

JAIN MORAL DOCTRINE

By

Dr. Hari Satya Bhattacharya

M.A.B.L., PH.D.

Calcutta

JAIN SĀHITYA VIKĀS MAṆḌALA

Bombay-400 056

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PUBLISHER'S NOTE

This book was intended to be published in the *2500*th celebration year of Nirvāna of Bhagvān Mahāvīr. For various reasons it could not be done.

We are however pleased to publish it very soon thereafter. Dr. Harisatya Bhattacharya, though a non-Jain has an exceptionally thorough knowledge of Jainism, such as can be acquired only by one brought up in it. He is however modest enough to acknowledge and accept suggestions from Jain Scholars.

The seventh Chapter of the book is the master piece of the author. There at the end of the Chapter, he draws attention to what should be the spirit of an universal religion and ethics. It should be a settler of all religious differences and as a norm explaining all moral conduct.

We thank the author for offering the book to us for printing & publishing.

A. K. Doshi
President
Jaina Sahitya
Vikas Mandal

1st January, 1976
Vile Parle, Bombay-400 056.

INTRODUCTION

A motivated act is followed by its consequence, which is obvious. You give food to a hungry man; the result is that not only the hungry man's hunger is removed but there arises a certain satisfaction in you for the time being. But religious minded men of all ages, especially people of ancient times, have believed that all motivated (not only motivated but also careless) actions bear fruits for the agent in the form of pleasant or unpleasant experiences, not necessarily in his present life, but unfailingly in his existences after his death. It may be stated that this belief in the after-death consequences in a person (though presently un-seen nevertheless sure) has been one of the patent incentives for his moral activities.

Nowhere perhaps has this belief been so strong as in ancient India, not even excluding its people of Buddhist persuasion.

The Jainas are also ardent believers in Karmas (acts) being indissolubly connected with their consequences to be experienced in future lives after the death of the man. Their Āçāryas have elaborately described the Karmas and the Karma-phalas and the central business of the present treatise is just a presentation of those descriptions of the Jaina Seers.

The book was written a pretty long time ago by the author as an essential supplement to his other works on the Jaina philosophy, viz., (1) his translation into English, of the 'Pramānnaya Tattvālokālankāra' (Deva Suri's book on Jaina logic, psychology and epistemology), (2) 'Reals in the Jaina Metaphysics', (3) 'The Jaina Prayer' (i.e., the Jain conception of God-hood).

As it was found that the publication of the entire book may take some time, it was thought expedient to publish it—part by part, in suitable journals and periodicals.

The book is now published after incorporating in it, the respective views of the different schools of Jainism on divergent points,—on suggestions from scholars, to whom the author is thankful.

In conclusion, it is the pleasant duty of the author to acknowledge his sincerest gratitude to Sri Amritlal Doshi and to Sri Tajmal Bothra, but for whose active all round encouragement and co-operation, the publication of the book would have been impracticable.

1 Kailas Basu Lane,
Howrah, 23-12-75.

HARI SATYA BHATTACHARYA,
M.A. B.L. Ph. D

CHAPTER I

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RELIGION AND MORALITY

Subjectively speaking, religion is a consciousness, establishing the closest possible relationship between a man and a being, transcending that man's ordinary empirical self. Religious beliefs and practices are due to the various attempts to establish that relationship. Although this general statement may be made about all the religions, current or past, in their positive and concrete forms, they have differed from each other more or less widely. Some religions are polytheistic, believing in a number of gods; some, henotheistic, in which one of the gods is given the supreme position while the others are more or less subordinated to him; Zoroastrianism, in some of its aspects, seems to posit two contending deities; while monotheism admits only one God. As regards the question of God's creating the universe, the religions do not seem to have been unanimous. Some maintained that God created the universe out of nothing, some held that matter in its ultimacy was independent of God and was only shaped and moulded in definite forms by the Creator; others contended that not only matter but time, space and an infinite number of souls had had independent realities of their own and that the Creator's business was only to build up bodies and environments or requisite circumstances for those psychical beings. It is, however, manifest that creation involves an internal urge in the Creator and as such, implies some sort of imperfection in him. Accordingly, it is only a finite being that can be a Creator in any sense, so that if God be conceived as the supreme being with infinite perfection, he cannot be supposed to be the Creator of the universe. As a matter of fact, some of the rational religions main-

tain that man alone is the Creator of his own destiny and dispense with the hypothesis of the world-Creator.

Amidst the variednesses of religions, it is certainly difficult to pick out the fundamental features which can be found in all religions. The conception of some sort of God as a being superior to the finite beings is of course the central doctrine in all forms of religion but differences crop up when we look to the positive contents of this idea of God. We have seen how world-creation has not been attributed to God by some religions. Upon a careful survey of all the most basic doctrines, connected with the theories of God, it appears that all religions, of whatever age and in whatever stage of development they may be, agree in attributing 'Power' to their god or gods. Even in totemism, a 'totem' is held sacred because it is supposed to have the 'power' of protecting the worshipper from evil or of curing his disease; because, in other words, beneficial influences are believed to be exercised upon the worshipper by the totem, while it is held to punish the disregard of its sacredness. Similarly, in fetichism, the 'fetich' e.g. a stick or a piece of stone is venerated because a peculiar 'potency' is attributed to it by reason of some peculiarity in its structure or of its being in-formed by a powerful spirit or of its being a sign or a representation of a transcending deity. God is thus in all religions essentially a powerful being. Another fundamental characteristic of the God in all religions is that he has 'the immediate apprehension' of all things. A third similar divine feature is the 'omniscience' of God i.e. the fact of his truly knowing all things and phenomena. The last attribute that is ascribed to God in every religion is that he is essentially a being in 'uninterrupted joy.' So, these four,—infinite power, infinite apprehension, infinite knowledge and infinite joy—are the features, attributed to God in every religion.

The finding that an idea of God with the above-mentioned four attributes is immanent in all forms of religion leads one to make a guess about the fundamental of a universal religion—a religion acceptable to all the religious-minded people. It is that the God of the universal religion is the God of supreme power, of infinite apprehension, of omniscience and of unobstructed joy. It is to be noted, however, that while the belief in such a God is traceable in all religions, it would be wrong to hold that this belief is fully rationalised and perfected in all of them, so far as its object is concerned. It may be that people of all ages have an instinctive belief in some form of divinity with its four aspects, as indicated above but this intuition must be held to be in the process of continuous rationali-

sation throughout the course of the religious history of a people. In the course of evolution, the native religious pre-disposition is supplemented by the intellectualism of the people, so that they come to develop a more and more perfected idea of God and his four features. Often-times, a religious hero who is much in advance of the ordinary people and who is variously regarded as a 'messiah', a 'prophet', a 'seer' or 'God's own begotten', gives a more comprehensive and rational account of God. Sometimes, thinkers again apply their intelligence to the problem and arrive at a more perfect conception of God. But whether the religious idea is developed in the former manner by the teachings of a 'revealer' i.e. the so-called founder of the religion or amplified by the speculations of philosophers, there is always that original basis or intuitive propensity for the religious attitude, which underlies the later belief, based upon argumentation or the faith founded upon the instructions of the 'teacher'.

The extremists of the evolutionist school do not admit the above innate religious tendency in man to believe in a God and try to prove that man began with a clean mind, clear of all religious predispositions. But, however much down in the mentality of primitive people we go, we always come across a groping there towards an 'indefinite', beyond the presentations of the senses, a leaning towards a 'being beyond', a 'more-than-I',—this indefinite 'being beyond', this 'more-than-I', being held as fit for being venerated, awed, believed in and depended upon. Accordingly, the genetic or the so-called scientific theory about the evolution of religion should not be unmindful of the intuitive basis. In fact, the intuition-theory and the evolution-theory have both their importance and usefulness in the history of religious progress. Evolution does not mean continuous and successive new creations out of nothing; it always implies a development or amplification of what already is,—may be, as a potentiality or implicit possibility; evolution thus signifies a constitutive permanent element and a contingent element of change as well. The instinct-theory of religion,—in however vague a manner it may do,—affirms that man has a native sense of the divinity with its four attributes; the business of the evolution school is to show how the history of a religion has been continuously bringing out the inner and the real significance of that intuitive idea of God.

"Religion is intimately wrapped up", says W. Wallace, "with the tillage of the fields, the pasture of the flocks, the rules and modes of wedlock, the customs of the market, with sanitary rules, with the treatment of disease". In fact, the religious position of a man is connected with his whole psychical nature, more or less intimately

and is in this respect distinguishable from a particular theory of his, regarding, say, a particular physical or chemical phenomena. The religious consciousness is immediate and involves a commanding persuasion; in the words of Schelling, it means 'what is at once heroic faith, fidelity to yourself and to God—a trust and confidence in the divine which excludes or abolishes all choice'. This signifies that one's religion or theory of God is essentially a conviction,—not merely a credulity nor even a critical knowledge of facts but rather, the realisation of a law in which he lives, acts and has his being. This inseparable connection between God-consciousness and the consciousness of one's own essential nature explains the best results we have of the rationalisation of a religion or of the original primitive notion of God.

Kant's critical researches led him to find out that some of the most essential matters of life, for their solution in accordance with the principle of practical reason, pointed to a regulative law, underlying and unifying them and that this law was identifiable with God, who is thus in a very real sense, immanent in the spiritual nature of man. God is no doubt conceived in most religions, as an external being, "something behind the cloud, some one beyond nature, the great one who breaks the law and works his will for his own". There is no denial also that this transcendent God, with some of the primitive people is identified with the King, the Law-giver, the Priest, the Prophet or the Seer. But with the progress of the process of rationalisation, all this came only to mean that God is more than the perishing individual, a reality greater than one's empirical self. Religion in the process of rationalisation is thus a progress from the objective to the subjective consciousness of God,—the former, characterising genertlly the primitive and the less advanced outlook and the latter, representing the more advanced, 'finding the voice of God mainly in the inner shrine of the heart'. (E. Caird) So far as the God-consciousness was concerned, the school of Schliermacher did away with all dualism between *'verstand'* and *'Vernunft'*, the gulf between the pure and the practical reasons and found in the essential emotional nature of man, the explanation of the religious sense.

For the discovery of the true grounds of religious consciousness and for the matter of that, of the true nature of God in his aforesaid four-fold aspects, we are thus led to fall back upon the true nature of man. Undeniably man is a social being; he feels that there are other beings who are essentially like him; that, in other words, there are spiritual realities other than but similar to him. Even the primitive man has the sense that he is not religious by

himself, that his God is not exclusively his, that he has not the liberty to choose his own God nor the exclusive claim to enjoy his blessings alone. The nature of man is thus inseparably related to that of others like him. If then rationalisation requires that God is to be sought in the nature of man, there are apparent psychological reasons for an individual's looking upon his community as something divine. The State, for example, was looked upon as Divinity by some peoples and for similar reasons, the religious Brotherhood, the Church, was recognised as God by most of the social religions. The most pronounced and unambiguous form of acceptance of a collection of men as the sole Divinity is that introduced by Auguste Comte, in which the supreme God is identified with Humanity, whose worship is to be performed by an organised priesthood and church, through an elaborate system of rituals.

While it may be admitted that all rationalised religions must be based on a recognition of the other realities, separate from, yet similar to, the individual, it is never right to obliterate the individual and fix upon the 'other-element', as the sole real Divinity. For the 'other-consciousness' is not the whole of one's consciousness; if a person has the apprehension in him, of persons other than him, he has also the consciousness of himself as an indubitable direct reality. This consciousness of the individual self as the primary reality asserts itself in a prominent manner in the religious theories and practices of a people.

It is surmised that the practice of Sacrifice as a religious act was due to a sense of union or communion between a group of men and their Deity, manifesting itself in the social banquet in which all the members of the community took their part; Sacrifice was thus due to the religious consciousness in its social aspect. But on the other hand, the practice of Magic also, in some form, can be traced in all primitive religions. Magic consisted in attempts to interpret the past, to foretell the future, to cure diseases, to remove evils, to bring about health and prosperity and so on. It was believed that the powers of the magicians to do those acts were due to his acquisition of some sort of control over nature. These powers were the magician's own individual attainment and were exercised by him alone through mysterious formulas and acts. The magical acts, it has been surmised by some, were not wholly fanciful acts but some of them at least were certainly due to the magician's careful observation of some natural phenomena. Whatever that might have been, Magic as distinguished from Sacrifice, consisted in setting up an individual's strictly private relation to the divine powers

of nature and in divinising the individual man so to say, in some manner.

Comte's Religion of Humanity had few adherents outside France and Huxley characterised it as 'Catholicism minus Christianity'. Humanity as a whole or a collective body has only a notional reality and the attribution to it of the four-fold divine features of power, apprehension, omniscience and blessedness can only be figurative. The individuals are real and each one of them can be accepted as the God. The fact of there being a number of individuals having similar natures may determine the nature of an individual in a certain manner but this does not invest the totality of the community with any real, living reality or negate the reality of the individual altogether. Comte's God was thus an unreal abstraction and could not accordingly command the heart-felt veneration of any truly religious-minded people. Another serious defect from which the so-called Religion of Humanity suffered was that it identified divinity with the ordinary experiential nature of man. Comte was right in finding his only God in the nature of man but erred in holding that a man or a collection of men, as finite beings and subject to all the ills, infirmities, misfortunes and limitations of a worldly life, could nevertheless be regarded as God. God,—in a rationalised religion is certainly the man,—or for the matter of that, any being having the principles of life and consciousness in him; but divinity attaches not to the ephemeral and the transitory aspect of the creature's nature but to what is eternal, essential and fundamental in it.

A word of caution is necessary again when recognising the divinity in the essential nature of man. An ordinary animal suffering from the vicissitudes of the ordinary life, is not God; it is only his pure nature to which divinity can be attributed, and in this sense, it is but natural to look upon the high-souled beings,—the super-ordinary persons who by their self-culture and self-development have realised their pure selves, as divine beings. This is done in most of the positive religions and is justifiable. But this would not warrant one to confine god-hood within the limited number of the Prophets or Messiahs of those religions. We must, on the other hand, recognise that every living being is essentially pure and has the capacity of fully developing its own nature. We must recognise, in other words, that every conscious creature is a God in potentiality and that when thus developed to perfection, this potential God in a living being appears in its true light i.e. as a full-fledged God with his four-fold attributes.

The basic idea of God in all religions is thus one in which he is characterised by the four-fold features of infinite power, infinite

apprehension, infinite knowledge and infinite joy. This fundamental God-idea when rationalised is found to be attributable,—not to any external transcendent being,—but to the essential nature of every living being. The central feature in a conceivable universal religion is thus the recognition of the fundamental nature of all conscious beings, high or low, as divine.

Like the religious sense, referred to above, a sort of a moral sense also may be said to be connected with the very nature of man. Not only do we do *act* but have always an idea of acts which we *ought to do*. These latter are looked upon as 'right' or 'moral' acts and every one has an apprehension of their goodness. "That we have this moral approving and disapproving faculty," says Butler, "is certain from our experiencing it in ourselves and recognising it in each other." The reality of this moral faculty is undeniable, as he says, "whether called conscience, moral reason, moral sense or divine reason, whether considered as a sentiment of the understanding or as a perception of the heart or, which seems the truth, as including both." Now, the existence of this faculty for moral evaluation being presupposed, an enquiry into its workings, deliveries and implications becomes of scientific interest.

The enquiry into the fundamental basis of the first principles of morality becomes of still further interest, when we find that besides the innate subjective faculty of judgement regarding 'what we ought to do', there is a general consensus among the advanced moralists of all times about some acts being held to be of particular merit. Thus, the ten Anga's or parts of the Dharma, as laid down in the Padmapurāṇa of the Vedic school are: Brahmaçarya (control of the sexual passions), Satya (truthfulness), Tapas (practice of penance), Dāna (charity), Niyama (self-control), Kṣamā (forgiveness), Śauça (cleanliness), Ahimsā (non-violence), Suśānti (peaceful temper) and Asteya (non-stealing). It will be seen that these ten modes of Dharma are in substantial agreement with the ten Pāramī's or excellent perfections of the Buddhist, which are Dāna (charity), Śīla (power of enduring), Naiskramya (renunciation), Prajñā (wisdom), Vīrya (equanimity of temper), Kṣānti (forgiveness), Satya (truthfulness), Adhisthāna (strength of resolve), Maitrī (loving all) and Upekṣa (indifference to all things worldly). According to the author of Jaina Tattvārthadhigama Sūtra also, the ten virtues to be practised are—Kṣamā (forgiveness), Mārdava (humility), Ārjava (straightforwardness), Satya (truthfulness), Śauça (cleanliness), Saṁyama (restraint), Tapas (penance), Tyāga (renunciation), Ākiñçanya (indifference) and Brahmaçarya (con-

trol of the sexual passions). Coming again to the primal or the *cardinal* virtues, the Śrīmad-bhāgvatam of the Vedic school states them as 'All pious practices which are included in the four—Ahimsā (abstinence from killing), Satya (truthfulness), Asteya (non-stealing) and Maithunavarjana (controlling of the sex-passions)'. The Suttanipāta of the Buddhists enumerates the Pança-śīla as follows: (1) Do not kill nor encourage others to kill. (2) Do not steal nor encourage others to steal. (3) Control your sexual passions and make others to do so. (4) Do not tell a lie and see that others also do not lie. (5) Abstain from drinking and instruct others also to that effect. We shall have occasions to deal in some details with the Mahāvratas or the fundamental acts of morality according to the Jaina's; here we may point out that these are Ahiṁsā or doing injury to none, Satya or truthfulness, Aparigraha or a spirit of non-attachment, Asteya or non-stealing and Brahmaçarya or the control of the sexual passions.

The above substantial unanimity among the various schools regarding the subjective aspect as well as the objective contents of the acts of morality raises the point as to why an act is deemed as morally right and accepted as something which we ought to do. In other words, the question that requires solution is: What is the criterion of the moral value of a practice,—the test of a 'moral worth', as we otherwise call it? Ordinarily, all our acts are with reference to, i.e., in connection with, a thing or phenomenon, external to us; we move ourselves either to appropriate an outside object or just to avoid it and, roughly speaking, all our acts are determined by the nature of that extraneous phenomena. While this is true, it does not mean that the nature of the external object has an intrinsic moral character of its own. An act presupposes certainly an external thing but the moral worth of the act does not emanate from the intrinsic nature of that object; it depends upon a relation between a subject and the object. The object outside is practically colourless, so to say. This is clear from the fact that the same object arouses moral activities in one individual while it may give rise to tendencies in another individual which are dubbed as immoral. Moral judgments are passed not on external objects but on the movements of an individual in connection with them.

This absolutely unmoral character of the external phenomena in and by themselves disposes of the basic position of the evolutionists of the school of Spencer and others. While these thinkers acknowledge the reality of the intuitive moral ideas in us, they offer an exogenic account of their origin. They admit that

some of our moral ideas, while innate in a particular generation, were nevertheless produced by circumstances, pressing upon their remote ancestors, which later on became intuitive in their successors by the law of heredity. It would be seen, however, that the evolutionists themselves confess that those external factors surrounding the ancestral individuals brought about the moral judgments in them, not because of themselves but because they were found to be useful or conducive to a happy life, either of those individuals or of the race. Thus the ultimate explanation of the generation of moral ideas involves an appeal to the subjective character of man.

Moral values thus emanate from the nature of man. From this, some thinkers are disposed to attribute their origin to the nervous condition of the experiencing individuals. It is said that the valuing subject has the mastery over only a limited amount of energy, so that a moral judgment is the outcome of that limited nervous energy being well applied. Where the operation of that fund of nervous energy is successful and self-complete, it evokes an idea of goodness about the activity and where the application of that nervous energy is unsuccessful or is hindered, the act becomes neutral and in extreme cases, immoral. It is submitted that even this biological account of an organic genesis of moral judgments, refers to the experiencing subject as the agent who pronounces those judgments and that until and unless those judgments are passed by that conscious agent, the operations of those nervous processes are purely un-moral, just like those external circumstances which surround him.

It is thus that the moral worth of an act or activity depends upon the mental state in the doer. Now, while this position is acknowledged, it is generally maintained that the imposition of a moral value upon an act consists in a reaction upon the external phenomena, from within the self. Moral worth thus implies a functional relation between an active subject and an external object. According to Ehrenfels, the process of moral valuation is dependent upon the nature and intensity of desire in one, while Meinong contends that it is determined by the volitional activity, evoked in the agent by the external object. The two views,—one emphasising the affective nature of man and the other, the conative—admit, however, that the imposition of moral value is fundamentally the result of relating the agent's desire to its object but that the immediate sense of the moral worth, as determined by the nature of the desire or the affective state is the effect of the immediate applica-

tion or inhibition of conative tendencies. At any rate, we are told that the sense of moral value is determined in terms of desire and that the strength of this desire is measured by the amount of pleasure that results.

The doctrine that pleasure involved in an act is the ultimate measure or standard of the moral value of an act, has had an important place in the history of the ethical doctrines. It is generally known as Hedonism and is prominently associated with Aristippus of Cyrene—according to whom, the moral worth of an act is judged by its tendency to increase pleasure and diminish pain. A similar doctrine is attributed to the Çārvākaś of India, whose main theme was: "So long as one lives, he should live pleasurably". It is clear, however, that pleasure which generally signifies momentary sense feelings of pleasure cannot be looked upon as the exclusive motive for actions. Epicurus, who was the most important of the systematisers of Hedonism, admitted nevertheless that not momentary feelings of sense but a happy life and a mind free from disturbance and care, was the goal of all human actions. It is said that according to Epicurus, the affairs of a state are disturbers of this happy life and that for this reason, he advises one's withdrawal from them. Of course, he laid down the attainment of pleasure as the goal of the human life but took care in stating 'we cannot live a life of pleasure which is not also a life of prudence, honour and justice'. In modern times, Hedonism appears in two aspects which are scarcely reconcilable with each other. According to 'egoistic' Hedonism, an agent's own greatest pleasure is the goal. The other form of Hedonism is qualitative and universalistic and is maintained by J. S. Mill and others. This form of Hedonism has been called 'utilitarianism', which makes two important departures from the original and the crudest form of the hedonistic individualism. The utilitarians point out firstly that while the attainment of pleasure is the end of all moral activities, permanent sources of interest are to be preferred to the disconnected pleasures. A distinction of kind or quality is thus introduced in the notion of pleasure and intellectual pleasures are expressly recognised as of higher value than the pleasures of sense, inspite of any quantitative worth in the latter in the form of fruitfulness or superior intensity. The other departure of the 'universalistic' Hedonism from the track of orthodox Hedonism is the acceptance of the greatest pleasure for the greatest number, including all sentient beings, as the moral goal, in the place of an individual's attainment of his own pleasure. The doctrine of 'utilitarianism' in this its latter aspect is emphasised by Sidgwick; "By utilitarianism is here meant the ethical theory that the conduct

which under any given circumstances is objectively right is of happiness on the whole; that is, taking into account all whose happiness is affected by the conduct". It is apparant that the acceptance of a distinction between different kinds of pleasure as also between the individualist and the social goal of pleasure, as made by the utilitarians, has the implication that the affective feelings of sensuous pleasure in an individual agent cannot be looked upon as a standard of moral value.

If then in the nature of the agent, we are to look for the basis of all moral judgments and if, further, the purely affective aspect of it does not yield a safe indication of it, we are left to the examination of the calmer and the more stable side of the human nature, its '*disposition*'. While the importance of disposition in the moral valuation of acts is expressly acknowledged, some, however, deny the psychological reality of the dispositions. According to them, dispositions are only generalisations of affective feelings of the moment. They can at best be taken to express possibilities or probabilities of 'worth-reactions', and these thinkers support their theory by an appeal to the doctrine of 'value-movement'. Values are said to change in accordance with the modifications of dispositions, due to suggestions, associations, habit, transference of feeling, development of powers of intelligence and abstraction and other such laws of value-movement. Dispositions are accordingly denied any real permanence and looked upon as artificial abstractions from transitory feelings and conative activities. Dispositions being devoid of real stability, they can yield what is an instrumental value only,—a value true for the particular occasion,—and no intrinsic value. It is true that two classes of values are generally made—viz. values of 'condition', determined by desires and feelings of the moment or exigencies of circumstances and higher values of the 'person' and the community. But both these forms of value being subject to mutations in accordance with the laws of value-movement, no moral valuations of any real intrinsic worth can be justifiable.

It is, however, debatable whether all dispositions are genetically dependent on and derivable from the affective and conative experiences of the moment. Besides the values of 'condition' and values 'personal' (including social)—noted above, an important third form of valuation has been recognised which is termed 'over-individual'. In this last class of values, the moral worth of an act is not judged from its conduciveness to individual pleasure or to social welfare. Dispositions at the back of valuation in such cases appear to be clearly original and underived from the passing mental

phenomena and acts are morally judged, independently of their instrumental value, i.e., apart from their affective effects. Moral values are not always 'extrinsic', in the sense of being based upon consideration of sensuous utility, but in all real cases, as we shall see hereafter, are 'intrinsic'. In these latter cases, valuation consists in the valuation of the activities as such and not as conducive to individual or social welfare in the empirical sense—in other words, the value is absolute here. This view may be taken to be implied in the contention of Shaftesbury, according to whom the moral sense like the sense of beauty, consists in a fundamental regard in the human mind for harmony and proportion—or, in the words of Hutcheson—"a natural and immediate determination to approve certain affections and actions consequent upon them or a natural sense of immediate excellence in them."

The recognition of the above absolute moral values of acts involves the recognition of the most essential nature of man, which transcends in a sense his affective states and even his empirical dispositions, as the true ground and basis of the moral judgements. This fundamental human nature is the norm or the logical demand which all moral acts are called upon to fulfil. Kant's Practical Reason which goes beyond the conclusions of his Pure Reason and gives an idea of the inmost self laying down the Categorical Imperative as the ultimate basis of all true moral valuation is an express recognition of this. He condemns all theories which regard any inducement other than pure reverence for the absolute moral law of the self as a moral motive. Kant's theory has been criticised as extremely rigoristic. Hegel attempted to concretise this transcendental self of Kant by conceiving it as of the nature of an 'idea' and connecting it indissolubly with its empirical expressions and Schopenhauer, by identifying it with a fundamental 'blind will', which energises towards satisfaction and ultimate tranquility. But the fact remains that moral judgements depend on the essential nature of man.

A morally good act is thus explained not as one that satisfies the passing affective aspect of the individual mind or that of the race. It is neither explained as an act consisting in the free flow of conative activity either of the individual or of the community. Neither is it dependent on the more stable side of human nature viz. its empirical disposition. According to Aristotle, a morally good act consists in doing well i.e. in activity leading to the attainment of the highest excellence, culminating in a life of pure speculation. Even the validity of this view of Aristotle may be doubted. Aristotle

himself maintained that this highest excellence was in-attainable by man, so that his theory practically amounts to an assertion about the impracticability of truly moral acts. The fact is that speculative faculty is only one aspect of human nature, which is a harmonious whole of this faculty as well as other faculties. Aristotle was wrong in identifying his highest virtue with but one aspect of the human mind. His 'eudaimonia' meant literally the state of being conditioned or determined by a good genius and this genius could not be taken as a mutilated part of the true self of man. This true and living genius was the essential human nature in its completeness.

The same thing may be said of the Stoical principle of morality. Ignoring for the purpose of the point which we are considering here, the Stoic doctrine that Reason was an ultimate stuff of matter, we find them maintaining that the universal Reason was immanent in the individual and that this Reason was the determiner of the moral character of an act. They were right in maintaining that the 'wise man' (by which, they meant, a morally disposed man) was 'self-dependent' and was conscious of his moral worth. But this consciousness of the Wise Man's moral worth was described by the Stoics simply as Reason. The Stoics thus laid exclusive emphasis on the rational nature of man as a moral being. A truly moral act is, however, not one which simply tends towards the development of man as a speculative being but to an all-round perfection of the human nature in its comprehensiveness. And if the inner nature of man in its essentiality is divine, as we have discussed before, then the moral character of an act is to be judged by its capacity to enable man to realise this native perfection in him.

In this connection, it is interesting to note the early Christian doctrines of Synderesis and Conscientia. Both signify an innate principle in man which enables him to judge an act morally. St. Jerome, in explaining the fourth of the 'four living creatures' of the vision of Ezekiel viz. the Eagle, says that it represents the remaining part of the soul over and above the other three parts i.e. the rational, the irascible and the appetitive aspects of it. This fourth part is the most essential nature of the soul, which St. Jerome speaks of as indestructible and about it, he says 'this the Greeks call Synderesis, which spark of conscience (scintilla conscientiae) was not extinguished from the breast of Adam when he was driven from Paradise; through it, when overcome by pleasures or by anger or even, as sometimes, deceived by a similitude of reason, we feel that we sin; and this in the Scriptures, is sometimes called Spirit.' St. Jerome thus seems to have made no distinction between Synderesis and Con-

scientia. Synderesis refers to an 'original righteousness' which persists in spite of the corruption of the human soul and its consequent Fall. This original righteousness is nothing other than the essential nature of man in its completeness.

Later on, Synderesis or 'the spark or fire put into the heart of man' in the words of Jeremy Taylor, is distinguished from Conscientia which refers to the particular attitude of man to good or bad action, 'bringing fuel to this fire'. Aquinas of course placed both Synderesis and Conscientia under the same class but looked upon them as modes of intellectual powers. Bonaventura, on the other hand, maintained that Synderesis was the basis of right volition and as such, consisted in the original tendency of the moral disposition while Conscientia was the basis of right judgment. Duns Seotus's view generally followed the Thomistic contention and according to Jeremy Taylor also, Synderesis was 'the general repository of moral principles or measures, i.e., the underlying rule of conscience, while the Conscientia itself was 'a conjunction of the universal practical law (i.e. Synderesis) with the particular moral action'.

It matters little whether Synderesis and Conscientia are held to be identical faculties, as seems to have been held originally or as distinct ones as maintained later on. The fact stands prominent in the midst of the scholastic disputes that they in their combination pass judgments on our acts as to their moral character. What is more important in this connection is to note that these faculties are innate; their manner of passing judgments is not determined by any considerations of the effects of the acts relating to either individual sensuous pleasure or social utility. Bonaventura explicity, though in the manner of the scholasticism of his age, points out that 'God has implanted a double rule of right in man's nature, one for judging rightly, and this is the rectitude of conscience; another for right volition, and this is the rectitude of Synderesis.' Now, God in a rational religion being identified with the essential nature of man, the two so-called God-given faculties for moral judgments cannot but be evolutions from within the fundamental self of man; so that the test of the moral character of an act is always: whether or not, it is consistent with the essentially perfect nature of the agent.

That the essential nature of man in its fulness is the ultimate basis for our moral judgment has thus been abundantly clear from what we have stated above. Butler, in describing the character of conscience, pointedly refers to the fact by saying: Conscience is 'the principle in man by which he approves or disapproves his heart,

temper and actions'; and at another place he says: 'to preside and govern from the very economy of the constitution of man belong to it'. Butler's important conclusion is that from the supremacy of Conscience, the human nature clearly appears as a system or constitution, a system or constitution adapted to virtue. Unfortunately, this inner constitution of man which is thus adapted to virtue is not always kept in view, in its entirety, while explaining the basis of moral judgments. We have seen how the school of Hedonism, including its supporters in modern times emphasised the affective aspect of the human nature in this connection, how the extreme biologists, fixing upon the exercise of the fund of organic energy in man, laid exclusive stress on the conative side of a moral act, how again, Aristotle and the Stoics and others looked upon the perfection of man's pure rational character as the supreme goal of all truly moral activities. The human nature, not being restricted to any one of these three of its aspects, these views are necessarily but one-sided and to that extent, inadequate. We have seen how Hutcheson and his school of Intuitianism held that the power of morally judging an act was intuitive in human nature.

The moral sense is 'an immediate sense of right or wrong', which accompanies right or wrong action or disposition, 'without any view of further natural advantage from them'. Moral sense, according to them is 'reflex affection', aroused by "the very objects of the affection," without any other consideration intervening. Moral judgments, emanating from the essential nature of the agent, thus fix upon its perceptual aspect alone, and the intuitionists do not take any account of the fact that a judgment regarding an act as a truly moral one is dependant not only upon its immediate recognition of it as such by the immediate perceptional faculty of the agent but also upon its consistency with the perfections of the cognitive, the affective and the conative powers in him as well. The theory of the intuitionists also accordingly suffers from an inherent one-sidedness in this respect. The test of the goodness or the badness of an act does not consist in the verdict of any one of the four essential faculties of the moral agent taken singly but lies in the fact whether or not, it involves all the four characteristics of the self viz. the rational, the volitional, the apprehensive and the affective taken together and as such, whether it leads to an all-round harmonious perfection of all of them, to a development, that is, completely free from the hindrance from any factors, external to the self.

To say, however, that morality or the passing of moral judgments on acts done is intuitive with us, is not to suggest that a truly moral life is actual with all the people. A moral judgment

has for its background or fountain source, the essential nature of man and in this sense only, the capacity for it is innate; but a full-fledged moral living requires a continuous clarification and a more and more perfected conception of that fundamental character of the human nature. Just as some sort of religious consciousness is innate in the sense that all people in whatever stage of progress they may be, have some sort of an idea of a higher being and just as for the purposes of a true religion, this original God-consciousness requires to be rationalised until it identifies God with the very essence of man as a spiritual being, moral sense also is intuitive as a bare power of appreciating or appraising an action and a perfect moral life requires a rationalisation of that sense and the truest possible conception of the human nature in its essentiality, i.e., of the human nature as devoid of all exotic influences. The fundamental nature of man is divine in as much as it is endowed with capacities of infinite intelligence, bliss, power and apprehension; the religious sense is a necessary recognition of this nature and a true religion involves the conscious perfection of that essential nature, i.e., an actual development of the ordinary state of man into the perfected nature of God. Exactly the same thing may be said of morality. Human nature with the fourfold capacities is its eternal background and the moral consciousness in its innateness is its counterpart; the moral life involves the effecting of the separation of the original and essential nature of man from the dirt and dross that are attached to it and the establishment of it on its own exclusive self.

We venture to maintain accordingly that religion and morality are in a sense identical phenomena. A religious act is essentially a moral act; both emanate from the same nature of man and involve an intuitive sense of that nature; both in their perfection require the perfection of that original nature of man and a consequent rationalisation of that innate sense. We are not unmindful of the contention of many scholars that a religion unconnected with morality is possible; that many religious acts have been unmoral, some, even immoral; that Buddhism, on the other hand, has been a pure system of morality, absolutely devoid of any conception of God. To us, it appears that this contention is mostly due to a misconception of facts. The distinction between a religious act and a moral act is recognised only in comparatively more recent times. In the earliest ages, there was only one form of value, attachable to an action. An act done in the name of religion, which involved even the grossest form of cruelty—even immorality—was looked upon as meritorious, not only from the religious standpoint but from the

view-point of self-realisation. Even when, later on, religious sense came to be distinguished somehow from the moral one, both religious and moral acts were equally believed to be conducive to the agent's welfare, immediate or ultimate. The process of progressive conversion of *powerful* Gods into *spiritual* beings, noticeable in some of the ancient religions, points also to an urge for not dissociating religion from morality. Lastly, it is to be noticed that in the ethical systems like that of Buddhism, the code of moral acts was extolled because of their efficacy in respect of a super-ordinary state which was expressly looked upon as divine and venerated with the utmost fervour of a religion. At any rate, in a supremely developed rational religion, where God is nothing other than the perfected self, no distinction can be drawn between a religious and a moral act, both of them leading to the realisation of the self.

Self-realisation being thus the sole aim and end of both religion and ethics, the claim of any system for supplying a basis for a supposed world-religion and world-ethics must be tested with reference to the conduciveness of its principles to the said aim, viz., the agent's self-realisation.

In light of the foregoing discussions about the fundamental basis of all religions and morality, we may make an estimate of Jainism as a religion and a code of moral practices. If religion is to be supposed to involve a belief in a world-creating God, then the Jaina religion is certainly athestic. On the other hand, religion in its rational form is a belief that every individual soul contains in it the seeds of the attributes of Divinity, viz., infinite Vision, infinite Knowledge, infinite Power and infinite Bliss—so that when fully developed and perfected, a soul becomes God. Jainism has such a belief and although it does not believe in an Architect of the universe, it is nevertheless a God—believing religion, i.e., a rational religion. The perfection of the soul obviously requires a faultless practice of a system of moral practices, all unfailingly pointing to the realisation of the aim of the said rationalised form of religion. Jaina ethics consists in the observance of rules and conduct which leads to the realisation of Godhood of the self. The bases of the Jaina religion and of its code of moral conduct are thus identical. This is what we have meant by a rationalised religion and rationalised ethics and Jainism is one such, par excellence.

CHAPTER II

THE INDISPENSABLE ASSOCIATES OF ÇĀRITRA

The self in its essentiality being infinite power, intelligence, joy and apprehension, its realisation and perfection which is the goal of religion and ethics, consists in its extrication from all impurities and elements of imperfection that are found associated with it in its experiential state. This emancipation of the empirical self is effected by Çāritra or right conduct. The possibility or rather the practicability of this fact of emancipation, may, however appear to be doubtful. If the elements of imperfection which are associated with the self, are real—which is an undeniable fact—and if the interfusion of the self with these elements of limitation is also a real phenomenon—which is also unquestionable—the complete emancipation of the self may not unjustly appear as difficult, if not impossible. This explains why in most of the European systems, the question of the complete and ultimate emancipation of the self is practically left open and untouched and some of them are content with identifying it with a citizenship of a well constituted State. There are some thinkers, nevertheless, who have taken up this ultimate question in all seriousness and discussed it in all its aspects. It has been found that the elements of finitude that are found in the self are not after all inseparable and that with all their rigours, the self has an element of freedom always left in it which enables it to transcend those elements of finitude and make itself ultimately free.

Some of the Indian philosophical systems seem to have taken up this question and discussed it in their own way, though in an indirect manner. The Mīmāṃsā school maintained that although it was possible for a man to effect spiritual development to make additions to

his powers of cognition and to secure better and better states of happiness here and hereafter, it was never possible to attain complete omniscience or perfection and infinitude in any direction. The dualistic section of the Vedānta thinkers also held that the emancipation of man consisted not in the attainment of any perfect omniscience or complete undetermined joy, which belonged, as they held, to the supreme God who was the Lord of all the freed and unfreed beings, but in the enjoyment of a status 'like' that of the supreme being, which always fell short of that of the Lord. The Jaina philosophers although they agreed with the Mīmāmsakas in their rejection of the doctrine of the supreme Lord were opposed to the theory of both the schools' of any imperfection, attaching to the finally emancipated beings. The Jainas maintained that man was essentially free and inifinite in his endowments but that in his finite state, his imperfection was due to his association with some principles, foreign to his fundamental nature. This foreign principle was called Karma by them, which was a reality, material in essence. They argued that when the Kārmic matter left the self completely, there was no reason why it should not emerge in its natural splendour and perfection.

The all-important question therefore arises as to the possibility of the Karmas, which according to the Jainas themselves, were attached to the nature of the self from the beginningless time, ever leaving or being made to leave the self completely. The Jainas solved the question by pointing out that although the Karma was found to stick to or to be mixed up with the soul, its intensity was liable to variation from time to time. There are occasions when the influences of the Karmas upon the self seem to wane and these serve as the opportune moments when the self is to exert and work assiduously for shaking off the shackles of the Karma. If the self avails itself of the favourable moments when the Karma-bond appears to be weak and loose and takes to the path of selfculture and self-development with a determined will, the realisation of its essential perfection becomes ensured more and more. The Jainas explain this in the following beautiful manner. Suppose a king is kept in perpetual dread of a powerful enemy and remains weakened thereby. Then suppose a time comes when the enemy is off his guard; the wary king at once utilises this opportunity, falls upon the enemy with a drawn sword and annihilates him; the result is that the king becomes perfectly free. The Jaina philosophers point out that every one's self is essentially free, so that when the Karma elements obstructing its freedom become weakened, it is possible for every one, if he is so minded, to exert himself for the annihilation

of those exotic elements and armed with the sword of moral conduct, to go on clearing the way for his own uplift and self realisation.

The perfectness of one's fundamental nature and its capacity to assert itself when the foreign elements limiting it in various ways become weak, are thus the metaphysical backgrounds for moral conduct. It would be seen however that besides these two ultimate facts, other requisites which may be looken upon as psychological, are necessary, in order that an act may be truly moral. A right act is not one which is mechanically done. Nobody regards the action of water, for instance, in cooling down a thing which is heated under the influence of fire, a moral act. Even the act of a man who does it instinctively or even as a matter of automatic routine, is hardly one of any moral value. It is only when the act is based on an immediate consciousness of the real state of affairs surrounding a man together with a consciousness of the ultimate aim of his life and in the next place, in a comprehensive and correct knowledge about his own self and about the nature of the circumstantial factors around him, that his act can be called morally right. Thus for the purposes of truly moral conduct, an unflinching consciousness (which may be called 'faith' because of its immediacy) about what a man is and about what he ought to be, is the first psychological pre-requisite. And secondly, it should be seen that a mere blind belief about one's actual state and about the possibility of his transcending it,—conscious though it is,—would not attach moral character to his act; he should also see that his conduct is broad-based upon a true knowledge about his own self and capacities as well as about the matters with which he is connected in his empirical experiences. A faith that one is in an undesirable state and is capable of bettering it, without which a real incentive to moral conduct would be wanting, as well as a correct knowledge regarding himself and his environments, which ultimately reveals the efficacy of an act in relation to one's self-realisation, are thus the two indispensable pre-requisites for all right conduct. The Jaina thinkers express this by saying that Samyak-darśana (right faith) and Samyak-jñāna (right knowledge) are associated with Samyak-cāritra (right conduct)—the three together called the Ratna-traya (three jewels) being the Mokṣa-mārga or the way to liberation.

The faith which is thus connected with right conduct must itself be of the right sort. It is Darśana or immediate apprehension —not the result of discursive cogitations. The Jaina philosophers describe this Samyak-darśana as relating to seven facts. Firstly, it has for its object the Jīva or the self, implying that there is an

immediate consciousness about one's own self being a reality. Nobody can conceive that he is not; self-consciousness or the consciousness about one's own self is thus unquestionably immediate. The second object of the Samyak-darśana is the Ajīva, a collection of reals which are outside the self. The very consciousness of the self as a limited and finite being implies the immediate consciousness of the Ajīva or the non-self as a reality too. The connection of the self with what it is not, i.e., with Ajīva is called the Āsrava (literally, an inflow of the non-self into the self); it is also implied in the immediate consciousness of the two foregoing co-existing realities. The result of this Āsrava or the co-mingling of the two realities of the self and the non-self is the 'Bandha' or the state of the self's bondage, an immediate consciousness which every one undoubtedly has. This feeling of bondage has variations of intensity, implying that the inflow of the elements of the non-psychical into the self may be stopped; a belief in the possibility of this stoppage of the further inflow of the non-psychical which is called the 'Samvara' is certainly psychological—though a moral one. We have on various occasions experiences of accumulated feelings of weakness and depression, 'slave-mentalities' subsiding in suitable circumstances which justifies the immediate moral belief in the possibility, firstly, of the 'Nirjara' or the partial annihilation of the non-psychical elements which found their way into the self and in the next place of the Mokṣa which is the culminating result of those foreign elements being absolutely removed. The right belief of the Jainas thus consists in an immediate faith in the reality of the seven things viz, the self, the non-self, the connection of the self with the non-self, the psychical bondage consequent on the said connection between the two disparate realities, the stoppage of their further connection, the partial dissociation of the non-self from the self and the final and the complete dissociation of the two from each other. It is called the 'Darśana' or apprehension, because of its immediate character as shown above.

The unflinching faith in the realities which is essential to moral conduct has been described by the Jainas to be of two sorts, which are respectively called the Vītarāga Samyaktva and the Sarāga Samyaktva. The former is the calm and unperturbed faith of one whose passions have all subsided. It is practically the faith of a person who is collected in his own pure psychical nature and consists in the absolute purity of the self itself. This form of Samyktva is looked upon as the Kśāyika or the *absolutely* passionless faith. The Sarāga Samyaktva which may be regarded as the Kśāyopaśamika or the faith of one whose passions have been controlled but

not yet completly is the faith of less developed persons. This form of faith is characterised by the following five marks viz.—(1) Praśama or pacification of passions, (2) Samvega or a spirit for avoidance of the Samsāra or the series of mundane existences, (3) Anukampā or a benevolent attitude towards all living beings, and (4) Āstikya or a belief in the real existence of the principles like the self, the non-self, etc. (5) Nirveda or collection of one's self within itself. It is clear that the Vītarāga Samyaktva is the culmination of the Sarāga.

As regards the causes of Samyaktva, it is said that the right faith is in some, 'natural', i.e., connate, while in others, it is aroused by external circumstances. These external circumstances may be of various sorts. Sometimes, Dravya e.g. an image of the omniscient Lord arouses faith; sometimes events of one's past lives are suddenly remembered which awakens the saving faith. One's presence in a place, Kṣetra, where the teachings of a true religion are being imparted, generates right belief in him. The propitiousness of time (Kāla) for the evolution of the right faith has been recognised. Another important antecedent of right belief is the proper attitude or Bhāva. In all cases of the awakening of Samyaktva, its unconditional antecedent is either the Upaśama, i.e. the *mitigation* of the 'faith-obscuring' and the 'deluding' Karma or their Kśāyopśama, i.e. their *mitigation* coupled with *partial destruction* or their Kṣaya or *complete destruction*. And it is to be observed that the weakening of the Karma forces in the above manner is followed by proper subjective attitudes called 'Labdhi's or attainments by the Jainas. These Labdhi's are five in number and are described in the Digamvara Śāstra's as follows:—(1) Kṣāyapaśamalabdhi; due to the weakening of the faith-obscuring and deluding Karma's the believer's senses, mind, etc. become such as to fit him for the acquisition of the right faith. (2) Viśuddhi-labdhi; the believer is possessed of a disposition for good actions and against bad acts. (3) Deśanā-labdhi; this consists in the believer's attainments of a disposition to know the truth. (4) Prāyogya-labdhi; this is the attainment of competency regarding subjective activity which shortens the period of further persistence of seven of the eight Karmas. (5) Karaṇa-labdhi: this consists in the attainment of final efficiency in the believer's subjective activity which generates the perfect right faith within the shortest period of 48 minutes.

The firm and the pure nature of right faith is indicated by its unflinching and unshaking character. The Jainas describe this by referring to what they call the eight Aṅga's or aspects of the

Samyak-darśana. (1) The first of these is the 'Nihśankita'. A true believer has no doubt about the nature of a thing as taught by the competent authority. The Arhat, who is venerated as the all-knowing Lord by the Jainas, has taught, for example, that a thing has many aspects (Anekānta); a Jaina having faith in the Arhat's teaching has no doubt in his mind about the truth of what the Arhat has said—a doubt, for instance, of the sort, 'Is the nature of a thing just such as taught by the Arhat or is it not so?' (2) The second aspect of the right faith is that it is 'Niḥkāṅkṣita'. It means that the true believer is perfectly disinterested and has no liking or predilection for anything whatsoever. He has, for instance, no attraction for enjoyment which this earth or the heavenly regions may promise nor has he any inclination towards any of the doctrines which lay emphasis on one particular aspect of reality, however attractive these one-sided views may be. (3) In the third place, the right belief is characterised by 'Nirviçikitsā'. The man of true faith has no feeling of natural repulsion towards any object, however dirty or unclean it may be, nor towards any form of subjective experience, however painful it may be, e.g., hunger, thirst, cold or heat. (4) The Samyaktva is marked by 'Amūḍha-dṛṣti'. This attitude consists in not accepting as true the false doctrines preached by unwise and interested persons, and in adopting a critical attitude towards them from the stand-point of the true religion of the true faith. (5) A true believer has the feature, called the 'Upagūhana'. It means that he has the tendency towards an ever-increasing self-culture in him through the practice of humility, simplicity etc. and refraining from exposing the drawbacks of others. (6) The sixth characteristic of Samyaktva is 'Sthitikaraṇa'. When passions of anger etc. drive away the believer or any other person from the path of rectitude, the man of right faith attempts to call him back and put him once more on the right track, through the study of scripture and employment of reason. (7) 'Vātsalya' is the next feature of right faith. It is a spirit of fond affection for a course of conduct which is based on non-violence and which leads one to the blissful state of the final liberation for himself and for all people who practise that course of pure conduct. (8) The last but not the least of the aspects of right faith is called the 'Prabhāvana'. It implies that a true believer develops his own self through the realisation in him of right faith, right knowledge and right conduct on the one hand and on the other, he presents in its best aspect, the true religion of the Jaina (not by simple preaching but by practising charity, penance etc. etc.).

From what has been said above the nature and features of right

faith, one should not consider that it is really based on some previous mode of correct knowledge. The Karma which, according to the Jainas, suppresses true faith and the subsidence of which causes the evolution of it, is different from the Karma which obstructs the rise of true knowledge. Accordingly, there is a fundamental difference between faith and knowledge. A man of faith is not always a wise man nor is a learned person necessarily a man of correct beliefs. The fact that Samyaktva presupposes the Labdhis or attainments described before, does not show that it is not an immediate form of apprehension. Nor does the description (e.g., by Samantabhadra) of Samyak-darśana as ('Deva-guru-Śāstra-Śraddhāna') a belief in the true god, teacher and scripture points in any way to true faith being other than a form of immediate consciousness. It is true that the teachings of the true master and studies of the true scripture are said to generate true faith; but this also does not show that Samyaktva is anything other than a form of immediate consciousness. We shall see hereafter how from the 'real' view of the Samyaktva, it is nothing but 'Svānubhūti' or self-consciousness itself. Here we are concerned with showing that the belief in the seven kinds of reals which has been called the Samyak-darśana is also an immediate form of consciousness. Even the fact of the Samyaktva arising from 'Adhigama' or phenomena, to some extent external to the believer does not detract from the character of immediacy. The outside factors are only conditions of the evolution of faith, not its productive cause. The faith arises from within the nature of the self, from which the Karma has fallen off. Samyaktva is thus an immediate form of consciousness, just like self-consciousness itelf. Teachings have been said to generate true faith; but the true faith does not arise so long as the matters of the teachings are not identified with the hearers' self. It is only where and when the essence of the teachings is felt to be incorporated in the very being of the hearer that he feels the right faith; right faith thus really rises from the self of the hearer and not exactly from outside teachings; this explains cases where teachings fail to evoke any response from the hearer in the form of a correct faith. The grounds of faith are in the self, not in any external phenomena and faith is an immediate form of consciousness, those external phenomena being only conditions of its evolution.

That the right faith is an immediate form of consciousness not intercepted by nor interfered with by any other consideration or form of cognition is also clear from the Jainas' description of it as consisting in pure Jñāna-çetanā. The Çetanā or consciousness of a being, according to them, is of three modes. In Karma-çētanā, the

consciousness of one's activities and efforts for attaining an object of desire is predominant while the second mode of Çētanā, the Karma-phala-çetanā is characterised by a feeling of pleasure or pain which arises from one's coming in contact with the object of his like or dislike. In the Jñāna-çetanā there is neither of the two preceeding modes of consciousness; the Jñāna-çetanā is a pure consciousness of itself as it is in itself, uncontaminated by any sense of energising towards an object or by any feeling arising from the appropriation or non-appropriation of that object. The Jñāna-çetanā is thus self-consciousness pure, simple and above all, immediate; and most of the Jaina thinkers identify Samyaktva with Jñāna-çetanā in as much as the Samyaktva is spontaneous faith which is not mixed up with any form of psychical activity or pleasurable or painful feelings or extraneous consideration. The Samyaktva is thus a form of immediate apprehension.

Some thinkers, however, point out that while the pure Jñāna-çetanā alone is applicable to the Vītarāga-Samyaktva, in the Sarāga-Samyaktva, the two forms of the Karma-çetanā and the Karma-phala-çetanā are present. The very expression, Sarāga, implies that the believer, having the Sarāga-Samyaktva has the Rāga or the feeling of attachment and as such, has the consciousness of his activities applied towards the attainment of desirable objects as well as a feeling of pleasure, arising from the attainment thereof. It is urged against this view that the Rāga affects the nature of one's conduct only; it has nothing to do with the nature of one's faith; so that it is always possible for one to have perfect faith or Jñāna-çetanā, while his conduct may be vitiated by the feelings of attachment or envy. This is one view regarding a person having the Sarāga-Samyaktva and the possibility of his having Jñāna-çetanā. But the real reply to the objection concerning the Sarāga-Samyaktva and the Jñāna-çetanā going together is that Samyaktva and Rāga cannot really go together. A man having Rāga or a feeling of attachment for worldly objects cannot have Samyaktva developed in him. In Sarāga-Samyaktva, the believer is not really Sarāga; all that is meant is that he moves in the world, the sphere of Rāga, without any real Rāga attaching to his nature. Although living and moving as a Sarāga being, the man is really 'Nīrāga'; the passions of Rāga do not enter into his nature and the Samyaktva which is devoid of all Rāga, is evolved in him. Thus, in the cases of Sarāga-Samyaktva also, the faith is immediate, 'Nirvikalpa' (undetermined), 'Śūkṣma' (subtle), 'Vāçāmagoçaram' (incapable of being expressed in words), and 'Svānubhūti-rūpa' (consisting in pure in-

trospective self-apprehension), as variously described by the Jaina philosophers.

Such is Samyaktva or the Samyak-darśana i.e. right faith, rising spontaneously from within one's self, which is one of the pre-requisites of Samyak-çāritra or good conduct.

Another indispensable condition for the moralness of acts is, as we have indicated already, Samyak-jñāna or right knowledge, according to the Jainas. Knowledge and faith, as we have seen, are separate matters; yet there are cases in which properly developed knowledge helps the development of right faith and cases also where right faith presents the objects of knowledge in an entirely new aspect. It is thus possible for faith and knowledge combining together, as they actually do, in the conduct of a morally disposed man.

Samyak-jñāna or valid knowledge has been described as correct (Vyavasāyi) cognition of one's own self (Sva) as well as of the non-self (Para), i.e., the environments surrounding him. The first of the two objects of knowledge is the self, which is characterised by consciousness, which the non-self, so far as it is not a conscious being, may be grouped under the five classes of unconscious objects, viz., 'matter', 'time' or the passive condition for the mutation of things, 'space' or the passive condition for the accommodation of substances and the two passive conditions for the 'motion' and the 'stoppage' of things. So, the foregoing six with their qualities and modes are the objects of determination by knowledge and knowledge effects the determination by examining its object under the following six categories viz. (1) 'Nirdeśa', i.e., definition or description of the thing as it is; thus the Nirdeśa of a house would be to describe it as a brick-built structure. (2) 'Svāmitva', i.e., indication of ownership; in the case of the house, its Svāmitva would be indicated by saying that it belongs to (say) A. (3) 'Sādhana', i.e., the description of the constituent materials; thus, a house would be described as constituted of bricks, mortar, lime etc. (4) 'Adhikaraṇa' or the determination of the locus of the object under observation; in the case of the house, it may be described as standing on a solid land within a certain village. (5) 'Sthiti' or the determination of duration; the house in question may be said to be capable of lasting for (say) 60 years. (6) 'Vidhāna' or the determination of the nature of the thing with reference to the mode of its genesis; thus in the case of the house, the following three things may be said viz., (i) Suppose there was a big cavity in the place where the house was built later on; a person wanting a temporary shelter, may

spread a sheet of canvas over the cavity and may thus make a habitation for the time being within that cavity; here the cavity is not destroyed but only its absoluteness is mitigated (Upaśama) by the canvas spread over it and the temporary shelter may be described as the result of the mitigation of that absolute cavity. (ii) In the next place, let us suppose, a person erects a strong room deep down in a part of the cavity; the room here certainly puts an end to a part of the cavity and yet the entire cavity is not destroyed; for, over and above the room, there is still a portion of the vacuum left; the strong room in this case may thus be described as the result of the mitigation (Upaśama) and the partial destruction (Kṣaya) of the original cavity. (iii) Lastly, let us suppose that an underground cell is constructed in the place of the cavity, which occupies the entire area of the cavity; here the entire cavity is destroyed (Kṣaya) and is replaced by the cell. It is thus that the mode of the origin of a thing under observation reveals its nature. In the example of the house, we see that it is either an improvised temporary habitation or a small strong room or a complete underground cell, according as it mitigates or partially fills up or completely replaces the original cavity.

Right knowledge determines the above six aspects of a thing under its scope in the right manner. For the correct determination of the nature of the object, the above six aspects of it may be re-grouped under the following eight considerations, viz., (1) 'Sat' or the aspect of 'existence'; according to the Jainas, the existence of a thing implies that it comes into being (utpāda), that it vanishes (vyaya) and that its underlying substance persists (dhrauvya) through all its modifications, e.g., the processes of continuous origination, annihilation and persistence; valid knowledge considers the correct manners in which these three aspects of a thing come into operation. (2) 'Saṃkhyā' or 'number'; the determination of a thing by correct knowledge gives the number of things similar to it. (3) 'Kṣetra'—the 'place' or the 'locus' of the thing. (4) 'Sparśana' or the 'extent'; correct knowledge determines the area within which its object may live, move and have its being. (5) 'Kāla' or the 'duration' of the existence of a thing. (6) 'Antara' or the 'interval'; it means that a thing may lose its nature and yet regain it after some time; correct knowledge directs itself to a consideration of this interval between the thing's losing its nature and then regaining it; Antara, however, is not confined within the conception of temporal interval between a thing's two particular states only; it may refer to the interval between one thing's attaining a state and another

thing's attaining that state as also to the spatial intervals between two or more things. (7) 'Alpa-bahutva' or 'relativity'; a correct cognition of a thing involves a comparative estimate of it in relation to other things as regards number, magnitude etc. (8) 'Bhāva' or 'modification'; the nature of a thing is variously modified by its coming in contact with other things; the Jaina philosophers classify the modifications in a thing generally under five heads which are as follows:—(1) First of all, we have the 'Audayika' or the 'originative' modification, brought about in a thing when it is under the influence of a foreign thing. (2) When the influence of that foreign thing upon the thing under observation is mitigated to a certain extent, we have a corresponding modification in the latter thing, which is called the 'Aupaśmika or 'mitigative'. (3) The thing under observation has in it the modification called the 'Miśra' or 'mixed', when the influence of the said foreign thing upon its nature is not only mitigated but is partially destroyed. (4) The complete elimination of all foreign influences from the nature of the thing under observation gives rise to a state in the latter which is termed the 'Kṣāyika' or the 'annihilatory'. (5) The nature of a thing is dynamic, according to the Jainas; its substance is not an unchanged and eternal identity but is essentially self-preservative, through its ceaseless passing modifications; there are again modifications in the nature of a thing, even when it is established in its own pure nature and these modifications in the substance of a thing continuously evolving from within itself and independently of the influence of anything foreign or external to it are its 'Pāriṇāmika' or the 'essential' Bhāvas or modifications.

Now, as regards the processes evolved by knowledge for the determination of its object in its above mentioned aspects, it refers to the 'Pramāṇa' and the 'Naya'. The former grasps the thing as a whole while the latter confines itself to the consideration of it in one of its particular aspects. The Pramāṇa is either 'direct' (Pratyakṣa) arising directly from within the knower's self or 'indirect' (Parokṣa). Under the direct knowledge come the cognitions known respectively as (1) the 'Avadhi' or the 'Clairvoyant', by which we perceive the non-sensuous aspects of a material thing, (2) the 'Manaḥ-paryaya' or the 'telepathic', which gives us the knowledge of other men's minds and (3) the 'Kevala' which consists in consciousness or knowledge of all things, of all times and of all places, with all their attributes and modes. The Parokṣa knowledge is so called because besides the internal psychical activity, it is dependent on the operation of other factors also. The indirect know-

ledge is primarily divided into the 'Śruta' or knowledge derived from the authoritative sources and the 'Mati' which is dependent upon sense-operations, either directly or indirectly. The Śruta refers to knowledge, arising from a study of the infallible scriptures as well as from hearing the teachings of truly wise persons. The Mati or the sensuous knowledge is due to the activities of the sense-organs (Indriyas) as well as of the internal organ (Anindriya) and is of five modes. The Mati proper is perception through the senses, i.e., the visual etc. and includes such internal feelings as that of pleasure, pain etc. The Smrti is the second mode of the Mati or sensuous knowledge which makes us remember an object of previous perception. In Saṃjñā otherwise called the 'Pratyabhijñā' we perceive the points of similarity or dissimilarity between a thing of present observation and another or a number of them, otherwise observed. The Çintā or the Ūha or the Tarka is the fourth form of knowledge which establishes a general relationship between two sensuous phenomena like fire and smoke. Through 'Abhinibodha better known as the Anumāna, we derive a particular truth from the more general conception, yielded by the foregoing inductive knowledge.

The Naya is the second method of knowledge according to the Jainas. Its distinctive feature, as indicated already, is that while a thing in its entirety comes within the purview of the modes of the Pramāṇa, the Naya takes up for its consideration such of its particular aspects in their exclusiveness as its 'universal aspect', 'general essence', 'points of its particularity' or 'individuality', etc. etc. The Naya is subdivided in various manners. One mode of its classification is into the 'Dravyārthika,' consisting in the exclusive consideration of the essential aspect of a thing and the 'Paryārthika' which looks to its modalities only.

Knowledge has for its object, the 'Sva', or the self and the 'Para' which is other than the self; this is the Jaina view. According to the Buddhists, there is neither any permanent self nor any permanent reality outside it. The Vedāntists admit the real existence of a one and the self-same transcendental soul but deny the existence of a real non-self. The thinkers of the Mīmāṃsā school acknowledge the reality of the self and of the non-self but contend that an introspective knowledge of the self is never possible. The philosophers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school point to the reality of an infinite number of selves as well as that of some kinds of the non-self but maintain that the self can be known only indirectly. The thinkers of the Sānkhya-Yoga school accept the reality of an infinite

number of conscious selves and that of one ultimate non-self but they do not admit that the conscious transcendental souls have a real connection with the Prakṛti or the principle of the non-self. Obviously, all these views are opposed to the theories of the Jaina thinkers.

The Jainas hold, of the above two objects of knowledge, the self and the non-self each has an infinite number of attributes and that they are ceaselessly undergoing infinite modifications. The 'Vastu' or the object of experience is thus possessed of infinite aspects. This, however, does not mean that the object of knowledge is necessarily unknowable. The Jainas, as we have hinted above, believe in the possibility of omniscience. Even when knowledge falls short of omniscience, some sort of true knowledge about the things is still possible. It consists in taking up a particular aspect or quality of the thing under observation and finding out in what relations this stands to the thing. It is obvious that these relationships between a thing and one of its modifications or attributes hold good as regards the thing in its other particularities also. True knowledge culminates in the discovery of these fundamental relationships between an object and its quality or mode. The Jainas' investigation of the nature of a thing thus concerns itself with a study of these relationships and finds expression in their famous theory of the 'Saptabhanga' or 'the seven modes of predication.' Shortly speaking, these seven predications consist in relating the thing to one of its given aspects in no less than seven manners. (1) Thus, the first predication shows how in some respects, that particular aspect can be positively attributed to the thing. (2) The second predication would indicate how in other respects, that aspect cannot be predicated of the thing. (3) The third predication would consist in a successive affirmation and negation of that aspect in connection with the thing, in some respects, while (4) The fourth Bhaṅga applies simultaneous affirmation and negation of it to the thing, in some respects. (5) In the next mode of predication the fourth and the first forms of predication are combined and (6) the sixth Bhaṅga is similarly a combination of the second and the fourth Bhaṅgas. (7) The last form of the predication consists in combining the third and the fourth Bhaṅgas together. The Jainas point out that Samyak-jñāna or true knowledge about the object involves a correct application of the above Sapta-bhaṅgas or seven modes of predication in respect of it, through the methods of the Pramāṇa and the Naya.

All knowledge is evidently not right knowledge, just as all faith is evidently not right faith. Save and except the telepathic and the omniscient forms of knowledge, which by their nature cannot be

wrong when they are evolved in a self, all other modes of knowledge are liable to be misleading. Thus clairvoyant cognitions, e.g., in many cases where people think that they are having super-ordinary perceptions, are often wrong. Where scriptures themselves are wrong and teachers unreliable, the authoritative knowledge, imparted by them is necessarily bad. Due to the derangements of the sense organs or of the internal organ of the mind, perceptions become false. On account of a similar derangement of the mental activities, the ideas recalled in memory and concepts formed from them become wrong while defective observation and wrong estimation of facts lead to fallacious conclusions. The Samyak-jñāna or valid knowledge is free from all forms of Samāropa or mistake. The Jainas characterise right knowledge as Vyavasāyi or certain, yielding ideas of its objects exactly as they are and as such, being free from all forms of doubt, illusion and inattentive tendencies.

We may conclude our study of the right knowledge of the Jainas by referring to what they call the eight Āçāra's in relation to it. The Āçāras are looked upon by the Jainas as the eight Aṅgas or limbs of Samyak-jñāna. They are practically so many respectful attitudes, one should assume towards that branch of the right knowledge which is known as the śruta or the authoritative. The eight Āçāras refer to a student's conduct towards the scripture and the scriptural teachers. The first of these Āçāras, Kālācāra, enjoins that scriptures are to be studied at those times only which are specified for their study. The Vinayāçāra consists in purity, both outward and subjective; the external vinaya or observance of purity at the time of study consists in purifying the body, cleaning the cloth which is put on, seating one's self on a little high and clear spot, bowing to the scripture and so on; while the internal purity consists in purifying mind, filling it with feelings of veneration etc. etc. The Śabdāçāra in connection with the scriptural study consists in using and uttering the words correctly and in accordance with the rules of grammar. The Arthāçāra requires that the correct meanings of words are always to be remembered and on no occasions one should distort them. The Ubhayāçāra insists that both the correct use of the words as well as the remembrance of their true meanings are to be kept in view, when studying the scriptures. It should be seen that sometimes the mere correct pronunciation of the scriptural words may bring some good; on some occasions again, the grasping of correct meanings only of these words may be useful; it is said that a benefit which is of a different nature from the benefits accruing from the Śabdāçāra alone or from the Arthācāra

alone, is secured when these are combined. The sixth Aṅga of the right scriptural knowledge is described as the Bahumānāçāra; it consists in respecting the scripture, respecting the right knowledge and respecting the teachers, who impart it. The Jainas emphasise the fact that without a respectful attitude on the part of the student towards the scripture and the teachers, the attainment of any right knowledge is impossible. The next is the Upadhānāçāra which consists in ever remembering correctly the verses, the texts and the aphorisms of the scripture and their expositions and on no account, forgetting any part of them. The last of the Āçāras is the Anihnavāçāra; its lays down that one should not conceal the knowledge which he has acquired but should rather impart it to others who want to know; nor should be concealed the name of the teacher from whom he is learning or who is the author of the books he is studying; nor should one conceal the scripture from honest enquirers but should always give publicity to them.

May it not be said that the respectful attitudes as described in the above Āçāras which have been laid down by the Jaina thinkers, as essential to the acquisition of the scriptural knowledge, are also indispensable for a person, interested in the investigation of any kind of truth?

Firm in faith of the right sort and possessed of correct knowledge about his own self and what is other than it, one becomes competent to lead a truly moral life—a life of right conduct or Samyak-çāritra which yields the Mokṣa, the blissful final emancipation.

CHAPTER III

OPERATIVE FACTORS IN IMMORALITY

An inclination towards moral activity implies some dissatisfaction with the actual state of life. The *summum bonum* or the ultimate moral goal is different from the ordinary fleeting aims of life and moral acts which are supposed to make possible the realisation of that supreme aim of life are necessarily different from one's ordinary activities. Moral actions may be viewed from two standpoints, viz., the negative one about actions which one ought not to do and the positive one about those which one ought to do. If in our ordinary life, its unhappy state is but too manifest to us, it is clear that the activities which are responsible for that unhappy state are to be avoided and simultaneously, of course, acts which tend to bring the realisation of the moral goal of life nearer are also to be positively practised.

The Indian philosophers look upon the empirical existence as a state of bondage and moral life, according to them, is a continuous course of activities for the attainment of freedom from that condition of bondage. The moralists of the Jaina school maintain that the 'Bandha' or the bondage of the self is due to what they call the 'Āsrava' or inflow of non-psychical matter into the soul, and that the emancipation or the 'Mokṣa' of the self consists in freeing itself from the slavery to that non-psychical substance. A consideration of this Āsrava and the Bandha, which will be attempted in this chapter, is necessary, just to see what are the activities which one should avoid. Thereafter, we shall consider the positive aspect of the moral life, i.e., the acts which are to be practised for the progressive approach towards the final blissful state of the Mokṣa.

The unhappy state of our empirical life is due to Āsrava, according to the Jainas. The self is associated with a body (kāya), the internal organ of mind (manas) and function of speech (vāk), all of which are modifications of matter or material energy. These three are mostly in continuous states of activities which are peculiar to each of them. The self is essentially different from matter and material phenomena but because it is closely associated with them from the beginningless past, it remains embodied in them and has a tendency to receive in itself these foreign materials. So, when one's body, speech or mind is active, his self has a sort of automatic vibration set up in itself, which prepares it for receiving the inflow of matter. This preparedness for or proneness to receiving the material inflow, on the part of the self, is called the 'Yoga'.

The Āsrava is thus ultimately due to the Yoga. The Āsrava may be considered from various standpoints. It is either good (śubha) or bad (aśubha). In the former case, it introduces the 'Puṇya' or the meritorious activities and in the latter, the 'Pāpa' or the vicious activities. It would be seen that the Yoga only modifies or twists, so to say, the soul in a particular manner; in order that the soul may be intimately or thoroughly in-formed by non-psychical energy, something more is necessary and this something is 'kaṣāya' or the group of Passions. Souls affected with passions are said to take in Sāmparāyika—Āsrava or the inflow which keeps them down within the mundane sphere while, when the souls shake off the passions, they have the 'Īryā-patha,' which, though a mode of the inflow, is the most meritorious and is immediately succeeded by the blissful emancipation. The mundane inflow is said to be of thirty-nine forms of manifestation. The activities of the five Indriyas or the senses are five such inflows, the four Kaṣāyas or passions, viz., anger, greed, deceitfulness and conceit, are four such, and the five Avratas or vowlessness (i.e., the non-practice of non-violence, truthfulness, non-stealing, sexual restraint and of non-appropriation) are five other modes of inflow. From these fourteen forms of subjective activities arise twenty-five kinds of activities which correspond to the same number of the Āsrava. These are (1) Samyaktva-kriyā or acts like divine worship which strengthen right belief. (2) Mithyātva-kriyā or activities, strengthening wring belief. (3) Prayoga-kriyā which consists in bodily movement. (4) Samādāna-kriyā—a tendency to give up the practice of the vows after adopting them. (5) Īryā-patha-kriyā—a careful walking in order not to injure any living being. (6) Prādoṣiki-kriyā—a tendency to accuse others.

(7) Kāyikī-kriyā—a readiness to injure others. (8) Ādhikaraṇikī-kriyā—being possessed of weapons of offence. (9) Pāritāpikā-kriyā—being possessed of means for the mental injury of any one. (10) Prāṇātipātiki-kriyā, depriving one of his senses, life, powers or power of respiration. (11) 'Darśana-kriyā—a desire for seeing pleasant forms. (12 Sparśana-kriyā—an activity for having pleasant touches. (13) Prātyayikī-kriyā—invention of new forms of sensual enjoyment. (14) Samantāpatana-kriyā—attending calls of nature in places frequented by human beings and animals. (15) Anābhoga-kriyā—careless throwing of things or one's own self, in places without seeing whether they are swept or not. (16) Sva-hasta-kriyā—doing things with one's own hands, which should be done by others. (17) Nisarga-kriyā—praising bad things. (18) Vidāraṇa-kriyā—publishing other persons' failings. (19) Ājñā-vyāpādinī-kriyā—wrong interpretation of scriptural teachings, in order not to follow them. (20) Anākāṅkṣa-kriyā—disrespect of sacred teachings out of vicious or lazy attitudes. (21) Prārambha-kriyā—indulging in misconduct. (22) Parigraha-kriyā—sticking to worldly things. (23) Māyā-kriyā—practice of deceit on one's right knowledge and right faith. (24) Mithyādarśana-kriyā—speaking highly of actions which contradict right faith. (25) Apratyakhyāna-kriyā—not giving up what ought to be given up.

So the above thirtynine states or activities are manifestations of the inflow of matter into the soul, the Āsrava which is called the 'Sāmparāyika' or what confines the self within the mundane sphere. It should not be thought, however, that the inflow in all people is of one and the same nature. The Jaina thinkers point out that there is a difference in the Āsrava in different persons, even when it is caused in them by the same form of activity; for, this self-same activity itself may be different modes in different people. A particular Āsrava-causing activity may be in some people, (1) intense (tīvra), in others, it may be, (2) mild (manda), (3) in some again, a difference in an activity is caused by 'the intention behind the act of the doer' (jñāta-bhavā); (4) sometimes, again the doer is not conscious of his intention behind his act, and this causes a difference in the Āsrava-causing activity (ajñāta-bhāva); (5) the agent's own capacity (vīrya) and his place in life sometimes cause a difference in his activity; (6) often, however, the difference in the inflow-inducing activity is due to the character of 'what it is dependent on' (adhikaraṇa). This last, viz., the 'Adhikarana' refers to the fact that an Āsrava-causing activity may greatly depend upon either the self or the non-self. The Adhikaraṇa or the dependence of the inflow may be of two kinds in as much as it may refer either to

the Jīva or the self or to the Ajīva or the non-self. The Jivādhikaraṇa or the Āsrava which depends on the self consists practically in the attitude of the self. Thus the Samrambha or the 'resolve' to do a thing, the Samārambha or the 'preparation' for doing it by having recourse to the means for it and the Ārambha or 'the actual commencement' of the doing, naturally influence the nature of the Āsrava. The inflow of foreign matter in the self, dependent on the Jīva is thus primarily of three kinds. The Yoga at the back of the Āsrava being of three sorts with reference to body, mind and speech, the Jīvādhikaraṇa or the soul-depending Āsrava is sub-divided further into nine modes. It would be seen that each subjective act which causes the Āsrava, may be done by the agent himself; or that the agent may have it done by others; or, thirdly that the agent may acquiese in the act, when done; the Āsrava is nevertheless caused in each of these cases and the nine modes of the Āsrava may thereby be divided into twenty seven forms. All subjective acts, inducing material inflow into the self are again primarily due to the Kaṣāya or the passions, which are four in number, viz., anger, greed, conceit and deceitfulness. The 27 forms of the Āsrava thus become 108, when viewed in connection with their basic causes, i.e., the four Kaṣāya's, and when we remember that each of the passions admits of four aspects (..e., the Anantānuvandhi or error-supporting, the Apratyākhyāna or preventing the partial practice, of the vows, the Pratyākhyāna or preventing the practice of vows altogether and the Samjvalana or preventing the practice of right conduct), the modes of the Āsrava or inflow become ultimately 432 in number.

The nature of the Āsrava is dependent not only on the attitude of the agent but also upon the state or the manner of the phenomena other than it for the time being. An example may help us in the better understanding of this fact. Let us suppose that a man is hungry and is to take food. This in-take of food depends both on the mental state of the man and on the state of the circumstances related with him. On the subjective side, the man, though hungry, may or may not be disposed to actively do anything for the removal of his hunger and this naturally influences the intake of food by him. On the objective side, again, the consumption of food is dependent upon the capacity of his body etc. etc. The Āsrava or the inflow of matter into the soul in this latter aspect is the Ajīvādhikaraṇa i.e. dependent on non-subjective element and is conceived by the Jainas as of the following sorts. There are the two kinds of the Nirvartanā. The first of these, the Mūla-guṇa, shows how the state of one's mind (which is a subtle form of matter, according to the Jainas), his body, his speech and his respiration, affects the Āsrava,

and the second, the Uttara-guṇa, describes the effects of suggestive things like books, statues, pictures etc. upon the character of the inflow. There are, again, the four kinds of the Nikṣepa or manners of putting things which also determine the nature of the Āsrava; the four kinds of the Nikṣepa are the 'Apratyavekṣita' (putting a thing without seeing), the 'Duḥpramṛṣta' (putting it petulantly), the Sahasā (putting the thing hurriedly) and the Anābhoga (putting a thing in a place where it ought not to be put). The two kinds of Samyoga or mixing up of things also modify the nature of the Āsrava, and these are—the 'Bhakta-pāna' or mixing up of food and drink and the 'Upakaraṇa' or mixing up of things which are necessary for the performance of an act. Lastly, the three kinds of the 'Nisarga' or movement, viz., of the Kāya or body, of the Vānga or speech and of the Mana or mind also influence the character of the Āsrava which one is to have.

It should be noticed in this connection that if the Āsrava implies a peculiar state of vibration or inclination in the self, in the form of the Yoga, it also implies a modification of the character of the matter which is to flow into the soul. In order that food may be consumed, not only is it necessary that the consumer is hungry but also that the food which is to be eaten, is properly chewed and fluidified or otherwise made fit for human consumption. In a similar manner, when there is the Āsrava, the subjective self is afflicted with the Yoga or an inclination towards materials foreign to it, while on the objective side, the matter which finds its way into the soul is modified in such a manner that it is automatically assimilated by it. The material energy thus made fit for its assimilation to the self, is called the Karma,—the presence of which in the self accounts for the latter's state of bondage. It is the Karma which thus limits the free state of the self for the time being. The Āsrava is made possible by corresponding fitnesses both in the receiving self and in the in-coming non-self; it introduces the foreign matter into the self and culminates in the 'Bandha' or the bondage of the latter.

The Māyā of the Vedānta school is conceived as what limits the nature of the self, but the essential difference between the Vedāntic Māyā and the Karma of the Jainas lies in the fact that while the Māyā is understood as a form pertaining to the self, the Karma of the Jainas is of a purely material form, foreign to the psychical essence. In one respect, however, the Jainas and the Vedāntic thinkers agree with each other. With both the schools, that which limits the soul,—the Māyā or the Karma,—has two distinct modes of operation. The Vedānta invests the Māyā with two Śaktis—res-

pectively called the Āvaraṇa and the Vikṣepa. Through the operation of the first of these powers of the Māyā, the real nature of the self is covered or enveloped while on account of the activity of the Māyā, which is called the Vikṣepa, the self appears as different from what it really is. The Jaina conception of the Ghātiyā (the destructive) and the Aghātiyā (the undestructive) forms of the Karma is comparable with the two powers attributed to the Māyā by the Vedānta school. While the essential nature of the Karma is to limit the infinitude of the self, its four Ghātiyā forms destroy, i.e. cover up the four essential attributes of the soul and the Aghātiyā present it in various modes of finitude.

The four, Ghātiyā Karma's are respectively the Jñānāvaraṇa, the Darśanāvaraṇa, the Mohanīya and the Antarāya. The first two suppress the two natural capacities of the soul for perfect knowledge and perfect apprehension, the third stupifies the self and the fourth circumscribes the boundlessness of its natural powers. The Vedanīya, yielding pleasure and pains, the Āyu, investing the self with a span or fixed period of life, the Gotra, incarnating the self in a high or low family and the Nāma, clothing the animal with a body, limbs and sub-limbs, are the four modes of the Aghātiyā Karma. The Karmas are thus primarily divided into eight classes which have further sub-divisions within them, totalling the Karmas into 148 sorts ultimately.

The Āsrava paves the way for the inflow of the various forms of the Karma into the self and the Jainas describe the particular states and activities of the self which induce the inflow of a particular mode of the Karma in each case. Thus it is said that the Jñānāvaraṇa and the Darśanāvaraṇa, Karmas, i.e., the Karmas' which suppress the perfect knowledge and apprehension, inherent in the soul are introduced by the Pradoṣa or a tendency to under-appreciate the people who are well-versed in the scriptures, the Nihṇava or a tendency to conceal knowledge, the Mātsarya or a tendency to refuse the imparting of knowledge out of envy, the Antarāya or a tendency to hinder the progress of knowledge, the Āsādanā or a tendency to deny the truth proclaimed by another, openly by speech or by bodily gesture or postures or the Upaghāta or a tendency to refute the truth inspite of knowing it to be nothing other than truth. The Mohanīya Karmas are either the Darśana-moha which stupify one's right faith or the Çāritra-moha which delude his right conduct. The former mode of the Mohanīya is introduced by the Avarṇa-vāda which consists in denouncing the Arhat or the omniscient Being, the Śrūta or the true scripture, the Saṅgha or the

assembly of saints, the Dharma or the true religion or in having wrong idea about the gods, e.g., thinking them to be fond of animal sacrifices, wine etc. The Çāritra-mohanīya or the Karmas that are responsible for a wrong conception about right conduct are said to be caused by the intense internal state, resulting from the activity of the Kaṣāya's or passions (as well as of the No-kaṣāya's or the lesser passions, viz., for joking, liking bad companions, etc.). The Antarāya Karmas are what obstruct one's natural powers of gaining (Lābha), giving (Dāna), enjoying consumable things (Bhoga), enjoying non-consumable things (Upabhoga) and of exercising powers (Vīrya). The influence of the Antarāya Karma is caused by one's interfering with another's exercise of his powers for Lābha, Dāna, Bhoga, Upabhoga and Vīrya.

The first mode of the Aghātiyā or the non-destructive Karma is the Vedanīya. It is of two sorts, viz., the Sātāvedanīya and the Asātāvedanīya. The former mode of the Vedanīya Karma, the Sātā, yields pleasure to the self and their inflow into the soul is induced by Bhūtānukampā, a feeling of compassion for all living beings; Vratyanukampā, a feeling of compassion for all persons who have adopted the Vratas or vows; Dānā, acts of charity; Sarāga-samyama, practice of self-control, though attended still with an apparent feeling of attachment; Saṃyamāsaṃyama, self-control with respect to some of the passions, not of all (through the practice of vows); Akāmanirjarā, ungrudging surrender to the fruition of Karma; Bāla-tapa, penances unattended with correct knowledge; Yoga, contemplation; Kṣānti, a spirit of forgiveness; and Śauça, a spirit of contentment, consisting in want of all forms of greed. The other form of the Vedanīya is the Asātā which yields feelings of unpleasantness and is introduced by Duḥkha, feelings of pain; Śoka, feelings of sorrow; Tāpa, feelings of repentance; Ākrandana, shedding tears; Vadha, injury or loss to life; Paridevanā, pathetic moaning in order to attract others' compassion. These six sources of the unpleasant Karmas may be subdivided into eighteen, in consideration of the fact that these feelings may be aroused in one's own self or in others or both in one's own self as well as in others.

The influence of the Gotra (lineage) Karma causes one's birth in a high or a low family. The Uççagotra-karma, which accounts for one's birth in a high family is introduced by Para-praśamsā, praising others; Ātmanindā, condemning one's own self; Sadguṇodbhāvanā, discovering goodness in others; Asadguṇācchādana, not publishing the goodness of one's own self; Nīçairvṛti, humility towards superiors and anutseka, want of pride for what

one has got or achieved. The opposites of the first four of these six introduce the Nīça-gotra-karma, i.e., Karmas which result in one's being born in a low family; viz. the Paranindā, vilifiying others; Ātma-praśamsā, extolling one's own self; Sadguṇācchādana, not publishing the good qualities of others; and Asadguṇodbhāvana, giving publicity to the fact of one's own possession of some good qualities which he really does not possess.

The Āyu is the period for which a being is confined within a particular body and is of four spans in accordance with whether it is the life-duration for the celestial beings, or for the human beings or for the subhuman beings or for the infernal beings. Taking active interest in the affairs of the world, however slight the activity or the taking of interest may be, together with the non-practice of the Vrata's or vows and the Śīla's or sub-vows is the general cause of the influence of all Āyu-karmas. The Deva-āyu or the Karma ensuring a life-period fixed for the gods is introduced by Bāla-tapa, or penances not backed by right knowledge; Akāma-nirjarā or calm surrender to the fruition of one's own acts: Saṃyamāsamyama,—self-control with respect to some of the passions only, not of all (when found in a lay man); Sarāga-samyama, self-control, though attended with a feeling of attachment still (when found in a monk); and Samyaktva or right belief (when developed in a human or a sub-human being). The Manuṣya-āyu or the life-period for a human being is also the result of the inflow of a corresponding group of Karmas and these Karmas are introduced by Alpārambha, one's putting in a comparatively small amount of worldly activity; Alpa-parigraha, one's interest in worldly affairs being comparatively small; as well as by Svabhāvamārdava or a natural humble disposition. The Tiryak-āyu-karma, is the Karma which secures for one, the life span fixed for a sub-human being and its inflow is caused by one's Māyā or deceitful attitudes and acts. Finally, the Nāraka-āyu-karma, or the Karma which gives one the life duration fixed for an infernal being is introduced by one's Bahvārambha, one's putting forth the greatest amount of wordly activities and Bahu-parigraha or taking considerable interest in the affairs of the world.

The Nāma or the bodybuilding Karma is either Śubha (good) or Aśubha (bad). The latter is introduced by the Yoga-vakrttā or crooked or deceitful operations of the mind, body and speech and by Visamvāda or contentious wrangling, envy, vilifications of others, self-applauding etc. while the Śubha Nāma-karma which secures a good body is brought into the soul by the opposites of the foregoing

two. The Tīrthamkara or the Arhat is the exalted Being who at tains omniscience and other perfections, while still in a body. Though an auspicious one; the Arhat's body is nevertheless a body and as such, it is the effect of an influence of some Karmas—called the Tīrthamkara-karma. The Tīrthamkara-karmas are certainly the best of all the Karmas and are introduced in a soul by the following sixteen Bhāvanās or the subjective activities. The first of these sixteen Bhāvanās is the Darśana-viśuddhi, i.e., the right faith with its excellent marks which we have already noticed, e.g., the 'Niḥśaṅkita', Niḥkāṅkṣita, etc. The rest of these attitudes are: (2) The Vinaya-sampannatā: or reverence for the path of liberation and for those who are on it; (3) The Śīla-brate-ṣvanatiçāra: observance of the Śīlas and the Vratas; (4) The Abhīkṣṇa-jñānopayoga, continuous pursuit of right knowledge; (5) The Samvega, not for a moment forgetting the miseries of the worldly existence; (6) The Śaktitastyāga, charity according to one's capacity; (7) The ṇaktitastapaḥ, practice of penances according to one's capacity; (8) The Sādhu-samādhi, helping the saints in every way; (9) The Vaiyāvṛtya-kārma, serving those who are really good; (10) The Arhatbhakti; reverence for the omniscient Lord; (11) The Āçārya-bhakti, reverence for the leader of the religious assembly; (12) The Bahuśruta-bhakti, reverence for the religious teachers; (13) The Pravaçana-bhakti, reverence for the scriptures; (14) The Āvaśyaka-parihāṇa attending without fail to the six prescribed daily duties; (15) The Mārga-prabhāvanā, propagation of the path of liberation; (16) The Pravaçanavātaslya, affection for the brothers in faith.

This finishes our rapid survey of the nature and the course of the Āsrava. The influence of foreign elements into the soul causes its bondage. It is Āsrava which serves as the channel for the inflow of those foreign elements. It should be noted that the soul cannot be subjected to bondage even if it comes in closest contact with things of sense, unless it is already in a weakened state. This weakness in the soul, which is preparatory for its Bandha or bondage, consists in the following five subjective conditions.

First of all, there is the Mithyā-darśana or wrong belief. The wrong belief may take the form of the Ekānta-darśana or laying exclusive emphasis on only one aspect of a thing or phenomena; or it may be an entirely perverse faith, i.e., the Viparīta-darśana; the Samśaya or sceptic attitude towards a matter of truth is another form of wrong belief; the ultra-obliging tendency called the Vinaya,—whch considers all forms of faith, divinities and all practice involved in all the religions, to be of equal merit is a mode of the Mithyā-

darśana; the last form of wrong belief is Ajñāna or utter ignorance consisting in an inability to distinguish right from wrong.

The second subjective ground for the psychical bondage is Avirati. It consists in non-restraint of the five senses and of the internal organ of mind and in want of a compassionate attitude towards all classes of animals.

Pramāda or carelessness is another phenomenon which weakens the soul and prepares it for its bondage. Sleep (nidrā), affection (sneha) and the careless permissions to the five senses as well as to the four passions to have their full play, are forms of the Pramāda. Another mode of the Pramāda consists in Kathās or careless talks about food, women, politics and scandalous matters. These also make one's self weak.

It is the Kaṣāyas or the four-fold passions of anger, greed, deceitfulness and conceit which are important Bandha-hetus or causes of psychical bondage.

The last but not the least of the soul's infirmities which bring about its bondage is of course the Yoga, which, as described before, is a proneness on the part of the self to welcome foreign elements into it, a psychical inclinatory vibration in correspondence with peculiar activities of one's mind, body and speech.

Thus the Āsrava introduces foreign elements into the soul and if the soul is already affected and weakened by its own subjective states of wrong belief, passions, non-restraint etc. those foreign elements find a fruitful soil and take deep roots in the nature of the self and get the mastery of it,—bringing about its bondage.

We have considered the acts and attitudes which bring about the inflow of foreign forces and activities into the self as well as those which complete its bondage. The Āsrava—inducing and Bandha-causing actions are the negative aspect of morality,—indicating, as they do, the thoughts and practices which one wishing to tread the moral path is to begin by avoiding. There can be no question about this that those acts which invite in one's self knowledge—obscuring, faith-suppressing, deluding and enervating influences must be avoided. There is further no doubting that acts which cause unpleasant feelings, birth in a low family, a bad bodily structure, parts or constituents or a miserable status, would be avoided by all, more or less automatically. But if the state of one's ordinary existence is felt to be far from desirable and if the quest for

Mokṣa or escape from the miseries of the empirical life is real, it can be said that the connection with this experiential world is to be progressively cut up. This implies that not only are the acts which introduce the evil Karmas into the self with their unpleasant results to be avoided but also those activities which cause the inflow of even the Śubha Karmas with their results, all desirable for the time being for some duration, are also be given up. The Jaina philosophers maintain that even the Arhats, so long as he is embodied in a frame, admittedly the most brilliant and auspicious one, has not the final liberation. His Mokṣa is complete only when it is 'Videha', i.e., only when the Arhat gives up the body and completely separates his self from it. Even the Tīrthaṅkara-karma and the Tīrthaṅkara-body stand in the way of the Arhat's complete emancipation, which becomes real only when that Karma and the body, resulting from it, are finally shaken off. Karma, in all its forms, is an obstacle to the attainment of the final bliss and all acts, described in the foregoing pages which cause the Āsrava of the Karma, are to be scrupulously avoided by a person who wants to be on the path of rectitude.

CHAPTER IV

OPPOSITION TO IMMORALITY

The soul's bondage to material elements is not a superficial contact with them, so that if the goal of life be complete emancipation of the self from the thraldom of those foreign influences, it should never be forgotten that it is not an easy task. The Bandha in one of its aspects is described by the Jainas as the 'Prakṛti-bandha', indicating that in the state of its bondage the nature of the self is permeated by the material elements through and through, 'Pradeśa' by 'Pradeśa', as they call it. The extrication of the self from the foreign forces is necessarily an enormous affair and in the Indian systems of philosophy, its enormity is fully recognised. The Vedic schools assert, on the one hand, that not a moment passes in which Karmas or acts are not done and, on the other, that one is bound to experience the fruits of those acts. The Karmas and the Fruitions thus go on multiplying, making the Mokṣa more and more inattainable. To show, however, that the final eradication of the Karmas, though difficult, is not impossible, the Vedic thinkers draw a distinction between Karmas to the effect that (1) at a particular moment, some of the Karma's are actually yielding fruits; (2) some of them are about to do so; (3) some lie in a potential state; and (4) some acts which are being presently done are to bear fruits in future suitably. It is said that the first two modes of the Karma cannot be avoided, their results must be experienced, and a person wanting to attain liberation in the shortest time possible is only to hasten his experience of their fruitions by having recourse to such practices as the creation of the 'Kāya-vyūha' or a number of simultaneous bodies, in and through which he finishes his experience of

those Karma-fruits within a very short time. The first and the second forms of the Karmas are thus to be done away with only by enjoying their fruits. As regards the 'potential' Karmas as well as the Karmas that are being presently done, it is believed that their coming to actual fruition may be prevented, nay, be destroyed, by moral practcies. It is in this way that the final emancipation is said to be realisable, through the eradication of the accumulating and the accumulated Karmas.

The Jaina doctrine of the Karma and the possibility of the eradications of its effects from the soul need not be thought to be very much different from the doctrine of the Vedic school. The Jainas emphatically assert that Mokṣa is inattainable so long as the least taint of Karma is left in the soul. The first step towards the realisation of emancipation is the 'Samvara' or the stoppage of further inflow of the Karma. Mere stoppage, however, of further inflow of the Karma does not yield the Mokṣa; for there are the Karma particles already introduced into the soul. These accumulated Karma's are also to be shaken off, in order that complete emancipation may be attained. This elimination of the accumulated Karmas is necessarily a long and gradual process. At first the accumulated Karmas are destroyed only partially; this is called the process of 'Nirjarā', by the Jainas. When all the Karmas are radically removed from the soul, it attains emancipation. The possibility of the annihilation of the Karmas and of the final emancipation consequent thereon, is thus affirmed by the Jainas.

To come back to our point, the Samvara, the first step on the way to moral progress consists in the stoppage of further inflow of the Kārmic matter. The way of effecting this is of course the avoidance of the acts and attitudes (described before) which call in the Karma-particles. This is Samvara, viewed from a negative standpoint. From the positive and the practical view-point, the Samvara or the stoppage of the further inflow of the Kārmic matter into the soul, appears as the effect of the following practices:—

1. The 'Gupti'.—This consists in strict suppression of the Yoga or unstable inclinatory vibrations, set up in the soul by the activities of the body, the mind and the speech. The Gupti is of three sorts, in as much as the control may relate to either of the three sorts of the vibrations, set up in the soul, respectively by any of those forms of activities of the body, the mind and the speech.

2. The 'Samiti'.—This is of five modes and means carefulness in the acts of 'Īryā' or walking, 'Bhāṣā' or speaking, Esanā or eating,

'Ādāna-nikṣepa' or taking and laying a thing and 'Utsarga' or excreting.

3. The 'Dharma'.—The Dharma is a system of good acts or attitudes in their perfect forms, ten in number, which are: (i) Kṣamā or forgiveness; (ii) Mārdava or humility; (iii) Ārjava or straightforwardness; (iv) Śaucha or contentment; (v) Satya or truthfulness; (vi) Samyama or self-control; (vii) Tapa or penance; (viii) Tyāga or renunciation; (ix) Ākiṃçanya or non-attachment to what is other than one's self; and (x) Brahmaçarya or sexual purity.

4. The 'Anuprekṣā'.—It consists in meditations of the following twelve facts: (i) The Anitya: that all things are transitory; (ii) The Aśaranā: that one's self is helpless except in so far as it can help itself; (iii) The Saṃsāra: that the self is moving through the series of mundane existences, one after the other; (iv) The Ekatva: that none but one's own self reaps the fruits of what it does; (v) The Anyatva: that the external world with its things and phenomena together with all one's body, mind, friends and relatives is distinct from his true self; (vi) The Aśuçi: that all non-psychical things including one's body and even one's own self when connected with the Karma-dirt are impure; (vii) The Āsrava: that as a result of the passionate attitude etc., the Kārmic matter flows into the self and that causes and continues the series of its unhappy mundane existences; (viii) The Samvara: that the Kārmic inflow can be and should be stopped; (ix) The Nirjarā: that the Kārmic matter can be and should be shaken off from the self; (x) The Loka: that the universe is of such and such a nature, extent and form; (xi) The Bodhi-durlabha; that it is difficult to be possessed of the right faith, the right knowledge and the right conduct; (xii) The Dharma-Svākhyātattva; that right faith, the right knowledge and the right-conduct put one on the path to liberation.

5. The Pariṣaha-jaya: this means that the man on the moral path must develop a perfectly patient and unperturbed attitude in the midst of the following trying circumstances, viz., the Kṣut or hunger, the Pipāsā or thirst, the Śīta or cold, the Uṣṇa or heat, the Damśa-maśaka or the bites of mosquitoes etc., The Nāgnya or nakedness, the Arati or languor, the Strī or women, the Çaryā or fatigue due to long walking in accordance with the rules laid down in the scripture or the preceptor's command, the Niṣadyā or a tendency to deviate from the prescribed posture of sitting, when in the face of imminent dangers, e.g., attacks of tigers, snakes etc., the Śayyā or a liking for comfortable beds, the Ākrośa or abuse, the Badha or as-

sault, the Yāçanā or a tendency to beg, when in need, the Alābha or the attitude of displeasure, when the think needed is not got, the Roga or diseases, the Tṛṇa-sparśa or contact with thorns etc., the Mala or dirt and dust, the Satkāra-puraskāra or respect and disrespect, the Prajñā or pride for being possessed of vast knowledge, the Ajñāna or a spirit of despair arising from non-possession of knowledge, even after all efforts for attaining it, the Adarśna or the waning of faith due to non-attainment of some expected supernatural powers.

6. The 'Çāritra'.—This refers to a group of five practices which are:—(1) The Sāmāyika, or a positive and active refrainment from all evil things, such as injuring life in any form; (2) the Çhedopasthāpanā, or re-establishment of one's self in the moral life of non-injury after deviation from it; (3) the Parihāra-viśuddhi, or the development of a stable disposition, consisting in a pure spirit of non-violence; (4) the Śūkṣma-sāmparāya, or the development of a psychical state in which the Kaṣāyas or the passions are deprived of all active force or power of action; (5) the Yathā-khyāta, or the establishment of one's self in a perfectly passionless state. These five forms of the Çāritra or moral conduct may be arranged in an ascending order, the preceding one leading to the succeeding. Thus, the Sāmāyika is the first stage, consisting in turning away from all acts of injuring life. The next stage strengthens it by reinstating the conduct in the practice of non-violance, if for some reason it deviated from it. The Parihāra-viśuddhi is the third stage in which the spirit of non-violence is stable and undislodgeable. In the next stage, the very roots of a violent spirit, the Kaṣāya's are thoroughly enfeebled. The Yathākhyāta is the last stage in the course of right conduct in which the passions are completely uprooted.

The practice of the above six viz. the Gupti, the Samiti, the Dharma, the Anuprekṣā, the Parīṣhajaya and the Çāritra stops the further inflow of the Karma-matter into the self. The practice of 'Tapa' or austerities also is helpful to the prevention of the Āsrava. As we have said already, the mere stoppage of the inflow of Karma-activities into the self is not, however, sufficient for the realisation of the Mokṣa; for, there are Karmas already accumulated there and without a destruction of these accumulated Karmas, the attainment of final liberation remains distant still. 'Nirjarā' is the process connected with this elimination of the accumulated Karmas.

The Jainas point out that the Karma's themselves in due time, fall off from the self, after their respective fruits good or bad, have

been fully experienced. In such cases, the operation of the Nirjarā is called the 'Savipāka'. The Savipāka Nirjarā, however, takes a long, long time, making the Mokṣa, a far-off attainment, if not an unrealisable one altogether. The other mode of the Nirjarā annihilates the accumulated Karmas without allowing their fruition. This is called the 'Avipāka' Nirjarā which hastens the attainment of the Mokṣa.* The Avipāka Nirjarā involves 'Tapa' or the practice of ascetic austerities. The Tapa thus effects Samvara on the one hand and on the other, culminates in the Nirjarā or the destruction of the accumulated Karmas.

The Tapa's or ascetic practices are either 'vāhya' or external or 'Ābhyantara' or subjective. There are six such forms of the external practices, which are; the Anaśana or fasting, the Avamaudarya or eating less and less than what one has the appetite for, the Vṛitti-parisamkhyāna or acceptance of food from a house-holder, only on certain conditions (which the Tapa-practiser divulges to no body) being fulfilled, the Rasa-parityāga or giving up daily the use of one or more of the following six delicious fluids viz. butter, milk, curd, sugar, salt and oil, the Vivikta-śayyāsana or sitting and sleeping in a lonely place, which is devoid of all animals, and the Kāya-kleśa or subjecting the body to privations and penances, until the mind is disturbed.

The subjective Tapas also are six in number, which are as follows:—

1. The Prāyaśçitta or expiation. Nine forms of expiation which are recognised by the Jainas are respectively, the Āloçana or confession before the head of the order, the 'Pratikramana' or repentance for the bad acts done, the Tadubhaya i.e. confession combined with repentance, the Viveka or discontinuance of the enjoyment of a much-liked object e.g. a particular food or drink, the Vyutsarga or unattachment to body, the 'Tapa' or practice of a penance, specially prescribed, the Çheda or degrading a transgressing person before the Order, the Parihāra or expulsion of a transgressor from the Order, and the Upasthāpana or re-admission of the transgressor into the Order, after his expulsion therefrom.

2. The Vinaya or reverence. It is of four modes, relating respectively to the reverence for the Jñāna, or right knowledge, for Dar-

* Nirjarā is described as two-fold,—the Savipāka and the Avipāka. The Savipāka Nirjarā however takes a long time and is called Akāma-nirjarā in the Śvetāmvara Śastra"s. Avipāka Nirjarā which hastens the attainment of Mokṣa is called Sakāma-nirjarā in the religious books of the Śvetāmvara Sect.

śana or right faith, for Çāritra or right conduct or relating to such reverential acts as bowing, folding of hands etc.

3. The Vaiyāvṛtya or service. It is of ten forms, in accordance with its being rendered to the Āçārya or the head of the Order of saints, the Upādhyāya or the preceptor, the Tapasvī or a saint practising penance, the Śaikṣya or a student saint, the Glāna or a sick saint, the Gaṇa or the believers belonging to the same Order, the Kula or the fellow disciples, the Samgha or the whole Order consisting of the four classes of "noble believers"* the Sādhu or saints, well confirmed and the Manojña or the saints who are very popular.

4. The Svādhyāya or study. It has five aspects viz. the Vāçanā or reading, the Pṛçchanā or questioning, the Anuprekṣā or reflection on what is read, the Āmnāya or retention and recitation and the Dharmopadeśa or teaching.

5. The Vyutsarga or avoidance. This is of two kinds viz. the avoidance of objects which are unidentified with the self and the avoidance of the subjective feelings of grief etc. and passions.

6. Dhyāna or contemplation. It consists in confining one's attention exclusively to one object and is said to be of four kinds viz. the Ārta, the Raudra, the Dharmya and the Śukla, of which the last two only lead to Mokṣa.

(i) The Ārta is painful contemplation. It is due either to a contact with some unpleasant object or phenomenon or to a separation from what is pleasant or to an affliction from which one thinks of freeing himself or to an intense expectation for getting in future some wished—for objects which are not presently obtained.

(ii) The Raudra consists in a vicious delight in acts of violence, in speaking falsely, in stealing and in preserving things of sensuous enjoyments.

(iii) The Dharmya is four-fold, arising from the Viçaya or contemplation; firstly, of the nature of the scriptural commands as infalliable, being the teachings of the omniscient Lord; secondly, of the ways of removing the wrong belief, the wrong knowledge and the wrong conduct of the people; thirdly, of the fruition of the Karma; and lastly, of the nature and the constitution of the universe.

* These four classes refer either to the Ṛṣis or saints with superhuman powers, the Yatis or saints possessed of the power of self-control, the Munis or saints, possessed of clairvoyant and telepathic knowledges and the Anāgāras or homless ascetics;—or to the Yatis or monks, the Āryikās or nuns, the Śrāvakas or believing laymen and the Śrāvikās or believing laywomen.

(iv) Śukla or the pure contemplation also is of four kinds, rather of four stages of development and perfection. The Śukla concerns itself with the contemplation of the self. To begin with, the self is thought of as a bundle of attributes, each separately from the other. In the next stage, one aspect alone of the self is attended to, in a steadfast manner. The third mode of the Śukla consists in an apprehension of very subtle vibrations within the self, though the self is deeply absorbed in itself. In the last stage, absorption of the self in itself is complete and the self is apprehended as perfectly steady and unmoved.

This finishes the consideration of the nature of the Samvara which stops the further inflow of the causes of the soul's bondage, the Karma-āsrava and of the Nirjarā which destroys the Karma-dirt which has already accumulated in a soul. When the Karma's are completely eradicated from the self so that not a trace of them is left there, the Jīva attains the Mokṣa, the state of liberation, which is the 'summum-bonum' of a moral life and the ultimate goal of all moral activities.

CHAPTER V

CARDINAL VIRTUES

In our considerations of the Āsrava, Bandha, Samvara and Nirjarā, references have been made here and there to some moral practices which are recognised to be of special merit and which require consequently a special study. Of the thirty-nine kinds of the Sāmparāyika Āsrava or mundane in-flow, five are mentioned as Avrata i.e., due to the non-practice of the five vows; in fact, when we shall consider the nature of these vows, and their supplements and their complements, we shall see that all these thirty-nine causes of the Āsrava are connected with non-practice or imperfect practice of these vows. We find that the six activities which cause the inflow of the knowledge-obscuring and the faith-obscuring Karma's are practically infringements of the vow of 'truthfulness' in some form or other. The six causes, inducting the Asātā-vedanīya or pain-bearing Karmas, similarly appear to be due to the non-culture of the spirit of 'renunciation'. The Āyu-karma which is responsible for the span of life, of a celestial, a human, a subhuman or an infernal being is stated to be introduced by the non-observance of the Vratas and the Śīlas. The Antarāya-karma is obviously introduced by the Atiçāra or the trangressions of the vow of 'non-violence'. In the same manner, the acts which cause the inflow of the Nāma, the Mohanīya and the Gotra Karma's in their Aśubha or bad forms are essentially connected with the infringements of the vows or the sub-vows. We have seen how Avirati or the non-observance of the vows is one of the prime causes of the Bandha or the soul's bandage. On the other hand, we are told that the Sātāvedanīya, i.e., the Karmas that yield pleasurable feelings are introduced by acts of compassion, self-control etc., which acts are but the Vratas or the Śīlas in some

form or other. The same thing is also true of the introduction of the Deva-āyu, an Āyu-karma of the good order. The Nāma and the Gotra-karmas in their subtle form are similarly introduced by acts which are really the practices of the vows of truthfulness etc. Roughly speaking, it may be said that while evil Karmas are introduced by acts of infringement of the Vratas and the Śīlas, the inflow of auspicious Karmas is effected by practices involving the observance of those Vratas and the Śīlas.

Coming to the Samvara or the stoppage of the inflow of the Karmas, we find that the various practices, e.g., the Gupti, the Samiti, the Parīṣaha-jaya, the Dharma etc.—all involve the scrupulous observance of the vows of non-violence truthfulness, renunciation, etc. Even the Tapa or the practice of penances and contemplation which bring about the Nirjarā or the elimination of the accumulated Karmas from a soul and lead to its final emancipation or the Mokṣa, seems to presuppose a faithful practice of the Vratas beforehand. An estimate of the Jaina moral code is accordingly incomplete without a careful examination of the various vows, prescribed by the Jainas. In fact, the vows and the sub-vows, form the very soul of the Jaina morality and the various moral practices recommended by the Jaina religion are but direct or indirect off-shoots from those vows and sub-vows.

According to the Jainas, a Vrata is an act or practice which is done with an intelligent determination about its nature that it should be done. The intelligent determination is based on a consideration of the effect of the act, both here and hereafter. Non-violence, for example, is prescribed and accepted as a Vrata or duty; why? Because the effect of violence is found to be unpleasant both here (as a punishable crime, according to the law of the land) and hereafter (as casting down the agent to a lower status). A Vrata or a duty is thus essentially connected with the nature of one's self and the determination of it as a Vrata or a duty is founded on an intelligent discovery of its relationship with the self.

A Vrata consists in a practice of some positive act, although it is generally defined as Virati, or abstention from certain manners of activities. The affirmative and the negative aspects of an act are not exclusive of each other. To ask a person to desist from a course of action is not to ask him to remain idle. Real and effective stopping a line of act is always through the active pursuit of a series of positive actions. Accordingly, the Jaina description of a Vrata or duty as a Virati or abstention should not lead one to think that a moral life according to the Jainas is a passive life of negation of

activities. As a matter of fact, as we proceed, we shall see that morality as a matter of practice among the Jainas is a system of positive definite acts. It is in this respect that the Jaina code of morals differs from the Vedāntic, which latter is conspicuous by its recommendations of one's progressive retirement from all fields of activities. The Buddhist doctrine of the Middle Path also lays stress on the importance of positive practices in the sphere of a moral life, but it seems that the Jaina emphasis on the affirmative aspect of morality is greater still.

The Vrata according to the Jainas is five-fold, consisting in five forms of Virati or abstention viz. from Himsā (violence), Anṛta (lying), Steya (stealing), Abrahma (sex-indulgence) and Parigraha (worldly attachment). When the recommended abstention is absolutely faultless in practice, the Vrata becomes the Mahā-vrata or the full vow; at lesser stages of perfection, the Vrata is called the Anu-vrata or a limited vow. The difference between the Mahāvrata and the Anu-vrata is thus not one of kind but one of manners of accomplishment only.

A Śalya means a thorn, which when entering a part of one's body, becomes a source of pain to him. A man on the moral path should always see that his practice of morality is free from the Śalya's or disturbing factors. The Śalya's in connection with one's moral life are three-fold and consist in dispositions or tendencies which undermine the very moral character of a prescribed practice. The first of these Śalya's is the Māyā-salya or a deceitful turn of mind; the second is the Mithyā-śalya or wrong belief; and the last is called the Nidāna which consists in a secret desire to get future pleasures from the practice of a moral act. The Śalya's thus provide for continuous vigilant introspection, during all the moments of a moral life. The mere practice of a prescribed act e.g. non-violence is not moral. The morally disposed man is to see that he is not practising (e.g.) non-violence from a motive of deceiving others or even himself. The moral man is also to see that he is not a victim to wrong faith. And finally, he should take to self-analysis, to be sure that his act is not motivated by a secret desire for sense-pleasures. The doctrine of the Śalya is extremely important. It requires that in order to be a really moral act, it is not enough that the act is recommended by the scripture, the agent is always to make a thorough search of his heart and be sure that nothing but a pure desire for his self-realisation motivates it. A highly meritorious act is shorn of its moral worth, if any taint of ignorance, deceitfulness or self-interest is found at the root of the act. The

Jainas emphasise this point by saying that a Vrata or practice of morality should always be Niḥśalya, i.e., free from the three modes of subjective blemishes, described above.

The Śalya's refer to the negative requirements for the perfect practice of the Vratas. The following Bhāvanā's or meditations strengthen one's disposition or tendency towards moral practices and may be looked upon as the positive necessities for moral progress. In the first place, it should constantly be kept in view that violence, lying, stealing, sexual indulgence and attachment to worldly matters lead to undesirable consequences both here and hereafter; that they are in fact pains in themselves. Secondly, the constant contemplation about the transitory character of the worldly phenomena and our bodily activities also strengthens our attitude of Samvega or apprehension of the miseries of the world and of Vairāgya i.e. the spirit of renunciation. In the third place, the practice of moral conduct becomes considerably easy, if we develop in ourselves the ideals of Maitrī or a friendly attitude towards all living beings, Pramoda or delight in the company of persons who are advanced in the path of liberation, Kāruṇya or compassion for beings who are less fortunate than ourselves and Mādhyastha or tolerance towards ill-behaved persons. These four attitudes, Bhāvanās or meditations as they are called, constitute a positive help to us in our progress in moral living.

Ahimsā or non-violence is abstention from Himsā or violence. Violence has been defined as doing injury to life through Pramatta-yoga or subjective disturbance due to passions. On analysis, violence is thus found to be due to the following. First of all, we have the body, the organ of speech and the internal sense of mind thrown into an agitated condition; these disturbances in the body, the mind or the organs of speech have repercussions into the soul which also is thrown into a vibratory, i.e., a strong inclinative unstable state, as a result of which the person hurts a living being. The essence of violence is 'the determination to hurt' (the Pramatta-yoga) and the actual act of violence consists in hurting either one's own subjective self (Bhāva-prāṇa) or objects attached to that (Dravya-prāṇa), or another person's mentalities or objects connected with them. An object may be injured by accident or inspite of the best intention of a person (as in the case of a patient dying on being operated on by a surgeon) but as there is no intention to injure, no violence can be said to have been committed in such cases. There may even be cases in which there is no Himsā, although some amount of intentional violence may be put in. A doctor cuts open a diseased part

of a body, knowing that the operation would be painful; a teacher scolds, sometimes assaults—a student; a religious preceptor wounds the feelings of one by turning him away from the ways of the world; in these cases, although violence is committed and that, intentionally, there is no Himsā because the real purpose at the back of these acts is not to commit injury but to do some real good. Not mere commission of injury nor even an intentional commission of injury is in all cases violence but cases in which the intention is permeated by Kaṣāya or passions, i.e., a conscious resolve to hurt, are cases of Himsā. It is said that where there is this Kaṣāya or violent attitude, we have a case of Himsā, no matter even if no outside being is injured thereby; for, the presence of the Kaṣāya in the person has actually hurt his own subjective self, although there is no overt act of violence, done to any other person. Himsā is thus distinguishable from crime; the former is committed as soon as there is the violent intention, even though the intention may not be manifested or translated in an overt act, while crime does not look to the motive unless and until it ushers into an overt act.

In this connection, it would be interesting to note the Jaina distinction between the following four forms of the Himsā. (1) The Sankalpinī or intentional. In cases where the act of violence to a being is actuated by an intention to injure him, we have this kind of Himsā, which is its worst form. (2) The Virodhinī or a return of violence in self-defence. Where acts of violence are done for one's own defence against violent attackers, we have the second mode of Himsā. The state laws in all civilised countries entertain the plea of self-defence, in all fit cases. The Jainas do not say that the Virodhinī is not Himsā but look upon it as much milder than the Sankalpinī; they admit that the Virodhinī may be unavoidable in all ordinary people but insist, like the administrators of the criminal laws in a civilised country, that the Virodhinī-violence should not exceed the strict requirements of self-defence; in cases where the Virodhinī goes beyond such limits and transforms itself into vindictive activity, it becomes as bad as the Sankalpinī. (3) The Ārambhinī or acts of violence which are connected with the ordinary daily acts of a person. Thus, a house-holder, in his daily life, sweeps his floors, washes his clothes, lights up his oven and so on and thereby injures innumerable organisms daily. (4) The Udyoginī, a violence, which is connected with purposeful undertakings like the tilling of lands, construction of mills, digging of wells etc.*

* The four types of Himsā, described here, viz., the Sankalpinī, the Virodhinī, the Ārambhinī and the Udyoginī, are not specifically mentioned in the religious books of the Śvetāmvara Sect.

The Jaina attitude towards these third and fourth acts of violence is similar to that towards the second. These may be necessary and unavoidable in a person living in a society or leading the life of an ordinary house-holder and violence in these cases, although violence in its essentiality, is milder than that in the Sankalpinī. The Jainas advise nevertheless that one should always see that violence be avoided in these cases as much as possible and in no case should exceed the minimum demands of life. They point out that it is only by the homeless ascetics that all forms of the Himsā, including the second, the third and the fourth can be avoided.

The Pramatta-yoga or Kaṣāya being thus the *sine-qua-non* of all forms of the Himsā, it is immaterial whether it manifests itself or not in an outside overt act. Bearing this important principle in mind, one clearly sees—(1) that a person may be guilty of violence, even though he has not done any actual act of violence, while another person who has done an act of violence may never the less be untouched by Himsā; (2) that a small number of violent acts of one person may give him a great number of unpleasant consequences while a great number of such acts may be found to yield only a very small number of evil consequences; (3) That there are differences in intensity in the consequences of violence in different persons; (4) That in some cases the consequences of violence is experienced even before the overt act of violence is done; sometimes, it is felt along with the act; sometimes it is felt after the act is done; sometimes again, the consequence of violence is experienced, even though the overt act remains undone; (5) That sometimes, many persons experience the consequence of a violent act done by a single person while sometimes, one single person experiences the consequence of a violent act, done by many jointly; (6) That an act of violence yields to one person the fixed consequence of violence, while to another person, it yields the consequence of a purely non-violent act; (7) That conversely an act of non-violence yields the consequence of non-violence to a person while it yields the consequence of a violent act to another person. It is needless to repeat that the presence or the absence of the passions, the Kaṣāya's or the Pramatta-yoga, that is to say, of an intentional disposition for injury—that accounts for these differences.

The Jainas are believers in the reality of life in vegetables and they insist accordingly on a person's refraining from needless injury to the plant-life They affirm that there is no reason why living animals should be killed or otherwise hurt. They proclaim that it is sinful to kill animals in the name of religion or for the purpose of

pleasing the gods. Some upholders of the practice of animal-sacrifice defends it by saying that the Dharma or the moral path is revealed by the gods and that therefore the sentient beings should be offered to them. Some again find no fault in killing goats, lambs or other animals for feeding the guests. Some people beileve that there is comparatively lesser sin in killing a big animal for their dishes than in killing a number of small animals in its place. Some again are of the persuasion that it is always good to kill one being, if it leads to the safety of other beings. Some people think that ferocious animals kill many creatures and that therefore the killing of the ferocious animals is always justifiable.

Some are of opinion that it is good to put an end to the life of a being subjected to pains and miseries, just to end them. There have again been strange thinkers who maintain that happiness in one's life shows that he did many austere acts, so that it is good to kill a happy man, in order that he may continue his enjoyment of happiness, perhaps in an intenser form, in his after-life. There are people who encourage their own death or the death of their gullible followers in the so-called sacred places, by believing or preaching that the death in those places is sure to lead to a happy state in the celestial regions for the person so dying. There have been similar lines of thought, justifying the killing of one's preceptor when he is absorbed in deep meditation, under the belief that the preceptor would have a long and happy state of heavenly existence thereafter. Lastly, there have been people who see merit in injuring their own selves by cutting off the flesh from their bodies in order to feed a hungry creature. The Jainas (e.g. the author of the Purusārthasiddhyupāya) condemn all such practices and moral theories. Injuring life in any form, either in one's own self or in that of others, under any consideration whatsoever is immoral according to them.

The nature and scope of Himsā should thus be carefully grasped by a man wanting to practise the Vrata of Ahimsā. Himsā does not necessarily confine itself within the four corners of an actual act done. Himsā is really a subjective activity. Violence is committed where an overt act is purposively done (Kṛta). It is also committed by one when he, instead of himself doing the violent act, has the act done by another person (Kārita). Even when a man does not himself do the act or have it done by others, he is guilty of violence, if he approves (Anumodita) of the act, when it is done. The Jainas point out that as one's doing of an act or having it done by others or approving it when done, may involve the activities of his

speech, mind and body in each case, Himsā or violence may be of nine corresponding modes.

For the faultless practice of the Vrata of Ahimsā, various acts are recommended by the Jaina moralists. There is a group of five positive acts, called 'Bhāvanās' which tend to make the practice of non-violence steady; viz. the Vāg-gupti, control of the tongue, i.e. of the words that we use, the Mano-gupti or control of the mind, the Iryā, or carefulness in walking, the Ādāna-nikṣepa-samiti—or carefulness in the matters of taking up or laying down things and the Ālokita-pāna-bhojana or thorough examination of our food and drink, before we take them. These Bhāvanās make us sure that our words, thoughts, and bodily activities do not injure any living being. The Jainas in their anxiety to ensure the faultless practice of non-violence go into further details and speak of Āṣta-mūlagunas or eight acts which one should refrain from. These negative acts refer to one's abstention from drinking wine, eating meat, tasting honey and consuming any of the five species of fruits such as figs etc. The reasons given for refraining from wine is that in the first place, intoxication stupefies one's mind, generates various violence-inciting urges in him, makes him forget the path of morality and have him ultimately free to commit acts of violence; in the next place, it is pointed out that liquor as well as all products of fermentation such as butter etc. are filled with innumerable animal-cules whose destruction is unavoidable for one consuming them. Meat obviously involves the killing of an animal; besides, various microscopic organisms find their abode both in the raw as well as the cooked meat, so that violence is unavoidable for one who eats meat. One collecting honey necessarily injures or hurts the bees which are in possession of it; even in the honey, fallen from the comb, there rest numerous microscopic animal-cules, so that one drinking honey must needs injure countless living beings. Figs and other fruits or vegetables of similar species, contain embryos of many minute organisms and hence an eater of these necessarily commits acts of violence.

As regards some of the acts of violence which are ordinarily indulged in by common people almost in a thoughtless or unconcerned manner, the Jaina moralists make a special reference to the following five, which they call the Atiçāras or transgressions of the law of Ahimsā, viz., the Bandha or trying up an animal, the Badha or assaulting the animal, the Çheda or mutilating it, the Atibhārārpana or putting upon it loads which are beyond the bearing capacity of the animal, and the Anna-pāna-nirodha or withholding from it, its food or drink,—all done in a mood of carelessness or anger. It

is interesting to note that most of these cruel acts have been held to be punishable crimes under the penal laws of a civilized country now a days.

The next Vrata which is essential to a moral life is the vow of truthfulness or Satya. Its opposite, i.e., speaking falsely, is the Anṛta—which is defined as telling something which is not factual. It should be noted that the Pramatta-yoga or wicked intention, which, as we have seen, lies at the root of violence and which gives it the character of violence, forms the basis of Anṛta or lying also. Nothing is a falsehood, unless it is a deliberate lie and nothing is true, if an improper motive prompts its utterance. It is accordingly said that even if a statement is true but made with the deliberate intention of hurting the hearer's feeling, the statement is deprived of its character of truth. On the contrary, a false statement made for the purpose of doing some good to the hearer cannot be condemned as a downright lie.

The character of a phenomena is determined with reference to its nature (dravya), time (kāla), place (kṣetra) and modality (bhāva). A particular cup, for instance, exists only as a thing, made of (say) silver, during (say) winter, at a particular place (say) Calcutta and as (say) a round article and you cannot think of it as constituted of an absolute substance persisting through all eternity, existing simultaneously at all places and possessed of an universal shape. A true statement presents a thing or a phenomenon as it is in respect of its own nature, time, place and modality. So, when a thing actually exists with reference to its own particular nature, modification, time, and location and one says that it does not exist—this is one form of lying; to say that a thing exists, where as a matter of fact it does not exist, is the second manner of lying; to speak about a thing as something which is really different from it, is the third kind of falsehood; the fourth form of lying includes the three following manners of stating a fact viz.—(1) The Garhita or the condemnable. A true statement may be so made with scornful laughter as to give pain to the hearer; it may be clothed in harsh and angry words; its tone may be incivil and its words, unconnected with each other; it may be so delivered as to give rise to mistaken ideas in the hearer; the words used may be ambiguous or meaningless; or they may suggest something which contradicts the eternal verities, as disclosed by the competent masters. All such statements, though embodying true facts are nevertheless Garhita or condemned. (2) The Sāvadya or faulty. Statements e.g. about cutting the limbs of an animal, about piercing it, about beating it, about

tilling lands, about trading (especially, trafficking in living animals), about stealing etc. etc., all lead to or are connected with injury to animals. Such statements may not contain any falsehoods; they may even be connected with truths but are nevertheless faulty and as such, to be avoided. (3) The Apriya or pain-giving. Words which create unpleasant feelings, envy and grief and exhaust one's patience, which give rise to fear, feelings of enmity, sorrow and quarrelsomeness,—are akin to falsehoods, even though they may contain a truth in them. In connection with the three forms of the fourth mode of lying, it is, however, to be noted that although harsh and cruel statements are here generally condemned, a teacher or a well-disposed man, when using unpleasant expressions to one whom he wants to reform, is not to be considered as a liar. It is the Pramatta-yoga or the evil passions which make one's expressions false,—so that a teacher or a well-intending person, speaking harsh just to mend the manners of the person talked to and having the good of the person in his heart, cannot be accused of telling a lie in any of its forms.

The Jaina teachers fully recognise the fact that a house-holder or an ordinary man of the world has to support himself, earn his livelihood anyhow and cannot do without collecting some articles to meet his necessities and that consequently, it is impossible for him to avoid lying absolutely. Accordingly, they lay down that a man should try to limit his false statements as much as possible. The form of lying which has been described above as the Sāvadya may be unavoidable for him but there is no reason why he should not give up the other kinds of false-speaking and why, in the case of the Sāvadya, he should go beyond what is barely necessary for his living.

As in the case of Ahimsā, the Jaina teachers prescribe five Bhāvanās or meditations for stabilising and strengthening the vow of Satya. These consist in the Pratyākhyāna or giving up of Krodha or anger, Lobha or avarice, Bhīrutva or cowardice, Hāsya or frivolitly and in the Anuviçī-bhāsaṇa or talking in accordance with the scriptural injunctions. The negative aspects of the vow of truthfulness are the avoidance of its transgressions in the forms of the Mithyopadeśa or teaching false doctrines; the Rahovyākhyāna or giving publicity to secret actions of persons; the Kūta-lekha-kriyā or forgery; the Nyāsāpahāra or breach of trust by taking advantage of one's forgetfulness; this is illustrated as follows:

[A deposits Rs. 500/- with B. Subsequently, A forgetting the amount of his deposit asks for the return of Rs. 400/- only.

B takes advantage of A's forgetfulness and gives him the amount demanded; thereby B misappropriates Rs. 100/-] The Sākāra—mantra-bheda—or the divulgence of what one supposes to be a fact, from his observation of the manners of some persons who hold consultations in private.]

'Asteya' or non-stealing is the third great Vrata or vow laid down in the Jaina religious books. Stealing has been defined as appropriating what was not given. All appropriations, however, are not theft; misappropriations which are deliberate or wilful i.e. actuated by the Pramatta-yoga are cases of theft. A question may be raised whether a righteous man inviting the Karma-pudgala in him, can be accused of theft. The Jaina moralists answer the question in the negative. In the first place, a Muni introducing in himself the Karma is not actuated by any Pramatta-yoga or intention to have it. Secondly, it is pointed out that Karma is a subtle form of matter which belongs to nobody, so that its inflow in a Muni does not mean 'any appropriation of a thing which is not given'; in legal phraseology, the inflow of Karma does not involve any 'wrongful gain' or 'wrongful loss' to anybody. Another point that is raised is whether such acts of a person as taking water from another man's well amount to stealing on his part, in as much as the water was not given to him by the owner of the well. The Jainas affirm that all appropriations of things which have not been expressly given are essentially cases of theft and in the case under consideration, i.e. in the case of water being taken without the express permission of the owner of the well, the taking of water is technically a case of stealing. They, however, point out that such technical stealing is unavoidable by ordinary people of the world and recommend that all mis-appropriations which are not unavoidable in this way, should be given up.

The five Bhāvanās or meditations, rather, acts which fix or stabilise one's practice of non-stealing are—Śūnyāgāra or living in a solitary place; Vimoçitāvāsa or living in a place, deserted by all people; Paroparodha-karaṇa or living in a place where one is not likely to be obstructed by others nor where one is likely to obstruct others;—Bhaikṣya-śuddhi—or looking to the purity of what is given to one as alms; and 'Saddharmā-visamvāda' or not entering into disputations with one's brothers in faith, in respect of one another's belongings.

The vow of non-stealing is transgressed, even when one, instead of himself stealing, abets it (Çetana-prayoga) or receives stolen property (Tādā-hṛtādāna); or sells things at inequitable prices i.e.

practises black marketing (Viruddha-rājyāti-krama); or uses false weights and measures (Hīnādhika-mānonmāna); or adulterates things (Prati-rūpaka-vyavahāra).

The Vrata of Brahma or sex-abstinence is opposed to 'Abrahma' which consists in the act of Maithuna or sexual contact. The Pramatta-yoga or deliberate inclination, i.e., sex-hunger is the primal source of all sex-activities. It is needless to point out that sex-urge arouses the intensest feelings in a person and as such, it is responsible for his bad and undesirable status, both here and hereafter. Complete sex-purity is possible only in houseless sages and saints; a house-holder cannot act up to that ideal of sex-abstinence and he feels the need of a companion for the satisfaction of his sex-hunger; this explains the validity of the custom of marriage in human society. The Jaina moralists maintain that sex-indulgence is always bad from a moral point of view; even a person who has his sex-satisfaction exclusively through his wife cannot be looked upon as high-placed in the scale of moral progress. Such a person is called the 'Kuśīla-tyāgi'. Although such a person stands lower in moral rank than the Muni, he is certainly better than a person, wallowing in uncontrolled sex-indulgences. At any rate the Jaina moralists recognise that living without a wife may be impracticable in most cases of ordinary men but they emphatically urge that there is no reason why one should go after a woman who is not his legally married wife.

As regards the Atiçāras or indirect transgressions of the vow of Brahamaçarya, they are indicated as—the Para-vivāha-karaṇa or causing marriage between persons who belong to mutually prohibited families; the Itva-bikā-pari-grahitā-gamana or co-habitation with a married woman of immoral disposition; the Itvabikā-aparigrahitāgamana or co-habitation with an unmarried woman of immoral disposition; the Anangī-krīḍā or unnatural intercourse; the Kāma-tībrā-bhinibeśa or surrender to strong sexual urge.

The following five Bhāvanās, on the other hand, stabilise one's vow against sexual unchastity viz. the Tyāga or refraining from hearing all talks which excite passions for women (the 'Strīrāga-kathāśravaṇa); from looking at the attractive limbs of a woman (the Tanmanoharānga-nirīkṣaṇa); from drinking liquids which excite sexual urge (the Vṛṣyeṣta-rasa) and from making one's own body clean and attractive (the Sva-śarīra-samskāra).

The last but not the least of the Vratas is the Aparigraha or non-attachment to worldly affairs. It is opposed to 'Parigraha' which consists in Mūrçchā or taking interest in the living or the

non-living objects of the world through Pramatta-yoga or passionate inclination. It is clear that if there is in any one's mind, even a trace of leaning or the apprehension of the sort 'this is mine,' he has Parigraha or attachment, even though he may live in a forest, naked and destitute of all gross things. On the other hand, if one's mind is devoid of all feelings of 'mine-ness', he has Aparigraha, even though he is surrounded by and lives in the midst of a number of possessions, movable and immovable.

The absolute non-attachment to worldly things is obviously impossible for a house-holder and the Jaina thinkers recommend accordingly that the range of worldliness should be progressively shortened. The five Bhāvanās strengthening the practice of the vow of non-attachment consist in withdrawing one's liking for the pleasant objects of the five senses and his dislike for the unpleasant objects of these five senses. The Aparigraha-vrata is transgressed even when a person confining his possessions within a certain number, changes their proportions without actually changing their number. Thus suppose, a person takes the vow to be content with four pieces of cloth and four utensils; his vow would be transgressed if he takes to the possession of three pieces of cloth and five utensils. The transgressions of the vow of non-attachment in this manner of interchanging are likely to be committed in respect of the following five pairs of possession; viz. lands and houses; silver and gold; cattle and corn: male servants and female servants; and things for putting on and utensils.

The above are the five Vratas or cardinal virtues for practice, according to the Jainas. Besides these primary vows, the Jaina moralists speak of Śīlas, which are sub-vows, supplementing the practice of the Vratas. The Śīlas are seven in number, divided into two broad classes of the Guṇa-vratas and the Śikṣā-vratas. The former enhance the value of the Vratas and are three in number. There are four forms of the Śikṣā-vratas. The Śikṣā-vratas are so called, because they make the practice of the vows, perfectly disciplined.

The first of the three Guṇa-vratas is the Dig-vrata. It consists in one's taking a vow to limit his activities throughout his life within fixed bounds in all the ten directions. This sub-vow of the Dig-vrata may be transgressed in five different ways viz—(1) When negligently or deliberately, one rises higher than his limit in the upward direction (Ūrdhua-vyatikrama); (2) When in the same manner, he goes lower than his downward limit (Adhaḥ-vyatikrama); (3) When in the same manner, he crosses his limits in the eight

other directions (Tiryak-vyatikrama); (4) When in a fit of passions or negligence, he increases his limit in one direction, even though decreasing it in another direction (Kṣetra-vṛddhi); (5) When he forgets the limits even though he does not cross them (Smrtyantarādhāna).

The Desā-vrata is the second mode of the Guṇa-vrata, and consists in one's taking a vow to still more limit his activities, already limited by the Dig-vrata vow, for a fixed period of time. The Deśa-vrata is violated—(1) if the vower sends for something from beyond the limited limit (Ānayana); (2) if he sends a person beyond the limited limit (Preṣya-prayoga); (3) if he sends his voice (e.g. by telephone) beyond the limited limit (Śabdānupāta); (4) if he communicates with persons beyond the limited limit, by making sign to them (Rūpānupāta); (5) if he throws material things beyond the limited limit (Pudgala-kṣepa).

The third mode of the Guṇa-vrata is the Anartha-daṇda-vrata, which means a vow not to commit any aimless sin. There are five forms of the Anartha-daṇda-vrata which consist in avoiding respectively the Apadhyāna or thinking ill of others; the 'Pāpopadeśa' or preaching sinful matter to others; the 'Pramāda-çāritra' or thoughtless mischievous acts, such as breaking the branches of trees aimlessly; the Himsādāna or distribution of offensive weapons among people; and the Duḥśruti or reading or hearing the reading of bad books. The Anartha-danda-vrata is transgressed, even when the vower makes fun of or with others (Kandarpa); when he throws mischievous and practical jokes at others (Kautçuçç); when he becomes garrulous (Maukharya); when he overdoes a thing (Asamīkṣyādhikaraṇa); when he keeps himself supplied with enjoyable things, which are more than what are necessary for him (Upabhogaparibhogānārthakya).

The disciplinary or the 'Śikṣā-vratas have, as said above, four forms. The first is the Sāmāyika which consists in self-contemplation at stated times e.g. sunrise, noon or sunset every day for a stated period every time. The Sāmāyika is transgressed by misdirection of mind (the Mano-duṣpraṇidhānam); by misdirection of body (the Kāya-duṣpraṇidhāṇam); by misdirection of speech (the Vāk-duṣpraṇidhānam); by decreasing the interest in the Sāmāyika (the Anādara); by forgetting the formalities connected with the Sāmāyika (the Smṛtyanupasthāna).

The 'Poṣadhopavāsa is the second Śikṣā-vrata and means a vow to fast on four days in a month viz. on the two eighth and the two fourteenth days in the two lunar fortnights in every month, by

abstaining from food and drink and by making religious study etc. in these days of fasting. The vow of fasting is violated by execrating in a place without inspecting and sweeping it beforehand (the Apratyavekṣitāpramārjitotsarga); by taking up a thing from or laying it down in a place, without first inspecting and sweeping it (the Apratyavakṣitāpramārijitādāna); by arranging for sitting in a place without first inspecting and sweeping it (the Apratyavekṣitāpramārjita-samstaropakramaṇa); by giving up interest in fasting (the Anādara) and by forgetting the prescribed formalities for fasting (the Smṛtyanupasthāna).

The Bhogopabhoga-parimāṇa is a vow, limiting one's enjoyment of both 'exhaustible' (Upa-bhoga) and 'un-exhaustible' (Bhoga) things. It is the third of the disciplinary sub-vows and is transgressed when the vower takes to eating living things, even such as green vegetables (Saçittāhāra); when he uses for his own purpose, a thing which is connected with a living thing e.g. when he uses a green leaf as a plate (Saçitta-sambandhāhāra); when he consumes a mixture of living and non-living things, e.g. hot and cold water together (Saçitta-sammiśrāhāra); when he eats exciting or particularly invigorating food (Abhisavāhāra); or when he takes an ill-cooked food (duḥ-pakvāhāra).

The fourth sub-vow under the 'Śikṣā-vrata is the Atithi-samvibhāga which means taking a vow to take one's meals only after giving a part of them to a deserving guest, preferably a man living the austere moral life of an ascetic, having right faith and right conduct; or, failing him, a house-holder having right conduct only; or, failing him a, person with right faith but without any observance of the vows. These are called the 'Supātras' or worthy donees. Not so good a donee would be one whose outward conduct is good but who is devoid of right faith; he is a 'Kupātra.' A person, however, whose conduct is not good and who is not possessed of right faith is an 'Apātra' or unworthy donee. The Jainas lay down principles which determine the nature of the 'things' to be given (e.g., 'the things' given should be helpful to study, etc.), the 'manners' in which they are to be given (e.g. by welcoming the guest etc. etc.), and the 'attitude', both of the giver and of the taker at the time when the gifts are made (e.g. in all humility etc.). The Jainas however assert that in the matter of 'Karuṇādānā' or charities, no distinction is to be made as regards the persons who are to receive the gifts, so that food, medicine, knowledge and removal of fears should be freely extended to all needy persons, Jaina or non-jaina, human or sub-human. This vow of 'giving to guests' is violated if one places

food on a living thing e.g. on a green leaf (Saçitta-nikṣepa); if one covers food with a living thing (Saçittāpidhāna); if one delegates his duties as a host to another (Para-vyapadeśa); if his charitable conduct is vitiated by disrespectfulness or by envious competition with another donor (Mātsarya); or if his charity is not made at the proper time (Kālātikrama).

This finishes our survey of the Vratas or the vows, essential to moral progress. The five Vratas are vows of non-violence, sexual purity, non-attachment, non-stealing and truthfulness. The homeless saints practise the vows in their perfection; the practice of those vows by the house-holders must necessarily be imperfect and hence the Vratas as performed by the householders have been called 'Aṇuvrata',—the difference between the Vratas and the Aṇuvratas being not one of kind but of degree in successful observance. The seven 'Śīlas' including the three Guṇa-vratas and the four Śiksā-vratas supplement the observance of the Aṇuvratas and are generally meant for the house-holders. The observance of the Śīlas paves the way of the house-holder for the practice of the five cardinal virtues and makes his conduct well-controlled. The Jainas further maintain that the well-ordered life which is the effect of the Śīla-practice, should be crowned with a well-ordered death. Such a death is called the 'Sallekhanā' by them and consists in a perfectly unattached and dispassionate attitude towards the world, during the last moments of life. This Sallekhanā or contemplative death is marked by total abstinence from food, drink, medicine and all things worldly and unperturbed fixation of the dying man upon his self. It is recommended for practice, not merely to a man observing the Śīlas (Na-śrāvakasyaiva Dig-viratyādi-śilavatah) but also to one who has brought himself under self-control (Samyatasyāpi). The Sallekhanā is not a form of suicide. It is recommended only when the body is completely disabled by extreme old age or by incurable diseases or when it is rendered hopelessly helpless by the destruction or enfeeblement of the senses and such other causes and the man becomes conscious of the impending unavoidable death and of the necessity of concentrating himself upon his pure-self.

Akalaṅka nicely illustrates the practice of Sallekhanā by point-out firstly how the traders in valuable articles never want the destruction of their storehouse; that when causes arise to destroy the house, they try to remove these causes to the best of their ability and resources; that when they find that those destructive causes are irremovable, they do no longer care for the house and concentrate their efforts upon the preservation of the valuable articles of the store-

house; that it is in the same manner that a good man never wants to put an end to his body; that he tries to save his body when disease and other ailments threaten to destroy it; but that when all attempts to save the body prove to be finally unavailing, he dissociates himself from it and establishes himself exclusively upon his essential self. This is Sallekhanā or peaceful contemplative death, which is essentially different from any form of suicide. It is clear that the calm and faultless character of the Sallekhanā is destroyed and its practice becomes condemnable, if there is in the dying man, 'Jīvitāsaṁśā' or a desire to live, Maraṇāsaṁśā or a desire to hasten death; Mitrāṇurāga or a lasting feeling of attachment for his friends; 'Sukhānubandha' or a longing fond remembrance of the occasions of past enjoyments or 'Nidāna or an expectant desire for enjoyments in the next world.

CHAPTER VI

STAGES IN THE MORAL PROGRESS

Moral progress involves the practice of the good acts, formulated in the foregoing chapters. At its lowest stage, we have the un-moral state in which there is a complete suppression of right faith, right knowledge and right conduct, while at its culminating point, the self emerges as fully realised in all its innate perfections. Until this final perfection is attained, the self finds itself in successively unhappy states and subjected to various forms of pain and privation e.g. the Pariṣaha's, as described before. During this long process of moral progress, there are many set-backs as well as steady advances. The most prominent points in the progress of a moral life have been considered by the Jainas to be fourteen in number and these have been called the 'Guṇasthāna's by them. These fourteen stages are marked by the gradual subsidence of the eight kinds of Karma, which bind down the self and the evolution of true faith, correct knowledge and moral activity in their various forms. It should be noted that the limitation of the self consists primarily in its forgetfulness of its true nature, which is due to the influx of the Mohanīya or the deluding Karma in it. The inflow of the Mohanīya prepares the self for the further absorption of other forms of the Karma. The inflow of the Mohanīya into the self is the fundamental obstacle to its self-realisation and moral progress begins with its partial removal. The Mohanīya is of two kinds—viz. the Darśana-mohanīya or that which deludes one's right belief and the 'Çāritra-mohanīya or that which deludes one's right conduct.

(1) The first stage in a moral life i.e. the basic subjective state from which the moral progress is to start is the state of Mithyātva or

wrong belief. This stage is characterised by the absence of a belief in the reality of liberation and is due to the activities of the Darśana-mohanīya Karma in the self.

(2) The second Guṇasthāna has been called the 'Sāsādana' or channel of regress or downfall. The Sāsādana is not a stage which succeeds the Mithyātva i.e. the first stage but is an inevitable channel, through which, the moral self in its downward way of retrogression, reverts to the first stage.

(3) The Miśra or the mixed stage is characterised by wrong belief co-existing with right belief. This also is a stage, through which a moral man, deflecting from the moral course, passes in order to revert to the original stage of the Mithyātva.

(4) The Avirata-samyaktva is a state in which there is the right belief but the belief is not attended with appropriate moral activities. This is really the second stage in the progress of the moral life, a stage which comes directly after the Mithyātva-stage. As in this stage of the Avirata-samyaktva, not all the Darśana-mohanīya Karma's are completely eradicated, there is a chance of fall from it, a reversion to the Mithyātva-stage. This retrogression, as pointed out above, is not direct and precipitate but through the third and the second Gaṇasthānas.

(5) The fifth-stage is the Deśa-virata. The real active moral life may be said to begin at this stage, in as much as it is in this that one takes, for the first time, to the practice of the Aṇu-vrata's or the great vows modified in accordance with a house-holder's life.

(6) In the next stage of the moral progress, which is called the 'Pramatta-virata', the vows are practised but practised imperfectly and the mind often casts a lingering look at the needs and the services of the body.

(7) It is in the 'Apramatta-virata' or the seventh Guṇasthāna that all careless conducts are stopped, the practice of vows becomes perfect and fault-less and the moral practiser absorbs himself in Dharma-dhyāna or spiritual meditations.

(8) The eighth Gunasthāna is the 'Apūrva-karaṇa' which as its name implies, consists in meditative activities which are 'novel'. It is at this stage that one takes to the first or the primary form of the pure meditation or Śukla-dhyāna (literally, white contemplation).

(9) The next stage in the course of moral progress is the Anivṛtta-karaṇa, which involves Śukla-dhyāna, more advanced than the one involved in the eighth Gunasthāna.

(10) The tenth stage, the Sūkṣma-samparāya, like the two stages preceding it, still consists in the practice of the first form of the Śukla-dhyāna, but goes beyond them in many respects. In the stage of the Sūkṣma-samparāya, one is practically free from all the four Kaṣāya's or passions, except a very slight degree of greed.

(11) In the Upaśānta-moha stage, the Çāritra-mohanīya or the Karma's that delude one's activities are rendered powerless. It is to be observed, however, that the eighth, the ninth, the tenth and the eleventh stages are characterised by a progressive mitigation or Upaśama of the Çāritra-mohanīya Karma's and are accordingly called the Upaśama-śreṇī. But these conduct-deluding Karmas, although mitigated in these stages, are not totally destroyed or eradicated and hence unless the moral person is particularly careful, he often falls a victim to those Karma's once more and his moral progress takes a retrograde course.

(12) But a man of strong moral will, instead of working for the Upaśama or the mitigation of the Çāritra-mohanīya, as involved in the eleventh stage may at once attain the twelth stage, without passing through the eleventh. Such a person puts himself upon the Kṣapaka-śreṇī, or a path in which the Çāritra-mohanīya Karma's are annihilated. The moral practiser thus finds himself in the twelth stage of the moral progress, called the Kṣīṇa-moha, in which the Çāritra-mohanīya Karma's are destroyed and he develops the power of the second form of the Śukla-dhyāna.

(13) At this stage which is called the 'Sayoga-kevali, not only are the Mohanīya or the Karmas that delude the true faith and the right conduct destroyed but the three other forms of the Ghātiyā or the destructive Karmas viz. those that obscure respectively right knowledge (the Jñānāvaranīya), right apprehension (the Darśanāvaranīya) and the innate powers of the soul (the Antarāya) also drop off from the soul completely. The result is that the self becomes perfect and omniscient, although the four modes of the Aghātiyā or the non-destructive Karma viz. the Āyu (the Karma that has given certain span of life), the Gotra (the Karma that has accounted for the family in which the self has incarnated itself), the Nāma (the Karma's that have determined its body and all that are connected with it) and the 'Vedanīya (the Karma that gives the self its various experiences of pleasure and pain) are still attached to it. The Sayoga-kevali stage is so called because at this stage, the self, although it is Kevali or omniscient, has still the Yoga or connections with body, mind and the function of speech, left in it.

(14) It is in the final, the Ayoga-kevali stage that the already pure, perfect and all-knowing self becomes free from the connections with or influences of the above four non-destructive Karmas and the consequent Yogas. It is immediately antecedent to the disembodied state of Liberation and lasts for a very very short period, just sufficient for uttering five short vowels with moderate speed.

It is to be noted that with the advance in spirituality, the self becomes less and less troubled by the Pariṣaha's or privations. It is said that up to the ninth Guṇasthāna, all the twenty-two sufferings may torment the self. During the tenth, the eleventh and the twelth stages of spiritual evolution, the Mohanīya Karmas are progressively overpowered or destroyed. The result is that with the mitigation or annihilation of those deluding factors, the moral self no longer suffers any inconvenience from the following eight ordinarily troublesome causes viz., nakedness, languor, woman, sitting in a determined manner, abuses from others, begging, respect or disrespect from others and infirm belief. In the thirteenth stage, all the destructive Karmas are annihilated, but the Vedanīya or the feeling-yielding forces still linger, although these lose all their powers, due to the absence of the Mohanīya or delusion. It may accordingly be said that theoretically at least, the eleven following feelings of privation due to the presence of the Vedanīya are conceivable in a person at the thirteenth stage viz.—hunger, thirst, cold, heat, insect-bites, walking, hard-bed, assault, disease, contact with thorns and dirt. With the attainment of the final bliss, all traces of privation-feelings absolutely disappear.

It has already been said that the Vratas or the vows are practised in their perfect form only by the homeless saints. The lay people practise the Aṇu-vratas or the vows in a modified form. The moral practioners are thus primarily divided into two classes viz.—the Anagāris, i.e., the homeless Munis and the Agāris or house-holders. People in the first six stages viz. the stages upto the Pramatta-Virata, are house-holders while the moral practioners in the next eight stages are homeless saints. A house-holder's moral efforts are directed to the practice of the following eleven acts, Pratimā's as they are called; viz.—(1) The Darśana-pratimā, which means that he must have a firm faith in the tenets of the Jaina religion; (2) The Vrata-pratimā, which means that he practises the Vratas to the best of his ability; (3) The Sāmāyika-pratimā, which enjoins that he must meditate deeply for fixed periods, at stated times; (4) The Poṣadhopavāsa-pratimā, which means that he observes the fasts faultlessly; (5) The Saçitta-tyāga-pratimā, which means that he must avoid all

forms of animated food; (6) The Rātri-bhukti-tyāga-pratimā, which requires that a true Jaina should never take his meals at night; (7) The Brahma-çarya-pratimā, which refers to the practice of sex-control; (8) The Ārambha-tyāga-pratimā, which means that he must limit the means of livelihood as much as possible; (9) The Parigraha-tyāga-pratimā, which means that he must renounce all desires for the worldly objects, as much as possible; (10) The Anumati-tyāga-pratimā which means that an honest house-holder should desist from advising others to take to worldly activities; (11) The Uddiṣta-tyāga-pratimā, which means that he should avoid what is specially prepared for him.

The above eleven Pratimās laid down for being practised by a house-holder will foster a feeling of renunciation in him and prepare him for the life of an Anagāra-muni or homeless saint.

The character of a man is judged by his conduct and circumstances connected with it. Even the all-renouncing Munis have their difference from each other; these differences refer to the following matters, viz. self-control (Samyama), scriptural knowledge (Śrūta), proneness to deviate from the moral path under compulsion (Pratisevanā), relation to the Tīrthamkaras as regards time (Tīrtha), distinguishing features both subjective and external (Linga), the sort of halo over their souls (Leṣyā), the possible post-mortem state (Upapāda) and the stages in the moral progress, they are in (Sthāna). Thus, one saint may be a contemporary of the Arhat while the other may be separated from him by a number of years; one may be more self-controlled than the other; one's knowledge of the scripture may be more profound than another's; after death one may attain liberation, while the other may be re-born in a celestial region, and so on. The Jainas generally recognise five classes of homeless saints, who are respectively; (1) The Pulāka's i.e. those that are sometimes found to deviate slightly from the faultless observance of the primary vows; (2) The Vakuśa's or those that are found to be slightly attached to their body, books and followers; (3) The Kuśīla's i.e. those that are sometimes found to deviate slightly from the correct practice of the secondary vows; (4) The Nirgrantha's or saints in the eleventh and the twelfth stages of moral progress who are absolutely free from all passions; (5) The Snātakas or those that are none other than the omniscient beings in the thirteenth and the fourteenth Guṇasthānas.

The moral practices of the saints are essentially the same as those of the laymen but are more strict in the case of the former.

The basic acts of morality which a saint is to practise are called the Mūla-guṇas or primary virtues and are twenty-eight in number, viz. 1-5 the five Vratas or great vows of non-violence, truthfulness, non-stealing, sex-control and renunciation of worldly things; 6-10 the five Samitis or acts of carefulness; 11-15 the control of the five senses; 16-21 the six following observances, viz. the practice of dispassion, worship of the divine Lord, salutation to Him, confession, study and realisation of the difference of the self from the body; (22) the pulling out of hair; (23) nakedness; (24) refraining from bathing; (25) sleeping on hard ground; (26) refraining from cleansing the teeth; (27) taking meals, standing; and (28) taking only one meal a day.

The other practices of the saint viz. the forms of the Dharma, of the penances, of the meditations are also prescribed. The Anagāra Muni practises all these moral acts with care and in a far more strict way than a layman does.

CHAPTER VII

THE JAINA ÇĀRITRA AS THE BASIS OF AN UNIVERSAL RELIGION AND MORALITY

In the foregoing pages, we have given an account of acts which are regarded as moral by the Jainas. They are moral in as much as they are believed to stop the further inflow of non-psychical forces in the soul and destroy those which are already accumulated there. It may appear to many, however, that the Jaina account of the moral acts is after all but a list of acts, most of which are acknowledged to be good and commendable by all people. Is there, then, any distinctive feature in the Jaina ethics?

The moral acts enjoined in the Jaina ethics being similar to those of the other systems, any distinction which the former can claim for it, must be in the ideal which it puts before it and in the manner in which this ideal may be held to explain and interpret the particular acts of morality.

As regards the aim and purpose underlying the moral acts, the different theories may be classified under two broad groups which may be described as 'other-pointing' and 'self-pointing'. Under the first class come firstly, those theories which maintain that a prescribed act is moral because it is so laid down by God or the gods and secondly, those that hold the morality of an act to be judged by its conduciveness to the welfare of the state, the community or the mankind in general.

It must be admitted that when an act is described as a commandment from a superior being, it is invested with a sacredness which is generally accepted as unquestionable. The practice of such

an act proceeds from faith and it is done with a spirit of self-surrender. In such a case, no distinction is drawn between a religious act and a moral act,—all such acts being commandments from supreme beings. But the questioning spirit of man,—his tendency to judge and ask the 'why' of every thing,—cannot be suppressed long; and as a matter of fact, at certain periods in the history of every community, people have wanted to know the basis of religion and morality. To suppress this questioning spirit by saying that divine commandments are not to be questioned or examined but followed ungrudgingly, has been unsuccessful in the long run. The demand for explanation became more and more insistent. An attempt to meet this demand was to tell that God was wise, that in His infinite wisdom He knew what was good for man and that a religious or moral commandment from Him was due to his desire for doing some good to the suffering humanity. This explanation contains the important admission that the religiousness or the moralness of an act was ultimately due to its conduciveness to human welfare. What sort of welfare would give an act such religious or moral character becomes thus an important further question and we shall discuss it presently.

It is, however, a matter of serious consideration whether the commanding character of an act can be retained, if we dissociate it from the idea of God as its source. The fact cannot be denied that the rationalisation of an act is inconsistent with an arbitrary command about it from without. This means that if a religious or a moral act is to be explained on a rational principle and the idea of God is also to be retained as its source,—the idea of God must itself be rationalised. In the Jewish, the Christian, the Mohamedan and the Avestan religions, God is put forward as the transcendental being who lays down commandments of religious and moral efficacy. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, God is the creator of the universe as well as the supreme teacher of the believers. In the Yoga system, God is conceived as 'the teacher even of all primaeval teachers of mankind'. With all this attribution of power and wisdom to God, the questioning mind tends to go further and want to know what is the rational basis of his commandments. According to the Jainas, all religious and moral injunctions do emanate from God but the eternal merit of their philosophy consists in their revolutionising the very conception of God. According to them, God is the Arhat, who was not a transcendental misty being but was one among and like other men and who became all-knowing through his self-culture and supreme moral efforts. Religious and moral commandments re-

ceive their sanctity and binding character, not simply because they were laid down by the Arhat but really because the very activities and the successful attainments in the life of the Arhat demonstrated that the acts which are the subject-matters of those commandments were really conducive to his own welfare as well as to the best welfare of man. This conception of God, not only as an omniscient being but as a man, struggling for and finally attaining through continuous efforts, both subjective and external, self-perfection, is unique in Jainism. This conception of God supplies the nucleus, not only for a universal religion but also the *basis of a faith in the efficacy of moral acts.* The simple fact may be illustrated thus: Why is non-violence a moral act? Because God has said so. Why has God so commanded and why should we take his word on trust? Because God was originally an ordinary man struggling for the perfection of his nature who in his life actually found that 'non-violence' did lead to his perfection straight.

The 'other-pointing-ness' involved in the nature of a moral act, thus means, in Jainism, that by doing it, you follow the command of God; but it does not mean that thereby you please the God. Because the God, the Arhat, is completely unconcerned with what we do or do not. By doing the moral act, we act on the commandment of God in pursuance of a right faith in his infallibility,—with the result that we are put on the way to our own spiritual development—just as the Arhat in his life successfully resorted to the act for his self-perfection.

The question of the possibility of attaining omniscience does not interest a modern thinker. It seems, however, to have been an important problem upon which heated debates were held in ancient India. The great school of the Mīmāmsaka's actually denied the reality of any omniscient being. At any rate people who do not place implicit faith in the teachings of the Arhats as embodied in the Jaina scriptures, will not be prepared to base the moral character of the ethical injunctions on the authoritative testimony of the Arhats. According to these moralists, the moralness of an action depends upon the actual good, it does to the State or the Community. The cardinal virtues in ancient Greece were those, the practice of which made one an useful citizen. The utilitarians as well as the humanists of modern times look upon an act as moral, which does 'the greatest good to the greatest number'. In this sense also a moral act is 'other-pointing', in as much as its moral character depends on facts and circumstances outside the agent's self.

But the question in connection with such 'other-pointing' standards always is: why should one feel tempted to do an act which is useful to others? Unless the act which does good to others is also directly useful to one's own self, its practice cannot be voluntary. The 'other-pointing' standard must needs be 'self-pointing' ultimately. Even in the case of an act being considered as moral on the ground of its being the Arhat's commandment, the standard was 'self-pointing' also, in as much as the act was believed to lead, as in the case of the Arhat, to the self-realisation of the doer.

The moral standard is thus ultimately and essentially 'self-pointing', which means that an act is moral, if it effects the doer's self-development. Without entering into the intricacies of metaphysical discussions here, we may safely refer to their yield and recognise the distinction between the empirical self or the self of fleeting experiences and the essential self i.e. the self, the features of which do not change. If then, self-development or self-realisation is the standard or the test of the moral-ness of activities, it must mean that an act is morally good which satisfies, not the self of the moment but that permanent self. The essential attributes—apprehension, cognition, power and bliss—are inherent in the soul; but in the soul's empirical state, the infinitude of these four-fold attributes, is limited, suppressed and weighed down. The effect of a moral act which is a religious one also, according to the Jainas, is just to remove the dust and dirt that has accumulated in the soul and made it finite and to enable it to appear in its essential attributes with all their infinitude. The aim and goal of all moral acts is thus the realisation of the true self and perfection of its innate infinite nature. This is the Jaina contribution to the doctrine of the moral test. This connection between the essence of the self and a moral act, as conceived by the Jainas, leads to their view of morality in its another aspect.

In the previous chapters, we have enumerated the moral acts, as inculcated by the Jainas. We have already hinted that all these numerous acts are but forms of the five Vratas and Sub-vows ancilary and auxiliary to or preparatory for them. The five vows of non-violence, truthfulness, non-stealing, renunciation and sex-control are thus the essence of morality or moral acts par excellence.

It is to be noted that in this process of subsumption, an attempt is further made to reduce the five Vratas into one viz. to that of the Ahimsā or non-violence. Thus, in connection with Parigraha or appropriation, it is said that although it is not identical with Himsā or violence, it generates what is called the 'Mamatva-pariṇāma' or a

mentality that such and such a thing is 'mine' and as such, indirectly leads to acts of violence. Aparigraha or non-appropriation prevents the growth of the Mamatva-pariṇāma and is Ahimsā in substance. Similarly, with respect to sexual indulgence, it is pointed out that the female sex and other organs are the abode of countless invisible organisms, which are killed in the process of procreation. The practice of Brahmaçarya prevents the slaughter of these organisms and as such, sex-control also is a mode of non-violence. In stealing, one mis-appropriates another person's articles which are so near and dear to his self as to form a part of his self; so that in committing theft, the thief hurts another person's life in its external aspect (the 'Dravya-prāṇa'). The vow of Asteya or non-stealing consists in abstaining from such misappropriation and as such, is really a form of Ahimsā. In the same manner, all untrue representations and harsh words injure other person's interests and feelings; so that Anṛta or false-speaking is essentially an act of violence. Truthfulness avoids such acts of violence and is accordingly a mode of non-violence.

More important is the subsumption of the Vrata's under the first vow of Ahimsā, from the subjective view-point. It has already been pointed out that violence is committed, as soon as Pramatta-yoga is allowed to take possession of one's self. Even if there is no overt act causing actual injury to another person, the man having the Pramatta-yoga or a passionate tendency in him is guilty of Himsā; the reason is that the passionate disposition in a man kills i.e. injures his own self,—before it hurts any other person. The Pramatta-yoga or an evil disposition is the essence of violence and Ahimsā consists essentially in the avoidance of the Pramatta-yoga and not simply in desisting from all overt acts of violence.. All acts which proceed from passionate dispositions are thus acts of Himsā. The definition of each of the five Vrata's may be recalled in this connection and it would be found that all branches thereof have been described as proceeding from the Pramatta-yoga. One is not guilty of violence, of lying, of sexual indulgence, of stealing or of worldly attachment, unless he is actuated by improper passions from beforehand, and conversely, if there be the influence of evil subjective tendencies in a person, he is guilty of violence, even though he has not actually hurt anybody or actually uttered a lie or actually stolen any article or actually indulged in sex-pleasures or actually collected things of worldly enjoyment. The Pramatta-yoga is the basis of all sins and consists primarily in doing violence to one's own self. It is essentially Himsā and its avoidance is Ahimsā. Accordingly, all the

Vrata's, the transgressions of which proceed from the passionate attitude and the faultless practice of which, presupposes primarily an active avoidance of the Pramatta-yoga, appear on ultimate analysis, as modes of one and the same Vrata viz., the vow of Ahimsā. All moral practices are related to the five Vrata's as complements or supplements to them, and all the five Vrata's are reducible to the one fundamental Vrata of Ahimsā. It is thus that the Jaina religion is fitly called the 'Ahimsā-dharma' or the religion of non-violence. This does not mean,—as is commonly understood, that Jainism consists simply in desisting from hurting animals and giving food to ants and insects; not even does it mean that Jainism consists in doing acts of charity only and stopping the spread of violence. The Jaina religion and ethics are far more than all these; they insist that improper dispositions of mind are to be controlled, suppressed and finally eradicated and one should concentrate himself solely in his true essence i.e. his psychical nature as distinct and distilled from all influences of unpsychical phenomena.

External good conduct is of course not condemned but if good conduct is to lead to the final emancipation, it must be based on the essential nature of the self i.e. the self as free from the influences of the Kaṣāyas or passions. Such Çāritra or really good conduct is described by the Jaina Āçārya's as 'Saga-çariyam' (Svaka-çaritam), self-determined action, which means action proceeding from the self's own nature, that is, from the self when it is 'savva-samga-mukko' and 'Naṇna-mano' i.e. free from all external relations and without its mind distracted in any way. This view of right conduct, as the Jainas call it, is from the 'Niśçaya' or transcendental standpoint, as distinguished from the 'Vyavahāra' or the ordinary. The latter has within its scope even the faith in the world-realities of the soul, the non-soul etc.; even the correct knowledge of all the sacred scriptures; even the practice of such recommended moral acts as charity, penance etc. These matters of the Vyavahāra may make a person wise, respectable and fortunate but in order that these may secure to him the attainment of the Mokṣa or the final liberation, they should be translated into the Niśçaya i.e. taken in their transendental significance. The Niśçaya view requires that for the purposes of the Mokṣa, one's faith, knowledge and conduct should be 'Samyak' or right. It is said that 'whoever practises, knows and apprehends his own self, through his self as unpervaded by anything external to the self i.e. whoever becomes identified thus with conduct, knowledge and faith, well, his view-point is that of the Niśçaya'. When one fails to confine his attention exclusively to his own essential self, allows other considerations to prevail in him,

his Darśana, Jñāna and Çāritra will not lead him to Mokṣa. In such a case, even if he devotes himself to the reverence to the Arhat, he is still a 'Para-samaya-vato' i.e. given up to externalities. It is definitely said that 'one who has knowledge about and reverence for the Arhat, the Siddha, their representations, the religious Assembly, the Scriptures (without concentrating himself upon himself), will only attract bondage for him with the Puṇya or meritorious Karmas and not be able to effect the destruction of all the Karmas' (173, Paṇçāstikāya-samaya-sāra). It is Rāga or the feeling of inclination towards things external to one's own self, that estranges him from his self and thus stands in the way of his emancipation. "He in whose heart there is an iota of affection towards an external object (even though the external object is the Arhat or God himself), does not know his own self, even though he is well-versed in all the scriptures". Acts which are generally regarded as meritorious may lead to the evolution of self-knowledge but unless and until an attitude of unperturbed self-concentration is generated and permeates all acts, visions and cognitions, one cannot be said to be put on the way to liberation. It is said : (177—Pançāstikāya-samaya-sāra) "One may understand the Tīrthamkara; the nine realities, constituting the universe; one may be possessed of the correct scriptural knowledge; he may have practised penances, even self-control; but (unless and until he has the true self-realisation in him), the Nirvāṇa is far away from him." Accordingly, the fundamental basis for all morality (and for all religious activities, religion and ethics on ultimate analysis being found to be identical) is embodied in the advice of the Jaina moralists—(179, Pançāstikāya-samaya-sāra), "If you want to have the final liberation, do not have attachment, any the least, for anything whatsoever."

The above close connection between one's subjective attitude and the morality of actions leads to a re-orientation of our ordinary views about religious and moral acts. The basis of these ordinarily held—is of course the command of God; it is so, even according to the Jainas, although they do not believe in a transcendental world-creating God. As we have seen, the Tīrthamkara, the man who developed his nature to perfection, is the God, to whose all-knowing nature, the secrets of religion and morality were crystal-clear and who revealed them to his bearers for the good of mankind. Yet, this is after all, the Vyavahāra or the 'other-pointing' view. According to the Jaina Niśçaya doctrine, not the Arhat alone but all souls who have attained perfection are Gods—each self being a potentiality of God. From the Niśçaya or the 'self-pointing' view, religious or a moral act is a divine command, in the sense that it ema-

nates from or is prompted by the true nature of man; it is a real 'categorical imperative' involved in the very nature of the self.

It is always possible to demonstrate how even the outward practice of the five Vratas of the Jainas can serve as the fundamental of a universal religion and universal ethics. If you are kindly disposed towards a neighbour of yours, causes of any ill-feeling between him and you disappear; if you speak truly to him, and your conduct is straight-forward towards him, he will remain attached to you; if your neighbour is sure that you will not steal his articles, he will repose trust in you; your practice of sex-control will never make your neighbour distrustful about you in any way; and finally, your practice of renunciation and self-control will make you an object of love and reverence to your neighbour. Not only from this individual point of view but from the social point of view also, it will be realised that an ordered and happy state or community depends upon the practice of these five Vratas by its individual constituents.

Carlyle's idea of a happy state of affairs in a society of men really points to a practice of Aparigraha, as inculcated in his advice—'Make thy claim of wages a zero...' What again are the devastating wars of the past and the present times but the effects of attempts to steal on a large scale? What, lastly, were the Trojan, the Rāma-Rāvaṇa and many other wars of the legendary periods as well as the wars of some of the Mahamadan kings against the Rajput princes, but dreadful activities in pursuance of sex-urges in big but unworthy people? The practice of the five Vratas goes a great way to the establishment of peace and happiness in individuals and communities.

The Vratas are more efficacious when they are broad-based on sincerest of intentions. Individuals often deflect from the true path; the League of Nations failed to establish peace and the U.N.O. is faring no better, because sincerity of purpose is or was wanting and because exclusive stress was laid on mechanical activities. But the fact is clear and is becoming more and more apparent daily that there is but one way to real and lasting peace, viz. a sincere wish for it and translating it in actions of truth, non-violence and self-control. The Vrata's practised without any Pramatta-yoga or improper motive or urge, form thus a secure foundation for a world-religion and world-ethics.

As we have said before more than once, all these, however, are Vyavahāra view-points, regarding the Vratas or the Çāritra, notions

how they bring about worldly good to an individual or society. Man is more than his empiric self and his relations to society. There is his spiritual self, his true and real self, the self as it is in itself, cleared of all relationships with matter. In connection with this self, one way of putting the fact is to say that Çāritra or right conduct removes all the foreign dirt from the essence of this self and presents it in its true light and true nature. Ultimate ethics and ultimate religion, however, confine themselves within the limit of spiritual reality in its transcendental aspect only. According to this Niśçaya or transcendental view-point, the Āsrava is not so much an inflow of Kārmic matter into the soul as it is 'Bhāvāsrava' or a person's subjective "deflection from his state of pure self-satisfaction as a Vītarāga or perfectly dispassionate being." The Bandha is similarly the 'Bhāva-bandha', consisting in "a modification of the natural pure apprehension of the totality (Akhaṇḍa), of the soul, an apprehension characterised by infinite cognition etc. into impure attitudes of attachment etc." As regards the Saṃvara, the Niśçaya view is that it is not so much the 'Dravya-saṃvara' or stoppage of inflow of foreign matters into the soul as "a pure psychical state arising from the very nature of the soul, consisting in a natural state of unlimited joy, ... independent of any external cause." The Nirjarā is similarly the 'Bhāva-nirajarā', according to the transcendental view, consisting in "a taste of the nectar of the natural joyfulness of the soul, arising from an apprehension of its attribute of pure consciousness." And lastly, the Mokṣa or the final liberation is not merely a dissociation from Kārmic phenomena but "a pure consciousness of the self as it is in itself (Nirvikāra)".

Viewed from this standpoint, "the three jewels" of the right faith, the right knowledge and the right conduct which have been described as the ways of attaining the liberation, put on a different significance. They are not practices nor instruments in the hands of the self; and it is not that the self attains liberation with their help. The soul secures its emancipation through itself and the 'jewels' are not phenomena, extraneous to it but are a part and parcel of its very nature.

"Know", as it is said, that one's own self is the right faith, right knowledge and right conduct ... Know that one's own self is the cause of its liberation". In the Niśçaya view, the Samyak-darśana is the 'Vītarāga-samyaktva,' an innate faith that the natural joyfulness of the pure self is alone to be sought after ('Upādeya'), the Samyak-jñāna is the intensive knowledge of the self as it is in itself, a knowledge which is inseparable from the nature of the self;

and the Samyak-çāritra is the pure activity of the self and for itself. As regards the Vratas, the practice of which, as we have shown, is the essence of the Çāritra, they have similarly been held to be not so much the abstinence from killing or telling lies etc. etc. as the suppression (Nivṛtti) of all feelings of attachment etc. due to the realisation of one's essential nature i.e. his pure apprehension, cognition and bliss. The Samiti's Gupti's and all other moral practices are also interpreted in a similar way.

By the above, it is not to be understood that the external practices are of no avail and may be neglected. It is only meant that the religious and moral acts are always to be backed by the best of motives,—not simply utilitarian but purely spiritual. In fact, this is the foundation of all true religions and true ethics; and may well serve as the basis of a universal code of moral and religious acts. The distinctive feature of Jainism lies not only in emphasising this all-important condition of all religious and moral activities but in justifying their position by looking upon morality not as an adjunct to the human nature but as part and parcel of it. Çāritra or right conduct is thus explained by the Jainas; "When one gives up the enjoyment of the objects of the five senses, his conduct is good from the Vyavahāra standpoint; when he removes from his heart all feelings of attachment and envy which prompt one to lean to sensuous enjoyment of things, his conduct is good from 'the Niśçaya view'. When the person realises and is firmly established in his pure nature and feels that self-control (e.g. avoidance of enjoying sensuous objects) is a part of his nature, his conduct is supremely good—good from what is called the 'Śūddha-niśçaya' stand-point." This is in substance the Jaina view about the test of the goodness of a religious or moral act. In light of this old, old doctrine of the Jaina Āçāryas, one may offer the following as the spirit of an universal religion and ethics, as a settler of all religious differences and as a norm, explaining all moral conduct: Practise the Çāritra with its constituent Vratas and their complements and supplements; when practising, see that your heart is not vitiated by any improper motive; look upon the Çāritra not as activities leading to the gain of any worldly good nor even as moral or religious activities externally appended to your self; but feel, realise and be absorbed in the idea that it constitutes the very essence of your Soul or Personality.

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Write to:—

Jaina Sāhitya Vikāsa Maṇḍala
112, Swami Vivekanand Marg
Ville Parle, Bombay 400 056.