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Editor : Satya Ranjan Banerjee

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RELIGION (*DHARMA*)- A SOCIAL NECESSITY JAINA PERSPECTIVE*

R. P. Poddar

Jaina ontology holds 'Time (*kāla*)' as having ascending (*utsarpiṇī*) and descending (*avasarpiṇī*) swings. In the first it swings from extreme evil (*duṣṣamā duṣṣamā*) to extreme good (*suṣamā suṣamā*) through the intermediary phases of evil (*duṣṣamā*), evil diluted with good (*duṣṣamā suṣamā*), good with vestiges of evil (*suṣamā duṣṣamā*) and good (*suṣamā*). The first two phases last for twenty-one thousand years each. The rest respectively last for (K-42000 years) 2K, 3K and 4K where 'K' stands for a fabulous measure of time (*koṭi koṭi sāgaropama*¹). The gear is reversed in the second. At present the Time is in the descending swing of which the first four phases and approximately 2527 years of the fifth phase have elapsed. After approximately 18,473 years of the current and 21,000 years of the sixth phase Time's swing will be reversed.

In the first two phases of the present descending swing, human beings were born in pairs of male and female. The new pair produced another before extinction and so on. All human requirements were fulfilled by ten types of trees called *kalpavṛkṣas* (wish-fulfilling trees)². The human beings of those times were, 'endowed with all the auspicious marks, having unimpaired form, voice, constitution, colour and a favourable wind humour, peaceful by nature; with slight anger, pride, deceit and greed; meek and mild; having few desires and keeping their wishes always within compass, not amassing anything, eating flowers and fruits growing on the earth, living under trees and wearing leaves'³. They did not need any weapon to protect themselves. Even

* Acharya Atmāram Memorial Jain lecture at Guru Gobind Singh Department of Religious Studies, Punjabi University, Patiala.

the beasts of the forest were friendly with them. They did not need cultivate any art or craft or trade or agriculture for a livelihood⁴.

Degeneration set in during the third phase of 'good gradually getting polluted with evil (*susamā duṣṣamā*)', may be, because of the inherent passions of human nature (*kaṣāyas*) which were dormant in the first two phases and began to show up in the third. *Kaṣāyas* are four: anger, pride, deceit and greed. Greed is desire for possession, enjoyment and aggrandizement. It pervades the rest: 'anger' springs from frustration of greed (*kāmāt krodho 'bhijāyate*); 'pride' is greed for self-aggrandizement and 'deceit' is practised for some sort of gain. 'Greed' is die-hard and sticks to the soul till it is rid of all the *ghātī karmans*. Burgeoning human passions disturbed the age-old pair-progeny system (*yugalika paramparā*). Strife set in over sharing of the wish-fulfilling trees-impelled by greed one trying to get more than the other and thus infringing upon the latter's natural right. So someone had to assume the role of guardian of society. One after another there were fifteen such guardians called *kulakāras*. They tried to deter people from acts of infringement upon the natural rights of others, the first five just by resenting (*hākāra*), the next five by prohibiting (*mākāra*) and the last five by condemning (*dhikkāra*). Perhaps these measures failed to arrest the degeneration. So the last *kulakāra*, Ṛṣabha tried to counter it by introducing additional means of livelihood, such as, agriculture and other arts and crafts etc. He also forged a sword and assumed kingship, may be to inflict corporal punishment on those who would not listen to condemnation.

After reigning for a fabulously long period of time, Ṛṣabha renounced the world and became a wandering ascetic, perhaps, to find a way more effective than the sword to contain and eradicate inordinate human greed which propelled one to encroach upon the natural rights of another.

In course of ascetic practices Ṛṣabha subjected himself to rigorous self-discipline (*samiti*) in respect of walking (*īryā*), speaking (*bhāṣā*), seeking and obtaining food (*eṣāṇā*), taking and depositing articles of use (*ādāna-nikṣepa*) and disposal of personal refuses (*utsarga*). He carefully guarded his faculties of thinking (*mana*), expressing (*vacana*) and acting (*kāya*). With these practices the

primeval passions (*kaṣāyas*) waned and vanished. He was released from all physical and spiritual bindings and revelation dawned upon him. He realized that self-restraint was the way to internal and external peace and harmony. It is at its best when a person conducts himself in such a way that he does not afflict or agitate any other living being. It is perfect *ahimsā*. This is how Ṛṣabha rediscovered the right path and became the first of the twenty-four founders of religion (*Tirthaṅkaras*) of the current descending swing of Time.

The legend of Ṛṣabha shows that religion (*dharma*) arose from a social necessity. People quarrelled with one another for larger share of *Kalpavṛkṣa*. Admonitions of *hākāra*, *mākāra* and *dhikkāra* were not enough to prevent the strife. Then Ṛṣabha assumed the role of a king and wielded a sword. After watching the functioning of the sword for quite long, he renounced it and founded the path of religion. Passions are the root cause of all evils. So evils are born in the mind and then spread out on the physical plane. So they can be effectively combated on the psychic plane and it is only *dharma* which can do that.

That a Tirthaṅkara should appear on earth when evil began to sprout in society, favourably compares with the reason given by Kṛṣṇa, the Viṣṇu incarnate, and in that capacity sustainer (*pālaka*) of the world. In the *Bhagavadgītā* (at chapter 4 stanzas 7-8) he declares :

*yadā yadā hi dharmasya glānirbhavati bhārata/
abhyutthānam adharmasya tadātmānam sṛjāmyaham//
paritrāṇāya sādḥūnām vināśāya ca duṣkṛtām/
dharma samsthāpanārthāya sambhavāmi yuge yuge//*

This concept has been adopted by Gosvāmī Tulasīdāsa in the context of Rāma's descent in the world. He says :

*jaba jaba hohim dharama kai hānī, bāḍhahim asura adhama
abhimānī/
taba taba prbhu dhari manuja sarīrā, harahim kṛpānidhi sajjana
bhīrā//*

The Viṣṇu-incarnate does that by killing the evil-doers, '*asura māri thāpahim suranḥa prabhu rākhahim sruṭi setu*'. The same is the implication of Kṛṣṇa's '*vināśāya ca duṣkṛtām*' But in Ṛṣabha's system there is no room for killing, i.e. application of physical force. When his ninety-eight sons, who had been asked by their elder brother

Bharata to surrender, sought his advice, he indicated his preference for self-denial. Consequently, all of them renounced the world. Bharata was ashamed. He regretted and later renounced.

Among many definitions of *dharma*, the one found in the *Mahābhārata*, is quite comprehensive. It is-

*dhāraṇād dharmā ityāhu dharmēṇa vidhṛtāḥ prajāḥ /
yat syād dhāraṇa-saṁyuktam sa dharmā iti niścayaḥ //*

// 12.110.11a/8.49.50a

Accordingly whatever sustains the progeny is *dharma*. Sustaining the progeny means maintaining the continuity of life (in all forms). Now there are myriads ways of maintaining the continuity of life. Another stanza gives the guiding principle of selecting the ways,

*ahiṁsārthāya bhūtānām dharmā-pravacanām kṛtam /
yat syād ahiṁsā-saṁyuktam sa dharmā iti niścayaḥ //*

// 12.251. 1pr / 8/707 2 pr

The guiding principle is *ahiṁsā*, abstention from causing injury to living beings (in all forms). It is this religion of *ahiṁsā* that Ṛṣabha founded and other *Tirthankaras* kept reviving from time to time.

In the *Ardhamāgadhī* canons there are several incidents of religious debates between a Jaina monk and a wandering religious mendicant (*parivrājaka*) of some other sect, where the former prefers to specify his religion as *vinayamūla dharmā* i.e. a religion based on ethics. By way of further elaboration he says that it is practised on two levels: on that of the houseless monks and nuns and on that of the householder men and women respectively called *anagāra vinaya* and *sāgāra vinaya*. The former enjoins the five great vows (*mahāvratas*):

- i) abstention from killing (*pāṇāivāyāo veramaṇam*)
- ii) abstention from falsehood (*musāvāyāo veramaṇam*)
- iii) abstention from taking what is not properly given or acquired (*adiṅṇādāṇāo veramaṇam*)
- iv) abstention from conjugal life (*mehuṅāo veramaṇam*)
- v) abstention from acquisition (not essentially needed) (*vahiddhādāṇāo or parigghāo veramaṇam*)

In case of the latter, because of permitting certain relaxations, these are called lesser vows (*aṇuvratas*). For example, the monks

have to observe the vow of non-injury to the farthest possible limit. There are six categories of living beings (*ṣaḍ-jīvanikāya*) viz.

- i) earth-bodied (*pudhāvīkāyā*)
- ii) water-bodied (*āukāyā*)
- iii) fire-bodied (*teukāyā*)
- iv) wind-bodied (*vāukāyā*)
- v) plant-bodied (*vaṇassaikāyā*) and
- vi) mobile-bodied (*tasakāyā*)

The first five categories are one-sensed (*ekendriya*) living beings. The sixth category consists of two, three, four and five-sensed living beings. Apart from abstaining, with utmost care, from causing injury to mobile beings (*trasakāya*), a monk is required to restrict his activities to such an extent that he causes the least disturbance in the natural state of the one sensed beings. So he can't dig the earth, can't bathe in a pond, river or sea, can't make or stir a fire, can't use a fan and can't pluck a leaf from a tree. A house-holder can exploit the one-sensed beings for the fulfilment of his bare personal and domestic needs. In respect of the rest he has to abstain from causing deliberate injury (*saṅkalpī himsā*). He may overlook such injury as is caused in course of day-to-day (*ārambhī*), professional (*udyogī*) and defensive (*virodhī*) activities. A householder may lead a conjugal life strictly limited to his legal wife and acquire property within conscientiously determined limits.

In respect of a monk activity includes doing (*kṛta*), getting done (*kārita*) and supporting or approving an act (*anumodana*). For a householder it is limited to doing (*kṛta*) and getting done (*kārita*). He is not concerned with approving or disapproving an act done by others⁵.

To facilitate the observance of the *aṇuvratas* seven-fold way of living (*sīla*) has been recommended consisting of-

- i) *upabhoga-paribhoga-parimāṇa* : fixing a limit on means of comfort such as houses, furniture, attendants etc. and on articles of daily use such as food and drink, bath-water, unguents etc;
- ii) *digvrata*: restriction of movement in each direction;
- iii) *anarthadaṇḍa (-tyāga)*: abstention from meaningless indulgence and occupation;
- iv) *deśavrata (or deśāvakaśika vrata)* : limitation in respect of area of activity;

v) *sāmāyika* : (daily) religious observances (as prescribed in the doctrines (*samaya*);

vi) *prosadhopavāsa*: observing fast on 8th and 14th day of each fortnight and on full moon and new-moon days;

vii) *atithi-saṁvibhāga* : sharing one's food with unscheduled guests i.e. the monks and the nuns on begging tour; and also offering food, medicine, protection and sacred books to the needy.

These seven with the five *aṇuvratas* constitute the twelve-fold (*dvādaśavidha*) religious conduct of the householders.

The observance of the *vratas* may be impaired in a number of ways. Five broad spectra have been mentioned in respect of each of the twelve *vratas*. These are called *aticāras* (transgressions). The vow of (1) abstention from killing is transgressed by (i) *bandha*, confinement; (ii) *vadha*, torture; (iii) *chaviccheda*, disfiguring (such as a bull by branding and an elephant by cutting the tusks); (iv) *atibhāra*, overloading (an animal used in transportation of goods), and, *bhakta-pāna-vyavaccheda*, cutting off or reducing food and drink. The vow of (2) abstention from falsehood is transgressed by (i) *sahasābhyākhyākhyāna*, false accusation in haste (without proper consideration); (ii) *raho'bhyaākhyāna*, false accusation in secret⁶; (iii) *svadāraṁantra-bheda*, betraying the confidence of one's wife; (iv) *mṛṣopadeśa*, spreading rumour; (v) *kūṭa-lekha-karaṇa*, tampering with a document or forging a document. The vow of (3) abstention from theft is transgressed by (i) *stenāhṛta*, profiting from stolen property (by buying and selling it); (ii) *taskara-prayoga*, using thieves (for some strategic purpose) (iii) *viruddha-rājyātīkrama*, infiltration into a hostile country (not permitting entry); (iv) *kūṭatulā-kūṭamāna*, using false balance and measures (to overweigh or underweigh in one's interest); (v) *tatpratirūpaka-vyavahāra*, dealing in counterfeit or adulterated goods. The vow of (4) limiting conjugal activity to one's legal wife is transgressed by (i) *itvarika-parigrhītāgamana*, intercourse with an ad hoc wife, procured during foreign travel or sojourn; (ii) *a-parigrhītā-gamana*, intercourse with an unwedded yet lawful bedcompanion of whoever hires i.e. a *sāmānyā* or a *veśyā*; (iii) *anaṅga-kṛdā*, extra-marital flirtation sans sex; (iv) *para-vivāha-karaṇa*, match-making; (v) *kāma-bhoga-tīvrābhilāṣa*, insatiable desire for sensual pleasures. The vow of acquiring property within conscientiously determined limits is transgressed by extending the

limits in respect of (i) corn-field, (ii) gold, (iii) food grains and money, (iv) servants and cattle, and (v) household fittings and furniture on specious reasons.

A householder transgresses the observance of (1) *upabhoga-paribhoga-parimāna*, by consuming (i) living substances (*sacittāhāra*), (ii) extracts from living substances (*sacittapratibaddhāhāra*), (iii-iv) unripe or artificially ripened medicinal fruits or seeds (*apakva-*, *duṣpakva-oṣadhi-bhakṣaṇa* and (v) pods in which seeds are yet to develop (*tucchoṣadhi-bhakṣaṇa*).

Besides a householder should avoid such means of livelihood as involve injury to living beings. Fifteen such have been enumerated, viz. (i) making a fire (*aṅgāra-karma*, for baking bricks, making charcoal etc); (ii) felling trees (*vanakarma*); (iii) making carts (*śakaṭakarma*); (iv) working carts or ferries on hire (*bhātākarma*); (v) digging earth or breaking stones (*sphoṭakarma*), dealing in (vi) ivory (*danta*), (vii) lac (*lākṣā*), (viii) liquors (*rasa*); (ix) poison (*viṣa*) and (x) hair (*keśa*); (xi) crushing (*yantra-pīḍaṇa*); (xii) branding or castrating an animal (*nirlāñchana*), (xiii) burning wood (*dāvāgnidāha*), (xiv) draining lakes, rivers and tanks (*sara-hrada-tāla-śoṣaṇa*) and (xv) running a brothel (*asatijanapoṣaṇa*).

Digvrata is transgressed by extending the fixed limits in (i) vertical; (ii) nether and (iii) horizontal directions (*ūrdhva-adhaḥ-tiryak-dikpramāṇātīkrama*), by (iv) interchanging the limits among directions at will and also by (v) forgetfulness; (3) *anartha-dandatyāga* by (i) lechery (*kandarpa*), (ii) mockery (*kautkucya*), (iii) garrulity (*maukharya*), (iv) making only one component of a tool etc. (consisting of more than one components) (*saṁyuktādhikaraṇa*), and (v) left overs etc. (*upabhoga-paribhogātirikta*). Observance of (4) *deśāvakaśika vrata* is transgressed by ordering necessary things from and sending things away beyond the fixed range of activity, (i) by a messenger (*ānayana-prayoga*), (ii) by a representative (*preṣyaprayoga*)⁷, (iii) by audio signals (*śabdānupāta*), (iv) by visual signals (*rūpānupāta*) and (v) by a projectile (*puḍgala-prakṣepa*).

Observance of *sāmāyika* is transgressed by (i-iii) ill application of mind, speech and body (*mano-vākyāya-duṣprañidhāna*); (iv) non-observance due to forgetfulness (*smṛtyakaraṇam*); (v) irregular and hurried observance or observance in a state of unsteadiness (*anavasthitasya karaṇam*). (6) *Proṣadhopavāsa* is transgressed by (i-

iv) improper inspection and cleaning (*apratyupekṣita*, *duṣpratyupekṣita*) of bed, covering; lavatory and latrine and (v) improper observance due to suppressed desire for sensual pleasures (*samyagananupālana*). (7) Observance of *atithi-saṁvibhāga* is transgressed by (i) placing the acceptable food in the midst of living substance such as seeds or grains (*sacitta-niksepana*), (ii) obscuring the food by seeds or green fruits, (*sacitta-pādhāna*); (iii) looking for the guest either earlier or later than the usual begging time of the monks and the nuns (*kālātikrama*); (iv) indicating that the food is being offered on somebody's behalf (*paravyapadeśa*) and (v) envious offering to prove one's superiority over others (*matsaritā*). In the first four cases the monk would not accept the food and in the last the very purpose of religious offering will be defeated on account of evil intention of the donor.

Further, the conduct of a householder is graded in eleven standards each being called a *pratimā* (measure). The first is called *samyagdarśana*, right faith characterized by a set conviction that the religion taught by the *tīrthānkara* is efficient to lead the follower to the ultimate good, both here and hereafter. Its typical (*peyāla*) transgressions are (i) *śaṅkā*, a lurking suspicion if this religion can really deliver the goods; (ii) *kāṅkṣā*, desire to shift loyalty to another religion; (iii) *vicikitsā*, distrust in the transcendental consequences of religious conduct viz. the heavens and the final state of emancipation; (iv) *parapāṣaṇḍa-praśamsā*, appreciation (teachers of) another religious sect; and (v) *para-pāṣaṇḍa-saṁstava*, familiarity with another religious sect.

The second is *vrata-pratimā*. At this stage the householder observes the five *aṇuvratas*, carefully avoiding the transgressions; the third is *sāmāyika*, proper observance of everyday religious formality; the fourth is *proṣadhopavāsa*, observance of the prescribed religious fasts and practice of meditation. Features of the fifth *pratimā* are meditating, taking no bath (with cold water), omitting the evening meal. This stage is called the stage of *rātri-bhojana-tyāga* or *pratimā* because of regular practice of meditation in a statue (*pratimā*)-like posture. This is also called the stage of *divā brahmacarya* (a celibate during daytime), because of renunciation of all conjugal affairs during daytime. The sixth is the stage of observing complete celibacy (*a-brahma-varjana-pratimā*). The seventh is the stage of abstention from

all raw articles of food (*sacittāhāra-varjana*). The eighth is the stage of *ārambha-tyāga*, renunciation of profession. However, the householder at this stage may give necessary advice and guidance to his professional successor. At the ninth stage (*parigraha-tyāga*), he remains aloof from his property, but continues to advise and guide his heir or heirs. At the tenth stage he gives up advising and guiding also (*anumati-tyāga*). At the eleventh stage he renounces food cooked for him and resorts to begging for his food and other necessary things (*uddiṣṭha-tyāga*).

The first *pratimā* has to be observed for a period of one month, then the second is added for two months, the third for three and so on. Thus in a period of five years and six months a householder *de facto* becomes a houseless mendicant (*anagāra*). (In some texts the eleventh is called *śramaṇabhūta pratimā* and supposedly the ninth, *parigraha-tyāga* is merged with it, keeping the total number at eleven. But the *uddiṣṭha-tyāga pratimā* is practically *śramaṇabhūta pratimā*. So differentiation between the two is not tenable.)

The Jaina religious conduct culminates in mortal emaciation by gradual reduction of food in-take (*apaścima-māraṇāntika-samlekhana*). This too like the other observances has five (types of) transgressions: (i) This too like world i.e. earthly pleasures in next life (*iha-lokāśamsā*); (ii) longing for the other world i.e. heavenly pleasures in next life (*paralokāśamsā*); (iii) longing for (prolongation of) life (*jīvitāśamsā*); (iv) longing for death (*maraṇāśamsā*); and (v) longing for sensual pleasures (*kāmabhogāśamsā*).

Conduct of the laity differs from that of the monk, not in kind but only in degree. After doing a compressed course of five and a half years, called *pratimā*, a layman qualifies for monkhood. Thus the conduct of the laity forms an ox-bow on the main stream of complete renunciation (*sarvavirati*).

Bifurcation of religious conduct into monastic and lay levels is a practical approach. By this provision the monastic level is kept close to the highest ideology and the laity too is tagged along. They sustain each other. The laity takes care of food, outfits and shelter for the monks and the nuns and also supplies recruits to the monastic order. In turn the latter fulfils the religious requirements of the laity by delivering sermons, by setting concrete examples of the highest principles of conduct and above all by preserving and propagation

the doctrines by virtue of which the distinct identity of the community has remained intact in spite of the vicissitudes of time.

In spite of practising religion on higher and lower levels, both the order of the monks and the laity have a common end—reaching the highest state of being (*mokṣa*) through the path of self-purification. The first *Tirthaṅkara* Ṛṣabha realized self-purification by guarding his faculties of thought (*manas*), speech (*vacana*) and action (*kāya*). On the individual level guarding of the faculties of thought, speech and action can be effected by shedding off the primeval passions of attachment and aversion, by maintaining silence and by giving up all physical activities.

*jā rāgādiṇiyatti maṇassa jāṇāhi taṃ maṇoguttim// Bha Ārā. 1181
moṇaṃ vā hoi vaciguttī // 8 // Ibid.*

kāyakiriyāṇiyatti kāussaggo sarīrage guttī// Ibid. 1182

Since an individual is put in a surrounding and he has certain inherent physical functions to perform, he cannot be absolutely speechless and actionless. So in relation to his surroundings and to his own person he can guard his faculties of speech and action by not allowing them to be swayed by passions and maintaining equanimity in walking, speakings, acquiring food, clothes and shelter, laying down and picking up articles of use and disposing of personal refuses. This calls for a harmonious relationship between the individual and his surroundings. It was for generating this relationship that the *vratas* were preached by the *Tirthaṅkaras*. Some greedy people appropriated more than due share of the *kalpavṛkṣas*, the life-sustaining natural resources, to themselves and the result was discord in the community. Additional resources could not be enough unless human greed was contained and this could be done effectively by awakening the moral conscience. It is to this objective that the religious (ethical) conduct is primarily directed. The moment a living being is born on the earth, it acquires a natural right to life. The vow of abstaining from killing safeguards this natural right not only to human beings but to all living beings. Falsehood is resorted for self-gratification at the cost of others. So this too is tantamount to causing injury, though by words, not by weapons. Improper appropriation of others' means of livelihood and physical comfort is theft. It is an economic offence, may be more deeply injurious than the physical one. It is said.

*atthammi hide puriso ummatto vigayaceyaṇo hodi/
maradi va hakkārakido attho jīvaṃ khu purisassa// Bha Ārā. 853.*

Inordinate carnality causes envy, and strife. It has been called ‘*bhedāyatana* = breeding ground of dissension (*Dasave. 9.2.12*). It has caused great wars such as the Trojan and the Rāma-Rāvaṇa. In a way, this too involves violation of natural right. Nature is seen to be producing male and female in almost equal numbers. In the pair-progeny tradition (*yugalika paramparā*) the balance was perfect. Nature has endowed male and female, of all species, with desire to unite and procreate and thus keep the creation going. This desire is very intense and its frustration may touch deeper layers of consciousness. One violating the conjugal life of another, or one appropriating to oneself a number of consorts and thus depriving others, causes an irremediable suffering. One who, propelled by greed, amassed more than reasonably required means of subsistence and physical comfort, behaves inimically towards others, because in his bid to have more and more he may prevent others from acquiring enough means for the fulfillment of bare necessities.

Nor do the killers etc. gain anything from inflicting all these sufferings on others. On the other hand, they too are sufferers, albeit, they may not realize it. Apart from the theological prognosis of atonement in next life, a killer suffers while killing. Since he himself wouldn’t like to be killed, his conscience does prick while killing and this leaves a scar on his psyche, not easy to be effaced. As virtue has its own reward so also vice has its own punishment. Gosvāmī Tulasīdāsa gives an apt example in the context of Rāvaṇa going to abduct Sītā. He says :

*sūna bīca dasakandhara dekhā, āvā nikaṭa jatī ke veṣā//
jākem ḍara sura asura ḍerāhīm, nisi na nīnda dina anna na
khāhīm//*

*so dasasīsa svana kī nāim, ita uta citai calā bhidojāim//
imi kupantha poda deta khagesā, raha na teja tana budhi bala
lesā//* *Rāmacarita-mānasa 3. 27. (4-5)]*

So killing etc. brings universal suffering and their eradication paves the way to universal well-being.

If one looks at the twelve-fold observances of a householder along with the list of typical transgressions to be avoided, one finds

that the whole system has been carefully worked out for practical application. What the system is calculated to deliver immediately is universal welfare, a welfare, not limited to mankind, but going down to one-sensed beings: earth-bodied, water-bodied, air-bodied, fire-bodied and the plant-bodied, with all sentient beings in between. It forbids-

- (i) confinement, torture, overloading and underfeeding of animals etc. as forms of slaughter;
- (ii) unconsidered accusation, back-biting, betrayal of confidence, spreading rumour, forgery and tampering of documents etc. as forms of falsehood;
- (iii) profiteering, smuggling, infiltrating, using false weights and measures and dealing in counterfeit and adulterated goods etc. as forms of theft;
- (iv) keeping concubines, prostitution and flirtation as forms of adultery;
- (v) owning property beyond the ceiling, under some pretext as unnecessary hoarding;
- (vi) consumerism as extravagance;
- (vii) burning and felling trees, dealing in ivory, lac, liquors, wool and flesh etc. as stigmatized means of livelihood;
- (viii) expanding the sphere of one's commercial and industrial activities as an excess; and
- (ix) all unproductive labours as futile.

If we judge these forbiddings in the present context, we find them relevant and efficacious in eradicating the evils pestering community life. Our constitution provides for protection of life (article 21). The vow of abstention from killing includes that and envisages much more. It has also been held by the supreme court of India that an individual's right to an unpolluted environment is a corollary to the fundamental right of protection of life (*Virendra Gaura vs State of Haryana*). To ensure an unpolluted environment, the forty-second amendment adds the following articles to the constitution:

48A: Protection and improvement of environment and safeguarding of forest and wild life: The state shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and wild life of the country.

51A: Fundamental duties:-It shall be the duty of every citizen of India-(g) to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, and to have compassion for living creatures; Environment can be kept unpolluted if human interference with nature is kept within sustainable level. The vow of abstention from killing, called *ahimsā* in common parlance, prescribes minimal exploitation of earth, water, air, fire and plant-life, just enough for the fulfilment of needs and not for the gratification of greed. If greed is not contained, need will go on expanding.

Instead of containing greed, the present consumerist culture is whetting it. Religion prescribes a curb on consumerism (*paribhoga-upabhoga-parimāṇa*). But getting a boost from the policy of liberalization and globalization, the consumerist culture is on a high tide. Religion favours localization of commercial and industrial activities (under *digvrata* and *deśavrta*) and this is what Gandhi propagated and practised as the first step towards building the national economy. This ensures participation of a larger number spread over a larger area and is, therefore, more congenial to our country where too many hands are without work. In short, religion is lack of its proper application.

The prevailing misconception about religion is that it is more for the next world than this one and more for personal consumption than social. It is under this misconception that our politicians proclaim that religion should not be mixed with politics and that secularism and religion are mutually exclusive. The fact is that religion is entirely this-worldly and also next worldly to remain firmly set as this-worldly. It is both personal and social, because compartmentalization of individual and society is *non-est*. Politics without religion will be unethical, and religion, in the true sense of the term, does not hamper secularism.

The householders constitute the community of which the order of the monks and the nuns is only an offshoot. So the ethics for the householders is the ethics for the community and its immediate objective is to rid the community of bad blood between individual and individual and establish good will and harmony. It is for the society as a whole and not for any isolated individual- an ethical system for an isolated individual is unconceivable. It is true that the ultimate end of religious conduct is liberation (*mokṣa*). The liberat...

soul ascends to the top of the inhabited universe (*siddhaśilā*) and there enjoys the fruits of liberation--infinite knowledge (*anantajñāna*), infinite perception (*anantadarśana*). This state is transcendental and also individual, since the liberated ones retain respective individuality. But there are also embodied omniscients (*sadeha kevalins*) who experience the bliss of liberation in life. So it is not purely and solely a transcendental state. It leaves its aura behind in this world as well.

The concept of *mokṣa* or *nirvāṇa* seems to have gathered momentum in the post-Vedic period, may be under the influence of the *śramaṇa* culture. Among the four *puruṣārthas* (objectives of life) the *śramaṇas* preferred to group *artha* and *kāma* together, as means and end of worldly life, keeping *dharma* and *mokṣa* separate as means and end of transcendental well-being⁸. *Mokṣa* as the goal of religious conduct seems to have been misconceived, it is rather the consequence. Religious conduct is within human jurisdiction, its consequence is extraneous.⁹ While emphasizing the importance of *mokṣa*, this dovetailing denies the immediate this-worldly effects of religious conduct. The latter, by itself, pervading this-worldly life and not overlapping beyond, may be more reasonably grouped with *artha* and *kāma* and that is what the concept of *tri-varga* does¹⁰. The primeval desires (*kāma*) need some means (*artha*) for their fulfilment. Since fulfilment of desires and acquisition of means thereof have to be kept within compass for a happy and peaceful worldly life, some sort of ethics is of necessity required for this purpose. *Dharma* fulfils this purpose. The trio together is conducive to happy and peaceful life which any split is sure to disrupt. Apart from it, is *apavarga* (*mokṣa*), going away from or giving up the pursuit of trio, encompassing entire worldly life, for higher bliss¹¹.

The Buddhist equivalent of *mokṣa* (liberation) is *nibbāna* (extinction). It is “an ethical state to be reached in this birth by ethical practices, contemplation and insight. It is therefore not transcendental” (Rhys David’s *Pāli Dictionary*). After the consumption of *kamma* and the consequent extinction of life-force (*viññāna*), there remains nothing to be put in any state. Before that the life-force remains a transmigrant and mutable entity, now in one form of life and then in another; now suffering infernal agonies and then enjoying heavenly pleasures. Though not believing in soul as a permanent entity, the Buddhists had to believe in transmigration and also in ‘hell’ and

‘heaven’ as punishment and reward for evil and good deeds. For the believers of ‘soul’ as a permanent entity it was necessary to find a pedestal for it after the cycle of transmigration had come to an end as a result of consumption of *karman*. *Mokṣa*, a state of liberation, provides that pedestal. It is the logical sequence of belief in the eternity of the principle of life.

Soul, its transmigration, suffering in hell, enjoying itself in heaven and last but not least its emancipation, though beyond physical perception, are integral parts of ethical system of most religions. If these are withdrawn, the system will be truncated. The religious philosophies which ignored them, such as the Bārhaspatya, could not build any sustainable ethical system.

Transmigration, hell, heaven and emancipation are corollaries of soul or principle of life as distinct from the body, acting with free volition and reaping the harvest thereof. This soul or principle of life is beyond physical perception. But it can be realized with faith:

*naiva vācā na manasā prāptuṃ śakyo na cakṣuṣā/
astīti bruvato 'nyatra katham tad upalabhyate//
astītye vopalabdhavyastattvabhāvena cobhayoḥ/
astītye vopalabdhasya tattvabhāvaḥ prasīdati//*

Kāṭha. 2. 3 (12-13).¹²

This faith is not for the sake of faith. It is for the sake of the ethical system to be complete and self-consistent. This is the next-worldliness of religion reinforcing its this-worldliness.¹³ The religion that we have delineated as ‘*duvālasavihi-gihidhamma*’ is worldly, framed to fulfil social necessities. Nevertheless, its consequences extend to eternity, because of the eternal nature of the agent, the soul. It is pivoted on *ahimsā* (non-violence).

Ahimsā is synonymous with *dharma*. It is the directive principle of the ethical system. It holds the society together and sustains the progeny. In its wider application it can prevent, ‘cruelty to animals’ withhold ‘pollution of land, water and air’ and felling of trees. Gandhi recommended ‘*ahimsā*’ for averting the ecological catastrophe. He believed that “there couldn’t be any ecological movements designed to prevent violence against nature, unless the principle of *ahimsā* (non-violence) became central to the ethos of human culture”. Mr. Fukunaga, Japanese business-man turned environmentalist, was

awarded Mahatma Gandhi World-Peace-Award for 1995. On receiving the award he observed that his activities bore a kinship to the non-violence that the Mahatma preached, 'non-violence to the environment in which we live'.

Now the question arises, if religion based on ethics is efficient to rid society of evils and set it on way to peace and harmony, where lies the rub?

Dharma has been compared to a *cakra* (wheel). A wheel fitted properly to a cart becomes functional. Rotated in the void it serves no purpose. Similarly religion (*dharma*) serves its purpose when applied to life, social life for that matter. A religious system, or any system, stagnates in course of time and polarizes into ritualistic formalities and ideological abstractions. The formalist wears religious outfits, punctiliously offers worship, chants the *mantras*, contributes to the construction of religious buildings, such as, temples and monasteries, occasionally sets out on pilgrimage and rests assured that he has earned merit enough to deserve plenty in this world and heavenly bliss in the next. Such a one is lauded in society as a religious man. This gives him further encouragement to show off. The ideologist delves deeply into the system, compares, analyzes, finds out the root, traces the development and obscures it with otiose interpretations. This one is honoured as a scholar. He rests on his laurels leaving the practice of religion (*dharma*) to the care of religious men. His kind multiples in academia. Thus religion is taken to the temples and the monasteries on the one hand and to the academia on the other, and its habitat, the social life, is bereft of it.¹⁴

The circumstances call for a re-orientation of society towards truly religious i.e. ethical culture.

What we have said about Jainism here is true for all religions, provided their ethical systems are duly emphasized and adopted in practice, and formalism and dogmatism are regarded as mere protective coverings, for which they are really meant. In the *Uttarajjhayana* there is a debate between Keśī, a monk in the line of Pārśvanātha and Gautama, the eldest *gaṇadhara* of Mahāvīra. The problem is why should there be only four restraints in the preachings of Pārśva and five in those of Mahāvīra and why should the former permit clothes, one below navel and the other above (*uttarā* and *antarā*), and the

latter prescribe complete nudity (for the monks). Clarifying the situation about wearing clothes and going nude, Gautama says that the purpose of the outfits is limited to touring in society (for alms) and being recognized as monks by the householders (so that the latter may treat them as such) : '*jatttham gahaṇattham ca loe liṅgapayoyaṇam*'. In case of the householders too, the formalities are meant for a distinct identity. Every religion has its respective formalities to give it a distinct identity of its own. In respect of the essence they are not much different and therefore efficacious to deliver goods. In the *Mahābhārata* there is a legend about *śeṣa*, apparently *śeṣanāga*, being appointed by Brahmā to bear the earth, but really a symbol of *dharma* which indeed bears the earth and sustains the world. The concluding stanza runs as follows:

*śeṣo 'si nāgottama dharmadevo
mahīm imām dhārayasi yad ekaḥ/
anantābhogaiḥ pariḡṛhya sarvām
yathāhaṁ balabhid yathā vā//* // *Ādi. 37.32 (BORI)*

Dharma is *śeṣa*, because everything in creation flits away, this one is left behind (*dharma eko hi niścalaḥ*). It is excellent among the *nāgas*, what doesn't swerve (i.e. what has '*ārjava*' as foremost virtue, *vag, tiryag gatau*). This alone bears the earth, holding it in its entirety with its infinite hoods (forms).

Notes :

1. There is twofold reckoning of time, one within the numeral system and the other beyond it. The first practically begins with *prāṇa*, the time taken in one exhalation and inhalation of a normal man. From *prāṇa* onwards it proceeds as follows: 7 *prāṇas* = 1 *lava*, 77 *lavas* = 1 *muhūrta*; 30 *muhūrtas* = 1 *ahorātra* (day), 30 *ahorātras* = 1 *māsa* (month); 12 *māsas* = 1 *varṣa* (year); 84,00, 000 years make one *pūrvāṅga*. Then it proceeds further in geometric progression up to 13 terms. Beyond this, time is described in terms of simile (*aupamika kāla*).

The unit of *aupamika kāla* is *palyopama*. *Palya* is conceived as a cylinder, having a diameter and depth of one *yojana* each = 96,000 ft. This *palya* is supposed to be packed up with hair tips, growing on a normal man's head in less than a week's time. One hair-tip is taken out every hundred years. Time taken in exhausting the *palya* is one

palyopama. (10)¹⁵ *palyopama* = 1 *sāgaropama*. Thus *koṭi sāgaropama* = (10)²⁹ *palyopama*.

2. These trees have been described with their respective properties in the following verses :

*mattaṅgesu ya majjāṃ sampajjai bhāyaṇāṇi bhīṅgesu/
tuḍiyaṅgesu ya saṅgata tuḍiyāim bahuppagārāim//
dīvasihā joisanāmayā ya ee karinti ujjoyāṃ/
cittaṅgesu ya mallāṃ cittarasā bhoyaṇatthāe//
maṇiyaṅgesu ya bhūsaṇavarāim bhavanāim bhavanarukkhesu/
āinnesu ya dhaṇiyaṃ vatthāim bahuppagārāim//*

// *Thāṇa* (comm.. on 10.192)

3. *savvalakkhaṇasampannā, rūva-sara-saṅghayaṇa-
chaviṇirātāṅkā, aṇulomavāyuvagā, pagai-uvasantā, patanukoha-
māṇa-māya-lohā, miumaddavasampannā, appicchā
asaṇṇihiyasañcayā, viḍimantaraparivasanā, jahicchiyakāmakaṃṇiṇa,
puḍhavipupphaphalāhārā, rukkhagehālayā.*

4. *vavagaya-asi-masi-kisi-vaṇiya-paṇiya-vāṇijjā ibid.*

Jambuddīvapannatti 2.

5. This implies that the order of the monks and the nuns has to act as the guardian of the community. If they connive at an evil act, committed by a person however great, or at an evil idea, propagated by a person, whoever he might be, they are shirking this social responsibility.

6. The Prakrit word is *rahasā* which may be derived from *rabhasā*, 'under impulse'.

7. The Prakrit word is *pesavaṇa*. The commentary renders it as 'preṣya'. But it may be the antonym of *ānayaṇa* (getting things brought in from outside the fixed range, i.e. importing). Then 'pesavaṇa' would mean getting things sent out of the fixed range i.e. exporting.

8. *jaṃ attha-kāma-kāmā apatta-kāmā paḍanti aharagaiṃ/
tā dhamma-mukkha-kāmā sāsaya-nibbāha-suha-kāmā//*

// *Ārāḥ Paḍ (V) 5.*

9. *karmaṇyevādhikāras te mā phaleṣu kadācana/
mā karma-phala-hei bhūr mā te saṅgostvakarmaṇi//*

// *Bhagavatagītā 2.47*

10. *dharme cārthe ca kāme ca lokavṛttiḥ samāhitā/
teṣāṃ gariyān katamo madhyamaḥ ko laghuśca kaḥ//*

*dharmārthakāmāḥ samameva sevyā yastveka sevī sa
naro jaghanyah/
dvayostu dakṣaṁ pravadanti modhyaṁ sa uttamo yo
niratas trivarge//*

// Mahābhārata 12. 161.

11. *apavargaḥ kriyāvasānam* (Śabdārthakalpadruma)
apavaggo pariccāgāvasānesu (Cone's Pali Dictionary)
12. This Aupaniṣadic idea has been simplified by
Kabīradāsa as follows:

*terā sām tujjha meṁ, jyom puhupana meṁ vāsa/
kastūrī kā miraga jyom phiri phiri sūṅghai ghāsa//*

Gandhi further simplifies it when he says,
*īśvara hātha kī chatarī hai, uṭhākara rakhoge to dhūpa
aur varṣā se bacāyegā.*

13. Gosvāmī Tulasīdāsa subordinates *mokṣa* to a worldly
life devoted to Rama, and says,

*ko jānai ko jaiyahim surapura, ko yamapura paradhāma ko/
tulasihim bahuta bhala lāgata, jagajivana rāmagulāma ko//*

This does not mean that he denies the existence of heaven, etc.
He is just giving a pious worldly life its due. He delineates an ideal
worldly life in the following words-

*kabahuṅka haum yaha rahani rahaṅgo/
śrīraghunātha kṛpālu kṛpā se santa subhāva gahaṅgo//1//
yathālābha santosa kāhū som kachu na cahaṅgo/
parahitā nirata nirantara manakramavacana nema nibahaṅgo//2//
paruṣavacana ati dusaha śravana suni tehi pāvaka na
dahaṅgo/
vigatamāna sama sītala mana paraguna nahim doṣa
kahaṅgo//3//
parihari dehajanita cintā dukhasukha samabuddhi sahaṅgo/
tulasidāsa prabhu yahi patha rahi abicala haribhakti lahaṅgo//4//*

Vinayapatrikā. 172

Such a life of devotion to the supreme may be conducive to
good for all. On the basis of his love for the supreme he is for extending
this blissful existence beyond worldly limits. The Supreme has kept
him well in this life and he will do the same in the next life, so say the
scriptures and his love prompts him to have faith,

*roṭi-lūgā nīke rākhai, āgehū kī veda bhākhai;
bhālo hvaihai tero, tātem ānanda lahata haum//
prīti ko pratīti mana mudita rahata haum/*

Ibid. 76.

14. (a) In the month of *Śrāvana* every year there is a mass pilgrimage of *kāmvariya*s on foot from Sultanganj in Bihar to Deoghar (*Vaidyanāthadhāma*) in Jharkhaṇḍa, a distance of nearly 80 kilometers, for bathing the symbolic *Śiva*-idol with *gāṅgā*-water. The whole route remains crowded with pilgrims. On the way there is a pilgrims' shelter built by a devotee popularly known as *kāmvariabābā*, who permanently stayed there. During the pilgrimage one morning it was rumoured that the *bābā* had misbehaved with a woman pilgrim. The mob at once got into a fury, passed a judgment and executed it. In religious frenzy the mob forgot that the crime had to be investigated and punished by proper agencies. This illustrates how crazy religion becomes irreligious.

(b) In Bihar there is a Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology and *Ahimsā*, supposedly situated near the birth-place of lord Mahāvīra viz. Kuṇḍagrāma. Adjacent to it there is a place of *devī*-worship. On special occasions, such as the *navarātra*, animal-sacrifice is offered at the place by the villagers. The said Institute is functioning there for nearly fifty years. The animal-sacrifice is going on as usual, nobody yet having successfully convinced the villagers that what they were doing in the name of religion is a slur on religion.

This shows how formalities and abstractions remain wide of the mark.

THE ĀDIPURĀṆA: THE GENESIS OF HUMAN HISTORY

Hampa Nagarajaiah

The *Ādipurāṇa*, ‘Lorebook of the Beginning’, narrates vividly socio-cultural aspects of the earliest times of human history. Incidentally it brings out socio-anthropological and metaphysical conceptualism of various philosophical theories and their development in the context of evolution of human society including the Jaina society. Jinasena’s eloquent description of the concept of cosmology and the genesis of Jaina history are principally based on the facts consistently maintained by Jaina religious tradition. The *Ādipurāṇa*, Jaina version of the Universal History, has a practical significance as a repository of Lore and exemplification which outweighs such much older texts.

The *Ādipurāṇa* must be clearly understood before Jaina way of spiritual life, tradition and religion could be adequately grasped. The extraordinary epic is almost an epitome of Jaina culture and civilization which has assimilated the socio-cultural currents of its contemporary period. The Jaina order has its own style and method of recording past events. The *Ādipurāṇa* is an ideal representation of that venerable hoary tradition. It is *Kathā* and *Itihāsa-Purāṇa*, containing archaic legendary tales of the great personalities with historical knowledge. ‘People get gems from the ocean, and similarly the readers get gemlike precious lessons from the Purāṇa’ [Jinasena, *Ādipurāṇa*, Parvan 2, verse 116].

A forerunner of a great literary style and system, cognoscente Jinasena was responsible for the standardization of the Purāṇa format. Imparting *ahimsā* cult of non-injury for over eighty years, the centurian Jinasenācārya heralded a socio-cultural, politico-spiritual and literary revolution by authoring the *Ādipurāṇa*, also known as the *Pūrvapurāṇa*. During the glorious epoch of the Rāṣṭrakūṭa’s, Ācārya Jinasena (765-865), an encyclopedist, planned and brilliantly executed the methodical documentation of social, economic, cultural and ethical life of human beings, in the light of Jaina perspective. In the process,

he has systematically explored the knowledge and wisdom stored up in the Jaina ethos. The *Ādipurāṇa*, “Lorebook of the Beginning”, the veritable cultural encyclopaedia of Jaina church, rests upon concepts which are exclusively Indian and possesses the character of a categorical ancient tradition. In this perspective, the *Ādipurāṇa* assumes majestic proportions.

The Rāṣṭrakūṭa era ushered in palmy days for Jaina literary renaissance, and Ācārya Jinasena, most illustrious patriarch revered by the Jaina church was the *creme de la creme* of the age. Gifted with unquestionable literary flair, he has authored prominent works of extraordinary merit, both in Prakrit and Sanskrit. By any standard, undoubtedly, Jinasena, respected as *Kalikāla-sarvajña*, the omniscient of *kali* era, was the uncrowned monarch of the Jaina literary world of the Rāṣṭrakūṭa age. His works, the *Pārśvābhyaṅga*, ‘the prosperity of Arhat Pārśva’, the *Jaya-dhavalā-tīkā*, ‘the victoriously luminous gloss’ (on the *Kaṣāya-Prābhṛta*), and the *Ādipurāṇa* ‘the Lorebook of the Beginning’, are of historical importance and are regarded as *tour de force*, feat of skill, with a stamp of authority and permanency on them.

For the first time in the Jaina literary practice Jinasena defined the visage of *Mahāpurāṇa* : “I shall recite the narrative of the sixty three ancient persons of the Tīrthaṅkaras, of the Cakravartins, of Baladevas, of half Cakravartins (Vāsudevas *alias* Nārāyaṇas) and of their opponents (Prati-Vāsudevas *alias* Prati-Nārāyaṇas). The work is called *Purāṇa* because it relates to the great persons, or because it is narrated by the great sages, or because it teaches the way to great bliss. Other writers say that, because it originated with the old poet it is called *Purāṇa*, and it is called *Mahā-*, great, because of its intrinsic greatness. The great sages have called it a Mahapurāṇa, because it relates to *Mahāpuruṣās*, great men, and because it teaches the bliss” [*Ādipurāṇa*, 1.20-23]. Purāṇas contain the biography/legend/story of mainly one hero/great person (*śalākā puruṣa*), whereas *Mahāpurāṇas* narrate the account of all the sixty-three greatmen. “The Mahāpurāṇa is a term peculiar to the Jain literature and means a great narrative of the ancient names. There are Purāṇas or old tales in the Jain literature, but they narrate the life of a single individual or holy person. The

Mahāpurāṇa, on the other hand, describes the lives of sixtythree prominent men of the Jain faith” [P.L. Vaidya, : “Intro ” : xxx].

According to the Jaina notion the manifest universe has the outline of a man standing with arms akimbo and legs apart. The universe with all its components is eternal and has neither a beginning nor an end. In other words, nobody created it nor any one can destroy it. Within this vast but finite three-dimensional structure are vertically ordered three tiers. The Jambūdvīpa, named after the *jambū* tree, is in the middle tier called *Madhya-loka*. [Ādipurāṇa 4. 48-50]. The Jambūdvīpa, the world of human activity, contains seven continents, including Bharata-kṣetra in the centre of which lies Bhāratavarṣa, the present subcontinent of India, separated from one another by six great mountains. The continents are divided into *karma-bhūmi*, realms of action, and *bhoga-bhūmi*, realms of enjoyment.

In the everlasting universe the wheel of time revolves incessantly in half-circles. The units of cosmic time are divided into two parts, namely the *utsarpiṇī-kāla*, half progressive in the ascending order, and *avasarpiṇī-kāla*, half-regressive in the descending order [Ādipurāṇa, Parva 3, verses 17-18]. The realms of action and enjoyment, i.e., the *karma-bhūmi* and *bhōga-būmi*, are subject to these temporal cycles of half-circle period. In the context of human life, the systematic concept of *utsarpiṇī* and *avasarpiṇī* deserves a detailed description, because they mark the gradual evolution and devolution in happiness, physical strength and stature, span of life, and the length of the age itself.

Each of the *utsarpiṇī* and *avasarpiṇī kālas*, the half-circle eons of time in the manifest universe, are further divided into six subdivisions, as follows:

- a. the six units of *utsarpiṇī*, progressive half-cycle;
 - i) *duṣamā-duṣamā*, extremely unhappy
 - ii) *duṣamā*, unhappy
 - iii) *duṣamā-suṣamā*, more unhappy than happy
 - iv) *suṣamā-duṣamā*, more happy than unhappy
 - v) *suṣamā*, happy
 - vi) *suṣama-suṣamā*, extremely happy

[Ādipurāṇa 3. 22-51].

- b. the six units of *avasarpinī*, regressive half-cycle
- i) *suṣamā-suṣamā*, extremely happy
 - ii) *suṣamā*, happy
 - iii) *suṣamā-duṣamā*, more happy than unhappy.
 - iv) *duṣamā-suṣamā*, more unhappy than happy.
 - v) *duṣamā*, unhappy
 - vi) *duṣamā - duṣamā*, extremely unhappy.

At the end of *utsarpinī kāla*, the ascending half-circle, the revolution of the age reverses and from there on the period of *avasarpinī kāla*, the descending half-circle commences. The process goes on in unbroken succession.

The concept of *Suṣamā* and *Duṣamā* eon reminds us of the concept of the *yugas* of world of *Kṛita*, *Tretā*, *Dvāpara* and *Kali-yugas*, in which the living conditions deteriorate from better to worse, and where the position and status of human life is almost identical.

Curiously, the Bhārata-Kṣetra, our earth, is, at the present time, in an *avasarpinīkāla*, the regressive half cycle, which commenced 3 years and 3½ months after Vardhamāna Mahāvīra's *nirvāṇa*, release from bondage, in 527 B.C., and it is of 21,000 years duration.

Thus in the last three stages of *utsarpinī* period and in the early three stages of the *avasarpinī* period, human beings were benefactors of celestial gifts from the *kalpa-vṛkṣa*, wish-fulfilling tree, and hence enjoyed life without physical labour. But difficult days set in the other stages, since the *Puṇya-bhūmi* and *kalpa-vṛkṣa* disappeared paving way for the *Karma-bhūmi*. [*Ādipurāṇa* 9.35-51].

During the period of *suṣamā-duṣamā* of *avasarpinīkāla*, the process of degeneration had set in, but yet it was still a *bhoga-bhūmi*. Being conscious of the deteriorating conditions, man began to wake up to his environments. For the first time he felt the necessity of seeking proper guidance. Thus, fourteen *kulakaras* (Manus), Law-givers, born one after another guided human beings. Nābhīrāja, last of the *Kulakaras*, and Marudevi, his consort, became the parents of Ṛṣabha (s. a. Ādideva, Ādinātha, Purudeva), the 15th Manu and the first Tīrthaṅkara, expounder of Jaina Religion [*Ādipurāṇa* 3. 152; 11.9].

Consequent to the changes in the phenominal world, men had to work to earn their livelihood. It is in this context that Ṛṣabhadeva taught the arts, science and culture of living. He was the harbinger of human civilization. He virtually inaugurated the age of action, founded the social order, family system and pioneered the different human activities. [*ibid*, 16. 180-82].

Ṛṣabha taught the art of cultivation of Land. Since he guided the mankind and informed the method of growing sugarcane, Ṛṣabha earned the epithet of *Ikṣvāku*, the sprout of sugarcane. He also tutored the three R's of reading, (w)riting and (a)rithmetic. For the benefit of his two daughters, Brāhmī and Sundarī, Ṛṣabha invented the art of writing and arithmetic. The ancient Indian Brāhmī script received its name after Brāhmī, his daughter.

Bharata, his eldest son, was the first Cakravartin, universal emperor, i.e., paramount sovereign, and our country was named after him as Bhārata. Bāhubali, second son of Ṛṣabha, was the first Kāmadeva. [*ibid*. 16.7; 17.76].

Thus, for having guided mankind in the most primitive age to meet the situation in their own simple ways, Ṛṣabhadeva verily earned the cognomen of 'Prajāpati', lord of creatures, Ādideva, first-lord, and Ādibrahma, 'the first creator', in a sense acceptable to Jaina tradition. Ṛṣabha did not create the world, but he created the organisation of human society.

At the beginning, all mankind was a single caste-*manuṣya-jātirekaiva* (Ādipurāṇa 38.45). The discovery of new means of livelihood lead to divisions. Ṛṣabha, prior to his attainment of Jinahood responded to the excessive lawlessness prevalent among the people by taking up arms and assuming the powers of a ruler. This resulted in the establishment of the warrior *Kṣatriya* caste, and subsequently arose the merchant *vaiśya* and craftsman *śūdra* castes. Gradually different means of livelihood were *vaiśya* and craftsman *śūdra* castes. Gradually different means of livelihood were invented and people were trained in different arts and crafts. [*ibid*, 16.184-85].

Later Bharata, the first Cakravartin, universal emperor, and eldest son of Ṛṣabha, introduced *dvijas*, twice-born. This newly

formed deva-Brāhmaṇas were entrusted with the care of Jinālayas and the performance of elaborate rituals: “Thus the Jainas converted the *varṇa* system into what was for them an acceptable form. The role of theistic creation was eliminated, and the existence of a class of ‘spiritually superior laymen’, analogous to the Hindu Brāhmaṇas was justified on the basis of conduct, rather than of some irrevocable cosmic order” [P.S. Jaini, : 291].

Jinasena felicitously accomplished a careful integration of the traditional Hindu *Samskāras*, rites and rituals, into the Jaina fabric. While Jainizing some important social norms, Jinasena was keen on evolving a parallel system which would remain uniquely Jain, in spite of apparent conformity with Hindu practices. Classification of Kṣatriya, Brāhmaṇa, Vaiśya and Śūdra, does not follow the Hindu mythology of describing their origin from various parts of the body of Prajāpati. The Jaina Śūdra can perform all the lay ceremonies and attain the quasi-mendicant status. The Jinas are not *avatārapuruṣas*, divine incarnations, but they achieved that exalted status to which man can aspire. This universe was not created by Jina or any god, and it cannot be destroyed by Jina or any god. Jaina Purāṇas sanctify only human heroes and extol their virtues and heroic deeds and victories, preserving a different recensions of such accounts. The designation of novel categories of *Śalākā-Puruṣas*, Illustrious Beings, in Jaina Purāṇas made the narratives more attractive. The beginning portion of the Purāṇa is closely connected with the origin of civilization at the start of a new time cycle. A useful discourse on the concept of time, space, and universe unfolds along with epochs of the Manus. The contents of the Purāṇas are traced to the now extinct ‘*Pūrvas*’, ancient ones, possibly a synonym for the Purāṇa itself. The Jaina Purāṇas were composed in Prakrit, Sanskrit, Apabhraṃśa, Kannaḍa, Tamil, Gujarati and Rājastāni.

Jinasena, it should be said to his credit and merit, is eminently successful in this creative endeavour, with considerable literary skill and traditional wisdom. Fully and ably exploiting the rich potentialities embedded in the hagiography of Rṣabha, saint-scholar-poet, three in one, Jinasena accomplished a fusion of the primitive with the profound elements of the first stage of man’s socio-religious awareness, animism.

Jinasena knew different narrative *Kathā* styles such as *ākṣepiṇī* and *vikṣepiṇī* and their application to achieve desired effect on the readers. His preference for *saddharma-kathā*, evidently projecting the prominence of Dharma over the other two *Puruṣārthas* of *artha* and *kāma*, finally to attain *mokṣa*.

The accumulated knowledge of Jaina Lore and the pith and marrow of the canonical texts, was passed from one generation to the succeeding ones. In the process, the pre-Jinasena scholar-saints like Kūcibhaṭṭāraka, Śrīnandi and Kavi-Parameṣṭhin, who were versed in the Purāṇic lores, had shouldered the responsibility of carrying forward the quintessence of the Purāṇa concept, much earlier to Jinasena. Obviously, the *Mahāpurāṇa* had a deep - rooted tradition.

Since none of the preceding works is extant, it is rather difficult to assess how far adept Jinasena is influenced by his predecessors. However, Jinasena, on his own accord, has acknowledged some of his forerunners like Siddhasena, Samantabhadra, Yaśobhadra, Pūjyapāda, Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka, Śivakoṭi, Jaṭāsimhanandī, Kāṇabikṣu, Śrīpāla, Pātrakesari, Vādisimha, Vīrasena, Jayasena and Kavi-Parameśvara. [Ādipurāṇ 1.43-60] Albeit, Jinasena is remembered revered, and reckoned as one of the more luminous and celebrated author. He symbolised the spiritual upsurge of his times, combining in himself the erudition of a scholar, the sensitivity of a poet and a passion of a reformer. The *Ādipurāṇa* is marked by a high degree of excellence and sensibility. Imparting *ahimsā* cult, Jinasena heralded a socio-cultural, politico-spiritual and literary revolution by authoring the *Ādipurāṇa*. Paragon of the Jaina heritage, Jinasena, had an access to all the major works of the early *ācāryas*. The entire *Śrutabhāṇḍāra*, library of palmleaf manuscripts, was at his disposal. He studied under Vīrasena and Jayasena, cognoscenti professors of late 8th century. As a privileged royal teacher, he had the first hand knowledge of political affairs. He was thorough with the *Canda-Paṇṇatti*, the *Jambūdiva-Paṇṇatti*, the *Tiloya-Paṇṇatti*, the *Sūriya-Paṇṇatti*, Prakrit works of 4th and 6th centuries, which deal with the astronomy and the nature of universe.

Jinasena intended and designed to author the entire *Mahāpurāṇa* himself. Accordingly he wrote the *Ādipurāṇa* (s.a. *Pūrvapurāṇa*), a

massive epic poem. Since Jinasena breathed his last before commencing the *Uttarapurāṇa*, the work was continued and the latter was authored by his disciple Guṇabhadra who thus completed the project of Mahāpurāṇa at Baṅkāpura (Kaṛṇāṭaka) in C.E. 898. Albeit, with Jinasena began the era of systematic organisation and clearer conceptualization of the Purāṇa, re-cast in the mould of the Sanskrit language. He made improvements on, and advances over the known frame of hagiography of the sixty three Mahāpuruṣas *olim* Śalākāpuruṣas, men of eminence, and updated the Nirgrantha position in the cultural milieu of the ninth century, when the imperial Rāṣṭrakūṭas were at the zenith of their political power in the Deccan.

To say that Jaina authors of the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata* theme tried to debunk the Vālmīki and Vyāsa versions, is just unjust. Different versions and traditions, which were complimentary, and sometimes contradictory, were current simultaneously. The authors adopting a version of their choice developed it according to their fancy. The *Uttarapurāṇa*, second half of the *Mahāpurāṇa*, narrates the story of the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*, which often deviates and shows variations when compared with the epics of Vālmīki and Vyāsa. The plus point of the Jaina Kathā is that Rāvaṇa, Duryodhana and Kaṛṇa, are depicted as men of many virtues and valarous acts. Jaina Purāṇas elevate these characters without denigrating other main characters. Thus, the Mahāpurāṇa has provided worthy models to the masses. Interestingly, there are two traditions even within the Jaina version.

The Mahāpurāṇa is the microcosm of the Jaina world and the *Ādipurāṇa* is its artery, the heart of Jaina literature. In a country that has already been walked over a legion of Indian mystic masseurs over the centuries, it is remarkable that the *Mahāpurāṇa* continues to allure the reader, even after eleven hundred years. The Mahāpurāṇ is not just a great epic; it is philosophy, history, mythology and spirituality-all rolled into one. At the same time, it is the richest storehouse of Ākhyānas, Upākhyānas, myths, legends and tales in all its colour and variety. Again, it is the vault of the culture of Indian peninsula, vividly describing the genealogy, chronicles, geography, the flora and fauna, and traditions of ancient times. This emphasises its significance and singularity.

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ANEKĀNTAVĀDA AND LANGUAGE

Satya Ranjan Banerjee

1. Anekānta

The Jaina theory of *anekāntavāda* is a distinctive contribution to Indian philosophical thought. It examines the manysidedness of Reality or manifoldness of Truth. It is virtually connected with the examination of Reality. Reality, according to the Jains, is permanent in the midst of changes. As *anekānta* basically determines the nature of Reality, let us define first what Reality is. Reality, according to Umāsvāti, is described as--

utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya-yuktam sat (TS. V. 30)

“Existence is characterised by origination, disappearance (destruction) and permanence” (S.A. Jain).

It is a permanent reality in the midst of change of appearance and disappearance. This conception of Reality is peculiar to Jainism. As existing reality in order to maintain its permanent and continued process must necessarily undergo change in the form of appearance and disappearance, it seems to us a paradox at the beginning. But a closer analysis and minute observation will help us to appreciate the significance of this description of Reality. For example, let us look at the seed of a plant. When the seed is planted in the soil it must necessarily break the shell and sprout out. This is the first step in its attempt to grow. Then the sprouting seed further undergoes change and some portion of it comes out seeking the sunlight and another goes down into the soil, will undergo enormous changes into the root system. Similarly, the portion that sprouts up into the air and sunlight will also undergo enormous changes of sprouting out in tendrils and leaves finally resulting in branches and stem of the plant all engaged in the task of procuring nourishment with the help of sunlight. At every stage thus we find change, the old leaves being shed off and the new sprouts coming in. This seems to be the general law of Nature.

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1. A lecture delivered on the 24th May 2002 at India International Centre organised by Jain Vishva Bharati Institute. Ladnun, Rajasthan.

The life of the seed *does* never *die*, it lives even though it is being constantly changed and this is what is *sat*.

What is true of a plant, is also true with regard to the basic or fundamental things of Nature. The Jain conception of Reality is different from the other Indian philosophers. Some philosophers would only emphasize change alone as the characteristic of Reality. The one-sided emphasis either on permanency or change is rejected by Jain thinkers. They consider this system as *anekānta*, a system which clings to a partial aspect of Reality. So the Jains call their own system as *anekāntavāda*, i.e., a system of philosophy which maintains that Reality has multifarious aspects and that a complete comprehension of such a nature must necessarily take into consideration all the different aspects through which Reality manifests itself. Hence the Jaina *Darśana* is also called *anekāntavāda* often translated as “Indefiniteness of Being”. It tells us that any material thing continues for ever to exist as matter, and this may assume any shape and quality. Thus *mṛttikā* (clay) as a substance may be regarded as permanent, but the form of a jar of clay (*ghaṭa-paṭādi*) or its colour, may come into existence and perish.

That a substance may assume different forms is illustrated by two verses from the *Āptamīmāṃsā* (also quoted by Malliṣeṇa in his *Syādvādamāñjarī*). The verse relates the story of a certain king who had a son and a daughter. Out of gold, the daughter got a jar made of gold, whereas the prince got a crown also made of gold. This act of the king displeased the daughter, whereas the prince was pleased; but the king was neutral being the possessor of so much gold whether in the form of a jar or of a crown. The verse in question runs thus:

*ghaṭa - maulī - suvarṇārthī nāśotpāda - sthitiṣvayam/
śoka - pramoda - mādhyasthyaṃ jano yāti sahetukam//*

[Apt. Mī. 59]

Similarly, to illustrate *utpāda*, *vināśa* and *dhrauvya*, there is another story which says-

*payovrato na dadhyatti na payo' tti dadhivrataḥ/
agorasavrato nobhe tasmād vastu trayātmakam//*

[Apt. Mī. 60]

The verse says that “he who has vowed to live on milk does not take curds; he who has vowed to live on curds does not take milk; he who has vowed to live on food other than those supplied by a cow takes neither milk nor curds” - so a substance has three qualities.

So *Anekāntavāda* describes the nature of a substance (*dravya*). *Anta* means *pakṣa*, or *koṭi* or *dharma*, another side of a substance. In analysing a substance, it is observed that it has, at least, two aspects. In one sense a permanent substance is an *anta* (one side) and *anityatva* is also an *anta* (another side). Nāgārjuna in his *Mādhyamika-kārikā* says-

*astīti nāstīti, ubhe 'pi antā śuddhī aśuddhīti ime 'pi antā/
tasmād ubhe ante vivarjayitvā medhye 'pi sthānam prakaroti paṇḍitaḥ//*

In his opinion, existence and non-existence, purity and impurity all are distinctive features of a substance. And this is *anta* or *dharma*.

From the above it can be said that in an *anekāntavāda*, the nature of contradictory features of a substance is described. If there is no mutual contradictory features, then it is not described by *anta*. In the Upaniṣad, a substance is considered as only permanent, the Buddhists consider the existence of a substance as transitory. But only the Jains think that a substance (*dravya*) is both permanent and transitory. When it is *nitya* (permanent), it is a *dravya* (substance), and when it is *anitya* (transitory), it is called *paryāya*. The description of a substance in the form of *dravya* and *paryāya* is the basic tenet of *anekāntavāda*. Umāsvāti defines *dravya* thus:

guṇa-paryāya-vad dravyam (TS. V 38)

“A substance is that which has qualities and modes.”

On the basis of the commentary *Sarvārthasiddhi* this definition can be explained thus. The basic idea is that in a substance the qualities and modes exist. The qualities of a substance are always associated with the substance (*dravya*). But the modes are not always associated with the substance (*dravya*). The Pūjyapāda says- “That which makes distinction between one substance and another is called a quality, and the modification of a substance is called a mode. A substance is associated with these two. Further, it is of inseparable connection and

permanent¹. The qualities are the distinguishing features of a substance and the lack of qualities would lead to intermixture confusion of a substance.”

When this definition is applied to soul and matter, the distinguishing features are clear to understand. Soul has the quality of consciousness, while matter has not got it. So, “souls are distinguished from matter by the presence of qualities, such as, knowledge, while matter is distinguished from souls by the presence of form (colour) etc. Without such distinguishing characteristics, there can be no distinction between souls and matter”. So knowledge and consciousness are the qualities always associated with souls, while forms, i.e. colour etc. are associated with matter.”

The Relativity of Knowledge:

The *Anekānta* teaches us the principle of the relativity of knowledge which is an important contribution to the domain of truth. An example of this partial truth is found in the *Udānasūtra* of the Pali canon as well as in philosophical treatises of the Jains. This is the story of the ‘Parable of the Blind Men and the Elephant’ (popularly known as *andha-gaja-nyāya*). There were certain blind men who experienced an elephant, and when they were asked to describe the elephant, each of them described the elephant in accordance with the experience he had with regard to the limbs of the elephant which he happened to have felt. Each one is right with regard to his experiences of the elephant, but each one’s experiences are not the whole truth. The *Udānasūtra* says-

*imesu kira sajjamti eke samana-brāhmaṇā/
viggaha naṃ vivadamti janā ekāṅga-dassino//*

Here the *ekāṅgadassino* indicates those blind men who see only a single limb of the elephant.

This simple story indicates that the truth or the pathways of Reality can be investigated from different angles of vision. This simple story also indicates the mansidedness of Truth, the multiple nature of Reality.

1. S. A. Jain, Reality, p. 162.

Though the Jains are the pioneers in their theory of relativity, the Buddhists as well as the Sanskrit writers are not completely devoid of this principle and the consistency of contradictories. The *andha-gaja-nyāya* found in almost all the systems of Indian philosophy shows that the possibility of a partial truth of apparent contradictories is acknowledged by all the systems of philosophy. But the Jains say that their philosophy only visualises the whole truth (*sakalādeśa*), while the other systems only possess the broken truth (*vikalādeśa*). These two contradictories are the essence of *anekāntavāda*. It is a fact worth noting that though the two sects, i.e., Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras, differ in many respects, but with regard to the theory of relativity they do not. For the origin of the concept of *anekānta*, the Śvetāmbara canons can help very little, though one or two references are found.

As far as the development of *anekāntavāda* is concerned, it can be said that it is not very old. Though there are some glimpses here and there in the Jain canonical literature, the real development did not start from the 5th century A.D. when the Śvetāmbara Jain canonical literature was codified finally. In the *Bhagavatisūtra* the process of *anekāntavāda* is hinted at in the form of *syādvāda*. The author of “Nayacakra” says-

*sarva-nayānām jina-pravacanasyaivā nibandhanatvāt
kim asya nibandhanam iti ced ucyate. nibandhanam
cāsyā. “āyā bhante nāṇe aṇṇāne (= ātmā jñānam
ajñānam) iti svāmī Gautama svāminā pṛṣṭo vyākaroti
Godamā nāṇe niyamā ato jñānam niyamād ātmani
jñānasyānya-vyatirekeṇa vṛttadarśanāt “āyāpūṇa siya
nāṇe siya aṇṇāṇe.”*

“All the sermons of the Jina is the source of *nyāya* (logic), then what is the necessity of this? The necessity of this doctrine rests on the knowledge and ignorance of Self; the answer when asked by Gautamasvāmī. So, Gautama, the rule is knowledge. This one is for both knowledge and ignorance.”²

In the passage of the *Bhagavatisūtra* mentioned above, there is a germ of *syādvāda*. The passage further says-

2. Dhruva, p. lxxvii.

Goyamā appaṇo ādiṭṭhe āyā, parassa ādiṭṭhe no āyā tad ubhayassa ādiṭṭhe avvattavvaṃ ātā ti ya no ātā ti ya iti.

If you ask, Gautama, then soul is, in other sense, the soul does not exist; but if both are asked, it is inexpressible- soul can be explained in both ways.³

As far as we know this is the earliest reference to *syādvāda*, but in this conception there are only three propositions which can be rendered as *asti* (affirmation), *nāsti* (negation) and *avaktavya* (indescribability).⁴ Gradually, in course of time, these three original propositions came to be known as *mūlabhaṅga*, particularly when the *syādvāda* developed into sevenfold propositions in the *Pravacana-sāra* and *Pañcāstikāya* of Kundakunda belonging to the 1st or 2nd century A.D.

In his commentary also Devanandī has only mentioned three propositions which are *sat* (affirmation), *asat* (denial) and *avaktavya* (indescribability) and not the sevenfold propositions as described by late logicians.

Among the other Jaina Āgama texts, in the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga Nirvyukti*, the reference to the *Syādvāda* is found.

After the period of canonical speculation, came the age of systematization in the 1st or 2nd century A.D. This is the age of Umāsvāti and Kundakunda. Umāsvāti (1st or 3rd century A.D.) makes no mention of the *Syādvāda*, not to speak of its seven propositions. In his *Tattvārtha-sūtra* (V.32), he, for the first time, refers to the principle of Relativity or *Anekānta* in his sūtra,

arpitānarpita-siddheḥ (TS. V. 32)

which means- “the contradictory views are established (*arpita*) from different points of view.” Pūjyapāda Devanandī or Jinendrabuddhi (bet. 5th and 7th centuries A.D.) in his commentary *Sarvārthasiddhi* on the *Tattvārthasūtra* comments on this sūtra thus (translated by S.A. Jain, see p. 157-158) :

3. op. cit.

4. op. cit.

“Substances are characterised by an infinite number of attributes. For the sake of use or need, prominence is given to certain characteristics of a substance from one point of view. And prominence is not given to other characteristics, as these are of no use or need at that time. Thus even the existing attributes are not expressed, as these are of secondary importance (*anarpita*). There is no contradiction in what is established by these two points of view. For instance, there is no contradiction in the same person Devadatta being a father, a son, a brother, a nephew and so on. For the points of view are different. From the point of view of his son he is a father, and from the point of view of his father he is a son. Similarly, with regard to his other designations. In the same manner substance is permanent from the point of view of general properties. From the point of view of its specific modes it is not permanent. Hence there is no contradiction. These two, the general and the particular, somehow, are different as well as identical. Thus these form the cause of wordly intercourse.

“A question is raised. That which exists is governed by the doctrine of manifold points of view (*relative pluralism*). Therefore, it is proper that molecules are formed from matter by division and union. But there is this doubt. Are molecules of two atoms and so on formed by mere union, or is there any peculiarity? The reply is this. When there is union of actions, these atoms are transformed by combination in one object, which is a molecule. If it is so, what is it that certain atoms combine and certain others do not, though all of them are of the nature of matter? Though the atoms are not different as far as their nature as matter is concerned, combination is established on the basis of capacity derived from the effect of mutual differences among infinite modes”.

But in the *Pravacana-sāra* and in the *Pañcāstikāya* of Kundakunda (2nd A.D.), the sevenfold propositions came into existence.

In the Golden age of Jain philosophy (bet. 6th and 10th centuries A.D.), we have two outstanding pioneers on Jain philosophy, Siddhasena Divākara (a Śvetāmbara) and Samantabhadra (a Digambara), both belonging to 6th and 7th centuries A.D. Siddhasena Divākara’s two works, namely, *Nyāyāvatāra* and *Sammati-tarka*

commented on by Siddharṣi (10th century AD.) and Abhayadevasūri (10th century A.D.) respectively, are famous Jain logical texts. Samantabhadra (also belonging to the same period) wrote *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* in which the Jainistic philosophy of *Syādvāda* was explained.

In this age belonged Haribhadra Sūri (705-775 AD.) whose *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya* is a famous book where brief discussions of the different systems of Indian philosophy are described. In fact, as far as I know, Haribhadra Sūri's *Anekāntajayapatākā* edited by H.R. Kapadia (Baroda 1947) is perhaps the first book where the problem of *anekānta* philosophy is explained.

In the same period (i.e. in the later part of the 8th century) also belonged Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka or Akalaṅkadeva who wrote the *Tattvārtharājavārttika* on the *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* of Umāsvāti, and *Aṣṭaśati*, a commentary on Samantabhadra's *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*, *Nyāyaviniścaya*, *Tattvārthavārttika-vyākhyānālaṅkāra* and numerous others.

Two other famous authors also belonged to this golden age. And they are—Vidyānandī (belonging to the early part of the 9th century AD.) and Māṇikyanandī (also belonging to the 9th century AD.). Vidyānandī (a Digambara) wrote a commentary entitled *Aṣṭasahasrī* on the *Aṣṭaśati* of Akalaṅkadeva and *Tattvārthasloka-vārttika*, whereas Māṇikyanandī (another Digambara of the 9th cent. A.D.), wrote his famous *Parikṣāmukha* on Jain Logic.

In the last period of Jain philosophy (bet. 11th and 15th centuries A.D.), there developed the Jain philosophy on the *syādvāda*. Two contemporary authors—Devasūri (1086-1169 A.D.) and Hemacandra (1088-1172 A.D.)—are the pioneers on the idea of *syādvāda*. Devasūri wrote *pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra* and its commentary *Syādvādaratnākara*. The prolific writer Hemacandra has two famous works called *Anyā-yoga-vyavacchedikā-dvātriṃśikā* and *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* which are the landmarks on Jain philosophical texts.

So also Ratnaprabhasūri and Malliṣeṇa. Ratnaprabhasūri (1181 A.D.) wrote *Syādvādaratnākara-vārttika* which was a shorter commentary on the *Syādvādaratnākara*.

Malliṣeṇa (1292 AD.) is the author of the *Syādvādamañjarī* which is a commentary on *Anya-yoga-vyavacchedika-dvātrimsikā* of Hemacandra.

In the decadent period of this age we have Maladhārī Rājaśekhara (1348 A.D.), Jñānacandra (1358 A.D.) and Guṇaratna (1409. A.D.)

Akalaṅkadeva (8th A.D.) in his *Nyāyaviniścaya* defines *anekānta* thus :

*upayogau śrutasya dvau syādvāda-naya-sañjñītau/
syādvādaḥ sakalādeśo nayo vikala-sañkayā//)*

*anatātmakārtha-kathanam syādvādaḥ. yathā jīvaḥ
puḍgalah dharmo' dharmā ākāśah kāla iti. tatra jīvo
jñāna-darśana-vīrya sukhair asādhāraṇaiḥ amūrttatvā-
sañkhyāta-pradeśatva-sukṣmatvaiḥ sādharmaṇa-
sādharmaṇaiḥ sādharmaṇa sattva-prameyatvā' guru-
laghutva-dharmatva-guṇitvādibhiḥ sādharmaṇaiḥ
anekāntaḥ. tasya jīvasyādeśāt pramāṇam syādvādaḥ.⁵*

In a very modern book entitled *Jaina-siddhānta-dīpikā* of Gaṇādhipati Tulsī, *anekānta* is defined in a lucid way as-

*sāmānya-viśeṣa-sad-asaṅg-nityānitya-vācyāvācyā-
dyanekāntātmakam (X. 29)*

i.e., “(The cognizable object is) universal-cum-particular, existent-cum-nonexistent, eternal-cum-noneternal, expressible-cum-nonexpressible and is thus indeterminate (in terms of formal contradiction).”

Satkari Mukherji and Nathmal Tantia in their notes (pp 188-189) have explained the sūtra thus.

“*Anekānta* means not *ekānta*. *Anta* literally means end or extreme. Thus ‘being’ is one extreme and ‘non-being’ is the other extreme of predication. This also holds good of eternal and non-eternal, and so on, which are given in formal logic as contradictories.

5. Mahendra Kumar Shastri, *Akalaṅka-grantha-trayam*, 1939. p.21.

According to pure logic, these oppositions are exclusive of one another and they cannot be combined in any one substratum. The opposition is absolute and unconditional. This may be called the absolutistic logic. The Jaina is a non-absolutistic, and so also all philosophers like the Sāṃkhya, the Vaiśeṣika, the Mimāṃsist and the non-monistic schools of Vedānta are non-absolutistics in as much as they do not believe in the absolute opposition of the logical extremes e.g, being and non being, eternal and non-eternal, and so on. According to the Jainas, opposition is understandable only in the light of experience. We know that light and darkness are opposed, because we do not see them together. *No a priori* knowledge of such opposition is possible. Accordingly the non-absolutist contends that if being and non-being are found together, and this finding is not contradicted by subsequent experience. We must conclude that there is no opposition between them. In other words, one is not exclusive of the other. We have seen a jar existing in its place and not existing in another. Existence and non-existence are thus both predicable of the jar. The concept of change or becoming involves that a thing continues and maintains its identity in spite of its diversity of qualities. The unbaked jar is black, becomes red when baked and yet continues as the jar. The Jaina thus maintains in strict conformity with the dictates of experience, that all reals are possessed of a nature which is not determinable in the light of formal logic. Everything is eternal as substance, but perishable *qua modes*. The Jaina does not consider the Naiyāyika to be sound logically when he makes substance and modes different entities which however are somehow brought together by a relation called *samavāya* (inherence). But inherence as an independent relation is only a logical makeshift which will not work.”

In the end we can thus sum up the entire discussion about *anekānta* in the succinct language of Ācārya Mahāprajña who in his book *Anekānta* in Hindi (translated into English by Mrs Sudhamahi Regunathan by the name of *Anekānta, the third Eye*) has said that our life is based on opposing pairs. The English translation says----

“Anekanta has one rule : co-existence of opposites. Not only is existence in pairs, they have to be opposing pairs. In the entire world of nature, in the entire universe of existence, opposing pairs exist. If there is wisdom there is ignorance. If there is vision there is lack of it

If there is happiness then there is sadness too. If there is loss of consciousness, there is awakening. If there is death, there is life. There is the auspicious and the inauspicious. High and low. The disturbed and the undisturbed. There is gaining of strength and the loss of it.” (pp 4-5)

II Language

Having thus described the fundamental basic conception of *anekānta* which really emphasises the manysidedness of truth, or to put it in a different way, looking at a substance (*dravya*) from its positive and negative aspects, I now pass on to apply the doctrine of *Anekānta* to the epistemological problem of language which consists of sentences and their meanings.

Various schools of Indian philosophy, the Sanskrit grammarians and rhetoricians have devoted much time to the linguistic problem of meaning. In order to ascertain the meaning of word(s) in a sentence, they have speculated various semantic aspects of language. The rhetoricians have defined a sentence thus:-

vākyaṃ syād yogyatā' kāṅkṣā' satti-yuktaḥ padocayaḥ

(SD. II. I)

“A sentence is a collection of words (*padocayaḥ*) possessing (*yuktaḥ*) compatibility (*yogyatā*), expectancy (*kāṅkṣā*) and juxtaposition or proximity (*āsatti*)”.

“Compatibility (*yogyatā*) means the absence of absurdity in the mutual relation of the things denoted by the words. A sentence like *payasā siñcati* has compatibility because water has the fitness, owing to its liquidity which is necessary for sprinkling. But a sentence like *vahninā siñcati* has no compatibility, since fire lacks liquidity which only can make a thing an instrument in the act of sprinkling. If it were held that a mere collocation of words can make a sentence even in the absence of compatibility then such a collection of words as *vahninā siñcati* would be a sentence; but no one would say that the above is a proper sentence, even though grammatically there is no defect in the sentence.

Expectancy (*ākāñṣā*) is another condition of a sentence. Absence of the completion of the sense will not make a sentence. Mere saying *gauḥ*, *aśvaḥ*, *puruṣaḥ* etc. will not make a sentence, because those words will create curiosity in the listener's mind to complete the sense. But if we say that *aśvaḥ dhāvati*, the curiosity of the listener will go away. If there is any desire (*jijñāsā*) in the mind of a listener to know something about the sentence, then that sentence is not a sentence. So the examples given above will not constitute a sentence, because they lack one of the requisites of a sentence which is expectancy (*ākāñṣā*).

“Juxtaposition (*āsatti*) is the absence of a break in the apprehension of what is said; i.e., the presentation of things without the intervention of time or other unconnected things” (Kane, SD. p 35).

In the *Bhāṣā-pariccheda*, *āsatti* is defined as
avyavadhānena padajanya-padārthopasthitih

i.e., the knowledge of the meaning of words resulting from the words being heard without any long pause (between the several words).

To conclude, it can be said that “a sentence is made up by the combination of several notions and it is therefore necessary that the impression made by each word should remain fresh until this combination is effected. If we utter the two words *gām* and *ānaya* at the interval of some hours, no sense will be apprehended. It is not absolutely necessary that the words must be *uttered* together. In a printed book we have no utterance and yet we apprehend the sense because the words occur in Juxtaposition.” (Kane, SD. p 35). So these three i.e., *yogyatā*, *ākāñṣā*, *āsatti* or *saṁnidhi* are said to be the causes of the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence (*vākyārtha jñāna*).

At a later stage, *Tātparyā* is also added to the conception of a sentence. In the *Parama-laghu-mañjūṣā* of Nāgeśabhaṭṭa (17th century A.D), *tātparyā* is also included in the definition of a sentence.

śābdabodha-sahakāri-kāraṇāni ākāñṣā-yogyotā'satti-tātparyāni.

Tātparya is another element which is the cause in helping the meaning of a word.

The rhetorician Viśvanātha says that in considering compatibility and expectancy, the words *ātmā* and *artha* are to be construed respectively as *ākāṅkṣā* and *yogyatā* respectively.

tatrākāṅkṣā-yogyatayor ātmārtha-dharmatve 'pi padoccaya dharmatvam upacārāt (Vṛtti under SD. II.1).

Although expectancy is a property of the soul and compatibility is an attribute of things, both of them are spoken of in the text as the properties of a collection of words in a secondary sense. (Kane, SD. p. 35)

Ākāṅkṣā literally means “a desire to know”. Desire does not inhabit in the words, nor in the sense. Desire is the property of the listener. So *ākāṅkṣā* is *ātmadharmā*, *yogyatā* really subsists in the thing as signified by the words. Words and things are closely connected. *Āsatti* is an attribute of words— when one utters the words in juxtaposition, the meaning is conveyed.

Having defined a sentence which is a collection of words, it is now time to define a word.

varṇāḥ padaṁ prayogārḥān anvitaikārtha-bodhakāḥ


“A word means letters so combined as to be suited for use, not in logical connection, conveying a meaning and only one meaning.”

The use of the word *prayogārḥā* “suited for use” means that the crude form of a word (*prātipadika*) is not regarded as a word. Unless the words are inflected, they are not considered word to be used in a sentence.

The words ‘not in logical connection’ means that the combination of letters are not logically connected though the combination of letters gives the meaning of words logically.

Having defined a word as “combination of words conveying a sense”, it is now necessary to know the nature of meaning of a word.

As far as the semantics of a word is concerned, the meaning of a word can be basically divided into three categories. They are:-



The picture gives us the idea of the basic meanings of a word. *Abhidhā* is the expressed or conventional meaning of a word, i.e. the meaning as conveyed by the direct signification of a word; it is, in fact, the dictionary meaning of a word. Mukulabhaṭṭa (last quarter of the 9th cent. A.D.) in his work *abhidhā-vṛtti-mātrkā* calls *abhidhā* as *mukhyārtha*. When the principal meaning of a word is indicated, Mukulabhaṭṭa terms it *mukhya*. The grammarians call it *śakyārtha* and *abhidheyārtha*, because the first meaning of words is given in the dictionary; it is *śakya*, because it gives that meaning which the word conveys (*śakya*); and because the meaning is given in the dictionary (*abhidhāna*), it is called *abhidheyārtha*.

This *abhidhā* is of three kinds---*yaugika*, *rūḍha* and *yogarūḍha*. When a word gets its meaning from its derivation (i.e. root + sufficial meaning), the word is termed as *yaugika* word; e.g. *kartā* doer. When a word receives its meaning other than what is expressed by its derivative meaning, it is called *rūḍhī* word, e.g. *kuśala* meaning 'expert' and not "one who collects grass." The derivative meaning (= *kuśam lāti dadāti vā iti kuśalaḥ*) is not prominent here, particularly when we say *karmaṇi kuśalaḥ* 'expert in work.' The *yogarūḍha* word is a combination of *yaugika* and *rūḍha*, and therefore, it has the significance of both, but the meaning refers to a third one, e.g. *pañkaja*.

Lakṣaṇā indicates the figurative meaning of a word (*lakṣyārtha*). By *lakṣaṇā* a new meaning of a word is indicated along with the principal or current meaning of a word. How the meaning of *lakṣaṇā* is acquired, is very well-explained by Amareshwar Thakur in his Introduction (at p. 28) to the *Kāvyaṣaṅkṣa* of Mammaṭa (bet. 1050 and 1100 A.D.):

“When the current meaning is barred by incompatibility and another meaning connected with the current meaning (*vācīyārtha*) comes to be attached to the word either through usage (*rūḍhi=prasiddhi* or *prayogavāha*) or for a special purpose (*prayojana*) then the function (*vṛtti*) by which this new meaning is presented is called *lakṣaṇā*.”

Two examples are given for *lakṣaṇā*: one is *karmaṇi kuśalaḥ* ‘expert in work’ and the other is *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ* ‘a ghoṣa resides in the Ganges.’ Here in *karmaṇi kuśalaḥ* the primary meaning of *kuśala* ‘a collector of *kuśa* grass’ (*kuśam lāti iti*) is barred by its figurative meaning ‘expert’-which meaning has come from the primary meaning as a gatherer of *kuśa* grass, because the gathering of *kuśa* requires discrimination, and as a result, secondary meaning ‘expert’ is sanctioned by usage. In the second example, *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*, the primary meaning *river* is barred, because a *ghoṣa* (a village of cowherds) cannot reside in the river. Naturally, the meaning of the Gaṅgā will be *gaṅgātāṭa* the bank of the Ganges.”

Vyañjanā directly means the ‘power of suggestion.’ *Vyañgārtha*, therefore, means ‘a suggested or implied meaning of a word.’

The implied meaning of a word is that meaning which gives rise to another meaning to be understood by persons inundated with the qualities of a genius. This *vyañgārtha* meaning depends upon (i) the speaker, (ii) the person spoken to, (iii) intonation of a language, i.e. the change of voice indicating emotions, (iv) the sentence, (v) the expressed meaning, (vi) the presence of another person, (vii) context, (viii) place and (ix) time. All the suggested meanings which give rise to another meaning is conveyed by the words and so words constitute a contributing factor for the suggestion of the meaning.

Even though these three are the powers of a word, the inner power of a word is *vṛtti* (function) or *śakti* (power) or *saṅketa*

(convention). It should be noted that each word in every language has a power to convey a particular sense. That power of a word is to be grasped from the convention. “When a man ascertains that a particular word has a convention in respect of a particular sense, then only does he recognise the power of the word to express that particular sense” (Kane, S D. p. 39).

How can we acquire the meaning of a word? Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana (17th-century A.D.) has given an indication to that effect in the *Bhāṣā-pariccheda* thus:

*śaktigrahaṃ vyākaraṇopamāna-koṣāpta-vyākhyād vyavahārataśca/
vākyasya śeṣād vivṛter vadanti sānnidhyataḥ siddha-padasya vṛddhāḥ//*

This verse tells us the conception of verbal testimony in the following cases.

1. *Vyākaraṇa* : We learn from grammar the meaning , of roots and suffices and relation of words in a sentence;

2. *Upamāna* : In some cases the meaning of a word can be ascertained by means of similarity of comparison;

3. *Koṣa* : We know the meaning of a word, both synonyms and antonyms, from a dictionary;

4. *Āptavākya* : We often get the meaning of a word from the usage of a higher authority;

5. *Vyavahāra* : We get the meaning of a word from the practical use of a word;

6. *Vākyāśeṣa* : Literally, *vākyāśeṣa* means ‘the end or rest of the passage’ i.e. it means the context. From the context the meaning of word comes out, e.g., in the Vedic passage *aktāḥ śarkarā upadadhāti*, the exact meaning of *aktāḥ* is *ghṛta* which is understood from the context (*tejo vai ghṛtan*). In the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā (I. 4 2a) this idea is expressed by *sandigdheṣu vākyāśeṣāt*).

7. *Vivṛta* : From explanation sometimes we can get the meaning of a word; e.g., *rasāla* means *āmra*, ‘mango.’

8. *Siddhapadasya vṛddhāḥ* : Sometimes the meaning of a word may be gathered from the utterances of well-known people.

Although we have different ways by which we acquire the meaning of a word, the problem is still shrouded in obscurity. P.V. Kane in his SD. has explained this phenomenon in the following manner :

“When a child begins to learn a language, he first understands the meaning of words in a lump and not of each word separately. When he hears the direction ‘bring a cow’ addressed by one old man to another, and sees a cow brought by the man, he understands that the direction meant the bringing of a body with a dewlap etc. He then has no distinct idea of the meaning of the two words *gām* and *ānaya*. Afterwards he hears two sentences ‘tie the cow’ and ‘bring the horse’ and sees the cow fastened and the horse brought. He finds that in the former of the sentences, a portion, namely *gām*, is common to the sentence *gām ānaya*, but another portion (*ānaya*) is omitted and something else inserted (*badhāna*). As in the case of both the sentences (*gām ānaya* and *gām badhāna*) the same body was dealt with, he naturally associates the portion *gām* with the body (cow). Thus he ascertains that the word *go* has a convention in respect of cow. The ascertainment of the convention leads him to understand that the primary meaning of the word *go* is cow.” (pp. 39-40).]

Tātparya says that every sentence must have a meaning which is intended to be conveyed by a sentence. If the hearer understands that intended meaning, the purpose is served. But in the following verse speaker’s intention and normal significance are different. The verse says.

*kim gavi gotvaṁ kim agavi ca gotvam.
yadi gavi gotvaṁ mayi na hi tat tvam/
yadi agavi ca gotvaṁ yadi vadasi tvam.
bhavati bhavān eva samam eva gotvam//*

“Does cowness reside in cow only, or can cowness reside in non-cow? If cowness resides in cow only, then it does not reside in me; but if you say that cowness lies in non-cow also, then cowness may be equal in you and in me as well.”

Here the intention of the speaker is to say that cowness resides in cow only; and so to say that you behave like a cow is contradictory. It can be taken as an example of *gauṇī lakṣaṇā*. The qualities residing in a bull, such as *jāḍya* (senselessness) and *māndya* (dullness), are transferred to a man. The word *go* primarily means the *jāti gotra*, and as the qualities senselessness and dullness are associated with the bull, the transference of these qualities is indicated in man. The manysidedness of the meaning of *go* can be looked upon on the basis of *anekānta*.

In a similar way, in the following example the contradictory position of words makes the sentence *double entendre*;

*mā yāhītyapamaṅgalam vraja sakhe snehena śūnyam vacas
tiṣṭheti prabhutā yathārucci kuruṣvaisā pyudāsīnatā/
no jīvāmi vinā tvayeti vacanaṁ sambhāvvyate vā na vā
tan mām śikṣaya nātha yat samucitam vaktum tvayi prasthite//*

“(If I say) don’t proceed it will be inauspicious; wander, my friend, my word will sound empty without any affection; stay (on) looks like commanding; do as you wish, will also mean indifferent; if I say I shall not be able to live without you, may or may not be liked by you; therefore, my lord, teach me what is to be told at the time of your departure”

The verbal forms like *yāhi*, *vraja*, *tiṣṭha*, *kuruṣva* have a special suggested meaning other than the lexicographical sense. The root *yā* does not simply mean ‘go’, it has a special sense ‘proceed’ ‘set out’ for a journey. The imperative indicates the idea of prohibition strengthened by the particle *mā*. Similarly, *vraja* does not mean mere going or proceeding, it gives the idea of wandering. Lexicographically, “wander implies the absence of a fixed course or more or less indifference to a course that has been fixed or otherwise indicated” (Webster’s *Dictionary of Synonyms*, 1942). The imperative gives the idea of wishes. *tiṣṭha* ‘stay (on)’ “stresses continuance in a place” and so it implies the non-movement of a person. The imperative also implies ‘command’. Finally, at the end of the series of actions comes the verb *kuruṣva* which normally means “do whatever you like”. This verb is used in a general notion.

The positive aspects of all these verbs have a negative side also. The implied sense of this passage, in the eye of *anekānta*, reflects the dilemma of the situation which will debar the husband from taking any decision for going. This is the implied sense of the passage.

The combination of sounds (or letters *varṇāḥ*) will give us infinite number of meanings. In the following verse the one letter *n* in

combination with the same letter *n* gives us a good sense. The verse in question is not really meant for alliteration, but is meant for showing the infinite power of sound combination. The verse says--

*na nonanunno nunnono nānā nānananā nanu/
nunno 'nunnanno nanunneo nānenā nunnanunna //*

(Kī XV. 14)

“No man is he who is wounded by a low man; no man is the man who wounds a low man, o ye of divine aspect; the wounded is not wounded if his master is unwounded; nor guiltless is he who wounds one sore wounded.” [translated by A. B. Keith, *A History of Sanskrit Literature*, Oxford, 1920, p 114.]


*Deep Structure, Surface Structure and Transformation.*⁶

Tātparya can be equated with the deep structure, surface structure and transformation of the modern linguistic theory.

It is normally said that sentences of all languages must have a deep structure and a surface structure. The deep structure gives the meaning of a sentence, while the surface structure gives the form of a sentence as it is used in communication. The basic idea of deep and surface structures can only be understood when a person listens to some one else speaking a language. What is most important is to find out a meaning in sounds of a language. The deep and surface structures are based on finding out a meaning in sounds. In fact, what we say is tantamount to saying that the form of a sentence is given outwardly by its surface structure, while the meaning of a sentence is conveyed by its deep structure. Take a sentence like—a new idea is often valuable.

The main function of the deep structure is to elucidate the explicit meaning of a sentence which is not provided by a surface structure outwardly.

Here



In the above sentence, the deep structure meaning of “the idea is new” is not explicitly conveyed by the surface structure- “a new

6. For this, see Roderick A. Jacobs and Peter S. Rosenbaum, *English Transformational Grammar*; Blaisdell Publishing Company, Waltham, Massachusetts. 1968. Quotations are indicated by page numbers.

idea”. It should be borne in mind that “deep structure of a sentence gives its meaning because the deep structure contains all of the information required to determine the meaning of a sentence.” (p. 19).

The surface structure is the sentence which is actually produced, which is actually written or spoken. The deep structure implies the inner intended meaning of a sentence which the native speaker of the language takes into account. The surface structure shows the sentence in communication, whereas the deep structure of a sentence tells us the significance of the sentence so spoken. In fact, the deep structure ultimately expresses the semantic aspect of a sentence which can be elicited from the sentence.

The next point which arises in this context is to state the relationship between the deep and surface structures of a sentence, or *vice versa*. The answer to this question is simple. The relationship between the deep and surface structures is transformation which functions as a link between the two. In other words, a deep structure becomes a surface structure via transformation. As deep structure is mainly based on the meaning of a sentence and its syntax, it is regarded as an “*abstract*” object, while surface structure, because of its written or spoken form, is closer to physical reality.

The part played by transformation to both these structures, is to change or transfer one constituent element into another. The transformation is the process which changes the word-order of the deep structure, so as to generate the surface structure.

“Transformation is the process which converts deep structures into intermediate or surface structures” (p 23). For example.

- i) a declarative sentence into an interrogative one.
- ii) an active sentence into a passive one.

For example - the active sentence

a) Daisy puzzled Winterbourne

is transformed into a passive as

b) Winterbourne was puzzled by Daisy.

Any language makes use of their elementary transformational processes: adjunction, substitution, and deletion.

For example, the English sentence-I have decided on the train can mean many aspects. It may mean that

i) something I have decided when I was travelling on the train; or it may mean

ii) out of many conveyances. I have decided that I shall go by train; or it may mean

iii) my ideas come to my mind when I normally travel by train, and so on.

In this connection it should be noted that the Jains are not lacking in unfurling the deep and surface structures of a sentence. In the *Bhagavati-sūtra* (Book ten, chapter III), in course of conversation with Mahāvīra, Goyama (Gautama) asks Mahāvīra some questions on language. The text in question runs as follows:

aha bhante! āsaissāmo saissāmo ciṭṭhissāmo ṇisiissāmo tuyatṭhissāmo āmaṃtaṇi āṇavaṇi jāyaṇi taha pucchaṇi ya paṇṇavaṇi paccakkhāṇi bhāsā bhāsā icchāṇulomā ya aṇabhiggahiyā bhāsā bhāsā ya abhiggahammi boddhavvā saṃsayakaraṇi voyaḍamavvoyaḍā ceva paṇṇavaṇi ṇaṃ esā bhāsā ṇa esā bhāsā mosā.

“Oh venerable one (*bhante!*) [when one says] we shall reside (*āsaissāmo*), we shall lie (down) (*saissāmo*), we shall stand (up) (*ciṭṭhissāmo*), we shall sit (down) (*ṇisiissāmo*), we shall stretch (*tuyatṭhissāmo*), the forms of language (*paṇṇavaṇi bhāsā*) [i.e. one of the twelve kinds of expressions] (*bhāsā*) such as, [1] addressing (*āmaṃtaṇi*) [2] ordering (*āṇavaṇi*), [3] prayer (*jāyaṇi*) as well as, [4] questioning (*pucchaṇi*), [5] advice (*paṇṇavaṇi*), [6] refusing (*paccakkhāṇi*), [7] consenting (*icchāṇulomā*), [8] irrelevant (*aṇabhiggahiyā*). [9] relevant (*abhiggahammi boddhavvā*), [10] doubtful (*saṃsayakaraṇi*), [11] explicit (*voyaḍā*) or [12] indefinite (*avvoyaḍā*)⁷ --- do these forms conform to the type of understanding (i.e. *paṇṇavaṇi* advice) or are they never false (*ṇa esā bhāsā mosā*)? Mahāvīra’s reply was---

ṇa esā bhāsā mosā

“They are not false.”

In fact, these questions of Goyama to Mahāvīra is related to sentences of a language. In a language, the utterances of human beings can be expressed in manifold ways of which some twelve forms are

7. See K. C. Lalwanī, *Bhagavati-sūtra* vol IV, Book ten chapter III, Calcutta-1985 pp. 133-134, Josef Deleu, *Viyāhapannatti*, Delhi, 1996, p. 169. This verse is also found in the *Paṇṇavaṇā-sūtra*, ch 11, p 172 of Jain Vishva Bharati edition.

mentioned by Goyama. Our unit of speech is the sentence and the sentence is the expression of our thoughts and ideas in the form of judgment which either affirms or negates our statement. Whatever things come to the mind of a speaker, he tries to convey his opinion to the hearer. It is said earlier that in communicating one's idea in a sentence, the idea must possess compatibility, expectancy and juxtaposition, and this will lead a sentence to logical judgment. If a sentence mirrors a judgment, it must conform to the logical law.

When we analyse the utterances of human beings, we see that the sentences may be of various forms. They could be---

(i) Assertory (*āmaṁtaṇī*), (ii) Interrogative (*pucchaṇī*) (iii) Petitionary (*icchā'ṇulomā*), (iv) Exclamatory (combination of i and iii). Apart from these, the sentences may be affirmative or negative, hypothetical or universal, personal or impersonal. Besides, the sentences may be incomplete in the form of Aposiopesis, Anakoluthon, Ellipsis and Interrogation⁸. These are the patterns by which our expressions or utterances are made.

Besides these sententious patterns of expressing our thoughts and ideas, our sentences, irrespective of any form, may be pedantic, ironical, autobiographical, apostrophic, eulogical, logical, melodious, elliptical, and so on. This is not all. All these stylistic patterns of our expressions depend on how our thoughts and ideas are communicated to a person; on how a person utters his speeches, following any stylistic patterns. His utterances may be balanced and symmetrical, analogical and diffused, verbose and condensed. Sometimes the style may be humourous, rhythmic and emotional, interlocutory and rhetorical; their expressions may be serio-comic, antithetical, and picturesque⁹. Even then our modes of expressions are not limited to these patterns. They are innumerable, multi-phased; they are *anekānta*. And all these modes of expressions are correct and are recognised in our ordinary speech. This idea is expressed by Mahāvīra in the language----*ṇa esā bhāsā mosā*, "This language is not false."

In explaining certain grammatical niceties, the Jains raised some fundamental questions on the meaning of *calamāṇe calie*. Almost at

8. For these ideas, see Rev. A. Darby, *The Mechanism of the Sentence*, Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1919, pp. 8-14;

9. S. R. Banerjee. *Sanskṛta Sāhitya Samālocanā Saṁgraha*, Calcutta, 1996. pp. xxi - xxxii.

the very beginning of the *Bhagavati-sūtra* (Book 1, ch-1), Goyama, while Mahāvīra was at Guṇasīlaka *caitya* in Rājagrha, asks Mahāvīra the very fundamental linguistic problem of *calamāṇe calie*. The text runs as follows:

*calamāṇe calie. udīrijjamāṇe udīrie. vedijjamāṇe vedie.
pahijjamāṇe pahīṇe. chijjamāṇe chiṇṇe, bhijjamāṇe bhīṇṇe,
dajjamāṇe dadḍhe, mijjamāṇe mae, nijjarijjamāṇe jijjīṇṇc.*

.....
*ee ṇaṃ cattāri padā egaṭṭhā nāṇāghosā ṇāṇā-vaṃjaṇā
uppaṇṇa-pakkhassa.*

.....
*ee ṇaṃ paṃca padā ṇāṇaṭṭhā ṇāṇā-vaṃjaṇā vigaya-
pakkhassa. [Bh. Sū. I. I. 11 - 13].*

“[Is it proper to call] moving as moved, fructifying as fructified, feeling as felt, separating as separated, cutting as cut, piercing as pierced, burning as burnt, dying as dead, and exhausting as exhausted.”

“These [first] four words are of the same import, though of different sounds and different suggestions.

“These five are of different imports, different sounds and different suggestions”

Apart from its philosophical implication on *Karma*-theory, this passage has a linguistic implication as well. The expressions *calamāṇe calie* have two tenses in one breath. Grammatically *calamāṇe* (moving) is a present participle tense implying the sense of continuous action; and hence it can be a present continuous tense. The implied underlying meaning is that the action has started but still continuing, and so the action is incomplete. But *calie* (‘has moved’) is a present perfect tense which means that the action has started and has continued for some time and now the action is complete and the result is there, and hence it is completive. So the use of two tenses is not congruous in the same expression. Mahāvīra’s contention on this sort of expression is that when an action continues for some time, it can easily be said that some portions of that continuous action have been completed and the remaining portion is still continuing, when the continuity of action is over, the action is finished, and so the action is said to be complete, and so the expression *calie* is used to indicate that sense.

In Book II chapter 6, it is said that language is the vehicle of expression (*ohāriṇī bhāsā*). This expression has a reference to the

Pañṇavaṇā-sūtra (chapter eleven on language pp 168-178 of Jain Vishva Bharati edition 1989). The basic points of this chapter are succinctly summed up by K.C. Lalwani thus:

“Language may be *satya*, *asatya*, *satya-mṛṣā* and *asatya-amṛṣā*. The main source of language is the soul. It arises in a physical body, gross, assimilative and caloric. Its shape is like that of a thunder. The matter let loose by language goes to the other extreme of the sphere. Matter-clusters with innumerable space units are included in it; matter with innumerable vacuum units are included in it: matter with a life-span of one, two, till ten time- units, countable time-units, uncountable time-units are included in it; matter with colour, smell, substance and touch are included in it. As a rule, matter from six directions are included, and they may be included without break or with break. The minimum life-span of language is one time-unit, and the maximum less than 48 minutes. Matter constituting language is acquired by the activities of the physical body, and is thrown out in the form of words or speech. *Asatya* and *satya-mṛṣā* languages are spoken with the decline of *karma* enshrouding knowledge and vision, but with the rise of *karma* causing delusion, while *satya* and *asatya-amṛṣā* are spoken with the decline of *karma* enshrouding knowledge and vision. Smallest in number are those who speak *satya*: innumerable times more are those who speak *asatya-mṛṣā*; innumerable times more than the second are those who speak *asatya*; innumerable times more than the third are those speaking *asatya-amṛṣā*; but infinite times more are those who speak not. Included in the last category are inadequate (undeveloped) organisms, the liberated souls, the rock-like steadfast (would-be-liberated) beings, and all one-organ being.¹⁰”

In conclusion, we can say that the application of *anekānta* in language is manifold. It is primarily found in the levels of meaning and in the context of syntax, apart from other grammatical niceties. From the discussion above it is seen that a word or a sentence may possess multi-levels of meaning. The verbal expression may be manifold, indeterminate and relative as the reality is also manifold, indeterminate and relative. As far as meaning is concerned it is

10. K. C. Lalwani, *Bhagavati-sūtra*, Vol I, Jain Bhawan, Calcutta (1973), reprint edition 1999, pp 280-281.

inexhaustive as reality itself. The meaning that we fix of a particular word or a sentence depends upon the context and the intention of the speaker----and it is all meant for our practical purposes. Syntactically that a sentence may be construed as active or passive or otherwise -- is all due to multi-structural pattern of a sentence. The manifold grammatical categories are infinite as the expressions of human beings are. Directly or indirectly, the principle of *anekānta* is inherent in the manifold aspects of language.

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