

THE JAINA CONCEPT OF OMNISCIENCE

L. D. SERIES 43

GENERAL EDITOR

DALSUKH MALVANIA

BY

RAM JEE SINGH

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BHAGALPUR UNIVERSITY

BHAGALPUR 7



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
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Printed by
K. Bhikhalal Bhavsar
Swaminarayan Mudran Mandir
46, Bhavsar Society
Nava Vadaj
Ahmedabad 13.
and Published by
Dalsukh Malvania
Director
L. D. Institute of Indology,
Ahmedabad 9.

FIRST EDITION
March, 1974



FOREWORD

It gives me great pleasure, indeed, in publishing Dr. Ramjee Singh's thesis entitled "The Jaina Concept of Omniscience" on the auspicious occasion of 2500th year of Nirvāṇa of Lord Mahāvīrā who is cherished as an Omniscient Tīrthankara by the Jainas. The author has done full justice to the subject and has given unmistakable evidence of wide study of the works pertaining to the subject. He has dealt with all those topics that have bearing on the subject. He has examined all those traditional arguments for and against omniscience. His Conclusion (chapter IX) is worthy of note. Thus the present study is thorough and systematic; it touches every aspect of the Jaina theory of Omniscience.

I am most thankful to Dr. Ramjee Singh for agreeing to the publication of his thesis, the present work, which earned him the Ph. D. Degree of the Bhagalpur University. I wish the book will be welcomed by all students of Philosophy.

L. D. Institute of Indology,
Ahmedabad-380009
5th March, 1974.

Dalsukh Malvania
Director.

PREFACE

The concept of omniscience has been a matter of great significance for both Indian philosophy and culture. It is one of the most central topics which figure in Jaina philosophy and religion. My aim, however, in this work is neither to support nor to refute the Jaina theory. I am interested primarily in presenting a philosophical account of the ways in which this concept functions and to examine the arguments and counter-arguments for the plausibility of the belief in the existence of an omniscient being. I do not wish to assert or deny whether or not there has actually been any omniscient being because this is a purely historical question. I have concerned myself with making conceptual analysis, classification and categorisation of the basic issues involved and with examining the foundations of the Jaina theory of omniscience within the context of Jaina metaphysics and epistemology. I have considered the various arguments for and against omniscience, but it seems to me, as I have suggested in the conclusion, that the utmost one can do for omniscience is to attempt its vindication; to attempt its validation will not be successful. But I do feel that the concept of omniscience poses many really philosophical problems and that is why I have given a purely philosophical treatment to it.

To the best of my knowledge no independent work has been done on the concept of omniscience in any modern language. Therefore, though the present work contains mainly what has been written by the ancient masters and hence cannot claim any originality in the literal sense of the term, yet it is hoped to fulfil a hitherto unsatisfied need. This is also perhaps the first systematic attempt on the subject in an independent and non-theological way. I hope, therefore, that it would be able to exhibit necessary independent judgement and critical attitude.

Soon after I joined the teaching profession, I developed interest in Jaina epistemology and logic, especially in Syādvāda. During the course of my studies, I found, however, that a great deal has been said and written on the subject by several Jaina and non-Jaina scholars, both ancient and modern. I felt I could hardly make any significant contribution to the subject. At this stage of my struggle my revered teacher Dr. D. M. Datta suggested the hitherto neglected topic of *Sarvajñatā* or omniscience. Incidentally, *Sarvajñatā* is also the logical culmination of the doctrine of *Syādvāda*.

When I started my research, I wished to present a study of the *Jaina theory of omniscience in the background of Indian philosophy*. Accordingly, I went on studying the Vedas, Upaniṣads, Rāmāyaṇas (Vālmiki, Adhyātma, Ānanda, Mānasa, Agni-veśa, Ātma and Bhānu-Bhākṣta), the Mahābhārat, Smṛtis and Mahāpurāṇas. These works offered a very rich source of information. I also had my further plan to go ahead with the Upapurāṇas, Tantra, Yoga-vāśiṣṭha, Tripiṭakas and the source books of the six systems. But I was advised by Dr. D. M. Datta and Dr. Kalidas Bhattacharya to stop with the materials collected so far. Moreover, when I completed my explorations into the Jaina works, the results obtained for the Jaina portion alone was more than enough. Now, it was a problem for me to give such a shape to this huge stock of information derived from all these sources, that it could fit into the structure of a doctoral dissertation. Fortunately, my learned teacher, Rajendra Prasad of I.I.T, Kanpur came to my rescue, and suggested to present the Jaina portion only, a plan of work which got the approval of Dr. D. M. Datta. The present work is the outcome of this very plan.

I feel my solemn duty to express my sincere gratitude and thanks to many scholars and *pandits* with whom I had the privilege to discuss, during the last twelve years, either personally or through correspondence, many issues connected with this work. I am specially indebted to the late Dr. Bhagavān Dās, Pt. Mahendra Kumar Jaina, Pt. Rahula Sankṛtyāyan

and Shri P. C. Divanji. I am also indebted to M. M. Gopinath Kaviraja, Pt. Sukha Lal Sanghvi, Dr. Vasudeva Saran Agrawal, Pt. Kailasa Chandra Shastri, Principal, Syādvāda Jain Mahavidyalaya, Varanasi, Dalsukh Malvania, Director, L. D. Vidyamandir, Ahmedabad, Dr. N. M. Tatia, Director, Prakṛt Institute, Vaiśālī, Pt. Chain Sukha Das, Principal, Jaina Sanskrit College, Jaipur, Rev. J. Kasyapa, formerly Director, Pāli Institute, Nālandā, Dr. M. L. Maheta, Director, Parśva-nātha Jain Research Institute, Varanasi, Dr. Kalidas Bhatta-charya, Director, Centre for Advanced Studies in Philosophy, Visva-Bharati, Shantiniketan and others. I am very thankful to Pt. Darbari Lal Kothia Jaina, Professor of Jaina Philosophy, Banaras Hindu University, Pt. Udai Chandra Jain, Professor of Buddhist Philosophy, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, Dr. Nemi Chandra Jaina, Secretary, Bhartiya Jaina Sansad, under whom I studied some very obstruse Jaina and Buddhist texts. To the authorities of the Central Library, Banaras Hindu University (Varanasi), Devakumar Jain Oriental Library (Arrah), Parśva Natha Jaina Research Institute (Varanasi), Visva-Bharati (Shantiniketan) and I. I. T., I am very thankful for kind help.

Last but not the least, I sincerely express my deep gratitude to my teachers Dr. Dharendra Mohan Datta and Dr. Rajendra Prasad for the unfailing light and guidance received from them during my studies and in the actual preparation of the work.

15 March, 1974.

Ram Jee Singh

ABBREVIATIONS

I. Books

BORI	Bhandarkara Oriental Research Institute
BJP	Bhārtīya Jñāna Pītha
CSS	Chowkhambhā Sanskrit Series
CJPH	Central Jaina Publishing House
DJS	Digambar Jaina Sangha
GOI	Gaekwad Oriental Institute
JCRS	Jaina Cultural Research Society
JSS	Jaina Śvetāmbara Sangha
JSUK	Jaina Sāhitya Uddhāraka Kāryālaya
KPJRI	Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute
KSS	Kashi Sanskrit Series
MDJG	Mānikcandra Digāmbara Jaina Granthamālā
NSP	Nirṇaya Sagar Press
PSPM	Parama Śruta Prabhāvaka Maṇḍala
PTS	Pāli Text Society
RJS	Rājacandra Jaina Śāstramālā
SBE	Sacred Books of the East
SBH	Sacred Books of the Hindus
SBJ	Sacred Books of the Jains
SJG	Sanātana Jaina Granthamālā
SJJ	Singhī Jaina Jñāna Pītha
VJG	Varṇī Jaina Granthamālā
VSM	Vīra Sevā Mandira

II. Journals, Proceedings, Seminars, Special Volumes, etc.

ABDP	Akhila Bhārtīya Darśana Pariṣad
AJP	Australasian Journal of Philosophy
IP	Philosophical Quarterly, Amalner
IPC	Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress
IPP	Proceedings of the International Philosophical Congress
IJP	Indian Journal of Parapsychology
JA	Jaina Antiquary
RJSS	Research Journal of Philosophy and Social Sciences
SY	Lucknow Seminar on Parapsychology and Yoga
SK	Madras Seminar on Karma and Rebirth

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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM OF OMNISCIENCE : AN INTRODUCTION

1. The meaning of omniscience

(A) Lexicographical description

The word omniscience and its derivatives have got many Indian equivalents and their occurrences are found in almost all classical Indian languages like Sanskrit, Pāli, Prākṛit, etc. But the most commonly used Sanskrit word is *Sarvajñā* (for 'omniscient') and its derivatives. Important lexical works¹ enumerate a number of synonyms for 'omniscient'. There is also a striking parallel between 'omniscient' and '*sarvajñā*' because the Latin 'omnis'² corresponds to the Sanskrit '*sarva*'.

-
- 1 (a) Amara Siṃha, *Amara-Kośa (Nāma-liṅgānuśāsana)*, ed., V. D. Śaramā, (Bombay, Venkateshwar Press, 1929), p. 196.
 - (b) Śāstri H. G., ed., *Abhidhāna-chintāmaṇi* with *Maṇiprabhā* comy. (Varanasi, CSS, 1964) I. 25; II 56.
 - (c) Śrūta Sāgara, Sūri, *Jina-Sahasra-nāma*, ed., with comy., Āśādhara, (Kāsi, BJP, 1954), pp. 42 and 63.
 - (d) Dhanañjaya, *Nāma-mālā* (Sabhaṣya), ed., S. Tripathi (Kāsi, BJP, 1950), pp. 58-59.
 - (e) Hemacandra, *Anekārtha-Saṅgraha*, ed., J. Śāstri (Varanasi, CSS, 1929), III. 150.
 - (f) Irugapa Dandādhinātha, *Nānārtha-ratna-mālā* ed., B. R. Śarmā, Poona, Deccan College, 1954) verse 1365
 - (g) Rāghava, *Nānārtha-Maṇjarī*, ed. K. V. K. Śarmā (Poona, Deccan College, 1954), 974.
 - (h) Patkar M. M. ed., *Śāradyākhyā nāma-mālā* (Poona, Deccan Collegē, 1957), p. 3.
 - 2 Lewis C. T. and Short C. ed., *A Latin Dictionary* (Founded on Andrew's edition of Freund's *Latin Dictionary*), Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1879, rev., Imp. 1927, p. 1265.

As is the case with all the words in use, 'omniscient' has got both straight-forward and idiomatic meanings. Sometimes, when we call a man 'omniscient', we do not mean that he knows everything, we simply mean that he is very learned and he knows a lot. But when God is described to be 'omniscient', the meaning is certainly straight-forward and in a very important sense, the omniscient God knows everything or He has infinite knowledge. The important English dictionaries³ also distinguish between the 'strict' and the 'hyperbolic' meanings of the term as described above. The dictionary meanings of other important European languages like German,⁴ Russian,⁵ French,⁶ Italian,⁷ Spanish⁸ etc. are generally grounded on the Latin meaning. Like Sanskrit 'Sarva', 'Omni' is a combining form of Latin 'omnis', used already in ancient Latin in forming compound adjectives as *omnifer* (all-bearing), *omnigenes* (of all kinds) etc. The number of these adjectives was increased in Christian and Late Latin by such additions as *omniscius* (all-knowing), *omnivalens* (all-powerful) etc. and in mediaval scholastic Latin by such as *omniprasens*, *omniscientia*, and

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- 3 Murray James, ed., *A New English Dictionary* (10 Vols., 1888–1928, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1909) VII, p. 109; *Webster's New International Dictionary* (Springfield, G. C. Merium & Co., 2nd ed (1950), p. 1700; *The Oxford Universal Dictionary* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 3rd ed., 1955), P. 1368; *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* (2 vols., Oxford, Clarendon Press, rev. 1947), Vol. II, p. 1386.
 - 4 Breul, Karl, rev., *A New German and English Dictionary* (London Cassell & Co., 1906), p. 321 "all wissend".
 - 5 Segal Louis ed., *New Complete English Russian Dictionary* (London, Lund Humpheries & Co., 1st ed., 1948), p. 654, "OMHVIIIEHT."
 - 6 James Boulhe & De V. Payen-Payne, *A New French and English Dictionary* (London, Cassell & Co., 1905), p. 331.
 - 7 Wessely J. E. & Payn G. R. & G. *Dictionary of the English & Italian.*
 - 8 Bensely Edward R., *A New Dictionary of Spanish and English Languages* (Paris, Garnier Brothers, N. D.), p. 453.

finally in modern Latin and especially in English itself by a multitude of words formed more or less on the model of these. The *Encyclopaedia Britannica*⁹ discusses the notion of omniscience as an attribute of God or Jesus Christ, and the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*¹⁰ deals with the concept of prescience as a necessity of God's omniscience.

As my objective in this work is to study the notion of omniscience as depicted in the ancient Indian thought and especially Jainism, I think, it would be worthwhile if I state what the important lexical works of the classical Indian languages say about it.

According to the Sanskrit grammar, the etymological derivation of the term '*sarvajña*' is governed by a particular rule according to which "the affix '*ka*' comes after a verbal root that ends in long '*ā*', when there is no prefix preceding it, and when the object is in composition with it."¹¹ Thus, the etymological meaning of '*Sarvajña*' is 'one who knows everything'. The great Sanskrit dictionary '*Vācaspatyam*'¹² also defines '*Sarvajña*' 'as one who knows everything'. It has given five different denotata of it, viz., Śiva, Buddha, Parameśvara, Sarvajñānakartari, and Durgā. An another Sanskrit lexicon '*Śabdakalpādruma*'¹³ while agreeing with the above

9 *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (24 vols. Chicago, Ency. Brit. Co., 15th ed., 1960), IX. 746; XIII. 17.

10 Hastings J. (ed.), *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* (13 Vols., Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1908-1927), X. 226, 228, 420; VI. 126-127. 323-324.

11 Pāṇini, *Aṣṭadhvāyī*, ed. & trans., S. C. Vasu (Allahabad, Pāṇini Office, 1897), III.2.3. (*ātoanupsarge ka*), *Vaiyākaraṇa Siddhānta Kaumudī* ed. Shiva Dutta (Bombay, Venkateshvara Press, 1971 (Samvat), III. 2.3.

12 Bhattacharya T. (ed.), *Vācaspatyam* (8 Vols., Varanasi, Chowkhamba S. S., 1962), Vol. VI, P. 5268.

13 Deva R. K. (ed.), *Śabdakalpādruma* (5 Vols., Delhi, Motilal Benarsidas, 1961) Vol. V., P. 303

meaning of 'Sarvajña' mentions Śiva, Buddha, and Viṣṇu as its denotata, in its masculine form and Durgā in its feminine form. Apte's *Practical Sanskrit Dictionary*¹⁴ practically agrees with them. According to Monier and Monier Williams, the¹⁵ term 'Sarvajña' means 'all-knowing'. There are about thirty references chosen from the varied fields of Sanskrit literature, to explain the meaning of the term. The Pāli equivalent for the Sanskrit 'Sarvajña' is *Sabbaññu*.¹⁶ According to the rules of Pāli grammar, if the verbal root 'ñā' comes after the object, a suffix known as 'ku' takes place.¹⁷ However, the meaning of Pāli 'Sabbaññu' is the same as Sanskrit 'Sarvajña'. The Prākṛit equivalent of 'Sarvajña' is very similar to Pāli, as, 'Savvañṇu'¹⁸ so is the Ardhamāgadhi equivalent 'Savvañṇu'.¹⁹

Grammars like Jainendra,²⁰ Kātantra,²¹ Haima²² etc.

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- 14 Gode P. K. and Karve C. G. (ed.), *Apte's Practical Sanskrit English Dictionary* (Poona, Prasada Prakasana, 1959, Part III., P. 1656.
- 15 Monier and Monier Williams (ed.), *A Sanskrit English Dictionary* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, New ed., 1956), p. 1185.
- 16 Rhys Davids T. W. and Stede W. *Pāli-English Dictionary* (Surrey, Pali Text Society, 1921), pp. 139-140.
- 17 Kashyapa J., *Pāli Mahā Vyākaraṇa* (Saranatha, Mahabodhi Society 1940), P. 192.
- 18 Suri V. R. (ed.), *Abhidhāna Rājendra* (7 Vols., Ratlam Jain śvet. Saṅgha, 1925) VII, p. 567, 585.
- 19 Ratnacandra (ed.), *Ardhamāgadhi Kośa* (4 Vols., Limbdi, S. S. Jaina Conference, 1932), IV., p. 692.
- 20 Devanandi, Guṇanandi (Com.), *Jainendra Prakriyā*, ed., Shri Lal Jain, (Kasi, Bharatiya Jaina Siddhanta Prakaśini, 1st ed. II. 2.3, p. 276. Devanandi, Abhayanandi (Com.), *Jainendra Mahāvṛtti*, ed., S. Tripathi, Kasi, Bhāratiya Jñānapīṭha, 2013 (V. E.), II.2.3., p. 102.
- 21 Śarmā Sarva, Bhava Sena (com.), *Kātantra Rūpamūlā* Jaipur, Vir Pustak Bhandar, 2481 (V. E.), Section. 587.
- 22 *Hema-Laghu-Prakriyā-Vyākaraṇa*, Hemachandra, Vinaya Vijaya, (com.), Bhavanagar, Jaina Dharma Prasara Sabha, 1974 (V. E.), p. 276.

also practically follow the Sanskrit rules of derivation of the term *Sarvajñā*. Abhidhāna Rājendra, a Jaina Encyclopaedia, discusses the notion of omniscience in the context of Jaina philosophy and religion. In Jainism, *Sarvajñā* denotes a person having perfect knowledge (*Kevala jñāna*).²³ However, even here two meanings have been distinguished. One is the common meaning which is almost the literal meaning, i.e., 'all-knowing, omniscient being'. The other is the special meaning determined by the philosophical and the religious background of Jainism. In the second sense, an omniscient being is he "who knows all substances with all their modes". This knowledge is gained only after the complete destruction of all obstructive veils.²⁴

(B) Conceptual Clarification

1. Some Misconceptions :

It should not be construed from what has been said that I am trying to determine the meaning of '*Sarvajñā*', just by referring to various lexicons, grammars, etc. It is now a common place that the lexical works cannot decide the meaning of any word. They report only the existing usages. One may conclude from what has been said in the preceding pages that there is almost no disagreement about the meaning of '*Sarvajñā*', because the various ways in which its meaning has been explained by the classical dictionaries do not differ from one another in any fundamental way. But this would be

23 *Abhidhāna Rajendra*, Vol. VII, p. 585.

24 Umāsvāmi, *Tattvārthadhigama Sūtra*, ed. S. C. Ghosal (S. B. J. Vol. II, Arrah, 1920), I. 29; Śruta Sāgara Sūri, *Tattvārthavṛtti*, ed. M. K. Jaina, (Kasi, Bhāratiya Jñānapīṭha, 1949), I. 29; Pūjyapāda, *Sarvārthasiddhi*, ed. P. C. Siddhānta Śāstri, (Kasi, B. J. P., 1944), I. 29; Vidyānanda, *Tattvārthaślokaṭīkā* (Bombay, Nirṇaya Sagar Press, 1918), I. 29.2; Akalaṅka, *Tattvārtharājavārttikam* ed. M. K. Jaina, (Kasi, B. J. P., 1953), Vol. I, 1.29.

a gross misunderstanding. While retaining its lexical identity, the word has got differing connotations when used by philosophers of different metaphysical and logical reorientations. I hope to make this point clear in the coming pages. In a sense, this is one of the main tasks, which the present work aims to fulfil.

Literally, 'omniscience' means 'all-knowledge' or 'knowledge of all'. But the term 'all' is used in different senses in different contexts. Hence the meaning of the term 'omniscience' will differ accordingly. Some grammarians say that the man who knows the meanings of 'all' will also know its referants, i.e., what it denotes or stands for. But this may be so in the *name* only, for no one can prevent another person from giving a word any meaning he likes.²⁵ The naming of words depends upon human stipulation. The term 'all' may also be applied to ordinary things like oil, water or butter, and then the person knowing all about such things, will be all-knowing. This means that even if one knows a little of the universe as a whole, he could be called all-knowing. It will be interesting to note that this is precisely the hyperbolic or idiomatic meaning of the term 'omniscient' as used in various dictionaries, i.e., when a very learned person is described as 'omniscient'. A third meaning of 'all' may be given as the epitome of the world included under the two terms 'positive' and 'negative'. Hence if one who knows this epitome of the world should be all-knowing. However, this is a very vague use of the term which does not mean knowledge of all things in full detail. Another defective approach would be to delimit the use of the term 'all' in a particular system by saying that all things mean only such and such things. In this way, the context of omniscience will vary from

25 Śāntarakṣita, *Tattvasaṅgraha* (Com. by Kamalaśīla) trans., G. N. Jha (2 Vols., Baroda, Oriental Institute, 1939), Vol. II. K. 3129-3135. The Mīmāṃsakas have no objection to accepting the five senses in which 'omniscient being' has been discussed there.

system to system and consequently there will be only discord and disharmony in interpreting reality.

For instance, to the Buddhists, 'omniscience' will mean knowledge of the *Pañch-Skandhas* (Five groups of bodily and psychical states), to the Vaiśeṣikas that of the seven categories, to the Naiyāyikas that of the sixteen categories, to the Sāṅkhyas that of the twenty-five principles, and so on. In this way, it will lead to unnecessary disagreements. To remove this difficulty, one may say that the term 'all' may stand for the Object of Cognition through all the six means of cognition recognised in Indian philosophy. Then, one who has such a knowledge will be called 'all-knowing'. But then one may argue like the Mīmāṃsakas that there are supra-sensible things like *Dharma*, *Adharma* etc. which cannot be cognised by any of the six means of cognition. Therefore the claim to omniscience is not glorified. In this sense, the term 'omniscient' (all-knowing) will apply to a person who knows all things except *Dharma* and *Adharma*. This is in fact robbing the term of its meaning and unduly restricting its scope. On the contrary, the Mīmāṃsakas and the Buddhists will understand by 'omniscience', not the knowledge of all individual details of the universe. For the Mīmāṃsakas it means knowledge of *Dharma* and *Adharma* and for the Buddhists that of the things which ought to be acquired or rejected (*heyopādeya*). This again is restricting the application of the term 'omniscient' in a difficult way. Hence, the Jaina approach, according to which, 'omniscience', being the knowledge of all things, will also include the knowledge of *duty* or *morality* as the Mīmāṃsakas and the Buddhists would like to emphasise. However, to equate the Buddhistic conception of omniscience with the knowledge of the five groups of Bodily and Psychical states (*Pañca skandha*) will be certainly an over simplification. This is clear from Kamaśīla's Commentary of the *Tattvasaṅgraha* of Śāntarakṣita. Professor Jayatilaka in his book *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge* (London, 1963) (p. 648) holds that "apart from the negative conclusions,

we have the positive claim on the part of the Buddha that he should be regarded as one who has a three-fold knowledge, which even other can develop." This attitude of not claiming omniscience for the Buddha seems to have been maintained upto the time when *Vibhaṅga* was composed as it does not mention Buddha's power of omniscience. In the Nikāya also, the words *sabbāññu* (omniscient) or *sabba-dassāvi* (all-seeing) do not find their places in the list of 100 epithets of the Buddha.

However, the Buddha appears to be recognised an omniscient in the Theravāda School before the completion of the Pali Canon—in *Patisambhidāmagga* and the *Kathāvatthu*. Here Buddha's omniscience means "Knowing everything conditioned and unconditioned without remainder" or "Knowing everything in the past, present and future."

This meant that the omniscience is claimed for the Buddha by his disciples far removed in time from the Buddha himself.

(Ibid., p. 448)

2. *Sarvajñatā and Nayavāda :*

Realising the apparent inadequacies in the analysis made by the Mīmāṃsakas, I propose to attempt an analysis of the concept of omniscience through the logical apparatus of *Nayavāda*. At the outset, it would be interesting to note that although the Jaina logicians have attempted elaborate analysis of the concept of omniscience, I have not found anywhere the application of *Nayavāda* to this concept. *Nayavāda* is an unique organon of analysis to help the understanding of reality. Its remarkable feature is that it enables us to avoid looking at a thing from just one point of view by neglecting other possible approaches. It does not produce confusion of standpoints but facilitates an integration and synthesis of the different ways of approach. This naturally leads to thoroughness and comprehensiveness. The seven *nayas* or standpoints are seven approaches to understand any object of knowledge. I think, this seven-pronged logical apparatus

can also be fruitfully applied to the notion of omniscience. I do not claim that what I am going to present offers a complete analysis but it certainly would exhibit the logically possible ways of interpreting omniscience in seven ways.

For the sake of convenience, I shall start with the last of the seven *nayas* – *Evambhūta* and end with *Naigama*, the first, in order to show that each preceding stand-point is subtler and more specialised than the succeeding one.

To start with the grammarians, they reach the climax when they identify reality with a highly specialised form of the verbal method like the sixth kind or *such-like-root* of the various speech-forms used in the expression of an object. However, only one is designated by the term in question, while an altogether different attitude must be designated by a different term under different conditions. It is even more rigorous than the etymological viewpoint in that it treats the different attitudes of the object denoted by different designations as numerically different entities. Now, the term '*sarvajña*' will here signify a specialised meaning desirable from its etymology, and will then mean, "true in its entirety to the word and sense."²⁶ This means that an object denoted by a particular word is recognised only when the object is in the actual state of performing its own natural function as suggested by the derivative meaning of that word, because if a thing be really recognised even when it does not fulfil its function, then cloth can also be called a jar and so on.²⁷

26 Vinays-Vijaya, *Naya Karmikā* ed., M. D. Desai (Bombay, Jaina Śvetambara Conference, 1915), p. 54, See, N. M. Tatia, *Nayas, ways of Approach & Observation* (Bangalore, Jaina Mission Society, N. D.) p. 9. Also see Y. J. Padmarajiah's *A Comparative study of the Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge*. (Jaina Sahitya Vikas Mandal, Bombay, 1963), p. 324.

27 Ibid. Verse 18. This is the approach of *Evambhūta Naya*. We have discussed the derivation of *Sarvajña* from the root '*jña*' (*Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini. III. 2.3).

Samabhirūḍha Naya (etymological standpoint) distinguishes between terms according to their roots. "With the difference of the words expressing the same object, the significance also differs,"²⁸ just as Jinendra, Sugat, Śaṅkara etc., though synonyms of *Sarvajña* signify differently according to their derivative senses. But it would be wrong, if we identify the *reality* with the *root* of the word. This will be the fallacy known as *Samabhirūḍhābhāsa*.²⁹

Then comes the '*Śabda Naya*' (verbal standpoint). Each name no doubt, has its own particular meaning, for example, Jinendra is not Sugata though both of them are omniscient beings. "Different words or synonyms may also refer to the same object."³⁰ In grammar, all the synonymous words of omniscience like *Sarvajña*, *Sarvavit*, *Sarvadarśi*, *Aśeṣavit*, *Akhiladyk*, *Viśvavit*, etc. will have the same sense because they are expressions of one and the same object. So the relation between terms and meaning is relative. When we take them to be absolute, we commit the fallacy known as '*Śabdābhāsa*'³¹ generally committed by the nominalists and the grammarians.

All the three preceding standpoints refer to the etymological or the verbal aspect, so they are more or less of the same type. Such verbal analysis, however, may interest the grammarians and linguists but the common man will be interested only in the real and natural state of a thing, which to him is of immediate utility. For instance, an ordinary man, in order to understand the meaning of '*Sarvajña*' will not care very much for the specific root derivation of the word or of its various synonyms. He will also not trouble himself with the past, future or even of the super-natural

28 Vinaya-Vijaya, Ibid., Verse 15.

29 Divākara, Siddhasena, *Nyāyavatāra*, ed., P. L. Vaidya, (Bombay, J. S. Conference, 1935), Verse 29 (Notes).

30 Vinaya-Vijaya, Ibid., Verse 14.

31 Divākara, Siddhasena, Ibid.

aspects of 'omniscient', since they do not serve any purpose. To him the real and natural state of a thing is the most straight-forward approach (*Rju-Sūtra Naya*).³² But such an approach will not be as practical as it seems. The omniscient being may not be present here and now, but this does not mean that he is non-existent. This is looking at things with a straight or direct glimpse, devoid of temporal dimensions. This is therefore a fallacious argument known as *rjusūtrābhāsa*.³³

So the *Vyavahāra Naya*³⁴ (Practical standpoint) in understanding the meaning 'omniscient' amounts to thinking the omniscient being possessing specific properties only, because generalities cut off from particulars are non-entities. This means that a general idea about an omniscient being as knowing everything is not enough. We must know the particular and specific individual possessing omniscience. "As no wound or scratch can possibly be healed by the application of the general property of poulticeness"³⁵ because the healing properties only inhere in specific poultices, so an idea of omniscience in general without referring to any particular omniscient being, is false. This line of approach which ignores general qualities, is entirely defective and it leads to the fallacy known as *Vyavahārābhāsa*.

The *Sangraha Naya* (Collective standpoint) deals with "the general properties alone while recognising that there exists no specific property apart from general property, i. e., both *Viśeṣa* and *Sāmānya* are co-existing and coincident."³⁶ We can illustrate this point with the example of the omniscient being itself. Not a single omniscient being can ever be conceived apart from the general quality of omniscience.

32 Vinaya-Vijaya, Ibid., K. 10-12.

33 Divākara, Siddhasena Ibid.

34 Vinaya-Vijaya, Ibid., K. 9.

35 Vinaya-Vijaya, Ibid., K. 10.

36 Ibid., K. 6.

It would, however, be a fallacy (*Saṅgrahābhāsa*) to treat omniscience apart from omniscient beings.

The most reasonable view will be, perhaps, to treat an object as possessing both the general and specific qualities, "because no particular thing in nature is possessed of a general property unaccompanied with some specific property or vice versa."³⁷ This is the standpoint of *Naigama* (Non-distinguished). This way of pantoscopic observation criticises the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism which the Jainas consider to be one sided and wrong. According to the latter, *Sāmānya* and *Viśeṣa* have separate existences from the object in which they inhere. In fact, in the sentence 'I am omniscient', the property of omniscience is a general quality that exists in other beings also, whereas 'I' indicates one particular individual. Hence, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas commit the fallacy known as *Naigamābhāsa*.

The above analysis shows that the concept of 'omniscience' can be interpreted variously. It would be worthwhile to consider the merits and demerits of each standpoint. As philosophers, we should welcome all the light that come from different approaches and try to work out a synthesis. Nayavāda is an unique instrument of analysis of both meaning and verbal usages, that reminds us of the linguistic analysis of the present time.

However, since this Naya-analysis fails to take into account the historical senses in which 'omniscience' has been used in the ancient Indian thought, an independent analysis in the historical perspective is necessary.

3. Some Conceptual Questions

(a) General

From the foregoing discussion, we have seen some of the

³⁷ Ibid. K. 5. See also Jaina C. R. *The Science of Thought* (Bijnor, Jaina Publishing House, 2nd ed.) Ch. I.

difficulties in defining the term 'omniscience'. It is necessary, therefore, to analyse the concept thoroughly so that we can arrive at its correct definition

We can start our analysis by asking whether omniscience is false or true knowledge? If it is the former, it is sheer delusion but if it is the latter, we can ask further whether it is knowledge of only the *important things* or of *all the things*? If it is the former, it is not omniscience in the sense it is restricted in scope, but if the latter, it raises a further question: Is it the knowledge of all objects without or with their attributes? If the first alternative is the case, it lacks the "knowledge of attributes". Besides, it raises many metaphysical issues, such as whether or not an object can be known without knowing its attributes or whether objects and their attributes are so separable in knowledge even if not in reality. I shall not, however, discuss such points at this stage of analysis. Rather, I shall mean by knowledge, knowledge of objects with their attributes. But this sense also raises another question, whether omniscience is knowledge of of all objects with *some* or *all* of their attributes. If we accept the first alternative its scope is again limited. If we accept the second, we are faced with a further problem: Is such a knowledge restricted only to some particular place or to all the places? If the former, it ceases to be omniscience being spatially limited, but if the latter, we must answer, whether this knowledge covers the entire present or the entire span of time, i.e., past, present and future. In the former case, it cannot be omniscience being restricted to the present only. In the latter case, we are faced with another difficulty. Is such a knowledge existing in any moment of time *successive* or *simultaneous*? If it is successive, there cannot be omniscience, since in this way the knowledge of all the objects with all their attributes at all the places and at all the times can never be exhausted and the knowledge so conditioned would never be completed. But if it is simultaneous, there would be another difficulty. Is it obtained by a single cognition

or by a series of cognitions ? The first alternative is unacceptable, since it is impossible to know the contradictory things like heat and cold simultaneously by one single cognition. But if it be possible to know them through a single abnormal cognition brought about by communion, then there can be no means of cognition to vouch for such knowledge since it is not produced by perception, inference, or authority. But if we accept the second alternative, we must say whether such a simultaneous knowledge apprehended by several cognitions is *actual* or *possible* only. If it is said to be actual, this view would be unacceptable since such a knowledge obtained by several cognitions covering even mutually contradictory things have never been found to exist at one and the same time. In fact, it is impossible to apprehend even in hundreds of thousands of years, each one of the innumerable things, past, present and future. But suppose, if the knowledge is only *possible*, we are then confronted with another question: If it be possible to know all things simultaneously, nothing will remain to be known by the omniscient being. In that case, after having this knowledge, he would behave as an unconscious being, since he will have nothing more to cognise. Supposing, for the moment, that this difficulty is somehow overcome, we shall still be faced with the question whether past and future are known as present or as they are, i.e., the past as past and the future as future. If we accept the first alternative, in that case, the distinctions of time as past, present and future will be lost as past and future will merge into the immediate present. But if we accept the second alternative, it will mean that the omniscient being cognises the past and future which are at present non-existents. Thus in both the cases, our knowledge would become illusory and wrong.

(b) Reality and Duty

To avoid many of the difficulties involved in the foregoing position, omniscience has been interpreted to mean knowledge of the important and essential things through

their important characteristics, and not of each and everything in their numerical details. But it may be asked, unless all the objects with all their attributes are known, how can the distinction between the essential and the non-essential be made? Even if it be somehow possible, some of the old difficulties will reappear. I propose to discuss them elsewhere. Presently, I shall give an exposition of omniscience understood in the sense mentioned above.

In the history of the Indian thought, I find that some who believe, on some grounds or other, in the possibility of omniscience take it to mean by it the knowledge of all reality or duty (what we ought to do) or of both reality and duty. These are the two aspects of the knowledge of important and essential things of the universe. As a matter of fact, when we say that omniscience is knowledge of important and essential things of this universe, we are obliged to answer to make the investigation complete, whether it refers to knowledge of *reality*, or *duty* or *beauty*. But since in the history of the Indian thought we do not find emphasis upon the knowledge of beauty as a constituent of omniscience, we can postpone its discussion here.

(c) *Omniscience as knowledge of the Reality*

If omniscience means "Knowledge of the reality", we shall have to answer another question: whether it means knowledge of the transcendental and ultimate reality or that of the empirical reality? If it be taken in the former sense, it will have a restricted meaning acceptable differently to different systems of thought. Then in that sense it would stand merely for the knowledge of a particular metaphysics. Knowledge of the essential reality may also mean the knowledge of class concepts or ideas as in Plato's philosophy. For example, instead of speaking of this table and that table, we sometimes speak of 'table'. So the entire physical world cannot be covered by knowing such questions as matter, space, time etc. But if we do not bind ourselves to a particular

metaphysics and instead hold the general view that omniscience means "knowledge of essential things", we are faced with a difficult task of explaining the status of the contingent and its relationships to the essential. One may say that the knowledge of essential things implies the knowledge of the contingent thing, as is done by the Sāṅkhyas. The knowledge of Prakṛti implies the knowledge of the contingent world. But if we admit that the knowledge of the essence does not contain the knowledge of the accident, we shall have to turn towards the pluralistic and realistic systems like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika which hold that the 'categories' imply the structure of the world.

If we accept that omniscience is knowledge of the empirical reality, there is no need of philosophy; as sciences are already doing the same work. But no scientist ever makes any claim to omniscience.

Now, supposing, we do have *knowledge of the reality* anyhow and in any sense, there will still remain the problem whether it is knowledge of temporal or non-temporal. If it means the former, we shall have to argue with science that omniscience is not possible. But if it is said that the ultimate reality is free from spatio-temporal limitations, we shall be committed to an idealistic view of the universe. So either we accept the scientific view, in which case omniscience is not possible, or we accept the idealistic view, in which case there is no unanimity as to what the ultimate reality is.

(d) *Omniscience as knowledge of the Duty*

In the second sense, omniscience is *knowledge of the duty* (or *dharma*) or of the principles of good conduct. According to this view, since our moral life is of supreme value to us knowledge of the morality is the real knowledge. Hence, omniscience (*Sarvajñatā*) will have to be the knowledge of *dharma* (*dharma-jñatā*). This is an ethical approach. It also has certain logical difficulties. For example, it must be stated whether *dharma*

referred to is any *dharma* prevailing at any particular place and at any time, or it is one particular *dharma* at a particular place and particular time. In the former case, there may be a conflicting *dharma*s since what is *dharma* according to one may not be according to the other. In the latter case there will arise another question. Whether the particular *dharma* in question is private or public? If it is the former, it may lead to narrowness and fanaticism and if the latter, we shall have to seek some eternal universal *dharma*, which is not yet in existence. It means that inspite of the great efforts by many religious thinkers, a universal religion is still an utopia and we are all following particular *dharma*s resulting in religious rivalries etc. Even what are called the Cardinal principles of morality, do vary from one religion to another.

There can be a third sense of omniscience different from these two senses. Contrary to the common presupposition of the duality of the knower and the object of knowledge, the Vedāntins and the Upaniṣadic thinkers adopt a different attitude. According to them, ultimately there is no distinction between the subject and the object. In this sense, omniscience is interpreted in terms of knowledge of the self or *Brahman*. The knowledge of 'all' here means the knowledge of the one ultimate *Brahman*, since *one* is *all* and *all* is *one*. However this meaning of omniscience is highly technical and metaphysical. It can be accepted only when we subscribe to its underlying metaphysics.

(e) *Concluding Remarks*

After this brief exposition of the different senses of omniscience, we can state the following as the prerequisite to make the concept of omniscience workable. *First*, it should be regarded as a true and valid knowledge, for if it is false, it would be only illusory. *Secondly*, it should not be regarded merely as a potential but as actualised knowledge. *Thirdly*, it cannot be indirect knowledge like inference or even direct knowledge like sense-perception. If it is indirect, it cannot

be always indubitable and definite; if it is sensuous, it cannot comprehend knowledge of things beyond a limited range of time and place. *Fourthly*, it cannot be either successive or obtainable through the help of more than one cognition, because in the former case, it can never be complete, while in the latter the same omniscient person will have to contain *several cognitions*, some of which will even be contradictory. *Fifthly*, omniscience must mean the knowledge holding good for all the places and all the times. *Sixthly*, it must mean knowledge of all things with all their attributes. *Seventhly*, since it is the knowledge of all things, it must naturally include the knowledge of the reality and the knowledge of the duty.

In short, it must be a synthesis of the different partial views. This is briefly, the outline of the Jaina view of omniscience, which may be now defined as an immediate and direct knowledge of all the objects of the universe, past, present and future, subtle and remote, far and near, by a single ever-lasting act of knowledge requiring no assistance from the senses and even mind.

2. The omniscient being

(A) General

Etymologically, the term *Sarvajña* (Omniscient) and *Sarvajñatā* (Omniscience) are derived from the same root. Both terms are based on the root *jñā* (*Jānāti*), to know and *Sarvajñatā* is formed by adding the abstract affix-‘*tā*’ to *Sarvajña*. The etymological meaning of the term ‘*Sarvajña*’ will be therefore ‘one who knows everything’.

First we have to ascertain, whether there is or is not any omniscient being? If there is none, then the question ‘who is omniscient?’ needs no answer. If we say that there is one, we must be prepared to prove our claim by giving suitable arguments. For the present, let us assume that we can give some such proofs. The actual proofs will be given a

little later. Now accepting that there is an omniscient being, we can further ask : what sort of being it is ? Is it personal or non-personal ? Supposing that the omniscient is a personal being, we can further ask : has it some extra-ordinary and super-normal personality like that of Gods or has it an ordinary and normal personality like that of human beings ? In case if it is claimed to be impersonal, the question, ' Is knowledge possible without a personality as its substratum ? ' It will demand an answer. Apparently it merits a negative answer. However, the Mīmāṃsakas do hold the possibility of impersonal knowledge when they regard the beginningless authorless, Vedas as the only source of knowledge of *dharma*. There are objections to this view. First, many human names like Kaṭha etc. are given to the different sections of the Vedas imply human authorship. Then, the Vedic words, being caused entities, cannot be eternal. To these objections, the Mīmāṃsakas say that the names occurring in the Vedas like Kaṭha and the like may be taken as conventional without any reason because the name may be for the portion of the Veda being explained by such people.

Apart from the Mīmāṃsakas, who claim all knowledge of *dharma* to be derivable from the Vedas, there are also the Vedāntins according to whom the impersonal *Ātman* or *Brahman* is the highest principle of knowledge. Obviously the Vedāntins ascribe the power of omniscience, omnipotence etc. to *Īśvara* but *Īśvara* is after all the phenomenal and not the noumenal reality. Hence, omniscience as the real knowledge, has to be ascribed to *Brahman* alone who is certainly impersonal.

(B) Omniscience and Personality

It is a truism that there must be somebody to acquire or possess the omniscient knowledge. It is also necessary that the knower should be endowed with personality. It is a common feeling that he must have at least the central unity which is

responsible for anybody for being a person. But personality has been conceived in the Indian tradition of admitting of various degrees of unification and development, so much so that it has been attributed to superhuman subjects like Gods, deities, angels and demons as well as to subhuman agencies like animals and birds, besides the human beings. Very often God is described as omnipotent, omnipresent and omniscient. But since the believers in polytheism or ditheism do not, however, accept any Surpeme God but believe in many deities, variously described, the deities are also treated as omniscient beings. Angels are also supposed to be supernormal beings with goodness within while the demons etc. are supposed to know everything of the world and also the minds of man. The demons etc. described in epic mythologies are also equipped with supernormal vision.

(C) *Human Omniscience*

It is interesting to find out the concept of omniscience associated with human beings. The notion of human omniscience is completely absent in Western thought, where only God is described as omniscient. In Indian thought, the concept of omniscience has generally been associated with Yogic attainments or salvation. Through Yoga, one can attain omniscience. Among the Yogis, we have the two main types, *-yukta* and *yunjñāra*. The former is one who has attained through spiritual perfection such intuitive knowledge of all objects which is constant and spontaneous, while the later is the kind of Yogi who require the help of concentration as an auxiliary condition for the attainment of intuitive omniscient knowledge. The Yoga Sūtra mentions many kinds of Yogic concentrations like *Dharmamegha* (Cloud of virtue),³⁸ *Asamprajñāta* (Super-conscious)³⁹ which is also called *Nirbija*

38 Patañjali, *Yoga Sūtra*, Vivekanand (trans. ed.) called *Rāja Yoga* (Almorah, Ramkrishana Mission, (1951) IV. 28.

39 Ibid., I. 18.

(Seedless)⁴⁰ or the state of salvation.⁴¹ In short, they result in spiritual clearness and in absolutely infallible right knowledge (*ṛtambharā*).⁴² This is the perception par-excellence having knowledge of all things (*Sarvaviṣayam*), and the entire nature (*Sarvārthaviṣayam*)⁴³ simultaneously. This is what the Jainas call omniscience or *Kevala Jñāna*. The state of *Dharmamegha samādhī* is also the state of Final Beatitude as well as omniscience.⁴⁴ This raises an important question that there is a vital relationship between the two concepts of omniscience and salvation which requires a separate treatment.

(d) *Mokṣa and Omniscience*

It is important to note that the liberated souls like the *Arhats*, *Buddhas* and *Jīvan Muktas* are also described in Indian philosophy as omniscient beings. It is perhaps because the notion of a liberated being implies the idea of perfection and since omniscience is perfection of knowledge, it has been associated with him. There may also be other reasons. The two concepts of omniscience and salvation are value-concepts and Indian philosophy being value-oriented, puts a great emphasis on our faith in the objectivity and realisability of these values, which are generally found to exist together. Thirdly, since the idea of *mokṣa* has been regarded as the highest value and the ultimate purpose of the life of the individual (*mokṣa eva paramapuruṣārtha*),⁴⁵ the state of *Mokṣa* is generally described as the state of

40 Ibid., I. 51.

41 Ibid., II. 25; III. 51; III. 55.

42 Ibid., I. 48.

43 Ibid., III. 55.

44 Ibid., IV. 33; III. 50; I. 25; I. 48.

45 Deshmukh C. D., "The Concept of Liberation", *The Philosophical Quarterly* (Amalner, Indian Institute of Philosophy, July 1937), Vol. XIII, N. 2, p. 135.

supreme and untrammelled knowledge. Hence a close relation between the two concepts of *Mokṣa* and omniscience becomes inevitable. Fourthly, the genesis of the idea of *Mokṣa* has also been traced to “the endeavour of man to find out ways and means by means of which he could become happy.”⁴⁶ This naturally presupposes that the knowledge is at the very root of salvation. The mechanism of *Mokṣa* is therefore the mechanism of the knowledge through which we eradicate our sufferings and achieve happiness. Now, an omniscient being will be best fitted to attain *Mokṣa*, since he will have the infallible knowledge about the ways and means of removing misery and acquiring happiness. Fifthly, *Mokṣa* has been described as the annulment of *avidyā* or nescience and the consequent dawn of knowledge, so much so that knowledge has been regarded as an essential precondition of *Mokṣa* and ignorance that of the bondage. This tendency of emphasising knowledge as a condition of *Mokṣa* reaches its climax in the Upaniṣadas and Vedānta, where knowledge has been identified with emancipation, as we find in the dictum : “To know is to become *Brahman*.” Omniscience alone is absolutely faultless knowledge. Sixthly, the state of omniscience involves a direct, immediate, intuitive apprehension of Truth. This is very much similar to the mystic state of mind of a liberated soul, capable of enjoying itself as supreme intelligence and bliss and identifying itself with or evolving into some higher personality. Seventhly, the description of *Mokṣa* as the state of “sound sleep”⁴⁷ (*suṣupti*) is not the negation of consciousness; rather it is the affirmation of it. It denotes that there are so many levels of consciousness and in order to know

46 Ramachandran N., “The Concept of Mukti in Indian Philosophy” *Proceedings of Indian Philosophical Congress* (Lucknow, 1944), p. 243.

47 Shamsastri R., *Jhā Commemoration Volume* (Poona Oriental Book Agency, 1937), p. 357. Also see R. Bhattacharya, “Mokṣa Darśana”, *Darśanika Traimāsika* (Faridkot, A. B. Darśana Parishad, July, 1955), Vol. I, N. 3, p. 63.

fully, one must be aware of all the levels viz., waking (*jāgrat*) dreaming (*svapna*) and sound sleep (*suṣupti*). In fact, *suṣupti* is said to be at the bottom of our entire conscious phenomena. Therefore it is the most comprehensive form of consciousness. *Mokṣa* has been conceived to be “ the seat of happiness wherein the liberated soul possesses all-vision, all-knowledge etc.”⁴⁸ Lastly, soul is the common abode of salvation and omniscience. *Mukti* refers to the soul, not to the body. Similarly, the state of omniscience is also the perfection of the cognitive faculty of the self, whereas *Mukti* is the highest goal of his spiritual life. To many of the systems, the soul is pure consciousness. Hence the liberated soul is described “ as endowed with knowledge and happiness.”⁴⁹

With the above brief introduction, I now proceed to discuss this relationship between omniscience and salvation as presented in different systems.

The Cārvākas, in accordance with their materialistic conception of soul (*caitanya-viśiṣṭa-deha eva ātmā*) and *mokṣa* (*dehocychedaḥ mokṣaḥ* or *mokṣas tu maraṇe ca prāṇa-vāyunivartanam*) cannot accept consciousness in *Mokṣa*, what to speak of omniscience. To the Buddhist, since the so-called ego is nothing more than the Five-fold aggregate of bodily and psychical states (*pañcha-skandhas*), *Nirvāṇa* will aim at the destruction of this mental continuum (*cittaṃ vimucyate*) or at least the “arrest of the stream of consciousness (*santati-anutpāda*)” leading to the cessation of the possibilities of future experience (*anāgatānutpāda*). Obviously, it is difficult to talk of omniscience during such a state. But the Buddhists do speak of Buddha’s omniscience on the same ground that has been used to refute others’ claims to omniscience. He is said to be

48 Yogindu, *Paramātma-Prakāśa*, ed., Upadhye A. N. (Bombay, Parama-Śruta-Prabhāvaka-Maṇḍala, 1937), II. 3, 9-11, etc.

49. Kundakunda, *Pravacanasāra*, ed., Upadhye A. N. (Bombay, Parama-Śruta-Prabhāvaka-Maṇḍala, 1935), I. 68.

omniscient because “at the very outset, it was Buddha who expounded the doctrine of Non-substantiality,⁵⁰ since according to them “that person alone could be omniscient who knows the whole world in its real form of being without soul.”⁵¹ In Buddhism, “omniscience results from the removal of obscuration of Moral defilement and of ignorance of the cognisable things.⁵² It is because of this that Buddha is said to stand at the head of all philosophers. Here it may be noted that by emphasising so much the concept of non-substantiality along with omniscience, the Buddhists have introduced valuational interpretation of omniscience. So it is said that Buddha’s omniscience does not rest upon his knowledge of such things as the number of insects in the world but upon the knowledge of the doctrine of Non-substantiality, “Three paths,” “Four Truths” etc.

According to the Nyāya, first the senses grasp the object, then the mind transfers the mental image of the perceptual cognition to the soul. Hence, consciousness comes to the soul when it is related to the mind, which in turn is related to the senses and the senses to the external objects. So in the disembodied condition, self will be devoid of consciousness. Thus the state of *Mokṣa* is like the state of deep dreamless sleep, devoid of consciousness,⁵³ since, *mokṣa* is freedom from pain. So long as soul is related to body, pain is inevitable; hence in order to avoid pain, the contact of the soul with the body and the mind has to be ended. In the Vaśeṣika philosophy, since the “Self has cognitions of things only when connected with body”⁵⁴, it is only when soul is free from the qualities

50 Śāntarakṣita, *Tattva-Saṅgraha*, 3340.

51 Ibid., 3337.

52 Ibid., K. 3338. *kleśajñeya-āvaraṇa-prahāṇato hi sarvajñatvam*.

53 Gotama, *Nyāya Sūtra*, ed. Vidyābhūṣaṇa S. C. (Allahabad, S. B. H. No. 8, 1913) IV. 1.63.

54 Śrīdhara, *Nyāya Kandali*, p. 57.

produced by contact with name and form (*ātmaviśeṣa-guṇānām-
atyant occhedaḥ*) or, as Śrīdhara would say, the destruction of
nine specific qualities (*navānām ātmaviśeṣa guṇānām atyanto-
cchedaḥ Mokṣaḥ*) that liberation is possible. Thus, the state,
of Mokṣa, in both Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika comes perilously
near the unconscious condition of a pebble or a piece of stone,
as is the criticism of the Cārvākas. To the Mīmāṃsakas
also, the state of liberation is free from pleasure and pain.
Consciousness is an adventitious quality of the soul and know-
ledge of objects is due to the activities of the *manas* and the
senses. According to the Prābhākaras, liberation is not even
a state of bliss, since attributeless soul cannot have even bliss.
Mokṣa is therefore simply the natural state of the soul
(*svātmaphuraṇarūpaḥ*).⁵⁵ According to the Bhaṭṭas, however,
Mokṣa is the realisation of the intrinsic happiness (*ātma-
saukhyānubhūti*) but Pārtha Sārthi Miśra⁵⁶ and Gaṅgābhaṭṭa deny
this against Nārāyaṇa Miśra, Bhaṭṭa Sarvajña and Sucaritra
Miśra. We can conclude that since the soul is regarded as
consciousness associated with ignorance (*ajñānopahitacaitany-
ātmavāda*) in the state of *Mukti*, omniscience is co-existent
with it.

However, this is not the case with other systems like
Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Vedānta, Jaina etc. According to these systems,
consciousness is not a mere quality but very essence of the
soul. Freedom consists in full manifestation of the glory of
the self. According to Sāṅkhya-Yoga, it is only when we can
effect a cessation of the link with matter that the state of
absolute isolation and redirection of our consciousness is
possible. There is, however, a clear ambivalence in Sāṅkhya-
doctrine of release in so far as it maintains that “it is the
spirit that is to obtain release, and yet the apparently predomi-

55 Śālikānātha, *Prakarāṇa Pañcikā*, P. 157.

56 Miśra Pārtha Sārthi, *Śāstra-dīpikā* (with commentaries of Somanatha
and Rāmakriṣṇa) (Bombay, 1915), pp. 125–30.

nant characterisation of spirit is such that it is impossible that it should either be bound or released.”⁵⁷ Anyway, the state of *Mokṣa* is the state of knowledge and so long *avidyā* remains there is no release. We have earlier discussed that in Yoga Philosophy, the state of *Mokṣa* is also the state of omniscience because it requires absolutely clear knowledge through concentration. In Jainism, the soul is essentially a knowing substance and is potentially omniscient, omnipotent etc. So in the state of *Mokṣa*, when the Karmic-veil is removed, the soul shines in its full splendour and possesses omniscience. Malliṣeṇa, a Jaina philosopher, ridicules the Naiyāyikas for reducing *Mokṣa* to a negative condition in which there is no consciousness and no joy.⁵⁸ The Jainas like the Upaniṣadic thinkers,⁵⁹ Buddhists,⁶⁰ Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas,⁶¹ Sāṅkhyas,⁶² Yogins,⁶³ Vedāntins, etc. admit the possibility of *Jīvan-Mukṭi*, which is not accepted by the Rāmānujists, Nimbārka, Mādhva and some others. The duality of *Mukṭi* in Jainism is perhaps a legacy of the Upanisads. The Jainas believe in *Mokṣa* as the result of the annulment of nescience and the consequent dawn of wisdom, hence *Jīvan-Mukṭi* seems to be one and the only legitimate concept. *Mukṭi* is, however, *Mukṭi*—it is one and indivisible. “It refers to the soul, not to the body, and the

57 Godwin W. F., “Theories of Consciousness and Liberation in Sāṅkhya Philosophy and the Philosophy of G. Santyana, “*Pr. Ind. Phil. Congress*” (Banglore, 1954, Ceylon Session), p. 17.

58 Malliṣeṇa, *Syādvāda Mañjarī*, ed. A. B. Dhurva (Poona, Bombay Sanskrit Series No. 83, 1933), 8.

59 *Kath. Up.* II. 3.14; *Muṇḍaka*, III. 2.6; *Bṛhad*, IV. 4.6–7 :

60 Buddhaghosa, *Visuddhi Magga*, ed. Warren H. (Cambridge, H. O. S. No. 41, 1950), XVI. 73.

61 Vātsyāyana, *Nyāya Bhāṣya* ed. Jha G. N. (Poona, Oriental Book Agency, 1939), IV. 2.3.

62 Īśvara-Kṛṣṇa, *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* (University of Madras, 1948), 67.

63 Patañjali, *Yoga-Sūtra*, IV. 30.

dissolution of the body is neither an inevitable precondition nor an integral feature of *Mukti*.”⁶⁴

It will be found that those systems which do not believe that consciousness is an essential element of soul are also *asatkāryavādins*. Hence their logic is that since consciousness did not exist in the soul in its natural state, it cannot emerge in its final state. As constitutional freedom of the soul is a logical necessity, so is its power of omniscience. Hence, the doctrine of omniscience vis-a-vis *mokṣa* rests or falls on the doctrine of *Satkāryavāda*.

64 Śāstri, S. Sūryanārāin, “Jivan-Mukti”, *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XIV, No. 14, Jan. 1939, p. 313.

CHAPTER II

THE CONCEPT OF OMNISCIENCE : A STUDY OF THE INDIAN BACKGROUND

1. The Non-believers in Omniscience (*Asarvajñavādins*)

(A) *Introductory*

The problem of omniscience has been a matter of abiding interest for Indian philosophy, religion and culture. It is therefore necessary to discuss its ancient philosophical background. Every idea or ideology in order to be properly understood, needs to be studied both in its background and foreground.

Though it is quite clear that idea of omniscience has been accepted, in some form or other, by almost all the Indian systems of Philosophy except the Cārvākas,¹ it is not possible to present a chronological account for want of historical records. The idea of omniscience is as old as the Indian culture and its germs are found in many Vedic and non-Vedic sources which date long before the canonical scriptures came into being. This is also because the Hindus, the Buddhists and the Jainas believe that their respective religions are eternal and are taught at different cycles of time by sages called the Buddhas, the Tirthāṅkaras and the Avatāras, and they were all omniscient beings.

1 Even to the Mīmāṃsakas “ all that is pertinent is the denial of knowledge of *dharma* by man.....who is denying the possibility of a person knowing other things ”—*Tattva Saṅgraha*, K. 3128. Also see Kumārila’s *Śloka-Vārtika*, II.110–11, “ The passage in question does not set aside omniscience.....”

This almost universal existence of the idea of omniscience in Indian culture and philosophy from the very beginning is proved by the idea of *Mokṣa*, because there is a close relation between the concept of omniscience and the doctrine of *mokṣa*. For the spiritual seekers, the most important problem is to find out the path of salvation, for which the 'sarvajña' is the best fitted. But it is controversial whether we can have a direct preception of the path of salvation i.e. *dharma*. The Buddhists and Jainas believe that their teachers had a direct knowledge of *dharma* but the Mīmāṃsakas hold that "sense-perception, which is the cognition of the person brought about by the correct functioning of the sense-organs, is not the means (of knowing *dharma*), because perception only consists in the appreciation of what already exists,"² and so on. However it must be made clear that the 'dharma' of the Buddhists is not identical with the 'dharma' of the Mīmāṃsakas. The Jainas and the Buddhists, since they do not believe in the authority of the Vedas, insist that the Arhats and the Buddhas did perceive the *dharma* because they were omniscient beings. This might have led to the presentation of arguments and counter-arguments.

Those who reject the idea of omniscience were perhaps motivated by the *religious* or *epistemological* considerations. The Cārvākas and the Indian agnostics and sceptics were motivated by the epistemological considerations, however the Mīmāṃsakas' motives were mainly religious and metaphysical.

(B) The Cārvāka Materialist

The Cārvākas will naturally reject the existence of any omniscient being because according to them perception alone is the valid source of knowledge. Attempts have, however, been made to show that this version of the Cārvāka episto-

2 *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* (Śābara Bhāṣya), ed. Jha G. N. (3 Vols., Baroda, G.O.s. Vol. LXVI, 1933) I.4.4.

mology, as presented by Mādhavācārya³ and some others emphasising "the purely distinctive or negative character of the Lokāyata-epistemology"⁴ is incorrect. It has been claimed that "though the Lokāyata-emphasis is on the primacy of sense-perception, it accepts reason also."⁵ But without attempting a final verdict on this controversial question, even if we accept that some Cārvākas accept inference also as a source of knowledge, we can call them empiricists in the broad sense of the term. But even if we discard their epistemology, we can infer their view on omniscience from their metaphysical positions.

The Cārvākas deny the existence of the disembodied soul, God, *Paraloka* (other world) *Karmaphala* (fruits of karma) etc. Now, since the individual soul or God form the substratum of omniscient knowledge, there is no question of their accepting the theory of omniscience. Vidyānandi, in a recent published work, criticising the Cārvākas says that on the basis of perception alone, no one can prove the non-existence of the omniscient being.⁶

(C) The Indian Sceptics and Agnostics

The Indian sceptics are called *Ajñānavādins*. They are identified with Saṅjaya and his School. Jacoby has freely translated 'Ajñānikas' as agnostic (a term coined by Huxley in 1859). But although the two terms are, etymologically or morphologically, the same, we shall have to distinguish between them. Viśvakarma defined an agnostic or sceptic as one who is enwrapped in misty cloud (*nehāreṇa pravṛtti*) and

3 Madhavācārya, *Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha*, trans. E. B. Cowell and R. E. Gough (London, Kegan Paul, Popular ed., 1914), p. 42.

4 D. P. Chattopādhyāya., *Lokāyata* (Bombay, People's Publishing House, 1949), p. 30.

5 Ibid. Ch I. Section 8.

6 Vidyānandi, *Satyāśāna Parikṣā*, ed. Jaina G. C. (Vācānāsī, Bhārtiya Jñāna Pīṭha, 1964), Section 22, p. 19.

has "lips that stammer".⁷ Mahāvira employs two terms 'Ignorant' and 'Perplexed' (*annāṇa*=ignorance, *vitigicchā*=perplexity)⁸ for agnostics; Buddha's expression is Eel Wriggling (*Amarāvikkhepa*)⁹ which signifies being "indifferent" or having neutral attitude towards metaphysical problems. According to Sañjaya "the same philosopher tends to be an agnostic when he freely confesses his inability to know the ultimate beginning and end of things, which virtually amounts to accepting the existence of the unknown and unknowable; and a sceptic "when he doubts or hesitates to admit the correctness of all bold assertions about matters beyond human cognition."¹⁰ The tendency of Sañjaya's teaching was sceptical or agnostic, but "it seems to have been not a morose but healthy agnosticism,"¹¹ based on studious evasion or suspension of judgments over the vital metaphysical questions. Hence the Buddhist and the Jaina accounts describing Sañjaya as an "intellectual coward"¹² exhibit only mutual hostility. Sañjaya and other leaders of the "sophistic movement"¹³ of the "Age of Post-Upaniṣadic Ferment"¹⁴ were "discussed and stubbornly hated and refuted by both Mahāvira and Gotama Buddha,"¹⁵ which are amply found in Brahmanical

7 Jacobi H. (tr.), *Gaiṇa-Sūtra* (Oxford, Sacred Book of the East Series, Clarendon), Part II, p. XXVI (Introd).

8 Ibid., *Sūtra-Kṛtāṅga*, I. 12.2.

9 *Dīgha-Nikāya*, ed. Kashyap J. (Nālandā Pāli Publishing Board, 1958), I. 28; I. 58.

10 Baruā B. M. *A History of Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy* (Calcutta, Calcutta University, 1921), pp. 323-324.

11 Belvalkar S. K. and Ranade R. D., *History of Indian Philosophy* (The Creative Period), (Poona, B.O.R.I., 1927), Vol. II, p. 454

12 Baruā B. M., Ibid., p. 330

13 W. Rhys Davids *Buddhist India* (London, 1903), p. 247

14 Belvalkar & Ranade, Ibid., p. 445

15 Mehtā R. N. *Pre-Buddhist India* (Bombay, Examiner's Press, 1939), p. 334,

and non-Brahmanical works. On the other hand, Sañjaya, the father of Indian dialectics may be regarded as the precursor of the sevenfold dialectics¹⁶ of the Jainas and the four-cornered antinomical formulations of the Buddhists. Whatever may be the reason for the studious evasion or suspension of judgments over some vital metaphysical questions, we cannot deny that their attitude was sceptical. The utterance typical of Sañjaya – “I do not say that it is so; I do not say that it is otherwise; I do not say that it is not so; nor do I say that it is not so.”¹⁷ fully exhibit his sceptical standpoint. It is natural to expect them that agnostics and sceptics will never accept the very idea of omniscience. They cannot recognise the potentiality in the human mind of knowing everything. They seem to resemble those referred to in the Vedas as Parmesthins¹⁸ who denied the possibility of knowing any cause or reality beyond the original matter.

The sceptical tendency which has its germs in the Vedas and which received nourishment in the age of post-Upaniṣadic ferment by the free thinkers, known as the Six Heretics, has been continuing in the Indian philosophy. An interesting example is found in the recently discovered work of Jaya Rāṣi Bhaṭṭa.¹⁹ The author in order to refute the various theories of the different systems has found out an easy way of upsetting the very doctrine of *Pramāṇas*,²⁰ which is the

16 Dutta N., *Early Monastic Buddhism* (Calcutta, Cal. Oriental Series No. 30. 1941), p. 40

17 Basham A. L. *History and Doctrine of the Ājīvakas* (London, Luzac & Co., 1951), p. 16.

18 Rg. Veda, X. 129. 6–7. There are references to those who doubted the existence of Indra, Rg. Veda, VIII. 89.3; and to *Dīrghatamas*, who became ignorant, for the sake of knowledge of the first cause. Rg. Veda. I. 164.6.

19 Bhaṭṭa Jaya Rāṣi, *Tattvopaplava Simha*, ed. S. Sanghavi (Baroda, Baroda Oriental institute, 1940).

20 Sanghavi Sukhalāl “Tattvopaplava Simha” *Darśana Aur Cintana* (Ahmedābād, Gujarāt Vidyā Sabhā, 1957), p. 105.

basis of the entire Indian metaphysical speculation. He says that some of the *Pramāṇas* are not free from defect and hence no metaphysics can be built on their basis. This is the doctrine of *Pramāṇopaplava Vāda* (overthrowing all means of knowledge) which leads to the metaphysical doctrine of *Tattvopaplavavāda* (upsetting of all principles). This is indeed the culmination of scepticism.

(D) *The Mīmāṃsakas*

The Cārvākas, and the Sceptics and agnostics have objected to the idea of omniscience mainly on epistemological grounds. To them human knowledge by its very nature is limited because the means of knowledge are limited

The Mīmāṃsakas, on the other hand, object to the idea of omniscience either of God or of man, partly on metaphysical but mainly on religious grounds. Being ritualists, they think that only the proper performances of rituals can guarantee the realisation of the highest good of life. "When an action is performed, there arises in the soul of the performer a certain potential energy, in the shape of a particular property or character, that, at the future time, brings about an eminently satisfactory result; and it is the potential energy that is called 'Dharma', 'Punya', 'Śubhādr̥ṣṭa' and so on"²¹ Now, there is no means of knowing the *dharma* except through the Vedic injunctions. Statements made by human beings are liable to be vitiated by carelessness, deliberate desire to cheat etc., while the Vedic sentences being not composed by any human agency are free from these defects. They have got self-evidencing authority in this matter. The knowledge of *dharma* being of a different character, cannot be the subject of sense-perception,²² because the senses are restricted to the present.

21 Bhaṭṭa Kumārila, *Śloka Vārtika*, trans. ed., G. N. Jha (Calcutta, Bibliotheca Indica Series, 1909), P. II (Intro.).

22 Ibid., II 115-118.

The Yogic perception also being based upon memory of pre-conceived things cannot cognise *Dharma*, which has never been perceived or thought of and is yet to come.²³ On the one hand, the excellences of the source of words only serve to set aside the chances of unauthoritativeness,²⁴ the absence of an author safeguards the Vedas against all reproach²⁵ and their eternality having been established all other assumptions of an omniscient author and the like become needless

The above account will show Kumāṛila's zeal to establish the reign of *dharma* which is universal, eternal and unchangeable. It is only the eternal and infallible Vedas that can be the source of its knowledge. It is significant, however, to find that Kumāṛila's opposition to the theory of omniscience is apparently partial, i.e. restricted to the sphere of *dharma*. He does not deny the possibility of omniscience in other matters except *dharma*. Kumāṛila asks, "who is denying the possibility of a person knowing other things?"²⁶ Thus, if omniscient means a person, who knows all things except *dharma* and *adharma*, Kumāṛila has no objection to it. But this is only Kumāṛila's strategy in arguments. When the Buddhists expose this generous offer made by Kumāṛila showing that the possibility of regarding 'all-knowing', the man who knows all things except *dharma* and *adharma* is superfluous, he tries to silence them by saying that "in every case, the term 'all' is used in reference to the context, hence if there is a person knowing *all things* relating to a certain context, what harm does that do to our position?"²⁷ He then narrates the different meanings of the term 'all', which I have discussed earlier in Chapter I.

23 Ibid., p. III (Introduction).

24 Kumāṛila, Ibid., II. 65-66.

25 Ibid., II. 68.

26 Śāntarakṣita, Ibid., K. 3128.

27 Śāntarakṣita, Ibid., K. 3129.

The other objection of Kumārila is, also though quite unassuming, yet very forceful. Arguing his case for the rejection of the theory of omniscience with restricted sense mentioned above, he says, “ if there really existed a person knowing all things, through all the six means of knowledge, how could such a person be denied? But if such a person be assumed to be knowing all things by a single means of knowledge i.e., perception, such a person would doubtlessly perceive taste and all other objects, by means of the sense-organs alone.”²⁸ Kumārila’s main object has been to show that in matters of *dharma*, Veda is the sole authority. Even if it be supposed to be composed by Buddha, he cannot be expected to be present everywhere to guide the mankind. Further, when there are many omniscient persons preaching mutually contradictory doctrines—the grounds of reliability being the same in all,—which one of these should be accepted or rejected? “If Buddha is omniscient, then what is proof for Kapila not being so? If both are omniscient beings, then how is it that there is difference of opinion between them?”²⁹ Kumārila would not therefore accept even the divine omniscience of Brahmā, Viṣṇu or Maheśvar, and would simply interpret their so-called omniscience in terms of “self-knowledge”.³⁰

II. The Believers in Omniscience (*Sarvajñavādins*)

(A) *Introductory*

Since, the belief in omniscience in some form or other has been a matter of faith, closely connected with the spiritual aspirations of the people in India, it has been accepted sometimes as a religious dogma, sometimes as a philosophical doctrine and sometimes as both. The opponents of this idea, the Cārvākas, the Indian sceptics and agnostics, do not weild

28 Ibid., 3135 also Kumārila’s *Śloka-vārtika*, II. III-112.

29 Śāntarākṣita, Ibid., K. 3143-3149.

30 Ibid., 3206.

much influence either philosophically or culturally. The case of the Mīmāṃsaka is different. His position though quite formidable, is yet divided between his emphasis upon the denial of the knowledge of *dharma* (*dharmajñātā*) and the denial of the knowledge of everything (*sarvajñātā*), so much so that he had to confess openly that he “does not set aside the idea of omniscience” and “what is signified by its denial is only the denial of omniscience in particular cases” (i.e., *Dharma*).³¹

Since the problem of omniscience is closely connected with the metaphysical and religious views of the various schools of Indian thought, differences in their respective attitudes and approaches to the problem are bound to occur. But instead of discussing the views of each particular school separately, an attempt is being made to present a brief survey of the dominant trends in a synoptic way in order to enable us to appreciate the particular views of some selected schools which will be discussed in the second part of the work.

(B) *The Devotional Approach*

Divinity and prayer very often go together. The form of worship may vary from one sect to another, but it is an essential feature of religious life. The main aim of a religious life is to attain liberation from the bondage of birth, death and rebirth. But people may differ about means of achieving it, because of their views about God, soul, matter etc. The cult of devotion, known in India as *Bhakti-Yoga* is regarded as the easiest way for an ordinary person, who may have neither the strength and facilities for the performance of *karma* nor the intellect needed for the path of knowledge (*Jñāna-Yoga*), nor stupendous endurance to follow the path of yogic meditation and concentration. On the other hand, *Bhakti* is more fascinating to the heart and mind as it is enriched by various sorts of concrete symbolism. The model of deity is

31 Kumārila, *Ibid.*, II. 110-111.

set before the individual and all its great and good qualities are vividly described in a prayerful mood of self-resignation. If he is in affliction, he prays for its merciful help, if he is keen on having knowledge of God, he seeks its divine light and if he has some mundane desires, he prays to it for their fulfilment. But the best devotee is he who desires to pray for prayer's sake. Of the nine kinds of *Bhakti*, *Kirtanam* is one of them, which consists in praising the deity in all respects. The devotee attributes to the *Deity* all the excellences like omnipresence, omnipotence, omniscience etc.

This approach of worship and devotion is found in all religious sects, and it seem to have its origin in the Vedas. There is a tendency in the Vedas, to extol each of the many deities as the supreme God, in course of the prayer offered to him or her. Naturally, every deity is described as the creator of the universe possessing all divine excellences including omniscience. In the Vedas, however, the term *sarvajña* or *sarvajñatā* does not occur but there are many words³² denoting the same meaning, e.g. "omniscience". For them omniscience is solely a divine attribute and never a humanone. Then, there are expressions such as, *Sahasrākṣa*,³³ *Viśvadraṣṭā*,³⁴ *Viśvatocakṣuḥ*,³⁵ *Viśvacarṣaṇe*³⁶ etc., in which the omniscience suggested, however, is more physical than psychological or spiritual. The power of vision glorified more often than the power of mind. The words *paśyati*, *pratipaśyati*, *mahāpaśyati* and *sarvampaśyati*³⁷ are very much suggestive in this context.

The concept of omniscience in the background of divine worship and practice is also found in the "*Stotra*" literature

32 *Sarvavit* (*Atharva Veda*, XVII.1.11), *Viśvavit* (A.V.1.1 3.4; R.V.X. 91.3), *Viśvavedas* (R.V.1.21.1) *Sāma Veda*, I.1.3) etc.

33 A.V., IV. 28.3; S.V., III.1.1; Y.V. XXXI.1.

34 A.V., VI. 107.4.

35 R.V., X.81.3

36 R.V., IX.48.5; A.V., IV. 32.4.

37 A.V., IV. 16.2.

of all sects. The *Stotras* are devotional prayers addressed to the different deities. There are some independent *Stotra* works³⁸ but most of them³⁹ form parts of some bigger works like the *Purāṇas*, the *Mahābhārata*, etc. In these works, the divine attributes of omnipotence, omniscience etc. are attributed to each individual deity.

(C) *The Approach of Self-Knowledge (Ātmajñatā)*

For the Upaniṣads the real is the *Ātman* or *Brahman*, the two words were being used very often synonymously. It follows therefore that “By knowing the *Ātman*, one knows everything”⁴⁰ or “*Ātman* being known everything is known.”⁴¹ Similarly, when Śaunaka asks Aṅgiras “By knowing what one knows everything”, the reply is given “*Brahman*”.⁴² In short, the Upaniṣadic thinkers want to bring home the truth that one who knows the cosmic spirit, either as *Brahman* or *Ātman*, knows everything. Thus, omniscience means knowledge of the Self (*Ātmajñatā*) or knowledge of *Brahman* (*Brahmanjñatā*).

The term ‘*Sarvajñatā*’ does not occur even once in any of the Vedas, however it occurs at least thirtyone times in the whole of 120 Upaniṣads; but whereas in the principal Upaniṣads, the term *Sarvajñatā* denotes the knowledge of the Self, in the minor ones, we find references to the omniscience of God and other deities. The Vedic conception of physical

38 *Śvayambhū Stotra* of Samantabhadra, ed., Jugal Kishore Mukhtār (Sahāranapur, Vīr Sevā Mandir, 1951); *Pātra Keśari Stotra* of Vidyānanda, ed. Lalā Rāma (Calcutta, Bhārtiya Jaina Siddhānta Prakāśini Samsthā, N.D.); etc.

39 *Viṣṇu Sahasranāma*, *Śiva Sahasranāma* etc. in various works *Rādhā Sahasranāma*, etc.

40 *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VI.2.1; *Iṣa*.6.7; *Bṛhad.* III.7.1.; IV.5.6; *Praśna*, IV.10.11; *Kaṭha* II.3; II.2.15; *Śāṇḍilya* II. 3; *Tripāṇḍibhūti Mahānārāyaṇa* Ch. VIII. p. 382; *Gaṇeśa* Ch. IV, p. 637, Ch. VI. p. 640.

41 *Bṛhad.* IV. 5.6.

42 *Mund.* I.1.3; I.1.6.

omniscience changes into the metaphysical omniscience. It means the complete negation of nescience or cosmic-illusion, by grasping the world's underlying reality. The Vedānta generally subscribes to this view. In this sense of knowledge of Self or *Brahman*, omniscience is different from the common notion which treats it as the knowledge of each particular detail of the world. Strangely enough, some of the Jaina thinkers like Kundakunda, Yogindu and others sometimes seem to advocate this inward approach to knowledge. "From the real point of view, the omniscient perceives and knows his soul only,"⁴³ says Kundakunda and declares that the practical point of view is unreal. Yogindu says "When *Ātman* is known, everything else is known : so *Ātman* should be realised by the strength of knowledge."⁴⁴ *Ācārāṅga*'s statement "one who knows one, he knows all",⁴⁵ being supported by monistic trends elsewhere⁴⁶ can also be similarly interpreted. Of course, majority of the Jaina scholars do not agree to this view and insist upon the interpretation of omniscience as the knowledge of all objects with all their modifications. For the *Upaṣāds*, *Ātman* or *Brahman* is omniscient but for Jinas, *Jīvas* (souls) are many and they might function as omniscient beings without any conflict.

(D) The Approach of Practical Utility (*Mārgajñatā*)

The Buddhist attitude to omniscience is practical and not metaphysical. It equates *Sarvajñatā* with *Mārgajñatā*. Dharma-kīrti says that they are not concerned with such useless controversies 'as to whether a man perceives the entire objects of this world. They are concerned only with the fact, whe-

43 Kundakunda, *Niyamasāra*, ed. & trans., U. Sain (Lucknow, Central Jaina Publishing House, 1931), Gāthā. 158.

44 Kundakunda, *Samayasāra*, ed. & trans., A. Chakravarti Kāshi, Bhārtiya Jñāna Pitha, 1950), Gāthā 11.

45 *Ācārāṅga Sūtra*, I. 2.3; Kundakunda, *Pravacanasāra*, I. 48.

46 *Sthānāṅga Sūtra* I.1; 1.4 (*Ege Ayā, Ege Loe*)

ther he knows about the desirable goal. He ridicules the idea of total omniscience and asks "what is use of knowing the infinite number of insects and worms for our spiritual realisation?"⁴⁷ and concludes that "true knowledge consists in knowing about what is desirable and what is not along with their causes, e.g., the four noble truths of Buddha."⁴⁸

The motive behind Dharmakīrti's stress on knowledge of *dharma* is to counter-act Kumārila's saying that he does not set aside omniscience as knowledge of everything. What he means is the denial of omniscience only in matters of *dharma*. The same idea is expressed in the Hindu epic by the term "*dharmajñatā*". This view is in opposition to the view of the Mīmāṃsakas. The Jainas also accept that omniscience consists in the true knowledge of the ultimate principles of morality⁴⁹ and reality (namely, *Ahimsā* and *Anekānta*) but this is so because all-knowledge will automatically comprehend the knowledge of duty and reality. This challenge to the Buddhistic position has led the later Buddhistic scholars like Prajñākaragupta,⁵⁰ Śāntarakṣita⁵¹ and others define and prove Buddha's omniscience in terms of knowledge of all objects of all the times.

(E) The Yogic Approach

In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya-Yoga, Tantras and the yogic literature of Buddhism and Jainism, we find reference to Yogic disciplines, which if perfected can enable one to

47 Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇa Vārtika*, ed. Rahula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, Allahabad Kitab Mahal, 1943), I. 33.

48 Ibid., II. 34.

49 *ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, ed. (Amaravati, 1939), Sut. 78 (Payadi-Sūtra).

50 Prajñākaragupta, *Pramāṇa-Vārtika-bhāṣya (Vārtikālaṅkāra)*, (Patna. K. P. J. R. I., Tibetan Sanskrit Series Vol. III), p. 29.

51 Śāntarakṣita, *Tattvasaṅgraha*, Trans. G. N. Jhā, Baroda, G.O.S., 1939, 2 Vols.

have extra-ordinary powers of cognition like the extra-sensory perception, clairvoyance, clair-audience, pre-cognition, etc. and they may also lead to omniscience. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas recognise *Alaukika Pratyakṣa*, of which the *Yogaja* (Yogic-intuition) is one of the three varieties. The latter may also produce omniscience, though every *yogī* does not possess the power of omniscience but only those who acquire it through special yogic efforts. Yogic omniscience thus differs from divine omniscience in that it is produced, while the latter is eternal.⁵² According to Yoga, omniscience rests in the intellect and is brought about by practice and conquest of desires,⁵³ *Sāmādhī*⁵⁴ etc. This omniscience is the truly discriminative knowledge of all things existing at any times.⁵⁵ The Tantras present “the most extensive reading of the Yoga”.⁵⁶ They declare that “an insight and pure life combined with a deep and intense appeal to devotion to the divinity automatically awaken the Divine *Śakti* in man.”⁵⁷ Whereas Patañjali-Yoga has been essentially the *yoga* of knowledge, the Tantric Yoga “never loses sight of the dynamism of the spirit and underestimate the creative power of will. The world is will and will is power.”⁵⁸ The *Kuṇḍalini* is the great hidden reservoir of psychic and spiritual force, and when stirred up, it generates a force which activates our whole being and endows it with a colossal power and super-human omniscience. “The yoga of *kuṇḍalini* moves the fibres of our existence so powerfully that our knowledge moves from the personal to the supra-cosmic.”⁵⁹

52 *Praśastapāda Bhāṣya*, p. 187; *Nyāyakandali*, p. 195.

53 *Yoga Sūtra* 3.2.

54 *Ibid.*, III. 49; IV. 29.

55 *Ibid.*, III.54.

56 Sircar M. N. *Mysticism of the Hindus* (Calcutta, Bharti Mahavidyalaya, 1951), p. 72.

57 Bose D. N. & Haldar H. *Tantras: Their Philosophy and Occult Sciences* (Calcutta, Oriental Publishing, 1956), pp. 99-100.

58 Sircar M. N. *Ibid.*, p. 76.

59 *A Ibid.*, p. 140.

It is the *Śakti* that pervades the entire universe through Yoga of different types.

The Tantra literature as a whole consists of two divisions : *Kriyā* and *Yoga*. "The elaborate rites of worship and the yogic practices often go hand in hand."⁶⁰ Besides the orthodox systems, the Buddhists and the Jinas also admit the existence of yogic knowledge. Dharmakīrti and Prajñākara-gupta⁶¹ and others clearly mention yogic perception. They have also a fullfledged system of Yoga. The Jinas have very greatly developed the science of *yoga*. Haribhadra compares *anālambara yoga* to *asamprajñāta samādhi*,⁶² of Patañjali which culminates in omniscience. Similarly, the concentration of the *Jivas* in the fourteenth *Guṇasthāna* (stages of spiritual development) is compared to *dharmamegha samādhi*⁶³ of Patanjali's. To him, since there is unanimity about the aims and objects of *yoga* as the realisation of truth, there should be no controversy about its nature also.

(F) The Approach of Faith

The belief in omniscience has been, to many, more a matter of faith than of reason. The common people hardly question why God is omniscient. Hence, we find in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, *Mahābhārata*, *Purāṇas* etc., which to a great extent represent the faith, aspirations and attitudes of the common people, a sort of universal acceptance of omniscience of God, deities, and yogins. But accordingly, no appeal is made to logic. There is however some reason behind this apparent neglect of reason. Logic has its own limitations in dealing with super-sensible phenomena. On the other hand, faith being different in nature,

60 Chakravarti C. *Tantras, Studies in their Religion and Literature* (Calcutta, Punthi Publishers, 1963), p. 4.

61 *Pramāṇavārtika*, II. 81-87; *Nyāya-Bindu*, I. 11. *Vārttikāṅkara*, III. 282-287.

62 Haribhadra, *Yoga-Vimśikā* (Āgrā, 1922), p. 20.

63 Haribhadra, *Yoga-bindu* (Ahmedābāda, 1940), 17-18.

may overcome these limitations. The basis of religion is ultimately faith. "The heart has reason of which reason has no knowledge," says Pascal. Many things are unanswerable to perception and inference but can be taken on faith. Siddhasena says that "Āgamas which propound *dharma* consist of *rational* and *dogmatic* portions"⁶⁴ depending upon the nature of things concerned. The basis of the dogmatic portion rests on spiritual intuition of the seers, and the unfailing authority of the *Śāstras*. This also is rooted in man's temperament which is composed of two elements, faith (*Śraddhā*) and knowledge (*Buddhi*). Thus omniscience is accepted by the majority of religious people as a matter of faith or religious dogma. As Santyana says "Religion is the poetry which we believe."

(G) *The Approach of Reason*

One who relies mainly on faith is willing to remain always dependent on others, thus stopping his further intellectual development and thereby may prove to admitting falsehoods. So there is the need of reason and logic. We, therefore, find a host of logicians trying to prove the theory of omniscience with great dialectical skill. This creates an atmosphere of enlightened faith on the one hand, but also creates narrow sectarian rivalries between the opposing factions. Postponing a fuller discussion for a latter occasion,⁶⁵ we can say that there is a splendid tradition of logicians, both Buddhists and Jainas, who have tried not only to meet the most formidable objections of the Mīmāṃsakas but also have adduced independent arguments for omniscience. This has led to the clarification and analysis of the concept to a great extent no doubt, but it has also made some unnecessary demands upon our think-

64 Divākara Siddhasena, *Sanmati Tarka* with Com'n. of S. Sanghavi & B. Doshi, ed. Dalsukh Malvani (Bombay, Jaina Śvet. Education Board, 1939), III. 143.

65 See Chapter VII.

ing by widening its meaning, which we have earlier discussed to some length in this work.⁶⁶

III. Concluding Remarks

The objectivity of concepts like God, soul, karma and the authority of the Vedas have been accepted by some while rejected by others, either as a result of faith or philosophical thinking.⁶⁷

According to the popular view, belief in the creator God is the criterion of being an *āstika*. According to this principle not only the Jainas, the Buddhists and the Cārvākas but also the Sāṅkhyas, Mīmāṃsakas, Advaitins will be treated as *Nāstika*. The Sāṅkhyas need no such hypothesis as God, and the Advaitins regard the concept of creator God (*Īśvara*) as the product of cosmic illusion or *Māyā*. This principle of division, therefore, is unsatisfactory, since it chooses only one principle namely the belief in God, and neglects the other equally vital and perhaps more comprehensive principles like soul, karma, etc.

The Vedicist like Manu suggests that an orthodox system is that which believes in the authority of the Vedas. According to this view, the Lokāyatas, Jainism and Buddhism will be called *nāstika*, whereas some frank or concealed atheists like the Mīmāṃsakas, the Sāṅkhyas and the Advaitins will be called *āstika*. Thus this classification is also based on a sectarian bias for the Vedas.

66 See Chapter I.

67 According to V. S. Agrawāla *India as known to Pāṇini*, (Lucknow University, 1952), p. 337. Pāṇini's reference to the terms *āstika*, *nāstika* and *daiṣṭika* (vide, Aṣṭādhyāyī, IV. 4.60) does not refer to beliefs, and non-belief in other worlds only. *Āstika* is that whom the Buddhists books call *Issarakāraṇavādi* (Vide, R. N. Mehtā, *Pre-Buddhist India*, p. 333; C. D. Chatterjee, "A Historical Character in the Reign of Ashoka", *Bhandārkar Com. Volume*, Vol. I, (Poona, 1917).

Pāṇini's suggestion is more comprehensive when he says that those who believe in the existence of the other world are *āstika*. According to this scheme, except the Cārvākas, all others will be regarded as *āstika*. The belief in the other world is vitally connected with the doctrine of karma. Therefore, the aim of this classification is to emphasise the importance of the law of karma, which is accepted by all systems of Indian philosophy except the Cārvākas.

Haribhadra makes a modification in Paṇini's scheme. According to Haribhadra *nāstika* is he who does not believe in the existence of *soul* (besides *Mokṣa*, merit, demerit, virtue, vice and the other world).⁶⁸ Even according to this scheme, only the Lokāyata system is *nāstika*. The case of the Buddhists is a little doubtful since although they do not believe in the existence of a permanent soul-substance, but they recognise the mechanism of the *Pañca-Skandhas* and also believe in merit, demerit etc.

Now, with the following, an attempt will be made to classify Indian systems according to their belief or disbelief in omniscience.

First, all the theistic systems believe in the existence of omniscience of some form or other, e.g. the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Yoga. Put negatively, we can say that all non-believers in omniscience namely, the Lokāyatas, the Indian Sceptics and the Agnostics and the Mīmāṃsakas, are also non-believers in God. Secondly, the converse of the above rule is however not true because not all believers in omniscience are theists, e.g., the Buddhists, Jainas, Sāṅkhyas and Advaitins. Negatively, all non-believers in God are not necessarily the non-believers in omniscience. This shows that the category of omniscience is wider than that of the category of belief in God. Thirdly, we know that with the exception of the Mīmāṃsakas, all

68 Haribhadra, *Ṣāḍḍarśana Samuccaya*, (with Guṇaratna's Comm. *Tarka-Rahasya Dipikā*), ed. Luigi Sualì (Calcutta, 1905), Verse 80 p. 300.

Vedic systems believe in omniscience. So we can conclude that some believers in the Vedas are also believers in omniscience and vice-versa. However, when we shall put this statement negatively, picture will change, because some non-believers in the Vedas are believers in omniscience, e. g. the Buddhists and the Jainas. This shows that there is not as close a relation between the believers in the Vedas and that of omniscience, as there is between the belief in God and omniscience. But then there cannot be also a relation of contradiction. This implies that the doctrine of omniscience can also be supported on the basis of the belief in the Vedas. Fourthly, all believers in *Karma* or *Karmaphala* are believers in the doctrine of omniscience and also the vice-versa. This shows a very close relation between the Karma doctrine and the doctrine of omniscience. Fifthly, this is not the case with the believers in soul. We can neither say that all the believers in the omniscience are believers in the soul like the Buddhists. However, there is only one objector on each side. This shows a close affinity between the two doctrines. Even the Buddhists can be accommodated because the concept of *pañca-Skandhas* is very much like the soul of other system. Sixthly, considering the relationship between the believers and the non-believers in omniscience in relation to the believers or non-believers in God, soul and karma, taken separately or collectively, we can have numerous positions. We can definitely say that in Indian philosophy, there is no system "which does not believe in omniscience but believes in the existence of God," or "which does not believe in the doctrine of *karma* but believes in omniscience." Lastly the Lokāyata is the only system which does not believe in omniscience, God, Vedas, soul and karma. This shows that belief in omniscience is incompatible with materialism and hedonism.

CHAPTER III

EVOLUTION OF THE JAINA THEORY OF OMNISCIENCE

I. Classification and Categorisation

(A) *Reasons and Motives*

The Jaina theory of omniscience is the result of an evolutionary process. Both the inner necessity of the Jaina philosophy and the influences of socio-cultural conditions have played important role in its development.

I shall first discuss briefly the reasons for the enunciation of the theory of omniscience in Jainism in general and then shall take up its particular motives.

The first and foremost reason for the formulation of the theory of omniscience in Jainism seems to be religious and cultural. Jainism denies both God and the Vedas, but it is nonetheless a religion. Hence, it needed the *Tirthaṅkaras*, who would function as the source of its scripture. The *Tirthaṅkaras* in order to be reliable (*āpta*) must be omniscient, the knower of the universal principles (*jñātāraṃ viśvatattvānāṃ*)¹ besides being the spiritual guides and the destroyers of the mountain of karmas. Samantabhadra clearly points out that a *Tirthaṅkara* like Mahāvīra is accepted as a *Tirthaṅkara* because he is omniscient and not because he possesses super-

1 Maṅgalācarana of *Tattvārtha Sūtra*, Com. by Pūjyapāda. Also see *Āpta-Parikṣā* of Vidyānanda, verse 3; For discussion see *Āpta-Parikṣā* (ed.) D. Koṭhiā (Saharānpur, Vira Sevā Mandir, 1949, pp. I-II, Intro.)

normal qualities which may be found to some extent even in beings not otherwise perfect.²

This view is also supported by common sense. Unless a *Tirthaṅkara* is all-knowing, how can he create a reliable *āgama*? The importance of this point is also admitted by the Mīmāṃsakas, when they attribute the power of omniscience in matters of *dharma* to the Vedas.³ The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that the omniscient God is the creator of the scripture (Vedas). In short, in order to ensure the reliability to the Āgamas, Omniscience of *Tirthaṅkaras* becomes a necessity. *Secondly*, the Jainas did not believe in the efficacy of rites and rituals as a means for spiritual salvation; they accept the path of knowledge, faith and conduct.⁴ It is likely, therefore, that they glorified the concept of knowledge into omniscience. *Thirdly*, Jainism is a religion of self-help and so it wanted that man should realize his highest good through his own efforts and finally attain infinite knowledge.⁵ Omniscience for the Jainas is a realisable ideal for human beings. *Fourthly*, Jaina thinkers hold that knowledge is the nature of the soul. Omniscience, therefore, if once attained is never lost, because it inheres in the soul and the soul is immortal. Here the Jaina concept of omniscience can be distinguished even from the highest yogic intuition of the Nyāy-Vaiśeṣika and Pātañjala-Yoga. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, “the power of apprehending reality in its fulness and harmony,”⁶ i. e. omniscience, is produced, and whatever is produced is bound to be non-eternal.⁷

2 Samantabhadra, *Āpta-Mīmāṃsā*, K., 1-3, 9; Also see *Aṣṭa Sahasrī*, pp. 3-50; *Āpta-Parikṣā*, K. 3-5; *Ratna Karaṇḍa Śrāvaka-cāra* of Samantabhadra, K. 5.

3 Kumārila, *Śloka-Vārtika*, II. 110-111.

4 Umāswāmi. *Tattvārtha Sūtra*, I. 1.

5 Kundakunda, *Pravacana Sāra*, I. 9: I. 13.

6 Praśastapāda, *Padārtha-dharma-saṃgraha* with Śrīdhara's *Nyāya-Kandali*, trans. Jha G. N., p. 258.

7 Ibid., p. 187.

In Pātanjala-Yoga, "the Yogin acquires omniscience when the all-pervading state of *citta* is restored. When it becomes as pure as the *puruṣa*, the latter is liberated."⁸ This is because it is "by means of *citta* that the self becomes aware of objects and enters into relation with the world."⁹ So until the body is cast off, the final liberation is not possible. *Fifthly*, the Jaina theory of omniscience follows from the Jaina theory of soul as the possessor of four-fold infinities, namely, infinite knowledge, infinite faith, etc. It means that the soul is potentially omnipotent and omniscient. It is the obstruction of the Karmic matter which covers the *Jīvas* with impurity. As soon as these impurities are removed, the soul is restored to its natural state.¹⁰ *Sixthly*, the concept of omniscience also follows from the Jaina concept of *Mokṣa*. *Mokṣa* means freedom of *Jīvas* from its Karmic particles and the state of *Mokṣa* is the state of infinite knowledge, infinite faith, bliss and power.¹¹ *Lastly*, the concept of omniscience has been a matter of abiding faith and spiritual aspiration in Indian culture. So it was natural for the Jainas to fall in line with the dominant traditions of the Indian thought.¹²

However, it must be admitted that the Jainas are the most ardent and systematic exponents of the theory of omniscience. This is supported by the fact that the Jaina thinkers have described their *Tīrthaṅkaras* as omniscient beings from the very beginning as is shown by the oldest religious records.¹³ But there has also been important changes in their theory which might have been necessitated by the inner logic of

8 Radhakrishnana S., *Indian Philosophy* (2 Vols., London, George Allen & Unwin, 1948 (rev.), Vol. II, p. 346.

9 *Yoga-Sūtra*, I.2; II.6; II.7; II.20.

10 *Aṣṭasahasrī*, p. 50.

11 Kundakunda, *Pravacana Sāra*, I. 19.

12 Cp. *Mīmāṃsā Śloka Vārtika*, II. 110; *Pramāṇa Vārtikam*, I. 34.

13 *Ācārāṅga Sūtra*; II.3 *Āvāśyaka Nir.*, Gāthā 127, *Bhagavatī Sūtra*, IX,32; *Āpta Mīmāṃsā*, K.5.

Jainism as well as by some external circumstances. In what follows I shall try to outline this process of change.

(B) *Chief Senses of 'Omniscience'*

Like any other topic in ancient Indian Philosophy, the concept of omniscience is not amenable to a rigorously historical treatment. It is very difficult rather almost impossible to sketch the origion, development and growth of this concept, if it is intended to present the history of its successive modifications and formulations. Therefore, in what follows, I shall present an account which may not be historically all correct but will certainly depict the besic strands in the complicated growth of the concept.

Pt. Sukhalālaṇī claims that in the beginning, omniscience meant "knowledge of everything conducive to spiritual realisation." I have not been able to find out statements supporting this view in the classical Jaina literature but to accept it on the authority of Sukhalālaṇī does not seem to be unreasonable specially because it fits in very well with the general trend of Jainism both as religion and philosophy. It is in keeping with the religious and spiritual tone of Jainism also. The path of *mokṣa* consists in right-knowledge, right-faith and right-conduct.¹⁴ Right-knowledge is said to be "the clear idea of the real nature of the ego and the non-ego, freed from the doubt, perversity and indefiniteness."¹⁵ Hence spiritual seekers have to gain such knowledge. And this is nothing but omniscience.

But in many early works of Jainism, I do find statements which make omniscience identical with self-knowledge or self

14 Umāswāmi, *Tattvārtha Sūtra*, I. 1; Kundakunda, *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, Gāthā 169; Nemicandra, *Dravya Saṅgraha*, Gāthā 39; Viranandi, *Candraprabhacaritam*, (ed.) Durgā Pd. & V.L. Śāstri (Bombay, 1912), XVIII. 123; Hariscandra Kavi, *Dharmaśarmābhilyudayam*, (ed.) Durgā Pd. (Bombay, 1894) XXI. 161.

15 *Dravyasaṅgraha*, Gāthā 42.

-realisation.¹⁶ Knowing the self, in Indian Philosophy and in Jainism is not like knowing an object in the ordinary sense. Knowing here means realising. Therefore, omniscience as “self-knowledge” means self-realisation. Self-realisation is the same as spiritual realisation.

Omniscience as self-realisation is logically very much different from omniscience as conducive to spiritual realisation. In the former sense, it is the end of life, therefore it is of intrinsic value. In the latter sense, it is a means to the acquisition of the end; therefore, it is of instrumental value. The same thing can be both means and an end but it cannot be a means to itself. Therefore, we cannot accept that omniscience is both conducive to and identical with self-realisation. However, it seems to me that it is quite natural to pass from one to the other, though the transition is not logical. This is what seems to have happened. If Sukhalālaḥ is to be trusted in his interpretation of Jainism, the Jainas started with the conception of omniscience as “the knowledge of the means of spiritual realisation” and then passed on to omniscience as “self-realisation.”

This latter view is in accordance with the Jaina belief that self is the central entity, being the ground of knowledge, morality and spiritual effort. The characteristic of the soul is to be always knowing; therefore, the soul is certainly the subject of knowledge, the knower par-excellence.¹⁷ The knowledge of this basic reality is the supreme knowledge.

At this point we find a very remarkable agreement between the Jaina and the Upaniṣadic standpoints.¹⁸ It is, no

16 Kundakunda, *Niyama Sāra*, Ch. X & XI, Gāthās 149–150, 158; *Pañcāstikāya Sāra*, Gāthā 166, *Pravacana Sāra*, I. 27; I. 36, *Samaya Sāra*, Ch. X (All Pure Knowledge), Gāthā 403; *Aṣṭa Pāhuda*, 58, 61.

17 Kundakunda, *Samaya Sāra*, Gāthā, 403.

18 For Upaniṣadic view, vide, *Muṇḍaka*, I.2.11; *Bṛhad*, II. 5.6 : *Chānd*, VI.21. To the question “By knowing what one knows everything”, it is replied that by “knowing *Ātman* one knows everything”—*Bṛhad*. II. 4.5.

doubt, true that it was the explicit aim of Jainism to rebel against the Upaniṣadic tradition, but it is wrong to think that the Jainas disagreed with everything in the Upaniṣads. This conception of the self knowledge as the knowledge of basic reality is one in which the Jainas are very close to the Upaniṣadic trend of thinking inspite of their disclaimer that they are opposed to the basic ideas of the Upaniṣadic philosophy metaphysics and theology.

There is also another sense in which the Jainas use the term 'omniscience'. In this sense, it means the knowledge of the essential principles and not knowledge of concrete details. *Ācārāṅga* says, "He who knows one, knows all."¹⁹ This passage when read in the actual context refers to the knowledge of passions (*Kaṣāyas*) which hinder right knowledge. The "One" referred to here, therefore, means knowledge of some essential moral principle. Pt. Sukhalālaṇī, who is one of the most important and modern exponents of this view of omniscience tries to interpret Mahāvīra's statement addressed to Jamālī in such a way that would give support to his position. Mahāvīra said to Jamālī that right-knowledge could be had only if things are known from the *points of view of both substances and modes*.²⁰ Sukhalālaṇī reads into this utterance the view that only he is omniscient who adopts both these points of view. This statement, however, has to be distinguished from an analogous statement emphasising *the knowledge of all substances and all modes*. If omniscience means knowledge of all substances and all modes, then it becomes knowledge of all things and therefore this view of omniscience will be the same as the second view which Sukhalālaṇī does not accept. But Sukhalālaṇī does not make it clear

19 *Ācārāṅga Sūtra*, I. 3.4.

20 *Bhagavatī Sūtra*, IX. 6. "From the point of view of substance, the world is eternal; from the point of view of modes, it is non-eternal". Real knowledge is knowledge of both substance and their modes and not of either substance alone or of modes alone. Cf. *Syādvāda Mañjarī*, K. 13-14; 16-19.

how knowledge acquired from both these points of views (*Dravva* and *Paryāya*) will make anybody omniscient, because *everything* can be known from these two points of view. And just to know a certain thing in this manner quite obviously is not to make the knower omniscient. It seems, however, that another interpretation can also be given. It may mean knowledge of essential things from both of the two points of view. i. e., only he can be omniscient who knows *all the essential reality* and knows them *from the points of view of both substances and modes*. In this sense, Sukhalālaḥ's position becomes a much more precise version of the view that omniscience is the knowledge of the essential things and at the same time it remains different from the view that omniscience is the knowledge of all things.

But in the body of Jaina philosophy, the meaning of omniscience as the knowledge of essential principle is substantially the same as the knowledge of self because the self is regarded as the most essential principle. Therefore, to know what is most essential is to know the self. He who knows the self, knows everything. It is mentioned by some important thinkers like Kundakunda, Pūjyāpāda, Yogindu and others that knowledge of the self underlies the knowledge of everything. *Sthānāṅga Sūtra's* suggestion about 'one soul' (*lge āyā*) and 'one universe' (*lge loye*)²¹ is very significant. In *Niyama Sāra*, Kundakunda clearly says : "It is from the practical point of view only that the Omniscient Lord perceives and knows all; from the real stand-point, the Omniscient perceives and knows his soul only."²² It means that the spiritual seeker should not engage himself in the flickering thought-activities concerning various attributes and modifications of all the six *dravyas*. He should devote his full attention to the realisation of his own self. Yogindu's words are also remarkable when he declares "that *Ātman* is known, everything else is known, so *Ātman* should

21 *Sthānāṅga Sūtra*, I.1, I.4.

22 Kundakunda, *Niyama-Sāra*, G. 158.

be realised.”²³ Pūjyapāda’s emphasis on “Self-knowledge” as distinguished from “self-delusion”²⁴ is also important. It seems very close to the Upaniṣads and the Vedānta.²⁵

23 Yogindu, *Parmātma-Prakāśa*, I. 103.

24 Puṇyapada, *Samādhi Tantra*, G. 20, 21, 22.

25 It is worthwhile to emphasise at this point some outstanding similarities between the Jaina and Upaniṣadic-Vedāntic philosophies. The *gāthās* of Kundakunda, Pūjyapāda and Yogindu read like passages from the Upaniṣads and Vedānta. The Upaniṣads also declare, “he who knows the self, knows everything” (*Bṛhad.* III. 7.1). Here it may be interesting to know some of the common points of agreement between Upaniṣad-Vedānta and some of the Jaina thinkers like Kundakunda, Pūjyapāda, Yogindu and others. *Firstly*, the descriptions of the Pure soul given by the Vedānta and some of the Jaina thinkers are very much similar. According to the Vedānta the soul is “eternal, pure, conscious, free, real, supremely blissful”—*Vedānta Sāra*, 171. Kundakunda also describes it as “absolutely pure, having the nature of perception and knowledge, always non-corporeal and unique.” (*Samaya Sāra*, Gāthā 38 Cp. *Samādhi Tantra* of Pūjyapāda, 6; *Parmātma-Prakāśa* of Yogindu, II. 213).

Secondly, both maintain that there are two kinds of selves—Empirical and Ultimate or Phenomenal and Noumenal. Śaṅkara distinguishes between *Ātmā* and *Jīva* (*Śaṅkara Bhāṣya* on *Brahma-Sūtra*, I. 3.24; *Śvet. Up.* IV.6.7; *Mund. Up.* I. 1). Kundakunda calls them *Sva* and *Para* (*Pravacana Sāra*, II.2; *Samaya Sāra Gāthā* 2), Yogindu calls them *Ātmā* and *Paramātmā* (*Paramātma-Prakāśa*, I. 92; II.17–18; I-23 I.16; I.25.) and so does Pūjyapāda (*Samādhi Tantra*, 30,1, etc.).

Thirdly, the concept of three-fold individuality is also common to both Upaniṣadic philosophy (*Tait. Up.* II. 1–5. *Pañca-Kośa*; *Kaṭha*, I. 3–13 (Three kinds of *Ātman*) *Chānd. Up.* VIII. 7–12 (Deussen deduces three positions) and the Jaina thinkers like Kundakunda (*Mokṣa-Pāhuḍa*, 5–8), Pūjyapāda (*Samādhi-Tantra*, 4. etc.), Yogindu (*Paramātma-Prakāśa*—I. 12–15—external, internal and supreme soul).

Fourthly, though the distinction i made between the empirical and ultimate self, in fact, it is the one single reality that is signified by the two terms (See *Śaṅkara Bhāṣya* IV. 1.3 Cp. *Samaya Sāra*, 3; *Paramātma Prakāśa*, II. 174; I.26; II. 175; *Samādhi Tantra*, 28). The doctrine of identification between *Jīvātman* and *Paramātmā* is so much common to Śaṅkara and Kundakunda that both of them use the

It should not, however, be understood that omniscience in the sense of the knowledge of essentials (or knowledge of self) is acceptable to all Jaina thinkers. There are quite a few Jaina thinkers who do not hesitate in giving a very straight-

term “*advaita*” which indicates oneness. (See Introduction p. CLiii to *Samayasāra* by A. Chakravarti). It is surprising that the Upaniṣadic phrase “I am that” (*So aham*) is repeatedly asserted by Pūjyapāda (*Samādhi Tantra*, 28, 31, 32, etc.)

Fifthly, the career of the individual self (*Jīva*) has been sketched in a similar way by Śaṅkara and Jaina thinkers. Śaṅkara regards the individual self as “the doer, the enjoyer and the sufferer (*S.B.* II. 3.33, II. 3.40, Cp. *Tait. Up.* III. 5; *Bṛhad. Up.* IV. 3.12), so does Kundakunda. This individual self which is merely the *Paramātman* limited by the limiting conditions (*Upādhis*) is subject to transmigration, the cycles of births and deaths. A perfect soul is ‘therefore’ free from birth, old age and death.....rebirth and is eternal, non-transient and independent. (*Niyama sara*, Gāthā 176-178; Cp. *Samayasāra*, G. 92, 93.)

Sixthly, both Śaṅkara and Amṛtacandra (the commentator on Kundakunda’s *Samaya sara*) refer to *Adhyāsa* (cognitive confusion)” on account of which the self puts on the qualities which really belong to not-self,” (*Samayasāra*-Gāthā-92, com. of Amṛtacandra). This is the same as the Vedāntic conception of super-imposition of the unreal upon the real. (*Vedāntasāra*, 32). This term “*Adhyāsa*” (in the technical sense meant here was perhaps not found in any of the philosophical writings before Śaṅkara, and it is likely that he got the suggestion from Amṛtacandra’s commentary on *Samayasāra* known as *Ātma-khyāti*.

Seventhly, both the Upaniṣadic-Vedāntic and the Jaina thinkers use the two points of view, i.e. those of *Vyavahāra* (Practical) and *Nīścaya* (Ultimate), because, in India, *dharma* “embraces in its connotation on the one hand spiritual and transcendental experience of a mystic of rigorous discipline and on the other a set of practical rules to guide a society of a people pursuing the same spiritual ideal.” (*Parmātma-Prakāśa* of Yogindu, (ed.), A. N. Upadhye, p. 29. (Introd.). Dr. Upādhye further says that “Amṛtacandra in his commentary on *Samaya Sāra*, 12, quotes a beautiful verse from an unknown source which indicates the relative importance of these viewpoints. This very verse is quoted by Jayasena with some dialectical

forward sense to the term. According to them omniscience means knowledge of everything in full details. In fact, these are the two important senses, namely, omniscience as knowledge of essentials and omniscience as universal knowledge,

difference in *Samaya Sāra*, 235. ” (*Paramātma-Prakāśa* of Yogindu, (ed.), A. N. Upādhye, p. 29 ff. (Introduction). Śaṅkara often appeals to *Vyavahāra* and *Paramārtha*. Kundakunda and others speak of *Vyavahāra* and *Niścaya*. Sometimes Yogindu uses the word *Paramārtha* for *Niścaya* (I.46, *Paramātma Prakāśa*) so does Kundakunda (*Samayasāra*, 8). Its parallel may be found in the Upaniṣadic distinction between *Parā* and *Aparā Vidyā* (*Mundak.* I.4-5) and also in that of between *Samvṛti* or *Vyavahāra Satya* and *Paramārtha Satya* of Buddhism (*Ency. Re. Ethics*, IX, P. 849, X. 592).

Eighthly, both according to Jainism and Vedānta, *avidyā* or *ajāna* (ignorance) is the cause of bondage, and liberation, therefore, is the stoppage of this process. The Jaina term for *avidyā* is *Mithyātva* and both agree that the cause of pain is simply error or false knowledge (See *Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya* II.3.46, *Ckand Up.* VIII. 8.45 Cp. *Tattvartha Sūtra*, VIII.1.2.). The path of freedom, therefore, is the path of knowledge.

Ninthly, there is much agreement in the Vedāntic and Jaina conception of *Mokṣa* as a state of positive bliss. Even the Advaitin emphasis on a realisation of identity between *Ātman* and *Brahma* signified by the Mahāvākyas ‘Thou art That’ or ‘I am Brahman’, finds its echo in Jainism (*Samādhi Tantra*, 28, (*So aham*). Pūjyapāda’s rejection of the false notions of self (*Samādhi Tantra*, 80) is exactly similar to that of the Vedānta (*Vedānta Sāra*. 105-136). Pūjyapāda and Yogindu speak the language of the Vedānta when they compare the body with robe that we cast away when it is worn out. (*Samādhi Tantra*, 64, *Paramātma-Prakāśa*, II. 179.)

Tenthly, both Vedānta and the Jainas accept the doctrine of substantial identity between the cause and effect or *Satkāryavāda*, which is self-evident.

Lastly, we find similarity also between Vedānta and Jainism in their notion of omniscience. In Advaita Vedānta also, omniscience is the culmination of the faculty of cognition. Omniscience, however, characterises God, the limited principle of *Brahman*. The nature of *Brahman* is pure knowledge and when it is limited by an object to be known, *Brahman* becomes the knower or the subject of knowledge. (S.B. I.

which ultimately survive and represent as two opposed views on the subject. There are equally respectable thinkers who subscribe to the view that omniscience is universal knowledge i. e., complete knowledge of complete details of which the world is composed.

To define omniscience as knowledge of everything may seem to make it an unreasonable ideal, but without it the appeal to common sense is also likely to be weakened. This is the historical cause which explains why the Jainas, who were very much logically sophisticated thinkers and sufficiently aware of the reactions of logical people, were keen about a theory of omniscience as the knowledge of all substances with all their attributes and modes. This cause is rooted in the religious motive for exalting the status of Mahāvīra and other *Tīrthaṅkaras* to the maximum. A religion whose prophet knows everything will be very easily accepted to be higher than another whose prophet is not so. It was this very

4.9). *Īśvara* is endowed with superior limiting adjuncts (*Niratiśayo-pādhi*) (*S.B.* II.3.45). Vedānta links nescience with misery, the Jainas link omniscience with eternal bliss.

Perhaps, it is on the basis of similar reasoning as sketched above that some people think that Śaṅkara borrowed a large part of his metaphysical apparatus from the Jainas. Whatever might be the truth of this contention, it is doubtlessly true that the Jainas used many concepts which become prominent in the Vedāntic philosophy and which later continued to be claimed as exclusively Vedāntic. It will be interesting to note that Śaṅkara, while criticising the wrong notions of self enumerates various schools such as Bauddha, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Vaiśeṣika, Pāṣupata etc. but he does not mention the Jaina view of self as one of the erroneous views. (See A. Chakravarti, Introduction to Kundakunda's *Samaya Sāra*, p. CLx). It might be, therefore, concluded that Śaṅkara's own central doctrine of identity between *Jīvātma* and *Parāmātmā*, is very much similar to the Jaina view.

I have discussed this problem more elaborately in my paper on "Advaita trends in Jainism" read before the Nāgpur Session of Indian Philosophical Congress, 1956. A Hindi version has been published in *Darśnika*, Faridkot, Vol. IV, No. 2.

desire of some Buddhists which motivated them to declare Buddha to be the knower of everything. I, therefore, quite agree with Pt. Sukhalālājī that the religious rivalry existing at that time motivated the rival religions to claim for their prophet this kind of omniscience.²⁶ This seems to be true of Jainism as well as of Buddhism and it explains the psychology behind the attempt to treat omniscience as knowledge of each and every details of the universe.²⁷

As I have already pointed out, this interpretation of omniscience does exalt it to such a height which may seem unreachable to many. It is likely, therefore, that this interpretation may not be acceptable to the logical mind. It is not that this fact was not noted by the Jaina logicians; rather they were clever enough to anticipate the reactions of the possible objectors and they also tried, in their own way, to manufacture explanations and justifications to take care of possible objections. In this attempt of theirs, they had to bring in many logical subtleties and complexities. No body can say, however, that they completely succeeded in this venture.

It is one of the most fundamental things in Jain philosophy, according to many Jaina thinkers, that what matters is not the knowledge of this thing or that thing, but the complete knowledge of all aspects of reality. Therefore it is not of much use if it is said that this prophet knows more than that prophet. What is important is the possession of complete or full knowledge of reality by the prophet. It is held that "you cannot know a single thing in its entirety unless you know all : thus one and the all are organically related, and so the knowledge of one

26 Sukhalālājī, "Sarvajñatva Aur Uskā Artha", *Darśana Aur Chintana*, (Sukhalālājī Sanmāna Samiti, Ahmedabad, 1957), pp. 554-555.

27 We can note the difference of attitude between Dharmakīrti and Prajñākara Gupta. The former treats Buddha as knower of the four noble truths only, (*Pramāṇavārtika*, II. 32-33) while the latter calls Buddha as the knower of all individual details (*Vārtikalāṅkāra* on above).

implies the knowledge of all.”²⁸ A single substance has got infinite modes and infinite are the classes of substances. So, “unless he knows all of them simultaneously, how will he be able to know all of them”²⁹ The Jainas believe, as Whitehead does, that every small particle of universe is related to the entire universe in space and time. So, “One who does not know simultaneously the objects of the three senses and in the three *lokas*, he cannot know even a single substance with its infinite modifications.”³⁰ The Buddhist position that “it is immaterial whether one knows everything or not; what matters is whether he knows the essential things, i.e., what he ought to know; it does not matter at all if one does not know the number of bacteria in any thing, the knowledge that matters is the knowledge that has a bearing on life or practice,”³¹ is not acceptable to the Jainas. For them, life is not composed of watertight compartments, admitting of different spheres of reality and duty. For example, unless one knows the doctrine of manifoldness of truth (*Anekānta*), he cannot practice non-violence (*Ahimsā*) in life, since the one rests upon the other. *Ahimsā* is an extension of the theory of *Anekānta* in life.

Quite early in the history of Jainism, i.e., in the age of the Āgamas coming upto Aklanka, Vidyānanda, Prabhācandra Yośovijaya and others, there is the tendency to justify the above sense of omniscience. Even Kundakunda, Haribhandra and Yaśovijaya, who are supposed to have supported the other view, have also supported in their earlier writings, this view of omniscience as the knowledge of all substances with all their modes.

This present notion of omniscience is in keeping with the

28 Often quoted lines, See Haribhadra : *Ṣaḍ-darśana-Samuccaya*, p. 48 (Maṇibhadra's Com.).

29 *Pravacana Sāra*, I. 49.

30 Ibid., I. 48.

31 Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇa-Vārtika*, I. 33; I. 35.

realistic tone and temper of the Jaina metaphysics. To the Jainas, there is no ambiguity in knowledge when it comprehends the entire modes of all the entities, because the universe is an integrated systems whose relations are equally real and objective. Dr. Nath Mal Tātia says, ‘Symbolically, the relations are links between *A* and the contents of not-*A*. This means that the complete knowledge of *A* implies the complete knowledge of not-*A* and this is obviously the knowledge of the whole universe.’³²

After going through the arguments presented by both of the opposing parties, it is very difficult for a philosopher to take any side. However, to me, there seems to be a controversy between what ought to be and what actually is the nature of *Kevala Jñāna*. The anxiety on the former side is to establish the theory of omniscience on a scientific and logical basis which would be acceptable to the modern mind. It tries to be liberal, accommodative and synthetic.

The earlier theory which treats omniscience as knowledge of the essentials has got very scanty textual support and some of the texts may be interpreted to suit even both the sides of the controversy.³³ The supporters of this view rely mainly on Kundakunda,³⁴ Haribhadra³⁵ and Yaśovijaya³⁶, but these thinkers have also advocated the other theory of omniscience.³⁷ But all this does not make the theory concerned cease to be a less sectarian and rigid and more acceptable and plausible to the common sense. Due to the rigid attitude on the part

32 N. M. Tatia, *Studies in Jaina Philosophy* (Vārānaśī, Jaina Cultural Research Society, 1951), p. 70.

33 The statement of *Ācārāṅga* I. 3.4 is one such.

34 *Niyamasāra*, 158.

35 Haribhadra, *Yoga Dṛṣṭi Samuccaya*, K. 102–108.

36 See *Darśana Aur Chintana*, p. 539.

37 *Pravacana Sāra*, I. 48–49; *Yoga Dṛṣṭi Samuccaya*, K. 140–47; *Jñāna-bindu-Prakaraṇa*, Sec, *Jaina Tarkabhāṣā*, Sec. 21.

of the second group of philosophers, the Mīmāṃsakas got sufficient opportunities for pointing out many inconsistencies in their theory of omniscience. I have discussed them elsewhere. But the Jaina logicians like Samantabhadra, Aklaṅka, Prabhācandra, Vidyānanda, Anantakīrti and others have very ably replied to these charges and have shown that omniscience to be omniscience must be the simultaneous cognition of all substances with all of their attributes. This also includes the knowledge of what is essential, i.e. knowledge of Self and duty.

II. Darśana and Jñāna

The relationship between *Kevala Darśana*³⁸ and *Kevala Jñāna* is also a matter of great controversy. According to the important Āgamas³⁹ and also the general trend of Jaina thinkers,⁴⁰ *Upayoga* (consciousness) has got two varieties indeterminate (*Anākāra*) and determinate (*Sākāra*), known as *darśana* and *jñāna* respectively.⁴¹

Thinkers like Kundakunda, Virasena, Brahmadeva have independent views on this problem. Some Āgamas like *Prajñāpanā* recognise a new faculty of knowing called *Pāsaṇaya*⁴² in addition to *Upayoga* each being divided into *Anākāra* and *Sākāra*. The distinction between *Upayoga* and *Pāsaṇaya* is said to consist in the different schemes of classifications of their *Sākāra* and *Anākāra* varieties.⁴³

38 'Darśana' has a specialised meaning in Jainism.

39 *Bhagavati Sūtra*, XVI 7; *Tattvārtha Sūtra*, II. 9.

40 Sidha Sona Gaṇi, *Tattvārtha Sūtra Bhāṣya Tikā*, II. 9; *Āpta Mīmāṃsā*, K. 101 with *Aṣṭa Śatī & Aṣṭa Sahasri*; *Pūjyapāda*, *Sarvārtha Siddhi*, II. 9.

41 *Tattvārtha Sūtra Bhāṣya*, II. 9.

42 *Prajñāpanā Sūtra*, Pada, 20, 30.

43 *Upayoga* is of two varieties, *Sākāra* and *Anākāra*, being divided into eight and four kinds respectively. *Pāsaṇaya* is also of two kinds (*Sākāra* and *Anākāra*) each subdivided into six and three kinds respectively. See also Malayagiri's *Tikā* on *Prajñāpanā Sūtra*, pada, 20, 30.

Other thinkers like Vīrasena, Kundakunda, Nemicandra, Brahmadeva etc. hold different views. To Vīrasena "what comprehends an external object of the nature of universal-cum-particular is *Jñāna* and the grasping of the self of the same nature is *darśana*."⁴⁴ Kundakunda tries to give an absolutistic interpretation when he says "*Jñāna* illuminates other objects only, *darśana* illumines the soul and the soul illuminates itself and other objects."⁴⁵ Nemicandra thinks that "*Jñāna* is the detailed cognition of the real nature of the ego and non-ego, while *darśana* is that of the generalities."⁴⁶ Brahmadeva, the commentator on *Dravya Saṅgraha* distinguishes between the logical and scriptural meanings of *Jñāna* and *darśana*.⁴⁷ According to the transcendental point of view, however, *darśana* and *jñāna* lose their identity in the Self.⁴⁸ But apart from these three views on the subject the Jaina scholars generally admit the two fold division of consciousness into indeterminate and determinate.

Relation between Darśana and Jñāna in the State of Omniscience

There are three views regarding the relationship between *darśana* and *Jñāna* in the state of omniscience. They are known as *Kramavūda* (Theory of Succession of *darśana* and *jñāna*), *Sahavūda*, (Theory of Simultaneity) and *Abhedavāda* (Theory of Identity).

I. Kramavāda :

According to this view *Kevala darśana* and *Kevala jñāna* are two different states of consciousness and they also occur alternatively in the state of omniscience.⁴ It is argued that the

44 Vīrasena, *Dhavalā Tīkā* on *ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, I. 1.4.

45 Kundakunda, *Niyama Sāra*, 160.

46 Nemiçhandra, *Dravya Saṅgraha*, 142, 143.

47 Brahmadeva, *Dravya Saṅgraha Vṛtti*, 44 (pp. 81-82).

48 Ibid., 82.

49 Siddha Sena Divākara, *Sanmati-Turka*, II. 4.

same consciousness is incapable of grasping the general and the particular aspect of things simultaneously, hence it must be known consecutively.⁵⁰ This view is deeply rooted in the Pre-Umāsvāmi Āgamas⁵¹ and is also held by Jinabhandra,⁵² Siddhasena Gaṇi⁵³ and others.

2. *Sahavāda* :

The advocates of the theory of simultaneity (*Sahavāda*) do not accept the above view. They say, "When the obstruction in the way of absolute knowledge is completely removed absolute knowledge springs up as a matter of course. Similarly, when the obstruction in the path of absolute perception is completely removed, absolute perception springs forth as a matter of course."⁵⁴ Thus it is wrong to argue with respect to *Kevala jñāna* on the analogy of sensuous knowledge *Kevala jñāna* has got beginning but no end, but according to *Kramavāda* it has both beginning and end, because it is not present at the time of *Kevala darśana*. So *Kramavāda* is also against the Scriptures.⁵⁵ Moreover, Kramavādins cannot answer objection of the Mīmāṃsākas that if omniscience is successive knowledge, it cannot really be omniscient, since there is no end of the period of succession.⁵⁶ Then, if the removal of obstruction is common to both *darśana* and *jñāna*, which of the two will spring forth first?⁵⁷ There is no reason why *Kevala darśana* should come first and *Kevala jñāna* afterwards, or vice versa. They shall have to answer further why there should be succession at all when the removal of obstruction is simultaneous?

50 Ibid., II. 4 (*Tikā*)

51 *Āvaśyaka Nirvyukti*, 973, 979; *Bhagavati Sūtra*, XVIII. 8; *Prajñāpana Sūtra*, 30.

52 *Vīṣeṣāvaśyaka-Bhāṣya*, Gāthā 3090; *Vīṣeṣaṇdvati*, Gāthā, 184.

53 *Tattvārtha Sūtra Bhāṣya Tikā*, I. 31.

54 Siddhasena Divākara, *Sanmati Tark*, II. 5.

55 Ibid., II. 6-8.

56 Śāntaraksita, *Tattva Saṅgraha*, 3248-49.

57 Siddhasena, Ibid., II. 9.

It is precisely for these reasons that even without unanimous support from the Āgamas, Jaina thinkers have advocated *Sahavāda* or the Theory of Simultaneity of *Darśana* and *Jñāna*. It has got a large number of supporters with Mallavādi as its strongest champion. This theory of simultaneity is perhaps the unanimous view of the Digambara tradition with partial support in the Śvetāmbaras also. Pūjyapāda says that for the non-omniscient being, the knowledge of *darśana* and *jñāna* is successive and for the omniscient, it is simultaneous.⁵⁹ Samantabhadra says that *Kevala jñāna* is simultaneous while the *Syādvāda* or relative knowledge is successive.⁶⁰ Akalaṅka⁶¹ and Vidyānanda⁶² have tried to advance certain arguments in support of this theory.

However, there are some objections of the Mīmāṃsakas regarding the simultaneous nature of *Kevala jñāna* which I have discussed elsewhere.⁶³ According to the theory of simultaneity, the omniscient comprehends all things at one and the same time. Now, unless it is admitted that he comprehends all things of all times, there is no meaning in his omniscience.⁶⁴ Then even if it is granted that *darśana* is *indeterminate* and *jñāna* is *determinate* knowledge, there is no sense in admitting their separate identity in the case of a person whose knowledge is absolute. For him, knowledge is knowledge and not distinct or indistinct knowledge.⁶⁵ Granting that in *Sahavāda*, both these functions (*darśana* and *jñāna*) are said to take place simultaneously, still the province of each function is strictly limited, e.g., *darśana* is concerned only with the

59 Pūjyapāda, *Sarvārtha Siddhi* on T. S., I. 30.

60 Samantabhadra, *Āpta Mīmāṃsā*, K. 101.

61 Akalaṅka, *Aṣṭaśatī*, on *Āpta Mīmāṃsā*, K. 101; *Tattvārtha Rāja Vārtika*, VI. 13.8

62 Vidyānanda, *Aṣṭa Sahasrī*, p. 281.

63 Ch. I (Vide *Tattva Saṅgraha*, K. 3248–51, *Niyamasāra*, 159).

64 Siddhsena Divākara, *Sanmāti Tarka*, II. 10.

65 Ibid., II. 11.

particulars while *Jñāna* only with universals. There are scholars who hold the opposite view. To them *darśana* is knowledge of the *Universals* and *Jñāna*, the knowledge of the *Particulars* basing their contention on Siddhasena Divākara's view (*Sanmati Tarka*, II. 25). Hence, when an omniscient has got *darśana*, he has not *jñāna* and, vice versa. Thus he will be always either a speaker of unknown things or else a speaker of unperceived things.⁶⁶

3. *Abhedavāda* :

It is on account of the reasons stated above and some other logical difficulties which led to the rejection of both the views by Siddhasena Divākara. He propounded the Theory of Identity of *Darśana* and *Jñāna* in the state of omniscience. As a matter of fact, *darśana* and *jñāna* are not two different things functioning at one and the same time, but just one thing functioning at the same time. The rule is that these two cognitions—*darśana* and *jñāna*, do not occur at one and the same time, holds good only up to that kind of knowledge called *manahparyāya*. In the case of *Kevala Jñāna*, no such separation between *darśana* and *jñāna* is necessary. They synchronise in *Kevala Jñāna*, and they are one and the same.⁶⁷

Siddhasena Divākara levels five charges against the earlier theories and anticipating their objections tries to reply to them. The advocates of *Kramavāda* try to defend their theory by saying that as in the case of the four kinds of knowledge (*mati*, *śruta*, *avadhi* and *manahparyāya*), a man perceives consecutively, it means also the same in the case of *Kevala Jñāna* also. But Siddhasena points out that this is an analogical argument based on imperfect similarity. In fact, the omniscient cannot be said to be the possessor of fivefold knowledge.⁶⁸ He is said to be omniscient etc. not merely

66 Ibid., II. 12-14.

67 Siddhasena Divākara, Ibid., II. 3.

68 Siddhasena Divākara, *Sanmati Tarka*, II. 15.

because he has the capacity of *Kevala Darśana* and *Kevala Jñāna* etc. but because he actualises these powers. Omniscience is not a potentiality but an actuality. Further, there is also no scriptural inconsistency in this position.⁶⁹ So he comes to the conclusion that *Kevala darśana* and *Kevala Jñāna* are one. In practice, two words, *darśana* and *jñāna* are used with reference to the non-liberated stages.⁷⁰ The first four kinds of knowledge which are imperfect and limited would cease to be completely replaced by absolute knowledge on the attainment of liberation.

Absolute knowledge is understood in two ways—in its general and in its particular aspects. It may be asked if both are one and the same, how is it then that in practice they are spoken of as being different? It is said that this is so because it has been stated in the Śāstras.⁷¹ Siddhasena Divākara formulates his own definition of *darśana* as “that kind of knowledge which takes place as regards things untouched and which does not come within proper province. This cognition does not admit in its fold that knowledge which takes place by virtue of *Hetu* (middle term) as regards things that are to happen in future and other things.”⁷² *Jñāna* and *Darśana* can occur simultaneously without distinction as in the case of a perfect being who, as a rule, perceives and knows things simultaneously.⁷³ Hence the view attributed to the so called Śāstras that “there is an interval of one *Samaya* between the production of *darśana* and *jñāna* should not be accepted as a true Jaina doctrine,⁷⁴ because one and the same *Upayoga* is responsible for both *Jñāna* and *Darśana*.

Yaśovijaya, although he supports this position of Siddhasena Divākara, is rather reconciliatory in his attempt. He wants to reconcile these conflicting views with the help of

69 Ibid., II. 18.

72 Ibid., II. 25.

70 Ibid., II. 19.

73 Ibid., II. 30.

71 Ibid., II. 20.

74 Ibid., II. 31.

the Jaina doctrine of standpoints or *nayas*. According to him, the theory of successiveness of *darśana* and *jñāna* has been formulated from the analytic standpoint (*ṛjusūtra naya*), whereas the theory of simultaneity is the result of the empirical standpoint (*vyavahāra naya*), and Siddhasena's Doctrine of Identity is the application of collective standpoint (*Saṅgraha naya*).⁷⁵ This is indeed a new approach designed to work out a synthesis between the conflicting theories. As a matter of fact, the advocates of the theory of identity also do not have enough justification to account for there being two concepts if *darśana* and *jñāna* are identical. Whatever Śāstras may say (i.e. though *Kevala jñāna* and *darśana* are one and one only, it has been practice to speak of knowledge and perception as being different), it has been proved beyond doubt that perfect knowledge and perception are one but they are said to be different not because cognitions are different but because the objects of this knowledge are two-fold viz, general and particular.⁷⁶

III. The Jaina Theory of Omniscience : Chronology

I shall try to sketch the chronology of the theory of omniscience in Jainism. But there are great difficulties in properly determining the chronology. *Firstly*, the antiquity of the Jaina thought is traced back to the pre-historical era,⁷⁷ of which there are no records. We have to be satisfied with some stray references here and there in the Vedas. *Secondly* the Jaina canons and the principal Jaina writers fall into two distinct orders—the Śvetāmbaras and the Digambaras. These two principal sects run on separate lines, the writers of one

75 Yaśovijaya, *Jñāna-bindu-prakaraṇa*, p. 48.

76 *Sanmati Tarka* II. 20 (Tīkā by Sukhalālaḥ and B. Doshi thereon).

77 For the views of many authoritative scholars about antiquity of Jainism, Jyoti Prasād Jaina's book "*Jainism, the Oldest Living Religion*" (Vārāṇasī, Jaina Cultural Research Society, 1951) is very important.

school rarely quoting those of the other. *Thirdly*, a vast majority of works have not yet been made available to the public. They are still lying in manuscript form in some old libraries or Jaina temples. *Fourthly*, the extant Sūtras need not be the first of this kind but may be the last which have supplemented their predecessors as a result of survival of the fittest. *Fifthly*, great historical researches are yet in progress to fix up correctly the dates of these works and at present there is considerable controversy regarding these dates. *Sixthly*, Jainism has been relatively a more neglected branch of Indological research than others. There are less authoritative and independent works on the history of Jaina philosophy.^{7 8} *Seventhly*, Jainism because of being regarded as heterodox and being associated with certain religious traditions of nudity, it has not been treated favourably by non-Jaina writers of ancient and medieval period. *Lastly*, unlike Buddhism, Jainism received very little royal patronage and hence its chronological or historical records were not preserved to the extent they deserved. There were only a few Jaina kings like Kumārapāla, who encouraged literary and philosophical activities.

Under these circumstances, it is not possible to trace satisfactorily the chronological development of the Jaina theory

78 Except for a few brochures published by Jaina Cultural Research Society, Varanasi and sketchy *History of Jaina Literature* written by late Sri Nāthu Rām Premi and other by Pt. Kailāsa Candra Śāstri, I do not find any other material of use. Of course, M. Winternitz's *magnum opus* "*A History of Indian literature*", Vol. II, Calcutta, 1933 devotes 170 pages to Jainism (pp. 424-595) and describes materials relating to omniscience on pages 575-595. In German Helmuth Von Glasenapp's *Der Jainismus* (Berlin 1925); W. Schubring's *Die Lehre der Jainas* (Berlin 1935); in French A. Guérinot's *La Religion Jaina* (Paris 1926) and Y. J. Padmarajah's *A Comparative Study of the Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge* (J. S. Y. M. Bombay 1953) and K. N. Jayatilke's *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge* (London George Allen & Unwin, 1963) are no doubt very useful.

of omniscience. In the pre-canonical period, which has been presented mostly through legendary history, the omniscience of Mahāvīra was accepted as indisputable. This legendary history has been generally presented in latter times in the different Jaina Purāṇas e.g. *Padma* of Raviseṇa, *Harivaṃsa* and *Ādi* of Jina Sena, *Uttara* of Guṇabhadra etc.

In the old Jaina literature, I find discussion of *Kevala Jñāna* in *Ācārāṅga*,⁸⁰ *Uttarādhyayana*,⁸¹ *Kaṣāya Pāhuḍa* (*Jaya dhavalā*),⁸² *Prajñāpanā*,⁸³ *Rājaprasnīya*,⁸⁴ *Bhagavati*,⁸⁵ *Mahābandha* (*Mahādhavalā*),⁸⁶ *Sthānāṅga*,⁸⁷ *Āvaśyaka Nir yukti*,⁸⁸ *Anu-yogadvāra*,⁸⁹ etc.⁹⁰ But we find here only stray remarks and no systematic account. For Umāsvāmi and Kundakunda, omniscience was a religious dogma and a religious heritage. Umāsvāmi, in his *Tattvārtha Sūtra*⁹¹ defines omniscience as the “simultaneous knowledge of all substances with all their modes.” Kundakunda’s *Pravacana Sāra*,⁹² *Pañcāstikāya Sāra*,⁹³ *Samaya Sāra*,⁹⁴ *Niyama Sāra*,⁹⁵ *Aṣṭa Pāhuḍa*⁹⁶ etc. refer to this conception of omniscience of which *Pravacana Sāra* takes special note.

The philosophical approach of the problem of omniscience begins with Samantabhadra. In his *Āpta Mīmāṃsā*,⁹⁷ he introduces inferential reasoning in support of omniscience. His

80 I. 3.4; II. 3.

81 XXIII; X; V.1-32.

82 Vol. I, pp. 21, 43, 46, 64-5.

83 29, 30.

84 165.

90 *Saṅkhaḍḍāgama*, I.1.21-23 (of Puṣpadanta & Bhātabali with *Dhavalā* of Vīrasena, V. 5.81)

91 I. 29

92 I. 28-31; I. 48; II. 105, etc.

93 28, 29.

94 Ch. I, X. 403.

85 I. 9.76; XVIII.

86 Vol. II, pp. 22-24.

87 II. 1.71.

88 Gāthā 127 etc.

89 V. 5.81-82

95 158, 159, 160-65.

96 I. 10-20.

97 5, 6.

*Svayambhū Stotra*⁹⁸ is also full of discussion on omniscience. Siddhasena Divākara also discusses the problem of *Kevala darśana* and *Kevala Jñāna* in his *Sanmati Tarka*.⁹⁹ In his *Nyāyāvatāra*,¹⁰⁰ he simply classifies knowledge into direct and indirect. Pūjyapāda Deva Nandi discusses omniscience in his *Sarvārtha Siddhi*,¹⁰¹ and also in his *Samādhi Tantra*,¹⁰² Deva Vāeaka in his *Nandi Sūtra* refers to the concept of omniscience at many places. Similarly, Jinabhadra *Kṣamā Śramaṇa*, in his famous works, *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-Bhāṣya*¹⁰³ with Hemacandra's commentary and *Viśeṣaṇavati*¹⁰⁴ discusses in detail many problems concerning omniscience. Haribhadra Sūri in his *Anekānta Jaya Patākā*,¹⁰⁵ *Saḍ-darśana-Samuccaya*¹⁰⁶ and his works on Yoga, namely, *Yogaḍṛṣṭi Samuccaya*,¹⁰⁷ *Yoga-bindu*¹⁰⁸ etc. refer to it. Anantakīrti's two works on the proofs of omniscience known as *Bṛhat Sarvajña Siddhi*¹⁰⁹ and *Laghu Sarvajña Siddhi*¹¹⁰ are of special significance. Pātrakeśari has also dealt with this problem in *Bṛhat Pañcha Namaskāra Stotra*,¹¹¹ Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka in his *Rāja-Vārtika*,¹¹² *Siddhi Viniścasya*,¹¹³ *Laghī yastraya*,¹¹⁴ *Nyāya Viniścaya*,¹¹⁵ and *Pramāṇa Saṁgraha*,¹¹⁶ has discussed it in detail from the philosophical point of view. Vidyānanda's *Aṣṭa Sahasrī*,¹¹⁷ *Tattvārtha Śloka-vārtika*,¹¹⁸ and *Āpta Parīkṣā*¹¹⁹ are logical works of the first rate on this

98 I. 5; VII. 5; XVIII. 11.

99 Kāṇḍa II.

100 K. 4.

101 II. 29.

102 9.

103 3090.

104 184-85.

105 p. 172-173.

106 45.

107 102-103; 140-147; 179-184; 208-7.

108 3, 17-18, 31.

109 pp. 130-204.

110 pp. 107-129.

111 4, 18-20.

112 I. 29; I. 30.

113 VIII, 1-43.

114 61.

115 165-163.

116 91.

117 pp. 44-71.

118 I. 29.1-39; I. 30.1-34.

119 pp. 206-239.

problem. Similarly, Prabhācandra's *Nyāya-Kumuda-Candra*,¹²⁰ *Prameya-Kamala-Mārtanḍa*¹²¹ and Anantavīrya's *Prameya-Ratna Mālā*¹²² give separate treatment to the problem of omniscience after meeting the objections of the Mīmāṃsakas. Abhayadeva Sūri's monumental commentary on *Sanmati Tarka Prakaraṇa*¹²³ is also important. Nemicandra in his *Gommaṭa Sāra* (*Jīva Kāṇḍa*¹²⁴ and *Karma Kāṇḍa*¹²⁵), *Dravya Saṅgraha*,¹²⁶ *Labdhi Sāra*,¹²⁷ Amṛtacandra in his *Puruṣārtha Siddhyupāya*,¹²⁸ Umāsvāmī in *Praśamarati Prakaraṇa*,¹²⁹ Rāja Malla in *Pañcādhyāyī*,¹³⁰ Hemacandra¹³¹ in *Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā*,¹³² Śānti Sūri in his *Nyāyāvatāra Vārtika Vṛtti*,¹³³ Māṇikyanandi in *Parīkṣā Mukham*,¹³⁴ Vādībha Simha in *Syādvāda Siddhi*,¹³⁵ Yogindu in *Paramātma-prakāśa*¹³⁶ and *Yoga sāra*,¹³⁷ Dharma-bhūṣaṇa in *Nyāya-dīpikā*,¹³⁸ Yaśovijaya in *Jñāna-bindu-prakaraṇa*¹³⁹ and *Jaina Tarka Bhāṣā*,¹⁴⁰ Malliṣeṇa in his *Syādvāda Mañjarī*,¹⁴¹ Guṇabhadra in *Ātmānuśāsana*¹⁴² etc have made valuable contribution to the study of the problem of

120 Vol. II. pp. 86-97.

126 42-44.

121 pp. 247-256.

127 606-644.

122 pp. 85-99.

128 I.5; I.6.

123 Second Kāṇḍa.

129 267-269

124 14.

130 II. 20.

125 10.

131 See also *Ayoga-Vyavacchedikā & Anya-yoga-vyavacchedikā*.

132 I. 9.18.

133 pp. 51-56.

134 11.

135 Chapter on Omniscience Verses 1-21.

136 p. 333 Gāthā 195.

139 Section 57-58.

137 99.

140 Section 21.

138 Section 13.

141 K.1.17 (with *Anyayogavyavaccheda-Dvātrīṃśikā* of Hemacandra).

142 176, 264.

omniscience. So far as the logical side is concerned, the names of Samantabhadra, Siddhasena, Akalaṅka, Vidyānanda, Prabhācandra, Anantakīrti, Hemacandra, Yaśovijaya, Vāḍibha Śiṃha, Dharmabhūṣaṇa etc. are important. Though the concept of omniscience was at first a religious dogma, later it acquired a rational status. The Jaina logicians had to fight the Mīmāṃsakas on the one hand and the Buddhists on the other in their defence of the possibility and desirability of omniscience as a religious and philosophical ideal.

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CHAPTER IV

SOUL-PSYCHOLOGY AND OMNISCIENCE

I. Soul-psychology and Omniscience

Knowledge is the natural and distinguishing characteristic of the soul *Jīva*.¹ If it were not the nature of the soul, it would be either the nature of the none-soul (*Ajīva*) or of nothing whatsoever. In the former case, the unconscious becomes the conscious, and the soul would be unable to know itself or anything else, because it would be then devoid of consciousness. In the latter case, there would be no knowledge, nor any conscious being which, happily, is not a fact. The presupposition behind any kind of knowledge—*Syādvāda* (relative) or *Sarvajñatā* (absolute) is the belief that the soul is the knower.

Knowledge and the Knower cannot be separated from each other.² For Jainas, unlike Vaiśeṣika, a thing and its attributes are not two separate entities brought together by a third category *Samavāya* or inherence. According to Jaina metaphysics, a substance and its attributes form an inseparable and indivisible unity. This means that self and knowledge are inseparable. Spiritual progress, therefore, consists in “the gradual enfolding of consciousness of the self to a higher and higher states resulting in the progressive widening of knowledge till the self becomes perfect and knowledge becomes co-extensive with reality. This is the state of omniscience for the self.”³ It is also his final salvation. The soul is a sub-

1 *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra*, XVIII. 10-11

2 Kundakunda, *Samayasāra*, 403.

3 Amṛtacandra, *Ātmakhyāti*, a commentary on Kundakunda's *Samayasāra*, 404.

stance, which is the respository of knowledge. Knowledge and memory do not exist in it "like loose images stocked in a drawer, or photos in an album, but as the diversified aspect of a partless entity, the mutually interpenetrating flashes or coruscations of a huge undivided conscious illumination, or as a multitude of inseparable and co-existing notes or rhythms of unitary intelligent force."⁴ Knowledge is the essence of the soul. There is no soul without knowledge and there is no knowledge without soul.⁵ This is a consequence of the general thesis of Jaina metaphysics that "there is no attribute without substance and no substance without attribute."⁶ All this follows from the very definition of substance or *Dravya* : "Whatever has substantiality, has the dialectical triad of origination, decay and permanence and is the substratum of qualities and modes, is *Dravya*."⁷ But it should be noted that Jainas do not say that attributes alone are sufficient to constitute a reality. For them *esse* is not *percipi*. On other hand, the substance is also not a featureless object like Advaita Vedānta i.e. absolute. The quality of *Sat* or reality as the characteristic of *Dravya*⁸ clearly indicates that it is not merely the form of the intellect rather it has its existence in *Rerum Naturata*. Considered in the light of the above description of the nature of the soul, omniscience becomes the natural property of the soul and non-omniscience only adventitious and accidental owing to its existence to some external causes or obstructions. Omniscience, can therefore be gained by destroying these causes which are four types of Karmas. i.e., delude-producing (*Mahanīya*), apprehension-obscuring (*Darśanāvaraṇīya*) comprehension-obscuring (*jñānāvaraṇīya*) and obstructive

4 C. R. Jain, *Jainism and World Problems: Essays and Addresses* (Bijnour, Jaina Parishad, 1934), Part II; p. 174.

5 Umāsvāmi, *Tattvārtha Sūtra*, II.8; cp. Rājamalla, *Pañcādhyāyī*, 3, 192.

6 *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, 13 & 50.

7 *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, 10; *Tattvārtha Sūt.* V. 38.

8 *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, 10; Cp. *T. Sūt.*, V. 29.

(*Antarāya*).⁹ Their removal brings four types of perfections (*ananta-catuṣṭaya*).¹⁰ The *Tattvārtha Sūtra* definition of *Upayoga* (consciousness) is wide enough to cover not only apprehension (*darśana*) and comprehension (*jñāna*) but also bliss and power.¹¹ A pure soul has destroyed the four *Ghātī Karmas*, existing in an auspicious body, possessed of infinite apprehension, comprehension, happiness and power.¹² It is inherently possessed of these fourfold infinities. But there is no pure or perfect soul in the empirical world. This means that the soul in its perfect form is ontologically real but not empirically real. However, there are different degrees of purity, extent, depth and fineness of apprehension and comprehension in different individuals. We can justifiably assume at the end of the series, a perfect soul, having perfect apprehension, comprehension, power and bliss. Every soul must be potentially perfect, because if it is not, it cannot gain perfection which is said to be its destiny and goal. The logic is simple: "there can be no destruction of things that do exist, nor can there be creation of things out of nothing."¹³ This state is the total separation of soul from the matter. But it remains only an ideal for mundane or embodied selves. The liberated souls alone attain this pure and perfect state."¹⁴

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not accept the Jaina position. Consciousness to them is an adventitious quality of the soul which comes temporarily as an effect of a complex cognitive machinery i.e. grasp between sense and object and then be-

9 *T. Sūt.* X. 1.

10 *Ibid.*, II. 13.

11 *Tattvārtha Sūtra*, II. 8 (*Lakṣaṇa* or differentia of soul may be either inseparable (*Ātmabhūta*) or separable (*Anātmabhūta*). Consciousness is inseparable but a celestial condition of existence is a separable quality of the soul.

12 *Dravyasaṅgraha*, 50.

13 *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, 15, Cp. *Gītā*, II. 16; *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* & *Sāṅkhya-Tattva-Kaumudī*, 8.

14 *Samayasāra*, 406.

tween sense and the mind and finally between the mind and the soul. They do regard soul as the substratum of all cognition but they maintain that self and cognition are two different things. Soul is, therefore, inherently devoid of all cognition. This fact is also reflected in the state of the final liberation. But the¹⁵ Jainas argue that if cognition is absolutely different from the soul, knowledge will be well-nigh impossible because they will always remain unrelated. Even the hypothesis of an inherent relationship between the two will not do.

There seems to be an appreciable amount of truth in the Jaina contention. In fact, the problem involved here is the one to which Bradley draws our attention in his criticism of the concepts of the substance and quality. If quality is different from the substance, i.e., if the relation between the quality and substance is external, then the attempt to relate the one to the other is bound to be an infinite regress. Using Bradley's general arguments against substance and quality, one can say in refutation to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position that if knowledge is an external quality of the soul, no intermediary link will be able to bridge the gulf between the two without producing an infinite regress. The Jainas do not put their arguments exactly in this way, but it can be reconstructed out of what has been said by them. It cannot also be said that since the soul is the agent (*Kartā*) and cognition the instrument (*Karaṇa*) the distinction between the two is necessary. Their relation is like that of eye and the vision and not like that of lamp and vision.

Knowledge is in fact identical with the soul, though it has different types of modes, "just as a serpent is identical with the coil of his body that he makes."¹⁶ This views of consciousness and self is also corroborated by actual experience,

15 *Nyāya Mañjari*, p. 77.

16 *Syādvāda Mañjari*, p. 43. (*Anyayoga-Vyāvachheda-Dvātrimśikā* Com. on verse 8).

we are always aware of ourselves as the knower and never as unconscious, or first being unconscious and then becoming conscious as a result of our relation with the consciousness. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika cannot save the situation by playing on words that in the sentence, 'I have knowledge', there is a proved distinction between the self and consciousness.

The position of Sāṅkhya is quite different. *Puruṣa* is of the nature of consciousness.¹⁷ Intellect is not innate to *Puruṣa* but an evolute of *Prakṛti*, which is itself unconscious. As a result of separation of *Puruṣa* from *Prakṛti*, the intellectual processes come to a stop leaving *Puruṣa* in the state of pure consciousness.¹⁸

To the Vedāntins, the quality of knowing does not constitute the nature of *Brahman*, for *Brahman* is above these limitations. He is pure existence-consciousness. The quality of knowing is the function of consciousness when associated with the internal organ i.e., *antaḥkaraṇa*. *Brahman* is free from the duality of subject and object, knower and known.¹⁹

The agreement between Sāṅkhya and Jaina position is really very great. In fact, the Sāṅkhya, Vedānta and Jaina schools of thought are united in their opposition against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of soul and its relationship to the knowledge in so far as according to all of the three schools, consciousness is not merely a quality of the soul but is its very nature. Therefore, the question of relating knowledge to the soul becomes an unwarranted question. However, there are certain things which can be said against the Sāṅkhya-Vedānta positions. The Sāṅkhya school holds a very peculiar view about the role of intellect. Intellect according to it is really not a source of knowledge but it is material (therefore unconscious) evolute of *Prakṛti*. This means that

17 *Yoga-Bhāṣya*, I. 9.

18 *Yoga-Sūtra*, I. 3.

19 *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*, p. 17.

by making intellect unconscious, Sāṅkhya weakens the foundation of knowledge because, speaking commonsensically, intellect plays a very important place in the preservation and protection of knowledge. However, there is also an opposite view. They say that even if the '*buddhi*' as the first evolute of *Prakṛti* is unconscious by itself, in the combination with the *Puruṣa* which mirrors itself in it, 'knowledge' is certainly not weakened. Similarly, in the system of Advaita Vedānta, even if it is true that from the *paramārtha* point of view all empirical knowledge forms parts of *Avidyā*, on the *Vyavahāra* level all the true criteria of Knowledge are valid. Hence, we cannot discover any weakening of the intellect in Śaṅkarācārya himself, nor in that of his followers.

The Vedāntic position goes to the other extreme of regarding all empirical knowledge as only pseudo-knowledge. This condemnation of empirical knowledge also weakens the intellect because what is left out as real knowledge after the rejection of intellectual or empirical knowledge is extremely ethereal and intangible.

The Jainas claim that they preserve the concreteness of knowledge and the empirical knowledge, because they neither treat intellect as unconscious nor do they accuse empirical knowledge as being of the nature of pseudo-knowledge. This amounts to saying that the Jainas are realists and empiricists in the broad sense of the term.

To the Buddhists, there is no problem of relation between the soul and consciousness. They do not believe in the existence of any substance like soul. Cognition to them, is a function of the beginningless stream of consciousness (*citta*) which takes the form of *Ālaya Vijñāna* and *Pravṛtti Vijñāna*. There is no permanent substratum or central matrix of the process. But in the state of *Mukti* or salvation, when consciousness is devoid of the influx of *avidyā* or *trṣṇā*,²⁰ it does not cognise any external object.

20 *Tattva Saṅgraha*, p. 184; Cp. *Saṃdāraṇandī*, XVI. 28, 29.

The Mīmāṃsakas, on the other hand, like the Jainas, regard consciousness as the attribute of soul and posit a very intimate relationship between them. But the great difficulty with the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas is that they regard knowledge as not self-revelatory but only “inferentially cognisable by something other than itself (*Parānumeya*).” According to them, cognition is by nature non-perceptible (*Parokṣa*) and is to be known by means of an inference where “cognizedness produced by the concerned piece of cognition”²¹ acts as the middle term, that is, by means of an inference of the type where existence of a cause is inferred from that of its effect. But if we say that knowledge is not self-revelatory, we cannot establish validity of this position because even an explanation of its meaning is an attempt at knowing it and this knowing, if not self-revelatory (which it must be *ex hypothesi*) will not be intelligible. But this is absurd position. It is commonly accepted that a non-perceptible unknown piece of knowledge cannot establish its meaning. That which is itself unconscious cannot help cognising other things.

Then, there are further difficulties connected with knowing our pleasures and pains. It is common feeling that we experience pleasures and pains and the clearest examples of self-revealing knowledge is the knowledge of pleasures and pains. Unless we ourselves know our own experiences, how can we claim to know others?

II. Gradation of Souls and Stages of Omniscience

Besides consciousness, there are also some other characteristics of the soul. In *Uttarādhyaṇa Sūtra*, the characteristics of soul other than *Upayoga* (consciousness) are given as “faith, austerities, energy, and realisation of its developments”²² Nemicaṇḍra says that *Jīva*, besides having *Upayoga*, is “form-

21 Pārthasārthi Miśra, *Śāstra-Dīpikā*, p. 157.

22 *Uttarādhyaṇa Sūtra*, XVIII. 11

80 GRADATION OF SOULS AND STAGES OF OMNISCIENCE

less, an agent, has the same extent as its own body, is the employer, exists in *Sam̐sāra*, is *Siddha* and has a characteristic upward motion.”²⁵ A similar list of soul’s characteristics is also given in *Pañcāstikāya Sāra*²⁴ and some other works²⁵ of Jainism. The self in Jainism is described in a dual manner as transcendent and empirical, liberated or bound, pure and impure. However, these words express *two points of view* and not *two different kinds* of self unrelated to each other.²⁶ A man, who is in his youth, cannot be regarded as merely a child. He is something more than a child. But at the same time he cannot be considered altogether different from the child he was, for, in that case he need not be ashamed of the indiscretions of his childhood.²⁷ Similar is the case with the soul. When “we look at it from the point of view of bondage and liberation, happiness and misery”,²⁸ etc. the various points of view must be duly considered for a proper description of what the self is.

23 Nemicandra, *Dravyasaṅgraha*, 2, 4-14.

24 Kundakunda, *Pañcāstikāya Sāra*, 27 It has the single omission of the last named characteristic of ‘having the upward motion’, which is mentioned in the next verse, *Pañcāstikāya Sāra*. 28.

25 *Puruṣārtha Siddhyupāya* of Amṛtacandra also regards soul as the agent and enjoyer (Verse 10). According to *Pravacanasāra* of Kundakunda, “the real nature of soul is knowledge and bliss” (I. 19). Though modification is the nature of soul (*Pravacanasāra* II. 31), it in fact has the triple characteristics of origination, decay and permanence (P. S., II. 62). The empirical self is also described as “bound up with Karmas from an indefinite past” (P.S., II. 20-22, Cp. *Pañcādhyāyī* of Rajamalla, 17, 18, 33)

Reference may be made to K. C. Sogani’s article “The Concept of Self and Various Expressions of the Ethical Ideal in Jainism” published in *Mahāvira Smārikā* (Jaipur, Rājasthān Jain Sabhā, 1693), p. 27.

26 Nemicandra, *Dravyasaṅgraha*, 7, 13; Kundakunda, *Samayasāra*, 7-9, 14-16; *Pravacanasāra*, II. 30; Amṛtchandra, *Puruṣārtha Siddhyupāya*, 4.

27 Siddhasena Divākara, *Sanmatitarka* I. 44.

28 Ibid., I. 46; See also I. 43,

Samantabhadra adopts non-absolutistic attitude²⁹ in his treatment of the question of self and its relation to body. However, the distinction between the empirical and the spiritual self is based on the distinction between what man *actually is* and *what he may become*.³⁰ But this should also be noted that the Jaina theory of soul applies not only to man but to any form of life including animals, birds, insects, plants, devils, angels, etc.

The empirical self is the soul in wordly bondage due to karmas. Therefore this state is said to be impure. The empirical self is agent, enjoyer, limited to the extent of body, resident of this world, undergoes change, admits of plurality, owes material karmas and last but not the least is conscious.³¹

Jaina thinkers have made great efforts to classify souls in several ways.³² One is struck at their patience for endless classifications, division and enumeration, which exhibit their scientific attitude, though quite naturally out of tune with

29 Samantabhadra, *Yuktyanuśāsana*, ed. Jugala Kishore Mukhtāra (Sarsāwā, Vīra Sevā Mandir, 1951), 10, See his criticisms of the Buddhist position, 11, 17.

30 H. Warren, *Jainism* (Ārrāh, Central Jaina Publishing House, 1916 2nd Ed.), Ch. III "Man As He Actually is" and Ch. IV "Man As He May Be."

31 *Dravyasaṅgraha*, 2, *Pañcāstikayasāra* 27, 28; *Tattvārtha Sūtra*, II.10-53; *Tattvārtha Rājavārtika*, pp. 124-158; *Sarvārtha Siddhi*, pp. 164-202; *Tattvārtha Vṛtti*, pp. 86-110; *Tattvārtha Ślokaṣārtika*, pp. 311-344; *Gommaṭa Sāra (Jīva Kāṇḍa)*, 70-117.

32 *Gommaṭasāra (Jīva Kāṇḍa)* gives many classifications having 14, (*Gāthā* 72), 57 (*Gāthā* 73), 570 in 19 varieties (*Gāthās* 75-78), 98 (*Gāthās* 80) varieties of Soul-classes (*Jīva Samāsa*). Great pains have also been taken to ascertain the bodily sizes of a soul (*Gāthās* 94-101), Kinds of births and their nuclei going to 84 lacs (*Gāthās* 81-93) and total kinds of bodily materials of all bodied souls reaching to one *Koḍa Koḍi* (i.e. one hundred million, 10 m. × 10 m.) ninety seven lacs, and fifty thousand crores (*Gāthā* 117).

the modern scientific temper. We are more concerned with the principles of their classifications than with its actual details.

[A] *Gradation in the form of Pañca-parameṣṭhi and the Concept of Omniscience*

The *Namokāra Mantra* (Salutation-chant) with which every devout Jaina makes his daily obeisance and worship indicates a gradual unfolding of the potentialities of the self. The *pañca-Parameṣṭhi* is a collective name for the five kinds of divine souls namely the *Arhats* or Perfected and embodied souls possessing infinite knowledge, happiness and power, *Siddhas* or the perfect soul in *Nirvāṇa* which are formless, bodiless, and free from all karmic attachment, the *Ācāryas* or the experts in the field of spirituality, the *Upādhyāyas* or the experts guiding ascetics and finally *Sādhus* or the ascetics devoted to the contemplation of self.³³ The Arhathood is the culmination of the faculties and powers of the soul and it is blessed with the four-fold infinities after destroying the four obstructive karmas.³⁴ However, even an *Arhat* is describable from both the points of view. From the transcendental point of view, an *Arhat* is without a body but from the ordinary point of view, he possesses a very illuminating body.³⁵ The nature of other divine beings such as *Siddhas*,³⁶ *Ācāryas*,³⁷

33 For details please see Dr. Nemichandra Śāstrī's *Maṅgala Namokāra: Eka Anucintana* (Kāśī, Bhāratiya Jñāna Pīṭha, (2nd ed.), 1960), where the different meanings of these words have been analysed. This chant has a mystical significance in Jaina literature (*Bṛhat-Dravya Saṅgraha*, 49). This chant originally consists of letters (*Dravya Saṅgraha*, 49) which can be reduced to even one letter viz. OM (Vide *Śākaṭāyana Vyākaraṇa*, I.1.77; I.1.81) and be lengthened into twelve thousand verses (*Pañca Namaskāra*).

34 Nemichandra, *Dravyasaṅgraha*, 50.

35 *Bṛhat-Dravyasaṅgraha*, p. 191 (Com. on *Dravyasaṅgraha*, Verse 50)

36 Ibid., *Dravyasaṅgraha*, 51; *Gommaṭasāra (Jīva Kāṇḍa)*, 68.

37 *Dravyasaṅgraha*, 52; *Bṛhat-Dravyasaṅgraha*, 52; *Gommaṭasāra (Jīva Kāṇḍa)*, p. 193.

Upādhyāyas,³⁸ and *Sādhus*³⁹ have been described separately. Arhathood is the stage of final destiny or the stage of *Ayoga Kevalin* (stage of absolute motionlessness) in the 14th i.e., the last stage in the ladder of spiritual development (*Guṇasthāna*) of the soul.⁴⁰ He has attained lordship of peaceful perfection; his Karmic influx (*āśrava*) is wholly stopped and is entirely freed from particles of karmic dust. His vibratory activity has also ceased and is motionless omniscient lord.⁴¹ The *Arhats* see the whole truth and preaches it but add nothing since the truth is perfect and one for all, and for all times, and must necessarily be without beginning and without end.

[B] *Five Types of Conditions for the Existence
of Soul (Gati)*

In *Maṅgalācaraṇa* of *Tattvārtha Sūtra*, generally found and used in Jain temples, we get a gift of Jainism. There it has been stated that there are five kinds of conditions for existence (*Gati*) of soul, namely, hellish (*Nārkiya*), sub-human (*Tiryāṇca*), human beings (*Mānuṣya*), celestial beings (*Deva*) and liberated beings (*Siddha*).⁴² Nemicandra describes fourteen different ways of soul-quests (*Mārgaṇā*),⁴³ which are intended to give us a detailed knowledge of souls. Existential condition (*Gati*) is the state of a soul, brought about by the operation of the body-condition-making Karmas (*Gati-nāma-Karma*). It is the cause of the soul's passing in either of the

38 *Dravyasaṅgraha*, 53; *Bṛhaddravyasaṅgraha*, 53.

39 *Dravyasaṅgraha* and *Bṛhat-Dravyasaṅgraha*, 54.

40 Devendra Sūri, *Karma Grantha*, (ed.) Sukhalālaji (Āgrā, Ātmānanda Jaina Pustaka PrachārakaMandala, 1918), II. 2 (with comment); *Gommatasāra* (*Jīva Kāṇḍa*), 9-65.

41 *Gommatasāra* (*Jīva Kāṇḍa*), 65.

42 J. L. Jaina, *Tattvārthadhigamsūtra* (Ārrāh, Central Jaina Publishing house, 1920), pp. 2-3.

43 Nemicandra, *Gommatasāra* (*Jīva Kāṇḍa*), 141-142.

four conditions of existence, namely, hellish, sub-human, human and celestial.⁴⁴

The different states of existence are the different modifications of *Jīva* brought about by Karmic conditions which are the real causal conditions that lead to the soul to manifest itself in a particular form of birth or death. The soul is neither born nor dead but due to its *Gati-nāma-Karma* it assumes different forms.⁴⁵ Here we find different grades of existence. The *Arhats* and *Siddhas* have no sensuous activities; nor they experience any sensuous pleasure. They enjoy infinite knowledge and happiness without the help of any senses.⁴⁶

The above view about the conditions of existence is almost a religious dogma. All ancient systems of thought, eastern or western, have postulated same patterns of existence. This scheme is combined with a religious schedule of reward and punishment. Apparently all this looks quite preposterous, but "there is nothing inherently impossible in the conception of these forms of living beings, who live, think and feel can and change their bodies at will, as described by Milton in his "Paradise Lost."⁴⁷ The state of liberation (*Siddha-Gati*) is free from birth, dotage, death, fear, miseries, feeling, diseases etc.⁴⁸ It is also the state of omniscience or the ideal state of existence.

[C] *Gradation of Functions (Mārgaṇā) of the Jīvas and Omniscience*

Mārgaṇā (Soul-Quest)⁴⁹ is the means for the identifica-

44 Ibid., 146. There is a detailed description of the characteristics of each *Gati* along with the size, shape, number, characteristic cognisability, etc. (*Gommaṭasāra Jīva Kāṇḍa*), 147–162) Kundakunda also thinks that the different *Gatis* are caused by their respective *Nama-Karma-Prakṛtis* (*Pañcāstikāya Sāra*, 61).

45 Kundakunda, *Pañcāstikāya Sāra*, 19, 60, 61.

46 Nemicandra, *Gommaṭasāra (Jīva Kāṇḍa)*, 174.

47 Ibid., p. 52 (English Introduction of J. L. Jaini).

48 Ibid., 152.

49 J. L. Jaini's Translation.

tion of souls.⁵⁰ It gives a detailed knowledge about them in their multifarious aspects. They deal with *Gati* (conditions of existence), *Indriyas* (senses), *Veda* (Sex-activity), *Kāya* (embodiment), *Yoga* (vibratory activity), *Kaṣāya* (passions), *Jñāna* (knowledge), *Samyama* (control), *Darśana* (conation), *Leśyās* (thought-colourations), *Bhavyatā* (capacity of attaining liberation from Kārmic bondage), *Samyakatva* (Right-belief), *Samjñitva* (Rationality) and *Āhāra* (assimilation).⁵¹ This is a classification of souls according to the different functions they perform in their different embodiments. However, there is a strong tendency towards a serial gradation from the less perfect to the more perfect. For example, the moving (*trasa*) worldly (*samsārī*) souls are classified on the basis of the number of senses they possess—one-sensed, two-sensed and so on. The one-sensed *Jīva* is the lowest in the grade of existence possessing only four *Prāṇas* (i.e. only the sense of touch and the three *Balas*) while the five-sensed soul (of human being) possess ten *Prāṇas*, and it is also rational.⁵² There is a tendency in Jaina works to classify souls according to the degrees of their development, as for example, into mundane and liberated,⁵³ and mundane into rational and irrational⁵⁴ and mobile and immobile,⁵⁵ and mobile souls into two-sensed worm to five-sensed man⁵⁶ and immobile into five kinds of bodies—earth, water, fire, air and vegetable,⁵⁷ from non-developable to developable. This perhaps is due to the belief⁵⁸ in the natural upward movement of the soul by virtue of which one can reach to the highest state of existence. Every soul is potentially equipped

50 Nemicandra, *Gommaṭasāra* (*Jīva Kāṇḍa*), 141.

51 Ibid., 142.

52 Kundakunda, *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, 114. Cp. *Gommatasāra* (*Jīva Kāṇḍa*), 74-76.

53 Umāsvāmī, *Tattvārthasūtra*, II. 10.

54 Ibid., II. 11.

56 Ibid., II. 23.

55 Ibid., II. 12.

57 Ibid., II. 13.

58 Nemicandra, *Gommaṭasāra* (*Jīva kāṇḍa*), 78.

with four-fold infinities and, hence, if proper efforts be made, there is no reason, why one cannot attain the state of super-knowledge, faith and happiness

[D] *Gradation according to the Stages of Spiritual Development (Guṇasthānas) of the Soul and Omniscience*

The spiritual progress of the soul has fourteen stages, from impurifying bondage to purified freedom, from wrong-belief to right-belief, from nescience to omniscience. Bondage is due to five causes, namely, wrong belief, vowlessness, carelessness, passions and vibratory activity.⁵⁹ From the *first* to the *third* stage of spirituality (*Guṇasthāna*), all the causes are found, though in the *second*, the first is absent for a very short time. In the *fourth* stage, all but the *first* (*Mithyādarśana*) are found, in the *fifth* and *sixth* stages, all but wrong belief and vowlessness are present. In the *seventh* to *tenth* stages, all but the first three, i.e., wrong-belief, vowlessness and carelessness are found and in the *eleventh* to *thirteenth* stages, all but the first four are found. However, none is present in the last stage.⁶⁰

The inner light, the quest for perfection, is never extinguished in the soul, even in its bondage. The eternal impulse towards the good is not always like a working volcano but remains like a sleeping one with the greatest possible potentiality. This spiritual slumber can be broken only by cutting the spiritual knot (*granthi*) of desire (*Rāga*) and aversion (*dveṣa*) by means of three-fold mechanism⁶¹ of moral purification and spiritual enlightenment known as slumbering impulse (*Yathāpravṛtta Karaṇa*), new spiritual impulse (*apūrvakaraṇa*) and impulse of spiritual dawn (*anivṛttakaraṇa*)⁶² with their respective sub-processes.⁶³ Omniscience is attained in the one

59 Ibid., VIII. 1. (*Mithyādarśana*, *Avirati*, *Pramāṇa*, *Kaṣṭha* and *Yoga*).

60 Ibid., II. 27; *Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya*, 1204-1217.

61 *Nemicandra*, *Gommatasāra* (*Jiva Kāṇḍa*), 47.

62 Ibid., 43-54.

63 *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-Bhāṣya* (*Brahadvṛtti*), 1202-1217; *Nemicandra*, *Labdhi Sāra*, 3-7.

but the last stage of spirituality (*Sayoga Kevalin*) but the soul still is subject to certain activities conditional upon matter.⁶⁴ However, in the *fourteenth* and *final* spiritual stage, when the inflow of Karmic-particles have absolutely stopped and his vibratory activity has completely ceased, he is said to be a non-vibrating omniscient lord (*Ayoga-Kevalin*).⁶⁵ Such a soul is devoid of eight kinds of karmas and instead possesses eight-fold excellences of omniscience (*Kevala Jñāna*), perfect conation (*Kevala darśana*), infinite power (*Ananta Vīrya*), perfect right belief (*Samyaktva*), un-disturbability (*Avyābādha*), interpenetrability (*Avagāhanatva*), and neither of low nor of high family (*Agurulaghutva*).⁶⁶ These excellences of the liberated souls or the *siddhas* are mentioned to refute the views of the following sects, namely, *Sadāśiva* (the view that the soul was never actually bound by the Karmas), *Sāṅkhya* (which holds that bondage, liberation and transmigration, happiness and misery are merely in *Prakṛti*), *Maskaris* (according to which the soul after liberation can be affected by the Karmas and can return to the world again), *Buddhas* (who believe that everything is transcendent), the *Naiyāyikas* and the *Vaiśeṣikas* (according to whom liberation means annihilation of happiness or the qualities of the soul), *Issaravādins* (for whom God is always free and creates the world) and the *Maṇḍalins* (who hold that the liberated soul has an ever-lasting upward motion).⁶⁷

We can say on the basis of the above that for Jainas, omniscience is the legitimate claim of every soul, as it follows from the essential nature of the soul as consciousness. Whatever might be its religious and spiritual implications, omniscience is the natural culmination of consciousness. If soul is inherently possessed of the infinite knowledge etc. (vide the doctrine of *Ananta-Catuṣṭaya*) which is temporarily lost due to Karmic-obstacles, its recovery is natural, if one is able to

64 Nemicandra, *Ibid.*, 64.

66 *Ibid.*, 68.

65 *Ibid.*, 64.

67 *Ibid.*, 69.

remove those obstacles. Further, it is not going to be the acquisition of an altogether new attribute, because neither a real thing is liable to destruction nor an unreal one can come into being.⁶⁸ Out of nothing, nothing comes.

[E] *Gradation of Transcendental Self and Omniscience*
Par excellence

In accordance with the spirit of non-absolutism, the Jainas make a distinction between the real and the ordinary points of view regarding the soul, but there are writers like Kundakunda, Yogindu and a few others, who deal with this problem more from the standpoint of *Niścaya*. The treatment naturally turns to be highly spiritual. *Ātman* turns out to be really *Paramātman*.⁶⁹ From practical point of view, the *Ātman* because of Karmic association undergoes various operations,⁷⁰ but from the real point of view, *Ātman* is not subject to bondage and liberation.⁷¹ The author of the work, Śrī Yogīndra has, no doubt, used both these points of view but ultimately the practical point of view is discarded in favour of the real point of view. Practical view-point is useful and essential in so far as it leads to the realistic view-point, but by itself, it is inadequate. Analogy of a 'cow' can do only so long we have not seen a 'gavaya'.

In the final spiritual evolution, the subject-object relation is very much different because the spirit, being endowed with the power of omniscience, is able to see all objects without having senses.⁷² Kundakunda in *Samaya Sāra*, gives instructions how to know the real self (*Sva-Samaya*). This *Sva-Samaya*⁷³ or the Ego-in-itself is the pure and ultimate reality.

68 Kundakunda, *Pañcāstikayasāra*, 19.

69 Yogindu, *Paramātmāprakāśa*, I. 16.

70 Ibid., I. 60, Cp. *Pravacanasāra*, II. 30.

71 Yogindu, Ibid., I. 64-68.

72 Kundakunda, *Pravacanasāra*, I.21; I.35; I.36; I.56.

73 Kundakunda, *Samayasāra*, 2.

This self, which has realised its oneness, is the beautiful ideal and absolutely free from bondage.⁷⁴ This description of the self very much resembles that of the Upaniṣadic and Advaitic *Brahman* or *Ātman*. But since, it is not the only reality in the whole world, it falls short of the status of the Upaniṣadic *Ātman*. From the real point of view, the soul is not bound, not touched, not other than itself but steady, same and not combined.⁷⁵ Here the knowledge of the knower is also the knowledge of the known.⁷⁶

The classification of the transcendental spirit into external (*Bahirātman*), internal (*Antarātman*) and absolute (*Paramātman*) is very significant. These are, in fact, only three stages of the progress of soul. This characterisation roughly corresponds to the method of *Arundhati Nyāya* or *Śākhā Candīa Nyāya* adopted in the Upaniṣad and Vedānta literature to point out the subtle nature of the soul by depicting the spiritual ladder starting from the food-sheath (*Annāmāya-Koṣa*) and leading to the blissful-sheath (*ānanda-māya-koṣa*)⁷⁷ or from the crude doctrine of soul as son (*putrātma-vāda*) to the Advaitic conception of Self as “pure, consciousness, eternal, free etc.”⁷⁸ Similarly, the *Bahirātman* represents the materialistic view of self, in as much as, it is identified with the gross-physical body and other material objects of enjoyment.⁷⁹ It remains engaged in sensual and carnal pleasures of life⁸⁰ and is desirous of getting material enjoyment here and hereafter and so is necessarily under the fear of death.⁸¹ In the next stage, naturally, the soul will transcend this physical barrier and

74 Ibid., 3.

75 Ibid., 14.

76 Ibid., 16.

77 *Tait. Up.* II. 1-7 (*Brahmānanda Valli*).

78 Sadānanda, *Vedānta Sāra*, 123-135.

79 Pūjyapāda, *Samādhi Tantra*, 7, 11, 13, etc.; Cg. Kundakunda, *Samaya-sāra*, 25; Yogīndu, *Paramātma-Prakāśa*, I. 13.

80 Pūjyapāda, Ibid., 7-55 (*Samādhi Tantra*).

81 Ibid., 42, 76; *Yoga Sāra* (of Yogīndu), 10; Rāja Malla, *Adhyātma-Kamala-Mārtanda*, III. 12.

will realise itself as the internal self which is separate and distinct from the body, is of the nature of knowledge and well-established in perfect tranquility.⁸² It is truly spiritual self, who⁸³ has no lust for material enjoyment⁸⁴ and is the way to liberation.⁸⁵ Rāja Malla, further, subdivides this internal self into three types - superior, inferior and in between the two.⁸⁶ *Ātman* though dwelling in the body is absolutely different from the body. It is not even a miniature of any universal self as is held by some of the Upaniṣads. Rather, the *Jīva*, according to Jainism, retains its separateness even in immortality. In the Vedānta, the *Ātman* and *Brahman* are the two aspects of the same reality; in Jainism, spirit and super-spirit are the two stages of the same entity, but spirit and world remain two different things, whereas in the Vedānta, the soul, God and the world all are one. Hence, as the description of a city does not constitute that of its ruler, the adoration of its body is not the adoration of the omniscient lord.⁸⁷ The *antarātman* or spirit becomes the super-spirit (*Paramātman*) when it knows itself, exists in knowledge, and is free from Karmas.⁸⁸ He after subjugating the senses, realises that the self is of the nature of real knowledge, is called a conqueror.⁸⁹ This is the state of embodied (*Arhat*) or disembodied (*Siddha*) *Paramātman*, and the *Arhat* is free from birth, old age, death⁹⁰ and other obstructions, is independent of the senses, unparalleled, liberated and free from rebirth. He is eternal, non-transcient and independent.⁹¹ He is *Siddha*, pure, omniscient

82 Yogīndu, *Paramātma Prakāśa*, 1, 14.

83 Pūjyapāda, *Ibid.*, 27, 30; *Mokṣa Pāhuḍa* 5 (Kundakunda).

84 Pūjyapāda, *Ibid.*, 17.

85 Pūjyapāda, *Ibid.*, 15, 37.

86 Rāja Malla, *Adhyātma-Kemala-Mārtanḍa*, III, 12 (Notes).

87 Kundakunda, *Samayasāra*, 30.

88 Yogīndu, *Ibid.*, 15.

89 Kundakunda, *Ibid.*, 31.

90 Kundakunda, *Niyamasāra*, 176.

91 *Ibid.*, 177

and conqueror of senses.⁹² This super-spirit has been classified into spirit (*Arhat*) and super-spirit (*Siddha*) by Rāj Malla.⁹³ The former has destroyed the obstructive Karmas and is embodied, while the latter has destroyed non-obstructive karmas and is disembodied. But each represents the *ananta-catuṣṭaya*. The *Paramātman* of Yogīndu, however, much it resembles the Upaniṣadic *Brahman*, cannot be compared with it. Upaniṣadic *Brahman* is one and only one and is the very source and support of everything; it is self-created and is self-existent. The *Paramātman* of the Jainas must maintain its basic individuality and independence from the world which is equally real. Even the mystic Yogīndu clearly says: “*Ātman* is never anything but *Ātman*; the non-soul (*Para Padārtha*) is always different from the soul; neither the *Ātman* can become the non-soul nor can the non-soul ever become the *Ātman*.”⁹⁴

From the above, the pluralistic and the realistic bias of Jainism is perfectly clear. The *Paramātman*, unlike the Upaniṣadic *Brahman*, is not self-created (*Svayambhū*) but it is the *Ātman* which becomes the *Paramātman*. The Upaniṣadic formula of the identity of *Ātman* and *Brahman* exhibits uncompromising unity but the Jaina-formula of relationship between *Ātman* and *Paramātman* points only to the identity of the different states of the same individual. Hence, any monistic or pantheistic interpretation will be, I am afraid, not in keeping with the basic tenets of Jainism.⁹⁵

The *Paramātman* of the Jainas is not absolutistic or pantheistic yet Jainism has worked out a system of Godhead contained in the very conception of spiritual evolution from *Ātman* to *Paramātman*. The diversity of *Siddha*, *Arhat*, *Tīrtha-ñkaras*, *Munis*, etc. is a logical consequence of this evolution.

92 Kundakunda, *Mokṣa-Pāhuda*, 35.

93 Rāja Malla. *Ibid.*, III. 12 (*Sa'kalātman & Vikalātman*).

94 Yogīndu, *Paramātma-Prakāśa*, 1. 67.

95 Radhakrishnan's *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 334-340 offers an absolutistic interpretation of Jainism.

However, it must be remembered that the *Paramātmān* of the Jainas is not like the creating *Īśvara* of the Nyāya but it is the highest ethical ideal, the summum bonum, and the spiritual terminus of self-development. The *Paramātmān*hood is at once the realisation of the metaphysical, ethical and religious ideals of the self. Realisation of the essential nature of the self (*Svarūpa Sattā*) as consciousness, is the same as the attainment of Siddhahood, which is at once the highest ethical and religious state one can aspire after. All this shows an unmistakable element of mysticism. The *Paramātmān* in Jainism, though not creative, is nearer to the idea of a personal absolute, but there is constant stress upon the attainment of the highest type of knowledge through self-development. Self is the embodiment of knowledge. Hence, it is said that when the *Ātman* is known, everything else is known. This again sounds like the Upaniṣadic idealism. "One who knows the self, knows everything."⁹⁶ The super-spirit or *Paramātmān* of the Jainas is also omniscient.⁹⁷ However, the subject-matter of knowledge according to the Upaniṣads and the Jainas is not the same. For Jainas, the subject-matter of perfect knowledge consists of all the substances with all their modifications. There will be so many theoretical and practical difficulties if we literally follow this definition of omniscience. Nor, we can accept the Vedāntic or Upaniṣadic interpretation of omniscience as self-knowledge. However, Kundakunda works out a *via media* between the two extremes. He says : "From the practical point of view (just as) knowledge illuminates other (objects), so does conation. From practical standpoint (just as) soul illuminates other objects, so does conation (also)."⁹⁸ In fact, soul is the very embodiment of knowledge; so, when one knows the soul, he knows everything.

96 *Brhad. Up.* III. 7.1.

97 Yogīndu, *Ibid.*, 15; Kundakunda, *Mokṣa Pāhuḍa*, 35; *Pravacana sārā*, I. 16; I. 20; I. 22; *Pāñcāstikāyasāra*, 35, 36; Nemicaṇḍra, *Gommat-sāra (Jīva Kāṇḍa)*, 65, 66; *Dravya Saṅgraha*, 50, 51.

98 Kundakunda, *Niyamasāra*, 163, See also 164 & 165.

III. Proofs for the Soul being the Ground of Omniscience

(A) General

Omniscience, having been shown to be an innate potential property of the soul, the fact of its being the ground of omniscience is also thereby established. The soul is, for the Jainas, the knower, who possesses four-fold perfection, both in its natural state and liberated states. Without the soul, the whole edifice of Karma-phenomenology, and that of ethics and morality will remain unexplained and untenable. Similarly, without it, transmigration, rebirth, etc. cannot be explained.

But can we not say that, although Buddha said that there was no soul,⁹⁹ his attitude was never less ethical and moral than anyone else's and he also regarded Karman and rebirth as acknowledged facts. Let us find out the reasons. At the outset, this may be mentioned that Buddha did not reject the soul altogether. What he rejected was the *substantial* conception of self (*sakkāyaditthi*), which is *avidyā* par excellence and hence cause of all passions. Buddha simply rejected the Brahmanical conception of soul, which was regarded as the inner core of the fundamental reality, immutable, permanent and eternal. In its extremely radical form, namely Advaita Vedānta, this soul or *Ātman* is said to be one without a second and hence the denial of all plurality and reality of the phenomenal world. Now according to Buddhism, if we regard soul as such an unchanging, permanent, being, there will be no scope for moral endeavour. On the one hand it might lead to moral

99 "Practically inseparable from the doctrine of *Anicca* is that of *Anatta*" (A. Coomaraswamy, *Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism*, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1956, p. 88). See *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, XII. 70. 32-37; XXXV.85; *Dīgha Nikāya* (*Mahāvidhara Sutta*) 15; *Vinaya Piṭaka* (*Mahā Vagga*), I. 6.38-46. Śāntaraksita goes to the length of saying that Doctrine of Non-substantialism (*Nairātmyavāda*) is the distinguishing feature of Buddha, and therefore he stands at the head of all philosophers, *Tattva Saṅgraha*, 3325, and "he who believes in *Ātman*, perishes," *Tattva Saṅgraha*, 3340.

lethargy (*akriyāvāda*), and on the other it might be the cause of all attachment and pain.¹⁰⁰ This belief in a permanent substance in man called the soul, is inconsistent with the Buddhist law of universal change and impermanence, which has been subsequently developed into that of momentariness (*kṣaṇikavāda*), which has been deduced from the criterion of existence as causal efficiency (*artha-kriyā-kāritva-lakṣaṇam*). Although Buddha denies the continuity of a permanent, identical, eternal, substantial soul, he does not deny the continuity of the stream of successive states of life which are causally conditioned. This makes the past, present and future lives continuous. Thus, Buddha does not propound the theory of Non-substantiality;¹⁰¹ he simply replaces the conception of substantial soul by that of an unbroken stream of consciousness, as we find in the philosophy of William James and David Hume. On the positive side, we have the doctrine of *Puñca-skandhas* or five groups of physical and psychical states, namely, (i) *rūpa* (four elements, the body, the senses), sense data, etc., (ii) *Vedanā* (feelings), (iii) *Sanjñā* (conceptual knowledge), (iv) *Samskāras* (predispositions) and (v) *Vijñāna* (consciousness).¹⁰²

100 cp. S. Radhakrishnan's statement in the Introduction to *Dhammapada*, p. 31 (London, Oxford University Press, 1958) "The proposition that there is no permanent unchanging self in persons or things (*Sarvam anātman*) is not a speculative theory, or a sentimental outburst on the transitoriness of the world, but the basis of all ethics." "The passionate sense of egotism is the root of the world's unhappiness" *Mādhyanika-Kārikā* of Nāgārjuna, XXVIII.2.

101 *Majjhima Nikāya* (Alaguddupama Sutta), I. 140. There are numerous passages attributed to Buddha and his disciples asserting the reality of self. "It is better Lord, for us to go in search of self"—*Vinaya Piṭaka*, I.23; "the self is the Lord of self"—*Vinaya Piṭaka*, I. 23; see also, *Mahāparinirvāna Sutta*, II. 26; "This is not mine; I am not this this is not myself;" *Samyutta Nikāya*, III. 25 "Self is our light (*attadīpa*), our refuge (*attasaraṇa*)."

102 *Samyutta Nikāya*, III. 86. See Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Psychology*, Chapter III.

But there are difficulties in this position. Is the self a mere empirical collection identical with five-fold aggregates of physical and psychical states? In other words, is the self identical with body and mind? If so, there would be no self after death. This will lead to materialism or nihilism (*uccheda-vāda*) and will also make moral and spiritual progress leading to *Nirvāṇa* meaningless. True, to questions like these, the usual Buddhist answer is that the relationship is indescribable (*avācya*).¹⁰³ But then, this is not really an answer. However, on behalf of the Buddhist, it can be said that Buddha adopted a neither-nor approach quite characteristic of the doctrine of the middle path (*Madhyamā Pratipadā*) i.e., he thought that soul is neither different from nor identical with the body,¹⁰⁴ in order to get rid of both eternalism (*Śāśvatavāda*) and nihilism (*Ucchedavāda*).

The second difficulty in the Buddhist view of Self is that it misses the sense of *identity*. It is true that the theory of a mind-continuum governed by the natural law of causation provides not only for *continuity*, but also for *change*. Each succeeding state is the result of the preceding state which means that nothing is lost. Now if the doctrine of Karma means an assertion of the inexorable moral law of causation, and rebirth implies not the physical continuity of the body but the emergence of a new series of states caused and conditioned by the preceding ones, then Buddhists say, they have no difficulty in accepting them. Similarly, memory also becomes explicable. Vasubandhu says "Memory is a new state of consciousness directed to the same

103 Nāgārjuna observes : "There is the self, there is the not-self, as also that there is neither the self nor the not-self"—*Mādhyamika Kārikā*, XVIII. 6.

104 *Samyutta Nikāya*, XII. 35.5; *Majjhima Nikāya*, I. 256. cp. "Eternalism implies inherent perfection while nihilism implies its impossibility. It is in order to avoid these two undesired consequences that the Buddha adopted the middle course and left these problems *avyākata* unexplained"—N. M. Tatia, *Studies in Jain Philosophy*, p. 14.

object caused by its previous states.”¹⁰⁵ This means that “as the present state of consciousness inherits its characters from the previous ones, the past in a way continues in the present, through its effect.”¹⁰⁶ Similarly they also explain such “rudimentary experiences as sensation or feeling and higher forms of experience, such as judgement and inference.”¹⁰⁷ The Buddhists believe that by accounting for *continuity* in the series of mental states and events, they can explain everything for which the identity of the soul has been considered necessary. But this is not correct. The successive constituents of a continuous series have to be held together in order that the series may form a continuity. Any constituent cannot do this work of holding together. This means that there must be some identical substance however refined it might be which performs its functions. Therefore, it is wrong to think that identity of self is an unnecessary notion.

It is now evident that Indian philosophers, including the Buddhists, think that we cannot adequately explain the fact of knowledge and morality without the hypothesis of a soul. So, even the Buddhist, who denied the substance-view of soul, have simply replaced it by the theory of a mind-continuum and *Pañcha-skandha*. The Cārvākas are the only exception. According to them the soul is nothing more than this conscious living body, which perishes along with the body at the time of death. They do not worry to explain knowledge beyond sense-perception and to them liberation with the sense of complete cessation of sufferings can only mean death. Hence, they do not care whether the soul exists or not. But all

105 Yośomitra, *Abhidharma Kosa Vyākhyā*, ed. Wogihara, Tokyo, pp. 711-712, quoted in T. R. V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, p. 33.

106 S. C. Chatterjee & D. M. Datta, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy* (Calcutta University Press, 6th ed. 1960), p. 138.

107 T. R. V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1955), p. 34.

other systems of Indian philosophy give their best attention to prove the existence of self.

The Jainas have also offered arguments for the existence of soul. Their discussion also, like others, has *Pūrva-pakṣa* (statement of the opponent's view) and *Uttara-pakṣa* (statement of their own view). Here, I shall confine myself to the examination of arguments for the existence of soul and shall not discuss Jaina criticisms of the different conceptions of soul in Indian philosophy. I shall also not discuss those Jaina arguments which are of general nature¹⁰⁸ and too well known. They can also be found elsewhere. I shall, therefore, concentrate only on those arguments which are based on the doctrine of *Pramāṇas*.

[i] *Argument for the existence of Soul based on Perception (Pratyakṣa) :*

The existence of Self is directly proved by our uncontradicted immediate experiences. Hence, to argue that the soul does not exist since neither it nor its functions are ever perceived directly¹⁰⁹ is wrong because it is proved by experience like happiness, sorrow, memory, etc. In fact, our own experience is the basis even of doubts and denials.¹¹⁰ All the mental

108 The Psychological Argument states that the various psychological functions of mental life cannot be explained without the hypothesis of a soul. But we can say that William James, David Hume, Buddhists and the Behaviourists do not accept this.

It is further said that 'self' cannot be doubted or denied, because it is "the self that by which we know" – *Ācārāṅga Sūtra*, I. 5.5.; cp. Śaṅkara's statements, "self cannot be doubted for it is the essential nature of him who denies it" – *Brahma-Sūtra* (S.B.), II. 3.7); "everyone is conscious of the existence of his own self and no one thinks "I am not" – *Brahma Sūtra* (S.B.) I. 1.1. "If there is no doubt, how do you realise *aham*?" – *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-Bhāṣya*, 1554–6. In a manner very much similar to Descartes (*Cogito ergo sum*), Mahāvīra also proves the existence of self. (Vide, *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya*, 1557).

109 *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya*, 1549

110 *Ibid.*, 1557.

states are the functions of the self and all these are quite evident in our everyday experiences. This is the knowledge of *ahampratyaya*¹¹¹ ('I sense') or the 'Cogito' of Descartes and unity of apperception of Kant. This is not realised through the external senses but through the internal sense.

But we can say that this argument contains a jump from the psychological to the ontological. No one denies the occurrence of our mental states but to posit a reality behind them is to stretch the idea too far. The Behaviourists, who explain everything in terms of behaviour, will not agree to it, nor will it be acceptable to Hume or James.

[ii] *Argument for the Existence of soul based on Inference (Anumāna) :*

Anumāna is a knowledge which comes after perception. (*tat pūrvakam anumānam*). Now, since no one has perceived the soul in the past, it cannot become the subject-matter of inference. Further, inference, to be valid, requires a relation of universal concomitance (*vyāpti*) between the major term (*sādhya*) and middle term (*hetu*). Here, as pointed out earlier, there is no relation between the soul (*major term*) and its recollection based on past perception (*middle term*), hence it can be inferred that there is no soul¹¹²

But it is said, as has been shown earlier, the existence of soul is self-evident and is proved by such uncontradicted experience as 'I feel pain' etc. The soul is supposed to be the substratum of consciousness, which is self-evident. Now, as *substance* cannot exist without attributes, so there can be no *soul* without consciousness. Now, we can say that since we realise the attributes (i.e., consciousness), we cannot avoid realising its *substance* (i.e., soul).¹¹³ However, it may be pointed out that this assertion is based on the commonsense view of the relation between substance and attributes, the myth of which has been exploded by Berkeley, Bradley, Śāṅkara and

111 Ibid., 1554.

112 Ibid., 1550

113 Ibid., 1558

others. There is also a quite serious objection from the side of the Cārvākas who hold that consciousness is the product of material elements, and hence there is no independent thing like soul as the substratum of consciousness. But the Cārvākas cannot prove it through perception, their only valid means of knowledge, because we never perceive anywhere the generation of consciousness by unconscious material elements. Even inference cannot prove it, because if the body were the cause of consciousness, it would have existed so long as the body existed i.e., during sleep, swoon, or even in a dead body,¹¹⁴ which is not a fact. We cannot prove causal connection between the matter and consciousness also because growth or decay of the body is not always followed by development and decay of consciousness. Even the organisation of the different material collocations to produce some consciousness requires some organiser, which is no other than the soul. To prove the identity between soul and body on the basis of such statements, 'I am fat', 'I am weak' is due to taking *literally* what has been said *figuratively*. Then to prove the non-existence of soul on the basis of such negative judgements 'there is no soul in the body' is self-contradictory. We cannot make a negative judgement in the case of absolutely non-existent object. Denial of something in the place implies the knowledge of its existence somewhere in some form.¹¹⁵

The Jainas build up their argument for the existence of soul on the classical criticism of materialism that if consciousness is not *implicit* in the material elements, it cannot become explicit. Whatever is non-existent (*asat*) cannot be made to exist (*sat*). As Vācaspati says "blue cannot be turned into yellow even by one thousand artists"¹¹⁶, so says Haribhadra "as oil is absent in each particle of sand, it cannot be produced

114 Prabhācandra, *Prameya-Kamala-Mātaṇḍa*, p. 114.

115 Guṇaratna's Commentary on Haribhadra's *Saḍ-darśana-Samuccaya*, 48-49.

116 Vācaspati Miśra, *Sāṅkhya-Tattva-Kaumudī*, 9 (notes).

from the combination also",¹¹⁷ as "an unreal being cannot come into being."¹¹⁸ This means that if consciousness is absolutely unreal, it can never become real, so it must exist in the soul. If it were not so, man might have been turned into matter and vice versa if the underlying material elements would have found favourable developments.¹¹⁹

It can also be argued for the existence of soul that since attributes of a substance having form must be with form, so knowledge etc. being *formless*, it must be with the formless, i.e., soul. Like begets like and hence qualities like consciousness cannot be produced by material body.

The soul is also knowable mediately through many other agencies. One argument is advanced on the analogy of a controller (*Adhiṣṭhāna*).¹²⁰ The human body can be moved and controlled at will like a machine or motor-car, and, therefore, there must be someone that moves and controls it. There must be some *agent* who moves and controls our different organs and senses. However, an objector can point out that as an automatic machine moves itself or as our different instincts, reflexes work themselves, so to posit something else may not be quite correct. However, it cannot be denied that this argument is in line with common-sense, of which the Jainas are the great champions.

The existence of soul is also proved on the ground that the term *Jīva* (soul) is a singular term having its own derivation and consequent significance and meaning and this meaning is the concept of soul.¹²¹ There is a relation of uni-

117 Haribhadra, *Śāstra-Vārtā-Samuccaya*, 44.

118 Kundakunda, *Pañcāstikāya Sāra*, 19, cp, *Sāṅkhyā-kārikā*, 9; *Chāṇḍogya Up.* VI. 2.2; *Brahma Sūtra* (S.B.), II.1.18; *Bhagavat Gītā*, II. 16.

119 Sukhalal Sanghavi, *Darśana Aur Cintana*, pp. 231-232. He lists seven proofs for the existence of soul.

120 *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya*, 1557.

121 *Ibid.*, 1575.

versal concomitance between a singular derivative term and its meaning. As a negative example, we can take the case of 'Dittha', which has no derivation, hence no meaning. However, this is an argument of linguistic nature and it can hold good only with regard to Sanskrit language. I do hold that linguistic argument is no argument at all. No ontological problem can be solved by etymology, neither in Sanskrit nor in any other language. But I have tried to place for historical reasons which depict the extreme anxiety of the Jaina thinkers to prove the existence of the soul.

In short, the self cannot be denied. To say that 'my *self* does not exist' is self-contradictory, because its existence is asserted in its very denial. To say that 'my *self* does not exist' is like saying 'my mother is barren'.

[iii] *Argument based on Scriptural Authority (Āgamas):*

It is true that scriptures do support the existence of soul and doubtlessly they contain the most impartial findings of the sincere and strenuous labour of the elevated souls. But then the difficulty arises when they differ among themselves and propound contradictory theories.¹²² The Jaina thinkers try to meet this objection by distinguishing between *valid* and *invalid scriptures*.¹²³ But then this has to be told what would be the criterion of a valid scripture and who will decide that this is a valid criterion. For example, Akalaṅka uses *consistency (Avisaṃvāda)*¹²⁴ as the criterion of a valid scripture, but is he prepared to transcend the limitations of Jainism? It is also said that scripture contains infallible statements made by the omniscient persons who directly perceive everything and have got self-realisation. But the old question is still there "If Sugata is omniscient, why not Kapila also? And if both

122 Ibid., 1553.

123 Siddhasena Divākara, *Nyāyavatāra*, 8 & 9.

124 Vidyānanda, *Aṣṭa Sahasrī*, p. 236 (see *Aṣṭa Śatī* of Akalaṅka), cp. Siddhasena Divākara, *Sammatī Tarka*, III. 45; Samantabhadra, *Āpta-Mīmāṃsā*, 78.

are omniscient, why there are differences of opinion between them ?”¹²⁵ Any reply to it will only be a shifting of position or a dogmatic assertion of one’s own position.

(iv) *Argument based on Analogy (Upamāna)* :¹²⁶

Analogical argument is based on similarity but since there is no object found like the soul, there can be no analogical argument about the soul. But this is not a fact. My consciousness of a table is just like yours and the soul is the substratum of such consciousness. Hence, there is no difficulty. But we see that from the resemblances between the attributes, the existence of the soul substance is inferred, hence, this is in fact an inferential argument.

(v) *Argument based on Circumstantial Implication*¹²⁷ (*Arthāpatti*) :

In the *Pūrva-pakṣa*, one may say that even *arthāpatti* cannot prove its existence since there is no object whose existence can be explained only by assuming the existence of the soul.¹²⁸ But this is wrong. The Jainas say, we cannot explain all kinds of experiences without postulating the soul. The postulate of consciousness present in our immediate experience is no other than the soul whose existence is undeniable.

(vi) *Argument based on Non-Cognition (Abhāva Pramāṇa)* :

The function of Non-cognition or *Abhāva* is to establish non-existence of something, hence it can only prove the non-existence of soul. But we can say that mind, sense-organs and all other material instruments like the microscope etc, cannot

125 Śāntarakṣita, *Tattva Saṅgraha*, 3149; see Akalaṅka, *Siddhiviniścaya*, VIII. 19.

126 Vādībhā Simha Sūri, *Syādvāda Siddhi*, Ch. I, (Jīva-Siddhi).

127 I owe this term to Dr. Rājendra prasād, I. I. T., Kanpur. He had also suggested another term ‘Contextual Implication’ but he preferred the former.

128 Vādībhā Simha Sūri, *Syādvāda Siddhi*, I. 9–10.

fully explain perception without soul. It means, therefore, that soul is definitely existent and its existence is proved negatively. It is true that everything cannot be perceived through eyes, for example, we can see our body with eyes but we cannot see our consciousness with them, but this does not mean that consciousness does not exist.¹²⁹

we can conclude that these proofs for the existence of soul may be regarded as indirect proofs to omniscience since soul is the substratum of omniscience. If soul does not exist, there is no locus for knowledge, since knowledge subsists in the soul itself and omniscience is knowledge par-excellence.

¹²⁹ Ibid., I. 15.

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CHAPTER V

THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY OF KARMA AND OMNISCIENCE

I. The Basic Postulate of the Theory : Its Genesis and Meaning

The soul according to Jaina metaphysics, being constitutionally free and potentially divine, its corruption in the state of worldly existence needs to be explained. If soul is consciousness itself, whence came his association with the body of physical matter ? The Jainas maintain that karma is the matrix of the universe and the whole world undergoes evolution due to karma. Karma is not only the ground-mass of individual's destiny but also the mould in which anything and everything takes shape. Our past karmas put a world before us otherwise it would not be possible to get appropriate pleasures and pains. Like the Leibnizian world, the set is different for different individuals. As a matter of fact, the function of karma is to produce appropriate experiences including pleasurable and painful ones. Hence, there have to be suitable objective world sets and suitable personal, individual sets, both conditioned by karmas. This will be a sort of idealism which may be called *Karmic Idealism*—distinct from either the subjective or the objective variety of metaphysical idealism.

Idealism here does not mean idealism in the conventional metaphysical sense. Karma can be either physical or mental and a world determined by karma is not completely a mental or idealistic world. Therefore, when I speak of *Karmic-Idealism*, I mean something else. A man's karmas are the ideal causes in the sense that they determine what a man ought to

get. The theory of karma holds not only that an individual ought to get what he deserves in virtue of his karma but also that he, infact, gets what he deserves in virtue of them. Therefore, karmas, which are the ideal determinants of an individual's private as well as public world, turn out to be also their actual determinants. This means that the private and the public worlds are determined by such causes (karmas) by which they also ought to be determined. All this gives enough justification for using the term Karmic-Idealism¹ in the sense it is used here.²

Various other attempts have also been made to explain the facts. These theories are materialism (*bhautikavāda*),³ naturalism (*svabhāvavāda*),⁴ temporalism (*kālavāda*),⁵ determinism (*niyatīvāda*),⁶ fortuitism (*yadracchāvāda*),⁷ scepticism and agno-

- 1 Please refer to my article "Karmic Idealism of the Jainas" before the Seminar on *Karma & Re-birth*, held in August 1965 under the auspices of the Centre for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras. The above is the gist of the said article and is also relevant to our present purpose.
- 2 cp. "The Law of Karma is thus the general moral law which governs not only the life and destiny of all individual beings, but even the order and arrangement of the physical world."—S. C. Chatterjee & D. M. Datta, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy* pp. 15-16.
- 3 *Dīgha-Nikāya*, I. 2; *Chāndogya Up.*, VIII. 8; *Tait. Up.* II. 1.2; *Brahmajāla Sūtra*; *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, I. 1.1.; II.1.9.; Madhvācārya, *Sarva-darśana-Saṅgraha*, Chapter I.
- 4 *Śvetāśvatara Up.*, I. 2.; Aśvaghōṣa, *Buddha Carita*, 52; *Mahābhārata* Śānti Parva, XXV.16; *Bhag. Gīta*, V. 14; For criticism, see Udayanācārya, *Nyāya Kusumāñjali*, I. 5.
- 5 *Atharva-Veda*. XIX. 53-54; *Mahābhārata*, Śānti Parva. XXV; XXVIII; XXXII; For criticism, see *Mādhara Vṛtti*, 61; *Nyāya-Siddhānta-Muktāvali*, 45.
- 6 *Dīgha-Nikāya* (sāmajjñā-phala-sutta); *Upāsagag-Daśāo*, VII; *Sūtra-kṛtāṅga*, I. 1.1.; *Buddha Carita*, p. 171 (ed. D. D. Kosambi); *Bhagavati-Sūtra*, XV.
- 7 Gotama, *Nyāya-Sūtra*, I.V.1.22; *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* cf cf Vātsyāyana, III. 2.31; *Mahābhārata*, Śānti Parva, XXXIII.23.

sticism (*saṃśayavāda* & *ajñānavāda*)⁸ etc. But none of these theories is broad based and successful as the karma theory. This explains the popularity and continuous influence of the karmic theory in Indian life and thought from ancient times down to the present age. It is not merely an accident of history that only the Cārvākas do not accept the karmic theory.

There are two important schools of karmic idealists—*Pra-vartaka* and *Nivartaka*, one emphasising and the other minimising the value of participating in worldly affairs. The former school is more attached to life and the social order and therefore upholds the banner of *dharma* and deprecates *adharma*. The practice of *dharma* leads to a more happy and gracious life here and hereafter in accordance with the merit and demerit acquired. This is the axle of the wheel of existence. So, according to them, there is no importance attached to liberation. They concentrate on the three *puruṣārthas* only i.e., duty (*dharma*), material wealth (*artha*) and enjoyment (*kāma*). This view is upheld by the Vedicist Mīmāṃsakas and ritualists. However, the Śramaṇic schools of Buddhism and Jainism as well as the vedic schools of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Sāṅkhya-yoga stick to the ideal of *Mokṣa*. They recognise karma to be the cause of bondage and advocate freedom from karma as the means to salvation. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, however, hold that God's instrumentality is required for the fruition of karma⁹ which remains as an unseen potency (*adr̥ṣṭa*) consisting in the merit and demerit of the soul. The Sāṅkhya does not accept the hypothesis of a creating *Īśvara*. The God of Yoga is also no dispensator of the fruits of action but simply the object of worship (*dhyāna*). Personal God, though dispensator of fruits, has no ontological status in Advaita Vedānta.¹⁰ The Jains combine the atomism of the Nyāya-

8 *Samyutta-Nikāya*, XLIV; *Dīgha-Nikāya* (Sāmajjñā-phala sutta); *Sūtra-kṛtāṅga*, I. 12.2.

9 Gotama, *Nyāya-Sūtra*, IV. 1.21; *Praśastapāda*, *Praśastapāda-Bhāṣya*, p. 48.

10 Śaṅkara, *Brahma-Sūtra* (S. B.), II. 1.26.

Vaiśeṣikas with the real modification of self. Karma is material or non-material as it is the modification of matter or consciousness. The thought activity is *Bhāva-karma*; the actual matter flowing into the soul and binding it is *Dravya-karma*.

The reasons behind the Jainas putting greater emphasis on the doctrine of karma and working out a science of karma in greater detail than what has been done by other systems are as follows. *Firstly*, they had to substantiate the sovereignty and independence of the soul over matter. This was a reply to the Cārvākas who had reduced the soul to an epiphenomenon of matter and had also rejected rebirth and salvation. *Secondly*, the Jainas could not reconcile with the radical Vedāntins like Śaṅkara who would accord karma a place only in the realm of *māyā*, which is unreal as a metaphysical entity. "From the level of *Paramārtha*, karma is irrelevant because the domain of *Paramārtha* is the supreme truth which is non-dual."¹¹ *Thirdly*, the Jainas also wanted to refute the one-sided fluxism of Buddhism which could not adequately explain the fact of fruition of karma without the identity of a permanent soul. *Lastly*, the Jainas also wanted to correct the wrong Brahmanical notion that karma is subservient to God and hence what is more important is not karma but the compassion of God.¹² If God is regarded as the creator, preserver, destroyer of the universe as also the dispensator of fruits of actions as well as the inner-controller and guide, then God's grace is the only rescue and support. Therefore, apart from theoretical difficulties of introducing God in the realm of nature and his occasional intervention etc. this

11 T. M. P. Mahadevan's observations in the Madras Seminar on *Karma and Rebirth*; Dr. R. V. De Smet 'The Law of Karma: A Critical Exposition,' Dr. N. Veezhināthan 'Karma and Rebirth', and others held similar views in the seminar. See also *Brahma-Sūtra* (S.B.), III. 1.1.; III. 1.13.

12 cp. *RgVeda*, X. 19.3; *Tait. up.*, III. 1; *Manusmṛiti*, I. 5.9.

leads to fatalism and pessimism¹³ The doctrine of grace is indeed a disgrace to the idea of man as the maker of his own destiny. This loss of ethical autonomy takes away the very basis of our moral life and perhaps is generated by a false belief that the potency of karma is also destroyed with the destruction of the human body.

The Jaina theory of karma might be accused of placing the destiny of man in the hands of ruthless law and not in those of a merciful God, who might be persuaded easily to improve it.

Mr. Sinclair Stevenson makes a similar projection when she says that "the belief in karma and transmigration kills all sympathy and human kindness for sufferers, since any pain a man endures is only the wages he has earned in a previous birth."¹⁴ But in view of tremendous inequalities pervading the

13 Prof. P. M. Bhambānī raises this question : " if all creation is grounded on God's volition, how can any non-voluntary action be at all ? " and replies " God being the Universal Consciousness, the epithet of voluntary and non-voluntary cannot be implied to Him." However, I can say that if God is only conscious, his karma cannot be a result of choice but when God said 'I am one, let me be many there is act of choice. To this a Viśiṣṭādvaitin may say that God has in Him both the aspects-*Cīta* and *Acīta* and so on. (See *Proceedings of Indian Philosophical Congress* (Hyderabad), 1939, Symposium on "Karma and Fatalism" in which Profs. P. M. Bhambānī, M. A. Venkata Rao & R. Ramānujāchāri had participated. Prof. S. Sūryanārāyaṇ Śāstri also contributed an article (Advaitic Approach) in the same *Proceedings*). Dr. R. V. De Smet holds that "the theory of Aquinas on God as the universal cause of everything in the evolving universe is strikingly parallel with the view of Śaṅkara." (See Madras Seminar on *Karma & Rebirth*, 1965 and *Brahma-Sūtra* (S.B.) II. 1.34).

14 S. Stevenson, *The Heart of Jainism*, p. 163, cp. Dr. R. V. De Smet "The Law of Karma, when it is given (as by Śaṅkara and Aquinas) its correct and subordinate place within a general theory of the total causation of the universe (with or without temporal beginning) by Brahman or God, ceases to be an iron law and to give rise to impossible antinomies, but to be retained in its core of reasonableness with its connotations of justice and ethical government of the world" —see Madras Seminar on *Karma & Rebirth*, 1965.

world, I hope, Mrs. Stevenson, if she cares to be a little impartial, will agree that if everything is attributed to Him, then a God all-merciful (being also omnipotent) has to be a God unjust. In fact, the science of karma is the real science of spirituality, in so far as it tries to unfold the real nature of spirit or self. This is self-knowledge or self-realisation. But to know the self is also to know that it is different from the non-self, with which it is in beginningless conjunction. Karma is the material basis of this conjunction which is nothing other than the bondage of karma. Unless, we have a thorough knowledge of karma, we cannot know about the true nature of spirit or self. The knowledge of karma removes the false notion of identity between the body and the self and so on. Individual differences and acquisitions all being due to karmas, its knowledge is essential for both self-knowledge and self-realisation. The entire doctrine of karma is based on the belief that the universe is a system subject to laws inherent in its own constitution.¹⁵ It also involves the idea of immortality of soul and metempsychosis because if the work of fruition has not been fully worked out in one life, future life is a logical necessity. Hence the belief in the transmigration and immortality also follows. This is nothing other than the science of spirituality. The explanation of the world and the place of man in it have always proved the Procrustian bed of spiritualistic metaphysics, so much so that some like the Advaitins, while trying to explain them had to explain them away. Others like the Buddhists had to reduce them to mere nothingness.

Literally, karma means 'action' or 'deed'. The common people use it in the sense of 'work' or 'profession'. But the *Sāstras* give a much wider denotation to it to include all types of actions-voluntary or non-voluntary, of human beings or

15 cp. William James' statement : "Spiritualism means the affirmation of an eternal moral order...."—*Pragmatism*, pp. 106-107.

other beings. It is also used in the sense of "rites and rituals"¹⁶ by the Mīmāṃsakas, in the sense of duties of the 'four-fold occupations (*varṇas*) and stations (*Āśramas*)' by the Smṛtikāras, in the sense of 'religious vows and disciplines' by the Paurāṇikas, in the sense of the 'object or the second case' by the Grammarians, in the sense of 'movement' and not voluntary action or the law of moral causation, residing only in one substance devoid of qualities and direct and immediate cause of conjunction and disjunction by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas,¹⁷ in the sense of 'function of *Rajas*' aspect of *Prakṛti* in Sāṅkhya-yoga¹⁸ etc. However, as technical philosophical term, it signifies not only action but also its actual potential effects. In Jainism, this means the activity of the soul which invites and enables matter to flow into it, as also the matter which does flow into the soul. The first is known as thought-activity (*Bhāvakarma*) and the second as material-activity (*Dravyakarma*). In other words, karma is that "finest matter which a living being attracts to itself by reason of certain impellant forces which are in the individual; not only attracted to but assimilated by the individual itself; and it changes the individuality of living being."¹⁹ Different systems of Indian philosophy adopt different terms to express the same thing for which 'karma' is used in Jaina literature. We can trace back the origin of the karma principle to the R̥gVeda in its concept of Order (*Rta*).²⁰ Buddha's concept of Law (*Dhamma*)²¹ practically signifies the same thing. Fate (*Daiva*) and luck (*Bhāgya*) are the distorted forms found in the general use. The Nyāya-

16 Pārthasārthi Miśra, *Śāstra-Dīpikā*, p. 80; *Śabara-bhāṣya*, II. 1.5.; Śālikanātha, *Prakaraṇa-Pañcika*, pp. 184-85.

17 Kaṇāda, *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra*, I. 1.17.

18 Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā*, 13.

19 V. R. Gandhi, *The Karma Philosophy* (Bombay, D.L.P. Fund 1913) p. 3.

20 *R̥gveda*, I.1.8; I.23.5; I.54.9; I.123.13.

21 *Mahānidāna Sutta*.

Vaiṣeṣikas speak of merit and demerit (*dharmādharmā*), unseen potency (*adr̥ṣṭa*) and even past impressions (*saṃskāras*),²² the Sāṅkhya-yogins use past actions (*āśaya*);²³ the Mīmāṃsakas call it unseen force (*apūrvā*);²⁴ the Advaita-vedāntins rather recommend to cosmic-ignorance (*Māyā*)²⁵ or ignorance (*avidyā*). Predisposition (*vāsanā*) is a common term for karma to the Buddhist and the Yogins.

II Karma : The Material Basis of Bondage and Nescience

[A] Karma and Matter

The soul being infected with four-fold passions, namely, wrong belief (*mithyā-darśana*), vowlessness (*avirati*), carelessness (*pramāda*), passions (*kaṣāya*) and vibrations (*yoga*), attracts matter.²⁶ These karmic particles attached to the soul are called karmas.²⁷ Matter (*pudgala*) is a non-soul substance (*ajīva-dravya*)²⁸ which has got form and qualities.²⁹ Matter is eternal, uncreated and has a huge magnitude.³⁰ There is some controversy about the meaning of form (*rūpa*) which *pudgala* possesses. Some hold that the *pudgala* has only shape or form³¹, still others hold that it also has qualities.³² This view is corroborated in a passage of *Tattvārtha-Sūtra*.³³

22 *Nyāya-Sūtra*, IV.1.3-9; I.1.17; *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, I.1.2.

23 *Yoga-Sutra* with *Bhāṣya*, I. 23-29; II. 2; III. 45.

24 *Śābara-bhāṣya*, II.1.5.

25 *Brahma-Sūtra* (S.B.), II. 1.9.

26 Umāsvāmī, *Tattvārtha-Sūtra*, VIII. 1-2.

27 Devendra Sūri, *Karma-Grantha*, ed., Sukha Lāla Sanghvi (Agra Ātmānanda Jaina Pustaka Prachāraka Mandala, 1953), I. 1.

28 Nemicandra, *Dravya-Saṅgraha*, 15.

29 Ibid., cp. *Tattvārtha-Sūtra*, V. 5.

30 Kundakunda, *Pañcāstikāya-Sāra*, 4.

31 Umāsvāmī, *Tattvārtha-Sūtra*, V. 5.

32 Nemicandra, *Dravya-Saṅgraha*, 15.

33 Umāsvāmī, *Tattvārtha-Sūtra*, V. 23.

Vardhamāna-Purāṇa also says that *pudgala* is endless and characterised by colour, smell, taste and touch.³⁴ It has two chief forms – atom and molecules.³⁵ An atom is obtained by a process of division leading to the indivisible,³⁶ whereas molecules can be decomposed into their constituent parts by division.³⁷ Matter (*pudgala*) is of six kinds depending upon the refinement of its constituents. They stand in this order : earth (gross-gross), water (gross), shade (gross-fine), objects of the four senses (fine-gross), karmic-matter (fine) and atom (fine-fine). The karmic-matter is very fine. It cannot be perceived by the senses. It is that kind of matter which is capable of becoming gross-matter.³⁸ Now, the material-molecules called *vargaṇās* are groups of the same kind of matter.³⁹ They are of twenty-three kinds⁴⁰ of which the thirteenth is the karmic-molecule (*karma-vargaṇā*).⁴¹ *Karma-vargaṇā* consists of more atoms but occupy less space in comparison with mind-group of molecules (*mano-vargaṇās*) which precede it,⁴²

The karmic-matter has the “Peculiar property of developing the effects of merit and demerit.”⁴³ So even if it is considered to be physical in nature, it has a tendency to determine the psychic characteristics. Each of the five classes of

34 *Vardhamāna-Purāṇa*, XVI. 16.

35 Umāsvāmi, *Ibid.*, V. 25.

36 *Ibid.*, V. 27; Kundakunda, *Niyama-Sāra*, 35.

37 Umāsvāmi, *Ibid.*, V. 26; Nemicaṇḍra, *Dravya-Saṅgraha*, 26 (for tripple process of division, fusion and both).

38 Nemicaṇḍra, *Gommaṭasāra* (Jīva-kāṇḍa), 602-603, Kundakunda, *Pañcāstikāya-sāra*, 83.

39 Jinabhadra Kṣamā Śramaṇa, *Viśeṣaśāyaka-bhāṣya*, 636.

40 *Ibid.*, 637-638; *Karma-Grantha*, V. 75; *Gommaṭasāra* (Jīva-Kāṇḍa) 594-95.

41 Nemicaṇḍra, *Gommaṭasāra* (Jīva-kāṇḍa), 594.

42 Jinabhadra Kṣamā Śramaṇa, *Vi.bh.*, 631-7; Bhadrabāhu, *Ār. Nir.*, 39, Kg. gr. V. 76

43 Radhakrishnan, I. P., Vol. I., p 319.

karmic-condition determine its corresponding physical states of the *Jivas* with the exception of the last one (*pariṇāma* or self-conditioned), which is not causally connected with the wheels of existence or liberation. These conditions are rise (*udaya*), suppression (*upaśama*), eradication (*kṣaya*), mixed process of eradication and suppression (*kṣayopāśama*) and the unconditioned (*pariṇāma*).⁴⁴ Being effected by the change in karmic-material *Jiva* experiences certain emotional states in which *Jīva* is only the substantial or the proximate cause (*nimitta-kartā*), while the karmic-material is the extrinsic or immediate cause (*upādāna-kartā*).⁴⁵

Many of the difficulties arising out of this position will be over if we remember the Jaina distinction between physical and psychical karma and also the Jaina philosophy of standpoints. Karmas are of two kinds – physical (*Dravya*) and spiritual (*Bhāva*).⁴⁶ The thought-activity is *Bhāva-karma* whereas the actual matter flowing into the soul and binding it is *Dravya-karma*. The *Bhāva-karma* may be compared with latent tendencies (*saṃskāras*) of other systems. Similarly, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of activity (*pravṛtti*) and the Yoga concept of modifications (*vṛtti*) are very near the Jaina concept of *Dravya-karma*. As our latent tendencies (*saṃskāras*) determine our overt actions, life and personality, so *Bhāva-karmas* affect our physical side of personality. Even the Naiyāyikas believe that all kinds of *pravṛtti* bind us to the chains of *saṃsāra* and lead to some kinds of birth, high or low. "Pain, birth, activity, faults, false notions : on the successive annihilation of these in turn, there is the annihilation of the one next before."⁴⁷ This compares well with the Buddhist chain of causation also. Yoga also believes that every *vṛtti* leaves behind a latent tendency and it is only when the mind gets rid

44 Kundakunda, *Pañcāstikāya-sāra*, 62.

45 Ibid., 63.

46 Brahmadeva, *Dravya-Saṅgraha-Vṛtti*, 8.

47 Gotama, *Nyāya-sūtra*, IV. 1.68.

of all its modifications, it is said to be in a balanced state.⁴⁸ To the Jainas, karmas are not only latent spiritual tendencies but also very refined kind of matter. They infect the *Jīvas* in accordance with its passional vibrations. The *Dravya-karma* is also said to be cover (*āvaraṇa*) and the *Bhāva-karma* to be faults (*doṣa*).⁴⁹ However, both of them are related to each other as cause and effect.⁵⁰

The approach of *Gommaṭasāra* to karmas is slightly different. It holds that karmas belong to one kind when we look at them from the point of view of generality or *karmaness*. Viewed as *Dravya-karma* (karmic-matter) and *Bhāva-karma* (its capacity of fruition), it is of two kinds. But the material aggregate of karmic molecules is *Dravya-karma*; its power to operate is *Bhāva-karma*.⁵¹ Anyway, this way of regarding material particles as karma is a bit peculiar way of describing them. But the reason for doing so is the fact they produce bondage.⁵² The different forms of *Bhāva-karmas* cannot occur in the consciousness of a *Jīva* without corresponding changes in *Dravya-karmas*.⁵³ Similarly a change in *Dravya-karma* must bring a change in *Bhāva-karma*. *Bhāva-karmas* will condition out emotional states (*Bhāvas*), which may be either pleasant or unpleasant. Thus the chain of causation is as follows : *Dravya-karma*, *Bhāva-karma*, and *Bhāva*.⁵⁴ However, an objection might be raised as follows : if the states of emotion or *Bhāvas* are really brought about by karmic-matter how can *Ātman* be said to be the cause of this *Bhāvas* ? To this, we can reply that emotional states (*Bhāvas*) are conditioned by *Dravya-karma* and karma in its turn is conditioned by karmic-thought

48 Patañjali, *Yoga-sūtra*, I. 41.

49 Sminatabhadra, *Āpta-Mīmāṃsā*, 4.

50 Vidyānanda, *Aṣṭa-sahasri*, p. 51.

51 Nemicaṇḍra, *Gommaṭasāra (Jīva-kāṇḍa)*, 6.

52 Amṛtacandra's commentary on *Pravacana-sāra* of Kundakunda, 25.

53 Kundakunda, *Pañcāstikāya-sāra*, 64.

54 Ibid., 64 (Notes by a Chakravarti thereon).

or *Bhāva*. *Jīva* is not the essential cause in that case and still without *Jīva* these changes cannot happen. Infact the *Jīva* is essentially responsible for the *Bhāvas* because its passions are the factors which attract karmic-matter. Hence, it is quite correct to say that *Jīva* does play a causal role in the production of *Bhāvas*, and it can therefore also contribute to their stoppage.

A better understanding of the whole problem becomes easier if we adopt the Jaina doctrine of standpoints (*naya*). Viewed in this light, from the practical point of view (*Vyāvahāra-naya*), the soul is the doer of material-karmas but according to the real standpoint (*nīśchaya-naya*), he is the doer of spiritual karmas (*Bhāva-karma*).⁵⁵ For example, in making a pot, the existence of the idea of pot in the mind of the potter is the spiritual-karma while its material existence is known by material-karma, The potter is directly the cause of the *Bhāva-karma* and the *Bhāva-karma* again is the cause of *Dravya-karma*. Therefore, from the real standpoint, the "potter having the idea of the pot" is the agent but according to the practical standpoint, he is the agent of *Dravya-karma* i.e., the perceptible actual pot. Really, the *Jīva* is neither the material nor the efficient cause of material karmas but only the agent of its own emotional states (*Bhāvas*). Therefore, it is only from the practical standpoint that the *Jīvas* are said to enjoy happiness and suffer misery which are the fruits of material karmas. Infact, he is the possessor of consciousness⁵⁶ only. This becomes quite clear from a *gāthā* of *Samaya-sāra* "all the eight kinds of karmas are material in nature and also suffering which is the effect of karmic fruition said to be material."⁵⁷ But it further adds : "it is only from the practical point of view that these various psychic states

55 Nemicandra, *Dravya-saṅgraha*, 1.

56 Ibid., 9.

57 Kundakunda, *Samaya-sāra*, 45.

are declared to be the nature of self.”⁵⁸ The real self is the unitary substratum of which these are empirical modifications.⁵⁹

It is clear from the above that the Jainas have tried very hard to preserve their fundamental non-absolutistic attitude with regard to the conception of the nature of karman. Karman, for them is neither absolutely identical with *Pudgala* nor completely distinct and different from it. This standpoint is not shared by the other systems of Indian philosophy. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, no doubt, holds creation to be the product of the union between matter and spirit, God functioning as the efficient cause. Merit and demerit do belong to the soul but again only to create the conditions of bondage. This leads to a tragic situation that the soul, being immutable and obiquitous remains unrelated with everything either moral or material. This is the consequence resulting from admitting absolute difference between matter and consciousness. The case of Sāṅkhya-Yoga or even Vedānta is no better. The *Puruṣa* or *Brahman* is said to be an absolutely immutable and incorruptible principle of pure consciousness. The world-process or the karma process belong to the realm of *Prakṛti* or *Māyā* with the result that in case of Sāṅkhya it leads to a hopeless irreconcilable dualism between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* and in the case of Vedānta to *māyāvāda*.

The Buddhists too suffer from one-sidedness, when they regard ignorance to be the enveloping cover of right-knowledge. The world of matter, which is also the stage on which actions are done, cannot affect the consciousness; only ignorance which is formless affects it. This means that Buddhists, at least some of them, fail to relate actions with consciousness. However, for the Yogācāra, there is no such problem of relationship between the material and the spiritual because for them everything is spiritual. The Cārvākas present a position

58 Ibid., 47.

59 Ibid., 48.

entirely contrary to this because for them, there is nothing spiritual and whatever looks spiritual is only an epiphenomenon of the material. The Cārvākas, the Yogācāras and the Advaitins advocate absolute identity while the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṅkhya-Yoga advocate absolute difference. The Jainas have tried to work out a *modus-vivendi*, i.e. a kind of identity-in-difference. The material and the spiritual are causally related, for there cannot be any existence without the co-operation of the two. The *Dravya-karma* and the *Bhāva-karma* are not contradictory but are supplementary.

[B] *Karma and Soul*

The Jaina position about nature of soul (*Jīva*) is completely unambiguous. But when the soul is completely free, potentially divine and innately perfect, it is natural to ask how and why it gets infected with such defects as are found in any empirical *Jīva*. This problem is really crucial one for Indian metaphysics. The Jaina reply is that the inherent four-fold-infinities of the *Jīva* are vitiated by something outside the soul, called *karma*. But we may ask why they should be any vitiation at all? This they attribute to nescience and further hold that the pre-condition of nescience are prepared by karmas. This is obviously circular reasoning. But it may not be proper to jump to this conclusion because the Jaina position on this point is full of several complexities and refinements. They hold that both nescience and karma are beginningless. The postulate of nescience has to be accepted because without it karma cannot be explained, while karmas work as the actual, material cover of knowledge, and lead to strengthen nescience. This is their relationship as exhibited in the lives of empirical *Jivas*. But if we ask what is their original relationship in the life of the first *Jīva*, the question is simply insoluble, because, logically speaking, for the Jainas, their relationship is beginningless, i.e., not acceptable in terms of time. Infact self also is above space, time and causation. To explain why it has been caught in the snares of worldly

existence and consequent relativity of cause and effect, bondage and liberation, the Jainas like many other Indian scholars say, we can do no better than assert that relationship between nescience and self has to be postulated as beginningless. We can discuss only the 'how' of the soul's bondage and not the 'why' of it.

For nescience, the Jainas use the term *mithyātva*. It means perversity of outlook. It leads one to wrong-perception, he perceives non-soul as the soul, irreligion as religion, wrong way as the right way, etc. Different authors have presented different divisions and sub-divisions of *mithyātva*.⁶⁰ *Mithyātva* is at the root of all evils and is also the cause of wordly existence. Jainas like others do not question further *whence* and *why* of nescience (*mithyātva*). But though nescience is beginningless, it is not endless. The Jainas say that as the luminosity of the sun is obscured by clouds, fog, etc., so the all-knowing nature of the self is obscured by the faith- and knowledge-obscuring karmas. And, just as the sun shines in its full splendour when the cloud is removed, so the self emerges as all-knowing when the veil of karma is lifted by the practice of prescribed methods. The analogy of sun and cloud has further been utilised to point out the degrees of knowledge and status of souls. As there is some light left even when the sun is covered with a very dark cloud, so fragment of pure knowledge remains in the soul;⁶¹ it does possess partial knowledge in forms of *mati*, *śruta* etc. Hence the distinction between all-obscuring (*śarva-ghātin*) and partial-

60 Umāsvāmī (*Tat-sūt.*, VIII. 1.) and Siddhasena Gaṇi (*Tat-sūt-Vr.*, VIII.1.) divide *mithyātva* into two kinds, firm (*abhigrahitā*) and not-firm (*anabhigrahitā*); Pūjyapāda (*Sarvārtha-siddhi*, VIII.1.) also gives two forms - inborn (*naisargika*) and acquired (*paropadeśapārvaka*) the latter again sub-divided into four sub-classes; Kundakunda (*Samayasāra*, 89) presents a three-fold division into wrong-faith (*mithyātva*), wrong-knowledge (*ajñāna*) and wrong-conduct (*avirati*); Devendra Sūri (*Ka.Gr.* IV. 50) gives five-fold division of it.

61 *Nandī-Sūtra*, 42.

obscuring (*deśaghātin*) karman leading to complete or partial obscuration of the capacity for knowledge. As the cloud can be lifted, so the veil of karma can also be lifted. But, one might say, there is a flaw in this argument. The obscuration of the sun by the cloud is an event in time, while the obscuration of the self by karmas is not temporal event because it has been earlier said to be beginningless. To explain this, the Jainas refer to the chemical action of an alkaline in completely removing the dross of gold from it, though the dross is coeval with gold. Similarly, the spiritual chemistry of concentration and right conduct can remove the karma from the self which has been associated with it from the very beginning of existence.⁶²

If karma is regarded as prior to self, then self would be its product but karma being material, this is not possible. We cannot also regard karma as posterior to self, for in that case the pure and perfect self will be made responsible for it. However, if we maintain that both the self and karma came together, there is no bondage or suffering which is otherwise regarded as consequence of karma. Nor can we bring God to solve this problem, for it will create many new difficulties well-known to the theistic conception. Hence the Jainas find it more reasonable to postulate a relation of beginningless conjunction between the soul and the karma. This view is not based on logical considerations alone, but also on religious and moral considerations. How the conscious *Jīvas* can be infected by the unconscious matter can also be explained with the help of some common, homely, examples. A liquor or drug obscures the power of consciousness, so that the affected person goes out of his senses.⁶³ Hence it is nothing very startling if the conscious soul is said to be infected by material karmas. Further, the worldly-souls are not absolutely non-material. It is in the

62 cp. Nemicaṇḍra, *Gommatasāra* (*Karma-kāṇḍa*), 2. "The eternal relation of soul and karmic-matter is their nature."

63 Hemacandra, *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, I. 1.52.

body and this is an instance of universal union of *Jīva* and *Ajīva*. *Jīva* possesses the same extension as the body does.⁶⁴ This has been very beautifully described by Shri J. L. Jaini :

“Lifeless matter is found united with the living soul. The whole drama of life is played or danced together by the living soul being in close grasp of lifeless matter. Lifeless *space* is the stage; lifeless *time* is the duration; and lifeless *dharma* and *adharma*, the indispensable assistants for the dancers to move or to rest. The exercise of dancing is their eternal movement in the cycle of mundane existence. At each stop, the momentum for a new movement is gained. At each embrace of matter, the delighted deluded soul throbs and vibrates for a fresh embrace. Wily matter is ever ready to attack the soul and flow into it with its million insinuations and to keep alive and vigorous the bondage of the living by the non-living.”⁶⁵

The link between the spirit and matter is found in the doctrine of *subtle body* or *karma-śarīra*. This is resultant of the unseen potency and the principle of susceptibility due to passions (*kaṣāyas*) and vibrations (*yoga*). Śāṅkhya admits of four forms of pure (*sāttvika*) and four impure (*tāmasika*) modifications of intellect (*buddhi*), such as knowledge, virtue, non-attachment and super-normal powers and their opposites. They are called the psychical factors⁶⁶ that make up the psychical-creation (*pratyaya-sarga*).⁶⁷ They also determine the subtle-body (*liṅga-śarīra*) of various forms of existence.⁶⁸ The subtle-body receives the impressions of karma and the form of embodiment is determined by it. This constitutes character. The union of the subtle-body with the gross-body leads to the birth and their disunion to death except in the case of a free-

64 Nemicandra, *Dravya-Saṅgraha*, 2; Kundakunda, *Pañcāstikāya-sāra*; 27.

65 J. L. Jaini, His notes on Nemicandra's *Gommaṭasāra (Karma-kāṇḍa)*, p. 3.

66 Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, *Sāṅkhya-kārikā*, 43.

67 Ibid., 40-41.

68 Ibid., 40-45.

soul. In Jainism, the effects of dispositions metamorphosed into material-particles which form the physical basis of our life are called *karma-śarīra* like the *liṅga-śarīra* of Sāṅkhya. These are the finer particles of matter of our past experiences being embodied in which the soul passes out the living body dead. The subtle-body, according to Vedānta, which consists of seventeen elements,⁶⁹ is material but transparent, so it remains imperceptible at the time of migration from one body to other. So here the Advaitins almost agree with the Jainas. According to Jainism, the *Jīva* migrates out with the potentialities of the organs of its future body, which are manifestations of its thought and will. Jung's theory of Racial Unconscious seems very close to this idea. Nahar and Ghosh say : "the action-currents of the human thought and will have their vestiges on the experiential body which brings about a new arrangement in the atomic distribution of the *karma-pudgala* comprising the *karma-śarīra*."⁷⁰

We can close the discussion of the subject of *karma-śarīra* with a significant observation from Hartman : "the experience gained in our life may not be remembered in their details in the next life, but the impressions which they produce will remain."⁷¹ The idea of karma-body or inner nature of Huxley is suggestive for belief in the persistence of personality which stores up various experiences. The outer nature or the neural

69 *Bṛhad. Uṣ.* (S.B.), I. 4.17.

70 P. C. Nāhar and K. C. Ghosh, *An Epitome of Jainism*, Calcutta, 1957, pp. 327-328. cp. Dr. Wiesman's theory of the "continuity of germ-plasm and transmission of those characteristics which are potentially contained in the structure of the germ-plasm from the common-stock. Odrigen is supposed to be the possible link between universal life and the gross matter"—(See Dr. Irene Bastow's article "Heredity as it affects immortality". *Āryan Path*, Bombay, March 1950); *Gommaṭasāra (Karma-kāṇḍa)*, 27; M. K. Jaina, *Jaina Darśana*, p. 168; *Gommaṭasāra (Jīva-kāṇḍa)*, 199, Doctrine of Emanation of Soul or *Jīva-samudghāta*, 202; *Dravya Saṅgraha*, 10 (See also *Vṛtti*, pp.10-12).

71 Quoted by P. C. Nāhar & K. C. Ghosh, *Ibid.*, p. 294.

frame (*audārika-śarīra*) is the vehicle of gross sensations. It has no interest in the inner nature or cognitions, affections, conations of man, but nevertheless it is of great interest for the karmic-body. The entire presentations of the outer nature (*audārika-śarīra*) become meaningful, and are referred back to the inner nature which determine it. So the outer and the inner determine each other.

Most of the difficulties of the Jainas here are due to their doctrine of the material nature of karman. With others, karman is non-material. To the Jainas, the karmas are no doubt crystallised effect of the past actions or energies but in order to act and react and produce changes, the energies must have to be metamorphosed into different forms. The material nature of karman can be inferred from its effect i.e. body, which has a physical frame. But unless, the karman is associated with the soul, it cannot produce any effect because it is only the instrumental cause and it is the soul which is the efficient cause of all experiences. Hence the Jainas regard the soul as the possessor of material karman.

III. The passage from Nescience to Omniscience—the ultimate ideal

The soul due to nescience takes matter into itself and gets into bondage. The role played by passions (*kaṣāyas*) and activity vibrations (*yogas*) in bondage are very important. *Yoga* is the vibrational activities of mind, body and speech in the soul. It creates subtle karmic-particles, that are attracted towards the soul and the soul due to its susceptibility to attachment and aversion, is naturally infected by the matter. This principle of soul's susceptibility towards karmic-matter is called passion (*kaṣāya*). If there is no *kaṣāya*, karmic-particles born out of the vibrational activities, will no doubt, flow towards the soul but they will not be able to stay there since there is no adhesiveness without passions. Similarly, if there is no vibration in the soul, no karma-particles will be created; then the soul will be free from them and hence no bondage. Pt. Hira Lal Jaina, in his introduction to the Hindi edition

of *Kaṣāya-pāhuḍa-sutta*⁷² of Śbri Guṇadhara with Yati Vṛṣabha's *Chūrṇi*, illustrates the function of and relations between *Jīva*, *Karma*, *Kaṣāya* and *Yoga* in a very beautiful manner by taking recourse to some analogies. Self is likened to the wall, *karmas* to dust-particles, *yoga* to the gush of wind and *kaṣāya* to the adhesive gum. Now, even if the wind blows and carries dust-particles to the wall, the wall does not keep them unless there is a gum applied to it. The stronger the gush of wind, more dust particles will flow in; similarly stronger the application of the gum, greater the adhesiveness. Similarly the quality of karmic-particles to be created depends upon the strength of the vibrations in the soul. So stronger the passions, stronger will be the bondage, because it is the passion that binds the karmic-matter to the soul.⁷³ *Yoga* merely creates the karma-particles but does not bind them to the soul. So *kaṣāya* becomes the most important factor in the causation of bondage.⁷⁴

72 Guṇadhara, *Kaṣāya-Pāhuḍa-Sutta*, with *Cūrṇi* of Vṛṣabha, ed. Pt. Hīra Lal Jain (Calcutta, Vīra Sāśana Sangha, 1955), p. 62.

73 Guṇaratna (in his com. on Haribhadra's *Saḍ-darśana-samuccaya*, p. 181) explains this with another example. He says the influx of karma means the contact of the particles of karma matter, in accordance with the particular kind of karma, with the soul, "just like the sticking of dust on the body of a person besmeared with oil. In all parts of the soul there being infinite number of karma atoms it becomes so completely covered with them that in some sense when looked at from the point of view of the soul is sometimes regarded as a material body during its *samsāra* stage." (Eng. trans. by S. N. Das Gupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. I., p. 194). This also explains "the copresence or interpenetration of matter and the conscious living substance (i.e., the soul) (which) is as good a fact of experience as the interpenetration of milk and water in a mixture of two, or of fire and iron in a red hot iron ball"—Guṇaratna, *ibid.* p. 181 (Eng. trans. S. C. Chatterjee and D. M. Datta, *Introduction to I. P.*, p. 103).

74 The importance of *kaṣāya* is evident from the fact that it forms the the main title of the great work of Guṇadhara, known as *Kaṣāya-pāhuḍa* or Treatise on Passions. This is said to be the Third Section

The importance of *kaṣāya* can also be realised from the side of deluding (*mohanīya*) karma which is said to be the root of all the eight kinds of karmas. *Mohanīya* karma is of two kinds—faith-deluding (*darśana-mohanīya*) and conduct-deluding (*cāritra-mohanīya*). On the basis of the presence of passions, *Cāritra-Mohanīya* has been further divided into (a) karmas with full-fledged passions (*kaṣāya-vedanīya*) and (b) karma with impoverished or weaker passions (*no-kaṣāya-vedanīya*). Karmas of type (a) are of sixteen kinds. To start with, they are classified into four kinds according to four *kaṣāyas*, namely, anger (*krodha*), pride (*māna*), deceit (*māyā*) and greed (*lobha*), each of which is again said to consist of four subdivisions : (i) Effor-feeding-passions (*anantānubandhi-kaṣāya*) or passions which keep the soul tied to the world which is infinite (*ananta*) and in which the soul is kept wandering by these passions—feeding karmas its erroneous belief. They are also called *anantānubandhi-kaṣāya* because they nourish or feed wrong-belief. They also keep very long. (ii) Partial-vow-preventing (*apratyākhyāna*). They do not last very long. (iii) Total-vow-preventing (*pratyākhyāna*). They are mild. (iv) Perfect-right-conduct-preventing (*saṃjvalana*). They are very mild.⁷⁵ In *Gommaṭasāra* (*Jīva-kāṇḍa*), Nemicandra, in the chapter on *Kaṣāya-mārgaṇā* discusses in detail the problem of *Kaṣāya-karmas* and their effects on different kinds of living beings.⁷⁶

It would also be interesting to know the two etymological derivations of the term *kaṣāya* given by Nemicandra. In the

of the Tenth Book of *Jñāna Pravāda*, one of the fourteen *Pūrvagatas*. The *Pūrvagatas* are five in the all form the five parts of *Dṛṣṭivāda*. which is regarded as the *Twelfth-Aṅga*, containing the direct sermons of Lord Mahāvīra. Vīra Sena's *Jayadhavalā* (ed. Phula Candra, Mahendra Kumar & Kailash Candra, Muttra, All India Digambara Jaina Sangha, 1947) is a commentary upon it.

75 Umāsvāmī, *T. Sūt.*, VIII.9; Devendra Sūri; *K. gr.* I. 17-22, 57.

76 Nemicandra, *Gommaṭasāra* (*Jīva-kāṇḍa*), 283-298; Devendra Sūri, *K.gr.*, I. 17-22.

first place, *kaṣāya* is derived from the root *kṛṣ* which means 'to plough'. Thus *kaṣāya* will mean that which ploughs (*kṛṣati*) the field of soul's karmas,⁷⁷ which (ploughing) leads to the huge harvest of pleasure and pain. *Kaṣāyā*, therefore, is also described as two kinds of passions known as love (*rāga*) and hate (*dveṣa*) or better, as pleasure and pain. So the second name of Guṇadhara's sacred work *Kaṣāya-Pāhuḍa* is given as *Pejja-doṣa-pāhuḍa*⁷⁸ by its commentator Yati Vṛṣabha. The *Prakrit* term *pejjadosa* means *rāga-dveṣa* in Saṅskrit or *love and hate* in English. Hence, treatise which deals with love and hate, attachment and aversion, the twin principles of worldly-fetter, is called *Pejja-doṣa-pāhuḍa*. Guṇadhara, in his very invocation (*maṅgala*) to the work says that attachment and aversion these two are the causes of worldly existence and *kaṣāya* is at the root of them. The term *kaṣāya* can also be derived from the root '*kaṣ*' 'to destroy'. It means that it destroys the right belief and right-conduct of the soul.⁸⁰ Then the different *kaṣāyas* are said to possess different characteristics, in so far as they are produced by intensity (*śakti*), thought paints (*leśyās*) and the bondage or non-bondage of age (*āyubandha-abandha*).⁸¹

77 Nemicandra, *Ibid.*, 283.

78 Guṇadhara, *Kaṣāya-pāhuḍa-sutta*, Gatha 14, Sūtra 21.

79 Guṇadhara, *Ibid.*, 1.

80 Nemicandra, *Gommaṭasāra* (Jīva-kāṇḍa), 283.

81 J. L. Jainī [English trans. of *Gommaṭasāra* (Jīva-kāṇḍa), p. 169] has presented a big table of *kaṣāyas* and *leśyās* and detailed mathematical calculation regarding the number of operation-places (*Udaya-sthāna*) of passions with spatial units (*Ibids.*, pp. 170-171) and the number of persons affected by *kaṣāyas* (*Ibid.*, pp. 173-174). For example, anger (*krodha*) is deep like a furrow in stone, or in a earth, or mild like a line in dust or water contributing to hellish, sub-human, human and celestial existence [Nemicandra, *Gommaṭasāra* (Jīva-kāṇḍa), 284]; pride (*māna*) is unbending like a mountain, bone, wood and cane (*Ibid.*, 285); deceit (*māyā*) is crooked like the bamboo-root, ram-horn, stream of cow, hoof-mark; greed (*lobha*) is fast like crimson-colour, wheel-dirt, body-dirt, turmeric colour. (*Ibid.*, 287). All of

True, *kaṣāya* is the cause of karmic-bondage and consequent whirling of existence, but this *kaṣāya* is itself due to *nescience* or *ignorance*. Thus the same delusion or ignorance appears in the tripple-process of *desire*, *aversion* and *delusion*.⁸² Therefore, one should eradicate these three.⁸³ Delusion is knowing the real as non-real; inclination toward favourable objects is desire and non-inclination towards unfavourable objects is aversion.⁸⁴ Thus I wish to conclude my present discussion about *kaṣāya* with this observation that *desire* and *aversion* on the one hand, and *delusion* on the other, and yet desire, aversion and delusion together, constitute the cause nexus leading to bondage.⁸⁵

While the *kaṣāya* creates bondage of soul with karma, *yoga* creates karma-particles. *Yoga* is the functional vibrations set in the soul by the activity of body, speech or mind⁸⁶ through which it attracts matter under the influence of past karmas. It is also described as the fourth *mārgaṇā* of the

these cause the above four grades of existence (*gatis*) respectively, cp. Kundakunda. *Pañcastikāya-sāra*, 135-136. "To a *Jīva* in *samsāra*, desire and aversion will naturally occur on account of these states, karmic-matter clings to the *Jīva*. The karmic bondage leads the the *Jīva* through the four states of existence;" cp. Kundakunda, *Pravacana sara*, II. 95. "As rain water helps in sprouting green vegetation over the earth with the help of existing material conditions, similarly *desire* and *aversion* help in creating the eight-fold karmas and consequent bondage," Kundakunda; *Pañcastikāya-sāra*, 155, "The combination of karma with *Jīva* is due to *yoga*, which is created by the *Bhāvas*, which are due to *desire*, *aversion* and *perverse cognition*."

82 Kundakunda, *Pravacana-sāra*, I. 83 (with com. of Amṛtacandra, Jayasena and Hemarāja), pp. 105-6.

83 Kundakunda, *Ibid.*, I. 84.

84 *Ibid.*, I. 85.

85 It would be interesting to study *kaṣāyas* from the point of view of different *nayas* and *nikṣepas*, but that requires a separate discussion which cannot be presented here (vide, Gunadhara, *Ibid.*, 14, 21, 22, 130).

86 Umāsvāmi, *Tat. Sūt.*, VI. 1.

fourteen.⁸⁷ Vibrations (*yoga*) are of two kinds—(i) subjective (*bhāva-yoga*), the underlying capacity in virtue of which the matter or mind, speech or body is set in vibration, and (ii) objective (*dravya-yoga*), i.e., the actual vibrations of the spatial units of soul.⁸⁸ *Dravya saṅgraha* divides *yoga* into three broad kinds of activities of mind, speech and body,⁸⁹ while describing the subdivisions of thought-activities causing the the karmic-influx (*Bhāvāśrava*). However, others works give different classifications and divisions of *yoga*.⁹⁰

Each of the passions and vibrations determine bondage in a specific way, Bondage is the association of the soul with the karmic-matter which it assimilates in virtue of its passions.⁹¹ The conscious state by which karma is bound with the soul is called ideal-bondage (*bhāva-bandha*), while the interpenetration of the *pradeśas* of karma and the soul is the material-bondage (*dravya-bandha*),⁹² *Pañcādhyāyī*⁹³ recognises three kinds of bondage i.e., it adds one more namely mixed (*ubhaya*) to the existing list. It takes place when the soul and the karma become identified with each other.⁹⁴ According to

87 S. C. Ghosal (Eng. trans.) Nemicaṇḍra, D. S., 13), pp. 39-41 (notes) cp. Nemicaṇḍra, *Gommaṭasāra*, (*Jīva-kāṇḍa*), 141-42.

88 J. L. Jaini (Eng. trans. to Nemicaṇḍra, *Gommaṭasāra*, 216 (*Jīva-kāṇḍa*).

89 Nemicaṇḍra, *Dravya Saṅgraha*, 30.

90 *Tattvārtha-Vṛtti* on *T. Sūtra*, VIII. 1 refers to fifteen sub-divisions. The activities of mind and speech are divided into four classes (true, untrue, mixed, neither true (nor false) and the activities of body into seven kinds. *Gommaṭasāra* (*Jīva-kāṇḍa*), describes in detail the functions of each of the kinds of *yoga* and offers further classifications (Ibid., 216-270). Truth is described to be of ten kinds of which suitable illustrations are given (Ibid., 223-224).

91 Umāsvāmī, *Tattvārtha-Sūtra*, VIII. 1-2; Kundakunda, *Pañcāstikāya-Sāra*, 154-155; Vīraṇandi, *Candraprabhacaritam*, XVIII. 96; Hariścandra Kavi, *Dharma-śarmābhyaṇḍayam*, XXI. 106.

92 Nemicaṇḍra, *Dravya-Saṅgraha*, 32; Kundakunda, *Pravacana-sāra*, II. 83-84; Rajamalla, *Pañcādhyāyī*, *Vardhamāna-Purāṇa*, XVI. 43.

93 Rajamalla, *Pañcādhyāyī* II. 46

94 Ibid., II. 48.

*Karma-grantha*⁹⁵ and other works,⁹⁶ bondage is of four kinds, nature (*prakṛti*), duration (*sthiti*), fruition (*anubhāga*) and mass (*pradeśa*). Now, nature and mass of bondage are conditioned by vibration but duration and fruition by passion.⁹⁷ This shows that passion is the internal and vibration the external cause of bondage. Kundakunda says that the opportunity for combination is created by affective states (*bhāvas*) and as such *bhāvas* are due to desire, aversion and vitiated outlook (*rāga, dveṣa and moha*)⁹⁸ and the eight kinds of karmas are said to be caused by the four external conditions (*dravya-pratyayas*), which themselves are the result of internal conditions (*bhāva-pratyayas*).⁹⁹ It is to be noted that Umāsvamī¹⁰⁰ mentions five causes of bondage but Kundakunda¹⁰¹ mentions only four. It might be that omission of carelessness (*pramāda*) might be due to fact that it is already included in the above mentioned four kinds.¹⁰²

Āsrava is the process by which karmic-matter enters into the soul. *Yoga* is the channel of *Āsarava*.¹⁰³ Literally also '*Āsrava*' means 'influx' or 'flowing' and hence it has no connection with the Buddhistic term *āsrava* (*Pāli, āsava*), which means depravity, human passion, sin, etc. The inflow is effect-

95 Devendra Sūri, *Karma-Grantha*, I. 2.

96 Umāsvāmī, *Tattvārtha-Sūtra*, VIII. 3, Nemicandra, *Dravya-Saṅgraha*, 33, Vīraṇandī, *Candraprabhacaritam*, XVIII. 97; Hariścandra Kavi, *Dharmaśarmābhyudayam*, XXI. 97; *Vardhamāna-Purāṇam*, QVI. 45.

97 Nemicandra, *Dravya-Saṅgraha*, 33; Rājamalla, *Adhyātma-ka.-mā.*, IV. 7.

98 Kundakunda, *Pañcāstikāya-sāra*, 155.

99 Ibid., 156.

100 Umāsvāmī, *Tattvārtha-Sūtra*, VIII. 1.

101 Kundakunda, Ibid., 156.

102 Devendra Sūri, *K.Gr.* II (It presents a complicated table of bondage (*bandha-yantra*) showing the number of karmas according to fourteen *guṇasthānas*, eight karmas, etc.

103. Umāsvāmī, Ibid., VI. 2; Vīraṇandī, Ibid., XVIII., see also S. C. Ghosal, Eng. Trans. *Dravya-Saṅgraha*, 82 (he quotes *Sthānāṅga-Sūtra*).

ed through the instrumentation of mind, body or speech, each being accompanied by deluding (*mohanīya*) karma. As water enters a pond or boat through various channels or holes, so karma-particles enter a soul through *āsrava*. Broadly, it is divided into *bhāva-āsrava* and *dravya-āsrava* (also known as karma-āsrava). The former works on the thought level, the latter on the material level.¹⁰⁴ There are also further five sub-divisions of *bhāvāsrava*¹⁰⁵ into delusion (*mithyātva*), lack of control (*avirati*), inadvertence (*pramāda*), vibrations (*yoga*) and passions like anger etc. (*kaṣāya*). *Mithyātva* is also of five kinds, namely, one-sidedness of knowledge (*ekānta*), a belief that one religion is as good as another (*vinaya*), adherence to false views (*viparīta*), doubt (*saṁśaya*) and ignorance (*ajñāna*). *Avirati* is also of five kinds, namely, violence (*hiṁsā*), falsehood (*anṛta*) stealing (*steya*), incontinence (*abrahma*) and desire for worldly-possession (*parigraha*). *Pramāda* consist of the following: reprehensible talk (*vikathā*), passions (*kaṣāya*), senses (*indriyas*), sleep (*nidrā*), and attachment (*rāga*); each of which (of the five kinds of *pramāda*) is sub-divided respectively into four, four, five, five and two kinds. Vibrations (*yoga*) are said to consist of 15 sub-divisions.¹⁰⁶

Umāsvāmī¹⁰⁷ mentions many sub-divisions of *āsrava*. Kundakunda, to whom *āsrava* means the fountain source of righteousness or sin, classifies it into righteous (*puṇya*) and non-righteous (*pāpa*).¹⁰⁸ Noble desires and thoughts of charity are the springs of right-conduct (*bhāva-puṇyāsrava*), and this leads to *puṇya-dravya-karma* leading to pure karmic-matter

104 Nemicandra, *Dravya-Saṅgraha*, 29; *Vardhamāna-Purāṇam*, XVI. 40-41.

105 Nemicandra, *Dravya-Saṅgraha*, 30; Brahmadeva, *Dravya-Saṅgraha-vṛtti*, p. 36. The five *aviratis* are called *avratas* (vowlessness) by Umāsvāmī (*T.*, *Sūt.*, VII. 13-17).

106 Brahmadeva, *Dravya Saṅgraha*, Vṛtti, p. 36-38., cp. Nemicandra, *Gommaṣasāra*, (*Karma-kāṇḍa*) 786.

107 Umāsvāmī, *Ibid.*, VI. 4-5.

108 Kundakunda, *Pañcāstikāya-Sāra*, 142 & 146.

into the soul. So *āsravas* like *bandha*, have two conditions—physical and psychic. The psychic conditions (*bhāva*) lead to physical conditions (*dravya*). The inordinate taste for worldly things, impure emotions, hankering after and indulging in sensual pleasures, causing anguish to fellow-beings, and slandering them openly or covertly, constitute the springs of evil.¹⁰⁹ So do the different animal-instincts, the different soul-polluting-emotions, the tempting senses, suffering and wrath, undesirable thoughts and corruption of the facilities of perception and will.¹¹⁰ Souls affected with passions have got *mundane inflow* causing the cycle of births and rebirths (*sāmparāyika*) and those without passions have *transcendent inflow* (*īryāpatha*).¹¹¹ The mundane-inflow of the thirtynine kinds (i.e., five caused by senses, four by passions, five by vowlessness and rest twentyfive are caused by twentyfive kinds of activity). However, the senses, passions and vowlessness are the causes and the twentyfive kinds of activity are their effects.¹¹² The differences in inflow in different souls arises from the differences in intensity (*tīvra-bhāva*), mildness (*mandā-bhāva*), intentional and unintentional conduct (*jñāta* and *ajñāta-bhāva*), dependence (*adhikaraṇa*) and position and power (*vīrya*).¹¹³ Then there are different causes of the inflow of each of the eight types of karmas causing bondage, which have been dealt with in great details.¹¹⁴

Karma is the material cause of bondage, while *Jīva* with passions is the efficient cause. Without karma, there can be no bondage, as there can be no butter without milk. Therefore, we find karma and bondage sometimes referred to as synonyms. This is also corroborated by the fact that the classification of karma are practically the same as those of bondage.

109 Ibid., 146.

110 Ibid., 147.

111 Umāsvāmī, *T. Sūtr.* VI. 4.

112 Ibid., VI. 5.

113 Ibid., VI. 6.

114 Ibid., VI. 10-27; Nemicandra, *Dravya-Saṅgraha*, 31; *Gommaṭasāra* (*karma-kāṇḍa*), 787-810.

As there is two-fold division of karma into material and spiritual,¹¹⁵ there are two kinds of bondage also.¹¹⁶ The *Karma-grantha*¹¹⁷ gives the same four divisions of both *karma* and *bandha*, rather we say that it is classification of *karma-bondage*. All this simply suggest, that the nature, duration, intensity and mass of bondage are determined by those of karma. Therefore, the *Karma-Grantha* discusses the different kinds of karma accordingly (i.e., according to nature, duration, intensity and extent),¹¹⁸ and it applies the same categories to bondage.¹¹⁹

Apart from the classification of karma according to its nature into eight kinds and their further sub-divisions,¹²⁰ karmas have also been classified on the basis of other principles. We have virtuous (*śubha*) and non-virtuous (*aśubha*),¹²¹ obscuring (*ghātin*), non-obscuring (*aghātin*), total-obscuring (*sarva-ghātin*) and partial-obscuring (*deśaghātin*),¹²² karmas, etc. But in all cases, karmas are related to bondage. Like water and milk, when being mixed up with each other, they are very much identical with each other. But we may say, there is a fallacy here because milk and water, being material can mix together, but how can the material karma put the spiritual self into the fetters of bondage. Here the Jainas try to save their position by taking recourse to theory of identity-in-difference between the soul and the body. *Jīva* is consciousness nodoubt but resides in the body

115 Nemicandra, *Dravya-saṅgraha*, 8; *Gommaṭasāra (karma-kāṇḍa)*, 2.

116 Nemicandra, *Dravya-saṅgraha*, 32; Kundakunda, *Pravacana-sāra*, II.83. & 84; Rājamalla *Pañcādhyāyī*, II. 47. Rājamalla, *Adhyātma-kamala-mārtanḍa*, IV. 6; *Vardhamāna-purāṇam*, XVI. 43.

117 Devendra Sūri, *K. Gr.* I. 2.

118 Ibid., I. 2-61.

119 Ibid., II. 3-12.

120 Ibid., I. 2; Nemicandra, *Dravya-saṅgraha*, 31; *Gommaṭasāra (karma-kāṇḍa)*, 67; Umāsvāmi, *T. Sūt.*, VIII. 4-5; *Praśamarati-prakarṇa*, 34.

121 Umāsvāmi, *T. Sūt.*, VIII. 25-26; Devendra Sūri, *K. Gr.* II. 22.

122 Devendra sūri, *K. Gr.* V. 13, 14; Nemicandra, *Gommaṭasāra, (karma-kāṇḍa)* 180-182.

The famous yoga classification of karma¹²³ into white (*śukla*), black (*kṛṣṇa*), both white and black (*śuklakṛṣṇa*), and neither white nor black (*aśuklākṛṣṇa*) corresponds to the Jaina classification into auspicious (*śubha*) and inauspicious (*aśubha*) karmas.¹²⁴ Similarly, *gati-karmas* of the Jainas are comparable to the tripple classification (*jāti*), age (*āyu*) and enjoyment (*bhoga*) according to yoga school.¹²⁵ The Buddhist¹²⁶ also bring their classification of consciousness into good, bad and indescribable (*śobhana*, *akuśala* and *avyākata*) on its three levels, namely weak, higher and super-human (*paritta-bhūmi*, *mahaggata-bhūmi*, and *lokuttara-bhūmi*). The four phases of life – misery, desire, form and the formless (*apāya*, *kāmaguṇī*, *rūpāvacāra* and *arūpāvacāra-bhūmis*) also point to the causal-nexus between the karma and the results. However, the main difference between the Buddhist and Jaina position is that while the former believes only in a five-fold psycho-physical integration (*pañca-skandha*), the Jainas accept permanent soul. Hence there is a wide difference between their conception of liberation if not in so much that of bondage.

Bondage exists only till karmic-flow continues. The process that leads to *karma-bandhana*, though beginningless, is not in principle endless, because the self is not essentially related to the karman. Vibrations (*yoga*) bring karmic-particles to soul and the passions (*kaṣāyas*) keep them attached to the soul. The elimination of *kaṣāyas* through spiritual practices will terminate vibrations and therefore the karmic-particles will find no foot-hold or sustenance. This is known

123 Patanjali, *Yoga-sūtra*, IV. 7. (Also see *Vyāsa-bhāṣya*).

124 Kundakunda, *Pañcāstikāya-sāra*, 143-147; Nemicandra, *Gommaṭasāra*, (*karma-kāṇḍa*) 143-147.

125 Vyāsa, *Yoga-sūtra* (*Vyāsa-bhāṣya*), II. 13.

126 I have utilised *Studies in Jaina Philosophy* by N. M. Tatiā, ch. IV, and *The Abhidhamma Philosophy* by Bh. J. Kasyap, regarding the Buddhist position.

as transcendent-inflow as compared to mundane inflow.¹²⁷ But transcendent-inflow cannot occur by itself, for it is enert. It requires some outside energy, which is determined by past dispositions of the soul who has potentially infinite energy temporarily crippled by karmas. The varying degrees of this (actual) soul-energy determine the differences in vibrations that finally determine various states and processes of karma and thereby bondage.¹²⁸

The self can break off the fetters of bondage only if the karma-conjunction is liquidated. But to start with, the karmic-flow must be stopped. This stoppage of the inflow of karmic-matter into the soul is known as *saṁvara*.¹²⁹ 'Saṁvara' is derived from 'saṁvriyate' i.e., meaning that which checks the causes of karma. This is the opposite principle of *āsrava*.¹³⁰ The volitional suppression of the psychic tendencies (such as the five senses, four passions, four instincts) is *bhāva-saṁvara* which is antecedent to the physical arrest of the karmic-inflow. To the extent to which there will be this suppression, the gateway for the entrance of evil will be closed.¹³¹ This requires freedom from three-fold vibrational activities of pleasure or pain.¹³² According to *Vardhamāna purāṇa*,¹³³ the *bhāva*-

127 Umāsvāmi, *T. Sūt.*, VI. 4.

128 They are classified into eleven kinds : bondage (*bandhara*), endurance (*sattā*), rise (*udaya*), premature rise (*udircaṇā*), increased realisation (*udvartana*), decreased realisation (*apavartana*), transformation (*saṁkramaṇa*), subsidence (*upaśamana*), incapability of other than two (*nidhatī*), incapability of all the processes (*nikācana*), and endurance without effect (*abādha*).

129 Umāsvāmi, *T. Sūt.*, IX. 1.

130 *āsravaḥ prati pakṣabhūtaḥ saṁvaraḥ*. (See *Sihānāṅga-Sūtra*, Adhyayana I.)

131 Kundakānda, *Pañcāstikāya-Sāra*, 148.

132 Ibid., 150.

133 *Vardhamāna-Purāṇam*, XVI. 67-68., cp. Nemicandra, *Dravya-Saṁgrah* 34; Rājamalla, *Adhyātma-Kamala-mārtanda*, IV. 9-12. *Bhāva-Āsrava* is of seven varieties—vows (*vratas*), restraint (*guptis*), observance (*dharma*), meditation (*anuprekṣā*), conquest of suffering (*pariśaha-jaya*) and various kinds of good conduct (*chāritra*)—(See *T. Sūt.*, IX.2; *Dravya Saṁgrah*, 35) having several varieties (*T. Sūt.*, IX. 4-10.)

saṃvara needs the stoppage of the experiences with desire and aversion, while *dravya-saṃvara* requires total stoppage of influx through vows and concentration. Now, when the karmic-inflow is completely stopped, the only task to be done is the purging out of all karmic-matter stored up from before, through austerities.¹³⁴ So long the entire karmic-matter enveloping the soul is being worked out, neutralised, or dissipated, freedom is not possible. It is easier to stop the fresh karma-material than to dissipate the already accumulated karma-particles, and so great austerities are required. This process is described as destruction of karmas (*nirjarā*).¹³⁵ This is of two kinds: *bhāva-nirjarā* and *dravya-nirjarā*. That modification of the soul, by which the matter of karma disappears in proper time after the fruits of such karma are exhausted, is called *bhāva-nirjarā*. The actual destruction is called *dravya-nirjarā*.¹³⁶ The soul, in the state of *nirjarā* or destruction of karmic-matter, shines with purity as a mirror shines when the accumulated dust is removed from its surface. Only when the fruits of action are already enjoyed or liquidated by the efforts of penances, way to liberation is prepared.

Penances are either external or internal, and each is of six kinds,¹³⁷ each having many divisions and sub-divisions.¹³⁸

134 Umāsvāmī, *T. Sut.*, IX. 3; *Prasamraṭi-Prakraṇa*, 221.

135 *Karma-kaṣāyo-nirjarā-Sthānāṅga-Tīkā*. 1.

136 Nemicaṇḍra, *Dravya-saṃgraha*, 36; Vīraṇḍi, *Candra-prabha-caritaṃ*, XVIII. 109-121; Hariṣcandra Kavi, *Dharmaśarmābhyaṇayam*, XXI. 122-123; *Vardhamāna-Purāṇam*, XVI. 90; Kundakunda, *Pañcāstikāya-sāra*, 151.

137 *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra*, XXVIII. 34.

138 Umāsvāmī, *T. Sut.* IX. 19-20 (outer penances are (i) abstaining from food (*anaśana*); (ii) control of will and senses (*avamaudarya*), (iii) curtailment of the number of things of daily use (*vr̥tti-pari-sankhyāna*), (iv) relinquishing taste (*rasa-parityāga*), (v) solitary abode (*vivikta-śayyāsana*) and asceticism (*kāya-kleśa*). The inner penances are also six—(i) expiation (*prāyaścitta*), (ii) humility (*vinaya*), (iii) service to sages (*vaiyā-vṛtṭya*), (iv) study (*svādhyāya*), (v) isolation of self (*vyutsarga*) and (vi) meditation (*dhyāna*).

Besides penances and austerities, meditation has also been regarded as a necessary condition of *nirjaiā*¹³⁹ which turns out all karmas, beneficial as well as baneful. When all the conditions are fulfilled, the intrinsic nature of self shines forth in its original purity, and the individual becomes *all-knowing* and *all-perceiving* and attains the state of infinite, unmixed bliss.¹⁴⁰ It is through the acquisition of five-fold attainment (*labdhis*)¹⁴¹ that the potentially free soul (*bhavyātmā*) attains the three jewels of right-faith, right-knowledge and right-conduct.¹⁴² Svāmī Vidyānanda argues that right-belief, right-knowledge and right-conduct constitute the path of freedom the antithesis of this trinity i.e., wrong-belief, knowledge and action must lead to bondage. *Uttarādhyaṇa*¹⁴³ also points out that faith, knowledge and conduct are interrelated. By knowledge one cognizes things, by faith he believes in them, by conduct he gets freedom from karman and by austerities he attains purity. By means of purity he proceeds to perfection. There is that close relation between knowledge and action. Conduct is the final fulfillment of knowledge.¹⁴⁴ Knowledge gives enlightenment, faith firmness and conduct makes the whole process meaningful. So the Jainas reject doctrine that wrong knowledge alone is the cause of nescience, or that right-knowledge alone is the condition of omniscience and freedom. It is only the modifications of the soul which cause destruction of all the four obstructive karmas (*ghātin-karmas*) which lead to *bhāva-mokṣa*. The actual termination of karmas is *dravya-mokṣa*.¹⁴⁵

139 Ibid., IX. 21-44.

140 Kundakunda, *Pañcāstikāya-sāra*, 157-158.

141 Nemicandra, *Labdhi-sāra*, 3-8, 33.

142 Umāsvāmi, Ibid., I. 1; Kundakunda, Ibid., 39-41.

143 *Uttarādhyaṇa-Sūtra*, XXVIII. 30, 35-36.

144 *Viśeṣaśyaka-bhāṣya*, 1126, 1158.

145 Nemicandra, *Dravya Saṃgraha*, 37; *Labdhi-sāra*, 644; Umāsvāmi, *Praśama-rati-Prakaraṇa*, 221; Kundakunda, *Pañcāstikāya-sāra*, 160; Vīrnanadi, *Chandra-pratīha-charitam*, XVIII. 123; and *Vardhamāna-Purāṇam*, XVI. 72, 73.

We may conclude, therefore, with the remark that knowledge and conduct are not two watertight compartments in Jainism. The summum-bonum of spiritual life is at once infinite-knowledge, faith, bliss and power. Knowledge here is not only a means as in the case of right knowledge but also as an end in the form of omniscience. The spiritual ideal of the Jainas is an integral one where knowledge, faith, bliss and power are strewn together. This means an integral-idealism. The state is not a vacuity, nor an abstract consciousness; it is a concrete ideal of knowledge and faith, power and happiness. As knowledge without faith is purile, so faith without knowledge is dogmatic. But both of them without power remain an impotent utopia, but power in itself is not a worthy end. Power is desirable only for bliss.

CHAPTER VI

OMNISCIENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY

I. Metaphysical Foundations of Knowledge

In spite of the best efforts of the Jaina and Buddhist logicians to differentiate logical and epistemological enquiries from religion and metaphysics, with which they were mixed up in the works of Hindu philosophers, it has not been possible to effect the complete separation. Perhaps the presentation of logic or epistemology as entirely independent of metaphysics is a more recent achievement. The reason behind this tendency of mixing up the problems of knowledge with those of reality or morality and spiritual progress is perhaps also rooted in the deeply religious climate of the time. Religion, in India, has been the fountain-spring of all philosophy, art and culture. The Indian mind had a temperamental distaste for pure speculation and abstract logic. It was deeply interested in the problems of practical life. The reason for this practical motive lies in the fact that 'every system, pro-vedic or anti-vedic is moved to speculation by a spiritual disquiet...in order to find out some means for completely overcoming life's miseries.'¹ So logic has been described by Kautilya not only as the lamp of all sciences but also helpful to practical affairs and the sustaining principle of *dharma*. It is this faith of the Indian mind that Logic, when divorced from life, becomes barren and useless. After all, logic is not an end in itself but a means for this ideal life.

For the Jaina logicians, as followers of a particular religious sect, it was difficult to break off completely from the funda-

1 S. C. Chatterjee & D. M. Datta, *An Introduction to Ind. Phil.*, p. 13.

mental traditional beliefs of Jainism like those in non-absolutism (*anekānta-vāda* or *syādvāda*), soul and non-soul (*jīva-ajīva*), karma, omniscience (*sarvajñatva*), etc. They are realists and also dualists. According to them *jīva* and *ajīva* are two independent realities, which cannot be reduced to each other. They do hold that mind and matter both cooperate in producing knowledge but would not agree with Kant, Diñnāga and Dharma-kīrti that 'understanding maketh nature'. Mind is simply the instrument of discovery like our sense organs. Any respect to reason does not imply the denial of the facts of experience. In fact, the infinite number of attributes and modes possessed by reality are discovered by our experience alone. This experience tells us that the reality is a developing process. It cannot be explained either in terms of *being* or *becoming*, *identity* or *difference*. The former fails to explain *change*, the latter the *basis of change*. Hence, the best way is to regard reality as being-in-becoming, identity-in-difference, reality-in-process. This they explain through the triple process of origination, decay and permanence.²

They accept both substance, or the principle of being and modes, the principle of becoming as necessary. Attributes exist in substances, depend upon them and are never without them. They cannot be the substratum of another attribute³ although many attributes can co-exist in one and the same substance at one and the same time and place. The change or becoming of substance is called modification, which is a change in the character or its attributes.⁴ So, this is not an unreal world but a thoroughly real world with the characteristic of *being* or *is-ness* as essential to it.⁵ *Jīvas* are also substances⁶ and the differentium of soul is consciousness (*upayoga*),⁷ which is also its essence. There cannot be soul without consciousness or vice-versa. The two are coeval with each other. Behind all mental

2 Umāsvāmi, *T. Sūtr.* V. 30.

5 Ibid., V. 29.

3 Ibid., V. 41.

6 Ibid., V. 3.

4 Ibid., V. 52.

7 Ibid., II. 8.

acts of cognition, affection, conation, memory and imagination etc., this consciousness is the universal underlying principle. It is the *ens unum, et semper-cognitum in omnibus notitis*. The soul knows and also knows that it knows. It means that there is no duality of subject and object in the case of knowledge of knowledge. One who knows, the soul is also the nature of knowledge.⁸ Therefore, though Jainas being realists do accept generally the duality of knower and known, do not regard the knowledge of knowledge as infected with this division. This position of theirs does not produce any inconsistency but rather gives them some advantages because knowledge has to be explained in a different way from that of knowledge of things and properties.

Those who regard that knowledge is distinct from soul and the soul becomes conscious with the association of knowledge, have to accept the soul as basically or originally unconscious which becomes conscious in certain special circumstances. Here the Jainas have to fight against the views of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, Sāṅkhya-Yogins, Advaita Vedāntins and even Buddhists. To the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, knowledge is an independent category of which soul is the substratum. Consciousness is not the essential property of the soul; it is created at birth and separated from the soul at the time of death or final salvation. So consciousness is an intermitant quality of the soul.⁹ Self is the instrumental cause of knowledge but itself it is not consciousness (i.e., knowledge). The soul becomes conscious only when conjoined with body and mind.¹⁰ It is queer indeed to suppose that the unconscious soul by mere mechanical juxtaposition with the instruments of mind and body can become conscious. It is not of the nature of "a mechanical glow flashing

8 Kundakunda, *Pravacana-sāra*, I. 35.

9 Vātasāyana, *Nyāya-bhāṣya* with *Nyāya-vārttika*, I. 1.10; cp. *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, III. 2.24.

10 Praśastapāda, *Padārtha-dharmī-saṃgraha* (with Śrīdhara's *Nyāya-kandali*, ed. G. N. Jhā), pp. 57, 279.

forth from an impact as between iron and flint...Nothing can change its essence, no mechanical impact or juxtaposition nor any quantitative accretion can bring about a qualitative difference in the essence of the reality."¹¹ This fact is supported both by logic and philosophy.

In the Sāṅkhya¹² as well as in the Vedānta,¹³ consciousness constitutes the very nature of the soul. However, this consciousness is not ordinary empirical knowledge but the ultimate, primordial knowledge. Empirical knowledge, on the other hand, belongs to the *antaḥkaraṇa*¹⁴ i.e., the co-operative function of mind (*manas*), ego (*ahaṁkāra*) and intellect (*buddhi*) in Vedānta, to the realm of *prakṛti* in the Sāṅkhya-Yoga.¹⁵ Knowledge to the Buddhist is a series of psychical states without the psyche, there being no focal centre holding beginningless stream of consciousness. Thus the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika has to fulfil the hard task of explaining the consciousness which seems to be contradictory, by a soul naturally devoid of it, while the Sāṅkhya-Yoga and the Advaita-Vedānta, because of their insistence on the soul being only pure consciousness have to declare all empirical knowledge to be either vitiated or illusory. The Buddhist account of *citta* as the continuity of consciousness seems to be valueless, when our individuality in the form of a permanent soul is denied.¹⁶

But the Jainas, on the other hand, claims to have avoided all these difficulties because they neither decry empirical know-

11 H. M. Bhaṭṭācārya, "The Jaina Theory of Knowledge", *Jaina Antiquary* (Ārāh, Vol. IV. No. 1, June 1938), p. 25.

12 Vyāsa, *Yoga bhāṣya*, I. 9.

13 Śaṅkara, *Brahma sūtra* (S.B.), II. 3.40.

14 Dharmarāja, *Vedānta paribhāṣa*, p. 17.

15 Viṣṇānbhikṣu, *Sāṅkhya pravacana bhāṣya*, I. 87; *Yoga bhāṣya*, I. 9.

16 cp. T. W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Psychology*, p. 8 "consciousness is only an intermittant series of psychic throbs associated with a living organization, beating out their coming to know through one brief span of life."

ledge nor ignore pure, non-empirical consciousness. All knowledge, whether pure or empirical, is the attribute of the soul. That is, the soul is the substratum and holder of knowledge in its entirety. This idea gets maximum emphasis and force in the Jaina concept of the omniscient as the ideal mind.

To the Jainas, soul and consciousness are inseparable. They are two different things only because the soul is the substance and consciousness is the attribute. But they are not externally related. Their inseparability follows from the very definition of substance as possessed of attributes and modifications¹⁷ and also that attributes depend upon substance because they can exist only by residing in substances.¹⁸ Knowledge is not an attribute separable from its subject, as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds, nor it is itself a substance as the Vedānta does, nor an immutable fact without any modification as the Sāṅkhya maintains. It is an attribute and cannot be the attribute of anything else besides the self. The soul is the *lakṣya* that of which the consciousness is the *lakṣaṇa* (attribute), which may be either separable (*anātmabhūta*) or inseparable (*ātmabhūta*). For example, *Jīvatva* is an inseparable, but the celestial state of existence is a separable, attribute of the soul. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and also the Mīmāṃsakas make consciousness a separable attribute of the soul and hence their difficulties. In fact, for Jainism, knowledge without self or self without knowledge is inconceivable.

The Jaina theory of soul, has many implications for any study of omniscience. Omniscience is an attribute of the soul in its natural condition as well as in the emancipated state. It is not only perfection of knowledge but also of happiness

17 Umāsvāmi, *T. Sū.*, V. 38.

18 Ibid., V. 41. Brahmadeva in his commentary on *Dravya saṃgraha* (Verse-2) of Nemicaṇḍra, says that each of the characteristic of the *Jīva* mentioned by Nemicaṇḍra has been mentioned in order to differentiate the Jaina conception of *self* from that of Sāṅkhya, Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, Cārvāka, Sādāśiva and Buddha.

and bliss. The concept of omniscience presents a cognitive as well as an ethical ideal which appeals to imaginative person. The only question is, whether or not, it is possible. The Jainas, no doubt, regard it not only possible, i.e., achievable, but as an ideal actually achieved by many prophets. The soul as the substratum of consciousness is the basis of knowledge. When the soul is in pure state, i.e., there are no obstructions, omniscience is inevitable. The soul in the pure state is omniscient. It seems to me that we may question about the achievability of the ideal but we have to accept it to be logically possible. Even a materialist can accept it as an ideal without introducing any contradiction in his materialistic system. The only thing to whom a materialist is committed is that consciousness originates from matter, i.e., it is not a basic reality as matter is. But after saying that, the materialist can go on to say that though consciousness is resultant or emergent of matter, yet it can develop to any extent i.e., even to the extent of omniscience. Omniscience has nothing to do with the origin of consciousness; rather it represents what consciousness could ultimately be, i.e., it is the culmination of consciousness and is not logically connected with how consciousness comes into being.

It is true that Jainism is the strongest exponent of the theory of omniscience, it does regard consciousness to be the essential nature of self. But even a system like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, which regards consciousness as the adventitious quality of the soul can also accept omniscience as the ideal of all-knowledge. There is no inconsistency in saying that the self acquires consciousness under certain conditions and then develops into omniscience. These two theories i.e., materialism and the theory of consciousness as an adventitious attributes of the self, are not sufficient to refute omniscience.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas do accept that there are omniscient *yogis* who have acquired omniscience through yogic exercises and *yogic-perception*, though consciousness is, for it, an adventitious attribute. However, the Nyāya could not protect

this ideal, because of a different reason that in the final state of liberation, the soul, according to it, becomes devoid of all cognitions. It should be noted that the Nyāya could have regarded consciousness as indestructible and hence also an attribute of the liberated soul because there is no logical inconsistency in regarding a thing which has a beginning as having no end.¹⁹

The Advaita Vedānta, being a completely idealistic system gives the highest status to self. In so far as according to it, self is the only reality (of course self is identical with *Brahman*). It is natural, therefore that the concept of omniscience gets a respectable place in Advaitic epistemology. However, it is also natural that the Advaitic omniscience also differs from the Jaina omniscience. For the Jainas, omniscience means the direct and simultaneous knowledge of all substances and their attributes. But for the Vedāntins, it means knowledge of self simply

19 The Nyāya school tries to illustrate this point like this : "Sound is non-eternal, because it is produced like a pot." But this is a very crude example which leads to a false conclusion. If we take a mathematical example, we can show that though a series like minus one, minus two, minus three, minus four etc. (-1, -2, -3, -4...) has no beginning but has got an end in plus one (+1). On the contrary a series like plus one, plus two, plus three, plus four etc. (+1, +2, +3, +4...) has a beginning but no end, because there is no limit to any mathematical number. Prof. Freedman thinks that it has been wrongly formulated, inasmuch as the series given here, viz, -1, -2, -3, -4..., the first member of a series leading to infinite negative numbers (nn) just as the positive +1 leads to a similar positive infinite series. In both cases, therefore, the series have a beginning and no end. To indicate the reverse, i.e., having no beginning but an end, it should have been formulated as "nn'.....-4, -3, -2, -1, leading to 0 (zero). The same holds for the positive series.

It would be interesting to compare the different standpoints held by Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja with regard to the conception of *Māyā*. To Śaṅkara, although *māyā* has got no beginning (*anādi*) but has got an end. To Rāmānuja, *māyā* has got both a beginning and an end, because he believes that whatever has got a beginning must have an end.

because there is nothing else besides the self which is ultimately real. The Sāṅkhya concept of omniscience is also different from the Jaina though it is closer to the latter than the Advaitic conception. For the Sāṅkhya, the omniscient is he who has a discriminative knowledge that the self is not *prakṛti*, but in knowing, one has to know what is not *prakṛti*. Therefore, the discriminative knowledge (*viveka*) of Sāṅkhya means knowledge of everything that is real, still the differences between the Sāṅkhya and the Jaina position would not be overlooked. I shall have to add here that these differences between the Jaina, Nyāya and Vedāntic positions are due to the different ontologies of these different systems.

The Buddhist, with a fleeting evanescent stream of consciousness, an ideal of *nirvāṇa*-generally signifying nothingness and the basic postulate of non-ego, make the ideal of omniscience very much removed from the reach of the common man, although great efforts have been made by the Buddhists to prove the omniscience of Lord Buddha. This they had to do obviously for religious reasons. Śāntarakṣita's famous argument is that nature of *citta* is to know and when the obstacles of knowledge like *kleśa* etc. are removed, it shines in its full blaze. This is very much like the Jaina argument for the existence of omniscience in the soul.²⁰ According to the Buddhist eternal omniscience is attained by the power of will after the removal of obstacles and it leads to the knowledge of non-soul as the highest reality. The Mīmāṃsā thinkers distinguish the self from the understanding and senses,²¹ so self is present when understanding (*buddhi*) is absent. So the self is not manifested in all acts of cognition. The facts of memory prove it. Cognition is an activity of soul.²² According to Prābhākara, the self is

20 The verse of Haribadra (*Yoga-bindu*, 431) quoted by Vidyānanda (*Aṣṭa-sahasrī*, p. 50) and by Akalaṅka (*Nyāya-viniścaya*, p. 294) reads like the same from Śāntarakṣita (*Tattva-saṃgraha*, 3338, 3339, 3435).

21 Jaimini, *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, I. 1.4; I. 1.5.

22 Kumārila, *Śloka-vārttika*, (*Ātmavāda*), 100.

something non-intelligent which is the substratum of qualities like knowledge, activity, etc. and so it is not the object of recognition but the substrate thereof. According to Kumārila, there is distinction between the soul as consciousness itself and the many selves, whose substratum is the one universal soul. The Mīmāṃsakas, in general, accept the Vedāntic theory of self except that they recognise some unconscious element in the soul which is perhaps the internal organ. So it is supposed to be both conscious and unconscious. This makes their position a little dubious. However, the reasons for the rejection of the theory of omniscience is more religious than metaphysical or epistemological. Mīmāṃsakas are avowed opponents of the doctrine of omni-science, hence if human omniscience is accepted, this will take away the entire ground of the doctrine of the Vedas.

II. Knowledge of Knowledge

Now, since soul is constitutionally a knowing being, it cannot exist without knowledge. It is like a lamp²³ which illumines itself as well as objects known. It may look odd to say that objects are knowable but knowledge is not. However, this view of the Jainas is not accepted by the Naiyāyikas and the Bhāṭṭas. To the Mīmāṃsakas, "knowledge is non-perceptive because intellect itself is known by inference consequent upon the knowledge of objects apprehended by it."²⁴ The Bhāṭṭas are

23 Mānikyanandi, *Parikṣāmukham*, I. 12. In *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokaṇīkā*, I. 18, the example given is that of the sun instead of a lamp. Siddhasena Divākara also says that *Pramāṇa* illumines itself as well as other objects (*Nyāyavatāra*, 1). Hemacandra also mentions that "as an object reveals itself, so the knowledge reveals itself and consequently a knowledge can know itself"—(*Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā-bhāṣya*, I. 1.2.). See also Samantabhadra, *Āpta-Mīmāṃsā*, 101; *Svayambhūstotra*, 63; Dharmabhūṣaṇa, *Nyāya-dīpikā*, I. 13.

24 *Śabara-bhāṣya* on *Mīm. Sūt.*, I. 1.5., See remarks made by M. K. Jaina, *Siddhi-viniścaya-īkā*, p. 99 (English Introduction). "But as the *buddhi* of our selves is as imperceptive as the *buddhi* of others, so it is impossible to know the objects by our own *buddhi* in as-much as we do not know them by the help of *buddhi* of others."

uncompromising non-self revelatorists they maintain that knowledge can be known only non-perceptually. Even the Prābhākaras maintain that knowledge is inferred from effect-in-the-form of cognition (*phala-samvitti*) but this is different from the Bhāṭṭas theory of cognition as inferred from the effect-in-the-form of manifestedness (*prākāṣya-rūpa-phala*).²⁵ The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika also holds that knowledge does not reveal itself, just as the finger-tip cannot touch itself. Knowledge is, no doubt, by nature perceptible but not self-perceptible.²⁶ But it is clear that this view, as has been pointed out by many critics, leads to the fallacy of *infinite-regress* because then every cognition will require another one to be cognised. But if the Naiyāyika says that the manifesting cognition does not require to be cognised by another cognition, one may retort by saying that if it is cognised by itself, then the self-revelatory nature of the same cognition is *ipso facto* established. Further, the hypothesis of the unknownness of the revealing cognition will also not do, for it is absurd to say that an unknown knowledge can know another piece of knowledge. Then, if we regard knowledge as imperceptible, our own states of pleasure and pain should not worry us. Instead, we should be able to feel happiness or sorrow at the pleasure and suffering of others. But it is obvious that we cannot have the experience of others. The famous Jaina logician Prabhācandra²⁷ has made a detailed criticism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position that a cognition cannot turn on itself to make itself its object. He says that as pleasure, pain and our religious experiences are self-cognised, so every cognition must be self-revelatory. Further there is no proof of a cognition cognising another. If one cognition is perceived by another, the other will never be able to cognise the first since the past is dead and gone and after-recognition is not a fact.

25 Śālikānātha, *Prakaraṇa-Pāṇcika*, p. 63. (For comparative account of the views of the Prābhākaras and the Bhāṭṭas on this problem).

26 Viśvanātha, *Kārikāvali*, (Bombay, Nirṇayasāgara), 57.

27 Prabhācandra, *Prameya-kāmala-mārtanda*, pp. 132-148.

The argument that, as non-self-revelatory sense-organs do cognise and apprehend their objects, so the imperceptible cognition can cognise other cognitions, cannot hold good, because it must be then accepted that the earlier knowledge of an object knows its object though it is not itself known. But this position has not been accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. The argument that God has got two sets of cognitions—one that knows the world and the other knows this knowledge will land us into the fallacy of infinite regress. It would be ridiculous to assign to God the power of omniscience and then take away the power of cognising his own knowledge.

The Jainas, on the basis of above arguments, have accepted the self-revelatory character of cognition. Their purpose is manifold. This view saves their scheme of pluralism and realism. Their fundamental dualism between the *jīvas* and the *ajīvas* is thereby easily defended. It is worthwhile to note that they use the term revelatory (*sva-prakāśa*) with regard to knowledge. It means that knowledge only reveals, it does not modify or alter its object. Hence it is free from the fallacy of either Berkeleyan idealism or Kantian phenomenalism. Jainism presents on the other hand pure monistic realism as for it “the object of knowledge is independent of knowledge relation and there is no dualism between the object known and the object as it is.”²⁸ This position may be compared with the epistemological monism of modern western neo-realists.

An objection may be raised here. On the Jaina position, it would be difficult to show the existence of self-revealing consciousness in the cases of certain psychological processes like *attention*. The self-consciousness, lying at the root of all such cognitions seems to be an ultra-psychological consciousness called “latent consciousness” by Ferrier.²⁹ To some extent, it might be compared with the transcendental ego of Kant or the accompaniment of Plotinus.

28 Dr. Rājendra Prasād, “A Critical Study of the Jaina Epistemology”, *Jaina Antiquary* (Arrah), Vol. XV, No. 2, Jan. 1949), p. 65.

29 J. F. Ferrier, *Institutes of Metaphysics* (2nd ed.), p. 81.

For the Upaniṣads, the self is self-luminous and so it knows others as well as itself.³⁰ According to the Vedānta, knowledge is of the nature of ultimate reality; it is itself its own light. For the Buddhists of Yogācāra school, there is nothing other than cognition.³¹

Among the self-revelatorists, the Jaina occupies a middle position between the Advaitins on the one hand and the Buddhists on the other, the former elevating knowledge to the extent of making it the ultimate transcendental reality, while the latter reducing it to an unbroken series of momentary perceptions.

It would be interesting to note the intimate connection between a system's metaphysics of the soul, and its position about the knowledge of knowledge. Those who accept the reality of things other than the soul, also regard the self as revelatory of those other things, besides being self-revelatory. They generally regard the relation between the soul and its knowledge to be one of either identity or identity-in-difference. The nature of *ātman* according to the Yogācāra Buddhist, the Jains, Sāṅkhyas, Yogins, Śāṅkara, Rāmānuja and other Vedāntins, is self-perceptible. Kumārila is the only exception to whom self is self-revelatory inspite of the fact, for him, knowledge is non-perceptible. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and the Prābhākaras, who hold that the self is not self-revelatory also recognise knowledge to be distinct from *ātman*, even when they admit the self-revelatory character of knowledge.³²

The Sāṅkhya-Yogins would like to substitute the pure consciousness or the essence of *puruṣa* for this unknownness of

30 *Kāth. Up.*, V. 15.

31 *Dharmakīrti, Nyāya-bindu*, I. 10.

32 The purpose of the Mīmāṃsakas in advocating the theory of knowledge as imperceptible (*parokṣa*) is obvious. They are uncompromising scripturalists. The knowledge of merit, demerit and other super-normal things are derived from the Vedas and Vedas alone. This knowledge is non-sensuous and therefore it must be indirect and imperceptible.

Illuminating cognition. But this position takes away the very basis of perceptual cognizance which is regarded as a mere modification of the unintelligent *buddhi*, an evolute of *Prakṛti*. Unlike the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, Sāṅkhya-Yogins and the Bhāṭṭas, the Upaniṣads, the Vedāntins, Yogācāra Buddhists and the Prābhākaras agree with the Jainas in accepting the self-revelatory character of knowledge, there are of course, some minor differences in their respective positions.

The view that knowledge is self-revelatory has some important bearing on the problem of omniscience. Omniscience designates the cognitive perfection of the soul and hence if it cannot cognise itself, it is not omniscience. When omniscience is all-knowledge, it would be absurd to deny its own knowledge to the self. By definition, the subject-matter of omniscience is "all the substances with all their modifications."³³ It means the knowledge of both the subject and the object, the knower and the known. This definition cannot be interpreted in the sense that through the perfect-knowledge (*kevala-jñāna*) one knows only the "modifications of the substances" (it being in the *tatpuruṣa* sixth) and not the "substances". This interpretation will be wrong, because it will render the term 'substance' in the sentence useless. Modifications always belong to the substances and hence even the word 'modifications' would have been enough for conveying the meaning of the said *sūtra*. In the said *tatpuruṣa-samāsa*, the standpoint of the author is clearly indicative of the purpose. Then the *sūtra* would mean that through perfect-knowledge one will know only the modifications and not the substances. As a matter of fact, these objections suffer from the wrong notion that *substances* and *modifications* can exist independently. Substance-modifications (*dravya-paryāyas*) in the *sūtra* should be understood as combinative (*dvandva-samāsa*).³⁴ Now, understood in this light, whether the self-revelatory or other-revelatory know-

33 Umāsvāmī, *T. Sūt.*, I. 29.

34 Akalaṅka, *Tattvārtha-rāja-vārttika*, I. 29. 7-8

ledge, all cognitions belong to the soul, and when all are known they naturally become conscious as well as self-conscious. The property of being self-conscious, is basic to all-knowledge. "He who clearly understands the self as of the nature of know-er on the authority of the scriptural knowledge is called *Śruta-kevalin*" —says Kundakunda.³⁵ He further says : "Just as the sun, all by himself is lustrous and warm, and a deity of the sky; so also the liberated soul is endowed with knowledge and happiness, and is a divinity of the world."³⁶

Even in the case of ordinary knowledge, whether it knows other things or not, because of the required circumstances, it always knows itself. Even in the cases of doubt or erroneous knowledge or any other forms of wrong knowledge, cognition reveals itself. Knowledge unlike material objects as *jār*, cloth, etc., is not produced and then it is known when associated with the mind. In fact it knows itself when it is produced. Knowledge is like the self-lustrous light of a lamp which not only illumines others but also itself and does the two things simultaneously.

It is clear, while accepting the Jaina philosophical perspectives, that if an omniscient is not conscious of his own knowledge, he cannot be conscious of the objects of his knowledge. So he will not be then really omniscient but very much ignorant. So to keep the doctrine of omniscience free from difficulties, the doctrine of the self-revelatory nature of knowledge seems to be an essential condition,

III. Validity of Knowledge and Omniscience

The problem of validity of knowledge involves many important questions of epistemology, e.g. what is the meaning of valid knowledge ? What is the criterion of validity ? How does validity originate ? What is the means of valid knowledge ? etc.

35 Kundakunda, *Pravacana-sāra*, I.33.

36 Ibid., I. 68.

According to Jainism, every *pramāṇa*, i.e., every means of *pramā* (valid knowledge) must be rooted in conscious awareness. Non-conscious instruments like sense-organs (*indriyas*), contact (*sannikarṣa*), etc., cannot yield knowledge³⁷ since *pramā* is of the nature of consciousness and is also the real guide of our purposive actions.³⁸

It is interesting to go through the historical development of the definition of *pramāṇa* in Indian philosophical traditions. According to Sukhalālji,³⁹ the Jaina approach may be studied under four broad categories : (1) Samantabhadra⁴⁰-Siddhasena⁴¹-method of defining *pramāṇa* as "revealing others as well as itself" (2) Akalaṅka⁴²-Māṇikyanandi⁴³-method of defi-

37 The Jainas reject the view held by Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya etc. that senses, contact etc. can be called *pramāṇa*. Vātsāyana admits *Sannikarṣa* (*Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. 1.3), Praśastapāda 'knowledge of its being' or *svarūpālocana* (*Praśasta-pāda bhāṣya*, p. 533) and Vijñāna bīkṣu 'activities of sense-organs' or *Vṛtti* (*Sāṅkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya*, II. 1) The Prābhākara, however, enlarge the scope of *pramāṇa* by defining it in terms of our experience or *anubhūti* (*Śabara-bhāṣya*, II. 1).

38 Māṇikyanandi, *Parīkṣā mukham*, I. 2 "Because *pramāṇa* enables acquiring beneficial things and leaving non-beneficial objects, this is nothing but knowledge." cp. Prabhācandra, *Prameya-kamala-mārtanda*, p. 5, Anantavīrya, *Prameya-ratna-mālā*, p. 4.

39 Sukhalāl Sanghavi, *Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics* p. 32, cp. *Siddhivinīścaya śika*, pp. 99-100 (Introduction by M. K. Jaina); *Nyāya-dīpikā*, pp. 12 14 (Introduction); *Parīkṣā-mukham*, Eng. Tr. & comy. by S. C. Ghosal, I. 1.

40 Samantabhadra, *Svayambhū-stotra*, 63; *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*, 101. He uses the words "*sva-para-avabhāṣaka*".

41 Siddhasena Divākara, *Nyāyāvatāra*, 1 (*sva-parābhāṣi*). He also adds one more characteristic to the definition of *pramāṇa*, "admitting of no obstruction" (*bādha-vivarjitam*) in order to characterize such kinds of false knowledge, e.g. images of two moons, etc. (Ibid. 7).

42 Akalaṅka adds two adjectives, namely, cognition of an object which was not so far cognised (*anadhigatārthaka*) and non-discrepancy (*avisamvāda*)-*Aṣṭa-śatī*, 36.

43 Māṇikyanandi, *Parīkṣā-mukham*, I. 1. "*pramāṇa* is valid knowledge of itself and of things not proved before."

nirg it as possessing “non-discrepancy combined with uncognisedness” (3) Vidyānanda⁴⁴-Abhayadeva Sūri’s⁴⁵ way of emphasising on its “indubious” and “definite” character and lastly (4) Hemacandra’s⁴⁶ stress on it as “authentic definitive cognition of the knowable”. Dharmabhūṣaṇa⁴⁷ also accepts this.

Historically speaking, Umāsvāmī’s definition of *pramāṇa* as that which gives knowledge of five kinds is earlier than the above four but he did not develop his definition in any detail. Therefore, we can start here with Samantabhadra’s definition (*sraparāvabhāsakam*), which forms the foundation for future definition. Siddhasena almost borrows (?) his three terms, *sva*, *para*, *avabhāsaka* in his own definition and his own addition of *bādhavivarjitam* (admitting of no obstruction) may be taken as an adjective to ‘knowledge’. Even Akalaṅka uses *ātmā*,⁴⁸ *ārtha*⁴⁹, and *vyavasāyātmaka*⁵⁰ in places of *sva*, *para* and *avabhāsaka* respectively. The terms *anadhigata*,⁵¹ *aniścita*⁵² *avisamvādi*⁵³ and *anirṇīta*⁵⁴ may be taken as adjective qualifying the noun ‘*ārtha*’. Māṇikyanandi’s attempt at juxtaposi-

44 Vidyānanda finds no need to admit the characteristics introduced by Akalaṅka and instead stresses upon it being determinate (*vyavasāyātmaka*)-*Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttikam*, I. 10.77.

45 He follows Vidyānanda but uses different term decisive (*nirṇīta*) for determinate (*vyavasāyātmaka*)-*Sanmati-tarka-ṭikā*, p. 518. Vādideva also accepts the views of Vidyānanda—*Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka-lāṅkāra*, I. 2.

46 Hemacandra introduces three characteristics : *Samyak*, also available in *T. Sūt.*, I. 1; Bhāsarvajña, *Nyāya-sāra*, p. 1; Dharmakīrti, *Nyāya-bindu*, I. 1. (ii) *ārtha*, and *nirṇaya*. He speaks of ‘authentic definitive cognition of an object’-*Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsa*, I. 1. II.

47 Dharmabhūṣaṇa, *Nyāya-dīpikā*, I. 18.

48 Akalaṅka, *Laghīyastraya*, 60.

49 Ibid., *Aṣṭa-śatī*, 36.

50 Akalaṅka, *Laghīyastraya*, 60.

51 Akalaṅka, *Aṣṭa-śatī*, 36.

52 Ibid., 101.

53 Ibid., 36.

54 Akalaṅka, *Aṣṭa-śatī*, 101.

tion of words is obvious for he uses *apūrvārtha*⁵⁵ for *anadhigata* and *sva* for *ātmā*. Vidyānandi⁵⁶ has also used the terms *sva*, *artha* and *vyavasāyātmaka* in his definition, that speak of the influence of Samantabhadra. However, credit goes to Akalaṅka⁵⁷ to emphasise that only *jñāna* is *pramāṇa*. Dharmabhūṣaṇa⁵⁸ says that the two terms *jñāna* as well is *pramāṇa* are derived with the affix ‘*anaṭ*’ in the instrumental voice. Prabhācandra, giving the three ways in which *pramāṇa* may be derived, says that in the instrumental sense (*karāṇa*), *pramāṇa* means “that by which right knowledge is gained”.⁵⁹ The reason lies in the fact that the Jainas generally regard knowledge as cognisant irrespective of its being true or false. No knowledge is either totally valid or invalid. So the criterion of validity will be complete non-discrepancy and that of invalidity its opposite i.e., discrepancy. This point is illustrated with the example of a perfumed substance possessing other characteristics also besides smell, but because of the preponderance of a particular attribute, namely, of being perfumed, it is called a perfumed substance.⁶⁰

In non-Jaina systems, Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas present a contrast to the Jainas. According to Kaṇāda, right knowledge must be free from all defects.⁶¹ Vātsyāyana making an improvement

55 Māṇikyanandi, Ibid., I. 1, cp. Akalaṅka, *Aṣṭa-śatī*, 36, cp. He seems to have borrowed *pūrvārtha* from Kumārila or Dharmakīrti and *sva* from Samantabhadra.

56 Vidyānandi, *Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttikam*, I. 10.77.

57 M. K. Jaina, His Introduction to *Siddhi-viniścaya-ṭīkā* of Akalaṅka with comy. of Anantavīrya, pp. 98-99,

58 Dharmabhūṣaṇa, *Nyāya-dīpikā*, I. 10.

59 Prabhācandra, *Prameya-kamala-mārtanda*, pp. 3-4; cp. Akalaṅka, *Tattvārtha-rāja-vārttikam*, I. 10; *Pramāṇa-nirṇayaḥ* (Pratyakṣa), p. 1; vide *Jainendra Vyākaraṇa* II. 3.112 for grammatical objections and for replies see Prabhācandra's *Prameya-kamala-mārtanda*, p. 4.

60 Akalaṅka, *Aṣṭa-śatī* (*Aṣṭa-sahasrī*), p. 276; *Laghīyastraya*, 22, *Siddhi-viniścaya-ṭīkā*, p. 94; Vidyānandi, Ibid., I. 10, 35-40.

61 Kaṇāda, *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*, IX. 2.12.

upon him says : “*Pramā* is right knowledge of objects i.e., it is the awareness of an object in its right form, knowledge of a thing as it really is.”⁶² The instrument of *pramā* is *pramāṇa*, which is defined as that which causes *pramā*.⁶³ However, this view has been further modified by Vācaspati as “*pramāṇa* is valid cognition of an object”,⁶⁴ which has also been accepted by Udayana⁶⁵ in conformity with Gotama’s tradition. Gaṅgeśa, the exponent of Navya-Nyāya describes the older definition and says that *pramā* is knowledge free from fallacy. This seems to be similar to Hemacandra’s definition.⁶⁶ The Mīmāṃsakas, in their definition of *pramā*, combine “originating from a non-defective cause” (*aduṣṭa-kāraṇa-ārabdha*) of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and “uncontradictedness” (*nirābādha*) and “novelty” (*apūrvārtha*) of the Buddhists.⁶⁷ Among Buddhists, Dinnāga has included “self-cognition” (*sva-samvitti*)⁶⁸ in his definition, and Dharmakīrti has introduced the term non-discrepant (*avisamvādi*).⁶⁹ Śāntarakṣita has tried to work out a synthesis between Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti. However, for the Buddhists, “there is no instrumentality of the senses, that there are only images and that there is no distinction between consciousness and its content”.⁷⁰ They do not accept ‘determination’ or ‘decisiveness’ as an essential characteristic of *pramāṇa*.

The Jains refute the views of Nyāya, Sāṅkhya, Mīmāṃsā and Yoga by accepting the adjective ‘*sva*’ since their defini-

62 Vātsyāyana, *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, I. 1.1 co. Annambhaṭṭa, *Tarka-saṃgraha*, 35.

63 Vātsyāyana, *Ibid.*, I. 1.3.

64 Vācaspati Miśra, *Tātparya-tīkā*, p. 21.

65 Udayana, *Nyāya-kusumāñjali*, IV. 1.5.

66 Hemacandra, *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I. 1.3.

67 Kumārila, *Śloka-vārttika*, Aup. 10-11.

68 Dinnāga, *Pramāṇa-Samuccaya*, I. 10.

69 Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇa-vārttikam*, II. 1.

70 Bhaṭṭācārya, H. M., “Jaina Critique of the Buddhist Theories of *Pramāṇa*”, *Jaina Antiquary*, Vol. XV, No. 1, June, 1949, p. 7.

tions do not require for *pramāṇa* to be at the same time knowledge of itself as well as of the objects known.⁷¹ However most of the definitions of *pramāṇa*, have insisted on “right knowledge”; about “newness”, there is no unanimity among the Jainas. Roughly speaking, the characteristic feature of the Jaina theory of *pramāṇa* is that knowledge as *pramāṇa* is like the sun or lamp, which illumines itself as well as others. The Jainas, therefore, also recognise even memory as a *pramāṇa* since it is true or false like perception.⁷² The Mīmāṃsakas⁷³ reject memory as *pramāṇa* because it gives no new knowledge. Jayanta gives a new argument against memory. Memory takes place when the object is absent. So he says, “our knowledge born of something which is [absent cannot be *pramāṇa*.⁷⁴ Vācaspati⁷⁵ does not regard memory as *pramāṇa* because of popular usage, so does Udayana. Buddhist’s objections to memory are similar to the Mīmāṃsakas but also they were clearly influenced by their own position with regard to *pramāṇa*. With regard to whether the continuous knowledge (*dhārāvāhika jñāna*) should or should not be treated as *pramāṇa*, the Jainas are among themselves divided. The Śvetāmbara-tradition generally recognise it as *pramāṇa* as do the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas, while the Digambaras, like the Buddhists, maintain a reserved attitude. A continuous knowledge becomes *pramāṇa* only when it takes note of specialities like the particular significance of the moments etc., and produces some new knowledge. However, among the Śvetāmbaras. Hemacandra rejects continuous knowledge as *pramāṇa* on the ground that it gives no new knowledge.

The next question to be discussed is to be : how does a *pramāṇa* establish its validity and what is the criterion of

71 Anantavīrya, *Prameya-ratna-mālā*, p. 3.

72 Vādideva Sūri, *Syādvāda-ratnākara*, III. 4.

73 Kumārila, *Śloka-vārttika* (Anumāna), 160.

74 Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, *Nyāya-mañjarī*, IV. 1.

75 Vācaspati Miśra, *Tātparya-īkā*, p. 20.

validity? To take the second point first, we know that the Jainas like the Naiyāyikas regard *practical utility as the criterion of validity*.⁷⁶ Valid knowledge enables us to acquire beneficial and avoid non-beneficial objects. Vātsyāyana says, “knowledge is apprehension exciting desire and leading to action”⁷⁷ and its criterion depends upon its “capacity to lead to successful action”.⁷⁸ This shows the pragmatic basis of the Jainas and the Naiyāyikas. However, the Jainas, do not commit the error of western pragmatists who equate validity with utility. “All valid knowledge is practically useful”, may be true but to convert it into “all practically useful knowledge is valid” is a case of wrong conversion of an ‘A’ proposition into another ‘A’ proposition. Buddhists commit the same fallacy, when they regard practical utility as the whole of truth. Jainas had introduced determination (*niścaya*) or decisiveness (*nirṇāta*) and other phrases in their definition of *pramāṇas*, but they only indicate some subjective or internal criterion. Truth, therefore, was described as the direct determination of the object and error as confusion of the thing cognised with something else. Being realists, the Jainas cannot accept the theory of error propounded by the Yogācāra subjectivists known as *ātma-khyāti*, or even that of the Vedāntins known as *anirvacanīya-khyāti*. According to the former, the existence of the external world is buried into the graveyard of *ālaya-vijñāna* and according to the latter, in the cosmic illusion or *māyā*. Here the distinction between truth and falsity is rendered impossible. Similarly, *asatkhyātivāda* of the Buddhist nihilists cannot be accepted since according to the Jainas nothing is *asat* and also because the Jainas are followers of *satkāryavāda*. The Sāṅkhya account of *akhyātivāda* fails to explain how an erroneous awareness manifests itself. Against the Prābhākara theory of *vivekakhyāti*, the Jainas urge that it presupposes, non-existence of error, but so long as the error survives, it exists and

76 Mānikyanandi, *Parikṣā-mukham*, I. 2.

77 Vātsyāyana, *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, I. 1.2.

78 Goṭama, *Nyāya-sūtra*, I. 1. 17.

we are also influenced by it, for example, by the rope-snake-illusion. So according to the Jainas, as truth is rooted in immediate cognition of the object by the subject, and "error may be possible owing to failure of proper discrimination due to *doṣas* or defects in the objective environment as well as in the sense-organs."⁷⁹

As the Jainas accept that *pramāṇa* is that valid knowledge which illumines itself as well as its knowledge, they refute the views of Yogācāra Buddhists who hold that knowledge only illumines itself and the views of Mīmāṃsakas, Naiyāyikas, etc., who maintain that knowledge illumines external object alone, as it cannot illumine itself. The other characteristic of *pramāṇa*, such as, 'novelty' and/or 'decisiveness' are also important. The first guarantees the growth of knowledge reaching to any height and the second guards it against mere imagination and day-dreaming.

The question of a criterion of validity leads to other questions regarding its origin and knowledge. It has been very hotly debated, whether validity or invalidity is intrinsic or extrinsic, and the following answers may be suggested :

- (i) Both validity and invalidity are extrinsic—*Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*.
- (ii) Both validity and invalidity are intrinsic—*Sāṅkhya-Yoga*.
- (iii) Validity is intrinsic but invalidity extrinsic—*Mīmāṃsā*.
- (iv) Validity is extrinsic but invalidity is intrinsic—*Buddhism*.
- (v) Both the validity and invalidity can be intrinsic in one sense and extrinsic in another senses—*Buddhism*.
- (vi) In case of familiar knowledge, validity and invalidity, are intrinsic, while in case of unfamiliar and new knowledge, validity and invalidity are extrinsic—*Jainism*.

79 H. M. Bhaṭṭācārya, "Jaina Critique of the Buddhist Theories of *Pramāṇa*", *Jaina Antiquary*, Vol. XV, No. 2, p. 32.

All the orthodox systems admit the validity of the Vedic testimony, while the heterodox systems deny it. However, the Mīmāṃsakas regarded the *Vedas* as eternal and impersonal, whereas the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas thought them to be creation of God.⁸⁰ But the Buddhists and the Jainas do not accept either the authority of the *Vedas* or God. Of the above theories, the first four have been very greatly discussed and therefore they need not be elaborated here. The fifth presents the position of Buddhists like Śāntarakṣita, who rejects the preceding views because they are influenced by the faith in the authority of the *Vedas*, while the Buddhist accept no such regulation or authority.⁸¹ For Śāntarakṣita, whether validity or invalidity is intrinsic or extrinsic depends upon certain special circumstances which may differ from case to case. For example, in the case of repeated acquaintance (*abhyāsa-daśā*), both validity and invalidity are intrinsic, while in the case of first acquaintance (*anyabhyāsadaśā*), both are extrinsic.⁸² This reminds one of the famous statement of Akalaṅka when he says that “no knowledge is either totally valid or invalid.”⁸³ This is also asserted by Vādideva Sūri⁸⁴ and Hemachandra.⁸⁵ It should be further noted that the Jaina position on this problem is quite in keeping with the non-absolutistic postulate. For example, Māṇikyanandi says “the validity of *pramāṇas* rises from itself as through another *pramāṇa*.”⁸⁶ Here the Naiyāyikas agree that the validity of *pramāṇas* is known through other source i.e., inference.

According to the Jainas, the validity is neither extrinsic alone as the Naiyāyikas say nor intrinsic alone as the Sāṅkhya-

80 Udayana, *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, II. 1.

81 Śāntarakṣita, *Tattva-saṅgraha*, 3123.

82 Ibid., 3123 (*Pañjikā* of Kamalaśīla).

83 Akalaṅka, *Aṣṭo-śati* (*Aṣṭa-sahasrī*), p. 277; *Laghiyastraya*, 22.

84 Vādideva Sūri, *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra*, I. 21.

85 Hemacandra, *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I. 1.8.

86 Māṇikyanandi, *Parikṣā-mūlham*, I. 13.

Yogins say. It is both extrinsic and intrinsic. If we ask when it is extrinsic and when intrinsic, their answer is this : in the case of knowledge of familiar objects validity is intrinsic, but in the case of unfamiliar objects, it is extrinsic. Dharmabhūṣaṇa⁸⁷ cites an example of a man who was familiar to one pond and unfamiliar to another. About the latter, he was doubtful whether it contains water or is only a mirage, and than using inferential knowledge that there is a smell of lotuses, cool breeze coming from that side, etc. he comes to the conclusion that it contains water. Hemacandra also supports this view when he says : “we become certain of validity of a *pramāṇa* either by itself or through the help of others.”⁸⁸ So subsequent confirmatory cognitions, cognition of its pragmatic consequences or cognition of an object invariably related to it, will determine the validity. Vidyānandi has also affirmed the views of Akalaṅka, Māṇikyanandi and Hemacandra by saying that *pramāṇa* ‘establishes itself regarding objects with which we are already familiar and takes the help of others in other cases.’⁸⁹ This is also supported by other Jaina logicians, like Anantavīrya⁹⁰ and Vādideva Sūri.⁹¹ However, a critic may raise an objection that if by inference, the validity of a *pramāṇa* is made, it may lead to many difficulties. Firstly, it will mean that an inference which is itself a *pramāṇa* is made to confirm another *pramāṇa*, which is a sort of paradoxical position. But in order to avoid this difficulty, if it is said that another inference will validate this, this will be a sort of infinite regress. Hence to avoid all these difficulties,

87 Dharmabhūṣaṇa, *Nyāya-dīpikā*, I. 21.

88 Hemacandra, *Pramāṇa-mimāṃsā*, I. 1.8.

89 Vidyānandi, *Pramāṇa-parikṣā*, “Prāmāṇyam-to-svataḥ-siddhambhyasat-paratoanyathā”.

90 Anantavīrya, *Prameya-ratna-mālā*, p. 6—“Prāmāṇya arises by itself”.

91 Vādideva Sūri, *Prameya-naya-tattvālokāṅkāra*, I. 11. “Prāmāṇya and aprāmāṇya arise through others, but regarding their knowledge, they arise by themselves.”

we can conclude, that validity depends upon external factor, but in its function, viz., the determination of the objects of knowledge, it is self-contained in the case of familiar objects and needs extraneous help in the case of unfamiliar objects.

The question of validity of knowledge is also closely related to the concept of *kevala-jñāna*. In keeping with their general position on the subject, the Jainas maintain that validity of omniscience is at the same time intrinsic and demonstrable by external factors. As it is a kind of immediate direct-perception (i.e., a *pramāṇa*), its validity must, therefore be intrinsic and immediately knowable. This establishes its infallibility also. But if its validity would have been recognised only as intrinsic, the concept of *kevala-jñāna* would have been installed only as a religious one, just as the Mīmāṃsakas believe in an eternal, infallible, impersonal, all-knowing *Veda*. The Jainas have also admitted the extrinsic validity of all *pramāṇas* including *kevala-jñāna*, since it has been included in the list of *pramāṇas*.⁹² This means that those who are familiar with the theory and practice of *kevala-jñāna*, for them its validity is intrinsic but to an unfamiliar man, its validity is extrinsic. This is in order to convince him of its truth, the help of other factors is necessary. Jaina literature is full of great dialectical skill exhibited in proving the fact of omniscience. This shows that it is both internally sound and externally defensible. This also explains why the Jainas were so anxious to accord *kevala-jñāna*, a place in the list of sources of knowledge and not to treat it only as mystical and religious dogma. This move was obviously intended to liquidate every ground of scepticism about its validity. *Kevala-jñāna*, being a *pramāṇa* itself, has a dual role to play. It is the essential means of right knowledge (*pramāṇa*) as well as it is itself right knowledge (*pramā*). Like all valid knowledge *Kevala-jñāna* cannot miss newness (*apūrvārtha*) and defini-

33 Umāsvāmī, T. *Sūtra*, I. 9.

ness (*vyavasāya*). If it is objected that no new knowledge can be acquired by the omniscient since he will cognise everything in a moment and from the next moment he will not be cognising anything because nothing will be left to be cognised for him, a Jaina can say in reply that one should note that the world of change is eternal and hence every next moment will be a new world of cognition. Similarly, *kevala-jñāna*, being an organ of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is “the authentic definitive cognition of an object.”⁹³ The use of the term ‘definitive cognition’ serves to negate the character of organ of knowledge of sense-object-contact as it is not a cognition and of doubt, etc. The term ‘authentic’ (*samyak*) means what is not contrary to fact and is an indeclinable. The result of this qualification is the exclusion of error. *Kevala-jñāna* is, therefore, clear beyond measure.

To conclude, the introduction of *kevala-jñāna* in the list of *pramāṇas* is a distinctive achievement of the Jainas in Indian epistemology. The other Indian systems have been able to recognise only the six kinds of *pramāṇas* ranging from perception to negation. In spite of the fact that all of these systems are deeply rooted in religion, in the field of logic and epistemology, omniscience, the culmination of religious experience, has seldom been treated as a scientific discipline. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and the Yogins discuss yogic or paranormal perception but it has rarely influenced their logical and epistemological thinking. It seems that the chapter on yogic-perception in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system is a logical misfit and possibly, an after-thought. *Yoga* as a system of philosophy is different from *Yoga* as a system of mental and spiritual discipline and hence *Yoga* has been developed in India more as a practical science or useful art rather than as a speculative system of philosophising. However, this is not so with the *kevala-jñāna* of Jainas. It is not only a matter of religious faith but also a well-reasoned epistemological and logical sub-

93 Hemacandra, *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I. 1.2 and also *bhāṣya*,

ject. Whatever might have been the motive in formulating the theory of *kavala-jñāna*, it is an integral part of Jaina epistemology.

Kevala jñāna has a super-validity of its own. The pure, perfect and absolute knowledge is like a mirror, which shows the purity and exactitude of knowledge, without any distinction or confusion and the absence of any effort, mental or sensorial. In it are reflected distinctly and simultaneously, all permanent and changing aspects, past, present and future of all objects which exist individually or collectively. "Ever free from obstruction, fully absorbed in one's own self, the supreme Soul is effulgent, like the sky, in the highest stage."⁹⁴

94 Amṛtacandra, *Puruṣārtha-siddhyupāya*, 223.

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CHAPTER VII

SYĀDVĀDA AND SARVAJÑATA

I. Absolutism Vs. Non-absolutism

The Jaina epistemology and logic, in the history of Indian thought, is perhaps more famous for *Syādvāda* and *Anekāntavāda* than for anything else. In fact, in technical philosophy, the value of these two doctrines, which are very much inter-related to each other, cannot be overrated. It is also true that they have greatly influenced Indian logic and epistemology in general.

It seems to be a truism that these two Jaina doctrines, which may be given the class-name of relativism, are opposed to any absolutistic position. The controversy between relativism and absolutism is an age-old one. It is very often argued that the two cannot be accepted at the same time. If everything is relative, if every knowledge is conditional, then no knowledge should be accepted as possessing absolute truth. Further, if there is any piece of knowledge, which is absolutely true then there seems to be no justification for saying that Jainas have very eloquently emphasised that the reality has many facets and therefore, every asseration about reality is bound to be true only conditionally i.e., in a qualified manner. There are critics, who claim, that relativism itself is a self-destructive theory. They say that unless something as absolute is accepted, we cannot accept either the relative nature of reality or that of knowledge. According to them, the statement that all knowledge is relative (or all statements are conditional) is in a sense, self-contradictory because this statement itself should not be considered to be relative, otherwise it will undermine the very basis of relativism.

I do not want to indulge here in this age-old controversy between relativism and absolutism. I, just, only want to point out that though it is very relevant to the subject-matter of the present work, yet it does not pose an insoluble problem connected with Jaina theory of omniscience, with which I am particularly concerned. In fact, the Jaina theory of relativism does not go against the Jaina theory of omniscience because it seems to me that relativism, according to Jaina philosophy, applies to our knowledge of reality in virtue of the fact that we i.e., lay man, approach reality only from *this* or *that* point of view. Therefore, if it is made possible to approach reality from all possible points of view i.e., from no-one-particular-point-of-view, then the resulting knowledge will not be vitiated by relativism. It seems to me that *Sarvajñatā* or omniscience is knowledge of this kind and that is why *Sarvajñatā* can be reconciled with *Syādvāda* or *Anekāntavāda*. This requires a fuller treatment that I have done elsewhere.¹

1 Please refer to my article "The Nature of Unconditionality in *Syādvāda* (read before the *Indian Philosophical Congress* in 1956 at Nagpur). This has subsequently been published in many journals *Jaina Antiquary* (Arrah, Vol. 22 No. 1, 1965; *Mahāvīra Smārīkā*, Jaipur, 1964) etc. I have tried to pose a problem : If non-absolutism is absolute, it is not universal, since there is one real which is absolute, and if non-absolutism is itself non-absolute, it is not an absolute and universal fact. So "tossed between the two horns of the dilemma non-absolutism simply evaporates" (S. Mookerjee, *The Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism*, p. 169). Complete Judgement (*sakalādeśa*) is the object of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and Incomplete Judgement (*vikalādeśa*) is the object of aspectal knowledge (*Naya*)—*Pūjyapāda, Sarvārtha Siddhi*, IV. 45. Hence the "non-absolute is constituted of the absolute as its elements and as such would not be possible if there were no absolutes (S. Mookerjee, *Ibid.*, p. 171).

Further, the unconditionality in the statement "all statements are conditional" is quite different from the normal meaning of unconditionality. This is like the idea contained in the passages, 'I do not know myself', where there is no contradiction between 'knowledge' and 'ignorance', or in the sentence, 'I am undecided', where there is at least one decision, that is 'I am undecided'. Similarly, the categoricity behind

Jaina logic of *Anekānta* is based not on abstract intellectualism but on experience and realism leading to a non-absolutistic attitude of mind. "Multiplicity and unity, particularity and universality, eternality and non-eternality, definability and non-definability"² etc. which apparently seems to be contradictory characteristics of reality, are interpreted from different points of view, to avoid any offence to logic, to be co-existent in the same object. All cognitions, whether of identity or diversity, are after all, valid. "They seem to be contradictory of each other simply because one of them is mistaken to be the whole truth."³ In fact, "the integrity of truth consists in this very variety of its aspects, within the rational unity of an all comprehensive and ramifying principle"⁴ Therefore, Prof. S. Mookerjee holds that "the charge of contradiction against the co-presence of being and non-being in a real is a figment of *apriori* logic."⁵

a disjunctive judgement (A man is either good or bad) is not like the categoricity of an ordinary categorical judgement, 'the horse is red.' Samantabhadra also says, "Even the doctrine of non-absolutism can be interpreted either as absolute or non-absolute according to the *Pramāṇa* or *Naya*. This means that even the doctrine of non-absolutism is not absolute unconditionally". (Samantabhadra, *Svayambhu Stotra*, 103). However, to avoid the fallacy of infinite regress, the Jainas distinguish between valid non-absolutism (*Samyak Anekānta*) and invalid non-absolutism (*Mithyā-Anekānta*). (Samantabhadra, *Apta Mimāṃsā*, 108; Vidyānanda, *Aṣṭasahasrī*, p. 290; Dharamabhūṣaṇa, *Nyāya-dīpikā*, pp. 130-131). Like an invalid absolute judgement, an invalid non-absolute judgement too is invalid. Therefore, to be valid, *Anekānta* must not be absolute but relative. In short, the doctrine of *Anekānta* is an opposite theory of *Ekānta*, which is "a one-sided exposition irrespective of other view points." (Haribhadra, *Anekānta-Jaya-Pataṅkā*, ed. H. R. Kāpadia, Gaekawāda Oriental Institute, Barodā, 1940, Vol. I., p. IX (Introduction).

2 Malliṣeṇa, *Syādvāda Mañjarī*,

3 S. Sanghavī, *Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics*, p. 25.

4 M. D. Desai, *The Nāya Karṇikā*, p. 25 (Introduction).

5 Mookerjee, *Ibid.*, p. 190. The author deals with the "Logical Background of Jaina Philosophy" in the light of *Anekānta* logic.

II. Is Knowledge Absolute ?

Since absoluteness is unknown to Jaina Metaphysics, so it is in its epistemology. The Jaina division of knowledge into immediate and mediate⁶ is not only free from the fallacy of overlapping division, but it is also based on common experience⁷ and supports the initial non-absolutism.

However, the professed non-absolutism becomes more explicit, when knowledge is classified into *Pramāṇa* (knowledge of a thing as it is in itself) and *Nyaya* (knowledge of a thing in its relation). *Pramāṇa* is Complete knowledge (*Saklādeśa*) and *Naya* is Incomplete Knowledge (*Viklādeśa*). The controversies between the two traditions of Jainism, *Āgamic* and the Logical, regarding the classification of knowledge have been discussed very ably by Sukhlālji.⁸

For clarification, it may be said that the terms “immediacy” and “mediacy” are used here in sense different from that in which they are commonly taken. Jainas deny the immediate the character of the ordinary perceptual knowledge as the western Representationalists also do, but unlike the Realists they hold that “knowledge is direct or indirect according as it is born without or with the help of an external instrument different from the self.”⁹

However, to avoid sophistication also to bring their theory in line with others, a distinction is made between the really immediate and the relatively immediate.¹⁰ The latter is

6 Umāsvāmī, *T. Sūt.*, I. 11–12; Māvīkynandi, *Parikṣā-Mukhaṇ*, II. 1; Hemacandra, *Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā*, I. 1.9; Dharmabhaṣana, *Nyāya-dīpikā*, p. 23.

7 Vide Dr. Rājendra Prasād's article “A Critical Study of Jaina Epistemology”, *Jaina Antiquary*, Vol. XV., No. 2, Jan., 1949, pp. 66–67.

8 Sukhlāl Sanghavī, *Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics* Section VIII, pp. 50–54.

9 N. M. Tatiā, *Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, p. 28.

10 See Hemacandra, *Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā*, I. 1.15; Ananta Vīrya, *Prameya-Ratna-Māla*, p. 14; Vādideva Sūri, *Pramāṇa-Naya-Tattvālokaṅkāra* with *Ratnākara-vatārikā* commentary by Ratnaprabhācārya (Kasi, Vira Samvat, 2437), II. 45.

empirically direct knowledge produced by the sense organs and mind.¹¹

Pramāṇa and *Naya* represent roughly the absolute and the relative characters of knowledge respectively, and taken together they constitute knowledge. So constituted, it becomes non-absolutistic knowledge. A closer study of the theory of *Pramāṇa* will reveal a relational structure of knowledge. If *Pramāṇa* is defined as the knowledge of an object in all its aspects and since "an object has innumerable characteristics,"¹² it implies that if we know one object in all its innumerable characteristics, we know all objects.¹³ The universe is an interrelated whole. Hence, right knowledge of even one object will lead to the knowledge of the entire universe. This shows that our knowledge is intrinsically relative in character. This relativism is realistic. "It not only asserts a plurality of determinate truths but also takes each truth to be an indetermination of alternative truths".¹⁴ The so many truths are really alternate truths; so it is a mistake to attempt at finding one absolute truth or even at having one cognition of the plurality of the truths. If knowing is a unity, known is a plurality, the objective category being distinction or togetherness." If finally, knowledge as the object, refers to the known, the known must present an equivalent of this, of relation or reference, a relation and its content."¹⁵ Intellectualistic abstractionism has to be given up and we should try to dehumanise the ideal

11 Māṇikyanandi, *Parīkṣā-mukham*, II. 45; Anantavīrya, *Ibid.*, p. 14; Hemacandra, *Ibid.*, I. 1. 21; Vādideva Sūri, *Ibid.*, II. 4.5; Dharmabhaṣaṇa, *Ibid.*, p. 33; Akalaṅka, *Tattvārtha-Rāja-vārttika*, I. 14; *Sīhanāga Sūtra*, II. 1.71.

12 cp. Haribhadra, *Ṣaḍ-darśana-sammuccaya* (with Guṇaratna's commentary), 55; Siddhasena Divākara, *Nyāyavatāra*, 29.

13 *Ācārāṅga Sūtra*, I. 2.4; Kundakunda, *Pravacana-sāra*, I. 48-49.

14 K. C. Bhattācārya, "The Jaina Theory of Anekāntavāda", *Jaina Antiquary*, Vol. IX, No. 1, p. 10.

15 *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

and realise the real. The reality is not a rounded ready-made whole or an abstract unity of many definite or determinate aspects but that "the so-called unity is after all a manifold being only a name for fundamentally different aspects of truth which do not make a unity in any sense of the term."¹⁶ So far we know or can know, the making of truth and making of reality is one. Reality like truth is therefore definite-indefinite (*anekānta*). Its indefiniteness follows from the inexhaustible reserve of objective reality and its definiteness comes from the fact that it grows up into the reality of our own knowing which we make.

So we can conclude that in Jainism, non-absolutism is not only a metaphysical but also an epistemological concept. There is no absolute reality, so there is no absolute truth.

III. Distinction between *Syādvāda* and *Sarvañatā*

Whatever might be the value of *Syādvāda* or *Anekāntavāda* in Jainism, it is not a final truth. In fact, it is recommended in so far as it helps us, in arriving at the ultimate truth. *Syādvāda* works or can work only in practical life, and it is therefore that the Jainas regard it as a practical truth. But there is also another realm of truth which is not in any way partial or relative but absolute and is the subject-matter of omniscience or perfect knowledge (*Kevala-jñāna*).

Therefore, though it seems to be self-contradictory to accept both *Syādvāda* and *Sarvajñatā*, yet the self-contradiction is more apparent than real. As *Vyavahāra* is not opposed to *Parmārtha* in Advait Vedānta, so here also *Syādvāda* and *Sarvajñatā* are not opposed to each other. As a matter of fact, for the Jainas, truth alone matters (*saccham logammi sārabhūyam*). But the quest of truth is not an easy one. There are our own likes and dislikes which come in the way of

16 H. M. Bhattācārya, "The Jaina Concept of Truth and Reality", *Philosophical Quarterly*, Calcutta, Vol. III, No. 3, October 1927, p. 213.

impartial investigations of truth. It is, therefore, necessary to acquire a strictly impartial and equanimous state of mind and as long we are unable to have it, we should continue our sincere efforts as an impartial seeker of truth but always aiming at achieving that state of intellectual impartiality and equanimity. It follows from this that on the one hand, we should try to understand others' points of view with almost regard of which we are capable, and on the other hand, we should always subject our own views to serious critical examination. Then and then alone, it is likely to be true. Thus, truth and truth alone, is the foundation of *Anekāntavāda*. Infact, *Anekānta* or *Syādvāda* is the typical Jaina attitude in the quest after truth. The Jainas believe that it is almost impossible to know the real nature of reality without the distinction of past, present and future, since it is possessed of innumerable characters belonging to the three times. Then there are also our own cognitive limitations. Hence it is difficult to know the complete truth and it is much more difficult to express it in language, which is a very feeble vehicle of thought. Hence, the adoption of the *Anekānta* attitude seems to be very much justified. In fact, *Anekāntavāda* also aims at attaining the whole and real truth and is, therefore, not scepticism. On the contrary, this attitude of the Jainas, gives them the advantage of remaining catholic in their outlook and of avoiding the fallacy of exclusive predication. Unlike the Vedānta, Jainism does not "see intellectual peace in the Absolute by transcending the antinomies of intellect" but "in the fact of the relativity of knowledge and the consequent revelation of the many-sidedness of Reality – the one leading to religious mysticism, the other to intellectual toleration."¹⁷ The traces of *Syādvāda* can also be found in the *Vedās*, *Upaniṣads* and some other systems of Indian thought.¹⁸

17 A. B. Dhurva, in his Preface (p. XII) to Malliṣeṇa's *Syādvāda Mañjarī*.

18 See Dalsukh Mālvaṇīā, *Āgama Yuga Kā Anekānta*, Jaina Cultural Research Society, Banaras, No. 13; Sukhalāla Sangavi, *Anekāntavāda: Vyāvahārika Aur Tāttvika*, No. 20; C. P. Suklā, *Jīvaṇ Main Syādvāda*,

Indeed, in Jainism, it has received the most systematic and serious exposition. It is also associated with the great Mahāvīra and, therefore, his every statement is prefixed with a “*syāt*” (somehow). Hence, it is said “to be flawless as it is neither opposed to the *Āgamas* nor to our experience.”¹⁹

However, the Jainas, in their great passion for knowledge and truth, have not remained satisfied with *Syādvāda*. Truth to be truth must be the whole truth. As stated earlier, even through the apparatus of *Syādvāda*, the Jainas have attempted at knowing the whole truth. But there is a vital difference between *Syādvāda* and *Sarvajñatā*. While *Syādvāda* illumines the reality indirectly, the *Kevala jñāna* does it directly.²⁰ But then there is no contradiction between the two kinds of knowledge, since by “illumining the whole reality, it means revelation of all the seven categories of self, not-self, etc.”²¹

As a corollary of the above, we can say that while in the case of *Syādvāda*, “one knows all the objects of the world in *succession*, in the case of *Kevala Jñāna*, the knowledge is *simultaneous*.”²² This characteristic of *Kevala Jñāna* follows from the very definition of omniscience.²³ The omniscient knowledge is regarded as simultaneous rather than successive.²⁴

There is yet another point of difference between *Syādvāda* and *Sarvajñatā* with regard to the effects of void knowledge (*pramāṇa*). There are two kinds of effects of a *pramāṇa*—immediate and

No. 27; Sukhalāl Sanghavi, *Jaina Dharma Kā Prāṇa*, No. 23; Sukhalāl Sanghavi, *Jaina Saṃskṛiti Kā Hṛdaya*, No 10 (All numbers refer to JCRS).

19 Samantabhadra, *Svayambhū-Stotra*, 138.

20 Samantabhadra, *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*, 105.

21 Vidyānanda, *Aṣṭa-Sahasrī*, p. 288.

22 Samantabhadra, *Ibid.*, 101; Vidyānanda, *Ibid.*, pp. 221–282.

23 Vidyānanda, *Tattvārtha-Śloka-Vārttikam*, I. 29.33.

24 Prabhācandra, *Prameya-kamala-mārtanda*, p. 254; *Nyāya-kumuda-çandra*, Vol. I, p. 88,

mediate. The immediate result of *pramāṇa* is the removal of ignorance. However, the immediate result of the absolute knowledge (*Kevala Jñāna*) is bliss and equanimity (*sukha, upekṣā*), while that of practical knowledge (i.e. *Syādvāda*), is the facility to select or reject what is conducive or not, to self-realisation.²⁵ The development of omniscience is necessarily accompanied by the acquisition or perfect of absolute happiness,²⁶ and freedom from destructive karmas.²⁷ This happiness is independent of everything, and hence eternal; it is not physical but spiritual.²⁸

The most fundamental difference between *Syādvāda* and *Sarvajñatā* or *Kevala Jñāna* is that the former "leads us to relative and partial truth whereas omniscience to absolute truth."²⁹ After all, *Syādvāda* is an application of scriptural knowledge³⁰ which determines the meaning of an object through the employment of one-sided *nayas*,³¹ and the scriptural knowledge is a kind of mediate or indirect knowledge.

True, unlike *Naya* (knowledge of an aspect of a thing), *Syādvāda* has in its sweep all the different *nayas*, but even then it never amounts to be the absolute truth. In fact, *Syādvāda* is merely an attitude of philosophising which tells us that on account of the infinite complexities of nature and our limited cognitive capacity what is presented is only a relative truth. Now, one may ask if we combine the results of the sevenfold *nayas* into one whole, cannot we get at the absolute truth? Is not the absolute truth a sum of relative truths? The answer is in the negative.

25 Siddhasena Divākara, *Nyāyavatāra*, 28; cp. Samantabhadra, *Ibid.*, 104.

26 Kundakunda, *Pravacanasāra*, I. 53; I. 19; I. 68.

27 *Ibid.*, I. 60.

28 *Ibid.*, I. 65.

29 Haribhadra, *Anekānta Jaya Pataka*, ed. H. R. Kapadia, Vol. II, p. CXX.

30 Akalaṅka, *Laghūyastrayān*, (*Akālāṅka Grantha Trayam*), ed. M. K. Jaina, (Calcutta), Singhi Jaina Granthamālā, 1939), 62,

31 Siddhasena Divākara, *Ibid.*, 30.

Firstly, the various items of knowledge arrived at through the alternative *nayas* do not and cannot take place simultaneously but in succession.³² Secondly, to regard *Syādvāda* as absolute is to violate its very fundamental character of non-absolutism. Samantabhadra has very explicitly said that “even *anekānta* (non-absolutism) is non-absolutistic (*anekānta*)³³ in respect of *pramāṇa* and *naya*. Further the distinction is made between *Samyak Anekānta* and *Mithyā Anekānta*³⁴ i.e. Real and False non-absolutism, and it is held that the real *anekānta* is never absolute but always relative to something else.³⁵ However, this is not the case with omniscience. It is the knowledge of the absolute truth.

There is one more minor point of difference between *Syādvāda* and *Sarvajñatā*. *Syādvāda* like ordinary knowledge rests on sense perception, i.e., it is limited to our sense organs only. But *Kevala Jñāna* has no dependence on any sense and arises after destruction of obstructions.³⁶ Ordinary individuals do not have this knowledge but only the *Arhats*,³⁷ whose deluding (*mohanīya*), the knowledge and belief obscuring (*jñānāvaranīya* and *darśanāvaranīya*), and the obstructive (*antarāyas*) Karmas have all been destroyed.³⁸ Knowledge is acquired by the soul direct without the intervention or senses of signs. There is a complete absence of dependence upon anything except the soul.

32 Samantabhadra, Ibid., 101.

33 Samantabhadra, *Svayambhū Stotra*, 102; Siddhasena Divākāra, *Sanmati Tarka*, III. 27-28.

34 Samantabhadra, *Āpta-Mīmāṃsā*, 102,

35 Vidyānanda, *Aṣṭa Sahasrī*, p. 290.

36 Māṇikyananda, *Parikṣā-mukham*, II. 11.

37 Vādideva Sūri, *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokāṅkāra*, II. 14.

38 Umāsvāmī, *T. Sūt.*, XI; Hemacandra, *Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā*, I. 1.15.

39 Vādideva Sūri, Ibid., II. 18.

CHAPTER VIII

ARGUMENTS FOR OMNISCIENCE

I. Introductory Remarks

Our study of the logical and historical development of the Jaina concept of omniscience yields some important conclusions. *First*, the problem of omniscience has been as old as Jainism and it is vitally associated with their *tīrthaṅkaras*. *Secondly*, it has been perhaps the most fundamental problem of Jainism, so much so that it has been described by the Jaina thinkers as the problem of life and death for their religion and culture. Naturally, vast literature has developed around this subject. *Thirdly*, the ideal of omniscience seems to have developed because of the inner necessity of the system as well as out of socio-cultural conditions. *Fourthly*, it has not remained merely a religious dogma or scriptural belief but it has been closely knit into the framework of a full-fledged philosophical theory with far-reaching implications. *Lastly*, it has encountered opposition from the avowedly heterodox Cārvākas on the one hand and the staunch orthodox Mīmāṃsakas on the other. The opposition of the Buddhists have more or less centered round their emphasis upon the knowledge of duty¹ and showing that Buddha was superior to Rṣabhadeva² and stands at the head of all philosophers.³

Before we examine the objections of the Mīmāṃsakas, it would be useful to know the background of their approach

1 Dharmakīrti, *Prāṇāṇa-vṛttikam*, I. 33; I. 34.

2 Śāntaraksita, *Tattva-saṃgraha*, 3348.

3 Ibid., 3340.

to the problem. First, the avowed object of the Mīmāṃsakas has been the consideration of *dharma*.⁴ So it is also known as *dharma-mīmāṃsā*. Of the three sections of the *Veda* – the rituals (*karma*), worship (*upāsana*) and knowledge (*jñāna*), it is the first of these that form the subject-matter of the study of Mīmāṃsā. It is clear, the ideas treated here are rooted in the *Vedas*. The *Vedas* alone, and the *Veda* is the only authority⁵ for it. Sense-perception cannot give the knowledge of *dharma* because that depends upon the contact of the sense-organs with the material object and as such can only grasp things existing at the present time. But *dharma* is not a material object, nor does it exist in time. However, this difficulty does not affect the *Veda*. The relationship between the word and its significance is natural and also eternal (without being created by conventions, etc.). Hence the Vedic knowledge is absolutely and unconditionally true and permanently and supremely authoritative because of its self-sufficient and self-manifest nature. The Mīmāṃsakas devote much of their attention to meeting the objections against the theory of self-sufficiency of verbal cognition⁶ and the eternal character of the word⁷ and to formulating their own arguments⁸ in support of their position. But even if the word and its meaning are eternal, there is always a chance of one's having mistaken notions about both. So there is no independent authority in human words. The *Veda* is free from any such defect since it is regarded as authorless, self-sufficient and eternal. Precisely, this is the reason that the Mīmāṃsakas have rejected the notion of any human source of knowledge of *dharma*.

4 Jaimini, *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, I. 1.1.

5 Ibid., I. 1.2

6 Ibid., I. 1.6-11; cp. Kumārila's *Śloka-vārtika* (G. N. Jha's trans.), pp. 409-412.

7 Ibid., I. 1. 12-17; cp. Ibid., pp. 411-420

8 Ibid., I. 1. 18-23; cp. Ibid., pp. 420-433.

The Jainas do not believe either in the self-sufficiency of verbal cognition or in the eternal character of the *Vedas*, nor do they regard it as the only authoritative source of knowledge of *dharma*. They attribute the knowledge of *dharma* to their *tīrthaṅkaras*, who are omniscient, faultless and detached from the world. Hence, they have found a substitute for the *Veda*. It is this reason that the Mīmāṃsakas oppose tooth and nail the entire doctrine of the omniscient person, as the final and infallible authority of morality, duty, etc. The second reason for their opposition to the idea of omniscience was mainly religious. The Mīmāṃsakas adhered to *karmakāṇḍa* or the Vedic ritualism which treats of many actions but mostly of sacrifices (*yajña*). (Hence, Mīmāṃsā is also called *yājñamīmāṃsā* or *adhvara-mīmāṃsā*) Therefore, violence crept slowly into the Vedic religion in the name of *yajña* or sacrifices, which shocked the conscience of the Jainas, because for them, non-violence had always been the supreme *dharma*. They, therefore, attacked the cult of vedic ritualism, the main plank of the Mīmāṃsā philosophy. However, to the Mīmāṃsakas *dharma* is what is Vedic and *adhharma* what is non-vedic. So, they could not accept any other criterion. Hence, to defend their basic position, they had naturally to attack the main basis of the reliability of Jaina-scriptures, namely, the omniscience of Mahāvīra etc. Thirdly, Jainism was a challenge to the Vedic culture in general. It not only challenged the supreme authority of the *Vedas*, the efficacy of rites and rituals, but also the established superiority of the Brahmins in the then social set up. This led to an ideological warfare between the Vedic and Śramanic cultures of India, with the result that each tried to wipe out the other. However, the idea of omniscience in Jainism was the most stable factor, Hence the Mīmāṃsakas opposed it so vehemently.

II. Mīmāṃsakas' Objections Answered

(A) Objections regarding the nature of Omniscience

In order to refute the doctrine of omniscience, the Mīm-

āmsakas start with the analysis of the possible meaning of the 'omniscience' and try to show that the concept has no logic and consistency. I shall discuss here the objections raised by the Mīmāṃsakas and the answers given by the Jainas and Buddhists side by side, I shall also offer my own comments wherever necessary and possible.

1. *The First Objections :*

The Mīmāṃsakas ask whether omniscience means the knowledge of everything or merely that of important and essential things of the universe. The Jainas cannot accept the second alternative which is both illogical and against their relativistic metaphysics. Unless one knows all the objects, he cannot distinguish between the essential and the non-essential, because knowledge is an interrelated whole. This is a type of objective relativism, which we also find in Whitehead and Bodin. However, there it has no similarity with Einstein's relativity except in the most general attitudes. The Jaina scriptures often proclaim this theory.⁹ Guṇaratna¹⁰ also refers to an oft quoted passage found in numerous Jaina works. It refers to the idea that "he who knows one also knows all". Every entity is related to all entities in the universe in some relation or other. These relations or *paryāya* are to be completely known. Hence, it follows that the complete knowledge of one entity involves the complete knowledge of other entities as well.

Since, the Jainas believe that the reality has innumerable characteristics, they cannot subscribe to the doctrine of comparative unimportance of the extent of knowledge. As things have many characters they can be known only when made the objects of all-sided knowledge or omniscience.¹¹ Hence the Jainas refute the views of both the Mīmāṃsakas and the Buddhists like Dharmakīrti, when they try to underrate the importance

9 *Ācārāṅga-sūtra*, I. 1.3.

10 Guṇaratna's comm. on *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya*, p. 222; cp. Kunda-kunda, *Pravacana-sāra*, I. 48.

11 Siddhasena Divākara, *Nyāyavatāra*, 29.

of omniscience against the knowledge of *dharma*. The Mīmāṃsakas point out that the assumption of omniscience is both *futile* and *false*.¹² It is false, since "it is impossible to know the innumerable atoms and hairs even of a single body"¹³, what to speak of knowing each of the endless number of things, past, present and future. It is futile because it is impossible and does not have any bearing upon *dharma* and *adharma*; it can be of no use in fulfilling any purpose of man. Since the *dharma* is cognisable through scripture only.¹⁴ (according to them), the entire attempt is as futile as "counting the crow's teeth"¹⁵ or "thumping of husks."¹⁶ It is interesting here to refer to Dharmakīrti, who also, in a similar vein, ridicules the very idea of omniscience consisting of the knowledge of number of insects, etc. of the universe.

But the later Buddhist thinkers do not accept this position. Prajñākaragupta shows that unless we have got pure knowledge, even our words cannot be true and reliable.¹⁷ Śāntarakṣita advances many arguments against the position of the Mīmāṃsakas. He says that "assertion of the impossibility of any one knowing all hairs and nails, etc., is without any basis and entirely based on ignorance,"¹⁸ since the unreality of omniscience has not been proved by any of the *pramāṇas*. To the charge of futility, Śāntarakṣita says that it is "with a totally different motive that the wise Buddhists make an attempt to acquire knowledge of all things."¹⁹ True, the Buddhists are primarily concerned with proving that Buddha knows the means of attaining heaven and liberation, and their attempt to prove Buddha's omniscience is only incidental. But it does not mean that in matters other than heaven and liberation, the know-

12 Śāntarakṣita, *Ibid.*, 3136.

13 *Ibid.*, 3137.

15 *Ibid.*, 3138.

14 *Ibid.*, 3140-41.

16 *Ibid.*, 3142-44.

17 Prajñākaragupta, *Vārttikālaṅkāra*, II. 287-552

18 Śāntarakṣita, *Ibid.*, 3268-3269.

19 *Ibid.*, 3308.

ledge of Buddha is not hampered by obstacles and is, therefore, all-inclusive. Rather, if he becomes omniscient, there is nothing to prevent him. So when the Mīmāṃsakas try to force the supporters of omniscience to accept 'omniscience' in any of the five senses²⁰ suggested by the Mīmāṃsakas on the basis of the knowledge of the epitomised forms of things, the Buddhists tried to keep away. Such an omniscience, according to the Mīmāṃsakas will be pseudo-omniscience, because it is knowledge of everything except *dharma* and *adharma*. This is why Kumārila says that "he does not reject omniscience of a person knowing other things; what he means is only the denial of omniscience in particular cases, e.g., knowledge of *dharma*."²¹

The famous Jaina philosopher Svāmī Vidyānanda²² also refutes the views of Dharmakīrti in restricting the meaning of omniscience only to the knowledge of desirable (*upādeya*) and non-desirable (*heya*) objects. Turning to the statement of Dharmakīrti ridiculing omniscience by calling it the knowledge of insects etc., it is said that one cannot rule out the possibility that the *Jīvas* were previously born as insects. Then the knowledge of insects will be quite important. The nature of reality is not determined by pragmatic consideration, so also is the case with knowledge. As the mirror reflects everything that are presented before it, or as the sun shines alike every where, similarly knowledge illumines all objects of all times and places without any distinction. Therefore, the question of 'desirable' and 'undesirable' things is unnecessary, for what is desirable at one place and time becomes otherwise at another place and time. Thus, only a complete knowledge can enable a person even to determine correctly what is really desirable and what is not. If it is said that omniscience means the knowledge of the epitome of the universe, like "desirable and undesirable" in Buddhism, the "nine categories" in Jainism and so

20 Ibid., 3130-3135.

21 Ibid., 3128., cp. Kumārila, *Śloka-vārttika*, II. 110-111.

22 Vidyānanda, *Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttikam*, I. 29.6-11.

on, it may be replied on behalf of the Jainas that this is only an understatement.

The Jainas strictly adhere to the concept of total knowledge as the criterion of omniscience. This has been stated by Yaśovijaya that all-inclusive cognition (*sarva-viśayatā*) and directness of perception (*sākṣātkāratva*) are the two characteristics of omniscience. The Mīmāṃsakas accept the former but only with regard to the omniscience of scripture; they also admit the latter but only with regard to the non-universal (*asarvaviśayaka jñāna*) knowledge.²³ Yaśovijaya's definition of *kevala-jñāna* as the "knowledge of everything"²⁴ may apparently look to be crude and simple, but it is not so. The distinguishing feature of *kevala-jñāna* is also said to be "*sarva-viśayatā*". Hence the Jainas will not allow one to reduce omniscient knowledge to that of the epitome of the universe, however useful that might be.

2. The Second Objection :

The second objection is about the knowledge of attributes and modes. Mīmāṃsakas argue "even if the person, by his diversified nature, apprehends all things – he cannot apprehend the specific individualities of all things. Under the circumstances, what would be the use of omniscient person who knows the things only in their general form, specially as in no other form is the thing apprehended."²⁵ The Jainas do not accept the truth either of the premises or that of the conclusion of this argument. To the Jainas, the substance does not exist separate from attributes and modes. Substance is the substratum of attributes and modes.²⁶ Substance or *dravya* is not merely a prop, supporting an alien fact. Attributes cannot constitute reality because Jainas do not believe

23 Sukhalāl Sangavī, his Introduction to *Jñāna-bindu-prakaraṇa* of Yaśovijaya, p. 45.

24 Yośovijaya, *Jñāna-bindu-prakaraṇa*, section 57.

25 Śāntarākṣita, Ibid., 3251-52.

26 Kundakunda, *Pañcāstikāyasaṃhita*, 10.

that *esse is percipii*. What they mean is that an attribute in order to be objective and not merely psychical does require an objective basis and that is *dravya*. Hence, it seems superfluous for the Jainas to say that the omniscient person knows also the attributes of the objects. In fact, objects cannot be conceived apart from attributes and vice-versa.

3. The Third Objection :

Even if we accept that the "omniscient person knows everything with all their attributes," omniscience cannot be true and complete unless it extends over *all the places* and *all the times*. The omniscient must know all things in all *places* and *times*. Infact, according to Jainism, spatial and temporal limitations are transcended even in imperfect super-normal perception called *avadhi*, but only with regard to the objects having form.²⁷ Even the highest type of *avadhi*, though it can perceive all objects having form, it cannot perceive all the modes of all the things.²⁸ This is not, therefore, complete omniscience. With respect to anything that was, is, or will be the case, the omniscient person knows them. But against such a conception of complete omniscience, the Mīmāṃsakas ask whether it is *successive* or *simultaneous*, and they claim to show that in both the cases, it becomes impossible. If it is successive, it cannot be omniscience, since in that case the endless number of objects with their innumerable attributes can never be exhausted and thus the knowledge so conditioned would never be complete.²⁹ The Jainas do not have any difficulty in making this point since they admit that the omniscient knowledge is not successive but simultaneous.³⁰ But then the Mīmāṃsakas ask whether

27 Umāsvāmī, *T. Sūt.*, I. 28.

28 Jinabhadra, *Kṣamāśramaṇa, Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya*, 685.

29 Śāntrakṣita, *Ibid.*, 3250, cp. Prabhācandra, *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa* p. 254, *Nyāya-kumuda-candra*, Vol. I. p. 88; Anantavīrya, *Ibid.*, pp. 97-98; Anantakīrti, *Bṛhad-Sarvajña-siddhi*, p. 151.

30 Prabhācandra, *Nyāya-kumuda-candra*, Pt. I, p. 97, *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa*, p. 26.

such a simultaneous knowledge is apprehended by one cognition or by several cognitions. If the former is the case then it is impossible to perceive contradictory things like pure and impure at once by a single cognition.³¹ The Jainas retort : why contradictory things cannot be known by a single cognition? Is it because they are not present at the *same time* or because by their very nature, they cannot be apprehended by a single cognition though they are present at the same time? If it is the former, it is incorrect since contradictory things like *pure* and *impure* do not exist at the same time. The latter position is also untenable since "there is simultaneous apprehension by one and the same cognition of mutually contradictory things like pure and impure and so forth, because they are incompatible with each other"³² Even though there are certain things that are mutually incompatible, they are cognisable by the same cognition. We do have simultaneous perception of darkness and light when there is a flash of lightening in a dark night. Analysing further, it is said that incompatibility is of two kinds—(i) mutual exclusiveness and (ii) non-existence. But by figuring in the same cognition, things do not become either *unified* or *co-existent*.³³ But it may be said that if there is nothing incompatible in contraries figuring in the same cognition, then it should be possible for pleasure and pain, love and hate also to figure in the same cognition. To this objection, it may be replied that "pleasure and pain are not simultaneously cognised because they do not appear at one and the same time on account of the fact that the causes of both cannot be presented at the same time and not on account of any incompatibility."³⁴ This means that the cause of the non-existence of the simultaneity of pleasure and pain lies in the non-simultaneity of their causes. For instance, "though mutually incompatible, the various colours, like blue, yellow,

31 Śāntarakṣita, Ibid., 3248.

32 Ibid., 3632.

33 Ibid., 3623-3624.

34 Ibid., 3625.

white etc. are actually seen at one and the same time³⁵ if they are located at different places."

However, this reply may lead to a further objection: Being embraced within the orbit of a single cognition, there is nothing outside the limit; and thus the idea being that things are only so many, they cannot be endless, they become limited. It may be replied to this that the mere fact that certain things are apprehended by a single cognition does not deprive the things of their own character. For instance, when various colours like blue, yellow, etc. appearing in a single picture, become apprehended by a single cognition,—they do not cease to be *many*; nor do they become merged into one another; in fact they are apprehended by cognition exactly as they are,—not in any other form. Hence it is apprehended as limitless,—not as limited. If it is argued that if the apprehension of the entire world is admitted, then, how could there be no apprehension of its limits?—one may reply that this cannot happen because there is no relation of universal concomitance between the apprehension of world and that of its limits. All things appear and disappear only in the forms in which they are apprehended by the consciousness of the omniscient person. But then there is another difficulty. If all things are included under a single cognition, then the cognised things must be supposed to have their limits. To this it may be said that there is no actual inclusion of things in the cognition. The extension of space is limitless because there can be no limits to the enumeration of things in it. If cognition is regarded as *formless*, there can be no apprehension of objects because cognition of one object would be indistinguishable from that of another. But this is not a great objection. In the cognition of the omniscient person, no differentiation of things and their functions is admitted because it covers *all* things, and not anyone thing only. But if this is the case, then things which are to be acquired (*upādeya*) cannot be distinguished from those to be

35 Ibid., 3626.

abandoned (*heya*). To this one can reply that when the entire world appears in consciousness, these two types of things also appear in it without any incongruity and without losing any of their essential characters.³⁶

There are some other difficulties also which we shall examine in what follows :

(a) In knowing things existing in all times, one may know the objects of past and future either as they are or as existing in the present. If the omniscient being knows the past and the future which are non-existent, his knowledge would be illusory. If the past and the future are known as existent they are converted into the present. If the past and the future are known by the omniscient as present, his knowledge again would be illusory. Hence in both the cases, omniscience is impossible.³⁷ But the Jainas turn aside this objection because they hold that past and future are perceived by the omniscient not as present, but as past and future. Hence, there is no question of its being illusory. The past and the future things are as much existent and real in relation to their own time as the present things are in relation to the present. In fact the omniscient knows past objects as existing in the past and future things as existing in the future.³⁸

(b) If the omniscient knows all objects at one and the same time he would become unconscious in the next moment because he would have nothing left to cognise.³⁹ But this would be absurd. The Jainas in reply to this objection, say that this objection would have been valid if both the perception of the omniscient and the entire world were annihilated in the

36 Kamalaśīla in his comm. on the *Tattva-saṅgraha* of Śāntarakṣita, 3627 discusses in detail many objections some of which have been presented here in brief.

37 Prabhācandra, *Nyāya-kumud-candra*, p. 88, *Prameya-kamala-mārtanḍa*, p. 254.

38 Ibid., *Prameya-kamala-mārtanḍa*, p. 261.

39 Ibid., *Prameya-kamala-mārtanḍa*, p. 261.

following moment. But both of these are ever-lasting, hence there is no absurdity.⁴⁰

(c) It is said that the knowledge of both the prior and the posterior non-existence of a thing cannot take place together. For example, simultaneously birth and death of the same person is impossible. A thing is used in one particular sense only; for example, a blue object is treated as blue and not as yellow. It is, therefore, that if an omniscient being treats both the prior non-existence (e.g. past) and posterior non-existence (e.g. future) simultaneously, it is wrong because both of them cannot co exist together.⁴¹ To this, the Jainas say that a thing is perceived as blue at a particular place and time and not always and everywhere. So birth and death are perceived as phenomena occurring at two places and two particular moments of time.⁴²

4. The Fourth Objection :

It is said, if the omniscient has direct perception of everything then he will also have direct knowledge of such tastes as are unclean things.⁴³ This would be a very uncomfortable state of affairs, for the omniscient is also considered to be spiritually perfect. But the reply to this is very simple. If the omniscient person had experienced the unclean taste through the contact of his gustatory organ, then alone he could be accused of having an undesirable experience. But whatever is cognised by him is cognised without actual sense-object-contact; it is cognised through the mind whose perceptiveness has been brought about by the impressions of past experiences.⁴⁴

40 Ibid., 260.

41 Prabhācandra, *Nyāya-kumuda-candra*, pp. 88-89.

42 Ibid., p. 97.

43 Śāntarakṣita, Ibid., 3145.

44 Ibid., 3318-19; cp. Anantakīrti, *Bṛhat-sarvajña-siddhi*, pp. 178-79; Anantavīrya, *Prameya-ratna-mālā*, pp. 97-98. (ed. H. L. Jaina).

It is further urged that if the omniscient being cognises everything, he must also have the experience of attachment, aversion, etc. in others, and therefore will be influenced and contaminated by them. Consequently he would cease to be omniscient because attachment and aversion are obstructions to right cognition.⁴⁵ The reply to this objection is simple. Mere knowledge of desires, aversions etc. is not sufficient to make a person tainted by them unless the self is transformed into the very mode of attachment, etc. One cannot be affected by those desires and simply by knowing them, for instance, one does not die by simply seeing the poison, or one does not drink wine by hearing the word 'wine'⁴⁶ or simply because one knows about the ingredients of the drink.⁴⁷ Besides, desires and aversions are produced by our impure mental states and senses and not by the self which is pure and perfect. Knowledge is different from active participation.⁴⁸

At this point, the difference between the Jainas and the Buddhist approaches are worth consideration. The Buddhist position can be interpreted to mean that all such objections arise only if we believe that the external world exists and is the object and cause of attachments. But attachments are the results of ignorance like the illusory perception of the second moon.⁴⁹ This is the typical Yogācāra view. But the Jainas being realists do not accept this explanation. They think that the omniscient being is above desires and aversions and hence it cannot be tainted by them in any way merely because it knows them. The Buddhists, therefore, according to the Jainas, do not explain the facts of unclean or impure states of things but explain them away by advocating the unreality of the external world.

45 Prabhācandra, *Prameya-kamala-mārtanda*, p. 254; Śāntarakṣita, *Ibid.*, 3315.

46 Prabhācandra, *Ibid.*, 260.

47 M. K. Jaina, *Jaina-darśana*, p. 313.

48 *Ibid.*, pp. 311-312.

49 Kamalaśīla, *Pañjikā*, on *Tattva-saṃgraha*, 3318-19.

(B) *Objections Based on the Instruction of Dharma
by the Omniscient Being*

One of the most important grounds on which the Mīmāṃsakas base their objections against the existence of the omniscient being is his power of imparting instructions regarding suprasensible objects, like *dharma* and *adharma*.

1. *The First Argument :*

The Arhat, they urge, cannot be regarded as omniscient on the ground that he is speaker (*vaktā*) or instructor (*upadeśaka*) of *dharma*,⁵⁰ which is supersensuous in nature. According to the Mīmāṃsakas, there could be no instruction by anybody, whether he is an ordinary man, or *yogi* or even a God, regarding supersensuous objects like *dharma*, since it cannot be perceived by one.⁵¹ *Dharma* is one, eternal, immutable and universal. It cannot change from person to person, from place to place, and from time to time. Now, according to the Mīmāṃsakas, *dharma* can only be derived from the *Vedas*, which are impersonal, authorless, eternal and universal. If we regard a particular person like Buddha or Mahāvīra as capable of giving instruction in matters of *dharma*, we shall be faced with many difficulties. Firstly, these persons do not exist for ever, they do cease to exist after the attainment of final salvation. Secondly, while alive, they fail to be omnipresent to guide all people in matters of *dharma*. Thirdly, there is also lack of unanimity among those instructors and often they make contradictory statements. Had they been omniscient beings, they would not have made conflicting statements.⁵² Lastly, they impart instructions even to the unworthy people like the low

50 Vādībha Siṃha, *Syādvāda-siddhi*, p. 29; Vidyānanda, *Āpta-parikṣā*, 99; Aṣṭa-sahasārī, p. Prabhācandra, *Nyāya-kumuda-candra*, p. 82, *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa*, p. 253; Anantavīrya, *Prameya-rātna-māla*, p. 17. (ed. S. C. Ghosal).

51 Kumārila, *Śloka-vārttika*, II. 156. cp. *Śabara-bhāṣya*, I. 1.2.

52 Śāntaraksīta, *Ibid.*, 3148-49.

caste people or the *śūdras*.⁵³ The utterances in the *Śrutis* about the omniscience of gods like Brahmā, etc. should be interpreted either figuratively or in the sense of self-knowledge.⁵⁴

These objections raised by the Mīmāṃsakas rest on their theory of sole competence of the *Vedas* in matters of instructions of *dharma*. But, on behalf of the Buddhists and Jainas, it might be urged that the *Vedas*, being mainly occupied with the instructions regarding sacrifices (*yajña*) are themselves vitiated by violence etc. They also contain many faulty statements, hence they are incapable of imparting correct instructions about *dharma*.⁵⁵

To say that "since Buddha or Mahāvīra does not exist for ever, they cannot impart instructions", is wrong. Even if they die, their teachings remain eternally with us like the words of the *Vedas*. Similarly, while alive, they may not be present everywhere, but their instructions are known to everybody. They say that there are conflicting statements made by different persons claiming omniscience, but this can be well applied to the case of *Vedas* also, where we find different commentators offering different interpretations.⁵⁶ If Buddha and Mahāvīra have imparted instructions to all the people,—rich and poor, high and low, it only reflects their large-heartedness and an abiding sense of compassion—the basis of all *dharma*.⁵⁷

2. The Second Argument :

Kumārila thinks that there is no invariable relation between the fact of being an instructor and that of being preceded by the perception of the objects of instruction.⁵⁸ Further,

53 Ibid., 3226-27; Kumārila, *Tantra-vārttika*, p. 116.

54 Śāntarakṣita, Ibid., 3206.

55 Ibid., 3263-64.

56 Dayānanda's interpretation strikes at the root of ritualism as prescribed by Mīmāṃsakas.

57 Śāntarakṣita, Ibid., 3571-3572.

58 Kumārila, Ibid., II. 157.

there can be no absolute certainty as to what is the real meaning of the instructor, because a man though knowing one thing in one way, may speak of it in another way.⁵⁹ Therefore, if any *person* is regarded as an instructor of *dharma*, the instruction is bound to suffer from such defects of ambiguity, vagueness, etc.

The Jainas see no point in this argument, because, for them, a man will be a better instructor if he is more learned; with the perfection of knowledge, verbal skill is also perfected. Even the Mīmāṃsakas admit that Jaimini, the founder of their system was an ideal instructor because of his excellent learning and wisdom in matters of *dharma*.⁶⁰

3. The Thrid Argument :

(a) The Mīmāṃsakas, further argue, that the *Arhat* cannot be omniscient since he is a speaker and the speech is the result of desires and aversions and where there are desires and aversions, omniscience is impossible. To this the Jainas reply that if the Mīmāṃsakas object to the verbal instructions being vitiated by one's desires and aversions, on these very grounds, the validity of their *Vedas* can also be questioned, However, if they say that the *Vedas* are eternal, we can point out to them that the *Vedas* themselves do not speak out their meanings but require an interpreter spokesman to do that.⁶¹ Again, as the *Vedas* have been regarded as free from attachment and aversion, there should be no reason to reject the omniscient's being free from attachment etc.⁶²

(b) The Mīmāṃsakas further argue that since the speech is connected with desires, the *Arhat* cannot be a speaker since he is free from all desires.⁶³ To this, it is said that there

59 Ibid., II. 160.

60 Vādībha Sīmha, Ibid., p. 29, cp. Vidyānanda, *Āpta-parīkṣā*, 100.

61 Akalaṅka, *Siddhi-viniścaya*, 13, cp. Śāntarakṣita, Ibid., 3602-5.

62 Ibid., 14.

63 Vādībha, Sīmha, Ibid., pp. 29-30.

is no invariable relation between our desires and our speech,⁶⁴ for instance, one speaks even during the state of swoon and sleep, where there is absence of desires. On the other hand, the fools and the idiots cannot be speakers of the scriptures although they might very much desire it.⁶⁵ Here, we can point out to the Jainas that our desires are buried deep into our unconscious and what we express during our sleep or swoon are the unconscious desires. We see that one who is confused speaks something other than what he wishes to speak; therefore the assertion does not always follow the wish of the speaker.⁶⁶ We can, then, conclude that the *Arhat* is an instructor due to his faultless cognition and there is no difficulty in his being a speaker or instructor because he is free from desires, etc.

4. The Fourth Argument :

The Mīmāṃsakas say that the omniscient being can have no 'desire to speak' since there is no conceptual content in him, due to the disappearance of all obstacles in the shape of affections born out of craving, and desire is invariably concomitant with the conceptual content.⁶⁷ The Buddhists answer to this is useful. According to them, conceptual content is of two kinds—unhealthy (beset with afflictions) and healthy (favourable to the world's welfare). The former is absent in such a person, while the latter is not incompatible with his nature.⁶⁸ The Jaina stand is also similar to it. They also do not admit any incompatibility between the state of omniscience and that of speakership or instructorship. On the other hand, they think that faultless instruction is impossible without the state of omniscience and desirelessness.⁶⁹ The instructions

64 Kumārila, *Ibid.*, II. 158.

65 Vādībha, *Simha*, *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

66 Kumārila, *Ibid.*, II. 161.

67 Śāntarakṣita, *Ibid.*, 3597.

68 *Ibid.*, 3598.

69 Vidyānanda, *Tattvartha-śloka-vārttikam*, I. 29-30.

of such a person are, however, not motivated by any unhealthy desires, which have been destroyed altogether but by his sense of compassion and universal welfare. But if it is urged that all conceptual content by its nature, appears in the form of the content of a thing as *beneficial* when it is *not beneficial*,—hence it is wrong, and mistaken; consequently any appearance of it would be incompatible with the character of the man who has got rid of obscurations. To this it is said that as a matter of fact, the omniscient does not recognise the conceptual content as beneficial; he knows it to be baseless. He is like the magician who knows the trick he is playing and is not thereby mistaken.⁷⁰

5. The Fifth Argument :

The Mīmāṃsakas deny the validity of the words of *Arhat*. They say that their words are not reliable being those of a person as the *Arhat* is a person like Buddha. To this, the Jainas say that only faulty words are unreliable. In fact, faultless instructions are always regarded as reliable, as is done with those of the *Vedas* by the Mīmāṃsakas themselves. The *Arhat* speaks out faultless instructions and hence their reliability cannot be doubted. The case with the Buddhists is slightly different. Lord Buddha is said to be always rapt in non-conceptual, indeterminate, abstract, communion and so he does not actually teach anything at all.⁷² "Teachings issue forth, freely from even the walls and with the help of these, men come to know, all that they want to know and thus they quickly secure all that is good for them."⁷³ However, such assertions seem to be only dogmatic⁷⁴ and hence unacceptable. The Buddhists say that it is purely through His super-vision that Buddha is regarded as the 'composer' of the teachings; hence His speakership need

70 Śāntarakṣita, Ibid., 3599-3600.

71 Vāḍideva Siṃha, Ibid., p. 30.

72 Śāntarakṣita, Ibid., 3242 (*Pañjika*).

73 Ibid., 3241-3243.

74 Kumārila, Ibid., II. 138-139.

not be associated with any conceptual content.⁷⁵ If the teachings had not been prompted by the overlordship of the omniscient person, then they might not be accepted as those of the reliable person.⁷⁶ In fact, the person is said to have become Buddha or Enlightened only when all that has to be known becomes known, all that has to be abandoned has been abandoned and all that has to be reflected upon has become reflected upon.

6. The Sixth Argument :

The Mīmāṃsakas hold speakership (i.e., the property of giving instructions about *dharma* etc.) as a reason (*hetu*) for rejecting the reality of the omniscient person. They argue that speakership is a *personal* characteristic. i.e., a characteristic which can be had only by a person, and as no person can be the final authority in matters connected with *dharma*, speakership (being personal) implies lacking in matters of *dharma*. Therefore, the speaker, being a person and hence not being the source of knowledge of *dharma*, cannot be omniscient, as the omniscient person must know everything including *dharma*.

However, the Jainas hold that to regard 'speakership' as a reason (*hetu*) for rejecting the reality of the omniscient is not valid reason (*samyak-hetu*),⁷⁷ inasmuch as there is no ground of conflict between the 'speakership' and 'omniscience'. If the Mīmāṃsaka says that a person who is a speaker is not omniscient because of giving instructions of *dharma*, then this statement contradicts his own earlier statement that Jaimini can give instruction or *dharma*.⁷⁸ However, for argument sake, even if it is admitted that 'speakership' is a valid reason to establish the non-existence of the omniscient being, we can ask what sort of speaker is meant here. It can mean one who makes statements not supported by *pramāṇas* (*pramāṇa-*

75 Śāntarakṣita, Ibid., 3606-3610.

76 Ibid., 3611.

77 Anantavīrya, Ibid., p. 92.

78 Prabhācandra, *Nyāya-kumuda-candra*, Vol. I, p. 03.

virodhi), or statement supported by *pramāṇas* (*pramāṇa-saṅgata*) or like an ordinary person who makes all sorts of statements (*sāmānya*). If the first alternative is true, then in using it as the *hetu*, one commits fallacy of unproved reason (*asiddha*) because it has not been proved that the omniscient makes statements unsupported by the *pramāṇas*; rather the opposite is true because there can be no false instructions given by the omniscient. If the second alternative is true, then it will lead to the fallacy of contradictory (*viruddha*) *hetu*, since such speaker (who makes only such statement as supported by the *pramāṇas*) must be omniscient being; and if we accept the last alternative, it will lead to the fallacy of irregular middle (*anaikāntika*) because in that case both omniscience and non-omniscience will be established depending upon the statements made by the ordinary speaker.⁷⁹

(b) Prabhācandra's argument against using 'speakership' as the *hetu* for establishing the non-existence of omniscience is also very similar to the above. According to him, such a speaker may be either meaningful (*arthasya vaktṛtvam*) or unmeaningful (*artha-rahitasya vaktṛtvam*) or ordinary (*sāmānya*). If the speaker is accepted as meaningful, it becomes against the reason (*viruddha*) because one who will speak only meaningful things will naturally be an omniscient being; if the second alternative is accepted, it proves the proposition (*siddha-sādhana*) since the Jainas also do not admit the unmeaningful speaker as omniscient being; if the speaker is regarded as ordinary (*sāmānya*), the Jainas have no opposition to it. If at all there might be any opposition, it might be either all-time opposition (*sahānavasthāna-virodha*) like enmity between the serpent and goose or mutually exclusive opposition (*paraspara-parihāra-lakṣaṇa-virodha*). It cannot be the first type of opposition, since the omniscient being also imparts instructions e.g. they are speakers. If the second alternative e.g. the opposition be-

79 Ibid., cp. Anantavīrya, Ibid., pp. 92-93; Prabhācandra, *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa*, p. 263; V. R. Sūri, Ibid., Vol. VII, p. 570.

tween speaker ship and omniscience is accepted, it can be again of two types : partial or total. In both the cases, there will be the fallacy of circular reasoning and hence non-existence of omniscience cannot be established. In short, the Jainas try to show that there is no relation of universal concomitance between non-existence of omniscience and speakership, hence 'speaker-ship' as a *hetu* cannot establish non-existence of omniscience.⁸⁰

7. The Seventh Argument :

Śāntarakṣita, the Buddhist logician, also holds that the affirmation of what is not incompatible cannot be rightly regarded as setting aside the other, otherwise the presence of colour might mean the absence of taste.⁸¹ However, the Mīmāṃsakas would argue that the character of being a speaker is incompatible with omniscience; they cannot co-exist, the conceptual content being their indirect cause. Since, one cannot speak without previous thinking, conceptual content must be regarded as the cause of speaking. But as all conceptual content is associated with verbal expression it cannot apprehend the forms of things, hence there can be no omniscience.⁸² To this objection, it might be said those who regard that the speaker-ship of the omniscient person follows from cogitation and thinking, do not admit the omniscient person on the ground of his being a 'speaker', nor on the ground of his conceptual knowledge.⁸³ But the opponent says that if it is held that in the conceptual state, the Lord is not omniscient, then His words would be uttered by one who is not omniscient and as such, not reliable. But it is incorrect to say this, since His non-omniscience has been discarded by His omniscience.⁸⁴ Some Buddhists hold that words proceed from the Buddha without conceptual content under the force of the initial momentum in manner of the revolution of the wheel.⁸⁵

80 Prabhācandra, *Prameya-kamala-māṇḍa*, p. 263; cp. Anantakīrti, *Laghu-sarvajña-siddhi*, pp. 119-120; *Bṛhat-sarvajña-siddhi*, pp. 140-142.

81 Śāntarakṣita, *Ibid.*, 3358.

82 *Ibid.*, 3358 (Panjikā)

83 *Ibid.*, 3361-3362.

84 *Ibid.*, 3364-65.

85 *Ibid.*, 3368-69.

(C) Some Other Objections

Here I propose to discuss some other objections not included in the previous ones, raised by the Mīmāṃsakas against the theory of omniscience.

The Mīmāṃsakas argue that, it is being claimed that there are many omniscient persons like Kapila, Kaṇāda, Buddha, Vardhamāna, etc., but since they impart mutually contradictory instructions, we cannot single out any one as the only omniscient being because the grounds of reliability are of the same authority in each case.⁸⁶ The Buddhists' answer is not very convincing inasmuch as they introduce some metaphysical considerations, which are disputable. To them, those who do not believe in the doctrine of no-soul, cannot be omniscient beings.⁸⁷ On this ground the claims of all philosophers other than Buddha are set aside. However, if other philosophers are accepted as holding the said opinion, they become different Buddhas. This does not completely answer the objection of the Mīmāṃsakas: "If Buddha is omniscient person, then what is the proof for Kapila not being so and if both are omniscient beings then how is that there is difference of opinion between them."⁸⁸

It might be urged on behalf of the Buddhists that sometimes by just using that some words of a particular person are found to be true of facts, that it is inferred that his words relating to all other things also are true. This is incorrect. But the Mīmāṃsakas may reply that in some matters like arithmetic, all beings—Jaina, Buddha and others—are found to be truthful; and no distinction is found among them,⁸⁹ hence, if they would have been omniscient beings, there would have been complete unanimity with regard to their instructions. Against this objection of the Mīmāṃsakas, it might be urged that it is wrong to think a person who knows the letters of the alphabet only as conversant with the essence of all sciences,

⁸⁶ Ibid., 3148.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 3325-3338.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 3149-3150.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 3150.

merely on the ground of his possessing the same amount of knowledge about one particular thing like food⁹⁰ as possessed by scientists. The essential characteristics of omniscience are present, according to Buddhists only in Lord Buddha, because he, at the very outset, expounded the doctrine of no-soul⁹¹ and also had direct preception free from all 'affliction' and 'obstacles'.⁹² However, the Mīmāṃsakas might argue that the same reason by which the omniscience of one person is proved, namely the love of Buddhists for their own view of things, can be used also by others.⁹³ For example, the Jainas, like the Buddhists, may also prove the omniscience of Jina in the same way. The Jainas may argue that since the Jina alone knows the doctrine of *Syādvāda*, he alone is omniscient and not Buddha.

The Buddhists' reply although interesting is not very convincing. According to them, there is a fundamental difference between the Buddhists and the Jaina approaches. They claim that their doctrines are well-knit, practicable and useful and based upon well-established premises while all these things are absent in any other doctrine.⁹⁴ But this is no argument. Even the Jainas and any other system of philosophy can also claim the said thing.

III. Arguments Based on Classical Pramāṇas

So long omniscience was treated as a religious dogma, logical proof was not considered necessary, but we have seen that in course of time, the problem of omniscience became a bone of contention between the Mīmāṃsakas on the one hand

90 Ibid., 3349 (see also *Pañjikā*)

91 Ibid., 3340 (cf. 3341-3348).

92 Ibid., 3338-3339; cp. Ratnakīrti, *Sarvajña-siddhi*, p. 5.

93 Ibid., 3151.

94 Ibid., 3352-3353. The Buddhists urge some other such pseudo-arguments also. They say that their objections against the Jaina theory of omniscience is not rooted in anger but in pity, which, they think, is not the case with others. But this is no argument.

and the Jainas and the Buddhist logicians on the other. Continuing their objections, it is worthwhile to consider their claim that existence of omniscient person has not been proved by any one of the five means of cognition (*pramāṇas*), namely, perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*) verbal testimony (*śabda*), analogy (*upamāna*) and presumption (*arthūpatti*). And if it fails within the scope of non-cognition (*anupalabdhi*), one can infer only its non-existence (*abhāva*). On the other hand, the Jaina and Buddhist logicians have given strong rejoinders to their objections. All this discussion⁹⁵ constitutes vast logical literature spread in various works, of course, containing of differences of details. I shall examine their arguments and also make my own comments wherever possible.

(A) *Arguments Based on Perception (Pratyakṣa)*

Sense-perception refers only to the definite objects of the senses coming into contact with sense-organs and existing in the present time.⁹⁶ As such, by itself, it cannot bring about omniscience. One cannot perceive the omniscient person because his perception cannot bring about the cognition of him, as he does not form an object of such cognition.⁹⁷

Against the above objection, the Jainas ask: Does perception annul the idea of omniscience with regard to a parti-

95 Kumārila, Ibid. II. 150-158; Prabhācandra, *Nyāya-kumuda-candra*, Vol. I, pp. 88-97, *Prameya-kanala-mātaṅga*, pp. 247-265; Anantavīrya, Ibid., pp. 85-99; Anantakīrti, *Brhat* and *Laghu-sarvajña-siddhi*, pp. 107-204; Vidyananda, *Aṣṭa-sahasrī*, pp. 44-71, *Āpta-parīkṣā*, pp. 206-239; *Tattvārtha-śloka-vārtīkām*, I. 29. 1-39; Akalaṅka, *Siddhiviniścaya*, (ch. VIII); Śāntarakṣita, Ibid., Ch. XXVI; Ratnakīrti, *Sarvajña-siddhi*, in *Ratnakīrti-nibandhaṇali*.

96 Kumārila, Ibid., II. 113-15; Prabhācandra, *Nyāya-kumuda-candra*, Vol. I, p. 86.

97 See Anantakīrti, *Laghu-sarvajña-siddhi*, p. 113, *Brhat sarvajñasiddhi*, p. 130; Anantavīrya, Ibid., p. 85; Akalaṅka, *Siddhiviniścaya*, VIII. 2; Ratnakīrti, Ibid., p. 5; V. R. Sūri, *Abhidhāna Rājendrah*, Vol. VIII, p. 568; Śāntarakṣita, Ibid., 186 (with comy).

cular person at a particular time and place, or with regard to all persons at all places and times? If it is the former, they have no objection since they do not say that omniscience is present in all persons and at all places and times; but if the second is meant, the objector himself would become an omniscient being, inasmuch as, a non-omniscient being cannot say that all persons are non-omniscient; if he can correctly make such a statement, he is no other than omniscient being.

The Mīmāṃsakas base their argument on the inapplicability of perception to omniscience. But the inapplicability of perception cannot be proved by perception, because perception cannot prove absence (*abhāva*) of perception. Further, the inapplicability of perception is not invariably concomitant with non-existence of the thing concerned.

To say that the non-existence of omniscient being is proved not by inapplicability of perception but by perception being inoperative is a mere verbal change in the statement. Perception is neither the *cause of* nor it *includes* the perceived, since objects exist even in the absence of perception. The Jainas further try to corner the Mīmāṃsakas by asking a dilemmatic question : whether they reject the notion of omniscient on the basis of their own perception or on the basis of the perceptions of all? If they accept the former, it is wrong since objects of distant places and past and future do exist even if they do not perceive them; if they choose the second alternative, it recoils upon them and proves themselves omniscient beings, since they are supposed to know the perception of everyone. As a matter of fact, both existence and non-existence are contradictory terms.⁹⁸

98 See Prabhācandra, *Nyāya-kumuda-candra*, Vol. I, pp. 89.90, *Prameya-kamala-mārtanda*, p. 255; cp. V. R. Sūri, *Ibid.*, p. 570; Anantakīrti, *Laghu-sarvajña-siddhi*, p. 113, *Bṛhat-sarvajña-siddhi*, p. 142. At this point the Mīmāṃsakas say that perception will require the help of light, sense organs etc. But the Jainas hold that *kevalajñāna* is a non-sensorial knowledge (Anantakīrti, *Laghu-sarvajña-siddhi*, p. 113)

The Mīmāṃsakas object to the naming of non-sensory knowledge as perception on the basis of common linguistic usage. But this is quite pointless since the word ‘akṣa’ meaning “to see” in the composition of ‘pratyakṣa’ is not very relevant, as for example, in the derivation of the Sanskrit ‘go’ (meaning, cow), the root ‘gam’ (meaning “to go”) is not very relevant.⁹⁹ Although the word ‘akṣa’ occurs both in sensory-perception (*indriya-pratyakṣa*) and non-sensory-perception (*arhat-pratyakṣa*), yet the same term means differently at both the places.¹⁰⁰ The important feature of perception is directness of cognition. In *arhat-pratyakṣa*, the soul knows the object directly without the help of sense-organs and other physical auxiliaries. Akalaṅka¹⁰¹ also rejects the contention of the Mīmāṃsakas on the basis of astronomical knowledge, etc. However, according to the Buddhists, the “knowledge of the Four Noble Truths” is omniscience, which is attained owing to long and steady practice of mind accompanied with an element of faith.¹⁰²

(B) Arguments Based on Inference (*Anumāna*)

According to the Mīmāṃsakas, the omniscient person cannot also be proved by means of inference.¹⁰³ In inference, we require a middle term and a relation of universal concomitance between the middle and the major terms, which we cannot have in the case of omniscience. However, if any-

which does not need such help. However, even in the cases of the perception of a cat or other nocturnal animals, these physical auxiliaries are not needed (*Anantakīrti, Bṛhat-sarvajña-siddhi*, p. 142.)

99 Anantakīrti, *Laghu-sarvajña-siddhi*, p. 119.

100 Vidyānanda, *Āptaparīkṣā*, 267, p. 220.

101 Akalaṅka, *Siddhiviniścaya*, VIII. 2; cp. Anantakīrti, *Bṛhat-sarvajña-siddhi*, pp. 146-148.

102 Mīmāṃsakas advance thirteen arguments to refute the contention of the Buddhists, which have been met by Ratnakīrti (see *Nibandhāvali* pp. 1-3).

103 Kumārila, *Ibid.*, II. 117; cp. Ratnakīrti, *Sarvajña-siddhi*, p. 5.

one insists that there is such a middle term (*hetu*), it would have to be either based on non-apprehension (*anupalambha*), or on causal concomitance (*kārya-kāraṇa-avinābhāva*) or on the nature of things (*svabhāva*).¹⁰⁴ It cannot be the first since what is needed here is a positive reason; it also cannot be the second, since causal relationship is always based on previous perception, but no perception is possible of omniscience; the third reason is also out of question, since an omniscient person himself being imperceptible, his nature, which must be inseparable from himself cannot also be perceived.

The reason (*hetu*) can be supplied only by perception or inference. If it is the first, it is absurd since the relation of universal concomitance cannot be established on the basis of perception and without this relation no inference can be valid. If it is said to be established by another inference, it will lead to circular reasoning and also to infinite regress.¹⁰⁵

Further, the reason that would be employed to establish the existence of the omniscient being would be vitiated by the fallacies of being inadmissible (*asiddha*), contradictory (*viruddha*) and inconclusive (*anaikāntika*).¹⁰⁶ For example, when a reason is given, it is adduced as a property belonging either to a positive-entity (*bhāva-dharma*), or a negative-entity (*abhāva-dharma*), or both (*ubhaya-dharma*). If it is the first, the reason would be inadmissible (*asiddha*) because unless the existence of omniscience is not established, there can be no reason regarding his positive attribute (*bhāva-dharma*); if the second alternative be accepted, there will be the fallacy of contradicted (*viruddha*), since instead of establishing the existence of omniscience, his non-existence becomes established through the reason of negative-attribute (*abhāva-dharma-hetu*); and if the

104 Prabhācandra (*Nyāya-kumudacandra*, Vol. I. pp 86-87) mentions only the last two. Kamalaśīla mentions all the three (*Tattvasaṃgraha* 3186); Vidyānanda, *Aṣṭasaṃsṛī*, p. 45, *Āptaparikṣā*, 88.

105 Prabhācandra, *Prameya-kamala-mārtanḍa*, pp. 247-248.

106 Ibid., p. 248, cp. Śāntarakṣita, Ibid., 3286; Anantavīrya, Ibid., p. 86.

last alternative be accepted, it would lead to the fallacy of inconclusive reasoning (*anaikāntika*), since the reason would apply both positively and negatively.

The Mīmāṃsakas also raise another query whether omniscient being sought to be proved is a particular being or being in general. If what is meant is a particular omniscient being, then, since we cannot get any other example either for (*pakṣa*) or against (*vipakṣa*) the claim, the reason (*hetu*) would be inconclusive and extraordinary (*asādhāraṇa-anaikāntika*). On the other hand, what is meant is a being in general, then the scripture created by the *Arhat* will not be valid. However, if the *Arhat* is sought to be proved as omniscient through a particular reason, then by the same logic, Buddha would also become omniscient.¹⁰⁷

Finally, the Mīmāṃsakas also try to show the difficulties in the famous Jaina argument advanced by Samantabhadra : "the existence of an omniscient being is established from the fact that to some beings invisible things like atoms, things or persons remote in time or place become known as objects of direct perception like the existence of fire in a hill is also the subject of perception."¹⁰⁸ The Mīmāṃsakas ask : Are these things the objects of one or of more than one perception ? If the first alternative be admitted, it is contradictory (*viruddha*) since the three kinds of perceptual objects, namely, the subtle (*śūkṣma*), obscure (*antarita*) and distant (*dūra*) cannot be the objects of one perception; if they be the object of various kinds of perception or cognition, it amounts to prove what is an obvious fact".¹⁰⁹ "If there really existed a person knowing all things, through the six means of knowledge, how could such a person be denied ?"¹¹⁰

107 Prabhācandra, *Prameya-kamala-mārtanda*, p. 248.

108 Samantabhadra, *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*, 5.

109 Prabhācandra, *Ibid.*, p. 248.

110 Kumārila, *Ibid.*, II. 111-112.

To get rid of these difficulties, the Jainas use 'knowability', 'cognisability' and the 'property of existence'¹¹¹ as the reason (*hetu*) for proving the existence of omniscience. But the Mīmāṃsakas urge, as we have shown earlier, that this reason could be taken to prove omniscience either in *general* or in *particular*, or *both*. If it is taken in the first sense, it becomes absurd (*ayuktaḥ*) since the matter is still under dispute; if it is in the second sense, the reason becomes inadmissible (*asiddha*), since the particular knowledge being limited, the extent of knowability also becomes restricted. If we choose the last alternative, the reason would become inconclusive (*anaikāntika*).¹¹² Even if the existence of omniscient person in general were established, it would not have any effect on the practical activity of man because this is a general assertion and there can be no influence of the words of such a person until he is really found to exist.¹¹³ Similarly, omniscience proved in particular person is also very vague statement, which does not refer to a particular person but to 'someone'.¹¹⁴

The Jaina and the Buddhist logicians have tried to show that inference cannot prove the non-existence of the omniscient being, since all the three reasons (*hetu*), namely, non-apprehension (*anupalambha*), contradictory (*viruddha*) and instructorship (*vaktṛtva*) are said to be faulty.¹¹⁵ Taking one by one, the non-existence of omniscient being cannot be proved by the absence of one's own (*sva-sambandhī*) apprehension of the

111 Śāntarakṣita, *Ibid.*, 3235-37; cp. Prabhācandra, *Ibid.*, p. 249. Samantabhadra (*Āpta-mīmāṃsā*, 105) uses *anumeyatva* *hetu*, it was Akalaṅka who introduced *Prameyatva* *hetu* (*Aṣṭa-śati* on *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*, 105).

112 Prabhācandra, *Ibid.* p. 249.

113 Śāntarakṣita, *Ibid.*, 3230-31 (*Pañjikā*).

114 *Ibid.*, 3232.

115 Prabhācandra, *Ibid.*, p. 263, *Nyāya-kumudacandra*, Vol. I. p. 91; V. R. Sūri, *Ibid.*, Vol. VII, 570; Akalaṅka, *Siddhi-viniścaya*, VIII. 5; Anantavīrya, *Ibid.*, pp. 92-94; Anantakīrti, *Brhat-sarvajña-siddhi*, pp. 154-169.

omniscient being, since if it claims to prove non-existence of the omniscient unconditionally (*nirviśeṣaṇa*), it is inconclusive (*anaikāntika*) because one cannot be sure if nobody else has the cognition of its existence. On the other hand, if it claims to prove it only in a qualified sense (*saviśeṣaṇa*), i.e., subject to certain conditions, then the proof has no status. Further, it cannot also be proved by the non-apprehension of all men (*sarva-sambandhī*) because such non-apprehension itself cannot be proved. If someone knows the nature of all men then he himself becomes omniscient.

Non-apprehension cannot be valid reason as it is neither the cause (*kāraṇa*), nor the effect (*kārya*), nor the pervader (*vyāpaka*) of 'omniscient being'.¹¹⁶ When 'non-apprehension' cannot be either the 'cause' or the 'pervader', the absence of it cannot mean the absence of omniscience. Similarly, 'non-apprehension' cannot be the 'effect' since there are scriptures containing instructions about many supra-sensible phenomena like *dharma* etc. In short, "non-apprehension" with regard to the above cases will not be operative because at the moment the non-apprehension of the omniscient is inevitable because at this moment there is none who is omniscient. So any attempt to deny the omniscient person on the ground of mere 'non-apprehension' is like denying the marriage of one's mother because mother's marriage¹¹⁷ is inevitably non-cognisable or naming one's father. If it is said that the cause is known from its effect and hence there is no need of denying the marriage of one's mother, this would not be a valid argument since a wicked woman might bring forth a son even without marriage. It might be urged against this, what is cognised is not *non-existence* but *existence*, and the non-existence of

116 Prabhācandra, *Nyāya-kumudacandra*, p. 91; cp. Śāntarākṣita, *Ibid.*, 3270.

117 Śāntarākṣita, *Ibid.*, 3282. It may be pointed out that a child can see the marriage of his mother with other man who becomes his step-father, but it is a case of remarriage.

the marriage of one's mother is not cognised because it is known by other people. But it may be said that one cannot know what the knowledge of the other people is. Besides, if the assertion regarding the marriage of one's mother is accepted as reliable, then why should one not regard another man's assertion that 'the omniscient person does not exist' as reliable ?¹¹⁸

The second reason 'contradiction' (*viruddha*) also cannot prove the non-existence of the omniscient being. The contradictory reason is of two kinds : direct (*sākṣāt*) and indirect (*paramparā*). Now, the former may prove the non-existence of the omniscient being either at a particular place and time or at all places and all times. If it be the former, the non-existence of the omniscient being is not really proved; however if we accept the second alternative, we ourselves become omniscient, since, we make our asseration as true of all places and all times.

The indirect contradictory reason is also not admissible. It has three kinds, relating to the cause (*kāraṇa*), the effect (*kārya*) and pervader (*vyāpaka*). Now, if they are contradictory with regard to a particular place and time, they cannot prove the non-existence of the omniscient being, but if they refer to all places and times, they indirectly prove its existence, since the man who possesses such a knowledge must be an omniscient being.

The third reason of 'speakership' (*vakṛatva*) has already been dealt with earlier.

(C) Arguments Based on Postulation (*Arthāpatti*)

Where the perception of an object cannot be explained without the assumption of another thing, the existence of that thing is known as postulation (*arthāpatti*). Those who claim to establish the existence of omniscient being on the ground of postulation try to show that there could be no

118 Prabhācandra, Ibid., Vol. I, p. 92.

instructions with regard to supersensuous objects if the instructor had not known them. Hence the omniscient being must be postulated or assumed, as there are such instructions. This argument may be interpreted also as an inferential reasoning both affirmatively (e.g. He who is an instructor is one who knows the supersensuous objects...) and negatively (e.g. He who does not know them is not an instructor...), showing a relation of invariable concomitance between "the fact of being an instructor and being preceded by the perception of the object of instruction."¹¹⁹

The Mīmāṃsakas argue that instructions may be either due to dreams, delusion and even for duping the disciples, or due to the acceptance of the teachings of the *Veda*. Now, if the former is the case, they are not worthwhile and reliable, but if the latter, then it amounts to accepting the Mīmāṃsakas position that *Veda* alone is the means of knowing *dharma*. But as regards Buddha, Mahāvīra and others, who are said to be ignorant of the *Vedas* since they unlike Manu-inparted their teachings to the low-caste people (*śūdras*), their preachings might have proceeded from delusion only.¹²⁰

In reply to the above charges, the Jainas and the Buddhists join their hands together, According to the Jaina logicians, *arthāpatti* is not capable of proving the non-existence of omniscient since it fails to establish the relation of universal concomitance between the conclusion and the reason.¹²¹ *Arthāpatti* works only where other means of knowledge, such as perception, are available, but no other source of knowledge establish non-existence of omniscients. Rather, even the validity of the *Vedas* can be proved by postulating some omniscient being.¹²²

119 Kumārila, *Śloka-vārttika*, II. 156-158.

120 Śāntarakṣita, *Ibid.*, 3222-3229; *Śabara-bhāṣya*, I. 1.2; Kumārila, *Ibid.*, II. 159.

121 Vidyānanda, *Āpta-parīkṣā*, 102.

122 See Prabhācandra, *Nyāya-kumudacandra*, Vol. I, p. 94, *Prameya-kamala-mārtanḍa*, p. 265.

The Buddhist logicians mainly concentrate on their replies to the charges of the Mīmāṃsakas against the omniscience of Buddha. They point out that “the flawless exposition of the path of heaven and *nirvāṇa* cannot have its source in delusion.”¹²³ It is sheer delusion to think him deluded who has attained the highest state of spiritual elevation free from all afflictions of the mind.¹²⁴

(D) *Argument based on Analogy (upamāna)*

Analogy (*upamāna*) is the means of knowing a thing based upon its similarity to another thing already known. When an object has nothing similar to it, it cannot be proved by analogical argument. Any person *like* the omniscient being is not perceptible; hence the existence of the omniscient cannot be proved on the basis of analogy. On the contrary, it would be correct for all men to deduce, from Analogy, the non-existence of any omniscient being, finding that nobody existing at present is omniscient.¹²⁵ If anyone is similar to the omniscient being, he will be himself omniscient.

In reply to the above objection of the Mīmāṃsakas, the Jainas simply rebut their argument by pointing out that since analogy works only in the field of resemblances and since we do not find the non-existence of anyone similar to the omniscient being, the non-existence of the omniscient being cannot be proved.¹²⁶

It may also be noted that any search after physical similarity of the omniscient being is useless, since the attribute

123 Śāntarākṣita, Ibid., 3665 along with 3217.

124 Ibid., 3256 along with 3225; 3567 along with 3226. See also Ratnakīrti, *Sarvajña-siddhi*, p. 25.

125 Śāntarākṣita, Ibid., 3215 3216, Prabhācandra, *Nyāya-kumudacandra*, Vol. I, p. 87, *Prameyakamala-mārtanda*, p. 249; Anantavīrya, Ibid., p. 17; V. R. Sūri, Ibid., p. 570.

126 Prabhācandra, *Nyāya-kumudachandra*, Vol. I, p. 94; *Prameyakamala-mārtanda*, p. 264; Vidyānanda, *Āpta-parikṣā*, 101.

of omniscience is spiritual and not bodily.¹²⁷ The Buddhists do not accept Analogy as a valid means of cognition. But for the Jainas, even if it were reliable, it would be of no use in proving the existence of the omniscient being because it requires similarity of the object cow (*gavaya*) to something well-known ('go'). In the present case the omniscient being is not an well-known object, nor there is anything similar to it.¹²⁸

Then the other argument that after having found that no man is omniscient one can conclude that no man is omniscient simply recoils upon the Mīmāṃsakas themselves, since if all men are seen by anybody he is himself an omniscient being. If non-omniscience of all proves one's own omniscience, the argument is incongruous.

(E) *Argument based on the Scriptures (Āgamas)*

According to the Mīmāṃsakas, "the existence of the omniscient cannot be proved by scriptures; for in that case there would be circular reasoning,"¹²⁹ i.e. the scripture will depend for its validity upon the omniscience of the author and the omniscience of the author will depend upon the scriptures for its confirmation. Scriptures may be either eternal or non-eternal. In the eternal scripture, which is no other than the *Veda*, there is no proof of omniscience of anybody. Such sentences occurring in the *Veda*—'He is omniscient' and the like are only eulogistic and should not be taken as descriptive.¹³⁰

127 Prabhācandra, *Nyāya-kumudacandra*, Vol. I. p. 94; cp. Śāntarakṣita Ibid., 3558-3561.

128 Prabhācandra, Ibid., p. 94; Ratnakīrti, Ibid., p. 25.

129 Kumārila, Ibid., II. 118. Also see II. 119-120, cp. Śāntarakṣita, Ibid., 3188-3189; Prabhācandra, Ibid., p. 87, *Prameya-kamala-mārtanḍa*, p. 249.

130 *Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttikam* of Vidyānanda, p. 65; *Sanmati-Tarka* of Siddhasena Divākara (Tikā), p. 46; *Syādvāda-Ratnākara* of Deva Sūri, p. 364.

However, the eternal scripture (*nitya-āgama*) may be either without beginning (*anādi*) or with beginning (*ādi*). Now if the eternal scripture without beginning is the reason (*hetu*) for the existence of the omniscient being, it will be wrong since it is impossible to prove the existence of an omniscient being which has a beginning on the basis of a beginningless scripture. But the eternal scripture cannot be treated as having a beginning because that would involve self-contradiction.

Similarly, non-eternal scriptures (*anitya-āgama*) cannot prove the existence of the omniscient being. Non-eternal scriptures may be the work either of an omniscient or of a non-omniscient being. If the former is accepted, it leads to the fallacy of circular reasoning; if the latter alternative is accepted, the scriptural assertions will have no authority.

One cannot prove the existence of an omniscient even on the ground of an unbroken tradition because every tradition is disputable and also it would entail the assumption of several omniscient beings forming an endless series, which it is more difficult to prove.

The Jainas point out that the *Āgamas*, proving the non-existence of the omniscient being are bound to be either personal (*pauruṣeya*) or impersonal (*apauruṣeya*). If they are the former they are again classed under two categories, i.e. either they are created by an omniscient being (*sarvajña-praṇīta*) or by a non-omniscient-being (*asarvajña-praṇīta*). If the former is true, it will lead to circular reasoning and if the latter is true, the *āgamas* become invalid and unreliable. Now, if they be supposed to be impersonal, they may be said to prove the non-existence of omniscience for all times and place or for a particular time and places. The second alternative is acceptable to the Jainas and if the opponents means to assert "that there is non-existence of the omniscient being at all times and places"—this assertion itself is self contradictory.¹³¹

131 See Prabhācandra, *Ibid.*, p. 95, *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa*, p. 264; Anantavīrya, *Ibid.*, p. 94; Vidyānanda, *Aṣṭa-sahasrī*, pp. 58-59; Ratna-

The Buddhist hold that so long as inferential knowledge is available, there is no need to affirm the existence of the omniscient person on the basis of scriptures (*āgamas*). This is because the Buddhists accept only two forms of cognition¹³² perception and inference. However, for arguments sake, they point out that there are Vedic passage called '*nimitta*' which speak of the eternal omniscience of Lord Buddha. As a matter of fact, the eternality of the *Vedas* has been totally rejected by the Buddhists but they have simply tried to show that even if the Vedic scripture is regarded as eternal omniscience of Buddha is not disproved.¹³³

(F) *Argument based on Non-apprehension (abhāva)*

Non-apprehension (*abhāva*) has also been accepted as a standard means of cognition by some Indian systems. What others call *anupalabdhī*, Jainas call *abhāva*. The Mīmāṃsaka have tried to show the inefficiency of the five means of cognition to prove the existence of the omniscient being; hence one might hope that remaining source of cognition, namely non-apprehension (*abhāva*) to be of help here. But what falls within the scope of non-apprehension is the non-existent.¹³⁴ non-apprehension, as a means of cognition, can only prove the non-existence of the omniscient being. As we do not cognise the omniscient, the argument runs, we must accept its non-existence as a fact.

kīrti, Ibid., pp. 26-27; Anantakīrti, *Laghu-sarvajña-siddhi*, pp. 114-115, *Bṛhat-sarvajña-siddhi*, pp. 203-204; Aklaṅka, *Siddhi-viniścaya*, 10 & 11.

132 Dharmakīrti, *Nyāyabindu*, I. 3.

133 Sāntaraksita, Ibid., 3511 3514. Jaina scholars like Joyoti Prasad Jaina (*Jainism-the oldest Living Religion*, p. 22.) holds that there are specific mention of their Tīrthaṅkara Ariṣṭanemi in the *Vedas* (*Rg Veda*, VIII. 8. 24; X 178.1; *Yajurveda*, XXV. 19; IX. 25; *Sāmaveda*, XX. 143.10.).

134 Prabhācandra, *Nyāya-kumudacandra*, Vol. I, p. 88; *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa*, p. 46; Akalaṅka, *Siddhi-viniścaya*, VIII. 4; Vidyānanda, *Aṣṭa-sahasri*, p. 46; *Āpta-parīkṣā*, p. 207; Anantakīrti, *Bṛhat-sarvajña-siddhi*, p. 133; Ratnakīrti, Ibid., p. 6.

The attempt of the Mīmāṃsakas to prove the non-existence of the omniscient suffers from the defects of over-simplification and self-contradiction. This is explained as follows : non-apprehension (*abhāva*) is either absolute (*prasajya-pratiśedha*) or relative (*paryudāsa*). If it is absolute, i.e., complete absence of the cognition it cannot become either the *cognition* or the *means of cognition* anything at all, and hence it cannot prove the non-existence of the omniscient being. Absolute non-apprehension will imply absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva*) of the omniscience like sky-lotus. But the Mīmāṃsakas cannot afford to accept this position since they do posit omniscience in the *Vedas*. Hence any attempt to prove the non-existence of omniscience through absolute non-apprehension will quite upset and also contradict the position of the Mīmāṃsakas.

But if it is relative, standing for the negation of the entity in the shape of the means of cognition,— even so it would be quite unreliable because what it declares non-existent, may be shown to be existent by another means of cognition. In relative non-existence if one is denied, its counter-correlative has to be asserted. This way, by proving the non-existence of omniscience, one has to assert the existence of omniscience by disproving it.

Then the relative non-apprehension may be either (a) free from the evidence of five *pramāṇas* (*pramāṇa-pañcaka-rahita*) or (b) of a different type. If it be the former, it can be again of two types : (i) totally free from the evidence of five *pramāṇas* and (ii) negating the evidence of five *pramāṇas*. If the former is the case, it cannot prove the object of knowledge (*prameya*) since it is totally free from the evidence of any of the five *pramāṇas*. Without *pramāṇas*, there cannot be proof of the object of knowledge. But if the latter is the case (i.e. negating the evidence of five *pramāṇas*), it can be either one's personal cognition or universal. If it be the former (i.e., personal), it cannot say anything about the mind or knowledge of other people. But if it concerns universality, it will be the cognition of omniscience.

Now, if I examine the alternative (b) (i.e., relative non-apprehension of a different type other than which is free from the evidence of five *pramāṇas*), it will also not help. This means that one will have to negate the idea of omniscience through other means not mentioned above. Such a negation of omniscience may be either *partial* or *total*. It is the former case, i.e., negation of omniscience at a particular place or time (*kvacit kadācit kasyacit*), the Jainas will have no objection to accept this position, since they also do not think that omniscient being is everywhere. But if one wants to prove negation of omniscience in all places and times, it is to admit one's own omniscience.¹³⁵

There is also a technical difficulty here. In order to establish the absolute non-existence of an object (i.e., the omniscient being), the following processes have to be undergone:¹³⁶ First, its accredited locus (in all times and places) is to be seen by the eye. Secondly, the counter-entity (i.e., the omniscient being) which could have been seen if it had been present, is to be remembered. Thirdly, there follows a purely mental process which gives rise to the notion of the non-existence of the omniscient being. Now, if the above analysis of the process of 'non-apprehension' be accepted as it has been accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas,¹³⁷ it follows that to disprove the non-existence of the omniscient being, one has to accept the existence of him in the past, without

135 Prabhācandra, *Nyāya-kumudacandra*, Vol. I. pp. 95-96, *Prameya-kamala-mātaṇḍa*, p. 265; Anantavīrya, *Ibid.*, p. 98; Vidyānanda, *Āptaparīkṣā*, 105-106, *Aṣṭa-sahasrī*, p. 48; Akalaṅka, *Siddhiviniścaya*, 14; Anantakīrti, *Bṛhat-sarvajñasiddhi*, p. 152; Ratnakīrti, *Ibid.*, 25; V. R. Sūri, *Ibid.*, p. 571.

136 As a matter of fact, Jainas have no right to argue on the basis of 'non-apprehension' since they do not recognise it as an independent and valid means of cognition. But for arguments sake, they use it to show inconsistency of this argument. See V. R. Sūri, *Abhidhāna Rājendra*, Vol. VII, pp. 569-70.

137 Kumārila, *Śloka-vārttika* (on Negation), IX. 27.

which no remembrance would be possible. This means that unless a person has got previous knowledge of the omniscient being, he cannot prove his non-existence. Then the counter-corelative of the non-existence of the omniscient being is his own existence. Then to deny its accredited locus in all times and places will imply omniscience at least of the said perceiver.

IV. Some Positive Jaina Arguments for the Existence of the Omniscient Being

Besides the foregoing arguments intended to disprove the non-existence of the omniscient being via meeting the objections of the Mīmāṃsakas, the Jainas have formulated certain important arguments of their own for the existence of the omniscient being. In the *Āgamas*, the existence of omniscience was a matter of religious faith and hence therein we find no systematic and logical argument. But when this faith was challenged, particularly, by the Mīmāṃsakas, the Jaina thinkers had to advance positive reasons besides making attempts to meet their objections.

(A) *Argument from the Nature of Soul as Consciousness*

Consciousness being the nature of the soul, the two are not different things which can be separated from each other, nor they are related together by some external relation like, *samavāya*. They argue as follows : the soul is either conscious or unconscious before it is being related to consciousness through external relation. Now, if the soul is conscious from the beginning, being related to consciousness by inherence, it is absurd; but if it is as unconscious, it may be so either due to its relation of inherence with unconsciousness, or due to its being with unconsciousness. If the former is the case, the second inherence is again useless, since the soul is already accepted as unconscious; but if it is one with unconsciousness, it is similar to the case in which the soul is accepted to be one with consciousness. In short, there cannot be any objec-

tion to accepting consciousness as the nature of the soul. Kundakunda, therefore, says that the soul and knowledge are not separable from each other like fire and heat but, are co-extensive with each other.¹³⁸ But this essential knowing ability of the soul, as has already been said, is crippled by its long association with the karmic-matter, and comes back to its original glory when the obstacles are removed.¹³⁹

The logic working here is very simple : when the nature of the soul is to know and when there are no obstacles in between the knower and the known, knowledge naturally becomes all perfect. Various analogies have been used to explain this point. Virasena¹⁴⁰ and Vidyānanda¹⁴¹ both refer to a popular analogy employed by Haribhadra.¹⁴² As the fire burns fuel when there is no obstacle, similarly the knowing-self will know everything, when all obstructions are removed. A negative analogy is also used : just as a diamond covered with dust does not reflect its usual lusture, so the self covered with knowledge-obscuring karmas, etc., does not know everything.¹⁴³

The basic idea behind this argument has been made clear by Akalaṅka¹⁴⁴ when he says that the soul is capable of knowing everything (*sarvārtha-grahāṇa-sāmarthyā*) and hence when its cover is removed, nothing remains unknown. Samantabhadra¹⁴⁵ has already prescribed the path of penances for the total and final liquidation of the karmic-fetters.

It is true that both the Buddhists and Jainas admit of certain obstructions or covers to our knowledge. However, the Buddhist attitude is influenced by other considerations; so that

138 Kundakunda, *Pravacana-sāra*, I. 23-25.

139 Ibid., I. 43, I. 53, I. 55-58.

140 Virasena, *Jayadhavalā Tika*, p. 66.

141 Vidyānanda, *Aṣṭa-sahasrī*, p. 50.

142 Haribhadra, *Yoga-bīndu*, 431.

143 Akalaṅka, *Nyāya-viniścaya*, 23, 465, 466.

144 Ibid., 361-362, 410, 414.

145 Samantabhadra, *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*, 5, 6.

this omniscience is proved as belonging to Buddha and not to others, only because Buddha alone has propounded the doctrine of soullessness.¹⁴⁶

(B) *Argument from Inferability (anumeyatva)*

It was perhaps Samantabhadra, who for the first time, tried to prove the existence of omniscience on the basis of an argument based on inferability (*anumeyatva*). In formulating this argument Samantabhadra perhaps had in mind the criticisms of the doctrine of omniscience made by the famous commentator of *Mīmāṃsā*, Śabara Svāmī. While explaining the significance of *codanā sūtra* (i.e., *dharma's* purpose is injunction for its sole authority)¹⁴⁷, Śabara Svāmī says : “Vedic injunction alone, and nothing else, is authoritative in matters of past, present and future, subtle, remote and intervenient objects.”¹⁴⁸ Thus, he closes the door of inferability with regard to such matters as knowledge of *dharma*.

Samantabhadra does not accept this and he says : “ the existence of an omniscient being is established from the fact that to some beings, invisible things like atoms, things or persons remote in time and place become known as objects of direct perception.”¹⁴⁹ This knowledge could not have been derived through the senses because there is no sense-object contact. This leads to the inference that the things must have been known in some non-sensuous way.

Kumārila, however, tries to refute the above contention of Samantabhadra by showing that no *pramāṇa* can prove the existence of omniscience; on the contrary, his non-existence

146 Śāntarakṣita, *Ibid.*, 3337-3340. The Buddhists think that omniscience is nothing other than the clearest cognition of the ‘soullessness’ of all things, for which they think that ‘cover of afflictions’ should be removed.

147 Jaimini, *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, I. 1.2.

148 Śabara-*bhāṣya*, I. 1.2.

149 Samantabhadra, *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*, 5.

can be proved.¹⁵⁰ This, I have earlier discussed. To meet the difficulties raised in the above position, Akalaṅka brought in a significant change in the argument. He changed the argument of inferability (*anumeyatva*) into the object of cognisability, knowability and the property of being an entity (*prameyatva*).¹⁵¹ There is nothing which is not the object of some knowledge; every object must be knowable by someone, by anyone of the means of cognition. This means there must be someone who could hold to other everything as an object of his knowledge. This person cannot be less than omniscient.

(C) *Argument from the Progressive Development of Knowledge*

An important proof¹⁵² of omniscience is based on the “necessity of final consummation of the progressive development of knowledge.”¹⁵³ Knowledge is said to admit of degrees and omniscience is the perfection of knowledge. The realisation of degrees of excellence, of knowledge must reach its consummation somewhere, since this is the way of all progression. As an imperceptible atom through progression of magnitude reaches

150 Kumārila, *Ibid.*, II. 117.

151 Vidyānanda, *Aṣṭa-sahasrī*, p. 58, and *Āpta-parikṣā*, pp. 112-13.

152 According to Sukhalālji, the origin of this argument may be traced to the *Yoga-sūtra* (I. 24) of Patañjali (*tatra niratīṣayam sarvajñā-bījam*)—See his Introduction to *Jñāna-bindu-prakaraṇa* of Yaśovijaya, p. 43. This states that the progressive development of knowledge is the basis of existence of the omniscient being. This argument seems to have been discovered by Yoga-system and later on it was also adopted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. (vide *Prastapāda-bhāṣya* with *Vyomavati* Comy. by Vyomaśiva, p. 560), Buddhists (vide Śāntarakṣita, *Tattva-saṃgraha*, 3160). However, credit goes to Mallavādi for having introduced this type of argument for the existence of omniscience, in Jaina literature. (Vide Mallavādī, *Naya-cakra* (MSS) Rāmāghāt Jaina Mandir, Kāśī, p. 123). It has been very popular argument with the Jainas. Yaśovijaya (vide *Jñāna-bindu-prakaraṇa*, p. 19) has employed only this argument to establish the notion of omniscience.

153 Hemacandra, *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, ed. Sukhalāla Sanghavī (Eng. trans. S. Mookerjee & N. M. Tatiā), I. 1.16.

to the great bulk of mountain, etc., so our “imperfect knowledge is capable of growth in the direction of perfection and the highest point to which it can be carried, will be omniscience.”¹⁵⁴ We can also approach this problem in a different way. We should always remember the nature of soul and its ‘consciousness-infinite’ (*ananta-jñāna*). Potentially the soul is omniscient hence the moment its veils are removed, the soul knows everything.

The Mīmāṃsakas have strongly attacked this position on the following two grounds : firstly, there is a limit to the development of our cognitive powers. If omniscience is said to be the final culmination of cognition, it could be so reached, either through sense-perception or through mental-perception. Now, it cannot be through sense-perception because sense-perception cannot transcend its limitations. Through practice and other things our powers develop but no one has been found to become capable of perceiving things beyond the reach of senses, however rich his practice may be.

The Mīmāṃsakas put this matter in a very sarcastic way : “The man, who can jump into the sky to the height of fifteen feet can never jump to the height of eight miles, however hard he may practice jumping.”¹⁵⁵ Similarly, the development of knowledge cannot be taken the form of omniscience. Further, even mental-perception cannot apprehend all things because it cannot operate independently of senses; if it could, then no person would be deaf or blind.

The second objection of the Mīmāṃsakas is more severe. Granting, they say, all intelligence to be made better by practice and exercise, it cannot be said that this proves no inherent limitations. For example, “in the matter of auditory perception, some men are superior to other in apprehending distant and

154 Malliṣeṇa, *Syādvāda-maṇjarī* (with *Anyayoga-vyavachheda-dvātrimśikā* of Hemacandra, ed. A. B. Dhruva, XVIII, p. 121).

155 Śāntarakṣita, *Ibid.*, 3168. See 3157–3174.

subtle sounds, but not in apprehending colour and other things.”¹⁵⁶ To say that this is possible would be to commit category-mistake. Similarly, when one has learnt Grammar, his intelligence may go very far in that field but not in the field of astronomy.¹⁵⁷

In reply to these criticisms of the Mīmāṃsakas, the Jains point out that some of the instances given, however, are very much crude, though they are suggestive. Anantakīrti¹⁵⁸ exemplifying the cases of extraordinary development in sense perception says that a vulture, a boar and an ant have got tremendously superior power of visual, auditory and olfactory perceptions. This is also not impossible for human beings. Replying to the charge of the Mīmāṃsakas that there is a limit to the progressive development of our knowledge, Akalaṅka¹⁵⁹ says that this is also based on false experience. For instance, we cannot jump even eight miles in the sky but there are birds, namely *garuḍa* which can fly hundreds of miles high in the sky. Therefore, knowledge and power can be increased in proportion to the removal of obstructions, and that of its obstructive veils in case of the soul. Vidyānanda¹⁶⁰ also gives many instances of this type.

The argument of the Mīmāṃsakas that one can never comprehend things beyond the senses is wrong, because the statement “sense-perception is limited” could be made only by him who had the direct apprehension of the sense-capacity of all beings. If one declares it on the basis of his own in-

156 Śāntarakṣita, Ibid., 3162-3163.

157 Ibid., 3164-3167.

158 Anantakīrti, *Bṛhat-sarvajña-siddhi*, p. 131.

159 Akalaṅka, *Siddhi-viniścaya*, VIII. 12.

160 Vidyānanda, *Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttikam*, I. 29, 36-38. He mentions many instances : a type of serpent which can jump very high; the flames of fire which goes high up to the sky; heavy stones if pelted can reach downwards, millions and millions of miles; the wind does blow throughout the length and breadth of the universe.

capacity, the argument would be inconclusive.¹⁶¹ Even the examples of jumping, etc. have not been properly understood by the Mīmāṃsakas. Jumping as a matter of fact depends upon strength and power, it has. There can be no rigid limit to it. "Through cocentration of mind and use of spiritual power, if one acquires mind-force (*manojaya*), jumping can reach the highest degree of perfection.¹⁶² Similarly, there can be no limit to mental cognition.¹⁶³ The nature of things depends upon different factors and they vary with the variation of those factors.¹⁶⁴

To the other charge of the Mīmāṃsakas that our knowledge suffers from *inherent* limitations, i.e., we cannot see through ears or hear through the eyes and so on, the Jainas maintain that this objection is again based on imperfect understanding of the reality. Even the cat and bat do see in the night without the help of light. Then the snake perceives sound not through the ears but through the eyes as it has no ears. There are many creatures which do not get sense-perception through the recognised channels of perception.¹⁶⁵ If this can happen in case of these creatures, there is no reason why it should not happen in that of human beings.

It seems to me that the difficulty of the Mīmāṃsakas in properly understanding the position of the Jainas is due to certain gross mistakes.

161 Śāntarakṣita, *Ibid.*, 3462-3466.

162 For Mīmāṃsakas' objections and the Buddhists' replies regarding limitation of sense-perception, see *Tattva-saṃgraha* of Śāntarakṣita, 3168, 3421 and 3425.

163 Śāntarakṣita, *Ibid.*, 3164-67 (objections); 3381-89 (replies).

164 Śāntarakṣita mentions the case of a fruit known as 'Āmalaki' which is very small, when grown in desert but not outside. Even through eyes, one can see all things if they are improved by the practice of Yoga (*Ibid.*, 3397-3401). He mentions a science of thought-reading (*Ikṣanika*) which if properly practised, brings about telepathic knowledge." (*Ibid.*, 3397-3401).

165 Anantakīrti, *Laghu-sarvajña-siddhi*, p. 117, Prabhācandra, *Prameyā-kamala-mātaṇḍa*, p. 259.

Firstly, the Mīmāṃsakas have failed to understand the truly non-sensuous character of omniscience. It is direct, distinct and immediate like sense-perception but is not dependent upon the sense-object-contact. Hence, much of the so-called difficulties and restrictions imposed by the Mīmāṃsakas are irrelevant.

Secondly, the Jaina conception of omniscience follows from the Jaina theory of the nature of soul as inherently capable of infinite knowledge. It is no wonder that the Mīmāṃsakas, to whom, the nature of the soul is inherently unconscious could not appreciate this point.

Lastly, the Mīmāṃsakas do not adequately, take into consideration the contributions of Yoga to the problem of the development of cognitive powers through the practice leading to super-normal cognition.

(D) Argument Based on the Truth of Astronomical Predictions

Akalāṅka points out that the science of astronomy makes correct predictions about the date and time of future eclipses. This proves the possibility of supersensuous knowledge. There is mention of such ancient occult sciences like *Ikṣaṇikā*¹⁶⁶ or *Praśna-vidyā*, which give information about supersensible things. The astronomical predictions of authoritative writers, he urges, may well be taken as indications of the possibility of the great teachers being omniscient.¹⁶⁷

All this proves at least that sense-object-contact is not necessary for all knowledge. If the knowledge of absolutely imperceptible or supersensuous things be not possible for a person, how the verification of astronomical knowledge be accounted for?¹⁶⁸

166 Śāntarakṣita, *Ibid.*, 3397-3401. cp. Akalāṅka, *Nyāya-viniścaya*, 407. He uses the term '*Viññānamanjasā*.'

167 Akalāṅka, *Siddhi-viniścaya*, VIII. 2, *Nyāya-viniścaya*, 414; Hemacandra, *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā (bhāṣya)*, I. 1.16, *Syādvāda-mañjari* on *Anyayoga-vyavaccheda-dvātriṃśikā*, XVIII.

168 Hemacandra, *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā (bhāṣya)*, I. 1.16.

It may be said here that astronomy is a mathematical science based on strict methods of calculation and observation of physical phenomena. It is an empirical science, although it indicates certain things about future events, it does not mean the existence of an omniscient being.

(E) *Argument based on the Absolute Non-existence of any Obstructive Pramāṇas*¹⁶⁹

This argument has also been given by Akalaṅka. It points to the lack of evidences to contrary. We have earlier discussed elaborately that none of the six *pramāṇas* prove the non-existence of the omniscient person, hence there is no contradictory proof against the existence of the omniscient person.¹⁷⁰ Perception cannot do it since it can prove only existence. This was also admitted by Kumārila. Inference can also not prove the non-existence of the omniscient being because there can be no inference without a middle term, as has already been shown. Scripture, postulation, analogy and non-apprehension also fail here due to variety of reasons.

This argument is not a new argument as it is only a collection of the arguments based on the six *pramāṇas*. But we can appreciate the additional force contained in it since it refers to all the six *pramāṇas*, in a collective way. It should also be noted that it is after all a negative argument¹⁷¹ as it only shows that there is no disproof, but it does not say anything positive. Therefore, it cannot be considered decisive.

169 Akalaṅka, *Nyāya-viniścaya*, 414; *Siddhi-viniścaya*, VIII. 6; Hemacandra, *Ibid.*; Vidyānanda, *Āpta-parīkṣā*, 93; Śāntarakṣita, *Ibid.*, 3268-3269.

170 Vidyānanda, *Aṣṭa-sahasrī*, pp. 44-76, *Āpta-parīkṣā*, 206-240; Anantakīrti, *Ibid.*, V. R. Sūri, *Ibid.*, pp. 566-85; Prabhācandra, *Prameya-kamala-mūrtanda*, pp. 247-256; *Nyāya-kumudacandra*, Vol. I. pp. 86-97.

171 In formulating this argument, I think, Akalaṅka might have in his mind the formidable objection raised by Kumārila that the existence of omniscient being cannot be established on the basis of any of the six *pramāṇas*. Therefore, Kumārila says quite confidently that if it

(F) *Argument from the Natural Tendency of Thought to go from part to whole*

It is a tendency of human thought to transcend its limits. If we analyse our thought, we find that knowledge in parts does not remain knowledge of parts but is unified into a system. According to Jainism every soul possesses in its natural state only the pure knowledge or omniscience.¹⁷² This is exhibited in five different forms depending upon the extent and penetration of knowledge-obscuring karmas. So, in perceptual knowledge (*mati-jñāna*), there is a partial glimpse of pure knowledge (*kevala-jñāna*). According to Vīrasena Svāmi¹⁷³, who is supposed to be the chief-architect of this particular argument, we can 'infer about the soul's pure-knowledge on the basis of our partial knowledge like *mati*, *śruta*, *avadhi* and *manahparyāya* as we make inferences about the whole mountain by perceiving only parts of it.

The above argument makes use of the gestalt in us to complete the incomplete and make a whole out of parts. But I do not think that this can conclusively prove the existence of omniscience. Knowledge is composed of the subject as well as object of knowledge. So even if we infer that on the objective side, everything can be comprehended, we cannot say that there is such a subject also and unless there is one, omniscience cannot be claimed to be a fact.

can be proved by any of the six means of cognition, how could it be not accepted. This means that it cannot be proved by any of the *pramāṇas*. Therefore, Akalaṅka shows that there is not a single *pramāṇa* which goes against it.

172 Vīrasena, *Dhavalā Comy.* on *ṣaṭkhaṇḍagama* of Puṣpadanta and Bhūtabali, ed. H. L. Jaina, etc., Vol. XIII; V. 81-83.

173 Ibid., cp. Akalaṅka, *Aṣṭa-śatī*, 3, *Nyāya-viniścaya-vivarāṇa*, ed. M. K. Jaina, p. 465; Vidyānanda, *Aṣṭa-sahasrī*, p. 50.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

A historical, analytic and comparative study of the Jaina concept of omniscience in the perspective of Jaina metaphysics has been made in the preceding chapters. But still I do not claim to have made the concept, all clear or completely defensible. Infact, it seems to me that this concept, borrowing Prof. Feigl's terms, can at most admit of *vindication* (*justificatio actionis*), and not *validation* (*justificatio cognitionis*).¹

Although, Jaina logicians have exhibited great dialectical skill in enunciating the concept of omniscience and arguing for its exemplification in reality, it remains ultimately a matter of faith. The denial of omniscience is simply a denial of their scriptures, and their fundamental religious and spiritual faith. Omniscience in Jainism is not only the perfection of the cognitive faculty of the self but also its ultimate end. It is the spiritual state of eternal bliss and also the culmination of religious aspiration. This state can be compared with

1 H. Feigl in his essay "Validation and Vindication : An analysis of the nature and the limits of Ethical Argument" included in *Readings in Ethical Theory*, ed. W. Sellars and J. Hospers (New York, Appleton Century-croft, 1952), which is a revision of an earlier essay "De Principii Non Disputandum....?" included in *Philosophical Analysis*, ed. Max Black (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1950), discusses the problem of justification as discussed not only with reference to ethical principles but also in regard to the more fundamental principles of deduction, induction and the criterion of factual meaningfulness. For an important analysis of closely related issues, see also W. Sellars' "Language, Rules and Behaviour", *John Dewey, Philosopher of Science and Freedom*, ed. S. Hook (New York, The Dial Press 1950.).

the *Jīvan-mukti* of Sāṅkhya and Vedānta, with the *Turiyāvasthā* or, *Brahmānanda*.

Now, it is also perhaps true to a great extent that we cannot *validate* any fundamental principle or ideal like this without being involved into what Feigl calls “vicious circularity.”² J. S. Mill also holds that “questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof.”³ It is necessary always to distinguish between “questions within a presupposed frame” and “questions concerning the frame” itself, as Carnap would say.⁴ In order to grasp this situation, a fundamental distinction, often neglected and blurred, must be made between the two types of justifying principles or knowledge-claims, namely, *validation* and *vindication*.⁵ *Validation* generally means a rigorous logical proof or “legitimising of knowledge-claims”. *Vindication* on the other hand, means the justification of an

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- 2 Feigl claims that we cannot without “vicious circularity” disclose any more ultimate grounds of *validation* in the field of deductive logic or in the rules of inference. Similarly, the rules of maximal probability in inductive inference form the ultimate validating basis of all empirical reasoning....Rational argument presupposes reference to a set of such principles at least implicitly agreed upon. Disagreement with respect to basic principles can thus only be removed if the very frame of validation is changed. This can occur either through disclosure and explication of a hitherto unrecognised common set of standards, i.e., still more fundamental validating principles to which implicit appeal is made in the argument, or it can be achieved through the pragmatic justification of the adoption of an alternative frame, or finally, through sheer persuasion by means of emotive appeals”. Sellars and Hospers, *Ibid.*, p. 675.
 - 3 J. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government*, ed. A. D. Lindsay (London, J. M. Dent & Sons, Everymans Library, 1960), p. 4.
 - 4 R. Carnap, “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” *Revue Internationale* 11, Jan. 1950.
 - 5 Without agreeing with Feigl on all the points that he has made in his article under reference, I have borrowed his above two terms which are extremely suitable for my present purpose.

action.”⁶ Now vindication, though weaker than validation, is an equally respectable method. Its value is all the more enhanced when we know that validation is impossible in matters of fundamental principles.

It is difficult to prove omniscience, but nonetheless we can vindicate it and the best way to vindicate it is to get the support of the expert judges (authority). It is not necessary to define who is an expert judge because the pre-philosophic notion of an expert is quite helpful here (the pre-philosophical notion is the untutored notion of the human race). The intellectual programme of mankind is effected not by ignoring but by utilising, the past and one way to profit by the past and the existing achievements of the race is to take advantage of the experience and expert opinion of the leaders of the society. Therefore, if it is suggested that in making the decision whether a certain being is omniscient or not, one should depend upon the verdict of the expert judges, it is not at all to suggest any fantastic or unworkable procedure. The reference to expert judges becomes inevitable where a decision of fundamentals have to be made. This was the reason why J. S. Mill⁷ suggested this method for distinguishing between good and bad pleasures. It is wrong to say that a great logician became dogmatic in accepting the authority of the judges of the community. Rather, if we look sympathetically at the whole thing, we shall find that he was adopting perhaps the only available method of distinguishing between the pleasures of different qualities because belief in the qualitative differences of pleasures is one of the fundamental principles of Mill's system. As a matter of fact, the expert advise does not kill the initiative of the intellect.

6 H. Reichenbach, *Experience and Prediction* (Chicago, 1938), Sees, 38-39 has formulated the theory of vindication for the principle of induction also.

7 J. S. Mills, *Ibid.*, p. 10. He says “from this verdict of the only competent judges, I apprehend there can be no appeal.”

The conception of expert is not a closely definable one. That is why it is, in a sense, vague. It offers a lot of freedom. Further, if two experts differ and they go to a third expert, it does not in practice produce any regresses. And, even if all the experts available differ, this procedure is not proved to be unworkable, because the intellect is sure to become more powerful and efficient after knowing the opinions of the experts. We can say at the most that the intellect may be overawed but it will surely continue functioning. It is the nature of intellect to be more active when confronted with such situations.

It is true that omniscience technically called *kevala-jñāna* finds an important place in Jaina epistemology. Whether it is the five-fold division of knowledge of the *āgamas*⁸ or the two-fold division proposed later on⁹, it has its own place. It is characterised as 'pure' (*kevala*), because it is independent of the services of any sense-organs and is also cognisant of all objects, and thus stands apart in a category of its own, having nothing in common with other modes of cognition.¹⁰ The perfect knowledge (*kevala-jñāna*) arises only after total annihilation of all obstructive veils.¹¹ This is nothing other than the state of liberation, as liberation also is freedom from

8 The five-fold division of knowledge into *mati*, *śruta*, *avadhi*, *manaḥ-paryāya* and *kevala* is generally accepted by the *āgamas*. See, *Rāya-pasenīya-sutta*, 165; *Bhagavati-sūtra*, 88 2.317; *T. Sūt.*, I. 9.

9 Knowledge is divided into immediate (*pratayakṣa*) and mediate (*parokṣa*) (*T. Sūt.*, I. 11-12; *Nyāya-dīpikā*, II. 1; *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I. 1.9; *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokāṅkāra*, II. 1.; *Parikṣā-mukham*, II. 1; *Nyāyavatāra*, I. etc. The immediate (*pratayakṣa*) is sub-divided into empirical (*sāṃvayavahārika*) and transcendental (*pārmārihika* or *mukhya*). *Kevala jñāna* is the absolute variety (*sakala*) of the latter. See, *Nyāyavatāra*, 25-26; *Parikṣā-mukham* & *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokāṅkāra*, II. 11, 12; *Nyāya-dīpikā*, II. 11; *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I. 1.15 etc.).

10 Hemacandra, *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā-bhaṣya*, I. 1.15.

11 Hemacandra, *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I. 1. 15, cp. Māṇikyanandī, *Parikṣā-mukham*, II.11; Umāsvāmī, *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, X. 1.

all karmic-matter.¹² As a matter of fact, the attribute of omniscience is an important feature of the state of liberation, other features being omnibliss, omnipower and omnifaith. So, we can conclude that omniscience follows from the state of liberation. This is also corroborated by the statement that “only the liberated souls are said to possess omniscience”.¹³ We can also say that the state of supreme salvation or self-realisation is also the state of supreme-knowledge or omniscience. Infact, the two are indistinguishable. Freedom and knowledge are coeval and coexistent.

Omniscience is, therefore, not only the culmination of our cognitive faculties, it is also the final consummation of our moral, religious and spiritual life. Hence, we find an intimate relation between the state of salvation and omniscience. In Buddhism, the state of liberation (*nirvāṇa*) is also the state of enlightenment (*bodhi-sattva*) or wisdom (*prajñā*). The perfect being (*tathāgata*) is, therefore, the owner of perfect wisdom (*prajñā-pāramitā*). This state is reached through the progressive development of our thought concentration (*bhāvanā*) which leads to the annihilation of the various handicaps to knowledge (*jñeyāvaraṇa*). In Sāṅkhya-Yoga, the state of omniscience is achieved during the absolute and absorbing concentration (*asamprajñāta samādhi* or *dharma-megha-samādhi*) as a result of the removal of the veil of knowledge. In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika also omniscience is the result of *adrṣṭa* born out of the highest yogic concentration. In Vedānta, omniscience follows from the state of realisation of the oneness of self and *Brahman*. In short, almost all the systems of Indian philosophy try to link the concept of omniscience with the highest state of religious and spiritual life.

As God's omniscience follows from the perfection,¹⁴ simi-

12 Umāsvāmi, Ibid., X-2: See Yogindu, *Paramātma-prakāśa*, II. 63, etc.

13 Vāḍideva Sūri, *Pramāṇa-nyaya-tattvālokāṅkāra*, II. 14; cp. Yogindu, Ibid., II. 6, 46, etc.

14 According to Christianity, God is absolutely omniscient because He

larly, human omniscience should be understood as a logical corollary to human perfection. Human beings not only have animality and materiality, but also intellectuality and spirituality. Hence it is a meaningful ideal for the human soul whether through his own spiritual and moral efforts or as a gratuitous gift of God, to aspire after perfect knowledge. "The soul is potentially a spiritual essence, seeking to fulfill itself through the body and the bodily channels of apprehension until its essence may become perfect actually, and so be a pure spiritual essence, apprehending without any bodily instruments."¹⁵

As a matter of fact, Jaina epistemology is based on non-naturalistic or spiritualistic faith. They strongly believe that all knowledge that we get from any source is already in the prior possession of the soul. Knowledge is an essential quality of the soul. "Knowledge is not mere knowing but the self as knowing" or "knowledge is the self-functioning of the self".¹⁶ This is also true with omniscience. Omniscience is innately possessed by every soul. What is needed for actualisation of this potentiality is to remove the veil by destroying the karmic-matter completely, matter which has penetrated into the soul owing to his past ethical decisions or volitions. So *kevala-jñāna* ceases to be a naturalistic or purely positivistic phenomenon, since it is neither derived from sense-organs or mind, nor from logic or inference, nor even from authority or scriptures:¹⁷

is the maximum being, hence most perfect also. Idea of perfection would be incomplete without the attribute of infinite or perfect knowledge. See *Old Testament, Zacharie*, 9:7; 10:1; 4:3; P. S., 33:15; 94:9; 139:13-16; Judith; 23:23-24 etc. According to the theistic systems also like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, God possesses six-fold perfections i.e., infinite knowledge, power etc. (Udyanācārya, *Nyāya-kusumāñjali*, 5)

- 15 Macdonald, *Religious Attitude and Life in Islam* (quoted by C. R. Jaina, Omniscience, DJP., Bijnore, 1935), p. 23.
- 16 H. M. Bhaṭṭācārya, "The Jaina Theory of Knowledge", *Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XIV, No. 1, Jan. 1939, p. 122.
- 17 Vide, J. N. Sinha, *Indian Psychology* (Kegan Paul, London, 1954), p. 364 (Jaina Doctrine of Omniscience).

It is already in our possession, we have only to fulfil its conditions. It is like intuition (*aparokṣānubhūti*) of the highest state that we find in Indian or in western philosophy.¹⁸

According to the early Pāli sources,¹⁹ Buddha offered a qualified support for the doctrine of omniscience even with regard to himself, and he often criticised Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta²⁰ claiming omniscience in the sense of knowing and seeing, all objects of all times, past, present and even future.²¹ His reluctance in claiming unqualified omniscience is mainly concerned with knowledge pertaining to the *future*, possibly because it will lead to some sort of determinism in metaphysics and morals. "To speak of omniscience in relation to future is to maintain an impossible position"²² because the course of future events is partly determined by the past and present and partly undetermined. I think, Buddha's hesitation in claiming unqualified omniscience was influenced mainly by moral considerations. If he knew the future acts of human beings, there was no meaning in voluntary action or freedom of will which form the basis of ethics and morality.

18 Prof. Dale Riepe in his *The Naturalistic Tradition in Indian Thought*, (University of Washington, Seattle, 1961) tries to compare the Jaina doctrine of omniscience with the Pythagorean Platonic doctrine of reminiscence (pp. 84-85), quoting "*The Dialogues of Plato: Meno*, (Eng. trans. Benjamin Jowett), Vol. I. Sec. 81, p. 360. But I am not sure, if such a comparison can be made.

19 cp. "Those who say that the recluse Gotama is omniscient and all-seeing constantly and at all times are not reporting me correctly" *Majjhima-nikāya*, I. 482. See, *Dīgha-nikāya*, I. 78-84; II. 82-83, III. 99-101; *Saṃyutta-nikāya*, I. 191; *Majjhima-nikāya*, II. 127.

20 Vide, *Majjhima-nikāya*, I. 372-378; II. 214-223.

21 Vide, *Dīgha-nikāya*, III. 134 "The recluse Gotama speaks of an infinite knowledge with regard to the past but not to the future". Dr. K. N. Upādhyāya in his thesis "A critical and comparative study of the Bhagavadgītā and Early Buddhism," (His thesis for the Ph.D. degree, University of Ceylon, 1964) pp. 340-347 has dealt with this problem.

22 K. N. Upādhyāya, *Ibid.*, pp. 343-344.

This kind of objection against unqualified omniscience is also found in Christian theology dealing with divine omniscience.²³ If God is omniscient, no human action is free. St. Augustine says "If you say, God foreknows that a man will sin, he must necessarily sin. But if there is necessity there is no voluntary choice of sinning but rather fixed and unavoidable necessity"²⁴ So also Locke says: "If God exists and is (essentially) omniscient, no human action is voluntary."²⁵

Now, one may say, if we apply the concept of omniscience to human beings, the results will be all the more devastating. But it may be pointed out that "God compels no man to sin, though he sees beforehand those who are going to sin by their own will."²⁶ Hence, God's omniscience cannot entail determinism. For instance, an intimate friend can have foreknowledge of another's voluntary actions, but it does not in any way affect his moral freedom.

But this does not seem to be a very good argument. A person's knowledge about the future action, of an intimate

23 Vide, *Old Testament*. It speaks of God's knowledge of future acts; so "God knows the course of action which would be pursued in any given contingency". See, 1 Samuel, 23. 27-28; 23. 9-13; Jeremie, 38. 17-23; 42.1.22; cp. John Calvin's statement: "when God created man, He foresaw what would happen concerning him"—*Institutes of Christian Religion*, Book III, Ch. XX; St. Augustine's remarks: "For to confess that God exists and the same time to deny that He has foreknowledge of future things is the most manifest folly...one who is not perscient of all future things is not God." (*City of God*, Bk. V, Sec. 9); See also W. Paley's *Natural Theology*, Ch. XXIV.

24 St. Augustine, *The City of God*, Book V, Sec. 9.

25 John Locke, *Essays Concerning Human Understanding*, Book IV, Chap. XXI, Sec. 8-11; cp. Boethius' statement: "If God is omniscient, no human action is voluntary"—(*Consolatio Philosophiae*, Part V, Sec. III).

26 St. Augustine, "De Libero Arbitrio". co. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, Part I, Sec. 2, para. 55.

friend of his is at most good guess and not definite knowledge.²⁷ Locke's argument that there may be man who chooses to do something which without knowing that it is within his power to do otherwise (e.g., "if a man chooses to stay in the room without knowing that the room is locked")²⁸ seems to reconcile necessity with freedom but in fact it is a reconciliation of ignorance and knowledge and hence it cannot work in the context. Infact, what is *forseen* (i.e., known conclusively) is *necessary*²⁹ and what is necessary is outside the scope of ethics.

If it is said that "it is not because God foreknows what he foreknows that men act as they do: it is because men act as they do that God foreknows what He foreknows,"³⁰ it will create a very awkward situation in which man's actions would determine God's knowledge. We can also apply this to human omniscience. There it will create greater complications. It will mean that knowledge of the omniscient being is not unfettered but determined by the actions of other men. Different people perform different actions, often quite contrary to that of their fellows. This will create a difficult situation for the cognising mind if it is to be so determined.

To say that the omniscient being is one who is justified in believing an infinitely large number of true synthetic propositions is not only vague but also self-contradictory. For example, it all dependas upon the belief in one proposition at least : "Nothing is uunknown to him". But this is to admit

27 See, Fred Newman's article "Omniscience is possible", *Australasian Journnl of Philosophy*, Sydney, Vol. 42, No. 1, May 1964.

28 See, Nelson Pike's article "Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action" *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Cornell, Vol. LXXIV, No. 1, Jan. 1965, p. 32.

29 cf. Leibnitz, *Theodici*, part I, Sec. 27.

30 Luis de Molina, *Concordia Liberi Arbitri*, quoted from Nelson Pike's article, *Ibid.*, p. 38, cf. Boethius, *Consolatio Philosophiae*, Bk. V, Sec. 3, para. 2.).

his omniscience and hence it is the like arguing in a circle, Thus the concept of omniscience, whether *logical* or *actual*³¹ does involve difficulties.

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- 31 F. Newman, *ibid.*, makes a distinction between two senses of omniscience, 'necessary' and 'actual', which has been criticised by R. Puccetti: ("Mr. Newman's view of omniscience"; a discussion) in *Journal of Australasian Philosophy*, Vol. 42, No. 2, August, 1964, p. 261. A rough comparison may be made with Buddha's distinction between *dispositional* and *unqualified* omniscience, (cp. K. N. Upādhyāya, *ibid.*, pp. 342-343).

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1	F. N.	Shastri H. G.,	Shastri, H. G.,
1	,,	Śruta Sāgar, Sūri	Śruta Sāgar Sūri
3	,,	Benarsidas	Banarsidas
4	9	' nā '	' ā '
7	33	Kamśīla	Kamalaśīla
20	31	Nīrbija	Nirbīja
22	3	<i>Makṣa</i>	<i>Mokṣa</i>
22	12	Infallabe	Infallible
22	F. N.	Ramchandran,	Ramachandran,
39	20	Upahisads	Upaniṣads
43	F. N.	Divakara	Divākara,
51	23	lge	<i>Ege</i>
51	24	lge	<i>Ege</i>
61	,,	Jāna	Jñāna
73	2	Soul Jīva	Soul or <i>Jīva</i>
73	3	none-soul	non-soul
74	17	on other	on the other
74	28	Mahaniya	Mohanīya
95	26	Expicabh	Explicable
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156	3	acpuise	acquire
177	12	Ridiculse	Ridicules
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