Śaḍ-darśana-samuccaya, he mainly deals with Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Jaiminī and Buddhism, and lastly on Jainism in a short section. Loka-tattva-nirṇaya is his another philosophical text in Sanskrit verses, where also he has discussed other systems including Jainism. He wrote a commentary on Umāsvāmi’s Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra. He also wrote a commentary on the Nyāyapravesa of the Buddhist Diinnāga. His other works are Yogabindu, Yoga-dṛṣṭi-samuccaya, Dharmanabindu etc. All these works deal with the doctrines of Jainism. Jacobi mentions some other works of Haribhadra. They are Anekānta-jaya-patatākā with his own commentary, Śāstra-vārttā-samuccaya, Śoḍāsa-prakaraṇa. Haribhadra’s Samarāicca-kahā is a prototype of Taranigavatī and is a Prakrit prose romance. Haribhadra also wrote a satire Dhūrtākhyāna by name in five ākhyanas (stories) during

Again it was in the 12th century that we had “the Omniscient of the Kali Age” (*Kali-kāla-sarvajñā*) Hemacandra (1088-1172 A.D.) of Gujarat who not only wrote on Jain philosophy but also on grammar, lexicography, poetics and metrics, of the Prakrit and Sanskrit languages. In fact, the growth of Jainism was distinct after the monumental works of Hemacandra. It was because of Hemacandra that Gujarat became the main stronghold of the Śvetāmbara Jainas and had remained so for centuries. In fact, the Jain literature flourished to a great extent in the 12th and 13th centuries in Gujarat. Hemacandra wrote several works, such as, *Siddha-hema-sabdānuṣūśāsana*, *Dhātupāṭha*, *Uṇādi-sūtra*, *Liṅgānuṣūśāsana* on grammar; and, *Abhidhāna-cintāmaṇi*, *Anekārthasaṃgraha*, *Nighantu-śeṣa*. *Ekāksara-nāmamālā*, *Deśināmamālā* on lexicography; and *Chando'nuṣūśāsana*, *Kāvyānuṣūśāsana* on metrics and rhetorics; and *Dvyāśraya-kāvyya*, *Triṣaṭi-śalākā-puruṣa-carita*, *Pariśiṣṭa-parvan* (*Shavarṇavali*), *Jaina Rāmāyaṇa* on Mahākāvyas; and *Pramāṇa-mimāṃsā*, *Anya-yoga-śvava-cchedikā* (in 32 verses) and *Yogasāstra* on philosophy. Hemacandra attacked Brahmanical morality, particularly on Manu, and had shown convincingly that the morality as proclaimed by Manu was incompatible with the command of Ahiṃsā.

In the 17th century we also have Yaśovijaya (1624-1688 A.D.) whose contribution to Jainism was a turning point in the Jain history. He was the first who tried to reconcile the differences between the Śvetāmpara and the Digambara conflict. It was he who wanted “to prove that the Kevalin, the completely Enlightened, so long as he leads a physical life, must take nourishment, that women can attain to release, and that the ordinary objects of usage of the monks, garments etc, are not to be counted as ‘possessions’, and that the saintly life does not exclude life in the world. (Winternitz, *History of Indian Literature*, Vol. II, p. 593). Though he is not a prolific writer, he seems to be a bulky writer. All his works are full of thoughts and ideas. His *Adhyātma-parīkṣā* in Prakrit with a Sanskrit commentary by the author himself, is a treatise on self-realisation. His *Jñāna-bindu-
prakaraṇa (written in 1675) and Jñānasāra or Aṣṭaka-prakaraṇa relate the essence of knowledge for acquiring the right perception of an object. It is also said that he revised the Dharma-saṁgraha written by Mānavijaya in 1681. This is a bulky book which describes the duties of the householder and the ascetic. This book is very rich in quotations, and it is seen that nearly 103 works and 26 authors are quoted in this book.

In the history of Jainism certain new ideas (which were once discarded by Mahāvīra) started to appear again. Around the 10th century A.D. differences in certain interpretations of Jainism came in. For example, Mahāvīra did not believe in Caturāśrama, that is, Brahmacarya, Gṛhaṣṭha, Vānaprastha, and Saṁyāsa (Jaina name is bhikṣu), but in the 9-10th centuries A.D., these started coming up again in Jainism. It is believed that Jinasena (9th cent. A.D.), a pupil of Viraśena, and the friend of King Amoghavāraśa I (815-877 A.D.), and author of the Ādipurāṇa, accepted the Caturāśrama system of Hinduism. His follower the famous Digambara Cāmuṇḍarāya (10th-11th centuries A.D.) in his work Cāritra-sāra has acknowledged this concept of the four āśramas of the Hindus. Except one (i.e. bhikṣu the name of the fourth stage), the names are also the same.

After a few centuries, Āśādhara (1240 A.D.) in his Sāgaradharmāmṛta and Medhāvin (1504 A.D.) in his Śrāvakācāra had given threefold classification of the Śrāvaka. These are pākṣika, naiṣṭhika, and sādhaka. A pākṣika-śrāvaka is a layman who practises the anuvratas and the mūlagunas. He is called a pākṣika layman, because he has an inclination (pakṣa) towards ahiṃsā, while, on the contrary, the naiṣṭhika-śrāvaka (which is, in fact, equivalent to naiṣṭhika-brahmacārī and which is again later on called kuṭullaka) is one who pursues his path upwards for spiritual attainment and practises the tenfold dharma of the ascetic. As in his culminating point (niṣṭhā) he leaves the household life, he is called naiṣṭhika śrāvaka. A Sādhaka is he who concludes (sādhayati) or renounces his human body by carrying out sallekhanā. (S.R. Banerjee, Introducing Jainism, Calcutta, 2002, pp 34, 36). The inclusion of this idea in the history of Jainism
was due to some historical influences of the time. Sometimes these differences might also be due to some other reasons.

Jainism is very severe, very difficult to follow. Particularly the life of the Śvetāmbara Sādhus who roam from place to place is very difficult to follow. They cannot cross the sea or water. As the Jaina Sādhus and Sādhvīs could not cross the sea, Jainism did not spread outside India. But in the last quarter of the twentieth century, some groups of Jains travelled all over the world spreading Jainism. They are not Sādhus and Sādhvīs in the real sense of the term, but they are called Śramaṇa and Śramani. They are allowed to travel everywhere. This started almost at the end of the 20th century, and the Terapanthī Sādhu community was the pioneers in this respect. The Jaina monks and nuns should not stay in one place for a long time and they must be constantly on the move preaching their religion. They can halt in one place only during the rainy season and resume their journey as soon as the rains are over. Even our present Ācārya Mahāprajñājī has been constantly roaming for over 70 years now. He has perhaps now left Ahmedabad as well. I saw him moving in the years 1958-59 in Calcutta and that is where I met the Ācāryaji for the third time, the first time being in 1957 at Sujangarh in Rajasthan. Wherever they moved, the monks preached the Jaina philosophy and that is how the religion was propagated. People attended these preachings in large numbers and often became the followers of the religion as well. It is said that in those days both Buddha and Mahāvīra used to go from place to place trying to convince the kings and the queens by their views, because unless the kings accepted it, you could not make the rest of the people (prajās) accept their views. Normally when they addressed the king in the assembly, common people were also there, listening. It is also said that there were over 5-6 lakh followers of Mahāvīra in those days and the preaching basically involved the fundamental truths and also removing from the minds of the followers any kinds of doubts or confusions relating to who he was and what was his role on this earth.
APPENDIX

SOME MAJOR RELIGIONS AND RELIGIOUS IDEAS OF THE WORLD.

A. MAJOR RELIGIONS OF THE WORLD

1. Christianity
   a) Roman Catholic
   b) Orthodox Catholic
   c) Protestants
   d) Coptic Christians

2. Judaism
   a) Jews and Judaism
   b) Jewish Sects
      i) Karaism
      ii) Cabala
      iii) Hasidism

3. Hinduism (Sanātana / Brahmanism)
4. Jainism (Śvetāmbara and Digambara)
5. Buddhism (Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna)
6. Śaivism (Śaktism)
7. Vaiśnavism
8. Śikhism (Grantha-sahib)
9. Brāhma-ism (propagated by Raja Ram Mohan Ray)
10. Islam (Muslims / Mohammedanism / Sufism)
11. Taoism
12. Confucianism
13. Shintoism
14. Lamaism
15. Zoroastrianism (Religion of the Parsees)
16. Animism
17. Baha’i Faith
18. Druze
19. Pagan Religion
20. Popular Beliefs

B. PRIMITIVE RELIGIONS.

a) 1. Ancestor worship
2. Animal worship
3. Fateshism
4. Magic
5. Human Sacrifice
6. Shamanism
7. Totenism
b) 1. Cargo Cults
   2. Ghost Dance
   3. Nativistic movements
   4. Peyotism
   5. Sun-Dance
   6. Voodoo

C. SUBJECTS OF RELIGION
   1. Creation of the world (Myths of,)
   2. God (Existence of God)
   3. Heaven and Hell
   4. Eschatology (the things after Death).
   5. Faith, Prayer and Belief
   6. Feast and Festival
   7. Priesthood, Ritual and Spiritual exercises
   8. Sacrifice / Worship
   9. Soul / Ātmā / Paramātmā

D. IDEAS OF GOD
   1. Monotheism → Monism
   2. Dualism → Deism
   3. Polytheism → Plurality
   4. Theism → Pantheism
   5. Agnosticism → Atheism
   6. Yahweh / Brahma / Allah
   7. Devil and Satan

E. RELIGIONS OF INDIA AND JAPAN

<table>
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<th>Japan</th>
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<td>1. Buddhism</td>
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<td>2. Buddhism</td>
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<td>4. Śaivism (Śaktism)</td>
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<td>5. Vaiśāṇavism</td>
<td>5. Popular Beliefs.</td>
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<td>6. Śikhism</td>
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<td>7. Brāhma-ism</td>
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<td>8. Islam / Muslim</td>
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<td>9. Christianity</td>
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<td>10. Zoroastrianism</td>
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BOOK REVIEW

Abhidhāna-cintāmaṇi-nāma-mālā of Hemacandrācārya edited by Gaṇi Śricandravijaya and published by Śri Rander Road Jain Sangh, Adajan Patiya, Rander Road, Surat, Gujarat, Vikrama Saṁvat 2059 (=A.D. 2003), pp. xxxii+1050+vi, price Rs 600.00 only.

One of the greatest contributions in the beginning of the twenty-first century is the edition of Abhidhāna-cintāmaṇi-nāma-mālā of Hemacandrācārya edited by Gaṇi Śricandravijaya with the commentary of Vyutpatti-ratnakara (composed in saṁvat 1686) by Śri Devasāgara Gaṇi, pupil of Ravicandra of the Añcalagaccha, during the Spiritual reign of Kalyāṇasāgarasūri. The book has six chapters (known as kāṇḍas) of which the fourth has several sub-sections. It has a section on indeclinables. Apart from these, the book contains an elaborate introduction and several appendices of words, ślokas and many other things. In the introduction the editor has discussed lots of problems on the significance of words and their meanings. The editor has also incidentally mentioned the existence of many other lexicographies which have enhanced the quality of the introduction. The introduction written in Sanskrit is very valuable.

The text, Abhidhāna-cintāmaṇi-nāma-mālā, deals with synonyms in six kāṇḍas. It begins with Jaina gods and ends with abstracts, adjectives, and particles. The abhidhāna-cintāmaṇi is supplemented by Nighanṭu-śeṣa, a botanical dictionary, and by Anekārtha-saṁgraha.

In the appendices, the word-index with their Gujarati meanings is given, and the śloka-index of the verses is also furnished. There is an index of books and authors quoted in the Vyutpattiratnakara.

Though Abhidhāna-cintāmaṇi was edited earlier by St. Petersburg (1847), by Vijayadharmaśūri, Bhavnagar, (Vir Saṁv. 2446), by Mahāvīra Jain Sabhā Cambay, from Nirmaya Sāgara Press, Bombay, Śaka 1818, on the whole, this Surat edition is a nice one, and I believe that all the previous editions will be eclipsed by the present one.

Satya Ranjan Banerjee

One of the serious and critical research productions of Professor V.M. Kulkarni is his latest publication, known as ABHINAVA Bhāratī TEXT RESTORED and other ARTICLES published from Ahmedabad under the General Editorship of Jitendra B. Shah. The text contains fifteen articles of V.M. Kulkarni --- all of which are concerned on rhetorics and poetry. Of them again, the text of ABHINAVA Bhāratī RESTORED occupies the most important position of the book. It has three appendices which also contain the criticism of some writers on rhetorics. Most of the articles, if not all, were published in different Journals from 1963 onwards till 2002. Each one is a gem and is a good specimen of serious research work.

ABHINAVA-bhāratī is a commentary on the Nāṭya-sāstra of Bharata by Abhinavagupta belonging to the 11th /12th centuries A.D. The commentary is very famous and occupies a unique position in the literary criticism of Sanskrit literature. This commentary is published in Gaekaward Oriental Series, Baroda, from 1927 onward by M. Ramakrishna Kavi. But unfortunately the edition as printed there is very corrupt and erroneous. V.M. Kulkarni has tried his best to restore the text on the basis of some quotations as found in Hemacandra’s Kāvyānusāsana, Ramacandra and Guṇacandra’s Nāṭya- darpaṇa and Ambāprasāda’s Kalpalata-viveka. All these writers have borrowed several passages from the ABHINAVA Bhāratī of Abhinavagupta. V.M. Kulkarni on the basis of the passages quoted by these writers has restored some of corrupt texts of ABHINAVA bhāratī. This will be reflected in his book at every step. The other articles of Kulkarni are similarly thought-provoking. It is quite in the fitness of things that the collection of these articles will be a treasure-house in the literary criticism of Sanskrit literature.

I hope this book of V.M. Kulkarni will act as a troch-bearer of future generation and will serve as a model of how to restore a corrupt text on the basis of external evidence. I believe that this work will be useful to scholars of Sanskrit literary criticism.

Satya Ranjan Banerjee
Aspect of Jainology and Buddhist Studies-ed by Jinendra Jain, Radha Publication, New Delhi, 2004, price Rs. 695.00

The book entitled, Aspect of Jainology and Buddhist Studies, a felicitation volume in honour of Professor Prem Suman Jain, an eminent authority on Oriental studies, is edited by Dr Jinendra Jain. The book has myriad characteristics of which one of them is to present an overall outlook on the huge scholarly work done by Professor P.S. Jain during the 35 years of his academic pursuit. It was pious commitment of his worthy students like Dr Jinendra Jain, devoted to oriental learning, to highlight the valuable works of his Guru. This commitment has come into existence as a consequence of his constant persuasion and an uninterrupted approach to scholars who are also devoted to the field of Oriental studies.

The book has been classified in three parts. The first part represents Professor Prem Suman Jain: Personality and Contributions. The second part of the book makes us acquainted with the latest scholarly research articles written by Professor Prem Suman Jain. In this part only his ten articles have been compiled by the editor. The third part which represents the articles written by the different well-known scholars purposely in honour of Professor Jain is the biggest one. Comprising all these three parts, this book has become a valuable treatise, and also represents the thought-provoking articles of many eminent scholars. One cannot help but praising Dr Jinendra Jain, the editor of the book, for his skill in editing the volume. The book begins from the thoughts of the persons closely related to Professor Jain and the thoughts revealed by the erudites on his life. In the same continuation, the reviews of the selected books by Professor Jain have been brought out. In this way, the first part of the book elucidates Professor Jain's personality and his unmeasurable contribution to the field of Oriental studies. It also makes us acquainted with this truth that Professor Jain has equal command over whole Śramaṇa tradition viz. Jainism and Buddhism. He has written a book on Prakrit grammar.

The second part of the book contains the articles written by Professor Prem Suman Jain. These articles fulfil the comparative studies of Buddhism and Jainism. One of the articles namely ‘Equivalent views about the Ultimate Reality in Jainism and Hinduism’, focuses
the ultimate reality from both the traditions. The author discusses on the trio of the traditions.

The third part of the book is dedicated to the ‘Aspects of Jainology and Buddhist Studies’. It has 33 articles. Some of the articles are related to Buddhist Philosophy and the rest are related to different aspects of Jain philosophy, Jain History, Jain Metaphysics, Jain Ethics, Jain Mathematics and Jain Art. In a nut-shell, all areas of Jain philosophy have been covered up. If the Jain logic and epistemology had included in the book, it would have become very valuable.

The articles of the book are very scholarly and will prompt the reader to read the book. This is the authenticity and purity of this book. The title of the book shows its importance. The get-up of the cover page of the book is attractive. The book is worth keeping not only in the libraries of Institutions, but also in the personal libraries of the learned scholars as well.

Pradyumna Shah
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