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प्रशस्तिश्लोकाः पृ० ३० ।

4. TRANSLATION

On the Organ of Knowledge

pp. 33-70.

(The numerals indicate the para)

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INTRODUCTION

About five years ago, I wrote in the preface of my work, *Jaina Ethics* : “the metaphysical Reality or Truth of logical coherence must remain merely a theoretical possibility unless it is translated into good of life through right living. In fact, the reality or truth is supra-logical and can be better realized by living it practically than by speculating on it intellectually.”

Little did I know that I myself may have to write one day on the ‘truth of logical coherence’ from the Jaina point of view. I had an occasion to guide a *Jaina* nun in the intricacies of the *Jaina Tarka Bhāṣā* of *Ācārya Yaśovijaya*. I was attracted by the maturity and depth of the work. Therefore, when Dr. R. C. Pandey, Professor and Head of the Department of Buddhist Studies, University of Delhi, Delhi, suggested that I should take up the translation of this work and when *M/S Moti Lal Banarasidass* offered to publish my translation with annotations, I gladly took up the work.

This effort of mine is humble in more than one way. In the first place, I have had no opportunity to study the subject of *Jaina* logic at the feet of a qualified *Guru* and as *Pt. Sukha Lala Ji* in his introduction to *Jaina Tarka Bhāṣā* has observed,¹ “it is not possible to follow a work like *Jaina Tarka Bhāṣā* without having a certain back-ground of the subject” and as *Dr. Satakari Mookerjee* has made the same observation regarding the *Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā*,² my attempt to write a commentary on the *Jaina Tarka Bhāṣā* is indeed a courageous step. My only help, however, in this task have been the works of my predecessors. Though all such works have been noted in the bibliography, special mention, however, may be made of the works of *Pt. Sukhalalji* whom I have followed in my *text* and whose notes on the *Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā* have been my guide throughout

1. PP. 8-9.

2. *Mookerjee, Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, preface, p. XI.

the work. In fact for the depth with which *Pt. Sukhalal Ji* has approached the problem of *Jaina logic*, it is very difficult for anybody to write anything on *Jaina logic* without being largely influenced by his works. No better compliments to *Pt. Sukhlal Ji* can be paid than that of *Dr. Satakari Mookerjee* : '*Pt. Sukhalal Ji* is the most learned man in the *Jaina* community and one of the foremost scholars of India. His knowledge of the *Buddhist*, *Jaina* and *Nyāya* systems is astounding and this has enabled him to edit the master pieces of *Jaina Philosophy* with perfect mastery and accuracy. The world will remain indebted to him for his contributions. He is one of the few intellectual stalwarts in the traditional field of Sanskrit scholarship that still are left to us'.¹

The development of the art of logic is rather a late phenomenon. This art of logic in India is invariably connected with religion and spiritualism. Still it has been claimed that it is a separate branch of learning.² The fact the science of logic is claimed to be a source of equanimity in misery and pleasure³ brings in very near to spiritualism,⁴ though this fact has perhaps escaped the notice of the classical authors. The ancient people, however, were conscious of the desirability⁵ as well as non-desirability⁶ of logic. This contradiction can be solved by understanding that the Reality is supra-logical but not illogical. The orthodox authors have perhaps not mentioned clearly this point also. The logic can take us to a certain point and is, therefore, useful, but because it cannot take us beyond a certain point, it becomes useless and it also becomes harmful when we insist that it should lead us to the Ultimate Reality. It may be said in other words that from spiritual point of view the utility of logic consists in showing the futility of logic for realisation of the Ultimate.

1. Mookerjee, *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, preface. p. XIV.

2. Cf *Nyāyabhāṣya*. 1.1.1.

3. *Arthaśāstra*, 1.2 व्यसनेऽभ्युदये च बुद्धिमवस्थापयति Also *Nītivākya-mṛta*, 5.56. व्यसनेषु न विधीदति नाभ्युदयेन विकार्यते ।

4. *Gītā*, 2.38.

5. *Rāmāyaṇa* (Ayodhyā kāṇḍa), 100.39; and *Mahābhārata* (*Śāntiparva*), 180.47.49. and *Manusmṛti* 11.106.

6. *Yājñavalkyasmṛti*, 1.3 and *Arthaśāstra*, chapter 2.

Whatever the position, it is a fact that there has been a tussle between the two view-points—the pro-logic and the anti-logic. The Jainas, true to their philosophy of neutrality, kept themselves aloof from all tussles in the beginning, but ultimately they had also to develop a science of logic of their own. This became necessary to defend oneself from the attacks of the opponents, who had begun challenging the rationality of the Jaina viewpoint. Not only this but it might have been also felt that a creed needs to be presented in an appealing form so that it could become popular. All scholars of philosophy, therefore, devoted themselves to the science of logic.

As far as the Jainas are concerned, they could find the basis for their system of logic in their scriptures themselves. It is but natural, because any thinking is, after all, based on some logic; that it may not have been systematised, is a different question. The *Jaina* logicians rightly caught the spirit of *Jaina* scriptures when they said that the main theme of the Jainism is non-absolutism (*anekāntavāda*) and that every statement is to be accepted only relatively true (*syādvāda*).

Pandit *Dalsukhbhai Malavaniya* has shown how we can find the germs of non-absolutism in the *Jaina* scriptures¹ and we need not repeat it here. Similarly, he has also dealt with the seven-fold statement, as found in the *Jaina* scriptures². The theory of the partial point of view (*Text*, chapter II) has also its origin in the *Jaina* scriptures.³

The other topics discussed in our *text* are also mostly dealt with in the *Jaina* scriptures. The five types of knowledge (*Text*, pp. 2-8) are mentioned by the *Bhagavatsūtra*⁴ and the *Sthānāṅgasūtra*,⁵ in addition to the *Nandīsūtra* which discusses only the varieties of knowledge in detail. Our author, *Yaśovijaya*, has mainly followed *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* in this context. As regards other topics, *Anuyogadvāra*⁶ mentions four types of

1. Āgamayuga kā Jaina Darśana, Agra, 1966, pp 51-91.

2. Ibid, pp. 92-115.

3. Ibid, pp. 114-124.

4. 88.2.317.

5. Sūtra, 77.

6. Sūtra, 59.

organ of knowledge (*Text*. 1.3 and 1-24). The three types of the inference, mentioned in the *Jaina* scriptures¹ are replaced by two varieties of our text (1.34). The same is the case with Hindu logic also where the *Nyāyasūtra* gives the same three varieties² as given in the *Jaina* scriptures and the later books like *Tarkasaṅgraha* mention the same two varieties as given in our *Text*. The *Jaina* scriptures also mention five types of causes³ (Cf text 1.52 and 1.54). The other tradition mentioned in the *Sthānāṅgasūtra*⁴ is nearer to the description of our *text*. Our text (1.50) has accepted only two parts of syllogism whereas *Bhadrabāhu* in his *Daśavaikālikaniryukti*⁵ has given a syllogism consisting of ten parts. The art of debate, which occupied an important place not only in the *Jaina* scriptures⁶ but in the ancient Hindu logic also⁷, was later on neglected in both the traditions. We, therefore, refrain from giving the details about this aspect.

The above account is based on the *Jaina āgamas* which assume their present form in 533 A.D. (according to the followers of *Śkaṇḍila*) or 466 A.D. (according to the followers of *Nagārjuna*).⁸ There are some authors, who are placed earlier than this period, and who have contributed to the development of *Jaina* logic. The first of such authors is *Kundakundācārya* who is generally placed in the middle of the 3rd century A.D.⁹

Ācārya Kundakunda justified¹⁰ the special meaning attributed to the term 'direct perception' by the *Jaina* logicians. (*Text*—1.3 and 1.4) As regards the concept of omniscience (*Text* 1.21) he made the remarkable statement that from real point of view the omniscient knows only the self.¹¹ As regards the seven-fold statement, *Kundakundācārya* agrees with

1. *Āgama Yuga Kā Jaina Darśana*, p. 148.
2. *Nyāyasūtra*. 1.1.5.
3. *Āgama Yuga Kā Jaina Darśana*, p. 151-152.
4. See *Ibid*, p. 159.
5. *Gāthā*, 92 ff and also *Gāthā*, 137.
6. *Āgama Yuga Kā Jaina Darśana*, Chapter IV.
7. Cf. *Nyāyasūtra*, 1.1.1.
8. *Bhārgava*, D., *Jaina Ethics*, p. 228. For detail see pp. 223-228.
9. *Ibid*, p. 247.
10. *Pravacanasāra*, 1.57, 58.
11. *Niyamasāra*, 158.

out *text* (1.63) in placing the inexplicable mode of saying at the fourth place¹ but in the *Pravacanasāra*² he himself places it in the third place.

Next comes *Umāsvāmī* (known as *Umāsvāti* in the *Śvetāmbara* tradition) who is placed in the third century A.D.³ He mentions along with the organs of knowledge the partial view point also.⁴ He, however, mentions only five view points⁵ in place of seven in our text (2.1). This is, of course according to the *Śvetāmbara* reading. The *Digambara* reading is different and gives all the seven view points. *Umāsvāti*, in his auto-commentary on the *Tattvārthasūtra*, explains that the partial view points do not represent any Jain subjects or non-Jaina schools but are only the different aspects of looking at an object.⁶ After *Umāsvāti* come *Ācārya Siddhasena* and *Sāmantabhadra*, both of whom could be placed near about fourth century A. D. Here we need not go into the controversy as to who of them preceded. It appears that this controversy has assumed a sectarian colour, as all the *Śvetāmbara* scholars insist on the precedence of *Siddhasena* whereas the *Digambara* scholars insist on the precedence of *Samantabhadra*. The question is considered to be important because one, who preceded of the two, would be given the credit of laying the foundation of Jain logic. We, however, do not enter this controversy.

The definition of the organ of knowledge in our *Text* (1. 1) was given by *Siddhasena*.⁷ He also gave the definition of cause⁸ which is substantially the same as given in our *Text*. (1. 35). He also made distinction between internal concomitance and external concomitance (*Text*; 1. 37). The distinction of the empirical and the transcendental perceptual cognition (*Text*, 1.4) was also made by him for the first time. Besides,

1. *Pañcāstikāya*, 14.

2. 2.23.

3. *Bhargava*, D., *Jaina Ethics*, p. 251.

4. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 1.6.

5. *Ibid*, 1.34. नंगमसङ्ग्रहव्यवहारजुसूत्रशब्दनयाः ।

6. Auto-commentary, *Ibid.*, 1.35.

7. *Nyāyāvatāra*, I

8. *Ibid*, 22.

9. *Ibid*, 20.

he also wrote on such famous topics of logic as inference-for-the-self and inference-for-others. the fallacies of the thesis, cause, homogeneous example and heterogeneous example and the resultant of the organ of knowledge.

The other work of *Siddhasena*, *Sanmati prakaraṇa*, describes the partial view point, knowledge and indeterminate intuition and the different schools from the point of view of non-absolutism. The inclusion of different non-Jaina schools in different partial view points was first initiated by *Siddhasena*¹ (Cf. *Text* 2—11).

Samantabhadra in his *Āptamīmāṃsā* has laid emphasis on non-absolutism and seven-fold statements. His definition of organ of knowledge is very much similar to that of our *Text* (1. 1).² The main emphasis of *Samantabhadra* has been to show the irrelevance of absolutism. In this description he has shown the irrationality of the non-Jaina system as also the possibility of reconciliation of contradictory view points. Another important work from our point of view is the *Viśeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya* of *Jinabhadra Gaṇi* who flourished from 484-588 A.D.³ Much of the description of 5 types of knowledge in our *Text* is nothing but a summary of the *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya bṛhadvṛtti*. Similarly the portion on partial point of view is also influenced by it.

Another author who laid down the foundation of a regular system of Jaina logic was *Akalaṅka* who has been placed in about 760 A.D.⁴ *Akalaṅka* has the same place in the Jaina philosophy as *Diṇnāga* and *Dharmakīrti* in the Buddhist philosophy. *Akalaṅka*'s influence on our *author* is seen specially in the description of partial point of view. It is also to be noted that the division of our *Text* into three chapters—organ of knowledge, partial point of view and symbols—is also taken from *Akalaṅka*'s *Laghiyastrayī*. After *Akalaṅka* came *Vidyānanda* who commented upon both—*Samantabhadra* and *Akalaṅka*. His influence on our *Text* is clear on the chapter on partial point of view. He has been placed in the 9th century A.D.⁵

1. *Sanmati prakaraṇa*, 3.47-49.

2. *Svayambhūstotra*, 63.

3. *Vidyābhūṣana Satisacandra*, History of Indian Logic, p. 181.

4. *Ibid*, p. 185.

5. *Vidyābhūṣana*, S. C., A History of Indian Logic, p. 186.

Ācārya Mānikyanandī who wrote *Parikṣāmukha*, a standard Text book on *Jaina* logic, came after *Akalaṅka* and is placed in 10th century A.D.¹ *Anantavīrya* who wrote *Prameyaratna-mālā*, a commentary on *Parikṣāmukha*, says that he churned the nectar of Logic—out of the ocean of the speech of *Akalaṅka*.² The book is divided into six chapters. In the first chapter the division of *Pramāṇa* has been given in the same way as in our *Text* (1.24). The definition of inference of our *Text* (1.34) has been directly taken from *Parikṣāmukha*.³ *Mānikyanandī* has given like our *Text* many subdivisions of cause. He writes a different chapter on fallacy giving examples of fallacies of eight types of organs of knowledge. Our *Text* has followed *Akalaṅka* in dividing his chapter whereas in style it comes nearer to the *Sūtra* style of *Parikṣāmukha*.

Mānikyanandī is followed by great commentators *Prabhā-candra* (11th century A.D.)⁴ who wrote *Prameyakamalamārtanda*] on *Parikṣāmukha* and *Nyāyakumudacandra* on *Laghiyastrayī*. These commentaries are very voluminous and deal with the non-*Jaina* systems in detail. Our author has a limited purpose of presenting *Jaina* logic in concise form in the new terminology of neo-logic and, therefore, he could not make much use of these commentaries in his work. Similarly the influence of the voluminous commentary (1000 A.D.) of *Abhayadeva Sūri* on *Sanmati Tarka* is also negligible.

The greatest influence on our *Text* is, however, that of *Pramāṇanayatatvālokaṅkāra* of *Deva Sūri* (1086-1159 A.D.)⁵ Our *Text* can, in fact, be said to be just a recast of this work. It may be argued that if it is so, our author cannot be said to be an original thinker. I would like to reproduce the words of Dr. Satakari Mookerjee in this connection. "As regards the originality of thought which is so highly praised in Europe and in the modern universities of India, our ancient writers did not set an inordinate value on it. It was as much a matter of

1. *Sāstri Kailāśacandra, Jaina Nyāya* p. 38.

2. प्रकलङ्कवचोऽभोधेरुद्वेगे येन घीमता । न्यायविद्यामूलं तस्मै नमो माणिक्यनन्दिने ॥
—*Prameyaratna-mālā*, 2.

3. *Sūtra* 9.

4. *Sāstri, Kailāśa Chandra, Jaina Nyāya*, p. 39.

5. *Vidyābhūṣana, S. C., A History of Indian Logic*, p. 198.

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1. *Śāstrī Kailāfacandra, Jaina Nyāya* p. 33.

2. अकलङ्कवचोऽम्भोघेरुद्ग्रे येन धीमता । न्यायविद्यामृतं तस्मै नमो माणिक्यनन्दिने ॥
—*Prameyaratna-mālā*, 2.

3. *Sūtra* 9.

4. *Śāstrī, Kailāśa Chandra, Jaina Nyāya*, p. 39.

5. *Vidyābhūṣana, S. C., A History of Indian Logic*, p. 198.

minor importance with them as originality of verbal expression. A serious work of philosophical topic did not hold an isolated position in India. It was rather a link in the expanding chain of philosophical speculation. And what was the object of serious concern was fidelity to the fundamentals of the schools and originality was more or less suspect with adherence of the system as rather furnishing a pit for error and misconception. We must not, therefore, expect either originality of expression or of thought in the sense of abrupt departure from the fundamental tenets which give the school a stamp of the distinctive individuality."¹

Deva Sūri also wrote an auto-commentary *Syādvāda-ratnākara* on *Pramāṇanayatattvālokāṅkāra*. The influence of *Deva Sūri's* word on *Jaina-Tarka bhāṣā* can be very well known by looking at the footnotes of this work edited by *Pandit Sukha Lal Ji*.

Except some other minor *Jaina* logicians who preceded *Yaśovijaya* mention may be made of *Hemacandra Sūri* and *Haribhadra Sūri*. *Hemacandrasūri's* work *Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā* (1088-1172 A.D.)² has been very ably commented upon by *Pandita Sukhalalji* and translated by *Satakari Mookerjee*. *Haribhadra Sūri* (about 1120 A.D.)³ is said to have written 140 works. He is said to have written a commentary on *Anekānta Jayapatakā*. Mention may also be made of *Dharmabhūṣana* (1600 A.D.)⁴ who is the author of *Nyāyadīpikā* and has been mentioned by name in our *Text* (1.33. L.25).

And lastly comes our author *Yaśovijaya Gaṇi* (1608-1688 A.D.)⁵ whose date and life history can be fortunately known from *Suśaṅkavelibhāsa*, a work written in ancient *Gujarati* by his contemporary *Kāntivijaya Gaṇi*. He was born in *Kanodum* near *Kalola* in *Gujarata* and died at *Dabhoi* in 1688 A.D. His father's name was *Nārāyaṇa* and mother's name was *Sobhagade*. He was a disciple of *Naya Vijaya* who was third in line to *Harivijaya* (1526-1595 A.D.) who was contemporary of *Moghul*

1. *Mookerjee Satakari*, Preface, *Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā*, p. X.
2. *Vidyā bhūṣana S. C.*, A History of Indian Logic, p. 205.
3. *Ibid*, p. 208.
4. *Ibid*, p. 215.
5. *Ibid*, p. 217.

Emperor, Akbar. *Hari Vijaya's* disciple was *Kalyāṇa Vijaya*. *Kalyāṇa Vijaya's* disciple was *Lābhavijaya*. And *Yaśovijaya's* teacher *Naya Vijaya* was the disciple of *Lābhavijaya*. A businessman, *Dhanaji Suri*, sent *Yaśovijaya* to *Kāśī* for higher studies in 1626 A.D. He made a special study of logic there and got the titles of *Nyāya Viśārada* and *Nyāyācārya*.¹ He himself says that he has written one hundred works. A list of seventy-two works of *Yaśovijaya* has been given by Pandit *Sukhalal Ji*. Forty of these works are fully available, seven works are partly available and twentyfive works are not available at all. Out of these works written by *Yaśovijaya*, it would be noticed that sixteen works are on Jaina logic, out of which only eight are available today. Out of these *Nayarahasya* has been referred to in our *text* also (p. 29.6.8). Out of the remaining works, *Nyāya-khaṇḍa-khāḍya* is written on the style of *Khaṇḍana khaṇḍa khāḍya* and *Aṣṭasāhasrī vṛtti* is a gloss on the *Aṣṭasāhasrī* of Vidyānanda. *Nyāyakhaṇḍakhāḍya* deals with soul, emancipation, momentariness, origination, destruction, non-absolutism, class and individual, space and time, determinant concomitant and determinate concomitant etc. It mentions amongst others, *Samantabhadra*, *Gandhastī*, *Sammati*, *Miśra*, *Bhaṭṭa*, *Śrīdhara*, *Udayana*, *Nārāyaṇācārya*, *Śiromaṇi*, *Didhiti-kāra Vardhamāna*, and *Guṇānanda*. Similarly *Aṣṭasāhasrī-vivaraṇa* mentions *Vācaspati*, *Maṇḍana Miśra*, *Prajñākara*, *Hemacandra*, *Vakka-kṛavartī*, *Vedānti-paśu*, *Kusumāñjali*, *Gurumata*, *Murāribhaṭṭa*, *Murāri*, *Miśra*, *Gautamīya*, *Bhaṭṭācārya*, *Jarannaiyāyika*, *Raghudeva Bhaṭṭācārya*, *Bhūṣaṇasāra* etc. This shows the comparative and critical outlook of *Yaśovijaya*. It is remarkable that he wrote not only on *Aṣṭasāhasrī* which is a work by a *Digambara* author, who has been criticised in our *text* also (1.2), but also commented upon a non-Jaina work, *Yogasūtra* of *Patañjali*. This indicates his non-sectarian approach. Another work is *Nyāyāloka*, whose contents are given as follows by *Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa* : soul, emancipation, inference, testimony, direct knowledge, indirect knowledge, validity of internal things, inherence, negation, ether, substance, etc.³ This work also refers

1. *Jaina Tarka-Bhāṣā*, p. 30. verse 4.

2. *Vidyābhūṣaṇa S. C. A History of Indian logic*, p. 220.

3. *Ibid*, p. 219.

to many *Jaina* and *non-Jaina* works.¹

Coming to *Jaina-tarka-bhāṣā* we have already noted above that it takes its scheme from *Akalaṅka*. The title of this book is common with the work of the same name of *Mokṣākara* and *Keśava Miśra*. The *Buddhist-Tarka-Bhāṣā* of *Mokṣākara* is divided in chapters. The names of the three chapters in *Jaina Tarka Bhāṣā* are, as already indicated, taken from *Laghiyastrayī* of *Akalaṅka*, but the last chapter on symbol does not follow *Laghiyastrayī* but the *Śvetāmbara* tradition as given in the *Vīṣṇavaśyaka-Bhāṣya*. As regards the work of logic, two works — *Nyāyakusumāñjali* the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* — have been made use of.

I have separately assessed the value of those portions of *Jaina-Tarka-Bhāṣā*, where Yaśovijaya has contradicted the view points of his opponent.² My conclusion is this that *Yaśovijaya* has mastered not only the *Jaina* work but also the *non-Jaina* works. His representation of the view points of his opponents is honest and faithful. His view point is objective and his style is distinctively his own. His method is direct, and he does not believe in pedantry. While summarising, he leaves the non-essential and concentrates on the essentials. At places he has shown his originality also, even though his aim was to write a handy text book for beginners. As an instance, we may refer to the *Text* where validity of recollection has been established (1-24). At places we also find that in his zeal to summarise, he has not only made his work too difficult but also neglected the essential part of the original work from which he was summarising.

With these words I invite my readers to go through the work. I have tried to be as authentic as possible in my translation and notes and I do hope that the book, though small in volume, would prove a safe guide for the beginners and a study of this book alone would serve as a good introduction to other higher works of *Jaina* logic.

Dayanand Bhargava

1. *Vidyābhūṣana*, S. C. History of Indian logic, p. 219.

2. Journal of the Department of Sanskrit, University of Delhi, Vol. 1. No. 1, December, 1971.

॥ जै न त र्क भा षा ॥

१. प्रमाणपरिच्छेदः ।

ऐन्द्रधृन्दनतं नत्वा जिनं तत्त्वार्थदेशिनम् ।
प्रमाणनयनिक्षेपैस्तर्कभाषां तनोम्यहम् ॥

[१. प्रमाणसामान्यस्य लक्षणनिरूपणम् ।]

§ १. तत्र-स्वपरव्यवसायि ज्ञानं प्रमाणम्-स्वम् आत्मा ज्ञानस्यैव स्वरूपमित्यर्थः, परः तस्मादन्योऽर्थ इति यावत्, तौ व्यवस्यति यथास्थितत्वेन निश्चिनोतीत्ये- 5
वंशीलं स्वपरव्यवसायि । अत्र दर्शनेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय ज्ञानपदम् । संशयविपर्ययान-
ध्यवसायेषु तद्वारणाय व्यवसायिपदम् । परोक्षबुद्ध्यादिवादिनां मीमांसकादीनाम्,
बाह्यार्थापलापिनां ज्ञानाद्यद्वैतवादिनां च मतनिरासाय स्वपरेति स्वरूपविशेषणार्थमुक्तम् ।
ननु यद्येवं सम्यग्ज्ञानमेव प्रमाणमिष्यते तदा किमन्यत् तत्फलं वाच्यमिति चेत् ;
सत्यम् ; स्वार्थव्यवसितेरेव तत्फलत्वात् । नन्वेवं प्रमाणे स्वपरव्यवसायित्वं न स्यात्, 10
प्रमाणस्य परव्यवसायित्वात् फलस्य च स्वव्यवसायित्वादिति चेत् ; न ; प्रमाण-फलयोः
कथञ्चिदभेदेन तदुपपत्तेः । इत्थं चात्मव्यापाररूपप्रयोगेन्द्रियमेव प्रमाणमिति स्थितम् ;
न ह्यव्यापृत आत्मा स्पर्शादिप्रकाशको भवति, निर्व्यापारेण कारकेण क्रियाजननायो-
गात्, मसृणतूलिकादिसन्निकर्षेण सुषुप्तस्यापि उत्प्रसङ्गाच्च ।

§ २. केचित्तु-

15

“ततोऽर्थग्रहणाकारा शक्तिर्ज्ञानमिहात्मनः

करणात्वेन निर्दिष्टा न विरुद्धा कथञ्चन ॥ १ ॥”

[तत्त्वार्थश्लोकवा० १.१.२२]

इति-लब्धीन्द्रियमेवार्थग्रहणशक्तिलक्षणं प्रमाण सङ्गिरन्ते; तदपेक्षलम् ; उपयोगात्मना

करणेन लब्धेः फले व्यवधानात्, शक्तीनां परोक्षत्वाभ्युपगमेन करण-फलज्ञानयोः परोक्ष-
प्रत्यक्षत्वाभ्युपगमे प्राभाकरमतप्रवेशाच्च । अथ ज्ञानशक्तिरप्यात्मनि स्वाश्रये परिच्छिन्ने
द्रव्यार्थतः प्रत्यक्षेति न दोष इति चेत् ; न; द्रव्यद्वारा प्रत्यक्षत्वेन सुखादिवत् स्वसंवि-
दितत्वाव्यवस्थितेः, 'ज्ञानेन घटं जानामि' इति करणोल्लेखानुपपत्तेश्च ; न हि कलश-
5 समाकलनवेलायां द्रव्यार्थतः प्रत्यक्षाणामपि कुशलकपालादीनामुल्लेखोऽस्तीति ।

[२. प्रत्यक्षं लक्षयित्वा सांख्यबहारिक-पारमार्थिकत्वाभ्यां तद्विभजनम् ।]

§ ३. तद् द्विभेदम्-प्रत्यक्षम्, परोक्षं च । अक्षम्-इन्द्रियं प्रतिगतम् कार्यत्वे-
नाश्रितं प्रत्यक्षम्, अथवाऽऽनुते ज्ञानात्मना सर्वार्थान् व्याप्नोतीत्यौणादिकनिपातनात्
अक्षो जीवः तं प्रतिगतं प्रत्यक्षम् । न चैवमवध्यादौ मत्यादौ च प्रत्यक्षव्यपदेशो न
10 स्यादिति वाच्यम् ; यतो व्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तमेवैतत्, प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तं तु एकार्थसमवायिनाऽ-
नेनोपलक्षितं स्पष्टतावच्चमिति । स्पष्टता चानुमानादिभ्योऽतिरेकेण विशेषप्रकाशनमि-
त्यदोषः । अक्षेभ्योऽक्षाद्वा परतो वर्तत इति परोक्षम्, अस्पष्टं ज्ञानमित्यर्थः ।

§ ४. प्रत्यक्षं द्विविधम्-सांख्यबहारिकम्, पारमार्थिकं चेति । समीचीनो बाधा-
रहितो व्यवहारः प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिलोकाभिलाषलक्षणः संख्यबहारः, तत्प्रयोजनकं सांख्य-
15 हारिकम्-अपारमार्थिकमित्यर्थः, यथा अस्मदादिप्रत्यक्षम् । तद्धीन्द्रियानिन्द्रियव्यवहि-
तात्मव्यापारसम्पाद्यत्वात्परमार्थतः परोक्षमेव, धूमान् अग्निज्ञानवद् व्यवधानाविशेषात् ।
किञ्च, असिद्धानैकान्तिकविरुद्धानुमानाभासवत् संशयविपर्ययानध्यवसायसम्भवात्,
सदनुमानवत् सङ्केतस्मरणादिपूर्वकनिश्चयसम्भवाच्च परमार्थतः परोक्षमेवैतत् ।

[३. सांख्यबहारिकप्रत्यक्षस्य निरूपणम्, मतिश्रुतयोर्विवेकश्च ।]

20 § ५. एतच्च द्विविधम्-इन्द्रियजम्, अनिन्द्रियजं च । तत्रेन्द्रियजं चक्षुरादि-
जनितम्, अनिन्द्रियजं च मनोजन्म । यद्यपीन्द्रियजज्ञानेऽपि मनो व्यापिपतिः तथापि
तत्रेन्द्रियस्यैवासाधारणकारणत्वाददोषः । द्वयमपीदं मतिश्रुतभेदाद् द्विधा । तत्रेन्द्रिय-
मनोनिमित्तं श्रुताननुसारि ज्ञानं मतिज्ञानम्, श्रुतानुसारि च श्रुतज्ञानम् । श्रुतानुसा-
रित्वं च-सङ्केतविषयपरोपदेशं श्रुतग्रन्थं वाऽनुसृत्य वाच्यवाचकभावेन संयोज्य 'घटो
25 घटः' इत्याद्यन्तर्जन्या(र्जल्पा)कारग्राहित्वम् । नन्वेवमवग्रह एव मतिज्ञानं स्यान्न
त्वीहादयः, तेषां शब्दोल्लेखसहितत्वेन श्रुतत्वप्रसङ्गादिति चेत् ; न; श्रुतनिश्चिताना-
मप्यवग्रहादीनां सङ्केतकाले श्रुतानुसारित्वेऽपि व्यवहारकाले तदननुसारित्वात्, अभ्या-
सपाटववशेन श्रुतानुसरणमन्तरेणापि विकल्पपरम्परापूर्वकविविधवचनप्रवृत्तिदर्शनात् ।
अङ्गोपाङ्गादौ शब्दाद्यवग्रहणे च श्रुतानुसारित्वान्मतित्वमेव, यस्तु तत्र श्रुतानुसारी
30 प्रत्ययस्तत्र श्रुतत्वमेवेत्यवधेयम् ।

[४. मतिज्ञानस्य अवग्रहादिभेदेन चातुर्विध्यप्रकटनम् ।]

§ ६. मतिज्ञानम्—अवग्रहेहापायधारणाभेदाच्चतुर्विधम् । अवकृष्टो ग्रहः—अवग्रहः । स द्विविधः—व्यञ्जनावग्रहः, अर्थावग्रहश्च । व्यज्यते प्रकटीक्रियतेऽर्थोऽनेनेति व्यञ्जनम्—कदम्बपुष्पगोलकादिरूपाणामन्तर्निवृत्तीन्द्रियाणां शब्दादिविषयपरिच्छेदहेतु-शक्तिविशेषलक्षणपुष्पकरणेन्द्रियम्, शब्दादिपरिणतद्रव्यनिकुरुष्वम्, तदुभयसम्बन्धश्च । 5 ततो व्यञ्जनेन व्यञ्जनस्यावग्रहो व्यञ्जनावग्रह इति मध्यमपदलोपी समासः । अथ अज्ञानम् अयं बधिरादीनां श्रोत्रशब्दादिसम्बन्धवत् तत्काले ज्ञानानुपलम्भादिति चेत् ; न; ज्ञानोपादानत्वेन तत्र ज्ञानत्योपचारात्, अन्तर्ध्यावग्रहरूपज्ञानदर्शनेन तत्कालेऽपि चेष्टाविशेषाद्यनुमेयस्वप्नज्ञानादितुल्याव्यक्तज्ञानानुमानाद्वा एकतेजोऽवयववत् तस्य तनुत्वेनानुपलक्षणात् । 10

[५. व्यञ्जनावग्रहस्य चातुर्विध्यप्रदर्शने मनश्चक्षुषोरप्राप्यकारित्वसमर्थनम् ।]

§ ७. स च नयन-मनोवर्जैन्द्रियभेदाच्चतुर्धा, नयन-मनसोरप्राप्यकारित्वेन व्यञ्जनावग्रहासिद्धेः, अन्यथा तयोर्ज्ञेयकृतानुग्रहोपघातपात्रत्वे जलानलदर्शन-चिन्तनयोः क्लेद-दाहापत्तेः । रवि-चन्द्राद्यवलोकने चक्षुषोऽनुग्रहोपघातौ दृष्टावेवेति चेत् ; न; प्रथमावलोकनसमये तददर्शनात्, अनवरतावलोकने च प्राप्तेन रविकिरणादिनोपघातस्या- 15 (स्य), नैसर्गिकसौम्यादिगुणे चन्द्रादौ चावलोकिते उपघाताभावादानुग्रहाभिमानस्योपपत्तेः । मृतनष्टादिवस्तुचिन्तने, इष्टसङ्गमविभवलाभादिचिन्तने च जायमानौ दौर्बल्योरः क्षतादि-वदनविकासरोमाश्चोद्गमादिलिङ्गकावुपघातानुग्रहौ न मनसः, किन्तु मनस्त्वपरिणतानिष्टेष्टपुद्गलनिचयरूपद्रव्यमनोऽवष्टम्भेन हृन्निरुद्धवायुभेषजाभ्यामिव जीवस्यैवेति न ताभ्यां मनसः प्राप्यकारित्वसिद्धिः । ननु यदि मनो विषयं प्राप्य न परिच्छिनत्ति तदा 20 कथं प्रमुप्तस्य 'मेवादी गतं मे मनः' इति प्रत्यय इति चेत् ; न; मेवादी शरीरस्येव मनसो गमनस्वप्नस्यासत्यत्वात्, अन्यथा विबुद्धस्य कुसुमपरिमलाद्यध्वजनितपरिश्रमाद्यनुग्रहोपघातप्रसङ्गात् । ननु स्वप्नानुभूतजिनस्त्रात्रदर्शन-समीहितार्थालाभयोरनुग्रहोपघातौ विबुध(द्व)स्य सतो दृश्येते एवेति चेत् ; दृश्येतां स्वप्नविज्ञानकृतौ तौ, स्वप्नविज्ञानकृतं क्रियाफलं तु तृप्त्यादिकं नास्ति, यतो विषयप्राप्तिरूपा प्राप्यकारिता मनसो युज्येतेति ब्रूमः । 25 क्रियाफलमपि स्वप्ने व्यञ्जनविसर्गलक्षणं दृश्यत एवेति चेत् ; तत् तीव्राध्यवसायकृतम्, न तु कामिनीनिधुवनक्रियाकृतमिति को दोषः ? ननु स्त्यानर्धिनिद्रोदये गीतादिकं शृण्वतो व्यञ्जनावग्रहो मनसोऽपि भवतीति चेत् ; न; तदा स्वप्नाभिमानिनोऽपि श्रवणाद्यवग्रहेणैवोपपत्तेः । ननु 'च्यवमानो न जानाति' इत्यादिवचनात् सर्वस्यापि लब्ध-स्थोपयोगस्यासङ्ख्येयसमयमानत्वात्, प्रतिसमयं च मनोद्रव्याणां ग्रहणात् विषयमस- 30 म्प्राप्तस्यापि मनसो देहादनिर्गतस्य तस्य च स्वसन्निहितहृदयादिचिन्तनवेलायां कथं

- व्यञ्जनावग्रहो न भवतीति चेत्; शृणु; ग्रहणं हि मनः, न तु ग्राह्यम् । ग्राह्यवस्तुग्रहणे च व्यञ्जनावग्रहो भवतीति न मनोद्रव्यग्रहणे तदवकाशः; सन्निहितहृदयादिदेशग्रह-
वेलायामपि नैतदवकाशः, बाह्यार्थापेक्षयैव प्राप्यकारित्वाप्राप्यकारित्वव्यवस्थानात् ,
क्षयोपशमपाटवेन मनसः प्रथममर्थानुपलब्धिकालासम्भवाद्वा; श्रोत्रादीन्द्रियव्यापार-
5 कालेऽपि मनोव्यापारस्य व्यञ्जनावग्रहोत्तरमेवाभ्युपगमात् , 'मनुतेऽर्थान् मन्यन्तेऽर्थाः
अनेनेति वा मनः' इति मनःशब्दस्यान्वर्थत्वात्, अर्थभाषणं विना भाषाया इव अर्थ-
मननं विना मनसोऽप्रवृत्तेः । तदेवं नयनमनसोर्न व्यञ्जनावग्रह इति स्थितम् ।

[६. अर्थावग्रहस्य निरूपणम् ।]

- § ८. स्वरूपनामजातिक्रियागुणद्रव्यकल्पनारहितं सामान्यग्रहणम् अर्थावग्रहः ।
10 कथं तर्हि 'तेन शब्द इत्यवगृहीतः' इति सूत्रार्थः, तत्र शब्दाद्युल्लेखराहित्याभावादिति
चेत्; न; 'शब्दः' इति वचनैव भणनात्, रूपरसादिविशेषव्यावृत्त्यनवधारणपरत्वाद्वा ।
यदि च 'शब्दोऽयम्' इत्यध्यवसायोऽवग्रहे भवेत् तदा शब्दोल्लेखस्यान्तर्मुहूर्त्तिकत्वादार्था-
वग्रहस्यैकसामा(म)यिकत्वं भज्येत । स्यान्मतम्—'शब्दोऽयम्' इति सामान्यविशेषग्रहणम-
प्यर्थावग्रह इष्यताम्, तदुत्तरम्—'प्रायो माधुर्यादयः शङ्खशब्दधर्मा इह, न तु शार्ङ्गधर्माः
15 खरकर्कशत्वादयः' इतीहात्पत्तेः—इति; मैवम्; अशब्दव्यावृत्त्या विशेषप्रतिभासेनास्या-
ऽप्ययत्वात् स्तोकग्रहणस्योत्तरोत्तरभेदापेक्षयाऽव्यवस्थितत्वात् । किञ्च, 'शब्दोऽयम्'
इति ज्ञान(नं) शब्दगतान्वयधर्मेषु रूपादिव्यावृत्तिपर्यालोचनरूपामीहां विनाऽनुपपन्नम्,
सा च नागृहीतेऽर्थे सम्भवतीति तद्ग्रहणं अस्मदभ्युपगतायावग्रहकालात् प्राक् प्रति-
पत्तव्यम्, स च व्यञ्जनावग्रहकालोऽर्थपरिशून्य इति यत्किञ्चिदेतत् । नन्वनन्तरम्—'क
20 एष शब्दः' इति शब्दत्वान्तरधर्मविषयकेहानिर्देशात् 'शब्दोऽयम्' इत्याकार एवाव-
ग्रहोऽभ्युपेय इति चेत्; न; 'शब्दः शब्दः' इति भाषकेणैव भणनात् अर्थावग्रहेऽव्यक्त-
शब्दश्रवणस्यैव सूत्रे निर्देशात्, अव्यक्तस्य च सामान्यरूपत्वादनकारोपयोगरूपस्य
चास्य तन्मात्रविषयत्वात् । यदि च व्यञ्जनावग्रह एवाव्यक्तशब्दग्रहणमिष्येत तदा
सोऽप्यर्थावग्रहः स्यात्, अर्थस्य ग्रहणात् ।

- 25 § ९. केचित्तु—'सङ्केतादिविकल्पविकलस्य जातमात्रस्य बालस्य सामान्यग्रह-
णम्, परिचितविषयस्य त्वाद्यसमय एव विशेषज्ञानमित्येतदपेक्षया 'तेन शब्द इत्यव-
गृहीतः' इति नानुपपन्नम्—इत्याहुः; तन्न; एवं हि व्यक्ततरस्य व्यक्तशब्दज्ञानमति-
क्रम्यापि सुबहुविशेषग्रहप्रसङ्गात् । न चैष्टापत्तिः; 'न पुनर्जानाति क एष शब्दः' इति
सूत्रावयवस्याविशेषेणोक्तत्वात्, प्रकृष्टमतेरपि शब्दं धर्मिणमगृहीत्वोत्तरोत्तरसुबहुधर्म-
30 ग्रहणानुपपत्तेश्च ।

§ १०. अन्ये तु—'आलोचनपूर्वकमर्थावग्रहमाचक्षते, तत्रालोचनमव्यक्तसामा-

न्यग्राहि, अर्थावग्रहस्त्वितरव्यावृत्तवस्तुस्वरूपग्राहीति न सूत्रानुपपत्तिः—इति; तदसत्; यत आलोचनं व्यञ्जनावग्रहात् पूर्वं स्यात्, पश्चाद्वा, स एव वा ? नाद्यः; अर्थव्यञ्जन-सम्बन्धं विना तदयोगात् । न द्वितीयः; व्यञ्जनावग्रहान्त्यसमयेऽर्थावग्रहस्यैवोत्पादा-दालोचनानवकाशात् । न तृतीयः; व्यञ्जनावग्रहस्यैव नामान्तरकरणात्, तस्य चार्थ-शून्यत्वेनार्थालोचनानुपपत्तेः । किञ्च, आलोचनेनेहां विना झटित्येवार्थावग्रहः कथं 5 जन्यताम् ? युगपच्चेहावग्रहौ पृथगसङ्ख्येयसमयमानौ कथं घटेताम् ? इति विचारणीयम् । नन्ववग्रहेऽपि क्षिप्रेतरादिभेदप्रदर्शनादसङ्ख्येयसमयमानत्वम्, विशेषविषयत्वं चाविरुद्ध-मिति चेत्; न; तत्त्वतस्तेषामपायभेदत्वात्, कारणे कार्योपचारमाश्रित्यावग्रहभेदत्वप्रति-पादनात्, अविशेषविषये विशेषविषयत्वस्यावास्तवत्वात् ।

§ ११. अथवा अवग्रहो द्विविधः—नैश्चयिकः, व्यावहारिकश्च । आद्यः सामा- 10 न्यमात्रग्राही, द्वितीयश्च विशेषविषयः तदुत्तरमुत्तरोत्तरधर्माकाङ्क्षारूपेहाप्रवृत्तेः, अन्यथा अवग्रहं विनेहानुत्थानप्रसङ्गात् अत्रैव क्षिप्रेतरादिभेदसङ्गतिः, अत एव चोपर्युपरि ज्ञान-प्रवृत्तिरूपसन्तानव्यवहार इति द्रष्टव्यम् ।

[७. ईहावायधारणानां क्रमशो निरूपणम् ।]

§ १२. अवगृहीतविशेषाकाङ्क्षणम्—ईहा, व्यतिरेकधर्मनिराकरणपरोऽन्वयधर्म- 15 घटनप्रवृत्तौ बोध इति यावत्, यथा—‘श्रोत्रग्राह्यत्वादिना प्रायोऽनेन शब्देन भवितव्यम्’ ‘मधुरत्वादिधर्मयुक्तत्वात् शाङ्खादिना’ वा इति । न चेयं संशय एव; तस्यैकत्र धर्मिणि विरुद्धनानार्थज्ञानरूपत्वात्, अस्याश्च निश्चयाभिमुखत्वेन विलक्षणत्वात् ।

§ १३. ईहितस्य विशेषनिर्णयोऽवायः, यथा—‘शब्द एवायम्’, ‘शाङ्ख एवायम्’ 20 इति वा ।

§ १४. स एव दृढतमावस्थापन्नो धारणा । सा च त्रिविधा—अविच्युतिः, स्मृतिः, वासना च । तत्रैकार्थोपयोगसातत्यानिवृत्तिः अविच्युतिः । तस्यैवार्थोपयोगस्य काला-न्तरे ‘तदेव’ इत्युल्लेखेन समुन्मीलनं स्मृतिः । अपायाहितः स्मृतिहेतुः संस्कारो वासना । द्वयोरवग्रहयोरवग्रहत्वेन च तिसृणां धारणानां धारणात्वेनोपग्रहान्न विभागव्याघातः ।

§ १५. केचित्तु—अपनयनमपायः, धरणं च धारणेति व्युत्पत्त्यर्थमात्रानुसारिणः— 25 ‘असद्गतार्थविशेषव्यतिरेकावधारणमपायः, सद्गतार्थविशेषावधारणं च धारणा’—इत्याहुः; तन्न; क्वचित्तदन्यव्यतिरेकपरामर्शात्, क्वचिदन्वयधर्मसमनुगमात्, क्वचित्तोभाभ्यामपि भवतोऽपायस्य निश्चयैकरूपेण भेदाभावात्, अन्यथा स्मृतेराधिक्येन मतेः पञ्चभेद-त्वप्रसङ्गात् । अथ नास्त्येव भवदभिमत धारणेति भेदचतुष्टया(य)व्याघातः; तथाहि—उपयोगोपरमे का नाम धारणा? उपयोगसातत्यलक्षणा अविच्युतिश्चापायान्नातिरिच्यते । 30

या च घटाद्युपयोगोपरमे सङ्ख्येयमसङ्ख्येयं वा कालं वासनाऽभ्युपगम्यते, या च 'तदेव' इतिलक्षणा स्मृतिः सा मत्पञ्चरूपा धारणा न भवति मत्पुपयोगस्य प्रागेवोपरतत्वात्, कालान्तरे जायमानोपयोगेऽप्यन्वयमुख्यां धारणायां स्मृत्यन्तर्भावादिति चेत्; न; अपायप्रवृत्त्यनन्तरं कचिदन्तर्गृह्यते यावदपायधाराप्रवृत्तिदर्शनात् अविच्युते; पूर्वापर-
 5 दर्शनानुसन्धानस्य 'तदेवेदम्' इति स्मृत्याख्यस्य प्राच्यपायपरिणामस्य. तदाधायक-
 संस्कारलक्षणाया वासनायाश्च अपायाभ्यधिकत्वात् ।

§ १६. नन्वविच्युतिस्मृतिलक्षणौ ज्ञानभेदौ गृहीतग्राहित्वाच्च प्रमाणम् ; संस्कारश्च किं स्मृतिज्ञानावरणक्षयोपशमो वा, तज्ज्ञानजननशक्तिर्वा, तद्वस्तुविकल्पो वेति त्रयी गतिः ? तत्र-आद्यपक्षद्वयमयुक्तम् ; ज्ञानरूपत्वाभावात् तद्वेदानां चेह विचार्यत्वात् ।
 10 तृतीयपक्षोऽप्ययुक्त एव; सङ्ख्येयमसङ्ख्येयं वा कालं वासनाया इष्टत्वात्, एतावन्तं च कालं वस्तुविकल्पायोगादिति न कापि धारणा घटत इति चेत्; न; स्पष्टस्पष्टतरस्पष्ट-
 तमभिन्नधर्मकवासनाजनकत्वेन अन्यान्यवस्तुग्राहित्वादविच्युतेः प्रागननुभूतवस्त्वैक-
 त्वग्राहित्वाच्च स्मृतेः अगृहीतग्राहित्वात्, स्मृतिज्ञानावरणकर्मक्षयोपशमरूपायास्तद्विज्ञान-
 जननशक्तिरूपायाश्च वासनायाः स्वयमज्ञानरूपत्वेऽपि कारणे कार्योपचारेण ज्ञानभेदा-
 15 मिधानाविरोधादिति ।

§ १७. एते चावग्रहादयो नोत्क्रमव्यतिक्रमाभ्यां न्यूनत्वेन चोत्पद्यन्ते, ज्ञेयस्ये-
 त्थमेव ज्ञानजननस्वाभाव्यात् । कचिदभ्यस्तेऽपायमात्रस्य दृढवासने विषये स्मृति-
 मात्रस्य चोपलक्षणेऽप्युत्पलपत्रशतव्यतिभेद इव सौक्ष्म्यादवग्रहादिक्रमानुपलक्षणात् ।
 तदेवम् अर्थावग्रहादयो मनइन्द्रियैः पोढा भिद्यमाना व्यञ्जनावग्रहचतुर्भेदैः सहाष्टाविं-
 20 शतिर्भेदभिन्नानामेतेषां षट्त्रिंशदधिकानि त्रीणि शतानि भवन्ति । बह्वादयश्च भेदा
 विषयापेक्षाः ; तथाहि-कश्चित् नानाशब्दसमूहमाकर्णितं बहुं जानाति-'एतावन्तोऽत्र
 शङ्खशब्दा एतावन्तश्च पटहादिशब्दाः' इति पृथग्भिन्नजतीयं क्षयोपशमविशेषात् परि-
 च्छिनन्तीत्यर्थः । अन्यस्त्वल्पक्षयोपशमत्वात् तत्समानदेशोऽप्यबहुम् । अपरस्तु क्षयोप-
 25 शमवैचित्र्यात् बहुविधम्, एकैकस्यापि शङ्खादिशब्दस्य स्निग्धत्वादिवहुधर्मान्वितत्वेना-
 प्याकलनात् । परस्त्वबहुविधम्, स्निग्धत्वादिवस्त्वधर्मान्वितत्वेनाकलनात् । अन्यस्तु
 क्षिप्रम्, शीघ्रमेव परिच्छेदात् । इतरस्त्वक्षिप्रम्, चिरविमर्शेनाकलनात् । परस्त्वनिश्चितम्,
 लिङ्गं विना स्वरूपत एव परिच्छेदात् । अपरस्तु निश्चितम्, लिङ्गनिश्चयाऽऽकलनात् ।
 [कश्चिन्तु निश्चितम्, विरुद्धधर्मानालिङ्गितत्वेनावगतेः । इतरस्त्वनिश्चितम्, विरुद्धधर्मा-
 30 ङ्किततयावगमात् ।] अन्यो ध्रुवम्, बह्वादिरूपेणावगतस्य सर्वदैव तथा बोधात् । अन्य-
 स्त्वध्रुवम्, कदाचिद्बह्वादिरूपेण कदाचिच्चबह्वादिरूपेणावगमादिति । उक्ता मतिभेदाः ।

[८. श्रुतज्ञानं चतुर्दशधा विभज्य तन्निरूपणम् ।]

§ १८. श्रुतभेदा उच्यन्ते-श्रुतम् अक्षर-सञ्ज्ञि-सम्यक्-सादि-सपर्यवसित-गमिका-
ऽङ्गप्रविष्टभेदैः सप्रतिपक्षैश्चतुर्दशविधम् । तत्राक्षरं त्रिविधम्-सञ्ज्ञा-व्यञ्जन-लब्धिभेदात् ।
सञ्ज्ञाक्षरं बहुविधलिपिभेदम्, व्यञ्जनाक्षरं भाष्यमाणमकारादि-एते चोपचाराच्छ्रुते ।
लब्ध्यक्षरं तु इन्द्रियमनोनिमित्तः श्रुतोपयोगः, तदावरणक्षयोपशमो वा-एतच्च परोपदेशं
विनापि नासम्भाव्यम्, अनाकलितोपदेशानामपि मुग्धानां गवादीनां च शब्दश्रवणे
तदाभिमुख्यदर्शनात्, एकेन्द्रियाणामप्यव्यक्ताक्षरलाभाच्च । अनक्षरश्रुतमुच्छ्वासादि,
तस्यापि भावश्रुतहेतुत्वात्, ततोऽपि 'सशोकोऽयम्' इत्यादिज्ञानाविर्भावात् । अथवा
श्रुतोपयुक्तस्य सर्वात्मनैवोपयोगात् सर्वस्यैव व्यापारस्य श्रुतरूपत्वेऽपि अत्रैव शास्त्र-
लोकप्रसिद्धा रूढिः । समनस्कस्य श्रुतं सञ्ज्ञिश्रुतम् । तद्विपरीतमसञ्ज्ञिश्रुतम् ।
सम्यक्श्रुतम् अङ्गानङ्गप्रविष्टम्, लौकिकं तु मिथ्याश्रुतम् । स्वामित्वचिन्तायां तु
भजना-सम्यग्दृष्टिपरिगृहीतं मिथ्याश्रुतमपि सम्यक्श्रुतमेव वितथभाषित्वादिना
यथास्थानं तदर्थविनियोगात्, विपर्ययान्मिथ्यादृष्टिपरिगृहीतं च सम्यक्श्रुतमपि मि-
थ्याश्रुतमेवेति । सादि द्रव्यत एकं पुरुषमाश्रित्य, क्षेत्रतश्च भरतैरावते । कालत
उत्सर्पिण्यवसर्पिण्यौ, भावतश्च तत्तज्ज्ञापकप्रयत्नादिकम् । अनादि द्रव्यतो नानापुरुषा-
नाश्रित्य, क्षेत्रतो महाविदेहान्, कालतो नोत्सर्पिण्यवसर्पिणीलक्षणम्, भावतश्च
सामान्यतः क्षयोपशममिति । एवं सपर्यवसितापर्यवसितभेदावपि भाव्यौ । गमिकं
सदृशपाठं प्रायो दृष्टिवादगतम् । अगमिकमसदृशपाठं प्रायः कालिकश्रुतगतम् । अङ्ग-
प्रविष्टं गणधरकृतम् । अनङ्गप्रविष्टं तु स्थविरकृतमिति । तदेवं सप्रभेदं सांख्यवहारिकं
मतिश्रुतलक्षणं प्रत्यक्षं निरूपितम् ।

[९. पारमार्थिकं प्रत्यक्षं त्रिधा विभज्य प्रथममवधेर्निरूपणम् ।]

§ १९. स्वोत्पत्तावात्मव्यापारमात्रापेक्षं पारमार्थिकम् । तत् त्रिविधम्-अवधि-
मनःपर्यय-केवलभेदात् । सकलरूपिद्रव्यविषयकजातीयम् आत्ममात्रापेक्षं ज्ञानमवधि-
ज्ञानम् । तच्च षोढा अनुगामि-वर्धमान-प्रतिपातीतरभेदात् । तत्रोत्पत्तिक्षेत्रादन्यत्राप्य-
नुवर्तमानमानुगामिकम्, भास्करप्रकाशवत्, यथा भास्करप्रकाशः प्राच्यामाविर्भूतः
प्रतीचीमनुसरत्यपि तत्रावकाशमुद्योतयति, तथैतदप्येकत्रोत्पन्नमन्यत्र गच्छतोऽपि पुंसो
विषयमवभासयतीति । उत्पत्तिक्षेत्र एव विषयावभासकमनानुगामिकम्, प्रश्नादेशपुरुष-
ज्ञानवत्, यथा प्रश्नादेशः क्वचिदेव स्थाने संवादयितुं शक्नोति पृच्छ्यमानमर्थम्,
तथेदमपि अधिकृत एव स्थाने विषयमुद्योतयितुमलमिति । उत्पत्तिक्षेत्रात्क्रमेण विषय-
व्याप्तिमवगाहमानं वर्धमानम्, अधरोत्तरारणिर्निर्मथनोत्पन्नोपात्तशुष्कोपचीयमानाधीय-
मानेन्धनराश्यभिवात्, यथा अग्निः प्रयत्नादुपजातः सन् पुनरिन्धनलाभादिद्विमुपा-
गच्छति एवं परमशुभाध्यवसायलाभादिदमपि पूर्वोत्पन्नं वर्धत इति । उत्पत्तिक्षेत्रापेक्षया

- क्रमेणात्पीभवद्विषयं हीयमानम्, परिच्छिन्नेन्धनोपादानसन्तत्याग्निशिखावत्, यथा अपनीतेन्धनाग्निज्वाला परिहीयते तथा इदमपीति । उत्पश्यनन्तरं निर्मूलनश्चरं प्रतिपाति, जलतरङ्गवत्, यथा जलतरङ्ग उत्पन्नमात्र एव निर्मूलं विलीयते तथा इदमपि । आ केवलप्राप्तेः आ मरणाद्वा अवतिष्ठमानम् अप्रतिपाति, वेदवत्, यथा पुरुषवेदादिशपुरुषा-
5 दिपर्यायं तिष्ठति तथा इदमपीति ।

[१०. मनःपर्यवज्ञानस्य निरूपणम् ।]

- § २०. मनोमात्रसाक्षात्कारि मनःपर्यवज्ञानम् । मनःपर्यायानिदं साक्षात्परिच्छे-
तुमलम्, बाह्यानर्थान् पुनस्तदन्यथाऽनुपपत्त्याऽनुमानेनैव परिच्छिन्नशीलं द्रष्टव्यम् । तद्
द्विविधम्—ऋजुमति-विपुलमतिमेदात् । ऋज्वी सामान्यग्राहिणी मतिः ऋजुमतिः ।
10 सामान्यशब्दोऽत्र विपुलमत्यपेक्षयाऽल्पविशेषपरः, अन्यथा सामान्यमात्रग्राहित्वे मनः-
पर्यायदर्शनप्रसङ्गात् । विपुला विशेषग्राहिणी मतिर्विपुलमतिः । तत्र ऋजुमत्या घटा-
दिमात्रमनेन चिन्तितमिति ज्ञायते, विपुलमत्या तु पर्यायशतोपेतं तत् परिच्छिद्यत
इति । एते च द्वे ज्ञाने विकलविषयत्वाद्विकलप्रत्यक्षे परिभाष्येते ।

[११. केवलज्ञानस्य निरूपणम् ।]

- 15 § २१. निखिलद्रव्यपर्यायसाक्षात्कारि केवलज्ञानम् । अत एवैतत्सकलप्रत्यक्षम् ।
तच्चावरणक्षयस्य हेतोरैक्याद्भेदरहितम् । आवरणं चात्र कर्मैव, स्वविषयेऽप्रवृत्तिमतोऽ-
स्मदादिज्ञानस्य सावरणत्वात्, असर्वविषयत्वे व्याप्तिज्ञानाभावप्रसङ्गात्, सावरणत्वा-
भावेऽस्पष्टत्वानुपपत्तेश्च । आवरणस्य च कर्मणो विरोधिना सम्यग्दर्शनादिना विना-
शात् सिध्यति कैवल्यम् ।

- 20 § २२. 'योगजधर्मानुगृहीतमनोजन्यमेवेदमस्तु' इति केचित्; तन्न; धर्मानुगृहीते-
नापि मनसा पञ्चेन्द्रियार्थज्ञानवदस्य जनयितुमशक्यत्वात् ।

- § २३. 'कवलभोजिनः कैवल्यं न घटते' इति दिकूपटः; तन्न; आहारपर्याप्त्यसा-
तवेदनीयोदयादिप्रसूतया कवलभुक्त्या कैवल्याविरोधात्, घातिकर्मणामेव तद्विरोधि-
त्वात् । दग्धरज्जुस्थानीयात्तस्यो न तदुत्पत्तिरिति चेत्; नन्वेवं तादृशादायुषो
25 भवोपग्रहोऽपि न स्यात् । किञ्च, औदारिकशरीरस्थितिः कथं कवलभुक्तिं विना भग-
वतः स्यात् । अनन्तवीर्यत्वेन तां विना तदुपपत्तौ लब्धस्यावस्थायामप्यपरिमितबलत्व-
श्रवणाद् भुक्त्यभावः स्यादित्यन्यत्र विस्तरः । उक्तं प्रत्यक्षम् ।

[१२. परोक्षं लक्षयित्वा पञ्चधा विभज्य च स्मृतेर्निरूपणम् ।]

- § २४. अथ परोक्षमुच्यते—अस्पष्टं परोक्षम् । तच्च स्मरण-प्रत्यभिज्ञान-तर्का-ऽनुमाना-
30 ऽऽगमभेदतः पञ्चप्रकारम् । अनुभवमात्रजन्यं ज्ञानं स्मरणम्, यथा तत् तीर्थकरबिम्बम् ।

न चेदमप्रमाणम्, प्रत्यक्षादिवत् अविसंवादकत्वात् । अतीततत्तांशे वर्तमानत्वविषय-
त्वादप्रमाणमिदमिति चेत्; न; सर्वत्र विशेषणे विशेष्यकालभानानियमात् । अनुभव-
प्रमात्वपारतन्त्र्यादत्राप्रमात्वमिति चेत्; न; अनुमितेरपि व्याप्तिज्ञानादिप्रमात्वपार-
तन्त्र्येणाप्रमात्वप्रसङ्गात् । अनुमितेरुत्पत्तौ परापेक्षा, विषयपरिच्छेदे तु स्वातन्त्र्यमिति
चेत्; न; स्मृतेरप्युत्पत्तावेवानुभवसव्यपेक्षत्वात्, स्वविषयपरिच्छेदे तु स्वातन्त्र्यात् । ६
अनुभवविषयीकृतभावावभासिन्याः स्मृतेर्विषयपरिच्छेदेऽपि न स्वातन्त्र्यमिति चेत्; तर्हि
व्याप्तिज्ञानादिविषयीकृतानर्थान् परिच्छिन्दत्या अनुमितेरपि प्रामाण्यं दूरत एव । नैय-
त्येनाऽभात एवार्थोऽनुमित्या विषयीक्रियत इति चेत्; तर्हि तत्तयाऽभात एवार्थः स्मृत्या
विषयीक्रियत इति तुल्यमिति न किञ्चिदेतत् ।

[१३. प्रत्यभिज्ञानस्य निरूपणम् ।]

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§ २५. अनुभवस्मृतिहेतुकं तिर्यगूर्ध्वतासामान्यादिगोचरं सङ्कलनात्मकं ज्ञानं प्रत्य-
भिज्ञानम् । यथा 'तज्जातीय एवायं गोपिण्डः' 'गोमटयो गवयः' 'स एवायं जिनदत्तः'
'स एवानेनार्थः कथ्यते' 'गोविलक्षणो महिषः' 'इदं तस्माद् दूरम्' 'इदं तस्मात् समी-
पम्' 'इदं तस्मात् प्रांशु इत्थं वा' इत्यादि ।

§ २६. तत्तेदन्तारूपस्पष्टास्पष्टाकारभेदान्नैकं प्रत्यभिज्ञानस्वरूपमस्तीति शाक्यः; 15
तन्न; आकारभेदेऽपि चित्रज्ञानवदेकस्य तस्यानुभूयमानत्वात्, स्वसामग्रीप्रभवस्यास्य
वस्तुतोऽस्पष्टैकरूपत्वाच्च, इदन्तोच्छेदस्व प्रत्यभिज्ञानिवन्धनत्वात् । विषयाभावात्ते-
दमस्तीति चेत्; न; पूर्वापरविवर्तवर्त्येकद्रव्यस्य विशिष्टस्यैतद्विषयत्वात् । अत
एव 'अगृहीतासंसर्गक्रमानुभवस्मृतिरूपं ज्ञानद्वयमेवैतद्' इति निरस्तम्; इत्थं सति
विशिष्टज्ञानमात्रोच्छेदापत्तेः । तथापि 'अक्षान्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधायित्वात् प्रत्यक्षरूपमेवेदं
युक्तम्' इति केचित्; तन्न; साक्षादक्षान्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधायित्वस्यासिद्धेः, प्रत्यभिज्ञान-
स्य साक्षात्प्रत्यक्षस्मरणान्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधायित्वेनानुभूयमानत्वात्, अन्यथा प्रथम-
व्यक्तिदर्शनकालेऽप्युत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात् ।

§ २७. अथ पुनर्दर्शने पूर्वदर्शनाहितसंस्कारप्रबोधोत्पन्नस्मृतिसहायमिन्द्रियं प्रत्य-
भिज्ञानमुत्पादयतीत्युच्यते; तदनुचितम्; प्रत्यक्षस्य स्मृतिनिरपेक्षत्वात् । अन्यथा 25
पर्वते बह्विज्ञानस्यापि व्याप्तिस्मरणादिसापेक्षमनसैवोपपत्तौ अनुमानस्याप्युच्छेद-
प्रसङ्गात् । किञ्च, 'प्रत्यभिज्ञानमि' इति विलक्षणप्रतीतेरप्यतिरिक्तमेतत्, एतेन
'विशेष्येन्द्रियसन्निकर्षसत्त्वाद्दिशेषणज्ञाने सति विशिष्टप्रत्यक्षरूपमेतदुपपद्यते' इति
निरस्तम्; 'इतस्सदृशः सः' इत्यादौ तदभावात्, स्मृत्यनुभवसङ्कलनक्रमस्यानुभवि-
कत्वाच्चेति दिक् ।

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§ २८. अत्राह भाट्टः—नन्वेकत्वज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञानमस्तु, सादृश्यज्ञानं तूपमानमेव, गवये दृष्टे गवि च स्मृते सति सादृश्यज्ञानस्योपमानत्वात्, तदुक्तम्—

“तस्माद्यत् स्मर्यते तत् स्यात् सादृश्येन विशेषितम् ।

प्रमेयमुपमानस्य सादृश्यं वा तदन्वितम् ॥ १ ॥

5 प्रत्यक्षेणावबुद्धेऽपि सादृश्ये गवि च स्मृते ।

विशिष्टस्यान्यतोऽसिद्धेरुपमानप्रमाणात् ॥ २ ॥”

[श्लोकवा० उप० श्लो० ३७-३८]

इति; तन्न; दृष्टस्य सादृश्यविशिष्टविजडस्य स्मृतस्य च गोः सङ्कलनात्मकस्य ‘गोसदृशो गवयः’ इति ज्ञानस्य प्रत्यभिज्ञानताऽनतिक्रमात् । अन्यथा ‘गोविसदृशो 10 महिषः’ इत्यादेरपि सादृश्याविषयत्वेनोपमानातिरेके प्रमाणसङ्ख्याव्याघातप्रसङ्गात् ।

§ २९. एतेन—‘गोसदृशो गवयः’ इत्यतिदेशवाक्यार्थज्ञानकरणकं सादृश्यविशिष्ट-
पिण्डदर्शनव्यापारकम् ‘अयं गवयशब्दवाच्यः’ इति सङ्ज्ञासञ्ज्ञिसम्बन्धप्रतिपत्तिरूप-
मुपमानम्—इति नैयायिकमतमप्यपहसितं भवति । अनुभूतव्यक्तौ गवयपदवाच्यत्वसङ्क-
लनात्मकस्यास्य प्रत्यभिज्ञानत्वानतिक्रमात् प्रत्यभिज्ञानावरणकर्मक्षयोपशमविशेषेण
15 यद्धर्मावच्छेदेनातिदेशवाक्यान्वयधर्मदर्शनं तद्धर्मावच्छेदेनैव पदवाच्यत्वपरिच्छेदोपपत्तेः ।
अत एव “पयोम्बुभेदी हंसः स्यात्” इत्यादिवाक्यार्थज्ञानवतां पयोऽम्बुभेदित्वादि-
विशिष्टव्यक्तिदर्शने सति ‘अयं हंसपदवाच्यः’ इत्यादिप्रतीतिर्जायमानोपपद्यते । यदि
च ‘अयं गवयपदवाच्यः’ इति प्रतीत्यर्थं प्रत्यभिज्ञातिरिक्तं प्रमाणमाश्रीयते तदा
आमलकादिदर्शनाहितसंस्कारस्य दिग्वादिदर्शनात् ‘अतस्तत् सूक्ष्मम्’ इत्यादिप्रतीत्यर्थं
20 प्रमाणान्तरमन्वेषणीयं स्यात् । मानसत्वे चासामुपमानस्यापि मानसत्वप्रसङ्गात् ।
‘प्रत्यभिज्ञानामि’ इति प्रतीत्या प्रत्यभिज्ञानत्वमेवाभ्युपेयमिति दिक् ।

[१४. तर्कस्य निरूपणम् ।]

§ ३०. सकलदेशकालाद्यवच्छेदेन साध्यसाधनभावादिविषय ऊहस्वर्कः, यथा
‘यावान् कश्चिद्धूमः स सर्वो बह्वौ सत्येव भवति, बह्विं विना वा न भवति’ ‘घटशब्द-
25 मात्रं घटस्य वाचकम्’ ‘घटमात्रं घटशब्दवाच्यम्’ इत्यादि । तथाहि—स्वरूपप्रयुक्ताऽव्यभि-
चारलक्षणायां व्याप्तौ भूयोदर्शनसहितान्वयव्यतिरेकसहकारेणापि प्रत्यक्षस्य तावद-
विषयत्वादेवाप्रवृत्तिः, सुतरां च सकलसाध्यसाधनव्यक्त्युपसंहारेण तद्ब्रह्म इति साध्य-
साधनदर्शनस्मरणप्रत्यभिज्ञानोपजनितस्वर्क एव तत्प्रतीतिमाधातुमलम् ।

§ ३१. अथ स्वव्यापकसाध्यसामानाधिकरण्यलक्षणाया व्याप्तेर्योग्यत्वाद् भूयोदर्श-
30 नव्यभिचारादर्शनसहकृतेनेन्द्रियेण व्याप्तिग्रहोऽस्तु, सकलसाध्यसाधनव्यक्त्युपसंहार-
स्यापि सामान्यलक्षणप्रत्यासत्त्या सम्भवादिति चेत्; न; ‘तर्कयामि’ इत्यनुभवसिद्धेन

तर्केणैव सकलसाध्यसाधनव्यक्त्युपसंहारेण व्याप्तिग्रहोपपत्तौ सामान्यलक्षणप्रत्यासत्ति-
कल्पने प्रमाणाभावात्, ऊहं विना ज्ञातेन सामान्येनापि सकलव्यक्त्यनुपस्थितेश्च ।
वाच्यवाचकभावोऽपि तर्केणैवावगम्यते, तस्यैव सकलशब्दार्थगोचरत्वात् । प्रयोजक-
बुद्धोक्तं श्रुत्वा प्रवर्तमानस्य प्रयोज्यबुद्धस्य चेष्टामवलोक्य तत्कारणज्ञानजनकतां शब्दे-
ऽवधारयन्तो(यतो)ऽन्त्यावयवश्रवण-पूर्वावयवस्मरणोपजनितवर्णपदवाक्यविषयसङ्कलना- 5
त्मकप्रत्यभिज्ञानवत् आवापोद्वापाभ्यां सकलव्यक्त्युपसंहारेण च वाच्यवाचकभाव-
प्रतीतिदर्शनादिति । अयं च तर्कः सम्बन्धप्रतीत्यन्तरनिरपेक्ष एव स्वयोग्यतासामर्थ्या-
त्सम्बन्धप्रतीतिं जनयतीति नानवस्था ।

§ ३२. प्रत्यक्षपृष्ठभावि विकल्परूपत्वाभ्यां प्रमाणमिति बौद्धाः; तन्न; प्रत्यक्षपृष्ठ-
भाविनो विकल्परस्यापि प्रत्यक्षगृहीतमात्राध्यवसायित्वेन सर्वोपसंहारेण व्याप्तिग्राहकत्वा- 10
भावात् । तादृशस्य तस्य सामान्यविषयस्याप्यनुमानवत् प्रमाणत्वात्, अवस्तुनिर्भासेऽपि
परम्परया पदार्थप्रतिबन्धेन भवतां व्यवहारतः प्रामाण्यप्रसिद्धेः । यस्तु-अग्निधूमव्यतिरि-
क्तदेशे प्रथमं धूमस्यानुपलम्भ एकः, तदनन्तरमग्नेरुपलम्भस्ततो धूमस्येत्युपलम्भद्वयम्,
पश्चादग्नेरनुपलम्भोऽनन्तरं धूमस्याप्यनुपलम्भ इति द्वावनुपलम्भाविति प्रत्यक्षानुपलम्भ-
पञ्चकाद्व्याप्तिग्रहः-इत्येतेषां सिद्धान्तः, तदुक्तम्- 15

“धूमाधीर्वाहिविज्ञानं धूमज्ञानमधीस्तयोः ।

प्रत्यक्षानुपलम्भभ्यामिति पञ्चभिरन्वयः ॥”

इति; स तु मिथ्या; उपलम्भानुपलम्भस्वभावस्य द्विविधस्यापि प्रत्यक्षस्य सन्निहितमात्र-
विषयतयाऽविचारकतया च देशादिव्यवहितसमस्तपदार्थगोचरत्वायोगात् ।

§ ३३. यत्तु ‘व्याप्यस्याहार्यारोपेण व्यापकस्याहार्यप्रसञ्जनं तर्कः । स च विशेष- 20
दर्शनवद् विरोधिशङ्काकालीनप्रमाणमात्रसहकारी, विरोधिशङ्कानिवर्तकत्वेन तदनुकूल एव
वा । न चायं स्वतः प्रमाणम्’ इति नैयायिकैरिष्यते; तन्न; व्याप्तिग्रहरूपस्य तर्कस्य
स्वपरव्यवसायित्वेन स्वतः प्रमाणत्वात्, पराभिमततर्कस्यापि क्वचिदेतद्विचाराङ्गतया,
विपर्ययपर्यवसायिन आहार्यशङ्काविघटकतया, स्वातन्त्र्येण शङ्कामात्रविघटकतया वोप-
योगात् । इत्थं चाज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वेन तर्कस्य प्रामाण्यं धर्मभूषणोक्तं^१ सत्येव तन्न(तत्र) 25
मिथ्याज्ञानरूपे व्यवच्छेद्ये सङ्गच्छते, ज्ञानाभावनिवृत्तिस्त्वर्थज्ञातताव्यवहारनिबन्धन-
स्वव्यवसितिपर्यवसितैव सामान्यतः फलमिति द्रष्टव्यम् ।

1. Cf. Nyāyadīpikā, p. 19

तदुक्तं श्लोकवातिकभाष्ये (१.१३.११५-८) ‘मादृशसाधनसम्बन्धाज्ञाननिवृत्तिरूपे हि फले
साधकनिरतर्कः’ इति ।

[१५. अनुमानं द्वेषा विभज्य स्वार्थानुमानस्य लक्षणम् ।]

§ ३४. साधनात्साध्यविज्ञानम्-अनुमानम् । तद् द्विविधं स्वार्थं परार्थं च । तत्र हेतु-
ग्रहण-सम्बन्धस्मरणकारणकं साध्यविज्ञानं स्वार्थम्, यथा गृहीतधूमस्य स्मृतव्याप्तिकस्य
'पर्वतो वह्निमान्' इति ज्ञानम् । अत्र हेतुग्रहण-सम्बन्धस्मरणयोः समुदितयोरेव कारण-
5 त्वमवसेयम्, अन्यथा विस्मृताप्रतिपन्नसम्बन्धस्यागृहीतलिङ्गकस्य च कस्यचिदनु-
मानोत्पादप्रसङ्गात् ।

[१६. हेतुस्वरूपचर्चा ।]

§ ३५. निश्चितान्यथानुपपत्त्येकलक्षणो हेतुः, न तु त्रिलक्षणकादिः । तथाहि-
त्रिलक्षण एव हेतुरिति बौद्धाः । पक्षधर्मत्वाभावेऽसिद्धत्वव्यवच्छेदस्य, सपक्ष एव सत्त्वा-
10 भावे च विरुद्धत्वव्युदासस्य, विपक्षेऽसत्त्वनियमाभावे चानैकान्तिकत्वनिषेधस्यासम्भवे-
नानुमित्यप्रतिरोधानुपपत्तेरिति; तन्न; पक्षधर्मत्वाभावेऽपि उदेप्यति शकटं कृत्तिकोद-
याद्, उपरि सविता भूमेरालोकवत्त्वाद्, अस्ति नभश्चन्द्रो जलचन्द्रादित्याद्यनुमान-
दर्शनात् । न चात्रापि 'कालाकाशादिकं भविष्यच्छकटोदयादिमत् कृत्तिकोदयादिम-
त्त्वात्' इत्येवं पक्षधर्मत्वोपपत्तिरिति वाच्यम्; अननुभूयमानधर्मिविषयत्वेनेत्यं पक्षधर्म-
15 त्वोपपादने जगद्धर्म्यपेक्षया काककाष्ण्येन प्रासादभावस्यस्यापि साधनोपपत्तेः ।

§ ३६. ननु यद्येवं पक्षधर्मताऽनुमितौ नाङ्गं तदा कथं तत्र पक्षभाननियम इति
चेत्; क्वचिदन्यथाऽनुपपत्त्यवच्छेदकतया ग्रहणात् पक्षभानं यथा नभश्चन्द्रास्तित्वं विना
जलचन्द्रोऽनुपपन्न इत्यत्र, क्वचिच्च हेतुग्रहणाधिकरणतया यथा पर्वतो वह्निमान्
धूमवत्त्वादित्यत्र धूमस्य पर्वते ग्रहणाद्वह्नेरपि तत्र भानमिति । व्याप्तिग्रहवेलायां तु
20 पर्वतस्य सर्वत्रानुवृत्त्यभावेन न ग्रह इति ।

§ ३७. यत्तु अन्तर्व्याप्त्या पक्षीयसाध्यसाधनसम्बन्धग्रहात् पक्षसाध्यसंसर्गमानम्,
तदुक्तम्-"पक्षीकृत एव विषये साधनस्य साध्येन व्याप्तिरन्तर्व्याप्तिः, अन्यत्र
तु बहिर्व्याप्तिः" (प्र. न. ३. ३८) इति; तन्न; अन्तर्व्याप्त्या हेतोः साध्यप्रत्यायनशक्तौ
सत्यां बहिर्व्याप्तिरुद्भावनव्यर्थत्वप्रतिपादनेन तस्याः स्वरूपप्रयुक्त(काऽ)व्यभिचारलक्षण-
25 त्वस्य, बहिर्व्याप्तिश्च सहचारमात्रत्वस्य लाभात्, सार्वत्रिक्या व्याप्तेर्विषयभेदमात्रेण
भेदस्य दुर्वचत्वात् । न चेदेवं तदान्तर्व्याप्तिग्रहकाल एव (काल एव) पक्षसाध्यसंसर्ग-
भानादनुमानवैक(क)व्यापत्तिः विना पर्वतो वह्निमानित्युद्देश्यप्रतीतिमिति यथातन्त्रं भाव-

1. Though this view has been accepted by a school of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya also, yet since the Buddhists laid special emphasis on this, it has been attributed to them. See Dr. Kothia, D.L., Jaina tarkaśāstra meṁ anumāna vicāra, p. 191

नीयं सुधीभिः । इत्थं च 'पकान्येतानि सहकारफलानि एकशाखाप्रभवत्वाद् उप-
युक्तसहकारफलवदित्यादौ बाधितविषये, मूर्खोऽयं देवदत्तः तत्पुत्रत्वात् इतरतत्पुत्रवदि-
त्यादौ सत्प्रतिपक्षे चातिप्रसङ्गवारणाय अबाधितविषयत्वासत्प्रतिपक्षत्वसहितं प्रागुक्त-
रूपत्रयमादाय पाञ्चरूप्यं हेतुलक्षणम्' इति नैयायिकमतमप्यपास्तम् ; उदेत्यति शकट-
मित्यादौ पक्षधर्मत्वस्यैवासिद्धेः, स इयामः तत्पुत्रत्वादित्यत्र हेत्वाभासेऽपि पाञ्चरूप्य- 5
सत्त्वाच्च, निश्चितान्यथानुपपत्तेरेव सर्वत्र हेतुलक्षणत्वौचित्यात् ।

[१७. साध्यस्वरूपचर्चा ।]

§ ३८. ननु हेतुना साध्यमनुमातव्यम् । तत्र किं लक्षणं साध्यमिति चेत् ; उच्यते-
अप्रतीतमनिराकृतमभीप्सितं च साध्यम् । शङ्कितविपरीतानध्यवसितवस्तूनां साध्यता-
प्रतिपत्त्यर्थमप्रतीतमिति विशेषणम् । प्रत्यक्षादिविरुद्धस्य साध्यत्वं मा प्रसाङ्ग्यदित्यनि- 10
राकृतग्रहणम् । अनभिमतस्यासाध्यत्वप्रतिपत्तयेऽभीप्सितग्रहणम् ।

§ ३९. कथायां शङ्कितस्यैव साध्यस्य साधनं युक्तमिति कश्चित् ; तन्न ; विपर्यस्ता-
व्युत्पन्नयोरपि परपक्षदिदक्षादिना कथायामुपसर्पणसम्भवेन संशयनिरासार्थमिव विपर्य-
यानध्यवसायनिरासार्थमपि प्रयोगसम्भवात्, पित्रादेर्विपर्यस्ताव्युत्पन्नपुत्रादिशिक्षाप्रदान-
दर्शनाच्च । न चेदेवं जिगीषुकथावामनुमानप्रयोग एव न स्यात् तस्य साभिमानत्वेन 15
विपर्यस्तत्वात् ।

§ ४०. अनिराकृतमिति विशेषणं वादिप्रतिवाद्युभयापेक्षया, द्वयोः प्रमाणेनाबाधि-
तस्य कथायां साध्यत्वात् । अभीप्सितमिति तु वाद्यपेक्षयैव, वक्तुरेव स्वाभिप्रेतार्थ-
प्रतिपादनायेच्छासम्भवात् । ततश्च परार्थाश्चक्षुरादय इत्यादौ पारार्थ्यमात्राभिधाने-
ऽप्यात्मार्थत्वमेव सायं(०मेव साध्यं) सिध्यति । अन्यथा संहतपरार्थत्वेन बौद्धैश्चक्षु- 20
रादीनामभ्युपगमा[त् साधनवैफल्य]दित्यनन्वयादिदोषदुष्टमेतत्साङ्ग्यसाधनमिति वद-
न्ति । स्वार्थानुमानावसरेऽपि परार्थानुमानोपयोग्यमिधानम्, परार्थस्य स्वार्थपुर-
सरत्वेनानतिभेदज्ञापनार्थम् ।

§ ४१. व्याप्तिग्रहणसमयापेक्षया साध्यं धर्म एव, अन्यथा तदनुपपत्तेः, आनुमानिक-
प्रतिपत्त्यवसरापेक्षया तु पक्षापरपर्यायस्तद्विशिष्टः प्रसिद्धो धर्मः । इत्थं च स्वार्थानुमा- 25
नस्य त्रीण्यङ्गानि धर्मा साध्यं साधनं च । तत्र साधनं गमकत्वेनाङ्गम्, साध्यं तु

गम्यत्वेन, धर्मी पुनः साध्यधर्माधारत्वेन, आधारविशेषनिष्ठतया साध्याद्धे(साध्यसिद्धे)-
रनुमानप्रयोजनत्वात् । अथवा पक्षो हेतुरित्यङ्गद्वयं स्वार्थानुमाने, साध्यधर्मविशिष्टस्य
धर्मिणः पक्षत्वात् इति धर्मधर्मिभेदाभेदविवक्षया पक्षद्वयं द्रष्टव्यम् ।

- § ४२. धर्मिणः प्रसिद्धिश्च क्वचित्प्रमाणात् क्वचिद्विकल्पात् क्वचित्प्रमाणविकल्पा-
5 भ्याम् । तत्र निश्चितप्रामाण्यप्रत्यक्षाद्यन्यतमावधृतत्वं प्रमाणप्रसिद्धत्वम् । अनिश्चित-
प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्यप्रत्ययगोचरत्वं विकल्पप्रसिद्धत्वम् । तद्व्यविषयत्वं प्रमाणविकल्प-
प्रसिद्धत्वम् । तत्र प्रमाणसिद्धो धर्मी यथा धूमवस्वादग्निमन्वे साध्ये पर्वतः, स खलु
प्रत्यक्षेणानुभूयते । विकल्पसिद्धो धर्मी यथा सर्वज्ञोऽस्ति सुनिश्चितासम्भवद्राधकप्रमाण-
त्वादित्यस्तित्वे साध्ये सर्वज्ञः, अथवा खरविषाणं नास्तीति नास्तित्वे साध्ये खरवि-
10 षाणम् । अत्र हि सर्वज्ञखरविषाणे अस्तित्वनास्तित्वसिद्धिभ्यां प्राग् विकल्पसिद्धे । उभय-
सिद्धो धर्मी यथा शब्दः परिणामी कृतकत्वादित्यत्र शब्दः, स हि वर्तमान(नः) प्रत्यक्ष-
गम्यः, भूतो भविष्यश्च विकल्पगम्यः, स सर्वोऽपि धर्मीति प्रमाणविकल्पसिद्धो धर्मी ।
प्रमाणोभयसिद्धयोर्धर्मिणोः साध्ये कामचारः । विकल्पसिद्धे तु धर्मिणि सत्तासत्तयोरेव
साध्यत्वमिति नियमः । तदुक्तम्—“विकल्पसिद्धे तस्मिन् सत्ततरे साध्ये”
15 [परी० ३. २३] इति ।

- § ४३. अत्र बौद्धः सत्तामात्रस्यानभीप्सितत्वाद्विशिष्टसत्तासाधने वानन्वयाद्विक-
ल्पसिद्धे धर्मिणि न सत्ता साध्येत्याह ; तदसत् ; इत्थं सति प्रकृतानुमानस्यापि भङ्ग-
प्रसङ्गात्, बह्विमात्रस्यानभीप्सितत्वाद्विशिष्टवहेत्वानन्वयादिति । अथ तत्र सत्तायां
साध्यायां तद्वेतुः-भावधर्मः, भावाभावधर्मः, अभावधर्मो वा स्यात् ? । आद्येऽसिद्धिः,
20 असिद्धसत्ताके भावधर्मासिद्धेः । द्वितीये व्यभिचारः, अस्तित्वाभाववत्यपि वृत्तेः ।
तृतीये च विरोधाभा(विरोधोऽभा)वधर्मस्य भावे क्वचिदप्यसम्भवात्, उद हम्-

“नासिद्धे भावधर्मोऽस्ति व्यभिचार्युभयाश्रयः ।

धर्मो विकृतोऽभावस्य सा सत्ता साध्यते कथम् ? ॥”

[प्रमाणवा० १. १९२]

- 25 इति चेत् न ; इत्थं बह्विमद्वर्मत्वादिविकल्पैर्धूमेन बह्व्यनुमानस्याप्युच्छेदापत्तेः ।

§ ४४. विकल्पस्याप्रमाणत्वाद्विकल्पसिद्धो धर्मी नास्त्येवेति नैयायिकः । तस्येत्यं वच-
नस्यैवानुपपत्तेस्तूष्णीम्भावापत्तिः, विकल्पसिद्धधर्मिणोऽप्रसिद्धौ तत्प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तेरिति ।

§ ४५. इदं त्वयधेयम्—विकल्पसिद्धस्य धर्मिणो नाखण्डस्यैव भानमसत्त्वयातिप्रस-
ङ्गादिति, शब्दादेर्विशिष्टस्य तस्य [भा]नाम्पुपगमे विशेषणस्य संशयेऽभावनिश्रये वा

वैशिष्ट्याभा[ना]नुपपत्तेः विशेषणाद्यंशे आहार्यारोपरूपा विकल्पात्मिकैवानुमितिः स्वीकर्तव्या, देशकालसत्तालक्षणस्यास्तित्वस्य, सकलदेशकालसत्ताभावलक्षणस्य च नास्तित्वस्य साधनेन परपरिकल्पितविपरीतारोपव्यवच्छेदमात्रस्य फलत्वात् ।

§ ४६. वस्तुतस्तु खण्डशः प्रसिद्धपदार्थाऽस्तित्वनास्तित्वसाधनमेवोचितम् । अत एव “अस्ततो नत्थि णिसेहो” [विशेषा० गा० १५७४] इत्यादि भाष्यग्रन्थे खरविषाणं 5 नास्तीत्यत्र ‘खरे विषाणं नास्ति’ इत्येवार्थ उपपादितः । एकान्तनित्यमर्थक्रियासमर्थं न भवति क्रमयौगपद्याभावादित्यत्रापि विशेषावमर्शदशायां क्रमयौगपद्यनिरूपकत्वाभावेनार्थक्रियानियामकत्वाभावो नित्यत्वादौ सुसाध इति सम्प्रतिभालनीयं स्वपरसमय-दत्तदृष्टिभिः ।

[१८. परार्थानुमानस्य प्रतिपादनम् ।]

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§ ४७. परार्थपक्षहेतुवचनात्मकमनुमानमुपचारात्, तेन श्रोतुरनुमानेनार्थबोधनात् । पक्षस्य विवादादेव गम्यमानत्वादप्रयोग इति सौगतः; तन्न; यत्किञ्चिद्वचनव्यवहितात् ततो व्युत्पन्नमतेः पक्षप्रतीतावप्यन्यान् प्रत्यवश्यनिर्देश्यत्वात् प्रकृतानुमानवाक्यावयवान्तैरेकवाक्यतापन्नात्ततोऽवगम्यमानस्य पक्षस्याप्रयोगस्य चेष्टत्वात् । अवश्यं चाभ्यु- 15 पगन्तव्यं हेतोः प्रतिनियतधर्मिधर्मताप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमुपसंहारवचनवत् साध्यस्यापि तदर्थं पक्ष-वचनं ताथागतेनापि, अन्यथा समर्थनोपन्यासादेव गम्यमानस्य हेतोरप्यनुपन्यासप्रस-ङ्गात्, मन्दमतिप्रतिपत्त्यर्थस्य चोभयत्राविशेषादिति । किञ्च, प्रतिज्ञायाः प्रयोगानर्हत्वे शास्त्रादावप्यसौ न प्रयुज्येत, दृश्यते च प्रयुज्यमानेयं शाक्यशास्त्रेऽपि । परानुग्रहार्थं 20 शास्त्रे तत्प्रयोगश्च वादेऽपि तुल्यः, विजिगीषूणामपि मन्दमतीनामर्थप्रतिपत्तेस्तत एवोपपत्तेरिति ।

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§ ४८. आगमात्परेणैव ज्ञातस्य वचनं परार्थानुमानम्, यथा बुद्धिरचेतना उत्पत्तिमत्त्वात् घटवदिति साङ्ख्यानुमानम् । अत्र हि बुद्धानुत्पत्तिमत्त्वं साङ्ख्येयाने(ख्येन) नैवाभ्यु- 25 पगम्यते इति; तदेतदपेक्षलम्; वादिप्रतिवादिनोरागमप्रामाण्यविप्रतिपत्तेः, अन्यथा तत एव साध्यसिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् । परीक्षापूर्वमागमाभ्युपगमेऽपि परीक्षाकाले तद्वाधात् । नन्वेवं भवद्भिरपि कथमापाद्यते परं प्रति ‘यत् सर्वथैकं तत् नानेकत्र सम्बध्यते, तथा च सामान्य- 30 म्’ इति ? । सत्यम्; एकधर्मोपगते(मे) धर्मान्तरसन्दर्शनमात्रं(त्र)तत्परत्वेनैतदापादनस्य वस्तुनिश्चायकत्वाभावान्, प्रसङ्गविपर्ययरूपस्य मौलहेतोरेव तन्निश्चायकत्वात्², अनेकवृत्ति-त्वव्यापकानेकत्वनिवृत्त्यैव तन्निवृत्तेः मौलहेतुपरिकरत्वेन प्रसङ्गोपन्यासस्यापि न्याय्य³

1. Cf. Vādanyāya, p. 3-6

2. Cf. Syādvādaratnākara, p. 553-554

3. Cf. Ibid., p. 554

त्वात् । बुद्धिरचेतनेत्यादौ^१ च प्रसङ्गविपर्ययहेतोर्व्याप्तिसिद्धिनिबन्धनस्य विरुद्धधर्माध्या-
सस्य विपक्षबाधकप्रमाणस्यानुपस्थापनात् प्रसङ्गस्याप्यन्याय्यत्वमिति वदन्ति ।^२

§ ४९. हेतुः साध्योपपत्त्यन्यथानुपपत्तिर्या द्विधा प्रयोक्तव्यः, यथा पर्वतो बह्नि-
मान्, सत्येव बह्नी धूमोपपत्तेः असत्यनुपपत्तेर्वा । अनयोरन्यतरप्रयोगेणैव साध्यप्रतिप-
5 तौ द्वितीयप्रयोगस्यैकत्रानुपयोगः ।

§ ५०. पक्षहेतुवचनलक्षणमवयवद्वयमेव च परप्रतिपक्ष्यङ्गं न दृष्टान्तादिवचनम्,
पक्षहेतुवचनादेव परप्रतिपत्तेः, प्रतिबन्धस्य तर्कत एव निर्णयात्, तत्स्मरणस्यापि पक्षहेतुद-
र्शनेनैव सिद्धेः, असमर्थितस्य दृष्टान्तादेः प्रतिपत्त्यनङ्गत्वात्तत्समर्थनेनैवान्यथासिद्धेश्च ।
समर्थनं हि हेतोरसिद्धत्वादिदोषाभिराकृत्य स्वसाध्येनाविनाभावसाधनम्, तत एव
10 च परप्रतीत्युपपत्तौ किमपरप्रयासेनेति ? ।

§ ५१. मन्दमतीतिस्तु व्युत्पादयितुं दृष्टान्तादिप्रयोगोऽप्युपयुज्यते, तथाहि-यः
खलु क्षयोपशमविशेषादेव निर्णीतपक्षो दृष्टान्तस्मार्प्यप्रतिबन्धग्राहकप्रमाणस्मरणनिपुणो-
ऽपरावयवाभ्युहनसमर्थश्च भवति, तं प्रति हेतुरेव प्रयोज्यः । यस्य तु नाद्यापि पक्ष-
निर्णयः, तं प्रति पक्षोऽपि । यस्तु प्रतिबन्धग्राहिणः प्रमाणस्य न स्मरति, तं प्रति
15 दृष्टान्तोऽपि । यस्तु दार्ष्टान्तिके हेतुं योजयितुं न जानीते, तं प्रत्युपनयोऽपि । एवमपि
साकाङ्क्षं प्रति च निगमनम् । पश्चादिस्वरूपविप्रतिपत्तिमन्तं प्रति च पक्षशुद्ध्यादिक्रमपीति^३
सोऽयं दशावयवो हेतुः पर्यवस्यति ।

[१९. हेतुप्रकाराणामुपदर्शनम् ।]

§ ५२. स चायं द्विविधः-विधिरूपः प्रतिषेधरूपश्च । तत्र विधिरूपो द्विविधः-
20 विधिसाधकः प्रतिषेधसाधकश्च । तत्राद्यः षोढा, तद्यथा-कश्चिन्न्याप्य एव, यथा शब्दोऽ-
नित्यः प्रयत्ननान्तरीयकत्वादिति । यद्यपि व्याप्यो हेतुः सर्व एव, तथापि कार्याद्य-
नात्मव्याप्यस्यात् (त्र) ग्रहणाद्भेदः, वृक्षः शिंशपाया इत्यादेरप्यत्रैवान्तर्भावः । कश्चि-
त्कार्यरूपः, यथा पर्वतोऽयमग्निमान् धूमवत्त्वान्यथानुपपत्तेरित्यत्र धूमः, धूमो ह्यग्नेः
कार्यभूतः तदभावेऽनुपपद्यमानोऽग्निं गमयति । कश्चित्कारणरूपः, यथा वृष्टिर्भविष्यति,
25 विशिष्टमेधान्यथानुपपत्तेरित्यत्र मेघविशेषः, स हि वर्षस्य कारणं स्वकार्यभूतं वर्षं गम-
यति । ननु कार्याभावेऽपि सम्भवत् कारणं न कार्यानुमापकम्, अत एव न बह्विधमं गम-
यतीति चेत्; सत्यम्; यस्मिन्सामर्थ्याप्रतिबन्धः कारणान्तरसाकल्यं च निश्चेतुं शक्यते,
तस्यैव कारणस्य कार्यानुमापकत्वात् । कश्चित् पूर्वचरः, यथा उदेत्यति शकटं कुचिको-

1. Cf. Syādvādaratnākara, p. 554

2. Cf. Ibid., p. 554-555

3. Cf. Ibid., p. 565

दयान्यथानुपपत्तेरित्यत्र कृत्तिकोदयानन्तरं मुहूर्तान्ते नियमेन शकटोदयो जायत इति कृत्तिकोदयः पूर्वचरो हेतुः शकटोदयं गमयति । कश्चिन् उत्तरचरः, यथोदमाद्भरणिः प्राक्, कृत्तिकोदयादित्यत्र कृत्तिकोदयः, कृत्तिकोदयो हि भरण्युदयोत्तरचरस्तं गमयतीति कालव्यवधानेनानयोः कार्यकारणाभ्यां भेदः । कश्चिन् सहचरः, यथा मातुलिङ्गं रूपवद्भवितुमर्हति रसवत्तान्यथानुपपत्तेरित्यत्र रसः, रसो हि नियमेन रूपसहचरितः, 5 तद्भावेऽनुपपद्यमानस्तद्रमयति, परस्परस्वरूपपरित्यागोपलम्भ-पौर्वापर्याभावाभ्यां स्वभावकार्यकारणभ्योऽस्य भेदः । एतेषूदाहरणेषु भावरूपानेवाग्न्यादीन् साधयन्ति भूमादयो हेतवो भावरूपा एवेति विधिसाधकविधिरूपास्त एवाविरुद्धोपलब्धय इत्युच्यन्ते ।

§ ५३. द्वितीयस्तु निषेधसाधको विरुद्धोपलब्धिनामा । स च स्वभावविरुद्ध-तद्व्याप्याप्युपलब्धिभेदात् सप्तधा । यथा नास्त्येव सर्वथा एकान्तः, अनेकान्त- 10 स्योपलम्भात् । नास्त्यस्य तत्त्वनिश्चयः, तत्र सन्देहात् । नास्त्यस्य क्रोधोपशान्तिः, वदनविकारादेः । नास्त्यस्यासत्यं वचः, रागाद्यकलाङ्कितज्ञानकलितत्वात् । नोद्गमिष्यति मुहूर्तान्ते पुण्यतारा, रोहिण्युद्गमात् । नोद्गमान्मुहूर्तपूर्वं मृगशिरः, पूर्वफा(फ)ल्गुन्युदयात् । नास्त्यस्य मिथ्याज्ञानं, सम्यग्दर्शनादिति । अत्रानेकान्तः प्रतिषेधस्यैकान्तस्य स्वभावतो विरुद्धः । तत्त्वसन्देहश्च प्रतिषेधतत्त्वनिश्चयविरुद्ध- 15 तदनिश्चयव्याप्यः । वदनविकारादिश्च क्रोधोपशमविरुद्धतदनुपशमकार्यम् । रागाद्यकलाङ्कितज्ञानकलितत्वं चासत्यविरुद्धसत्यकारणम् । रोहिण्युद्गमश्च पुण्यतारोद्गमविरुद्ध-मृगशीर्षोदयपूर्वचरः । पूर्वफल्गुन्युदयश्च मृगशीर्षोदयविरुद्धमधोदयोत्तरचरः । सम्यग्दर्शनं च मिथ्याज्ञानविरुद्धसम्यग्ज्ञानसहचरमिति ।

§ ५४. प्रतिषेधरूपोऽपि हेतुर्द्विविधः—विधिसाधकः प्रतिषेधसाधकश्चेति । आद्यो 20 विरुद्धानुपलब्धिनामा विधेयविरुद्धकार्यकारणस्वभावव्यापकसहचरानुपलम्भभेदात्प्रश्न-धा । यथा अस्त्यत्र रोगातिशयः, नीरोगव्यापारानुपलब्धेः । विद्यतेऽत्र कष्टम्, इष्टसंयोगामावात् । वस्तुजातमनेकान्तात्मकम्, एकान्तस्वभावानुपलम्भात् । अस्त्यत्र च्छाया, आँष्यानुपलब्धेः । अस्त्यस्य मिथ्याज्ञानम्, सम्यग्दर्शनानुपलब्धेरिति ।

§ ५५. द्वितीयोऽविरुद्धानुपलब्धिनामा प्रतिषेध्याविरुद्धस्वभावव्यापककार्यकारण- 25 पूर्वचरोत्तरचरसहचरानुपलब्धिभेदात् सप्तधा । यथा नास्त्यत्र भूतले कुम्भः, उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तस्य तत्स्वभावस्यानुपलम्भात् । नास्त्यत्र पनसः, पादपानुपलब्धेः । नास्त्यत्राप्रतिहतशक्तिम् बीजम्, अङ्कुरानवलोकनात् । न सन्त्यस्य प्रशमप्रभृतयो भावाः, तत्त्वार्थब्रह्मानाभावात् । नोद्गमिष्यति मुहूर्तान्ते स्वातिः, चित्रोदयादर्शनात् । नोद-

1. The varieties of different types of causes are given as four (Sthānāṅgasūtra, p. 309-310), fifteen (Pramāṇasaṃgraha, 29-30) twenty eight (Pramāṇaparikṣā, pp. 72-75), twenty-two (Parikṣāmukha 3 57-90), sixty-four (Pramāṇanaya, 3 50-99) eleven (Pramāṇamīmāṃsā, 1.2.12) or nine (Nyāyadīpikā, pp 95-99)

गमत्पूर्वभद्रपदा मुहूर्तात्पूर्वम्, उत्तरभद्रपदोद्गमानवगमात् । नास्त्यत्र सम्यग्ज्ञानम्, सम्यग्दर्शनानुपलब्धेरिति । सोऽयमनेकविधोऽन्यथानुपपत्त्येकलक्षणो हेतुरुक्तोऽतोऽन्यो हेत्वाभासः ।

[२०. हेत्वाभासनिरूपणम् ।]

§ ५६. स त्रेधा—असिद्धविरुद्धानैकान्तिकमेदात् । तत्राप्रतीयमानस्वरूपो हेतुर-
5 सिद्धः । स्वरूपाप्रतीतिश्चाज्ञानात्सन्देहाद्विपर्ययाद्वा । स द्विविधः—उभयासिद्धोऽन्यतरा-
सिद्धश्च । आद्यो यथा शब्दः परिणामी चाक्षुषत्वादिति । द्वितीयो यथा अचेतनास्त-
रवः, विज्ञानेन्द्रियाद्युर्निरोधलक्षणमरणरहितत्वात्, अचेतनाः सुखादयः उत्पत्तिमत्त्वा-
दिति वा ।

§ ५७. नन्वन्यतरासिद्धो हेत्वाभास एव नास्ति, तथाहि—परेणासिद्ध इत्युद्भाविते
10 यदि वादी न तत्साधकं प्रमाणमाचक्षीत, तदा प्रमाणाभावाद्बुभयोरप्यसिद्धः । अथा-
चक्षीत तदा प्रमाणस्यापक्षपातित्वादुभयोरपि सिद्धः । अथ यावन्न परं प्रति प्रमाणेन
प्रसाध्यते, तावत्तं प्रत्यसिद्ध इति चेत्; गौणं तर्कसिद्धत्वम्, न हि रत्नादिपदार्थस्त-
स्वतोऽप्रतीयमानस्तावन्तमपि कालं मुख्यतया तदाभासः । किञ्च, अन्यतरासिद्धो यदा
हेत्वाभासस्तदा वादी निगृहीतः स्यात्, न च निगृहीतस्य पश्चादनिग्रह इति युक्तम् ।
15 नापि हेतुसमर्थनं पश्चाद्युक्तम्, निग्रहान्तत्वाद्वादस्येति । अत्रोच्यते—यदा वादी सम्यग्-
चेतुत्वं प्रतिपद्यमानोऽपि तत्समर्थनन्यायविस्मरणादिनिमित्तेन प्रतिवादिनं प्राश्निकान्
वा प्रतिबोधयितुं न शक्नोति, असिद्धतामपि नानुमन्यते, तदान्यतरासिद्धत्वेनैव निगृ-
ह्यते । तथा, स्वयमनभ्युपगतोऽपि परस्य सिद्ध इत्येतावानै(इत्येतावतै)वोपन्यस्तो हेतुरन्य-
तरासिद्धो निग्रहाधिकरणम्, यथा साङ्ख्यस्य जैनं प्रति 'अचेतनाः सुखादय उत्पत्ति-
20 मत्त्वात् घटवत्' इति ।

§ ५८. साध्यविपरीतव्याप्तो विरुद्धः । यथा अपरिणामी शब्दः कृतकत्वादिति ।
कृतकत्वं ह्यपरिणामित्वविरुद्धेन परिणामित्वेन व्याप्तिमिति ।

§ ५९. यस्यान्यथानुपपत्तिः सन्दिह्यते सोऽनैकान्तिकः । स द्वेधा—निर्णीतविपक्ष-
वृत्तिकः सन्दिग्धविपक्षवृत्तिकश्च । आद्यो यथा नित्यः शब्दः प्रमेयत्वात् । अत्र हि
25 प्रमेयत्वस्य वृत्तिर्नित्ये व्योमादौ सपक्ष इव विपक्षेऽनित्ये घटादावपि निश्चिता । द्वितीयो
यथा अभिमतः सर्वज्ञो न भवति वक्तृत्वादिति । अत्र हि वक्तृत्वं विपक्षे सर्वज्ञे सन्दिग्ध-
वृत्तिकम्, सर्वज्ञः किं वक्तुः सोऽहोस्विभेति सन्देहात् । एवं स इयामो मित्राणुव्रत्तादित्या-
द्यप्युदाहार्यम् ।

§ ६०. अकिञ्चित्कारण्यश्चतुर्थोऽपि हेत्वाभासमेदो धर्मभूषणेनोदाहृतो न श्रेष्ठः ।

सिद्धसाधनो बाधितविषयश्चेति द्विविधस्याप्यप्रयोजकाङ्क्षस्य तस्य प्रतीत-निराकृता-
रूपपक्षभासभेदानतिरिक्तत्वात् । न च यत्र पक्षदोषतन्त्रावश्यं हेतुदोषोऽपि वाच्यः,
दृष्टान्तादिदोषस्याप्यवश्यं वाच्यत्वापत्तेः । एतेन कालात्ययापदिष्टोऽपि प्रत्युक्तो
वेदितव्यः । प्रकरणसमोऽपि नातिरिच्यते, तुल्यबलसाध्य तद्विपर्ययसाधकहेतुद्वयरूपे
सत्यस्मिन् प्रकृतसाध्यसाधनयोरन्यथानुपपत्त्यनिश्चयेऽसिद्ध एवान्तर्भावादिति संक्षेपः । 5

[२१. आगमप्रमाणनिरूपणम् ।]

§ ६१. आप्तवचनादाविर्भूतमर्थसंवेदनमागमः । न च व्याप्तिग्रहणबलेनार्थप्रति-
पादकत्वाद् धूमवदस्यानुमानेऽन्तर्भावः, कूटाकूटकार्षापणनिरूपणप्रवणप्रत्यक्षवदभ्यास-
दशायां व्याप्तिग्रहणैरपेक्ष्यैवास्यार्थबोधकत्वात् । यथास्थितार्थपरिज्ञानपूर्वकहितोपदेश-
प्रवण आप्तः । वर्णपदवाक्यात्मकं तद्वचनम् । वर्णोऽकारादिः पौद्गलिकः । पदं सङ्केत- 10
वत् । अन्योऽन्यापेक्षाणां पदानां समुदायो वाक्यम् ।

§ ६२. तदिदमागमप्रमाणं सर्वत्र विधिप्रतिषेधाभ्यां स्वार्थमभिदधानं सप्तभङ्गीमनु-
गच्छति, तथैव परिपूर्णार्थप्रापकत्वलक्षणतात्त्विकप्रामाण्यनिर्वाहात्, कचिदेकभङ्गदर्शनेऽपि
व्युत्पन्नमतीनामितरभङ्गाक्षेपधौव्यात् । यत्र तु घटोऽस्तीत्यादिलोकवाक्ये सप्तभङ्गी-
संस्पर्शशून्यता तत्रार्थप्रापकत्वमात्रेण लोकापेक्षया प्रामाण्येऽपि तत्त्वतो न प्रामाण्यमिति 15
द्रष्टव्यम् ।

[२२. सप्तभङ्गीस्वरूपचर्चा ।]

§ ६३. केयं सप्तभङ्गीति चेदुच्यते—एकत्र वस्तुन्येकैकधर्मपर्यनुयोगवशादविरोधेन
व्यस्तयोः समस्तयोश्च विधिनिषेधयोः कल्पनया स्वात्काराङ्कितः सप्तधा वाक्प्रयोगः
सप्तभङ्गी । इयं च सप्तभङ्गी वस्तुनि प्रतिपर्यायं सप्तविधधर्माणां सम्भवात् सप्तविध- 20
संशयोत्थापितसप्तविधजिज्ञासामूलसप्तविधप्रश्नानुरोधादुपपद्यते । तत्र स्यादस्त्येव सर्व-
मिति प्राधान्येन विधिकल्पनया प्रथमो भङ्गः । स्यात्—कथञ्चित् स्वद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावा-
पेक्षयेत्यर्थः । अस्ति हि घटादिकं द्रव्यतः पार्थिव्यादित्वेन, न जलादित्वेन । क्षेत्रतः
पाटलिपुत्रकादित्वेन, न कान्यकुब्जादित्वेन । कालतः शैशिरादित्वेन, न वासन्तिका-
दित्वेन । भावतः व्यामादित्वेन, न रक्तादित्वेनेति । एवं स्यान्नास्त्येव सर्वमिति प्राधा- 25
न्येन निषेधकल्पनया द्वितीयः । न चासत्त्वं कालपनिकम् ; सत्त्ववत् तस्य स्वातन्त्र्येणानुभ-
वात्, अन्यथा विपक्षासत्त्वस्य तात्त्विकस्याभावेन हेतोस्त्रैरूप्यव्याघातप्रसङ्गात् । स्या-
दस्त्येव स्यान्नास्त्येवेति प्राधान्येन क्रमिकविधिनिषेधकल्पनया तृतीयः । स्यादवक्तव्य-
मेवेति युगपत्प्राधान्येन विधिनिषेधकल्पनया चतुर्थः, एकेन पदेन युगपदुभयोर्वक्तुम-

- शक्यत्वात् । शतशानशौ सदित्यादौ साङ्केतिकपदेनापि क्रमेणार्थद्वयबोधनात् । अन्यतर-
त्वादिना कथञ्चिदुभयबोधनेऽपि प्रातिस्विकरूपेणैकपदादुभयबोधस्य ब्रह्मणापि दुरुपपा-
दत्वात् । स्यादस्त्येव स्यादवक्तव्यमेवेति विधिकल्पनया युगपद्विधिनिषेधकल्पनया च
पञ्चमः । स्यान्मास्त्येव स्यादवक्तव्यमेवेति निषेधकल्पनया युगपद्विधिनिषेधकल्पनया
5 च षष्ठः । स्यादस्त्येव स्यान्मास्त्येव स्यादवक्तव्यमेवेति विधिनिषेधकल्पनया युगप-
द्विधिनिषेधकल्पनया च सप्तम इति ।

- § ६४. सेयं सप्तमङ्गी प्रतिभङ्ग(ङ्गं) सकलादेशस्वभावा विकलादेशस्वभावा च ।
तत्र प्रमाणप्रतिपन्नानन्तधर्मात्मकवस्तुनः कालादिभिरभेदवृत्तिप्राधान्यादभेदोपचाराद्वा
यौगपद्येन प्रतिपादकं वचः सकलादेशः । नयविषयीकृतस्य वस्तुधर्मस्य भेदवृत्तिप्राधा-
10 न्याद्भेदोपचाराद्वा क्रमेणाभिधायकं वाक्यं विकलादेशः । ननु कः क्रमः, किं वा
यौगपद्यम् ? । उच्यते—यदास्तित्वादिधर्माणां कालादिभिर्भेदविवक्षा तदैकशब्दस्यानेका-
र्थप्रत्यायने शक्यत्वात् क्रमः । यदा तु तेषामेव धर्माणां कालादिभिरभेदेन वृत्तिमा-
त्मरूपमुच्यते तदैकेनापि शब्देनैकधर्मप्रत्यायनमुखेन तदात्मकतामापन्नस्यानेकाशेषरूप-
स्य वस्तुनः प्रतिपादनसम्भवाद्यौगपद्यम् ।

- 15 § ६५. के पुनः कालादयः ? । उच्यते—काल आत्मरूपमर्थः सम्बन्ध उपकारः
गुणिदेशः संसर्गः शब्द इत्यष्टौ । तत्र स्याज्जीवादि वस्त्वस्त्येवेत्यत्र यत्कालमस्तित्वं
त्वत्(तत्)कालाः शेषानन्तधर्मा वस्तुन्येकमेति तेषां कालेनाभेदवृत्तिः । यदेव चास्ति-
त्वस्य तद्गुणत्वमात्मरूपं तदेवान्यानान्तगुणानामपीत्यात्मरूपेणाभेदवृत्तिः । य एव
चाधारे(रो)ऽर्थो द्रव्याख्योऽस्तित्वस्य स एवान्यपर्यायाणामित्यर्थेनाभेदवृत्तिः । य एव
20 चाविष्मभावः सम्बन्धोऽस्तित्वस्य स एवान्येषामिति सम्बन्धेनाभेदवृत्तिः । य एव
चोपकारोऽस्तित्वेन स्वानुरक्तत्वकरणं स एवान्यैरपीत्युपकारेणाभेदवृत्तिः । य एव
गुणिनः सम्बन्धी देशः क्षेत्रलक्ष्णोऽस्तित्वस्य स एवान्येषामिति गुणिदेशेनाभेदवृत्तिः ।
य एव चैकवस्त्वात्मनाऽस्तित्वस्य संसर्गः स एवान्येषामिति संसर्गेणाभेदवृत्तिः । गुणीभूत-
भेदादभेदप्रधानात् सम्बन्धाद्विपर्ययेण संसर्गस्य भेदः । य एव चास्तीति शब्दोऽस्ति-
25 त्वधर्मात्मकस्य वस्तुनो वाचकः स एवाशेषानन्तधर्मात्मकस्यापीति शब्देनाभेदवृत्तिः,
पर्यायार्थिकनयगुणभावेन द्रव्यार्थिकनयप्राधान्यादुपपद्यते । द्रव्यार्थिकगुणभावेन पर्या-
यार्थिकप्राधान्ये तु न गुणानामभेदवृत्तिः सम्भवति, समकालमेकत्र नानागुणानामसम्भ-
वात्, सम्भवे वा तदाश्रयस्य भेदप्रसङ्गात् । नानागुणानां सम्बन्धिन आत्मरूपस्य च
भिन्नत्वात्, अन्यथा तेषां भेदविरोधात्, स्वाश्रयस्यार्थस्यापि नानात्वात्, अन्यथा
30 नानागुणाश्रयत्वविरोधात् । सम्बन्धस्य च सम्बन्धिभेदेन भेददर्शनात्, नानासम्बन्धि-

भिरैकैकसम्बन्धाघटनात् । तैः क्रियमाणस्योपकारस्य च प्रतिनियतरूपस्यानेकत्वात् ,
 अनेकैरूपकारिभिः क्रियमाणस्योपकारस्यैकस्य विरोधात् । गुणिदेशस्य च प्रतिगुणं
 भेदात् , तदभेदे भिन्नार्थगुणानामपि गुणिदेशाभेदप्रसङ्गात् । संसर्गस्य च प्रतिसंसर्गि
 भेदात् , तदभेदे संसर्गिभेदविरोधात् । शब्दस्य प्रतिविषयं नानात्वात् , सर्वगुणानामे-
 कशब्दवाच्यतायां सर्वार्थानामेकशब्दवाच्यतापचेरिति कालादिभिर्भिन्नात्मनामभेदोप- 5
 चारः क्रियते । एवं भेदवृत्तितदुपचारावपि वाच्याविति । पर्यवसितं परोक्षम् । ततश्च
 निरूपितः प्रमाणपदार्थः ।

इति महामहोपाध्यायश्रीकल्याणविजयगणिशिष्यमुख्यपण्डितश्रीलाभविजयगणिशिष्यावतं-
 सपण्डितश्रीजीतविजयगणिसतीर्थ्यपण्डितश्रीनयविजयगणिशिष्येण पण्डितश्रीपद्म-
 विजयगणिसहोदरेण पण्डितयशोविजयगणिना कृतायां जैनतर्क-
 भाषायां प्रमाणपरिच्छेदः सम्पूर्णः ।

10

२. नयपरिच्छेदः ।

[१. नयानां स्वरूपनिरूपणम् ।]

§ १. प्रमाणान्मुक्तानि । अथ नया उच्यन्ते । प्रमाणपरिच्छिन्नस्यानन्तधर्मात्म-
 कस्य वस्तुन एकदेशग्राहिणस्तदितरांशाप्रतिक्षेपिणोऽध्यवसायविशेषा नयाः । प्रमाणै- 15
 कदेशत्वात् तेषां ततो भेदः । यथा हि समुद्रैकदेशो न समुद्रो नाप्यसमुद्रस्तथा नया
 अपि न प्रमाणं न वाऽप्रमाणमिति^१ । ते च द्विधा - द्रव्यार्थिकपर्यायार्थिकभेदात् । तत्र
 प्राधान्येन द्रव्यमात्रग्राही द्रव्यार्थिकः । प्राधान्येन पर्यायमात्रग्राही पर्यायार्थिकः । तत्र
 द्रव्यार्थिकस्त्रिधा नैगमसङ्गद्वयवहारभेदात् । पर्यायार्थिकश्चतुर्धा ऋजुमूत्रशब्दसमभिरू-
 ढैवंभूतभेदात् । ऋजुमूत्रो द्रव्यार्थिकस्यैव भेद इति तु जिनभद्रगणिश्चमाश्रमणाः^२ । 20

§ २. तत्र सामान्यविशेषाद्यनेकधर्मोपनयनपरोऽध्यवसायो नैगमः, यथा पर्या-
 ययोर्द्रव्ययोः पर्यायद्रव्ययोश्च मुख्यामुख्यरूपतया विवक्ष्यणपरः । अत्र सच्चैतन्यमात्मगीति

1. Cf. Tattvārthaśloka-vārtika, 1.6.21,5

नाप्रमाणं प्रमाणं वा नयो ज्ञानात्मको मतः

स्यात्प्रमाणं कदेशस्तु सर्वं चाप्यविरोधतः ॥

नार्यं यस्तु न चाप्यस्तु अस्त्वंशः रूप्यते ।

मासमूहः समूहो वा सन्मूहो योऽप्यते ॥

2. Cf. Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣyabrhadvṛtti, Gāthās 75, 77, 2262

पर्याययोर्मुख्यामुख्यतया विवक्षणम् । अत्र चैतन्याख्यस्य व्यञ्जनपर्यायस्य विशेष्यत्वेन मुख्यत्वात्, सत्त्वाख्यस्य तु विशेषणत्वेनामुख्यत्वात् । प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिनिबन्धनार्थक्रियाकारित्वोपलक्षितो व्यञ्जनपर्यायः । भूतभविष्यत्त्वसंस्पर्शरहितं वर्तमानकालावच्छिन्नं वस्तु-स्वरूपं चार्थपर्यायः । वस्तु पर्यायवद्द्रव्यमिति द्रव्ययोर्मुख्यामुख्यतया विवक्षणम्, पर्यायवद्द्रव्याख्यस्य धर्मिणो विशेष्यत्वेन प्राधान्यात्, वस्त्वाख्यस्य विशेषणत्वेन गौण-
5 त्वात् । क्षणमेकं सुखी विषयासक्तजीव इति पर्यायद्रव्ययोर्मुख्यामुख्यतया विवक्षणम्, अत्र विषयासक्तजीवाख्यस्य धर्मिणो विशेष्यत्वेन मुख्यत्वात्, सुखलक्षणस्य तु धर्मस्य तद्विशेषणत्वेनामुख्यत्वात् । न चैवं द्रव्यपर्यायोभयावगाहित्वेन नैगमस्य प्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गः, प्राधान्येन तदुभयावगाहिन एव ज्ञानस्य प्रमाणत्वात् ।

- § ३. सामान्यमात्रग्राही परामर्शः सङ्ग्रहः—स द्वेधा, परोऽपरश्च । तत्राशेषविशेषे-
10 ष्वौदासीन्यं भजमानः शुद्धद्रव्यं सन्मात्रमभिमन्यमानः परः सङ्ग्रहः । यथा विश्वमेकं सदविशेषादिति । द्रव्यत्वादीन्यवान्तरसामान्यानि मन्वानसङ्ग्रेहेषु गजनिमीलिकाम-वलम्बमानः पुनरपरसङ्ग्रहः । सङ्ग्रहेण गोचरीकृतानामर्थानां विधिपूर्वकमवहरणं येनाभि-सन्धिना क्रियते स व्यवहारः । यथा यत् सत् तद् द्रव्यं पर्यायो वा । यद् द्रव्यं तज्जीवादि षड्विधम् । यः पर्यायः स द्विविधः—क्रमभावी सहभावी चेत्यादि ।
15 § ४. ऋजु वर्तमानक्षणस्यापिपर्यायमात्रं प्राधान्यतः सूचयन्नभिप्राय ऋजुसूत्रः । यथा सुखविवर्तः सम्प्रत्यस्ति । अत्र हि क्षणस्यापि सुखाख्यं पर्यायमात्रं प्राधान्येन प्रदर्श्यते, तदधिकरणभूतं पुनरात्मद्रव्यं गौणतया नाप्येत इति ।

- § ५. कालादिभेदेन ध्वनेरर्थभेदं प्रतिपद्यमानः शब्दः । कालकारकलिङ्गसङ्ख्या-पुरुषोपसर्गाः कालादयः । तत्र बभूव भवति भविष्यति सुमेरुरित्यत्रातीतादिकालभेदेन
20 सुमेरोर्भेदप्रतिपत्तिः, करोति क्रियते कुम्भ इत्यादौ कारकभेदेन, तटस्तटी तटमित्यादौ लिङ्गभेदेन, दाराः कलत्रमित्यादौ संख्याभेदेन, यास्यसि त्वम्, यास्यति भवानित्यादौ पुरुषभेदेन, सन्तिष्ठते अवतिष्ठते इत्यादावुपसर्गभेदेन ।

§ ६. पर्यायशब्देषु निरुक्तिभेदेन भिन्नमर्थं समभिरोहन् समभिरूढः । शब्दनयो हि पर्यायभेदेऽप्यर्थाभेदमभिप्रेति, समभिरूढस्तु पर्यायभेदे भिन्नानर्थानभिमन्यते ।¹

1. This suggests why synonyms are called paryāyavāci in Sanskrit. It means that no two words carry exactly the same meaning; they only indicate the different modes (paryāyas) of an object. Thus the word 'paryāya' of Jaina philosophy has been used in its technical sense, in the word 'paryāyavāci'

अभेदं त्वर्थगतं पर्यायशब्दानामुपेक्षत इति, यथा ईन्दनादिन्द्रः, शकनाच्छक्रः, पूर्दा-
रणात्पुरन्दर इत्यादि ।

§ ७. शब्दानां स्वप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभूतक्रियाविष्टमर्थं वाच्यत्वेनाभ्युपगच्छन्नेवम्भूतः ।
यथेन्दनमनुभवन्निन्द्रः । समभिरूढनयो हीन्दनादिक्रियायां सत्यामसत्यां च वासवादे-
रर्थस्येन्द्रादिव्यपदेशमभिप्रैति, क्रियोपलक्षितसामान्यस्यैव प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तत्वात्, पशु- 5
विशेषस्य गमनक्रियायां सत्यामसत्यां च गोव्यपदेशवत्, तथारूढेः सद्भावात् । एव-
म्भूतः पुनरिन्दनादिक्रियापरिणतमर्थं तत्क्रियाकाले इन्द्रादिव्यपदेशभाजमभिमन्यते ।
न हि कश्चिदक्रियाशब्दोऽस्यास्ति । गौरश्च इत्यादिजातिशब्दाभिमतानामपि क्रियाश-
ब्दत्वात्, गच्छतीति गौः, आशुगामित्वादश्च इति । शुक्लो, नील इति गुणशब्दाभि-
मता अपि क्रियाशब्दा एव, शुचीभवनाच्छुक्लो, नीलनालील इति । देवदत्तो यज्ञदत्त 10
इति यष्ट्याशब्दाभिमता अपि क्रियाशब्दा एव, देव एनं देयात्, यज्ञ एनं देयादिति ।
संयोगिद्रव्यशब्दाः समवाय(यि)द्रव्यशब्दाश्चाभिमताः क्रियाशब्दा एव दण्डोऽस्या-
स्तीति दण्डी, विषाणमस्यास्तीति विषाणीत्यस्तिक्रियाप्रधानत्वात् । पञ्चतयी तु
शब्दानां व्यवहारमात्रात्, न तु निश्चयादित्ययं नयः स्वीकुरुते ।

§ ८. एतेष्वामात्राश्चत्वारः प्राधान्येनार्थगोचरत्वादर्थनयाः अन्त्यास्तु त्रयः प्राधा- 15
न्येन शब्दगोचरत्वाच्छब्दनयाः । तथा विशेषग्राहिणोऽर्पितनयाः, सामान्यग्राहिणश्चान-
र्पितनयाः । तत्रानर्पितनयमते तुल्यमेव रूपं सर्वेषां सिद्धानां भगवताम् । अर्पितनयमते
त्वेकद्वित्र्यादिसमयसिद्धाः स्वसमानसमयसिद्धैरेव तुल्या इति । तथा, लोकप्रसिद्धार्थानु-
वादपरो व्यवहारनयः, यथा पञ्चस्वपि वर्णेषु भ्रमरे सत्सु इयामो भ्रमर इति व्यपदेशः ।
तात्त्विकार्थाभ्युपगमपरस्तु निश्चयः, स पुनर्मन्यते पञ्चवर्णो भ्रमरः, वादरस्कन्धत्वेन 20
तच्छरीरस्य पञ्चवर्णपुद्गलैर्निष्पन्नत्वात्, शुक्लादीनां च न्यम्भूतत्वेनानुपलक्षणात् । अथवा
एकनयमतार्थग्राही व्यवहारः, सर्वनयमतार्थग्राही च निश्चयः । न चैवं निश्चयस्य
प्रमाणत्वेन नयत्वव्याघातः, सर्वनयमतस्यापि स्वार्थस्य तेन प्राधान्याभ्युपगमात् ।
तथा, ज्ञानमात्रप्राधान्याभ्युपगमपरा ज्ञाननयाः । क्रियामात्रप्राधान्याभ्युपगमपराश्च
क्रियानयाः । तत्रजुष्टत्रादयश्चत्वारो नयाश्चारित्रलक्षणायाः क्रियाया एव प्राधान्यमभ्यु- 25
पगच्छन्ति, तस्या एव मोक्षं प्रत्यव्यवहितकारणत्वात् । नैगमसंग्रहव्यवहारास्तु यद्यपि
चारित्रश्रुतसम्यक्त्वानां त्रयाणामपि मोक्षकारणत्वमिच्छन्ति, तथापि व्यस्तानामेव, न
तु समस्तानाम्, एतन्मते ज्ञानादित्रयादेव मोक्ष इत्यनियमात्, अन्यथा नयत्वहानि-
प्रसङ्गात्, समुदयवादस्य स्थितपक्षत्वादिति द्रष्टव्यम् ।

- § ९. कः पुनरत्र बहुविषयो नयः को वाऽल्पविषयः ? इति चेदुच्यते—सन्मात्र-
गोचरात्संग्रहात्तावन्नैगमो बहुविषयो भावाभावभूमिकत्वात् । सद्दिशेषप्रकाशकाश्वहा-
रतः संग्रहः समस्तसत्समूहोपदर्शकत्वाद्बहुविषयः । वर्तमानविषयावलम्बिन ऋजुसूत्रा-
त्कालत्रितयवर्त्यर्थाजातावलम्बी व्यवहारो बहुविषयः । कालादिभेदेन भिन्नार्थोपदेशका-
5 च्छब्दाच्चद्विपरीतवेदक ऋजुसूत्रो बहुविषयः । न केवलं कालादिभेदेनैवर्जुसूत्रादल्पाथता
शब्दस्य, किन्तु भावघटस्यापि सद्भावात्सद्भावादिनाऽर्पितस्य स्याद् घटः स्यादघट
इत्यादिभङ्गपरिकरितस्य तेनाभ्युपगमात् तस्यर्जुसूत्राद् विशेषिततरत्वोपदेशात् । यद्य-
पीदृशसम्पूर्णसप्तभङ्गपरिकरितं वस्तु स्याद्वादिन एव सङ्गिरन्ते, तथापि ऋजुसूत्रकृतैतद-
भ्युपगमापेक्षयाऽन्यतरभङ्गेन विशेषितप्रतिपत्तिरत्रादुष्टेत्यदोष इति वदन्ति । प्रतिपर्याय-
10 शब्दमर्थभेदमभीप्सतः समभिरूढाच्छब्दस्तद्विषया(द्विपर्याया)नुयायित्वाद्बहुविषयः । प्रति-
क्रियं विभिन्नमर्थं प्रतिजानानादेवम्भूतात्समभिरूढः तदन्यथार्थस्थापकत्वाद्बहुविषयः ।
§ १०. नयैवाक्यमपि स्वविषये प्रवर्तमानं विधिप्रतिषेधाभ्यां सप्तभङ्गीमनुगच्छति,
विकलादेशत्वात्, परमेतद्वाक्यस्य प्रमाणवाक्याद्विशेष इति द्रष्टव्यम् ।

[२. नयामासानां निरूपणम् ।]

- 15 § ११. अथ नयामासाः । तत्र द्रव्यमात्रग्राही पर्यायप्रतिक्षेपी द्रव्यार्थिकाभासः ।
पर्यायमात्रग्राही द्रव्यप्रतिक्षेपी पर्यायार्थिकाभासः । धर्मिधर्मादीनामे(मै)कान्तिकपरार्थक्या-
भिसन्धिर्नैगमाभासः, यथा नैयायिकवैशेषिकदर्शनम् । संचाऽद्वैतं स्वीकुर्वाणः सकलविशेषा-
न्निराचक्षणः संग्रहाभासः यथाऽखिलान्यद्वैतवादिदर्शनानि सारूपदर्शनं च । अपार-
मार्थिकद्रव्यपर्यायविभागाभिप्रायो व्यवहाराभासः, यथा चार्वाकदर्शनम्, चार्वाको हि
20 प्रमाणप्रतिपन्नं जीवद्रव्यपर्यायादिप्रविभागं कल्पनारोपितत्वेनापह्नतेऽविचारितरमणीयं
भूतचतुष्टयप्रविभागमात्रं तु स्थूललोकव्यवहारानुयायितया समर्थयत इति । वर्तमान-
पर्यायाभ्युपगन्ता सर्वथा द्रव्यापलापी ऋजुसूत्राभासः, यथा तांथान्तं मतं । कालादि-
भेदेनार्थभेदमेवाभ्युपगच्छन् शब्दाभासः, यथा बभूव भवति भविष्यति सुमेरुरित्यादयः
शब्दा भिन्नमेवार्थमभिधधति, भिन्नकालशब्दत्वात्तादृक्सिद्धान्यशब्दवदिति । पर्याय-
25 ध्वनीनामभिधेयनानात्वमेव कक्षीकुर्वाणः समभिरूढाभासः, यथा इन्द्रः शक्रः पुरन्दर
इत्यादयः शब्दा भिन्नाभिधेया एव, भिन्नशब्दत्वात्, करिकुरङ्गशब्दवदिति । क्रिया-

1. The idea is that the non-Jaina systems of philosophy are also partly true, but they are false inasmuch as they overlook each other Cf. Gommatasāra, Karmakāṇḍa, 895.

परमनयानं वयं मिच्छं ललु होइ सव्वहा वयणा ।

जेणानं पुण वयं सत्तं लु कहंविचयणादो ॥

नाविष्टं वस्तु शब्दवाच्यतया प्रातिक्षेपत्वेन भूताभासः, यथा विशिष्टचेष्टाशून्यं घटारूपं वस्तु न घटशब्दवाच्यं, घटशब्दप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभूतक्रियाशून्यत्वात्, पटवदिति । अर्थाभिधायी शब्दप्रतिक्षेपी अर्थनयाभासः । शब्दाभिधाय्यर्थप्रतिक्षेपी शब्दनयाभासः । अपरितमभिधानोऽनर्पितं प्रतिक्षेपन्नर्पितनयाभासः । अनर्पितमभिधेयदर्पितं प्रतिक्षेपन्नर्पिताभासः । लोकव्यवहारमभ्युपगम्य तत्त्वप्रतिक्षेपी व्यवहाराभासः । तत्त्वमभ्युपगम्य व्यवहारप्रतिक्षेपी निश्चयाभासः । ज्ञानमभ्युपगम्य क्रियाप्रतिक्षेपी ज्ञाननयाभासः । क्रियामभ्युपगम्य ज्ञानप्रतिक्षेपी क्रियानयाभास इति ।

इति महामहोपाध्यायश्रीकल्याणविजयगणिशिष्यसूर्यपण्डितश्रीलामविजयगणिशिष्या-
वतंसपण्डितश्रीजीतविजयगणिसतीर्थपण्डितश्रीनयविजयगणिशिष्येण
पण्डितश्रीपद्मविजयगणिसहोदरेण पण्डितयशोविजयगणिना
विरचितायां जैनतर्कभाषायां नयपरिच्छेदः सम्पूर्णः ।

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३. निःक्षेपपरिच्छेदः ।

[१. नामादिनिःक्षेपनिरूपणम् ।]

§ १. नया निरूपिताः । अथ निःक्षेपा निरूप्यन्ते । प्रकरणादिवशेनाप्रतिपत्त्या-
(न्या)दिव्यवच्छेदकयथास्थानविनियोगात् शब्दार्थरचनाविशेषा निःक्षेपाः । मङ्गलादि- 15
पदार्थनिःक्षेपान्नाममङ्गलादिविनियोगोपपत्तेश्च निःक्षेपाणां फलवत्त्वम्, तदुक्तम्—“अप्र-
स्तुतार्थापाकरणात् प्रस्तुतार्थव्याकरणाच्च निःक्षेपः फलवान्” [लघी० स्ववि०
७. २] इति । ते च सामान्यतश्चतुर्धा—नामस्थापनाद्रव्यभावभेदात् ।

§ २. तत्र प्रकृतार्थनिरपेक्षा नामार्थान्यतरपरिणतिर्नामनिःक्षेपः । यथा सङ्केति-
तमात्रेणान्यार्थस्थितेनेन्द्रादिशब्देन वाच्यस्य गोपालदारकस्य शक्रादिपर्यायशब्दानभि- 20
धेया परिणतिरियमेव वा यथान्यत्रावर्तमानेन यदृच्छाप्रवृत्तेन दित्यद्वित्यादिशब्देन
वाच्या । तत्त्वतोऽर्थनिष्ठा उपचारतः शब्दनिष्ठा च । मेवादिनामापेक्षया यावद्रव्यभा-
विनी, देवदत्तादिनामापेक्षया चायावद्रव्यभाविनी, यथा वा पुस्तकपत्रचित्रादि-
लिखिता वस्त्वभिधानभूतेन्द्रादिवर्णावली ।

§ ३. यत्तु वस्तु तदर्थवियुक्तं तदभिप्रायेण स्थाप्यते चित्रादौ तादृशाकारम्, 25
अक्षादौ च निराकारम्, चित्राद्यपेक्षयेत्वरं नन्दीश्वरचैत्यप्रतिमाद्यपेक्षया च यावत्कथिक्तं
स स्थापनानिःक्षेपः, यथा जिनप्रतिमा स्थापनाजिनः, यथा चेन्द्रप्रतिमा स्थापनेन्द्रः ।

§ ४. भूतस्य भाविनो वा भावस्य कारणं यन्निक्षिप्यते स द्रव्यनिःक्षेपः, यथा-

ऽनुभूतेन्द्रपर्यायोऽनुभविष्यमाणेन्द्रपर्यायो वा इन्द्रः, अनुभूतघृताधारत्वपर्यायेऽनुभविष्यमाणघृताधारत्वपर्याये च घृतघटव्यपदेशवत्तत्रेन्द्रशब्दव्यपदेशोपपत्तेः । क्वचिदप्राधान्येऽपि द्रव्यनिःक्षेपः प्रवर्तते, यथाऽङ्गारमर्दको द्रव्याचार्यः, आचार्यगुणरहितत्वात् अप्रधानाचार्य इत्यर्थः । क्वचिदनुपयोगेऽपि, यथाऽनाभोगेनेहपरलोकाद्याशंशालक्षणे-
 5 नाविधिना च भक्त्यापि क्रियमाणा जिनपूजादिक्रिया द्रव्यक्रियैव, अनुपयुक्तक्रियायाः साक्षान्मोक्षाङ्गत्वाभावात् । भक्त्याऽविधिनापि क्रियमाणा सा पारम्पर्येण मोक्षाङ्गत्वापेक्षया द्रव्यतामश्नुते, भक्तिगुणेनाविधिदोषस्य निरनुबन्धीकृतत्वादित्याचार्याः ।

§ ५. विवक्षितक्रियानुभूतिविशिष्टं स्वतत्त्वं यन्निष्पद्यते स भावनिःक्षेपः, यथा इन्दनक्रियापरिणतो भावेन्द्र इति ।

- 10 § ६. ननु भाववर्जितानां नामादीनां कः प्रतिविशेषस्त्रिष्वपि वृत्त्यविशेषात् ?, तथाहि—नाम तावन्नामवति पदार्थे स्थापनायां द्रव्ये चाविशेषेण वर्तते । भावार्थशून्यत्वं स्थापनारूपमपि त्रिष्वपि समानम्, त्रिष्वपि भावस्याभावात् । द्रव्यमपि नामस्थापनाद्रव्येषु वर्तते एव, द्रव्यस्यैव नामस्थापनाकरणात्, द्रव्यस्य द्रव्ये सुतरां वृत्तेश्चेति विरुद्धधर्माध्यासाभावान्नैपां भेदो युक्त इति चेत्; न; अनेन रूपेण विरुद्धधर्माध्यासाभावेऽपि
 15 रूपान्तरेण विरुद्धधर्माध्यासात्तद्वेदोपपत्तेः । तथाहि—नामद्रव्याभ्यां स्थापना तावदाकाराभिप्रायबुद्धिक्रियाफलदर्शनाद्भिद्यते, यथा हि स्थापनेन्द्रे लोचनसहस्राद्याकारः, स्थापनाकर्तृश्च सद्भूतेन्द्राभिप्रायो, द्रष्टुश्च तदाकारदर्शनादिन्द्रबुद्धिः, भक्तिपरिणतबुद्धीनां नमस्करणादिक्रिया, तत्फलं च पुत्रोत्पत्त्यादिकं संवीक्ष्यते, न तथा नामेन्द्रे द्रव्येन्द्रे चेति ताभ्यां तस्य भेदः । द्रव्यमपि भावपरिणामिकारणत्वात्नामस्थापनाभ्यां
 20 भिद्यते, यथा ह्यनुपयुक्तो वक्ता द्रव्यम्, उपयुक्तत्वकाले उपयोगलक्षणस्य भावस्य कारणं भवति, यथा वा साधुजीवो द्रव्येन्द्रः सद्भावेन्द्ररूपायाः परिणतेः, न तथा नामस्थापनेन्द्राविति । नामापि स्थापनाद्रव्याभ्यामुक्तवैधर्म्यादेव भिद्यत इति । दुग्धतक्रादीनां श्वेतत्वादिनाऽभेदेऽपि माधुर्यादिना भेदवन्नामादीनां केनचिद्रूपेणाभेदेऽपि रूपान्तरेण भेद इति स्थितम् ।

- 25 § ७. ननु भाव एव वस्तु, किं तदर्थशून्यैर्नामादिभिरिति चेत्; न; नामादीनामपि वस्तुपर्यायत्वेन सामान्यतो भावत्वानतिक्रमात्, अविशिष्टे इन्द्रवस्तुन्युच्चरिते नामादिभेदचतुष्टयपरामर्शनात् प्रकरणादिनैव विशेषपर्यवसानात् । भावाङ्गत्वेनैव वा नामादीनामुपयोगः जिननामजिनस्थापनापरिनिर्वृतमुनिदेहदर्शनाङ्गाबोद्धासानुभवात् । केवलं नामादित्रयं भावोच्छासैर्नैकान्तिकमनात्यन्तिकं च कारणमिति ऐकान्तिकात्य-

नितकस्य भावस्याभ्यर्हितत्वमनुमन्यन्ते प्रवचनवृद्धाः । एतच्च भिन्नवस्तुगतनामाद्य-
पेक्षयोक्तम् । अभिन्नवस्तुगतानां तु नामादीनां भावाविनाभूतत्वादेव वस्तुत्वम्, सर्वस्य
वस्तुनः स्वाभिधानस्य नामरूपत्वात्, स्वाकारस्य स्थापनारूपत्वात्, कारणतायाश्च
द्रव्यरूपत्वात्, कार्यापन्नस्य च स्वस्य भावरूपत्वात् । यदि च घटनाम घटधर्मो न
भवेत्तदा ततस्तत्संप्रत्ययो न स्यात्, तस्य स्वापृथग्भूतसंबन्धनिमित्तकत्वादिति सर्वं नामा- 5
त्मकमेष्टव्यम् । साकारं च सर्वं मति-शब्द-घटादीनामाकारवत्त्वात्, नीलाकारसंस्थान-
विशेषादीनामाकाराणामनुभवसिद्धत्वात् । द्रव्यात्मकं च सर्वं उत्पन्नविफणकुण्डलिताका-
रसमन्वितसर्पवत् विकाररहितस्याविर्भावतिरोभावमात्रपरिणामस्य द्रव्यस्यैव सर्वत्र सर्व-
दानुभवात् । भावात्मकं च सर्वं परापरकार्यक्षणसन्तानात्मकस्यैव तस्यानुभवादिति
चतुष्टयात्मकं जगदिति नामादिनयसमुदयवादः । 10

[२. निःक्षेपाणां नयेषु योजना ।]

§ ८. अथ नामादिनिक्षेपा नयैः सह योज्यन्ते । तत्र नामादित्रयं द्रव्यास्तिक-
नयस्यैवाभिमतम्, पर्यायास्तिकनयस्य च भाव एव । आद्यस्य भेदो संग्रहव्यवहारो,
नैगमस्य यथाक्रमं सामान्यग्राहिणो विशेषग्राहिणश्च अनयोरेवान्तर्भावात् । ऋजुसूत्रा-
दयश्च चत्वारो द्वितीयस्य भेदा इत्याचार्यसिद्धसेनमतानुसारेणाभिहितं जिनभद्रग- 15
णिक्षमाश्रमणपूज्यपादैः—

“नामादित्यं दृक्चट्टियस्य भावो अ पञ्जवणयस्स ।

संगहववहारा पढमगस्स सेसा उ इयरस्स ॥” [७५]

इत्यादिना विशेषावश्यके । स्वमते तु नमस्कारनिक्षेपविचारस्थले—

“भावं चिय सद्दुदणया सेसा इच्छन्ति सव्वणिकखेवे” [२८४०] 20

इति वचसा त्रयोऽपि शब्दनयाः शुद्धत्वाद्भावमेवेच्छन्ति ऋजुसूत्रादयस्तु चत्वार-
रश्चतुरोऽपि निक्षेपानिच्छन्ति अविशुद्धत्वादित्युक्तम् । ऋजुसूत्रो नामभाव-
निक्षेपावेवेच्छतीत्यन्ये; तत्र (तन्न); ऋजुसूत्रेण द्रव्याभ्युपगमस्य सूत्राभिहि-
तत्वात्, पृथक्त्वाभ्युपगमस्य परं निषेधात् । तथा च सूत्रम्—“उज्जुसुअस्स
एगे अणुवउत्ते आगमओ एगं दव्वावस्सयं, पुहत्तं नेच्छइ स्मि” [अनुयो० 25
सू० १४] । कथं चायं पिण्डावस्थायां सुवर्णादिद्रव्यमनाकारं भविष्यत्कुण्डलादि-
पर्यायलक्षणभावहेतुत्वेनाभ्युपगच्छन् विशिष्टेन्द्राद्यभिलाषहेतुभूतां साकाराः मिन्द्रादिस्था-
पनां नेच्छेत् ? न हि दृष्टेऽनुपपन्नं नामेति । किञ्च, इन्द्रादिसञ्ज्ञामात्रं तदर्थरहित-
मिन्द्रादिशब्दवाच्यं वा नामेच्छन् अयं भावकारणत्वाविशेषात् कुतो नामस्थापने

- नेच्छेत् ? । प्रत्युत सुतरां तदभ्युपगमो न्याय्यः । इन्द्रमूर्तिलक्षणद्रव्य-विशिष्टतदा-
काररूपस्थापनयोरिन्द्रपर्यायरूपे भावे तादात्म्यसंबन्धेनावस्थितत्वात्तत्र वाच्यवाचक-
भावसंबन्धेन संबद्धाभ्यामोऽपेक्षया सन्निहिततरकारणत्वात् । सङ्ग्रहव्यवहारौ स्थापना-
वर्जास्त्रीभिक्षेपानिच्छत इति केचित्; तन्मानवद्यं यतः संग्रहिकोऽसंग्रहिकोऽनर्पितभेदः परि-
5 पूर्णो वा नैगमस्तावत् स्थापनामिच्छतीत्यवश्यमभ्युपेयम् , सङ्ग्रहव्यवहारयोरन्यत्र
द्रव्यार्थिके स्थापनाभ्युपगमावर्जनात् । तत्रापक्षे संग्रहे स्थापनाभ्युपगमप्रसङ्गः,
संग्रहनयमतस्य संग्रहिकनैगममताविशेषात् । द्वितीये व्यवहारे तदभ्युपगमप्रसङ्गः,
तन्मतस्य व्यवहारमताद्विशेषात् । तृतीये च निरपेक्षयोः संग्रहव्यवहारयोः
स्थापनाभ्युपगमोपपत्तावपि समुदितयोः संपूर्णनैगमरूपत्वात्तदभ्युपगमस्य दुर्निवारत्वम्,
10 अविभागस्थानैगमात्प्रत्येकं तदेकैकभागग्रहणात् । किञ्च, सङ्ग्रहव्यवहारयोरैगमान्तर्भा-
वात्स्थापनाभ्युपगमलक्षणं तन्मतमपि तत्रान्तर्भूतमेव, उभयधर्मलक्षणस्य विषयस्य
प्रत्येकमप्रवेशेऽपि स्थापनालक्षणस्यैकधर्मस्य प्रवेशस्य ह्युपपादत्वात्, स्थापनासामान्यत-
द्विशेषाभ्युपगममात्रेणैव सङ्ग्रहव्यवहारयोर्भेदोपपत्तेरिति यथागमं भावनीयम् । एतैश्च
नामादिनिक्षेपैर्जावादयः पदार्था निक्षेप्याः ।

15

[३. जीवविषये निःक्षेपाः ।]

- § ९. तत्र यद्यपि यस्य जीवस्याजीवस्य वा जीव इति नाम क्रियते स नाम-
जीवः, देवतादिप्रतिमा च स्थापनाजीवः, औपशमिकादिभावशाली च भावजीव इति
जीवविषयं निक्षेपत्रयं सम्भवति, न तु द्रव्यनिक्षेपः । अयं हि तदा सम्भवेत्, यद्यजीवः
सन्नायत्यां जीवोऽभविष्यत्, यथाऽदेवः सन्नायत्यां देवो भविष्यत्(न्) द्रव्यदेव
20 इति । न चैतदिष्टं सिद्धान्ते, यतो जीवत्वमनादिनिधनः पारिणामिको भाव इष्यत
इति । तथापि गुणपर्यायवियुक्तत्वेन बुद्ध्या कल्पितोऽनादिपारिणामिकभावयुक्तो
द्रव्यजीवः, शून्योऽयं भङ्ग इति यावत्, सतां गुणपर्यायाणां बुद्ध्यापनयस्य कर्तुम-
शक्यत्वात् । न खलु ज्ञानायत्तार्थपरिणतिः, किन्तु अर्थो यथा यथा विपरिणमते
तथा तथा ज्ञानं प्रादुरस्तीति । न चैवं नामादिचतुष्टयस्य व्यापिताभङ्गः, यतः
25 प्रायः सर्वपदार्थेष्वन्येषु तत् सम्भवति । यद्यत्रैकस्मिन् सम्भवति नैतावता भवत्य-
व्यापितेति ब्रुद्धाः । जीवशब्दार्थज्ञस्तत्रानुपयुक्तो द्रव्यजीव इत्यप्याहुः । अपरे तु वद-
न्ति—अहमेव मनुष्यजीवो [द्रव्यजीवो]ऽभिधातव्यः उत्तरं देवजीवमप्रादुर्भूतमाश्रित्य
अहं हि तस्योत्पत्तौर्देवजीवस्य कारणं भवामि, यतश्चाहमेव तेन देवजीवभावेन भवि-
ष्यामि, अतोऽहमधुना द्रव्यजीव इति । एतत्कथितं तैर्भवति—पूर्वः पूर्वा जीवः

परस्य परस्योत्पत्सोः कारणमिति । अस्मिन् पक्षे सिद्ध एव भावजीवो भवति,
नान्य इति—एतदपि नानवद्यमिति तत्त्वार्थटीकाकृतः ।

§ १०. इदं पुनरिहावधेयं—इत्थं संसारिजीवे द्रव्यत्वेऽपि भावत्वाविरोधः, एक-
व-तुगतानां नामादीनां भावाविनाभूतत्वप्रतिपादनात् । तदाह भाष्यकारः—

“अहवा वत्थुभिहाणं, नामं ठवणा य जो तयागारो । 5

कारणया से दब्बं, कजावन्नं तयं भावो ॥१॥” [१०]

इति । केवलमविशिष्टजीवापेक्षया द्रव्यजीवत्वव्यवहार एव न स्यात्, मनुष्यादेर्दे-
वत्वादिविशिष्टजीवं प्रत्येव हेतुत्वादिति अधिकं नैयरहस्यादौ विवेचितमस्माभिः ॥

॥ इति महामहोपाध्यायश्रीकल्याणविजयगणिशिष्यमुख्यपण्डितश्रीलाभविजयगणिशिष्यावतंस-
पण्डितश्रीजीतविजयगणिसतीर्थ्यपण्डितश्रीनयविजयगणिशिष्येण पण्डितश्रीपद्म- 10
विजयगणिसोदरेण पण्डितयशोविजयगणिना विरचितायां जैनतर्कभाषायां
निक्षेपपरिच्छेदः संपूर्णः, तत्संपूर्णं च संपूर्णं जैनतर्कभाषा ॥

॥ स्वस्तिश्रीश्रमणसङ्घाय ॥



सूरिश्रीविजयादिदेवसुगुरोः पट्टाम्बराहर्मणौ,
 सूरिश्रीविजयादिसिंहसुगुरौ शक्रासनं भेजुषि ।
 तत्सेवाऽप्रतिमप्रसादजनितश्रद्धानशुद्धया कृतः,
 ग्रन्थोऽयं वितनोतु कोविदकुले मोदं विनोदं तथा ॥ १ ॥

5 यस्यासन् गुरवोऽत्र जीतविजयप्राज्ञाः प्रकृष्टाशयाः,
 भ्राजन्ते सनया नयादिविजयप्राज्ञाश्च विद्याप्रदाः ।
 प्रेम्णां यस्य च सद्यः पद्मविजयो जातः सुधीः सोदरः
 तेन न्यायविशारदेन रचिता स्तासर्कभाषा मुदे ॥ २ ॥

10 तर्कभाषामिमां कृत्वा मया यत्पुण्यमर्जितम् ।
 प्राप्नुयां तेन विपुलं परमानन्दसम्पदम् ॥ ३ ॥

पूर्वं न्यायविशारदत्वविरुद्धं काश्यां प्रदत्तं बुधैः
 न्यायाचार्यपदं ततः कृतशतग्रन्थस्य यस्यार्पितम् ।
 शिष्यप्रार्थनया नयादिविजयप्राज्ञोत्तमानां शिशुः
 तत्त्वं किञ्चिदिदं यशोविजय इत्याख्याभृदाख्यातवान् ॥ ४ ॥



Translation

Mahāmahopādhyāya Śrī Yaśovijaya's

JAINA-TARKA-BHĀṢĀ

OR

A Manual of Jaina Logic

1. On the Organ of Knowledge :

After bowing to Jina, who is saluted by the groups of Indras, and who gives instructions in the real nature of things, I compose the Manual of Logic, that consists of (three parts viz.) the organ of knowledge, the partial truth, and the different ways of putting a thing.

[1. *The investigation into the definition of the pramāṇa in general*].

*1. Pramāṇa is the definitive cognition of the self and the others.

Here 'self' is the very nature of the knowledge itself, the 'others' are objects other than that, and 'the definitive' is that, which ascertains both of them as they are.

Here the word 'cognition' is used to avoid undesirable extension to indeterminate intuition. The word 'definitive' is used to avoid that (undesirable extension) to doubt, error and indecision. The epithet 'self and the others' has been used to indicate the nature (of the pramāṇa) and by way of refutation of the Mīmāṃsakas etc. who hold the non-perceptibility of knowledge and of those who believe in the non-dualistic existence of knowledge etc. and deny the existence of external objects.

Now, if right cognition (itself) is meant to be pramāṇa, then what else is to be said as its resultant ? Correct; but its resultant is the definite cognition of the self and objects.

Now, in this way, the quality of being definitive cognition of the self and others, will not exist in the *pramāṇa*; the *pramāṇa* being definitive cognition of others and the resultant being definitive cognition of the self; if one argues like this, the answer is : no, because it will be rationalised by partial identity of (the two) the *pramāṇa* and its resultant.

Thus, it is concluded that the function-sense only, when engaged in its conscious activity, is the *pramāṇa*, because the self, unappropriated by its conscious activity, does not reveal its objects like touch etc., because (otherwise) a man in deep sleep would also have that (cognition) by the sense-object-contact with soft cotton etc.

*2. Some say that the sense *qua* attainment, characterised by the capacity of apprehending the objects is the *pramāṇa*, as **“the capacity of the self, in the form of apprehension of the object, is mentioned as the instrument and this is not relatively contradictory”**. (TSV., 1.1.22) this is not correct, because the resultant of sense *qua* attainment is mediated by the instrument which is conscious activity, and because if by accepting the non-perceptibility of the capacities, the non-perceptibility and perceptibility of the knowledge of the instrument and the resultant (respectively) is accepted, it will amount to acceding to the view point of Prabhākara. If one argues that even the capacity of knowledge is perceptible, through the substance, in its substratum, which it pervades, i.e. the self, it cannot be so; if it were perceptible through the substance, it will not be in order to hold it as self-illuminating as is the case with happiness etc.; moreover the mention of instrument in (the sentence) ‘I know the pitcher through knowledge’ would be illogical; (for example) there is no mention of the neck and earthen bowl at the time of the perception of the pitcher, even though they are perceptible through the substance.

[2. *Having defined perceptual cognition, its division into two, empirical and transcendental:*]

*3 That cognition is of two kinds: perceptual and non-perceptual. Perceptual is that which as an effect depends on the senses or the self which is called ‘akṣa’, a stock-word in

the category of Uṇādi words, in the sense of 'permeating i. e. pervading all objects in the form of knowledge.'

Not that in this way the title of 'perceptual' will not apply to visual intuition (of limited extension) and clairvoyance etc. and sensuous knowledge etc, because this is only its etymological meaning; its usage being in the sense of clarity, implied by it as one united word giving a single meaning. And 'clarity' means, revealing in a greater degree than that revealed by inference etc. ; (thus) there is nothing wanting here.

That which is hidden from sense is non-perceptual i. e. indistinct cognition.

*4. The perceptual cognition is of two types : the empirical and the transcendental. The empirical (sāmvyavahārika) is based on unhindered transaction (sāmvyavahāra), characterised by day-to-day talk of engagements and withdrawals, e. g. perceptual cognition of ourselves. As it takes effect through the activity of the self, mediated by sense and mind in reality, it is non-perceptual, because the fact of mediation is here the same as in the knowledge of the fire by smoke. Moreover, it is in reality non-perceptual, because here also doubt, error and indecision are possible as in non-existent, inconclusive, and contradictory inference-fallacy and like a correct inference it also admits of the possibility of certainty preceded by agreement (intimation) and memory.

[3. *The investigation into empirical perceptual cognition, and the distinction between sensuous and scriptural knowledge.*]

*5. This (empirical perceptual cognition) is of two kinds: sensuous and quasi-sensuous. The sensuous is effected by eyes etc. and the quasi-sensuous is born of mind. Though mind functions even in the sensuous cognition, yet as it is the extraordinary cause there, it is no fault (to call it sensuous).

Both of these are of two kinds : sensuous cognition and scriptural knowledge. Sensuous cognition is conditioned by a sense and the mind and is not based on word, whereas that which is based on word is scriptural knowledge.

By the term 'based on word' is meant the knowledge in the form of the inward repetition of a word like 'pitcher is pitcher', having established the connection between the word

and its import either from the instruction of others about the intimated object or from the scriptural books. If one should say that in this way only perception would be sensuous cognition and not speculation etc. etc. because they are accompanied by the mention of word and are therefore to be included in the scriptural knowledge; it is not correct; because though at the time of intimation, speculation etc. are based on word, yet they are not based on that at the time of transaction, because by virtue of the skill through practice, it is found that even without basing on word, a variety of speech is preceded by the chain of manifold thinking. Since in Aṅgas Upāṅgas etc. and in the perception of word etc. there is no basis of word, it is sensuous cognition, but inasmuch as there also the meaning is known on the basis of words, it is scriptural knowledge.

[4. Four divisions of sensuous cognition, viz. perception etc.]

*6. Sensuous knowledge is of four kinds : perception, speculation, perceptual judgment, and retention.

The lowest knowledge is perception. It is of two kinds : contact-awareness and object-awareness. Vyañjana is that which manifests the object; (in the first place) it is the physical sense-organ shaped like Kadamba flower etc. and characterised by the particular power of cognising the objects of sound etc., (secondly) the substance transformed into sense-data such as sound (-atoms) etc, and (thirdly) the relation of the two (mentioned just now). So it (vyañjanāvagraha) is a compound in which the middle word has been dropped i.e. contact of vyañjana with vyañjana. Then if one argues that this is ignorance because no knowledge is received at that time, like the contact of ear and sound in the case of a deaf; it is not so; it being the instrument of knowledge, is by transference of epithet, called knowledge, because at its culmination is seen knowledge in the form of object-perception, or even at that time an indistinct knowledge can be inferred like the dream-knowledge etc. which can be inferred by particular type of gestures etc. (and) because it cannot be marked—like one spark of fire—on account of its subtleness.

[5. In support of the non-contactary nature of mind and sight, while demonstrating the four types of contact-awareness.]

*7. That (contact-awareness) is of four kinds in accordance with the difference of senses except sight and mind, which being of non-contactory nature cannot have any contact-awareness; or otherwise, if they were the subject of favour and injury of the object known, there should have been wetness and burning at the sight and thought of water and fire. If it is argued that favour and injury of the eye are found at the sight of the sun and the moon etc., it is not correct, because it is not found at the time of their first sight; and because when seen constantly the injury by the ray of the sun, which comes into contact can be accounted for, as also the sense of favour because of lack of injury at the sight of the moon etc. which are possessed of natural qualities of gentleness etc.

At the thought of the dead or lost things, and the thought of the union of the loved ones and procurement of riches, the injury and favour, indicated by weakness and emaciation of chest etc. and by the beaming face and horripilation etc., do not belong to the mind; but to the self through the help of mind-*qua*-substance in the form of multitude of desirable or undesirable material atoms transformed into mental form; just like through the checking of wind in the heart and medicine; the contactory nature of mind is not proved by them. If it is said that if the mind does not contact its object by approaching it, how does the feeling that 'my mind has gone to Meru mountain etc.' come to a sleeping man; it is not true; because the dream of going of mind to Meru mountain etc. is false like that of the body, or otherwise there would be (undesirable) situation of the occurrence of favour and injury caused by the fragrance of flower etc. and the fatigue caused by travel etc.

If it is said that favour and injury by the sight of the bathing of Jina, experienced in dream and by non-attainment of the desired object (respectively) are seen with reference to the awakened person also, we answer that they may be seen because of the science of dream, but the result of the action, viz, satisfaction etc., is not there by the science of dream as to prove the contactory nature of mind in the form of contacting the object.

If it is said that the result of action in the form of discharge of semen virile is found in dream also; that is due to intensity of desire, and not due to the action of inter-course with the women, so where is the fault? If it is said that listening to song etc. in cases of somnambulism, there is contact-awareness of the mind also, it is not so, for in that stage though one thinks oneself to be dreaming, yet one perceives through ears etc. alone. Because, on the authority of the statement like 'one who is negligent, does not know' because all being involved in the world have their activity of consciousness spread over infinite time-points, and because at every time-point, it receives mind-substance, even though not contacting the object, how the mind without leaving the body, will not have contact-awareness at the time of thinking about heart etc. which are in its vicinity; listen; mind is cogniser and not cognitum; contact-awareness is there at the time of cognising the cognitum and it has no scope, therefore, at the time of receiving matter constituting mind, nor has it any scope at the time of thinking about heart etc. which are in its vicinity, because the distinction of working in close contact or otherwise (not working in close contact) is decided from the point of view of external objects, or also because of the skilled cessation and subsidence of karmic veils of mind, there is no cognition of the object, and because even at the time of functioning of the senses of ear etc., the functioning of mind is accepted only after the contact-awareness, because the meaning of the word mind (manas) 'thinks over(manyate)the objects', or 'by it are thought over(manyante) the objects,' conforms to its etymology, and because just as the language cannot function without indicating the meaning, similarly mind cannot function without thinking over the object. Thus it is concluded that eyes and mind have no contact-awareness.

[6. *Treatment of object-perception.*]

*8. Object awareness is the cognition of the general features without any distinction of form, name, genus, activity, quality, and substance. How then the scriptures say as 'he has cognised word', there is the non-existence of the absence of the

mention of 'word' etc.; no; because only the speaker says 'word', or because it is meant for not distinguishing it from the form and taste etc. If the determinate knowledge that 'this is word', were there in object-perception, then since the word 'word' takes a period of less than forty-eight minutes (but more than one time point) to pronounce, the one time-pointedness of object-perception would be shattered. One may say : the cognition of both—the general and the special—may be included in object-perception, and later on may be considered the beginning of speculation in the form that 'here are, generally speaking, sweetness etc. the qualities of the sound of bow-string;' it is not so; because if it is cognition of the special as distinguished from non-word, it would be perceptual judgement, because the cognition of the little cannot be firmly established from the point of view of the further and further species. Moreover, the knowledge 'this is word' is not logically justifiable without the speculation in the form of thinking of word, as distinguished from form etc. and speculation is not possible in uncognised object, and, therefore, its place would have to be accepted before the time of object-perception accepted by us, and that (time) is the time of contact-awareness, devoid of the knowledge of object, and so on and so forth. Afterwards—because the speculation regarding the qualities other than that of sound is mentioned as 'which word is this,' the object-perception should be accepted in this form alone that 'this is word,' if it be argued; no; the word' is said by the speaker only, at the time of object-perception, the scriptures mention only indeterminate learning of word, and because the indeterminate is general in form, and the formless conscious activity can cognise that much only. And if the cognition of indeterminate word is accepted in contact-awareness, it would also become object-perception, because it cognises the object.

*9. Some say: from the point of view of a child who is just born and is devoid of the ideas of intimation etc., cognition is that of general nature, but for a man who is conversant with the object, the cognition is special, and therefore from this point of view it is not logically incoherent to

say that 'he cognises the word', it is not so; in this way for more intimately conversant, it would be, beyond the determinate knowledge of word, a cognition of many-manyspecials. And we cannot say that 'this is desirable,' the scripture does not speak of any adjective (but says unqualifyingly) that 'one does not know which word is this,' even the wisest cannot cognise the further and further qualities without cognising the word, which is qualified.

*10. Others say that the scriptural statement is consistent because object-perception is said to be preceded by intuitional cognition, and intuitional cognition, cognises indistinct general features, whereas the object-perception cognises the form of the object as distinct from other objects; this is incorrect; Does the intuitional cognition precede contact-awareness, or is it identical with it ? The first alternative is not possible, because it (intuitional cognition) is not possible without the relationship of the object and its awareness. Nor is the second alternative possible, because at the last moment of the contact-awareness, object-perception takes place and there is no place for intuitional cognition. Nor is the third alternative possible, because then it (intuitional cognition) would be just another name for contact-awareness, and because it is devoid of object-cognition, intuitional cognition is not possible in it. Moreover, how can intuitional cognition, without speculation, lead to object-perception ? And how can speculation and perception, which last separately for innumerable time-points (and one time-point) occur simultaneously ? This should be thought over. If it be said that since even perception has been shown as having the varieties of quick and otherwise (slow) etc. it also lasts for innumerate time-points and is not incoherent with having the particulars as its object; it is not so; in reality, these are the varieties of perceptual judgement, and have been described as varieties of perception on the basis of secondary usage of the effect in the cause, because the particulars cannot be the subject in reality in such cases where particulars are not the subjects.

*11. Or perception is classified into two : The transcendental and empirical. The former cognises only the gen-

ral features, the latter has the particulars as its subject; because the speculation occurs in the form of curiosity regarding the further and further qualities over and above that; otherwise as it would lead to the non-occurrence of speculation without perception, it is here alone that the varieties of quick and otherwise (i. e. slow) can be justified, and it is because of this that the practice of the chain of further and further knowledge should be understood.

[7. *Investigation of speculation, perceptual judgement and retention, respectively.*]

*12. Speculation is inquisitive pursuit (for the knowledge) of specific details, i. e. it removes the points of disagreement and applies the points of agreement, e. g. 'this must be normally sound as being capable of reception through ears etc.' or 'this must be the sound of a conch as it is possessed of the qualities of sweetness etc.' This is not doubt, because that consists in knowledge of various objects of opposite nature in the same subject, and because this, being inclined towards definiteness, is different.

*13. Perceptual judgement is the determination of the specific characteristic of that which was speculated upon. e. g. 'This must be sound only,' or 'this must be the sound of conch only.'

*14. That (perceptual judgement) being firm-fixed is retention. It is classified into three: absence of lapse, memory and memory-impression. Absence of lapse is absence of removal of uninterrupted conscious activity on one object. Memory is the unfoldment of that very conscious activity on the object after an interval as 'it is the same.' Memory-impression is the impression which causes memory and is carried by perceptual judgement. Since both types of perceptions are included in perception and three types of retention in retention, the division (of sensuous cognition into four) is not disturbed.

*15. Others, who follow only the etymological meaning viz. that perceptual judgement (apāya) is removal (apanayana) and retention (dharāṇa) is retaining (dhāraṇā), say that 'perceptual judgement is the determination of distinction from the non-existent particular and retention is

the determination of the existent particular' ; this is not so, because perceptual judgement sometimes coming from thinking of the distinction from others, sometimes from agreement with existing qualities and sometimes from both, has no varieties, being only of one variety, which is certainty; otherwise memory (which being incapable of being included in 'retention', in the sense taken just now) would be excessive and there would be the incoherency of sensuous cognition having five varieties. Now, if it be said, that the retention, accepted by you, does not exist at all, and, therefore, the four-fold division is undisturbed; because on the cessation of conscious activity, what is retention ? Absence of lapse, defined as the uninterrupted conscious activity, does not differ from perceptual judgement. And what is accepted as memory-impression for numerable or innumerable time at the conclusion of the conscious activity regarding pitcher etc., and the memory in the form of 'it is the same', it (both of them) is not retention, which is a variety of sensuous cognition, because the conscious activity of sensuous cognition has already ceased, and even in the case of conscious activity occurring after an interval of time, memory would be included in retention, where agreement with the existing qualities would predominate; it is not so; as after the working of perceptual judgement is seen, the working of its current for a moment, therefore, absence of lapse (will have to be accepted in addition to perceptual judgement), and as joining the indeterminate intuition of the present and the past as 'this is the same', and the resultant of the previous perceptual judgement, memory (will also have to be accepted in addition to perceptual judgement) and also the memory-impression in the form of impressions causing that (memory) (will have to be accepted in addition to perceptual judgement).

*16. If it be said that the two forms of knowledge, the absence of lapse and the memory, as cogniser of the already cognised, are not organ of knowledge; and as for memory-impression, these are the three options : is it destruction-cum subsidence of the knowledge-obscurer karman of memory, or is it the power to generate that knowledge or is it a thought about that object ? Now, the first two options are

incompatible, because they are not (included) in the form of knowledge, the varieties of which are under discussion here. The third option is also incompatible because memory-impression is desired to last for numerable or innumerable time, but thought about an object cannot last for this much time, and, therefore, no retention is compatible; it is not so; being the cause of memory-impressions of different natures of clear, clearer and clearest type, and because of its being cogniser of newer and newer objects, absence of lapse (is the cogniser of the uncognised) and so also, being the cogniser of previously uncognised oneness of the object, memory is the cogniser of the uncognised, and by transference of epithet of the effect to the cause, though itself the memory-impression is not knowledge; yet its categorisation as the variety of knowledge is not incompatible, because it is the power which generates that knowledge in the form of destruction-cum-subsidence of the knowledge-obscuring karman of memory.

*17. And these determinate perception etc., do not occur either in a perverted or disturbed order, or deficiently, because it is the nature of the cognised to generate cognition in this very way. Sometimes, in case of a man who is habituated to it, only perceptual judgement, and in case of an object where the memory-impression is strong, only memory is noticeable; even there the order of determinate perception etc. is not noticeable on account of subtlety like the piercing of the hundred petals of a lotus. Thus sensuous knowledge has twenty-eight varieties; object-perception etc. (by etc. we include speculation, perceptual judgement and retention) being multiplied by six—mind and (five) senses, (thus twenty four) plus contact-awareness having four varieties (there being no contact-awareness of mind and eyes). Or these varieties multiplied by the twelve varieties—many, multiplied, quick, independent, determined, and constant (these six) and their opposites—work out to be three hundred and thirty six in all. These varieties many etc., are from the point of view of cognizant; e. g.—some one knows much, listening to the

group of different sounds, knows that there are 'so many sounds of conch and so many sounds of drums' i. e. in this way, he distinguishes separately between the different types, on account of the speciality of destruction-cum-subsidence of karmans. The other, on account of lesser destruction-cum-subsidence of karmans, even though in the same place, knows less. One, on account of the brilliance of the destruction-cum-subsidence of karmans, knows multi-typed, knowing even the single sound of conch etc. as possessed of many qualities of agreeableness etc. The other knows non-multi-typed, knowing as possessed of few qualities of agreeableness etc. One knows quickly, cognising immediately. The other knows slowly, cognising only after a long thought. One knows independently, cognising by its very form without any sign. The other knows dependently cognising only by the help of some sign. Sometimes it is determinate, being cognised as not possessed of contradictory qualities. The other is indeterminate, being cognised as possessed of contradictory qualities. One is constant, being cognised always as much etc., the other is inconstant, being cognised sometimes as much, sometimes not as much. The varieties of sensuous knowledge have been said.

[8. *Investigation of verbal knowledge after classifying it into fourteen varieties*].

*18. The varieties of verbal knowledge are given. Verbal knowledge is of fourteen types: alphabet, discursive, right, having beginning, having end, containing repetitions, and included in the main scripture (these) together with their opposites. Then the alphabet is three-fold: script, alphabet, and potential auditory attainment. The script alphabets are the different types of scripts, the alphabets are the spoken akāra etc.—these two are called knowledge only by transference of epithet. The potential auditory attainment is the conscious activity towards listening through mind and senses or the destruction-cum-subsidence of the veil of that (verbal knowledge). This potential auditory attainment is not impossible even without receiving instruction from others, because attention is seen at hearing of a sound even amongst innocent children, who have received no instructions, and amongst

cows etc. and because even the one-sensed creatures receive indistinct sounds. A non-alphabetical verbal knowledge is sighs etc. because it also causes real functioning knowledge because from it also arises the knowledge that one is in misery etc. Or being useful in knowledge, though all the activities are verbal knowledge, yet here (in sighs etc.) alone is fixed the conventional usage, as famous amongst those who are well versed in scriptures. The knowledge of those possessed of mind is discursive. The opposite of it is non-discursive. What is included in the main and subsidiary scriptures, is right; the mundane is false. Thinking from the point of view of the knower, there is option—even the false knowledge acquired by a person of right vision is right knowledge, because of its suitable adjustment as an incorrect statement, whereas even the right knowledge, acquired by a man of perverted vision, is wrong knowledge. Having a beginning— (it has a beginning) substantially with reference to an individual, territorially, in Bharata and Airāvata, periodically, the ascending and descending rounds (of the circle of time), and psychically, the efforts etc. of those instructors. Having no beginning—(it has no beginning) substantially with reference to different individuals, territorially in Mahāvīdeha, periodically quasi - ascending and descending rounds (of the circle of Time) and psychically, destruction-cum-subsidence in general. Similarly, the varieties having end and having no end should be thought of. Repetitive is the same reading, generally in the dr̥ṣṭivāda (the twelfth and the last, and now supposed to be lost, limb (aṅga) of the scripture). Non-repetitive is the unsimilar reading in the Kālikaśruta (a Jaina scripture). That is said to be included in the main scriptures, which is composed by the gaṇadharas (direct disciples of the Tīrthaṅkaras). That is said to be excluded from the main scriptures which is composed by the elders (of the monasteries). In this way, the empirical perception in the form of sensuous and verbal cognition together with their varieties, has been investigated into.

[9. After classifying the transcendental perception into three, the investigation of clairvoyance at the outset].

*19. That which for its genesis depends only on the activity of the soul is transcendental (perception). It is three-fold: clairvoyance, telepathy and perfect knowledge. Having all those objects which have forms as its subject and depending only on the Self is the clairvoyance type of knowledge. It is six-fold: following, augmenting, and extinguishing together with their opposites. Following is that which follows even to the place other than that of its genesis, like the light of the sun; just as the light of the sun arising in the east spreads to the west also and, illuminates the territory there, similarly this also though generated in one place, illuminates the objects to the man even when he moves. Non-following is that which illuminates the objects only in the place of its genesis, like the knowledge of an astrologer (who answers questions); just as an astrologer answers the question asked only at certain places, similarly it also illuminates objects only at authorised places. Gradually increasing from the place of its genesis is the augmenting, like the fire, placed in the multitude of dry and increasing fuel and enkindled by the burning of the lower and upper pieces of wood of *Premna Spinosa*; just as fire enkindled by effort, increases at gaining of fuel, similarly by virtue of extremely auspicious actions, this also augments after genesis. Decreasing is that which gradually decreases in its scope after genesis, like the flame of fire on the removal of the mass of the fuel-matter; just as the flame of fire, with its fuel removed, decreases, this also decreases. Distinguishing is that which after its genesis, perishes absolutely like the wave of the water; just as the wave of water, just after its genesis, disappears completely similarly this also. Non-extinguishing is that which lasts upto death or upto the attainment of pure-knowledge, like the sex-consciousness; just as the male-sex-consciousness etc. lasts as long as the male form etc. of existence endures, similarly this also.

[10. Investigation into Telepathy]

*20. That which has a direct cognition of mind only is telepathy. Here it should be noted that it can directly cognise only the psychic modes and cognises the external objects only

through inference of the logical impossibility of the one in the absence of the other. It is two-fold : straight-intelligence and wide-intelligence. Straight i. e. cogniser of the general intelligence, is the straight-intelligence. Here 'general' means lesser particulars than those (known) by wide-intelligence; otherwise, if we accept only cognition of the general (and no particulars), it would be the same as the indeterminate intuition of the psychic modes. Wide,—i. e. cogniser of the particulars, intelligence is the wide-intelligence. By straight-intelligence is known that one has thought about pitcher etc. whereas wide-intelligence cognises it, as possessed of hundreds of modes. Both of these cognitions are called partial perceptions as having partial objects as its subject.

[11. *Investigation into Pure-knowledge*]

*21. That which has a direct cognition of all substances with modes is called pure-knowledge. Therefore, it is called perfect perception. As its cause—the destruction of veil—is one; it has no variety. Here the veil is karman only, because our knowledge, which does not work in its sphere, is veiled (and) if all things cannot be its sphere, it would lead to the absence of the knowledge of necessary concomitance; and in the absence of veil, absence of lucidity would be incoherent. On the destruction of veil by right faith etc. which are opposite to karman, the pure knowledge is attained (or proved).

*22. Some say, 'it is born of mind only purified by the qualities by spiritual practices'; it is not so; even the mind, purified by qualities, cannot generate it like the knowledge of the objects of five senses.

*23. The Digambaras (a sect of Jainism) say that a person who takes morsels of food, cannot have pure knowledge; it is not so; because the taking of morsels of food, is caused by hunger creating karman, and the rise of unpleasant-feeling karmans etc. have no contradiction with pure-knowledge, because it has contradiction only with destructive karmans. If it be said that it is not generated from that (karman) which is like a burnt rope, it is not so; for in this way there would be no mundane existence from the similar age-determining karman.

Moreover, how can there be existence of gross-body of the Lord without the food of morsels? If its possibility without that be accepted on account of infinite energy, it would lead to the absence of taking of food even in the worldly state, because of the conviction of immeasurable power (in that state also); this all has been explained elsewhere. Thus perception has been described.

[12. *After defining and classifying non-perceptual into five, investigation of recollection*].

*24. Now non-perceptual is described—non-perceptual is that which is not clear. And it is of five kinds : recollection, recognition, reasoning, inference, and verbal testimony. Recollection is the cognition generated only by experience as 'that is the image of the Tīrthaṅkara (Lord)'. This is not non-organ of knowledge, because of its coherency like perception etc. If it be said that it is non-organ of knowledge because it makes the part of the past indicated by 'that', as a subject of present; it is not so; because it is not a rule that the time of qualified be always felt in the qualification. If it be said that it is a non-organ of knowledge because of its dependence on the cognitive organ of experience; it is not so; because (in that case) even inference would not be organ of knowledge, on account of its dependence on the knowledge of necessary concomitance etc. If it be said that inference is dependent on the other only in its genesis, but it is independent in its cognition of the subject; it is not so; even recollection depends on experience in its genesis only, and as far as its cognition of the subject is concerned, it is also independent. If it be said that recollection, which knows only that which has already been a subject of experience, is not independent even in the cognition of the subject; then, as cognising the objects which have already been the subject of the knowledge of necessary concomitance etc., the inference also cannot be the cognitive organ in any case. If it be said that the inference invariably makes an uncognised object as its subject, then it is the same case with recollection which makes the object, hitherto unknown as 'this is that', as its subject.

[13. *Investigation into recognition*]

*25. Recognition is the synthetic knowledge, caused by experience and recollection, and cognising the similarity (between the two) and identity (of one person at different ages) etc., e.g. 'This body of the cow is the same,' 'gavaya (the Gayal) is like cow', 'he is the same Jinadatta', 'he is saying the same thing', 'a buffalo is different from the cow', 'this is away from that', 'this is near that', 'this is longer or shorter than that' etc.

*26. The Buddhists hold that there is no one knowledge as recognition because it consists of two varieties in the form of this and that which are obvious and obscure respectively; it is not correct: because it is experienced as one like the knowledge of the picture even though it differs in form, and because, in fact, this is one as being obscure in form and generated from its own source and because the indication 'this' is the cause of recognition. If it is said that this recognition does not exist because of the absence of its subject; we say : no; because it has as its subject the particular object which is one consisting of the former and the latter modes. Therefore, the view 'that this is, in fact, a couple of knowledge in the form of experience and memory not touching anything unperceived hitherto' is refuted; because in this way there would be the unacceptable position of the elimination of all qualifying knowledge. Yet some hold the view that this is perceptual cognition, because it conforms to the concomitance in agreement and disagreement with the senses; this is also not so; because the confirmation to the concomitance in agreement and disagreement with direct perception cannot be proved, because the confirmation to the direct perceptual cognition and memory (both) of the recognition is experienced, otherwise, there would be an undesirable occasion of its occurrence at the time of first sight of the object.

*27. And, if this be said that recognition is produced by senses with the help of the memory, produced by the awakening of the latent impressions, born at the time of first sight, at the time of the next sight; it is incorrect; because direct perception is not dependent on memory.

Otherwise, if we accept its mental cognition depending on the memory of concomitance etc., there would be an undesirable occasion for the elimination of the inferential knowledge of fire in the mountain. Moreover, it is an additional type of cognition because we have a different feeling of 'I recognise here,' this refutes the view that 'this is a qualified direct perception with the knowledge of its qualification at the approximity of the senses with the objects qualified'; because we don't have it in 'he is like this' etc. and because we experience a synthetic order in memory and experience.

*28. Here, the Bhaṭṭa school holds, "Let recognition be one knowledge, but the knowledge of similarity at the sight of gavaya and at the memory of cow is analogical. It is said :

"Therefore, whatever is remembered is qualified by similarity. Therefore, the similarity of the standard or the standard of similarity itself is its subject. Though the similarity is directly perceived and the cow is remembered yet the quality of being qualified cannot be proved from any other organ of knowledge and, therefore, analogy is an organ of knowledge;"(SV., up., 37-38)

this is not so; there is a synthesis between the body qualified by similarity and seen and between the cow which is remembered, and the synthetic knowledge that 'gavaya is similar to cow' does not overlap the limit of recognition. Otherwise, in such cases as 'the buffalo is dissimilar to cow' there would be an excess to analogy because this is not the subject of similarity and, therefore, there would be disturbance in the number of organs of knowledge.


*29. This refutes the view point of Naiyāyikas also who hold analogy to be cognition of the relationship of word and its meaning as this is to be indicated by the word gavaya caused by the knowledge of the meaning of the analogical sentence 'gavaya is like cow' and based on the act of looking at a body qualified by similarity, because it does not exceed the limits of the recognition being synthetic of the indicativeness of the word 'gavaya' in the object by saying that whatever qualities were

described in the analogical sentence are found in the indicativeness of that word. Therefore, those who have a knowledge of the meaning of the sentence that "swan is one which discriminates between the water and the milk" can have the knowledge that this is to be indicated by the word 'swan' at the sight of an individual qualified by discrimination between water and milk. If we were to accept an extra organ of knowledge except recognition for the knowledge that this is to be indicated by the word 'gavaya', then we would have to search for another organ of knowledge to know that 'this is subtler than that,' at the sight of a bigger fruit—bilva (Aegle Marmelos)—of a person who has the impression of the sight of a smaller fruit—āmalaka (Emblie Myrobalan). If these were to be accepted as mental (cognition) then there would be an occasion for accepting even analogy as mental. Therefore, in short, recognition should be accepted in the knowledge "I recognise".

[14. *Investigation into Reasoning*]

*30. Reasoning is the logic about the probandum and probane relationship etc. with reference to all places and types, for example, wherever there is smoke it is always when there is fire or it is not without fire; all words of 'pitcher' indicate pitcher; all pitchers are indicated by the word pitcher etc. Thus, the direct perception does not work—simply because it is not within its jurisdiction even with the help of the concomitance in agreement and disagreement together with repeated sight—in the concomitance, characterised by no exception, and caused by the innate nature of the object; and, certainly it can be known by summarising all the individual cases of the probandum and the probane, therefore, only reasoning caused by the sight, memory and recognition of the probandum and the probane is capable of making it known.

*31. Now if this be said that since the concomitance characterised by co-existence in its own probandum is capable of that, therefore, by the senses helped by repeated sight and by non-observation of any exception, the concomitance may be said to be perceived because it is possible



to summarise all individual cases of the probandum and the probane by the relationship of generalisation; it is not so; because, all individual cases of the probandum and the probane are summarised by reasoning alone which is experienced as 'I reason', and because there is no proof to assume the relationship of generalisation in knowing the concomitance, and also because without logic even if the general is known, it cannot bring to mind all individuals. The relationship of the word and its meaning is also known through reasoning, because only it can cover all the words and their meanings. It is seen that a man, who comprehends the word, looking at the efforts of an elderly person, who is asked to do a thing and who proceeds to do it hearing another elderly person, who asks him to do it, as the cause of the knowledge caused by it and remembering at the time of the last syllable, the previous syllables also and having recognition in the form of a synthetic knowledge in the form of words and sentences by process of elimination and addition by summarising all individual cases, gets the knowledge of the relationship of the word and its meaning. And as this reasoning does not depend on the relation of any other knowledge and by its own capability it leads to the knowledge of the relation, therefore, there is no case of regressus ad infinitum.

*32. The Buddhists say that this is not an organ of knowledge as being in the form of an after-thought coming after the direct perception; this is not so; even an after-thought coming after direct perception can know only that which is known by direct perception, and therefore, cannot grasp the concomitance by generalising all. And this is an organ of knowledge like an inference, even though its subject is general; just as you accept validity from practical point of view (of inference) which, though dealing with no object (i.e. general), is indirectly connected with an object. They hold the doctrine that in a place where there is neither fire nor smoke, a person has non-observation of smoke first, then having observation of fire and smoke, (thus) with one non-observation and with two observations, afterwards having non-observation of fire and then non-observation of smoke also, by these two non-obs-

vations, he grasps the concomitance by direct perception with the help of five non-observations ; for it is said :

(1) No knowledge of smoke, (2) knowledge of fire, (3) knowledge of smoke and (4) no knowledge of fire and (5) smoke, thus by direct perception and by non-observation by these five there is the adjustment (of the knowledge of the concomitance); this is wrong; even the two types of direct perception—observation and non-observation—can perceive an object which is at hand and cannot have any imagination (of the past or the future) and therefore, is not capable of observing all objects mediated by distance etc.

*33. As regards the view point of the Naiyāyikas who hold that reasoning is the reference to determinate concomitant when there is a doubt about determinate concomitant and this is like a particular observation only helpful in the organ of knowledge at the time of the opponents or is only just its concurrent as remover of the doubt of the opponent and is not in itself an organ of knowledge; this is not so; because reasoning is in itself an organ of knowledge in the form of grasping the concomitance and giving definitive knowledge of the self and others, and the logic, as assumed by the opponents also sometimes being a part of this thinking or as being the remover of the doubt of one who wants to conclude perversely or even independently, being a remover of the doubt in general, is used. In this way, the validity of reasoning asserted by Dharmabhūṣaṇa as remover of ignorance is justified inasmuch as it is the remover of false knowledge concluding in the definitive knowledge of the self, on which (definitive knowledge) depend the usage of the knowledge of the objects in knowledge; it is the resultant in general.

[15. *The definition of the inference for one self, after classifying inference into two*]

*34. Inference is the knowledge of probandum from probane. It is of two varieties : for oneself and for others. The inference for oneself is the probandum caused by the recollection of the relationship and the knowledge of the probane, e.g. the knowledge, that 'the mountain contains fire', arising in a

person who has perceived the smoke and has (also) recollected the concomitance. Here the knowledge of the probane and the recollection of the relationship should be jointly accepted as the cause, otherwise there would be an occasion for occurrence of inference with reference to a person who has forgotten or not grasped the relationship and has not perceived the probane.

[16. *Discussion about the nature of the cause*]

*35. The cause is characterised by the certainty of logical impossibility (of the one) in the absence of the other and not characterised by the three etc. The Buddhists, nevertheless, say that the cause has three characteristics. In the absence of subsistence in the subject the non-existent will not be eliminated and in the case of no subsistence in the homologous instance, there will be no removal of contradiction and there would be no possibility of the negation of inconclusive in the absence of the necessary absence in heterologous cases and, thus, the inference will not be without obstacles; it is not so; even in the absence of subsistence in the subject, the inference is seen in such cases as the 'śakaṭa will rise because kṛttikā has arisen', 'the sun is above because the earth is enlightened', 'there is moon in the sky because there is the moon in the water. It should not be said that here also subsistence in the subject can be established by saying that the time and space is possessed of the śakaṭa which would rise in the future, because it is possessed of the rise of the kṛttikā because if we were to accept subsistence in the subject, in this way, with reference to a subject which is not experienced, then with reference to the subject of the world, the blackness of the crow would be established as a means to the whiteness of the palace also.

*36. If the subsistence in the subject is not a part of the inference in this way, then how is the rule of the knowledge of the subject—if this be asked; sometimes the subject is known as an epithet of the logical impossibility in the absence of other e.g. the existence of the moon in water cannot be established without the existence of the moon in sky and sometimes, the subject is known as the substratum of the cause which is

grasped, e. g., the mountain has fire because it has smoke; if smoke is here grasped in the mountain, the fire is also felt there. At the time of grasping the concomitance, as there is not always the feeling of the mountain, it is not grasped.

*37. As for the view that association of the subject with the probandum is felt by grasping the relationship of the probandum and the probane of the subject in the internal concomitance as it is said that **"in the subject which is treated as thesis, the concomitance of the probane with the probandum is the internal concomitance, at other places it is external concomitance (Pra. Na. 3. 38)"**; it is not so; by the internal concomitance if the cause is capable of giving the knowledge of the probandum, the external concomitance would have to be accepted as a futile invention. The concomitance being defined as innate without any exception and the external concomitance being only an associate, the concomitance of universal nature can hardly be said to have any variety only on account of its subject. If it be not so, then only at the time of grasping an internal concomitance, there would be the experience of the relationship of the subject and the probandum and the inference would be futile without the knowledge, 'the mountain has fire', this should be thought upon by the scholars in accordance with the scriptures. In this way what the Naiyāyika holds as the thesis being hindered as in the inference that 'these mango fruits are ripe because they are grown on the same branch, like the other mango fruits', and where there is an inconclusive reason in such examples as 'this Devadatta is a fool, being his son, as are his other sons'; in order to avoid undesirable extension in such cases, the three characters given above together with the subject as unhindered and the reason as non-inconclusive, the five characteristics form the definition of cause; this is also refuted because the sustenance in the thesis cannot be established in such cases as 'śakaṭa will rise' etc. and because these five characteristics exist in cases of fallacies also as 'he is black, because he is his son'. So a definite logical impossibility in the absence of the other is always the proper characteristic of the cause.

[17. *the discussion of the nature of the probandum*].

*38. Certainly, the probandum is to be inferred by the cause. Now, if it is asked : what is the definition of the probandum, our answer is : a probandum is that which is neither known, nor refuted and is desirable. The epithet of 'neither known' is given to establish that those objects which are doubted or grasped contradictorily are probandum. The epithet 'nor refuted' has been given here to avoid the acceptance of that as probandum, which is contradictory to direct perception etc. The epithet of 'desirable' is given to prove that an undesirable thing cannot be a probandum.

*39. Some say that only a doubtful thing can be established as a probandum in a debate; it is not so; because even a man who is perverted or ignorant may also engage himself in a debate with a desire to know the views of the opponents and because it can be used to remove the perversion and the indecision just like the removal of doubt, and, because it is seen that father etc. engage themselves in educating the son etc. who are perverted or ignorant. It cannot be said that in such case, inference cannot be used in a debate which is held for victory, because the other person, being proud, is perverted in that case also.

*40 The epithet of 'nor refuted' is given in connection with both the speaker and the opponent because only that which is not proved otherwise by an organ of knowledge can be a probandum in a debate. The epithet of being desirable is said only with reference to the speaker, because it is only the speaker who can possibly desire to support his own point of view. So, in inferences as 'eyes etc. are meant for others', even though only this much has been said that they are meant for others, yet only this can be established as probandum that they are meant for the self. Otherwise, because the Buddhists accept the eyes etc. to be meant for others, which are a collection, the inference being futile; this inference of the Sāṅkhya would be fallacious as possessed of incoherence etc. The subject which is useful in the inference for others is shown even at the time of the inference for the self, to show that there is not much difference between the two, because

the inference for others is always preceded by the inference for the self.

*41. From the point of view of grasping the concomitance, the quality itself is the probandum, otherwise it cannot be established, whereas from the point of view of inference, the subject, together with its quality to be proved is the probandum. This subject is called the thesis also and this thesis is always well known. Thus, there are three parts of an inference meant for the self—the subject, the probandum and the probane. The probane is the part as indicator, the probandum as indicated and the subject as the substratum of the quality to be proved, because the purpose of the inference is to prove the probandum as residing in a particular substratum. Or the thesis and the cause—these are the two parts in the inference for the self, because the thesis is the object which is qualified by the quality to be proved and, thus, two alternatives can be seen with reference to the desire to express the difference and the identity of the quality and the qualified object.

*42. The qualified object is sometimes proved, sometimes optional and sometimes both. That which is proved by a definite organ of knowledge as direct perception etc., is said to be the proved one. That which is the subject of such knowledge which is indefinite and neither valid nor invalid, is optional. That which is the subject of the both is the proved and the optional both. For example, the proved qualified object is the mountain, in case the probandum is 'being possessed of fire' on account of being possessed of smoke, because the mountain is experienced by direct perception. An optionally qualified object is the omniscient when his (of the omniscient) existence is the probandum, as in the inference that 'an omniscient exists because there are no definite proofs to prove the contrary in the inference: or just as the horn of the donkey, when its non-existence is the probandum in the inference, 'the horns of the donkey do not exist'. Here, the omniscient and the horns of the donkey are optionally proved before the proof of their existence or non-existence. In the inference 'the word is changeable, because it is produced', the word is a

qualified object, proved both ways. That word in the present is perceived directly but its knowledge in the past and the future is optional and since that all (the word of the present, past and future) is the qualified object, it is proved as well as optional. Anything can be probandum in a qualified object which is proved or is both proved and optional but in an optionally qualified object it is a rule that only the existence or the non-existence is the probandum, as it is said **"in that when it is optional the existence and its opposite are the probandum"** (Pari. 3. 23).

*43. Here the Buddhists say that existence cannot be the probandum in the qualified subject which is optional because it is not consistent to prove its particular existence, as existence in general is undesirable; it is wrong; if this be so, there would be an occasion for elimination of all inference, as when fire in general is undesirable, it will not be consistent with a particular fire. Now, when the existence is the probandum, its cause would either be a positive quality or a negative quality or a quality which is both positive and negative; in the first case it cannot be proved because a positive quality cannot be established in an object whose existence is not proved. In the second case, there would be an over-lapping because that characteristic would be present even where existence is absent. In the third case, there would be a contradiction because a negative quality cannot be there in an object which exists, as it is said, **"there is no positive quality in a thing which is not true, because then there will be over-lapping both ways, and a non-existent thing is contradictory of any quality so how can that existence be proved?"** (Pramāṇavārtika, 1.192); if this be said; no; in this way there would be no inference of the fire by the smoke because of the optional quality of being possessed of the fire.

*44. The Naiyāyikas say that there is no qualified object which is optionally proved, because an optional thing cannot be valid. If this be accepted, this very reasoning cannot be held good and he (the Naiyāyika) should remain silent because a qualified object which is optionally proved is itself not proved, and there cannot be any logical negation of it.

*45. This should be borne in mind—the qualified object which is proved optionally is not experienced in toto, because then there would be a knowledge of a non-existent thing. And, if we accept its knowledge qualified by the words etc. then in case of doubt or certainty of absence of the epithet, there would be no knowledge of the qualification and then the inference of the optional only in the form of imposition of the necessary concomitance, will have to be accepted in the part of the epithet, because the only purpose of this is to negate the contrary imposition assumed by the opponent by proving the existence, characterised by the existence in a particular territory and time and by proving the non-existence, characterised by the absence of the existence in all territories and times.

*46. In fact, it is proper to prove the existence or non-existence, in part, of the well-known object. It is because of this that while commenting on **“there is no negation of the non-existence”** (*Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, 1574) the sentence—‘there is no donkey-horn’—has been interpreted as “there is no horn in the donkey.” In the inference of the particulars that ‘an object, which is absolutely eternal, is not capable of performing any action, because there is no simultaneity or order’, it is easy to prove the absence of the power to perform any action in the absence of order and simultaneity, in things which are eternal : this should be thoroughly examined by those who have a knowledge of the doctrines of their own as well as of others.

[18. *The Discussion of Inference for Others*]

*47. By transference of epithet, an inference for others, consisting of the statement of the cause and the subject, is called inference, because it gives the knowledge of the object through inference to the listener. The Buddhists say that the subject is known by the discussion itself and, therefore, should not be expressively said; it is not so; being obstructed by certain statements, even though those who are more intelligent can know the subject, yet it should be indicated necessarily to others, and because only that subject is not to be expressed which is known by being one with the other sentences of the syllogism in question. And even the Buddhists must accept the statement of the subject necessary, like the concluding

statement, to indicate that the quality is a qualification of a certain qualified object; otherwise, there would be an occasion for not stating even the cause which can be known only by the statement of the support, and as far as the condition of making known to the people of dull wit is concerned, it is the same in both the cases. Moreover, if the statement was not to be stated, it should not have been stated even in the beginning of the scriptures, whereas this is found stated even in the Buddhist scriptures, and if this is said to be stated in the scriptures for favouring others, its use would be equally justified in a debate for those who want victory, for making it known to the person of dull wit.

*48. It is said that only that where a statement is given from the scriptures of the opponent to prove a thing, is the inference for others e. g. the inference of the Sāṅkhya that 'the intelligence is unconscious because it is created like the pitcher'. In this inference of the Sāṅkhya, the quality of being produced is not accepted by the Sāṅkhyas themselves, in the intelligence, so only here, it is a case of inference for others; this is not correct; because there is a difference of opinion regarding the validity of the scriptures between the two opponents, otherwise, the probandum would be proved by that (scripture) alone. And even if we accept the scripture before examining it, it would be obstructed at the time of examination. If it is so, how you yourself state this to others "which is absolutely one, cannot be connected with many as generality"? True; but here we do not use it as a deciding factor of the object but rather as a means to establish that where one quality is there, another quality will also have to be accepted, because the deciding factor is the original cause which perverts this inference (namely, generality is multiformed because it is connected with many and that which is connected with many is multiformed), and because it is justifiable to use this inference as an aid to the original cause as by the removal of that which is coexistent with manifoldness, it (manifoldness) is also removed. And as regards the inference that 'the intelligence is unconscious etc.' it is not justifiable to use it, because we do not place any proof which obstructs the opponent

view and which imposes the opponent qualities and which proves the concomitance of the cause of the perversion of the inference.

*49. The cause should be used in two ways : as concomitant with the probandum and as being one impossible without the other e. g. the mountain consists of fire because the smoke can be there only when there is fire or because the smoke cannot be there if fire is not there. Since the probandum can be proved by the use of either of these two, the two are not used simultaneously.

*50. Only two—the statement of the thesis and the cause—are the parts of inference for others and not the statement of illustration etc. because the other can understand by the use of the thesis and the cause alone and the relationship of concomitance is decided by reasoning alone, and that concomitance is reminded by the statement of the thesis and the cause alone and because an illustration which is uncorroborated cannot lead to knowledge, and if the illustration is corroborated, it becomes a case of one which is already proved otherwise. Corroboration means proving the concomitance of the cause with its probandum, having proved it free from the fallacy of unproven etc. and if the other men can understand by this alone what is the use of making any other effort ?

*51. The use of the illustration etc. is justified to make the dull-witted persons understand; thus one who is definite about the thesis by the destruction-cum-subsidence (of the veil) and is capable of understanding the other parts being expert in remembering the reasoning, which leads to concomitance and which is reminded of by the illustration, to such a person the cause alone should be stated. To one who is not definite about the thesis as yet, the thesis should also be stated, and the illustration should also be stated to one who does not remember the reasoning leading to the remembrance of concomitance. Even the application should be stated for a person who does not know how to apply the cause in the thesis and the conclusion should be stated to one whose curiosity is still unfulfilled. The puri-

fication of the thesis etc. should be stated to a man who does not agree with regard to the nature of the thesis etc. and thus, the cause can have even ten parts.

[19. *Treatment of the Varieties of Cause*]

*52. This cause is two-fold: positive and negative. The positive is also two-fold: that which proves something positive and that which proves something negative. The former of these is of six types, to elaborate—some cause is determinate concomitant only e.g. the word is non-eternal because it is created by effort. Though all causes are determinate concomitant, yet here this variety has been separately accepted as being different from the rest of the varieties as cause viz. effect etc. Thus, the inference that 'this is tree because it is śimśapā' (Dalbergia sissoo) will also be included in it. Some causes are effect e.g., this mountain consists of fire because, otherwise the fact of containing smoke cannot be justified. Here smoke which is the effect of the fire and cannot be justified in its absence, makes the fire known. Some causes are in the form of cause (as against the effect) e. g., there would be rain because otherwise a particular type of cloud could not have been there; here that particular cloud being the cause of the rain makes the rain, which is its effect, known. Certainly, if it is said that the cause is possible even without its effect and is, therefore, not an indicator of the effect and, therefore, the fire does not indicate the smoke; it is true; but where it is possible to ascertain that all other causes are also co-operating and there is no hindrance in its capability, there alone the cause can also be the indicator of the effect. Some cause precedes e. g., śakaṭa would rise because otherwise the rise of kṛttikā would not have been there. Here, after the rise of the kṛttikā the rise of the śakaṭa takes place immediately after it without exception and, therefore, the kṛttikā indicates the rise of the śakaṭa as its predecessor cause. Some cause is the successor e. g., Bharaṇī rose before, because kṛttikā is rising. Here, the rise of the kṛttikā, which succeeds the rise of the Bharaṇī, indicates it. These two (the predecessor and the successor) are different from the cause and the effect

as they are mediated by the obstacle of time. Some cause is simultaneous e. g., the fruit of *bijorā* (a species of citron) should be possessed of form because the fact of being possessed of taste cannot be justified otherwise. Here taste which is always simultaneous with the form, being not justifiable in its absence, indicates it. It differs from the nature, cause and effect because it is different in its nature and has no priority and successiveness. In these examples, the positive cause like smoke etc. prove the positive thing like fire etc., therefore, they are positive proving a positive thing, and they are also known as availability of non-contradictory.

*53. The second is that which proves negation and which is called the availability of the contradictory. It is of seven types: contradiction in nature and availability of concomitant with that etc. e.g., there is no absolute absolutism because non-absolutism is found. He has no certainty of the reality because there is doubt. He has no pacification of anger because there are signs of agitation on his face etc. He cannot tell a lie because he is possessed of a knowledge which is not polluted by attachment etc. The *Puṣya* constellation will not rise because *Rohiṇī* has arisen. The *Mṛgaśīrṣa* did not arise a moment before because *Pūrva-phālgunī* has arisen. He has no false knowledge because he has right attitude. Here non-absolutism is contradictory in nature to absolutism which is to be negated. The doubt in the reality is concomitant with uncertainty which is contradictory to certainty of the truth which is to be negated. The signs of agitation etc. on the face constitute the effect of non-pacification which is contradictory to the pacification of the anger. Possession of a knowledge not polluted by attachment etc. is the cause of truthfulness which is contradictory to a lie. The rise of *Rohiṇī* is predecessor of the rise of the *Mṛgaśīrṣa* which is contradictory to the rise of *Puṣya tāṛā*. The rise of *Pūrvaphālgunī* is a follower of the rise of *Maghā* which is contradictory to the rise of *Mṛgaśīrṣa*. Right faith is the concomitant of right knowledge which is contradictory to false knowledge.

*54. The negative cause is also twofold: that which proves something positive and that which proves something

negative. The first is called non-availability of the contradictory and is of five types: non-availability of the effect contradictory to the probandum, non-availability of the cause contradictory to the probandum, non-availability of the nature contradictory to the probandum, non-availability of the determinant concomitant contradictory to the probandum and non-availability of a concomitant contradictory to the probandum. For example, this man is extremely sick because we do not find the activities of a man free from sickness. Here is trouble because the desired object is not available. The objects are multisided because the nature of onesidedness is not found. Here is shade because heat is not available. Here is false knowledge because right attitude is not available.

*55. The second is the non-availability of the non-contradictory which is of seven types: non-availability of the nature, non-availability of the determinant concomitant, non-availability of the effect, non-availability of the cause, non-availability of the predecessor, non-availability of the follower, non-availability of one which is simultaneous. For example, 'here is no pitcher on the earth because there is no availability of its nature which is due if it were available'. There is no panasa (*Artocarpus integrifolia*) because there is no tree available. This seed is not with its power unobstructed, because a sprout is not seen in it. He has no peacefulness etc. because there is no faith in the true nature of things. Svāti will not arise after a moment because the rise of citrā is not seen. Pūrvabhādrapada did not rise a moment before because we have no knowledge of the rise of Uttara-bhādrapada. He has no right knowledge because we do not find any right attitude. Thus, though of many types, the cause is characterised by the only quality of not being coherent otherwise, and other than that are fallacies.

[20. Description of fallacies.]

*56. This fallacy is three-fold: unproved, contradictory and inconclusive. That whose nature is not determined is unproved. Indetermination of knowledge is either through ignorance or through doubt or through perversion. It is two

fold: unproved for both and unproved for either of the two. As an example of the former we can say 'the word is changeable, because it can be perceived by the eyes.' As an example of the latter, we can say 'the trees are unconscious because they are devoid of knowledge, senses and death in the form of stoppage of age', or 'happiness etc. are unconscious because they are created'.

*57. If it is said that there is no fallacy unproved for both, because when once one says that it is unproved and if the opponent does not state a proof to prove it, then it will be unproved for both, because of the absence of any proof, and if he states a proof, then, because of the proof being impartial, it will prove it for both. Moreover, as long as he cannot produce a proof for the other to prove it, it is unproved to him also; it this be argued, then this is secondarily unproved because the jewel etc. are not primarily called false jewels as long as they do not appear to be so. Moreover, if the fallacy is unproved for one of the debator, the opponent would be defeated and if he is defeated, it is difficult to free him from defeat. Nor it is proper to support it afterwards by cause, because the debate lasts only as long as there is defeat. Here, it is to be said that just as a debator even though accepting the propriety of the cause, cannot make the other debator or those who ask question, understand it, because of their forgetfulness etc. of the logic given for its support, similarly, he does not accept the unproved also and is defeated by the cause which is unproved for both. Moreover, even if not accepting it himself, if a cause is placed, because it is proved for the opponent, it is the unproved for one of the two and a place for defeat, e. g., the following arguments of the *sāṃkhya* towards the Jainas: 'happiness etc. are unconscious because they are created like pitcher etc.'

*58. That which is concomitant with the contrary to the probandum is called the contradictory cause e. g., the word is not changeable because it is produced. Here the quality of being a product is concomitant with changeability, which is contradictory to unchangeability.

*59. That whose consistency otherwise is doubted is

inconclusive. It is of two types: that whose existence in the heterologous is decisive and that whose existence in the heterologous is doubtful. The example of the former is 'the word is eternal because it is knowable, Here the quality of knowability etc. is decided in the example of sky and is similarly decided in the heterologous example of the non-eternal pitcher etc. The example of the latter is that the person under discussion is not an omniscient, because he is a speaker. Here this quality of being a speaker is doubtful in the omniscient, because it is doubtful whether the omniscient is a speaker or not. Similarly, the example that the son of Mitra is black, should also be given.

*60. A fourth type of fallacious cause, given by Dharma-bhūṣaṇa, "immaterial" by name, should not be accepted. This immaterial or purposeless is of two types—the means to prove that which is already proved and that which is obstructed; but these two are not different from the varieties of the appearance of the known thesis and the appearance of the thesis which has been refuted. It should not be said that where there is a fallacy in the thesis, there should be fallacy in the cause also, because then we will have to accept the fallacy of the examples etc. also. By this, mis-timed should also be taken to be refuted. Similarly, inconclusive is also not additional which is there where there are two causes of equal force and of opposite nature and this is included in the unproved fallacy, because the logical impossibility of one without the other—the cause and the probandum under discussion—is not decided.

[21. *Investigation of the Organ of Knowledge, viz: Scriptures.*]

*61. Scripture is that knowledge which is manifested in the statement of some authentic personalities. It cannot be said that it is included in the inference because like smoke it also supports the truth by the force of the cognition of the invariable concomitance, because a man who is habituated can know the truth (by it) without depending on the cognition of the concomitance, just like a man, who is expert in knowing the real or false coin, distinguishes between the two as though by perception. One, who is expert in advising beneficial things, preceded by the knowledge of the

real state of affairs, is authentic. His statements consist of letters, words and sentences. The letters etc. are the alphabets which are material. One, which has a particular meaning, is word and a collection of the words, which are inter-related with each other, forms a sentence.

*62. This organ of knowledge of scriptures, states its meaning always positively as well as negatively and follows the seven-fold way of statement, because it can be valid and real in that very way, giving us the full truth and because even when only one way of stating a thing is used, the other ways of stating the truth are always supplied by those who have intelligent understanding. In sentences like 'there is a pitcher', there is no seven-fold statement, and it is considered valid from worldly point of view, only because it can convey the sense, but, in reality, it should be noted that it is not valid.

[22. Discussion about the Seven-fold Statement]

*63. If it is asked : what is this seven-fold statement; the answer is : keeping in view the enquiries regarding each and every aspect of an object, the statement in seven ways, which is not self-contradictory and is marked by syāt (from one point of view) and states negatively and positively, separately, and both ways, collectively, is the seven-fold statement. This seven-fold statement arises in accordance with the seven types of questions, arising out of seven types of curiosities, arising out of seven types of doubts; there being seven types of qualities possible with reference to each mode of an object. The first statement, amongst these, is that from a particular point of view every thing does exist, taking primarily the positive aspect. Here from a particular point of view, means relatively from the point of view of its own form, territory, time and nature. All pitchers etc. exist in their form of being made of clay and not of water etc.; from the point of view of territory, in Pāṭaliputra etc. and not in Kānyakubja etc.; from the point of view of time, in autumn etc. and not in spring etc.; and from the point of view of nature, as black and not as red. Similarly, the second statement is that anything, from a point of view, does not exist, taking primarily the negative aspects.

This non-existence is not imaginary because this is experienced independently like the existence, otherwise, the three-fold characters of the cause would be disturbed, because non-existence in the heterologous example would not be real. From a particular point of view it exists and from a particular point of view it does not exist—this is the third statement taking positive and negative aspects into account, respectively. The fourth is that from a particular point of view it is indescribable—where the negative and the positive aspect have been given predominance simultaneously, because both cannot be simultaneously expressed in one word, because even by the continuous participles like 'being' etc. the two meanings are shown one by one and because by such words as 'one of the two', even though somehow both of them may be known, yet each one of them cannot be expressed by one word even by the Lord creator. The fifth is : from one point of view it does exist and from another point of view it is indescribable—here the positive aspects and the positive and the negative aspects have been kept in view simultaneously. The sixth is that from one point of view it does not exist and from another point of view it is indescribable—here the negative aspect and the positive and the negative aspects have been kept in view simultaneously. The seventh is that from one point of view it does exist, from another point of view it does not exist, and from yet another point of view it is indescribable—here the positive aspect and the negative aspect (respectively) and the positive aspect and the negative aspect simultaneously, have been kept in view.

*64. This seven-fold statement is the full and the partial with reference to each statement. The statement is full which is made simultaneously about an object whose infinite aspects have been proved by an organ of knowledge, identifying by transference of epithet or by making the identical aspect pre-dominant by times etc. That statement is partial which states one by one about an object, which has been made the subject of one point of view by differentiating by transference of epithets or by making the aspects of difference dominant. What is this order and what is this simultaneity? We explain it—when the difference is desired to be expressed by means of times etc. of

the qualities of existence etc. then there is order, because one word cannot have the power of conveying many meanings. When those very aspects are spoken of as identical by means of times etc. and then by making one aspect expressed even by one word, the expression of the whole of the object becomes possible which assumes identity with it and this is simultaneity.

*65. What are these time etc.? We explain; they are time, form, object, relationship, effect, an aspect, an aspect of the object, contact and word. Now, when we say that from a particular point of view the objects soul etc. do exist, then we identify by time taking that all other infinite qualities in the object are there in the same time in which there is existence, And whatever is the innate nature of the existence of its own, similar is the innate nature of other infinite qualities of their own, and, therefore, they are identified with it on account of the fact of innate nature; and whatever object is the substratum, viz. the matter, of the existence that is also the substratum of other modes and, thus, there is identity with reference to the object. and whatever relationship of all pervasiveness is of existence, the same is the relationship of the others also, and, thus, there is identity from the point of view of relationship. And whatever effect has existence in sustaining object in its own form, similar is the effect of the other aspects, and, thus there is identity from the point of effect. And whatever is the place of the qualified object, viz. the territory of the existence, the same is that of other aspects, and, thus there is identity from the point of view of the territory of the qualified object. And whatever contact is of existence with the soul as being one with it, similar is that of other aspects and, thus, there is identity from the point of view of contact. In relationship, the difference is subordinate and the identity is predominant, whereas in contact, the order changes and this is the difference between the two. The word 'is', which is indicative of the quality of existence, is also indicative of all other infinite qualities, and, thus there is identity through word which is justified by giving a secondary place to the point of view of the mode and by giving predominance to the point of the matter. The identity

of the qualities is not possible, by subordinating the point of view of the matter and by predominating the point of the modes, because it is not possible for many qualities to be at one place simultaneously, or if at all it is possible, we would have to accept the difference of their substratum. And because there are the different qualities or, otherwise, there would be no difference in them and because the matter which is the substratum is also different, there would be a contradiction in its being the substratum of different qualities and because there is difference in the relationship on account of the difference of these which are related, because it is not consistent that many related things be related by one relation. The effect of each one of them, which is determined separately, is also different, because the effect of many effects cannot be one. The territory of one qualified object is different with reference to each quality, because if it is one there would be the inconsistency in identifying the territory of the qualified objects of the qualities of different objects. There is difference in the contact with reference to the contact, because if there is no difference in the contact to each, there would be no difference in those also which come in contact. There is difference in the word with reference to each subject, because if all qualities were to be indicated by a single word, then all objects of the world would be indicated by a single word; thus identity is secondarily imposed on qualities differentiated by times etc. Similarly, the attitude of difference and the secondary use of it should also be stated. Here ends the discussion of non-perceptible. And the object of organs of knowledge has been described by it.

Here ends the chapter on the organ of knowledge in the manual of Jaina logic, written by Paṇḍita Yaśovijayagaṇi, the brother of Paṇḍita Śrī Padmavijayagaṇi and the disciple of Paṇḍita Śrī Nayavijayagaṇi, the class-fellow of Paṇḍita Śrī Jītavijayagaṇi, the best amongst the disciples of Paṇḍita Śrī Lābhavijayagaṇi, the chief disciple of Mahāmahopādhyāya Śrī Kalyāṇavijayagaṇi

2. On The Partial Point of View.

[1. Investigation into the Nature of the Partial Point of View.]

*1. The organs of knowledge have been described. Now we describe the partial point of view. The partial point of view is the effort of cognising a part of an object, possessed of infinite qualities, cognised by the organ of knowledge, but not over-looking the other parts of it. This is different from the organ of knowledge as cognising only a part of it. Just as one part of an ocean is neither ocean nor non-ocean, similarly, partial point of view is neither organ of knowledge nor non-organ of knowledge. They are of two types—of the modes and of the substance. That which cognises only the substance primarily, is that of substance, and that which cognises only the mode primarily, is that of modes. The substantial is of three types : the non-distinguished, the generic and the empirical. The modal is of four types: the straight-expressed, the verbal, the subtle and the such-like. Jinabhadraṇiṣamaśramaṇa holds the straight-expressed to be a variety of substantial.

*2. The non-distinguished is the effort to grasp all the aspects whether general or particular e. g., the desire to make one subordinate and the other predominant out of the two substances and out of the mode and the substance, e.g., there is existence and consciousness in the self. Here out of two modes one is intended to be predominant and another is intended to be subordinate. Here consciousness which is the manifest mode, is the object qualified and as such, is predominant, whereas the existence is the epithet, and as such, is subordinate. That which is characterised by the capacity to do something positive or negative is called the manifest mode, and that which is the nature of the object, limited only to the present, and having no contact with the past and the future, is the mode of the object. In the example that 'the object is that which is characterised by the mode of the object', two objects have been intended to be indicated as predominant and subordinate, because here the qualified object viz., the

object consisting of modes is predominant and the object as an epithet is subordinate. In the example that 'a man devoted to passion is happy for a moment', the person devoted to passion as being an object, which is qualified, is primary, whereas the quality of happiness, as an epithet, is subordinate. It should not be said that the non-distinguished is an organ of knowledge as it deals with both the object and its mode, because only that, which deals with them both as predominant, is an organ of knowledge.

*3. That, which deals only with the general qualities, is the generic. It is of two types: ultimate and non-ultimate. The ultimate generic is that which takes into consideration only the pure existence of the substance, being indifferent to all particulars e. g. the universe is one because it has the common quality of existence. That which, though, accepting the general substance etc., adopts the attitude of closing of eye like an elephant in regard to its varieties, is known as non-ultimate generic. That, which distinguishes methodically in the objects, cognised by generic, is empirical e.g., that, which is existence, is either the matter or the mode. The matter is of six types—the soul etc. The mode is of two types—the simultaneous and that which comes in order.

*4. Analytic stand point is that which primarily indicates only that mode, which is of the present moment e.g., there is the mode of happiness at present. Here, the temporary mode of happiness is shown primarily. Its substratum, the soul, is not said as the subordinate.

*5. That, which accepts the difference in the meaning of the word on account of time etc., is known as verbal. Time etc. include time, case, gender, number, person and preposition, e. g., there was, is and will be Sumeru—here, it accepts the difference in the Sumeru from the difference of the time etc; 'the pitcher is made' and 'he makes the pitcher'—here (it accepts the difference) by the difference of the case; *taṭa*, *taṭi* and *taṭam* (coast)—here (it accepts difference) by the difference of the gender; *dārāḥ* and *kalatram* (wife)—here (it accepts difference) by the difference of number; thou goest and you go—here (it accepts difference) by the difference of

person; santiṣṭhate and avatiṣṭhate (he stands)—here it accepts (difference) by the difference of preposition.

*6. Subtle is that which accepts different meaning of the synonym words by the difference of their etymology. The verbal stand-point accepts identity in the object, even though there is difference in the modes. Subtle accepts difference of objects when the modes are different. It overlooks the identity of the meaning of the synonyms e. g. he, who has great power, is Indra; he, who is capable, is śakra; he, who pierces the city, is Purandara. etc.

*7. Such-like point of view is that which accepts the meaning of the words indicated by them only when the object is engaged in the action, indicated by those words. e. g. Indra is so (only) when he has great power. The subtle point of view accepts the use of Indra etc. for whether the action of having great power is present or not, because the word is used to indicate an object which is possessed of the action in general just as the word 'cow' is used for a particular animal, whether there is the action of going in it or not, because such is the convention. But such-like point of view accepts the word Indra etc. only when it is performing that action and is engaged in the action of having great power etc. From this point of view there is no word which is not the indicator of some action because the words indicating a class, like cow and horses etc., are also root-words e. g., a cow is that which goes and a horse is that which goes swiftly. Even the words indicating qualities like white and blue—are also root-word, white being that which purifies, and the word 'blue' meaning that which makes blue. The words, which are proper names like Devadatta and Yajñadatta, are also root-words meaning 'may god give it' or 'may the sacrifice give it'. The word indicating a union or a collection is also root-word because here also the action of the existence of the staff in the daṇḍī and of the horns in an animal possessed of horns, predominates. This point of view accepts that the five types of words are only from practical point of view and not in reality.

*8. Out of these the first four dealing primarily with the meaning are the points of view of the meaning whereas, the last

three dealing primarily with the words, are the points of view of words. Those points of view which cognise only the particular, are called implied points of view, whereas those who cognise the general are called unimplied. From the point of view of the unimplied view-point, all the Siddhas have the same nature. From the point of view of implied view-point, the Siddhas, who get liberation in one or two or three times, are equal to only those who get liberation in the same period. The empirical point of view is that which follows the famous conventional meaning e. g., even though there are five colours in the bee, yet the bee is called black. That point of view, which accepts the real nature of the things is real. It accepts that there are five colours in the bee because its body, which is gross, is made of material of five colours; but the other colours white etc, being subordinate, are not felt. Or we can say that one, which takes into consideration only one point of view, is empirical, whereas that which takes into consideration all points of view, is real. We should not say that in this way the real point of view would become an organ of knowledge and thus, its nature as a particular point of view would be disturbed, because it accepts the predominance of (only) that point of view which is under its jurisdiction, even though taking into consideration all point of views. Those points of view are called the points of view of knowledge, which accept predominance of knowledge only. Those points of view which accept only the predominance of the action, are called points of view of action. The four points of view, analytic etc., accept the predominance of action, characterised by conduct, because it is the immediate cause of liberation. Though the non-distinguished, the generic and the empirical accept all the three—conduct, knowledge and faith—as the cause of liberation, but separately and not collectively, because this point of view does not accept that liberation is necessarily effected by the three, knowledge etc. alone, otherwise, they would not be the points of view, because the acceptance of them collectively is the real doctrine.

*9. Which point of view again here covers much and which less? We state it—the non-distinguished covers more

than the generic, which covers only the existence, because, it (the non-distinguished) covers both existent and non-existent. The generic, as it shows all the existent object collectively, covers more than the empirical, which manifests only a particular existence. The empirical covers more, being related with the objects of all the three times—past, present and future—than the analytic which deals with only the objects of the present. The analytic covers more as it cognises the opposite of the verbal, which accepts different objects, differentiated by time etc. The verbal is less than the analytic not only by the difference of time, etc. but also because it accepts only one aspect of the existence of the existent pitcher also as ‘it is pitcher from a particular point of view’ and ‘it is not pitcher from a particular point of view’; and, thus, it is more particularised than the analytic. Though, the object, possessed of seven aspects, is accepted only by one who accepts non-absolutism, yet there is no fault in accepting that it propounds a particularised object than accepted by the analytic verbal point of view. The verbal point of view covers more than the subtle as it accepts the difference of meaning of synonym words and it does not accept the difference in the object on account of the difference of the synonym. The subtle covers more than the such-like which accepts the difference in the object on the basis of the difference in the action.

*10. A statement from a particular point of view is also affirmation with reference to its object, but it is only a partial statement and it should be observed that this is its difference from the statement of the organ of knowledge.

[2. *Discussion of the False Points of View.*]

*11. Now we deal with the false points of view. That which covers only object and overlooks the mode, is the false point of view of substance. That, which covers only the mode and overlooks the substance, is the false point of view of mode. That, which accepts absolute independence of the quality and the qualified object, is the false point of view of the non-distinguished e. g., the philosophy of the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. That which accepts the non-duality of the exis-

tence and refutes all individuals is the false generic point of view e. g., all systems of non—dualism and the Sāṅkhya philosophy. That, which intends an unreal division of the substance and its mode, is the false empirical point of view e. g., the Cārvāka system. Cārvāka refutes the division of substance and the modes, etc. of the soul, supported by the organ of knowledge and supports, as a follower of the rough common usage, only the division of four matters. That which refutes the substance altogether and accepts the present mode only, is the false analytical view-point e. g., the philosophy of the Buddhists. That which accepts only the difference in the objects on the basis of difference of times etc., is the false verbal view-point e.g., the Sumeru 'was,' 'is' and 'will'; (these words) indicate altogether a different meaning because they are words belonging to different times and are like the other words which are proved to be so. That which accepts only the difference of the objects indicated by the synonym words, is the false subtle view e. g., Indra, Śakra and Purandra etc. indicate altogether different objects, because they are different words like other words as, 'elephant' and 'deer.' That which accepts that a word cannot indicate an object which is not possessed of the action, is the false such-like view-point e. g., a pitcher which is devoid of a particular action is not to be indicated by the word 'pitcher', because it is not possessed of the action, which is the cause of using that word, just like another word. That which indicates only the meaning and negates the word, is the false point of view of meaning. That which indicates the word only and negates the meaning, is the false point of view of word. That which indicates the implied and refutes that which is not implied, is the false implied point of view. That which accepts that which is not implied and refutes that which is implied, is the false unimplied point of view. Negating the reality and accepting only the common place thing, is the false empirical point of view. Accepting the reality and negating the practical point of view, is the false real point of view. Accepting knowledge and refuting action, is the false point of view of knowledge. Accepting the action and refuting the knowledge, is the false point of view of action.

Here ends the chapter on the partial point of view in the manual of Jaina logic, written by Paṇḍita Yaśovijayagaṇi, the brother of Paṇḍita Śrī Padmavijayagaṇi and disciple of Paṇḍita Śrī Nayavijayagaṇi, the class-fellow of Paṇḍita Śrī Jitavijayagaṇi, the best amongst the disciples of Paṇḍita Śrī Lābhavijayagaṇi, the chief disciple of Mahāmahopādhyāya Śrī Kalyāṇavijayagaṇi

3. On the Symbol

[*The Discussion of the Symbols of name etc.*]

*1. The points of view have been discussed. Now, we discuss the symbol. Symbol is that which is particular type of composition of words or objects for proper adjustment and removal of the lack of understanding, in accordance with the context etc. The symbols are useful because they adjust the benediction of name etc. in the auspicious objects etc. as is said : "**symbol is fruitful because it removes the irrelevant and adjusts the relevant.** (Laghi. Svavi. 7.2") Generally speaking, they are of four types—name, replacement, substance and nature.

*2. The symbol of name is that which indicates the object not caring for the relevant meaning of the word e. g., the words like Indra etc., which indicate some child of a cow-man, are not indicated by the synonym words Śakra etc., and the words which are evolved accidentally and are not used in any other sense like Dīṭṭha and Daviṭṭha. This identity of the name and its object is in reality dependent on the meaning, but secondarily it is dependent on the words. From the point of view of the Meru etc., the symbols of name last as long as the objects, whereas in case of the names 'Devadatta' etc. they do not last as long as the object, or the

script 'Indra' etc, which are names of a particular object, inscribed on a book, paper or picture etc., is also the symbol of name.

*3. The object, which is devoid of the essence of that object but is replaced with that intention, is called replacement; it is of the same type in the picture but is formless in the dice etc; it lasts for a short period in picture etc. but lasts as long as the object in the image of the natural temples; just as the image of Jina is the symbol of Jina and just as the image of Indra is the symbol of Indra.

*4. That which is the cause of the past or the future, is the symbol of substance, as the use of the word Indra for one who has once experienced the state of Indra or will experience the state of Indra in future; here, the use of the word Indra being justified like the use of the word 'pitcher of ghee' with reference to one, which has once been the substratum of the ghee or would be the substratum of ghee in future. Sometimes, the symbol of substance is used to indicate the sense of secondary, just as one who crushes the charcoal is called the nominal ācārya, i. e. he is an ācārya, because he is not possessed of the qualities of the ācārya. Sometime, it is used in the sense, in which it is not in actual use e. g., the worship of Jina even though done with devotion yet done unmethodically and characterised by the desire for this world and the other world and not free from the desire, is called the pseudo-action because the improper action is not the way to liberation directly. It is called 'material' because done with devotion even though unmethodically, it is the way to liberation indirectly because the ācāryas proclaim that the quality of devotion renders, the fault of being unmethodical, powerless.

*5. That which is symbolised as itself characterised by experience of the action which one desires to convey, is called actual symbol e. g., one who is engaged in the action of having great power, is actual Indra.

*6. What is the difference between the names etc. excepting the actual, because all (the three) are found in all the

three ? The name, for example, is common in every object, which is named, and in its image and in the substance. The absence of the real object, in the form of image, is also found equally in all the three, because all the three are devoid of the real. The substance also exists in the name, the image and the substance, because it is the substance which is named and of which the image is made, and, of course, the substance in the substance itself is present by its very nature; therefore, it is not proper to distinguish between these as there are no contradictory qualities in them; if this be said; no, their difference is justified, because even though they are not possessed of contradictory qualities in this way, yet in another way, contradictory qualities can be proved in them; e. g. the image is different from the name and the substance, because there we have the form, intention, conception, action and the resultant e. g., in the image of Indra, the form as being possessed of thousand eyes etc. and the intention of that person, who made the image, as to make it real Indra and the conception of Indra, of one who sees it, by looking at that form, and the action of bowing etc. of those, whose minds are engaged in devotion, and the resultant in the form of the birth of son etc., is also seen. These things are not so in the name 'Indra' and the potential Indra, and, therefore, it is different from these two. Similarly, the substance being the potential cause of the real is also different from the name and the image, e. g., a speaker, without attention, is a potential one, as at the time of attention, he becomes the cause of the real, characterised by attention, or just as the soul of a monk is potential Indra, as it is the cause of the real Indra. This is not the case with the name and the image of Indra. Similarly, the name is also different on account of the above said differences from the image and the substance. Therefore, even though the milk and the butter-milk etc. are identical from the point of view of whiteness yet, they are different from the point of view of sweetness etc. Similarly, the name etc., though identical from one point of view, are different from another point of view.

*7. One can say that only the real is the object; what is

the use of accepting name etc. which are devoid of the substance; it is not so; even the name etc. are the characteristics of the object and, therefore, in general, they also are not excluded from the real. When one says 'Indra', without any qualification, the qualified thing is known only by context etc. by thinking over all the four—the names etc. Or these names etc. are used as the part of the real itself, because the emotions are aroused even at the name of Jina or the image of Jina or at the sight of the body of a dead sage. Of course, the three—the names etc. alone are not the immediate and the unfailing cause of exciting the emotion and therefore, the old ācāryas accept the superiority of the real which is the immediate and the unfailing cause. This has been said from the point of view of the names of different objects. The names etc., which are in the same object, are the object because they invariably accompany the real, because every object is a name itself in the form of the word, the image in itself in its form, a substance in its cause, and it assumes the reality when it becomes the effect. If the name of the pitcher were not the characteristic of the pitcher, then it would not be an indicator of it; because it is the cause of relation of identity with one which is not different from itself and, therefore, everything is in the form of the name. And, everything has a form because all—the intelligence, words, pitcher etc.—have a form of their own, and the form of the blue etc. and of particular postures etc. are proved by experience. Everything is substantial because everywhere the substance is experienced as the cause of the manifestation and the concealment and as free from all modifications like the snake which is sometimes with raised hood, sometimes without hood and sometimes circular. Everything is real, because it is experienced as being the cause and effect in the form of modification. Therefore, the world is made of these four and thus we have a combination of the points of view of names etc.

[2. *The Adjustment of the Symbols in the Points of View*]

*8. Now we adjust the points of view with the symbols of names etc. The three, names etc. are accepted by the

material point of view only, whereas the real is experienced by the point of view of the mode only. The first has two varieties—the generic and the empirical, because the non-distinguished which cognises the general is included in the generic and the non-distinguished which cognises the particular is included in the empirical point of view. The four—the analytic etc.—are the varieties of the second. This has been said in accordance with ācārya Siddhasena by the reverend Jinabhadra Gaṇi kṣamā śramaṇa in the Viśeṣāvaśyaka : **names etc. belong to the substantial and the real to the modal point of view. The generic and the empirical are the varieties of the first and the rest of the second (75).**

He expresses his own point of view at the time of discussing the symbol of salutation etc : **the verbal point accepts all the symbols** [2847], By this statement, he means to say that all the three verbal points of view accept only the real, as being pure, and the other four—analytic etc.—accept all the four symbols because of impurity. Some others hold that the analytic point of view accepts the name-symbol and the real only; this is not so; because the Sūtra scriptures declare that the substantial symbol is accepted by the analytic point of view, but it negates the acceptance of difference. Thus, the sūtra says : **'from the analytic point of view a person, who is not engaged in its conscious activity, is essentially one object, because this point of view does not accept the difference'** [Anuyoga sūtra, 14] And how will it not accept the image symbol, which has the shape of Indra and by looking at whom, the word 'Indra' is uttered; while it accepts even the gold, which has not assumed any shape, in the form of a lump, as being the cause of the real modes of would-be necklace etc. ? The name, of course, is not illogical with reference to the visible. Moreover, why shall it not accept the name and the image symbols, which are not different from the cause of the real, while it accepts only the word 'Indra' etc. or only that which is indicated by the word 'Indra' etc. even when there is no reality ? Their acceptance would rather be more justifiable; because of the reason that the substance in the form

of the image of Indra and the image-symbol in the form of a particular shape, have the relationship of identity with the real, the mode of Indra, and as such are more closely related with it in comparison to the name which is related (only) through the relationship of the indicated and the indicator. Some say that the generic and the empirical accept three symbols except the image; this view is not free from faults, because it must be accepted that either the generic or the non-generic or the non-distinguished in general, accept the image, because the acceptance of the image is not prohibited in (other) substantial point of view except in the generic and the empirical. (Now which of the above mentioned three types of the non-distinguished accepts the image?). In the first case, the generic (also) will have to accept the image, because the generic point of view is not different from the generic non-distinguished. In the case of the second (alternative), the empirical will have to accept that (i. e. the image) because that (i. e. the non-generic) is not different from the empirical point of view. And in the case of the third (alternative), even if accepting that the generic and the empirical separately do not accept the image; it would be difficult to avoid its acceptance jointly by them in the form of the full non-distinguished point of view, because each one of them (the generic and the empirical) cognise one part each of the undivided non-distinguished. Moreover, because the generic and the empirical are included in the non-distinguished, therefore, its attitude should also be included in them, because though the scope, characterised as the characteristic of both of them (viz. the general and the particular) cannot be included in one of them, yet the characteristic of one, viz. the image-symbol, can be easily held to be included, because the division of the generic and the empirical can be justified merely by accepting the general and the particular image-symbol—all this should be thought over in accordance with the scriptures. The objects, soul etc., should be symbolised by the symbols of names etc.

[3. *The Symbols with reference to soul*].

*9. That which, whether a soul or not, is named as soul,

is called the name-symbol of soul; the image-symbol of soul is the image of gods etc.; the real symbol of soul is one who is possessed of the subsidence of the knowledge-veiling *karman*. Thus, these three symbols are possible with reference to soul but not the substantial symbol. This would be possible, only if one who is not soul at present would become a soul in future, just as one who is not god in the present is to become god in future and that is called substantial symbol of god. But this cannot be accepted in the doctrine because the existence of knowledge in a soul is considered to be without beginning and without end. But if we were to imagine a soul, to be devoid of qualities and modes but possessed of a beginning-less knowledge, then this would be a non-existent thing, because the qualities and the modes of an existent thing cannot be eliminated by mental thinking. The objects do not show modifications depending on our knowledge but our knowledge is produced as the objects show modification. We cannot say the four-fold division of names etc. is disturbed by it, because it is possible in almost all other objects. "There is no disturbance in the rule if it is not 'possible in one'", say the ancient people. Some say that one who knows the meaning of the word 'soul' but is not devoted to it, is also a substantial soul. Others say that I myself, the soul of the man, should be known [as the substantial soul] because I will be the cause of the soul of the god who is yet to take birth, and because I myself will transform myself in the form of the god. Therefore I am now the substantial soul. Their intention is this that the prior soul is the substance of that which is yet to take birth and to follow. In this way, only a liberated soul would be a real soul and no other soul—therefore, this point of view is also not free from defects; this is elaborated by the commentator of the *Tattvārtha*¹

*10. This should be kept in mind that in this way thought all mundane souls would be substantial but they would not be contradictory to real because it is held that the names etc. of one object are invariably concomitant with the real. So

1. Cf. *Tattvārthabhāṣyavṛtti*, p. 48.

“Or the name of the object is the name, its form is its image, its being cause to the coming mode is the substance and the object in its effective form is the real”. (Viśeṣ vaṣyaka, 60).

If we accept so, it would not be possible to accept any substantial soul from the point of view of soul in general, because the man etc. are the particular soul of god etc. — all this has been discussed by us in detail in the *Nayarahasya* etc.

Here ends the chapter on the symbol in th manual of
 Jaina logic, written by Paṇḍita Yaśovijayagaṇi, the
 brother of Paṇḍita Śrī Padmavijayagaṇi and the
 disciple of Paṇḍita Śrī Nayavijayagaṇi, the
 class-fellow of Paṇḍita Śrī Jitavijayagaṇi,
 the best amongst the disciples of Paṇḍita
 Śrī Lābhavijayagaṇi, the chief disciple
 of Mahāmahopādhyāya Śrī
 Kalyāṇavijayagaṇi

May this work, composed by the purity of faith, engendered by the unequalled favour of his service, when he, a noble teacher and scholar, Śrī Vijayādisinḥa, who was like the sun in the sky of the spiritual lineage of the noble teacher and scholar, Śrī Vijayādideva, has attained the throne of Indra, cause happiness and recreation amongst the groups of the learned. (1)

He, the most expert in the science of logic, who had received lore from Jitavijaya of lofty ideas as well as from the modest, learned teacher Nayādivijaya, and who had the wise Padmavijaya as his loving brother—has composed this treatise on Jaina logic. May it render pleasure to the reader.

Whatever merit I may have earned by composing this epitome of logic, may I attain the great wealth of the highest happiness thereby. (3)

On whom previously, the scholars in Kāśī had conferred the title of 'expert in logic' and who, when he had composed a hundred works, was awarded the degree of the 'ācārya of logic'; he, Yaśovijaya, an infant-pupil of the learned Nayādivijaya, has related this knowledge at the request of the disciples. (4)

NOTES

P. 1. L. 1. Cf. *Daśavaikālika*, 1. 1., *devā vi tam nammsanti jassa dhamme sayā maṇo*

‘Even the gods bow down to him whose mind is always engaged in *dhamma*’.

P. 1. L. 2. For the partial point of view (*naya*) see *supra* p. 71. For the different ways of putting a thing see *supra* p. 77.

P. 4. L. 4. A glance at the definition of *pramāṇa*, given by different Jain logicians and collected by *Paṇḍita Sukhalālaṇī* in his notes on *Pramāṇa mīmāṃsā* and also by *Pandita Kailash Chandraji* in his *Jaina-nyāya* (p. 45), would clarify that *Yaśovijaya* has borrowed his definition directly from *Vāḍidevasūri* (*Pramāṇanayatattvālokaḷāṅkāra* 1. 2.) *Siddhasena* (*Nyāyāvātāra*, 1) and *Samantabhadra* (*Āpta mīmāṃsā*, 63) who say that *pramāṇa* is illuminator (*ābhāsi* and *ābhāsaka*) of the self and the others. *Yaśovijaya*, following, *Vāḍidevasūri* replaced the word ‘illuminator’ by definitive cognition (*vyavasāyī*).

Following the *Mīmāṃsakas* and the *Buddhists*, *Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka* (*Aṣṭasatī*, *Aṣṭasāhasrī*, p. 175) and *Māṇikyanandī* (*Parīkṣāmukha*, 1.1) lay down the condition that the *pramāṇa* should reveal an object, hitherto unknown (*apūrvārtha*). *Yaśovijaya* has followed the majority of the Jain logicians in this connection and has not made any reference to the condition. He was of course conscious of this condition as is clear from his text p. 6 line 7.

Siddhasena, quoted above, says that *pramāṇa* should be immune from contradictions (*bādhavarjitam*). He is followed by *Akalaṅka*, quoted above. *Yaśovijaya* shows his awareness of of this condition when he observes that recollection is also an organ of knowledge, because it is coherent like perception etc. (*Text*, p. 9 line 1).

P. 1. L. 4. The *Naiyāyikas* hold that knowledge does not cognise itself. It has to be cognised by another knowledge called *anuvyavasāya*. The Jainas, like the *Buddhists* and the *Vedāntists* accept the self-illuminating nature of the knowledge. Therefore, the word ‘self’ in the definition is significant.

P. 1. L. 6 *Yaśovijaya* will himself admit that object-awareness is the cognition of the general features only (Text p. 4 line 9) and yet object-awareness is obviously a *pramāṇa*. So the question arises that how can he here exclude indeterminate intuitions from cognition? *Paṇḍita Sukhalālaṭī* in his commentary on text (p. 31), says that here *Yaśovijaya* is only following the tradition of his predecessors like *Māṇikyanandī* and *Vādidevasūri*. In fact, as pointed out by *Dr. Indra Chandra Shastri* in his commentary on the text (p. 2), there is a difference of opinion about the nature of indeterminate intuition as to whether it is indetical or not with the object-awareness. May be that *Yaśovijaya* considered the two as different and therefore really excluded the former form cognition while including the latter into it. For a detailed study of knowledge and indeterminate intuition, see Nathmal Tatia, *Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, pp 70-80.

P. 1. L. 7. The *Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas* are said to be upholders of the non-perceptibility of knowledge, because they believe that knowledge cannot be known directly but can only be inferred from the object, which is known.

P. 1. 1. 8 The idealists traditions of the *Yogācāra* Buddhists and the non-dualist *Vedānta* do not accept the reality of the external world. The *Jainas*, on the other hand, are realist. Therefore, the *pramāṇa* is said to be definitive cognition of not only the self but of the others also.

Paṇḍita Sukhalālaṭī comments (p. 31) that by saying that the epithet of 'self and the others' has been used to indicate the nature (of the *pramāṇa*), *Yaśovijaya* means to stress that one should not think that this epithet is superfluous, as it is implied in the very nature of the knowledge, as accepted by the *Jainas*. It is meaningful not as excluding anything, but merely as indicator of the nature.

P. 1. L. 10-12 *Vādi Devasūri* in the sixth chapter of his *Pramāṇanayatattvālokāṅkāra*, has dealt with the problem of the resultant of *pramāṇa* in detail. Resultants, he says, means that which is effected by *pramāṇa* (VI. 1.). It is either direct or indirect (VI. 2.) The direct resultant of the *pramāṇa* is the removal of ignorance (VI. 3). The indirect resultant of all the

pramāṇas, other than pure knowledge, is a spirit of appropriation, avoidance or indifference whereas the indirect resultant of pure knowledge is only a spirit of indifference (VI. 4-5). Here the *Jainas* show a better understanding of the problem by stating the resultant of the pure knowledge separately, while the *Naiyāyikas* do not do so. The argument that the resultant of pramāṇa in the form of the spirit of appropriation, etc., should be different from the pramāṇa itself, does not hold good (VI. 7) because both, the pramāṇa and its resultant, belong to the one and the same cogniser (VI. 8). Therefore, the difference between the two is only partial (VI. 6). As far as the direct resultant, viz., the removal of ignorance is concerned, it is obviously identical with pramāṇa, which is knowledge (VI. 12). Thus, this is one way of proving that the pramāṇa and its resultant are partly identical and partly different. Even the direct resultant is not absolutely identical with the pramāṇa, because the latter is the instrument whereas the former is its effect and the two cannot be absolutely identical (VI. 15).

Vādi Devasūri (VI. 16) accepts that the resultant is the knowledge of the self as well as the non-self. This is the view of the traditional *Jaina* logicians. *Yaśovijaya*, however, does not follow the *Jaina* tradition but adopts the view of the *Vijñānavādi Buddhists* in accepting the knowledge of the self only as the resultant. *Paṇḍita Sukhalāla* has suggested that the knowledge of the self is, in reality, the resultant; the knowledge of the non-self is automatically implied therein [Commentary on the *Text*, p. 32].

The way for *Yaśovijaya* has already been paved by *Akalaṅka* who held that each succeeding member of determinate perception, speculation, perceptual judgment, retention, memory recognition, reasoning and inference is the resultant of each antecedent member (*Laghīyastrayī*, 1.6). If we accept this, each member, except the first and the last, would be pramāṇa as well as resultant and thus the identity-cum-difference between the two is established. This position was further strengthened, as shown above, by *Vādi Devasūri*. *Yaśovijaya* took the advantage of this background and interpreted the identity-cum-

difference in his own way to bring in an alien concept into Jaina logic.

P. 1. L 12-14. The above problem of the resultant of the *pramāṇa* assumes a new dimension in Jaina philosophy because other systems accepted the means of knowledge—i.e. sense-object contact (*sannikarṣa*)—as *pramāṇa* and knowledge as its resultant. The Jainas, on the other hand, accepted knowledge itself to be *pramāṇa*.

The non-Jaina systems define *pramāṇa* as the cause of valid cognition. If we accept this, it would mean that immediate antecedent of knowledge—i. e. senses, may be called as *pramāṇa*. Now, the Jainas, when faced with this contention, held that the material sense-organ (*dravyendriya*) is not the immediate antecedent of knowledge. Amongst the actual organ of sensing (*bhāvendriya*) also it is only the function-sense, engaged in conscious activity, which can be considered as the immediate antecedent of knowledge and not the sense *qua* attainment (*labdhindriya*). If we were to accept sense *qua* attainment as the immediate antecedent of knowledge, a man in deep sleep will also have cognition.

The first reason for not accepting the sense *qua* attainment as *pramāṇa* (i.e. means of valid knowledge) is this that it does not lead to knowledge directly but only through conscious activity. So conscious activity and not the sense *qua* attainment should be accepted as the means (*kaṛaṇa*) of valid knowledge, as it immediately preceds it. The second argument is this that as we have seen in the beginning, the *pramāṇa* cognises itself as well as the others (the objects of knowledge); but as the capacities, which in this case are the senses *qua* attainment, are non-perceptible, if we accept them as *pramāṇa*, it will also have to be accepted that *pramāṇa* does not perceive itself. This will amount to accepting what the *Mīmāṃsakas* accept and rejecting what the Jainas accept.

If it is argued that the capacities be also accepted as perceptible through their substratum, then we will have to accept that just as knowledge is to be accepted as self-illuminating because of its perceptibility through substance, happiness will also be accepted as self-illuminating in the same way.

P. 2.L.7—The earlier Jaina scriptures mention five types of knowledge, which are classified here—as also elsewhere in the later *Jaina* philosophical works—into two types of cognition.

P. 2.L.13—Any knowledge born with the help of an instrument—like senses or mind—which is different from the soul, was originally held to be indirect, but as all the *non-Jaina* systems considered it to be direct, *Jinabhadra* (ViBhā, 95), who is here followed by Yaśovijaya, fell in line with other systems by according such knowledge the status of empirically direct knowledge. The original concept of direct knowledge was included in the concept of transcendently direct knowledge. For reasons of such adjustment, see *Dr. Nathmal Tatia, Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, pp. 28-29.

P. 2.L.15—*Anīndriya* means quasi-sensuous— Cf line 20 below.

P. 2.L.17—Non-existent (*asiddha*) means that which does not exist in the thesis, inconclusive (*anaikāntika*) means that which exists in the heterologous also, and contradictory (*viruddha*) means that which co-exists with the absence of probandum Cf. *Pramāṇasaṅgraha*, p. 111.

P. 2.L.20—Eyes, etc. include ear, eyes, smell, taste and touch—*Nandīsūtra*, 2-5.

P. 2.L.21—For a detailed discussion on whether mind is a sense or not, see *Dr. Nathmal Tatia, Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, pp. 31-32.

P. 2.L.23-28. Dr Radhakrishnan's following remarks make the difference of the sensuous cognition (*matijñāna*) and scriptural knowledge (*śrutajñāna*) clear: "*Mati* is ordinary cognition, obtained by normal means of sense perception... *Śruta* or testimony is knowledge derived through signs, symbols or words. While *matijñāna* gives us knowledge by acquaintance, this gives only knowledge by description"—*Indian Philosophy* Vol. I, pp. 294-95.

The matter, however, is not so simple. The difference between the two was clear as long as *śrutajñāna* actually stood for the scriptural knowledge. It was so only in the earlier

period. In the later period, however, *śrutajñāna* came to mean all verbal knowledge. Now arose the difficulty. If *matī* is held to be bereft of association with words, how speculation (*ihā*) etc. can be included in it, because they are associated with words? All perceptions are not dumb. The *śruta*, on the other hand, is also classified into two : associated with words (*sākṣara*) and bereft of words (*anākṣara*). So there is no fundamental difference between the two. Therefore, *Siddhasena Divākara* observes that *śruta* is not anything in addition to *matī*, because to accept it as an additional type of knowledge is futile as well as it involves undesirable extension—*vaiyarthya*tiprasaṅgābhyām na matyabhyadhikam śrutam—*Niścayadvātrimśikā*, 12. This view is supported by *Yaśovijaya* for the first time in the history of Jaina Logic, in his *Jñānabindu*. Here, however, *Yaśovijaya* tries to mention the traditional difference between the two after the fashion of *Jinabhadra*. This view is quoted verbatim by *Paṇḍita Sukhalāla* in his commentary. *Dr. Nathmal Tatia* has summarised the position as follows : "Simple verbal association is not considered sufficient to raise a cognition to the status of *śruta*. In our ordinary perceptions we associate the object with its name as soon as we perceive it. But we do not go any further. But there are cases of perceptual cognition which do not stop at simple verbal association, but continue further into discursive thought with the help of language. This continuation leads them to the category of *śrutajñāna*.—*Studies in Jaina Philosophy* p. 56.

P. 2.L.28-30. As explained by *Dr. Indra Chandra Śāstrī*, in his *Hindi notes* (p. 6) on the *Jaina-tarka-bhāṣā*, we have two simultaneous experiences while reading a book (1) the visual experience of the shape of the letters, etc, this is *matī*; (2) the meaning conveyed by the words; this is *śruta*. The first is included in written script and spoken alphabet whereas the second is the conscious activity through verbal knowledge. Cf. *Jaina-tarka-bhāṣā*, 18.3-5.

P. 3.L.2. *Siddhasenagaṇin* gives three categories of sensuous knowledge (1) born with the help of the sense organs only, (2) born with the help of the mind only and (3) born with the help of the sense organs and the mind both. To these may be

added the fourth category of the intuitive knowledge of the plant world and unlevelled animals where cognition is born without the help of either of the mind or the sense-organs—*Bhāṣya*, *Tattvārthasūtra*, 1.14

P. 3 L.2. *Nandīsūtra*, 35 illustrates the contact-awareness (*vyñjanāvagraha*) giving the example of a sleeping man who is awakened by a number of calls. Now the sound comes into contact with the ears of the sleeping man in succession for a considerable period before the person concerned actually realises that somebody is calling him. All this is an example of contact-awareness. As soon as the man is awakened to consciousness, the contact-awareness develops into object-awareness (*arthāvagraha*.)

P. 3.L.6-10. Contact-awareness is not unconscious as it develops, as shown above, into object-awareness. It is only due to its undeveloped state that its existence cannot be directly known, though it can be inferred just as dream-knowledge can be inferred by gestures etc.—Cf *ViBhā* 195—198. Having summarised the position of *Jinabhadra*, *Yaśovijaya* suggests another alternative, viz., contact-awareness may be accepted as conscious only by transference of epithet, as it brings about object-awareness, which is conscious.

P. 3. para 7. *Pandita Kailash Chandra Shastri* in his book, *Jaina Nyāya*, has given some more arguments, collected mainly from the *Digambara* works, to prove the non-contactary nature of sight. We give below some of these arguments, as they further support the arguments given by *Yaśovijaya*:

(1) The eyes cannot know the collyrium applied in the eyes. Had the eyes power to know by contact, they would have known the collyrium.

(2) It cannot be argued that since the eyes do not know the covered things, they are not non-contactary. The eyes can know things covered by glass, etc.

(3) The magnet though contactary—cannot attract iron, which is either at long distance or is obstructed by some other object. The same applies to the eyes also.

(4) The supposition that some rays shoot from the eyes

proves nothing. The rats are never seen illuminated by such rays, so as to prove the contactory nature of eyes.

P. 4. Para 8. The problem is this that the *Nandīsūtra* (36) says that object-awareness (*arthāvagraha*) consists of such cognition as 'this sound.' Now this cognition is perceptual judgment (*apāya*) and not object-awareness according to scriptures. So how to reconcile this with the statement of the *Nandīsūtra* ? The answer is that the word 'sound' is being said from the point of view of the speaker and not from the point of view of the cogniser (*ViBhā*, 253). The word 'sound' takes more than one time-point to pronounce, the object-perception will exceed its one time-pointedness.

Once we accept that even the grossest form of particularity can be an object of object-perception, there would be no scope for perceptual judgment, because there being no end to the subtler forms of particularity, all particularities would be grosser in relation to another particularity.

P. 4. Para 9. The problem, presented above, cannot be solved by saying that a man, with familiarity with the object can know its particulars even in the one time-pointed object-awareness, though the unfamiliar child may not be able to know them. It would lead us to the undesirable position of accepting that a man with richer knowledge can know greater number of particulars in his object-awareness. But the scriptures are clear on this point in holding that one does not know by object-awareness the nature of the sound etc.

P. 5. L. 7-9. The problem is that even perception is said to have varieties like quick and slow (see page 6 lines 23-21 of the *text*). If perception lasts only for one time-point, how can we say that it has the varieties of quick and slow ? The answer is that these varieties in fact belong to perceptual judgment, but are said to be belonging to the perception by transference of epithet and treating the cause as the effect.

P. 5. Para 11. We can also solve the problem raised in the above paragraph by accepting two types of perception : the genuine perception and the metaphorical perception. We have explained the position of the genuine perception. One genuine perception, which has no varieties, leads to one perceptual judgment. Now if the cogniser wants to ascertain about a

further specific characteristic, he has a new speculation (*ihā*) and in this case the former perceptual judgment serves as the base and as such it is metaphorically called perception. Now, it is obvious that this perception can have the above-mentioned varieties. Also Cf. *Siddhasenagaṇi's* Commentary on the *Tattvārthasūtra*, 1.16.

It is notable here that out of all the Jaina logicians like *Akalaṅka*, *Vidyānandī*, *Vādi Devasūri*, and *Hemacandra*, it is only *Yaśovijaya* who sticks to the original position of the Jaina canons in holding perception to be indeterminate; the others regard it to be determinate.

P. 5. L. 17-18. Though speculation (*ihā*) is also preceded by doubt (*saṁśaya*), yet it is different from doubt, because doubt cannot exclude the false from the true out of mutually contradictory objects, whereas speculation strives for the ascertainment of the truth and ultimately succeeds in doing so—*ViBhā*, 183-84. Also cf. *Siddhasena's* Commentary on *Tattvārthabhāṣya*, 1.15.

P. 5. Para 15. *Jinabhadra* holds the view that perceptual judgment cognizes the existing characteristics and excludes the non-existing ones. It is by way of refutation of an opinion which holds that it only excludes the non-existing characteristics and the existing characteristics are cognized by retention (*dhāraṇā*)—*ViBhā*, 185-186. As all the synonyms of perceptual judgment, given by *Umāsvāti* are negative, it seems that he is more inclined towards the opinion, refuted by *Jinabhadra*, whereas the *Nandīsūtra*, which gives positive synonyms also for perceptual judgment, seems to agree with *Jinabhadra*—Cf. *Dr. Nathmal Tatia, Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, p. 42.

P. 5. L. 28—P. 6. L. 6. A difficulty in accepting the view, given by the opponents, is raised. Suppose we accept that retention cognizes the existing characteristics, then memory will not be included in retention, and will have to be accepted as an independent variety of sensuous cognition (*matijñāna*). Thus there will be five varieties of sensuous cognition, whereas the scriptures accept only four varieties. It has been shown here that none of the three varieties of retention, mentioned in the previous paragraph, can be included in the perceptual judgment and, therefore, they have to be accepted as independent varie-

ities of sensuous cognition.

P. 6. Para 16. Absence of lapse makes our memory-impressions clearer and clearer, and as such, cannot be dismissed as cogniser of the already cognised. Similarly memory cognises the oneness, uncognised by any other means, of the object of the past and the present and has to be admitted as an organ of knowledge. Memory impression, of course, is not knowledge in itself.

P. 6 L.16. Perverted order (*utkrama*) means the latter in order, coming prior to the former in order, whereas the disturbed order (*vyatikrama*) means leaving some in between the two or more. Thus speculation (*īhā*) occurring before perception (*avagraha*) is the example of perverted order whereas perceptual judgment (*avāya*) occurring after perception (*avagraha*) omitting speculation (*īhā*) in between the two, is the example of disturbed order. It may, however, be noted that it is not necessary here that the first may necessarily lead to the second or the second may necessarily lead to the third and so on and so forth.

P. 6 L.18. The example of the piercing of the hundred petals of a lotus is common in Sanskrit literature. Cf. *Sāhitya-darpaṇa* (Ed. Jivānanda, Calcutta 1934) Explanation of IV. 258—*utpalapatraḥ śatavyatibhedavallāghavāṇna saṁlakṣyate*.

P. 6 L. 19. The mind and eyes have no contact—awareness (*vyañjanāvagraha*). This has already been dealt with at length in the *text* itself on page 3 para 7.

P. 6 L. 20. The difference between many (*bahu*) and multiplied (*bahuvidha*) is that the former consists of knowledge of many individuals like knowledge of many cows whereas the latter consists of knowledge of many varieties like the knowledge of various kinds of cows—*Sarvārthasiddhi* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 1.16.

P. 6 L. 27. Paṇḍita Kailash Chandrāji in his *Jaina Nyāya* (p.156) gives an alternative explanation of quick (*kṣīpra*) and slow (*akṣīpra*) knowledge. According to this explanation, quick knowledge may be explained as knowledge of a quickly falling current of water whereas slow knowledge is the knowledge of a slowly moving horse.

P. 6 L.27-28. There seems to be a difference regarding the name of the fifth variety. *Yasovijaya* mentions it as *nīśrita* whereas the *Digambara* tradition mentions it as *niśṭa*. The example of *niśṭa*, according to *Digambara* tradition, is the knowledge of an elephant, whose body is hidden in water, by the sign of its trunk, visible out of the water. Thus the *Digambara*s explain this variety literally as 'raised' (= *niśṭa*).

P. 6 L.* 29. The *Digambara* tradition mentions *ukta* (=said) and *anukta* (=not said) in place of *nīścita* and *anīścita*. *Ukta* means knowledge through one's words whereas *anukta* means knowledge by implication.

P. 6 L. 30. Here also, as in the case of *kṣipra* and *akṣipra*, an alternative explanation is given in the *Jaina Nyāya* (p.156). The constant knowledge (*dhruva*) is the knowledge of the constant object like mountain.

P. 7 L. 2. *Śrutajñāna* (verbal knowledge) has already been defined in the *text* (para 5) as knowledge. *Āvaśyakaniryukti* (942) explains it as scriptural knowledge. Later it came to indicate all symbols, written or spoken and even inarticulate verbal knowledge came to be included in it. To quote *Dr. Nathmal Tatia*, "this development of meaning is not, strictly speaking, chronological....The self-same thinker could have started from the conception of *śruta* as scripture and reached the conception of *śruta* as inarticulate verbal knowledge"—*Studies in Jaina Philosophy* : p. 53. It is in the light of the above, that the varieties of *śrutajñāna* are to be understood.

P. 7 L. 3-4. The written form of a letter is *sañjñākṣara*, whereas its spoken form is *vyañjanākṣara*. These two are called knowledge only by transference of epithet. In other words, these two are *dravyaśruta* or only material symbol, whereas the potential auditory attainment is *bhāvaśruta* or *śruta-jñāna* proper.

P. 7 L. 5-7. *Labdhyakṣara* is the potential verbal thinking arising out of perceptual cognition, received through the medium of any of the sense-organs of sight, smell etc. and mind. *ViBha* (102) explains that just as internal sensuous cognition is possible even without the existence of corresponding external physical sense organ, which only enhances the power of the internal sensuous cognition, similarly the

one-sensed can have potential verbal knowledge in the absence of *dravyaśruta*. It is by the same logic possible for the plants to experience the objects of five senses, even without having such senses. All this is possible due to the destruction-cum-subsidence of the veil of knowledge; otherwise the plants and the one-sensed would have become omniscient (*ViBhā*, 103). The essence of the discussion is that the soul is capable of having all knowledge without any external aid of senses etc.; the real obstacle in having knowledge is the veil of knowledge and not the absence of external senses. Moreover, no soul in whatsoever form, is completely devoid of knowledge, or otherwise there would be no distinction between the soul and non-soul. The one-sensed, however, do not possess any articulate speech but receive only an indistinct sound. Without the internal capacity of verbal thinking, however, the one-sensed organisms cannot have any instincts of hunger, fear, sex etc., which depend upon some such thinking that 'such and such object would be good for me'.

P. 7 L. 8. The basic idea is, as explained in *ViBhā* (502), quoted by *Pandit Sukhalalji*, that whatever causes the *bhāvaśruta* is the *dravyaśruta* and as such, sighs etc. as indicator of misery etc., are also a sort of a non-alphabetical verbal knowledge.

P. 7 L.10. *Dr. Tatia* has (*Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, p. 50 and pp. 53-55) beautifully analysed the position of the *Jaina* scriptures on the nature of *sañjñā* and *asañjñā śruta*, which we summarise as follows: *sañjñā* has three connotations (i) Discursive thinking, taking into account the past, the present and the future. This is called *dvirghakālika* (ii) Discriminative power between good and bad only with reference to the present. This is called *hetūpadeśika*, (iii) Knowledge of right scriptures. This is called *dr̥ṣṭivāḍopadeśikī*. The word *asañjñā* has also three connotations: (i) Weak mind, (ii) Absence of mind, (iii) Perverted knowledge. Besides *ūha* or instinct is also called *sañjñā* in comparison to that which has no instinct either.

Thus the first *sañjñā* is that of instincts possessed by one-sensed organisms, the second is the discriminative power between good and bad, possessed by the two or more sensed organisms, the third is discursive thinking which takes into

account the past, the present and the future and the fourth is the right knowledge. The beings possessed of these *sañjñās* are relatively called *sañjñīs* in comparison to those possessed of the lower type or types of *sañjñās*. The omniscient are beyond any *sañjñā*, because they are free from all functioning of *matijñāna*.

P.7.L.11-14. Objectively speaking, *Jaina* scriptures are right whereas non-*Jaina* scriptures as well as books on secular subjects are wrong, but subjectively speaking, a person with right attitude can get benefit out of wrong scriptures whereas another person with perverted attitude may draw wrong conclusions from the right type of books also. Thus, from the pragmatic point of view, it is the attitude of the knower and not the nature of the knowledge, which makes the knowledge right or wrong. Cf. *Nandīśūtra*, 41.

P. 7 L.14-19. It is a common practice amongst the *Jainas* to analyse things from the four-fold points of view of substance territory, period and the essence. From the point of view of substance, *śruta* (which in the present context means right knowledge and not verbal thinking) has a beginning and also an end with reference to a particular individual. It has a beginning when an individual ascends the fourth stage of spiritual development viz. *samyagdṛṣṭi guṇasthāna*. It has an end when the individual either reverts back to the first stage viz. *mithyādṛṣṭiguṇasthāna* or attains omniscience, which is beyond *śruta*. With reference to different individuals, it has neither beginning nor end; because persons, possessed of right knowledge, always exist.

From the point of view of territory, it has a beginning and an end in the territories of *Bharata* and *Airāvata*, where it appears at the time of first *Tīrthaṅkara* and disappears at the end of the *Tīrtha* of the last *Tīrthaṅkara*. It has neither a beginning nor an end in the territory of *mahāvīdeha*, where it is always present, because it is believed that right knowledge never disappears in that territory.

From the point of view of period, it has a beginning and an end in the *Bharata* and *Airāvata* territories, as it appears in the third time-period of the ascending and descending ages and disappears in the beginning of the fourth time-period of



the ascending age and in the end of the fifth time-period of the descending age. It has neither a beginning nor an end in the *Mahāvideha*, where there is no distinction of ascending or descending age and where it exists in all times.

From the point of view of essence, it has a beginning and end with reference to the teacher or the scripture, responsible for its creation. It has no beginning and no end as far as destruction-cum-subsidence of veil of knowledge-obstructing *karman* is concerned, because it is always there in a smaller or greater degree.

It would be observed that in the above description, *Śruta* has stood for right knowledge and not verbal knowledge in general, but in the last case while showing the beginningless and endless variety psychically, *śruta* stands for verbal knowledge in general.

It may also be mentioned that except the varieties of alphabetical and non-alphabetical and the varieties of included in-the-main-scriptures and excluded-from-the-main-scriptures, the other varieties are mentioned only in the *Svetāmbara* tradition and not in the *Digambara* tradition.

P. 7 L.24. *Yaśovijaya* has mentioned only three varieties of clairvoyance, whereas the *Jaina* scriptures generally give many more varieties and sub-varieties. At the outset, clairvoyance can be due to birth (*bhava-pratyaya*) or due to merit (*guṇa-pratyaya*). Denizens of heaven and hell are possessed of clairvoyance from their very birth. The clairvoyance of human and sub-human beings, however, is due to special merit.

Another classification of clairvoyance is from the point of view of its subject. It may, in its lowest stage of the lower form (*deśāvadhi*), extend to a small fraction of an *aṅgula* (a small measure) and may know the things having form, within that space. It may penetrate only a small fraction of an *avalika* (a small measure of time) and may know infinite number of modes. The highest stage of the lower form knows all the *loka* (the universe inhabited by living beings), penetrates into *palya* (a large measure of time) lesser by a *samaya* (the smallest fraction of time) and knows the innumerable modes.

The highest type of clairvoyance (*sarvāvadhi*) knows all the things having form in space of the size of countless number

of *loka* and penetrates into countless number of cycles, past and present. Only it cannot know all the modes, which can be known only by the omniscient. In between the lowest and the highest type, lies the middle type (*paramāvadhi*).

The clairvoyance of the 'following' type is further classified into three (i) that which follows to the other place (*kṣetrānugāmi*) (ii) that which follows to the other birth (*bhāvānugāmi*) and that which follows to the other place as well as the other birth (*kṣetrabhāvānugāmi*). We get the three sub-varieties of 'non-following' type by taking the opposites of the above three.

There are some more types of clairvoyance. One classification is into that of stable (*avasthita*) and unstable (*anavasthita*). The stable stays till the whole of life-time or till attainment of omniscience. The unstable continues to increase or decrease after its genesis.

Another classification is into that of one-symboled (*ekakṣetra*) and many-symboled (*aneka-kṣetra*). Sometimes, some symbols like that of *śrīvatsa* etc. (cluster of hair of a peculiar form) appear in the upper part of the body with the emergence of clairvoyance. These symbols are many in cases of gods, denizens of hell and *Tīrthāṅkaras*, and one in case of others. Hence this classification.

Thus we have four more types. Added with the six, given in our *text*, the total number comes to ten. In case it is due to birth, out of these ten, only five, viz. stable, unstable, following, non-following and many-symboled, are possible. In case it is due to merit, all the ten types are possible. In the lower form, all the ten types are possible. In the middle form, all types except decreasing, extinguishing and one-symboled, are possible. In the highest form, only the following five types are possible: following, non-following, stable, non-extinguishing, and many-symboled. In the cases of middle form and highest form, non-following means not following in the other birth, because those possessed of these two forms get emancipated and do not get re-birth.

P. 8 L.7-8. Here mind stands either for objects thought by the mind or modes of mind. According to *Umāsvatī* (*Tattvārthasūtra-bhāṣya*, 1.24) telepathy knows the objects thought by

the minds of others. *ViBhā* (814), however, holds that it is the mind-substance which is directly known by the telepathy and the objects, thought by the mind, are known only through inference. *Yaśovijaya* has followed this latter tradition, which, according to *Pt. Kailashchandrajī*, is the *Śvetāmbara* tradition. *ViBhā* (814) argues that the objects, thought by the mind can be either material or non-material. Now non-material objects cannot be directly known by one who is not omniscient. Hence the objects, thought by the mind, can be known only indirectly and not directly. *Akalaṅka*, however, criticises this position (*RājaVā.* 1.23.6-7) by saying that telepathy, being a case of *pratyakṣa*, should not depend on the sense-organs and the mind, and, therefore, cannot include inference.

P.8 L.10. *Pūjyapāda* holds (*SarSi.* 1.24) that *vipulamati* knows lesser objects in number but with a greater lucidity. *Vipulamati* is infallible and is possessed by one who is ascending the spiritual ladder, while *ṛjumati* can falter and is possessed by one who is falling down.

Telepathy is possessed only by the human beings, born in the *karmabhūmis* (lands of the birth of *Tīrthaṅkaras*) and possessed of right faith, self-control, and freedom from passion.

P. 8. L 15. This definition of pure knowledge is the one accepted by almost all the Jaina thinkers and yet this does not seem to be the original concept of omniscience. In the *Ācārāṅga* (1.3.4) a sentence which says 'one who knows one knows all, and one who knows all knows one' occurs. This has been quoted in support of the concept of omniscience, as presented in our *text* and in other Jaina texts. (e.g. see *Tatia, Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, p.70. Also *Syādvādamāñjarī*, I) *Paṇḍita Sukhalalji* has, however, correctly pointed out that if we keep the context in mind, this sentence hardly implies knowledge of all substance with all modes (*Darśana aurā cintana*, p. 555). This sentence simply means that one who knows the one root-cause of all evils, viz., passion, knows all its varieties viz. anger, pride, greed and deceitfulness. It is clear from the following sentence, which says 'one who controls one controls many and one who controls many controls one.' The conclusive portion of this topic also says that one who knows anger knows pride, one who knows pride

knows deceitfulness and so on and so forth.

Paṇḍita Sukhalāḷī has quoted an incident from the *Bhagavatisūtra* (9.6) also to prove that omniscience, in the original tradition, meant only knowledge of an object from both the points of view of the modis (*dravyārthikanaya*) and the point of view of the modes (*paryāyārthikanaya*). Knowledge of all the substance with all modes, is only a later development.

Kundakundācārya reconciled the original meaning with the popular meaning by ascertaining that from the real point of view omniscience means knowledge of the self whereas from the empirical point of view omniscience means knowledge of all the substance with all their modes (*Niyamasāra*, 166). It becomes all the more important when we keep into mind that *Kundakundācārya* has himself spoken of the empirical point of view as unreal (*samayasāra*, 11).

Haribhadra in his *Yogaṭṭhisamuccaya* (102-108) has also spoken of *sugata*, *kapila* etc. as omniscient. He has himself said in his works on logic that *sugata*, *kapila* etc. are not possessed of omniscience. These two contradictory positions also appear to be the result of the two meanings of omniscience—the original and the popular. Our author has himself supported *Haribhadra* in *Kutarkagrahanivṛtti dvātriṃśikā*. So the original meaning of omniscience seems to be a balanced view between the point of view of modis (which is emphasised by the *Vedānta* by taking into account only the unchangeable) and the point of view of modes (which is emphasised by the *Buddhists* by taking into account only the transitory phase of existence).

I have the occasion of discussing the issue with some of the Jaina ascetics. One interesting interpretation of omniscience, given by an ascetic, was that it means knowledge of all the possibilities, inherent in the substance. All this shows that there is an attempt on the part of the Jainas to re-interpret the conventional concept of omniscience, which appears as mere dogma to the modern mind and as such is not acceptable. The interpretation of *Paṇḍita Sukhalāḷī* has, however, one defect. If we accept his interpretation, the Jaina theory of karman and nature of soul will have to

be considerably changed. Knowledge is the nature of soul. It is the veil of knowledge-obstructing *karman* which hinders our knowledge. That all *karmans* disappear at the attainment of perfection is also evident. The inevitable conclusion would be that a perfect soul should know everything. Hence it is perhaps not possible to re-interpret the nature of omniscience without corresponding re-interpretation of the connected concepts, which are inherent in the *Jaina* system.

P. 8 L. 17. There seems to be much of hair-splitting with regard to the reasons given for and against the existence of omniscient. One argument for the acceptance of omniscience is given by *Ācārya Yaśovijaya* in his *Jñānabindu*. The argument is that since knowledge has gradation inasmuch as it is greater and lesser with reference to different persons, it must have perfection also with reference to somebody. This argument was first given by *Patañjali* in his *Yogasūtra* (1.25). *Mallavādī* was the first *Jaina* author to advance this argument (cf. *Darśana aurā Cintana*, p. 429).

The second argument is that all objects are interrelated. Knowledge of one, therefore, implies knowledge of all. This argument is advanced in the *Syādvādamāñjarī*.

Here *Yaśovijaya* has given two other arguments. Unless we accept omniscience, there would be no knowledge of necessary concomitance. It is not clear to me what *Yaśovijaya* really means. It appears that perhaps he has this idea in his mind: necessary concomitance implies universal knowledge, which is not possible without omniscience. Another argument is that when the veil of knowledge-obstructing *karman* has been removed, there is no reason why there should not be the emergence of omniscience.

P. 8 L. 20. The *Naiyāyikas* believe that no knowledge is possible without mind and soul. The mind of some *yogis* attain such power which makes them omniscient (*Prāśasta-pāda-bhāṣya* on *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*, 1.11-13, p. 187). Naturally this knowledge disappears on the attainment of liberation, when mind ceases to exist.

Yaśovijaya refutes this by saying that just as practice of *yoga* does not make any other of the five senses capable of knowing all, similarly the yogic practice cannot make mind

capable of knowing all.

P. 8 L. 22-27. The question is sectarian and, therefore, we refrain from making any comments. This is one of the major points of difference between the *Digambaras* and the *Śvetāmbaras*. The other major difference is on the question of liberation of women, which is held possible by the *Śvetāmbaras* and impossible by the *Digambaras*. For the *Digambara* view of these problems, one may refer to *Nyāyakumudacandra* (pp. 852-878).

P. 9 L. 1-2. The opponents, who believed that recollection is non-organ of knowledge, advance certain arguments in support of their contention. The first of these arguments has been advanced by the author of *Cintāmaṇi* (p. 845), who says that in recollection either of the two—the qualified and the qualification—is not present, whereas the recollection makes it a subject of present, thus making an unreal assertion. We recollect on the form of 'that pitcher' etc., whereas the part of the knowledge indicated by 'that' belongs to the past. Now, 'that' is the qualification, and it indicates past but it is not necessary that this time indicated by qualification should necessarily be connected with the qualified. Here 'that' indicates the time (past) of the previous experience and not of the pitcher.

P. 9 L. 2-4. *Udayanācārya* (*Nyāyakusumāñjali*, 4.1) says that recollection's validity depends on the validity of the experience and as such it cannot be said to be the organ of knowledge, even though it may be real. The answer to this objection is that if we were to apply this criteria, inference's validity also depends upon the validity of concomitance, and as such inference would also be a non-organ of knowledge.

P. 9 L. 4-7. Here *Yasovijaya* has shown some originality, inasmuch as the arguments, advanced here, go deeper than that of any other *Jaina* logician.

P. 9 L. 7-8. Compare para 16 on page 6., where the objection that recollection knows only that which has been already known, has been answered.

P. 9 L. 15-17. The *Buddhists* hold that the recognition is in the form of 'this is that' or 'that is this'. Here the object

indicated by 'this', is the subject of direct perception whereas the object, indicated by 'that', is the subject of indirect knowledge i.e. recollection. (*Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 442). Therefore, in the cognition 'this is that' we have, in fact, two knowledges, the direct and indirect; the one of them being clear and the other being obscure. It is, therefore, wrong to accept one cognition in recognition. The answer is two-fold : in the first place just as the Buddhist accept the knowledge of a pitcher as one knowledge, though we have the knowledge of many colours in it, similarly we feel recognition as one knowledge though it consists of knowledge of 'this' and 'that'. Secondly, recognition is really an obscure knowledge, concerned with the object, indicated by 'that', the use of 'this' is only to help recognition. Just as knowledge of the picture arises out of picture, similarly recognition arises out of its own source.

P. 9. L. 17-18. The Buddhist believe in the transitory nature of things and hold that the *Devadatta* of to-day is not the same *Devadatta* as of yesterday. From their point of view, therefore, the recognition 'he is the same *Devadatta*', is wrong. For them, in fact, there is no question of recognition. The *Jainas*, on the other hand, believe in 'change in permanance'. An object, according to them, changes but does not loose its identity. The change is, therefore, partial and not absolute and thus recognition is possible. In fact, the very fact that we do recognise things in practice, has been used by the *Jainas* as well as the *Brahmanical* philosophers to refute the theory of transitory nature of things.

P. 9 L. 18-20. The *Prabhākara* school holds that all knowledge is valid. When we mistake conch-shell for silver, we have two knowledges—the perception and the recollection; we only confuse the two. Similarly, in the recognition also, we have two knowledges, the perception and the recollection, and we confuse the two, not making the distinction between the two.

Now, this assumption is wrong; because if we were to accept this, all such qualifying knowledge as that of '*daṇḍī*' (=a person possessed of staff) would become impossible because here also we would have two knowledges—the knowledge of the qualification (staff) and the knowledge of the qualified

(person). It may be noted that the arguments, given for refuting the positions of the *Buddhists* and the *Prabhākaras*, are altogether different and, therefore, the phrase 'ata eva' (for this very reason) in lines 18-19, is redundant. (I have elaborated this point in my article on *Jaina-tarka-bhāṣā*, *Journal of the Department of Sanskrit*, University of Delhi, Vol. I, No. 1, December, 1971, pp. 110-111).

P. 2. L. 20-23. The *Naiyāyikas* argue that recognition is possible only when there is direct perception and is not possible when there is no direct perception; therefore, recognition is nothing but direct perception. The answer is that recognition becomes possible not when there is only direct perception but also recollection. Had direct perception (without recollection) been the only pre-condition for recognition, it (recognition) would have become possible at the very first sight of the object (when there is no question of its recollection).

P. 9 L. 24-27. Granting what has been said above, *Vācaspati Miśra* in his *Nyāyavārtikatātparyāṭīkā* (p. 139) holds that recognition is produced by senses, the recollection or the latent impressions also being helpful in its production. It is with this help that direct perception cognises the present object as qualified by the past. Here, *Yaśovijaya* refutes this point of view. As direct perception is not dependent on memory, therefore this position is tenable. This refutation is not convincing. Nobody holds that direct perception is dependent on memory but it may precede certain direct perception. *Vācaspati Miśra* holds that recognition is the case where memory precedes direct perception. This cannot be denied even by the *Jainas*. The bone of contention is whether we accept these two, as independent cognitions, or as one synthetic cognition and if we accept them as one synthetic cognition, should it be termed as perception or recognition. (Compare my article, in the *Journal of the Department of Sanskrit*, University of Delhi, Vol. 1, No. 1, December, 1971, p. 111). *Yaśovijaya* gives another argument to decide this dispute. If we accept this as direct perception, the cases of inference would also be decided by the help of direct perception, aided by the mind having the recollection of concomitance and there would be no necessity for inference. Here *Yaśovijaya* seems to have the

argument of *Jayanta* (*Nyāyamahjari*, p. 461) in his mind. *Jayanta* has conceived of a mental perception responsible for recognition. There is, in fact, no difference between the procedure laid down by *Jayanta* on the one hand and by the *Jaina* logician on the other; the difference is only that of name.

P. 9 L. 27-30. The *Naiyāyikas* hold that the senses do come into contact with the qualified object in the case of recognition, hence it is a case of direct perception, the qualification of the qualified also being known through the help of recollection. Now, this contention is also wrong; for in experiences such as 'he is like this' the qualified object (he) does not come into contact with the senses, though this is also a case of recognition. Here also it is doubtful whether experiences like 'he is like this' should really be called recognition. The *Naiyāyikas* are correct if we accept what the common man understands from recognition. The definition of recognition, as given by the *Jaina* logicians, includes much more than what the prevalent meaning of the term indicates.

P. 10. L. 3-6. Even the *Mīmāṃsakas* and *Naiyāyikas*, who hold recognition to be valid, do not extend the scope of recognition to be cognition of similarity or to be the cognition qualified by similarity. These two are, according to them, the subject of analogy, which is an independent organ of knowledge. The similarity is perceived directly and the cow is the subject of recollection, yet the qualified *gavaya* is the subject of analogy.

P. 10 L. 8-10. The *Jainas* hold any synthetic knowledge caused by experience and recollection to be recognition. The cognition, based on analogy, according to the *Mīmāṃsakas*, is also a synthetic knowledge caused by experience and recollection and as such is perfectly within the limits of recognition, as conceived by the *Jainas*. The objection—if we were to accept an independent organ of knowledge for such cognitions as '*gavaya* is like cow', we have to accept another organ of knowledge for such cognitions as 'a buffalo is different from the cow'—is not valid. In fact *Yaśovijaya* missed the point that those who believed in analogy as an independent organ of knowledge, include dissimilarity also as the subject of analogy. Not only this, they include the knowledge of an object, quali-

fied by any particularity of its own, under the subject of analogy (compare *Siddhānta Chandrodaya* p. 30. Also my article in the *Journal of the Department of Sanskrit*, University of Delhi, Vol. 1, No. 1, December, 1971, pp. 111-112). It is, therefore, evident that the cognitions such as 'a buffalo is different from the cow' would be the subject of analogy and that there would be no disturbance as alleged by *Yāśovijaya* in the number of the organs of knowledge.

P. 10 L. 11-14. The *Naiyāyikas* accept analogy in a slightly changed sense. The subject of analogy, according to them, is neither similarity nor the object qualified by the similarity, but the relationship of word and its meaning. Now this relationship between the word and its meaning is also the subject of recognition, which being a synthetic knowledge, can cognise the experience of an individual object and its nature of being indicated by a particular term.

P. 10 L. 15-17. The idea is that the indicativeness of the word is known by the quality which is described in the analogical sentence. The idea that such a sentence should convey similarity is not correct. Take, for example, a sentence 'swan is one which discriminates between the water and the milk'. This sentence can also become the source of the knowledge of the relationship between the word 'swan' and its meaning when one observes an animal discriminating between water and milk. Now, will the *Naiyāyikas* accept this as an example of analogy, is the important question. From what we have said above in the preceding paragraph of our notes, it becomes obvious that *Yāśovijaya* has overlooked the exact scope of analogy. According to *Siddhānta Chandrodaya* (p. 30), this knowledge of the relationship of the word 'swan' with its meaning is also possible through analogy.

P. 10. L. 17-20. *Yāśovijaya* has raised another objection against the independence of analogy as an organ of knowledge. Granting that similarity, dissimilarity or particularity and the knowledge, based on them, is the subject of analogy, what about the knowledge based on the relatively largeness or smallness of objects? Obviously, one would have to accept a separate organ of knowledge for such cognitions. Then why not include these cognitions together with those gained

through analogy, under one organ of knowledge, recognition? All these cognitions have one thing in common, they are based on synthetic knowledge, caused by experience and recollection, and as such can be grouped together under the subject of recognition.

P. 10 L. 23. *Umāsvāti* (*TattvārthaBhāṣya* 1.15) has used the words *tarka* (reasoning) and *ūha* (logic) as synonyms of second variety of sensuous knowledge, the speculation. It was *Akalaṅka* (*Laghīyastrayī svavivṛti*, 3.2) who first of all offered a logical definition of reasoning. Since then, the Jaina logicians have been defining reasoning as an independent organ of knowledge for cognising all such concepts as are universal like that of the concomitance of probandum and probane. Another such universal relationship is that of the relationship of word and its meaning. It is for including such relationships that the word 'etc.' has been used in this definition.

P. 10. L. 25. By the phrase 'concomitance, characterised by no exception, and caused by the innate nature of the object' is meant a concomitance without associate adjunct (*upādhi*). The example of such concomitance is where there is smoke, there is fire. If we reverse the order and say where there is fire, there is smoke it would become example of concomitance with associate adjunct, as this concomitance is not universal and is true only when the fire has the contact of wet fuel. This wet fuel is called the associate adjunct (*upādhi*). It is only the concomitance without associate adjunct which forms the subject of reasoning.

P. 10. L. 26-28. The concomitance does not fall within the jurisdiction of direct perception because it is an accepted fact that direct perception can cognise only those objects which are present, whereas concomitance has jurisdiction over past, present and future.

Direct perception is incompetent to have commerce with remote occurrences. The concomitance, therefore, can be cognised only by reasoning which is helped by the observation of probandum and probane and also by recollection and recognition. We repeatedly observe that the probandum is associated with probane. We generalise this association with the help of recollection of previous associations

of the probane and probandum and by recognising that the present association is of the same nature as the previous ones. This gives rise to the reasoning that the concomitance between the probandum and probane is universal.

P.10. L.29—P.11.1.2. Granting that universal concomitance cannot be the subject of direct perception, it may be argued that the co-existence of an individual data in its own probandum can be directly perceived. The *Naiyāyikas* hold that even the general (*sāmānya*) can be perceived by means of supra-mundane direct perception (*alaukika pratyakṣa*). It is through this that all individual cases of the probandum and probane can be generalised. Thus reasoning can be replaced by supra-mundane direct perception. The answer to this is two-fold. In the first place, the *Naiyāyikas* themselves are not unanimous regarding the principle of the perception of the general (*sāmānya*). It is accepted in the *Cintāmaṇi* but not in the *Dīdhiti*. Secondly, even if we accept that the general can be perceived, the reasoning shall be essential for including all the individual dates. Even if we know the generals, we will have to reason that the general is valid only when it includes all individual datas. Here, again, reasoning is essential for including all individual data.

P. 11.L.5-7. A word has many syllables. Recollection, therefore, has to be used for connecting the whole word. It is on account of repeated observation and recollection that the synthetic knowledge of recognition is used in getting the meaning of a word. The process of elimination and addition can be explained thus : an elderly person asks another person to bring a cow and then he asks again to take away the cow and bring a horse. Now this gives rise to the comprehension of the meaning of the word 'cow', because a particular animal is brought and taken away at the utterance of the word 'cow'.

P.11.L.7-8. The *regressus ad infinitum*, which can be objected to in the present case, can be explained as follows: reasoning leads to the removal of doubts regarding the knowledge of the relationship of the two—the probane and the probandum or the word and its meaning. Now there may be a doubt again regarding the relationship of the two and we may require the knowledge of another concomitance to

remove it. If we produce another concomitance there may be again a doubt and again another concomitance may be required to remove it and so forth.

This *regressus ad infinitum* does not arise because the reasoning has the inherent capacity of leading to the knowledge of the relation without depending on any other knowledge of relation.

P.11. L.9.-12. The Buddhist do not 'accept the validity of any after-thought and as such also the validity of reasoning, which is only an after-thought coming after the direct perception.

Now there are two alternatives; either reasoning cognises as an after-thought only what has been already cognised by direct perception or it cognises the general which has not been cognised by direct perception previously.

In the first case it cognises only what has already been cognised by direct perception and, therefore, can cognise concomitance, as has been already explained above in the text in para no. 30. Therefore, reasoning will have to be accepted as an additional organ of knowledge. In the second case if it is to be accepted that reasoning cognises the general also then it cannot be said to be invalid for this reason alone. The Buddhist themselves accept the validity of inference even though it cognises the general which is unreal. They hold that it is valid from practical point of view because just as there is coherence between what is perceived and what is found through direct perception, similarly there is coherence between what is found and what is inferred by inference. If inference could be valid even though it deals with the general, reasoning could also be valid even though it deals with the general.

P. 11. L. 12-19. The *Jainas* hold that perception, either through observation or through non-observation, can perceive an object which is at hand and cannot have any imagination of the past or the future and, therefore, gives insight into the universality and necessity of the relationship of two terms by mere observation of their co-presence or non-observation of them out of relation.

P. 11.L.20-25. The *Naiyāyikas* maintain that reasoning is only helpful in removing doubts about concomitance and is not independent organ of knowledge (*Cintāmaṇi, Anumāna Khaṇḍa*, p. 210). Fire is inferred from smoke, here smoke is determinate concomitant (*Vyāpya*) and fire is determinant concomitant (*Vyāpaka*). If there is any doubt about the universality of the concomitance it is asserted that where determinant concomitant is absent determinate concomitant is also absent. This is known as *āhārya* knowledge which has no subject of its own.

The purpose of the reasoning according to the *Naiyāyikas* is two-fold : it is helpful in the organ of the knowledge at the time of the doubt raised by the opponent, or to be brief, it removes the doubt of the opponent.

In either case it is only helpful in the organ of knowledge. The position is clarified by means of an example. Suppose, there is doubt about an object as to whether it is man or the trunk of a tree. When we settle this doubt we have two types of decisions :

I. This is the trunk of the tree.

II. This is not man.

According to the *Jainas*, this is for the second decision that we require reasoning. According to the *Naiyāyikas* even this second decision can be arrived at by perception which cognises the absence (*abhāva*) also through contact of the qualifications through the contact of the qualified.

The *Jainas* accept reasoning as an independent organ of knowledge because it fulfils all the conditions laid down at the beginning of our text in para I. The form of reasoning as accepted by the *Naiyāyikas* is also useful in three ways :

I. When there is doubt about the universality of the concomitance.

II. When an opponent, who wants to arrive at perverse conclusion, raises doubt.

III. When there is doubt independent of the conditions laid down in number I and II above.

P. 11. L. 25-27. A doubt arises as to how the position of *Dharmabhūṣaṇa*, who maintained reason as remover of ignorance, could be reconciled with that of the *Naiyāyikas* who main-

tained reasoning as the remover of doubt. The answer is that *Dharmabhūṣaṇa* used the term 'ignorance' in the sense of wrong knowledge. Wrong knowledge is the same thing as doubt. It may again be objected that an organ of knowledge according to the *Jainas* must remove ignorance and if we accept reasoning only as the remover of doubt, how can we hold it to be an organ of knowledge. The answer is two-fold. In the first place knowledge means definite cognition which is not possible without the removal of doubt. Therefore, reasoning does remove ignorance when it removes doubt. Secondly, all organs of knowledge lead to the definitive cognition of the self and reasoning is no exception to it. Therefore, the general resultant of the organ of knowledge, viz. the removal of ignorance, is not wanting in the case of reasoning either.

P. 12. L. I. The definition of inference has been directly taken from *Hemacandra*. The first to define inference was *Siddhasena* who used the word *Liṅga* in place of *sādhana* (*Nyāyāvātāra*, 5). The first author to use the terminology of our text was *Akalaṅka* (*Nyāyaviniścaya*, part II, 2.1) who was followed by other *Jaina* logicians.

It was *Dharmabhūṣaṇa* who offered a criticism of the definition of inference as given by *Uddyotakara* and followed by other *Naiyāyika* (*Nyāyadīpikā*, p. 66). The *Naiyāyikas* hold that inference consists in the comprehension of the probane (*Liṅga-parāmarśa*). This comprehension has been defined as the knowledge of the subsistence of the probane in the subject qualified by the knowledge of universal concomitance. Obviously this definition cannot be tenable for the *Jainas* who, as would be clear from the following para of the text, do not maintain subsistence in the subject as the necessary condition for inference. *Dharmabhūṣaṇa* objected to the definition of the *Naiyāyikas* on the basis that it defines only the probane and not the probandum. The comprehension of the probane is only the cause of inference and not inference itself (*Nyāyadīpikā*, p. 67).

It may be mentioned here that while *Abhayadevasūri* amongst the *Śvetāmbaras* and *Akalaṅka* amongst the *Digambaras* criticise three varieties of inference given in the *Nyāya-sūtra* (1. 1. 5), *Yaśovijaya*, following *Hemacandra*, kept silence

about it. *Pandit Sukhalalji* has pointed out that it may be due to the fact that a great *Śvetāmbara Ācārya Āryarakṣita* had previously supported the three varieties of inference. (*Anuyoga-dvāra*, p. 212. 1).

P. 12. L. 9-11. The argument (Cf. *Pramāṇavārttika*, 1.17) given in these lines has been elaborated by *Hemacandra* as follows: if we do not accept the subsistence in the subject, such inferences as 'sound is perishable since it is visible' would be valid whereas they are not so on account of non-existent middle term (as the probane 'visible' does not subsist in the subject 'sound'). The example of contradiction on account of non-subsistence in the homologous instance is: X is omniscient because he is a speaker. Here 'being speaker' does not subsist (necessarily) in the homologue 'omniscient'. This very example is an instance of inconclusive also because the attribute of being a speaker is not necessarily absent in the heterologue 'non-omniscient'.

P.12.L.15. A better counter-example than that of crow and palace would be: "the ocean in the world has fire because there are kitchens in the world which have smoke".

P.12.L. 16-20. Here *Yaśovijaya* has raised a subtle but a serious objection against the Jaina view, viz. subsistence of the probane in the subject is not necessary. Perhaps *Yaśovijaya* is the only author to deal with this objection in such details. The objection is that if the probane does not necessarily subsist in the subject how the subject is invariably known in all the inferences. If a valid necessary concomitance is the only condition for a valid inference, then there must be some cases of inference where the subject may remain altogether unknown. As there are no such cases it can be argued that the subject becomes known because the probane subsists in it. The answer is that it is not only through the subsistence of the probane in the subject that the subject is known but the subject can be known also as a qualification of the necessary concomitance. For example, in the inference 'there is moon in the sky because there is moon in the water, the subject 'sky' is known as a qualification of 'moon', which has necessary concomitance with the reflection of the moon in the water. Sometimes, the subject

may be known as the substratum of the probane. For example, in the inference, 'the mountain has fire because it has smoke', the probandum 'mountain' is known as the substratum of the probane 'smoke'. It would be observed that in this second example, there is not much of difference between the *Jainas* and the *Naiyāyikas*. It is only in the first example that they differ.

P.12.L.21-26. *Yaśovijaya* raises another objection to the solution given above.

This second objection can be understood by understanding the three types of necessary concomitance as given in the books on *Jaina* logic.

I. External Concomitance—This concomitance is valid with respect to the homologue.

II. Complete concomitance—This concomitance is valid with respect to both the subject and the homologue.

III. Internal concomitance—This concomitance is valid with reference to the subject only. (*Siddhiviniścayaṭīkā*, pp. 345-347 and *Pramāṇanaya-tattvālokāṅkāra*, 3.39).

It is only this last type of concomitance, the internal concomitance, which makes an inference valid. Out of the first two types, the external concomitance is superfluous because it is valid only if accompanied by internal concomitance also (*Nyāyāvatāra*, 20 and also *Pramāṇanayatattvālokāṅkāra*, 3.38). As for the complete concomitance, it automatically includes the internal concomitance (*Siddhi-viniścaya*, 5.15). It is, therefore, the internal concomitance only which makes an inference valid. The external concomitance, at best, can be only an aid to the internal concomitance.

Yaśovijaya here shows a keen insight and observes that in fact necessary concomitance is of universal application and as such cannot be classified into different types, only on the basis of its validity with reference to any particular data, such as the subject or the homologue. He, therefore, is against classifying necessary concomitance into different categories as has been done by his predecessors.

Coming to the point that the subject is known on account of its associations with the probane, it may be argued that in an internal concomitance where the necessary con-

comitance is valid with reference to subject only, the association of the subject with the probandum will be known just at the time of grasping the concomitance itself. This objection is answered by saying that if it were so, the very exercise of inference would be futile because the knowledge desired by the inference would be attained at the time of the cognition of concomitance.

P. 13.L.1-6. *Nyāyakumudacandra* (p. 442), gives some details about the invalid inference where the thesis is hindered or where the reason is inconclusive. In the first case, it would be observed that there is no logical impossibility of the one in the absence of the other (*avinābhāva*) and therefore, the question of any valid concomitance does not arise. In the second case of inconclusive reason, the counter-argument would contradict the argument only when it is stronger. But the fact that it is stronger cannot be proved, when the conditions laid down for a valid cause are fulfilled in both the cases. It would, therefore, lead to the fallacy of interdependence (*anyonyāśraya*); the inference would be inconclusive if the counter-argument is stronger and the counter-argument would prove to be stronger if the inference is inconclusive.

The definition of the *Naiyāyikas* is too narrow (*avyāpta*) because, as explained above, there are examples of valid inference, where the conditions, laid down by the *Naiyāyikas* are not fulfilled and it is also over-lapping (*ativyāpta*) because there are examples where the five-fold conditions are fulfilled and yet the inference is not valid. The example as given in the text is as follows: 'He is black, because he is his son': The other sons of the same persons are known to be black and hence this inference. This inference is held to be invalid even by the *Naiyāyikas* on account of the presence of condition (*upādhi*) and is therefore, an example of non-existent concomitance (*vyāpyatvasiddha*).

P. 13. L. 9-11. The definition of probandum has been taken *verbatim* from *Pramāṇanayatatvālokāṅkāra* (3. 15). The purpose of each epithet as given in this definition has also been almost taken *verbatim* from that very book (3. 15-17). The paras 39 and 40, however, offer additional explanation regarding this definition.

P. 13. L. 12-16. It has been said above that the probandum are those objects which are either doubted or grasped contradictorily. Now in this para it is explained that a contradictorily grasped object may also become a probandum. The reason is simple. It is not necessary that only a person full of doubts may enter into a debate; it is equally possible that even an ignorant or a perverted person may do so. Now if the opponent is in doubt, the probandum would be a doubtful object but if he is ignorant or perverted, the probandum would be a contradictorily grasped object. It is also not necessary that a debate be always aimed at the attainment of knowledge. Sometimes, the debates may be aimed at victory. In such cases one of the disputants is perverted and is proud. In such cases also the probandum is not doubted but contradictorily grasped.

P. 13. L. 17-23. Both the parties in a debate must agree that the probandum is not refuted by any other organ of knowledge or otherwise there is no point in proceeding with the inference at all. As far as the quality of desirability goes, the probandum is desirable to the person, who uses the inference. In the autocommentary on *Pramāṇanayatattvālokaṅkāra*, *Syādvādaratnākara* (p. 538), an inference is quoted to prove the point. This inference is repeated in the *text* also. The *Sāṅkhya* uses an inference for the *Buddhist* to prove the existence of soul : 'eyes etc. are meant for others'. Now, how do we interpret the term, 'for others' ? If, 'for others' is not taken to mean 'soul', it may mean anything which is not eyes etc.

The *Buddhists* also accept that the eyes etc. are not meant for themselves but for something which is a collection. This would mean the agreement of the two and consequently the futility of the inference. The *Buddhists* on the contrary do not accept this inference and point out the fallacy of incoherence etc. in it. This implies that they also accept that here the probandum is the soul. This goes to prove our point that the probandum should be such as is desirable to one who uses the inference.

All this discussion is relevant in cases of inferences-for-others. Here, however, the context is that of inferences-for-the-self. Yet the problem has been discussed because there is not

much of difference between the two; the inference-for-others being always the follower of inference-for-the-self.

P. 13. L. 24-25. When the probandum is to be explained with reference to necessary concomitance, the quality alone is the probandum, whereas from the point of view of inference, the subject together with the quality is probandum. If we do not accept this distinction and insist on the subject together with its quality as probandum, no necessary concomitance would be possible when we speak of the smoke and the fire in the necessary concomitance 'where there is smoke, there is fire', where there is no reference to the thesis, 'mountain.' Compare *Pramāṇanayatatvālokāṅkāra* (3.19).

P. 14. L. 2-3. The idea is that the thesis consists of the two—the qualified and the quality. We may take them together as one thesis or may mention them separately as two constituents of one thesis.

P. 14. L. 8-10. The inference 'an omniscient exists because there are no definite proofs to prove the contrary in the inference' is used by the *Jainas* to prove the existence of omniscient to the *Mīmāṃsakas*, who do not believe in the existence of omniscient. Now the qualified object, omniscient, is accepted for the sake of argument; it may prove to be existing or otherwise only after the inference has been conclusively decided. This type of qualified object is said to be optionally proved. The *Naiyāyikas*, who do not mention this type of qualified object, would change the form of the inference to 'somebody is omniscient' thereby making 'somebody' the qualified object. As regards the second inference 'the horns-of-the-donkey do not exist', *Yatovijaya* also accepts, following *ViBhā* (1574), that here it is the existence of horns in the donkey which is denied, because the non-existent, the horns-of-the-donkey, cannot be denied.

P. 14. L. 16-18. The objection of the *Buddhists* of making existence the probandum is of a fundamental nature. The *Buddhists* accept only the particular object which is momentary, without parts and independent of each other, as the only reality. They do not accept the general (*Sāmānya*). When we say that the existence is the probandum, the question arises that whether we want to prove the particular existence or the

general existence. The question of proving the general existence does not arise because it simply does not exist. If it is said that we want to prove particular existence, it would simply not be possible to have any concomitance with reference to the particular existence which is momentary.

The answer to this objection is that if we were to uphold it, any inference would become impossible. For example, in the stock-example, the fire in general would not be the probandum because it is non-existent and it would not be possible to have any concomitance.

P. 14.L. 18-25. The objection raised in the *Pramāṇavārttika* (1.192) has been explained by *Yaśovijaya* himself. The answer is that if existence cannot become probandum, because it cannot be proved through a probane which is either positive or positive-cum-negative or negative, then the stock example of inference would also be invalid because the quality of 'possessed of the fire' is also optional.

P. 14. L. 26-27. The answer of the *Jainas* to the *Naiyāyikas* can be explained as follows : In the contention of *Naiyāyikas*, the qualified object is the optionally proved qualified object. This contention itself proves that optionally proved qualified object can also serve as qualified object.

Ratnākaraśāstrī in the *Pramāṇanayatatvālokāṅkāra* (3.22) discusses the supposed answers of the *Naiyāyikas* that here the qualified object, the optionally proved qualified object, is admitted because it is accepted by the opponents. The objection is answered by saying that if the opponent accepts this on the basis of valid cognition then the *Naiyāyikas* should also accept it. If, on the other hand, the opponent did not accept it on valid cognition, the *Naiyāyikas* should not accept it even hypothetically. But the very fact that they accept it leads to that a thesis in some cases can be accepted for the sake of argument.

P. 14.L. 27-28—P. 15. L. 1-3. The objection, raised above, regarding the contention of the *Naiyāyikas*, may also be true with reference to the *Jainas*, who hold that the non-existence is never negated. Now, if a non-existent object is not to be negated, how can non-existence be proved of an optionally proved qualified object ?

The answer to this objection is that this would be valid only if the qualified object, which is optionally proved, were to be experienced in toto. Once an object has been experienced in toto, there is no question of its denial. The question is then how do we experience the optionally proved qualified object. One answer can be that optionally proved qualified object is experienced as qualified by words etc. Now in such cases, the inference would have the limited purpose of removing any doubt about the qualifications etc. or of removing any perverted knowledge about the existence of the qualification. This type of inference is conditional and has only a limited purpose. Therefore, this position also can be only partially acceptable.

The correct position, therefore, is that the non-existent object is experienced only in parts, which are existent.

P. 15. L. 6-8. To take another example, 'an absolutely external object is not capable of performing any action, because there is no simultaneity or order'; here the qualified object—absolutely eternal object—is not accepted by the *Jainas* themselves, who infer and yet the *Jainas* make absolutely eternal object as qualified object for the sake of argument, because it is easier to prove the non-existence of an absolutely eternal object in this way. The argument would proceed in this way : in an absolutely eternal object, there is no order or simultaneity and when there is no order or simultaneity, there is no capability of performance of any action and in the absence of capability of any action, the existence of an absolutely eternal object cannot be proved. It may, however, be pointed out here that *Yaśovijaya* has positively said (*The Text*, p. 14, l. 13-14) earlier that in the case of an optionally proved qualified object, the probandum is limited to existence, and non-existence whereas in the inference, under discussion, this rule appears to have been violated inasmuch as the qualified object (absolutely eternal object) is optionally proved and yet the probandum is neither existence nor non-existence but absence of capability of performing any action.

P.15.L.11. The three parts of inference meant for the self (or alternatively two parts) have already been discussed in the *text* in para 41 on page 13. The *Jainas* hold

that the same are the parts of an inference-for-others. The earlier *Jaina* logicians suggested the use of illustration also as the third part. Compare *Āpta Mīmāṃsā* (6, 17, 18, 27) and *Nyāyavatāra* (13, 19). *Akalaṅka* and other *Jaina* logicians including Yaśovijaya, who followed him, did not consider illustration as a part of syllogism. *Devasūri* went to the extent of accepting that in cases of exceptionally intelligent person the use of the probane only may also suffice (*Syādvādaratnākara*, p. 548). This is, however, the position which is held generally by the Buddhist and is refuted here. Amongst the Buddhists also *Dharmakīrti* had accepted two parts in *Vādanyāya* (p.61). In the *Pramāṇavārttika* (1.128), however, he accepted only probane as the part of syllogism. All this shows a tendency to reduce the number of the parts of syllogism. The fact, that the *Jaina* logicians including *Yaśovijaya* (the text p.16, para 51) accepted the utility of other parts of syllogism also with reference to persons of dull wit, shows that the *Jaina* view has not been rigid about the parts of syllogism. The stand of *Devasūri*, who even agreed with the Buddhists, shows the liberality of the *Jaina* approach, which is based on relativity.

Yaśovijaya and majority of the *Jaina* logicians have, however, refuted the position of the Buddhists, who hold that thesis may also be eliminated from the syllogism as it may be known from the context itself.

P.15. L.12-20. The arguments of *Yaśovijaya* against the Buddhists' view-point can be explained as follows: the probane can also be presumed from the context. When one says that the word is transitory, the probane of 'being produced by effort' is also known impliedly, at least, to some intelligent persons; and, therefore, may be eliminated in such cases. It is, in fact, not a question of knowing impliedly, but of making the validity of the relationship of the qualified object and the quality, explicitly clear. For this, the mention of the qualified object is as necessary as that of the probane.

P. 15. para 48. Here we find very strange view-point of the *Sāṅkhya* school. Everybody accepts inference for-others as inference, where persons other than the self are conveyed the conclusion of the inference by using syllogism.

The *Sāṅkhya*, on the other hand, says that the inference, where the probane is acceptable only in the scriptures of the opponents, is inference-for-others.

Now, how can a disputant use the probane, which is acceptable only in the scriptures of the opponents, unless he himself accepts the validity of those scriptures. Now, if one accepts the validity of the scriptures of the opponent as against one's own, there is no point in carrying on the debate any more; everything would be decided by the scriptures, upheld by the disputant and his opponent jointly. If the disputant does not uphold the validity of the opponents' scriptures, how can he advance an argument based on the assumptions, which are upheld only in the scriptures of the opponents? A probane, acceptable to the opponent only, can, however, be used in an inference for the sake of argument aiming at proving the very unacceptability of the probane. For example, the *Jainas* use the following inference: 'that which is absolutely one, cannot be connected with many as generality. Now, this inference has been used only to show the relationship of the two, the oneness and being connected with many. It does not prove anything more. Now, if we accept 'that which is one cannot be connected with many', we will have to refute the existence of generality, which, according to the *Naiyāyikas*, is one but connected with many. That which is connected with many cannot be one. This proposition makes generality impossible. Thus the inference takes an altogether contradictory form. Such being not the case in the example, given by the *Sāṅkhyas* viz. the intelligence is unconscious because it is created like the pitcher, the inference, given as an example of inference-for-others by the *Sāṅkhya*, cannot be accepted.

P. 16. L. 3. The *Naiyāyikas* accept positive (*anvaya*) and negative (*vyatireka*) concomitance. The Buddhists also accepted it (*Hetubinduṭīkā*, p. 19). The *Jainas* do not accept these two as the varieties of concomitance, but only as two ways of putting the cause.

P. 16. L. 17. This tradition of accepting ten parts of the syllogism has its origin in the *Niryukti* of *Bhadrabāhu* (*Daśa-vaikālika Niryukti, Gāthā*, 137). It may be mentioned that

the *Yuktidīpikā* on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* also mentions ten parts (*Yuktidīpikā* on *Kārikā*, 6) of inference. Besides the well-known five parts, the *Yuktidīpikā* says that curiosity (*jijñāsa*), doubt (*saṁśaya*), purpose (*prayojana*), attainment of the possible (*śakya-prāpti*) and removal of doubt (*saṁśayavyudāsa*) are also the parts of inference. These five parts are said to be explanatory of the first five parts and as such serve the same purpose as the last five (the purity of the thesis etc.) parts, mentioned by *Bhadrabāhu*.

P. 16. Sub-topic 19 (Varieties of cause). *Yaśovijaya* has given 25 varieties of causes. The earlier authors, the *Jainas* as well as the non-*Jainas*, have given lesser number of varieties of causes. The most famous of these varieties are, in fact, the three varieties of inference. Compare *Nyāyasūtra* (1.1.5). *Anuyogadvāra* (p. 212 A), a *Jaina* scripture, also supports this view though other *Jaina* logicians like *Abhayadeva* criticise it. Compare *Sanmatīṭikā* (p. 559). We have already pointed out that *Yaśovijaya* preferred to keep silence on such a controversial point. Amongst the *Jaina* works, *Sthānāṅga* (p. 309-310) mentions only four varieties of cause. Amongst the Buddhists, *Dharmakīrti* mentions only three varieties of causes (*Hetubindu*, p. 54). All this goes to prove that the tendency to multiply the number of varieties of causes, is quite later. The first *Jaina* logician to give 15 varieties of causes was *Akalaṅka* (*Pramāṇa-saṁgraha*, 29-30). *Vidyānanda* raised this number to 28 (*Pramāṇa-parīkṣā*, pp. 72—75). *Yaśovijaya* has followed *Devasūri* (*Pramāṇa-nayatattvālokalaṅkāra*, 3. 50-95) as far as the main varieties are concerned, but *Devasūri* gives some sub-varieties also, raising the total number of varieties to 41. *Hemacandra* and *Dharma-bhūṣaṇa* have, however, kept the number only to 5 and 9 respectively. It may also be mentioned that *Yaśovijaya* has not shown any tendency to contradict the views of the opponents on this issue; though in other *Jaina* works like *Nyāyakumudacandra*, we do find a refutation of the view-point of the Buddhists, who hold only two varieties of causes, and of the view-point of the *Naiyāyikas* and *Sāṅkhyists* who hold five and seven varieties of causes respectively; compare *Jaina Nyāya* of *Kailash Chandra Shastri* (pp. 218-224).

The basic fact regarding the *Jaina* classification of the

causes is that they hold necessary concomitance to be based on two factors—necessity of synchronal and successive occurrence of simultaneous events (*Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, 2. 10). Out of these two, the latter—the successive occurrence appears to have caught the imagination of the *Jaina* logicians and may be said to be their original contribution in the field of Indian logic. For the clearer understanding of the details of the varieties of causes, as given by *Yaśovijaya*, we produce below five charts.

II POSITIVE CAUSE

Which proves something positive (availability of non-contradictory)
By giving

Determinate concomitant as cause e. g.	Effect as cause e. g.	Cause as cause e.g.	Predecessor as cause e.g.	Successor as cause e.g.	Simultaneous as cause e.g.
The word is non-eternal because it is created by effort. [The cause of 'created by effort' is the determinate concomitant of the probandum 'non-eternal'.]	This mountain consists of fire because otherwise the fact of containing smoke cannot be justified. [The cause of 'smoke' is the effect of the probandum 'fire'.]	There would be rain because otherwise a particular type of cloud could not have been there. [The cause 'particular type of cloud' is the cause of the probandum 'rain'.]	<i>Śakaṭa</i> would rise because otherwise the rise of <i>kṛttikā</i> would not have been there. [The cause 'rise of <i>kṛttikā</i> ' is the predecessor of the probandum 'rise of <i>Śakaṭa</i> '.]	<i>Bharaṇī</i> rose before because <i>kṛttikā</i> is rising. [The cause 'rise of <i>kṛttikā</i> ' is the successor of the probandum 'rise of <i>Bharaṇī</i> '.]	Fruit of <i>bijorā</i> should be possessed of form because the fact of being possessed of taste cannot be justified otherwise. [The cause 'taste' is the simultaneous of the probandum 'form'.]

III POSITIVE CAUSE

Which proves something negative (availability of contradictory)
By giving

Contradictory in nature e.g.	Contradictory in concomitant e.g.	Contradictory effect	Contradictory cause	Contradictory predecessor	Contradictory successor	Contradictory simultaneous
There is no absolute absolutism <i>because</i> non-absolutism is found. [The cause 'non-absolutism' is contradic- tory in nature to absolute absolutism.]	He has no certainty of the reality <i>because</i> there is doubt. [The cause 'doubt' is contradictory in concomitant to 'certainty of reality'.]	He has no pacification of anger <i>because</i> there are signs of agitation on his face. [The cause 'sign of agi- tation on face' is contradictory effect to 'pacification of anger'.]	He cannot tell a lie <i>be- cause</i> he is possessed of knowledge which is not polluted by attachment etc. [The cause 'possession of knowledge not polluted by attach- ment' is the contradictory cause to 'tell- ing a lie'.]	The Puṣya constellation will not rise <i>because Rohiṇī</i> has arisen. [The cause 'rise of <i>Rohiṇī</i> is the contradictory predecessor to 'the rise of <i>puṣya</i> '.]	The <i>Mṛgaśī- rṣa</i> did not arise a mo- ment before <i>because Pūrva- phālguni</i> has arisen. [The cause 'the rise of <i>Pūrva-phālgu- nī</i> is the con- tradictory follower of 'the rise of <i>Mṛgaśīrṣa</i> .]	He has no false know- ledge <i>because</i> he has right attitude. [The cause 'right attitude' is the contra- dictory simul- taneous of the 'false knowledge']

IV NEGATIVE CAUSE

Which proves something positive (non-availability of the contradictory)

By giving

Non-availability of the effect contradictory to the probandum
e.g.

This man is extremely sick *because* we do not find the activities of a man free from sickness.
[Here cause is the non-availability of 'the activities of a man free from sickness' which is the effect contradictory to the probandum 'extreme sickness'.]

Non-availability of the cause contradictory to probandum
e.g.

Here is trouble *because* the desired object is not available.
[Here the cause is the non-availability of the desired object which is the cause contradictory to the probandum 'trouble'.]

Non-availability of the nature contradictory to the probandum
e.g.

The objects are multi-sided *because* the nature of one-sidedness is not found.
[Here the cause is the non-availability of 'nature of one-sidedness' which is a nature contradictory to the probandum 'multi-sidedness'.]

Non-availability of the determinant concomitant contradictory to the probandum
e.g.

Here is shade *because* heat is not available.
[Here the cause is the non-availability of 'heat' which is a determinant concomitant-contradictory to the probandum 'shade'.]

Non-availability of the concomitant contradictory to the probandum
e.g.

Here is false knowledge *because* right attitude is not available.
[Here the cause is the non-availability of 'right attitude' which is contradictory concomitant to the probandum 'false knowledge'.]

V NEGATIVE CAUSE

Which proves something negative-negative (non-availability of the non-contradictory)

by giving

<p>Non-availability of the nature e.g. Here is no pitcher on the earth <i>because</i> there is no availability of its nature which is due if it were available. [Here the cause is the non-availability of 'nature of pitcher' which is a nature of the pitcher.]</p>	<p>Non-availability of the determinant concomitant e.g. There is no <i>panasa</i> tree <i>because</i> there is no tree available. [Here the cause is the non-availability of 'tree' which is the determinant concomitant of <i>panasa</i> tree.]</p>	<p>Non-availability of the effect e.g. The seed is not with its power unobstructed <i>because</i> a sprout is not seen in it. [Here the cause is the non-availability of sprout which is the effect of 'unobstructed power of the seed'.]</p>	<p>Non-availability of the cause e.g. He has no peacefulness <i>because</i> there is no faith in the true nature of things. [Here the cause is the non-availability of 'faith in the true nature of things,' which is the cause of 'no peacefulness'.]</p>	<p>Non-availability of the precedent e.g. <i>Svāti</i> will not rise after a moment <i>because</i> the rise of <i>citrā</i> is not seen. [Here the cause is the non-availability of rise of <i>Citrā</i> which is the predecessor of 'rise of <i>Svāti</i> after a moment'.]</p>	<p>Non-availability of the successor e.g. <i>Pūrvabhādra pada</i> did not arise a moment before <i>because</i> we have no knowledge of the rise of <i>uttara bhādrapada</i>. [Here the cause is the non-availability of 'rise of <i>uttarabhādra pada</i>', which is the successor of 'rise of <i>Pūrvabhādra pada</i>'.]</p>	<p>Non-availability of the simultaneous e.g. He has no right knowledge <i>because</i> we do not find any right attitude. [Here the cause is the non-availability of 'right attitude' which is simultaneous of 'right knowledge'.]</p>
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P. 18. L. 2-3. The *Jaina* logicians believe that the cause is characterised by the only quality of not being coherent otherwise. A question arises that if cause is characterised by one quality only, the fallacy should also be only one (*Nyāyaviniścaya vivaraṇa* 2. 196). *Akalaṅka* says that in fact there is only one fallacy, *akiñcitkara*, which is classified into three as shown in the following para of the text (*Nyāyaviniścaya vivaraṇa*, 2. 202). It may be mentioned that the text also mentions *akiñcitkara* in para 60 as a variety of fallacy given by *Dharmabhūṣana*. *Yaśovijaya* refutes this variety. Obviously the *akiñcitkara* of *Akalaṅka* is different from that of *Dharmabhūṣana*.

P. 18. L. 4-8. *Devasūri's* definition of unproved is more specific : 'the probane, whose quality of not being coherent otherwise is not proved through an organ of knowledge, is unproved'. *Pramāṇanayatattvālokāṅkāra* (6. 48).

The first example of unproved gives visibility as a quality of sound; as it is admitted neither by the disputant nor the opponent; it is said to be unproved for both. The second example asserts that trees have no death. This is a probane advanced by the *Buddhists* who hold it but the opponents, namely the *Jainas*, do not accept this. Therefore it is a probane unproved for the one, namely the opponent. The third is the example where the probane is unproved for the disputant. This inference is advanced by a *Sāṅkhya* philosopher. Now the *Sāṅkhya* philosopher does not maintain that anything can be created; it can only have manifestations. Therefore the probane is here unproved to the disputant.

The *Naiyāyika* accepts three types of unproved cause. In the first case the subject is non-existent. In the second case, the cause, advanced in the inference, is not factual with reference to the subject. In the third case the concomitance involves a condition (*upādhi*) (*Tarka-saṅgraha*, p. 46).

The *Ratnākaraṇvatārikā* (6. 51) has given as many as 25 varieties of the unproved cause advanced by the non-*Jaina* system.

The *Jainas* include all these varieties in the two, given above.

P. 18. L. 9-20. It may be argued that there is no fallacy

of 'unproved-for-either', because when something is held to be unproved for either of the two, the disputant and the opponent, it becomes the duty of the one party, who maintains it to be proved, to prove it to the other party also. If he gives a proof, it becomes proved for both and if he cannot give a proof, it remains unproved for both. In either case the fallacy of unproved-for-either cannot be proved. The argument that it can be said to be 'unproved-for-either' as long as the other party advances a proof to prove it, is not valid, because nobody can declare a jewel as artificial (*ratnābhāsa*) unless it is proved to be so. The idea is that no object under discussion or examination, can be said to be false unless the result of the discussion or examination is known. That object can, at the best, be said to be unproved only secondarily. An object becomes primarily unproved only when it is proved to be so conclusively.

Another objection against holding, 'unproved-for-either' as fallacy would be that if we accept it, the disputant would be defeated without any difficulty, as the opponent can conveniently say that the cause, advanced by the disputant, is unproved for him and as such is fallacious. The disputant cannot get rid of this difficulty by proving the cause, challenged by the opponent, as when once the fallacy has been shown, the disputant gets defeated and he cannot continue the arguments any more. The answer in that 'unproved-for-either' is a fallacy and it does not lead to an easy defeat of the disputant as shown above. The fallacy 'unproved-for-either' leads to the defeat not just by the opponent declaring it to be so, but only either when the convinced disputant, even though himself adopting a correct probane, is unable to prove it to the opponent on account of forgetfulness about the arguments in its support, and at the same time does not accept that the probane is unproved or when the disputant advances a cause, which he himself does not hold to be correct and yet advances it only because the opponent accepts it.

The essence of this discussion is that the cause becomes fallacious if one party, which advances it, cannot prove it on account of forgetfulness even though it is itself convinced of its correctness. The cause is, obviously, fallacious if its correct-

ness is not believed by the one who advances it, even though the opponent may hold it to be correct.

P. 18. L. 21-22. The definition of the contradictory is the same as that given by the *Naiyāyikas* (*Tarkasaṅgraha*, p. 45). Even the illustration of this fallacy is the same as given by the *Naiyāyikas*.

Ratnākaraśatīkā on *Pramāṇanayatatvālokāṅkāra* (6. 53., gives eight sub-varieties of the contradictory cause. The first of these is that which pervades the subject as well as the heterologue. The second pervades the subject as well as a part of the heterologue. The third resides in a part of the subject and part of the heterologue. The fourth resides in a part of the subject and pervades the heterologues. These very four fallacies are duplicated when we apply them with reference to those inferences where homologues are not available.

P. 18. L. 23-28. The *Naiyāyikas* define inconclusive cause as one that co-exists partially. (*Tarkasaṅgraha*, p. 44). They speak of its three varieties, over-wide (*sādhāraṇa*), peculiar (*asādhāraṇa*) and non-exclusive (*anupasaṁhārin*). That which co-exists both with the probandum and its negation is the over-wide type of inconclusive cause. It is similar to the first variety of our *text*. That which exists neither in the homologue nor in the heterologue is the peculiar. That which has neither a homologous illustration nor a heterologous illustration is the non-exclusive.

Ratnākaraśatīkā on *Pramāṇanayatatvālokāṅkāra* (6. 57) gives eight sub-varieties of that type whose existence in the heterologous is doubtful. These varieties consist of probanes (1) pervading the subject, the homologous, and the heterologous, (2) pervading the subject and existing in a part of the homologous and the heterologous, (3) pervading the subject and the homologous and existing in a part of the heterologous, (4) pervading the subject and the heterologous and existing in a part of homologous (5) existing in a part of the subject, a part of the homologous and a part of the heterologous, (6) existing in a part of the subject and a part of homologous and pervading the heterologous, (7) existing in a part of the subject and a part of the heterologous and pervading the homologous, and (8) pervading the homologous and heterologous

and existing in a part of the subject.

P. 19. L. 1-2. The two types of the 'immaterial' cause can be illustrated as follows : (1) sound is audible, because it has the class-essence of sound (Here the audibility of sound is very well known). (2) Fire is cold, because it is a substance (Here the probandum 'coldness' is contradicted by perception). The first of these is an example of fallacious thesis, known as *pratīta-sādhya-dharmaviśeṣaṇa*. We have already noted in the text above (para 38, page 13) that the probandum should not be already known. The second is the example of *pratyakṣa-nirākṛtasādhya-dharma-viśeṣaṇa*.

The argument against any other fallacy, except the three mentioned above, is this that the necessary concomitance can remain unknown either through indecision or through error or through doubt. If it is through indecision, it is unproved; if it is through error, it is contradictory; if it is through doubt, it is inconclusive. So the question of accepting any other fallacy does not arise.

P. 19. L. 3-4. What is called as 'mis-timed' here, is generally known as 'obstructed' (*bādhita*) and is accepted in a case 'where the negation of the thing to be proved is established by another (stronger) proof'. (*Tarkasaṅgraha*, p. 48). It is the same as the second variety of the 'immaterial', illustrated above; it, therefore, needs no separate refutation.

P. 19. L. 4-5. What is called as 'inconclusive' here is generally known as *salpratīpakṣa* amongst the *Naiyāyikas* and is accepted in a case 'wherein there is another reason proving the negation of the thing to be proved' (*Tarkasaṅgraha*, p. 48). Its example is : 'sound is eternal, because it is audible like any other sound; and sound is non-eternal, because it is a creation like jar.' It may be pointed out that in the case of an inconclusive cause, the counter-argument is of equal force; if it becomes stronger, it becomes a case of obstructed (*bādhita*).

Now it is clear that if two contradictory reasons of equal force were to be given, the necessary concomitance, on which the inference stands, would stand unproved and hence, it would be included in the unproved type of fallacious cause.

P. 19. L. 7-9. The objection that the scriptures are not

an independent organ of knowledge but are included in the inference has been raised by the *Vaiṣeṣikas*. (*Praśastapāda bhāṣya*, p. 576).

P. 19. L. 9-10. The definition of scripture (*Āgama*) given here is subjective. According to this definition the first authenticity goes to the *Tirthaṅkaras*, the second to the *gaṇadharas* and the third to the *Ācāryas*. The primary authenticity goes to the scriptures, whose ideas are those of the *Tirthaṅkaras* and words those of the *Gaṇadharas*. Other scriptures, whose ideas originated from *Gaṇadharas* and their disciples, are of secondary authenticity; their authenticity depending on their coherence with the scriptures of primary authenticity just as the authenticity of *Smṛti* in *Hinduism* depends on their coherence with the *Śrutis*.

Besides this objective criteria of the authenticity of the scripture there is subjective criteria also which has been explained in the *text* (p.7, L. 12-14) and *notes* on it.

P. 19. para 62. It appears that the authenticity of *Jaina* scriptures is believed to be somewhat of an object nature. It is the relativity of the statements, which make it authentic because the nature of the things is such that they are not possessed of any absolute characteristic. *Gommaṣāsāra* (*Karmakāṇḍa*, 895) says that the non-*Jaina* scriptures are wrong as their intention is to attribute absolute characteristics whereas the *Jaina* scriptures are right because they attribute non-absolute quality to an object. *Yasovijaya* emphatically asserts that any statement is correct only when it is seven-fold. Such statement is made from a particular point of view and yet it does not lose sight of the fact that statements can be made from other angles also. Thus all statements are impliedly relative even though they may not be so explicitly.

P. 19. L. 18. *Dalsukha Bhai Malaviya* in his book *Āgama yuga kā Jaina darśana* (pp.94-114) has traced the origin of the seven-fold statement. The *Nāsadīya Sūkta* (*Rgveda* 10. 121) has spoken of the state before creation as neither existent nor non-existent. It is a statement in which the origin of seven-fold statement can be partially traced. The statement like 'it moves and it moves not' (*Īsopaniṣad*, 5) clearly proves that the thinkers of the *Upaniṣads* were conscious of

the fact that opposite qualities can be attributed to one object from different angles. From this evolved the four-fold statement of existence, non-existence, existence, and non-existence both, and inexplicability. The *Jaina* scriptures also show sometimes this four-fold statement (e.g. *Bhagavatisūtra*, 1.1.17). These very four-fold statements were later on evolved into seven-fold statements by permutation and combination. The Buddhists (*Saṃyutta Nikāya*, XL. IV.) and the agnostics led by *Samjayavelāṭṭhiputta* (*Dīghanikāya*, *Sāmaññaphalasutta*) have also shown some tendency for four-fold statement and yet their attitudes differ from those of the Jainas inasmuch as the Jainas accept the validity of every statement from a particular point of view, whereas the Buddhists preferred to keep silence about the validity of any of the statements and the agnostics also proclaimed their ignorance about the validity or otherwise of the statements. Thus the peculiarity about the theory of their seven-fold statement is the theory of partial point of view (*nayavāda*) which Yaśovijaya has explained separately in the second chapter of the *Text*.

P.19. L.18-20. Though an object is possessed of infinite attributes, yet the seven-fold statement is to be made with reference to one attribute only. The seven-fold statement is the permutation and combination of affirmation and negation, separately and simultaneously. *Aṣṭasāhasrī* (p. 125) explains it thus :

(1) Affirmation, (2) negation (3) affirmation and negation separately, (4) affirmation and negation simultaneously (5) affirmation and simultaneous affirmation and negation, (6) negation and simultaneous affirmation and negation, and (7) separately and simultaneously affirmation and negation. Here there is some difference regarding the order of the third and the fourth statement. The order, which is given here, is generally followed by the *Jaina* logicians, though *ViBhā* (2232) changes the order, Compare *Jaina Nyāya* (pp. 318-319).

P. 20. L. 7-10. *Akalāṅka* (*Tattvārthavārttika*, p.252), was the first *Jaina* logician to notice the distinction between the full and the partial seven-fold statement. There seems to be some difference of opinion regarding the nature of full

and the partial seven-fold statement but we do not go into that detail as it does not help us in understanding the *text* any better.

P.20-L.16-25. The *Ratnākarāvatārikā* on *Pramāṇanayatatvālokaṅkāra*, IV.44) explains this 'identity' in an easier way. The sentence 'soul etc. exist from a particular point of view' means that (1) at the *time* when existence inheres in the soul the other qualities also do so, (2) the other qualities are as much the qualities of soul as existence because all of them have the *form* of qualities in them, (3) other qualities have the same *object* as substratum, as existence, (4) the same *relationship* of identity (in some sense) subsists between the other qualities and the soul as that between existence and the soul, (5) other qualities also *effect* the soul in the same way as does existence, (6) other qualities inhere in the same *place* of the soul wherein existence inheres, (7) other qualities have *contact* with the soul in the same way as existence has contact with it, and (8) the *word*, existence, which here indicates soul which has existence, also indicates the soul which has other qualities. Now these meanings are possible when the point of view of the mode is secondary and the point of view of the matter is given predominance.

P. 20. L. 26-27 *F. W. Thomas* in his notes to the translation of *Syādvādamāñjarī* (p.140, note 32) remarks "i.e. if what is being said to actual is a state (= 'mode') e.g. 'a bracelet,' it cannot be credited with all the qualities belonging to the general substance, gold."

P.20. L.28—P. 21. L. 6. We explain below the 'difference, following *Ratnākarāvatārikā* (on *Pramāṇanayatatvālokaṅkāra*, IV. 44). When we say 'an object has existence, it means (1) at the *time* when existence inheres in the object, qualities other than existence cannot inhere in it, (2) other qualities cannot have the same *form* as that of existence, (3) other qualities cannot have the same *object* as a substratum as existence, (4) the same *relationship* that subsists between existence and the object cannot subsist between the other qualities and the object, (5) other qualities do not *effect* the object in the same way as does existence (6) other qualities do not inhere the same *place* of the object wherein existence inheres

(7) other qualities do not have *contact* with the object in the same way as existence has contact with it and (8) the *word*, existence, which here indicates the object which has existence cannot signify the object which is possessed of qualities other than existence.

The *text* in para 65 follows *Syādvāda-mañjarī* (pp. 193-194).

CHAPTER 2

ON THE PARTIAL POINT OF VIEW

P. 21. L. 14-15. This chapter deals with the nature of the partial point of view as cogniser of a part of an object but not overlooking the other parts of it. *Aṃṛtacandra Sūri* says that the *Jaina* doctrine of *naya* gives prominence to a particular aspect leaving aside the other aspect, thereby churning the nectar of reality first as a milkmaid draws part of the rope of the churning rod by one hand loosening the other part to get butter out of curd (*Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, 225).

Naya has been defined as the intention of the knower. (*Nyāyākumudacandra*, p. 606).

The fallacious partial point of view has been explained in the *text* itself (pp. 24-25).

P. 21. L. 15-16. The *Śloka-vārttika* (1. 6) argues, "if the part of the sea only be looked upon as the sea, the remaining part of the sea would be a non-sea or the sea becomes a conglomerate of countless seas and there would be none who knows the sea fully." So a part of an object is neither the object nor a non-object. It is interesting to note that *Malayagiri* (*Āvaśyakaniryukti*, p. 369A) holds that all partial points of view are false because the partial point of view which takes into account the other partial points of view into account, is really an organ of knowledge. So the partial point of view is only that which takes into account the part of the object. This point of view of *Malayagiri* is exceptional and is not accepted by logicians. *Yaśovijaya* falls in line with the general view when he defines false point of view.

P. 21. L. 17. The two types of partial point of view—the modal and the substantial—are the basic varieties (*Siddhiviniscayaṭīkā* p.521.1).

P.21.L.19-20. *Tattvārthasūtra* (1.34) mentions only the first five *nayas*, the last two being included into the fifth, the verbal. *Anuyogadvāra* (148, 151) also says that the last three *nayas* are verbal *nayas*. Since *Tattvārthasūtra* mentions the last three *nayas* as verbal it mentions the verbal *naya* of our text as the present (*Sāmprata*).

P.21 para 2. Here in all the examples of the non-distinguished partial point of view, mode or substance, which is qualified, is predominant whereas the other mode or substance, which is the qualification, is subordinate.

Literally *Naigama* means 'one which does not cognise one (but both, though one as predominantly and the other as subordinately), 'naikam gamah' For other etymologies of the word one may refer to *Vibhā*, 2657, 2658.

Another meaning of *naigama* is 'intention'. (*Sarvārthasiddhi*, 1.33.) A man, with intention of cooking says that he is cooking even though he is only collecting fuel, water etc.

P. 22. Para 3. The difference between the generic and empirical is that the former takes into account only generic whereas the latter takes into account particular alone. The empirical does not take into account the generic because it cannot be demonstrated; it is only the particular which can be demonstrated (*Syādvādamahārī*, pp. 211-212). For example, neither existence, taken into account by the ultimate generic, nor the substance, taken into account by non-ultimate generic, can be demonstrated; it is only the particular, soul or matter for example, which can be demonstrated.

P. 22. para 4. The logic behind the analytic standpoint is given in the *Syādvādamahārī* (p. 213) as follows : The past has perished; the present has not assumed form. Both of them, are, therefore, as non-existent as asses' horns. They have no practical efficacy and have, therefore, no reality. It is only the entity of the present, which is used in all practical efficacy and which is real.

P. 22. para 5. The verbal makes difference because

of time etc. but does not make difference amongst synonyms. It is the subtle which makes difference amongst synonyms. Compare *Syādvādamahjari* (p.214) which says that since all the synonyms indicate one and the same object, it does not make any distinction amongst them.

P. 22. para 6. *F. W. Thomas* (*Syādvādamahjari*, p. 156, f.n.15) raises an interesting question : since *rūḍha* in ordinary Sanskrit denotes 'conventional', 'current', as opposed to etymological (*yaugika*) meaning, this *Jaina* term is somewhat surprising, as signifying the opposite; but the verb-form *samabhirohaṇa* occurs *infra*, p. 158, v. 36.

The subtle takes synonyms, on the basis of their etymologies, as distinct words like any other two words like 'Indra', 'cattle', 'man' etc. This means that it overlooks the fact that two or more synonyms, after all, indicate one and the same object.

P. 23. para 7. The such-like point of view insists that a word can be used for an object only at a time when the object is engaged in the activity, indicated by the word etymologically. As to the question how such-like point of view will decide about the use of words which are conventional and not etymological the answer would be that the proposition of *Yaska* that every word is derived from root, is correct.

P.23. L.15. Compare *Nyāyakumudacandra*, pp. 793-794.

P.23 L.16-18. Compare *Tattvārthasūtra*.

P.23. L.18-21. *ViBhā*, 2691-2692.

P.23.L.24-29. Here is an attempt to connect the logical theory of *naya* with the ethical theories of means of liberation. That conduct is the immediate cause of liberation is supported by *Pūjyapāda* in his commentary on *Tattvārthasūtra* (9.18). He also asserts that the three—right faith, right knowledge and right conduct—are collectively the cause of liberation. (*Sarvārthasiddhi* on T. S. 1. 1). I have discussed the problem in the fourth chapter of my work, *Jaina Ethics*.

P.24.L.16. Quality and qualified object, etc. include the part and the whole, the cause and the effect, and the general and the particular. Compare *Nyāyakumudacandra* (p. 123). According to *Nyāyakumudacandra* (p. 627, L. 7) not only the

Vaiśeṣika but *Sāṅkhya* system of philosophy is also included in the false point of view of non-distinguished.

P.24.L.18. Compare *Lagṛhyastrayālaṅkāra* (5.38). The fact that the non-Jaina systems are shown as false points of view should not be interpreted as meaning that the doctrine of points of view has essentially anything to do with the non-Jaina systems. The nature of things is such that it admits of the doctrine of points of view (Auto-commentary on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 1. 35).

CHAPTER 3

ON SYMBOLS

P.25. L. 14-15. The purpose of the symbols is to make distinction of words and objects which indicate the object which are cognised either through organ of knowledge or through partial point of view. Sometimes these objects are indicated not by words but by objects themselves. (*Nyāyakumudacandra*, p. 799. L.5-8). Therefore the *text* in its definition of symbol includes both word and the object.

P.25.L.16-17. *Pūjyapāda* also says that the purpose of the symbol is to exclude the irrelevant and depict the relevant (*Sarvārthasiddhi*, 1. 5). *Dhavalā* (p. 30) says that the listeners are either ignorant or partially aware or fully aware of the object which is to be discussed. The ignorant listener does not know the meaning of the word. If he mistakes substantial symbols for modal symbol or *vice versa* the symbols are to be used to correct him. A man who is partially aware or fully aware of the object under discussion may also have doubts and symbols are used to remove that.

P. 25. L. 18. A symbol (consisting of word or object) can be used in four ways : (1) It may be used without any regard for the qualities possessed by the object which it indicates e.g. a poor man may be named as *Rāja* (king). (2) An object may be used as symbol for another object without any regard for the shape of the two, e.g. a wooden chessman is called king even though it has no resemblance with the king

in shape (3) A word may be used with reference to an object without any regard for the present position it occupies, e.g. an ascetic, who was king before renouncing the world, may be called a king. (4) A word may be used paying due regard to the qualities, shape and present position of the object it indicates e.g. the word king may be used, for a person who is really a king. These four symbolic uses are respectively called—name, replacement, substance and nature.

P. 25. L. 19. *Dhavalī* (p.18) speaks of eight types of names based on the fact whether the name indicates the generic or a collection of two objects or a quality or an action etc.

P.25 L.23-24. The name is a symbol not only in its spoken form but in its written form also.

P.25. L.25-26. In our notes above we have spoken of the symbolic replacement without any regard for the shape. It, however, does not mean that all symbolic replacements are such. In representing a great man through his idol, we do pay attention to his shape also.

Anuyogadvāra (sūtra 10) mentions different types of ways of symbolic replacement by means of idols or pictures which are made by using the wood, the walls, the cloth, the clay and the stone etc.

P.25.L.28. *Nyāyakumudacandra* (p. 806) raises a doubt as to how the concept of symbol of substance is to be reconciled with the concept of the substance as possessed of qualities and modes. The solution is that a substance can be said to be possessed of modes only when it adopts the present mode and leaves the past mode preparing for the future mode. So substance is always inclined toward the coming modes. It is in this sense that we take substance in the chapter dealing with symbols. In the text we have more uses of the symbol of substance—one when a word is used in the secondary sense and the object is to be called so nominally and second when the word is used for pseudo-object or pseudo-action. Besides we have other types of symbols of substance. In the first place, the substance, which is symbol, may either be sentient (*āgama*) or connected with the sentient (*no-āgama*). A person who knows the reality but is not engaged at present in thinking

about it or in explaining it to others, is known as sentient substance-symbol. The body of person who is not engaged in the conscious activity is the semi-sentient substance-symbol. If the person is not engaged in the conscious activity at present, his body is the knower's semi-sentient substance-symbol. If the person concerned does not know at present but would know in future, his body is known as would-be semi-sentient substance-symbol. The Karmic material (consisting of *karma* or *no-karma*) which is also connected with the person is known as the third semi-sentient substance-symbol (*Nyāyakumudacandra*, pp. 806-807).

P. 25. Para 6. The basic idea is that the four symbols are partly identical and partly different. The replacement symbol differs from name and substance inasmuch as one behaves with the replacement-symbol as it were real whereas one does not do so with the name-symbol and substance-symbol. The substance-symbol, on the other hand, has the capacity to assume reality, which the name-symbol and replacement-symbol do not have. Compare *ViBhā*, 53-54.

P. 26. para 7. The doubt raised in this para and the answers offered are taken from *ViBhā* 55-72. The Jaina philosophy accepts all of them removing mutual contradiction, if any, whereas the non-Jaina systems insist on one of the other aspects (*ViBhā*, 72).

P. 27. para 8. The name-symbol is said to be accepted by the point of view of substance. The reason is that naming of an object is not possible if we view it from the modal point because the modes change every moment and if we keep the modes in view it is not possible to give any name to it.

The difference of opinion expressed in line 15 has already been given in the *text* p. 21, line 20.

The replacement-symbol is also to be accepted by substantial point of view only because it does not take into account the shape and identifies one object with the other which is not possible in case of mode.

As regards the substance-symbol, it is obviously to be accepted by the substantial point of view, because it presumes unity amongst the modes of past, present and future.

It is only the real which is to be accepted by the modal points of view.