



JAINA LITERATURE AND PHILOSOPHY A CRITICAL APPROACH

Dr. Sagarmal Jain

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Publisher's Note

Present title "*Jaina Literature and Philosophy*" is a compilation of some of the important articles authored by Prof. Sagarmal Jain, Director, Parshvanath Vidyapeetha. These articles are Scholarly monographs on different aspects of Jaina Philosophy and Religion. The articles of this volume give us a beautiful account of Origin and Development of Jaina Philosophy and Religion, History of Jaina literature ranging from canonical period to C-10.A.D., History of Jaina Tradition, Jaina Epistemology, Metaphysics, Ethics along with many more thought provoking articles on present day's world problem and to their solutions.

We extend our sincere thanks to Prof. Jain who contributed such beautiful articles and entrusted to us for its publication.

We are thankful to Dr. Ashok Kumar Singh, Editor of the Volume.

Our thanks are also due to Dr. Shriprakash Pandey and Dr. Vijay Kumar Jain, who managed it through the press.

We hope, this book will definitely be very useful to the researchers, beginners in Jaina Philosophy & Religion as well as general readers interested in knowing main tenets of Jainism in nutshell.

B.N. Jain
Secretary
Parshvanath Vidyapeetha

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
Jaina Literature [From Earliest Time to c. 10th A. D.]

Jaina Literature of Early Period

Ancient Indian Literature was composed mainly in three languages, i.e., Saṁskṛta, Pāli and Prākṛta. Out of these three Pāli is nothing but a shade of Prākṛta language. As a literary language, Prākṛta, being a group of various local dialects as Māgadhi, Pāli, Paisāci, Śaurasenī, Mahārāṣṭrī, was never developed as a single language but as a group of languages. Various types of Apabhraṁśa were also developed from Prākṛta. Its various shades developed according to their different places and time. If we consider these three main languages from religious point of view, all the Vedic religious literature is found in Saṁskṛta while the Jaina canonical and Buddhist literature is in Prākṛta and Pāli, respectively. So far as the Jaina religious literature of early period is concerned, it was mainly written in Prākṛta known as Prākṛta canons. Jainas started writing from c. 3rd-4th A. D. in Saṁskṛta but notably these Saṁskṛta works are based on Prākṛta works whether as an independent or in the form of commentaries.

So far as the Jaina literature (of early period) prior to c. 3rd A. D. is concerned, barring few of the early philosophical and literary treatises, it is mainly confined to the canonical literature only. Majority of

the canonical literature belongs to this period, though their final editing and writing on palm-leaves belong to c. 5th A. D. Among Śvetāmbara canons, except the *Nandīśūtra* and the later edition of *Praśnavyākaraṇa*, most works were composed before the c. 3rd A. D. No doubt, some interpolations and changes did take place therein at the time of Valabhī Council yet they are clearly traceable. It would be a great mistake if on account of these interpolations and changes the whole of the Āgamas are regarded as posterior. Although most of the works of this period contain the religious preachings with some popular parables and stories as well as religious code of conduct, certain works deal with Jaina cosmology, metaphysics, *Karma* philosophy and theory of knowledge also. The list of canonical literature is, for the first time, found in *Nandīśūtra* (c. 5th A. D.). If we accept *Nandīśūtra* as a work of c. 5th A. D., all the works referred to in *Nandīśūtra* belong to a date prior to it. But they all were not composed in a single spur of moment. All the canonical works, it seems are composed in during c. 5th B. C. to c. 4th-5th A. D., i.e., within one thousand years. The works mentioned in the *Nandīśūtra* are the following :



Unfortunately, all the above mentioned works are not available, today. Some of them are lost. Out of twelve Aṅga Āgamas, the 7th chapter of *Ācārāṅga* (*Mahāparijñā*) and the major portion of *Drṣṭivāda* are said to be extinct. So far as the subject-matter of 7th chapter of *Ācārāṅga* is concerned, in my opinion, it was mainly related to the *Jinakalpa* or strict code of conduct of naked monks. When the followers of this strict code of conduct disappeared gradually, no serious efforts were made to restore it and finally it got lost. Likewise, the twelfth *Aṅga Drṣṭivāda*, said to be containing five parts (i) *Parikarma*, (ii) *Sūtra*, (iii) *Pūrvagata*, (iv) *Anuyoga* and (v) *Cūlikā*, seems to have dealt mainly with the philosophical doctrines of other schools of thought including the Pārśva tradition. *Pūrvagata*, the third part of *Drṣṭivāda*, exclusively, dealt with the doctrines of Pārśva tradition, later on accepted as the doctrines of Mahāvīra. All these works were preserved only through oral tradition, because, Jaina monks and nuns were strictly prohibited to write on palm-leaves, those days. That study and preservation of the Jaina literature, written on palm-leaves were prohibited due to the strict observance of non-violence. They were of the opinion that in the process of writing, studying and preserving the palm-leaf works, the injury to the *Jīvas* was inevitable. That is why, they made no efforts to restore them in written form. This was the reason behind the loss of *Drṣṭivāda* as well as some other āgamas. In my opinion, *Drṣṭivāda*, in particular, became extinct, because of following factors — firstly, its contents were not fully in accordance with Mahāvīra's tradition and were mostly related with philosophical discussions of other traditions and schools, hence unable to arouse interest in Jaina monks. Secondly, the concepts, accepted by Mahāvīra's tradition, were included in other Āgamic texts also, hence Jaina monks did not make any effort to preserve the Pūrva literature. Thirdly, due to the oral tradition, other *Aṅga* āgamas could not remain

intact. We find that earlier subject-matter of *Praśnavyākaraṇa* has been completely changed. Similarly, partial changes as well as some additions are also noted in the subject-matter of *Jñātādharma-kathā*, *Antakṛddasāṅga*, *Anuttraupapātika* and *Vipāka-sūtra*. Among the secondary canons (*Aṅga-bāhya* āgamas) following works, known as *Kālika* and *Utkālika*, respectively were also lost in due course of time. The details of such canons are as under :

Kālikasūtra not available presently —

1. Kṣullikāvimānapravibhakti
2. Mahallikavimānapravibhakti
3. Aṅgacūlikā
4. Vaggacūlikā
5. Vivāhacūlikā
6. Aruṇotapāda
7. Varuṇotapāda
8. Garuṇotapāda
9. Dharaṇotapāda
10. Vaiśramaṇotapāda
11. Velandarotapāda
12. Devendrotapāda
13. Utthānaśruta
14. Samutthānaśruta
15. Nāgaprajñāptipāṇikā.

Utkālikasūtra not available presently

1. Kalpikākalpikā
2. Cūlakalpikā
3. Mahāprajñāpanā
4. Pramādāpramāda
5. Pauruṣīmaṇḍala
6. Maṇḍala Praveśa
7. Vidyācaraṇa Vinīścaya
8. Dhyānavibhakti
9. Vītarāga Śruta
10. Vihārakalpa
11. Cāraṇavidhi.

About the subject-matter of these *Kālika* and *Utkālikasūtras*, not extant today, it is very difficult to

comment upon. Their subject-matter can be inferred on the basis of their titles only. One *Āṅgasūtra*, i. e., *Dṛṣṭivāda*, 15 *Kālikasūtra* and 11 *Utkālikasūtras*, thus, the number of extinct or not available texts, comes to be 27, in total. Except these 27, all the 51 texts are available. At present six *Āvaśyakas* being counted as one, the number finally becomes 46. It is not possible here to deliberate on the corresponding authorship, date and subject-matter of each and every text of this list in this article, so I shall discuss, in short, only few important works in their chronological order.

Primary Canons (Āṅgas)

Ācārāṅga is considered as the oldest of all the works of the early period. According to the scholars, the first part of *Ācārāṅga* belongs to the c. 5th-4th B. C. This part contains the original preachings of Lord Mahāvīra. It deals with the spiritual preachings alongwith the basic principles of non-violence and ethical code of conduct, prescribed for Jania monks and nuns. Its last chapter depicts a real picture of the ascetic life of Lord Mahāvīra. The 7th chapter of the first part is supposed to be lost after the composition of its *Niryukti*, i. e., c. 2nd-3rd A. D. The second part of *Ācārāṅga* is known as *Āyāracūḍā* – an appendix. It mainly deals with the detailed rules and regulations or the code of conduct of Jaina monks and nuns alongwith some of the events of the life of Mahāvīra. Modern scholars opine that the second part of *Ācārāṅga* was composed during the c. 2nd-1st B. C. Another important canonical work of this era is *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* dating c. 4th-3rd B. C. This work is also full of spiritual and moral preachings but its peculiarity lies in the presentaion of different philosophical views prevalent in that particular era. Like *Ācārāṅga*, it also comprises two parts (*Śrutaskandhas*). Scholars are of the opinion that the second part of *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* is some what posterior to the first.

The third important work in chronological

order of the Jaina canonical literature is *Isibhāṣiyāim* (*Rṣibhāṣitam*). All the scholars of Prākṛta and Jainology : Western and Indian, consider it of c. 4th-3rd B. C. It marks the catholicity of early Jaina thinkers. It contains the ethical preachings as well as philosophical views of forty-five thinkers. Out of these Nārada, Asitadevala, Āṅgīrasa, Pārāśara, Āruṇa, Nārāyaṇa, Yājñavalkya, Uddālaka, Vidura etc. definitely belong to Upaniṣadic tradition. Similarly, Sāriputta, Vajjiputta, Mahākāśyapa etc. belong to Buddhist tradition while Pārśva and Vardhamāna belong to the Jaina tradition. A few others are of other independent Śramaṇic tradition, not extant today. This work shows that in the early period the Upaniṣadic and other Śramaṇic traditions were tolerant as well as respectful to each other.

Uttarādhyayana and *Daśavaikālika* are other important works of this early phase. *Uttarādhyayana* contains thirty-six chapters, mainly dealing with the religious preachings as well as some metaphysical doctrines of Jainism. Some chapters of this text are regarded as the later additions by the scholars but in no way they are later than the c. 2nd or 1st B. C. The next work *Daśavaikālika*, composed by Ārya Śayyambhava (c. 5th-4th B. C.) mainly deals with the ethical code of conduct of Jania monks and nuns alongwith the spiritual discourses and preachings. However, we can not deny the possibility of the interpolations to the some extent in its final editing.

The other works dealing with the ethical code of conduct are *Niśītha*, *Daśāśrutaskandha* (*Āyāradaśā*), *Vyavahāra* and *Kalpa*, all composed by Ārya Bhadrabāhu inc. 3rd B. C. These works, not only deal with the code of conduct but with transgressions and atonements also.

Against general belief, that all the *Āṅgas* are composed by the *Gaṇadharas*, direct disciples of Lord Mahāvīra, some opine that except *Ācārāṅga* and *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, all the *Āṅgas* are composed later on. In

my opinion, it is very difficult to assign any particular date or authorship to these extant works because of containing different levels of the development of Jaina thought, occurred through different ages.

After *Ācārāṅga* and *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, next two *Āṅgas* in successive order are *Sthānāṅga* and *Samavāyāṅga*. They may be considered as encyclopaedia of early Jaina thoughts and beliefs, mainly based on the numbers more or less similar to *Aṅguttaranikāya* of Buddhist tradition. Both these works provide more information about the Jaina order and development of Jaina thoughts of the later period, i.e., c. 3rd-4th A.D. The next in the list is *Bhagavati* (*Vyākhyāprajñapti*) mainly dealing with different aspects of Jaina philosophy. According to a group of scholars, this voluminous work, was composed at different phases and not at one time. Evidently, it has references to the later works like *Prajñāpanā*, *Anuyogadvāra*, etc. belonging to c. 1st-4th A. D. and side by side, depicts various earlier original concepts, witnessing change in the process of development of Jaina thoughts. The next work of early period is *Jñātādharma-kathā*. Second part of this work is considerably later than the first. The first contains mainly stories preached by Lord Mahāvīra to his disciples. Its 19 chapters, referred to in *Āvaśyaka-sūtra*, are undoubtedly, composed in the early period. The next among *Āṅga* canons is *Upāsakadaśāṅga*, considered as the first work related to the code of conduct of lay devotees (*Śrāvakaś*). It comprises life-sketches of ten prominent lay followers of Lord Mahāvīra. Not having any trace of any later work, it belongs to the early period. *Antakṛddāśāṅga* deals with the life-stories and ascetic life of the persons, attaining their salvation in the last span of their life. According to *Sthānāṅga*, it has only ten chapters dealing with life-stories of 10 persons. But present volume contains life-stories of 93 persons. It clearly shows that not at the time of Valabhī *Vācanā* alone but even after that some additional matters

were incorporated in *Sthānāṅga*. Same is the case with *Anuttaropapātikadaśāṅga*. Its early edition contained life-stories of only ten persons who attained *Sarvārthasiddhi Vimāna* and were supposed to attain liberation in their next births. Of Jaina canon *Praśnavyākaraṇadaśā*, unfortunately, the earlier contents are totally extinct. It seems that the present subject-matter of this work was incorporated in around c. 7th A.D. Its extant edition deals with five *āśravas*, viz., violence, untruthfulness, theft, unchastity and possessiveness alongwith five *saṃvaras*, viz., truthfulness, non-stealing, chastity and non-possession. Last available work of *Āṅga* canon is *Vipākadaśā*, dealing with fruits of merit and demerits.

Secondary Canons (Upāṅga)

The first work of the secondary canons is *Aupapātika*, dealing with the episode of Sūryābhadeva. It also depicts a beautiful picture of ancient art and architecture. On the basis of this depiction, scholars date this work not earlier than c. 1st-2nd A.D. The next work of this category is *Rājaprasāniya* which, so far its subject-matter is concerned, is more similar to the Buddhist Pāli canon — *Pasenīyasutta*. The third and the fourth, *Jīvābhigama* and *Prajñāpanā*, respectively, deal with the Jaina metaphysics in general and the concepts of *jīva* and *ajīva* in particular. The authorship of *Prajñāpanā* is attributed to Ārya Śyāma (c. 1st A.D.). Out of these twelve secondary canonical works only *Prajñāpanā's* authorship is known. About the authorship of other works, we are still in dark. The fifth one is *Jambūdvīpaprajñapti*, mainly dealing with Jaina Geography in addition to the life-history of Ṛṣabhadeva. The subject-matter of next two works, *Sūryaprajñapti* and *Candraprajñapti* are related with Jaina cosmology in general and Jaina astronomy in particular. Scholars date these c. 2nd-1st B.C. Other five works of this bunch are very short and rather of less important.

Besides *Āṅga* & *Upāṅga* canonical literature,

Candrakavedhyaka, *Taṇḍulavaicārika*, *Āturpratyā-khyāna*, *Mahāpratyākhyāna*, *Marānavibhakti*, mainly concerned with the Jaina *Sādhana*, are known as *Prakīrṇakas*, in general and *Samādhimarāṇa* in particular. All these works are, undoubtedly earlier to the c. 4th-5th A.D.

Among the non-canonical works of this period, very few in number are extant, namely *Tattvārtha-sūtra* and its auto-commentary (c. 3rd-4th A. D.), *Paumacariya* of Vimalasūri (c. 2nd-5th A. D.) and Digambar works composed in Śauraseni Prākṛta like *Kasāyapāhuḍa* of Guṇadhara (c. 4th A. D.) and *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama* of Puṣpadanta Bhūtabali (about c. 5th A. D.). Apart from these, the works of Kundakunda, Samantabhadra and Siddhasena Divākara may also be considered as the works of early period. Scholars differ on the exact date of composition of these works, except that of *Tattvārtha-sūtra*. They date these in between c. 2nd-5th A. D.

Among non-canonical literature, the first *Niryuktis*, ten in number, are of great importance. These (*Niryuktis*) mainly explain the meaning of Jaina technical terms from the various stand-points alongwith the brief account of the subject matter of that particular Āgama. Scholars widely differ about the time and authorship of *Niryuktis* except that of *Govindaniryukti*. Some are of the opinion that these *Niryuktis* are composed by Bhadrabāhu-I (c. 3rd B. C.) while others consider these to be composed by Bhadrabāhu-II, the brother of Varāhamihira (c. 6th A. D.). But in my humble opinion, as external and internal evidences show it was neither of Bhadrabāhu-I or of Bhadrabāhu-II. But, Āryabhadra of c. 2nd-3rd A. D., in all probability, was the author of these *Niryuktis*. I have given various reasons in support of this view in my independent article published in *Sāgara Jaina Vidyābhārati* (Pārśvanātha Vidyāpīṭha, Varanasi, 1994). Presently, we have only the following *Niryuktis* :

1. *Āvaśyakaniryukti*,
2. *Daśavaikālikaniryukti*,
3. *Uttarādhyayananyiryukti*,
4. *Ācārāṅganiryukti*,
5. *Sūtrakṛtāṅganiryukti*,
6. *Daśāśrutaskandhaniryukti*,
7. *Kalpaniryukti* and
8. *Vyavahāraniryukti*.

Apart from these, two more *Niryuktis* — *Ogha* and *Piṇḍa* are also available, but considered to be the part of *Āvaśyakaniryukti* and *Daśavaikālikaniryukti*, respectively, hence, not independent works. We also have a mention of two more *Niryuktis* on *Sūrya-prajñāpti* and *Rṣibhāṣita*, but they are extinct now.

To conclude, we can say that more than hundred works could be considered to belong to this early period but about thirty of them are now extinct.

Jaina Literature of this Period

The evolution and changes occurred in Jaina thought and practice during c. 3rd-10th A. D. is traceable through its literature. For literature is the mirror of the cultural development of any society. The prime period of the composition of literary works of Jainism corresponds to c. 3rd-10th A. D. Almost all the important works of Jainism were finally composed and edited in this period. The literature, which emerged in this period, may be divided into five categories :

1. *Āgamas* and their commentaries.
2. Philosophical works.
3. Works related to the Jaina religious practices.
4. Jaina epics and other narrative literature.
5. Secular Literature of Jainas.

1. Āgamas and their Commentaries

As I have already mentioned that except *Nandīsūtra* and present edition of *Praśnavyākaraṇa*, most of the *Āgamas* were composed before c. 3rd A. D. but their final editing had been done only in the

c. 5th A. D. At the time of this final editing, interpolation of many later developed philosophical concepts and informations regarding the Jaina order creaped into these. The *Nandīśūtra*, the *āgamic* work composed during this period, deals with the Jaina theory of five-fold knowledge as well as contains its later developments which took place in c. 4th-5th A. D. Similarly, the drastic changes in the original subject-matter of *Praśnavyākaraṇa* and partial changes in *Antakṛddasā* and *Anuttaraupapātīkadasā* also occurred during this period. Almost all the *Prākṛta* and some of the early *Saṃskṛta* commentaries on the Jaina *Āgamas* were written in this period, in form of *Niryuktis* (c. 3rd-4th A. D.), *Bhāṣyas* (c. 6th A. D.) and *Cūrṇis* (c. 7th A. D.). This period is of great literary importance because majority of the *Āgamic* works were finally edited and some of them were even composed also in this period.

Besides these *Niryuktis*, *Oghaniryukti* and *Piṇḍaniryukti* are also available but *Oghaniryukti* is considered as the part of *Āvaśyakaniryukti* and *Piṇḍaniryukti* as the part of *Daśavaikālikaniryukti*, hence they are not independent works. Though, *Niryuktis* on *Sūryaprajñaptī* and *Ṛṣibhāṣita* are referred to in *Āvaśyakaniryukti* (Verse 85) but at present these two are not available. The *Niśīthaniryukti*, considered to be the part of *Ācārāṅganiryukti* is mixed with its *Bhāṣya*. All these *Niryuktis* are written in *Prākṛta* verses and deal very precisely with the contents of the respective *Āgamas*.

After *Niryukti*, *Bhāṣyas* on *āgamic* texts were composed in c. 5th-6th A. D. The *Bhāṣyas* are more exhaustive and elaborate than those of *Niryuktis*. They were also composed in *Prākṛta* verses. *Bhāṣyas* are quite prolific in their contents referring to various concepts of Jaina philosophy and the code of the conduct for monks and nuns with their exceptions and punishments.

Among *Bhāṣya*, *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* is the most important. It is the first work of Śvetāmbara tradition, dealing with the problems of Jaina philosophy with minute details. The concept of five-fold knowledge has been discussed elaborately with a critical approach herein. Among various proofs given for the existence of soul, one bears similarity to that of Rene Descartes (c. 16th A. D.), a Western philosopher, proving the existence of soul through doubt itself. In *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, various contrary views of Jaina ācāryas are mentioned and reviewed alongwith the views of some rebellious Jaina thinkers, i.e., *Nihnavas*. It also deals with the differences of Śvetāmbara and Digambara traditions regarding the successiveness and simultaneity of *Kevalajñāna* and *Kevaladarśana* as well as the problem of nakedness of the monk with full details. Other *Bhāṣyas* mainly deal with the ethical code of conduct of ascetics with their exceptions and the conditions in which these exceptions could be followed alongwith their atonements. The *Bhāṣyas*, dealing with the code of conduct of monks are—*Daśavaikālikabhāṣya*, *Uttarādhyayana-bhāṣya*, *Bṛhatkalpabhāṣya*, *Vyavahārabhāṣya*, *Niśīthabhāṣya* and *Jītakalpabhāṣya*. Some of the *Bhāṣyas* also contain some informations of historical importance. As the authors of the *Bhāṣya*, we have only two names : Jinabhadraṇi and Saṅghadāsagaṇi. Jinabhadraṇi is the author of *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* while Saṅghadāsagaṇi is the author of *Bṛhatkalpa*, *Vyavahāra* and *Niśīthabhāṣyā*. Of these two Saṅghadāsagaṇi is supposed to be senior to Jinabhadra, because Jinabhadra, in his work *Viśeṣaṇavati* has referred the *Vasudevahiṇḍī*, a work authored by Saṅghadāsagaṇi. The period of Jinabhadra, is undoubtedly, the latter half of the c. 6th A. D. As Saṅghadāsagaṇi was senior to Jinabhadraṇi, it leaves no room for doubt that he must have flourished in second half of the c. 6th A.D. All these *bhāṣyas* are of considerable length; composed in *Prākṛta* verses and deal with

their subjects exhaustively. We find a rich cultural data and some informations about the cultural history of India in the *Bhāṣyas*.

Next, the *Cūrṇis*, unlike the *Niryuktis* and *Bhāṣyas* are written in prose. *Niryuktis* and *Bhāṣyas* are written in Prākṛta only, while the *Cūrṇis* in Prākṛta mixed with Samskr̥ta. Among *Cūrṇis* — *Āvaśyaka*, *Daśavaikālika*, *Uttarādhyayana*, *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, *Anuyogadvāra*, *Nandī* and *Niśītha*, are the most important.

All these *Cūrṇis* were written by Jinadāsaganī Mahattara. In *Nandīcūrṇi* it is clearly mentioned that this work was completed in Śaka Samvat 598 corresponding to 676 A. D. It is, therefore, concluded that most of the important *Cūrṇis* were written in c. 7th A. D. Some *Cūrṇis* viz., *Daśavaikālika* of Agastyasimha and *Cūrṇisūtras* on *Kaśāyapāhuḍasutta* are the earlier among the *Cūrṇi* literature.

Among whole of the commentary literature *Cūrṇis* hold an important place because first, they deal with the various subjects and are directly concerned with social and cultural heritage of Jainism. Secondly, they supply so many informations about the Jaina History pertaining c. 1st-6th A. D.

Cūrṇis were succeeded by Samskr̥ta commentaries, written on different *Āgamic* texts, known as *Vṛttis* or *Vivaraṇas*. Among Samskr̥ta commentators Haribhadrāsūri is the earliest, flourished in the middle of the c. 8th A. D. He wrote commentaries on *Āvaśyaka*, *Daśavaikālika*, *Jīvābhigama*, *Prajñāpanā*, *Nandī*, *Anuyogadvāra* and *Piṇḍaniryukti*. Śīlāṅkācārya, flourished in the c. 9th A. D. believed to have written several commentaries on *Āgamas* but unfortunately at present only two commentaries on *Ācārāṅga* and *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, are available. After Śīlāṅka, Abhayadevasūri and Śāntisūri are the prominent names among commentators. Abhayadevasūri has commented on nine of eleven *Aṅgas* except *Ācārāṅga* and *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, hence called *Navāṅgi-*

vṛttikāra. Śāntisūri has written a commentary on *Uttarādhyayanasūtra*. Both of these later Samskr̥ta commentators flourished, during c. 10th-11th A. D. This trend of commentary-writing is still current in Śvetāmbara tradition.

In Digambara tradition, *Kaśāyapāhuḍasutta* and *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama* are considered as equivalent to *āgamas*. These works are written in c. 4th-5th A. D. On *Kaśāyapāhuḍasutta* first commentary was written by Yativṛṣabha in the form of *Cūrṇi-sūtras* in c. 6th A. D. After that in c. 9th A. D. Vīrasena wrote two commentaries *Jayadhavalā* and *Dhavalā* on *Kaśāyapāhuḍa* and *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, respectively. *Mahādhavalā* is a commentary on the one part of *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, written by his disciple Jinasena. These commentaries mainly deal with Jaina philosophy in general and *Karma* theory in particular.

2. Important Philosophical Works of this Period

Among the Jaina philosophical works composed between c. 3rd-10th A.D., the *Tattvārthasūtra*, with its auto-commentary by Umāsvāti, is the pioneer one and may be considered as the first systematic work on Jaina philosophy. Composed in c. 3rd A. D., it also has the credit of being the first *Samskr̥ta* work of Jaina literature, written in the style of other *Sūtragranthas* of Indian philosophy. The especiality of this work is that it is equally respected as well as accepted by both the sects of Jainism — Śvetāmbara and Digambara. It encompasses ten chapters dealing with Jaina metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. Its first chapter deals mainly with Jaina theory of knowledge, *Naya* and *Nikṣepa*, second with *Jīva* (living substance), third and fourth with hells and heavens, fifth with Jaina metaphysics, sixth to ninth chapters with Jaina doctrine of *Karma* and Jaina *sādhana* or ethical code of conduct of house-holders and monks, respectively. Finally, the tenth one deals with the concept of liberation (*mokṣa*). Notably, the concept of *Guṇasthāna* and *Saptabhaṅginaya* (Seven-fold

judgement) are totally absent in it. This shows that these concepts came into existence later during c. 5th-6th A.D.

After *Tattvārthasūtra*, Ācārya Siddhasena Divākara's *Sanmatitarka* is the next critical and important work, composed in c. 4th A. D. in Prākṛta verses. It explains critically the concept of *dravya* (substance), *guṇa* (properties), *paryāya* (modes) and their mutual relationship on the basis of the Jaina theory of *Naya*, *Nikṣepa* and *Anekāntavāda* (non-absolutism). It is the first work in which one-sided views of other philosophers are critically examined to establish Jaina theory of *Anekāntavāda*. Some of the *Dvātriṃśaka-dvātriṃśikās*, of the same author, also, critically examine the philosophical views of other Indian schools under the pretext of praising the *Jina*. Even if the refutation of the philosophical views of other schools of Indian philosophy is found in the canonical works also, they are neither critical nor systematic in their approach. Siddhasena for the first time, critically examined the views of other Indian philosophies, showing their logical inconsistencies. So far as the works on Jaina epistemology are concerned, *Nyāyāvatāra* of Siddhasena may be considered the first work on Jaina logic. This work provides the base to understand the later gradual developments in Jaina logic, particularly the contribution of Akalaṅka and Vidyānandi in this regard.

Among the writers of the Digambara sect, who wrote independent philosophical treatises, Samantabhadra (c. 5th A. D.) occupies an important place. His *Āptamīmāṃsā* is a noted scholarly presentation. It immitates *Sanmatitarka* of Siddhasena, in style but differs in language. *Sanmatitarka* is in Prākṛta verses, while *Āptamīmāṃsā* is in Saṃskṛta verses. It also critically evaluates the one-sided views of other philosophies. These two works namely, *Sanmatitarka* and *Āptamīmāṃsā*, may be considered as the prime works for the exposition of Jaina theory of

Anekāntavāda. *Āptamīmāṃsā* is an important work which establishes the concepts of Jainism after a critical evaluation of those of the other schools of Indian philosophy.

Another important work of this age is *Dvādaśāranayacakra*, authored by Mallavādī in c. 5th A. D., aiming to establish Jaina theory of *Anekāntavāda* by pointing out inconsistencies in the thoughts of other schools of Indian philosophy. The style of this work is somewhat different from that of *Sanmatitarka* and *Āptamīmāṃsā*, as these two later works are composed in verses and deal with their subject-matter in a precise manner. *Nayacakra* is composed in prose and deals with its subject-matter exhaustively. The distinguishing feature of *Dvādaśāranayacakra* is that it critically examines the views of one philosophical school through the arguments of its opponent. In this way it makes a circle (*cakra*) in which the last school of thought is refuted or critically examined by the first one. On the basis of these three important works, this age is known as "The Age of Critical Presentation of *Anekāntavāda*". Besides '*Anekāntajayapatākā*' and '*Anekāntavādapraveśa*' of Haribhadra (c. 8th A. D.) also deal with the same subject-matter, but in a different manner. *Viśeṣa-vaśyakabhāṣya*, of Jinabhadraṇi *Kṣamāśramaṇa*, is one of the important work of this age. In Śvetāmbara tradition it is the first work which deals with various problems of Jaina philosophy in detail and with minute observation. In Digambara Tradition also the *Tattvārthasūtra* is considered as the first systematic work on Jaina philosophy. The oldest available commentary on *Tattvārthasūtra* in Digambara tradition is Pūjyapāda Deva-nandi's *Sarvārthasiddhi* which is next to *Svopajñā-bhāṣya* (auto-commentary of Umāsvāti). It is composed in the first half of c. 6th A. D.

During c. 8th A. D. two more commentaries were produced namely Akalaṅka's *Tattvārthavārttika*

and Vidyānandi's *Śloka-vārttika* which are of great importance. Both of these works not only propound the Jaina philosophy but also critically evaluate and estimate the other philosophical systems. Like other works, these commentaries also discuss the points of dispute between Śvetāmbara and Digambara sects, such as the concept of women's liberation (*strī-mukti*), the taking of food by omniscients (*kevalī-bhukti*) etc. At the same time in Śvetāmbara tradition too, two commentaries on *Tattvārthasūtra*, namely *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra* and *Tattvārthasūtravārttika* by Siddhasenagaṇi (c. 7th) and Haribhadra (c. 8th) respectively, were brought out.

The composition of independent works on Jaina doctrine of *Karma* starts with c. 4th A. D. In Digambara tradition the independent works on Jaina doctrine of *Karma* composed during c. 4th-10th A. D. are *Mahākarma-prakṛti-prābhṛta* (*Ṣaṭakhaṇḍasāstra*) by Puṣpadanta Bhūtabali (c. 4th A. D.), *Kaṣāyaprābhṛta* by Guṇadhara (c. 4th A. D.), *Kaṣāyaprābhṛta Cūṛṇi* by Yativṛṣabha (c. 6th A. D.), *Dhavalā Tīkā* and *Jayadhavalā Tīkā* by Vīrasena (c. 9th A. D.) and *Gommaṭasāra* by Nemicaṇḍra Siddhāntacakravartī (c. 10th A. D.). Similarly, in Śvetāmbara tradition *Karmaprakṛti* by Śivaśarmasūri (c. 5th A. D.), *Prācīna-Ṣaṭkarmagrantha*, *Śataka* and *Saptatikā* by Śivaśarmasūri and *Pañcasanḡraha* are the noted treatises composed during this age. All these works present detailed description of Jaina Philosophy in general and Jaina doctrine of *Karma* in particular.

Haribhadrasūri composed more than eighty works on different aspects of Jaina philosophy and religion. He developed a Jaina system of Yoga on the basis of Patañjali's Yoga and established some new concepts of Jaina Yoga. Haribhadra was a prolific writer who has written on every aspect of Jaina philosophy and religion. His *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* and *Śāstravārtīsamuccaya* are two important works which describe comparatively the thoughts of other

systems of Indian philosophy. In *Śāstravārtīsamuccaya*, he has paid more respect and veneration to the other schools of thought. It was Haribhadra who for the first time started the cult of commentary writing in Saṃskṛta which was developed by Śīlāṅka (c. 9th A. D.) and Abhayadevasūri (latter part of c. 11th A. D.). These commentaries not only explain the facts about the different *āgamic* topics but also critically examine the philosophical concepts.

During this period a number of spiritualistic treatises appeared. Kundakunda added distinct idea to Jaina spirituality through his voluminous literature. According to Digambaras, his period is supposed to be c. 1st A. D., mainly based on the evidence of *Markara Abhilekha* which has already been proved as fake inscription. According to new researches his period has been established as c. 6th A. D. (See — Aspects of Jainology, Vol. III, ed. by Prof. M. A. Dhaky & Prof. S. M. Jain, P. V., 1991, p. 8). He has contributed a lot to the field of Jaina philosophy, by writing his distinguished works as *Samayasāra*, *Pravacanasāra*, *Niyamasāra* etc.

3. Works on Religious Practices and Ethics

The literature related to Jaina religious practices may be divided into following five categories :

(i) Hymns composed in the praise of *Tīrthaṅkaras*.

(ii) Works related to the modes of worship, rituals and religious ceremonies.

(iii) Works concerned with religious preachings.

(iv) Works composed on Jaina *Sādhana* and Yoga.

(v) Works related to the Code of Conduct of Monks and Nuns as well as house-holders.

Under the first category *Dvātrimśikās* of Siddhasena Divākara (c. 4th A. D.) hold an important place. He has written 32 *Dvātrimśikās* out of which seven — first five, 11th and 21st are composed in the

praise of different *Tīrthaṅkaras*. Many of these *Dvā-trimśikās*, apart from praising the *Tīrthaṅkaras*, critically examine the theories of other philosophical systems. The next important work of this eulogical literature is Samantabhadra's *Svayambhūstotra*. It consists of 143 ślokaś written in praise of twenty-four *Tīrthaṅkaras*. Kundakunda's *Daśabhakti* is also an important work dealing with ten-fold *lakṣaṇas* of *dharma*. Another most popular and well-received work, respected equally by both the sects — Śvetāmbara and Digambara, is Mānauṅga's *Bhaktāmarastotra* (c. 6th A.D.) composed in the praise of first *Tīrthaṅkara* Rṣabhadeva.

The second category encompasses the work related to Jaina modes of worship and rituals. The first work of this category was *Pūjāprakaraṇa* by Umāsvāti but unfortunately it is not available. Similarly, in Digambara tradition some more treatises related to this theme viz. *Arhatpratiṣṭhā* and *Jinā-bhiṣeka*, both authored by Pūjyapāda Devanandī (c. 6th A. D.), are also not available today. A few works on Jaina modes of worship were also composed but presently except some of *Pañcāśakas* and other works by Haribhadra, none of these are available. Among nineteen *Pañcāśakas* only following are related to this theme :

- (i) *Dīkṣāvidhi*
- (ii) *Caityavandanavidhi*
- (iii) *Pūjāvidhi*
- (iv) *Jinabhavana-nirmāṇa-vidhi*
- (v) *Pratiṣṭhā-vidhi* and
- (vi) *Jinayātrā-vidhi*.

Haribhadra has discussed the subjects in his *Ṣoḍaśakas* also. Some *Ṣoḍaśakas* such as *Pratiṣṭhā-vidhi*, *Pūjāphala* and *Dīkṣādhikāra* may be regarded as related to this theme. *Pañcāśakas* are composed in Prākṛta, while *Ṣoḍaśakas* in Saṁskṛta. Haribhadra's *Caityavandana* alongwith its auto-commentary *Caityavandana-bhāṣya* and *Pratiṣṭhākalpa* are the noted

works of this category.

The third category of religious literature includes the works such as Kundakunda's *Aṣṭapāhuḍa*, Pūjyapāda Devanandī's *Iṣṭopadeśa* and Dharmadāsagaṇi's *Upadeśamālā* composed in Prākṛta, Saṁskṛta and Prākṛta, respectively. However, the authorship of *Upadeśamālā* is a matter of dispute. Above mentioned both the works lucidly record the preachings of religious doctrines. Haribhadra has also contributed some works such as *Upadeśapada*, *Dharmabinduprakaraṇa*, *Upadeśaprakaraṇa* and *Sambodhaprakaraṇa* to this theme.

The fourth category related to Jaina *sādhana* and Yoga, abounds in its literature. *Prasamarati-prakaraṇa* by Umāsvāti (c. 3rd-4th A. D.) may be regarded as the first work of this category. Pūjyapāda Devanandī's *Samādhitantra* (c. 6th A. D.) also belongs to the same category. On Jaina Yoga Haribhadra contributed a lot by writing several books on Jaina yoga. *Yogavimśikā*, *Yogaśataka*, *Yogabindu*, *Yogaḍṛṣṭisamuccaya* and *Dhyānaśataka* are some of his important works on Jaina yoga.

The fifth category comprises the works composed on Jaina ethics and code of conduct for Jaina monks and nuns. It is the category to which several works have been contributed by the Ācāryas of both the sects — Śvetāmbara and Digambara. In Śvetāmbara tradition, apart from commentaries (*Bhāṣyas* and *Cūrṇis*) written on Jaina Āgamas on this very theme, some independent works were also composed, particularly dealing with the ethical code of conduct of Jaina ascetics and lay-followers. Among these works, Umāsvāti's '*Śrāvaka-prajñāpti*' may be regarded as the first, but unfortunately it is also not available. In Digambara tradition, *Mūlācāra* and *Bhagavati-Ārādhanā*, are the important works elaborately dealing with the code of conduct of Jaina monks and nuns.

In my opinion, *Mūlācāra* and *Bhagavati-Ārādhanā* basically belong to Yāpanīya tradition and

not to Digambara. I have proved this on the basis of multiple internal as well as external evidences in my book *Jaina Dharma kā Yāpanīya Sampradāya*. In Digambara tradition *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvaka-cāra* of Samantabhadra (c. 6th A. D.) is regarded as the first work composed on the ethical code of conduct for Jaina house-holders, however, its authorship is also a matter of dispute. In Śvetāmbara tradition after '*Uvasagadasāo*', the seventh *aṅga* of Jaina canons, '*Sāvayapaṇṇatti*' by Haribhadra is the first available work, dealing with the code of conduct for Jaina lay-devotees. Some independent works dealing with the atonement (*Prāyaścitta*) were also written in this period among which Jinabhadra's '*Jītakalpa*' stands as the most important work. Later on, on the basis of *Jītakalpa*, Indranandi's *Chedapiṇḍasāstra* and *Cheda-sāstra* by unknown writer were composed in Yāpanīya tradition. Especiality of these two works lies in the fact that they not only prescribe the laws of the atonement for Jaina monks and nuns but for the male and female lay-devotees also.

4. Jaina Narrative Literature

Jaina narrative literature of this period is generally divided into five categories, viz. (i) biographies of the 63 illustrious personalities (*Śālākāpuruṣas*) described together in one book, (ii) life-stories of these religious great personalities described independently in a work, (iii) religious tales in romantic form, (iv) semi-historical *prabandhas* and (v) compilation of stories in the form of *kathākoṣas*.

However, main objective of the narratives was religious exhortation meant for the masses. It may be noted that most of the literature of this form, excluding canonical texts belong to this period, i.e., c. 3rd-10th A. D. Though some prominent works of the narrative literature such as *Triṣaṣṭiśālākāpuruṣa* of Hemacandra, semi-historical *prabandhas* — *Prabhāvaka-carita*, *Prabandha-cintāmaṇi*, *Ākhyānakamaṇikośa*, *Prabandhakōśa*, etc., have been composed

between c. 12th-14th A. D.

In the first category *Caupannamahāpuruṣa-carīyam* of Śīlāṅkācārya (c. 9th A. D.) depicts the life of 54 out of 63 *Śālākāpuruṣas*, leaving out 9 *Pratīvasudevas*, in Prākṛta. Containing 10,800 verses, it deals with 19 characters out of 54, exhaustively, while the remaining characters have been described only in few pages. It belongs to Śvetāmbara tradition. In Digambara tradition, Jinasena and his pupil Guṇabhadra (c. 9th A. D.) also composed *Mahāpurāṇa* or *Triṣaṣṭicaritra* in Saṃskṛta. It is divided in two parts — *Ādipurāṇa* and *Uttarapurāṇa*, describing the life of 63 great personalities of Jainism. On the same theme Puṣpadanta also composed one of the greatest work of *Apabhramśa* language, namely *Triṣaṣṭimahāpuruṣa-guṇālaṅkāru* (later c. 10th A. D.). Puṣpadanta carries to perfection the possibility of *Apabhramśa* as a vehicle of poetry.

Second type includes many *Kathās*, *Ākhyānas* and *Caritas* in Saṃskṛta, Prākṛta and *Apabhramśa*. It deals mainly with the biographies of individual *Tīrthaṅkaras* and other celebrated personalities of their times. The first and foremost work of the corresponding period is certainly *Paumacariya*, of Vimalasūri (c. 2nd-5th A.D.) of *Nāila* or *Nāgila Kula*, which deals with the life-stories of Lakṣmaṇa and Rāvaṇa. It is a pioneer work of Jinas on *Rāmakathā*. It has considerable impact on one work of Raviṣeṇa's *Padmacarita* (c. 7th A. D.) in Saṃskṛta and Svayambhū's *Paumacariu* (c. 8th A. D.) in *Apabhramśa*. There is also another version of Jaina *Rāmakathā* represented by Guṇabhadra (898 A. D.) in *Uttarapurāṇa* and followed by some other Digambara writers of (c. 10th A. D.). Some other works of this category are *Pārśvābhya-daya* by Jinasena (c. 9th A. D.), *Harivaṃśapurāṇa* by other Jinasena (c. 9th A. D.), *Vardhamānacarita* by Asaga, *Neminirvāṇamahākāvya* by Vāgbhaṭṭa, *Candra-prabhacarita* by Vīrasena and some Kannaḍa works

such as *Ādipurāṇa* by Pampa and *Śāntipurāṇa* by Ponna (c. 10th A. D.) may also be included in this category. It is also to be noted that stories of Rāma and Kṛṣṇa are well recognised in Jaina tradition and Jaina writers composed so many independent works on the life of these two great personalities, accordingly.

The third type marks an interesting phase in Indian literature, in which religious tales are presented in a romantic form. The *Taraṅgalolā* of Pādaliptasūri in Prākṛta is lost but its epitome in Saṁskṛta *Taraṅgāvatī* indicates that it might have possessed engrossing literary qualities. Then there is the *Vasudevahiṇḍī* of Saṅghadāsagaṇi (c. 6th A. D.). *Vasudevahiṇḍī* is probably the Mahārāṣṭrī version of Guṇāḍhya's famous *Bṛhatkathā*, written in Sātavāhana period. Vasudeva, the father of the Kṛṣṇa, the romantic hero of this novel, evidently remind us of Naravāhanadatta, the Hero of Guṇāḍhya. Next there is *Samarāiccakahā* of Haribhadra in Prākṛta described by author as religious story, i. e., *Dharmakathā*. The fortune of the hero Samarāditya is traced through his 9 previous births. The underlying principle of these narratives is the doctrine of *Karma*. Haribhadra's *Dhūrtākhyāna* in Prākṛta is also one of the important works of Jaina literature. It shows through this imaginary tale how skilfully the incredible legends of Hindu Mythology could be ridiculed. Next, *Kuvalayamālā* (Mahārāṣṭrī Prākṛta) by Śvetāmbara ācārya Udyotanasūri, composed in 799 A. D. shows author's thorough acquaintance with works of previous writers by referring to them. He has beautifully described the corrupt city life. *Upamitibhava-prapañcakathā* is composed in Saṁskṛta in 906 A. D. by Siddharṣi. The work of Siddharṣi is an elaborate and extensive allegory. It is a narrative consisting of series of birth stories, i. e., the hero of all the stories is the same person in different births. Ācārya proposes to explain the mundane carrier of the soul (*Jīva*) under the name of *saṁsārī jīva* from the lowest stage of

existence to the final liberation. The conversion of the cruel king Marudatta to Jainism is the theme of this work. No literature representing the fourth type, i. e., semi-historical *prabandhas* has been written in corresponding period. All these *prabandhas* are written after c. 12th A. D.

The last type is represented by the compilation of stories or *Kathākoṣas*. The stories contained in these works have got a definite moral purpose to be propagated and as such teachers and preachers could use them independently without any specific context, throughout their discourses. Many of the *Kathākoṣas* are of anonymous composition.

The well known work of this type is *Dharmopadeśamālā* of Jaisimhasūri (867 A. D.) composed in Prākṛta. The work has auto-commentary and has 156 stories. *Bṛhatkathākoṣa*, composed in 931 A. D. by Hariṣeṇa, is also one of the important works of Yāpanīya tradition of Jainism. It is very informative Jaina text of early medieval period.

5. The Secular Literature of Jains

As defined, being a realistic system with a high spiritualistic bias, the basic texts of Jainism deal with the phenomena of the spiritual kingdom as well as physical universe. Jaina Ācāryas introduced various learnings aiming at the development of personalities and character, preservation of its cultural heritage, shoulder the responsibilities of the ascetic and house-holders in society and performance of religious duties. These aims are achieved by learning such subjects as could strike the balance between the spiritual as well as worldly life.

The earlier Jaina canons mention different subjects dealing with worldly phenomena. *Sūtra-kṛtāṅga*, *Bhagavatī*, *Samavāyāṅga*, *Nandīsūtra*, *Prajñāpanā*, *Jambūdvīpaprajñāpti*, *Candra* and *Sūrya-prajñāpti* describe various aspects of biology, grammar, *chanda*, *nirukta*, *jyotiṣa*, geography, astronomy

etc., but in *Āgamas* these different subjects are intermingled. Realising necessities of some independent works regarding worldly phenomena, Jaina *ācāryas* composed some secular literature dealing with the physical phenomena.

As the result, by the beginning of c. 3rd A. D. several independent works were composed on various subjects such as — Astronomy, Astrology, Geography, Mathematics, Biology, Arts and Architecture, Linguistic and Medicinal discipline, i. e., *Āyurveda*, etc. It would be in the fitness of the things to record some of the details about such works, viz. *Lokavibhāga* of Sarvānandi (c. 6th A. D.) and *Tiloyapaṇṇatti* of Yati-vṛṣabha composed in Prākṛta, are two important works on Astronomy and Geography. Some more works like Umāsvāti's *Jambūdvīpasamāsa* and *Kṣetravicāra* (c. 3rd A. D.) and *Bṛhatkṣetrasamāsa* of Jinabhadraṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa (c. 7th A. D.) also dealt with Geography and some aspects of Jaina cosmology. Among these works,

Kṣetravicāra is not available today. *Jīvasamāsa* and *Jīvavicāra* as well as *Taṇḍulavaicārika* are the works dealing with Jaina Biology. Puṣyapāda Devanandī (c. 6th A. D.) had composed a treatise named *Vaidyakaśāstra* dealing with *Āyurvedic* medicines, but this work is also not available. *Jyotiṣakaraṇḍaka* is a *Prakīṛṇaka* which deals with Jaina Astrology. In the field of grammar, *Jainendra Vyākaraṇa* or *Endravyākaraṇa* of Indranandī (c. 6th A. D.), *Śākaṭāyana Vyākaraṇa* alongwith its auto-commentary, *Āmogha-vṛtti* of Pālyakīrti Śākaṭāyana (c. 9th A. D.) and *Śvayambhū Vyākaraṇa* of Tribhuvana Svayambhū (c. 8th A. D.) are regarded as important works of this category.

The literary evolution of Jainas, particularly in Prākṛta, which took place during c. 5th B.C.-10th A. D. shows that the Jaina *ācāryas* were versatile genius. They composed various treatises on different subjects but mainly on philosophical and religious topics.



Origin and Development of Jainism

Jainism is one of the oldest living religions of the world. It has a rich spiritual, cultural and literary heritage to its credit. Indian religious quest has two main streams — Vedic (*Brāhmaṇic*) and *Śramaṇic*. Among the living world religions Jainism, as well as Buddhism, belong to the *Śramaṇic* trend of Indian culture. There were some other *Śramaṇic* religions also but they either like *Ājīvikas*, disappeared in the course of time or like *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* and other ascetic systems of Hindu religions, became part and parcel of great Hindu religion by adopting some tenets of Vedic religion.

Śramaṇic tradition is spiritualistic and soteriological in its very nature. It lays special emphasis on renunciation of worldly belongings and enjoyments and on emancipation from worldly existence, i.e., the cycle of birth and death. It may be accepted without any contradiction that these very ideas of emancipation (*mokṣa/mukti/nirvāṇa/kaivalya*) and renunciation (*tyāga/samyama/vairāgya*) have been cultivated by the *Śramaṇas*. Asceticism is the fundamental concept of *Śramaṇic* tradition. It is on this ground that the religions of *Śramaṇic* tradition such as Jainism and Buddhism differ from the early Vedic religion. The early Vedic religion was against asceticism and emphasized the material welfare of the individual and the society. The Vedic seers in their hymns were praising the worldly existence and praying for their own health and wealth as well as of their fellow beings, while the *Śramaṇas* were condemning this worldly existence and propounding the theory that this worldly existence is full of suffering and the ultimate end of human life is to get rid of the cycle of birth and death. Austerity, renunciation, emancipation, atheism, the

supremacy of human being over gods, equality of all beings, opposition to the supremacy of Brahmins and to animal sacrifices and emphasis on moral values were some of the fundamental tendencies of *Śramaṇic* tradition. We also find that some of the above mentioned tendencies such as renunciation and emancipation were totally absent from the earlier form of Vedic religion. These concepts were contributed by the *Śramaṇas* to Indian culture in general and Hinduism in particular.

Antiquity of Jaina Tradition

The antiquity of Jainism goes back to the pre-historic period of Indian culture. In support of this view Prof. H. Zimmer observes, "there is truth in the Jaina idea that their religion goes back to remote antiquity, the antiquity in question being that of the Pre-Aryan" (*Philosophies of India*, p. 60). We find references to *Vrātyas* and *Arhats* in *R̥gveda* and *Atharvaveda*, the oldest texts of the Indian literature. These *Vrātyas* and *Arhats* of Vedic period are the ancestors of Jainas. They are also known as *Śramaṇas* in *Upaniṣadic* period. Alongwith the references of *Vrātyas*, *Arhats* and *Śramaṇas* in *Vedas* and *Upaniṣadas*, we find mention there of some Jaina *Tīrthaṅkaras* such as R̥ṣabha, Ajita and Ariṣṭanemi. It conclusively proves that Jainism, in its oldest form as *Vrātya* or *Arhata* tradition, was prevalent at the time of the composition of *Vedas* hence its antiquity goes back to pre-Vedic period, i.e., at least three to five thousand years before Christian era. Secondly, in Mohen-jo-daro and Harappa some seals of meditating *Yogīs* have been found, which show that the tradition of performing meditation and *Yoga-sādhana* was present much prior in Indian Culture to the arrival of *Aryans* and

their *Yajña* rituals because no *Yajña-vedī* is found in these excavations.* At that time present Jainism was known as a *Vrātya-dharma* or *Arhat-dharma*.

Later on, in the *Upaniṣadic* period (c. 800 B. C.) the *Vrātyas*, *Arhats* and *Śramaṇas* were divided into various religious schools. At that time (c. 800 B. C. to 500 A. D.). Jainism was known as *Nirgrantha-dharma*. In Buddhist Pāli Tripiṭaka and the ancient Jaina canons as well as in the pillar-edicts of Aśoka the religion of Lord Pārśva and the Mahāvīra is mentioned in the name of *Nirgrantha Dharma*. Historicity of Lord Pārśva, the 23rd *Tīrthaṅkara*, is now well established and accepted by all the scholars. According to Jaina tradition the predecessor of Lord Pārśva is Ariṣṭanemi. He is supposed to be the real cousin of Lord Kṛṣṇa. Thus, the historicity of Ariṣṭanemi can also be established on the basis of the historicity of Lord Kṛṣṇa. If we hold Lord Kṛṣṇa to be a historic person, then Ariṣṭanemi is also historical. We find his name not only in *Vedas* but in *Upaniṣadas* and Hindū *Purāṇas* also. Some scholars furnish an inscriptional evidence to prove the historicity of Ariṣṭanemi (Neminātha). There is found a Copper deed of gift of a Babilonian King Nebuchandrazar (1140 B. C.) at Prabhaspattan in Gujrat. It, as per reading of Dr. Pranath (T.O.I., dt. March 19, 1935), indicates that the King must have come to Mount Revata to pay homage to Lord Neminātha. Though the reading is not accepted by all the scholars yet we cannot reject it as totally false. Lord Nami of Mithilā, the 21st *Tīrthaṅkara* of Jainas, is also accepted as a *Ṛṣi* in *Upaniṣadic* and Hindū *Paurāṇic* tradition. So far as the historicity of Lord Ṛṣabha is concerned, it is a well established fact that not only his name but his life-story and teachings also occur in *Bhāgavat* and some other *Purāṇas*. According to Prof. Dalasukh Malvania, who is well-

read in Buddhist canons, the name of some Jaina *Tīrthaṅkaras* such as Ṛṣabha, Padma, Candraprabha, Puṣpadanta, Vimala, Dharma, Nami, Ariṣṭanemi and Mahāvīra also occur in Buddhist literature in the form of previous *Buddhas*, *Bodhisattvas* or *Pratyekabuddhas*. *Theragāthā* also mentions the Vaddhamāṇa Thera. According to its earlier commentary, Aṭṭakathā, he was Licchaviputra. In my humble opinion, he was not else than Vardhamāna Mahāvīra, the 24th Jaina *Tīrthaṅkara*. Thus, it can be said with a degree of certainty that all the Jaina *Tīrthaṅkaras* are not legendary characters. Though, it may be true that some legendary characteristics might have crept into the life-stories of Jaina *Tīrthaṅkaras* presented in Jaina *Purāṇas*, their very existence can not be challenged. Whether we accept the historicity of Jaina *Tīrthaṅkara* or not, it is beyond doubt that the Jaina ideas of renunciation, austerity, penance, self-mortification, non-violence, celibacy, meditation etc. were prevalent in the pre *Vedic* period. Sri Ramchandra observes that, "*Upaniṣads* represent the Brahmanical spiritual thought. As seen later, the Brāhmaṇas did not accept spiritualism truthfully. They borrowed spiritual thoughts from their Pre-Aryan adversaries, now friends, in a perverted manner.... The *Śramaṇic* culture was ascetic, atheistic, pluralistic and 'realistic' in content.* This comes out clearest from a consideration of the earliest faith of the Jainas — one of the oldest living surviving sects of the *Munis*. The pre-*Upaniṣadic* materialistic (*Pravṛtti-Dharmic*) Vedic thought later evolved pseudo-spiritual thought (*Nivṛtti-Dharmic*) mainly through the influences of the Muni-Śramaṇa culture, in pre-Buddhistic times, within its fold (Ramchandra Jain — *The Most Ancient Aryan Society*, pp. 48-49). It is this semi-materialistic and semi-spiritualistic thought which gave birth to a new form of religion, which is known as Hinduism.

* *Yajña-Vedī* has been identified in some Indus Valley sites such as Kalibaṅgam. (Editor)

* Cf. : The editor's "Studies in the Origin of Buddhism." (Editor)

Hinduism is nothing but an assimilation of *Vedic* and *Śramaṇic* traditions.

Jainism & Hinduism

However, these two distinct trends (*Brāhmaṇic*) as well as *Śramaṇic* have been prevalent in Indian Culture from its earliest days. But our culture, being a composite one, a water-tight compartment among its different shades is not feasible at all. We cannot understand Indian Culture completely without understanding its these two different constituents, Viz., *Śramaṇic* and *Vedic*, developed later on in the form of Jainism, Buddhism and Hinduism. So one thing must be clear in our mind, that studies and researches in the field of Indology are not possible in isolation. In fact, Jainism, Buddhism and Hinduism are so intermingled and mutually influenced by each other that to have a proper understanding of one, the understanding of other is essential. No doubt, these different trends are distinguishable but, at the same time, we must realize that they are not separable. Though on the basis of some peculiarities in theory and practice we can distinguish them yet it is very difficult to make a complete separation, because none of these trends remained uninfluenced by one another. The earlier *Śramaṇic* trend and its later shades such as Jainism and Buddhism had influenced the *Vedic* tradition, which later on developed in the form of Hinduism. The concepts of *tapas* or austerity, asceticism, liberation, meditation, equanimity and non-violence, which were earlier absent in *Vedas*, came into existence in Hinduism through *Śramaṇic* influence. The *Upaniṣadas* and the *Gītā* have evolved some new spiritualistic definitions of *Vedic* rituals and they are the representatives of the dialogue which had taken place in *Śramaṇic* and *Vedic* traditions. The *Upaniṣadic* trend of Hinduism is not a pure form of *Vedic* religion. It incorporates in itself the various *Śramaṇic* tenets and gives a new dimension to *Vedic*

religion. Thus, we can say that Hinduism is an intermingled state of *Vedic* and *Śramaṇic* traditions. The voice, raised by our ancient *Upaniṣadic Ṛṣis* and *Munis* as well as *Śramaṇas* against ritualistic emphasis of *Vedic* tradition and worldly outlook of caste-ridden Brahminism, became stronger in Jainism and Buddhism along with the other minor *Śramaṇic* sects. Thus, the *Upaniṣadic* trend as well as Jainism and Buddhism provided a resort to those fed up with *Vedic* ritualism and the worldly outlook towards life.

Not only Jainism and Buddhism but some other sects and schools of Indian thought such as *Ājīvikas* and *Sāṅkhyas* also adopted more or less a similar attitude towards *Vedic* ritualism. However, Jainism and Buddhism are more candid and forthcoming in their opposition towards *Vedic* ritualism. They reject outrightly the animal-sacrifice in *Yajñas*, birth-based caste-system and the infallibility of the *Vedas*. In the form of Mahāvīra and Buddha, the most prominent rationalist preachers, we find the real crusaders, whose tirade against caste-ridden and ritualistic Brahminism, crippled with its inner inadequacies, gave a severe jolt to it. Jainism and Buddhism have come forward to sweep away the long accumulated excrescences grown on Indian culture in the form of rituals, casteism and superstitions. But we shall be mistaken if we presume that in their attempt to clear off the dirt of *Vedic* ritualism, Jainism and Buddhism remained intact. They were also influenced by *Vedic* rituals considerably. After c. 3rd or 4th A.D., ritualism in the new form of *Tāntrika* rituals crept into Jainism and Buddhism and became part and parcel of their religious practices and mode of worship. With the impact of Hindu *Tāntrism*, Jainas adopted various Hindu deities and their mode of worship with some variations, suited to their religious temperament but were alien to it (Jainism) in its pure form. Jaina

concept of *Śāsanadevatās* or *Yakṣa-Yakṣis* is nothing but a Jaina version of Hindu deities. As I have pointed out earlier, the influence has been reciprocal. This can be discerned from the fact that on the one side Hinduism, accepted Rṣabha and Buddha as incarnation of God, while, on the other, Jainism included Rāma and Kṛṣṇa in its list of *Śālākāpuruṣas*, great personalities. A number of Hindu gods and goddesses are accepted as consorts of *Tīrthaṅkaras* such as *Kālī*, *Mahākālī*, *Cakreśvarī*, *Ambikā*, *Padmāvatī*, *Siddhikā* and some others as independent deities such as *Sarasvatī* and *Lakṣmī*. It is to be noted that the Jains have included Rāma and Kṛṣṇa in their list of sixty-three great personalities before c. 3rd A.D. because a mention of Kṛṣṇa in the early canonical text is found. Not only this, an epic on the story of Rama was composed in Jaina tradition by Vimalasūri in between c. 1st-5th A. D. Similarly the image of Jaina Sarasvatī (c. 2nd A. D.) is also found at Kaṅkālī Ṭīlā, Mathura. Thus, evidently various Hindu deities were included in Jainism before c. 3rd A. D.

The moot point, I intend to come to, is that different religious traditions of our great Indian culture have exchanged various concepts from one another. It is the duty of the scholars to study and highlight this mutual impact which is the need of the hour and thus, to bridge the gulf that exists between different religious systems due to the ignorance of their interactions and that of history of mutual impacts. Though it is true that *Śramaṇic* tradition in general and Jainism and Buddhism in particular have some distinct features, discriminating them from the early *Vedic* or *Brāhmaṇic* tradition yet they are not alien faiths. They are the children of the same soil and they come forward with a bold reformative spirit. It would be a great mistake if we consider that Jainism and Buddhism, are a mere revolt against Brāhminism or faiths alien to Hinduism. The Western scholars have committed a blunder in high-lighting this view

and laid the foundation of enmity and disintegration in this great Indian culture. But, in reality, it was not a revolt but a reformer's crusade. In fact, *Vedic* and *Śramaṇic* traditions are not rival traditions as some of the Western and Indian scholars wrongly constitute, they are complementary to each other. These two represent the two aspects of human existence — physical as well as spiritual. There has been a deliberate effort to create a gulf between Jainism and Buddhism on the one hand and Hinduism on the other, by Western Scholars. Unfortunately, some Indian scholars, even Jaina scholars have supported their point of view, but in my humble opinion this is a false step taken in a wrong direction. It is true that *Śramaṇic* and *Vedic* traditions have divergent views on certain religious and philosophical issues, their ideals of living also differ considerably, but this does not mean that they are rivals or enemies of each other. As reason and passion, *śreya* and *preya*, in spite of being different in their very nature, are the components of the same human personality, so is the case with *Śramaṇic* and *Vedic* traditions. Though inheriting distinct features, they are the components of one whole Indian culture. Jainism and Buddhism are not rivals to Hinduism, but what they preach to the Indian society may be termed as an advanced stage in the field of spirituality as compared to Vedic ritualism. If the *Upaniṣadic* trend, in spite of taking a divergent stand from *Vedic* ritualism, is considered as part and parcel of Hinduism and an advance towards spirituality, what is difficulty in measuring Jainism and Buddhism with the same yardstick? If *Upaniṣadic* tradition is considered as an advancement from Vedic ritualism to spiritualism, then we have to accept that Buddhism and Jainism have also followed same path with a more enthusiastic spirit. They stand for the upliftment of the weaker section of Indian society and redemption from priesthood and ritualism. They preach the religion of common man, based on

the firm footing of moral virtues, instead of on some external rituals.

Today, scholars working in the field of Jainology need a new approach to reinterpret the relationship of Jainism with Hinduism, particularly its Upaniṣadic trend, in the light of ancient Jaina texts of c. 4th and 3rd B. C. such as *Ācārāṅga*, *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* and *Isibhāṣiyāṁ*. I am sure that an impartial and careful study of these texts will remove the misconception that Jainism and Hinduism are rival religions. In *Ācārāṅga*, a number of passages bearing affinity with *Upaniṣadas*, in their words and style as well as in essence are found. *Ācārāṅga* mentions *Śramaṇa* and *Brāhmaṇa* simultaneously, not as rivals, as considered later on. In *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* (c. 4th B.C.), we find a mention of some *Upaniṣadic Ṛṣis* such as Videhanami, Bāhuka, Asitadevala, Dvaipāyana, Pārāśara and others. They are accepted by Jainas as the *Ṛṣis* of their own tradition though they followed different codes of conduct. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, addresses them as great ascetics and great men, who attained the ultimate goal of life, i.e., liberation. *Isibhāṣiyāṁ* (*Ṛṣibhāṣita*), considered formerly as the part of Jaina canon, also mentions the teachings of Nārada, Asitadevala, Aṅgirasa, Pārāśara, Āruṇi, Nārāyaṇa, Yājñavalkya, Uddālaka, Vidura and many other Upaniṣadic *Ṛṣis*, depicted as *Arhat Ṛṣis*. These references of the Jaina canonical works not only prove the open-mindedness of Jainism, but also that the stream of Indian spiritualism is one at its source, irrespective of divisions later on into Upaniṣadic, Buddhist, Jaina, *Ājīvika* and other rivulets. The work *Ṛṣibhāṣita* is a clear testimony to the assimilative and tolerant nature of Indian thought in general and Jaina thought in particular. Today, the society, deeply bogged into communal separatism and strife, such great works are our torch bearers.

Thus, the position accorded to the *Upaniṣadic Ṛṣis* in early sacred texts of Jainism is a clear

evidence that the stream of Indian spiritualism is one at its source. We may not have a proper understanding of the various trends if we treat them in isolation. *Ācārāṅga*, *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* and *Ṛṣibhāṣita* may be understood in a better way only in the light of *Upaniṣadas* and vice-a-versa. Similarly the *Sutta-nipāta*, *Dhammapada*, *Theragāthā* and other works of Pāli canon may only be studied properly in the light of Prākṛta Jaina canons and the *Upaniṣadas*.

Jainism and Buddhism

As already mentioned Jainism and Buddhism, both belong to the same *Śramaṇic* tradition of Indian culture. Mahāvīra, the 24th *Tīrthaṅkara* of Jainas and Gautama, the Buddha, are contemporaries, flourished in the c. 6th and 5th B. C., at a time when the simple natured worshipper of early Vedic religion became caste-ridden and ritualistic. Western thinkers regard both of them as the rebel children of Hinduism but they are really, the reformers. They provide a spiritual meaning to the *Vedic* rituals and challenge the infallibility of the Vedas and undercut the indisputable superiority of the Brāhmaṇas. Both, being atheistic in nature hence, do not accept the concept of God as a creator and controller of the world. They establish the supremacy of man instead of the God and other deities and declare that man himself is the maker of his own destiny. It is the man alone and none else who can attain even Godhood through his moral life and spiritual practices. For both of them every living being is capable of attaining *Nirvāṇa*, i.e., Godhood or Buddhahood. Both of them rejected the concept of grace of God. For them, solely our own self, is responsible for misfortune as well as sufferings. Thus, they both accept the supremacy of self and law of *karma*. Moral code, preached by Buddha and Mahāvīra, in general sense is also similar. To get rid of the cycle of birth and death, i.e., from worldly sufferings, is the common end of Buddhism, Jainism and the *Upaniṣadic* thinkers. Both, Buddhism

and Jainism preach five *śīlas* or mahāvratas, with only one difference, that is, in place of non-possession of Mahāvīra, Buddha preaches non-consumption of intoxicative drugs.

The major differences between these two sister religions from the view-point of metaphysics and ethical code are following :

(a) First, while the *Upaniṣadic* thinkers contemplate one eternal and immutable reality behind the world of phenomena and plurality, the Buddha found everything impermanent and changing and thus substanceless *Niḥsvabhāva* and sorrowful. Mahāvīra synthesised both the above extreme views, he saw no contradiction between permanence and change. For him being and becoming — both are the aspects of the same reality. He defined reality as origination, decay and permanence. Lord Mahāvīra never believed in absolute permanence or total cessation.

(b) Secondly, the philosophical approach of Buddhism towards other philosophical doctrines was negative, while that of Jainism was positive. Lord Buddha preached that one should not fall in or accept any of the *dṛṣṭis*, i. e., philosophical view-point, whether it is of eternalism or of nihilism, because being one-sided, none of them represent a right view-point. But Mahāvīra said that both the doctrines are partially true, if they are viewed from different angles; so one should not discard one's opponent's view, as totally false. For Jainas different opposite views may be acceptable from different angles. To Mahāvīra nothing was absolutely true or false, hence, he remained positive in his approach all the time. Again, while Buddhism laid stress only on the changing aspect of reality, Jainism gave due consideration to the changing as well as the eternal aspect of reality.

(c) Regarding moral and religious practices, Jainism advocates rigorous and strict austerities, while Buddha condemns this rigorous outlook and recommends a middle path.

In spite of similarity in their mission, Buddhism flourished more on others' soils than on its native land and established itself as a world religion, while Jainism could never had a firm-footing on the foreign soil. It remained firmly rooted in India through all the periods of Indian history, while Buddhism, after c. 9th-10th A. D. was totally uprooted from its own land of origin. Why did these two religions meet the diametrically opposite fates ? There were many reasons behind it. To name a few, Buddhism in its early days found such royal patrons as emperor Aśoka and Kaniṣka, fired with the missionary zeal of spreading it outside India and had the territory of their empire across the Indian borders. Though Jainism also in its early days found some royal patrons as Candragupta Maurya, Samprati and Khāravela, yet they did not try for the expansion of Jainism on foreign soil. Moreover, the Jaina monks did not choose to go outside India, because it was very difficult for them to observe their strict code of conduct outside the country and they did not like to be flexible in their code of conduct. Another most important reason was that the Buddha had recommended the middle-path and remained flexible throughout his life, in prescribing the moral code for his monks and nuns. This middle-path and flexibility, made Buddhism more adaptable to the foreign soil. But due to the same reasons Buddhism was so adapted by Hinduism that it could not retain its independent entity in India. First of all the middle-path of Buddha was not very far from the teachings of the *Gītā*. Not only this, *Mahāyāna* an offshoot of Buddhism had very little to mark it out from the original stock of Hinduism. Secondly, the Buddha himself was accepted as the ninth incarnation of Viṣṇu. Thirdly, flexibility in moral code made the life of Buddhist monks so luxurious and even corrupt that in India they could not retain the respect of common men. Jainism, on the other hand, throughout, had a

leaning towards extremism and remained strict and mostly inflexible in its moral code. That is why, Jaina monks could not go and propagate Jainism across the boundaries of India. Fourthly, owing to its strict code of conduct even for a house-holder it was not easily adaptable in foreign countries. However, it helped in retaining the faith of the common men and its own entity in India. Thus, the extremism of Jaina religion while on the one hand prevented its expansion in India and abroad, but on the other hand, it proved to be the sole cause of its survival in India. It was because of the strict austerities associated with Jainism that it remained a closed set, little understood beyond its adherents. Even the unusual absorbing power of Hinduism could not absorb it. This speaks of its originality, capable of withstanding the chal-

enge of Hinduism. Last but not least among the causes of the extinction of Buddhism from the Indian soil was that Buddhism never tried to develop the order of laymen and lay-women. By the word 'order' they mean the order of monks and nuns. But Jainism always laid stress on the four-fold order — of monks, nuns, laymen and lay-women and that was why it did not lose its identity.

Thus, the two parallel religions, having their origin against the same socio-religious back-ground and beginning their journeys together, drifted wide apart and had altogether a different history. Buddhism almost vanished in India, but prospered in China, Japan, Srilanka and many other countries; Jainism remained in India, neither expanding nor suffering from further shrinking.



Historical Development of Jaina Philosophy and Religion

[c. 3rd-10th A. D.]

The Western scholars often remark that the Indian philosophies and religions are not dynamic but static. But this remark is not tenable when we study any Indian Philosophy or religious tradition from historical point of view. We notice a sequence of changes and developments in their thoughts and practices. This is true with regard to Jainism as well as other schools of Indian philosophy.

Though the basic tenets such as non-violence, self-control etc. of Jainism, in thought and practice, remained the same throughout the ages yet their explanations and their applications were modified in conformity with time and circumstances by Jaina *Tīrthaṅkaras* and *Ācāryas*. Even in the earlier times, every successive *Tīrthaṅkara* made reforms and changes in the religious practices and ethical code of conduct as per the need of his age. As regards the code of conduct of monks and nuns, 23rd chapter of *Uttarādhyayana*, *Āvaśyakaniryukti* (verses 1258-1262) and some other commentaries on Jaina canons clearly maintain that the religious code of Mahāvīra and his predecessor Lord Pārśva and other *Tīrthaṅkaras* were different. It was found that whereas Lord Ariṣṭanemi laid more stress to avoid the violence and cruelty towards animal kingdom in social rituals such as marriage ceremonies etc. Lord Pārśva opposed the violence in the name of religious austerities (practices). Lord Mahāvīra discovered the root cause of violence in the will for the accumulation of wealth and lust for worldly enjoyment hence laid much stress on celibacy and non-possession and prescribed a new religious code of conduct. Not only in the earlier period but in the above said period, i. e., corresponding c. 3rd-10th A.D. also, several revolu-

tions, changes and developments took place in Jaina thoughts and practices. Jainas were proud of the rigorous and austere life-styles of their monks. But in the post *Nirvāṇa* era of Mahāvīra some relaxations and exception crept into the code of conduct of Jaina monks. Not only the junior monks, i. e., *Kṣullakas*, keeping three, two or one cloth alongwith a bowl but the senior monks, having accepted nudity also started keeping one woolen blanket to save themselves from the extreme cold of northern region and also a bowl for accepting the alms, particularly some liquids, necessary in the old age. Thus, the code of *Jinakalpa* and *Sthavirakalpa* along with *sāmāyik-cāritra* (junior monk-hood) and *Chedopasthāpanīyacāritra* (senior monk-hood) came into existence, which, later on, after c. 2nd A. D. divided Jainism into Schism such as *Digambara*, *Śvetāmbara* and *Yāpanīya*, with their own Codes of Conduct.

It was the first phase of major changes in the Jaina code of conduct, particularly the one for Jaina monks and nuns. The second phase is known as *Caityavāsa*, i. e., the temple based living of monks. With the advent of idol worship and the acquisition of great wealth in the name of these temples and deities by the community, the ceremonial-ritualistic aspect of religion became dominating and the monks started taking interest in external and pompous modes of religious practices. There also developed a special group of administrator clergies. Thus, the *Bhaṭṭārakas* in the Digambara sect and the *Yatis* in Śvetāmbara sect, started living under luxurious conditions, became managers of the temples and temple associated properties and assumed control over the temple-rituals as well as over certain part of community

living in a certain province. In their time, the code of conduct of monks and nuns remained confined into the books only and did not appear in the practical life.

Against this situation a revolution was worked out, in Digambara tradition by Kundakunda (c. 6th A. D.) and in Śvetāmbara tradition by Haribhadra (c. 8th A. D.). But this revolution failed to reap any fruit and remained ineffective and the institution of *Bhaṭṭārakas* and *Yatīs* thrived in the later centuries also. Its only credit was that the tradition of the real ascetics, following the rigorous path of Mahāvīra, could be saved for some centuries. Again in Śvetāmbara tradition, a great revolution took place in the c. 10th A. D. under the leadership of Jineśvarasūri against the temple based living of the monks, i.e., *Caityavāsa* and administrator clergies. Due to this revolution *Kharataragaccha* came into existence in the c. 10-11th A. D. This revolutionary and reformative spirit continued in Jaina community in the later centuries also and owing to that sub-sects *Tapāgaccha* (c. 12th A. D.), *Loṅkāgaccha* (c. 15th A. D.), *Sthānakavāsī* (c. 16th A. D.) and *Terāpanthī* (c. 18th A. D.) came into existence in Śvetāmbara tradition. Similarly, in Digambara tradition also *Banārasīmata* Digambara *Terāpantha* (c. 16th A. D.) and *Tāraṇapantha* a non-idol worshipper sect, came forward with their reformative outlook. In fact, it is due to the impact of Hindū devotionism and Tāntrism that the ritualistic idol-worship started in Jainism and it is that due to the Muslim impact non-idol worship sects such as *Loṅkāgaccha*, *Sthānakavāsī*, *Terāpantha* and *Tāraṇapantha* took birth in Jainism. This shows that in practice Jainism is not a static but a dynamic religion.

So far as the changes in the Jaina thought are concerned, Jaina scholars divided their history of philosophical development in three ages which are as under :

- (i) The *Āgama* Age (c. 5th B. C.-3rd A. D.).
- (ii) The age of critical presentation of

Anekāntavāda (c. 4th-6th A. D.).

- (iii) The age of systematization of Jaina philosophy (c. 7th-10th A. D.).

This nomenclature underlies the tendencies, dominating the particular era. However, this division is only a tentative one. No water tight compartment in the division of ages is possible. The tendencies of one age can be traced in other ages also. For example, *Āgamic* age terminates with c. 3rd A. D. but the final editing as well as the composition of some *Āgamic* texts continued up to the c. 5th A. D. Not only this but the date of composition of commentaries on *Āgamas* extends up to the c. 11th A. D. Similar is the case with the age of critical presentation of *Anekāntavāda*; as seeds of *Anekānta* can be traced in *Āgamas* such as *Bhagavatisūtra* etc. but its critical presentation continued not only upto Haribhadra (c. 8th A. D.) but upto Yaśovijaya and Vimaldas (c. 17th A. D.). Similarly the age of philosophical systematization commences from c. 7th A. D. but the actual effort in this direction starts from the composition of *Tattvārthasūtra* and its auto-commentary by Umāsvāti long before during the c. 3rd A. D. and continued upto the period of Yaśovijaya, i. e., the c. 17th A. D. Thus, it is very difficult to divide these ages strictly into a particular framework of time.

The Age of *Āgamas*

Most of the *Āgamic* literature was composed during c. 5th B. C.-3rd A. D. but some of *Āgamic* texts like *Nandīsūtra* and the present edition of *Praśnavyākaraṇa* were composed in c. 5th-6th A. D. In the most important councils (*Vācanās*), which were held at Mathurā and Valabhī in c. 4th-5th A. D. respectively, for editing and rewriting of these *Āgamas*, some new additions and alterations were also made and that is why some of the *Āgamas* contain some informations and conceptions, developed later in c. 4th-5th, in Jaina philosophy.

The *Āgamas* are mainly concerned with the

religious code of conduct and moral preaching. Pt. Dalasukha Malvania rightly observes that *Anga Āgama* deals with moral code of conduct (*Caritānuyoga*) rather than metaphysics (*Dravyānuyoga*). So far as the subject-matter of *Āgamas* is concerned this position remains the same upto the period of *Niryuktis* (c. 3rd-5th A. D.), *Bhāṣyas* (c. 6th A. D.) and even *Cūrṇis* (c. 7th A. D.). Some scattered seeds of philosophical discussions may no doubt be seen in some of the *Āgamas* and their commentaries; but *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, mainly a work full of philosophical discussions, is an exception.

Age of Critical Presentation of Anekāntavāda

Similar is the case with the second era, i. e., the age of critical presentation of *Anekāntavāda*. So far as *Anekāntavāda* is concerned, it can be traced in *Āgamas* as a mere conception. Its critical presentation as a Jaina doctrine was introduced with the works of Siddhasena Divākara and Samantabhadra in c. 4th-5th, respectively. The treatises, composed by them, mainly for critical presentation of *Anekāntavāda* also worked as a base for the age of philosophical systematization.

Siddhasena Divākara's *Sanmatitarka* and *Dvātrimśikas* is regarded as the first book of critical philosophy. The concept of *Pañcājñāna* (Five-fold knowledge) is, for the first time, critically analysed in its subtle form in the said composition. It embraces other different contemporary views prevalent in Jaina tradition. The author dives deep in evaluating the established concepts in Jainism rather than peeping outside in different systems.

In the works attributed to this age, particularly in commentaries on *Tattvārthasūtra*, the first extant commentary, after the auto-commentary of Umāsvāti, is *Sarvārthasiddhi* of Pūjyapāda (first half of the c. 6th A. D.). It not only depicts the concept of *Guṇasthāna* but rather describes it with more details.

Akalaṅka's *Rājavārttika* and Vidyānandi's *Śloka-vārttika* are the two works, regarded as main contributions in Digambara tradition. Both these works critically elaborate the contents of *Tattvārtha*. Through, these works we can assume that, the differences between Digambara and Śvetāmbara became more prominent in this era and the disputes on the problems of 'Strī-mukti', 'Kevalī-bhukti' and simultaneousness and succesiveness of *Jñānopayoga* and *Darśanopayoga* of *Kevalī* came into prominence. Along with these internal disputes of Jaina sects, logical refutation of other schools of thought, is also the main characteristic of this age. All the important philosophical works, composed in this particular era, critically evaluate the views of other schools of thoughts and try to establish Jaina view of non-absolutism, based on their theory of *Anekāntavāda*, as most logical and true.

The Main Objective of Early Jainism

Before discussing the early metaphysics and epistemology of Jainas it would be proper to discuss the main objective of early Jainism and its attitude towards life, which is to get rid of the cycle of birth and death and thus, to emancipate man from sufferings. It tries to track down sufferings to their very root. The famous Jaina text of an early period *Uttarādhyanasūtra* says :

*kāmāṇugiddhippabhavaṃ khu dukkhaṃ
savvassa logassa sadevagassa.*

jaṃ kāiyaṃ mānasiyaṃ ca kiñci

tassa antagam gacchai vīyarāgo. (32.19)

That is the root of all physical as well as mental sufferings of everybody, including the gods, is the desire for enjoyment. Only a dispassionate attitude can put an end to them. It is true that materialism seeks to eliminate sufferings, through the fulfilment of human desires, but it cannot eradicate the prime cause from which the stream of suffering wells up. Materialism does not have at its disposal an effective

means for quenching the thirst of a man permanently. Not only this, its attempts at the temporary appeasement of a yearning, have the opposite effect of flaring it up like the fire fed by an oblation of butter. It is clearly noted in the *Uttarādhyayana* :

*suvanṇa-rūpassa u pavvayābhavē
siyā hu kelāsasama asamkṣayā.
narassa luddhassa na tehiṃ kiñci
iccha u āgāsasamā aṇantiyā. (9.48)*

That is even if an infinite number of gold and silver mountains, each as large as the *Kailāsa*, are conjured up, they would not lead to the final extinction of human desires, because desires are infinite like space. Not only Jainism but all spiritual traditions unanimously hold that the root cause of sorrow is attachment, lust or a sense of mineness. The fulfilment of desires is not the means of ending them. Though a materialistic perspective can bring material prosperity, it cannot make us free from attachments and yearnings. Our materialistic outlook can be compared to our attempt of chopping the branches off while watering the roots of a tree. In the above mentioned *gāthā*, it is clearly pointed out that desires are endless just as space (*Ākāśa*) and it is very difficult to fulfil all of them. If mankind is to be freed from selfishness, violence, exploitation, corruption and affliction stemming from them, it is necessary to outgrow materialistic outlook and to develop an attitude, which may be described as spiritual.

The word *Adhyātma*, the Samskr̥ta equivalent of spirituality derived from *adhi + ātmā*, implies the superiority and sublimity of *Ātman*, the soul force. In the oldest Jaina text *Ācārāṅga*, the word *ajjhatthavisohī*, connotes, inner purity of the self, which is the ultimate goal of *Jaina-Sādhana*. According to Jainism, the realisation of physical amenities or creature comforts is not the ultimate aim of life. There are some higher ideals of life which are over and above the mere biological and economic needs of

life. Spirituality consists in realising these higher values of life.

Jaina spirituality teaches us that happiness or unhappiness is centred in the soul and not in worldly objects. Pleasure and pain are self-created. They are subjective in nature also. They do not depend totally on the objects, but depend also on the attitude of a person towards them. The *Uttarādhyayanāsūtra* (20.37) mentions :

*appā kattā vikattā ya, duhāṇa ya suhāṇa ya
appā mittamamittam ca, duppaṭṭhiyasupaṭṭhio.*

That the self (*ātmā*) is both the doer and the enjoyer of happiness and misery. It is its own friend when it acts righteously and foe when it acts unrighteously. An unconquered self is its own enemy, unconquered passions and sense organs of the self are its own enemy. Oh monk ! having conquered them, I move righteously.

In another Jaina text of the early period *Āura-paccākkhāṇam* (c. 3rd A. D.) it is mentioned :

*ego me sāsado appā, ṇāṇadamisaṇasamjuo
sesā me bahirā bhāvā, savve samjogalakṣhāṇā.
samjogamūlā jīveṇam, pattā dukkhaparamparā
tamhā samjogasambandham, savvabhāveṇa vosire.
(26. 27)*

The soul endowed with knowledge and perception alone is permanent, all other objects are alien to self. All the serious miseries, suffered by self, are the result of individual's sense of 'mine' or attachment towards the alien objects and so it is imperative to abandon completely the sense of 'mine' with regard to the external objects. In short, according to Jainism not identifying oneself with the objects not belonging to the soul, is the starting point of spiritual practice (*sādhana*). Non-alignment with material object is the pre-requisite for self-realisation, the main objective of early Jainism. According to it, renouncement of attachment is the same as the emergence of a balanced view of even-sightedness (*samadṛṣṭitā*).

The reason, as to why Jainism regards abandonment of 'sense of mine' or of attachment as the only means for self-realisation, is that so long as there is attachment in a man, his attention is fixed not on self or soul, but on not-self, *i.e.*, material objects. Materialism thrives on this object-oriented attitude or indulgence in the not-self. According to the Jaina philosophers, the identification with the not-self and regarding worldly object as a source of happiness or unhappiness, are the hallmarks of materialism. This is considered as a wrong view-point. The right view-point regards the self as of supreme value and aims at the realisation of its quiddity or its ideal unconditioned state of pure knower, which is free from attachment and passions. It is mentioned in *Samayasāra* (209) :

evam sammāñi appāṇam muṇadi jaṇagasahāvaṇi.

that the self, possessed of a right view-point, realises the pure soul as knowledge. Thus according to Jainism the right view-point regards self as pure knower (*śuddha draṣṭā*) and distinct from not-self. This detached attitude only can free one from one's mental as well as physical sufferings.

Cause of Bondage and Suffering of the Self

Jainism maintains that the attachment (*Rāga*) and delusion (*Moha*) obscure our spiritual nature and are responsible for our worldly existence and suffering. The most intense *vāsanā* is *hrdaya-granthi*, which is a deep attachment towards sense-objects and worldly desires. The oldest nomenclature of Jaina sect is *Niggantha-dhamma*. The word *Niggantha* means the one who has unknotted his *hrdaya-granthi*, *i.e.*, the 'mine'-complex. It means, in other words, one who has eradicated ones attachments and passions. The word, 'Jaina', also conveys the same meaning; a true Jaina is one who has conquered one's passions. According to Lord Mahāvīra, "to remain attached to sensuous objects is to remain in the whirl" (*Ācārāṅga*, 1.1.5). The attachment towards sensuous

objects is the root of our worldly existence (*Ācārāṅga*, 1.2.1). Further, it is also mentioned in the *Ācārāṅga*, 1.3.1, "only he who knows the nature of the sensuous objects is possessed of self, knowledge, scripture, Law (*dhamma*) and Truth (*bambha*)." The five senses together with anger, pride, delusion and desire are difficult to be conquered, but when the self is conquered, all these are completely conquered (*Uttarādhyayana*, 9.36). Just as the female crane is produced from the egg and the egg from the crane, in the same way desire is produced by delusion and delusion by desire (*Uttarādhyayana*, 32.6). Attachment and hatred are the seeds of *karma* and delusion is the source of attachment and hatred. *Karma* is the root of birth and death. This cycle of birth and death is the sole cause of misery. Misery is gone in the case of a man who has no delusion, while delusion is gone in the case of a man who has no desire; desire is gone in the case of a man who has no greed, while greed is gone in the case of a man who has no attachment" (*Uttarādhyayana*, 32.8). According to the *Tattvārthasūtra* 8.1, a famous Jaina text, perverse attitude (*mithyā-darśana*), non-abstinence (*avirati*), spiritual inertia (*pramāda*), passions (*kaṣāya*) and activity (*Yoga*) — these five are the conditions of bondage. We can say that *mithyā-darśana* (perverse attitude), *mithyā-jñāna* (perverse knowledge) and *mithyā-cāritra* (immoral conduct) are also responsible for our worldly existence or bondage. But perversity of knowledge and conduct depends upon the perversity of attitude. Thus, the perversity of attitude, which is due to *darśana-moha* is one of the important factors of bondage. Non-abstinence, spiritual inertia and passions are due to the presence of perverse attitude. Though activities of mind, body and speech known as *Yoga* are considered the cause of bondage yet these, in themselves are incapable of bondage unless by perverse attitude and passions. They are only the cause of *Āsrava* (in-

flux of *kārmic* matter), not the cause of bondage. Bondage is possible only through the *Yoga* in association with perverse attitude and passions. The perverse attitude (*mithyā-darśana*) and the passions (*Kaṣāyas*) are mutually cause and effect of each other just as the egg and the hen or the seed and the tree. We can not fix the priority of one over the other, passions are due to the perverse attitude and perverse attitude is due to the passions.

Early Jaina Doctrine of Karma/Bondage

According to Jaina philosophy every activity of mind, speech and body is followed by the influx of a finer type of atoms, which are technically known as *karma-vargaṇā-pudgala*. In the presence of passions, this influx (*āsrava*) of *kārmic* matter cause bondage, which is of four types — 1. Kind (*prakṛti*), 2. quantity (*pradeśa*), 3. duration (*sthiti*) and 4. intensity (*anubhāga*) (*Tattvārthasūtra*, 8.4). The activities of mind, body and speech, technically known as *yogas*, determine the *prakṛti* and the *pradeśa* of *kārmic*-matter while the passions determine the duration (*sthiti*) and the intensity (*anubhāga*-mild or intense power of fruition) of the *Karma*. *Karma*, in Jainism is the binding principle. It binds the soul with the body hence responsible for our worldly existence. *Karma* has the same place in Jainism, as unseen potency (*adrṣṭa*) in Nyāya, *Prakṛti* in Sāṅkhya, *Māyā* in Vedānta, *Vāsanā* in Buddhism, *Śakti* in Śaivism and *Pāśa* (trap) in Śākta school. *Karma* is something foreign which veils the natural faculties of infinite knowledge, infinite perception, infinite bliss and infinite power. It is also responsible for our pleasant and unpleasant experiences and worldly existence. According to Vidyānandī, two functions of the *Karma* are to obscure the natural faculties of soul and to defile the soul. Jainism also believes in the same *modus operandi* of *karma*. According to it *karma* itself is competent to produce its fruit in due course of time and there is no need of God or other external

power for its fruition.

The *Karmas* are of eight types — (i) *jñānāvaraṇa* : knowledge obscuring, (ii) *Darśanāvaraṇa* : perception obscuring, (iii) *Vedanīya* : feeling producing, (iv) *Mohaniya* : deluding, (v) *Āyu* : age determining, (vi) *Nāma* : body or personality determining, (vii) *Gotra* : status determining and (viii) *Antarāya* : obstructive (*Tattvārthasūtra*, 8.5).

Among these eight types of *karma*, *Jñānāvaraṇa*, *darśanāvaraṇa*, *mohaniya* and *antarāya* — these four are considered as destructive *karma* or *ghātī karma*, because they obscure the natural faculties of infinite knowledge, infinite perception, infinite bliss and infinite power, respectively. The other four — *vedanīya*, *āyu*, *nāma* and *gotra* are called *aghātī* or non-destructive *karma*. They are only responsible for bodily existence of present life and incapable of continuing the cycle of birth and death. It is only due to the deluding *karma* (*mohaniya karma*) that the cycle of birth and death continues. This deluding *karma* is responsible for perversity of attitude and the passions. The emancipation of soul is only possible when the perversity of attitude is destroyed and passions are overcome.

The *Uttarādhyaṇasūtra* says that just as a tree with its root dried up, does not grow even though it is watered, similarly actions (*Karma*) do not grow up when delusion (*moha* or *avidyā*) is destroyed (28. 30). One devoid of a right attitude (*darśana*) cannot have right knowledge (*jñāna*) and there can not be rectitude of will (*caraṇa-guṇa*) without right knowledge (*jñāna*). One devoid of the rectitude of will cannot have emancipation from evil will and one devoid of emancipation from evil will (induced by *karma*) cannot attain final emancipation (32.9).

The Ultimate End : Mokṣa

The attainment of emancipation or *mukṭi* is the pivot on which all the ethico-religious philoso-

phies of India revolve. Jainism maintains that the liberation — the perfect and purified state of the soul, is the only and ultimate goal of every individual. *Mukti* does not mean in Jainism, the losing of one's own identity. The self retains its identity even in the state of liberation.

In *Ācārāṅga*, the nature of *Paramātmā* (the immaculate soul) is described as that which is beyond the grasp of logic and intellect. He is one and alone. He is harmless. He is neither long nor short, nor a circle nor a triangle, nor a quadrilateral nor a sphere. He is neither black nor blue, nor red, nor yellow, nor white. He is neither pungent nor bitter, nor astringent, nor sour, nor sweet. He is neither hard nor soft, neither heavy nor light, neither cold nor hot, neither greasy nor dry. He is not subject to birth and decay. He is free from attachment. He is simileless. He baffles all terminology. There is no word to describe. He is neither sound nor form, nor odour, nor taste, nor touch. (*Āyāro* — Ed. Yuvācārya Mahāprajña, J. V. B., Ladnun, 1981, pp. 262-266.)

In the *Niyamasāra* (181), 'Being' (*astitva*), the pure existence is considered to be one of the qualities of a liberated soul. *Mokṣa*, according to Jainism, means a complete perfection and purification of soul. In the state of liberation there is neither pain nor pleasure, nor any obstruction, nor any annoyance, nor delusion, nor any anxiety. A liberated soul is really free from all sorts of impurities and from the cycle of birth and death (*Niyamasāra*, 178-180). In liberation the soul realises the *ananta-catuṣṭaya*, i.e., infinite knowledge, infinite perception, infinite bliss and infinite power. This *ananta-catuṣṭaya* is the inherent nature of the soul. Jainism believes that every individual soul has the potentialities of Godhood and the soul can attain to it. By shedding away all the *kārmic* particles of four destructive *karmas* (*ghātī-karma*), the soul attains *Arhathood*, which is the state of *vītarāga-daśā* or *jīvana-mukti*. So long as the

four non-destructive *karmas*, i.e., *Nāma*, *Gotra*, *Āyuṣya* and *Vedaniya*, are not exhausted the soul of *Arhat* remains in a highly refined physical body and preaches truth to the world. Shedding physical and *kārmic* body, when these four non-destructive *karmas* are exhausted the soul of *Arhat* goes upto the top-most of the universe — abode of liberated soul known as *siddhaśīlā*, remains there eternally and enjoys perfect knowledge, perfect power, perfect perception and perfect bliss (*Niyamasāra*, 181-182). Thus, emancipation, according to Jainism, is nothing but realisation of one's own real nature.

Jaina Sādhana in Early Period

In the earliest Jaina āgamas, particularly in *Ācārāṅga* and *Uttarādhyayana*, we have a mention of *Triyāma*, *Cāturyāma* and *Pañcayāma*. Though *Ācārāṅga* mentions *Triyāma*, it does not give any detail about it. Its commentator Śīlāṅka had derived the meaning of three-fold path of liberation, i.e., Right faith, Right knowledge and Right conduct. But in my opinion this derivation of Śīlāṅka is hardly in accordance with its real meaning. *Triyāma* refers to the three vows — Non-violence, Truth and Non-possession. Jaina tradition is very firm in maintaining that Lord Pārśva, the twenty-third *Tīrthaṅkara* had preached *Cāturyāma* — Non-violence, Truthfulness, Non-stealing and Non-possesiveness. Mahāvīra added one more *yāma* celibacy as an independent vow in the *Cāturyāma* of Pārśva and thus, introduced *Pañcayāma*. Formerly, it was taken for granted that woman is also a possession and no one can enjoy her without having her in his own possession. But Mahāvīra took it as an independent vow. In some of the canonical works we also have a five-fold path of liberation but in a different way as Right faith, Right knowledge, Right conduct, Right penance and Right efforts. In *Uttarādhyayana* as well as in the works of Kundakunda the four-fold path of liberation, i.e., Right faith, Right knowledge, Right conduct and Right pen-

ance are mentioned. Here Right effort has been merged into Right penance. Similarly, later on merging the Right penance into Right conduct, Umāsvāti prescribed the three-fold path of liberation in his *Tattvārthasūtra* (c. 3rd A. D.). *Ācārāṅga* has also mentioned the three-fold path in a different form, namely — non-violence (*nikṣiptadaṇḍa*), wisdom (*prajñā*) and ecstasy (*samādhi*) which is more like the three-fold path of *prajñā, śīla* (supplementary vow) and *samādhi* of Buddhism. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* and some other canonical works also mention two-fold path of liberation, i.e., *vidyā* (wisdom) and *caraṇa* (conduct) (*Vijjācaraṇa pamokkha*). We see that there are different views about the path of liberation but Jainas never accepted single path either of knowledge or devotion or action. They believe that neither knowledge, nor faith nor conduct alone can be regarded as a means of salvation. But all the three combined together make an integrated path of liberation which is a peculiarity of Jainism. In this integration we have a reflection of its non-absolutistic approach *Anekāntavāda*, the central doctrine of Jainism.

Now, if we take each constituent of the three-fold path, separately, Right faith (*Samyak Darśana*) comes first. In earliest canonical works such as *Ācārāṅga* and *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, the term *Darśana* is used either in the sense of self-realisation or right vision (right attitude). As 'faith' it is used for the first time in *Uttarādhyayana*, and there it means nine categories (*Tattvas*). The same meaning is retained in Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra* while defining *Samyak-Darśana*. But after c. 3rd-4th the meaning is also changed and *Samyak-Darśana* is defined as faith, 'Jina' as a Deva (Ideal), Nirgrantha as a Guru (Teacher) and non-violence as a *Dharma*.

Similarly, the term *Samyak-Jñāna* (Right knowledge) is used in the sense of discriminative knowledge of self and not-self in the earlier canons. But later on the term is used as the knowledge of

Jaina scripture.

So far as *Samyak-Cāritra* (Right conduct) is concerned, the meaning of the term remains the same throughout the ages. It encompasses the observance of five great vows (*mahāvratas*), five vigilances (*samitis*), three controls (*guptis*) and ten *dharma*s. This right conduct is exclusively prescribed for the monks and nuns. Similarly, five minor vows (*aṇuvratas*), three *guṇa-vratas* and four *śikṣāvratas* as well as eleven *Pratimās* are prescribed as a right-conduct for the house-holders (*Śrāvakas*). According to both the sects — Śvetāmbara and Digambara, the code of conduct of Jaina monks and nuns was very rigorous at the time of Mahāvira (c. 6th B. C.) but with the passage of time, coming to the period of Bhadrabāhu-I, (c. 3rd B.C.) it became lenient. By this period various exceptions in the five great vows as well as in other rules and regulations of Jaina monks and nuns has been accepted. This lenient tendency is clearly visible in the *Chedasūtras* of Bhadrabāhu-I in the form of atonements of the various exceptions and transgressions in the code of conduct. This liberalism in the code of conduct culminates in c. 6th-7th. In *Bhāṣyas* and *Cūrṇis* of *Chedasūtras*, one can find ample examples of this liberalism. It is quite difficult to mention all those changes which took place in the Jaina code of conduct during the period of c. 3rd B.C.-3rd A. D., because of two reasons — firstly, some of the exceptions mentioned in *Bhāṣyas* (c. 6th A. D.) and *Cūrṇis* (c. 7th A. D.) might have come in practice after c. 3rd A. D. A period which is beyond the purview of this article and secondly, it is impossible to include, all the changes that occurred, in the frame of this brief article. Here we can only refer the scholars to see these *Chedasūtras* and their commentaries.

The major changes which took place during above period are regarding the use of clothes and begging bowls by Jaina monks. On the basis of the fig-

ures of Jaina monks and nuns inscribed on the pedestals of Jina-images of Mathura (c. 1st B. C.-2nd A. D.) it can be easily inferred that by that time the use of clothes and begging bowls was in vogue, though the ideal state of nudity was intact. The figures of monks found at Mathura are almost nude but are depicted having a folded large piece of cloth, on their left arm, may be a woolen blanket, and which seems to be instrumental in hiding their nudity. Similarly, there are certain figures of Jaina monks, having begging bowls in their hands. These figures clearly show that in these centuries, i. e., c. 2nd B. C.-3rd A. D., the use of woolen blanket and begging bowls was common atleast among the Jaina monks and nuns of North India. But in South India, practice of nudity remained intact in that period.

The Cause of Schism and Caityavāsa

Remarkably, it was this use of blanket and begging bowls, along with certain other exceptions in the code of conduct which led to the schism in Jainas into Śvetāmbara, Digambara and Yāpanīya. According to *Āvaśyakamūla-bhāṣya*, the controversy regarding the use of clothes and begging bowl was raised first time after 606 years of the Nirvāṇa of Lord Mahāvīra, i. e., c. 1st-2nd A. D.

However, on the basis of facts, narrated above, it can be concluded that liberalism in the rigorous code of conduct of Jaina monks and nuns caused the schism into Śvetāmbara, Digambara and *Caityavāsa*, i. e., living in temples or *Maṭhas* in Jaina order. This tendency of living in the temples of Jaina monks and nuns further caused the deterioration in their strict code of conduct and various exceptions were accepted into general rules. This liberalism, later on, also gave birth to the various *Tāntrika Sādhanās* in Jainism.

Though on the basis of the code of conduct, particularly the use of clothes and bowls, the first sectarian division took place inc. 1st-2nd A. D. But prior to that, we have also trace of another type of differences in Jaina order particularly pertaining to doctrines, started in the life-time of Lord Mahāvīra itself.

In Jaina tradition, the persons, having doctrinal differences with the tradition of Mahāvīra, are called as *Nihnavas*. These *Nihnavas* were seven in number. *Āvaśyakaniryukti* (Verse 778-783) and *Uttarādhyayananyukti* (Verse 165-178) mention the following *Nihnavas* and their basic differences from the traditional Jainism along with time and place of their origin. The names of *Nihnavas* and their details are as under :

No.	Name of <i>Nihnavas</i>	Their particular theory on which they differed from Mahāvīra's tradition	Time of Origination	Place of Origination
1.	Jāmāli	<i>Bahuratavāda</i> (An action, in the process of completion, can't be called completed, it is uncompleted.)	14 years after Mahāvīra's enlightenment.	Śrāvastī
2.	Tiṣyagupta	<i>Jīva-pradeśavāda</i> (Any one pradeśa of the soul can be called as <i>Jīva</i> .)	16 years after Mahāvīra's enlightenment.	Rṣabhapur
3.	Āśāḍha-bhūti	<i>Avyaktavāda</i> (difficult to say who is who).	214 years after Mahāvīra's Nirvāṇa.	Śvetāmbikā
4.	Aśvamiṭra	<i>Samucchinnavāda</i> (All the objects are transient and get destroyed just after their origination.)	220 years after Mahāvīra's Nirvāṇa.	Mithilā
5.	Dhanagupta	<i>Dvikriyāvāda</i> (possibility of having two experiences simultaneously.)	228 years after Mahāvīra's Nirvāṇa.	Ulūkātīra

No.	Name of <i>Nihnava</i> s	Their particular theory on which they differed from Mahāvīra's tradition	Time of Origination	Place of Origination
6.	Rohagupta	<i>Trairāśikavāda</i> or <i>no-Jīvavāda</i> (three categories in world — living beings, non-living beings, neither living nor non-non-living beings.	544 years after Mahāvīra's Nirvāṇa.	Antaranjīā
7.	Goṣṭhā-māhila	<i>Abāddhikavāda</i> (Karma-particles only touch the soul — pradeśas.	544 years after Mahāvīra's Nirvāṇa.	Daśapur

Apart from these, some divisions took place in the Jaina order only due to administrative needs. In *Kalpasūtrasthavirāvalī*, the Jaina order is said to be divided in various *Gaṇas*, *Kulas* and *Śākhās*. This type of division was based neither on any theoretical differences nor on the Code of Conduct. This division of *Gaṇa*, *Kula* and *Śākhā* was based on the hierarchy of the spiritual teachers or on the basis of the group of the monks belonging to a particular region. The final division of the Jaina church such as Śvetāmbara, Digambara and Yāpanīya came into existence in the c. 4th-5th A. D. as we do not find any literary or epigraphic evidence for these sectarian divisions dated pre-c. 4th-5th A. D.

Development of Jaina Theory of Knowledge

The development of Jaina theory of five-fold knowledge extends over a long period of 2600 years. The tradition of Mahāvīra's predecessor Pārśvanātha (c. 800 B. C.) bears clear marks of *Pañcājñānavāda* or five-fold knowledge, a preliminary conception of Jaina epistemology. In *Rājaprasānīyasūtra* (165) Ārya Keṣī, a follower of Pārśva tradition, called himself believer of the theory of five-fold knowledge and explained the same to King Paesī. *Uttarādhyayana* also the same refers. It is remarkable that there is not much difference between Pārśva and Mahāvīra, so far as their Metaphysics and Epistemology are concerned. Had there been any difference on these issues, it would have been definitely mentioned in *Bhagavati* and *Uttarādhyayana*, both pointing out the differences regarding ethical code of conduct the traditions of

both. Except some issues on the ethical code of conduct in which he makes some additions later on, Mahāvīra accepts the metaphysics and epistemology of Pārśva as it is. The reference of *Jñānapravāda*, the fifth one of fourteen *Pūrvas* (the literature belonging to the tradition of Mahāvīra's predecessor Lord Pārśva) also proves that before Mahāvīra there was a concept of *Pañcājñānavāda* assigned to *Nirgrantha* tradition of Pārśva and was later developed in Mahāvīra's tradition. *Ācārāṅga* and *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, the oldest extant Jaina literature, do not bear any mark of the discussion over the theory of knowledge, whereas *Uttarādhyayana*, *Sthānāṅga*, *Samavāyāṅga*, *Bhagavati*, *Anuyogadvāra* and *Nandīsūtra*, elaborately discuss the gradual development of the conception of *Pañcājñānavāda*. It suggests that although the theory of five-fold knowledge (*Pañcājñānavāda*) was derived from Pārśva's tradition, it was later on developed by Mahāvīra.

Pt. Dalasukha Malvania, in his well-known book '*Āgama Yuga kā Jaina Darśana*' has mentioned three stages of the development of *Pañcājñānavāda* based on the chronology of Jaina *Āgamas*. At the first stage knowledge was divided into five types — *Matī* (the knowledge obtained through the sense-organs (*indriya*), quasi-sense-organs (*anindriya*), and mind (*mana*), *Śruta* (scriptural knowledge); *Avadhi* (clairvoyance); *Manah-paryaya* (telepathy or knowledge of others' mind) and *Kevala* (perfect knowledge comprehending all substances and their modifications or omniscience). The description of

five-fold knowledge, found in *Bhagavatisūtra*, is in accordance with this first stage. The *Sthānāṅga* and Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra* (c. 3rd A.D.) refer the second stage where the knowledge is divided into two main heads — (i) *Pratyakṣa* (direct knowledge incorporating sensory and scriptural knowledge) and (ii) *Parokṣa* (indirect knowledge which incorporates the three extra-sensory knowledge). Umāsvāti also supports this two-fold division. At this stage, it was supposed that apart from the cognition depending on the soul alone (*Ātmasāpekṣa Jñāna*), the cognition depending on sense-organs and quasi-sense-organs (*indriya-anindriya sāpekṣa*), depending on the intellect (*buddhi sāpekṣa*) and the cognition depending on the *Āgamas*, should be considered as Indirect knowledge (*Parokṣa Jñāna*). It became a special feature of Jaina Epistemology because others were considering it as a direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*). The development of this second stage was very essential as it was to pave the way of synthesis between the theory of knowledge (*Jñāna-vāda*) and validity of knowledge. At this stage, the knowledge (*Jñāna*) itself was considered as an instrument of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and was divided into Direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) and Indirect knowledge (*parokṣa*).

The third stage of the development is represented by *Nandīsūtra* (c. 5th A. D.). In the whole of the *Āgamas*, *Nandīsūtra* is the only composition which thoroughly deals with the theory of five-fold knowledge. In *Nandīsūtra* another development is also visible where the sense-cognition is included in *pratyakṣa*, following the common tradition. The second work, dealing with the conception of five-fold knowledge is *Anuyogadvārasūtra* (c. 2nd). *Anuyogadvāra* is earlier than *Nandīsūtra* because former does not include sense cognition in Direct knowledge as the latter does. It is believed that *Anuyogadvāra* and *Nandīsūtra* are compiled by Āryarakṣita and Deva-

vācaka, respectively. Regarding the authorship of *Anuyogadvārasūtra* scholars have different opinions as to whether Āryarakṣita himself is the author or some one else. So far as the question of Āryarakṣita is concerned it is a fact that he for the first time translated the Jaina technical terms by *Anuyoga-vidhi*. It is the text of philosophical method. In the beginning, *Anuyogadvārasūtra* mentions that *mati*, *avadhi*, *manah-paryaya* and *kevala* — these four types of knowledge depend on experience only. They can not be preached where as *śrutajñāna* can be studied and preached. At this third stage of development *Anuyogadvāra* gives importance to the four-fold division. In this third stage of development particularly based on *Nandī* and *Anuyogadvāra*, the cognition depending on sense-organs, even being considered transcendently as indirect (*parokṣa*), was also included in direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) following the concept of other traditions and it was designated as *saṃvyāvahārika pratyakṣa* (perception according to the common usage or ordinary perception).

In my opinion, primarily empirical sensual cognition was included in *darśana* and contemplative *matijñāna* was confined only to the deliberative intellectual knowledge (*vimarśātmaka jñāna*). This distinction was also recommended in later period. Four early classifications of *matijñāna*, i.e., *avagraha*, *īhā*, *avāya* and *dhāraṇā* are also considered as deliberative knowledge but when sensory cognition was included in *matijñāna*, the question arose as to how the knowledge, originated from sense-organs, would be regarded as indirect knowledge. Consequently, it was accepted as *saṃvyāvahārika pratyakṣa* (perception according to common usage) following the other philosophical traditions.

To synthesize the first stage of five-fold knowledge with two-fold classification of *pramāṇa* — *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa* of second stage, a third stage was introduced. An attempt was also made to

correlate the Jaina concept of *pratyakṣa* (direct knowledge) with the concept of perception (*pratyakṣa*) of other philosophical traditions.

Akalaṅka (c. 8th A. D.) who contributed a parallel system of Jaina logic based on the *Āgamic* conception and some later Ācāryas classified the *pratyakṣa* into two parts, i.e., *saṁvyāvahārika pratyakṣa* (perception according to common usage) and *pāramārthika pratyakṣa* (transcendental perception). Its brief reference can be traced in *Nandīśūtra* and a detailed one in Jinabhadra's *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya* (c. 700 A. D.). Akalaṅka etc. have followed the same two-fold concept of *pratyakṣa*.

So it is clear that the conception of five-fold knowledge is quite old but its gradual development took place only during the c. 3rd-7th A. D. Because *Tattvārthasūtra* and its auto-commentary, both do not refer these two types of *pratyakṣa* — *saṁvyāvahārika* and *pāramārthika*. By that period *mati-jñāna* was considered as *parokṣa*. The hypothesis of these two types of *pratyakṣa* — *saṁvyāvahārika* and *pāramārthika* came into existence after c. 3rd-4th A. D. in the period of *Nandīśūtra* (c. 5th A. D.) as the above division was clearly mentioned in this text.

Bhagavatisūtra refers to *Nandīśūtra* and *Anuyogadvāra* for the details about the Jaina theory of knowledge. It concludes that this portion was incorporated in *Bhagavati* at the time of *Valabhī Vācanā* (c. 5th A. D.). *Sthānāṅga*'s classification of knowledge as *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*, also is contemporary to *Tattvārthasūtra* (c. 4th A. D.). In the above mentioned scriptures *avadhijñāna* (clairvoyance), *manah-paryaya-jñāna* (telepathy or knowledge of others' mind) and *kevalajñāna* (perfect knowledge comprehending all the substance and their modes, i.e., Omniscience), all being beyond the range of our senses are considered as transcendental perception or self perception. This conception did not undergo any

change in later periods also. Similarly the scriptural knowledge also continued to be considered as indirect (*parokṣa*). But among the two classes of *matijñāna* — *indriyajanya matijñāna* (originated from senses) and *manojanya mati-jñāna* (originated from mind), the sense originated *matijñāna* was considered as *parokṣa* from the transcendental (*pāramārthika*) point of view and *pratyakṣa* from the point of view of common usage (*saṁvyāvahārika*). The other traditions were considering sense originated *matijñāna* as *pratyakṣa*. When discussions over *Pramāṇasāstra* (science of valid cognition) started, the *matijñāna*, originated from mind, was further divided in different classes and got assimilated with different *Pramāṇas*. After *Nandīśūtra* the development of this conception of the five-fold knowledge is found in *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya* where not only its different classifications are mentioned but the doubts regarding the very concept and the solutions are also discussed. This era witnessed intensive discussions over the relationship of *darśana* and *jñāna* as well as *śrutajñāna* and *mati-jñāna*.

The development of the conception of five-fold knowledge continued during the c. 3rd-7th A. D. but it got interrupted after the c. 7th A. D. and discussions over *Pramāṇavāda* (science of valid cognition) started. This is noteworthy that *Pramāṇavāda* in Jainism was the result of the impact of other philosophical traditions.

Jaina Concept of Pramāṇa

The theory of five-fold knowledge, originally belonged to Jainas but the case is different with the theory of *Pramāṇa*. This latter conception is borrowed by Jainas from other philosophical traditions. The concept of *Pramāṇa* in Jaina philosophy came into existence in c. 3rd-4th A. D. and continued to develop upto the c. 13th A. D.

Jaina Ācāryas, first of all accepted the concept of *Pramāṇa* as it was prevalent in other philoso-

phical traditions, particularly in Nyāya and Sāṅkhya school, but in due course of time they got it associated with their concept of five-fold knowledge. Thus, whatever development of Jaina theory of *Pramāṇa* is seen in Jainism, is the result of its synthesis with *Pañcā-jñānavāda*. While classifying the *Pramāṇa* some new concepts came into existence. They are undoubtedly unique contributions of Jaina philosophy. For instance, *Smṛti* (memory), *Pratyabhijñā* (recognition) and *Tarka* (Induction) were for the first time considered as *Pramāṇa*.

We shall now see as to how the development of *Pramāṇavāda* took place in Jaina *āgamas*. Jaina *āgamas* refer three and four types of *Pramāṇa* accepted by Sāṅkhya and Naiyāyikas, respectively. *Sthānāṅga* clearly mentions three types of *Vyavasāya* (determinate cognition), i.e., *Pratyakṣa* (perception), *Prātyika* and *Ānugāmika* (inference) whereas *Bhagavati* mentions four types of *Vyavasāya*, i.e., *Pratyakṣa*, *Anumāna*, *Upamāna* (comparison) and *Āgama* (verbal testimony). Similarly, in *Sthānāṅga* four types of *pramāṇas* called *Hetu* are mentioned.

In this way *Sthānāṅga* mentions both, three-fold and four-fold classification of *Pramāṇa* in the form of *Vyavasāya* and *Hetu*, respectively. *Anuyogadvārasūtra* not only clearly mentions four types of *Pramāṇa* but also elaborately discusses each of them. The details about the four *Pramāṇas* given by *Anuyogadvārasūtra* is very much similar to that of Nyāya school. As I have stated earlier, *Bhagavati* refers to the *Anuyogadvāra* for more details about the *Pramāṇas*. It indicates that at the time of Valabhī council (c. 5th A. D.) the concept of four types of *Pramāṇa* had already been accepted by Jaina philosophers but when *Pramāṇavāda* got synthesized with the conception of five-fold knowledge, the *Upamāna* (comparison) had no place in it.

Later, Siddhasena Divākara in his *Nyāyāvātāra* and Haribhadrāsūri in his *Anekāntajayapatākā*

mentioned only three types of *Pramāṇas*. Umāsvāti (c. 3rd-4th A. D.) for the first time declared five-fold knowledge as *Pramāṇa* and divided it into two classes *Pratyakṣa* and *Parokṣa*. Later on, *Nandīsūtra* divided *Pratyakṣa* in two sub-classes *Sāmvyaṭvāhārika* and *Pāramārthika*, including sensory perception into the first one and *Avadhi*, *Manah-paryaya* and *Kevala* into the second, respectively. The four *Āgamic* divisions of *Matijñāna* — *Avagraha* (the cognition of an object as such without a further positing of the appropriate name, class, etc.); *Īhā* (the thought process that is undertaken with a view to specifically ascertain the general object that has been grasped by *avagraha*); *Avāya* (when further attentiveness to final ascertainment takes place regarding the particular feature grasped at the stage of *Īhā*) and *Dhāraṇā* (the constant stream of the ascertainment, the impression left behind it and the memory made possible by this impression, all these operations or the form of *matijñāna* are called *dhāraṇā*) were accepted as the two classes of sensory perception. The indirect knowledge (*Parokṣa-jñāna*) enumerated the cognition originated from mind (*manasajanya jñāna*) and Verbal testimony (*Śrutajñāna*) with a view that Inference (*Anumāna*) etc. are the forms of *Manasajanya-jñāna*.

Thus, the attempt to synthesize the concept of *Pramāṇa* with the theory of five-fold knowledge in the true sense begins from the period of Umāsvāti. Ācārya Umāsvāti maintains that these five types of cognition (knowledge) are five *pramāṇas* and divides these five cognition into two *Pramāṇas* — direct and indirect. Pt. Malvania has observed that the first attempt of this synthesis was made in *Anuyogadvārasūtra*, the only text accommodating Naiyāyika's four-fold division of *Pramāṇa* into knowledge. But this attempt not being in accordance with the Jaina view, the later scholars tried to solve this problem and ultimately succeeded in doing so. They discussed the

concept of *Pramāṇas* on the base of five-fold knowledge of Jaina Āgamas. According to *Nyāya-śāstra*, the cognition originated from Mind (*mānasa-janya jñāna*) is of two types — *Pratyakṣa* and *Parokṣa*. The knowledge originated from mind which experiences pleasure and pain, is Direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) whereas the inference (*anumāna*) and comparison (*upamāna*) are Indirect forms of knowledge (*parokṣa*). So having considered sensory-perception of *Matijñāna* as *Sāṃvyāvahārika Pratyakṣa* (perception according to common usage), cognition based on intellect (*Bauddhika Jñāna*) as inference (*anumāna*) and verbal testimony (*Śrutajñāna*) as *Āgama pramāṇa*. Jainas synthesized the conception of five-fold knowledge with the *Pramāṇaśāstra* of the other schools of Indian philosophy. In *Anuyoga-dvārasutra*, *Pratyakṣa* is divided in two heads, i. e., (1) perception originated from sense-organs (*indriya-janya*) and (2) perception originated from quasi-sense-organs (*no-indriya*). Quasi-sense originated perception included *avadhi*, *manah-paryaya* and *kevalajñāna*. This concept of knowledge carries the same meaning as the one, conveyed by the transcendental knowledge in other philosophical traditions. The distinction between ordinary perception (*Laukika Pratyakṣa*) and Transcendental perception (*Alaukika Pratyakṣa*) of Vaiśeṣikas is accepted by the Jainas under the name of *Sāṃvyāvahārika* and *Pāramārthika Pratyakṣa* and was synthesized later on with their conception of five-fold knowledge (*pañcājñānavāda*).

According to Pt. Dalasukha Malvania the *Āgamic* period (c. 5th A. D.) has no trace of any independent discussion over *Pramāṇa*. Till that period Jainācāryas have collected the opinions of other philosophical schools in their treatises. In the corresponding period a number of traditions on the types of *Pramāṇa* were prevalent. Jaina Āgamas refer traditions of three and four types of *Pramāṇas*. The mention of three types of *Pramāṇas* — *Pratyakṣa*

(perception), *Anumāna* (inference) and *Āgama* (verbal testimony), refers to the old Sāṅkhya System. While mention of four *pramāṇas* including *Upamāna* (comparison) belongs to Naiyāyikas. It clearly shows that by the end of c. 5th A. D. the concept of *Pramāṇa* as an independent concept was not developed in Jainism. The first work which elaborately deals with the *Pramāṇaśāstra* is Siddhasena's *Nyāyāvatāra*. The period of Siddhasena Divākara is fixed as c. 4th-5th A. D. *Nyāyāvatāra* mentions three *Āgamic* divisions of *Pramāṇa*, i.e., perception, inference and verbal testimony (*Āgama*). Though Siddhasena has expressed briefly the Jaina opinion on the *Nyāya-śāstra* of Sāṅkhya and Nyāya but he has followed mostly the old tradition, accepted by Jaina Āgamas. At some places he has only revised the definitions of *Pramāṇa* of other schools on the basis of Jaina theory of Non-absolutism (*Anekāntavāda*).

Nyāyāvatāra clearly follows the *Āgamic* tradition, as far as the description of *Pramāṇa* is concerned. It, no where, mentions the later developed concept of *Smṛti* (memory), *Pratyabhijñā* (recognition) and *Tarka* (indirect proof : *tarka* is not by itself, a source of valid knowledge, though it is valuable in suggesting hypothesis which leads indirectly to right knowledge) as *Pramāṇa*. This proves that *Nyāyāvatāra* is undoubtedly an ancient text compiled by Siddhasena Divākara. After *Nyāyāvatāra*, the literary works which discuss the concept of *Pramāṇa* are Pūjyapāda's *Sarvārthasiddhi* (c. 6th A. D.) of Digambara tradition, Siddhasenagaṇi's commentary on *Tattvārtha-bhāṣya* (c. 7th A. D.) and Haribhadra's *Anekāntajayapatākā* (c. 8th A. D.) of Śvetāmbara tradition. In these works there is no trace of *Pramāṇa* like *Smṛti* etc. This concept is discussed for the first time in the works of Akalaṅka (c. 8th A. D.) and Siddharṣi's commentary on *Nyāyāvatāra* (c. 9th A. D.) of Digambara and Śvetāmbara traditions, respectively. The independent development of Jaina Nyāya

commences from the period of Akalaṅka, who for the first time expounded *Smṛti*, *Pratyabhijñā* and *Tarka* as independent *Pramāṇas*. The Jaina theory of Nyāya was given a new direction in the c. 8th A. D. Akalaṅka not only established *Smṛti*, *Pratyabhijñā* and *Tarka* as independent *Pramāṇa* but also revised the definitions or meanings of Perception, Inference and Āgama, given by Siddhasena and Samantabhadra. In his definition of *Pramāṇa*, he introduced a new term *avisamvādi* in place of *svapara-avabhāṣaka*. Most probably, this characteristic of changing definitions was borrowed from the Buddhist tradition. It was an especiality of Akalaṅka that he logically evaluated even the pre-established conceptions, hence rightly called the father of Jaina Nyāya. His works *Laghīyastraya*, *Nyāyaviniścaya*, *Siddhiviniścaya* and *Pramāṇasaṅgraha* are related to the Jaina Nyāya. *Pramāṇasaṅgraha* is the Akalaṅka's last work in which matured Jaina Nyāya, especially *Pramāṇa-śāstra*, is elaborately discussed. Though in his earlier works he mentioned *Smṛti*, *Pratyabhijñā* and *Tarka* as *Pramāṇa* yet as independent *Pramāṇas*, these are established only in this work. As such from the point of view of the history of Jaina *Pramāṇa-śāstra* this is a valuable work giving new dimension to the concept of *pramāṇa*.

In the history of Indian logic the Jaina logicians, in the c. 8th A. D., for the first time accepted memory (*Smṛti*), recognition (*Pratyabhijñā*) and induction (*Tarka*) as a *Pramāṇa*. This is Jaina's special contribution to the field of Indian *Pramāṇa-śāstra*. Not even a single tradition of Indian logic accepts memory (*smṛti*) as an independent *Pramāṇa*. Only *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, a work of c. 16th A. D., mentions *Smṛti* as *Pramāṇa*. Though Naiyāyikas had accepted recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) as a kind of perception (*pratyakṣa pramāṇa*) yet neither they regarded it as an independent *Pramāṇa* nor accepted *Smṛti* as its cause (*hetu*). Jainas maintained, in case

Smṛti is not *Pramāṇa*, how recognition (*Pratyabhijñā*) can be accepted as *Pramāṇa* because in absence of memory (*Smṛti*), *Pratyabhijñā* is not possible. If memory (*Smṛti*) is not *Pramāṇa*, *Pratyabhijñā* also a combination of past memory and present perception can not be considered as *Pramāṇa*, because *Pratyabhijñā* is based on *Smṛti*. Similarly, Jainas established *Tarka* as independent *pramāṇa* because in the absence of *Tarka* *Pramāṇa*, *Vyāpti* (universal relation) is not possible and without *Vyāpti*, inference (*Anumāna*) is quite impossible. To solve this problem Naiyāyikas accepted *Sāmānya Lakṣaṇa Pratyāsatti* (generic nature of individuals). Jainas accepted *Tarka* *Pramāṇa* at the place of Naiyāyika's *Sāmānya Lakṣaṇa Pratyāsatti* which is more extensive than that and may be called Inductive leap (*āgamana*). Jainas maintained induction (*āgamana*) and deduction (*nigamana*) of Western Logic and introduced them in the name of *Tarka* and *Anumāna* as an independent *Pramāṇa*, respectively. An independent *Tarka* *Pramāṇa* was needed because acquisition of *Sāmānya* (generality) through perception is not possible and without *Sāmānya*, *Vyāpti* is not possible. Similarly in absence of *Vyāpti*, Inference (*anumāna*) is impossible. Since in Jainism, *Sāmānya Lakṣaṇa Pratyāsatti* is nowhere mentioned as a kind of perception, Jainas established *Tarka* as independent *Pramāṇa* to solve the problem of *Vyāpti*. As *Pratyabhijñā* was needed for *Tarka* and *Smṛti* for *Pratyabhijñā*, Jainas accepted all these three as independent *Pramāṇa*.

It was Akalaṅka (c. 8th A. D.) who for the first time referred these three types of independent *Pramāṇa* in Digambara tradition. Before Akalaṅka, his predecessors Samantabhadra (c. 5th A. D.) and Pūjyapāda (c. 6th A. D.) do not make any mention of it. In Śvetāmbara tradition, Siddhasena Divākara (c. 4th A. D.), Jinabhadra (c. 6th A. D.), Siddhasena Gaṇi (c. 7th A. D.) and Haribhadra (c. 8th A. D.)

mention nothing about these three independent *Pramāṇas*. In Śvetāmbara tradition, as per my knowledge, only Siddharṣi (c. 9th A. D.), in his commentary of *Nyāyāvatāra* has mentioned the validity of these three independent *Pramāṇas*.

Thus, in Digambara tradition from c. 8th A.D. and in Śvetāmbara tradition by the end of c. 9th A.D. memory (*smṛti*), recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) and induction (*tarka*) were established as independent *Pramāṇa*. Earliest works on Jaina logic were in brief and mainly concerned with the Jaina concept of *Pramāṇa*. Works on Jaina logic, composed later on were a healthy review of the conceptions of *Pramāṇa* prevalent in other philosophical traditions. Pātraśvāmi's *Trilakṣaṇakadarthana* was the first one to refute the *Hetulakṣaṇa* of Dinnāga. Vidyānandi (c. 9th A. D.) wrote *Pramāṇaparīkṣā* to evaluate the characteristics of *Pramāṇa*, their divisions and subdivisions, prevalent in other philosophical traditions. In this period some more works pertaining to Jaina logic (*Pramāṇaśāstra*) had been composed but seem to be destroyed. In Digambara tradition, Prabhācandra's *Nyāyakumudacandra* and *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* are two of some prominent works composed in c. 10th-11th A. D. Both of the works are the commentaries on Akalaṅka's *Laghiyastrayī* and in Śvetāmbara tradition, Vādidevasūri's *Pramāṇanaya-tattvāloka* and its commentary *Syādvādaratnākara* (c. 11th A. D.) are well known works on Jaina logic. After that Hemcandra's *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* (c. 12th A. D.) is an important work which mainly deals with the concept of *pramāṇa* though it is incomplete. The development of *Navya-nyāya* (Neo-logistic system) begins with the entry of Gaṅgesh Upādhyāya in the field of Indian *Nyāya* in c. 13th A. D. But for four centuries the Jaina logicians were unacquainted with this new literary genre and continued to follow the style of Vādidevasūri. Thus, the development of Jaina Logic (*Nyāyaśāstra*) remained interrupted after

c. 12th A.D. It was Yaśovijaya who followed the style of *Navyanyāya* and for the first time composed *Tarkabhāṣā* and *Nyāyabindu* in *Navyanyāya* style, in the latter part of c. 17th A.D. In Digambara tradition, *Saptabhaṅgītarāṅgaṇī* was written by Vimaladas following the same style.

Thus, we can conclude that it is only from c. 3rd A. D.-12th A. D. when Jaina logic made its progress and opened a new vistas for its further development.

Development of the Theory of Non-absolutism (*Anekāntavāda*) and *Syādvāda*

Non-violence in practice, non-absolutistic approach in thought and conditional predication or qualified assertion (*Syādvāda*) in speech are the pillars upon which the splendid palace of Jainism is erected. Theory of non-absolutism (*Anekāntavāda*) is the central philosophy of Jainism. So far as the historical development of this theory of *Anekāntavāda* is concerned, its historical development can be divided into three phases. Its first phase begins with the preachings of Mahāvīra, i. e., c. 6th B. C. and is extended upto the composition of Umāśvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra* (first half of the c. 4th A. D.). It was the period of origination of *Anekāntavāda*. Basically, the non-violent and tolerant attitude of Mahāvīra helped much in the development of the non-absolutistic principle of *Anekāntavāda*. In *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, he clearly opines, "one who praises one's own view-point and discards other's view as a false-one and thus, distorts the truth will remain confined to the cycle of birth and death."

It follows that Mahāvīra preached the utmost carefulness regarding one's speech. In his opinion speech should be unassaulting as well as true. He warned his disciple monks against making unwarranted categorical assertions or negations. He instructed them to make only a conditional statement (*Vibhajjavāya Vāgarejja*). It is the *Vibhajjavāda*

from which the theory of non-absolutism (*Anekāntavāda*) emerged. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, in its first chapter records various contemporary one-sided doctrines regarding the nature of soul and creation of the universe. Mahāvīra's approach to all these doctrines is non-absolutistic or relative. In every case, whether it was the problem of eternalism (*Śāśvatavāda*) and nihilism (*Ucchedavāda*) about the soul or that of finiteness and infiniteness of the world or that identity and difference of body and soul or also that of monism and pluralism, Mahāvīra's approach was never absolutistic but relativistic. It was firmly maintained in Jaina canons that the nature of reality is complex and multi-dimensional as well as confluence of many self-contradictory attributes, so it can be approached and explained from various angles or view-points. It is believed that *Tīrthaṅkara* Mahāvīra while explaining the reality uttered first sentence as *tripod (tripadī)*, i.e., *Uppannei, Vigamei, Dhuvei Vā*. Accordingly in Jainism Reality / 'Sat' is defined as possessing origination, decay and permanence (*Utpādayayadhrauvyayuktam sat : Tattvārtha*, 5.29). This three-fold nature of Reality is the base of the Jaina theory of Non-absolutism. On the one hand, the nature of Reality is complex, i. e., a synthesis of opposites : identity and difference, permanence and change, oneness and manyness and so on, and on the other hand scope of our experience, knowledge and even expression is limited and relative, so we can not know the Reality as a whole from any particular angle. Our every knowledge about the Reality will always be partial and relative only and in that position our expression or statement about the Reality will be always relative and not categorical (*ārpitā nārpīte siddhe : Tattvārtha*, 5). In canonical age we have an account of only this much discussion about *Anekāntavāda*.

Thus, in the first phase of its development, this theory was evolved from the theory of *Vibhajja-*

vāda. Though the theory of *Vibhajjavāda* was common to both — Jainism and Buddhism but so far as Buddhist approach to the metaphysical doctrine is concerned, it was a negative one, while Mahāvīra's was a positive one. Lord Buddha maintained that whether it is eternalism or nihilism, none of these can be regarded as true because any one-sided approach neither represents a right vision regarding Reality nor it explains our practical problems of sorrow and sufferings. That is why he kept mum while answering the questions related to the metaphysics. It is due to this negative approach that Buddha's theory of Nihilism came into existence later on in Buddhism. On the other hand, Mahāvīra's approach towards these one-sided views was positive. He tried to synthesize these different views on the basis of his theory of *Anekāntavāda*.

The synthesis is found for the first time in *Bhagavatisūtra*, wherein, on the basis of two main divisions of *Nayas* — substantial standpoint (*Dravyārthika Naya*) and modal standpoint (*Paryāyārthika Naya*) as well as *Niścaya Naya*, *Vyavahāra Naya* and different *Nikṣepas* (Positing) and Gateways of investigations (*Anuyogadvāras*) such as — Substance (*dravya*), space (*deśa*), time (*kāla*), mode (*bhāva*), name (*nāma*), symbol (*sthāpanā*), potentiality (*dravya*), actuality (*bhāva*) etc. He has synthesised the various opposite view-points. So it is clear that in the first phase, i. e., before c. 3rd A. D. *Vibhajjavāda* of Lord Mahāvīra was fully developed in the positive and synthesising theory of *Anekāntavāda* along with its subsidiary doctrines such as the doctrine of standpoint (*Nayavāda*) etc. Thus, along with the origination of *Anekāntavāda*, the doctrines of *Naya*, *Nikṣepa* and *Anuyogadvāra* came into existence.

The second phase of the development of Non-absolutism / *Anekāntavāda* began with Siddhasena Divakara's *Sanmatitarka* (c. 4th A. D.), continue till the Haribhadra's works such as *Śaddarśana-*

samuccaya, *Śāstravārtāsamuccaya* (c. 8th A. D.) etc. This second phase has three main characteristics — firstly, apart from the *Āgamic Nayas*, i. e., *Dravyārthika* (Substantial) and *Paryāyārthika* (modal) or *Niścaya* (Ideal) and *Vyavahāra* (practical view-point), the doctrine of Seven-fold *Nayas*, i.e., *Naigama* (considering both the general and particular properties of the thing), *Sangraha* (considering general properties of an object), *Vyavahāra* (considering specific properties of an object), *Rjusūtra* (confined only to the present mode of an object), *Śabda* (treating with synonyms), *Samabhirūḍha* (taking into consideration only etymological meaning of word. According to this *Naya*, even word has a different meaning) and *Evambhūta Naya* (denoting object in its actual state of performing its natural function) was developed. Though the *Āgamic Nayas* remained in vogue till the Kundakunda's period (c. 6th A. D.).

It is to be noted that in earlier *Āgamas* such as *Ācarāṅga*, *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, *Uttarādhyayana* etc., this concept of seven-fold view-point (*Nayas*) is absent. Only in *Anuyogadvārasūtra* and *Nandīsūtra* this concept of seven-fold view-point is found but these are the works of the c. 2nd-4th A.D. In *Samavāyāṅga*, it is an interpolation. Secondly, in *Tattvārthasūtra* (first half of c. 4th A. D.) the number of basic view-points are five. The *Samabhirūḍha* and *Evambhūta* are accepted as sub-types of *Śabdanaya*. Siddhasena Divākara (c. 4th A. D.) in his *Sanmatitarka* has accepted six *Nayas*, he does not mention *Naigama Naya*. Thus, we may conclude that the number of *Nayas*, as seven, was finalised later on but prior to the end of c. 5th A. D. Only with one exception of Mallavādī (c. 5th), who mentions twelve *Nayas* in his work '*Dvāśāranayacakra*', development in the number of *Nayas* became stagnant because of the development of the doctrine of *Anuyogadvāras*, i. e., the gateways of investigation. These twelve *Nayas* of

Mallavādī are some what different in their names and presentation. Though the author showed the relationship between the traditional seven *Nayas* and his twelve *Nayas* [See : Malvania D., *Āgama Yuga kā Jaina Darśana*, p. 312.] though doctrine of *Anuyogadvāras* (gateways of the investigation) can be traced in some of the *Āgamas* of later period as *Bhagavatī*, *Samavāyāṅga*, *Prajñāpanā* and *Anuyogadvārasūtra* yet the number of these gateways of investigation never remained constant. In *Tattvārthasūtra*, it was only eight while in *Dhavalā tīkā* of *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama* its numbers were increased upto eighty. This doctrine of gateways of investigation is nothing but viewing, understanding and explaining the nature of the things with their multiple facets or aspects and thus it can also be considered as a development of *Vibhajyavāda* and *Anekāntavāda*. Here, it is noteworthy that this increase in the number of the *Nayas* (view-points) or the *Anuyogadvāras* was well received by later Jaina thinkers because the earlier *Ācāryas* kept the door open in this regard. Siddhasena Divākara clearly mentions in his work *Sanmatitarka* (second half of the c. 4th A. D.) that number of view-points can be as much as the way of linguistic expressions. (*Sanmatitarka*, 3/47)

Doctrine of Seven-fold Predication (Saptabhaṅgī)

The second main characteristic of this second phase of the development of *Anekāntavāda*, is the doctrine of seven-fold predications or the seven ways of expressions (*Saptabhaṅgī*). The concept, regarding the ways of expressions, dates back to the Vedic period. The two forms of expressions / predications — affirmation and negation, are accepted by all. These two depend on existence or non-existence. By negating both the existence and non-existence, we have a third way of expression *Avyaktavyatā*, i.e., inexpressibility. By accepting the both a fourth way of expression was emerged, comprising both affirmation and negation. These four ways of expression are well

accepted in *Upaniṣadas* and Buddhism. So far as Jainism is concerned it is in the *Bhagavatisūtra* where for the first time these different ways of expressions (*Bhaṅgas*) are found. In *Bhagavatisūtra* (9/5) while dealing with the concept of Hell, Heaven and abode of *Siddhas*, Lord Mahāvīra mentioned only three ways of expression, i. e., affirmation, negation and in-expressibility but while dealing with the aggregates of the different numbers of atom, he mentioned more than twenty-three ways of expressions. Pt. Dalsukha Malvania is right when he says that of course we have seven predications or *Saptabhaṅgī* in *Bhagavatisūtra*, but in my humble opinion these different ways of expressions (*Bhaṅgas*) do not represent the doctrine of seven-fold predications rather it is only a prior state. Here, these ways of expressions are framed on the number of atoms in aggregates. Secondly, this discussion may be a later interpolation because in *Tattvārthasūtra* and its auto-commentary, this concept of seven-fold predication is absent. Thirdly, it is also clear that neither in *Bhagavatisūtra* nor in the *Tattvārthasūtra* and its auto-commentary, the theory of seven-fold predication is systematically presented in its logical form, with number of predications as seven and only seven. For the first time in Siddhasena Divākara's *Sanmatitarka*, this theory of seven-fold predication is logically presented. After that in *Āptamīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra (c. 5th), *Sarvārthasiddhi* of Pūjyapāda (c. 6th), *Pañcāstikāya* (14) and *Pravacanasāra* (2/23) of Kundakunda (c. 6th A. D.) and some other later works of this period this doctrine of seven-fold conditional predication has been discussed in detail. In general, there are only three types of our linguistic expression — affirmation, negation and inexpressibility. On the basis of these three fundamental ways of linguistic expressions and their combinations mathematically only seven predications are possible neither more nor less. In order to show the conditionality or relativity of these seven-fold predi-

cations Jaina ācāryas put a qualifying mark before each of the predication / statement, so that the affirmation or negation or even in-expressibility of predication may not be taken as absolute. This qualifying mark is the word 'Syāt' (स्यात्), which being put before every predication, removes the every possibility of uncertainty and indefiniteness of the predication and make the predication conditional as well as relative. The seven-fold conditional predications are as follows :

1. Conditional affirmation (स्यात् अस्ति)
2. Conditional negation (स्यात् नास्ति)
3. Conditional inexpressibility (स्यात् अवक्तव्यं)
4. Conditional affirmation and negation respectively (स्यात् अस्ति च नास्ति च)
5. Conditional affirmation and inexpressibility (स्यात् अस्ति च अवक्तव्यं च)
6. Conditional negation and inexpressibility (स्यात् नास्ति च अवक्तव्यं च)
7. Conditional affirmation, negation and inexpressibility (स्यात् अस्ति च नास्ति च अवक्तव्यं च)

It is noteworthy that for Jainas inexpressibility (*anirvacanīyatā* or *avyaktavyatā*) does not denote absolute inexpressibility as Vedānta means. It is only conditional inexpressibility because simultaneous affirmation and negation are not possible in our linguistic expressions.

The Jaina doctrines of non-absolutism, conditional predication and view-points yielded good results particularly in that age of philosophical disputation as well as religious and social conflicts. Though the Jaina thinkers made optical estimation of the philosophical assumptions of other schools of thought yet they paid proper respect to them and accepted their Truth value on the basis of different *Nayas*. In this regard the views of Siddhasena Divākara and Haribhadra are commendable. Siddhasena tried to establish the truth value of other schools of thought on different view-points. He said Sāṅkhya school is

true from substantial view-point, while Buddhist view is true from the view-point which is confined to only present mode of an object (*Rjusūtra Naya*).

He further remarks that all schools of thought are true when they are understood from their own standpoint and so far as they do not reject the truth-value of others. A non-absolutist does not divide them into the category of true and false. The same spirit is also followed by Haribhadra in his works such as *Śāstravārtāsamuccaya* and *Śaḍdarśana-samuccaya*. It is only Haribhadra, who in his *Śaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, presented all the six schools of thought in their true spirit and without condemning them. No other work in the history of Indian philosophy has been written till date in such a noble spirit. In this period, Jaina ācāryas tried to synthesize the different conflicting views and thus tried to establish harmony and peace in the society.

Historical Development of Jaina Metaphysics Astikāya

The doctrine of *pañcāstikāya* which refers to the five constituents of the universe is regarded as the most original theory of Jainism. There is, of course, no mention of *pañcāstikāya* in *Ācārāṅga*, but it is found in the Pārśva chapter of *Rṣibhāṣita* (c. 4th B. C.). This shows that this concept belongs to the tradition of Pārśva (c. 8th B. C.). In the tradition of Mahāvīra, however, we find its first reference in *Bhagavatīsūtra* (about c. 1st B. C.).

In Jaina philosophy the word *astikāya* means the substance which exists (*asti*) with an extension in the space, i.e., constituent component (*kāya*). In Jaina philosophy *jīva*, *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa* and *pudgala* — these five are regarded as *astikāyas* from the very ancient times, and there is no change in this concept, even today. They can be translated as the living beings (*jīva*), Space (*ākāśa*), Medium of motion and rest (*dharma-adharma* taken together) and Matter (*pudgala*).

Among these five *astikāyas*, three of them — *dharma*, *adharma* and *ākāśa* are thought of as unitary and remaining two — *jīva* and *pudgala* as infinite in number. From the c. 3rd-10th A. D. there is no major change in the concept except that, with the development of the concept of *śaḍdravya* (the six-fold theory of substance), time (*kāla*) was also accepted as an unextended substance (*anastikāya*). The debate whether time can be regarded as an independent substance or not begins with the c. 3rd-4th A. D. or even before the composition of *Tattvārthasūtra*; and the difference of opinion in this regard continues upto the time of *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* (c. 7th A. D.). Some of the Jaina philosophers regarded time as an independent substance while the others did not. But subsequently Digambara and Śvetāmbara both the traditions synthesized the concept of *astikāya* and *dravya* and both of them agreed to accept time as *anastikāya*, i.e., an independent unextended substance.

The idea of *Pañcāstikāya* is, distinctly, an original concept of the Jainas. We do not find it in any other ancient philosophical system, except that in the ancient times *astikāya* has a broad and general meaning, denoting anything that exists (*asti*); but in due course of time there developed a distinction between *astikāya* and *anastikāya* and the former was taken to be an extended substance in space. Technically speaking *astikāya* is a multi-spatial substance (*bahu-pradeśī-dravya*), i.e., a substance which is extended in space.

Pañcāstikāya

The Jaina concept of *śaḍdravya* (theory of six substances) has developed from this very idea of *pañcāstikāya* by adding time as an independent substance in the earlier concept of *pañcāstikāya*. The concept of *śaḍdravya* came into existence during the c. 1st-2nd A. D. Thus the concept of *pañcāstikāya* is definitely a very old concept because we find its reference in the Pārśva chapter of *Isibhāṣiyāim*, one

of the oldest scriptures. Till the period of *Ācārāṅga* and the first *Śrutaskandha* of *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* we donot find any reference to this concept so far as the Mahāvīra's tradition is concerned. Thus, we can say that the concept basically belongs to Pārśva tradition. When the followers of Pārśva were included in the Mahāvīra's order, their concept of *pañcāstikāya*, along with some other concepts, was also accepted in the Mahāvīra's tradition. *Bhagavatisūtra* for the first time mentions that the world is made of *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa*, *jīva* and *pudgala*. *Isibhāsiyāim* only refers to the five *astikāyas* but has not mentioned their names. Even, if the names were decided, we find no description as to their exact nature and function. Further, the meaning that we understand of the *pañcāstikāya*, today, is gradually ascribed to them in due course of time. We find atleast two references in the *Bhagavatisūtra* which clarify that the *dharma-astikāya* and the *adharma-astikāya* at that time did not mean media of motion and rest, respectively. In the 20th *śataka* of *Bhagavatisūtra*, it is mentioned that abstinence from the eighteen places of sin and observance of the five vigilances (*samitis*) alongwith three controls (*guptis*) is *dharmāstikāya*, while indulging in the eighteen places of sin and not following the five vigilances (*samitis*) and the three controls (*guptis*) is, called *adharmāstikāya*. In the 16th *śataka* of *Bhagavatisūtra*, the question is raised whether a deity (*deva*) standing at the end of the universe (unoccupied space) can move his hands outside the universe (*aloka*)? The answer given to this question is not only negative but is also explanatory. It says that as the movement of *Jīva* and *Ajīva* is possible only through matter (*pudgala*) and as there is complete absence of *jīvas* and the *pudgalas* in the *aloka*, the movement of the hands of the diety is impossible there. If *dharma-dravya* was considered as a medium of motion, at that time the answer would have been in different way, i.e., due to the absence of *dharma-dravya* he can not

move his hands. Thus, the concept of *dharma* and *adharma* as the respective medium of motion and rest, seems to be a later concept. This idea has arrived by the time of the composition of *Tattvārthasūtra* (i.e. in the second half of the c. 3rd or first half of the c. fourth). The allusions made in *Bhagavati* and other scriptures clearly show that the meanings of *dharmāstikāya* and *adharmāstikāya* in those days were identical to the meaning of the terms *dharma* and *adharma* as pious and sinful respectively. Thus, the concept of *dharma* and *adharma* as the medium of motion and rest, respectively, seems to be a latter concept, but this idea has arrived by the time of the composition of *Tattvārthasūtra* (i.e., c. 3rd A.D.). In *Uttarādhyayana*, chapter 28th also *dharma* and *adharma* are mentioned as the medium of motion and rest respectively, but according to scholars this chapter is a later addition of the c. 1st or 2nd A. D.

Seven Categories

In *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* (2 / 5-765-782) we find two categories of being (*asti*) and not-being (*nāsti*). The elements which are classified under being category are — *loka* (universe), *aloka* (space beyond universe), *jīva* (the living-being), *dharma*, *adharma*, *bandha*, *mokṣa*, *puṇya*, *pāpa*, *āsrava*, *saṃvara*, *vedanā*, *nirjarā*, *kriyā*, *akriyā*, *krodha*, *māna*, *lobha*, *prema*, *dveṣa*, *caturanta*, *samsāra*, *deva*, *devī*, *siddhi*, *asiddhi*, *siddhanijasthāna*, *aādhu*, *asādhu* and *kalyāṇa*.

This detailed list is abridged in the second part (*śrutaskandha*) of *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*. Here we find the mention of *jīva-ajīva*, *puṇya-pāpa*, *āsrava-saṃvara*, *vedanā-nirjarā*, *kriyā-adhikaraṇa*, *bandha* and *mokṣa*. It is an earlier stage, as Pt. Dalsukha Malvania observes, the concept of nine-fold elements is developed from this very list after deleting *vedanā*, *kriyā* and *adhikaraṇa* from it. This is alluded, in *Samavāyāṅga* and *Uttarādhyayana*, approximately c. 2nd or 3rd A. D. Out of these nine-fold elements

Umāsvāti presents, the concept of seven elements (*tattvas*) including *punya* and *pāpa* under *āsrava*, in the c. 3rd-4th. We find discussions of the seven-fold or nine-fold categories (*tattva*) in the later composed scriptures of both the Śvetāmbara and the Digambara traditions. This shows that the concept of seven categories (*tattva*) has also its origin in *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* and has taken final shape in due course of time and got finalised in c. 3rd or 4th A. D. During the c. 7th-10th A.D. these ideas had properly conceptualised as it is described in details with their various classes and sub-classes.

We find that at the root of the formulation of the concepts of seven or nine-fold categories, six-fold substances and the six-fold *jīvanikāya*, is the basic idea of *Pañcāstikāya*. The Jaina thinkers, of course, have developed the concept of six substances by synthesizing their conception of *Pañcāstikāya* and the idea of substance as it is found in the other philosophical systems. In the following pages we will try to see as to how it has worked out.

Substance

What is known as substance is the fundamental constituent of the universe. The *sat*, of the ancient Indian philosophical traditions, has taken the form of *dravya* (substance) later on. As a matter of fact, the philosophical traditions which regard the ultimate reality as one and unchangeable have adopted the world 'Sat' and those which consider the reality as many and changeable have used the word substance (*dravya*), instead of 'sat'. In the systems of Indian thought like *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* etc. the use of the word substance (*dravya*) or *padārtha* remains in vogue. So far as the Jaina philosophy is concerned though we find the term *dravya* in *Ācārāṅga* yet the word is not used in any technical sense.

In *Uttarādhyayana*, the word '*dravya*' is mentioned for the first time. That particular chapter of *Uttarādhyayana*, where in *dravya* is discussed, is reg-

arded as relatively later, of c. 2nd or 3rd A. D., by the scholars. There we find that not only the word *dravya* (substance) is used, but the mutual relation among the substance, attributes and modes are also discussed. Substance is defined as substratum of attributes (*guṇāṇām āsavo davvo*). In my opinion, this definition of substance, given in *Uttarādhyayana*, seems to be influenced by the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* school. Pūjyapāda Devanandī defined substance as an aggregate of attributes in his commentary on *Tattvārthasūtra*, known as *Sarvārthasiddhi* (c. 5th or 6th A. D.). This definition seems to be influenced by the Buddhist *Skandhavāda*. In favour of this view Pūjyapāda has quoted '*guṇāṇām samuo davvo*' from the scriptures. This shows that this concept should have been prior to the c. 6th. Both the definition of substance as 'substratum of attributes' and 'aggregate of attributes' should have been in my opinion, prevalent before the c. 3rd. By synthesizing these two views through Jaina theory of *Anekāntavāda* (non-absolutism) the substance is defined for the first time, as that which possesses attributes and modes in Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra*.

Six-substances (Ṣaḍdravya)

We have already stated that the concept of *ṣaḍdravya* (six substances) has been developed from the idea of *pañcāstikāya*. By adding 'time' as an independent substance in *pañcāstikāya*, the concept of six substances (*ṣaḍdravya*) is formulated. Though from c. 2nd-7th A. D., 'Time' was always a matter of discussion whether it is an independent substance or not (as it is indicated in several works from *Tattvārthasūtra* to *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*), yet finally it was accepted as an independent substance. It was c. 7th A. D. when both the Śvetāmbara and Digambara traditions agreed to accept the idea of *ṣaḍdravya* and no change occurred in the theory afterwards. The six substances are now classified into the following three main divisions — *astikāya-anastikāya*, *jīva* (living),

ajīva (non-living) and *mūrta-amūrta*. In the first classification — *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa*, *jīva* and *pudgala* — these five are regarded as *astikāya* and 'Time' as *anastikāya* (unextended substance). In the second classification *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa*, *pudgala* and *kāla* are regarded as *Ajīva* (Non-living beings) and the *Jīva* is considered as living being. In the last classification *jīva*, *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa* and *kāla* are regarded as *amūrta* (abstract) and *pudgala* (matter) as *mūrta* (concrete). We have already stated that the development of the concept of substance in the Jaina philosophy is almost influenced by the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* philosophy. *Jainācāryas* have synthesised the *Vaiśeṣika* idea of substance with their own concept of *pañcāstikāya*. As such while in *Vaiśeṣika* there are nine substances, the Jainas, by adding time to *pañcāstikāya* have made them six in all. *Jīva*, *ākāśa* and *kāla* remained common in both. *Prthvī*, *ap*, *tejas* and *marut* — the four, out of the five *mahābhūtas* which are regarded as substances in the *Vaiśeṣika* are not recognised by the Jainas as independent substances. They are only considered as varieties of *jīva-dravya*. The Jainas have also not accepted 'dik' and 'mana' as independent substances, instead they have included three others — *dharma*, *adharma* and *pudgala* in their scheme of substances. It may also be noted that while the other traditions have treated *prthvī*, *ap*, *vāyu* and *agni* as *jaḍa* (non-living), the Jainas regard them as living. Thus, the Jaina concept of six substances (*ṣaḍdravya*) seems to be quite original. We can only find its partial similarity with other traditions. The main reason behind this is that the Jainas have developed their idea of six substances (*ṣaḍdravya*) on the line of their own theory of *pañcāstikāya*.

Ṣaḍjīvanikāya

Along with *pañcāstikāya*, we also find the concept of *ṣaḍjīvanikāya* (six-fold living beings) in Jaina canons. This concept has developed from

jīvāstikāya, one of the *kāyas* in *pañcāstikāya*. The six kinds of *jīvāstikāya* are — earth (*prthvīkāya*), water (*apkāya*), air (*vāyukāya*), fire (*tejas-kāya*), vegetation (*vanaspatikāya*) and mobile beings (*trasakāya*). The use of the word *kāya* (body) for earth etc. is found since remote past. In *Pālitripitaka* Ajitakeśa-kambali, calls *prthvī*, *ap*, *tejas* and *vāyu* — the four *bhūtas* as *kāya* but *Pakudhakaccāyana* adds three more to the list, i.e., happiness (*sukha*), sufferings (*duḥkha*) and the living being (*jīva*) and make them seven in number. The Jainas position is a little different. First they regard the five — *jīva*, *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa* and *pudgala* as *kāya* (*astikāya*) and then include *prthvī*, *ap*, *tejas*, *vāyu*, *vanaspati* and *trasa*, six in all, under *jīvanikāya*. Thus, there are two concepts — *pañcāstikāya* and *ṣaḍjīvanikāya* and both of them have been prevalent in Jainism in the c. 4th-3rd B. C. in their crude form, but were developed and systematised in c. 3rd-5th A. D.

Distinct references of *ṣaḍjīvanikāya* are available in the first chapter of *Ācārāṅga* and in *Sūtra-kṛtāṅga* also. It is accepted by all the scholars that all these scriptures are of the c. 4th B. C. and are contemporary to the older part of Pāli *Tripitaka* and earlier *Upaniṣadas*. It is likely that these concepts might have belonged to Mahāvīra.

The concept of *pañcāstikāya* basically belongs to the Pārśva tradition. It is recognised in the tradition of the Mahāvīra also while interpreting the world. There is a reference in the *Bhagavatisūtra* to the effect that Mahāvīra has accepted the Pārśva ideas that the universe is made of *Pañcāstikāya*.

I do not agree with Pt. Malvania's opinion that the concept of *pañcāstikāya* is a later developed concept. It is true, of course, that in the earlier works of Mahāvīra's tradition there is mention of only *ṣaḍjīvanikāya* and not of *pañcāstikāya*. But when the Pārśva tradition merged with that of the Mahāvīra,

the philosophical ideas of the former also got their way in the latter. As such, the idea of *pañcāstikāya* was basically of Pārśva tradition, so it could find its place in *Bhagavatisūtra* after its merging in Māhāvīra's tradition.

The Jains regard, not only vegetation and other living beings but even earth, water, fire and air too, as living beings. This is a very typical Jaina concept. In the other systems, such as *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* etc. these four elements are considered as *mahābhūtas* and as such *jaḍa* (unconscious, inanimate). Among the *mahābhūtas*, *ākāśa* (space) is the only element, regarded as non-living (*ajīva*) in both the traditions (Jainism as well as *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*). That is why *ākāśa* is included in *pañcāstikāya* but has no place in *śaḍjīvanikāya* in which only the other four, viz., earth, water, fire and air are included. The Jaina thinkers accept not only the life as dependent on earth, water and the like but also as living too. That is why the abstinence from violence towards earth, water, air, fire and vegetation is so prominently prescribed in the Jaina *Sādhana*, particularly for the *Muni*'s. The subtleness and the extreme that we find in the observance of non-violence (*Ahimsā*) in the Jainism have their roots in the idea of *śaḍjīvanikāya*. If we regard earth etc. under the category of the living beings, it is but natural to abstain from their violence.

The conception of *śaḍjīvanikāya* in Jainism is the oldest one. It is accepted as such from its origin to date. It is difficult to say that it has undergone any fundamental change between c. 3rd-10th except that some important issues regarding their classification have been raised and some detailed informations about their body, their way of taking food, their language, their classes, sub-classes etc. are depicted in *Prajñāpanā* and *Jīvājīvaḥigama*. According to Pt. Malvania there is a description in the second chapter of *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, known as *Āhāraparijñā*, regarding the *yonis* in which *jīvas* take the birth and the way in

which they transmigrate from one *Yoni* to another and the manner in which they take their food etc. A type of *jīvas* are called *anasyūta* there. From this, we can conclude that the idea of *anantakāya* (infinite *jīva* in one body) and *pratyekakāya* (One *jīva* in one body) came into existence in c. 3rd-4th. The decision as to which of the creatures (*jīvas*) are to be included in the two, three or the four sensed *jīva*, respectively is also finalised afterwards. In *Bhagavati*, it takes the form of *jīva-ajīva* division, however, the concept has fully developed by the time of *Prajñāpanā* because there we have detailed discussions on *indriya*, *āhāra*, *paryāpti* etc.

After the c. 3rd an important change occurred in the classification of mobile and immobile being (*trasa* and *sthāvara*). Right from *Ācārāṅga* to *Tattvārthasūtra*, earth, water and vegetation are regarded as immobile (*sthāvara*) and fire, air and the two, three, four and five-sensed living creatures as mobile (*trasa*). The last chapter of *Uttarādhyayana*, Kundakunda's *Pañcāstikāyasāra* and Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra* confirm it. Afterwards not only earth, water and vegetation but all the one-sensed beings are regarded as immobile. However, due to the movement seen in fire and air it becomes difficult to regard them as immobile. The root cause of the problem was that in those days the two or more sensed beings were called *trasa*, hence it was thought that other than two or more sensed beings all the one sensed beings are considered as *sthāvara* (immobile). This shows the change which had taken place in the c. 5th-6th in the *trasa-sthāvara* classification, approximately. After that in both the *Śvetāmbara* and *Digambara* sects, the concept of *pañcāsthāvara* has found firm footings. It is noteworthy here that when air and fire are regarded as *trasa*, there is the use of the term *udara* (urala) for *trasa*. In the beginning the criterion of classification of *trasa-sthāvara* is made from the point of view of moveability of things, and as air and fire are

moveable in nature they are thought of as *trasa*. The moveable nature of *vāyu* is so apparent that it is called *trasa*, first of all out of five one sensed beings. By minute observations, it is seen that fire too has a tendency of gradual expansion through fuel so it is also included into *trasa* (mobile). But the movement of water is regarded as possible only due to the low level of the earth so movement is not its own nature. Therefore, water, like the vegetation is also taken as *sthāvara* (immobile). As the movement in air and fire is inherent so these two are considered as *trasa* and other as *sthāvaras*. Further when the two or more sensed *jīvas* are recognised as immobile (*sthāvara*) the problem of reconciling this view with *āgamic* statements arose. In the *Śvetāmbara* schools this reconciliation is marked as the basis of the distinction of *labdhi* and *gati*. From the standpoint of the *labdhi*, air and fire are viewed as immobile (*sthāvara*) but viewed from the angle of movement (*gati*) they remain mobile (*trasa*). In the *Dhavalā* commentary of Digambara tradition (c. 10th) the problem is solved differently. It is said that the basis of calling air and fire as *sthāvara*, is not their movement but their *Nāma-karma* origin. *Jayasenācārya*, the commentator of *pañcāstikāya* of Kundakunda, solves the problem by making a distinction between *nīścayanaya* and *vyavahāra-naya*. According to him, the earth, water and vegetation are included into *pañca sthāvara* because of their *Nāma-karma* origin, but air and fire classification under *pañcasthāvars* are only from the practical point of view (*vyavahāra*). From *nīścayanaya* they are *trasa* as they actually appear to be mobile. All these exercises really are worthwhile attempts to reconcile the differences, cropped of during respective contentions of the ancient and the later scriptures.

So far as the question of different classifications of *jīvas* are concerned they are crystalised during the c. 3rd-10th. In that period the concepts of

Jīvasthāna, *Mārgaṇāsthāna*, *Guṇasthāna* have also developed. Wherever these topics have been discussed in the *Aṅga-Āgamas* such as *Bhagavati* etc. the reference has been made to *Aṅga-bāhya Āgamas* (External authorities) such as *Prajñāpanā* etc. It confirms that these theories are developed after the c. 2nd. First they are discussed in the *Aṅga-bāhya Āgamas* and afterwards at the time of *Valabhī-vācanā* they are included in *Aṅga-āgamas* with the note that for detailed discussions relevant *Aṅga-bāhya* scriptures are to be seen.

Jaina Theory of Guṇasthāna and its Development

The doctrine of fourteen stages of spiritual development (*Guṇasthāna*) is one of the most popular theories of Jainism. Except *Samavāyāṅga*, none of the canonical work refers to this theory. Scholars are of the strong opinion that the reference relating to *Guṇasthāna* found in *Samavāyāṅga* is an interpolation incorporated at the time of second Valabhī Council (c. 5th A. D.). The *Niryuktis* are also silent about this theory, except the present edition of *Āvaśakaniryukti* wherein, two *gāthās* mention the names of these fourteen *Guṇasthānas*. This is remarkable that till the time of Haribhadra's commentary on *Āvaśyaka Niryukti*, these two *gāthās* were not accepted as *Niryuktī gāthās* as in his commentary, he has clearly mentioned that these *gāthās* has been quoted by him from the *Saṅgrahaṇī-sūtra*.

It seems that till the c. 4th A. D. the concept of these fourteen stages of spiritual development has not come into existence. Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra* throwing light on almost every aspect of Jaina philosophy and religion including various stages of spiritual development does not mention the fourteen *Guṇasthānas* as such. The same is the case with its auto-commentary. Though in the ninth chapter of the *Tattvārthasūtra* the author has mentioned four, seven and ten stages of spiritual development, yet he does not make any mention of these fourteen stages in it.

Thus, we may conclude that the theory of the fourteen stages of spiritual development was not prevalent at the time of compilation of *Tattvārthasūtra*, otherwise, Umāsvāti would have mentioned it.

These evidences show that the theory of fourteen *Guṇasthānas* came into existence after *Tattvārthasūtra*, i.e., c. 4th A. D. For the first time, this theory was introduced along with all its details, in Puṣpadanta and Bhūtabali's *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama* (c. 5th A. D.). After that it is discussed in Pūjyapāda's *Sarvārthasiddhi* (c. 6th A. D.) and *Tattvārthabhāṣya-tīka* of Siddhsenagaṇi (c. 7th-8th) in detail, however, its pre-concept in the form of ten stages was already present in *Ācārāṅganiryukti* (22-23) and *Tattvārthasūtra* (9/47). From these ten stages of spiritual development the theory of fourteen *Guṇasthāna* was conceptualised in c. 5th A. D.

These fourteen stages are as follows :

1. The first stage is called *mithyādr̥ṣṭi*, i.e., perversity of attitude. It is the lowest stage from where the spiritual journey of soul starts. It is considered as a stage of spiritual development only because in this very state the efforts for the attainment of the right vision are made. The process of *granthi-bheda* occurs at the end of this stage. At this stage the soul, is in the grip of extreme passions (*anantā-nubhandhī kaṣāya*).

2. The second stage is known as *sāsvādana-samyagdr̥ṣṭi*, i.e., to have a momentary taste of the right vision. This is an intermediate stage and it occurs when soul falls from the right attitude towards the false attitude. This stage is called *sāsvādana-samyagdr̥ṣṭi* because in this stage soul has a taste of right attitude or right version just as a person after eating delicious dishes vomits and has a taste of those dishes in that state of vomiting.

3. The third stage is technically known as *samyag-mithyādr̥ṣṭi*. It is mixed stage of the right and

false attitudes like the taste of curd mixed with sugar, which is neither sweet nor sour. This is the stage of doubt. In this stage soul accepts neither the perverse attitude nor the right one. It remains in dilemma.

4. The fourth stage is *aviratasamyagdr̥ṣṭi*, a stage of right attitude without right conduct. Though in this scheme of *Guṇasthāna* it is considered to be the fourth stage, but in reality it is the first stage in the upward journey of the soul towards its spiritual heights. It is the stage in which the soul gets the glimpse of truth for the first time. At this stage the self knows right as a right and wrong as a wrong but due to the lack of spiritual strength, inspite of the knowledge and the will, he cannot abstain himself from the wrong path of immorality.

5. The fifth stage is known as *deśavirata-samyagdr̥ṣṭi*. This is the stage of right attitude with partial observance and partial non-observance of moral code. A house-holder, who possesses right vision and observes five *anuvratas*, three *guṇavratas* and four *śikṣāvratas*, comes in this category. In this stage one knows what is right and also tries to practise it, but one cannot have full control over one's passions. At this stage there is only partial expression of the energy of self-control. After attaining the fourth stage, if one develops spiritual strength and has control over the second set of four passions, i.e. *apratyākhyāni-kaṣāya-catuṣka*, one is able to attain this stage.

6. In spiritual journey of the soul, the sixth stage is called *pramatta-samyata-guṇasthāna*. It is the stage in which the self observes right conduct fully. He observes five *mahāvratas* and other rules of moral conduct of a monk, yet he has an attachment towards his body and due to this attachment the spiritual inertia is still there. This is the stage of self-control with spiritual inertia. At the end of this stage the aspirant tries to subside or annihilate the third set

of four passions and spiritual inertia and climbs the seventh ladder.

7. The seventh stage is the stage of self-control and self awareness alongwith freedom from spiritual inertia, which is technically known as *apramatta-samyata-guṇasthāna*. At this stage the self has full control over his passions and observes the moral code without any negligence. This stage can be attained by overcoming the nine types of *pramādas* or unawareness and the three sets of four types of passions. From this stage there are two ways open for the upward spiritual journey of the soul. They are technically known as *upaśama-śreṇī* and *kṣapaka-śreṇī*. *Upaśama-śreṇī* is the path of suppression or subsidence while the *Kaṣapaka-śreṇī* is the path of annihilation. The person, who climbs the ladder of spiritual progress by suppressing his passions, is bound to fall from spiritual heights but the person who climbs up the ladder of spiritual heights through the annihilation of his passions ultimately attains *nirvāṇa* or emancipation.

8. The eighth stage of spiritual development is called *apūrvakaraṇa*. In this stage self attains a special purification and spiritual strength, and thus becomes capable of reducing the duration and the intensity of the previously bonded *karmas*. At this stage soul performs the four processes of the *karma* — *sthitighāta* (destruction of the duration of *karmas*), *rasaghāta* (destruction of the intensity of *karmas*), *guṇa-saṅkramaṇa* (transformation of the quality of *karmic* matter) and *apūrva-sthitibandha* (bondage of an unprecedented kind of duration). This total process is technically known as *apūrva-karaṇa*. In this stage the soul for the first time experiences the spiritual bliss and tranquility and emotional disturbances do not effect it much. At this stage the three sets of four passions alongwith anger and pride of the fourth set disappear, only subtle deceit and greed alongwith nine sub-passions (instincts) remain.

9. The ninth stage is named as *anivṛttikaraṇa*, because the process of *anivṛttikaraṇa* operates in this stage. It is also known as *bādara-samparāya guṇasthāna*, because in this stage there is occasional possibility of the soul being effected by gross passions (*bādara-samparāya*), although it has a power of control over them. At this stage, out of nine sub-passions, three types of sexual instinct subside and only six instincts and subtle greed remain, but due to the presence of sub-passions and subtle greed, a fear of attack by gross passions remain. At the end of this stage struggle for spiritual progress comes to an end and the soul climbs the tenth ladder.

10. This stage is named as *sūkṣmasamparāya-guṇasthāna*, because at this stage only the subtle form of greed remains. This greed can be interpreted as the subconscious attachment of the soul with the body. When this subtle attachment alongwith remaining sub-passions is subsided or annihilated, the soul ascends to the next stage. The soul, who has made his spiritual progress through the ladder of subsidence (*upaśama-śreṇī*) ascends to the eleventh *guṇasthāna* and the soul, which take up the ladder of annihilation (*kṣapaka-śreṇī*), climbs directly to the twelfth stage.

11. This stage is known as *upaśāntamohaniya-guṇasthāna*; because in this stage deluding *karma* remains in the subsided form. It is the highest stage for those who ascend through the ladder of subsidence or suppression. But ultimately the suppressed passions arise and disturb the tranquility of mind. The soul invariably descends from this stage either to the sixth, fifth or fourth or even first stage. This is noteworthy that Jainism does not advocate the process of suppression of the passions for the spiritual progress. This view of Jainism is further supported by the modern psychologists such as Freud etc.

12. The twelfth stage in the spiritual development of the soul is called *kṣiṇamoha-guṇasthāna*. In this stage deluding karma, which is the main obstruc-

tion in the spiritual progress, is completely destroyed. At the end of this stage the rest three *ghāti-karma*, *jñānāvaraṇa*, *darśanāvaraṇa* and *antarāya* are also destroyed and the soul ascends to the thirteenth stage.

13. This stage is known as *sayogī-kevalī-guṇasthāna*. In this stage soul attains the four infinities, i.e., infinite knowledge, infinite perception, infinite bliss, infinite power and thus becomes omniscient. It is the highest stage of spiritual development. It is the stage of *jīvana-mukti* of other systems of Indian philosophy. Only due to the existence of four non-destructive *karmas*, i.e., *āyu* (age), *nāma*, *gotra* and *vedanīya*, soul remains in the body till the span of age determining *karma* is not exhausted.

14. This stage is named as *ayogīkevalī-guṇasthāna*, because in this stage the omniscient soul controls its activities of mind, body and speech and thus prepares itself for the final emancipation. In this stage the remaining four non-destructive *karmas* are destroyed and the soul, after leaving the body, proceeds for its heavenly abode at the top of the universe and lives there for time-infinite.

Three Stages of Spiritual Quest

There are two classifications of spiritual quest in Jainism — Theory of fourteen *guṇasthānas* already discussed and the theory of three stages of spiritual developments. This second classification is based on *Upaniṣadic* classification of the soul. The *Upaniṣadas* have two, three and four-fold classification of the soul. In two-fold classification, the soul is of two kinds — *antaḥprajñāna* and *bahīḥprajñāna* (*Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*, 7) and in four-fold classification, four stages of the soul, are : (i) sleeping state, (ii) dreaming state, (iii) awakened state and (iv) transcendental state (*Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*, 2/12). Similarly, in Jainism spiritual quest has been summarised in three stages — (i) the extrovert self (*bahirātmā*), (ii) the introvert self (*antarātmā*) and

(iii) transcendental self (*paramātmā*). It is clear that in Jainism these three stages of spiritual quest are a later developed concept, because neither the canonical works nor the earlier works of Jaina philosophy of Umasvāti, Siddhasena Divākara etc. refer it. In Digambara tradition, for the first time we have a mention of these classification in Ācārya Kunda-kunda's *Mokṣaprābhṛta* (4) then in the Pūjyapāda's *Samādhitantra* (4), Svāmikumāra's *Kārtikeyānu-prekṣā* (192) and Yogindu's *Paramātmaprakāśa* (13). In Svetāmbara tradition, Haribhadra has mentioned these three states of spiritual quest in his work :

These three stages are as under :

1. The extrovert self (*bahirātmā*) : Possesses perverse attitude hence consequently does not discriminates soul from body, regards the external thing as mine and takes keen interest in the worldly enjoyment.

2. The introvert self (*antarātmā*) : The self, which possesses the right attitude and therefore, clearly distinguishes the soul from the body and the other external belongings is called an introvert self. It does not take interest in the worldly enjoyments, but meditates on one's own real nature and regards external belongings as alien to it. This has been further subdivided into three states — (i) lower, (ii) middle and (iii) higher. The soul belonging to fourth stage of *guṇasthāna* is called lower introvert self. The soul belonging to the fifth or the sixth stage of *guṇasthāna* is called middle introvert self and the soul belonging to the seventh to twelfth *guṇasthāna* is called higher introvert self.

3. The transcendental self (*paramātmā*) : The self, completely free from all sorts of impurities and passions such as aversion, attachment, pride, anger, deceit, greed, sexual desire and other sub-passions. According to Jaina tradition this type of self possesses four infinities, i.e., infinite knowledge, infinite perception, infinite bliss and infinite power. There are

two categories of transcendental Self — (i) *Arhatas* and (ii) *Siddhas*.

Three-fold Path of Liberation

The Jaina theory of bondage and liberation of the soul is unique in Indian philosophy. Jainism holds that *jīva* is bound by its own *karmas*. With every activity mental or physical and, however, subtle that may be, the *karma* particles veils the soul and this is the bondage of the *jīva*. Thus, the cause of the bondage of the *jīva* is its own passionate activity of mind, body and speech. As the cause of the bondage is the union of *karma*-matter with the soul, the liberation means the separation or complete annihilation of these *karma*-particles, Jainism prescribes three-fold path for attainment of liberation. This three-fold concept witnessed gradual changes in it between c. 3rd-10th A. D. *Ācārāṅga* for the first time in its 6th chapter, mentions *triyaṃ*, but as this term is used there vaguely, it is quite difficult to derive any definite meaning from it. That is why the commentators explained it in different ways. Some explained it as three *yamas*, i.e., non-violence, truth and non-possession, while some took it as Right knowledge, Right faith and Right conduct. In my opinion, this term connotes the meaning of non-violence (*nikhitta-daṇḍa*), reasonableness (*prajñā*) and composure or equanimity of mind. Apart from this three-fold concept we find mention of four-fold path of liberation in *Uttarādhyaṇa* and Kundakunda's *Pañcāstikāya*. This four-fold path includes — Right attitude, Right knowledge, Right conduct and Right penance. In *Samavāyaṅga* and *Sthānāṅga*, we find different outlook as the both of the works mention two-fold, three-fold, four-fold and five-fold path of liberation. Thus, till the canonical age the number of constituents of the path of liberation was not fixed. For the first time in the Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra* it was fixed as three — right knowledge (*samyak-jñāna*), right faith (*samyak-darsana*) and right conduct (*samyak-*

cāritra), (three jewels of Jainism) which are equally recognised and well received in both of the sects of Jainism — Śvetāmbara and Digambara alongwith their sub-sects.

In c. 4th-5th the meaning of the constituents of this three-fold path was reinterpreted. For example the term *darsana* used in *Ācārāṅga*, connoting the meaning as 'to see' or 'to observe' got its new interpretation in *Uttarādhyaṇa* as 'to believe' or 'to have faith' in categories (*tattvas*), *Tattvārthasūtra* also supports this meaning. Later on, this meaning of *samyak-darsana* was replaced by the meaning as to have faith in *Arhanta* as a 'Deva', i.e., the object of worship, *Nirgrantha* as a teacher (guru) and religion as non-violence or being benevolent to others. This meaning is still in vogue.

Similarly, the meaning of *samyak-jñāna* or right knowledge also got some new interpretation. In the earlier times Jaina thinkers held that the right knowledge consists in knowing the things in its real nature alongwith its infinite facets. This right knowledge is classified into five types in earlier *Āgamas* as — (i) *Matijñāna* — the knowledge obtained through five senses and the mind. It includes both sense perception as well as rational and inferential knowledge, (ii) *Śrutajñāna* — the knowledge acquired through language or through symbols and expressions or scriptural knowledge, (iii) *Avadhijñāna* — extra-sensory perception akin to clairvoyance, (iv) *Manahparyaya-jñāna* — reading the thought-waves of others mind and (v) *Kevalajñāna* — perfect knowledge. The detailed description about the development of these types of knowledge has already been discussed in the present article under the heading of 'Jaina Theory of Knowledge'.

Later on, Right knowledge was considered as the knowledge of the seven categories (*tattvas*), i.e., *jīva* (living substance), *ajīva* (non-living substance), *āsrava* (influx of karmic matter), *saṃvara* (stoppage

of the influx of the karmic matter), *nirjarā* (stoppage of the accumulated karmic matter) and *Mokṣa* (complete annihilation of the *karma* and to remain in one's pure nature). But after the c. 3rd A. D. the meaning of right knowledge changed and it was held that right knowledge consisted in the discrimination between the self and not-self. The right knowledge is the knowledge of the pure self but the pure self can be known only through the reference to not-self. Thus, knowing the nature of the not-self and differentiating it from the self is called the science of discrimination (*bheda-vijñāna*) and this science of discrimination constitutes the real meaning of right knowledge. Kundakunda (c. 6th A. D.) has made an exhaustive study of the science of discrimination in *Samayasāra* (207-210). He says anger, deceit etc. are due to the power of fruition of the karmic matter, hence not the real nature of the self. The self is the pure knower. In *Iṣtopadeśa* (33) of Pūjyapāda Devanandī (c. 6th A. D.) it is mentioned that right knowledge is that in which a clear distinction between the self and not-self is made. Amṛtacandra also followed the same meaning of right knowledge in his works. He says 'he who is liberated (*siddha*) has become so, through discrimination of self from not-self and who is in bondage, is so due to its absence (*Samayasāra*kalaśa, 132). Thus, in Jainism during c. 6th-10th A. D., the right knowledge is equated with this science of discrimination of self and not-self which as a right knowledge was well accepted in Jainism as well as in *Gītā*, *Sāṅkhyā*-*Yoga* system and *Śāṅkara*-*Vedānta* also.

In Jainism right conduct has been described from two points of view — real and practical. In the earlier *āgamas* from real point of view right conduct is considered in which the soul is completely free from passions and perversities. It is the state of equanimity of mind. In Jainism, it is maintained that conduct is *dharma*, *dharma* is equanimity and equanimity means the state of self which is free from the

vectors of attachment and aversion. From practical point of view right conduct means the adoption of such rules of disciplines as prescribed by the Jinas.

Later on, right conduct is considered by Jaina thinkers on the basis of its two aspects — external and internal. These two aspects are technically called *dravya* and *bhāva* respectively. In Jainism external rightness of an action is to be decided in relation with other living beings. In other words, external rightness of an action depends upon its outer social results. If an action results in the well being of others or cultivates social good from the practical or extrinsic viewpoint, it is called good or right. But the intrinsic purity or righteousness of an action depends on the intention or motive of the doer. It is purity of intention or motive and not the external result, that makes an action intrinsically good or bad. In earlier times extrinsic aspect was more important for Jainas. In *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* the Buddhist view is criticised on the basis that they neglect the external aspect of an action. Later on, stress was given on intrinsic aspect by Jaina themselves. It is considered that an action is wrong if it is actuated by a bad intention, may it lead to the happiness of others. But we must be aware of the fact that Jainism being an integral philosophy does not hold any one-sided view, it gives due importance to the intention as well as the consequences of an action. It adds due importance to the social aspects of morality. Jainas do not believe in the dualism of thought and action. For them a right action is the proof of mental purity and the mental purity is the basis for the righteousness of an action. This outlook about the righteousness of the conduct remained unchanged in the later times also. One should be aware of the fact that the general code of conduct for an house-holder as well as for monks and nuns remained the same from the earliest time to the c. 10th but with the passage of time some changes occurred in the interpretation of such rules.

In fact, the canonical works have mere skeleton of rules and regulations of conduct, it is only in the *Bhāṣya* (c. 6th A. D.) and *Cūmīs* (c. 7th A. D.). Jaina thinkers tried to robe this skeleton. They gave not only the various interpretations to the rules and regulations for the monks and nuns as well as for the lay followers, according to their time and circumstances, but discussed in detail their exceptions and atonements also. In the earlier times, it was maintained that instead of breaking the rules prescribed for self-control, it is better to accept the *Samādhimarāṇa*, but in those centuries it was maintained that one should protect one's self by all means. A monk or a nun who protected his life by accepting or resorting to the exception was not considered the guilty of breaking the rules if his mind was pure. In *Oghaniryukti* (47-48), it is said that for the proper following of the path of liberation, protection of body is essential. Thus, in these centuries accepting the exceptions was favoured.

So far as the developments or the changes in the ethical code of conduct of monks and nuns are concerned, the period from c. 3rd-10th A. D. must be considered of much importance on the two grounds. Firstly, in the c. 4th-5th A. D. a major diversion took place in the code of conduct of Jaina monks and nuns. Before this said period Jaina *sādhana* meant self-purification, hence exclusively individualistic, but by these centuries, instead of self-purification, stress was laid on the propagation as well as survival of Jainism in the society. As a result, instead of individual, Jaina order (*saṅgha*) became more important. It was maintained that at any cost, the image of Jaina order (Jaina society as a whole) should not be damaged and for this purpose external behaviour was considered of much importance than that of internal purification. A slogan had been given that an action though pure, if against the general will, should not be followed. Not only this, but to maintain the dignity of Jaina *saṅgha* and propagation of Jaina religion various exceptions

were accepted in earlier code of conduct. Secondly, this period is considered very important as most of the Jaina sects emerged in this period during c. 4th-5th A. D. This period is known as the period of Schism in Jaina history. Three important Jaina-Sects – Digambara, Śvetāmbara and Yāpaniya have their origin in this period. This is also to be noted that before c. 2nd-3rd A. D., the code of conduct of Jaina ascetics was very rigorous but from the c. 3rd-4th many exceptions-relaxations were accepted in their earlier code of conduct.

The distinguished feature of this age was that by this period Jaina ascetics started living in the temples and *maṭhas* instead of living in outskirts of the cities and secluded places. Not only this but instead of following the vow of non-possession, in its true spirit, Jaina monks became the owner of these temples, *maṭhas* and the properties donated to the temples. It was only this period when tradition of *Caityavāsa*, i.e., living in the Jaina temples or *maṭhas* started. Due to the tendency of *Caityavāsa* Jaina monks became liberal to some extent in their code of conduct. They started leading luxurious life instead of rigorous one. In spite of these drawbacks of this period one thing is very remarkable that most of the important Jaina literature was composed as well as written in this period. It is noteworthy that in this period (c. 4th-5th A. D.) writing of the Jaina canons as well as other works on palm-leaves was started. The Bhāṭṭārakas and Yatis made better efforts to preserve the treasure trove of Jaina literature. They offered the medical services not only to Jaina society but to the other people also. Thus, in spite of, some weakness in following the religious code of conduct of Jaina monks, they got favour of Jaina society at large due to their benevolent services to the society.

Development of the Concept of Tīrthaṅkara and Bhakti Movement in Jainism

The concept of *Tīrthaṅkara* is the pivot,

around which the whole Jaina religion revolves. In Jainism, *Tīrthaṅkara* is regarded as the founder of religion as well as the object of worship. Generally, the Jaina concept of *Tīrthaṅkara* resembles that of incarnation (*avatāravāda*) of Hinduism. Both carry the same object as they are propounders of religion but there is a fundamental difference in both of the concepts. According to *Gītā*, the purpose behind the incarnation of God is to propound religion and to destroy the wicked while in Jainism *Tīrthaṅkara* is only regarded as propounder of religion, not the destroyer of wickeds. Not only this, the second fundamental difference between *avatāra* and *Tīrthaṅkara* is that, in former the supreme power or God descends on earth to reincarnate himself in different forms in different ages and in this way, He is the one and only person who reincarnates himself from time to time, on the contrary, in Jainism every *Tīrthaṅkara* is a different person (Soul) and on account of his special personal efforts (*sādhanā*) made in previous births, attains the supreme position. Though, it is very difficult to say that in this entire hypothesis of twenty-four *Tīrthaṅkaras* and twenty-four *Avatāras*, who has taken to what extent from whom but it is fact that in the process of development of their concepts both have influenced each other.

The word *Tīrthaṅkara* is being used from time immemorial. It mainly connotes the meaning as one who establishes four-fold order (*caturvidha saṅgha*). According to the old Buddhist literature, such as, *Dīghanikāya* and *Suttanipāṭa* (at the time of Buddha and Mahāvīra) there were flourished several persons who declared themselves as *Tīrthaṅkaras*. *Dīghanikāya* mentions the Jñātaputra Mahāvīra as one of the six Buddha's contemporaneous *Tīrthaṅkaras*. Though, it seems quite amazing because the first *Śrutaskandha* of *Ācārāṅga* and *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, elaborately describing the life of Mahāvīra, do not call him as *Tīrthaṅkara*. It shows that these *āgamic* texts are

more older than that of *Dīghanikāya*. In the whole Jaina *āgamic* literature, the word '*Tīrthaṅkara*' is used for the first time in *Uttarādhyayana* and in second part of *Ācārāṅga*. Words like *Arhat*, *Jina*, *Buddha* are frequently used in excessive form in the old *Āgamas*, the synonyms of *Tīrthaṅkara*. Presently, the word *Tīrthaṅkara* has become a specific term of Jaina tradition.

Chronologically, the concept of *Tīrthaṅkara* came into existence between c. 3rd-1st B. C. So far as the fully developed concept of *Tīrthaṅkara* is concerned, the first complete list of *Tīrthaṅkaras* is found in the appendix of the *Samavāyāṅga* which was incorporated at the time of Valabhī council, i.e., c. 5th A.D. Among Jaina *āgamas* the first part of *Ācārāṅga*, considered as the oldest extant Jaina text (c. 5th B. C.), mentions the ascetic life of Mahāvīra only. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* which describes some special features of Mahāvīra's life only hints about *Pārśva's* tradition. *Ṛṣibhāṣita* mentions *Pārśva* and Vardhamāna (Mahāvīra) as *Arhat* Ṛṣi. The second part of *Ācārāṅga*, for the first time describes Mahāvīra as *Tīrthaṅkara* alongwith some details of his parents, mentioning them as *Pārśvāpatya*. *Uttarādhyayana* clearly mentions some of the life-incidents of *Tīrthaṅkara's* like Ariṣṭanemi, *Pārśva* and Mahāvīra, whereas it indicates only the name of *Ṛṣabha*, *Śānti*, *Kunthu* and *Ara*. Similarly, the *Namipavajjā*, the 9th chapter of *Uttarādhyayana*, elaborately describes the facts about Nami but it does not mention Nami as *Tīrthaṅkara*. Even in *Kalpasūtra*, there are some details about the life of Mahāvīra, *Pārśva*, Ariṣṭanemi and *Ṛṣabha* out of twenty-four *Tīrthaṅkaras*. Remaining names of second to twenty first *Tīrthaṅkaras*, seem to be incorporated in the list of *Tīrthaṅkaras*, later on in c. 4th-5th A. D. In Digambara tradition earliest description about 24 *Tīrthaṅkaras* is found for the first time in *Tiloyapaṇṇatti*, which is supposed to be composed after c. 5th A. D. So far as iconographical

evidences are concerned only images of the four *Tīrthaṅkaras* — Mahāvīra, Pārśva, Ariṣṭanemi and Rṣabha — are found during c. 3rd B. C.-1st A. D. The images of other *Tīrthaṅkaras* are of later period, i.e., after c. 2nd-3rd A. D. This suggests that the concept of 24 *Tīrthaṅkaras* came into existence only after c. 3rd. With the development of the concept of *Tīrthaṅkaras* the system of their worship (*Pūjā-paddhati*) also came into prominence.

Jainism emerged as an ascetic religion. Initially, it laid more stress on austerity and meditation. In the beginning all sorts of ceremonial or sacrificial performances (*karmakāṇḍa*) were totally absent in it. It was only a religion of self-purification. In *Āgamas* there are no traces of ceremonial performances or any system of idol worship or religious adoration, asking for the grace of God. In Jaina tradition, for the first time the six essential duties (*ṣaḍāvaśyakas*), i.e., practice for equanimity (*Sāmāyika*), praising twenty-four *Tīrthaṅkaras* (*Caturvīṃśati stavana*), paying respect to *ācāryas* (*vandanā*), atonement of blemished activities (*pratikramaṇa*), mortification (*kāyotsarga*) and taking some vow (*pratyākhyāna*) were introduced.

Most probably, in c. 2nd-3rd B. C., these six essentials (*ṣaḍāvaśyakas*) got ordained and established. Archaeological evidences emphatically show that in Jaina tradition, making of the Jaina images was started in c. 3rd-4th B. C., but no evidence found about the modes of worshipping these idols, particularly in ancient *Āgamas*. For the first time, *Rāyapaseṇīyasutta* mentions the rituals of worshipping of Jina-image. A comparative study proves that it was only an adoption of Hindu method of worshipping their deities. Though, some of the portions of *Rāyapaseṇīyasutta* are undoubtedly old, but the portion which deals with the art of temple building and rituals relating to the worship is still older and belongs to the c. 3rd-4th A. D. To me, it appears that

the development of devotionism and ceremonial performances in Jainism, started from c. 3rd-4th A. D. In this period, the Hindu system of ceremonial performance and worship was adopted in Jainism with minor changes. Starting from the period of Lord Pārśva and Mahāvīra upto the c. 2nd A. D., the Śramanic tradition in general and Jainism in particular joined hands in the development of new spiritualistic Hinduism, through condemning all sorts of ceremonial as well as sacrificial performances alongwith Vedic sacerdotalism, but Jainism itself started imitating blindly the Hindu rituals in c. 3rd-4th, and thus a variety of ceremonial offerings came into existence in the Jaina religious practices. This blind adoption of Hindu practices occurred not only in Śvetāmbara and Yāpanīya tradition of Northern India but in the Digambara sect of South India also. As a result, not only the *Vaiṣṇava* system of worship and ceremonies started in the Jaina temples but sacrificial offerings and ladles became prevalent. Due to these influences of Hindu caste system and untouchability also paved their way in Jainism. Jaina lay-devotees started wearing brahmanical sacred thread (*yajñopavīta*) and performing sacrifices and sacrificial ladles. Ācārya Jinasena (c. 8th A. D.) had adopted all the Hindu sanctifying rites (*samskāras*), with some modifications in his work *Ādipurāṇa*.

Following blindly, the Hindu *mantras* of worshipping, Jaina lay devotees started invoking and departing the *Tīrthaṅkaras* in their *Pūjā* ceremonies, while according to the Jaina philosophy the *Tīrthaṅkaras* neither come nor depart after final emancipation, as well as they may not be adored as the object of worship for the worldly attainment, as they are free from all types of attachment and aversion (*vītarāga*). But a lay-devotee always remains in search of such a deity who can save him from worldly calamities and help him in worldly attainments. For this purpose

Jaina ācāryas accepted several Hindu goddesses like *Kālī*, *Mahākālī*, *Padmāvatī*, *Ambikā*, *Siddhāyikā*, etc. as demi-goddesses (*Yakṣis*). They accepted various rituals and incantations for worshipping these goddesses. Thus, in between c. 5th-8th A. D. several Hindu gods and goddesses became part and parcel of Jaina deities. The special feature of this age was that performing arts like Dance, Music etc., which were strongly opposed in earlier āgamas, such as *Uttarā-dhyayana* strongly expounds all sorts of dances as vexation and songs as lamentation, are cropped in Jaina system of worship, gradually. This description of fine arts in *Rāyapaseṇīya*, as a part of Jaina way of worship was incorporated in about the c. 5th A. D. at the time of *Valabhī-vācanā*. This depicts a complete picture of gradual development of fine arts like Sculpture, Dance, Music, Drama etc. in Jaina tradition. When the *Tāntrism* and *Vāmamārga* came in-vogue in c. 5th-6th A. D., Jainism could not save itself from the impact of these traditions. Being an ascetic and spiritual religion, Jainism was not much affected with *Vāmamārga* but *Tāntrism* and ceremonial performances of Hinduism definitely left their impact on it.

Development of Various Arts & Architecture in Jainism in Early Period

Archaeological evidences emphatically show that in Jaina tradition the making of Jaina images started in c. 4th-3rd B. C. Though, on the basis of Harappan Teracotas and seals some Jaina scholars opine that tradition of making Jaina images is as old as the Harappan culture, yet it is very difficult to prove these teracotas and seals as of Jaina origin. Later, in the Khārvela epigraphs (c. 2nd B. C.) it is clearly mentioned that Nandas (c. 4th B. C.) had taken away the Jaina images from Orissa to Patna which is enough to prove that the making of Jaina

images was prevalent in c. 4th B. C. The earliest Jaina image, found from Lohānipur, Patna, belongs to Mauryan period (c. 3rd B. C.). Several Jaina images alongwith epigraphs have been found from Mathurā and remains of Jaina temples from Kaṅkālīṭīlā. Among those, the earliest images date from c. 2nd B. C.-2nd A. D. Many of these images are found with dated epigraphs of Kuṣāṇa period, i. e., c. 1st-2nd A. D. So far as the literary evidences are concerned, we for the first time, find in *Rāyapaseṇīyasutta*, the details of temple architecture and the rituals related to idol-worship. The *Rāyapaseṇīyasutta* is undoubtedly an early work, and its portion dealing with temple architecture and various performing arts, by no means, can be of later period than c. 3rd A. D., because its various incarnations (*avatāras*) tally with the archaeological remains of c. 1st-2nd of Kaṅkālīṭīlā, Mathurā.

Though the development of various secular arts and sciences was a movement, independent of any religious tradition, yet it may be noted that religious traditions not only contributed in their development, but also decided the direction of development. Jainas believe that various arts and sciences were developed by Lord Rṣabha, the first *Tīrthanikara*. In Jaina canonical literature 64 arts of women and 72 arts of men are mentioned. We have a general reference to these arts / sciences in *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, *Jñātādharmakathā*, *Antakṛddasā*, *Samavāyāṅga*, *Anuttaraupapātikadaśā*, *Rāyapaseṇīyasutta*, *Jambūdvīpaprajñapti*, etc. Though in these canonical works we do not find any details about these yet on the basis of these works and their commentaries Dr. N. L. Jain, in his book (*Scientific Contents in Prākṛta Canons*, P. V., Varanasi, 1996) has presented the following list of various arts and sciences prevalent in c. 2nd-3rd A. D.

Different Types of Learning Arts and Sciences in Various Canons

	1	2	3	4	5	6
	SK	RP	AKT	GDK	ANU	JDP
Number of Learnings	64	72	72	72	72	72
1. Terrestriology (Storms)	✓	—	—	—	—	—
2. Meterology	✓	—	—	—	—	—
3. Dreamology	✓	—	—	—	—	—
4. Astrology	✓	—	—	—	—	—
5. Science of Limbal Movement	✓	—	—	—	—	—
6. Science of notes (birds)	✓	—	—	—	—	—
7. Palmistry	✓	—	—	—	—	—
8. Science of Distinctive marks in body	✓	—	—	—	—	—
9. Science of Women Studies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
10. Science of Men Studies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
11. Science of Horses (Training & Management)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
12. Science of Elephants (Training & Management)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
13. Science of Cows and Oxen	✓	—	✓	✓	✓	✓
14. Science of Sheep	✓	—	—	—	—	—
15. Science of Poultry	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	—
16. Science of Portridge	✓	—	—	—	—	—
17. Science of Quails	✓	—	—	—	—	—
18. Science of Young Quails	✓	—	—	—	—	—
19. Science of Royal Wheels	✓	✓	—	—	—	—
20. Science of Royal Umbrella	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
21. Science of Royal Sceptre	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
22. Science of Swords	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
23. Gemology (Precious Stones)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
24. Science of Coinage, Cowries or Special Gems	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
25. Science of Shieldings	✓	—	—	—	—	—
26. Science of Prosperity	✓	—	—	—	—	—
27. Science of Fiascos	✓	—	—	—	—	—
28. Science of Natural or Acquired Conception	✓	—	—	—	—	—
29. Science of Stimulation	✓	—	—	—	—	—
30. Atharva-vedic Incantation	✓	—	—	—	—	—
31. Science of Jugglery/Magic	✓	—	—	—	—	—
32. Science of Oblation with Fire	✓	—	—	—	—	—
33. Archery	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
34. Science of Moon	✓	—	—	—	—	—

	1	2	3	4	5	6
35. Science of Sun	✓	—	—	—	—	—
36. Science of Venus	✓	—	—	—	—	—
37. Science of Jupiter	✓	—	—	—	—	—
38. Meteorology	✓	—	—	—	—	—
39. Science of Glow of Horizon	✓	—	—	—	—	—
40. Science of Notes of Animals	✓	—	—	—	—	—
41. Science of Notes of Special Birds	✓	—	—	—	—	—
42. Prognostics of Dust-falls	✓	—	—	—	—	—
43. Prognostics of Hair-falls	✓	—	—	—	—	—
44. Prognostics of Meat-falls	✓	—	—	—	—	—
45. Prognostics of Blood-falls	✓	—	—	—	—	—
46. Science of Goblins	✓	—	—	—	—	—
47. Science of Semi-goblins	✓	—	—	—	—	—
48. Science of Sleeping	✓	✓	—	—	—	—
49. Science of Unlocking	✓	—	—	—	—	—
50. Cāṇḍālic Learning/Psychotherapy	✓	—	—	—	—	—
51. Shabari (Kiratana) Language	✓	—	—	—	—	—
52. Dravida (Tamila) Language	✓	—	—	—	—	—
53. Kalingi (Oriya) Language	✓	—	—	—	—	—
54. Gauri (A specific cardiolic) Language	✓	—	—	—	—	—
55. Gandhari Language	✓	—	—	—	—	—
56. Science of Descending	✓	—	—	—	—	—
57. Science of Ascending	✓	—	—	—	—	—
58. Science of Yawning	✓	—	—	—	—	—
59. Science of Sustainance	✓	—	—	—	—	—
60. Science of Embracing/Clinging	✓	—	—	—	—	—
61. Science of Dispeptisation	✓	—	—	—	—	—
62. Science of Surgery and Medicine	✓	—	—	—	—	—
63. Demonology/De-demonology	✓	—	—	—	—	—
64. Science of Invisibility/Disappearance	✓	—	—	—	—	—
65. Art of Writing	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
66. Mathematics	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
67. Dramatics	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
68. Vocal Music	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
69. Instrumental Music	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
70. Science of Musical Notes, Phonetics	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
71. Science of Percussion Instruments	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
72. Science of Orchestra	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

	1	2	3	4	5	6
73. Art of Gambling	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
74. Special type of Gambling/Art of Speech	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
75. Art of Playing by Dice	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
76. Art of Playing by Special Dice	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
77. Art of Quick Poetics/Guarding City	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
78. Water Purification/Ceramics	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
79. Food Science/Agriculture	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
80. Art of Soft/Medicated Drinks	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
81. Textiles and Fabrication	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
82. Cosmetics and Perfumery	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
83. Science of Bed-dressing	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
84. Art of Composing Ārya-metrics	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
85. Art of Riddlerly Poetics	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
86. Magadhan Language Poetics	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
87. Art of Comp. Non-samskr̥ta 32 Letter Poetics	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
88. Art of Comp. <i>Ġitika</i> -meter Poetics	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
89. Art of Comp. <i>Anuṣṭup</i> -meter Poetics	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
90. Chemistry of Silver	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
91. Chemistry of Gold	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
92. Art of Goldsmithy	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
93. Women Cosmetisation	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
94. Building/Architectural Engineering	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
95. Town Planning	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
96. Construction of Army Barracks	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
97. Science of Measures	—	✓	—	—	—	—
98. Astrology/Medicine/Military Science : Counter movement of Army Art	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
99. Military Science : Arraying of Army	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
100. Cyclic Arraying of Army	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
101. Garudic Arraying of Army	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
102. Wedge Arraying	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
103. General Fighting	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
104. Wrestling	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
105. Intense Fighting	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
106. Sight Fighting/Stick Fighting	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
107. Fist Fighting/Boxing/Pugilistic Fighting	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
108. Hand-to-Hand Fighting	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
109. Creeperlike Fighting	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

	1	2	3	4	5	6
110. Art of Divine Arrows/Transformation	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
111. Art of Swordsmanship	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
112. Silver Digest (Pak)	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
113. Gold Digest (Pak)	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
114. Metal Digest	—	✓	—	—	—	—
115. Jewel-Gem Digest	—	✓	—	—	—	—
116. Rope Tricks	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
117. Circular Play-tricks/Playing with Fabrics	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
118. Special Type of Gambling (Nalika-khela)	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
119. Art of Piercing Leaves	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
120. Art of Drilling Hard Earth	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
121. Art of Animation/Inanimation	—	✓	—	—	—	—
122. Science of Omens/Omenology	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
123. Sc. of Dramatic Dressing/Painting	—	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
124. Science of Planet Rahu	—	—	—	—	—	—
125. Planetology	—	—	—	—	—	—
126. Town Planning	—	—	—	—	—	—
127. Army Barracking	—	—	—	—	—	—
128. Horses Training	—	—	—	—	—	—
129. Elephant Training	—	—	—	—	—	—
130. Knowledge of Special Learning	—	—	—	—	—	—
131. Science of Incarnation	—	—	—	—	—	—
132. Science of Knowing Secrets	—	—	—	—	—	—
133. Science of Direct Knowing About Objects	—	—	—	—	—	—
134. Planetary Motion/Science of Military Movements	—	—	✓	✓	✓	✓
135. Chemistry of Perfumes	—	—	—	—	—	—
136. Art of Flowering/Tasting of Foods/ Art of Wax-technique	—	—	—	—	—	—
137. Counter Arraying of Army	—	—	✓	✓	✓	✓
138. Art of Home Construction	—	—	—	—	—	—
139. Powder Technology	—	—	✓	✓	✓	✓
140. Art of Inanimation	—	—	✓	✓	✓	✓
141. Agriculture	—	—	✓	✓	✓	✓
142. Science of Architecture	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	64	72	72	72	72	72

Conclusion

To conclude, I would like to mention here some of the specialities of early Jainism. Though early Jainism was much rigorous in its code of conduct yet on the other hand it was very liberal in its approach. The earliest Jaina canonical works, *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* and *Rṣibhāṣita* not only incorporate the preachings of the various sages of Upaniṣadic, Buddhists and some other Śramaṇic traditions, but call them *Arhat*, *Rṣis*, as acceptable to their own tradition. Furthermore, *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, propounding this liberalism, says "One who praises one's own views as true and condemns others view as false distorts the truth and remains confined to the cycle of birth and death." It was the non-violent, liberal and assimilating approach of early Jaina thinkers which gave birth to the non-absolutism (*Anekāntavāda*), the fundamental principle of Jaina philosophy. On the basis of this principle early Jaina thinkers built their philosophical structure and developed their metaphysical and epistemological theories in which they tried to reconcile beautifully the rival views of Indian philosophy. Whether it was the question of metaphysical theories or the epistemological problems of Philosophy, they always tried for the reconciliation of the opposite conflicting views.

Though, some of the basic concepts of Jaina Philosophy such as *Pañcāstikāyavāda*, eight types of *karmagranthi* and five-fold knowledge were prevalent even before the times of Lord Mahāvīra or of Lord Pārśva, but the concepts such as three-fold nature of reality, six substances, two-fold and seven-fold division of *Nayas*, four-fold *Nikṣepas*, different *Anuyoga-*

dvāras and doctrine of *Syādvāda* and *Saptabhaṅgī* have developed gradually in due course of time. Barring the concept of *Saptabhaṅgī*, fourteen *Guṇasthānas* and six types of *Pramāṇas*, all other concepts of Jaina metaphysics and epistemology took their shape before c. 2nd-3rd A. D. It is the *Tattvārthasūtra* of Umāsvāti and its auto-commentary (c. 3rd A.D.) in which Jaina philosophy for the first time, was presented in a systematic form. But it was not the last stage of the development of the Jaina philosophy, since various new definitions and details about these concepts were formulated even after this period which I would like to discuss in the second volume of this project. In developing their own philosophical system, Jaina thinkers while on the one hand, have accommodated various philosophical concepts of other contemporary Indian schools, on the other hand they synthesised the various contradictory theories of Indian schools of thought in such a way that the contradictions are completely dissolved in the non-absolutistic broader perspective. It is the most important contribution of early Jaina thinkers to the Indian philosophy.

But in the process of adopting the thoughts and practices of other Indian systems, particularly Hinduism, caste-system, untouchability, wearing of sacred thread and various other rituals also crept their way in Jainism. As a result spiritualistic Jainism became ritualistic. Though it was a later development (c. 6th-7th A. D.) yet, it no doubt had given some scratches to the ideal spiritualistic image of Jainism. It was necessary, perhaps, for the survival of Jainism in the middle centuries of Indian history.



Brāhmaṇic and Śramaṇic Cultures : A Comparative Study

We cannot appreciate Indian culture completely without understanding its different constituents. i.e. Jainism, Buddhism, and Hinduism. So, one thing must be clear in our mind that studies and researches in the field of Indology are not possible in isolation. In fact, Jainism, Buddhism, and Hinduism are so intermingled and mutually influenced that to have a proper comprehension of one, the understanding of the others is essential.

However, two distinct trends have been pre dominating in Indian culture from its earliest days, known as Brāhmaṇic and Śramaṇic. No doubt, these two trends are distinguishable but at the same time we must be aware of the fact they are not separable. Though on the basis of some peculiarities in theory, we can distinguish them yet in practice, it is very difficult to divaricate them because neither of the two remained uninfluenced by the other. The earlier Śramaṇic trends and its later phases, Jainism and Buddhism, were influenced by the Vedic tradition and vice a versa. The concept of tapas or austerity, asceticism, liberation, meditation, equanimity and non-violence, earlier absent in the Vedas, came into existence in Hinduism through Śramaṇic influence. The Upaniṣadas and the *Gītā* evolved some new spiritual definitions of Vedic rituals. Both are the representatives of the dialogue taken place in Śramaṇic and Vedic traditions.

The Upaniṣadic trend of Hinduism is not a pure form of Vedic religion. It incorporated in itself various Śramaṇic tenets which gave a new dimension to Vedic religion. Thus, we can say that our Hinduism is an intermingling of Vedic and Śramaṇic traditions. The voice raised by our ancient Upaniṣadic Rṣis, Munis and Śramaṇas against the ritualistic and worldly outlook of caste-ridden Brāhmaṇism, became more strong in the form of Jainism and Buddhism along with other minor Śramaṇic sects. Infact, the Upaniṣadic trend as well as Jainism and Buddhism provided refuge to those fed up with Vedic ritualism and the worldly outlook on life. Not only Jainism and Buddhism but some other sects and schools of Indian thought such as Ājīvakas and Sāṃkhyas also adopted more or less the same course towards Vedic ritualism. However, Jainism and Buddhism were more candid and vehement in their opposition towards Vedic ritualism. They outrightly rejected animal sacrifices in *yajñas*, the birth-based caste-system and the infallibility

of the Vedas. In Mahāvira and Buddha, the most prominent preachers (exponents), we find the real crusaders; whose tirade, against caste-ridden and ritualistic Brāhmaṇism, touching a low water-mark and crumbling under its inner inadequacies, gave a severe jolt to it. Jainism and Buddhism came forward to sweep away the long accumulated excrescence, grown on Indian culture in the form of rituals, casteism, and superstitions.

But we shall be mistaken if we presume that in their attempt to clear away the dirt of Vedic ritualism, Jainism and Buddhism remained untouched. They were also considerably influenced by Vedic rituals. Ritualism, in the new form of Tāntric practices, crept into Jainism and Buddhism and became part and parcel of their religious practices and mode of worship. With the impact of Hindu Tāntricism, Jainas adopted various Hindu deities and their mode of worship with some changes, which were suited to their religious temperament but were alien to Jainism in its original form. The Jaina concept of *Śāśana Devatā* or *Yakṣa-Yakṣis* is nothing but a Jaina version of Hindu deities. As I have pointed out earlier, the influence has been reciprocal. This can be demonstrated by the fact that on one side Hinduism accepted Rṣabha and Buddha as incarnation of God while on the other Jainism included Rāma and Kṛṣṇa in its list of *Śalākā Puruṣas*. A number of Hindu Gods and Goddesses were accepted as consorts of *Tirthaṅkaras* such as Sarasvatī, Lakṣmī, Kālī, Mahākālī, Cakreśvari, Ambikā, Padmāvatī and Siddhikā.

The moot point I intend to make is that different religious traditions of our great Indian culture have borrowed various concepts from one another and that it is the duty to study and highlight this mutual impact, which is the need of the hour, and thus bridge the gulf existing between different religious systems.

Though it is true that the Śramaṇic tradition, in general and Jainism and Buddhism, in particular have some distinct features discriminating them from the Vedic or Brāhmaṇic tradition, yet they are not foreigners. They are the children of the same soil who came forward with a spirit of reform. It is sometimes mistakenly thought that Jainism and Buddhism were a revolt against Brāhmaṇism. Western scholars in particular maintain this notion. But here I would like to say that it was not revolt but reform. In fact, Vedic

and Śramanic traditions are not rival traditions as some Western and Indian scholars think. There seems to have been a deliberate effort to create a gulf between Jainism and Buddhism on the one hand and Hinduism on the other, by Western scholars. Unfortunately some Indian scholars, even Jaina scholars, also supported their views but in my humble opinion this was a step in the wrong direction. It is true that Śramanic and Vedic traditions have divergent views on certain religious and philosophical issues; their ideals of living also differ considerably. But this does not mean that they are rivals or enemies of each other. As passions and reason, *śreya* and *preya*, in spite of being different in their very nature, are the components of human personality, so is the case with Śramanic and Vedic traditions. Though inheriting distinct features, they are the components of one whole Indian culture. Jainism and Buddhism were not rivals to Hinduism, but what they preached to the Indian society was an advance stage in the field of spirituality compared to Vedic ritualism.

If the Upaniṣadic trend, in spite of taking a divergent stand from Vedic ritualism, is considered part and parcel of Hinduism, what is the difficulty in measuring Jainism and Buddhism with the same yardstick? Again if Sāṃkhyas and Mīmāṃsakas, Advaitists and Dvaitists, in spite of having different philosophies and pathways, belong to the Hinduism, why not Jainism and Buddhism? If the Upaniṣadic tradition is considered an advance from Vedic ritualism to spirituality, then we have to admit that Buddhism and Jainism have also followed the same path with a more enthusiastic spirit. They worked for the betterment of weaker sections of Indian society and redemption from priesthood and ritualism. They preached the religion of common men, founded on the firm footing of moral virtues rather than on some external rituals.

Today, researchers in the field of Jainology need a new approach to reinterpret the relationship between Jainism, Buddhism, and Hinduism -- particularly the Upaniṣadic trend -- in the light of ancient Jaina texts such

as *Ācārāṅga*, *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, and *Isibhāṣiyāṁ*. I am confident that an impartial and careful study of these texts will remove the misconception that Jainism and Hinduism are rival religions. In *Ācārāṅga* we find a number of passages similar to those of the Upaniṣada in word, style as well as in essence. *Ācārāṅga* mentions Śramaṇa and Brāhmaṇa simultaneously. This proves that for the preacher of *Ācārāṅga*, Śramaṇa and Brāhmaṇa are not rival traditions as they were considered later on. In *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* we find mention of some Upaniṣadic Ṛṣis such as Videhanami, Bāhuk, Asitadevala, Dvaipāyana, and Pārāśara. They were accepted as the Ṛṣis of their own traditions though they followed a different code of conduct. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* addresses them as great ascetics and great men (*mahā-puruṣa*) who attained the ultimate goal of life, i.e. liberation.

Ṛṣibhāṣita, considered as the part of a Jaina canon, also mentions the teachings of Nārada, Asitadevala, Angiras, Pārāśara, Aruna, Nārāyana, Yājñavalkya, Uddālaka, Vidura, and others. They have been called *Arhat* Ṛṣis. Its writing in the Jaina tradition is sign of the tolerance and openness of Jainism on the one hand. On the other hand it shows that the stream of Indian spirituality is one at its source, irrespective of their division later into the Upaniṣadic, Buddhist, Jaina, Ājīvaka and other rivulets. This work is a clear proof of the assimilative and tolerant nature of Indian thought. Today, when we are deeply bogged down in communal separatism and strife, this great work could be an enlightening guide.

Thus, the position, these Upaniṣadic Ṛṣis held in early books of Jainism, is clear evidence that the stream of Indian spirituality is one at its source. We cannot have a proper understanding of these trends if we treat them in isolation. *Ācārāṅga*, *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* and *Ṛṣibhāṣita* may be understood in a better way only in the light of the Upaniṣad as and vice versa. Similarly, the *Sūttanipāṭa*, *Dhammapada*, *Therīgāthā*, and other works of the Pāli canon may be properly studied only in the light of the Prakṛta Jaina canons and the Upaniṣadas.



Samatva Yoga : The Fundamental Teaching of Jainism and Gītā

Ours is the age of tremendous growth of knowledge and scientific discoveries. Paradoxically, at the same time, we can call it also the age of anxiety and mental tension. Our traditional values and beliefs have been eroded by this growth of scientific knowledge. We know more about the atom than the values needed for a meaningful and peaceful life. We are living in a state of chaos. Our life is full of anxiety, excitement, emotional disorder and value-conflicts. In this age of anxiety American people alone are lavishly draining out more than 10 billion dollars per annum on wine and other alcoholic drugs. Today, what is needed for man is the mental peace and the capacity for complete integration with his own personality and with his social environment. This can only be achieved through the practice of *samatva*, i.e. mental equanimity or calm disposition. The theory of *samatva yoga* has been preached in India more than two thousand years ago by Lord Mahāvīra and Lord Kṛṣṇa.

Concept of Samatva in General

The concept of *samatva* is the cardinal one of Jainism and *Gītā*. It pivots the ethics of Jainism and *Gītā*. In English, we can term it as excellent blend of equality, equilibrium, harmony, integration and rightness. But none of these terms depict the true meaning of the word *samatva* and the exact sense in which it is used in the context of Indian philosophy. Hence better to use it without translating it into English. The word *samatva* has different meanings in different contexts. Sometimes it means a balanced state of mind, undisturbed by all kinds of sorrows and emotional excitements, pleasures and pains and achievements and disappointments. Sometimes it refers to the quality of a personality, completely free from the vectors of aversion and attachment, or that with mental equilibrium (वैतराग or स्थितप्रज्ञ). The word *samatva* also denotes the feeling of equality with the fellow-beings (आत्मवत् सर्वभूतेषु). Loosely speaking, it also conveys the meaning of social equality and social integration. Ethically, the term *sam* or *samkyak* suggests rightness (सम्यक्त्व). We must be aware of the fact that in all its different imports the term *samatva* is associated with some kind of mental psychological state, having some impact on our social and individual adjustment.

Concept of Samatva in Jainism

In a Jaina text *Vyākhyāprajñaptisūtra* there is a conversation between Lord Mahāvīra and Gautama. Gautama asks Mahāvīra : "What is the nature of soul ?" Mahāvīra answers, "The nature of soul is *samatva* (आयाए सामाइए)" Gautama again asks, "What is the ultimate end of soul ?", Mahāvīra replies; "The ultimate end of soul is also *samatva* (आयाए सामाइस्स अट्टे).

This view, the real nature of soul is *samatva*, is further supported by Ācārya Kundakunda. In his famous work *Samayasāra* he deals with the nature of soul. Probably, he is the only Jaina Ācārya who used the word *samaya* or *Samayasāra* instead of Ātman or Jīva. The Ācārya has purposely used this word for Ātman. So far as I know, no commentator of *Samayasāra* has raised the question as to why Kundakunda used the word *samaya* for *Jīva* or soul. I think the word '*samaya*' may be a Prākṛt version of Sanskrit word समः यः which means one who has the quality of *samatva*. Further, the word *Samayasāra* may also be defined in the similar fashion. It can be concluded, therefore, that one who possesses *samatva* as his essential nature is called *samayasāra* (समत्वं यस्य सारं तत् समयसारं). Ācārya Kundakunda also equated the word '*samaya*' with *svabhāva* or essential nature. He used the words *sva-samaya* and *para-samaya*. *Sva-samaya* means inner characteristics and *para-samaya* means resultant characteristics. *Sva-samaya* has been explained as an ultimate end. In this way, according to Kundakunda too, the nature and ultimate end of soul is *samatva*. Further more, according to the Jaina Ethics the way through which this ultimate end can be achieved is also *samatva*, known in Prākṛit as *sāmāiya* (सामाइय) or *samāhi* (समाहि). In this way, the three basic presuppositions of Jaina Ethics, the moral agent (साधक), the ultimate end (साध्य) and the path through which this ultimate end can be achieved (साधना मार्ग), are equated with the term *samatva*. In Jaina ethics end and means are not external to the moral agent, but part and parcel of his own nature and potentially present in him. Someone may ask : "What is the difference between a *siddha* and a *sādhaka*?" My humble answer to this question is that the difference between those two is not qualitative but quantitative in nature. It is a difference between capability and actuality. By means of *sāadhanā*, we

can exhibit only what is potentially present in us. That is the whole process of *sādhana* is the transforming of capability into actuality. According to the Jaina tradition, if *samatva* is not our real intrinsic nature, we cannot achieve it by means of *sādhana*, because *sādhana* is nothing but a practice of *samatva*. The three-fold path, of right knowledge, right belief and right conduct, depends entirely on the concept of *samatva* for its rightness. The three-fold path is only an application of *samatva* to the three aspects of our conscious activities, i.e. knowing, feeling and willing. According to the Jain Ethics, *samatva* should be a directive principle of the activities of knowing, feeling and willing.

Concept of Samatva in Gītā

The Ethics of *Gītā* also is solely based on the concept of *samatva*. The words *sama* and *samatva* and their various forms occur in *Gītā* more than hundred times. The *Gītā* contains many references, suggesting that the real nature of God is *sama* and so on. The *Gītā* equates *sam* with *Brahman*, the ultimate reality. Ācārya Śankara explained this by showing an identity between *sam* and *Brahman*, while Rāmānuja and others interpret that the *sam* is the quality of *Brahman*. But for our present purpose it hardly makes any difference. The *Gītā* mentions that the God the *amśi* (अंशी) of which, we are *amśa* (अंश), exists in the heart of every individual as a quality of *samatva*. Not only this but the way through which we can realise that ultimate reality of God is also *samatva-yoga*. In this way, the three basic presuppositions of the Ethics of *Gītā*- the moral agent, the ultimate end and the path through which this ultimate end can be achieved, are also equated with the term *samatva*.

Gītā as a treatise of samatva yoga

A question may be asked why *samatva-yoga* is to be considered as the fundamental concept of *Gītā*. Among the commentators of *Gītā*, there is a serious controversy; whether it is a treatise of *jñāna-yoga* or *bhakti-yoga* or *karma-yoga*. Among these commentators, Śankara is the supporter of *jñāna-yoga*. To him the knowledge alone can lead us to the realization of ultimate reality, the *Brahman*. While Rāmānuja and others held the view that it is only *Bhakti* through which we can realise God. Tilaka and Gandhi supported a third view that fundamental teaching of *Gītā* is, neither *jñāna-yoga* nor *bhakti-yoga* but *karma-yoga*. Dr. Rādhakṛṣṇan and some others have tried to bring out harmony among these divergent views. But I think the basis on which we can reconcile these views is still missing.

How can we reconcile the views of *jñāna-yoga*, *karma-yoga* and *bhakti-yoga* without any common element? My humble suggestion is that only with the concept of *samatva* we can reconcile these different view-points, because *samatva* is a common reconciling factor. Though the question why *samatva-yoga* is to be considered as the main theme of *Gītā*? is still un-answered, I would like to submit some arguments in support of my view that the *Gītā* is a treatise of *samatva-yoga*.

(1) In the *Gītā* the term *yoga* has been used at many places and in different contexts, we have only two definitions of *yoga* in the whole of *Gītā*. The first one is 'Samatvaṁ yoga ucyate' (समत्वं योग उच्यते) and the second one is 'yogaḥ Karmasu Kauśalam' (योगः कर्मसु कौशलम्). But the second one cannot be considered as a categorical definition of *yoga* it is only a conditional or a relative definition, because the term *Karmasu* shows a condition. It only tells us that with reference to certain activity (कर्म), the skillful performance is to be called *yoga*. But this is not the case with the first one. It may be considered a categorical definition of *yoga*. It simply states that mental equilibrium is to be called *yoga*.

(2) Secondly, in the 6th chapter of *Gītā* Lord Kṛṣṇa told Arjuna 'Thou must be a *yogī* because a *yogī* is superior to *jñānin*, *karmin* and *tapasvin*'; The question is what type of *yoga* does Kṛṣṇa want to teach Arjuna? It can neither be a *jñāna-yoga* nor a *karma-yoga* for the simple reason that here *yogī* is considered superior to *jñānin* and *karmin*. I think here Kṛṣṇa is asking Arjuna to practise *samatva yoga* which is the supreme *yoga*.

(3) Thirdly, the concepts of *jñāna*, *karma* and *bhakti* inherit their value by *samatva* only. It is the '*samatva*' which gives them value and validity. Without *samatva* they are like a cheque or a paper currency, having no intrinsic value of its own. In the absence of *samatva*, *jñāna* can be a mere knowledge of scriptures but not *jñāna-yoga*, and the same is true with *karma* and *bhakti* also.

(4) Fourthly, *jñāna*, *karma* and *bhakti* are the mere means for realization of ultimate end, namely, God. But *samatva* is not only a means but an end itself. It is not for some thing else which stands outside of it. I think according to the *Gītā* the *sam*, the *brahman* and God are one. Thus, we can say that the concept of *samatva* is the sole basis of the ethics of the *Gītā*.

Organic Basis of Samatva Yoga

What is the justification in saying that our essential

nature and our aim of life is *samatva*, or that *samatva* should be the directive principle of our life? What is the ground for its justification? To answer these questions, first of all we must understand the human nature. By human nature I mean his organic and psychological make-up. What do we mean by a living organism? By living organism we mean an organism that has a power to maintain its physiological equilibrium. In Biology, this process has been known as Homeostasis, which is considered as an important quality of a living organism. The second essential quality of a living organism is its capacity of adjustment with the environment. Whenever a living organism fails to maintain its physiological equilibrium and adjust itself with its environment it tends towards death. Death is nothing but failure of this process. It follows where there is life, there are efforts to avoid unequilibrium to maintain equilibrium.

Psychological basis of Samatva

Nobody wants to live in a state of mental tension. We like no tension but relaxation, no anxiety but satisfaction. This shows that our psychological nature is working for a mental peace or a mental equilibrium. Freud accepts that there is a conflict between our Id and Super ego but at the same time he agrees that our ego or conscious level is always working to maintain an equilibrium or for the adjustment between these two poles of our personality. It is a fact that there are mental states such as emotional excitements, passions, and frustrations, but we cannot say that they are our intrinsic nature because they do not exist for their own sake; they exist for satisfaction or expression. Secondly, they owe their existence to some other external factors. An important process of our personality is the process of adjustment and adjustment is nothing but a process of restoring peace, harmony and integration. In this

way, we can say that the concept of *samatva* has a sound basis for its justification in our organic and psychological nature.

Samatva as a Directive Principle of Living

Some one may remark that the Darwinian theory of evolution goes against the concept of *samatva*. Darwin presented a theory of the evolution of life, in which he suggested that 'Struggle' for existence is the basic principle of living. Apparently, it is true that there is a struggle for existence in our world and nobody can deny this fact. But due to certain reasons, we cannot call this as directive principle of life. To the question; "Why is it so?" my humble answer is that first of all this theory is self-contradictory because its basic concept is subsisting on others, that is, 'living by killing'. Secondly, it is opposed to the basic human nature and even animal nature to some extent. Struggle is not our inner nature (स्वभाव लक्षण) but it is only a resultant one. It is imposed on us by external factors. Whenever we have to struggle we do it out of necessity and not out of nature, and what is done in compulsion cannot be a guiding principle of our life, for it does not emanate from our inner nature. Thirdly, it goes against the judgments of our faculty of reasoning and the concept of natural law. If nobody has right to take my life, then on the ground of the same reasoning I have no right to take another's life.

The theory of 'live on others', is against the simple rule that all living beings or human beings are potentially equal. According to Lord Kṛṣṇa the concept of equality and union of all living being (आत्मवत् सर्वभूतेषु) can give us a right directive principle of living with fellow-beings and according to Lord Mahāvira the directive principle of living is not 'live on others', but 'live with others' or 'live for others' (परस्परपग्रहो जीवानाम्-तत्त्वार्थ सूत्र).



Jaina Concept of Peace

Peace : The Need of our Age

We are living in the age of science and technology. The advancement in our scientific knowledge has removed our religious superstitions and false dogmas. But unfortunately and surprisingly, side by side, it has also shaken our mutual faith and faith in moral virtues as well as religio-spiritual values. The old social and spiritual values of life, acting as binding on humanity and based on religious beliefs, had been made irrelevant by scientific knowledge and logical thinking. Till date, we have been unable to formulate or evolve a new value structure, so necessary for meaningful and peaceful living in society, based on our scientific and logical outlook. We are living in a state of total chaos. Infact, the present age is the age of transition, old values have become irrelevant, and new ones have not been yet established. We have more knowledge and faith in atomic structure and power than the values needed for meaningful and peaceful life. Today, we strongly rely on the atomic power as our true rescuer and discard the religio-spiritual values as mere superstitions. Mr. D.R. Mehta rightly observed, "In the present day world with religion getting separated from daily life and spreading commercialisation killing (violence) has increased manyfold and sensitivity to (others) life whether animal or human has declined in proportion". For us human being is either a complicated machine or at least a developed animal, governed by his instincts and endowed with some faculties of mechanical reasoning. Thus, we have developed a totally materialistic and selfish outlook.

The advancement in all the walks of life and knowledge could not sublimate our animal and selfish nature. The animal instinct lying within us is still forceful and is dominating our individual and social behaviour and due to this our life is full of excitements, emotional disorders and mental tensions. The more advanced a nation, more stronger the grip of these evils of our age over it. The single most specific feature by which our age may be characterised is that of tension. Now a days not only the individuals, but the total human race is living in tension.

Though outwardly we are pleading for peace and non-violence yet by heart we still have strong faith in the law of the jungle, i.e. the dictum-- 'might is right'. We are living for the satisfaction of our animal nature only, though we talk of higher social and spiritual values. This duality

or the gulf between our thought and action is the sole factor disturbing our inner as well as outer peace. Once the faith in higher values or even in our fellow beings is shaken and we start seeing each and every person or a community or a nation with the eyes of doubt, definitely, it is the sign of disturbed mentality.

Because of materialistic and mechanical outlook our faculty of faith has been destroyed and when the mutual faith and faith in higher values of co-operation and co-existence is destroyed, doubts take pace. The doubt causes fear, fear gives birth to violence and violence triggers violence. The present violence is the result of our materialistic attitude and doubting nature. The most valuable thing, human race has lost in the present age, is none other than peace.

Science and technology has given us all the amenities of life. Though due to the speedy advancement in science and technology, nowadays, life on earth is so luxurious and pleasant as it was never before yet because of the selfish and materialistic outlook and doubting nature of man, which we have developed today, no body is happy and cheerful. We are living in tension all the times and deprived of, even a pleasant sound sleep. The people, materially more affluent having all the amenities of life, are more in the grip of tensions. Medical as well as psychological survey reports of advance nations confirm this fact. Tendency to consume alcoholic and sedative drugs is increasing day by day. It also supports the fact that we have lost our mental peace at the cost of this material advancement. Not only this, we have also been deprived of our natural way of living. S. Bothara maintains "What unfortunately has happened, is that the intoxication of ambition and success has made us forget even the natural discipline, which we, inherited from the animal kingdom"². Because of the development of mental faculties we have not only denied to accept social or religious checkpost but we also have denied natural checks. Now our life-cart has only accelerator, no break. Our ambitions and desires have no limits. They always remain unfulfilled and these unfulfilled desires create frustrations. These frustrations or resentments are the cause of our mental tensions. Due to the light legged means of transportation, physical distances are no bars to meet the peoples of different nations, cultures and religions and thus, our world is shrinking. But unluckily and disdainfully because of the materialistic and selfish outlook, the distance of our hearts is increasing day by day.

Instead of developing mutual love, faith and co-operation we are spreading hatred, doubt and hostility and thus deprived of peace, mental as well as environmental, the first and foremost condition of human living. Rabindra Nath Tagore rightly observes, "For man to come near to one another and yet to continue to ignore the claims of humanity is a sure process of suicide"³.

Meaning of Peace in Jainism

The term peace has various connotations. It can be defined in different ways from different angles. Intrinsically peace means a state of tranquility of mind. It is the state in which self rests in its own nature, undisturbed by external factors. Peace means soul devoid of passions and desires. *Ācārāṅga*, mentions that an aspirant who has attained peace has no desire⁴. Peace means cessation of all desires. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* equates it with *Niravāṇa* i.e., the emancipation from all desires, in other word, it is the state of self-contentment or total subjectivity i.e. the state of pure Seer. *Ācārāṅga* maintains one who is aware of peace will not fall in the grip of passions⁵. While defining peace, Saint Thomas Aquinas has rightly maintained the same view. He says, "peace implies two things first our self should not be disturbed by external factors and secondly, our desires should find rest in one i.e. the self"⁶. This inner peace can also be explained from negative and positive view-points. Negatively, it is the state of the cessation of all the passions and desires. It is the freedom from the vectors of attachment and aversion. Positively, it is the state of bliss and self contentment. But we must remember that these positive and negative aspects of inner peace are interdependent on each other, they are like the two sides of the same coin and they can not exist without each other. We can only distinguish them but not divide them. The inner peace is not mere and abstract idea, but it is something, which is whole and concrete. It represents our infinite self.

Now we turn to the external peace. While the inner peace is the peace of our self, external peace is the peace of society. We can also define it as environmental peace. In Jainism, the Prakṛt word 'santi' -- Saṃskṛta equivalent *Kṣānti*, also means forgiveness. In *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, among ten virtues the first and foremost is forgiveness, the basic need for social peace. It is the state of cessation of wars and hostilities, among individuals, individuals and society, different social groups and nations, on the earth. So far as this outer peace or the peace of the society is concerned it

can also be defined in both ways negatively as well as positively. Defined, negatively it is the state of cessation of wars and hostilities. Positively and it is the state of harmonious living of individuals as well as societies and nations. It is the state of social co-operation and co-existence. But we must be aware of the fact that the real external peace is more than non-war. It is a vital peace. It is the state, free from mutual doubts and fears. So far as the doubts and apprehensions against each other exist, inspite of the absence of actual war, really. It is not the state of peace. Because where there is fear, the war exists. In modern world we term it as cold war. War is war, whether it is cold or actual, it disturbs the peace of society. Real external peace is only possible, when our hearts are free from doubts and fear and each and every individual has firm faith not only in the dictum 'Live and Let live'. but 'Live for other.'

According to Jaina Philosopher Umāsvāti, "By nature living beings are made for other, (*Parasparopagraho-jīvānām*)"⁷. So long as our hearts are full of doubts and fear and we do not have full control on our selfish animal instincts as well as firm belief in mutual co-operation and co-existence, real social peace on earth will not be possible.

Real peace dawns only if our hearts are full of universal love, which is something different from mere attachment, because, for Jainas attachment is always linked with aversion. But universal love is based on the concept of equality of all beings and firm faith in the doctrine that by nature living beings are made for each other. We must also be aware of the fact that this external or environmental peace depends on the mental peace of individuals, since, our external behaviour is only an expression of our inner will and attitude towards life. Thus, we can say that the various aspects of peace are not mutually exclusive but inclusive. The peace of society or in other words the environmental peace is disturbed, when the inner peace of the individual is disturbed and vice versa. In my humble opinion hostilities and wars are the expressions and outcomes of sick mentality. It is the aggressive and selfish outlook of an individual or a society that gives birth to confrontations among individual, individual and society as well as among different social or religious groups and nations. At the root of all types of confrontations and wars, which disturb our environmental peace, there lies the feeling of discontentment as well as will for power, possession and hoarding. Thus social disturbances, conflict and confrontations are only symptoms of our mental tensions or sick

mentality.

In fact, the peace of society depends on the psychology or mental make-up of its members, but it is also true that our attitude towards life and behavioural pattern is shaped by our social environment and social training. The behavioural pattern and mentality of the members of non-violent society will surely be different from that of a violent society. While on the one side social norms, ideals and conditions affect the mental make-up and behavioural pattern of the individual, on the other side there are also individuals, who shape the social norms, ideals and conditions.

Though, it is correct that in many cases disturbed social conditions and environmental factors may be responsible for vitiating our mental peace, yet they can not disturb the persons, strong spiritually. According to Jainism spiritually developed soul remains unaffected at his mental level by external factors. But on the other hand disturbed mental state necessarily affects our social and environmental peace. Thus, for Jainas the inner peace of the soul is the cause and that of the society is the effect. Modern tension theory also supports this view. A book namely 'Tensions that causes Wars' tells us that 'economic inequalities, insecurities and frustrations create groups and national conflicts', but for Jainas economic inequalities and feeling of insecurities can not disturb those persons, who are self-contented and free from doubts and fears. So far as the frustrations are concerned they are generated by our ambitions and resentments and can be controlled only by extinction of desires. Therefore, we must try first to retain inner peace or the peace of soul.

In Jaina texts, we find certain references about the importance and nature of peace. In *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, it is said that "as the earth is the abode for all living beings so the peace is the abode for all the enlightened beings of past, present and future". These souls having attained the spiritual heights always rest in peace and preaches for peace. For Jainas peace means the tranquility or calmness of mind and so they equated the term peace (*śānti*) with the term equanimity or *samatā*. For them peace rests on mental equanimity and social equality. When mental equanimity is disturbed inner peace is disturbed and when social equality is disturbed external or social peace is disturbed. Jainism as a religion is nothing but a practice for mental equanimity and social equality. For the same, they use particular *Prākṛta* word '*sāmāiya*' (*samatā*), the principal concept of the Jainism. It is the pivot around which the whole Jainism

revolves. In English the term '*Sāmāiya*' connotes various meanings such as equanimity, tranquility, equality, harmony and righteousness, in different contexts. Sometimes it means a balanced state of mind undisturbed by any kind of emotional excitement, pleasure or pain, achievement and disappointment, sometimes it refers to the personality, completely free from the vectors of aversion and attachment, i.e. a dispassionate personality. These are the intrinsic definitions of '*Samatā or Śānti*'. But when this word is used extrinsically it means the feeling of equality with all the living beings and thus it conveys social equality and social harmony.

Peace as the Ultimate Goal of Life

According to the Jaina thinkers, the ultimate goal of life is to attain peace or tranquility, our essential nature. In *Ācārāṅgasūtra*, one of the earliest Jaina canonical texts, we find two definitions of religion, one as 'tranquility' and other as non-violence. Lord *Mahāvīra* mentions "Worthy people preached religion as tranquility or equanimity"¹⁰. This tranquility or peace of mind is considered as the core of religious practice, because it is the real nature of living beings, including human beings. In another Jaina text known as *Bhagavatīsūtra*, there is a conversation between Lord *Mahāvīra* and Gautama. Gautama asked *Mahāvīra* "What is the nature of self and *Mahāvīra* answered 'O Gautama' the nature of self is tranquility i.e. peace. Gautama again asked 'O, Lord what is the ultimate goal of self, *Mahāvīra* answered 'O, Gautama, the ultimate goal of self is also to attain tranquility or peace"¹¹.

In *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, the term peace is equated with emancipation¹². Thus, for Jainas peace, being an essential nature-*sva-svabhāva* of self, it is considered as ultimate goal of life.

In Jainism, religion is nothing but a practice for the realisation of one's own essential nature or *Sva-svabhāva* which is nothing but the state of tranquility or peace of mind. This enjoying of one's own essential nature means to remain constant in *Śākṣībhāva* i.e. to remain undisturbed by external factors. It is the state of pure subjectivity which is technically known in Jainism as *Sāmāyika*. In this state, the mind is completely free from constant flickerings, excitements and emotional disorders. To get freedom from mental tensions, the *vibhāvas* or impure states of mind, is the precondition for enjoying spiritual happiness which is also a positive aspect of inner peace. Nobody wants to live in a state of mental tensions, every one would like not tension but relaxation, not anxiety but contentment. This

shows that our real nature is working in us for tranquility or mental peace. Religion is nothing but a way of achieving this inner peace. According to Jainism, the duty of a religious order is to explain the means by which man can achieve this peace : inner as well as external. In Jainism, the method of achieving mental peace is called as *Sāmāyika*, the first and foremost duty among six essential duties of monks and house-holders. Now the question arises how this tranquility (*Samatā*) can be attained? According to the Jaina view-point, it can be attained through the practice of 'non-attachment'. For attachment is the sole cause of disturbing our inner peace or tranquility.

Attachment, the cause of mental tensions

As I have already mentioned that the most burning problem of our age is the problem of mental tensions. The nations, claiming to be more civilised and economically more advanced, are much more in the grip of mental tension. The main objective of Jainism is to emancipate man from his sufferings and mental tensions. First of all, we must know the cause of these mental tensions. For Jainism, the basic human sufferings are not physical, but mental. These mental sufferings or tensions are due to our attachment towards worldly object. It is the attachment, which is fully responsible for them. The famous Jaina text *Uttarādhyayana-sūtra* mentions "The root of all sufferings- physical as well as mental, of every body including gods, is attachment towards the objects of worldly enjoyment. It is the attachment, which is the root cause of mental tension. Only a detached attitude towards the objects of worldly enjoyment can free mankind from mental tension"¹³. According to Lord *Mahāvīra* to remain attached to sensuous object is to remain in the whirl. He says "Misery is gone in the case of a man who has no delusion, while delusion is gone in the case of a man who has no desire; desire is gone in the case of a man who has no attachment"¹⁴. The efforts made to satisfy the human desires through material objects can be likened to the chopping off the branches while watering the roots. Thus, we can conclude that the lust for and the attachment towards the objects of worldly pleasure is the sole cause of human sufferings and conflicts.

If mankind is to be freed from mental tensions, it is necessary to grow a detached outlook in life. Jainism believes that lesser will be the attachment, the greater will be the mental peace. It is only when attachment is vanished, the human mind will be free from mental tensions and emotional disorders.

Non-Possession to resolve economic inequality

The attachment gives birth to desire for possession, occupation and hoarding, which is nothing but an expression of one's greedy attitude. It is told in Jaina scriptures that greediness is the root of all sins. It is the destroyer of all the good qualities¹⁵. Anger, pride, deceit etc. all are the offshoots of attachment or mineness or greed. Violence, which disturbs our social and environmental peace, is due to the will for possession. In *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, it is mentioned that those having possession of whatever sort, great or small, living or non-living, can not get rid of sufferings and conflicts (1/1/2). Possession and hoarding lead to economic inequality, which cause wars. Thus, to achieve peace and the norm of non-violence in social life, the prime need is to restrict the will for possession mental as well as physical also, that is why *Mahāvīra* propounded the vow of complete non-possession for the monks and nuns, while for laity, he propounded the vow of limitation of possession (*Parigraha Parimāṇa*) and vow of control over consumption (*Bhogopabhog Parimāṇa*). Jainism holds that if we want to establish peace on the earth then economic inequality and vast differences in the mode of consumptions should be atleast minimised. Among the causes of wars and conflicts, which disturb our social peace, the will for possession is the prime, because it causes economic disbalance. Due to economic disbalance or inequality, classes of poor and rich came into existence and resulted in class conflicts. According to Jainas, it is only through the self-imposed limitation of possession and simple living, we can restore peace and prosperity on the earth.

Non-Violence as means to establish peace

Tranquility is a personal or inner experience of peace. When it is applied in the social life or it is practised outwardly, it becomes non-violence. Non-violence is a social or outer expression of this inner peace. In *Ācārāṅga*, Lord *Mahāvīra* remarks, "The worthy men of the past, present and the future all say thus, speak thus, declare thus, explain thus; all breathing, existing, living and sentient creatures should not be slain, nor treated with violence, not abused, nor tormented. This is the pure, eternal and unchangeable law or the tenet of religion"¹⁶.

In other words, non-violence is the eternal and pure form of religion. In Jainism, non-violence is the pivot round which its whole ethics revolves. For Jainas, violence represents all the vices and non-violence represents all the virtues. Non-violence is not a single virtue but it is a group

of virtues. In *Praśnavyākaraṇasūtra* the term non-violence is equated with sixty virtuous qualities, just as peace, harmony, welfare, trust, fearlessness, etc.¹⁷. Thus, non-violence is a wider term, which comprehends all the good qualities and virtues.

Non-violence is nothing but to treat all living beings as equal. The concept of equality is the core of the theory of non-violence. The observance of non-violence is to honour each and every form of life. Jainism does not discriminate human beings on the basis of their caste, creed and colour. According to Jaina point of view, all the barriers of caste, creed and colour are artificial. All the human beings have equal right to lead a peaceful life. Though violence is unavoidable yet it can not be the directive principle of our living. Because it goes against the judgements of our faculty of reasoning and the concept of natural law. If I think that nobody has any right to take my life then on the same ground of reasoning I have also no right to take another's life. The principle, live on others or 'living by killing' is self-contradictory. The principle of equality propounds that every one has the right to live. The directive principle of living is not 'Living on other' or 'Living by killing' but 'Living with other' or 'Live for others (*Parasparopagrahojivānām*)'¹⁸. Though, in our worldly life, complete non-violence is not possible yet our motto should be 'Lesser killing is better Living'. Not struggle but co-operation is the law of life. I need other's co-operation for my very existence and so I should also co-operate in other's living.

Further, we must be aware of the fact that in Jainism non-violence is not merely a negative concept i.e. not to kill; but it has positive side also i.e. service to mankind. Once a question was asked to *Mahāvīra*, 'O Lord, one person is rendering his services to the needy ones while other is offering *Pūjā* to you, of these two, who is the real follower because he is following my teachings'¹⁹.

The concept of non-violence and the regard for life is accepted by almost all the religions of the world. But Jainism observes it minutely. Jainism prohibits not only killing of human beings and animals but of the vegetable kingdom also. Harming the plants, polluting water and air are also the act of violence or *hiṃsā*. Because they disturb ecological balance or peace. Its basic principle is that the life, in whatever form it may be, should be respected. We have no right to take another's life. Schweitzer remarks "To maintain, assist or enhance life is good. To destroy, harm or hinder is evil". He further says. "A day may come when

reverence for all life will win universal recognition"²⁰. "The *Daśavaikālika* mentions that every one wants to live and not to die, as we do, for this simple reason, Niggaṇtha prohibit violence"²¹. It can be said that the Jaina concept of non-violence is extremist and non practical, but we cannot challenge its relevance for human society. Though Jainism sets its goal as the ideal of total non-violence, external as well as internal, yet the realisation of this ideal in practical life is by no means easy. Non-violence is a spiritual ideal, fully realisable only in the spiritual plane. The real life of an individual is a physio-spiritual complex; at this level complete non-violence is not possible. According to Jaina thinkers the violence is of four kinds : (i) deliberate (*saṃkalpī*) or aggressive violence i.e. intentional killing (ii) protective violence i.e. the violence which takes place in saving the life of one's own or his fellow being or in order to make peace and ensure justice in the society (iii) occupational i.e. violence which takes place in doing agriculture or in running the factories and industries (iv) and violence, which is involved in performing the daily routine work of house-holder such as bathing, cooking, walking etc. A person can proceed towards the fulness of non-violent life to the extent as he rises above the physical level. The first form of violence, which is deliberate, is to be shunned by all, because it relates to our mental proclivities. So far as the thoughts are concerned, a man is his own master, so it is obligatory for all to be non-violent in this sphere. External circumstance can influence our mind at this level, but they cannot govern us. From the behavioural point of view, deliberate violence is aggressive. It is neither necessary for self-defence nor for the living. So all can avoid it. The other forms of violence, i.e. protective and occupational are inevitable, so far as man is living on a physical level. But this does not mean that the ideal of non-violence is not practicable and so it is not necessary for human race.

The second form of violence is defensive which takes place in the activity of defence. It becomes necessary for the security of one's own life, the life of his fellow beings and the protection of property. External circumstances may compel a person to resort to be violent or to counter attack in defence of his own life or that of his companions or for the protection of his belongings. As those, who are attached to the physical world and has a social obligation to protect others life and property, are unable to dispense with this defensive violence. A person living in family is unable to keep away completely from this type of violence, because

he is committed to the security of family members and their belongings. In the same way the persons, who are in government can not get rid of it. For they are the custodians of human rights and national property, Prof. Murty also maintains. "Aggressive and unjust wars have been condemned by Hindu, Buddhist, Jaina scriptures and moralists, but they had to admit that defensive and just wars may have to be undertaken without giving up *maitrī* (friendliness) an *karuṇā* (compassion) for people of both the sides"²².

It is true that in our times Gandhi planned a non-violent method of opposition and applied it successfully. But it is not possible for all to oppose non-violently with success. Only a man, unattached to his body and material objects and with heart free from malice, can protect his rights non-violently. Again, such efforts can bear fruits only in a civilized and cultured human society. A non-violent opposition may be fruitful only if ranged against an enemy, having a human heart. Its success becomes dubitable if it has to deal with an enemy having no faith in human values and is bent upon serving his selfish motives by violent means.

As far as occupational violence and the violence, taking place in routine-activities of the life, is concerned everyone cannot shake it off. For, so long as a person has to earn his livelihood and to seek fulfilment of his physical needs, deliberate violence of vegetable kingdom is unavoidable. In Jainism, intentional violence to mobile animals by a house-holder has been forbidden even when it becomes necessary for the maintenance of life and occupation. So far as the violence takes place in defensive activities and wars, Jains hold, that it should be minimised as far as it is possible and innocent persons should not be killed at any cost. Jaina thinkers suggested various methods for non-violent wars and to minimise the violence in even just wars. The war, fought between Bharata and Bāhubali was an example of non-violent war.

Though some or other form of violence is inevitable in our life yet we should not conclude that the observance of non-violence is of no use in the present. Just as violence is inevitable for living, non-violence is also inevitable for the very existence of human race. So far as the existence of human society is concerned it depends on mutual co-operation, sacrifice of one's interest for that of his fellow-beings and regard for others' life. If above mentioned elements are essential for our social life, how can we say that non-violence is not necessary for human life. Society

does not stand on violence but on non-violence, not on claiming our rights but on accepting the rights of others as our duty. Thus, the non-violence, is an inevitable principle for the existence of human society. At present we are living in an age of nuclear weapons due to which the very existence of human race is in danger. Lord *Mahāvīra* has said in *Ācārāṅga* that there are weapons superior to each other, but nothing is superior to non-violence²³. Only the observance of non-violence, can save the human race. Mutual credibility and the belief in the equality of all beings, can alone restore peace and harmony in human society. Peace can be established and prosperity can be protected on the earth through non-violence and mutual faith-only.

Regard for others ideologies and faith

Fanaticism or intolerance is the another curse of our age. Jainism, since its inception, believes in and preaches for peace, harmony and tolerance. It has been tolerant and respectful towards other faiths and religious ideologies throughout its history of existence. In Jainism, one hardly comes across with instances of religious conflicts involving, violence and bloodshed. At most one meets with instances of disputations and strongly worded debates concerning ideological disagreements. The Jaina men of learning, while opposing the different ideologies and religious stand-points, paid full regard to them and accepted that the opponents' convictions may also be valid from a certain stand-point.

Among the causes, generating fanaticism and intolerance, the blind faith is the prime one. It results from passionate attachment, hence is uncritical or 'unexamining' outlook. It causes perverse attitude. In Jainism, various types of attachment are enumerated; among them *darśana-moha/dr̥ṣṭirāga* (blind faith), due to its very disposition, has been reckoned "Paramount". In point of fact, it is considered central in religious intolerance. It leads one's attitude towards a strong bias for one's own and against other's religion. Non-attachment is, therefore, considered as a pre-condition for the right attitude or perception. A perverse, hence defiled attitude renders it impossible to view the things rightly, just as a person wearing coloured glasses or suffering from jaundice is unable to see the true colour of objects as they are. "Attachment and hatred are the two great enemies of philosophical thinking. Truth can reveal itself to an impartial thinker"²⁴.

One who is unbiased and impartial can perceive the truth in his opponent's ideologies and faiths and thus, can possess deference to them. Intense attachment unfailingly

generates blind faith in religious leaders, dogmas, doctrines and rituals and consequently religious intolerance and fanaticism came into existence.

Jainism holds that the slightest even pious attachment, towards the prophet, the path, and the scripture is also an hindrance to a seeker of truth and an aspirant of perfection. Attachment, be it pious or impious, cannot go without aversion or repulsion. Attachment results in blind faith and superstition and repulsion consequences into intolerant conduct. The Jainas, therefore, laid stress on the elimination of attachment, the root cause of bias and intolerance.

Though, in Jainism, right faith plays an important role-- it is one of its three "jewels" - it is the blind faith, which causes intolerance. Jainism, therefore, does not support blind faith. Jaina thinkers maintain that the right faith should be followed by right knowledge. The faith seconded by right knowledge or truthful reasoning cannot be blind one. According to Jaina thinkers, reason and faith are complementary and actually there is no contention between the two. Faith without reason, as the Jaina thinkers aver, is blind and reason without faith is unsteady or vacillating. They hold that the religious codes and rituals should be critically analysed. In the *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra*, Gautama, the chief disciple of *Mahāvīra* strongly supports this views before *Keśī*, the pontiff of the church of Jina *Pārśva*. Said he, "The differences in the Law must be critically evaluated through the faculty of reasoning. It is the reason which can ascertain the truth of Law"²⁵.

If one maintains that religion has to be solely based on faith and there is no place for reason in it, then he will unfailingly develop an outlook that only his prophet is the only saviour of mankind; his mode of worship is the only way of experiencing the bliss and the Laws or Commands of his scripture are only the right one hence he is unable to make a critical estimate of his religious prescriptions. While one who maintains that the reason also plays an important role in the religious life, will critically evaluate the pros and cons of religious prescriptions, rituals and dogmas. An 'attached' or biased person believes in the dictum 'Mine is true'. *Ācārya* Haribhadra says, "I possess no bias for Lord *Mahāvīra* and no prejudice against Kapila and other saints and thinkers; whosoever is rational and logical ought to be accepted."²⁶ Thus, when religion tends to be rational, there will hardly be any room for intolerance. One who is thoroughly rational in religious matters, certainly, would not be rigid and intolerant.

Dogmaticism and fanaticism are the born children of

absolutism. An extremist or absolutist holds that whatsoever he propounds is correct and what others say is false, while a relativist is of the view that he and his opponent, both may be correct if viewed from two different angles hence a relativist adopts a tolerant outlook towards other faiths and ideologies. It is the doctrine of *Anekāntavāda* or non-absolutism of the Jainas, the concept of religious tolerance is based upon. For the Jainas non-violence is the essence of religion from which the concept of non-absolutism *Syādvād* emanates. Absolutism represents "violence of thought", for, it negates the truth-value of its opponent's view and thus, hurts the feeling of others. A non-violent search for truth finds non-absolutism.

Non-absolutism of the Jainas forbids the individual to be dogmatic and one-sided in approach. It pleads for a broader outlook and an open mindedness, which alone can resolve the conflicts that emerge from differences in ideologies and faiths. Non-absolutism regard the views of the opponent also as true. Remarks *Siddhasena Divākara* (C. 5th A.D.) "All schools of thought are valid when they are understood from their own stand-point and in so far as they do not discard the truth-value of others. The knower of non-absolutism does not divide them into the category of true and false. They become false only when they reject the truth-value of other."²⁷ It was this broader outlook of non-absolutism which made Jainas tolerant.

While expounding this tolerant outlook of the Jainas, *Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya* (C. 17th A.D.) mentioned "A true non-absolutist does not disdain to any faith and he treats all the faiths equally like a father to his sons. For, a nonabsolutist does not have any prejudice and biased outlook in his mind. A true believer of *syādvāda* is that who pays equal regards to all the faiths. To remain impartial to the various faiths is the essence of being religious. A little knowledge which induces a person to be impartial is more worthwhile than the unilateral vast knowledge of scriptures."²⁸

Jainas believe in the unity of world religions, but unity, according to them, does not imply omnivorous unity in which all lose their entity and identity, They believe in the unity in which all the alien faiths will conjoin each other to form an organic whole, without loosing their own independent existence. In other words, it believes in a harmonious co-existence or a liberal synthesis in which though all the organs have their individual existence, yet work for a common goal i.e. the peace of mankind. To eradicate the religious conflicts and violence from the world,

some may give a slogan, "one world religion", but it is neither possible nor practicable, so far as the diversities in human thoughts are in existence. In the *Niyamasāra* it is said that there are different persons, their different activities or karmas and different levels or capacities, so one should not engage himself in hot discussions, neither with other sects nor within one's own sect."²⁹

Haribhadra remarks that the diversity in the teaching of the sages is due to that in the levels of their disciples or in stand-points adopted by the sages or in the period of time when they preached, or it is only an apparent diversity. Just as a physician prescribes medicine according to the nature of patient, the illness and the climate, so is the case of diversity of religious teachings.³⁰ So far as diversity in time, place, levels and understanding of disciples is inevitable, vividity in religious ideologies and practices is essential. The only way to remove the religious conflicts is to develop a tolerant outlook and to establish harmony among them. Thus, Jaina theory of *Anekāntavāda* prevents us from being dogmatic and one-sided in our approach. It preaches us a broader outlook and open mindedness, more essential in solving the conflicts owing to the differences in ideologies and faiths. Prof. T.G. Kalghatgi rightly observes "The spirit of *Anekānta* is very much necessary in society, specially in the present day, when conflicting

ideologies are trying to assert supremacy aggressively, *Anekānta* brings the spirit of intellectual and social tolerance."³¹

For the present day society what is awfully needed is the virtue of tolerance. This virtue of tolerance i.e. regard for other's ideologies and faiths is maintained 'Jainism from its earlier time by these days. *Mahāvīra* mentions in *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* those, who praise their own faiths and ideologies and blame that of their opponents and thus distort the truth, will remain confined to the cycle of birth and death.³² Jaina philosophers all the time maintain that all the view-points are true in respect of what they have themselves to say, but they are false in so far as they refute totally other's view-points.

Jaina saints also tried to maintain the harmony in different religious-faiths and to avoid religious conflicts. That is why Jainism can survive through the ages.

The basic problems of the present society are mental tensions, poverty, violence, fundamentalism and the conflicts of ideologies and faiths. Jainism try to solve these problems of mankind through three basic tenets of non-attachment (*Aparigraha*), non-violence (*Ahiṃsā*) and non-absolutism (*Anekānta*). If mankind collectively observes these three principles, peace and harmony can certainly be established in the world.

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Religious Harmony and Fellowship of Faiths : A Jaina Perspective

Among the most burning problems, the world is facing today, religious fundamentalism and intolerance is the most crucial. The miraculous advancement in science and technology provided us light-legged means of transportation and communication. As a result physical distances have no bars to meet the peoples of different nations, cultures and religions. Our world is shrinking but disdainfully the distances of our hearts are widening day by day. Instead of developing mutual love, cooperation and faith, we are spreading hatred and hostility and thus ignoring the values of harmonious living and co-existence. The blind and mad race of nuclear weapons is a clear indication that the human race is proceeding towards its formidable funeral procession. Rabindranath Tagore rightly observed "For man to come near to one another and yet to ignore the claims of humanity is the sure process of suicide."¹ In the present circumstances, the only way out left for the survival of mankind is to develop a firm belief in mutual co-operation and co-existence. Religious harmony and fellowship of faiths is the first and foremost need of our age.

Humanity as a Binding Force

Undoubtedly we belong to different faiths, religions and cultures. Our modes of worship as well as way of living also differ to some extent. There is also no denying the fact that our philosophical approaches and viewpoints are divergent but among these diversities there is a common thread of unity which binds all of us, and it is nothing except humanity. We all belong to the same human race. Unfortunately, at present, humanity as such is largely shoved into the background and differences of caste, colour and creed have become more important for us. We have forgotten our essential unity and are conflicting on the basis of these apparent diversities. But we must bear in our mind that it is only humanity which can conjoin the people of different faiths, cultures and nationalities. Jaina *ācāryas* declared the human race as one (*egā maṇussa jāī*)². The difference of caste, culture and creed are not only superficial but mostly the creation of man.

What is True Religion

The ultimate end in view of all religions is to ensure

peace and happiness for the individual and to establish harmony within human society. However, as is known from history, countless wars have been fought in the name of the religion. The religion thus remains accused for the inestimable amount of bloodshed of mankind. Of course, it is not of the so-called men of religion responsible for this horrible consequences. At present religion as such is largely shoved into the background or at best used in the service of political ideologies. If one believes that only his faith, his mode of worship and his political ideologies are the right means for securing peace and happiness for mankind, he cannot be tolerant to the view-points of his opponents. The immediacy, therefore, is to develop tolerance to and friendship for others. It is the only approach by which we can generate peace and harmony inside human society.

Can religion as a category, of which Jainism is a part, meet with this challenge of our times? Before this question can be answered we must make a distinction between a true and a false religion. Because a true religion never supports violence, intolerance and fanatical outlook and it cannot *per se* be made responsible for the ignominious acts committed in the name of religion by such religious leaders who want to serve their vested interest. The barbarity committed in the past and perpetrated in the present in the name of religion is due very largely to the intolerance and fanaticism of the so-called religious leaders and their ignorant followers.

The only way of freeing oneself from this sordid situation is to comprehend the true nature, indeed, to grasp the "essence" of religion and to develop tolerance toward and respect for other's ideologies and faiths.

For the Jainas, a true religion consists in the practice of equanimity and its foundation is the observance of non-violence. In the *Ācārāṅgasūtra*, the earliest Jaina text (c. late 4th cent. B.C.), we come across these two definitions of religion : Equanimity is the essence of religion, while the observance of non-violence is its external exposition or a social aspect of religion. The *Ācārāṅga* mentions that practising of non-violence is the true and eternal religion.

Jainism, since its inception, believes in and preaches for peace, harmony and tolerance. It has been tolerant and respectful toward, other faiths and religious ideologies throughout its history of existence. In Jainism one hardly

comes across instances of religious conflicts involving violence and bloodshed. At most one meets with instance; of disputations and strongly worded debates concerning ideological disagreements. The Jaina men of learning while opposing the different ideologies and religious standpoints, fully paid regard to them and accepted that the opponents' convictions may also be valid from a certain standpoint.

Humanity as a true form of religion

First of all we are human being and then anything else i.e. Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, Muslims, Sikhs, Jains and the like. To be a real human being is a pre-condition for being a real Hindu etc. Our prime duty is to be a human in its real sense. This spirit is echoed in one of the earlier Jaina text *Uttarādhyayana* wherein Lord Mahāvira has laid down four conditions for a true religious being. viz-1. Humanity 2. true faith 3. control over senses and 4. efforts for self-purification³. Thus, we see that among these four conditions of a religious being, humanity occupies the first and the foremost position.

In Jainism religion is defined as a true nature of thing (*Vatthu Sahāvo Dhammo*⁴) and in the light of the above definition it can be said that humanity is the true religion of mankind. For, it is its essential nature. As a human being if we fail to behave like a human being, we have no right to call ourselves a religious being or even a human being. Bertrand Russell, the eminent philosopher and scientist of our age, suggests "I appeal as a human being to the human beings that remember your humanity and forget the rest. If you can do so the way lies open to a new paradise. If you cannot, nothing lies before you but universal death"⁵. And thus, I want to emphasize that humanity is our first and the foremost religion.

What is Humanity ?

The question may be raised what we mean by the term humanity? The simple answer is, humanity is nothing but the presence of self-awareness reasonableness and self-control. These three qualities are accepted as distinguishing features between a human being and animal being by all the humanist thinkers of our age. These three basic qualities are comprehended in Jaina concept of three jewels, i.e. *Samyak-Darśana* (right vision), *Samyak-Jñāna* (right knowledge) and *Samyak-cāritra* (right conduct), respectively which also constitute the path of liberation.⁶ The presence of these three makes a being a perfect human being.

Fellowship means Unity in Diversity

Jaina thinkers assert that unity implies diversity. For them unity and diversity are the two facets of the same reality. Reality itself is unity in diversity. Absolute unity i.e. monism and absolute diversity i.e. pluralism, both of the theories are not agreeable to Jainas. According to them from the generic view point reality is one, but when viewed from modal view-point, it is many. Once a question was asked to Lord Mahāvira, O' Lord! whether you are one or many. To this Mahāvira replied, "From substantial view point I am one, but if viewed from changing conditions of mind and body I am different each moment and thus many." This view is further elaborated by Ācārya Malliṣeṇa. He says "whatsoever is one, is also many"⁷. Really, unity in diversity is the law of nature. Nature everywhere is one, but there is diversity in it, as the natural phenomena differ from each other, so is the case with human beings also. Though all the human beings have some common characteristics and features yet every individual-being differs from others and has some specific qualities. It is also true about religions. All the religions have some common characteristics sharing with others as well as specific qualities of their own. Universal virtues such as non-violence, friendliness, service to the needy, truthfulness, honesty, control over senses, etc. are commonly shared by all the religions of the world. Unfortunately, at present, these common universal virtues which are the essence of religious practices have been shoved into the background and external rituals, which are divergent in their nature, have become more important. Thus, we have forgotten the essential unity of all the religions and are stressing their diversities.

I am emphasizing the essential unity of all the religions, this does not mean that I am the supporter of one world religion or undermining the specialities and diversities of them. What I intend to say is that the absolute unity and absolute diversity, both are illusory concepts and fellowship of faith means unity in diversity.

Co-operation as Essential Nature of Living Beings

For Jainas co-operation and co-existence are the essential nature of living beings. Darwin's dictum- 'struggle for existence' and the Indian saying- *Jivajīvasya bhojanam*, that is 'life thrives on life' are not acceptable to them.

They maintain that it is not the struggle but the mutual co-operation is the law of life. Umāsvāti (4th century A.D.) in his work *Tattvārthasūtra* clearly maintains that mutual

co-operation is the nature of living beings (*parasparopagraho Jivānām*)⁸. Living beings originate, develop and exist with the co-operation of other living beings. So is the case with the human society also, its existence also depends on mutual co-operation, sacrifice of one's own interest in the interest of other fellow beings and regard for other's life, ideology, faith and necessities. If we think that other's services are essential for our existence and living, then we should also co-operate in others living.

If we consider taking the help of others in our living as our right, then on the same ground of logic it is our honest duty to help others in their living. The principle of equality of all beings means that every one has a right to live just as myself and therefore one should not have any right to take other's life.

Thus, for Jainas the directive principle of living is not 'living on other's or 'living by killing', but 'living with others' or 'living for others'. They proclaim that co-operation and co-existence are the essential nature of living beings. If it is so, then we must accept that religious tolerance and fellowship of faiths are such principles as should be followed at the bottom of our hearts.

One World-Religion : A Myth

In order to eradicate the conflicts and stop violence in the name of religion from the world some may give a slogan of one world religion but it is neither feasible nor practicable. So far as the diversities in thoughts and habits, in cultural background and intellectual levels, of the human beings are in existence, the varieties in religious ideologies and practices are essential. Jaina pontiff Haribhadra rightly maintains that the diversity in the teachings of the Sages is due to diversity in the levels of their disciples or the diversity in the standpoints adopted by the Sages themselves or the diversities in place and time i.e. ethnic circumstances in which they preached or it is only apparent diversity. Just as a physician prescribes different medicines according to the condition of patients, his illness and the climatic conditions, so is the case with the diversity in religious preachings also⁹. Therefore, unity, as well as diversity both are equally essential for the fellowship of faiths and we should not undermine any one of them. Just as the beauty of a garden consists in the variety of flowers, fruits and plants, in the same way the beauty of the garden of religions depends of the variety of thoughts, ideals and modes of worship.

Equal Regard to all Religions

According to Jainas equal regard to different faiths and religions should be the base of religious harmony and fellowship of faiths. Jaina thinker Ācārya Siddhasena Divākara remarks "just as emerald and other jewels of rare quality and of excellent kind do not acquire the designation of a necklace of jewels and find their position on the chest of human beings so is the case with different religions and faiths. Whatever excellent qualities and virtues they possess unless they are catenated in the common thread of fellowship and have equal regard for others, they can not find their due place in human hearts and can be charged for spreading hostility and hatred in mankind¹⁰."

Therefore, one thing we must bear in our mind that if we consider other religions or faiths as inferior to ours or false, real harmony will not be possible. We have to give equal regard to all the faiths and religions. Every religion or mode of worship has its origination in a particular social and cultural background and has its utility and truth value accordingly. As the different parts of body have their own position and utility in their organic whole and work for its common good, so is the case with different religions. Their common goal is to resolve the tensions and conflicts and make life on earth peaceful. For this common goal each and every one has to proceed in his own way according to his own position. Every faith, if working for that particular common goal has equal right to exist and work, and should be given equal regard.

According to Jainācārya Siddhasena Divākara (4th Century A.D.) the divergent view points/faiths may be charged as false only when they negate the truth value of others and claim themselves exclusively true. But if they accept the truth value of others also, they attain righteousness. He further says, 'Every view-point or faith in its own sphere is right but if all of them arrogate to themselves the whole truth and disregard the views of their rivals, they do not attain right-view, for all the viewpoints are right in their own respective spheres but if they encroach upon the province of other view points and try to refute them, they are wrong¹¹'. For Jainas rightness of particular faith or viewpoint depends on the acceptance of rightness of other. Siddhasena further maintains that one who advocates the view of synoptic character of truth never discriminates the different faith as right or wrong and thus pays all of them equal regard¹². Today, when fundamentalism is posing a serious threat to communal harmony and equilibrium, unity

of world religions is not only essential but the only way out to protect the human race.

Jainas, too believe in the unity of world religions but unity according to them does not imply omnivorous unity in which all lose their entity and identity. They believe in that type of unity where in all the alien faiths will conjoin each other to form an organic whole without losing their own independent existence and given equal regard. In other words they believe in a harmonious existence and work for a common goal i.e. the welfare of mankind. The only way to remove the religious conflicts and violence from the earth is to develop a tolerant outlook and to establish harmony among various religions.

Now we shall discuss the causes of intolerance and devices suggested for the development of a tolerant outlook and religious harmony by the Jainas.

True Meaning of Religion

So far as the leading causes responsible for the growth of fundamentalism and intolerant outlook are concerned, in my humble opinion, the lack of the true knowledge and understanding of the real nature and purpose of religion is prime. By religion generally we mean to have some uncritical beliefs in supernatural powers and performance of certain rituals as prescribed in our religious texts, but it is not the true and whole purpose of religion. Haribhadra in his work '*Sambodha Prakaraṇa*' (1/1) clearly remarks that the people talk about the path i.e. religion but they do not know that what is the path or religion in its true sense. In the famous Jaina text, *Kārtikeyānupreksā* (478), dharma (religion) is defined as the real nature of the things. If it is so, then question arises what is the real nature of human being? In a Jaina text known as *Bhagavatīsūtra* (1/9), it is clearly mentioned that the nature and ultimate end of the soul is equanimity. Lord Mahāvira has given two definitions of religion. In *Ācārāṅgasūtra* (1/8/4) he says "worthy people preach that the religion is mental equanimity" Equanimity is considered as the core or essence of religion, because it is the real nature or essence of all the living beings, including human beings also. Equanimity is the state in which consciousness is completely free from constant flickering, excitements and emotional disorders and mind becomes pacific. Haribhadra says whether a person is a Śvetāmbara or a Digambara or a Bauddha or belongs to any other religion, whosoever attains equanimity of mind, will attain the liberation (*Sambodha Prakaraṇa*, 1/2).

Thus, the attainment as equanimity or relaxation from

tensions is the essence of religions. Secondly, when we talk of social or behavioural aspect of religion, it is nothing but the observance of non-violence. In *Ācārāṅga*, (1/4/1) Lord Mahāvira propounds, "The worthy men of the past, present and the future will say thus, speak thus, declare thus, explain thus, all breathing, existing, living and sentient creatures should not be slain, nor treated with violence, nor abused, nor tormented" This is the pure, eternal and unchangeable law or the tenet of religion.

Ācārya Haribhadra maintains that performance of rituals is only the external form of religion. In its real sense religion means the eradication of passions and lust for material enjoyments as well as the realization of one's own real nature. Thus, for Jainas the true nature and purpose of religion is to attain equanimity and peace in individual as well as in social life. Whatsoever disturbs equanimity and social peace and spreads hostility and violence is not a true form of religion, instead it is *Saitana* in the cloak of religion. But now-a-days, the essence of religion has been shoved into background and dogmatism, uncritical faith and performance of certain rituals have got precedence. Thus, we have forgotten the end or essence of religion and stuck to the means only. For us it has become more crucial point that while performing prayer, our face should be in the east or in the west, but we have forgotten the purpose of prayer itself. The religion aims at having control over our passions, but unfortunately we are nourishing our passions in the name of religion. Actually, we are fighting for the decoration of the corpse of religion and not caring for its soul. If we want to maintain religious harmony and ensure peace on the earth, we must always remain aware of the end and essence of the religion, instead of external practices and rituals.

The English word religion is derived from the root 'religio' which means 'to unite'. On the basis of its etymological meaning we can say that whatsoever divides the mankind, instead of uniting it, cannot be a true form of religion. We must be aware of the fact that a religion in its true sense never supports violence, intolerance and fanatical outlook. A true form of religion is one which establishes harmony instead of hostility, affection and kindness instead of hatred.

Blind Faith - the Root of Intolerance

Among the causes that generate fanaticism and intolerance, blind faith is the principal; it results from passionate attachment hence uncritical or "unexamining"

outlook. Attachment (Mūrchā) according to the Jainas is the cause of bondage. It causes perverse attitude. In Jainism various types of Attachments are enumerated. Among them *darśana-moha/dr̥ṣṭirāga* (blind faith), due to its very nature has been reckoned "paramount". In point of fact, it is considered as a central element in religious intolerance. It leads one's attitude towards a strong bias for one's own and against other's religion. Non-attachment is, therefore, considered as precondition for the right attitude or perception. A perverse, hence defiled attitude renders it impossible to view the things rightly just as a person wearing coloured glasses or suffering from jaundice is unable to see the true colour of objects as they are. Attachment and aversion are the two great enemies of philosophical thinking. Truth can reveal itself to an impartial thinker"¹³. Non-attachment, as Jainas hold, is not only essential it is imperative in the search of truth. One who is unbiased and impartial can perceive the truth of his opponents's ideologies and faiths and thus can possess deference to them. Intense attachment unfailingly generates blind faith in religious leaders, dogmas, doctrines and rituals and consequently religious intolerance and fanaticism come into existence. The religions which lay more emphasis on faith than reason are narrower and fundamentalist. While the religions according due importance to reason also are more conciliatory and harmonious. It is the reason or critical outlook which acts as check-post in religious faiths and rituals.

Jainism holds that the uncritical outlook and even pious attachment towards the prophet, the path and the scripture is also an hindrance to a seeker of truth and aspirant of perfection. Attachment results in blind faith and superstition and repulsion consequences into intolerant conduct. The real bondage, as Jainas confirm, is the bondage due to attachment. A person who is in the grip of attachment cannot get rid of imperfection. Gautam, a chief disciple of Lord Mahāvira, failed to attain omniscience in the life time of Mahāvira on account of his pious attachment towards Mahāvira. Same was the case with Ānanda, the chief disciple of Lord Buddha, who could not attain arhathood in the life-time of his "Śāstā". Once Gautam asked Mahāvira : "Why am I not able to attain the perfect knowledge, while my pupils have reached the goal. "Lord answered : "Oh, Gautam, it is your pious attachment towards me which obstructs you in getting perfect knowledge and emancipation"¹⁴. The Jainas therefore laid stress on the elimination of attachment, the root cause of bias and intolerance.

Reason - The Check-Post of Blind Faith

In Jainism right faith, one of its three 'Jewels', plays an important role in emancipation of the soul. On the contrary, the blind faith causes intolerance. Jainism therefore does not support blind faith. Jaina thinkers maintain that the right faith should be followed by right knowledge. The faith followed by right knowledge or truthful reason cannot be blind one. According to Jaina thinkers, reason and faith are complementary and actually there is no contention between the two. Faith without reason, as the Jaina thinkers aver, is blind and reason without faith is unsteady or vacillating. They hold that the religious codes and rituals should be critically analysed¹⁵. In the *Uttarādhyayanāsūtra*, Gautam, the chief disciple of Mahāvira, strongly supports this view before Keśī, the pontiff of the church of Jaina Pārśva. He said : "the difference in the Law must be critically evaluated through the faculty of reasoning. It is the reason which can ascertain the truth of Law"¹⁶.

If one maintains that religion has to be solely based on faith and there is no place for reason in it, then he will unfailingly develop an outlook that only his prophet, religion and scriptures are true and other's prophets, religions and scriptures are false. He will also firmly believe that his prophet is only savior of mankind; his mode of worship is the only way of experiencing the bliss and the laws or commands of his scripture are the only right ones and thus he remains unable to make critical estimate of his religious prescriptions. While one who maintains that reason also plays an important role in the religious life, will critically evaluate the pros and cons of religious prescriptions, rituals and dogmas. An "attached" or biased person believes in the dictum 'Mine is true'. while the "detached" or unbiased person believes in the dictum 'Truth is mine.'

Guṇaratnasūri (early 15th cent. A.D.) in his commentary on the *śaḍdarśanasamuccaya* of Haribhadrasūri (c. 3rd quarter of the 8th cent. A.D.) has quoted a verse, which explains : "a biased person tries to justify whatever he has already accepted, while an unprejudiced person accepts what he feels logically justified"¹⁷. Jainism supports 'rational thinking'. Supporting the rational outlook in religious matters Ācārya Haribhadra syas : "I possess no bias for Lord Mahāvira and no prejudice against Kapila and other saints and thinkers. Whosoever is rational and logical ought to be accepted"¹⁸. While describing the right faith Amṛtacanda (c.early 10th cent. A.D.) condemns three types of idols namely superstitions relating deities, path and

scriptures¹⁹. Thus when religion tends to be rational there will hardly be any room for intolerance. One who is thoroughly rational in religious matters, certainly would not be rigid and intolerant.

Non-Absolutism - the Philosophical Basis of Tolerance

Dogmatism and fanaticism are the born children of absolutism. An extremist or absolutist holds that whatsoever he propounds is correct and what others say is false, while a relativist is of the view that he and his opponent both may be correct, if viewed from two different angles and thus a relativist adopts a tolerant outlook towards other faiths and ideologies. It is the doctrine of '*Anekāntavāda*' or non-absolutism of the Jainas on which the concept of religious tolerance is based. For the Jainas non-violence is the essence of religion from which the concept of non-absolutism emanates. Absolutism represents 'violence of thought', for, it negates the truth-value of its opponent's view and thus hurts the feeling of others. A non-violent search for truth finds non-absolutism.

Jaina thinkers are of the view that reality is a complex one.²⁰ It has many facets, various attributes and various modes. It can be viewed and understood from different angles and thus various judgments may be made about it. Even two contradictory statements about an object may hold true. Since we are finite beings, we can know or experience only a few facets of reality at one time. The reality in its completeness cannot be grasped by us. Only a universal-observer-*Sarvajña* can comprehend it completely. Yet even for an Omniscient it is impossible to know is and to explain it without a standpoint or viewpoint²¹. This premise can be understood from the following example. -- Take it for granted that every one of us has a camera to clic a snap of a tree. We can have hundreds of photographs but still we find most portion of the tree photographically remains uncovered, and what is more, the photographs differ from each other unless they are taken from the same angle. So is the case with diversified human understanding and knowledge. We only can have a partial and relative view of reality. It is impossible for us to know and describe reality without an angle or viewpoint. While every angle or viewpoint can claim that it gives a true picture of reality but each one only gives a partial and relative picture of reality. On the basis of partial and relative knowledge of reality one can claim no right to discard the views of his opponents as totally false. According to Jaina thinkers the truth-value of opponents must be accepted and respected.

Non-absolutism of the Jainas refuse to allow the individual to be dogmatic and one-sided in approach. It pleads for a broader outlook and open mindedness, which alone can resolve the conflicts that emerge from differences in ideologies and faiths. Satkari Mookerjee rightly observes that Jainas do not believe in the extremist a priori logic of the absolutists. Pragmatically considered, this logical attitude breeds dogmatism and if carried a step further, engenders fanaticism, the worst passion of human heart²². For non-absolutism the views of the opponent are also true. As Siddhasena Divākara (5th Cent . A.D.) remarks "All schools of thought are valid when they are understood from their own standpoint and so far as they do not discard the truth-value of others. Hemcandra was a Jaina saint; he composed his works in the praise of Śiva. This liberalism is also maintained by later saints who composed their works in Hindi or Gujarati like Ānandaghana and many other, till these days. In a Hindi couplet J.K. Mukhtar says :

buddha Vīra jina Harihara Brahmā yā usako svādhīna kaho/

bhakti bhāva se prerita ho, yaha citta usī me līna raho //

Door of Liberation - Open to All

Jainism holds that the followers of other sects can also achieve emancipation or perfection, if they are able to destroy attachment and aversion. The gateway of salvation is open to all. They do not believe in the narrow outlook that "only the follower of Jainism can achieve emancipation, others will not". In *Uttarādhyayana* there is a reference to *anyalīga-siddhas* i.e. the emancipated souls of other sects²³. The only reason for the attainment of perfection or emancipation, according to Jainas, is to shun the vectors of attachment and aversion. Haribhadra, staunch advocate of religious tolerance remarks : "One, who maintains equanimity of mind will certainly get emancipation whether he may be a Śvetāmbara or Digambara or Buddhist or any one else. It is this broad outlook of the Jainas which makes them tolerant to the non-violence of thought.

About the means of liberation, the Jainas are also broadminded. They do not believe that their mode of worship or their religious practice is the only one that represents the way to reach the goal of emancipation. For them, not the external modes of worship, but the right attitude and mentality are the things that makes religious practices fruitful. The *Ācārāṅga-sūtra* mentions that the practices which are considered to be the cause of bondage

may be the cause of liberation also.²⁵ It is the intrinsic purity not the external practices which makes the person religious. Haribhadra propounds that neither one who remains without clothes nor one who is white clad, neither a logician nor a metaphysician, nor a devotee of personal cult will get liberation unless he overcomes his passions²⁶. If we accept the existence of the diversity of modes of worship according to the time, place and level of aspirants and lay stress on the intrinsic purity in religious matters then certainly we cannot condemn religious practices of a non-absolutist. They become false only when they reject the truth-value of others²⁷. It was this broader outlook of non-absolutism which made Jainas tolerant.

While expounding this tolerant outlook of the Jainas, Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya (17th cent. A.D.) maintains a true non-absolutist does not disdain any faith but treats all the faiths equally as a father does to his sons. For, a non-absolutist does not have any prejudiced and biased outlook. A true believer of 'Syādvāda' (non-absolutism) is one who pays equal regard to all the faiths. To remain impartial to the various faiths is the essence of being religious. A little knowledge which induces a person to be impartial is more worth while than the unilateral vast knowledge of scriptures²⁸.

Non-personalism - A Keystone for Tolerance

Jainism opposes the person-cult (person-worship) for it makes the mind biased and intolerant. For the Jainas, the object of veneration and worship is not a person but perfectness i.e. the eradication of attachment and aversion. The Jainas worship the quality or merit of the person not the person. In the sacred *namaskāra-mantra* of the Jainas veneration is paid to the spiritual-posts such as *arhat*, *siddha*, *ācārya* and not the individuals like Mahāvīra, Rṣabha or anybody else. In the fifth *pada* we find that the veneration is paid to all the saints of the world. The words 'loye' and 'Savva' demonstrate the geneosity and broader outlook of the Jainas²⁹. It is not person but his spiritual attitude which is to be worshipped. Difference in name, according to the Jainas, is immaterial since every name at its best connotes the same spiritual perfection. Haribhadra in the *Yogaḍṛṣṭi-samuccaya* remarks that 'the ultimate truth transcends all states of worldly existence, called *nirvāṇa* and is essentially and necessarily 'single' even if it be designated by different names like *Sadāśiva*, *Parabrahman*, *Siddhātma*, *Tathāgata*, etc.³⁰ Not only in the general sense but etymologically also they convey the same meaning. In the *Lokatattva-nirṇaya*

he says, "I venerate all those who are free from all vices and filled with all virtues, be they Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Śiva or Jaina"³¹. This is further supported by various Jaina thinkers of medieval period as Akalaṅka, Yogīndu, Mānatunga, Hemcandra and many others. While worshiping Lord Śiva the Jaina pontiff Hemcandra says : "I worship those who have destroyed attachment and aversion, the seeds of birth and death, be they Brahma, Viṣṇu Śiva of Jina"³². This liberalism of the Jainas on the methods of worship can be supported by the legends of the previous lives of Mahāvīra. It is said that Mahāvīra in his previous existences was many times ordained as a monk of other sects where he practised austerities and attained heaven.

As for scriptures, the Jainas outlook is liberal. They firmly believe that a false scripture (*Mithyā-Śruta*) may be a true scripture (*Samyak-Śruta*) for a person of right attitude; and true scripture may turn false for a person of perverse attitude. It is not the scripture but the attitude of the follower which makes it true or false. It is the vision of the interpreter and practitioners that counts. In the *Nandisūtra* this standpoint is clearly explained³³. Thus we can say that the Jainas are neither rigid nor narrowminded in this regard.

References of Religious Tolerance in Jaina Works

References to religious tolerance are abundant in Jaina history. Jaina thinkers have consistently shown deference to other ideologies and faiths. In the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* the second earliest Jaina work (c. 2nd cent. B.C.), it is observed that those who praise their own faith and views and discarded those of their opponents, possess malice against them hence remain confined to the cycle of birth and death³⁴. In another famous Jaina work of the same period, the *Isibhāṣiyāṁ*, the teaching of the forty five renowned saints of Śramanic and Brahmanic, schools of thought such as Nārda, Bhāradvāja, Maṅkhali-Gośāla and many others have been presented with due regards³⁵. They are remembered as Arhatṛṣi and their teachings are regarded as an Āgama. In the history of world religions there is hardly any example in which the teachings of the religious teachers of the opponent sects were included in one's own scriptures with due esteem and honour. Evidently, it indicates the latitudinarian and unprejudiced outlook of the earliest Jaina thinkers. We also have a reference to religious tolerance in the *Vyākhyāprajñapti*, one of the early works of the Jainas, when an old friend of Gautama, who was initiated in some other religious sect, came to visit him. Mahāvīra commanded Gautama to welcome him and Gautama did so³⁶. According

to *Uttarādhyayana*, when Gautama, the chief disciple of Mahāvira and Keśi, a prominent pontiff of Pārśvanātha's sect met at Kośāmbī, both paid due regard to each other and discussed the various problems dispassionately and in gentle and friendly manner about the differences of both the sects³⁷.

Haribhadra has not only maintained this latitudinarian outlook of earlier Jainācāryas, but lent new dimension to it. He was born in the age when the intellectuals of the India were engaged in hair-splitting philosophical discussions and in relentless criticism of one other. Though he also critically evaluated the other philosophical and religious systems, his outlook was fully liberal and attempted to see the truth of his opponent's logic also.

In the *Śāstravārtā-samuccaya* which is one of the foremost works illustrating Haribhadra's liberal outlook, it is mentioned that the great saint, venerable Lord Buddha preached the doctrine of Momentariness (*Kṣaṇikavāda*), Non-existence of soul (*Anātmavāda*), Idealism (*Vijñānavāda*) and Nothingness (*Śūnyavāda*) with a particular intention to vanish the mineness and desire for worldly objects and keeping in view the different levels of mental development of his followers, like a good physician who prescribes the medicine according to the disease and nature of the patient³⁸. He has the same liberal and regardful attitude towards Sāṃkhya and Nyāya schools of Bhrahmanical philosophy. He maintains that naturalism (*Prakṛtivāda*) of Sāṃkhya and Īśvara kārṭtvavāda of the Nyāya school is also true and justified, if viewed from certain standpoint³⁹. Further, the epithets such as the great saint (*mahāmuni*), the venerable (*arhat*), the good physician (*Suvaidya*) used by him for Buddha and for Kapila shows his generosity and deference to other religious leaders. Haribhadra's crusade against sectarianism is unique and admirable in the history of world-religions.

Alongwith these literary evidences there are some epigraphical evidences of religious tolerance of the Jainas also. Some Jaina ācāryās such as Rāmkirti and Jaymaṅgala-sūri wrote the hymns in the praise of Tokalji and goddess Cāmundā.⁴⁰ Jaina kings such as Kumārpāla, Viṣṇuvardhan and others constructed the temples of Śiva and Viṣṇu along with the temple of Jina⁴¹.

Finally, I would like to mention that Jainism has a sound philosophical foundation for religious tolerance and throughout the age, it practically never indulged in aggressive wars in the name of religion nor did they invoke divine sanction for cruelties against the people of alien

faiths. They have always believed in religious harmony and fellowship of faiths.

Though generally Jainas do classify religions in the heretic (*mithyā-dṛṣṭi*) and non-heretic (*samyak-dṛṣṭi*) yet, *mithyā-dṛṣṭi*, according to them, is one who possesses one-sided view and considers others as totally false, while *samyak-dṛṣṭi* is the one who is unprejudiced and sees the truth in his opponents views also. It is interesting to note here that Jainism calls itself a union of heretic views (*micchādamsana-samūh*). Siddhasena (5th cent. A.D.) mentions "Be glorious the teachings of Jina which are the union of all the heretic views i.e. the organic synthesis of one-sided and partial views, essence of spiritual nectar and easily graspable to the aspirants of emancipation."⁴²

Ānandaghana, a mystic Jaina saint of the 17th cent. A.D. remarks that just as ocean includes all the rivers so does Jainism all other faiths. Further, he beautifully expounds that all the six heretic schools are the organs of Jina and one who worships Jina also worships them.⁴³ Historically we also find that various deities of other sects are adopted in Jainism and worshipped by the Jainas. Ācārya Somadeva in his work *Yaśastilak-campū* remarks that where there is no distortion from right faith and accepted vows, one follow the tradition prevailing in the country.⁴⁴

As we have already said that Jainas believe in the unity of world religions, but unity, according to them, does not imply omnivorous unity in which all the alien faiths will conjoin each other to form an organic whole without losing their own independent existence. In other words it believes in a harmonious co-existence or a liberal synthesis in which all the organs have their individual existence, but work for a common goal i.e. the peace of mankind. To eradicate the religious conflicts and violence from the world, some may give a slogan of "one world religion" but it is neither possible nor practicable so far as the diversities in human thoughts are in existence. In the *Niyamasāra* it is said that there are different persons, their different activities or *karmas* and different levels or capacities, so one should not engage himself in hot discussions neither with other sects nor one's own sect.⁴⁵

Haribhadra remarks that the diversity in the teachings of the sages is due to the diversity in the levels of their disciples or the diversity in standpoints adopted by the Sages or the diversity in the period of time when they preached, or it is only an apparent diversity. Just as a physician prescribes medicine according to the nature of patient, its illness and the climate so is the case of diversity

of religious teachings.⁴⁶ So far as diversity in time, place, levels and understanding of disciples is inevitable, variety in religious conflicts is to develop a tolerant outlook and to establish harmony among them.

At last I would like to conclude my paper by quoting a beautiful verse of religious tolerance of Ācārya Amitagati--
Sattveṣu maitrīm guṇīṣu pramodaṃ

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18. *Loke śāstrabhāse samayabhase ca devatabhase / nityamaṇi tattvarucina kaitavya-mamudhadrstivam / 26*
-- *Purusārtha-Siddhyupāya-Amartacandra*, The Central Jaina

Kliṣṭeṣu jiveṣu kṛpāparatvam

Mādhyasthyabhāvaṃ viparita vṛtttau

Sadā mamātmā vidahātudeva.⁴⁷

Oh Lord ! I should be friendly to all the creatures of world and feel delight in meeting the virtuous people. I should always be helpful to those who are in miserable conditions and tolerant to my opponents.

Publishing House, Ajitasram, Lucknow, 1933.

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23. Yasya sarvatra samata nayeṣu tanayesviva /
Tasyanekāntavādasya kva nyunādhikasemusī //
Ten a syādvādāmālambya sarvadarśanatulyatam /
Moksoddesavi (dvi) sesena yah pasyati sa śāstravit //70//
Mādhyasthyameva sastrartho yena taccāru siddhyati /
Sa eva dharmavādah syadanyadbaliśavalganam //71//
Mādhyasthyasahitam hyekapadajnanamapi pramā /
Sastrakotiḥ vṛthāivanya tathā cōktam mahātamanā //73//
--*Adhyātmopaniṣat*-Yoṣovijaya, Sri Jainadharmarprasarakā Sabha Bhavanagara, 1st Ed., Vikram, 1965.
24. Namō Arahantānaṃ/namo siddhānaṃ/namo Āyariyānaṃ/
Namō Uvajjhāyanaṃ/namo loye savva sāhūnaṃ /
Vyākhyā prajñāpti, Mahavira Jaina Vidhyalaya, Bombay.
Samachim coiya samana kei sapakkhaditthio vamenti, settam Micchasuyam.
Vṛti-etani bharatadini sastrani mithyadrsteh
Mithyātvaparigrhitāni bhavanti, tato
Viparitabhiniṣeṣavṛddhihetutvaṃ mithyāśrutam etānyeva
Ca bharatadini śāstrani samyagdr̥ṣṭeh
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Je utatthd visusamti, saṃsaram te viussiyā //
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36. He khamdaya! sagayam, Khamdaya! Susagayam - *Bhagavati*, 2/1.
37. Kesikumāra samaṇe goyamaṇ dissama gayam / Padirūvaṇ padivattim sammam sampadivajjai // -- *Uttarādhyayana sūtra*, Sanmati Jñanpitha, Agra, 1st ed. 23/16.
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The Solution of World Problems : A Jaina Perspective

We all are human beings first hence the problems, humanity is facing today, are our own. In fact, we, ourselves are solely responsible for their creation and naturally have to bear their consequences also. Become our earnest duty to ponder over their roots and causes, to suggest their solutions and to make honest efforts for their eradication.

Problem of Mental Tension and its Solution

The growth of scientific knowledge and outlook has reverly jolted our superstitions and false dogmas. But unfortunately, it has shaken our faith in spritual and human values also. Today, we have more knowledge of and faith in the atom and atomic power than the values needed for meaningful and peaceful life. We rely more on atomic weapons as our true rescuer than on our fellow-beings. The advancement in science and technology has provided us amenities for a pleasant living. Today the life on earth has become pleasant and luxurious as it was never before. Yet because of the selfish and materialistic outlook, nobody is happy and satisfied. This advancement, in all walks of life and knowledge, could not sublimate our animal and selfish nature. The animal instinct lying within us is still dominating

our individual and social behaviour. What, unfortunately has happened is that the intoxication of ambition and success made us more greedy and egoistic. Our ambitions and desires have no limits. They always remain unfulfilled and the create frustration. Frustration and resentments give birth to mental tensions. These days, the people and nations, more affluent materially having all the amenities of life, are more in the grip of tensions. Medical as well as psychological reports of advanced nations confirm this fact. This shows that the cause of our tensions is not scarcity of the object of necessities, but the endless desires and the lust for worldly enjoyment. Among the most burning problems, the world facing today, that once of mental tension is the prime one. We are living in tension all the time and even a pleasant sound sleep has become a dream. The single and most salient feature by which our age may be characterised is that of tensions.

As a matter of fact, all the problems, we are facing today are created by us hence, their consequences are also to be borne by us.

The main object of Jainism is to emancipate man from his sufferings i.e. mental tensions and thus to attain

equanimity or tranquility. First of all, we must know the causes of these mental tensions. To Jainism, the basic human sufferings are not physical but mental. These mental sufferings or tensions are due to our attachment towards worldly objects. It is the attachment, fully responsible for them. The famous Jain text *Uttarādhyaṇa-sūtra* mentions: "The root of all sufferings : physical as well as mental, of every body including gods, is attachment which is the root cause of mental tension¹. Only a detached attitude towards the objects of worldly enjoyment can free mankind from mental tension. According to Lord Mahāvīra, to remain attached to sensuous objects is to remain in the whirl. Says he : "Misery is gone in the case of a man who has no delusion, while delusion is gone in the case of a man who has no desire; desire is gone in the case of a man who has no greed while greed is gone in the case of a man who has no attachment."² The efforts, made to satisfy the human desires through material objects, may be likened to the chopping off the branches while watering the roots. He further remarks that uncountable mountains of gold and silver like Kailāśa can not satisfy the desires of human beings because desires are endless like sky³. Thus, the lust for and the attachment towards the objects of worldly pleasure is the sole cause of human tensions.

If mankind is to be freed from mental tensions, it is necessary to grow a detached outlook in life. Jainism believes that the lesser the attachment, the greater will be the mental peace. It is only when attachment vanishes, the human mind becomes free from mental tensions and emotional disorders and attains equanimity, the ultimate goal of all our religious practices and pursuits⁴.

The Problem of Survival of Human Race and Disarmament

The second important problem, the world is facing today, is the problem of the survival of human race itself. Due to the tremendous advancement in war technology and nuclear weapons, the whole human race is standing on the verge of annihilation. Now it is not the question of survival of any one religion, culture or nation, but of the whole humanity. Today, we have guided missiles but unfortunately, unguided men. The madness, of one nation or even an individual, may lead to the destruction of the whole humanity. Because of the advancement in scientific knowledge and outlook our faculty of faith has been destroyed. When mutual faith and faith in higher values of co-operation and co-existence is destroyed, doubts take

place. Doubts cause fear, fear produces the sense of insecurity which results in accumulation of weapons. This mad race for accumulation of weapons, is likely to lead to the total annihilation of human race from this planet.

Thus, the problem of survival of mankind is related to the question of disarmament. To meet this aim first of all we will have to develop mutual faith or trust and thus remove the sense of fear and insecurity, the sole cause of armament-race, and then to check the mad race for weapons. Let us think what means have been suggested by the Jainas to solve the problem of human survival and to check the mad race for weapons. For Jainas, it is the sense of insecurity which causes fear and *vice a versa*. Insecurity results in the accumulation of weapons. So it is our prime duty to develop the sense of security among fellow beings. In *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, it is clearly mentioned that there is nothing higher than the sense of security which a human being can give to others⁵. The virtue of fearlessness is supreme. It is two-fold (1) one should not fear from others and (2) one should not cause fear to others. A real Jain saint is one who is free from fear and enmity⁶. When the fear vanishes and enmity dissolves there is no need for armaments. Thus, the sense of security and accumulation of arm and weapons are related to each other. Though, arms and weapons are considered as means of security yet these, instead of giving security, generate fear and a sense of insecurity in the opposite party hence a mad race for accumulation of superior weapons starts. Lord Mahāvīra had seen this truth centuries before that there is no end to this mad race for weapons. In *Ācārāṅga* (C. 4th B.C.) he proclaimed "*atthi sattham parenaparam natthi asattham parenaparam*" i.e. there are weapons superior to each other, but nothing is superior to *aśastra* i.e. disarmament or non-violence⁷. It is the selfish and aggressive outlook of an individual or a society that gives birth to war and violence. They are the expressions and outcome of our sick mentality. It is through firm faith in mutual credibility and non-violence that humanity can get rid of this mad race for nuclear weapons and thus can solve the problem of its survival.

The Problem of War and Violence

At the root of all types of wars and violences there lies the feeling of discontentment as well as the will for power and possession. According to *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, the root of violence is attachment or will for possession. A book namely "*Tension that causes war*" tells us that economic inequalities, insecurities and frustrations create group

conflicts. It is true that in the old days the cause of war was only will for power and possession, whether it was the possession of women or land or money. But now-a-days economic inequality, over population, sense of insecurity and unequal treatment on the basis of caste, creed and colour may be added to the causes of wars. Jaina thinkers have all the time condemned war and violence. In *Uttarādhyayana*, it is said "If you want to fight, fight against your passions. It is much better to fight with one's own passionate self than to fight with others. If some one is to be conquered, it is no other than your own self. One who has got victory over one's own self is greater than the one who conquers thousand and thousand of warriors".

Jainas aim at complete eradication of war and violence from the earth, it is not possible as long as we are attached to and have possession for any thing-living or non-living, small or great. There are persons and nations who believe in the dictum 'might is right'. Though aggressive and unjust, war and violence is not acceptable to Jainas, they agree to the point that all those, attached to physical world and having a social obligation to protect others life and property, are unable to dispense with defensive war and violence. Jainas accept that perfect non-violence is possible only on spiritual plane by a spiritual being, completely free from attachment and aversion and having full faith in the immortality of soul and thus remaining undisturbed by the fear of death and sense of insecurity. The problem of war and violence is mainly concerned with worldly beings. They cannot dispense with defensive and occupational violence. But what is expected of them is to minimize the violence at its lowest. Ignorant and innocent persons should not be killed in wars at any cost. Jaina thinkers have suggested various methods and means for non-violent wars and for reducing violence even in just and defensive wars. They suggested two measures. First the war should be fought without weapons and in the refereeship of some one. The war, fought between Bharat and Bāhubali, is an example of such a non-violent war. In our times Gāndhījī also planned a non-violent method of opposition and applied it successfully. But it is not possible for all to oppose non-violently. Only a man, detached even to his body and his heart free from malice, can protect his right non-violently. In addition to this, such efforts can bear fruits only when raised against one with human heart. Its success becomes dubitable when it has to deal with some one without faith in human values and wants to serve his selfish motives. Jainism permits only a house-holder and not a monk to

protect his rights through violent means in exceptional cases. But the fact remains that violence for Jainas is an evil and it cannot be justified as a virtue in any case.¹⁰

Problem of Disintegration of Human Society

The disintegration of human race is also one of the basic problems, humanity is facing today. Really, the human race is one and it is us who have erected the barriers of caste, creed, colour nationalities etc. and thus disintegrated the human race. We must be aware of the fact that our unity is natural while these divisions are artificial and man made. Due to these artificial man made divisions, we all are standing in opposition to one another. Instead of establishing harmony and mutual love, we are spreading hatred and hostility in the name of these man-made artificial divisions of caste, creed and colour. The pity is that we have become thirsty of the blood of our own fellow beings. It is a well known fact that countless wars have been fought on account of these man-made artificial divisions. Not only this, we are claiming the superiority of our own caste, creed and culture over others and thus throwing one class against the other. Now, not only in India but all over the world class-conflicts are becoming furious day by day and thus disturbing the peace and harmony of human society.

Jainism, from its inception, accepts the oneness of human race and oppose these man made divisions of caste and creed. Lord Mahāvīra declared that 'human race is one'¹¹. He further says that there is nothing like inferiority and superiority among them. All men are equal in their potentiality. None is superior and inferior as such. It is not the class but the purification of self or a good conduct that makes one superior¹². It is only through the concept of equality and unity of mankind, which Jainism preached from the very beginning, that we can eradicate the problem of disintegration and class-conflict. It is mutual faith and co-operation which can help us in this regard. Jaina ācāryas hold that it is not the mutual conflict but mutual co-operation which is the law of living. In his work *Tattvārtha sūtra*, Umāsvāti maintains that mutual co-operation is the essential nature of human being¹³. It is only through mutual faith, co-operation and unity that we can pave the way to prosperity and peace of mankind. Jainas believe in the unity of mankind, but unity, for them doesn't mean absolute unity. By unity they mean an organic-whole, in which every organ has its individual existence but works for a common goal. i.e. human good. For them unity means, 'unity in diversity'. They maintain that every race, every

religion and every culture has full right to exist, with all its peculiarities, but at the same time, it is its pious duty to work for the welfare of the whole humanity and be prepared to sacrifice its own interest in the larger interest of the humanity. In the Jaina text *Sthānāṅgasūtra* we have the mention of *Grāmadharma*, *Nagaradharma*, *Rāṣṭradharma* etc.¹⁴ referring to one's duty towards one's village, city and nation that has to be fulfilled.

Problem of Economic inequality and Consumer Culture

Economic inequality and vast differences in the mode of consumption are the two curses of our age. These disturb our social harmony and cause class-conflicts and wars. Among the causes of economic inequality, the will for possession, occupation or hoarding are the prime. Accumulation of wealth on the one side and the lust, for worldly enjoyment on the other, are jointly responsible for the emergence of present-day materialistic consumer culture. A tremendous advancement of the means of worldly enjoyment and the amenities of life has made us crazy for them. Even at the cost of health and wealth we are madly chasing them. The vast differences in material possession as well as in the modes of consumption have divided the human race into two categories of 'Haves' and 'Have nots'. At the dawn of human history also, undoubtedly, these classes were existent but never before the vices of jealousy and hatred were as alarming as these are today. In the past, generally these classes were co-operative to each other while at present they are in conflicting mood. Not only disproportionate distribution of wealth, but luxurious life led by affluent people these days, is the main cause for jealousy and hatred in the hearts of the poor.

Though wealth plays an important role in our life and considered as one of the four *puruṣārthas* i.e. the pursuits of life yet it cannot be maintained as the sole end of life. Jainas, all the time, consider wealth as a means to lead a life and not a destination, *Uttarādhyayanāsūtra* rightly observed, "that no one who is unaware of treasure of one's own protect one-self by wealth¹⁵. But it does not mean that Jaina *ācāryas* do not realise the importance of wealth in life. *Ācārya Amṛtacandra* maintains that the property or wealth commits violence. Jainas accept the utility of wealth; the only thing they want to say that wealth is always a means and it should not be considered as an end. Not doubt wealth is considered as a means by materialist and spiritualist as well, the only difference is that for materialist it is a means to lead a luxurious life while for spiritualist, as well as

Jainas, it is a means for welfare of human society and not for one's own enjoyment. The accumulation of wealth in itself is not an evil but it is the attachment towards its hoarding and lust for its enjoyment which makes it an evil. If we want to save the humanity from class-conflicts, we will have to accept self-imposed limitation on our possessions and modes of consumption. That is why Lord Mahāvira has propounded the vow of complete non-possession for monks and nuns and vow of limitation of possession for laities. Secondly, to have a check on our luxurious life and modes of consumption he prescribed the vow of limitation in consumption. The property and wealth should be used for the welfare of humanity and to serve the needy, so he prescribed the vow of charity. In Jainism the vow of charity is named as *Atithi saṁvibhāga*. It shows that charity is not an obligation towards the monks and weaker sections of society but through charity we give them what is their right. In Jainism it is the pious duty of a house-holder to fix a limit to his possessions as well as for his consumption and to use his extra money for the service of mankind. It is through the observation of these vows that we can restore peace and harmony in human society and eradicate economic inequality and class conflicts.

Problem of Conflicts in Ideologies and Faiths

Jainism holds that reality is complex. It can be looked at and understood from various view-points or angles. For example, we can have hundreds of photographs of tree from different angles. Though all of them give a true picture of it from a certain angle yet they differ from each other. Not only this but neither each of them, nor the whole of them can give us a complete picture of that tree. They individually as well as jointly will give only a partial picture of the tree. So is the case with human knowledge and understanding also, we can have only a partial and relative picture of reality. We can know and describe the reality only from a certain angle or view-point. Though every angle or view-point can claim that it gives a true picture of reality yet it gives only a partial and relative picture of reality. In fact, we cannot challenge its validity or truth-value, but at the same time we must not forget that it is only a partial truth or one-sided view. One who knows only partial truth or has a one-sided picture of reality, has no right to discard the views of his opponents as totally false. We must accept that the views of our opponents also may be true from some other angles. The Jaina theory of

Anekāntavāda emphasises that all the approaches to understand the reality give partial but true picture of reality, and due to their truth-value from a certain angle, we should have regard for other's ideologies and faiths. The *Anekāntavāda* forbids to be dogmatic and one-sided in our approach. It preaches us a broader outlook and open mindedness more essential to solve the conflicts taking place due to the differences in ideologies and faiths. Prof. T.G. Kalghatgi rightly observes, "The spirit of *Anekānta* is very much necessary in society, specially in the present days, when conflicting ideologies are trying to assert supremacy aggressively. *Anekānta* bring the spirit of intellectual and social tolerance".

For the present-day society what is awfully needed is the virtue of tolerance. This virtue of tolerance i.e. regard for others ideologies and faiths has been maintained in Jainism from the very beginning. Mahāvīra mentions in the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, those who praise their own faiths and ideologies and blame those of their opponents and thus distort the truth will remain confined to the cycle of birth and death¹⁷. Jaina philosophers have maintained that all the judgments are true by their own view-points, but they are false so far as they refute other's view-points totally. Here I would like to quote verses from works of Haribhadra (C.8th A.D.) and Hemcandra (C. 12th A.D.), which are the best examples of religious tolerance in Jainism. In *Lokatattvanirṇaya* Haribhadra says: "I bear no bias towards Lord Mahāvīra and no disregard to the Kapila and other saints and thinkers, whatsoever is rational and logical ought to be accepted¹⁸. Hemacandra in his *Mahādeostotra* says" "I bow to all those who have overcome attachment and hatred, which are the cause of worldly existence, be they Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Śiva or Jina¹⁹. Thus, Jaina saints have tried all the times to maintain harmony in different religious-faiths and tried to avoid religious conflicts.

The basic problems of present society are mental tensions, violence and conflicts of ideologies and faiths. Jainism had tried to solve these problems of mankind through the three basic tenets of non-attachment or non-possessiveness (*aprigraha*), non-violence (*ahimsā*) and non-absolutism (*Anekānta*). If mankind observes these three principles, peace and harmony can certainly be established in the world.

Problem of the Preservation of Ecological Equilibrium

The world has been facing a number of problems such as mental tensions, war and violence, ideological conflicts,

economic inequality, political subjugation and class conflicts not only today but from its remote past. Though some of these have assumed an alarming proportion today, yet, no doubt, the most crucial problem of our age is, for coming generation would be, that of ecological disbalance. Only a half century back we could not even think of it. But today, every one is aware of the fact that ecological disbalance is directly related to the very survival of human race. It indicates lack of equilibrium or disbalance of nature and pollution of air, water, etc. It is concerned not only with human beings and their environment, but animal life and plant-life as well.

Jainism presents various solution of this ecological problem through its theory of non-violence. Jainas hold that not only human and animal being but earth, water, air fire and vegetable kingdom are also sentient and living beings. For Jainas to nollute, to disturb, to hurt and to destroy them means commit the violence against them which is a sinful act., It is their firm belief that earth, water, air, fire and vegetable pave the way for the protection of ecological balance. Their every religious activity starts with seeking forgiveness and repentance for disturbing or hurting earth, water, air and vegetation. Jainācāryas had made various restrictions of the use of water, air and green vegetables, not only for monks and nuns but for laities also. Jainas have laid more emphasis on the protection of wild-life and plants. According to them hunting is one of the seven serious offences or vices. It is prohibited for every Jaina, whether a monk or a laity. Prohibitions for hunting and meat-eating are the fundamental conditions for being a Jaina. The similarity between plant-life and human life is beautifully explained in *Ācārāṅgasūtra*. To hurt the plant life is as sinful act as to hurt human life. In Jainism monks are not allowed to eat raw-vegetables and to drink unboiled water. They cannot enter the river or tank for bathing. Not only this, there are restrictions for monks on crossing the river on their way of tours. These rules are invogue and observed even today. The Jaina monks and nuns are allowed to drink only boiled water or lifeless water. They can eat only ripe fruits, if their seeds are taken out. Not only monks, but in Jaina community some householders are also observing these rules. Monks and nuns of some of the Jaina sects place a piece of cloth on their mouths to check the air pollution. Jaina monks are not allowed to pluck even a leaf or a flower from a tree. Not only this, while walking they always remain conscious that no insect or greenery is trampled under their feet. They use

very soft brushes to avoid the violence of smallest living beings. In short, Jaina monks and nuns are over conscious about the pollution of air, water, etc.

So far as Jaina house-holders are concerned they take such vows as to use a limited and little quantity of water and vegetables for their daily use. For a Jaina water is more precious than *ghee* or butter. To cut forest or to dry the tanks or ponds are considered very serious offence for an house-holder. As per rule, Jaina house-holders are not permitted to run such type of large scale industries which pollute air and water and lead to the violence of plant-life and animal-kingdom. The industries which produce smoke in large quantity are also prohibited by Jainācāryas. These types of industries are termed as '*mahārambha*' or greatest sin and larger violence. It is considered as one of the causes

for hellish life. Thus, Jainas take into consideration not only the violence of small creatures but even earth, water, air, etc. also. The fifteen types of industries and bussiness prohbited for the house-holder are mainly concerned with, ecological disbalance, pollution of environment and violence of living beings. Jainācāryas permitted agriculture for house-holders, but the use of pesticides in the agriculture is not agreeable to them, because it not only kills the insects but pollutes the atmospheres as well as our food items also. To use pesticides in agriculture is against their theory of non-violence. Thus, we can conclude that Jainas were well aware of the problem of ecological disbalance and they made certain restrictions to avoid the same and to maintain ecological equilibrium, for it is based on their supreme principle of non-violence.

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19. *Mahādevastotra* (Hemacandra), 44.

The Concept of Non-Violence in Jainism

The concept of non-violence has been preached by almost all the religions of the world. All the thinkers of humanity and the founders of religious orders universally accepted it as a core principle of human conduct and cardinal religious virtues. In Indian religions in general and Jainism in particular non-violence is considered as a supreme moral virtue (Ahimsā paramo dharmah).

In Ācārāṅga, a canonical Jaina Text of 4th cent. B.C., Lord Mahāvira declares that "All the worthy men of the past, the present and the future say thus, speak thus, declare thus, explain thus, that all the breathing, existing, living and sentient creatures should not be slain, nor treated with violence, nor abused, nor tormented. This is the pure, eternal and unchangeable law or the tenet of religion."¹ 'Bhaktaparijñā' also mentions the superiority of non-violence over all other virtues. It says "just as in the world there is nothing higher than mountain Meru and nothing extended than the sky, so also (in the world) there is nothing excellent and universal than the virtue of non-violence."² In Praśnavyākaraṇasūtra, non-violence is considered as a shelter to all the living beings. In it Ahimsa is equated with sixty virtuous qualities such as peace, harmony, welfare trust, fearlessness etc.³ For Jainas non-violence is a wider term comprehending all the virtues. It is not a single virtue but a group of virtues. Ācārya Amṛtacandra in his famous work Puruṣārthasiddhupāya maintains that "all moral practices such as truthfulness etc. are included in Ahimsā (non-violence), similarly all the vices are comprehended in Himsā (violence) because virtues do not vitiate the real nature of self while vices do vitiate. Thus, in Jainism non-violence represents all the virtues and violence all the vices.

The same view is also propounded in the famous Hindu work Mahābhārata. It says 'As the foot-prints of all smaller animals are encompassed in the footprint of an elephant in the same way all the virtues (dharma) are included in Ahimsā (non-violence).⁴ Further it maintains that there is nothing higher than the virtue of non-violence⁵ because it comprehends all the virtues⁶ Lord Buddha in Dhammapada also remarks enmity is never appeased by enmity, but only by non-enmity- it is an eternal law.⁷ In other words it is not the violence, but non-violence that can be accepted as an universal law of human conduct.

Not only in indigenous religions, but in the Semitic religions also non-violence is accepted as religious virtues. 'Thou shall not kill'⁸ is one of the ten commandments, which is perscribed by prophet Moses. In the Holy Bible Jesus Christ also said 'Love thy enemy'.⁹ In Islam the supreme being (Allāh) is called the Beneficent (Al-Rahmān) and the Merciful (Al-Raheem). These injunctions of the great prophets and law givers of the world show that it is the doctrine of non-violence which can only be a universal law of an advanced human society.

This universal acceptance of the ideal of non-violence does not mean that the ideal has been practised by all the religions of the world, in the same spirit and by all the means. In Vedic religion we have the injunction such as "Consider all the creatures of the world as your friend"¹⁰ or "see all the beings as your ownself",¹¹ yet in practice we find that; in early Vedic religion there are sanctions for not only animal sacrifices but for the human sacrifices also. In Vedas, we have the prayers to the deities for the total destruction of the enemy and victory over it.¹² This shows that the primitive religion and early Vedic religion also were not very much cooped with the doctrines of non-violence. It is also true in the case of Judaism and Islam. Though in Judaism 'thou Shalt not kill' is accepted as one of the ten commandments, but for the Jews people, this injunction only means not to kill the people of their own group and faith. Similarly in Islam, the ideal of non-violence is confined to the follower of their own faith. In it we have the sanction for Jehada. Both of these Semitic religions also have sanction for animal sacrifices. Thus, we can say that in early Vedic religion, Judaism and Islam alongwith the other primitive form religions of the world, the concept of non-violence is only confined to the non-violence towards the people of one's own group and faith. In the history of Semitic religion." Christianity for the first time totally condemned the human killing. Lord Jesus Christ bestowed his compassion on all the human beings, though in Christianity, we do not have any sanction for animal sacrifices in the name of religion, but for the sake of human food animal killing is allowed in it. In the history of indigenous religions Vaiṣṇavism, Jainism and Buddhism, condemned all the violence towards the animal-kingdom. Though in Buddhist countries meat-eating is a common

practice yet we must be aware of the fact that this does not have any religious sanction on the part of Buddhism. Vaiṣṇavism prohibit the violence towards the vegetable kingdom. It is in Jainism for the first time that the violence towards the vegetable kingdom as well as other subtle being of the water, earth, air and fire is totally shunned off. A Jaina monk neither can eat raw vegetables, nor can accept the meal which is prepared for him. He can drink only boiled water or water which is completely lifeless. He observes non-violence by all the nine means, i.e. (1-3) not to do violence through mind, body and speech, (4-6) not to order for violence through mind, body and speech and (7-9) not to recommend violence through mind, body and speech.¹³ So far as the conduct of house-holder is considered, he has been prohibited only from the intentional violence of mobile beings.

In Pali tripitaka, Buddha himself prohibited the meat-eating to the monks, if it is seen, known or heard that the animal was killed for them. Though, Buddha allowed his monks to accept invitations for meals i.e. to accept the meals which is prepared for them. Buddha also not prohibited his monks from eating raw vegetable and drinking the water of well or river. All this shows a development in the meaning of the term non-violence. This development did not take place in a chronological order, but through the cultural and rational development of human society. The development in the meaning of the term non-violence is three dimensional : (1) to refrain from the violence of human beings, to vegetable kingdom and life existing in the finest particles of earth, water, air and fire (2) to refrain from the external act to the internal will of violence i.e. from outward violence to inward violence and (3) to refrain from the violence of other self to the violence of one's own self.

Religious sanction for violence and Jaina view-point

The acceptance for the 'inevitability of violence in the social and individual life is something different from giving it a religious sanction. Though Jaina thinkers accept that complete non-violence as they consider it, is not possible in this worldly life. Yet neither they gave the religious sanction to the violence nor they degraded this ideal of non-violence by saying it as impracticable. Even if some sort of violence is permitted to the house-holders and in some cases to monks in the Jaina scriptures such as *Niṣīthacūṛṇī* 15 etc., they never say that this type of violence is not violence at all. For example, in building the temple

of Jina, there will be unintentional violence of one sensed being of earth, water etc. and there may occur unintentional violence of two or more sensed beings. But they never said that violence done in the name of religion is not violence at all, as Vedic scriptures propound. They say that it is a violence, done for the sake of the greater good of the individual and society. It is a little demerit conducive to greater merit. If in a situation violence is inevitable, Jaina thinkers advice to opt the lesser violence for the greater good. Intentional violence of immobile one-sensed living beings for lively-hood and in religious performances is permitted to house holders only.

Rational Foundation of Non-Violence

Mackenzi, an eminent Western scholar, believes that the ideal of non-violence is an outcome of fear.¹⁶ But Indian thinkers in general and Jainas in particular never accepted this view. For them the basis of non-violence is the concept of equality of all beings. They based this ideal not on the emotional basis but on the firm footings of reason. The *Daśavaikālika*, a Jaina canonical text of 3rd century B.C. mentions that every one wants to live and not to die. For this simple reason *Niggaṇthas* prohibit the violence.¹⁷ It is also mentioned that Just as pain is not dear to oneself, having known this regarding all other beings, one should treat all the beings equally and should keep sympathy with all of them on the simple basis of equality.¹⁸ The simplest rule of our behaviour towards the others is 'whatever you desire for yourself and whatever you do not desire for yourself, desire that or do not desire that for others.'¹⁹ This experience of likeness of all beings and the regard for the right of all to live are the basement for the practice of non-violence. It is not only in Jainism, but in Buddhism and Hinduism also non-violence is supported on the rational ground of equality of all beings.

In *Dhamampada* Lord Buddha also remarks 'All men tremble at torture and love life and fear death, remember that you are like unto them, so do not kill nor cause slaughter.'²⁰ In *Īṣopaniṣad* it is declared "For a man who realises this truth, all beings need, become the self; when one thus sees unity, what delusion and what sorrow can one have". This idea of the *Īṣopaniṣad* (6 & 7) is echoed thus, in the *Gītā* : "The man whose self has been integrated by yoga sees the Self in all beings and all beings in the Self : he sees the same everywhere". *Sarvatra samadarśinaḥ*. "One who sees, by analogy with oneself, the same everywhere, whether it is pleasure or pain, is the best yogi,

Ātm'aupamyena samam paśyati. (Gītā, vi.29,32) Our classical commentators have rightly brought out the implication of this. By analogy with oneself (ātmaupamya) when one realizes that what is good or bad for oneself must be so for others, one would always do only what is good for others. He would be engaged in the welfare of all beings (Sarvabhūtahita), hating none, and with friendliness and compassion for all.

Non-violence is nothing but to treat all living being as equal. The concept of equality is the core of the theory of non-violence. The observance of non-violence is to honour each and every form of life. According to Jaina point of view, all the beings have equal right to lead a peaceful life. Though violence is unavoidable yet it can not be the directive principle of our living, because it goes against the judgements of our faculty of reasoning. If I think that nobody has any right to take my life on the same ground, I have also no right to take another's life. The principle, 'live on others' or 'living by killing' is self-contradictory. The principle of equality propounds that every one has the right to live. The directive principle of living is not 'Living on others' or 'Living by killing' but 'Living with others', or 'Live for others' (Parasparopagrahojīvānām).²¹ Though in our worldly life complete non-violence is not possible yet our motto should be 'Lesser violence is better Living'. It is not the struggle but co-operation is the law of life. I need other's co-operation for my very existence and so I should also co-operate in other's living.

The meaning of Non-violence

The term non-violence (Ahimsā) has various connotations. Generally it means not to kill, slay or hurt any living being. Ahimsā means abstention or refraining from himsā. Himsā means violence, injury, harm, deprivation, mutilation, disfigurement and causing pain and suffering to others. In Tattvārthasūtra the term violence is defined as to hurt the vitalities of a living being through the operation of intense passion infected activity of mind, body and speech. This definition of himsā covers two aspects external and internal. In Jainism, violence is considered of two types -- Dravyahimsā and Bhāvahimsā.²² The act of harming or hurting is Dravyahimsā i.e. external violence and the intention to hurt or to kill is Bhāvahimsā i.e. internal violence. There is a causal relation between Dravyahimsā and Bhāvahimsā. Generally, Dravyahimsā caused by entertaining impure or passionate thought activities such as anger, pride, deceit, greed, sorrow, fear,

sex-desire etc. An outer act of hurting others vitalities if proceeded by impure thought activity i.e. ill-will then it really becomes an act of violence. On the basis of dravya and bhāva himsā we have four alternatives of violence (1) both intention and act of killing (2) only there is an intention of killing, not the act of killing. (3) act of killing minus intention of killing and (4) neither the act of killing and nor the will,²³ though apparently it seems an act of hurting.

In Jainism, violence not only involves the killing or causing harms to other beings but it is also related to our ownself. To hurt the vitalities of other beings is called para-himsā, i.e. violence of others while to entertain impure thought activity or ill-will is the violence towards our ownself. Impure thought activity or ill-will injures the real nature of this soul by disturbing its equanimity. The evil thought activity vitiates the purity and equanimity of the soul hence called sva-himsā i.e. violence of our ownself. This violence of our ownself is more than the violence of others, because the later may only be possible when former had taken place. Generally, we cannot kill or cause harm to others without impure thought activity or ill-will i.e. the violence towards others implies the violence of our ownself. Bhaktaparijñā mentions "killing of other beings is killing one's ownself and compassion for others is the compassion for one's ownself." Thus, will is the mother of activity. Ill-will causes sinful activity. The violence towards others can only be committed after committing violence towards one's ownself. Ācārāṅga says, "he who ignores or negates other beings, ignores or negates one's ownself. He whom you wish to kill or control or on whom you wish to inflict suffering is yourself."²⁴ We can not kill or harm other without killing our ownself i.e. without vitiating our equanimity, the real nature of ourself. It is the attachment and hatred which make violence possible. In the state of equanimity i.e. non-attachment and non-hatred commission of violence is an impossibility. Thus, passions necessarily lead to the violence of our ownself as well as to otherselves. Ācārya Amṛtacandra in his famous work Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya mentions "The absence of attachment and other passions is non-violence, while presence of these is violence. This is the essence of Jaina scriptures. There will be no violence even if vitalities are injured when a person is not moved by any kind of passions and is careful in his activity. But if one acts carelessly moved by the influence of passions, there is certainly a violence whether a living being is killed or not. Because a passionate person first

injures his ownself through the self. It does not matter whether there is subsequently an injury is caused to another being or not."²⁵ The will to injure and act of injuring, both constitute violence, but of these two, first is more vital, so far as the principle of bondage is concerned. Thus, in Jainism every activity of mind, body and speech infatuated with passions and carelessness is called violence and absense of violence is non-violence.

Positive aspect of Non-violence

Further, we must be aware of the fact that in Jainism non-violence is not merely a negative concept i.e. not to kill; but it has positive meaning also as compassion and service to living beings. Once a question was asked to Mahāvira 'O Lord, one person is rendering his services to the needy persons while other is offering pūjā to you, of these two who is your real follower, Mahāvira answered 'first one is the real follower of mine, because he is following my teaching.'²⁶

Non-violence and War

Just as peace and non-violence are synonyms so are the war and violence. There can be no war without violence. One who is engaged in war is definitely engaged in violence. Though aggressive and unjust wars have been condemned by all the religions yet defensive wars are considered as moral and just. Judiasm, Islam, Christianity and Hinduism all support those wars which are fought for a religious and just cause. Islam considers Jihad as a religious duty. In Hinduism Bhagavadgītā also supports war for the sake of just cause.

Now, we shall consider the position of Jainas in this regard. Jaina thinkers advocate non-resistance towards all the force whether used justly or unjustly. Jaina monks are totally prohibited for any resistance which involves violence. For Jainas, war is always immoral act, for it is always waged due to our attachment and involve violence : external as well as internal. In Jaina canons it is said "what is the use of fighting with others. If one wants to fight he should fight with himself because it is your passionate self which is to be conquered. One who conquers his ownself conquers four passions and five senses and ultimately conquers all the enemies."²⁷ All wars have their origin in passions and attachment and so generally speaking are all unjust. Jaina monks are not permitted to violent resistance even for the protection of their own life, but as an exceptional case if the very existence of Jaina order is in danger, they are permitted

even for the violent resistance. In Jaina canons we have the example of Ācārya Kālaka, who engaged himself in warfare against the king of Avantī for the rescue of his nun sister Sarasvatī.²⁷ But all that resistances of that nature are considered as an exception. So far as as an moral act.

So far as the house-holders are concerned, they are allowed to involve in such wars, fought for the just cause. But it should be noted here that the war fought for the just cause must be a defensive one and not an offensive one. The aggressive wars faught by Jaina kings were never considered by Jaina thinkers as moral act.

It was Jainism that gave the idea of wars where in violence was not involved. This spirit may will be understood by the story of Bharat and Bāhubali; Bharat who wanted to be a Cakravartī King attacked Bāhubali who accept his sovereignty. Both were engaged in war, refused to when they were suggested for a non-violent method of war, both of them agreed to. In our age Mahatma Gandhi had demonstrated the way of passive resistance i.e. Satyāgraha.

Jainism sets its goal as the ideal of complete non-violence external as well as internal : The realisation of this ideal in the practical life is by no means easy. Non-violence is a spiritual ideal, fully realisable only in the spiritual plane. The real life of an individual is a physio-spiritual complex; at this level complete non-violence is not possible. According to Jaina thinkers the violence is of four kinds (i) deliberate (Samkalpī) or aggressive violence i.e. intentional killing (ii) protective violence i.e. the violence which takes place in saving the life of one's own or his fellow being or in order to make peace and ensure justice in the society (iii) Occupational i.e. violence taking place in doing agriculture or in running the factories and industries (iv) violence, is involved in performing the daily routine of a house-holder such as bathing, cooking, walking etc. The first form of violence must be shunned by all, because it relates to our mental proclivities. So far as the thoughts are concerned, a man is his own master. So it is obligatory for all to be non-violent in this sphere. From the behavioural point of view, deliberate violence is aggressive. It is neither necessary for self-defence nor for the living.

The Second form of violence is defensive taking place in the activity of defence. It becomes necessary for the security of one's life. External circumstances may compel a person to be a violent or to counter attack in defence of his own life or that of his companions or for the protection of his belongings. A person living in family is unable to

keep away completely from this type of violence because he is committed to the security of family members and their belongings. It will not be possible for him to resist non-violently with success. Only a man, unattached to his body and material objects, his heart free from malice, can protect his rights non-violently. A non-violent opposition only may be fruitful against an enemy with human heart.

So far as occupational violence is concerned everyone cannot shake it off. For so long as a person has to earn his livelihood and to seek fulfilment of his physical needs, deliberate violence of vegetable kingdom is unavoidable. In Jainism intentional violence to mobile animals by a house-holder has been forbidden even when it becomes necessary for the maintenance of life and occupation.

Undoubtedly one or other form of violence is inevitable in our life, but on this basis we can not take decision that the observance of non-violence is of no use in the present. Just as violence is inevitable in the world for living, non-

violence is also inevitable for the very existence of human race. So far as the existence of human society is concerned it depends on mutual co-operation, sacrifice of one's interest in the interest of his fellow-beings and regard for other's life. If above mentioned, elements are essential for our social life, how can we say that non-violence is not necessary for human life. Society does not stand on violence but on non-violence, not on fulfilment of self-interest but on sacrifice of self-interest, not accepting our own rights but in accepting the rights of others as our duty. Thus, we can say that the non-violence is an inevitable principle of the existence, for human society. At present we are living in age of nuclear weapons and due to this the existence of human race is in danger. At present it is only the observance of non-violence, which can save the human race. It is mutual credibility and the belief in the equality of human beings which can restore peace and harmony in human society.



The Role of Parents, Teachers and Society in Instilling Culture Values

Meaning of Culture Values

When we talk about instilling culture-values in our children, we should be clear about one thing: What do we mean by culture-values? What kind of values do we want to teach? Do we want to continue the present hypocritical double standard in the name of culture and tradition? Are we not keeping alive a culture, devoid of any real values, a mere pomp and show, where in the gap between saying and doing is too wide and deep to cover it? Do we want our children to make outward claims of religion, morality, good conduct and behaviour at places of worship, temples, churches and social gatherings while in the work place and at home, to be involved in deception, intrigue and immoral behaviour? I am saying this because perhaps we have the same expectations from our children. Today, we want our youngsters to become successful businessmen, officers or politicians. But whether a person having good character and doing what he thinks and says, may be successful presently in any field? These days, corruption is so widespread in politics, administration and business, it seems

that no one with good character and morals can be successful. Even in the field of so-called religion, the success of such a person is doubtful because there too fundamentalist monks, sectarianism, the blind pursuit of name and fame are so strong that the difference between words and deeds is clearly visible. Our so-called 'good', yoga teachers and masters of religious establishments are clear examples of this dualism. Thus, we need to be clear what we mean by building the character of our youngsters. Do we want a 'successful' person or a truthful and honest one? It seems that in our heart of hearts, we want our youngsters to be successful but seemingly truthful and honest. It is a bitter fact that while talking about a well-cultured child, we do not mean more than formal courtesy, etiquette and blindly following old traditions.

Does instilling culture-values imply adopting the modern Western culture of materialism and lavish luxurious living without good conduct and morality? To this end, now-a-days, not only in the prosperous high class but even in the middle class, people have the desire to send their

children to convents. Though the children in convent schools learn outward formality and etiquette, they are largely poor in moral and spiritual values.

Alternatively, in the name of culture and tradition, do we want to instill sectarianism, religious fanaticism, prejudice and/or lifeless ritualism in our children? Many people who talk of character building have such hollow objectives. They expect their children to have blind faith in religious concepts and traditions.

Thus, before discussing the problems of instilling culture and tradition in our youngsters, we should define what we mean by a cultured person. Does it mean one who is successful in the present atmosphere? Does it mean one who is Westernized in attitude and conduct? Does it mean a child who is religiously attached to traditional rituals? Or do we want our youngsters to have spiritual outlook and to have faith in humanitarian values?

In my view, when we think beyond our personal interests and religious prejudices and set aside indulgence towards our child, we will clearly see that, in reality, a cultured person is one who has good intentions and immaculate conduct. In fact, culture means good character. Culture means moving away from animal instincts and imbibing human values. Culture can be instilled in children by teaching them such qualities as self-control, rational outlook and co-operation. Let us now consider how we can accomplish our goal.

Avoid Certain Fallacies about Education:

It is unfortunate that most of us do not understand the purpose of education. Neither gaurdians nor teachers, politicians nor society understands the real motive behind what is being taught. Most of us have forgotten that an important purpose of education is instilling-culture values. There seems to be a chaos in the field of education and consequently people merely link education to livelihood. Materialistic thinking limits the purpose of education to prepare an individual to earn his livelihood. However, if the goal of education is just earning bread, what is the difference between man and animal? It is said :

*Āhār nidrā bhayamaithunam ca
sāmānyametad paśubhih narānām*

(Eating, sleeping, fear and sex, these four instincts are common between men and animals.)

It is a fact that bread comes first but it is not the ultimate goal of life. So why, only earning the bread is being considered the goal and the end of education? It is

unfortunate that this thinking is dominant not only in the field of education but also among the parents and administrators. Today, parents want their children to study the subjects leading to prosperity and authority. We want our son to become a doctor, an engineer or a government officer not because he will become more useful to the society but because he will have authority and weath. This blind pursuit of power and wealth has polluted our outlook towards education. This materialistic outlook is not producing good educated human beings but it is breeding the 'devil' in us. Our education is turning out everything but a human being. But can an education, not breeding human values and not making man a man be called education? Today, education is related to bread and not to character. Today, the significance of education is not building a good character but producing a clever diplomat. The government is under this delusion. Our (Indian) government thinks that teaching of ethics is against the ideal of secularism, but does secularism imply immorality and unethical conduct? The teaching of ethics has been discarded in the name of secularism. We may print the motto

sā vidyā yā vimuktaye

(education is, that leads to liberation).

But our present system of education is not concerned with it. Moral and spiritual values do not have any place in today's education although the commissions recently set up by the government have stressed the urgent need for the teaching of morals and ethics in their reports. Today's educators and students, both are slaves of money. On the one hand, the teacher teaches not because he is interested in developing the character of his students but because he gets his salary. On the other hand, the government, the parents and students do not consider him to be a GURU (master) but a servant. When GURU is reduced to the status of a servant, then the expectations of instilling culture values are invain. These days the GURU-student relationship is business like - a bargain. In our ancient scriptures, education has been described as the nectar of life but today it has been reduced to the status of means of earning the livelihood. We have forgotten the basic goal of education. In the words of the famous Urdu poet Firaq:

*Sabhī kuch to ho rahā hai is a tarakki ke jamāne men
Magar kyā gajab hai kī ādamī insān nahin hotā*

(Everything is happening in this age of progress but the tragedy is that man is not becoming a human being.)

Today's education is turning out doctors, engineers,

lawyers, etc. but to some extent, it is not producing good human beings. Unless education instills moral and spiritual values in a child, it can not produce human beings. Our primary responsibility is to make man a man, to instill culture values in our youngsters. The famous American thinker Tufts writes:

Education is for character building, by character building and of character building.

Thus, according to Tufts, the purpose and end of education is to sow the seeds of good character and good values in a human being. Since the independence of India, the commissions, set up to study and suggest reforms of education, headed by the famous philosopher, Dr. Radhakrishnan, the famous scientist, Dr. D.S. Kothari, and the famous educationist, Dr. Mudaliyar, all came to the conclusion that education must relate to human values. As long as this is not done, as long as education does not sow the seeds of good character traits, instead of good human beings, our colleges and universities will continue to turn out people with undersirable attitude and tendencies.

The Role of Parents and Guardians in Character Building:

It is true that family is the first school for a child where the seeds of culture values are sown. A child spends about 18 out of 24 hours with the family members. Thus, naturally he or she is most influenced by the character of his family members. Now the question arises: Are today's parents in a position to teach good character to their children through their actions? If the parents are busy in the pursuit of their own interests and material pleasures, then it seems impossible for children to learn good values. Many parents of high class, affluent families lead a luxurious life, greatly influenced by materialism of modern culture. It is rather difficult to imagine that their children will keep away from materialism. On the contrary, it is seen that such youngsters develop many undersirable habits and behaviour. First, such families are adopting non-vegetarianism and using intoxicating drinks, thus moving away from good, healthy, clean diet. Secondly, their untamed desires have put a question mark on the purity of their character. Thirdly, because of the greed for money, the reliability and simplicity of their lives is being eroded. It is evident that such atmosphere is not conducive to the building of good character of children. If the parents spend much of their time in offices, parties and clubs, and the children are left in the care of servants and baby-sitters, they lose intimacy

with their children. Thus, how can their children be expected to learn culture values? This also applies to the children of working parents. In many cases, the character traits developed by such children are of the servants and baby-sitters and not of the parents. Many people send their youngsters to Western-style boarding schools so that their children may not come in the way of their indulgence or they may not pick up the undesirable habits and conduct of their parents. In this context the couplet written by an Urdu poet seems to be appropriate:

Tifl men boo aai kyaa ma baap ke itwaar ki

Doodh to dabbe ka hai taaleem hai sarkar ki

(How can an offspring adopt the faith of the parents?

He is the given canned milk and (British) government's education.)

We can not depend on others to instill our culture and traditions in our children. If parents want their children to imbibe the sound and health, features of our ancient Indian culture, they will have to lead a clean life of self-control and self-sacrifice. They will have to be immaculate in their livelihood and behaviour.

What should Parents and Guardians Do?

1. Parents and guardians should have an immaculate, cultured and ethical conduct so that they produce a good influence on the youngsters.
2. Parents and guardians should watch the kind of company their children keep. Peer pressure has tremendous effect on youngsters.
3. We should select the schools carefully. We should respect the teachers and teach our youngsters to do the same.
4. We should select the boarding schools and dormitories carefully for our youngsters.
5. As far as possible, the children should not be left in the custody of servants and baby-sitters. We should spend as much time with our children as possible.
6. We should provide good literature for reading and should try to keep our children away from 'dirty' books, films and records.
7. We would educate our children about our values with the medium of moral stories and the life stories of great men.
8. We should take our children to meet with noble, educated and cultured personalities.

Equanimity and Meditation (Sāmāyika and Dhyāna)

Sāmāyika is the principal concept of Jainism. It is the first and foremost among six essential duties of a monk as well as of a house-holder. Prakṛta term Sāmāyika is translated into English in various ways such as observance of equanimity, viewing all the living beings as one's own self, conception of equality, harmonious state of one's behaviour, integration of personality as well as righteousness of the activities of mind, body and speech. Ācārya Kundakunda also used the term samāhi (samādhi), in the sense of sāmāyika where it means a tensionless state of consciousness or a state of self-absorption¹. In its general sense the word sāmāyika means a particular religious practice through which one can attain equanimity of mind. It is an end as well as means in itself. As a means it is a practice for attaining equanimity while as an end it is the state in which self is completely free from the flickerings of alternative desires and wishes, excitements and emotional disorders. It is the state of self-absorption or resting in one's own self. In Āvaśyakaniryukti, it is mentioned that the sāmāyika is nothing but one's own self in its pure form². Thus, from transcendental point of view, sāmāyika means realisation of our own self in its real nature. It is the state in which one is completely free from attachment and aversion. In the same work Ārya Bhadra also mentions various synoymys of sāmāyika³. According to him equanimity, equality, righteousness, state of self-absorption, purity, peace, welfare and happiness are the different names of sāmāyika. In Anūyogadvārasūtra⁴, Āvaśyakaniryukti⁵ and Kundakunda's Niyamasāra⁶, sāmāyika is explained in various ways. It is said that one who by giving up the movement of uttering words, realised himself with non-attachment, is said to have supreme equanimity⁷. He, who detached from all injurious or unpious actions, observes three-fold control of body, mind and speech and restrains his senses, is said to have attained equanimity⁸. One who behaves equally as one's own self towards all living beings mobile and immobile, is said to have equanimity⁹. Further, it is said that one who observes self-control, vows and austerities, one in whom attachment and aversion do not cause any disturbance or tension and one who always refrains from indulgence, sorrow and ennui, is said to have attained equanimity or sāmāyika¹⁰.

This practice of equanimity is equated with religion it self. In Ācārāṅga, it is said that all the worthy people

preach religion as equanimity¹¹. Thus, for Jainas, the observance of religious life is nothing but the practice for the attainment of equanimity. According to them, it is the essence of all types of religious activities and they all, are prescribed only to attain it. Not only in Jainism but in Hinduism also, we find various references in support of equanimity. Gītā defines yoga as equanimity¹². Similarly, in Bhagvatī it is said that the observance of equanimity is the worship of lord¹³.

The whole frame-work of Jaina sādhanā has been built on the foundation of sāmāyika i.e. the practice for equanimity. All the religious tenets are made for it. Ācārya Haribhadra maintains that one who observes the equanimity or samabhāva will surely attain the emancipation, whether he belongs to Śvetāmbara sect or Digambara sect, whether he is Bauddha or the follower of any other religion. It is said in Jaina religious texts that one who observes hard penances and austerities such as eating once in a month or two as well as one who makes the donations of crores of golden coins every day, can not attain emancipation unless he attains equanimity. It is only through the attainment of equanimity of mind that one can get emancipation or liberation. Ācārya Kundakunda says "what is the use of residing in forest, mortification of body, observance of various fasts, study of scriptures and keeping silence etc. to a saint, who is devoid of equanimity" (Niyamasāra, 124).

Now we come to the next question how one can attain this equanimity of mind. Mere verbal saying that I shall observe the equanimity of mind and refrain from all types of injurious activities does not have any meaning unless we seriously practise it in our own life.

For this, first of all, one should know what are the causes which disturb our equanimity of mind and then make a n endeavour to eradicate them.

It is very easy to say that one should observe the equanimity of mind, but in practice it is very difficult to attain it. As our mental faculty is always in grip of attachment and aversion, what so ever we think or do, is always motivated by either attachment or aversion. Because the vectors of attachment and aversion are solely responsible for the disturbance of mental equanimity so the practice to attain equanimity depends on the eradication of attachment and aversion. So long as we do not eradicate the attachment and aversion, we are unable to attain equanimity.

Now, our attention turns to the eradication or attachment and aversion. How we can get rid of these two enemies of equanimity. Attachment is another name of mineness and this mineness can only be uprooted through the contemplation of *ektva bhāvanā* and *anyatva bhāvanā* i.e. nothing is mine except my own self. In *Āurapaccakhāna*, it is clearly mentioned that if we want to conquer the mineness we must have to contemplate on the transitory nature of worldly things as well as of our own body. Only he who perceives that the death is coming nearer and nearer every moment, can see the things in their right perspective. *samyagdarśana* is nothing but to have a proper understanding of the worldly things. One, who perceives one's own death and transitory nature of things, can never be attached to them. When mineness disappears, otherness also disappears. For these two are the relative terms and without one, other also loses its meaning and when the idea of mineness as well as otherness dissolves, attachment and aversion disappears and equanimity dawns.

There is only one way to attain the equanimity of mind and that is through the contemplation of real nature of one's own self as well as of worldly things. One can eradicate the vectors of attachment and aversion and thus attain equanimity. And it is through self-awareness that one can be steady and firm in the state of equanimity or self-absorption. Equanimity needs proper understanding of

real nature of one's own self as well as of others. In *Niyamasāra*, it is said that one, who meditates in one's own real nature with non-attached thought, activity and realises his self through righteous and pure concentration, can attain the supreme equanimity. One, who always practises the *dharma dhyāna* (righteous meditation) and *śukla dhyāna* (meditation of pure-form or real nature) can attain the equanimity. Thus, sāmāyika is closely related to meditation, without meditation and self-awareness no one can attain the equanimity of mind. *Kundakunda* further maintains that one who is absorbed in righteous and pure meditation is the *antarātmā* or *sādhaka* and one who is devoid of such contemplation or meditation is called *bahirātmā*. The realisation of self is only possible through equanimity and equanimity is possible only through the meditation of one's own real nature (*Niyamasāra*, 15, 147).

At last, I would like to conclude my paper by quoting a beautiful verse of Sāmāyika-pāṭha of *Ācārya Amitagati-Sattveṣu maitrīm guṇiṣu pramodaṁ kṛṣṭesu jīveṣu kṛpāparatvaṁ. Mādhyasthyabhāvaṁ Viparīta vṛttau Sadā mamātmā vidadātudeva.*

Oh Lord! I should be friendly to all the creatures of world and feel delight in meeting the virtuous people. I should always be helpful to those who are in miserable conditions and tolerant to my opponents."

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The Concept of Vibhajjavāda and its Impact on Philosophical and Religious Tolerance in Buddhism and Jainism

Buddhism and Jainism both belong to the same Śramanic tradition of Indian Culture, Gautama, the Buddha and Vardhamāna, the Mahāvīra were contemporaries. The philosophical awakening was the main feature of their age. The various religio-philosophical problems and questions were put before the religious leaders and thinkers and they were expected to answer and to solve these. The various answers were given to the same problem by different thinkers, and owing to this difference of opinions on the philosophical problems, the various philosophical schools emerged in that age. According to the Pali *Tripiṭaka* there were sixty two schools or sixty two different views held by different teachers on the nature of man and world, and according to Prākṛta Āgamas there were three hundred sixty schools. Each one of them was claiming that his view was the only right view (*samyagdr̥ṣṭi*) and other's views were false views (*mithyādr̥ṣṭi*). But according to Buddha and Mahāvīra all of them have one sided picture of the reality or the phenomenon which is a complicated one. Both of them found that these various philosophical and religious schools and sects were conflicting with each other without understanding the problem itself and cling to onesidedness. This onesidedness, is due to the absence of analytic approach towards the problems and improper method of answering the questions. If philosophical questions are answered categorically or absolutely they present only onesided picture of the fact or phenomenon and thus create a false notion. According to the Jaina thinkers the onesidedness (*ekānta*) and the claim that my view is the only right-view (*āgraha*) are considered as false notions (*mithyātva*).

For Buddha and Mahāvīra both, the true method of answering the philosophical questions is the method of analysis. Only an analytic approach towards the philosophical problems can give us a right vision. Both of them suggested that the philosophical questions should be answered after analysing them. This method of analysis was called as vibhajjavāda in both the canons. Buddha and Mahāvīra both claimed themselves as vibhajjavādins. In Buddhist order at the time of Aśoka only the Vibhajjavādins were considered as the true followers of Buddha. In Aṅguttarnikāya it is mentioned that there are four methods of answering a question -- (i) answer to a question en-toto

i.e. absolutely (*ekāṃśavāda*), (ii) answer to a question after analysing it into various parts (*vibhajjavāda*), (iii) answer to a question by raising a new question and (iv) to keep silence.¹ Buddha and Mahāvīra both preferred the second method i.e. *vibhajjavāda*, though Buddha sometimes used the first, third and fourth methods also. It is mentioned in the texts that Buddha himself claimed as Vibhajjavādin. Prof. S.Dutt in his book *The Buddha and Five After Centuries* says "perhaps the word Vibhajjavādin originally meant one whose method was to divide a matter posited into its component parts and deal with each part separately in his answer and not with the whole matter in en-toto fashion." This method of *vibhajjavāda* i.e. the method of analysis is well illustrated in *Subha-sutta* of the *Majjhima-nikāya*. Subha asked Lord Buddha, 'whether a busy life of a man of the world is to be preferred or a monk's reposeful life?' Buddha answered - 'the busy life may be a failure or success and so too the life of repose.' Similarly in the Jaina text *Bagavatisūtra*, Jayanti asked Mahāvīra whether sleeping is good or awakening is good? Lord answered that for a sinner sleeping is good and for a saint awakening is good. This analytic approach towards the problems shows that the relative answer is the proper method to deal with the problems, whether they are philosophical, religious, ethical or the problems of everyday life. Absolute or categorical answer explains only one aspect or the part of the problem and other aspects of the problem remain unexplained.

Thus, we can say that analytic approach towards the problems gives us broader outlook to understand them and we are more nearer to the truth.

It is due to *vibhajjavāda*, an analytic approach, the theory of *anekāntavāda*, in Jainism and *sūnyavāda* in Buddhism came into existence. The positive analytic approach of Lord Mahāvīra gave birth to *anekāntavāda* and *syādvāda* and the negative analytic approach of Lord Buddha later on gave birth to *sūnyavāda*. Both are, in fact, the offshoots of *vibhajjavāda*, or analytic method. Here I am not going into the details that how the theories of *anekāntavāda* and *sūnyavāda* emerged from *vibhajjavāda*. It is a matter of an independent paper. Here my submission is that this method of analytic approach towards the philosophical, ethical and other problems, has given a

broader perspective to understand the things. Buddha and Mahāvira, both condemned onesided narrow outlook. For both, it is the main cause of religious as well as philosophical quarrels leading to intolerance. It is said, "one, who sees only one aspect of the reality is ignorant, a real scholar sees hundreds of aspects of it."² "The person who possesses only onesided view quarrel with each other."³ In *Suttanipāta* Lord Buddha says, "He, who does not acknowledge an opponent's doctrine (*dhamma*), is a fool, a beast, a person of poor understanding. All those who abide by their own views, are fools with a very poor understanding".⁴ "One who is firm in his own view and holds that his opponent is a fool; thus he himself brings on strife calling his opponent a fool and impure."⁵ Further, Buddha says "There are two results of a dispute, first it is incomplete (picture of the truth) and secondly it is not enough to bring about tranquility. Having seen this, let no one dispute understanding *khema* (i.e. peace). It is the place where there is no dispute."⁶ "Those who maintain their own *dhamma* as perfect and other's *dhamma* as wretched, say that their own views (opinions) are the truth and so having disagreed, they dispute. One becomes low by the condemnation of the others. There will be no one distinguished amongst the *dhammas* if they condemn other's views."⁷ Here I have mentioned only a few passages of Lord Buddha in support of religious tolerance. For further details in this regard, the study *Culla-viyūha* and *Mahā-viyūha-suttas* (i.e. chapter 50 and 51) of *Suttanipāta*, is suggested where these points are further elaborated.

Jainism believes in the theory of *anekāntavāda* which means that the views, the ideologies and the faiths of others should be respected. Mahāvira like Buddha mentions in *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*. "Those who praise their own faiths and ideologies and blame that of their opponents and thus distort the truth, will remain confined to the cycle of birth and death."⁸ It is further maintained that "all the *nayas* (view-points) are true in respect of what they have themselves to say, but they are false in so far as they refute totally other *nayas* (i.e. the view points of the opponents). Those, who take different view points (*nayas*) together and

thus grasp all the aspects of a thing (fact or phenomenon) have a right understanding, just as those who with eyes, are able to grasp an elephant as a whole and not like the blindmen, who take one particular part of an elephant as a whole elephant."⁹ It is this broader outlook which can establish harmony among the apparently conflicting views of various religions.

This broader outlook for religious tolerance is maintained in Buddhism till the period of Asoka, because we find so many evidences about religious tolerance and religious co-existence from the inscriptions of Asoka. But I do not know, whether this outlook of religious tolerance and harmony was further maintained or not by Buddhism in India. I request the scholars of Buddhism to enlighten us in this regard. Though it is true that Buddhism has shown this broader outlook every where outside India and remained there co-existing with the earlier religions of those countries.

So far as Jainism is concerned this religious tolerance and harmony is maintained by the later Jaina Acaryas also. In one famous Jaina text of 3rd B.C. namely *Isibhāsiyāṁ* the views of different teachers of Śramanic and Brahmanic trends like *Nārada*, *Bhāradvāja*, Gautama Buddha, *Maṅkhali* Goṣāla and many others, have been presented with regards. They are called as Arhat Ṛṣis and their preachings are regarded as *Āgamas*. I would like to conclude my paper by quoting these two beautiful verses of religious tolerance of Haribhadra (C. 8th A.D.) and Hemacandra (C. 12th A.D.) respectively. Haribhadra says --

*na me pakṣapāto vīre na dveṣo kapilādiṣu /
yuktimadvacanāṁ yasya tasya kārya parigraha //*

I have no bias towards Lord Mahāvira and no disregard to Kapila and other saints and thinkers. Whatsoever is rational and logical ought to be accepted.

Hemacandra says --

*bhava bījānkurajanā rāgadyakṣayamupāgatā yasya/
brahmā vā viṣṇurvā haro vā jino-vā namastasmaih//*

I bow all those who have overcome the attachment and hatred which are the cause of worldly existence, be they Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Śiva or Jina.

*sabbe bala sunihina panna sabbevime ditthi parivvasana
-- Suttanipāta, 50/3(880)*

5. *sakayane capi datthaham vadano kamettha balo ti para
daheyya
sayameva so methagamavaheyya param vadam balama-
suddha dhammam*

-- Suttanipāta 50/16(893)

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3. *Udāna*, 6/4.
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6. *appaṃ hi etaṃ na alaṃ samaya dube vivadassa phalāni
brūmi
evaṃ pi disva na vivadiyetha khemami passam abibada
bhumim*
-- Suttanipāta 51/2(896)
7. *sakaṃ hi dhammaṃ paripunna mahu annassa dhammassa
pana hinamahu
evaṃ pi viggataha vivadiyanti sakaṃ sakaṃ sammuti mahu
saccam*
8. *parassa ce vambhayitena hino na koci dhammesu visesi assa
puthu hi annassa vadanti dhammant nihinato samhi
davaḥam badana*
-- Suttanipāta, 51/10-11(904-905)
9. *sayam sayam pasamsamta garahamta param vayam
je u tattha viusamti samsare te viussiya*
-- Sūtrakṛtāṅga, 1/1/2/23.
9. See, Samaṇasuttam, 728, 730 and 731.



The Teachings of Arhat Pārśva And The Distinctness of His Sect

Among the Nirgrantha Tirthankaras, the historicity of Arhat Pārśva as well as of Jina Vardhamāna Mahāvira has been fully established. Inscriptional and literary evidences play an important role in establishing the historicity of a person. The earliest inscription relating to Pārśva, of the 2nd or 3rd century A.D.,¹ has been found from the Kaṅkālī Tīlā, Mathurā. It is inscribed on an image of Pārśva, installed by Ghoṣaka, a disciple of Gaṇi Aggahiniya of the Sthāniya-kula of the Kottīya-gaṇa, a sub-order of friars and nuns also noticed in the hagiological list (earlier part, c. A.D. 100) of the *Paryuṣaṇā-kalpa* (compiled c. A.D. 503/516).² Though uninscribed, a more than life size sculpture of Pārśva (upper part mutilated)³ and a tiny figure of Pārśva as the central focus of an *āyāgapāṭṭa*, both stylistically datable to the period of the Śaka king Ṣoḍās (c. early 2nd cent. A.D.),⁴ prove that Arhat Pārśva was venerated in, and arguably before, that period. A metal image of Pārśva in the Prince of Wales Museum, variously dated between the 2nd-1st cent. B.C. to c. 2nd cent. A.D., is one more early piece in evidence.⁵

The inscriptional as well as the literary references to the Nirgranthas, however, are met with from c. third century B.C. The term "Niggantha" is mentioned in the inscription of Maurya Aśoka⁶ and is fairly frequently met with in the Pāli *Tripitaka*⁷ (usually, of course, in hateful and denegatory terms) though this cannot be taken as a conclusive evidence for the earlier church of Pārśva because the term Niggantha by then also had included the sect of Mahāvira. In point of fact, the Pāli canon confounded a few views and teachings of these two historical Tirthankaras. As demonstrated in the early days of the Nirgranthic researches by Jacobi,⁸ in the *Tripitaka* it is said that Niggantha Nātaputta (Mahāvira) preached *cāturyāma-saṃvara*, while in point of fact the preacher of the *cāturyāma-dharma* was Arhat Pārśva and not Mahāvira according to the Ardhamāgadhi canon of the Nirgranthas themselves.⁹ Mahāvira preached five-fold great vows (*pañca-mahāvratas*) and not the *cāturyāma-saṃvara*.

What we today can know about the teachings of Arhat Pārśva and the distinctness of his sect from that of Jina Vardhamāna is only through the available Ardhamāgadhi canon preserved in the Northern Church of Mahāvira, because the ancient church of Pārśva was later progressively

absorbed in the former and the records and texts relating to its hagiology and history are long lost.

Nirgranthologists like Pt. Sukhlal Sanghvi and others were of the opinion that the *Pūrva* literature (so often mentioned in the canonical literature from the late Kuṣāṇa period onward) had belonged to Pārśva's tradition.¹⁰ At present, however, no texts of that category of specification exists. Today, in so far as our knowledge of Pārśva's teachings and traditions goes, we are dependent on the canonical literature of Mahāvira's tradition, and, to a very small extent, on the Pāli canon of the Buddhists as well.

In the Ardhamāgadhi canon, the *Isibhāsiyāñ* (*Rṣibhāṣitani*)¹¹ the *Ācārāṅga*,¹² the second book, the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*,¹³ the *Vyākhyāprajñapti*,¹⁴ the *Jñātādharma-kathā*,¹⁵ the *Uttarādhyaṇa*¹⁶ and the *Rāja-Pradesiya*,¹⁷ the *Narakāvalikā*,¹⁸ and the *Sthānāṅga*¹⁹ reveal some significant references to Pārśva, his teachings as well as traditions. In the *Uttarādhyaṇa*,²⁰ the *Samavāyāṅga*,²¹ the *Āvaśyakaniryukti*,²² the *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* of Jinabhadraṇi kṣamāśra-maṇa,²³ the *Āvaśyakacūṃṛ*²⁴ and in the *Paryuṣaṇā-kalpa*²⁵ as well as in the *Mūlācārā*²⁶ of the Yāpaniya Church there are references to some distinctive (and hence distinguishing) features of the sects of Pārśva and Mahāvira.

On Pārśva's life and the history of his times and of his sect, scanty material is traceable in these works; yet it is significant that they contain sufficient material pertaining to the ethical teachings and philosophical doctrines of Pārśva. They also firmly point toward the distinctness of Pārśva's sectarian tradition from that of Vardhamāna.²⁷

The Teachings of Pārśva in Isibhāsiyāñ

The earliest and authentic version of Pārśva's philosophy and teachings is encountered in the *Isibhāsiyāñ* (*Rṣibhāṣitani*),²⁸ a text compiled c. 1st cent. B.C. but often containing material that goes back to c. 4th century B.C., some even perhaps earlier. In a separate article,²⁹ I had suggested that the *Isibhāsiyāñ*, in terms of some of its content, is earlier than the whole of Pāli as well as the Ardhamāgadhi canonical literature excepting of course the first book of the *Ācārāṅga*. M.A. Dhaky opines that this text belongs to Pārśva's tradition. I, however, hold a different view. In my opinion the text, in earlier times, might have

been composed in Pārśva's tradition as an independent text, but later on it was assimilated in the *Praśnavyākaraṇasūtra*, considered to be one of the ten *Daśā* texts as well as the tenth work among the 11 *Āṅga*-books of Mahāvira's tradition.

The *Isibhāsiyāñ* has an independent chapter on Pārśva's doctrines and teachings.³⁰ The authenticity of the Pārśva's view presented in this chapter cannot be doubted for various reasons. First, the *Isibhāsiyāñ* contains the teachings not only of Pārśva but also of Arhat Vardhamāna of the Nirgrantha Church, Maṅkhali Gośāla of the Ājīvaka sect; Vajjiyaputta, Mahākassapa, Indranāga and Sāriputta of the Buddhist Church, and Yājñavalkya, Asita-Devala, and Uddālaka-Āruṇi of the Vedic tradition. When we compare the views of the aforesaid saints mentioned in the *Isibhāsiyāñ* with the texts of their own traditions, we notice general similarity between them, which by and large proves the authenticity of the content of the *Isibhāsiyāñ*. If the author of the work in presenting had remained faithful to the original teachings of the ṛṣis or teachers of the other sects, we must conclude that he also was faithfully presenting the views of Pārśva. Second, we find that the teachings of Pārśva presented in the *Isibhāsiyāñ* corresponds to that which is stated of Pārśva's church in other canonical works like the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, the *Uttarādhyayana*, and the *Vyākhyāprajñapti*. Third, the authenticity as well as high antiquity of the Pārśva-chapter in the *Isibhāsiyāñ* can also be supported on the ground that this chapter is represented by its two separate versions. It is said that the second version of this book originally was found in the text named *Gati-vyākaraṇa* i.e. the *Praśnavyākaraṇa*. The reference thus runs:

गतिवागरणगंथाओ पमिति जाव सामित्तं इमं अज्झयणं ताव इमो बीओ पाढो दिस्सति

The views of these two versions of the same chapter fully correspond to each other with slight difference in content and to an extent in language, a few details figuring more in one than in the other. Thus, at a very early date, two versions (*vācanās*) of the same subject had existed. This chapter contains philosophical as well as ethical views of Arhat Pārśva. First of all, in this text, the views of Pārśva about the nature of the world are stated. To explain the nature of the world the following five questions were raised:

- (1) What is the nature of the world (*loka*)?
- (2) What are the different planes of the world?
- (3) To whom the world belongs?

(4) What does one mean by (the term) "world"?

(5) What is the meaning of the term *loka*?

Answering these five questions Arhat Pārśva said:

- (1) The world consists of the animate beings and the inanimate objects.
- (2) There are four different planes of the world:
 - (i) Material (*dravya*)
 - (ii) Spatial (*kṣetra*)
 - (iii) Temporal (*kāla*)
 - (iv) Existential (*bhāva*)
- (3) World inheres in selfhood. It exists by itself. In the perspective of commandeering position the world belongs to animate beings but in the perspective of its constitution, it belongs to both animate and the inanimate.
- (4) As for the existence of the world, it is eternal, with neither the beginning nor the end but is ever changing and (thus) dynamic in nature.
- (5) While explaining the meaning of the term *loka*, it is said that this world is called *loka*, because, it is known or experienced or recognized. (The Sanskrit term *lokāyata* means to be known or to be recognized.) To explain the nature of motion the following four questions have been raised:
 - (a) What is motion or *gati*?
 - (b) Who meets this motion?
 - (c) What are the different forms of motion?
 - (d) Why is it called *gati*, motion?

Answering these questions about the motion Arhat Pārśva said:

- (a) Any motion or change in existence in animate and in the inanimate beings is called *gati*.
- (b) Animate and inanimate (substances) encounter motion or change. This change is of four types: substantial, spatial, temporal and existential.
- (c) The existence of movement or change is also perennial with no beginning or end.
- (d) It is called *gati* because it has motion.

About the *karma* philosophy and the moral teachings of Arhat Pārśva, it is thus recorded:

1. The animate beings possess an upward motion by their inherent (abstract) nature, while the matter has a downward motion by its intrinsic nature (inertia).
2. The animate beings reap the fruits of their deeds according to their (good or bad) *karmas* or activities, while the changes in inanimate substances take place due to their dynamic nature.

The animate beings are activity-oriented, the inanimate substances are change-oriented or dynamic in nature.

The animate beings have two types of experience, of pain and pleasure. Only those who can get rid of violence and other evils including wrong viewpoint will have the feeling of bliss. A Nirgrantha, who eats only inanimate things, will meet emancipation and thus will end the transmigratory cycle.

In the second version of this chapter the following additional concepts are also mentioned:

- (1) The motion is of two types: (i) self-motivated and (ii) generated by external factors.
- (2) Whatsoever a person experiences, it is due to his own, and not due to other's deeds.
- (3) Those who observe the *cāturyāma* (the fourfold ethical code beginning with non-violence and ending with non-possession) will be free from the eight-fold *karmas* and will not be reborn in the four *yonis* or generic categories.

The essence of the doctrines and ethical teachings of Pārśva as embodied and expositioned in the *Isibhāsiyāñ* may be thus summarized:

- (i) The world is eternal with no creator behind it.
- (ii) Permanence in change is the essential nature of the world. World is dynamic in disposition. It consists of the five *astikāyas*, existentialities.
- (iii) Substances are of two kinds, animate and inanimate.
- (iv) The animate possesses an upward motion; the inanimate (by law of gravity), downward motion.
- (v) The motion is of two kinds: (a) self-motivated and (b) directed by external factors.
- (vi) The *gati* or transmigratory motion of animate beings is due to their own *karmas*, while the motion of matter is due to its own dynamic nature and inertia.
- (vii) The *karmas* are of eight types.
- (viii) Evil and non-restraint activities consequence in pain and in the cycle of births and deaths.
- (ix) Those who indulge in passions and violence cannot achieve the eternal peace and bliss.
- (x) Liberation can be achieved through the observance of four *yāmas*, self-restraints.

Teachings of Pārśva in other Canonical Works

In the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, the *Uttarādhyayana*, and the *Vyākhyāprajñapti*, we find some explanation of, or minute observations on, what is broadly stated in the *Isibhāsiyāñ*. In these texts the views of Pārśva are presented by the

followers of Pārśva and not by Pārśva himself. It is in the *Isibhāsiyāñ* alone that the original version of Pārśva's teachings is directly and implicitly present. Elsewhere we meet with Pārśva's views by proxy, through the discussions between the followers of Pārśva and that of Mahāvira or in a few instances by Mahāvira himself.

In the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*,³¹ for instance, is incorporated a conversation between Gautama and Udaka-Peḍhālaputra, the follower of Pārśva, on the nature and language of the *pratyākhyāna*-vow of non-violence. In this long discussion Udaka-Peḍhālaputra stressed on a technical point that, while taking the vow of non-violence, one must frame it in the language that "I shall not kill the being, who is presently in mobile-form (*trasa-bhūta*) instead of saying 'I shall not kill any mobile being.'" Similarly, in the *Vyākhyāprajñapti*³² some observations relating to the difference in minutiae about the nature and meaning of the terms *sāmāyika*, the *pratyākhyāna*, the *saṁvara*, the *viveka* and the *vyutsarga* have been made during the discussion of Kālāsyaavaiśya-putra, the follower of Pārśva and some sthaviras of the Mahāvira's following.

In the *Vyākhyāprajñapti*³³ we come across a very interesting and pinpointed discussion between the lay-followers of Mahāvira and the *śramaṇas* of Pārśva's tradition on the outcome of restraint and penance. It had been questioned: If the outcome of restraint is to stop the influx of fresh *karmas* and of penance to liberate the soul from the karmic bondage, then why the souls are born as devas in the celestial regions? To this question different answers were given by the *śramaṇas* of the Pārśva's church. At last Kaśyapa said it is due to the adherence to pious deeds such as penance and restraint that the souls are born as devas in celestial quarters. In the *Uttarādhyayana*³⁴ we also come across an interesting dialogue between Gautama and Keśi on aspects relating to the monastic disciplines and spiritual practices; as a result, some distinctive features of Pārśva's teachings surface.

Distinctness of Pārśva's Sect

Pārśva as well as Mahāvira belonged to the Nirgrantha section of the Śramaṇic traditions which had several similarities in doctrines, philosophy, and religious practices. So far as the philosophical aspect of their teachings is concerned, the traditions of Pārśva and Mahāvira have much in common. Scholars of Nirgranthology like Pt. Sukhlal Sanghvi and others are of the opinion that the Mahāvira's sect has considerably borrowed from that of

Pārśva in the field of metaphysics and karma philosophy.³⁵ The concepts, such as the world is eternal as well as dynamic, that it exists by itself and has no creator, are common to both traditions. The concept of permanence in change as the nature of Reality, which is the foundational tenet of the later Nirgrantha doctrine of *anekāntavāda* or non-absolutism is also met with in its embryonic form in, and in point of fact is central to, the teachings of Pārśva as well as Mahāvira. Similarly, the concept of the five *astikāyas* and the eight-fold *karmas* are found in the philosophy of Pārśva as well as Mahāvira. We encounter brief references to these concepts in the Pārśva-chapter of the *Īsibhāiyāñi* and more detailed ones in the standard canonical works of Mahāvira's tradition.

Similarly, the concepts of *āsrava*, *saṁvara*, *nirjarā*, *sāmāyika*, *pratyākhyāna* and *pauṣadha* are also common to both traditions, though there were some differences in the minutiae of these concepts and observances. The difference in opinion about the nature of *pratyākhyāna* between Gautama and Udaka Peḍhālaputra in the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* has been earlier noticed. Similarly, the differences in terms of detail on the practices are noticed in the relevant dialogues in the *Vyākhyāprajñapti* and in the *Uttarādhyāyana* also. However, these differences were related mostly to the code of conduct and not to the doctrines, philosophy, and principles of ethics as such. The distinctness of Pārśva's sect lies in its code of conduct, and not in dogma or philosophy, since it somewhat differed from that of Mahāvira. We shall notice and discuss at this point the distinctive features of the Pārśva's tradition.

(1) Pārśva propounded *cāturyāma-dharma*, while Mahāvira preached the *pañcayāma-dharma* or the five *mahāvratas*.³⁶ According to the Ardhamāgadhī canon, Mahāvira added celibacy as an independent vow to the *cāturyāma-dharma* of Pārśva. The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* mentions that Mahāvira prohibited having woman, and eating during night hours.³⁷

The question arises: Why did Mahāvira add celibacy as an independent vow? The answer to this question can be read in the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*. In the times of Pārśva, woman was considered a property or possession and it was taken for granted that prohibition of possession implied the prohibition of sexual relationship, for no one can enjoy the woman without having her. But, as the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* informs, in the time of Mahāvira, there were some *pāsathā* (wayward) *śramaṇas*, who believed that the prohibition of possession did not imply (or include) the prohibition of sexual

enjoyment. "If any woman invited or offered herself for enjoyment to a *śramaṇa*, then the fulfillment of her sexual desire was no sin, just as the squeezing of a blister or boil (causes relief) for some time (and has no dangerous consequences); so it is with (the enjoyment of) attractive (woman). How could, then, there be sin due to that?"³⁸

From this stanza it follows that some *śramaṇas* were interpreting the concept of non-possession in their own way. It only meant that, for the one who takes the vow of non-possession, cannot have a wife or woman. So it became necessary for Mahāvira explicitly to add celibacy as an independent vow and to lay considerable stress on the observance of this vow.

If we contemplate this question historically, we notice that the ancient Vedic *ṛṣis* used to marry and had progenies. After that state in life, on the one hand is followed the concept of *vānaprastha*, in which a *ṛṣi* did have a wife but observed celibacy; on the other hand, as informed by the Nirgrantha canonical literature, there were *śramaṇas* who were of the view that to enjoy a woman without possessing or getting her married was no sin: which is why Mahāvira included in the fold a separate, clear, definite and uncompromising vow of celibacy.

In Pārśva's tradition, repentance was not accepted as an essential daily duty. Only when a monk committed sin or transgression of his vows may he repent. But Mahāvira made repentance an obligatory daily-duty. A monk must repent every morning and evening whether he committed a sin and violated his vows or not. In the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*³⁹ and in the *Vyākhyāprajñapti*⁴⁰ as well as in other canonical works of Mahāvira's discipline it is known as *pratikramaṇa-dharma*.

One more difference in monastic practice was that Pārśva did not lay stress on nudity; he rather allowed one or two apparels for his monks (who thus were *sacelaka*), while stressed on nudity and so Mahāvira's tradition was known as *acela-dharma*. Though the medieval commentator of the *Uttarādhyāyana* holds that Pārśva allowed his *śramaṇas* to wear expensive or coloured robe,⁴¹ we possess no early textual support for such an assumption.

These three were the main features distinguishing the monastic code of conduct of Pārśva and that of Mahāvira. Alongwith these three major differences, there also were some minor differences which are found in the concepts of the ten *kalpas* or planes of asceticism.⁴² For instance, in Pārśva's tradition a monk could accept the invitation for food and also could take food prepared for him; but

Mahāvīra forbade this practice. Pārśva allowed his monks to accept the meals prepared for the king; Mahāvīra prohibited it. In Mahāvīra's tradition it was vital for a friar (or nun) to move from one place to another, except during the rainy season: Also, an ascetic, he had said, must not stay at one place for more than a month. But, according to Pārśva's tradition, a friar could stay at one place as long as he wished. In short, to keep on wandering was essential in Mahāvīra's but was optional in Pārśva's disciplinary code. Again, Mahāvīra had stressed that an ascetic must stay on at one place during the four months of the rainy season; in Pārśva's tradition this practice was also optional.

According to Mahāvīra an aspirant to friarhood must be initiated probationally. After this testing period, if he is proven eligible, then he may be allowed to be ordained second time and his seniority was fixed accordingly in the Order or Saṃgha.

These are some of the distinctive features of Pārśva's philosophy, teachings, and monastic discipline as can be traced out from the early literature. The belief that all Jinās teach the same code of conduct, and that the ascetics of the Pārśva's Order had become wayward by Mahāvīra's time receives no support from the evidence locked in the earlier canonical books.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. See *Epigraphia Indica*, Vol. X. Appendix. A list of Brāhmī Inscriptions S.N. 110, p. 20.
2. *Kalpasūtra* 216. In the various inscriptions of Kaṅkāli Tilā, Mathurā, we have two readings about this kula of the Koṭṭiya-gaṇa: (1) Thāniya-kula (2) Sthāniya-kula. While in the *Kalpasūtra* we have a third reading, Vāṇijja-kula.
3. Preserved in the Government Museum, Lucknow.
4. This date is after the recent researches by Gritli v. Mitterwallner.
5. Cf. U.P. Shah, *Studies in Jaina Art*, Varanasi 1955, plate 1, fig. 3.
6. *Me Kate ime viyāpata hohonti ti niganthesu Pi* -- Inscription No. 7, line 16, Delhi-Topara Inscription.
7. See G.P. Malalasekere, *Dictionary of Pāli-Proper names*, Vol. II, London 1974, pp. 61-65.
8. Hermann Jacobi, *Jaina Sutras*, Part II, (S.B.E. Vol. XLV), Introduction, p. xxi.
9. (A) *Cāujjñame niyaṇthe-Isibhāsiyāiṇ*, 31.
(B) *Cāujjāmo ya jo dhammo jo imo paṃcasikkio-Uttarādhyayana* 23/12.
10. See Pt. Sukhalal, *Cāra Tirthaṅkara* (Hindi), (sec. edn.), Varanasi 1989, pp. 141-43, See also "Introduction", *the Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. XXII, p. xlv.
11. *Isibhāsiyāiṇ*, 31.
12. *Ācārāṅga* II, 15/25.
13. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* II, 7/8.
14. *Vyākhyāprajñapti* 1/9/21-24; 2/5/95; 5/9/254-255.
15. *Jñātādharma-kathā* 2/3/1-6.
16. *Uttarādhyayana* 23.
17. *Rājapradeśiya* 2/3.
18. *Narakāvalikā (Niryāvaliya-sūtra)* 3/1.
19. *Sthānāṅga* 9/61.
20. *Uttarādhyayana* 23/12-13; see also commentary of Śāntiācārya for these verses.
21. *Samavāyāṅga* 8/8; 9/4, 16/4, 38/1, 100/4.
22. *Āvaśyaka-niryukti* 238 and 1241-1243.
23. *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya*.
24. *Āvaśyaka-cūṛṇi*.
25. *Paryūṣanā-kalpa (Kalpa-sūtra)* 148-156.
26. *Mūlācāra*.
27. See Arhat Pārśva.
28. *Isibhāsiyāiṇ*, 31.
29. See Sagarmal Jain, *Rishihhasit : A Study*, Jaipur 1988.
30. *Isibhāsiyāiṇ*, 31.
31. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* II, Chapter 7th.
32. *Vyākhyāprajñapti* 10.9.33. Ibid, 2.5.
- 33.
34. *Uttarādhyayana* 23.
35. See *Cāra Tirthaṅkara* for detailed discussion.
36. *Uttarādhyayana* 23/12.
37. *Se vāriyā ithi saraihattam-Sūtrakṛtāṅga* 1/6/28.
38. *Ibid.*, 1/3/4/9-10.
39. *Ibid.*, 2/7/81.
40. *Vyākhyāprajñapti* 1/9/123. See also *Āvaśyaka-niryukti* 1241.
41. *Uttarādhyayana* 23/12. See also Śāntiācārya's *ṭikā* on the above verses.
42. See (a) *Āvaśyaka-niryukti*, 1241-1243.
(b) *Bṛhat-Kalpa sūtra-bhāṣya*, 6359-6366.

Reconsidering the Date of the Nirvāṇa of Lord Mahāvira

The Jaina writers usually, after equating their dating with the Śaka era, have concluded that after a period of 605 years and 5 months of the *Nirvāṇa* of Mahāvira, Śaka became king. (*Tiloyapaṇṇatti* 4 : 1499; *Paiṇṇayasuttāim* : I part : 1984 - *Titthogālīpaiṇṇayaṃ* : (623)).¹ On the basis of this postulate, even today, the date of the *Nirvāṇa* of Mahāvira is held to be 527 B.C. Among the modern Jaina writers, Pt. Jugal Kishore Mukhtar (1956 : 26-56), of the Digambara sect, and Muni Śrī Kalyana Vijaya (1966 : 159), of the Śvetāmbara sect, have also held 527 B.C. to be the year of the *Vira Nirvāṇa*. From about the 7th century A.D., with a few exceptions, this date has gained recognition. In the Śvetāmbara tradition, for the first time in the *Prakṛṇaka* entitled '*Titthogālī*,' (*paiṇṇayasuttāim* : I part : 1984 : *Titthogālī* 623) and in the Digambara tradition, for the first time in *Tiloyapaṇṇatti* (4 : 1499), it is clearly mentioned that 605 years and 5 months after the *Nirvāṇa* of Mahāvira, Śaka became king. Both the texts were composed between 600 and 700 A.D. To the best of my knowledge, none of the earlier texts ever showed the difference between the *Nirvāṇa* of Mahāvira and the Śaka era. But this much is definite that from about 600-700 A.D., it has been a common notion that the *Nirvāṇa* of Mahāvira took place in the year 605 before Śaka. Prior to it, in the *Sthavirāvalī* of *Kalpasūtra* and in the *Vācaka* genealogy of the *Nandīsūtra*, the reference to the hierarchy of Mahāvira is found, but there is no mention of the chronology of the *Ācāryas* : therefore, it is difficult to fix a date of the *Nirvāṇa* of Mahāvira on the basis of these texts. In the *Kalpasūtra* (Sūtra-147, p. 145) only this much is mentioned that now 980 years (according to another version 993 years) have passed since the *Vira Nirvāṇa*. This fact makes only this much clear that after 980 or 993 years of *Vira Nirvāṇa*, Ācārya Devarddhigaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa finally edited this last exposition of the present Canon. Similarly, in *Sthānāṅga* (7 : 41), *Bhagavatisūtra* (9 : 222-229) and *Āvaśyaka Niryukti* (778-783),² alongwith the reference to Nihnavas, a reference to after how much time of Mahāvira's life-time and his *Nirvāṇa* were they prevalent is found. Here only there are some clues by comparing which with the external evidences of definite date, we can contemplate the date of *Nirvāṇa* of Mahāvira.

There have been differences of opinion from the very beginning on the date of *Nirvāṇa* of Mahāvira. Although, it has been clearly stated in *Tiloyapaṇṇatti*,³ a book recognised by the Digambara sect, that 605 years and 5 months after the *Nirvāṇa* of Mahāvira, Śaka became the king, there are four different statements found in this book, which are as follows :

- i. 461 years after Vira Jinendra attained salvation, Śaka became the king.
- ii. 9785 years after Vira Bhagavān attained salvation, Śaka became the king.
- iii. 14793 years after Vira Bhagavān attained salvation, Śaka became the king.
- iv. 605 years and 5 months after Vira Jina attained salvation, Śaka became the king.

Besides this, in *Dhavalā*; (4 : 1 : 44 : p. 132-133)⁴, a commentary on *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, there are three different statements as to after how many years of the *Nirvāṇa* of Mahāvira, Śaka (Śālivāhana Śaka) became the king :

- i. 605 years and 5 months after Vira Nirvāṇa.
- ii. 14793 years after Vira Nirvāṇa.
- iii. 7995 years and 5 months after Vira Nirvāṇa.

In Śvetāmbara tradition there are two clear opinions as to how much time after the *Nirvāṇa* of Lord Mahāvira Devarddhi's last assembly on Āgama was held. According to the first opinion, it was composed 980 years after the *Vira Nirvāṇa*, whereas according to the second it was composed 993 years after the event⁵.

It is significant also to note that in the Śvtāmbara tradition, there are two opinions regarding the date of Chandragupta Maurya's accession to the throne. According to the first, he ascended the throne⁶ in the year 215 of the Vira Nirvāṇa. However, in *Titthogālī Paiṇṇaya* only this much has been mentioned that (after *Vira Nirvāṇa*) the region of the Mauryas started 60 years after the Pālakas and 155 years after the Nandas (*Paiṇṇayasuttāim* I part : 1984, *Titthogālī Paiṇṇayaṃ* : 621), whereas according to the second opinion of Hemacandra (*Parīṣiṣṭa Parva* : 8 339),⁷ he ascended the throne 155 years after *Vira Nirvāṇa*. Similarly, in *Laghuposālik Paṭṭāvalī* (p. 37) it is written that 155 years after *Vira Nirvāṇa* Candragupta Maurya ascended the throne. Also, in *Nagapurīya Tapāgaccha*

Paṭṭāvalī (p. 48) it is written that 155 years after the *Vīra Nirvāṇa* Candragupta became the king, (*Vīrāt 155 varṣe Candraguptonṛpaḥ*). According to this *Paṭṭāvalī*, the reign of Mauryan dynasty ended after 278 years of *Vīra Nirvāṇa*. Now the period of 189 B.C. as the end of the Mauryan dynasty can be justified only when the *Vīra Nirvāṇa* is accepted as to be 467 B.C. It is worth mentioning here, that the historians have accepted 187 B.C. to be the date of accession to the throne of Puṣyamitra. This second theory, presented by Hemacandra, is a hindrance in ascertaining the year 527 B.C. to be the year of the *Nirvāṇa* of Mahāvīra.⁸ It is clear from these discussions that there has been a controversy regarding the date of the *Nirvāṇa* of Mahāvīra even in ancient times.

Since the old internal evidences regarding the date of the *Nirvāṇa* of Mahāvīra were not strong, the Western scholars on the basis of the external evidences alone, tried to ascertain the date of the *Nirvāṇa* of Mahāvīra; and as a result many new theories came into light regarding the same. The following are the opinions of different scholars regarding the date of Mahāvīra's *Nirvāṇa* :

1. Hermann Jacobi⁹ (It is to be noted that initially Hermann Jacobi accepted the traditional date 527 B.C., but later on he changed his opinion), 476 B.C. He has accepted the reference found in the *Parīśiṣṭa Parva* of Hemacandra to be authentic which says that 155 years after the *Vīra Nirvāṇa* Candragupta Maurya ascended the throne, and he ascertained the date of Mahāvīra's *Nirvāṇa* on the basis of this reference only.

2. J. Charpentier¹⁰, 467 B.C., He followed the opinion of Hemacandra and ascertained that the date of *Nirvāṇa* of Mahāvīra as to be 155 Years before Chandragupta Maurya.

3. Pandit A. Shanti Raja Shastri¹¹, 663 B.C., He considered the Śaka Era to be the Vikrama Era and establish the date of *Nirvāṇa* of Mahāvīra as to be 605 years before the Vikrama Era.

4. Prof. Kashi Prasad Jayaswal,¹² 546 B.C., He has mentioned only the two traditions in his article "Identification of Kalki". He has not ascertained the date of Mahāvīra's *Nirvāṇa*. But at some other places he has considered 546 B.C. to be the date of Mahāvīra's *Nirvāṇa*, adding 18 years between Vikrama's birth and his accession to the throne (470+18) he fixes the date of Mahāvīra's *Nirvāṇa* as 488 years before Vikrama.

5. S.V. Venkateswara,¹³ 437 B.C., His assumption is based on the Anand Vikram Era. This Era came into vogue 90 years after the Vikrama Era.

6. Pandit Jugal Kishor Ji Mukhtar,¹⁴ 528 B.C. On the basis of various arguments, he has confirmed the traditional theory.

7. Muni Sri Kalyana Vijaya,¹⁵ 528 B.C., While confirming the traditional theory, he has tried to remove the inconsistencies of the theory.

8. Prof. P.H.L. Eggermont,¹⁶ 252 B.C., The basis of his argument is equating the incident of *Samghabheda* of Tiṣyagupta in the Jaina tradition, which took place during the life time of Mahāvīra in 16th year of his emancipation. With the incident of *Samghabheda* and the act of drying up of the Bodhi tree by Tiṣyarakṣita in the Buddha *Samgha*, which took place during the reign of Aśoka.

9. V.A. Smith¹⁷, 527 B.C., He has followed the generally accepted theory.

10. Prof. K.R. Norman¹⁸, About 400 B.C., Considering Bhadrabāhu to be Chandragupta's contemporary, he fixed the period of 5 earlier *Ācāryas* as 75 years, at an average of 15 years each, and thus fixed the date of Mahāvīra's *Nirvāṇa* as $320+75 = 395$ B.C.

In order to determine the date of the *Nirvāṇa* of Mahāvīra, along with the Jaina literary sources we must also take into account the legendary and epigraphical evidence. We would follow the comparative method to decide which of the above-mentioned assumptions is authentic, and will give priority to the epigraphical evidences, as far as possible.

Among the contemporaries of Lord Mahāvīra, the names of Lord Buddha, Bimbisāra-Śreṇika and Ajātaśatru are well-known. The Buddhist sources give more information about them than the Jaina sources. The study of Jaina sources also does not give rise to any doubt about their contemporaneity. The Jaina Āgamas are mostly silent about Buddha's Life-history, but there are ample references to the contemporary presence of Mahāvīra and Buddha in the Buddhist Tripiṭaka literature. Here we shall take only two of the references. In the first reference there is a mention of the event of *Dīghanikāya* (*Sāmaññaphalasutta* : 2 : 1 : 7)¹⁹ in which Ajātaśatru meets many of his contemporary religious heads. In this reference, the chief minister of Ajātaśatru talks about Nirgrantha Jñātrputra like this : "Master, this Nirgrantha Jñātrputra, is the master of the sect as well as the monastery, teacher of the sect, a scholar, and a renowned *Tīrthanikara*, he is admired by many and respectable gentleman. He has been a long wandering mendicant (*Parivrajaka*) and is middle-aged". It can be derived from this statement that at the time of

Ajātaśatru's accession to the throne Mahāvīra's age must be about 50 years, because his *Nirvāṇa* is supposed to have taken place in the 22nd year of Ajātaśatru Kuṇika's rule. By deducting 22 years from his total age of 72 years, it is proved that at that time he was 50 years old (see *Vīra Nirvāṇa Samvat aur Jaina Kāla Gaṇanā*, pp. 4-5). So far as Buddha's case is concerned, he attained his *Nirvāṇa* in the 8th year of Ajātaśatru's accession to the throne. This is the hypothesis of Buddhist writers. This hypothesis given rise to two facts. Firstly, when Mahāvīra was 50 years old, Buddha was 72 (80-8), i.e. Buddha was 22 years older than Mahāvīra. Secondly, Mahāvīra's *Nirvāṇa* took place 14 years after Buddha's *Nirvāṇa* (22-8-14). It is worth mentioning here, that in the reference occurring in the *Dīghanikāya* (*Sāmaññaphalasutta* : 2 : 2 : 8), where Nirgrantha Jñāturputra and other five *Tīrthaṅkaras* have been called middle-aged, there is no mention of Gautama Buddha's age, but he must be 72 at that time because this event took place during the rule of Ajātaśatru Kuṇika and Buddha's *Nirvāṇa* took place in the 8th year of the rule of Ajātaśatru.

But contrary to the above-mentioned fact one finds another information in the *Dīghanikāya* that Mahāvīra has attained *Nirvāṇa* during Buddha's life-time. The reference from the *Dīghanikāya* is as follows (*Pāsādikasutta* : 6 : 1 : 1)²⁰

"I heard this once that the Lord was residing in a palace built in the mango orchard of the Śākya known as *Vedhaññā* in Śākya (country).

At that time Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta (*Tīrthaṅkara* Mahāvīra) had recently died at Pāvā. A rift was created among the *Nigaṇṭhas* after his death. They were divided into two groups and were fighting by using arrows of bitter words at one-another - "you don't know this *Dharmavinaya* (=Dharma), I know it. How can you know this *Dharma-vinaya*? you are wrong in ascertaining, (your understanding is wrong), I am rightly ascertained. My understandint is correct. My words are maningful and yours are meaningless. The things you should have told first you told in the end and vice-versa. Your contention is mindless and topsy-turvy. You presented your theory and withdrew. You try to save yourself from this allegation and if your have power, try to save yourself from this allegation and if you have power, try to resolve it. As if a war (-slaughtering) was going on among the *Nigaṇṭhas*."

The house-holder disciples of the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, wearing white dresses, also were getting indifferent,

distressed and alienated from the *Dharma* of *Nigaṇṭha* which was not expressed properly (*durākhyāta*), not properly investigated (*duṣpravedita*), unable to redeem (*anairyāika*), unable to give peace (*ana-upāsama-Saṁvartanika*), not verified by any enlightened (*a-Samyak- Saṁbuddha-pravedita*) without foundation = a different *stūpa* and without a shelter."

Thus, we see that in the Tripiṭaka literature, on the one hand where Mahāvīra has been described as middle-aged, on the otherhand, there is an information about the death of Mahāvīra during the life-time of Buddha. Since, according to the sources based on Jaina literature, Mahāvīra died at the age of 72, it is certain that both the facts cannot be true at the same time. Muni Kalyana Vijaya ji (*Vīra Nirvāṇa Samvat aur Jaina Kāla Gaṇanā*, 1987, p. 12) has called the theory of Mahāvīra *Nirvāṇa* during the life-time of Buddha as a mistaken concept. He maintains that the incident of Mahāvīra's demise is not a reference to his real death, but to a hearsay. It is alos clearly mentioned in Jaina Agamic texts that 16 years before his *Nirvāṇa*, rumour of his death had spread, hearing which many Jaina *Śramaṇas* started shedding tears. Since the incident of the bitter-argument between Makkhaligōsāla, a former disciple of Mahāvīra, and his other *Śramaṇa* disciples was linked with this rumour, the present reference from the *Dīghanikāya* about the dath of Mahāvīra during the life time of Buddha is not to be taken as that of his real death, rather it indicated to the rumour of his death by burning fever caused by *Tejoleśyā*, hurled upon him by agitated and acutely jealous Makkhaligōsāla after dispute.

Buddha's *Nirvāṇa* must have taken place one year and few months after the rumour about Mahāvīra's death, therefore, Buddha must have attained *Nirvāṇa* 14 years, 5 months and 15 days before Mahāvīra's *Nirvāṇa*.

Since Buddha's *Nirvāṇa* took place in the 8th year of Ajātaśatru Kuṇika's accession to the throne, Mahāvīra's *Nirvāṇa* must have taken place in the 22nd year of his accession. *Vīra Nirvāṇa* must have taken place in the 22nd year of his accession (*Vīra Nirvāṇa Samvat aur Jaina Kāla Gaṇanā*, p. 4). Therefore, it is certain that Mahāvīra's *Nirvāṇa* took place 14 years after the *Nirvāṇa* of Buddha. The fixation of the date of Buddha's *Nirvāṇa* would definitely influence the date of Mahāvīra's *Nirvāṇa*. First of all we shall fix the date of Mahāvīra on the basis of the Jaina sources and inscriptions and then we will find out what should be the date of Buddha's *Nirvāṇa* and whether it is supported by the other sources.

While determining the date of *Nirvāṇa* of Mahāvira, we would have to keep in our mind that the contemporaneity of Ācārya Bhadrabāhu and Sthūlibhadra with Mahāpadma Nanda and Chandragupta Maurya; of Ācārya Suhasti with Samprati; of Ārya Mañkṣu (Mangu), Ārya Nandila, Ārya Nāgahasti, Ārya Vṛddha and Ārya Kṛṣṇa with the period mentioned in their inscriptions and of Ārya Devarddhigaṇi kṣamāśramaṇa with king Dhruvasena of Valabhī, is not disturbed in any way. The historians have unanimously agreed that Chandragupta ruled from 317 B.C. to 297 B.C. (Majumdar : 1952 : p. 168; Tripathi : 1968 p. 139)., Therefore the same should be the period of Bhadrabāhu and Sthūlibhadra also. It is an undisputed fact that Chandragupta had wrested power from the Nandas and that Sthūlibhadra was the son of Śakṣāla, the minister of the last Nanda. Therefore, Sthūlibhadra must be the younger contemporary and Bhadrabāhu the older contemporary of Chandragupta. This statement that Chandragupta Maurya was initiated into Jaina religion, may or may not be accepted as authentic, still on the basis of the Jaina legends one must accept that both Bhadrabāhu and Sthūlibhadra were contemporary of Chandragupta. The main reason behind Sthūlibhadra's renunciation could be Mahāpadma Nanda's (the last ruler of the Nanda dynasty) misbehaviour with his father and ultimately his merciless assassination (*Titthogālīpāṇṇayanā* : 787 : *Pāṇṇayasuttāṇi* I part : 1984). Moreover, Sthūlibhadra was initiated by Sambhūtivijaya and not by Bhadrabāhu. At the time of first assembly on composition of Āgama held at Pāṭaliputra, instead of Bhadrabāhu or Sthūlibhadra, Sambhūtivijaya was the head, because only in that particular assembly it was decided that Bhadrabāhu will make Sthūlibhadra to study the Pūrva-texts. Therefore, it seems that the first assembly was held any time during the last phase of the Nanda rule. The period of the first assembly can be accepted as before 155 years of the Vira Nirvāṇa era. If we accept that both the traditional notions are correct and that Ācārya Bhadrabāhu remained Ācārya from Vira Nirvāṇa Saṁvat 157 to 170 and that Chandragupta Maurya was enthroned in 215 V.N., then the contemporaneity of the two is not proved. It concludes that Bhadrabāhu had already died 45 years before Chandragupta Maurya's accession. On this basis Sthūlibhadra does not even remain the junior contemporary of Chandragupta Maurya. Therefore we have to accept that Chandragupta Maurya was on throne 155 years after *Vira Nirvāṇa*. This date has been accepted by *Himvanta Sthavirāvali* (Muni Kalyana Vijaya : Vikram Era 1987 : p.

178)²² and *Parīṣiṣṭa Parva* (8 : 339) of Ācārya Hemacandra also. On this basis only the contemporaneity of Bhadrabāhu and Sthūlibhadra with Chandragupta Maurya can be also proved. Almost all the *Paṭṭāvalis* accept the period of Bhadrabāhu as an Ācārya to be 156-170 V.S. (*Paṭṭāvali Parāga Saṁgraha*, p. 166; *Vividhagacchīya Paṭṭāvali Saṁgraha* : I part : 1961 : pp. 15, 37, 48). In Digambara tradition also the total period of the three *Kevalis* and the five *Śrutakevalis* has been accepted as 162 years. Since Bhadrabāhu was the last *Śrutakevali*, according to the Digambara tradition his year of demise must be the year 162 of the Vira Nirvāṇa Saṁvat. Thus, despite the fact that there is a difference of 8 years regarding the period of demise of Bhadrabāhu as accepted by the two traditions, the contemporaneity of Bhadrabāhu and Chandragupta Maurya is fully justified. Muni Shri Kalyana Vijaya (*Śrī Paṭṭāvali Parāga Saṁgraha* : 1966 : 52; *Vira Nirvāṇa Saṁvat aur Jaina Kāla Gaṇanā* : p. 137)²³, in order to prove the contemporaneity of Bhadrabāhu and Chandragupta Maurya, accepted the period of Sambhūtivijaya as an Ācārya to be 60 years in place of 8 years. In this way, while accepting the date of the Nirvāṇa of Mahāvira as 527 B.C., he has tried to establish the contemporaneity of Bhadrabāhu and Chandragupta Maurya. But it is only his imagination (*Vira-Nirvāṇa Saṁvat aur Jaina Kāla Gaṇanā* - p. 137 & *Paṭṭāvali Parāga Saṁgraha* - p. 52)²⁴; there is no authentic proof available. All the Śvetāmbara *Paṭṭāvalis* accept the date of the demise of Bhadrabāhu to be the year 170 V.N.S. Also, in *Titthogālī* it has been indicated that the decay of the knowledge of the fourteen *Pūrvas* started in the year 170 V.N.S. Bhadrabāhu was only the last of the 14 *Pūrvadhara*s. Thus, according to both of the traditions - Śvetāmbara and Digambara, the date of demise of Bhadrabāhu stands as 170 and 162 of V.N.S. respectively.

On the basis of this fact, the contemporaneity of Bhadrabāhu and Sthūlibhadra with the last Nanda and Chandragupta Maurya can be proved only if the date of *Nirvāṇa* of Mahāvira is accepted as 410 years before V.S. or in the year 467 B.C. The other alternatives do not prove the contemporaneity of Bhadrabāhu and Sthūlibhadra with the last king of the Nanda dynasty and Chandragupta Maurya. In *Titthogālī Pāṇṇayanā* (783-794) also the contemporaneity of Sthūlibhadra and the king Nanda has been described. Thus on the basis of these facts it appears more logical to accept the date of the *Nirvāṇa* of Mahāvira as 467 B.C. *Himvanta Sthavirāvali* also mentions that Chandragupta was enthroned in 155 years after the *Vira*

Nirvāṇa and that Vikramārka lived 410 years after the *Vīra Nirvāṇa* (see *Vīra Nirvāṇa Saṁvat aur Jaina Kāla-Gaṇanā*, p. 177). This also confirms the theory of accepting the date of Mahāvira's *Nirvāṇa* to be 467 B.C.

Again, in the Jain tradition the contemporaneity of Ārya Suhasti and the king Samprati is unanimously accepted. The historians have acknowledged the period of Samprati to be 231-221 B.C. (Tripathi : 1986 : p. 139)²⁵ According to the Jain *Paṭṭāvalis*, the period of Ārya Suhasti as *Yuga Pradhāna Ācārya* was 245-291 V.N.S. If we base our calculation on the assumption that *Vīra Nirvāṇa* took place in 527 B.C., we will have to accept that Ārya Suhasti became the *Yuga Pradhāna Ācārya* in 282 B.C. and died in 236 B.C. In this way, if we consider 527 B.C. to be the year of *Vīra Nirvāṇa*, then, in no way, the contemporaneity of Ārya Suhasti and the king Samprati could be established. But, if we accept 467 B.C. to be the year of *Vīra Nirvāṇa*, then the period of Ārya Suhasti as an *Ācārya* starts from 222 B.C. (467-245=222). On this basis the contemporaneity is established, but the reign of Samprati extends to only one year during the Ācaryaship of Ārya Suhasti. But Ārya Suhasti had come in contact with Samprati when he was a prince and the ruler of Avanti, and may be at that time Ārya Suhasti was an influential Muni in spite of not being a *Yuga Pradhāna Ācārya* of the *Samgha*. It is remarkable that Ārya Suhasti was initiated by Sthūlibhadra. According to the *Paṭṭāvalis*, Sthūlibhadra was initiated in 146 V.N.S. and died in 215 V.N.S. It can be derived from this fact that 9 years before Chandragupta Maurya's accession, and during the last Nanda king (Nava Nanda), Ārya Sthūlibhadra had already been initiated. If, according to the *Paṭṭāvalis*, the total life of Ārya Suhasti is considered to be 100 years and his age at the time of initiation to be 30 years, then he must have been initiated in 221 V.N.S. i.e. 246 B.C. (assuming the date of *Vīra Nirvāṇa* in 467 B.C.) It does prove the contemporaneity of Ārya Suhasti with Samprati, but then, there is a difference of 6 years, if he is accepted to have been initiated by Sthūlibhadra himself because 6 years before he got initiated, in 215 V.N.S., Sthūlibhadra has already died. It is also possible that Suhasti may have got initiated at the age of 23 or 24, and not at the age of 30. Even then, it is certain that on the basis of the references made in *Paṭṭāvalis*, the contemporaneity of Ārya Suhasti and Samprati is possible only by accepting the date of *Vīra Nirvāṇa* as 467 B.C. This contemporaneity is not possible if the date of the Mahāvira *Nirvāṇa* is accepted as 527 B.C. or any other later date.

Thus, by accepting the date of the *Vīra Nirvāṇa* as 467 B.C. the contemporaneity of Bhadrabāhu and Sthūlibhadra with Mahāpadma Nanda and Chandragupta Maurya and that of Ārya Suhasti with Samprati can be proved. All other alternatives fail to prove their contemporaneity. Therefore, in my opinion, it will be more appropriate and logical to accept 467 B.C. as the date of the *Nirvāṇa* of Mahāvira.

Now we shall consider the date of the *Nirvāṇa* of Mahāvira also on the basis of some of the inscriptions. Out of five names - Ārya Maṅgu, Ārya Nandil, Ārya Nāgahasti, Ārya Kṛṣṇa and Ārya Vṛddha, mentioned in Mathurā inscriptions (see *Jaina Śilālekha Saṁgraha*, articles 41, 54, 55, 56, 57 and 63) first three are found in *Nandisūtra Sthavirāvalī* (*Gāthā* : 27-29) and remaining four names are found in *Kalpasūtra*. According to the *Paṭṭāvalis*, the period of Ārya Maṅgu as a *Yugapradhāna Ācārya* is considered to be in between 451 and 470 V.N.S. (*Vīra Nirvāṇa Saṁvat aur Jaina Kāla Gaṇanā*, p. 112). On accepting the date of the *Vīra Nirvāṇa Saṁvat aur Jaina Kāla Gaṇanā*, p. 112). On accepting the date of the *Vīra Nirvāṇa* as 467 B.C. his period extends from 16 B.C. to 3 A.D. and if it is 527 B.C. his period extends from 76 B.C. to 57 B.C. Whereas, on the basis of the inscriptions (*Jaina Śilālekha Saṁgraha* article No. 54) his period stands as Śaka Saṁvat 52 (Haviṣka year 52), i.e. 130 A.D. In other words, while considering the period of Ārya Maṅgu as indicated by *Paṭṭāvalis* and inscriptions there is a difference of 200 years if the date of *Vīra Nirvāṇa* is accepted as 527 B.C. and if it is 467 B.C. there is a difference of 127 years.

In several *Paṭṭāvalis*, even the name of Ārya Maṅgu, is not mentioned. Therefore, the theories, concerning his period, based on the *Paṭṭāvalis* are not authentic. Moreover, the only one *Paṭṭāvalī* called *Nandisūtra Sthavirāvalī*, which mentions Ārya Maṅgu, does not indicate the teacher-taught (*Guru-śiṣya*) tradition. Therefore, there are chances of the omission of certain names which has been confirmed by Muni Kalyana Vijayaji himself (*Vīra Nirvāṇa saṁvat aur Jaina kāla Gaṇanā*, pp. 121 & 131). Thus it is not possible to establish the date of the Mahāvira's *Nirvāṇa* on the basis of the inscriptional evidences related to Ārya Maṅgu, because on this basis neither the traditional belief in the date of Mahāvira's *Nirvāṇa* as 527 B.C. nor the scholars' opinion, as 467 B.C., could be proved correct. On equating the *Paṭṭāvalis* with the inscriptions, the date of *Vīra Nirvāṇa* falls around 360 B.C. The reason of this uncertainty is the presence of various wrong conceptions regarding the period

of Ārya Maṅgu.

So far as Ārya Nandil is concerned, we find the reference to his name also in the *Nandisūtra*. In the *Nandisūtra Sthavirāvalī* (*Gāthā*, 27-29), his name appears before Ārya Nāgahastī and after Ārya Maṅgu. There is an inscription of Nandika (Nandil) of the Śāka Saṃvat 32 in the inscriptions of Mathurā (see *Jaina Śilālekha Saṃgraha*, article No. 41); in another inscription of the Śāka Saṃvat 93, the name is not clear, only 'Nadī is mentioned there. (see *Jaina Śilālekha Saṃgraha*, article No. 67). Ārya Nandil is referred to also in the *Prabandhakośa* and in some ancient *Paṭṭāvalis*, but since at no place there is any reference to his period, it is not possible to establish the date of the *Nirvāṇa* of Mahāvira on the basis of this inscriptional evidence.

Now let us consider Nāgahastī. Usually in all the *Paṭṭāvalis*, the date of the demise of Ārya Vajra, has been considered as 584 V.N.S. After Ārya Vajra, Ārya Rakṣita remained the *Yuga Pradhāna Ācārya* for 13 years, Puṣyamitra for 20 years and Vajrasena for 3 years, i.e. Vajrasena died in the year 620 V.N.S. In Merutunga's *Vicāraśreṇī*, the period of Ārya Nāgahastī as the *Yuga Pradhāna* has been accepted as continuing for 69 years, i.e. Nāgahastī was the *Yuga Pradhāna* from 621 to 690 V.N.S. (*Vira Nirvāṇa Saṃvat aur Jaina Kāla Gaṇanā*, p. 106 note). If Hastahastī of the Mathurā inscription is Nāgahastī, then he is also referred to as the *guru* of Māghahastī in the inscription of the Śāka Saṃvat 54, which establishes him of before 131 A.D.

If we accept the date of the *Vira Nirvāṇa* as 467 B.C., then the period of his *Yuga Pradhānaship* extends between 154 and 223 A.D. According to the inscriptions he had a disciple in 132 A.D. yet one can be content by assuming that he must have initiated some one 22 years before being a *Yuga Pradhāna*. If we accept his life-span to be 100 years, he must have been 11 years old when he is supposed to have initiated Māghahastī. It seems almost impossible to believe that he was able to initiate somebody by his sermons at the age of 11 and that such an underage disciple was able to perform the *Mūrti-Pratiṣṭhā*. But if, on the basis of the traditional concept, we accept the *Vira Nirvāṇa* year to be before 605 of the Śāka Era or 52 B.C., then the references made in the *Paṭṭāvalis* tally the inscriptional evidences. On this basis his tenure of *Yuga Pradhānaship* extends from 16 to 85 of the Śāka Era, Māghahastī, one of his disciples was able to perform the *Mūrti-Pratiṣṭhā* by his sermons. Although common sense would hardly accept it as logical that his *Yuga Pradhānaship* extended for 69 years, yet because of

the fact that it considers the information given in the *Paṭṭāvalis* to be correct, this inscriptional evidence about Nāgahastī supports the date of *Vira Nirvāṇa* as 527 B.C.

Again, in one of the inscriptional sketches of Mathurā, Ārya Kṛṣṇa with that Ārya Kṛṣṇa mentioned after Śivabhūti in *Kalpasūtra Sthavirāvalī* (last part 4 :1), then his period on the basis of the *Paṭṭāvalis* and *Vīṣeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* (*Gāthā* : 2552-2553), could be established around 609. V.N.S., because as a result of the dispute over clothes between the same Ārya Kṛṣṇa and Śivabhūti the Boṭika, Nihnava came into existence. The period of this dispute is fixed as 609 V.N.S. If we accept the *Vira Nirvāṇa* year to be 467, then the period of Ārya Kṛṣṇa is supposed to be as 609-467=142 A.D. This inscriptional sketch belongs to 95+78=173 A.D. Since Ārya Kṛṣṇa has been figured as a deity, it is natural that 20-25 years after his death, in 173 A.D., this sketch must have been made by some Ārya Arha, one of his follower disciples. In this way, this inscriptional evidence can maintain compatibility with other literary reference only when 467 B.C. is established as the year of the *Vira Nirvāṇa*. It is not possible to reconcile it with any other alternatives.

In the Mathurā inscriptions (*Jaina Śilālekha Saṃgraha*: article no. 56 & 59), the name of Ārya Vṛddhahastī is related with two inscriptions. One is from Śāka Era 60 (Huviṣka year 60) and the other from 79 of the same. According to the Christian era, these inscriptions belong to 138 and 157 A.D. respectively. If he is the Ārya Vṛddha of the *Kalpasūtra Sthavirāvalī* and the Vṛddhadeva of the *Paṭṭāvalis* (*Vividha Gacchīya Paṭṭāvalī Saṃgraha* : p. 17), then according to the *Paṭṭāvalis*, he was led to perform *Mūrti-Pratiṣṭhā* in Karmāṭaka in the year 695 V.N.S. If we accept 467 B.C. to be the year of the *Vira Nirvāṇa*, then this period can be fixed at 695-467=228 A.D. whereas the inscriptional evidences are from 138 and 157 A.D. But, if according to the traditional concept the date of the *Vira Nirvāṇa* is accepted as 527 B.C. then his period is to be fixed at 695-527=168 A.D. Therefore, on accepting 527 B.C. to be the *Vira Nirvāṇa* year, the equation between this inscriptional evidence and the *Paṭṭāvali* based evidence is found to be matching well. On assuming 25 years to be the average period of tenure of each *Ācārya*, his period should be around 625 V.N.S. because Vṛddha occupies the 25th place in *Paṭṭāvalī*. Thus his time can be fixed as 625-467=158 A.D. which also proves the 467 B.C. as the period of *Vira Nirvāṇa*.

The last evidence, on the basis of which the date of Mahāvira's *Nirvāṇa* can be established is king Dhruvasena's inscriptions and his period. According to the popular belief, after the Valabhī assembly, first time *Kalpasūtra* was recited before a congregation at Ānandpur (Vadanagar) in order to console the grieved King Dhruvasena on his son's death (*Śrīkalpasūtra* : 147 pp. 145, Vinaya Vijaya : Commentary : p. 15-16). The period of Valabhī assembly is fixed as 980-993 V.N.S. There are several inscriptions of Dhruvasena available. The period of Dhruvasena the first, is said to be from 525 to 550 A.D. (Parikh, Rasikalal : 1974 :40). If this event is related to the second year of his accession i.e. 526 A.D., then it is proved that Mahāvira's *Nirvāṇa* must have taken place in 993-526=467 B.C.

Thus atleast three of the six inscriptional evidences prove that the *Nirvāṇa* of Mahāvira took place in 467 B.C. Whereas the two evidences may prove 527 B.C. as the period of *Vira Nirvāṇa*. But the dates based on the *Paṭṭāvalī* could be incorrect; therefore, they cannot be an obstacle in determining the date of the *Vira Nirvāṇa* as 467 B.C. One of these inscriptions is not helpful in fixing the date. These discrepancies are there also because the authenticity of the periods of the *Ācāryas* given in the *Paṭṭāvalī* is doubtful and today, we have no grounds to remove these discrepancies. Still we derive from this discussion, that most of the textual and inscriptional evidences confirm the date of Mahāvira's *Nirvāṇa* as 467 B.C. In that case, one will have to accept the date of the *Nirvāṇa* as 467 B.C. In that case, one will have to accept the date of the *Nirvāṇa* of Buddha to be 483 B.C., which has been accepted by most of the western scholars, and only then it will be proved that about 15 years (14 years and 5 months) after the *Nirvāṇa* of Buddha the *Nirvāṇa* of Mahāvira took place.

Notes :

1. a. *Nivvāṇe Virajīṇe chavvāsasadesu pañcavarisesuṃ. Paṇamāsesu gadesuṃ sañjādo saganio ahavā.*
b. *pañca ya māsā pañca ya vāsā chacceva hontivāsasayā pariṇivvuassārihato so uppanṇo sago rāmā.*
2. *Titthogālī Painṇayam, 623 bahuraya paesa avvattasamucchādugatiga abaddhiyā ceva. satte-e ṇiṇhagā khalu titthami u vaḍḍhamāṇassa, (778) bahuraya jamālipabhavā jīvapaesā ya tīsaguttao avvattā āsadhao samuccheyā samittāo. (779). gangāo dokiriya chaluḡā terāsiyāṇa uppatti. therāya goṭṭhamāhila puṭṭhamabaddham parūvinti. (780)*

sāvattḥī usabhapuram seyaviyā mihilam ullugātiram. purimantaranji dasapura rahavīrapuram ca nagarāim (781)

coddasa solasa vāsā cauddasavīsuttarā ya donni sayā. aṭṭhāvīsā ya duve pañceva sayā u coyālā. (782)

pañca sayā calasīyā chacceva sayā nāvottarā hoti. nānupattiya duve uppanṇā viṇavveue sesā. (783)

3. *Virajīṇe siddhigade causadaigisattḥivāsaparimāṇe. kālammi adikkante uppanṇo ettha sakarāo. (461) ahavā vīre siddhe sahasaṇavakammi sagasayabbhahie. paṇasīdimmi yatīde paṇamāse (Y. 9785, M5) sakanio jādo. 1497.*

pāthāntaram.

coddasasahasasagasayateṇa divāsakālavicchede. (19793) vīresarasiddhido uppanṇo ahavā. 1498.

pāthāntaram.

ṇivvāṇe virajīṇe chavāsasadesu pañcavarisesu. paṇamāsesu (Y. 605, M.5) gadesu sañjādo saganio ahavā. 1499.

pāthāntaram.

Tiloyapaṇṇatti - section 4, 1496 - 1499.

4. *avanidesu pañcamāsāhiyapañcuttarachassadavāsāṇi havanti aiso virajīṇināṇivvāṇagaddivāsādo jāva sagakālassa ādi hodi tāvadiyakālo. kudo? (605) edamhi kāle saganarindakālammi pakkhitte vaḍḍamā-ṇajīṇaṇivvudakālāgamāṇādo. vuttaṃ ca-pañca ya masa pañcaya vāsā chacceva hoti vāsasayā. sagakāleṇa ya sahiyā thaveyavvo tado rāsī (41)*

aṇṇe ke vi āriyā coḍḍasasahassa - sattaṣaḍ - tiṇa divāse-su jīṇaṇivvāṇadinādo aikkantesu saganarinduppattim bhaṇanti (14793) vuttaṃ ca-gutti-payattha-bhayāim coddasarayanāi samaikaṇṭaim. pariṇivvude jīṇinde to rajja saganaribḍassa. (42)

aṇṇe ke vi āriyā evaṃ bhaṇanti. taṃ jahā-sattasahassa ṇavasaya pañcāṇa divarisesu pañcamāsāhiesu vaḍḍhamāṇajīṇaṇivvudadinādo aikkantesu saganarindarajju-ppatti jādo ti. ettha gāhā-sattasahassā ṇavasada pañcāṇa divi saṃpañcamāsā ya. aikantā vāsāṇaṃ jaiyā taiyā saguppatti : (43)

(7995)

edesu tisu ekkena hodavvaṃ na tiṇṇamuvadesāṇa saccattam, aṇṇonṇaviroḥādo tado jāṇiya vattavvaṃ. --Dhavalā tikā samanvita Śātkhaṇḍāgama, Khanda 4, Bhaga 1, Pustak 9, p. 132-133 (section 4/1/44)

5. *samaṇassa bhagavao Mahāvīrassa Jāva savvadukkhapa-hiṇassa navavāsa sayāim vīkaṇṭāim dasamassa vāsasayassa ayam asiime saṃvacchare kāle gacchai,*

vāyanāntare puna ayaṃ tenaue saṃvacchare kālāṃ gacchai iha disai.

Śrī Kalpasūtra 147, p. 145.

6. *pālagaranno saṭṭhi paṇapaṇṇasayaṃ viyāṇa ṇaṇḍāṇaṃ maruyāṇaṃ aṭṭhasayaṃ tisā puna pusamitāṇaṃ.*
--*Titthogālī painṇayaṃ (Painṇaya Suttāim) 621*
When 60 pākaja + 155 Nandavanśa = 215 years had passed, the rule of the Maurya dynasty began.
7. a. *evenṃ ca Śrīmahāvīra mūlervarṣaśate, pañcapanācāśadadhike candragupto ābhavannīpanā.*
-- *Parīṣiṣṭaparva-Hemacandra, sarga 8/339.*
b. *Laghuposālika paṭṭāvalī, Nāgapurīyatapāgaccha paṭṭāvalī* (ed. Jinvijaya 1961) and *Himavanta Therāvalī* also acknowledge that Chandragupta Maurya ascended to the throne 155 years after the *Vira Nirvāṇa*.
8. It is remarkable that the year of the *Vira Nirvāṇa* may be accepted as 527 B.C. only when Chandra Gupta Maurya's accession is accepted to have taken place in the year 215 of the *Vira Nirvāṇa* era. If the date of his accession is accepted to be the year 155 of the *Vira Nirvāṇa*, then we should accept 467 B.C. to be the date of the *Vira Nirvāṇa*.
9. Jacobi, H., *Parīṣiṣṭaparva* : year 1891 : P. introduction p. 5; He considers the reference of the *Parīṣiṣṭaparva* of Hemacandra to be authentic according to which 155 years after the *Vira Nirvāṇa*, Chandragupta Maurya's accession took place, and on this only basis he determined the date of the *Nirvāṇa* of Mahāvīra.
10. Charpentier, 1992 : 13-16; He also based, his arguments on Hemacandra and considered that the *Nirvāṇa* of Mahāvīra took place 155 years before Chandragupta Maurya.
11. Shastri, A. Shantiraj : *Anekānta* 1941, Vol. 4, No. 10; He considered the Śaka Saṃvat to be the Vikram Saṃvat and accepted that 605 years before the Vikram Saṃvat Mahāvīra attained *Nirvāṇa*.
12. Jayaswal, 1917 : 151-152; In his article entitled '*The Historical Position of Kalki and his Identification with Yaśodharman*', he has mentioned only two traditions. He made no mention of the date of the *Nirvāṇa* of Mahāvīra.
13. Venkateshwar, 1917, p. 122-130; His opinion is based on the Anand Vikram Saṃvat. This was vague 10 years after the Vikram Saṃvat.
14. Mukhtar : 1956 : p. 26-56; On the basis of various arguments he confirmed the tradition accepted theory.

15. Muni Kalyana Vijaya : *Vikrama Saṃvat aur Jaina Kālagāṇanā*, 1987 : p. 149; while confirming the traditional accepted theory, he also tried to remove its inconsistencies.
16. Eggermont, P.H.L. He has given his arguments equating the very event of schism by Tiṣyagupta which took place during the 16th year of the attainment of Lord Mahāvīra with the event of drying the Bodhi tree by Tiṣyagupta and event of schism in Buddha Order during the reign of Aśoka.
17. Smith : 1969 : 141 He accepted the common popular theory.
18. Narman, K.R. "Observation on the Dates of the Jina and Buddha" in Bechert, H. *The Dating of the Historical Buddha*, a Pt. I. p. 300-312 Gottingen.
19. *ajjataropikho rājāmacco rājānaṃ māgadhaṃ ajātasattum vedehiputtāṃ etadavoca "ayaṃ, deva, nigaṇṭho nāṭaputto saṅghi ceva gaṇi ca gaṇācariyo ca, nāto, yasassī, titthakaro, sādhusammato bahujanassa, rattaññū, cirapabbajito, addhagato, vayoanupatto. Dīghanikāya, Sāmaññaphalasutta. 2/1/7.*
20. *evaṃ me sutāṃ. ekaṃ samayaṃ bhagavā sakkesu viharati vedhaññā nāma sakyā tesāṃ ambavane pāsāde. tena kho pana samayena nigaṇṭho nāṭaputto pāvayaṃ adhunākālāṅkato hoti. tassa kālāṅkiriya bhinnā nigaṇṭhā dvedhikajāta bhaṇḍanajāta kalahajāta vivādāpannā aññamaññaṃ mukhasattihī vitudentā viharanti-" na tvaṃ imaṃ dhammavinayaṃ ājānāsi, ahaṃ imaṃ dhammavinayaṃ ājānāmi, kiṃ tvaṃ imāṃ dhammavinayaṃ ājānissasi? micchāpaṭipanno tvamasī, ahamasmi sammāpaṭipanno. Sahitaṃ me, asahitaṃ te. purevacaniyaṃ pacchā avaca pacchāvacaniyaṃ pure avacea. Adhiciṇṇaṃ te viparāvattaṃ āropito te vādo. niggahito tvamasī. cara vādappamokkhāya. nibbethehi vā sace pashosī' ti. vadho yeva kho mañña nigaṇṭhesu nāṭaputtiyesu vattati. ye pi nigaṇṭhassa nāṭaputtassa sāvakā gihī odātavasanā te pi nigaṇṭhesu nāṭaputtiyesu nibbinnaṃ rūpā virattarūpā paṭivānarūpa-yathā taṃ durakkhāte dhammavinaye duppavedite aniyyanike anupasamasāṃvattanike asammāsāmbuddha-ppavedite bhinnathuṇe appaṭisaraṇe.*
21. It is noteworthy that almost all the *Śwetāmbara Paṭṭāvalis* mention the same period.
22. It is noteworthy that the original Ms. of the *Himavantaṣṭhavirāvalī* is not available after its Gujarati translation; its Gujarati translation by Pnadi Hiralal Hansraj of Jamnagar, is the only base. It shows that

Kunika and Udayi ruled for 60 years after the *Nirvāṇa* of Mahāvira and the Nandas ruled for 94 years there after, and accordingly Chandragupta Maurya's accession is said to be in 155 V.N.S.

23. Vikram Samvat 1987 : 137; Note that Muniji's effort to accept the period of Maurya to be 160 instead of 108, considering "*muriyāṇamaṭṭhasayaṁ*" as "*muriyāṇaṁ*"

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15. *Nandisūtra* (Sthavirāvalī), Ed. Madhukar Muni, Shri Agm Prakashan Samiti, Beawar, (Rajasthan).
16. *Niryukti Samgraha*, Ed. Vijayasen Surishvara. Harshapuspa-mrit Jain Granthamala, Lakhabavala, Saurashtra, 1989.

saṭṭhasayaṁ". is not a historical fact.

24. It should be noted that Muniji's effort to extend Sambhūtivijaya's period from 8 year to 60- years. and changing 108 year period of the Mauryas (this fact is supported by history) to 160. years is nothing but an effort to confirm his own hypothesis.

17. Norman K.R. "Observation on the Dates of the Jaina and Buddha" in Bechert, H. *The Dating of the Historical Buddha* Pt. I, p. 300-312, Göttingen.
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Prof. K.S. Murty's Philosophy of Peace and Non-violence

Prof. K.S. Murty is one of the leading Indian Philosophers of our age. For him Philosophy is not the mere abstract thinking about the Ultimate Reality but an honest effort to solve the actual problems of humanity. That is why his work, 'The Quest for Peace' attracts philosophers, as well politicians and sociologists. Here, I would like to confine my observations about Prof. Murty's Philosophy to his work, 'The Quest for Peace'. This work is a testimony that his philosophy is related to the concrete and practical life and the actual perennial problems of human society. In this outstanding work he has not only presented the Hindu ideals dealing with the problem of war and peace but also critically analysed the causes of war, disturbing our social peace and the possibility for peace and non-violence. In the process, he critically evaluated the various theories pertaining to war and examined the various philosophies dealing with the concept of non-violence. In addition, at the end of his work, there is an epilogue where in he has suggested the awakening of world consciousness as a way out to get rid of the burning problem of war and violence.

Prof. K.S. Murty as a Realist

In this epilogue, he firmly maintains that it is only through the awakening of world consciousness that peace and prosperity can be restored on our globe. The most notable thing about Prof. K.S. Murty's 'Philosophy of Peace', is that in his examinations and evaluations he always remains a realist or a practical philosopher. Though he speaks of ideals yet he always keep them on the concrete foundation of actualities of human life. For him, human being is always human being, living with all its animal instincts. He observes, 'Men according to Hindu thinkers are not all sweet, reasonable and potentially saintly. There are some men with divine temperament while others with demonic temperament. In the present age i.e. Kaliyuga, the latter preponderates. Utopian dreams, where all men will lead blissful lives, consider all mankind as one family mutually and unselfishly helping each other, are silly. (P. 31-32) He further maintains. "There is, says Hinduism, an element of evil in human nature, Rajas (activistic tendency) and Tamas (inertia) are not wholly absent in any man; in some they predominate to such an extent that tranquility and goodness-Sattva- are never successful in

overcoming them." (P. 33)

So far as I understand the philosophy of Prof. K.S. Murty, he opines that the ideals or the norms of the society can not be built, putting aside the actualities of our lives. He never sees the Utopian dreams. Being a realist or actualist he always tries to see the practical-side of the problem. For him philosophy is some thing real or concrete and not mere abstract thinking. It is connected with our day to day problems. The philosophy unable to solve the riddle of our actual life is of no use and only a tool of intellect. He says, "so a social organisation which forgets this (actualities of human nature) and gives up altogether the use of force for maintaining order and enforcing law, based on righteousness, will end in chaos." (P. 32) Thus, we can conclude that Prof. K.S. Murty, about social ideals and norms, always remains a realist, having a deep under-standing of actual human nature.

An Evaluation of K.S. Murty's Views about Non-Violence

With regard to the problems of war and peace or force and non-violence, Prof. Murty admits that the complete eradication of force, violence and wars from the earth is not possible at all. He maintains that so far as injustice and crime exist on the earth, use of force, violence and even war is inevitable. He supports his view by quoting a Chinese sage Mo-Ti, "A sin cannot be controlled except by punishment and not to punish such a terrible criminal is a sin" (P. 15). As long as we are living in the society, it is our prime and foremost duty to maintain social justice. Says, Prof. K.S. Murty, "Otherwise the strong will oppress the weak and society will be like the world of fish- the big ones eating the small. Danda (Punishment), therefore, is necessary (Page 32). For him social justice is primary and peace or non-violence is secondary. He does not advocate that type of peace or non-violence, which distorts the social justice. Says, he, "absolute tolerance of all wrongs done to oneself is not a virtue (P. 33). He further maintains 'Asceticism and celibacy may be good things but they cannot be so for all men. Science, painting and philosophy are good things but they are also not for all men. Similarly, conquest of anger by non-anger, of unrighteousness by righteousness, of evil by love, may be good things, but all are not capable of

practising them. And it is also important to remember, the Hindu thinkers urge that such behaviour cannot be successful in dealing with all men." (P. 33) Thus, for him one should meet evil with justice and so the tolerance of an evil is not moral at all. "The Peace, which is achieved on the cost of injustice is not good. Says he, the doctrine of non-injury must be reconciled with the necessity to punish those who deserve it and such a punishment may itself be in tune with the spirit of the doctrine. According to Prof. K.S. Murty, one should not tolerate injustice for the sake of non-violence or disturbance of social peace. Aggressive and unjust wars have been condemned by all the Indian thinkers and they hold that just and defensive wars should be undertaken. Those who disturb social peace and do injustice with our fellow being for the sake of their selfish motive, should be punished. But, he holds, this must be done without giving up *maitri* (friendliness) and *karuṇā* (compassion) (See *Prologue Page XXI*). Just and defensive wars should be undertaken as a sense of duty and at that time our hearts should be free from malice or ill-will. One should not harbour hatred even towards one's opponent or enemy. So far as Prof. K.S. Murty's view on the above said matter is concerned, it is in confirmity with the ancient thinkers of India. He is thoroughly correct when he comments, "If reverence for life, taken as an absolute value, were stronger than it is, war would decrease very much in frequency and number." (P. 44) But I am not intune with Prof. Murty when he says "Non-injury unless motivated by compassion becomes a superstition and compassion may sometimes lead us to commit injuries to living beings (Page 44)". I am of this view that non-injury or non-violence does not emanate from compassion which is an emotional aspect of our being, but it follows from the faculty of reasoning as a sense of duty. Non-violence should be observed as a sense duty or obligation and not mere as a feeling of compassion. Compassion always has a sense of attachment as its root. Whatsoever is motivated by attachment or mineness is always immoral. If once we accept non-violence as an absolute ethical value based on our faculty of reasoning, we have no right to say that "war is not always immoral" and "Ahimsa does not sum up morality" - as Prof. Murty holds. Though I agree with Prof. K.S. Murty that in our worldly life complete non-violence is not possible, it does not mean that complete non-violence is mere a superstition as he maintains. Those, who are attached to worldly possessions or even to worldly life and have a social obligation to protect other's life and property,

are unable to dispense with defenesive violence. But it must be remembered that violence is always violence and it can never be an ethical virtue. Inevitability of violence in worldly life does not make it ethical or moral. There are certain things in the world which are inevitable or necessary for our life, notwithstanding we can not say all of them as moral. I differ with Prof. Murty's view when he concludes, 'It seems to be silly to admit that all life is equally worthy of reverence (P. 44). In my humble opinion to be worthy of reverence is something different from to be observed perfectly. We cannot challenge the intrinsic value of non-injury or non-violence on the basis of its un-practicability in worldly life. Perfect non-violence, however, is not possible yet it does not mean that it is totally impossible in this world. Those, who are completely detached, even to their body, can observe it perfectly. Prof. Murty's pragmatic equation of morality with practicability and immorality with impracticability is not very desirable because then morality will lead to selfishness.

May be a situation one has to choose between the two violences - Major and Minor instead of violence and non-violence. In such a situation Jaina Ācaryas suggest one should select a minor violence instead of a major one. Prof. K.S. Murty also observes, though man has the obligation to help all living beings, clearly this is impossible and selection had to be made as to whom he should help and whom he may have to injure... when a human life is endangered by disease-carrying germs it seems to be ethically right to preserve it at the cost of the lives of these germs by administration of antibiotics. The use of rat-poison, germicides and disinfectants like DDT to preserve human life seems morally right because human life is qualitatively more valuable than animal life." (P. 44) But in this statement of Prof. Murty I find the usage of some words as objectionable. My first objection is about his use of word 'ethically or morally right'. Here we must be clear in our mind that our selection between two evils or violences does not make a lesser one ethically or morally right. Violence is an evil and it cannot be morally or ethically right in any case. In our worldly life for the sake of our individual interest or even in the interest of human society, in certain situations we have to make a selection between two evils or vices; but on account of our selection, Vices will never be regarded a virtue. Secondly, the human life may be valuable but not in all the cases, so to say, in a desert, a life of a plant is more valuable than human being. Punishments are prescribed for those human beings who

hurt animal life or even plants, in our scriptures as well as civil codes of various nations. Now a days, we have already accepted that the use of germicides and hurting of plant life is not good for ecological balance.

Prof. K.S. Murty's Concept of Peace

The concept of peace has two main aspects, internal as well as external. The internal aspect is known as mental peace or tranquility, it is related mainly to the individuals and that too particularly to their mental state. While the external aspect of peace is known as social-peace and is related to the society mental peace depends on the cessation of conflicts which takes place between our passionate self i.e. Id and ideal-self i.e. super ego. So far as the external or social peace is concerned, it depends on our harmonious living as a member of society. It is the state of cessation of conflicts and wars between individual and society and among different religious and social groups as well as nations.

While dealing with the concept of Peace, in his famous work, 'The Quest for Peace' Prof. K.S. Murty, has emphasised the social or external aspect of peace, but it does not mean that he underestimated the inner peace. He remarks "Not to have hatred towards any one and to harbour no enmity towards any living being, are cardinal virtues, based on the great truth that it is Ātman that is inundate in all beings. Nirvairā is achieved not by cessation of all reaction to evil, but by making the mind and will, pure. Such purity, according to the Gītā, is achieved when one gains inner poise, non-attachment and abandonment of concern with the fruits of actions". (P. 21) He further says "to have no mamata (sense of mine) and ... equanimity in action is the way of obtaining man's highest end." (P. 21)

We must also remember the fact that the external or social peace depends on the inner or mental peace of the members of the society. Society without individuals is something abstract, it is the individual who makes society concrete or real. That is why the inner peace of the individuals is a pre-condition for social peace. A disturbed mind disturbs social peace. In the introduction of Prof. K.S. Murty's book - 'The Quest for Peace' our former Prime Minister and an enlightened statesman Dr. P.V. Narasimharao rightly observes "The Peace and equality should be both inner and outer. There could be no peace outside unless there is inner peace. By inner peace, I do not necessarily mean the individual state of mind attained by sādhanā,

what I mean is that the minds of all men should reach a state where they are free from fear, free from mistrust, free from the urge for self-aggrandisement and exploitation. Today there is an all-pervading war psychosis, because wars begin in the minds of men, and these minds disrupt peace. The same minds need to be oriented to promote peace and this can be done only by a peace-psychosis. (P. XXIX)

Thus, we can conclude that the peace, inner as well as outer, both are worthy to achieve, but stress should be given on inner peace. For inner peace is the cause and outer peace is an effect. But the position of Prof. K.S. Murty is some what different in this regard.

While examining the various theories of the causes of wars, his approach is also realistic. Though he agrees with spiritualists that all wars have their beginning in our minds but at the same time he holds a realistic position and maintains that working of human mind depends on external situations. In the beginning of sixth chapter of this book- The Quest for Peace, says, he, "The Unesco constitution says war begins in the mind of men." In as much as all human activity begins in men's minds- for after all without an idea and a will nothing begins- that is an obvious truism. But in so far as men's minds are moulded by their social and cultural environment and by the traditions of their political institutions, we have to seek for the causes of war at the deeper level. You cannot change the working of men's minds, when their civilisation, social organisation and political institutions force them to think and act in certain ways (P. 142)." Thus for him, it is not only men's minds, which are solely responsible for wars and conflicts, but environmental situations also play an important role as a cause of wars and conflicts.

In the sixth chapter of his work, he deals with various theories about the cause of wars and also makes a critical estimate of them. He is not in tune with the various psychological theories which generally hold that war is rooted in human nature. He is also not in agreement with those economists, who hold that population pressures and economic conditions are the sole causes of wars. He does not fully support the tension theory which holds that frustrations create wars. Says he "To conclude whatever the case was in ancient times, modern warfare among great states does not seem to be mainly the effect of tensions either in leaders or in peoples" (P. 161). But to a certain extent he is in tune with Dewey and accepts war as a social

institution or social pattern.

A way out to Peace

At last he opines that war and violence can not be put to an end without a fundamental alteration in social and cultural structure. It is only through awakening of peace consciousness we can change social and cultural pattern and get rid of wars. He observes "Without informed public opinion and good faith a new world order cannot arise and without coming into existence of a unity of outlook and a community of interests among all men (without national and class differences). There can be no world peace (P.182). Prof. K.S. Murty propounds three principles, namely (a) Homonoia-Human brotherhood, (b) Tolerance and (c) Universal Ethics as the bases of peace. Says he, "If a consistant world view could be evolved in consonance with (if not based upon) these three concepts, through the co-operative efforts of the intellectuals of all cultures and if they take pains to make it fashionable among all peoples a universal culture may evolve and make permanent world

peace a possibility." (P. 199) For the cultivation of peace consciousness among peoples, and to make efforts for permanent world peace he suggested to constitute a *Respublica-Litteraria*. It is the duty of the intellectuals to work hard for the awakening of peace consciousness because, says he peace cannot be brought about by fine phrases and nice lectures but by hard work and sacrifice (P. 214).

Peace demands the sacrifice of selfish interests and narrow outlooks as its price. It is only through the consciousness of 'world family' we can establish peace and secure prosperity on the earth.

अयं निजः परो वेत्ति गणना लघुचेतसाम्,
उदारचरितानां तु वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम्।

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All the references, in this article are from Prof. K.S. Murty's book 'The Quest for Peace', Ajanta Publications, Jawahar Nagar, Delhi, 1986, page numbers are given in bracket after the quotations.

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