

# JAINA MYSTICISM AND OTHER ESSAYS



Dr. Kamal Chand Sogani

PRAKRIT BHARTI ACADEMY, JAIPUR

# **JAINA MYSTICISM AND OTHER ESSAYS**

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## Publisher's Note

Dr. Kamal Chand Sogani is an established and renowned name in the fields of Prākṛta and Apabhraṃśa languages, Jaina philosophy and related studies. His writings evoke interest in the academic world for their freshness and thoughtfulness. His profound insight as well as his interpretation of complexities of the wide spectrum of subjects covered by him is admirable.

Prakrit Bharti is pleased to launch the publication of compilation of his articles, mostly published in academic journals. This first anthology contains fifteen articles selected by the author himself.

The articles included in this collection are --

1. Jaina Mysticism; 2. Jaina Faith and Morals; 3. Ahimsā as a Socio-Spiritual Value; 4. Right and the Good in Jaina Ethics; 5. Mahavira and Socio-spiritual Values; 6. The Concept of Devotion in Jainism; 7. Mahavira on : Individual and his Social Responsibility; 8. Nature and Process of *Sallekhanā*; 9. Ethical Philosophy of Kundakunda; 10. Jaina Ethical Theory; 11. Anekānta : Metaphysico-spiritual Perspective; 12. Syādvāda; 13. Kundakunda on the Modifications (*Paryāyas*) of Self and their ethico-spiritual implications; 14. Karma-yoga of the *Gītā* : A teleological Interpretation; and 15. The Negative and Positive Sides



of Conduct According to the *Upaniṣads*, the *Gītā* and Jainism.

As is evident, this selection covers a range of topics such as Jaina mysticism, Ahimsā, ethics, metaphysics, Anekānta, and comparative study of some themes common to Gita and Upanishads. All these articles should prove to be a link between the ancient and the modern, both in terms of content as well as style. In fact, the author presents the ancient doctrines and their application in life in the much needed modern way so as to make them relevant and significant in the present day world. We are sure, this work will be received well by the common reader as well as the scholars.

We are thankful to Dr. Sogani for entrusting us with the publication of his scattered articles both in English and Hindi. Our thanks are also due to Śhri Surendra Bothara for copy editing and editorial advise; and to Shri Manjul Jain for computer type-setting.

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
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## JAINA MYSTICISM

In the cultural history of mankind, there have been persons who regard spiritual quest as constituting the essential meaning of life. In spite of the marked environmental differences, their investigations have exhibited remarkable similarity of experience and expression. Such persons are styled mystics and the phenomenon is known as mysticism. Like the mystics of Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, Islam etc. Jaina mystics have made abundant contribution to the mystical literature as such, though unfortunately the well known *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*<sup>1</sup>, does not make mention of Jaina mysticism along with Hindu mysticism, Buddhist mysticism, Muslim mysticism, Christian mysticism etc. So far as I know, it is Dr. A. N. Upadhye who has for the first time discussed, though briefly, the nature of Jaina mysticism.<sup>2</sup> It will not be amiss to point out here that the Jaina *ācāryas* have handled this topic quite systematically and in great detail.

The equivalent expressions in Jainism for the word 'mysticism' are: *Śuddhopayoga*<sup>3</sup>, *Arhat*<sup>4</sup> and *Siddha* state<sup>5</sup>, *Paṇḍita-Paṇḍita Marāṇa*<sup>6</sup>, *Paramātmān-hood*<sup>7</sup>, *Svasamaya*<sup>8</sup>, *Parādr̥ṣṭi*<sup>9</sup>, *Sāmarthya-Yoga*<sup>10</sup>, *Ahimsā*<sup>11</sup>, *Ātmasamāhita* state<sup>12</sup>, *Sambodhi*<sup>13</sup>, *Samatva*<sup>14</sup>, etc. All these expressions convey identical meaning of realising the transcendental self. The traditional definition of Jaina mysticism may be stated thus: Mysticism consists in the attainment of *Arhat*-hood or *Siddha*-hood through the medium of *Samyagdarśana* (spiritual awakening), *Samyagjnāna* (value knowledge), and *Samyakcāritra* (ethico-spiritual conduct) after dispelling *Mithyādarśana* (spiritual perversion), *Mithyājñāna* (perverted value knowledge), and *Mithyācāritra* (perverted conduct)<sup>15</sup>. Kundakunda (1st cent. A. D.) records departure from this terminology when he says : 'Mysticism consists in realising



the *Paramātman* (transcendental self) through the *Antarātman* (internal self) after renouncing the *Bahirātman* (external self<sup>16</sup>). Haribhadra (7th cent. A. D.) also employs a different terminology when he announces : ‘Mysticism consists in arriving at the, state of *Vṛttisaṃkṣaya* (cessation of mental states) through the stages of *Samyagdr̥ṣṭi* and *Cāritrī* after abandoning the stage of *Apunarbandhaka*<sup>17</sup> (*Mithyādr̥ṣṭi* in transition<sup>18</sup>). At another place he says ‘Mysticism consists in attaining to *Parādr̥ṣṭi* (transcendental insight) through *Sthirā* (steady spiritual insight), *Kāntā* and *Prabhā Dr̥ṣṭis* (elementary and deep meditational insights) after passing through *Mitrā*, *Tārā*, *Balā*, and *Dīprā*<sup>19</sup> *Dr̥ṣṭis*.’<sup>20</sup> All these definitions of mysticism are fundamentally the same. *Paramātman* refers to *Arhat*-hood, *Siddha*-hood, *Parādr̥ṣṭi*, and the state of *Vṛttisaṃkṣaya*; *Antarātman* points to *Samyagdarśana*, *Sthirādr̥ṣṭi*, and *Samyagdr̥ṣṭi*; and consequently to *Samyagnāna*, *Samyakcāritra*, the state of *Cāritrī* and the *Kāntā* and *Prabhā Dr̥ṣṭis*; *Bahirātman*, refers to *Mithyādarśana* the state of *Apunarbandhaka* along with *Mitrā*, *Tārā*, *Balā* and *Dīprā Dr̥ṣṭis* and consequently to *Mithyāgnāna*, and *Mithyācāritra*.

Thus we may say that the *Paramātman* is the true goal of the, mystic quest. The journey from the *Antarātman* to the *Paramātman* is traversed through the medium of moral and intellectual preparations, which purge everything obstructing the emergence of potential divinity. Before this final accomplishment, a stage of vision and fall may intervene. Thus the whole mystic way be put as follows: (1) Awakening of the transcendental self, (2) Purgation, (3) Illumination, (4) Dark-night of the soul, and (5) Transcendental life. According to Underhill, “Taken all together they constitute the phases in a single process of growth, involving the movement of consciousness from lower to higher levels of reality, the steady remaking of character in accordance with the “independent spiritual world”<sup>21</sup>. But the Jaina tradition deals with the mystic way under the fourteen stages of spiritual evolution, technically known as *Guṇasthānas*. However, these stages may be subsumed under the above heads in the following way:

1. Dark-period of the self prior to its awakening:  
*Mithyātva Guṇasthāna* (First)

2. Awakening of the self : *Avirata Samyagdr̥ṣṭi Guṇasthāna* (Fourth)

Fall from awakening: (a) *Sāsādana Guṇasthāna* (Second)  
(b) *Miśra Guṇasthāna* (Third)

3. Purgation : (a) *Viratāvirata Guṇasthāna* (Fifth); (b) *Pramattavirata Guṇasthāna* (Sixth)

4. Illumination : (a) *Apramattavirata Guṇasthāna* (Seventh); (b) *Apūrvakaraṇa Guṇasthāna* (Eighth); (c) *Anivṛttikaraṇa Guṇasthāna* (Ninth); (d) *Sukṣmasamparāya Guṇasthāna* (Tenth); (e) *Upasāntakaṣāya Guṇasthāna* (Eleventh); (f) *Kṣīṇakaṣāya Guṇasthāna* (Twelfth)

5. Dark-period post illumination: Fall to the first or the fourth *Guṇasthāna*.

6. Transcendental life: (a) *Sayogakevalī Guṇasthāna* (Thirteenth); (b) *Ayogakevalī Guṇasthāna* (Fourteenth)

(1) Dark-period of the self prior to its awakening or  
*Mithyātva Guṇasthāna*:

In this *Guṇasthāna* the empirical souls remain in a perpetual state of spiritual ignorance owing to the beginning-less functioning of *Mohanīya* (deluding) *Karma*. This *Karma* on the psychical side genders a complex state of 'Moha' having spiritual perversion (*Mithyādarśana*) and perverted conduct (*Mithyācāritra*) as its ingredients. Here the effect of *Mithyādarśana* is so dominant that the self does not evince its inclination to the spiritual path, just as a man invaded by bile-infected fever does not have liking for sweet juice<sup>22</sup>. This *Mithyādarśana* vitiates knowledge and conduct alike. In its presence both knowledge and conduct, however extensive and suffused with morality they may be, are impotent to disintegrate the hostile elements of the soul and to lead us to those superb heights which are called mystical. Consequently the darkest period in the history of the self is the

one when the self is overwhelmed by *Mithyādarśana*. It obstructs all our mystical endeavours. Thus the plight of the self in *Mithyātva Guṇasthāna* resembles that of a totally eclipsed moon or a completely clouded sky. It is a state of spiritual slumber with the peculiarity that the self itself is not cognisant of its drowsy state. Led astray by the perverted attitude, the soul staying in this *Guṇasthāna* identifies itself with bodily colour, physical frame, sex, caste, creed, family, friends and wealth<sup>23</sup>. The consequence is that it is constantly obsessed with the fear of self-annihilation on the annihilation of the body and the like<sup>24</sup> and is tormented even by the thought of death<sup>25</sup>. Besides, it is the victim of the seven kinds of fear<sup>26</sup> and the eight kinds of pride<sup>27</sup>. Again under the influence of *Mithyādarśana* "One accepts the *Adharma* (wrong religion) as the *Dharma* (right religion), the *Amārga* (wrong path) as the *Mārga* (right path), the *Ajīva* (non-soul) as the *Jīva* (soul), the *Asādhū* (non-saint) as the *Sādhū* (saint), the *Amukta* (un-emancipated) as the *Mukta* (emancipated) and vice versa<sup>28</sup>. " Kundakunda<sup>29</sup> and following him Yogīndu, Pūjyapāda, Śubhacandra, Kārttikeya etc. recognise this *Mithyātva Guṇasthāna* as the state of *Bahirātman*. In this *Guṇasthāna* there are such souls as will never triumph over this darkest period and hence will never win salvation. They are technically called *Abhavyas*.<sup>30</sup> Haribhadra aptly calls them *Bhavābhinandīs* (welcomers of trans-migratory existence<sup>31</sup>). In contrast to these souls, there are, according to Haribhadra, *Apunarbandhakas* who are also occupying this *Guṇasthāna*<sup>32</sup>. The difference is that the latter are moving in the direction of becoming *Samyagdr̥ṣṭis* and consequently do not commit sinful acts with much strong inclination, do not attach undue value to the worldly life and maintain proprieties in whatever they do<sup>33</sup>; whereas the former are *Mithyādr̥ṣṭis* proper, and consequently they are mistaken as to the nature of things, evince no disgust for worldly existence and are like the man to whom unworthy acts appear worthy of performance<sup>34</sup>. The *Apunarbandhakas* may be further said to have developed first four *Yogadr̥ṣṭis*, namely, *Mitrā*, *Tārā*, *Balā*, and *Dīprā*. It may be noted here that the spiritual darkness of the *Apunarbandhakas* is not so intense as that of the *Bhavābhinandīs*.

## (2) Awakening of the self or *Aviratasamyagrṣṭi* *Guṇasthāna* :

Spiritual awakening or conversion is the result of *Granthibheda* (cutting the knot of ignorance<sup>35</sup>). By virtue of cutting the knot, the *Bhinnagranthi* sees supreme verity and acquires unswerving conviction in the true self.<sup>36</sup> This occurrence of *Samyagdarśana* (spiritual awakening) is consequent upon the instruction of those who have realised the divine within themselves or are on the path of divine realisation.<sup>37</sup> Yogīndu points out that insight is attained by the *Ātman*, when, at an opportune time, delusion is destroyed.<sup>38</sup> It may be noted here that when there is *Ardhapudgalaparāvartana Kāla*, for the deliverance of the self, it prepares itself for three types of *Karaṇas* (*Bhāvas*), namely, *Adhaḥpravṛttakarāṇa*, *Apūrvakarāṇa*, and *Anivṛttikarāṇa*, which guarantees for it spiritual awakening.<sup>39</sup> Each of these *Karaṇas* lasts for an *Antarmuhūrta* (less than forty eight minutes<sup>40</sup>). Just after the process of *Anivṛttikarāṇa* the soul experiences the first dawn of enlightenment or spiritual awakening<sup>41</sup>. It is by these *Karaṇas* that *Granthibheda* is effected. "Even as a person born blind can see the world as it is on the sudden acquisition of eyesight, so can a soul having experienced the vision the truth as it is. Even as a person suffering from long-drawn disease experiences extreme delight on the sudden disappearance of the disease, so does a soul eternally bound to the wheel of worldly existence feels spiritual joy and bliss on the sudden dawn of enlightenment."<sup>42</sup>

This is to be borne in mind that the spiritual awakening is to be sharply distinguished from the moral and the intellectual conversion. Even if the man in the first *Guṇasthāna* gets endowed with the capacity of intellectual and moral achievements, it cannot be said to have dispelled the spiritual darkness. The characters portrayed by Jaina *ācārya* of *Dravya-līṅgī Muni* and some of the *Abhavyas* who have attained to the fair height of intellectual knowledge and moral upliftment illustrate this sort of life without spiritual awakening<sup>43</sup>. Thus the flower of mysticism does not blossom by the water of mere morality and intellectuality, but requires spiritual manure along with it.



It will not be idle to point out here that the soul in this *Guṇasthāna* is called *Samyagdr̥ṣṭi*, *Antarātman*<sup>44</sup>, *Bhinnagranthi*<sup>45</sup>, and the occupant of *Sthirādr̥ṣṭi*<sup>46</sup>. Being spiritually awakened, the *Samyagdr̥ṣṭi* considers his own self as his genuine abode regarding the outward physical dwelling places as artificial<sup>47</sup>. He renounces all identification with the animate and inanimate objects of the world and properly weighs them in the balance of his discriminative knowledge<sup>48</sup>. His is the only self that has acquired the right of *Mokṣa*<sup>49</sup>. Besides, he practises universal compassion (*Anukampā*)<sup>50</sup>, does not hanker after worldly opulence and empyrean pleasures<sup>51</sup>, shows no feeling of disgust at the various bodily conditions caused by disease, hunger etc.,<sup>52</sup> and is free from all fears.<sup>53</sup> Again, being overwhelmed by fear, inferiority and greed for profit, he does not recognise *Himsā as Dharma*<sup>54</sup>. Apart from this, he has deep affection for spiritual matters and strengthens the conviction of those who are faltering in their loyalty to the path of righteousness<sup>55</sup> and disseminates spiritual religion through various means best suited to time and place<sup>56</sup>.

#### **Fall from awakening or (a) *Sāsādana Guṇasthāna* and (b) *Miśra Guṇasthāna* :**

If the spiritual awakening is due to the total annihilation of *Darśana Mohanīya* (Vision-deluding) *Karma*, the self has thrown over all the chances of its fall to the lower stages<sup>57</sup>. This is called *Kṣayika Samyaktva*<sup>58</sup>. It is *Sthirādr̥ṣṭi* proper<sup>59</sup>. But if the spiritual awakening is consequent upon the suppression of *Darśana Mohanīya Karma*, the self after one *Antarmuhūrta* either falls to the lower stages or remains in the same stage with the emergence of certain defects ordinarily incognisable<sup>60</sup>. This is known as *Upaśama Samyaktva*<sup>61</sup>. Here four *Anantānubandhi* passions and the Vision-deluding *Karma* which is divided into three qualitatively different fragments of *Mithyātva* (impure), *Samyaktva-Prakṛti* (pure), and *Samyaka-Mithyātva* (semi-pure) are suppressed<sup>62</sup>. When the impure piece comes up, the self again descends to the first *Guṇasthāna* where again darkness overwhelms<sup>63</sup> him; if the semi-pure piece, the self falls to the third *Guṇasthāna*, namely, *Miśra Guṇasthāna* wherein total

scepticism as regards matters spiritual prevails<sup>64</sup>. If there is the rise of the *Anantānubandhi* passion the soul sinks to the second stage known as *Sāsādana Guṇasthāna*<sup>65</sup>. This is the intermediary stage of the self which has fallen from the peak of the mountain of *Samyagdarśana*, but has not arrived at the stage of the *Mithyātva Guṇasthāna*<sup>66</sup>. In this stage the peculiar taste of the fall from *Samyagdarśana* like the peculiar taste of sweet food after its vomiting is experienced<sup>67</sup>. Lastly, when the pure piece rises up, it continues to be in the fourth stage, but has lost the purity of *Upāsama Samyaktva*. This is called *Kṣāyopaśamika Samyaktva*<sup>68</sup>.

### (3) Purgation or (a) *Viratāvirata Guṇasthāna* and (b) *Pramattavirata Guṇasthāna*.

After dispelling the dense and intense darkness caused by the vision-deluding (*Darśana Mohanīya*) *Karma*, the passionate and ardent longing of the awakened self is to purge the conduct deluding (*Cāritra Mohanīya*) *Karma* which now stands between it and the transcendental self. Only those who are in possession of sturdy will are capable of doing so, says Amṛtacandra<sup>69</sup>. In the fifth *Guṇasthāna*, the aspirant who is a householder is incapable of making himself free from all *Himsā* root and branch<sup>70</sup>. In consequence, he adopts the five partial vows (*Aṇuvratas*) along with the seven *Śīla vratas* in order to sustain the central virtue of *Ahimsā* as far as possible<sup>71</sup>. This state of the self's journey has been called *Viratāvirata* or *Deśavirata Guṇasthāna*, since here the aspirant avoids intentional *Himsā* of two to five-sensed *Jīvas*, but he has to commit the intentional *Himsā* of one sensed *Jīvas* namely the vegetable bodied, fire bodied etc.<sup>72</sup>. Besides, the *Himsā* which is committed in being engaged in a certain profession, in performing domestic activities and in adopting defensive measures, cannot be avoided by him<sup>73</sup>. This shows that the householder's life is a mixture of virtue and vice<sup>74</sup>, which obstruct the purgative way pursued by the mystic. Hence the aspirant, being motivated by certain incentives to spiritual life (*Anuprekṣās*) gradually renounces the householder's type of living, becomes a saint in order to negate *Himsā* to the last degree<sup>75</sup>. In

consequence, the saint observes five *Mahāvratas*, five *Samitis*, three *Guptis* and practises internal and external austerities with special attention to meditation, devotion, and *Svādhyāya*. Besides, he gets food by begging, eats only a little, gets over sleep, endures troubles, practises universal friendship, adheres to spiritual upliftment, and turns away from acquisitions, association and life-injuring activities<sup>76</sup>. Thus from the life of *Muni*, “vice totally vanishes and there remains virtue which will also be transcended as soon as the flight into the realm of spirit is made<sup>77</sup>.” Since in this stage complete meditational self-submergence is lacking, though there is complete self-restraint (*Samyama*), this stage is styled *Pramattavirata Guṇasthāna*<sup>78</sup>, i. e. here *Pramāda* exists with self-restraint<sup>79</sup>. Nevertheless this stage may be regarded as the terminus of purgative way. It may be noted here that the self in the fifth *Guṇasthāna* and onwards is called *Cāritrī*.<sup>80</sup>

(4) Illumination or (a) *Apramatta Virata* (b) *Apūrvakaraṇa*, (c) *Anivṛttikaraṇa*, (d) *Sukṣma-Samparāya*, (c) *Upasānta Kaṣāya* and (f) *Kṣīṇakaṣāya Guṇasthāna* :

These *Guṇasthāna* from the seventh to the twelfth are the meditational stages or the stages of illumination and ecstasy. In other words, these are the stages of *Kāntā and Prabhā Drṣṭis*.<sup>81</sup> It is to be noted here that the self oscillates between the sixth and the seventh *Guṇasthānas* thousand of times and when it attains steadiness, it strenuously prepares itself either for suppressing or for annihilating the conduct-deluding *Karmas*.<sup>82</sup> This oscillation is the result of the struggle between *Pramāda and Apramāda*. By the time the aspirant reaches the seventh *Guṇasthāna*, he has developed a power of spiritual attention, of self-merging and of gazing into the ground of the soul. It is through the aid of deep meditation that the mystic now pursues the higher path. In consequence, he arrives at the eighth and the ninth stages known as the *Apūrvakaraṇa* and the *Anivṛttikaraṇa Guṇasthāna*, where exists the state of profound purity.<sup>83</sup> In the tenth *Guṇasthāna* known as *Sukṣma-Samparāya* there is only subtle greed that can disturb the soul.<sup>84</sup> The soul suppresses even this subtle greed in the eleventh *Guṇasthāna* known as *Upasānta*

*Kaṣāya* and thus absolves itself from the rise of all types of passions.<sup>85</sup> If the self follows the process of annihilation instead of suppression it rises directly from the tenth to the twelfth *Guṇasthāna* known as *Kṣīṇakaṣāya Guṇasthāna*.<sup>86</sup> Here the conduct deluding *Karma* is destroyed instead of being suppressed. Pūjyapāda rightly observes that meditation produces supreme ecstasy in a mystic who is firmly established in the self. Such an ecstatic consciousness is potent enough to burn the *Kārmic* fuel; and then the person remains unaffected by external troubles and never experiences discomposure.<sup>87</sup>

### (5) Dark night of the soul post illumination:

Owing to the suppressed passions gaining strength, the illuminated consciousness of the eleventh *Guṇasthāna* falls to the lowest stage of *Mithyātva* or to the fourth stage of *Avirata Samyagdr̥ṣṭi Guṇasthāna*. The consequence is that the ecstatic awareness of the transcendental self gets negated and an overwhelming sense of darkness envelops the mystic. It may be noted that not all mystics experience this dark night. Those of them who ascend the ladder of annihilation escape this tragic period, whereas those who ascend the ladder of suppression succumb to its dangers and pains. Mystics of the latter type no doubt will also reach the pinnacle of transcendental life, but only when they climb up the ladder of annihilation either in this life or in some other to come.

### (6) Transcendental life or (a) *Sayogakevalī* and (b) *Ayogakevalī Guṇasthānas*:

The slumbering and the un-awakened soul, after passing through the stages of spiritual awakening, moral and intellectual preparation, now arrives at the sublime destination by dint of ascending the rungs of meditational ladder. In the thirteenth stage the soul possesses dispassionate activities (*Yoga*) and omniscience (*Kevalajnāna*), hence it is known as *Sayogakevalī Guṇasthāna*<sup>88</sup>. It is a state of *Jīvana-Mukta*, a supermental state of existence and an example of divine life upon earth. The fourteenth stage is called *Ayogakevalī Guṇasthāna*, as there the soul annuls all



activities (*Yogas*), but preserves omniscience and other characteristics<sup>89</sup>. In this stage the soul stays for the time required for pronouncing five syllables— *a, i, u, r, hr̥*<sup>90</sup>. After this, disembodied liberation results (*Videha Mukti*). To be more clear, the self in the *Sayoga Kevalī* and *Ayoga Kevalī Guṇasthānas* bears the title of 'Arhat' and after this, the title of 'Siddha'.<sup>91</sup> This state of *Siddha* is beyond all *Guṇasthānas*.<sup>92</sup>

It may be noted here that the self in these *Guṇasthānas* is called *Paramātman*<sup>93</sup>, the doer of *Vṛttisaṃkṣaya*<sup>94</sup>, and the possessor of *Parādr̥ṣṭi*<sup>95</sup>. This perfected mystic is established in truth in all directions<sup>96</sup>. He experiences bliss, which is supersensuous, unique, infinite, and interminable<sup>97</sup>. Whatever issues from him is potent enough to abrogate the miseries of tormented humanity<sup>98</sup>. His presence is supremely enlightening. He is the spiritual leader of society<sup>99</sup>. Just as a mother educates her child for its benefit and a kind physician cures diseased orphans, so also the perfected mystic instructs humanity for its upliftment and dispenses spiritual pills to the suffering humanity<sup>100</sup>. He is always awake<sup>101</sup>. He has transcended the dualities of friends and foes, pleasure and pain, praise and censure, life and death, sand and gold, attachment and aversion<sup>102</sup>. Since he is the embodiment of spiritual virtues, he leads a life of super-moralism but not of amorism<sup>103</sup>. Thus we may conclude by saying that the cognitive, conative and affective tendencies of the perfected mystic reveal their original manifestation in supreme mystical experience, which is ineffable and transcends all the similes of the world.<sup>104</sup>



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# JAINA FAITH AND MORALS

## 1. INTRODUCTORY

Jainism is one of the oldest living religions of the world. It represents the continuation of indigenous sramanic culture which is at least as old as the *Vedas* themselves, so far as the literary evidence goes, though the archaeological evidence takes sramanism far back to Harappan civilization, which is regarded as non-Vedic in origin and outlook. The Jaina faith has, no doubt, influenced Vedism on the one hand and Buddhism on the other, though being influenced by them in the course of its gradual development. There is no denying the fact that Jainism is humanistic in its approach and spiritualistic in its depth. An unbiased eye can look into its religious fervour and moral earnestness. These two elements are so greatly intertwined in it that one is apt to confuse religion with morality and vice versa. The fact is that one cannot be reduced to the other. In practice, though the two are closely associated, yet, they are quite distinguishable. Jainism subscribes to the view that "religion if taken seriously and rationally will be deeply moral; but it is not morality"<sup>1</sup>. The two are not identical. Thus it will not be contradictory to aver that a religious man will be necessarily moral. but a moral man may not be necessarily religious. In other words, religion is coextensive with morality, but morality is not always coextensive with religion. A man may be moral without being religious. All this shows that the realms of religion and morality are theoretically distinguishable. The Jaina faith vehemently criticises the view which identifies religion with personal and social morality, and which defines it merely as "the consciousness of the highest social values". The Jaina saints and sages have

always exhorted us to look beyond the mere moral nature of man to transcendental horizons of life, thereby justifying that social righteousness is not the beall and end-all of human life. This is not to decry social morality, but to save religion from being identified with it, and to keep the domain of religion as quite distinct from that of morality.

Side by side with the tendency of identifying religion with morality, there is witnessed another tendency of defining religion in theological terms, i. e. with reference to God, the creator of the universe. Since Jainism does not uphold the idea of God as the creator, sustainer and destroyer of the world, the above definition does not bring forth the characteristic feature of religion. If this definition of religion is adhered to, Jainism, Buddhism, Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Mīmāṃsā are excluded without any justification. Now the question arises : What constitutes the universal core of religion? The question can be answered by considering the utterances of the saints and mystics all over the world, in all cultures, religions, places and ages. Pratt rightly concludes that "religion is not so much theology as life it is to be lived rather than reasoned about"<sup>2</sup>.

Religion is a transcendental spiritual experience which is permanent, trans-subjective, blissful, intuitive, supersensuous, infinite, incommunicable and ineffable. It is the non-conceptual state of existence wherein all differentiations disappear. "To be emptied of all empirical contents is the universal character of that experience."<sup>3</sup> "What is left is the pure ego, the self itself, seeing itself as reflected in itself."<sup>4</sup> Brightman rightly remarks, "mystical experience is immediate, but cannot be called immediate experience of God, it is rather an immediate experience of the self, which may be taken as a sign of the reality of God, provided philosophical thought finds this idea tenable."<sup>5</sup> Thus the Jaina view of religion lays stress on realizing the transcendental nature of the self, which the individual feels as his own. This shows that theology does not find favour with Jainism, so is the case with theological definition of religion.

## 2. CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF JAINISM

After setting aside the sociological and theological definitions of religion let us now proceed to discuss the characteristic features of Jainism as a religion. The question now confronts us is : What are the constitutive factors which endow Jaina faith with religious fervour? In other words, how Jainism has occupied itself with religious outlook? The answer can be searched in delineating (i) the nature of self, (ii) the goal of human pursuance, (iii) the doctrine of *karma*, (iv) the meaning of spiritual awakening (*samyag-darśana*), (v) the incentives to spiritual life, (vi) the performance of spiritual exercises; and (vii) the concept of *arhat* and *siddha*.

2(i). **Nature of Self** : There is no denying the fact that the idea of self (*ātman*) occupies a central place in Jaina religion. That it exists independently of anything else is brought out by the ontological status accorded to it in the Jaina faith. It is one of the six substances. It is to be distinguished from the other substances, since it is capable of developing introverted as well as extroverted experience. The rest are without any iota of sentience.<sup>6</sup> Perhaps it is because of this that Kundakunda calls it *mahārtha* (a great objectivity)<sup>7</sup>, and Kārttikeya calls it *uttama-dravya* (excellent substance)<sup>8</sup>.

The religious treatises of the Jainas deal with the nature of the self from two perspectives, noumenal and phenomenal, or transcendental and empirical, so as to bring home to us the totality of the self in its mundane and supermundane aspects. The transcendental view represents the self in its unadulterated state of existence, whereas the empirical view describes the self in its defiled form. The former state is known as *siddha*, while the latter one is called *saṃsārī*. It is to be borne in mind that these two states of self are metaphysically indistinguishable, though the *karmic* adjuncts create distinctions between them. In other words, the empirical self is potentially transcendental, though this noumenal state of existence is not actualized at present, hence the distinction is undeniable. In view of the metaphysical position upheld by the Jaina there are infinite selves,

and thus every mundane self is potentially *siddha*, and this *siddhahood* needs be actualized in the interest of arriving at the supreme summit of religious experience. It is not idle to point out that though we are in the defiled form of existence from the beginningless past, the *niścaya-naya* (transcendental view) reminds us of our spiritual magnificence and glory. It prompts the sullied self to behold its spiritual heritage. When the self has ascended to the pinnacle of spiritual experience, the *vyavahāra-naya* (empirical view) is of no significance for the aspirant. The *vyavahāra-naya* which points to our slumbering state in the domain of spiritualism applies to our *samsārī* state, while the *niścaya-naya* which indicates our transcendental spiritual nature is applicable to *siddha* state in us. To say that every empirical self is potentially divine (*siddha*) is to say that it is basically possessing infinite knowledge, infinite bliss and infinite energy. Thus spiritual realization consists in the full manifestation of the cognitive, affective and conative potencies inherent in the self. Let us now discuss the nature of self from the aforesaid perspectives.

First, the *vyavahāra-naya* tells us that the empirical self owns at least four *prāṇas* (one sense, one *bala*, life-limit and breathing) and at best ten *prāṇas* (five senses, three *balas*, life-limit and breathing). The lowest in the grade of existence are the one-sensed souls. They possess four *prāṇas*, namely, sense of touch, *bala* of body, life-limit and breathing, and they are of four kinds, namely, earth-bodied, water-bodied, fire-bodied, air-bodied and vegetable-bodied selves. As we move higher on the ladder of biological existence, we have two-sensed to five-sensed selves having six, seven, eight, nine and ten *prāṇas* respectively.<sup>9</sup> We may point out in passing that it is only the five-sensed human selves who are capable of unfolding their potential divinity. In contradistinction to *vyavahāra-naya*, the *niścaya-naya* points out that knowledge-consciousness (*jñāna-cetanā*) is the real *prāṇa* of self.<sup>10</sup> It is by virtue of this that the self is distinguished from other substances. The noumenal view does not take any note of the ten *prāṇas*, but keeps its eyes fixed on the essential life of the self, namely, knowledge-consciousness.

Secondly, the *vyavahāra-naya* recognizes empirical self as bound by material *karmas* (*dravya-karma*) and psychical *karmas* (*bhāva-karma*). Owing to the effects of *karma* the self trans-migrates from one body to another, from one state of existence to the other. With *karmic* associations from beginningless time, the self is affected by the material objects of the world and appears to possess material qualities of colour, touch, taste, and smell. But the *nīścaya-naya* which directs our attention to the real nature of the self proclaims that the self's intrinsic nature cannot be destroyed by the *karma* and it is devoid of any of the material qualities.<sup>11</sup> The real self does not hanker after bodily acquisitions.

Thirdly, according to the *vyavahāra-naya*, the self extends up to the limits of bodily dimensions on account of its narrowing and dilating characteristics because of the effect of *karma*,<sup>12</sup> just as a lotus-hued ruby extends its lustre to the cup of milk, when placed in it,<sup>13</sup> or just as a lamp throws its light to the extent of the space in which it is placed<sup>14</sup>. The *nīścaya-naya* propounds that the self is capable of extending to the entire *lokākāśa*<sup>15</sup>.

Fourthly, the *vyavahāra-naya* tells us that the empirical self is the doer of material and psychical *karmas*.<sup>16</sup> These two are so interconnected that one gives rise to the other.<sup>17</sup> *śubha* (auspicious) and *aśubha* (inauspicious) actions occasioned by *śubha* and *aśubha* psychical states are done by the empirical self. But the *nīścaya-naya* expounds that in whatever deeds the self may get itself engaged in the world, they are not the representatives of the self in its pure, undefiled and transcendental nature. The self in its real nature is not the doer of material and psychical *karmas*, but it is the doer of transcendental states of knowledge and the like. When the empirical self rises to the transcendental plane of experience, it becomes the doer of pure actions devoid of attachment and aversion.

Fifthly, in the eyes of *vyavahāra-naya*, the empirical self is the enjoyer of pleasure and pain.<sup>18</sup> These are the results of *karmic* associations from beginningless time. But according to

*niścaya-naya*, the self is capable of enjoying such happiness as is transcendental, born of the self, supersensuous, incomparable, infinite and indestructible.<sup>19</sup>

Lastly, the *niścaya-naya* regards the self as its own lord (*prabhu*).<sup>20</sup> It is its own enemy and friend,<sup>21</sup> it is not dependent on any other agency for its salvation. It is called *svayambhū*.<sup>22</sup> It is a state of self-sufficiency which requires no other foreign assistance to sustain itself. It is itself the subject, the object, the means of its achievement; it achieves for itself, destroys the extraneous elements and is the support of its infinite potencies. Hence the self manifests its original nature by transforming itself into six cases; it is at once the nominative, the accusative, the instrumental, the dative, the ablative, and the locative case respectively.<sup>23</sup>

To sum up these two religious points of view, the *niścaya* and the *vyavahāra*, bring about the nature of self in its two aspects, namely, the transcendental and the empirical. Kundakunda affirms that transcendental spiritual experience surpasses all the conceptual points of view whether *niścaya* and *vyavahāra*.<sup>24</sup> The living religious experience is the non-conceptual state of existence. Amṛtacandra argues that the proper results of instruction to a disciple can only issue if he, after assimilating the nature of *niścaya-naya* and *vyavahāra-naya*, adopts the attitude of indifference towards both of these, i. e. if he transcends these intellectual points of view.<sup>25</sup>

**2 ii). Goal of Human Pursuance :** As we have already said, *niścaya-naya* provides religious goal for the human aspirant. It is one of the ways of expressions of the religious goal. In the following we shall deal with some of its significant expressions which, no doubt, convey identical meaning.

First, the religious goal is described as the attainment of *paramātman* after one's passing through the state of *antarātman* and renouncing the state of *bahirātman*.<sup>26</sup> The *paramātman* is *parama ātman*, the highest, infinite self. The *bahirātman* has awareness only of the physical body and its various

accompaniments, the *antarātman* has developed spiritual awareness, but the *paramātman* attains to the highest realization of spiritual experience that passes understanding<sup>27</sup> In the state of *paramātman* the empirical self is metamorphosed into transcendental self. In other words, the empirical self becomes universal self in the sense that it is now capable of intuiting all the objects of the world owing to the emergence of omniscience. In view of the fact of possessing omniscience, it will not be contradictory to say that the omniscient being is all-pervading, and that all the objects are within him, since he is the embodiment of knowledge and all the objects are the objects of knowledge.<sup>28</sup> The omniscient being neither accepts nor abandons, nor transforms the external objectivity,<sup>29</sup> but only witnesses and apprehends the world of objects without entering into them, just as the eye sees the object of sight.<sup>30</sup> In a similar vein Yogindu points out that the universe resides in the *paramātman* and the *paramātman* resides in the universe, yet the *paramātman* is not the Universe.<sup>31</sup> Again the *paramātman* or the universal self comprehends within its sweep all the objects of the world, so it may be said to be immanent (*sarvāgāha*) in the universes.<sup>32</sup> To be more clear, Jainism propounds the theory of knowledge-immanence and self-transcendence, just as we have light's immanence and sun's transcendence. The Universal self not only manifests infinite intuitive knowledge, but also experiences unalloyed bliss which is self-originated, supersensuous, unique, infinite and interminable.<sup>33</sup> The correlate of infinite knowledge and bliss is infinite energy without which the former two cannot be sustained. Thus we may say that the cognitive, conative, and affective tendencies of the self find supreme satisfaction in the state of *paramātman*. It is of capital importance to point out that Jainism gives credence to the infinite plurality of *paramātmans* just as there is ontological pluralism of empirical selves. Every empirical self can become universal self and there are as many universal selves as there are empirical selves without any contradiction. In Jaina terminology, every *jīva* is potentially a *siddha* and in *siddhahood* self-individuation is sustained.

Secondly, there is a different expression of the religious goal. *Sva-samaya* is the sublime religious ideal to be aimed at. The self which is absorbed in the 'other' is *para-samaya* and the self which is established in one's own consciousness is *sva-samaya*. In other words, *sva-samaya* is the state of *parama samādhi* in which all the conceptual leanings caused by our mind are replaced by non-conceptual spiritual existence,<sup>34</sup> beyond righteousness and unrighteousness. Kundakunda observes that just as a shackle, whether of gold or of iron indiscriminately ties a man, so also the righteous (*śubha*) and unrighteous (*aśubha*) conduct bind the self to mundane miseries.<sup>35</sup> The wise men shun both *śubha* and *aśubha*. Rare are such persons who are disposed to discard *śubha* as worthless. Puṇyapāda tells us that vowlessness causes vice and the observance of vows engenders virtues; but deliverance is the destruction of both.<sup>36</sup> The aspirant should adhere to *śubha* after renouncing *aśubha*, but after establishing himself in *sva-samaya*, the former is automatically abandoned.<sup>37</sup> Thus both *śubha* and *aśubha* prevent the self from having spiritual experience, hence they are equally condemned as unwholesome for the healthiest development of the spirit. But if the empirical self finds that it is difficult to rise to the state of *sva-samaya*, it should continue to perform *śubha* actions, but with the clear knowledge that these actions, however, devotedly performed will in no way enable the self to relish *parama samādhi*.

Thirdly, the religious goal may also be expressed in terms of *maraṇa* (death). Every empirical self is subject to repeated births and deaths. Though death is inevitable, yet that type of death can become our religious goal after which there is no birth. The occurrence of such a death is a matter of great achievement. In this world many types of human deaths can be witnessed. All these need no dilation. These are all empirical deaths, since they are pregnant with the future possibility of birth and in all births-human, celestial, hellish and sub-human the empirical self is involved in great anguish and affliction of diverse nature. Consequently, none of these forms of existence can afford interminable happiness. The death of the transcendent type is exemplified in the lives of omniscient beings when they part with



their body.<sup>38</sup> This is known as *kevalī-marāṇa*, which requires our paramount devotedness. It is here that the inevitability of death has been properly met with.

Lastly, the realization of perfect *ahimsā* is deemed to be the religious goal. *Ahimsā* is so central in the Jaina faith that it may be called the beginning and the end of Jaina religion. All living beings from the one-sensed to the five sensed are basically like our own self.<sup>39</sup> Consequently, it is not justifiable to injure them, to rule over them and to torment them.<sup>40</sup> In fact, *ahimsā* represents adequate behaviour towards all living beings.<sup>41</sup> It is the essence of wisdom and the eternal religion.<sup>42</sup> Samantabhadra says that *ahimsā* of all living beings is equivalent to the realization of the highest self.<sup>43</sup> The truth is that to be violent to other beings is to be violent to one's self.<sup>44</sup> It is, therefore, said that one should keep an attitude of friendship towards all living beings. The, *Ācārāṅga-sūtra* pronounces that one should neither deprive any living being of life, nor rule over him, nor torment him, nor excite him.<sup>45</sup> If one proceeds to translate perfect *ahimsā* into practice, one cannot stop short of spiritual realization. It may be noted that the basic factors in any form of *himsā* are attachment (*rāga*) and hatred (*dveṣa*), and these two continue to be operative in the mundane form of existence in different degrees. They can be overcome only when the empirical self arrives at the acme of spiritual experience. It is here that perfect *ahimsā* is conceivable, and below that only degrees of *ahimsā* are possible, hence perfect *ahimsā* is rightly the religious goal to be achieved.

2 (iii). **Doctrine of Karma** : We have said above that every *jīva* is potentially *siddha*, and the religious goal consists in realizing *siddhahood* which is the same as the state of *paramātman*, *svasamaya*, *kevalī-marāṇa* and *ahimsā*. This means that the goal is not something situated in a distant land, but it is the self in its veritable, dignified and ontological nature. In spite of this basic oneness of nature, the empirical selves differ from one another in respect of knowledge, prosperity, status, bodily make up, etc. What is the cause of this difference? How to account for these perceptible distinctions among empirical selves?

The answer of the Jaina is that it is the beginningless material subtle principle known as *karma* that is responsible for the cause of differences in the empirical selves. This *karma* has been exercising its limiting and crippling influence on the empirical conscious principles from the beginningless past, thereby it has been obstructing the manifestation of their inherent excellences. But it, may be noted that however encumbered with *karmic* matter a self may be, it cannot obstruct the manifestation of consciousness to the full, just as even the most dense cloud cannot interrupt the light of the sun to its farthest extreme. This material subtle principle known as *dravya-karma*, and its psychical counterpart in terms of *rāga* and *dveṣa* is called *bhāva-karma*.

*Karmas* are of varied nature, but the fundamental kinds of *karma* are eight in number<sup>46</sup> — i. *jñānāvaraṇīya-karma*: that which obscures knowledge, ii. *darśanāvaraṇīya-karma*: that which obscures undifferentiated cognition, iii. *vedanīya karma* : that which produces the feeling of pleasure and pain, iv. *mohanīya-karma* : that which obstructs right belief and right conduct, v. *āyu-karma*: that which determines the period of stay of self in a particular body, vi. *nāma-karma*: that which is responsible for the built of a particular kind of body, vii. *gotra-karma*: that which determines status in society; and viii. *antarāya-karma*: that which obstructs will power and enjoyable gains.

It is no doubt true that *karmas* bind the self to mundane existence. Now the question that arises is this : How the self is bound by *karma*? What are the causes that create *karmic* bondage in the self? The answer of the Jaina is that it is actions (mental, bodily and vocal) polluted by passions<sup>47</sup> that cause empirical bondage to the self. The passion-free actions do not bring about any mundane bondage whatsoever. Actions with passion are known as *jñeyādeyaṃamana-kriyās*, since they are consequent upon transmuting the inherent meanings of the objects of the world; and actions without passions are *jñāpati-kriyās*, since they arise in consequence of having supersensuous knowledge which knows things without any distortion and predilections.<sup>48</sup> Bondage of

*karmas*, presupposes in-flux of *karmas*, i. e. *bandha* presupposes *āśrava*. Any action of mind, body and speech is the cause of *karmic* influx (*āśrava*). This *āśrava* becomes bondage in presence of passion. When there are no passions, there is no bondage (*bandha*) but, in the absence of passions, there is no doubt influx of *karma* (*āśrava*) owing to actions, but this *āśrava* cannot adversely affect the self. Thus it is passions that mar the spiritual career of an aspirant.

Now the question that confronts us is : Is there any way to end *āśrava* and *bandha*? The answer of the Jaina is that if the inflow of *karmas* is stopped and the accumulated *karmas* are brushed aside, the self can be made free from all *karmic* filth. Thus *mokṣa* (emanicipation from *karmic* matter) is through *saṁvara* (stoppage of *karmic* matter) and *nirjarā* (shedding of *karmic* matter). All these three have their psychical counterparts, i. e. there is *bhāva-saṁvara*, *bhāva-nirjarā* and *bhāvamokṣa*.<sup>49</sup> This shows that without psychical transformation nothing worthwhile can be achieved. He who makes himself free from passions following right course of conduct stops the influx of *karmas*. To make oneself completely free from auspicious and inauspicious, psychical states is possible only gradually. Thus *saṁvara* is gradual. The life of *aṇuvratas* and that of *mahāvratas* illustrate the gradual process of *saṁvara* and, consequently of *nirjarā*. In other words, the *ācāras* of the householder and that of the *muni* pave the way for realising, *saṁvara*, *nirjarā* and *mokṣa*. In the state of *mokṣa*, the self, experiencing infinite knowledge, infinite bliss and energy absolves itself from the perpetual rounds of birth and death, and it thus annuls the filth of *karmas* in its entirety.

**2(iv) Meaning of Spiritual Awakening :** Spiritual awakening, according to the Jaina faith, is the commencement of religious living. It opens the way to spiritual pilgrimage. The irreligious self is converted to religion, which is tantamount to saying that the self is born in the realm of spiritual values. The intellectual understanding of religious truths is not enough, but a sense of participation in them is to be developed.

“*Samyagdarśana* is the prime cause of salvation, just as the foundation is the mainstay of a palace, good luck that of beauty, life that of bodily enjoyment, royal power that of victory, a culture that of nobility and policy that of government.”<sup>50</sup> Rightness in knowledge and conduct is acquired through, *samyagdarśana* or spiritual awakening. The spiritually awakened self considers his, own self as his genuine abode and regards. the outward dwelling places as artificial.<sup>51</sup> He renounces all identification with the animate and inanimate objects of the world, and properly weighs them, in the balance of his awakened spirit. Thus he develops a unique attitude towards himself and the world, around him.

The religious treatises of the Jainas discuss the nature of *samyagdarśana* from two points of view, namely, *nīścaya* (transcendental) and *vyavahāra* (empirical). The former regards *samyagdarśana* as awakening of the transcendental self, whereas the latter regards, it as the belief in the seven *tattvas*.<sup>52</sup> Even in the belief in the seven *tattvas*, the central principle is the self. So ultimately *vyavahāra-samyagdarśana* will give rise to *nīścaya-samyagdarśana*. Amṛtacandra accords to *nīścaya-naya* or *śuddha-naya* the status of *samyagdarśana*.<sup>53</sup> This is due to the fact that *śuddha-naya* consists in recognizing the self as untouched by *karmas*, as undifferentiated, and as perdurable,<sup>54</sup> and this experience is not other than spiritual awakening or *samyagdarśana*, thus *nīścaya* and *vyavahāra-samyagdarśana* are not opposed to each other, but the latter may be regarded as the means to *nīścaya-samyagdarśana*. In other words, *vyavahāra-samyagdarśana* is fruitful only when it gives rise to *nīścaya-samyagdarśana*.

There may be a tendency to confuse spiritual awakening with moral and intellectual accomplishments. One may say that he who is intellectually enlightened and morally converted is spiritually awakened. How can a man after attaining to the fair height of intellectual knowledge and moral upliftment be spiritually barren? Though it is astonishing, yet it is regarded as a fact by the Jainas. The ‘*dravya-liṅgī-muni*’ is an instance of

this sort of life. No doubt, intellectual learning and moral conversions may facilitate spiritual awakening in, certain selves, but this cannot as a rule bring about the latter. A spiritually unawakened man may be an astute intellectualist, a resolute moralist, but he will lack that spiritual quality by virtue of which he may be called a real saint, a seeker of spiritual truth, a person moving on the path of religion. Thus spiritual awakening is to be sharply distinguished from moral and intellectual accomplishments.

Now the question is : What are the criteria of *samyagdarsāna*, or spiritual awakening? Is there any way to judge the occurrence of spiritual awakening in the life of an aspirant? The answer given is this that though spiritual awakening is a subjective phenomenon, yet the Jaina *Ācāryas* have given certain individual and social characteristics that accompany *samyagdarsāna*. In general it may be said that the spiritually awakened self is without any iota of fear and pride. He is not frightened when worldly pleasures part company and troubles accompany him. Nor is he perturbed by the life hereafter. He has no fear of death, disease, accidents, insecurity, and of losing prosperity.<sup>55</sup> Again he has comprehended the futility of pride, and consequently pride of learning, honour, family, caste, power, opulence, penance and body has been forsaken by him.<sup>56</sup> Besides the spiritually awakened-self develops certain individual characteristics in his own personality. First, he regards, without any doubt, kindness to all creatures as *dharma* and any injury to them as *adharma*.<sup>57</sup> Secondly, he does not hanker after transient pleasures of the world.<sup>58</sup> Thirdly, he dissociates himself from irrational and unscientific traditional beliefs. These three characteristics are technically known as *niḥsaṅkita*, *niḥkāṅkṣita* and *amūḍhadṛṣṭi* respectively. Besides, there are certain social characteristics which emanate from the spiritually awakened being. First, he does not hate a meritorious being owing to certain diseased bodily conditions and the like.<sup>59</sup> Secondly, he does not lay open the faults and weaknesses of others and does not publicize his own good deeds. Thirdly, if any body is constrained to deviate from the path of righteousness, he re-establishes him

in the right path.<sup>60</sup> Fourthly, he evinces, deep affection for those who are on the path of righteousness.<sup>61</sup> And lastly, he propagates spiritual values by such means as are best suited to time and place.<sup>62</sup> These five attitudes are technically known as *nirvicikitsā*, *upagūhana*, *sthikaraṇa*, *vātsalya* and *prabhāvanā* respectively.

**2(v). Incentives to Spiritual Life :** After attaining *samyagdarśana* or spiritual conversion, the self is prompted by certain incentives to lead spiritual life. These incentives known as *anuprekṣās* engender detachment, lift the mind of the aspirant above profane relations and lead him from the domain of passion to that of dispassion. Incentives are twelve in number.<sup>63</sup> (i) Incentive of transitoriness (*anityānuprekṣā*) : The awakened self looks all-round and finds that all the things of the world are transitory. Body, fame, pleasures of the senses and other things of *bhoga* and *upabhoga* are unstable in character like a bubble of water. Friends, beauty, children and wealth are impermanent like a rainbow. Being fed up with the impermanence of things, the awakened-self strives to seek the permanent self. (ii) Incentive of helplessness (*aśarāṇānuprekṣā*) : The awakened-self derives inspiration from the fact of helplessness on many occasions in life. Helplessness before incurable disease and death are the two important life situations. (iii) Incentive of transmigration (*samsārānuprekṣā*) : The four forms of bodily existence — human, celestial, hellish and sub-human are fraught with numberless sulterings. The awakened-self realizes this and endeavours to adopt a course of discipline that may bring an end to transmigratory character of self. (iv) Incentive of loneliness (*ekatvānuprekṣā*) : The awakened-self experiences that the mundane soul is killed alone, is born alone, dies alone, and alone becomes perfect. The consequences of good and bad actions are experienced alone. Neither kinsmen nor friends, nor sons and daughters share one's sufferings; one alone has, to bear them. (v) Incentive of the distinction between self and the not-self (*anyatvānuprekṣā*) : Body is sensuous, unconscious, impermanent and with beginning and end, while the soul is supra-sensuous, conscious, permanent and without beginning and end. When one is alien even to this body so nearest to the self, the question of

its distinction with other objects of the world around does not arise. The awakened self therefore withdraws his mind from externalities and fixes it in the depth of his own self. (vi) Incentive of bodily impurity (*asuci-anuprekṣā*) : The awakened-self derives inspiration from the fact that the body is full of impurities and is the root cause of birth, death, mental and physical sufferings. Consequently, attachment to body is of no consequence in the interest of higher life. (vii) Incentive of the universe (*lokānuprekṣā*) : In this beginningless universe which has many things as its constituents, the importance of human existence can be assessed. The significance of human life cannot be denied without falling into inconsistency. Thus the awakened-self is encouraged to make use of this life for higher advancement. (viii) Incentive of the difficulty of attaining spiritual calm (*bodhidurlabhānuprekṣā*) : The awakened-self is aware of the fact that there are formidable obstacles in arriving at the acme of spiritual realization. In consequence, he is required to set aside indolence and inactions in this very life for traversing the path of spiritual realization. (ix-xi) Incentive of influx, stoppage and shedding of *karmas* (*āśrava-saṁvara-nirjarānuprekṣa*) : The awakened-self dwells upon the consequence of *karmas* in their various forms. This prepares the self to rise at the height of blissful experience bereft of *karmas*. (xii) Incentive of sacred preachings (*dharmānuprekṣā*) : The awakenedself is inspired to practise *ahiṁsā-dharma* preached by an *arhat*. This inspiration is so total that he feels an inner urge to observe forgiveness, self-control, continence and the like. The observance of these virtues culminates in self-contemplation and social upliftment.

Having been guided by the incentives to spiritual life, the aspirant devotes his energies to meditation, devotion and *svādhyāya* alongwith the performance of other spiritual exercises. Before taking up these spiritual practices, he resorts to moral discipline in the form of *aṇuvratas* and *mahāvratas*. Without moral observances, the spiritual practices cannot be sustained. According to the Jaina faith, moral and spiritual discipline find their completion in the life of the *muni*, since the life of the householder affords only partial ground for them. The moral and

spiritual practices of the *muni* culminate in the attainment of the religious goal of *arhat-hood and siddha-hood*. We now first proceed to deal with the spiritual exercises.

**2(vi). Spiritual Exercises :** The *muni* performs many types of spiritual exercises, such as (a) *guptis and samitis*, (b) control of the five senses, (c) sixfold essentials, and (d) *tapas*.

(a) The ideal thing for a *muni* is to control totally his physical, mental and vocal activities and to fix himself in the *ātmanic* experience. Such a sublime endeavour is termed *gupti*.<sup>64</sup> Thus from the standpoint of the highest ascent, it simplifies the withdrawal of mind, body and speech from virtue and vice, and from the auspicious and inauspicious activities, but from the standpoint of *śubhopayogī muni*, it means the recoiling of the triple agencies merely from the inauspicious deeds.<sup>65</sup> The observance of carefulness in moving, speaking, taking food, keeping and receiving things, evacuating bowels, etc. is termed *samiti*.<sup>66</sup> It may be noted here that the *muni* accepts food not for increasing strength, enhancing longevity, gratifying relish, and attaining bright look, but performing spiritual study, pursuing self-control and meditation.<sup>67</sup>

(b) It is an evident fact that attachment to senses and sensuous pleasures creates enormous difficulties in the spiritual path. Hence a *muni* controls the five senses from their attachment to colour, sound, smell, taste and touch. In order that the senses may be curbed, a *muni* should observe proper discipline. The sense of sight should neither be attracted by beauty nor repulsed by the ugliness of things; the sense of hearing should not be led away by any tune whatsoever; the sense of smell should not be seduced by the fragrance of things; the sense of taste should not be overcome by different kinds of juices, and lastly the sense of touch should not be led astray by different kinds of touch.<sup>68</sup>

(c) A *muni* performs six essentials.<sup>69</sup> (i) *Sāmāyika* : He develops an equanimous state of mind in the midst of life and death, loss and gain, pleasant and unpleasant events, friends and foes, pleasure and pain. (ii) *Vandanā* : He offers salutations to



*Arhanta* and *Siddha Pratimās* and to those who excell in spiritual attainments. (iii) *Stuti* : He contemplates on the divine characteristics of the twenty-four *Tīrthaṅkaras*. (iv) *Pratikramaṇa* : He purifies the faults in spiritual living by resorting to self-criticism, and confession in the presence of his *guru*. (v) *Pratyākhyāna* : It implies the determination of the *muni* to renounce in future all that is inconsistent with his spiritual pursuit. *Pratikramaṇa* has retrospective reference, while *pratyākhyāna* has prospective one. (vi) *Kāyotsarga* : In it the *muni* practises a formal non-attachment to the body for a prescribed period of time.

(d) *Tapa* : He eradicates desires from the texture of self.<sup>70</sup> It is the real enemy of self. Consequently, its extirpation is of paramount importance. The *tapās* are of two kinds, viz. (i) external and (ii) internal.

(i) External austerities (*tapas*) are of six kinds.<sup>71</sup> — i. *Anaśana* : It means fasting for a limited period of time, such as for one day, two days, etc. ii. *Avamaudārya* : It means to take less than the normal quantity of food each day. iii. *Vṛttiparisamkhyana* : It means the predetermination of the *muni* regarding the number of houses to be visited, the particular manner of taking food, the specific type of food, the giver or specific qualification, when he sets out to get food. If the things conform to his norm, he would accept food, otherwise he would go without it for that day. iv. *Rasaparityāga* : It implies the abstinence from one or more articles of food, namely, milk, curd, ghee, oil, sugar and salt; and from one or more kinds of tastes, namely, pacrid, bitter, astringent, sour and sweet. v. *Viviktaśayyāsana* : It means that a *muni* abandons the dwellings of depraved householders. He does not make use of them for sitting, sleeping and standing. vi. *Kayakleṣa* : In it the body is put to certain discomforts through uneasy and stern postures.

These external austerities do not aim at the flagellation of the body, but contribute towards the inner advancement of a *muni*.<sup>72</sup>

(ii) The internal austerities are also of six kinds.<sup>73</sup> i. *Prāyaścitta* : When a *muni* has committed certain transgressions, he resorts to repentance for the wrong done in order to purify himself. That is the real *prāyaścitta* wherein the commission of fault in spiritual life is not repeated. ii. *Vinaya* : It means the expression of humbleness towards the spiritually superior. A *muni* is not conceited in his attainments, and behaves modestly with all those who have attained to spiritual heights. iii. *Vaiyāvṛtṭya* : It means the rendering of service to other *munis* through suitable means when they are overwhelmed by disease, affliction and any disturbance whatsoever. iv. *Vyutsarga* : It implies the relinquishment of internal and external *parigraha*. v. *Svādhyāya* : The study of scriptures is *svādhyāya*. Its purpose is to enrich the intellect, to refine moral and spiritual efforts, to infuse detachment and fear from mundane miseries, and to purify defects that may occur when one pursues the divine path. For those who are fickle-minded and intellectually unsteady, nothing is so potent to end such a state of mind as the pursuance of *svādhyāya*. Without the acquisition of scriptural knowledge, there is always a danger of being led astray from the virtuous path, just as the tree full of flowers and leaves cannot escape its deadening fate for want of the root. The man with *svādhyāya* saves himself from being led astray, just as the needle with thread is not lost. vi. *Dhyāna* : It represents the concentration of mind on a particular object. The object of concentration may be profane or holy in character. The mind may concentrate either on the debasing object or on the object which is elevating. The former is *aprasasta-dhyāna* and the latter is *prasasta*. In dealing with *dhyāna* as *tapa*, we are concerned with the *prasasta* type of *dhyāna*, since it is only relevant to spiritual realization. It is the indispensable, integral constituent of right conduct, and consequently it is directly related to the actualization of the divine potentialities. It is the clear and single road by which the aspirant can move straight to the supreme good. All the disciplinary observances find their culmination in *dhyāna*, and they form an essential background for the performance of *dhyāna*. The practice of the fourfold virtue of *maitri* (friendship with all creatures), *pramoda* (appreciation of

the merits of others), *karuṇā*, (compassion for those who are in trouble) and *madhyasta* (indifference to those who are irrational), is the mental prerequisite conditions of *dhyāna*. The aspirants should avoid those places which are inhabited by the vicious, hypocrites, gamblers, drunkards, harlots and the like, and should choose a bank of river, an island, a cave, a summit of a mountain and other places of seclusion for practising spiritual concentration. For him, whose mind is immaculate, stable and detached, every posture, every place, and every time is fit for meditation. Many places in the body have been enumerated for mental concentration, namely, the two eyes, two ears, the foremost point of the nose, the forehead, the place between the two eye-brows etc. *Prasastadhyāna* is of two types, namely, *dharma* and *śukla*. The best kind of *dharma-dhyāna* is to meditate upon the self by fixing one's mind in it after renouncing all other thoughts. After *dharma-dhyāna*, *śukla-dhyāna* is practised. In it the mind shortens its field of concentration to the effect that the *muni* meditates upon one substance, an atom, and the like. In consequence, the *muni* experiences infinite knowledge, bliss and energy.

After dealing with these spiritual exercises, let us deal with devotion as one of the very important spiritual exercises for higher advancement of the self. Devotion implies sublime affection towards the perfected souls (*arhat* and *siddha*) or towards those who are much advanced on the path of divine realization. The Jaina devotional texts regard devotion as of great significance. Vādirāja says that in spite of deep intellectual attainments and great moral accomplishments, the aspirant cannot achieve liberation without profound devotion. Samantabhadra points out that just as iron is turned into gold by a mere touch of the *pārāsa* stone, so also the devotee is transformed into an effulgent personality, and what he speaks is regarded as of great importance. But here a question may be asked : Is devotion possible in Jainism? Again, one may say that devotion in Jainism is a contradiction in terms, since devotion presupposes the existence of a being who can actively respond to the aspirations of the devotee, and in Jainism the conception of such a being is inadmissible. The reply is that in Jainism *arhat* and *siddha* are

the objects of devotion. They are, no doubt, not affected by devotion, and remain quite indifferent to human weal and woe. They are beyond attachment and aversion. Why is, then, devotion directed to them? The answer is that by our devotion to the *arhat* or the *siddha* our thoughts and emotions are purified. A great heap of *punya* is deposited in the self by devotion. By virtue of this there results spiritual advancement. This sort of change in the devotee cannot result from worshipping a mere stone, hence the importance of devotion for *arhat* or *siddha*. Thus the aspirant should not breathe in despondency for the aloofness of *arhat* or *siddha*. Those who are devoted to the *siddhas* and *arhats* are automatically elevated.

2 (vii). Concept of Arhat and Siddha : By performing spiritual exercises, an aspirant or a *muni* attains to spiritual perfection, the goal of religious endeavour. He, earns the title of *arhat* or *arhanta*. Now *arhat* may be of two types — *tīrthaṅkara* and *non-tīrthaṅkara* (ordinary omniscient soul). The distinction between the two is this that the former is capable of preaching and propagating religious doctrines in order to guide the mundane souls immersed in the life of illusion, and his sermons are properly worded by *gaṇadhara*s, while the latter is not the propounder of religious principles, but silently enjoys simply the sublimity of spiritual experience. We shall now deal with the characteristics of *arhanta*. First, the *Ācārāṅga* tells us that an *arhanta* is established in truth in all directions. He is *ātmasamāhita* (established in the *ātman*). He has freed himself from anger, pride, death, greed, hatred, birth and death. In the state of *arhat-hood* there are neither senses, nor is there any calamity, nor astonishment, nor sleep, nor desire, nor hunger; there is only *nirvāṇa*.<sup>74</sup> Secondly, *arhantas* lead a life of supermoralism but not of amoralism. He is no doubt beyond the category of virtue and vice, good and evil, *punya* and *pāpa*, yet he may be pronounced to be the most virtuous soul, though the pursuit of virtuous life cannot bind him to mundane cycle of birth and death.<sup>75</sup> Thirdly, just as a mother educates her child for its benefit and a kind physician diseased orphans, so also the *arhat* instructs humanity for its upliftment and dispenses spiritual pills

to suffering humanity.<sup>76</sup> He is a spiritual leader of mankind. Whatever issues from him is potent enough to abrogate the miseries of tormented humanity. His presence is supremely enlightening. Fourthly, with the emergence of *ātmanic* experience and steadfastness in it, the conquest over the mind, the senses, and the passions becomes natural to *arhat*. By virtue of his self-realization, he has transcended the dualities of friends and enemies, pleasure and pain, praise and censure, life and death, and gold.<sup>77</sup> Fifthly, the *Ācārāṅga* tells us that the unwise sleep, the sages always awake.<sup>78</sup> Samantabhadra says that being impelled by the desire to live and enjoy, the ordinary persons work hard in the day and getting tired, they resort to sleep at night, but the mystic keeps awake day and night in the process of self-realization without being overwhelmed by indolence, inertia and looseness.<sup>79</sup> Sixthly, the *arhanta* has attained supersensuous knowledge, infinite potency and unique resplendence.<sup>80</sup> He is omniscient. He neither accepts nor abandons the external objectivity<sup>81</sup>, but only witnesses the world just as the eyes see the objects of sight<sup>82</sup>. Along with omniscience he experiences infinite bliss. Seventhly, the spiritual experience of *arhat* is ineffable and transcends all the similes of the world. Thus the essence of *arhat* cannot be completely described in rational terms. From this point of view the *arhat* is the 'wholly other'. At best, the *arhat* can be described by negative expressions. The *Ācārāṅga* tells us that the *arhat* is neither long nor small, he is neither black nor blue, etc., he is neither cold nor hot, he is neither feminine nor masculine, nor neuter; he perceives, he knows but there is no analogy.<sup>83</sup>

Considered from the perspective of spiritual realization, *arhat* and *siddha* stand at par. The difference is that the former enjoys embodied liberation and the latter disembodied one. *Arhat* is the perfect guru owing to the delivering of sermons for general beneficence and is also called perfect *deva* on account of the complete actualization of the divinity potential in himself. Thus in *arhat* there is the consistent identification of *devatva* and *gurutva*, of the inward experience and the

outward expression. In *siddhas* there is only the *devatva*. This does not imply the belittlement of the *siddha*, but simply the glorification of *arhat* as the supreme *guru*, *gurutva* being his additional characteristic.

### 3. MORALS

As we have said, the performance of spiritual exercises presupposes the practice of morals. Without moral observances spiritual progress is inconceivable. The conviction of the Jaina is that for the man who is spiritually awakened, morality serves as a means to spiritual living, but for the ordinary man, it is an end in itself. The realm of morality is auspicious psychical states resulting in auspicious activities. The obstacles to the achievement of morals are inauspicious activities emanating from inauspicious psychical states. Thus in order to stamp out the inauspicious psychical states from the texture of self the individual must abstain himself root and branch from violence, falsehood, theft, unchastity and acquisitions. This negative process of purifying the self necessarily requires the pursuance of the positive process of non-violence (*ahimsā*), truthfulness (*satya*), non-thieving (*asteya*), chastity (*brahmacarya*) and non-acquisition (*aparigraha*). These five virtues replace the five vices. It may be noted here that *ahimsā* is the central and fundamental of these virtues. All the rest are regarded as the means for its proper sustenance, just as the field of corn requires adequate fencing for its protection.<sup>84</sup> When the replacement of vices by virtues is total, we are said to observe complete morality (*sakala*) and when it is partial, we have partial morality (*vikala*). He who observes complete morality is called a *muni*, while he who observes partial morality is called a householder. The life of *anuvratas* represents partial morality of the householder, whereas the life of *mahāvratas* represents complete morality of the *muni*. The *anuvratas* and the *mahāvratas* are the ways of overcoming the vices of *himsā*, *steya*, *asatya*, *abrahmacarya* and *parigraha*. Let us deal with the nature of these vices which will help us in deriving the scope of *anuvratas* and *mahāvratas*.

*Himsā* may be defined as the committing of injury to the physical and psychical aspects of oneself and others through the operation of passion-ineffected activities of mind, body and speech. This means that if, in spite of the dispassionate activities of mind, body and speech any living being is injured, it cannot be called *himsā*, since the infecting element of passion is missing.<sup>85</sup> On the contrary, even if the activities of mind, body and speech are passion-infected, and no living being is oppressed, even then the actions are called *himsā*. Here though the soul has not injured others, yet it has injured itself by defiling its own natural constitution. Thus we may say that it is only on the basis of the internal state of mind that the acts of *himsā* and *ahimsā* are to be judged. This should not be taken to understand that external behaviour is of no significance since in human life the outward commission of *himsā* without the pursuance of internal corruption cannot be vindicated. He who exclusively emphasizes the internal at the expense of the external forgets the significance of outward behaviour. Thus both the internal and external aspects should occupy their due places.

*Himsā* is of two kinds — intentional and non-intentional. The latter has again been divided into *udyamī*, *ārambhī* and *virodhī*. Intentional *himsā* implies the voluntary commitment of *himsā* by one's own self along with the provocation and endorsement of the acts of *himsā*. Besides, *himsā* which is unavoidably committed by reason of one's own profession, by the performance of domestic activities, and by defending oneself, one's neighbour, one's country, one's belonging, and the like from one's foes is called *udyamī*, *ārambhī* and *virodhī himsā* respectively.

3(i) *Ahimsā (Aṇuvrata-Mahāvratā)* : Now the householder is incapable of turning away completely from *himsā*, hence he should keep himself away from the intentional commission, of *himsā* of the two-sensed to five-sensed beings. *Himsā* owing to profession, domestic activities, and defensive measures cannot be counteracted by him. Thus he commits non-intentional injury to *jīvas*, namely, the vegetable-bodied, the air-bodied, the fire-bodied,

etc. Even in the realm of one-sensed *jīvas* and in the realm of non-intentional injury he should so manage to confine his operations as may affect the life and existence of a very limited number of *jīvas*. In these two provinces the point to note is that of reducing the amount of injury that is apt to be caused and not that of total relinquishment which is not possible without endangering the survival of man. If we reflect a little, we shall find that man is subject to *himsā* by the very condition of his existence. Yet instead of aggravating the natural weight of *himsā* by falling foul upon one another and by our cruel treatment with the animal and vegetable kingdoms we should endeavour to reduce this general curse to the extent it is possible. The observer of *ahimsānuvrata* should avoid gambling, hunting, drinking, meat eating, and the like.

The implications of *ahimsānuvrata* in solving social, national and international problems is that the principle of mutual understanding should be adhered to. Life should be elevated altogether from the plane of force to that of reason, persuasion, accomodation, tolerance and mutual service.<sup>86</sup> The maintenance of universal peace, and the promotion of human welfare, can only be effected by suffusing worlds' atmosphere with the spirit of *ahimsā*. War is to be discouraged, exploitation is to be condemned. Besides, a social consciousness is to be developed against the use of wine and the slaughtering of animals.

The *muni* extends active friendship to all living beings from the one-sensed to the five-sensed without any exception, and consequently all forms of intentional *himsā* are shunned and the question of *udyamī*, *ārambhī* and *virodhī himsā* does not arise in his case. The *muni* is a world citizen. He, therefore, draws the attention of men to the inefficacy of *himsā* for solving social, national and international disputes. He himself is the embodiment of *ahimsā* and exhorts others to develop reverence for life as such.

**3 (ii). Satya (Aṇuvrata-Mahāvratā) :** Let us begin with the meaning of falsehood. It implies the making of wrong and improper statement by one who is overwhelmed by passions such



as anger, greed, conceit, deceit and the like. Falsehood is of four kinds. The first kind of falsehood refers to the affirmation of the existent as non-existent, the second refers to the declaration of the non-existent as existent, the third refers to the representation of the existing nature of things as different from what they are, and the fourth is indicative of speech which is disagreeable to others. The *muni* avoids all these four forms of falsehood, and therefore, he is said to observe *satya-mahāvratā*. But the householder has to speak harsh, unpleasant, violent words for defense, for running the household and doing professional management, therefore he observes *satyāṇuvratā*. The observer, of *satyāṇuvratā* does use words which are soothing, gentle and ennobling. If any speech causes *himsā*, it should be withheld. Ultimately the criterion of *satya* and *asatya* is *ahimsā* and *himsā* respectively. Thus *satya* speech should lead to *ahimsā*.

3 (iii). *Asteya (Aṇuvratā-Mahāvratā)* : *Steya* means the taking of things under the constraint of passion without their being given by the owner. It may be noted here that things constitute the external *prāṇas* of a man and he who thieves and plunders them is said to deprive a man of his *prāṇas*. This, is not other than *himsā*. The *muni* who observes *mahāvratā* does not take anything whatsoever without the permission of others, but the householder uses such things freely as are of common use without their being given, such as wellwater, and the like. Thus he is observing *asteyāṇuvratā*. It may be noted, here that the *muni* does not use even the common things without their being given by others. The householder does neither take those things which are forgotten and dropped by others nor give them to any one else. Purchasing of costly things at reduced prices is stealing, which is probably due to the fact that one may sell a thing after getting it by improper methods. Adulteration, abetment of theft, receiving stolen property, use of false weights and measures, smuggling, and the like come under stealing.

3 (iv). *Brahmacarya (Aṇuvratā-Mahāvratā)* : Sex-passion is. *abrahma*. He who frees himself completely from sexual inclination is observing *brahmacarya-mahāvratā*. But the

householder who abstains himself from the sexual contacts with all other women except his nuptial partner is observing *brahmacaryāṇuvrata*. Sex-passion is *himsā* and *brahmcaria* is *ahimsā*. The householder keeps himself away from adultery, prostitution, unnatural methods of sexual enjoyment, and the like.

3 (v). **Aparigraha (Aṇuvrata-Mahāvratā)** : Attachment to things is *parigraha*. Those who have a feeling of attachment to things in spite of their external renunciation are far from *aparigraha*; and those who have external things are not free from internal attachment. Thus if one is prone to remove internal attachment, one should correspondingly throw aside external possessions also. Attachment is a form of *himsā* and those who wish to practise *ahimsā* should avoid attachment. The householder is incapable of renouncing all *parigraha*; therefore he should limit the *parigraha* of wealth, cattle, corn, buildings, etc. This is *parigraha-parimāṇāṇuvrata*. We may say that the householder's vow of *aparigraha* would tend to annul the economic inequality rampant in society and thereby everybody will be able to get things of daily necessities at least. Today, men and nations are striving for enhancement of their wealth and territory at the cost of others with the consequence that the individual and national tensions are increasing. *Parigraha* is detrimental when it engenders inordinate clinging. This vow of *aparigraha* is a mean between capitalism and communism. It is a road to true socialism. The *muni* renounces all *parigraha* of worldly things. Thus he follows *aparigrahamahāvratā*.

The observance of these five vows is capable of bringing about individual as well as social progress. Thus the Jaina faith and morals sum up the spiritual and moral living of the individual along with the social upliftment.



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7. *Pravacanasāra*, Rayacandra Jaina Sastramala, Bombay, 11. 100-2.
8. *Kārtikeyānupreksa*, 204.
9. The illustrations of the two-sensed souls are sea-snail, cowrie-shellfish, earth-worm, conch-shell-fish, etc.; of the three-sensed souls are louse, bug, ant, etc.; of the four-sensed souls are gadfly, mosquito, fly, bee, beetle, dragon-fly and butter-fly; of the five-sensed souls with ten *prāṇas* are celestial, hellish and human beings and some sub-human souls (Sogani, K. C., *Ethical Doctrines in Jainism*, Sanskriti Samrakshaka Sangha, Sholapur, p. 33).
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43. *Svayambhūstotra*, Vira Seva Mandira, Delhi, 117.
44. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga-sūtra* 1. 7. 9.
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46. *Gommatasara Karmakanda*, Rayacandra Jaina Sastramala, Bombay, 8
47. Passions are the psychical states of self. These psychical states are of very great variety, but all of them may be included in attachment (*nāga*), aversion (*dveṣa*) and infatuation (*moha*), which again can be subsumed under *subha-bhāva* (auspicious psychical states) and *a-subha-bhāva* (inauspicious psychical states) leading to *punya āśrava-bandha* and *pāpa āśrava-bandha* respectively. *Moha* (infatuation) which is the spiritual perversion and *dveṣa* (aversion) which manifests in anger (*krodha*), pride (*māna*), etc. are invariably *a-subha-bhāva*. Besides *nāga* (attachment) expressing itself in deceit (*mayā*), greed (*lobha*) etc. and in sensual pleasures is *a-subha*; but *nāga* directed to spiritual and moral matters is *subha*. In other words, devotion to Arhat, Siddha and saints, compassionate attitude towards those who are in distress and are thirsty and hungry, state of mind bereft of anger, pride, deceit and greed—all these lead to *punya āśrava*. Besides, belittlement of others, sensual indulgence, causing pain to others, employment of knowledge in base objects—all these lead to *pāpa āśrava*. (vide *Samayasāra*, 282 and *Pancāstikāya*, 135. 40).
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50. Handiqui, *Yasastilaka and Indian Culture*, Jivaraja Granthmala, Sholapur, p. 248.
51. *Samadhisataka*, 70.
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78. *Ācārāṅga-sūtra*, 1. 3. 1 (p. 28).
79. *Swayambhūstotra*, 48.
80. *Pravacanasāra*, I. 15, 19.
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## AHIMSĀ AS A SOCIO-SPIRITUAL VALUE

There is no denying the fact that the doctrine of *Ahimsā* is the be-all and end-all of the Jinist way of life and living. “Just as in the world there is nothing higher than the Meru mountain and nothing more extended than the sky, so also in the world, there is no value excellent and universal corresponding to *Ahimsā*<sup>1</sup>.” The oldest Jaina *Āgama Āyāro* remarkably pronounces that none of the living beings ought to be killed or deprived of life, ought to be ordered or ruled, ought to be enslaved or possessed, ought to be distressed or afflicted and ought to be put to unrest or disquiet. (सर्वे पाणा न हंतव्या, न अजावेतव्या, न परिषेत्तव्या, न परितवेयव्या, न उद्देयव्या)<sup>2</sup> The sociopolitical organisations and the capitalistic set up can easily derive inspiration from this ethico-social statement. Thus the *Āyāro (Ācārāṅga)* conclusively pronounces that after understanding the importance of kindness to beings, the enlightened person should preach, disseminate and applaud it at all places in East-West and North-South directions. (दयं लोगस्स जाणित्ता पाईणं, पडीणं, दाहिणं, उदीणं आइक्खे विभए किट्ठे वेदवी)<sup>3</sup> The *Praśnavyākaraṇa Sūtra* designates Social *Ahimsā* as kindness (दया), security (रक्षा), salutariness (कल्याण), fearlessness (अभय), non-killer (अमाघाज), and so on<sup>4</sup>.

Owing to the momentousness of *Ahimsā*, the *Ācārāṅga* gives us certain arguments to renounce *Himsā*.

(1) **Socio-political argument against *Himsā*:** The *Ācārāṅga* condemns *Himsā* by saying that its operation is without any stop, cessation and discontinuance and it goes on increasing to the extent possible with the political consequenc that the race of armaments becomes unarrestable and continues to grow without any check. In contradistinction to this it eulogizes *Ahimsā* by saying that its observance is total and not piecemeal, with the result that the armament race discontinues and comes

with the result that the armament race discontinues and comes to a stop. (अत्थि सत्थं परेण परं, णत्थि असत्थं परेण परं)<sup>5</sup>.

(2) **Psychological Argument against *Himsā*** : After comprehending and beholding the significance of peacefulness of beings, one should renounce *Himsā*, inasmuch as *Himsā* causes suffering to beings and human suffering caused by theft, hoarding, falsehood, slavery, economic exploitation, social operation, curtailment of legitimate freedoms and the like is a great mental disturbance is dreadful and is associated with unbearable pain and affliction. Since life is dear to all beings, pleasures are desirable, pain is undesirable for them, beings ought not to be killed, ruled, possessed, distressed & so on. (णिज्झाइत्ता पडिलेहिता पत्तेयं परिणणिव्वाणं सव्वेसि पाणाणं अस्सातं अपरिणिव्वाणं महब्भयं दुक्खं ) (सव्वे पाणा सुहसाता दुक्खपरिकूला । सव्वेसि जीवितं पियं) <sup>6</sup>

It can not be gainsaid that human beings are engaged in actions and these actions are directed to different ends and some purposes. The *Ācārāṅga* expresses unpleasant surprise when it finds that there are human beings who are prone to realise ends and purposes through *Himsā*, such as killing, ruling, possessing, distressing and disquiting beings. They not only commit *Himsā*, but also they provoke others to commit *Himsā* and appreciate those who commit *Himsā*. The *Ācārāṅga* further tells us that these types of perverted actions defile human personality and thwart its proper development. (इमस्स चेव जीवियस्स परिवंदण-माणण-पूयणाए जाती-मरण-मोयणाय दुक्खपरिघातहेउं से सयमेव पुढविसत्थं-उदयसत्थं-अगणिसत्थं-वणस्सतिसत्थं-वाउसत्थं-तस्कायसत्थं समारंभति, अण्णेहि वा पुढविसत्थं (आदि) समारंभावेति, अण्णे वा पुढविसत्थं (आदि) समारंभते समणुजाणति । तं से अहिताए .....)<sup>7</sup> We may thus conclude that the criterion of perverted action is *Himsā*, whereas the criterion of right action or ethico-social action is *Ahimsā*. It is of capital importance to note that when our energies are directed to *Himsaka* (destructive) ends social development is obstructed and when our energies are directed to *Ahimsaka* (constructive) ends social development sets in. (एस खलु गंथे, एस खलु मोहे, एस खलु मारे, एस खलु गिरए)<sup>8</sup>

It will not be idle to point out that the talk of *Ahimsā* is not possible without a world of living beings. Social *Ahimsā* begins with the awareness of the 'other'. Like one's own existence, it recognises

the existence of other beings. In fact, to negate the existence of other beings is tantamount to negating one's own existence. Since one's own existence can not be negated, the existence of other beings also can not be negated. Thus there exists the universe of beings in general and that of human beings in particular. (णेव सयं लोगं अन्धाइक्खेज्जा, णेव अत्ताणं अन्धाइक्खेज्जा । जे लोगं अन्धाइक्खति से अत्ताणं अन्धाइक्खति, जे अत्ताणं अन्धाइक्खति से लोगं अन्धाइक्खति)<sup>9</sup> The *Ācārāṅga* tells us that after properly comprehending the different types of beings one should adopt an attitude of *Ahimsā* towards them and make them fearless. (लोगं च आणाए अभिसमेच्चा अकुतोभयं)<sup>10</sup>

For a living being, self has been necessarily recognised in addition to the material body. Thus living beings mean conscious selves alongwith the body. These selves are endowed with cognitive, affective and conative tendencies, by virtue of which they see and know, they like pleasure and dislike pain, and they are engaged in actions. These beings are the doers of actions and the enjoyers of the results of those actions. These living beings (empirical selves) both human and non-human are reacting with one another through their actions. The Jaina *Āgama* classifies living beings (*Jīvas*) into five kinds, namely, one sensed to five-sensed beings.<sup>11</sup> This classification of *jīvas* into five kinds is used for the measurement of the degree of *Ahimsā*. The more the senses the more the evolved consciousness. As for example, two-sensed *Jīvas* are more evolved than the one-sense beings, five sensed beings are more evolved than the one, two, three and four-sensed beings. Thus *Ahimsā* will be directly proportionate to the *Ahimsā* of the beings (*Jīvas*) classified. *Ahimsā* as a ethico-social value gives importance to outward behaviour of human beings. It regards outward behaviour of individual human beings and sociopolitical organisations as socially valuable.

Now for the progress and development of these beings, *Ahimsā* ought to be the basic value guiding the behaviour of human beings. For a healthy living, it represents and includes all the values directed to the 'other' without over-emphasizing the values directed to one's own self. Thus it is the pervasive principle of all the values. Posit *Ahimsā*, all the values are posited. Negate *Ahimsā*, all the values are negated. *Ahimsā* purifies our action in relation to the self and other



beings. This purification consists in our refraining from certain actions and also in our performing certain actions by keeping in view the existence of human and sub-human beings.

It may be asked what is in us on account of which we consciously lead a life of values based on *Ahimsā*? The answer is : it is *Karuṇā* which makes one move in the direction of adopting *Ahimsā*-values. It may be noted that the degree of *Karuṇā* in a person is directly proportionate to the development of sensibility in him. The greatness of a person lies in the expression of sensibility beyond ordinary limits. This should be borne in mind that the emotional life of a person plays a decisive role in the development of healthy personality and *Karuṇā* is at the core of healthy personality and *Karuṇā* is at the core of healthy emotions. Attachment and aversion bind the human personality to mundane, -existence, but *Karuṇā* liberates the individual from Karmic enslavement. The *Dhavalā*, the celebrated commentary on the *Śaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, remarkably pronounces that *Karuṇā* is the nature Of soul.<sup>12</sup> To make it clear, just as infinite knowledge is the nature of soul, so also is *Karuṇā*. This implies that *Karuṇā* is potentially present in every being although its full manifestation takes place in the life of the *Arhat*, the perfect being. Infinite *Karuṇā* goes with infinite knowledge. Finite *Karuṇā* goes with finite knowledge.

Thus if *Karuṇā* which is operative on the perception of the sufferings of the human and sub-human beings plunges into action in order to remove the sufferings of these beings, we regard that action as *Sevā*. Truly speaking, all *Ahimsā*-values are meant for the removal of varied sufferings in which the human and sub-human beings are involved. Sufferings may be physical and mental, individual and social, moral and spiritual. To alleviate, nay, to uproot these diverse sufferings is *Sevā*. In fact, the performance of *Sevā* is the verification of our holding *Ahimsā*-values. It is understandable that physical, mental and economic sufferings block all types of progress of the individual and make his life miserable. There are individuals who are deeply moved by these sufferings and consequently they dedicate themselves to putting an end to these sufferings.

Thus their *Karuṇā* results in *Sevā*. Thus *Ahimsā*, *Karuṇā* and *Sevā* are interrelated and are conducive both to individual and social progress. It is significant to point out that Mahavira's social mind exhorted that *Ahimsā* consists in recognising the dignity of man irrespective of caste, colour and creed. Man is man and should be recognised as such without any hesitation. The dignity of man is sacred and it is our duty to honour this dignity. Every individual, whether man or woman, should enjoy religious freedom without any distinction. A non-violent society can not subscribe to class exploitation and social oppression of man. Mahavira bestowed social prestige upon the down-trodden individuals. This led to the development of self-respect in them. Thus he showed that no man or woman should be deprived of availing himself of the opportunities of advancement. It is not idle to point out that in the present state of affairs the significance of *Ahimsā* can not be dispensed with. The easing of tensions and cessation of conflicts among states, the maintenance of universal peace and the promotion of human welfare can only be effected by suffusing world's atmosphere with the spirit of *Ahimsā*. This *Ahimsite* spirit of Mahavira extended itself even to the lowest scale of life and he promulgated that life as such is basically identical. Hence no living being should be hurt, enslaved and excited.

***Ahimsā* as end and means :** It is of capital importance to note that *Ahimsā* can be both an extrinsic and intrinsic value, i.e. both value as a **means** and value as an end. This means that both the means and the ends are to be tested by the criterion of *Ahimsā*. Thus the principle that "the end justifies the means" need not be rejected as immoral, if the means and ends are judged through the criterion of *Ahimsā*. In fact, there is no inconsistency in saying that *Ahimsā* is both an end as well as a means.

***Ahimsā*. and Truth :** Along with *Ahimsā*, the *Ācārāṅga* speaks of Truth, and it tells us that one should be steadfast in Truth and says that he who fixes himself in Truth destroys all evil tendencies. Again it tells us to be decisive about truth and he who follows the behests of Truth overcomes death. Now the question arises how the two are related. In my opinion, the *Ācārāṅga* regards *Ahimsā* as

the highest social Truth and likewise the highest Spiritual Truth and we shall discuss later on that Spiritual Truth and *Ahimsā* are also identical. (सच्चसि धिति कुव्वह। एत्थोवरए मेहावी सव्वं पावं कम्मं झोसेति)। (पुरिसा सच्चमेव समभिजाणाहि। सच्चस्स आणाए से उवट्ठिए मेघावी मारं तरति)<sup>13</sup>

## (2)

**Spiritual Perspective of *Ahimsā* :** In the previous section we have dwelt upon *Ahimsā* as a social value. This view regards *Ahimsā* as 'other' oriented and is concerned with the progress and development of the 'other'. It is a concrete form of *Ahimsā* and embodies diverse patterns according to social needs. It has only outward reference and is deeply dedicated to social amelioration. When Acarya Samantabhadra announces that in this world *Ahimsā*, of living beings is equivalent to Brahman, the metaphysical reality, he is propounding *Ahimsā* as the highest social value (अहिंसा भूतानां जगति विदितं ब्रह्म परमं)<sup>14</sup> on the contrary, the *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya* moves in a different direction when it unambiguously expresses that non-emergence of attachment, aversion etc. on the surface of self is *Ahimsā*. (अप्रादुर्भावः खलु रागादिनां भवत्यहिंसेति). This pronouncement has a deep inward reference and regards *Ahimsā* as a spiritual value. This method of dealing with *Ahimsā* obliges us to peep into one's own inner life, so that attachment and aversion along with their ramifications like anger, pride, deceit and greed are completely got rid of. The *Praśnavyākaraṇa Sūtra* designates *Ahimsā* as Nirvana (निष्वाण), *Samādhi* (समाही), Supreme tranquility (संती), happiness (पमोज), super satisfaction (तित्ती) and purity (पविता) and so on.<sup>15</sup> Along with this the spiritual perspective of *Ahimsā* is manifested in recognising *Paramātmā* as the Summum Bonum,<sup>16</sup> in describing *Samayasāra* beyond *Niścaya* and *Vyavahāra* as the spiritual goal to be achieved,<sup>17</sup> in enunciating *Svasamaya* as the sublime ideal to be aimed at<sup>18</sup> and in delineating knowledge-consciousness as the spiritual end of aspirant's endeavours.<sup>19</sup> The *Arhat* or *Siddha* state is the state of knowledge-consciousness, the state of omniscience and bliss. In all these manifestations of spiritual *Ahimsā*, there occurs non-emergence of attachment and aversion as pointed out by the *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*. In other words, we may say that even the slightest fall

from complete self-realisation is to be regarded as *Himsā*. Thus *Himsā* commences with the appearance of passions on the ground of self.

Owing to the great significance of *Ahimsā* the *Ācārāṅga* and the *Samanasuttam* give us spiritual argument to renounce *Himsā*.

**Spiritual Argument against *Himsā* :** Since all the selves are transcendently alike, killing the 'other' is killing one's own self, ruling the other is ruling one's own self, enslaving the other is enslaving one's own self, distressing the other is distressing one's own self, and disquieting the other is disquieting one's own self. By reason of this *Himsā* all the living beings has been abandoned by those desirous of self-realisation.<sup>20</sup> (तुमं सि णाम तं चेव जं हंतव्वं ति मण्णसि, तुमं सि णाम तं चेव जं अज्जावेतव्वं ति मण्णसि, तुमं सि णाम तं चेव जं परितावेतव्वं ति मण्णसि, तुमं सि णाम तं चेव जं परिघेतव्वं ति मण्णसि, एवं तं चेव जं उद्देवेतव्वं ति मण्णसि)

**Judgement of the acts of *Himsā* and *Ahimsā* :** After understanding the acme of spiritual *Ahimsā*, we are obliged to judge the acts of *Himsā* and *Ahimsā* through inward reference. Social *Ahimsā* is to be judged through outward reference. The *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya* tells us that if the bodily movement etc. are performed with circumspection, nevertheless if any living being is oppressed, it can not be called *Himsā*,<sup>21</sup> for the infecting element of intense passion is missing. On the contrary, even if, by careless bodily movements no animate body is oppressed, the actions are not free from *Himsā*.<sup>22</sup> Here though the soul has not injured others, yet it has injured itself by defiling its own natural constitution.<sup>23</sup> It will not be amiss to point out that the *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya* is aware of the disparity between the exterior behaviour and the interior state of mind and consequently it judges the acts of *Himsā* and *Ahimsā* not on the pattern of Social *Himsā* and *Ahimsā*, but on the pattern of spiritual *Himsā* and *Ahimsā*. First, he preaches that he who does not explicitly commit *Himsā* may also reap the fruits of *Himsā* because of his continual mental inclination towards indulging in *Himsā* and he who apparently employs himself in the acts of *Himsā* may not be liable to fruits of *Himsā*.<sup>24</sup> Secondly, owing to one's intense passion one may be subjected to grave consequences even by committing trifling *Himsā*, while, owing to mild passion, the other escapes the sad and

serious consequences in spite of perpetrating gross acts of *Himsā*.<sup>25</sup> Thirdly, it is amazing that, in spite of the two persons following the same course of *Himsā*, divergence at the time of fruition may be exhibited on account of the differences in their states of mind and intensity of passions.<sup>26</sup> Fourthly, though *Himsā* may be committed by one, yet consequences may be suffered by many. Similarly, though it may be committed by many, the consequences may be suffered by one.<sup>27</sup> From all these we may conclude that the point of reference in judging the acts of *Himsā* and *Ahimsā* is the internal state of mind.

**Reconciliation between Social *Ahimsā* and Spiritual *Ahimsā* :** From the discussion of Social *Ahimsā* and Spiritual *Ahimsā*, it follows that the Social *Ahimsā* has outward reference and spiritual *Ahimsā* has inward reference and the disparity between the outward and the inward is overcome through emphasis on inward reference. The danger is that this may lead to antisocial activities by presenting the support of spiritual *Ahimsā* working through inward reference. One may conceitedly argue that it is no use renouncing the performance of certain actions, but that the internal mind alone ought to be uncontaminated. But it is to be borne in mind that in lower stages, which exceedingly fall short of selfrealisation, the external performance of a man has no meaning without his being internally disposed to do so. Hence the external and the internal influence each other; and in most cases the internal precedes the external. Thus, in no case, the outward commission of *Himsā*, without the presence of internal corruption can be vindicated. He who exclusively emphasizes the internal at the expense of the external forgets the significance of outward behaviour.<sup>28</sup> He loses sight of the fact that the impietousness of external actions necessarily leads to the pollution of the internal mind, thus disfiguring both the aspects, namely, the internal and the external. In consequence, both the internal and external aspects should occupy their due places.



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## RIGHT AND *THE GOOD* IN JAINA ETHICS

There is no denying the fact that India is a land of spiritualism. The *Upaniṣads*, the *Gītā*, the *Buddhist Tripiṭakas* and the *Jaina Āgamas* – all these regard spiritual realisation as the highest objective of human life. In these works, ethical utterances are intertwined with spiritual expressions. In the present paper, I shall endeavour to reconstruct the Jaina view of ethical philosophy, so that Jaina concepts of right and wrong, good and bad are properly formulated. The fact is that ethics should be confined to the realm of right and wrong, good and bad. The realm beyond this is the realm of metaphysics and mysticism and not of ethics. I shall not, therefore, talk about the supra-ethical character of life, however important it may be from the Jaina point of view. What I intend to discuss here relates to some of the questions that arise in normative ethics and meta - ethics in the context of Jaina ethical views.

### Presuppositions of Jaina ethics

Before dealing with these questions, let us first deal with the presuppositions which Jaina ethics has made in order to work out its ethical philosophy.

(1) The first presupposition refers to the existence of the individual centres of consciousness which existed in the past, exist at present, and shall exist in future<sup>1</sup>. These are endowed with cognitive, affective and conative tendencies, by virtue of which they see and know, they like pleasure and fear suffering, and they are engaged in beneficial as well as harmful activities<sup>2</sup>.

(2) Secondly, Jaina ethics presupposes that for everything an individual does, he is responsible (*pahu = prabhu*)<sup>3</sup>. No other being can be held responsible for the actions which a person performs. To say that a person is held responsible for an action

is to say that he could have done otherwise if he had chosen to do otherwise. Thus the ascription of responsibility to man is inconceivable without a free will. If a man is not his own sovereign, he can not be free; therefore he can not be held responsible and also he can not be praised or blamed, punished or rewarded. Frankena rightly remarks: "We must assume that people are normally free to do as they choose. If by nature, they were like ants, bees, or even monkeys, if they had all been thoroughly brain-washed, if they were all neurotically or psychotically compulsive throughout, or if they were all always under a constant dire threat from a totalitarian ruler, then it would be pointless to try to influence their behaviour in the ways that are characteristic of morality. Moral sanctions, internal or external, could not then be expected to have the desired effects."<sup>4</sup>

(3) Thirdly, Jaina ethics assumes that an individual is the doer of actions, right or wrong, good or bad. That he voluntarily performs actions, follows from the fact of his being a free agent. Again, and as a consequence, he is the enjoyer of the results of those actions.

## SECTION (1)

### (Rightness of action and Jaina ethics)

Let us now proceed to deal with the theory of the rightness of action. The equivalent expression in Jaina ethics for the term 'right' and 'good' is '*Śubha*'. Here the question that confronts us is this : How to determine what is morally right for a certain agent in a certain situation? Or what is the criterion of the rightness of action? The interrelated question is what we ought to do in a certain situation? or how duty is to be determined? The answer of Jaina ethics is that right, ought and duty can not be separated from *the good*. In other words, the criterion of what is right, ought and duty is the greater balance of good over bad that is brought into being than any alternative.

Thus Jaina ethics rejects act-deontology (particular actions are intrinsically right or wrong) and rule-deontology (particular rules are intuitively right or wrong). Jaina ethics does not regard



certain rules (do not kill, do not steal etc.) as absolutely always right and certain others as absolutely always wrong. The conviction of the Jaina ethics is that actions can not be right or wrong in vacuum. They always produce certain effects either good or bad. Thus Jaina ethics does not condemn the action of telling a lie to enemies, robbers, and even to persons who ask questions when they have no right to ask. Under some circumstances it is right to break a promise, or to take something that belongs to another without his permission. Mill rightly remarks, "It is not the fault of any creed but of the complicated nature of human affairs that rules of conduct can not be so framed as to require no exception, and that hardly any kind of action can safely be laid down as either always obligatory or always condemnable".<sup>5</sup>

The above discussion takes us to the view that Jaina ethics holds the teleological theory of right. Since teleologists have often been called Utilitarians, we shall be regarding teleological position as 'utilitarian position'. The question now arises whether Jaina ethics subscribes to act-approach or rule-approach in deciding the rightness or wrongness of actions. The former is called act-utilitarianism while the latter, rule-utilitarianism. Do not kill, Do not tell a lie, Do not hoard, Do not steal and Do not commit adultery — all these rules have as their basis the productivity of good consequences in the society. Since rules have utilitarian basis, they must be selected, maintained, revised and replaced on this basis. Once rules are so framed, they are to be followed even if it is known that they do not have the best possible consequences in certain particular cases.

However, Jaina ethics maintains that sometimes it is not the following of the rule that produces maximum balance of good over bad, but its breaking. May be, keeping this in view, Samantabhadra argues that truth is not to be spoken when by so doing the other is entangled in miseries.<sup>6</sup> Svami Kumar in the *Kārttikeyānuprekṣā* disallows the purchase of things at low price in order to maintain the vow of non-stealing<sup>7</sup>. Though Jaina *Ācāryas* allow breaking of the moral rules in exceptional circumstances on utilitarian basis, yet they have warned us time

and again that breaking of the rule should not be made common, since it may lead to the weakening of faith in rules which are in a way the basis of social order. The *Niṣītha Sūtra* is a compendium of exceptions to moral rules. This work has very carefully laid down the principles of breaking the rules. This implies that Jaina ethics does not allow superstitious rule-worship, but at the same time holds that scrupulous conscientious caution is to be exercised in breaking the rules.

Thus rule-utilitarianism like rule-deontology does not find favour with Jaina ethics. Rules are merely guiding principles in common circumstances, but when the circumstances are exceptional we have not to look to rules for making any moral decision, but to situations and particular actions from the point of view of producing greater balance of good over bad. This goes to show that every time, as the act-utilitarian suggests, we have to calculate anew the effects of each and every action on the general welfare.

The whole discussion brings us to the view that both acts and rules, specific situations and general principles, are to be taken into account for deciding the rightness or wrongness of actions. This may be called **modified act-utilitarianism** which can not allow a rule to be followed in a particular situation, when, following it is regarded as not to have the best possible consequences. This means that Jaina ethics accepts the possibility that sometimes general moral principles may be inadequate to the complexities of the situation, and in this case a direct consideration of the particular action without reference to general principles is necessary. Thus according to Jaina ethics acts are logically prior to rules and the rightness of action is situational.

It is of capital importance to note here that according to Jaina ethics, there is no such thing as a moral obligation which is not an obligation to bring about the greatest good. To call an act a duty is dependent on the fact of producing a greater balance of good over bad in the universe than any other alternative. Duty is not self-justifying; it is not an end in itself. "The very nature

of duty is to aim beyond itself. There can no more be a duty to act, if there is no good to attain by it, than to think if there is no truth to be won by thinking.”<sup>8</sup>. Thus, duty is an extrinsic good, good as a means, this does not deprive duty of its importance in ethical life, just as health does not become unimportant by its being extrinsic good. The pursuance of *Aṇuvratas* for the householder and the *Mahāvratas* for the Muni may be regarded as dutiful actions.

Here it may be said that rightness or wrongness of an action does not depend upon the goodness or badness of consequences, but upon the motive or motives from which it is done. We can find references in Jaina ethical texts wherein good motives are given prime importance for the performance of action producing good consequences. So long as good motives issue in right action productive of good consequences, there is nothing wrong in accepting the dependence of rightness of action on good motive. Jaina ethics seems to tie good motives with the rightness of actions producing good consequences. Its conviction is that if there is good motive like kindness or charitable disposition, right actions are bound to occur. At one stage in man’s moral evolution it may be possible; at ordinary man’s level this may not happen. Since Jaina ethics, it seems to me, could not evenly face the problem arising from the fact that sometimes good dispositions are not able to produce right actions issuing in good consequences, it made rightness of action productive of good identical with good motive. But the point is that such actions are not so blameworthy as they would have been if they had been done from bad motives. No doubt the agent deserves praise for acting as he did, but the action is wrong.

Jaina ethics seems to confuse that to call an action morally praiseworthy is the same thing as to say that it is right, and to call it morally blameworthy is the same thing as to say that it is wrong’. In point of fact these two judgements are not identical. It so often happens that a man may act wrongly from a good motive, i.e. conscientiousness may lead to fanatical cruelty, mistaken asceticism etc. and he may act rightly from a bad

motive, for instance, feeling of revenge may be able to check certain criminal actions. However, in the former case we regard the actions as wrong, whereas in the latter we regard them as right. This means that the consideration of motives does not make any difference to the rightness or wrongness of actions. In other words, goodness or badness of disposition is to be distinguished from the rightness or wrongness of conduct. Thus if a right action is done from a good motive and the same action is done from a bad motive, though the goodness of the consequences will be the same, yet the presence of *the good* motive will mean the presence of an additional good in the one case which is absent in the other.<sup>10</sup>

In conclusion, we may say that according to Jaina ethics the criterion of right or wrong is the goodness or badness of consequences. It rejects the view that certain rules ought absolutely always to be followed, whatever the consequences may be. No action is to be unconditionally done or avoided. No action can be our duty irrespective of the goodness of the consequences. The question whether an action is right or wrong, does not depend on motive, and the presence of motive whether good or bad constitutes an additional factor in the rightness or wrongness of actions.

## SECTION (2)

### (Good and *the good* in Jaina ethics)

We have said above that according to Jaina ethics right, ought and duty can not be separated from *the good*. Now the question that confronts us is : what is intrinsically desirable, good or worthwhile in life according to Jaina ethics? What intrinsic values are to be pursued according to it? The answer that may be given is this : What is intrinsically good and valuable or what ought to be chosen for its own sake is the achievement of 'Ahimsā of all living beings', the attainment of knowledge etc. But the basic question that remains to be discussed is the definition of good or *Śubha*. Simple enumeration can not lead us anywhere. The question 'what is good?' is different from the

question, as Moore says, 'what is *the good*?' i.e. what things are good? In order to understand '*the good*' or the *Śubha* the first step is to understand, what is good or what is *Śubha*?

What, then, is good or *Śubha* ? How is *Śubha* or good to be defined? According to the Jinist, *Śubha* is an experience in tune with *Ahimsā*. The experience in tune with *Ahimsā* is a complex phenomenon. The ingredients of this experience are analysable into knowing, affecting and active elements. *Śubha Anubhava* is constituted by these elements. It is called *Śubha Cāritra* in Jaina ethics. *Śubha Cāritra* without *Ahimsā* is inconceivable. Thus good or *Śubha*, according to the Jinist, is definable, since the experience which it entails is complex, therefore, analysable into its constituents. The experience of good is not a simple unanalysable experience. Had it been so, it would have been indefinable.

We can better understand the nature and importance of the question, 'What is good or *Śubha* in the realm of ethics?' when we find that it is like the question, 'What is *Dravya* (substance) in the realm of metaphysics?' The definition of *Dravya* given by the Jaina *Ācāryas* is : *Dravya* is that which is *Sat* (being).' Here 'being' is used in a comprehensive sense and not in any particular sense. But no particular thing can be apart from 'being'. Logically speaking, we may say that 'being' is the highest genus, whereas particulars are its species and the relation between the two is of identity in - difference. Similarly, when I say that '*Śubha* is an experience in tune with *Ahimsā*', I am using the term '*Ahimsā*' in the comprehensive sense and not in a particular sense. But no particular *Śubha* can be separated from *Ahimsā* and *Ahimsā* manifests itself in all particular *Śubhas*. In a logical sense it can be said that *Ahimsā* is the highest genus and particular *Ahimsās* are its species, and the relation between generic *Ahimsā* and particular *Ahimsā* is a relation of identity in-difference. As for example, in non-killing and non-exploitation, though the identical element of *Ahimsā* is present, yet the two are different. So the above is the most general definition of *Śubha* just like the definition of *Dravya*.

It may be noted that we can understand 'being' only through the particulars, similarly, the understanding of general *Ahimsā* is possible only through the particular examples of *Ahimsā*, e.g. non-killing, non-exploitation, non-enmity, non-cruelty, etc.

Thus the definition of *Śubha* as the experience in tune with *Ahimsā* is the most general definition like the definition of *Dravya* as that what is *Sat*. The former can be thought of evaluatively, just as the latter can be thought of factually i.e. value neutrally.

It is alright that good is definable as the experience in tune with *Ahimsā*, but it may be asked : what is *Ahimsā*? Now the question 'What is *Ahimsā*?' in the value-world is like the question 'What is *Sat*?' in the factual world? Just as *Sat* is understandable through the particular examples of things like pen, table, book etc., so also *Ahimsā* is understandable through the particular examples of *Ahimsā*, like non-killing, non-exploitation, non-enmity, non-cruelty etc. When it is so easily understandable through examples, the craving for the definition of *Ahimsā* is pedantry, serving no purpose. *Ahimsā* can be taught by examples, just as in arithmetic  $2+2 = 4$  can be taught to a child with the help of an example like two balls + two balls = 4 balls and gradually the child learns to do big sums without examples. In the same way *Ahimsā* can be understood gradually. The argument of understandability can not be adduced in the case of *Śubha* without definition. For understanding *Śubha*, definition is a necessity, but a similar necessity does not exist for *Ahimsā* in view of the above-mentioned facts.

It may be noted that the *Puruṣārthasidhyupāya* defines *Ahimsā* by saying that the non-emergence of attachment etc. on the surface of self is *Ahimsā*<sup>11</sup>. This definition of *Ahimsā* has its own significance but this is not the type of definition required by the socio-ethical consciousness of mankind. To adopt the above definition of *Ahimsā* is tantamount to adopting the realm of mysticism, which does not concern us here. Our enquiry in ethics is concerned with the pursuit of *Śubha* (good) and avoidance of *Aśubha* (bad).

Now it may be asked how does Jaina ethics arrive at *Ahimsā* in defining 'Śubha'? What is its meaning?

**Presuppositions of *Ahimsā*** : (1) - *Ahimsā* presupposes, first , a world of living beings, both human and non-human, along with the fact that each of them is constantly affecting the other and is being affected by the other either evenly or unevenly. Secondly, *Ahimsā* presumes that life is dear to all<sup>12</sup> and for all living beings pain is disturbance, fearful and unpleasant<sup>13</sup>. This is also expressed by saying that just as pain is unpleasant for oneself, so also it is unpleasant for all living beings<sup>14</sup>. Thus without these two presuppositions the talk of *Ahimsā* is inconceivable.

But these two presuppositions are psychological in nature and the statement of *Ahimsā* is evaluative in nature. The former are factual or descriptive assertions, while the latter is a normative or a value-assertion. Does this mean that value-assertions can be derived from factual assertions, ethical conclusions can be drawn from non-ethical premises, 'ought' can be derived from 'is'? I simply wish to say that for the Jinist *Ahimsā* is not a logical deduction from the above mentioned presuppositions : it is an independent occurring in the context of the stated presuppositions. Had it been a deduction like the angles of a triangle as equal to two right angles, the whole of mankind would have understood *Ahimsā* immediately. Thus though the Jinist maintains the autonomy of normative ethical discourse by maintaining the distinction between facts and values, yet it holds that there is some connection between fact and value. Though the two, fact and value, are no doubt distinct, yet they are not unrelated to each other. The relation is not of entailment but is empirical. 'Life is dear to all' does not entail 'we ought not to kill life' but at the same time it can not be said that there is no connection between the two. The connection is empirical, not logical.

**Meaning of *Ahimsā*** : (1) *Comprehensive meaning of *Ahimsā** : The oldest Jaina Āgama Āyāro (Ācārāṅga) remarkably pronounces that none of the living beings ought to be killed, ought to be ordered, ought to be enslaved, ought to be distressed

and ought to be put to unrest<sup>15</sup>. It is a unique and unparalleled statement in the entire Jinist literature. I need not say that it basically embraces all the aspects of social experience in its normative perspective. The political organisation, the economic orientation and the institutional set up can easily derive inspiration from this ethically significant statement. Owing to the all-inclusive nature of *Ahimsā* the *Puruṣārthasidhyupāya* seeks to explain falsehood-truth, stealing-non-stealing, unchastity-chastity, possession-non-possession etc. as forms of *Himsā-Ahimsā*<sup>16</sup>. This way of expression regards *Ahimsā* as the essence of all virtues, thus giving supreme status to *Ahimsā* it deserves.

(2) *Narrow meaning of Ahimsā* : The above meaning of *Āyāro* and the *Puruṣārthasidhyupāya* is representative of the extent which *Ahimsā* is supposed to include, although most of the Jaina texts seem to include in *Ahimsā* only non-killing<sup>17</sup>. It should be borne in mind that if *Ahimsā* is understood only in the sense of non-killing, it is narrow and socially not of wide significance. In fact, killing is the last limit of *Himsā* and not the only expression of *Himsā*. There are hundreds of expressions of *Himsā* and *Ahimsā* below that last limit.

After defining *Śubha* or good in terms of *Ahimsā* in the comprehensive sense, we now propose to discuss, what is *the good* or the *Śubha* according to the Jinist? In other words, the question now confronts us is : What kinds of things are intrinsically good according to the Jinist? This means that there are ends which are to be desired for their own sake. The Jinist does not subscribe to the view recognised by Dewey that there are no ends intrinsically good or worthwhile in themselves. The Jinist view is that not all things are instrumentally good. There are goods which are final and intrinsic and should be pursued for *the goods* themselves.

This brings us to the distinction between 'good as a means' and 'good in itself'. What I wish to say is this : the question what is *the good* i.e. what things are good comprises two things namely (1) good as a means, and (2) good in itself<sup>18</sup>. But the definition that 'Good is an experience in tune with



*Ahimsā* is applicable to both. Whenever we judge that a thing is 'good as a means', we judge both that it will have a particular kind of effect, and that effect will be good in itself. It may be noted that ethical judgements regarding 'good as a means', may not be universally true; and many, though generally true at one period, will be generally false at other<sup>19</sup>, whereas ethical judgements regarding 'good in itself' are universally true. In both these kinds of good, the criterion of good as *Ahimsā* is to be adhered to. I may say in passing that the principle that 'the end justifies the means' need not be rejected as immoral if the above definition of good is accepted. For our present purpose *the good* means good in itself or the things which are intrinsically good.

Now the answer to the question, what is *the good*, i.e. what kinds of things are intrinsically good according to the Jinist, is as follows:

1. The first thing which is *the good* for the Jinist is the *Ahimsā* of all living beings<sup>20</sup>. The Jinist classifies living beings (*Jīvas*) into five kinds, one-sensed to five-sensed *Jīvas*. The Jinist uses this classification as the measurement of the degree of *Ahimsā*. The classification of *Jīvas* is in the ascending order of the importance of *Jīvas* owing to the fact of having evolved consciousness known from the number of senses manifested. As for example two-sensed *Jīvas* are more evolved than the one-sensed *Jīvas*, five-sensed *Jīvas* are more evolved than the one, two, three, and four-sensed *Jīvas*. Thus *Ahimsā* will be directly proportionate to the *Ahimsā* of the *Jīvas* classified. The good '*Ahimsā* of all living beings' means the *Ahimsā* of these living beings. Though this measurement of *Ahimsā* emphasises the number of senses for calculating *Ahimsā*, yet in certain situations *Ahimsā* can not always be commensurate with the number of senses affected.

The *Purusārthasidhyupāya* seems to be aware of this fact. Therefore, it says, though *Himsā* may be committed by one yet there may be many who will have to suffer the consequences; it may be committed by many, the consequences

may be suffered by one. Besides, in spite of the two persons following the same course of *Himsā*, divergence at the time of fruition may be exhibited on account of the differences in their states of mind. Moreover, he who does not explicitly commit *Himsā*, may also reap the fruits of *Himsā* because of his continual inclination towards indulging in *Himsā*; and he who apparently employs himself in the acts of *Himsā* may not be liable to the fruits of *Himsā*. Thus we may conclude that in judging the acts of *Himsā* and *Ahimsā*, it is the internal state of mind that counts. This does not mean that the outward commission of *Himsā* has no relevance. The importance of the internal state of mind should not be over-emphasised. The *Puruṣārthasidhyupāya* tells us that he who exclusively emphasises the internal aspect at the expense of the external forgets the significance of outward behaviour<sup>21</sup>.

2. The second thing which is *the good* or good in itself according to the Jinist is the virtuous disposition and action and the appreciation for the virtuous. The virtuous are those who have disposition not to act unjustly<sup>22</sup>, who have disposition to bestow fearlessness on the fearful<sup>23</sup>, to treat the distressed, the thirsty and hungry with kindness<sup>24</sup>, to act charitably towards the needy<sup>25</sup>. Besides, the virtuous practise forgiveness<sup>26</sup>, straightforwardness<sup>27</sup>, humbleness<sup>28</sup>, egolessness<sup>29</sup>, non-acquisitiveness<sup>30</sup>, self-control etc. Such persons should be treated respectfully, so much so that they may not feel hurt in society<sup>31</sup>.

3. The third thing which the Jinist may call *the good* is knowledge. In other words, the experience of knowledge in tune with *Ahimsā* is *the good*. It is significant to acquire and give to others knowledge of facts and values. It may be noted that since knowledge is liable to be misused the *Puruṣārthasidhyupāya* advises us to acquire knowledge only after having cultivated right attitude<sup>32</sup> and right attitude is the *Ahimsā* attitude. In a similar vein the *Samaṇasuttam* tells us that vast knowledge without right attitude is of no use.

According to the Jinist, three things are *the good* i.e. intrinsically good – *Ahimsā* of all living beings, virtuous disposition and action and the appreciation of the virtuous and knowledge. There may be other things which are good, but they can, on analysis, be shown to be the combination of two or more of the above goods. For example, *Vātsalya* (mutual love), which is *the good*, is a combination of virtuous disposition with knowledge and the emotion of love. Aesthetic enjoyment which is again *the good* is a combination of happiness with the knowledge of the art object. Thus Jaina ethics upholds the doctrine of value pluralism; and this theory of *the good* or intrinsic goodness may be styled *Ahimsā-utilitarianism*, by which all *the goods* represented by Jaina ethics can stand the test of *Ahimsā* in the comprehensive sense.

### SECTION (3)

#### (Meta-ethical Trends in Jaina ethics)

In Jaina terminology the questions which meta-ethics is concerned will reduce themselves to the following : (i) What is the meaning or definition of the terms of like *Śubha* and *Aśubha*? (ii) What is the nature of judgements in which these terms are used? (iii) How can such judgements be justified and supported?

The first question that confronts us is : What is good or *Śubha* ? According to Jaina ethics '*Śubha*' is an experience in tune with *Ahimsā*, as has been discussed in section-2. The ingredients of this experience (which is complex but unified) are emotions, and knowledge issuing in end-seeking action. Satisfaction on the fulfilment of ends is the accompaniment of the experience. The implication of the definition of '*Śubha*' or 'good' is that goodness does not belong to things in complete isolation from feeling; a thing is good, because it gives rise to an experience in tune with *Ahimsā*. Besides, that a thing does this is an objective fact and not an imaginary construction. The question, What is 'right' can be answered, according to the Jaina ethics, by saying that right cannot be separated from *the good*. Thus, right is that which tends to produce experience in tune with *Ahimsā*.

The above definition of good or *Śubha* presented by the Jaina ethics avoids the two extremes of naturalism and non-naturalism, subjectivism and objectivism which are the meta-ethical trends. Now, when the Jaina ethics says that '*Śubha*' is an experience in tune with *Ahimsā*, it is accepting the merit of both naturalism and non-naturalism. The statement that *Śubha* is an experience in tune with *Ahimsā* accepts value in the world as related to consciousness and leaves room for 'ought' experience. For example, to say that kindness is an experience in tune with *Ahimsā* implies that we ought to be kind. Besides, that experience is not of the type 'liked by me' and so is not subjective or reducible to feeling but possesses an objective character, and at the same time this experience is not simple, unanalysable but complex and analysable, and therefore definable as has been explained above.

The second question of meta-ethics that draws our attention is What is the nature of ethical judgements according to the Jaina ethics? The question under discussion reduces itself to this. Are ethical judgements expressive of any cognitive content in the sense that they may be asserted true or false? Or do they simply express emotions, feelings, etc. When we say that *Himsā* is evil, are we making a true or false assertion or are we experiencing simply a feeling? Or are we doing both? According to the cognitivists, the ethical judgement, '*Himsā* is evil' is capable of being objectively true and thus moral knowledge is objective, whereas the non-cognitivists deny both the objectivity of assertion and knowledge in as much as, according to them, ethical Judgements are identified with feeling, emotions etc. Here the position taken by the Jaina ethics seems to me to be this that though the statement, '*Himsā* is evil' is objectively true, yet it cannot be divested of the feeling element involved in experiencing the truth of the statement. In moral life knowledge and feeling can not be separated. By implication we can derive from the *Tattvārtha Sūtra* that the path of goodness can be traversed through knowledge (*Jñāna*) and feeling and activity. Thus the conviction of the Jaina ethics is that the knowledge of good and right is tied up with our feelings, and that in their absence we

are ethically blind. In fact, our feelings and knowledge are so interwoven that we have never a state of mind in which both are not present in some degree. So the claims of cognitivists and non-cognitivists are one sided and antagonistic to the verdict of experience. Blanshard<sup>33</sup> rightly remarks, "Nature may spread before us the richest possible banquet of good things, but if we can look at them only with the eye of reason, we shall care for none of these things; they will be alike insipid. There would be no knowledge of good and evil in a world of mere knowers, for where there is no feeling, good and evil would be unrecognisable". Again 'a life that directs itself by feeling even of the most exalted kind will be like a ship without a rudder'. Thus the nature of ethical judgement according to the Jaina ethics is cognitive-affective. "The achievement of good is a joint product of our power to know and our power to feel"<sup>34</sup>.

The third question in meta-ethics is to ask how our ethical judgements can be justified. That the ethical judgements are objectively true need not imply that their justification can be sought in the same manner as the justification of factual judgements of ordinary and scientific nature. The reason for this is that value can not be derived from fact, ought from is. In factual judgements our expressions are value-neutral, but in ethical judgements we can not be indifferent to their being sought by ourselves or by others. That is why derivation of ought from is, value from fact is unjustifiable. The value judgements, according to Jaina ethics, are self-evident and can only be experienced directly. Thus they are self-justifying. The conviction of the Jaina ethics is that no argument can prove that '*Hiṃsā* is bad' and '*Ahiṃsā* is good'. What is intrinsically good or bad can be experienced directly or immediately. The justification of right can be sought from the fact of its producing what is intrinsically good, i.e. from the fact of its producing experience in tune with *Ahiṃsā*.



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## MAHAVIRA AND SOCIO-SPIRITUAL VALUES

In the cultural history of mankind, Mahāvīra is one of those few towering personalities who practised and propagated the principles of peaceful coexistence. The Jaina tradition of *Tīrthaṅkaras* regards Mahāvīra as the twenty-fourth *Tīrthaṅkara* whereas Ṛṣbha or Ādinātha has the honour of being the first *Tīrthaṅkara* who taught people the cultivation of land, reading and writing, and introduced the institution of marriage and social system etc. He is the first preacher of *Ahiṃsā Dharma*, the basis of *Śramaṇa* culture.

This *Ahiṃsā Dharma* is so central in Mahāvīra's philosophy of life that it may be called the beginning and the end of his philosophy. He fought for individual liberty and revolted against the economic exploitation and social oppression of man and introduced vigorous innovations in the then existing social law and order. Mahāvīra regarded the individual and his social responsibility as the key to the progress of both individual and society. Mahāvīra did not confine himself to individual upliftment, but he dedicated himself to the development of a new creative social order for the healthiest orientation of the individual. Thus in the philosophy of Mahāvīra, both individual and society, 'I' and 'Thou' are properly reconciled.

Mahāvīra was born at Kṣatriya Kuṇḍagrāma or Kuṇḍalapura (now known as Vasukunḍa) in Bihar (50 kms. to the north of Patna) on Monday the 27th March 598 B. C. His father, Siddhārtha, was the Gaṇarājā of Kuṇḍalapura, which was the centre of Jñāṭṛka Kṣatriyas. His mother, Trisālā was the daughter of Ceṭaka, the great Licchavi Gaṇarāja Pramukha of Vaiśālī republic. In Buddhist texts Mahāvīra is referred to as the Niggantha Nataputta. Mahāvīra became a Nirgrantha Muni at the age of 30. He meditated day and night and at last under the *sal* tree on the bank of the river Rjukūla, he attained supreme knowledge known as *Kevalajñāna* and became *Arhat* at the age of forty-two. For thirty years thereafter he visited different parts of the country, especially the im-

portant centres in Eastern and Northern India and promulgated the doctrine of *Ahimsā* and *Anekānta* throughout. In view of the all-embracing character of Mahāvīra's principles, the Jaina *ācārya* Samantabhadra, as early as second century AD called the religion of Mahāvīra 'Sarvodaya' Tīrtha which term is so commonly used now-a-days after Gandhiji. Mahāvīra attained nirvana at Pāvā in Bihar at the age of 72 years on Tuesday the 15th Oct. 527 BC. This day is celebrated as the Dipavali festival (festival of lamps) throughout India. Besides, Mahāvīra's nirvana day marks the beginning of *Vīra Nirvana Samvat*. This *Samvat* is the oldest *Samvat* followed in India.

The social values which were regarded by Mahāvīra as basic are *Ahimsā*, *Aparigraha* and *Anekānta*. These three are the consequence of Mahāvīra's devotedness to the cause of social reconstruction. In consequence, his social mind exhorted that *ahimsā* consists in recognising the dignity of man irrespective of caste, colour and creed. Man is man and should be recognised as such without any hesitation. The dignity of man is sacred and it is our duty to honour this dignity. Every individual, whether man or woman, should enjoy religious freedom without any distinction. Mahāvīra bestowed social prestige upon the down-trodden individuals.

In the present state of affairs the significance of *ahimsā* cannot be dispensed with. The easing of tensions and cessation of conflicts among states, the maintenance of universal peace and the promotion of human welfare can only be effected by suffusing world's atmosphere with the spirit of *Ahimsā*. Mahāvīra's use of *ahimsā* saw its culmination when he used *Prākṛta*, the language of the masses as the medium of expression for his religious preachings. This indicates his democratic spirit. He was well aware of the fact that language is as dear to man as his own life. Therefore he preached in *Prākṛta*, the language used by the common man. This *ahimsā* spirit of Mahāvīra extended itself even to the lowest scale of life and he promulgated that life as such is basically identical; hence no living being should be hurt, enslaved and excited.

Mahāvīra was well aware of the fact that economic inequality and the hoarding of essential commodities very much disturb social



life and living. These acts lead to the exploitation and enslavement of man. Owing to this, life in society is endangered. Consequently, Mahāvīra pronounced that the remedy for the ill of economic inequality is *Aparigraha*. All the means of illegitimate *Parigraha* bring about social hatred, bitterness, and exploitation. The method of *Aparigraha* tells us that one should keep with one self that which is necessary for one's living and the rest should be returned to society for its well-being. Limits of wealth, essential commodities, —all these are indispensable for the development of healthy social life. In a way wealth is the basis of our social structure and if its flow is obstructed because of its accumulation in few hands, large segments of society will remain undeveloped. The hoarding of essential commodities creates a situation of social scarcity which perils social life. In order to resist such inhuman tendency, Mahāvīra incessantly endeavoured to establish the social value of *aparigraha*. It should be borne in mind that along with human and economic inequality, differences in outlook create a situation of conflict in society. The result is that constructive tendencies in man suffer a great deal. If we take things in the right perspective we shall find that differences in outlook appear as a result of the use of creative faculties inherent in man. If this fact is not adhered to, these differences become the cause of conflict between man and man, the consequence of which is that social unity is disrupted. Mahāvīra by his deep insight could see the waste of social energy on account of the wrong understanding of the nature of things. Consequently, he preached that differences in outlook are in fact differences in the nature of things. These different aspects of things are to be understood as the different aspects of truth. In fact, difference in outlook should be treated as difference in standpoints. By this, dissension disappears and social solidarity sets in. Mahāvīra's doctrine of standpoints can be called *Nayavāda* which is a corollary of *anekāntavāda*, the doctrine of multiple aspects of truth. By virtue of the promulgation of this social value, man started thinking that along with his own standpoint, the standpoint of the other is also significant. This gave rise to social tolerance and broad-mindedness, which is a key to social adjustment and progress. This led to the conclusion that truth cannot be monopolised and every man in society, can sub-

scribe to the discovery of a new aspect of truth. Thus *Anekānta* is the dynamic principle of social life, by virtue of which life is saved from being stagnant.

Apart from the prescription of social values, Mahāvīra regards *mokṣa* or spiritual values as the highest objective of human life and for the attainment of which he has prescribed the development of *Samyagdarśana* (spiritual awakening), *Samyagiñāna* (value-knowledge) and *Samyakcāritra* (ethico-spiritual conduct).

Mahāvīra regards spiritual awakening (*Samyagdarśana*) as the beginning of the spiritual pilgrimage, and it is the foundation of the magnificent edifice of liberation. Spiritual perversion acts as a barricade to soul's true life. It is the root of all evils, the seed of the tree of *saṃsāra*. The person experiencing spiritual perversion becomes perverted in his attitude. It poisons all our activities, so as to check the realisation of the *summum bonum* of life. Moreover, it is responsible for the perversity of knowledge and conduct alike. So long as spiritual perversion is operative, all our efforts to witness the sun of self's glory are bound to fail. Thus it is to be rooted out in the interest of rendering its unwholesome function. In other words, spiritual awakening is to be attained, which in turn will make knowledge and conduct conducive to the attainment of *Paramātman*. It is only after the acquisition of spiritual awakening that the person attains the primary qualification for even marching towards emancipation from the wheel of misery. If spiritual perversion is at the root of worldly life and living, spiritual awakening is at the root of liberation. Even performing very severe austerities, persons devoid of spiritual awakening do not attain spiritual wisdom even in thousands and crores of years. Just as a leaf of the lotus plant because of its own nature and constitution is not defiled by water, so also an awakened person because of his spiritual nature is not sullied by passions and sensuous attractions. Value-knowledge and ethico-spiritual conduct is acquired through spiritual awakening. The spiritually awakened self considers his own self as his genuine abode and regards the outward dwelling places as artificial. He renounces all identification with the animate and inanimate objects of the world, and properly weighs them

in the balance of his awakened spirit. Thus he develops a unique attitude towards himself and the world around him.


According to Mahāvīra, that is value-knowledge (*Samyagjñāna*) by virtue of which the spiritual principle is cognized, mind is curbed and soul is purified. Again, that is value-knowledge by which the person becomes free from attachment.

As regards ethico-spiritual conduct (*Samyakcāritra*), Mahāvīra recognises that the person who is devoid of all attachments and who is engrossed in the self apprehends and experiences the self in its basic nature. Such a person certainly pursues ethico-spiritual values. The person who is not disposed to the spiritual way of life but performs austerity and adopts vows acts unwisely. Having experienced the real self when the person translates into life the renouncement of vice, he, then, attains supreme peace. The person should meditate on his own virtuous and spiritual nature. He should devote his energies to meditation on the self, perform devotion to *Arhat* and *Siddha* and engage himself in *svādhyāya* of ethico-spiritual literature along with the performance of other spiritual exercises. Before taking up these spiritual practices, he resorts to moral discipline in the form of *anuvratas* and *mahāvratas*. Without moral observances, the spiritual practices cannot be sustained. According to Mahāvīra, moral and spiritual discipline find their completion in the life of the *Muni*, since the life of the householder affords only partial ground for them. The moral and practices of the *Muni* culminate in the attainment of the spiritual values of *Arhathood* and *Siddhahood*.

It may be noted here that Mahāvīra gave utmost importance to the practice of *dhyaṇa*, since it is directly related to the actualisation of the divine potentialities. It is the indispensable, integral constituent of ethico-spiritual conduct, and consequently it is directly related to the actualisation of spiritual values. It is the clear and single road by which the aspirant can move straight to the supreme values. All the disciplinary observances find their

culmination in *dhyāna*, and they form an essential background for the performance of *dhyāna*. The practice of the fourfold virtue of *maitrī* (friendship with all creatures), *pramoda* (appreciation of the merits of others), *karuṇā*, (compassion for those who are in trouble) and *mādhyaṣṭha* (indifference to those who are irrational), constitute the mental prerequisite conditions of *dhyāna*.

In conclusion, we may say that Mahāvira after self-realisation dedicated himself to the creation of socio-spiritual values. For this he is regarded as one of the greatest leaders of mankind.



## THE CONCEPT OF DEVOTION IN JAINISM

It is generally recognised that devotion in Jainism is a contradiction in terms, since devotion presupposes the existence of a Being who can actively respond to the aspirations of the devotee, and in Jainism such a conception of Being is inadmissible. It is true to say that Jainism does not uphold the idea of such a Being known as God, but it undoubtedly recognises the *Arhat* and the *Siddha* as the divinity-realised souls who may be the objects of devotion. But “neither *Arhat* nor *Siddha* has on him the responsibility of creating, supporting and destroying the world. The aspirant receives no boons, no favours, and no curses from him by way of gifts from the divinity. The aspiring souls pray to him, worship him and meditate on him as an example, as a model, as an ideal that they too might reach the same condition.”<sup>1</sup> It should not be forgotten that unified, single-minded devotion to *Arhantas* or *Siddhas* accumulates in the self the *Punya* of the highest kind, which brings about as a natural consequence, material and spiritual benefits. Samantabhadra observes that the adoration of *Arhanta* deposits great heaps of *Punya*.<sup>2</sup> He who is devoted to him relishes prosperity and he who casts aspersions sinks to perdition; in both, *Arhanta* is astonishingly indifferent.<sup>3</sup> Though the perfected souls have transcended the dual, yet devotion to them, nay, mere turning to them can fulfil our purposes and annul the accumulated filth of *Karman*.<sup>4</sup> The aspirant should not, therefore, breathe in despondency for the aloofness of God (*Arhanta* and *Siddha*). Those who are devoted to Him are automatically elevated.

### Nature of Devotion

It is interesting to investigate on the nature, kinds and effects of devotion as recognised in Jainism. Devotion implies the sublime affection, circumscribed by the immaculacy of thought and emotion,

towards the divinity-realised souls or towards those who are advanced on the path of divine realisation.<sup>6</sup> The devotee profoundly knows the object of his devotion, namely, *Arhat* and *Siddha*. Every fibre of his being feels the supremacy and sublimity of the object of his devotion to such an extent that when the devotee finds himself confronted with the omniscient and omnipotent God (*Arhanta* and *Siddha*), he abruptly and spontaneously proclaims himself to be shameless<sup>6</sup>, ignorant<sup>7</sup> like an obstinate owl<sup>8</sup>, child<sup>9</sup>, etc. This is a sort of religious humility, self-depreciation, self-devaluation and a consciousness of 'creaturehood'.<sup>10</sup> This strange and profound mental reaction of calling oneself a creature in the face of that which is transcendent is not a conceptual explanation of the matter but a mode of submergence into nothingness, an attempt to convey the content of the feeling response in the best possible way. Again the object of devotional consciousness is "wholly other" in the sense of its being *Anupama*<sup>11</sup>, i.e., it is absolutely and intrinsically other than everything that is and can be thought of. It is 'majestic'<sup>12</sup> in the sense that its infinite characteristics are incapable of being described by us.<sup>13</sup> Notwithstanding the fact of being possessed by the subjective feeling of the status of a creature and the objective feeling of the devotional object being supreme and 'wholly other', the devotee is led to the singing of the praise of God (*Arhanta* and *Siddha*) on account of being captured by the fire of devotion like the deer who resorts to save its child from the clutches of a lion out of love or like a cuckoo (*koyala*) which sings in autumn merely due to the presence of small mangoes.<sup>14</sup> This refers to the 'element of fascination'<sup>15</sup> in the devotional object. Though the object is awe-inspiring on account of its infiniteness, yet it is fascinating and very easily captivates and transports the devotee with strange exultation. The consequence of his emotions is that his vocal cords begin to function automatically in extolling the deity, though in a limited way. Again, the devotee who finds all the objects of the world quite impotent to bestow upon him spiritual solace surrenders himself to God (*Arhat* and *Siddha*) for putting an end to transmigratory existence and to tribulations and fears.<sup>16</sup>

The devotee is so much attracted by the divine consciousness that he expresses his deep yearning for establishing the holy feet of

God in his heart for ever.<sup>17</sup> Intoxicated by the devotional juice, the devotee announces that he keeps God in his heart and so allows Him (God) to cross the ocean of mundane miseries ; but after a moment, he reverses the position by saying that God serves as the air inside the leather bag of his heart for crossing the ocean of world.<sup>18</sup> The spirit of utter consecration is manifested when Samantabhadra proclaims that — that is intellect which remembers God, that is head which bows down at His feet, that is successful life which lives under His pious shelter, that is speech which sings His praise, that is a sacred man who is engrossed in His devotion, and that is a learned man who bows down at His feet.<sup>19</sup> Consequently He alone is the object of his belief, he exclusively remembers and adores Him, both his hands are meant only for paying Him obeisance, his ears are ever engaged in listening to His noble characteristics, his eyes are always busy in beholding His beauty, his deep-rooted habit is to write something in His praise, and His head is for the sole purpose of bowing to him.<sup>20</sup>

### Types of devotion

*Bhakti*, according to Jainism, may be classified as *Arhat Bhakti*, *Ācārya Bhakti*, *Upādhyāya Bhakti* and *Pravacana Bhakti*.<sup>21</sup> Another classification runs as *Siddha Bhakti*, *Śruta Bhakti*, *Cāritra Bhakti*, *Yogī Bhakti*, *Ācārya Bhakti*, *Nirvāṇa Bhakti*, *Pañca-Guru Bhakti*, *Tīrthaṅkara Bhakti*, *Nandiśvara Bhakti*, *Śānti Bhakti*, *Samādhi Bhakti* and *Caitya Bhakti*.<sup>22</sup> Kundakunda's *Niyamasāra* categorises *Bhakti* into *Nirvṛtti Bhakti* and *Yoga-Bhakti*.<sup>23</sup> The former comprises devotion for right belief, right knowledge and right conduct and for the emancipated soul; the latter implies absorption in self, meditation after one has renounced attachment etc. and the foreign mental activities.<sup>24</sup> The different types of devotion may be stated as pertaining to (1) *Stuti*, (2) *Vandanā*, (3) Idol worship, (4) *Nāmasmaraṇa*, (5) *Bhajana-kīrtana*, (6) *Vinaya*, (7) *Vaiyāvṛtṭya*, and (8) *Abhikṣaṇajñānopayoga*.

(1) *Stuti* entails one to devote oneself to the holy contemplation of the divine characteristics revealed by the consecrated twenty-four *Tīrthaṅkaras*, and to the sacred meditation on the implications of their names.<sup>25</sup>

(2) *Vandanā* signifies the offering of salutation to the *Arhanta* and *Siddha Pratimās* and to those who excel in righteous and virtuous living.<sup>26</sup> In other words, the aspirant should pay obeisance to those who occupy themselves with study and meditation, practise the five great vows, condemn looseness of conduct, observe *darśana, jñāna, cāritra* and *tapa-vinayas*, disseminate the merits of virtuous personalities, and are self-controlled and enduring.<sup>27</sup>

(3) Idol worship needs no dilation. Jaina temples themselves are the visible illustrations of this sort of worship.

(4) *Nāmasmaraṇa* implies the devoted repetition of the name of *Paramēsthins* or *Om* and the like.

According to the *Dravya-saṅgraha*<sup>28</sup>, the *Namokāra-mantra* and the other *mantras* given by the Guru are to be repeated and meditated upon. Somadeva attaches great importance to the *Namokāra-mantra*.<sup>29</sup> “The counting of the letters is to be done with a rosary composed of lotus seed or golden beads or sun-stones or gems; the counting may also be done with flowers or on the finger-joints. The repeating of the *mantras* may be vocal or mental, the latter method being the more efficacious. Great mystic value is attached to this formula.”<sup>30</sup>

(5) *Bhajanās* also contribute to the development of moral and spiritual life. They may serve as an incentive to spiritual life, indicate the necessity of virtuous life, reveal the significance of *Deva*, *Śāstra* and *Guru*, and bring out the effects of God-realisation. These different types of *Bhajana* may be found in *Banārasī Dāsa*, *Bhāga-cānda*, *Dyānatarāya*, *Bhūdhara Dāsa*, *Anandaghana*, etc.

(6) *Vinaya* implies the expression of modesty before the triple-jewelled personalities.<sup>31</sup>

(7) The rendering of service to saints is called *Vaiyāvṛtīya*.<sup>32</sup>

(8) *Abhikṣaṇajñānopayoga* implies the strenuous pursuance of spiritual knowledge. Though it is predominantly intellectual, it is capable of arousing our devotion for God (*Arhat* and *Siddha*).



## Importance and effects of devotion

Next come the importance and effects of *Bhakti*. According to Kundakunda, he who bows with great devotion at the feet of *Jina* undermines the root of *Samśāra*.<sup>33</sup> Pūjyapāda pronounces that the Self by dint of its devotedness towards *Arhanta* and *Siddha* can transform itself into the state of *Paramātman*.<sup>34</sup> Vādirājamuni represents that notwithstanding deep intellectual attainments and untainted moral accomplishments the doors of the edifice of liberation are locked by delusion and incapable of being thrown open by the aspirant without applying the key of profound devotion.<sup>35</sup> Again, since God is incomparable and unlike anything else, our devotional outpourings are incapable of unfolding His being, says Vādirājamuni.<sup>36</sup> Despite this disharmony between our words and His Being, our expressions permeated with the nectar of devotion are capable of bestowing upon us the desired fruits.<sup>37</sup> All sorts of mundane pleasantness and supermundane results follow as a consequence of devotion to God, nay perforce accompany the devotee.<sup>38</sup> Thousands of imperilling disturbances and obstructions disassociate themselves from the devotee.<sup>39</sup> He who has heard God's pious name and has poured his heart and soul into it, has escaped the mountain of distresses.<sup>40</sup> He who unwaveringly and with tears of joy and with jubilant voice adores God relieves himself from diverse heartrending diseases.<sup>41</sup> Though God has transcended the duality of praise and censure, yet the singing of His glory sweeps away the filth of vices from the mind of the devotee.<sup>42</sup> Again, inspire of the fact that the ocean of God's characteristics cannot be crossed by the ship of words, it is unequivocally certain that every person can, by a moment's devotion purify his soul,<sup>43</sup> nay, even God's name is capable of purifying him.<sup>44</sup> Samantabhadra points out that just as iron is turned into gold by a mere touch of the *pārāsa* stone, likewise the devotee is transformed into an effulgent personality and his words are reckoned as pregnant with great momentousness.<sup>45</sup> According to Vādirājamuni it is by devotion that the obstacles that might baulk the movement of the devotee towards heavenly pleasures and his pilgrimage towards liberation are overthrown; and the devotee gets endowed with such a penetrating intellect that he never encounters any difficulty in memorising the scriptures.<sup>46</sup> Samantabhadra exhorts that

in his case devotion has resulted in fearlessness and in the dissipation of several diseases, and in making him a magnificent, respectable and virtuous personality.<sup>47</sup> *Bhakti*, according to Dhanañjaya, blesses a devotee with eminence, richness and success.<sup>48</sup>

Thus, it may be seen that according to Jain conception the effects of devotion are mundane pleasures (in this world and in heaven), supermundane happiness, abrogation of distress and disturbance, banishment of physical diseases, removal of vices and attainment of virtues, overthrowing of the obstacles, acquisition of penetrating intellect, development of effulgent personality and weighty tongue, wide recognition, achievement of success and riches and, lastly, attainment of fearlessness.



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## MAHAVIRA ON : INDIVIDUAL AND HIS SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

Mahavira is one of those few towering personalities who fought for individual liberty in the context of social life. He revolted against the economic exploitation and social oppression of man and introduced vigorous innovations in the then existing social law and order. In a way, he was a social anarchist. In this way, Mahavira regarded individual and his social responsibility as the key to the progress of both the individual and society. He seems to be aware of the fact that the emphasis on merely individual progress without taking note of social responsibilities is derogatory both to the individual and society. Mahavira was neither merely individualistic nor merely socialistic. In his attitude both individual and society are properly reconciled. This attitude of Mahavira is in consonance with his total approach to any problem that confronts him. He is averse to one-sidedness and therefore adheres to all-sided approach to a problem.. His method is *Anekāntic*. Hence in Mahavira's philosophy of life, if individual liberty is to be sought, social responsibilities can not be dispensed with.

In order that an individual may acquire firm footing in life, Mahavira advised the individual to be without any doubt in the various spheres of thought and in its multiple approaches. Doubt kills decision and without an act of decision individual does not muster courage to go forward. Now the question is : How to acquire the state of doubtlessness? The answer can be given by saying that either the individual should stop thinking and resort to a sort of mental slavery or he should employ himself in the task of vigorous thinking. Mental slavery is the path of blind faith, but vigorous thinking is the path of awakened mind.

To my mind Mahavira must have subscribed to the later view. In man many kinds of experiences find their place and reason should be freely allowed to play upon every aspect of experience, so as to arrive at rational decisions in every department of life. Mahavira never threatened the critical faculty in man, in as much as he seems to be aware of the fact that by paralysing the critical faculty in man, he will be cut at its roots. Mahavira is convinced of the fact that in the philosophy of art, education, social science, history, religion, etc. no one point of view can be absolute; there will always be alternative possibilities open. Freedom in thinking can not be curtailed. No one philosophical view can be final. So long as man is alive and free to think, different philosophical views will continue to appear. Thus gradually faith in *Anekānta* will emerge. This faith is rational and not blind. It has emerged from the very process of rational thinking. When the very nature of thinking is understood, the individual will be free from doubt regarding the possibility of alternative points of view emerging in the sphere of thought. Thus Mahavira wishes an individual to be *Niḥśaṅkita*. Besides, adherence to rational thinking may lead us in a different direction. When limitations of thinking are made intelligible, a state of frustration may set in. In certain individuals, there may be witnessed a tendency to transcend reason. There may be moments in life, when the transcendence of reason is very much satisfying. Here an individual comes across a new type of awakening which may be called suprarational awakening. The individual thereby acquires faith in supra-rational existence. The emergence of faith in *Anekānta* and Supra-rational existence makes an individual free from fear and pride; by virtue of this faith, he attains a sort of mental equilibrium, and consequently he does not fear death, pain, censure, insecurity etc.; he becomes modest, forsakes all pride of learning, honour, family, affluence etc.

After the individual attains clarity in cognitive functioning, he is required to impose upon himself restraint in the realm of desire. Man is a bundle of desires. Desires do not arise in vacuum. They presuppose goods. Desires may admit of two kinds, namely, possessive and creative, corresponding to two kinds of goods, namely, material and creative. The difference between the

two kinds of goods is that the former admits of exclusive individual possession, while the latter can be shared by all alike. Thus the possessive impulses aim at acquiring private goods, whereas the creative ones aim at producing goods that can be enjoyed by all without any conflict. 'Material possessions can be taken by force', but 'creative possessions cannot be taken in the way'. The desire for material goods makes man's personality egocentric which is the cause of social tensions and frustration. Creative desires lead the individual towards self-satisfaction and social progress. When Mahavira advised men to be free from desires (*Nihkāṅkṣita*) he seems to be referring to possessive desires. Bertrand Russell rightly remarks, "The best life is one in which creative impulses play the largest part and the possessive impulses the smallest". (Political ideas, 6, 12). If we reflect a little we shall find that it is possessive impulses that give rise to Himsa. The society which encourages possessive individuals encourages the acts of Himsa. So Mahavira made it obligatory for the individual to make himself free from the desires for material possessions.

The history of social thought reveals that with the advancement of knowledge social beliefs of a particular age are replaced by new beliefs. Many religious superstitions, social paths of life and other forms of follies and falsities are derogatory to individual progress, therefore they are condemned in every age of history. But the change is met with great resistance. The reason for this is that change is looked by individuals with doubt and uncertainty. Besides love for conventionality and vested interests run counter to the acceptance of novelties in thought. All these obstacles mar individual dynamism. The individual who is a slave to customary beliefs, however false they have been declared to be, cannot develop his own personality and his actions are just like machines. Mahavira, therefore, preaches that an individual should be free from follies (*Amūḍhatās*). It is only through such individuals that society progresses and a scientific outlook gains ground. Such individuals are forward looking, and are free from the pressures of narrow traditionalism. They are always open-minded and are ever eager to learn from history and experience.

It is no doubt true that cognitive and conative clarities are essential to individual progress. If man's mind is prejudiced and his actions are stereotyped and wrongly directed, nothing worthwhile can be achieved. In order that an individual becomes an embodiment of noble thought and actions, virtuous dispositions are, to be cultivated. This prepares the individual to do certain kinds of actions in certain kinds of situations. This is not just to think or feel in certain ways. There may be individuals who can think clearly and express good emotions whenever the situation calls for, but they may not act virtuously when required to do so. Consequently, Mahavira preached that an individual should develop virtuous dispositions of honesty, gratitude, *Ahimsā*, forgiveness, modesty, straightforwardness etc. This individual characteristic is known as upavrhana. It cannot be gainsaid that noble thoughts can be translated into action through the medium of character. Mere thought is important to bring about any individual transformation. It is only virtues in addition to thought that can effect transformation in the life of an individual and transmute existing state of affairs.

Mahavira, no doubt, greatly emphasised the development of the individuals, in as much as he was convinced of the fact, that there is nothing over and above the good of the individual men, women and children who compose the world. But he did not lose sight of the fact that the individual develops not in isolation but among other individuals. The proper adjustment of 'I' and 'thou' leads to the healthiest development of both 'I' and 'thou'. 'Thou' may represent social and political institutions. Social and political institutions must exist for the good of the individuals. All individuals should live together in such a way that each individual may be able to acquire as much good as possible. Thus every individual, therefore, shall have certain responsibilities towards one another. This is the same as saying that an individual has certain social responsibilities. Therefore, social and individual morality are equally necessary to a good world.

Mahavira unequivocally says that the other is like our own. This does not mean that there are no individual differences. Rather it means that individual should be allowed freedom to develop his own individualities. There should not be any distinction between man and man on the basis of religion, race, nationality. To create differences between one individual and the other on these factors is derogatory, therefore, should be condemned ruthlessly. Consequently, Mahavira exhorted us not to hate individuals on these accounts (*Nirvicikitsā*). These are irrelevant inequalities.

These negative conditions of not hating others is not sufficient, but the positive condition of loving them (*Vātsalya*) is very much necessary. To love is to see that equal opportunities of education, earning and the like are received by every individual without any distinction, of race, religion, sex and nationality. In his own times Mahavira fought for the equality of all men, and he revered individual dignity. Where there is love there is no exploitation. To treat other individuals as mere means is decried and denied. Where there is *Vātsalya*, all our dealings with others will be inspired by reverence; the role of force and domination will be minimised.

It is likely that individuals may deviate from the path of righteousness. In dealing with persons they may become so selfish as not to allow others their due share of liberty, they may become very possessive. Pride of power, use of force, and exploitation of the weak may look to them normal ways of life. Creative impulses in man may suffer owing to their destructive attitude. When individuals behave fanatically with one another, the real good will be served if they are (convinced) to deal with others rationally. To establish them in the good life is '*Sthitikarāṇa*'. This is very much necessary in a society where the rule of creative impulses is to be established.

Lastly, the good ways of life, of thinking and doing things should be made widely known to people at large, so that they may feel obliged to mould their lives in that pattern. For this psychological methods of transmitting knowledge are required to be followed in all earnestness. The scientific techniques of radio,



television and the like are to be utilised for propagating good ways of life. If the researches in the laboratories are not taken to and utilised in the fields, they will serve no significant purpose. They will be like doing things in seclusion. Similarly, if the findings in the human laboratory in the realm of values are not taken to human beings in general, things will deteriorate and conditions will not change. Mahavira, therefore, says to propagate values of life (Prabhavana).



## NATURE AND PROCESS OF *SALLEKHANĀ*

### Nature of *Sallekhanā* as distinguished from suicide :

*Sallekhanā* implies the enervation of external body and internal passions in a legitimate way by the gradual removal of the causes of their nourishment, so that one can renounce the present body with a view to have a new bodily modification.<sup>1</sup> To be more clear, the abandonment of the bodily frame on being confronted with the uneschewable calamity, famine, senility, and disease for the sustenance of spiritual practices has been regarded as *Sallekhanā*.<sup>2</sup> This signifies that the process of *Sallekhanā* is to be adopted either in special circumstances when the religious observances are being endangered on account of unavoidable bodily infirmities and the like, or on the occasion when the time of natural death has been known in all probability.<sup>3</sup> No doubt the body which the medium of the upliftment of the soul is to be properly nourished and cared for and the diseases are to be seriously met with without any retreat. But if the body refuses to respond to our earnest endeavours, we should not falter to forsake it like a villain in the interest of saving the peace of mind.<sup>4</sup> Thus if one is encountered with the causes of the termination of duration of the present life one should resort to the performance of the process of *Sallekhanā* which is not other than the spiritual welcome to death. This is not yielding to death, but a way of meeting the challenge of death undauntedly and adequately. The happy embracement of death has been calculated to carry the spiritual dispositions to the next birth,<sup>5</sup> but it is not very easy to practice. Those who have submitted themselves to vicious deeds throughout their lives cannot easily think to adopt the process of *Sallekhanā*. This requires an earnest endeavour from the start. Samantabhadra<sup>6</sup> declares that austerities, if they have been truly, deeply, and successfully performed, must bear

the fruits of noble death. "Self-restraint, study, austerities, worship, and charity, all become useless if the mind is not pure at the last hour of life. Just as the training of a king who has learnt the use of weapons for twelve years, becomes useless if he faints on the battlefield."<sup>7</sup> The resignation of the body to death has not been considered to be as difficult as the observing of self-control, and the fixing of one's mind in the Atman, when the vital forces depart from the body.<sup>8</sup> Thus the emphasis is on the rejection of passion, and consequently this noble death serves for the fulfilment of *Ahimsā*.<sup>9</sup> It is on account of this practice of the abrogation of passions that the process of *Sallekhanā* must needs be distinguished from suicide which is perpetrated by the cruel dominance of passions, through the mal-agency of water, fire, poison, inhibition of breath and the like.<sup>10</sup> Suicide is easy when compared with the adequate performance of *Sallekhanā*. The latter is undertaken only when the body fails to answer to the spiritual needs of the individual and when the inevitability of death is a matter of undisputed certainty; while suicide may be committed at any time in the life time under the spell of emotional disturbance or passionate attitude of mind.

### **Process of *Sallekhanā* in case of the householder :**

The householder must first attain the purity of mind by renouncing attachment, aversion and infatuation. Afterwards in modest and sweet words he should make his earnest request to the members of his family and others around him to pardon him for the vicious deeds committed by him to afflict them wittingly and unwittingly. He should also forgive them from the bottom of his heart for being troubled by them on certain occasions. He should then practice the five *Mahāvratas* and engage himself in the study of scriptures with adequate zeal without allowing himself to be seduced by grief, fear, hatred, and the like. Nourishment is to be renounced gradually so that mental disturbance may be avoided. The persistence of equanimous mental state is the prime necessity. The physical renunciation of food to enervate the body must needs be balancement of the strength of the spirit. In other words, the gradual development

of spiritual energy must automatically result in the gradual renunciation of the causes of physical nourishment. In the first place, only milk and whey should be continued after having abandoned the solid food, then after giving up even the former, only hot water should be taken. Subsequently fasting should be observed. Then after entirely devoting himself to the meditation on the fivefold holy names of *Arhant*, *Siddha*, *Ācārya*, *Upādhyāya* and *Sādhu*, the aspirant should bid farewell to his body. While practising *Sallekhanā* the *Sādhaka* should avoid the following faults<sup>11</sup> – (1) desire to live, (2) desire to die, (3) remembrance of friends, (4) revival of past pleasures, and (5) expectations for future prosperity. Samantabhadra<sup>12</sup> takes out ‘revival of past pleasures’ and puts ‘fear’ in its place. According to *Uvasagadasāo*<sup>13</sup> the defects which should be avoided are – (1) longing for this world, (2) longing for the next world, (3) longing for life, (4) longing for death, and (5) longing for sensual pleasure.

### Process of *Sallekhanā* in case of the Saint :

While practising *Sallekhanā* the saint may resort to any one of the three types of death, namely, (1) *Bhaktaparijñā-marāṇa*, (2) *Īṅgīnī-marāṇa*, and (3) *Prāyopagamana-marāṇa*.<sup>14</sup> Only that saint who is confronted with incurable disease, intolerable old age, formidable famine, great weakness of hearing and sight, infirmity of legs, and certain inevitable troubles, and others like these has been permitted to adopt any of the above *marāṇas*.<sup>15</sup> He who is quite capable of pursuing his course of conduct well need not turn towards such deaths.<sup>16</sup> We shall now deal with the *Bhaktaparijñā-marāṇa*. In the circumstances expressed above or when the occurring of natural death has been conceived to be a matter of certainty after a short duration of time (maximum twelve years),<sup>17</sup> the saint takes the guidance of some efficient *Ācārya*, and resorts to the process of internal and external renunciation.<sup>18</sup> The internal renunciation refers to the emasculation of the passions of anger and the like, while the external one, to the enervation of body.<sup>19</sup> The saint renounces all *Parigraha*, attains all sorts of external and internal purity, and

gives himself to the constant reflection on austerity, knowledge, fearlessness, loneliness and endurance.<sup>20</sup> By abandoning all strengthening juices and accepting only unseasoned and simple meals and practising the six kinds of external austerities, the saint gradually weakens his body, though he takes care that his internal peace is not disturbed.<sup>21</sup> Of all these methods of depriving the body of strength, the practice of two days fast, three days to five days fast and then light meals have been appreciated.<sup>22</sup> Along with this it is imperative for the saint to remove anger by forbearance, pride by modesty, deceit by simplicity and greed by contentment.<sup>23</sup> Similarly minor passions of laughter, indulgence, sorrow, ennui, disgust, fear, and sex inclinations, instinct of food, of acquisition, of fear, and of sex; three inauspicious *Leṣyās*, namely *Kṛṣṇa*, *Nīla* and *Kapota*; and attachment to supernatural powers – all these should be brushed aside.<sup>24</sup> This whole process continues till the separation of the soul from the body. The saint is kept under a spiritual atmosphere created by the *Ācārya*, so that at the time of death thoughts may not get polluted. Next comes *lṅginī-marāṇa*. It is more difficult to practice. It is capable of being pursued by the saints who possess bodies of the best order. The saint who prepares himself for this type of death resorts to a place devoid of living beings, lighted by sunlight, and not perforated by holes. There he lies down, or sits, or remains standing on the bed of straw properly made bereft of living beings.<sup>25</sup> He then purges his mind of inimical thoughts, establishes himself in *Darśana*, *Jñāna*, and *Cāritra*, and sets his face against all sorts of food and *Parigraha*.<sup>26</sup> He endures all *Parīṣaha* undauntedly, resists all temptations, and does not get disturbed even if his body is thrown at untoward places by furious animals.<sup>27</sup> He engages himself in meditation, avoids sleep, and does not neglect his essential duties. In short, his whole time is devoted to meditation, study, auspicious reflection and the like. He does not require the services of other saints and of the *Ācārya*. In the *Bhaktaparijñā-marāṇa* the saint serves himself and is

served by others, in the *Īṅginī-maraṇa* he declines to accept the service rendered by others, but in the *Prāyopagamana-maraṇa* neither he serves himself, nor he accepts the service of others.<sup>28</sup> In the *Prāyopagamana-maraṇa* the saint does not feel the necessity of even evacuating his bowels.<sup>29</sup> He keeps his body from beginning to end in the same position in which he first placed it.



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## ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY OF KUNDAKUNDA

In the history of Jainism, Kundakunda shines as a profound exponent of spiritualism. His thoughts are dedicated to evaluating objects and phenomena mystically. He justifies his approach by saying that people at large have not only listened to, and are intensely familiar with the dualities of life, but they also have experienced them a great deal; on the other hand they have not even chanced come across the mystical approach to life.<sup>1</sup> Kundakunda's works, therefore, strike a tranquil but dynamic note of spiritual inwardness. For him, nothing short of spiritual realisation can serve as the highest objective of human life. Only those who are profoundly interested in the spiritual way of life can benefit from his writings. He pursues the whole subject with intense earnestness with a view to giving a thorough mystical turn to the ordinary ways of man's thinking. His writings often have not been comprehended by those who are not equipped and are not capable of meeting the challenge of life. The intent of his works, if these works are not studied in their entirety and in the totality of their context, would escape since there are *gāthās* in his works which, taken singly, would mislead the reader. To illustrate : The empirical viewpoint is false and the transcendental viewpoint is true.<sup>2</sup> Both the auspicious and inauspicious actions are evil.<sup>3</sup> There is no difference between merit and demerits.<sup>4</sup> They are like the fetters of gold and iron respectively.<sup>5</sup> Again, repentance for past misconduct, pursuit of the good, self-censure, confession before the Guru etc. —all these constitute the pot of poison.<sup>6</sup> To say, 'our village, our town, our city, our nation' is self-delusion.<sup>7</sup> On forming a consistent view of his utterances, we find that, although he advises the individuals to dive deep into the depths of human self after abandoning mundane career, he does not ignore the momentuousness of moral attitude. He may be the champion of supper-empirical view of



life; yet he does not absolutely cast aside empirical view of life. For instance, in the *Samayasāra*, he says that the transcendental viewpoint which speaks about the real nature of objects is fit to be known by the realisers of the highest spiritual experience. But those who fall short of the experience need be preached by means of empirical viewpoint.<sup>8</sup> While it is not unlikely that we cannot find much in his works which may enable us to form a systematic view of his ethical philosophy; even then, from whatever is available in his works, may shed light on his ethical thinking. In the present paper I shall endeavour to reconstruct his view of ethical philosophy, so that his concepts of right and wrong, good and evil, are properly formulated. As for ethics, I seem to feel that it should be confined to the realm of right and wrong, good and evil. The realm beyond this is the realm of metaphysics and mysticism, not of ethics. I, therefore, shall not here talk about the supra-ethical character of life, however important it may be for Kundakunda. What I intend to discuss here relates to some of the questions that arise in normative ethics, and meta-ethics in the context of the ethical views of Kundakunda.

At the outset, we come across certain presuppositions which Kundakunda has made in order to work out his moral philosophy. The first presupposition made by him refers to the existence of the individual centres of consciousness which existed in the past, exist at present, and shall exist in future.<sup>9</sup> In other words, these centres of consciousness have been existing since beginningless time. They, moreover, will endure for ever. These are endowed with cognitive, effective and conative tendencies, by virtue of which they see and know, they like pleasure and fear suffering, and they are engaged in beneficial as well as harmful activities.<sup>10</sup> Secondly, according to Kundakunda, for everything that an individual does, he is responsible (*Pahu = Prabhu*). No other being can be held responsible for the actions which a person commits. To say that a person is held responsible for an action is to say that he could have done otherwise if he had chosen to do otherwise. Thus the ascription of responsibility to man is inconceivable without a free will. If a man is not his own sovereign, he cannot be free; therefore he cannot be held responsible and also he cannot be praised or blamed, punished or rewarded.

Kundakunda seems to be aware of the fact that the assumption of responsibility and that of freedom are parts of the moral institution of life. Frankena rightly remarks : “We must assume that people are normally free to do as they choose. If by nature, they were like ants, bees, or even monkeys, if they had all been thoroughly brain-washed, if they were all neurotically or psychotically compulsive throughout, or if they were all always under a constant dire threat from a totalitarian ruler of the work’s kind, then it would be pointless to try to influence their behaviour in the ways that are characteristic of morality. Moral sanctions, internal or external, could not then be expected to have the desired effects.”<sup>11</sup> Thirdly, Kundakunda points out that an individual is the doer of actions, right or wrong, good or evil. That he voluntarily performs actions, follows from the fact of his being a free agent. Again, and as a consequence, he is the enjoyer of the results of those actions.

After dealing with the presuppositions of morality in accordance with the ethical philosophy of Kundakunda, we may first proceed to consider what things, or kinds of things, have intrinsic value according to him. In other words, the question that confronts us is : what is intrinsically good or worthwhile in life according to Kundakunda? The reply of Kundakunda seems to me to be this : The belief in the presuppositions is the first to be intrinsically desired. Kundakunda firmly holds that, without the belief in responsibility, freedom, and the individual centres of consciousness, nothing worthwhile can be achieved in life.<sup>12</sup> It is the root of the tree of moral life.<sup>13</sup> Besides this, compassion for all the living being,<sup>14</sup> a whole of knowledge and virtue,<sup>15</sup> observance of five great vows,<sup>16</sup> virtues like contentment<sup>17</sup>, forgiveness<sup>18</sup>, modesty<sup>19</sup>, moral emotions like fearlessness<sup>20</sup>, and universal love<sup>21</sup>, and propagation of values<sup>22</sup> — all these are intrinsically desirable. It should be borne in mind that it is the experience of these intrinsic values that is good in itself. Kundakunda states that good experience (*subha bhāva*) is intrinsically valuable.<sup>23</sup> Kundakunda speaks of *subha bhāva* to represent all that is intrinsically valuable<sup>24</sup>. It is a complex mental state comprising cognitive, conative and affective elements. The *Samayasāra* regards *bhāva*, *parināma*, *adhyavasāya*, *citta*, etc. as synonyms.<sup>25</sup>

We have dwelt upon the things that are intrinsically worthy. But the basic question that remains to be discussed is the definition of good or *subha*. Kundakunda enumerates things that are *subha*. Perhaps he does not face the question, 'What is good or *subha*?' It is surprising that he does not give us any criterion of intrinsic goodness. Simple enumeration cannot lead us anywhere. I shall try to give the definition of good which, I believe, shall be in congruence with the utterances of Kundakunda. Thus we may say, *subha* is an experience in tune with *ahimsā*. Since there are degrees of *ahimsā*, so there are degrees of *subha* or good. The ingredients of this experience, which is complex but unified are emotions, and knowledge issuing as a result of an end-seeking action. Satisfaction on the fulfilment of ends is the accompaniment of experience. The implication of the definition of *subha* or good is that goodness does not belong to things in complete isolation from feeling; a thing is good, because it gives rise to an experience in tune with *ahimsā*.

I wish to discuss this question a little further. The question as to what is *subha* in the realm of ethics is like the question, 'What is *dravya*?' in the realm of metaphysics. The definition of *dravya* given by the Jaina *ācāryas* is : *Dravya* is that which is *sat* (being). Here 'being' is used in a comprehensive, and not particular, sense. However, no particular can be apart from being. We may logically say that being is the highest genus whereas the particulars are its species and the relation between the two is 'identity-in-difference'. Similarly, when I say that *subha* is an experience in tune with *ahimsā*, I am using the term '*ahimsā*' in the comprehensive sense and not in a particular sense. No particular *subha* can be separated from *ahimsā* and *ahimsā* manifests itself in all particular *subhas*. In a logical sense, it can be said that *ahimsā* is the highest genus and particular *ahimsās* are its species, and the relation between *ahimsā* and *ahimsās* is a relation of identity-in-difference. For example, in non-killing and non-exploitation, though the identical element of *ahimsā* is present, yet the two are different. So the above is the most general definition of *subha* just like the definition of *dravya*. It may be noted here that we can understand 'being' only through the particulars since general being is unintelligible owing to its being abstract, though we can think of it

factually, i. e. value neutrally. Similarly, the understanding of general *ahimsā* shall come only through the particular examples of *ahimsā*, e.g. non-killing, non-exploitation, non-enmity, non-cruelty etc., though we can think of it evaluatively. I may point out, in passing, that particular kinds of *ahimsā* are a matter of exploration. Every age develops many kinds of subtle *himsā* which are a matter of exploration. Gross *ahimsā* like non-killing is easily recognisable but subtle *ahimsā* like non-exploitation is a matter of discovery. Thus different forms of *ahimsā* will ever be appearing before us and by our exploring outlook and tendencies. In fact, *ahimsā* presupposes a realm of living beings, both human and non-human. So *śubha* will be operative only in such a realm of living beings. In other words, the experience of *śubha* will always be in relation to living beings : No living beings, no *śubha*. Thus the definition of *śubha* as the experience in tune with *ahimsā* is the most general definition like the definition of *dravya* as that which is *sat*. The former can be thought of evaluatively, just as the latter can be thought of factually, i. e. value neutrally.

Thus all the goods represented by Kundakunda can stand the test of *ahimsā* in the comprehensive sense. We can speak of Kundakunda as a value-moralist from the point of view of *ahimsā* and a value-pluralist from the point of view of things that are good in themselves. This theory of intrinsic goodness may be styled '*ahimsā*-utilitarianism'. This means that this theory considers ends tested by the criterion of *ahimsā* to be the general good which includes one's own good without any inconsistency. This *ahimsā*-utilitarianism is to be distinguished from Hedonistic utilitarianism of Mill, but it has some resemblance with the Ideal-utilitarianism of Moore and Roshdall.

The next question that arises is : 'What is the criterion of the rightness of action?' In this life an individual passes through many situations and as a moral agent or as an adviser he has to take decisions. So the interrelated question is : 'What must we do or advise others to do in a certain situation?' Let me clarify this question. Suppose a man borrows a sword from his friend for self-defence for a particular period of time, shall he return it to him at the expiry of

time when his friend is planning to kill his parents? What would Kundakunda say? Should the man keep his promise or break it? Keeping in view the good to be produced by breaking the promise, Kundakunda, it seems to me, would advise him to break the promise. Thus the criterion of rightness of action, according to Kundakunda, is the greater balance of good over evil that may be engendered in a particular situation. It means that Kundakunda upholds teleological position as distinguished from the de-ontological one in which an action or a rule is intrinsically right irrespective of the goodness of the consequences. This is tantamount to saying, that, in the ethical philosophy of Kundakunda, right cannot be separated from the good.

It is true that, from the study of his works, we find that nowhere does he talk of life-situations. He is the master of inwardness, and consequently he is concerned more with the moral worth of an action than its mere rightness. He seems to be aware of the fact that there may be external rightness without there being any moral worth. Kundakunda is prone to transform the individual. In consequence, he discusses the rightness of an action from the standpoint of moral inwardness. For him an action which has no moral worth is morally evil though it may be right. So far as I have been able to understand Kundakunda, he stands for the moral transformation of an individual and seems to believe that if all the individuals take care of themselves, the external situations will always be in harmony with their moral attitude. He, therefore, proclaims that mental inclination (*bhāva*) is the cause of virtue and vice.<sup>26</sup> The moral worth of an action depends on virtuous mental disposition (*subha bhāva*) or good disposition. It is this virtuous mental disposition which, according to Kundakunda, entails merit (*punya*) and the disposition contrary to this entails demerit (*pāpa*).<sup>27</sup> In the *Samayasāra* he tells us that the mental inclination in *himsā*, falsehood, possession, unchastity, and stealing entails demerit, whereas the mental inclination in *ahimsā*, truthfulness, non-possession, chastity and non-stealing entails merit.<sup>28</sup> In the *Pañcāstikāya* he avers that those actions which are fraught with indolence, which come from anger, conceit, deceit, and greed, which cause injury to others, and which culminate others fall into the gamut of evil actions.<sup>29</sup> Besides, inordinate indulgence in carnal pleasures, to

be subject to sensuous objects, to be occupied with anxiety ridden mental states, to enjoy cruelty, fraudulence, thieving, and possessiveness, to employ knowledge in harmful activities — all these are evil inclinations.<sup>30</sup> If some evil action because of *aśubha bhāva* is committed, Kundakunda prescribes the performance of repentance (*pratikramaṇa*), so that the consciousness of *śubha bhāva* is (indirectly) deepened. Kundakunda considers *pratikramaṇa* to be so important that in the *Niyamasāra* he says that, if the performance of attentive *pratikramaṇa* is not possible because of the exhaustion of bodily vigour, one should at least have unflinching faith in it.<sup>31</sup>

It seems to me that, in a way, Kundakunda identifies right with the good and wrong with evil. *śubha bhāva* is right and good : *Aśubha bhāva* is wrong and evil. These two expressions seem to be one for Kundakunda. Leslia Stephen rightly remarks “.... moral-ity is internal. The moral law — has to be expressed in the form, ‘be this’ not in the form, ‘do this’ ... ..the true moral law says ‘hate not’, instead of ‘kill not’ ... .. the only mode of stating the moral law must be as a rule of character.”<sup>32</sup> Kundakunda believes in ‘to be’ and not merely in ‘to do’. It means that ‘being’ should result in doing and ‘doing’ should be based on being. Kundakunda says that compassionate disposition should result in the act of kindness to a thirsty, hungry and distressed being with whom feels sympathetic suffering.<sup>33</sup> This comes to a point that Kundakunda adheres to the cultivation of morally good dispositions rather than to the doing of right actions either prudentially or impulsively or altruistically. This, in essence, seems to be the ethical philosophy of Kundakunda.



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## JAINA ETHICAL THEORY

It cannot be denied that human nature is essentially end-oriented. This end-orientation of man implies that human life is a striving towards certain ends. In other words, "it is so thoroughly teleological that it cannot be understood apart from what it is seeking to become."<sup>1</sup> The discipline which deals with the process of seeking and striving in terms of good and bad, and consequently in terms of right and wrong is termed Normative Ethics and judgements like 'A was a good man', 'to harm someone is wrong' are known as normative judgements of value and obligation respectively. Again, the discipline which aims at philosophical analysis of ethical terms or concepts like 'right', 'good' etc., which asks the meaning and definition of such terms, seeks justification of normative judgements, discusses their nature, and is concerned with the analysis of freedom and responsibility is termed Meta-ethics. Besides, there is descriptive historical inquiry to explain the phenomena of morality in the various periods of history. Thus, normative ethics, meta-ethics and descriptive ethics constitute three kinds of ethical inquiry. In the present paper, I propose to look at Jaina ethics from the normative and meta-ethical perspectives, to the exclusion of its descriptive historical inquiry. In other words, I shall not be describing the *Ācāra* of the Householder and that of the *Muni* in the various periods of history, but shall be dealing with some of the questions regarding value and obligation and meta-ethics, from the point of view of Jaina ethics in order to bring out the contributions of the Jainas to the above ethical questions.

Let us start with the Jaina theory of value, and then go on to the Jaina theory of obligation and finally to the Jaina theory of meaning and justification of the judgements, of value



and obligation (Meta-ethics). The question that confronts us is : what is intrinsically desirable, good or worthwhile in life, according to the Jaina? What intrinsic values are to be pursued according to him? The answer that may be given is this : What is intrinsically good or valuable or what ought to be chosen for its own sake is the achievement of *Ahimsā* of all living beings, the attainment of knowledge, the realisation of happiness, the leading of a virtuous life, and the experiencing of freedom and good emotions. Thus the criterion of intrinsic goodness or the good-making characteristic shall be the fulfilment of ends, like *Ahimsā*, knowledge, virtues etc. and the satisfaction that attends the their fulfilment. We may say here that goodness is a matter of degree and this depends on the degree of fulfilment of ends and the resulting satisfaction therefrom. An altogether good shall be wholly fulfilling the ends and wholly satisfying the seeker. The Jaina texts speak of the partial realisation of *Ahimsā* and the complete realisation of *Ahimsā* and of other ends. This theory of intrinsic goodness may be called *Ahimsā*-Utilitarianism. This means that this theory considers *Ahimsā* and other ends to be the general good. But it may be noted here that this general good shall not be possible without one's own good. Thus by this theory of *Ahimsā*-Utilitarianism narrow egoism is abandoned. This, *Ahimsā*-Utilitarianism, is to be distinguished from Hedonistic Utilitarianism of Mill, but it has some resemblance with the Ideal Utilitarianism of Moore and Rashdall.<sup>2</sup> The point to be noted here is that Moore distinguishes between good as a means and good as an end (good in itself). When we say that an action or a thing is good as a means, we say that it is liable to produce something which is good in itself (Intrinsically good). The Jaina recognises that *Ahimsā* can be both good as a means and good as an end. This means that both means and ends are to be tested by the criterion of *Ahimsā*. I may say in passing that the principle that "the end justifies the means" need not be rejected as immoral if the above criterion of means and ends is conceded. It may look paradoxical that *Ahimsā* is an end. But it is not so. Perhaps in order to avoid this misunderstanding that *Ahimsā* cannot be an end the

*Sūtrakṛtāṅga* has pronounced that *Ahimsā* is the highest good. In a similar vein, Samantabhadra has also said that *Ahimsā* of all living beings is equivalent to the realisation of the highest good. This shows that there is no inconsistency in saying that *Ahimsā* is both an end and a means. Thus, the expression *Ahimsā*-Utilitarianism seems to me to be the most apt one to represent the Jaina theory of intrinsic goodness.

Let us now proceed to the Jaina theory of obligation. The ultimate concern of the normative theory of obligation is to guide us in the making of decisions and judgements about actions in particular situations. Here the question that confronts us is this: How to determine what is morally right for a certain agent in a certain situation? Or what is the criterion of the rightness of action? The interrelated question is: what we ought to do in a certain situation? Or, how duty is to be determined? The answer of the Jaina is that 'right', 'ought' and 'duty' cannot be separated from the good. The criterion of what is right etc. is the greater balance of good over bad that is brought into being than any alternative. Thus, the view that regards goodness of the consequences of actions as the right-making characteristic is termed the teleological theory of obligation as distinguished from the deontological theory of obligation which regards an action as right or obligatory, simply because of its own nature regardless of the consequences it may bring into being. The Jaina ethics holds the teleological theory of obligation (Maximum balance of *Ahimsā* over *Himsā* as the right-making characteristic).

The question now arises whether Jaina ethics subscribes to act-approach or rule-approach in deciding the rightness or wrongness of actions. The former is called act-utilitarianism, while the latter, rule-utilitarianism. It seems to me that though the Jaina *Ācāryas* have given us moral rules, yet in principle they have followed act-utilitarianism, according to which every action is to be judged on the goodness of the consequences expected to be produced. Since to calculate the consequences of each and every action is not practically possible, Jaina *Ācāryas* have given us guiding moral principles in the form of *Anuvratas* and

*Mahāvratas*, *Gunavratas* and *Śikṣāvratas* and so on. This means that Jaina ethics accepts the possibility that sometimes these general moral principles may be inadequate to the complexities of the situation and in this case a direct consideration of the particular action without reference to general principles is necessary.

May be, keeping this in view, Samantabhadra argues that truth is not to be spoken when by so doing the other is entangled in miseries;<sup>5</sup> Svami Kumar in the *Kārttikeyānupreṣā* disallows the purchase of things at low price in order to maintain the vow of non-stealing.<sup>6</sup> According to rule-utilitarianism exceptions can not be allowed. This implies that Jaina ethics does not allow superstitious rule-worship but at the same time, prescribed that utmost caution is to be taken in breaking the rule, which has been built up and tested by the experience of generations. Thus according to Jaina ethics, acts are logically prior to rules and the rightness of the action is situational.

It is of capital importance to note here that according to Jaina ethics, there is no such thing as a moral obligation which is not an obligation to bring about the greatest good. To call an act a duty, is dependent on the fact of producing a greater balance of good over evil in the universe than any other alternative. Duty is not self-justifying; it is not an end in itself. "The very nature of duty is to aim beyond itself. There can no more be a duty to act, if there is no good to attain by it, than to think if there is no truth to be won by thinking."<sup>7</sup> Thus, duty is an extrinsic good, good as a means; this does not deprive duty of its importance in ethical life, just as health does not become unimportant by its being extrinsic good. (The pursuance of *Aṇuvratas* for the householder and the *Mahāvratas* for the *Muni* may be regarded as dutiful actions).

In view of the above, it seems that Jaina ethics will look with a critical eye at the deontologism of Priphard and Ross. According to Ross, there are self-evidently binding *prima facie* duties such as duties of gratitude, duties of self-improvement,

duties of Justice etc. The conviction of the Jaina is that all these duties are conducive to good as an end. Hence they should be followed because of the conduciveness to good, and not because they are independent of good consequences.

We have so far considered the criterion by which we are to determine what we morally ought to do in a given situation, how the rightness or wrongness of action is to be decided. But the question that remains to be discussed is: How the moral worth of an action is to be evaluated? How does, in Jaina terminology, an action become *punya* and *pāpa*-engendering? In other words, how does an act become virtuous or vicious, praiseworthy or blameworthy, morally good or bad? (1) It is likely that an act by the criterion of rightness may be externally right but internally immorally motivated. A man may seem to be doing things according to a moral rule, but it may be with a bad motive. (2) Again, an act by the standard of rightness may be externally wrong, but it may be done with a good motive. For example, one may kill the rich in order to serve the poor. (3) An act may be externally right and done with good motive. (4) An act may be externally wrong and done with a bad motive. Thus there are four possibilities (1) Right act and bad motive, (2) Wrong act and good motive, (3) Right act and good motive and (4) Wrong act and bad motive. The third and fourth category of acts which according to Jaina ethics may be called *Śubha* (auspicious) and *Aśubha* (inauspicious) *Leṣyās* are respectively called virtuous and vicious, are acts having moral merit and demerit. The concept of *Leṣyās* in Jainism also invites our attention to the fact that the degree of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness of actions will depend on the degree of intensity of good and bad motives. The first category of acts (Right act and bad motive) may look proper externally but its moral significance is zero. All deceptions are of this nature. The moral worth of the second category of acts (wrong act and good motive) is complicated and can be decided only on the nature of the case. Though in Jaina ethical works, importance of good motive is recognised as contributing towards the moral merit of an action yet the Jaina *Ācāryas* have clearly stated that he who exclusively emphasised the internal at the expense of the external forgets the

significance of outward behaviour. In consequence, both the internal and external aspects should occupy their due places. Ewing rightly observes that “they (good motives) lead us into evil courses on occasion if there is not at the back of our minds a moral consciousness which prevents this, so the strictly moral motive should always in a sense be present potentially.”<sup>9</sup>

Let us now try to find out the answer of the Jaina to certain meta-ethical questions. The fundamental questions to be taken into account are: (1) What is the nature of ethical judgements (obligatory and value) according to the Jaina? and (2) What is their justification? These two are the main questions of ethics in our times. Contemporary moral philosophy has concerned itself with this almost excluding Normative ethics; it is not interested so much in practical guidance even of a very general kind as in the theoretical understanding and conceptual clarification of ethical judgements.

Let me now state the first question more clearly. There have been recognised three kinds of knowledge (1) knowledge of fact, as, this flower is yellow; (2) knowledge of necessity, as  $7 + 5 = 12$ , and (3) knowledge of value, as A was good man or murder is wrong. The question under discussion reduces itself to this: Are ethical judgements expressive of any cognitive content in the sense that they may be asserted as true or false, or do they simply express emotions, feelings etc. The upholders of the former view are known as cognitivists, while those holding the latter view are known as non-cognitivists (emotivists). When we say that *Himsā* is wrong, are we making a true or false assertion or are we experiencing simply a feeling? Or are we doing both? According to the cognitivists, the ethical judgement, *Himsā* is wrong, is capable of being objectively true and thus moral knowledge is objective, whereas the non-cognitivists deny both the objectivity of assertion and knowledge, in as much as according to them, ethical judgements are identified with feelings, emotions etc. Here, the position taken by the Jaina seems to me to be that though the statement, ‘*Himsā* is wrong’ is objectively true, yet it can not be divested of the feeling-element involved

in experiencing the truth of the statement. In moral life, knowledge and feeling cannot be separated. The *Tattvārthasūtra* pronounces that the path of goodness can be traversed only by right knowledge (*Darśana* and *Jñāna*) and feeling and activity (*Cāritra*). Amrtacandra says that first of all knowledge of right, wrong and good is to be acquired, afterwards moral life is to be practised. Thus, the conviction of the Jaina is that the experience of value and obligation is bound up with our feelings and that in their absence, we are ethically blind. In fact, knowledge and feelings are so interwoven into a complex harmony that we have never a state of mind in which both are not present to some degree. So, the claims of cognitivists and non-cognitivists are one-sided and are very much antagonistic to the verdict of experience. Blanshard rightly remarks, "Nature may spread before us the richest possible banquet of good things, but if we can look at them only with the eye of reason, we shall care for none of these things; they will be alike insipid. There would be no knowledge of good and evil in a world of mere knowers, for where there is no feeling, good and evil would be unrecognisable." And a life that directs itself by feeling even of the most exalted kind will be a ship without a rudder. Thus the nature of ethical judgement according to the Jaina is cognitive-affective. The achievement of good is a joint product of our power to know and our power to feel.

The next question in meta-ethics is to ask how our ethical judgements (value and obligations) can be justified. That ethical judgements are objectively true, need not imply that their justification can be sought in the same manner as the justification of factual judgements of ordinary and scientific nature. The reason for this is that, facts can not be derived from values, is from ought. In factual judgements our expressions are value-neutral, but in ethical judgements we cannot be indifferent to their being sought by ourselves, or by others. That is why derivation of ought from is, fact from value is unjustifiable. The value judgements according to the Jaina are self-evident and can only be known by intuition; thus they are self-justifying. The conviction of the Jaina is that no argument can prove '*Himsā* is evil' and '*Ahimsā*

is good'. What is intrinsically good or bad can be known only by intuition. The justification of right can be sought from the fact of its producing what is intrinsically good.

In this paper I have ventured to deal with the Jaina ethical theory very briefly in the light of the contemporary discussion of ethical theory. In my view, the future of Jaina ethics should move in this direction so as to keep pace with the modern discussions of the ethical and meta-ethical problems.



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## ANEKĀNTA :

### METAPHYSICO - SPIRITUAL PERSPECTIVE

#### *Anekānta* : Metaphysical Perspective

It is incontrovertible that metaphysics deals with the problem of reality. Philosophers have endeavoured to expound the world of phenomena in a consistent manner. For Jaina thinkers, reality is constituted of apparent contradictions. So its one dimensional exposition is not possible. It is an inalienable complex of permanence and change, existence and non-existence, oneness and manyness, universality and particularity etc.<sup>1</sup> Because of this complexity reality is styled '*Anekāntic*'. It is thus multidimensional possessing antagonistic dimensions of permanence and change, one and many etc. These antagonistic dimensions are infinite in number, of which we know only a few of them. Thus the Jaina philosopher differs from all absolutists in their approach to the unfoldment of the inner nature of reality. The Jaina advocates change to be as much ontologically real as permanence. Being implies becoming and vice versa. This conception of reality reminds us of the Greek philosopher Parmenides who regarded 'Being' as the sole reality wholly excludent of all becoming, as also of Heraclitus, for whom, permanence being an illusion, 'Becoming' or perpetual change constitutes the very life of the universe. It also makes us reminiscent, of the Buddhist philosophy of universal flux and of the unchanging, static, permanent absolute of *Vedānta*. But all these point to the one-sided approach to reality. It may be said that "if the *Upaniṣadic* thinkers found the immutable reality behind the world of phenomena and plurality, and the Buddha denounced



everything as fleeting, Mahāvīra found no contradiction between permanence and change, and was free from all absolutism.”<sup>2</sup>

Problem of reality implies the problem of substance. In consonance with the *Anekāntic* view of reality already discussed substance is characterised by simultaneous origination destruction and persistence or is the substratum of attributes and modes.<sup>3</sup> Permanence signifies persistence of substance along with attributes, and change refers to fluctuating modes along with the emergence of the new modes and the disappearance of the old ones at one and the same time.<sup>4</sup> To illustrate, gold as a substance exists with its modifications and qualities. Now after making an ornament, gold as a substance is existent along with its attributes and what changes is the mode.

### Substance and Quality

Substance as different from the general and specific qualities and modifications are nothing but abstractions. Qualities are incapable of being existent by themselves even for a moment. They necessitate the simultaneous existence of substance, and are denied any isolated character ; and they are themselves bereft of qualities.<sup>5</sup> As regards the relation between them, we may say that they are non-separate and nonidentical. Non-separateness results owing to their subsistence in the same spatial extent, and non-identity issues because of the fact that one is not the other. The assertion that substance is not quality and that quality is not substance serves only to emphasise the non-identical character of both substance and quality. It does not mean the absolute negation of substance in quality and vice-versa.<sup>6</sup> Thus the relation between *Dravya* and *Guṇa* substance and quality is one of identity-in-difference. The difference between them is only the difference in point of nomenclature, number, characterisation, and purpose and not difference with reference to spatial extent.<sup>7</sup>

## Substance and modification

The notion of *Paryāya* is peculiarly Jaina.<sup>8</sup> In conformity with the nature of substance as permanence in mutability, *Paryāya* alludes to the variable aspect of a thing which is due to the external and internal inducements. Every quality transmutes its state every moment; and this mode of being is called *Paryāya* which is incessantly transforming itself into the next, though the quality as such is never abrogated. It is on this account alleged that substance is in a state of perpetual flux. However incessant and infinite the transformations may be, the underlying substantiality and permanency can never part with existence. Substance and *Paryāya* are not to be distinguished like two different things, for it is substance through qualities which because of its flowing nature attains the qualification of *Paryāya*. Substance and modes are neither exclusively identical nor exclusively different, but the relation is one of identity-in-difference, which is in perfect harmony with the nonabsolutistic attitude upheld by the Jaina. Thus origination and destruction are applicable to *Paryāyas* and persistence to qualities along with substance.

### Persistence and the Distinction between *Guṇa* and *Paryāyas*

The Jaina conception of persistence is defined as that which accounts for recognition in the form of the proposition "This is the same".<sup>9</sup> This is consequent on the fact that the essential nature of substance or quality, notwithstanding its mobility, is eternal and unchangeable.<sup>10</sup> Thus the continuously flowing nature of quality does not annihilate the quality itself, which, if admitted, would fail to account for memory and in consequence run counter to all our daily commonplace transactions. Continuance devoid of variability stands in direct antagonism to experience. Hence permanence is not the denial of change, but includes it as its necessary aspect. In the same way, qualities in the absence of modifications are incapable of being conceived. To distinguish *Guna* from

*Paryāya*, in the first place, the infinite attributes are ever simultaneously present, but the modifications do not appear simultaneously, but only in succession. Secondly, qualities render the judgement of sameness possible, while the judgement 'This is not the same' is accountable only by making allusion to modifications. Thirdly, *Guṇas* as such are to be interpreted as immutable in contrast to *Paryāyas* which are regarded as mutable. In other words, attributes of a substance are credited with the nature of perpetuation, while the originative and decaying designations are accorded to *Paryāyas*.

### Classification of Substance : Plurality, Duality and Unity

Jainism resolves the whole of the universe of being into two everlasting, uncreated, coexisting, but independent categories of *Jīva* and *Ajīva*. The *Ajīva* is further classified into *Pudgala* matter, *Dharma* principle of motion, *Adharma* principle of rest, *Ākāśa* space and *Kāla* time. Hence reality is dualistic as well as pluralistic. But, according to the Jaina, plurality, considered from the point of view of one existence, entails unity also. According to Kundakunda, in spite of the unique characteristics possessed by the different substances, existence has been regarded as an all-comprising characteristic of reality which ends all distinctions.<sup>11</sup> The *Kārttikeyānupreṣā* recognises that all substances are one from the standpoint of substance, while they are distinct and separate from their characteristic differences.<sup>12</sup> Samantabhadra also endorses this view by affirming that in view of the conception of one universal existence all are one, but from the point of view of substances distinctions arise.<sup>13</sup>

Padmaprabha Maladhārīdeva pronounces that *Mahāsattā* pervades all the things in their entirety, but it is always associated with *Avāntarasattā* which pervades only the particular objects.<sup>14</sup> In a similar vein, Amṛtcandra speaks of the two types of *Sattā*, namely, *Svarūpasattā* and *Sādraśyasattā*. The latter is the same as *Sāmānyasattā*. In his *Saptabhaṅgitarāṅgiṇī* Vimaladāsa discusses the problem of unity and plurality of existence in detail,

and concludes that both the postulation of existential identity and the articulation of differences from the standpoint of different substances are logically necessary and justifiable.<sup>15</sup> Thus Jainism gives credence to the recognition of existential oneness but not exclusively, since it is always bound up with plurality. This is quite consistent with the *Anekāntātmaka* view of reality propounded by the Jaina philosopher. Thus *Mahāsattā* will be associated with its opposite, namely, *Avāntarasattā*. It may again be pointed out that this *Mahāsattā* is not an independent something as may be conceived, but is invariably accompanied by its opposite.<sup>16</sup> Kundakunda holds the nature of existence as one, immanent in the totality of substances constituting the universe, comprehending and summarising the universe, having infinite modifications, indicative of the triple characteristics of origination, destruction, and persistence and in the last as associated with the characteristics opposite to those mentioned above.<sup>17</sup> Hence unity, duality, and plurality-all are inseparably and inevitably involved in the structure of reality. This is the *Anekāntic* view of reality.

By recognising both *Jīva* and *Pudgala* as substances Jainism steers clear of the two extremes of materialism and idealism which are radically opposed to each other. Materialism considers the universe as rooted in matter while idealism imagines the mind or spirit to be fundamental and primary. The former lays stress on the recognition of the reality of matter and considers the mind to be an incident or accompaniment; the latter affirms that mind or spirit is to be reckoned as real and matter just an appearance. But according to Jainism, both matter and spirit are equally true.

### Knowledge of reality and its expression

It will be noted here that if the *Anekāntic* reality is indescribable altogether, any sort of discussion along with the path of liberation will be blocked, as nobody will be able to preach and propound.<sup>18</sup> According to Jainism reality or substance or universe is cognized by, *Pramāṇa* and *Naya*.<sup>19</sup> *Pramāṇa* refers to the grasping of reality in its wholeness, while *Naya* points to

an aspect of infinitely-phased reality illumined by *Pramāṇa*, thus the latter takes into consideration only a fragment of the totality.<sup>20</sup> A substance embellishes itself with apparent antagonisms. The emphasis on the one and the cancellation of the other would irresistibly lead us to the biased estimation and *Ekāntic* view of reality.<sup>21</sup> *Pramāṇa* assimilates all the characteristics at once without any contradiction and animosity between one characteristic and the other, for instance, between one and many, existent and non-existent, etc. Of the unfathomable characteristics, *Naya* chooses one at one moment, but keeps in view the other characteristics also. We can thus say that both *Pramāṇa* and *Naya* are essential for the proper understanding of the nature of reality. Reality being the repository of infinite attributes, the apprehension of it from a particular angle of vision, i.e., *Naya*, which is objectively given and not subjectively contemplated, does not exhaust the whole of the multiphased reality. So, in order to avoid the possible misunderstanding that reality is exhausted by the employment of a particular *Naya*, every predication should be preceded by the word 'Syār' in order to make us aware of the possibility of other alternative predications. Hence it is known as the doctrine of *Syādvāda*. *Syādvāda* is no doubt the logical outcome of *Anekāntavāda*, the doctrine of the multiple nature of reality. It is simply the mode of predication or communication envisaged by the Jaina to convey the knowledge of the multiphased reality. Thus *Syādvāda* is the mode of expression, *Anekāntavāda* or *Nayavāda* is the mode of cognition. *Syādvāda* is the expression of *Anekāntavāda* in language.

We may point out here that corresponding to the infinite antagonistic characteristic, there are infinite *Nayas*. But summarily speaking, all the *Nayas* from the metaphysical point of view can be summed up into two kinds namely — *Dṛavyārthika Naya* and *Paryayārthika Naya*. These two *Nayas* can very well expound the nature of reality, or substance or universe. *Dṛavyārthika Naya* refers to the permanent aspect of a substance and *Paryayārthika Naya* refers to the changing aspect of a substance.

## ***Anekānta* : Spiritual Perspective**

The first section has been devoted to the metaphysical understanding of reality or substance or universe. For the proper intelligibility of the *Anekāntic* reality, Jaina *Ācāryas* have given us two *Nayas*, namely, *Dravyārthika Naya* and *Paryayārthika Naya* corresponding to the permanent and changing aspects of reality. This type of comprehension yields intellectual satisfaction, yet it does not show us the way to spiritual growth, satisfaction and self-realisation. Axiological consciousness is very much different from descriptive consciousness produced by metaphysical curiosity of the human mind. So the Jaina *Ācāryas* have propounded two axiological *Nayas*, namely, *Niścaya* and *Vyavahāra* for properly evaluating the manifested and unmanifested *Paryāyas* of self. Thus we have axiological *Anekānta* and the metaphysical *Anekānta*.

The axiological *Niścaya Naya* affirms that the realisation of self's *Svarūpasattā*, or the manifestation of intrinsic characteristics and modifications of the self, or the expression of the self's original origination, destruction and continuance is the terminus of spiritual journey. No doubt, the self is existent, but its existence is mundane from the beginningless past. The self is not to acquire existence, but what is to be acquired is simply the purity of existence. *Dharma*, *Adharma*, *Ākāśa* and *Kāla* are the pure existents. *Pudgala* in the *Aṇu* form is pure and in the *Skandha* form is impure, but the self exists in the defiled state of existence. It is, in the empirical state, characterising itself with impure modifications and qualities, and consequently impure origination, destruction and continuance occur. By its own strenuous efforts transcendental modifications and qualities, and pure origination, destruction and continuance are to be revealed. In this state alone, the self realises its true substantiality.

## Meaning of two axiological Nayas.

The *Niścaya Naya* grasps the soul in its undefiled state of existence in contradistinction to the *Vyavahāra Naya* which describes the self as bound, impure and the like. No doubt, we are in the defiled form of existence from beginningless past, but the *Niścaya Naya* reminds us of our spiritual magnificence and glory. It prompts the sullied self to behold its spiritual heritage. It endeavours to infuse and instil into our minds the imperativeness of *Śuddha Bhāvas* after abundantly showing us the empirical and evanescent character of *Śubha* and *Aśubha Bhāvas* that bind the soul to mundane existence. It does not assert that the soul is at present perfect but simply affirms that the self ought to attain the height illuminated by it. It has the force of 'ought' and not of 'is', but this force is valid for empirical selves. In the opening chapter of the *Samayasāra* Kundakunda summarises the implication of the aforementioned two *Nayas* by saying that every self has heard about, observed and experienced the worldly enjoyments and consequential bondage, but the nature of the highest self has never been comprehended.<sup>22</sup> Hence the former is *Vyavahāra Naya*, while the latter is called *Niścaya Naya*, which points to the potentiality of the empirical self to become pure and enjoy its unalloyed status. It is therefore averred that when the self has elevated itself to the domain of spiritual experience, the *Vyavahāra Naya* becomes false and the *Niścaya Naya* is seen to be genuine. In other words, we achieve the right to renounce the *Vyavahāra Naya* only when we have accomplished the loftiest height of mystical experience. If we regard the *Vyavahāra Naya* as untruthful at a low stage, *Punya*, *Pāpa*, bondage, and the necessity to do strenuous effort to achieve liberation would be of no avail. It may be noted here that the falsity of the *Vyavahāra Naya* affects neither the existence of external objects nor the omniscience of the transcendental self which reflects the differences of the world as they are. In explaining the nature of spiritual experience, Kundakunda affirms that the transcendental experience surpasses all the conceptual points of view<sup>23</sup> whether *Niścaya* or *Vyavahāra*. The former represents the self as unbound and untouched by attachment and aversion, while the latter, as

bound and touched by them, but he who transcends these verbal points of view is called *Samayasāra*, the terminus of spiritual journey. The self becomes pure consciousness, bliss and knowledge.

It may be noted here that like the *Niścaya* or *Paramārtha* and *Vyavahāra Nayas* enunciated by Kundakunda, Śāṅkarācārya, the great exponent of the *Advaita* doctrine, makes use of the *Paramārthika* and *Vyāvahārika* view-points as the corner-stones of his philosophy. But the two differ widely. The *Paramārthika* view as advocated by Śāṅkara negates the *Paramārthika* existence of other material and non-material objects of the world which, in the view of the Jaina, have their own independent existence. The *Vyavahāra Naya* of the Jainas simply points to our slumbering state in the domain of spiritualism, and does not in the least touch the existential aspects of things. The *Niścaya* or *Paramārthika Naya* simply serves to awaken the slumbering soul to attain its spiritual heritage. It does not pretend to annul the external things by mere spiritual outlook.

### **Doer and deed : An axiological point of view**

We may discuss the philosophy of the doer and the deed from the axiological point of view. From the *Niścaya* point of view, the transcendental self is the doer and enjoyer of its own pure states. From the *Vyavahāra* point of view the empirical self is the doer and enjoyer of the impure states of self. This is the spiritual perspective of *Anekānta*. There is no denying the fact that the empirical self has been the doer of impure dispositions of attachment and aversion since an indeterminable past, so it is no doubt the author of these dispositions. But according to the *Niścaya* point of view, in whatever deeds the empirical self may get itself engaged in the world, they are not the representative of the self in its transcendental nature. When it is axiologically said that the empirical self is not the author of these impure dispositions; the purpose is to persuade the self to look behind these disposition. The chief point of reference is the self in its pure nature. There is no contradiction in affirming that the enlightened self which has realised its true nature manifests the



pure modes and thereby becomes the substantial agent of those modes, and in affirming that the ignorant self because of its erroneous identification with the alien nature develops impure dispositions, and thereby it is called their agent.<sup>25</sup> Just as from gold only golden things can be produced, and from iron only iron things, so the enlightened self produces pure modifications and the ignorant self produces impure ones.<sup>26</sup> When the ignorant self becomes enlightened, it starts generating pure modifications without any incongruity. Thus the self is simply the doer of its own states and not the doer of anything else whatsoever. The empirical self is the author of impure psychic states on account of its association with attachment and aversion. But if we advance a step further and reflect transcendently, we arrive at the inevitable conclusion that the pure self can not be the author of these impure psychical states because they are foreign to its nature. Thus the transcendental self is the doer of transcendental psychical states. Besides it is also their enjoyer.

### **Auspicious, Inauspicious and Pure Psychical States**

Again, the spiritual perspective of *Anekānta* is expressed when it is said that auspicious and inauspicious psychical states of self continue to captivate it in never-ending tensions and the pure psychical states of self engenders equanimity. Thus from the *Niścaya* point of view both the auspicious and inauspicious psychical states prevent the self from attaining to the loftiest spiritual heights, hence they should be equally condemned as unwholesome for the healthiest development of the self. But from the *Vyavahāra* point of view if the empirical finds it difficult to rise to spiritual heights, it should develop auspicious psychical states, but with the clear knowledge, that these psychical states will in no way enable the self to realise the pure states of self. The inauspicious psychical states should by all means be disapproved.

In the end we may say that to make *Anekāntic* reality intelligible from the metaphysical perspective, *Dravyārthika* and *Paryayārthika* *Nayas* are necessary and to make an

axiological assessment of *Anekāntic* reality from the spiritual perspective, *Niścaya* and *Vyavahāra* *Nayas* can not be dispensed with.



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## SYĀDVĀDA

The significant fact about knowledge is its communicability. When knowledge is for one's own self, the question of communicability can be dispensed with; but when it is for the other, the question needs serious consideration. Communicability is accomplished through properly worded propositions. Thus knowledge to be communicable is to be reduced to propositions. This goes without saying that formulation of propositions is dependent on the content of knowledge. It is not idle to point out that if there is discordance between the content of knowledge and formulation of propositions, serious misunderstandings are bound to arise. *Syādvāda* is the linguistic device to represent without any omission and distortion the content of knowledge. Thus in a way *Syādvāda* and knowledge become the obverse and the converse of the same coin.

Knowledge, according to the Jaina, reveals itself and the object. In consequence the Jaina thinkers propound that the object has infinite characteristics some known, some in the process of being discovered and many as yet unknown. This is known as the doctrine of *Anekāntavāda*. *Syādvāda* is the method of communicating the manifold characteristics of a thing to the other. In the absence of this technique real knowledge of a thing can not be passed to others without any discongruence. Thus *Syādvāda* is the expression of *Anekāntavāda* in language. If *Anekāntavāda* is the mode of cognition, *Syādvāda* is the mode of expression.

The significant point to be comprehended in regard to *Anekāntavāda* is that every characteristic of a multiphased thing is maintaining its identity through the existence of its opposite

as its aspect. In fact, a thing can not be the same thing without the negation of other things in it. For example, a colour can not remain a colour without the negation of other characteristics like taste, smell etc. in it. Thus non-existence is as much an essential aspect of the real as existence is. Negative propositions can not be asserted without accepting non-existence as an element in the constitution of the real. Similarly, the characteristics of one and many permanence and change, generality and particularity are reconciled in a thing without any incongruity. Thus when the Jinist is faced with the problems of expressing the complex content of knowledge in language in a way which can communicate to the other the knowledge as such, he had to devise the method of *Syādvāda*. The word 'Syāt' when added to a proposition is indicative of the presence of multiple characteristic in a thing in addition to the characteristic referred to in the proposition under consideration. In the proposition 'Syāt *Ghaṭa* is colourful' the word 'Syāt' implies that the subject *Ghaṭa* is a manifold of attributes, of which the attribute of being colourful referred to in the proposition is there being colourful referred to in the propositions is there in the *Ghaṭa* as a matter of fact. This should not be understood, as it is generally done, to mean that the existence of colour in the *Ghaṭa* is doubtful. In other words, certainty of colour along with the manifoldness of characteristics is indicated by the word 'Syāt'.

The word 'Syāt' can also be understood differently, though the difference is of expression and not of meaning already discussed. As already pointed out, a thing is the repository of infinite attributes. Hence the apprehension of it from a particular angle of vision or point of view, technically called *Naya*, does not exhaust the whole of the multiphased thing. It is important to note that the *Naya* is objectively given and not subjectively contemplated. So in order to avoid the possible misunderstanding that a thing is exhausted by a particular *Naya*, every predication should be preceded by the word *Syāt*, thus making us aware of the possibility of other predications in regard to that thing. Thus *Syādvāda* is the

custodian of clarity, certainty and unambiguity in the field of philosophy. It is by no means the doctrine of doubt and uncertainty.

Although an existence is possessed of infinite attribute yet the knowledge of it is not a simple affair. The question is what is it to know a thing ? and how many propositions are requisite to express the content of knowledge ? The conviction of the Jaina is that seven distinct propositions, neither more or less, are needed to express the content of knowledge in regard to an existent. The significant point to be noted here is that each proposition is not the result of mere subjective necessity but is traceable to an objective situation which actually possesses attributes as an ontological truth. All this implies that since the existents or their characteristics are infinite in number, seven propositions can be expressed with reference to each. Consequently, there will be infinitely seven-fold propositions without any inconsistency.

Let us now illustrate the doctrine of seven-fold propositions by taking an example of the attribute existence or permanence or oneness etc. in respect of pen.

1. The first proposition is : *Syāt* pen exists. This means that the existence of pen is contextual, the context being its own *Dravya* (substance), *Kṣetra* (Space), *Kāla* (time) and *Bhāva* (State). It is by virtue of this context that the pen derives its individuality and becomes meaningful. In fact this context is interwoven into the constitution of the pen itself, so it can not be separated from the object. This proposition controverts the possibility of unqualified existence of a thing without the consideration of substance, space, time and state.

2. The second proposition is : *Syāt* pen does not exist. The proposition does not, as it seems, negate the existence of pen referred to in the first proposition, but it states the non-existence of pen in respect of other *Dravya*, *Kṣetra*, *Kāla*, and *Bhāva*. Thus it strengthens the first proposition rather than cancels it. The pen is pen only because it is not pen. In other

words the existence of pen in respect of its own *Dravya*, *Kṣetra*, *Kāla* and *Bhāva* can not maintain its identity, if non-existence of pen in respect of other *Dravya*, *Kṣetra*, *Kāla* and *Bhāva* is not considered the concomitant aspect of pen. Thus both existence and non-existence are copresent in the pen without any contradiction. According to the Jaina, non-existence is as much constitutive of the nature of thing as existence. The critics fail to see that contradictory statement can be made about a thing, if context is changed. The conviction of the Jaina is that if this proposition is denied, it shall be difficult for us to account for the differences of things. Hence, by asserting this proposition We come across a new aspect of thing which is not given in the first proposition.

3. The third proposition is : *Syāt* pen exists and does not exist. In this proposition the two attributes of existence and non-existence in their relevant contexts are successively predicated of the pen. Thus this proposition which appears merely the summation of the first two propositions, is not really so. It expresses a new aspect of pen under consideration. This aspect is not present either in the first or in the second proposition considered separately. If mathematics is our guide, the third proposition is nothing but a summation of the first two. But according to the Jaina experience which is our sole guide tells us that the combination or separate units gives rise to a distinctive attribute. In the word 'go', though the two letters g and o are merely combined yet this combination gives rise to distinctive meaning, not apprehended in any of its constituent elements.

4. The fourth proposition is : *Syāt* pen is inexpressible. In this proposition the two attributes of existence and non-existence instead of being asserted successively as in the third proposition, are asserted simultaneously. The need for simultaneous assertion of these oppositive attributes is man's desire to express in words the apprehension of pen as such. Since words are incapable of expressing this apprehension of pen the pen is inexpressible. It may be noted here that inexpressibility is

a novel and factual characteristic of pen. The distinction between the third and fourth propositions is that in the former the novel attribute is the result of consecutive togetherness of the elements of existence and non-existence, whereas in the latter it is the result of simultaneous presentation of the two elements in question. It goes without saying that this inexpressibility is not absolute, it is only so in the context of the two opposite attributes being together synchronically. "The common-sense principle implied in its recognition is that what is given can not be rejected simply because it is inexpressible by a single positive concept".

The fifth, Sixth, and Seventh propositions are : (5) *Syāt* pen exists and is inexpressible. (6) *Syāt* pen does not exist and is inexpressible. (7) *Syāt* pen exists and does not exist and is inexpressible. All these propositions according to the Jaina, represent a new aspect of the real. It may be noted here that the Jaina texts have not discussed these propositions clearly.

Now the question arises : What is the basis of regarding the number of propositions as seven, neither more nor less than this ? The answer of the Jaina is that since affirmation and negation are constitutive of the real, there are only seven questions possible in regard to the real. These questions are consequent upon the seven kinds of inquisitiveness of mind to know a thing, which in turn is dependent on the seven objective aspects of the real. In fact, the enquiry starts upon the initial doubt, for example does a pen exist or not? Or is a thing permanent or changing? And the answer is seven distinct propositions or *Bhaṅgas*.

What I feel here is that the Jaina in propounding the seven propositions is making use of mathematical knowledge, which necessarily leads to these seven *Bhaṅgas*. Out of these the first four are empirically verifiable or understandable and the last three are mathematical possibilities. That is why the Jaina texts have not explained the last three *Bhaṅgas* in the way they have explained the first four ones. But there is nothing wrong in saying that they are possibilities confirmed by

mathematics. So if one speaks of more than seven *Bhaṅgas*, there will either be duplication or assertion of propositions neither confirmed by mathematics nor by experience, if one speaks of less number of propositions, there will either be omission or suppression of the aspect of the real given to us either mathematically or experientially.

It may now be argued that since Jaina philosophy is known as *Anekāntavāda* (non-extremism and non-absolutism) does the seven fold prediction apply to *Anekāntavāda* itself ? The answer of the Jaina is in the affirmative. *Syāt Anekāntavāda*, *Syāt Ekāntavāda* and so one will be the seven propositions (*Saptabhaṅgas*). Knowledge which takes into account the nature of the real as consisting of an infinite plurality of attributes is called *pramāṇa* and this is non-absolutism, knowledge which takes into account one attribute without negating the other attributes present in the real is called, *Nyāya* and this is *Ekāntavāda*. In other words the *Anekānta* can not be subordinated without admitting *Ekānta* as its opposite, just as a tree can not be saved if the branches are taken out.

Of the many charges alleged against the doctrine of *Syādvāda*, the most fundamental is that of self-contradiction. In other words, the charge is that the Jaina doctrine flagrantly violates the law of non-contradiction which says that A can not be both A and B at the same time. Thus how can pen have the characteristics of both existence and non-existence ? Before answering this objection, let us first discuss the attitude of the Jaina towards the law of non-contradiction propounded by formal logic. The conviction of the Jaina is that the law of non-contradiction is a priori and thus does not state any facts about reality. If it is asked what is the criterion of contradiction the reply of the Jaina would be that it is experience and not pure thought. It is by the former that the notion of contradiction should be decided. Two facts are contradictory, if they are not found to coexist in experience just as light and darkness, heat and cold, and the like. On the contrary, if experience confirms the coexistence of seemingly contradictory attributes in a thing



it should be regarded as valid. Thus the Jaina insists that the source of the law of nonc-ontradiction should be sought not in a priori thought, but in experience of the behaviour of things. Following this mode of logic, the Jaina finds no empirical contradiction in asserting that the pen has the characteristics of both existence and non-existence, as has been explained above.



## Kundakunda on the Modifications (*Paryāyas*) of Self and their ethico-spiritual implications

It can not be gainsaid that Kundakunda, the great philosopher of the first Century A.D. stands for the ethico-spiritual transformation of the individual and society. He bases his doctrine of transformation on the *Paryāyas* (modifications) of self. According to Kundakunda, the self, as an ontologically underived fact, is one of the six substances subsisting independently of anything else<sup>1</sup>. It is styled *Mahattā*<sup>2</sup> (a great objectivity). In consonance with the definition of substance adopted by Kundakunda in conformity with the Jaina tradition, self is the repository of qualities (*Guṇas*) and modifications (*Paryāyas*) and is characterised by simultaneous origination of new mode, cessation of old mode and continuance of quality as such along with the substance self<sup>3</sup>. On this basis it may be said that it is a synthesis of permanence and flowingness. Permanence refers to qualities and flowingness refers to modifications. According to Kundakunda, consciousness is the essential quality of the self<sup>4</sup>. Its flowing character manifests itself at the mundane stage of existence in auspicious and inauspicious psychical dispositions<sup>5</sup>. Whenever the auspicious mode of kindness originates, inauspicious mode of cruelty ceases and the quality of consciousness continues simultaneously. Thus self as a substance exists with its modifications and qualities. In the present paper I intend to discuss the modifications of self and their ethico-spiritual implications.

Kundakunda speaks of essential modifications<sup>6</sup> (*Svabhāva Paryāyas*) and non-essential modifications (*Vibhāva Paryāyas*) and accepts that the empirical self has been associated with the non-essential modifications (*Vibhāva*

*Paryāyas*) since an indeterminable past thereby it has identified itself with attachment and aversion. The consequence of which is that it is the doer of right and wrong actions and the enjoyer of their results<sup>8</sup>. We may point out in passing that the transcendental self occupies itself with essential modifications (*Svabhāva Paryāyas*) and goes beyond the duality of attachment and aversion and is the doer of detached actions and the enjoyer of pure knowledge and bliss. It may be noted here that the relation between the empirical self and the transcendental one is one of identity-cum-difference; i.e., there is metaphysical identity between the two states (empirical and transcendental) of the same self<sup>9</sup>, but the difference is also undeniable in respect of the *Vibhāvas* which have been persisting since an infinite past. The empirical self is potentially transcendental<sup>10</sup>, though this transcendental state of existence is not actualised at present; hence the distinction is incontrovertible.

Now the empirical self with non-essential modifications (*Vibhāva Paryāyas*) from beginningless past is given to us in the-mundane form. These selves (*Jīvas*) are infinite in number. Kundakunda classifies empirical selves into five kinds, one-sensed to five sensed *Jīvas* (living beings)<sup>11</sup>.

The lowest in the grade of existence are the one-sense *Jīvas*. These one-sensed *Jīvas* admit of five-fold classification, namely, the earthbodied, water bodied, fire-bodied, air-bodied and, lastly, vegetable-bodied selves<sup>12</sup>. These *Jīvas* possess only pleasure-pain consciousness<sup>13</sup>. Two sensed to five-sensed *Jīvas* possess end-consciousness<sup>14</sup>. These living beings are constantly engaged in action, which is by its very nature directed to some end, conscious or unconscious. In other words, every action is impregnated with some conscious or unconscious end. It follows from this that actions with unconscious end are absolutely determined having no choice, whereas the actions with conscious end involve freedom of choice. The former are excluded from the scope of ethics, since they are non-moral

actions, but the latter are the subject of ethical enquiry, since they are either moral or immoral. It has been very well recognised that non-human actions are unconscious, and therefore instinctive, and the human actions which are conscious are deliberative.

It is with human actions that we are concerned here. Human beings are behaving with other human beings and with other non-human beings either morally or immorally. Now the question is: what end does make human actions moral? and what end does make human actions immoral? The Jinist may answer: If the end is good (*Śubha*) the action that is directed towards it will be called moral action or right action, and if the end is bad (*Aśubha*), the action that is directed towards it will be called immoral action or wrong action.

According to Kundakunda *Śubha Bhāva* is good and *Aśubha Bhāva* is bad. The examples of *Śubha Bhāva* are: (1) Devotion to *Arhanta*, *Siddha*, *Sādhu* and to moral values, respect for the persons to be revered<sup>15</sup>. (2) Compassionateness towards those who are in distress and are thirsty and hungry<sup>16</sup>. (3) Charity and a state of mind bereft of anger, pride, deceit and greed<sup>18</sup>. The examples of *Aśubha Bhāva*<sup>19</sup> are: (1) Conduct mixed with excessive sluggishness, (2) mental states infected with anger, pride, deceit and greed, (3) sensual indulgence, (4) belittlement of others, (5) affliction caused to others, (6) employment of knowledge in unworthy and base object, (7) cruelty and immoral inclinations.

The above discussion takes us to the view that the wordly human beings who have identified themselves with the non-essential modifications (*Vibhāva Paryāyas*) from beginningless past are capable of leading an ethical life in society. They are no doubt useful for society and its development. Though they are dedicated to multi-dimensional social progress, yet they are not completely free from mental tensions in observing moral prescriptions.

Kundakunda seems to be aware of this limitation of socio-ethical life. In his view it is all due to the fact that the self has identified itself with the non-essential modifications (*Vibhāva Paryāyas*) which manifest themselves in *Śubha* and *Aśubha Bhāvas* or the moral and immoral observances. Kundakunda therefore draws our attention to the essential modifications (*Svabhāva Paryāyas*) of self. He advises us to relinquish the working of *Vibhāva Paryāyas* after turning to *Svabhāva-Paryāyas* of self.

He expresses grief that people at large have not only listened and are not only intensely familiar with the dualities of life, but also they have expressed them a great deal<sup>20</sup>.

No doubt we are in the empirical form of existence from beginningless past, but his theory of *Svabhāva Paryāya* reminds us of our spiritual magnificence and glory.

It prompts the sullied self to behold its spiritual heritage. It endeavours to infuse and instil into our minds the imperativeness of *Śuddha Bhāvas* after abundantly showing us the empirical and evanescent character of *Śubha* and *Aśubha Bhāvas* that bind the self to merely socio-ethical living.

The doctrine of *Svabhāva Paryāya* does not assert that the self is at present perfect but simply affirms that the self ought to attain the height illumined by it. It has the force of 'ought' and not of 'is', but the force is valid for empirical selves having *Vibhāva Paryāyas*.

Kundakunda, the prominent exponent of the doctrine of *Svabhāva Paryāya*, has bequeathed to us the philosophy of the doer and the deed. He proclaims that in whatever deeds the empirical self may get itself engaged in the world, they are not the representatives of the self in its pure, undefiled and transcendental nature. The empirical self with the emergence of *Svabhāva Paryāyas* is the doer of its own pure states of existence<sup>21</sup>. The empirical self having *Vibhāva Paryāya* is the doer of impure dispositions. No substance is capable of doing


a thing foreign to its nature. And since these impure dispositions do not pertain to the self in its original nature, the transcendental self is denied the agency even of these impure dispositions. The denial of the authorship of auspicious and inauspicious psychical dispositions points to the supermundane, uncontaminated state of the self. There is no denying the fact that the empirical self has been the doer of impure dispositions since an indeterminable past; so it is the author of these dispositions. If this is not granted, it will make the position of the Jaina indistinguishable from the position of the *Saṃkhya* which imputes all actions to the material *Buddhi*, and regards the principle of consciousness as immutable. When the Jaina says that the empirical self is not the agent of impure dispositions, he simply persuades the empirical self to look to *Svabhāva Paryāya*. Hence here the chief point of reference is the self in its pure nature. The Jaina reads no contradiction in affirming that the enlightened self which has become familiar with its true nature manifests the pure modes (*Svabhāva Paryāyas*) and thereby becomes the substantial agent of those modes, and in affirming that the ignorant self because of its erroneous identification with the alien nature develops impure dispositions, and thereby it is called their agent<sup>22</sup>. Just as from gold only golden things can be produced, and from iron only iron things, so the enlightened self produces pure modifications (*Svabhāva Paryāyas*) and the ignorant self produces impure ones (*Vibhāva Paryāyas*)<sup>23</sup>. When the ignorant self becomes enlightened, it starts generating pure modifications without any discongruity. Thus the self is simply the doer of its own states and not the doer of anything else whatsoever. The empirical self is the author of impure psychical dispositions. But if we advance a step further and reflect transcendently, we arrive at the inevitable conclusion that the pure self cannot be the author of these impure psychical dispositions because they are foreign to its nature. Thus the transcendental self is the doer of transcendental *Bhāvas*. Besides, it is also their enjoyer<sup>24</sup>.

It has been said that consciousness is the essential characteristic of the self. It manifests itself in psychical dispositions which follows from consciousness as the conclusion from premises. The psychical dispositions is of three kinds, namely, *Śubha* (auspicious), *Aśubha* (inauspicious) and *Śuddha* (pure)<sup>25</sup>. The self is said to possess auspicious psychical dispositions when it is absorbed in the performance of meritorious deeds of moral nature<sup>26</sup>. Besides, when the self entangles itself in demeritorious actions of violence, sensual pleasure, and the like, it is said to possess inauspicious psychical disposition<sup>27</sup>. Both these auspicious and inauspicious psychical dispositions continue to captivate the self in the never-ending tensions of misery. Kundakunda, therefore, makes an explicit pronouncement that so long as the self is mated with these two types of psychical dispositions, it will be unfruitfully dissipating its energies in pursuit of vain mirages. But as soon as the self parts company with these auspicious and inauspicious psychical dispositions it joins hands with *Śuddha* (Pure) psychical dispositions<sup>28</sup>. In other words, the experience of *Śuddha* (Pure) psychical disposition automatically obliges the *Aśuddha* psychical dispositions (*Śubha* and *Aśubha*) to disappear. The inauspicious psychical dispositions should by all means be disapproved, inasmuch as they will bring about thousands of heartrending tensions. The pure consciousness which relinquishes the impure psychical dispositions associated with the empirical consciousness realises omniscience and such happiness as is transcendental, born of the self, supersensuous, incomparable, infinite and indestructible<sup>29</sup>. This transcendental self may be designated as *Sayambhū* (*Svayambhū*)<sup>30</sup>. To make it clear, it is a state of self-sufficiency which requires no other foreign assistance to sustain itself. It is itself the subject, the object, the means for its achievement, it achieves for itself, destroys the extraneous elements, and is the support of its infinite potencies. Hence the self manifests its original nature by transforming itself into six cases; it is at once the nominative, the accusative, the instrumental, the dative, the ablative, and the locative case respectively<sup>31</sup>.

Kundakunda regards the attainment of *Svabhāva Paryāya* as the attainment of knowledge-consciousness (*Jñāna Cetanā*) which is the fullfledged and legitimate manifestation of consciousness<sup>32</sup>. The *Arhat* or *Siddha* state is the state of knowledge-consciousness, the state of omniscience and bliss<sup>33</sup>.

When the self identifies itself with *Vibhāva Paryāya* Kundakunda calls it *Bahirātman*. When it turns to the significance of *Svabhāva Paryāya* it is styled *Antarātman* and with the emergence and realisation of *Svabhāva Paryāya* it is designated as *Paramātman*<sup>31</sup>.

Kundakunda's doctrine of *Svabhāva Paryāya* and *Vibhāva Paryāya* pertaining to self is identical with *Svasamaya* and *Parasamaya* respectively. In *Parasamaya* the self identifies itself with the body and the foreign psychical states of attachment and aversion and the like and in *Svasamaya* the self is established in one's own self<sup>35</sup>. The *Parasamaya* individual is either moral or immoral; whereas the *Svasamaya* individual is out and out spiritual with morality as its social manifestation.



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## Karma-yoga of the Gītā : A teleological Interpretation

The *Bhagavadgītā* is one of those few books which have gained wide popularity not only among the scholars of repute, but also among the commonplace persons. Millions of people derive inspiration from this classic. It has been a source of great, calm and comfort, to those who are deeply involved in mundane miseries. Its central teaching has been diversely formulated, so much so that if one finds in it the message of *Karma-yoga*, the other reads in it the message of *Jñāna-yoga*, still the other sees in it the message of *Bhakti-yoga*. However controversial its central teaching may be, there is one thing which seems obvious that *Karma-yoga* is regarded as the significant doctrine of the *Gītā*. What I propose to present in this paper is that if the doctrine of *Karma-yoga* is socially meaningful, it should be interpreted teleologically. In other words, *Karma* or action should be judged right or wrong with reference to the goodness or badness of the consequences. This is tantamount to saying that no action is self-justifying and no action can be our duty regardless of the goodness of the consequences.

Now it may be said that the above approach to the doctrine of *Karma-yoga* is not all in conformity with the evidence that we have in the *Gītā* regarding the meaning of *Karma-yoga* as the performance of dutiful actions without any consideration of effects of such actions. The *Gītā* says, “Your right extends only to action not to its fruits or consequences.<sup>1</sup> Those who seek for the fruits of actions are pitiable.<sup>2</sup> He who performs a prescribed duty after renouncing all attachment to fruits of action is the man of *Sāttvika* relinquishment.<sup>3</sup> Again, it may be said that in order to substantiate the doctrine of duty for duty’s sake, the *Gītā* portrays the picture of an ideal *Karma-yogi* with reference to his inward attainments and outward conduct. As regards

his inward attainments, the *Gītā* says that he is a man who has been successful in developing an eqanimous state of mind free from all perturbation in the midst of worldly sorrows and pleasures.<sup>4</sup> He seeks consummate satisfaction in the self, by the self.<sup>5</sup> Such a man is established in Brahmanic experience<sup>6</sup> and enjoys peace<sup>7</sup> and illimitable bliss.<sup>8</sup> In his outward conduct the ideal *Karma-yogi* is engaged in social action (*Lokasaṃgraha*)<sup>9</sup> for the proper functioning of society and is occupied with the doing of good to all creatures (*Sarvabhūtahite rataḥ*).<sup>10</sup> Besides he is just and compassionate to all living beings.<sup>11</sup> What is important to note here is that he is engaged in action after abandoning attachment to the consequences of actions.<sup>12</sup> In this way the *Gītā* reconciles the life of contemplation with that of action, and I have no quarrel with this reconciliation. What I wish to say is that this action is teleological and not de-ontological. Its de-ontological character is not in consonance with the facts of life and the preachings of the *Gītā*.

Looking to the above evidence, one may be convinced that the *Gītā* is antagonistic to the teleological interpretation of action. But I wish to argue that the *Karma-yoga* is teleological in character. I propose to discuss this in a general way without going into the details of act-teleology and rule-teleology.

Let us first examine the socio-moral situation in which Kṛṣṇa preaches the doctrine of *Karma-yoga* to Arjuna. In the battle field when Arjuna sees his teachers, uncles, etc. he is moved with compassion for his relatives etc. and speaks about the bad consequences of war. Arjuna impresses upon Kṛṣṇa that it is not right to slay his kinsmen. If he does so, the consequence will be the ruin of the family, uprooting of all healthy social traditions, the reign of lawlessness, and the corruption of the women of the family. In view of the disastrous consequences of war Arjuna, shows his reluctance to fight and asks Kṛṣṇa to guide him in this hour of crisis. Kṛṣṇa persuades Arjuna to do his duty as a Kṣatriya. If this duty of fighting this righteous war is not performed in a right spirit, Kṛṣṇa says, Arjuna will be condemned to ill-fame and so on. Besides, if Arjuna dies on the, battle field, he will enjoy the pleasures of heaven and if he wins the war, he will enjoy the earth. Again, if these egoistic considerations are incapable

of motivating Arjuna to get ready to fight, he is exhorted to fight for the social cause without any thought of self-interest in terms of pleasure and pain, gain and loss and victory and defeat.<sup>13</sup> These are the empirical grounds on which Arjuna is persuaded to meet the demands of duty to fight. Arjuna is shown the egoistic consequences of not fulfilling his duty along with social considerations. Thus the advice given by Kṛṣṇa to Arjuna is out and out teleological in character. The duty is tied up with the consideration of consequences either affecting one's own self or society. It may be noted here that Kṛṣṇa must have arrived at the decision of fighting when all the efforts of peaceful settlement between the two parties failed. He must have evaluated the consequences of fighting and not fighting before he is convinced to fight. Thus the advice of the *Gītā* to fight seems to be consequent upon the goodness of the consequences.

Being an astute ethico-religious philosopher with a deep understanding of human nature, Kṛṣṇa coaxes Arjuna to do his duty after considering the egoistic and utilitarian consequences of his actions. Yet ultimately he establishes the supreme worth of utilitarianism and brushes aside egoistic considerations. The evidence for this is that the man whose delight is in the self alone and who is satisfied with the self has no work that needs to be done (for himself).<sup>14</sup> Again, in this world he has no interest whatever to gain by the actions. He does not depend on the beings of the world for any of his interests.<sup>15</sup> In other words, such a man has overcome all his egoistic inclinations and consequently he will never be motivated to work by such considerations as are termed egoistic. But the *Gītā* proclaims that the ideal *Karma-yogi* dedicates himself to performing social actions for the maintenance of society (*Lokasaṅgraha*).<sup>16</sup> The ordinary man will follow the example of such a person.<sup>17</sup> The *Gītā* seems to maintain that 'the great men are the path-makers who blaze the trail that other men follow'. In the same spirit Kṛṣṇa says "There is not for me, O Arjuna, any work in three worlds which has to be done nor anything to be obtained which has not been obtained; yet I am engaged in work. If I cease to work, I shall be the creator of disordered life."<sup>18</sup> Thus the ideal *Karma-yogi* has nothing further to accomplish for himself, he works for the sustenance and proper education of society. In

this way he rejoices in the social action for the beneficence of all living beings without any prejudice.<sup>19</sup> Now I may pose a simple question : Can such a man work without the consideration of social consequences in view? It seems to me that he cannot proceed a single step without keeping in view the ways and means of doing good to society. He is a thorough utilitarian without any grain of egoistic trend for serving the social cause. The words like *Lokasaṃgraha* and *Sarvabhūtaḥiterataḥ* are comprehensive terms which simply indicate the direction in which an ideal man should move. But what is to be detailed content of this direction will depend on the perception of this great man. And this perception is bound to be teleological. It cannot be apart from the good of society. No details of social beneficence can be worked out without looking into the consequences of action. In other words, the *Karma-yogi* of the *Gṛā* is the man who is devoted exclusively to healthy social goals without any selfish individual interference. Is this not pure utilitarianism? I feel it is. Thus the *Gṛā* is right when it says that our right as *Karma-yogi* should extend to social action only and not to selfish consequences. Selfish consequences no doubt mars the spirit of dedication to social upliftment. Thus the statement of the *Gṛā* that those who seek for the fruits of actions are pitiable, may be interpreted by saying that those who are interested in seeking the fruits of actions for themselves should be pitied, since they are the enemies of society and its progress in healthy directions. Individual self-interests are derogatory to all types of social action for the good of society.

Now a question may be asked : How will an ordinary man who has not attained to the loftiest heights of spiritual experience be able to perform actions in the spirit advocated by the *Gṛā* in the above sense? To be more clear, the ideal, *Karma-yogi* has freed himself from egoistic leanings but the ordinary man cannot absolve himself from self-interests, which are in most cases the only motivating factors. Here the question is not whether the action is teleological but whether it is purely utilitarian. The *Gṛā* seems to me to be aware of this difficult path of pure utilitarianism free from egoistic inclinations. Consequently, it advises the ordinary man like us to make efforts in this direction, however difficult this path is. In this path, the *Gṛā* says,

no efforts is ever lost; and even a little movement in this direction is of momentous significance.<sup>20</sup> What the *Gītā* wishes us to say is this that man should cultivate the habit of thinking about social goods without the involvement of personal interests. The more we forget about our selfish interests, the more we become happy, and those whose self-interests tend to be zero are persons who tend to be perfectly happy. Our primary concern should be social good and this will be achieved only in proportion to the diminishing of personal interests. Thus the ordinary man can accomplish social beneficence only partially whereas the ideal man can do so completely. But in both cases the social action is teleological, and this social action may be political, economic, moral and religious according to their dispositions. To say that the ideal man will not involve himself in political and economic struggles is to narrow the meaning of the words. *Lokasamgraha* and *Sarvabhūtahiteratah*. No doubt, his involvement in these struggles will not be narrowly oriented. He will think and do in terms of mankind, nay, in terms of all living beings. Thus at his level narrowism in social action is abandoned and he transcends the boundaries of countries, nations and cultures, and the *Gītā* supports this without any inconsistency, though comprehensively and not in a detailed way. The treatises like the *Gītā* can do so only comprehensively, leaving the detailed programmes to the person concerned. Here I do not say, I may mention in passing, that such a man will never err in the choice of social goals, but this error will not be, because of personal considerations. It may be due to improper calculation of social consequences affecting mankind at large.

It is on account of the fact, that, the ideal man is engaged in social action without any iota of egoism that he is equanimous in praise and censure, honour and dishonour, success and failure and in those who call him friend or foe.<sup>21</sup> Besides, such a man neither rejoices nor hates, neither, grieves nor desires, and is not disturbed by the hot or cold weather, and is content with anything that comes.<sup>22</sup> All these dualities affect only that man who is egoistically disposed. He who is prone to social action only is not perturbed by these dualities. The test that a man is exclusively socially oriented is that he remains unruffled, in the social situation of praise and blame, honour and dishonour and

so on. He is the only man who can devote his entire energies to social beneficence without any retreat. This is pure and simple teleology of the utilitarian kind, which is at the base of social change. It is only the teleological consideration of the above kind that can bring effective social change at any period in the history of any culture.

It may be said that when the *Gītā* exhorts us to perform the prescribed duties, we are required to act de-ontologically i.e. without any consideration of consequences of actions. The *Gītā* says that the four-fold order of society is created according to the aptitude and function of human beings in society. The four-fold (*Brāhmaṇa*, *Kṣatriya*, *Vaiśya* and *Sūdra*) class determined by temperament and vocation has certain specific duties to perform.<sup>23</sup> Kṛṣṇa advises Arjuna not to renounce prescribed duty that ought to be done. An action which is prescribed or obligatory and which is performed without any desire of any fruit is said to be *Sāttvika* or good. This notion of prescribed duties may be said to support de-ontological nature of action. To me it appears that these prescribed duties are teleological. What is the principle underlying these duties? The answer is temperament and not heredity. Why this four-fold order? The answer that can be given is that by this four-fold division the society may function in an orderly way. In this way the prescribed duties of a class are meant for the welfare of the society as a whole. Thus the so called prescribed duties of a class are teleological and not de-ontological. The advice of Kṛṣṇa to Arjuna to fight because of his being a *Kṣatriya* tacitly depends on the goal of social welfare which Kṛṣṇa might be having in his mind. If the duty of *Kṣatriya* is de-ontological, he must create occasions to fight in order to fulfil his duties whether there is any welfare of society or not. Hence this duty cannot be regarded as independent of the good of society. Thus for Kṛṣṇa welfare of society is primary and the prescribed duties are simply the means to this end. As for Kṛṣṇa, so for the ordinary man like us. Even if the ordinary man is ordered to perform these prescribed duties because of not having so much maturity as Kṛṣṇa, their teleological character is not lost, just as even if the parliament orders us to follow a certain course of action, its teleological character is not thrown overboard. Thus if in a changed social order this four-fold division of society does not

work well, it will be in the spirit of the *Gītā*, if this four-fold division is discarded in order to bring a new social set up for the good of mankind and new duties are brought into being.

Finally, I may argue that the aim of the *Gītā* is not to provoke wars. Its aim is to encourage the healthiest development of the individual and the perfect welfare of society. This tendency can be clearly witnessed when the *Gītā* speaks in terms of divine and demoniac qualities.<sup>24</sup> The demoniac nature of man is to be shaken off and the divine nature is to be fostered and nourished. Now *Karma-yogi* is a man with divine virtues. What are the divine virtues of a *Karma-yogi*? They are many, but I shall mention only those which are relevant. The two are non-violence (*Ahimsā*) and compassion for living beings (*Dayā Sarva Bhūteṣu*).

In the *Gītā* these two seem to be very important. The *Gītā* decries *himsā* in unequivocal terms by saying that the action which is undertaken without regard to consequences, to loss and injury (*himsā*) is said to be *tamas*.<sup>25</sup> *Ahimsā* is eulogised in the *Gītā* when it is said that the ideal man regards all living beings as of equal value and that he is just and compassionate to all living beings.<sup>26</sup> Besides, he sees with an equal eye, a learned and humble Brahmin, a cow, an elephant or even a dog or an outcast.<sup>27</sup> When such is the preaching of the *Gītā*, a question naturally arises: How should we reconcile war with this attitude of *Gītā*? No doubt *Ahimsā* is very dear to the *Gītā* but when this principle is incapable of bringing about the welfare of society in exceptional circumstances it may be violated in the interest of the good of society. The conviction of the *Gītā* seems to be that no principle is absolutely always right or wrong just as our action of speaking the truth is not absolutely always right, since we are required to tell a lie to enemies and robbers. So the *Gītā* is allowing war in exceptional circumstances in the interest of social welfare, when all the methods of peaceful negotiations fail. This stand of the *Gītā* is intelligible. This can be so only when the *Gītā* accepts teleological theory of action. In the de-ontological theory of action exception to a principle can not be allowed, whatever the consequences may be. Thus the *Gītā* allows breaking of



principle in exceptional circumstances on utilitarian basis. But this should be done with great care and caution and the advice of the morally matured personalities is to be sought. Thus by allowing war in the main stream of *Ahimsā* the *Gītā* convinces us that the *Karma-yoga* is to be regarded as teleological in character.



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## THE NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE SIDES OF CONDUCT ACCORDING TO THE UPANIṢADS, THE GĪTĀ AND JAINISM

The *Upaniṣads*, the *Gītā* and Jainism regard the deliverance of the Self as the summum bonum of human life. They also describe the means to be adopted for the attainment of that sublime end. The *Praśna Upaniṣad* says that the *ātman* is to be discovered through faith, knowledge, austerity, and chastity.<sup>1</sup> According to the *Kāthopanīṣad*, he who has not desisted from doing evil, and whose mind is not calm and equipoised, cannot hope to attain the Self even if he is equipped with the intellect of deep penetration.<sup>2</sup> In the same strain, the *Gītā* tells us that those who have no faith in the sovereign truth wander through the circle of birth and death.<sup>3</sup> The sublime height cannot be attained by the undisciplined.<sup>4</sup> The evil-doers who are deluded by illusion, and who partake of the nature of demons cannot reach the supreme, on the other hand, those who have renounced all desires, and who are free from attachment pride and selfishness realise tranquility.<sup>5</sup> According to Jainism also, the attainment of liberation is dependent on the acquisition of right faith, right knowledge and right conduct.<sup>6</sup> The *Darśanapāhuda* tells us that right faith engenders right knowledge, by virtue of which the virtuous and vicious paths are cogitated, and that the possessor of right faith, in turn, blows away vices and adopts *Śīla*, thereby enjoying prosperity and emancipation.<sup>7</sup> The *Mokṣapāhuda* proclaims that neither knowledge nor austerity is fruitful, individually, the fusion of the two brings about emancipation.<sup>8</sup> *Śīla* and knowledge are never opposed to each other. It is stated that right faith, knowledge, austerity, self-control, truth, non-stealing, chastity, contentment and compassion for living beings form the family of the former.<sup>9</sup> Neither intellectual study, nor the keeping of books and the peacock feather, nor living in a religious institution, nor pull-

ing out the hair can be equated with *Dharma*.<sup>10</sup> He who abandons attachment and aversion, and resides in the *ātman* moves towards the eternal *Gati*.<sup>11</sup> Again, he who is free from pride, deceit, anger, greed, possession, infatuation and sinful engagements of a worldly nature, and he who has conquered the passions and endured hardships, is established in the path of liberation and attains supreme happiness.<sup>12</sup> The *Upaniṣads* and the *Gītā* may differ from Jainism in regard to the meaning of faith, the former advocating faith in the supreme *ātman*, the cosmic principle, as identical with the Self within, and the latter faith in the super-empirical conscious principle imprisoned in the body. But, in point of ethical formulations, the *Upaniṣads*, the *Gītā* and Jainism speak with one voice. It is proposed to deal in this paper with the negative and positive sides of conduct according to the *Upaniṣads* and the *Gītā* with a view to comparing them with those prescribed by Jainism.

### Avoidance of Sins and Passions

The negative side of conduct consists in purging oneself of sins and passions, in subduing the senses, and in restraining the mind, while the positive side embraces the several virtues along with devotion and meditation. The *Chāndogyaopaniṣad* mentions stealing of gold, drinking of wine, polluting the bed of one's teacher, killing a *Brāhmaṇa* and keeping company with perpetrators of the above as the five kinds of great sins and considers them derogatory.<sup>13</sup> The *Praśna Upaniṣad* opines that pure *Brahman* is realised by those in whom there is neither lying nor deceit nor crookedness.<sup>14</sup> Thus, the thief, the drunkard, the adulterer, the Brahmocide, the liar, the deceitful and the man who associates with them, — all go to ruin. According to Jainism, a pilgrim on the path of self realisation must avoid wine, meat, honey, violence, falsehood, stealing, incontinence and acquisition.<sup>15</sup> He should neither commit these sins nor incite others to commit them, nor extol those perpetrating these sins.

According to the *Gītā*, demoniac qualities cause thralldom. Ostentation, arrogance, excessive pride, anger, harshness, and ignorance, — all these are demoniac qualities.<sup>16</sup> To refuse to distinguish between action and renunciation, to be possessed of non-purity, non-

truth and non-conduct, to give oneself to insatiable desires, to hold wrong views on account of delusion, to act with impure resolves, and to be hedonistic, — all these are *Āsuri* characteristics.<sup>17</sup> Again, to be covetous, to be violent, to be snared in hundreds of vain hopes, to be entangled in anger and lust, to be engaged in amassing wealth by unjust means for the gratification of desires, to regard oneself as accomplished, as lord and king of men, and as happy and strong, and to be puffed up with riches and birth, — all these also come under the sweep of demoniac nature.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, persons having such inclination regard the world as unreal, without basis and without God. They despise the Supreme Being which is hidden in themselves and in others.<sup>19</sup> The above-mentioned base and sordid dispositions must needs be relinquished in the interest of higher progress. According to Jainism all that is responsible for inauspicious *Āsrava* is demoniac in character. Four kinds of instincts,<sup>19a</sup> the three inauspicious *Leśyās*, sensual indulgence, *Ārta* and *Raudra Dhyānas*, improper use of knowledge, delusion<sup>20</sup> and the thirteen kinds of passions<sup>21</sup> along with violence, falsehood, incontinence and acquisition of wealth, — all these entail inauspicious *Āsrava*.

The *Leśyās* of Jainism bear close resemblance to the demoniac endowments of the *Bhagavad Gītā*. Of the six *Leśyās*,<sup>22</sup> *Kṛṣṇa*, *Nīla*, *Kapota*, *Teja*, *Padma* and *Śukla*, the first three are inauspicious and the other three are auspicious. One who does not give up enmity, is wrathful, pugnacious, villainous and bereft of piety and compassion is possessed by *Kṛṣṇa Leśyā*.<sup>23</sup> One who is slow, conceited, deceitful, indolent, mysterious, covetous, expert in swindling, extremely sleepy, bereft of common sense and sagacity, and extremely eager for sense objects is controlled by *Nīla Leśyā*.<sup>24</sup> To be angry with others, to be full of sorrow and fear, to be envious and slanderous, to belittle and tease others, to be pleased with supplicants, to be ignorant of one's own loss and gain, to extol oneself, to give wealth to flatterers, not to trust others and not to distinguish between duty and non-duty, — all these are characteristics of men possessed by *Kapota Leśyā*.<sup>25</sup> Then, there are eight kinds of pride which come under the *Āsuri* characteristics. They are pride of knowledge, respectability, prestige, community, family, wealth, austerity and body.<sup>26</sup> Jain ethics exhort that all these should be renounced.

## Control of the Senses and the Mind

Next comes the control of the senses and the mind. He who is bereft of understanding and is of uncontrolled mind fails to restrain the senses which are like the vicious horses of a charioteer, says the *Kaṭhōpaniṣad*.<sup>27</sup> The Self is the master of the bodily chariot, with intelligence as the charioteer, mind as the reins, senses as the horses, objects as the path, and the Self together with the mind and the senses as the enjoyer.<sup>28</sup> Now, the man equipped with understanding and a strong mind succeeds in controlling the senses which are like the noble steeds of a charioteer.<sup>29</sup> He, thereby, terminates the round of births, and acquires the immortal state whence there is no return.<sup>30</sup> The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, the *Kena* and the *Taittirīya Upaniṣads* also prescribe self-restraint and self-conquest.<sup>31</sup> According to the *Gītā*, desire resides in the senses, the mind and the intelligence, and by curtailing knowledge through these, it deludes the embodied soul.<sup>32</sup> The senses and the attachment and aversion to the objects of the senses are the enemies of the soul.<sup>33</sup> The mental dwelling upon the objects of the senses brings about attachment to them, which, in turn, engenders desires, producing anger on their being obstructed.<sup>34</sup> The consequential effect of anger is infatuation, giving rise to the loss of memory by which intelligence declines and, as a consequence, ruin follows.<sup>35</sup> Thus the mind which is fickle, passionate, strong and obstinate, and which is not easily controlled like the wind, should be curbed by incessant practice and nonattachment.<sup>36</sup> The senses are required to be kept under control, and the desires need be extirpated.<sup>37</sup> Mere withdrawing of the senses from their normal action, without subduing desires, will be mere hypocrisy.<sup>38</sup>

According to Jainism also, the control of the mind along with the senses and the desires is necessary for higher progress. He who restrains the monkey, viz., the mind wandering through the objects, viz., the senses gets the desired fruits.<sup>39</sup> In case one fails to do so, scriptural study, performance of austerity and observance of vows and bodily penance, all these would be of no effect.<sup>40</sup> Thus the camels, in the form of the five senses, should not be let loose; after grazing the whole pasture of pleasures they will hunt the soul in the area of rebirth.<sup>41</sup> Hence, by capturing the leader, viz., the mind, the

others, viz., the senses, are captured, the roots being pulled out, the leaves necessarily wither.<sup>42</sup> Desire acts like wine in exciting the senses.<sup>43</sup> Again, the desire for the objects of the senses produces passions like anger etc.<sup>44</sup> These passions which appear in the form of attachment and aversion delude the mind and snatch away its stability.<sup>45</sup> The bird of mind will cease to fly when the feathers of attachment and aversion are cut.<sup>46</sup> The seed of attachment and aversion is delusion which eclipses knowledge, with the consequence that the real nature of things remains hidden.<sup>47</sup>

## Cultivation of Virtues

We now turn to the consideration of the positive side of conduct. According to the *Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*, charity and compassion are to be practised in addition to self-control.<sup>48</sup> The observance of austerity, charity, non-violence, truthfulness and simplicity of behaviour has been enjoined by the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*.<sup>49</sup> Some *Upaniṣads* speak of celibacy also.<sup>50</sup> The *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* enunciates a number of practices, but decides finally in favour of the study of the sacred scriptures as constituting penance and the highest virtue.<sup>51</sup> When the pupil takes leave of his teacher after studies, he is advised to speak the truth, respect the law, not to be negligent of the study of the sacred scriptures and not to deflect from welfare, from the means of thriving and from duties to gods and fathers. He is further advised to offer to the teacher the wealth the latter desires, and then marry and procreate.<sup>52</sup> He should regard his mother, father, teacher and guest as gods, perform faultless actions, and imitate only the noble conduct of his Teacher. He is required to show respect to highly disciplined *Brāhmaṇas* and to offer them gifts with faith, magnanimity, meekness, awe and proper understanding. Again, if doubt creeps in as to the pursuance of any course of action, the best way is to follow the conduct of those *Brāhmaṇas* who are devout, compassionate, careful thinkers and lovers of virtue.<sup>53</sup>

The virtues or the divine endowments mentioned in the *Gūṇa*<sup>54</sup> may be classified into different categories to facilitate comparison with the Jaina enumeration. The first group may comprise the turning away from the objects of the senses, the controlling of speech,

body, and mind, and understanding. The second may include charity, sacrifice, tranquillity, universal compassion, pure devotion and *Ācārya-upāsana*. The third may be taken to embrace non-violence, truthfulness, non-acquisition, renunciation and absence of fault-finding; it may include also freedom from lust, anger, pride, greed, fear, enmity and force. The fourth may include forgiveness, gentleness, purity, austerity, modesty, scriptural study, spiritual knowledge, simplicity of behaviour and wise apportionment of knowledge. The fifth may be taken to embrace insight into the evils of birth, death, old age and sickness. It may comprise also of meditation, resplendence, abstemiousness, endurance, steadfastness, non-attachment, spiritual experience, liking for solitude, dislike for the crowd, absence of fickleness, purity of mind, freedom from attachment and aversion, and equal-mindedness to all happenings, desirable and undesirable.

Now, three types of austerities have been recognised by the *Gṛā* : (1) The *Sāttvika* austerity is of three kinds, namely, those pertaining to the body,<sup>54a</sup> word<sup>54b</sup> and mind.<sup>54c</sup> (2) The *Rājasa* austerity is that which is performed for the sake of ostentation or with a view to capturing respect, honour and reverence.<sup>55</sup> (3) The *Tāmasa* type of austerity is that which is pursued under delusion and entailing the torture of one's own self and harm to others.<sup>56</sup> Next come the three types of charity : (1) That which is given out of duty, with proper consideration of place, time and recipient, and without any expectation of return is the *Sāttvika* gift.<sup>57</sup> (2) The *Rājasa* gift is that which is given unwillingly or by hurting oneself, with the hope of return or with selfish designs.<sup>58</sup> (3) The offering which is made with despise, without proper respect and without any regard for time, place and recipient is *Tāmasa* in nature.<sup>59</sup> Likewise, renunciation admits of a threefold classification : (1) The performance of the acts of sacrifice, charity, austerity and other prescribed actions after one has renounced attachment to and yearning for their fruits is to be regarded as *Sāttvika* renunciation.<sup>60</sup> (2) The abandonment of prescribed actions out of sheer fear of pain is the *Rājasa* type of renunciation. and (3) that out of sheer ignorance is of the *Tāmasa* type.<sup>61</sup>

Comparable to the *Upaniṣads*, we find that Jainism too recognises scriptural study as the best of austerities.<sup>62</sup> The householder

who observes *Brahmacaryāṇu-vrata*, *Satyāṇu-vrata* and *Atithisamvibhāga-vrata* follows more or less all the duties that the *Upaniṣadic* teacher wants his disciple to pursue. The four classes of virtues enunciated in the *Gītā* (see infra p. 85-86) may be compared with the different types of virtues prescribed in Jainism, namely the three *Guptis* (control of the mind, body and speech), the control of the five senses, the causes of the auspicious *Āsrava*,<sup>63</sup> the sixteen kinds of reflections,<sup>64</sup> freedom from passions, the five vows of *Ahimsā*, *Asteya*, *Brahmacarya*, *Aparigraha* and *Satya* along with their several attributes to strengthen them, and the ten *Dharmas* viz., forbearance, modesty, simplicity of behaviour, contentment, truth, self-restraint, austerity, renunciation, non-attachment and celibacy. The fifth group of the *Gītā* may be compared to some of the incentives to spiritual life according to Jainism,<sup>64a</sup> with the importance of knowledge, conduct, study, meditation and austerity,<sup>65</sup> and also with solitude, endurance, equanimity in pleasure and pain, and conquest of attachment, aversion and infatuation.<sup>66</sup> The *Sāttvika* austerity may be compared roughly with the internal austerity as propounded by Jainism. The extent of austerity in the *Gītā* does not correspond fully with the external and internal austerity of Jainism. The sole purpose of austerity according to Jainism is to unfold the divinity within. Hence, the *Rājasa* and *Tāmasa* austerities do not count to the Jains. The vow of *Atithisamvibhāga-vrata*<sup>67</sup> corresponds to the *Sāttvika* charity of the *Gītā*. It is stressed in Jain religion that all auspicious observances should be made without deceit (*Māyā*), perversity (*Muhyā*) or desire for material benefits (*Nidāna*).<sup>68</sup> Though the yearning for worldly fruits is to be condemned, the desire for spiritual betterment is to be appreciated.<sup>69</sup> It is to be borne in mind that in contrast to the *Upaniṣads* and the *Gītā*, Jainism lays stress on *Ahimsā* as the guiding principle from which all other virtues can be derived; the stress in the *Upaniṣads* is more on Truth than anything else.

## Meditation

Next to be considered is *Yoga* or devotional meditation. The importance of *Dhyāna* (meditation) is seen when the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* pronounces that the immaculate nature of God can be realised neither by sight, nor by speech, nor by any other sense, nor by austerity,



nor by any action, but only through meditation after the purification of the inner being.<sup>70</sup> The great world-illusion passes away only through meditation upon God and by entering into His being, says the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*.<sup>71</sup> According to the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, the *yogī* has to banish all desires and all longing for possessions; he has to curb the mind and the senses, and then meditate in solitude upon the Supreme Self by fixing the mind on the *ātman* without allowing anything to distract it.<sup>72</sup> The *Mokṣapāhuda* says that he who is desirous of crossing the formidable ocean of *saṃsāra* has to meditate upon the pure Self after renouncing all passions, detaching himself from all worldly engagements, and observing silence.<sup>73</sup> The tree of worldly existence cannot be eradicated by the *Dravya-śramaṇa* who is occupied with the pleasures of the senses, but can be uprooted by the *Bhāva-śramaṇa* with the axe of meditation.<sup>74</sup> Just as a lamp which, if unobstructed by wind, continues to burn in a well surrounded house, so the lamp of meditation in the absence of the wind of attachment keeps illuminating the heart of the *Bhāva-śramaṇa*.<sup>75</sup> The *Paramātmaprakāśa* tells us that the *ātman* which is incapable of being known by the *Vedas*, the *Śāstras* and the senses is accessible to pure meditation.<sup>76</sup> Notwithstanding the observance of moral discipline, the performance of austere penances and the extensive study of the scriptures, success in spiritual life is incapable of being achieved without the pursuance of meditation.<sup>77</sup>

The *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* prescribes certain prerequisites for *Yoga*. The place for meditation is required to be pleasing to the mind and free from noise and water and be not aching to the eyes. The ground should be even, clean and free from pebbles, fire and sand. One should select for practice a place in the still recess of a cave.<sup>78</sup> According to the *Gītā*, the *Yogī* should set his firm seat, in a clean place neither too high nor too low, covered with sacred grass, a deer-skin and a cloth, one over the other, for practising *Yoga*.<sup>79</sup> The Jain work *Jñānārṇava* enumerates a list of places which are to be avoided and which are to be preferred for the practice of *Dhyāna*.<sup>80</sup> Such places as are disturbing, captivating or unpleasant, noisy on account of crows, owls, asses, dogs and the like, vitiated by thorns, uneven stones, bones, blood etc., or having objects that might counteract meditational efforts should be avoided. Mountains, caves, and other solitary places

should be chosen for the purpose.<sup>81</sup> The *yogī* should fix his seat on a wooden plank, rock, ground or sandy place.<sup>82</sup> The deerskin is, however, never used in the Jain tradition.

Regarding the posture and process of meditation, the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* says that one should keep the three parts of the body in equilibrium and control the senses so as to enable him to concentrate on *Brahman*.<sup>83</sup> The important thing is that the mind should be adequately restrained.<sup>84</sup> The supreme Symbol *OM* has been prescribed for meditation.<sup>85</sup> The bow of *OM* and the arrow of Soul sharpened by devotion should be directed by concentrated attention to pierce the mark of *Brahman*.<sup>86</sup> On the matter of posture, the *Gītā* tells us that, having practised the vow of celibacy and attained fearlessness, serenity, and control of the mind, the *yogī* should hold the body, head and neck erect and motionless; he should then turn to the Supreme Self looking fixedly at the tip of his nose without being distracted in any way.<sup>87</sup> Only those who are moderate in travel and in food, restrained in actions and regulated in sleep and waking succeed in *Yoga*.<sup>88</sup> In Hindu scriptures the efficacy of *OM* has been recognised.<sup>89</sup> But in Jainism it has not been enjoined as a means of meditation. According to the Jain tradition any convenient posture subscribing to mental control may be adopted.<sup>90</sup> After turning the senses away from their objects, casting aside attachment and aversion, and acquiring an equipoised state of mind, the *yogī* should concentrate his mind on the forehead.<sup>91</sup> For concentration during meditation, nine other places also have been enjoined, viz., the two eyes, the two ears, the tip of the nose, the mouth, the navel, the head, the heart, the palate and the place between the two eyebrows.<sup>92</sup> Symbols have also been suggested for meditational purposes. The *Dravyasaṅgraha* declares that the *Namokāra* and other mantras imparted by the *Guru* should be utilised in the practice of meditation.<sup>93</sup> The *Mokṣapāhuḍa* instructs that meditation should be instituted after restraining food, posture and sleep.<sup>94</sup>

## Devotion

As regards devotion, the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* mentions *Upāsana* and *Bhakti* to God and the *Guru* as the means for the realisation of the

**Brahman.** In the *Gūṇa*, *Saguṇa* devotion, as differentiated from the *Nirguṇa* one, which is difficult for the mundane souls, has been envisaged as a means for the realisation of the Supreme which is incapable of being attained either by the *Vedas* or by austerities, or by gifts or by sacrifices.<sup>95</sup> One-pointed and unswerving devotion is indispensable to the transcending of the three *Guṇas*.<sup>96</sup> But, of the four types of *Bhaktas*, namely, the sufferer, the seeker for knowledge, the person who is eager for wealth and the wise, the last is the best because of his impersonal and absolute devotion.<sup>97</sup> Again, the *Gūṇa* says that even of the *yogīs*, as distinguished from those engrossed in mere external asceticism, intellectual knowledge and rituals, the greatest is the devotee.<sup>98</sup> Hence, devotion cannot be dispensed with for higher ascension. The recognition of *Bhakti* as an integral constituent of the sixteen kinds of reflection,<sup>99</sup> its inclusion in the six essentials of the *Muni*,<sup>100</sup> and in the daily life of the householder in the form of *Jinapujā*, *Sāmāyika*, *Vaiyāvṛtya* etc. illustrate the emphasis laid by Jainism on devotion as indispensable to spiritual advancement. The *Mokṣapāhuḍa* tells us that divested of the *ātman*, externalism, extraneous penances, scriptural learning, observance of the manifold rules of conduct, — all these are preposterous and puerile.<sup>101</sup> He who is devoted to the *Deva* and the *Guru* and to ascetics following right conduct and pursuing meditation, is established in the path of liberation.<sup>102</sup> *Saguṇa Bhakti* may be equated with the aforementioned types of devotion; and the *Nirguṇa* one, with the supreme meditation which is not only difficult but also not possible in the initial stages of *Yoga*. The devotion of the distinguished *yogī* will be free from the three *Śalyas*, namely, *Māyā* (deceit), *Mithyā* (perversity) and *Nidāna* (desire for worldly benefits). The three lower types of devotees described in the *Gūṇa* may be said to possess *Nidāna Śalya* according to Jainism.

### Effects of Yoga and the element of Grace

Clear complexion, sweet voice, the emission of good smell, extraordinary decrease in excretions, the possession of a light and healthy body and freedom from sensual indulgence, — all these are the physiological effects of *Yoga* or deep meditation.<sup>103</sup> The spiritual effect consists in the disintegration of sorrows and bonds, which re-

sults in the realisation of the *Brahman*, the Universal Self.<sup>104</sup> But before this attainment may ensue, divine grace is essential. The *Mundakopaniṣad* tells us that the *ātman* manifests itself only to him whom it chooses.<sup>105</sup> "It implies that man's endeavours for a full-fledged realisation of God may always fall short of the ideal, unless grace comes from above."<sup>106</sup> The *Gītā* does not speak of the physiological effects of *Yoga*. Those who succeed in the practice of *Yoga* attain to the mystical effect of realising supreme peace. And, those who fail, on account of the imperfect practice of *Yoga*, are born in heaven, then in the house of prosperous persons or in the family of *yogīs*, and ultimately seek salvation by means of fresh endeavours and the revival of previous impressions.<sup>107</sup> It is necessary to seek God's grace before one hopes to reach the highest.<sup>108</sup> The *Mokṣapāhuḍa* pronounces that meditation on the *Svadravya* (viz., the unique, eternal and pure *ātman*) as distinguished from the *Paradravya* (viz., the things other than the *ātman*) leads to emancipation, the path of the *Tīrthankaras*.<sup>109</sup> If deliverance is not attained owing to imperfections, heaven is indubitably attained. Then, after returning from there, and again pursuing right belief, right knowledge and right conduct, one will attain liberation.<sup>110</sup> Such a person gets endowed in this world with knowledge, endurance, prosperity, health, contentment, strength and a handsome body.<sup>111</sup> The theory of grace from Divinity is, however, foreign to Jainism.<sup>112</sup> As there is no God over and above the *Tīrthankaras*, and they too have gone beyond attachment and aversion, divine grace, in the view of the Jaina, is a contradiction in terms. It is only meditational efforts that lead one eventually to *Nirvana*.



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11. *Yogasara*, 48.
12. *Mokṣapāhuḍa*, 45, 80.
13. *Chāndogyopaniṣad* (*Chand.*) 5. 10. 9.
14. *Praśna*, 1. 1. 16.
15. *Ratnakaraṇḍa Śrāvakācāra* of Samantabhadra (Ed. J. K. Mukhtara, Viraseva Mandira, Delhi), verse 66.
16. BG, (Translation by S. Radhakrishnan, *The Bhagavad Gītā*). 16. 4.
17. BG, 16. 7, 10, 11.
18. *Ib.*, 16. 12 to 15.
19. *Ib.*, 16. 8, 18.
- 19a. These are: *Āhāra* (food), *Bhaya* (fear). *Maithuna* (sex) and *Parigraha* (acquisition).
20. *Pañcāstikāya* of Kundakunda (Rayacandra Jaina Sastramala, Bombay, 1904), verse 140.
21. *Sarvārthasiddhi* of *Pūjyapāda* (Bharatiya Jnana Pitha, Kasi, 1944), verses 7.
9. These passions are: Anger (*Krodha*), *Pride* (*Māna*), *Deceit* (*Māyā*), *Greed* (*Lobha*), *Laughter* (*Hāsyā*), *Love* (*Rati*), *Hatred* (*Arati*), *Grief* (*Śoka*), *Fear* (*Bhaya*), *Disgust* (*Jugupsā*), *Hankering after women* (*Puruṣaveda*), *Hankering after men* (*Strīveda*) and *hankering after eunuchs* (*Napurīśakaveda*).
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23. *Ib.*, 509.
24. *Ib.*, 510, 511.
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27. *Kaṭha*. 1. 3. 5.
28. *Ib.*, 1. 3. 3-4.
29. *Ib.*, 1, 3. 6.
30. *Ib.*, 1. 3. 9.
31. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* (*Bṛhad.*) 5. 2. 1; *Kenopaniṣad* (*Kena.*) 4. 8;

*Taittirīyopaniṣad* (Taitt.) 1. 9.

32. *BG*, 3. 40.

33. *Ib.*, 3. 34.

34. *Ib.*, 2. 62.

35. *BG*, 2. 63.

36. *Ib.*, 6. 34, 35.

37. *Ib.*, 3. 41.

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40. *Ib.*, 22. 28.

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42. *Ib.*, 2. 140. (Translation, vide Intro., p. 19)

43. *Jñānārṇava*, 17. 7.

44. *Ib.*, 20. 2.

45. *Ib.*, 23. 7.

46. *Ib.*, 23. 27.

47. *Ib.*, 23. 30; see also *Iṣṭopadeśa* of Pūjyapāda (Rayacandra Jaina Sastramala, Bombay, 1954), verse 7.

48. *Bṛhad.*, 5, 2. 3,

49. *Chand.*, 3. 17-4,

50. *Kaṭha.*, 1. 2. 15.; *Praśna*, 1. 1. 15.

51. *Taitt.*, 1. 9.

52. *Taitt.*, 1. 11.

53. *Ib.*, 1. 11.

54. *BG*, 13. 7 to 11; 16. 1, 2, 3; 18. 51 to 53.

54a. The bodily austerities are : purity, continence, non-violence, simplicity of behaviour and adoration to the gods, the *Brāhmaṇas*, the wise and the spiritual guide.

54b. Austerities of the word are : scriptural study and the utterance of inoffensive, beneficial and true words.

54c. The mental austerities are : serenity, silence, self-control, even-ness of mind and purity of thoughts. *BG*, 17. 14 to 17.

55. *BG*, 17. 18.

56. *Ib.*, 17. 5, 6, 19.

57. *Ib.*, 17. 20.

58. *Ib.*, 17. 21.

59. *Ib.*, 17. 22.

60. *BG*, 18. 6.

61. *BG*, 18. 7. 8.

62. *Mūlācāra* of Vattakera (Anantakirti Digamabara Jaina Granthamala, Bom-

bay, 1919), verse 409.

63. The causes of the auspicious *Āsava* are : Composure of the mind, devotion to the *Deva*, the *Śāstra* and the *Guru*, and rendering help to those who are in distress and who are thirsty and hungry. *Pañcāstikāya* verses 136 to 138.

64. The sixteen kinds of reflections are : (1) *Darśanaviśuddhi* (Transcendental awakening), (2) *Vinaya-saṁpannatā* (Possession of reverential attitude towards the *Guru* and the spiritual path), (3) *Śīla-vratasvānācāra* (Observation of vows and renunciation of passions for the proper pursuance of vows), (4) *Abhīkṣajñānānopayoga* (Application of oneself constantly to the earning of spiritual knowledge), (5) *Samvega* (Due apprehension of worldly miseries), (6) *Śaktitas tyāga* (Charity in the matter food, shelter and knowledge), (7) *Śaktitas tapa* (Pursuance of proper bodily austerities without the concealment of strength); (8) *Sādhu-samādhi* (Removal of obstacles from the path of a Muni), (9) *Vaiyāvṛtya* (Nursing of the virtuous souls). (10) *Arahanta-bhakti* (Devotion to Arhats), (11) *Ācārya-bhakti* (Devotion to the Teacher). (12) *Bahuśruta bhakti* (Devotion to the learned), (13) *Pravacana-bhakti* (Devotion to the spiritual brethren), (14) *Avastyakaparihāra* (Performance of the six essential duties), (15) *Mārgaprabhāvana* (Influencing the society through the medium of knowledge, austerity, charity, *Bhakti* and adoration, and (16) *Pravacanavātsalya* (Having an affectionate attitude towards the spiritual brethren). *Sarvārthasiddhi*, 8-9.

64a. These are: (1) Incentive of transitoriness of things (*Anityānupreksā*), (2) Incentive of inescapability from death (*Asarāṇānupreksā*), (3) Incentive of transmigration (*Samsārānupreksā*) and (4) Incentive of bodily impurity (*Aśuci-anupreksā*). The work *Kārtikeyānupreksā* (Ed. A. N. Upadhye, Rayacandra Jaina Sastramala, Bombay, 1960), deals with these *ānupreksās* along with the others in detail.

65. *Mūlācāra*, verse 968.

66. *Ib.*, 950, 816, 880.

67. *Sarvārthasiddhi*, 7. 21, 28, 39.

68. *Ib.*, 7. 18.

69. *Śrāvakācāra* of Amitagati (Mulacandra Kisanadasa Kapadiya, Surat, 1958), 7. 20, 21, 25.

70. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* (*Muṇḍ.*) 3. 1. 8.

71. *Svetasvatāropaniṣad* (*Svet.*) 1. 10.

72. *BG.* 6. 10, 23-26.

73. *Mokṣapāhuḍa*, 26-28.

74. *Bhāvapāhuḍa* of Kundakunda (Patani Digambara Jaina Granthamala, Maroṭha, 1950), verse 122.

75. *Ib.*, 123.

76. *Paramātmaprakāśa*, 1. 23.

77. *Śrāvakācāra* of Amitagati, 15. verse 96.

78. *Svet.*, 2. 10.

79. BG, 6. 11.
80. *Jñānārṇava*, 27. 23-29 ; 28. 1-7.
81. *Ib.*, 27. 21-34 ; *Śaṭkhaṇḍāgama* of Puṣpadanta and Bhūtabali (Ed. H. L. Jain, Jaina Sahitya Uddharaka Fund Karyalaya, Amraoti, 1939). vol. 13, p. 66.
82. *Jñānārṇava*, 28. 9.
83. *Svet.* 2. 8.
84. *Ib.*, 2. 9.
85. *Munḍ.* 2. 2. 6.
86. *Ib.*, 2. 2. 3-4.
87. BG, 6. 13-14.
88. BG, 6. 17.
89. BG, 8. 13 ; 17. -24.
90. *Jñānārṇava*, 23. 11.
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95. BG, 12. 2, 5; 11. 53, 54.
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98. BG, 6. 46, 47.
99. See *infra*, pp. 87.
100. These are *Sāmāyika*, *Stuti*, *Vandanā*, *Pratikramaṇa*, *Pratyākhyāna* and *Kayotsarga*. Cf. *Mūlācāra*, 516.
101. *Mokṣapāhuḍa* 99, 100.
102. *Ib.*, 52, 82.
103. *Svet.* 2. 13.
104. *Ib.*, 2. 14. 15.
105. *Munḍ.* 3. 2. 3. See also *Kaṭha* 1, 2. 23.
106. R. D. Ranade, *Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy* (Oriental Book Agency, Poona, 1926), p. 345
107. BG, 6. 15, 41-45.
108. BG, 18. 56, 58, 62.
109. *Mokṣapāhuḍa*, 17-19.
110. *Ib.*, 20, 77 ; *Jñānārṇava* 41. 26, 27,
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112. *Mūlācāra*. verse 567.







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