




# JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY



**Dr. Indra Chandra Shastri**

सच्चं लोगम्मि सारभूयं



पार्वनाथ विद्याश्रम शोध संस्थान, वाराणसी-५

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# **JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY**

*By*

**Late Dr. Indra Chandra Shastri**

**M.A. Ph. D.**



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### ***Publisher's Note***

We feel immense pleasure in presenting this valuable work 'Jaina Epistemology' by Late Dr. Indra Chandra Shastri in the hands of the scholars. Dr. Indra Chandra Shastri was the second Research scholar of P. V. Research Institute. He was awarded Ratan Chand Memorial Scholarship by this Institute to work on the Epistemology of Jaina Āgamas. He was awarded Ph. D. Degree by B. H. U.

Though there are various independent works on Jaina theory of Reality, Syādvāda, Jaina Metaphysics etc. but we don't have any work on Jaina Epistemology or Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā. It is gratifying that this subject has been for the first time exhaustively dealt by Dr. Indra Chandra Shastri. The present work not only covers the epistemological concepts of Jaina Philosophy but it also includes their comparative studies with other systems of Indian Philosophy. As a matter of fact the author has made a remarkable contribution to Indian Epistemology in general and Jaina Epistemology in particular.

We are extremely sorry as this work could not be published in his life time due to certain unavoidable reasons. After his demise his eldest son Dr. Satya Suman Shastri approached Dr. Sagar Mal Jain, Director, P. V. Research Institute and expressed his desire to see it through the press. While going through the manuscript it was realised that the pattern of references and diacritical marks adopted in thesis left much to be desired. It required a thorough scrutiny. Dr. Shastri, the author having left for heavenly abode it was the sole responsibility of the Institute as a publisher to prepare a correct press copy. We are happy to note that our academic staff Dr. Sagarmal Jaina, Director, Dr. Arun Pratap Singh, then Research Associate and Dr. Ashok Kumar Singh, Research Officer undertook this responsibility and corrected copy was given to the press.



We are thankful to the heirs of Dr. I. C. Shastri esp. Dr. Satya Suman and Sneha Suman who took keen interest in publication and also made a donation of Rs. 2100/- as a publication grant for this work.

We are again thankful to Dr. Sagar Mal Jaina and Dr. Ashok Kumar Singh who have been instrumental in its publication. We are also thankful to Sri Mahesh Kumar, Divine Printers for its speedy printing.


**B. N. Jain**

**Secretary**

**P. V. Research Institute**



Born : May 27, 1912    Expired November 3, 1986



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**M. A. Ph. D.**

**SHASTRACHARYA, VEDANTA-VARIDHI  
NYAYATIRTHA**

**Ex. Head of the Department of Sanskrit Institute  
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Delhi.**



## ***Author's Note***

I have discussed in the present work the problem of epistemology as depicted in the Jaina canonical literature. Originally, it was planned to have two parts; the Āgama-school and Tarka-school; and thus, embrace the entire field of Jaina epistemology as well as logic. But, the volume of first part became so large that it surpassed the reasonable limit of a thesis. Consequently, the second part has been left for further presentation.

The field of Jaina philosophy remains, more or less, unexplored. Very few scholars have tried to present it critically. We can mention in this respect Dr. S. Mukarjee and Nathmal Tatia. The edition of *Syādvāda-mañjarī* by Principal A. B. Dhruva covers all the points relating to Jaina metaphysics. It has discussed a few topics of epistemology also. Dr. P. L. Vaidya's edition of *Nyāyāvatāra* is definitely a valuable contribution to Jaina logic. Dr. Upadhye has translated *Pravacanasāra* and edited it with a critical introduction. But, he could devote only a few pages to philosophy. Principal Chakravarti's contribution towards metaphysics is valuable. Messrs J. L. Jaini, Ajit Prasad and S. C. Ghosal, are old names; but, their main contribution consists in translations. Their independent works are merely introductory. Pt. Sukhlal, Prof. Mahendra Kumar and Prof. Dalsukh Malavania have contributed a lot towards philosophy, epistemology and logic; though in Hindi. Their critical editions have helped me a lot in preparing the present work. But, none has tried so far to present the problem of Epistemology in its totality and an independent study. I humbly beg to say that this is the first attempt in this respect.

The present thesis is divided into six chapters. In addition, it includes an introduction, containing a brief survey of the works on the topic. It presents a summary of Jaina authors

and their works, covering a period of two millenia. The different trends resulting from natural development or external influences also have been recorded at their proper places.

The first chapter treats the definition of knowledge. It has three sections : the metaphysical position, the function and the object. Its introductory part shows the fundamental principles of Jaina epistemology traced from the original Āgamas. The first section is a comparative study of the metaphysical position of knowledge. The second deals with the function of knowledge, i. e. the relation between subject and the object. The third treats the nature of the object of knowledge. It ascertains the positions of three psychological functions of knowing, feeling and willing; criticizing the Buddhist view of their identity.

The second chapter presents a historical survey of the division of knowledge with its seven stages; beginning with the Bhagavati Sūtra right upto Akalaṅka. It shows the aspects of subject, object, cause, appearance and the like, accepted by different systems as the basis of division. At the end it dwells upon the twofold division of direct knowledge ( pratyakṣa ) and indirect knowledge ( parokṣa ) as held by the Tattvārtha.

The third chapter deals with mati and śruta, the two types of indirect knowledge. The conception of sense-organs, position of mind, their contact with the objects, successive stages and such other topics of real epistemological interest are discussed with matijñāna. The controversy about the position of avagraha is fully discussed. The question of samjñis also is included in it. The conception of śruta undergoes three developments. In the first stage it is confined to the canonical literature. In the second stage it is knowledge derived from speech or scriptures. In the third stage it is identical with mati. All the three stages have been discussed in detail.

The fourth chapter treats Avadhi, Manaḥparyaya and Kevala, the three types of direct knowledge. It begins with the conception of supernormal knowledge as held by other systems.

with occasional comparative remarks. Yogipratyakṣa, Siddhapratyakṣa and Ārṣapratyakṣa as admitted by the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems, have been compared with the corresponding Jaina notions. All the varieties of avadhi with its proportional developments have been shown in their true perspectives. The controversy about the object of manaḥparyaya, the views advocated by Jinabhadra and Akalaṅka have been already stated. In the discussion of Kevalajñāna the question of omniscience has been special attention. It shows that the knowledge of reality and omniscience are two different things. The notion of omniscience comes as a necessary equipment of the creator or a religious preacher. This is supported by the Buddhist conception of ten bhūmis and pāramitās. The fourteen stages of spiritual development beginning from three karaṇas ( feats ) and granthibheda ( unloosening the knot of kārmiṇ bondage ), right upto the attainment of kaivalya, have been described. The question of identity or difference in knowledge amongst the three stages of kevala with yoga, kevala without yoga and the kevala with liberation has been discussed in the light of other systems.

The fifth chapter treats Darśana, the inarticulate cognition. Several notions regarding the nature of darśana, beginning from the stage of soul's inclination right upto the general apprehension of an object have found a place here. The controversy between Vīrasena and the logical school has been fully discussed. I have also shown how the first view of soul's inclination changed into the popular view. The problems of succession, simultaneity, or identity between kevalajñāna and kevala darśana also have been properly dealt with. It shows how the question of omniscience is the root-cause of this controversy.

The sixth chapter discusses the problem of Ignorance ( ajñāna ), in its four aspects of illusion, perversion, absence of knowledge and its cause. The question of jñānāvaraṇa and darśanāvaraṇa, with their subdivisions is fully discussed.

The reader will find in comprehensiveness this work and a comparative outlook in the treatment. A thought is like rain-water stored by different traditions into their own pots and given different names. No topic is the exclusive property of a particular system. One cannot have its full view by visualizing it in a particular pot. I have tried here to give the views of different systems fully, as to make them clearly understandable. In a way, it is a study of the entire topic rather than a single system.

The present work, the result of my studies as a Ratan Chand Jaina Fellow, has kept me engaged for several years. I owe a deep sense of gratitude to the trustees of the above Fellowship for their generosity. I am highly indebted to Dr. P. L. Vaidya, Mayurbhanja Professor of Sanskrit, Benares Hindu University, under whose able guidance I have worked and completed the thesis. His instructions and timely encouragement have been a source of inspiration to me. Prof. Dalsukh Malavania has gone through some chapters and given valuable suggestions. His deep scholarship in the field of Jainism has been a great asset to me.

**Dr. Indra Chandra Shastri**



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## ***About the Author***

**Late Prof. (Dr.) Indra Chandra Shastri**, Shastracharya, Vedantavaridhi, Nyayatirtha, was a great and renowned philosopher, an exceptional scholar, author and exponent of the country endowed with a truly versatile genius. Shunning the lime light of publicity, he made outstanding contribution in various fields of knowledge creating social awareness with human consciousness. His contributions are pioneering and have blazed a new trail. His work is by all accounts monumental and is of fundamental value. Distinguished by notable academic achievements his scholarship encompasses Religion, Philosopha (eastern and western), Culture, Indology, History of Indo-European languages, Grammar, Linguistics and Philology, Sociology, Poetics, Logic, Epistemology, Sanskrit, Prakrit inculuding Pali and so on and so forth. His role was that of a social reformer, a savant as an iconociast, which he successfully performed through his writings, lectures, public utterances and direct contact with students and people all over the country. At a minimal estimate in the career span of 60 years he wrote nearly 70 books, more than 600 research papers and articles, delivered a few hundred public lectures and speeches all over India reflecting on healthy and positive aspect of religion with emphasis on social reform and national integration. Throughout his life he carried on an effective campaign against obscurantism, superstitions and religious dogmas.

Dr. Shastri was a philosopher-thinker in his approach. He made dispassionate, critical analysis of thought currents which have prevailed over the centuries. In doing so, he does not follow any tradition but argues and writes independently with rare imagination, combined with abstract thinking, thus giving a fresh dimension to thought. His entire effort can be epitomised as individual spiritualism (he owes much to the Anekanta of Jainism), supplemented by the scholasticism of a genius. He has contributed on diverse literary subjects like Sanskrit poetics, Philology and Jain literature but his forte has been Religion, Philosophy and Culture.



Firmly grounded in Sanskrit literature, Oriental Philosophy and learning with a Doctorate from Banaras Hindu University, he had been a student of reputed scholar, Pt. Bal Krishna Mishra and had close association with Mahamana Madan Mohan Malaviya, the then Vice-Chancellor of the University. His doctoral thesis was adjudged as the best treatise on the subject till then. He received his M.A. in Sanskrit from Agra University, securing first position. He was also Shastracharya in Vedanta (first position) from Banaras Hindu University, Shastri from Punjab and Nyayatirtha from Calcutta.

Along with an original thinker, eminent educationist and reformer, he was also a social activist. In 1940, inspired by Mahatma Gandhi's freedom movement, he actively participated in it. In Bikaner in 1942, he organised a small group of four hard-headed youths who looked after passengers at the local railway station, especially coming from Delhi and motivated them to be united and struggle against the British rule. And in the same year he successfully campaigned against the heinous practice of 'Bal-Deeksha' (forcible adoption of male and female children of indigent parent in Rajasthan countryside by Jain ascetics). Consequently, a public bill against the evil practice was piloted through the Bikaner State Assembly and was passed. It was a revolutionary step at that time and was appreciated by national leaders like Mahatma Gandhi, Vijay Laxmi Pandit along with other Jain and non-Jain eminent personalities such as Acharyajin vijya Muni, Pt. Sukhlaji Sanghvi and others. While working as Head, Deptt. of Hindi & Sanskrit, Vaish College, Bhiwani during 1945-48, he addressed students and people and inspired them to rise against the British rule. He also hoisted the national flag and publically made a bonfire of foreign clothes. After partition in 1947, he organised Social Worker Refugee Relief Camp, Group 'O' Bhiwani and also helped them in many other ways.

He launched and edited several reputed journals like 'Bharatiya Sanskriti', was founder-Secretary 'Akhil Bharatiya Sanskrit Sahitya Sammelan' from 1954-58 and successfully organised All India Oriental Conference (Delhi) in 1958 as Secretary. At that time, he was being sent to Jamaica Uni-

versity (West Indies) as a Visiting Professor of Indology but an attack of Glaucoma resulted in his complete blindness.

He was a living profile in courage and dedication, who despite his complete blindness in the last 26 years of his life, worked indefatigably and undeterred, almost single-handed, for a cause. Though blind he had a rare vision. He lost his eyesight in 1961 at the age of 49, when he was Head of Sanskrit Deptt. in the Institute of Postgraduate Studies, University of Delhi. After that (1961—69) he did intensive research work on the project 'Religion and Modern Man' as Professor Emeritus under University Grants Commission and produced many important works with the help of assistants. During these years he also delivered scholarly lectures all over India. By that time he had a nationwide formidable reputation for his contribution in the field of learning and social work. Publication and propagation of his distinguished writings of outstanding merit are of immense use not only for the academic world, but will specially provide the younger generation a new insight, rational and healthy approach with modern outlook towards religion, culture and tradition, the need of the hour.

Born on May 27, 1912 at Dabwali Mandi now in District Sirsa of Haryana, Dr. Shastri was a selfless and simple man who never cared for publicity, recognition or official favours. Only a few months before his death on Nov. 3, 1986 he was given official recognition in the form of 'Certificate of Honour', but he himself was not alive to receive it. The Lt. Governor of Delhi conferred upon him 'Sahitya Seva Samman' for the year 1984-85 on May 29, 1986 on behalf of Hindi Academy, Delhi. The academic world and the society in general owe him a big debt. His genuine and integrated approach with endless zeal for creating social awareness was almost unique. He strengthened and promoted the fundamental democratic values of citizenship through socio-religious aspect. Born in a family of ordinary means, Dr. Shastri left home and parents at the age of nine and came to Bikaner for education. He composed Sanskrit slokas at the age of 13, almost a miracle. The spark within took him to far off places like Banaras, Madras, Calcutta, Bombay and finally he settled in Delhi. For

him knowledge was a passion and his life remained a quest for truth and learning, a reflection of his ideas. It was an ideal blend of commitment, dedication and action.

**Positions held :** 1. Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Institute of Post-graduate Studies, University of Delhi (1956—61); 2. Director, Prakrit Vidyapeeth, Shri Jainendra Gurukul, Panchkula, Ambala (1977-78); 3. Lecturer and Reader, Department of Sanskrit, University of Delhi (1953-59); 4. Research Scholar, Parshwanath Vidyashrama, Banaras Hindu University (1948-53); 5. Head of Department of Sanskrit and Hindi, Vaish College, Bhiwani (1945-48); 6. Lecturer, General Editor-Publications, Sethia Jain Sanskrit & Prakrit Academy, Bikaner (1938-44); 7. Secretary, Akhil Bharatiya Sanskrit Sahitya Sammelan, Delhi (1954-58); 8. Secretary, All India Oriental Conference, Delhi session 1957; 9. Editor—‘Bharatiya Sanskriti’ Bharatiya Sanskriti Sammelan, Delhi (1954-55); 10. Editor—‘Jain Prakash’, A.I.S.S. Jain Conference, Bombay (1952-53) 11 Founder Editor—‘Shramana’ Parshwanath Vidyashrama, Banaras (1949-52); 12. Assistant Editor—‘Nav Yug’ daily (now Nav Bharat Times), The Times of India group, New Delhi (1950).

Dr. Shastri has been chief speaker at World Religious conferences at Ujjain, Rajgir; Mahabodhi Society, Delhi; Gandhi lecture series, Rajghat; Gandhi Hindustani Sabha, Rajghat; Ahimsa Seminar, Delhi; Gita Seminar, Amravati; Jain Yuvak Sangh, Bombay, Rotary Club, Bombay and Bikaner; Lions Club Beawar etc., also invited him. Besides he also delivered lectures on his favourite subject ‘Religion and Modern Man’ in different years at Bombay, Calcutta, Bangalore, Madras and other places. Dr. Shastri’s services as teacher have been highly valued by the student community. A number of students guided by him for Ph. D. are now holding high positions in Sanskrit and other departments of colleges and Universities.

**Books Published :** 1. Sanskrit Kavya Shastra Ka Itihas (553 pages, demy size), an adaptation of P.V. Kane’s History of Sanskrit Poetics, 2. Bharat ki Arya Bhashaen, 3. A Study of Nyayamanjari by Jayant Bhatta (a UGC project, 368 pages in type). 4. Pali Bhasha aur Sahitya—translation of Geiger’s

Pali Language and Literature and the portion of Pali Sahitya written independently, 409 pages, demy size). 5. Shri Jaina Siddhanta Bol Sangraha (a compilation in eight volumes, about 500 pages each), a mine of information on Jaina doctrines. 6. Loktantra ka Lakshya (awarded by the Uttar Pradesh Hindi Sansthan). 7. Mahabharata ke Sukti Ratna. 8. Hamari Parampara. 9. Manava aur Dharma. 10. Jainism and Democracy, 11. Dhyan aur Manobal. 12. Dharma aur Rashtra Nirman. 13. Mahavira ki Jeevan Drishti. 14. Upasak Dashang-sutram (preface of 72 pages). 15. Katha Sarovar and 16. Kanton Ke Rahi (both collections of Jaina stories). 17. Sanskrit Sudha Part I & II. 18. Solah Satiyan (collection of stories). 19. Aalok aur Unmad and 20. Sanskriti ke Bhoot (both collections of critical philosophical essays on religion and culture). 21. Bharatiya Sanskriti ki do Dharaen. 22. Tathastha ki Pukar (translation of C. Rajagopalachari's Noice of the Uninvolved,). 23. Bal Deeksha Vivechan etc.

Along with ten booklets about 400 research papers and articles have also been published in important journals, national dailies and magazines.

**Manuscripts :** 1. Drishti Sristi Vadah (Sanskrit); 2. Dashvai-kalik Sutra ek Manan (Jaina Aagama ka manthan); 3. Praman Mimansa (Jaina Dharma—Etihasik Prishthabhoomi); 4. Shada-vyashak athava Pratikraman (dainindin Jainaanush than); 5. Samayik Ek Jeevan Drishti; 6. Bhagwan Mahavira ka Karma Siddhanta; 7. Samajik Parivartan—Ek Vaigyanik Adhyayan; 8. Vyakti aur Samaj; 9. Vyakti aur Parivartan; 10. Loktantra aur Samaj; 11. Samajik Sansthan aur Parivartan; 12. Netritva; 13. Dharma Sanstha ki Manasik Prishthabhoomi; 14. Vishwa Dharmik Paramparaen; 15. Bharatiya Sanskriti; 16. Tap aur Bharatiya Sanskriti; 17. Dharma Sanstha aur Vartman Manav; 18. Manav ka Bhavisya; 19. Dharma Sanstha ke Vardan aur Abhishap; 20. Manavata ka Punargathan (translation of Soro-kin's 'Reconstruction of Humanity'); 21. Ahinsa-Ek Manovaig-yanik Vishleshan; 22. Jaina Sadhana; 23. Jaina Parampara; 24. Jaina Kathaen; 25. Jeevan Patheya (collection of poems); 26. Kalidasa; 27. Bharatiya Darshan; 28. Bharat ka Rashtriya

Dharma; 29. Bharatiya Sanskriti me Naari; 30. Mahapurushon ke Vicaar;; 31. Gitanjali (Hindi translation) etc. 200 research papers and articles are unpublished.

He had long association with and was highly admired by contemporary eminent personalities like late Mahamana Madan Mohan Malaviya, late Kaka Saheb Kalelkar, late Ananthasayanam Ayyanger, late Smt. Rameshwari Nehru and late Shri Brijlal Nehru; late Dr. Hazari Prasad Dwivedi, litterateur; late Shrimannarayan, ex-Governor Gujrat; Dr. P.V. Kane, late Prof. V.V. Narlikar, late Shri Jainendra Kumar, late Dr. P. L. Vaidya, late Dr. Satkari Mookerjee, late Pt. Balkrishna Mishra, late Dr. Mangal Dev Shastri and late Pt. Badrinath Shukla, Dr. D. S. Kothari, Dr. L. M. Singhvi, Dr. Mandan Mishra, Dr. Prabhakar Machwe, Dr. Nagendra, Prof. Dalsukh Malvaniya, Shri Akshaya Kumar Jain, Shri Laxmi Chand Jain, Shri Yashpal Jain. Shri Sobhagyamal Jain, Prof. Sube Singh Rana; Dean (Colleges); Dr. Ramchandra Pandeya, Dr. Vijayendra Snatak and Dr. U. B. Singh; Dr. Kewal Krishna Mittal, and Dr. P. V. Bapat,

Many national English and Hindi dailies along with magazines carried long articles on Dr. Shastri at different occasions. Not only Jain community but the academic world particularly University of Delhi, Banaras Hindu University, Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeeth, Arya Samaj with whom he remained closely associated and the society at large feel grateful for Dr. Shastri's contributions.

## HISTORY AND SOURCES

### *The Period*

The development of the Jaina theory of knowledge extends over a long period of 2600 years. The idea of knowledge and its various types can be traced as early as the history of Jainism begins. Not only Mahāvīra, but the tradition of his predecessor Pārśvanātha also bears clear marks about the conception of knowledge.

### *The traces before Mahāvīra*

1. The Nandīśūtra<sup>1</sup> refers to a list of fourteen pūrvas. It is believed, on certain grounds, that this literature belonged to the tradition before Mahāvīra, as the very name suggests. In the Bhagavatī sūtra<sup>2</sup> the ascetics belonging to the order of Pārśvanātha and others of pre-Mahāvīra order are described as obtaining the knowledge of fourteen pūrvas; while those belonging to the order of Mahāvīra are described as obtaining the knowledge of eleven Aṅgas. This and certain other statements confirm the above view. Out of the fourteen books recognised as Pūrvas the fifth one is Jñānapravāda. The very name suggests that the entire book was devoted to the treatment of knowledge. Jayadhavalā<sup>3</sup> and other works of the latter period describe its contents also; which testify to the same fact.

### *Pūrva-literature not a myth*

It cannot be said that the existence of Pūrva literature is

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1. Nandī 56
  2. Bhagavatī 11, 11. 182
  3. Jayadhavalā vol. I, p. 141

merely a myth. We still inherit some fragments of them which are a clear proof for their existence. The *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*<sup>1</sup> contains two verses, which are attributed by Maladhārin to the Pūrva literature. Prof. H. R. Kapadia<sup>2</sup> provides a big list of the extant works that are taken from or based upon the Pūrvas. The present karma literature also constitutes a part of it. The Prābhṛta<sup>3</sup> literature of Digambaras and some Śvetāmbara<sup>4</sup> Āgamas are held as the fragments of them.

### *Other grounds of its antiquity*

2. In Rājaprasānīya,<sup>5</sup> Keśī Kumāra, a follower of Pārśvanātha explains five types of knowledge to king Paesi.

3. The discussion<sup>6</sup> between Keśī and Gautama points out all differences that existed between Pārśvanātha and Mahāvīra. But, it does not refer to the theory of knowledge. Such an important point could not be left untouched had it been a new introduction by Mahāvīra.

4. The Jaina theory of karman<sup>7</sup> also supports the above view. It has been already stated that the karma-literature stands as a part of the Pūrva-literature. The first two types of the eight fold division of karman are exclusively based on the theory of knowledge. The five types of jñānāvaraṇīya and the first four types of darśanāvaraṇīya strictly follow the corresponding types of jñāna and darśana.

5. The unity between Śvetāmbara and Digambara sects regarding the theory of knowledge further confirms the above view. The fundamental difference between the two sects lies in respect of garments. According to Digambaras, a muni should

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1. V. BH. pp. 76-77, 82, 83.

2. H. C. L. J. p. 88

3. Dhavalā Int. p. 71

4. H. C. L. J. p. 88

5. Rājaprasānīya 165

6. Uttarādhyayana XXIII

7. Karmavipākā 4

not wear clothes, while Śvetāmbaras allow them in the case of Sthavirakalpa, a lower stage of ascetic order. The higher stage known as Jinakalpa, where clothes are not allowed, they say, has become out of practice since Jambū Svāmin.<sup>1</sup> The tradition of Pārśvanātha allowed garments for all munis; while Mahāvīra laid emphasis on neckedness. On this basis it is held that Śvetāmbaras carried mainly the tradition of Pārśvanātha and Digambaras that of Mahāvīra. But, there is no mentionable difference between the two sects regarding the theory of knowledge. It shows that both of the Tīrthaṅkaras were unanimous in this respect.

### *Conclusion*

The above mentioned factors definitely prove that the Jaina literature on theory of knowledge existed long before the birth of Mahāvīra. If it is associated with the age of Pārśvanātha, we can say that it is not later than 800 B. C.

### *The field unexplored*

If we follow the Jaina mythology it reaches a hoary past. But, as in the case of Purāṇas, mythology may help in tracing the history of the buried past; it cannot be accepted as it is. The construction of the history of thought on the basis of mythology, though interesting, requires an independent effort. At present we are confined to the period which is not so obscure. The study of Jaina thought on the basis of non-Jaina literature, as the Vedas, Upaniṣads, Purāṇas and the Buddhist Piṭakas also may give some valuable information; but that also stands as a subject for independent study.

### *The Last Author*

The last notable author on the problem of knowledge was Yośovijaya Upādhyāya, who flourished in 1800 A. D. Thus, the development of the idea of knowledge covers a period of more than two and a half millenia. The development though

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1. V. Bh. G. 2593



varied does not leave the central point. It is interesting to note how the idea made its journey through various phases; sometimes pure and genuine, keeping its chastity undisturbed; than mixed with the external influence, again taking its original form and recasting itself in a new model.

Below we shall give a brief account of the main landmarks in the development of literature related with the theory of knowledge.

### THE TWO SCHOOLS

The Jaina literature on epistemology can be classified into two schools<sup>1</sup> i. e. [1] Āgama-School and [2] Tarka-School. The main difference between them does not lie in any principle or the fundamental conception, but in the way of treatment. The following points may show the characteristics of each school :—

1. *Literature* : The Āgama School is mainly based on the canonical literature and the post-canonical literature developed as commentaries. There are very few independent works related with the Āgama-School. Tarka-School is mainly based on independent works dealing with the subject logically.

2. *Age* : Originally the Āgama School begins with the age of Pārśvanātha; but the extant literature related with this school starts from 300 B. C. and continues upto 1000 A. D. Though the contribution of Yaśovijaya is not insignificant; yet, he stands all alone, after an interval of eight centuries. The Tarka-School begins with Siddhasena or Samantabhadra (600 A. D.) and lasts upto Hemacandra (1100 A. D.). Yaśovijaya contributes to this school also but he cannot be included into the age as he comes all alone after a long interval.

3. *Dominant idea* : In Āgama School the dominant idea is ethical aspiration and liberation from bondage of the world. The factor of knowledge stands here, as one of the constituents

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1. J. S. S. Vol. 3, p. 127.

of the way to salvation. It does not figure as the central theme. The five types of knowledge stand as the spiritual powers manifested gradually as the self aspires higher and higher. They are landmarks of the spiritual development. In the Tarka-School knowledge is a means to ascertain reality. The criteria of validity, methods of its ascertainment, the sources of knowledge and its relation with the object are the main problems of this School.

4. *External influence* : Āgama-School is a secluded development without any outside influence. Tarka-School is an occurrence necessitated by the outside influence. It is an attempt to defend the Jaina views from external attacks and at the same time to refute the non-Jaina views. The terms of discussion with others compelled the Jaina scholars also to reshape their views in the logical style maintained by other systems. This necessitated change in grouping and the method of presentation.

5. *Style* : Agamic literature is marked with simplicity and natural flow. The Upaniṣads, the Piṭakas and the Āgamas have a direct appeal to the heart. They are far away from the hairsplitting wrangling of the logical period.

6. *Language* : We may add to the above list an external factor of the language also. The original part of the Agamic literature was written in local dialects with a view to make it understandable even to the common people. Sanskrit was naturally neglected. This tendency is found in the Buddhist literature as well. The logical literature took its birth from the discussions with Brahmanical thinkers, who took to Sanskrit for their philosophical discussion. It became the language of scholarship as well as that of the court. The Jaina Scholars also, in order to stand with non-Jaina thinkers and to get an access in the scholarly world took to Sanskrit as their medium of philosophical treatment.

7. *Faith versus Reason* : Faith is the dominant feature of the Agamic literature. There is no appeal to reason. The canonical discussions are confined only to the interpretation of scriptural texts. The logical literature solely depends upon rea-

son. It does not support or reject any point on the basis of merely the scriptural authority, but takes reasoning as the ultimate support.

8. *Motive* : The Agamic discussions are motivated with preaching of the path to liberation. They were meant for every person, laymen as well as scholars. Spoken language, simple and lucid style, informative outlook and such other factors make the Agamic literature a literature of the people. While the logical literature motivated with the desire for defeating the opponents in discussions, naturally, it meant for Pandits or learned scholars. Over and above the sincere and faithful reasoning, it adopted verbal wranglings also.

9. *Right and Wrong* : The notion<sup>1</sup> of right (Samyak) and wrong (Mithyā) in the Agamic School is based on ethical position of the cognizer. If the cognizer is a person with right attitude (Samyagdṛṣṭi), every cognition is right; if, on the other hand if the cognizer is a person with perverted attitude (Mithyāḍṛṣṭi) no cognition is right. The value of cognition is measured, in the Agamic school, with the scale of ethics. In the logical school rightness and wrongness have no concern with subject or the cognizer. They are related with the object. A cognition is right, if it corresponds with the object, otherwise wrong.

10. *Upayoga and Pramāṇa* : The epistemology of the Āgamas means the theory of upayoga; its definition, divisions and subdivisions. But, the epistemology of the tarka-period means the theory of pramāṇa, or the problem of objective validity.

## THE LITERATURE OF THE ĀGAMA-SCHOOL

### *The Works known as Āgamas*

According to Jaina tradition the Āgamas are neither eternal, nor composed by any superhuman being or God as the systems of Mīmāṃsā and the Nyāya, respectively, hold in the

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1. Tat. Su I. 32-33, p. 56.

case of Vedas. In essence they were propounded by the Tīrthāṅkaras and compiled into book form by Gaṇadharas, the chief Disciples.<sup>1</sup> In addition to the composition of Gaṇadharas, some other works also were accepted as Āgamas and held in that esteem. The sages<sup>2</sup> who possessed the knowledge of all the fourteen Pūrvas, were known as Sruta kevalins and were ranked next to the kevalins as far as their religious knowledge was concerned. The works<sup>3</sup> composed by them also, were included into the canonical literature. Next we come to daśa-pūrvins; the sages possessing the knowledge of entire ten Pūrvas. Their works also were credited as Āgamas. The main reason for this view is that a sage having the knowledge of complete ten Pūrvas must be a samyagdr̥ṣṭi.<sup>4</sup> A mithyādr̥ṣṭi, cannot study the tenth Pūrva completely. He can go up to the ninth Pūrva completely and to the tenth Pūrva in a part. He is liable to speak untruth also. On the other hand a person with a minimum knowledge of entire ten Pūrvas, being decidedly a samyagdr̥ṣṭi cannot speak untruth. The credit of scriptural validity can be attributed to a samyagdr̥ṣṭi only. The other person cannot be accepted as an undisputable authority. Vattakera svāmin<sup>5</sup> adds to the above list the works of Pratyeka Buddhas also, who have attained perfect knowledge not as Tīrthāṅkaras but as the ordinary sages.

### *The Present State of the Āgamas*

We cannot say that the present works, known with the name of Āgamas, are the same as they were composed in their original form. The present works cannot claim to be the very words of Tīrthāṅkaras or Gaṇadharas. Slippings and interpolations are natural in the course of time. Many of the works are totally lost. The remaining ones have gone through consi-

1. Āva. Nir G. 90-92

2. V. BH. G.

3. Nandī. 41

4. Mūlācāra p. 80

5. Ibid.

derable changes. Yet, they cannot be discarded in whole-sale as without any authenticity. They cannot be assigned to an author of the latter period, as a whole. Though disfigured, they contain a lot of genuineness. Even in their present form they preserve the ancient lore and tradition to a great amount. We can safely hold that the present canonical literature has the nearest approach to the words of Tīrthaṅkaras and Gaṇadhara. They are the only means to understand the founders of the system in their original words.

### *Three Councils (Vācanās)*

It is said that the followers of the Buddha held three councils (saṅgītis) for arranging the sermons of Lord Buddha. Similarly, the followers of Mahāvīra also held three councils (vācanās) in order to arrange their canonical literature.

1. *The Council of Pāṭaliputra*—One hundred<sup>1</sup> and sixty years after the death of Mahāvīra, Northern India was engulfed in a long famine, lasting for twelve years. The Jaina sādhus left Magadha and scattered themselves over the region, where alms were easily available. The study of canonical literature, which was being carried through oral tradition, met with a serious set back. When the famine was over the learned monks assembled at Pāṭaliputra and restored eleven aṅgas; but none could recite the fourteen Pūrvas completely. The only Śrutakevalin at that time was Bhadrabāhu, who had gone to Nepal for practising yoga. The saṅgha sent Sthūlabhadra and some other monks to study the Pūrvas. Out of them only Sthūlabhadra was able to learn ten Pūrvas with explanation and the remaining four in mere reading. At the same<sup>2</sup> time he was forbidden by his preceptor not to impart further the knowledge of those four Pūrvas. Sthūlabhadra died 215 years<sup>3</sup> after the death of Mahāvīra.

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1. Āv. Cūrṇi II 187

2. Vīra Nirvāṇa p. 94

3. Ibid. p. 62

According to the tradition of both Śvetāmbaras<sup>1</sup> as well as Digambaras,<sup>2</sup> Bhadrabāhu was the last Śrutakevalin. According to Śvetāmbaras he died 170 years after the death of Mahāvīra. The Digambara tradition maintains his death eight years earlier.

Thus, we conclude that 170 years after the death of Mahāvīra the knowledge of the last four Pūrvas was nearly lost. Sthūlabhadra possessed it partially and that also to keep it to himself only.

According to Śvetāmbaras<sup>3</sup> the tradition of ten Pūrvas ended with Vajrasvāmin who expired 584 years after the death of Mahāvīra. According to the Digambara<sup>4</sup> tradition the last ten-pūrvin was Dharasena. He passed away 345 years after the death of Mahāvīra. The difference between the two traditions regarding Śrutakevalin was insignificant. But, in this case they differ not only in name but in time also, and hold a considerable difference of 239 years.

Vajra was followed<sup>5</sup> by Āryarākṣita. The latter was Yuga-pradhāna (Chief of the era) for 13 years and arranged canonical literature into four anuyogas. They were :—

1. Caranākaraṇānuyoga — Ethical literature.
2. Dharmakathānuyoga — Didactical stories.
3. Gaṇitānuyoga — Literature on Geography and Mathematics.
4. Dravyānuyoga — Literature on metaphysics

Āryarākṣita<sup>6</sup> himself knew nine Pūrvas and only a part of the tenth Pūrva. Amongst his disciples only Durbalikā Puṣpamitra<sup>7</sup> was able to learn the nine Pūrvas. He also forgot

1. Vīra Nirvāṇa p. 62.
2. Dhavalā Int. p. 26.
3. Merutuṅga Vicāra. Vīra Nirvāṇa, p. 64
4. Dhavalā Vol. I, Int. p. 26
5. Āva Nir. G. 763-777, V. Bh. G. 2284-2295
6. V. Bh. G. 2511 ṭīkā
7. Ibid.

the ninth one in absence of revision. Gradually, the knowledge deteriorated and 1000 years<sup>1</sup> after the death of Mahāvīra there was none to preserve it, even to the extent of complete one Pūrva. According to Digambaras<sup>2</sup> this situation arose earlier i.e. 683 years after the death of Mahāvīra. This is a brief account, how the Pūrva literature was lost.

2. *The Council of Mathura* : Eight hundred years<sup>3</sup> after the death of Mahāvīra there was another famine lasting for 12 years. When it was over the learned monks assembled at Mathura under the presidentship of Ārya Skandila. They arranged Kālikaśruta in this council. According to another version Skandila was the only person, at that time, to know anuyogas. In the council he imparted their knowledge to other sādhus. Skandila was yugapradhāna between 826 and 840 years<sup>4</sup> after the death of Mahāvīra. The same time can be assigned to this council also. The speciality of it was that it introduced writing for preservation of the Āgamas.

3. At the same time when Skandila held his council at Mathura, Nāgārjuna held another council at Valabhī. He collected<sup>5</sup> all the literature that was prevalent in oral tradition, arranged it systematically and put it on the paper.

These two councils slightly differ from each other in their readings. The reading<sup>6</sup> of Mathura is known as Māthuri-Vācanā and that of Valabhī goes with the name of Nāgārjuna.

### *The Edition by Devardhi Gaṇin*

About 150 years after these two councils, Devardhi Gaṇin held another council at Valabhī. He attempted at the preservation of miscellaneous literature which was not arranged so

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1. Bhagavatī 2.8, Sattarisayaṭhaṇa, p. 327

2. Dhavalā Int. p. 27

3. Nandī Cūrṇī, p. 8

4. Vīra Nirvāṇa, p. 104

5. Ibid., p. 110

6. Ibid., p. 116

far. He also tried to compose the differences between two readings, as far as it was possible. But important differences were accepted as they were, which are still referred by the cūrṇis and ṭīkās. Many short treatises<sup>1</sup> which were not so far assigned with canonical authority, got that position in this council.

The present Āgamas are believed to be the redaction of this council. If we accept the list given in the Nandīśūtra as the arrangement of this council, it is clear that many works have been lost even after that.<sup>2</sup> The extant works also do not possess the same size as it is given in the Nandīśūtra.

### *The Āgamas according to Digambara Tradition*

According to the Digambara tradition Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama, Kaṣāyaprabhṛta and Mahābandha are the only works<sup>3</sup> that are directly related with the words of Mahāvīra. The other āgamas have been lost in the course of time. Dr. Hirālāl<sup>4</sup> gives the following account of the Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama being reduced to writing :—

“The teachings of Lord Mahāvīra were arranged into twelve aṅgas by his pupil Indrabhūti Gautama, and they were handed down from preceptor to pupil by word of mouth till gradually they fell into oblivion. Only fractions of them were known to Dharasena who practised penances in the Candra Guha, of Girinagara in the country of Saurāṣṭra (modern Kathiawara). He felt the necessity of preserving the knowledge and so he called two sages, who afterwards became famous as Puṣpadanta and Bhūtabali, and taught to them portions of the fifth Aṅga Vivāhapaṇṇatti and the twelfth Aṅga Dīṭṭhivāda. These were subsequently reduced to writing in Sūtra form by the two eminent pupils. Puṣpadanta composed the first 177 sūtras and his colleague Bhūtabali wrote the rest, the total being 6000 sūtras”.

1. Vīra Nirvāṇa, p. 112

2. Dhavalā Int. p. 71

3. Ibid., p. I

4. Ibid., p. II



According to the account given by Indranandin<sup>1</sup> in his commentary of Śrutāvatāra, Śaṭkhaṇḍāgama had six commentaries. The first known as Parikarma was written by Kunda-kunda. The remaining commentaries are attributed to Śama-kunḍa, Tumbulūra, Samantabhadra and Bappadeva. Dhavalā is the most popular of them, it is as big as 72000 metres.

The commentary of Vīrasena, in addition to its logical and penetrative treatment, is important in other respects also. It quotes a big number of gāthās from the Āgamas, still prevalent in the Svetāmbara tradition; which no other Digambara work has quoted. These quotations serve as a common heritage for the two traditions. There is another number of references which are not found in any older work. It points to a treasure of cultural development which is entirely lost. Vīrasena refers to two different schools of thought on certain points of disagreement and designates them as the Northern school and the Southern school.<sup>2</sup> This reference points to the traditions of Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras respectively, and indicates their different regions of the development.

Kaṣāya Prābhṛta was written by Guṇadhara, a contemporary of Dharasena. It also possesses the commentary of Jayadhavalā by Vīrasena.

In addition to the above two works, Mahābandha also is placed in the category of Āgamas. It is an expansion of the sixth chapter of Śaṭkhaṇḍāgama by Bhūtabali himself. It is also known as Mahādhavalā.

Thus the Digambara tradition recognizes Dhavalā, Jayadhavalā and Mahādhavalā as the three siddhānta-granthas, based on Śaṭkhaṇḍāgama, Kaṣāya Prābhṛta and Mahābandha.

### *Two Traditions supplementing each other*

The above three works are mainly related to the Pūrva literature<sup>3</sup>. It is interesting to note that according to the Śvetām-

1. Dhavalā Int. p. III

2. Mahābandha, Int. p. 1

3. Jayadhavalā Int. p. 1.

bara tradition Dṛṣṭivāda, the twelfth Aṅga; which has the Pūrvas as its one part, is lost entirely. On the other hand the Digambara tradition, though maintains all the Aṅgas as lost; yet, the above mentioned three Siddhāntas are accepted as fragments of the Pūrvā literature, Thus, in a way they supplement each other.

## AGAMIC LITERATURE ON THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

### *Original Āgamas*

The first half of the Ācārāṅgasūtra is accepted as the oldest portion of the extant Jaina literature. It contains a significant remark expressing identity between the cognizer and the cognition.<sup>1</sup> Vivāhapaṇṇatti<sup>2</sup> and Ṭhānāṅga<sup>3</sup> clearly express the five types of knowledge with its divisions and other points related to the problem. Uttarādhyayana<sup>4</sup> enumerates the five types in its 28th Chapter. In Paṇṇavaṇā<sup>5</sup> there are two full chapters dealing with the subject. Its Paśyatta-Pada<sup>6</sup> has no parallel any where else in the Jaina literature. Anuyoga-dvāra<sup>7</sup> by Ārya Rakṣita (100 B. C.) starts with the five types of Āgama-school; but, later on elaborately<sup>8</sup> discusses the logical conceptions. Nandī (400 A. D.) is fully devoted to the theory of knowledge.

Amongst the Digambara Āgamas all the three works of Saṅkhaṇḍāgama, Kaṣāya Prābhṛta and Mahābandha provide a valuable information in this respect.

1. Ācārāṅga I 5.5.5

2. Bhagavatī VIII, 2.17-103

3. Sthānāṅga 463

4. Uttarādhyayana XXVIII 5-6

5. Paṇṇavaṇā pada p. 30

6. Ibid., 29

7. Anuyogadvāra 1

8. Ibid., 144.

### Commentaries

After the original Āgamas we come to the commentaries. The Śvetāmbara Āgamas are associated with the following four types of commentaries : (1) Niryuktis (Pr. Nijjutti), (2) Bhāṣyas (Pr. Bhāsa), (3) Cūrṇis (Pr. Cūṇṇi) and (4) Ṭikās. The first three are in Prākṛta and the last in Sanskrit. The first two are in the metrical form while the latter two in prose.

The number of Niryuktis is ten. The major part of them was composed by the second<sup>1</sup> Bhadrabāhu who lived in the 5th century A. D. The Niryukti on the Daśavaikālikasūtra discusses the ten parts of Syllogism<sup>2</sup> and the different types of debates<sup>3</sup> (kathas) which are very important in the history of Indian logic. The Niryukti on the Āvaśyaka sūtra<sup>4</sup> provides a valuable material for the study of Jaina epistemology.

The Bhāṣyas come next in the order of commentaries. They are eleven in number. The fifth Chapter of Āvaśyaka niryukti, known as Sāmāyika niryukti contains a big commentary known as Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya by Jinabhadra Kṣamāśramaṇa (7th Cent. A. D.). It is an encyclopedic work related with all the topics of Jaina philosophy. The first 836 gāthās of it are entirely devoted to the theory of knowledge. It covers all the points and views discussed in the previous literature and stands as a land-mark in the development of Agamic philosophy. The VBh is further commented by Jinabhadra himself, Koṭyācārya (8th Cent. A. D.) and Maladhārīya Hemacandra (12th Cent. A. D.). The Bhāṣyas on the Vyavahārasūtra and Bṛhatkalpa-sūtra also discuss some epistemological points here and there. They are said to be the composition of Saṅghadasa Gaṇin.

In Bhāṣyas, the Āgama school reaches its highest stage of development. The subsequent works do not contribute anything new but present the old views in new form.

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1. Jñāna Bindu Int. p. 5

2. Daśa Niryukti, 52.

3. Daśa Nir.

4. Āva Niryukti, 51-79.

The Cūrṇi literature developed in the seventh or eighth century A. D. The Cūrṇis are an abridged form of the Bhāṣyas. Their speciality consists in the introduction of stories like Jātakas of the Buddhist literature. Jinadāsa Mahattara is very popular amongst their authors. He wrote a cūrṇi on the Nandī sūtra, which is entirely devoted to the problem of knowledge.

Haribhadra was the first Sanskrit commentator of the Āgamas. He lived in the eighth century A. D. His commentaries are more or less a translation of the cūrṇis. After Haribhadra we have Śilāṅkācārya, who died in the 9th cent. A. D. He was followed by Śāntiācārya, who wrote Bṛhattīkā on the Uttarādhyaṇa sūtra. After him we have Abhayadeva who commented the nine Āṅgas. He lived in beginning of the 11th century. Maladhārī-Hemacandra lived in the twelfth century. He has commented on Anuyogadvāra and annotated the Nandī and Āvaśyaka. His commentary on VBh. is well known. At the end we come to Malayagiri, but his commentaries supersede all the previous authors, in their excellence and scholarly treatment. He has dealt with every topic scholarly and masterly. His style is clear and fluent. His commentary on the Nandīsūtra is a valuable contribution to the subject. He also lived in the twelfth century A. D.

Amongst Digambaras we have already referred to the six commentaries of Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama; but, leaving Dhavalā, none of them is traceable. Dhavalā occupies the same place in Digambara literature as VBh in the Śvetāmbaras. It forms an independent school in the conception of knowledge. Virasenācārya finished this work on the 8th October, 816 A. D.<sup>1</sup> the Wednesday morning. Kaṣāya Prābhṛta contains the cūrṇi by Yati Vṛṣabha. We also have the commentary Jayadhavalā on it by the author of Dhavalā. It is also a valuable contribution. Mahābandha is mainly related with Karma theory. Though it is an expansion of the sixth chapter of Ṣaṭkhaṇḍā-

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1. Dhavalā Int. p. 1.

gama it is placed amongst the Āgamas, owing to its antiquity and the authorship which goes to the authors of original Āgamas; namely, Bhūtabali.

*The Tatvārtha and its commentaries*

The Tatvārtha sūtra is an independent work presenting the substance of Āgamas in Sūtra style. Though, it does not come directly in the tradition of canonical literature; yet, advocates the Agamic view faithfully. Umāsvāti (Umāsvāmin according to the Digambara version) dated fourth century A. D. has put in it the metaphysics, ethics, epistemology, cosmology and other topics of the Āgamas in aphorism, which was the style of that period. He deals with every subject logically and systematically. The Tatvārtha sūtra with its commentaries stands as a valuable literature on Jaina religion and philosophy.

*The Bhāṣya and Tīkāś* : Umāsvāti has himself written a Bhāṣya on it; but, some Digambara scholars are doubtful about its genuineness. The Bhāṣya is commented upon by Siddhasena Gaṇin, also known as Gandhahastī. Siddhasena (9th Cent.) His copious references, grammatical explanations and the statements of different views prevalent at that time, give a valuable information on all the topics. The commentaries of Haribhadra and Yaśovijaya are further mentionable in this context. They are not found completely.

*Sarvārthasiddhi, Rājavārtika and Śloka-vārtika* : The Digambara tradition holds Sarvārthasiddhi by Pūjyapāda as the first commentary of the Tatvārtha. Pūjyapāda was a great scholar of grammar as well as of logic and philosophy. Sarvārthasiddhi is a logical explanation of the Tatvārtha. It is believed that Samantabhadra also wrote a big commentary on it, which was known as Gandhahastī. Mahābhāṣya, and the present Āptamīmāṃsā, also known as Devāgama stotra, served as maṅgalācaraṇa at its beginning. But this tradition is not supported on the historical ground. Pt. Sukhlal<sup>1</sup> holds that the Bhāṣya of Siddhasena has been wrongly associated with Samanta

1. Sukhlal, T. S. Int. p. 42

bhadra and the same is known as Gandhahastī-Mahābhāṣya, after the title of its author. Sarvārthasiddhi is commented upon by Akalaṅka, the great logician. His work known as Rājavārtika stands as a monumental work in the history of Jaina thought. It is a unique contribution. After Akalaṅka we come to Vidyānanda, the author of Ślokavārtika. Though based on the Tattvārtha Ślokavārtika is more related with the Tarka-school. Vidyānanda has no parallel in the minuteness of discussions. While establishing the Jaina conception, logically he criticises the other systems also, which is not usual with the Āgama-school.

*Other commentaries :* The Tattvārthasūtra contains a commentary of Śrutasāgara also, which has recently come out. The commentary of Malayagiri would have been a valuable contribution; but, it exists in references only. The names of Yogendradeva, Yogadeva, Lakṣmī-deva, Abhayanandin, etc. also are mentioned as the commentators of Tattvārtha. Some of them are in Kannaḍa.

*Independent Works :* Apart from Umāsvāti, Kundakunda occupies the first place as an author of independent works related with the Āgama-school. He is said to have written eighty-four Prābhṛtas, ten Bhaktis, a Tīkā on Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama and many other works.<sup>1</sup> Mūlācāra also is attributed to him. His Rayaṇasāra and Bārasa-Aṇuvekkhā are related with religious duties and ethical reflections respectively. His Niyamasāra, Pañcāstikāyasaṁgraha, Samayasāra and Pravacanasāra are valuable contribution to philosophy. They are widely read by the Digambaras. He has contributed some new topics to the theory of knowledge. Pravacanasāra, Bodhapāhuḍa and Śrutabhakti are mainly related with the subject. Siddhasena, though accepted by Śvetāmbaras as the father of Jaina logic, exercised a great influence on the Agamic thought; particularly on the conception of knowledge. His Sanmati-tarka and certain Dvātrimśikās give a new interpretation to the theory of know-

1. Pravacanasāra Int. p. 24.

ledge. Jinabhadra's *Viśeṣaṇavatī* deals with the problem of Kevalajñāna and Kevala darśana at a considerable length.

Yaśovijaya, though last in the chronological order, occupies the front position for his contribution. He has written numerous books on different topics. His versatile genius has greatly enhanced the stand of Jaina philosophy in the field of logic as well as ethics. His small treatise *Jñānabindu* sums up the epistemology of the Āgama-school while *Tarkabhāṣā* does so in the field of Tarka-school.

*Bhagavatī ārādhana* by Śivārya (5th cent. A. D.) also deals with the topic in its chapter on *Jñānāvaraṇīya*. *Hari-vamśapurāṇa* and *Ādipurāṇa* discuss it in their introductions. *Lokaprakāśa* also is a valuable contribution in this respect. *Gommaṭasāra* and *Dravyasaṃgraha* of Nemicaṇḍra Siddhānta-cakravartī also play an important role. The latter has a commentary by Brahmadeva which gives a logical explanation to the views, appearing contradictory to one another.

The above statement is not a comprehensive list of the works related with the topic. Many works of minor importance have been left out. Similarly the recent works in English or modern languages are not taken into consideration. Still we have mentioned the main landmarks in the history of Āgama-school.

*The Karma literature* : The literature on the theory of karman also throws a considerable light on the problem of knowledge. The problem of ignorance, perversion and many other topics cannot be clarified without resorting to the discussion of karmans.

The tradition of karma-literature begins with the *Karma-pravāda*, the eighth Pūrva. It was entirely devoted to the theory of karman. In addition to the above a part of the *Āgrāyaṇīya* and the *Jñānapravāda Pūrvas* also was devoted to the discussion of karma-theory. It is believed that the following works which discuss the theory of karman are based on the fourth *Prābhṛta* of fifth vastu of the *Āgrāyaṇī Pūrva* :

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|------------------|------------------|
| 1. Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama | 2. Karma-prakṛti |
| 3. Ṣataka        | 4. Saptatikā.    |

The Kaṣāya-prābhṛta also discusses the same topic. It is based on the third Prābhṛta of tenth vastu in the Jñāna-pravāda. Karma-prakṛti was composed by Śivaśarma Sūri in the 4th century A. D. The Ṣataka and Saptatikā or Sittari are known as the fifth and sixth karmagranthas respectively. We are not sure about their authorship. According to one view they are composed by Śivaśarma Sūri The other view attributes them to Candrarṣi-Mahattara (6th cent.) The latter is known as the author of Pañca-saṁgraha also, which is an important work on this topic.

In addition to the above, there are four other works by Devendra Sūri (1220 A. D.). They are generally known as four Karma granthas; but, their actual titles are as follows :—

- (1) Karmavipāka, (2) Karmastava, (3) Bandhasvāmitva and (4) Ṣaḍaśṭikā, Devandra Sūri has himself written a commentary on them; where he refers to the four old karma-granthas as the basis of his own. They also had the same title prefixed with Bṛhat. They were composed by Garga Ṛṣi, about whom nothing is known.

### LITERATURE OF THE TARKA-SCHOOL

*Mutual Influence* : The present treatment is confined to the Āgama school only. The development of the Tarka-school is beyond its scope. Yet, the Agamic treatment, in its later stages, is not free from the logical influence. Many scholars have contributed to both the schools to a considerable extent. It is, therefore, essential to have some acquaintance with the main trends of the logical development.

*Beginning of the Tarka-School* : The tarka or reasoning is a human instinct. It begins with the history of human race. The earliest literature of India is full of logical discussions. We cannot say that the Brāhmaṇas, the Upaniṣads and the Piṭakas pursued their debates without any system. They must



have followed certain principles to conduct their discussions, which are highly developed. In the Brāhmaṇas, their field was the interpretation of Vedic injunctions, in the Upaniṣads they were applied to the spiritual field, and in the Piṭakas they were adopted also for refuting the different philosophical views. The Jaina Sūtras also clarify many points in the form of discussions. These discussions are carried generally between Mahāvīra and Gautama<sup>1</sup> or between Sudharman and Jambū.<sup>2</sup> Some discussions were held with the followers of other systems also. In Uttarādhyayana Gautama holds a discussion with Keśi, the follower of Pārśvanātha<sup>3</sup>. In Rājaprasāṇīya Keśi had a discussion with king Prasenajit on the eternity of the soul.<sup>4</sup>

In addition to the above discussions we have some references showing the existence of logic as a science at that time. The Bhagavatī<sup>5</sup> and Anuyogadvāra<sup>6</sup> sūtras refer to four sources of knowledge accepted by the logical tradition. The Bhagavatī refers to them apart from the five types of knowledge and designates them as pramāṇa to distinguish from the latter, while the Anuyogadvāra combines the both. The Sthānāṅgasūtra<sup>7</sup> refers the same as hetus. The theory of nayas shows a highly developed state in the field of reasoning. The Sthānāṅga<sup>8</sup> describes various types of debates also, which were held in those days. But, we do not come across any independent work on the science of reasoning earlier than the Nyāyasūtra of Gautama.

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1. Bhagavatī 5.3. 191-192.

2. Vipākasūtra 1.1

3. Uttarādhyayana XXIII

4. Rājaprasāṇīya. 164-200

5. Bhagavatī 5.3. 191-92

6. Anuyogadvāra, 144.

7. Sthānāṅga, 338

8. Ibid., 189 and 282

*Application of the term 'Nyāya'* : In the early period of Indian philosophy the term 'Nyāya' was not applied in the sense of logic which was recognised as Ānvīkṣikī. The Mīmāṃsā system applied this term to the established rules governing interpretation of the Vedic texts. Later on the grammarian applied to the proverbs, utilised for the interpretation of their aphorism. That was the age of authority and the discussions were carried within a limit. To question the authority of ancient scriptures was regarded as an act of sacrilege. But later on, when the orthodox and heterodox systems faced each other, the question of violating the authority lost its importance. The word that was coined for the rules of controlling the Vedic injunctions or interpreting the aphorisms of grammar was applied to general rules controlling all types of discussions. Thus, from the religious field it came to the secular field.

The Uttarādhyaṇa<sup>1</sup> refers the term 'Nyāyamārga' which is interpreted as the way to liberation. As a matter of fact it means the way to righteousness. Logic also is nothing, but the way of right thinking.

Like grammar the science of reasoning also is a general science. It has no relation with a particular system or school of thought. But every system has codified the rules of logic in the light of its own metaphysics. Gautama was the pioneer in this respect. He, for the first time, as we know from the extinct works, wrote an independent treatise on logic and codified the science of reasoning in the light of Vaiśeṣika system. This gave impetus to all the systems, particularly the Buddhism, and thus the era of logic was ushered in the field of Indian thought.

#### *Beginning of the Jaina logic : Three Periods*

The Jainas were, more or less, self-centered upto the time

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1. Uttarādhyaṇa II, p. 9

of Devardhi-Gaṇin. They were devotees of their own literature and disregarded the non-Jaina literature as mithyāśruta.<sup>1</sup> But as the time passed, they could not keep themselves aloof from the external influence. The main currents of the era clearly reflect in the works of that period. This state continued upto Siddhasena Divākara and Samantabhadra. As the time passed, the external influence got more and more momentum; till independent works on logic came into existence. We may call this period as the period of creative logic. The second period begins with Akalaṅka and lasts upto Hemacandra. It is the period of real logic. The third period is the contribution of a singular genius namely Yaśovijaya Upādhyāya. He introduced Navyanyāya in the field of Jaina logic and made it up to date. Below, we shall try to give a brief sketch of each period with its contribution to the Jaina logic.

#### *The Creative Period :*

We have mentioned above the certain logical conceptions as expressed by the Āgamas. The division of knowledge as stated by the Anuyogadvāra<sup>2</sup> is a clear influence of the logical period. The Nirvyuktis and Bhāṣyas show a further development in this matter. They have adopted the logical style also. But, as far as the subject matter is concerned their treatment is predominantly Agamic. In the independent literature we see a gradual adoption of the logical subjects also; which have served later on as the basis of proper Jaina logic.

#### KUNDAKUNDA

Kundakuna (Ist cent.) defines pratyakṣa<sup>3</sup> and parokṣa and enumerates the seven<sup>4</sup> categories of speech. Umāsvāti (4th cent.) gives four synonyms of mati which are interpreted

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1. Nandī 41.
  2. Anuyogadvāra 144.
  3. Pravacanasāra I 54-58.
  4. Ibid. II 23

as the four types of parokṣa, as accepted in the Tarka-school.<sup>1</sup> He also divides the five types of knowledge into pratyakṣa and parokṣa, but excludes sense-cognition from the category of pratyakṣa.<sup>2</sup> Thus he adopts the logical terms but interprets them in the way of Āgamas. In the Bhāṣya<sup>3</sup> he mentions the four fold division of pramāṇa, which is a clear reference to the logical conception. The Nandīśūtra (5th cent.) includes sense cognition also in the category of pratyakṣa.<sup>4</sup> The above mentioned works, though refer to the logical conceptions, do not indulge in their discussions. They do not refute the other systems. Though logical influence is clear in them; yet, the proper logical period does not begin with them. The real period of logic begins when we have discussion with other systems, and it gets perfection when the Jaina logic is codified.

The advent of Nāgārjuna (300 A.D.) started a revolution in the Indian thought. The age of tradition and authority gave way to free thinking. Mutual discussion led to deep and systematic deliberation. Apart from the metaphysical considerations the science of reasoning itself became a subject for discussion. The Jaina thinkers, so far indifferent, began to feel their existence in danger. They also felt the necessity of codifying their logic of defending their conceptions from the outside attacks and getting a befitting position in the world of scholars. As the result of this necessity two illuminaries appeared in the horizon of Jaina philosophy. They were Siddhasena Divākara and Samantabhadra. Both of them flourished between 500 and 600 A. D.

#### SIDDHASENA :

Siddhasena, though a great logician, did not accept logic as

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1. T. Rājavārtika I 13
  2. Tattvārtha I 10
  3. Tattvabhāṣya I 10
  4. Nandī 3

the final authority on all matters. He has explicitly recognised its limitations and has expressed in clear terms that logic has no right to go beyond its scope. There are certain matters where reasoning has no approach. Logic can neither confirm nor reject them<sup>1</sup>. They can be known through the Āgamas only. We can compare this view with the Ācārāṅgasūtra, which relates about reality, that the tarka cannot approach it and the intellect cannot grasp<sup>2</sup> it. The same thing is repeated by the Upaniṣada, the Śārtrakabhāṣya and the Buddhist literature of pre-scholastic period. Siddhasena was not a critic of the Non-Jaina systems only. He examined the Jaina conceptions also logically and suggested many changes in the traditional notions. He did not find any difference between Jñāna and Darśana in the stage of omniscience<sup>3</sup>; between *mati* and *śruta*<sup>4</sup> and also between *avadhi* and *manaḍparyaya*.<sup>5</sup> Regarding the theory of knowledge he has attached more importance to the objective side. His three fold<sup>6</sup> division of pramāṇa and distinction between jñāna and darśana on the basis of *nayas*<sup>7</sup> testify to the above. He explained logically that *guṇas* and *paryāyas* stand in the same relation to *dravya* on the ground of two *Nayas*<sup>8</sup>. His contribution towards the theory of *nayas* also, is remarkable. His works : Siddhasena wrote Sanmatitarka, Nyāyāvatāra and 32 Dvātrimśikās as the tradition goes. The Sanmati is an entirely new and systematic exposition of the doctrine of Anekānta; which is the central theme of Jaina philosophy. It has been discussed by Siddhasena in a logical style. He has tried to assign Jaina philosophy a deserving place amongst the contemporary systems of Indian thought; to indicate the relation of

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1. Sanmati, III 43-45

2. Ācārāṅga I 5.6.2.

3. Sanmati II 3.

4. Niścayadvā. 19

5. Ibid. 17

6. Nyāyāvatāra 2

7. Sanmati II, 1.

8. Ibid. III, 10

Jaina Śāstras to other rival systems of philosophy; to discuss other systems arising out of Anekāntavāda ; to interpret the different views and doctrines occurring upto date in other systems from Anekānta point of view; and to base the new currents of thoughts on the broad basis of the established doctrine of Anekānta; and thus popularise them amongst the learned pandits.

The original work of Sanmati, from its very birth came to have a wonderful influence on Jaina literature. From 7th century right upto the present time it has been described by Śvetāmbaras as well as Digambaras as a supreme work of genius. Some have copiously drawn upon the verses of Sanmati in support of their own thoughts. Many have written commentaries thereupon while many others have composed entirely new works basing their own views on Sanmati. Some have written elaborate and profound works to refute these views of Sanmati with which they did not agree; others have enhanced the reputation of Sanmati harmoniously synthesising its views. In short, it can be said that the place of honour given to the system of logic in Jaina philosophy is to a great extent due to Sanmati. It is really the foremost composition expressing clearly the logic of Mahāvīra as the name suggests. The language of the text is Prākṛta. It consists of 167 verses as found in the printed copies of mere text, or 166 as can be confirmed on the basis of commentaries. Like Pravacanasāra of Kundakunda it is divided into three chapters, named as Kāṇḍas. Pandit Sukhlal has assigned these kāṇḍas the names of Naya-Mīmāṃsā, Jñāna Mīmāṃsā and Jñeya Mīmāṃsā in keeping with the contents of the chapters.

#### Dvātrimśikās :

The number of Dvātrimśikās, available at present, is twenty one. With Nyāyāvatāra the number becomes twenty-two. From view point of the subject-matter the available Dvā. can be classified under three heads. First to fifth, the eleventh and the twenty first are eulogies; the 6th discusses the problem of Āpta

and the 8th is a critical exposition of Jalpakathā. The rest are given to philosophy and to the discussion of reality according to various systems.

We are not concerned with the eulogistic compositions. Amongst Dvā. of critical character the sixth deals with the nature of Āpta (the men of authority). It reminds one of the Āpta mīmāṃsā by Samantabhadra and Āpta parīkṣā by Vidyānanda. But the method of their exposition is quite different. In the 8th Dvā. there is a critical discussion of Jalpakathā employed for the sake of rivals defeat and one's own victory. Siddhasena has exposed the hollowness of such tricks of debate which end in sheer fatigue of one's own tongue and sleepless nights for the defeated as well as the victor. Amongst Dvā. dealing with the systems of philosophy and the nature of things the 7th ends with the name of Vādopaniṣad, giving a brief survey of the art of debate, the tricks employed, there and the qualities needed. The 9th Dvā. has in it such a subtle vein of disapproval regarding the Upanisadic doctrines that it is quite possible that it might have been written to refute the famous Upanisadic doctrines. It speaks highly of the deep scholarship of the author and his intimate knowledge of Indian philosophy. Dvā. from 12 to 15 deal with Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika and nihilistic school of Buddhism respectively. Dvā. dealing with ancient Indian logic testify to the profound study of this system on the part of Siddhasena. In the 19th Dvā the famous trinity of Jaina philosophy that of Jñāna, Darśana and Cāritra is first mentioned as a means of liberation. Then comes a very subtle analysis of Jñāna. Incidentally some other philosophical things also are analysed. The subject matter of the 22nd Dvā. (Nyāyāvatāra) will be discussed separately.

The Nyāyāvatārasūtra is the first composition completely devoted to Jaina logic. It is very small in size, consisting 32 stanzas only, but has put all the points relating to the Jaina logic into nutshell. This is why it is called a sūtra. Later scholars have composed voluminous works on the foundation of its

one or other sentences. The whole edifice of Jaina logic stands on the system depicted in it. In certain aspects Nyāyāvatāra resembles Nyāyapraveśa of Dinnāga and in other respects Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti. Prof. Malvania has discussed it by giving ample quotation from the original works in Appendix No. 1 of Nyāyāvatārasūtravārtika. It shows that Siddhasena, though keeping in view the Jaina point, has amply followed Dinnāga in his definitions.

In the Agamic literature the Jñāna and Pramāṇa stand as altogether separate subjects. Umāsvāti combined them by dividing the five types of Jñāna into two Pramāṇas. Siddhasena also has twofold division, but does not follow the Agamic tradition. He takes into consideration the Pramāṇas only. In the definition of perception he includes both, experience as well as intuition. In Parokṣa he includes inference and verbal testimony. Thus, Siddhasena does not follow the Agamic conception of pramāṇa; but that of the Sāṅkhya or the old Buddhists.

Indian logic mainly deals with the four aspects of knowledge, namely pramāṇa, the source of knowledge; pramātā, the cognizer; prameya, the object and pramiti, the cognition. Siddhasena has discussed in the present work all of these aspects according to the Jaina point of view. The definition of pramāṇa its divisions and subdivisions and the parts of syllogism have been discussed in a short but precise manner. He has taken up the question of Nayas also and has tried to refute other systems. He generally follows Dinnāga in the wording of definitions, but at the same time rejects his views of idealism and Trilakṣaṇa.

Some of the stanzas of Nyāyāvatāra suggest to the existence of another work on logic before Siddhasena; but it is difficult to ascertain whether they refer to the Jaina or non-Jaina work.

Siddharṣi (9th and 10th cent.) wrote a valuable commentary on the Nyāyāvatāra. It explains the text in its proper setting and at the same time gives valuable information of the views of



Diñnāga and Dharmakīrti. It can be said, as in the case of many other commentaries, that it is as important as the text itself. Siddharṣi is the author of *Upamitibhavaprapaṇcakathā* and the commentary known as *Heyopādeya* on the *Upadeśa-mālā*, a *Prākṛta* work in verse-form of *Dharmadāsa*.

There is one more point that enhances the value of this commentary, it is one of the few works representing the school of Siddhasena who differs from Akalaṅka in classification of *pramāṇas*.

#### SAMANTABHADRA :

Samantabhadra is recognised as a eulogist (*stutikāra*) by the later scholars. His works are mainly eulogies in the praise of Tīrthaṅkaras. But they are so pregnant with philosophy and logic that it would be wrong to class them merely with the devotional literature. He has criticised all the absolutists minutely while eulogising the propounder of non-absolutism. He has applied the theory of non-absolutism to the Agamic as well as logical conceptions. It appears, that by this time logic had become a separate science and was treated as an independent subject.

Samantabhadra is recognised as the author of four works—

1. *Svayaṃbhūstotra*, 2. *Yuktyanuśāsana*, 3. *Āptamīmāṃsā* and
4. *Stutividyā*.

(1) *Svayaṃbhūstotra* is a eulogy of twenty-four Jaina Tīrthaṅkaras. It occupies very high place in the stuti-literature. Eulogy of every Tīrthaṅkara refers to one or the other system of thought allegorically. (2) *Yuktyanuśāsana* also is a philosophical eulogy. It points out the defects of other systems, and asserts that the teachings of Jina are free from them. The virtues of Jina, it claims further, are not found anywhere else. (3) *Āptamīmāṃsā* is the master-piece of Samantabhadra. The examination of *āpta*, the person whose words can claim indubious validity, is the theme of this excellent composition. External pomp and show, he says, can be found in a juggler

also. Such things cannot make a person reliable. The criterion of an āpta is this, that his views are not contradicted by reason or authority.<sup>1</sup> The absence of contradiction is further ascertained through the fact that his words do not go against the established facts.<sup>2</sup> The preachers of non-Jaina systems are not āpta because their views are contradicted by the established facts.

Samantabhadra also, like Siddhasena, places all the three sources of knowledge on the same footing. He holds that the reason, the experience and the authority possess the same amount of validity.<sup>3</sup> Thus, he rejects the views of the Nyāya, the Cārvāka and the Mīmāṃsā systems which attach more importance to reason, experience and the authority respectively. He fixes the premises of reason where the speaker is not a reliable person and a thing is established through the sign (hetu) only. On the other hand, where the speaker is reliable and a thing is established on the ground of his words only, it is the premises of āgama.<sup>4</sup> Thus, Siddhasena and Samantabhadra, though great logicians, do not recognise tarka as the ultimate authority in all matters. Like Siddhasena, Samantabhadra also devotes his work of the establishment of non-absolutism. He is very emphatic on Syādvāda, the theory of relative existence.

Though he has not written any independent work on logic or epistemology; yet his occasional remarks are a valuable guide to the future logicians.

We can sum up the contribution of Samantabhadra in the following points :—

(1) He fixed the nature of Syādvāda and Saptabhaṅgi, which are the essence of Jaina philosophy; and showed their applicability to all the scholastic controversies.

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1. Āptamīmāṃsā 6

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., 76-77

4. Ibid., 78

(2) He defined *pramāṇa* and its *phala*, which was unanimously followed throughout the logical period.

(3) He defined *Syādvāda* as *Śruta-pramāṇa* and *nayas* as its parts.

(4) He, for the first time, associated the term *Nyāya* with *Saptabhaṅgī*.

The commentaries of *Akalaṅka* and *Vidyānanda*, which we shall take up shortly, have considerably enhanced the value of *Āptamīmāṃsā*.

### MALLAVĀDIN AND SIṂHA-GAṆIN

(1) *Mallavādin* (6th cent.) was a contemporary of *Siddhasena*. He was a great logician. It is suggested that his proficiency in debate brought him the title of *Mallavādin* (The champion-debator). He wrote a commentary on *Sanmatitarka*, which is not available. His remarkable genius and penetrating vision can be seen in his independent work, *Dvādaśāranayacakra*. He has presented in it the theory of *Syādvāda* in the form of a wheel, every absolutistic system representing one spoke of it. In a moving wheel one spoke is turned down by the second and this process goes on for ever. There is neither beginning nor end to it. At the same time one cannot say that one spoke is weaker than the other. Similarly, *Mallavādin* has arranged all the systems in the form of a wheel. One system is disproved by the other. None is weaker than its opponent which also meets the same fate. None is left unopposed. The complete wheel represents the comprehensive view of *Syādvāda*.

*Mallavādin* was a *Śvetāmbara*; yet he was held in high esteem in the *Digambara* circle also, *Akalaṅka* shows a great respect for his *Dvādaśāranayacakra*. He has recommended it for the knowledge of *Nayas*.<sup>1</sup>

(2) *Siṃha-Gaṇin* has written a big commentary on *Dvādaśāra nayacakra*. He flourished not later than 700 A. D.; as he

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1. *Nyāyaviniścaya* III 91

quotes Diñnāga and Bhartṛhari, but not Dharmakīrti or Akalaṅka.

**PĀTRAKESĀRIN (8th Cent.) :**

Another luminary in this era was Pātra keśarin or Pātra-svāmin as referred in many works. He wrote a purely logical work named 'Trilakṣaṇa-kadārthana' refuting the theory of Trilakṣaṇa accepted by Diñnāga, the establishing Anyathānupapatti (logical impossibility of one in the absence of other) as the only criterion of middle term. Nyāyāvatāra also defines hetu in the same manner.

It may be observed here that Nyāyāvatāra and Trilakṣaṇa-kadārthana are the only works of this age which can be regarded as independent contribution to proper logic. Out of them the latter is not available. The other works of this period mainly discuss the principles of Naya, Syādvāda and Anekāntavāda. Pt. Sukhlal and Prof. Malavania have coined this age as the age of the establishment of Syādvāda.<sup>1</sup>

Another scholar of this period is referred as Śrīdatta. He is attributed with the authorship of Jalpanirṇaya. But his work is not available. Ācārya Sumati, with the authorship of a commentary on Sanmati is referred by Śāntirakṣita in his Tattvasaṃgraha.<sup>2</sup> But this work also is not available.

### THE PERIOD OF ACTUAL LOGIC

The contribution of Buddhist thinkers towards Indian logic cannot be overestimated. The history of logic and philosophy is nothing but the history of attacks and counter-attacks between the Buddhists and the other systems. Asaṅga and Vasubandhu propounded the theory of idealism. Diñnāga supported it by refuting the validity of Pramāṇas on which the edifice of realism stood. He was the father of Buddhist logic. Alongwith the refutation of objective realism accepted by the Nyāya,

1. Jaina Sāhitya Saṃśodhaka Vol. 3, p. 127

2. Tattvasaṃgraha p. 379

Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya and Mīmāṃsā etc. he exploded their theories of pramāṇa also. Praśastapāda, Udyotakara, Kumārila, Pūjyapāda, Siddhasena, Samantabhadra, Mallavādin, Siṃha-Gaṇin, Īśvarasena etc. repulsed his attacks and pleaded for their own theories. Then came Dharmakīrti with his unique glamour. He not only gave a befitting reply to other systems but also made some improvement in the contentions of Diṇnāga. Thus, the Buddhist logic got a solid foundation. After that on one side he was supported by Arcaṭa, Dharmottara, Śāntirakṣita, Prajñākara, etc.; who defended him and tried to consolidate the Buddhist position. On the other hand he was attacked by Prabhākara, Umbeka, Vyomaśiva, Jayanta, Sumati, Pātrasvāmin and Maṇḍana Miśra etc. This philosophical warfare continued for four centuries and enriched our philosophical literature with precious jewels.

**AKALAṆKA (778 A. D.) :**

Akalaṇka was the first scholar to systematize the Jaina theory of knowledge logically. He is regarded as the father of Jaina logic. Akalaṇka-Nyāya has become a by-word amongst the later Jaina scholars. He wrote two commentaries and four independent works.

(a) Commentaries :

- (1) Rājavārtika on Tattvārtha
- (2) Aṣṭaśatī on Āptamīmāṃsā

(b) Independent works :

- (1) Nyāya viniścaya
- (2) Siddhi viniścaya
- (3) LaghIyastraya
- (4) Pramāṇa saṃgraha

(1) *Tattvārtha Rājavārtika* : It is a monumental commentary on the Tattvārtha. We have referred to it in the Āgama school also. It covers all the topics of Jaina Epistemology, Ontology, ethics, cosmology and geography. It follows Sarvārthasiddhi not only in purport but generally uses its sentences as Vārtikas

and develops them in the Bhāṣya. It discusses all the problems on the basis of Anekānta. There is no topic or sūtra, except a few, which does not contain the Vārtika '*Anekānta*' meaning that the problem can be solved through Anekānta.

Rājavārtika, as we have already mentioned, is an encyclopaedia of Jainism. Its method of dealing with the subject is logical. It does not propound anything on the basis of mere faith. Its first and fifth chapters treat philosophical problems while the remaining portion is connected with the ethical, geographical and other conceptions prevalent in the Agamic school. Some topics are his special contributions; which are not found anywhere else. Its first chapter deals with the problems of epistemology, specially the sūtras 9-13 and 20-22.

(2) *Aṣṭaśatī*: It is a commentary on Āptamīmāṃsā of Samantabhadra. The name *Aṣṭaśatī* refers to its size being as big as 800 Anuṣṭubh metres. In his dealings with the philosophical topics Akalaṅka is very terse. His style is more suggestive than expressive. It suggests the central idea and leaves other things for speculation. Deep sense, few words and logical acumen are the specialities of his style and they are more distinct in *Aṣṭaśatī*. It is due to Vidyānanda, that we are able to grasp it. Apart from the topics dealt within Āptamīmāṃsā i.e. the refutation of all absolutistic notions, *Aṣṭaśatī* throws light on many more points which were not discussed by Samantabhadra. Regarding the theory of knowledge also its contribution is very important. Akalaṅka discards the Buddhist notion of absolute rationalism, and at the same time the Mīmāṃsā notion of absolute dependence on the Vedas. He establishes the principle of omniscience as against the notion of Cārvāka and Mīmāṃsā, and at the same time asserts that the propounders of non-absolutism only can be the omniscient and not Buddha or the preachers of other systems. In the first Kārikā he proves tarka (hypothesis) as an independent source of knowledge (pramāṇa). The seventh kārikā criticizes Dharmakīrti in his definition of Nigrahasthāna. The thirteenth states

that Svalakṣaṇa as held by the Buddhist is not absolutely devoid of connotation. In the commentary on thirty sixth Kārikā he defines pramāṇa as the uncontradicted consciousness apprehending a new object i.e. not cognised before. The 101th Kārikā defines pramāṇa as the cognition of reality and recognizes simultaneity of jñāna and darśana in the case of omniscient.

The above mentioned two works are commentaries. But they are more important than any original work on Jaina philosophy. They are widely read in the Jaina institutions.

All the independent works of Akalaṅka are devoted to epistemology and logic. This has made him the father of Jaina logic. These works, though small in size, are pregnant with subtle thought. The influence of Dharmakīrti is quite distinct in these works.

(1) *Laghīyastraya* : It is a composite work containing three small treatises (prakaraṇas) viz. (i) *Pramāṇa-praveśa* (ii) *Naya-praveśa* and (iii) *Pravacana-praveśa*. The first book consists of four chapters, the second of one and the third of two. In all, there are seven chapters. There is a small commentary (vivṛti) on them by Akalaṅka himself. It is in the form of notes, some times adding altogether new things to the original. (1) *Pramāṇa praveśa* contains four chapters (i) Nature of Pramāṇa, (ii) classification, (iii) object and the (iv) result. *Napa-praveśa* is devoted to the description of Nayas. *Pravacana praveśa*, though begins with the definition of pramāṇa, naya and nikṣepa; deals mainly with Śruta jñāna; its divisions and subdivisions. *Laghīyastraya* has a big commentary known as *Nyāyakumudacandra* by Prabhācandra.

(2) *Nyāya Viniścaya* : *Nyāya Viniścaya* is exclusively devoted to logic. It appears that Akalaṅka has arranged it in the style of *Pramāṇa Viniścaya* by Dharmakīrti. It has three chapters of perception, Inference and Authority respectively. Like *Laghīyastraya* it also contains a small commen-

tary by Akalaṅka himself. Vādirāja the great logician, has written a big commentary on it.

(3) *Pramāṇa saṁgraha* : It is a sort of supplement to Nyāya Viniścaya containing eighty seven and a half stanzas divided into nine Prastāvas on the following subjects :—

- (i) Definition of perception, Śruta preceded by perception, inference or authority; result of pramāṇa, the definition of real perception and other topics related with it.
- (ii) Memory, Recognition and Tarka as divisions of mediate cognition.
- (iii) Inference and the parts of syllogism with other allied topics.
- (iv) Refutation of the three factors (trilakṣaṇa) admitted by the Buddhist as essential conditions for a valid hetu and confirmation of anyathānupapatti; the different types of hetus.
- (v) Hetvābhāsas or fallacies of the middle term.
- (vi) Rules and kinds of debates.
- (vii) Āgama and the Omniscient.
- (viii) Saptabhaṅgī and naya.
- (ix) Naya and nikṣepa.

(4) *Siddhiviniścaya* : In its original form it is not available. A commentary of it is found in manuscript only. Unlike Aṣṭaśatī and Vivaraṇa, this commentary does not quote the original text. It is, therefore, impossible to restore the original work. The commentary contains twelve prastāvas dealing with various topics pertaining to logic and ontology.

Some other works like Nyāyacūlikā, Svarūpasambodhana, Akalaṅkastotra etc. are attributed to Akalaṅka; but, their authenticity is doubtful.

**HARIBHADRA (813-883)**

Haribhadra lived just after Akalaṅka or must have been his younger contemporary. He was a versatile genius with



allround scholarship. His impartial attitude has brought him a good name in the non-Jaina circle also. No other Jaina scholar, in the domain of philosophy, has attracted so many Indian as well as the Western scholars as Haribhadra has done. His *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* expresses the catholicity of mind.

The old tradition attributes Haribhadra with a fabulous number of 1444 works. Prof. Kapadia has given a list of eighty seven works in his Introduction to *Anekānta-Jaya-patākā*; which can be classified into two categories of independent works and commentaries. We may mention the following works as related with logic or epistemology :—

- (1) *Anekānta-Jayapatākā*. (2) *Anekāntavāda praveśa*.
- (3) *Sarvajña siddhi*. (4) *Śāstravārtāsamuccaya*.
- (5) *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*. (6) *Lokatattvanirṇaya*.
- (7) *Anekānta praghaṭṭa*. (8) *Anekānta siddhi*
- (9) *Syādvā a kucodya parihāra*. (10) *Nyāyaviniścaya*.

The last four works are not available. We can add to the above list a number of commentaries, written on the works related with our subject :—

- (1) *Anuyogadvāravṛtti* (2) *Prajñāpanāvṛtti*
- (3) *Tattvārthavṛtti* (incomplete) (4) *Nandīttkā*
- (5) *Nyāyāvatāravṛtti* (not available)
- (6) *Āvaśyaka laghuvṛtti*
- (7) *Āvaśyaka bṛhadvṛtti* (8) *Caityavandanavṛtti*.

He has also written a commentary on the '*Nyāyapraveśa*' of *Diñnāga* which shows his impartiality and love for learning; without sectarian bias.

His works on Yoga, Astrology, Ethics and other subjects also are held in high esteem. He is one of the few Jaina scholars, who have made a valuable contribution towards secular subjects also.

His Dharmasaṅgrahaṇī is a composition in Prākṛta, discussing the philosophical topics. His Aṣṭakas and Śoḍaśakas i. e. minor works of eight or sixteen stanzas, also are pregnant with philosophical thoughts. His speciality lies in the presentation of all the systems faithfully and finding out a way to compromise in them.

VIDYĀNANDA (9th cent.) :

After Akalaṅka we come to Vidyānanda as a great logician, philosopher and original thinker. He was a profound scholar of all the system of Indian thought, particularly Mīmāṃsā and Buddhism. His style is elegant and clear. Unlike Akalaṅka, he is not a miser in words. His clarity of expression, vast study and deep thinking assign him a very high place in Jaina philosophy.

Vidyānanda wrote three commentaries and six original works :—

- (a) *Commentaries* :
- (1) Tattvārtha-śloka-vārtika with Bhāṣya.
  - (2) Aṣṭasāhasrī or Devāgamālāṅkāra
  - (3) Yuktyanuśasanālāṅkāra.
- (b) *Independent works* :
- (1) Āpta parīkṣā.
  - (2) Pramāṇaparīkṣā.
  - (3) Patra parīkṣā.
  - (4) Satyaśāśana parīkṣā.
  - (5) Śrīpura Pārśvanāthastotra.
  - (6) Vidyānanda Mahodaya.

(1) *Śloka-vārtika* : It is a commentary on the Tattvārtha-sūtra; but supersedes many independent works for its originality, deepness and scholarly treatment. The Rājavārtika is generally confined to the Agamic views; but the Śloka-vārtika indulges in philosophical discussion and criticises the non Jaina systems bitterly.

Rājavārtika is in the form of prose, like the Nyāyavārtika of Udyotakara. Ślokavārtika, on the other hand, is in metrical form like the vārtikas of Dharmakīrti, Kumārila and Sureśvara.

Vidyānanda was a South Indian. He was born in the age when philosophical controversies were ripe. He had to meet the attacks of all the non-Jaina systems, particularly the Nyāya Mīmāṃsā and Buddhism. In Ślokavārtika he criticises the vārtikas of Dharmakīrti, Kumārila and Udyotakara. It is probable that the presence of these three vārtikas might have urged him on to write a vārtika on Jaina philosophy. Vidyānanda does not indulge in unnecessary wrangling of words. His arguments are sound and logical. They make an appeal to the intellect as well as the heart.

Nearly half of the Ślokavārtika is devoted to the theory of knowledge. It throws light on many obscure points and stands as a valuable contribution to the subject. Vidyānanda discusses the topics of Jñāna as well as pramāṇa. Thus, it is indispensable to the study of both the schools. His minute observation, supreme genius, profound knowledge and accuracy of expression have raised the Jaina philosophy to a high position. The Ślokavārtika covers all the topics mentioned in the Rājavārtika and adds many more, meeting the need of the time.

(2) *Aṣṭasahasrī* : Vidyānanda wrote Aṣṭasahasrī after the Ślokavārtika. It is a commentary on the Aṣṭaśatī of Akalaṅka and occupies very high place in the Jaina philosophical literature. It is due to this excellent exposition that we are able to understand the idea of Akalaṅka who is not easily accessible. Vidyānanda brings into light many new points also. It is claimed that "One should study Aṣṭasahasrī only. There is no need of going through many scriptures. This single composition is sufficient to show the heart of all the systems." We cannot say that the above claim is an exaggeration. Vidyānanda has discussed nearly all the new develop-

ments of Indian philosophy. The importance of Aṣṭasahasrī regarding the theory of knowledge also is second to none. It throws valuable light on the distinction between knowing and feeling; the problem of ultimate validity, the question of omniscience and such other obscure topics not discussed anywhere else.

(3) *Yuktyanuśāsanālaṅkāra* : It is a middle sized commentary on Samantabhadra's Yuktyanuśāsana; being a clear exposition of the text.

(4) *Pramāṇa parīkṣā* : It is based on the small treatises of Akalaṅka; which discuss the theory of knowledge. *Pramāṇa parīkṣā* deals with the logical side only. It brings the theory of knowledge into a final shape. The definition of *Pramāṇa*, the divisions, the types of immediate and mediate cognitions; inference; recognition; and the varieties of affirmative and negative hetus, are some of the points discussed in it.

(5) *Patraparīkṣā* : It is a small work on the science of debate. The Indian systems hold different views regarding the parts of syllogism to be applied in a debate. Vidyānanda asserts that the first two are sufficient in a debate conducted for victory over the opponent. But, where the purpose is not victory, and the discussion is carried for ascertaining a fact or for explaining a point to the pupil, all the parts can be utilised according to necessity. *Patra parīkṣā* is the smallest composition of Vidyānanda.

(6) *Āpta parīkṣā* : Vidyānanda has written it after the style of *Āpta mīmāṃsā*. The Digambara version of the *Tattvārtha* contains a stanza at its beginning, by way of benediction. It describes the virtues of an *āpta*, a person whose words can be relied upon. This stanza serves as the theme of *Āpta parīkṣā*. Vidyānanda states in it, that these virtues are found in an Arhat only. Kapila, Kaṇāda, Buddha or others do not possess them and therefore, they are not *āpta*. The superhuman beings like Īśvara of the Nyāya, Brahman of the Vedānta, and other gods like Śiva etc., either do not exist at all, or they are devoid

of those virtues. They also cannot be included into the category of an āpta. Āpta parīkṣā contains 124 kārīkās. The kārīkās from 87 to 109 discuss the question of omniscience.

(7) *Satyaśāsana parīkṣā* : This is an unpublished work, thought to be the last composition of Vidyānanda. It begins with a promise of examining the different monistic systems holding soul, sound, consciousness or mind as the only reality ; the systems of Cārvāka, Buddha, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Bhaṭṭa Prabhākara, Tattvopaplava and non-absolutism; but ends with an incomplete description of Prabhākara. It appears that Vidyānanda could not complete the remaining portion. It is one of the most important works on comparative philosophy. Vidyānanda has composed it after a ripe experience and balanced views. It is unfortunate that such an excellent work was lying unnoticed so far. Its publication would add a precious jewel to the treasury of not only Jaina but, Indian philosophical literature.

The above mentioned four critiques and the two commentaries are a great asset of Jaina philosophy. We can say that Vidyānanda's contribution towards Jaina logic and epistemology is superseded by none.

(8) *Śrīpura Pārśvanātha stotra* : It is a philosophical eulogy by Vidyānanda, like the eulogies of Samantabhadra; containing 30 stanzas.

(9) *Vidyānanda Mahodaya* : It is not available except in references.

ANANTAVĪRYA (9th cent.) :

He is known through his commentary on the Siddhiviniścaya. He has made the composition of Akalaṅka easily accessible. Vidyānanda and Anantavīrya are regarded as the highest authorities on Akalaṅka; but there is a lot of difference between the two. The commentary of Vidyānanda is not merely an explanation of the original text, it is also new contribution. We can compare him with Vācaspati Miśra in his Bhāmati on

Sāṅkarabhāṣya. His works deal with the subject independently and can be classed with original works. Anantavīrya's commentary is merely an explanation. It is a simple and authoritative exposition of the ideas already existing in the original text adding nothing new of its own.

ANANTAKĪRTI (11th cent.) :

He was a contemporary of Vidyānanda and composed three works, which are based on the Siddhiviniścaya of Akalaṅka. His two works named as Laghusarvajñāsiddhi and Bṛhatsarvajñāsiddhi appear to be based on the eighth chapter of Siddhiviniścaya. This chapter is known as Sarvajñāsiddhi. The third work is based on the chapter of Jīvasiddhi and bears the same title. It is not available.

MĀṆIKYANANDIN (900 A.D.) :

Parīkṣāmukha is the only work attributed to Māṇikyanandin. But, it has immortalized the author. It is the first aphorism on Jaina logic. Māṇikyanandin has put in it the logic of Akalaṅka in clear and precise terms. It has two commentaries of Prameyaratnamālā and Prameyakamalamārtanḍa which are widely studied in the Digambara institutions. They serve the purpose of elementary and detailed studies respectively. Parīkṣāmukha exercises a great influence amongst the logicians, both Śvetāmbaras as well as Digambaras. It is divided into six chapters of Pramāṇa, Parokṣa, Prameya, Phala and Pramāṇābhāsa. Māṇikyanandin introduced the condition of 'apūrva' (not already cognized) in his definition of Pramāṇa and thus excluded the repeating cognition (dhārāvāhī jñāna) from the category of pramāṇa. He might have followed Akalaṅka in this respect, who adopted it under the influence of Kumārila. But, it was accepted by all the later Digambara scholars while the Śvetāmbaras did not concede to it. This is the only point in the definition of pramāṇa that differentiates the two traditions. Māṇikyanandin has also criticised Prajñākara for his theory of the effect existing before the cause. Parīkṣāmukha

leaves into the Agamic treatment entirely as far as the theory of knowledge is concerned. It does not refer to the five types of knowledge with their subdivisions of *avagraha* etc. any where. It divides *pramāṇa* into *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa* with their subdivisions as suggested by the logic of *Akalaṅka*, including the Agamic types in various categories. It follows *Akalaṅka* also in defining the terms of syllogism. *Vidyānanda* and *Māṇikyanandin* are staunch followers of *Akalaṅka* and therefore have striking resemblance in their definitions.

**KULABHŪṢAṆA** (10th cent.) :

He wrote a commentary of the *Vādanyāya* of *Syādvāda-Keśarin*. Though the work is not available at present, yet it is clear that it was widely known in the non-Jaina circle. *Durveka Miśra*, in his commentary of *Hetubindu*, refers to him.<sup>1</sup>

**ABHAYADEVA** (11th cent.) :

Abhayadeva has written a colossal commentary on the *Sanmatitarka*. The name of this commentary, according to the author, is *Tattvabodhavidhāyinī*, but it came to be recognised as *Vādamahārṇava* (the ocean of debates) owing to its lengthy discussions and critical style. Abhayadeva shows his talent more in criticising others than in explaining his own views. But, unlike the other critics he does not represent the other systems in a twisted form. He puts forth every thought faithfully. His style is clear and informative. The volume of this commentary supersedes all the previous works on philosophy written by Jaina or non-Jaina scholars. The Jaina literature did not possess any work on any topic of such a big size before it. It is as big as 25000 metres. The gradual increase in the bulk of philosophical work seems to culminate in this commentary. Like *Sanmati* it is also divided into three *kāṇḍas* and discusses those very subjects. The whole of its 2nd chapter is devoted to the problems of *jñāna* and *darśana*.

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1. *Hetubindu* p. 378

**PRABHĀCANDRA (1037-1122) :**

He is well known as the author of *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* and *Nyāyakumudacandra*. The former is a commentary on the *Parīkṣāmukha* and the latter on *Laghīyastraya*. It appears that *Prabhācandra* wrote a commentary on the *Tattvārtha* also. The authorship of *Śākaṭāyana-Vyāsa* also is ascribed to him; but it is not confirmed as yet.

The subject matter of *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* is the same as that of *Parīkṣāmukha*. It criticises all the non-Jaina systems at great length. Its style of refutation is rather destructive. Only a small portion of its treatment can be considered as a real contribution. The remaining portion is merely the wrangling of words. One cannot place it at par with *Vidyānanda* or *Akalaṅka*. Nevertheless, the composition represents the tendency of that age. Its influence on *Devasūri*, in his *Syādvāda Ratnākara* is clear.

*Nyāyakumudacandra* is written in a fluent and clear language. The author has tried to follow *Vidyānanda* and *Anantavīrya* in it, but how far he has succeeded is a matter to be judged; unlike *Vidyānanda* he does not try to clarify his own view but indulges in refutation of others by creating a labyrinth of alternatives; a big number of which is useless.

Unlike *Prameyakamala*, *Nyāyakumudacandra* is not written on any definite plan. The discussion of one and the same problem is scattered over many places.

Dr. S. Mukerji writes : “As regards *Prabhācandra*’s work, they are literally formidable for their abstruse array of arguments and their forbidding language which has neither grace nor literary charm.”<sup>1</sup>

**VĀDIRĀJA (11th cent.) :**

He is known as the author of *Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa*. It is a lucid and scholarly commentary on the *Nyāyaviniścaya*.

**1. Pramāṇamīmāṃsā Introduction.**



by Akalaṅka. Its originality, authenticity and profoundness lies in the numerous references from other systems. No direct influence from any other Ācārya is discernible in Vādirāja. His elegant style, minute observations and clear cut analysis can be seen no where else. He does not say anything which he has not mastered himself. He does not represent the other systems incompletely as is the case with many critiques of opponent systems. He is quite faithful to them also. He alludes to authoritative works only for his references and refutations. His arguments are sound and convincing. We have already stated the arrangement of subject matter and chapters in Nyāya-viniścaya. Vivaraṇa also follows the same.

**JINĒŚVARA (1095 A. D.) :**

He is the author of a Vārtika known as Pramālakṣṇa. It is the first Vārtika in Śvetāmbara literature. It refutes the definition and divisions of Pramāṇa as held by other systems and establishes his own views. This is another work representing the school of Siddhasena.

**CANDRAPRABHA SŪRI (12th cent.) :**

He has written a small treatise known as Prameyaratnakośa. It defines the philosophical terms in a brief form.

**ANANTAVĪRYA (13th cent.) :**

He is a contemporary of Candraprabha. He has written a commentary on Parīkṣāmukha, with moderate size. The work is known as Prameyaratnamālā. Its style is lucid and clear. It is very useful to understand the logic of Akalaṅka in a simple and easy way.

**DEVASŪRI VĀDIN (1087-1170) :**

Though Siddhasena had laid the foundation of the Tarka-school by his composition of Nyāyāvatāra; his views, as expressed in it, did not get much following. No later scholar except Siddharṣi has commented upon it. The independent works that

can be quoted as representing his views, are *Pramālakṣma* and the *vārtika* of Śāntiācārya. There is no other work supporting him by way of a commentary or an independent composition, which can be placed in this gap of 400 years. On the other hand, the logic of Akalaṅka became a by word amongst the Digambaras. He was followed by a chain of successive high-ranking scholars. We can assign three reasons to this phenomenon. Firstly, Siddhasena proposed certain things which went against the Agamic conceptions; consequently, he was opposed bitterly. Akalaṅka did not suggest any change; but suggested only a reshaping of the Agamic theories. So, he did not get any opposition. Secondly, the Śvetāmbaras loved their canonical literature more ardently, as they were in possession of an uninterrupted tradition. On the other hand the Digambaras had lost the tradition of Agamas and had no cause to stick to any one more than the other, on the ground of mere tradition. Thirdly, the South India was a great centre of philosophical discussions at that time. Śāṅkara, Kumārila, Prabhākara, Dinnāga, Dharmakīrti and many other stalwarts of different systems flourished in that part. Consequently the Digambara scholars, who mostly belong to that region, came into contact with other systems, and felt a necessity to systematize their own logic and criticize others. On the other hand the Śvetāmbaras were confined to the tradition of their Āgamas and enriched that literature with various types of works connected with the Āgama-school. By the end of the tenth century they also came into clash with Digambaras as well as the non-Jaina systems. Thus, they also felt the necessity to systematize their logic and refute others.

This is, how Devasūri desired to write *Pramāṇanaya-tattvāloka*. It is a treatise on logic in the form of aphorism. Though styled after *Parīkṣāmukha*, it is not without its own originality. It surpasses the latter in the discussion on *hetu* and many other respects. It contains two more chapters of *naya* and the system of debate, which are lacking in *Parīkṣāmukha*.

It should be stated here that Devasūri also does not follow Siddhasena for his logic. He generally follows the views of Akalaṅka. He accepts the Akalaṅka nyāya with slight variations, and introduced it in the tradition of Śvetāmbaras also. This introduction consolidates further the position of Akalaṅka, as the father of Jaina logic.

### SYĀDVĀDA RATNĀKARA

Devasūri has himself written a commentary on Pramāṇanayatattvāloka, known as Syādvādaratnākara. It is in words of Dr. S. K. Mukerji<sup>1</sup> an encyclopedic work both in size and scope. Its treatment is lucid and elegant. It treasures not only all the developments in Jaina logic and philosophy upto the time, but also records the criticism of Jainism in other systems. His sense of collection is so keen and knowledge so profound that this only work suffices to know all the currents of Jainism, Pt. Mahendra Kumar<sup>2</sup> writes that one need not study Mārtaṇḍa and Kumudacandra after the study of Ratnākara. They are completely covered by it.

Devasūri was a great debator. It is said that he met with Kumudacandra in a long debate on the salvation of women. This brought him the title of Vādin; and he was known as Vādidevasūri. He refutes Akalaṅka in his view of the invalidity of repeating cognition and Vidyānanda in his definition of pramāṇa as power (labdhi).

### HEMACANDRA (1089—1173) :

He was a contemporary of Devasūri. He was born two years before his birth and died three years after his death. He was an alround genius. There is no branch of learning to which he has not contributed. We can mention Pramāṇamīmāṃsā and two Dvātriṃśikās as his works on philosophy.

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1. Pramāṇamīmāṃsā. Int.

2. Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa Int. p. 48.

*Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* : It is a composition in the form of Sūtras, with the self-commentary. Dr. S. K. Mukerji in his preface to the above work gives the following account :—

“The *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* of Hemacandra occupies an important position in the philosophical literature of India in general and in the Jaina philosophical literature in particular. It is a standard text book on Jaina logic and epistemology. It is quite natural that Hemacandra is deeply indebted to the previous writers both of Jaina and non-Jaina schools and a fastidious critic will find in Hemacandra’s texts reproduction. But this need not detract from the merits of the work, since Indian writers do not make a fetish of originality either of thought or of language provided the views expressed therein accord with their philosophical position. The *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* is written on the same pattern of Sūtra and commentary as the celebrated work of Vāḍideva Sūri. But it compares favourably with the latter in that it avoids the unremitting elaboration of arguments and prolixity of expression. It contains all the arguments that are necessary to elucidate a problem and the range of information is not substantially inferior to that of the more ambitious works referred above.”

Unfortunately, this work is not available in its completeness. The extant portion is critically edited by the renowned scholar Pt. Sukhlal; which in itself, has become a valuable contribution to Jaina philosophy.

Hemacandra’s two *Dvātrimśikās* are *Anyayoga-vyavaccheda-dvātrimśikā* and *Ayoga-vyavaccheda-dvātrimśikā*. The former is a devotional prayer addressed to the last Tīrthaṅkara Mahāvīra. But in reality it is a criticism of the Brahmanical and Buddhist systems. The latter also is a eulogy in praise of Tīrthaṅkaras. The former has a commentary known as *Syādvādamañjarī* by Malliṣeṇa.

ŚĀNTYĀCĀRYA (12th cent.):

He was a younger contemporary of Hemacandra. He has

written a Vārtika and its commentary on Nyāyāvatāra. He has refuted Akalaṅka and supported Siddhasena.

**RATNAPRABHA (1181 A. D.) :**

He has written a moderate-sized commentary on Pramāṇa-nayatattvaloka. The commentary is named as Ratnākarāvatārika meaning that it is a small treatise to understand the ocean like Syādvādaratnākara. Its bombastic style sometimes surpasses the limits of a philosophical work. Nevertheless, it is a handy work for the student of Jaina philosophy.

**MALLISENA (1229 A. D.) :**

The commentary known as Syādvādamañjarī by Mallisena occupies very important position in the Jaina logical literature. It is widely read. Like Hemacandra, Mallisena also does not like unnecessary expansion. He deals with every subject precisely, covering all the essential points. It is a summary of the Jaina philosophical conceptions. Its account of other systems is lucid and faithful.

**GUṆARATNA (1400 A. D.) :**

He wrote a Vṛtti on Haribhadra's Śaḍdarśanasamuccaya. It was first published in 1905 by the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal. The work gained a considerable popularity among the eastern as well as the western scholars. It is highly useful to have a comparative view of the Indian systems of philosophy. Guṇaratna is very accurate and faithful in giving the account of all the systems. Its faithfulness can be judged from the fact that it is quoted by way of reference to represent the views of all the systems. At the same time it is so clear that certain obscure points, which the works of those respective systems have left unexplained are easily understood through it.

### **The Introduction of Navyanyāya**

The Indian logic took a new turn with the advent of Gaṅgeśopādhyāya in the beginning of the thirteenth century. He laid

foundation of the Navyanyāya-school by writing *Tattvacintāmaṇi* on four *pramāṇas*. Its commentators like Mathurānātha, Jagadīśa, Gadādhara and others made the discussions so subtle and deep that the old definitions appeared as inaccurate. Later on, the new science was adopted not only by the philosophical systems but in the discussions of grammar and prosody also. Its current was so powerful that no body could claim to be a logician, philosopher or even a grammarian without knowing it. It became an essential part of the debates on all the subjects.

#### YAŚOVIJAYA UPĀDHYĀYA :

By the end of the 17th century, after a lull of five hundred years, there arose a new illuminary in the horizon of Jaina philosophy and literature. It was Yaśovijaya Upādhyāya. He was a superb genius, who drank deep in all the systems of thought and was a profound scholar of all the new as well as the old developments of logic and philosophy. Nothing comes out of his pen which is not properly digested. His account is authoritative, logical and scholarly. His presentation is accurate and clear. His discussion is minute and comprehensive. He does not indulge in unnecessary wordy-warfare to increase the volume of composition. He is precise and to the point.

Yaśovijaya has written on all the topics related with the Jaina ethics, logic, epistemology and other subjects. Pt. Sukhlal gives a list of his works which number seventy two. Out of them forty are completely available, seven are incomplete and twenty-five have been lost. His pen runs with equal force in Saṃskṛta, Prākṛta, Gujarātī and Hindi.

His *Jñānabindu* and *Tarka-bhāṣā* are entirely related with the theory of knowledge. The former work deals with the Agamic conceptions while the latter is devoted to the logical school. These compositions, though small in size, are very important to understand the subject. Yaśovijaya is an adept in diving deep and bringing out the inner essence. Regarding the Agamic views he leans towards the school of Siddhasena. His

Anekāntavyavasthā deals with the theory of Anekānta in Navyanyāya style. Aṣṭasahasrīvivaraṇa is a commentary on Vidyānanda's Aṣṭasahasrī. Nyāyakhaṇḍakhādyā is styled after the Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā of Śrīhaṛṣa and criticises all the non-Jaina systems. Nyāyāloka also comes in the same category. These three works show that while Yaśovijaya could write digests like Jñānabindu and Tarkabhāṣā, he was also adept in writing full-fledged classical works, which are very hard to master. The works having 'Naya' in their title speak themselves of the subject matter. Bhāṣārāhasya deals logically with an Agamic topic; namely, the basis of distinction between the true and false speech as given in the Prajñāpanāsūtra; the remaining works are not related with the subject.

#### VIMALA DĀSA :

We may add to the period of Navyanyāya one more work. It is Saptabhaṅgītarangī by Vimaladāsa. It is a treatment of the Saptabhaṅgī logic, in new style.

#### Smaller works :

We have given above a short account of the important authors who have contributed to the system of Jaina logic and epistemology. Below, we give a list of works, which are minor in size as well as importance.

#### Śvetāmbara Works

Authors	Works
1. Śrīcandra (1150 A. D.)	Utpādādisiddhi-prakarāṇa
2. Devabhadra (12th Cent.)	Nyāyāvatāra ṭippaṇa.
3. Padma Sundara (1675 A. D.)	Pramāṇasundara
4. Muni Candra (12th Cent.)	Anekāntajayapatākā- ṭippaṇa
5. Rājasekhara (1157 A. D.)	(i) Syādvādakalikāṭippaṇa (ii) Ratnākārāvatārikāṭippaṇa (iii) Śaḍdarśanasamuccaya
6. Subhaviyaya (1610 A. D)	Syādvāda-bhāṣā

- |                              |                      |
|------------------------------|----------------------|
| 7. Muni Sundara (1398 A. D.) | Traividyaagoṣṭhi     |
| 8. Malayagiri (12th cent.)   | Dharmasaṃgrahaṇīṭīkā |

### Digambara Works

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|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. Devasena (10th cent.)              | (i) Nayacakra<br>(ii) Ālāpapaddhati                                                       |
| 2. Dharmabhūṣaṇa Yati<br>(15th cent.) | (i) Nyāyadīpikā<br>(ii) Pramāṇa Vistāra                                                   |
| 3. Prabhadeva Svāmin                  | (i) Pramitivāda<br>(ii) Muktiivāda<br>(iii) Avyāptivāda<br>(iv) Tarkavāda<br>(v) Nayavāda |
| 4. Jagannātha                         | Muktiivāda                                                                                |
| 5. Narendrasena (14th cent.)          | Pramāṇaprameyakalikā                                                                      |
| 6. Abhinava Cārukīrti Paṇḍitācārya :  | (i) Prameyaratnamālālāṅkāra<br>(ii) Prameyaratnakalikā-<br>Prakāśikā                      |
| 7. Bhāvasena Traividya                | Viśvatattvaparakāśa                                                                       |
| 8. Vādiraja                           | Vedamañjarī                                                                               |
| 9. Vādisiṃha                          | (i) Pramāṇanaukā<br>(ii) Tarkadīpikā                                                      |
| 10. Śrutasāgara Sūri                  | Tattvārthavṛtti                                                                           |
| 11. Vīrasena                          | Pramāṇanaukā                                                                              |

We cannot claim that the above list is comprehensive. Many new works have come into light as the old collections are perused. The dates are not exact but approximate.

### Two currents in the logical school

One more point to be stated here is the existence of two logical schools to which we have occasionally referred. The first school may be enshrined as Siddhasena-school. Siddhasena, Jineśvara, Siddharṣi, Abhayadeva and Śāntisūri come under this school; while the other logicians belong to Akalaṅka-school. Yaśovijaya supports Siddhasena in the Agamic concep-



tions. But, in the logical views, he follows Akalaṅka. The main difference between these schools lies in the division of Pramāṇa. Siddhasena divides Pramāṇa into three :— Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Āgama. In Pratyakṣa he includes experience (sense-perception) as well as intuition (supersensual perception). This division is more akin to the Sāṃkhya and Nyāya systems, and does not follow the Agamic tradition. Akalaṅka divides Pramāṇa, first, into two, Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa. In Parokṣa he includes all the types of mediate cognition viz., Memory (smṛti), Recognition (Pratyabhijñāna), Hypothesis (tarka), Inference (anumāna) and Verbal testimony (āgama). He coins the name Sāṃvyavahārika pratyakṣa for sense-perception and Pāramārthika pratyakṣa for the intuition; which is further divided into Sakala (complete) and Vikala (incomplete).

#### **Survey of the three periods :**

It can be observed here that the history of the Jaina logic passed through three periods. The first is dominated by Siddhasena, Samantabhadra and Mallavādin. The main current of this period was not the systematization of logical notions but the defence of non-absolutism against the attack of absolutistic systems. The theories of Anekānta and Naya with their identity and difference with other systems is the principal topic of discussion.

The second period begins with Akalaṅka and lasts upto Vāḍideva Sūri. It was necessitated by the attacks of Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti on the traditional notions of the sources of knowledge. All the systems arranged logically their theory of knowledge just to reply the Buddhist attack. The great scholars like Akalaṅka, Vidyānanda, Haribhadra, Vādirāja and Vāḍideva Sūri are the specialities of this period.

The third period is the contribution of Yaśovijaya Upādhyāya. He interpreted the Jaina logic and philosophy in the Navyanyāya style and made it upto date.



## THE GENERAL CONCEPTION OF KNOWLEDGE

### The Dominating Spirit

Philosophy in India does not begin as a science of ascertaining facts but as the quest for values. Fundamentally, it is Mokṣaśāstra, the science of salvation. The theory of knowledge is not an exception. The highest knowledge in the Upaniṣads is the knowledge of Brahman,<sup>1</sup> the knowledge that leads to liberation.<sup>2</sup> Maitreyī discards everything which does not help in attaining immortality.<sup>3</sup> The discussion between Nārada and Sanatkumāra,<sup>4</sup> the distinction between Parāvidyā and Aparāvidyā<sup>5</sup> and the avowed futility of the Vedic lore<sup>6</sup> stress upon the same point repeatedly. It can be asked here, that according to the Upaniṣads Brahman is the only reality and therefore, knowledge of Brahman alone can be claimed as the knowledge of reality, and one may try thus, to assign a logical validity to the conception of Brahman, but this type of notion is a later development, related with the scholastic period. Upaniṣads in themselves did not aim at the logical validity. Their main objective was to show the path to liberation, which they hold, as the only standard of valuation. The Sāṅkhya system promises complete cessation of all sorrows

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1. Muṇḍaka 1.1, 3-5
  2. Īśa 11
  3. Bṛhad 2.4.3
  4. Chāndogya 7.3
  5. Muṇḍaka 1.1.4
  6. Ibid.. 1.2.7; Gītā II, 46

as its chief aim.<sup>1</sup> The Yoga is entirely devoted to the attainment of kaivalya. Gautama<sup>2</sup> in his Nyāyasūtra enumerates sixteen categories and asserts that their knowledge would lead to the attainment of the highest purpose i.e. liberation. In the category of prameya<sup>3</sup> (object) he enumerates only those objects as are important in the attainment of apavarga. The Vaiśeṣika<sup>4</sup> system begins with the interpretation of dharma as the means for attainment of the worldly as well as transcendental wellbeing. Mīmāṃsā,<sup>5</sup> the strict devotee of the Vedas, does the same by explaining dharma as injunction of the Vedas. The Buddhists<sup>6</sup> aim at the nirvāṇa i.e. removal of passions, which are the chains that keep the soul in bondage. The spiritual development achieved through the removal of karmic matter is the main theme of the Jaina scriptures.<sup>7</sup>

The early discussion on the Jaina theory of knowledge also is dominated with the same spirit. The path for spiritual progress, aiming at the final goal of liberation is the central tone of the Āgamas.<sup>8</sup> Knowledge in this period is not valued on the merit of logical validity but as a means for the ethical progress. Jñāna (knowledge) is one of the constituents of the path to Mokṣa,<sup>9</sup> and the knowledge which does not help in achieving that goal is discarded as ajñāna or mithyājñāna<sup>10</sup> (perverted knowledge). The difference between jñāna and ajñāna or mithyājñāna is not objective but subjective.<sup>11</sup> The cognition

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1. Sāṅkhyakārikā 1
  2. Nyāyasūtra 1.1.1
  3. Nyāyasūtra 1.1.9;  
Nyāyamañjarī, p. 428
  4. Vaiśeṣikassūtra 1. 1
  5. Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.1
  6. Abhidharmakośa IV 127
  7. Uttarādhyayana XXVIII, 36
  8. Ibid. XXIX, 59
  9. Ibid. XXVIII 1-3
  10. Nandī, 25 ; Tattvārtha I 32
  11. Bhagavatī 8.2.81

of a samyagdr̥ṣṭi (the person with right view-point) whether it is logically correct or incorrect is always samyagjñāna. Similarly, the cognition of a mithyādr̥ṣṭi (the person with wrong attitude) is always ajñāna or mithyājñāna. The division of 'Naṇi' and 'Annāṇi' in the Bhagavatī<sup>1</sup> and the subsequent Agamic literature is based on the condition of the self being Samyagdr̥ṣṭi or Mithyādr̥ṣṭi.

It is held that the cognition of a Mithyādr̥ṣṭi is no more useful to the attainment of liberation and therefore useless. It does not serve the purpose of knowledge, and therefore, it is no more knowledge.<sup>2</sup> On the contrary, the cognition of samyagdr̥ṣṭi, who is a true aspirant, is always useful for the above purpose; and therefore, it is jñāna or samyagjñāna. The Agamic literature is dominated with this pragmatic attitude.

### Clarification of Some Terms

Before, we proceed further, it is necessary to have clear idea of certain technical terms related to the subject. There is a number of terms in the Agamic literature which express a sense quite different from the one expressed in the logical period or in non-Jaina systems. Below we give a few of such terms :

1. *Upayoga* : It is a general term comprehending all activity related with consciousness. Literally, it means application, attention or coordination of the subject and the object.<sup>3</sup> It is the application of the faculty of knowing possessed by the soul. It is attention of the soul when the latter knows an object, coordination also carries the same sense. Here, we use the term cognition for upayoga. It is divided into Nirākāra Upayoga or darśana (inarticulate cognition) and Sākāra upayoga or Jñāna (articulate cognition).

1. Bhagavatī 8.2.81

2. (Sukhlal), Tattvārthasūtra 1.38

3. Tattvābhabhāṣyaṭīkā II 8.

2. *Darśana or Nirāḷāra Upayoga* : Inarticulate cognition or sensation preceding every articulate cognition is known as Darśana. It should be noted here that darśana precedes the sense-perception as well as the supersensuous perception or intuition. In the domain of ethics the term darśana means attitude, where it is known as dṛṣṭi also.

3. *Jñāna and Ajñāna* : The articulate cognition gets the designation of jñāna or ajñāna according to the faith of the knower. But, in the Nandī and the later literature the term jñāna is also used in a general sense. We have used it in a general sense and have prefixed it by samyak (right) or mithyā (wrong) to show the distinction.

4. *Jñāna and Knowledge* : One more thing to be noted here is that the term jñāna of the Indian philosophy is generally translated into English as knowledge. But the term knowledge implies the idea of truth in itself. It is always valid. The Jaina Āgamas also use this term in the same sense, but in the logical period they are not exactly synonyms. Jñāna of the Indian systems is true as well as false. Wrong apprehension also is jñāna. I have followed the traditional path of using the term knowledge in the sense of jñāna to cover all its aspects.

### The Canonical Approach

*Absence of Proper Definition* : We do not find any complete definition of knowledge in the Jaina canonical literature. Whenever a question is asked, "What is knowledge?" it is answered by enumerating the five types of knowledge.<sup>1</sup> Gautama also, in his Nyāyasūtra does not define Pramāṇa in general; but, goes direct into the divisions.<sup>2</sup> Perhaps, this method was based on the principle that if parts are known the whole would come into light by itself. But it does not mean that the Āgamas leave the problem altogether unexplained. We have mentioned in the

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1. Bhagavatī 8.2.18

2. Nyāyasūtra

introduction the vast literature dealing elaborately with the topic of knowledge. The lack of precise definition is neither an oversight nor a deliberate omission; but a speciality of the period. Systematic logical definition and the development of syllogism were of a later origin. The Upaniṣads, the Piṭakas and the other literature of that period testify to the above. The Upaniṣads express high philosophical thoughts in a simple style. The dialectics of the Mahāyāna school of Buddhism with their hair splitting discussions were rooted in the lucid and direct style of the talks of Buddha. Similarly the highest principles of Jainism have been stated in the Āgamas in a simple style. Precise definition was an outcome of the discussions with other systems. The problem of knowledge has three aspects; viz. metaphysical, ethical and epistemological. The metaphysical aspect is related with the subjective side of knowledge. There is sufficient material in the Āgamas showing the position of knowledge in regard with this subject. The ethical aspect relates with the question of valuation. Regarding this topic also the Agamic view is very clear. The epistemological aspect discusses relation between subject and the object. The theories of direct presentation, representation, subjectivism, objectivism and such others are related with this aspect, which was not so developed in the Agamic period. Still, there are certain references in the Āgamas where one can find the seeds of the scholastic development in this respect also.

We shall try to show some scattered fragments on which the whole edifice of Jaina epistemology is built in the early period of Āgamas.

*Metaphysical Position* : The Bhagavatīśūtra enumerates eight types of soul according to its different states :—

- (1) Dravyātman—Soul *qua* substance
- (2) Kaṣāyātman—Soul *qua* passions
- (3) Yogātman—Soul *qua* activity
- (4) Upayogātman—Soul *qua* cognition
- (5) Jñānātman—Soul *qua* articulate cognition

(6) Darśanātman—Soul *qua* inarticulate cognition

(7) Caritrātman—Soul *qua* conduct

(8) Vīryātman—Soul *qua* energy.

Dravyātman means the soul as a substance, which is responsible for the notion of unity or continuity in all its modes. This is a natural and permanent state. Kaṣāyātman means the soul in the modes of passions. This state is the result of karmic influence i.e. the rise of Mohanīya karman; which continues upto attainment of the twelfth stage of spiritual development (guṇasthāna)<sup>1</sup> Yogātman is activity of the soul carried through the mind, speech or body. It is an effect of the Nāma-karman and lasts upto the thirteenth stage. In the fourteenth stage though Nāmakarman is not destroyed, yet, the movement (yoga) of all the three types does not last any more. So yogātman does not exist in that stage. The two states of yogātman and Kaṣāyātman exist with the souls that are under bondage of the karmic matter. They do not last after liberation. Upayogātman means the state of conscious activity. It is not the effect of karmans. On the contrary it is effected by the removal of karmic influence, totally or partially. Upayoga increases or decreases in scope, according to the thinness or thickness of the karmic obscurance. Thus, this state is influenced by the karman in negative aspect only. It is found in all souls whether liberated or in bondage. It is related with two of the four natural Infinites (ananta catuṣṭaya) recognised as the very characteristics of the soul. Jñānātman, here means the state of articulate cognition related with a samyagdṛṣṭi.<sup>2</sup> Jñānātman is effected mainly by the removal of Jñānāvaraṇīya and Mohanīya. The removal of the latter is necessary by way of creating the right attitude, which is a condition for jñāna. It is also a natural state of the soul but becomes samyak or mithyā according to the action or inaction of mithyātva mohanīya. In case

1. See the chapter on Kevalajñāna.

2. Bhagavati XII, 10

the term *jñāna* is taken in a general sense without the subjective distinction of *samyagdr̥ṣṭi* or *mithyādr̥ṣṭi*, it is coexistent with *Dravyātman* and *upayogātman*. *Darśanātman* means the state of inarticulate appearance. It is caused by the removal of *Darśanāvaraṇīya*. It is also a natural state of the soul and common to all. *Caritrātman* is the state of the soul self-concentrated or turned away from the worldly activities. In this state the inflow of new karmans is stopped and the soul strives for destroying the existing ones. It develops fully when the *Mohanīya* is completely destroyed. According to Jainism, there are two grades of the ethical conduct. The higher grade is called *caritra*, *sarvavirati* or *Samyama*. It is practised by those who have renounced the family life and embraced asceticism. The lower grade is known as *caritrācārita*, *Deśavirata* or *Samyamāsamyama*. It is observed by the layman or *gṛhastha*. In this grade rules of conduct are such as allow concession (*sāgara*). Partially it is *caritra* and partially not. It stops the inflow of karmans in a part only. *Caritrātman* is mainly related to the higher grade. *Vīryātman* is the state of the soul related with energy or power. It is also a natural state but gets its full development when *Antarāyakarman* is removed. It is also found in every soul.

Out of the above mentioned eight aspects the six, leaving *Kaṣāyātman* and *Yogātman*, are natural. *Upayogātman* is a general term for the two states of *jñāna* and *darśana*. *Dravyātman* is the basis of all. The remaining four states represent the four Infinites (*anantas*) which are the very characteristics of every soul. They are infinite knowledge (*Ananta Jñāna*), Infinite Perception (*Ananta Darśana*), Infinite Bliss (*Ananta Sukha*) and Infinite Energy (*Ananta Vīrya*). Infinite Bliss is the natural development of *caritrātman*. The remaining three are the developments of corresponding aspects.

Thus, we come to the conclusion that cognition, with its two aspects of *jñāna* and *darśana*, is a permanent feature of the soul. It is not an accidental phenomenon produced by the external factors. Here, we can notice the difference from the



Nyāya, holding buddhi as an accidental phenomenon, occasioned by the conjunction of certain external and internal causes; and disappearing the next moment automatically and altogether absent in the states of sleep and liberation. According to Jainism it is not knowledge but the obscurance of knowledge that depends upon the external cause i.e. karmic matter. The knowledge is natural. Every soul is omniscient as far as its nature is concerned.

This point is further confirmed by the Nandīśūtra<sup>1</sup> which states that in no state of the self, knowledge disappears totally. Even in the state of Nigoda<sup>2</sup> where the karmic veil is the thickest, a slight portion of knowledge remains unobscured. "If that also were covered" states the Nandī, the soul would become non-intelligent (Jaḍa) like matter (Pudgala)", and it is an impossibility.

The position is further clarified in the following discussion between Lord Mahāvīra and Gautama<sup>3</sup> :

Gautama asks : "O Lord the soul is jñāna or ajñāna" ?

Lord replies : "O Gautama ! the soul is jñāna as well as ajñāna, but jñāna is positively soul."

It should be recalled here that the terms jñāna and ajñāna are used in the senses of samyagjñāna and mithyājñāna. Ajñāna should not be mistaken here, as absence of knowledge. The above statement shows a relative identity between knowledge and the soul. The Uttarādhyayana<sup>4</sup> and the Bhagavatī<sup>5</sup> sūtras state upayoga as the definition of Jīva. Sthānāṅga<sup>6</sup>

1. Nandī 42

2. The kingdom of Nigoda is generally stated to exist in scum on the water-surface. It is the lowest stage of biological evolution. It consists of the minimum degree of consciousness.

3. Bhagavatī XII, 10. 468

4. Uttarādhyayana, XXVIII, 10

5. Bhagavatī II, 10

6. Sthānāṅga 441

specifies upayoga as the characteristic of Jiva. This shows that knowledge is the only factor that distinguishes soul from matter.

*Identity between Instrument and Agent* : Uttarādhyayana<sup>1</sup> describes knowledge as the instrument of cognising objects. It can be objected here that an instrument is always different from the agent. In the case of cognition the soul is agent; while senses etc. are instruments. It goes against the theory of identity between the two. Ācārāṅgasūtra<sup>2</sup> replies to the above objection by proposing identity between agent and the instrument as far as the present case is concerned. It says that the soul is cogniser as well as the instrument of cognition. The conception of this identity is the speciality of Jainas. According to them soul is the only real cause of cognition. The senses, light, object, contact between the senses and the object etc. are only helping causes, required occasionally. They are not essential. The same soul plays the part of instrument as well as the agent.

This identity should not be confused with the Vedantic conception of changeless absolute consciousness or the yogācāra conception of the mere flow of the successive cognitions. The Jainas differ from both of them. They accept neither absolute change nor absolute permanence. Change with continuity according to them is the essence of existence.<sup>3</sup> Cognitions change every moment ; but, at the same time there is some continuity also. The two factors of change and permanence are two phases of the same reality. The idea of the eight souls, as stated above is based on this principle.

*Ethical Position or Value of Knowledge* : The Uttarādhyayana<sup>4</sup> speaks of knowledge as an instrument of knowing the object. But, this is not the dominant idea on which the value of

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1. Uttarādhyayana XXVIII, 35

2. Ācārāṅga I.5.5

3. Tattvārtha V. 30

4. Uttarādhyayana XXVIII 35

knowledge is judged. The real value of knowledge, as has been already stated lies in its ethical utility. There are three virtues that pave the path to liberation<sup>1</sup>; (i) Right Attitude (*samyagdarśana*), (ii) Right knowledge (*Samyagjñāna*) and (iii) Right conduct (*samyakcāritra*). *Uttarādhyayana*<sup>2</sup> adds austerity (*tapas*) also to the above list; but, it is virtually included into the conduct. Right-knowledge, as has been stated before, is not possible without Right attitude; and the conduct is not right unless it is accompanied by right knowledge. Without right conduct deliverance from the worldly miseries is impossible and without perfect deliverance from miseries, no permanent happiness can be achieved.<sup>3</sup> Thus, knowledge plays an important part in constructing the road to deliverance (*mokṣa*).

Right faith is generally defined as the firm belief<sup>4</sup> in the words of Jinas, those who have conquered all passions and have attained omniscience; faith in the efficacy of their teachings as the only guide for spiritual progress and deliverance. The teaching of Jinas is arranged in nine categories<sup>5</sup> (*tattvas*) and six substances<sup>6</sup> (*arthas*). The function of Right-faith is to divert the attention of a *jīva*, from worldly affairs to spiritual progress. As soon as an aspirant gets his attention diverted towards the spiritual progress, his knowledge and all other activities are directed towards the attainment of that very goal, and therefore, become *samyak* or purposeful. Thus the utility of right faith is confined to the diversion of attention only. It is not related with the development of any characteristic of the soul. Right knowledge and right conduct are the real attributes of soul; which increase with the spiritual progress and get their full manifestation at the stage of liberation. This is why

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1. *Uttarādhyayana* XXVIII. 30; *Tattvārtha* I.1

2. *Ibid.*, 2

3. *Ibid.*, XXVIII, 30

4. *Ibid.*, 15

5. *Ibid.*, 146. *Sthānāṅga*, 665

Vādideva Sūri in his *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka*<sup>1</sup> mentions these two only as the means for liberation and includes Right faith into Right knowledge as its necessary pre-requisite. Thus, knowledge and conduct are the only factors essential for liberation.

Further, ignorance (*ajñāna*) and attachment (*moha*) or passions (*kaṣāyas*) are the only vices that obstruct the soul in its spiritual journey. Ignorance is removed by knowledge and attachment by conduct; which induces the soul to self concentration. Out of the four destructive (*ghātin*) karmans, that are responsible for putting obstructions in the development of spiritual qualities, the first two i. e. *Jñānāvaraṇīya* and *Darśanāvaraṇīya* are related with knowledge, and the remaining two i. e. *Mohanīya* and *Antarāya* are connected with conduct. Thus, according to the theory of karman also, only the two factors of *jñāna* and *cāritra* are mainly concerned with the path of liberation.

Out of the twin of knowledge and conduct none can be said, as more important than the other. Both enjoy the same status. The *Daśavaikālika*<sup>2</sup> sūtra states at one place that knowledge has primacy over the conduct, the latter has no possibility without the former. At another place it compares a person of learning, but without practice, with a donkey who carries burden of sandle-wood. As the donkey bears the burden; but, has no share in the wealth of his load ; similarly the person without practice, merely bears the burden of his knowledge. He cannot enjoy the spiritual progress, which is the real fruit of knowledge. The *Āvaśyakaniryukti*<sup>3</sup> states that knowledge is useless without conduct and conduct is useless without knowledge. Thus, the Jaina Āgamas attribute equal importance to both of them.

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1. *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka* VII

2. *Daśavaikālika* IV

3. *Āvaśyakaniryukti* 101

*The Epistemological Function of Knowledge*: For the present our main concern is to ascertain the position of knowledge in relation to its function of cognising the object. The Āgamas do not provide much material in this respect. We have already alluded to a passage from Uttarādhyayana<sup>1</sup> which describes knowledge as the instrument of cognising objects. But, it does not throw much light on the relation between the subject and the object.

Āvaśyaka niryukti<sup>2</sup> defines knowledge as an illuminaer, from this idea two points of fundamental importance come to our mind. Firstly the function of knowledge is only to illumine the object which is already in existence. Knowledge does not create anything new. The Indian thinkers hold three views in this respect :

(1) The idealists like Yogācāra hold that the external objects do not exist apart from the ideas. Knowledge, according to them does not illumine the existing objects; but appears itself in the form of objects.

(2) The Buddhists like Sautrāntika, hold that the thing-in-itself exists independent of mind; but, it is not the object of conception. It is merely perceived. All the concepts are mental creations which are associated with the percepts.

(3) The Nyāya, Sāṅkhya Vaibhāṣika and other realists hold that our senses or mind does not create anything new. Our knowledge only illumines the already existing objects.

The Jainas line with the third conception. They are realist in toto. Every quality, according to them, that becomes the object of knowledge is a reality and as such is already in existence.

The second point, that emerges from the above extract of Niryukti, is this, the objects are presented to the soul directly.

1. Uttarādhyayana XXVIII. 35

2. Āvaśyakaniryukti 1069

The Jainas do not accept the theory of representation as the Buddhist or Sāṅkhya holds.

There are two views regarding apprehension of the object. The Sāṅkhya-system holds that the object is reflected into the mode of buddhi; and the latter grasps that reflection only. It has no direct apprehension of the real object. The Sautrāntika also holds the same view with a different version. He maintains that consciousness assumes the form of the object; which he expresses as tadākāratatā (coordination); and thus the object is not grasped directly. These two systems follow the theory of representation. On the other hand the Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and other systems maintain that the object is presented to the subject directly. There is no other via media between the two. They maintain the theory of presentation. The Jainas also accept the latter view. The doctrine of illumination supports it. As the representation is not illumination of the object itself it is reflection or coordination as the case may be.

*Four Fundamentals* : The conclusions drawn from the above passages of the Āgamas and Nirvyukti can be summed up under the following heads :

(1) Knowledge is identical with the self, but the self is not identical with knowledge as it contains certain other qualities also.

(2) The function of knowledge is to illumine the objects. It does not create anything new.

(3) The soul is the instrument as well as the agent of cognition.

(4) The objects are presented to the subject directly.

These four factors, constitute the foundation of Agamic theory of knowledge, which developed later on in the numerous branches and in huge literature. In the present chapter we shall discuss these points and try to show their further development.

**Full Treatment**

*The Problem* : Yaśovijaya defines knowledge as the special quality of soul; which illumines the object and itself.<sup>1</sup> This definition can be analysed under the following three heads :

(1) Its first part deals with the metaphysical position of knowledge and holds that it is a characteristic of the soul.

(2) The second part is related with the function of knowledge, and holds that it is illumination.

(3) The third part is connected with the object. It is the knowledge itself (sva) and the external things (para).

The Indian systems hold divergent views regarding the above three points and go from one extreme to the other. According to Cārvāka knowledge is a passing phase of the four material elements. He does not believe in any permanent intelligent entity known as soul. Regarding the other two points we have no sources as to ascertain his position precisely. Generally it is believed that he holds the common-place view and attaches more importance to the sense observation, rather than inference etc. But we cannot say that he is totally irrational. His rejection of inference and the other sources of indirect knowledge as devoid of independent validity has a sound logic behind it; as can be discovered from his only available work i.e. *Tattvopaplava sūtra*. Śrīharaśa, in his *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya* has adopted the same arguments to refute the dualistic conceptions.

The Nyāya system believes in a permanent entity known as soul; but maintains that it is not naturally intelligent. Knowledge is a phenomenon; which occurs at the collocation of certain internal as well as external means.<sup>2</sup> As far as the function of knowledge is concerned the system agrees with the Jainas and holds that it is illumination. But, the views regar-

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1. Jñānabindu p. 1

2. Kārikāvalī 57 ; Nyāyavārtika II. 1.21

ding the process of that function are not the same in these systems. The Nyāya is a firm believer of the theory of contact. The Jainas do not regard it essential. Regarding the object also the Nyāya differs from the Jaina. It contends that knowledge cannot illumine itself. Even an expert dancer cannot climb over his own shoulders. The first cognition is related with the external object only. If one desires to know that cognition also, the second cognition is needed, which has the first cognition as its object. Further, a third is required if the second one is to be apprehended; and this process goes on till the cogniser is satisfied and gives up further desire or effort.

The Sāṅkhya maintains that the soul is intelligent by nature. But, it is entirely passive;<sup>1</sup> all activity is restricted to prakṛti. In the function of knowledge also the soul does not play any active part. All the business is done by buddhi<sup>2</sup> which is an evolute of prakṛti (matter) and therefore, non-intelligent<sup>3</sup> (jaḍa). But, it is intellicized<sup>4</sup> through the reflection of puruṣa. This intellicized buddhi, according to Sāṅkhya, is the real<sup>5</sup> cognizer. Regarding the function of knowledge, the Sāṅkhya does not believe in illumination. It proposes the theory of reflection<sup>6</sup> (pratibimbavāda). The object is reflected into buddhi and that reflection is enlightened by the reflection of puruṣa into buddhi.<sup>7</sup> Thus, buddhi is a double reflector.<sup>8</sup> The same buddhi modified according to the reflection of the object is known as jñāna.<sup>9</sup> So, knowledge means, to catch reflection of

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1 Sāṅkhyakārikā 19-20; Yogadarśana, II. 20

2. Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī K. 5

3. Ibid.

4 Sāṅkhyakārikā 20

5 Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī K. 5

6. Yogasūtratattvavaiśārādī. I. 6

7. Yogavārtika p. 22; Outlines Ind. Phil. p. 284

8. Ibid.

9. Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī K. 5



the external object. Regarding the object, the Sāṅkhya holds that transcendental intelligence, i. e. *puruṣa*, is consciousness without any object.<sup>1</sup> It is pure intelligence, mere awareness or sentience. The discursive knowledge, i.e. the mode of *buddhi* also does not have the thing in itself as its object. It apprehends the reflection only. The existence of thing in itself is a matter of inference.<sup>2</sup> Regarding self cognition the Sāṅkhya goes with the Nyāya and holds that the same cognition cannot cognise itself. It requires another mode of *buddhi* where it reflects and then apprehended.<sup>3</sup>

The Mīmāṃsaka goes very near to the Jaina conception of soul. The only fundamental difference between the two systems is that Mīmāṃsā holds soul as all-pervasive.<sup>4</sup> According to Jainism it is coextensive with the body it occupies. According to the Mīmāṃsā, knowledge is a mode of the soul.<sup>5</sup> The function of knowledge is to generate the quality of manifestedness (*jñātatā*) in the object.<sup>6</sup> Regarding the subject matter of knowledge the Prabhākara school of Mīmāṃsā agrees with the Jaina. He also believes in the self-luminosity of the cognition.<sup>7</sup> But Kumārila contends that all knowledge is beyond perception. It is inferred through the quality of manifestedness which is generated in the object.<sup>8</sup>

According to Śaṅkara, there are two types of knowledge, transcendental and discursive. The transcendental knowledge is the soul itself, which is otherwise known as Brahman. It is Pure Intelligence, Pure Existence and Pure Bliss. It is free from the

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1. Yogadarśana, II.20; Outline Ind. Phil. p. 279

2. Outline of Indian Philosophy p. 283

3. Ibid.,

4. Ibid., 303

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Prakaraṇapañcikā p. 63

8. Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi p. 15

three kinds of difference<sup>1</sup> i. e. (1) the difference due to the existence of another object of the same class, (2) the difference due to the existence of an object of dissimilar class and (3) the difference due to the existence of parts in its own body. This means that the Vedānta holds not only the unity of soul, but denies the status of reality to everything else. All external appearances, according to it are illusion. But, when we come to the level of discursive knowledge it also maintains theory of cognition like the other systems. Cogniser, according to this theory, is the soul limited by or reflected into the mind-substance<sup>2</sup> (antaḥkaraṇa). At the time of cognizing an object the antaḥkaraṇa goes out through the senses and transforms itself into the shape of the object.<sup>3</sup> This mode (vṛtti) of antaḥkaraṇa is recognised as jñāna or knowledge.<sup>4</sup> According to Vedānta<sup>5</sup> Avidyā or ignorance has two fold function. Firstly, it obscures the reality. Secondly, it projects new impositions. The Jaina also believes in the theory of obscurance (āvaraṇa) but, the āvaraṇa of the Jaina is related with the cognizer only. Regarding the subject matter the two systems agree with each other and hold that knowledge illumines the object as well as itself simultaneously<sup>6</sup>

According to the Sarvāstivāda school of Buddhism the soul is known as citta. But, it is not a single unit nor an everlasting individuality. It is a composition of many elements. Generally it is split into two parts, the subjective part or the mind viewed as a receptive faculty, is represented by one element called, indiscriminately, citta, vijñāna, or manas.<sup>7</sup> It represents pure

1. Saṅkara on Chāndogya 6.2.1

2. Vedāntasāra p. 10

3. Vedāntaparibhāṣā p. 46

4. Ibid., 29

5. Vedāntasāra p. 13

6. Vedāntaparibhāṣā 262

7. Central Conception of Buddhism p. 15

consciousness, or pure sensation, without any content. Its content is placed in the objective part which contains the definite sensation (*sparśa*), feelings (*vedanā*), ideas (*saṃjñā*) volitions (*cetanā*) and various other mental phenomena up to the number of forty six elements. So, it is that feelings come to be viewed as objects of mind. According to the Buddhism every thing is a momentary flash.<sup>1</sup> So, there is nothing to move towards the other, no contact, no seizing grasping or reflection of any sort. Because, all of these phenomena presume continuity for more than one moment. The phenomenon of knowledge,<sup>2</sup> according to Buddhism, is a compound phenomenon, resolvable into a number of elements simultaneously flashing into existence. According to the laws of interconnection (*pratityasamutpāda*), some elements invariably appear accompanied by others arising in close contiguity with them. A moment of colour (*rūpa*), a moment of the sense of vision matter (*cakṣuḥ*) and a moment of pure consciousness (*citta*) arising simultaneously in close contiguity, constitute what is called a sensation (*sparśa*) of colour. The element of consciousness according to the same law never appears alone, but always supported by an object (*viṣaya*), and a receptive faculty (*indriya*). When we say that consciousness cognises its object it does not mean that consciousness has to perform some function. It simply appears in coordination (*sārūpya*) with its objective elements. It is, properly speaking, doing nothing. Regarding the self-cognizability of knowledge the Buddhism agrees with the Jaina.

The Yogācāra school of Buddhism totally denies the existence of external things. It holds consciousness as a series of reflexes appearing one after another. It proposes that *citta* itself appears into the forms of different objects. So, there is no cognition of the object existing independently.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 37

2. Ibid., p. 35

3. Suzuki, *Laṅkāvatāra*

We have given above some conceptions regarding knowledge and its objective, prevalent in Indian Philosophy. In the foregoing pages we shall examine them in comparison with the views held by the Jaina.

### **The Metaphysical Position of Knowledge**

We have analysed the problem of knowledge into three parts. The first part is related with the metaphysical position. It is a corollary of the problem of reality. We shall give below the Jaina conception of reality and try to ascertain the position of the soul therein.

*The Jaina Conception of Reality* : The fundamental notion of reality as held by the Āgamas is expressed in the three Mātṛkapadas.<sup>1</sup> They are held as mother words giving birth to the whole system of Jaina philosophy and constitute the central theme of the entire Jaina philosophy and metaphysics. Their importance can be further estimated from the tradition,<sup>2</sup> which holds that the Tīrthāṅkaras speak these three words only. The Gaṇadhara simplify them and erect the whole structure of Jaina canons on their foundation. The Sthānāṅgasūtra<sup>3</sup> also refers to them. They are stated in the following order. It originates, it perishes it continues. The Tattvārtha<sup>4</sup> describes them as the definition of reality.

These three conditions of reality are not caused by any external factor. They are natural and the very essence of every existence. Hemacandra<sup>5</sup> explains that everything beginning from the flickering of a candle upto the sky, possesses the same nature i.e. change with permanence.

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1. Daśvaikālikatīkā by Haribhaṭṭa, Gīthā 8

2. Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya Gāthā.

3. Sthānāṅga X

4. Tattvārtha V 30

5. Anyayoga vyavacchedadvātrimśikā. 5

The main ground for this contention is this, that a reality must have some purpose to serve. A reality without any utility is inconceivable. The Jainas do not believe in mere existence as the Vedānta does. The object, which is permanent without any change, or which perishes every moment without any continuity, cannot serve any useful purpose. Purposiveness must have action as its pre-requisite necessity; which is not possible both in the conditions of change without permanence or permanence without change. Action means an order of successive stages of the beginning, the middle and the completion. An absolute permanence cannot have these stages without inviting some sort of change. Similarly, a thing with absolute change cannot go through these stages, as it cannot last even for two moments.<sup>1</sup>

*Categories and Realities*: The Vaiśeṣikasūtra<sup>2</sup> describes six categories (padārthas) and three realities<sup>3</sup> (arthas). It distinguishes artha (reality) from padārtha (category) in this, that the former inheres existence in it and the latter does not.<sup>4</sup> The artha has an external existence and can be perceived through senses or yogic perception.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand the categories are conceptual. They are the analytic interpretations of external and internal phenomena. The Nyāyasūtra admits sixteen categories;<sup>6</sup> whose knowledge leads to the highest good. Vātsyāyana<sup>7</sup> divides reality into the four epistemological types of pramāṇa (source of knowledge), pramātā (cognizer), prameya (object) and pramiti (cognition). It means that the question of reality is related with epistemology while that of category with the spiritual progress. The Jaina also admits the two types as

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1. Syādvādamañjarī K. 5
  2. Vaiśeṣikasūtra 1.1.4
  3. Ibid., 8.2.3; Vaiśeṣikabhāṣya 8.2.3
  4. Vaiśeṣikasūtra 1.2.7; Kārikāvalī, 14-15
  5. Dinakarī p. 40
  6. Nyāyasūtra 1.1.1
  7. Vātsyāyanabhāṣya

tattva or tathya and dravya. Vātsyāyana<sup>1</sup> explains tattva (category) as the true nature of an object. If the object is real, its tattva is reality or existence. If the object is unreal its tattva is unreality or non-existence. The Jainism also holds the same view. The Uttarādhyayana enumerates the following nine kinds of tathyas<sup>2</sup> : Jīva (soul), Ajīva, (not-soul), Bandha (bondage), Puṇya (virtue), Pāpa (vice), Āśrava (inflow of the karmic matter), Saṁvara (stoppage of the inflow), Nirjarā (destruction of the karmans already stored), Mokṣa (salvation). A real faith in these nine categories is known as samyaktva<sup>3</sup> (the right attitude), which is one of the constituents of the way to liberation. The same sūtra describes dravya, guṇa and paryāya as the objects of knowledge which constitute the objective reality.

The Tattvārtha<sup>4</sup> substitutes tattva in place of the tathya and describes their number as seven, instead of nine. It includes puṇya and pāpa in the category of āśrava. The Uttarādhyayana describes the six dravyas as loka<sup>5</sup> (universe). It means that the six dravyas with their guṇas and paryāyas constitute the entire external reality.

In the Nyāya system all objective reality is included in the second category of prameya. According to the Jainism all the three realities of dravya, guṇa and paryāya are included into the first two categories of jīva and ajīva.

*Dravya, Guṇa and Paryāya* : Dravya is defined as the abode of guṇas.<sup>6</sup> The Tattvārtha<sup>7</sup> and the later scholars add paryāya

1. Vātsyāyanabhāṣya p. 2
2. Uttarā. XXVIII, 14.
3. Sthānāṅga, 65.
4. Uttarā. XXVIII, 14; Tatvārtha I, 1-5
5. Uttarā. XXVIII 5-8; Tattvārtha I.4.
6. Uttarā. XXVIII, 6.
7. Tattvārtha V. 38.

also as located in the dravya. But that does not constitute a definition of the latter as paryāyas exist in guṇas also.<sup>1</sup> According to the N. V. systems also dravya is the abode of guṇa (quality) and karman<sup>2</sup> (motion). As far as guṇas are concerned they agree with the Jainas. But, the conception of karman is altogether different from the conception of paryāya. Karman is a motion and exists in the dravyas which have a limited dimension.<sup>3</sup> The paryāya of the Jainas means change which exists in all the dravyas. Guṇa and paryāya are the very characteristics of a dravya.

*Guṇa* : It is an attribute that continues in all the successive stages of a dravya<sup>4</sup>. For instance, consciousness is the guṇa of jīva (soul). It exists constantly in every jīva. It may undergo changes according to the object or the karmic influence but never disappears totally.

*Paryāya* : The successive stages through which a dravya passes are known as paryāyas. The different forms of the soul as man, animal, the being of the heaven or hell are paryāyas. In the case of pudgala (matter) colour, taste, smell and touch are guṇas; but, the different forms of jar, cloth etc. and different shades of colour such as black, white etc. are paryāyas.

*Relative Identity and difference between dravya and the other Two* : The guṇas and paryāyas are relatively different as well as identical with the dravya. Yaśovijaya explains this difference by citing the example of a pearl necklace<sup>5</sup>. The necklace differs from the pearls as well as their brightness. In the same way a dravya differs from its guṇas as well as paryāyas. He explains the identity by citing another example. The gold is not different from its brightness and the different forms of ear ring,

1. Uttarā. XXVIII, 22.

2. Vaiśeṣikasūtra 1.1.15

3. Vaiśeṣika Upa. 1.1.17

4. Dravyaguṇaparyāyanorāsa p. 118.

5. Ibid., 11.12.

bangle etc. which it undergoes. In the same way dravya is not different from its paryāyas and guṇas.<sup>1</sup>

*Difference between Guṇa and Paryāya :* Uttarādhyayana makes the distinction between guṇa and paryāya by stating that guṇas exist in the dravya only, while the paryāya exists in dravya as well as guṇas.<sup>2</sup> Consciousness is the guṇa of a jīva. It is found in all the jīvas. The different states of men, beasts, etc. are the paryāyas. They are related with Dravya. But the different forms of cognition also are paryāyas. They belong to a guṇa i.e. consciousness. Similarly the qualities of colour etc. are guṇas, found in the pudgala dravya. The different forms of jar, cloth etc. are paryāyas of the same dravya. But, the different shades of colour etc. are paryāyas of guṇa.

The difference between guṇa and paryāya can be further explained in this way. A golden jar and an earthen jar are different from each other in respect of guṇas. In respect of the paryāya they are identical. On the other hand the successive states of gold as a ring and as a bangle are different from each other in respect of paryāya and identical in respect of guṇa. Guṇas are related with the qualities of the stuff, which is the material cause of a thing. Paryāyas are different forms of the same stuff. The above example should be taken as a rough estimate only. The difference between earth and gold can be explained as the difference in paryāya also, if pudgala is taken as dravya. The above consideration holds good only when gold and earth are taken as dravyas. The distinction between these two things does not depend upon their forms, which are paryāyas, but on their natural qualities.

*The Above Difference is only Relative :* In contrast with dravya, guṇa and paryāya both stand as differentia. Guṇa distinguishes one dravya from the other dravya and paryāya distinguishes one state from the other state occurring succe-

1. Dravyaguṇaparyāyanorāsa 1.28

2. Uttarā. XXVIII, 7.



ssively. A cloth is different from jar: because, they possess different qualities. This difference is based on *guṇas*. The jar is different from the lump of clay; because, it is a different successive stage. Here, the difference is based on the *pariyāya*. But, it is only a rough estimate. On minute observation the difference between the two becomes insignificant. There is no difference of qualities between two jars of similar size and material; nor they are successive stages of the same matter. Still they are different from each other. This numerical difference is attributed to *guṇas*. But, both of them are two *pariyāyas* in relation to the stuff i.e. clay. The cloth and jar also are two *pariyāyas* in relation to *pudgala dravya*. On this ground one can say that the difference between *guṇa* and *pariyāya* does not hold any sound basis.

The Jaina view is very clear in this respect. It agrees that *guṇa* and *pariyāya* are not two different entities as the *Nyāya* system holds. They are two aspects of the same reality. One is related with numerical difference, while the other with temporal. They are interchangeable in different relations. *Siddhasena Divākara*<sup>1</sup> does not recognise any difference between the two. The *Āgamas* also express both the aspects by the term *pariyāya*. In the Jaina epistemology unity or uniformity is represented by *dravya* and difference, numerical as well as qualitative, by *pariyāya*, *guṇas*, being mainly a differentia, are included into *pariyāya*. But, the difference between the two types of qualities is not negligible. The qualities represented by the *guṇas* are constant. They last as long as the substance does. The qualities represented by the *pariyāyas* are changeable and successive. They appear one after another. Secondly, *guṇas* are the qualities of *dravya* only; while *pariyāyas* exist both in *guṇas* as well as *dravya*. Colour is a *guṇa* but different shades of black, white, red etc. are *pariyāyas* of it. Similarly, taste is a *guṇa* but different tastes of sweet, bitter, sour etc. are its *pariyāyas*. In the case of *jīva* consciousness is a *guṇa*, but different

cognitions are its paryāyas. Similarly, the change of stuff into different shapes or forms is dravya-paryāya, just as the change of lump into the form of a jar. The change of soul into various biological kingdoms also is dravyaparyāya.

One more point that can be raised in this connection is this, that a jar possesses the particular shape just as the particular colour. The shape is known as paryāya while the colour is a guṇa. Is there any reason behind this discrimination ?

The Jaina replies that all varieties, whether qualitative or numerical, related with space or time, are paryāyas. The shape and the colour both are paryāyas. But, there is a set of paryāyas which distinguish one substance from the other; they are called guṇas. The colour distinguishes pudgala from the other substances, but the particular shape does not. It can be held commonly by jīva as well as pudgala. The paryāya is related with different modes or states of the same dravya.

The difference between guṇa and paryāya can be further ascertained on the ground that paryāya is a differentia based on change. It is pariṇāma. Guṇas are not pariṇāma. Out of the three synonyms of paryāya the two, i. e. paryāya and viśeṣa are common to both guṇa and paryāya. The third synonym pariṇāma is peculiar to paryāya only.

**Dravya and Paryāya : A Relative conception :** The conception of dravya and paryāya is not fixed. The same thing pointing to diversity is paryāya and that to unity is dravya. The clay is paryāya in respect of pudgala, as it points to one state of the latter. But, the same is dravya in respect of its substate of lump, jar etc. Dravya means the stuff or material cause, Paryāya means the effect. The same thing is effect in one respect and cause in the other. Guṇas are generally accepted as to continue in all the stages of their respective dravya. Brightness is the guṇa of gold and it continues in all the stages of bangle, necklace etc. When we talk of a guṇa, we mean a

quality that exists in the material cause and continues in its different modes. This is why, *guṇas* are related with *dravya* only. Moreover, *guṇa* does not change with the change of *paryāya*. The necklace and the bangle possess the same *guṇas*. The Jaina does not admit the destruction of all *guṇas* with the destruction of a *dravya* and the emergence of all the *guṇas* a new with every new *dravya*, as the *Nyāya* holds.

In consideration of *pudgala* as *dravya*, colour, taste, smell and touch are *guṇas*. The various forms of cloth, jar are *dravya-paryāyas* and the different shades of colour are *guṇaparyāyas*. When gold is considered as *dravya* the notion of *guṇa* and *paryāya* will change accordingly. Then, we shall not consider the qualities that distinguish *pudgala* from the other substances; but, those which distinguish gold from the other objects. These qualities last as long as the substance subsists. The qualities of colour etc. are eternal because, they are related with an eternal substance, i.e. *pudgala*. The question of gold is different its qualities are not eternal; because, gold is not eternal. Eternity of *guṇas* means only the existence, as long as the substance exists. The difference between eternal and temporary *dravyas* is based on the conception that eternal *dravyas* are not interchangeable. The matter cannot be transformed into soul. The non-existence of one eternal *dravya* as the other is recognised in Jainism as *atyantābhāva*, which is eternal. On the other hand the temporary *dravyas* are inter-changeable. The atoms constituting a jar are liable to be transformed into a cloth. The non-existence of one temporary *dravya* into the other is *anyonyābhāva*; which is temporary.

*The Vaiśeṣika view compared* : According to Jainism the criterion of existence is causal efficacy. The *Vaiśeṣika* does not support this view. It holds existence as a separate category and a thing is existent when it inheres in that category.<sup>1</sup> On this very ground the *Vaiśeṣika* distinguishes a reality from other categories. He holds the first three categories, i. e. *dravya*, *guṇa*

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1. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1.2.7

and karman as realities. They inhere in the category of existence. The other categories of *sāmānya* (universality), *viśeṣa* (particularity), *samavāya* (inherence) and *abhāva* (non-existence) exist by themselves. They are not realities. Kaṇāda calls the reality as *artha* and category as *padārtha*. The *artha* has objective existence. It is open to perception, sensual or supersensual. *Padārtha* is merely a logical conception. *Praśastapāda*<sup>1</sup> observes : They (*padārthas*) have their sole being within themselves and have the intellect as their indicator. They are not effects, not causes, have no generality or particularity, are eternal and are not expressible in the term 'thing'.<sup>2</sup>

According to Jainism the categories also are as objective as the realities. The only difference is that the former have no substantial existence. They are included in the very existence of their respective *dravyas*. As a matter of fact the first two categories of Jainas, i. e. *Jīva* and *Ajīva*, include the entire world of reality. The remaining seven categories are different phenomena related with the soul and its progress towards the final goal. They are not logical but ethical categories. The categories of the *Vaiśeṣika* are important in the field of epistemology. We cannot conceive an object without them. But, the Jaina categories have no bearing on the problem of epistemology. They are related with the ethical position of the soul.

According to the *Vaiśeṣika*, *guṇa* and *karman* inhere in the *Dravya*. According to Jainism they are related in the relation of identity-in-difference. The *Vaiśeṣika* holds them as separate entities; which inhere in the existence. According to Jainism they are not totally separate from *dravya*. *Guṇa* and *pariyāya* along with *dravya* constitute the three objective aspects of the same reality. According to *Vaiśeṣika*, the first moment of a *dravya* is free from *guṇa* and *karman*; according to Jainism they are the very ingredients of a reality.

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1. *Praśastapādabhāṣya* p. 19

2. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*. 1.1 4 and 8 2.3.

*Epistemological Function of Guṇas* : The term dravya is used in two senses. In ontology it means the substance or reality which has guṇa and paryāya as its other two aspects. In the field of epistemology it means the concept, which is responsible for the idea of generality or continuity. Below, we propose to discuss the epistemological significance of all the three.

Generally, it is held that a quality distinguishes one class or person from the other class of person. It is the differentia, on which the classification of substances is based. But, on examination we can see that it is the basis of uniformity also. It differentiates one class from the other; at the same time unites two or more members of the same class with one another and groups them together into one unit. For instance, consciousness is a quality of the soul. It distinguishes the intelligent existents from the non-intelligents; but, at the same time shows a uniformity amongst all the living beings. Thus, guṇas perform the double function of pointing out the difference as well as the unity. But, this doubleness does not mean that guṇas contain two different natures. Both functions are carried by the same nature. They are two sides of one and the same category. The positive side is related with unity; while the negative with discrimination.

In relation to paryāyas, qualitative as well as numerical, guṇas serve as the uniting link and show the existence of a substantial continuity. The same soul passes through many modes of divine, human, beastly or hellish kingdoms, but still there is a substantial continuity in all of them. This continuity is based on the consciousness, which is a quality of the soul. We recognise all these stages of qualitative modes, occurring successively in the same person as soul, on account of consciousness. Similarly, in different persons also the uniformity of being soul is understood on the basis of consciousness. Corporeality (rūpitva) inter-links all the successive stages as well as the different numerical units of table, chair, jar etc. related with the same material stuff.

*Two stand-points based on Dravya and Paryāya* : The Jainism maintains seven stand-points<sup>1</sup> (nayas), according to which a thing is judged. The first three of them are Dravyārthika-nayas and the remaining four are Paryāyārthika-nayas. Dravyārthika-nayas point to universality while Paryāyārthikas to particularity. The first group carries the idea of one in many and the second that of many in one. These two stand-points do not contradict each other but represent two aspects of the same reality.

Each of the ideas of generality and particularity can be further discussed in two<sup>2</sup> relations i. e. (i) in relation to time and (ii) in relation to number. The same clay undergoes many successive stages of lump, jar etc. The idea of the unity of clay in all these stages is based on vertical universality (ūrdhvatā-sāmānya). It generates the idea of unity in many successive stages of the same object. The units that are linked together by this universality are not simultaneous but exist one after another. The experience of cowness in all the numerically different units of cows is due to horizontal universality (tiryaksāmānya). Individual cows though different in number, possess a uniting link of cowness. Corresponding to these two types of universality there are two types of particularity also. Both types of universality are presented by dravya. A reality is called dravya both when it stands as one in all the temporally or numerically different units. The stand-point representing dravya is known as the dravyārthika-naya. In the case of particularity the successive stages of temporal diversity is represented by paryāya and that of space or number is represented by guṇa. But, the stand-point representing the both, guṇa as well as paryāya is Paryāyārthika. There is no Guṇārthika. This means that paryāya is a comprehensive term which includes both types of difference. There are many references in

1. Anuyogadvāra 139

2. Prameyakamalamārtanḍa, p. 466

the Āgamas, where numerical diversity also is expressed as paryāya.<sup>1</sup>

We meet with numerous instances where the above stand-points are expressed in both the aspects.<sup>2</sup> When all the six categories of Dharma, Adharma, Ākāśa, Pudgala, Jīva and Kāla are considered as dravya or loka it is a case of horizontal universality.<sup>3</sup> The statement of the Sthānāṅgasūtra<sup>4</sup> expressing the soul, the universe, the knowledge and many other things as one also stands in the same class. The Bhagavatī and Prajñāpanāsūtras mention many stages of jīva and pudgala. They are the instances of vertical universality.<sup>5</sup>

*The Vertical Universality and the Notion of Oneness :* We have stated above that the substance or dravya is recognised as horizontal universality in contrast with numerical difference and it is vertical universality in contrast with temporal diversity. In both the cases it generates the notion of oneness. As far as the vertical universality is concerned the systems of Nyāya and Jainism agree with each other. Both of them hold that the universality which continues in the successive stages unites them and generates the notion of oneness. But, in the case of horizontal universality the tarka-school of the Jainas holds a slightly different view. It maintains that the latter does not generate the notion of oneness but that of similarity<sup>6</sup>; while the Naiyāyika holds that the universality of cowness (gotva) is one in all the temporally or numerically different units of cows. The Jaina Āgamas also differ from the tarka-school in this respect. They hold that both varieties of the universality produce the notion of oneness. We have mentioned

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1. Bhagavatī 25.5 and 25.2; Prajñāpanā 5

2. Ibid. 7.2.273; 14.4.512; 18.10

3. Sthānāṅga 458

4. Ibid., 1-2

5. Bhagavatī 14.4; Prajñāpanā 13

6. Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa, p. 467

## *The General Conception of Knowledge*

above, the Sthānāṅgasūtra expressing the soul as one.<sup>1</sup> Samantabhadra also states all things as one on the basis of existence.<sup>2</sup> There is no reason why the one type of universality should generate the idea of oneness and the other that of similarity. Nothing can unite two other things which itself is not one. Two links would require another link for their own unity. If the link is one and exists in both of them why the united members should not be admitted as one in relation to that link?

Dr. S. Mukerji gives the following remarks on it : “According to Akalaṅka, Vidyānanda and later logicians upto Yaśovijaya, universality is rather a qualitative aspects of the individuals, numerically different in different individuals. The unity of universals is set forth as more or less a conceptual figment, which they seek to equate with similarity. Individuals belonging to a class are similar to one another and the similarity though numerically different, is accorded the status of universal. Thus the universal *qua* similarity is numerically different discrete in different individuals and so the universal as a unitive self identical principle asserted to be an ontological fiction.”<sup>3</sup>

We may assign one reason to the above differentiation. Ontologically, the numerical difference is permanent. The number of atoms or the souls will remain the same as it is or as it was. No individual atom or soul-unit loses its individuality, inspite of phenomenal modifications. On the other hand the temporal state is not a permanent feature. It appears and disappears leaving nothing behind. The individuality of a state is not permanent individuality. So, it does not obstruct the idea of oneness which is related with a permanent aspect. The individuality related with number is a permanent individuality. It does stand as an obstruction in the idea of oneness. So, in this case the universality means similarity and not unity.

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1. Sthānāṅga 1
  2. Āptamīmāṃsā
  3. Non-Absolutism



**Classification of Reality**

We have understood the nature of reality, also known *dravya*,<sup>1</sup> with its two aspects of *guṇa* and *paryāya*. Now we come to its division. The *Bhagavati*, *Sthānāṅga*, *Samavāyaṅga* and *Anuyogadvāra* divide it into two<sup>2</sup> : *Jīva* (soul) and *ajīva* (not-soul). We can compare this division with the *Sāṅkhya* conception of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*. But the two systems differ in the line of demarcation. According to Jainism the psychological functions of knowing, feeling and willing belong to *Jīva*, while according to *Sāṅkhya* they are the functions of *Prakṛti*. We shall point out other differences between the two systems later on. *Ajīva* has been further divided into five *dravyas*, but, at present we are not concerned with that division.

There are four views regarding the division of reality. According to the materialistic view the whole universe is composed of matter only and ultimately there is no distinction between the conscious and unconscious existences. The very combination of certain material elements produces consciousness and there is no eternal entity known as the self. Modern scientist also holds the similar view, but it maintains that the primary stuff of which the world is composed, cannot be classed either as matter or as mind.

Russell says, "The stuff of which the world of our experience is composed, is, in my belief, neither mind nor matter; but, something more primitive than either. Both mind and matter seem to be composite, and the stuff of which they are compounded lies in a sense between the two, in a sense above them both, like a common ancestral".<sup>3</sup>

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1. *Bhagavati* 1.8.9 : *Tattvārtha* 5.29

2. *Bhagavati* 7.10.305; *Sthānāṅga* 251; *Samavāya* 149;  
*Anuyoga* 141

3 . *Analysis of Mind* p. 10

James views that the raw material out of which the world is built up is not of two sorts, one matter and the other mind, but that it is arranged in different patterns by its interrelations, and that some arrangements may be called mental, while others may be called physical.<sup>1</sup>

In Indian philosophy there is the well-known school of Cārvāka which holds matter as the ultimate cause of the sentient and insentient world. This conception is as old as the history of thought. The Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtra refers to it that a certain class of Śramaṇas and Brāhmaṇas maintain that this world is composed of earth, water, fire, air and ether. The soul originates from the combination of these elements and perishes in them.<sup>2</sup> Bṛhadāraṇyaka also states the same fact.<sup>3</sup> There is another materialistic school described in the Sūtrakṛtāṅga which holds that this body is identical with the soul, or the soul is not different from the body.<sup>4</sup> Another materialist is described as holding four elements only.<sup>5</sup> In the Buddhist scriptures Ajitakeśakambalin is stated to hold that this man comes from four material elements and perishes therein. There is no eternal soul lasting after the body and taking another birth.<sup>6</sup>

The second view, on the other extreme, is held by the idealists holding the mind or spirit as the only fundamental principle of reality, which splits itself into the world of objects and the world of minds as its necessary stages of development or self-expression. So that, the finite minds and objects are not two essentially different realities without community; but, are essentially the same in kind.

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1. Analysis of Mind
  2. Sūtrakṛtāṅga 1.1.1.7-8
  3. Bṛhadāraṇyaka 2.4.12
  4. Sūtrakṛtāṅga 1.1.1.11-12
  5. Ibid., 1.1.1.18
  6. Brahmajālasutta

The above is the general formulation of Absolute Idealism accepted by Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhaver, Bradley, Bosanquet and Royce; all of whom agree in holding the entire universe as rooted in one universal Mind, Spirit, Will, Experience or Self and that the mind of man is of the essence of this universal spiritual principle and, therefore, shares in its spiritual qualities though on finite scale, but has the potentiality of infinitude. Instead of being absorbed by matter or being an accompaniment of it, mind is the primordial stuff of which all else is made.

In the Indian systems Advaita Vedānta and the Yogācāra school of Buddhism believe in consciousness or mind as the ultimate stuff or the only reality.

The third view is represented by the Descartes, Locke and Kant etc. who hold mind and matter as the two ultimate realities. In the Indian systems this view is held by the Sāṅkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā and Jainism. They hold that the reality is divided ultimately into two groups viz., intelligent and non-intelligent. These systems hold soul as a separate and ultimate entity quite distinct from the matter.

The fourth view is proposed by the nihilist holding that there is no ultimate reality at all. The world is mere phenomenal appearance having no real substratum.

### **The Āgamic Treatment of Soul**

#### **Metaphysical Evolution**

The Jaina Āgamas discuss the problem of soul in three aspects. The first aspect is known as Jīva-Samāsa (classes of souls). It divides the soul on the basis of different bodies obtained in the different kingdoms, and expresses the evolution of life. The second aspect is known as Mārgaṇā (soul-quest). It comprises of other inner differences in species, sex, passion, knowledge, conation in the embodied condition of the soul. The third aspect is Guṇasthāna (spiritual stages). It discusses the inner progress of the soul, and describes the stages of the

soul from ignorance and delusion to the state of perfection.

(1) *Jīva-Samāsa (Soul classes)* : From protoplasm of the germ-cell to a full-blown human being, there is an infinite number of mundane souls or living beings in the universe. The protoplasm has no senses other than the touch. The human beings have all the five senses and the mind. The beings that come in middle of these limits possess two, three, four or all the five senses. Thus, they can be divided into six classes :— The evolution of senses occurs in the order of the senses of touch, taste, smell, sight and hearing. The mind comes at the last. The one-sensed beings will have the sense of touch only. The two-sensed will have those of the touch and the taste. The three sensed will have the sense of smell also. The four-sensed gets one more, i.e. the sense of sight. The five-sensed have all the five. Some of them possess mind while the others do not. Those with mind are known as *saṃjñīns* while others are *asaṃjñīns*. All the animals having less than five senses are *asaṃjñīns*; while the five-sensed are both *saṃjñīns* as well as *asaṃjñīns*. The one-sensed beings are again divided into fine (*sūkṣma*) and gross (*bādhara*). They have another division of *Pratyeka* (one soul with one body) and *sādhāraṇa* (many souls with one body). One-sensed animals are further divided into five kingdoms of earth, water, fire, air and vegetables.

Some mundane souls when attacked or in fear of something or some one, can voluntarily move from one place to the other place. A man attacked with a sword can run away. Similar is the case with many other beings like dogs, ants etc. But a tree cannot move from its place. The ability to move voluntarily from one place to the other place divides the souls into two classes of Mobiles (*trasa*) and Immobiles (*sthāvara*). All the one-sensed animals are immobiles. According to another view, fire and air are mobiles. All the animals having more senses are mobiles.

There are four kingdoms through which the soul passes. The three kingdoms of hell, human beings and divine beings possess generally all the five senses with mind. In the sub-

human kingdoms we have all the six stages, beginning from the one-sensed animals, going upto the saṃjñāns.

The kingdom of hell is divided into seven narakas; where the beings suffer the result of their sins. The division of sub-human kingdoms is already shown above. The human kingdom is divided into Karmabhūmi and Bhogabhūmi. The inhabitants of Karmabhūmi are engaged in three kinds of profession for their livelihood i. e. the profession of fighting (*asi*), the profession of education (*masi*) and the profession of cultivation (*kr̥ṣi*). They have fifteen islands to dwell in. The inhabitants of Bhogabhūmis do not adopt a profession for their livelihood. Their requirements are supplied by trees. They have thirty dwellings. In addition to it there are fifty-six antardvīpas (the islands in the ocean). They also are bhogabhūmis. There are fifteen places of the spontaneous birth of human species; who are without mind and do not get full development. They are called sammūrcchima, projected spontaneously without the sexual intercourse. The inhabitants of divine kingdom are divided into four classes of Bhavanapatis, Vāṇavyantaras, Jyotiṣkas and Vaimānikas. In Navatattva jīvas are divided into 563 varieties. This division is generally based on the Prajñāpanāsūtra. In the Digambara literature the same is found in Jivakāṇḍa of Gommatasāra.

(2) *Mārgaṇās (Soul-quests)* : There are fourteen mārgaṇās or the ways in which we search the mundane souls :—

(i) *Gati* (kingdoms or conditions of existence) : They are four in number; viz. Naraka (hellish kingdom), Tiryac (sub-human kingdom); Manuṣya (human kingdom) and Deva (divine kingdom).

(ii) *Indriya* : (Sense-quest) : It is divided into five types of beings having one, two, three, four or five senses.

(iii) *Kāya* (groups or classes) : There are six kāyas comprising one each of the five types of one-sensed animals and one of the trasas; two-sensed and onwards.

(iv) *Yoga* (vibration) ; The vibration of body mind and speech is known as yoga. It has fifteen types. The vibrations of mind and speech have the following four varieties each :

- |               |   |                       |
|---------------|---|-----------------------|
| 1. Satya      | — | true                  |
| 2. Asatya     | — | false                 |
| 3. Miśra      | — | a mixture of the both |
| 4. Asatyamṛṣā | — | neither of the two    |

The vibration of body i.e. *kāyayoga* has seven varieties. The Jainas hold five types of bodies :

(i) *Audārika Śarīra*—the gross body of the animals of human and sub-human kingdoms ; which contains flesh and blood.

(ii) *Vaikriya Śarīra* — Astral body of the beings of hellish and divine kingdoms : and also the Yogic bodies in the human kingdom. They are free from flesh and blood and can be transformed into various forms.

(iii) *Āharaka Śarīra*—The assimilative overflow : a man-like white form of one cubit with soul units emanated by a saint from his head.

(iv) *Taijasa Śarīra*—The electric body.

(v) *Kārmaṇa Śarīra* —The karmic body. The first three bodies individually and mixed comprise two varieties of *kāyayoga* each. The seventh type consists of karmic body.

(vi) *Veda* —Three types of sexual desires related with the male, female and the third (hermaphrodite).

(vii) *Kaṣāya* (Passions)—They have twenty-five types i.e. the four types of Anger, conceit, crookedness, and Greed multiplied into four degrees of each, and nine *nokaṣāyas* (non-passions).

(viii) *Jñāna*—Eight types of knowledge : five *jñānas* and three *ajñānas*,

(ix) *Saṁyama*—Five varieties of self-restraint.

(x) *Darśana*—Four types of inarticulate cognition.

(xi) *Leśyā*—Six types of thought intensity, expressed through six types of colour.

(xii) *Bhavyatva*—Capability of attaining liberation.

(xiii) *Samyaktva*—Faith, right, wrong or mixed.

(xiv) *Samjñā*—Rationality.

(xv) *Āhāra*—Assimilation of diet,

(3) *Guṇasthānas* (Spiritual stages) : There are fourteen spiritual stages showing the progress of soul. We shall discuss them in the chapter of *Kevalajñāna*.

### **The Self, Consciousness and Cognition : a comparative view**

We have stated above knowledge at the main feature that distinguishes one class of reality from the other. The class which possesses it is recognized as intelligence, soul, spirit or the self, while the other as non-intelligent, non-soul, matter or body. The question of knowledge, apart from its logical or epistemological considerations, has three aspects.

(i) The first aspect is, whether there is any permanent entity as the abode of knowledge.

(ii) The second is related with knowledge as a faculty.

(iii) The third is concerned with knowledge as cognition or function.

We shall discuss these three aspects in the foregoing pages and have a comparative view.

#### *The Materialistic view :*

The materialist, known as *Cārvāka* in Indian philosophy, maintains that the whole Universe is composed of four elements, and believes in perception as the only source of knowledge. The other sources are either invalid or secondary. They cannot claim interdependent validity. The apparent world can be divided into physical bodies, senses and the lifeless objects. All of them are compositions of the four elements. Consciousness also is an outcome of them when transferred

into the physical body. Though individual elements do not consist of that power; yet, their combination does; just as a peculiar mixture of certain herbs produces the power of intoxication, or the mixture of white and yellow produces red colour. This conception of the materialist is found in the oldest scriptures of all the Indian systems. The Sūtrakṛtāgñasūtra and Brahmajālasūtra state many varieties of them. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad describes the materialist conception as follows :—

“The mass of consciousness rising from these material elements disappears into them. There is no consciousness after death.”<sup>1</sup>

There are two views regarding the emergence of consciousness. Some hold that it is produced as something new while others maintain that it is only a manifestation of the thing which was lying dormant in the constituent elements.

It is generally argued against the Cārvāka, if there is no eternal soul taking successive births and having consciousness as its characteristic, why there is a difference in the status. Some persons are happy while others miserable. This cannot be explained without admitting previous life. To this Cārvāka replies that this difference does not necessarily imply the existence of previous life and a permanent soul. The difference in status is just like bubbles in the ocean. There is no ethical cause behind it. The lack of certain element in the body hampers its full development. The result is diseases and other miseries. All the phenomena of happiness and misery have physical or material causes at their root.

The idea of ‘I’ness also cannot prove the existence of a separate self. It is related with the body just as in the case of ‘I am fat.’ Moreover, all the activities attributed to the self are invariably connected with the body. We do not see anything which can postulate a separate existence of the self. There is

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1. Bṛhadāraṇyaka



no reason to discard the visible cause and postulate invisible one, whose existence cannot be otherwise proved.

It can be argued; if the four elements are sufficient to manifest or produce the power of consciousness, why it is not generated in jar etc.

The Cārvāka replies that it depends upon the peculiar combination of elements as it is in the case of intoxicant herbs. Only a peculiar variety of herb, compounded in a peculiar way can produce intoxication and not otherwise; similarly the elements put in a peculiar way with a definite proportion and combination can generate the power of consciousness.

#### *The Materialist view criticized*

Vidyānanda<sup>1</sup> advances the following arguments against the materialist theory :

The existence of the self is proved on the basis of introspection. Every body feels. "I am happy"; "I know" "I desire" etc. This notion of 'I' refers to the self without any contradiction or doubt. This should not be confused with the physical reference of 'I am fat'. Introspection is internal appearance while the latter is external. There is a clear distinction between the two appearances of 'I am fat' and 'I am happy'. The former depends upon the external senses while the latter is purely mental. Secondly, the introspection is always followed by 'I' representing to something internal while the physical cognition appears as 'this' also, and refers to something external. Thirdly, the object of introspection is confined to the individual. Caitra cannot perceive the pleasure or pain of Maitra. But the object of external appearance is common to every-body. The fatness of Caitra can be seen by Maitra as good as by Caitra. These factors show a clear line of demarcation between the two. The experiences of 'I am fair coloured, I am fat' etc., on the basis of which the Cārvāka tries to connect the notion of I with the

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1. T. Ślokavārtika, p. 28-31.

body, are not introspections; as they depend on external senses. They refer to something external and they are not personal.

Moreover, the soul and the body are separate entities as they are different in nature like fire and water. The nature of the soul is consciousness, while that of body is tangibility. The soul is self-luminary and incorporeal. The body is cognised by something other than itself and it is corporeal.

The separateness of the self from the body is further proved on the basis of their different cognizability. The self is experienced internally through introspection while the body is known externally through senses. If the self is accepted as a product of the physical elements it should be the object of senses. Though, the cognition of the external objects also is assisted by the mind; yet mind is not the only instrument there. The mind does not work there until the object is presented by the senses. In the case of soul external senses are helpless.

Moreover, the consciousness according to Cārvāka, is either manifestation of the physical elements or their production. In the first case the soul is automatically proved as an eternal entity. Manifestation implies that it is not actually produced. One can say that manifestation is not necessarily a contradictory to production. A jar is produced as well as manifested. The Jaina replies that the jar is manifested only when it has been already produced. It is not manifested in respect of its existence. Manifestation is related with its appearance only. But, the consciousness if accepted manifested in all cases it cannot be held as generated, and the factor of always manifestedness would prove the self of consciousness as an eternal entity separate from the body and physical elements.

The second alternative that the elements produce consciousness also does not stand the logical test. In this case the elements are either material cause (upādāna karaṇa) of consciousness or the auxiliary cause (nimitta karaṇa). In the latter case, one will have to seek for the material cause some where else;

without which the auxiliary causes have nothing to operate upon. They are helpless. Where, the visible material cause is not found we have to postulate invisible one, as in the case of sound and lightening etc. In the case of sound the different parts of mouth are auxiliary causes, giving articulation to the sound; but they are not the stuff of which the sound is constituted. We, therefore, postulate a material substance which changes itself into the form of sound. Similarly, in the case of consciousness also if body or the physical elements are simply auxiliaries we would have to postulate some material cause also of which the consciousness is constituted; and this would lead to the existence of soul.

The Cārvāka argues : when visible cause is available there is no reason for postulating the invisible one. In the case of sound also we need not go out of the perceptible cause. One should be satisfied with the visible cause, whatever it may be.

The Jaina replies that the Cārvāka contention that one should satisfy merely with the visible cause, and should not postulate the visible one goes against his own conceptions. The fire is produced from the pieces of wood (araṇi) rubbed together. In this case the Cārvāka himself postulates some invisible fire as material cause of the visible fire. Otherwise his system of causation would collapse. According to his theory of causation fire and earth are different elements. They do not act as the cause and effect mutually. Consequently the fire cannot be produced from the wood as the latter belongs to a different element i.e. earth. If fire is accepted as the effect of wood, it would lose its position of being a separate entity. Similarly, the pearls are produced from water as far as visible cause is concerned. Consequently, they would lose their connection with the element of earth and would become a part of water, which is not accepted by the Cārvāka also. Similarly, the water oozing out of the moon stone will lose its relation with the element of water and come into the category of earth. Thus the whole system of causation and the conception of

elements would collapse. On the other hand, if some hidden cause is postulated in the above instances which belongs to the same class of element as the effect does; the same principle should be applied to the case of consciousness also. As, none of the physical elements possesses the nature of consciousness.

If the Cārvāka accepts some subtle element as material cause of the consciousness, he would have to explain whether it belongs to the same class as that of consciousness or different one. In the former case the existence of the self is established automatically. It does not matter if it is given a different name. If the subtle element belongs to same different class it cannot be held as the material cause of consciousness, just as fire in the case of water.

The Cārvāka argues : It is not essential that the cause and the effect must belong to the same class. We see a scorpion being produced from cowdung. There is no similarity between the two. The dung is lifeless while the scorpion is with life.

The Jaina replies that cowdung is the material cause of body only; and both of them belong to the same class of the corporeal substance (pudgala). The self of the scorpion has another conscious entity as its cause. In the case of body also, it is not produced from the cowdung but from the elements which are capable of being transformed into a body. It is another thing that such elements are found abundantly in cowdung.

It can be argued that the subtle elements also belong to the same class as that of consciousness as far as both are substances or existents.

The Jaina replies that this similarity has no value in the system of causation. Otherwise the four elements also would become similar and have mutual causation, as all of them belong to the same class in respect of being substances or existents. If this type of similarity is accounted, one can ask further whether the elements are mutually included or not. If not, the

consciousness also on the same ground cannot be included in the four elements and must stand as a separate entity. If the elements are mutually included, the doctrine of four elements becomes baseless.

The subtle element admitted as the material cause of consciousness, therefore, must be different from the unconscious elements and at the same time continued in all the conscious activities. Such an element is nothing but the soul, which is free from the material qualities of colour, taste etc.; is the object of self-cognition as well as inference.

### *Other Schools of Materialism*

We have discussed above the theory of Cārvāka holding physical elements as the cause of consciousness. There are some other notions also associated with the system. They show a gradual development in conception of the self.

(1) There is a view that consciousness is produced by the physical body. Vidyānanda refutes it on the following ground : If physical body is the only cause of consciousness, why the latter is not found in a dead body. If it is said that the dead body lacks in the element of air, it is an acceptance of some thing other than the body as the cause of consciousness. Moreover, what is the cause of consciousness, body as a whole or its parts ? In the first case there should be no consciousness in a person whose hand or leg is cut off. In the case of parts there should be a plurality of consciousness in one body without any controlling factor.

Further, we see that the body is always changing. It undergoes an absolute change when a child becomes an old man. But we remember the experiences of boyhood in old age also. It implies that there must be some permanent factor continued in all the stages; which does not change with the body; and serves as a link in different stages. That factor is soul.

(2) Another school identifies the self with the senses. It is

refuted on the following grounds :—

(a) If there is no cognizer separate from the senses the cognition should disappear with disappearance of the senses. But, the cognition does not disappear even when the eyes are closed. It lasts in the form of a concept.

(b) Secondly, even when the senses and the object are in close contiguity the cognition does not occur if the mind is absent. During sleep, our sense of touch is already in contact with the bed, but its softness is not experienced.

(c) Thirdly, all the senses have their limited sphere of objectivity. The eye cannot go beyond the colour or form. The nose is limited to smell only, and so on. There must be some organ which coordinates the findings of different senses. In some cases we examine the same thing with different senses and then come to a decision. This function of coordination cannot be performed by the senses individually or collectively. It postulates a separate principle which is nothing but the soul.

(4) Another school holds mind or Buddhi as the cause of consciousness. We shall discuss it with the system of Sāṅkhya.

The above discussion is related with the ontological position of consciousness as held by the Cārvāka. Regarding his specific theory of the psychology of feeling, willing or knowing no material is available. Tattvopaplava Sīmha is the only available work related with that system. But it is mainly confined to criticism of the logic of other systems. It does not explain its own conceptions.

### **The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika**

#### *The Nature of Soul :*

The Nyāya<sup>1</sup> and Vaiśeṣika<sup>2</sup> systems go one step further

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1. Nyāyasūtra 1.1.10

2. Vaiśeṣikasūtra 3.2.4

and admit the soul as a permanent reality. They define it as substratum of knowledge and other psychic qualities which means that consciousness resides in the self through the relation of inherence. Unlike Jainas they do not hold the two as identical, but accept their existence as separate entities. The Nyāya maintains two types of soul : Supreme and Common. The supreme soul is God. It is one and eternally Omniscient. The common souls are many and possess the quality of knowledge as an adventitious phenomenon. Both types of souls are all-pervading and eternal.<sup>1</sup> Every individual body is associated with a separate soul.

### *Its Qualities*

God has eight qualities<sup>2</sup> of number (saṃkhyā), dimension (parimāṇa), severally (pr̥thaktva), conjunction (saṃyoga) disjunction (vibhāga), consciousness (buddhi), desire (icchā) and effort (prayatna). The common soul contains six more<sup>3</sup> viz., pleasure (sukha), pain (duḥkha), merit (dharma) demerit (adharma), aversion (dveṣa) and predisposition (bhāvanā.)

### **The Number of the Selves**

The common souls are many in number; otherwise, the NV. says, difference in experiences of different bodies cannot be explained. One person is happy while the other miserable. This difference cannot exist in one and the same self. The individual soul experiences pain or pleasure and occupies different bodies in different births, according to the merit or demerit.<sup>4</sup>

### *Dimension of the Self*

The soul has the extreme magnitude. It is all-pervading.<sup>5</sup> If it is admitted as atomic, the Nyāya argues, it would occupy

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1. Kārikāvalī 51

2. Ibid., 34

3. Ibid., 35

4. Praśastapādabhāṣya p. 73; Nyāyakandaī p. 86

5. Praśastapādabhāṣya p. 70; Nyāyakandaī p. 88

only a minute spot in the body and thus, cannot experience pain or pleasure occurring simultaneously in different parts. If it is as big as the body it occupies, it would become perishable. It will have to increase or decrease according to the size of the body, for adjustment.

### *Knowledge of the Self*

According to Vaiṣeṣika the self is the object of inference<sup>1</sup> only. It argues that the existence of the organs of senses and their appropriate objects imply a distinct knower who can use them. The activity of organs must have an agent to account for it, for every instrument requires an agent to handle it; as for instance; the axe requires a cutter in the act of cutting. Some of the Naiyāyikas hold that the common self is capable of being perceived<sup>2</sup> also while the supreme soul is only inferrible. The common soul is also inferrible as substratum of the eight qualities of consciousness, pleasure, pain etc.

### *The Self and Consciousness*

The qualities of knowledge etc. are accidental phenomena appearing in the physical bodies only. There is nothing in the intrinsic nature of the self which is spiritual as that word is ordinarily understood. The point in respect of which it differs from other entities, whether atomic or all-pervading, is this, that it comes to possess knowledge, feeling and volition; while the rest can never do so. In other words, the self is the basis of psychic life, but that life is only adventitious to it. The knowledge or experience here is neither essence nor a constant feature of the self, but that it only appears when certain external factors, none of which is spiritual, cooperate. It will be seen that the Nyāya system in this regard is not far from materialism.

All the special qualities of soul disappear in the state of

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1. Kārikāvalī, 50; Praśastapādabhāṣya 69; Nyāyakandalī, p. 71

2. Nyāyamañjarī p. 429-34



liberation.<sup>1</sup> There is nothing positive in that state, which can distinguish the soul from the other categories. The Vaiśeṣika, asked about the distinguishing factor in that state, replies that the souls differ from one another as well as from other categories on account of Viśeṣa (particularity) which is another name of mere numerical difference. There does not exist any difference of kind in that state.

### *Two types of consciousness*

In conformity with the two types of soul the Nyāya admits two types of consciousness also. The consciousness of the Supreme soul i.e. God is permanent, self-luminary and all apprehending; we shall compare this type of consciousness with Kevalajñāna of the Jainas. The actual theory of consciousness or cognition, as propounded by the Nyāya, does not apply in the case of God.

### *Contact between Mind and Soul as the General condition for Consciousness*

It has been stated above that consciousness in the common self is an adventitious phenomenon. It is generated by the collocation of certain internal and external means. The soul being all-pervading and immovable cannot do anything by itself. For this purpose the Nyāya admits the existence of another eternal entity known as mind (manas). The mind is atomic in size and moves from one place to another, and the same is responsible for the phenomenon of consciousness. The contact between mind and the soul is a general condition for all consciousness.<sup>2</sup>

### *Consciousness in the State of Sleep, a Difficulty*

But there is a difficulty on the part of Nyāya, which is hard to explain. All-pervasiveness means a contact with all the

1. Praśastapādabhāṣya, p. 281; also Kandalī on it

2. Praśastapādabhāṣya p. 89; Kārikāvalī 57

objects having smaller size.<sup>1</sup> It means that the self is always in contact with the mind. When the both entities are eternal, their contact also is eternal. Eternity of contact would involve the eternity of consciousness. This would render the state of sleep an impossibility; which, according to Nyāya, is without consciousness.<sup>2</sup> The Nyāya tries to explain this difficulty in various ways; but, none of them is convincing. According to one explanation, in the state of sleep the mind enters into an artery known as purītat; and thus breaks contact with the self.<sup>3</sup> Dina'kar gives an account of this disjunction,<sup>4</sup> but fails to explain the fundamental difficulty. It does not give any explanation to the objection, related with the size of the self, when it is all-pervasive, how the mind can go beyond it ?

A modern school of the NV. holds the contact of mind with the tactual sense<sup>5</sup> as the general condition for consciousness. The tactual sense is an airy composition occupying the whole body. The artery of purītat is free from it. Thus, when the mind enters into the purītat the contact with tactual sense is lost, and there is no consciousness in that state.

This explanation also is not free from fault. If the mind, in the state of consciousness, is always in contact with tactual sense, the tactual experience also should appear constantly, besides the other experiences. An explanation is given to this difficulty that although tactual experience occurs with every other experience, it is not felt as the other cognitions inhibit it.<sup>6</sup> According to another view, associated with Pakṣadhara Miśra, the contact between mind and skin, not the tactual organ, is the general condition for consciousness.<sup>7</sup> But this

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1. Muktāvalī p. 129; Kārikāvalī 26

2. Praśastapādabhāṣya, p. 186; Muktāvalī, p. 246

3. Dinakari p. 248

4. Praśastapādabhāṣya p. 186; Muktāvalī p. 246.

5. Dinakari 248.

6. Vaiśeṣikasūtravṛtti 3.2.1

7. Ibid.

explanation is merely a fancy. It is not supported sound by logic.

Moreover, one more fundamental difficulty remains unsolved. All souls are all-pervading. Thus, no particular mind and particular body can be assigned to a particular soul. Thus, all experiences should be common to every body. The Nyāya tries to explain it on the basis of destiny (adr̥ṣṭa); but, the latter also stands in the same relation to every soul.

### *Consciousness and Cognition*

The systems of the Vedānta, Sāṅkhya, Jaina and Buddhism make a distinction between consciousness and cognition. consciousness, they say, is the power or nature of the self and cognition is its effect, generated through a certain process. The Nyāya does not recognise any difference between the two. It holds that there is no consciousness when there is no cognition. It is an advocate of asat-kāryavāda holding that effect does not exist in any form before its production or emergence. It is produced quite a new. In the state, when cognition is absent, the soul remains almost like a dead. It does not possess any power that can develop into cognition. The responsibility of producing a cognition is equally shared by all the members of collocation. The soul is distinguished only by the fact that it inheres in the knowledge while others do not.

In addition to the general factor noted above, there are some other factors also responsible for particular types of knowledge. In case of the perception of external objects fourfold contact is essential.<sup>1</sup> the self unites with the mind, the mind with the senses also and the senses with the object. The object, light senses etc also stand as members of the collocation by implication. The qualities of soul as pleasure, pain, desire, aversion knowledge and effort are cognized by twofold contact of the soul with the mind.<sup>2</sup> In the case of inference the middle term is

1. Praśasta Pādat Bhāṣya 187

2 Ibid.; Kārikāvali 57

necessary. In analogy comparison plays the important role, and in verbal testimony the verbal knowledge is essential. These special causes are held by the Nyāya as *pramāṇas* or the sources of knowledge.<sup>1</sup> The Nyāyamañjarī admits entire collocation as *pramāṇa*.<sup>2</sup> But, later on the Nyāya splits the members of collocation into two groups of the general causes and the special causes known as *kāraṇa* and *karaṇa* respectively. Only the special cause or *karaṇa* is recognised as *pramāṇa*. This problem is mainly related with the logical development.

### *The Jaina Position Compared*

The Jaina disagrees with the Nyāya in the following points :—

(1) According to Jainism consciousness is not a separate entity; it is the very nature of the self. It is connected with the self not through the relation of inherence but that of identity-in-difference.

(2) The Jaina does not recognise the existence of God as a permanent entity, naturally different from the common selves. All selves stand on equal level as far as their intrinsic nature is concerned. Every self is capable of being liberated, which is the state of perfection.

(3) In no state the self remains without consciousness. During sleep also it is not absolutely unconscious. In the state of liberation it is freed from all contamination and attains the perfect consciousness.

(4) According to Jainism the self is coextensive with body. The eternity of the self does not mean total absence of change, but change with permanence.

(5) According to Jainism all consciousness is self-luminary.

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1. *Muktāvalī* p. 233

2. *Nyāyamañjarī* p. 12

## The Nyaya-view Criticized

### (1) *Relation between the self and consciousness*

If consciousness (buddhi) is supposed to be absolutely distinct from the soul<sup>1</sup>, the consciousness of A is in the same position to his soul as the consciousness of B. That is to say, both consciousnesses would be equal strangers to the soul of A and there is no reason why his consciousness should serve him better than the consciousness of any other person, in determining the nature of things; in fact there is no such thing as his consciousness, all consciousness being equally foreign to him.

### (2) *Inherence does not solve the Difficulty :*

The Nyāya tries to explain the above objection by introducing the theory of inherence (samavāya). But, the relation of inherence also being one, eternal and all-pervasive, helps very little in this respect. It cannot fix any limitation that the thing which is related with A cannot relate with B through the same relation. Moreover, according to the Nyāya, the soul also is all-pervasive. There is no reason why the consciousness generated in the soul of A is not in the same relation with B or others.

### *Eternity of the soul challenged :*

Further, the Vaiśeṣika (pīlupāka) holds that the quality of a substance never changes, without destruction of the substance. When the colour of a jar changes, it does not change by itself. The old colour is destroyed only when the jar also containing it, is destroyed; new colour is produced after the new jar has come into existence. If the same principle is applied in the case of consciousness the soul will become perishable. The Nyāya will have to accept the destruction of soul alongwith the destruction of consciousness.

### *Another difficulty :*

Even, if it is accepted that inherence unites consciousness

with the particular self there is another difficulty which cannot be explained. The inherence is itself a separate category and hence one would have to explain the relation between consciousness and inherence. Why inherence should work on a particular consciousness? If there is another relation to unite consciousness and inherence the question can be put about the second relation also; ultimately it would lead to *ad infinitum*. If the first relation of inherence is self-united and does not require any other relation to be united with consciousness; where the same principle is not applied to the case of consciousness and soul also. They also can be accepted as self-united. The Naiyāyika generally cites the example of light, which illumines the object as well as itself. Similarly, he says, inherence is capable of uniting the objects as well as itself. The soul and buddhi do not possess that capacity; because, they possess a different nature. The Jaina raises the same objection in the case of light also. If the light and illumination are two separate things, why the illumination is a function of light only and not that of other things. When we say natural capability, it cannot be explained without accepting a relation of identity between the two.

*The relation of Inherence is defective :*

As a matter of fact a substance without quality or action, and a quality or action without substance, are inconceivable. They are essential aspects of one and the same reality. The difference between them is not physical but logical. The Nyāya view that they are separate entities related by a third entity cannot explain the position. Śrīharsa in his Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍakhādyā has refuted the Nyāya theory of inherence very strongly. If an entity and its function are held as separate, the inherence and its function of uniting the two objects also will have separate existences. They will require a second inherence for their unity. The Jaina holds that a substance and its quality are self-related in a tie of identity-in-difference, and no third category is required to unite them.

*Difference between Agent and the Instrument :*

It can be proposed here that the agent and the instrument are always different from each other. In the action of cutting a tree the scythe is instrument while the cutter is agent. Both of them have different positions and different existences. Similarly, in the act of cognition the soul is agent and the consciousness is instrument. Both of them cannot be held as one and the same thing. The Jaina replies that merely the grammatical use of instrumental case does not establish one's absolute difference from the agent. There are numerous instances where the instrumental case is used for a category identical with the agent. We say that a serpent makes a coil with his body. In this case the serpent is agent, his body is instrument and the state of coil is effect. But, we cannot say that they are absolutely different from one another. The Vedantic example of the spider, weaving its web by itself is well-known.

*Two Types of Instruments :*

On examination, one can find two sets of instrumental cases. In a number of cases the instrument is separate from the agent; as in the case of scythe and the cutter. But in other cases it is identical with the agent. The instances of the serpent's coil and the spider's web come into this class. It can be further illustrated : when we say "Rāma goes by a car", the car is a case of the external instrument. But when we say, "Rāma goes on foot" the foot is a case of internal instrument. The foot is a part of Rāma. It is not totally different from him.

It can be argued that difference between instrument and the agent, in the case of internal instruments, is imaginary. But, this argument has no ground. We see that the state of coil in the snake is different from the state of straightness. No body can say that these states are imaginary. The agent transforming himself into these states must do so with some instrument. The Nyāya holds that an agent without instrument, and an instrument without agent, cannot function. Mere imagination cannot

put anything into different states. The pillar cannot take the form of coil, however strong the imagination may be.

*The Inherence of Consciousness in the self, against experience :*

Further according to the Nyāya the soul is not conscious (cetana) by itself, but becomes so through the inherence of consciousness. This is against experience. Every body feels consciousness as nature of the self. Moreover, if the soul is not conscious by itself, what is it ? The Nyāya has no reply to this question. If the soul is by itself without consciousness, .e. jaḍa, it cannot possess the later through inherence any more than a jar can do so. By itself there is no difference between jar and the soul.

*Location and the located :*

The Nyāya argues that the experience "I am conscious" shows that the soul is an abode of consciousness just as the earth of a jar. The location and the located are always different from each other. Similarly, the soul and consciousness also are mutually different from each other. The Jaina replies to this that the experience of location and the located is possible in one and the same object also. We say, 'The head on the body' even when the head is not different from the latter.

*Theory of God :*

Another point of controversy is the admittance of God by the Nyāya. It is related more with ethics than the theory of knowledge. Still, some points deserve mention for the present also. According to the Nyāya God is omniscient. His knowledge and other qualities are eternal. Jainism also holds liberated souls as omniscient, but their knowledge is eternal in the sense that once produced, never disappears. According to the Nyāya there is a fundamental difference between two souls. God is omniscient and one, the common soul is ignorant and many. God is the creator and Master of the Universe, the other is a slave and toy of the fate (adr̥ṣṭa). One is entirely free from



pleasure and pain, the other is subject to all transient passions. Almost every attribute that can be predicated to one is necessarily denied to the other. Knowledge, Will and Volitions are the only factors on which both are classed as soul. In this respect also the difference is not insignificant. The qualities of God differ from the soul fundamentally. In the case of God they are eternal while in the ordinary souls they are evanescent. The theory of contact, which is the essence of the Nyāya conception of knowledge, does not apply to God. Unlike the common souls, His knowledge is self-cognitive.

The Jainism does not recognize any qualitative difference between the bound and the liberated souls. In the first case the same qualities are limited on account of the karmic veil, in the latter case they are fully developed.

#### *Absence of Consciousness in the state of liberation*

The third difference between the two systems is this, that the Nyāya holds that there is no consciousness in the state of liberation.<sup>1</sup> According to Jainism the self attains perfect consciousness in that state. This difference owes its existence to the positions assigned to consciousness. According to the Nyāya it is an adventitious phenomenon. An adventitious phenomenon cannot occur when its cause is absent. In the state of liberation which is a permanent and pure state without any possibility of returning back, the causes that produce knowledge are no more possible. The liberated souls do not possess the body any more and without body the contact with mind is not possible. Consequently, there is no knowledge. The Jainas hold consciousness as a natural state. By nature, every self is omniscient. That nature lies dormant as long as the karmic obscurance exists. As soon as the karmic veil disappears the soul comes into its full bloom of perfect knowledge. The Jaina contends, if there is no consciousness in the state of liberation, nobody

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1. Praśastapādabhāṣya 281; Nyāyakandali

would covet for that position. Moreover, it wipes out the difference between intelligent and non-intelligent realities. According to Jainism the state of sleep also is not absolutely without knowledge. If the person in sound sleep, the Jaina argues, cannot receive any impression; is without the power of sensation or cognition, he cannot be awakened by shouting or even pouring water; because, he cannot feel the sensation of anything. He can wake up only when the slumber disappears by itself and the contact of mind with the soul is re-established.

### *Dimension of the Self*

The fourth difference between the two systems is regarding the dimension of the soul. The Nyāya advances the following reasons to support his view :—

(i) The merits or demerits (adṛṣṭa) of a person serve as the causes of the objects, which are going to affect his life. Thus, the merits of Devadatta function as a cause in the birth of his would be wife. The causation is not possible unless the cause is present, where the effect is produced. It implies that the merits of Devadatta must be present at the spot where his would-be-wife takes birth. The merits are qualities and they cannot stay without the substance. It implies the presence of Devadatta's soul also at the spot of his merits i.e. the place of the birth of his would-be-wife. The presence of Devadatta in the distance place where his wife takes birth is impossible if he is confined to his body. This causation can be explained only by admitting the soul as all-pervading.

(ii) According to the Nyāya the first motion in atoms, upward flames of the fire, oblique motion of the air and such other motions are caused by the adṛṣṭa of animals. It implies the presence of adṛṣṭa and consequently that of the soul, wherever that function occurs.

(iii) The soul attracts the atoms; which are the constituents of the body to be occupied by it. Without admitting the soul as all-pervading it cannot attract them from far and wide.

The Nyāya advances the following arguments against the Jaina theory of intermediate dimensions :—

(1) If the soul is co-extensive with the body it must have parts and thus will lose its eternity.

(2) It will become mūrta and cannot enter into the body, because mutual obstruction is the nature of mūrtas. According to Jainism a mūrta means possession of corporeal qualities of colour, taste, smell and touch. According to Nyāya it means the possession of lesser magnitude, other than the supreme one.

(3) When the soul of a child transforms into the size of a youth, it has to leave its former position and adopt the new one. This strikes at the very root of the eternity of the soul.

#### *The Jaina Criticism of the theory of all-pervasiveness*

The Jaina advances the following arguments against all-pervasiveness of the self.

(i) All the special qualities of soul are found in body only. The feelings of pleasure, pain etc. do not cross the physical boundaries. This is a clear proof, that the soul does not exist beyond it. One cannot postulate a thing where its qualities do not exist.

(ii) The ethical reasons advanced by the Nyāya do not stand in the present case. Firstly, the Jainas do not admit adṛṣṭa as a quality of the soul. It is a material substance which sticks to the soul. Secondly, the Jainas do not admit co-presence of the cause and effect as an essential condition of the law of causation. An event, which has passed long ago, generates its memory. The Law of causation depends upon the capability (yogyatā) of an entity to produce a particular effect. All other conditions are non-essential.

(iii) The Nyāya objection that the soul will become perishable if its dimension changes according to the body, also does

not hold good. Eternity, according to Jainism, as has been stated before is not absence of change, but the change with continuity. A snake changes its positions from coil to straightness; but, it cannot be said as generated anew with every new position. Similarly, the soul, though changing its positions according to the body, is not produced anew.

According to Jainism corporeality (*mūrtatva*) does not depend on the size; but on the possession of corporeal qualities.

Moreover, if the soul is all-pervasive the system of particular soul in possession of particular knowledge, will collapse. It has been already discussed in the foregoing pages.

(iv) The fourth point of eternity of the soul is connected with the general problem of the Jaina conception of reality. It also has been already discussed.

### *Self consciousness*

The fifth point of difference between the Nyāya and Jaina is related with the nature of consciousness. According to the Nyāya consciousness apprehends the object only. It depends on subsequent cognitions for self-illumination. We shall discuss this question in the section on the object of knowledge.

## **The Mīmāṃsā**

### *Theory of the Self*

The Mīmāṃsā conception of the self depends upon the Vedic texts which speak of the sacrificer equipped with the sacrificial implements proceeding to heaven.<sup>1</sup> The function of proceeding to heaven is not possible in the physical body; so there is some incorporeal entity which ensouls the body and proceeds to heaven.<sup>2</sup> The presence of such an entity is inferred from the phenomena of breathing, winking of eyes and the like;

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1. Śāstradīpikā p. 118

2. Ibid. p. 119

which cannot belong merely to the body, as they are not found in a dead body.<sup>1</sup> Such phenomena as the feelings of pleasure, pain and the like are cognised by the person himself only, while the qualities of colour, taste etc. which belong to the physical body are cognized and perceived by others also; who have no direct cognition of the feelings of other persons. This shows that there are certain qualities in the person which are directly cognisable by himself only. From the fact of there being certain qualities of the person which differ radically from the qualities that belong to the physical body, we conclude that the entity spoken of as going to heaven is other than the physical body. (compare with the arguments given by Vidyānanda). Moreover the act of cognizing, desiring and the like presuppose an agent, which is the self Ātman.<sup>2</sup>

According to Śābara the actual nature of the self cannot be described in positive terms. It can be described negatively in the style of Upaniṣads—*Neti-Neti*, but its existence can be felt through introspection or inferred in the case of others.<sup>3</sup> This soul is everlasting; a person or personality apart from the feelings and cognitions. It is in the terms of Brāhmaṇas indestructible, not liable to disruption, but it comes into contact with perishable things, like sense organs, merit (dharma) demerit (adharma) and so forth.<sup>4</sup>

According to Prabhākara the self is the basic cause of cognitions<sup>5</sup> which are produced when other auxiliary causes assemble.<sup>6</sup> He, generally, follows the Nyāya conception. But, cognition according to him is an act (prayatna) of the soul and not a quality as the Nyāya holds. He does not admit soul

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1: Śāstradīpikā p. 119

2. Ibid., p. 120.

3. Śābarabhāṣya Tra. p. 26-31.

4. Śatapatha Brā, 14. 7-3-15.

5. Prakaraṇapāñcikā p. 147

6 Ibid-149

as the object of introspection.<sup>1</sup>

Kumārila maintains that the soul is something distinct from the body, the sense-organs and buddhi. It is eternal, imperishable and is the real doer of action; agent of acts, as well as the experiencer of their results and reactions. It is also all-pervading. It is of the nature of pure consciousness, and not qualified by the limitations of time and space.<sup>2</sup> It is the soul that passes through the experiences of pleasure, pain etc. and yet, it never renounces its own character of consciousness; it forms the constant factor in all those variable and varying experiences. The self experiences the reactions of its acts. If the self consists of consciousness, not in its eternal form; but in the form of feelings and cognitions; then it would not be possible to account for the different activities of the man, or even the phenomenon of rebirth. It is, therefore, necessary to regard the soul as being of the nature of consciousness.

The Nyāyavaiśeṣika systems did not admit any action in the self—neither change of place (spanda), nor change of form (pariṇāma). Kumārila though denies the former, admits the latter.<sup>3</sup> That is, he recognizes the possibility of model changes in the self. In spite of these modifications it is regarded as eternal for Kumārila rejects the view that even internal change militates against permanence.<sup>4</sup> Experience acquaints us with many things changing almost constantly; yet, maintaining their identity.

The Jaina system goes one step further and accepts the change of place also. The fundamental difference between the Jaina and Kumārila regarding the self consists in the size only. The difference regarding the change of place is its natural issue. The change of place is not possible in an all-pervading object.

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1. Prakaraṇapañcikā 151

2. S. V. Ātmavāda 75.

1. SV. Ātmavāda 74

2. SV. Pratyakṣavāda 53.

Kumārila also regards the soul as partly conscious and partly unconscious. It is conscious in the part where the act of cognition is produced. In other parts it is unconscious. In this view the Mīmāṃsā goes very near to the Nyāya conception. Roughly seen the Jaina does not favour this view. He says that the soul is an indivisible unit having consciousness as its essential character. It cannot be said that it is conscious in one part and unconscious in the other. But, the Jaina theory of āvaraṇa renders this difference insignificant. The Jaina also accepts that the āvaraṇa is removed partially. When we see through the eye the āvaraṇa is removed only from that part of the soul which is occupied by the pupil. The other parts remain obscured. This is why generally the cognitions through all senses do not occur simultaneously.

Regarded from this point of view, the difference is significant in the ethical plane only. When the soul is liberated or the āvaraṇa is totally removed; the soul, according to Jainism, becomes omniscient. The question of partial obscurance does not arise in that state. According to the Mīmāṃsā system partial consciousness is a natural state. It is not caused by any external matter as the Jaina maintains. This is why Mīmāṃsā does not believe in the theory of omniscience.

#### *Mīmāṃsā Theory of Consciousness*

Cognition, according to Kumārila is a mode of the self. It is described as an act (kriyā) or process (vyāpāra). This change or disturbance which takes place in the ātman brings about a certain relation with the object known. The self, being by hypothesis omnipresent, is necessarily in relation with all the existents; but, that relation is not the same as is required for knowledge. If it were, jñāna would arise in respect of all objects. The relation that produces jñāna is unique. It is described as a sort of comprehension.<sup>1</sup> To know is a transitive verb.<sup>2</sup>

1. Śāstradīpikā p. 56

2. Ibid.

The act of process of knowing is viewed as an act with object (a *kriyā* with *karman*). The result of the transitive verb is not found in the agent. It rests in something other than the doer. It is manifested not in the doer but in the object. The act of cooking for instance, is seen in the agent, but its result, of softness (*vikleđa*) is found in the cooked material, i. e., rice, grain etc. The former is the subject, the latter the object. When *Jñāna* arises in the self, relating the self to an object, the latter is affected in a particular way, so that the experience is not wholly a subjective manifestation; but, also an objective modification corresponding to it. The object becomes illumined (*prakāśaviśiṣṭa*) thereby; and it being thus, illumined or made known (*prakāṣa* or *jñāta*): its *jñātata* serves as a sign for our inference that *Jñāna* must have arisen in the self.

Prabhākara disagrees with Kumārila and holds that the self does not suffer any change. He follows the Nyāya conception in this respect. Action, according to Prabhākara, is not movement or change but merely the sense expressed by a verb.

#### *Kumārila's view criticised*

In the domain of philosophy the term act (*kriyā*) or process (*vyāpāra*) is full of confusion. According to the N. V. systems *kriyā* means five types of motion which necessarily implies the change of place. This sort of action is not possible in the self which according to the *Mīmāṃsā* system is all-pervading. The *Vaiśeṣika* also denies this sort of action to any all-pervading substance. The other kind of action is modal change or *pariṇāma*. It is both, automatic as well as implemented by the external cause. But, Kumārila cannot explain this sort of action also in a permanent all-pervading substance. According to Jaina the self is as big as the body it occupies. It increases and decreases according to the size of the body. At the same time it can move from one place to another place. So, both, types of changes viz. the change of place (*spanda*) and change of form (*pariṇāma*) are possible in it. But, they are not feasible



in an all-pervading substance. The modal change also implies the change of place.

Jayanta has traced the act theory of knowledge to a grammatical prejudice, a confusion between knowledge as a manifestation and the verb to know which denotes an action. When we hear the expression 'I know' 'I cognize' we are apt to be misled to the idea that knowledge or cognition is an activity or process which implies some motion or physical change. But this only shows how in philosophy the vague expressions of ordinary language are misleading.

On observation it will appear that all verbs do not imply a change or action on the part of the agent. In certain cases the verbs express the very existence of the agent. When we say, 'the moon shines' it does express any change of the part of the moon. It is an expression of the very existence of a luminary. Similarly, when we say, 'the mirror reflects', at the removal of a veil covering it we do not mean any positive action on the part of the mirror. It simply means the removal of obscurance and existence of the mirror. In the case of knowledge the Jaina also does not mean any positive action. It is simply removal of obscurance which automatically results into the manifestation of an object. According to Parthasarathi<sup>1</sup> the conception of agent does not imply movement. Even the omnipresent soul is the agent of sacrifice, knowledge, volition, desire etc. without the possibility of any movement. Action in these cases means, merely the sense expressed by a verb. In the case of movements also, he argues, the soul is agent, merely on the basis of its being commandant. The movement is possible in body only and not the soul. According to Nyāya also it is not action but a quality which is generated through a certain contact. The same is knowledge. The Mīmāṃsā conception of knowledge as an activity is comparable with the conception of mode (vṛtti) held by the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta.

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1. Śāstradīpikā p. 119

According to Kumārila knowledge is not the object of perception. It is only inferrible. Śābara<sup>1</sup> also holds the same view. Prabhākara<sup>2</sup> on the other hand is an advocate of tripuṭi pratyakṣa, maintaining the perception of object, knowledge and the soul in one and the same appearance. His views are generally accepted by the Jaina also.<sup>3</sup>

## The Sāṅkhya

### Theory of the Self

The self, according to Sāṅkhya, is pure consciousness. Though it is an improvement on the Nyāya theory; yet for practical purposes, it does not provide any better explanation. The Puruṣa<sup>4</sup> of Sāṅkhya is static, admitting change of neither place nor time. It is absolutely passive, identified more with feeling or the effective side of the psychic phenomena than the cognition or active side. It cannot know or desire anything unless assisted by the mind (buddhi) and sense-organs. Though it is the very essence of sentience, yet all its psychic life is due to its association with the evolutes of Prakṛti (matter).<sup>5</sup> That which constitutes the activity of the subject, as commonly known to us is due to the physical element which enters into its make up.<sup>6</sup>

In respect of the intrinsic character of puruṣa the Sāṅkhya resembles the N. V. system. Both are equally gospels of sublime isolation. The only difference being that the self in that condition, according to Sāṅkhya, continues to be sentient or rather sentience. The Nyāya, on the other hand, holds that the self is without any sentience or consciousness in that stage. But, this

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1. Śābarabhāṣya 1.1.4
  2. Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 52-53. X 6.5
  3. Pramāṇanayatattvāloka I
  4. Sāṅkhyakārikā 19
  5. Ibid., 20
  6. Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya 2.36-38

distinction is merely theoretical. Because, according to Sāṅkhya also, the self in that stage is without any knowledge, owing to the lack of appropriate means like the internal organ and the senses. The pure consciousness does not serve any practical purpose in that stage. According to Nyāya the self is like an image made of earth; which gets motion when drawn by a horse. According to the Sāṅkhya it is like an invalid person, who, inspite of his power to move, is practically helpless. The Sāṅkhya splits the power and its application into two different entities.

### *Two Types of Consciousness*

Cārvāka denied the existence of the self as a separate entity and explained the phenomenon of consciousness as based on the physical elements. The Nyāya held the self as a separate entity and explained consciousness as an adventitious quality. Prabhākara followed the Nyāya in respect of the self but maintained consciousness as an act. These systems regarded the self in itself as unconscious. According to them cognition and consciousness do not make any difference. They are one and the same phenomenon, which appears at the collocation of certain causes, and disappears in their absence. Kumārila is an advocate of energy or power as a separate entity; which manifests itself into corresponding actions. He contends that if the soul does not possess consciousness i.e. the power of generating cognition as its nature, there is no difference between a jar and the soul. The latter also cannot produce cognition just as the former. It is therefore essential to admit the faculty of consciousness as nature of the soul, which is transformed into the act of cognition. He introduces the theory of consciousness and cognition as separate categories.

The Sāṅkhya, in his view of the soul, stresses upon the point of consciousness and leaves the problem of cognition entirely on the material substance known as buddhi. Thus he holds them not only as separate categories, but also as belonging to separate realities. The two factors of consciousness and cogni-

tion are recognised in the Sāṅkhya system as pure consciousness and empirical consciousness respectively.

*Pure Consciousness*

The soul is pure consciousness. It cannot be described in positive terms. It has no change, no form, no motion, no quality no impurity. It is all-pervading and pure sentience. It is distinct from the forms of knowledge, the ideas and the images. We cannot have its mental picture as we can have of other things. It is a transcendent principle whose real nature as such is beyond the empirical sources of knowledge. But, it is this principle in connection with which the whole plane of consciousness is interpreted as the experience of a person.

In our ordinary ways of mental analysis we do not detect that beneath the forms of knowledge there is some other principle, which has no change, no form; but, which is like a light which illumines the mute, pictorial forms; which the mind assumes. The pure consciousness is nothing but this light. Without it all knowledge would be blind. This principle of pure consciousness (cit) cannot be separately perceived, but the presence of this principle in our forms of knowledge is distinctly indicated by inference.

*The Jaina system contrasted with the Sāṅkhya*

The following points should be observed in the above description of pure consciousness; which are not accepted by the Jaina :

1. The consciousness in itself is an independent reality and exists by its own right.
2. It is not active agent but passive experient.
3. It is a permanent unchangeable reality.
4. It is quite different from the forms of cognition; yet enlivens them.

5. It is like a light without which all knowledge would be blind.

6. It is without any quality. We shall discuss the above points and explain the Jaina views regarding them.

*(1) Consciousness as an Independent Reality*

Jainas also hold consciousness as essence (svatattva) of the self and in a way identical with it, but they do not agree in absolute identity. As a matter of fact this difference between the two systems is a natural result of their respective metaphysical positions. According to Jainism consciousness is the essence as well as a faculty of the soul which is neither absolutely different nor absolutely identical with its substratum. The Nyāya system stood on one extreme and advocated absolute difference. The Sāṅkhya stands on the other extreme and proposes absolute identity. It holds that faculty is nothing but cause in the form of unmanifested effect. It is included in the very conception of the cause. The difference between sand and an oilseed does not lie in the fact that the latter possesses a faculty of producing oil while the former does not; but the very nature of oil-seed differentiates it from the sand i. e. one contains the oil in unmanifested form while the other does not.

The Jaina contends that a faculty is not absolutely same as the cause. We see the same cause producing various effects. The same mango fruit produces different cognitions of colour, form, taste etc. If there is only one cause and not separate faculties giving effect to separate cognitions, the difference in effects cannot be explained. Similarly, the same lamp produces different effects of burning the wick and sucking the oil. Consciousness is only one of the many faculties of the self; the others being Bliss and Power. They cannot be included into consciousness. These faculties cannot exist without a substratum and that substratum is soul. In this respect, the soul is not merely a faculty or an aggregate of them but a separate factor connecting all the faculties and qualities.

As a matter of fact the difference between Jaina and the Sāṅkhya conceptions is very subtle. It owes more to their different theories of causation and the nature of reality than to the actual position of consciousness. The Sāṅkhya does not accept any thing being produced a new or vanishing in the course of time absolutely; the states to interlink which the acceptance of a third category of continuity and a relation of identity-in-difference between them may be necessary. Moreover, the locus of action is the agent only; and not the experient, which is simply a passive observer. The question of change, therefore, does not arise in the case of Puruṣa, who is absolutely passive. According to Jainism every reality as has been stated above consists of the three factors of rise, decay and continuity. The Sāṅkhya believes in the factor of continuity only as far as Puruṣa is concerned and attributed the factor of change to Prakṛti. In the case of Puruṣa, therefore, no other substratum, representing the factor of continuity is required. The Jaina contends that these two factors cannot be separated as belonging to separate entities. Every reality is constituted of all the three factors.

The Jaina does not favour the Sāṅkhya division that the noumenal consciousness, with the factor of continuity is represented by Puruṣa and the phenomenal consciousness with the factor of change, which is also known as cognition or ideation, is connected with Buddhi.

*(2) The Consciousness : a passive observer*

The second point of difference is this that according to Sāṅkhya Puruṣa is mere passive observer or simple awareness. This notion is the basis of the Sāṅkhya theory of representation. According to it, our consciousness does not observe the objects directly. The external objects are never apprehended by the cogniser. It is only their images, reflected into the pure substance of buddhi, that are the objects of apprehension. According to Sāṅkhya, cognition means the creation of these images, forms or concepts. This function is done by Buddhi which is transformed into these images. But these images are

evolutes of material unconscious substance, however fine it may be. They cannot be intellicized unless connected with an intelligent being. This function is done by Puruṣa. In the process of cognition buddhi plays the active part; because it constructs the images. In the process of intellicizing of buddhi also, Puruṣa does not play any active part. According to Vācaspati Miśra Buddhi receives the reflection of Puruṣa also and according to Vijñānabhikṣu it is reflected into Puruṣa after getting the reflection of the object. The moon does not play any active part when it is reflected into water. It exists just as it was before the reflection. It is the purity of water substance that is responsible for getting reflection. The moon is the same for the object where it is reflected and where not. Vijñānabhikṣu cites the example of mirror, which also knows no change whether anything is reflected into it, or not. The Jaina criticises this view on several grounds :

Firstly, the dualistic theory of representation is merely a fancy. There is no proof supporting the theory of images or modes as proposed by the Sāṅkhya. The Jaina believes, that our cognitions directly apprehend the external objects. Cognition does not mean creation or reflection, but simply illumination of the already existing objects.

Secondly, *cit* has no form or corporeal qualities. and therefore, it cannot be reflected into Buddhi. Reflection is possible in a thing which has colour or form.

Thirdly, the absolute division of the entities as active and passive has no basis. There is nothing which is entirely passive. Simple awareness also implies some action on the part of the person holding it. It is a reaction of the external effect, and must attribute the reactor with some activity. In the case of reflection also we cannot say that the reflector is absolutely inactive. Had it been so, there would be no difference between a lump of clay and the glass. There is no reason why the latter should receive the reflection and not the former, when other

things are equal in both cases. The example of the moon also does not explain the difficulty. If existence of the moon does bring some novelty in the water, we cannot say that it is inactive. Action does not necessarily mean physical movement. It means any kind of change or causation. There is a difference between the mirror with reflection and one without it. This difference implies a change and change implies activity.

Fourthly, the *Puruṣa* cannot establish the contact with *buddhi* without any activity on his part. The impression of *prakṛti* on *Puruṣa* is impossible without a change on the part of *Puruṣa* also. Mere presence of *prakṛti* cannot bring any change in *Puruṣa* unless the latter also plays some active part. And the moment it is admitted, that the original character is lost and a new one acquired, the function of losing one and acquiring the other is an action, which makes *Puruṣa* also an agent; and it is contrary to the *Sāṅkhya* tenets. The analogy of the crystal also points in the same direction. If it be not due to a certain action in the crystal that it catches a reflection how is it that an opaque stone does not catch it? Therefore, it is plain that *cit* is agent as well as experient, i.e. a *kartā* and *bhoktā* directly, and not through *prakṛti*.

Fifthly, the notion of *prakṛti* as the agent and *Puruṣa* as the experient is also against the principle of ethics. If *Puruṣa* is not doer or responsible for action he cannot be charged with the responsibility of bearing the fruit. The fruit of good or bad deeds must be borne only by the person who is responsible for doing them. Moreover, *Prakṛti*, according to *Sāṅkhya*, cannot work without the reflection of *Puruṣa*. *Buddhi*, the first effect of *Prakṛti* is not evolved till *Puruṣa* does not reflect into it. If independence is the main characteristic of an agent, *Buddhi* does not enjoy that credit. Similarly, *Puruṣa* also cannot be held as absolutely free from the responsibility of doing. The relation of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* in the *Sāṅkhya* system is compared with lame and the blind.<sup>1</sup> *Puruṣa* is lame and *Prakṛti* the

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1. *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 21



blind. Both of them are interdependent. In that case none can be distinguished as agent. Both are doers and hold equal responsibility.

*(3) Consciousness as an unchangeable reality*

The consciousness is not absolutely free from change on the ground stated above. Moreover, all the functions of consciousness, just as knowing, feeling and willing must have some object to deliberate upon. We have awareness of something. This something is the content of awareness. Awareness without content is an impossibility. It must have some content and change with the change of content. Further a reality without change cannot serve any purpose and that which does not serve any purpose is no more a reality.

*(4) Consciousness and cognition as Related to different Entities*

The Sāṅkhya conception that the activities of knowing, feeling and willing etc. are related with the matter, while consciousness is pure intelligent, constituting a separate entity; also is untenable. The psychical activities are the very functions of consciousness. A function and the energy producing it, cannot have separate entities as their substratum. Otherwise, they cannot have the relation of cause and effect. The earth and jar cannot belong to separate entities. Moreover, if conscious activities are associated with matter, the ultimate difference between mind and matter does not stand any more. It would render the Sāṅkhya a materialist. Moreover, to be consciousness and devoid of cognition is an absurdity. The term *cit* cannot be explained without admitting knowledge as its nature.

*(5) Puruṣa and Blindness of knowledge*

The fifth point that without Puruṣa, all knowledge would be blind, depends upon the conception of knowledge. According to Sāṅkhya, as has been stated above, knowledge is a transformation of non-intelligent substance. It, therefore, requires the help of an intelligent being. Jainism does not recognize such a distinction between knowledge and intelligence. Every cognition is a function of consciousness or intelligence. The

question of being blind, therefore, can not arise in the present case. The notion of knowledge being the product of a non-intelligent substance also is plausible.

### 6 *Puruṣa without any quality*

The sixth point that Puruṣa is without any quality, is fundamentally against the principle of metaphysics. There can be no reality without quality. It is a mere conceptual abstraction. Existence means the possession of some positive quality.

### *The Sāṅkhya Theory of Cognition*

We have stated above that according to Sāṅkhya cognition is a modification of buddhi, which is an evolute of prakṛti, dominated by sattva. Buddhi, through the contact of senses with the object, takes form of the latter. This taking form or modification is known as jñāna, adhyavasāya or vṛtti i. e. the cause of knowledge.<sup>1</sup> The reflection of Puruṣa or pure consciousness in vṛtti is recognized as pramā or knowledge. It may be observed here that the Sāṅkhya maintains both buddhi and jñāna as insentient. Pramā, though insentient as far as its material cause is concerned, appears as if possessing sentiency through the reflection of Puruṣa. It is described as consciousness reflected in mode of Buddhi or Buddhi Vṛtti possessing the reflection of consciousness.<sup>2</sup> According to Vācaspati Miśra<sup>3</sup> Vṛtti is like a double-faced mirror, where the citśakti is reflected on one side and object on the other. Thus, there is an exchange of qualities between the buddhi and Puruṣa. Buddhi takes the qualities of Puruṣa and appears like a sentient entity. Puruṣa takes the impress of buddhi and appears like the experiencer of pleasure, pain, knowledge etc. as its own;<sup>4</sup> while actually they are the qualities of buddhi. But the impress of buddhi does not affect

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1. Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī p. 72-73

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Sāṅkhyakārikā, 36, 37.

the pure *cit*, it works on reflection only.<sup>1</sup> We observe this phenomenon in the ordinary reflection. The reflection of the sun into water affects the latter by imposing its brightness and such other qualities as exist in the sun. On other hand, the water affects reflection and not the sun with its motion and other specialities. This reciprocal impression completes the essentialities of knowledge. Thus, it should be observed, that according to Sāṅkhya consciousness and knowledge have two different substratum. Consciousness is the characteristic of *Puruṣa* and knowledge that of *Buddhi*. The part played by consciousness in generating knowledge is confined to reflection only.

*Vijñānabhikṣu*<sup>2</sup> holds a slightly different view regarding this process. He maintains : First of all *buddhi* takes the form of object. In the case of perception it is done by going out through the senses, in inference by knowledge of the middle term, and in the case of comparison by analogy. In the case where *Vṛtti* is generated by the contact of senses with the object, the *buddhi* takes along with it, the sense-material also for its transformation. In such cases the mode or *Vṛtti* is a blend of *Buddhi* and sense-material. This is why the mode or reflection does not invariably correspond with the object. A jaundiced eye looks white object as yellow, this yellowness does not come from *buddhi* which is a pure material; but, from the sense of vision, which goes out along with *buddhi* and carries the yellow substance through its rays. Thus, *buddhi* with its different forms of the objective reflections is reflected into *Puruṣa*, and he is able to apprehend *Vṛtti* as well as the object reflected in the latter. *Vācaspati* holds that it is *Puruṣa* that is reflected and not the *Vṛtti*, which is the recipient of the reflections both of *Puruṣa* as well as the object. *Vijñānabhikṣu* holds the quite opposite view and maintains that *Vṛtti* is reflected into *Puruṣa* and not vice versa. As a red flower does not make any real

1. Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī, p. 85

2. Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya I, 87

change into the crystal; yet, makes it appear as red through the reflection: similarly, Vṛtti makes the Puruṣa appear as the knower or experient without making any real change. This reflection of Vṛtti into Puruṣa is mere uparāga or abhimāna.<sup>1</sup>

Patañjali<sup>2</sup> describes Puruṣa as a pratisamvedin (reflection) of Buddhi. As echo of the sound is called pratidhvani, similarly, reflection of knowledge is called pratisamvedana. Buddhi takes the mode of object and the same modified Buddhi reflects into puruṣa.

According to Vijñānabhikṣu the object is known by Vṛtti and Vṛtti by Puruṣa. It can be asked here if coordination (tadā-kāratā) with the object is an essential condition of a cognition, how it is possible in the case of Puruṣa. Vṛtti can coordinate, the object as it is a changable object. But Puruṣa is unchangeable. How can it know the Vṛtti without any transformation? The objection is replied by Vijñānabhikṣu by expliniting the term coordination in two ways. In the case of Buddhi coordinations means a real transformation. In the case of Puruṣa it is mere reflection. It means, according to Vijñānabhikṣu, the object can be apprehended either through taking its form or through its reflection. Puruṣa, though all-pervasive, does not know all objects. His cognition is limited to reflections only. Buddhi also is all-pervasive but Vṛtti is confined to certain conditions of external or internal senses. This is why Vṛtti also cannot grasp all objects.<sup>3</sup>

The difference between Vijñānabhikṣu and Vācaspati regarding the conceptions of the knower (pramāta), the knowledge (pramā) and the source of knowledge (pramāṇa) can be ascertained in the following table :

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1. Sāṃkhyapravacanabhyaṣya I. 87

2. Yogadārśna p. 45-46

3. Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya I 87

	Vācaspati	Vijñānabhikṣu
1. Knowledge : Puruṣa reflected into (pramā)	Vṛtti or vṛtti with the reflection of Puruṣa	Vṛtti reflected into Puruṣa
2. The source of knowledge (pramāṇa)	Vṛtti	Vṛtti
3. Cognizer (pramātā)	Buddhi	Puruṣa

We have already discussed the Jaina criticism of these views.

#### *The Advaita Vedānta : Brahman or Pure Consciousness*

According to the Vedānta the soul is not only a substratum of all psychic phenomena; but, also the ultimate cause of the physical world. It is known as Brahman or pure consciousness. It is the light of all lights, foundation of all cognitions and the only ultimate reality. The external world of phenomenal appearance springs forth from it.<sup>7</sup> The Vedānta distinguishes pure consciousness from empirical cognitions by holding the former as absolutely real, while the latter as illusions; which are indescribable in the terms of existence (sat) or non-existent (asat).<sup>2</sup>

#### *Comparison with the Sāṅkhya*

According to the Sāṅkhya all varieties of empirical consciousness pertain to a reality separate from Puruṣa, who is a mere spectator. According to the Vedānta, Brahman is the only reality. There is no parallel reality having separate existence. The ideations and concepts, known as the cognitions of the external world, are illusory forms (vivartas) of Brahman. Though the Vedānta also admits Māyā, just as the Prakṛti of Sāṅkhya; which is the material cause of the world; yet, it is

1. Muṇḍaka 1.1. 6- ; Vedāntasāra 19-21

2. Vedāntasāra 6.

not a reality. It is a universal illusion or ignorance. The pure consciousness, according to the Vedānta has three characteristics of Existence (*sat*) consciousness (*cit*) and Bliss (*ānanda*). According to Sāṅkhya Bliss is identical with pleasure, which is a quality of Prakṛti. Further, according to Sāṅkhya the number of the selves is infinite. According to the Vedānta it is one.

#### *Comparison with the Jainism*

According to Jainas the self in its pure form consists of four infinities; viz., (1) Infinite Knowledge (Ananta jñāna), (2) Infinite Perception (Ananta darśana), (3) Infinite Bliss (Ananta sukha) and (4) Infinite Energy (Ananta vīrya). The first two Infinities resemble *cit* of the Vedānta. The remaining two factors correspond to the Vedantic Bliss and Existence. But, the Jainas differ from the Vedānta in the nature of these attributes. According to the Vedānta nothing can be said about these attributes in positive terms. Consciousness, here, means the absence of non-intelligence. Similarly, Bliss means absolute negation of misery; and Existence means the absence of non-existence. According to Jainism they are positive terms. Darśana and Jñāna are the cognitions of real objects. They are not without content as the Sāṅkhya or the Vedānta maintains. Similarly, Vīrya also is something positive. It is the energy with its capability of manifestation into various acts. Sukha is the contentment resulting from reflection on the self. The Jaina does not identify sukha with pleasure (saḍvedanīya) yet, holds it as a positive quality.

Moreover, the world of appearance, according to Jainas, is as real as the consciousness itself. Nothing can appear, they say, which does not exist. According to the Vedānta the individual souls also are illusory manifestations of one Supreme soul or pure consciousness,<sup>1</sup> the Brahman. According to the Sāṅkhya and Jaina they are real and many in number. But, the individual self of the Sāṅkhya, though many in number, is just

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1. Siddhāntaleśasamgraha p. 79-134

like Brahman of the Vedānta as far as its intrinsic character is concerned. It is in the case of empirical self that the Vedānta and Sāṅkhya have some comparison with the Jaina.

### *The Empirical self and cognition*

Like Sāṅkhya the Vedānta also admits cognition as a mode of Antaḥkaraṇa.<sup>1</sup> In the perception of an external object the mind goes out to the object through the senses; which act as vehicles of the movement of antaḥkaraṇa, towards the object. On reaching the object, antaḥkaraṇa is transformed into the latter; just as water, going out of a tank through a drain to a tub, assumes the form of the tub after reaching it. But, the mere fact of antaḥkaraṇa assuming the form of the object does not explain the knowledge of an object. Antaḥkaraṇa is a material, or unconscious substance. So, the modification of antaḥkaraṇa, by itself, cannot amount to knowledge. The vṛtti or the mode of antaḥkaraṇa is illumined by the self, the cit, which is there as the observer (sākṣin) of all changes. In all empirical experiences the antaḥkaraṇa and the ātman remain identified or fused together, just as in a red (hot) iron ball, fire and iron remain indistinguishably blended together. Hence, every change of antaḥkaraṇa enjoys the light of the self that is indistinguishably identified with it, and thus, knowledge becomes possible. In case of the non-perceptual knowledge, antaḥkaraṇa does not go outside but, transforms itself into mental images of happiness, pain, object etc. as the case may be.<sup>2</sup>

The empirical self of the Vedānta does not differ from that of the Jaina as far as its function is concerned. But according to the Vedānta and Sāṅkhya it is not an imperishable reality. According to the Vedānta it is the pure soul conditioned by or reflected into the ajñāna. After realization, when the condition (upādhi), limiting or reflecting the absolute soul, is removed, there is no empirical soul. It exists as long as the condition

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1. Vedāntaparibhāṣā p. 46

2. Vedāntaparibhāṣā p. 68

exists. The difference between the two souls is not real but caused by the external condition. The exponents of the theory of condition as the limitation clarify the point by comparing it with space. The space conditioned by a jar, in reality, does not differ from the infinite space. It exists as long as the condition i.e. jar exists. The theory of reflection is explained by citing the example of the sun reflected into water. The absolute soul is like the real sun, while the empirical soul is like his reflection into water. The reflection exists as long as the reflector i.e. water exists. Thus, according to Vedānta the absolute soul is real, the empirical self is unreal. The former is unlimited and eternal, the latter is limited and perishable. The former is neither agent nor experient, the latter assumes both the positions.

The Sāṅkhya holds the empirical soul as a reflection of Puruṣa into Buddhi or the assumption of the qualities of prakṛti by Puruṣa as his own, as Vijñānabhikṣu maintains. As far as the material cause is concerned the empirical self is a group of the evolutes of Buddhi. The reflection of Puruṣa into buddhi executes an inter-change of qualities between the two. In the case of Puruṣa only the reflection is effected and not the real puruṣa. This blend is ego or self of the Sāṅkhya. As soon as this egoistic existence is removed the empirical soul vanishes. Looked in this way, Sāṅkhya also is an advocate of the empirical soul as a perishable phenomenon generated by the illusion.

#### *The number of souls*

In the Advaita Vedānta transcendental soul is absolutely one.<sup>1</sup> It is away from the three kinds of difference, i. e. (1) the difference due to the existence of an entity of the same class, (2) difference due to the existence of an entity of another class and (3) difference due to parts in his own person. Regarding the number of empirical souls there are two schools.

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1. Śaṅkara on Bṛhad. 2.51



The school of Sureśvara maintains the unity of Jīva.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, the Vivaraṇa-school admits plurality.<sup>2</sup>

The main objection forwarded against the unity of jīva is that if there is only one soul, why there are different activities in different bodies. If all the bodies are pervaded by the same soul, why there is a difference in status. One is happy, the other is miserable. One is educated, the other is unlettered. We cannot say that the qualities like happiness and knowledge belong to the body as can be said of the fatness or thinness. Moreover, the scriptures say that many souls like Śuka etc. have freed themselves from bondage of the world and attained liberation, while others are still in bondage. If there is only one soul this distinction cannot be explained.

The upholder of one jīva explains these difficulties in three ways—(1) Brahman is one and therefore, Jīva also is one, and there is only one body associated with it. Other bodies are without any Jīva, just as the bodies of dream-land. The whole world is an illusion of the same soul. The apparent difference is like the difference appearing in the dream. The story of the liberation of Śuka etc. also is a dreamy phenomenon. All points of difference and other difficulties are to be explained by the same simile of dreams. This view is held by Maṇḍana Miśra and other followers of Drṣṭi Sṛṣṭivāda. They hold that Ajñāna, though one, possesses the power of generating different kinds of things just as sleep in the state of dream projects various objects. There is one soul and one ajñāna and therefore, jīva also is one. In this conception liberation becomes and ideal that can never be achieved individually.

(2) The second interpretation is based on the śrutis propounding Īśvara as creator of the universe. It holds that the reflection of Brahman in Māyā is known as Īśvara and that is the only soul. It is known as Hiranya-garbha also. The other jīvas

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1. Naiṣkarmyasiddhi III. 53-54

2. Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha p. 265

are reflections of Īśvara. They are like the painted clothes worn by the pictures on a painted convass. In this conception there is one jīva with many reflections. As a matter of fact, this view admits the existence of many jīvas and many bodies. But, there is a difference of status between Īśvara and them. This view is held by Vivaraṇa and other followers of Sṛṣṭi Drṣṭi-vāda.

(3) The third interpretation is that there is one soul known as Hiranyagarbha subsisting in all the bodies. It can be asked, if one soul subsists in all the bodies why there is no interchange of experiences; why Caitra does not enjoy the pleasures as are enjoyed by Maitra. The Vedantist replies that body is the regulator in this matter. The experiences of previous lives are not felt in the present life, because, bodies have changed inspite of the unity of soul. Similarly, inspite of the unity of soul Caitra and Maitra have different experiences on account of their different bodies. This explanation, also makes the attempt for liberation, on the part of individual selves, a futile effort.<sup>1</sup> The above mentioned difficulty does not arise in the plurality of souls as accepted by the vivaraṇa-school.

### *Three types of Knowledge according to the Vedānta*

The Advaita Vedānta maintains three stages of soul and asserts three types of knowledge corresponding with them. They are Brahman, Īśvara and Jīva. Brahman is pure consciousness. It is devoid of all objectivity. It is self-luminative. Īśvara is the consciousness attached with Māyā; with the function of projection only, and not that of Āvaraṇa. Consequently, Īśvara knows everything in the form of subject-object. He is the cognizer and the whole world is his object. Jīva is limited by or reflected into antahkaraṇa. His cognition is a dependent on vṛtti, which removes the Āvaraṇa of consciousness conditioned by the object. It is limited and perishable.

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I. Advaitasiddhi p. 539; Siddhāntaleśasaṃgraha p. 370

The Jainism does not admit the first type. It holds that every knowledge must have something as its object. In the case of self-lumination also self appears as the object. The knowledge of Īśvara can be compared with that of a Kevalin, when the Āvaraṇa is removed completely. The only difference is this, that the Vedantic Īśvara cognizes the objects which are his own projection; while according to Jainism they exist independent of the kevalin. In the case of Jīva the two systems hold different processes. According to Vedāntavṛtti, which is a mode of Antaḥkaraṇa, removes āvaraṇa from the object and thus, manifests it temporarily. According to Jainism Vṛtti is not required. The Āvaraṇa is removed by the presence of certain external and internal factors and the object is illumined.

Kundakunda incorporates the first two types of consciousness by resorting to two stand-points (nayas). According to the discursive stand-point, he says, a kevalin knows and sees all the objects; but, from the real stand-point the omniscient perceives and knows his self only.<sup>1</sup> But, these stand-points do not contradict each other. They are only different ways of expression. Every knowledge according to Jainism, illumines the object as well as itself. The knowledge of kevalin is not an exception. But unlike Nyāya, the object does not enter into the class of causation. The knowledge is an illumination. It is a natural phenomenon, occurring by itself, irrespective of the object. When a lamp is lighted it spreads the light without any dependence on the object. It will illumine the jar if the latter exists in its proximity, otherwise not. But, the absence of the illumination of jar does not make any difference in the function of the lamp. Similarly, the soul begins to cognize the object and itself as soon as the obscurance is removed. The object, if comes in the arena, is presented to the soul, otherwise not. It has nothing to do with the function of the soul. This is why the real standpoint leaves the object altogether. On the other

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I. Niyamasāra Gāthā 158

hand, the discursive stand-point takes it into account. This view is explained in another way also. Really, the soul is self-luminary. The objects are reflected into it. Thus, the apprehension of the soul means the apprehension of objects also, which stands as reflected into the soul. But, this explanation goes against the theory of illumination.

### **The Idealist School of Buddhism**

#### *The Theory of Soul or Consciousness*

The Yogācāra divides consciousness into four categories : Citta, Manas, Manovijñāna and the five sense vijñānas. In its general sense, the term citta covers all varieties of consciousness; but, in its specific significance it is the principle of unification, by which all the activities are understood as issuing from one centre. The Manas is a discriminating agency by which the homogeneous, undifferentiated citta is divided into two parts, the one as the seer and other as the seen; the one as grasping ego and other as the object grasped. The manas is not only intellective; but, also a conative principle. The Vijñāna, that is Manovijñāna is separated from the Manas, only in retaining the latter's intellective function, and may be translated as the intellect; in which case the manas may be regarded as corresponding to the will and the affection. The five Vijñānas are thus, the five senses which discriminate a world of individual forms, each within its own sense-fold.<sup>1</sup>

The citta in its specific sense is known as Ālaya vijñāna and resembles the soul or Pure consciousness of other systems. But, Ālaya vijñāna of the Yogācāra is not an abstract principle devoid of content, as the Sāṅkhya Puruṣa. According to Laṅkāvatāra it is rich in content, and just because of this inner richness, it is able to evolve out of itself a world of infinite multitudinousness. It is, indeed, an inexhaustible reservoir of seeds (bīja) which have been accumulated therein since

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1. Suzuki : Laṅkāvatārasūtra p. 248.

the beginningless past. So, the definition of citta is as follows :—

“Cittena cīyate karma”. That karma is accumulated by citta means that the latter takes in all that goes on in the mind and also that is done by the body. Technically stated, every deed (karman), mental or physical, leaves its seeds behind, which are deposited in citta, and citta has been hoarding them since time immemorial. It is the rich repository of all the thoughts, feelings, desires, instincts etc., no matter how they have come to act, that is, whether merely stirred up in the inmost recesses of one's consciousness, or carried out by the body into deed, or checked in the incipient stages of their activity. Psychologically, the citta may thus, be regarded as corresponding to subconsciousness.

We have seen above that Sāṅkhya admitted the Puruṣa as pure consciousness, because it has nothing to do with the formation of ideas. The conception of purity in the Vedānta depended on the Absolute reality of the Brahman. The purity the Ālaya vijñāna is the logical purity, i. e. absolute freedom from the dualistic way of reasoning, which is a function of manas; a disturbed state of the citta. Laṅkāvatāra says “From the Ālaya are stirred up all the mental activities like waves; with habit energy (vāsanā) as cause, they are born in accordance with the law of origination. This disturbed state is recognized as Vyāvṛtti or Pravṛtti. The Vedānta held Brahman or the undisturbed state as the reality and the disturbed one as illusion. The Yogācāra holds both the states as real. As a matter of fact this difference is based not on real positions of the two factors, but on the different views regarding the conception of reality. If those views are taken into consideration the apparent difference will become insignificant. According to the Vedānta whatever originates or perishes is not real. It, therefore, proposes that Brahman is the only reality while the lower stages, which are produced later on, are illusion. According to Yogācāra, every reality is momentary. It

holds change as the essence of reality or existence. It, therefore, cannot deny the status of reality to any thing, merely on the basis of its being generated or open to destruction. Yogācāra also holds citta as an avyākṛta (unexpanded) form of the apparent ideas and concepts.

The Jaina conception of soul has a remarkable affinity with Ālaya vijñāna, particularly, in its ethical side, where it is known as Tathāgatagarbha. The fundamental difference lies in the Buddhist denial of the factor of continuity; without which the problem of recognition cannot be explained. Another point of difference between the two systems is that according to the Jainism, karman does not mean merely predispositions or saṃskāras of the past mental and physical activities; but also material substance, which sticks to the soul according to the activities, and stays there according to the intensity of the passions.

### *The Theory of Empirical Consciousness*

We have stated above that Ālaya vijñāna or citta is the repository of all consciousness. Its calm state is free from the dualistic way of reasoning. When stirred, it undergoes various changes. These resultant changes known as paryāyas are called pravṛtti-vijñāna or empirical consciousness. We have stated above the four stages of citta, such as citta, manas, manovijñāna and five sense-vijñānas.<sup>1</sup>

The Manas, in this system, is not an independent agent acting on the citta from outside as the Nyāya holds. It is a creation of the citta itself. Depending upon the Ālaya the Manas arises; allied with the citta and Manas the Vijñāna arises. Again, with the citta as its cause and supporting it, the manas walks along depending on the citta. The Citta is caused to move by the Vijñāna, and there is an interdependence between them. From this it is evident that the Manas depends

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1. Suzuki : Laṅkāvatāra p. 248

on the citta for its existence, and at the same time citta takes manas for the object of its activity. Without manas, there will be no mentation; and without mentation the very existence of citta will not be known. The one thus, gives support to the other, and at the same time is supported by the other.

The business of Manas is thus two-fold : (1) to reflect on the citta and (2) to make citta visualise itself as object. This is called 'arranging' (vidhīyate), or putting in order (vidīyate) or reflecting (manyate), which is the function of Manas. It is again described as walking in two ways, which means the dualistic character of the manas as against absolute unity of the citta. One citta has now been differentiated into citta and Manas, and this latter particularises that citta is no more neutral, non-discriminative and non-functioning; for all the karma seeds, hitherto lying dormant in the absolute citta, have now begun to sprout out in full vigour. These germinating seeds are now distinguished as discriminated by the Vijñānas known Manovijñāna, by the aid of the five senses, wherewith creating a world of individuals. The latter is called 'the seen' or what is presented (dṛśya) which is now recognised as real and substantial, and from this arise all kind of spiritual tribulations.

### **The Realist School of Buddhism**

#### *Consciousness or Soul*

According to the realist school of Buddhism, consciousness is an element like elements of the material world. According to Abhidharma philosophy<sup>1</sup> mind is split into two chief parts. The subjective part, or mind viewed as a receptive faculty is represented by one element called, indiscriminately, citta, vijñāna or manas. It represents pure consciousness, or pure sensation, without any content. It is defined as 'Vijñānam

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1. Central Conception of Buddhism p. 15

prativijñaptiḥ' i.e. consciousness is an intimation of awareness in every simple case.

But, this awareness cannot appear in life in its true separate condition, it is always accompanied by some secondary mental phenomenon. These constitute the second part of Mind and are known as citta, dharmas. Although, quite undifferentiated in itself, the pure sensation is, nevertheless, distinguished from the stand-point of its origin and its environment i. e. the elements by which its appearance is accompanied. From this point of view there is a set of six different kinds of consciousnesses corresponding to a set of six receptive faculties (indriyas) and a set of six kinds of objects. We thus, have six categories of consciousness beginning with visual sensation or precisely, pure sensation, arising in connection with some colour and ending with consciousness associated with supersensuous objects, not perceivable by senses.

Consciousness has been compared in Milindaprasṇa with a watchman at the middle of the crossroads beholding all that come from any direction. Buddhaghōṣa in Aṭṭhasālinī says that consciousness means that which thinks its object. If we are to define its characteristics we must say that it knows (vijñāna), goes in advance (pūrvāṅgama) connects (sandhāna) and stands on Nāmarūpa (nāmarūpapadasthānam). When the consciousness gets a door, the objects of sense are discerned and it goes first as the precursor. When a visual object is seen by the eye, it is known only by consciousness, and when the dharmas are made objects of mind, it is known only by the consciousness. Buddhaghōṣa also refers here to the passage in the Milindaprasṇa we have just referred to. He further goes on to say that when states of consciousness rise one after another they leave on gap between the previous and the latter, and therefore consciousness appears as connected. When there are the aggregate of the five skandhas, it is lost; but there are the four aggregates as Nāmarūpa. He further asks, is this consciousness the same as the previous consciousness or different



from it ? He answers that it is the same. Just so, the sun shows itself with all its colours etc., but he is not in reality different from those characteristics; and it is said that just when the sun rises, its collected heat and yellow colour also rise then, but it does not mean that the sun is different from these. So the citta or consciousness takes the phenomena of contact etc. and cognizes them. So, though it is the same as they are; yet, in a sense it is different from them. Vijñāna or consciousness means according to Buddhaghosa, both the stage at which the intellectual process starts and also the final resulting consciousness.

It is generally held that Buddhists are Anātmavādin or deny the existence of soul. But, as a matter of fact, they hold that atman or self is not a real and ultimate fact, it is a mere name for a multitude of interconnected facts, which, in the Buddhist philosophy are recognized as elements (dharmas). Buddhism never denies the existence of a personality, or soul, in the empirical sense, it only maintains that it is not an ultimate reality. It is a stream of inter-connected facts. It includes the mental elements and the physical ones as well, the elements of one's own body and the external objects as far as they constitute the experience of a given personality. The representatives of eighteen classess (dhātu) of elements combine together to produce this interconnected stream. There is a special force, called peripi, which holds these elements combined. It operates only within the limits of a single stream and not beyond. This stream of elements kept together, and not limited to present life, but having its roots in past existences and its continuation in future one—is the Buddhist counterpart of the soul or the self of other systems.

### *Sautrāntika Theory of Cognition*

Stcherbatsky<sup>1</sup> gives the following account of the theory of cognition as admitted by Sarvāstivādin and the Sautrāntikas :

#### 1. Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 55

“Their explanation of the origin of knowledge was in perfect agreement with their ontology, i. e. with the theory of a plurality of separate, though inter dependent, elements (dharma-s). resolvable into a number of elements simultaneously flashing into existence. Being conceived as momentary flashes, the elements could not move towards one another, could not come into contact, could not influence one another, there could be no seizing, or grasping of the object by the intellect. But, according to the laws of interconnection (pratītya-samutpāda) prevailing between them, some elements are invariably appearing accompanied by others arising in close contiguity with them. A moment of colour (rūpa), a moment of the sense of vision-matter (cakṣuḥ) and a moment of pure consciousness (citta) arising simultaneously in close contiguity, constitute what is called a sensation (sparśa) of colour. The element of consciousness according to the same laws never appears alone, but always supported by an object (viśaya) and a receptive faculty (indriya).

#### Summary of the above views

Pandit Sukhlal sums up the above views in two tendencies.<sup>1</sup> The first tendency is found in the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta systems. They hold that consciousness (cit-śakti) and cognition (jñāna) have separate substratum. Consciousness lies in Puruṣa or Brahman while the cognition is a mode (vṛtti) of antaḥkaraṇa or buddhi, which is a material substance. The second tendency is found in Buddhism and Nyāya etc. They say that the above of consciousness as well as cognition is one and the same and they are related in a tie of cause and effect. Bauddhas admit that citta known as ‘nāṇa’ is the above of consciousness as well as cognition. The Nyāya and some other systems accept permanent soul as the abode of the two. The Jaina also accepts a permanent soul. The same is called consciousness (caitanya) in the form of cause and in the form of effect it is called cognition.

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1. Jñānabindu, Int. p. 3.

### The Jaina view fully explained

#### *Soul or Jīva*

Amongst the Āgamas the soul is known as jīva. Literally it means one that possesses life, prāṇa.<sup>1</sup> The term prāṇa is not confined to breathing only. It includes all the faculties that are the sign of life. The five senses, the faculties of thinking, speaking and moving; breathing and the period for which a being is going to live, all constitute one prāṇa each.<sup>2</sup> The mundane souls possess the prāṇas according to the status of their evolution. But, the term jīva is not to be taken in that sense for the present. It is a general term applied to all the states of soul, liberated or in bondage.

#### *Definition of Jīva*

The Bhagavatt<sup>3</sup> and Uttarādhyayana<sup>4</sup> sūtras state Upayoga as the definition of jīva. Tattvārtha<sup>5</sup> also supports the same view. Upayoga means attention or application of consciousness (caitanya); which is the essence (svatatva) of Jīva.<sup>6</sup> Vidyānanda points out the difference between essence and definition (lakṣaṇa) in this, that the essence is a definition as well as the definee. It occupies both the positions; while mere definition is not necessarily given that position.<sup>7</sup> The consciousness itself is jīva. It is a power, known through application only. Upayoga, therefore, serves as definition better than consciousness. The separate existence of jīva is proved on the ground of Upayoga or the function of consciousness.

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1. Tattvārthaśloka-vārtika 318.
  2. Gommatasāra Gāthā 129-30.
  3. Bhagavatt II, 10
  4. Uttarādhyayana 28, 10
  5. Tattvārtha 2.8.
  6. Tattvārthaśloka-vārtika p. 318
  7. Ibid.

Two Types of Definition

The main function of a definition is to discriminate the definee from other things. This purpose can be served by a thing or quality which is inseparable from the definee as well as by one which can be separated. The quality of heat in fire comes into the first category. It cannot be separated from the fire. The staff, in the case of a man-with-staff, belongs to the second category. The staff though helps in discrimination of the person from others, is not an essential part of the man. On the basis Vidyānanda classifies the definition in two types. The first is essential (ātmabhūta) and the second non-essential (anātmabhūta)<sup>1</sup>.

Upayoga is an essential definition of the self. We cannot separate it from the latter. There is no soul without Upayoga and there is no Upayoga without soul. Yet, we cannot say that they are absolutely one and the same thing. Upayoga is only a part of the psychical function. Other functions are feeling, willing etc. which according to Jainism are not included into Upayoga which is the activity of cognition only, a particular expression of consciousness (caitanya) which covers the entire range of psychical life. This is also one of the reasons for regarding it as the essence and upayoga as the definition of jīva.

Nemicandra defines the jīva as follows :—

It is characterised by upoyoga, is formless, and an agent, is co extensive with the body, is the experient of the fruits of karman, exists in Saṃsāra. the siddha has a characteristic of upward motion,<sup>2</sup> Kundakunda also agrees with the same.<sup>3</sup> Devasūri indicates the same thing by pointing out a contrast with other systems.<sup>4</sup> We shall discuss the above points one by one.

1. Tattvārthaśloka-vātika, p. 318

2. Dravyasaṅgraha, 2

3. Pañcāstikāyasamayāsāra 27

4. Pramāṇanayatatvāloka VII, 55

*It is a changeable yet everlasting Reality*

Reality according to Jainism, as we have already stated, consists of three factors; origination, decay and permanence. This principle holds good in the case of soul also. Every soul undergoes various changes. It moves from one place to another place, takes different shapes and forms and passes through successive lives. Yet, does not lose its permanence.

In the case of soul, permanence means both with reference to substance as well as person. The soul is an intelligent substance and cannot become non-intelligent. At the same time no soul loses its individuality by merging into or combining with the other souls. According to the Vedānta jīvātman have a conditional existence. When the condition is removed they merge into the great soul of Brahman. The Jainas do not favour this view.

Both, Jīva (soul) and pudgala (matter) are many in number; while other substances are without plurality. Permanence with reference to substance is common to all of them. No substance loses its nature and transforms into the other. The question of individual permanence is concerned with jīva and pudgala only. Jīva is an ultimate unit. It may have smaller or bigger size according to the physical body; but, it does not depend upon any external help for expansion or diminution. Neither it combines with other souls for expansion nor cuts away something from its own person for diminution. The number of pra-deśas (the units of space) remains the same in both conditions. But, this is not the case with pudgala, which has atom as the smallest individual unit. The bigger units of physical structure are not composed merely by that individual atom. It is assisted by other atoms to compose a bigger structure. The number of atoms increases with the increase of dimension. The diametrical expansion of the soul without additional equipment is the point which is attacked by the non-Jaina systems. The only explanation that the Jainas give, is that the soul is immaterial, and the principle of material objects cannot be applied to immaterial things.

In the case of atoms the Nyāya maintains a fundamental classification. The atom of earth cannot change into the atom of water. But, the Jaina does not hold such distinction as fundamental. He maintains that earth and water are groups or combinations of atoms. The atoms in themselves do not possess any of these distinction. The atom, which at present is a part of earthly body, can become a part of the body of water. Further, all the atoms possess all the four qualities of colour, taste, smell and touch. But, they are not entirely similar. The colour, taste, smell and touch of one atom are different from those of the other. The condition of these qualities changes according to the combination and external influence. But, they are not without distinction in their pure state also. The case of jīvas is different. In their pure state, though they exist as separate units, they are not different in quality. All the souls possess the same attributes in equal measure. The qualitative difference between the jīvas is caused by the karmic matter which is external. As soon as that impure element is removed all the souls acquire their pure state in which there is no difference of quality. Dissimilarity between two atoms is natural but in two souls it is due to karmic influence.

In the state of liberation all souls exist in the same position without any qualitative difference. But, their individuality is not affected thereby. Even when two souls occupy the same unit of space, they are not one and the same. Perhaps, this factor has led to the conception of Tiryaksāmānya as the cause of the appearance of similarity and not that of unity.

Regarding the dimension of the soul in the state of liberation the Jainas hold that it is as big as two thirds of the physical body, lastly occupied. These factors show a materialistic tendency on the part of Jainas.

We have already discussed the various notion regarding the permanence of soul. The Jaina is a non-absolutist. He favours neither absolute permanence nor absolute momentariness. The

feelings of pleasure and pain, the system of bondage and liberation, ethical notions of virtue and vice with their good and bad results, presuppose a change with permanence. The absolutist standing on either extreme, cannot explain the above phenomena.<sup>1</sup>

*It is Agent as well as Experient*

The Vedānta held that the soul in its essence is neither agent nor experient. The phenomenon of doing something and bearing its fruit appear on the lower level of existence. The Jīvātman which stands on the same level as those phenomena, is both the agent as well as the experient. It acts and bears the fruit. The Sāṅkhya maintains Prakṛti as the agent and Puruṣa as the experient. Jainism along with other systems holds that the soul is both, agent as well as the experient.

As a matter of fact the soul by itself is inactive in all the systems. Generally, it is assisted by the external matter for doing something. In the Nyāya-system it is assisted by the physical body or mind. In Jainism also the soul does not undergo any change, either that of form or that of space, without the assistance of karmic matter. In the case of liberated soul it is held that as soon as it is freed from the karmic bondage it goes up, till the top-end of the universe, as it consists of the nature of going upwards. But, leaving that movement, which is a matter of faith only, all movements related with the soul are effects of the karmic influence. The influence of karman on the soul according to Jainism is as powerful as that of Prakṛti on Puruṣa in the Sāṅkhya system. The only difference between the two systems is that the Jaina does not divide the responsibilities of doing and bearing the fruit in two entities. It holds that the soul mixed with karman is the doer and the same is experient. Further, it should be noticed that the puruṣa of Sāṅkhya is inactive, doing nothing by himself. The function of liberation also is done by prakṛti.

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1. Syādvādamāñjarī, Kārikā 25

The soul of the Jainas is not so dependent. It exercises a full control over the karmic matter and can adjust it in his own interest. The Jainas are not fatalists. They provide ample scope for free activity.

Further, the Jainas hold that the functions of an agent as well as the experient continue in liberated souls also. But, that is merely a theoretical consideration. The Siddhas, as the liberated souls are known, do not move from one place to another place. Similarly, they do not suffer the modal change also. They will remain in the same position and form as they have come to possess once, at the first moment of their liberation. It is said that the cognition of Siddhas changes according to the change of object, and Siddhas also suffer the change as their quality of cognition changes. But, this point does not prove the existence of any real change in them. Moreover, when they are omniscient, knowing all the objects of the past, present and the future simultaneously, the question of change in cognition also does not hold any reason. The only purpose of stressing upon the principle of change in Siddhas is simply to apply the three factors of reality in their case also.

Moreover, it is controversial whether Siddhas cognize the objects in the same manner as the persons with imperfect cognition.

#### *It has an Infinite Plurality*

Gautama asks in the Bhagavatsūtras : O Lord ! How many souls are there ? their number is numerable, innumerable or infinite ?

The lord replies : “O Gautama ! they are infinite in number.”

The original text of the above talk maintains the term paryāya in the sense of numerical diversity. Gautama asks the number of paryāyas and Mahāvīra replies that it is infinite. Thus, the Jaina is an exponent of plurality of souls.



The mundane souls are divided into two groups of Vyavahāra rāśi and Avyavahāra rāśi. Avyavahāra rāśi means the multitude of souls which have not come out of their lowest state of consciousness. The kingdom where they are lying from the time immemorial. It is a reservoir of souls living in infinite number with one body. It is never exhausted. The Vyavahāra rāśi means the multitude of jīvas that have come out from that reservoir and are wandering up and down in the world. They occupy one body each. The conception of avyavahāra rāśi is comparable with the state of equilibrium of Prakṛti in the Sāṅkhya and undisturbed state of Ālaya-vijñāna in Buddhism.

*It is co-extensive with the Body :*

We have already discussed different views regarding the size of soul. There are many other conceptions, which are as old as the Upaniṣads. They show that the Jaina is not the only upholder of the middle size. Below, we give a brief survey of these views :

(1) The Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad refers to the view that the soul is co-extensive with the body it occupies.<sup>1</sup> It states that just as a sword pervades the sheath and fire the fire-pit so the soul pervades the body upto nails and hair. Jainas also hold the same view.

(2) Bṛhadāraṇyaka mentions that the soul is as big as a grain of rice or barley.<sup>2</sup>

(3) Kaṭhōpaniṣad states, another view that it is as big as the thumb.<sup>3</sup>

(4) Chāndogya holds it as big as the span of thumb or the fore-finger.<sup>4</sup>

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1. Kauṣītaki 4.20

2. Bṛhadāraṇyaka 5.6.1

3. Kaṭho 4.12

4. Chāndogya.

(5) The majority of Upaniṣads state it as all-pervasive.

The above mentioned conceptions in the Upaniṣads, except the last one, are related with the empirical self only. The transcendental soul is without any size.

In the scholastic period roughly, we have three views related with the extension of the soul. According to the Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Sāṅkhya, Yoga and the Śāṅkara-school of the Vedānta soul is vibhu or contains the biggest dimension. With Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika the biggest dimension means state of being in contact with all the objects having lesser size. According to Sāṅkhya and Yoga it means all pervasiveness and according to Vedānta it means the state of being above the considerations of size and other limitations. Thus, the above systems, though one in not admitting any smaller size in the soul, disagree in the conception of the biggest size also. Nevertheless, they also admit the psychic activity as confined to the body; and they postulate one or the other factor to explain this phenomenon.

Rāmānuja, Mādhva and Vallabha are on the other extreme. They hold the discursive self (jīvātman) as having atomic size, i. e. aṇuparimāṇa, while attribute God with all-pervasiveness.

The Jaina favours the middle position. It holds the soul co-extensive with the body. When occupying the body of an ant it is as big as the ant; and when pervades the body of an elephant it expands to that extent. Thus, according to Jainism the soul does not contain any fixed size. It can contract itself and become atomic. It can expand itself and become all-pervasive. But, one thing is fixed. It has innumerable space-units (pradeśas). Their number is always the same. It neither increases nor decreases. The same number accommodates itself in a smaller or bigger area. Thus, in contrast to the above-mentioned two views, we can say, the Jaina does fix any size. He holds it variable and flexible. On this very point he is attacked by other systems that it would render the soul perishable.

ble. But the Jaina conception of permanence is quite different from that of other systems.

Yašovijaya states, that the Jainas are not totally against the all-pervasiveness of the soul.<sup>1</sup> The conception of Samudghāta (astral projection) explicitly supports that the soul is all-pervasive as far as its power is concerned. In the NyāyakhaṇḍaKhādyā he confirms that the soul can pervade the entire universe and on the basis of this capacity we can hold it all-pervasive. But, as far as its activities are concerned it is confined to the body.

If we compare this view with the Nyāya and other systems the disagreement becomes insignificant. The supporters of all-pervasiveness also hold that the activity is confined to the body only. According to the Vedānta the antaḥkaraṇa, which is a centre of all psychic activities, is coextensive with the body. The Sāṅkhya also holds the empirical self as limited to the body. The mind (manas) of the Nyāya is atomic and here, we can say, it differs from the Jaina conception. The Buddhist also agrees with the Jaina.

Brahmadeva<sup>2</sup> incorporates the views in another way : He says that in respect of Kevalajñāna the soul is all-pervasive and in respect of pradeśas it is coextensive with the body.

Thus, we have three aspects concerned with the size of the soul.

(1) It is coextensive with the body in respect of general condition of pradeśas.

(2) It pervades the whole universe (loka) in respect of the capacity of pradeśas.

(3) It pervades loka as well as aloka in respect of kevalajñāna.

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1. Nyāya-Khaṇḍakhādyatīkā, Kārikā, 70 page 648-649

2. Dravyasaṃgrahatīkā.

The first aspect can be compared with the conception of empirical self of other systems. The second aspect is comparable with the Nyāya view of all-pervasiveness. The third view resembles the Vedantist conception of without any limitation.

Kundakunda supports the conceptions of all-pervasiveness as well as that of the middle size on the basis of two different aspects. In respect of knowledge the soul is all-pervasive. He says :

“The soul is coextensive with knowledge; knowledge is said to be coextensive with the objects of knowledge; the object of knowledge comprises the physical and non-physical universe, therefore, knowledge is omnipresent. He, who does not admit the soul to be coextensive with knowledge, must indeed concede that the soul is either smaller or larger than knowledge. If the soul is smaller, the knowledge, being insentient, cannot know; if larger, how can it know in the absence of knowledge? The great Jina is everywhere and all the objects in the world are within him, since the Jina is an embodiment of knowledge and since they are the objects of knowledge’”.<sup>1</sup>

Ontologically, the soul consists of the middle dimensions. He cites the example of a sapphire to support this view. The sapphire thrown into milk, occupies a limited span of space; but affects the entire milk with its colour. Similarly, the soul physically occupies the body only, but can illumine the whole universe. He states in clear terms :

“The knower has the knowledge, for his nature and all the objects are within the range of knowledge; just as the objects of sight are within the ken of the eye; though, there is no mutual inherence. The knower, who is beyond sense-perception, necessarily knows and sees the whole world, neither entering into nor entered into by the objects of knowledge, just as the eye sees the objects of sight. The knowledge operates on the objects, just as a sapphire, thrown in the milk, pervades

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1. Pravacanasāra, I. 24-26

the whole of it with its lustre. If those objects are not within the knowledge, knowledge cannot be all-pervasive; the knowledge is all-pervasive, how the objects are not existing in it : The omniscient lord neither accepts nor abandons nor transforms the external objectivity, he is all around and knows everything completely".<sup>1</sup>

Thus, we can see that the views of Kundakunda and Brahmadeva are based on the theory of omniscience. They generally exhibit the Vedantic influence. On the other hand Yaśovijaya explains the all-pervasiveness in the light of Nyāya theory.

### *The Aspects of the Self*

According to the Vedānta there are three aspects of soul : Jīva, Īśvara and pure consciousness of Brahman. Brahman is the absolute reality. Jīva is personal soul and Īśvara is universal soul. The latter two are the effects of avidyā; yet, they are included into the six categories admitted as beginningless.<sup>2</sup> The other categories are : Pure consciousness (Brahman), Difference between Jīva and Īśvara, Avidyā and Relation between Avidyā and Pure consciousness. But, the absence of beginning does not give them the status of permanence. All of them, except the pure consciousness are perishable. The Vedānta-conception, in this respect, resembles the Jaina conception of the relation between soul and the karmic matter. It is also beginningless, yet perishable.

The Nyāya divides the self into two : Jīva and Īśvara. Both of them are eternal realities. Īśvara is creator of the universe. Jīva experiences the fruit of his doings according to adṛṣṭa. The only difference between the Nyāya and Vedānta conception is this, that the Nyāya holds them as permanent realities while the Vedānta does not recognise anything as permanent except Brahman. Īśvara of the Nyāya is free from the laws

1. Pravacanasāra I. 27-32

2. Jīvaḥ Īśaḥ viśuddhā cit tathā jīveśayor bhidā /  
Avidyā taccitoryogaḥ ṣa ḍasmākamanādayaḥ //

that govern common souls. The knowledge, will and activity of the common souls are momentary, while those of Īśvara are permanent. Common souls know the object through a contact of sense with the object. Īśvara perceives them directly. The knowledge of ordinary souls apprehends the object only, while for self apprehension they require another cognition, i. e. *anuvyavaśāya*. The knowledge of Īśvara is self-revelatory. Ordinary souls lose their knowledge and other special qualities in the state of liberation, Īśvara holds them permanently.

The Yoga does not recognise Īśvara as an ontological reality, but holds it a mere hypothesis for the practice of yoga.

The Sāṅkhya and probably the Vaiśeṣika system before Praśastapāda do not recognize the existence of God. They hold that all souls are similar in status as well as nature. The yoga system holds Īśvara as a soul with eternal purity. It was never associated with ignorance or passion. It is the highest ideal of human aspiration.

The Jaina also does not recognize any existence of God. It holds that all souls are fundamentally similar and enjoy the same status and nature. Only the karmic influence, which is a foreign matter, makes them different. The theory of evolution, according to Jainism, is the theory of different grades of the karmic influence.

#### **The states of the Liberated and the Bound**

Generally, all the systems, except those of Cārvāka and Mīmāṃsā, recognise two states of the common soul. According to the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika the liberated souls are dispossessed of all the special qualities that distinguish a soul from other objects.<sup>1</sup> According to Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta the real soul is always free. The state of bondage is merely an illusion. According to the Buddhist the soul is a stream of

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1. Praśastapādabhāṣya p. 281.

successive psychical appearances. Liberation means the discontinuation of that stream.<sup>1</sup> Nirvāṇa, as they recognize the liberation, is an extinction. According to Jainism mokṣa or liberation means freedom from the bondage of karmic matter. The person, who, once breaks the contact with karmic matter, is not associated with it again. This state is attained through gradual progress attained by saṃvara and nirjarā.<sup>2</sup> The liberated souls attain four perfections which were lying suppressed so far.

### **The nature of Consciousness (Caitanya)**

According to Jainism consciousness is the very nature of the self, continued in every state under liberation of bondage. It is found in the lowest stage of the psychical evolution as that of Nigoda as well as in the omniscient. It is present in sleep<sup>3</sup> also; otherwise the pleasing experience of sound and comfortable sleep, in the subsequent waking state, cannot be felt. This conception is based on the logic that the soul and non-soul are fundamentally different. They cannot be interchanged. If the soul, at a certain moment, has no consciousness, it would become non-soul; which is against the fundamental conception of dualism. Moreover, the object, once without consciousness cannot possess it, as it is in the case of matter.

The consciousness though not generated quite a new, is open to change and gradation. It is not an unchangeable eternity like cit of the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta. The Jaina differs from Buddhism also, which does not hold the factor of continuity in the successive conscious phenomena. The Jainas hold that consciousness is not merely a chain of successive momentary flashes but a constant factor undergoing various changes. It is a permanent faculty with various manifestation.

### **Pure Consciousness and Jainism**

In the logical period the Jainism have clearly discarded

1. Aśvaghoṣa
2. Tattvārtha 10.2
- 3, Tattvārthaślokaṇṭikā. p. 49

The existence of pure consciousness. They hold that consciousness must have something as its object.<sup>1</sup> In the case of self cognition also they regard self as the object. But in the Jāgamic period we have certain references where the existence of pure consciousness is recognized.

(1) *The Prajñāpanāsūtra* divides upayoga into Nirākārapayoga (inarticulate cognition) and Sākāropayoga (articulate cognition).<sup>2</sup> The term Nirākāra is explained in the logical period, as sāmānyamātra-grahana or the cognition of mere existence.<sup>3</sup> But generality also is an Ākāra. On this ground Vīrasena interprets Nirākāra as appearance without any object.<sup>4</sup> We shall discuss it in the Chapter of Darśana.

(2) Akalaṅka states that consciousness has two forms,<sup>5</sup> the cognition-form and the object-form. Cognition-form is like the mirror without any reflection. The object form is like that with reflection. Cognition-form is common in all apprehensions; but the object-form is different with every appearance. The cognition form is pure consciousness. But the conception of pure consciousness according Jainism is merely a logical analysis. It is not a metaphysical state, as in the Sāṅkhya and Vedānta systems, which hold it a permanent reality. But on discursive level, they also hold that pure consciousness cannot appear alone. Appearance is a mixed phenomenon. Another difference between Jaina and other systems, in this respect is related with the substratum of these two types of consciousness. According to Sāṅkhya there are two separate entities supporting them. According to the Vedānta the former is real and self-supporting while the other is unreal, merely an illusion, based on the former. The Yogācāra admits former as the support of the latter, while the former is self-supported. According to the Sautrāntika

1. Sāstravārtāsamuccaya 387-402

2. Prajñāpanā Upayogadvāra 262

3. Pramāṇanayatattāloka II. 8

4. Dhavalā p. 38-82.



they differ in time only. Pure consciousness appears at the first moment and the other in later stages. According to Jainism both of them exist in one eternal, but changeable reality and both are equally real.

#### *The objects and content of Knowledge*

The above discussion leads us to another controversial point of great significance. There are two kinds of verbs : transitive and intransitive. To know is a transitive verb just like 'to cook' or 'to illumine'. A transitive verb must have some object to operate upon. Cooking is not possible unless there is some material to be cooked. An illumination is not possible unless there is something to be illumined. The object also is one of the means that helps in operation of a transitive verb.

The Mīmāṃsā system follows a quite realistic attitude in this respect and admits the object, not only a means of knowledge, but also holds that knowledge operates on the object and generates in it a quality of manifestedness (*prākāṣya*), just like in the act of cooking the quality of moisture (*vikleđa*) is produced in rice or grain. Other non-Jaina systems also do not find any difficulty as they admit object also as one of the means of knowledge in one or other way.

The Jaina explanation to this problem is this, that knowledge must have something as its object. But, it is not the same as the physical object. We may call the object of knowledge as its content, in order to distinguish it from the material object. The jar which qualifies the cognition of jar (*ghaṭa-jñāna*) is not the same as the material jar. The cognition of jar (*ghaṭa-jñāna*) is a mental phenomenon, while the external jar is physical. The difference between mental and physical worlds is clear in other cases also. The physical approach to an object is quite different from the mental approach. The mental approach does not possess the external object as its destination, while the physical approach does. The destination of mental approach is the mental image. The same is

the cause of memory. After sensation the mind begins to construct images, corresponding to the external object. These images are modifications of consciousness called *jñeyākāra*. Akalaṅka explains it in the following way :

The reflection in a mirror is just like its prototype. But, the latter is not the content of mirror. The mirror contains the reflection only. Similarly, knowledge contains the images or concepts only. They distinguish one cognition from the other; and not the physical objects. It is immaterial whether those concepts resemble the external objects or depend upon them. We have the concepts of past and future objects also. Some of them are real, others mutilated or disfigured, others are merely fanciful.

The theory of the two forms of *jñānākāra* and *jñeyākāra* needs further elucidation just to avoid confusion with other systems. The *Yogācāra* admits that the knowledge itself appears into the forms of subject and object; and the external objects do not exist at all. The Jaina view is different from it. It holds that the external physical objects exist as they appear. But, they do not appear as the content of knowledge. The contents of knowledge are subjective while the material things are objective. The *Sāṅkhya* and *Vedānta* systems hold *vṛtti* as taking the form of object. But, that is a real physical transformation. The *antaḥkaraṇa* of the *Vedānta* and *buddhi* of the *Sāṅkhya* are material objects. The consciousness or *caitanya* of the Jaina is not material. It is not transformed in the shape of the object. *Jñeyākāra* means the state of being qualified with the content. It is just like the mirror with reflection. The Jaina position differs from the coordination (*tadākāratā*) of the Buddhist also. The *Sautrāntika* holds that the *jñāna* is coordinated with the object. The Jaina admits that it is mere attention of the object. The *Vedānta* and *Sāṅkhya* hold pure consciousness and *vṛttijñāna* as representing the *jñānākāra* and *jñeyākāra* respectively. But, according to Jainism they are not two separate entities. They are one and the same thing. The division of two forms is merely logical.

Thus, the content of the knowledge is not something different from knowledge itself. It is the qualification of knowledge. The Vedānta and Sāṅkhya accept a separate existence of consciousness, which is pure and unqualified. The Jainas do not favour this view. They hold that consciousness must have some content or qualification, in all its states.

If we leave aside the grammatical conventions, which sometimes lead to confusion in the domain of philosophy, the question does not arise at all. It arises only in the act theory of Mīmāṃsā, which has its own explanation. According to Jainas different cognitions are mere states or modes of the soul; just like coil and straightness of a snake. Those states may refer to particular object at a particular moment, but do not require the object as an essential cause. Mere reference cannot confer upon the object the credit of causation.

#### Functions of Consciousness

The modern psychology divides consciousness under three functions : knowing, feeling and willing. Gautama in his Nyāyasūtra enumerates six functions as the signs of the self.<sup>1</sup> Out of them jñāna is same as knowing in the modern psychology. Sukha (pleasure) and Duḥkha (pain) are included into feeling; and Icchā (desire), Dveṣa (hatred) and Prayatna (volition) are only different modes of willing. Abhidharma divides these functions into four skandhas or groups : They are Vedanā (feeling) Saṃjñā (ideas) Saṃskāra (volition) and Citta Vijñāna (pure consciousness, without content).<sup>2</sup>

The Jaina division, to some extent resembles that of Buddhism. The Jaina technical term for Citta or pure sensation is Darśana, for Saṃjñā it is Jñāna, for saṃskāra it is Moha. Vedana is the same as in Abhidharma. Cetanā or Caitanya is the common cause of all these functions. According to Jainism these four functions are related with the self

1. Nyāyasūtra 1.1.10; Vaiśeṣikaśūtra 3.2.4

2. Stcherbatsky Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 15

while according to Buddhism they are separate elements grouped together as Skandhas for convenience. They do not come from or belong to any common entity.

Out of these four functions Darśana and Jñāna are natural characteristics of the soul and exist in the state of liberation also. The remaining two functions, that is Vedanā and Moha are the result of karmic influence. They exist in the state of bondage only. Mohanīya is included into four ghātikarmans; which effect the natural qualities of soul. Vedanīya is placed into aghātin karmans, which do not have any direct bearing on the virtues of soul. They are mainly concerned with the physical body. Desire, will etc. are the result of Moha. They are accompanied by pleasure or pain. Vedanīya is mere feeling. It is congenial or reverse according to the physical adjustment. The agreeableness or disagreeableness when accompanied by Moha, becomes intense.

*Bliss is not a Feeling :*

We have stated before 'Infinite Bliss' as one of the four Infinites, existing in the liberated souls. But it is not the same as pleasure. They differ from each other fundamentally. Pleasure results from the attainment of external objects which are desired or liked or which are congenial to our physical existence. Bliss is not produced. It is natural in the soul manifesting itself at the disappearance of Mohanīya karman. It corresponds to the pure Ānanda in Brahman of the Vedantist, and pleasure corresponds to the result of Dharma (adṛṣṭa) as accepted by the Nyāya. Bliss is more of a negative nature, resulting from the destruction of worldly pains. Pleasure has a positive nature, resulting from the worldly gains.

*Feeling in the state of Arhatship :*

There is one more point that requires clarification. In the

state of Arhatship or Jivanmukta, Mohanīya disappears totally while Vedanīya continues, which can produce pleasure and pain in that state also. If it is said that pleasure and pain are generated by the presence of the desired and undesired objects respectively; they are not possible in the state of an Arhat, who has no desire at all on account of total destruction of Mohanīya. For this, our reply is, that congeniality or reverseness to the physical structure also sometimes produces pleasure and pain. An Arhat also feels the pain of pricking a nail into his body and the pleasure of soft touch. The only distinction between him and a layman is that he is not affected or delighted on such occasions, while the latter does. The distinction between knowing and feeling, in the case of an Arhat, is very minute. We can explain it in the following way :

The feeling of pleasure and pain can be divided into two types : mental and physical. Passion, hatred, love, anger and all other psychical states produce the first kind of feeling and it is the result of Mohanīya karman, which does not exist in Arhats. The feeling generated by the effect of bodily states, such as disease, heat or coldness, hurt etc. constitutes the second type; which results from the presence of Vedanīya karman. This feeling exists in the case of Arhats also. It is inevitable with the existence of body. An Arhat knows the pricking of nail in the body of other person as well as in his own. But, he does not feel it which is confined to his body only. This constitutes the difference between feeling and knowing.

### *Feeling and Knowledge*

Dharmakīrti<sup>1</sup> identifies feeling with knowledge. He says that knowledge and feeling are not different from each other as they are produced by the same cause. In his view the difference in effect must have difference in the cause. The Jainas hold

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1. *Pramāṇavārtika* II 251

that knowledge and feelings are two different modes of the same soul. They are not identical. Dharmakīrti's view is mainly based on the principle that unity of cause must have the unity of effect. The Jainas regard that this principle does not hold good in all cases. When a jar is broken, the cracking sound and the broken parts are produced simultaneously by the same cause. But, they are not one and the same thing.<sup>1</sup> More over, it is wrong to hold that there is no difference in the cause. Feeling is produced from the presence of Vedanīya while knowledge is the result of the removal of Jñānāvaraṇīya and Darśanāvaraṇīya. No doubt, soul is the common cause in both cases; but that does not constitute the entire causation. There are many other factors involved in it.

Knowledge and feeling differ in their appearance also. Feeling appears in the form of pleasure or pain while knowledge appears in form of experience of an object. Feeling is the object of liking or disliking as the case may be; knowledge in its pure state is above from these subjective considerations.

Further, knowledge follows the object. A jar cannot be known as a cloth. In the case of illusion also certain objective qualities play an important role. But, this is not the case with feeling. It is not objective, but subjective. Fire produces happiness in a person shivering with cold; but, the same is unpleasant to a person perspiring with scorching heat. It follows that feeling does not depend upon the object but on the experient.

As a matter of fact feeling is the subsequent stage of knowledge. When our body is touched with a hot iron the awareness of heat is not feeling, it is knowledge. At the second stage we feel it unpleasant or pleasant as the case may be. Sometimes we are indifferent. This feeling of pleasantness, unpleasantness or indifference is beyond the scope of knowledge.

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1. Aṣṭasahasī p. 78

The Nyāya<sup>1</sup> and Vaiśeṣika<sup>2</sup> also accept the difference between feeling and knowing. They are separate qualities inhering in the soul. Buddhi is a phenomenon resulting from the contact of senses with the object. Pleasurable and painful feelings are the results of Dharma and Adharma known as Aḍṛṣṭa. Aḍṛṣṭa also inheres in the soul; but according to Jainism the soul itself takes the modes of different feelings. The difference between the two notions is the same as exists regarding the position of soul and knowledge. The Sāṅkhya also holds feeling as the effect of Prakṛti, but, different from knowledge. As far as the ontological position is concerned no system holds any material difference between knowing and feeling. But, all the systems, except the Sautrāntika, admit a difference between them, in the case of functions.

In the ancient Buddhism also this distinction is clearly stated. Majjhimanikāya<sup>3</sup> illustrates the distinction in the following way : In case of two sticks rubbed together, heat is produced simultaneously, so Vedatā takes place simultaneously with sparśa, for they are produced from the same cause.

### *Consciousness and Upapoga*

The first two functions of consciousness, namely perception (darśana) and ideation (jñāna) are known in Jaina terminology as Upayoga. It is a mode of the soul related with consciousness<sup>4</sup>. The term Upayoga literally means a relation by coming near; expressing the relation of the object with knowledge by coming into contiguity.<sup>5</sup> This relation is not a contact as the Nyāya holds. According to Jainism the only thing that is required is the removal of obscurance. The soul is by nature an illuminer. The object is by nature open to be illumined. This relation of

1. Kārikāvalī 145

2. Ibid.

3. Majjhimanikāya

4. Sarvārthasiddhi 2/8-9

5. Tattvārthabhāṣyaṭīkā ( S. S. Gaṇin ) II. 8.

the illuminer and illuminated is obstructed by the karmic veil. There is no other sort of distance between the two but, the obstruction of karman. As soon as it is removed, they come into natural relation. Upayoga means the establishment of this relation. The soul does not require any external means to illumine the object. They are helpful in removing the obstruction only. It means, Upayoga is the removal of this obstruction. In its positive sense it is nothing but the soul. Fire is naturally possessed of the power of burning. But the application of that power depends upon the coming of fuel into contact with it. Fuel does not generate the power or anything else. Similarly, the object does not generate consciousness or upayoga.

Siddhasena defines upayoga in two ways<sup>1</sup> :—

(1) Firstly, upayoga means possession. It is possession of the stages of jñāna and darśana in their limited sphere of objectivity by consciousness. The consciousness, which is a constant characteristic of the self, manifests itself into the stages of jñāna and darśana. This manifestation is upayoga. But, this definition does not include the upayogas of kevalajñāna and kevaladarśana as they are always manifest. They are constant. Siddhasena G. gives another definition for the inclusion of constant upayoga.

(2) According to this definition Upayoga means attention of jñāna and darśana towards the object. This definition can be applied to the case of constant cognition also.

Pūjyapāda defines upayoga as the mode of consciousness caused by two categories of means<sup>2</sup>

Akalaṅka<sup>3</sup> developing the idea of Pūjyapāda states that it is a mode of the cognizer, related with the consciousness;

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1. Tattvārthabhāṣyaṭīkā II. 8

2. Sarvārthasiddhi II. 8

3. Tattvārtharājavārtika II. 8



occurring at the possible presence of external and internal means. Akalaṅka stated all the factors pertaining to Upayoga. The first question is, what is upayoga? Akalaṅka replies that it is a mode of the cognizer. We have already stated that Jainism classifies reality in two fundamental categories; viz., Jīva and Ajīva. The three categories of Pramāṇa, Pramātā and Pramiti, stated by Vātsyāyana come into the category of Jīva and the fourth category of Prameya is Jīva as well as Ajīva. The Jainas hold that it is one and the same thing that undergoes different modes and takes the positions of agent, instrument and the result of knowledge. The second question is, "Do the Jainas admit every mode of the soul as upayoga?" Akalaṅka replies in the negative. Every mode is not upayoga, but only that which is related with consciousness. As a matter of fact consciousness or caitanya is power and upayoga is its application. This is exactly what is meant by the literal sense of the term. The third question is, "what are the causes of Upayoga?" Akalaṅka replies that there are two types of causes : External and Internal. Each of them is further divided into two : Inseparable and separable. Thus, there are four types of sources :

(1) External inseparable (bāhya ātmabhūta)—Physical senses. They are external, because they are material and different from the soul. They are inseparable because they cannot be separated from the body, which is one with the soul as long as it is not liberated.

(2) External separable (bāhya anātmabhūta)—The object, light etc. which are external as well as separable.

(3) Internal separable (ābhyantara anātmabhūta)—The matter constituting physical mind which is the material cause of thinking etc. It is internal yet separable from the soul.

(4) Internal inseparable (ābhyantara ātmabhūta)—Bhāva-yoga or psychical activity of the soul resulting from partial or complete destruction of the obscuring karmic matter.

All the above mentioned four types are not essential everywhere. In certain cases all are necessary, in others, three, two or even one can do. The fourth is essential everywhere. The same is the efficient cause or *jñāna*.

Vidyānanda<sup>1</sup> refers to the two varieties of *upayoga*; viz , *kṣāyika*, resulting from the total destruction of obscurance and *kṣāyopaśamika*, resulting from partial destruction. The first variety does not require any external or separable means. It solely depends upon the fourth type of causes, which is always present. On this ground the two types are described as permanent cognition (*nityopayoga*) and impermanent cognition (*anityopayoga*) *kṣāyika upayoga* is permanent, once appeared it never vanishes, *kṣāyopaśamika*, on the other hand is impermanent. It appears and vanishes according to the external and internal conditions. But, it should be noted that this temporariness does not mean total disappearance. It only means a change in respect of objectivity, intensity, kind etc (as to depends on the proportion of the Karmic veil). These two types can be compared with the light of the sun and that of a candle respectively. The light of the sun pervades the whole region simultaneously. It does not require any movement from one place to another place for illumining the objects. On the other hand the candle light is capable of illumining the objects placed in a narrow region. If we want to see the things outside that region, either we have to move the candle or bring the objects within that region. It can illumine those objects gradually. The *Kṣāyika upayoga* is like the sun. It is generated at the total destruction of karmic veil. The soul with its nature of consciousness begins to illumine all the objects simultaneously. It does not require any order to reach them. It is unlimited or infinite. *Kṣāyopaśamika upayoga* is limited. It reaches the objects generally by order and has to leave the first object before reaching the other. This is why it is held as changing while the former as constant.

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1. *Tattvārthaśloka-vārtika* II. 8.

*Two Upayogas do not occur simultaneously*

All the systems agree that two cognitions do not occur at one and the same moment. But, they give different explanations for it. The Nyāya system explains it on the ground, which is atomic. It cannot contact two objects simultaneously. The Vedānta and Sāṅkhya explain it on the ground of Vṛtti (mode). The Bauddha also admits the theory of tadākārātā (co-ordination), which explains the above fact. According to Jainism an omniscient apprehends all the objects in one upayoga. He does not require further upayogas to cognise other things. The objects of all the three times and the entire universe appear in one and the same cognition. But, the case of imperfect knowledge is different. It cannot focus on two objects simultaneously.<sup>1</sup> One cannot have the attentions of cold and hot at one and same moment. It does not mean that two things are beyond the scope of one attention. We can have the attention of army which includes all the parts of it. But, the attention of army as related with collective noun is quite different from that individual parts. One cannot have the elephants and horses as the objects of one attention individually. Similarly, one object having the characteristics of hot and cold can be focussed in one attention, but not the two characteristics considered individually.

The principle of single upayoga at a time is not confined to the cognitions generated by the senses or mind only. The super-sensual cognitions of avadhi and manaḥparyāya also have single focus at a moment. The case of omniscient also is not exempted from this rule. Kevalins also; are generally accepted as holding one upayoga at a time. But, the objective sphere of that upayoga is so vast that the above rule becomes insignificant. We shall discuss this problem in the chapter of kevala-jñāna.

*Identity between Soul and its function*

We have already discussed the question of identity between

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1. Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya G. 2439-43.

soul, i.e. the agent and the instrument of knowledge. It points out to the fact that soul is the only essential cause of cognition. But, that identity is not confined to the agent and instrument only. The Jainism holds it between the cause and effect also. Thus, knowledge is not totally different from the soul.

We have stated before that the Jaina does not believe in pure existence or the existence as a separate category attributing other things with the status of existence. According to Jainism, existence means association with some purpose. Purposiveness is included into the very nature of every existent. The soul is associated with the purpose or activity of knowledge. Thus, the very existence of soul means its function of cognition. For instance, the existence and illumination are not two separate things in the case of light. They are identical with each other. The apparent difference is based on different relations. In relation to itself the light exists. In relation to an object it illumines. Similarly, the soul exists in relation to its own person, and it cognises in relation to objects. The same act is recognised as shining when related with the personal appearance of a luminary but, it is illumination in relation to the things under it. The same utterance is preaching as well as speaking in different relations. Burning is not different from the very existence of fire. Similarly, the existence of soul means the act of knowing.

Further, cognition is a manifestation of the self. It is its self-expression. Every thing manifests itself into this or that form. The earth manifests itself into the form of jar, cup etc. Those forms are not different from the earth. Similarly the cognitions of jñāna and darśana are manifestations of the self. They are not separate from the latter.

Akalaṅka stresses upon this identity on the basis of Evaṃbhūta naya;<sup>1</sup> the view-point that regards actual function denoted by a particular connotation, as an essential condition for that particular designation. According to it, a student does not

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1. Tattvārtharājavārtika 1.1.26, page 6

deserve that calling when he is on leave or not actually engaged in study. A fire is not fire unless it produces heat or burns something. Similarly, a soul is not soul unless it knows something.

Vidyānanda<sup>1</sup> maintains that term Jñāna has three senses—Apprehension, the power of apprehension and the cogniser. Ontologically, they do not differ from one another. But, when considered epistemologically or with a view to point out some distinction, they are relatively different. He cites the example of fire. There are three aspects in it. The fire as substance, the fire as power of burning, and the fire as act of burning. We say, “The fire burns”. The fire is agent, its power of burning is instrument and burning is action. Similarly, the soul is agent, consciousness or the power of knowing is the instrument and knowledge is the act. This explains the experience of difference among the three categories, actually they are one and the same thing. Vidyānanda’s expression of “svavivartavivartinoḥ” is very significant in this respect. It shows that the soul or consciousness does not leave its original state while engaged in the function of cognition. A snake is always snake whether it is in coil or straight. Similarly, a consciousness is always so, whether it knows a jar or cloth. The word vivarta is not used here in the Vedantic sense of the difference in reality; but, in the sense though both states stand on the same level of reality; one is changing and the other is continued.

Jinabhadra gives three derivations of the term jñāna which explain its different positions ultimately leading to their identity with the soul.<sup>2</sup> According to the first derivation jñāna means the process that leads to apprehension ( jñāti iti ). It is that function of soul which leads to the appearance of an object;

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1. Tattvārthsśloka-vārtika p. 58
  2. Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya p. 80-81

The same is known as upayoga. Vidyānanda holds that the jñāna is power ( labdhi ) and not upayoga<sup>1</sup>. Devasūri<sup>2</sup> rejects this view and holds that labdhi cannot be the efficient cause of knowledge. The efficient cause ( karaṇa ) means that which has the effect as its next stage. The labdhi and knowledge are not successive stages. They are mediated by upayoga. So, the upayoga only can claim to be the efficient cause of knowledge. But, the above objection is not very serious. Upayoga is the function of consciousness; and a function is not considered as an intervention between cause and the effect. The later logicians have changed the definition of karaṇa accordingly. They hold that efficient cause is karaṇa only when it is functioning. However, the function known as jñāna is not different from the soul. The second derivation points out to the cause of knowledge ( jñāyate anena ). It is interpreted as the kṣaya or kṣayopāśama of the corresponding obscurance. In its positive sense, it is also not different from the soul. The third derivation points out to the substratum ( jñāyate asmin ). It is nothing but the soul, where the quality of cognition subsists. Thus, jñāna in its all the three aspects is nothing but soul.

### Relation between Subject and the Object or Proper Epistemology


The definition of knowledge was analysed into three parts. The first part was related with the metaphysical position of knowledge, which has been already discussed. We have known that knowledge is a function of consciousness, that is, the soul. Now, we shall try to know what sort of function it is. In other words we shall try to find out how a subject comes in relation with the object, and thus, we enter into the second phase of the problem; which is the problem of epistemology proper.

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1. Tattvārthaślokavārtika 2.18.1, p. 327

2. Syādvādaratnākara p. 49-50.

The relation between subject and object presupposes the existence of both the factors. But, the Indian as well as the Western systems hold different views regarding it. Some of them hold subject as the only reality, while others resort to the object only. There are others who hold both of them as real or unreal. The second point of controversy is, whether the subject is related with the object directly or through a via media. Amongst the Indian systems epistemology follows metaphysics. First, they fix up a particular notion regarding the nature of universe and then explain the subject-object relation in consonance with their metaphysical conceptions. Epistemologically, we can divide the Indian systems as follows :—



### *The Existence of Subject and Object :*

Before discussing the relation between subject and object we have to ascertain the real nature of these two notions. As far as phenomenal appearance is concerned both of them appear distinctly. There are no two views regarding it. But, regarding their real nature there is a lot of controversy.

(1) The Advaita Vedānta holds that external objects do not exist independent of the subject. They are illusary projections

subsisting in the latter. The subject has a real existence while the object has phenomenal existence.

(2) The Yogācāra maintains that the object does not exist at all. The subject itself appears into the two forms of subject and object.

(3) The Mādhyamika holds that the subject and object both are phenomenal.

(4) The realistic systems on the other hand, hold independent and a real existence of both the subject as well as object. But, they also hold divergent views regarding their actual nature. According to the Buddhist the object is absolutely particular without any mixture of generality which is purely subjective. According to Sāṅkhya it is general. The others hold it as a combination of both. The Jaina holds that the object exists independent of the subject and possesses the characteristics of generality as well as particularity relatively.

The main objection against the idealist systems is this, that the apparent diversity in cognition can not be explained without diversity in the objects. If the objects do not exist at all or do not possess real existence, where from this diversity comes? The example of dream also cannot explain it; because, the dreams are not absolutely unconnected with the objective reality. The world of dream is composed of only these objects as are already experienced. The only difference is that they appear in the relations different from their real existence. The past impressions also cannot explain this diversity as the diversity in impressions also must have some cause behind it. Ultimately, we shall have to admit some external cause responsible for diverse cognitions and impressions.

Further, we observe a lot of difference between the subjective and the objective appearances. The appearance of pleasure pain etc. is subjective. It differs with the subject. No two persons feel alike. But, the appearance of jar, i. e.



objective appearance is one and the same, in spite of the difference in cognisers. Objective appearance changes with the change of object. The subjective appearance, on the other hand, changes with the change of subject. The idealist cannot explain this difference between the two appearances.

The Jaina is an empiricist. He holds that everything that is apprehended must have objective existence. He differs from the realistic Buddhism also, which holds the notion of class as merely conceptual. On the other hand he discards the Sāṅkhya view also, which holds the notion of particularity as merely conceptual. The Jaina holds that the aspects of generality and particularity, both are real and objective. Both of them exist in each and every object.

Now, we come to the question of relation between the two. According to the Advaita Vedānta the object is related with the subject through the mode of antaḥkaraṇa. The antaḥkaraṇa goes out through the medium of senses and transforms itself into the form of object. This mode of antaḥkaraṇa destroys the obscuring ajñāna, lying with the consciousness conditioned by the object. 'This results into the appearance of jar which was projected by avidyā.

According to Yogācāra this relation means appearance of the subject in the form of object.

Amongst realists the Sautrāntika and Sāṅkhya are the advocates of representation theory. The Sautrāntika holds that Jñāna takes the form of object. This he calls tadākāratā (coordination). Thus, cognition of jar means the coordination of jar by jñāna. The latter does not reach the object directly, but gets its coordination and can infer the existence of object, through it. The Sāṅkhya holds that the object is reflected into the mode of buddhi. Cognition means the apprehension of that reflection only. In the vṛtti of Vedānta the contact with the object is real. In the case of Sāṅkhya it is merely a reflection. Thus, the buddhi is not able to reach the object directly.

The other realistic systems do not believe in the theory of representation. They hold that the object is presented to the subject directly. But, the presentation is not one and the same in all systems.

(1) The presentation according to Nyāya means physical grasping. The term *upalabdhi* used by Gautama, Vātsyāyana and Vācaspati signifies the idea. Udayana has substituted it by *paricchitti* (measuring) which also denotes the same thing. The Nyāya is very particular about its theory of contact. Cognition means the contact of the soul with the object through mind. The soul, according to Nyāya is all-pervading. It is always in contact with the objects far and near. But, that kind of contact is not sufficient for cognition. The contact that results into cognition must be through the mind. The soul is united with the mind, the mind with the senses, and the senses with the object. Thus, in the case of perception it is a four-fold contact. In the case of feelings it is two-fold, i.e. the soul is united with the mind. But, the contact between senses and the object is not same in all the cases. In the perception of a substance it is unity (*saṁyoga*). In the perception of *guṇas* it is united—inherence (*saṁyukta samavāya*). In the case of generality existing in the *guṇas* it is united-inherent-inherence (*saṁyukta- samaveta - samavāya*). In the cognition of sound it is inherence. In the case of generality existing in the sound it is inherent-inherence (*samaveta samavāya*). In the cognition of non-existence it is merely a qualification (*viśeṣaṇatā*). Though the Naiyāyika is very particular in establishing some sort of physical contact between subject and the object; yet, his theory of six-fold contact is so generous that it can establish the contact anywhere.

The Mīmāṃsaka also supports the theory of contact and all-pervasiveness of the soul. But, his idea of knowledge is different from the Nyāya, He holds knowledge not as grasping

but as generating the quality of manifestedness (*prākāṭya*) on the object.

The Jaina, in accordance with his notion of limited size of the soul, does not believe in the theory of contact or grasping. He contends that the soul is confined to the body, while knowledge can cover the whole universe. The relation with the object means simply illumination of the object. The sun while sticking to its own place illumines the earth. It is not necessary for him to stay with the object of its illumination. Similarly, the soul does not come into direct contact with the objects; nor they are represented by *via media*, but illumined by the soul when the obscurance of *karmans* is removed. Thus, according to Jainism knowledge means the removal of this obscurance which naturally results into the illumination of an object. Further, this illumination is not a quality generated in the object as the *Mīmāṃsaka* holds. The knowledge is totally a subjective phenomenon. Illumination also is the function of soul. The Jaina term for it is *upayoga* (attention). The main objection against the *Mīmāṃsā* is this, if the quality of manifestedness is produced in the object, the latter should be apprehended also by the person who is not attentive. On the other hand the effect of manifestation by a particular subject is confined to that person only. In the case of light where the illumination is an objective phenomenon, the illumined object is open to the vision of every body. The objective phenomenon of touch is open to everybody's apprehension. But the quality of manifestedness generated by A is not open to B. It is therefore, purely subjective.

This Jaina position is unique in this respect. It admits neither reflection, nor modification. The illustration of the sun also does not explain the position fully. Kundakunda cites the example of sapphire placed into milk. The sapphire makes the milk appear green without pervading the entire area. But, this example also does not explain the phenomenon of illu-

mination as an individual factor related with the subject only.

*Kundakunda's View Explained*

Kundakunda maintains that whatever knows the object, is knowledge. It modifies itself and all the objects stand in knowledge. The two commentators, Amṛtacandra and Jayasena take different courses to explain it. Amṛtacandra takes the position of Sautrāntika and holds that knowledge takes the form of object. This change in form is caused by the object; and consequently the latter stands in knowledge. Standing in knowledge according to this interpretation is to be reflected in knowledge.

But this view goes against the Jaina position in two ways. Firstly, the Jainas do not admit the knowledge as taking the form of object. The Jaina logician have criticised the Sautrāntika bitterly, on this very issue, Jñeyākāra, as we have already stated, is not a mode of jñāna but, the state of being qualified. Secondly, the Jaina does not admit object as the cause of knowledge, to which the above interpretation naturally leads.

Jayasena's interpretation is more logical. He holds that the statement that all objects stand in knowledge should not be taken in literal sense. It is only an allegorical statement just as we say that mirror contains the jar. As a matter of fact the mirror does not hold the jar but, only gets its reflection. Similarly, the object does not stand in knowledge. It is only manifested in it. He only means that a cognition never appears without having an object as its datum. Whenever there is a cognition it must be associated with some object. Thus, an object in the form of datum must stand in knowledge. It does not mean that Kundakunda is in favour of the theory of representation. This confusion rises from the Jayasena's simile of mirror. But, we should note that Jayasena writes "ādarśa bimbamiva" and not "pratibimbamiva". He does not say that the object stands in knowledge just like the reflection of an object. He says that the object itself stands in the mirror.

The reflection is only a *via media*. Similarly, the object itself stands, in knowledge through its *via media* of objectivity. The word ‘*vyavahāreṇa*’ is significant here. He means by it that the above view can be held in a discursive way only. Actually, the position is quite different.

Kundakunda himself has stated the actual position by saying “The knower has knowledge for his nature and all the objects are within the range of knowledge, just as the objects of sight are within the ken of the eye, though there is no mutual inherence ”

“The knower, who is beyond sense perception necessarily knows and sees the whole world neither entering into nor entered into by the objects of knowledge, just as the eye sees the objects of sight.”<sup>1</sup>

“The knowledge operates on the objects, just as sapphire, thrown into milk, pervades the whole of it with its lustre.”<sup>2</sup>

As a matter of fact, Kundakunda analyses the problem in two aspects. The knowledge as power and the knowledge as function. As far as the knowledge as power is concerned it is confined to the body only, and we cannot say that objects stand into knowledge. But, as regards the function it is not limited; just as a lamp has its function of illumination beyond the place it occupies; knowledge also covers the entire universe with its function.

It can be further asked that knowledge is either instrument or agent. In both cases its operation is possible only at the spot of its existence. When the soul has a limited size the cognition of distant objects is not possible. This question does not arise in the case of Sāṅkhya, Vedānta, Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā, because they hold soul as omnipresent and maintain different theories to establish its real contact with the object.

Kundakunda analyses the question in two view-points of popular aspect (*vyavahāra dṛṣṭi*) and that of real aspect

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1. Pravacanasāra I. 29.

(niścaya-dṛṣṭi). According to the former the soul is co-extensive with knowledge and knowledge is co-extensive with the object. In the case of omniscient the object of knowledge comprises the whole physical and non-physical universe therefore, knowledge is omnipresent. He who does not admit the soul to be co-extensive with knowledge, must concede that the soul is either smaller or greater than knowledge. If the soul is smaller, knowledge being insentient cannot know, if greater, how can it know in the absence of knowledge? The great Jina is every where and all the objects in the world are within him, since the Jina is an embodiment of knowledge and since they are objects of knowledge.

In this view Kundakunda, under the influence of the Vedānta, has made an attempt to reconcile the Jaina view of the limitedness of the soul with the Vedānta. But it has resulted in a confusion and the Jina position regarding the theory of knowledge has become rather indefinite. None of the later scholars has appreciated this view and has supported the theory of presentation regarding knowledge.

According to the real aspect the knowledge and object are separate from each other. They are defined differently. They are not co-extensive. They are related in a subject-object relation, without any physical mixing.

## The Object of Knowledge

The third point in the definition of knowledge is related with its object. According to the definition of Yaśovijaya the knowledge illumines the object as well as the self.

The Nyāya holds that knowledge manifests the object only. It cannot reveal itself. The knowledge of a jar can be known by a second knowledge, which is called Anuvyavasāya or after-thought. The Nyāya theory is based on the contention that nothing is cognized unless it comes into contact with the soul through mind. This rule is equally applicable to the external as well as the internal objects. Even the attributes of soul, such

as pleasure, pain, desire etc. are not known until the mind comes into their contact. Knowledge, according to the Nyāya, as has been stated before, is grasping in the physical sense. This grasping implies difference between the object grasped and that which grasps. The factor of grasping which is another name of knowledge, can not be grasped by itself. It requires another knowledge to be grasped.

The main objection against the Nyāya, advanced by other systems, is that the contention of after-thought leads to regress ad infinitum. If the cognition of jar requires another cognition to be cognized, the second cognition would require a third one and so on. The Nyāya replies to the objection that the judgement of the existence of jar stands in need of the apprehension of jar only. The second judgement, regarding the knowledge of jar requires another knowledge to apprehend it. It is not necessary for the first judgement that its knowledge must be cognized. The regress ad infinitum is applicable only if the first judgement is impossible without the second and second without the third. In the present case first judgement occurs with cognition of the jar without waiting for its own apprehension. The Jaina contends that no judgement can be confirmed unless its source is apprehended.

The Bhaṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā goes a step further and holds that the knowledge of object i. e. pot, is not perceived even at subsequent moment. It is never directly known, either with the object or at a subsequent moment of reflection. The dictum runs, "Just as the tip of a finger cannot touch itself, so knowledge cannot know itself by itself". Knowledge is known, however, through inference. In order to explain the quality of manifestedness (jñātatā) abiding in the object we must suppose, for want of any other explanation, that there was such a thing as knowledge of the object. Knowledge, therefore, is never known directly; it is inferred through the quality of knownness, that exists in the object and is experienced in the appearance of the pot.<sup>1</sup>

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1. Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi, p. 18

Prabhākara disagrees with Kumārila and holds every cognition as self-illuminative. He maintains that each and every apprehension is constituted of the three factors of knowledge, the self and the object. He calls it as *trīpuṭi-pratyakṣa*.<sup>1</sup>

Murāri Miśra on the other hand holds that after the cognition of pot, there is an after-appearance which has the above mentioned three factors as its objects.<sup>2</sup>

The Advaitins do not accept any of these positions. Against Bhaṭṭa they argue : The Bhaṭṭas seem to think that, as a result of the knowing activity of the self the object (the pot) comes to acquire the quality of being known which is similar to its other qualities of size, colour, etc. and that the knowledge of the pot is to be inferred from this objective of quality. But, this theory is unintelligible; because, we cannot understand how the knowing activity of the self should be able to endow the object with the quality of knownness, which is to be conceived as objective like the properties of colour, size, etc. It is contradictory to think, as the Bhaṭṭas do, that knowledge is the activity of the self, and yet, the result of this activity (viz. knownness) is an objective characteristic on a par with colour, size, etc. The result of the activity of the self must be in the self and not in the object; that is, it must be subjective and not objective. The attempt to infer the knowledge of an object from any objective characteristic is, therefore, doomed to failure. Consequently, the theory of the Bhaṭṭas is untenable.

As against the Naiyāyikas, the Advaitins argue that the theory that knowledge known in a subsequent reflective knowledge involves a great difficulty. To suppose one knowledge to be the object of another knowledge is to hold that two states of knowledge exist together at the same time, which is inconceivable. It faces one more difficulty. The Nyāya holds that the subsequent reflective knowledge, in which the previous knowledge is known as an object, is a self-conscious judgement of

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1. *Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi*, p. 18.

2. *Ibid*,



the form, "I know the pot (ghaṭam aham jānāmi)" or what is the same as "I possess the knowledge of pot" (ghaṭa jñānavā-naham). In such a case, the knowledge (of the pot) comes to be perceived as a quality inhering in the self. The self is directly perceived, and knowledge is perceived indirectly through perception of the self. In the Nyāya scheme of relations between the mind and the percept, already explained, the relation between the perceiving mind and this knowledge falls within the class of saṃyukta samavāya i. e. inherence in the conjoined. For, in this case first there is a direct connection of mind with the self, and then, through the self, with the knowledge inhering in it. But, this account of the Nyāya does not satisfactorily explain the knowledge of knowledge. The self according to the Nyāya has many qualities inhering in it and all of them are not held to be perceived in the perception of the self. As the attribute of a self is not necessarily perceived, therefore, in the perception of the self, it is of little help to say that knowledge is perceived as being an attribute of the perceived self. For, even then, to answer the question why the attribute knowledge should be perceivable, whereas some other attributes of the self are not perceivable, the Nyāya must say, because knowledge is an attribute of the nature of which is to be perceived. "If so, the Vedāntist asks, what harm is there in supposing that it is the very nature of knowledge to be perceivable, they gain little by resorting to the round about way of explaining that knowledge is perceived as an attribute inhering in the self, which is perceived by the mind.

The Vedāntins themselves hold that it is the nature of knowledge to be self-manifest. When the pot is known, the knowledge of the pot also becomes manifest at that very moment. The self manifesting the nature of knowledge is regarded by the Vedāntins to be a natural subjective characteristic, which, therefore, cannot be classed under immediacy (pratyakṣatva) as pertaining to objects. As Mādhavācārya puts it "Things like pots are perceived as objects. But knowledge being self-manifest

cannot be regarded as an object of perception.”

The Jainas also hold knowledge as self-manifest. It is like the lamp which illumines the object as well as itself. The self-manifestation and the manifestation of the object are not two functions. It is one function, where all the three factors of knowledge, the self and the object appear simultaneously.

### **The Jina Stand-point clarified**

The theory of manifestation or illumination implies that our knowledge solely depends upon experience. Whatever we know is given, and enjoys an existence independent of the mind. Not only the substances or physical qualities but the relations, class concepts and all other categories have their objective existence.

According to Jainism a thing is possessed of an infinite number of attributes and characteristics. Out of them certain qualities are natural (*svabhāva*) while others are derivative (*Vibhāva*) i. e. caused by external association. Consciousness in *Jīva* is a natural quality. It is neither produced nor destroyed. The *Jīva* does not depend upon any external factor for its possession. But the possession of divine or human body is not independent. The *Jīva* depends upon *pudgala* or other factors for their possession. They are not natural. Similarly, *pudgala* has corporeality as its natural quality. But, its transformation into a physical body is derivative. According to the *Vedānta*, the natural qualities are real, while others unreal. But, according to Jainism, there is no difference between the two as far as reality is concerned. Perishability or permanence have no value in this respect. Everything that exists, temporary or permanent, natural or derivative, is on the same level as far as reality is concerned. All of them are objective and external.

### **Reality is not confined to the Existence only**

Further, the Jaina does not believe that reality is confined to the existences only; which is only an aspect of it. The reality

consists of many other aspects also in addition to the existence. The aspects of existence and non-existence are governed by four factors. They are : Substantiality (Dravya), Space (Kṣetra), Time (Kāla) and State (Bhāva). Everything exists in relation to its own substantiality, space, time and the state. The same thing does not exist in relation to the substantiality etc. possessed by another thing. But, as far as reality is concerned, both aspects are objective and stand on equal footing. As a matter of fact they are implied by each other. Existence implies non-existence in relation to the factors other than governing the existence. Similarly, non-existence implies existence in different relations. One without the other is unconceivable. To say, that one is real and objective and the other as unreal and merely conceptual has no reason. The cognition of both the aspects is an experience, based on external reality. The Jaina differs from the Mīmāṃsā also which holds that the cognition of absence (abhāva) as purely mental.

### **Generality and Particularity**

What has been said about existence and non-existence, applies to the question of generality and particularity also. The Buddhists like Diṇṇāga and Dharmakīrti hold that sense-experience is confined to particularity only. The class-concepts are purely mental and are added to the particulars afterwards. Kant also holds that the time, space, class and all other categories of understanding are supplied by the mind. According to Jainism generality and particularity, both are objective. Nothing is supplied by the mind. They are two aspects of the same reality rolled into one. The mind only arranges them.

### **Knowledge : True and False**

It can be argued; if nothing appears in knowledge which does not exist objectively, the difference between true and the false would disappear; as both of them would refer to the objects existing externally. The Jaina replies that objectivity or subjectivity of a cognition has nothing to do with its truth or

falsehood. A cognition is false when the something appears in the context other than its own. In the case of the conch-shell appearing as silver, the silver exists in relation to its own substantiality of silverness. It does not exist in relation to shellness as it appears in the present case. Similarly, it exists in relation to its own space, i. e. the shop where it is sold, and not in relation to the space where it is appearing. The same is the case with time and state also. The Jaina does not hold that the silver is purely mental as the Vedānta or Yogācāra does. He says the silver and shell both exist in relation to their contexts. A cognition is false when the context is disordered.

False knowledge is that which represents things in relation in which they do not exist. When a rope, in a badly lighted place, gives rise to the illusion of a snake, the illusion consists in taking the rope to be a snake i. e. perceiving the snake where it does not exist. Snakes exist and ropes also exist, there is no untruth in that. The error, thus, consists in this, the snake is perceived where the rope exists. The perception of a snake under relations and environments in which it is not then existing, is, what is meant by error here. What was at first perceived as a snake was later on contradicted and thus, found false. Falsehood, therefore, consists in the misrepresentation of objective facts in experience. Illusion consists in attributing such spatial, temporal or other kinds of relations to the objects of our judgement as do not actually exist, but the objects themselves actually exist in other relations. When I mistake the rope for a snake, the snake actually exists, though its relation with 'this' as 'this is a snake' does not exist, for the snake is not the rope. This illusion is thus, called *Sadasatkhyāti* or misrelating the existents.

The truth and falsehood of the context are ascertained by the subsequent correspondance or contradiction. The criterion of falsity is not subjectivity of the appearance, but its contradiction. If a judgement is contradicted by another judgement of unquestionable truth, the former is to be rejected as untrue.

Subjective experience, as illustrated by dream, is rejected as false because it is contradicted by the waking experience. There is no intrinsic characteristic of falsity. The problem of falsity is thus, ultimately a question of experience. The problem of truth also is no less a matter of experience and a priori logic is absolutely incompetent to deal with it. We have discussed it further in the chapter on *ajñāna*.

### **The Personal experiences explained**

Again, it can be asked; if the whole data of knowledge are supplied by the experience, how do you explain the cognitions based on personal attitude? The same person is cognised by one subject as his enemy, while by the other as his friend. If the attributes of enmity and friendship are possessed by the object, why they are not common to both the subjects. The subject holding friendly attitude does not see the object as an enemy and the subject holding hostile attitude does not perceive him as a friend. Moreover, if they are the objective characteristics; why they are not perceived by an omniscient? If they are perceived, how do you explain his attitude of indifference?

The Jaina replies that the above notion has two aspects. It is concerned with knowledge as well as feeling. When both of them are intermixed, they result into a confusion. There is a lot of difference between the appearances when we feel an enemy and when we know an enemy. The knowledge of enemy is totally objective while its feeling is subjective. Like all other judgements the judgement of 'He is an enemy' also is relative. None can say that this statement is unconditional. A person is enemy in relation to a particular person, time or occasion. Enemy means a person hatred or harmful attitude towards another. If a person really possesses such an attitude he is enemy of the person towards whom he holds such an attitude; and this judgement is not particular to any subject. Even a dispassionate person (*vītarāga*) can behold it. It does not, in any way, affect his own attitude towards the object of the judgement. He only knows his (of the object) attitude of

enmity towards a particular person. The omniscient himself is free to have his own attitude. He is not dependent in that respect. Similarly, a third person also can know the state of affairs as good as the persons involved in it. But, he is not affected with the results and, therefore, is free from the feeling of pleasure or pain.

The feeling of enmity is a sort of mental pain, which is like all other feelings, subjective. It results from the intensity of hatred lying with the subject. If the hatred is not intense the feeling will be mild. An omniscient is absolutely free from it, and therefore, does not have such feelings. Similarly, a third person who is not attached with the result, is away from such feelings.

An omniscient does not hold harmful attitude towards anybody; and therefore, he is an enemy to none. Still, another person can have hostile attitude towards him. He can feel the omniscient as his enemy and the question of its being right or wrong does not arise. It pertains to ethics and not logic. But, when a third person or he, himself, makes a judgement proposing the omniscient lord as his enemy he is wrong. Because, the factors that can establish the enmity do not exist in relation to the omniscient.

One can explain this point in another way also. Three ladies perceive a person in different relations. For one, it is a perception of the son, for second that of the brother and for third that of the husband. It can be asked whether these qualities are actually possessed by the person so perceived, or they are imposed by the ladies concerned. If they are objective why they are not common to all of them ?

The Jaina reply to this question also is the same as that of the former. As far as knowledge is concerned the judgement is common. Everybody can see a person as brother in relation to a particular lady. Even his wife knows that A is brother of B. But the pleasure that results from the sight of a brother is particular to that lady only to whom he is so related. The quali-

ties of being brother, husband or son are as objective as those of being jar etc. Just as, we call a thing 'jar' in relation to a particular form etc., similarly, we call a person brother who stands in a particular relation to the other person. Both connotations depend on the popular conventions. There is no ground in viewing one as objective and the other as subjective.

### **The Jaina and Different forms of Objectivism**

With a view to have a clear vision of the Jaina position we can further compare it with the three trends of the objectivism prevalent in the western philosophy.

### **The Jaina and Primitive Objectivism**

The method of primitive objectivism conceives of every object of experience as existing, and as existing independent of the fact that it is experienced. Just as a chair can stand in relation of nearness to a table without depending in any way for its existence upon that relation, so from this most extreme of the realistic standpoint any object can stand in relation of being known by someone without being in any way affected thereby. Things are apart from us just as what they seem when experienced by us. This appears to be the standpoint of the child and the savage. It does not make any distinction between the events that appear in dreams and illusions, and the events that figure in waking life as common to many individuals. The illusory objects, instead of being regarded as mental or subjective, are considered by primitive realism to be merely queer and unreliable physical existents. The child does not think of dreamland as a place within his head, but, as a remote and fantastic realm, some how cut off from the world of waking life. And as it is with the dreamland of the child, so it is with the ghostland of the savage, which is populated in large measure with the products of his dreams, fancies and tribal legends.

The Jaina does not admit physical existence of the world of dreams as it appears. Nevertheless, the constituents of the dreamland are as physical as those of the waking world.

According to Jainism the knowledge of every being except that of the omniscience is alloyed with passions and other karmic effects; which disfigure or colour the vision like the coloured glasses. They do not allow the object to appear in its own context. This disfiguring sometimes amounts to a very high degree and we call it illusion. When the degree is not so high we consider it valid cognition. The difference between the two is that of degree and not quality. The cognition of a layman is valid to certain degree only. Nothing is absolutely valid or invalid. Even the appearance of the moon as two or with smaller size is valid as far as the existence of the moon is concerned. It is wrong in respect of the number and size which are not related with the object. It is caused by the external causes such as the displacement of the eyeball or distance.

Dream is nothing but the memory revived. Its material is supplied by the past experience. On account of sleep (nidrā) a variety of Darśanāvaraṇīya, the memory does not appear in its own characteristic. Mohanīya disfigures it through the forces of hatred, desire, passion, etc. and makes it appear in a queer form. We call the dream an illusion or invalid cognition because, the memory is so disfigured that it loses its ownself and the karmic effect comes into foreground. In the waking state also, when darkness, inner fear and such other factors pollute the vision, the rope appears as a snake. The difference between knowledge and the disfigurement is this, that the former is the result of the removal of karmic obscurance while the later results from the karmic rise (udaya). The first depends upon the object while latter on the subject.

Thus, the Jaina does not discard the subjective element altogether, but holds that it is not knowledge. We have already stated that feeling and willing, the psychical functions other than knowledge, are no doubt, subjective. But, as far as knowledge is concerned, it has nothing which is not given. We can further clarify this point by comparing it with a mirror. The mirror does not reflect anything which does not exist externally. But



if there is some defect in the glass or polish the reflection is disfigured. This disfiguring is not reflection though it appears alongwith it. Similarly, the elements of illusion are not knowledge, though they appear with the latter.

The primitive objectivism accepted every form of appearance as knowledge without any discrimination, while, the Jaina analyses such experiences into two parts; the one is knowledge and the other is feeling, a non-cognitive function of consciousness. The knowledge is a natural function of the same while the latter is a karmic influence. The primitive objectivism accepted the appearance of dreams also as having a corresponding physical world. According to Jainism it is worked out by memory plus karmic effects.

### **The Jaina and Commonsense Objectivism**

The common sense objectivism regards the so-called unreal as merely subjective and exclusively inside the mind, while at the same time all that is physically real, is regarded as independent of, or external to the mind, although directly or immediately present in it.

The technical weakness of the commonsense realism consists in the fact that the admittedly real objects of our experience can be shown to be (selectively) relative to the minds that know them, to exactly the same extent as the objects of the most fantastic dreams; and if (selective) relativity implies subjectivity in one case it should imply equally in the other.

The difficulty in maintaining the modified realism of the common sense epistemology can be perhaps more clearly seen, if we take the stand-point of a bystander or uninterested observer who views the knowledge situation as it appears in relation to a mind other than his own. From this stand-point we find that another persons' report of what he experiences does not depend merely or primarily upon the nature of the objects themselves, as we experience them, but, upon the posi-

tion and general condition of the person who makes the report.

To illustrate : If my neighbour and I are both looking at some common physical object, such as chair or a mountain, and if my neighbour presses his eyeball and reports the resulting movements in the object, which to me continues to appear motionless, then I see myself forced to believe that the object which he experiences, some how depends upon his action, and there it differs from the object which I experience, and which I assume to be independently real. In short, when my neighbour's experience of such things as chairs and tables differs from my own, by varying with his position and behaviour I explain the discrepancy by assuming that the objects of his experience exist only in his mind and not in the space that surrounds us. Thus, there comes to be formed the notion of a realm of 'mere ideas' or 'states' of consciousness dependent upon the knower and separate from the real objects to which they more or less accurately correspond. These secondary or subjective objects are at first conceived as residing only in the minds of others. We continue to think of ourselves as apprehending the external world directly and truly, even after we discover that our neighbours can apprehend it only indirectly in the form of subjective effects or images which it produces in them. This naively egotistic attitude, however, cannot long endure. The same reasons that made us believe that our neighbours perceived internal reflections or copies of things rather than things themselves will be advanced by them as proof that we, too, are cut off from a direct consciousness of anything other than our own mental states.

The Jaina does not draw any line between the true and false cognitions as far as their objectivity is concerned. The data of false cognition is as objective as that of the true. The only difference between them, as has been stated before, lies in their relative appearance. In true cognition a thing appears in the same relations as it persists. In false cognition it appears in a perverted form. The reality or pervertedness of an

appearance is ascertained through subsequent correspondance or contradiction. We know the vision of a person as perverted when his knowledge is contradicted by the subsequent cognitions or other tests. On the contrary if cognition corresponds to the subsequent factors, the vision is true.

The Vedānta and other schools of idealism argue that in the world of dream we see one dream holding correspondance with the other. The cognition of a person having jaundiced eye can be confirmed by another person having the same defect. We cannot say merely on the basis of this correspondance, that the preceding cognition was true. The Jaina replies that correspondance does not mean merely support by the subsequent factor, but a confirmation by a cognition or behaviour of unquestionable validity. According to Jainas the absolute validity can be obtained in the state of omniscience only; where a thing can be known in all its aspects. In the case of discursive knowledge the validity or invalidity depends on the subsequent behaviour. Ultimately, we have to accept an authority on which all the cognitions can be tested. If we question, Vidyānanda says, even the validity of that fundamental standard, we can stay nowhere; and the system of entire philosophical structure will collapse.

The difficulties that stand in the way of the common-sense objectivism do not arise in the case of Jainism; because, it accepts a test of the validity, whose authority is final.

### **The Jaina and New Objectivism**

The third form of the objectivism holds that concrete objects of perception owe their nature to the relations in which they stand to the individuals who perceive them.

In order to clarify this point, let us consider the case of an apparent convergence of the parallel rails of the track as viewed from the rear platform of a train. The relativistic objectivist, would explain the appearance that the converging rails were as physical, external and objective as the parallel rails

themselves; but, that each pair of rails is relative to a context rather than independent and absolute. The same rails may in one context be parallel; in another, convergent; in still another perhaps, divergent. The whole situation can, moreover, be explained in terms of purely physical (optical) laws, without invoking any psychic factor or mind, where a photographic plate put in place of the human eye the result would be analogous, if not identical.

The new objectivist explains the cases of dreams and outright hallucinations also on the same line as those of distorted perspective. The brain of a person suffering from hallucination must be considered in relation not only to the present, but also to those past events of the material world with which it has interacted and which constitute what we call its 'memories' or 'apperception mass'. The unreal objects which appeal to the diseased imagination as external, are external in that particular and highly complicated system that includes past events together with the present abnormal condition of the persons' blood and nerves. To express the whole view in technical terms we may characterize relativistic objectivism as the theory that the relations between two phenomena of experience are rarely dyadic, but are always at least triadic; that what appears to be a simple case of A. R. B. (A related in a given way to B) is in reality a case of (A-R-B.) R-C- (A related to B with reference to a given context C); and an important element in the context C will be the brain of the percipient.

The first difficulty with this position consists in the fact that the diverse appearances of the same thing in different context always presuppose a single primary system of events, each of which occupies a single unequivocal position in objective space-time and it is by means of this single public and physical system that the variety of private and subjective perspectives can be explained and harmonized. Thus, to return to our illustration of the parallel train tracks: there are as many degrees of apparent or perspective convergence of the rails as

there are points of observation in a straight line. But, despite these variations of perspective, the rails behave as if they were parallel, and the whole series merely perspective convergence can be explained as the simple optical effects upon differently situated recipients which would be produced by a single pair of really parallel rails.

The second objection is based on the fact whether or not we always ought to be content with apprehending facts and relations with the qualifying phrase "real for us" or true in this context', we are never thus content. Unless we are conscious of being deceived, every one of our cognitive assertions—the most immediate perception no less than the most reflective judgement—claims to transcend the context in which it occurs and to confer upon its objects a status of universal and absolute existence.

The Jaina also believes in relativity, but his conception of relativity is quite different from that of the new objectivist. According to Jainism the nature of a thing is not relative in the sense that it exists in relation to a particular point of vision only. A thing possesses innumerable qualities without depending upon the cognizer. In the case of *derivativa* (*Vibhāva*) qualities also we can only say that they are adventitious. They are generated by a cause different from the self. But, while they are existing they are as real as the natural ones. The soul and the body constitute one unit in the form of a man. It may depend upon external factors for its birth, but once produced it stands by itself. Its existence does not depend upon the relation with the cognizer. It will exist, without consideration of being looked at from a particular point of view.

At the time of expression we stress upon one point and ignore the others. It does not mean that it exists in relation to the very point of outlook. It exists in relation to the very nature of the reality. For, instance, a thing is external as well as evanescent. The eternity and evanescence do not depend

upon any external factor. But, when a person wants to stress upon one of them he expresses it in relation to this or that factor. That existence does not depend upon the cognizer. The cognizer is free to choose any of the qualities already existing for his expression. He cannot impose anything new. Similarly, no quality exists in relation to him.

Secondly, the Jaina does not say that all the qualities and relations are physical. The existences are physical as well as non-physical. But non-physicality does not necessarily mean subjectivity. There are many non-physical objective qualities; such as knowledge, action etc. which are neither subjective nor physical.

Thirdly, the Jaina would not say that the perception of the convergence of the rails is true. It emphatically denies the relation of convergence with the rails. It only says that all the factors of convergence and rails are supplied by the experience. The defective appearance is the result of the defective sight or angle of vision. We cannot say that the convergence or other relations exist as they appear. They are wrongly imposed there by the defective sight, passions or other factors.

Thus, the Jaina is free from the difficulty which was faced by the objectivist. The Jaina does not place all the notions, true as well as wrong at the same level. According to him, both are objective, but in the one case the context is real while in the other perverted. Moreover, subjective elements as those of feelings, passions and others also play an important part in such cases. They are generally a mixture of feeling and knowing. If we dissect the two elements clearly the difficulty will be removed by itself.

### **The Jaina and Kant**

According to Kant our knowledge, no doubt, begins with experience, but is not wholly derived from experience. Knowledge consists of impressions derived from experience, together with other elements supplied by the faculty of knowledge from

within itself. "This leaf is green" is a piece of knowledge. The mere green impression of the sense represents no knowledge, till it is organized by the ideas of substance (leaf) and quality (green) supplied by the understanding. Our faculty of knowledge however, cannot work unless it gets its material from sense impressions.

The Jaina agrees with Kant as far as he holds that experience and mind both cooperate in production of knowledge. But, the Jaina does not admit any element supplied from within. No doubt, our mind organizes the material supplied by the experience, but it does not add anything new. The whole material comes from experience. The Jaina admits that the factors of universality and necessity, on which Kant propose certain categories of thought conceived as a priori, are not mental phenomena. They also are given. The Jaina does not find any reason why a portion of knowledge should be accepted as external and the other as internal. The ideas of substance and quality also are not purely subjective. They are also as external as the leaf.

### **Experience Cognises Universal as well as particular**

There is another point on which the Jaina differs from the rationalists. Kant holds that sense experience can give insight into particulars only and the universal forms are contributed by thought or the mind. The Jaina does not see any reason why things should be particulars alone. Things are, according to the Jaina, both universals and particulars together. In the term of Hegel they are concrete universals. Reflective thought certainly enables us to analyse the two aspects in a concrete real, but that does not argue the inability of experience to take stock of reality in its universal character. A real is a particular which possesses a generic attribute. There is no reason why experience should fail to take cognizance of the generic aspect though it is present in it.

### **Emergence of concept**

The Jaina does not find any difficulty in accounting for the

emergence of concepts. It is reflection, no doubt, which is necessary for the evolution of conceptual thought, but reflection is grounded in experience, which in its turn directly derives from reality. Experience furnishes unanalysed data with the universal and particular rolled into one. Reflection only distinguishes the two elements and this has been misconstrued to be the original contribution of thought. But thought does not impose the universal. It only discovers its existence in the real. If the universals were the subjective creations, our experience would have to be denounced as valueless, as particulars, even if perceived, would yield no knowledge, as Kant has proved. If experience be not unnecessarily condemned to take stock of particulars only, for which there is no logical necessity, and if again universals be not denied an objective status and basis, for which again there is neither warrant for justification, and if, in conformity with the plain verdict of experience, the nature of reals is admitted to be made up of both the elements, universal and particular and to be cognised as such.



## The Division of Knowledge

### *Historical Survey*

It will be interesting to note at the outset how the Jaina Theory of Knowledge passed through different stages of development. It is a story of the progress of a thought, which takes its birth from stray ideas scattered here and there, like a tiny stream from a few drops of water. In the way it is joined by other currents and becomes a mighty river appearing as a single unit. We cannot discriminate in that stage the contribution of particular current; but, it is already there. The Jaina theory of knowledge takes its birth from the stray ideas in the Āgamas. In that stage the development is pure and unalloyed. In the stage of Nirvyūktis the idea of twofold division<sup>1</sup> usurps in; which is an external influence, yet, the spirit of Āgamas dominates. Then, we have Anuyoga where the fivefold division of the Āgamas goes into back and the fourfold division of the Nyāya<sup>2</sup> comes into prominence. Umāsvāti reverts to the position of Nirvyūktis and stresses upon the twofold division<sup>3</sup>, which was finally accepted. In the Nandī another development is seen where the sense-cognition is included into pratyakṣa<sup>4</sup>, following the common tradition. Jinabhadra<sup>5</sup> and Akalaṅka<sup>6</sup> designate it as Saṁvyavahāra pratyakṣa (perception according to the common usage) just to avoid its contradiction with the

1 Bṛhatkalpa Nirvyūkti 4.3, 24-25.

2 Anuyogdvāra, p. 211.

3 Tattvārtha Sūtra, I. 9-12.

4 Nandī, Sūtra 4.

5 Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya, 95.

6 Laghīyastraya, 3-4, see also vivṛti

Niryukti or Tattvārtha. Māṇikyanandin<sup>1</sup> and Vādidevasūri<sup>2</sup> again adopt the logical division and try to formulate the Āgamic conceptions into their own style. The logic of Siddhasena<sup>3</sup> divides pramāṇa into three types only. The Āgamic division more or less, is subjective.<sup>4</sup> The division of pratyakṣa and parokṣa is instrumental in the Niryuktis and Tattvārtha<sup>5</sup>; but, in the logical period it depends upon the clarity of apprehension.<sup>6</sup> In the case of subdivision Umāsvāti takes all the factors of subject, instrument, object and clarity<sup>7</sup> into account. Later on the subject is dropped altogether. The clarity is confined to the division of pratyakṣa and parokṣa only. The logicians take into account the two factors of instrument and object<sup>8</sup> only. Out of them the latter is not so powerful as the former.<sup>9</sup> But, Siddhasena keeps in view the object only.<sup>10</sup> Thus, the development of the Jaina division of knowledge passes through various phases. Sometimes, free from the external influence, then slightly mixed with it, then losing its originality into the latter, again establishing its originality and then constructing a parallel system of logical development.

Pandit Sukhlāl has arranged these developments into seven stages<sup>11</sup> —

(1) The first stage may be called purely Āgamic or Karma-śāstrīya. It divides knowledge into five types and subdivides each of them into various sub-types. One cannot trace any

1 Parīkṣāmukha II. 1.

2 Pramāṇanaya Tattvāloka II. 1.

3 Nyāyāvatāra 1.

4 Bhagavati 88.2.317.

5 Tattvārtha Sūtra, I. 9-12.

6 Parīkṣāmukha II. 3-4; Pramāṇanaya Tattvāloka II. 2-3

7 Tattvārtha Sūtra I. 9-13.

8 Parīkṣāmukha II. 5-12; III 2, 3, 5, 11, 14 & 99

9 Ibid,

10 Nyāyāvatāra 2

11 Jñānabindu Int. p. 5.

external influence in these divisions and sub-divisions. No doubt, parallel notions can be found in other systems also, but that is merely an accident. We cannot say that one system borrowed from the other. It might be a development of some common source existing before them. But, as far as the present literature is concerned the Āgamic division seems to be an independent development.

The Āgamic division is predominantly subjective; but, other considerations are not totally ignored in it. Mati and Śruta are common to all the mundane souls. Avadhi has two types. One is found in all the inhabitants of divine and hellish kingdoms. The other type is found in the beings of human or sub-human kingdoms, it is a super-natural power. Manaḥ-paryaya is possible in an ascetic (muni) only. The kevala dawns when the aspirant destroys the karmic obscurance completely. The three types of ajñāna are confined to a mithyā-dṛṣṭi only. Thus, these types express different ethical status of the owner. The question of mati and śruta is rather complicated. The Tattvārtha states śruta as a subsequent stage of mati resulting from the scriptural knowledge, confined to a fixed number of texts. The Nandī also holds a particular set of scriptures as samyak-śruta and another set as mithyāśruta. It means that śruta is confined to the scriptural knowledge only. On the other hand it is held as common to all the beings with imperfect knowledge. But, we cannot say that the scriptural knowledge is possessed by one-sensed beings also. For this purpose śruta is described as the mental reflection associated with speech or articulation. In this respect, the demarcation between mati and śruta becomes, more or less, insignificant. We shall discuss these problems in the next chapter. At present we want to show the general trend of the Āgamic division, which is mainly subjective.

(2) The second stage is based on the Nirvyuktis, majority of which originated in the second century of Vikrama era. It shows some marks of the external influence. The Nirvyuktis

divide knowledge into two types of direct cognition (pratyakṣa) and indirect cognition (parokṣa); and incorporate the five types by subdividing them into three and two types respectively. The two-fold division is based on the instrument. The direct cognition is based exclusively on the soul, while the indirect one takes into account the senses or mind also, as its instruments. We have already discussed that Jainism does not attach any importance to the senses or other helpers, as far as the instrument of knowledge is concerned. He holds the soul only as agent as well as the instrument. The division of direct and indirect does not hold any significance in this respect. On the other hand the Nyāya is keen on the instrument only. It divides knowledge according to the different causes effecting the apprehension of an object. The division of direct and indirect, as held by the Niryuktis is an instrumental division; which is a new introduction in the Jaina system and shows a certain degree of external influence. The Niryuktis do not admit the Nyāya conception of sense-cognition as pratyakṣa. Thus, the influence is limited to the two-fold instrumental division only. Further, the matī is given certain synonyms which are indicative of the instrumental types as held by the Nyāya. Thus, the Niryuktis tried to accommodate the Nyāya division without moving an inch from the Āgamic position. They held firmly the Āgamic view and did not admit the Nyāya influence when it went against the former.

(3) The third stage is represented by the Anuyogadvāra which also dates the second century of Vikrama era. Ārya Rakṣita, the author of Anuyogadvāra gives prominence to the four-fold division as given by Gautama in his Nyāyasūtra. He divides knowledge into perception, inference, analogy and authority and follows the Nyāya system in sub-divisions of inference etc. In perception he includes the three varieties of intuitive cognition i. e. Avadhi, Manaḥparyaya and Kevala as well as the sense-cognition. Thus, his division is an attempt to incorporate the Jaina view into that of the Nyāya; which might have gained a popularity at that time. Ārya Rakṣita has foll-

owed the Nyāya system not only in the division of jñāna but in the field of definitions also.

The Bhagavati and Sthānāṅga also refer to the fourfold division but there it is treated separately. It is designated as pramāṇa in distinction to jñāna. These Āgamas show only the existence of a popular division which had no bearing on the Jaina theory of jñāna. Ārya Rakṣita for the first time combines them and gives prominence to the popular conception.

(4) The fourth stage is the contribution of Umāsvāti through his Tattvārtha and the auto-commentary. Umāsvāti lived in the fourth century of Vikrama era. He did not like the Anuyogadvāra which left the original Jaina tradition and immersed into that of the Nyāya. He reverted to the Niryuktis and supported the two-fold division of Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa. Anuyoga tried to assimilate the Jaina tradition in the Nyāya; while, Umāsvāti tried to assimilate the latter into the former. He included all types of cognition as accepted by the Nyāya into Mati and Śruta. Perception, Inference and Analogy were included into Mati and Āgama into Śruta. In Bhāṣya, he refers to the fourfold division as a view held by some thinkers. His twofold division was later on accepted by all the Jaina scholars and the four-fold division lost ground. The general acceptance of Umāsvāti's view was affected by two reasons : firstly, because it supported the original Jaina tradition. Secondly because it incorporated the view of other systems and thus checked the temptation of leaning towards the popular view. He found out a logical way for accommodation of others without losing his own individuality, which was thrown into danger by Ārya Rakṣita.

The Nandī follows Tattvārtha in its two-fold division, but includes sense-cognition into the category of pratyakṣa. In this way the mati is divided into pratyakṣa as well as parokṣa. The sense-cognition is pratyakṣamati and the types of mediate cognition are parokṣamati. Leaving this innovation, in other respects, the Nandī follows the Tattvārtha.

(5) The fifth stage is the contribution of Siddhasena Divākara. He probably flourished in the beginning of sixth century. He has introduced revolutionary changes in the Jaina tradition, which were never before thought of. They appear to the logical intellect but, annoyed the devotional mind. This is why, Divākara remained neglected for a long period of one thousand years. No body cared to consider his theories sympathetically. It was, Yaśovijaya Upādhyāya, in the 18th century A. D. whose love for reason compelled him not only to discuss the views of Siddhasena but also support them logically.

Siddhasena introduced his new theories on the following four topics :

- (1) The unity between Mati and Śruta
- (2) Unity between Avadhi and Manaḥparyaya
- (3) Unity of Kevala jñāna and Kevala darśana
- (4) Unity between Jñāna and darśana (faith).

Siddhasena threw a new light on the above mentioned four problems. The orthodox followers of Āgamic tradition could not appreciate his views. Some of them openly opposed him while others remained indifferent. Jinabhadra opposed him strongly, but his opposition was confined to the topic of unity between kevala jñāna and kevala darśana. No body cared to consider the other topics until Yaśovijaya took them in his Jñānabindu. Siddhasena has discussed these topics in 'Niścaya dvātrimśikā' and 'Sanmati Prakaraṇa'.

(6) The sixth stage begins with Jinabhadra. The speciality of this stage lies in supporting the Āgamic views on the logical ground. Jinabhadra in his VBh. discusses all the topics touched by his predecessors and deals with them logically. He adopted logic for the sake of discussion only. Regarding the theoretical conceptions he did not go beyond the Āgamic tradition. Pūjyapāda, Devanandin and Akalaṅka also supported the Āgamic theories on the basis of logic. It is the speciality of this stage. The Tattvārtha recognized sense-cognition as

parokṣa on account of its being a variety of mati. The Anuyoga-dvāra and Nandī included it into perception. Jinabhadra introduced a compromise between the two views by calling the sense cognition as samvya-vahāra pratyakṣa, i. e. perception according to the popular usage. This introduction was accepted by Akalaṅka and all the later logicians.


(7) The seventh stage is purely logical. The main contribution of this stage is a parallel system of Jaina logic based on the Āgamic conception. Akalaṅka was the dominating personality of this period. His contributions related with the Āgamic problems can be summed up as follows :

(i) Umāsvāti included inference etc., the sources of knowledge as accepted by non-Jaina systems, into both Mati and Śruta, Akalaṅka included them in Śruta only.

(ii) Umāsvāti gave four synonyms of Mati such as Smṛti, Saṁjñā, Cintā and Abhinibodha. These were interpreted, so far as the different modes of the mental appearances without any special significance. Akalaṅka explained them as the four types of Parokṣa adopted by the logical period.

(iii) Umāsvāti divided the five types of knowledge into two Pramāṇas, and thus indicated that the theory of Pramāṇa is not different from the theory of jñāna as expressed in the Jaina Āgamas. Akalaṅka developed the idea and constructed a full system parallel to the non-jaina systems, based on the Āgamic convention.

#### The Division according to Bhagavatī sūtra<sup>1</sup>



<sup>1</sup> Bhagavatī 88.2.317

The present reduction of Bhagavatī refers to Rājaprasānya for further development<sup>1</sup> of this topic which in addition to the above diagram mentions two varieties of Avagraha and refers to Nandī for the further. The successive references to Rājaprasānya and Nandī show on one side, that there was no difference between the two stages regarding further development, on the other side it puts one into doubt whether the first stage had developed to the extent of Nandī.

The following points are noteworthy in the above division :

(i) It mentions the term Abhinibodha in place of Matī, which got prominence in the later stages. Jinabhadra interprets Abhinibodha as the decisive knowledge bent towards the external object. This definition is more expressive of pratyakṣamati.

The Tattvārtha gives Abhinibodha as one of the synonyms of Matī. Akalaṅka interpreted it as inference. But, in the karmic literature we do not find any mention of Abhinibodha. Jñānāvaraṇīya refers to Matī only in its first variety. Matī indicates the function of mind while abhinibodha, that of the senses. It is to be decided what was the actual idea expressed by the first type of knowledge.

(ii) The Nandīsūtra divides Matī into Śruta-Niḥśṛta and Aśruta-Niḥśṛta and then subdivides Śruta-Niḥśṛta into Avagraha etc. Bhagavatī leaves altogether the variety of Aśruta-Niḥśṛta.


(iii) The above varieties are confined to Jñāna only. The question of Ajñāna and Darśana is not referred to.

The Prajñāpanā Sūtra<sup>2</sup> which is admitted as the Upāṅga of Bhagavatī includes all the varieties and classifies knowledge as follows :

1 Rājaprasānya Sūtra, 165.


2 Prajñāpanā, 15 pada.





The division of Prajñānā also is purely Āgamic.

The second stage of division is found in the Sthānāṅga. Following the style of dyadic division, it classifies everything into two only.



The important speciality of this period is the introduction of Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa in the Āgamic tradition. Pandit Sukhlal, as has been stated above, mentions, this stage as the


<sup>1</sup> Sthānāṅga Sūtra, 71

contribution of Niryuktis. Perhaps, he did not attach any value to the division of Sthānāṅga, which follows its own plan and does not care for the objective basis for classification. Sometimes, it ignores essential factors simply to keep the harmony of number. As a matter of fact the Sthānāṅga is a collection which includes many notions of the later period also.

In the logical period Pratyakṣa is divided into Vikala and Sakala which means nokevala and kevala of the Sthānāṅga.


The following points deserve attention in the above division.

(i) It divides Śrutaniḥśṛta into two varieties of Vyāñjanāvagraha and Arthāvagraha, while according to the general conception it should be as follows :—



The omission of four-fold division of Avagraha, Īhā etc. and its direct coming to the subdivisions of Vyāñjanāvagraha and Arthāvagraha is accountable to its style of the chapter, where everything is classified in twofold division. We cannot assign it any philosophical significance.

(ii) Secondly, it gives Arthāvagraha and Vyāñjanāvagraha as the divisions of Aśruta-Niḥśṛta also. According to the commentary it should have the following order :




The four buddhis of Autpattikī etc. are purely mental. Vyañjanāvagraha is not possible in their case. Consequently, the twofold division based on Vyañjanāvagraha and Arthāvagraha is possible with sense-cognitions only. So, the commentator has attempted for a regrouping; but, he also goes astray. In the Nandī, Avagraha etc. are confined to Śruta-Niḥśṛta only. They are not connected with Aśruta-Niḥśṛta, which is divided into four Buddhis.

(iii) Thirdly, it is doubtful whether the division of Śruta Niḥśṛta and Aśruta-Niḥśṛta is as old as the Aṅgas. It is found in the Nandī only. The Digambara literature does not provide it. In Śvetāmbaras also it is not found in the Nirvyuktis. Even Umāsvāti has left it altogether. In the Nandī also Mati is mentioned as having twenty eight varieties and the four buddhis are not included in them. If they are included the number would come to thirty two.


#### Division of Knowledge : Third Stage

This stage is represented by the Anuyogadvāra. It refers to five types in the beginning by way of Maṅgala, but later on adopts the logical division and tries to adjust the Āgamic division into it.

He divides as follows<sup>1</sup> :



<sup>1</sup> Anuyoga p. 211



The following points should be noted in the above divisions :


(1) It leaves Mati and Śruta and replaces them by Indriya-pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Aupamyā and Āgama. It does not mention smṛti and tarka admitted by the later Jaina logicians as varieties of Parokṣa.

(2) The Āgamic division of Mati-jñāna has been left altogether.

**Division of Knowledge : The Fourth and subsequent stages :**

We have stated that the division of Anuyogadvāra did not get much favour as it went astray from the Āgamic tradition. So, Umāsvāti reverted to the position of Niryuktis and his division was established finally. In the further stages the theory was developed and discussed minutely. No-body suggested any fundamental change except Siddhasena. By the Āgamic division we understand either that of the Bhagavatt as fully expressed in the Prajñāpanā or that of the Sthānāṅga

as finalised in the Nandī<sup>1</sup>, which refers first to the old tradition and then amplifies the second stage in the following order :



We may observe the following points in the above :

(1) Nandī, following the tradition of Anuyoga and feeling the pressure of non-jaina systems, included sense-cognition into Pratyakṣa; but could not go against the old tradition also and therefore, described Matī as pratyakṣa as well as parokṣa.

(2) It has tried to incorporate the nonjaina-conception in the old tradition, but does not try to explain the contradiction.

(3) The Nandī as well Anuyoga does not say anything about the purely mental cognitions such as introspection etc. According to the Nandī they can be included into Parokṣa-matī, while according to Anuyoga they can be adjusted nowhere.

1 Nandī Sūtra 4.

(4) Jinabhadra clarifies the position of Nandi by stating sense cognition as the *Sāṃvyavahārika* Pratyakṣa. He stated that Avadhi etc. were purely Pratyakṣa, and inference etc. purely Parokṣa. The cognition generated by the mind and the senses are perception according to the common usage.

It leads to the following conclusion :

1. Avadhi, Manaḥparyaya and Kevala are perceptions in the real sense.
2. Śruta is entirely parokṣa.
3. The Mati generated by the senses is pratyakṣa, from the popular point of view while parokṣa in the real sense.
4. Mati generated by the mind is entirely Parokṣa.

The Tattvārtha does not favour the idea of including sense-cognition into perception. He divides the five types into a clearcut division of two *pramāṇas*, viz., *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*.

In our treatment we shall mainly follow the *Prajñāpanā*, but, also include the twofold division of Direct and Indirect as suggested by the *Niryuktis*.

The *Prajñāpanā* has the following divisions :<sup>1</sup>

Upayoga	
(A) Sākāra	(B) Nirākāra
(1) Mati Jñāna	(1) Cakṣur Darśana
(2) Śruta Jñāna	(2) Acakṣur Darśana
(3) Avadhi Jñāna	(3) Avadhi Darśana
(4) Manaḥ-paryaya-Jñāna	(4) Kevala-Darśana
(5) Kevala Jñāna	
(6) Mati-Ajñāna	
(7) Śruta-Ajñāna	
(8) Vibhaṅga Jñāna	

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
<sup>1</sup> *Prajñāpanā*. 15 pada

In the terms of modern psychology we can divide the above types of follows :

- (1) The first two varieties of Nirākāra may be known as sensation.
- (2) The first two varieties of A may be known as perception and Imagination.
- (3) 3-5 of A and 3-4 of the B may be known as intuition.
- (4) 6-7 are perception and imagination of a person with perverted attitude.
- (5) The 8th is the intuition of a person with perverted attitude.

**The Basis of the Division : A comparative view**

There are different views regarding the basis of the division of knowledge. The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems lay stress on the causal side. Śaṅkara Miśra in his Upaskāra divides knowledge<sup>1</sup> as follows :



1 V. S. Upaskara p. 298.



Vidyā is defined as the knowledge produced by the faultless senses.<sup>1</sup> Avidyā is the cognition produced by the faulty senses and the faulty impressions<sup>2</sup> (saṃskāra).

The above systems hold three types of causes<sup>3</sup> that produce an effect, viz., samavāyikāraṇa (The inherent cause), asama-vāyikāraṇa (the cause related with the inherent cause) and nimittakāraṇa (the efficient cause). In the case of knowledge the soul is samavāyikāraṇa and the contact of soul with mind, senses and object, is asamavāyikāraṇa. The soul is a common cause to every type of knowledge<sup>4</sup>. The difference among the various types of knowledge is based on the asamavāyikāraṇa or nimitta kāraṇa. In the case of perception (pratyakṣa) the differentiating cause is the contact between senses and the object.<sup>5</sup> This contact has two varieties, viz., ordinary (laukika) and extra-ordinary (alaukika). The ordinary is divided into six varieties.<sup>6</sup> Extra-ordinary contact has three types<sup>7</sup> : Jñāna-lakṣaṇa (intercourse through association); Sāmānyalakṣaṇa (The Intercourse through knowledge of generic character) and Yogaja (The Intercourse produced by meditation). The perception produced by Yogaja contact is known as sarvajñīya also. The other two types of extra-ordinary contact, along with the ordinary contacts come into the category of asarvajñīya. Thus, we can observe that the above classification follows the causal side of knowledge. The division of nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka, of course, which is common with every system though not absolutely devoid of causal consideration is generally ascribed to the difference of appearance.<sup>8</sup>

1 Vai. Sūtra 9.2.12

2 Vai. Sūtra 9.2.10

3 Siddhānta Mukṭāvalī I 16-17

4 V. S. Upaskara p. 144

5 Ibid. also p. 300

6 Siddhānta Mukṭāvalī K. 59

7 Ibid, K. 63

8 Siddhānta Mukṭāvalī K. 58

Similarly, the distinction among *laiṅgika* (inference), *smṛti* (memory) and *ārṣa* (supernatural cognition) also is based on the cause.<sup>1</sup> *Laiṅgika* is defined as the cognition produced by the reflection on the middle term<sup>2</sup> (*hetu*). *Smṛti* is produced by the awakening of past impressions<sup>3</sup> (*Samśkāra*). *Ārṣa* is produced by virtues<sup>4</sup> (*dharma*). The *Nyāya* system and the later tenets of the *Vaiśeṣika* school do not recognize *ārṣa* as a separate cognition. They include, it into the yogic perception.

The division of *avidyā*<sup>5</sup> is, however, mainly based on the faulty appearance. The *saṃśaya* differs from *viparyaya* in its undecisive character. *Anadhyavasāya* is indistinct appearance. *Svapna* (dream) is however, distinguished on the basis of sleep, which is a cause.

The *Nyāya* classifies knowledge according to the following table<sup>6</sup> :

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1 *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* 9.2.1


2 *Ibid.* 9.2.2-5

3 *Ibid.* 9.2.6

4 *Ibid.* 9.2.13

5 *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra Upaskara* 6 p. 298

6 *Siddhānta Mukṭāvali* 1 K. 51



There is no difference between the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika regarding the subdivisions of perception.

It can be observed here that *pramā* and *apramā* of the Nyāya are not the same as *vidyā* and *avidyā* of the Vaiśeṣika. According to the Nyāya *Smṛti* is not *pramā* while according to the Vaiśeṣika it is *vidyā*. The Jaina also holds *smṛti* as *pramā*. Out of the four types of valid knowledge (*vidyā*) maintained by the Vaiśeṣika, the Nyāya rejects *smṛti* as *apramā*. The *ārṣa* knowledge is included into perception of the yogin. Thus, the Nyāya sums up the four types into two and adds two more. The Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, reduces *upamāna* and *śabda* to the category of inference.

The Mīmāṃsā, Sāṅkhya and Vedānta systems also look to the cause for their division of knowledge. They hold different theories of perception; yet, are one in the conception of contact between senses and the object as the basis of ordinary perception. Regarding the division of non-perception they hold different views and also regarding number as well as definitions. The Prabhākara school of Mīmāṃsā adds postulation<sup>1</sup> (*arthāpatti*) to the list accepted by the Nyāya. The Advaita Vedānta and the Bhaṭṭa School of Mīmāṃsā accept non-apprehension (*anupalabधि*) also as an additional source of knowledge. The Sāṅkhya is satisfied with three<sup>2</sup> only, viz. perception, inference and testimony. But, this difference does not hold much significance as far as the question of proper knowledge is concerned. It may have some significance in the domain of logic where the question of the sources of knowledge is discussed. There also the main attempt of the contending schools is two-fold. The schools having shorter division try to include the bigger one into their own arrangement; while the schools having bigger list try to establish independent existence of each and every member of their classification. The distinc-

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1 Prakaraṇa Pañcikā V

2 Sāṅkhyakārikā K. 2

tion regarding appearance is confined to the *pratyakṣa* on one side and other types on the other.

There are different theories also regarding the supreme validity in case of disagreement. The *Nyāya* gives more importance to inference and holds that in case of dispute inference is more reliable than perception or other sources. The *Mīmāṃsā* attributes ultimate authority to the Vedic texts in case of any dispute. But that authority is confined to the field of ethics only, where other sources have no approach. The *Vedānta* also is more emphatic on the teaching of *Upaniṣads* regarding the conception of transcendental reality. Regarding the discursive knowledge it follows the *Bhāṭṭa*. The *Sāṅkhya* attaches equal importance to all of them. As a matter of fact there cannot be any difference between findings of two sources of knowledge, if they are free from fault. The question of comparative reliability arises in the cases of discussion between two opponents. In such cases, generally inference is followed; if the disputants are not followers of the same scriptures. If they are, the testimony is supreme.

The Buddhist has an altogether new basis for his division. He looks towards the object<sup>1</sup> rather than the cause. He divides knowledge into *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* only. *Pratyakṣa* is perceptual and *anumāna* is conceptual. There are two types of objects : *Svalakṣaṇa* (thing-in-itself) and *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa* (thing as understood). The thing-in-itself is devoid of all concepts of name and class; and the same is the object of perception. All the conceptual knowledge, is inferential. Thus, the Buddhist holds two types of knowledge according to the two types of object. The other varieties of imperceptual knowledge, as accepted by the Vedic systems, do not differ from inference as far as their subject-matter is concerned. According to the *Nyāya* and other systems the same object can be apprehended by two or more sources. *Vātsyāyana* proposes *abhisamplava* (possibility of apprehension of the same object through many

1 *Nyāyabindu* p, 21 and 24.

pramāṇas) in certain cases, and vyavasthā fixed objectivity of one pramāṇa only) in other cases. The Mīmāṃsā confines the objectivity of dharma to scriptures only. In other cases he is not particular.

### The Basis of Jaina Division

The Jaina division of knowledge, as has been stated above, varies according to the amount of external influence. The basis of division also undergoes various changes accordingly.

The first classification of the five-fold division is more or less subjective, which we have already discussed. But, the consideration of object also is already there. Mati is the knowledge of objects, which are within the reach of senses. Śruta is the knowledge of objects expressed in scriptures. Avadhi is the cognition of material objects which are beyond the reach of senses. Manaḥparyaya is that of the mind and kevala is that which apprehends all objects. If we take into consideration the different types of Kṣayopaśama, this division can be said as causal also. But, it leads to reciprocity as the division of kṣayopaśama depends upon the division of effectual cognitive types. In case of distinction between incomplete and complete types of knowledge, no doubt, the criterion of kṣayopaśama and kṣaya can hold good, without any confusion.

The second classification is based on two factors. The Niryuktis and Tattvārtha follow the cause only. They hold perception as the knowledge, depending, exclusively upon the soul as its cause. All knowledge that depends upon the sources other than the soul is parokṣa. The logical period lays emphasis on the nature of appearance. The sense-cognition, which was parokṣa in the Āgamic conception becomes pratyakṣa in the logical school owing to its distinctiveness. But, the basis of appearance is confined to the division of pratyakṣa and parokṣa only. For further classification the tenets of logical school also resort to the consideration of cause. The division of parokṣa into smṛti (memory), pratyabhijñāna (recognition), tarka (hypothetical judgement), anumāna (inference) and Āgama (testimony) is

based on the different sources. The same is the case with the division of *pratyakṣa* also as far as the ordinary perception is concerned. In other cases it is objective.

### **The Definition of Perception**

In the division of knowledge perception occupies the most important place. The epistemology of a system mainly depends upon its theory of perception. Other types of knowledge are related with the problem of logic and not epistemology. We shall try to compare the Āgamic view of perception with other systems.

One thing deserves notice in the present context. Perception according to the Jaina Āgamic theory, as has been stated above is confined to the supersensual cognition only. The sense-cognition is regarded as *parokṣa*<sup>1</sup>. It is only in the logical period that sense-cognition comes into the category of perception. But, the case is quite reverse with other systems. Their older texts keep in view the sense-cognition only while defining perception. The inclusion of eternal cognition of God and the supersensual cognition of yogins is a later development. The logic begins with the common-sense knowledge and covers spiritual development when advanced. The Āgamas start with the spiritual stages and later on cover the common knowledge.

### **The Nyāya Theory of Perception (*pratyakṣa*)**

The term *pratyakṣa* is applied to a particular type of cognition as well as its source, known as *pramāṇa*. The latter is beyond the scope of our discussion. We are mainly concerned with the cognition itself. We have to judge here, in what respect the Nyāya differentiates perception from other types of knowledge.

Gautama defines *pratyakṣa* as "that knowledge which arises from the contact of a sense-organ with the object, which is inexpressible in words; which is unerring and well-defined".<sup>2</sup> The above definition expresses the cause as well as the nature of per-

1 *Tattvārtha* I. 10-12

2 *Nyāyasūtra* I.2.4

ception. If the question of cause is left aside, the first characteristic of its nature is that it is inexpressible (*avyapadeśyam*). It is not simple to ascertain the exact meaning of this term. Jayanta, sums up his long discussion about it with the following remarks : "I have stated the views of different exponents on the basis of tradition. The scholars may accept, whatever appears them the right."<sup>1</sup>

According to the interpretation of old Naiyāyikas, he says, 'avyapadeśyam' means the knowledge which does not fall as the object of speech. We apprehend the form, taste etc. of an object without associating them with any name, as the apprehension of baby, who is ignorant of language. It is perception. But, when the same are associated with names, and we are conscious that it is the cognition of form or taste, and are in a position to convey them to others, we pass from the limits of perception to those of Āgama. VBh. expressing the views of some Ācāryas indicates the same thing by way of pointing out the distinction between *mati* and *śruta*. According to it, every cognition before the association of name is *mati*, and *śruta* after the association.

According to another interpretation 'avyapadeśyam' means absence of association with any other simultaneous sound-cognition, such as hearing the name of an object, uttered by some person, at the time when it is perceived. If by the moment, when we see a cow, a man says 'here is a cow', the knowledge of the sound as associated with the perceptual appearance is not considered as perception but as sound-knowledge (*śabda-pramā*). This view is supported by the definition of sound-knowledge as given by Gautama.

According to the third interpretation the adjective 'avyapadeśyam' is introduced in order to refute the conception of grammarians, who hold that there is no cognition without the association of speech.

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<sup>1</sup> Nyāyamañjarī p. 82



Vacaspati Miśra<sup>1</sup> and later logicians of the Nyāya school interpret it as the expression of indeterminate cognition. They hold that the Nyāya accepts two types of pratyakṣa, viz., determinate and indeterminate. Gautama has specified both of them in his definition through the terms of 'vyavasāyi' and 'avyapadeśyam' respectively. It is a matter of investigation how far the Buddhist notion of 'kalpanāpoḍham' is comparable to the 'avyapadeśyam' of Gautama.

If we accept the last view as representative of the Nyāya theory, it can be concluded that the Nyāya does not attach any importance to the distinction between perceptual and imperceptual knowledge, as far as their appearance is concerned. Though the variety of indeterminate cognition is confined to perception only; yet, that does not cover the whole range of perceptual knowledge.

The first and second views try to draw a line between perceptual and the verbal knowledge. The Jainas also deal with the same problem when making a distinction between mati and śruta. If a cognition, according to the first view, appears as associated with words, it is not perception, it is to be regarded as verbal knowledge. The Jainas do not endorse this view. They hold that mere association of words does not make an appearance a verbal knowledge. It is verbal only when it depends upon the speech uttered or distinctly remembered at the time of appearance. When a person learns from an authority that such and such object should be named as such, his knowledge is verbal. But, when the same is assimilated and appears in a form mixed with sense-perception, it is not verbal or śruta. In the logical period it was regarded that every cognition is necessarily composed of three parts; viz., the cognition of the object, the cognition of the object-cognition and the cognition of the self. The cognition of jar is identical with the appearance of 'I know a jar'. Thus, the Jainas do not regard non-association of words as the criterion of perception.

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1 Nyāyāvatāra Dīpikā, p. 70

The second view is connected with the situation when senses and the speech function simultaneously. If perception is limited to the apprehension not associated with name, the association of name by the listener, in that case, is a clear instance of verbal knowledge. He associates that name with that particular form on the authority of speech only. If the same is done through the mental equipment, obtained through the past experiences, then the case is different. In that case the cognizer does not depend on outside authority. Thus, the second view does not differ from that of the Jains.

In the later period perception is defined in two ways. Some logicians have paid attention towards the causal side while others are particular about appearance. Those who look at the causal side, generally regard the knowledge produced by the sense-object contact as perception. But, this definition was found fallacious. Gaṅgeśa criticises Gautama's definition on several grounds : Firstly it is too wide, since every cognition is produced by the contact of manas with the object which is also a sense-object contact. Secondly, it is too short, as it does not apply to the intuitive apprehension of God, who is without any sense. The modern Naiyāyika, defines perception as the cognition not produced by any other cognition. Inference is produced by the cognition<sup>1</sup> of middle term accompanied by the knowledge of universal concomitance, comparison and authority also have other cognitions as their cause. It is the perception only, which is not preceded by any cognition. Yaśovijaya points out a defect in this definition also. He says that the determinate cognition is always caused by the indeterminate cognition. Consequently, it can no more claim to be a perception if the definition of Gaṅgeśa is followed. The Nyāya explains away this difficulty in his statement of the process of cognitive causation. The senses, the contact, the indeterminate cognition, the determinate cognition, and favourable or unfavourable attitude; this is the order of succession in the process of perception. The general system of

1 Muktāvalī, p. 235

causation has four parts : The cause, its application (vyāpāra), the cognition and its result. If we consider these four stages in relation to the cognition, we have two central points. In case the indeterminate perception (nirvikalpaka) is accepted as the main point the determinate (savikalpaka) perception would be accepted as the result (phala), the senses as the source of knowledge (pramāṇa) and the contact as its application (vyāpāra). In case the determinate cognition is regarded as the main point, the attitude is the result, the contact is the source, and the indeterminate cognition is the application (vyāpāra). The vyāpāra itself is not a cause and, therefore, the mediation of nirvikalpaka does not lead to the dependence of savikalpaka on a cognition.

Bhasarvajña<sup>1</sup> defines perception as the cause of right and direct (aparokṣa) experience. His definition is related with the cause of knowledge. Moreover, he does not define the term aparokṣa which is merely another name of pratyakṣa. Rāghava, the commentator of Nyāyasāra, defines aparokṣa as the cognition not produced by speech (śabda) or sign<sup>2</sup> (liṅga). But, this does not serve as the criterion of perception. It only means that perception is that which is neither inference nor verbal knowledge. Bhāsarvajña divides knowledge into three types only. He does not recognize comparison as a separate source of knowledge. Consequently, he excludes the above two only from the category of knowledge to discriminate pratyakṣa. His definition does not help much in deciding the actual nature of perception.

Prāśastapāda<sup>3</sup> points out two significant factors in the definition of pratyakṣa. Firstly, he gives the derivation of pratyakṣa, meaning that which depends upon akṣa, the senses. Secondly, he says that pratyakṣa is that cognition which is produced by the four-fold-contact. In the case of inference or

1 Nyāyasāra p. 2

2 Nyāyatattvaparīkṣā p. 71

3 Prāśastapāda Bhāṣya Kanda II 186

other types of imperceptual knowledge the contact is two-fold. The soul is united with the mind. But, in the case of perception it is four-fold. The soul is united with the mind, the mind with the senses, and the senses with the object. But, this definition also applies to ordinary perception only. It falls short in the case of Yogipratyakṣa and Īśvarapratyakṣa. It is also not applicable to the perception of internal qualities such as pleasure, pain etc. But, as far as the ordinary perception of external things is concerned, Praśastapāda's definition represents the Nyāya-view clearly.

The Bhaṭṭa theory of perception develops on the same line as that of the Nyāya. Jaimini defines perception as the cognition produced in the self by the intercourse of sense-organs with the object.<sup>1</sup> This definition is practically the same as that of the Naiyāyika. Prabhākara defines perception of direct apprehension<sup>2</sup> (sākṣāt pratītiḥ).

Kapila, in his Sāṅkhya-sūtra, defines perception as the cognition which takes the form of object, after being related to it.<sup>3</sup> Vijñānabhikṣu elucidates that perception is the psychic function (buddhivṛtti) which goes out to the object and is modified according to the form of object, to which it is related.<sup>4</sup> The object does not produce the psychic function itself; but, only modifies it. The mode inheres in the psychic function. The psychic function goes out, like the flame of a lamp, through the gateways of sense-organs, to the external object which is proximate to it, and is modified by the particular form of the object.

Īśvarakṛṣṇa defines perception as determinate cognition of an object, produced by its proximity to the sense-organ<sup>5</sup>. Vācas-

1 Mimāṃsāsūtra, 1. 1. 4

2 Prakaraṇa Pañcikā, p. 51

3 Sāṅkhya Darśana, p. 49

4 Sāṅkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya, p. 49

5 Sāṅkhyakārikā, K. 5

pati states that the object transforms the mind into its own particular form, which is in itself formless.<sup>1</sup> Thus, according to Sāṅkhya transformation of the mental mode (buddhivṛtti) into the form of object is the essential condition for perception. In the case of internal perception also, though vṛtti does not go out; yet, the phenomenon of transformation occurs internally. In the case of yogic perception the same is performed through supernatural power obtained through the yogic practices. So, the Sāṅkhya also does not differ substantially from the Nyāya. Where the Nyāya lays stress on the contact the Sāṅkhya does so on the transformation or mode of the mind.

According to Śaṅkara-school of the Vedānta, the eternal consciousness (Brahman) is modalized in three ways<sup>2</sup>. It is modalized by different objects and called as object-consciousness (Viśayacaitanya). It is modalized by the mental modes and called as cognitive-consciousness (pramāṇa caitanya). And it is modalized by different minds and called as cognizing consciousness (pramāṭṛ caitanya). Thus, there is only one universal consciousness; it is determined by the mind or internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa), the activities of the mind or mental modes and the objects cognized. There are the determinants of the universal light of consciousness. Perception means the identification of all the three types of modalized consciousness. The antaḥkaraṇa goes out through the vehicles of senses and occupies the place of the object. Thus, the consciousness modalized by antaḥkaraṇa (pramāṭṛ caitanya), the consciousness modalized by the outgoing antaḥkaraṇa (vṛtti caitanya) and the consciousness modalized by the object (viśaya-caitanya) and identified. This identification does not take place in the case of imperceptual knowledge.

In the above-mentioned definitions of perception one thing is common, that all of them recognize sense-object as the

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1 Sāṅkhya Tattvakaumudī, K. 5

2 Vedānta Paribhāṣā p. 44

general condition for perception. Further, they do not try to distinguish perception from the other types of knowledge on the basis of appearance.

Sālikānātha defines *pratyakṣa* as the direct (*sākṣāt*) experience.<sup>1</sup> Some logicians of the Nyāya school also have defined it similarly. But, the idea underlying the term '*sākṣāt*' is a hard nut to explain. Nyāyamañjarī defines it as an experience after which one feels accordingly; or it is a cognition which is not produced by any generated cognition.<sup>2</sup> Another logician defines it as the cognition produced by the senses. But, all these explanations do not help much in knowing the nature of directness. As a matter of fact direct means the cognition where the cognizer and the object stand face to face without any mediation where the object is directly presented. In the Nyāya-theory the self with senses is the cognizer. When the object stands in direct relation with the senses it is a case of perception. In the case of inference this relation is mediated by the cognition of middle term; in the case of verbal knowledge it is mediated by the knowledge of sound and in analogy by the perception of similarity. In these cases the object is represented by other cognitions. According to the Āgamic school of the Jainas the soul is cognizer without any assistance. In the three types of supersensual knowledge the object is presented to the soul directly. In the case of sense-cognition it is presented by the senses, therefore, it is held as *parokṣa*. If the directness is accepted as the criterion of perception, which is favoured by the majority of Jaina as well as non-Jaina thinkers, the difference between Jaina and the Nyāya systems is accountable to the nature of cognizer.

The Buddhist view is clear as far as the nature of *pratyakṣa* is concerned. Dharmakīrti holds that perception is always indeterminate or inarticulate.<sup>3</sup> The stage of articulation or

1 Prakaraṇa Pañcīkā p. 51

2 Nyāyamañjarī p. 65

3 Nyāyabindu p. 11

determination is reached through inference. He holds absence of articulation (*kalpanāpoḍham*) as the criterion of perception.

According to the logical school of Jainism the criterion is distinctiveness.<sup>1</sup> The object appears clearer and more distinct in perception than it does in inference etc. This distinctness cannot be described in words but can be experienced by everybody. A perceived object is more distinct than the one inferred or known through verbal authority.<sup>2</sup> This is why one desires to perceive the object which has been already cognized by inference or verbal authority.

This definition is common to the sense-cognition as well as supersensual cognition. The Āgamic school defined perception on the basis of cause. The logical school defines the same on its intrinsic character.

As far as the derivation of the term is concerned Jainas hold that *akṣa* means *jīva* or the self. The senses according to them are something external to *akṣa*. *Pratyakṣa* means the cognition presented to *akṣa* or the self directly.

#### *The definition of Parokṣa*

The term *parokṣa* does not have any independent definition. All cognition other than *pratyakṣa* is recognised as *parokṣa*. According to the Āgamic conception *parokṣa* means indirect knowledge. The other systems do not propose *parokṣa* as a different category in contrast with *pratyakṣa* but go directly into its divisions.

The above order of fivefold division places *mati* and *śruta* first and then the other types. We shall discuss in the same order. It has been stated before that according to the Āgamic conception *mati* and *śruta* are *parokṣa* or indirect. The next chapter therefore is titled as "Indirect Knowledge."

1 *Parīkṣāmukha* II, 3.

2 *Parīkṣāmukha* II, 4.

3 *Pravacanasāra* I, 57; 58 *Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya* 89-99;  
Anuyoga *Ṭīkā* p. 149

## Indirect Knowledge

### The Types of Indirect Knowledge

#### Mati Jñāna

It has been already stated that out of the five types of knowledge the last three are related with pure intuition. They are attained as super-natural powers and not through psychological process. The second of the remaining two, i.e. śruta, is limited to scriptures. It also does not possess any importance as far as the psychology of knowledge is concerned. It is mati, that covers the whole range of cognition as far as modern psychology is concerned. The entire process beginning with contiguity of senses and the object, upto the subconscious impressions which are capable of rising again in the form of memory; are included into this type of knowledge. All varieties of profane knowledge perceptual or conceptual, termed and classified differently by different systems are included in it.

#### Two Connotations

The Mati is known as Ābhinibodhika also. This term is prevalent in the old Āgamic literature<sup>1</sup>, while the term mati is based on the karma literature which refers to the corresponding āvaraṇa as Matijñānāvaraṇa<sup>2</sup> and not Ābhinibodhikajñānāvaraṇa. In the division of Ajñāna also only mati is found.

VBh. explains abhinibodha as the cognition resulting from the presence of an object. The same thing is further confirmed

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1. Bhagavati 88.2.317

2. Karmagrantha, I. 4



in the statement that Ābhinibodhika cognizes only the objects<sup>1</sup> that are present. This explanation limits the sphere of the first type of knowledge to sense-cognition only. In that case all types of mediate as well as mental cognition would go to *kruta*.

Akalaṅka interprets ābhinibodha as inferential knowledge.<sup>2</sup> He wanted to propose that the logical division of *pāroḥṣa* is based on the four synonyms of *Mati* as given in the *Tattvārtha*. But, it is doubtful whether his explanation is based on some tradition or is a new introduction.

Siddhasena Gaṇin interprets Ābhinibodhika as the general term covering all types of perceptual and imperceptual cognitions. He clearly states that Ābhinibodhika cognizes all the three times. On the other hand he confines *mati* into the present, which was a general term according to Jinabhadra and Akalaṅka.<sup>3</sup>

As a matter of fact nothing can be said precisely about the clear significance of these terms. Roughly, it can be said on the basis of etymology, that *mati* is expressive of the mental function while *abhinibodha* that of the sensation of the present object.

### The Range of Matijñāna

*Mati* covers all types of knowledge related with the epistemology and logic. It will be seen, as we proceed, how its subdivisions include all varieties of sensual as well as mental cognitions.

Umāsvāti gives five synonyms<sup>4</sup>, explaining the range of *Matijñāna*. He states that *mati*, *smṛti*, *saṃjñā*, *cintā* and *abhinibodha* are identical in sense. Accurately speaking they are not synonyms with the same denotation, but different regions.

1. Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya 80
2. Tattvārtha Rājavārtika Sūtra 1.13
3. Tattvārtha Bhāṣyaṭīkā Sūtra I.13
4. Tattvārtha Sūtra I.13

of the field covered by Mati. Umāsvāti means that none of the varieties of knowledge expressed by these synonyms goes beyond the sphere of Mati. All of them are covered by it.

Siddhasena Gaṇin explains the above terms as follows<sup>1</sup> :

- (i) Mati — The cognition generated by the senses and the mind and apprehending the present only.
- (ii) Smṛti — Memory, the mental revival of the past impressions.
- (iii) Saṁjñā — Recognition. The cognition of the object already known, but presented again.
- (iv) Cintā — Hypothetical judgement.
- (v) Abhinibodha—The general term for all types of the above mentioned and other varieties. It cognizes all the three times.

Akalan'ka interprets Abhinibodha as inference.<sup>2</sup> In other respects he agrees with Siddhasena Gaṇin.

#### The Division of Mati : Instrumental

Mati is produced by senses or mind or both<sup>3</sup>. In case of the animals without mind, it is generated by the senses only. Such animals are known as asaṁjñins. Modern psychologist explains their activity as merely habitual or instinctive. The Jainas hold that such animals cannot think logically. Asaṁjñin does not mean total absence of mind<sup>4</sup>, but the absence of developed mind amounting to intellect of the modern psychology. The cognitions of the type of memory etc. are purely mental. They do not depend upon the assistance of the senses. The perceptual cognition of the animals with mind is based upon the senses as well as mind.

1. Tattvārtha Bhāṣyaṭīkā Sūtra I.13

2. Tattvārtharājavārtika Sūtra I. 13

3. Tattvārtha Sūtra I. 14

4. See saṁjñās

Umāsvāti in his Bhāṣya refers to one more type, i.e. Oghajñāna<sup>1</sup>. Siddhasena Gaṇin interprets it as the cognition where the function of mind or senses is not explicit<sup>2</sup>. Where the only cause is Kṣayaopaśama. For example the movement of a creeper towards the roof of a cave or tree. But, this type does not possess a qualitative difference, as that of degree. It is only a lower degree of undeveloped mind.

### The Psychology of Matijñāna

We have stated the senses and mind as the instruments of Mati. It is essential to know what is meant by this instrumentality and what is the position of the senses and mind in the Jaina psychology.

The Jainas hold Kṣaya or Kṣayaopaśama of the corresponding Āvaraṇa as the only cause of cognition. In the case of Mati also this principle is equally applicable. The part played by the senses in a cognition is this, they help in kṣayaopaśama, just like the external causes of light, object etc. The self is by nature conscious and can know everything without any external assistance. But, its power of knowing is obscured by the karmic matter. The only requirement of a cognition is, therefore, the removal of this obscuring matter. In the case of Matijñāna this function is caused by the senses and the mind along with other external and internal causes.

As a matter of fact the senses are instrument in the negative aspect only. We can compare them with the windows in a room. The man sitting inside the room naturally possessed the power of perceiving outside. But, the function of his power is obstructed by the walls. The only thing he requires is the removal of this obstruction, partially or totally. In the case of complete knowledge this obstruction is removed totally. In other cases it is removed partially. Just as the windows remove the obstruction of walls to a part and the man can see through

1. Tattvārtha Bhāṣya Sūtra I. 14

2. Tattvārtha Bhāṣya Tīkā Sūtra I. 14

such parts only; similarly the senses are the windows or the partial removal of the karmic matter. The windows do not help in perception in the positive sense; but they help negatively i.e. by removing the obstruction. Akalaṅka places the senses in category of external but inseparable cause in contrast with the object, light etc. which are not inseparable.<sup>1</sup>

### The Senses : Their nature

The Nyāya defines senses as the supersensual organ of knowledge having its locus in the animals organism.<sup>2</sup> A sense cannot be itself sensed or perceived. It is only inferred as an organ necessary for the function of perception. The Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā also hold similar views. According to the Vedānta senses are the vehicle through which the mind goes out and transforms into the form of object.<sup>3</sup> According to the Mīmāṃsā a sense is what produces a clear and distinct knowledge of the object, brought in contact with.<sup>4</sup> According to the above-mentioned three systems the external senses are material substances constituted of the physical elements (bhautika) and localised in the different end-organs. Regarding the internal sense, i.e. the mind they hold different views which will be discussed later on.

According to the Sāṅkhya the senses are not physical bodies like the pupil of the eye, but modifications of subtle material principle called ahankāra. He thinks that a physical (bhautika) element cannot account for the perception of a distant object. In perception the senses must have a direct contact with the objects. But a physical organ cannot have direct contact with an object which lies at a distance or behind a glass. This is possible only if the sense-organ be all-pervading in character and not limited to physical substance. So the Sāṅkhya thinks

1. Tattvārtha Rājavārtikā II. 8
2. Tattva Kaumudī p. 3
3. Vedānta Paribhāṣā p. 46
4. Śāstradīpikā p. 36
5. Sāṅkhyakārikā 25

that the senses are modifications of a subtle and all-pervading matter (ahaṅkāra) and are themselves all pervading in character.

### **The Function of senses**

According to the Nyāya the function of senses is to establish a contact between object and the mind<sup>1</sup>. The Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta also hold the same view with a different process. According to Sāṅkhya also it is a vehicle of buddhi, which goes out and takes different reflections. This function cannot be performed by the visible physical structure, so something invisible with the capacity of performing that function is postulated and the same is the sense according to different systems. According to the Nyāya, Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā that subtle element also is as physical as the body, but, its ingredients are finer than those of the latter. They do not take into consideration the outer structure which also is composed of the same element in grosser form.

The Buddhist conceives sense-organ (indriya) as a kind of translucent subtle matter which covers the body when it is living.<sup>1</sup> It is like the shining of a jewel which cannot be cut into two, cannot be burnt, has no weight and disappears without a residue at death. It is nevertheless atomic, and is represented by five different kinds of atoms. The atoms of the organ of sight cover in concentric circles of the eye-ball. The atoms of the organ of taste, or more precisely, that matter which is supposed to convey the sensation of taste, covers in concentric semi-circles of the tongue. The atoms of organ of touch cover the whole body. Being as subtle as the rays of a jewel, this matter cannot appear alone, it is supported by gross matter (mahābhūta) of which the eye-ball and flesh in general are constituted.

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1. S. Muktāvalī p. 264

The Buddhist holds five types of vijñāna corresponding to the five senses. These vijñānas are not material but subjective. They are known as caittas, the mental products. To the above list we can add the faculty of intellect or consciousness (manas, indriya āyatana), Nonsensuous objects (Dharma āyatana or dharmas) and Nonsensuous consciousness (mano-vijñāna dhātu), which are not material but included in the list of dhātus. Thus, according to the Buddhist there are six senses, out of which five are material and the sixth immaterial (arūpin); and six vijñānas which are purely psychical. The Buddhist does not take into consideration the outer gross material structures.

In Jainism the senses are described as mark of the Jīva as well as the instruments of cognition. In the first sense they are related with entomology and in the second case with epistemology. The five senses in the former sense are known as five types of life (prāṇa) possessed by animals according to the stage of their biological evolution. The Jaina divides the living beings into five classes (jātis) on the basis of the number of senses possessed by them. These classes consist of the one-sensed animals, two sensed animals and so on upto the five-sensed ones. In the field of epistemology the senses are instruments of perception. They have two types—the material structure (dravyendriyas) and the psychical function (bhāvendriyas).

### *Dravyendriyas*

The senses as material structure are effected by the corresponding Nāmakarman. They are physical and made of the same stuff as that of the body. The Jaina does not regard a particular physical element as the cause of a particular sense-organ as the Nyāya holds. As a matter of fact the Jaina does not hold the earth, water etc. as the elements. They are themselves compounds or bodies made from the combination of atoms. In the atomic state they are simply pudgala and cannot be differentiated as earth or water etc.

The atoms are grouped together into eight *vargaṇās* according to their capability of being transformed into certain bodies. We have already stated the five types of bodies, which have corresponding five *vargaṇās* for their constitution. The speech, mind and breathing also are material. They have one *vargaṇā* each as their material cause. Our physical structure is constituted of *audārika vargaṇā* and the same is the material cause of sense-organs.

*Dravyendriya* is further divided into *Nirvṛtti* and *Upakaraṇa*. *Nirvṛtti* means the arrangement or form. It is again divided into *Bāhya* (External) *Nirvṛtti* and *Ābhyantara* (Internal) *Nirvṛtti*. *Bāhya-Nirvṛtti* is the external form and *Ābhyantara-Nirvṛtti* is internal form. The *Prajñāpanā* states that *Bāhya-Nirvṛtti* has innumerable forms according to the innumerable types of animals. We see a clear difference in the outer form of the ears between a horse and a man. But the *Ābhyantara-Nirvṛtti* has the same form in all the animals. The *Prajñāpanā* states that the form of the auditory sense is like the flower of the Kadamba. The visual sense is like the grain of masura (a kind of pulse). The olfactory sense is like the flower of *atimuktaka*. The gustatory sense is like the edge of a sword. The cutaneous sense possesses various forms.

According to the Digambara tradition *Bāhya Nirvṛtti* is the particular material form and *Ābhyantara* is the part of the soul surrounded by the physical structure. According to the *Śvetāmbaras* *Bāhya* and *Ābhyantara*, both are material; but *Śīlāṅka* in his commentary on *Ācārāṅga* supports the Digambara tradition.

*Upakaraṇa* is the power of grasping an object, possessed by the *Nirvṛtti*. The Digambara tradition holds that *Upakaraṇa* means what assists. It is also a material structure without which the *Nirvṛtti* is incompetent to function. It is divided into two parts of external *upakaraṇa* and internal *upakaraṇa*. In the case of eye the pupil—the white and black substance—is internal *upakaraṇa* and the eye-lids and eye-brows

are external upakaraṇa. Śīlāṅka also endorses the same view. It should be observed here that the Digambara tradition divides material structure of senses into three parts : (1) Bāhya Nirvṛtti, (2) Ābhyantara Upakaraṇa and (3) Bāhya Upakaraṇa. The Śvetāmbara tradition holds Upakaraṇa not as the material structure, but, the power possessed by the material structure which is known as Nirvṛtti. According to the Digambara tradition Ābhyantara Nirvṛtti is psychical, the Śvetāmbara holds it as material. The dravyendriyas are caused by the corresponding Nāma-karman.

### *Bhāvendriyās*

The physical senses (Bhāvendriyas) are not material but power or function of the self. They are again divided into Labdhi (power) and Upayoga (application). Labdhi means the partial destruction and the partial subsidence (kṣāyo-paśama) of the obscuring and the obstructing karmans. The application of labdhi, on a particular object, is known as upayogendriya. It results into the cognition of an object.

It has been stated above that the living beings are divided into five classes according to the number of senses possessed by them. The animals possessing one sense only are recognised as ekendriyas. Those possessing two are known as dvīndriyas and so on. The order of their possession is cutaneous, gustatory, olfactory, visual and auditory. The animal possessing the latter must possess the former also.

### **The Blind and five senses**

It can be asked, whether a blind man is four-sensed or enjoys all the five ? In the former case he cannot be included into human beings, who necessarily possess all the five senses. In the latter case, there is no reason why he does not have visual perception.

The Jaina replies that the number of senses in a particular being depends upon the class (Jāti) in which he is born. The allotment of class is done by the Jāti-nāma-karman. None can



be born as a man if he is not under the influence of the Nāma-karman which equips an animal with all the five senses. Thus, under the effect of Nāmakarman a blind man, on account of his being a man, must possess all the five senses. The Kṣāyopaśama required for the completion of psychical senses is already there. He does not lack in the Aṅgopāṅga-nāma-karman and paryāpti-nāma-karman (the karmic matter which causes the completion of various limbs or the life in body) also. They invariably exist in a five-sensed animal, the state effected by Pañcendriya-jāti-nāmakarman. But, the material sense of a blind man ceases to function owing to some defect. Thus, he lacks in upayoga of the visual perception. He cannot be placed with the four-sensed animals, merely for the absence of Upayogendriya. Moreover, in respect of Upayogendriya, all the animals are one-sensed; as there can be only one upayoga at a time. So, the classification of living beings should be considered in regard to Nirvṛtti-Indriya. As regards Labdh-Indriya all the animals are five-sensed; because, Matijñānāvaraṇa is common to all the senses. Its Kṣāyopaśama is not separate for every sense. The difference in the cognition is based on other factors. A tree, which belongs to the class of one sensed animals, possesses all the five senses as far as labdhi is concerned,

Labdhi is attained at the very first moment when a jīva enters into a new life. The formulation of Nirvṛtti begins as the effect of Aṅgopāṅga nāmakarman and gets its completion through the effect of paryāpti nāma-karman.

The Digambara do not admit all the five senses in every living being even in respect of labdhi. According to them there are separate āvaraṇas for every labdhi. The type of Kṣāyopaśama is not common to all the five senses.

### **Relation between senses and the object**

According in the Buddhist, the senses function without direct contact with the objects of perception. They are all distance receptors (Aprāpyakārin) and do not require imme-

mediate contact with their objects. This is especially seen in the case of the senses of sight and hearing. We see far-off objects that cannot have any direct or approximate contact with the eyes. We hear sound from a long distance. Similarly, the eye perceives objects much larger than itself and so incapable of being covered by it. Again, the eye and ear can perceive the distance and the direction of sights and sounds respectively. This they could not if like the senses of smell, taste and touch, they were in immediate contact with their objects. Lastly, many of us can, at the same time, see the same object or hear the same sound from different places. Conversely, one man can, almost at the same time, see two things or hear two sounds, fairly apart from each other. This shows that the senses of sight and hearing can function without actual contact with their respective objects.

According to the Nyāya, Sāṅkhya, and Vedānta systems, the senses can perceive only such objects as are in direct or indirect contact with them. This is obvious in the case of so-called lower senses, namely touch, taste and smell. Sensations of touch and taste arise only when the sense-organs are in immediate contact with their respective objects. To taste a thing means to place it in direct contact with the tongue. To touch a thing is to bring it in contact with the skin. Sense-object contact as a condition of olfactory sensation is no less real, although it may sometimes be less obvious. If the smelling object be in our immediate surrounding, there is obvious contact of it with the olfactory organ. If it be at a distance from us, then the odorous particles given off by the object are brought in actual contact with the sense-organ by currents of air. In case of the lower senses all systems of philosophy agree that there is a direct sense-object contact. It is also admitted that the senses of smell, taste and touch remain passive in their end-organs where they are met by their respective stimuli. The remaining two senses of sight and hearing also act in contact with their objects, although not quite as directly as the rest.

According to the Vedānta, the sense of hearing travels to the sounding objects and gives us the sensation of sound. The Nyāya, holds that sound-waves sent by the object are received into the ear-passage and perceived there as sound. According to both, the Nyāya and the Vedānta, the visual sense reaches out to the object and gives us colour-sensations. This is way the eye and ear can perceive the distance and direction of their respective objects. According to the modern science visual sensation is believed to be due to the transmission of light-waves from the object to the eye; in the systems mentioned above, it is explained by the emanation of light-rays from the eye to the object. Ordinarily, the colour-rays are not visible, but inferred as the medium of sense-object contact in visual perception. Still we may perceive them under special circumstances, as when they emanate from the eyes of cats and other animals in a dark night.

The Mīmāṃsā maintains Samprayoga as the essential condition of sense-perception. Bhavadāsa, an ancient interpreter of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra, means the actual contact by samprayoga. But, Kumārila did not endorse the above view. He altogether changed the meaning of samprayoga. He asserts that samprayoga means the act of senses. He maintains that it is not essential that a sense must have physical contact with the object to be comprehended. The presence of the object, in a place within the range of the objectivity of a particular sense, and the capability of the sense-organ to perceive the object, is sufficient for a perception. Samprayoga is nothing but the contiguity of the sense and the object.

Though, Kumārila rejects the theory of contact as an essential condition, yet, practically accepts that all senses cognize the object after a real contact. Thus, he also sides with the Nyāya.

The Jaina supports the former position of Kumārila. He also holds that the physical contact with the object is not an essential condition for sense-perception. He says that it is

mere capability (yogyatā), that is needed for sensation. Yogyatā, as we have stated in the case of labdhi, is nothing but kṣāyopasaṃa of the obscuring matter. The upayoga depends upon many internal as well as external factors. The contiguity of physical senses with the object also is one of them. But, this contiguity does not necessarily mean a physical contact. In the case of four non-visual senses, the Jaina also admits real contact. He differs from the Buddhist in not accepting the auditory sense as a distance-receptor. He agrees with the Nyāya that the sound comes into a real contact with the ear before it is apprehended. But, the Jaina differs in the nature of that contact. According to the Nyāya the auditory sense is the space surrounded by the ear-cavity (karṇa-śaṣkuli) and the sound is a quality of the space produced either by conjunction (saṃyogaja) or disjunction (vibhāgaja) of two objects, or by the sound itself (śabdaja). The first sound is produced by the conjunction or disjunction. It produces another sound and this series goes on till they reach the ear-cavity. The contact between the auditory-sense and the sound is not a conjunction; because, it is possible in two substance only and the sound is not a substance. It is a quality which inheres in the auditory sense which is the space-substance. According to Jainism the sound is a material product, composed of Bhāṣāvargaṇā. The body of sound projected at its own place travels through the vehicle of air and strikes with the ear, a fleshy structure of the shape of kadamba which causes the sensation of sound.

In the case of eye the Jaina agrees with the Buddhist and holds it as a distance-receptor. The Nyāya admitted the eye as a fiery substance, which goes out and establishes a contact with the object. The Jaina does not favour it.

The Jaina, though denies the Buddhist view of Śrotra as a distant-receptor (aprāpyakārin), yet, does make a distinction between śrotra and the other senses of this type. He holds that the senses of touch, taste and smell apprehend an object which is not only in contact (sprṣṭa) but also fastened (baddha). The

sense of sound apprehends the object which is *sprṣṭa* only. It does not require the condition of being fastened also. It is so sharp (*paṭu*) that mere contact is sufficient. Thus, the Jaina holds three classes regarding the contact between senses and the object. The senses of touch, taste and smell apprehend the object which is in touch as well as physical grip (*baddha-sprṣṭa*). The sense of sound apprehends on mere touch only. The sense of sight apprehends the object which is neither in touch nor in grip.

### The Object of Senses

According to the Nyāya the senses are constructed of one element each. The sense of smell is an earthly composition, the senses of taste is made of water, the sense of sight that of fire, the sense of sound that of space and the sense of touch that of air. These elements contain one special quality each; which is the object of corresponding senses.

The Nyāya asserts that the quality apprehended by a sense must be possessed by its constituent elements. The olfactory sense (*ghrāṇa*) is the organ of apprehending smell. It must have the quality of smell in it. As such, it is constituted of the earth, to which smell originally belongs as an attribute. The gustatory sense (*rasanā*) is the condition of taste-sensation. It is constituted by physical element called water, because it is possessed of the specific attribute of that element viz. taste. The visual sense (*cakṣu*) is the cause of colour sensations and itself contains colour. It has its locus in the pupil of the eye. It is constituted of a luminous substance called *tejas* or light. The cutaneous sense (*tvak*) is the source of touch-sensation and temperature-sensation. It is constituted of the physical element of air; because, like air it manifests the quality touch.

The Jaina does not approve of the Nyāya-view that a particular sense is constituted of the particular element. He holds that all senses belong to the same material cause, i. e. *audārika-vargaṇā*. The Nyāya contention that a particular quality is sensed by a particular sense-organ because the latter is constituted

of the element holding the same quality, as its specific character, is not based on sound reasoning. The earth possesses the taste, colour, form and touch also along with the smell. The olfactory sense also must, according to the Nyāya contain all these qualities as it is constituted of the earth. In that case, there is no reason why it should sense the smell only and not other qualities. The Nyāya can argue that other qualities, are not its specific qualities, as they are found in other substances also. In that case, the Jaina contends, the elements of air, fire and water would have no specific quality, as they contain nothing which is not found elsewhere. Moreover, the physical elements possess some non-physical qualities also, as that of number, dimension, conjunction etc., but they are not admitted as object of the senses. The only explanation for the regulation of objectivity, the Jainas say, is the Kṣayopaśama or natural capacity of the senses. Other explanations do not hold any sound basis. Ultimately, one has to resort to the natural capacity.

The Jainas hold the five qualities as sensed naturally by the corresponding five organs. The organ of touch-sense is naturally capable of apprehending the quality of touch. The Jainas maintain eight kinds of touch, viz., hot and cold, soft and hard, viscid and rough, heavy and light. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds only the temperature sense as related with the touch-organ. He adds to the varieties of hot and cold, a third one of the temperature which is neither hot nor cold (*anuṣṇāṣita*). The qualities of softness and hardness, according to the Nyāya, are not original but based upon the quality of conjunction (*saṁ-yoga*). If the conjunction of constituting parts is dense the resulting substance will appear as hard. If it is loose the object will appear as soft. The quality of viscosity, according to the Nyāya, is found in the element of water only. Roughness is nothing but its absence. He does not accept them as the object of touch-organ. The qualities of heaviness and lightness also are not peculiar to the touch-sense. They are inferred through the factors down or its absence. The Buddhist enumer-

ates eleven categories as the object of touch-sense. They are the earth, water, fire, air, softness, hardness, heaviness, lightness, coldness, hunger and thirst.

According to the modern psychology there are four classes of the cutaneous, namely the sensations of (i) touch proper, pressure or contact, (ii) those of heat and warmth, (iii) those of cold and coolness, (iv) those of pain.

(2) *Rasanā*—The gustatory sense reveals the five types of taste; namely astringent (*tikta*), bitter (*kaṭu*), pungent (*kaṣāya*), sour (*amla*) and sweet (*madhura*). The *Nyāya* holds six types, adding saline to the above list. The Buddhist also follows the popular view, adopted by the *Nyāya*. Modern psychology reduces the list to four as the pure taste sensation, namely, sweet, salt, acid and bitter. It holds other tastes as a mixture of taste with smell or touch.

(3) *Ghrāṇa*—The olfactory sense apprehends two varieties of smell, namely, fragrant and nonfragrant. The *Nyāya* also holds the same view. The Buddhist adds two more viz. intense (*utkaṭa*) and mild (*anutkaṭa*). The modern psychology holds that there are many degrees of the intensity of smell. They are so vague and indistinguishable from one another, that is impossible to have an accurate classification. They also get blended with (a) tactual sensations of nostrils, as in the case of the smell-sensation of ammonia or of snuff; (b) organic sensations of the respiratory system, e.g. certain smells stimulate respirations and others have a choking effect; and (c) common sensibility, e.g. some smells have an exhilarating and others a depressing effect on the organism as whole.

(4) *Cakṣur*—The sense of vision apprehends the five varieties of colour, namely, black (*kṛṣṇa*), blue (*nīla*), red (*arūṇa*), yellow (*pīta*) and white (*śukla*). The *Nyāya* terms black as *nīla* and places green (*harita*) in the place of blue. He adds two more colours of tawny (*kāpota*) and mixed (*citra*) and brings the list to seven. The Buddhist adds the form (*saṁsthāna*) also

as the object of visual sense. He admits four varieties of colour and four of the form. In another way he mentions 20 varieties of rūpa i.e. visual data. The modern psychology accepts seven varieties of colour with a complex system of sensation. The Buddhist inclusion of form (ākāra) in visual objects is not favoured by the Jaina and the Nyāya. They hold that it can be perceived by the sense of touch also.

(5) Śrota—The sense of sound apprehends three varieties of the sound; namely (i) produced by living being (sacitta), (ii) produced by the lifeless object (acitta) and (iii) the mixed (miśra). Tattvārtha divides the sound into two varieties of (1) produced after certain deliberate process (prāyogika) and accidental (vaisrasika). The sound is divided in other varieties also, but, they are connected with its being an articulate, inarticulate speech and so on. They have no bearing on the objectivity of auditory sense. There is a fundamental difference between the Nyāya and the Jaina in the conception of sound. The Nyāya holds sound as the quality of space. The Jaina holds it as a material substance composed of Bhāṣā vargaṇā. The Nyāya divides the sound into two varieties of inarticulate (dhvanyātmaka) and articulate (varṇātmaka). The Buddhist divides the sound into two varieties of pleasing (manojña) and displeasing (amanojña); with four subdivisions of each.

According to the modern psychology sounds are waves of vibrations produced by certain physical action.

### The conditions for sensation

Śaṅkara-Miśra gives four necessary conditions for the perception of colour, viz. (i) large magnitude (mahatparimāṇa), (ii) visibility (udbhūtattva), (iii) not being overpowered (anabhibhūtattva) and (iv) the property of colour (rūpa). The Jaina recognizes the above conditions in different terms. He admits that an atom is beyond the visual perception. Amongst the



compounds (skandhas) also some are visible while others are not. The compounds of Ābhāraka Vargaṇā, Taijasa Vargaṇā, Kārmaṇa Vargaṇā, Bhāṣā Vargaṇā and Manovargaṇā are not visible. Though the conception of udbhūta rūpa and anudbhūta rūpa is not found in Jainism; yet the acceptance of visibility of one compound and the invisibility of others comes to the same. Similarly, the invisibility of atoms resembles the Nyāya conception of atomic magnitude as unperceivable. When the Jaina resorts to natural capability or incapability in such cases, the Nyāya attempts to classify the grounds as such.

The conditions of light, object and contact etc. accepted by the various systems as necessary for visual perception are not favoured by the Jainas. He holds them useful for particular cases but, does not include them in the systems of general causation.

According to the Nyāya every material substance does not possess all the physical qualities. The air possesses the quality of touch only. The fire has two; namely, touch and colour. The water has four with an addition of taste and fluidity (sneha). The earth is without fluidity; but, has smell in its place. The Jainas hold that every material substance contains all the physical qualities. In some they are manifest while in others they are unmanifest. The air is not without colour, but it has it only in unmanifested condition. Similar is the case with taste and smell also. The condition of manifestation or the reverse also, according to Jainism, is not absolute. It is related with the subject. In darkness the colour of a jar is unmanifest to human beings, but the same is manifest to owl and cat.

### **The Perception of Substance**

According to Nyāya the substances are perceived by two senses only, i.e. of sight and the touch, the remaining three organs are limited to their respective qualities.<sup>1</sup> The Jaina and

1. Tattvārthasūtra, Pt. Sukhlal Sanghvi, p. 34

Buddhist do not make this distinction. According to Buddhism the substance is nothing but a collection of qualities. Abhidharma says that the earth is nothing but the colour and form.<sup>1</sup> The Jaina holds that the quality and substance are not quite separate. They are different as well as identical. The sensation of one cannot be differentiated from that of the other. So, all the senses apprehend quality as well as the substance.

### Fast and Slow Processes of sensation

The Jaina admission of the visual sense as a distance-receptor and the other senses as contact-receptors gives rise to the conception of two speeds in the process of cognition.<sup>2</sup> The senses working after close contact begin their process from Vyañjanāvagraha (the contact between sense and the object). The amount of knowledge is so scanty, at this stage, that one does not feel as cognising anything. This state is compared with the first drop of water thrown on a new earthen-ware, just out from the even.<sup>3</sup> The first drop disappears totally without leaving any apparent mark; yet we cannot say that it went without any effect. A series of similar drops produces a clear effect. Had the first drop been without any effect the subsequent drops also could not produce any effect.

Similarly, when we call a sleeping person, the first call goes unheeded; but, when called repeatedly, he wakes up. We cannot say that the first call was absolutely ineffective. It also had its effect, though not distinct. The speed of the above process is slow as compared with that of the visual sense. This is recognized as manda-krama. The same is the case with other senses recognising the object after contact.

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1. Viśeṣā, G. 149

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

The process of the visual perception does not start from the contact between sense and the object. It grasps the object without any contact and reaches the stage of *arthāvagraha* directly. It is compared with the reflection in a mirror; which reflects the object in contiguity, at once. The speed of this process is swifter than the former, and is known as *paṭukrama*.

After *avagraha* both types of the senses have the same speed and the procedure. As a matter of fact the subsequent stages or concerned with the arrangement of the data already supplied. The outer senses play little part in that arrangement. Which is mainly a mental function.

### The Mind (Manas)

In Western philosophy the mind means both, the self as well as the totality of conscious states; where the self gets its manifestation. In both cases it corresponds to the soul or the psychic activity of Indian systems. It is never applied to the instrument of those activities as the *manas* is generally conceived in Indian thought. In our treatment, we have followed the common tradition of accepting the mind and *manas* as synonyms.

According to the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* mind is an internal sense. It is atomic in size and moves around the external senses. Its contact with the soul is an essential condition for knowledge and thus, it controls the non-occurrence of many cognitions at a time.<sup>1</sup> Unlike the other senses it is not made of any of the physical elements. It is an eternal substance having an independent existence.<sup>2</sup> It is beyond the sensual perception and can be known through inference only. The mind does not possess any of the physical qualities, consequently its objectivity is not confined to any of them. It is a common instrument for all types of knowledge. But, the subjective qualities of

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1. *Vaiśeṣika sūtra*, 3.2.1

2. *Ibid*, 3.2.2

pleasure, pain etc. are directly perceived by the mind. Doubt, dream, memory, inference and other types of indirect knowledge are purely subjective, and therefore apprehended by the mind.

According to the Vedānta *manas* is not a comprehensive term. It is a particular state of *antaḥkaraṇa*, which includes all types of mental states. The *Antaḥkaraṇa* is an evolute of *avidyā* and occupies the entire body. It involves the empirical self of the Vedānta, a condition of pure consciousness, limiting the latter into body and thus constituting the person of *jīva*.<sup>1</sup> It goes out through the senses and establishes the three-fold identity. The qualities of pleasure, pain etc. are apprehended by *antaḥkaraṇa* itself. According to another opinion they are directly perceived by the (modalized) consciousness ( *kevala sākṣībhāṣya* ) *Antaḥkaraṇa* has five conditions with five corresponding names. The condition of suspense (*saṁśaya*) is expressed by *manas*; that of judgement (*nīścaya*) by *buddhi*; vanity (*garva*) by *ahaṅkāra*, consciousness by *citta* and recollection by *smṛti*.<sup>2</sup>

According to the Sāṅkhya mind is an evolute of *prakṛti* coming after *ahaṅkāra* (ego). It is all-pervading and is intelligized through the reflection of *Puruṣa*. In other respects the Sāṅkhya resembles the Vedānta.

In the Buddhism Mind is split into two chief parts.<sup>3</sup> The subjective part, or mind viewed as a receptive faculty, is represented by one element called, indiscriminately, *citta*, *vijñāna* or *manas*. It represents pure consciousness, or pure sensation, without any content. Its content is placed in the objective part which contains the definite sensation (*sparsa*); feelings (*vedanā*),

1. See—Vedāntasāra and Vedānta Paribhāṣā.

2. Vedānta Paribhāṣā p. 76

3. Sāṅkhyakārikā 22,23

4. Central Conception of Buddhism p. 15

ideas (saṃjñā) volitions (cetanā) and various other mental phenomena. upto the number of forty-six separate elements. So, it is that feelings come to be viewed as objects of the mind. Out of the 75 elements known as dharmas in Buddhism, 64 belong to the mental group (caitta dharmāḥ). To this we can add citta or the mind as a receptive faculty. The remaining ten are five senses and the five objects. They are differentiated from the mind and mental elements as being material (rūpiṇaḥ) while the latter are immaterial (arūpiṇaḥ). Besides the forty-six mental phenomena the mind contains fourteen elementary forces (viprayukta saṃskāra), the element of character (avi-jñapti) and the three elements which are eternal (asaṃskṛta) : among the latter is Nirvāṇa, the chief dharma. The common feature of all these elements is that they are apprehended by the intellect directly without any intermediate agency of the senses. In the apprehension of sense-objects there is likewise participation by the intellect; but these dharmas are nonsensuous objects, they are the exclusive domain of receptive intellect, just as colour is the exclusive domain of the sense of vision. The Buddhist does not regard the soul as different from mind.

In Jainism, the mind is known as no-sense (anindriya) or not-sense<sup>2</sup> (no-indriya). The terms 'no' or 'not' in this case, do not mean negation but comparatively lesser degree of the character of a sense. Though mind also is a source of knowledge, it is regarded as no-indriya; because, it is dependent on other senses for grasping the external objects. It is a common factor in all cognitions. The object of other senses is fixed but the mind is not confined to any of the physical qualities. It is capable of apprehending the past and future also. The main function of the mind is thinking. It arranges the data given by the senses.

Like other senses the mind also is divided into two varieties

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1. Tattvārtha, 2,19

the physical mind (*dravyamana*) and the psychical mind (*bhāvamana*). The physical mind is material, constituted of *manovargaṇā*. It occupies the whole body. The Digambaras admit the heart as its abode; and of the shape of a lotus with eight petals. The psychical mind (*bhāvamana*) is the power or activity of the self resulting into various states of mentation.

In the Nandī and Anuyogadvāra the ordinary perception is confined to the five external senses.<sup>1</sup> Mental cognition is not regarded as perception. But, in the later stage the apprehensions of pleasure, pain etc. are included into perception. In the Āgamic period feeling has no relation with the mind. It is effected by *Vedanīya-karman* and directly connected with the soul. Even the animals without mind, feel pleasure, pain etc. The Arhats, who generally do not apply the mind to any psychic activity, are said to feel favourable or unfavourable experiences directly through the soul. In this stage the mind is purely connected with the function of thinking.

According to the Nyāya, the qualities of soul are cognized by the mind.<sup>2</sup> The Jaina does not favour this dependence. He says that soul can apprehend its own qualities independently.

The Vedānta, Sāṅkhya and Buddhist assign the qualities of pleasure, pain etc. to mind only. The Jaina says that they are the qualities of the self mixed with karmic matter.

### The Function of Mind

The Āgamic term for the function of mind is *saṃjñā*. It is divided into many ways.<sup>3</sup>

#### (1) The First Division

According to the first division it has three varieties :

(a) *Dirghakālikī*—The sense of keeping the past impressions

1. Nandīśūtra 5, Anuyogasūtra 144

2. Siddhānta Muktvāṇī K. 57

3. Vaiśeṣika Bhāṣya G. 504-527

into memory and reflection on the future. This sense is found in the kingdoms of heaven and hell and in the womb-born (garbhaja) animals. The division of saṁjñiṇs (with mind) and asaṁjñiṇs (without mind) depends mainly on this sense.

(b) *Hetuyādīkī*—The sense of acceptance or rejection of an object after proper consideration of its advantages or disadvantages. This sense is found in all the mobile (trasa) animals; who can move from place to place according to their interest.

(c) *Dṛṣṭivādīkī*—The sense of getting the knowledge of Dṛṣṭi-vāda, the twelfth āṅga. This sense is found in the persons with right attitude (samyagdṛṣṭi) only. The above division of saṁjñā is related to the higher grade animals only.

## (2) The Second Division

According to the second division the saṁjñā is divided into two varieties of (a) knowing and (b) feeling :

(a) The variety of knowing relates to the five types of knowledge, mati, śruta etc.

(b) The variety of feeling is divided into the following four types :

(i) *Āhārasaṁjñā*—The feeling of hunger. It is effected by the rise of corresponding Vedanīya karman.

(ii) *Bhayasaṁjñā*—The feeling of fear; effected by the Mohanīya karman.

(iii) *Maithunasaṁjñā*—The feeling of sexual desire, effected by Mohanīya.

(iv) *Parigrahasaṁjñā*—The desire for accumulation, effected by Mohanīya.

The Bhagavati-Sūtra adds six more varieties; i. e. the four passions (kaṣāyas), Oghasaṁjñā and Lokasaṁjñā. Oghasaṁjñā is the habitual feeling without any explicit psychic conscious-

1. Bhagavati 7.8. Prajñāpanā pada 8.

ness. It is just like the activities of unconscious mind *loka-saṁjñā* is the ordinary type of articulate cognition.

In the *Ācārāṅga*<sup>1</sup> there are six more *saṁjñās* of (i) *Moha*, (ii) *Dharma* (iii) *Sukha*, (iv) *Duḥkha*, (v) *Jugupsā* and (vi) *Śoka*.

The above types of *saṁjñās* are common to all the mundane being. They are found in the one-sensed animals also.

### The Problem of *Saṁjñin* and *Asaṁjñin*

In the Jaina biological evolution only a particular section of the five-sensed animals is regarded as *saṁjñin*. All other animals are *asaṁjñins*. This division is roughly based on the possession of mind or otherwise. The animals with mind are known as *saṁjñins* and others as *asaṁjñins*<sup>2</sup>. But, at the same time it is held that *Mati* and *Śruta* are common to all the imperfect souls. We have divided *mati* into three types of *indriyanimitta* (produced by the senses alone), *anindriyanimitta* (produced by the mind only) and *ubhayanimitta* (produced by the both). The first type of *mati* is possible in the one-sensed animals also as they also possess the sense of touch. The *śruta* is caused exclusively by the mind; so it cannot exist in the lower grade animals who are without mind.

Jinabhadra tries to explain this inconsistency by holding the division of *saṁjñin* and *asaṁjñin* as based on the physical mind; which is not completed in the lower grade animals. Their activity is mere instinctive and not rational. But, as far as the psychical mind is concerned, they are not absolutely without mind. They also possess the power of thinking or feeling to a certain degree. The trees, though one-sensed in physical consideration, exhibit a clear sense of feeling, the favourable or unfavourable touches. But, this contention of Jinabhadra, goes against the theory of cognitive causal system. The psychical

1. *Ācārāṅga Ntrukti* G. 38, 39.

2. *Tattvārtha* II. 25

3. *Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya* G. 104



sense does not function without the help of physical sense, as we have stated in the case of a blind. According to the same principle, the psychical mind is impotent without the physical mind. Consequently, the phenomena of mental activities cannot be explained in the case of asaṃjñīns.

The only possible explanation of this division is that the negation in the case of asaṃjñīns, does not mean total absence, but an undeveloped condition. The mind of the lower grade animals is not so developed as amounting to rationality. This view is further confirmed by the first division of saṃjñā, stated above. The animals by instinct also possess mind in undeveloped form; and consequently, they have śruta also.

### **The Object of Mind**

According to the Non-Jaina systems mind is an essential condition for all types of psychic function. It is only the Vedānta, which holds certain qualities as sāksībhāṣya (cognized by the pure soul).<sup>1</sup> But, as far as the cognition of external things is concerned, he also holds antaḥkaraṇa, as an essential condition. The Jaina does not favour this view. The Nandī clearly holds the sense cognition as different from the mental cognition.<sup>2</sup> The first is pratyakṣa while the latter is parokṣa. All types of parokṣa in the logical period, except Āgama are included into parokṣa-mati. Akalaṅka includes them into śruta;<sup>3</sup> but, this difference is related with the fixation of a demarcation line between mati and śruta. Akalaṅka includes all types of mental cognition into śruta. As far as the sense cognition is concerned he does not differ from the Nandī.

Thus, mind is not an essential condition for all types of knowledge. In the logical period it is held that mind functions in the case of sense-cognitions also. But, that is an external influence. We have stated the variety of mati exclusively rela-

1. Vedānta Paribhāṣā p. 72

2. Nandī Sūtrā 4 and 24

3. Tattvārtha Rājavārtika p. 54

ted with the senses. In such cases the soul cognizes the object through the medium of senses, without depending upon the assistance of mind, just as in the case of supersensual cognition, it does so directly. It is another thing that in the case of saṃjñins, the mind begins to function as soon as an object is presented.

In the case of supersensual cognition of avadhi and manaḥ-paryāya the role of mind is finished with the desire to know a particular object. After knowledge it begins to function again for the creation of favourable or unfavourable attitude. In the case of an omniscient it is absolved from that function also. Similar, is the case with sense-cognition. It (mind) functions in creating a desire to know a particular thing. It has nothing to do with the stage of sensation. It functions again for creating the particular attitude. But the stages of desire and attitude are not cognitive stages. They are result of Mohanīya karman. Here, the mind does not function as an instrument of knowledge, but that of feeling or willing.

The mind as an instrument of cognition is related with the four types of imperceptual knowledge. They are memory, recognition, hypothetical judgement and authority. In the Āgamic period these types are expressed along with mati or śruta. No doubt, the feelings of pleasure, pain etc. are directly related with the mind. But, they are not cognitions. The four types of passions (kaṣāyas) and nine types of mild passions (nokaṣāyas) also are related with the mind, but those also are not cognitions. In the four stages of avagraha etc. the mind begins to function from the stage of Īhā, which is a mental inclination towards judgement. Here, it operates upon the data supplied by the senses. According to Jainism mati advances from general to particular. This process consists in doubt, inclination and judgement. All these stages are mental phenomena. In the animals without mind these states do not occur. Such animals get sense-impression and react habitually. For, the states of doubt etc. the memory of past impression is necessary. It is not possible in the lower grade animals. They

cannot retain the memory of past events. The flies sit on the same thing even if they are hundred times blown away. They cannot be rational. Memory is the quality of a developed mind. Similarly, the power of retention (dhāraṇā) also is a mental quality.

The above discussion leads us to the conclusion that mind is an instrument of knowing as well as the other psychical activities of feeling and willing. The external senses are related with knowing only. In the case of knowing the mind is further analysed in two varieties. It serves as an instrument of an independently recognised category of knowledge, as in the case of memory, inference etc. It also serves as an instrument of the development of sense-cognition. As a matter of fact both types are fundamentally the same. The elements of memory and inference exist in both cases. But, in one case they are independently recognized while in others they are secondary to the sense-cognition. This division does not exist in the Āgamic period. It was introduced by the logical period, where the question of inference etc. came into prominence.

## The Division of Mati

### Śruta-Nisrita and Aśruta-Nisrita

Mati covers all the stages of acquisition, conservation and elaboration, accepted by the modern psychology as the stages of thinking. These stages are only a logical assumption. They are hardly felt distinct from the another in our common experience. Sometimes, our mind works so abruptly that one cannot discriminate whether the experience is a mental contribution or a sensation. Russell cites an example to clarify this point.<sup>1</sup> Once, in the days when motor-car was a new invention, and people were not acquainted with its machinery, he motored with a friend in a country-side. Suddenly, the tyre burst out with the noise like a gun-shot. His friend was not acquainted with the noise of bursting and took it as that of a gun.

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1. Analysis of Mind. p. 139

At the same moment he told Mr. Russell that he had seen the flash also. The flash, at that time was decidedly a mental creation. But, the feeling was so strong that it appeared like a sensation. We may quote another example from him. When we listen to a foreign dialogue, though we know it, we have to sit near the speaker and be careful to listen every word. But, when the dialogue is in the mother tongue, such closeness or attention is not required. As far as auditory sense is concerned it works with equal capacity in both places. But, in the former case the mind does not work so swiftly as to fill up the gap at once. In the second case it is swift and fills all the gaps left by sensation, at once. It is therefore, difficult to ascertain the limits of sensation and mentation in a particular case. But, the sensation does not reach the stage of knowledge unless it is interpreted, understood or given a mental arrangement.

The function of interpretation or understanding is generally known as intellectuation. The back-ground of this intellectuation is based on the material supplied by the person himself or some other person. When a child is born he is not able to understand anything. Gradually, his intellect develops either on his own experiences or instruction from other persons. The instructions are either oral or through books. The main difference between the two bases of intellectual development is, that the former is automatic and experimental. The second is derived and indirect.

The Nandī divides Matī into two varieties of Śruta-nisṛita and Aśruta-niḥsṛita on the above mentioned two grounds. The intellectuation based on scriptures of other kinds of instructions is śrutānisṛita and that based on other sources is aśrutānisṛita. Malayagiri defines śruta-nisṛita as the cognition of a person with the intellect developed through the study of scriptures.<sup>2</sup> The latter are not recollected at the time of cognition; but, function as assimilated in the mental set up.

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1. Nandī Sūtra, 26

2. Nandī tīkā, p. 143

On the other hand, if they are remembered at the time of cognition as authorities, the resulting knowledge would be śruta and not mati.

The natural capability of mind to strike at the right solution or exact point without the previous knowledge of scriptures is Aśruta nisṛta. It is the direct result of kṣayopaśama attained through birth (utpatti), self-discipline (vinaya), practice (karma) and rationality (pariṇāma).

The Nandī again divides Śruta-nisṛta into four types of Avagraha etc. and Aśruta-nisṛta into four Buddhīs. It is convenient to discuss first, the four buddhīs. The Nandī describes them as follows.

1. *Autpattikī* : The sense of striking at the right point, which is never seen, heard or otherwise known before; and thus, leading to a successful result is known as autpattikī. It does not depend upon instruction or other external causes. It is a natural gift. The Nandī cites thirteen stories to illustrate it. They are stories of wits and wisdom like the Aesop's Fables. They only show how the natural genius of persons get them successfully through hardships.

2. *Vainayikī* : The intellect of finding out a right solution in a complicated matter is known as Vainayikī. It enables one to know the essence of religion, ethics and politics. It is beneficial in this life as well as after death. It is attained through self-discipline (vinaya). The Nandī illustrates it with fifteen stories. It is attained through long service of the preceptor. It should not be taken as resulting from the teaching of the latter. The result of teaching is Śruta-nisṛta, while vainayikī is a mental development of intellect obtained through service and self-discipline. The first example makes the distinction very clear. Two disciples of the same teacher, with the same amount of book-knowledge observe the same phenomenon. One of the, two who was rather impertinent, reached the wrong conclusion, while the other, with obedient nature,

strikes at the right conclusion. The distinction between the two is not based on the knowledge but on their personal intelligence.

(3) *Karmaja*—The intellect developed through practice in a particular vocation. It is illustrated with twelve stories.

(4) *Pāriṇāmikī*—The intellect attained through inference, reason and other methods of rationality; ripened with the advancement of age, is known as *pāriṇāmikī*. It also helps in mundane as well as spiritual attainments. It has twenty-one stories.

If we consider the sphere of *Śruta niśrita* on the basis of buddhis we can say that it covers the whole field of indirect mati. *Śruta niśrita* is confined to direct mati.

#### Some Historical Remarks

The above division of *Śruta niśrita* and *Aśruta niśrita* is not found in the Digambara tradition. In the *Śvetāmbaras* also it is not found in the *Bhagavati*, *Prajñāpanā*, *Niryuktis* and *Anuyoga*. It is the *Nandī* which refers to it for the first time. In the *Bhagavati* and *Āvaśyaka-Niryukti* four buddhis are described without their relation with mati. They are not specifically mentioned as related to any of the five types of knowledge. The *Śruta* at that time was confined to scriptural knowledge only. Consequently, these examples of wits, generally associated with unlettered persons, could not be credited as *śruta*. So, it appears that the author of *Nandī* tried to include them in *Mati* through the above mentioned device.

The fluctuation in sense of philosophical terms, helps in adjustment; but, at the same time makes distinction a difficult problem. This is seen especially in the case of distinction between *Mati* and *Śruta*; which we shall discuss shortly.

We cannot say that the division of *Śruta niśrita* and *Aśruta niśrita* is precise and mutually exclusive. The process of *Avagraha* etc. is as common to the unlettered as it is to a

1. *Bhagavāṇī*, *Āvaśyaka Niryukti* G. 932

lettered. One cannot say that the four types of avagraha etc. are always Śruta niśrita. Similarly, the buddhis also are not peculiar to the uneducated only. It appears that the author has followed in it the local tradition of associating the above tit-bits with uneducated people. So, when they were recognised as associated with the persons without śruta, the others came to be accepted as related with the person with śruta.

According to VBh. the four buddhis also appear in the natural process of Avagraha etc., yet, they are named as Aśruta niśrita, because, they depend upon the kṣayopaśama of the previous life or of the same life attained through practice or such other things. They do not depend upon the scriptural knowledge or the instruction by a teacher. On the other hand the stage of 'Īhā' is an inclination to classify the object, i.e. to attach it with some connotation. It is not possible unless the cognizer possesses the knowledge of words and their meanings. This knowledge is obtained through scriptures or instruction only. A person, however, intelligent he may be, cannot be acquainted with the terminology of a particular language without instruction.

But this solution raises another difficulty. It implies that the stage of 'Īhā' cannot be attained by a being unacquainted with language. By language we do not mean here the personal inner articulation, which is a constant companion of thought. Here it means the common dialect based on the instruction. We cannot say that a cow, monkey or such other intelligent animals do not reach the stage of 'Īhā'. They form their judgements also, and reach even the stage which is more advanced. They do not get any instruction from scriptures, but learn everything by their natural instinct. So, the solution given by VBh. also is a general way of classification. There is no hard and fast demarcation between the two.

### **The Division of Śruta niśrita**

It has been stated above that the two-fold division of Śruta

#### **1. Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya G. 177**

niśrita and Aśruta-niśrita was introduced by the author of Nandī. If this division is not taken into consideration Matī is directly divided into the four varieties of Avagraha, Īhā, Avāya and Dhāraṇā. This division is common with the Śvetāmbaras as well as Digambaras. It is found in all the cononical and latter literature. It expresses the psychological process of knowing as admitted by the Jainas.

Knowledge, in the ordinary sense of the term, is judgement. But, a judgement is not reached at once. One has to pass through certain stages before reaching it. The philosophical systems have explained these stages in various ways.

The Nyāya admits four stages in the following order :—

- (1) Contact between the organ of sense and the object.
- (2) The cognitions of the object and its characteristic without relation (viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭyānavagāhi jñānam).
- (3) Cognition of the two as related with each other.
- (4) The desirable, undesirable or indifferent attitude towards the object.

Prabhākara and Kumārila endorse the Nyāya view with a slight change in the second stage, which we shall point out in the chapter of Darśana.

The Sāṅkhya explains these stages as follows :—

- (1) Contact
- (2) Outgoing of buddhi at the spot of the object.
- (3) Reflection of the object into buddhi.
- (4) Reflection of puruṣa into buddhi or that of buddhi into puruṣa; the conceptions held by Vācaspati and Vijñāna-bhikṣu respectively.

The Vedānta holds the following process<sup>1</sup> :—

- (1) Contact
- (2) Outgoing of Antaḥkaraṇa at the spot of object.
- (3) The removal of ignorance obscuring the consciousness conditioned by the object.



- (4) The illumination or projection of the new object. This stage varies according to the two schools of the Vedānta.

The Buddhist holds a different process :

- (1) Contact or contiguity as the case may be.
- (2) Inarticulate cognition of the particular object-instants (artha-kṣaṇa).
- (3) Mental creation of the name, class etc.

In the Abhidharma philosophy the sense cognition is known as Pañcadvāra vīthi. It is explained through the simile of a man sleeping under a mango-tree.

A man is lying under a mango-tree lost in deep sleep. A fruit drops down and rolls by his side. He is suddenly woke up and tries to find out what has disturbed him. He sees the mango fruit nearby; picks it up and smells and examines. Having been ascertained that it is quite ripe and good, he eats it. In this process :

(1) The deep sleep is compared to the passive state of mind, when it is having its own course, undisturbed by any kind of impression, either objective or ideational. This state of mind is called Bhavaṅga.

(2) Getting up and trying to find out what has disturbed him, is like that lazy state of mind when the subject feebly strives to make out whether the stimulus came through the eye, or the ear, or the nose, or the tongue or the skin (touch). This is called Pañcadvāravajjana or turning to impressions at the five doors of senses.

(3) 'Seeing the mango fruit' is like the arising of the particular sensation, either of the eye or any other four doors of senses. It is sensation, pure and simple, free from any reflection over it. This state is known as 'Viññāna' or consciousness.

(4) 'The picking up the mango fruit' is like the mind receiving the stimulus as an independent object existing outside in the world of reality. This is called 'sampaṭicchana' or the recipient consciousness.

(5) Smelling and examining the mango fruit is like the mind reflecting over the object and trying to understand it in the light of its previous experiences. This is called 'santīraṇa' or the investigating consciousness.

(6) Ascertaining that the mango is quite ripe and good is like the mind giving the object a definite place in the field of knowledge. This is called 'Votthapana' or the determining consciousness.

(7) 'Eating the mango' is like the mind tending to adjust the object according to its own suitability. This is the most lively state of consciousness, in which the subject is fully conscious of itself and determines its own attitude towards the object. This is called javana or the active consciousness.

In Manodvāra-vīthi or the course of cognition through the mind door, the object of cognition is not a stimulus of the outside world: but, an ideational image arising from within, which presents itself with an already ascertained and determined character. This course of cognition, therefore, begins with the sixth stage of the Pañcadvāra vīthi, i. e. with Votthāpana or the determining consciousness.

The modern psychology admits the following stages :

- |                  |                                        |
|------------------|----------------------------------------|
| (1) Acquisition  | { Sensation<br>Perception              |
| (2) Conservation | { Memory<br>Imagination                |
| (3) Elaboration  | { Conception<br>Judgement<br>Reasoning |

### Avagraha (sensation)

According to the Jaina psychology of knowing, the cognitive process begins with darśana and ends with Dhāraṇā. There are three middle stages of Avagraha, Īhā and Avāya. The stage of judgement is reached in Avāya. The first two stages comprise in awareness and the inclination towards a judgement. The stage of Avagraha appears immediately after Darśana.

Its conception, therefore, varies according to the views about Darśana to which we have devoted an independent chapter.

According to the general view Darśana is the first cognitive stage appearing after contiguity of the senses and the object. Pūjyapāda,<sup>1</sup> Akalaṅka<sup>2</sup> and all scholars of the logical school have accepted this view. According to them Avagraha is not mere awareness. This stage is covered by Darśana. Avagraha goes one step further towards apprehension of the particularity.

According to Virasena<sup>3</sup> darśana is the first inclination of the soul, for knowing. It does not refer to any external object. It puts the senses at work. According to this view avagraha means the stage of contiguity, which is closely followed by the first awareness of the external existence, known as arthāvagraha. The process of particularization begins with Īhā.

According to the first view Avagraha is defined as the cognition of object, following the general awareness of mere existence appearing at the contiguity of the sense-organ with the object. It holds that in the stage of Avagraha one is able to make a distinction whether the object is a sound or colour. This view is open to certain difficulties. The Avagraha; as will be seen later on, is divided in two stages of Vyañjanāvagraha and Arthāvagraha. The first stage is the contact of the senses with the object. This stage cannot be explained in any other way; as its four-fold division, i. e. the exclusion of visual sense and mind from its sphere, points out clearly that it is nothing but the contact between the two. It would mean that the stage of Avagraha begins with the contact and Darśana comes after it; which is against the established order.

Secondly, the particularization is always preceded by a doubt, having an equal balance on two or more, alternatives, then there is the stage of leaning towards one side followed by

1. Sarvārthasiddhi Sūtra, I. 15
2. Tattvārtharājavārtika Sūtra, I. 15
3. Dhavalā p. 354

the stage of judgement. We cannot make the cognition of first particularity an exception to this rule. If Avagraha is admitted as cognition of first particularity it also must be preceded by doubt and speculation (Īhā). These points will be discussed further as we proceed.

The second view dominates the Āgamic literature. Umāsvāti, Siddhasena Gaṇin and Jinabhadra support it. The examples of a sleeping man and the earthen pot fresh from the oven, as expressed in the Nandī, support the same. According to this view Avagraha is the first awareness of external existence, without any distinction of sound, colour etc. All particulars in this stage lie unmanifest. The first stage towards the realization of particularity begins with Īhā.

The process of cognition as admitted by the above mentioned two views can be placed as follows :

1. Contact—Darśana—Avagraha—Īhā etc.
2. Darśana—contact—Avagraha—Īhā etc.

According to the second view contact is a stage of avagraha, known as vyañjanāvagraha.

### **Vyañjanāvagraha (The contact between senses and the object)**

Avagraha is divided in two stages of Vyañjanāvagraha and Arthāvagraha.

Vyañjanāvagraha means the contact between senses and the object leading to the manifestation of the latter. By senses we mean here the internal physical senses (antarnirvṛtti), which possess the power of cognition. The term Vyañjanā has three meanings : The senses, the object to be cognized and the contact between the two. The third is known as Vyañjanāvagraha.

It can be objected here that the contact is not knowledge, it is a physical relation. It exists between sound and the auditory sense of a deaf also, who is decidedly without any knowledge.

Jinabhadra replies to this objection that Vyañjanāvagraha is not absolutely without knowledge as it supplies matter to

Arthāvagraha;<sup>1</sup> which is knowledge without any doubt. Vyañjanāvagraha results into Arthāvagraha. If it were without any knowledge, it cannot transform into a knowledge. Jñāna does not necessarily mean a cognition but, also its cause.

It is interesting to contrast this view with that of the logical period, where Sannikarṣa is explicitly rejected as not knowledge, and therefore Apramāṇa. It is the paucity of our philosophical discussions that when the same thing comes from a rival system it is severely attacked and it is forgotten that the criticism goes against their own tenets also.

Jinabhadra suggests another explanation also. He says that a thin ray of knowledge exists in Vyañjanāvagraha as well, but is unmanifest on account of its dimness. A single ray of light cannot appear distinctly in thick darkness. The contact, in the case of a deaf does not result into cognition, nor it contains even the thinnest ray of knowledge. Consequently, it cannot be accepted as Vyañjanāvagraha. It means that Vyañjanāvagraha is a contact of the object with living senses only. Even in the stage of mere contact they possess some distinction from the dead senses. This distinction is based on two grounds. Firstly, the living senses differ from the dead ones in their capacity of producing knowledge. Secondly, the living senses begin their function from the very first moment. If they are like the dead in that stage, they cannot produce knowledge in the subsequent stages also.

It can be further objected that knowledge is always manifest. It is like the light which is ever-illuminated. To say the knowledge as unmanifest, is a contradiction. They are contrary to each other like the light and darkness.

Jinabhadra replies that 'unmanifest' does not mean here, that the thin ray of knowledge is unmanifest even to its own extent. It is always manifest to the extent of its size. But, that manifestation is so feeble that we cannot realize it. It is just like the cognition of a sleeping or unconscious person. He is

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1. Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya G. 200

not aware of his own sensation. When awake he expresses total absence of knowledge during sleep or senselessness. But, we cannot say that knowledge was totally absent in those conditions. During sleep also some persons utter meaningful sentences, reply to the calls in a general way and move their limbs. These, functions are not possible in total absence of knowledge. After all they are reactions of certain stimuli which are a kind of knowledge. They are never seen in inanimate things like stones and bricks. But knowledge at that time is so obscured by slumber that it is realized neither at that time, nor afterwards.

In the waking state also we do not realize all the impressions or sensations, changing every moment. It is only the strong feelings and distinct apprehensions, that we are aware of. Many others come and go without invoking any attention. Similarly, Vyañjanāvagraha also is indistinct on account of its feebleness. But, it cannot be excluded from the category of knowledge.

As a matter of fact knowledge is a long process gradually advancing towards judgement and confirmation. It begins with the contact and gets completion in the stage of judgement. The first judgement is again scrutinized and results into discrimination. This process goes on as long as the cognizer does not divert his attention. It is difficult to hold any of the middle stages as knowledge and reject others. If the preceding stage is not knowledge, it cannot result into knowledge subsequently. The particles of sand, which do not possess oil in any degree, cannot produce it even when assembled in a big quantity. The oil-seeds can do so; only because they possess oil in single grain also; however, scanty it may be. Nothing can be produced in later stages which is not possessed by a thing in the first stage. This principle holds good in the case of knowledge also. If the first moment, i. e. the contact, is not knowledge, it cannot develop into knowledge even in the succeeding stages. So, Vyañjanāvagraha must be accepted as knowledge.

Moreover, Vyañjanāvagraha lasts for a duration of innumerable moments, changing into Arthāvagraha at the last moment. We cannot say that knowledge appeared suddenly at the last stage. It is an accumulation of the impressions taken in the innumerable moments. There is no instant without putting its mark. As the cloth is produced by all the threads constituting it; one cannot say, that the last thread is cloth and the others are not; similarly, impressions of all the instants combined make a knowledge. They cannot be divided into two groups, one as knowledge and the other as not-knowledge.

According to Pūjyapāda and the exponents of first view, the distinction between Vyañjanāvagraha and Arthāvagraha consists in their degree of distinctness. Vyañjanāvagraha is indistinct while the latter is distinct as compared with the former.

This explanation does not appeal to the logical mind. There must be some distinct characteristic separating one stage from the other. If Darśana is the first stage of awareness of general character, the succeeding stage would be the speculation of particularity, and the third is judgement. If the two stages of avagraha are fixed between awareness (darśana) and speculation (Īhā) there must be some distinguishing factor. If the classification is based merely on the degree of distinctness, there are as many stages as the units of time.

According to the former view this difficulty does not arise. It is clear in its classification. Darśana is a psychical state preceding the contact; then, there is the contact known as Vyañjanāvagraha, then, there is the general apprehension known as Arthāvagraha followed by the speculation (Īhā) which leads to judgement (avāya).

### **Types of Vyañjanāvagraha**

The senses of sight and mind apprehend the object without physical contact, while the others depend upon contact. Accordingly, the sight and the mind do not pass through

the stage of Vyañjanāvagraha.<sup>1</sup> They reach the stage of arthāvagraha directly after darśana. So, Vyañjanāvagraha is related with the remaining four senses only, i. e. the senses of the touch, taste, smell and sound.

#### Arthāvagraha (The first apprehension)

Vyañjanāvagraha was mainly related with the function of senses, without producing any appreciable result in respect of grasping the object. The first moment, when the cognizer becomes aware of the external existence, is arthāvagraha. It lasts for a moment only. Jinabhadra describes it as a cognition of generality without any mixture of particularity; free from connotation and classification.<sup>2</sup> The cognizer does not know even the nature of object, whether it is visible, audible or the object or some other sense. It results, in the subsequent stage into speculation of particularity.

The Nandī includes classification of sound, colour etc. into arthāvagraha.<sup>3</sup> Jinabhadra explains away the contradiction in the following way<sup>4</sup> :

In arthāvagraha sound or colour etc. are apprehended in a general way; i. e. not as sound or colour, but, merely as an external existence. The object is the same in all stages beginning from avagraha upto the judgement. None can say that avagraha does not have sound or colour as its object. The difference amongst the successive stages is that they gradually advance towards particularization. Avagraha is the starting point of external awareness. It does not go beyond the most general form of mere existence. He contends further<sup>5</sup> that the cognition of sound as sound is a judgement i. e. avāya and not avagraha. If it is admitted as the first stage, Avagraha and Īhā will have no scope. Moreover, the cognition of 'this is

1. Tattvārtha I. 12; Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya G. 194

2. Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya G 252

3. Nandisūtra 29-30

4. Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya G 253

5. Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya G 254



sound' implies the exclusion of colour etc. which is clearly, a knowledge of particularity.

It can be argued that the cognition of sound as sound is Avagraha and not Avāya, because, in the stage of Avāya we go a step further towards particularity. In that stage we cognize the particulars also whether the sound emanates from a horn or conch. Thus, the difference between the two lies in degree of awareness and not quality.

Jinabhadra<sup>1</sup> replies, if the above classification is based on degree only, there cannot be any limit of it. If the decision of sound as belonging to conch is admitted as Avāya, what about the further particulars. We go further and decide that the sound is sweet and not harsh. Further, it is coming from North and not from the South. Either we shall have to fix other classes for these particulars or admit the preceding stages as avagraha in relation to the succeeding ones. This will render the whole classification an anamoly.

Further, the decision of 'this is sound' implies the exclusion of colour etc. This exclusion is not possible without the speculation of two sides. It necessitates the existence of Īhā (speculation) before reaching the above decision. Speculation is not possible unless a thing, at first, is apprehended in a general way, and this general apprehension must be admitted as free from all particularity. Otherwise, it also will have an Īhā and a general apprehension as the preceding stages. We cannot say this general apprehension as Vyañjanāvagraha as it is related with the four senses only, and is confined to the function of mere senses. Consequently, we have to admit arthāvagraha as a general apprehension of the type stated above.

Further, arthāvagraha is admitted as lasting for a moment only. The decision of 'this is sound' can last as long as the further investigations are not carried. It is only the cognition of generality without any particularity that lasts only for a moment, as the cognition of particularity begins from the very next moment,

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1. Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya 255

Again, if the decision 'this is sound' is admitted as avagraha it must pass through certain stages before reaching that decision. It implies the existence of Avagraha and Īhā before it. In that case it must be admitted as Avāya. If that decision is reached without previous stages the same should be accepted in the case of avāya also, and this will render the stages of avagraha and Īhā without any scope.

It can be argued that the whole process upto the stage of decision is included into arthāvagraha, and the succeeding stages would go to Īhā and Avāya. This argument is inconsistent with the time duration of arthāvagraha, which lasts for not more than one moment. The whole process is not possible in such a short period.

According to another view the conception of arthāvagraha varies according to the cognizer. In the case of a just-born baby avagraha is free from all particularity. He is unacquainted with the terminology or the classification of language. In his case, therefore, avagraha can be defined according to the first view. But, in the case of an experienced person there is no knowledge of general type. He apprehends particularity at the very first moment. In his case, avagraha should be defined according to the latter view.

The above explanation also goes against the accepted cognitive process. The stage of particular decision cannot be reached at the very first moment. It must be preceded by the stages of general apprehension and speculation. Moreover, an experienced person can reach the decision swifter than the inexperienced one. But, there cannot be any difference in the procedure. The cognition of particularity without a general apprehension is an impossibility. This holds good in both cases, the experienced as well as the inexperienced.

If an experienced person is believed as to reach the stage of particularity without passing through the previous stages; another person with more experience would cognise further particularity at the first moment; and thus, the established procedure

will have no explanation. Again, in this case, avagraha would include all particularity into its sphere, and the subsequent stages will go without any function.

It can be argued : If arthāvagraha lasts for one moment only and has the apprehension of most general type, it cannot have the twelve varieties of bahu (cognition of many), eka (cognition of one) etc. These varieties are possible, if avagraha lasts for more than one moment and possesses a gradation in the sphere of objectivity.

Jinabhadra replies that the above division is mainly based on judgement (avāya) and not avagraha. The introduction of these varieties in avagraha also is only figurative and not real; based on the avagraha being a cause of avāya, which is the real possessor of these varieties.

#### **Naiścayikāvagraha and Vyāvahārikāvagraha**

After discussing the general nature of avagraha Jinabhadra explains two aspects related with the problem.<sup>1</sup> According to the real aspect avagraha lasts for the moment only and does not apprehend any particularity. But, the process of knowledge is so swift that the moment of real arthāvagraha cannot be appreciated by the persons with imperfect knowledge. It is beyond general apprehension. It is accepted only as a logical postulation. Avagraha according to the discursive aspect lasts for more than one moment, and apprehends the general types of particularity also. The avagraha based on real aspect is known as Naiścayikāvagraha and that on discursive aspect as Vyāvahārikāvagraha. The first is followed by Īhā with speculation of the most general division, and Īhā is followed by Avāya with the decision of 'this is sound'. Again there is Īhā speculating the sound with further discrimination and it is again followed by Avāya. The former Avāya, apprehending the sound only may be taken as Avagraha in relation to the subsequent Īhā and Avāya. If one goes further towards particularization the same process will be repeated again. There will be again Īhā

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1. Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya G. 289

and then Avāya. This process goes on according to the interest of the cognizer. In every process the stage preceding Īhā may be held as avagraha; because, it is general in relation to the subsequent stages. In this way avāya will be the last stage where a cognizer ceases to go further. This stage will be preceded by Īhā and the stage preceding Īhā would be avagraha in relation to the following stages; and Avāya in relation to the preceding ones. The first stage lasting for a moment is real avagraha; which is not preceded by any cognition. Similarly, the last stage is exclusively avāya where the cognizer stops to go further. The middle stages of speculation are Īhā, and those of decision are avagraha as well as avāya. The connotation of avagraha in the middle stages is discursive (vyāvahārika) based on their being a cause to the subsequent Īhā and Avāya, and being a general apprehension in respect of the further stages.

### Īhā (speculation)

The real avagraha has been described as the apprehension of mere existence. The speculation of particularity starts with Īhā,<sup>1</sup> which continues upto the stage of judgement (avāya). It is beginning of the process of sifting, whether the object known is a sound or colour. If the cognition of first particularity is accepted as the sphere of avagraha, the view held by logical school, Īhā starts with further particularization. In that case the speculation whether the sound emanates from a horn or a conch would constitute the subject-matter for Īhā. As a matter of fact Īhā is a desire for knowing a thing in particularity. This particularity is not confined to a definite stage. Even after reaching the stage of the judgement of a particular type, one can desire to know further about its particulars. Thus, Īhā occurs not only before avāya but also after it, if the cogniser continues thinking and is desirous of knowing a thing further.

### Īhā and Jijñāsā (desire for knowledge)

The logical school, following the definition of Pūjyapāda,

1. Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya G. 289

maintains that *Īhā* is a desire for the knowledge of particularity. The *Nyāya* contends that desire does not necessarily precede knowledge. Even, the objects which we do not desire, come to be known. The Jaina replies that we come across hundreds of things in our daily life; but, only about a few of them, reach the stage of judgement. This difference cannot be explained without accepting the existence of desire, distinct or indistinct, for knowing. Even in the case of undesirable things the desire for knowing cannot be ruled out. Desire for possession is something different from that knowing. This desire is explicit in the advanced stages of knowledge. On the same ground it can be postulated in other stages also. Moreover, *Īhā* is a mental contemplation on data supplied by the senses. This contemplation is not universal. Some objects disappear altogether after the first sensation without leaving any mark or impression on the mind. Only those which impress the mind, favourably or unfavourably, are contemplated further till the stage of judgement. These phenomena lead us to the conclusion that a desire precedes the judgement. This desire is not of a general type, where the agent follows his freewill. It is forced upon the cognizer by sensation. The cognizer has to limit his choice within the boundaries, constructed by sensation.

### **Īhā and Doubt (saṁśaya)**

It can be argued that *Īhā* cannot be differentiated from doubt. Both of them are apprehensions without any decision. The Jaina replies that there is a lot of difference between the two. In doubt one wavers in two or more alternatives without reaching the stage of judgement. He puts equal balance on all the alternatives. It leaves the subject in confusion. *Īhā* does not waver amongst alternatives. It naturally advances towards a judgement. It prepares the ground for the latter. It speculates the nature of a thing on logical ground and inclines towards accepting one alternative and rejecting the others. *Īhā* does not lead to perversity or confusion.<sup>1</sup>

1. *Vlśeṣāvaśyakaṭkā* G. 289

Akalaṅka states that Īhā is not doubt; because, it occurs after it<sup>1</sup>.

### Avāya (Judgement)

Avāya is the stage of judgement where one reaches at a decision. The decision is reached after due deliberation on the points of agreement and disagreement. Just again the case of sound, one ascertains on the ground of its being sweet, that it emanates from a conch and not from a horn.<sup>2</sup>

Regarding judgement there are two tendencies in Indian systems. The Buddhist asserts that judgement is always negative. According to him “this is a jar” means that ‘it is not not-jar’. It follows the principle of apoha, that is negation. The Sāṅkhya and Mīmāṃsā hold that judgement is always affirmative. Even the negative judgement, according to them, points to something positive. The Nyāya accepts both kinds. The negative judgement, he says, refers to only the negative aspect and the affirmative judgement relates to the positive aspect. The Jaina holds that both, the positive as well as negative aspects, are present in all the judgements. Even in the negative judgement something is affirmed and in the affirmative judgement something is denied. The process of Avāya confirms the above statement. The Īhā speculated two alternatives. Out of them one is accepted and the other is rejected in the stage of avāya. Thus, a judgement is always associated with both aspects; positive as well as negative.

### Apāya and Avāya

The Prākṛta term avāya is rendered into Saṃskṛta in two forms having different meanings. If it is taken to be Apāya the sense of negation dominates. In that case it resembles the Bauddha term Apoha. If it is held as Avāya it carries the positive sense, meaning a decision. Umāsvāti and the subse-

1. Tattvārtha Rājavārtika p. 43

2. Viśeṣāvaśya Bhāṣya, G. 290

quent Śvetāmbara literature accepts the former<sup>1</sup> term while Digambaras patronize the latter.<sup>1</sup>

This controversy leads to the discussion about the factor that plays most important part in arriving at a judgement. At the stage of Īhā, the assertion of the existing factor carries more weight, but the negation of the non-existing factor is not reached as yet. This is completed in the stage of Avāya. According to this process the positive factor is known at the stage of Īhā, while the negative factor awaits Avāya. Umāsvāti in his Bhāṣya stresses upon this point and recognizes the term Apāya on that basis.

The Digambara tradition, perhaps under the influence of Mīmāṃsā, does not give any prominence to the negative aspect. They have always interpreted it as Avāya, in the sense that it reaches the positive aspect. Akalaṅka has tried at a compromise<sup>2</sup> and stated that it does not matter whether we call it Apāya or Avāya. In both cases both aspects must be accepted. No judgement is possible in absence of any of the two.

Jinabhadra refers to another view also holding the stage of Avāya as the negation and that of Dhāraṇā, the fourth stage, as assertion.<sup>3</sup>

### Dhāraṇā (Retention)

Dhāraṇā consists in retention of the judgement already arrived<sup>4</sup> at. It does not add anything new to the knowledge but helps in retaining the already acquired for a longer duration or in putting the subconscious impression that can be revived into memory. It is divided into the following three types<sup>5</sup> :

(1) *Avicyavanā*—Fixation of attention on the same point for a long time without diversion. It is the state of cognition

1. Tattvārtha Bhāṣya Sūtra I.15
2. Tattvārtha Rājavārtika I. 15, p. 43
3. Ibid.
4. Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya G. 185-87
5. Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya G. 291

lasting for a longer duration without interruption. The Nyāya and Buddhist systems, which maintain that knowledge lasts for a moment only, explain such cases as a series of similar cognitions. They have termed it as *Dhārāvāhika jñāna* (repeated cognition). The systems like *Mīmāṃsā* and Buddhist contend that only the first cognition is valid while the following are invalid; because, they do not add anything new to the knowledge. Amongst the Jainas also *Digambaras* hold the same view. This point is hotly discussed in the logical field. The Vedāntist admits that in such cases, there is only one cognition lasting as long as the attention is not diverted. This view resembles the present *avicyavanā*.

(2) *Vāsanā* (impression)—The concentration on a subject for a long period, makes strong memory in brain impressions which can be revived into memory. These impressions are known as *Vāsanā* and constitute the second variety of *Dhāraṇā*.

(3) *Smṛti* (memory)—Mental revival of the past impressions. It is effected by *Vāsanā* as stated above and arises generally through sensation of the same object or its associates.

#### Other Senses and Avagraha etc.

While illustrating the four stages of *Avagraha* etc. we have generally mentioned the auditory sense only. The same process can be explained in other senses also. In the stage of *avagraha* the sensation is not distinguished whether the stimulus came from the sense of vision or that of audition. In this stage we have the same appearance through all the senses. The discrimination begins from *Īhā*. It wavers between two alternatives. It does not occur where the apparent objects do not bear similarity to a considerable extent. In the case of visual *Īhā* the choice is possible between a man and a stump, and not between a man and a camel. Because, the camel is totally dissimilar to a man. The same thing can be said of other senses also. In the state of dream where the external senses do not function the mind undergoes the same process.



### The Order of Avagraha etc.

The above mentioned four stages occur one after another. Their order cannot be changed or reversed nor can they occur simultaneously. The next stage is impossible without the preceding one. In cases where the object is familiar the above process does not appear distinctly, on account of its abruptness; but it exists already there.

### The Division of Mati concluded

Thus, we see that mati has twenty eight types. The four stages of avagraha etc. multiplied into the six senses comprise twenty-four; to this we can add the four types of vyañjanā-vagraha which does not occur in the case of mind and the visual sense.<sup>1</sup>

According to another division the four Buddhis are included in place of Vyañjanāvagraha.<sup>2</sup> But, this view is not sound, as the process of avagraha etc. is present in the case of four Buddhis also. They cannot have a separate class.

### Mati divided into three hundred and thirty six types

The above mentioned twenty-eight varieties of Mati are again divided into the following twelve objective considerations<sup>3</sup> :

(1) *Bahu* (many)—The apprehension of many things simultaneously by the same sense. In a concert of many musical instruments a person, with minute observation apprehends all the instruments distinctly. His cognition is known as bahu, i. e. grasping of many things by the same sense. In case of different senses the Jainas do not admit simultaneity. They hold that two senses cannot operate simultaneously. But, the principle that two cognitions do not occur simultaneously holds good in the case of two senses as well as two things. Consequently, the idea of bahu can be explained in collective sense only.

1. Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya G. 300

2. Ibid. ṭṭkā

3. Ibid. G. 307

(2) *Eka* (One)—The opposite of *Bahu* (many) is one. It means grasping one thing at a time.

(3) *Bahuyidha* (Qualitative plurality)—The cognition of different qualities at a time. The former division was related with the numerical plurality, while the present one refers to qualitative plurality.

(4) *Ekayidha* (Qualitative unity)—The apprehension of one quality at a time.

(5) *Kṣīpra* (Swift)—Grasping the object swiftly.

(6) *Akṣīpra* or *manda* (Slow)—Grasping an object slowly.

(7) *Niśrita* (Inferential)—Grasping the object through some sign or emblem.

(8) *Aniśrita* (non-inferential)—

(9) *Niścita* (decisive)—Grasping an object ultimately.

(10) *Aniścita* (unconclusive)—Grasping the object without arriving at a decision.

(11) *Dhruva* (unfailing)—The cognitive power of a person, which never fails, which grasps the object positively when the latter comes into contiguity.

(12) *Adhruva* (uncertain)—The power of cognition is liable to failure on certain occasions. Some persons are gifted with such a power of keen observation that nothing can escape from it; while the others are not so keen. These two divisions are based on this fact.

The ninth and tenth types are interpreted in two ways. Malayagiri<sup>1</sup> refers to both of them. The second interpretation is this, cognition of an object mixed with other qualities is *Niśrita* and that without any mixture is *Aniśrita*. Jinabhadra interprets them in the sense of *Viparyaya* (false cognition) and its opposite. The Digambaras read *Niśrita*<sup>2</sup> in place of *Niśrita*. They explain it that the cognition of an object fully manifested is *Niśrita* while that of partially manifested is *Aniśrita*.

1. Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya G. 307

2. Tattvārtha Rājavārtikā p. 49

Similarly, in place of *Niścita* they read 'anukta', meaning the cognition of whole word or sentence on hearing the first letter or word; or knowing the tune of lute etc. from its tinkling.<sup>1</sup>

Out of the above mentioned twelve varieties the first four are related with the object, while others with the cognitive power.

This division is roughly applied to all the varieties of *Mati*. Really seen it is not possible in the case of *vyañjanāvagraha* or *Naiścayika arthāvagraha*. *Jinabhadra* says that *vyañjanāvagraha* is the cause of all subsequent stages. The characteristics manifested in the effect exist in the cause also. Thus, the above varieties are not improbable in the case of *Vyañjanāvagraha* also.

As a matter of fact the twelvefold division is merely a fanciful expansion of the fundamental categories. Some of the twelve categories are incompatible with the fundamental stages. *Īhā* when reaches the stage of decision, becomes *Avāya*. Thus, it cannot have the type of *Niścita*. Similarly, the *Avāya* is the stage of decision. It cannot have the state of *aniścita*. *Jinabhadra* replies to these objections that even a decisive knowledge, leading to a judgement, is not always of the same nature. Two persons reaching the same judgement differ in their strength of conviction. We cannot say that both of them possess an equal degree of it. One is adamant while the other is shaky, so the above types can be explained in all cases. But, this explanation is far-fetched. These twelve types multiplied into the twenty-eight original types come to the number of three hundred and thirty six as the division of *mati*.

*Matijñāna* and *Samśaya* etc.

One may ask here that certain categories of *Mati* do not differ from *Samśaya* (doubt), *Viparyaya* (illusion) or *Anadhya-vasāya* (inarticulate appearance). The tenth category of the twelvefold division i. e. *aniścita*, does not differ from doubt. The category of *niśrita* in its second sense, is nothing but illusion. *Īhā*, is nothing but doubt. The *Naiścayika-avagraha*:

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1. *Tattvārtha Rajavārtika* p. 49

is the same as anadhyavasāya. If they are included into Mati, the latter claim to be a pramāṇa or valid knowledge.

Jinabhadra<sup>1</sup> replies to the above in two ways. The first reply is mainly connected with the logical period. According to it, none of the categories can be identified with doubt etc. The latter are not knowledge; because they do not lead to any decision. They stop where they are. The categories of avagraha etc. on the other hand do not stop where they are. Ultimately, they lead to a judgement. They are the middle steps carrying to valid knowledge. If they are invalid the resultant cognition cannot be valid. So they cannot be discarded as Apramāṇa. The criteria of a jñāna is that which leads to a judgement. It should not hamper the successful activity. The 'aniścita' category of the twelvefold division does not obstruct the subject in his successful activity. It differs from its opposite in not having the firm conviction, that the latter does. Both of them are equally active for successful result. In the case of doubt the subject is lost in alternatives. In Īhā he strives to reach a judgement. The category of Niścita as explained in the second sense, also does not stand in the way as an obstruction. The subject knows the object as it is, but he is slightly disturbed by a parallel notion; but, he does not stop there. The parallel notion does not stand in the way of his activity. For instance, the subject correctly knows animal in his sight, as buffalo, and acts according to the conviction, but, occasionally, his conviction is slackened and he begins to suspect the same as a horse also. Even then, he does not diverge from his activity according to the former notion.

The difference between Naiścayika avagraha and Anadhyavasāya is this, Avagraha does not stop where it is. It provides material for further apprehension. It is a starting point. Anadhyavasāya stops where it is, as in the case of a mad or inattentive persons. Avagraha is knowledge, because it serves as means for subsequent real stages of knowledge. Anadhyavasāya

1. Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya G. 313

is not so, because it does not serve even as a cause. Thus, the fundamental difference between the two lies in their having or not having the subsequent stages.

The second explanation follows the Agamic notion and it is more reasonable. As a matter of fact, Jinabhadra says, the three categories of doubt etc. also, are included into Matijñāna. After all, they also emerge from the attention of consciousness and have the same process as that of valid knowledge. Validity in the Agamic school, is subjective and not objective.

#### **The Duration of Avagraha etc.**

Vyañjanāvagraha is a contact between senses and the object. It does not produce any knowledge as the mind does not operate in it. It can last for antarmuhūrta (duration of time more than one āvalika and less than forty-eight minutes). Naiścayika Avagraha lasts for a moment only. Īhā and Avāya last for antarmuhūrta. Out of the three types of Dhāraṇā Avicyavanā and smṛti last for Antarmuhūrta; while the third category of Vāsanā can last for indefinite period.<sup>1</sup>

#### **The order of Causation in Avagraha etc.**

Yaśovijaya proposes that avagraha and Īhā are cause and Apāya the result of knowledge. Avicyavanā the first category of Dhāraṇā, is confirmation of the judgement reached in the stage of Apāya. The remaining two categories of Dhāraṇā are separate cognitions.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya G. 333-34

2. Jñānabindu p. 10

## Śruta Jñāna (Scriptural Knowledge)

Śruta-Jñāna comes second in list of the five types of knowledge. It is defined as the knowledge having mati as its cause.<sup>1</sup> Really, it is Mati with prolonged activity.

The root of the conception of śruta as an independent type of knowledge lies in the respect and reliability bestowed on the ancient scriptures. No religious order can stand any longer if it loses its faith in the ancient tradition. Every sect has one or the other book as its pivot around which it revolves and can leave it only at the risk of its own life. The Vedic religions took shelter in the Vedas as the final and infallible authority, in ethical and metaphysical matter. The Christians, Muslims, Jews, Persians, Buddhists and all other religions of the world have accepted this or that book as final authority.

Moreover, we construct the building of our future on rocks of the past. The present knowledge gets its material from the past events. If every generation starts its journey of the cultural progress from the very beginning and ignores the past tradition altogether, it cannot make any progress. Our state of the present mental development is a result of the past hundreds and thousand years. We have to give due importance to the past history and its records. Before the advent of logical period the traditional scriptures were given a very high place. Even the thinkers like Śaṅkara have discarded reasoning where it goes against the scriptures.

### Three stages

The conception of Śruta as distinct from Mati has passed through three stages. In the first stage Śruta Jñāna meant knowledge derived from the scriptures. It is divided into Aṅgapra-  
viṣṭa and Aṅgabāhya and further subdivisions.<sup>2</sup> The peculiarity of this period is that it confined śruta-jñāna to the Jaina

1. Tattvārtha I. 20, Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya G. 100

2. Tattvārtha I. 20

canonical literature only. It is represented by the *sthānāṅga*<sup>1</sup> and the *Tattvārtha*.<sup>2</sup>

The second stage is represented by the *Niryuktis*<sup>3</sup>, the *Nandī*<sup>4</sup> and the *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*<sup>5</sup>, where the *śruta* is divided into fourteen types of *akṣara*, *Samjñin* etc. and the whole knowledge associated with speech is included in it. In this stage *śruta* becomes a prolonged function of *mati*. This view gained prominence in the later Jaina literature and got a general approval.

The third stage is represented by *Siddhasena Divākara* who rules out totally the distinction between *mati* and *śruta*. He announces them as identical. *Yaśovijaya* also shows some favour for *Siddhasena*. This view, though somewhat reasonable did not get much favour as it went against the established tradition of the five types of knowledge. We would try to discuss all the three stages in detail in the following pages.

### **The First stage : Śruta as scriptural knowledge**

According to Jaina tradition, religion is an eternal factor and so the scriptures. In the *kṣetra* of *Mahāvīdeha* they exist permanently. But, in the *kṣetra* of *Bharata* they become extinct in a certain period and are again instituted by a new *Tīrthaṅkara*. In the present era, known as *Huṇḍā Avasarpiṇī* the first *Tīrthaṅkara* was *Rṣabhadeva* and the last *Mahāvīra*. All of them had their own canonical literature. It does not mean that at the time of new *Tīrthaṅkara* the old tradition is totally extinct. The *Bhagavati* states that out of the twenty-three intervals occurring between the twenty-four *Tīrthaṅkaras* the tradition of Jainism had only seven breaks.<sup>6</sup> In the first eight

1. *Sthānāṅga* II
2. *Tattvārtha* I. 20
3. *Āvaśyaka Niryukti* G. 18
4. *Nandī Sūtra* 37
5. *Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya* G. 451
6. *Bhagavati* XX. 8.677

intervals it continued getting revision with every new Tirthaṅkara. Similar is the case with the last eight. According to this view the present tradition starts from Śāntinātha, the sixteenth pontiff of the current series. But, his existence also goes, to a mythical past. As far as our knowledge of history Pārśvanātha is the earliest, who can definitely be assigned a historical existence.

In the time of Pārśvanātha scriptural knowledge was arranged into fourteen Pūrvas. The Nandī relates them as follows<sup>1</sup> :

1. Uppāya—It is related with the Jaina metaphysics; describing the origin of substances and their qualities.
2. Aggāniya—related with the numbers and dimensions.
3. Viria—it discusses the potentialities or powers of the animate and inanimate beings.
4. Atthinatthippavāya—it discusses the problem of the existence and non-existence from the stand points of dravya, kṣetra, kāla and bhāva.
5. Nāṇappavāya—related with the five types of knowledge.
6. Saccappavāya—related with Jaina ethics, discussing the questions of saṁyama (restraint) and truth with their opposites.
7. Ayappavāya—related with the problem of soul.
8. Kammappavāya—dealing with the eight types of karman with their subdivision.
9. Paccakkhāṇappavāya—dealing with various types of vows practised by the ascetics and householders.
10. Vijjaṇupavāya—dealing with magic and supernatural powers.
11. Avañjha—dealing with the question of merits and demerits with their results.
12. Pānāo—dealing with the ten types of Parānas (vibrations).
13. Kiriāviśāla—discusses the practises to be observed by an ascetic (saṁyamin)

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1. Nandī Sūtra 56 also Samavāya



14. Lokabindusāra—The subject is not mentioned. Probably it dealt with the Jaina cosmology.

These pūrvas were present in the tradition of Mahāvīra also. We have given in the introduction how they came to extinction.

### **The Tradition of Mahāvīra**

The present canonical literature belongs to the tradition of Mahāvīra. He had eleven Gaṇadharas (chief disciples). It is said that each of them composed one dvādaśāṅgī<sup>1</sup> (a set of twelve āgamas compared with the different part or limbs of the body of śruta puruṣa, i. e. personified śruta-jñāna). But, we come across only one dvādaśāṅgī. Perhaps, each gaṇadhara propagated the same knowledge and was taken as the independent compiler of it.

Mahāvīra himself did not compose any book. It is said that Gautama, the first gaṇadhara, put him a question thrice and Mahāvīra expressed the essence of ultimate truth in three words.<sup>2</sup> They are known as three Mātṛkapadas. We have already referred to them in the first chapter. Gautama elaborated these words and composed the entire set of dvādaśāṅgī. The questions of Gautama are known as three Nisejjas (Saṃskṛta Niṣadyās). They are defined as asking questions with due reverence. It bears a striking resemblance with Upaniṣads in the Vedic literature.

We have no means to know the number of niṣadyās pertaining to the remaining ten Gaṇadharas; but, it is certain that at least one of them has recourse to fifteen niṣadyas. But, we do not know anything about the answers given by Mahāvīra.

In the tradition of Mahāvīra the Jaina literature was arranged in the following twelve Āgamas :

1. Haribhadra on Āvaśyaka Nirvyukti G. 735
2. Ibid. also Āvaśyakacūrṇi p. 337
3. Nandī Sūtra 55

1. Āyāra (Sk. Ācāra)
2. Sūyagaḍa (Sk. Sūtrakṛta)
3. Thāṇa (Sk. Sthāna)
4. Samavāya
5. Viāha Paṇṇatti (Sk. Vyākhyā prajñapti or Bhagavati)
6. Nāyādhamma kahāo (Jñātādharma-kathā)
7. Uvāsagadasāo (Upāsakadaśā)
8. Antagaḍadasāo (Antakṛddaśā)
9. Anuttarovavāiyadasāo (Anuttaraupapātikadaśā)
10. Paṇha-vagaraṇā (Prašnavyākaraṇa)
11. Vivāgasūya (Vipākasūtra)
12. Diṭṭhivāya (Dṛṣṭivāda)

Out of the above list Diṭṭhivāya is now extinct. It had five sections :—(1) Parikamma, (2) Sutta, (3) Puvvagaya, (4) Anu-yoga and (5) Culiya.

Perhaps, Diṭṭhivāya included all the Pūrva literature and other remnants of the tradition of Pārśvanātha. The remaining eleven āṅgas are the contribution of the tradition of Mahāvīra. It is also said that Dṛṣṭivāda was originally composed in Saṃskṛta, while other Āṅgas in Ardha-Māgadhī, the spoken language of that time on the borders of Magadha and Kośala.

### The Order in the Composition of Dvādaśāṅgī

In the enumeration of twelve Āṅgas Dṛṣṭivāda comes as the last. But, there is a difference of opinion regarding its composition. Some believe that the Āṅgas were composed just in the order as they are enumerated. While others maintain that fourteen Pūrvas, which comprise Purvagata, the third section of Dṛṣṭivāda, were composed first; they were followed by the rest of dvādaśāṅgī.

It seems that the fourteen Pūrvas were prevalent as an old tradition at the time of Mahāvīra, but were not included into śruta. After the completion of eleven Āṅgas all the traditional knowledge prevalent at that time, was included in one āṅga, namely Dṛṣṭivāda. This is why the last Āṅga differs from the

remaining Angas in many respects i. e. size, language and subject matter. Its early extinction also proves the same fact.

Dṛṣṭivāda is divided into the following five sections of (1) Parikamma (2) Sutta (3) Puvvagaya (4) Anuyoga (5) Culiya. The above order is based on the Nandī.<sup>1</sup> Akalaṃka, Hemacandra, Devendra Sūri and Vinaya Vijaya assign third place to Anuyoga and the fourth to Puvvagaya.

### The Literature Known as Āgamas

Dvādaśāṅgī is not the only literature recognised as the Āgamas. There are numerous works in addition to it which are credited with the same amount of authority.

The Nandī provides three definitions of Samyak Śruta and Mithyā Śruta.<sup>2</sup> According to the first definition Dvādaśāṅgī, composed by the omniscient Tīrthaṅkaras, the works composed by the sages possessing the knowledge of fourteen Pūrvas and those composed by the sages possessing knowledge of not less than complete ten Pūrvas are Samyak-Śruta, while those composed by the persons with lesser knowledge, may be samyak-śruta as well as Mithyā-Śruta. The non-Jaina works like Bhārata, Rāmāyaṇa etc. are Mithyā Śruta. According to the second definition all scriptural knowledge-Jaina and non-Jaina is samyak śruta if it is possessed by a person with right attitude (samyag dṛṣṭi), and the same is Mithyā-Śruta if possessed by a person with wrong-attitude (Mithyā-dṛṣṭi). The third definition ascribes the credit of samyak Śruta to the scriptures possessed by a person with wrong faith also if they persuade him to abandon the wrong faith and embrace the right one. The second or third definitions are not pertinent to our discussion. The first definition fixes a basis for recognising a script as Āgama.

After Dvādaśāṅgī composed by Gaṇadharas, we come to the works composed by the saints having a knowledge of four-

1. Nandī Sūtra 55

2. Ibid 40-41

teen Pūrvas; otherwise known as Śruta-kevalins. It is said that in addition to Gaṇadharas, Mahāvīra had 289 Śruta kevalins as his disciples. But, we do not know anything about their works. After them we have Jambū Svāmin, the last saint to attain liberation. He is a well-known figure in the dialogues between him and Sudharman, but nothing is known about his independent works. Jambū is followed by four Śruta kevalins, viz. (1) Prabhava Svāmin, (2) Śayyambhavasūri (3) Yaśobhadrasūri and (4) Sambhūtivijaya. Śayyambhavasūri composed Daśavaikālikasūtra which is a digest of the Ācārāṅga and deals with the conduct of a Jaina ascetic. We are in dark about the works of other three.

Then comes Bhadrabāhu Svāmin. In addition to some Nirvyuttis, he is accredited with authorship of the following works :—

(1) Pajjosaṇākappa, (2) The eighth chapter of Dasa-Suyak-khandha, (3) Vyavahārasūtra and (4) Kalpasūtra.

Sthūlabhadra was the last of Śrutakevalins; but nothing is known about his works.

Now, we come to the list of sages knowing ten pūrvas, Vajrasvāmin was last in this line. But, no work is available written by any of them. Śyāma-Sūri is the only one to write the Paṇṇavanā; which deals with all the topics of Jaina philosophy. Droṇasūri also who is ascribed with some Saṁgrahaṇīs on the Upāṅgas, is placed with Daśapūrvadharas.

In addition to the above, there are certain works composed by Pratyekabuddhas, the persons who were to attain liberation in the same life. Some chapters of Uttarādhyayana are said to belong to this category. The works known as Paiṇṇas (Prakīrṇakas) are ascribed to the disciples of Mahāvīra other than Gaṇadharas and Pratyekabuddhas. Such disciples were 1444 in number; but, the number of accepted paiṇṇas is ten only. It is said that Mahāvīra at the time of his Nirvāṇa, recited fifty five adhyayanas dealing with the fructification of puṇya (merit), fifty five that of pāpa (demerit), thirty six unasked and

one named as Pahāṇa (Sk. Pradhāna). We do not know whether any one of these adhyayanās is incorporated in the existing canons.

Further, there are some anonymous works. Some of them are commented upon by Bhadrabāhu and this gives them the position of Āgamas. The works like Suria Paṇṇatti are included in the Āgamas on the basis of tradition only.

### **The Present classification**

The Nandī divides Śruta Jñāna into fourteen types. Out of them the first ten are related with second stage of development. We shall discuss them in their proper place. The last four varieties are related with scriptures. They are introduced in the following two pairs : (1) Gamika and (2) Agamika; (3) Aṅgapaviṭṭha and (4) Anaṅgapaviṭṭha.

### **Gamika and Agamika**

The Nandī-Cūrṇī defines Gamika as the text which is read twice, thrice or hundred times with a slight change in the beginning middle or at the end. Gamika is also explained as the literature with various types of classification or alternative interpretations. But, nothing can be said with precision about the meaning of this term. Generally, Dṛṣṭivāda is held as gamika and the rest as agamika.


### **Aṅgapaviṭṭha and Anaṅgapaviṭṭha**

The second division is current in these days also. We have already enumerated the twelve Aṅgas. They are known as dvādaśāṅgī or dvādaśāṅga Gaṇipīṭaka. These 12 aṅgas are considered as 12 limbs of the personified śruta. They are two feet (padas) two lower legs, (Jaṅghas), two thighs (urus), two halves (gātrārdhas) of back and belly, two arms (bāhus) one neck (grīvā) and one head (śīrṣa). Āyāra and Sūyagaḍa stand for the feet, Diṭṭhivāya for the head and the rest aṅgas stand for other limbs. On the other hand the Anaṅga-praviṣṭa literature does not form a part of this śruta-puruṣa. It comprises such scriptures as are not included into dvādaśāṅgi. But,

this does not answer the question why a particular canon is admitted as a part of the allegorical śruta puruṣa. This distinction is explained on the basis of two factors. Firstly, it is admitted that the works composed by Gaṇadharas are Aṅga-paviṭṭha, whereas composed by Śrutasthavidas (learned scholars) are anaṅgapaviṭṭha. Secondly, that śruta which exists in every tīrtha-in short which is niyata, is aṅgapaviṭṭha and the rest is anaṅgapaviṭṭha. The second view, it seems, is an influence of the Vedic Tradition. At least four of the aṅgas are biographical sketches of the historical personages. We cannot say that the same persons or the same number of other persons with the same names and life-events take birth again and again. It is an acceptance of the theory of incarnation which the Jainas do not hold. The question of eternal literature, therefore, does not arise.

#### Further division

The Anaṅgapaviṭṭha is further divided as follows :



Āvassaya (Sk. Āvaśyaka) means essential. It consists of the text to be recited in daily rites observed by ascetics and householders. It is just like the sandhyā of the Vedic system.

Kaliya Sūya—The śruta studied or recited during the first and the last quarter of the day and night. The śruta which is not confined to a particular time for its recitation is designated as Ukkaliya-sūya. The Nandī provides a list of thirty-one canons as Kaliya sūya and twenty-nine as Ukkaliya-sūya<sup>1</sup>.

1. Nandī Sūtra 43-44

### Comparison with the Vedic Tradition

It can be observed that the term *śruta* carries the same idea as *śruti* of the Vedic tradition. Some *Āgamas* also bear similarity in names with the Vedic literature. But, as far as their subject-matter is concerned they are totally different. We may quote some of them below :—

(1) *Kalpasūtra* :—The Vedic literature also contains a number of *kalpasūtras*. But, they discuss the rules of conduct to be followed in the various stages (*āśramas*) of life. The Jaina *Kalpasūtra* contains biographical sketches. It is a matter of further investigation what was the original meaning of 'kalpa' and how it came to be applied in two different senses.

(2) *Vyākaraṇa* :—In the Vedic literature *Vyākaraṇa* means grammar. But in the Jaina *Āgamas* *Vyākaraṇa* means explanation. The *Praśna Vyākaraṇa* is an explanation of a number of questions.

(3) *Nirukta* :—The Vedic term *Nirukta*, in its exact form is not found in the Jaina literature. But, we have the term *Niryukti* bearing a certain degree of resemblance. *Nirukta* discusses the derivation of Vedic words. *Niryukti* is a commentary in *Prākṛta* in the *gāthā* form. Here, we have some resemblance, as in both cases it means explanatory notes in addition to it there are certain original *āgamas* bearing the title *Niryukti*. They have nothing to do with derivation or etymology.

The explanation of such terms is an independent subject which can throw much light on our ancient philology.

(4) *Aṅga*—The term 'aṅga' occurs in the Vedic as well as the Buddhist literature. The Vedas are reported to have six *aṅgas*. But there, the term occurs not in the sense of limbs but a subordinate or helping literature. The Vedic text is not included in the *aṅgas*. Moreover, each of the six *aṅgas* contains an exclusive field of subject, quite distinct from the others. In Jaina literature the *aṅgas* constitute the main body of *Śruta-puruṣa*. Secondly, the twelve *aṅgas* are not so exclusive in the subject-matter as it is in the Vedic literature. They are not associated with different branches of learning as we find in the

**Vedic aṅgas.** In the Buddhist literature this term is found in Aṅguttaranikāya. There, the literature is divided according to the form. Thus, the verses, small anecdotes, stories of Buddha's previous births, literature in the form of questions and answers, Buddha's sayings and such other forms, each constitutes a different aṅga; which are nine in number.

It is probable that the term aṅga has been taken from the Vedic literature by the Jainas, which does not fit so well in the case of their literature.

#### Modern classification

According to the modern classification the Āgamas are divided into six groups :

(1) Aṅga, (2) Uvāṅga, (3) Cheyasutta, (4) Mūla-sutta, (5) Painnaga and (6) Culiyasutta.

(1) Aṅga—Dṛṣṭivāda on account of its extinction is not included in the modern āgamic division. So, the number of Aṅgas comes to eleven.

(2) Uvāṅga—In conformity with the 12 aṅgas there are 12 uvāṅgas :—

- |                   |                        |
|-------------------|------------------------|
| 1. Uvavāiya.      | 7. Jambuddivapaṇṇatti. |
| 2. Rāyapaseṇī.    | 8. Nirayāvaliyāo.      |
| 3. Jivābhigama.   | 9. Kappiyā.            |
| 4. Paṇṇavaṇā.     | 10. Pupphīā.           |
| 5. Canda Paṇṇatti | 11. Puppha cūliyā.     |
| 6. Sūrapaṇṇatti   | 12. Vaṇhidasā.         |

Every aṅga is associated with one upāṅga in the order stated above. But, we do not find any conformity of the subject-matter. The term Upāṅga is found for the first time, in the Tattvārtha only; otherwise, it was Anaṅgapraviṣṭa. It appears that the term Upāṅga means only the secondary stage in comparison with aṅgas.

(3) Cheya sutta—The term Cheda is peculiar to Jaina literature only. It also, is not found earlier than the Āvasya-kaniryukti. Literally 'cheda' means 'cut'. In cases of certain



misconducts the seniority of an ascetic is cut down by certain months, and he becomes junior to his youngers. Perhaps, the sūtras where this kind of punishment was prescribed came to be known as chedasūtras. They are just like 'prāyaścittas' of the Vedic literature. They also provide directions in the course to be adopted in unusual circumstances. They are six in number :

- |                 |                       |
|-----------------|-----------------------|
| 1. Niśītha.     | 4. Daśāśruta skandha. |
| 2. Mahāniśītha. | 5. Bṛhatkalpa.        |
| 3. Vyavahāra.   | 6. Jītakalpa.         |

The Sthānakavāsī sect of Śvetāmbara Jaina accepts four only. It omits Mahāniśītha and Jītakalpa.

(4) Mūla Sūtras—The significance of the term Mūla also cannot be explained in clear terms. It does not occur in the ancient literature. There is a number of conjectures with the interpretation of this term. According to Winternitz these sūtras came to be known as Mūla-sūtras in contrast to their commentaries. Carpentier says that they were Mahāvira's own words. Schubring, accounts for the name for their being fundamental teachings of the Jaina cult. They are prescribed for a disciple at the beginning of his ascetic career. The last explanation appears more probable. It is also probable that they got this name as their original text was committed to memory and recited without explanation. This practice continues even now. Mūlasūtras are five in number :—

- |                    |                   |
|--------------------|-------------------|
| 1. Uttarādhyayana, | 4. Piṇḍanijjutti, |
| 2. Dasaveyāliya,   | 5. Ohanijjutti,   |
| 3. Āvassaya,       |                   |

Sthānakavāsins omit the last two. They do not recognise the two niryuktis as composed by Bhadrabāhu. Prof. Weber and Prof. Būlhar also admit the same on different grounds. The Sthānakavāsins exclude Āvaśyaka also from the list of Mūla-sūtras and add Nandī and Anuyogadvāra in its place, and make the number four.

(5) *Paiṇṇagas*—Originally *Paiṇṇagas* (Sk. *Prakīrṇaka*) meant miscellaneous literature. The number of *paiṇṇagas* varied according to the number of gifted disciples of a *Tīrthaṅkara*. Thus, in the time of *Mahāvīra* it is stated that there were 1400 *paiṇṇas*. But in the modern classification the *paiṇṇas* are recognised as ten. They are :

- |                             |                            |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. <i>Causaraṇa</i>         | 6. <i>Gaṇivijjā</i> ,      |
| 2. <i>Āurapaccakkhāṇa</i> , | 7. <i>Maraṇa Samāhi</i> ,  |
| 3. <i>Bhakta pariññā</i> ,  | 8. <i>Devendra Sūtra</i>   |
| 4. <i>Tandula Veyālija</i>  | 9. <i>Samstāraka</i>       |
| 5. <i>Candavijjā</i>        | 10. <i>Mahāpaccakkhāṇa</i> |

(6) *Cūliya sutta*—The *Nandī* and *Anuyogadvāra* are recognised as *Chūliyasuttas*. Perhaps, this name was given to them on account of their short volume.

The *Sthānakavāsins* do not recognise the fifth and sixth class. They follow thirty two *Āgamas* in the following order : (1) 11 *Aṅgas*, 12 *Upaṅgas*, 4 *chedas*, 4 *Mūlas* and 1 *Āvassaya*,

In addition to the original *āgamas* the *Mūrtipūjaka* sect of the *Śvetāmbaras* admits *Niryuktis*, *Bhāṣyas*, *Cūrṇis* and *Tīkās* also as authority which the *Sthānakavāsins* do not support.

#### Classification according to the subject-matter

As far as the subject-matter is concerned the *Jaina Āgamic literature* is divided into four *anuyogas* :—

1. *Caraṇakaraṇānuyoga*—Ethics
2. *Dharmakathānuyoga*—Religious stories,
3. *Gaṇitānuyoga*—Mathematics and secular sciences,
4. *Dravyānuyoga*—Metaphysics.

But, in the allotment of the *Āgamas* to these four groups no much attention is paid. It is more or less haphazard. All the eleven *aṅgas* and *Dasaveyāliya* are classed in the first group; when some of them are exclusively biographical sketches

#### The Digambara-division

The *Digambaras* also divide *śruta* into *Aṅgapraviṣṭa* and *Aṅgabāhya*. The *Aṅgapraviṣṭa* is the same as that of the

Śvetāmbaras. Aṃgabāhya is divided into the following fourteen kinds :—

- |                  |                    |
|------------------|--------------------|
| 1. Sāmāyika,     | 8. Uttarādhyayana, |
| 2. Saṃstava,     | 9. Kalpavyavahāra, |
| 3. Vandanā,      | 10. Kalpākalpa,    |
| 4. Pratikramāṇa, | 11. Mahākalpa,     |
| 5. Vinaya,       | 12. Puṇḍarīka,     |
| 6. Kṛtikarma.    | 13. Mahāpuṇḍarīka, |
| 7. Dāsavaikārka. | 14. Niṣīdhikā.     |

We have discussed the present state of the Digambara as well as Śvetāmbara Āgamas in the Introduction. There is not a single canonical work which is commonly held as genuine by the Śvetāmbaras as well as Digambaras alike. But, still there is a considerable volume of the text which is supported by both the traditions. For instance, the Jñātadharmakathā, has the same form even now, as it is described by Dhavalā and others in the Digambara tradition. If such works are admitted as original, they can serve as a common link for both the sects.

### The Second Stage : Śruta as Knowledge

We have given above a short description of the Jaina Āgamic literature known as Śruta. But, in reality it is only a source of the Śrutajñāna. The literature itself is not knowledge. It is called so on account of its being a source of the latter. Śrutajñāna, generally means a knowledge based upon authority. That authority is either a person or a book. But, in the later period, it covers a wider field. Every knowledge associated with speech as its cause or its effect, came to be recognised as Śruta. On the other hand it was realized that every articulate cognition is associated with speech. Thus, there arose a difficult problem of fixing the limits of mati and Śruta,

Jinabhadra<sup>1</sup> points out the difference in the following seven points (1) Definition, (2) Causation, (3) Classification, (4) Senses, (5) Speech, (6) Articulation, (7) Dumb and eloquent. These points will be elaborated in the following pages :

1. Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya G. 97

### The Definition of Śruta

Viśeṣāvaśyaka gives two definitions of Śruta. According to the first, whatever is the object of auditory sense is śruta.<sup>1</sup> But, the sound as the definition leads, cannot be included in the divisions of knowledge, still it is known as śruta; because, it plays important part in producing śruta-jñāna. It is called Dravyaśruta, meaning the material cause of Śruta-jñāna.

Śruta in the real sense means the knowledge produced by senses and the mind; associated with sound and capable of being expressed into words. It is known as Bhāvaśruta in contrast with Dravyaśruta.

### Limits of Mati and Śruta<sup>2</sup>

There are three parts in the above definition. The first part is related with the cause, which is the same as in Mati. As a matter of fact śruta does not depend upon external senses. It has the mind only as its producing cause. Even, in the case of auditory sense, it is mati as far as the question of grasping the sound is concerned. The stage of śruta begins when one starts to formulate an idea on the basis of its meaning. The second part distinguishes Śruta from Mati. It holds that the knowledge based on speech is Śruta. The mati does not depend upon speech. Roughly, this factor distinguishes the two types of knowledge from each other. By speech, here, Jinabhadra says, we should take the words, whose meaning is already known. It means that the auditory sense is not so important as the words of other person, whether spoken or written, to produce śruta-jñāna. But, one can say that everything that is seen, touched, smelt or tasted has a meaning behind it. Our mind brings out that meaning after due deliberation. We see a particular arrangement of colour and shape and interpret it as flower. We relish a sweet taste and interpret that it is a mango fruit. This process is common with all the senses and their objects, and not merely with words, There is no reason in including the one

1. Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya G. 81

2. This complete discussion based on Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya and its commentary G. 81-176

into śruta-jñāna and the others into mati. Roughly, a cognition is śruta-jñāna when it arises at hearing or reading something, in the form of mental association of word with its meaning.

The third part expresses the special quality or śrutajñāna. It is capable of being expressed to others through the medium of speech. The cognition of mati cannot be fully transmitted as it arises without the association of words. Moreover, when we grasp an object through external senses, the experience cannot be put into words entirely. Only a fragment of it can be conveyed through speech; and that also by the person who knows the expression of language, to a person with the same ability. The cognition of a new-born baby does not associate any words with the knowledge. Thus, the range of mati differs from that of śruta. Śruta considers only that object and only to that extent as can be expressed in words. It is associated with speech as its cause as well as the effect.

It can be argued : if every cognition associated with speech is śruta, Īhā, Avāya and Dhāraṇā also would become śruta; as they also do not occur without the association of speech. Thus, the mati will be confined to Avagraha only.

Jinabhadra replies to the above that every cognition associated with speech is not śruta, but, only that which follows the speech; which has words as its genetic cause. The stages of Īhā etc., though associated with speech, are not produced by it. In the case, where those stages are produced by words, there is no harm in accepting them as śruta.

Again, it can be asked : mati has been divided into śrutaniśrita and aśrutaniśrita; and Avagraha etc. are admitted as śrutaniśrita. If every cognition that is produced by Śruta or word is śruta-jñāna the Īhā etc. cannot be explained as the division of mati; because, all of them are based on śruta i. e. Śabda or speech.

The above objection does not hold good in the present case, as Śrutaniśrita in the case of avagraha etc. does not mean that they depend upon speech at the time of their occurrence. Their dependence lies in the person; who possesses a mind cultivated

through the knowledge of scriptures, who is a learned or educated person. The case of Śrutajñāna is quite different, where the speech is depended upon at the time of occurrence.

### Śruta in the Animals Having less than five Senses

It can be asked further, if Śruta is dependent on speech, it is not possible in the case of one-sensed animals. They neither possess mind to associate a word with its sense, nor the faculties of hearing and speaking; to grasp or utter any word. Thus, the existence of śruta cannot be explained in their case. This will go against the Āgamic conception that all the animals positively possess two types of knowledge.

Jinabhadra replies that one-sensed animals, though devoid of speech i. e. dravyaśruta, possess bhāvaśruta. The faculties of hearing, speaking and thinking are the cause of dravyaśruta only. In their absence dravyaśruta is not possible. But, there is no difficulty in having bhāvaśruta in their absence. Bhāva śruta is neither cause nor the result of speech. A learned man, while asleep, neither listens nor speaks any word. Still we cannot say that he is devoid of śrutajñāna. By seeing its manifestation in the waking state one can infer its existence in the sleeping state also, as one infers the existence of butter in the milk from the latter production, though it was not visible before. Similarly the one-sensed animals also possess śruta in unmanifested form. The manifestation, in their case, is not possible as they are not equipped with the necessary instrument. Bhāvaśruta, in such cases, means the Kṣayopaśam of Śrutajñānāvaraṇa. Its existence can be proved, not only on the basis of testimony, but, also on basis of the existence of different desires (saṃjñās) in them. They also feel hunger or desire for food. Such desires are not possible if they are totally devoid of mind; and the existence of mind leads to the existence of śruta also.

Again, it can be asked; śruta has been defined in two ways. In the case of dravyaśruta it was defined as whatever is heard. The bhāva śruta is defined as soul in the state of attention (upayoga) towards dravyaśruta i. e. words. Both

are impossible in the case of one-sensed animals as well as in the sleeping man, who can neither listen a word nor can apply their attention to utter a word. Jinabhadra replies that in such cases we have another derivation which means the instrument of hearing (śṛṇotyānena) or cause of hearing (asmāt) or the location of hearing (asmin). Ultimately, these derivations express the sense of kṣayopaśama of the obscuring kārmiṇ matter ; and it is not impossible in the case of one-sensed animals as well as in the sleeping man. But, these derivations do not explain the fundamental difficulty.

It can be argued that the example of sleeping man does not suit in the case of one-sensed animals. Śruta, ultimately depends upon the faculties of speaking and hearing. The person with these faculties can convey his ideas through the vehicle of words and can understand others. A sleeping man possesses both of the faculties. Though, in sleeping state he does not apply them ; yet, they are not absent. He can use them at any moment. Thus, we can admit the existence of śruta in his case. But, in the case of one-sensed animals those faculties are totally absent. There is no basis to prove the existence of śruta in them.

The above argument does not put any difficulty as the faculties of speech and hearing are accepted to be present, though in mild form, in one-sensed animals also. We observe a particular tree, sensitive of nontactual impressions. On this basis we can say that the other senses are not totally absent in them. Similarly, they also have their feelings and desires which are the functions of mind. Even then, their classification as the one-sensed animals, means the absence of material-senses (dravyendriyas) in them. In the same way they possess bhāvaśruta and not dravyaśruta.

Again it can be asked ; if śruta is possible in one-sensed animals also without any recourse to speech, the latter can not be a condition of śruta and thus cannot form a part of the definition.

The Jaina clarifies, his position that the above definition, is meant for the śruta as found in the five-sensed animals. Who are fully conscious of the words and their meanings. It does not include the śruta of the one-sensed animals who are admitted as having two types of knowledge merely on the basis of Āgamic conception. Their śruta does not function in any appreciable manner. It is known as Oghaśruta, quite indistinct, like a tree in the seed.

Again, one can ask, if the existence of śruta is accepted in one-sensed animals without any functional appearance or other basis, the existence of all the five types of knowledge should be accepted there on the same ground. This objection is replied on two grounds ; firstly, the existence of a particular type of knowledge in a particular person depends upon the corresponding kṣayopaśama. For knowing a particular kṣayopaśama in a particular being the only source is the Āgamic statement. It is a matter of faith only. The Āgamas do not propose existence of kṣayopaśama of Avadhi etc. in one-sensed animals. Secondly, they are not totally deprived of the function of first two types of knowledge. It has been already stated that they also possess desires and feelings and the power of articulate thinking.

As a matter of fact, as will be seen later on, Śruta has no connection with speech or sound. It is articulate cognition or vikalpa as known in the Buddhist and other systems. The Nyāya recognises the same as prakāra. Thus, every articulate thinking is śruta.

#### **Difference between Mati and Śruta based on causation<sup>1</sup>**

We have pointed out the difference between mati and śruta on the basis of their having different definitions. They can be further differentiated on the following basis. Mati is the cause and śruta is its effect. Śruta is always preceded by Mati.

One can argue that sometimes mati also is preceded by śruta and it is wrong to say that in every case mati is the cause and śruta the effect. For example, when mati is generated at

1. Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya G. 110-115



hearing a sound i. e. śruta, the order changes. Śruta becomes cause and mati the effect. This argument is based on misunderstanding the nature of real śruta. In the case quoted above, only dravya-śruta stands as the cause of mati, while we are concerned with bhāvaśruta.

The above principle is applicable in the case of causation only. It only proposes that mati does not occur as the effect of śruta. It does not rule out the occurrence of mati after śruta as an independent knowledge. Just as the ornaments of bangles or ear-rings must have gold as its cause, Gold must precede them. But, it does not mean that gold cannot have existence even after those forms are no more. The subsequent existence of gold does not depend upon the ornaments as its cause. Similarly, śruta is a particular form of mati and must have the latter as its cause. When that form disappears, there is no difficulty in occurrence of mati from its own causes. None can say, that śruta, once produced, rules out mati for ever.

### **Dravyaśruta preceded by Mati**

According to another opinion it is not bhāvaśruta, that is preceded by mati but the dravyaśruta i. e. speech. No body speaks without thinking. First, we establish the idea in our mind and then convey it to others. So, the speech is preceded by mati.

There are three objections to this view. Firstly, it leaves no scope for bhāvaśruta. If the mental association of word with its meaning, which precedes utterance of a speech, is mati, the same should be admitted in case of the knowledge resulting from hearing the speech. Thus, the mental thoughts preceding as well as following the speech are included into mati and no room is left for śruta. Secondly, we are not concerned with the difference between dravyaśruta and mati. It is already established; because, the former is a matter while the latter is knowledge. There can be no question about their difference. The question is related to the difference, between two types of

knowledge; i. e. mati and bhāvaśruta only. Thirdly, it was proposed that śruta is preceded by mati and mati is not preceded by śruta. If śruta is taken as dravyaśruta the above proposal is not supported. Because, dravyaśruta is not only the effect of mati, it is also a cause of the latter. It is effect of mati in the case of a speaker; but, in the case of listener it is the cause of mati. The knowledge that is generated in the listener has the speech as its cause.

As a matter of fact dravyaśruta is preceded not by mati but, bhāvaśruta. When one thinks before speaking, his thinking is associated with words. It is, therefore, not mati but bhāvaśruta. One can infer from dravyaśruta the existence of preceding bhāvaśruta.

#### **Difference on the Basis of Division**

Mati is divided into 28 types of avagraha etc. Śruta is divided into Aṅgapraviṣṭa and Aṅgabāhya etc. This basis is founded on the tradition only. It does not possess any logical significance.

#### **The Senses as the Basis of Difference<sup>1</sup>**

The fundamental difference between mati and śruta is based upon the senses that produce them. Śruta is produced by the auditory sense while mati results from all the five. It should be observed that all cognitions produced by the auditory sense are not śruta. They are śruta as well as mati. The only limitation is that the cognition resulting from other senses is necessarily mati, while resulting from the auditory sense may be śruta as well as mati. But, the confinement of śruta to the auditory sense does not mean that it is the result of hearing only. In the case of scriptures śruta results from visual perception. It is śruta in spite of its independence from the auditory sense. If a cognition is associated with or follows a speech, oral or written, it is generally regarded as the case of auditory sense. It can be grasped through vision or other senses also. Like spoken words, written scriptures also are accepted as dravyaśruta; because, they are cause of bhāvaśruta.

1. Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya G. 116-121

The auditory perception of a boy, who does not understand the meaning of words is not śruta. It is only mati and takes its usual stages of avagraha etc. similarly, the perception of written scriptures, without understanding their meaning is mati.

The acceptance of śruta as result of all the senses does not render the distinction, based on senses, meaningless; because, knowledge associated with speech is the main factor that constitutes śruta. It may result from any of the five senses. It is admitted as the cognition of audition on account of its capability of being an object of hearing. Whatever is associated with speech must possess that capability. Thus, every cognition of this sort is admitted as related with the sense of audition, and the same becomes a distinguishing factor between mati and śruta.

According to a certain view, the śruta here, means dravyaśruta i. e. speech only, and it is mati as well as śruta. In relation to the speaker it is śruta, because it is heard. In relation to the listener it is mati, because it is deliberated upon for finding out a meaning. But, this view is not correct. The same word cannot be mati as well as śruta. Mere etymological derivation, leading to different forms in relation to different persons, cannot establish any real difference in one and the same thing. Moreover, as far as dravyaśruta is concerned, the difference between mati and śruta is beyond any doubt. One is knowledge and the other is matter. The present controversy is related with bhāvaśruta and mati. So, the above view cannot hold good any longer.

### **The Definitions of Dravyaśruta, Bhāvaśruta and Ubhayaśruta<sup>1</sup>**

In the discussion of śrutajñāna the terms dravyaśruta etc. have been repeated many times. It is necessary that we understand them clearly. VBh. defines them in the following way, based upon a gāthā ascribed to pūrva-literature.

1. Dravyaśruta—When the words known through śrutajñāna, are spoken merely out of habit; without any

1. Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya G. 127-134

attention on their meanings, it is dravyaśruta. The speaker is not aware of the scriptures of the speech to which his words are connected. He has become so familiar with them that they come out spontaneously. Such words are not connected with śrutajñāna as far as their origin is concerned. But, they produce śruta-jñāna in the listener and on this basis they are called dravyaśruta. The scriptures also are dravyaśruta on the same ground.

2. Bhāvaśruta—When the cogniser, knows the meaning associated with a speech; but, does not speak, his cognition is bhāvaśruta. The cognition in this case is not put into words.

3. Ubhayaśruta—When the object cognized by śruta-jñāna gets utterance at the same time, it is ubhayaśruta.

Bhāvaśruta is infinitely richer than dravyaśruta and ubhayaśruta; as we can speak only a fragment of what we know. we can keep hundreds of things in our mind at a time, but can speak them by order; one at a time. Thus, in the whole life we can speak very few things.

### **Mati and Dravyaśruta<sup>1</sup>**

As far as dravyaśruta is concerned it is not contrary to mati. If a person speaks the object cognized by mati, his mati becomes dravyaśruta, as it is the cause of dravyaśruta i. e. speech.

There are three categories in which the speech of a person can be classified :

1. Suppose, one knows the object through oral instruction or scriptures or some other way of śruta and then speaks. In this case the cause is bhāvaśruta and the result is dravyaśruta.

2. He knows the object without any recourse to scriptures or instruction and then speaks. In this case the cause is mati while the result is dravyaśruta.

3. He speaks without attention. It is dravyaśruta only.

In case he is silent the first category is purely bhāvaśruta, while the second is purely mati.

1. Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya G. 135-144

According to another opinion, when anything is cognized by mati and spoken with attention, it is bhāvaśruta. When the same is spoken without attention it is dravyaśruta and if it is not spoken at all, it is mati. Thus, the differentiating factor of mati and śruta is speech only. As far as cognition is concerned they are identical.

VBh refutes the above view that it leaves no scope for bhāvaśruta. In the first case there are two things viz. attention and speech. The first is mati and the latter is dravyaśruta. None of them has any affinity with bhāvaśruta. In the second case it is clearly dravyaśruta.

Moreover, the cognition, which is mati at the time of its inception, cannot become śruta by merely being expressed in words. If it is mati it will remain so throughout. There should be some qualitative difference if śruta is accepted as a separate type of cognition.

**Difference between mati and śruta due to expressibility and inexpressibility<sup>1</sup>**

Another important difference between mati and śruta consists in that the objects apprehended by śruta can be expressed in toto. They are not beyond the reach of words. It does not mean that all such objects are actually expressed or conveyed to others. A greater part of them is left unexpressed. But, this is due to their huge number and the shortness of life. By nature they are not inexpressible. On the other hand the objects cognised by mati and the avadhi etc. are not within the reach of the words. The objects known through scriptures or preaching can be put into words in their entirety. Every thing known in this way can be conveyed to others. But, what we know through senses or other types of perceptual cognition, cannot be expressed through words as it is. The words are generally related with class-concepts. The individual peculiarities, appearing new and new with every perception, are beyond the reach of words. We can experience them but not express. It is on this basis that

1. Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya G. 145-150

Dharmakīrti defines perception as the cognition beyond *kalpanā*—the apprehension that can be put into words.

The scriptures say that only an infinitely small part of the inexpressible object can be put into words and those which can be put into words do not entirely come into scriptural form. Only a very small part of them is collected into scriptures.

### Conclusion

In order to have a clear conception of the distinction between *mati* and *śrūta* we can divide the matter in the following three categories :—

1. In the first category we include those objects as are expressible but not accompanied by the attention of *śrūta*; i. e. the cognition of which does not depend upon instruction or scriptures. The cognition of such objects is *mati*.

2. In the second category we include those objects which are not expressible. They also come into *mati*.

3. In the third category we place those, which are expressible and at the same time accompanied by *śrūta* attention. The cognition of such objects is *śrūta*.

The above classification would show that there are two conditions for *śrūta*. Firstly, its object should be expressible. Secondly, its cognitions should be produced by *śrūta* i. e. speech or scriptures.

All expression is not *śrūta*, because it may arise without the help of instruction or scriptures. In such cases it is nothing but *mati*. The reason for excluding such cases from the category of *śrūta* is this : in the case of *śrūta* it is necessary that the whole knowledge should be expressible. It is possible only if the cognition depends upon some verbal testimony. Any knowledge gathered from self-experience may have some element that can be put into words, but, the whole of it cannot be translated into language. It is always mixed with certain material that is inexpressible. So, the only possible limitation

is that whatever is śruta, it must be expressible and not the vice versa, i. e. whatever is expressible is not necessarily śruta. Mati is expressible as well as inexpressible. Śruta is always expressible.

It can be said; in the case when mati and śruta, both are expressible, they do not differ as far as their subject-matter or the nature of cognition is concerned. The only difference, that can be held in such cases is that, one depends upon scripture or speech while the other on experience. But, the difference in cause does not make any intrinsic difference in the nature of knowledge.

The above objection does not arise if we compare the internal nature of the śruta with mati. The object of śruta is naturally expressible as it is cognized. It does not allow any difference between expression and the cognition. On the other hand the object of mati is not expressed as apprehended. The difference among the tastes of sugar, gur, sugarcane, honey and dates is beyond the reach of words. The term sweet is only a lame expression. Much of the experience is left unexpressed. So, mati and śruta differ in their internal nature also.

#### **The Illustration of Bark and Rope<sup>1</sup>**

The difference between mati and śruta is also illustrated by the bark and rope. Mati is like the bark and śruta like the rope. It means that śruta is a particular stage of mati. The latter continues to exist even in that stage. As the existence of bark is not finished on its transformation into rope. The latter is merely an advanced stage of the former. Similarly, śruta is an advanced stage of mati.

#### **The Difference of Articulation and Inarticulation<sup>2</sup>**

According to another opinion śruta is articulate (sākṣara) and mati inarticulate (anākṣara). This view goes against the conception of Īhā etc. as the sub-class of mati, which are articulate cognition. In the stages of mati, only avagraha is

1. Viśeṣavāśyakabhāṣya G. 154-161

2. Ibid G. 162-170

inarticulate. In the latter stages the cognizer must have articulate cognition. It can be argued that avagraha etc. are recognized as the stages of śruta-niśrita-mati, so the function of articulation, in the latter stages can be performed by śruta. This view also is not free from defects. If the function of Īhā is performed by śruta the former cannot be a stage of mati. If, in spite of its being the function of śruta Īhā is admitted as the stage of mati śruta will have no scope. The alternative that both mati as well śruta should be accepted to exist there, also is not feasible; because, two upayogas do not occur simultaneously.

Moreover, śruta-niśrita does not mean articulation or dependence upon śruta at the time of occurrence. It only means the relation with a person whose mind is well-cultivated through the knowledge of scriptures or other instructions.

As a matter of fact, bhāvaśruta and mati both are articulate as well as inarticulate. Mati in the stage of avagraha is inarticulate and in the latter stages articulate. Śruta is articulate as far as it follows the scriptures or articulate speech. It is inarticulate when it follows a sound other than books or distinct speech : just as the sound of inhaling or exhaling, spitting, coughing etc. But, in the case of dravyaśruta it is positively articulate. Inarticulate sound is not accepted as dravyaśruta. So, the difference of articulation and inarticulation is applicable to dravyaśruta and mati only.

### The difference between the two based on Silence and Eloquency<sup>1</sup>

Śruta is eloquent. It can express the object to others. Mati is silent. It cannot make the object known to others. It can be said, as far as cognition is concerned mati and śruta, both are silent. It is only speech, recognized as dravyaśruta, that can express the meaning to others. It is related with bhāvaśruta; because, it is a cause of the latter. If bhāvaśruta is heard as eloquent on account of the expressiveness of its cause, the mati also can be proved eloquent on the same basis. The object of mati is not expressed through words, but the same can be done

1. Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya G. 171-176



through movements of the body or other sources. The above contention goes against the following reasons. Firstly, the physical movements are not the exclusive cause of mati. They are common to mati as well as śruta. They cannot be called dravyamati as we call speech as dravyaśruta. So, dravyaśruta, being closely related with bhāvaśruta, can assign eloquence to śruta in general. This cannot be said in the case of mati. Secondly, the indications also when they go beyond the limit of perception and indicate something more, come into the category of śruta. Śruta does not mean spoken or written words only. But, every thing that given some idea based on authority. After all words also are indications. A person touches his mouth with folded five fingers. As far as the perception of his movements is concerned it is mati. But, when we come to know that such indications express hunger, we pass into the sphere of śruta. Thus, what cannot be perceived, inferred or otherwise known, and is exclusively based on the authority of the other person, is śruta. In the above case, if hunger is known through other conditions it will be mati. It is śruta when the fact is made known by the person through words, speech or any other ostensible movement.

#### Fourteen categories of Śrutajñāna<sup>1</sup>

The Nandī divides śruta into fourteen kinds of Akṣara, Anaṁṣara etc. Before coming to their explanation some historical remarks are necessary.

These fourteen categories are not found in the Digambara literature. In the Śvetāmbara literature also they are mentioned for the first time by Āvaśyakaniryukti. They are not referred to even in the Tattvārtha. But, the first two categories of Akṣara and Anaṁṣara are accepted by the Digambara also. In the karma-literature of Śvetāmbaras as well as the Digambaras śruta is described as having twenty varieties; which include the above-mentioned two. VBh refers to a gāthā from the Pūrvā-literature referring to the same. It appears that the fourteen categories are a development of these two. Jinabhadra has

1. Nandī sūtra, sūtra 40 5<sup>7</sup>

See also—Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya G. 459-555

given an elaborate description of them on the basis of Nirvyukti. Akalaṃka also has mentioned them but his explanation is quite different.

The Nandī refers to following fourteen categories :

- |                  |                    |
|------------------|--------------------|
| 1. Akṣara śruta  | 2. Anakṣaraśruta   |
| 3. Saṃjñīśruta   | 4. Asaṃjñīśruta    |
| 5. Samyak śruta  | 6. Mithyāśruta     |
| 7. Sādi śruta    | 8. Anādi śruta     |
| 9. Saparyavasita | 10. Aparyavasita   |
| 11. Gamika       | 12. Agamika        |
| 13. Aṅgapraviṣṭa | 14. Anaṅgapraviṣṭa |

### Akṣara śruta and Anakṣaraśruta<sup>1</sup>

Akṣara means the symbols that express some idea. They are called Akṣara, because, they are not destroyed even at the destruction of object. They are imperishable. The Jainas do not admit eternity of letters in the form of sound as the school of grammarians holds. The imperishability means that they last for ever, as far as their knowledge is concerned. That knowledge also exists not in the form of attention; but, in the form of faculty or power (labdhi).

The akṣara is divided into vowels and consonants. The vowel is known as svara meaning that which sounds. The consonant is known as vyañjana, that which expresses. It is generally consonant that are responsible for the expression of different meanings; while the vowels are mere sounds. Articulate sound expressing definite meaning is Akṣaraśruta.

Inarticulate sounds with definite expressions are Anakṣaraśruta. Long and deep breathing expresses the state of grief, spitting expresses hatred. Similarly, coughing, nasal and such other sounds express a definite meaning. They are included into Anakṣara śruta. One can say that the motions of body also express some meaning. The different kinds of hand-movements denote refusal, calling, threat etc. They also should be included into Anakṣaraśruta. Jinabhadra holds that the pre-

1. Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya G. 454-503

sent consideration is concerned with sound only and therefore movements are not taken into account.

### **The Division of Akṣaraśruta<sup>1</sup>**

Akṣaraśruta is divided into saṃjñākṣara, Vyañjanākṣara and Labdhyakṣara.

(1) Saṃjñākṣara means the particular shape and form of the latter of a script. Maladhāri Hemacandra refers here to the eighteen kinds of scripts prevalent at that time.

(2) Vyañjanākṣara means a word that expresses certain meaning. All the words of different languages, with particular meanings are vyañjanākṣaras.

(3) Labdhyakṣara—The learning of an Akṣara is labdhyakṣara. It includes both, the upayoga as well as labdhi related with the knowledge of a script.

The first two varieties dravyaśruta. The last is bhāvaśruta.

### **Two kinds of Labdhyakṣara<sup>2</sup>**

Jinabhadra divides labdhyakṣara into two varieties of perception and inference. The cognition of Akṣara obtained by the senses and the mind is perception; while that obtained through mark is inference.

It may be recalled here that according to the Tattvārtha as explained by Akalaṃka and later Digambara logicians, all varieties of mediate cognition (parokṣa) are included into mati. They interpret the four synonyms of mati as four varieties of mediate cognition. According to Jinabhadra śruta and mati both are mediate as well as immediate. When they arise from senses and the mind they are immediate and when they depend upon other sources, say hetu etc. they are mediate. But, Jinabhadra does not clarify the difference between mati and śruta in respect of the categories of pratyakṣa and parokṣa. On the other hand he seems to include all varieties of inference into parokṣa-śruta, and leaves no scope for parokṣamati. Akalaṃka also includes inference etc. into Śrutajñāna.

1. Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya G. 464-468      2. Ibid. 469-500

**Akalaṃka's Interpretation of Akṣara and Anakṣara<sup>1</sup>**

Akalaṃka interprets akṣara and anakṣara as the two varieties of inference, viz., inference proper (svarthānumāna) and syllogism (parārthānumāna). Anakṣara is the inferential knowledge related with the inferer. It is anakṣara; because, it does not take the form of oral sentences. The syllogism is akṣara-śruta as it takes the form of speech in order to convey the idea to others. Thus, according to Akalaṃka Akṣara is only a Dravyaśruta limited to speech; and Anakṣara is Bhāvaśruta i. e. knowledge. According to Śvetāmbaras the third category of labdhyakṣara was bhāvaśruta. It was pratyakṣa as well as parokṣa. The Anakṣara-śruta of the Śvetāmbaras has no place in the Digambara literature.

Perhaps, Akalaṃka being a logician, tried to incorporate the Āgamic view in the logical system. As far as the Āgamic conception is concerned, the Digambara tradition is not so rich as that of the Śvetāmbaras. The three-fold division of Akṣara-śruta, so common in the Śvetāmbara literature is not found in the Digambaras.

**Samjñiśruta and Asamjñiśruta<sup>2</sup>**

The division of Samjñiśruta and Asamjñiśruta is based on the stages of mental development or the degree of the power of thinking. According to Jainism, as stated before the mind is divided into physical mind and psychical mind. The physical mind is not possessed by all animals. It is found in a portion of the five-sensed animals only. The general classification of sañjñins and asañjñins is based on the possession of physical mind. But, this does not mean that the animals without it are totally devoid of the mental activities. Their different movements clearly express the existence of mental functions in greater or lesser degree. The one-sensed animals, who cannot move from one place to another place at their free will, or who cannot move, have their limbs by themselves, also possess certain amount of mental function, like feeling and willing etc. Considered from this point of view no animal is asañjñin.

1. Tattvārtha Vārtika
2. Viśeṣāvaśyakabbāṣya G. 504-536

But, the mental function as found in one-sensed animals like earth etc. is so minute that it cannot be commonly apprehended. The animals like ants are seen running in several ways in search of food. They react to the external stimuli and do such other things as clearly express the existence of mind in them. This is not so clear in the case of one-sensed animals. Their mental function is known as Oghasañjñā; which in the present case is not recognised as such. The present distinction of sañjñīśruta and Asañjñīśruta is based on this very assumption of Jinabhadra that a kārṣāpaṇa ( a four anna coin ) also is money; but, a person cannot be held as a moneyed man by possessing that much. Similarly, a thing does not become colourful by merely possessing some colour. Moneyed man is called by possessing a big amount of money and the designation of colour-ful is based on possession of beautiful colour. The first case depends upon big quantity and the second on commendability. In the present case both the factors are taken into consideration. Out of the three varieties of Sañjñīśruta, which we are going to describe, the first two depend upon the first factor and the last one on the second factor.

### **Three types of Sañjñīśruta**

The question of Sañjñīśruta and Asañjñīśruta is considered in the following three aspects :—

(1) Kālikī or Dīrghakālikī Sañjñā - The mental power of retaining the past experiences and speculation in future plans is known as kālikī or Dīrghakālikī sañjñā. It is based on, as the name suggests, the capacity of dwelling upon a long span of time. According to this assumption a person with the power of memory and future speculations is sañjñīn and others are Asañjñīn. This type of Sañjñīśruta is found in the animals that possess physical mind i. e., the residents of heaven and hell, and the womb-born ( garbhaja ) five-sensed animals. The general classification of Sañjñīn and Asañjñīn is based upon the above contention. This Sañjñā corresponds to the soul of Western thinkers.

**(2) Hetuvādupadeśa Saṁjñā**

The animals who can feel the agreeable and disagreeable objects and react accordingly for protection or comfort of their body are saṁjñīns and others asaṁjñīns. The thinking of such animals is generally confined to the present only. They cannot keep in view the past or speculate the future. According to this assumption all the animals having two senses or more are saṁjñīns, while the one-sensed animals are asaṁjñīns. Hetuvāda means reaction to the external stimuli.

**(3) Dṛṣṭivādupadeśa saṁjñā**

This assumption is based upon the ethical factor like that Jñāna or Ajñāna. According to it a person with right attitude (samyagdṛṣṭi) is saṁjñīn, and that with a wrong attitude (mithyā dṛṣṭi) is asaṁjñīn. The latter is called asaṁjñīn because his saṁjñā is not useful for the spiritual development, just as his jñāna also amounts to ajñāna.

**Samyak śruta and Mithyāśruta<sup>1</sup>**

There are two considerations in recognising a śruta as samyak or mithyā. According to the first consideration the scriptures composed by the sages having a minimum knowledge of full ten pūrvas is samyak-śruta ; while the whole non-jaina literature is mithyāśruta, the works composed by the Jaina sages having the knowledge of less than ten pūrvas may be included into samyak as well as mithyā. This assumption is based on the conception that a Mithyādṛṣṭi cannot obtain the knowledge of full ten pūrvas. This consideration keeps in view the question of authoritative validity. According to the second consideration every scripture possessed by a samyagdṛṣṭi is samyak-śruta and that possessed by a mithyā-dṛṣṭi is mithyā-śruta.

**Sādi-saparyavasita śruta<sup>2</sup>**

Śrutajñāna is without beginning and end (anādi-aparyavasita) in the view of the Dravyārthika-naya. It has beginning well as end in view of the Paryāyārthika-naya.

1. Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya G. 527-536

2. Ibid. 537-539

If we leave aside the question of two Nayas and consider śrutajñāna on its own merit we have the following four alternatives :—

1. Sādi-saparyavasita—Having beginning as well as end.
2. Sādi-aparyavasita—Having beginning but no end.
3. Anādi-saparyavasita—Having end but no beginning.
4. Anādi-aparyavasita—Having neither beginning nor end.

These four alternatives are discussed in relation to the following four considerations :—(1) Dravya (person), (2) Kṣetra (place), (3) Kāla (time), (4) Bhāva (state).

If the śruta is considered in relation to one person it has both, the beginning as well as the end. A person with śrutajñāna can have three prospects: Firstly, he may make further progress and attain kevalajñāna. Secondly, he may die with his knowledge of śruta and forget the majority of it in the next life. Thirdly, he may lose the knowledge in the very life on account of physical or mental disorder. All the three cases prove that the śruta is never without end. Jinabhadra says that a person with the knowledge of fourteen Pūrvas, does not remember all of them in his heavenly life. He may remember a portion of them or forget entirely. Even in the same life he may retain it or forget according to the external and internal factors. The change of faith from right to wrong, death, falling ill, absence of revision etc. are some of the factors which wipe out the already acquired śrutajñāna.

So far, we were considering the subject in relation to samyagjñāna. If the śruta is taken as general, we come to the following conclusions :—

1. The first alternative can be applied to an individual in the case of samyakśruta only.
2. The second alternative of beginning without end is merely hypothetical. It is found nowhere.

3. The third alternative, i.e. end without beginning, applies to the person who is expected to attain liberation. He was never without śruta but loses it with the attainment of kevala-jñāna i.e. omniscience.

4. The fourth alternative, i.e. neither beginning nor end applies to a being who is Abhavya, who does not possess the capacity of attaining liberation.

In respect of the conditions of place, time and state the alternatives are applied as follows :—

As far as the countries of Bharata and Airāvata are concerned we have the first alternative. In these two parts śruta begins with the first Tīrthaṅkara and ends when the order of the last Tīrthaṅkara is ended.

As regards time also we have the first alternative in relation to the above two countries. According to Jainism the wheel of time is divided into two halves having six spokes (ara) each. The first half, where everything progresses with the march of time is known as Utsarpiṇi. The latter half, where everything deteriorates gradually is known as Avasarpiṇi. In both the halves śruta begins with the third spoke and ends in Utsarpiṇi by the beginning of the fourth spoke and in Avasarpiṇi upto the end of the fifth spoke. The present age is considered as the fifth spoke of Avasarpiṇi, which has a duration of twenty-one thousand years. Out of which two thousand and five hundred years have been passed.

As regards the states of attention, sound, effort, place, pose etc. śruta has the first alternative.

We have the fourth alternative of neither beginning nor end in respect of the persons taken collectively, Videhakṣetra, the time prevalent there in, and the state of kṣayopaśama. The above alternatives show the positions of scriptural knowledge in different times and regions. They also show when the scriptures come into existence and when they are extinct.



**Gamika and Agamika śruta<sup>1</sup>**

The śruta which is connected with mathematical calculations or repeats the same text again and again with a particular purpose is known as Gamika. This name was generally given to Dṛṣṭivāda, the twelfth aṅga. The śruta composed in various meters and prose forms is Agamika, it is also known as kālika.

**Aṅgapraviṣṭa Aṅgabāhya**

The division of Aṅgapraviṣṭa and Aṅgabāhya is based on three factors which we have already discussed.

It is said that Dṛṣṭivāda contained the full subject matter of all the pūrvas, Aṅgas and other literature. Even that the composition of the literature other than Dṛṣṭivāda is meant for the persons who could not learn Dṛṣṭivāda. A woman was not allowed to study the Dṛṣṭivāda. According to the Digambara tradition she cannot attain liberation, but the Śvetāmbaras do not deny her that privilege. According to them a female can become a Tīrthaṅkara also. The nineteenth Tīrthaṅkara was a woman. Still, they also contain many injunctions belittling the position of woman. It appears to be a Brahmanical influence.

**The Subject matter of Śruta-jñāna**

A person with Śruta-jñāna can know all the objects of the world, the present, past or future with all modes and states. But his cognition is indirect. He knows, but cannot perceive them. Śruta is not preceded by sensation or the stage of acquisition.

According to certain systems the scriptural knowledge result into intuition or perceptual knowledge. But, the Jaina does not support it. As far as the subject-matter is concerned the Jaina also holds that śruta is not inferior to kevala. The only difference between the two is that the first is indirect while the latter is direct.




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1. Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya G. 549-555

## Direct Knowledge

It has been already stated that the Tattvārtha and Āvaśyaka Niryukti divide the five types of knowledge, into two categories of direct cognition (prayakṣa) and the indirect cognition (parokṣa). The first two types of Mati and Śruta are Indirect cognitions while the remaining three are direct-cognitions. We have also discussed the basis of this division. The cognition which arises from the soul without any external help is direct and that depending upon external cause is indirect. The direct knowledge is independent of all factors, commonly held as the cause of knowledge. Regarding the object also it differs from the ordinary cognitions. It apprehends the objects that are remote, past, future, minute, hidden or otherwise uncognizable through the external senses. It is supernormal.

Almost all the schools of Indian philosophy believe in supernormal perceptions. Only the materialist school of Cārvāka does not believe in any source of knowledge other than sense-perception. The Mīmāṃsaka also denies the possibility of super-normal knowledge, except that derived from the Vedas. But, the systems of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Vedānta, Buddhism and the Jaina believe in supernormal perceptions and give their own accounts.

The modern sciences of hypnotism, occultism etc. will find sufficient material for research in the Indian account of supernormal perceptions. They will find in it the evidences of auto-suggestion, clairaudience, hyperaesthesia of vision, hearing, touch, etc., hypermnesia, thought reading, thought transference telepathy, and different types of trance or ecstasy obtained through yogic practices.

### The Nyāya Theory of Supernormal Perception

According to the Nyāya theory of knowledge all perception, except that of God, results from a contact between senses and the object. This principle is applied every where, Even the supernormal-perception is not an exception to it. But, in order to depend the above principle and to apply it every where the Nyāya has become so lenient or rather lose in the conception of contact, that it has nearly lost the sense of restriction. One can establish the contact everywhere.

The Nyāya divide that contact into two categories of Ordinary contact (*laukika sannikarṣa*) and Extraordinary contact (*alaukika sannikarṣa*). The ordinary contact has been already discussed with its six varieties.

Extraordinary contact has the following three types<sup>1</sup> :

- (1) The contact through the knowledge of generic character (*śamānya-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*).
- (2) The contact through association (*Jñāna-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*)
- (3) The contact produced by meditation (*yogaja-sannikarṣa*)

#### (1) The Contact through the Knowledge of generic character

Sometimes, through the knowledge of generic nature of an individual, we perceive all other individuals of that kind with all times and places, in respect of the same generic nature. In such cases, the knowledge of generic nature (*sāmānya*) of an object constitutes the extraordinary contact. For instance, when we see a particular case of smoke along with its generic character (*dhūmatva*), we have a universal preception of smokeness related with all the three times. In the preception of smoke we have ordinary contact viz., union (*saṃyoga*) between the visual organ and the particular smoke; in the perception of generic character we have the contact of united-inherence (*saṃyukta-samavāya*) between visual organ and the generic character. These two are the cases of ordinary contact, but in

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1. Kārīkāvālī K. 63-65

the perception of universal smoke the contact is extra-ordinary. It is established through the knowledge of generic character, which inheres in all the smokes. It is extra-ordinary in the sense that it is not objective. It is merely conceptual.

The necessity of cognizing all smoke of all times and all places arises, according to the Nyāya, is to ascertain the relation of universal connection between smoke and fire, which is essential condition of inference.

The Jaina as has been already discussed does not believe in the contact-theory. He resorts to Kṣayopaśama as the ultimate source in all cases of knowledge. The ascertainment of invariable concomitance (vyāpti) also does not require the knowledge of all individuals; but, the knowledge that one does not happen without the other, or one happens only when the other is present (tathopapatti or anyathānupapatti) is sufficient for it. But, this knowledge, if confined to particular cases, is not competent to establish a universal relation. If it is universal, it does not differ materially from the Nyāya-conception. The only difference is, where the Jaina resorts to Kṣayopaśama and gets freedom from the responsibility of further explanation, the Nyāya tries to give some interpretation, feasible or unfeasible.

## (2) The contact through Association

Sometimes an object or a quality is not actually present before the sense-organ. it is recollected on the basis of its association with the object that is present. But, the cognitions of the object that is presented and that of its associate, are not held as two. There is one appearance where certain matter is supplied by direct sensation and the other by association. This is called the contact through association, which brings about an indirect perception of the quality that is not presented. For instance, when we see a piece of sandal-wood, we feel that it is fragrant. What is the cause of this visual perception of fragrant sandal? Here, the visual organ is united with the piece of sandal-wood which produces the direct visual perception of sandal-wood, but, the fragrance is not a direct object of vision. In this case

the perception of sandal-wood generates the idea of fragrance through association, which serves as the extraordinary contact in the visual perception of fragrant sandal-wood.

According to Jainism the fragrance of sandal-wood is not perceived. It is the object of recollection, which appears as one with the visual perception. It is recognized as *pratyabhijñā*, which is a variety of indirect knowledge. The *Nyāya* holds it as perception. He, therefore, has to explain the experience of fragrance through some abnormal contact.

The cognitions generated by the above-mentioned two contacts are not held as super-normal by the Jainas. We are not mainly concerned with them in the present discussion which is related with the supernormal knowledge.

### (3) The contact produced by Meditation

The third variety of extraordinary contact is produced by meditation or yoga. It is beyond the recognized process of contact. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa<sup>1</sup> describes the nature of *Yogipratyakṣa* that it can perceive all the objects that are past, distant, hidden, subtle, or have not come into existence as yet. It can perceive dharma which is absolutely supersensible. A Yogin can apprehend all the objects of world simultaneously in one cognition.

*Bhāsarvajña*<sup>2</sup> distinguishes the *yogipratyakṣa* from ordinary one in this respect, that the latter apprehends only the gross objects through a physical contact; is dependent of the help of light, time, space and merit or demerit of the person. The yogic perception does not depend upon this help. It is a direct and immediate perception with the apprehension of all the objects, gross as well as subtle, existent as well as non-existent, without the physical contact.

### Yogic Perception and Divine Preception

Both, the yogins and God equally know all the objects of world, even those as are naturally supersensible as dharma

1. *Nyāyamajñā* p. 97

2. *Nyāyasāra* p. 3

(merit) etc; still, they differ in their omniscience. The omniscience of yogins is produced by meditation, while divine omniscience is eternal. Moreover, the divine perception of dharma (Moral law) is natural (*śāmsiddhika*), dharma constitutes the essential nature of God, who is the author of Vedic injunctions. But, yogins learn the real nature of dharma, first indirectly through the Vedic injunctions, and then have an intuition through long meditation. When they attain the stage of direct intuition the dependence on Vedic texts is finished. They become themselves an authority. Just as in the case of inference, when we perceive the same fire as was inferred before, the dependence on the mark is finished.

The Jainas do not recognise the above two types. They do not admit the conception of God. Every cognition, according to them, has a beginning. They classify the supernatural cognitions, on the basis of their gradation. The knowledge of an omniscient, though attained at the destruction of entire obscurance through the self-disciple and penance, does not disappear. It is eternal and constant. But, the supernormal knowledge of lower type is open to disappearance as well as further development, resulting into the stage of omniscience. It is not constant and functions only when the attention is applied.

### The Division of Yogipratyakṣa

Praśastapāda<sup>1</sup> divides yogic perception into two types of (1) Yuktapratyakṣa—the perception of those who are in ecstasy and (2) Viyuktapratyakṣa—the perception of those who are not in ecstasy.

Those with ecstasy can perceive their own souls, the souls of others, space, time, atoms, air, manas, qualities (*guṇas*) movements (*karmans*), universalities (*sāmānya*) and particularities (*viśeṣa*), inherence (*samavāya*) through the manas strengthened by the powers attained through maditation. And those without ecstasy perceive subtle, hidden and remote things,

1. Praśastapāda Bhāṣya p. 97

through the fourfold contact of the self, manas, sense-organs and the object. The main difference between the two is that the former does not depend upon the four-fold contact while the latter does.

Bhāsarvajña<sup>1</sup> also follows Praśastapāda in dividing yogic perception into two types of (1) ecstatic intuition and (2) the non-ecstatic intuition. In the ecstatic intuition there is no peripheral stimulation or contact of the external sense-organs with the object ; the perception of all objects follows from the conjunction of the self with the internal organ or manas aided by dharma brought about by intense meditation and the grace of God. Thus, in the state of ecstasy the internal organ or manas, alone is operative, the external organs are entirely in-operative at that time. But in the non-ecstatic intuition the yogic perception of supersensible objects, follows from the four-fold, three fold, or two-fold contact as the case may be. When the objects are perceived through the senses, other than the auditory organ, the contact is four-fold, i. e. of the soul with mind, of the mind with the sense-organs, of the sense-organs with their respective objects. In the perception of sound the contact is threefold ; i. e. of the self with manas, and the manas with auditory-organ of auditory organ with its object. And in the perception of pleasure etc. there is the two-fold contact of the self with the manas and of manas with its object.

The Jainas divide yogic perception into two varieties of Incomplete (vikala) and complete (sakala). The complete perception is constant and all-apprehensive. It apprehends all the objects of the universe; present, past or future, subtle or gross, material or immaterial with same cognition without any break or obstruction. The Incomplete perception is not constant. It occurs only when and where the attention is paid. It is also limited in scope.

According to Jainism the sense-organs do not play any part in the yogic perception. The soul is not assisted by anything else in such cases. Though, in ordinary perception also soul is the main factor; but, the sense-organs also help as

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1. Nyāyasāra p. 3

auxiliaries without which the soul is helpless. In the case of extraordinary perception the senses do not function at all. The soul is empowered by the particular kṣayopaśama to apprehend the objects, without taking any help from the sense-organs. The inner sense or manas also does not play any part as far as this cognition is concerned. It functions only in creating desire to know a particular object. It has nothing to do after that. In the case of complete knowledge that desire also is not required, as an omniscience knows all the objects every moment.

The Neo-Naiyāyikas divide yogins and their perception in the following two types<sup>1</sup> :—

1. Yukta—the perception of a yogin, who has attained union with the Sūpreme Being.
2. Yuñjāna—the perception of a yogin, who is endeavouring to attain such a union.

The first type enjoys a constant perception of all the objects, while the second type can do so with a little effort, i. e. attention or meditation.

The above conception of the modern Naiyāyikas bears a considerable resemblance with that of the Jainas. The Incomplete perception (vikala) resembles the Yuñjāna and the complete one with yukta. But, the Nyāya conception of contact between mind and the soul as a necessary condition is protested by the Jainas more strongly in this case.

#### **Savikalpaka and Nirvikalpaka stages in Yogi-Pratyakṣa**

Jayasimhaśūri<sup>2</sup> holds that the yogic perception in the state of ecstasy, is always indeterminate; since in ecstasy the complete focus of attention cannot be brought about by a determinate or discriminate perception. There is no element of discrimination in the yogic intuition in the state of ecstasy. But, it must not be supposed that the yogic intuition in ecstasy is the same as ordinary indeterminate perception which apprehends the mere forms of objects and not their mutual

1. Kārikāvali K. 65
2. Nyāyasārtika p. 82



relations. Our indeterminate perception marks the lowest stage of immediacy, while the yogic intuition in ecstasy marks the highest limit of immediacy. Our indeterminate perception is below determinate perception, while the indeterminate perception of a yogin in ecstasy, is above determinate perception and indeed, above all determinate cognitions, presentative or representative, perceptual or conceptual. Our indeterminate perception is immediate 'sense-perception', while that of the yogin in ecstasy is immediate "intellectual intuition". Our indeterminate perception apprehends the mere form of an object, through an external sense-organ, while that of the yogin in ecstasy apprehends all the objects of the world simultaneously. The speciality of the indeterminate perception of a yogin lies only in the state of ecstasy. But the perception of yogin out of the condition of ecstasy can be both, determinate or indeterminate.

According to Jainism the cognition of yogins also, whether complete or incomplete, is preceded by indeterminate perception (*darśana*). It is only the *manaḥ-paryaya jñāna* (perception of others' mind) which is always determinate. The other two varieties pass through the stages of determinate as well as indeterminate.

But, in case of the cognition of an omniscient, there is a controversy whether he passes through two stages, or has one stage with both specialities or without the distinction. We shall discuss the problem along with *Kevalajñāna* and *Kevaladarśana*.

### **Ārṣajñāna (Intuition Produced by Austerities)**

*Praśastapāda* refers to another kind of supernormal knowledge, which is kindred to *yogipratyakṣa*. It is held that the sages, who are authors of the *Śāstras*, have a true intuitive cognition of all objects, past, present, and future, and also of *dharma* (moral Law) and other supersensible objects. Owing to its dependence on the contact of the *manas* with the self and peculiar *dharma* or power born of austerities; such an intuitive

cognition is called *ārṣajñāna*. It is perceptual in character; since, it is not produced by inferential marks and so forth; but it differs from ordinary perception in that it is not produced by the external organs. It is known also as *prātibhajñāna*.

Jayasimḥasūri<sup>1</sup> says that essentially there is no difference between *ārṣa* intuition and the yogic intuition (*yogipratyakṣa*), as both of them are produced by a peculiar dharma or merit. The only difference between the two lies in fact that former is produced by the practice of austerities (*tapojanita*), while the latter is produced by meditation (*yogaja*). Both of them are non-sensuous and have mind only as their instrumental cause.

The Jaina tradition designates the authors of Āgamic literature as *Śruta-kevalins*. Their knowledge is just like the omniscient, but not perceptual in character. It is not direct but indirect acquired through the preachings of the omniscient. Consequently, it is included into *śrutajñāna*.

As a matter of fact there are three considerations regarding the *Ārṣajñāna*. If it is related with the scriptures it is *śruta*. It is not necessary for *śruta* that it should be acquired from or based upon entirely on the speech of others. We have already stated that the omniscient lords (*Tīrthaṅkaras*) preach only three words (*Tripadī*) and the *Gaṇadhara*s acquire the knowledge of full 14 *pūrvas* or 12 *aṅgas*. In spite of it the whole of their knowledge is *śruta*; because, it is based on preaching, however short it may be. The intelligent listener can develop the idea in volumes; but, he does not lose the central theme or the nucleus of it. In such cases the *Ārṣajñāna* is *śruta*.

If the *Ārṣajñāna* is held as perceptual in character and as apprehending the objects beyond sense-perception, it must be admitted as *yogipratyakṣa*. It does not make any difference whether the power obtained is caused by austerities or meditation.

1. *Nyāyasāraṭīkā* p. 83, see also "The Positive sciences of the Ancient Hindus" by Seal, p. 17

In case the Ārṣajñāna is<sup>1</sup> intuitional (prātibha), appearing like a flash of light, produced through the operation of mind, it is nothing but mati. We have cited the examples of four buddhis which cover the whole range of prātibhajñāna.

As a matter of fact the difference between the Vaiśeṣika and the Jaina is very little. The Vaiśeṣika holds that knowledge of dharma depends upon the scriptures for its origination. When developed it becomes Ārṣa or yogic according to the two types of practices. According to Jainism also the knowledge of supersensual objects is acquired first through scriptures. The same when highly developed through self-discipline and meditation, results into kevalajñāna. In the state of śruta it was imperceptual; but, in the stage of kevala it becomes perceptual. The Vedic tradition makes a distinction between the two stages by calling their possessors as ṛṣi and muni respectively. The ṛṣi has intuitional direct knowledge. The muni possesses the same indirectly.

The idea of scriptural knowledge, gradually developing into intuition is also expressed by the Upaniṣads through their three-fold way of realization. The śravaṇa (to learn the scriptures from a preceptor), manana (logical deliberation) and nididhyāsana (constant meditation) result into the intuition or realization of Brahman.

### **Siddha-Darśana (Occult Perception)**

Besides the intuition of yogins and sages, Praśastapāda describes the perception of occultists who cannot perceive super sensible objects like dharma. They can perceive only the sensible objects as are too subtle or too remote for an ordinary perception; and as such are hidden from our view. They perceive these subtle, remote and hidden objects not through meditation or austerities; but through the external sense-organs sharpened by the application of certain ointments or the like; which, produce certain occult powers. And such an occult-perception is purely sensuous, since, it is produced by the external sense-organs with the help of certain occult medicines,

#### **1. Vaiśeṣika Sūtra-Bhāṣya 9.2.13**

chants etc. Thus, the difference between ordinary perception and occult perception lies in that the former is produced by the sense-organs unaided by any external application, while the latter is produced by the sense-organs sharpened and refined by the application of medicines etc. The former does not go beyond the ordinary limits. The latter is not confined there. Both of them are sensuous. Praśastapāda and his commentators Śrīdhara, Udayana and others do not explain how occult powers are generated in sense-organs, by the application of occult medicines. They have simply recorded occult-perception as a fact of experience.

According to Jainism all cognition which depends upon the sense-organ is included into *Mati* or *Śruta*. The application of occult-medicine or performance of chants may help in increasing the power of a particular sense-organ; but, this much cannot place it with supernormal perception. A cat can see in the darkness, the vultures can see an object from a long distance, but, their cognitions do not go beyond the scope of *Mati*. If the man also happens to possess that power his cognition cannot be recognised other than *mati*. Even the memory of past lives is a variety of *mati*. A person begins to see distant objects through the help of telescope, similarly he can see the subtle objects through a microscope. It does not make his cognition supernormal. Supernormality, according to Jainism, means complete independence from the sense-organs.

#### Kumārila's objection

Kumārila<sup>1</sup> contends that the sense-organ can never apprehend the object beyond its scope; the sense of vision can see only the visible objects. The extraordinary power produced through meditation or austerity can work only within the scope. One can see remote and subtle objects through it. But, it cannot make colour as the object of auditory sense. *Dharma*, which is naturally supersensible cannot be perceived through any sense. Jayanta meets this objection by citing the examples

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1. Śloka-Vārtika, II. 111-13

of cats and vultures, who can perceive the object where human eyes are incompetent. Similarly, he says, yogins with their supernatural powers can behold everything, even the objects which are beyond the scope of ordinary perception. But, Kumārila's objection is not really met with. He does not oppose the perception of a remote object or of that in darkness. They are not beyond the scope of visual perception by nature. They are not perceived by a man on account of remoteness or the obstruction of darkness where the human perceptual power falls short. These objects by themselves are not invisible. But, the objects like dharma etc. are naturally beyond the scope of sense-organs. They cannot be perceived even through supernormal power.

The above objection does not arise in the case of Jainas as they do not maintain that supernormal or direct, perception depends upon the senses. It is produced by the soul directly, without any dependence on the senses.

Kumārila puts forth some other objections also, but they are based on the assumption that Direct knowledge also depends upon the senses; which the Jainas do not accept.

### **The Sāṅkhya Theory of Supernormal Perception**

According to the Sāṅkhya, everything exists at the present moment; nothing goes out of existence and nothing new comes into existence. The various qualities of things are only modes of energy (rajas) acting in different collocations of the original guṇas, or reals of mass (tamas) energy (rajas) and essence (sattva). And these various energies are sometimes actual (kinetic), sometimes potential, rising to actuality, and sometimes sublatent, subsiding from actuality into sublatency. Thus, the so called future objects are present as latent or potential, and the so-called past objects are present as sublatent; and only those things which are supposed to be present are actual. So the mind of the yogin can come in contact with the past and future objects, which are not nonexistent at present, but

exist only as sublatent and potential respectively by virtue of certain peculiar powers produced by meditation.<sup>1</sup>

Vijñānabhikṣu<sup>2</sup> points out that the mind of the yogin can come in contact with the distant and hidden objects by virtue of the peculiar power (*atiśaya*) acquired by meditation. This peculiar power of the mind consists in its all-pervasiveness or its power of acting on all objects owing to the complete suppression of the inertia or matter-stuff (*tamas*) of the mind which prevents it from acting on all objects. He also points out that the inertia (*tamas*) of the mind is removed sometimes by the intercourse of sense-organs with their objects as in ordinary sense-perception, and sometimes by the *dharma* born of meditation as in yogic perception.

Aniruddha<sup>3</sup> says that the perception of a yogin is produced by the internal organ or mind and not by the external organs, and consequently, it is not like the perception of an ordinary person. The yogin alone, who has acquired particular powers through the favourable influence of the *dharma* born of yoga, can perceive objects in all times and places through the connection of his mind with *prakṛti*, the ultimate ground of all existence.

Vijñānabhikṣu's account conforms with the Jaina conception to a great extent. As far as the theory of obscurance is concerned *tamas* of the Sāṅkhya is just like the *Āvaraṇa* of the Jaina. It is removed through meditation or other varieties of self-discipline, and thus the power of supernormal cognition is unveiled. The self which comes in possession of that power is according to the Sāṅkhya, the mind and according to Jainism the soul itself. This difference is not epistemological but metaphysical. The soul of Sāṅkhya is devoid of all qualities. So he has to resort to *prakṛti* for all activities mental or physical.

1. Sāṅkhyasūtra Vṛtti by Aniruddha I. 90
2. Sāṅkhya Pra. Bhāṣya I. 91
3. Sāṅkhyasūtra Vṛtti, I. 90

The Jaina soul is not so. It possesses all the psychical virtues. The existence of past and future objects also is partially admitted by the Jainas. Everything, they say, exists in form of the cause, even before its production. It exists even after destruction in the form of another shape. Nothing, they say, which is not existent in any form, can come into existence. Their theory of causation also is more akin to the Sāṅkhya than that of the Nyāya.

### Yoga and Supernormal Perception

According to the system of yoga there are five stages of mental activity.<sup>1</sup> Out of them the first three i. e. wandering (kṣipta) forgetful (mūḍha) and occasionally steady (vikṣipta) have no bearing on the yogic powers. In the fifth stage the mind reaches the highest state of supra-conscious ecstasy (asamprajñāta samādhi). It is the state of pure consciousness, without the appearance of any object.<sup>2</sup>

The fourth stage i. e. the conscious ecstasy (samprajñāta samādhi) is divided into eight stages :

Samprajñāta Samādhi			
Vitarkānugata	Vicārānugata	Ānandānugata	Asmitānugata
Savitarka	Savicāra	Sānanda	Sasmita
Nirvitarka	Nirvicāra	Nirānanda	Asmita
or			
Ānandamātra			

(1-2) Savitarka and Nirvitarka stages are related with gross objects.

(3) Savicāra Samādhi is the condition of the mind when on account of deep concentration, it becomes identified with subtle objects such as atoms, tanmātrās, etc. associated with the notions of time, space and causality; and qualified by many other qualities and associations, and erroneously identified with their names and concepts.

1. Yoga sūtra I 5-6

2. Yoga sūtra I 17

(4) Nirvicāra samādhi is the condition of mind when through deep concentration, it becomes identified with subtle objects such as atoms, tanmātrās etc., in their pure state, divested of all the notions of time, space, and causality, and devoid of all qualifications and associations.

These two stages may have for their objects, atoms, tanmātrās the Ahaṅkāra, the buddhi and the prakṛti.

(5) Sānanda samādhi is the determinate state of mind when by deep concentration it becomes identified with gross sense organs, the essence of which is sattva owing to their power of manifesting object. This is the view of Vācaspati Miśra. But, Vijñānabhikṣu holds that the sense organs are the objects of savitarka samādhi. According to him, the object of sānanda samādhi is extreme bliss arising from the predominance of sattva (essence); though rajas (energy) and tamas (inertia) are not entirely suppressed.

(6) Nirānanda samādhi is indeterminate state of mind when by deep concentration it becomes identified with gross sense organs. But, Vijñānabhikṣu holds that ānandasamādhi does not admit of two forms, viz. sānanda and nirānanda.

(7) Sasmita samādhi is the determinate state of mind when by deep concentration it becomes one with the Buddhi (the cause of the sense-organs) which is identified with the empirical self. This is the view of Vācaspati.

According to Vijñānabhikṣu, the object of asmita is the consciousness transformed into the form of pure self. This kind of samādhi may have for its objects either the finite self (jīvātman) or the infinite self (paramātman). According to Bhojarāja, in this stage the Buddhi which is endowed with pure sattva, rajas and tamas, being entirely suppressed, becomes the object of contemplation.

(8) Asmita-samādhi is the indeterminate state of the mind when it becomes one with the Buddhi which is identified with the pure self.



Vijñānabhikṣu does not recognize two forms of samādhi each under Ānandānugata and Asmitānugata. He recognizes the six types only.

Vācaspati Miśra comprehends all the different kinds of saṁprajñāta samādhi under three classes :

1. Grāhya-samādhi or concentration on external objects
2. Grahya-samādhi or concentration on the sense organs
3. Grahitr-samādhi or concentration on the ego.

In the different stages of saṁprajñāta-samādhi the yogin attains certain miraculous powers (siddhis) which strengthen his faith in the process of yoga. They are achieved as the result of concentration on different objects. No reason is given why these powers are attained or why particular powers are attained as the result of concentration on particular objects. These are the facts of actual experience of the yogin, and they have been recorded as such.

The Yoga system of Patañjali bears a striking resemblance with the process of spiritual development as depicted in the Jaina Āgamas.

The Jainas hold fourteen guṇasthānas (steps of spiritual development) showing the gradual progress of soul. The first guṇasthāna is Mithyātva, which is like the first three stages of mind accepted in the yoga-system. But, in this stage also, according to Jainism, certain miraculous powers of inferior type are possible. The manaḥparyaya-jñāna (perception of the mind of others) is possible in the sixth stage only, which is attained by an ascetic. Omniscience is achieved in the thirteenth guṇasthāna when the āvaraṇa corresponding to the inertia (tamas) and Moha corresponding to the energy (rajas) are fully destroyed. The processes of the spiritual development as depicted in the yoga, Buddhism and Jaina systems is a separate subject for study. We have given short comparative notes wherever necessary.

### The Vedānta and Supernormal Perception

The Vedānta is not particular about the supernatural powers attained through yogic practices. It aims at the intuition of Brahman realized through the threefold way of the Upaniṣads. The yogic practices are adopted only as the means for purification of mind.<sup>1</sup>

Mahādeva Sarasvatī, the author of *Tattvānusādhāna*, divides *saṁādhi* into two types of *saṁprajñāta* and *asaṁprajñāta*. He defines the *saṁprajñāta* as an unbroken stream of mental functions apprehending pure consciousness (*cit* or Brahman) without the distinction of subject and object. In this stage the mental modes are not entirely destroyed; they have Brahman or pure consciousness as their object and are transformed into it. The consciousness of subject and object drops altogether, but the mental modes remain concentrated on and transformed into pure consciousness; it is the result of the utmost practice of concentration. He defines *asaṁprajñāta saṁādhi* as the complete suppression of the effects of *saṁprajñāta-saṁādhi*. Even the transformation of mind into the form of Brahman or pure consciousness without the medium of mental modes, are entirely destroyed.

Sadānanda, the author of *Vedāntasāra*, recognizes two kinds of *saṁādhi*, viz., *Savikalpaka-saṁādhi* and *Nirvikalpaka-saṁādhi*. He defines the former as the mental mode which has Brahman or pure consciousness as its object, is transformed into the latter and where the distinction of the knower, the known and the knowledge is not destroyed. In this stage there is the consciousness of identity with the pure-self through the medium of mental modes, in spite of the consciousness of quality of the subject and object. He defines the latter as the mental mode which has Brahman or pure consciousness as its object, into which it is transformed and with which it is completely identified, in this stage, though there is a mental mode which

1. See Das Gupta, *Yoga as Philosophy and Religion*, Ch. XIII

is transformed into Brahman or pure consciousness, there is no consciousness of the mental modes; but, only the consciousness of pure Brahman.

According to Vedānta the external world is an illusion. It appears as long as the reality i. e. pure consciousness or Brahman is not realized. The yogin in the highest stage, according to the Vedānta, is totally freed from the illusion. He, therefore, does not see the external world. But, this is not the case with the Jainas. According to them the external world is as real as the internal one. It is not an illusion. It does not disappear even when the perfect knowledge is attained. On the contrary the yogin begins to observe it in more detail.

According to Jainism the fourteenth *guṇasthāna* is Ayogin kevalin. It is also known as the stage of *Śaileśa*, which means the stage when all activities, mental, vocal or physical are stopped and the person becomes like a mountain (*śaila*). This stage resembles the *asamprajñāta samādhi* of the yoga. But, in that stage also, according to Jainism, the articulate knowledge does not disappear. The Jainas hold that the articulate or determinate cognition does not necessarily depend upon the mental activity. In perfect knowledge all things are directly perceived by the soul independent of mind.

### The Buddhist and Supernormal Perception

According to Dharmakīrti<sup>1</sup> the intuitive perception of yogin is produced by the constant meditation on ultimate truths. Dharmottara explains that there are four ultimate truths :

1. All is momentary (*sarvaṃ kṣaṇikam*)
2. All is void (*sarvaṃ śūnyam*)
3. All is pain (*sarvaṃ duḥkham*)
4. Everything is like itself (*sarvaṃ svalakṣaṇam*).

By constant meditation on these four truths the yogin gradually attains a more and more distinct vision of them; and when he attains the highest stage he acquires the most distinct

1. Nyāyabindu p. 20 see also *ṭīkā* by Dharmottara

vision or intuition. As long as the Yogin does not reach the highest limit of distinct vision, his perception is slightly blurred as if hidden behind mica. But, when he reaches the highest limit, he perceives them most distinctly, as if they were within his grasp. His intuitive perception in this stage is indeterminate. According to Buddhists the indeterminate perception itself is not distinct and vivid, but it acquires distinctness and vividness from its contact with the determinate perception which is its immediate antecedent.

Aniruddha, the author of *Abhidhammattha saṅgaho*, describes the different levels of consciousness. He divides consciousness into two stages viz., subliminal consciousness or subconsciousness below the threshold of consciousness (*manodvāra*), and supraliminal consciousness or consciousness above the threshold of consciousness. He divides supraliminal consciousness, again, into two orders, viz., normal consciousness and supernormal consciousness. Normal consciousness is called *kāma-citta* as it is generally confined to the *kāmaloka* or the plane of existence in which *kāma* (desire) dominates. Super-normal consciousness is called *Mahaggata citta* or sublime or exalted consciousness. And this supernormal consciousness, again is subdivided into *rūpa citta*, which is generally found in the *rūpa loka* or the sphere of visible forms which are not altogether immaterial, and *Arūpa-citta*, which is concerned with *Arūpa loka* or the sphere of the invisible or formless, and *Lokottaracitta* or transcendental consciousness which is above the three worlds, viz. *Kāmaloka*, *Rūpaloka* and *Arūpaloka*.

In order to pass from *Kāmacitta* to *Rūpacitta* severe discipline and concentration of mind are necessary. A monk must regulate all physical and mental activity and concentrate his mind on a single selected object or sensation without changing the object of thought. After sometime the sensuous mark or symbol is replaced by the corresponding image. This concentration of the mind on a bare sensation or its image is called

preliminary concentration (*parikamma-samādhī*). Then by more intense concentration of the mind the image is divested of its concrete, sensuous, or imaginal form, and is converted into an abstract conceptualized image, though not completely deindividualized. The concentration of the mind on this conceptualized image during the period of transition from normal consciousness to super-normal consciousness is still known as access concentration (*Upacāra-Samādhī*). At this stage there intervenes the lowest order of supernormal consciousness known as the first *Rūpa-jhāna*.

There are five *rūpa-jhānas*, which consist in the gradual elimination of the factors of consciousness and attainment of an intensified inward vision and on absolute equanimity or hedonic indifference.

The higher stages of *samādhī* in the yoga system are attained by concentrating the mind on subtler and subtler objects. But the higher stages of *Jhāna* in the Buddhist system are attained by eliminating the factors of consciousness gradually.

Above the level of *Rūpa-citta* there is the *arūpa-citta* which is concerned with *Arūpaloka* or the world of the invisible or formless. The *Anūpaloka* is entirely non-spatial. And the experience of this world can never be sensuous. In the highest stage of the *Rūpa citta*, which is attained by the gradual elimination of the factors of consciousness, there is the abnormal clarity of inward vision or intuition together with hedonic indifference or equanimity. Above this stage there is no longer elimination of factors of consciousness, but all consciousness of distinction or limitations. There are four stages of *Arūpa-jhāna*.

When the mind transcends all these different stages of supernormal consciousness concerned with the *Rūpaloka* and the *Arūpaloka*, it attains the highest stage of supernormal consciousness which is called transcendental or supermundane consciousness (*lokottara citta*).

Jhāṇa consciousness is a mystic consciousness. It is brought about by auto-suggestion. It consists in intensifying or concentrating consciousness on a single object. The object is first of all a percept, then an image, then a concept. So far the mind is in the preparatory stage. Then gradually the contents of consciousness are eliminated in the different stages of Rūpa jhāṇa till the mind at last acquires supernormal clarity of vision and hedonic indifference. So long the mind is in the plane of visible forms (Rūpaloka). It is conscious of the ethereal but not of the immaterial or non spatial. Then the mind comes in touch with the entirely immaterial world of the invisible or formless by gradually eliminating all consciousness of distinction and limitations. The mind is, at first, concentrated on infinite space, then on infinite consciousness, then on infinite nothingness, and last of all attains the stage of complete trance or quasi unconsciousness which may be described as neither consciousness nor unconsciousness. This is the highest stage of Jhāṇa-consciousness, but not the highest plane of consciousness. When the mind completely transcends even the plane of visible or formless (Arūpa loka), it attains the stage of transcendental or super mundane consciousness (Lokottara-citta).

As to the noetic quality, Jhāṇa-consciousness is strongly characterised by it. It gives us insight into depths of truth unfathomed by the discursive intellect; it brings the mind into touch with higher and higher planes of existence. The chief intellectual result of the different stages of Jhāṇa-consciousness is a supernormal clarity of inward vision or intuition untroubled by discursive intellection or hedonistic affection.

The Jhāṇa process gives the following powers :

- (i) Hyper-aesthesia of vision or clairvoyance (dibbacakkhu abhinna), e. g. the supernormal vision of the past and the future history of a particular individual.
- (ii) Hyper-aesthesia of hearing or clairsaudience (dibbasacca),

e. g. supernormal hearing of sounds and voices, both human and celestial, the distant become near.

(iii) Thought reading and thought transference or telepathy (cetopariyasana or para citta vinnāna).

(iv) Hypermnnesia (pubbenivasanusatti) or reminiscence of the past history of former lives.

According to Jainism there are three planes of supernormal consciousness. The first plane known as avadhi-jñāna is limited to the material objects. It resembles the Rūpacitta of the Buddhist. It is limited to the cognition of rūpins or material objects. The second plane is known as manaḥparyaya jñāna, where one can know the other's mind. It is subtler than the previous plane. Moreover, the avadhi-jñāna is not necessarily connected with the spiritual aspiration. It is found in the beings with right faith as well as wrong faith (mithyādr̥ṣṭi). The second and third planes are based on the spiritual development. The second is confined to the monks only who have eliminated the third stage of Mohanīya-karman (attachment) and revealed the natural virtues found in the sixth step of the spiritual ladder.

But, the Jainas do not hold that the consciousness of the lower plane is eliminated in the higher plane. On the contrary the knowledge of lower plane gets further development in the higher stages.

In the third plane one knows the arūpin (immaterial) objects also. The Jainas do not admit any order of objective appearance, in this stage. All the objects material or immaterial, conscious or unconscious are apprehended simultaneously.

### **The Jaina Theory of Direct knowledge**

According to Jainism transcendental perception is produced by the self alone; it is assisted by neither sense-organs nor the mind. It is a natural quality of the soul, lying inactive on

account of the karmic obscurance. It gets its manifestation according to the partial or total removal of the corresponding obscurance. It is divided into the following three stages of (1) Avadhijñāna, (2) Manaḥ paryayajñāna, (3) Kevalajñāna.<sup>1</sup>

Umāsvāti<sup>2</sup> holds the above three types of knowledge as perception (pratyakṣa-pramāṇa) in contrast to Mati and Śruta which are parokṣa on account of their dependence upon the senses and the mind or scriptures. Jinabhadra, Akalaṅka and the latter logicians have named them as pāramārthika pratyakṣa in contrast to the sense-cognition named as sāmvyavahārika-pratyakṣa. The Sthānāṅga<sup>3</sup> classifies the above three types into Vikala (incomplete) and sakala (complete). The first two are Vikala-pratyakṣa while the last is sakala-pratyakṣa.

#### Avadhijñāna (clairvoyance)

Avadhijñāna is the supernormal knowledge of material objects.<sup>4</sup> It is known as avadhi, because, its sphere of apprehension is limited.<sup>5</sup> It resembles clairvoyance or clair-audience of the modern psychology. But, according to Jainism all cognitions related with Avadhi are produced direct by the soul. The senses do not play any part in them.

There are three characteristics which distinguish avadhi from kevala i.e. omniscience. Firstly, it is limited in the scope of apprehension. It perceives the material objects only. Secondly, it is not constant. It follows attention (upayoga). The kevala is constant, and does not require any attention. Thirdly, its (avadhi) area of objectivity is wider in the lower regions than in the upper ones.<sup>6</sup>

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1. Nandī Sūtra 5.

2. Tattvārtha I. 11-12

3. Sthānāṅgasūtra 71

4. Tattvārtha I. 28

5. Anuyoga Maladhārī p. 1

6. Malayagiri on Nandī p. 65



**The types of Avadhi<sup>1</sup>**

Avadhi is divided into two types, based upon the factors of its cause. Though, the real cause of all avadhi, as in the case of other types of knowledge, is kṣayopaśama, without which no cognition is possible; yet, in certain beings it is natural; just like the capacity of flying in birds. Every bird, merely on account of its birth as a bird, is adept in flying. Similarly, every being born in the plane of gods or hellish beings, is equipped with avadhijñāna. This avadhi is called bhava-pratyaya (caused by birth). This conception is based, perhaps, on the notion that abnormal knowledge is a necessary equipment for the excess of happiness as well as misery. Further, the inhabitants of these kingdoms do not possess gross bodies. Their bodies are fluid (Vaikreyaka), Supernormal bodies and supernormal knowledge go together.

The second type of avadhi is known as kṣayopaśama-pratyaya, caused by the partial removal of avadhijñānāvaraṇa. This occurs in the kingdoms of men as well as animals. According to Jainism an animal also can rise up to the fifth step of the spiritual progress and can observe the vows of a gṛhastha or śrāvaka. We have not come across any other system giving so much concession to a being of sub-human kingdom. In the Purāṇas some animals, associated with the gods incarnate or sages, are described as having supernatural powers. In the Indian legends also some birds are characterized as possessing occult knowledge and describing hidden treasures or foretelling the future calamities or personal destiny. But, they are not given any philosophical importance.

The capacity of bhavapratyaya avadhi is fixed according to the region where a being takes its birth. For instance, the being of hellish plane cannot perceive beyond six miles. Similarly, in the different stages of gods and the seven hells (narakas) the potentiality of avadhi is fixed. But, this is not the case with the

1. Tattvārtha I. 21-22; Nandī sūtra 7-8

Sthānāṅga Sūtra 71; Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya G. 572.

other type. It varies according to kṣayopaśama, not only in the matter of area but in certain other respects also. Accordingly, the kṣayopaśama-pratyaya avadhi is divided into the following six sub-classes.

**The six varieties of Bhava-pratyaya avadhi<sup>1</sup>**

(1) Anānugamika—the avadhi which sticks to the place of its birth; which does not follow the owner if he happens to leave that particular place where avadhi was produced. It is like the knowledge based on the local acquaintance and the study of environment. A person can reply the queries related with his own surroundings. If he happens to leave his home-town, he cannot answer any question.

(2) Ānugamika—the avadhi which follows the owner even if he leaves the place of its birth. It is compared with the colour of a cloth which accompanies the latter every where. We can compare it with the knowledge of philosophy or other higher sciences not dependent of particular environment.

(3) Hīyamana—the avadhi which covers large area at the time of its origin, but shrinks gradually up to the stage of negligibility or disappears totally. It is like the flame of fire spreading in dry fuel, but gradually extinguishing with the consumption of fuel.

(4) Vardhamāna—the avadhi which is negligible at the time of its birth but gradually increases upto the extent of whole universe. It is like the fire of match-stick thrown into a heap of dry fuel.

(5) Anavasthita—the avadhi which is unsteady; increases and decreases without any system. It is like the waves of ocean undergoing various forms.

(6) Avasthita—the avadhi which is steady. Having once appeared, it never disappears upto the attainment of Kevala-jñāna or the end of life. Sometimes, it follows the next life

1. Sthānāṅga Sūtra 526; Nandī 8; Tattvārtha I. 22

also. It is like the sex-organ which does not change through out the life.

### **Two varieties of Ānugamika<sup>1</sup>**

The ānugamika avadhi is again divided into two varieties of antagata (situated at the border) and madhyagata (situated in the middle). (1) Antagata is explained in three ways : According to the first explanation it means that which is situated at the fringes of soul. The avadhi is produced by a number of molecules (spardhaka) which appear like the particles of light spreading out of the window in the sun. In certain beings they are numerable, in others innumerable. These units consist of various powers and forms. Some of them appear on the border of the soul. Again a number of them occupies the front position, another operates on the back, and a third in the lower parts; while another number is associated with upper parts. Another number occupies the middle. Antagata-avadhi means the avadhi having only those units as occupy the border and not other parts. According to another explanation it is body and not the soul that is concerned here. Antagata means, situated at the border of the physical body. A person sometimes can see in a particular direction only. Though the soul has no parts as far as kṣayopasaṃśāra is concerned, yet a person sees a particular direction only. This is due to the body where the spardhakas of avadhi operate. The kṣayopasaṃśāra appears in various ways. Its nature can be judged from the result only. Avadhi for a particular direction postulates the particular kṣayopasaṃśāra. According to the third explanation antagata means the cognizer situated at the end of the area illuminated by the avadhi directed towards a particular direction. It means that when the cognizer stands on one end of his cognitive area and not in the middle of it, then it is antagata.

(2) Madhyagata also is explained in the similar three ways, taking into consideration the three factors of the border of soul, body or area respectively.

#### **1. Malayagiri on Nandī p. 82**

The avadhi of gods, hellish beings and Tīrthaṅkaras is madhyagata; that of animals is antagata and that of human-beings is not fixed. It varies according to kṣayopāśama. The avadhi of gods and hellish-beings lasts for the whole life; that of Tīrthaṅkaras upto the attainment of kevalajñāna, that of others is uncertain.

#### The area cognized by Avadhi<sup>1</sup>

The knowledge of common people is confined to the capacity of senses and the mind. The area of avadhi is ascertained from the point where the soul begins to function independently. The minimum and the maximum area cognised by it can be fixed by placing the sense-cognition on one side and omniscience on the other. Avadhi with the minimum capacity apprehends the area, as little as the dimension of a panaka<sup>2</sup> in the third moment of its birth.<sup>3</sup> The maximum area cognised by avadhi is the entire universe and innumerable units of the same size beyond it. According to Jaina cosmology the whole universe is measured by fourteen Rajjus, a hypothetical scale of innumerable yojanas. It is believed that the five substances of Dharma, Adharma, Jīva, pudgala and kāla are found in this area of fourteen rajjus only. Beyond it there is only one substance, i. e. Ākāśa (space). Out of the six dravyas the pudgala is material while the other five are immaterial. Avadhi can know the material objects only. But, the question under discussion is the extension of space, where the object can be apprehended by the avadhi with maximum capacity. Jinabhadra<sup>3</sup> holds that avadhi can apprehend an area as much as is constituted by innumerable worlds of the dimension of fourteen Rajjus. Though practically, avadhi does not know anything beyond the universe, as there is no material to be apprehended, it is only the statement of capacity in respect of area.

1. Viśeṣāveśyaka Bhāṣya. 585-703; Malayagiri on Nandī, p. 97
2. Panaka is the shortest being of the vegetable kingdom which takes birth in the body of a huge fish stretching eight thousand miles. The simile indicates the very short area as the object of minimum avadhi.
3. Viśeṣāveśyakabhāṣya G. 598-607.

**The four measurements of Avadhi<sup>1</sup>**

There are four factors on which the capacity of avadhi is ascertained. They are time, space, substance (dravya) and mode (bhāva or paryāya). By time and space we mean here, the material objects existing in a particular span of time or area. The two substances of space (ākāśa) and time (kāla) cannot be perceived by avadhi, as they are immaterial. These four factors excel one after the other in minuteness. It means that avadhi cognizing a certain number of space-units cannot cognize the same number of time-units. It requires a higher potency to cognize them. It requires still higher potency for cognizing the same quantity of substance units, and still higher for modes. Space is minuter than time; substance is minuter than space and modes are minuter than substance. The shortest unit of time is samaya and that of space is pradeśa. If the number of space-units covered by a finger-tip (aṅgula) is compared with the same number of samayas, the latter would amount to innumerable utsarpiṇīs and avasarpīṇīs. So, with the one unit of time, there are innumerable units of space. With one unit of space there are infinite (ananta) units of substance, and with one unit of substance there are numerable (saṅkhyāta) or innumerable (asaṅkhyāta) modes.

With the extension in span of time the area must extend; but there is no certainty vice versa. With the extension of area the span of time may or may not increase. Similarly, with the extension in space and time the substances and modes must increase, but, there is no guarantee vice versa. In the same way the modes must increase with the increase in substance; but, it is not so, if the position is reversed.

**The proportional development of Avadhi in respect of Time and Space<sup>2</sup>**

We have mentioned above the minimum and maximum area

1. Viśeṣavaśya bhāṣya G. 611-614
2. Ibid. G. 617-626

cognized by the avadhi. All other units of space fall in the middle. As the area extends, time also gets its extension. But, this extension is not without a proportion. Jinabhadra gives the following account of it.

According to Jainism samaya and pradeśa are the shortest indivisible units of time and space-respectively. But they are so minute as beyond the common appreciation. They are not taken into account for general measurement. Aṅgula (finger tip) and Āvalika are the shortest units commonly applied to the measurement of space and time respectively.

The avadhi cognizing an area measured by an innumerably small part of aṅgula, would cognize the span of time measured by the correspondingly small part of āvalika. The avadhi with an area of one aṅgula will have one āvalika in respect of time. This proportion continues as below :

Space	Time
Hasta ( 1.5 feet )	Muhūrtānta (less than 48 minutes)
Gavyūti (4 miles)	Divasānta (less than 24 hours)
Yojana ( 8 miles )	Divasapṛthaktva (2 to 9 days)
25 Yojanas ( 200 miles )	Pakṣāṅkta (less than one fortnight)
Bharata kṣetra	Māsānta (less than one month)
Jambūdvīpa	More than one month
Manuṣyaloka	One year
Rucakadvīpa	2 to 9 years; according to another view one thousand years.
Saṅkhyeya dvīpa-sāgara (numerable islands and oceans)	Numerable years more than one thousand.
Asaṅkhyeya dvīpa-sāgara	Innumerable years.

The increase in time is not certain with the increase in area; but, with the increase in time that in space is certain.

#### The scope of Avadhi in respect of substance<sup>1</sup>

We have known the area and the span of time cognized by

1. Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya G. 627-669

avadhi in its three degrees of minimum, maximum and the middle. We have also known the proportional expansion of the two. Now, we come to the scope of avadhi in respect of substance. It has been already stated that matter (pudgala) is the only substance that can be cognized by avadhi. Its molecules are divided into the following eight classes known as vargaṇās :

1. Audārika vargaṇā— The molecules forming the parts of gross bodies (audārika sarīra).
2. Vaikreyaka vargaṇā—Those forming the parts of fluid body (vaikriya sarīra)
3. Āhāraka vargaṇā— Those forming the parts of astral body (āhārakasārīra)
4. Taijasa vargaṇā— Those forming the parts of fire body (Taijasa sarīra)
5. Bhāṣā vargaṇā — Those constituting the parts of sound.
6. Āṇaprāṇa vargaṇā— The molecules of respiration
7. Manovargaṇā— The molecules of mind.
8. Kārmaṇavargaṇā— Molecules of karmans.

All the atoms occupying single space-units constitute one vargaṇā. All molecules occupying two space-units constitute the second vargaṇā and so on ad infinitum. This constitutes an infinite number of vargaṇās. The molecules upto a certain grade are not fit for constitution of a gross body. After that there comes a number of fit molecules. Again they are unfit. When the number of atoms is further increased, the molecules become fit for the fluid body. Further increment makes them fit for astral body. This process goes on upto the karmavargaṇā. The number of atoms increases in the higher and higher vargaṇās but the grossness decreases. Vaikreyaka vargaṇā is finer than the audārikavargaṇā. Āhāraka vargaṇā is still finer. Karmavargaṇā is the finest.

1. Viśeṣiāvaśyakabhāṣya G. 631.

The solidity of matter is divided into four degree of guru (heavy) laghu ( light ), gurulaghu ( mixed ) and agurulaghu (neither of the two). The matter with the nature of falling down is known as guru as a stone. That with the nature of upward movements is laghu; as fire. That with side movement is gurulaghu as air; and that which is free from all these categories is agurulaghu. The above division is only a rough estimate. In reality there is no matter which is absolutely guru or absolutely laghu. Everything possesses both the natures more or less degree. Even a stone can move upwards or side-wards when thrown accordingly. In the real aspect there are only two groups; that of gurulaghu and agurulaghu. The first four of the above vargaṇās are gurulaghu and the rest are agurulaghu.

The scope of avadhi in respect of substance begins from the cognition of either tejovargaṇā or bhāṣāvargaṇā. If it starts with tejovargaṇā, it is more on the side of gurulaghu. Then, it moves towards the apprehension of grosser objects. When the gurulaghu group is fully apprehended it expands, if further purified, towards the apprehension of agurulaghu group. In case it is not further purified it stops there for some time and then disappears. The avadhi beginning with the cognition of bhāṣāvargaṇā is more on the side of agurulaghu. It progresses towards the cognition of finer vargaṇās. Having apprehended all the four vargaṇās of agurulaghu group, it covers the gurulaghu group also, if further purified. The following table will show how the avadhi develops in the case of substance in proportion to time and space.

Substance	Space	Time
1. Taijasa śarīra	Innumerable islands and oceans	Innumerable parts of palyopama
2. Karmaṇa śarīra	do	do
3. Taijasa vargaṇā	do	do
4. Bhāṣāvargaṇā	do	do
5. Manovargaṇā	A numerable part of the entire universe.	A numerable part of palyopama.



6. Karma vargaṇā	A considerable part of the universe	A considerable portion of palyopama.
7. do	The entire universe	A little less than palyopama.

Karma-vargaṇā consists of the finest molecules. It has been shown in the sixth category. The seventh category is therefore, left blank. But it does not mean that the proportion of substance does not increase in it. In the seventh category avadhi begins to see dhruva vargaṇās, which are subtler than the karmavargaṇās. An avadhi jñānin in this stage, begins, to apprehend the atoms as well. Moreover, it generally turns into paramavadhi, which is necessarily followed by kevalajñāna.

#### **The object limit of Bhavapratyaya-Avadhi<sup>1</sup>**

So far we were discussing the scope of avadhi attained as the result of extraordinary virtues, in the human and sub-human kingdoms. The capacity of this avadhi is not fixed. It fluctuates according to the ethical status or the past virtues. The scope of avadhi related to the kingdoms of hell and heaven, which is effected thereby the very birth is more or less fixed. In the kingdom of hell the minimum area is four miles and the maximum eight miles. In the kingdom of heaven minimum is two hundred miles and the maximum lokanādi, the central part of universe from top to the bottom with a length of 14 rajjus and breadth of one ra jju.

#### **Three stages of Deśavadhi, Pramāvadhi and Sarvāvadhi<sup>2</sup>**

We have mentioned above that the scope of avadhi is not fixed. It begins with an innumerable part of angula, and extends upto the entire universe. As far as its capacity is concerned it can cognize an area as big as innumerable universes. It extends up to the stage just preceding omniscience. Keeping in view the above consideration, Akalaṅka divides avadhi into three stages of Deśavadhi (the avadhi related with a part), Paramā-

1. Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya G. 690-699

2. Tattvārtha Rājavārtika pp. 56-57.

avadhi (avadhi developed into the highest stage) and sarvāvadhi (Avadhi related with the whole). Deśāvadhi has three grades, minimum (jaghanya), maximum (utkrṣṭa) and the middle (ajaghanyotkrṣṭa). The paramāvadhi also has the above three grades. Sarvāvadhi is without any gradation. Deśāvadhi in the minimum stage perceives an infinitely small part of an aṅgula. In the maximum stage it cognizes the entire universe. All the middle stages are related with the third category. Paramāvadhi in the minimum degree perceives the entire universe with an additional unit of space, that in the maximum degree perceives the space measured by innumerable universes. The middle stages are related with the third category. Sarvāvadhi perceives innumerable units of space in addition to those already covered by paramāvadhi. Deśāvadhi may undergo all the eight stages of vardhamāna, hīyamāna, avasthita, anavasthita, anugāmin, apratipātin and pratipātin. Out of the eight, we have already discussed the first six. Pratipātin means that which shines like a flash of lightening disappears at once, without any duration. Apratipātin is the opposite of pratipātin. The Paramāvadhi does not meet the stages of hīyamāna and pratipātin. Sarvāvadhi meets with the four stages of avasthita, anugāmin, ananugāmin and apratipātin. We have discussed above the gradations of deśāvadhi with middle capacity. All these stages are found in the human kingdom. The maximum limit of avadhi in the case of sub-human kingdom is innumerable islands and oceans in respect of space, innumerable years of time and a certain degree of fiery substance.

Paramāvadhi is possible in the human kingdom only. It is attained by a person with a high degree of self-discipline. Sarvāvadhi cognizes all the objects that are within the scope of avadhi. It necessarily results into kevala. As a matter of fact Paramāvadhi is a variety of Deśāvadhi only. The categories of Deśāvadhi and sarvavadhi cover the entire range of avadhi.

The conception of sarvāvadhi is not found in VBh. According to Śvetāmbara tradition Paramāvadhi results into kevalajñāna.

**Manaḥparyaya-jñāna (Thought-reading)**

Manahparyaya means the modes of mind. Their knowledge is called manahparyaya-jñāna.<sup>1</sup> It is also called manahparyava (prākṛta-Manapajava) or manahparyāya. The Digambara literature uses the last name only.<sup>2</sup> The terms paryava and paryaya express the sense of thought-reading, while paryāya means the modes of mind.

**The Object of Manahparyaya**

There are two opinions regarding the real nature of the object of manahparyāya. The Niryuktis and Tattvārtha<sup>4</sup> with its commentaries of Sarvārthasiddhi, Rājavārtika and Ślokavārtika propose that the subject-matter of manahparyaya is the object conceived by the mind. Gommatasāra<sup>5</sup> adds that the object which is half-conceived or is to be conceived in future also is apprehended by Manahparyāya. According to Jinabhadra<sup>6</sup> Manahparyāya apprehends the different modes of mind-substance. The objects conceived are not cognized by it, but, later on inferred by Mati. Siddhasena Gaṇin in his commentary on the Tattvārtha favours the latter view. The Nandi<sup>7</sup> seems to support the former but it is interpreted in both ways by commentators.<sup>8</sup>

It may be recalled here that Jainism proposes two types of mind : (1) Physical mind (dravyamana) and psychical mind (bhāvamana). Psychical mind is a mode of soul in the state of deliberation. It is immaterial like the soul and so beyond the reach of imperfect knowledge. There are no two opinions in

1. Viśeṣāvaśyabhāṣya G. 810

2. Tattvārtha 1/9- Digambara tradition

3. Āvaśyaka Niryukti G. 76

4. Tattvārtha Sūtra I. 23

5. Gommatasāra G. 438

6. Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya G. 841

7. Nandi Sūtra 78

8. See Cūrṇi and tīkā on the above

this matter. The physical mind is the material composition made of molecules known as *Manovargaṇā*. The physical mind changes and takes various forms according to thought-impressions. Every idea puts some mark on it. Sometimes, when the feeling is intense, the impression is so deep that it is visible on the outer surface also. The face of an angry person is reddened. His body trembles. When the feeling is not so intense, or the thought is merely of the nature of knowledge, it is not externally visible. But, it cannot escape from the physical mind; which catches the impression of every idea and feeling, however, feeble it may be. On the other side the physical mind is affected by the gross physical body also. Heavy stomach, hunger, thirst, holding up the calls of nature produce different effects on the physical mind, which further puts its impressions on the psychical mind. So, the physical mind is passive as well as active.

The main objection against the view that *Manaḥparyāya* perceives the objects conceived by the mind is that the objects under conception are material as well as immaterial. The immaterial objects are beyond the scope of imperfect perception. On this ground Jinabhadra holds that *Manaḥparyāya* does not perceive the objects conceived; but, the different modes of physical mind.

In the Śvetāmbara literature none possesses the above view before Jinabhadra. The Nandī<sup>1</sup> states, 'Maṇogae bhāve jāṇai'. Its simple translation is, "It knows the objects existing in the mind." But the commentators like Jinadāsa Gaṇin and Malayagiri, following the footsteps of Jinabhadra, interpret, 'maṇogae bhāva' as the modes of mind-substance.

In the Digambara tradition none has adopted this view. Even the logicians like Akalaṅka and Vidyānanda do not favour it.

The Yogasūtra of Patañjali supports<sup>2</sup> the view of Jinabhadra,

1. Nandī Sūtra 18 with its cūṇī and Ṭīkā.
2. Yogasūtra III. 19

but, on a different ground. Patañjali describes the psychical powers produced by the practice of yoga. Through the concentration on different objects, he says, one can have supersensuous perception of that very object. In the same context he states that by concentration on the mind of other person one is able to know his mind. The object conceived by that mind is not perceived, because, that is not the object of concentration.

Majjhimanikāya of Suttapitaka describes certain rules of conduct to be observed by a bhikkhu if he desires some accomplishments, natural as well as supernatural. Amongst the supernatural powers the cognition of all varieties of mind also is referred. It also does not indicate the objects conceived by the mind as the subject-matter of that cognition.

#### **Critical Examination of the views represented by Akalaṅka and Jinabhadra**

We can analyse the above problem under the following heads :—

1. The meaning of the term.
2. The purpose or distinguishing characteristics.
3. The cognition of physical mind.
4. The cognition of the object conceived.

(1) The term 'manaḥparyāya' means the modes of mind. But, the mind can be physical as well as psychical. So the term itself does not indicate sufficiently which aspect is meant for. The terms of manaḥparyāya and manaḥparyava also can be interpreted in both ways.

(2) The main purpose of manaḥ-paryāya jñāna is, roughly speaking thought-reading.<sup>1</sup> It can not mean merely the cognition of changes produced in the mind-substance; but, that of the ideas contained in it. Akalaṅka maintains that the function of manaḥparayāya is not completed unless it knows the ideas also. Jinabhadra<sup>2</sup> confines it to the cognition of mind substance only. The cognition of ideas, he says, is the result of subsequent inference.

1. Tattvārtha Rajavārtika I. 23

2. Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya G. 814

(3) As far as the cognition of physical mind is concerned, there is no difference between the two exponents. Both of them hold that physical mind is perceived by *manaḥparyāya*.

It may be mentioned here that according to Mahābandha,<sup>1</sup> the physical mind is apprehended by the mind (Mana) of the cognizer. Akalaṅka<sup>2</sup> interprets 'mana' as soul while Dhavalā<sup>3</sup> interprets it as Matijñāna. But, the contention of Dhavalā<sup>3</sup> is not right; as according to this view, *Manaḥparyāya* loses the credit of being a direct (*pratyakṣa*) cognition. If it depends upon Mati it must be helped by the senses or mind; and thus, must fall into the category of Indirect cognitions (*parokṣa*). Though, an attempt is made to explain away this difficulty and it is said that Mati, in the present case, is not a producing cause; but, only a helper pointing out the location of the object of *Manaḥparyāya*, just as the cognition of cloud in perceiving the moon. But, when *Manaḥparyāya* cannot perceive the contents of mind directly, it will have to depend upon the cognition of mind as a producing cause; as it is in the case of inference.

(4) It is about the cognition of objects conceived that there are two opinions<sup>4</sup>. Jinabhadra holds that it is an inference and beyond the scope of *manaḥparyāya*. Akalaṅka holds that it is *manaḥparyāya*. Now the question remains whether *manaḥparyāya*, according to Akalaṅka, cognizes the conceived objects directly or indirectly. If it perceives directly it would perceive the immaterial objects also, which is an impossibility. Akalaṅka says that the cognition of the conceived objects is not direct. They are cognized through the perception of the physical mind. Thus, Akalaṅka also has accepted in a way the

1. Mahābandha p. 64

2. Tattvārtha Rājavārtika p. 58

3. Dhavalā p. 1258

4. See-Studies in Jaina Philosophy pp. 66 68

Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya G. 814-821

Tattvārtharājavārtika p. 58 (1-23-6-7)

inferribility of the conceived objects; but he does not recognize this as a separate cognition. It can be objected that if the cognition of conceived objects is indirect, it cannot be *manaḥparyāya*, as the latter is a direct cognition (*pratyakṣa*). Akalaṅka replies that indirectness and directness do not depend upon the direct or indirect apprehension of the object. They depend upon the external assistance. If the soul is assisted by the senses or mind the resulting cognition is indirect; otherwise, it is direct. In cognition of the conceived objects the soul is not assisted by any of the senses. It is, therefore, direct. Even if a thing is known through another one, the cognition is direct, provided it does not depend upon the external factor as its cause.

One may say that the physical mind also is an external factor. If knowledge of the conceived objects is derived through it, the latter is not direct. It must be *matijñāna*. Akalaṅka replies, where the mind is a producing cause the resulting cognition is *mati*. In the present case the mind is not a producing cause but only an auxiliary. When we see the moon in clouds, the clouds are not considered as producers of the cognition of the moon. They are simply location. Similarly, the mind substance of a person in which the conceived ideas are known, is not a producing cause, it is simply a location of the object, i.e. the conceived ideas. The inference which is a variety of *mati*, depends upon the senses or mind as its producing cause. In the present case no external help is taken by the cognizer. Thus, the cognition of the conceived ideas though indirect on the objective side, is not indirect (*parokṣa*) on the causal side, which is the main consideration in deciding the nature of *pratyakṣa* or *parokṣa*.

In logical period the clarity of appearance becomes the criterion of perception. If *manaḥparyāya* is a perception it must have that clarity, which is found in the direct observations only. The cognition of the conceived objects cannot come into that category. In that case we shall have to confine the sphere

of *Manaḥparyāya* to the mind-substance only. Perhaps, Jinabhadra was influenced by the logical school in this regard. But, Akalaṅka is very careful. We do not find any confusion between Akalaṅka as a logician and Akalaṅka as an exponent of the canonical theories.

Thus, we can see that the real difference between the two Ācāryas is not about the subject-matter but about the inclusion of the cognition of the conceived objects into *manaḥparyāya*.

The above discussion leads to another question of fundamental importance, we have to decide whether *Manaḥparyāya*, by nature, is a direct cognition or indirect one. By direct we do not mean here the subjective directness or independence from assistance of the senses, but, the objective presentation or the direct apprehension. If it is a direct cognition we must confine its sphere of objectivity to the physical mind only. Conceived ideas on no account, can be presented directly. If it is indirect we must admit the conceived ideas as its object. The question of the object being a material substance does not arise in this case. We can know the soul and other immaterial substances through inference, i. e. indirectly.

According to the Jaina theory of knowledge a direct cognition is preceded by the corresponding *darśana*. An indistinct flash of general type is essential before plunging deep into particularity. Amongst the five types of cognition *śruta* and *manaḥparyāya* have no corresponding *darśanas*. The *śruta* is definitely indirect. About *Manaḥparyāya* Jinabhadra states that it has no corresponding *darśana*; because, owing to its intensity of force produced by the particular *kṣayopāśama*, it dives direct into particularity and does not pass through the stage of generality, as other cognitions do. But, this explanation is not convincing. *Manaḥparyāya* is not more forceful than *kevala*. When *kevala* also has a corresponding *darśana*, there is no reason why *Manaḥparyāya* should not pass through that stage. We can admit the possibility of swiftness as in the case of well-acquainted objects. But, it is not reasonable to leave that stage



altogether. The absence of corresponding darśana leads us to the idea that Manaḥparyāya is an indirect cognition. There is no other reason which can be ascribed to this factor. We think that Manaḥparyāya is not a perceptual but conceptual. Its real function is the reading of thoughts and not the perception of mind-substance. It is immaterial whether it passes through the latter stage but that is not its real purpose.

This indirectness, on the part of Manaḥparyāya does not interfere with its position as pratyakṣa; because, the basis of the conception of pratyakṣa and parokṣa, as we have already stated, is not objective directness but the subjective independence from the senses and other external help.

One more point that requires clarity in this connection is, how the physical mind is perceived. It is beyond the reach of senses, and therefore, Mati and Śruta are out of the question. Avadhi can know it; but, it does not necessarily, precede Manaḥparyāya. The person having Manaḥparyāya may or may not possess it. So, Manaḥparyāya is the only cognition that is left. If its function is confined to the conceived objects there is no cognition to perceive the mind-substance. The alternative that it can be left unperceived also is unthinkable, because, without the perception of the physical mind the conceived ideas cannot be cognized. Akalaṅka explains away this difficulty by accepting the mind-substance also as the object of Manaḥparyāya in its first stage, the subsequent stage being the cognition of conceived objects. One is direct, while the other is indirect. but both constitute one cognition.

The modern Naiyāyika may object that directness and indirectness cannot go together. But, this contention appeals no more to reason when the particular cases of a cognition are examined. In the visual perception direct cognition finishes with the apprehension of a particular shape and particular colour. It cannot formulate the ideas of jar, cloth etc. which is the result of subsequent deliberation, and therefore, indirect. But, we are accustomed to mix up both the elements and the

entire conceptual cognition is designed as perception. The same factor can be applied in the case of *manaḥparyāya* also. As real *mati* is judgement (*avāya*) which is the third stage, and, the stages of *avagraha* and *īhā* are also included into *mati* on account of their being a cause to *avāya*.

According to *Mahābandha*<sup>1</sup> and *Dhavalā*<sup>2</sup> *Manaḥparyāya* is a cognition of another's desire (*saṃjñā*), Memory (*smṛti*), Intellect (*mati*), Deliberation (*cintā*), Life (*Jīvita*), Death (*maraṇa*), Gain (*Lābha*), Loss (*Alābha*), Pleasure (*Sukha*), Pain (*Duḥkha*) the destruction of city (*Nagaravināśa*), the destruction of a district (*Deśavināśa*), the destruction of a province (*Janapadavināśa*) etc. This account makes the distinction between *avadhi* and *manaḥparyāya* insignificant.

#### The cause of *Manaḥparyāya*

It has been stated before that *avadhi*, *manaḥparyāya* and *kevala* are supernatural powers attained through the spiritual progress. But, *avadhi* is supernatural as well as natural. In the case of human and sub-human beings it is super-natural but in the case of heavenly and hellish beings it is natural. *Manaḥparyāya* is always supernatural. It is enumerated in the eight powers (*labdhis*) attained through yoga.

The *Yogasūtra*<sup>3</sup> states that the knowledge of other's minds is obtained through concentration on them. The *Majjhimanikāya*<sup>4</sup> proposes that if a *bhikkhu* desires to know other's mind, he should completely observe the rules of conduct (*śīla*), restraint from sensual pleasures (*śamana*), concentration (*dhyāna*) and cognizance (*vipaśyanā*) and should stay in deserted houses. These practices are not particular for attaining the power of thought-reading only but, general conditions for all sorts of supernatural powers.

1. *Mahābandha* p. 64

2. *Dhavalā* p. 1258

3. *Yogasūtra* III. 19

4. *Majjhina Nikāya*

Pūjyapāda<sup>1</sup> accounts *manaḥparyāya* to four factors : (1) *Kṣayopaśama* of *Vīryāntarāya*, (2) *Kṣayopaśama* of *manaḥparyāyajñānāvaraṇa*, (3) *Āṅgapāṅga Nama-Karman* and (4) the contact with other's minds,

(1) *Antarāya-karman* puts obstacles in the progress of soul towards mundane as well as spiritual attainments. The first four types of it are related with the obstruction of worldly gains. The last is *vīryāntarāya*. It suppresses the natural as well as super-natural powers of the soul. The power of knowledge also is not free from its effect. The soul cannot attain a particular knowledge unless *Vīryāntarāya* is subsided or otherwise removed. This is why, its *kṣayopaśama* is a common cause in every type of cognition. The second cause is the *kṣayopaśama* of the corresponding *āvaraṇa*. It does not require any explanation. The third factor is *Āṅgapāṅganāmakarman*. It should be noticed that the physical mind plays an important role in producing *Manaḥparyāya*. Its completion on the subjective as well as the objective side is the first condition for the cognition of thoughts. The completion of the physical mind is the function of *Nāmakarman*. The *Āṅgapāṅganāmakarman* is its subclass particularly related with the completion of body and its parts. The fourth factor is the physical mind. According to Jinabhadra it is the very object of *manaḥparyāya*. According to Pūjyapāda it is a helping cause the object being the conceived ideas.

### **Manaḥparyāya and Avadhi<sup>2</sup>**

It may be recalled here that *Avadhi* has all the material objects as its subject-matter. The physical mind also is included in its scope. Thus, as far as the subject matter is concerned, *Manaḥparyāya* has nothing new. On this basis Siddhasena, proposes the identity between *Manaḥparyāya* and *Avadhi*.

But, it goes against the traditional division. As a matter of

1. *Sarvārthasiddhi Sūtra* I. 23

2. *Tattvārtha* I. 16, *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* G.812-814

fact Siddhasena<sup>1</sup>, being a logician gives prominence to the objective side. His two-fold division of Pramāṇa follows the Buddhist tradition, which is based on the two kinds of objects. The other factors are not taken into consideration. In the Āgamic tradition, as has been stated before, objective consideration is not so important as the subjective.

If we take into consideration the subject Avadhi and Manaḥparyāya differ from each other. Avadhi can occur in all the four kingdoms of heaven, hell, human and subhuman. Manaḥparyāya is possible in the kingdom of men only. Among men also it is confined to samyagdr̥ṣṭis only, while both samyagdr̥ṣṭis as well as mithyādr̥ṣṭis can possess avadhi. Manaḥparyāya occurs in ascetics with a high quality of character only.

The Tattvārtha<sup>2</sup> relates the following four factors that distinguish Manaḥparyāya from Avadhi :

(1) Viśuddhi (purity)—Manaḥparyāya is purer than Avadhi. Avadhi also can perceive the mind-substances; but, it is not so clear as Manaḥparyāya. Avadhi perceives them only in a general way. Manaḥparyāya is specially meant for them. Naturally the latter is more precise and deep. For instance, a person knowing many things in a general way is not so deep in a particular subject as its specialist is.

(2) Kṣetra (area)—Avadhi begins from an innumerably small part of a finger and goes up to the whole universe or more. Manaḥparyāya is limited to the human habitation (Mānuṣakṣetra) only i. e. (two and a half islands).

(3) Viśaya (object)—Avadhi has all the material objects with an amount of their modes, as its object. The object of Manaḥparyāya is only an infiniteth part of matter (pudgala).

(4) Svāmin (Owner)—Avadhi occurs in all the four kingdoms without any dependence on spiritual virtues. Manaḥpar-

1. Niścayadvātrimśikā

2. Tattvārthasūtra 1.16

yāya is possible in ascetics with a high standard of character only. Amongst the fourteen stages of the spiritual development it is found only in seven stages i.e. from sixth to twelfth. In those stages also there are two kinds of aspirants. Some aspirants, advance in their spiritual journey by destroying the obstructing karmans. Their path is known as kṣapakaśreṇī; others do not destroy the obstructing karmans, but bring them to the state of subsidence. This path is known as Upaśamaśreṇī. The aspirant with Upaśamaśreṇī cannot go beyond the eleventh stage. His progress is stopped at that stage, when the subsided karmic matter is disturbed and comes up on the surface. Consequently, the aspirant falls down. Manaḥparyāya is not possible in the condition of retrogression. It occurs in the ascending state only. Though the higher grade of Avadhi also requires a certain degree of character; yet, avadhi as general is not so dependent.

### The Nandī and Manaḥparyāya darśana

We have already stated that Manaḥparyāya has no corresponding darśana. But, the Nandī attributes to it both the functions of knowing (jāṇai) as well as perceiving (pāsai). It seems a contradiction to the above proposal. This difficulty is explained several ways:-According to the first explanation the two functions are related not with manaḥparyāya, but, the person having it. The Nandī means, only that the cognizer apprehends first, the mind-substance and then thinks over it. The second function is related with the mind and can be placed in the second type of darśana, i. e. acakṣurdarśana. In the case of Śrutajñāna also, it is held, that the cognizer conceives certain ideas through śruta-jñāna and then deliberates on them. This deliberation is acakṣurdarśana.

The only possible objection to this view, is that acakṣurdarśana is classed as mediate (parokṣa) cognition. It is possible in the case of distant objects only; which are beyond perception and known through scriptures, as the golden mountain etc.

#### 1. Nandī Sūtra 18 with its cūrṇī and Ṭīkā

But, where the object is directly cognized, as in the case of *manaḥparyāya*, no such *darśana* is possible. But, this objection has no ground, as there is nothing which can prevent the possibility of *acakṣurdarśana* in case of the objects directly perceived. One can think over a jar which is directly perceived, and have a mental perception. The Jainas do not believe in the Buddhist epistemological division of objects, holding certain objects as merely perceptible while others as inferrible. In the logical period they have supported the theory of *Pramāṇasamplava* (convergence of the sources of knowledge). Even the existence of perceived fire on the hill-top they say, can be further examined through inference.

One more point of minor significance, that can be raised in this respect is, whether the cognition of a person with *manaḥparyāya* is direct or indirect. The position of the Jainas in this respect is very clear. When the object is cognized by *manaḥparyāya* it is direct or *pratyakṣa* and when it is cognized through *acakṣurdarśana* it is indirect or *parokṣa*.

According to another opinion a person with *manaḥparyāya* possesses *avadhi* also. So, the function of knowing (*jānai*) and perceiving (*pāśai*) as related in the *Nandī*, are performed by *Manaḥparyāya* and *avadhi* respectively. This view is inconsistent with the *Bhagavatī*, which holds that a person with *Manaḥparyāya* may or may not possess *avadhi*. But, the above difficulty can be explained if the statement of the *Bhagavatī* is given a bit more consideration. The *Bhagavatī* is related with *jñāna* only. It does not say anything about *darśana*. It does not propose that the coexistence of *avadhi-darśana* and *Manaḥparyāyajñāna* also is merely a probability. Moreover, it can be held that in the stage of *darśana* there is no difference between *avadhi* and *manaḥparyāya*. In that stage they have a cognition of general type, which develops into *avadhi* in one case and *manaḥparyāya* in the other. That stage is termed as *avadhi* in a general way; on account of its being an all-inclusiveness. We cannot say that *avadhi-darśana*

precedes Avadhijñāna only, and not manaḥparyāya-jñāna. But it has no claim to be called as manaḥparyāyadarśana; because that distinction comes in the later stage.

According to Akalaṅka<sup>1</sup> manaḥparyāya has three stages— (1) Darśana, (2) Cognition of the mind-substance and (3) cognition of the conceived objects. In the case of Śrūta also we have three stages, viz. (i) Darśana, (ii) Matijñāna and (3) Śrūtajñāna. Both Śrūta and Manaḥparyāya rely on the darśana occurring in the first stage. Although they are mediated by Mati and avadhi respectively, yet, their field begins with the first stage. According to Jinabhadra there are only two stages.

According to another explanation the two functions of 'Jānai' and 'Pāsai' are related with the person who possesses both avadhi as well as Manaḥparyāya.

Jinabhadra<sup>2</sup> says that 'Pāsai' in the present case does not refer to darśana, but to a clear and distinct knowledge known as 'paśyattā'.

### Two Types of Manaḥparyāya

Manaḥparyāya is divided into two types of Rjumati and Vipulamati. The difference between the two is not that of quality but that of degree. Vipulamati apprehends<sup>3</sup> the objects more minutely than Rjumati. The Tattvārtha mentions two points to express the difference between the two. Firstly, Vipulamati is purer than Rjumati. Secondly, it is infallible while the latter is subject to fall or disappearance.

We have mentioned before the fourteen ethical steps which a soul aspires for attaining liberation. At the end of the seventh step the aspirant adopts either of the two paths. In the path of Upaśamaśreṇī the karmic matter is not destroyed

1. Tattvārthavārtika G. 162-170

2. Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya G. 814-820

3. Tattvārtha I. 24-25

but remains subsided, ready to rise at any disturbance. The aspirant adopting this path does not go beyond the eleventh step; where he falls down and reverts to a lower position. He may try again and reach the goal by adopting the other path; but as long as he is in Upaśamaśreṇī the fall is inevitable. The other path is known as Kṣapakaśreṇī. The aspirant adopting this path does not fall and rises gradually till the attainment of kaivalya. In this path the karmic matter does not stay in reserve. It is totally destroyed; leaving no chance of rising again.<sup>1</sup>

Rjumati, generally, occurs in the aspirant with Upaśamaśreṇī. Owing to the existence of karmic matter in reserve his knowledge is not so pure as it is in the case of kṣapakaśreṇī. Secondly, it is subject to disappearance when the aspirant falls down. Vipulamati is attained by the aspirant with kṣapakaśreṇī; who destroys the obscuring karmic matter totally. Naturally, his cognition is purer and infallible.

Jinabhadra<sup>2</sup> holds that Rjumati and Vipulamati differ from each other in respect of subject-matter also. Rjumati apprehends an object in its simple form. Vipulamati cognizes the same with more particulars. For instance, in apprehension of a mind engaged in the conception of jar, Rjumati will grasp only the gross changes in the mind-substance, enabling the knower to infer the jar in a general way; while Vipulamati will apprehend the minute changes also; whereby the cognizer can infer also the particulars. He can make out the colour, size, stuff and other particulars of the object under conception.

Siddhasena Gaṇin<sup>3</sup> also supports the above view. The same thing, he says, which is grasped by Rjumati in a general way, is apprehended by Vipulamati with more particulars.

1. Tattvārtha Rājavārtika See I. 25
2. Viśeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya G.
3. Tattvārthabhāṣya Tīkā, Sūtra I. 25, p. 101-2



Mahābandha<sup>1</sup> explains the difference in another way. It holds that Rjumati cognizes the objects which have come into mind distinctly. The objects that are half-conceived or to be conceived in future are not apprehended by it. While Vipulamati apprehends all of them.

According to Akalaṅka<sup>1</sup> Rju means formed (nirvartita) by the knowledge of the object lying in others' mind or simple. He incorporates the view of Mahābandha by the first condition and that of Niryukti by the second. Rjumati is formed by the cognition of the object lying in others' mind. This object has three types of mind, speech or physical activity. A person conceives an object distinctly in his mind, utters a speech in clear tone or moves his body with some specific purpose; but forgets it in the course of time. He cannot recall them to his mind. Rjumati knows those objects or acts and can say that such and such object was conceived, spoken or expressed in some physical act. Thus Rjumati apprehends the desire, memory, anxiety about life or death, pleasure, pain etc. existing in others' mind. But, the contents must be clearly formed in the mind, speech or body, as the case may be. Vipulamati does not wait for clear formation of the concepts. It is so sharp that it apprehends the concepts which are not fully formed or are yet to be formed. Moreover, it apprehends them more minutely.

It should be observed here that the text of Mahābandha is read as "Vaṭṭamānāṇam" (Sk. vyaktamanasaṃ) as well as 'Vaṭṭamānāṇam' (Sk. vartamānāṇām). Akalaṅka follows the first reading and interprets it as the persons who have formed the idea clearly. The second reading means the object which is already present in the mind. According to this interpretation Rjumati does not apprehend the objects which have slipped from memory or would be coming to mind in future.

In the terms of modern psychology we can say that Rjumati apprehends the conscious mind only. Vipulamati is competent to apprehend the subconscious and unconscious minds also.

#### 1. Tattvārtha Rājavartika p. 58

## Kevalajñāna (Omniscience)

The fifth type of cognition is known as kevalajñāna. It is attained when the obscuring karmic veil is totally removed. It knows all the objects in their entirety with all qualities and modes. It is the stage of omniscience, the perfect knowledge.

### The Meaning of Kevala

In Sāṅkhya-system the term kevala is applied to Puruṣa dissociated from Prakṛti.<sup>1</sup> Kaivalya is the state of liberation free from the bondage of world; where all the three types of pain are totally removed. Where the three guṇas of prakṛti revert to their original source, i. e. prakṛti and leave puruṣa in its purity. According to the yoga-system<sup>2</sup> kaivalya means the state of equilibrium where the mind is free from wandering. The Vedānta holds Kaivalya as unity with Absolute Brahman. According to the above-mentioned systems kaivalya has nothing to do with omniscience: which is an independent supernatural power. They do not regard omniscience as an essential pre-requisite of salvation, An aspirant may or may not reach the stage of omniscience, before attaining the final goal.

In the Buddhist literature<sup>3</sup> the term kevala has been used in two senses. It means oneness as well as perfectness. Kevalin is described as one who is perfect or fully accomplished. Sutta-nipāta Aṭṭhakathā relates kevalins as having all the virtues (savvagūṇa), fully accomplished (paripuṇṇa) all-powerful (savvayoga) and free from worldly dispositions (visamṃyutta). It is an epithet of Arhat or Buddha often accompanied by Mahesi. But, in Buddhist literature also the term 'kevalin' does not express a man with knowledge of all the objects, past, present and the future.

1. Sāṅkhyakārikā 17

2. Yogasūtra IV. 34

3. Saṃyuttanikāya A. 153

In the Jaina literature the term *kevala*, whether single or with 'jñāna' is applied to perfect knowledge. The last type of knowledge is called *kevala*; firstly, because, it exists alone. It does not coexist with any other type of cognition. Secondly, according to Yaśovijaya<sup>1</sup> the first four types of cognition are produced by the corresponding *kṣayopaśama* as well as the rise of *kevalajñānāvaraṇa*. The soul unassisted by the karmic matter is not competent to produce them. But, the *kevala* is produced by the soul alone.<sup>2</sup> We may assign this reason also to its designation as *kevala*. If the *kevala* is taken in the second sense, i.e. perfect, then *kevalajñāna* means perfect knowledge.

### Definition

*Āvaśyakaniryukti* defines *kevala* as the means of knowing all substances with their qualities modes and states. It is infinite, eternal, imperishable and without gradation. The *Bhāṣya* elaborates the above view as follows :—All substances undergo the modes (*pariyāyas*) of origination and destruction etc. These modes can be classified into three types; viz. (1) produced by the external factors, (2) natural and (3) mixed i.e. produced partially by the external cause and partially natural. The nature of all these modes is known by *kevalajñāna*. It dawns when the obscuring matter is totally destroyed. It is infinite, because it has infinite modes as its object. It is eternal, because it functions incessantly. The other types of cognition do not illumine the objects constantly. They do so, only when it is desired and the attention is paid. In the case of *kevala* the attention is permanent. It is not recurrent. All the objects are always under-cognition. Further, *kevala* is imperishable. Once appeared it never vanishes. It has one degree only. There is no gradation in it; because, it appears when the soul is completely purified. It is the state of perfection. Degrees are possible in imperfect state only.

1. *Viśeṣāvaśyakab Bhasya* G. 823

2. *Ibid.*

### The Problem of Omniscience

It has been stated above that kevalajñāna is infinite. It knows all the objects with their states and modes entirely. This brings us to the question of omniscience. Indian philosophers hold different opinions regarding it.

The system of Cārvāka totally denies the existence of extraordinary cognition. It does not believe in any supersensual or spiritual knowledge, nothing to say of omniscience. The Sūtrakṛtāṅga mentions another system known as Ajñānavādin; which resembles modern scientist. It does believe in supernatural cognition; but asserts that its scope is limited. There is no cognition with unlimited area. One cannot know all the objects of past, present and the future. The capacity of knowledge is naturally limited.

The Mīmāṃsā system is very particular about the supreme authority of the Veda. In accepting the existence of omniscience also it is cautious that the Vedic authority is not violated. According to Śābara, only through the Veda can know objects that are past, present, future, minute, obstructed or distant. No sense-organs can approach them. Kumārila says, "We do not aim at the refutation of omniscience. We only mean, that it is not possible without the knowledge of the Veda. If the existence of an omniscient is proposed on the basis of all the six sources of knowledge, there can be no objection. But, when it is held as effected by one source only it is not probable. It is like the apprehension of all the properties of smell, taste etc. by the organ of sight." We can sum up the Mīmāṃsā conception as follows :—

1. As far as the meaning of omniscience is concerned the Mīmāṃsā does not differ from the Jaina. Both of them agree that omniscience (sarvajñatva) means the cognition of entire universe.

1. Śābarabhāṣya Sū 1.1.2.
2. Ślokavārtika. 1. 110-12.

2. According to the Jaina an omniscient knows all the objects simultaneously in the same cognition. The *Mīmāṃsā* holds that certain things like virtue (*dharma*), vice (*adharma*) etc. are the exclusive field of the Vedas. They cannot be known by any other source. Regarding other things also the *Mīmāṃsā* holds that all the objects cannot be known through the same source of knowledge.

3. According to Jainism the knowledge of an omniscient is perceptual and purely spiritual. The *Mīmāṃsā* holds that it is indirect based on the authority of the Veda. The Omniscient of the *Mīmāṃsā*, is just like the *śrutakevalin* of Jainas.

The Buddhist, like Jaina, believes in the direct knowledge of *Dharma* etc. for which the *Mīmāṃsā* depended solely upon the Veda. It is not irrelevant if we state here briefly the underlying idea of the two notions of omniscience as direct knowledge and that as indirect knowledge. The exponents of these views intended to establish the authority of their respective canons. The *Mīmāṃsā* held them eternal, not composed by any body, the systems of Buddhism and Jainism held them as composed by an omniscient and faultless person. Naturally, the *Mīmāṃsaka* could not rely on any person, human or superhuman for the validity of the Veda. He attributed the validity to the Vedic text itself and gave it with supreme authority. The Buddhist and Jainas held their scriptures as composed by competent persons. There are two conditions of this competency. The person should have complete knowledge and he should be faultless. The Buddhist meant by complete knowledge the knowledge of virtues and vices, or the things that are desirable or undesirable. *Dharmakīrti* says that it does not matter whether a person does or does not apprehend all the objects. What matters is that he should know the relevant things. No purpose is served by knowing the number of insects.

The Jainas on the other hand contend that it is difficult to make a distinction between relevant and irrelevant thing. All the objects of world are so interconnected that the knowledge

of one is incomplete without knowing all. Nothing can be known completely until and unless all things are known. So, Sarvajña, according to Jainism, means one who knows all the things completely.

According to the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems there are two types of omniscience. The omniscience of God is eternal. It is neither produced nor destroyed. The omniscience of yogin is a kind of supernatural power obtained through yogic practices. But, unlike the Jaina, this power is not the manifestation of a natural property of the soul, but an acquired embellishment; which vanishes after a certain period. According to Jainism the omniscience is an essential prerequisite of liberation. No soul can aspire to the state of salvation without obtaining it. But this is not the case with the Nyaya-Vaiśeṣik systems. According to them the way to liberation is independent of omniscience. All the yogins do not necessarily obtain that power before attaining liberation. In the state of liberation also, they hold, cognition is totally absent. On the other hand the Jainas propose that all the liberated souls are omniscient. They are always with perfect knowledge.

According to the Sāṅkhya, Yoga and Vedānta systems also Kaivalya and Sarvajñatva are two different things. Kaivalya as has been stated above is the state of liberation; where the cognition of worldly things does not remain. Sarvajñatva is a lower stage where the soul and matter are not absolutely separated from each other. According to the Sāṅkhya knowledge is a function of Buddhi, which is an evolute of prakṛti. The question of omniscience, therefore, has no concern with puruṣa. When the Buddhi obtains purity by removing the dirt of tamas and rajas, and the property of pure sattva is fully manifested, the aspirant attains the highest state of *Vaśīkārasamjñā*, the state of complete dispassionateness or perfect self-control; only then the omniscience is obtained. Like, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣik the Sāṅkhya also holds this power as perishable and unessential for liberation. The state of *Vaśīkārasamjñā* can be compared with the state of *Vitarāga* as held by the Jainas.

The Sāṅkhya does not believe in the existence of God. But, the yoga system accepts his existence. Though God in the yoga system also is not a creator as it is in the Nyāya; yet, he possesses all the virtues that are the ideal of an aspirant. He is held as omniscient also. But, it is to be decided whether the omniscience ascribed to God is a quality of buddhi or that extraordinary Puruṣa (Puruṣaviśeṣa) himself. In the latter case it cannot be conceptual.

According to the Vedānta Avidyā contains two powers; i.e. the power of obscurance (Āvaraṇaśakti) and the power of projection (Vikṣepaśakti). Avidyā with the second power is recognised as māyā which is the condition of God. The Absolute Brahman is neither omniscient nor ignorant. It is pure intelligence. The second stage is that of God. He is Brahman conditioned by Māyā. He is omniscient, as Māyā in his case, is without the power of obscurance. Thus, it will be seen, that according to the Vedānta also omniscience is not a state of the pure soul. Another type of omniscience, held by the Vedānta is related with yogins. It is perishable and not essential to liberation.

### **Two types of omniscience**

We can see from the above discussion that according to Nyāya and Vedānta there are two types of omniscience. The first type is related with God while the second type is found in the yogin. The first is eternal while the second is the result of yogic practices. One is natural while the other is acquired. One is permanent while the other perishable.

The omniscience of God, more or less, is an ethical hypothesis. Those, who have admitted God as creator and controller of the universe, could not assign him that function, without the attribute of omniscience. No control is possible without knowing the subjects under control. The second necessity of admitting God as omniscient arose from the desire to attribute validity to the Vedas on the basis of their being created by God. Those who did not believe in the existence of God had to

propose the omniscience of a human being in order to establish the authority of their scriptures. The reliability of a statement can be proved on two tests; either its contents are proved by logic or its author has perfect knowledge of the subject concerned and is free from any vice which may induce him to speak a lie. The first test was rather hard. It could not be applied to many objects which could be neither proved nor disproved on the basis of logic. Ethical problems also were beyond its scope. Consequently, the second test was adopted. Every system tried to establish the omniscience of their first preacher to whom the authority of their scriptures goes.

The Mīmāṃsā system established the validity of the Veda not on the basis of its being created by an omniscient being but on the basis of its being an eternal knowledge.

### **The Arguments for omniscience**

The existence of omniscience is proved on the following grounds :

(1) Whatever has gradation must have two limits; as it is in the case of dimension. The lower limit of dimension is found in the atom while the upper in space (ākāśa). Similarly, knowledge also is a graded phenomenon. Some people possess it more than the other. The lower limit of knowledge is accepted in the kingdom of nigoda. It develops gradually in the plane of other animals having one, two, three, four or all the five senses. With the possession of mind it gets further development. The upper limit is fixed when everything is known. There is no reason in fixing it any where in the middle, arbitrarily. Perfect knowledge means, where nothing is left to be known.

The above argument was originally proposed by Yogabhāṣya and adopted with slight adjustments by nearly all the systems in support of their own conception.<sup>1</sup>

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1. Yogabhāṣya 1.25; Tattva Vai 1.25; Tattvasaṃgraha Pañjikā K. 3160



The Mīmāṃsaka argues that the existence of gradation does not necessarily prove a particular stage. The span of gradation may be shorter or longer according to the capacity of the agent or other circumstances. The upper limit of knowledge can be fixed according to the maximum capacity of the sense-organs. A human being can perceive an object from a distance of one furlong or so; and an eagle can do so from two or three miles. But, this does not mean that one can see the whole universe, sitting at one place. After all the capacity of the senses is limited.

Yaśovijaya<sup>1</sup> replies that the argument stated above holds good in the case of sense-perception only. But, the sphere of knowledge is far wider than sense-perception. If the existence of yogic perception is accepted, we shall have to go beyond the senses. In that case the only limit that can be fixed is, where nothing remains to be known.

Moreover, knowledge with Jainism, as we have stated above, is not an acquired phenomenon. It is a natural characteristic of the soul. That characteristic does not function fully as long as it is obstructed by the karmic matter. As soon as the obstacle disappears, there is no reason why the soul should not regain the natural characteristic. The Jaina, as well as Buddhist logicians, have compared the karmic matter with the impurity mixed with gold. The gold, fresh from the mine, is always mixed with foreign matter; which is gradually separated through the process of purification. Similarly, every soul, in this world, is mixed with karmic matter. That matter is sometimes thick and sometimes thin. The old matter flows out while the new one flows in. These phenomenal variations prove the possibility of a stage when the foreign matter is totally washed away. In that state there is no more obstruction. Consequently, the natural characteristic of omniscience is fully revealed. Jaina ethics proposes *saṃvara* and *nirjarā* as the process of

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1. Jñānabindu p. 19

achieving total freedom from the karmic matter. Saṃvara stops the new inflow while nirjarā exterminates the same in store.

#### The Path leading to Kevalajñāna

Kevalajñāna, as we have stated above, is the state of perfection. According to Jainism it means the state of omniscience while other systems hold different views about it. But, they are unanimous in one respect, viz., that it is the highest stage of ethical attainment. They also agree, except the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems, that it is knowledge of the highest truth. The conception of highest truth is different with every system. According to the realist school of buddhists it is the fourfold noble truth. According to Yogācāra it is Ālayavijñāna and according to Māhīyamika it is void (śūnya). Perfect knowledge to these systems, is the realization of truth as held in their respective views. The Vedānti holds Brahman as the highest truth. Consequently, it holds the knowledge of Brahman as the perfect knowledge. The Sāṅkhya maintains that the realization of distinction between prakṛti and puruṣa is the perfect knowledge. According to Jainism the highest truth is the relative existence of every object. All objects of the world are so interrelated that perfect knowledge of one is impossible without knowing all. This factor is further supported by the canonical maxim, as he knows all who knows one; who knows all, he knows one. Thus, the comprehensive view of the relative existence is impossible without knowing all things. This led to the conception of omniscience as the highest knowledge.

Nearly, all the systems, except Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā, hold discursive knowledge as the cognition of falsity or half-truth. According to Jainism, all types of knowledge except kevala have only a partial view of an object. The conception produced by them presents the truth in a part only. It is kevala that can realize the truth completely. Thus, according to Jainism, omniscience is both; it is knowledge of the entire universe as well as the knowledge of reality. According to other systems the knowledge of reality is something above the knowledge of

universe. A person striving for the knowledge of reality may or may not possess the knowledge of the universe; which is as discursive as lower types of knowledge. One has to rise above the stage of omniscience for attaining liberation. But, the path leading to omniscience i. e. the knowledge of universe and that leading to the knowledge of reality is roughly the same in all systems. The person who obtains universal knowledge is not far from perfect knowledge, which he must attain in the same life. Generally, the Indian systems are not particular in describing the way to omniscience but to the knowledge of reality or perfection. The omniscience is gained by the way in the journey of spiritual progress.

### **Omniscience and Buddhism**

According to Buddhism<sup>1</sup>, the knowledge of ultimate truth is attained through constant contemplation on the four noble truths. When contemplation reaches the highest and most perfect stage, the aspirant has a most distinct vision; of these truths. It is perceptual and not conceptual. Dharmakīrti holds that good and bad qualities of mind can be increased infinitely through practice. Knowledge also is a quality of the mind as compassion, nonattachment etc. So, it can be developed to the degree of perception. Omniscience is the development of *prajñā* which is a quality of mind. Śānta Rakṣita maintains that knowledge (*prajñā*) means the cognition of dharmas. It is incomplete as long as even a single dharma remains unknown. It gets perfection when all the dharmas are known.<sup>2</sup>

Dharmakīrti's view is challenged by the Mīmāṃsaka on two issues : firstly, he says, that the practice in a particular act may increase the capacity of the doer, but it is possible within a limit only. A person practising in long jump may increase his capacity by a few feet or yards. But, however high his skill and practice may be, he cannot jump over miles toge-

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1. Nyāyabindu I. 11.

2. Pramāṇa Vārtika I. 132 see also Tattvasaṃgraha K. 3441-43; Kandalī 196; Saṃmatī tīka p. 60

ther. His jumping capacity must remain within a narrow limit. Secondly, conceptual and perceptual cognitions are totally different from each other. Perception is very clear and distinct, conception is not. In the stage of meditation the knowledge of a person is conceptual, It cannot be transformed into perception even after a long and hard practice. He cites the example that water and fire are opposite to each other; water may imbibe a certain degree of heat but, on no account it can be transformed into fire.

Dharmakīrti replies that the examples of long jump and water cannot be applied to the present case. In the case of long jump the person has to start from the very beginning in every new attempt. A considerable part of the new effort is exhausted in preserving the old capacity from diminution. It does not necessarily add something to the already acquired capacity. With the fall of physical powers the rate of diminution is so high that it becomes impossible even to keep up the old capacity; nothing to say of progress. This is not the case with knowledge. One need not worry about it in respect of the state already reached. The aspirant climbs higher and higher with every new effort. There is no possibility of going down if he is a bit careful. Even death does not hamper his progress. Thus, when the progress is certain and there is no obstruction or any other cause to stop progress in the way, there is no reason why the aspirant should not attain the highest stage; where nothing is left to be known.

Moreover, the capacity of jumping is adventitious. It is not natural with the body or the soul. The body acquires it when certain attempt is made and loses it the very next moment. Consequently, it cannot go beyond a limit. An acquired phenomenon is always limited. The case of knowledge is quite different. It is a natural characteristic of mind. The example of water also suffers from the same defect. The heat generated in water is not natural. It is acquired. Moreover, the water is consumed up by the intensity of heat. So, there is no chance of its being transformed into fire. But, in the case of conceptual

knowledge becoming perceptual the above difficulties do not arise. Śānta Rakṣita says that the constant meditation of the face of one's beloved makes the latter appear as if present. He makes a general rule that whatever is meditated upon, whether existent or non-existent, must appear distinctly when the meditation comes to the stage of perfection.

The Jaina does not agree with the Buddhist in that meditation can lead to a perceptual knowledge. The appearance of face the beloved is only an illusion. The knowledge of an omniscient cannot be placed in the same category. On the contrary it is the highest truth. Moreover, nobody can meditate upon many things at a time. The meditation on four noble-truths cannot turn into the knowledge of entire universe which is quite different from the former. But, it does not mean that the Jainas hold meditation as useless. They also hold it highly useful for the destruction of karmans and thereby worldly bondage. It is an important member of the six varieties of internal penance (ābhyañtaralapa), which is essential for soul-purification. The only point of disagreement is that the conceptual knowledge cannot turn into perceptual one. The two are absolutely different from each other.

### **The position of Omniscient in the Buddhist Ethics**

The Buddhism holds ten stages (bhūmis) through which a Bodhisattva (Buddha-designate) passes before reaching his goal. There are ten pāramitas (perfections) corresponding to ten bhūmis. Originally, there were six bhūmis and six pāramitas, but, the Mahāyāna added four more, which are particular to Bodhisattva only.

It should be mentioned here that, according to Buddhism, there are three varieties of aspirants; viz. Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas and Bodhisattvas. The Śrāvakas attain salvation through learning the path of liberation from others. Pratyekabuddhas realize the truth by practising penance and meditation in seclusion. These two types of aspirants attain Nirvāṇa (liberation) in the sixth stage and do

not go beyond. The person who attains *prajñāpāramitā*, realizes the noble truths and destroys the bondage. He is known as Arhat. An Arhat need not be an omniscient. His efforts are confined to the salvation of his own self. He does not care for others. Bodhisattva is the compassion—incarnate. He strives for happiness and salvation of others more than his own. Upto the sixth stage his journey is common with others. But, after that he acquires some powers which are helpful in preaching and converting others to his faith.

In the seventh stage, known as *Dūraṅgama*, a bodhisattva acquires great wisdom in the choice of expedients for helping others. He understands that all the Buddhas are identical in their spiritual cosmic body. He participates in the infinite attributes of Buddhas, and sees their multifarious physical bodies. He discerns the thoughts and feelings of others. He has conquered all the passions and sins and is free from them. His thoughts, words and deeds are pure, and he is in possession of all the factors of Enlightenment. He works without effort or ulterior motive. He transcends the lower wisdom of the *Hīnayāna*. He attains the liberation, but does not come to realize personal *nirvāṇa*. He enters the great ocean of Buddha-knowledge. He is free from the four *viparyāsa*s.

The eighth stage is called *Acalā*. A bodhisattva now acquires the *ṣaṇti* called *anautpattika-dharma-ṣaṇti*. He is not contaminated by any actions. The Buddhas initiate him into infinite knowledge, otherwise he would enter into *nirvāṇa*, instead of persevering in his efforts to gain *bodhi* for the good of all. He understands the process of the evolution and involution of the universe. He knows the exact number of atoms in the different elements, of which the universe is composed. He assumes different bodies and shows them to the people as he thinks fit. He acquires the ten powers (*vaśitas*). In this *bhūmi* a bodhisattva pervades the whole world with the feeling of friendliness.

The ninth stage is *Sādhumatī*. A bodhisattva now, knows all phenomena and principles truly and certainly, whether they

are mundane or supermundane, conceivable or inconceivable, compounded or uncompounded. He knows everything about the minds and hearts of men and about meritorious and demeritorious actions. He becomes a great teacher and acquires the four *pratisamvids* (accurate understanding of the particulars of everything). He is protected by the *dhāraṇīs* (protective spells.)

The tenth stage is *Dharmameghā*. In this stage the *bodhisattva* acquires a glorious body, emits some rays which destroy the pain and misery of all living beings. He obtains the ten deliverances of a *Bodhisattva*.

The above account of the four stages, particular to a *Bodhisattva*, shows that the knowledge of universe has no relation with salvation. *Prajñā* or the transcendental knowledge is attained in the sixth stage; which means the knowledge of four noble truths. In the succeeding four stages a *bodhisattva* tries to achieve those embellishments as are helpful in propagation of his mission. The metaphysics, logic and all other types of philosophical knowledge are, according to buddhism, mere equipments of a preacher. They are not essential to the progress of the soul. In other words they are a social utility. The person who is interested in his personal uplift does not require them. This factor brings into light a remarkable point related with the history of omniscience. It shows clearly that the conception of an omniscient came as a social necessity. The compassion and mercy attached to God in Vedic systems were attributed to the *Bodhisattva* in Buddhism. But, that mercy can be effectual only if the person having it, is gifted with necessary power and knowledge, with which he can convince others and make them believe his own gospel.

The seventh perfection according to Buddhism, is *Upāya-Kauśālyā-Pāramitā*, also given as *Upāya-Pāramitā*. It is explained as skilfulness or wisdom in the choice and adoption of the means or expedients for converting others or helping them. The practice of this *pāramitā* involves the practice of all

virtues that a preacher requires. Such a preacher needs three other things for complete success in his mission. These are : ( 1 ) The saṅgrahavastus (means or items of sympathy or conversion ), ( 2 ) The pratisaṁvids (understanding of all things) and ( 3 ) Dharaṇis ( protective spells ). He is immune to danger and disease.

The omniscience is included in four pratisaṁvids; which the bodhisattva attains gradually as he rises in the higher stages. In the ninth, i. e. Sadhumatī they are complete. We can hold it as the stage of omniscience.

The acceptance of omniscience in the case of Buddha raises one problem. The Buddhist regards all the conceptual knowledge as the result of passions or avidyā. When Buddha is free from avidyā he can no more have conceptual knowledge or the acts of preaching etc. This problem was solved by the conception of Anābhogacaryā; meaning that the Buddha does not desire to know or do anything. His acts for the salvation of beings are performed automatically. Even his sermons come out without any preconception. Regarding conceptual knowledge also Śānta Rakṣita holds that the teaching of past and future events is done only by yogins, who are not pure. Tathāgata does not possess the discursive knowledge, however, superior it may be. He is in a constant trance and is entirely free from avidyā. But, the old scriptures of Buddhism do not propose any such category of yogins except Bodhisattva, who possesses the knowledge of entire universe. Of course, in Abhidharma-kośa and Vinaya-piṭaka some supernatural powers are attributed to other aspirants also, but the knowledge of entire universe is confined to Buddha only. The conception of Anabhogacaryā bears striking resemblance with the Digambara conception of Tīrthaṅkaras speaking automatically without any preconceived plan.

Thus, according to Buddhism there are two types of transcendental knowledge, viz. prajñā and bodhi. Prajñā is the knowledge of four noble-truths, attained through concentration



on them, at the destruction of *Kleśāvaraṇa* and *Jñeyāvaraṇa*. Bodhi is the knowledge of entire universe, which helps Buddha in his preaching. *Prajñā* is perceptual and inarticulate Bodhi is articulate. Though, these terms are generally confused and sometimes applied in one and the same sense; yet they can be distinguished in the above way.

The souls, which attain *prajñā* enter into *nirvāṇa*, which is the state of cessation of all the psychic phenomena the series of which is known as soul. It is interpreted as total extinction of the discursive knowledge, dissolution in *Ālayavijñāna* or *śūnya* by the different buddhist tenets. Bodhisattva does not enter into *Nirvāṇa* till he is not able to liberate all the souls from bondage.

The conception of bodhisattva can be compared with the Jaina conception of *Tīrthaṅkaras*. A *Tīrthaṅkara* also is attributed with many supernatural embellishments which are not found in ordinary Arhats. They are, in Jainism also, meant for increasing the influence of a *Tīrthaṅkara* who establishes a new order for salvation of others. But, as far as knowledge is concerned, there is no difference between an ordinary Arhat and a *Tīrthaṅkara*. Further, a *Tīrthaṅkara* does not wait for the salvation of all beings, as bodhisattva of the buddhist does. *Tīrthaṅkara* also enters into *nirvāṇa* with the expiry of his current life as other Arhats do. In the stage of *Nirvāṇa* or *Mokṣa* all of them enjoy equal status. The soul does not cease to exist in it, but continues with its knowledge of the universe. As far as *kevalajñāna* is concerned the ordinary Arhats, *Tīrthaṅkaras* and *Siddhas* (the liberated souls) do not hold any difference; which is not the case with Buddhists. According to them Bodhisattva is superior to all others in respect of knowledge. As a matter of fact, according to Buddhism, omniscience is not natural. It is a quality attained through practice. Bodhisattva attains it through long practice of innumerable lives. It is not a necessary result of the destruction of passions. According to Jainism it is a necessary result.

Śāntarakṣita explains the knowledge of all the three times as follows : All the objects of past and future are related with the present. The past object is directly or indirectly the cause of the present. Similarly, the future object is the effect of the present. A yogin, who knows the present perfectly, understands its cause and the effect also. Thus, he knows all the objects of past and future. This idea can be compared with the Jaina maxim, 'he knows all, who knows one.' But, the above description shows that the knowledge of past and future is derived from perception of the present. It is not direct. On the other hand the Jaina holds that the knowledge of a sarvajña is perceptual or direct in all the three times. He does not infer the past or future from the present; but, perceives all in the three tenses directly.

### Kaivalya and Advaita-Vedānta

According to Advaita-Vedānta<sup>1</sup> also the knowledge of Universe and the knowledge of reality i.e. Brahman are two different things. The knowledge of Universe is an attribute of Īśvara (God). Brahman, according to the Vedānta, is pure consciousness. When the same is conditioned by Māyā, it is known as Īśvara. Now, the Māyā has two powers of obscurance and projection. It is known as avidyā where both powers are in operation as in the case of ordinary souls. In the case of Īśvara where Māyā is in its pure substance, the first power does not operate. Accordingly the knowledge of God is not obscured and he knows the entire universe. The second power of Māyā helps him in the creation of universe; which is his own projection. He creates it, retains it and destroys it. Māyā is the constituent (pariṇāmin) cause of the universe, while God is illusory (vivatar) cause<sup>2</sup>

Vidyāraṇya explains the phenomenon of omniscience as follows : Universal experience means the consciousness reflected

1. Vedāntasāra
2. Vivaraṇa Prameya Saṅgraha p. 202

into the effects of Māyā. Thus, as far as the present is concerned, God is related with all objects through universal illusion. In the case of past objects this relation is not possible as the objects as well as the modes of Māyā related with them, do not exist any more. But, their impressions last forever, as it is in the case of ordinary persons. The modes of Māyā continue in the form of memory. God knows the past objects as consciousness is reflected into those modes. He knows the future objects also just as a potter knows the pots to be made which are under his contemplation.

The above discussion leads one to a significant point. It means that the knowledge of past and future objects, even in the case of God, is not perceptual. Perception according to Vedānta, as has been stated above, consists in three-fold identity of consciousness conditioned by the object, consciousness conditioned by the mode (vṛtti) and consciousness conditioned by the mind (antaḥ karaṇa). The identification is not possible in the case of past and future objects, as they do not exist at that time.

The Buddhist also holds the knowledge of past and future objects as conceptual and not perceptual. But, it holds a different view regarding the way of knowing them. In his view the knowledge of objects that are not present, is inferential. The past objects are inferred as cause of the present ones. The future objects are inferred as the effects of the present ones. In the first case it is an inference of the cause from its effect. In the second case it is inference of the effect from its cause.

On observation<sup>1</sup> it will appear that God of the Vedānta and the Bodhisattva of the Buddhists more or less, stand on the same level. Of course, the Vedantic God is creator, protector and destroyer of the universe, which the Buddhist does not admit. But, in other respects, the fundamental idea is the same. Both are assigned the highest place in their respective systems

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1. Compare with the Jain conception of twofold division of karman; Ghātin and Aghātin.

and are attributed with similar powers, as are necessary for their functions. Both are omniscients; possess the knowledge of reality; but, behave as if on the discursive plane. God acts on account of *Māyā* while *Bodhisattva* does so out of compassion; which also is an effect of discursive knowledge. Both of them help others in attaining salvation; but, themselves are never freed from their pious duty. The only difference between their status is that Buddha makes his spiritual journey through many births and deaths while God is eternal. But, the theory of incarnation bears some comparison in that respect also.

According to the *Vedānta* all the discursive knowledge is illusion. The transcendental knowledge is the ethical goal which an aspirant strives for. Liberation means the removal of illusion, which is effected by the realization of substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) in its reality. Just as the illusion of snake in a rope lasts as long as the existence of rope is not realized; similarly, the universal illusion exists only upto the realization of Brahman. The ignorance of Brahman and the illusive appearance of external objects are caused by *avidyā* with its two-fold power. In order to realize the substratum i. e. Brahman, one has to destroy *avidyā*. The latter is destroyed by the knowledge of Brahman only. But, this knowledge is not the same as occurs after the destruction. The latter is a revelation where the differences of knower, known and the sources of knowledge disappear. In that state, only the pure consciousness persists, nothing else is existent. But, the knowledge of Brahman preceding the destruction of *avidyā* is not so pure. In that stage the same process is held as in the ordinary perceptions i.e. *Antaḥkaraṇa* is transformed into the mode of Brahman. This mode is a creation of *antaḥkaraṇa* which by itself, is an effect of *Māyā*.

### The way to realization

According to *Vedānta*, Brahman is realized through the knowledge of *Upaniṣads*. Śaṅkara has discussed elaborately how the purport of all the *Upaniṣads* lies in establishing the unity between *jīva* and Brahman. 'Ekamevadvitīyam' and

'Tattvamasi', are regarded as the supreme gospels (Mahāvākyas) which express the essence of Upanisadic teaching. Ramatīrtha, in his 'Vidvanmanorañjini', the well-known commentary on 'Vedāntasāra', states that an aspirant with necessary foundation realizes Brahman as soon as he is taught mahāvākya by a preceptor. The necessary equipments are the systematic study of the Vedas, purity of mind and freedom from prejudices of impossibility and undesirability of the transcendental knowledge. The other requisites are four primary preparations (sādhana-catuṣṭaya).<sup>1</sup> An aspirant with such an equipment and the purity of heart realizes his unity with Brahman as soon as he is made aware of the fact. This awareness results from the three-fold way of Śravaṇa (verbal knowledge) manana (deliberation) and nididhyāsana (constant meditation). Madhusūdana, following the Vivaraṇa, holds śravaṇa only as the real cause of realization. The aspirant with necessary foundation gets realization as soon as he is taught the great unity between him and Brahman. It is strictly a verbal knowledge and not meditational as the Buddhists hold.

Bhāratī-Tīrtha in his 'Dhyānadīpa' proposes invocation (upāsana) also, as a source of realization. But it is not supported by Śaṅkara, who accepts the utility of upāsana by way of purification only, meant for the lower grade of aspirants.

As a matter of fact, unity with Brahman is not something to be attained or created. Śaṅkara holds it beyond the four types of attainments. It is already there. The only thing to be done is to make the person realize it. Just as a person, who has forgotten the golden chain lying in his own neck begins to search for it here and there. His search is not for something to be attained. The only thing that is required, is to make him aware of the state which he has forgotten. Similarly, Brahman is already one with jīva; which the latter has forgotten. As soon as he is made known of the reality, he becomes one with Brahman. This function of making one aware of the identity

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1. Siddhānta Lesa-Saṅgraha p. 452

with Brahman is done by the mahāvākya of the Upaniṣads. The constant meditation (prasāṅkhyāna) on the preaching of the Upaniṣads leads one to the realization of that unity. The Vedānta also quotes the illustration of the beloved damsel, who appears distinctly before her lover's vision even though past or distant.

But, the appearance of damsel, as we have stated, in the case of Buddhists, is an illusion and, therefore, invalid. Does the realization also come in the same category? The Vedantist replies that it is not invalid; because, all the scriptures testify to its validity. Moreover, the criterion of validity is the agreement (saṃvāda) with the object. This agreement is confirmed in the present case by the Vedic texts. In the case of the damsel there is no source of confirmation.

It may be mentioned here that the theory of agreement is not generally held by the Vedantists. Fundamentally, it is a Buddhist notion. Moreover, the instance of damsel does not fit in the present case. An illusory appearance cannot lead to the idea of real appearance in another case.

Vācaspati holds mind with the above meditation as the main source of realization.

The Vedantic scriptures, in general, do not take meditation into consideration. They are emphatic on the facts of the Upaniṣads and propose that scriptural authority is the only source of realization. This rules out the question of invalidity; as the Vedic scriptures, according to the Vedānta, hold supreme validity. Śaṅkara is not prepared to assign any validity to reason where it goes against the Vedic text.

The above conception raises another difficulty which stood in the case of Buddhist also. The realization is held as perceptual knowledge. If it depends upon authority, it cannot be perceptual.

The Vedānta replies that there is no doubt about the perceptuality of realization. A perceptual illusion can be

removed only by the perception of reality. The knowledge caused by the speech, though as a general case, is imperceptual; yet, the same becomes perceptual when assisted by constant meditation; just as simple fire is not able to produce apūrva (the merit produced by sacrifice, which helps the sacrificer in obtaining the fruit of his deeds), yet, the same does so when assisted by the Vedic sacraments. This explanation is founded on assumption that the authority of the Veda is unchallengeable and it cannot be explained in any other way.

According to another version the speech also can produce perceptual knowledge when assisted by the intensity of contemplation; just as in the case of parted beloved. This conception resembles the Buddhist notion of yogipratyakṣa. The only difference is that the latter does not take testimony into consideration, authority of which is fundamentally against the Buddhist logic.

According to another conception perceptuality of cognition does not depend upon the cause, but, upon the object. The object is perceptual where it is identical with consciousness of the cognizer. Pleasure, pain and other qualities of antaḥkaraṇa are perceptual because, they are imposed on the inner consciousness known as sākṣicaitanya; which is always in unity with the cognizer. In the case of external objects also, that unity is obtained through mode (vṛtti). Thus, the realization of Brahman is perceptual; because, its object is perceptual. It does not matter whether it is caused by the senses or the verbal authority.

According to another view, attributed to the preceptors of monism, the imperceptuality of cognition does not depend upon that of the object. It is a quality of consciousness. It is perceptual when the object and cognition are identified.

Thus, according to Vedānta, the realization of Brahman, though produced by authority, is perceptual in nature.

As soon as Brahman is realized the ignorance (avidyā) is removed. With the removal of avidyā the mode of antaḥ-

*kaṛaṇa*, transformed into Brahman, which is also an effect of *avidyā*, vanishes; as the effect cannot last any more when the material cause disappears. In that state there is no more a distinction between cognizer and the cognized; only the pure Brahman subsists.

### **The Vedantic Theories compared with the Jainas**

We have stated above that the two powers of *Māyā* can be compared with the two types of karmans accepted by the Jainas. *Ghātikarmans* correspond to *Āvaraṇaśakti* and *Aghātikarmans* to *vikṣepaśakti*. In the state of arhats, according to Jainism *Ghātikarmans* disappear altogether, while *aghātikarmans* subsist. We can compare this state with God of Vedantins as far as knowledge is concerned.

The pure state coming after realization is comparable with that of the *siddhas* (liberated souls). In that state, according to Jainism, both types of the karmans are destroyed. But, the distinction between cognizer and the cognized remains all the same. This, and other differences between the two systems owe to their different metaphysical positions.

The middle state of the realization through *vṛtti* can be compared with the *Śaileśī* state of the Jainas which occurs in the fourteenth *guṇasthāna*.

A note of warning is necessary here that above comparison does not mean that the above states are same in both the systems. There are many points of disagreement which will be pointed out when the Jaina conception is discussed fully. The purpose of the present discussion is to give a rough idea of the line of spiritual progress held by different systems in comparison with the Jaina; and it is interesting to note that there is striking resemblance. We find the same thing expressed in different words.

### **The Vedantic Theory of *Jīvanmukta* criticized**

The Vedānta holds, though the appearance of external objects is illusive and caused by *avidyā*, it continues for some



time even after realization. This is known as the state of *Jīvanmukta*. An objection is raised to this conception that, as the illusive appearance is the effect of *avidyā*, it can no longer stay when *avidyā* is destroyed. The Vedantists reply to this objection in various ways by citing the examples of physical phenomena. For instance, the person whose illusion of snake in a rope has vanished continues to tremble for some time out of the impression of fear lasting in his mind. Similarly, the wheel of a potter continues to move for some time even when the rod, which sets the wheel on motion, is removed. But, these examples do not solve the riddle in its real perspective. The real question is that, when the constituent cause is removed the effect can stay no-where. A cloth cannot last if its constituent yarn is burnt. The above instances do not prove the existence of effect after the destruction of constituent cause. The appearance of snake is only an auxiliary cause of fear or trembling. The real causes are physical and mental weaknesses. The impressions made by the appearance of snake are so intense that they last for sometime even after disappearance of the cause of fear. But, in the case of realization there is nothing on which the impressions can stay. The pure Brahman cannot have any impression. It is pure like the space. *Avidyā* is the material of which the impressions are constituted. When it is totally destroyed there is no possibility of any impression. The instance of potter's wheel also is a case of auxiliary cause only. Madhusūdana tries to silence the Nyāya, by holding that the impression of *avidyā* can stay without any substratum just as, according to the Nyāya system, a thing stays for a moment even without any substratum at the time of destruction. But, this is not an explanation. No system other than the Nyāya favours this theory. Śaṅkara has refuted the Nyāya system on this very point in his *Sāriraka Bhāṣya*. Nothing can be proved by merely quoting a similar defect in the conception of a rival system. The example of the pot with flower or garlic, which bears the odour even when the contents are taken away, also is not helpful; as the invisible particles bearing that smell are already there.

**Madhūsūdana<sup>1</sup>** says that the impression of *avidyā* is without any material cause, just as the destruction (*dhvaṁśa*) of a thing. But, destruction is a negation. It cannot be compared with a positive phenomenon.

Another example, that is cited relates to a person, who knows clearly that the moon is one, yet, he perceives two moons out of the defective vision. This simile also is defective. The appearance of two moons is caused by the defect in vision. In the present case no defect is possible as there is no more *avidyā*. The simile of burnt cloth also suffers from the same defect, moreover *avidyā* has no parts.

According to another view *avidyā* has many forms. Out of them one form lasts even when Brahman is realized; just as the generic character lasts even when the individual is no more. This is a confusion of the conceptual and physical existences. The generic character is merely conceptual. Its existence or nonexistence does not depend upon the physical existence or otherwise of a thing. But, *avidyā*, with all its forms, stands on the same level of existence. Moreover, if a portion of *avidyā* lasts even after realization, it will remain for ever.

Madhusūdana gives another explanation that *māyā* has many powers. Some of them are removed by realization while others subsist even after that. *Avidyā* also exists along with the remaining powers. This explanation is logical but, goes against the Vedantic conception that *avidyā* is removed totally by realization. Moreover, the Vedānta will have to find out another source for the removal of *avidyā* with a remaining power, as realization is not sufficient to put it away.

The Jaina theory of Arhat is more clear in this respect. An Arhat destroys the four karmans only. At which he attains full knowledge, full perception, complete happiness and full energy. The remaining four karmans are already there. They are responsible for keeping the body and meeting physical necessities. These four karmans are removed when their term

expires naturally or by the particular yogic power known as *samudghāta*.

According to the Vedānta a *Jīvanmukta* does not make any distinction between good and bad; but owing to the natural good habits, which he has inculcated during past practices, he generally does not behave badly or in an objectionable manner. Otherwise, he is free from all the moral or ethical codes. The Jainas maintain that an *Arhat* is free from all passions, which are the main cause of objectionable deeds. The Vedantic conception goes near to the *Vajrayāna* way of living. The only difference is that the former proposes it after realization, while the latter does so as the way for attaining *siddhi*. As for the omniscience obtained through yogic practices, the Vedānta does not advance any special theory.

### Omniscience and Sāṅkhya

According to the Sāṅkhya liberation means realization of difference (*vivekakhyāti*) between *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*. This is obtained through constant meditation on distinction between the two. When the meditation reaches its highest stage *Puruṣa* realizes that he is distinct from *Prakṛti*. This realization is known as *vivekakhyāti*, *kaivalya* or salvation.

### Three states of Realization

Like Vedānta, the Sāṅkhya also believes that a *Puruṣa* may continue for some time to enjoy the fruits of his past deeds, even after realization. It has three states or grades. The highest state destroys all the worldly bondage as soon as it is attained. The person in it does not wait for enjoying the fruits of his past deeds. His meditation and feeling of discrimination are so intense that no more scope is left for any connection with *prakṛti*. It is attained into the highest state of trance (*asamprajñāta samādhi*) from which there is no possibility of coming back (*vyutthāna*). The second state is obtained when the aspirant reaches *samprajñāta samādhi*; the state of trance with concep-

1. Sāṅkhya Sūtra III. 23 *Yogabhāṣya* III. 55, also II. 26.

tual feeling. The aspirant realizes in it the soul as distinct from prakṛti; but, his feeling is not so intense as to destroy all the past impressions. Consequently he continues to enjoy the physical pleasures for some time, till he rises above and attains asaṃprajñāta samādhi. This state is known as Jīvanmukta; which is possible in the second grade only. The third state is still lower. The aspirant in it, does not acquire realization. It is confined to study, deliberation and meditation only. The Sāṅkhya also generally cites the example of potter's wheel to explain the state of Jīvanmukta.

### Prakṛti layas

The aspirants, who do not reach the stage of realization yet practise nonattachment from buddhi etc., and concentrate on prakṛti, submerge into the latter. This state is known as Prakṛti-laya. But, it is not the final stage. The persons so submerged are born again as gods in their next life. Their past impressions are not destroyed owing to the absence of realization. The persons taking birth in this way are gifted with the knowledge of entire universe. They are omniscient and omnipotent. The Sāṅkhya conception of God or Īśvara is limited to this stage only. It does not believe in an eternal God.

A person in the state of Prakṛtilaya is naturally empowered with Asaṃprajñāta-samādhi, through which he attains liberation.

In Yogasūtra Asaṃprajñātasamādhi is described as having two causes. In the case of gods and prakṛtilayas it is attained as a birth-right (bhava-pratyaya). In case of others it is caused by faith, energy, memory, meditation and illumination. The above conception is comparable with the two types of avadhi recognized in Jainism. But, the Jainas hold that the knowledge or other virtues of higher type can be attained through penance

1. Sāṅkhya Sūtra III. 77
2. Sāṅkhya Pra. Bhāṣya p. 113
3. Ibid. p. 106

and the self-control only, with an exception that they are certain in the case of Tīrthaṅkaras.

Thus, we see that according to Sāṅkhya the way to liberation and the way to omniscience are quite different from each other. For liberation the knowledge of distinction is essential; while for omniscience one has to concentrate on prakṛti. But, one thing is certain that an omniscient is naturally gifted with asaṃprajñāta samādhi. So, he is not far away from liberation; he gets it as a certain future. According to Jainism also omniscience is not same as liberation. The aspirant has to destroy four karmans more for attaining the latter. The only difference between the two systems is that according to Sāṅkhya omniscience is not an essential stage for attaining liberation while the Jainas hold it as essential.

### **Omniscience and Yoga**

The yoga system gives a vivid description of the stages attained by an aspirant along with the supernatural powers which he comes to possess. Omniscience also is one of these powers.

According to Yogabhāṣya<sup>1</sup> there are two directions in which the river of mind flows; it flows towards the evil and it flows towards the good or right. The flow that is directed towards kaivalya is good. It is known as kaivalyapragbhārā. The other, that is directed towards worldly pleasures is known as saṃsāra-pragbhārā. The kaivalyapragbhārā is like samyagdarśana and the saṃsāra-pragbhārā like mithyādarśana of the Jainas. In the Buddhist tradition kaivalyapragbhārā can be compared with the beginning of prajñāpāramitā.<sup>2</sup>

Yoga with its eight stages of yama, niyama etc. is the general way of attaining vivekakhyāti, which is the highest goal of human pursuit. The last stage is asaṃprajñāta samādhi; where the mind is without any content. On reaching this stage

1. Yogasūtra I. 19

2. Ibid. I 20

one realizes the distinction between prakṛti and puruṣa and attains liberation, without further delay.

There are three ways to reach the stage of asaṃprajñāta-samādhi. In the case of gods and prakṛtilayas it is natural, attained with the birth. It does not mean that they have attained it without any yogic practices or purification of the mind; but they have done so in their previous lives. It only means that in the current life they attain that stage without any further effort. Another way to reach asaṃprajñāta-samādhi is the fivefold path of yogic practices i. e. Śraddhā (mental cheerfulness and hope), Vīrya (courage and energy leading to firmness or perseverance), Smṛti (memory), Samādhi (meditation) Prajñā (wisdom or enlightenment). Through prajñā the aspirant knows the reality and by concentration on the knowledge of reality he acquires nonattachment and through that asaṃprajñāta-samādhi. These five equipments are rather stages. The lower one paves the ground for the higher one. The third way to attain asaṃprajñāta-samādhi is the devotion to God.

### Yoga and the conception of God<sup>1</sup>

Like Sāṅkhya the Yoga also does not believe in God as a creator. But, he maintains that it is a person who is never influenced by the effects of prakṛti. He is ever pure, never touched by sorrows, activities and their good or bad results. The difference between a liberated soul and God is that the former was once attached with worldly ties and God was never so.<sup>2</sup> Similarly, the difference between a prakṛti-laya and God is that the former is liable to bondage in future, while God is never. As far as their present condition is concerned there is no much difference among the three. The supremacy of God lies in His eternity. He has the upper limit of knowledge leading to the establishment of omniscience. His omniscience does not serve any self interest.<sup>3</sup> It is meant for the benefit of

1. Yogasūtra I. 20

2. Ibid. I. 23

3. Ibid. I. 24-29

others. He preaches the path of salvation to worldly souls after partial or complete delusion. Out of compassion he instructed the highest truth to the sage Asuri. God is the eternal teacher. He is preceptor of even the oldest sages. The person, who is a devotee of God, comes to know the pure soul and is freed from all obstacles.

Thus, we see that the conception of God, in the yoga system, is a source of consolation and encouragement for the aspirant, who feels the direct way of salvation a bit hard. It places an ideal before him for which he has to strive. Secondly, when God himself shows the path, there is no room for misguidance. Thirdly, the compassion of God is a great solace in the arduous journey of spiritual realization. One thing is common with Boddhisattva of the Buddhist and God of the yoga; that this omniscience is an equipment for the salvation of others.

### **Yoga and Development of Knowledge<sup>1</sup>**

According to Yoga the reason for shortness of our knowledge is that the states of our mind are continually changing and we do not dwell upon one thing for a long time to go into its heart. If the concentration is deeper and steadier the real and perfect knowledge of all things begins to appear before mind's eye.

The eight parts of yoga are solely a preparation for the highest stage of concentration when the knowledge of entire universe is attained. The first four parts i. e. yama, niyama, āsana and prāṇāyāma, are mainly concerned with the spiritual and physical discipline, which is necessary for checking the mind from wandering after worldly pleasures. In pratyāhāra the mind is centered in its own nature, is completely identified with the object of inner concentration. Dhāraṇā is the concentration of mind on a particular point. Dhyāna is the continuance of the same, without changing the current. Samādhi or

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<sup>1</sup> Yogasūtra IV. 29-35

trance contemplation results, when by deep concentration mind is transformed into the form of object. Samādhi is again divided into various stages.

The first stage is vitarkānugata, where the mind is concentrated on gross objects. It has two parts; i.e. savitarka, where mind becomes one with a gross object together with its name, etc. and nirvitarka; where the mind is without any consciousness of name etc. The savitarka state is not different from ordinary conceptual states in which the particular thing is not only associated with the concept of its name, but also with other concepts and their various relations.

The second stage is vicārānugata. In this the yogin directs his attention to finer and subtler objects, those from which the atoms have been derived, namely tanmātrās. It also has two states of savicāra and nirvicāra based on the association and the absence of time, space, causality. In this stage the aspirant can perceive the fine elements in their pure state, which are otherwise unperceivable.

The third stage is Ānandānugata. In this stage the mind is filled with supreme bliss or happiness. The self elevates itself from the objective meditation and is one with the pure sattva or blissful aspect of the senses.

The fourth stage is Asmitānugata. In this stage the mind is in the state of pure being when the self is one with the Buddhi. The stages of ānandānugata and asmitānugata also are divided into two each. Ānandānugata is sānanda and nirānanda. Asmitānugata is sasmita and nirasmita. Thus, the four stages of samādhi turn into eight kinds.

The first stage is confined to discursive knowledge; conceptual as well as perceptual. The second is the knowledge of reality. In the nirvicāra stage the steady light of perfect knowledge burns, and this is the highest and the truest knowledge known as ṛtambharā prajñā. This knowledge is quite different from the knowledge derived from the scriptures or inference, as those are based on concepts which only take notice of the



general characteristics of things, and thus are only symbols which can never take us to the heart of reality. Ordinary perception also does not reach there, as it is confined to gross objects only. As the right knowledge of samādhi is gradually more and more sustained, the potencies of imperfect knowledge and ignorance of ordinary consciousness are superseded. These potencies being superseded, those states of consciousness cannot manifest themselves, and thus samādhi becomes strengthened, and by the strengthening of samādhi, comes further prajñā; new potencies of prajñā come to be accumulated, and these bring in the prajñā states, and thus further strengthen their potencies. Thus, the potencies of ordinary consciousness being gradually rooted out, the yogin remains in a new world of right knowledge or prajñā consciousness. But, it is the peculiarity of this prajñā consciousness that neither it nor its potencies serve to bind the puruṣa except by loosening the knots or avidyā, which gradually tend to disintegrate the citta and dissociate it from the puruṣa.

We have seen above that in the higher and higher stages of samādhi the mind passes from the gross objects to the finer ones. It happens in the same order reversed, in which the apparent universe comes into existence. This returning process reaches its final stage when the equilibrium of prakṛti is attained. In that state buddhi, which fascinated puruṣa into its charm, disappears into prakṛti. This state of trance or samādhi is known as asaṃprajñāta samādhi or the contentless meditation. The final prajñās which help the movement of this returning process are said to be of seven kinds. The first four are as states of consciousness associated with the four stages of samādhi. The first one dawns in the form : "I have known the world, the object of suffering and misery, I have nothing more to know of it." The second stage is of the form; "The grounds and the roots of saṃskāras have been thoroughly uprooted, nothing more of it remains to be uprooted." The third is of the form; "Removal has become a fact of direct cognition by means of inhibitive trance." The fourth is of the form "The

means of knowledge in the shape of discriminative knowledge has been understood." This is the fourfold freedom of conscious discrimination from external phenomena. The three *prajñās* that rise after this are not psychological states of mind but metaphysical and real states of the disintegrating process of the return of the *citta* to *prakṛti*. These movements are as follows : (1) The double purpose of *buddhi*, *bhoga* (ordinary experience) and *apavarga* (salvation) have been realized; (2) The strong gravitating tendency of the disintegrated *guṇas* drive them into the *prakṛti* like heavy stones dropped from high hill tops; and they finally collapse into the *prakṛti* substance where they remain merged for ever : (3) the *puruṣa* having passed beyond the bondage of the three, shines forth in its own pure and ultimate freedom.

The main difference between the *Sāṅkhya* and the *Yoga* regarding the way to emancipation is this, that *Sāṅkhya* lays more stress on the knowledge of distinction between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. This knowledge is attained through contemplation and meditation. The *yoga* is emphatic on concentration and the control of mind through yogic practices. Ultimately the mind becomes useless and submerges into its cause, i. e. *prakṛti*. Thus, the *puruṣa* is freed from the mental bondage. This state is known as *kaivalya*.

According to the Buddhist soul is not a permanent entity. It is a flow of successive psychical phenomena. *Nirvāṇa* or emancipation means the discontinuation of this flow. According to the *Vedānta* the soul is a permanent, unchangeable reality. The discursive knowledge is the effect of *antaḥkaraṇa*, which is the substitute for the self of other systems. This *antaḥkaraṇa* loses its existence after realization. According to *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* systems the function of the self is served by *buddhi*. When it returns to its original source, i. e. *prakṛti* the self is no more. The *Puruṣa* has nothing to do with discursive knowledge. Thus, according to all the above systems salvation means the end of discursive self with its qualities of knowledge, feelings and passions. According to Jainism passions are removed with

the destruction of MohanIya. But, there is nothing to destroy knowledge. Yaśovijaya, perhaps under the influence of Vedānta, has proposed that the four types of discursive knowledge are effected by kevalajñānāvaraṇa. When this āvaraṇa disappears they do not exist any more. Thus, in a way, we can say that according to Jainism also the discursive knowledge disappears at the dawn of kevalajñāna; but the Jaina does not make any distinction between the two types, as far as their appearance is concerned.

The Jaina divides the mind ethically into four dhyānas. In the first two dhyānas it is directed towards evil-thinking. They resemble the saṃsāra-prāgbhārā state of the Yoga. In the remaining two the mind is directed towards good thinking. They resemble the state of kaivalyaprāgbhārā. The different states of these two dhyānas bear a striking resemblance with the yoga theory of samādhi. We shall discuss them in detail along with the Jaina theory of spiritual progress.

### **Conception of Tāraka Stage in Yoga**

According to the system of yoga the last three parts of dhāraṇā, dhyāna and samādhi are known as samyama.<sup>1</sup> The concentration or samyama on different objects results into various supernatural powers. The yogia who concentrates on the three times comes to possess the knowledge of all the three times. Similarly, he gets the knowledge of entire universe when prātibha-jñāna arises. It is the knowledge just preceding vivekakhyāti. This state is known as Tāraka, because it brings the worldly bondage to an end. It knows the entire universe, in all the times and conditions simultaneously. This is attained in the stage of viśokā. It resembles the kevalajñāna of the Jainas, appearing after the destruction of Moha. According to yoga it is perishable and a sort of obstacle in the path of realization; It is a disturbance in meditation. The Jaina does not support this view. But, no other system except yoga has described the omniscience as akrama, which is maintained by the Jaina also.

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**1** Yogasūtra III. 54

The yoga-conception of infinite knowledge also bears a striking resemblance with the Jaina conception of *anantajñāna*. Patañjali says that when the dirt of obscurance is removed totally the knowledge becomes infinite; as the knowable objects are finite, they fall short in comparison with knowledge. Vyāsa cites the example of sky and glow-worm. Similarly, the Jaina also maintains that practically a kevalin perceives the entire universe, but its capacity is infinite. Had there been infinite number of universes a kevalin would have perceived all of them.

### **Kevalajñāna and the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika Schools**

We have already described the Nyāya view of the Vaiśeṣika super natural knowledge; which is attained through an extraordinary contact with the universe. This contact is established through yogic practices for which they do not prescribe any definite course and generally follow the yoga system.

In the state of liberation the soul is devoid of all qualities including knowledge. The Nyāya does not make any difference between the discursive and transcendental types of knowledge. In the state of liberation where the other systems propose absence of discursive knowledge and the revelation of transcendental knowledge, the Nyāya proposes the total absence. Practically, they are on the same level.

In addition the Nyāya accepts eternal omniscience of God; which is a necessary equipment for his functions of creation, preservation and destruction of the universe. The Nyāya, chiefly being a devotee of logic does not propose any original theory regarding omniscience.

### **Jainism and Omniscience**

The Jainas hold a very clear and systematic view about the journey of soul towards liberation. Their theory of *guṇasthāna* presents a definite road with well-measured mile-stones; leading to the ultimate goal. *Guṇasthāna* means the different stages of spiritual attainments. The soul regains its natural powers in higher

and higher degrees as the aspirant ascends to the stairs of guṇasthānas. The powers of soul are lying buried under the obscuring karmans. The degree of manifestation of those powers varies according to the thickness or thinness of the obscurance.

According to Jainism Mohanīya is the most powerful of all the karmans. This is the principal cause of bondage of the soul. The other karmans get their strength from moha. The arrangement of fourteen guṇasthāna also is mainly based on its different potencies. We can compare it with the avidyā of other systems.

Moha operates on the soul in two ways. Firstly, it does not allow the soul to know its own reality. The soul, which is immaterial, eternal and pure, is wrongly identified with the material, perishable and impure body or senses. The cause of this perverted attitude is recognized as Darśanamohanīya. Darśana means vision; attitude or faith. Darśana-moha clouds that vision, makes the attitude perverted and misdirects the faith. The second operation of Mohanīya is to obstruct the soul in its attempt to attain the pure state of infinite bliss. The passions keep the soul involved in external pleasures and pains. This operation is effected by cāritramohanīya. The first four guṇasthānas are based on different stages of darśana-mohanīya and five to twelve on cāritramohanīya. The last two are the stages of complete realization.

The first guṇasthāna is known as Mithyādṛṣṭi. It can be compared with the saṃsāraprāgbhārā conception of the yoga—system. In this stage the attitude of soul is always misdirected. He through after external pleasures and is known as bahirātman or bahirmukha. This stage also has many grades of karmic influence. Sometimes, the influence is thick and sometimes it is thin. These gradations are the result of a definite process or deliberate striving for liberation. Nor they set the aspirant on right path. They are merely wanderings in a forest where the person, who has lost the way, sometimes, goes very

close to the right path and sometimes far away. In no case he is sure to get the right path.

### Three karaṇas and granthibheda

The soul, wandering thus, when reaches near the way, it is known as *yathāpravṛtti-karaṇa*. It means a right step taken accidentally without deliberate attempt. This step is compared with a stone of hilly river, which becomes round, rolling in the current. Similarly, a soul suffering from miseries of the world and wandering through high and low kingdoms of the universe, accidentally reaches the stage when his reserve karmic matter comes within a fixed degree. It is said that in this stage the duration of all the karmans, except *Āyuṣya*, comes within a period of one *koṭākoṭī* (one crore multiplied into one crore) *sāgaropama*<sup>1</sup>. But, this stage is not unique in the career of a soul. Every soul has reached it innumerable times without breaking the knot of passions, though he comes oftenly on that point.

The second step is *apūrvakaraṇa*. In this stage he unlooses the knot of passions. The aspirant, who has once attained this stage is sure to get liberation within a specified period; namely, *ardhapudgala parāvartana*. This stage comes as a new step in the beginningless career of soul. This is why it is called *apūrvakaraṇa*.

1. According to Jainism the attachment of karmic matter with the soul lasts for a definite period only. It must detach by the expiry of that period; during which the new matter flows in and is attached with the soul for a shorter or longer period. The duration of this period is fixed according to the intensity of passions (*kaṣāyas*). The maximum duration of *Mohanīya* is seventy *koṭākoṭī* (one *koṭī* multiplied into one *koṭī*) *sāgaropama*, a particular measurement of time. *Jñānāvaraṇa*, *Darśanāvaraṇa*, *Vedanīya* and *Antarāya* have thirty *koṭākoṭī*. *Nāma* and *Gotra* have twenty and *Āyuṣya* has thirty-three *sāgaropama* only as their maximum duration.

The third step is *anivṛttikaraṇa*, where an aspirant definitely gets the right attitude (*samyagdr̥ṣṭi*). This is the starting point of spiritual journey. The Jaina divides it into fourteen stages.

#### Fourteen Guṇasthānas (the ladder of spiritual journey)

In the ladder of *guṇasthāna* the first step is *mithyādr̥ṣṭi* i. e. wrong attitude. The aspirant does not rise above it until he unloosens the tie of *moha* existing in the form of *darśana-moha*. The second step is *sāsvādana* which is touched when the aspirant with *Upaśamaśreṇi* falls down. The third is *miśra guṇasthāna* meaning a mixture of the right and wrong attitudes without a firm belief. This *guṇasthāna* may be touched both in ascending as well as the descending condition.

The fourth step marks a definite progress in the spiritual journey. In this stage the effect of *darśanamohanīya* is weakened and the aspirant gets the right attitude along with a firm faith in reality. We can compare it with the beginning of *prajñāpāramitā* of the Buddhist, *Brahmajijñāsā* of the Vedāntist and *Kaivalyaprāgbhārā* of the yoga system. The aspirant, at this stage finds out the right path and firmly believes in its efficacy to lead to the final goal. But, he stops with the faith only and does not start marching. The effect of *cāritramohanīya* does not allow him to put the decision into practice. This *guṇasthāna* is known as *avirata samyagdr̥ṣṭi* (right attitude without observation of the rules of conduct).

In the fifth *guṇasthāna* the aspirant is partially freed from the effect of *cāritramohanīya* and takes to the vows of a householder. This stage continues upto the stage of complete renunciation.

It should be mentioned here that *cāritramohanīya* is divided into four grades based on the intensity of passions. *Anantānubandhī* is the first grade, where the passions are so intense that the person under its influence is debarred from

getting right attitude. He is confined to first *guṇasthāna* as long as it continues. The second grade is *apratyākhyānāvaraṇa*. It does not allow the person to take any vow or observe the rules of conduct. One, who aspires in the fifth *guṇasthāna*, has to subdue it. The third grade is *pratyākhyānāvaraṇa* which stands in the way of full renunciation attained in the sixth *guṇasthāna*. The fourth grade is *saṃjvalana*. In this grade the intensity of passions is reduced to such mildness as they do not put any material obstacle. Still they affect the life of an ascetic to the extent of minor pitfalls. This effect is subdued in the seventh step.

In the sixth *guṇasthāna*, one takes to the vows of an ascetic and adopts complete renunciation. But, still he is prone to pitfalls (*pramādas*). This is why, it is called *pramattasamyata guṇasthāna*. The pitfalls are five in number; namely :

(1) Intoxication (*Madya*), (2) sensual pleasures (*viśaya*), (3) passions (*kaṣāya*), (4) slumber (*nidrā*) and (5) mundane talks (*vikathā*). The fifth *guṇasthāna* is open to subhuman beings also. But, the *guṇasthānas* beginning from the sixth onwards are open to human beings only. It means, an animal can take to the vows of a householder, but not those of an ascetic.

The seventh *guṇasthāna* is *Apramatta samyata*. In this stage the aspirant is very careful and keeps himself away from pitfalls.

The eighth is *Nirvṛtti guṇasthāna*. In this stage the aspirant prepares himself for the destruction or subsidence of the remaining part of *mohanīya*.

One thing is noticeable here that *darśanamohanīya* is divided into three potencies, which are compared with the three *guṇas* of the *Sāṅkhya*. The first and the strongest potency is *mithyātvamohanīya*, where the right attitude is an impossibility. The second is *miśramohanīya* which results into the mixed attitude marking the third *guṇasthāna*. The mildest potency is *samyaktvamohanīya*. This potency does not obstruct the right attitude. It is like an intoxicant bereft of the



power of intoxication. It only blurs the vision slightly resulting into a partiality towards one's benefactors. ( *praśastarāga* ); just as devotional love towards a Tīrthaṅkara or some other high personality, based on the virtues of the latter. But, ultimately it is also a tie, which can last upto the seventh *guṇasthāna* only. In the eighth *guṇasthāna* *darśanamohanīya* is totally removed either by destruction or subsidence. From this stage the aspirant undertakes either of the two courses of *upaśamaśreṇī* or *kṣapakaśreṇī*.

The ninth *guṇasthāna* is *Anivṛtti-bādara-sāmparāya*. This stage is attained when the aspirant either destroy or subdue the six types of *nokaṣāya* such as *hāsyā* (laughter), *rati* (attachment), *arati* (hatred), *bhaya* (fear), *śoka* (grief) and *jugupsā* (spitefulness).

The tenth stage is *sūkṣmaśāmparāya*. It is attained when the aspirant is freed from the gross passions entirely. By the end of the ninth *guṇasthāna* he removes the sexual urge of all the three types, along with *krodha* (anger), *māna* (conceit-ness) and *māyā* (crookedness) of *saṃjvalana* potency. Only the *lobha* (greed) remains. It is also removed by the end of this stage.

The eleventh *guṇasthāna* is *upaśāntamoha*. This stage is attained by the aspirant in *upaśamaśreṇī*; who subdues the passions completely. By the end of this stage the passion which were so far lying dormant come into operation and the aspirant falls down. He may go down to the first stage or stop somewhere in the middle. He strives again in the same or other lives and rises upwards by adopting *kṣapakaśreṇī*.

The person who adopts *kṣapakaśreṇī* and ascends higher and higher by destroying the passions, has nothing, in reserve. He does not touch the eleventh *guṇasthāna* and reaches direct the twelfth. This stage is known as *kṣīṇamohanīya*, where *Mohanīya* is totally destroyed. The aspirant in this stage is known as *chadmasthavītarāga*; meaning the person who has destroyed passions but has not attained full knowledge. We

have seen that in the guṇasthānas beginning with the fifth upto the twelfth mohanīya plays the important role. The other ghātikarmans are not directly taken into account.

In the thirteenth guṇasthāna the other three ghātikarmans jñānāvaraṇīya, Darśanāvaraṇīya and Antarāya are destroyed simultaneously. The soul attains full knowledge, full perception and full energy. This is known as Sayogikevalin; meaning that an omniscient with the activities of mind, speech and body continued. It is the stage of Arhat or jīvanmukta.

The fourteenth guṇasthāna is Ayogi-kevalin. In this stage the activity of all the three types is stopped. This state is known as Śaileśī; meaning the static condition like the king of mountain. This state can be compared with asaṃprajñāta samādhi of the yoga system.

After the fourteenth guṇasthāna the soul leaves this body and shoots up like an arrow, till it reaches the top end of this universe. It is the state of liberation. According to Jainism there is a place on the top of the universe, known as siddhaśīla which is the abode of liberated souls.

#### Four Dhyānas (contemplations)

In addition to the fourteen guṇasthānas the Jainas hold four dhyānas expressing the ethical development of mind. Dhyāna means contemplation. It has four types of (1) ārtadhyāna (contemplation on material gains and losses), (2) raudradhyāna (contemplation of violent acts), (3) dharmadhyāna (contemplation on virtuous deeds), and (4) śukladhyāna (contemplation on the self). The first two types are related with the persons engrossed in worldly desires. The remaining two are useful for attaining liberation. They have four stages each. Dharmadhyāna has the following stages—

- (1) Ājñāvicaya—to contemplate over the teachings of a vītarāga or sarvajña.

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1 [See Karmagrantha IV.

- (2) Apāyavicaya— to contemplate over the nature of vices and the way to get rid of them.
- (3) Vipākavicaya— to contemplate over the fruits of good and bad deeds.
- (4) Samsthānavicaya— to contemplate over the form of the universe.

According to the Śvetāmbara tradition dharmadhyāna is found upto the twelfth guṇasthāna, beginning with the sixth. The Digambaras hold that it is possible in four guṇasthānas only i. e. from fourth to the seventh.

The Śukladhyāna has the following four stages—

(1) Pṛthaktva vitarka savicāra—Analytic contemplation focussed on different objects; it changes from object to object, word to word, object to word and word to object. This stage can be compared with the savitarka and savicāra stages of samādhi held by the yoga.

(2) Ekatva vitarka-avicāra—synthetic deliberation, where the person sticks to one object. It is comparable with nirvitarka and nirvicāra of yoga.

(3) Sūkṣamakriyā-apratipātin—This stage is attained in the fourteenth guṇasthāna, when the activities of mind and speech are stopped through the control over physical activity. The activities thus stopped do not revive again. This is why it is called apratipātin.

(4) Samucchinnakriyā-nivṛtti—In this stage the activities of mind, speech and body are completely stopped. Even the mildest movements of respiration etc. do not occur. This stage lasts for a few moments only, comparable with the pronunciation of five short vowels.

The first two stages of śukladhyāna are found in the eleventh and twelfth guṇasthānas, provided the aspirant possesses the knowledge of pūrvas. The person with less knowledge gets dharmadhyāna only. The remaining two stages occur in the thirteenth and fourteenth guṇasthānas only.

There is another way to know the existence of above four stages. The first stage is possible in the aspirant with all the three yogas (activities). He can apply the motors of mind, speech and body for his deliberations. The second is possible in the aspirant who uses one instrument only for his deliberation. The third stage is possible with kāya-yoga (bodily activity) only; and in the fourth stage no activity of any type is possible.

Dharmadhyāna appears at the removal of darśanamohanīya. It is possible in a samyagdṛṣṭi only. The first stage of śukla dhyāna is reached when Mohanīya is totally removed. The second stage occurs when all the ghātikarmans are destroyed and kevalajñāna is attained. The third stage is a complete cessation of mental and verbal activities. It is a process to attain the fourth stage where the activities come to stop entirely whereby the soul is liberated from all bonds.

#### Leśyā (Thought paints)

Another category that expresses the different stages of soul-purification is leśyā. It is that by which a jīva assimilates virtue and vice with itself. The feelings arising from yoga, coloured by passions, lead to bhāvaleśyā and the actual colours of bodies produced by such feelings are called dravyaleśyās. They are held six according to the different grades of temperament possessed by living beings. Each grade is represented by a colour in the following way :

- |                       |                            |
|-----------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. Kṛṣṇaleśyā—Black   | 4. Tejoleśyā—Golden        |
| 2. Nīlāleśyā—Blue     | 5. Padmaleśyā—Lotus colour |
| 3. Kāpotaleśyā—Pigeon | 6. Śuklaleśyā—White        |

All of them are found upto the sixth guṇasthāna. The seventh contains only the last three. The eighth to thirteenth contains śukla only. The fourteenth guṇasthāna has no leśyā as the mind does not work there.

1 Sthānāṅgasūtra 247, Āvaśyaka IV.

2 Āvaśyaka, Haribhadra Tīkā p. 645

3 Tattvārtha X. 10

**The Way to Liberation concluded**

According to Jainism liberation means the absolute freedom from karmic bondage. The way leading to it is divided into two parts i. e. (1) *saṃvara* (stoppage of the new inflow of karmans) and (2) *Nirjarā* (the destruction of those already in store). There are five passages of new inflow : (1) *mithyātvā* (wrong attitude), (2) *avirati* (non-abstinence from sensual indulgence), (3) *pramāda* (slips), (4) *kaṣāya* (passions) and (5) *yoga* (activity). The first passage is blocked in the fourth *guṇasthāna*; second in the sixth; third in the seventh; fourth in the eleventh or twelfth and fifth in the fourteenth. It should be noticed here that in thirteenth *guṇasthāna* the activity of all the three types of mind, speech and body continues; and thereby the inflow of karmans also. But, the karmic matter inflowing in that stage is not attached with the soul. It comes in and goes out by itself.

The bondage (*bandha*) of karmans is divided into the following four types :—

- (1) *Prakṛtibandha*—The bondage related with the types of *karmaprakṛtis* that are to flow in a particular activities.
- (2) *Pradeśabandha*—the bondage related with the number of molecules to flow in.
- (3) *Sthitibandha*—the bondage related with fixing the period of duration of each *karmaprakṛti*.
- (4) *Anubhāgabandha*—the bondage that decides intensity of the fruit giving power of a particular *prakṛti*.

The *yoga* (activity) is responsible for the first two types only. It is the cause of the inflow of *karmaprakṛtis*. The period of duration and the intensity in fruit are controlled by the *kaṣāya* (passions). If the *kaṣāya* is intense the duration will be longer and the intensity of fruit will be higher. On the other hand, if passions are mild the duration and fruit intensity also are reduced in the same proportion. In the *guṇasthānas* from eleven to thirteen *kaṣāya* has no effect. Consequently, the ]

karmic matter flowing in has neither duration nor intensity to give any fruit. In the fourteenth guṇasthāna the activity is stopped entirely. Hence, there is no possibility of any inflow. In this stage all the passages of karmic inflow are completely blocked.

The other requisite of the freedom from karmic bondage is the destruction of karmans which have already flowed in. This function also continues along with saṃvara. This destruction is achieved in two ways : either by experience of the result, or by nirjarā (removal through various types of penances). A certain amount of karmic matter is removed by experiencing its fruit, while the other is destroyed by observing certain penances. These penances are divided into twelve types, out of which the first six are external, related with the physical restraints, the remaining six are internal related with spiritual development. We have already stated the gradual removal of mohanīya in the guṇasthānas. The effects of other karmans also are gradually minimized along with it. But, as has been stated above, up to the twelfth guṇasthāna mohanīya is the main factor. The thirteenth is attained by the destruction of three more. At the end of fourteenth the remaining four also are destroyed.

### Three places of Kevalajñāna

We have been discussing so far the way to emancipation as held by the Jainas, without which the conception of the omniscient cannot be understood fully. We have seen that the aspirant gets right attitude in the fourth guṇasthāna. The attainment of samyagdarśana changes his knowledge also into samyak, before which it was mithyā. In this stage he is expected to direct his knowledge and other powers towards the emancipation of soul; which were formerly misdirected towards worldly pleasures. As far as the amount of knowledge is concerned there is no increase in it. In the sixth guṇasthāna the aspirant may attain certain supernatural powers including two types of knowledge i.e. avadhi and manaḥparyāya. But

avadhi is possible in lower stages also while *manahpariyāya* does not occur below the sixth stage. But, these powers are not inevitable. They are exceptional powers (*labdhis*) obtained by only a small number of aspirants. Like yoga-system the Jainas also holds that these supernatural powers are interruptions in the spiritual progress, but the latter exempts super-normal knowledge from that category. In the twelfth *guṇasthāna* the aspirant destroys *mohanīya* completely. This stage can be compared with destruction of *avidyā* as held by the Buddhist and Vedantist and the removal of illusion of identity between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* as held by *Sāṅkhya*. The thirteenth *guṇasthāna* is the stage of revelation; which is attained by destroying the remaining three *ghātikarmans*. According to the Buddhist the cessation of *avidyā* means the cessation of soul, which is a flow of impressions produced by *avidyā*. The stage of realization, therefore, does not exist any longer. According to *Vedānta* it is the state of realization of Brahman. According to *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* it is *vivekakhyaṭi*. According to Jainism it is complete view of the entire universe. But, the function of mind continues in it. In the fourteenth *guṇasthāna* the activity of all the three *yogas* is stopped. In the stage of liberation the physical body also does not exist.

As far as the question of omniscience is concerned we have three stages (1) *sayogi-kevalin* or the thirteenth *guṇasthāna*, (2) *ayogikevalin* or the fourteenth *guṇasthāna* and (3) the *siddhas* (liberated souls).

The first question that arises in this respect is whether there is any difference among the three stages, as far as *kevalajñāna* is concerned. We can compare them with other systems in the following way :—

1. *Sayogikevalin*—*Jīvanmukta* without trance,
2. *Ayogi kevalin*—*Jīvanmukta* in trance (*asaṁprajñāta-samādhi*)
3. *Siddha*—*Kaivalya*.

All the non-jaina systems except *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika*,

whose opinion does not hold much importance in this respect, maintain that the knowledge of the type of omniscience is possible in the first stage only. The second and third states do not realize any difference of subject and the object. They are states of pure consciousness. But the Jainas hold that all the three states hold similar knowledge. The responsibility of this disagreement goes to their different views regarding the cause of such knowledge. The non-Jaina systems hold that knowledge with a distinction of subject and object does not occur without mind. When a yogin is in trance or attains kaivalya, the mind ceases to function. The Jainas hold that mind is required in the cases of imperfect knowledge only. In the case, of perfect or complete knowledge the mind does not play any part. It is an organ of discrimination and limitation. The limited knowledge requires it to fix up the focus on a particular point. In the case of kevala focus on a particular object is not needed. The lense of kevala is so powerful that it gets the reflection of all the objects simultaneously. We have cited the examples of a candle and the sun. The candle illumines the objects that are placed near it successively. The sun brings into light all the objects under it, simultaneously.

But, this conception is a bit confused on the part of the Jainas. Knowledge is not a single function. In the case of ordinary perception the first thing is stimulation; where the senses are not active but passive. They receive the external stimuli. All the external objects that are placed within a particular area, generate stimulation simultaneously. The sounds coming from various instruments strike the ear-hole simultaneously. After this stimulation there comes the stage of discrimination, where the mind works gradually. The mind cannot take into account all the sounds coming from different instruments in a lump. It contemplates the stimulants in succession. The stage of stimulation is not knowledge. According to Jainism it may be called darśana or vyañjanāvagraha. Knowledge is always discriminatory, leading to a judgment.<sup>1</sup>

1 *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama Sūtra* 135



In the case of kevalajñāna it may be admitted that all things reflect into the soul without any *via media*; or they are illumined by the soul simultaneously. But the stage of mere reflection or illumination does not constitute knowledge. The knowledge begins when particular objects are conceived discriminately. This conception is not possible without some organ which takes into consideration the individual cases in succession.

We can put the same problem in another way. The process of knowledge has two actions related to two different agents. In the stage of stimulation the objects are agents and the senses are passive receivers. The second stage is a response to the stimulation caused by the first stage. Here, the agent is mind or soul, The simultaneous stimulation by many objects is possible as it has many agents. But, the simultaneous action of mind on all the objects is not possible, as in this case the agent is one. It must act gradually. Of course; when the agent contains a huge body and can cover many units of space simultaneously, it can act upon many things simultaneously, but the Jainas cannot hold that view; because their soul has a limited size.

If the Jaina conception of knowledge, in the case of kevala, is limited to mere stimulation, without reaching the stage of discrimination, as the instance of the sun leads to, it is understandable. But it would mean that kevala is without any *kalpanā* (articulation) as the Buddhists hold regarding their perception. If the discrimination also is within the range of kevala, it cannot be explained without mind.

The Jainas give one explanation that according to Buddhism, only the thing in itself is existent. The discriminations of name, class etc. are merely conceptual. They do not exist externally. But, according to Jainism nothing is merely conceptual. Every concept has a corresponding external existence. In kevala, as in the case of other cognition, the concepts also reflect as good as the solid objects. In the case of limited cognition the operating organ, i. e. mind has a limited capacity.

It covers the range of reflections gradually. But, in the case of kevala the operating organ is the soul itself. It has unlimited capacity; consequently the entire range is covered simultaneously. Really seen in both the cases the soul is the only operator. The psychical mind (bhāvamana) is nothing but the partial manifestation of the soul. In the case of kevala it is fully manifested.

Dhavalā distinguishes the two types of knowledge on the basis of karma-theory. The limited knowledge is produced by the partial removal (kṣayopaśama) of the āvaraṇa, while the unlimited, i. e. kevala is produced by complete destruction (kṣaya) of the āvaraṇa. Mind (bhāvamana) is itself a kṣayopaśamika state. It cannot co-exist with the kṣāyika state of kevala. So, as far as knowledge is concerned, there is no difference between sayogin and the ayogin guṇasthānas.

### The Kevalin and Mind

It can be asked here, that the thirteenth and fourteenth guṇasthānas are separated from each other merely on the ground that one is with yoga, while the other is without yoga. The meaning of yoga in the present case is not physical structure (dravyayoga), which exists in the fourteenth guṇasthāna also. In the present case yoga means the mental, oral and physical activity. It means that a kevalin in the thirteenth guṇasthāna possesses these activities and that in fourteenth guṇasthāna does not.

The Śvetāmbaras hold that a kevalin uses his mind when a sage with manaḥparyāya, or a god in the Anuttaravimāna, the highest region of gods, feels some doubt in his convictions; he repeats the question in his mind. The kevalin understands the question and repeats the reply in his mind. The sage and god apprehend it by their own supernormal cognitions. This view may be significant to trace the history of telepathy, but, does not prove the real utility of mind in a kevalin.<sup>1</sup>

1. Siddhasen Gaṇin on Tattvārtha II. 26

The Digambara tradition holds that the existence of mental activity in a kevalin is merely a presumption (*upacāra*), based on the common-place conviction that mind is a necessary preliminary of speech. Commonly it is held that a person with mind must have some mental activity before he speaks. The speech is always preceded by deliberation. An Arhat also preaches sermons, which cannot come out without preceding thought. One is likely to speculate on this basis, the Digambaras say, that a kevalin also possesses some mental activity. But, in reality a Tīrthaṅkara speaks without any prethought. His words come out spontaneously. Perhaps, this idea is borrowed from the Buddhist in his theory of *anābhogacaryā*.<sup>1</sup>

As a matter of fact the existence of mental activity cannot be denied in the thirteenth *guṇasthāna*. The kevalin visits different places for preaching his sermons, holds discussions, replies the questions asked by different persons and takes part in debates with the upholders of rival views. All these activities are not possible without mind. It is another thing that his knowledge is purely spiritual.

Generally, the activities of mind are classified into three functions, of feeling, willing and knowing. About feeling there are two opinions. Some hold that it is direct function of soul. The mind has nothing to do with it. The Vedantic conception of *Sākṣībhāṣya* presents the same view. The *Nyāya* and other realistic systems hold it as the function of mind. The Jaina logicians of the latter period have adopted the same view. But, the theory of *karman* and the *Āgamas* seem to hold a different conception.

The *Tattvārtha* relates *śruta* as the function of mind; which has nothing to do with feeling. Moreover, the conception of psychical senses, which include the mind also is based on the apprehension of different objects. They are spiritual energies produced by the *kṣayopaśama* of *jñānāvaraṇīya*. On the other hand feeling is an effect of *Vedanīya*. The *Sāṅkhya* holds both

feeling and knowing as the qualities of citta. The Nyāya also regards mind as an instrument of feeling as well as knowing. But, according to these systems the soul, in itself, is more or less inactive. It is simply a passive substratum where the mind plays its role, and bears the entire responsibility of conscious activity. But, the Jaina position is different. He holds the soul as an agent and active force in the functions of feeling and willing also. The mind is a particular capacity of soul and plays its part in a very limited sphere, as the other senses do. The function of feeling does not depend upon it.

Further, the mental activities are divided into four types of (1) Satya manoyoga (true mentation), (2) Asatyamanoyoga (false mentation), (3) Miśramanoyoga (mixed), (4) Anubhaya manoyoga (neither of the two). This division solely depends upon the activities of mind related with cognition. It means that we cannot explain the existence of mind on ground other than cognition. It creates the same difficulty again in the case of kevalins. If they possess mind it must have some bearing on their cognition.

In order to explain this difficulty we should understand the position of mind clearly. It is wrong to confine the activity of mind to cognition only. The mind as a faculty of knowing and the mind as yoga or inner activity are two different things. One is the result of kṣayopaśama while the latter is a positive activity of the soul, produced as the effect of certain karmans. When the same activity is caused by Mohanīya it results into anger, pride or other passions. When it is caused by Vedanīya it results into painful or pleasurable feelings. But, the physical mind, which is the general cause of all these activities, is the same in all these cases. We cannot explain certain activities of a kevalin, just as preaching, replying the questions, discussions, visiting various places for propagation of his mission etc. Without admitting the existence of mind. As far as his intuition knowledge is concerned, mind is not required. As a matter of fact the mind is incapable or rather contrary to the vision of

truth. It leans towards a particular point of view only; while the intuition is comprehensive. It is always above the mental approach.

Thus, we come to the conclusion that as far as kevalajñāna is concerned, the mind has nothing to do. But, the other functions of a kevalin are not free from the mental operation.

### **Kevala and Feeling**

The kevalin in sayogin guṇasthāna possesses four karmans, Vedanrya is one of them. Consequently, he feels the pleasure and pain according to the physical or external causes. Of course, this feeling is not so intense as it would have been if accompanied by moha. Nevertheless, the feeling is there and a kevalin also cannot escape from it as long as there is Vedanrya. Kundakunda and the Digambara tradition following him, deny the existence of pain in a kevalin. But, their view goes against the Tattvārtha and the theory of karman, which propose the existence of eleven hardships (pariṣaha) in a kevalin also. Though Pūjyapāda and Akalaṅka, in the light of Kundakunda, have tried to minimize it on the ground that the absence of Mohanrya renders the effect of Vedanrya insignificant. But, there is no sense in accepting the existence of Vedanrya in a kevalin if it is absolutely without effect. Samantabhadra has clearly stated the existence of pleasure and pain in a kevalin.

### **The Kevalin and other Activities**

Like Bodhisattva the Jaina Arhat also, after revelation, is engaged in different activities of preaching and converting others to his path of liberation. He also possesses certain external and internal embellishments for influencing others. The complete knowledge is one of them. It is described as one of the twelve exceptional merits possessed by an Arhat. But, leaving jñānātiśaya and apayāgamatiśaya, the remaining ten exceptional merits are not common to every kevalin. There are:

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1 Āptamīmāṃsā, 93

mūka-kevalins, ( dumb ) who cannot speak. They are far from pūjātiśaya ( excellence is worship ) and vāgatiśaya ( excellence in speech ). The eight external embellishments are particular to Tīrthaṅkaras. The other arhats, who rise from the position of a common man do not possess them. The Buddhists attribute omniscience also to Bodhisattva only as his exceptional merit. The Jainas hold it as common.

According to Śvetāmbaras the activities of an arhat, just as eating, walking, speaking and others are similar to ordinary men. But, the Digambaras hold exceptions in them also. An arhat does not take his diet from the solid food. He gets it from other stuff through supernatural power. He does not feel hunger or thirst. His speech does not come from mouth but sprouts from the entire body; with an inarticulate sound; which is understood by all the audience in different languages. It is said that the same sound turns into seven hundred different dialects. The Śvetāmbaras hold that a Tīrthaṅkara gives his sermons in Ardhamāgadhī, the dialect spoken on the borders of ancient Magadha and Kośala. It is, perhaps, because, the last two Tīrthaṅkaras flourished in that region.

### The Other Differences between an Arhat and Ordinary Kevalins

We have discussed above, yoga as the distinguishing factor between the thirteenth and fourteenth guṇasthānas. The same makes a distinction between an arhat and siddha.

The difference between the kevalin in fourteenth guṇasthāna and the siddhas is that the latter is without physical existence. The former possesses it without any activity. The siddhas possess eight qualities :—

- (1) Ananta Jñāna—Infinite knowledge
- (2) Ananta Darśana—Infinite perception
- (3) Avyābādha Sukha—Infinite bliss
- (4) Akṣaya sthiti—Permanent existence
- (5) Kṣāyika saṃyaktva—Right attitude resulting from the destruction of karmans

- (6) Amūrtitva—Immateriality or intergibility
- (7) Ananta śakti—Infinite power.
- (8) Agurulaghutva—Absence of weight.

Out of these the first, second, fifth and seventh are found in the Arhat also. The remaining four are particular to Siddhas only,

### **The Kevala and Other Types of Knowledge**

It has been already stated that jñānāvaraṇīya is divided into five types, corresponding to the five types of knowledge. Each type is manifested when the corresponding āvaraṇa is removed. Kevalajñāna is manifested when the āvaraṇas are totally removed. It means the existence of all the four types of knowledge along with kevala. The Jaina thinkers hold different explanations to this phenomenon.

1. According to the old tradition the four types of incomplete knowledge also co-exist with the kevala; but, they are useless as kevala dominates them. They are like a hundred rupees possessed by a millionaire. We cannot say that the millionaire does not possess hundred rupees, but they are not mentioned when his worth is estimated. We can also compare them with the light of candle in the midday when the sun is shining brightly. According to this conception the incomplete knowledge does not differ from the complete one as far as its nature is concerned.

2. According to Jayadhavalā and Dhavalā<sup>1</sup> Kevalajñānāvaraṇa obscures the complete knowledge. But, that obscurity is not so thick as to wipe out the light entirely. Certain rays come out in spite of the obscurity. Those rays are responsible for the different types of incomplete knowledge. They are further obscured by the corresponding āvaraṇas. When the obscurity is totally removed the question of certain rays producing knowledge does not arise. We compare this phenomenon with the light coming in the room through a small hole.

1. Dhavalā Book XIII pp. 214, 215 & 345

When the complete wall is removed the certain rays coming through the hole amalgamate in the full gloom.

3. Yaśovijaya explains the same in different manner. He compares kevalajñānāvaraṇa with the clouds obscuring the sun. Though the cloud enshrouds the light of the sun; yet its obscurance is not very thick. It is not so strong as to wipe out the difference between day and night. But, that dim light also can be further obscured by wall etc. The āvaraṇas of mati etc. are compared with this obscurance. At the time of kevala the obscurance of both the types is destroyed. This also means a sort of merger into the complete knowledge. But, Yaśovijaya introduces a new theory. He says that kevalajñānāvaraṇa has two functions. On one hand it obscures the kevalajñāna; on other hand, it produces the incomplete knowledge, which is further obscured by the other types of āvaraṇa. When the kevalajñānāvaraṇa is removed the question of the existence of incomplete knowledge does not arise. It is evident that Yaśovijaya is clearly influenced by the Vedantic conception of the two functions of avidyā. An āvaraṇa can conceal the light as well as blur the vision so that the object appears as disfigured, as in the case of whirling stick lighted at the ends (ālātacakra) or the appearance of two moons. But, where the knowledge is correct, whether partial or complete, it cannot be produced by āvaraṇa. The Vedantic conception of vikṣepaśakti can be justified on the ground that the appearance of external objects is false. It must have some defect in the cause. But, the Jainas do not hold the appearance of external objects as false. It is as true as the cognition produced by kevala. The difference lies in quantity and not in quality. Kevalajñāna and its āvaraṇa are opposed to each other. The latter cannot produce kevalajñāna. In the same way it cannot produce any other knowledge which holds the same nature as kevala.

4. Kundakunda proposes a fundamental difference between the two types of knowledge. He says that kevala is natural (svabhāva) while the other types are extra-natural (vibhāva)<sup>1</sup>.

1. Pravacanasāra. 1/47-49 & 58.



But, he does not explain his view. We can explain it in the light of Yaśovijaya. It can also be interpreted in the light of Brahmajñāna of the Vedānta. It means that the incomplete knowledge is not a part of the complete one but, an altogether different or rather opposite category. The reality cannot be realized in parts. The partial vision is not a true vision even to some extent. The truth is always complete. Even if we want to know one thing we have to know the all. There is no difference between the complete knowledge of one thing and the knowledge of entire universe. It means that the complete knowledge and incomplete knowledge cannot stay together.

5. There is another factor also which draws a line of distinction between the two. The incomplete knowledge is always accompanied by pride and prejudice, favour and disfavour. It results into love or hatred, attachment or enmity. The complete knowledge results into the indifferent attitude. Though this difference is not due to the existence or nonexistence of passions; yet, the passions do play a part in deciding the nature of knowledge. We cannot think incomplete knowledge without passions. Similarly, one cannot think the complete knowledge with passions.

6. Samantabhadra asserts that complete truth is found in the knowledge of the omniscient only. Incomplete knowledge is always mixed with more or less amount of falsity.

### **Kevala and Speech**

According to the Buddhist and Vedantist the reality is beyond the approach of mind as well as speech. The speech can represent the reality only when it is mixed with some conceptual element; which is not a reality. On this ground they hold that speech and omniscience are opposite to each other. According to Jainism the speech represents only a partial view of the object, but, that view is not wrong. It is also correct in relation to its own sphere of relativity. It becomes wrong only when it denies the views based on other aspects. Thus, according to Jainism the speech and omniscience are not opposed to each other.

### The Object of Kevalajñāna

The Upaniṣads repeatedly stress upon the knowledge of one which can lead to the knowledge of all. It is their main teaching. The Ācārāṅga also announces that a person who knows one, he knows all; and who knows all, he knows one. Both of them identify the knowledge of one with the knowledge of all.<sup>1</sup> But, the two systems explain the above fact in different ways. According to the Vedānta Brahman is the only reality. The knowledge of Brahman means the knowledge of entire reality. It denounces the knowledge of external things as mere verbal wrangling. It holds that the cause is the only reality and its knowledge implies the knowledge of effect. Bṛhadāraṇyaka says that the earth is the only reality. Its effects are merely the play of words. It is earth where all the pots of different types subsist. The knowledge of earth means the knowledge of all pots. Similarly, the knowledge of Brahman means the knowledge of entire universe. It does not mean that a person with the knowledge of Brahman comes to possess the knowledge of all things. It only means that he has seen the fundamental reality; after which the knowledge of resultant objects becomes false.

But, the Jaina interpretation is quite different. It does not hold that the knowledge of the fundamental cause is the only knowledge. The knowledge of effects also is as true as that of the cause. Knowledge of one as leading to the knowledge of all only means that all objects are so interrelated that the complete knowledge of one implies the knowledge of all. This contention is based on the fundamental principles of relative existence.

#### Kundakunda's view

Kundakunda provides another explanation of the above. He says that the above issue can be explained according to two view-points (nayas). If we follow that real view point (nīścayānaya) a kevalin perceives his self only. But, from the discursive

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1. Ācārāṅga 1/23.

view-point he knows all the objects.<sup>1</sup> Kundakunda generally interprets Jaina conceptions in the light of Vedānta. According to the Vedānta Brahman is self cognizant, similarly Kundakunda also holds soul as the self-cognizant. The vyavahāra-naya of Kundakunda is just like the vyāvahārika-satta of the Vedānta; which maintains that, on discursive plane, sarvajña means the cognizer of all external appearances, as it is in the case of God.

Kundakunda is interpreted also in the following way : According to the real view-point the soul is self-cognizant. It does not cognize anything else. But, all objects stand as reflected into soul. The knowledge of soul, therefore, ultimately leads to the knowledge of entire universe.

#### Arguments for Omniscience

We have given above some arguments generally advanced to prove omniscience. Below we give a summary of those and others briefly :

1. The soul is a knower by nature. It cannot remain ignorant of any object if there is no obstruction ; just as fire cannot cease to burn the fuel if it is without obstacle.<sup>2</sup>

2. The incomplete knowledge, which we experience, is a part of the complete one. The existence of the whole implies the existence of the part.

3. The passions (doṣa) and obscurances (āvaraṇa) must disappear totally at a certain stage as they have gradation ; just as the removal of the foreign matter from gold<sup>3</sup>.

4. The knowledge must have its stage of completeness as it is a graded phenomenon ; just as in the case of size the highest stage is found in the space, similarly, in the case of knowledge it is omniscience<sup>4</sup>.

5. We see the people with different degrees of intellect, sagacity etc. They must attain perfectness at a certain stage ; because, they have a gradation.

1. Niyamasāra 159.

2. Aṣṭasahasrī p. 50.

3. Āptamīmāṃsā, 4-5; Tattvārtha Ślokavārtika, 1/29/32-33.

4. Tattvārtha, Ślokavārtika 1/29/23.

# DARŚANA

## INARTICULATE COGNITION

### Darśana as Attitude

The term darśana is applied in two senses. In ethical field it means attitude of the soul towards worldly objects. It is right (samyak) if the soul leans towards spiritual progress & believes in liberation as the highest aim of life. It is wrong (mithyā) if the soul is engrossed in worldly pleasures and goes astray from the ultimate goal<sup>1</sup>. According to Siddhasena Divākara darśana, in the sense of attitude, is to be included into matijñāna.<sup>2</sup> But this can be said of the attitude found upto the seventh guṇasthāna only; where right attitude is caused by the rise of samyaktva mohanīya. The kṣayopaśama of matijñānāvaraṇa and the rise of either of the three degrees of darśanamohanīya create a certain attitude of mind towards worldly objects; it is called samyagdr̥ṣṭi, mithyādr̥ṣṭi or miśradr̥ṣṭi as the case may be. Beyond the seventh guṇasthāna the aspirant positively gets kṣāyika samyaktva which is a natural characteristic of the soul. It exists even in the liberated souls. This attitude is beyond the range of matijñāna. Though kṣāyika samyaktva is possible in the fourth guṇasthāna also, yet, the existence of other varieties is not ruled out. As a matter of fact, the right attitude can be created in two ways; firstly, it is a result of simple faith produced by the teachings of certain persons to whom we are devoted; or by the books which we hold in high esteem, being the sacred books of our family; or by logical confirmation based on arguments. Secondly, it comes as the result of inner purification; when a person subdues his passions, and rises above the pride and prejudices, he gets a real and distinct vision of soul and

1. Tattvārtha I. 2.

2. Tattvārtha tīkā p. 29

matter. The first type is a variety of mati as it is a mental phenomenon. The second type is manifestation of the natural quality of soul.

The psychology of early Buddhism divides knowledge into three degrees—*diṭṭhi* (opinion), *vitakka vicāra* (logical operations) and *bodhi* (intuitive knowledge). The latter two degrees can be compared with *parokṣa* and *pratyakṣa* of the *Tattvārtha*. The first degree is characterised as opinion not guided by reason (*paññindiya*) but, by desires (*taṇhā*). In the Jaina literature we meet both the terms; i. e. *darśana* and *diṭṭhi*. But the *diṭṭhi* of Buddhists is related with wrong attitude only. They do not hold any category as right attitude; because all conceptual knowledge, according to them, is false.<sup>1</sup>

### **Epistemology and Darśana**

In the theory of knowledge *darśana* is generally interpreted as inarticulate (*nirākāra*) appearance preceding articulate (*sākāra*) knowledge.<sup>2</sup>

Almost all the Indian schools of philosophy, except *Bharṭṛhari*, *Mādhva* and *Vallabha*, have admitted two stages of perception and recognized the existence of an indeterminate cognition before the stage of determinate cognition.<sup>3</sup> But, they hold slightly different views regarding the nature of these two stages : -

*Śaṅkara* holds indeterminate perception as the apprehension of mere being; the particular object and its properties are beyond its scope. According to this view the appearance of mere being (*sattā*) is the only appearance of reality. The association of particular names and properties is a projection of *avidyā*, and therefore, false. It means that the first stage of inarticulation is the cognition of reality and the stages of articulation are mere concepts, without corresponding objective

1. Psychological attitude of Early Buddhism p. 52

2. *Prajñāpanā* 15 pada.

3. *Vedānta Sāra*

reality. The general conception of the Jaina also resembles the Vedānta as far as it holds mere being as the object of darśana. But, the Jaina does not make any distinction between articulate and inarticulate cognition in regard to their relation with the reality. He holds that both are equally real and objective. In the above sense ākāra means bheda (division).

The Buddhist<sup>1</sup> also holds the articulate cognition merely conceptual, having no objective reality; and inarticulate cognition as the apprehension of mere objective reality. But, unlike the Vedantist he does not hold it as the apprehension of mere being. He contends that inarticulate cognition apprehends the thing-in-itself, without any association of name or class-concepts. The difference between Vedānta and the Buddhism owes to their different conceptions of reality. The Buddhist does not divide perception into the above-mentioned two varieties, but holds them as independent types of knowledge; namely, *pratyakṣa* (perception) and *anumāna* (inference). There are two different types of objects also corresponding to them. Perception is related with percepts, the objective reality and inference with concepts which have no objective reality. According to Jainism concepts are not devoid of objective reality. The Buddhism holds ākāra as *vikalpa*, the conceptual notions of class, name etc. and not *bheda* as the Vedānta maintains. According to Buddhism every thing is *svalakṣaṇa*, i. e. having its own individual definition, without any similarity with others. The difference between Jaina and Buddhist can be noticed in the following points :

1. According to Buddhism *vikalpa* is merely conceptual; according to Jainism it is as real as the percepts.

2. According to Buddhism the object of first appearance is particular without any identification with others. According to Jainism it is general without any distinction.

3. The Buddhist stresses upon the term *nirvikalpa*; as *vikalpa* according to him, means absence of reality. The Jainas

1. Nyāyabindu p. 11

propose nirākāra, as the cognition of generality has no particular form or shape.

4. The Buddhists proceed from particular to general. The Jainas from general to particular.

5. According to the Buddhist nirvikalpaka cognition occurs when three factors of mental-stream (citta-santati), sense-stream (indriya-santati) and object-stream (viṣaya-santati) meet one another. According to Jainism it occurs just after the contiguity between senses and the object. This contiguity is not necessarily a contact but the capability of perceiving the object; caused by a particular kṣayopaśama. In the case of intuitional (avadhi and kevala) darśanas the senses do not play any part.

7. As far as the cognizer and the object are concerned the Jaina does not hold any difference between jñāna and darśana. According to Buddhism nirvikalpa is the result of above three factors while savikalpa is mere mental. In one case the object is real, in the other it is unreal.

8. The Buddhism holds pratyakṣa as the illumination and anumāna as creation. According to Jainism every cognition is illumination.

Kumārila<sup>1</sup> holds that indeterminate perception apprehends the individual (vyakti), which is the substratum (ādhāra) of its generic and specific characters. The Buddhist also held individual as the object of inarticulate cognition; but, that individual was devoid of all concepts. Kumārila maintains, the same as the substratum of class-concepts. He also holds ākāra as the name or class but, unlike Buddhism they are not merely conceptual.

Prabhākara maintains that both the generic and specific characters are the object of inarticulate cognition; but they appear in it as an indistinguishable mass.<sup>1</sup> In his view

1. Śloka-vārtika Sūtra IV. 113. see also Strūa IV, 112 and 118; and Nyāyaratnākara

ākāra means arrangement. The earlier Vaiśeṣika also holds the same view.

Pārthasārathi Miśra,<sup>1</sup> the great exponent of Kumārila, views that inarticulate cognition is the apprehension of an object with its multifarious properties, such as generality, substantiality, quality, action and name etc. but they do not appear as related to one another. According to this view ākāra means relation.<sup>2</sup>

Vācaspati Miśra presents the Sāṅkhya view of immediate perception as the simple apprehension of an object, pure, unqualified and uncharacterised. In this view ākāra means qualification or characterization.<sup>3</sup>

The earlier Naiyāyika<sup>4</sup> maintains that there is no difference between the two except that the inarticulate cognition does not give any name to the object. As far as the cognition of substantiality, quality, generality and action are concerned they are similar to each other. Here ākāra means 'name' which resembles the Jaina conception of śruta-jñāna.

The later N.V. hold that indeterminate perception apprehends the object and its property as unrelated to each other. Here, ākāra means relation.<sup>5</sup>

The Neo-Sankarites also hold that indeterminate perception is the nonrelational appearance of an object which is not necessarily sensuous in character. The old Vedantist expressed the object of immediate perception in positive terms. Here, the same is repeated in negative terms in order to avoid dialectical difficulties.<sup>6</sup>

1. Prakaraṇa Pañcīkā pp. 54-5.
2. Śāstradīpikā pp. 139-140.
3. Sāṅkhya Tattva Kaumudī K. 5.
4. Nyāyabhāṣya I. 1. 4.
5. Tattvacintāmaṇi Vol. I. (B. I.) p. 809
6. Vedānta Paribhāṣā p. 89



The above mentioned systems have coined different terms to suit their conceptions of the two cognitions. The main terms are as given below :

1. Vedānta and Jainism —	Nirākāra	sākāra
2. Buddhism —	Nirvikalpaka	savikalpaka
3. Nyāya —	Niṣprakāra	saprakāra

If we take up nirākāra and sākāra as the general terms, the above views can be summed up as follows :

1. Nirākāra has generality as its object while sākāra has particularity (Vedānta).

2. Nirākāra is particular while sākāra is general. The position is totally reversed (Buddhism).

3. Nirākāra has both, general and particular, as its object but without any relation (Pārthasārathi Miśra).

4. Nirākāra means cognition of an object without any quality (Sāṅkhya).

5. Nirākāra means cognition of both, the object as well as its property, without relation (Nyāya).

6. Ākāra means class. Nirākāra means the cognition of individual without associating it with a class (Kumārila).

7. Nirākāra means absence of name (old Nyāya).

### **Darśana in the Jaina Epistemology**

The Paṇṇavaṇā sutta divides upayoga into sākāra (articulate) and nirākāre ( inarticulate ) cognitions. The sākāra is known as jñāna while nirākāra as darśana. Darśana is devoid of judgment (vyavasāya). In the logical period it is not included into the category of pramāṇa. As a matter of fact it is neither pramāṇa nor apramāṇa. The terms applied to valid and invalid judgments respectively. Darśana is mere awareness without any predication.

Regarding the actual nature of darśana the Jaina scholars

hold widely different views.<sup>1</sup> Before going into the detailed account we would like to sum up them in the following :

1. The direct cognition is darśana while that obtained through a mark is jñāna.

2. Darśana apprehends the present only, while jñāna is related with all the three times.

3. Darśana is limited to the appearance of mere existence; while jñāna begins with particularization.

4. Darśana represents the view-point of universality and jñāna that of particularity.

5. Darśana is the cognition of particular object without knowing their particularity.

6. Darśana is the first two stages of mati; i. e. avagraha and thā. Jñāna begins from the stage of avāya.

7. Darśana stands on the same stage in the case of mind and vision where Vyañjanāvagraha stands in the case of touch-senses.

8. Darśana is identical with Vyañjanāvagraha; jñāna proceeds with Arthāvagraha.

9. Avagraha is Darśana; while the subsequent stages of thā etc. are jñāna.

10. Darśana apprehends the self only, while jñāna is related with external objects.

11. Darśana is the first inclination of soul towards knowing something, preceding the contiguity :

1) *Darśana as Direct Cognition* : The first view has been referred to by Siddhasena Gaṇin in his commentary on the Taevārtha.<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately, we are in the dark about the upholder of this view. Siddhasena Gaṇin mentions it only to reject it at the end. According to this view the term ākāra, as stated in the Prajñāpanā and other Āgamas, means the mark. Sākāra

1. Prajñāpanā 15 pada

2. Tattvārthatīkā Su. II. 8, p. 152

upayoga means the cognition obtained through a mark, as one infers a conch from its sweet and soft sound. It does not include the case of visual perception where we cognize a jar through appearance of certain form, as the mark must be different from the object that is conceived. Roughly stated, this view renders all the sense-cognitions as darśana while limits jñāna to the inferential types only. But, in its deeper sense, this view reflects Diñnāga and Dharmakīrti. They hold two types of knowledge corresponding to the two types of objects. The external real objects are particulars without the association of class or name, which makes them expressible. They are merely perceptual. The notions of class, name etc. are merely mental creations. Their knowledge is conceptual. Perceptual knowledge is direct, while the conceptual is formed by the mind on the basis of perception. It is an attempt to explain the appearance. The division of darśana and jñāna, according to the view under discussion, can be identified with perceptual and conceptual types of knowledge of the Buddhist.

Like Diñnāga and Dharmakīrti, the modern thinkers like Bosanquet also hold that all conceptual knowledge is inferential. We do not see a jar, but a particular form which gives rise to a particular class-concept already existing in the mind. The cognition of mere form is Darśana while its adjustment with a class concept is jñāna. In the words of Kant the appearance of the thing-in-itself is darśana while its understanding through moulding it into certain categories is jñāna. The Indian realists maintain that knowledge of an object through visual and factual qualities is perception while that through the qualities of taste or sound is inference. The knowledge of a jar, through its visible form is perception; but, the knowledge of a car through its sound is inference. As a matter of fact both the cases belong to the same category. In the case of jar, we do not see jar but a particular shape. We call that shape as jar, because, we are taught to associate that particular name with that particular form. That teaching is revived in memory and we call a particular shape with the particular name. In the case of car we listen to

the sound and infer the car. In the case of jar we see a particular colour and form and infer the jar. There is no material difference between the two cases. It can be said that sound is not a quality of the car. It is a mark, indicating existence of the car. In the case of visual perception the form and colour are the very characteristics of the object. The person who has cognition of this type does not make further attempts. His curiosity is satisfied. The process of perceiving the object is finished along with it. But, in the case of sound one is not satisfied with that much. He desires to ascertain further till the object is clearly seen. It shows a clear difference between the knowledge of sound and that of the form. But, this distinction holds good in a rough estimate only. When the question is discussed minutely it does not stand any longer. The desire does not prove the absence of clarity; but, the anxiousness to know a particular quality on the part of the subject. In the case of a mango-fruit the subject is not satisfied with the observation of colour and form. He is not satisfied till he does not taste it. In the case of a flower one is not satisfied till he smells it. In the case of a musical instrument one desires to know its sound. The desire depends mainly on the purpose served by the object. The object is not deemed as known until its main quality, for which it is recognized as such, is known. What is said about the sound and car, can be said of taste and the fruit also. The objection that sound is different from the object, does not apply to this case. The taste is a quality of the fruit. One infers the nature of fruit through its taste; which is an essential characteristic of all the tangible objects (rūpins). Thus, we can say that all the conceptual knowledge is inferential. According to the view under discussion all knowledge, i. e. jñāna is conceptual or inferential. It is a judgment, where something is predicated. The appearance without predication is darśana.

If the present view is accepted in the sense explained above, not much difference remains between it and the popularly accepted view which we have numbered three. The only difficulty

that stands against it, is, that it falls short in the case of intuitional cognitions. The Jaina Āgamas accept distinction between darśana and jñāna in the case of avadhi and kevala also. But, we cannot say, in their case, that one is obtained through mark while the other is not. All of them are direct. Siddhasena Gaṇin rejects the above view on this very ground.<sup>1</sup>

(2) *Darśana as Confined to the Present only* : The second view is this; darśana apprehends the present only while jñāna is related with all the three tenses, present, past and future. We can compare this view with the modern thinkers like Russell, differentiating sensation from image. Russell holds that sensation is without any mixture of the past events or memory, while the image is not constructed until it is mixed with the past impressions or memory. This view also falls short in the case of intuitional knowledge, particularly that of omniscience, where every thing is perceptual.

It may be observed that the above two views, though logically sound, are not accepted, because they fall short in the case of supernatural knowledge.

(3) *Darśana as the Apprehension of Generic character* : According to Jainism everything consists of both the generic as well as the specific characters.<sup>2</sup> It is also admitted that knowledge as a general rule, proceeds from generality to particularity. We have elaborately discussed this factor in the division of matijñāna. According to the present view darśana, apprehends generality while jñāna is related with particularity. It can be said that the terms of generality and particularity are not fixed, they are relative. The same object can claim both the categories in different relations. But, in the present case generality means absolute generality, which is in no way particularity, such as the apprehension of mere being.

Though, this view is generally accepted by the Agamic as well as the later scholars; yet, it is not free from confusion. It

1. Tattvārtha Sūtra II, 8. p. 152

2. Sanmati Tarka 2. 1

is generally held that darśana is the first apprehension, occurring after the contiguity of subject with the object. But, it is inconsistent with the conception of vyañjanāvagraha. Vyañjanāvagraha is generally defined as the contact between senses and the object. It is the physical grasping of an object. It is included in the process of knowledge simply because it is cause of the latter. No knowledge of any sort, whether general or particular is possible before it. The limitation of vyañjanāvagraha to the four senses, which cognize the object after real contact, has no significance if it is not the first stage or is preceded by some other apprehension. Vyañjanāvagraha is followed by arthāvagraha. Thus, there is no place for darśana.

While defining avagraha, some scholars have specified that after contiguity there is darśana and then avagraha. But, this order also goes against the notion of vyañjanāvagraha. In other definitions the avagraha is stated as the first apprehension of generality after the contiguity. If this view is accepted, darśana would mean a stage before contiguity.

Yaśovijaya<sup>3</sup> suggests a solution for this difficulty. He states that darśana is nothing but naiścayikāvagraha. It should be recalled here that vyañjanāvagraha is mere contiguity of senses and the object. The subsequent stage is arthāvagraha. It has two considerations. When considered precisely it is the first general apprehension occurring after contiguity. It is known as naiścayikāvagraha. Roughly considered avagraha is a relative term. Generality, in this case, means a comparative generality. The apprehension, "He is a man" is a cognition of particularity as it specifies the class of man etc. In true aspect such cognitions are avāya. But, when the cognizer goes further and tries to know whether the person under consideration is an English or German, the former cognition becomes ava-

1. Sarvārthasiddhi
2. LaghIyastraya p. 2, Śloka 5.
3. Jñānabindu

graha. But, the naiścayikāvagraha is absolutely free from the notions of class, name etc. Yaśovijaya holds the same as darśana.

This view, though rational, upsets the Agamic divisions of mati. The province of mati starts with vyañjanāvagraha and ends with dhāraṇā. To hold darśana as a middle stage makes the latter a part of mati.

(4) *Darśana as the Representative of dravyārthika naya* : Siddhasena Divākara,<sup>1</sup> who always looks to the side of object, explains jñāna and darśana in another way. He says that universality and particularity are two aspects of one and the same individual. The consideration of these aspects is based on two different view-points (nayas). The view-points related with the aspect of universality are known as dravyārthika while those with the aspect of particularity are termed as paryāyārthika. Darśana and jñāna stress upon these two fundamental aspects respectively. Though the object is same in both cases; yet, darśana takes into consideration the universal aspect, while jñāna the particular one.

' In the stage of omniscience, when the object is intuited as whole and not in parts, and the knowledge is all-comprehensive, the distinction of darśana and jñāna disappears.

(5) *Darśana as the cognition of particulars without particularity* : According to Abhayadeva<sup>2</sup>, the commentator of Sanmati, Darśana is the cognition of particular objects without knowing their particularity. This is a logical explanation of Siddhasena in the light of Nyāya. It means that the object is same in the case of Darśana as well as Jñāna. But, in the first case the particulars are not recognized as such. They are apprehended without any relation between one another.

(6) *Darśana as the first two stages of Mati* : Jinabhadra in his Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya and Malayagiri in his commentary on the Sthānāṅga sūtra, refer to a view holding avagraha and ihā

1. Sanmatitarka II. 2.

2. Sanmatitarka Ṭīkā p. 553

as darśana, while the latter stages of avāya and dhāraṇā as jñāna. The identification of darśana with avagraha and thā, as the present view proposes, puts down the objection raised above. But, this would either upset the theory of the four stages of matijñāna or reject the separate existence of darśana.<sup>1</sup>

(7) *Darśana as the first stage of Distant-senses* : Siddhasena Divākara<sup>2</sup> holds that darśana is the first apprehension of things cognized by the distant senses. According to this view darśana is confined to two senses only, i. e. the sight and the mind. The four touch-senses do not come in this category. The terms cakṣur-darśana and akaṣur-darśana are confined here, to the visual and mental cognitions respectively. The mental cognition here does not include inference etc. in it. It is confined to conceptual judgments only, just as the existence of atoms. This view brings darśana at par with vyañjanāvagraha. The stage ascribed to vyañjanāvagraha in the case of touch-senses, is allotted to darśana in the case of other senses.

(8) *Darśana as identical with Vyañjanāvagraha* : Brahmadeva<sup>3</sup> states contiguity as the definition of darśana; but, he does not exclude the touch-senses from this category. In his case the scope of vyañjanāvagraha is identical with darśana.

(9) *Darśana as Arthāvagraha* : Siddhasena Divākara<sup>4</sup> refers to another view, which holds that arthāvagraha is darśana, while the subsequent stages are jñāna. We have already discussed this view in the name of Yaśovijaya.

According to Brahmadeva<sup>5</sup> the cognition of colour, taste etc. in a general way is darśana while that of its division, yellow, white etc., is jñāna. This conception also amounts to the same view as expressed above.

1. Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya G. 536

2. Sanmatitarka II. 21.

3. Bṛhaddravyasaṅgraha p. 81

4. Sanmatitarka II. 22.

5. Bṛhaddravyasaṅgraha p. 88



(10) *Darśana as apprehension of the self*: Virasena<sup>1</sup> refers to a view that every cognition apprehends the self as well as the external object. The two parts of objectivity are confined to darśana and jñāna respectively. Darśana apprehends the self only while jñāna is related with external objects. This view fixes the provinces of jñāna and darśana definitely.

A point is raised that the above view goes against the general notion of jñāna. It is defined as cognition of the self as well as the object. If the distinction between jñāna and darśana is based on their being cognitions of the external objects and the self, respectively, jñāna stands no more as the cognition of both. Thus, the Jaina conception of knowledge would become identical with that of the Nyāya.

Brahmadeva<sup>2</sup> replies that the above objection is not applicable in the present case. The Naiyāyika does not hold darśana and jñāna as two different types of knowledge. He maintains that no knowledge is self-luminous. It means that there is no instrument to know knowledge itself. It would remain always unknown at the time of its production. It is only in later stages that the knowledge itself can be cognised, if so desired. According to Jainism darśana and jñāna are two different types complementing each other. Thus, nothing remains unknown. They are two functions of the same agent. For instance, fire burns as well cooks. The activity of fire is the same in both cases. The distinction is based on the objects it operates upon. The same activity operates on fuel as burning, and on rice as cooking. Similarly, the same consciousness when acts as apprehension of the self, it is darśana; while the same is jñāna when apprehending external objects. The division is based on the objects and not on the activity.

(11) *Darśana as the first inclination of the self*: Dhavalā<sup>3</sup> improves the last view that darśana starts with the first inclina-

1. Dhavalā pp. 145-48

2. Bṛhaddravyasaṅgraha p. 82

3. Dhavalā p. 458-9

tion of the self to know an object. This stage precedes the stage of contiguity. If we consider the process of knowledge, the above views can be put in the following order :

1. Inclination or mere awareness—The view held by Dhavalā
2. Contiguity—Siddhasena and Yaśovijaya.
3. The cognition of mere existence—Pūjyapāda and the logical period
4. Cognition of general type—Nemicandra and Brahmadeva

As a matter of fact the term avagraha and its general definition denote that it is the first stage where an object comes into consideration. Darśana, therefore, must be the stage of mere awareness or contiguity. In the latter case it would be confined to two senses only as the case of touch-senses goes to vyañjanāvagraha.

Further, the terms of vyañjanāvagraha and Arthāvagraha themselves support the above view. Vyañjanāvagraha is merely an activity of senses before reaching the object, as vyañjanā means the senses which manifest the object. It is in the stage of arthāvagraha that the object enters into the process. Now, darśana must be a stage preceding them. It can be nothing but the desire of soul towards knowing a particular object, which sets the senses at work.

Brahmadeva<sup>1</sup> explains it in the following way : The self makes an effort to know the external object. It is an intellectual phenomenon resulting into jñāna. This effort is darśana while the later cognition is jñāna. For instance, a person is engaged in conceiving a jar, wishes to know a cloth. He turns his mind from the jar and tries to apply the same to cloth. The middle stage when the mind has left the association with jar and has not reached the cloth is darśana. This state lasts for a short while only.

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1. Bṛhaddravyaśaṅgraha p. 81

Darśana is recognized as 'sāmānyagrahaṇa' in all the texts. But the term sāmānya is interpreted differently. Vīrasena<sup>1</sup> and Brahmadeva<sup>2</sup> assert that sāmānya means the self or jīva. Vīrasena says that the self is sāmānya (general); because, it is common in all the cases of cognition. He further states that visual darśana is the result of the kṣayopaśama of cakṣurdarśanāvarṇa. This kṣayopaśama, though confined to visual perception only, does not make any distinction amongst the perceptions of different objects. Perception of jar is the result of similar kṣayopaśama as it is the perception of cloth. Kṣayopaśama is the manifestation of a particular power. The power is not related with the cognition of particular objects, but, to the capacity of soul. It would illumine any object that is within the grasp of that capacity. The kṣayopaśama is identical with the self and its first inclination towards application of that power is darśana. Brahmadeva holds that the self is sāmānya; because, it is common to all cognitions. The soul is a common cause in the perception of a jar as well as a cloth. The two cognitions are differentiated from each other on the basis of objects only.

### **Dhavalā and Akalaṅka**

Another explanation in this context may be traced in Rājavārtika. Akalaṅka<sup>3</sup> states that consciousness has two forms; the subjective form (jñānākāra) and the objective form (jñeyākāra). The subjective form is like the mirror without reflection; and the objective form is like that with reflection. Darśana, as stated by Dhavalā, can be identified with jñānākāra while jñāna with jñeyākāra. Akalaṅka relates jñānākāra as parātman while jñeyākāra as svātman; but, that is in respect of a jar, the object. If the same thing is considered in respect of the self or knowledge the order will be reverse. Then, jñānākāra would be considered as svātman and jñeyākāra or parāt-

1. Dhavalā p. 380-82

2. Bṛhadravyasaṅgraha p. 81

3. Rājavārtika p. 55

man. Darśana, on account of its being unassociated with the objective element, is svātman, the real nature of the self. Jñāna is associated with the object, and therefore, it is not the real nature of the self. It is parātman. Akalāṅka also states jñānākāra as common to all cognitions (sarvasādhāraṇa) while jñeyākāra as different with each cognition. It is particular (viśeṣa). Thus, we can say that the above statement is a logical interpretation of Dhavalā.

### **The Criticism of Dhavalā**

An objection based on the literal meaning of the term of darśana, is advanced against Dhavalā. Darśana means observation. If the external objects are not observed by darśana, none else can do so. This will render the whole universe invisible as it is in the case of a blind man.

Brahmadeva replies to the above that the function of observation is done by jñāna. Philosophical conceptions do not necessarily follow the popular sense of a term. The process of knowledge begins with darśana and lasts upto the final stage of jñāna. The purpose of present discussion is to allot the province to each stage. The popular view has no weight whether observation should be included into jñāna or darśana. Moreover, darśana is not directly related to the external object. Indirectly, it covers everything. Darśana observes the self, which contains jñāna and jñāna is related with the external object.

Again, it can be objected; if darśana and jñāna are apprehensions of the self and external things respectively, they should appear simultaneously; as the soul is never self-ignorant.

Dhavalā replies, when the obscuring karman is totally removed, jñāna and darśana are always simultaneous. But, in the case of incomplete knowledge they appear gradually. In the state of external appearance the internal is obscured. Obscurance does not mean here total disappearance but its falling into the back ground.

Again it can be asked that *śrutajñāna* also is self-cognitive like other cognitions. Consequently, there should be a *śruta-darśana* preceding *śrutajñāna*. Dhavalā replies that this objection stands no more as *śruta* is preceded by *mati*, which is also *jñāna*. Similarly, *manaḥparyāya* also preceded by *mati* or *avadhi*, and therefore, has no corresponding *darśana*.

Again, there is one objection, which is a bit hard to explain. If *darśana*, being an internal appearance, is independent of the senses; the division of *cakṣurdarśana* and *acakṣurdarśana* becomes groundless, because, in the region of internal cognitions the only instrument that works is the soul; which is common in all cases.

Dhavalā replies that the division of *darśana* is not based on the self-appearance but on its subsequent transformation into *jñāna*. *Cakṣurdarśana* means the self-appearance resulting into visual cognition and so on. According to Jainas every cognition of an external object is preceded by the corresponding effort of soul which is termed after the resulting *jñāna*. The number of *kṣayopaśamas*, responsible for *darśana*, is the same as that of resulting *jñāna*. This contention is not a fancy. It is based on sound logic. In each and every case of cognition we have to admit the consciousness of certain inherent power existing in the soul.

This explains the order of succession also in the case, of different *darśanas*. The *darśana* of *jar* is not coexistent with the *darśana* of cloth; because, they are produced in succession.

### Two senses of self cognition

According to Jainism all cognitions apprehend the object as well as the self. But, Dhavalā holds that *darśana* does not apprehend the external object, while *jñāna* does not apprehend the self. We can explain this difficulty by analysing the meaning of the self (*sva*). The cognition of the self (*svaprakāśa*) has two meanings. Firstly, it is self-illumination accompanying all the appearances of external as well as the internal objects. Secondly, it is activity of the self occurring before

jñāna. It is a sort of attention. In the distinction of jñāna from darśana we take the latter sense. In the definition of knowledge as general we have the former sense.

### **The Main differences summed up**

The main differences between the conventional view and that of Dhavalā can be summed up in the following points :

Conventional view	Dhavalā's view
1. Jñāna is a decisive knowledge of the self as well as the object, darśana is not decisive.	Darśana and jñāna both are decisive; darśana is related with the self while jñāna with external objects.
2. Darśana is the cognition of generality, while jñāna is that of particularity.	Darśana and jñāna both are cognitions of generality as well as particularity.
3. Both occur after the contiguity of senses with the object.	Darśana is prior and jñāna posterior to the contiguity.
4. Both are related with the self as well as external objects.	Darśana is related with the self while jñāna with the external objects
5. Darśana is not pramāṇa; jñāna is both.	Darśana is always pramāṇa, jñāna is both.

The view of Dhavalā can be compared with Samānāntara-pratyaya of the Buddhist.

### **The Two Views Reconciled**

We have stated above several notions regarding darśana, which are found in the Śvetāmbara or Digambara literature. Fundamentally, they can be put into two broad and naturally opposite groups. According to the first group darśana occurs after the contiguity between subject and the object; while, according to the second group it occurs before. In the original Āgamas we find two terms expressing the nature of darśana. They are nirākāra and sāmānyagrahaṇa. But, these terms do not lead to any conclusion, as they can be interpreted in both

ways. In the later literature generally, the first view is followed; but, Vīrasena, who is held in very high esteem by Digambaras, successfully refutes the above view and establishes the second. It is strange that he did not get a following. The great scholars like Pūjyapāda, Akalaṅka and Vidyānanda do not care even to mention the second view. All of them are advocates of the first view. Of course, they lived earlier than Vīrasena, but not earlier than the date of the first view; which was first proposed by Kundakunda. We cannot say that the later scholars were not in its knowledge.

Brahmadeva<sup>1</sup> makes an attempt to reconcile both the views. He says, 'If a parson explains both the views after understanding clearly the import of logic as well as the Āgamas and keeps an impartial attitude; then, both are correct. 'He holds that logic is meant for convincing others. It explains a theory in the light of the conceptions held by others. When a non-Jaina asks about the difference between jñāna and darśana, he is roughly replied that darśana is the cognition of generality, while jñāna is that of particularity. But, when the same thing is explained for a clear understanding of darśana, it is the cognition of the self.

Brahmadeva's solution<sup>1</sup> for the two views is not fully convincing; yet, he points out to one significant thing. It can be said, on this basis, that the first view is a later phase. It appears that this view was introduced as a logical interpretation of the Jaina theory. We have stated before that the Āgamas are silent about the self-cognizability of jñāna. Ābhinibodhika, the synonym of mati, is explained as the cognition leaning towards the object. The introduction of 'sva' (self) in the definition of pramāṇa is a later development, perhaps borrowed from Dīnnāga. But, it was adjusted in the system as the term pramāṇa in its early phase stood for an aggregate of jñāna as well as darśana. According to Dhavalā darśana is not excluded from the category of pramāṇa. Moreover, the Jainas

1. Bṛhaddravyaśaṅgraha p. 83

did not leave the self unknown as the Nyāya did. Like all other systems, admitting consciousness as a natural characteristic of the self, the Jaina also admitted the soul as self-luminary. But, he maintained two bases for the two phenomena in the same process. In the course of time *pramāṇa* and *samyag-jñāna* became synonyms, and the term *jñāna* included in it the self-cognition also. Consequently the logicians had to find out another explanation for *darśana*. Though, they gave up the original view; yet, did not abandon two things. Firstly, that *darśana* is the starting point of knowledge. Secondly, it is the apprehension of generality. With the advent of logical period, as I have stated before, the venue of epistemological interpretations changed from subjective to objective. Consequently, the activity of mere soul was altogether left. The first stage of knowledge became contiguity between senses and the object; and '*sāmānyagrahaṇa*' was interpreted as the cognition of mere existence.

Another point which may be held responsible for the above two views is this; *pramāṇa* is generally held as the cause of valid knowledge; but the Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras differ from each other in the exact nature of that cause. Vidyānanda holds that the cause of knowledge is *labdhIndriya*, meaning the psychical senses in the form of power. He clearly states that in the definition of *pramāṇa*, *jñāna* means the power of soul leading to the apprehension of an object. Devasūri, on the other hand, holds *upayoga*, i. e. attention or application of that power as the cause of knowledge. The stage of *labdhi* exists before the contiguity, but, that of attention comes after it. The view held by Dhavalā, is nowhere mentioned by the Śvetāmbaras. In the Digambara tradition we have both the views; for which the above difference regarding the cause of knowledge also may be held responsible to some extent.

#### The Popular View Criticized by Vīrasena

Vīrasena<sup>1</sup> criticizes the popular view on the following grounds :

1. Dhavalā p. 145-8



1. Firstly, a reality consists of generality and particularity both combined. One without the other is inconceivable. Both of them appear simultaneously in each and every cognition. If generality is admitted as the object of darśana and particularity that of jñāna, they cannot appear at one and the same moment; as a person with incomplete knowledge cannot have two cognitions at a time. We shall have to admit, therefore, that none of the jñāna and darśana, is devoid of either of the two aspects.

2. Secondly, even if it is accepted that jñāna and darśana are related with one aspect each, they will lose their validity. A valid cognition means the knowledge of reality. Generality without particularity and particularity without generality are no more a reality. Their cognition means a partial cognition and hence, it is not valid.

3. Thirdly, the aspects of generality and particularity, in exclusion of each other cannot be the objects of knowledge, as one, divested of the other does not exist at all.

4. Fourthly, the conception of darśanāvaraṇya also goes against the popular view. Amongst the nine types of it, the first four follow the corresponding types of darśana. They cannot be understood independently. But, the remaining five types of slumber (nidrā) etc. are self-evident. According to the theory of karman they do not put any obscurance on jñāna. They are related with darśana only. They do not put obstruction merely to the cognition of generality. They obstruct the very activity of soul towards knowing. Our body, and hence the physical sense of touch, is already in contact with the bed during sleep. Yet, cognition does not arise, as the soul activity is obstructed. In karma-literature darśanāvaraṇa is compared with a gate-keeper who does not allow the person to be presented to the king. It means that darśanāvaraṇa is a general obstruction not allowing any type of cognition, general or particular. This is possible if the very activity of soul is obstructed.

As a matter of fact the consciousness of an object is accompanied by two appearances (pratyayas); i.e. the appearance of assertion (anvayapratyaya) and the appearance of negation (vyatirekapratyaya). When we see a jar, our appearance asserts the existence of jar and negates the existence of other things. These two pratyayas are not separate from each other. They constitute two aspects of expression related with the same cognition. The appearance of an object is impossible without resorting to both of them. Anvayapratyaya is related with generality and vyatirekapratyaya with particularity. They appear in succession only when expressed through words or conceived discriminately; but, in general appearance they are simultaneous. Even in speech or conception the assertion of jar naturally means the negation of others. The only difference is that one sense is expressed while the other is implied. Darśana and jñāna, which in the case of incomplete knowledge must have succession, cannot be related with two aspects appearing simultaneously and identically. Darśana is, therefore, simple awareness of the self without any contact with the object. This appearance is called svagata-pratyaya (self-awareness).

Siddhasena's view of jñāna and darśana as the representative of two nayas also is untenable on the same ground. The Nayas are not cognitions of particular aspects; but expressions. In expression also the different aspect is not altogether left, but regarded as implied; which in no way can be interpreted as absence. The aspects of generality and particularity are present in every appearance. In expression also the relevant point is put forth while the other goes to the background. The naya which totally rejects the possibility of other aspects is regarded as durnaya or nayābhāsa (fallacious view-point).

Dhavalā<sup>1</sup> also rejects the view that avagraha and Ihā are darśana while the other stages are jñāna. It specifically asserts that all the four stages, beginning with avagraha upto dhāraṇā are matijñāna.

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1. Ibid.

### Darśana as Cit and Jñāna as Prakāśa

Dhavalā makes a distinction between jñāna and darśana on the basis that darśana is simple awareness of the self. It is known as cit or caitanya (consciousness). Jñāna is the knowledge of external objects, known as prakāśa (illumination). In the state of darśana, there is no arrangement of the subject and object. It is a sort of awakening, where the self gets ready to know objects.

Nemicandra defines darśana in following verse :

Jaṃ sāmāṇaggahaṇam, bhāvāṇam ṇeya kattu āyaram,  
Avisesiūṇa atṭhe, daṃsaṇamidi bhaṇṇae samae.<sup>1</sup>

The above verse is admitted as the standard way of distinguishing darśana from jñāna. It is generally translated as, that perception of the generalities of things without particularities in which there is no grasping of details, is called darśana in the scriptures. This definition is divided into the following three parts :

- (1) Jaṃ Sāmāṇaggahaṇam bhāvāṇam—General apprehension of the objects.
- (2) ṇeya kattu āyaram—without particulars.
- (3) Avisesiūṇa atṭhe—without grasping details.

According to Dhavalā sāmāṇaggahaṇa means the awareness of the self. The self is sāmānya (general) because it is common to every cognition. In the former interpretation sāmāṇaggahaṇa meant general apprehension and bhāvāṇam (of objects) stood as its objective. In the present interpretation sāmāṇaggahaṇa means the appearance of sāmānya i. e. the self. Bhāvāṇam is associated with the second particular of 'ṇeya kattu āyaram.' Thus it means, without qualifying or characterizing it with the objects. Before, the association of attributes of the objects knowledge is simple and without any form or shape. The objects transform the knowledge and give it a particular shape. This shape is described as ākāra.

#### 1. Gommatasāra

Jayadhavalā<sup>1</sup> interprets ākāra in two ways. Firstly, it means the state of being object to certain knowledge. All external things exist in their own nature independent of knowledge. A certain internal or external phenomenon transforms a particular thing into the objective of a certain knowledge. On account of this transformation that particular thing is separated from the multitude of other things. Darśana is the stage occurring before this phenomenon. Secondly, 'ākāra' means the object other than the self. Both definitions lead to the same conclusion. The first takes into consideration the object while the second is related with the self.

The third particular is 'avisesiūṇa atthe'. In the former interpretation it meant without associating the object with its details. In the present it means without specification or qualification of the objects. In the former case it meant qualifying the cloth with colour etc. as it is red, white, cotton, woollen etc. In the present case it means qualifying the knowledge with objects, as it is the knowledge of jar, cloth etc.

In the cognition of 'this is a jar', the jar stands as the object of consciousness and; thus, it is objectified. At the same time the object on its part qualifies the consciousness. These, two functions i. e. the objectification of the thing and qualification of consciousness are designed by Jayadhavalā as ākāra. Darśana is free from either of the two functions. In its case neither a thing stands as an object nor the consciousness as qualified. It is self-luminous. We can compare it with the light, when there is no object to be illumined. The light is no more an illuminer as long as the object does not come in its contiguity. We may call it simply shining. But, the same becomes illumining when an object enters into the sphere. Similarly, the state of consciousness before the introduction of an object is nirākāra or without object. This is called darśana or cit. As soon as an object is introduced it becomes sākāra, jñāna or prakāśa.

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1. Jaya Dhavalā p. 359

We can compare the view of Dhavalā with the conception of Sākṣīcāitanya as held by the Vedānta.

### Darśana and Pramāṇa

As on the nature of darśana, there are different views regarding its validity also. According to Buddhism and the Vedānta it is the sole claimant of real validity. The articulate cognition or conceptual knowledge can have only a discursive validity. In the systems of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika the conception of validity changes with the change in definition of pramāṇa. The old schools generally define pramāṇa as the experience free from illusion. On this basis Śrīdhara has accepted inarticulate cognition as pramāṇa. Viśvanātha also follows him. But, Gaṅgeśa, the father of the school of Navyanyāya, holds validity of predication as an essential condition of pramāṇa.<sup>1</sup> According to him darśana is neither pramā (valid knowledge) nor apramā (invalid knowledge). The systems of Mīmāṃsā, Sāṅkhya and Yoga, generally follow the Nyāya in this respect.

In Jainism the problem of pramāṇa is a contribution of the logical period. The Agamic conception of samyak or mithyā was subjective. All knowledge related with a samyagdr̥ṣṭi was samyak and that with a mithyādr̥ṣṭi was mithyā. But, darśana was held as free from the controversy of samyak or mithyā. In the division of upayoga there are three ajñānas or mithyājñānas in addition to the five jñānas. But, we do not see such division in the case of darśana. As a matter of fact the notion of samyak and mithyā is related with personal attitude. It is the fruit of jñāna. Through jñāna one decides whether an object should be accepted, rejected or held indifferently. Darśana is not competent to help in the formulation of that attitude; as it does not lead to any judgment.

Siddhasena Gaṇin<sup>2</sup> clearly states that the difference between samyagdr̥ṣṭi and mithyādr̥ṣṭi exists in the case of articu-

1. NyāyakandaI 198; KārikāvalI 134

2. Sanmatitarka Ṭīkā, p. 553

late cognition only. In the case of inarticulate cognition both are on the same level. Darśana of a person in the first stage of spiritual development (guṇasthāna) is just like that in the fourth or further stages.

But, Abhayadeva divides darśana also into samyak and mithyā. He does not care whether it leads to any judgement or not, He says that every cognition, whether articulate or inarticulate is samyak, if its upholder is a samyagdr̥ṣṭi and it is mithyā in the reverse case.

We have mentioned above the Agamic view about the validity of darśana. Umāsvāti<sup>1</sup> has advocated the same view. With the advent of logical period the question of samyak and mithyā changed into pramāṇa and apramāṇa and the criteria also changed from subjective to objective. The question arose whether in respect of the object darśana is pramāṇa, apramāṇa or something beyond the two.<sup>2</sup>

All the Jaina logicians accept decision or judgement as the essential condition for pramāṇa. They express it through different terms like adhyavasāya vayasāya niścaya or nirṇaya etc. By this they wanted to exclude the Buddhist perception from the category of pramāṇa; but it held true in the case of darśana also. Consequently, darśana was not included into pramāṇa. Māṇikyanandin<sup>3</sup> and Devasūri<sup>4</sup> go to the extent of calling it pramāṇabhāsa (invalid cognition) and specify its exclusion from the category of pramāṇa.

Abhayadeva<sup>5</sup> has accepted darśana as pramāṇa, but his interpretation of sanmati follows the Agamic school.

Yaśovijaya<sup>6</sup> in his Tarkabhāṣā excludes darśana from the category of pramāṇa. But, in Jñānabindu he accepts it as

1. Tattvārthabhāṣya 2/9
2. Pramāṇamīmāṃsā p. 5
3. Parīkṣāmukha I. 27
4. Pramāṇanaya Tattvāloka I.
5. Sanmati Tīkā p. 553
6. Jaina Tarkabhāṣā p. 1

naiścayika-avagraha, and thereby includes it into mati which is both pramāṇa as well as apramāṇa. As a matter of fact, though mati is pramāṇa; yet, its first stage, where no judgement is formed, is neither pramāṇa nor apramāṇa.

Hemacandra<sup>1</sup> excludes nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa from the category of pramāṇa by inserting nirṇaya in his definition. Though he specifies the exclusion of Buddhist perception and anadhyavasāya only; yet, it brings darśana also to the same lot by implication.

According to Vīrasena<sup>2</sup> darśana also is a judgement. The question of its validity, he holds, is not subjective but objective. Jñāna, which he names prakāśa or pratibhāsa is both pramāṇa as well as apramāṇa. But, darśana, being a cognition of the self, is always pramāṇa. It is absolutely free from doubt (saṃśaya) illusion (viparyaya) or indefiniteness (anadhyavasāya). We can compare this view with Śaṅkara who holds cognition of the self as always free from doubt etc.

### Division of Darśana

Darśana is divided into the following four types :<sup>3</sup>

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|--------------------|--------------------|
| 1. Cakṣurdarśana.  | 3. Avadhi darśana. |
| 2. Acakṣurdarśana. | 4. Kevala darśana. |

The first two types depend upon the senses as their cause while the remaining two are supernormal. They are produced by the self independently. According to Dhavalā all the four darśanas spring from the self. None of them has sense as its cause.

1. The term cakṣurdarśana does not require any explanation. It is related with the sense of vision.

2. About acakṣurdarśana there are different views. The general conception is this, that the darśana related with non-visual senses and the mind is acakṣurdarśana. The discrimina-

1. Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā p. 5.

2. Dhavalā p. 148

3. Prajñāpanā, 29 Upayogapada

tion between visual and the nonvisual senses is understandable as the former apprehends from a distance while the latter through contact. But, to place the mind also in this category is hard to explain. As a matter of fact mind has no darśana. Its function is limited to the objects grasped by the external senses. Memory and conceptual deliberations like inference etc., which are the actual province of mind, do not pass through the stage of darśana. This view is supported by the Nandī sūtra also, which does not admit the variety of mental perception.

According to Siddhasena Divākara<sup>1</sup> ordinary darśana is confined to mind and the visual sense only. Consequently, acakṣurdarśana means the mental apprehension not derived through a mark or hetu. According to this view the cognition springing from mind alone, and not from any other senses, falls under the head of acakṣurdarśana. It is the cognition of subtle or distant things, such as atom, meru etc.

We are at a loss to understand precisely the underlying idea of the above view that the mental cognition of an atom is acakṣurdarśana while that of fire through the mark of smoke is jñāna. Perhaps, it means that in the case of inference the mind does not conceive the object independently. The conception of fire is memory which depends upon the former sense-cognition. The perception of the mark helps in revival of that memory. In the case of mental cognition like that of atoms, the idea is formed by the mind itself. It is a mental vision, where the senses are helpless. Further, in inference we do not construct a mental image. It is simply the cognition of the existence of major term. In the mental visual cognition a certain image is constructed. The former is conceptual, the latter perceptual.

The above views are mainly concerned with the conception of darśana as the cognition of generality. Dhavalā also follows nearly the same view. But in its case cakṣurdarśana does not

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1. Sanmati II. 25, 26



mean the darśana springing from the vision, but that effort of the soul which later on results into visual cognition. As a matter of fact the division of cakṣurdarśana etc., has no real significance in the conception of Dhavalā. It is merely assumed. Moreover, the distinction between visual and other senses exists on the physical plane only. The former grasps the object without any physical contact; while the others are touch-senses. In the plane of internal experience they do not hold any distinction. In case, darśana is an internal experience, this division has no ground. If, inspite of it, darśana is divided on the basis of future development, then, there should be six varieties corresponding to the five external senses and the mind, and not two based on touch and without touch.

According to another view, referred by Dhavalā<sup>1</sup>, acakṣurdarśana means recollection of the objects already perceived. Dhavalā rejects it on the plea that it would mean the absence of acakṣurdarśana in one-sensed animals. If 'perceived' is held as 'grasped' by any of the senses, acakṣurdarśana would be confined to a mental activity, and this comes to the view of Siddhasena Divākara.

Jinabhadra holds that manahparyāya and Śruta are followed by acakṣurdarśana. Perhaps, Dhavalā<sup>1</sup> has the same in view.

3. Avadhidarśana is the awareness preceding avadhijñāna. It has the same sphere of objectivity as avadhijñāna.

The above three types of darśanas occur before jñāna. Cakṣur and acakṣur precede matijñāna while avadhi darśana preceded avadhi-jñāna. Śruta has no preceding darśana as it is preceded by matijñāna. Mahāparyāya also is preceded by jñāna, which we have already discussed.

4. The last type is kevaladarśana. It corresponds to kevalajñāna. According to the traditional view it occurs before kevalajñāna; but, it is not accepted by all. There are three views regarding it, each championed by a great stalwart of Jain tradition; which we propose to discuss in brief.

1. Dhavalā p. 380-382

### Kevalajñāna and kevaladarśana

There are three views about the order of succession regarding kevalajñāna and kevaladarśana :

1. According to the first view kevala-darśana precedes kevalajñāna. This view is championed by Jinabhadra and has been generally accepted in the Śvetāmbara tradition. It is also supported by the old Agamic tradition.

2. The second view holds that both of them occur simultaneously. It is advocated by Mallavādin and has got a general acceptance in the Digambara tradition.

3. The third view maintains that in the stage of kevala; jñāna and darśana become one. This view is held by Siddhasena Divākara.

### Historical Survey of the Three Views

The Āgamas as well as the other literature earlier than Umāsvāti<sup>1</sup> favour the first view only. The second and third views are not found in it. They are not mentioned even for refutation. Of course, Kundakunda has supported the second view, but, it is a controversial point whether he lived before Umāsvāti. For the present we have followed Pandit Sukhāl, who is definite that Umāsvāti was earlier than Kundakunda. Āvaśyakaniryukti asserts that even a kevalin does not possess two upayogas simultaneously. This statement appears to be a refutation of the second view. But, it is doubtful whether this portion of Niryukti is genuine and not interpolated after Umāsvāti, as it is clear that the entire literature which goes with the name of Niryukti is not genuine.

It is Tattvārtha-Bhāṣya<sup>1</sup>, where we find the second view for the first time. Umāsvāti states that in the case of first four types of mati etc. the upayoga occurs in order. In the case of kevalin where jñāna and darśana are inseparable, all cognizant and constant, the upayogas are simultaneous. Siddhasena

1. Tattvārtha Bhāṣya I. 31.

□ Gaṇin<sup>1</sup> interprets the above statement in favour of the first view; but, he does so on the plea that Umāsvāti cannot go against the Āgamas. His very arguments show, if the question of Āgamas is left aside, the meaning would be quite different. It also shows that before him, Umāsvāti's statement was interpreted in favour of the second view. We are not sure about the author of that interpretation as no other commentary on the Bhāṣya is available.

Kundakunda in his Niyamasāra<sup>2</sup>, Pūjyapāda in Sarvārthasiddhi<sup>3</sup> and Samantabhadra in Āptamīmāṃsā<sup>4</sup> refer to the second view only. They do not refer to the first and third views even for refutation. Thus, up to Samantabhadra we do not meet with any Digambara work which mentions the opposite views even for refutation. Akalaṅka is the first to refute the first and third views. In the Aṣṭaśatī,<sup>5</sup> he supports the second view and clearly refutes the first view. In the Rājavārtika<sup>6</sup> he mentions the first view as an insult to the omniscient; and at other places indicates the undesirability of the third view also. He gives a verbatim reply to Siddhasena Divākara by quoting a stanza from Sanmati-Tarka. Thus, we can say that Digambara tradition favours the second view only; but the attempt to refute other views was not made before Akalaṅka.

Now, we come to the Śvetāmbara tradition. We have stated before that the Agamic literature supports the first view, while the Tattvārtha Bhāṣya favours the second. There is a gap of at least two hundred years between Umāsvāti and Jinabhadra; but no work of this period, which discusses the above controversy is available. When we come to the works of Jinabhadra, in the seventh century of Vikrama era, we see that the second and

1. Tattvārtha Bhāṣya Ṭīkā p. 111-112
2. Niyamasāra, G. 159
3. Sarvārthasiddhi I. 9
4. Āptamīmāṃsā K. 101
5. Aṣṭaśatī with Aṣṭasāhaśrī p. 281
6. Tattvārtha Rājavārtika 6.13.8

third views are not only introduced; but, show the existence of sufficient literature before it, dealing with the point. Jinabhadra in his *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*<sup>1</sup> not only supports the first view but also refutes the second and third views. In his *Viśeṣanavattī* (184-219), though a small compendium, he has discussed the same more elaborately. Jinabhadra's detailed account and logical presentation of the different views shows that all the three views were prevalent in the Śvetāmbara tradition and were represented by different schools of thinkers. On the other hand, upto the time of Jinabhadra there is no Digambara scholar to refer to the first or third view. Further, we can say that even upto the present time, no Digambara scholar has supported two other views.

The above survey leads us to the conclusion that the old tradition favoured the first view only, i. e. kevaladarśana and kevalajñāna occur successively and not simultaneously, as the second view holds; nor they are identical as the third view shows. Now, we shall try to trace out how the idea of remaining two views originated. Pt. Sukhlal holds it as the influence of logical period. He states that the theory of omniscience as held by the Jainas was attacked on two issues. Firstly, it was said, if jñāna and darśana occur successively the stage of omniscience cannot be had. When there is jñāna the data of darśana will remain unknown, and when there is darśana the data of jñāna would remain unapprehended. Secondly, when an omniscient has known everything, what would he do in the second moment? The second objection was common to all systems admitting the existence of omniscience. But, the first objection was particular to the Jaina only. It is probable that the Jaina thinkers came to the theory of simultaneity just to reply it. But no theory can get general approval unless it is supported by the scriptures. Consequently, the advocates of the second view interpreted scriptures as to support their own view. But the people for whom the old tradition was supreme did not favour it. Siddhasena Gaṇin clearly expresses the view

1. *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* G. 3089-3135

that, though he is not against the logicity of the second view; but the words of the Āgamas are the supreme authority. If logic goes against them we should drop it and hold the Agamic view.

Siddhasena Divākara, being a great logician, holds that in case jñāna and darśana are simultaneous, there is no reason in holding them different. The same logic which establishes their simultaneity supports identity also. So, he introduced the third view; and interpreted some Agamic quotations also in his support.

Thus, all the three views were established and had its champions. But, Umāsvāti was a great supporter of the Agamic tradition. His support to the second view still remains a mystery.

It is also probable that these views might have originated from the mutual discussions of the Jaina thinkers, without any outside influence.

The discussion about these three views continued in the Svetāmbara literature for more than 150 years. Each view was supported by reputed scholars. Jinabhadra has collected all the views with their arguments in his Viśeṣaṇavatī and Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya.

### **Arguments for each view**

The first view is generally based on the Agamic statements. In the Paṇṇavaṇāsūtra Gautama asks Mahāvīra whether a kevalin sees (pāsai) Ratnaprabhā (the first plane of hellish kingdom) at the same moment when he knows (jāṇai) it. Mahāvīra replies in the negative. He gives reason in the support of his view that jñāna is articulate while darśana is inarticulate. If is for this reason that a kevalin when sees, does not know; and when knows, does not see. The same question is asked about the other planes of hellish kingdom also, with the same reply.

The above statement of Paṇṇavaṇā, which has parallel passages in the Bhagavatī also, clearly expresses that jñāna and

darśana do not occur simultaneously. It is argued that kevalin, in the above discussion, means the person with avadhi; but it is rejected by Jinabhadra as without any ground.

The second view is based on the following arguments :

1. The Āgamas state kevalajñāna and kevaladarśana as the upayogas which begin but never end. If they are accepted as occurring in succession it would mean that they begin as well as end; and this would go against the above conception of the Āgamas.

2. According to the theory of karman jñānāvaraṇa and darśanāvaraṇa are destroyed simultaneously. It means that kevalajñāna and kevaladarśana are manifested at the same moment. There is no reason why two lamps should not shine simultaneously when their cover is removed at one and the same moment. If, even at the removal of āvaraṇa the jñāna and darśana do not occur, the removal would become useless.

3. If it is said that the occurrence of one stands as obstacle to the other, it would mean their mutual obscurance, which is against the general conception.

4. If either of them does not occur even at the destruction of karmic āvaraṇa, the non-occurrence would become natural and consequently permanent.

5. If jñāna and darśana occur in succession, a kevalin cannot be omniscient. He will not be able to apprehend the generals and particulars at the same moment, or when he sees all things he cannot know them, and when he knows them, cannot see.

Jinabhadra replies to the above arguments as follows :

1. The first objection that kevalajñāna and kevaladarśana are held as without end, which is not possible if they occur in order, is not tenable. The succession or order exists in upayoga only, and the conception of endlessness is in regard to labdhi. Matijñāna also is said to exist for sixty-six sāgaropama. But, we cannot say that this period is related with upayoga.

2. The second objection also has the same answer. The removal of āvaraṇa is responsible for labdhi only. The upayoga takes certain other factors also into account. Otherwise, the duration of mati etc. for a long period of sixty-six sāgaropamas cannot be explained.

3. If jñāna and darśana do not occur at a time, it does not mean that they are āvaraṇa to each other. It is the nature of cognition that two do not occur simultaneously.

4. The fourth objection that non-occurrence of cause would lead the phenomenon to permanence; also is replied by the above. As it is in the case of mati etc. that even at the kṣayo-paśama of āvaraṇa, they are not constantly in upayoga; similarly, kevalajñāna and kevala-darśana also are not constantly in the state of upayoga even when āvaraṇa is destroyed.

It should be noted here that the above objections are replied on the same ground; and it is this, the kṣaya or kṣayo-paśama of the karmic matter is responsible for manifesting the cognitive power only. Its application depends upon other auxiliaries external as well as internal. The existence of power does not necessarily mean its application. For instance, in the state of liberated souls the antarāya karman disappears totally, with all its five varieties; including dānāntarāya (obstruction in giving) lābhāntarāya (obstruction in getting), bhogāntarāya (obstruction in enjoyment of consumable commodities), upa-bhogāntarāya (obstruction in other enjoyments). But a liberated soul never gets any of the privileges obtainable from the disappearance of these five varieties; because, other auxiliaries are no more operative in that state.

We can compare this view with the yogic perception of other systems. They believe that a yogin, though possesses the power to know all things; yet, actually knows them only when he applies a particular attention. The notion of constant cognition is, perhaps, due to the influence of the notion of God, accepted by other systems. The Jainas tried to incorporate all

the virtues in their kevalins, as were accepted in God by other system. They left the function of creation, as is expressively went against the karma-theory. The Vedānta also has attributed all powers of God to jīvanmuktas, except that of creation.

The upholders of the second view are ready to accept power and its application as two things in the case of incomplete cognitions; where other auxiliaries are needed. But, in the case of complete knowledge, which does not depend on any external cause, both are one and the same. In the case of avadhi and manaḥparyāya also a particular mental inclination is necessary. In their case the mind serves as director. But, in the case of kevalin, where mind also not function any more, the casual attention is hard to explain.

5. The fifth objection also is replied in the same manner. A kevalin is omniscient because he possesses the power of seeing and knowing all things. It does not matter whether he actually applies that power. The opponent can raise one difficulty in this respect, if both āvaraṇas are destroyed simultaneously, the resulting jñāna and darśana must be simultaneous. There is no reason why one of them should be earlier than the other. It is also replied that simultaneous occurrence is related with power only. The upayoga is independent.

### **The Unity between Kevalajñāna and Kevaladarśana**

1. The first and the main argument advanced by the upholders of unity is this, that the destruction of two āvaraṇas does not necessarily imply the existence of two cognitions of kevaladarśana along with kevalajñāna. The āvaraṇas of mati etc. also are no more in existence in the stage of kevala; yet the cognitions of mati etc. do not exist with it. It is an established principle that two upayogas do not coexist. So, we conclude that inspite of the destruction of two āvaraṇas the resulting cognition is one.



Jinabhadra replies that kevalajñāna is complete knowledge. It cannot co-exist with the incomplete knowledge, as they are contradictory to each other. Similarly, we can hold that complete darśana arises at the expiry of incomplete darśana. But, there is no contradiction between the two types of complete cognitions.

Moreover, kevalajñāna and kevaladarśana stand on equal ground. To hold that at the expiry of both incomplete jñāna as well as darśana, only kevalajñāna is manifested and not kevaladarśana is quite irrational.

In the above discussion we have mainly followed Jinabhadra; who is an advocate of the first view. The second view is ascribed to Mallavādin, but, his arguments in original are nowhere to be seen. The third view is represented by Siddhasena Divākara. His arguments are further supported by Yaśovijaya in his Jñānabindu. The statement of Paṇṇavaṇāsūtra also, presented in the support of the first view, is interpreted by Yaśovijaya in his own support.

### **General Remarks**

The discussion of kevalajñāna and kevaladarśana is an important commentary on the conception of omniscience. According to the first view, which no doubt, represents the Agamic tradition, sarvajña means a person possessing the power to know all objects. The application of that power is arbitrary. This view seems to be genuine. Other systems also hold the same view.

Later on came the age of competition in the glory of religious founders. Every sect tried to prove its founder as supreme in all respects. The Nyāya and Vedānta observed that God is omniscient without mind. All of his activities go on automatically. The Jainism and Buddhism being atheistic attributed those virtues to Bodhisattva or Arhat. So, the knowledge of Arhat was accepted as constant. It was not possible unless the principle of constant attention (satata upayoga) was accepted.

The simultaneity of jñāna and darśana also was accepted for the same reason.

Siddhasena being a logician, made further improvement. He held that omniscience cannot be established unless jñāna and darśana are simultaneous. But, both of them are partial views of the same thing. The view of an omniscient cannot be a partial view. It is always complete. So, he held that in the stage of kevala jñāna and darśana merge into one. As we have stated before, Siddhasena always looks to the objective side. But, Jaina notion of jñāna and darśana is subjective, related with two natural powers of the self,



## CHAPTER VI

# AJÑĀNA

## IGNORANCE

### Four Meanings of the Term Ajñāna

In Indian philosophy the term ajñāna is applied to four senses (1) Firstly, ajñāna means wrong knowledge; the cognition which does not correspond with the object or does not cohere with the subsequent cognitions as the idealists hold. In this sense ajñāna is generally known as mithyājñāna, samāropa, khyāti, viparyaya or adhyāsa. It is related mainly with the problem of validity of knowledge which is a topic for logical period.

2. In the second sense ajñāna means perverted knowledge which is a subjective consideration. Perversion does not mean wrong apprehension but the wrong attitude towards the object. This is the main problem of ethics as well as the Agamic conception of ajñāna.

3. In the third sense it means absence of knowledge. Here, we have to discuss, if knowledge is a nature of the self, why we know a few objects only and those also not without some effort. Further, why there is inequality in respect of knowledge among different persons.

4. In the Vedānta-system Ajñāna means avidyā with its two-fold power of obscurance as well as false projection. The Jaina term for obscurance is jñānāvaraṇa or darśanāvaraṇa. This sense is related to the nature of the cause of ignorance.

The Āgamas are mainly related with the last three senses only. We shall discuss all the four under the following heads :

1. Ajñāna as wrong knowledge.
2. Ajñāna as perverted attitude.
3. Ajñāna as absence of knowledge.
4. Ajñāna as the cause of ignorance.

### Ajñāna as Wrong Knowledge

We have stated before that the epistemology of Āgamas is subjective and not objective. So, the question of validity of knowledge according to the correspondance, coherence or some other theory is a subject for logical discussion. It is beyond the scope of our present treatment.

According to the Jaina logic valid knowledge (pramā) means a decisive cognition of the self as well as the object. The wrong knowledge is known as samāropa (false imposition) which has three types : (1) saṃśaya (doubt) 2. viparyaya (illusion) and 3. anadhyavasāya (indistinct appearance). Darśana also is generally included in the last category. The only difference that can be held between darśana and anadhyavasāya is based on their future development. Anadhyavasāya stops with its flash of indistinct appearance. Darśana later on develops into jñāna. On this basis it is held by some as pramāṇa. Māṇikyanandin adds 'apūrva' (novel) also to the definition of pramāṇa, just to exclude repeated cognition (dhārāvāṇi jñāna) from the category of pramāṇa. But the Śvetāmbara tradition does not agree with Māṇikyanandin. It holds repeated cognition also as pramāṇa.

The Nyāya system excludes smṛti (memory) and tarka (hypothetical judgment) also from the category of pramā, which the Jaina logicians do not favour. But, these problems form an independent subject of study. Some Jaina scholars, though following the Agamic treatment, have adopted the objective view of validity. They have used the term samyagjñāna in place of pramāṇa and thus, mixed both the schools. But, their view is not supported by the Agamic spirit.

### The Cause of Wrong Knowledge

The only question, relevant with the Agamic theory, is about the cause of wrong appearance. We can discern two factors in a wrong appearance. Firstly, nonappearance or indistinct appearance of a reality; secondly, the imposition of foreign element. As far as the first factor is concerned we ascribe it to jñānāvaraṇīya. The second element is the result of mohanīya

mixed with past impressions. A person who is absolutely free from greed will never impose silver on a conch shell. In the same way he will never see a snake in the place of rope if he is free from fear. In such cases the apparent qualities are, more or less, common to both alternatives i.e. the real as well as apparent. But, the preference for apparent is caused by the complexes inherent in the self. In the case of doubt also mohaniya works to some extent. In anadhyavasāya āvaraṇa plays the important part, which does not allow the indistinct appearance result into the distinct one. Or, we can say in such cases the mind is drifted towards another object owing to certain forces that work in the mind or natural disinclination; and thus the former appearance remains indistinct.

As a matter of fact, according to Jainism, no demarcation line can be drawn between right and wrong as far as incomplete knowledge is concerned. No two things are absolutely dissimilar. When, one thing appears as something else it must possess some characteristics that are common to both. It is a matter of degree to what extent they are possessed. Similarly, in the case of so called valid cognition also the object must contain some characteristics as are common to other things. Anuyoga-dvāra states that there are no two things absolutely similar or absolutely dissimilar. If correspondance with the object is held as the criterion of validity, every appearance is valid to some extent and to some extent only. The logical division of pramā and apramā is only discursive, taking into consideration the major part only. According to Jaina logic difference between truth and falsehood is not that of quality, but of degree. This view can be compared with Hegelian idealism according to which the distinction between truth and error is one of degree and not of kind.

### **Ajñāna as Perverted attitude**

The Tattvārtha<sup>1</sup> relates that mati, śruta and avadhi have a reverse type (viparyaya) also; meaning that they are not only

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1. Tattvārtha I. 32

jñāna but also ajñāna. The reverse of jñāna is ajñāna. Apparently, it seems a contradiction. The something cannot be jñāna as well as ajñāna. But, the above difficulty does not arise when the terms are considered in relation to the subject. Jñāna in the present context stands for samyagjñāna and ajñāna for mithyājñāna. But, the jñāna in itself is neither samyak (right) nor mithyā (wrong). It is samyak or mithyā according to the attitude (dṛṣṭi) of the subject. If the subject holds a right attitude, his knowledge is samyak, and if he holds a wrong attitude his knowledge is mithyā.

Pūjyapāda<sup>1</sup> and Akalaṅka<sup>2</sup> explain this point through the instance of milk placed in the gourd with dust. The milk, though sweet by nature gets bitter if placed in a gourd with dust. Similarly jñāna becomes ajñāna when possessed by a mithyādṛṣṭi. It may be argued that a jewel does not lose its lustre wherever it may be placed. Even if buried under-ground it will hold its nature as before. Similarly, jñāna also does not change its nature of samyaktva or mithyātva merely by association with different subjects. Akalaṅka replies, 'We do not propose that everything changes its nature by different associations. It is the peculiarity of certain things that they do not change while others do. Moreover, it is also possible that the same condition may influence one thing and not the other. No, general rule can be made in this respect. Regarding jñāna it is held, that it changes according to the subject. The main reason for this view is that jñāna is not an entity separate from the subject. It is the very nature of the soul. Consequently, its change is natural with the change of the subject's attitude.

#### **Difference between Jñāna and Ajñāna in respect of appearance**

The next point related with this topic is whether there is any difference between jñāna and ajñāna in respect of cognition. In ajñāna also a jar appears as jar as good as in the case of jñāna. Umāsvāti<sup>3</sup> explains that ajñāna, i. e. the knowledge of

1. Sarvārthasiddhi I. 31

2. Tattvārtharājavārtika p. 63

3. Tattvārthasūtra I. 33

a mithyādr̥ṣṭi, is not rational. He strikes at the right point merely by accident. For instance, an intoxicant or lunatic does not recognize a thing as it is. He may take a cow for a horse and vice versa. He may call a stone as gold and gold as stone. Accidentally, he may strike at the right point also and call an object what it is. But, this accidental recognition of reality is not rational. It is based on eccentricity. We cannot recognize it as valid inspite of its correspondance with the reality. Similarly, the knowledge of a mithyādr̥ṣṭi, though similar to samyagdr̥ṣṭi in its outward form, is not based on rational ground. A mithyādr̥ṣṭi also knows the jar as jar but he does not know in what relation it is so. He does not know that the existence of a thing is relative. It exists in relation to its own substantiality, space, time and state; while in relation to those of another it does not. A mithyādr̥ṣṭi cannot make out this distinction. His knowledge of existence or non-existence is merely accidental.

Pūjyapāda<sup>1</sup> states that a mithyādr̥ṣṭi takes a non-existent for existent, an existent for non-existent and sometimes both of them rightly; just as a person in the state of delirium mistakes his wife for mother and vice versa. He, accidentally, strikes at the right point also and calls the mother as mother. But it can not be recognized as valid cognition. Similarly, mati etc. when not based on rationality, become wrong.

#### **Four types of Illusion (viparyaya)**

As a matter of fact the distinction between right and wrong, in this respect, is not discursive but philosophical. Pūjyapāda classifies the perverted knowledge into the following types<sup>2</sup> :

1. Kāraṇaviparyāsa—Perverted notion regarding the cause of an object. The monistic Vedānta holding Brahman as the cause of universe; and other systems differing from the

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1. Sarvārthasiddhi, I. 31

2. Ibid.

Jainas in respect of the cause of universe, are included in this category.

2. Bhedābhedaviparyāsa—Perverted notions regarding the relative identity and difference. The notions of absolute identity or absolute difference between cause and effect are the instances of this perversion.

3. Svarūpaviparyāsa—Perversion about the nature of reality; like the Buddhist conception of all objects as particulars or without conceptual elements, or without any real existence.

All these false notions are examples of different types of viparyāsa, i. e. perverted knowledge.

### Two Denotations of Sat and Asat<sup>1</sup>

The main contention of the Tattvārtha sūtra is that in ajñāna there is no discrimination between sat and asat. Aka-  
laṅka takes them in two senses each. Firstly, sat means commendable and asat means censurable. An aspirant tries to make a distinction between what is commendable or beneficial and what is the contrary. He accepts the beneficial and abandons the harmful. The criterion of this valuation is nothing but salvation, the absolute emancipation from the worldly ties and pains. The other standards of valuation are not ultimate. A person with right attitude can rightly judge the value of everything on the standard of salvation; while the person with wrong attitude goes astray.

The second meaning of sat is existent. In this respect also the various systems hold different views. According to the Vedānta sat means an unchangeable eternity; according to Buddhism it is a flux and so on. The Jaina holds that sat means change with permanence. This philosophical distinction between sat and asat is held rightly by a samyagdr̥ṣṭi only.

The first meaning is related with the ethics while the second with metaphysics. A wrong attitude rejects in either of the two

1. Tattvārtha Rājavārtika p. 63



meanings, is sufficient to make the knowledge a mithyājñāna. The metaphysical perversion can be further analysed into kārānaviparyāsa etc.

#### Four bases for calling the knowledge of Mithyādṛṣṭi as Ajñāna

Jinabhadra<sup>1</sup> relates the following four reasons in calling the knowledge of a mithyādṛṣṭi as ajñāna.

1. Sadasatoraviśeṣa (Indiscrimination between sat and asat). A mithyādṛṣṭi takes up everything in 'the absolutistic way while the reality consists of nonabsolutism. Thus, he is not able to ascertain what is sat, and what is not. This is a mithyājñāna in the realm of metaphysics.

2. Bhavahetu (The cause of bondage)—Knowledge of a mithyādṛṣṭi leads him to entanglement in the worldly affairs. He takes those very acts as the cause of liberation as increase the cycle of births and deaths. This point relates to the field of ethics.

3. Yadr̥cchopalambha—Irrationality in judgement. This point relates to the field of logic.

4. Jñānaphalābhāva (nonattainment of the fruit of knowledge)—The purpose of knowledge is to accept what is beneficial and to abandon what is harmful. A mithyādṛṣṭi does not get this efficiency. He adopts the harmful way to bondage which deserves abandonment. On the other hand he rejects the blessed way to emancipation, which is worthy of following. This is a pragmatistic explanation.

#### The Objective view of Vidyānanda

Vidyānanda takes the objective view in deciding the problem of mithyājñāna and includes all the three varieties of saṁśaya (doubt), viparyaya (illusion) and anadhyavasāya (indistinct appearance) in viparyaya. He states that the first three types of jñāna can occur in the form of illusion also with its above-mentioned three types. In mati and śruta all the three types

1. Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya G. 15

are possible; but, in avadhi there are two only; for, doubt is confined to the mental function only. In avadhi the senses or the mind do not function any more. It is intuitional, a direct apprehension by the soul. The possibility of illusion, in the case of avadhi, is caused by the existence of wrong attitude in the beings with avadhi. Similarly indistinct appearance (anadhyavasāya) is possible where the attention is withdrawn or diverted towards some other objects without reaching the stage of decision.<sup>1</sup>

This viparyaya or perversion is possible in the first three types only; as only they can coexist with mithyādarśana (wrong attitude). Manaḥparyāya occurs in an ascetic only, where darśanamohanīya and the major portion of cāritra-mohanīya is either destroyed or subdued. Kevala occurs when the four ghātikarmans are destroyed completely. So, viparyaya, which is the result of darśanamohanīya, does not occur in these stages. In the case of avadhi also it occurs with the lower types only. It is not possible in the cases of parmāvadhi or sarvāvadhi.

#### Eleven types of Āhārya and Sahaja etc.

Vidyānanda<sup>2</sup> divides viparyaya into two categories of āhārya (imposed) and sahaja (natural). Āhāryaviparyaya is the perversion created by wrong instructions, verbal or scriptural. It is an external imposition. Sahjaviparyaya means the perversion created by the effect of past impressions existing naturally. The śruta is āhārya in some cases and sahaja in others. Mati and vibhaṅga (perverted avadhi) are sahaja only. Thus, we have the following eleven categories :

1. Ahāryaśrutaviparyaya—The convictions derived from mithyāśruta i. e. the books or preachings related to misguided authorities; such as the various notions of absolutists regarding the existence and nonexistents etc.

1. Tattvārtha Śloka-vārtika I. 31

2. Ibid.

2. Āhāryaśrutasaṁśaya—There are some heretics doubtful in the existence of distant objects like heaven, hell etc. Others are doubtful in the apparant objects also. Their holding is Āhārya-śruta-saṁśaya.

3. Āhārya-Śruta-Anadhyavasāya—There are others who hold indistinct knowledge (anadhyavasāya) regarding the existence of an omniscience. Further, there are some, not clear in ethical code also.

4. Mativiparyaya—sahaja.

5. Matisaṁśaya—sahaja.

6. Matyanadhyavasāya—sahaja.

We have stated above forty-eight types of mati related with each sense. Any illusion, doubt or indistinction related with them constitutes the corresponding type of viparyaya. Similarly, any wrongness in memory, recognition or inference also would come in these categories :

7. Śruta-viparyaya—sahaja

8. Śruta saṁśaya—sahaja

9. Śruta-Anadhyavasāya—sahaja.

These types are connected with the śruta where no external authority is depended upon, just as in the case of inference. Vidyānanda considers the views of Mīmāṃsā and Grammarian schools regarding the interpretation of a sentence as āhārya viparyaya.

10. Avadhiviparyaya—sahaja

11. Avadhi-Anadhyavasāya—sahaja.

### Other systems compared

The above stated view of ajñāna is not peculiar to Jain only. Other systems also maintain similar views.

Buddhism divides knowledge (prajñā) into three types of Anāsraprajñā, Sāsraprajñā and Avyākṛtaprajñā. The first is called vidyā and the second avidyā. Vasubandhu<sup>1</sup> states that avidyā is not the absence of vidyā but an opposite to vidyā;

1. Abhidharmakośa VII, 2.

just as the terms of anṛta (untrue) and amitra (not friend). They do not express merely the negative sense, i. e. the absence of truth or that of friends, but something positive which goes against the sense of the term without negation. They mean falsity and enmity respectively. Similarly, avidyā means a knowledge which is not vidyā i. e. perverted knowledge. As a matter of fact avidyā is the dirt of knowledge. Avyākṛtaprajñā is simple knowledge and cannot be classified in either of the two. It is like darśana of the Jainas. The Buddhist also accepts that vidyā leads to salvation and avidyā to bondage <sup>1</sup>

But unlike Jainism the Buddhist does not hold vidyā and avidyā on the same level in respect of their objective side. According to Jainism the object appears similar in both cases, but, it is conceived differently. In vidyā the conception is non-absolutistic while in avidyā it is absolutistic. According to Buddhism the conceptual knowledge is loka-saṃvṛti-satya, i. e. true in discursive consideration only. It is not paramārtha-satya i. e. true in reality. The real truth relates to the knowledge of four noble truths only.

At the same time the Buddhist does not distinguish vidyā from avidyā on subjective consideration as the Jainas do. According to Buddhist both are common with every-body. The only difference between an enlightened and the layman is that the former has realized the truth while the latter has not. As far as their cognition of external objects is concerned they are on the same level. The enlightened having realized the truth concentrates on it and purifies his mind. Purification does not mean the absence of discursive knowledge but abstinence from vices (akuśala) and leaning towards virtuous deeds (kuśala). This purification gradually slackens the worldly ties, the group of which is recognized as the self. Ultimately, when all the ties break away, the self does not exist any more, it attains the state of nirvāṇa.

1. Abhidharmakośa II. 28

Though *sammā-diṭṭhi* (right attitude) plays important part in Buddhism also, it is not the sole criterion of distinction between *vidyā* and *avidyā*.

Further, it should be observed that *avidyā*, according to Buddhism, is not a foreign matter that obscures the natural light of the self as it is according to the Jaina and *Vedānta*. According to Buddhism *avidyā* also is a natural state of the mind, i. e. self. It is a flow of psychical activities directed towards the so-called impious deeds (*akuśala*). The same flow becomes *vidyā* when the direction is changed. So, *vidyā* does not rise as the destruction or disappearance of *avidyā* but the latter turns into *vidyā*. The distinction of purity and impurity also is merely discursive, based on social convictions.

According to the *Vedānta* *jñāna* and *ajñāna* are diametrically opposite to each other. One is intelligent, the other is non-intelligent. One is light, the other is darkness. One is internal, the other is changeable. One is beyond time and space, the other is within those limits. One is without any positive quality, the other is the cause of all conceptual thoughts. One is eternal, the other is external. According to Buddhism *avidyā* was a particular direction of the self. According to the *Vedānta* it is an obscurance of the natural state of Brahman. One is noumenal, the other is phenomenal. The *Vedānta* attributes *ajñāna* with two functions. It obscures the knowledge of reality and it projects a non-real matter for imposition. The latter function can be compared with *mithyā dr̥ṣṭi* of the Jainas. But, the Jaina being a realist does not believe in phenomenal projection. He holds misconceptions in its place. The function of obscurance is comparable with *jñānāvaraṇa* of the Jainas, to which we shall come shortly.

*Vijñāna* Bhikṣu and Patañjali<sup>1</sup> also interpret *avidyā* as the knowledge opposite to *vidyā*.

The *Sāṅkhyasūtra* maintains *jñāna* as the cause of salvation

### 1. *Yogasūtra* II. 3-4

while viparyaya that of bondage. By jñāna it means the knowledge of discrimination between prakṛti and puruṣa. Viparyaya is not merely illusion or wrong cognition, but, all the mental impressions or activities that lead the self astray and keep it involved in the worldly affairs.

Vijñāna Bhikṣu, following Yogasūtra, enumerates the following five types of viparyaya :

1. *Avidyā*—The cause of taking one as permanent, pure, pleasurable and spiritual what is really perishable, impure, painful and material is called avidyā.

2. *Asmitā*—Arrogance or the conception of identity between spirit and matter; to maintain that there is no spirit except the material body.

3. *Rāga*—attachment

4. *Dveṣa*—Hatred

5. *Abhiniveśa*—complexes like the fear of death etc.

Vācaspati relates the following three types of bondage as the effect of viparyaya.

1. *Prākṛtika*—Holding prakṛti (matter) as the self and worshipping it with that esteem.

2. *Vaikṛtika*—Holding vikṛti, the effects of prakṛti, i. e. the material elements, senses, ego (ahaṅkāra) and mind (buddhi) as the self and worshipping them.

3. *Dākṣiṇaka*—To hold sacrifice (iṣṭa) and the works of public utility (āpūrta) as the path to happiness.

All these conceptions, according to Sāṅkhya are misleading. Jainism included these into mithyātva.

Patañjali supports the Sāṅkhya view by holding the above mentioned five types of viparyaya as kleśas. He divides the mental activities into klišṭa (afflicted) and aklišṭa (non-afflicted) corresponding to mithyājñāna, the samyagjñāna of the Jinas. Avidyā is the fundamental cause of the remaining four kleśas. He states in clear term that avidyā is not absence of knowledge, but the knowledge opposite to vidyā.

The Nyāya also holds *tattvajñāna* as the path to liberation while *viparyaya* as the cause of bondage. But in its later stages, it leaves the aim of liberation and deals mainly with logic, where *ajñāna* is not perverted knowledge, but absence of knowledge.

### **Ajñāna as Absence of Knowledge**

Now, we come to the problem of ignorance, in its literal sense, i. e. the absence of knowledge. The term knowledge, in the present context, has two denotations. Firstly, it means the power of knowing and secondly, it means the cognition or the application of that power. The question of the absence of knowledge will be discussed in both perspectives. We shall discuss why we cannot know an object, as well as why we do not know an object. By absence also we can take partial as well as the total absence. Partial absence in other words is the problem of inequality in knowledge. The total absence is the problem of mind and matter which we have already discussed in the first chapter. We can analyse the problem in following questions :

1. Why does one class of entities possess the power of knowing while the other does not ? In other words it is a question related with distinction between intelligent and nonintelligent beings.

2. Amongst intelligent beings also why there is a gradation of knowledge ?

3. If knowledge is a natural characteristic of the self why it is not permanent ?

These questions and such others are replied by different systems in their own way. According to the materialistic view of *Cārvāka* there is no difference between intelligent and non-intelligent beings. Regarding inequality or gradation of knowledge he depends upon the physical structure of mind. It can grasp more objects and penetrate deeper if the tissues are fine. Their roughness results into intellectual bluntness. Our mind is affected by diet and other physical environment also. The third question does not arise in the case of *Cārvāka* as it rela-

tes to the upholder of consciousness as natural characteristic of the self,

The Nyāya makes a distinction between non-intelligent and intelligent on the basis that the latter can inhere in the quality of buddhi or consciousness. That quality is generated by the contact between mind and the soul which is possible in the physical body only. In the state of sleep as well as liberation that contact is lost and therefore on cognition is possible. Regarding the gradation of knowledge, the Nyāya attributes all responsibility to buddhi, which can be developed through various exercises. The question of constant knowledge does not arise in his case.

According to Buddhism mind or citta is naturally intelligent or intelligence. It is a psychical flow, but it grasps the object only when the latter comes into concomitance. The power of cognition is obscured by jñeyāvaraṇa also. The gradation in knowledge depends upon the thickness or thinness of that āvaraṇa. But, it should be noted here, that āvaraṇa, according to Buddhism, is not a material substance but impression (saṃskāra) of the past experiences. We see that our mind loses balance or concentration when anger or other passions invade it. It is not able to apprehend even a clear object in that state. Thus, these saṃskāras influence the mind and rob it of its natural power. Ignorance results from absence of concentration or concomitance.

According to Sāṅkhya ignorance results from absence of vṛtti. It holds knowledge as well as its obscurance as belonging to matter (prakṛti); which is constituted of three ingredients. The first ingredient, namely sattva causes knowledge, while the third namely tamas, causes obscurance. The destruction of the sense power (indriyavadha) is one of the functions of tamas. Deafness, blindness, and other defects of senses result from it. Thus, the absence of knowledge is caused by tamas, which is a substantial matter. The gradation in knowledge depends upon



the purity of sattva which again depends upon the lesser or greater influence of rajas and tamas.

According to the Yoga-system there are five activities of mind. The state of ignorance also is one of them. The gradation in knowledge depends upon the first activity i. e. *pramāṇa*.

The Advaita Vedānta holds *avidyā* or *ajñāna* as a positive category, which is neither permanent like Brahman nor non-existent like lotus in the sky. It consists of two powers, namely the power of obscurance (*āvaraṇaśakti*) and the power of projection (*vikṣepa śakti*). We have already discussed the latter which is responsible for imposition or *mithyājñāna*. At present we are concerned with the power of obscurance, which conceals the reality. At realization, as we have stated, obscurance is destroyed totally and reality is revealed. It does not present any difficulty in its explanation. We have to discuss particularly the discursive knowledge of external objects, known as *ṛtti-jñāna*, Brahman is one and the *ajñāna* obscuring it also is one. If it is removed at the first cognition, there should be no further obscurance. There are five views to explain this difficulty.

1. According to the first view *Ṛttijñāna* is like a flash of glow-worm in the all-covering universal darkness. It destroys *ajñāna* in a very small part only that also for a moment.

2. According to the second view the *ajñāna* contracts like a mat and spreads again when the cause of that contraction disappears.

3. The third view maintains that *ajñāna* flees away like a defeated soldier and comes again when the cause of fear is no more.

4. The fourth view holds that *ajñāna* by nature is not able to obscure that region of reality which is occupied by *ṛtti*. It obscures only that region as is free from *ṛtti*.

5. According to the fifth view, which is the most popular there are two types of *ajñāna*, *Mūlājñāna* (root ignorance) and *Tūlājñāna* (temporary ignorance) or *avasthājñāna* (pheno-

menal ignorance) Mūlājñāna is one. It is destroyed at realization only. Tulājñānas are as many as there are cognitions. Every cognition destroys the corresponding tulājñāna while the others subsist as they were.

The last view can be compared with the Jaina theory of kevalājñānāvaraṇa and the four types matijñānāvaraṇa etc., which can be put in other words as sakalājñānāvaraṇa (obscurance of complete knowledge) and vikalājñānāvaraṇa (obscurance of incomplete knowledge). The Jaina theory of kṣayopaśama is a combination of the first and second views. The first propounds partial destruction (kṣaya) which the Jainas do not believe.

The next question relates to the position of tulājñānas. There are two views regarding it :

1. According to the first view these ajñānas also have no beginning just as Mūlājñāna.
2. According to the second view they are not without beginning. They come and go like the states of dream and sleep.

According to Jainism the duration of all the karmans is fixed. None can be said as beginningless. Yet, all the karmans are beginningless in respect of their stream. The old are destroyed and new ones come in. This stream is sometimes thick and sometimes thin. When it is thick the amount of knowledge decreases. When it is thin the amount of knowledge increases. But, this gradation occurs in the four types of incomplete knowledge only. Kevala has no gradation. It occurs at the destruction of obscurance completely. Consequently, it is permanent. In this respect we can say that the obscurance of kevala is beginningless. It does not mean that the same obscuring substance is in operation from the time without beginning. The maximum duration of the obscuring substance is twenty koḍākoḍī sāgaropama; after which it cannot remain attached with the soul. It only means that the obscurance of kevala has no beginning and consequently the stream of its obscurance also is without beginning. This cannot be said of other types as they

appear and disappear. In the cases of avadhi and Manaḥ-paryāya also where they have never occurred before, the stream of their obscurance also can be held as beginningless. We can compare the stream with Mūlājñāna and individual obscuring substances with Tulājñāna.

### **The Jaina Theory of Āvaraṇa**

According to the karma theory of Jainas the function of obscurance is related with the first two types of karman, i. e. jñānāvaraṇīya and darśanāvaraṇīya. The function of projecting mithyājñāna or other false notions are related with Moha-nīya. According to Jainism this projection is not false appearance, but wrong attitude. Wrongness does not mean unreality but perversion or leading astray from the path of liberation.

Jñānāvaraṇa is compared with a cloth bondage on the eyes. It means that jñānāvaraṇa obscures the power of knowledge. Darśanāvaraṇa is compared with the door keeper who does not allow a person to present himself before the king. Similarly, darśanāvaraṇa obstructs the presentation. A child and an animal possess the power of sensation in same amount as does a learned man. The presentation of a thing is similar in both cases. But, the child lacks in the power of knowledge. His understanding cannot be compared with that of a grown up person. On the other hand a blind man and a person with perfect sight possess the same power of understanding. But, in the case of blind the things are not presented while in the latter case they do.

### **Division of Āvaraṇa<sup>1</sup>**

We have divided the āvaraṇa into jñānāvaraṇīya and darśanāvaraṇīya. They are further divided into five and nine types respectively. The five types of jñānāvaraṇa correspond to the five types of jñāna. Darśanāvaraṇa is divided into nine types, out of which the first four correspond to the four types of darśana. The remainining five types are as follows :

<sup>1</sup> See, Karmagratha I. 10

1. Nidrā—sleep; where the person can be awakened easily.
2. Nidrā-nidrā—sound sleep; to be awakened with difficulty.
3. Pracalā—sleep in sitting or standing position.
4. Pracalā-pracalā—sleep in the state of walking.
5. Styanagrddhi—Somnambulism, or doing work in sleep.

### Sarvaghātin and Deśaghātin

According to the karma theory, as we have stated before, the eight karmans are divided into two groups. The first group consists of Jñānāvaraṇīya, Darśanāvaraṇīya, Mohanīya and Antarāya. It is known as ghātin, because, it suppresses the natural qualities of soul. The second group consists of Vedaṇīya, Āyuṣya, Nāma and Gotra. It is known as aghātin, because, it does not suppress the qualities of soul. It is mainly related with new creation.

The ghāti-karmans are further classified in the following types known as uttaraprakṛtis :

1. Jñānāvaraṇīya ...	...5
2. Darśanāvaraṇīya ...	...9
3. Mohanīya ...	...28
Four passion multiplied into four grades ...	...16
Nine Nokaṣāyas (mild) passions...	...9
Darśāna mohanīya ...	...3
4. Antarāya ...	...5

In all there are forty-seven ghātiprakṛtis. They are divided into two groups, according to their potency to suppress or observe the corresponding spiritual quality. The prakṛtis which suppress the corresponding quality completely are known as sarvaghātinis and those which do so partially are deśaghātinis.

Out of the above forty-seven prakṛtis the following are sarvaghātinis :

- 1—2. Two āvaraṇas of kevalajñāna and kevaladarśana.
- 3—7. Five types of sleep, nidrā etc.

8-19. First three quadruples of passions. They obstruct the right attitude, the vows of a layman and the vows of an ascetic respectively.

20. Mithyātvamohanīya.

At present we are concerned with 1 to 7 only. The remaining prakṛtis mainly obstruct the right conduct and right attitude.

The remaining twenty seven prakṛtis are deśaghātinīs. They are as follows :

1-4. First four types of jñānāvaraṇīya.

5-7. First three types of darśanāvaraṇīya.

8-11. The fourth quadruple of passions.

12-20. Nine types of mild passions.

21-22. Samyaktvamohanīya and miśramohanīya.

23-27. Five types of antarāya.

In this group also we are concerned with 1 to 7. Thus we have seven sarvaghātinī and seven deśaghātinī prakṛtis related with jñāna or darśana. Out of the seven sarvaghātinīs kevalajñānāvaraṇa is related with jñāna while the remaining six with darśana. The last five are different types of slumber which obstruct darśana completely. But, it is only a rough estimate. During sleep also one reacts the external stimuli. It is not possible without a certain degree of sensation. Further, we make up a sleeping person by calling him. It is not possible if he does not get any sensation of sound. So, we have to admit there a certain degree of sensation however feeble it may be.

#### **Kevalajñānāvaraṇa and Kavaladarśanāvaraṇa**

Kevalajñānāvaraṇa is compared with a cloud obscuring the sun. The cloud, however, thick it may be, cannot obscure the sun completely. It cannot wipe out the difference between day and night. It can be asked in this respect : if kevalajñānāvaraṇa does not obscure knowledge completely, it cannot be a sarvaghātinī prakṛti. For, it is held that even a minutest particle of sarvaghātinī is sufficient to obscure the corresponding quality completely.

The above objection does not stand any more if we consider the quality obscured by kevalajñānāvaraṇa. It does not obscure knowledge in general; but, only the kevala type of it, which does not know any gradation. It is always obscured completely. Complete knowledge is the last point of the gradation of knowledge. It cannot have further degrees. Even, if one particle of obscurance exists, there is no complete knowledge. Thus, one particle is sufficient to obscure the corresponding quality completely.

Further, kevalajñāna is a kṣāyika state; which occurs at the complete destruction of corresponding āvaraṇa. We have stated above the three types of the removal of karmic matter. They are kṣaya, kṣayopaśama and upaśama. Kṣaya means complete destruction, Upaśama means complete subsidence, and Kṣayopaśama means partial destruction or subsidence with a partial rising.

It can be asked here, whether all the āvaraṇas of kevalajñāna are destroyed at one and the same time or at different times. In first case we shall have to accept them as beginningless. Because, kevalajñānāvaraṇa once removed, cannot reappear; and kevalajñāna once realized cannot be reobsured. But, we cannot accept this view as the duration of āvaraṇa is fixed. In the second case partial removal has to be accepted. This objection does not stay any longer if the nature of kevalajñānāvaraṇa is considered precisely. There are innumerable āvaraṇas related with kevalajñāna, each with full capacity of obscuring the latter. They are destroyed automatically at the expiry of their duration or by following internal or external penances. The old are destroyed and new ones come in. Absence of partial destruction only means that kevala is not revealed partially. As a matter of fact complete knowledge is not obscured by the volume of jñānāvaraṇa which increases and decreases according to our passions. Complete knowledge is obscured by the last molecule of āvaraṇa, destruction of which results into kevalajñāna. Other molecules assembled in that volume are related with incomplete knowledge only. At the same time we

cannot fix a particular molecule with that designation; because it will produce the same difficulty. No particle can exceed the maximum limit of duration. Every particle is lost in a volume. It is a question of relativity; but, the whole volume cannot be designed as such. Though no particular molecule lasts for more than the fixed duration; yet, the last molecule is always there. Every molecule, while operating, obscures complete knowledge; but, when it disappears, the resulting knowledge is not complete but incomplete, as other particles are left behind, and new ones are added to them. When new inflow is stopped, and the stored molecules are destroyed, knowledge also increases gradually. All the middle stages are kṣāyopāśamikas. But, at the end there comes a stage when the last molecule also is destroyed. The destruction of that molecule means kṣaya or complete destruction; which results into kevalajñāna. Thus, we can see that kṣāyika state occurs once only. In spite of it the corresponding āvaraṇa is not beginningless.

The comparison of kevalajñānāvaraṇa with cloud raises another confusion. Does the cloud obscure the sun or the lower world? Sarvajñātman has beautifully described this confusion. He says, ordinary people hold the sun as obscured by the cloud; while in reality the object of obscurance is their own vision. According to the Vedānta, ignorance about Brahman is the root cause of the apparant world. The sun in that system is compared with the object of ignorance i. e. Brahman and the observer is jīva. But, the Jainas are realists. They do not hold that ignorance of reality projects the apparent world. So, they hold that the object of jñāna as well as ajñāna is the external objective world as well as the knowledge itself. Thus, as far as the knowledge of sva (self) is concerned we can say that the consciousness itself is the locus as well as the object of ignorance. But, in respect of the knowledge of external world the locus and object are different. The self is the locus and the external world the object. Thus, the two views of the Vedānta are more or less reconciled.

Further, we have stated that Darśanāvaraṇa is like a door-keeper and Jñānāvaraṇa like a bondage on the eye. The first is concerned with presentation, while the second with understanding. Presentation is objective; it introduces a new object to consciousness. Moreover, the varieties in presentation depend upon the object. On this basis, we can associate the corresponding obscurance also with the object. The understanding, though it moves round the presented object, does not depend upon it. The variation in understanding does not necessarily require variation in the object. The same man, with similar presentation, is taken into different relations by different persons. On this plea, we can say jñāna as subjective, and consequently the corresponding āvaraṇa also.

The question of kevaladrśanāvaraṇa also is the same as that of kevalajñānāvaraṇa. The only difference is that it is related with presentation.

Yaśovijaya attributes the above two types of āvaraṇas with double functions i.e. the obscurance of the kevalajñāna and kevaladarśana as well as production of incomplete cognitions.





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## ***About the Book***

This work is evidently an outcome of extensive study of Jaina Agamas at first hand, great industry and philosophical discrimination. The work is not mere descriptive catalogue of contents but sets out to marshall the data on a logical basis. It also shows healthy outlook and freedom from dogmatic bias. Though the author takes up the role of an advocate of the dogman of Jaina religious tradition, he takes care to distinguish what possesses more dogmatic value from what has intrinsic logical work

Though the writer's principal concern is with the Jaina theory of knowledge, he has elucidated the ontological concepts of the school that have bearing upon the epistemic problems. His treatment is in the main correct and adequate. The maturity of judgement and sober appraisal of the rival and orthodox positions and their points of agreement and divergence evinced by the author will ensure him the reputation of being one of the pioneer exponents of Jainology in English.

On the whole the work of Mr. Indra Chandra Shastri is a praiseworthy contribution. The Author shows himself capable of rising superior to partisan spirit and parochial vision. The Jaina epistemology like its ethics is an essential factor of Indian culture, heritage and is thus entitled to the serious study which it has received in the book. It is creditable for the author that he has fully done justice to his subject and achieved remarkable success in drawing out the philosophical implications of the ancient notions to the utmost limit.

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