

सच्चं लोगम्भि सारभूयं

Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion

By
Dr. Ramjee Singh



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Dr. Sagarmal Jain

Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion

By
Dr. Ramjee Singh
M. A., Ph. D., D. Litt.
Vice-Chancellor
Jaina Visva-Bharatī-Sansthan
Ladnun (Rajasthan)

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PUBLISHER'S NOTE

We feel immense pleasure in bringing out this book 'A Perspective in Jaina Philosophy and Religion' by Prof. Ramjee Singh, Vice-Chancellor, Jaina Visvabharati, Ladnun, Rajasthan (Deemed to be University) in the hands of scholars, as 64th publication of Pārśvanātha Śodhapīṭha. It is a collection of his valuable research papers and articles, written on various aspects of Jaina Philosophy and Religion, appeared in different journals, seminar proceedings, felicitation and commemoration volumes. These have been classified under sections — Jaina View of Life, Jaina Epistemology, Jaina Metaphysics, Jaina Ethics, Jaina Psychology, Non-absolutism and its Relevance to Jainism and Jaina-Yoga.

We are extremely grateful to Prof. Singh, who did us a favour by giving this work to the institute for publication.

Prof. Singh, an eminent scholar of international fame on Gandhism and Non-violence, is also an authority on Jaina studies, and has made a significant contribution to it. A true Gandhivādi he follows its doctrines in word and spirit and practices in his life.

We are grateful to Dr. Ramanbhai C. Shah and other members of Shree Bombay Jaina Yuvaka Sangh for providing grant of Rs. Ten Thousand for publication of this book.

We are thankful to Prof. Sagarmal Jain, Director of Pārśvanātha Śodhapīṭha, who has been instrumental in obtaining this work for publication and seeing it through the press.

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PREFACE

The basic ideology of Jainism has been close to my heart for the following reasons — firstly, I have found an intellectual basis of the Gandhian principle of *Ahiṃsā* in the Jaina theory of *Anekāntavāda* (Non-absolutism); secondly, I had, therefore started my initial research on *Syādvāda-Anekāntavāda* which was later changed into the “Jaina Concept of Omniscience” on the advice of my revered teacher late Dr. D. M. Datta. Thirdly, I have been greatly benefitted in my life from the association of several Jaina scholars and saints, who have bestowed upon me their affection and kindness. Lastly, as a student of Indology, I thought that it is better to devote my attention to Jainology, which has been relatively a neglected discipline although it has immense potentiality.

Jainology is an amalgam of Jaina philosophy, Religion and Culture. The scope of the literature produced by Jaina masters and scholars are unlimited. However, a systematic research on Jaina philosophy, Religion and Culture has been very meagre.

The present work is perhaps the first important contribution in this comprehensive field born out of deep study and analysis. It is undoubtedly a scholarly compendium of Jaina Epistemology, Metaphysics, Ethics, Psychology, Religion and Culture. However, unlike an introductory outline, it is marked by profundity and the typical synthetic approach to all problems. The book is neither sectarian nor unsympathetic in this treatment but fully balanced.

This book will enrich the small shelf of books on Jainism in English of every intelligent scholar and lover of Jainism.

My first work on *The Jaina Concept of Omniscience* was published by L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad in 1974. In the meantime, I have prepared several research papers on Jaina Philosophy, Religion and Culture, which were presen-

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ted to various national and international conferences. However, they have been so arranged that the collection looks like a monograph.

My grateful thanks go to my friend and Director, Dr. Sagarmal Jain, of Pārśvanātha Śodhapīṭha, Varanasi, who agreed to publish it from his Institute. Whatever deficiencies are there, they are mine, and whatever merit is found go to Dr. Jain and the management of his Institute without whose help this work would not have seen the light of the day.

15-8-1992

Address

Bhikhampur,
Bhagalpur – 812 001.

Ramjee Singh

Vice-chancellor
Jaina Visvabharati
(Deemed University)
Ladnun (Rajasthan)

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INTRODUCTORY

(1) *Jaina View of Life.*

(2) *Jaina Āgamas and Indian Culture.*

Chapter One

JAINA VIEW OF LIFE*

[1]

(1) Life is a struggle for perfection. Philosophy should serve as the light house in this struggle of life. Hence, true philosophy, must be a philosophy of life. Our attention has uptill now been mainly directed towards the problems of *reality* and *knowledge*, *God* and *Soul* etc., but we have neglected *Man*. However, arts and science, philosophy and culture have got significance only in relation to man. Hence, Vyāsa correctly said : “There is nothing higher than man” (*nahi śreṣṭhataram kiñcit mānuṣāt*) ” Chandīdās perhaps went a little further : “Man is higher than everything and nothing is more important than him” (*Sābār upare mānūṣa satya, tāhār upare nai*). Even the Greek Sophists with their own interpretation regarded “man as the measure of all” (*Homo mensura*). The Jainas, even denied God, because they believed in the potential divinity of man. This reminds us of the famous Vedic saying : “Those who know Brahman in Man knows the Being who is Supreme” (*Ye puruṣe Brahman Viduste Viduḥ Parameṣṭhinam : Atharva Veda, X. VII. 17*).

(2) According to Jainism, man can attain divinity contained in the concept of Four-fold Infinities (*anantachatuṣṭaya*). Thus, it shifted the emphasis from God to Man—an outcome of the development of inwardness. Hence, the interest of Jainism has been centered mainly around man, his morality and destiny. Of the seven fundamental categories of Jaina philosophy, only two, the ‘self’ and the ‘Non-self’ are dealt with from a metaphysical point of view; the other five are more corrolaries. Āsrava (inflow of karmic-matter) is

* Jaina Lecture to the 54th Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress held at Madras.

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the cause of mundane existence and Saṁvarā is the cause of liberation. Everything else is only its amplification.

(3) Our conduct cannot be isolated from our way of life. Truth and valuation are inseparable. Samantabhadra in his Yuktyānuśaṅgam (Verse 15) says : “Without knowing the real nature of things, all moral distinctions between bondage and liberation, merit and demerit, pleasure and pain will be blurred.”

(4) For Plato, Saṁskāra and Bradley, philosophy, broadly, is the ‘knowledge of reality’ for the logical positivist it is only ‘linguistic analysis’. However philosophy, to be true, must be philosophy of life, where we do not have a part-view but the whole-view or world-view. “Idealism was unable to see the trees in the wood, while empiricism could not see the wood in the trees” said C. D. Broad (*Contemporary British Philosophy*, Ed. J. H. Muirhead, Vol. 1, 1924). These are the two different ways of approaching the problem but they are not the only ways. Hence, we should see the world steadily and as a whole. If we do not look at the world synoptically, we shall have a very narrow view of it Purely critical philosophy is arid and rigid.

(5) The Jaina view of life known as anekānta (Non-absolutism) is nearer to such a synoptic view. To quote Whitehead, such a non-absolutistic approach is “an endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted” (A. N. Whitehead : *Process and Reality*, 1929, p. 4). The function of philosophy is not merely academic pursuit of knowledge and reality, it also serves as a way of life. It has the dual purpose of revealing truth and increasing virtue so that it may provide a principle to live by and purposes to live for. Hence, C. E. M. Joad opinions that “We must achieve a synoptic view of the universe” (C. E. M. Joad : *A Critique of Logical Positivism*, 1950, p. 29).

[II]

(1) The Jaina attitude of non-absolutism is rooted in its attitude towards life. Life is dear to all. To do harm to others is to do harm to oneself. The Ācārāṅga Sūtra (1. 5. 5) declares : “Thou art he whom thou intendest to tyrannise over.” Hence a feeling of immense respect and responsibility for human personality inspires Jainism. It has upheld the worth of life very much, hence its main emphasis is on Ahimsā or non-violence.

(2) However its concern for non-violence is more due to ideological consciousness than emotional compassion. Unlike Buddhism Jainism does not view life as a transient and illusory phenomenon, nor it regards it as immutable like the Upaniṣad-Vedānta philosophers. Infact, both absolute permanence and absolute impermanence is absolute non-sense. Adhering to the common experience, Jainism regards the nature of reality as having the characteristics of origination, decay and continuance—giving a non-exclusivists view.

(3) Secondly, Jainism believes in the potential divinity of man. Given freedom of development, every individual can attain the supreme spiritual progress. Hence, any interference means spiritual degeneration. Violence is nothing but interference with life, hence it must be eschewed in thought, word and deed. In this context, Anekāntavāda (non-absolutism) is an extension of Ahimsā in the realm of thought and so is Syādvāda a logical corrolary in the field of speech. Anything should be viewed not from only one standpoint (ekānta) but from many angles of vision. The real is a variable constant, hence there must be variable angles of vision, which will negate dogmatism and imperialism of thought. Ekānta, means the ‘only’ point of view, whereas Anekānta implies the principle of reciprocity and interaction among the reals of the universe.

(4) This Anekānta-ideology is the spirit of synthesis (Samanvaya-dṛṣṭi) nutured into the synthetic culture of India.

In the Vedas and Upaniṣads, the ultimate reality is described neither as real (Sat) nor as unreal (Asat). Some described the reality is one, while others hold it as many. In fact, the ultimate reality as the same, though it is called by different names. Ajñeyavāda or Agnosticism of Sañjaya shows reconciliatory spirit through his Four-fold or Five-fold formula of denial, so the Vibhajyavāda or the Critical method of Investigation of Buddha is contrasted with the Ekāntavāda. This is his doctrine of Middle-path or the Madhyam-pratipadā which induced Buddha to “treat prevalent opinions with all due consideration.” Nāgārjuna’s Dialectics of Four-fold Antinomies (chatuskoṭi) resembles Anekānta approach. The Bhedaḥbhedā system of Bharata-prapañcha is actually referred to as Anekānta. While the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsā and the Sāṃkhya have an anekānta bias with respect to some of their ideas and methods. Therefore, Śāntaraksita attributes the concept of vaichitrya to the Mīmāṃsā as well to the Sāṃkhyas. Even the critique on the light doctrines of Gautama resemble the Anekāntavāda in its spirit and form although they are not as pervasive as they are in Jainism.

(5) Anekāntavāda is the heart of Jainism. It constitutes its moral original contribution to the philosophical speculation. However, Anekāntavāda-syādvāda has been more maligned than understood even by the great Vedāntic and Buddhist Ācāryas. It is misfortune that system like Advaita which realises the inadequacy of logic to appreciate the evidence of experience as well as the probabilistic interpretation of multi-valued logics, which can reconcile the apparent contradictions in the Anekāntavāda. Anekānta implies twin functions of analysis and synthesis known as conjunctive and disjunctive dialectics respectively or Nayavāda and Syādvāda.

(6) Viewed in the light of the doctrine of Anekānta, the reality reveals not merely as many (anantātmakam) but also as infinitely manifold (ananta-dharmātmakam). The reality is possessed of infinite number of attributes and human know-

ledge is limited untill it attains omniscience. Hence we cannot have the complete grasp of the whole reality or an absolute affirmation or complete negation of a predicate. To know is to relate, therefore our knowledge is essentially relative and limited in many ways. In the sphere of application of the means of knowledge or in the extent of the knowable our thought is relative. The whole reality in its completeness, cannot be grasped by this partial thought. The objectivity of the universe reveals that the universe is independent of the mind which implies principle of distinction leading to the recognition of non-absolutism.

(7) In absolute sense, a thing is neither real nor unreal, neither permanent nor evanescent but both. This dual nature of things is proved by a reductio-ad-absurdum of absolutism. Further, this is also the basis of the Law of Causation, because an 'absolute real' can neither be cause nor an effect. However, an 'absolute flax' cannot be the basis of operation for the Law of Causation. Similarly, the controversy between unity and plurality can be easily solved by the Anekānta logic, which affirms attributes in a unitary entity. A thing is neither an absolute unity nor an irreconcilable multiplicity. Infact, it is both multiplicity-in-unity. Similarly, both absolute existence and non-existence are metaphysical abstractions.

[III]

(1) To say that a thing is neither real nor unreal, neither eternal nor non-eternal, neither static nor mobile but partakes of the dual nature perhaps is an affront to the believers in the traditional Laws of Thought. No body rejects them but these abstract formulations are not suited to dynamic character of the universe. Our own observation and experience reveals that the two-valued logic seems to be unreal. So far that abstract formulation of the Laws of Thought A is A (Identity), A is not A (Contradiction), A is either A or not A (Excluded Midoh), they may be right. But their concrete

formulations (A Radio is a Radio) admits of change. A real radio is constantly undergoing change, hence there is change according to space and time. Similarly, even change is meaningless without the idea of persistence. Hence the contradiction (A Skylab cannot both be and not be) is only nominal because 'A Skylab' is a Skylab so long it works as a laboratory in the Sky but when it takes as a debris after degeneration, if it is not the same sky-lab in the same condition. Hence, a skylab can be both a skylab and not a skylab. There is no difficulty to accept this in actual experience.

(2) The denial of pre-non-existence and post-non-existence as part of a real leads to the impossibility of all theoretical and practical activity. Similarly, the denial of non-existence of mutual identity (numerical differences) and absolute non-existence is also impossible. If there is no difference, there will be no distinction, hence no independence between subject and object. If there is negation of identity, there is worse confusion. Hence the nature of reality can neither be exclusively *identity* nor *multiplicity*. As regards relations, no relation is meaningful if there is pure identity and no relation is possible between the two absolutely independent and different terms. Similarly regarding causal efficiency, the real cannot be either 'absolute constant' nor can it be an 'absolute variant' but a 'variable constant'.

[IV]

(1) It is asked, whether this kind of non-absolutism is itself *absolute* or *not*. If it is former, there is at least one real which is absolute; if it is not, it is not absolute and universal fact. Whether non-absolutism is itself absolute or relative depends upon the nature of proposition which is either complete (Sakalādeśa) or incomplete (Vikalādeśa). The former being the object of valid knowledge (Pramāṇa) and the latter, two object of aspectal knowledge (naya). This means that the directive of non-absolutism is not absolute unconditionally. However, to avoid the fallacy of infinite regress, the

Jainas distinguish between the true non-absolutism (*Samyak-Anekānta*) and the false non-absolutism (*Mithya-Anekānta*). To be valid, therefore, non-absolutism must not be *absolute* but always *relative*. When one attribute is stated as constitution the whole nature of the real and thus implies the negation of other attributes, such cognitions are examples of the 'false absolute'. But *Naya* is not false though it is partial or knowledge from a particular standpoint.

(2) The nature of unconditionality in the statement "All statements are conditional" is quite different from the normal meaning of unconditionality. This is like the idea contained in the passage "I do not know myself" where there is no contradiction between *knowledge* and *ignorance*, or in the statement 'I am undecided', where there is atleast one decision : "I am undecided" the unconditionality is not at the level of existence, while at the level of *essence* (thought) anything is alternative. We do not live in the realm of *thought* or *reason* above. Behind *reason*, there is always the watershed of *unreason* or *faith*. The Jainas too have faith in their scriptures as anybody else has in his or her. Her is unconditionally. In each community, there is a special absolute. The absolutes themselves are alternation so far as they are possible (till we are on thought level), but I have chosen one and stick to it, it is more than possible, it is existent or actual. At this point, there may be a reconciliation between conditionality and unconditionality. On thought level, the statement "Everything is conditional", holds good but when we adopt the point of view of *existence*, we are led to rest with unconditionality.

[V]

(1) Ideologically, we cannot make one-sided exposition. But in actual usage, whenever we make any particular statement (*S is P* or *S is not P*), it takes the form of a categorical proposition. Even a Hypothetical (*If S then P*) or a Disjunctive (*Either S or P*) is said to have a categoric basis and

therefore, they can be converted into categorical propositions. But since our thought is relative, so must be our expression.

(2) There is another problem also—how to synthesise the different angles of vision or internal harmony of the opposed predications (S is P, S is not P, S is both P and not P, S is neither P nor not P). It is, therefore, the Jainas prefix Syāt (Somehow, in some respect) as a corrective against any absolutist way of thought and evaluation of reality. This is a linguistic tool for the practical application of non-absolutism in words. Because of this prefix Syāt and the relative nature of proposition, it is called Syādvāda. But words are only expressive or suggestive (Vachaka or Jñāpaka) rather than productive (Kāraka). Thus the meaning is, however, eventually rooted in nature of things in reality and we have, therefore, to explore a scheme of linguistic symbols (Vachana-vinyasa) for model judgements representing alternate standpoints. (*Nayas*), or a way of approach or a particular opinion (*abhiprāya*) or view-point (*apekṣā*).

(3) This philosophy of standpoints bears the same relation to philosophy as logic does to thought or grammar to language. We cannot affirm or deny anything absolutely of any object owing to the endless complexity of things. Every statement of a thing, therefore, is bound to be one-sided and incomplete. Hence the doctrine of seven-fold predication (*Saptabhaṅga*) in the logical consumption of the doctrine of relative standpoints (*Syādvāda*). If we insist on absolute predication without conditions (*Syāt*), the only cause open is to dismiss either the diversity or the identity as a mere metaphysical fiction. Every single standpoint designated in every statement has a partial truth. Different aspects of reality can be considered from different perspectives (*Nikṣepa*). Thus *Naya* is the analytic and *Saptabhaṅga* is the synthetic method of studying ontological problems.

If this form of statements, this doctrine insists on the correlation of affirmation and negation. All judgements are

double-edged in character-existent and non-existent. The predicate of inexpressibility stands for the unique synthesis of existence and non-existence and is therefore 'unspeakable' (*avaktavya*). Thus three predicates—'existence', 'non-existence' and 'inexpressibility' make seven exhaustive and unique modes of expression of truth.

[VI]

(1) We are aware of various criticisms against *Anekāntavāda*-*Syādvāda* that they involve the fallacies of self-contradiction (*Virodha*), Absence of Common Abodi (*Vaiyādhikarāṇya*), Infinite-Regress (*Anavasthā*), Confusion (*Śaṅkā*), Exchange of Natures (*Vyatikāra*), Doubt (*Saṁśaya*), Non-apprehension (*Apratipatti*), Both sides (*Ubhaya*) etc. However, we do not want to go into details.

(2) We have considered the most formidable criticism that how far non-absolutism of *Syādvāda* is not absolute but relative. However, it is wrong to confuse the Pragmatic and Pluralistic realistic attitude of *Syādvāda* with either Pragmatism of James-Dewey either or with the *objective relativism* of the sophists or even with the *relative absolutism* of Whitehead or Bodis or with Einsteinian relativity except in the most general attitude. Pyrrho's prefixing every judgement with a 'may be' must not be identical Jaina 'Syāt'. The former degenerates into Agnosticism or Scepticism, the latter leaves no room for any such thing. Scepticism means in the minimum, absence of any assertion, whereas *Syādvādins* always assert, though what they assert are alternatives—each being valid in its own Universe of Discourse, which controls the interpretation of every word. This is the logic of Relatives.

(3) Perhaps on account of its catholicity of outlook *Syādvāda* is branded as a form 'eclecticism' or a 'philosophy of compromise'. "Since an eclectic system is a loose piece of mosaic work, rather than an organised body of original thought, the term has come to be one of reproach." However, this is

unjust to brand it as a 'loose piece of mosaic work' or 'odd collection of arbitrary half-truths'. In fact the truths presented are alternative truths which are true in their own aspects. Of course, Syādvāda rejects the 'dispotic absolute truth' or the 'block universe' or a 'seemless coat'. Even in the synthesis achieved through the dynamics of Syādvāda, there is 'discriminative unity' rather than 'secondless unit'. In short, absolutism in thought is rejected to avoid arbitrariness in action.

(4) To brand Syādvāda as *agnosticism* or Scepticism like that of Saṅjaya or of Pyrrho is again another injustice. The prefix 'Syāt' does not mean 'perhaps' but 'in respect of' a particular context. Each model truth is valid from its own standpoint. It is not a doctrine of 'know nothingness' or 'unknowability'. Each standpoint of the saptabhaṅgī is definite in its own place. Syādvāda statements are not 'indefinite' (Belvalkar), but 'indeterminate' (Hiriyanna) which means that it cannot be defined absolutely. No single mode of expression is adequate to express the nature of reality. The various modes of truths are not merely many truths, but alternative truths, each being as definite as anything.

(5) Regarding the charge of 'Self-contradiction' against Syādvāda by the great Vedantic and Buddhist Ācāryas, I feel that the motive behind it must be extra-logical. How one can believe that Dharmakīrti will call Anekantavāda as mere non-sensical talk (Pralāpamātra) in view of Jaina theory of dual character of universal and particular of a thing. He asks of all realities are Sat, there would be no difference between cow and camel. Prajñākara Gupta and Arcaṇa point out that the triple charactered nature of reality having origination, destruction and permanence cannot exist together and hence is self contradictory. Śāntarakṣita thinks that there would be a comingling (Sāṅkya) and a confusion (Sandeha) in the dual nature of reality, the result of which would not be helpful to decide which is general and which particular.

Karnakagomin also refutes the dual characteristic theory of the Jainas in his own way. In his famous treatise Refutation

of Anekāntavāda (Anekāntavāda Nirāsa), Jitari says that one cannot have identity as well as difference by the same nature.

Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja also point out to the violation of the law of contradiction.

However, all these thinkers forget that the laws of thoughts should be considered by the testimony of experience and not be pre-conception. Experience shows that a thing is real in own respect but not so in other respect.

The triple character theory is supported through anvasthā-nupapannatva hetu. From the realistic standpoint there is so such difference which could indicate the separation between identity and difference. The reality is synthism of identity-in difference and each synthesis is a Jātyantara (Sui generis). Akalaṅka points out that the Buddhists philosophers ignore the formula Sarvobhavastudatṣvabhāti and tries to establish equality between curd and camel.

Infact, Syādvāda is against the formulations of formal two-valued logic. It avoids vicious intellectualism and the fallacy of exclusive particularity. Thus Syādvāda is a new dynamics of thinking which is based on catholicism and regard for truth seen from different angles.



Chapter Two

JAINA ĀGAMAS AND INDIAN CULTURE

The Place of the Āgamas in Cultural History of India

Language and Literature apart from art and architecture constitute the most important records of the cultural history of a country. Hence, the study of the Āgamas is bound to reveal the most important observations of Jainism and its contribution to Indian culture.

As we all know, the collective term given by the Jainas to their Sacred literature is called Āgamas written in Prakṛt just as the Buddhist Piṭakas in Pāli and the Brahmanical Vedas in Saṁskṛt. The Jaina Āgamas like the Buddhist Piṭakas contain the sermons of their founders. They were later on codified by their trusted disciples into the language of the people just for the larger benefit of the masses. Thus the original Sacred Books of both the Jainas and the Buddhists were written in Prakṛt, i. e., Ardhamāgadhi and Pāli respectively. Being missionaries, their mission was to interest not only the intellectuals but the common people and hence they used the language of the common man. The Jaina Āgamas accord a very respectable position to Ardhamāgadhi by calling it not only the language of the Aryans¹ but also of the celestial gods². The Buddhist Tpiṭakas enjoin upon their followers to use the local dialect of the people³ for the propagation of their sacred teachings. This was nothing but a legitimate protest against the touch-me-not attitude of the Vedic scholars who would never descend down from their ivory tower of

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1. Bhagavati Sūtra, V. 5. 4.
 2. Prajñāpana Sūtra, 1.
 3. Chulla-Vagga-Khuddaka-Vatthu-Khandha-Buddha-Vaṇṇa-Nivṛtti.

Saṁskṛt language and on the other hand they would look down upon the use of these languages of the people for imparting religious instructions. Prakṛt and Pāli were declared to be the languages of the outcastes or Mlechchhas.¹ This shows their regard for maintaining the so-called cultural purity by the priestly order to ensure their monopoly for ever. To be impartial, we cannot deny that there was some amount of animosity among the Jainas and the Buddhist scholars against the use of Saṁskṛt language at least at the critical stages which is amply reflected in the painful sight of some of Pāli and Prakṛt scholars maintaining linguistic isolationism as a result of which they remained unaware of the Indian heritage as depicted in Saṁskṛt language and literature. The Bhikkhus of the Hīnayāna cults of Buddhism in Burma and Ceylon are examples of such isolationism. Similarly, many eminent scholars of Saṁskṛt of that age remained unaware of the growth and development of ideas in the field of Pāli and Prakṛt languages. The cause of this linguistic animosity was also unhealthy religious rivalries which are demonstrated into the literature of the 7th and 8th centuries A. D. All these factors went to retard the growth of cultural synthesis in India at least for some time.

In this respect, the Jaina tradition has been rather liberal. Down from the days of Ārya Rakṣit (2nd Century of Vikram Samvat) and Uṃa Swāmī (3rd Century of V. S. , there has been equal interest in Prakṛt and Saṁskṛt so much so that both these languages became the common and combined treasures of the Jaina. Naya, the Jainas have adopted other regional languages also like Kannaḍa and Tamil in South India, Gujarātī and Marāṭhī in Western India and even Hindi in Central India for the propagation of their religious teachings or literary pursuits.

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1. No Mlechchhaitavai Napabhāsitavai — Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali, p. 49.

Pt. Sukhalalji¹ has divided the entire extent of Jaina philosophical literature broadly into four periods beginning with the Āgamic period. Notwithstanding the differences in the two tradition of Digambaras and Śvetāmbaras, the Jainas generally agree that the Āgamas constitute the inspired wisdom of Lord Mahāvīra², when he attained perfection and Omniscience. The sermons were later on codified by his chief disciples called Gaṇadharas. According to the Jaina tradition, there are only two types of persons, who are qualified to know the secrets of religion—the Omniscient (Kevalin) who directly perceive everything of all places and of all times. Then there is another class of persons who understand the meaning and significance of sermons indirectly, i. e., through the lectures or sermons by the Kevalins themselves. They are called Śruta Kevalins. Ācārya Yati Vṛṣabha has given the chronological account of the Missionary (Ācārya) tradition of 683 years after the Nirvāṇa of Lord Mahāvīra having 3 Kevalins, 5 Śruta Kevalins, 20 different orders of Ācāryas.³

According to the Śvetāmbara tradition⁴, the last compilation of the Āgamas had been done at Valabhi after 980 years of the death of Lord Mahāvīra at the time of Devardhi, however the compilations of some of the Āgamas were done at Pāṭaliputra also which was after 250 years of Lord Mahāvīra's death. The Āgamic literature is vast and stupendous, comprising of 12 Aṅgas, 12 Upāṅgas, 4 Mūlas, 2 Chulikas

1. Sukhalal Sanghavi, Darśana Aur Chintana (Ahmedabad, 1957), p. 362.
2. Kailash Chandra Śāstri, Jaina Dharma (Kashi, 2475 V. N.), p. 254.
3. Mahendra Kumar Ācārya, Jaina Darśana (Kashi, 1955 A. D.), p. 16. He says that Harivaṃśa Purāṇa, Jayadhavalā, Ādi Purāṇa and Śrutāvatara also support it. see Preface to Jayadhavalā, Volume I, pp. 47-50.
4. Dalsukha Malvania, Jaina Darśanika Sahitya Ke Vikas Ke Rūparekhā (Varanasi, 1952), pp. 1-4.

Sūtras, 6 Cheda Sūtras, 10 Prakīrṇakas etc¹. The commenta-
tion on these Āgamas are called *Niryuktis* and *Bhāṣyas*, which
are in poetry style and those in prose style are called *Cūrṇis*.
Available *Niryuktis*, are said to be compositions of Bhadrabāhu,
the Second, which contain subtle philosophical discussion on
the problems of existence of soul, analysis of knowledge and
meaning etc. The *Bhāṣyas* contain the fuller accounts of all
subjects. Sanghadās Gaṇi and Jinabhadra are the two famous
Bhāṣyakāras. Jinabhadra was a versatile genius, who has written
practically on all subject under the sun. Sanghadās Gaṇi has
limited himself to the task of dealing with the problems of
epistemology and the ethics of the Jaina Sādhus. Among the
Cūrṇikāras, Jinadāsa Mahattara is a notable figure. *Cūrṇis* are
shorter commentaries in prose on the pattern of Jātakas. In
Sanskṛt, the oldest commentaries of the Āgamas is of Ācārya
Haribhadra (757-857 V. S.), next to whom are Śīlāṅka Sūri
(8th Cent. V. S.) and Saṅghacārya, Abhayadeva and Malla-
dhari Hemacandra and last but not the least Malayagiri. All
these scholars wrote their commentaries in Sanskṛt and Prākṛt
but they were so vast and deep that shorter commentaries
in the languages of the people was considered essential. Hence,
we find the composition of many *Primers* and *Beginners* in
regional languages like Tabā in *Gujarati*. Ācārya Dharma
Singh is said to be an important author of such *Beginners* and
Primers.²

According to the Digambara tradition³, all the old Āgamas
are said to have lost except the 12th called *Dṛṣṭivāda*. They
regard Bhadrabāhu as the last Śruta Kevalī, with him out of
14 Pūrvas, 4 were lost. After Bhadrabāhu, the different Ācāryas
became the teachers of 11 Aṅgas and 10 Pūrvas and the pro-
cess of disintegration continued up till 683 years after Mahā-
vīra's Nirvāṇa. An important Ācārya named Dharasena initia-

1. Dalsukha Malvania, *Jaina Darśanika Sāhitya ka Singhāvaloka-
kana* (Kashi, 1949), pp. 2-3.

2. *Ibid*, p. 6.

3. Kailash Chandra Shastri, *Jaina Dharma*, p. 255.

ted his two most able disciples, named Puṣpadanta and Bhūtabali into the Āgamas, who later on compiled the Sermons in the form of a monumental epics of religion called, *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama* in Prakṛt. A contemporary of Ācārya Guṇabhadra compiled *Kaṣāya-Pāhuḍa* upon which Yati Bṛṣabha wrote a commentary in Prakṛt after he learnt it from Ārya Maṅṣku and Nāgahastī. There are quite a few commentaries on these two monumental treasures—*Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama* and *Kaṣāya-pāhuḍa*. The last of the commentaries on *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama* called *Dhavalā* is by Vīrasena, which comprises 72 thousand verses. The commentary on *Kaṣāya-pāhuḍa*, called *Jayadhavalā* is equally monumental having 20 thousand verses written by Vīrasena and 40 thousand added by his disciple Jinasena. The final portion of the *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama* is called *Mahābandha* which has 41 thousand verses. This has been composed by Bhūtabali himself. Fortunately, all those three monumental Āgamas are treasured at Muḍabidri's temple library. Ācārya Nemichand Siddhānta Śāstri Chakravarti of the 10th century was supposed to be an authority on these three Āgamas. He had composed *Gommaṣasāra* and *Labdhisāra* to give the essences of these Āgamas. Toḍaramala has written commentaries upon *Gommaṣasāra* and *Labdhisāra* in Bhaṣā. Ācārya Kunda-kunda's *Samayasāra*, *Pravacanasāra*, *Niyamasāra* and *Pañcāstikāya-sāra* are in acknowledged Prakṛt works which are regarded as good as the Āgamas by the Jains. Jainācārya Umāswātī wrote *Tattvārtha-Sūtra*, which is regarded as the Veritable Bible of the Jains by both the sects. The legend of the propagation of Jaina religion rests with the Tīrthankars and their disciples called eleven Gaṇadharas, who are said to have converted a community of 4411 Śramaṇas¹ from whom the entire Jaina community has grown.

2. The Contribution of the Āgamas

The Validity of Scriptural Knowledge—Except the Cārvākas, all systems of Indian Philosophy admit the validity of scriptural knowledge. In the Vedic tradition, the Vedas which are

1. Kalpa-Sūtra, p. 285.

regarded as impersonal, constitute the highest authority of religion. In the tradition of the Śramaṇic culture of Buddhism and Jainism, the authority of scriptures rests with their prophets, who are supposed to be Omniscient as well above all *desires and aversions*. In the Jaina tradition, the validity of the scripture is accorded at par with direct perception¹ since the scriptural knowledge is knowledge gained by the Omniscient being, who has directly perceived the reality. Thus scriptural knowledge is also definite and indubious like the omniscient knowledge. This is admitted by Samantabhadra in his Āpta-Mīmāṃsā². It should also be noted that the knowledge and practice of Scriptures (Āgamas) also leads to the attainment of Kevala-jñāna, so as to the knower of the Śrutas are called Śruta-kevalin. Anybody and everybody cannot be Śruta. In order to be a Śruta, he must fulfil the conditions of becoming desireless (Vītarāga) and he must destroy the Karmas which obscure the real nature of Śruta.³ Only then, such a Scriptural knowledge serves like the bliss.⁴

According to the Vedic tradition, the Vedas manifest their own validity. Words used by us, according to them, denote things that can be cognised by other means of knowledge, and, if we cannot know them through other means, then those who utter them must be of unquestionable authority. So non-Vedic utterances cannot possess any inherent validity.⁵ According to Prabhākara, such non-Verbal knowledge is of the nature of inference because only the verbal cognition of the Vedas is strictly verbal.⁶ The Vedic thinkers adopt the doctrine of impersonate authorship perhaps to

1. Gommaṭasāra (Jiva-Kaṇḍa), Gāthā 368; Tattvārtha-Śloka-Vārttika, I. 9. 20.
2. Āpta-Mīmāṃsā, Śloka 105.
3. Tattvārtha-Śloka-Vārttika, I. 20. 2.
4. Kunda-kunda, Darśan pāhuḍa, Gāthā, 17.
5. Pārthasārathi Miśra, Śāstra-dīpikā, p. 53.
6. Śīlāṅka, Prakaraṇa-Pañcikā, p. 83.

maintain its infallibility¹, because a person is liable to many defects. However, in order to prove the impersonal authorship of the Vedas, the Vedic thinkers; especially the Mimāṃsakas introduce a mystical theory of the eternality of the Vedas. They hold that the relationship between the word and its meaning is natural and not created by convention. The purpose of the Mimāṃsakas in rejecting the authorship of the Vedas to Gods is because God, who is incorporeal, has no organs of speech and hence he cannot utter words, and if He assumes the human form, then He is subject to all the limitations of material existence and hence his utterances will not be authoritative. Then there is no tradition of divine or human authorship of the Vedas. If it is said that the Vedas are human compositions because names of saints and seers occur, it may be said that the hymns deal with the eternal phenomena of nature and the names of persons have only symbolical significance and not any historical significance.

In tracing their Āgamas to the utterances of Lord Mahāvīra, the Jains have a more secured position. Firstly, since Mahāvīra is Omniscient (Kevalin) what he says must be true. Since, he is above desires (Vītarāga), what he says is free from any subjective prejudices. Lastly, since he is compassionate, what he says is for the benefit of the people. Thus the Jaina theory of scripture as the sermons of Lord Mahāvīra is more intelligible and rational. The adherence of one's faith in the personality of Lord Mahāvīra gives a religious colour. Lastly, such a theory of scripture having its source in the personality of a realised man raises the dignity and status of man to the status of God. Omniscience is not divine but human. It requires a Sādhana. Thus the Jaina doctrine of Āgamas sets up everything in real and historical context, while the explanation of the impersonality of the Vedas is rather vague and ambiguous. However, it looses at one place—by treating the Vedic authorship as impersonal, it implies that it is perhaps very-very old and ancient because a person is

1. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Śloka-Vārttika, II.

after all a historical event. Here the Jaina reply is that since the truth contained in the Āgamas are one, eternal and permanent, it is as old as anything. The objects of the knowledge are the one and the same for all. Hence their cognition is neither new nor old. Hence, there is an argument in the teaching of all Arhatas.¹ In this sense, the teachings are eternal and universal and hence impersonal. Thus, the line of demarcation between personal and impersonal authorship of the scripture gives way to a reconciliation. A prophetic utterance, in the sense, it is eternal and universal, is impersonal; however, since it comes from the mouth of a historical person, it is personal.

Agama and its Interpretation — The statement of a trustworthy person is said to be Āgama. Otherwise, words themselves are inert, lifeless and even ambiguous. Hence, the validity of Śabda rests with the person who uses them. Hence, the interpretation of the Āgamas depend both upon the *Speaker* and also upon the *Audience*. So far, the speakership of the Āgamas is concerned, it is held to be the direct sermons of the Omniscient Lord, which have been compiled and codified by their chief disciples called Gaṇadhara.² So far the interpretation of the Āgamas from the point of view of the audience is concerned, it should be clearly noted that a certain amount of intellectual ability and moral preparation is needed for the appropriate grasp of the subject matter. In absence of such a preparation, the same Āgama admits of different and even conflicting interpretations about one and the same subject, like the different interpretations of the Brahma-Sūtra and the Bhagavad-Gīta. The Jaina Āgamas are the sermons of the Tīrthaṅkaras which have been correctly reported by the Śruta-kevalin and the Gaṇadhara, who are also supposed to be omniscient and also above all desires of love and hate, hence the validity of the Jaina Āgamas is

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1. Ācāraṅga-Sūtra, 4. 125; Sūtra-kṛtāṅga, 2. 1. 15, 2. 2. 41.
 2. Āvaśyaka-Niryukti, G. 192 and Nandī-Sūtra, G. 40.

doubly raised because both the Source as well as the Course of the Āgamas are pure.

The Place of Samayika — There are three distinctive contributions of Jainism to Indian Culture — Equality (Sama), Self-control (Śama) and Dignity of labour (Śrama).¹ Equality or Sāmāyika is said to be the heart of Jainism. In the Jaina religious scripture, Dvādaśāṅgī or in the 14th Pūrva,² the place of Sāmāyika is the first and foremost among the six daily duties. Without the practice of Sāmāyika or equality, there is no hope for any religious or spiritual realisation. When a householder accepts the Jaina religion, he solemnly pledges to abide by the principle of equality.³ The whole of Viśeṣaśāyika-bhāṣya of Jinabhadra Gaṇi is an exposition of this principle of Sāmāyika. The three jewels of Jainism, i. e., Right Faith, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct⁴ depend upon the principle of equality. The Gītā calls it the inner poise or the evenness of mind (Samatvam⁵), or equal mindedness (Sama Cittatvam⁶ or Samatā⁷) and such a man who attains this is called seer with an equal eye (Samadarśinaḥ⁸ or Sarvatra-sama-darśana⁹). This principle of equality must be reflected both in *thought* and *action*. In thought it is the principle of Anekānta, in action it is the principle of Ahimsā.

(a) *Anekanta* — Anekānta is the application of the principle of equality in the sphere of thought. Thus it is not a philo-

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1. Sukhalal Sanghavi, *Jaina Dharma kā Prāṇa* (Kashi, 1952), p. 2.
 2. This is called the Ācārāṅga Sūtra.
 3. Karemi Bhante Samayeam.
 4. Umāswāmī, *Tattvārtha-Sūtra*, I. I.
 5. *Bhagavad-Gītā*, II. 48.
 6. *Ibid*, XIII. 9.
 7. *Ibid*, X. 5.
 8. *Ibid*, V. 18.
 9. *Ibid*, VI. 29.

sophy but a philosophical standpoint just as there is the Advaitic standpoint of Śāṅkara and the standpoint of the Middle-path of the Buddhists. Anekānta literally means non-absolution. Though the Anekānta Period in Jaina philosophical literature comes after the end of the Āgamic period, the genesis of the Anekāntic idea is already present in the Āgamic literature. The famous Bhagavatī Sūtra refers to the important and interesting dreams that Lord Mahāvīra had just before he had attained Keval-jñāna. In one of the dreams, there is reference to 'multi-faced' or 'multi-coloured' (citra-vicitra¹) wings of Pansakholi which symbolises the multi-faced reality.

The Buddhists also have their doctrine of Vibhajjavāda or 'conditional expressions', which means that they discard one-sided view (ekāṁśavāda).² However, the Buddhists believed in Vibhajjavāda to a limited extent, where as the Jainas believe it to the full extent, so that it was finally developed into the Theory of Non-absolutism (Anekāntavāda).³ In Buddhism, Vibhajya means division and Vibhajya Vyākaraṇīya means answering a question by dividing. While the Buddhists attribute the divergent attributes at the same time with regard to two different things, the genius of the Jainas is reflected in attributing the different attributes in the one and the same subject, of course, the contexts are different. This leads to the organon of Sapta-bhaṅgī and the multi-valued logic of Syādvāda. Even in the Vedas⁴ and Upaniṣads⁵, the description of the reality is in terms of contradictory attributes, like *real* and *unreal*, *mobile* and *immobile*. Nāśadiya Sūkta, therefore, avoids to describe the reality either as *real* or *unreal*.⁶ Thus Anekānta

1. Bhagavatī Sūtra, 16. 6.

2. Dīgha-Nikāya, Sangeet Pariṇāma Sūtra No. 33.

3. Sūtra-kṛtāṅga, I. 14. 19, I. 14. 22; Bhagavatī Sūtra, 7. 2. 270, 12. 2. 443, 25. 4, 1. 8. 72.

4. Ṛg-veda, I. 164. 46.

5. Iśāvāsya Upaniṣad, 5; Taittirīya Upaniṣad, II. 7; Bṛhadāraṇyak Upaniṣad, I. 21. 1; Chāndogya Upaniṣad, 6. 2.

6. Ṛg-veda, X. 129.

seems to be a dynamic of thought-reconciliation, through which we find an attempt at synthesis between apparently contradictory attributes of eternality and non-eternality of the world¹ or finiteness or infiniteness of the Jīva² or difference or non-difference between the body and the soul.³ Anekānta however, should not be understood to mean that reality is contradictory. It simply means that it has innumerable number of aspects and attributes which can be thoroughly comprehended only when we can put all of them together. This is ideal of perfection, which can be attained only when we become an omniscient. However, we can have the knowledge of one or other aspect if we are free from prejudice and bias. Thus, on the one hand it has its ideal of finality of knowledge, in reality it aims at aspectal knowledge or *naya*.⁴ As a corollary, we have to be cautious in our speech. Lord Mahāvīra explained every problem with the help of *śīyavaya*⁵ or Syādvāda. Absolutism in speech and language is as bad as absolutism in thought. The Āgamic stress on Anekānta and Syādvāda is due to its great adherence to Ahimsā. Anekāntavāda or Syādvāda is extension of the principle of Ahimsā on intellectual level. Jains think that without non-violence in thought, non-violence in practice is impossible.

(b) *Ahimsa* — Ahimsā follows as a logical corollary from the principle of Equality (*Sāmya*) of souls. The inequalities of physical and mental abilities are only accidental and they are due to the Karmas. How, since 'life is dear to all and since everything has got life', we have to accept the principle of Ahimsā as an important means of spiritual realisation. To the Śramaṇic cult of Jainism, the means are as important as the ends. Our end is no doubt self-realisation or Mokṣa. Now,

1. Bhagavatī Sūtra, II. 1, IX. 6; Sūtra-kṛtāṅga 1. 4. 6.

2. Bhagavatī Sūtra, II. I. 90, IX. 38. 7, XIII. 4. 481.

3. Ibid, XIII. 7. 495, XVII. 2.

4. Ibid, VII. 2. 273.

5. Sukhalal Sanghvi, Jaina Dharma Kā Prāṇa, p. 2.

this self-realisation is impossible without the love of self and this love of self is nothing other than Ahimsā, since self resides in everything. Jainism looks upon the whole world as filled with life. Nothing is fallow or sterile, nothing is dead and inert. What to speak of living beings, even plants and every portion of matter have got life. Hence, respect for life is a spiritual act, it is a law of our being. If we forget it, life becomes well nigh impossible. 'As we feel our pain, so we must feel the pain of others', says the Ācārāṅga. The same truth is stated in Daśvaikālika, where it is clearly said that 'all beings desire to live, none want to die'. All our religions accept Ahimsā as a virtue but Jainas have worked out a complete philosophy of non-violence, hence here Ahimsā is more due to rational consideration than emotional as we find in Buddhism and Christianity. The Jaina Ahimsā, embraced the whole universe and is not restricted to humanity. There we can find that Advaita Vedānta and others admit oneness of soul and practically removes the ground of mistrust and violence, which are the result of duality.

Nivarttaka Dharma — Ahimsā together with Aparigraha constitute the ethical wholeness of self-control or self-restraint in social relationship, self-control is the foundation of a higher moral life as in individual life, it is the basis of higher spiritual life. Except for the Mīmāṃsakas, who believe in heaven etc. all the Vedic and non-vedic systems adopt Mokṣa as the Summum Bonum of life, which is a state of cessation of the wheels of existence. It is happiness (Śreya) rather than pleasure (Preya) which is the goal of life. Thus self-purification (Ātma-śuddhi) and not the acquisition of any earthly or heavenly pleasures, which is the aim of life. The obstacles in the forms of delusion, ignorance and craving must be rooted out by practising the different vows or *Vratas*, throughout life. Hence, the importance of a realised soul rather than some mysterious agency is emphasised. In short, all these constitute the *Nivarttaka Dharma* or world-withdrawing religion, which is said to be the heart of Jainism. It is bound to be individualis-

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tic, world-withdrawing and self-negating. Emphasis on renunciation, asceticism, penances etc. in the account of Sāadhanā given in the Ācārāṅga is literally soul-stirring. Like Buddha, Mahāvīra also presented a gloomy picture of the world. 'The living world is afflicted, miserable' — thus begins the second lecture of the first book of Ācārāṅga.



JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY

(1) *From Nescience to Omniscience*

(2) *Omniscience : Misconceptions and Clarifications*

(3) *Six Approaches to the Concept of Omniscience*

(4) *Non-absolutism and Omniscience*

Chapter Three

FROM NESCIENCE TO OMNISCIENCE

(1) Soul : The Basis of Science, Nescience & Omniscience

By overthrowing rational psychology in his 'Critique of Pure Reason'¹, Kant has disproved the very existence of the soul and thereby the doctrines of the immortality and simplicity of it. But what he lost in the 'Critique of Pure Reason', he regained them in the 'Critique of Practical Reason'. Lord Mahāvīra presenting the Pūrva-pakṣa in the Viśeṣavaśyaka bhāṣya² comes to the conclusion that the soul does not exist, but in the Uttar-pakṣa, refutes all the arguments of the opponents and successfully establishes the existence of the soul. Eminent psychologists of today have been finding themselves helpless to do away with the hypothesis of the soul. "Modern man (is also) in the search of a soul."³ "The reality of self is obvious to the Introspectionist as the reality of the organism is to the Behaviourists."⁴ James supports it and his pupil, Calkins comes out strongly for a 'psychology of selves'. Stern, Dilthey, Spranger and Allport have been endeavouring to build up a 'science of personality'. The theory of soul holds that the principle of consciousness must be a substantial entity, psychic phenomena are activities, and the activity is possible unless there exists an agent. Therefore William James regards its admittance 'to be the line of least logical resistance'. Calkins holds that the self, far from being a metaphysical concept, is an ever present fact of immediate experience and fully worthy to be

1. On paralogism of Reason in the transcendental dialectic.

2. Gāthā : 1552 (Yaśovijaya Granthamālā No. 1).

3. Jung's : Modern Man in Search of a Soul, Kegan Paul.

4. Woodworth, R. S. : Contemporary Schools of Psychology, pp. 241-242.

made the central fact in a scientific psychology.¹ Huxley, Spencer and even Darwin have likewise admitted that the materialistic hypothesis involves grave philosophical errors.²

In fact, nothing would be simpler than to start with sensation, which is as simple as simplicity, hence it is bound to be indivisible affection which does not imply a reflection even. Naturally, the subject of such sensations must then be a simple substance, "The ancients employed the term 'should' to indicate their conceptions of a knowing substance that was partless and indestructible and therefore immortal."³ Words⁴ abound with references to the arguments for the existence of soul. It is due to the soul that a body appears to be living, the soul itself being the principle of consciousness.⁵ Udyotkara⁶, the famous author of Nyāya-Vārttika, therefore observes that there is practically no un-unanimity regarding the existence of soul.

(2) Soul : Its Characteristics

Indian philosophers are agreed about the nature of the soul as possessing consciousness. Even the Cārvākas regard Ātman as Consciousness, which is a byproduct of the material body.⁷ The Buddhists⁸ also accept this position, with little difference. However, Jainism is very emphatic about the characteristic of soul as consciousness⁹, which consists of jñāna and

1. Mehta, M. L. : Jaina Psychology, p. 190.

2. Nahar and Ghosh : An Epitome of Jainism, p. 273.

3. Jaina, C. R. : Jaina Psychology, p. 3.

4. Viśeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya, Gāthā 1532, 1538; Prameya-kamala-Mārtaṇḍa, p. 114 and Śāstra-vārtā-samuccaya, p. 44.

5. Kulkarni, P. G. : 'The Jaina Concept of Soul', Journal of Philosophical Association, Vol. III, No. 11-12, p. 63.

6. Malvania, D. S. : Ātma-Mīmāṃsā, p. 34.

7. Caitanya — Viśiṣṭa deha-eva-ātma.

8. Visuddhi-magga of Buddha-ghosha, XIX. 23.

9. Cf : Sarvārtha-Siddhi, 38; Dravya-Saṅgraha by Nemi-chandra, 2; Pravaçana-sāra of Kunda-kunda, II, 80; Nyāya-

darśana (knowledge and intuition). In the Tattvārtha-Sūtra¹, the term for Cetanā is given as Upayoga² which includes bliss and power besides cognition and intuition. So very Jīva, in its natural condition possesses 'four-infinities'.

(3) Karma : The Material Basis of Bondage

So infinite cognition, intuition, bliss and power belong to the soul in the state of perfection. But the mundane souls are infected by something foreign, which obscures their natural faculties. This foreign element is known as Karman. The Jaina conception of Karman is not 'action' or 'deed' as it etymologically means; it is an aggregate of very fine imperceptible material particles. This Doctrine of the Material Nature of Karman is singular to Jainism alone; with others karma is formless. The Jainas regard karma as the crystalised effect of the past activities or energies. But they argue that "in order to act and react and thereby to produce changes in things on which they work, the energies must have to be metamorphosed into forms or centres of forces."³ Like begets like. The cause is like the effect. "The effect (i. e. body) is physical, hence the cause (i. e. Karma) has indeed a physical form."⁴ But unless Karma is associated with the soul, it cannot produce any effect, because karma is only the instrumental cause and it is the soul which is the essential cause of all experiences. Hence the Jainas believe in the Doctrine of Soul as the Possessor of Material Karma.⁵ But why the conscious soul should be associated with the unconscious matter ? It is owing to the Karma, which is a substantive

Sūtra of Gautama, 72; Pañcāstikāya-sāra of Kunda-kunda, I. 27; Sarvārtha-Siddhi, p. 163; Puruṣārtha-Siddhyupāya, 9.

1. Tattvārtha Sūtra, XIV. XII. 8.

2. Upayoga means 'active consciousness' and Labdhi means 'dormant conscience'.

3. Nahar and Ghosh : An Epitome of Jainism, p. 317.

4. Cf : Outlines of Jaina Philosophy by M. L. Mehta, p. 63; Nyāya-Viniścaya-Vivaraṇa, p. 292.

5. Outlines of Jaina Philosophy by M. L. Mehta, p. 61.

force or matter in a subtle form, which fills all cosmic space. "The soul by its commerce with the outer world becomes literally penetrated with the particles of subtle-matter."¹ Moreover, the mundane soul is not absolutely formless, because the Jainas believe in the Doctrine of Extended Consciousness, like the Doctrine of Pudgala in Buddhism and the Upaniṣads² and also to some extent in Plato and Alexander. While the Sāṃkhya-Yoga, Vedānta, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and the Buddhists kept consciousness quite aloof from matter, the Jainas could easily conceive of the inter-influencing of the soul and the Karmic-matter, hence the relation between the soul and Karma became very easy. The Karmic matter mixes with the soul as milk mixes with the water or fire with iron. Thus the amūrta karma is affected by mūrta karma as consciousness is affected by drink and medicine. This is the relation of concrete identity between the soul and the Karma.

Without the Karma Phenomenology, the diversity of the variegated nature and the apparent inequalities among human beings and their capacities remain unexplained. Kālavāda (Temporalism)³, Svabhāvavāda (Naturalism)⁴, Niyativāda (Determinism)⁵, Yadrēchāvāda (Fortuism)⁶, Ajñānavāda and Saṃśaya-vāda (Agnosticism and Scepticism)⁷, Bhauti-

1. Radhakrishnan, S : Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 319.

2. Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, I. 16; Kaṭha Upaniṣad, IV. 12. Chāndogya Upaniṣad, III. 14. 3.

3. Atharva-veda, XIX. 53-54; Mahābhārata (Śānti-parva) chapters 25, 28, 32, 33; Nyāya-Siddhānta-Muktāvalī, Kārikā 45.

4. Buddha-carita by Koṣambī, p. 52; Bhagavad-Gītā, V. 14.

5. Buddha-carita, p. 171; Dīgha-nikāya, I. 2; Rhys Davids, Dialogues, Part II, p. 69.

6. Nyāya-Sūtra of Gautama, IV. I. 22; Nyāya-Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, III. 2. 31; Mahābhārata (Śānti-parva) 33, 23.

7. Buddha-carita, p. 178; Sūtra-kṛtāṅga, I. 12. 2.

kavāda (Materialism)¹ and Māyā-vāda (Illusionism)² fail to satisfy us. Karma is the basis of Jaina psychology and the key-stone supporting edifice of the Jaina ethics.

(4) The Concept of Nescience

The link between the spirit and the matter is found in the Doctrine of the Subtle Body (Karma-Śarīra or Liṅga-Śarīra), a resultant of the unseen potency and caused by a Principle of Susceptibility due to Passions and Vibrations. The Doctrines of Constitutional Freedom of the soul and its Potential Four-fold Infinities means that the Soul is intrinsically pure and innately perfect. It is due to Karma that it acquires the conditions of nescience. Nescience is opposite to science or knowledge, i. e., through nescience we see reality not as it is and hence we are deluded and misguided. This Ignorance or Nescience is the “force which prevents wisdom shining from within, that is that which holds it in latency.”³ The relation between the soul and the non-soul is beginningless and is due to nescience or avidyā⁴, otherwise called Mithyatva⁵, Ajñāna⁶, Mithyā-Jñāna⁷, Viparyaya⁸, Moha⁹, Darśana-moha¹⁰, Aviveka¹¹, Mala¹² and Pāśa¹³

1. Dīgha-Nikāya, I. 2.
2. Brahma-Sūtra (Śāṅkara-bhāṣya), III. 2. 38.
3. Key of Knowledge by C. R. Jaina, p. 743.
4. Yoga-Darśana, II. 24; Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra, XIX. 2. 10; Kaṭha Upaniṣad, I. 2. 5; Brahma-Sūtra (Śāṅkara bhāṣya), I. 1. 1; Samyutta Nikāya, II. 17. 7-15.
5. Sthānāṅga-Sūtra, X. 1, p. 734.
6. Samaya-Sāra of Kunda-kunda, II. 92.
7. Nyāya-bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, IV. 1. 3.
8. Sāṃkhya-Kārikā of Īśwarakṛṣṇa, Kārikā 47, 48; Praśastapāda-Bhāṣya, p. 538.
9. Nyāya-Sūtra of Gautama, IV. 1. 6.
10. Samaya-prābhṛta of Kunda-kunda, 25-27.
11. Sāṃkhya-Sūtra, VI. 2.
12. Ṣaṭ-ratna-saṅgraha, p. 36.
13. Ibid, p. 38.

etc. in different schools of Indian Philosophy. They are responsible for the worldly existence, or bondage, which is determined by the nature (Prakṛti), duration (Sthiti), intensity (Anubhava) and quantity (Pradeśa)¹ of karmas. Jīvas take matter in accordance with their own karmas because of self-possession (Kaṣāya). This is known as bondages², the causes of which are Delusion (Mithyā-dṛṣṭi), Lack of Control (Avirati), Inadvertence (Pramāda), Passions (Kaṣāya) and Vibrational-activities (Yoga).³

The Jaina term for avidyā is mithyātva, which is divided into categories and sub-categories differently. According to Umāswāmī,⁴ it may be divided into abhigrahita and anabhigrahita; according to Pūjyapāda Devanandī⁵ it may be divided into Naisargika and Paropdeśapūrvaka, the last again sub-divided into four sub-classes. According to Kunda-kunda delusion (moha) may be divided into Mithyātva, ajñāna and avirati⁶; according to the Fourth Karma Grantha, mithyā-darśana is divided into — abhigrahika, anabhigrahika, abhiniveśika, samasvaika and anabhoga.⁷ However, the most popular division is of Pūjyapāda⁸-ekānta, viparīta, vainayika, samśaya and ajñāna with their numerous sub-division. The five-fold causes of bondage is sometimes reduced to two or

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1. Tattvārtha-Sūtra, VIII. 3; Dharma-karma-abhyudayaṃ, XXI. 108; Pañcāstikāya-sāra of Kunda-kunda, V. 148; Karma Grantha, V. 96; Vardhamāna Purāṇa, XVI. 45; Dravya-Saṅgraha by Nemichandra, 33; Adhyātma-Kamala-Mārtanḍa, IV. 7.
 2. Tattvārtha-Sūtra, VIII. 2.
 3. Tattvārtha-Sūtra, VIII. 1; Dravya-Saṅgraha by Nemichandra, 30; Sarvārtha-Siddhi, pp. 374-375.
 4. Tattvārtha-Sūtra, VIII. 1.
 5. Sarvārtha-Siddhi (on Tattvārtha-Sūtra, VIII. 1), p. 375.
 6. Samaya-sāra of Kunda-kunda, 89.
 7. Karma-Grantha, 4. 51.
 8. Sarvārtha-Siddhi, VIII. 1.

three (mithyā-darśana, kaṣāya and yoga or simply kaṣāya and yoga) or four.¹ In short, nescience or mithyātva is at the root of all evils and the cause of worldly existence. The Jainas do not like to bother about its whence and why. It is coeval with the soul, hence eternal and beginningless. Both the questions of the Self and Nescience are accepted as facts on the basis of uncontradicted experience. As the bondage is determined by the karmas, the nature of bondage is determined by the nature of karmas. There are eight fundamental varieties² of these karmas, i. e., jñānāvaraṇīya, darśanāvaraṇīya, vedanīya, mohanīya, āyu, nāma, gotra and antarāya with their different sub-divisions.³ Vidyānanda Swāmī in his Tattvārtha-Śloka-Vārttika⁴ says that as Right Attitude, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct constitute the path to liberation,⁵ the anti-thesis of this Trinity, i. e., Wrong Attitude, Wrong Knowledge and Wrong Conduct must lead to the bondage. If the very outlook is wrong, one cannot expect right knowledge and there cannot be right conduct without right knowledge.⁶ There is close relation between knowledge and action. Conduct is the fulfilment of knowledge.⁷ Theory without practice is useless as practice without theory is blind. Knowledge enlightens, penance purifies and restraint

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1. Tattvārtha-Sūtra, Bhāṣya by Phulchanda Siddhānta Shastri, pp. 367-368.
 2. Adhyātma-Kamala-Mārtanḍa of Kaviraja Malla, IV. 2., p. 89.
 3. Tattvārtha-Sūtra, VIII. 4; Karma-Grantha, I. 2; Dravya-Saṅgraha by Nemichand, 31; Praśamaratī prakaraṇa of Umāswatī, 34.
 4. Mehta, M. L. : Outlines of Jaina Philosophy, pp. 135-138, p. 146 (5, 9, 2, 28, 4, 103, 2 and 5 divisions).
 5. Bhāṣya on Tattvārtha-Sūtra, I. 1, p. 72.
 6. Tattvārtha-Sūtra, I. 1.
 7. Uttarādhyayana-Sūtra, XXVIII. 30.

protects.¹ Even after attaining tattva-jñāna, the soul remains embodied for sometime to enjoy the fruits of its past sañcit karmas.² So on the psychological grounds, the Jainas reject the metaphysical position of all those who subscribe to the Doctrine of Unitary principle (i. e., Wrong knowledge alone) as the cause of the bondage.

(5) The Concept of Omniscience

Definition and Analysis—Omniscience or Keval-Jñāna is a kind of direct but extra-sensory perception, “the perfect manifestation of the innate nature of the self, arising on the complete annihilation of the obstructive veils,”³ which is gained by the destruction of Deluding, Knowledge obscuring, Belief obscuring and Obstructive Karmas,⁴ when the soul is free from all karmic-matter owing to the non-existence of the causes of bondage and to the shedding of all karmas,⁵ the subject-matter of which is all the substances in all their modifications at all the places and in all the times.⁶ Nothing remains unknown to the omniscient.⁷

On analysis of the concept of omniscience, we have to decide whether he is human or divine or both; whether the

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1. Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, Gāthā 1126, 1158.
 2. Tātia, N. M., Ibid, p. 150.
 3. Cf : Sāṃkhya-Kārikā of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, 67; Yoga-Darśana, IV. 30; Nyāya-Sūtra, III. 2. 19; Vaiśeṣika Upaskār, V. 2. 19; Dialogues of the Buddha II, p. 132; Tattvartha-Sūtra-Varttika, p. 72; Vedānta-Sāra (Niklinanda's translation) Śloka 217.
 4. Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā of Hemachandra, 1. 1. 15; Sthānānga-Sūtra, 2. 26.
 5. Tattvartha-Sūtra, X. 1.
 6. Ibid, X. 2.
 7. Ibid, I. 30. Cf : Jaina-Tarka-bhāṣā of Yaśovijaya, 21; Pramāṇa-Naya-Tattvaloka, 2. 22; Āvaśyaka Nirvyukti, 77; Niyama-sāra, 15.

knowledge of an omniscient is simultaneous or successive; whether the power of omniscience is potential or actual; whether an omniscient knows all the objects or simply the most important objects; and whether he knows the past and the future as the present or as the past or future. To the Mīmāṃsakas¹ the term omniscient may either mean (1) the knower of the term 'omniscience' or (2) complete knowledge of one thing such as oil or (3) knowledge of the entire world in a most general way or (4) perfect knowledge of one's own respective scriptural matters or (5) simply knowledge of respective things through the respective Pramāṇas as far as possible.

(6) Historical Development and Comparative Estimate of the Concept of Sarvajñatva

The germinal concept of omniscience can be traced back to the Vedas where Varuṇa sits looking at all. In the Upaniṣads, the state of omniscience is the state of bliss or Turīyā-vasthā. He who knows Brahman, knows everything. Ātman being known everything is known.² Hiraṇyagarbha is Sarvajña.³ Likewise in the Vedānta, the Brahman alone, who is one without a second⁴, is omniscient. In Buddhism, omniscience is granted to the Buddha. True to their non-metaphysical attitude, they do not bother about each and everything⁵, but only about their Four Noble Truths⁶, and their own religious observances etc. Prajñākargupta⁷

1. Tattvārtha-Sūtra-Bhāṣya, I. 47, I. 51.

2. Sanghavi, Sukhalalji : Jñāna-Bindu-Paricaya of Yaśovijaya (Jñāna-maṇḍala, Kashi, V. S. 1998), p. 45.

3. Macdonell, Vedic Mythology, p. 226.

4. Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, 4. 5. 6.

5. Chāndogya-Upaniṣad, 6. 23; Aitareya-Upaniṣad I. 1. 1; Praśna-Upaniṣad, 6. 3. 4; Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣad, 1. 1. 9; Śāṅkara Bhāṣya (Brahma-Sūtra), 2. 1. 22.

6. Chāndogya Upaniṣad, 6. 2. 1.

7. Pramāṇa-Vārttika, 1. 33. 35.

in his commentary on Dharmakīrti's work has established the trio-temporal-spatial omniscience of Sugata and that state is attainable by any man free from attachment and taints. Śāntarakṣita¹ supports this. In idealistic schools of Buddhism like Sūnyavāda and Vijñānavāda, the Concept of omniscience comes very near to that Upaniṣadic monism where all-knowledge amounts to self-knowledge. However to the Buddhists, who subscribe to the Doctrine of Momentary Stream of Consciousness, the fact of omniscience, extending to past and future becomes meaningless. The creating Īśvara of Nyāya school is omniscient.² Vaiśeṣika regards God as omniscient besides other Yogic-souls. Similarly, Alaukika Pratyakṣa of the Nyāya³ school, Asamprajñāta Samādhi of the Yoga⁴, Jīvan-Mukti of Sāṃkhya⁵ and Vedānta⁶ Turīyāvasthā of the Upaniṣads⁷ and Radhakrishnan's⁸ Religious Experience have very clear implications of omniscience, although they partly encroach on the realm of religious mysticism. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, omniscience means knowledge of its seven principles, to the Sāṃkhya it implies intuition of 25 principles, to the Buddhists, it implies the right knowledge of Pañca-skandhas, to the Vedāntins it is the knowledge of the Brahman and to the Jains it will mean the all comprehensive-knowledge of the six categories. Excepting the Mīmāṃsakas⁹ and the Cārvākas all Indian systems believe in the possibility of human omniscience, however, the

1. Pramāṇa-Vārttika, 1. 147-148.

2. Pramāṇa-Vārttikālaṅkāra (Ed. Rahul Sankṛtyāyana).

3. Tattva-Saṅgraha, Śloka 3309, 3328-3329.

4. Upadhye, A. N. : Ibid (Introduction, LXXVIII).

5. Naya-bindu-ṭīkā, p. 15; Nyāya-mañjarī, p. 103; Nyāya-kandalī, p. 195.

6. Yoga-darśana, IV. 29, III. 49.

7. Sāṃkhya-Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Kārikā 67.

8. Vedānta-sāra, Śloka 217.

9. Taittiriya Upaniṣad, II. 9.

Sramaṇic culture insistence on human omniscience more than others to grant infallibility to their prophets, because on this depend the very life and death of their systems.¹

In short, the Doctrine of Omniscience follows as the *sine qua non* from the metaphysical, religious and psychological view-points of each of the school. True to their realistic metaphysics, the Jainas conceive of omniscience as purely human and actual—a direct knowledge of all knowable of all places and times.² The Āgamas and the logical treatises have equated Sarvajñatva with Dharmajñatva.³ Later Jaina thinkers like Samantabhadra⁴, Siddhasena⁵, Akalaṅka⁶, Haribhadra⁷, Vidyānandī⁸ have separated the concept of omniscience⁹ from the idea of religious experience.¹⁰ With Ācārya Kunda-kunda¹¹ Sarvajñatva is a dogma, a religious heritage, almost similar to the Advaitic and Upaniṣadic emphasis on treating Sarvajñatva as Ātmajñatva. The names of other Jaina thinkers such as Umāsvāmī¹², Anantakīrti¹³, Patrakesari¹⁴, Prabha-

1. An Idealistic View of Life, p. 84; Cf : Joad, C. E. M. : Counter Attack from the West, p. 79.
2. Tattva-Saṅgraha, p. 844; Cf : Mīmāṃsā-Śloka-Vārttika, pp. 110-112.
3. Upadhye, A. N. : Ibid (Introduction, LXXIX-LXXX).
4. Cf : Jaina, C. R. : Jaina Psychology, p. 6; Nyāya, the Science of Thought, ch. XVIII.
5. Śaṭkhaṇḍāgama (Payadianu), 78.
6. Āpta-mīmāṃsā, Śloka 5, 6.
7. Sanmati-prakaraṇa, Kārikā 2.
8. Aṣṭa-Śatī, Śloka 5, 6 (Common on Āpta-mīmāṃsā).
9. Śaḍ-darśana-Samuccaya (fourth chapter).
10. Aṣṭa-Sāhasrī (common on Āpta-mīmāṃsā incorporating Aṣṭa-Śatī) 5, 6.
11. Pravacana-sāra of Kunda-kunda (Jñāna-prakaraṇa); Samaya-sāra of Kunda-kunda (Jīva-kāṇḍa).
12. Tattvārtha-Sūtra.
13. Bṛhat-Sarvajña-Siddhi (Manikya Granthamala, Bombay).
14. Pañca-Namaskāra-Stotra.

chandra¹, Abhayadeva Sūri², Rajaśekhara³, Vadibh Singh Sūri⁴, Anantakīrti⁵, Maṇikyanandī⁶, Pūjyapāda Devanandī⁷, Śānti Sūri⁸, Yaśovijaya⁹, Mallavādin¹⁰, Vādi Deva Sūri¹¹, Nemichandra¹², Hemchandra¹³, Mallisena¹⁴, Dharmabhūṣaṇa¹⁵, Devendra Sūri¹⁶, etc. are relevant.

(7) Mimamsaka's Objections and Their Replies

The Mīmāṃsakas try to show that omniscience cannot be established through any of the Pramāṇas.¹⁷ It cannot be established through Pratyakṣa. Perception implies sense-object-contact during the present time and in the case of Kevala-Jñāna, this is lacking. To this, we can say that the question of sense-object-relation is not always valid, because things are beyond the power of senses. Such invisible things like atoms, things or persons remote in time or things far beyond

1. Nyāya-Kumuda-Candra of Prabhacandra (Manika chandra Jaina Granthamala, Bombay); Prameya-Kamala-Mārtanḍa of Prabhacandra (Nirṇaya Sagar Press, Bombay).
2. Commentary on : Sanmati-Prakaraṇa.
3. Syādvāda-Kalika.
4. Syādvāda-Siddhi.
5. Prameya-Ratnamālā.
6. Parīkṣā-Mukham.
7. Sarvārtha-Siddhi.
8. Nyāyāvatāra-Vārttika-Vṛtti (Singhi Jaina Granthamala).
9. Jñāna-Bindu-Prakaraṇa of Yaśovijaya (Singhi Jaina Granthamala).
10. Nyaya-Bindu.
11. Pramāṇa-Naya-Tattvāloka.
12. Dravya-Saṅgraha by Nemichandra.
13. Parīkṣā-Mukham of Manikya Nandī.
14. Syādvād-Manjari.
15. Nyāya-Dīpikā.
16. Karma-Granthas (Atmananda Jaina Granthamala).
17. Mīmāṃsā-Darśana, I. 1. 4.

(like the Meru hill) became known as the object of direct perception, just like the knowledge of existence of fire in hill from the smoke is also the subject-matter of perception.¹ Here we may be reminded of the researches in para-psychology and extra-sensory perception including telepathy and clairvoyance. As for perception, we can say that only a type of perception which claims to know all things of all times and places, can definitely say that omniscient does not exist. But if there is such a type of all-comprehensive perception it is no other than the omniscience.² Similarly, omniscience cannot be established through Anumāna, because we cannot think of a relation of universal concomittance between the Sadhya and the Hetu. Śabda Pramāṇa also cannot prove it, because there is no infallibility of the Āgamic authority to support it and the fallible Āgamas are either created by omniscient or non-omniscient. Now, if it is through omniscient, there is the fallacy of circular reasoning³ and if it is through non-omniscient, there is fallacy of Contradiction.⁴ Upamāna⁵ also cannot establish this, because it works on the basis of imperfect resemblances between two instances, but there is complete absence of any similarity with regard to the omniscient. Arthāpatti⁶ too is helpless, for nothing is affected by the omniscient. Even Abhāva⁷ of omniscience fails to prove its existence. Prabhacandra⁸ following the

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1. Parīkṣā-Mukhaṁ, Verse 2; Cf : Nyāya-Dīpikā, p. 42; Nyāya-Viniścaya, pp. 361-362; Svayambhū Stotra, Kārikā 75; Aṣṭa-Sahasrī, p. 45.
 2. Āpta-mīmāṃsā, Kārikā 97.
 3. Mīmāṃsā-Śloka-Vārttika, p. 81; Tattva-Saṅgraha, p. 831.
 4. Tattva-Saṅgraha, Kārikā 3188-3189.
 5. Ibid, 3190.
 6. Ibid, 3215.
 7. Ibid, 3218.
 8. Nyāya-Kumuda-Candra, Part I, p. 88.
 9. Ibid (Sarvajñatvavāda), pp. 86-97.

pattern of Vidyānandi¹ successfully counteract all these arguments and shows that none of these six Pramāṇas go against omniscience. Even Abhāva must prove it, since all of them implies some reality as their objects.² Besides these epistemological objections the Jainas anticipate some other objections and try to meet them. Regarding the objection that the Arhat is not omniscient because he is a speaker like some vagabond, it is said “there is no contradiction between the speakership and the omniscience. With the perfection of knowledge, verbal skill is also perfected.³ However it may be retorted that Vītarāga Omniscience can not speak for speech is related with desire to speak, and a Vītarāga Omniscient is devoid of any desires. But as a matter of fact, this argument is fallacious. There is no relation between the two. An intelligent person even if he has desire, may not explain the Śāstras and during swoon and dreams, where there is absence of desires, people are seen talking and uttering something.⁴ Similarly, when it is said that the proof of the omniscience follows from the final consummation of the progressive development of cognition⁵, the Mīmāṃsakas object to it and say that there must be a limit of all progress like that in any human activity. The Jainas reply that physical progress is different from mental progress.⁶ Knowledge is limitless and infinite. When the soul shines in full splendour it attains omniscience.⁷ To the objection that if an omniscient knows all the objects of the universe at one instant, nothing remains to be cognised by him in the next moment, hence the

1. Āpta-Parikṣā, pp. 206-229 (Hindi translation Vir Seva Mandir Trust Prakashan).

2. Āpta-Mīmāṃsā, Kārika 98-108.

3. Syādvāda Siddhi, VIII. 3.

4. Ibid, VIII. 4 and VIII. 5.

5. Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā, I. 1. 16.

6. Jaina Darśana (Hindi, Mahendra K. Acharya, Varanasi), p. 311.

7. Tattvartha-Sūtra, X. 1; Sthānāṅga-Sūtra, 226.

soul would turn to be unconscious having nothing to cognise; it is reported that it would have been so only if the perception of the omniscient and also this world-order were destroyed in the following moment. But both of them are eternal. Hence it is foolish to hold that there is one single cognition.¹ With respect to the objection that because the omniscient knows 'everything', he might be tainted by the evils contained in them, it is replied that knowledge is different from active participation.² One cannot be subjected to attachment and miseries simply in knowing them, because we cannot be called a drunker simply as we know about the different ingredients of the drink.³ Next, it is objected that we cannot think of an omniscient because through the world we find only ignorant persons. To this it is said that our ignorance cannot be our excuse. We cannot say that persons like Jamini etc. were ignorant of the Vedas because we do not find any such person at the present time.⁴ When it is argued that since the beginninglessness and endlessness are apparent in the state of omniscience, things must appear in that way, it is replied that the nature of reality does not change in perceiving them. Things appear as they are.⁵ When it is said that because the Āgamas establish omniscience of the Arhat and omniscients also create Āgamas, this is simply paradoxical⁶, it is said that the Āgamas of the present are profited by the past Āgamas. The Mīmāṃsakas say that omniscience may mean either successive or simultaneous knowledge of all objects. Now, if it is regarded as successive knowledge, omniscience becomes impossible since the objects of the world in the past, present and future are inexhaustible, hence the

1. Jaina Psychology (Jaina Sanskriti Sanshodhana Mandala, Varanasi), p. 112.

2. Jaina Darśana, pp. 311-312.

3. Ibid, p. 313.

4. Ibid, p. 313.

5. Ibid, p. 312.

6. Ibid, p. 312.

knowledge would also be ever-complete. If the knowledge is regarded as simultaneous, there will be confusion and contradiction due to the presence of contradictory objects at the same time. Past and future are non-existent at the present time, hence a knowledge about them would always be illusory.

(8) Some Proofs for the Existence of Omniscience

We have to face these difficulties because we regard omniscience only as ordinary perception writ large. As a matter of fact *omniscience is a form of direct simultaneous¹ extra-sensory-perception where there is no scope for CONFUSION, ILLUSION or IGNORANCE.* “Our phenomenal knowledge suggests the noumenal as a necessity of thought, but not known through the empirical Pramāṇas.² Metaphysically, manifold and complete objectivity implies some extra-ordinary perception. Psychologically, differences in intelligence etc. in human beings presuppose the possibility of omniscience, somewhere and in some body. Logically, on account of the lack of contradictory proof, it is established beyond doubt. According to the researches made by Sukhalal Sanghavi, the origin of all these proofs may be traced back to the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali.³ Knowledge like measure and quantity has got degrees, hence knowledge is bound to reach its final consummation.⁴ References about omniscience, in all other literatures⁵, are after the date of the Yoga-Sūtra. In Jaina literature this argument was first of all advocated by Mallavadi,⁶ though the sources concerned are not exactly clear.

1. Prameya-Kamala-Mārtaṇḍa, p. 254, pp. 260-261; Cf : Nyāya-Kumuda-Candra, part I, pp. 88-97; Prameya-Ratna-Mālā, p. 52; Aṣṭa-Sāhasrī, p. 130; Bṛhat Sarvajña Siddhi, p. 130.
2. Radhakrishnan, S. : Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 509.
3. Yoga-Sūtra, I. 25.
4. Syādvāda-Maṅjarī (Hindi Ṭikā), p. 237.
5. Praśastapāda's Comments, Vyomavati, p. 108.
6. Nyāya-cakra (Manuscripts, p. 123), quoted in Jñāna-Bindu-Prakarava of Yaśovijaya, p. 44.

We can sum up the most formidable proofs of Akalaṅka-Deva under the following three categories—firstly, omniscience is proved because there is absolute non-existence of any obstructive-Pramāṇas against it.¹ Akalaṅka tries to prove the existence of omniscience on the basis of truth found in the astronomical spheres, which indicates correctly about the future eclipses of the sun and moon.² Lastly, omniscience follows from the essential nature of the soul as knower of all things. As the sun shines fully after the removal of the clouds, so the self knows everything when the knowledge-obscuring-karmas is completely liquidated.³ According to Vīrasena Svāmī⁴, we can infer about the whole mountain after perceiving a part of it, so we can be sure of complete knowledge in self by perceiving partial knowledge. Samantabhadra has proved the existence through the reasoning based on Anumeyatva⁵, or capable of being known through inference. Dharmabhūṣaṇa explaining this says that ‘perception’ does not mean only ‘actual perception’ but also ‘object of knowledge’⁶. Let us repeat with the author of Āpta-Parīkṣā, “when omniscience is proved by all the six Pramāṇas⁷, who dare to reject it?” None, perhaps none. Omniscience is perfectly consistent with the Jaina conception of knowledge as the removal of veil.⁸

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1. Siddhi-Viniścaya-Ṭīkā (Manuscripts), Ibid, p. 421 (J. S. P.); Cf : Tattva-Saṅgraha, p. 846; Āpta-Parīkṣā, p. 54; Aṣṭa-Sahasrī, p. 47; Tattvārtha-Śloka-Vārttika, p. 13; Śāstra-Vārtā-Samuccaya, p. 80; Prameya-Kamala-Mārtaṇḍa, p. 370; Prameya-Ratna-Mālā, p. 54.
 2. Syādvāda Mañjarī, p. 237.
 3. Jaina Darśana, p. 308.
 4. Aṣṭa-Śatī Kārikā 3; Nyāya-Viniścaya 465; Aṣṭa-Sahasrī, p. 50.
 5. Āpta-Mīmāṃsā, Śloka 5.
 6. Nyāya-Dīpikā, pp. 41-42.
 7. Āpta-Parīkṣā, p. 212.
 8. Tatia, N. M. : Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya, p. 70.

Chapter Four

OMNISCIENCE : MISCONCEPTION AND CLARIFICATION

(1) Meaning of the Term

There is a striking parallel between 'Omniscient' and 'Sarvajña' because the Latin '*Omnis*'¹ corresponds to the Samskr̥t '*sarva*'. Even in ancient Indian languages like Samskr̥t, Pāli, Prākṛt, etc. there are many equivalents of the term 'Sarvajña'², but the most commonly used term is 'Sarvajña' itself. The etymological meaning of Sarvajña is governed by a particular rule according to which the affix 'ka' comes after a verbal root that ends in long ā, when there is no prefix preceding it and when the object is in composition with it (*ato-anupsarge kaḥ*).³ As the Pāli⁴ and Prākṛt⁵ grammars

1. Lewis, C. T. & Short, C. (ed.) : *A Latin Dictionary* (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1879 rev. 1927), p. 1265.
2. Vācaspatyam (ed.), T. Bhattācārya (Varanasi Chowkhamba Samskr̥t Series, 1962, 8 vols.), Vol. VI, p. 5208 gives its different meanings; Śabda Kalpadrumaḥ (ed.), R. K. Deva (Delhi : Moti Lal Banarasidas, 1961, 5 vols.), Vol. 5, p. 303; Āpte's Practical Samskr̥t Dictionary (ed.) P. K. Gode & G. C. Karve (Poona : Prasad Prakashan, 1959), Part III, p. 1656 agree with Vācaspatyam; Monier & Moneir Williams (A Samskr̥t English Dictionary, Oxford Clarendon Press, New ed., 1956, p. 1185) gives 30 references chosen from the varied fields of Samskr̥t literature.
3. Pāṇini, Aṣṭādhyāyī (ed.) S. C. Vasu (Allahabad : Paṇini Office, 1887), III. 2. 3.
4. Rhys Davids, T. W., Stede, W. : Pāli-English Dictionary (Surrey, Pāli Text Society, 1921), pp. 139-140; Pāli Mahavyākaraṇa (ed.), J. Kashyapa (Sarnath; Mahabodhi Society, 1940), p. 2.
5. Suri, V. R. (ed.) : Abhidhān Rājendraḥ (Ahmedabad : R. J. S. Singh, 1925), Vol. 7, p. 567,

practically follow the rules of Sanskrit, the dictionary meanings of other important European languages like German¹, Russian², Italian³, Spanish⁴, French⁵, English⁶ etc. are generally grounded on the Latin meaning.⁷ Thus literally, the term 'Omniscience' means 'all-knowledge' or 'knowledge of all'. But the terms 'all' and 'knowledge' are used or can be used in different contexts. Similarly the term 'omniscient' has got both straight forward and idiomatic meanings. When we call a man 'omniscient', we do not mean that he knows everything, we simply mean that he is very learned and he knows a lot. Thus there is a distinction between the 'strict' and the 'hyperbolic' meanings of the term. Then there are special meanings also that are determined by the philosophical and cultural background of a particular system.

It is clear that the lexical works do help to determine the meaning of a term but they cannot finally decide the meaning because they report only the existing usages. While retaining the lexical identity, the term may have different connotations,

1. Breul, K. : *A New German and English Dictionary* (London, Cassell & Co., 1906), p. 321, Omniscient = *all wissend*.
2. Segal, L. (ed.) : *New Complete English-Russian Dictionary* (London : Lund Hampheries & Co., 1948), p. 654.
3. Boulle, J. & Payne-Payne, De V. (ed.) : *A New French and English Dictionary* (London : Cassell & Co., 1905), p. 331.
4. Wessely, J. E. & Payne G. R. (ed.) : *A Dictionary of the English and Italian Languages* (Leipzig, 1909), p. 135.
5. Bensely, E. R. (ed.) : *A New Dictionary of Spanish and English Languages* (Paris : Ganeir Brothers, N. D.), p. 453.
6. *A New English Dictionary* (ed.) James Murry (18 Vols., Oxford 1888-1928), Vol. VII, p. 109; *Webster's New International Dictionary* (Springfield, 1950, 2nd edition), p. 1368; *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* (2 Vols., Oxford, 1947), Vol. II, p. 1386.
7. *Omni* is a combining form of Latin *Omnis*, as *Omnigenes*, *Omnivalense*, *Omnipresence*, *Omniscientia* etc.

hence the meanings of the term 'omniscience' also differ accordingly. For example, "the man who knows the word 'all' may be 'all-knowing' in name."¹ It means that the man who knows the meaning of 'all' will also know what it signifies. But this is a meaning in *name* only for no one can prevent another person from giving a word any meaning he likes. The meaning of a term depends upon human stipulation. *Secondly*, a man may be called 'omniscient', if he knows about everything of a given context (for example, the names of all dramas of Kālidāsa and Shakespear). This is precisely the hyperbolic or idiomatic meaning, when a versatile genius or highly learned man is discribed as 'omniscient'.² A third meaning of 'all' may be understood in the sense of the epitome of the world included under the two categories, *positive* and *negative*.³ There are two defects here. This is very vague and not exhaustive in particular details. Then we may delimit the use of the term 'all' in a particular system hence the meaning of the term is bound to vary from system to system.⁴ To get rid of this difficulty, one may say that the term 'all' stands for the *object of cognition*.⁵ But the Mīmāṃsakas may say that there are supra sensible things which can not be cognised by the six means of a cognition.⁶ We know, the Mīmāṃsakas restrict the application of the term to mean the knowledge of *duty* (*dharma*)⁷, while the Buddhists limit it to the knowledge of *morality* (*Heya-Upādeya*)⁸ and to the Jainas, it is the

1. Śāntarakṣita, Tattva-Saṅgraha (with Commentary of Kamala-śīla, (ed.) G. N. Jha (2 Vols., Baroda Oriental Institute, 1939), Vol. II, Kārikā 3130.
2. Ibid, K. 3131.
3. Ibid, K. 3132.
4. Ibid, K. 3134.
5. Ibid, K. 3134.
6. Śloka-Vārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (ed.) G. N. Jha.
7. Ibid, II. 68.
8. Dharmakīrti, Pramāṇa-Vārttika (ed.) Rāhul Sāṅkṛtyāyana (Allahabad : Kitab Mahal, 1943), I. 33, II. 34.

knowledge of “all substances with all their attributes and modes in all times and in all places.” (*Sarva-dravya-guṇa Paryāyeṣu*).¹

(2) Analysis of the Meaning of the term Omniscience

If we suppose that omniscience means the knowledge of ‘all substances with all their modes’, we can ask : whether omniscience is false or true knowledge ? If it is false, it is sheer non-sense but if it is true, we can further ask : “whether it is knowledge of only the *important things* or of *all* the things.” If it is the former, it is not omniscience in the sense under study, if it is latter it raises a further question : Is it the knowledge of all the objects *without* or *with* their *attributes*. If we accept the first alternative, it will raise many complicated metaphysical issues, such as whether or not an object can be known without knowing its attributes or whether objects and their attributes are so separable in knowledge even if not in reality ? Thus, the second alternative is accepted which will imply ‘knowledge of objects *with* their attributes’. But on further analysis, it will raise another question : whether the knowledge is of all *objects* with *some* or *all* attributes ? If the former, the scope becomes limited, if the latter, there is another dilemma. Is such a knowledge restricted to *some* particular place or to *all the places* ? If we accept the first alternative, it becomes restricted in space but if we accept the second alternative, we are faced with a further problem : whether the omniscient knowledge (unlimited in space) covers the entire *present* only or the entire span of time—past, present and future. If we accept the former, it is restricted to the present moment only but if we accept the second alternative, there is another difficulty : whether such knowledge is *successive* or *simultaneous* ? If it be successive, there can be no omniscience for *all* the *objects* with *all attributes* and *modes* at *all places* and at *all times* can never be exhausted. But if it is taken to be *simultaneous*, there crops yet another

1. Tattvārtha-Sūtra of Umāsvāmī (Ārrah, 1920), I. 29.

difficulty : Is such a simultaneous knowledge obtained by a single act of cognition or by a series of cognitions ? The first alternative is unacceptable since then it would be impossible to distinguish between contradictory things and characteristics like heat and cold simultaneously through the act of one single cognition. But suppose, if it can be known through a single supernormal cognition brought about by communion, then there can be no means of cognition to vouch for such knowledge because it is not produced either by perception, inference or authority. But if we accept the second alternative, we can still ask : whether it is *actual* or *possible* ? If it is *actual* it would be difficult to conceive a state of knowledge obtained through several cognitions covering even mutually contradictory things. Then it is impossible to apprehend even in hundreds of thousands of years each one of the innumerable things and thus characteristics of all places and at all times. But to avoid this difficulty, if we suppose that such a knowledge is only possible we are again confronted with another problem. If it is possible to know all things and their attributes simultaneously, nothing will remain to be known by the omniscient being. In that case after having the knowledge, he would behave as an unconscious being, since he will have left nothing to cognate. Supposing, for the moment that we somehow try to overcome this difficulty, we shall still be beset with another problem : Whether past and future will be known as present or as they are, i. e., the past as past and the future as future. If we accept the first alternative, distinction of *time* will be lost because the past and the future will merge into the immediate present. But if we accept the second alternative it will imply that the omniscient being cognise the past and the future which are at present non-existents. Thus, in both cases, our knowledge would be illusory and wrong.

(3) Categorization

In order to avoid these difficulties involved in the analysis of the concept of omniscience, it has been interpreted to mean the knowledge "important and essential things through their

important characteristics” and not of “each and everything in their numerical details.” But it may be told that unless all the objects with all their attributes are known, how can the distinction between the ‘essential’ and the ‘non-essential’ be made. Even if it be possible, some of the old difficulties will reappear. But supposing as it is, even then we can ask : what does this omniscience (as the knowledge of important things through their important characteristics) refer to ? To this question, there are some answers in Indian thought, but for my convenience, I shall choose only three for their elucidation and examination : (a) Omniscience as the knowledge of reality, (b) Omniscience as the knowledge of duty and (c) Omniscience as knowledge of the self. I shall take one by one :

(a) *Omniscience as the Knowledge of Reality* — Suppose, omniscience means knowledge of reality, it is to be clarified : whether it implies the knowledge of the ‘transcendental reality’ or the ‘empirical reality’. If it be the former it will mean difficulty in different systems of thought and metaphysics. But if we do not bind ourselves to any particular metaphysical stand-point and instead vaguely hold the general view that omniscience means knowledge of the essential things, we are faced with a difficult task of explaining the status of the *contingent* and its relationship to the *essential*. The Sāṃkhya for example, may say that the knowledge of the *essential* implies that of the contingent world. But if we admit that the knowledge of the essence does not contain the knowledge of the accident, we shall have to turn ourselves to the pluralistic-realistic systems. However, if we accept the second alternative that omniscience is the knowledge of the empirical reality, there is perhaps then no need of philosophy as the different sciences are already doing the work. But no scientist ever makes any claim to omniscience. But suppose we do have knowledge of reality anyhow in any sense, there still remains a problem : whether it is knowledge of the *temporal* or *non-temporal* reality ? If we accept the first position, we shall have to argue with science that omniscience is not possible.

But if we accept the second view that the ultimate reality is far from spatio-temporal limitations, we will be driven to an idealistic view of the universe. Thus, either we accept the views of science according to which omniscience is not possible or we accept the idealistic position, in which case again, there can be no unanimity.¹

(b) *Omniscience as Knowledge of Duty* — Viewing those difficulties, omniscience has been treated as the knowledge of duty (*dharma*), since our moral life and hence its knowledge is of supreme value to us. Here omniscience (*Sarvajñatā*) will be equated with the knowledge of duty (*dharmajñatā*). But even this religious-ethical approach involves some difficulties : whether *duty*, referred to here, is duty in general (*Sāmānya dharma*) or duty in particular (*Varṇāśrama dharma*). If the first alternative is accepted, there may be conflicting lists, since duties vary from person to person and to the same person from time to time. If we adopt the second alternative, another difficulty will arise : whether the particular duty is *private* or *public* ? If the former, it may lead to narrowness and sectarianism; but if it is the latter, we have to explore some universal and eternal principles of duty, which is very difficult. Even the concept of 'Universal Religion' is still an utopia.²

(c) *Omniscience as Knowledge of Self* — To simplify matter we can give up the dualistic approach of subject and object

1. For the most part of this analysis, I am indebted to Abhidhāna Rājendra of V. Sūri (Ratlam : J. S. S. 1927, 7 Vols.), Vol. III, pp. 567-585; Nyāya-Kumuda-Candra of Prabhacandra (Bombay : M. C. D. Jaina Series, 1938), Vol. I, pp. 86-97; Prameya-Kamala-Mārtaṇḍa of Prabhacandra (Bombay : S. B. Pandurang, 1921), pp. 247-264; Āpta-Parīkṣā of Vidyānandi (Saharanpur : Vir Seva Mandir, 1949), pp. 206-239.
2. Śloka-Vārttika of Kumārila, II, 111-112; Tattva-Saṅgraha of Śānta Rakṣita, K. 3135.

and identify the object with the subject. Here the knowledge of the object is identical with the knowledge of the subject. However, this meaning of omniscience as the knowledge of the Self is highly specialised and metaphysical because Sarvajñatā is identical with Ātmajñatā.”¹

(4) Implications of Omniscience : Doubts and Difficulties

Those who argue for the existence of omniscience as a fact, rests on metaphysical postulates that knowledge is the self-functioning of the self. This is theory of the innate possession of omniscience by every soul. What is needed is the actualisation of this potentiality. This is a controversial question, whether there is soul or not and if there is, whether even potentially it is capable of knowing everything. But if we accept these metaphysical postulates, there are serious moral implications. If one knows the future acts of human beings, there was no meaning in voluntary action. So Locke says about omniscience of God : “If God exists and is essentially omniscient, no human action is voluntary.”² Augustine also says : “If you say, God foreknows that a man will sin, he must necessarily sin. But if there is necessity there is no voluntary choice of sinning but rather fixed and unavoidable necessity.”³ To say that since God compels no man to sin, though he sees before-hand those who are going to sin by their own will.⁴ God’s omniscience cannot entail determinism on the analogy of an intimate friend having the fore knowledge of another’s voluntary actions without affecting his friend’s moral freedom, is not a very good argument. A per-

1. Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad, II. 4. 5.

2. John Locke : *Essays Concerning Human Understanding*, Book IV, Ch. XXI, Sec. 8-11; Cp. Boethius : “If God is omniscience no human action is voluntary”, *Consolation Philosophiae*, Part V, Sec. III.

3. St. Augustine : *The City of Gods*, Book V, Sec. 9.

4. St. Augustine : *The Libero Arbitrio*, Cp. Fredrich Schievermae, *The Christian Faith*, Part I, Sec. 2, Para 56.

son's knowledge about the future action of an intimate friend of his is at most a good guess and not a definite knowledge. To say that a man is free to do something which without knowing that it is within his power to do otherwise is not freedom but ignorance. What is foreseen is necessary and what is necessary is outside the scope of ethics.¹ However, if it is said that "it is not because God foreknows what he foreknows that men act as they do, it is because men act as they do that God foreknows what he foreknows,"² will create awkward situation in which man's actions will determine God's knowledge. But suppose if it is the case of human omniscience it will mean that the knowledge of the omniscient being is not unfettered but determined by the actions of other men. But since different people perform different actions, it will create a difficult situation for the cognising mind. To say that the omniscient being believes in an infinitely large number of true synthetic propositions is vague and self-contradictory, for this depends upon the belief at least in one proposition : "Nothing is unknown to him". But this is to admit his omniscience and hence it is like arguing in a circle.³

(5) Validation and Vindication

But such a 'Vicious circularity'⁴ as Fugel says, we cannot escape when we cannot *validate* any fundamental principle or ideal like this. J. S. Mill also says that "questions

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1. Fred Newman : "Omniscience is Possible", *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, Sydney, Vol. 42, No. 1, May 64.
 2. Nelson Pike : "Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action", *The Philosophical Quarterly* (Cornell University), Vol. LXXIV, No. 1, Jan. 65, p. 32.
 3. F. Newman makes a distinction between two senses of *omniscience* : *necessary* and *actual* like Buddha's distinction between *dispositional* and *unqualified* omniscience and Jainas distinction between *potential* and *actual*.
 4. Sellers, W. and Hospers, J. (ed.) : *Readings in Ethical Theory* (New York Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953). Fugel

of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof"¹ or as Carnap says that it is necessary always to distinguish between 'question within² a presupposed frame' and 'question concerning the frame'. In order to grasp this situation, a fundamental distinction often neglected and blurred, must be made between the two types of justifying principles or knowledge-claims, namely, *validation* and *vindication*. Validation generally means a vigorous logical proof or 'legitimising of knowledge-claims'. Vindication on the other hand, means the justification of an action, which is, though weaker than validation, is an equally respectable method, especially when we know that validation is impossible in matters of fundamental principles.

It seems that although the logicians have exhibited great diabolical skill in enunciating the concept of omniscience and arguing for its exemplification in reality the concept has not been made altogether clear or completely defensible. But apart from the rational approach, there is also another approach. It is sometimes called the approach of faith or the intuitional approach, which is applicable in matters of supra-sensible and beyond space-time objects. The non-rational (ahetuvāda) approach though different from the rational approach (hetuvāda) is not an irrational approach. After all, there are limitations to our reason as there are limitations

in his essay "Validation and Vindication : An Analysis of the future and the limits of Ethical Arguments" discusses the problem of justification not only with reference to ethical principles but also in regard to the more fundamental principles of deduction, induction and the criterion of factual meaningfulness.

1. J. S. Mill : *Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government* (ed.) A. D. Lindsay (London : J. M. Dent & Sons, 1960), p. 4.
2. R. Carnap : "Semantics and Ontology", *Revue Internationale*, 11. 1. 1950.

to our senses. Thus, there are two separate fields of investigation¹, science and spirituality. Science deals with spatio-temporal phenomena with the help of senses and common-sense reasoning including scientific experiment. But there are other fields also, unexplored and also beyond the scope of scientific reach. It seems that there are different ways of knowing. True, there is the western emphasis on critical intelligence and eastern emphasis on creative intuition but there is universal recognition of the spirit in man. It is necessary to be *reasonable* and not *logical*. Our whole logical life grows on the foundations of a deeper insight. If intuitive knowledge does not supply us with universal major premises which we can neither question nor establish, our life will come to an end. Intuitions are not substitutes for thought. They are challenges to intelligence. This spirit of man or creativity is felt everywhere in artistic achievement and poetic genius, religious experiences and ethical life, in scientific genius and psychological life.²

The concept of omniscience is such a concept, which can admit of vindication (justification actions) on the ground of faith which is supported by the seers having intuitional insight. Modern researches in the field of para-psychology specially in clairvoyance, clair-audience, precognition, telepathy etc. also support the knowledge which can be gained by transcending space-time and the senses. The science of Yoga can be also examined in this direction. It has been the abiding spiritual ambition of man to extend the frontiers of his knowledge. The very attempt to put a limit, an absolute limit to our knowledge is unscientific. It was customary for the old philosophy to discredit the knowledge gained by the senses,

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1. Sanmati-Tarka of Siddhasena Divākara, III. 43-45; Āpta-mīmāṃsā, of Samantabhadra, 76-78.
 2. Radhakrishnan, S. : *An Idealistic View of Life* (London : Gey Allen & Unwin, 1947), Ch. IV; *Intellect and Intuition*, Ch. V; *The Spirit in Man*.

as it was for an old fashioned theology to discredit the nature of the worth of the body.¹ Both have proved to be erroneous. Human thinking with regard to goodness, duty and morality, art and beauty, “extends without assignable limit the knowledge of mankind.”² The growth of human knowledge has been a sort of progressive limitation of sceptical and agnostic attitude. Thus the possibility of omniscience is also contained in the ideal of knowledge or ideal of science. Even in the ideal of epistemological certainty without which all our claims to knowledge must be suspects’’³ suggests that the quest for certainty in knowledge is indeed a quest towards omniscience. In reasoning, context is not seen simultaneously with the meaning which has to be the object of reflection and analysis. Thus reason cannot make prime discoveries. The miracle of mind is well-known. What is needed is to unfold the gates of mind and extend the limitless horizon of knowledge.



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1. Ladd, G. T. : *Knowledge of Life and Reality* (Yale University, 1918), p. 97.
 2. Ibid, pp. 98-99.
 3. Ayer, A. J. : *The Problem of Knowledge* (London : Macmillan & Co., 1958), p. 41.

Chapter Five

SIX APPROACHES TO OMNISCIENCE IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

The acceptance or non-acceptance of the idea of Omniscience in a particular system of Indian Philosophy can provide us with a new principle of division of the Indian systems. There are those like the Buddhists, the Jainas, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the Sāṃkhya-Yogins and the Vedāntins who accept the idea of Omniscience either as a religious dogma or as an epistemological-metaphysical principle. However, the idea is very important and fundamental both to the śāstras and common usages. Its germinal concept can be traced back even to the Vedas.¹

However, the Cārvākas, the Indian Agnostics, the Mīmāṃsakas reject the very idea of omniscience. The Carvākas, for example will naturally reject such an assumption because the last word in the Lokāyata epistemology is direct sense-perception.² Hence, they cannot accept anything which is transempirical or transcendental like soul³, God⁴, Paraloka⁵,

1. Macdonell, A. A. : *Vedic Mythology*, Strassburg, 1897, pp. 22-26.
2. Debi Prasad Chattopadhyay thinks that "the purely destructive or negative character of the Lokāyata-epistemology, as depicted by Mādhava (*Sarva-Darśana-Saṅgraha*, Eng. trans. E. B. Cowell, R. E. Gough, London, 1914), was fictitious Lokāyata. People's Publishing House, 1949, p. 30. He is of the opinion that though the Lokāyata-emphasis is on the Primacy of sense perception, it accepts reason also. See Ch. 1, Section 8.
3. Shastri, D. R. (ed.) : *Cārvāka-Śaṣṭhī*, The Book Co. Calcutta, 1928, Verses 14 & 49.
4. Ibid, Verses 41 & 42.
5. Ibid, Verses 33, 54 & 55.

Karmaphala¹ (the consequences of good-evil actions). If the existence of Ātman or the eternal metaphysical subject is denied, the very idea of omniscience is put to a naught. Soul is supposed to be the substratum of knowledge and when this ground is lost, the entire edifice falls down. Attributes cannot exist without the substance.

The Indian Agnostics Sceptics accept a self-imposed limitation to their knowledge, while the Nihilists by their attitude leave no room for any discussion upon this subject. Knowledge by its very nature is limited. However, refined and developed it might be, it cannot grasp all the complexion and substitution of the whole world in the past, present and future. The reality, to use Kant's words, is unknown and unknowable.

However, the worst critics of the doctrine of Omniscience, are the Indian Retreatists or Mīmāṃsakas. Strangely enough, though they accept the unchallengeable authority of the Vedas and its fundamental dogmas like the Soul, Heaven, Rebirth, and Pre-birth etc., they openly and most avoided by deny the existence of the omniscience God. The reason is obvious and somewhat extra-ontological but thoroughly practical. The Mīmāṃsakas are essentially ritualists. To them rituals and their proper performances can guarantee us the highest good of life. So they in their enthusiasm to accord the supreme place for the rituals and their sources, i. e., the scriptures, they have denied the existence and personal God. According to them the Vedas are eternal and gospel truth. They are infalliable and impersonal.² Kumāṛila's criticisms of the idea of Omniscience are well known.³ Since, the teachings of

1. Shastri D. R. : *Short History of Indian Materialism*, The Book Co., Calcutta, 1930, p. 17.

2. Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra (with Śabara's Bhāṣya), I. 1-2; Mīmāṃsā Śloka-Vārttika, 110-112; Dinkarī, p. 29.

3. Śloka-Vārttika, II. 110-143, II. 139-141.

Buddha, Mahāvīra and Kapila differ among themselves.¹ Kumārila has a ground to ask the readers how the Omniscience have different views regarding the same thing ?

Omniscience, literally means, all knowledge or the perfect knowledge. This may apparently look to be a very simple idea but really it involves many problems. Let us discuss a few of them.

All-knowledge is rather a very vague term. We have to see whether this knowledge is to be taken denotatively or connotatively, i. e., whether an omniscient being knows all the objects with all their attributes *numerically* or through their important characteristics. Then if Omniscience means knowledge of Past, Present and Future, we have to know whether the Omniscience knows past and future as the present or past as past and future as future. In brief, whether Omniscient knowledge is simultaneous or successive, is an important question. Now, let us also discuss, who is an Omniscient ? Whether he is human or divine or both ? We know that there are references both about human and divine Omniscience in our religious and philosophical literature. But then, we have to find out whether the concept of human Omniscience has developed out of the idea of divine Omniscience or Vice Versa ? Even, just to satisfy our sense of history, we have to find out the particular system that has laid the foundation of this idea and it would be more interesting to know the socio-cultural causes for the emergence of this idea which is so much talked about in our books. Whether this idea is the product of pure philosophical speculation or a mere religious dogma or both ? It is generally argued that the idea, at first, evolved as a religious dogma but later on logical arguments were also advanced to defend its validity. This view finds its support in the fact that the validity or invalidity of the Vedas formed the main planck of all discussions for and against

1. Tattva-Saṅgraha, K. 3148-3149, सुगतो यदि सर्वज्ञः कपिलो नेति का प्रमा । अथो भाषय सर्वज्ञो मतभेदः तयोः कथम् ।

the idea of Omniscience. Connected with this, we have to discuss the relation between the idea and God and Omniscience. Apparently, we do not see any relation save and except the fact that Omniscience is regarded as a divine attribute of God. But in Indian Philosophy, both the theistic and the athiestic schools have supported the idea of Omniscience. For example, the theistic systems like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika¹ and Yoga² along with the athiestic schools like Sāṃkhya³, Jainism⁴ and Buddhism⁵ and purely metaphysical disciplines like the Upaniṣads⁶ and the Vedānta⁷ accept Omniscience. Ofcourse, there are certain differences too. For example, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas accept the idea of both divine and human Omniscience. However, Omniscience is a capacity of knowledge only among the Yogis and not ordinary average people. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika do not regard Omniscience as a pre-conditions of Mokṣa because the state of Mokṣa is the state of utter unconsciousness. Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Vedānta also do not insist upon attainment of Omniscience as a pre-condition of Mokṣa as otherwise held by the Jainas.

Then there is yet another very important problem : the relation between the two very important and related concepts of Sarvajñatā (Omniscience) and Dharmajñatā (Revelation). We have to see whether the idea of Sarvajñatā is a product of the idea of Dharmajñatā or vice versa. Buddhism is the veri-

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1. Padārthadharma-Saṅgraha of Praśastapāda, p. 187; Nyāya-Kandalī of Praśastapāda, p. 195; Bhāṣa Pariccheda of Viśwanātha, Section 3; Vaiśeṣika Sūtra of Kaṇāda, IX. 1. 11-15.
 2. Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali, I. 43; III. 16.
 3. Sāṃkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya of Vijñānabhikṣu, 1. 91.
 4. Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā of Hemchandra, 1. 1.
 5. Pramāṇa Vārttika of Dharmakīrti, 1. 33; 1. 35.
 6. Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, IV. 5. 6.
 7. Śāṅkara Bhāṣya on Brahma-Sūtra of Vādarāyaṇa, I. 2. 8; I. 3. 13.

table champion of Dharmajñatā because Buddhas's Omniscience is the sense of Dharmajñā or Mārgajñā (Path-leader). It senses that both these principles of Omniscience and revelation have got independent origins, although later on they have fused together. As pointed out earlier that the Buddhists, at first, subordinates the idea of Sarvajñatā to the idea of Dharmajñatā but later on, perhaps on account of the Jaina influences, we find separate and independent treatment of Omniscience even at the hands of the Buddhists. Lord Buddha becomes an Omniscient deity. However, this is interesting to know that the sectarian bias of each of the schools like the Jainas, Buddhists, Sāṅkhyas lead them to think only their own perceptor as Omniscient and non-else. This has naturally led the Mimāṃsakas to put them in a very awkward position. How is it that if all of them are Omniscientists, they differ so vitally.

Before, I take up a fuller discussion of the problem, I like to discuss broadly the six main approaches to the concept of Omniscience in Indian Philosophy.

SIX APPROACHES TO THE CONCEPT OF OMNISCIENCE IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

(1) The Approach of Worship

The Vedic Approach to the concept of omniscience is the Approach of Worship. There is a tendency to extol each of the many gods as the Supreme God, who is naturally the Creator of the universe and possessing the attributes of omnipotence, omniscience etc. However in the whole of the Vedas, the particular term Sarvajñatva or Sarvajñatā never occurs, yet there are many words denoting the meaning of the said word, as can be inferred from the following expressions : Viśva Vedas¹, Viśva Vid², Viśvani Vidvan³, Sarvavit⁴,

1. Rg-veda, 1. 21. 1; Sāma-veda, 1. 1. 3.

2. Atharva-veda, 1. 13. 4; Rg-veda, 10. 91. 3.

3. Rg-veda, 9. 4. 85; 10. 122. 2.

4. Atharva-veda, 17. 1. 11,

Jātvedas¹, etc. However, throughout all these discussions, 'Omniscience' is a purely divine attribute. No where is found a single passage where it is human. However, there are prayer-passages to the gods to grant infinite knowledge and strength.² In the Vedic speculation, which is mostly primitive and crude, we find that each god at first is a symbol of Nature or a picture of the gross physical world as indicated by names. Hence, we find the concept of physical omnipresence and physical omniscience as can be inferred from the following expressions : Sahasrākṣa³, Viśvataścakṣuḥ⁴, Viśva-Draṣṭaḥ⁵, Viśva-carsane⁶, etc. Infact, this physical omnipresence forms the basis of their physical omniscience. Omniscience of these gods are more physical than psychological or mental, so much so that the power of vision is glorified more often than the power of mind. Such omniscience of Lord Varuṇa is evident.⁷ The words Paśyati, Prati-paśyati, Mahā-paśyati and Sarvaṁ-paśyati⁸, are very suggestive in this respect (The omniscience of Agni⁹, Indra¹⁰, Varuṇa¹¹, Vaka¹², Puruṣa¹³, Soma¹⁴, etc. Is referred here and there.).

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1. Atharva-veda, 1. 7. 2; 1. 7. 5; 1. 9. 3; 2. 128; 2. 292; 3. 1; 3. 2. 1; 4. 15. 10; 4. 234; 4. 39. 1; 4. 40. 1-8; 3. 15. 8; 3. 22. 4.
 2. Sāma-veda, 1. 2. 199; Ṛg-veda, 8. 93. 34.
 3. Atharva-veda, 4. 28. 3; Sāma-veda, 3. 1. 1; Yajur-veda, 31. 1.
 4. Ṛg-veda, 10. 81. 3.
 5. Atharva-veda, 6. 107. 4.
 6. Ṛg-veda, 9. 48. 5; Atharva-veda, 4. 32. 4.
 7. Atharva-veda, 4. 16. 5.
 8. Ibid, 4. 16. 2.
 9. Ṛg-veda, 1. 1. 1-2, 1. 12. 1.
 10. Sāma-veda, 1. 2. 199, 1. 4. 352, 1. 4. 382.
 11. Atharva-veda, 4. 16. 5, 4. 16. 2.
 12. Ibid, 4. 20. 4, 4. 40. 2.
 13. Yajur-veda, 33. 1.
 14. Ṛg-veda, 9. 66. 1.

(2) Approach of Ātmajñātā

In the Upaniṣads, the concept of Sarvajñatva has been equated with the concept of Ātmajñatva or Brahmajñatva. When 'All this is Ātman'¹, we can conclude that 'Ātman being known everything is known'.² It is a common assertion of the Upaniṣads that 'By knowing the Ātman, one knows everything'.³ However, Ātman and Brahman are used synonymously, as expressed in the following. This 'Self is the Brahman'.⁴ 'I am Brahman'.⁵ Like the expression 'All this is Ātman' we have the expression 'All this is Brahman'.⁶ The famous Upaniṣadic dictums 'That thou art'⁷ and 'I am Brahman'⁸ affirm this identification. This makes clear that the concept of Brahman is the primal and pivotal concept of the Upaniṣads⁹ together with the concept of Ātman. So like the conversation in the Brhadāraṇyaka¹⁰, we also meet a similar conversation in the Muṇḍak about

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1. Chāndogya Upaniṣad, 7. 25. 2.
 2. Brhadāraṇyak Upaniṣad, 4. 5. 6.
 3. Chāndogya Upaniṣad, 6. 21; Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad, 6. 8. 7; Brhadāraṇyak Upaniṣad, 6. 8. 7, 3. 7. 1, 4. 5. 6; Praśna Upaniṣad, 4. 10-11; Kaṭha Upaniṣad, 2. 1. 3, 2. 2. 15; Śaṇḍilya Upaniṣad, 2. 3; Trivadvibhūti Mahānārāyaṇīya Upaniṣad, Ch. 8, p. 382; Gaṇeśottartapin Upaniṣad, Ch. IV, p. 637; ch. VI, p. 640.
 4. Chāndogya Upaniṣad, 3. 14. 1.
 5. Brhadāraṇyak Upaniṣad, 1. 4. 10.
 6. Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad, 2. 2. 11; Brhadāraṇyak Upaniṣad, 2. 4. 6, 1. 5. 6, 1. 4. 1.
 7. Chāndogya Upaniṣad, 6. 8. 7; Aitareya Upaniṣad, 5. 3; Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, 1. 16.
 8. Brhadāraṇyak Upaniṣad, 1. 4. 10.
 9. Ibid, 1. 4. 10; Maitrī Upaniṣad, 6. 77; Kauṣṭaki Upaniṣad, 4. 19.
 10. Brhadāraṇyak Upaniṣad, 4. 5. 6.

Brahman when Śaunaka enquires from Aṅgīrā 'knowing what one knows everything' it is replied that 'It is Brahman'¹.

While the term 'Sarvajñatā' does not occur even a single time in the whole of the Vedas, it occurs for 31 times in the whole of 120 Upaniṣads but where as in the principal Upaniṣads the term denotes 'knowledge about the Self', in the minor Upaniṣads, we find references about the omniscience of God and other deities. We pass from the Vedic conception of Physical omniscience to the metaphysical omniscience of the Upaniṣads. Soul-knowledge is all-knowledge, hence the Upaniṣadic message : 'Know thyself'². But this 'soul-knowledge' which is equivalent to 'all-knowledge' does not mean each and every details of the contingent world. It would simply mean the complete negation of nescience, the cosmic-illusion, by fully grasping the underlying reality. Strangely enough, this Ātmanic Approach to knowledge is common both to the Upaniṣads and some of the Jaina thinkers like Kunda-kunda and Yogīndu. Kunda-kunda identifies Sarvajñatā with Atmajñatā meaning thereby that any ethics of self-realisation must aim at knowing the Self which is the highest principle of their metaphysics and morality. But at some places there is greater emphasis over Brahman³ or even the Creator God and His omniscience than this subject-objectless Ātman⁴.

1. Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad, 1. 1. 3, 1. 1. 6.
2. Chāndogya Upaniṣad, 7. 1. 1, 6. 1. 1-3; Brhadāraṇyak Upaniṣad, 3. 7. 1; Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad, 1. 1. 37.
3. Kaṭha-Upaniṣad (Śāṅkara Bhāṣya), 2. 2. 13; Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, 1. 6; Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad 1. 1. 9, 2. 2. 7; Kena Upaniṣad (Śāṅkara Bhāṣya), 3. 1; Śvetaśvatara Upaniṣad, 1. 4, 1. 9; Maitrayaṇīya Upaniṣad, 7. 1. 3. 21; Subala Upaniṣad, Ch. 5, p. 245; Śuka-Rahasya, 1. 9, p. 257.
4. Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad (Ādi Prakaraṇa), 3. 36; Alatsanti Prakaraṇa, 4. 85; 4. 89; Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad, 1. 1. 9, 2. 2. 7; Adhyātma Upaniṣad, V. 13, p. 537; Tripuratapina Upaniṣad, Ch. 2, p. 537.

Like the Vedic tradition, sometimes the Upaniṣadic seers also indulge in prayerful exaultations to the deities.¹ Omniscience of Viṣṇu², Brahmā³ and even Maheśa⁴ finds explicit references. Lastly, the concept of omniscience is also associated with the mystical syllable 'Aum'⁵ which is the acme of spiritualistic cosmogony of the Upaniṣads. 'Aum' is the world-all⁶ and hence to know 'Aum' is to know everything.

(3) The Approach of Dharmajñata

The heterodox systems like Buddhism and Jainism have a religion without God but they would not like to miss the advantages that one gets in accepting God. God is omnipotent, omniscient etc. Hence what is said by God, acquires additional prestige and power. Hence as a substitute of God, they have Prophets who are also omniscients in. This is the simple law of spiritual sociology that necessity is the mother of invention. Instead of God or goddess, they strictly adhere to their respective religious dogmas. The basis of religion is ultimately faith. 'The heart has reason of which reason has no knowledge', says Pascal. Tennyson in his 'Memorium' has said 'Believing where we cannot prove'. The need for believing is inherent in human nature. So we have nothing to say against the religious dogmas. "Religion may sometime justifiably be taken in the Lucretian sense of superstitio"⁷, says Galloway. But what of

1. Mahānārāyaṇīya Upaniṣad, 2. 9-10, 6. 2 & 5; Praśna-Upaniṣad, 1. 8; Īśāvāsya-Upaniṣad 8; Hansa-Upaniṣad, V. I, p. 146.
2. Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad, 6. 38.
3. Nārada-parivrajaka Upaniṣad, 8. 14.
4. Sarva Upaniṣad, V. 20.
5. Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, 1; Chāndogya Upaniṣad, 2. 23. 3; Taittirīya Upaniṣad, 18-17; Maitrī Upaniṣad, 6. 5, 6. 3; Śvetāśvatar Upaniṣad, 1. 14; Kaṭha Upaniṣad, 2. 3. 2. 1. 8; Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad, 3. 1. 9; Praśna Upaniṣad, 5. 1-5; Kaṭha Upaniṣad, 1. 2. 15-17.
6. Chāndogya Upaniṣad, 1. 15.
7. Philosophy of Religion, p. 27 (Edinbur., 1956).

that ? 'Religion is the poetry which we believe'—as Santyana says in his *Reason and Religion*. Thus omniscience is demonstrated as a religious necessity, i. e., we pass from metaphysical determination to an ethical and volitional determination of knowledge. This spirit of the evangelic religions may also be traced back to the Mahābhārat, where knowledge of Dharma is held as the supreme knowledge. Even in the Jaina Āgamas, the concept of Sarvajñatā has been equated with the conception of Dharmajñatā¹. Prajñākargupta has proved Sugata (Buddha) as Dharmajña together with Sarvajña². Śāntarakṣita also supports it³.

(4) Approach of Reason

Dogmas if left to the private field should not be questioned, but if made public, they are bound to face postmortem examinations and hence the formal reasoning is bound to step in. So, we find quite a host of logicians who try to prove Omniscience with the rarest dialectical skill and logical acumen. Among the Buddhists, the names of Śāntarakṣita⁴ (749-770) and Prajñākargupta⁵ (about 10th century) are important. Among the Jainas, there is long and continued tradition of logicians who have tried to prove Omniscience with the help of arguments. The names of Umāswāti (2nd Century)⁶, Siddhasena (5th Century)⁷, Samantabhadra (6th Century)⁸, Pūjyapada (6th Century)⁹, Akalaṅka (7th Cen-

1. Śaṅkhaṇḍāgama (Amravati, 1939), Sut. 78.

2. Pramāṇavārttikalaṅkāra, p. 329.

3. Tattva-Saṅgraha, K. 3328.

4. Ibid (G. O. S., Baroda), K. 3328.

5. Pramāṇa-Vārttikalaṅkāra (Mahabodhi Society, Saranath), p. 329.

6. Tattvārtha-Sūtra (Varni Jaina Granthamala, Kashi), I. 9.

7. Sanmati-Prakaraṇa (Ed. Dalsukha Malvania, Banaras), Ch. VII.

8. Āpta-Mīmāṃsā (Jaina Siddhanta Prakashini Sanstha, Calcutta), Ch. VII.

9. Sarvārtha-Siddhi (Bhāratīya Jñāna Pīṭha, Kashi), Ch. I, II.

tury)¹, Abhayadeva Sūri (7th Century)², Haribhadra (8th Century)³, Vidyānanda (9th Century)⁴, Maṇikyanandī (9th Century)⁵, Anantakīrti (11th Century)⁶, Prabhacandra (11th Century)⁷, Hemcandra (11th Century)⁸, Vadideva Singh Sūri (12th Century)⁹, Mallisena (14th Century)¹⁰, Dharmabhūṣaṇa (14th Century)¹¹, Yaśovijaya (18th Century)¹² etc.¹³ are important in this connection.

(5) Mixed Approach of Reason and Faith

Man has both head and heart, hence needs not only to be silent but also to be convinced, i. e., we want a synthesis of faith and reason, which is in conformity with the best traditions of Indian Philosophy. Bare reason is empty and blind

1. Aṣṭa-Śatī (Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay), Śloka 5 & 6.
2. Tattva-Bodha-Vidhāyini or Vāda-Mahārṇava (Gujrat Puratatva Mandir, Ahmedabad), Ch. I.
3. Śad-darśana-Samuccaya (Chowkhambha, Banaras), Ch. IV.
4. Aṣṭa-Sāhasrī (Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay), Ch. I.
5. Parīkṣā-Mukham (Central Jaina Publishing House, Lucknow), Ch. VI.
6. Br̥hat-Sarvajña-Siddhi (Manikya Candra Digambar Jaina Granthamala, Bombay).
7. Nyāya-Kumud-Candra (M. C. D. J. Granthamala, Bombay) Chapter on Sarvajñatā, pp. 86-97.
8. Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā (Bhasti Jaina Parishat, Calcutta), Appor. VI-XVIII.
9. Syādvāda Siddhi (M. C. D. J. Granthamala, Bombay) Ch. VI.
10. Syādvāda-Maṇjarī (Paramshruta Prabhavaka Mandir, Bombay), Śloka 17.
11. Nyāya-Dīpikā (Vir Seva Mandir, Saharanpur), Ch. II. Sec. 17.
12. Jñāna-Bindu (Singhi Jaina Jñāna Pitha, Ahmedabad), Ch. VII.
13. Śānti-sūri (Rajashekhar, Patrakesari, Devanandi Nemi-candra etc.),

faith is dangerous. So what is needed is an integral approach where we should learn to respect the intuitional experiences of the trusted and tried persons and also maintain the intellectual and logical standards. I think, this is the typical Jaina approach to the concept of omniscience. With the Jainas, the concept of omniscience is both a religious dogma as well as logical theory. The Āgamas and the logical treatises equally try to establish the theory of omniscience. Lord Mahāvīra's omniscience is a religious necessity and possibility of human omniscience is a rare intellectual achievement of the Jaina Logicians in the face of terrific opposition from the side of the Mīmāṃsakas.

(6) The Yogic Approach

In the literature of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and also Sāṃkhya-Yoga and some of the Tantras, we find that there are yogic-disciplines, which if perfected can enable us to have extraordinary powers, such as extra-ordinary perception, extraneous perception, pre-cognition etc. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika recognises Alaukika Pratyakṣa¹ of which the yogic intuition is one of the three varieties². Yogic perception differs from divine omniscience in that it is produced, while the latter is eternal³. The Yoga philosophy believes that if the art of Yoga is perfected, we can achieve the redirection of our consciousness, which is brought about by practice and conquest of desire⁴. The normal limits of human vision are not the limits of the universe. Asamprajñāta Samādhi of Yoga⁵ indicates the possibility of human omniscience. Recent researchers in the field of para-psychology simply go to strengthen this position⁶.

1. Laugākṣi Bhāskara, Tarka-Kaumudī, p. 9; Viśvanātha's Bhāṣa-Pariccheda, Sec. 3.
2. Padārtha-dharma-saṅgraha of Praśastapāda, p. 258.
3. Ibid, p. 187; Nyāya-Kandali, p. 195.
4. Yoga-Sūtra, 1. 2.
5. Ibid, 3. 49, 4. 29.
6. Names of J. B. Rhine, G. N. M. Tyrrell, P. D. Payne, L. J.

CONCLUSION

Of all the six approaches to the concept of omniscience in Indian Philosophy, the Jaina approach is most serious and sincere. This problem is a problem of life and death to them. They accept it as a religious dogma, as an outcome of reasoning and Logic and also as a fruit of yogic exercises.



Benedict, H. H. Price, Charles Richet, R. Tischner, J. J. West, G. E. W. Wolstenholme, E. C. P. Miller, R. S. Woodworth, Carl Murchison, S. D. Katkin, Mayer, O. Mc Dougall etc. are well known.

Chapter Six

NON-ABSOLUTISM AND OMNISCIENCE

(1) Is Non-absolutism Absolute ?

Is non-absolutism is absolute, it is not universal since there is one real which is absolute and if non-absolutism is itself non-absolute, it is not an absolute and universal fact. "Tossed between the two horns of the dilemma non-absolutism thus simply evaporates."¹ But there are also the following points :

(a) Every proposition of the dialectical seven-fold judgement is either Complete or Incomplete². In complete judgement, we use only one word that describes one characteristic of that object and hold the remaining characters to be identical with it. On the other hand, in Incomplete Judgement, we speak of truth as relative to our standpoint³. In short, Complete Judgement is the object of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) and Incomplete Judgement is the object of aspectal knowledge (Naya)⁴. Hence the "non-absolute is constituted of the absolute as its elements and as such would not be possible if there were no absolute."⁵

1. Mookerjee, S. : The Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism, Bharati Mahavidyalaya, Calcutta, 1944, p. 169.
2. Umāsvāmī : Tattvārthadhigama-sūtra, Central Jaina Publishing House, Arrah, T. 6; Vidyānanda : Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttikam, 1. 6. 3, (Ed.) Manoharlal, Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1918, p. 118, IV. 43; Vadideva Suri : Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokalaṅkāra, IV. 43, Kashi, Editor-Himanshu, Vijaya Vira Samvat 2437.
3. Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika, p. 118; Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka, IV. 45.
4. Pūjyapāda : Sarvārtha-Siddhi, Bhāratīya Jñāna Pīṭha, Kashi, 1955, p. 20.
5. Mookerjee, S. : Ibid, p. 171.

(b) The unconditionality in the statement “All statements are conditional” is quite different from the normal meaning of unconditionality. This is like the idea contained in the passage—‘I do not know myself’, where there is no contradiction between ‘knowledge’ and ‘ignorance’ or in the sentence, ‘I am undecided’, where there is atleast one decision that I am undecided. Similarly, the categoricity behind a disjunctive judgement (A man is either good or bad etc.¹) the categoricity is not like the categoricity of an ordinary categorical judgement. ‘The horse is red’. The question of ‘why’ has been discussed elsewhere² in detail.

(c) Samantabhadra, an early Jaina logician, in one of his worship-songs, clarifies this position the light of the doctrine of manifoldness of truth. He says, “even to the doctrine of non-absolutism can be interpreted either as absolute or non-absolute according to the *pramāṇa* or *Naya* respectively. This means that even the doctrine of non-absolutism is not absolute unconditionally.³

(d) However, to avoid the fallacy of infinite regress, the Jainas distinguish between Valid non-absolutism (*Samyak anekānta*) and invalid non-absolutism (*Mithya Anekānta*⁴). Like an invalid absolute judgement an invalid non-absolute

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1. Bradley, F. H. : The Principles of Logic, Oxford, 2nd ed., Vol. 1, p. 130.
 2. Jaina Antiquary, Arrah, Vol. 22, No. 1, article of the author entitled ‘The Nature of the Unconditionality in *Syādvāda*’, pp. 20-24.
 3. Svayambhu Stotra, K. 130, Vira Seva Mandir, Sarasawa, 1951, p. 67 and *Nyāya-dīpikā* of Abhidharma Bhūṣaṇa, Ed. Darbari Lal Kothia, Vira Seva Mandir, Sarasawa, 1945, pp. 128-129.
 4. Samantabhadra : *Āpta-Mīmāṃsā*, K. 108, Sanatana Jaina Granthamala, Kashi, 1914; *Aṣṭa-Sāhasrī* : Vidyānanda, Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay, p. 290; *Nyaya-dīpikā*, pp. 130-131.

judgement, too is invalid. To be valid, **Anekānta** must not be absolute but always relative. In short, the doctrine of non-absolutism is an opposite (theory) or **Ekāntavāda**, one-sided exposition irrespective of other view points¹. **Anekāntavāda** literally means not, one, aside, exposition but many sided exposition taking into account all possible angles of vision regarding any object or idea.

Now, if we consider the above points, we can not say that "the theory of relativity cannot be logically sustained without the hypothesis of an absolute."² Thought is not mere distinction but also relation. Everything is possible only in relation to and as distinct from others and the Law of contradiction is the negative aspect of the Law of identity. Under these circumstances, it is not legitimate to hold that the hypothesis of an absolute cannot be logically sustained without the hypothesis of a relative. Absolute to be absolute presupposes a relative somewhere and in some forms, even the relative of its non-existence.

Jaina Logic of **Anekānta** is based not on abstract intellectualism but on experience and realism leading to a non-absolutistic attitude of mind. Multiplicity and unity, particularity and the Universality, eternality and non-eternality, definability and non-definability³ etc., which apparently seem to be contradictory characteristics of reality or object, are interpreted to co-exist in the same object from different points of view

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1. Kapadia, H. R. (Ed.), **Anekānta-jaya-patākā** of Haribhadra, Vol. I, p. IX (Introduction), Gackawada Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1940.
 2. Radhakrishnan, S.: **Indian Philosophy**, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1929, Vol. I, pp. 305-306 (Cf. Hanumanta Rao's article on 'Jaina Instrumental Theory of Knowledge', Indian Philosophical Congress, 1926 (Proceedings)).
 3. **Syādvāda-Maṅjari** of Mallisena, (ed.) A. B. Dhruva, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1933, V, 25.

without any offence to logic. All cognition be it of identity or diversity or after all are valid. They seem to be contradictory of each other simply because one of them is mistaken to be the whole truth¹. In fact, "the integrity of truth consists in this very variety of its aspects, within the rational unity of an all comprehensive and ramifying principle."² The charge of contradiction against the co-presence of being and non-being in the real is a figment of a priori logic.³

(2) Is Knowledge Absolute ?

Since absoluteness is unknown to Jaina Metaphysics, so it is in its metaphysics of knowledge. The Jaina division of knowledge into immediate and mediate⁴ is not only free from the fallacy of overlapping division but it is also based on common experience⁵ and point out to the initial non-absolutism.

However, the professed non-absolutism becomes more explicit, when knowledge is classified into *Pramāṇa* (knowledge of a thing in its relation)⁶. This aspect of knowledge existing

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1. Sanghavi, S. : Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics, Indian Studies, Past and Present, Calcutta, 1961, p. 19.
 2. Desai, M. D. : The Naya-Karṇikā, C. J. P. H., Arrah, 1915, p. 25 (Introduction).
 3. Mookerjee, S. : Ibid, p. 190 (Chapter I deals with 'Logical Background of Jaina Philosophy' in the light of Anekānta Logic).
 4. Tattvārtha-Sūtra, I. 11-12; Parīkṣā-Mukham of Maṇikyānandī (Ed.) S. C. Ghoshal, The Central Jaina Publishing House, 1940, II. I; Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā of Hemacandra, edited by Sukhalal Sanghavi, Bhartiya Vidya Bhawan, Bombay, 1939, I. 1-9; Nyāya-Dīpikā, p. 23; Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokāṅkāra, II.
 5. Prasad, R. : His Article on "A Critical Study of Jaina Theory of Knowledge", in Jaina Antiquary, Vol. XV, No. 2, Jan. 1949, pp. 66-67.
 6. Tattvārtha-Sūtra I. 6; Nyāya-dīpikā, p. 8.

in relation to a number of things and being liable to be influenced by others is a fundamental feature of Jaina epistemology. *Pramāṇa* is complete knowledge (*sakalādeśa*) and *Naya* is Incomplete knowledge (*vikalādeśa*).¹ Other controversies between the two traditions of Jainism Āgamic and the Logical, regarding the classification of knowledge are referred to elsewhere.²

For clarification, it may be said that the terms 'immediacy and mediacy' are used in different sense than the common meaning and understanding. Jainas deny the immediate character of the ordinary perpetual knowledge like the western representationalists but unlike the Realists. "The knowledge is direct or indirect accordingly as it is born without or with the help of an external instrument different from the self."³

However, to avoid sophistication and also to bring their theory in line with others a distinction is made between really immediate and relatively immediate.⁴ The latter is empirically direct and immediate⁵ knowledge produced by the sense-organs and the mind.⁶

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1. Sarvārtha-Siddhi, pp. 20-21; Tattvārtha-Śloka-Vārttika, p. 118.
 2. See, Sukhalal Sanghavi's, Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics, Section 8, pp. 50-54.
 3. Tatia, N. M. : Studies in Jaina Philosophy, Jaina Cultural Research Society, Banaras, 1951, p. 28.
 4. *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokāṅkāra*, II. 45; *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I. 1. 15; *Nyāya-dīpikā*, p. 32; *Pramēya-ratna-mālā* of Anantakīrti, Commentary on *Parīkṣa Mukham* (*Ibid*), p. 14.
 5. *Parīkṣa Mukham*, II. 5; *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I. 1. 21; *Pramēya-ratna-mālā*, p. 14.
 6. *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokāṅkāra*, II. 4. 5; *Nyāya-dīpikā*, p. 33; *Tattvārtha-Rāja-Vārttika* of Akalaṅka, Jñāna Pīṭha, Kashi, 1915, Commentary on *Tattvārtha-Sūtra* 1. 14. *Sthānāṅga-Sūtra* II. 1. 71; *Nandī-Sūtra* 4.

Pramāṇa and Naya represent roughly the absolute and the relative characters of knowledge respectively and taken together, as knowledge is constituent, it becomes non-absolute. A closer study of the theory of Pramāṇa is defined as the knowledge of an object in all its aspects and since an object has innumerable characteristics¹ it implies that if we know all.² The universe is an interrelated whole. Nothing is an isolated phenomenon. Hence, right knowledge of the even one object will lead to the knowledge of the entire universe. This shows that our knowledge has got a relative character. This relativism is realistic. It not only asserts a plurality of determinate truths but also takes each truth to be an indetermination of alternative truths.”³ These so many truths are really alternate truths, so it is a mistake of finding one absolute truth or even one cognition of the plurality of truths.

“If knowing is a unity, known is a plurality, the objective category being distinction or togetherness. If finally, knowledge is the object, refers to the known, the known must present an equivalent of this of relation or reference, a relation and its content.”⁴ Intellectualistic abstractionism has to be given up and we should try to dehumanise the ideal and realise the real. The reality is not a rounded ready made whole or an abstract unity of many definite or determinate aspect but that “the so called unity is after all a manifold being only a name for fundamentally different aspects of truth which do not

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1. Nyāyavatāra, V. 29; Śaḍ-darśāna-samuccaya of Haribhadra, 55 (with Guṇaratna's Comments), Royal Asiatic Society, Calcutta, 1905.
 2. Acārāṅga-Sūtra, 13. 4. 122; Pravacana-sāra of Kunda-kunda (Ed., Trans.), A. Chakravarti, Raichandra Jaina Shastra Mala, Bombay, 1935, 1. 48-49.
 3. Bhattacharya K. C. : His article on “The Jaina Theory of Anekānta” in Jaina Antiquary, Vol. IX, No. I.
 4. Ibid, pp. 10-11.

make an unity in any sense of the term.”¹ So far we know or can know, the making of truth and making of reality is one. Reality like truth is therefore definite-indefinite (*anekānta*). Its indefiniteness follows from the inexhaustible reserve of objective reality and its definiteness comes from the fact that it grows up into the reality of our own knowing which we make.

So we can fairly conclude that in Jainism, non-absolutism is not only a metaphysical but also an epistemological concept. There is no absolute reality, so there is no absolute truth.

Jainas believe that “when there is isolation and obstruction, there is everywhere, so far as the abstraction forgots itself unreality and error.”²

(3) Distinction between Syādvāda and Sarvajñatā

Syādvāda is not the final truth. It is merely an attitude of knowledge. In fact, it simply helps us in arriving at the ultimate truth. Syādvāda works or can work only in our practical life and it is therefore that the Jainas regard it as

1. Bhattacharya, H. M. : His article on ‘The Jaina Concept of Truth and Reality’ in the Philosophical Quarterly, Calcutta, Vol. III, No. 3, October 1927, p. 213.
2. Bradley, F. H. : Essays on Truth & Reality, Oxford University Press, 1914, p. 487; Bradley F. H. : Appcorace & Reality, Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 9th imp., 1951, “There is truth in every idea, howsoever false.....Reality is now this; now that; in this sense it is full of negative, contradictions and oppositions.”
Holmes, E. : The Quest of Ideal, p. 21. “It would be nonsense to say that every movement is either swift or slow. It would be nearer the truth to say that every movement is both swift and slow...”
Hegal, G. W. F. : A History of Philosophy, p. 465. “Contradiction is the root of all life and movement, that everything is contradiction...”

practical truth (Vyavahāra Satya). Siddhasena Divākara points out this fact clearly in the following verses —

i. e., without the help of Syādvāda, we cannot execute our business in our practical life.

But there is another realm of truth which is not in any way partial or relative but absolute and which is the subject matter of omniscience or perfect knowledge.

Let us illustrate the point of difference between these two types of knowledge — Syādvāda and Sarvajñatā.

(a) The immediate effect of valid knowledge (Pramā) is the removal of ignorance, the mediate effect of the absolute knowledge or Kevala-Jñāna, is bliss and equanimity, which the mediate effect of practical knowledge or Syādvāda is the facility to select or reject¹, what is conducive or not, for self realisation Pramāṇa or Jñāna² is the right knowledge.³ The development of omniscience is necessarily accompanied by that of perfect or absolute happiness,⁴ being free from destructive Karmas.⁵ This happiness is independent of every-

1. Nyāyavatāra, V. 28; Mīmāṃsā, p. 104.
2. There seems to be difference between the categories of (Jñāna) and the means of valid knowledge (Pramāṇa), Tattvārtha-Sūtra, I. 9-10, however Maṇikyanandī says that a particular type of Jñāna is Pramāṇa which has the determination of itself as well as of the objects not known before. (Parīkṣa-mukham, I. 1-2) so says Akalaṅka (Aṣṭa-śatī, Aṣṭa-sāhasrī, p. 175) and Vidyānandī (Tattvārtha-Śloka-Vārttika, I. 1078, p. 174), According to Hemcandra, a means of knowledge is the authentic definite cognition of an object (Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā, I. 1. 2), so is the view of Vadideva (Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka, I. 2. 3).
3. Nyāya-Dīpikā, p. 9; Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā, I. 1. 2.
4. Pavacana-sāra of Kunda-kunda, ed. & trans. A. N. Upadhye, Raicandra Jaina Shastra Mala, Bombay, 1935, I. 19, I. 59, I. 68.
5. Ibid, I. 60,

thing and hence eternal it is not physical but spiritual.¹ It is not the pleasures of those senses which are in fact miseries, the cause of bondage and dangerous.²

(b) Syādvāda is so foundational to the Jaina Philosophy that it has been assigned a very high place in Jaina metaphysics of knowledge. It is said to be flawless³, perhaps because it is associated with the great Mahāvīra. True “both Syādvāda and Kevala-jñāna (omniscient knowledge) illumine the whole reality, but the difference between them is that while the former illumines the object indirectly, the latter does it directly.”⁴ Vidyānanda further explaining the point stresses the fact that there is no contradiction between the two kinds of knowledge, since by ‘illumining the whole reality’, it means revolution of all the seven categories of self, not self etc.⁵ This attitude shows the spirit of Syādvāda is so much ingrained in Jaina culture that it finds it difficult to assign Syādvāda an inferior place than omniscience.

(c) A vital point of difference between Syādvāda and omniscient knowledge is that while in the case of the former, one knows of all the objects of the world in succession, in the case of Kevala-jñāna, the knowledge is simultaneous.⁶ By its every definition, omniscience means “an actual direct nonsensuous knowledge, the subject matter of which is all the substances in all their modifications at all the places and in all the times.”⁷ The omniscient knowledge is regarded as simultaneous rather than successive, perhaps because it is successive,

1. Pravacana-sāra of Kunda-kunda, Ibid, I. 65.

2. Ibid, I. 63-64; I. 76 (Cf. Parmātma Prakāśa of Yogīndu, Ed. A. N. Upadhye, Parama Śruta Prabhavaka Mandal, Bombay, 1937, V. 201).

3. Svayambhu Stotra, V. 138.

4. Āpta-mīmāṃsā, V. 105.

5. Aṣṭa-sāhasrī, p. 288.

6. Āpta-Mīmāṃsā, 101; Aṣṭa-Sāhasrī, pp. 281-282.

7. Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika, I. 29-23, p. 253.

there can be no omniscience. Since the objects of the world in shape of past, present and future can never be exhausted, consequently knowledge will always remain incomplete.¹

But their might be difficulties even if we regard omniscient knowledge as simultaneous, such as the following —

(1) The omniscient person comprehend contradictory things like heat and cold by a simple cognition which seems absurd.² To this objection, it may be replied that contradictory things like heat and cold do exist at the same time, for example, where there is flash of lightning in the midst of darkness, there occurs a simultaneous perception of the two contradictory things.³

(2) Then, if the whole world is known to the omniscient person, all at once, he has nothing to know any further, and so he will turn to be quite unconscious having nothing to know.⁴ To this, it may be said on behalf of the Jainas that the objection would have been valid if the perception of the omniscient person and the whole world were annihilated in the following instant. But both are everlasting, hence there is no absurdity in the Jaina position regarding the simultaneity of omniscient perception.⁵

(d) The most fundamental difference between Syādvāda and Sarvajñatā or Kevala-jñāna is that while the former “leads us to relative and partial truth whereas omniscience to absolute truth.”⁶ It comes within its own range. After all,

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1. Prameya-kamala-mārtanḍa of Prabhacandra, Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1941, p. 251; Nyaya-Kumuda-Candra of Prabhacandra, M. D. J. G. Bombay, 1938, Vol. 1, p. 88.
 2. Prameya-kamala-Mārtanḍa, p. 254.
 3. Ibid, p. 260.
 4. Ibid, p. 254.
 5. Ibid, p. 260.
 6. Anekanta-jaya-patāka of Haribhadra, Introduction, Vol. II, p. CXX,

Syādvāda is an application of scriptural knowledge¹ which determines the meaning of an object through the employment of one-sided Nayas², and the scriptural knowledge is a kind of mediate or indirect knowledge.

True, unlike Naya (knowledge of an aspect of a thing), Syādvāda in it sweeps all the different nayas; but even then it never asserts that it is the absolute truth. In fact, Syādvāda is merely an attitude of philosophising which tells us that on account of infinite complexities of nature and limited capacity of our knowledge, what is presented is only a relative truth. Now, one can point out that if we combine the result of the seven-fold nayas into one, cannot we get as the absolute truth ? Is not the absolute truth a sum of relative truths ? The answer is in the negative. Firstly, the knowledge arrived at through the alternative Nayas do not and cannot take place simultaneously but in succession³ leading to the fallacy of infinite regress⁴ since an object possesses innumerable character. Secondly, to regard Syādvāda as absolute is to violate its very fundamental character of non-absolutism. Samantabhadra has very explicitly said that even Anekānta (non-absolutism) is non-absolute (Anekānta⁵) in respect of Pramāṇa and Naya. Further, the distinction is made between Samyak-Anekānta and Mithyā-Anekānta⁶ (i. e. Real and False non-absolutism) and it is held that the real Anekānta is never absolute but always relative to something else.⁷ However, this is not the case with omniscience. It is the knowledge of the absolute truth.

1. Laghīyastraya of Akalaṅka (Akalaṅka Grantha Trayam Ed. Mahendra Kumar, Singhi Jaina Granthamala, Calcutta, H. 1139), K. 62, p. 21.
2. Nyāyavātara, K. 30.
3. Āpta-mimāṃsā, K. 101.
4. Nyāya-kumuda-candra, p. 89.
5. Svayambhu Stotra, K. 102; Sanmati Tarka, III. 27-28.
6. Āpta-Mimāṃsā, 108.
7. Āṣṭa-Sāhasrī, p. 290.

(e) Their is one more minor point of difference between Syādvāda, knowledge and omniscience. Syādvāda like ordinary knowledge rests on sense-perception, i. e., it is limited to our sense-organs only. But Kevala-jñāna has no dependence on any sense and arises after destruction of obstructions.¹ Ordinary individuals do not have this knowledge but only the Arhats², whose deluding (Mohanīya) Karmas are destroyed and the knowledge and Belief obscuring (Jñānāvaraṇīya + Darśanāvaraṇīya) Karmas are removed and the obstructive Karmas (Antarāyas) are also destroyed.³

Here, knowledge is acquired by the soul directly without the intervention of senses or signs⁴, for in that case it would not have cognated all objects, for the senses can only stimulate knowledge of object which can be perceived by them. Here we find a complete absence of dependence upon anything except the soul. Jainas like the western Realists and Representationalists held that the ordinary sense-perception is really mediate in character and hence according to the Jainas, the transcendental perception (Kevala-jñāna) is immediate along with Avadhi and Manaḥ-paryaya, all of which do not require the help of the senses.⁵

This attempt to free perception from the limitations of senses accords it a very high status and hence it is regarded as supreme knowledge characteristic of supreme state of self-realisation and bliss.⁶

CONCLUSION

The following points have emerged out of the foregoing discussions :

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1. Parīkṣā-mukham, II. 11.
 2. Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokāṅkāra, II. 14.
 3. Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā, I. 1. 15; Tattvārtha-sūtra, X. 1.
 4. Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokāṅkāra, II. 18.
 5. Pravacana-sāra, I. 54.
 6. Ibid, I. 19, I. 59, I. 60.

(a) *Importance of Anekanta Logic* : Anekānta logic is as important as the absolute wisdom or omniscience. The loss caused by Anekānta or Syādvāda by its being mediate is fully made up by its capacity to demonstrate the truth of the absolute wisdom to mankind. That is why it has been regarded as indispensable for common practical life.¹ Not only this, it has been accorded a special religious status. Even Lord Mahāvīra's sermons are delivered through the technique of Syādvāda,² which is very much perfect technique of expressing the manifold nature of reality. This is the technique of the Victor and the perfect.³

(b) *The dual nature of Anekanta—Anekanta & Ekanta* : Anekāntavāda is both Anekānta and Ekānta. It is ekānta in as much as it is an independent view point, it is anekānta because it is the sum total of view points. Anekānta may also become Ekānta, if it does not go against the right view of things.⁴

As the doctrine of Anekānta shows all possible sides of a thing and thus does not postulate about a thing in any fixed way, in the same way Anekānta itself is also subject to this possibility and other side—that is to say, it also sometimes assumes the form of onesidedness.⁵ However, the Jainas do not have any objection even if their doctrine recalls on itself. On the contrary, it strengthens their position and shows the unlimited extent of the range.⁶

1. Sanmati Tarka, III. 68.

2. Bhagavatī Sūtra, VII. 2. 273; XIII. 7. 495; Every sermonic sentences of Lord Mahāvīra had always a prefix of Syat for otherwise truth would have been violated, Cf. : Āpta-Mimāṃsā, 105.

3. Svayambhu Stotra, 41 and 45.

4. Sanmati Tarka, III. 28.

5. Ibid, III. 27.

6. Anekanta-Jaya-Pataka, Vol. II (Introduction), p. CVII.

(c) *Beyond Anekanta* : True, absolute wisdom is baseless without the Anekanta logic but to suppose that there is nothing beyond Syādvāda in Jaina theory of knowledge, is wrong. The importance of Syādvāda lies more in its analytical enquiry than in concrete results. It is a way of philosophising rather than a readymade metaphysics. The demand of higher spiritual life is the life of a Yogin, who realises the complete unity of existence in his consciousness, transcending the sphere of the phenomena. He can view things sub-species aternitatis, through his pure insight and intuition. "He is in possession of absolute truth, transcending the realm of provisional truths."¹ This is the state of supreme knowledge, free from all limitations, where "the soul vibrates at its natural rhythm and exercises its function of unlimiting knowledge."² This is another name of pure perception or infinity in epistemology and mysticism in religion. This is an attitude of mind which involves a direct, immediate and first hand intuitive apprehension of the reality. Some Jaina teachers and another like Ācārya Kunda-kunda³ and Yogīndu⁴ are outspoken mystics. Their mysticism turns round two concepts — Ātman and Paramātman (God but not creator). Paramātman in Jainism is nearer to that of a personal Absolute and the different states of spiritual development are merely meditational stages being caused by sick-mindedness of the soul for its final deliverance.

(d) *From Anekanta to Advaitiya Omniscience* : So far Jainism puts the highest value on the mystical experience of a Kevalin who transcends the realm of the phenomenal and

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1. Shastri P. : His article on "The Jaina Doctrine of Syādvāda with a New Pragmatic Background", in Siddha-Bhārati, II, 93.
 2. Radhakrishnan, S. : Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 298.
 3. Pravacana-sāra, I. 35, I. 60, I. 61, I. 29, II. 106.
 4. Paramātmā Prakāśa, II. 174, II. 201, II. 195, and his Yoga-Sāra, V. 9.

reaches at the absolute truth, "it approaches very near Advaita Vedānta".¹ Yogīndu's² identification between the spirit and the super spirit is a triumph of monism in the history of Indian religious thoughts. As the Vedāntins distinguish between the higher and the lower knowledge, so here also we find a distinction between omniscience and Syādvāda. However, inspite of many other similarities, there is one vital difference, in the Vedāntic conception the objectivity is not outside the knower, while for Jaina³ omniscience, there is a complex external objectivity infinitely over both time and place and the individual self retains its individuality even in the search of omniscience and bliss.



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1. Shastri, P. D. : Ibid, p. 13; Cf. : See author's article on "Advaita Trends in Jainism", published in Dārśanika, Faridkot, 1959.
 2. Pravacana-sāra (Ibid), Introduction, p. LXXVII.
 3. Sanmati-Tarka, I. 49; I. 150; Āpta-Mīmāṃsā', 24 & 25; Tattvartha-Śloka, I. 23-53.

JAINA METAPHYSICS

- (1) *Advaita Trends in Jainism.***
- (2) *Nature of Unconditionality in Syadvada.***
- (3) *An Examination of Brahma-Sutra (II. 2. 33)***

Chapter Seven

ADVAITA TRENDS IN JAINISM

Avidyā : The Cause of Bondage

Spiritualism is an essential feature of Indian mind. It always endeavours after spiritual light or the vision of truth. Hence the Vedic prayer — “lead me from falsity to Truth, from darkness to light, from death to immortality.” Bondage is the process of birth and rebirth, the consequent miseries. Liberation therefore is the stoppage of this process.¹ The vision of truth is the vision of freedom. Ignorance therefore is the cause of the bondage.

This is the principle which acts as the hindrance against the apprehension of truth, obstructs our innate capacity to know the truth. This is our degeneration or descent. Hence knowledge is essential for liberation and hence the prayer.

The seeds of Vedāntic (Advaitic) thought can be traced in the Upaniṣads, where Avidyā is perversity of vision and attachment to the world. Māyā is the cosmic force that brings forth the world of plurality. If the Māyā conditions the universe, Avidyā keeps one attached to it. There is Māyā because there is Avidyā. To Gauḍapāda, Māyā is the cosmic illusion and the avidyā the individual ignorance – a result of it. Śaṅkara postulates Māyā to explain origination of cosmic illusion while Avidyā the individual. However the freedom is the goal. But this freedom is only through knowledge (Jñānāt-eva-tu-Kaivalyam²) without knowledge there is no emancipation (Ṛte-Jñānānna Muktiḥ³). The purpose of man (is effected) through the mere knowledge of Brahman—

1. Bhagavad-Gīta, 2. 51; Kaṭha-Upaniṣad, 1. 3. 7-8.

2. Malkani, G. R. : Vedāntic Epistemology, p. 3.

3. Ṛg-veda.

thus Bādarāyaṇa opines.¹ He who knows the self, overcomes grief.² He who knows that highest Brahman, becomes even Brahman.³ He who knows Brahman, attains the highest.⁴ Mokṣa is the absence of false knowledge says Padmapāda. This insight, this changed attitude to life and its happenings is not so much a condition of Mokṣa, as Mokṣa itself.⁵ The cause of pain is simply error or false knowledge.⁶ The Jaina term for Avidyā is Mithyātva. Knowledge dawns only after the destruction of darkness. So the path of freedom is the path of knowledge. Knowledge therefore is the first of the 'Three Jewels'⁷ The soul is inherently perfect and has infinite potentiality. It is self luminous. It shines as the sun. But there are clouds and fogs of Karma. So the moment the clouds disappear, the Sun comes into its own. It is our ignorance about the real nature of our souls that bind us to the

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1. Brahma-Sūtra, Śāṅkara Bhāṣya, III. IV. 1.
 2. Chāndogya Upaniṣad, III. 1.
 3. Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad, III. 2. 9.
 4. Taittirīya Upaniṣad, II. 1., Chāndogya Upaniṣad, VI. 14, VIII. 7; Bṛhadāraṇyak Upaniṣad, IV. 5. 6-15, Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, 5. 13.
 5. Radhakrishnan, S. : Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 637.
 6. Śāṅkara Bhāṣya on Brahma-Sūtra, II. 3. 46; Chāndogya Upaniṣad, VIII. 8. 4-5; Nyāya-Bhāṣya, 4. 2. 1; Praśastapāda Bhāṣya.
 7. Tattvārthadhigama-Sūtra, 10. 1; Tattvārtha-Sūtra, 1. 1; Dravya-Saṅgraha, 40, p. 538; Cf. : Sāṅkhya-Kārikā of Īśwarakṛṣṇa (Trans. by S. S. Shastri), 44; Maṭhara-vṛtti, 44; Tattvārtha-Śloka-Vārttika, p. 72; Candraprabha-Caritam, K. 44; Yoga-darśana, 2.3, 3-5; Tattvārtha-Sūtra, 8. 1; Uttarādhyayana Sūtra, 21. 19. 18. 123; Dharma-śarmabhyudaya, 23. 43, 28. 20, 29. 71, 32. 7; Sthānaṅga-Sūtra, 2. 2. 21. 123; Samaya-sāra of Kunda-kunda, IX. 293; Pañcāstikaya-samaya-sāra of Kunda-kunda, 1. 47; Pravacana-sāra of Kunda-kunda, II. 81.

wheel of Saṁsāra or bondage. Thus the need of right knowledge or the knowledge of reality is Supreme.

Here we find almost no distinction between Jainism and Vedānta.

State of Liberation

We have seen that Mokṣa is the goal of human life. With the solitary exception of the Cārvākas all schools of Indian philosophy accepts this as the Highest Good or Param puruṣārtha. However there are two different views regarding the nature of Mukti—positivistic and Negativistic. The Buddhists¹, the Naiyāyikas², the Sāṁkhyas³, Yoga⁴ and the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā⁵, hold that in the State of Mukti there is complete absence of miseries but not the attainment of some positive happiness. The Jainas⁶ and the Vedāntins do hold that the State of Mukti is the state of double blessedness. There is first the end of miseries and then there is also the attainment of Positive bliss. This is because the self possesses infinite knowledge, Power and bliss. Here comes a difficulty. If Mokṣa is the result of spiritual discipline, it can not be eternal, if otherwise it is beyond attainment. Vedānta solves this difficulty. To the Advaitins Mokṣa is the realisation of identity of Jīva and Brahman. It is not something to be attained afresh.

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1. Cf. Mādhyamika Vṛtti (P. T. S.), p. 197; Introduction to Paramātma Prakāśa of Yogīndu (Trans. by A. N. Upadhye); The World and Liberation, Prapañca-pravṛtti; For positive Views of Nirvāṇa, see Visuddhimagga of Buddha-Ghosh, 8. 247, 16. 64; 16. 37.
 2. Nyāya-Bhāṣya, 1. 1. 21; Nyāya-mañjarī, p. 508; for positive views, see p. 200.
 3. Sāṁkhya-kārikā of Īśwarakṛṣṇa, 67; Sāṁkhya-tattva-kaumudī, 67.
 4. Yoga-Bhāṣya, 4. 30.
 5. Śloka-varttika, 107.
 6. Samaya-sāra of Kunda-kunda, 10. 4.

It is 'Prāptasya Prāptiḥ', so says the Upaniṣads 'That Thou art'¹ and not "That Thou becomest", Since Brahman besides Sat and Cit is also Ānanda so Jīva becomes Ānandamaya² when it realises it. Bliss and knowledge are identical.³ Thus liberation is a positive bliss besides cessation of all kinds of miseries. To conclude with Maṇḍana, mere absence of misery is not happiness because misery and happiness, may be experienced together by a person merged in a cool tank with the scorching sun above.⁴

Nature of Soul

The concept of bondage and liberation follows from the concept of the soul. For the self is prior to all, bondage and liberation, truth and falsehood. Its existence is self-proved; it can not be doubted, for it is the essential nature of him who doubts it.⁵ It is known in immediate perception, prior to all proof. It is logical postulate. Metaphysically the conception of self-existence implies that the self is eternal, immutable and complete.⁶ So far Jainism and Advaita Vedānta affirm the existence of self.

Again we find that self is conscious, both in Vedānta and in Jainism, when bondage is the Souls' Association with the body through ignorance, soul is something other than the physical self. Self is the pure existence which is not only uncontradicted but also uncontradictably. This persists through all its states.⁷ The moment we try to negate we affirm. Then this

1. Chāndogya Upaniṣad.

2. Taittiriya Upaniṣad, III. 8, II. 7.

3. Pravacana-sāra of Kunda-kunda, 1. 59-60.

4. Ramcaran : Concept of Mukti in Indian Philosophy (Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1944).

5. Bhagavad-gīta, II. 37; Chāndogya Upaniṣad, VIII. 7. 12; Taittiriya Upaniṣad, II. 1-7.

6. Īśa. Upaniṣad, 1; Śāṅkara-Bhaṣya on Brahma-Sūtra, 1. 1. 4.

7. Śāṅkara Bhaṣya, II.2. 1; Bhagavad-gīta, II. 16.

pure existence is also pure consciousness. Therefore the Ātman is nothing other than the consciousness. However, this consciousness is not the flux of states, a stream of consciousness. It is an universal and eternal consciousness.¹ It is undifferentiated consciousness alone (Nirviṣeṣa Cinmātram²) or pure consciousness with no difference of knower, knowledge, the known, infinite, transcendent, the essence of absolute knowledge.³ Coming to the Jaina conception of Soul, we find that as Jīva is also a substance or Sattā is real or existence. However the most important characteristics of Jīva (like the Vedānta) is consiousness or Upayoga.⁴ So it is co-extensive with knowledge. Further, as in the Vedānta we find the Soul described as eternal, Pure, Self-illuminated, free, real, supremely blissful, infinite (Nitya, Śuddha, Buddha, Mukta, Satya, Paramānanda), so also is Jainism.⁵

Ātman Paramātman

The career of the individual self sketched by Śaṅkara is exactly parallel to the sketch given by Jaina Metaphysics. There are two kinds of Self, recognised in Jainism — Pure or Swa-samaya or Ego-in-itself and Para-Samaya or Empirical Ego⁶. Ego-in itself is the same as the Paramātman of Upaniṣads or Brahman of Vedānta. Śaṅkara calls the ultimate reality as Paramātman or the Supreme-Self. To Śaṅkara Paramātman and Brahman are inter-changeable terms. The

1. Advaita Makaranda, 11. 13.

2. Sarva-Siddhānta-Saṅgraha, XII. 8. 41; Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya on Brahma sūtra, III. 2.16; Yaśavanta Muktāvalī, p. 49.

3. Viveka-cuḍāmaṇi. p. 239.

4. Paramātma-Prakaśa of Yogīndu (Trans. by A. N. Upadhye) III. 8; Pañcāstikāya-samaya-sāra of Kunda-kunda, 2. 80, 1. 27; Dravya-saṅgraha, 2.

5. Cf. : Vedānta-sāra of Sadānanda, 171 (Nikhilānanda); Samaya-sāra of Kunda-kunda, 1. 37-38; Tattvārtha-sūtra. II. 8.

6. Samaya-sāra of Kunda-kunda, 1. 2.

doctrine of identifying Jivātma and Paramātma is common to both the Upaniṣads and the Jaina thought. In this connection it is worth pointing out that both Kunda-kunda and Śāṅkara used the word 'Advaita' the indication of the oneness of Jivātma and Paramātma."¹ It is the individual Self which is the doer, the enjoyer, the sufferer.² The Ātman clothed in the Upādhis is the Jīva which enjoy, suffers and acts from both of which conditions, the highest soul is free.³ Paramātma Prakāśa of Yogīndu strikes a more idealistic note when it says that it is the internal by leaving everything external that becomes the Supreme Soul. Paramātman is peace, happiness and bliss.⁴

The doctrine of three-fold individuality (external, internal and the supreme) is supported by Kunda-kunda, Yogīndu, Pñjya-pāda, Amṛtacandra and Guṇabhadra etc. Similarly in non-Jaina literature, we find its counterparts in early Vedic literature, in the doctrine of Pañcakośa of the Upaniṣad.⁵ However, these are ultimately one.⁶ Ātman is nothing but sentinancy, non-concrete and Paramātman is nothing but infinite vision, knowledge and bliss. The Ātman itself is Paramātman. Paramātman was called Ātman only because of Kārmic limitations. Yogīndu Superspirit or Paramātman represents the ultimate point of spiritual evolution, which is above subject and object.

However, there is no denying the fact that inspite of vast similarity, we still miss the monistic and pantheistic grandeur of the Upaniṣadic Brahman in the Jaina conception of

1. Introduction to Samaya-sāra of Kunda-kunda; p, CLII.

2. Brhadāraṇyak Upaniṣad, IV. 3. 12; Taittirīya Upaniṣad, III. 5; Śāṅkara Bhāṣya on Brahma-sūtra, II. 3. 33.

3. Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya on Brahma-sūtra, I. 3. 19.

4. Introduction to Paramātma-Prakāśa of Yogīndu (detailed summary of the Contents of Paramātma Prakāśa).

5. Taittirīya Upaniṣad, II. 1-5.

6. Mysticism in Maharashtra, p. 386.

paramātman. The assertion of the Jainas about the Plurality of Selves¹, is apparently in contra-distinction with the Advaitic thought. However, this is not quite in conformity with other Jaina texts or Jaina view of substance or reality. Substance is that which always exists as the universe, which has neither beginning nor end. Substance is one (as a class). It is inherent essence of things. It manifests itself through diverse forms.² What is not different from Sattā or Substance, that is called Dravya which is derived from the root 'Dru' meaning 'to flow'. It is non-different from substance or existence.³ It is reality.⁴ Kunda-kunda goes to the extent that there is neither origination (Utpāda) nor decay (vyaya or Vināśa) but eternal and immutable. Origination and decay etc. concerns the Paryāyas of the substance not the substance itself. According to Umāswatī, the definition of Reality or existence or substance is Sat (Existence).⁵ 'Reality is substance' and 'Substance is reality' or 'Reality is existence' or Sattā. So existence is reality or reality is existence. This is to say that all is one because all exists.⁶ So says Sthānāṅga-sūtra that there is 'One Soul', 'One Universe' (Ege Āyā, Ege Loe).⁷ Thus we see that we are very near to the Upaniṣadic or Vedāntic conception of absolute idealism.

However, a dualistic bias of the Jainas lead them to demarcate between ideal existence and Material existence, which is only illogical. Reality is reality, Existence is existence. It is all

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1. Samaya-sāra of Kunda-kunda, 1. 1; Paramātma-Prakāśa of Yogīndu (Introduction); Dravya-Saṅgraha, 3. 12; Pañcāstikāya-samaya-sāra of Kunda-kunda, 1. 16; Gommaṣasāra, 141 (Jivakāṇḍa,).
 2. Pañcāstikāya-samaya-sāra of Kunda-kunda, 1. 8.
 3. Pravacana-sāra of Kunda-kunda, 9.
 4. Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra, V. 29.
 5. Ibid, V. 29.
 6. Tattvārtha-sūtra-bhāṣya, 1. 35.
 7. Sthānāṅga-sūtra, 1. 1, 1. 1-4.

inclusive. There is no distinction of subject and object. The concept of such an all pervading existence can only be ideal. The Jaina canons being too crude could not solve this apparent dualism, hence posited Jīva-Dravya and Ajīva-Dravya, but in Umāswāti and Kunda-kunda we do not find such an apparent gulf between reality and reality. Thus Jainism can not escape monism in the last analysis. While they are opposed to each other, they do not seem to be opposed to the Unity which is a synthesis of opposite¹. Mere Jīva and Ajīva, Spirit and Matter are abstractions. They are moments of one universal. This is the concrete universal – a reality at once divided and united. This is unity in diversity or identity-in-difference.

Yogīndu and Kunda-kunda equates Ātman with Parmātmān. The separateness and individuality of a Jīva is only from the point of view of Vyavahāra or experience². Plurality of souls is a relative conception — which reality presents when we lay stress on sensations, feelings and bondage. There is no need to deny plurality of the Jīvas at the psychological level³. Even Śaṅkara does not deny plurality at the practical level. But in Philosophy, Psychological and practical levels are not all. Logic is the hard task-master. Pluralism and Relativism are the two features of a first analysis of common experience and Jainism stops short of it, disregarding its implications⁴. Plurality may be existence or actual. But it is not real. Similarly infinite is inherent in the finite. We cannot sustain the hypothesis of relativism without an absolute.

Thus we find great similarity between Advaita and Jainism. Prof. A. Chakravarti⁵ gives a unique proof of it. He

1. Radhakrishnan, S. : Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 339.

2. Dravya-Saṅgraha, 3. 7 & 8.

3. Radhakrishnan, S. : Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 339.

4. Hiriyanna, M. : Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 171.

5. Samaya-sāra of Kunda-kunda (Introduction. p. CLX);
Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya on Brahma-sūtra, 1. 1.

says that Śaṅkara enumerates various schools he considers erroneous as Bauddha, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Vaiśeṣika and Pāśu-pata etc. regarding the nature of soul. It is strange that he does not mention the Jaina account of self as one of the erroneous views. Perhaps the Jaina concept of Self and identity of Jīvātma and Paramātma is the same as in the Advaita Vedānta. Śaṅkara is very near to Jaina-thought. Like other commentators of Brahma-Sūtra, Śaṅkara does not support the view that the Jīva limited by Avidyā is one. Brahman limited by the different inner-organs born of Avidyā becomes divided as it were many individual souls¹. This is opposed to the doctrine of Eka-Jīva-Vāda held by other Vedāntins. There are various arguments of Aneka-Jīva-Vādins. They hold that there are many individuals and the world appearance has no permanent illusion for all the people, but each person creates for himself his own illusion². From this follows the doctrine of Drṣṭi-vāda, i. e., the theory that the subjective perception is the creating of the objects and that there are no other objective phenomena apart from subjective and perception³. Even in the Upaniṣads there is distinction between Ātman and Jīvas.⁴ And the theory of Eka-Jīva-Vāda sometimes goes against the Upaniṣads and the Brahma-Sūtras⁵.

Doctrine of Standpoints

Thus to speak of a thing as one or many is entirely dependent upon the point of view we adopt. Śaṅkara says that though Devadatta is one, he is thought and spoken as a man, a Brahmin, a learned in the Vedas, generous, boy, youngman,

1. Radhakrishnan, S. : Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 610.

2. Dasgupta, S. N. : History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1, p. 417.

3. Ibid, p. 478.

4. Bṛhadāraṇyak Upaniṣad, 4. 3. 21, 3. 3. 5; Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, 4. 6.

5. Brahma-sūtra, 2. 1. 32, 2. 1. 33.

old man, father, son, grandson, brother, son-in-law etc.¹ from different standpoints. This is very similar to the Jaina theory of Syādvāda or Asti-Nāsti-Vāda. Even in the Upaniṣads we have glimpses of how reality reveals itself in different ways at different stages of our knowledge². This distinction of standpoints is a common feature of Vedānta (Śāṅkara) and Jainism. Śāṅkara distinguishes ultimate reality from practical reality. Vyavahāra view is useful, essential so far it leads to the realistic view-point. Just as a non-Aryan can not be made to understand except through the medium of his non-Aryan language so the knowledge of the absolute can not be communicated to the ordinary people except through the vyavahāra point of view³. But in itself it is in-sufficient. He must rise higher. Kunda-kunda therefore examines every problem from these two points of view in dealing with problems of an empirical life and the real point of view in dealing with supreme reality transcending limitations of the empirical life⁴. So to transcend the lower is not to ignore it⁵. Hegel⁶ has recognised it; Spinoza⁷ has accepted it. James⁸ has prescribed it; Bergson⁹ admitted it; Plato¹⁰ affirmed it; Vedas¹¹ and Upaniṣads¹² have proclaimed it; Buddhists¹³ and

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1. Cakravarti, A. : Introduction to Samaya-sāra, p. CLIX.
 2. Radhakrishnan, S. : Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 299.
 3. Samaya-sāra of Kunda-kunda, 1. 8.
 4. Cakravarti, A. : Introduction to Samaya-sāra, p. CLI.
 5. McTaggart : Hegelian Cosmology, II. 292.
 6. Ibid, 292.
 7. Ethics (Imagination, Reason and Intuition), Cf. : Vol II, p. 29.
 8. Institutional Religion and Personal Religion.
 9. Cf. : Intellect and Intuition.
 10. Cf. : Perception and Knowledge.
 11. Ṛg-veda, 10. 129. 1-2.
 12. Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad, 1. 45.
 13. Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, IX. 849, X. 592.

many others formulated it; Jainas¹ and Advaita² too have recommended it. Deussen rightly says that “the Parā-vidyā is nothing but metaphysics in an empiric dress, i. e., Vidyā as it appears considered from the standpoint of Avidyā, the realism innate³ in us. Thus the distinction between the practical and real standpoints of view is a common feature of Vedānta and Jainism, may even of Buddhism of the Upaniṣads.

Concept of Omniscience

Our phenomenal knowledge suggests the noumenal as a necessity of thought but not as something known to through the empirical pramāṇas.⁴ Owing to the apparent inadequacy of empirical knowledge, Jainism and Vedāntins have developed another organon of knowledge. Not content with Mati, Śruta, Avadhi and Manaḥ-paryaya, Jainas have developed the theory of Keval-jñāna or omniscience which is the highest type of perception which falls in the category of extra-sensory perception⁵, where the soul intuitis all substances with all their modes⁶. Nothing remains unknown in omniscience⁷. Self and knowledge are co-extensive. Its apprehension is simultaneous sudden and obiquitus. This is practically the same as intuition or integral experience, Anubhava or Śakṣatkāra (Direct perception), Samyag Jñāna⁸, i. e., perfect knowledge or Samyag Darśana⁹ (Perception-intuition) in Advaita Vedānta. Omniscience is the culmination of the faculty of cognition of conscious principle¹⁰. It is the

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1. Samaya-sāra (Introduction), p. CLI.
 2. V. P. (Siddhanta Leśa Saṅgraha), 1.
 3. Deussen System of Vedānta, p. 100.
 4. Radhakrishnan, S. : Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 509.
 5. Mehta, M. L. : Outlines of Jaina Philosophy, p. 99.
 6. Tattvārtha-Sūtra, 1. 30; Āvaśyaka-Niryukti, 77.
 7. Sāṃkhya-Sūtra-Bhāṣya, 1. 31.
 8. Śāṅkara Bhāṣya on Brahma-sūtra, 1. 2. 8.
 9. Ibid, 1. 3. 13.
 10. Mehta, M. L. : Outlines of Jaina Philosophy, p. 102.

full manifestation of the innate nature of a conscious self, emerging on the total cessation of all obstructive vells, is called 'that' (intuition) transcendent and pure¹. Jaina literature is full of discussion on omniscience². There are various proofs for it. Inductively, the gradation of knowledge implies omniscience. So says Hemcandra that the proof of it follows from the proof of the necessity of the final consummation of the progressive development of knowledge and other grounds³. Metaphysically, complex and manifold objectivity implies some extraordinary perception. Psychologically, differences in intelligence etc. presupposes omniscience. Religious-Mystical argument proves omniscience on the basis of religio-mystical experience. Logically, on account of the lack of contradictory proofs, omniscience is established⁴. What Vedānta puts negatively, Jainism puts positively. Vedānta links nescience with misery and Jaina links omniscience with eternal bliss. The Vedānta annihilates nescience by submerging the individual into the universal while Jaina says that individual itself becomes universal⁵. The Jainas hold that each and every entity is related to all entities⁶. Nothing is wholly independent. Nothing is intelligible by itself. So logically the perfect knowledge of one thing means the perfect

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1. Cf. : Ibid p. 99; Radhakrishnan, S. : Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 511.
 2. Prameya-Kamala-Mārtanḍa, 254. 60; Pañcā-Namaskāra-Stotra, 4. 10-20; Aṣṭa-śatī, K.140; Nyāya-viniścaya, K 465, 361, 362; Saṅkhaṇḍāgama, 22.78; Jayadhawālā, p. 66; Ācārāṅga-sūtra, 2. 3. 3; Āva'yaka-Niryukti, Gāthā 127.
 3. Parīkṣā-mukhaṁ of Māṇikyanandī, translated by Mukerjee and Tatia, p. 30.
 4. Ibid, p. 34.
 5. Pravacana-sāra of Kunda-kunda (Introduction).
 6. Tatia, N. M. : Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p. 70.

knowledge of all things. Jacobi¹ has quoted an old Jaina Stanza "one who knows one things, knows all and he alone who knows all things knows everything completely."²

This is the culmination of enlightenment, soul-knowledge in its pristine form, perception par-excellence. It does not depend upon any sense (Atīndriya) and arises after destruction of all obstruction³.

This is relativism par-excellence. To an omniscient the limitation of Syādvāda or conditional predication logically cannot bind. He is all knowing. The veil of ignorance is lifted which obscures vision. Thus here we see that the theory of relativity presupposes the hypothesis of an absolute. The very consciousness of our relativity means we have to reach out a fuller conception. A mere pooling of the contributions of the different standpoints (Naya) will not lead us to the truth in itself. Truth is not a haphazardous jumbling up of its every bits but is a harmonious whole. Dr. Raju holds that "their (Jainas) doctrine is a doctrine of the relativity of knowledge"⁴. They hold "there is reality; its nature is such and such. still, it is possible to understand it in quite opposite ways"⁵. But to the omniscient there would not be relative but absolute and unconditional knowledge. Thus relativism as logically pushed forward leads to absolutism. The moment we accept that there is intuitional knowledge of the

1. Jaina Sūtra, II, p. 34.

2. Cf. : Ācarāṅga-sūtra, 1. 3. 4, Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya.

3. Cf. : Parīkṣā-mukhaṁ, 2. 10; Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra, X. 1; Nyāyavatāra, 27; Prameya-kamala-martanda, 1. 1. 9-10; Pramāṇa-naya-tattvalokālaṅkāra, 11. 18; Sthanaṅga-sūtra, 226; Dravya-saṅgraha, 5; Rāja-praśnīya, 165.

4. Raju, P. T. : The Principle of Four-cornered Negation in Indian Philosophy, Extracts from the review of Metaphysics, Vol. VII, No. 4, June 1954, p. 707.

5. Ibid, p. 697.

Kevalin, which is higher than thought, we are led to monism absolute and unlimited¹.

Theory of Causation

Following the doctrine of identity between the cause and the effect, Ācārya Kunda-kunda maintains (consistent with Jaina Metaphysics) that the Cetana cause can produce non-cetana effects. Strangely enough the Advaita-Vedānta which maintains the Brahman to be the ultimate cause of all reality also maintains the non-difference in cause and effect². However in Jainism while the spirit and the matter seem to be opposed to each other they do not seem to be opposed to the unity which is a synthesis of opposites. Again, each portion of matter may be conceived as like a garden full of plants, or like a pond full of fishes. There is nothing fallow, nothing sterile, nothing dead in the universe³. Considered from this point of view Jainism comes very near to Vedānta.

Conclusion

The different categories, thus viewed as functional variations of one principle, are no longer in a position of antagonism or indifferent isolation⁴. It seems legitimate to conclude that the universe is one existence which manifest itself, as substance as it unifies the modes and attributes. It is one universe that the Jaina metaphysics gives us⁵. All is one because all exists⁶. So we find in the Sthānāṅga-sūtra such utterance as 'Ege Aya; Ege loe', 'One Universe, One soul'⁷. But unfortunately the Jaina Metaphysics was

1. Radhakrishnan, S. : Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 340.
2. Introduction to Samaya-sāya of Kunda-kunda, p. CLVII.
3. Radhakrishnan, S. : Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 334.
4. Aṣṭa-sāhasrī, p. 113.
5. Moekerjee, S. : The Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism, pp. 301-302.
6. Tattvārtha-sūtra-bhāṣya, 1. 35.
7. Sthānāṅga-sūtra, 1. 1, 1. 4.

not allowed to develop along this line¹. So says Radhakrishnan, "it is only by stopping short at a half-way house that Jainism is able to set forth a pluralistic realism."²

Since these two substances are interdependent, the dualism must in its turn and finally be resolved in a monism³. Any way whether Jainism can be transmuted into Advaita or not it is certain that there are obvious Advaita trends in Jainism⁴.



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1. Mookerjee, S. : The Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism, p. 302.
 2. Radhakrishnan, S. : Indian Philosophy, p. 340.
 3. Hiriyanna, M. : Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 172.
 4. Datta, D. M. : His kind letter to me on the subject.

Chapter Eight

NATURE OF UNCONDITIONALITY IN SYĀDVĀDA

(1) *Ahimsa, Anekantavada and Syadvada* — Jainism is a great experiment in *Ahiṃsā* (non-violence) in word, deed and thought. Infinite knowledge, faith, power and bliss are the innate characters of every soul. What is needed is external non-interference. The doctrine of *Anekantavāda* (non-absolutism) is simply an extension of *Ahiṃsā* in the field of reality. When things have many characters (*anantadharmaṃtmaṃ*)¹, naturally they are objects of all-sided knowledge. Any particular object can be viewed from different points of view. So when we speak of a particular aspect, we have to use the word 'syāt' i. e., from a particular point of view, or as related to this aspect, this object is such and not otherwise. So *Syādvāda* is the doctrine of Relativity of Judgement which is born out of the non-violent and non-absolutistic attitude of the Jainas, which led to the uttermost cautiousness of speech of "explaining problems with the help of *Sīyavaya* (*Syādvāda*) or *Vibhajjavaya*. Our thought is relative. Our expressions are relative². Thus the doctrines of *Ahiṃsā*, *Anekantavāda* and *Syādvāda* are organically related.

(2) *Syadvada : A form of Scepticism* — Scepticism 'denies the possibility of knowledge'³, said James Iverach. It starts from 'no more such than such' and ends in 'we know not where, why and whence'. It doubts or denies the very possibility of knowledge. But the position taken by Jainism is this "there is reality; its nature is such and such; still it is possible

1. Haribhadra, *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya*, 55.

2. Tatia, N. M. : *Studies in Jaina Philosophy* (1951), p. 22.

3. *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. 5, p. 340 b.

to understand it in quite opposite ways.”¹ Prof. K. C. Bhattacharya who gives indeterministic interpretation of this theory clearly says that the Jainas “the theory of indeterministic truth is not a form of scepticism. It represents, no doubt, but toleration of many modes of truth.”² Prof. Kalidas Bhattacharya, who tries to interpret Anekāntavāda from alternative standpoints also holds that “the Syādvādin is quite definitely assertive so far as *asti*, *nāsti* etc. are concerned.”³ This is a form of realism which asserts a plurality of determinate truths and they have thus developed a wonderful organon of *Saptabhaṅgī* or the seven-fold pluralistic doctrine of Jaina dialectics. True, every judgement bears the stamp of relativity, but this relativity does never mean uncertainty. In fact, this theory of seven-fold predication is ‘derived from Jaina ontology that reality is determinate’⁴.

(3) *Is Non-absolutism Absolute* — Put into the dialectics of the seven-fold predication, the negation of non-absolutism (i. e. non-absolutism does not exist) is equivalent to the affirmation of absolutism. If non-absolutism is, it is not universal since there is one real which is absolute; if non-absolutism is itself non-absolute, it is not an absolute and universal fact : thus “tossed between the two horns of the dilemma non-absolutism simply evaporates.”⁵

But we should remember that every proposition of dialectical seven-fold judgement is either Complete or Incomplete.

1. Raju, P. T. : The Principle of Four-cornered Negation in Indian Philosophy, Extracts from the Review of Metaphysics, June 1954, p. 697.
2. The Jaina Theory of Anekāntavāda, Jaina Antiquary June 1943, p. 14.
3. His kind letter to me, dated 30-12-1953, Cf. : His Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy (1953), p. 364.
4. Mookerjee, S. : The Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism (1944), p. 123.
5. Ibid, p. 169.

In complete judgement “we use only word that describes one characteristic of that object, and hold the remaining characters to be identical with it.”¹ On the other hand, in Incomplete Judgement (Naya) we speak of truth as relative to our standpoints, hence a partial knowledge. “Hence the non-absolute is constituted of absolutes as its elements and as such would not be possible if there were no absolute.”²

(4) *Is Conditional Judgement Unconditional* — We have seen that every judgement is true but conditionally or relatively. But the statement that ‘all propositions are conditional’ cannot be a sweeping remark, for then it will mean that “all statements including even the statement that ‘all statements are conditional’ would be conditional.” But the Jainas insist that all propositions except the proposition of its own system have, relative truth. They say that all seven alternatives are true and so their seven-fold conditioned predication is an all comprehensive categorical statement. True, they treat the alternatives only as alternatives, and not as disjunctives in which, alternatives are mutually exclusive, they are nevertheless making a categorical judgement. Does this mean that their doctrine is the doctrine of relativity of knowledge but not of relativity of truth ? Yes, the Jainas do hold that their own system is absolutely true. But if knowledge is relative, our knowledge of reality also can have only relative truth.

So we come to this statement that ‘every statement is conditional’ may in sense be taken as unconditional. This is unconditionality in conditionality, or absolutism in non-absolutism. When the Jainas say that ‘every thing is conditional’, they are unconditional to this extent that ‘every thing

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1. Mehta, M. L. : Outlines of Jaina Philosophy (1954), p. 123.
 2. Mookerjee, S. : The Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism (1944), p. 171.

is conditional'. Now, does this not mean self-contradiction or complete overthrowing of the absolutistic position ?

Let us analyse, "A categorical judgement asserts an actual fact absolutely"¹ in which the relation between the subject and the predicate is simple and unconditional one. Now, in the above proposition, 'every proposition is conditional', the relation between 'every proposition' (i. e. subject) and 'conditional' (predicate) is apparently unconditional, but there is no clash between its unconditionality and conditionality.

For example, when Bhaṭṭas say that consciousness associated with ignorance is the Self, on account of such Śruti passages, "During dreamless sleep the Ātman is undifferentiated consciousness."² Even in the waking state a man says — 'I do not know myself' though he is aware of his own existence. 'I had no knowledge' means that I have atleast 'the knowledge of having no knowledge'. But here there is no clash between knowledge and ignorance, hence no contradiction.

Similarly when I say 'I am undecided' (when I am extremely perplexed about everything), there is indeed one *decision* that I am undecided. But this *decision* does not quarrel with my *indecision*, hence no contradiction.

Similarly in Logic, we have disjunctive judgements — "The signal is either red or green"; "A man is either good or bad" etc.³, we do mean something categorical behind them. But this categoricity is not like the categoricity of a simple unconditional judgement, 'The horse is red'. True, the basis is always categorical but this categoricity does never clash with the proposition being disjunctive.

1. Bosanquet, B. : Logic, Vol. 1, 11nd edition (1911), p. 88.

2. Maṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, 5.

3. Bradley, F. H. : The Principles of Logic, Vol. 1, 11nd edition, p. 130.

When a logical positivist says that “there is no metaphysics and reality may come through the back-door. Like “Hydra they raise their heads over and over again, not to be destroyed afresh, but to conquer a new.”¹

In the conclusion we may say that the unconditionality in the statement, ‘All statements are conditional’, is quite different from the normal conditionality. This is how and why ?

(5) *Senses, Reason and Faith* — There are primarily two sources to understand the world — *senses* and reason. Closely connected and corresponding to them there are two grades of Reality — *existence* and *essence* (as the existentialists will say) or existence and reality (as the Hegelians will say). Existence is actuality, or actual verification. This is unconditional, absolute and categorical. There is no alternation or condition, being monistic and unilateral in attitude. But there is another thing *thought*. Thought is rational thought or simply reason. Thought gives us essences either by a sort of reflection or by the way of hypothesis and then interprets the world in terms of these essences. However, this interpretation is not verification. There may be alternative essences or hypothesis in terms of each, which the world can be interpreted. Thought therefore is not concerned with existence, but with essences, and there is always the possibility of alternative essences or hypothesis. This is exactly what we mean, when we say that ‘everything is conditional’. To thought or reason thus, everything is *conditional* or alternative.

But we cannot live in the world of thought alone; we cannot forget *existence*. But this attitude to existence must be other than thought or reason and what is other than thought or reason must be unreason or irrationality. This irratio-

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1. Gadkar, (Mrs) V. Gajendra : Logical Positivism vs Metaphysics, *Proc. of Indian Philosophical Congress* (Mysore), p. 183.

nality leads us to existence, which as such is unconditional. Behind reason there is always the unreason. We can give the name of *faith* to this phenomenon as Kant¹, Herder, Jacobi etc., have suggested. There are many grounds of faith — one being the *scripture*. Scripture differs from one another. Jainas must stick to their own position. Here is definiteness. However, we cannot expect such definiteness, on the other side. Reason only differs from one another. Jainas must stick to their own position. Here is definiteness. However, we cannot expect such definiteness on other side. Reason only offers alternative pictures — Jaina, Advaita, Vaiśeṣika etc., all are equally possible. But do we always obey the command of reason ? No, we have also own interest on irrationality. Hence, in order to avoid indefiniteness etc., we stick to one such possibility which is chosen for us by the community to which we belong or by some superior intuition. Thus there comes unconditionality. However another may choose another possibility as existence if he belongs to another community or if his genius moves in another direction. So there appears to be again alternation among existence. But this alternation is not genuine. There is alternation only so far as we think. There is alternation only on thought level. We compare thought with other thoughts. And, what is comparison ? Comparison involves thinking and reasoning, so it is thought process. Some are bound to admit alternation. My standpoint is only a possible one. But I cannot always fly in the air of possibilities, I must have moorings in some one definite form of actuality. I must adopt one standpoint.

(6) *Conclusion* — Jainism is against all kinds of imperialism in thought. For each community there is a special absolute. But the absolute themselves are alternations so far as they are possible. But this is only on thought level. But when I

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1. Immanuel Kant : Critique of Pure Reason, English Translation by Kemp Smith, p. 110, p. 174, pp. 315-316, pp. 323-324.

have chosen one it is more than possible, it is existence or actual. So there is a wonderful reconciliation between conditionality and unconditionality. Every thing is conditional on thought level, but not on the level of existence. Thus there is no real contradiction.



Chapter Nine

AN EXAMINATION OF BRAHMA-SŪTRA (II. 2. 33)

(From the Jaina Standpoint)

Aphorism & Contradiction — The aphorism¹ under examination seems to be an innocent statement about the Law of Contradiction. However, the purpose of this aphorism is to examine the Jaina logic of seven paralogsms, which is declared to be a wrong theory on the ground of the impossibility of the presence of contradictory qualities in one and the same substance.

However, I think that many of the misgivings could have been avoided had there been a sincere effort to understand the Jaina point-of-view more sympathetically by trying to realise the importance of what is called, 'universe of discourse'. For, even the Law of contradiction means that two contradictory terms *B* and *not B* cannot both be true *at the same time of one and the same thing A*. In other words, two contradictory propositions can not both be true, i. e. one must be false. A man can not at the same time, be 'alive' and 'dead'. This means that the products of thought should be free from inconsistency and Contradiction, i. e. , valid in Hamilton's sense². However, Mill goes ahead and holds that it must also be true, i. e., agree with the reality of things.³ It means that "before dealing with a judgement or reasoning expressed in language, the import of its terms should be fully understood, in

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1. 'Not in one substance because of the impossibility', Brahma-sūtra, II. 2. 33.
 2. Hamilton, 'Lectures', Vol. III, pp. 25-26.
 3. Mill, J. S. : Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy, 4th edition, p. 564, p. 470.

other words, logical postulates to be allowed to state explicitly in language all that is implicitly contained in thought.”¹ The Pragmatists also complain against ‘Formal Logic’ for its neglect of the ‘context’². Even Mathematical Logicians, according to whom, there is “no essential connection between connotation and denotation”³ admit the conception of a Universe of Discourse in the sense of ‘a given context, or range of significance’.⁴

The Four-cornered Negation and Contradiction — The four-cornered negation of the Madhyamika Buddhists throws light on the problem. According to them, Reality is not (neither *B*, nor *not B* nor *both B and not B*, nor *neither B and not B*). Now, if Reality *is*, neither being nor non-being can be negated. But, the Madhyamikas hold that though the Reality is not *Being* or *Non-being* it can not be different from them. Thus even the *neither... ..nor* (i. e. neither Being nor non-Being) has to be negated, and consequently there has to be a double negation.

This looks like violating the Law of Contradiction, for the denial of the contradictories suggests the possibility of a position in between the two contradictories. Professor Raju⁵, however, suggests a technical device for the relief of the Buddhists to meet this charge of the possible violation of the Law of Contradiction. In the doctrine of four-cornered negation if we distinguish between contrary and contradictory opposition in the manner of western logic, we will see that two contraries can be negated but not the two contradictories.

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1. Hamilton, ‘Lectures’, Vol. III, p. 114.
 2. See F. C. S. Schiller’s ‘Logic For Use’, Chapter on ‘Formal Theories of Judgement’ and ‘Meaning’, Also See John Dewey’s ‘Logic’, p. 192.
 3. Stebbing, L. S. : ‘An Introduction to Modern Logic’, p. 55.
 4. Ibid, p. 56.
 5. Raju, P. T. : The Four-cornered Negation, ‘The Review of Metaphysics’, Vol. VII, No. 4, June 1954.

Law of Contradiction and the Advaita Vedānta — To Śaṅkara, Being and Non-being are *contraries* not *contradictories*. Reality is *Being*; Non-being is unreal; but there is the third order of reality which is neither *Being* nor *Non-being*, This is the phenomenal word which is neither real nor unreal but phenomenal, this is Mayā.

To illustrate this point, a reference to the Upaniṣadic account of the self would be instructive, Self is *mobile* and yet *immobile*, distant yet *near*, *transcendent* yet *immanent*.” Śaṅkara¹, in his interpretation of this verse anticipates the objections of his opponents with regard to the question : how these contradictory predications are made about the same subject ? Śaṅkara says that there is no fallacy here (*naiśa doṣaḥ*)² because two contradictory statements have been made from two separate standpoints. Ātman is said to be immobile and one viewed from the ultimate point of view, when the Ātman is free from all conditions. But it can also be described as mobile (more mobile than mind itself) when it is associated with the powers of limiting adjunct, of being an internal organ³. Similarly, Ātman is described as far and distant because it is beyond the reach of the ordinary mind, but for the wise people, it is described as being there within (*tadantrasya sarvasya*)⁴. Similar statements with contradictory predications are found at other places and Śaṅkara has no other alternative but to reconcile them with the help of his multi-valued logic, the merit of which he unfortunately forgets while criticising the Jaina theory of affirmative-negative-predications (*asti-nāsti-vāda*). However, if we remember the Jaina doctrine of reality⁵ as identity-in-

1. “Iśa Upaniṣad” with Śaṅkara’s Commentary, 5.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid, 4.

4. Ibid, 5.

5. Umāsvāmī, ‘Tattvārtha Sūtra’, See also Kunda-kunda’s ‘Samaya-sāra’ (Introduction by A. Chakravarti, p. CXXXIII).

difference which is both a permanent and changing entity manifesting through constant change of appearance and disappearance, then we can easily understand that reality when looked at as the underlying permanent substance may be described as permanent, but when viewed from the point of view of the modes (paryāya) which appear and disappear, it may be described as non-permanent and changing. This difference of aspect is the well known Jaina doctrine of *Naya*. It is indeed a tragedy that Śaṅkara, while making a distinction between the Vyāvahārika and Pāramārthika points of view throughout his commentary forgets the same in respect of Jainism. In common experience, we find in the same object, the existence of one thing (pot) and the non-existence of the other (cloth). This does not mean that the same thing is both pot and cloth, hence there is no contradiction.¹ Examples of co-existing self-contradictory attributes are daily perceived but only from different points of view. For example, in the same tree, the trunk is stationary while the branches and leaves are in motion. Like Kunda-kunda, Śaṅkara examines every problem from the two points of view, practical and real, and this doctrine is the supporting edifice of the Advaita Philosophy. The same material clay or gold may be transformed into various forms. So to speak of a thing as one or many entirely depends upon the points of view we adopt. The same substance 'mud' is spoken differently as jar, jug, etc. Devadutta although one only, forms the object of many different names and notions according as he is considered in himself or in his relation to others; thus, he is thought and spoken of as a man, Brahmin, son, grandson, etc. Does it not exactly look like the Jaina point of view of asti-nāsti-vāda ?

Ramanuja and Contradiction — Like Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja also criticises Jaina theory of seven paralogsisms². No doubt,

1. Rajendra Kumar, 'Anekānta, Syādvāda aur Saptabhaṅgī' in *Jaina Darśana*, Year 1, No. 1.
2. 'Śrī Bhāṣya' of Rāmānuja on 'Brahma-sūtra', II. 2. 33.

he recognises substance and attributes as *distincts* but he says that *asti* and *nāsti* cannot be predicated of the same thing from the Dravya point of view alone¹, i. e., the same substance cannot have the two contradictory predicates. In spite of this, Rāmānuja seems to be very much prejudiced against the Jaina theory when he asks : How can we say that the same thing *is* and *is not* at the same time ? However, Rāmānuja forgets that if we describe a thing both from the standpoint of underlying substance (dravya) and its modifications (paryāya), we shall have no such difficulty. We meet with these difficulties because we prefer to live in the world of empty abstractions. In a sense, the Vedāntic metaphysics of Rāmānuja is the doctrine of *one* and *many*. It is *one* when we talk of the one Absolute Brahman, it is *many* when we know about the multiple *jīvas* and the multiverse. And when reality is *one* and *many* at the same time, Vedāntism itself becomes a sufficient argument in favour of Syādvāda. How does the Absolute, which is one and only one, become the all ? How can the one Brahman consist of both conscious (cit) and unconscious (acit) elements ? If these contradictions can be reconciled by Rāmānuja, he should not find fault with the very logical calculus of reconciliation adopted by the Jaina doctrine. Thus Rāmānuja's attempt to discover contradictions in Syādvāda destroys the entire edifice of his metaphysics itself. Anekāntavāda pleads for soberness and loyalty to experience which discards absolutism. The dual nature of things is proved by a reduction-ad-absurdum of the opposite views. This does not mean any offence to the canons of logic. The concept of pure logic which is prior to and absolutely independent of experience is dangerous. "Logic is to systematize and rationalize what experience offers"². In one

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1. Kṛṣṇa Candra, 'Vedānta Sūtra Ke Vyākhyākāra Aur Saptabhaṅgī', in 'Jaina Darśana', Year I, Number 1.
 2. Mookerjee, S. : The Jaina Philosophy of Absolutism (Calcutta, 1944), p. 78.

"To allow logic to work in vacuo and to dictate terms to

word logic must be loyal to *reason* and *experience* alike. Even Vedānta ultimately relies on experience to prove the reality of the triune principle of existence, consciousness and bliss.

Some other Vedantic Acharyas and Contradiction — According to Vijñānabhikṣu¹, unless the qualitative differences (prakārabheda) are recognised as true, two fundamentally opposite things cannot be reconciled into one object. But if the differences are recognised as true, it amounts to the Vedāntic position. But can we not ask the Vedāntist: how can *ultimate* differences be reconciled with the *ultimate* identity of Brahman? Either they should accept *identity* as *ultimate* or differences as *ultimate* but not *both*. However, the Jains can avoid such a difficulty by accepting the differences from relative standpoints. We can speak of existence (bhāva) and non-existence (abhāva) of the same thing from two standpoints without being inconsistent. Existence and non-existence coexisting in the same thing is said to be contradictory because both of them are taken as whole-characteristics. It can be well reconciled by taking them as part-characteristics. Vallabha² also suffers from the same defect as Vijñānabhikṣu when he insists upon the fact that differences can be reconciled *only* in the Absolute Brahman, who assumes the form of the Jīvas for the enjoyment of bliss. However, it is difficult to follow how the formless Brahman assumes different forms, how the *One* becomes many? If the law of contradiction is not violated here, the same charge cannot be levelled against the Jaina position when the contradictory attributes are said to inhere in the same object from the different relative standpoints.

the data of experience — and the unfettered exercise of logic in defiance of and in opposition to the testimony of experience, has been responsible for hopelessly chaotic results achieved by metaphysical speculations".—Ibid.

1. Vijñānabhikṣu, Vijñānāmṛta Bhāṣya, II. 2. 33—"Prakāra-vedam Bina Virudhayorekada Sahavasthāna-sambhāvata", etc.
2. Vallabha, 'Aṇu-bhāṣya', II. 2. 33.

Śrīkaṇṭha has clearly misunderstood the Jaina standpoint itself. While he accepts the possibility of reconciliation of the contradictory attributes in the same object from different standpoints, he outright denies that Jainas ever adhere to the relativistic logic¹.

Lastly, Nimbārka and Bhāskara, who broadly accept the Jaina principle of identity-in-difference or unity in diversity with regard to the nature of reality, also fail to appreciate the true import of Jaina principle. Nimbārka², for instance, refuses to admit the application of this principle in matters of Syādvāda. His commentator Śrī Nivāsācārya's³ explanation becomes unphilosophical when he says that the *justification for admitting the principle* of identity in-difference lies in the Śruti and not in logic.

Bhāskara⁴ argues that if non-absolutism (Anekānta) is universal, it becomes absolute (ekānta); if not, it is nothing definite. Thus "tossed between the two horns of the dilemma non-absolutism thus evaporates"⁵. However, Bhāskara fails to note the Jaina distinction between valid non-absolute (samyak-anekānta) and invalid non-absolute (mithyā-anekānta)⁶. To be valid, anekānta must not be absolute but relative. The doctrine of non-absolutism can be interpreted either as *absolute* or non-absolute according to Pramāṇa or Naya respectively, which only suggests that non-absolutism is not absolute unconditionally.⁷ But the unconditionality of

1. Śrīkaṇṭha, 'Śrī Kaṇṭha-bhāṣya II, 22. 33 with Ṭīkā of Appayadīkṣita.
2. Nimbārka, 'Nimbārka-bhāṣya, II. 2. 23.
3. Śrī Nivāsācārya, Ṭīkā on 'Nimbārka-Bhāṣya, II. 2. 33.
4. 'Bhāskar Bhāṣya' on Brahma-Sūtra II. 2. 33.
5. Mookerjee, S. : Ibid, p. 171.
6. Samantabhadra, 'Āpta-Mīmāṃsā, K. 108; 'Aṣṭa 'Sahasrī' (Vidyānandī), p. 290; Nyāya-dīpikā" (Vidyānandī), pp. 130-131.
7. Samantabhadra, 'Svayambhu Stotra' K. 103.

Anekānta or Syādvāda is quite different from the normal meaning of unconditionality. This is like the idea contained in the expression “I do not know myself”, where there is no contradiction because there is no contradiction between knowledge and ignorance. Similarly, in the sentence, ‘I am undecided’, there is at least one decision that ‘I am undecided’. As a matter of fact, these critics of Syādvāda fail to appreciate the fact that everything is possible only in relation to and as distinct from something other. Contradictory characteristics of reality are interpreted as to coexistent in the same object from different points of view without any offence to logic.



JAINA ETHICS

- (1) *Karmic Idealism of the Jainas.***
- (2) *Omniscience : Determinism and Freedom.***
- (3) *Jaina Moksha in Indian Philosophy.***

Chapter Ten

KĀRMIC IDEALISM OF THE JAINAS

Karma is the matrix of the universe which undergoes evolution due to karma. Karma is not only the ground-mass of individual's destiny but also the mould in which anything and everything takes shape.

(1) Karma is generally regarded as the principle of determination of the individual's destiny, his well-being and suffering. But a careful study will show that karma is also the ultimate determinant of the various courses of events. There are three reasons for this : *first*, the problem of individual happiness and suffering is not an isolated affair, because it is somehow related to the entire universe. The past karma puts a world before the individual which brings appropriate pleasure and pain to him. In short, karma determines both his heredity and environment. *Secondly*, even Time, Nature, Matter, etc, are not outside the scope of karma and they are merely the different expressions of the working of the universal law of karma. *Thirdly*, karma is the principle of determination of the world. The variation in matter and time can only be ascribed to karma if we are to avoid the defects of Temporalism (Kālavāda), Naturalism (Svabhāvavāda), Determinism (Niyativāda), Accidentalism (Yadrēchavāda), Materialism (Bhautikavāda), Scepticism and Agnosticism (Saṁśayavāda and Ajñānavāda), etc.

(2) According to the popular and traditional scheme of Jaina classification of Karmas, they are of eight fundamental types. The different karmas determine our faith (darśana), knowledge (jñāna), feeling (vedanā), delusion (moha), age (āyu), physique (nāma) status (gotra) and power (antarāya). In short, the karmas determine the entire personal-social set-up of the individual, and they also condition a world set-up for him. Of course, in the Leibnitzian manner, the

set-up is different for everybody. The Jainas also believe that the effects of karma are different upon different individuals in accordance with the nature (*prakṛti*), duration (*sthiti*), intensity of fruition (*anubhāga*) and quantity (*pradeśa*) of karmas. It is true that in the list of enumeration of various types and sub-types of karmas, we do not find a satisfactory explanation as to why any of this is this and not otherwise. But the Jaina thinkers try to uphold the relevance of karma-theory to the minutest details of life. For instance, the *nāma-karma* is said to be of forty-two kinds with sub-classes of ninety-three kinds; as they bring about their respective effects. This demonstrates the anxiety of the Jainas to ascribe anything and everything to some or other form of Karma. In other words, this is to assert the doctrine of universal causation known as *Karmavāda*.

(3) I think, this may be interpreted as a sort of Idealism, known as *Kārmic Idealism*, which will be distinct and different from both Subjective and Objective Idealisms. A rough comparison, however, may be made with Kantian Idealism, where there is a construction of categories. But here the categories are not created by the understanding. They are only related to the understanding. That way, even the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas* have said that *generality* and *particularity* are relative to our understanding. In fact, *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* are pure objective categories but they only point out that there is some sort of relativity, but this relativity is objective and not subjective. Hence, we can conclude that *Kārmic Idealism* is not a form of subjective Idealism. Nor is it Objective Idealism, since the Jainas do believe in the eternal co-existence of matter and mind as independent principles of reality. The union of soul and matter is regarded as self-proved and hence the eternal bondage of soul and *kārmic* matter is described as its very nature, as dirt in golden ore. This is the starting point of Jainism.

(4) However, in the ordinary sense of the term, we cannot speak of *kārmic idealism* because karma, in the Jaina philo-

sophy, is not an 'idea'. It is an aggregate of very fine imperceptible material particles. It is the foreign element that infects the purity and perfection of the soul, which has consciousness as its distinguishing feature. This is the doctrine of the material nature of karma, which is peculiar to Jainism. With other systems of Indian philosophy, karma is formless. But the Jainas regard karma as the crystallized effect of the past activities or energies. They say that "in order to act and react and thereby to produce changes in things on which they work, the energies must have to be metamorphosed into form or centres of forces." Like begets like. The cause is like the effect. The effect, i. e., the body is physical, hence the cause, i. e., karma has indeed a physical form.

The karmic-matter is one of the six kinds of matter or *pud-gala*. It is very fine and imperceptible, but it is capable of becoming matter. The material molecules or *vargaṇas* are molecule-groups of the same kind of matter. There are twenty three kinds of such *vargaṇas* of which the thirteenth is the karmic-molecule or *karma-vargaṇas*. There is an intricate arithmetic about the number of karmic molecules. The material nature of karma is quite evident.

(5) But even if karma is considered to be physical in nature, it has a tendency to determine psychic characteristics. "It has the peculiar property of developing the effects of merit and demerit." Then karmas are of two kinds, physical or *dravya-karma* and ideal or *bhāva-karma*. The thought of the spiritual activity is *bhāva-karma* whereas the actual matter flowing into the soul and binding it is called *dravya-karma*. The *bhāva-karmas* may be compared with the *saṃskāras* or latent tendencies of other systems. The Nyāya view of *pravṛtti* (activity) and the Yoga concept of *vṛtti* (modifications) are very near to it. As our *saṃskāras* or latent tendencies determine our overt actions, life and personality, so *bhāva-karmas* also affect our physical side of personality. The *dravya-karma* is also characterized as cover (*āvaraṇa*) and *bhāva-karma* as faults

(doṣa). Both of them, however, are related to each other as cause and effect. The material aggregate of karmic molecules is dravya-karma; its power to operate is bhāva-karma. Bhāva-karmas will condition our bhāvas or emotional states, which may be either pleasant or unpleasant. Now, if these states of emotion (bhāva) are really brought about by karmic matter, how can Ātman be said to be the cause of these bhāvas ? But the soul's agency is such that while giving up its own state, it can effect entirely alien or non-mental changes (i. e., it is the cause of its own mental states which are also indirectly conditioned by karmic matter). To this, we can say that emotional states (bhāvas) are conditioned by dravya-karma and karma in its turn is conditioned by karmic-thought or bhāva. Jīva is not the essential cause, in that case and still without essential cause, these changes cannot happen. The soul which brings about changes in itself is the upādāna-karaṇa (material cause) of such mental states but not of the changes in karmic matter, which are distinctly material in nature. This means that there is a psycho-physical parallelism. Jīva brings changes in consciousness, and matter in the case of material things, and yet the two series are interrelated in a parallel pattern. This implies that neither can matter become mind nor can mind become matter. Jīva is the agent of its own bhāvas, as it causes its own resultants. But it is not the agent of pudgala-karmas,

(6) However, much of these difficulties will be got over, if we adopt the Jaina doctrine of standpoints or naya. According to the practical point of view, the soul is the doer of material-karmas (dravya-karma), but according to the real point of view, it is the doer of ideal karmas (bhāva-karmas). For example, in making a pot, the existence of the idea of pot in the mind of the potter is the ideal karma (bhāva-karma). The potter is directly the cause of the bhāva-karma and the bhāva-karma again is the cause of dravya-karma. Therefore from the real standpoint the 'potter having the idea of the pot' is the agent but according to the practical standpoint, he is

the agent of dravya-karma. Really, a jīva is neither the material nor the efficient cause of the *material-karmas* but only the agent of its own emotional states or bhāvas. Therefore, it is only from the practical standpoint that the jīvas are described as enjoying happiness and misery which are the fruits of material karma. In fact, the jīva is the possessor of consciousness only. Ātman or jīva is the agent of its own bhāvas, as it causes its own resultants.

(7) In an important sense, science of karma has been described as the science of spirituality. Spirituality aims at unfolding the real nature of spirit or self. This is self-knowledge or self-realization. But to know the self is also to know that it is different from the non-self, with which it is in beginningless conjunction. Karma is the material basis of bondage and nescience of the soul. The beginningless relation between soul and non-soul is due to mithyātva (nescience) which is responsible for the worldly existence. This is determined by the nature, duration, intensity and quantity of karmas. Jīvas take matter in accordance with their own karmas because of self-possession (kaṣāya). It is therefore clear that the science of karma is a necessary part of the science of spirituality. Unless we have a thorough knowledge of the karmas, we cannot know about the true nature of spirit or self. The knowledge of karma removes the false notion of identity between the body and the self, and so on. This is nothing other than the science of spirituality.



OMNISCIENCE¹ : DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM²

(1) If X foreknows that Y will act in a manner known as Z, and if Y really acts in the same manner, there seems to be no choice for Y but rather fixed and inexorable necessity. If it is admitted that somebody is omniscient, no human action can be free or voluntary. So it may also be deduced that if the omniscience is a fact, morality becomes a delusion.³

(2) In the case of God, omniscience is regarded as the very nature of God, because He is the maximum being and the only cause of the effected beings. As maximum being, He is the most perfect being, hence most conscious and absolute self-conscious⁴. But being the only possible cause of beings, God is eminently whatever any effected being may be. Thus knowing himself perfectly and most directly, he knows himself as he is, hence as the only possible cause of all possible beings, and thus knows everything, real or mere possible, in the awareness of his own essence. One reason why God is omniscient is His *omnipotence*.⁵ Since He created all things He knew them before they existed, while they were still mere possibilities. He knows not only that which actually exists, but also that which could possibly exist, i. e., future realities and

1. By 'omniscience' I mean knowledge of all things—actual or possible of all places and of all times.
2. By 'freedom' I mean 'freedom of will'.
3. Cp. 'Either freedom is a fact or morality is a delusion'.
4. Richard De. V. Smet, 'Omniscience in Christian Thought, an unpublished article written on my request, p. 1.
5. Paul Heinisch, Eng. Editor Rev. William Heidt, *Theology of the Old Testament*, p. 89; Cp. P. S., 33 : 15; 94 : 9; 15 : 24; Sir. 23 : 20,

future possibilities, in a word, everything. The second reason for God's omniscience is His omnipresence from which no one can escape whether he ascended into heaven, lay down in sheol or sojourned at the furthest limits of the sea.¹

(3) Now, a serious consequence might follow from such a position, "when God created man, He foresaw what would happen concerning him,"² for to confess that "God exists and at the same time to deny that He has foreknowledge of future things is the most manifest folly... one who is no prescient of all future things is not God."³ If we say that God foreknows that a man will sin, he must necessarily sin. But "If there is necessity there is no voluntary choice of sinning but fixed and unavoidable necessity."⁴ So also Locke says, "If God exists and is (essentially) omniscient, no human action is voluntary."⁵ Boethius also says, "If God is omniscient, no human action is voluntary."⁶

(4) Now, one may say, if we apply the concept of omniscience to human beings, the results will be all the more devastating. But it may be pointed out that "God compels no man to sin, though He sees beforehand those who are going to sin by their own will."⁷ Hence, it may be argued that divine omniscience cannot entail determinism. For instance, an intimate friend can have foreknowledge of another's

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1. Theology of the old Testament, p. 89; Cp. Jer. 23 : 23-24; PS. 139 : 11-2; Samuel, 23 : 27-28; 23 : 9-13.
 2. Calvin's statement : *Institutes of Christian Theology*, Book-III, Ch. XXI.
 3. St. Augustine's Remarks : *City of God*, Book V, Sec. 9; See also W. Paley's *Natural Theology*, Ch. XXIV.
 4. St. Augustine, *The City of God*, Book V, Sec. 9.
 5. John Locke, *Essays Concerning Human Understanding*, Book IV, Ch. XXI, Sec. 9-11.
 6. Boethius, *Consolatio Philosophiae*, Part V, Sec. III.
 7. St. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio*, Cp. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, Part I, Sec. 2, Para 55.

voluntary actions but it does not in anyway affect his moral freedom.

(5) But this does not seem to be very good argument. A person's knowledge about the future action of an intimate friend of his is at most a good guess and not definite knowledge.¹ Locke's argument that there may be a man who chooses to do something which without knowing that it is within his power to do otherwise (e. g., "If a man chooses to stay in the room without knowing that the room is locked.")² seems to reconcile *necessity* with *freedom* but in fact it is a reconciliation of *ignorance* and *knowledge*, e. g., he thinks himself free only so long he does not know that he is not free.

(6) If it is said that "It is not because God foreknows what He foreknows that men act as they do : it is because men act as they do that God foreknows what He foreknows"³, it will create a very awkward situation in which man's actions would determine God's knowledge. We can also apply this to human omniscience, where it is likely to create greater complications. It will mean that knowledge of the omniscient being is not unfettered but determined by the actions of other men. Different people perform different actions, often quite contrary to that of their fellows. This will create a difficult situation for the cognising mind if it is to be so determined.

(7) To say that the omniscient being is one who is justified in believing an infinitely large number of true synthetic

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1. See, Fred Newman's article on "Omniscience is Possible" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, Sydney, Vol. 42, No. 1, May, 64.
 2. See Nelson Pike's article on "Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action" in *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Cornell University, No. 1, Jan,' 65, p. 32.
 3. Luis de Molina, *Concordia Liberi Arbitrii*, quoted from Nelson Pike's article, Ibid p. 38, Cp. Boethius, *Consolatio Philosophie*, Book V, Sec. 3, Para 2.

propositions is not only vague but also self contradictory. For example, it all depends upon the belief in one proposition at least. 'Nothing is unknown to him'. But this is to admit his omniscience and hence it is like arguing in a circle. Thus, the concept of omniscience whether *logical or actual*¹ does involve difficulties.

(8) According to the early Pali sources², Buddha offered a qualified support for the doctrine of omniscience even with regard to himself, and he often criticised Nigantha Natta-putta³ claiming omniscience in the sense of *knowing* and *seeing*, all objects on all times — past, present and even future.⁴ His reluctance in claiming unqualified omniscience is mainly concerned with knowledge pertaining to future possibly because it will lead to some sort of determinism in metaphysics and morals. "To speak of omniscience in relation to future is to maintain an impossible position,"⁵ be-

1. Cp. Newman (Ibid) makes a distinction between two senses of omniscience, 'necessary' and 'actual' which has been criticised by R. Puccetti (See his article "Mr. Newman's view of omniscience"; a discussion in *Journal of Australasian Philosophy*, Vol. 42., No. 2, Aug. 1964, p. 261). A rough comparison may be made with Buddha's distinction between *dispositional* and *unqualified* omniscience (See Dr. K. N. Upadhyaya's Thesis, "A Comparative Study of the Bhagavadgītā and early Buddhism", University of Ceylon, pp. 342-343).
2. Cp. "Those who say that the recluse Gotama is omniscient and all-seeing — ... constantly and at all times..... — are not reporting me correctly." Majjhima-Nikāya, I. 482; Cp. Dīgha-Nikāya, I. 78-84, II. 82-83, III. 99-101; Samyutta-Nikāya, I. 191; Majjhima-Nikāya, II. 127.
3. Vide, Majjhima-Nikāya, I. 372-378; II. 214-223.
4. Vide, Dīgha-Nikāya, III. 134; "The recluse Gotama speaks of an infinite knowledge with regard to the past but not to the future."
5. Dr. K. N. Upadhyaya, Ibid, pp. 343-344.

cause the course of future events are partly determined, by the past and present and partly undetermined. I think, Buddha's hesitation in claiming unqualified omniscience was influenced mainly by moral considerations. If he knew the future acts of human beings, there was no meaning in voluntary action or freedom of will which forms the basis of ethics and morality. In fact, what is foreseen (i. e., known conclusively), is *necessary* and what is necessary is outside the scope of ethics.¹

(9) In view of these difficulties, I wonder why the belief in omniscience in some form or other has been a matter of faith, closely connected with the spiritual aspirations of the people. In India, it has been accepted sometimes as a religious dogma, sometimes as a philosophical doctrine and sometimes as both. Except the Cārvākas, almost all the systems of Indian Philosophy — both orthodox and heterodox accept it. Even to the Mīmāṃsakas, "All that is pertinent is the denial of knowledge of *dharma* by man..." They do not intend to deny "the possibility of person knowing all other things."² Even the famous passage of Kumārila in question "does not set aside omniscience."³

(10) To my mind, the reasons and motives in formulating the concept of omniscience are *extra-logical*, for it is always at the cost of freedom of will, the basis of our moral life.



1. Cp. *Theodice*, Part I, Sec. 27.

2. Śāntarakṣita, *Tattva-Saṅgraha*, Vol. II, K. 3128 (G. O. I. L., Baroda).

3. Kumārila, *Śloka-Vārttika*, II. 110-111.

Chapter Twelve

JAINA MOKṢA IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

(1) *Introductory*

The concept of Mokṣa is perhaps the biggest idea in man's quest of happiness. Sri Ramashankar Bhattacharya says that the science of Mokṣa is an experimental science of mental power.¹ The history of human existence is a history of endless effort to eliminate sorrow and attain happiness. This is human nature. But we do not get what we want. We are a miserable lot. Death alone is the full-stop to our sufferings. But if we accept this idea of death, it would mean a tragic blow to the sense of human adventure, freedom and effort. We cannot be satisfied with less than immortality. More than that, Immortality must be accompanied by joy. This state of eternal joy bereft of all sufferings is regarded as Mokṣa or liberation. This liberation in itself seems to be a purely negative idea; but since the search for absolute freedom involves the search for ultimate purpose of the life of the individual (Parama Puruṣārtha)², there is a positive aspect also.

The concept of *Mukti* roughly distinguishes Indian thought from Western thought. The reason is to be found in the concept of the Soul in Indian Philosophy. With the exceptions of Plato and Plotinus, Western Philosophy is quite unaware of a philosophy of the Self. On the other hand, all Indian systems, both orthodox and heterodox, recognise the idea of the Self as the first requisite for any philosophical adventure.³ This is the spiritual basis of our ethical life. The three pursuits of human life, namely *Dharma* (virtue), *Artha* (Wealth),

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1. Dārśanika, July 1955, article on Mokṣa-Darśana, p. 63.
 2. Deshmukha, C. D. : The Concept of Liberation in the Philosophical Quarterly, July 1937, p. 135.
 3. Udyotakara ; Nyaya-Varttika, p. 366.

and Kāma (enjoyment) are regarded as simply subservient to mokṣa. It is the highest pursuit (Mokṣa eva paramapuruṣārtha). The genesis of the idea of Mokṣa is traced in “the endeavour of man to find out ways and means by which he could become happy or at least be free from misery”¹, as in the state of ‘sound sleep’.²

(2) *Concept of Moksha in Indian Philosophy*

Just as no school of Indian philosophy, not even the Cārvākas, deny the concept of Self, similarly there is absolute unanimity regarding the central conception of Mokṣa as the highest goal of life;³ but the different schools differ with regard to the nature of *Mukti* and the means for its realisation, according to their different metaphysical positions and attitudes.

For example, in consonance with the materialistic conception of the Soul (caitanya-viśiṣṭa-deha-eva-ātman), the Cārvākas come to a materialistic conception of liberation (dehocchedaḥ-Mokṣaḥ or Mokṣastu Maraṇa ca prāṇavāyunivartanam). Similarly, in consonance with the doctrines of the Middle-path and Dependent Origination, Buddhists reject both Eternalism (Śāśvatavāda) of the Upaniṣads and Nihilism (Uchedavāda) of the Cārvākas. They deny the continuity of any identical substance in man, but not the continuity of the stream of unbroken successive states of five kinds (Pañca-skandhas). The soul or ego is nothing more than this Five-fold Aggregate, hence Nirvāṇa must be the destruction of this mental continuum (*cittam vimuccate*), or at least the “arrest of the stream of consciousness (santati-anut-

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1. Ramacandran, N. : ‘Concept of Mukti in Indian Philosophy’, Proceedings of Indian Philosophical Congress, 1944, p. 243.
 2. Shamashastry, R. (Dr.) : ‘The Concept of Mukti in Indian Philosophy’, Jha Commemoration Volume, p. 357.
 3. Haribhadra : Yoga-dṛṣṭi-samuccaya, pp. 129-130; Bhāva-Prābhṛta of Kunda-kunda.

pada)", leading to the cessation of the possibilities of future experience (Anāgatānutpāda).

In Nyāya, the destiny of the individual Self is determined by the concept of the Self and its relation to consciousness, which has not been regarded as an essential and inseparable attribute of the soul. Consciousness arises, when it is related to the mind, which in turn is related to the senses, and the senses related to external objects. So in the disembodied condition, self will be devoid of consciousness. Release is freedom from pain.¹ So long as the soul is related to the body, pain is inevitable. Pleasure and pain are produced by undesirable contacts with objects. Thus the state of freedom is like the state of deep dreamless sleep, devoid of consciousness.² Pleasure and pain go together like light and shade. So absolute cessation of suffering (ātyantika-duḥkha-nivṛtti) must by implication mean cessation of pleasure too. Now to escape from this dilemma, faced by the majority of the Nyāya-thinkers like Vātsyāyana, Śrīdhara, Udayana, Raghunātha Śīromaṇi, there is the opposite thesis of the Naiyāyikadeśins and other Naiyāyikas like Bhāsarvajña and Bhūṣaqa, that freedom is bliss³, instead of a state of painless, passionless, unconscious existence free from the spatio-temporal conditions. However, this is not possible unless they revise their conception of the self and its relation to consciousness.

Like Nyāya, the Self in Vaiśeṣikas has cognitions of things when it is connected with the body.⁴ So it is only when the soul is free from the qualities (either pleasure or pain) produced by contact with name and form (ātmaviśeṣa guṇanāma ātyantocchedaḥ), or as Śrīdhara would say navnāma ātmaviśeṣa guṇanāma ātyantocchedaḥ Mokṣa, that liberation is possible. It is the absolute destruction of nine specific quali-

1. Nyāya-bhāṣya, III. 2. 67.

2. Nyāya-sūtra, IV. 1. 163.

3. Nyāya-sāra, pp. 39-41; Nyāya-bhāṣya, I. 1. 22.

4. Nyāya-kandali, p. 57.

ties of the Self. To save this view from the charge that Mokṣa comes perilously near the unconscious condition of a pebble or a piece of stone, the Vaiśeṣikas propound a doctrine of Inherent Felicity in the state of Mokṣa. But they have yet to explain how felicity is Unconscious.

Mīmāṃsakas, like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, regard the soul as eternal and infinite, with consciousness as its adventitious attribute, dependent upon its relation to the body. It survives death to reap the consequences of action. Since the Mīmāṃsaka school belongs to the ritualistic period of the Vedic culture, the final destiny of an individual is regarded as the attainment of heaven—the usual end of rituals (Svarga kāmoyajete). But latter on, the idea of heaven is replaced by the idea of liberation, for they realised that we have to fall back to the earth as soon as we exhaust our merit. The concept of heaven was indeed a state of unalloyed bliss (at least temporary). But the state of liberation is free from pleasure and pain, since consciousness is an adventitious quality of the Soul. To Prabhākaras, Mokṣa is the realisation of the Moral Imperative as duty (*Niyoga-siddhi*). To Kumārila, it is the “Soul’s experience of its own intrinsic happiness with complete cessation of all kinds of misery,”¹ which is very much like the Advaitic conception. The general conception of Bhaṭṭas is the realisation of intrinsic happiness (ātmasaukhyānubhūti). Pārthasārathi Miśra² and Gāgabhaṭṭa deny this. Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa, Bhaṭṭasarvajña and Sucaritra Miśra clearly admit the element of happiness in the state of *Mukti*, since to them, Soul is consciousness associated with ignorance (Ajñānopitacaitanyātmavāda) during embodied existence.

According to Sāṃkhya, consciousness is not a mere quality but the soul’s very essence, The soul is pure, eternal and immutable. Hence it is not blissful consciousness (ānanda

1. Mānameyodaya, V. 26.

2. Śāstra-dīpika, pp. 125-131.

svarūpa) or stream of consciousness (caitanya pravāha) or material consciousness (caitanya-deha-viśiṣṭa). The Self (Puruṣa) of Sāṃkhya remains untouched either by joy or sorrow, migration, bondage and liberation.¹ Bondage and liberation are phenomenal. The latter requires the formal and final cessation of all the three kinds of sufferings without a possibility of return.² This neutral and colourless state of *Kaivalya* is again an unattractive picture with no appeal to the aspirant. Similarly, in Yoga, freedom is absolute isolation of Matter from Self. It is only when we can effect a cessation of the highest principle of matter (*citta* = *mahat* = *Buddhī*) that the state of absolute isolation and redirection of our consciousness is possible. However there is clear ambivalence in Sāṃkhya doctrine of release in so far as it says that "it is the spirit (Puruṣa) that is to obtain release, and yet the apparently predominant characterization of spirit is such that it is impossible that it should either be bound or released."³

Unlike Sāṃkhya-Yoga, the Self in Sāṅkara is not only consciousness but also blissful consciousness. Unlike Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, what is needed is an *intuition of identity* instead of an *intuition of difference*. Unlike Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, Mokṣa in Advaita Vedānta is not only destruction of individual's relation with the world (Prapañca-sambandhavilaya), but dissolution of the world itself (Prapañca-vilaya).

Rāmānuja believes that there is both identity and difference between God and Man. Man's body and soul are real. The soul is not pure and impersonal consciousness, but a thinking substance with consciousness as its essential attribute. Hence, Mokṣa is not self-annulment in the absolute, but a self-

1. Sāṃkhya-kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, K. 62.
2. Sāṃkhya-kārikā & Sāṃkhya-Tattva-Kaumudī, K. 64-68; Sāṃkhya-Pravacana-Bhāṣya, 3. 65-84.
3. Godwin W. F. : 'Theories of Consciousness and Liberation in the Sāṃkhya Philosophy and the Philosophy of G. Santayana', Proceedings of Indian Philosophical Congress.

realisation through self-surrender and self-effacement — the supreme satisfaction of religious emotion. The liberated soul is not God, but neither is he separated from His all-comprehensive existence.¹ This is *Sāyujya-bhakti* (unitive devotion). To Madhva, the distinction between God and Self is real.² Though the Jiva is absolutely dependent upon God, he is active and dynamic.³ Hence *Mokṣa* is 'blessed fellowship' and not a mere identification. Thus in the state of *Mukti*, there is not only the utter absence of pain but also the presence of positive bliss. To Nimbarka, with whom the soul is both different and non-different from God (*Bhedābheda*), complete submission results in both God-realisation and self-realisation which is endless joy and bliss. Śuddhadvaita school of Vallabha regards the relation between God and Soul as that of whole and part. Duality and distress go together. The moment the soul is one with God, we get final release which is utter bliss. To other Vaiṣṇavites like Sri Caitanyadeva, Jai-deva, Vidyāpati, Candīdāsa etc., to whom the ultimate reality is love and grace, liberation means love through divine grace. *Bhakti is Mukti*.

In the *Gītā*, we find that the status of souls is that of different fragments or sparks of God; hence *Mokṣa* must be the unity with *Puruṣottama*—indeed a blissful state. However, it must be sameness of nature (*Sādharmya*) with God, and not Identity (*Sārūpya*). But in the *Upaniṣads*, as in the *Advait Vedānta*, the realisation of Oneness with God is the ideal of man, which is a state of ecstasy and rapture, a joyous expansion of the Soul.

To the *Kāpālikas*, *Mokṣa* is found in the sweet embrace of Hara and *Pārvatī* (*Hara-Pārvatyalīṅgaṁ*); to the *Pāśupats*, it lies in the holding of all power (*Paramaiśvaryam*); to the *Udāsīns* (atheists), it is in the eradication of egoism (*ahaṁ-*

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1. Sadhu Santideva : The Critical Examination of the Philosophy of Religion, Vol. II, p. 986.
 2. Madhva-bhāṣya on *Brahma-Sūtra*, III. 3. 1.
 3. Ibid, II. 3. 38.

kāra nivṛtti); to the Vaiyākaraṇas, it is in the power of speech (Brahma rūpya banya darśanam); to the Sarvagāṇas, it is in the eternal continuum of the feeling of the highest felicity (Nitya niratiśaya sukhābodhaḥ) etc.

Broadly, there are two different approaches to the conception of liberation in Indian Philosophy :

(1) The Materialistic Conception of Mokṣa of the Cārvākas, and

(2) The Non-materialistic Conception :

(a) *Positive Conception* — Vedānta & Jainism.

(i) Sārūpya — Becoming like God in Nature and Form = Gītā.

(ii) Sāmīpya — Blessed fellowship = Madhva, Nimbārka, Vallabha, Caitanya etc.

(iii) Sālōkya — Residing in the world of God (Vaikuṇṭha) = Rāmānujists.

(iv) Sāyujya — Becoming one with God = Advaita Vedānta.

(b) *Negative Conception* : Buddhism.

(i) *Uccheda* — Nihilism = Mādhyamika Buddhism.

(ii) *Nirodha* — Cessation of suffering = Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas & Mīmāṃsakas.

(c) *Neutralistic Conception* : Sāṃkhya & Yoga.

However, there is ample evidence to prove that some of the Buddhist texts, and some Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas go so far as to prove a positivistic conception of liberation.

(3) *The Jaina Outlook*

Jainism is an important ideological phenomenon in the religio-philosophical history of mankind. It attempts a 'reapproachment between warring systems by a breadth of vision which goes in the name of Syādvāda or Anekāntavāda.¹ It shares

1. Jaina, H. L. : "What Jainism stands for", Jaina Antiquary, Vol. II, No. 2, Cf. : Shastri, K. C. : Jaina Dharma (2nd ed. Hindi), p. 63.

the realism of the Vedas, the idealism of the Upaniṣads, the worship-cult of the Purāṇas, the colourfulness of the Epics, the logical analysis of the Naiyāyikas, the atomism of the Vaiśeṣikas, the metaphysical dualism of the Sāṃkhya, the mysticism of the Yogins, and most surprisingly even the monistic trends of the Advaita Vedānta, reflected specifically in Kunda-kunda and Yogīndu.¹ Siddhasena affirms that all heretic views combined constitute the sayings of Lord Jina. This is the non-absolutistic attitude of Anekāntavāda, which is an extension of Ahimsā in the intellectual field. Absolutism or imperialism in thought, word and deed is unknown to the Jainas, who are opposed to all kinds of force and fanaticism. Jainism has tried to develop a *neither-nor* attitude by avoiding extremes.

(4) *Soul and Karma : The Basis of Freedom and Bondage*

The Jainas believe the Doctrine of Soul as the Possessor of Material Karma² and the Doctrine of Extended Consciousness.³ The Jainas subscribe to the Doctrine of Constitutional Freedom of the Soul and its Potential Four-fold infinities, meaning thereby that the Soul is intrinsically pure and innately perfect. But Soul and Karma stand to each other in the relation of beginningless conjunction.⁴ Karma is an aggregate of very fine imperceptible material particles, which are the crystallised effect of the past activities or energies. The link between matter and spirit is found in the Doctrine of the Subtle Body (Karma-Śarīra or Liṅga-Śarīra), a resultant of the unseen potency of Passions and Vibrations. "The soul by its commerce with the outer world becomes literally penetrated with the particles of subtle-matter."⁵ Moreover, the

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1. Reference may be made to author's article on 'Advaita Trends in Jainism'.
 2. Mehta, M. L. : *Outlines of Jaina Philosophy*, p. 61.
 3. Tattvārtha-Sūtra, V. 16; Syādvāda-Mañjarī, V. 8.
 4. Nahar & Ghosh : *An Epitome of Jainism*, p. 285.
 5. Radhakrishnan, S. : *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 319.

mundane soul is not absolutely formless, because the Jainas believe in the Doctrine of Extended Consciousness. While the Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and the Buddhists kept consciousness quite free from matter, the Jainas could easily conceive of the inter-influencing of the soul and Kārmic-matter; hence the relation between soul and Karma become very easy. The Kārmic-matter mixes with the soul as milk mixes with water or fire with iron. Thus formless (amūrta) Karma is affected by Mūrta Karma, as consciousness is affected by drink or medicine. Logically, the cause is non-different from the effect. The effect (body) is physical. Hence the cause (Karma) has indeed a physical form.¹ But unless karma is associated with the Jīva (soul), it cannot produce any effect; because Karma is only an instrumental cause; it is the Soul, which is the essential cause of all experiences. This explains the Doctrine of the Soul as the Possessor of Material Karma. The question arises, but why is the conscious soul associated with unconscious matter. Unlike Sāṃkhya, which propounds a Doctrine of Unconscious Teleology, Jainas work out a karma-phenomenology. Karma is a substantive force or matter in a subtle form, which fills all cosmic space. It is due to karma that the Soul acquires the conditions of nescience or ignorance. The relation between soul and non-soul is beginningless, and is due to nescience or avidyā. This is responsible for worldly existence, or bondage which is determined by the Nature (Prakṛti), Duration (Sthiti), Intensity (Anubhava) and Quantity (Pradeśa)² of Karmas. Jīva takes matter in accordance with its own karmas and passions (kaṣāyas). This is our bondage³, the causes of which are

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1. Meha, M. L. : *Ibid.*, p. 63; Nyāyāvatāra-vārttika, p. 292.
 2. Tattvārtha-Sūtra; VIII. 3; Dharmasharmabhudayama, XXI. 108; Pañcāstikāya-sāra, V. 148; Vardhamāna Purāṇa, XIV. 45; Adhyātma-Kamala-Mārtanḍa. IV. 7; Dravya-saṅgraha, 33; *Karma-Grantha*, 6.
 3. Tattvārtha-sūtra, VIII. 2.

Delusion (*mithyā-dṛṣṭi*), Lack of control (*avirati*), Inadvertence (*pramāda*), Passions (*kaṣāya*) and Vibrations (*Yoga*).¹ Nescience is at the root of all evils and cause of worldly existence. The Jainas do not bother about its whence and why. It is regarded as coeval with the Soul; hence it is eternal and beginningless. Both the Self and Nescience are accepted as facts on the basis of uncontradicted experience. Vidyānanda Swāmī says that Right Attitude, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct constitute the path of liberation. Naturally, the anti-thesis of this Trinity must lead to bondage. If the very outlook is wrong, one cannot expect right knowledge; and there cannot be right conduct without right knowledge.² Theory and practice are interlinked. So, on this realistic ground, the Jainas reject the metaphysical position of all those who subscribe to a unitary principle as the cause of Bondage.

(5) *Jaina Moksha*

(a) *Definition of Moksha* — Mokṣa, the last of the Jaina moral categories, is the gist of Karma-phenomenology and its relation to the Science of the Soul. *Mukti* is total deliverance of the Soul from karmic-veil — *Sarvavarṇavimuktir-muktiḥ*. As Umāsvāmī says, Mokṣa is the total and final freedom from all Karmic-matter; in other words, the non-existence of the cause of bondage and the shedding of all the Karmas.³ Āśrava is the influx of the Karma-particles into the Soul. This influx is caused by the actions of the body, speech and mind.⁴ As the Karmic inflow is the principle of bondage and its stoppage is a condition of Mokṣa, so *Samvarā* is opposite to Āśrava.⁵ *Samvarā* literally means controlling.

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1. *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, VIII. 1; *Dravya-Saṅgraha*, 30; *Sarvārtha-Siddhi*, pp. 374-375.
 2. *Uttarādhyaṇa-sūtra*, XXVIII. 30.
 3. *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, X. 2.
 4. *Ibid*, VI. 1-2.
 5. *Ibid*, IV. 1.

But Sainvara only arrests fresh-flow of karma-particles. What we require is not only stoppage of the fresh-flow, but also dissipation of the old one. This shedding or dissipation called Nirjara is possible by austerities¹. Umāsvāmī has used two prefixes—VI (Viśeṣarūpeṇa), PRA (Prakṛṣarūpeṇa)² in defining Mokṣa, meaning thereby that Mokṣa is the total and exhaustive dissolution of all karmic particles, which is the condition of omniscience.

(b) *The Nature of Moksha* : The Āgamic verse “sukhamāt-yantikam yatra” etc. admits the experience of eternal bliss in the state of Mukti. “It is the safe, happy and quiet place which is reached by the great sages.”³ Some of the Jaina Ācāryas regard bliss as an attitude of knowledge.⁴ In Advaita Vedānta, consciousness and bliss come together in the undifferentiated One Brahman. Malliṣeṇa⁵ ridicules the Naiyāyikas for reducing Mokṣa to a state which is indistinguishable from pebbles, etc. He says that our phenomenal life is better, in which happiness comes at intervals, than the state of *Mukti*, which is emotionally dead and colourless. But the Jaina claim for attaining a state of eternal happiness in the state of Mokṣa faces a serious dilemma. If it is a product (of spiritual Sādhana), it is non-eternal; and if it is not such a product, it must be conceded that either it is constitutional and inherent or at least impossible of attainment. So the very conception of Jaina Self and bondage makes the enjoyment of eternal happiness well-nigh impossible. This might be a logical objection. But the Jaina idea of Mokṣa is one of Infinite Bliss, which follows from the Doctrine of Four-fold Infinities of the Soul.

(c) *The Doctrine of Constitutional Freedom and Four-fold Infinities* : The Jīvas possess four-infinities (ananta catuṣ-

1. Tattvartha-sūtra, IX. 3.
2. Ibid, X. I.
3. Sūtrakṛtāṅga, I. 1; I. 15-16.
4. Sarvarthasiddhi of Pūjyapada, X. 4.
5. Syādvādamānjari, V. 8.

ṭaya) inherently, which are obscured by the veil of four Ghātia (Destructive) *Karmas*. But the Jaina doctrine of Constitutional Freedom of the Soul and the Four Infinities presents a difficulty. If the Self is inherently good and essentially perfect, how can Karma be associated with the Soul ? If karma is said to be the cause of bondage, and bondage the cause of Karma. then there is the fallacy of regressus-ad-infinitum. But if Karma is beginningless, then how can the soul be essentially perfect ? All the doctrines, of Mokṣa-Sādhana then seem to be quite meaningless. Bondage and Mokṣa are both phenomenal, not real. As Sāṃkhya-Kārikā says—"Of certainty, therefore, not any (Spirit) is bound or liberated."¹ We think that the Soul is constitutionally free. But this freedom cannot be manifested without spiritual discipline. This is in consonance with the Jaina doctrine of Satkāryavāda which makes a distinction between the Manifest and the unmanifest. Sāṃkhya and Advaita Vedānta hold that Mokṣa is not the attainment of what is unattained but what is already attained (Prāptasya prāptiḥ). But whereas Sāṃkhya stresses the need of 'discrimination', and Advaita Vedānta emphasises 'identification', the Jainas work out a scheme of 'manifestation'. The logic is simple. If what is non-existent cannot be produced², the effect is existent even before the operation of the cause.

(d) *Jivan-Mukti and Videha-Mukti* : The Jainas, like the Upaniṣadic thinkers³, Buddhists⁴, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas⁵, Sāṃkhyas,⁶ Yogins,⁷ Vijñānabhikṣu and Vallabha etc., recog-

1. Kārikā, 63.

2. Cf. Introduction to Samaya-sāra (Ed. A. Chakravarti), p. CLVII.

3. Kaṭha Upaniṣad, II. 3. 14-15; Muṇḍak Upaniṣad, III. 2. 6; Bṛhadāraṇyak Upaniṣad, IV. 4. 6-7.

4. *Visuddhi-Magga*, 16. 73.

5. Nyāya-Bhāṣya, IV. 23.

6. Sāṃkhya-kārikā, K. 67.

7. Yoga-sūtra, IV. 30.

nise the existence of Jivana-Mukti together with *Videha-Mukti*. But Rāmānujists, Nimbarka, Mādhva etc. do not accept Jivana-mukti. Apart from Jivana-mukti and *Videha-Mukti*, there is an idea of Krama-Mukti (Gradual salvation) in the upaniṣads.¹ However, *Mukti is Mukti*—it must be one and indivisible. Any reference of the persistence of body etc., is meaningless. The duality of *Mukti* in Jainism is perhaps a legacy of the Upaniṣadic influence. Since the Jainas, like Advaita-Vedānta believe in release through the dawn of wisdom and the annulment of nescience, Jivana-Mukti is the one and only legitimate concept. *Mukti* refers to the soul, not to the body; and the dissolution of the body is neither an inevitable pre-condition nor an integral feature of *Mukti*.²

(e) *Nirvana and Moksha* : Mokṣa literally means 'release', release of the soul from eternal fetters of Karma. Nirvāṇa (Buddhist) is derived from the Pāli root 'nibuttu', which means 'blowing out'. However, instead of taking it in a metaphorical sense of 'blowing out' of passions etc., it is taken in the literal sense of extinction. There is ample evidence to believe that Buddha himself looks upon Nirvāṇa as a positive state of consciousness. The distinction between Sopādhiṣeṣa & Nirupādhiṣeṣa Nirvāṇa is a significant one. One refers to the annulment of the dirt of the mind, while the other refers to the annulment of existence itself.

(f) *Bhava Moksha and Dravya Moksha* : The Jiva attains Mokṣa when he is free from the snares of Karma (Karma-phala-vinirmuktaḥ mokṣa). The Mokṣa is either Bhāva (Objective) or *Dravya* (Subjective). When the soul is free from four Ghātiyā *Karmas* (Jñānāvaraṇīya, Darśnāvaraṇīya, Mohanīya, Vedanīya), it is Bhāva Mokṣa; and when it is free from Aghātiyā *Karmas* (Nāma, Ayu, Gotra, Antarāya), it is Dravya-Mokṣa. After freedom from Aghātiyā *Karmas* (action-currents of non-injury), the Soul attains a state of

1. Kātha Upaniṣad II, 3. 5,

2. S. S. Suryanarayana Sāstri's paper on 'Jivana-Mukti', *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Jan. 1939 (Vol. XIV, No. IV).

never-ending beatitude. A person attains the state of Omniscience when Mohanīya (Deluding), Jñānāvaraṇīya (Knowledge-obscuring), Darśanāvaraṇīya (Faith-obscuring) and Antarāya (Obstructive) karmas are destroyed.¹ After the attainment of Kevala-Jñāna a person is free from all kinds of Karmas and attains final liberation.² The Soul comes into its own and regains infinite knowledge, infinite bliss and infinite power.

(g) *The Abode of Mokṣa* : When the Jīva attains freedom, it rises higher and higher and reaches the summit of Lokākāśa which is called Siddha-Śīla (Region of the Free and Liberated). It may be pointed out that this is a new conception. The Vedic conception regards Ātman as all-pervasive. The Buddhists do not accept any such things as Ātman; hence they do not posit a Locus of Mokṣa (Mokṣa-sthāna). The Maṇḍalī sect of the Jains think that there is no such fixed place of Mokṣa. The soul is ever-progressing. But the Jaina concept of *Dharma* and *Adharma* (Medium of motion and rest), present in each object, leads us to think that there must be a fixed state where the motion must stop.

(h) *Conclusion* : Mokṣa in Jainism is not something new. It is a rediscovery of man himself through self-realisation. True happiness lies within. 'Look within' is what Jainism says. "Self-realisation is the ideal of systems such as Nyaya-Vaiśeṣikas and the Sāṃkhya too."³ Advaita-Vedānta also is a philosophy of self-realisation par-excellence. The Karma-phenomenology of the Jains is the outcome of the realistic and the externalistic approach. Constitutional freedom of the soul is a logical necessity. This is simple Satkāryavāda.



1. Tattvārtha-Sūtra, X. 1.

2. *Ibid*, X. 2, X. 3.

3. Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan's Presidential Address to the Nagpur Session of Indian Philosophical Congress (Proceedings), p. 7.

JAINA PSYCHOLOGY

(I) *Para-Psychology and Jainism.*

Chapter Thirteen

PARA-PSYCHOLOGY AND JAINISM

(1) Introductory

Jainism is an important ideological phenomenon in the religious history of mankind. It is a well known non-Brahmanical religio-philosophical system which represents a missionary spirit of an evangelist culture with an important heterodoxical departure from the accepted Vedic traditions of India. The entire edifice of Jainism rests on one principle 'Life is dear to all'. This attitude of respect for life is called non-violence (*Ahimsā*) or positive love. That is Jesus. That is Gandhi. Love is the basis of life and religion This is manifested in the 'work of relieving misery'¹ and 'securing welfare'² of man. In other words, personality is the ultimate truth. Therefore the entire emphasis of Jainism is upon the worth and dignity of man and an 'alloyed holiness'³ of his personality which alone can 'raise mankind to the supreme status of Godhead'⁴. Any form of subjection is a standing negation of the worth of personality and antithetical to the spirit of self-realisation. So the spirit of Jainism is a foe to all kinds of force and fanaticism—either in word, deed and thought. Any form of absolutism or imperialism in thought is repugnant to the spirit of Jainism. Yaśovijaya, a great Jaina logician (18th Century A.D.) describing the Jaina view says that the Jainas have a sympathetic attitude towards all other religions just like a mother

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1. Warren, H. : *Jainism*, Central Jaina Publishing House, Arrah, 1916.
 2. Prasad, B. : *World Problems and Jaina Ethics*, Jaina Cultural Research Society, Banaras, 1951.
 3. Jaina, C. R. : *The Key of Knowledge*, Central Jaina Publishing House, Arrah, 1915.
 4. Ibid; Shastri, K. C. : *Jaina Dharma*, Bharatiya Digambar Jaina Sangha, Banaras, 2475 (Jaina Era).

who loves all her children alike. Another early Jaina philosopher Siddhasena Divākara (5th Century A. D.) goes to the length of affirming that all heretical views combined constitute the doctrine of Jainism. Ānandaghana (18th Century A. D.), another Jaina thinker in his extra synthetic mood, describes the six systems of Indian Philosophy as different forms and figures of the same Sweet Mother Divine. It seems that "Jainism has attempted a reapproachment between these warring systems by a breadth of vision which goes by the name of *Syādvāda* or *Anekāntavāda*."¹ *Anekāntavāda* or the Doctrine of Manifoldness of Truth means that truth is relative to our standpoints. The nature of reality is very complex. It has innumerable characteristics and attributes.² But there is limit to human knowledge. Reality is given to us in several partial views. To assert one is not necessarily denying the other. No one can claim the ownership of the whole truth. Total monopoly in the realm of truth and knowledge is only possible for an Omniscient. This is the typical Jaina non-absolutistic attitude which forms the metaphysical foundation of the principle of Non-violence. Non-violence in action must precede non-violence in thought. All the confusion of thought which is prevailing in the world is the outcome of inexhaustive research and the acceptance of a part for the whole. Almost all our disputes only betray the pig-headedness of the blindmen, who spoke differently about the same elephant. Thus we see that truth is not exclusive to anyone. Huxley also asks us to persuade people that every Idol however noble it may seem is ultimately a Moloch that devours its worshippers. In other words, it is fatal to treat the relative and the homemade as though it were the Absolute. "All dogmatism owes its genesis to this partiality of outlook and fondness for a line of thinking to which a person has accustomed him-

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1. Jaina H. L. : "What Jainism stands for" ?, *Jaina Antiquary*, Vol. II, No. 2, Arrah, 1956.
 2. Haribhadra : *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya* (with commentary of Guṇaratna), Royal Asiatic Society, Calcutta. 1905.

self.”¹ Madame Blavatsky also says “when one party or another thinks himself the sole possessor of absolute truth, it becomes only natural that he should think his neighbours absolutely in the clutches of Error or Devil.”² Hence the Jainas are very correct in providing a theoretical basis for their practical belief in non-violence, since theory and practice are interlinked. Anekāntavāda or the Doctrine of Manifoldness of Truth is thus the extension of Ahimsā (non-violence) in the realm of thought.

(2) Religion and Para-psychology

Religion is perhaps “man’s first attempt to make clear to himself its own position in the universe.”³ But despite thousand years of effort and about a hundred years of systematic psychological research, this question remains conspicuously obscure and unsolved. Our mind is still a mystery and who knows it well not remain so if we go on beating the same pathways of research within the old frontiers of mind. However, the type of religion which is compatible with modern philosophy is one “which is detached from the world and unresponsive to intelligence. Hence an irrationalist religion can fit their philosophical requirements.”⁴ In Indian thought, the word ‘religion’ has been given additional connotation than the Latin word (Re-legere). It is called ‘Dharma’.

1. Tatia N. M. : “Nayas : Ways of Observation and Approach”, *Proceedings of Indian Philosophical Congress*, Madras, 1954.
2. Blavatsky, H. P. : *The Secret Doctrine*, California, 1947, quoted in “The Place of Philosopher in Modern Society”, *Silver Jubilee Commemoration Volume* (Indian Philosophical Congress), Calcutta, 1950.
3. Rhine, J. B. H. : *New Frontiers of the Mind*, London, Pelican, 1950.
4. Gibson, A. B. : “Modern Philosopher Consider Religion”, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXV, No. 3, Sydney, 1957.

This Dharma as Annie Besant defines “is the inner nature that has reached in each man a certain stage of development and unfoldidg.”¹ However, every religion is a “process which has two sides, an inner and an outer : from one point of view it is a state of belief and feeling, an inward spiritual disposition, from another point of view it is an expression of this subjective disposition in appropriate acts.”² Judged from this standard, the inner side of Jaina religion consists in spiritual realisation through the practice of non-violence (Ahimsa) in word, deed and thought since Ahimsa is the essence of Jainism. Nevertheless, Jainism combines epistemological relativism (Syādvāda and Anekāntavāda) metaphysical dualism of mind and matter, numerical pluralism of nine fundamental elements and sociological self-transcendence by observing different vows of non-violence, truth etc. In its synthetic spirit, it shares the realism of the Vedas, idealism of the Upaniṣadas, worship-cult of the Purāṇas, colourfulness of the Epics, the spirit of logical analysis of the Naiyāyikas (Indian Logicians), metaphysical dualism of the atomism of the Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhyas, mysticism of the Yogins, some sort of monistic trend of the Advaita Vedānta, the spirit of revolt of the Indian Materialist (Lokāyats) and the sense of compassion of the Buddhas. As a religion, it has a great historicity. According to Rhys Davids, Hopkins, Oldenberg, Bendole, Monier Williams, W. W. Hunter, Harnsworth, Wheeler, Charpentier, Maxmuller, Bhandarkar, Jayaswal, Tilak, Jainism is older than Buddhism. According to Jyoti Prasad Jaina, It is ‘the oldest living religion’³. To others, like Hoernle, Jacoi, S. Chetty etc., it is the primitive faith of mankind.

1. Besant, A. D. L. : *Dharma*, Theosophical Publications, London (N. D.).
2. Galloway, G. : *The Philosophy of Religion*, Edinburg, 1956.
3. Jaina, J. P. : *Jainism : The Oldest Living Religion*, Jaina Cultural Research Institute, Banaras, 1951.

Before we discuss the relation between para-psychology and religion, let us have a word about para-psychology itself. What is it? Is it a 'recrudescence of superstition' or an organised attempt at deceiving the masses with the superstitious nonsense in the interest of the bourgeois reactionaries.¹ Supporters may argue that such big names such as Sidgwick, Myers, Prime Ministers Gerald Balfour and Gladstone, Wallace, Thomson, Rayleigh, Ledge, Curie, Bergson, W. James, Tennyson, Ruskin, Crookes etc., are associated with it. But then a clever critic might retort, "Sir William Crookes was a great physicist but it does not preclude the possibility of his having been hoodwinked in the matter of psychic matter."² Is it then a "tendency to the third order of knowledge largely a search for an aesthetic satisfaction"³ or a sheer 'mystification'⁴. To the natural scientists, it is '*a convenient asylum ignorant*'⁵. Let us close this chapter by recalling Goethe's remark to Eckermann, "If anyone advances anything new.. people resist with all their might."⁶ Supporting this psychological explanation for the opposition of para-psychology, Tyrrel says that "there is undoubtedly an instinct which urges us to reject the unusual and the inexpli-

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1. West, D. J. : *Psychical Research Today*, Gerald Duckworth, London, 1954.
 2. Parija, P. : "Inaugural Address to the Symposium on Religion", *Indian Journal of Para-psychology*, Vol 1, No. 4, Ganganagar, 1959.
 3. Jastrow, J. : "The Animus of Psychical Belief", *The Case For and Against Psychical Belief*, Massachusets, 1915.
 4. Houdini, H. : "A Magician Among the Spirits", *The Case For and Against Psychical Belief*, Massachusets, 1915.
 5. Tischner, R. : *Telepathy and Clairvoyance* (Eng. translation, W. D. Hutchenson), Kegan Paul, London, 1925.
 6. Barrett, W. F. : *Psychical Research*, Home University Library, London, 1911.

cable whatever the evidence in its favour may be.”¹ However, Virchow offers another explanation for such opposition : “Facts are inconvenient and the facts are all the more inconvenient because the strike at the root of things.”² Evidences are so correct that a person like William James was forced to confess : “In fact, were I asked to point to a Scientific Journal where hard-headedness and never-sleeping suspicion of sources of error might be seen in their full-bloom, I think I should have to fall back on the Proceedings of Society of Psychical Research.”³ It is needless to repudiate the charges of those who believe that through the researches in para-psychology, the “public has been misled, funds expended, energies of young-men wasted.”⁴ Instead “the assertions of eminent investigators among them scientists of world-wide renown are too numerous and too decided.”⁵ So far its achievement is concerned, it is simply wonderful. Schopenhauer once said, “The phenomena under consideration are incomparably the most important among all the facts presented to us by the whole experience.”⁶ “No scientific movement ever set on foot has, in the same length of time, contributed so much towards the advancement of knowledge as psychical research.”⁷ Rt. Hon. W. E. Gladstone said : “It is the most important

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1. Tyrrel, G. N. M. : *The Personality of Man*, Penguin, London, 1947.
 2. Tischner, R. : Ibid.
 3. James, W. : “Will to Believe and other Essays”, Longmans, London, 1939.
 4. Kellogg, C. : “New Evidences for Extra-sensory-perception”, *The Scientific Monthly*, Vol. XIV, London, October, 1937.
 5. Oesterich, K. : *Occultism and Modern Science*.
 6. Tischnaer, R. : Ibid.
 7. Bruce, H. A. : *Unpopular Review*, Oct.-Dec., 1914, quoted by W. R. Prince in ‘Is Psychology worth while ?’

work which is being done in the world. By far the most important.”¹ Sir Henry Bergson addressing the 28th session of Society of Psychical Research said, “This new science will soon make up the time lost.”² Prof. Charles Richet feels that though the claims may seem to be “Absurd, but not matter, it is true.”³ But after all, we wonder as to why such hyperbolic statements are being made ? Is this the real study of man ? Man is man because of his mind. And our mind is still a mystery. True “psychology has explored a vast field, from academic deserts to greenlands of five human material, but there still exists a Gobi Desert, virtually unexplored and uncharted, concerning which the books say nothing.”⁴ And the official aim and purpose of Psychical Research Society is to “examine without prejudice or prepossession and in a scientific spirit those faculty of man, real or supposed, which appear to be unexplicable on any generally recognised hypothesis.” Let us conclude with L. K. Anspacher : “To believe that everything has been discovered is as profound an error as to mistake the horizon for the limits of the world.”⁵

Directly, para-psychology has no significance for religion. Para-psychology is para-psychology. It is not a religion but a

The Case for and Against Psychical Belief, Massachusetts, 1915.

1. Gladstone, W. E. : Journal of Society of Psychical Research, Vol. VIII, London, 1885.
2. Bergson, H. : ‘Presidential Address’, Proceedings of Society of Psychical Research, Vol. VIII, London, 1885.
3. Richet, C. : Thirty Years of Psychical Research (English trans. Stanely De Brath), Macmillan, London, 1933.
4. Payne, P. D & Bendit, L. J. : *The Psychic Sense*, Faber and Faber, London, 1943.
5. Anspacher, L. K. : Challenge of the Unknown, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1952.

branch of science whose business is to enquire into the nature of human personality.¹ Indirectly, “the main significance of psychical research for religion lies in its promise to reveal a much wider background of thought than that provided by correct scientific philosophy.”² Science has been exploring almost entirely the external world but our “psyche is a field yet to be explored.”³ “*Manas* maketh man as distinguished from both god and brute.”⁴ Man is a mystery, a miracle according to Carlyle. And mind of man is a mystery par-excellence. “In seeing what is, the mind is rendered transparent, it is divested of its will, it reflects without gathering dust.”⁵ It is the man and his mind that is the cause of bondage and liberation, pain and pleasure—says wisdom of India. And “infact the study of human personality and the extense of human faculty form the main object of psychical research”⁶ Jung rightly says that the “place of deity seems to be taken by the wholeness of man.”⁷ However, Barrett says that “psychical research, though it may strengthen the foundations cannot take the place of religion, using in its widest sense that much abused word. For fater all, it deals with the external, though it be an unseen world. The psychic order is not the spiritual order.”⁸ However, Sir

1. Tyrrel, G. N. M. : Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Rao, Ramkrishna : “A Note on Jung’s Conception of Psyche”, Proceedings of Indian Philosophical Congress, Mysore, 1956.

4. Ram, N. : Man : His Origin and Evolution, Theosophical Publications, Adyar, 1952.

5. Mehta, R. : The Search for Freedom, Theosophical Publications, Adyar, 1957.

6. Barrett, W. F. : Ibid.

7. Jung C. G. : Collected Works (Psychology of Religion), Vol. III, Pantheon Series, New York, 1958.

8. Barrett, W. F. : Ibid.

Arthur Conan Doyle holds that “the ultimate result will be union of science with religion.”¹ Tischner also thinks that “the influence of psychical research extends further to the philosophy of religion and to ethics,”² because both these branches deal with the inner aspect of man. However to L. R. G. Crandon, “psychical research has as much to do with religion as golf.”³ But he accepts that “it is going to be one of the most important factor in changing not religion but religious concepts and beliefs.”⁴ Tyrrell in his *Science and Psychic Phenomenon* has admitted that psychical research lies at the meeting point of three departments of human thought — Science, Philosophy and Religion.”⁵ So we can conclude that “It will ... unite science and religion, more than any other activity of mankind has so far done.”⁶ In a recent symposium held at Cuttuck under the auspices of Indian Institute of para-psychology, Dr. A. C. Das, the president, observed that para-psychology is just “developing as a new branch of psychology.”⁷ Mr. M. N. Mukherjee in his

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1. Doyle, A. : “The Psychic Question As I See it,” *The Case for and Against Psychical Belief*, Massachusets, 1915.
 2. Tischner, R. : Ibid.
 3. Crandon, L. R. G. : “The Margery Mediumship”, *The Case for and Against Psychical Belief*, Massachusets, 1915.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Tyrell, G. N. M. : *Science and Psychic Phenomena*, Metheun, London, 1938.
 6. Ātreya, B. L. : “Modern Psychical Research and Ancient Adhyatma Vidya, Their Metting Points”, *Proceedings of Indian Philosophical Congress*, Poona, 1951.
 7. Das, A. C. : “Religion and Para-psychology”, Presidential Address, “Seminar on Religion and Para-psychology”, *Indian Journal of Parapsychology*, Ganganagar, Vol. I, No. 4, 1959.

paper "Materialism and Para-psychology"¹ has gone so far to equate para-psychology with all other psychical science. Richard V. De Smet² another symposiast held that it is 'a scientific description'. Prof. B. N. Banerjee³ quotes H. J. Eysenck (*Sense and Non-sense in Psychology*) thinks that para-psychological phenomena have been proved. However, Prof. G. S. Nair⁴, holds that though "Para-psychology came upon the trail of science, but its genuine home is man's interest towards religion." In a recent Symposium on 'Para-psychology and Yoga' (21st and 22nd December, 62) organised under the auspices of the Lucknow University, the President Acharya Jugal Kishore observed that "as civilization advances further into nuclear age and education becomes a more complex phenomenon, the most natural science to take the place of psychology will be para-psychology."

(3) Jainism And Para-psychology

(a) Soul Psychology and Karma Phenomenology

The Jains believe in the Doctrine of Soul which forms the basis of Higher Psychology popularly termed as para-psychology or Meta-psychology. The idea of psychology as the 'Science of Soul' seems old. "There was a time, when it lost its

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1. Mukherjee, M. N. : 'Materialism in Para-psychology', Indian Journal of Para-psychology, Vol. 1, No. 4, Ganganagar, 1959.
 2. Smet, R. De. : "Para-psychology and Catholicism", Indian Journal of Para-psychology, Vol. 1, No. 4, Ganganagar, 1954.
 3. Banerjee, B. N. : "Religion and Para-psychology", The Indian Journal of Para-psychology, Vol. 1, No. 4. 1, Seth Sohan Lal Institute of Para-psychology, Ganganagar, December, 1959.
 4. Nair, G. S. : "Religion and Para-psychology", Indian Journal of Para-psychology, Vol. 1, No. 4, Ganganagar, 1959.

mind, now it seems to have lost its consciousness even.”¹ But so far and no further. Even eminent psychologist of today find themselves helpless to do away with the hypothesis of soul. Jung’s book “*Modern Man in Search of Soul*” (London 1934) is amply illustrative of this fact. The reality of the self is obvious to the introspectionists.² James regards the admittance of soul to be the line of ‘least logical resistance’. His pupil Calkins comes out strongly for a ‘Psychology of Selves’—not as metaphysical concept but an ever present fact of immediate experience. Stern, Dilthey, Allport, Spranger etc., have been endeavouring to build up a ‘Science of Personality’. Alexis Carrel, the Nobel prize winner scientist demands that attention should be focussed on the ‘soul of man’³. The ‘*Racial Unconscious*’ of Jung, the ‘*Group Mind*’ of McDougall, the ‘*Comprehensive Consciousness*’ of Myers have all something of a Soul-psychology in them.

This Soul-psychology of the Jainas is not concerned with merely the measurement of sensation or the effect of emotions on the outer physical body within the spatio-temporal order. On the other hand, the soul has the inherent capacity to know all things, which follow from the Doctrine of Four-fold infinities of the soul. Every soul innately possesses infinite apprehension, infinite comprehension, infinite power and infinite bliss. Consciousness is the most essential characteristic of the souls⁴. However, this perfect state of soul is possible only

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1. Ātreya, B. L. : *An Introduction to Para-psychology*, Moradabad, 1949.
 2. Woodworth, R. S. : *Contemporary Schools of Psychology*, Methuen, London, 1949.
 3. Carrel, A. : *Man the Unknown*, London, 1948.
 4. (a) Umā Swamī : *Tattvārthadhigama-sūtra* (English trans. J. L. Jaini), Central Jaina Publishing House, Lucknow, 1920.
 (b) Mallisena : *Syādvāda-maṅjarī* (Ed. and English trans. A. B. Dhruva), Bombay Sanskrit and Prākṛit Series, No. LXXXIII, Poona, 1933.

after the total destruction of the respective Karmic obstructions. This Karma is the basis of Jaina Psychology. Karma phenomenology is the root concept of Indian speculation which has reached its acme in Jaina ideology. Just as there is the Law of Causation in Science, Doctrine of Psychic Determinism in Freudian Psychology, so there is Doctrine of Karma in the field of moral life. It means, as a man sows, so he reaps. Every act must have its consequence and if the consequences have not been fully worked out in our life time, they demand a rebirth which in turn implies the idea of metempsychosis and the immortality of soul. To them, it is impossible to explain the diversity of universe especially the inequalities among men in worldly position and privileges without the hypothesis of Karma.

The Jaina accounts of soul and Karma are interlinked together. They believe in the Doctrine of Soul as the Possessor of Material Karma¹. The soul is innately pure and inherently perfect but that is infected by something foreign called *Karma*, which has been defined *as an aggregate of particles of very fine matter* imperceptible to our senses. Just as shining sun is often obscured by either a patch of cloud or mist or a veil of dust, so the pure and perfect soul is clouded by the mist of some or other types of Karma. The Doctrine of soul as the Possessor of Karma involves three questions : Firstly, how can we say that (imperceptible multitude of atoms) exist ? Secondly, how Karma has a physical form ? Thirdly, if Karma is material, how is it connected with the immaterial self ? Let us take one by one.

Karma phenomenology is the keystone supporting edifice of Jainism. Just as a sprout, which is an *effect* has a seed which is the cause, so our happiness and misery which are *effects*, must have *cause* — which is nothing but Karma. The objection that happiness is derived either from a garland,

1. Mehta, M. L. : *An Outline of Jaina Philosophy*, Jaina Mission Society, Bangalore, 1954.

sandal paste, a woman etc., which are all objects of sight, is irrelevant since persons having the same means for enjoying happiness do not get the same type of happiness.

To the second question, why Karma has a physical form, it is said that because of our experience of pleasure, pain etc., since there can be no such experiences in association with that which is formless, just in connection with other. Then Karma has a physical shape because it undergoes change in a way different from souls, which is inferred from the change of its effects like body.

Now the last question is—how could the material Karma be connected with the immaterial soul? It is said that it can be in the way consciousness is affected by a drink of intoxicant etc. Then the empirical soul is not absolutely formless. Jainas believe in the Doctrine of Extended Consciousness¹. The soul is equal in extent to its own body, for its attributes are found only in the body. Now Karma is *material* and soul is also *extended*, hence it can be affected by the material Karma. However, the Jainas regard that the soul and Karma stand to each other in a relation of beginningless conjunction², like the association of the dross with the gold. But just as the dross is removed by the action of an alkaline substance, so the removal of beginningless Kārmic veil is possible by the practice of the prescribed course of religious meditations etc. This higher psychology of the Jainas has been worked out in greater details. The material particles constituting the Karma can be viewed from their *nature* and *number* depending upon the activities of body, mind and speech, and *duration* and *intensity* depending upon passions³ (Passions are

1. (a) Uma Swāmi : Ibid.

(b) Mallisena : Ibid.

2. Nahar, P. C. and Ghosh, K. C. : *An Epitome of Jainism*, Calcutta, 1957.

3. Devendra Sūri : *Karma-Grantha*, Atmananda Jaina Granthamala, Ahmedabad, 1921.

four : greed, pride, deceit, anger).

Discussing the nature of Karma, the Jainas point out eight fundamental types¹ each divided into a number of subtypes. Of the eight, four are *Obscurative* (comprehension-obscuring, apprehension-obscuring, deluding power-obscuring) and the remaining are *non-obscurative* (age, physique, status and feeling determining Karmas). Each type of Karma is determined by the nature of Kārmic atoms. The detailed study of the various types and subtypes of these Karmas only reveal that the Jainas have a deep faith in the universal chain of causation, leaving no room for chance. Chance is nothing but law unknown. So we find that even our names and forms are determined by our past Karmas.

The *number* of the Kārmic matter depends upon the activity of the soul. The maximum and minimum activities fall respectively to the feeling producing and age-determining Karmas according to the Jainas. The whole universe is full of Kārmic matter having a constant influx into the soul.

Then the Jainas have a calculus of their own for measuring the *duration* of each Karma. The maximum and minimum length of duration of the four obstructive karmas is 30 koṭa-koṭi-sāgaropams, 10 koṭākoṭi = crore multiplied by crore *palyopams* = a Sāgaropama), i. e., a measure.

Lastly, the *intensity* of the Karma depends upon the strength and weakness of our passions. The more sinful or virtuous a man is, the duration of his sinful or virtuous Karma is longer and the position thereof is stronger.

The conception of soul and Karma is thus the basis of higher psychology in Jainism. The soul is innately pure and inherently perfect but because of Kārmic veils, there is obscuration and hence imperfection.

(b) Cognition : Sensory and Extra Sensory

Therefore, if the soul is free from the Kārmic influences, it is omniscient and in this state the soul becomes liberated,

1. Devendra Sūri : Ibid.

But the worldly and empirical souls are infected with Kārmic matter, hence its power of cognizing everything in all condition is veiled by the Kārmic-clouds. "But as although the light of the sun may be veiled by cloud, some light, however, breaks through the clouds, so there also a fraction of the faculty of cognition is preserved to the soul, for if it were to loose this, it is no longer the soul."¹ Consciousness is the most essential and defining characteristics of the soul². Cognition is an important aspect of this consciousness which is divided into Indeterminate (apprehension) and Determinate cognition (comprehension)³ with their numerous divisions and sub-divisions⁴. Thus we find that Jaina psychology follows

1. Devendra Sūri : Ibid.

2. (a) Amṛtacandra : Puruṣārtha Siddhyupāya (Ed. and Hindi trans. by Nāthū Ram Premī), Parama Śruta Prabhavaka Mandala, Bombay, 1953.

(b) Yogīndu : Parmātma-Prakāśa & Yoga-Sāra (Ed. A. N. Upadhyā), Raicandra Jaina Shastramala, Bombay, 1937.

(c) Kunda-kunda : Pravacana-sāra (Ed. and English trans. A. N. Upadhyā), Raichandra Jaina Shastramala, Bombay, 1935.

(d) Kunda-kunda : Pañcāsikāya-sāra (Ed. and English trans. A. Chakravarti), Arrah, 1920.

(e) Kunda-kunda : Samaya-sāra (Ed. and English trans. A. Chakravarti), Bhartiya Jñāna Pīṭha, Kashi, 1950.

(f) Kunda-kunda : Niyama-sāra (Ed. and English trans. by Uggar Sain), Lucknow, 1931.

(g) Pūjyapāda : Sarvārtha-Siddhi (Ed. and Hindi trans. by Phūlacandra Siddhānta Śāstri), Bhartiya Jñāna Pīṭha, Banaras, 1955.

(h) Umā Swāmī : Ibid.

3. Umā Swāmī : Ibid.

4. Ibid.

from its 'epistemology of experience'¹ with soul as its basis. Indeterminate cognition is detail less knowledge or the primitive stage of general awareness with simple *existence* as its content and without any other reference. It is of four types : *Visual apprehension, nonvisual apprehension, apprehensive clairvoyance* and *apprehensive omniscience*.² Determinate cognition is divided into 8 categories : *nonverbal comprehension, verbal comprehension, clairvoyance, Telepathy, omniscience* and *three wrong types of non-verbal, verbal comprehension and wrong clairvoyance*.

Three types of relations are envisaged between Apprehension (Indeterminate) and comprehension (Determinate) : of non-simultaneity³, of succession⁴, and of simultaneity.⁵ Broadly, comprehension has been divided into sensory (also called indirect) and Extra-sensory⁶ (also called Direct) perception. The reason that the sensory knowledge is called Indirect is because the *soul* gets the glimpses of reality through the media of sense-organs and not directly. This view gets some support by an analysis of the psychological process involved in the sensory knowledge that perhaps perception involves inference, a question raised of late by the psychophysiologists.

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1. Tatia N. M. ; Studies in Jainism, Jaina Cultural Research Society, Banaras, 1951.
 2. Umā Swāmī : Ibid.
 3. Bhadrabāhu : Āvaśyaka-Niryukti, Āgamodaya Samiti, Surat, 1928,
 4. (a) Akalaṅkadeva : Aṣṭa-Śatī (a Commentary on Āpta-Mīmāṃsā of Samantabhadra), Nirṇaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1915.
 (b) Umā Swāmī : Ibid.
 (c) Kunda-kunda : Niyama-sāra, Ibid.
 5. Siddhasena Divākara : Sanmati-Tarka-Prakarāṇa, Gujarat Puratatva Mandir, Ahmedabad, 1921.
 6. Umā Swāmī : Ibid.

Then we come to Extra-sensory perception : clairvoyance, Telepathy and Omniscience. "Empirical or sensory perception is conditioned by the senses and mind as is limited"¹, but Extra-sensory perception transcends the general laws of space, time and other conditions of normal perception. "Opinion in the West is yet divided on the question whether paranormal powers are biologically primitive and present in the organism or they are outgrown and replaced, or they are the latest acquisitions."² Except the materialist Cārvākas and the scripturalist Mīmāṃsakas, all systems of Indian Philosophy believe in Extra-sensory perceptions. Extra-sensory perception is a form of Direct perception. It may sound odd. But this follows from the very conception of the Jainas that the basis of all knowledge is self. And "if the soul has the capacity to know, it must know *independently* of any external condition. It is as independent as existence."³ It is like a lamp which illuminates itself. It is not a spatial or temporal relation but a capacity. Space and time are no doubt principles of physical limitations which disappear with the stoppage of Kārmic influx into the soul and their shedding. "The (full) manifestation of the innate nature of a conscious self, emerging on the total cessation of all obstructive veils, is called" that (intuition) transcendent and pure."⁴ This transcended and pure knowledge is of two kinds—Absolute (*Sakala*) and

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1. Maṇikya Nandī : Parīkṣāmukhaṁ with Prameya-Ratna-mālā, Commentary of Ananta Vīrya (Ed. & English trans. S. C. Ghosal), The Central Jaina Publishing House, Lucknow, 1940.
 2. Akolakar, V. V. : "Scientific Psychology and Indian Thought", Address to the Psychology Section of the Indian Philosophical Congress, Cuttuck, 1959.
 3. Tatia N. M. : Studies in Jainism, Ibid.
 4. Hemachandra : Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā (Ed. and English trans. S. Mookerjee and N. M. Tatia), Bharati Jaina Parishat, Calcutta, 1946.

Relative (*Vikala*¹). When there is complete cessation of all possible veils, it is Absolute (*Sakala*) but when there is qualitative or quantitative difference in the subsidence and annihilation of these veils, there occurs two varieties of knowledge : Clairvoyance (*Avadhi*) and Telepathy (*Manah-paryaya*).

(c) *Avadhi Jnana or Clairvoyance*

Etymologically, *Avadhi* (Clairvoyance) means 'limit', and perhaps it is therefore defined as "that which is limited to objects having shape and form."² Negatively speaking, formless things like soul, space, time, motion and rest are beyond the perview of Clairvoyance. We know that the soul is capable of perceiving everything in all its modes. However it is only possible when he has completely destroyed the influences of Karmas. But if he has destroyed it only partially, he acquires the power of direct perception of things limited to forms and shape, though they are too distant or minute or obscure. We know that the inherent capacity of soul of perceiving all things is limited or obstructed by knowledge-obscu-

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1. (a) Abhinava Dharmabhūṣaṇa : Nyāya-Dīpikā (Ed. and Hindi trans. Darbarilal Jaina 'Kothia'), Vira Seva Mandir, Sarsawa (India), 1945.
 - (b) Mahāvīra : Sthānāṅga Sūtra (Ed. by Rai Dhanapat Singha), Jaina Prabhakar Press, Bombay, 1890.
 - (c) Jina Das : Nandī Sūtra, Āgamodaya Samiti, Bombay, 1924.
 - (d) Umā Swāmī : Ibid.
 2. (a) Umā Swāmī : Ibid.
 - (b) Jina Das : Ibid.
 - (c) Bhadrabāhu : Ibid.
 - (d) Yaśovijaya : Jñāna-Bindu-Prakaraṇa (Ed. and Hindi trans. Sukhalalji Sanghavi), Singhi Jaina Granthamala, Ahmedabad, 1942.
 - (e) Yaśovijaya : Jaina-Tarka-Bhāṣā (Ed. & Hindi trans. Sukhalalji Sanghavi), Singhi Jaina Granthamala, Ahmedabad, 1938.

ring Karmas. Avadhi transcends the barriers of time and space in proportion to the difference of destruction-cum-subsidence of Kārmic veils. The highest type of Clairvoyance will cognise all objects having form irrespective of past, present and future or near and far and the lowest type can perceive any object having very small fraction (*Āṅgula*) and can penetrate only a small part of time (*Āvalikā*) and only a part (*Atom*) of all the modes.¹ When a person has partially destroyed the influences of Karmas, he acquires the power of direct knowledge of thing (having forms) but are too distant or minute or obscure to be observed by the ordinary senses and mind. Clairvoyance differs in degrees according to four categories of space, time, matter and modes.² Here the Jainas conceive of a Doctrine of Gradation according to which Clairvoyant perception differs in degrees. For example, in point of space, the Clairvoyant perception extends from infinitesimal part of space (*Āṅgula* = the smallest fraction of space) to the inhabited Universe (*Loka* = the biggest fraction of space). Similarly from the point of view of time, it extends from *āvalikā* (the smallest fraction of time less than a second) to the countless number of cycles of time including past and future. The infinitesimal indivisible ultimate unit of time is called time-point (*Samaya*) and that of space is called space-point (*Pradeśas*). They are beyond ordinary human comprehension and hence can be perceived only by the Omniscient. The indivisible unit of matter is atom and the indivisible unit of mode is one mode of an infinite number with regard to Time, Space, Matter and Modes—the Jainas work out a theory of Relative subtilty of Time, Space, Matter and Modes³—Time-point being the most extensive and Modes being the least extensive. Knowledge of all the modes is beyond ordinary knowledge which is possible only to an Omniscient.

1. Jina Das : *Ibid.*

2. Mahendra Kumar : *Jaina Darśana, Varni Jaina Granthamala*, Banaras, 1955.

3. Bhadrabāhu : *Ibid.*

Broadly, Clairvoyance has been divided into congenital (Bhāva-Pratyaya) and Non-congenital (Guṇa Pratyaya). The former is the birthright of denizens of heaven and hell¹ and the latter is acquired through merit by men and lower animals. This has been further subdivided into six kinds². There is another classification of Clairvoyance into three kinds such as Clairvoyance of space (Deśāvadhi) corresponding to non-congenital form, ultimate and universal Clairvoyance (Paramāvadhi and Sarvāvadhi) which are possessed by the saints and the *Arhats* only. The former is liable to destruction but not the latter two³. Āvaśyaka Niryukti provides us a more detailed study of Clairvoyance subject from fourteen standpoints of view.⁴ So sum up, if we are endowed with the highest type of *Avadhi* or Clairvoyance, we can perceive all the things having form.⁵

(d) Manah-Paryaya or Telepathy

Literally Manah-Paryaya means 'mental state', though technically it means 'entering into other's mind'. As Clairvoyance (*Avadhi*) is the direct knowledge of things even at a distance of space and time, so Telepathy (Manah-Paryaya) is the direct knowledge of the thoughts of others. This should not sound something absurd in view of Jaina theory of soul as the possessor of infinite knowledge. If we can remove the obstacles like hatred, jealousy etc., that stand in the way of knowing other minds, we can have direct and unfailing excess to the present and past thoughts of others. However, here besides the Jaina Doctrine of soul, we are also concerned with Jaina Doctrine of Mind which is based on the principle

1. Uma Swamī : Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Akalaṅkadeva : Tattvartha-rāja-Vārttika, Bharatiya-Jñāna-Piṭha, Banaras, 1915.

4. Bhadrabahu : Ibid.

5. (a) Jina Das : Ibid.

(b) Bhadrabahu : Ibid.

of Vargaṇās (group of atoms).¹ The different atomic groups constitute the different bodies in the respective order of gradation—Physical, Fluid, Assimilative, Luminous and Kārmic bodies, speech, respiration, mind, Karma Bodies etc.

A state of thought is a mode of mental-stuff. To perceive these mental modes is called telepathy. Mind is both physical and psychical according to the nature of atomic constituents. According to the Jaina doctrine of Karma, mind is a kind of material substance made of Kārmic atoms. Hence the psychical mind is the double principle of attainment and activity of cognition.

Scholars are divided as to the fact whether telepathy should be conceived as perceiving the states and modes of mind alone as held by Jinabhadra², Hemcandra³, etc. or it perceives also the external objects as held by Pūjyapāda Devanandī⁴, following the Āvaśyaka Nirukti⁵. To the former school in telepathy, we are directly associated with the states of mind engaged in thinking, denying the possibility of direct perception of external objects themselves and due to its association with the mental stuff, the object itself, is called mind. Hence external objects are also perceived by Telepathy. Anyway, the distinction between ordinary immediate knowledge, i. e., internal and external perception (Mati Jñāna) and telepathy must be maintained because the mind is only inactive in Telepathy and is due to the potency of destruction-cum-subsidence Karma.

1. (a) Bhadrabāhu : Ibid.

(b) Jina Bhadra : Viśeṣāvaśyaka-Bhaṣya, Yaśovijaya Jaina Granthamala, Banaras, No. 35 (N. D.).

2. Jina Bhadra : Ibid.

3. Hemacandra : Ibid.

4. (a) Akalaṅkadeva : Tattvartha-rāja-vārttika, Ibid.

(b) Pūjyapāda : Ibid.

5. Jina Das ; Ibid.

Telepathy has been recognised of two varieties¹. Simple Direct knowledge of simple mental things, viz., of what a man is thinking now (*Rju-mati*) and Complex Direct knowledge of complex mental things viz., of what a man is thinking now along with what he has thought of in the past and will think in the future (*Vipulmati*). Naturally, the latter is purer and more lasting², more vivid though less wider in scope and therefore superior in the spiritual ladder³.

(e) *Telepathy and Clairvoyance*

Both these kinds of direct and immediate knowledge are the resultant of destruction-cum-subsidence of karmic veils. In both of them, we intuit the states of material substance that constitute the mind. Like Clairvoyance, telepathic knowledge also differs in spatial extension and temporal penetration. However, they differ according to their purity, scope, subject and object⁴. Intuition of mental states is more lucid and purer than in the states of Clairvoyance⁵. So far as scope is concerned, in telepathic knowledge we can know only an infinitesimal part of the object of Clairvoyance-Simple-Telepathic knowledge knows an infinitesimal degree of the attributes of an atom⁶, whereas in complex telepathic knowledge, one gets an infinitesimal part of simple mental knowledge. We have already seen that Clairvoyant knowledge is the birth-right of denizens of heaven and hell but telepathic knowledge is acquired due to merit, hence confined to the sphere of human beings only. The former is possible for

1. (a) *Umā Swāmī* : Ibid.

(b) *Mahavīra* : Ibid.

2. *Umā Swāmī* : Ibid.

3. *Pūjyapāda* : Ibid.

4. (a) *Umā Swāmī* : Ibid.

(b) *Hemacandra* : Ibid.

5. *Uma Swāmī* : Ibid.

6. Ibid.

living beings, in all the possible status of existence, viz., hellish sub-human, mankind, celestial beings, and liberated beings, whereas telepathic knowledge is possible only for human beings with exalted conduct¹ occupying anyone of the stages of spiritual perfection (Guṇasthāna) ranging between the 6th to the 12th stages. With regard to the object of Telepathic knowledge, it extends to the infinitesimal part of the subtlest form of mental atoms (Mano-vargaṇās). In Clairvoyance, we intuit other forms of atoms limited to the material object and that again not covering all their modes. But a closer study will reveal that the line of demarcation between the two is not very clear. I do not say that they do not differ. They differ only in degrees. Qualitatively, they are the same. Hence a famous Jaina logician Siddhasena Divākara does not recognise any distinction between Clairvoyance and telepathy², and extends the scope of telepathy to the sub-human organisms. Anyway, for a specialised study, I think, the distinction will continue.

(f) *Clairvoyance, Telepathy and Modern Psychological Research*

“Legends and reports of apparent telepathy or clairvoyance must be as old as man”, said A. S. Parkes in his opening remarks in a CIBA³ foundation symposium on ‘Extra-sensory-perception’. During the last three decades, resolute efforts have been made to apply the different problems of extra-sensory-perception under laboratory conditions where millions of tests have been carried in the same way as those used in other ordinary branches of research, which may be said to establish the fact beyond the possibility of

1. Jina Das : Ibid.

2. (a) Akalaṅkadeva : Nyāya-Viniścaya (Ed. and Hindi trans, Mahendra Kumar Shastri), Singhi Jaina Granthamala, Ahmedabad, 1939.

(b) Yaśovijaya : Jñāna-bindu-prakaraṇa, Ibid.

3. Wolstenholme, G. E. W. & Miller, E. C. P. (Ed.) : Extra-sensory-perception, C. I. B. A. Foundation, London 1956.

controversy and is regarded as an 'actual and demonstrable occurrence'¹. Myers' two volumes on '*Human Personality*' are the *Magnum opus* and something of a Bible in the tradition of Psychical Research which have also been included in the examination for fellowship in mental and Moral Philosophy in Trinity College, Dublin. Not only this, centres of Research in para-psychology have been established in the Department of Biophysics at the University of Pittsburgh, a chair of para-psychology at the University of Utrecht besides large scale experiments at Duke University.

Literally, Clairvoyance means 'clear seeing' and telepathy means 'far-feeling'. Telesthesia is an alternative word for Clairvoyance. Tischner agrees with Myers that telepathy is "the communication of impressions of any kind from one mind to another independently of the recognised channels of sense."² "Wireless telepathy and the X-rays suggest themselves very strongly as analogous to telepathy and Clairvoyance."³ Philosophers like Hegel, Schelling⁴, Fichte, Von Hartmann spoke of telepathy and Clairvoyance as 'accepted facts'. Distinguished physicists like Sir Oliver Lodge, Sir William Crookes and Sir William Barrett, psychologists like William James, Heymans, Rhine, Pratt, Murphy, Price, Ryzl, Zorab, Thouless, Nandor Fodor etc., are the pioneers in the experiment of psychical research. Prof. Charles Richet, after years of devoted research in this field says that "Cryp-testhesia, telekinesis, ectoplasm and premonition seem to be founded on granite; that is to say, on hundreds of exact observations and hundreds of vigorous experiments."⁵ Alexis

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1. Rhine, J. B. H. : Extra-Sensory-Perception, Faber & Faber, London, 1934.
 2. Tischner, R. : Ibid.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Richet, C. : Ibid.

Carrell holds that, "Clairvoyance and telepathy are a primary datum of scientific observation."¹ To McDougal "the ancient belief in Clairvoyance seems also in a fair way established."² Even such critical investigators as Lehmann, Dessoir and Baerwald admit today the existence of telepathy. Prof. H. H. Price sees no way of denying them.³ Telepathy forms a very ancient problem. Herodotus tell of a King named Gesus who consulted the Delphic messenger. Classical and medical literature abounds in cases of the influence of one mind upon another. Swedenborg was renowned in this respect. Mesmer and his followers claimed its actual demonstrations. R. Warcollier's *La telepathic* contains much valuable material about para-psychology. "Rhine has estimated that about fifty percent people have, or can develop the faculties required for experiments in Clairvoyance and telepathy."⁴ "Rhine also gives some suggestions to those who may care to repeat those experiments."⁵ Recently in the Statesman (Calcutta, 19th January 1963), we have read a news about transmission of thought waves between London and Moscow. This is Science. But let us conclude poetically.

"If the dull substance of my flesh was thought.
Injurious distance would not stop the way".
and

"As star to star vibrates light, may soul to soul.
Strike thro' a finer element of her own."

(g) *Omniscience or Kevala-Jnana*

Omniscience is recognised as an attribute of God but

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1. Carrel, A. : Ibid.
 2. Besant, A. D. L. : The Riddle of Life, Theosophical Publications, London (N. D.).
 3. Price, H. H. : His article in Philosophy, London, Oct. 1940.
 4. Payne, P. D. & Bendit, L. J. : Ibid.
 5. Rhine, J. B. H. : Extra-sensory perception, Ibid.

thanks to the Jainas who make it possible also for the ordinary human beings. This might have been partially motivated by the fact that since they do not believe in an Omnipotent or Omniscient God. They have brought in this conception of human Omniscience just to compensate that loss. Anyway, Omniscience or Kevala-Jñāna has been recognised as a kind of direct and 'extra-ordinary sensory perception'. (This phrase '*extra-ordinary sensory perception*' instead '*Extra-sensory perception*', we owe to Dr. W. L. M. Perry which has been also supported by A. S. Parkes in course of CIBA foundation symposium¹ as referred above). They think that the expression 'extra-sensory perception' is a singularly unfortunate one, in that it begs the question as to the nature of the phenomenon under discussion, and has a slightly supernatural and mystical connotation. However, to Dr. Rhine, the old expression 'extra-sensory-perception' is 'preferable which means by it a perception is a mode that is just not sensory, omitting all questions of 'unrecognised'². It is the highest type of immediate and direct extra-sensory perception which is the perfection of the cognitive faculty of self when shines in its full splendour after the total destruction of the deluding, knowledge-obscuring, faith-obscuring and obstructing Karmas³. So a person possessing omniscience can perceive all the substance with all their modes⁴. This is regarded as the state of final liberation when the soul is free from all Kārmic-matter to the non-existence of the cause of bondage and to the shedding of all Karmas, and it can perceive 'all the substances in all their modifications at all the places and in all the times.'⁵ Nothing remains unknown to

1. Wolstenholme, G. E. W. & Miller, E. C. P. (Ed.) : Ibid.

2. Rhine, J. B. H. : Extra-sensory-perception, Ibid.

3. (a) Mahāvira : Ibid.

(b) Uma Swāmi : Ibid.

4. Uma Swāmi : Ibid.

5. Ibid.

the Omniscient.”¹ The Jains try to prove Omniscience though all the recognised sources of knowledge in Indian Philosophy² after meeting the onslaught from the side of the Mīmāṃsakas³ who are the worst critics of the theory of human Omniscience in view of their unfailing faith in the validity of the scriptures. Briefly our phenomenal knowledge suggests the noumenal as a necessity of thought. Then this manifold and complex objectivity implies the need of some extraordinary perception. Psychologically, differences in intelligence etc., in human beings presupposes the possibility of Omniscience somewhere and in somebody. The Jaina logicians claim that since there is no contradictory proof against this, hence it can be accepted as a convenient and plausible hypothesis. Knowledge like measure and quality has got degree, hence knowledge is bound to reach its final consumation which is nothing but Omniscience, Akalaṅka, a famous Jaina Logician, tries to prove the existence of Omniscience on the basis of truth found in the astronomical sphere, which predicts correctly the position of future eclipses of the Sun and the Moon. Lastly, the concept of Omniscience follow as a logical corollary from the Jaina theory of soul as inherently pure and infinitely perfect. True, there is the Karmic veil but as the sun shines in its full splendour after the removal of the mists, fog or cloud, so the self knows everything where the knowledge obscuring Karmas are completely liquidated⁴. From partial knowledge, we can infer about the complete or total knowledge, just as we infer about the whole of mountain

1. (a) Bhadrabāhu : Ibid.

(b) Kunda-kunda : Niyama-sāra, Ibid.

2. Prabhacandra : Nyāya-Kumuda-Candra, Manik Candra Digambar Jaina Granthamala, Bombay, 1938.

3. Jamini : Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra (Ed. and Hindi trans. Devadutta Sharma), Prema Pustaka Bhandara, Bareilly, 1957.

4. (a) Akalaṅkadeva : Aṣṭa-śatī, Ibid.

(b) Akalaṅkadeva ; Nyāya-viniścaya, Ibid.

by perceiving only a part of it. This is how Vīrasena Swāmī reasons. Samantabhadra, an early Jaina Logician has tried to prove the existence of Omniscience though the reasoning based on the capability of being known through inference. Dharmabhūṣaṇa explaining this says that perception does not mean 'actual perception' but also 'object of knowledge'. Shri Sukhalalji Sanghavi, perhaps the most erudite living Jaina Scholar, says that the origin of all the above varieties of proofs for the existence of Omniscience can be traced back to the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali, especially the Sūtra which deals with Omniscience¹. Let us conclude with the author of Āpta-parīkṣā : "When Omniscience is proved by all the six traditional sources of knowledge, it is established beyond all doubt." The concept of Omniscience is perfectly consistent with the Jaina concept of soul as the possessor of infinite knowledge which is veiled due to various reasons as stated elsewhere in this paper.

(4) Karma and Rebirth

If the culmination of knowledge lies in Omniscience, the final consummation of spiritual life consists in the attainment of emancipation or better self-realisation. It may be possible that owing to various limitations, the final salvation may not be possible during the present life time and hence we require a number of births for its realisation. This is the metaphysics of rebirth. Rebirth is the inseparable twin of Karma. But if rebirth is a fact, the idea of pre-birth also cannot be rejected. The present is the result of the past and cause of the future. As every event must have a cause so every cause must have its effects. This is the Law of Karma, the Ultimate Law of the Universe which adjusts effect to cause on the physical, moral and spiritual planes of being. This is the Law of the Conservation of Moral Energy or the Moral Law of Equilibrium operating in an undeviating and unerring manner like

1. Patañjali : Yoga-Sūtra (Ed. & English trans. by J. H. Woods), Cambridge, 1914.

the Master Law going on uncessantly and ceaselessly. Karma is rebirth latent and rebirth is Karma manifest like indivisible unity of cause and effect. There are broadly speaking two schools of those who believe in the Law of Karma. The Negativists despise all forms of Karma good or bad since they cause bondage. To the Positivists like the Mīmāṃsakas and others, we should practise good Karmas to get good results.

The Karma phenomenology of the Jainas rests on the assumptions that every act must have its consequences which if not fully worked out in our life time, demand a future life for their fruition. This leads us to the idea of metempsychosis. The apparent diversities and inequalities among men demand an explanation which can be satisfied by the Law of Karma. But the Jaina meaning of *Karma* is different from the ordinary meaning. Karma here does not mean 'work and deed' but an "agregate of particles of very fine matter which are not perceptible by the senses." This is the Doctrine of the Material Nature of Karman which is singular to Jainism. With other, Karman is formless. The Jainas regard Karma as the crystalised effect of the past activities of energies. But they argue that "in order to act and react and thereby to produce changes in things on which they work, the energies must have to be metamorphosed into forms or centres of forces."¹ Like begets like. The cause is like the effect. "The effect (i. e., Body) is physical, hence the cause (i. e. Karma) has indeed a physical form."² But unless Karma is associated with the soul, it cannot produce any effect because Karma is only the instrumental cause and it is the soul which is the essential cause of all experiences. Hence the Jainas believe in the Doctrine of soul as the Possessor of Material Karma. But why and how the conscious soul should be associated with the unconscious matter? It is owing to the Karma, which is a substantive force or matter in a subtle form,

1. Nahar, P. C. & Ghosh, K. C. : Ibid.

2. Mehta, M. L. : Ibid.

which fills all cosmic space. "The soul by its commerce with the outer world becomes literally penetrated with the particles of subtle-matter."¹ Moreover the mundane soul is not absolutely formless, because the Jainas believe in the Doctrine of Extended consciousness like the Doctrine of Matter (*Pudgala*) in Buddh'sm and the Upaniṣads², and so to some extent in Plato and Alexander. While in Sāṃkhya-Yoga, Vedānta, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhists kept consciousness quite aloof from the matter, the Jainas could easily conceive of the inter-influencing between the soul and the Kārmic-matter, hence the relation between the soul and Karma becomes very easy. The Kārmic matter mixes with the soul as milk mixes with the water or fire with iron. Thus the formless Karma is affected by the corporal Karma as consciousness affected by drink and medicine. This is the relation of concrete identity between the soul and the Karma.

Without the Karma phenomenology, the diversity of the variegated nature and the apparent inequalities among human beings and their capacities remain unexplained. Moreover, Karma explains the problem of the original Sin, Good and Evil, Heredity and many unexplained problems of science, say in ethnology and astronomy. The proper understanding of the Law of Karma destroys the causes of envy and jealousy and ill-will, impatience and even fear of death. This attitude enables the Jainas to reject many other theories such as Temporalism (according to which the root cause of diversity is Time which is the highest God, all-pervasive and all-

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1. Radhakrishnan, S. : History of Philosophy, Vol. 1, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1948.
 2. (a) Anonymous : Śvetāśvatar Upaniṣad, I. 1. 6, Gita Press, Gorakhpur, 2009 (Vikrama Era).
 - (b) Anonymous : Kaṭha Upaniṣad, IV. 12, Gita Press, Gorakhpur, 2008 (V. E).
 - (c) Price, H. H. : Ibid.

powerful)¹. Naturalism proclaiming the Omnipotence of Nature discarding all human endeavours². *Determinism* as preached by Purāṇa Kāśyapa and Makkhali Gośāla leading to the doctrine of non-action, *Fortuitism or Accidentalism*³ like the Greek thinker, such as plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Epicureans etc⁴. *Agnosticism* and *Scepticism* born out of Materialism of Ajita Keśa Kambalin, Saṅjaya, Velletri Nātha-putta and lastly *Illusionism* of the Advaita Vedānta⁵. Karma is the basis of Jaina Psychology and the keystone supporting edifice of the Jaina ethics and metaphysics. Needless to say that the metaphysics of transmigration presupposes the metaphysics of Metempsychosis and Karma which are acknowledged as facts and axioms in the Indian thought. Karma is viewed from four points of view — its nature, duration, intensity and scope⁶. According to their *nature*, Karmas are of eight fundamental varieties such as, Knowledge obscuring karma, Intuition obscuring karma, Feeling obscuring karma, Belief obscuring karma, Age determining karma, Status and Power determining karma. There are numerous divisions and sub-divisions of these varieties also⁷.

The Doctrine of Karma and rebirth seems to be an important missing link in modern psychology. In Indian Philosophy,

1. (a) Anonymous ; Atharva-veda, XIX. 5, 3, 4, S, P, E, Vol. XLII.
- (b) Vyāsa : The Mahābhārata (Ed. & Hindi trans. Hanuman Prasad Poddar and R. D. Shastri), Gita Press, Gorakhpur, 1955-85.
2. Vyāsa : Bhagavad-Gītā, Gita Press, Gorakhpur, 1953.
3. Vātsyāyana : Nyāya-Sūtra-Bhāṣya (Ed. & English trans. G. N. Jha), Oriental Book Agency, Poona, 1939.
4. Hastings, J. (Ed.) : Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. I, Edinburg T. and T. Clark, 1908.
5. Vyāsa : Brahma-Sūtra (Ed. & Hindi trans. Harikṛṣṇa Dāsa Goendka), Gita Press, Gorakhpur, 1953.
6. Devendra Sūri : Ibid.
7. Ibid.

this dogma is an article of faith. In Vedānta, this Karma is used as *Māyā* (Cosmic illusion), *Avidyā* (Ignorance) or *Prakṛti* (Material world), in *Mīmāṃsā* it is called *Apūrva* (without a beginning), in Buddhistic thought it is *Vāsanā* (clinging), in *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* it is *Āśaya* (Past actions), in *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* systems it is used as *Dharmādharmā*, *Adṛṣṭa* (stock of merit and demerit) and *Saṃskāra* (impressions of the past), in other Hindu literature the terms used for Karma are roughly *Daiva* (Fate), *Bhāgya* (Luck), *Puṇya* and *Pāpa* (Virtue and Sin). The Jains by introducing this concept of Karma want to remove the defects in the Vedic conception of somewhat deistic God who interferes in the creation of universe without any purpose which leads to the suppression of individual freedom and effort. This also helps them to successfully refute Buddhistic Doctrine of Momentariness and the *Cārvāka* conception of Materialism.

(5) **Jaina Yoga**

Jainism like other systems of Indian Philosophy aims not only at intellectual explanation of truth but also at its realisation. This involves the idea of the Path of spiritual realisation known variously such as *Yoga* (merging of the finite with the infinite), *Dhyāna* (Meditation), *Samādhi* (Concentration). To Patañjali, the author of the *Yoga-Sūtra*, *Yoga* means the 'Cessation of the states of mind'. The Jaina term for *Yoga* is *Caritrā* (conduct). To them bondage is due to the inflow of *Kārmic* matter that is due to the actions of body, mind and speech.¹ Hence the process of emancipation will naturally start with the stoppage of this inflow² and liquidation of the already accumulated Karma-particles associated with.³ But all these require a practical discipline of all round restraint of thought, speech and mind (*Gupṭi*)⁴,

1. *Umā Swāmī* : Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

five-fold regulations (*Samiti*) of five main vital functions¹, observances of ten-fold moral virtues (*Dharma*)², contemplation of the twelve-fold objects (*Anuprekṣā*)³, Victory over 22 kinds of troubles (*Paṛiśahjaya*)⁴, and observances of five-fold conducts *Cāritrā*.⁵ Besides, practices of six-fold external and internal austerities with their numerous subdivision are essential. This long list of the rules and regulations of conduct and their transgressions indicate that if physical austerity is an index of self-realisation, moral life is a *sine qua non* for its achievement.

With this idea in view, the Jainas conceive of fourteen gradual stages of spiritual development (*Guṇasthāna*). A detailed study will show a logical order according to the principle of Gradual Evolution of soul from Decreasing sinfulness to the Increasing Purity leading to the final unveiling of the soul. "As one goes ascending in the stages of self-realisation and the practice of Yoga, one gradually develops the perspective of truth,"⁶ This I must confess is a very careful probe into the unhidden powers of the inner world. This Doctrine of *Guṇasthāna* or Spiritual Development and Yoga are interconnected since the idea of stages of spiritual development involves the idea of the means of liberation.⁷ Yoga is the process of eradication of the exterior and the interior to realize the transcendental self by

1. Umā Swāmī : Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Kalghatgi, T. G. : "Production and Control of Paranormal Phenomena in Jaina Yoga", Proceedings of Seminar on Yoga and Para-psychology, Lucknow University, 1962.

7. Yaśovijaya : *Yoga-Lakṣaṇa-Dvātriṃśika*, Jaina Dharma Prasarak Sabha, Bhavanagar, C. N. D.

cutting the knot for self-realisation.¹ But self-realisation requires self-concentration or *Dhyāna*² for our mind is always restless. Like the two divisions of Yoga according to Patañjali, the Jainas also divide into five stages such as Practice of Spiritual life (*Adhyātma*), Repeated Practice (*Bhāvanā*), Equanimity (*Samatā*), Final Annihilation of Residual Karmas (*Vṛtti Saṅkṣaya*) and Concentration (*Dhyāna*).³ Thus concentration is the immediate cause of liberation and hence so much emphasis is laid down by the Jainas upon this concept of Yoga.

(6) The Doctrine of *Leśyās* or Colorations of the Embodied Souls

The association of the soul with Karma is beginningless. The soul when associated with Karma forms the Subtle Body (*Karma Śarīra*) comparable to subtle bodies of *Sāṃkhya* (*Līṅga-Śarīra*)⁴ and *Vedānta* (*Sūkṣma Śarīra*).⁵ The subtle Karmic matter in the soul throws a reflex producing certain colorations about the souls. This is the *Leśyā*. Since the soul is colourless, hence all colorations concern only the embodied souls which are connected with the matter. The passions determine the nature of the colorations since the infinite power and energy of the soul is circumscribed by the power obscuring Karma being defiled by the passions. The delimited energy as determined by coloration is *Yoga* or

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1. *Pūjyapāda : Samādhi Tantra* (Ed. & Hindi trans. by Jugal Kishore Mukhtar), Vir Seva Mandir, Sarsawa, 1939.
 2. *Umā Swāmī* : Ibid.
 3. Haribhadra : *Yoga-Bindu*, Jaina Grantha Prakasaka Sabha, Ahmedabad, Series No. 25, 1940.
 4. *Īśvarakṛṣṇa : Sāṃkhya-Karika* (Ed. and English trans. by S. S. Shastri), Madras, 1948.
 5. Sadānanda : *Vedānta-sāra* (Ed. & English trans. Nikhilananda), Advaita Ashrama, Almora, 1949.

activity.¹

The colour-index of the embodied souls is two-fold; material (*Dravya Leśyā*) and mental (*Bhāva Leśyā*). Material colorations refer to the body or organism, which are produced by Karma-particles² or by binding Karma or by mental activities. Mental colorations (*Bhāva Leśyā*) refers to the psychic conditions which result from the feelings and mental activities. Popularly six types of colour-indexes have been suggested to fit in with all the moral and immoral kinds of beings such as wickedness and cruelty is represented by black (*Kṛṣṇa*) anger and envy by blue (*Nīla*), dishonesty and meanness by grey (*Kapota*), discipline by pink (*Padma*), subduing of Passions by Yellow (*Pīta*) and meditation of virtue and truth by white colorations (*Śveta*). Similarly, the denizens of hell, the celestial beings and the human beings are different bodily colorations such as black, white etc.

In short, the doctrine of colorations is the triple index of body, mind and heart. So the aura or radiation spreading round the gods and prophets like Jesus, Buddha, Mahāvīra, Zoraster etc., presenting a halo has got positive meanings. Just as every neurosis has got a psychosis, so every material colour suggests a physico-psycho-logico-moral attribute. It is held that these colorations are perceptible only through extra-sensory perception. A concrete instance has been quoted by Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi of Dharwar university³ where a Tibetan Lama named Manglabjong Rama could see owing to the Yogic discipline he had undergone, the lusture of the aura of an individual. He once saw blue of light emanating from a Chinese delegation which had gone to see the Dalai Lama

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1. Chandrsi Mahattar : *Pañcha-Saṅgraha*, *Mukta Bai Jñāna Mandir*, Dabhol (N. D.).
 2. Mahāvīra : *Uttaradhyayana Sūtra* (Ed. Jael Charpentry), Upsala, 1922.
 3. Kalghatgi, T. G. : 'Doctrine of Leśyā', *The Voice of Ahimsā*, Vol. IX, No. 9, Lucknow.

(the Tibetan high priest who had taken refuge in India after communist on-slaughts upon them). He then appealed to the Dalai Lama not to accept the sweetended words of the members of the delegation, as they were full of fraud. J. Charpentur's *Leśyā-Theory of Jainas and Ājivakas* (Freests-krift, 1910) may be consulted.

Corresponding to this Jaina Doctrine of colorations, we have similar references elsewhere also. In *Mahābhārata*, there is a description about six types of colorations of souls¹. In *Patañjali Yoga-Sūtra*, mental states have been classified into four kinds according to this coloration principle² which is said to have been suggested having a Jaina influence³. On the basis of an account in *Dīgha-Nikaya*, Leumann and Sukhalal Sanghavi⁴ both have found resemblances of six colorations with Makkhali Gośāla's six-fold divisions of human beings. In Buddhism, Karma is classified into the same four colours as in *Yoga-Sūtra*. The theosophical view of the transcendental colour in the individual may also have some resemblance to the Jaina Doctrine of colorations⁵.

(7) Conclusion

Inspite of well-recognised centres of Psychical Research in the universities of pittsburgh, Utrecht, Duke etc., and the societies of Psychical Research in London and New York with big names associated with them, para-psychology in the West has just emerged from the stage of heresy. This is precisely because the western scholars have approached this

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1. Vyāsa ; *The Mahābhārata*, Ibid.
 2. Patañjali ; Ibid.
 3. Das Gupta, S. N. ; *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, Cambridge, 1922.
 4. Sukhalalji Sanghavi : *Darśana Aur Cintana*, Gujrata Vidya Sabha, Ahmedabad, 1957.
 5. Besant, A. D. L. and Leadbeater, C. W. ; *Thought Forms*, Theosophical Publications, London, 1921.

problem purely from the traditional experimental-laboratory standpoint, and hence so little achievement inspite of such a tremendous effort. Para-psychology demands a new methodology and a new understanding. Para-psychological experiences such as that of clairvoyance, telepathy, omniscience are not common to all and universal and hence it requires a man-to-man research depending mostly upon the individual experiences gained either by them or by ourselves practising those methods. I am constrained to believe that one who is absolutely uninitiated in those disciplines even to a comfortable extent, it is difficult for him either to brand it either as magic or cent per cent scientific. In India, para-psychological phenomena have been investigated from the side of religion and their practices in everyday life. So it is not so much a matter of principle but an actual fact of life.

The Jainas have got a systematic discipline for the achievement of those types of extra-sensory perceptions as stated in the paper. What is required is to demonstrate to the West its validity. Now two methods may be employed. Firstly, every ardent research worker should see for himself what it is and one worker should compare his notes with the other. The second method will be to collect the reports of Psi-phenomenon from those who are already adept in this field and again compare their individual reports. The contribution of Jainism towards the conception of human omniscience is very significant and it needs special investigation.

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NON-ABSOLUTISM AND ITS RELEVANCE

- (1) *Non-absolutistic Heritage of Bhagavan Mahavira.***
- (2) *Non-absolutism and Jaina View of Darshana.***
- (3) *Relevance of Anekanta for Modern Times.***
- (4) *Syadvada : A Solution of World Tension.***

Chapter Fourteen

NON-ABSOLUTISTIC HERITAGE OF BHAGAVĀNA MAHĀVĪRA

[I]

Only man possesses culture and man lives in society. So culture grows out of the life-history of a nation. It is all-inclusive capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society. It is transmitted by communication and is, therefore, an accumulative structure developed out of the reflective thinking of man. It is all the ways of doing and thinking of a group. In other words, it is the 'Stock in trade' of a group. Social groups are distinguished from each other by difference in their stocks of culture-patterns and values. Culture heritage is the sum total of the culture-patterns that a person inherits from the various social groups. *Descriptively*, culture includes customs, beliefs, morals, art, knowledge. *Historically*, it is the sum total of social heritages. *Normatively*, It is composed of traditions, attitudes, ideas that control human behaviour. *Psychologically*, culture is the means by which people try to obtain their goals. *Structurally*, it is an organization of conventional understandings and learned behaviour and *genetically* it arises from and includes all the products of social interaction. Culture includes not only patterns of behaviour but the attitudes and beliefs that motivate behaviour. It is the product of human societies and of the individuals who compose them. In short, culture is the mother of personality, thus culture and personality within the framework of human groups become inseparable. Personality dimensions are expressions in part of culture.

[II]

The age in which Mahāvīra (6th Century B. C.) was born, was a period of cultural revolution all over the world. Socrates was born in Greece, Zoroaster in Persia, Lao-Tse and

Confucius in China and Bhagavāna Mahāvīra and Buddha in India. In India, this was an age of transition and uncertainty. Caste distinctions and priestly oligarchy had become a source of enormous irritation and a means of popular exploitation. Rituals and superstition had over-shadowed the simple faith of nature-worship of the Vedas and had, therefore, led to the growth of Brahmanism. There was also an intellectual chaos and philosophical revolts. Economically, the society was passing through a transition from a pastoral-agriculture-handicraft stage to a developing capitalist economy, which led to a corresponding political changes in the political constitution leading to the rise and growth of small village republics and democratic consciousness. It is in this background that Lord Mahāvīra was born and had lived. No doubt, Jainism in the present form, is the heritage of Lord Mahāvīra but it would be wrong to ignore the origin and development of the creed of the long line of the Tīrthaṅkaras, of whom Lord Mahāvīra was the 24th and the last. However, the origin of these Tīrthaṅkaras, that is Jainism, has been a faithful source of speculation and error for the orientalisists. Without going into the problem of historicity of these 24 Tīrthaṅkaras, we can safely conclude that the credit of India's greatness belongs to the Jainas no less to the Brahmins and the Buddhists¹. At this stage of information, we can conclusively reject either the Buddhistic derivation theory² or the Hindu-dissenter theory³ and accord to Jainism

1. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, S. C. : Jaina Gazette, p. 35.
2. Jyoti Prasad Jaina : Jainism : The Oldest Living Religion (Varanasi : Jaina Cultural Research Society, 1951), list 8 proofs to show that Jainism is not an off-shoot of Buddhism, pp 5-14; See, S. B. E., Vol. XXII & XLV (Introduction).
3. Ibid., pp 15-47; "Jainism and Buddhism are definitely not Hinduism nor even Vedicism", Jawaharlal Nehru, Discovery of India (Asia Publishing House, 1967, Rep.), pp. 123-124.

an original system quite distinct and independent from all others¹. So Dr. G. N. Jha says : If it has similarities with the other Indian systems, it has its own peculiarities and marked differences as well². Though it may not be possible at this stage of our knowledge to determine the comparative antiquity of Jaina and Brahmanic things,³ we may say that Jainism is probably as old as the Vedic religion, if not the older⁴ It is indeed very original, independent and systematic doctrine⁵ and is one of the earliest home religions of India. Unlike Buddhists Jainism, on the other hand, has preserved down to the present time its integrity as a separate world. Hence, it is wrong to hold that Jainism was founded by Mahāvīra in the 6th Century. That his predecessor "Pārśva was a historical person, is now admitted by all as very probable."⁶ But again, Jacobi says : "There is nothing to prove that Pārśva was the founder of Jainism. Jaina tradition is unanimous in making Ṛṣabha, as the First Tīrthaṅkara"⁷ whose references as a recognised mystic⁸, are found in the Vedic and Purāṇic literature. The Hindus, themselves recognise Ṛṣabhadeva as the 9th incarnation of Viṣṇu⁹. The excavations at Mohenjodaro¹⁰, specially the

1. Jacob, L. H. : "The Metaphysics and Ethics of the Jainism", Jaina Antiquary, Arrah, Vol. X, No. 1, p. 40.
2. Jaina Gazette, 1921, p. 146.
3. Chakravarti, C. H. : 'Jainas and Hindus', Jaina Gazette, April, 47, p. 61.
4. Cultural Heritage of India (Calcutta : R. K. Centenary Memorial), Vol. I, pp. 185-198.
5. Guerinor, A. : Bibliographica Jainica (Introduction).
6. S. B. S. (Jaina Sutras), XLV (Introduction).
7. Indian Antiquary, Vol. IX, No. 2, p. 163.
8. Ranade, R. B. : Mysticism in Maharashtra, p. 9.
9. Bhāgavat Mahāpurāṇam, V. 5, 28; V. 5. 3, V. 5. 32; Harivaṁśa Purāṇam, VIII. 58.
10. "Mohenjodaro Antiquities and Jaina Antiquary, XIV. 1, pp. 1-7.

finds of nude images are similar to the characteristics of Jaina śramaṇas. The Kāyotsarga¹ posture of Yoga is peculiarly Jaina. In short, we can conclude that Jainism is a very ancient religion and is related to the primitive philosophy. It is believed to have a non-Aryan or of non-Vedic Aryan origin².

Nurtured into the synthetic culture of India and deeply influenced by the Jaina tradition, Mahāvīra showed wonderful ability in organisation of his Order (Saṅgha), of the floating mass of Śramaṇic literature and culture. He propagated a veritable spiritual democracy admitting ascetics and laymen, Brahmins and Śūdras, male and female—all into the folds of Jainism, rejecting the Varṇāśramas, the authority of the Vedas, God and the myth of māyā and Karma-kāṇḍa. Positively, he enunciated that the Jaina doctrine of knowledge are inherent in soul, the Karma-phenomenology and inward strenuousness and affirmation of spirit through rigid ethical life for the attainment of salvation.

All the teachings of Mahāvīra have come down to us as a living tradition contained in the sacred works (Āgamas)³ which are regarded as eternal and permanent teachings⁴ for the benefit of the entire mankind, contained in the 14 Pūrvas. Mahāvīra himself taught the Pūrvas to his disciples, known as Gaṇadharas. Further the 12 Aṅgas, 12 Upāṅgas, 4 Mūlas, 2 Cūlikas Sūtras, 6 Cheda Sūtras, 10 Prakīrṇakas⁵ were composed. Their commentaries are known as Niryukits &

1. Ādi Purāṇa, XVIII.

2. Shasri, S. : Jaina Antiquari, Vol. XV, No. 2, p. 58.

3. Nandī-Sūtra, 40.

4. Ibid, 57.

5. Malvania, D. : Jaina Dārśanika Sahitya Kā Simhāvalokana (Varanasi : J. C. R. S.), 1940, Bulletin No. 2, pp. 2-3; Bolani, F. C. ; Jaina Grantha Aur Granthakāra (Varanasi : J. C. R. S.), 1950, pp. 1-4.

Bhāṣyas (in poetry) and Churnis (in prose). The Pūrvas were gradually lost but they were superseded by new canons compiled from time to time by the religious councils at Pāṭaliputra (4th Century B. C.) and Vallabhī (5th Century B. C.) for issuing Siddhānta. According to Jacobi, the Pūrvas contained the dialogues between Mahāvīra and rival teachers. The Dṛṣṭivāda, which is said to have included the 14 Pūrvas, dealt chiefly with the philosophical standpoints (dṛṣṭis) of the Jainas and other schools.¹ Notwithstanding the differences between the Digambara and the Śvetāmbaras, the entire ancient written literature of the Jainas known as Āgamas, are ascribed to Mahāvīra. Hence it is important to study the philosophical attitude (dṛṣṭi) of Mahāvīra in the perspective of Indian thought and culture.

[III]

Broadly, we can find four marked philosophical attitudes in ancient Indian thought and culture : The Brahman, the Buddhist, the Jaina and the last but not the least the Cārvāka attitude towards life. The Cārvāka-attitude is out and out materialistic atheistic and hedonistic. The Brahman attitude is rooted in the Vedas and Upaniṣads and hence it is highly speculative and ultra-absolutistic.² Ultimate reality is conceived as Truth, consciousness and Infinite (Satyam, Jñānam and Anantam)³, called as Brahman or Ātman⁴ which is ultimately indefinable. The Buddhist

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1. Bool Chand ; Lord Mahāvīra (Varanasi : J. C. R. S.) 1948, p. 62.
 2. Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, VI. 11; Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, 6; Taittirīya Upaniṣad, III. 1; Īśāvāsyā Upaniṣad, 1; Ṛg-veda, X. 129. 1, I. 164. 46.
 3. Taittirīya Upaniṣad, III. 1.
 4. Chāndogya Upaniṣad, VI. 8. 7, III. 14. 1; Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, II. 5. 19.

attitude is rationalistic¹ in epistemology and middle of the road (Madhyama pratipada² in metaphysics and morals. The Jaina attitude, from the days of Mahāvīra is radical non-absolutistic, which has developed perhaps out of their great regard for non-violence. Jainism, a religion, has practically been identified with non-violence (Ahimsā) and is the key-note of Jainism. Non-violence to be total and complete must be non-violence in thought, word and deed. Hence, they have formulated non-absolutistic theories in all these three fields of life—Anekāntavāda (thought), Syādvāda (speech) and Ahimsā (action). Thus, non-absolutism is not partial but integral, not an accidental but an essential feature of Jainism. It is true that the spirit of synthesis (samanvaya) is found in the very texture of Indian culture because it has been a unity in diversity. Hence, even before the advent of Lord Mahāvīra, the non-absolutistic ideas in the seed form were present in the philosophical climate of India. In the Vedas and Upaniṣads, the ultimate reality is described neither⁴ as 'purely real (Sat)⁵ nor as unreal (asat)⁶. Some say it was One⁷, while others hold it become many⁸. Ultimately, it is said that the ultimate reality is the same, though it is called by different names⁹. Ātman is

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1. Bodhisattvabhūmi, I. XVII (Yukti-Śaraṇa), Chūla-mālukya Sutta, 63.
 2. Samyutta-nikāya, XII. 17. 7-15; XII. 35, 5.
 3. Dīgha-Nikāya, II, p. 217 (P. T. S.); Mahānidāna Sutta (Warren's trans. p. 208); Samyutta Nikāya (Warren's Trans.) XXII. 165.
 4. Ṛg-veda, X. 129; Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad 5.
 5. Ṛg-veda, I, 164. 46; Chāndogya Upaniṣad, VI. 2.
 6. Bṛhadāraṇyak Upaniṣad, I. 2. 1; Taittirīya Upaniṣad II. 7; Chāndogya Upaniṣad, III. 19. 1.
 7. Chāndogya Upaniṣad, VI. 2.
 8. Ibid.
 9. Ṛg-veda, I. 164. 46.

Brahman.¹ Even Lord Buddha's attitude was very close to non-absolutism. He always avoided two extremes—eternalism and nihilism, and held the middle view (madhyam prati-padā).² Lord Buddha's Vibhajjavāda has contributed negatively a lot to the rise and growth of Syādvāda. Even the pre-Mahāvīra Jaina thought was saturated with non-absolutistic ideas.³

The Brahmanic, the Buddhistic and the Jainas are all engaged in the quest of truth only their methods are different. The method of philosophising adopted by Mahāvīra is known as Anekāntavāda (Non-absolutism), which is characterised by two things — totality (Pūrṇatā) and reality (Yathār-thatā)⁴ or viewing the whole reality in its completeness and concreteness. Hence, it was never a Utopia but an attitude of practical life. The basic principle of non-absolutism is applicable in all works of life social and religious, literary and cultural, economic and political. We shall however limit ourselves to the three-fold non-absolutism in thought, word and action.

[IV]

(a) *Non-absolutism in Thought* : Anekāntavāda — Life is a unity of thought, word and deed. Thought influences action. Hence, emphasis has been laid upon right thinking (Samyak dr̥ṣṭi⁵ or Samyak Jñāna⁶). But what is right and what is

1. Bṛhadāraṇyak Upaniṣad, II. 5. 19.
2. Saṃyutta-nikāya, XII. 17; XII. 24; XII. 35; XL. 85; XLIV, I. 7-8; Aṅguttara-nikāya, 3; Dīgha-nikāya, I.
3. S. N. Gokhale says, "Ahimsā is the key-note of Jainism, a philosophy which comes from pre-Aryan days", quoted by Bool Chand, Ibid, p. 55.
4. Sanghavi, S. : Anekāntavāda (Varanasi : J. C. R. S., 1948), p. 3.
5. Dīgha-nikāya, 22 (Warren, pp. 372-374); Majjhima-nikāya (quoted by Sogen); Systems, pp. 169-171.
6. Tattvartha-sūtra of Umā Swāmī, I. 1.

wrong, nobody knows because on the one hand, reality is complex, on the other hand, there is limitation to our knowledge, so long we do not attain omniscience. To know is to relate, therefore, our knowledge is essentially relative and limited¹ in many ways - in the sphere of application of the means of knowledge or in the extent of the knowable.² Our thought is relative. The whole reality in its completeness, cannot be grasped by this partial thought. What is necessary is a change in our attitude, not with the thought alone. Jainism, no doubt, recognises the objectivity of the material universe because it is the most consistent form of realism in Indian Philosophy. The objectivity of the universe reveals that the universe is independent of the mind. This independence presupposes the principle of distinction, which ultimately leads to the recognition of non-absolutism (*anekānta*) realism. The theory of manifoldness of knowledge or reality is the logical terminus of the principle of distinction. Further, *distinction* presupposes the notion of *plurality* and also *activistic* implication of *reciprocity* among the reals³ which finally results into the relativistic notion of knowledge and reality. The principle of distinction is the universal and basic axiom of all realistic metaphysics. The impelling logic of distinction presents to us an infinitely diversified universe, or in indeterminate reality. A philosophy which does not admit of distinction or independence of subject and object develops inevitably either into subjective or objective idealism. Hence, *Anekāntavāda* is the most logical and consistent form of realism. This is true of modern Einsteinian Theory of Relativity. Russel refutes the idealistic interpretation and says, "the

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1. Ladd, G. T. : Knowledge, Life and Reality, p. 95.
 2. Sanghavi, S. : Advanced Studies in Logic and Metaphysics, (Calcutta : Indian Studies, 1961), pp. 4-6.
 3. Padmarajiah, Y. J. : Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge (Jaina Sahitya Vikas Mandal, 1963, Bombay), Chapter IX (*Anekāntavāda*).

fundamental assumption of relativity is realistic, namely, that those aspects in which all observers agree when they record a given phenomenon, may be regarded as objective, and not as contributed by the observers.”¹ Subjectivism or solipsism is against scientific relativism, which is sustained by the postulate of the plurality and objectivity of the universe.

Mahāvīra too was neither a sceptic nor an agnostic. He believed that these infinite number of attributes and characteristics can be discovered by experience alone, and not by a priori logical consideration or random speculations. But he does not admit of a distinction between the external and internal sources of knowledge or reality. A consideration will show the inadequacy of pure logic to give us the full knowledge of the real. The traditional laws of identity (A is A), contradiction (A is not A) or Excluded Middle (A cannot be both A and not A) have no appeal to experience and behaviour of things.² There is no denying the fact that they are Laws of Thought and hence also laws of Reality but we must determine their meanings by an appeal to experience alone. Reals are concrete facts of experience, Universal is the very life of particulars and particulars cannot be bereft of universals. But again, the truth of this can be realised through reference to our actual experience. Let us try to understand these problems with the help of dialogue between Mahāvīra and Gautama :

“Are the souls O Lord, eternal, or non-eternal ?
They are eternal, O Gautama,
from the view-point of substance,
and non-eternal from the view-point of modes.”³

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1. Russell, B. : ‘Relativity’, Encyclopaedia Britannica (University of Chicago, 1950).
2. “The Logical Background of Jaina Philosophy”, by S. Mookherjee in the Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism (Calcutta : Bhārati Mahāvīdyalaya, 1944).
3. Bhagavati Sūtra, VII. 2. 273.

"Is the body, O Lord, identical with the soul or different ?
The body, O Gautama, is identical
with the soul as well as different from it."¹

Similarly, we have numerous dialogue regarding the problem, "whether universal and absolute non-violence is good or bad ?"² "Whether to sleep or to remain awake is good ?"³ "Whether to be weak or strong ?"⁴ "Whether the Jīvas are mobile or not ?"⁵ "Whether the soul is powerful or powerless"⁶, and so on. And the replies of Mahāvīra are always conditional and double, which are also correct, because there is actual reference and experience.

A thing is neither real nor unreal, neither eternal nor non-eternal, neither static nor mobile, neither small nor big in the absolute sense but has dual nature.⁷ This is no offence to the Laws of thought because two-valued logic seems to unreal if there is loyalty to experience. There is no brass tracks in life or logic. Take for example, the case of being and becoming or identity and difference. It is presupposition of 'difference' that the 'identity' of a thing undergoing change is maintained. *Change* is meaningless without the idea of persistence. Hence, the contradiction between them is only so-called and illusory. The denial of pre-non-existence

1. Bhagavatī Sūtra, XIII. 7. 495.

2. Ibid, VII. 2. 270.

3. Ibid, XII. 2. 443.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid, XXV. 4.

6. Ibid, I. 8. 72.

7. For an elaborate discussion of the Jaina theory of manifoldness of reality, reference may be made to Syādvāda-mañjarī of Mallisena with Anyayoga-Vyavaccheda-Dvātri-mśikā of Hemcandra (Ed.) A. B. Dhruva (Poona : B. O. R. I., 1933) and Anekanta-Jaya-Patākā of Haribhadra Sūri (ed.) H. R. Kapadia (2 Vols.), Gaekwad Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1960, etc.

and post non-existence as part of a real leads to the impossibility of the law of causation and the consequential impossibility of all theoretical and practical activity. Similarly, the denial of non-existence of mutual identity (numerical difference) and absolute non-existence is also impossible. There plurality presupposes that the identity of one is not the identity of another. If there is no difference, there will be no distinction, hence no independence between the subject and the object. If there is the negation of identity, there is worse confusion. Hence, the nature of reality is not exclusive or extremistic. It is existent-cum-non-existent; identity-cum-difference, one-in-many. This is seeing both the sides, the obverse and the reverse of the thing. Similarly we can think of the universal and the particular. The world of reals is not only plurality but also unity. But the oneness is not secured at the sacrifice of the many, nor are the many left in un-social indifference.¹ As regards relations, no relation is meaningful if there is pure identity and no relation is possible between two terms which are absolutely independent and different, hence relation is neither a case of unification nor mutual dependence. Relation has no status outside the terms. Hence, there is only one alternative to treat relation in the sense of identity-in-difference as an ontological truth, not merely inferable², but also as an indubitably perceptual fact.³ Lastly, if causal efficiency (Arthakriyākāritvam) is

1. Mukherjee, S. : Ibid, p. 302.

2. Prameya-kamala-mārtanḍa of Prabhacandra (ed.) M. K. Jaina (Bombay, 1941), 2nd edition, p. 514.

3. Ibid, p. 514; According to Y. J. Padmarajiah, the Jaina view of relation between the two extremes of Vedānta and Nyāya corresponds, in some essentials, to the views of contemporary westerners like De Witt Parker, "The Theory of Relations, The Self and Nature (Cambridge, 1917) ch. IX; William James, "The Theory and its Relations", The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and

the test of reality, the real cannot be an absolute constant nor can it be an absolute variable but a variable constant.¹ An absolute real can neither be a cause nor an effect² for an absolute effect will have no necessity for a cause, and an eternal cause will be unamenable to any change is self-contradictory. Hence, real to be real must reveal itself not merely as many (Anantātmakam) but also infinitely manifold (Anantadharmātmakam) or non-absolutistic (Anaikāntika). This is the integral view of identity-in-difference, or Being-in-becoming etc. (Ubhayavāda or Miśra-vāda³). We may be unable to understand this unique nature (Jātyantara) of this concrete unity through the recognised channels of knowledge but if we can realise at all the general features of the Absolute, we can see that somehow they come together in a known, vaguely and in the abstract, our result is certain.

This is another point, whether this kind of non-absolutism is itself *absolute* or *not*. If non-absolutism is absolute, there is at least one real which is absolute; and if it is *not*, it is not an absolute and universal fact. For the answer to this question, we shall have to turn ourselves to the theory of Relativism (Syādvāda) including the theory of standpoint (Nayavāda), sevenfold predication (Saptabhaṅgī) and Verbal usage (Nikṣepa).

(b) *Non-absolutism in Speech* : Syādvāda — Whether non-absolutism is itself absolute or relative depends upon the nature of proposition, which is either complete (Sakalādeśa)

Scientific Methods (ed.), F. S. D. Woodbridge (2 Vols.), Vol. II, pp 30-35; W. McTaggart ; 'The Theory and its Relations', Ibid, Vol. II, p. 35.

1. Tatia, N. M. : "Anekānta, Syādvāda and Saptabhaṅgī", Ācārya Bhikṣu Smṛti Grantha (Calcutta, 1961), p. 82.
2. Mookherjee S. : Ibid, p. 25.
3. Padmarajah, Y. J. : Ibid, p. 38.

or Incomplete (Vikalādeśa)¹, the former being the object of valid knowledge (Pramāṇa) and the latter, the object of aspectal knowledge (Naya).² This means that the doctrine of non-absolutism is not absolute unconditionally. However, to avoid the fallacy of an infinite regress, the Jainas distinguish between true non-absolutism (Samyak-anekānta) and false non-absolutism (Mithyā-anekānta).³ To be valid, therefore, non-absolutism must not be *absolute* but always *relative*. When one attribute is stated as constituting the whole nature of the real and thus implies the negation of other attributes, such cognition are examples of the 'false absolute'. But *Naya* is not false though it is partial knowledge from a particular standpoint. Similarly, the nature of unconditionality in the statement 'All statements are conditional' is quite different⁴ from the normal meaning of unconditionality. This is like the idea contained in the passage 'I do not know myself'. Where there is no contradiction between *knowledge* and *ignorance*, or in the sentence, 'I am undecided', where there is atleast one decision; 'I am undecided'. The unconditionality is not at the level of existence, while at the level of *essence* (Thought) everything is alternative. We do not like in the realm of *thought* or *reason* alone. Behind *reason*, there is always the *unreason* (Faith). The Jainas, too has faith in their scriptures as anybody else has in his own. Here is definiteness or unconditionality. In each community, there is a special absolute. The *absolutes* themselves are alternation

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1. Umāswāmī : Tattvārtha-sūtra, I. 6; Vidyānandi : Tattvārtha-Sloka-Vārttikam, I. 6. 3.
 2. Pūjyapāda : Sarvārtha-siddhi (Kashi, 1955), p. 20.
 3. Samantabhadra : Āpta-mīmāṃsā (Kashi, 1914), K. 108; Vidyānandi : Aṣṭa-sāhasrī (Nirṇaya Sagar Press, Bombay), p. 290; Dharmabhūṣaṇa : Nyāya-dīpikā (Sarasava, 1945), pp. 130-131.
 4. Vide author's article 'Nature of Unconditionality in Syādvāda', in this book.

so far as they are *possible* (till we are on thought level), but when I have chosen one and stick to it, it is more than possible, it is existent or *actual*. Thus, there may be a reconciliation between unconditionality and conditionality. So on thought level, the Syādvāda statement 'Everything is conditional', holds good but when we adopt the point of view of existence, we are bound to rest on unconditionality.

But there is a problem, how to express this conditionality-cum-unconditionality in language? From the point of view of *anekānta*, we cannot make one-sided exposition. But in actual usage, whenever we make any particular statement (S is P or S is not P), it takes the form of a categorical proposition. Even a hypothetical (If S then P) or a disjunction (Either S or P) is said to have a categorical basis and therefore, they can be converted into a categorical one. But since our thought is relative, so must be our expression. Then there is another problem also to synthesize the different angles of visions or internal harmony of the opposed predications (S is P, S is not P, S is both P and not P, S is neither P nor not P etc.). It is therefore, Lord Mahāvīra had always prefixed a restrictive expression, *Syāt*¹ ('somehow' or 'in some respect') as a corrective against any absolutist way of thought and evaluation of reality. This is a linguistic tool for the practical application of non-absolutism in words. Because of this prefix 'Syāt' and the relative nature of the proposition, it is called *Syādvāda*. But words are only expressive or suggestive (*Vācaka* or *Jñāpaka*) rather than productive (*Kāraka*). Thus, the meaning is, however, eventually rooted in the nature of things in reality and we have,

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1. Shastri, K. C. ; "Syādvāda and Saptabhaṅgī", *Premi Abhinandan Grantha*, p. 338; *Āpta-Mīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra, K. 105. However, there is no need of 'Syāt' for an enlightened person who knows its imports; *Laghīya-straya* of Akalaṅka, Verse 38; *Naya-viniścaya* of Akalaṅka, Verse 454.

therefore, to explore a scheme of linguistic symbols (*Vacan-vinyāsa*) for model judgements representing alternative stand-points (*Nayas*). A *Naya* in an alter-‘viewpoint’¹ a way of approach or particular opinion (*abhiprāya*) or view-point (*apekṣā*) about an object as an event. This philosophy of standpoints bears the same relation to philosophy as logic does to thought or grammar to language. We cannot affirm or deny anything absolutely of any object owing to the endless complexity of things. Every statement of a thing, therefore, is bound to be one-sided and incomplete. Hence, the Doctrine of Seven-fold Predication (*Saptabhaṅgī*)² is the logical consummation of the doctrine of relative stand-points (*Syādvāda*) which synthesize the different points of view. If we insist on absolute predication without conditions (*Syat*)³, the only course open is to dismiss either the diversity or the identity as a mere metaphysical fiction. Every single standpoint designated in every statement has a partial truth. Different aspects of reality can be considered from different perspectives (*Nikṣepa*)⁴. Thus *Naya* is the analytic and the *Saptabhaṅgī* is the synthetic method of studying ontological problems. In the forms of statements, this doctrine insists on the co-relation of affirmation and negation. All judgements are double-edged in their character. All

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1. *Nyāyāvatāra* of Siddhasena Divākara, Śloka-29; *Laghī-yastraya*, Śloka-42; *Syādvāda-maṅjari*, Śloka-28; *Parīkṣā-mukham* of Maṇikyanandi, Verse-19; *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*, K. 106.
 2. *Naya-karṇikā* of Vinaya Vijaya, K. 22; *Saptabhaṅgī Naya* of Mannomala Jaina (Introduction); Tatia, N. M. : *Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, p. 198.
 3. Jacobi calls *Syādvāda* a synonym of Jainism, *Vide of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. VII, p. 465; Scriptural knowledge of the Jains are also called *Syādvāda-śruta*, vide *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra, K. 105.
 4. *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, I. 5.

things' are existent as well as non-existent. The predicate of 'inexpressibility' stands for the unique synthesis of existence and non-existence and is therefore 'unspeakable' (Avak-tavya). These three predicates, 'existence', 'non-existence' and the 'inexpressible' make seven propositions. These seven predicates are thus the seven exhaustive and unique modes of expression of truth.

It is wrong to charge the theory of Syādvāda with the fallacies of self-contradiction, undeterminism, doubt, uncertainty or abandoning original position in describing the Avyak-tam, Infinite Regress, Confusion, Vaidhikarāṇa etc. It is also wrong to confuse the pragmatic and pluralistic-realistic attitude of Syādvāda with either Pragmatism of Messrs. James-Dewey-Schiller or with the subjectivistic relativism of the Sophist or with the relative absolutism of Whitehead or Bodin or with Einsteinian relativity except in the most general attitude. Pyrrho's prefixing every judgement with a 'may be' must not be identified with Jaina 'Syāt', for the former degenerates into agnosticism or scepticism, whereas there is no room for any scepticism whatsoever in Jainism. Scepticism means in the minimum, absence of any assertion, whereas Syādvādins always assert, though what they assert are alternatives - each being valid in its own Universe of Discourse², which controls the interpretation of every word. This is the logic of Relatives.³

Although, I have tried to designate Anekāntavāda as theory of non-absolutism in thought, while Syādvāda as the doctrine of non-absolutism in speech, both of them are used

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1. For a detailed criticism of these charges, see, Jaina Darśana (Syādvāda Special Number), Vol. II, Nos. 4, 5; Jaina Darśana of M. K. Jaina (Syādvāda-mimāṃsā), pp. 549-622.
 2. Bool : Laws of Thought, p. 166.
 3. Mitra, A. C. ; Deductive Logic, pp. 198-200.

as synonyms.¹ It is opposed to one sided exposition or statement. There is relation between thought and speech. Hence, Buddha emphasised the importance of right speech (Samyak Vācā) along with right views (Samyak dr̥ṣṭi). The Hindu thinkers have also recognised the virtue of speech (Vācaka) along with the physical (Kāyika) and mental (Mānasika) virtues. To the Jainas, non-absolutism is a virtue, absolutism is vice (Adharma). Views are bound to differ because we are guided by different conditions, thought and modes and attitudes. Hence, we must avoid strong and absolute judgements, because we are not the sole possessor of truth. In other words, it is fatal to treat the relative and the home made as though it were the Absolute.² It is the language that makes cognition illuminative of its objects.³ Hence, language too must be so disciplined as to conform itself with the dictum of reality, which is recognised as manifold.

(c) *Non-absolutism in Action* : Ahimsā — The Jaina principle of respect for life (Ahimsā) is the origin of the respect for the opinion of others. Hence, anekāntavāda or syādvāda is an extension of Ahimsā in thought. Non-violence in action must precede non-violence in thought. For Jainism, of all moral principles, ahimsā is a universal and categorical rule of action and is prescribed for its own sake. It is, therefore called the supreme virtue.⁴ It is perhaps, because life is dear to all.⁵ The Ācārāṅga says : “There art he whom

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1. Rayanavati, I. 8; Anekānta-jaya-patākā, I. 30, I. 17, I. 27.
 2. Huxley, Aldous : His Message to the Silver Jubilee Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, Calcutta, 1950.
 3. Vākpadīya of Bhartṛhari (Benaras Sanskrit Series), I. 124.
 4. Bṛhat-svayambhu-stotra of Samantabhadra, Verse 119.
 5. Daśavaikālika-sūtra, VI. 10; Ācārāṅga-sūtra, I. 2. 92-93 (Sabbesi Jibigam Piyam).

those intendest to kill.”¹ One’s soul is inviolable, so is that of others.² Mahāvīra believed in the spiritual equality of all beings and the supreme importance of life. Hence, any action out of our passional vibrations inflicting injury or death is abjured on all accounts. But what is negatively, abstaining from violence is positively love, sympathy and fellow-feeling.³ Negations and affirmations are complementary to each other. So what is negation of the evil is also the affirmation of the good. Hence, there are the *negative* and *positive* aspects of Ahimsā⁴. The Jaina philosophers have distinguished objective violence (Dravya-himsā) and subjective violence (Bhāva-himsā).⁵ The former is concerned with the *act*, the latter with the *agent*. Purely objective violence like the surg.on’s operation is not violence.⁶ Hence, the attitude of the soul, the bad motive and intention (Pramāda and Kaṣāya) constitute the true basis of violence and non-violence.⁷ Of course, the Jainas also take into account the external behaviour. But the emphasis is upon *intention*. If only material (Dravya) himsā is regarded as the touch-stone of Ahimsā, which we cannot remove in any form when we are living, individual salvation would

1. Ācārāṅga-sūtra, I. 5. 4-5.

2. Upāsakādhyāna, Kalpa 24, Śloka, 292; Padma-purāṇa, XIV. 186.

3. Maitrī, Pramoda, Kāruṇya and Mādhyastha, Yaśastilaka of Somadeva, pp. 334-337.

4. Sanghavi, S. : Pacificism and Jainism (Varanasi : J. C. R. S.), pp. 4-5; Pravacana-sāra of Kunda-kunda, III. 17.

5. Brahāt-kalki-bhāṣya, Verse 394-399, The Vitality (Prāṇa) are conscious (Bhāva) or material (Dravya). Himsā is injury to these vitalities.

6. Viśeṣavāśyaka-bhāṣya, Verse 1764.

7. Tattvartha-sūtra, VII. 13; Puruṣārtha-siddhyupāya, 43; Samāya-sāra of Kunda-kunda, Gāthā, 262.

become an impossibility.¹

Non-violence, however, is not only an individual affair. Individuality is a social affair because personality is a social product.² It is embedded in social adjustments and accommodation, reason and persuasion rather than force and fraud. True, the concept of *power* is as fundamental to politics as that of energy to physics, but what is needed is power without passions, exploitation, hatred and subjugation of the fellow beings. Hence, non-violence has a social content. Its application to the problems of social relations gives rise to the principles of truth (*Satya*). Ahimsā here assumes the forms of *anekānta*, which is perhaps the most persistent and rigorous quest of truth in a dispassionate manner. Similarly, the vows of non-possession (*Aparigraha*) and non-stealing (*Asteya*) taken together constitute the principle of non-violence in the economic field. If murder is violence, disproportionate possessions, vulgor show of wealth, corruptions, exploitation, adulteration etc. are violence, though veiled but more dangerous. Similarly, the principle of *brahmacharya* (Celibacy or self-control) is also nothing but a form of sexual ahimsā.⁴ There is also *social violence* which consists in the denial of equal, effective and maximum opportunity of self-realisation to all. In the international field, imperialism and colonialism, also constitute violence like war and armament. On the other hand, the doctrine of peaceful co-existence and move for disarmament are the application of the principle of non-violence in the international politics. In short, Ahimsā is in reality of the basic social ethics.⁵

1. Sāgara-dharmāmṛta of Āśādhara, IV. 23.

2. Subhāṣitavali, p. 463; Sāgara-dharmāmṛta, II. 22.

3. Prasad, Benoy : World Problems with Jaina Ethics (Varanasi, J. C. R. S., 1951), pp. 8-9.

4. Tatia, N. M. : "Ahimsā in Indian Culture", The Voice of Ahimsā, Vol. VIII, No. 9-10, Sept.-Oct., 1958, p. 337.

5. Amar, G. L. : "The Jaina Conception of Ahimsā", Marudhar Kesari Abhinandana Grantha (Jodhpur), p. 32.

Every set of institution requires a virtue, without which it loses organic vitality and becomes mechanical, ineffective and perverted. However, if non-violence is accepted as universal social morality, we can achieve a better society and a happier world. Therefore, Roman Rolland¹ said that the 'R̥ṣis' who discovered the law of non-violence in the midst of violence were greater geniuses than Newton, greater warriors than Wellington. Non-violence is the law of our species as violence is the law of the brute.

Ahiṃsā has become both a philosophy and a creed for Jainism. It is distinguished from the Buddhist² and the Brahmanical³ thinkers who would justify wars and even hunting etc. They believe in the purity of intention but they are not very particular about purity of behaviour. For the Jainas, the behaviour (external) must be as pure as intention⁴ (internal). Hence, the Jaina-āgamas classify hiṃsā into Saṅkalpaja and Ārambhaja. The former is committed with the sole intention of hiṃsā, the latter is committed unavoidably in the exercise of one's professions, duties, self-defence, etc. which may further be divided into Udyamis, Gṛharambhi and Virodhī.⁵ The householder can abstain from Saṅkalpaja Hiṃsā, but not from Ārambhaja although he tries his best to avoid it.⁶ The root cause of hiṃsā, however, is passion.

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1. Rolland R. : Mahātmā Gāndhī, p. 48 quoted by T. G. Kalghatgi, "The Jaina Doctrine of Ahiṃsā : A Critique", Tour of the Karnatak University (N. D.), p. 25.
 2. Aṭṭhaśālinī, p. 80.
 3. Manusmṛti, XV. 140-141.
 4. Tatia, N. M. : "The Jaina Ideal of Ahiṃsā", Seminar on Theory and Technique of Ahiṃsā, Delhi University, 1969, p. 6.
 5. Jaina, G. C. : "Jaināgama Main Ahiṃsā", unpublished article, p. 4.
 6. Pañcādhyaṃ of Royamalla, Śloka 813.


Therefore, the Jainas, indicate not only the transgressions (Aticāra)¹ of Ahimsā but also prescribe a number of ways and means for the preservation of Ahimsā, called bhāvanā² (contemplations), both negative and positive.

[V]

The trio of *mana*, *vacana* and *karma* which is brought in our discussion is to establish non-absolutism. Hence, it is a trio rather than a *trichotomy*. It is vicious intellectualism and the error of exclusive particularity to separate thought from speech or action or vice-versa. Ethical life is a whole an integration of the three aspects of personality, which are interdependent and supplementary to each other. But as I have been able to follow the Jaina spirit and scriptures, I am constrained to believe that the metaphysics of *anekānta* together with the logical dialectics of *naya*, *syādvāda*, *saptabhaṅgi*, *nikṣepa*, have been explored to establish the doctrine of Ahimsā on a solid logical and metaphysical foundation. However, the motivation for Mahāvīra to adopt Ahimsā is to be traced outside the realm of logic and metaphysics. It has to be find out in the long heritage of non-violence in the Indian culture and also in the character and conditions of Indian society during Mahāvīra. It seems that the Indian society at this stage was worst victim of violence. Ethics is situational. It cannot be indifferent to the needs of the time. Cruel sacrifices, meaningless rituals, unequal social order, growth of capitalist economy and political rivalries led to this great emphasis upon the philosophy of non-violence.

1. "The transgressions of non-violence are *bandhā*, *baddha*, *cheda*, *Atibhāra-ropana*, and *annapāna nirodha*", *Tattvārtha-sūtra* (*Bhāṣya*), VII. 3.
2. Negativity, they are *Vakgupti*, *Manogupti*, *Īryā*, *Ādāna-nikṣepāna-Samiti* and *Ālokitapāna-bhajana*; positively there are *Maitrī*, *Pramoda*, *Kāruṇya* and *Mādhyasthya*, *Ibid*, VII. 6.

This is very similar to our time, when there is strong opinion in favour of disarmament and world peace. It seems, non-violence is a necessity, even today. We have to choose between *Atom* and *Ahimsā*. William James, therefore, calls for a 'moral equivalent of war'. It is not only an intellectual utopia but a concrete moral guide and social stabiliser. The *all or the non-approach* has brought us on the brink of total annihilation and social anarchy, hence the non-absolutistic approach in thought, word and deed is the only way before us.



Chapter Fifteen

NON-ABSOLUTISM AND JAINA VIEW OF DARSANA

India has been the birth-land and play-ground of different types of philosophies, even the rustics and the illiterate talk about Brahman and Ātman, Māyā and Mokṣa, Anekānta and Ahimsā. Infact philosophy runs into the veins of Indian blood. Indian people not only talk but also live philosophy. Philosophy, Religion and Ethics are so close to the Indian life that they become inseparable parts of the personality of every Indian. Jainism, Buddhism or Vedānta are not arm-chair of philosophies but they are living creeds of the Indian people. Thus philosophy is not only the light-house but also the fountain of life for them. It is not only an enquiry into the meaning of reality but also into the meaning of life. Indeed, Indian philosophy is the philosophy of life.

However, in the technical sense, philosophy is used in three different senses in Indian thought, namely, vision, self-realisation and ratiocination. The first meaning, i. e., 'vision' is very crude although very close to the literal meaning of philosophy or Darśana (dṛś = to see). Here 'seeing' means 'sense-perception' or Pratyakṣa. The Cārvākas accept this view of darśana, because it holds that perception alone is the source of knowledge. In our ordinary usage, we glibly talk about vision of a pot (Ghaṭa-darśana) or vision of cloth (Paṭa-darśana). But I wonder, if we can accept such a crude view of philosophy, although we can not deny that the 'deeper-seeing' starts from the 'surface-seeing' of a perceptual 'pot' or a piece of 'cloth'. Even the Vedāntic example that the different forms of pot have their ground in the mother-earth, forms change but not reality.

The second sense in which philosophy is used is that of Knowledge of self (*Ātma-darśana*) or intuitive experience. The Upaniṣads and other systems recognise self as the ultimate reality and hence to know the self is to know the reality. Strangely enough, some of the Jaina mystics like Kunda-kunda, Pūjyapāda and Yogīndu accept this view of philosophy. For them knowledge of the self is the highest knowledge and self-realisation is the highest value of life. "One who knows the self, knows all." The gāthās of Kunda-kunda, Pūjyapāda and Yogīndu read like passages from the Upaniṣads and Vedānta. Kunda-kunda clearly says : "It is from the practical point of view only that the Omniscient Lord perceives and knows all; from the real point, the omniscient perceives and knows his soul only."¹ Yogīndu's words are also remarkable when he declares, "That Ātman is known, everything else is known, so Ātman should be realised."² Pūjyapāda distinguishes 'self-knowledge' from 'self-delusion'³ like the Upaniṣads and the Vedānta.⁴

The third meaning of philosophy is reason or ratiocination. The Nyāya is the champion of logic in Indian thought. Logic is regarded as the light of all knowledge, means of all practical behaviour and even sustainer of all virtues. Without logic, philosophy loses its lustre. Self-knowledge or Intuitive-knowledge is rare phenomenon. It can not be generalised. Hence for ordinary use of life, logic is a must in the field of thought and behaviour. In the absence of reasoning, ideas become idiosyncrasies. They become too personal and private. Even intuition is not against reason, though it may be beyond reason. Those who do not know reason are begots and fools and not men. Hence every system of Indian Philo-

1. Niyama-sāra, Gāthā 158.

2. Paramātma-prakāśa, I. 103.

3. Samādhi-tantra, Gāthā 20-22.

4. Brhadāraṇyak Upaniṣad, III. 7. 1; Vedānta-sāra, 171; Brahma-sūtra (S. B.), IV. 1. 3.

sophy accepts Nyāya or Logic as the necessary methodology of Philosophy. The importance of Logic is reflected in the fact that Logic or Nyāya is identified with one of the important systems of Indian Philosophy, attributed to Gotama. Hegel in the west had gone further and had identified not only logic with Philosophy but also with reality. This sort of paralogism is however not accepted by the Indian thinkers. Even Gotama regards reason as the means not the end. The technical Nyāya word for philosophy called 'Anvikṣa' means "investigation, since it consists in the reviewing (anuvikṣaṇa) of a thing previously apprehended by perception and verbal testimony."¹ Whatever is established is true. The purpose of the Nyāya is critical examination of the objects of knowledge by means of logical proof.² Every Science is a Nyāya, which means literally going into a subject. Hence, it is sometimes called Tarka-vidyā or Vāda-vidyā (science of debate and discussion). The Jains also have a long and rich tradition of their own logic beginning from the Āgamas.³ Samantabhadra and Siddhasena, Akalaṅka and Hemacandra, Maṇikyananda and Vidyānanda, Abhayadeva, Devendra Sūri, Vadirāja, Dharmabhūṣaṇa, Anantavīrya, Yaśovijaya are some of the most important logicians of the Jaina tradition. It means that logic and life go together. Neither logic is unconnected with life nor life is averse to logic.

However, there are two additional senses in which Philosophy is used in Jainism, which are peculiar to its own. In one of these senses, philosophy stands for faith (Śraddhā) of which we find mention in the second verse of Tattvārtha-sūtra (I. 2.). Infact, here we get the definition of Samyak-darśana which means conviction in the knowledge of things ascertained as they are. *Tattva* means 'thatness' and *Artha* is that which is ascertained, hence tattvārtha means ascertainment of 'that-

1. Nyāya-bhāṣya, I. 1. 1.

2. Ibid.

3. Śaṭ-khaṇḍāgama, V. 5. 51; Sthānāṅga-sūtra, pp. 309-310.

ness' or 'tattva'. Tattvārtha Śraddhaṇam is Samyak-darśanam. This is the first of the trio of the Right Belief, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct, together which constitute the path to liberation. Faith is the precursor to knowledge. The Gītā also says that he who has faith attains wisdom or knowledge.¹ Faith is not blind belief, but it is the psychological condition of knowledge. Not only knowledge, faith is necessary even for attaining the highest degree of Yoga², and the worlds of righteousness.³ Even sacrifice becomes void which is empty of faith.⁴ Man is of the nature of his faith, what his faith is, that verily, he is.⁵ Right belief is the basis on which Right knowledge depends, hence we find the serial order in the sūtra which mentions first the right belief and only second Right knowledge. Right belief or Samyag-darśana is either with attachment (Sarāga) or without attachment (Vītarāga). The first is characterised by calmness (Praśam), fear of mundane existence (Samvega), Compassion for all living beings (Anukampā) and belief in the existence of things according to tattvārtha. The second type of samyak-darśana consists in the belief in the purity of soul without attachment which can be attained either by intuition (Nisarga) or by tuition (Adhigama) — either by percepts or scriptures. Matter, place, time and five attainments are the external aids and subsidence of Karma (Upaśama), Destructor of subsidence (Kṣāyopaśama) of Karmas are the internal aids to samyak-darśana.

However, there is one lacuna in the concept of Right belief as to what is 'thatness'. Every system of philosophy has its own object of knowledge. Then, right belief will differ from System to system. But it does not matter. The supreme lord

1. Śrīmadbhagavadgītā, IV. 39.

2. Ibid, IV. 47.

3. Ibid, XVIII. 71.

4. Ibid, XVII. 13.

5. Ibid, XVII. 3.

as the Gītā says, confirms the faith of each and grants the reward each seeks. Every surface derives its soil from the depths even as every shadow reflects the nature of the substance. No matter what we rever so long as our reverence is serious, it helps its progress, which is required is serious and sincere faith.

The second special sense of darśana in Jainism is understood in the sense of the knowledge of the generality (Sāmānya-bodha) or Indeterminate knowledge (Ālocanā). This is also called formless consciousness or indeterminate knowledge (Anākāra Upayoga). That knowledge which is gained without probandum (Liṅga) is darśana, which takes the help of probandum is Jñāna. The former is restricted to the immediate present, where as which is spread over the past, present and future in the indeterminate intuition is the cognition of an object which leaves the specific determinations out of account and it takes place immediately on that very sense-object contact. The indeterminate intuition transforms into determinate perception. A cognition which fails to take note of specific characteristics is called *indecision*¹, because it falls short of certitude delivering itself in the form 'what may it be'. Where there is lack of decision or certitude, there can not be valid knowledge. Although, there is some similarity between Jaina 'darśana' and Buddhistic 'Nirvikalpa Jñāna', but the latter cannot be called 'Pramāṇa' as there is indecision. But 'darśana' as Hemacandra holds is not sensation (Ava-graha). That perception of the generalism (Sāmānya) of things without particulars (Viśeṣa) in which there is no grasping of details is called 'darśana'.²

Darśana whether is visual (Cakṣuḥ) or non-visual or clairvoyant (Avadhi), it is merely 'darśana'. It is neither right belief nor wrong belief. The logical tradition of the Jainas include darśana from the category of Pramāṇa and scholars

1. Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, I. 1. 6.

2. Dravya-saṅgraha, 43.

like Māṇikyanandī and Vādideva Sūri treat it as semblance of Pramāṇa¹ (Pramābhāsa). Abhayadeva in his commentary on Sammatī-tarka, no doubt regard 'darśana' as 'Pramāṇa' but it is not in the logical sense but in the scriptural sense where darśana is regarded as Samyak-darśana. Yaśovijaya in his Trakabhāṣā (p. 5) treats darśana as determinate perception and hence falls in the category of Pramāṇa, on the other hand excludes darśana from the category of Pramāṇa.² Hemacandra also treat it as non-pramāṇa.

We have seen that the term 'darśana' has been used in different senses in the Jaina Philosophy. However, even if we accept the most commonly accepted meaning of 'darśana' as direct knowledge of reality, it ceases to be universal in the true senses of the term as every system has its own conception of reality. Hence, there will be as many 'darśanas' as system of thought. This leads us to posit alternative standpoints in philosophy. This is Anekānta, which is the soul of Jaina thought and culture.



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1. Parikṣā-mukham, VI. 2; Pramāṇa-naya-tattvaloka, VI. 24-25.
 2. Tarkabhāṣā, p. 1.

Chapter Sixteen

RELEVANCE OF ANEKĀNTA IN MODERN TIMES

Modern times is an era of crisis in the realm of human civilization. The reason is that we give so much attention to short-range and local problems that long-range and global problems continue to be neglected. Secondly, life has become more intricately interdependent and complex. So simpler solutions no longer suffice. A world civilization is fast emerging and we cannot afford to solve our problems with a parochial temper and sectarian outlook. For human survival, we need human cooperation on a plenary scale able to deal with rapidly increasing complexities. The critical problems are so complex that we need a philosophy equally complex to grapple with them. One dimensional man in a multi-dimensional world-crisis will be out of joint. Inter-existence is the positive option for mankind. Either there is organic growth of mankind or there is organic destruction of human civilization. Not only this it is too late in history to convert all of mankind to Christianity or Islam or Jainism (or to Communism or Capitalism or any other isms), but also to some metaphysical principles which we have been cherishing since antiquity. The growth of scientific knowledge and outlook has destroyed most of our false dogmas and superstitions but it has failed to provide us knowledge that could sublimate our animal and selfish nature. Animality has been dominating our individual as well as social behaviour. Hence, our life has become full of tensions, turmoils and disorders. Therefore, although we are outwardly pleading for world-peace and non-violence, yet we have been preparing for war. This is the crisis of modern time that we aspire for peace but prepare for the formidable funeral procession of mankind.

Humanity is tottering today upon the brink of self-annihilation for lack of understanding, which includes understanding ourselves and understanding each other. It is a time of tragic importance for the world because even before the shadows cast by one war is lifted fully, the skies become overcast with dark threatening clouds. Hence, at no period of human history man was in need of sound philosophy than today. As war begins in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defence of peace should be built. Today, if one person does not agree with me, he is wicked, if a country does not agree with my country, it is wicked as if there is no half-way, no neutrality. So ultimately it is our warring ideologies that are at the root of world-tension. But ideologies or philosophies depend upon our-way of philosophizing. Hence Locke rightly felt that epistemological problems are prior to all others. An epistemological reorientation will influence metaphysical grounding which in turn will determine our socio-ethico-political views. Any solution can ultimately be achieved through knowledge free from confusion and prejudices.

Since things have many characters, they are the objects of all sided knowledge. The knowledge which determines the full meaning of an object through the employment of onesided knowledge, is partial knowledge. Hence we should discard all absolute judgements, otherwise truth would be violated. Reality has got innumerable characteristics. A valid knowledge is defined as that which gives us knowledge of a thing in its various aspects. All expressions are somehow real. All objects have got innumerable characters, hence all things are multi-dimensional or Anekāntic.

The world is the store-house of great chaos in thought. All the confusion of thought which is prevailing in the world is the outcome of inexhaustive research and acceptance of a part for the whole. Almost all our disputes only betray the pig-headedness of the blind men who spoke differently about an elephant. The outstanding personalities like Sri Aurobindo,

Raman Maharshi etc. spoke to us, in a world over organised by ideological fanaticism, that truth is not exclusive or sectarian. Every idol however noble it may seem is ultimately a Moloch that devours its worshippers. It is fatal to treat the relative and the home-made as though it were the Absolute. It is only intellectual clarity which will resolve all conflict and rivalry. All dogmatism owes its genesis to the partiality of outlook and fondness for a line of thinking to which a person has accustomed himself. This is imperialism and aggressiveness in thought. When the one party or another thinks himself the sole possessor of absolute truth, it becomes natural that he should think his neighbours absolutely in the clutches of Error or the Devil. Today, one man or one country fight with the other because their views vary. Views are bound to vary because we are guided by different conditions, thought and attitudes. Hence, it is wrong to think oneself right and rest others wrong. Here Syādvāda-Anekāntavāda represents the highest form of Catholicism coupled wonderfully with extreme conservatism, a most genuine and yet highly dignified compromise better than which we cannot imagine.

We must realise that there is other's view-point as our own. This can happen when one puts oneself into another's shoes or to get under the skin of others. This is called sympathy which is the act of reproducing in our minds the feelings of another. Gandhiji once told : "I advise a man not from my standpoint but from his. I try to put myself in his shoes. When I cannot do so. I refuse to advise." He once said : "I am myself a Puritan but for others a Catholic."

Syādvāda or Anekāntavāda is adoption of the safe and secure middle-path leaving the two extremes. It means that virtue has many facets. There is place for the penance of a saint, chastity of a woman, innocence of a child, bravery of a hero etc. As a lover of nature, one can equally enjoy the rains of rainy season, coolness of winter and heat

of summer. Similarly, life is not one straight road. There are two many complexities in it. It is not like a train which once started keeps running. The real is a variable constant. It is being and non-being, unity and plurality, the universal and the particular rolled into one. A thing is neither an absolute unity nor split into an irreconcilable plurality. It is both unity and plurality all the time. There is no opposition between unity of being and plurality of aspects. Similarly, things are neither exclusively particulars, nor are they exclusively universals, but they are a concrete realisation of both. The two elements can be distinguished by reflective thought, but cannot be rent asunder. A real is neither a particular nor universal in an exclusive manner, but a synthesis which is different from both severally and jointly though embracing them in its fold. A real is *sui generis*.

Although Syādvāda-Anekantavāda is not a complete logic, it does involve a basic principle that seems to be essential to the kinds of philosophy needed to account for, and to deal with, the complexities of our emerging world civilization. The two-valued logic developed presupposes the principle of excluded middle as most basic — X is either A or non-A but not both (because A and non-A are contradictions). The dynamic, dialectical, organic unities inherent in the increasingly intricate interdependent organisations constituting our emerging world require a more dynamic, dialectical organic logic than is presently available. Despite the fact that the two-valued logic has immense practical values when used judiciously, it is still not adequate to account for all of the vital developments in human society.

It is so difficult to say objectively anything fundamental about today's civilization or modern man because "all of us are caught in the same prejudices." Only a man who is 'wholly of the present' can say something important about the present-day world, and only he who has the 'most intensive and extensive consciousness' of himself and his situation can hope to be such a man. What is required is 'essential

thinking' (Heidegger) or 'total seeing' (J. Kṛṣṇamūrti) by competent persons for apprehending the problems and predicaments of contemporary civilization and for granting an inkling of their possible solutions. Karl Jaspers also talks of 'luminous encompassive thinking', through which contemporary political consciousness must be transformed and a new kind of politics adequate to the threat of atomic doom should be created. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan while speaking on the future of civilization (*Kalki, The Future of Civilization*, first published, 1929) held that to avert periodic crisis of civilization, what is required is religious idealism and "cooperation and not identification, accommodation to fellowmen and not imitation of them and toleration and not absolutism." Thus if we want to save our civilization from *atomic annihilation*, we have to encourage Anekānta culture. However, Anekānta philosophy of life should not be confused with contradictionism, indeterminism, scepticism or solipsism. When we look to the particular merits of each side, there is no contradiction. Application of existence and non-existence to the same thing is contradiction but when existence and non-existence are asserted from different standpoints, it is not contradiction. Even the Upaniṣads, we have the glimpses of how the reality reveals itself in different ways at different stages of knowledge. Hence Anekānta attitude should not be equated with subjective relativism of the Sophists. It is 'objective relativism' or 'relative absolutism' like Whitehead, Bodin etc. However, there is no similarity with Einstein's theory of relativity. To some extent, we may find its parallel in old Pyrrhonianism in the West. But while Pyrrhonianism relapses into agnosticism or scepticism, there is no room for scepticism whatsoever in Jaina theory of Syādvāda or Anekāntavāda. Scepticism, means in the minimum, absence of assertion, whereas Syādvādin always *assert*, though what they assert are alternatives. Disjunctive judgement is still judgement. Each disjunction is alternatively valid. Either there is no self-complete Reality or any such reality is wholly infinite, a mere

demand that refuses to be actualised. The only scepticism is that there is concerning the so-called self-complete reality. So where as a sceptic is sceptical about any character of reality, Syādvāda is quite definitely assertive. Yet he is more sceptical than any sceptic in the world so far as the definiteness of the ultimate reality is concerned. He would go beyond *avaktavya* or *Sūnya* so far the Advaitins and *Sūnyavādins* are concerned with regard to their statements regarding ultimate reality.

Hence, Anekanta stands against all mental absolutism. We can substantiate this relativistic standpoint on the cosmo-micro-physical ground supported by Einstienian doctrine of relativity and Maxwell's equation of electre-magnetism which go fundamentally against the notion of absolute truth. When we say, we know this, we are saying more than is strictly correct, because all we know is what happens when the waves reach our bodies. Researches in Psychology of thinking, perception of self and conception of self in Child-psychology and Psycho-analytical studies in Freudian narcissism or Adlerian power-factor support relativism. From socio-cultural standpoint, the doctrine of relativism is justified for no smooth functioning of society is possible without mutual accomodation and adjustment which presupposes Catholicism in thought and sense of tolerance. In ethics and morality, we know so far relativism is dominating. In the field of logic, the doctrine of the universe of Discourse is sometimes limited to a small portion of actual universe of things and is sometimes co-extensive with that Universe. The Universe of Discourse controls the interpretation of every word. Logic of Relatives too recognises the truth of Syādvāda-Anekāntavāda when it discusses all relations embodied in propositions.

Much of the confusion either of Buddhism or Advaita Vedānta is due to false exaggeration of the relative principles of *becoming* and *being* into absolute truths. Same is the fault with Parmenidian *Being* and Heraclitan *Flux*. These may be called the variety of philosophical doctrines.

Hence Anekānta doctrine is the exposition of the principle of 'comprehensive perspectivism'. No perspective is final or absolute unless it is understood in terms of relativity. Therefore, even Anekānta (non-absolutism) is subject to Anekānta (non-absolutism). If non-absolutism is absolute, it is not universal since there is one real which is absolute. And if it is not a non-absolute, it is not an absolute and universal fact. Tossed between the two horns of the dilemma, non-absolutism thus simply evaporates. But we can meet this difficulty by making a distinction between the *theory* and *practice* of anekānta. Every proposition of the dialectical seven-fold judgement is either complete or incomplete. In the former, we use only one word that describes one characteristics of that object and hold the remaining characters to be identical with it. On the other hand, in the Incomplete judgement, we speak of truth as relative to our standpoint. In short, the complete judgement is the object of valid knowledge (Pramāṇa) and the Incomplete Judgement is the object of aspectal knowledge (*Naya*). Hence the [non-absolute is constituted of the absolute as its elements and as such would not be possible if there were no absolutes.

Here we can solve this difficulty by analysing the nature of unconditionality of the statement 'All statements are conditional', which is quite different from the normal meaning of unconditionality. This is like the idea contained in the passage — 'I do not know myself', where there is no contradiction between 'knowledge' and 'ignorance'. In the sentence, 'I am undecided', there is at least one decision that 'I am undecided'. Similarly, the categoricity behind a disjunctive judgement (A man is either good or bad), is not like the categoricity of an ordinary categorical judgement like 'The horse is red'. True the basis is always categorical but this categoricity does never clash with the proposition being disjunctive. When a logical positivist says that 'there is no metaphysics', philosophy enters through the back-door. In short, the unconditionality in the statement 'All statements

are conditional' is quite different from the normal conditionality. There are primarily two sources to understand the world — *senses* and *reason*, closely connected with two grades of reality — *existence* and *essence* (Existentialism) or *existence* and *reality* (Hegel). Existence is actuality or actual verification, which is unconditional, absolute and categorical. There is no alternation or condition. But on the level of *thought* or *reason* or *essence*, there may be alternatives. But we cannot live in the world of thought alone and forget *existence*. We must also have something other than thought or reason which is *unreason* or irrationality. Behind reason, there is always the *unreason*, which we can give the name of *faith* (as suggested by Kant, Herder, Jacobi etc.). There are many grounds of faith — one being the Scripture. Scripture differs from one another. Jainas must stick to their position. Here is definiteness. However, we cannot expect such definiteness with reason because it only offers alternative pictures — Jaina, Advaita, Vaiśeṣikas. All are equally possible. In order to avoid indefiniteness we stick to one such possibility which is chosen for us by the community to which we belong or by some superior intuition. Thus there comes unconditionality. However, another may choose another possibility as existence if he belongs to another community or if his genius moves into another direction. So there appears to be again alternation among existence. But this alternation only on thought level. We compare thought with other thoughts. And what is comparison ? Comparison involves thinking and reasoning, so it is thought-process. Some are bound to admit alternation. My standpoint is only a possible one. But I cannot always fly in the air of possibilities, I must have moorings in some actuality. I must adopt one standpoint.

Jainism is against all kinds of imperialism in thought. For each community there is a special absolute. But the absolute themselves are alternatives so far as they are probables. But this is only on thought level. But when I have chosen one it is more than possible, it is existence or actual. So

there is wonderful reconciliation between conditionality and unconditionality. Every thing is conditional on thought level, but on the level of existence there is no real contradiction.

To avoid the fallacy of infinite regress, the Jainas distinguish between valid non-absolutism (Samyak Anekānta) and invalid non-absolutism (Mithyā Anekānta). Like an invalid absolute judgement, an invalid non-absolute judgement, too, is invalid. To be valid, Anekānta must not be absolute but relative.

If we consider the above points, we cannot say that the “theory of relativity cannot be logically sustained without the hypothesis of an absolute.” Thought is not mere distinction but also relation. Everything is possible only in relation to and as distinct from others and the Law of Identity. Under these circumstances, it is not legitimate to hold that the hypothesis of an absolute cannot be sustained without the hypothesis of a relative. Absolute to be absolute presupposes a relative somewhere and in some forms, even the relative of its non-existence.

Jaina logic of Anekānta is based not on abstract intellectualism but on experience and realism leading to a non-absolutistic attitude of mind. Multiplicity and unity, definability and non-definability etc. which apparently seem to be contradictory characteristics of reality are interpreted to co-exist in the same object from different points of view without any offence to logic. They seem to be contradictory of each other simply because one of them is mistaken to be the whole truth. Infact, integrity of truth consists in this very variety of its aspects, within the rational unity of an all comprehensive and ramifying principle. The charge of contradiction against the co-presence of being and non-being in the real is a figment of a priori logic.



Chapter Seventeen

SYĀDVĀDA : A SOLUTION OF WORLD-TENSION

Expository : Syāt (somehow) Syādvāda is (an epistemological) solution of World-tension.

Analysis :

(a) Syādvāda¹ — The Jaina theory of Judgement and truth as relative.

(b) World-tension — “Present international tensions among nations.

(c) Epistemological Solution — Solution emanating from the standpoint of knowledge.

Synthesis : Syādvāda along with its complementary doctrines of Anekāntavāda and Nayavāda, when applied to the phenomena of international tension, might result in perpetual peace.

World-tensions

By world-tension, we mean presence of international conflicts, hot and cold wars, so-called Peace and Defence treaties etc. But international conflicts are often the result of internal conflicts.² Internal conflicts and contradictions often lead to external and international aggressions and wars.³ Hence

1. (a) ‘Every proposition is true but only under certain condition’ — S. Radhakrishnan, History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1, p. 302.
(b) ‘स्यात् प्रधानो वा स्याद्वादः’ — Chāinsukha Das, Jaina Darśana-sāra.
2. Azad, A. K. : Inaugural Address at Seminar to discuss the contribution of Gandhian outlook and technique to the solution of tensions (5-1-1953).
3. Kriplani, J. B. : “Gandhian way Towards Peace”, — Seminar-above.

world tension includes “tensions within and among nations.”¹ It is no use denying the great dangers that threaten our present generation.² The riven atom, uncontrolled, can only be a growing menace to us all.³ One atom bomb killed more than seventy thousand people, but now it is not a question of one or two or even hundred but of hundreds of millions of them. Prof. Yusuki Tsurumi says in agony — “Japan’s mind is disturbed profoundly. We face war — how can we avert it ?”⁴ Therefore while inaugurating Silver Jubilee Session of Indian Philosophical Congress Dr. K. N. Katju fears that the story of Mahābhārata it seems is being re-enacted all over again. In the conclusion of that war there was neither the victim to lament his defeat nor the victor to celebrate the victory.⁵ Referring to Korea he observed, their towns and villages, their land and dwellings are being trampled under foot and destroyed over and over again by invading troops and retreating troops and human life there seems to have lost all sanctity.⁶ So that the war of liberation has been turned into a war of annihilation. Surely this is completely a new version of liberation.⁷ Though the third-war might mean virtual end of all that western civilization stands for, yet there is inspite of all this an imminent danger of

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1. “Solution of tensions within and among nations” — Indian National Commission for cooperation with Unesco decides this as the main topic of discussion.
 2. Prof. Tucci : My Approach to Gandhi — referred above.
 3. Robert Oppenheimer, Ex-chairman, Advisory Atomic Council — under Article, ‘Atomic Weapons and American Policy’, quoted in *Foreign Affairs*, July 1953.
 4. Prof. Tsurumi, Japanese delegate to the Gandhian seminar, vide his paper to the Seminar.
 5. Dr. K. N. Katju : Inaugural Address to Silver Jubilee Session of Indian Philosophical Congress.
 6. Dr. K. N. Katju : Ibid.
 7. Dr. K. N. Katju : Ibid.

war.¹ The result is the mounting suspicion and rivalry between the two power blocks, feverish rearmament and cold war, alternating with tipid war.² In spite of recent peace moves this is no gain saying the fact that the world is sharply divided into two opposing camps³ and there is an array of peace (war), defence (offence) treatises like NATO'S⁴ MEDO'S⁵ and many more yet to come out. The development of the international organisations in last fifty year recognises that disputes which arise concern many states, and that they need to be settled.⁶ So we are practically in a world bewildered by the turmoil of nationalism and war.⁷ The whole world is in the ferment.

Need of a Solution

Humanity is tottering today upon the brink of the principle of self-annihilation for the lack of proper understanding⁸ which includes understanding ourselves, understanding each other.⁹ It is a time of tragic importance for the world, because even before the shadows cast by the war lifted fully, the skies have become overcast with dark threatening clouds.¹⁰ Hence, at no period of human history man was in need of a sound

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1. R. N. Kaul : Social Philosophy, 'Socialist Democracy'.
 2. E. Ashirvatham : 'Is Peace Possible' ? Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. XIV, No. 2, April 1952.
 3. E. Ashirvatham : Ibid.
 4. NATO : North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
 5. MEDO : Middle Eastern Defence Organisation.
 6. James N. Hyde : Article "U. N. and the Peaceful Adjustment", in Proceeding of Academy of Political Science, Vol. XXV, Jan. 1953, United Nations; Success or Failure.
 7. E. H. Carr : Nationalism and After, p. 70.
 8. Paul Arther Schillip : Article "On Human Understanding", Silver Jubilee Number, Vol. 2, p. 107.
 9. Paul Arther Schillip : Ibid.
 10. Raj-pramukh of Mysore : Message to the Jubilee Session.

Philosophy than today.¹ As war begins in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defence of peace should be built.² Today if a person does not agree with you he is wicked, if a country does not agree with your country it is wicked; there is no half-way³, hence there is no neutrality.⁴ Unesco, realising the need of a solution is however keen.⁵

Solutions there are and are of many types — political including diplomatic, economic, religious etc. Broadly there are two approaches towards world peace —

(a) Religico-Spirituo Mystical Approach.

(b) Politico-Economico-Positivistic Approach.

Religico-Spirituo Mystical View — The upholders of the religico-spirituo-mystical view hold that without is within.⁶ We cannot banish war while we are perpetuating war within us. The tremendous amount of hatred and injustice within us accumulated in a national form leads to war.⁷ Hence the best solution of world-tension is to control the animal within us.⁸ Here the dictum is “Reform yourself and the world will be reformed.”⁹ Some of the mystics, however, depend upon God’s goodness.

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1. Srimati Hansa Mehta : Message to the Jubilee Session.
 2. Dr. Alva Myrdal : Quotation from Unesco’s constitution.
 3. Pt. J. L. Nehru : Inaugural Address of Gandhian Seminar (5-1-1953).
 4. Memorandum on the Signature of His Majesty’s Government in the U. K. of the Optional clause cmd — 3452, p. 10, Quoted from “Conditions of Peace” by E. H. Carr, p. 51.
 5. Dr. Alva Myrdal : Her Speech on ‘There can be no Neutrals’, Seminar (5-1-1953).
 6. Idealistic thesis.
 7. J. C. Kumarappa : “A Non-violent Way of Life”, Article in Gandhian Seminar.
 8. J. C. Kumarappa : *Ibid.*
 9. J. B. Kriplani : Gandhian Way Towards Peace, Seminar.

Political Solution — Professional politicians often indulge in diplomatic double talk which breeds pessimism and cynicism on the part of the people and makes peace a mere will-o-the wisp.¹ Some very irresponsible politicians talk of 'preventive war'² as a solution of world-tension, for they think offence may be the best form of defence.³ From United Nations we cannot have any hope. Vyshinsky charges that "U.S.A. has stolen the sign-board of U. N."⁴ and also Turner confirms that the "U. N. is really dead as a peace and security maintaining organization."⁵ Commenting upon the prospects for Berlin Meeting the Eastern Economist doubts "whether the meeting will prove another episode in the cold war or a real ground of understanding."⁶ Similarly the same Journal had declared that "Conference at Bermuda will hold out no new hopes for the world."⁷

Hence political solution is practically no solution, for present day politics is not a politics of peace and brotherhood but of falsity and fraud, deceit and dishonesty. We cannot adopt politics as a profession and remain honest.⁸ So said Adolf Hitler that if you wish the sympathies of broad masses,

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1. E. Ashirvatham : 'Is Peace Possible' ? Article in Political Science Journal.
 2. Macarthy and Co. in the U. S. A. Senate.
 3. Mathew, Secretary Navy of U. S. A. under Truman. Indian Political Science Journal, July 1953.
 4. Vyshinsky, Soviet Delegate to the United Nations General Assembly.
 5. A. C. Turner : Review of Atlantic Alliance "Bulwark of the West : Implications and Problems of NATO.", *International Affairs*, Vol. XXIX, No. 4, Oct. 1953.
 6. Eastern Economist, Article "Prospects for Berlin Meeting", Jan. 1954.
 7. Eastern Economist, Article "Conference At Bermuda", Nov. 20, 1953.
 8. Lowis Mettenry Howe, Address, Jan. 17, 1933.

then you must tell the crudest and most stupid things.¹ Hence any politico-diplomatic talks of either big four or five for peace will prove a mere moonshine for diplomatic talks are talks of interest and convince.

Economic Solution — But political evils are to a large extent supposed to be eliminated through democracy which has no place for autocratic whims for waging war. But if we are working upto a democracy in politics we must have a democracy in Economics.² Most serious of the problems which claimed their attention were not political or territorial but financial and economic and that the perils of the future lay not in frontiers and in sovereignties but in food, coal and transport.³ Political rights too have failed to provide a key to the millennium.⁴ So political democracy if it is to survive must be interpreted in economic terms.⁵ So long as there are tigers in society there will be wars.⁶ Permanent peace cannot come from the endless see-saw, but only from the elimination of the causes of enmity between nations. And in the present day these causes are mainly to be found in economic interest of certain sections and are therefore only to be abolished by a fundamental reconstruction⁷, of course not of the type of U. N. R. R. A., W. M. B., I. B. R. D., I. T. A., E. R. P. and their counterparts.⁸

This fatal neglect of the economic factor by the peace-maker of 1919 was the main theme of Mr. Keynes's famous

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1. Adolf Hitler : Mein Campf.
 2. J. C. Kumarappa : Gandhian way.
 3. J. M. Keynes : Economic Consequence of Peace, p. 134.
 4. R. N. Kaul : Social Philosophy, 'Socialist Democracy'.
 5. E. H. Carr : Conditions for Peace.
 6. J. C. Kumarappa : Gandhian way.
 7. B. Russell : In Praise of Idleness, p. 101.
 8. I mean the Soviet Economic pact with Eastern democracies etc.

book 'The Economic Consequence of the Peace'.¹ Individual profit which in the 18th and 19th centuries provided the motive force of the economic system, has failed us and we have not discovered any moral for it rather than war.² Mr. Keynes adds "Pyramid-building, earthquakes even wars may serve to increase wealth."³ During great U. S. economic crisis Governor Lafolette however charged those who had squandered 40,000,000,000 dollar of American money in the most wasteful and futile war of modern history and were not prepared to vote money for public works to relieve distress.⁴ The Economic Digest confirms this waste today, when it published that U. S. spends 16 million dollars a month on U. S. forces in U. K.⁵

So somehow people think that if economies be reconstructed it can bring peace. So economies means political economies and political philosophy. And with this comes the perenial conflict of political ideologies. The free-world must adhere to Marshall and Keynes and the Keynesian Revolution, while the Reds find salvation in no other economic structure other than the Marxian, because the Capital is not a personal, it is a social power.⁶ So again, ultimately it is our warring ideologies that are at the root of world tension. So whether we philosophize or we won't, we are to be philosophized.⁷

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1. J. M. Keynes : Economic Consequence of Peace.
 2. E. H. Carr : Conditions for Peace, p. 101.
 3. J. M. Keynes : The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, p. 129.
 4. D. W. Brogan : The American Political System, p. 132.
 5. Economic Digest : Artical "Spending by U. S. Forces in Britain," May, 1953.
 6. Mark Engles : Communist Manifesto, Vol. 1, p. 45.
 7. Aristotle : Quoted from "Introduction to Philosophy" by G. W. Patrick, p. 49.

Transition to Epistemological Solution

But we must philosophize only in a particular way as there are many methods of philosophy. Much of our philosophy depends upon our way of philosophizing. Empiricism leads to scepticism¹, whether of Locke or of the Cārvākas. Similarly, dogmatism, rationalism, intuitionism, authoritarianism, mysticism etc. have their own consequences. This branch of philosophy has very lately been accorded an independent place and the term Epistemology has been used firstly by Ferrier², although we can not forget Locke who first reminded us to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understanding were or were not fitted to deal with.³ In short, Locke felt that the epistemological problems are former to all others.⁴ After all any quest for reality presupposes (path of⁵) knowledge. In any survey of the history of philosophy we come across with the treatment of knowledge.⁶ Cunningham calls it to be the problem of intellectual enterprise.⁷ But problems of knowledge pre-supposes the methods of acquiring Knowledge. Otherwise one may ask, "If it is the business of Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason to show how mathematics is possible, whose business is to show how the critique of pure reason is possible⁸ ? To maintain that our knowledge is true, we must prove that it is really so. Thus the validity of knowledge is made to rest on the validity of the methods of

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1. S. C. Chatterji : Problems of Philosophy, p. 32.
 2. Ferrier : Institutes of Metaphysics (1884), Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 13/448.
 3. Locke : 'Epistime to the Reader', "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding".
 4. Patrick : Introduction to Philosophy, p. 326.
 5. L. T. Hobhouse : Theory of Knowledge.
 6. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 13/448.
 7. Cunningham : Problems of Philosophy, Chap. VI-VIII.
 8. The New Realism, p. 61 quoted from Nyaya Theory of Knowledge.

knowledge.¹ Doctrines of the Pramāṇas, ranging from one (Cārvāka) to eight², I am sure, determine to a great extent the nature of philosophy. So an epistemological reorientation will influence metaphysical grounding, which in turn will determine our socio-ethico-political views.³

Great logical inter-relations among all social and sociological studies prove that one follows as the *reductio-ad-absurdum* from the other. Thus we see that any solution can ultimately be achieved through knowledge free from confusion and prejudices.⁴ Each addition to knowledge is in sober truth one step further to the goal of all effort, the right understanding of the whole of things as they are in their inmost nature.⁵ But the main difficulty is to blend the divergent current of thought and in particular the methods of philosophy and science.⁶

With this end in view we put before you an old wine in a new bottle—The relative.⁷ Jaina Theory of Judgement namely Syādvāda as it expresses one aspect of reality. Syādvāda is composed of two words—Syāt⁸ and vāda.⁹ Syāt may mean perhaps¹⁰, some how¹¹, may be¹², in some respect¹³

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1. S. C. Chatterjee : Problems of Philosophy, p. 3.
 2. Dr. Kuppaswāmī Śāstrī : A Primer of Indian Logic, p. 40.
 3. L. T. Hobhouse : Theory of Knowledge.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Ibid.
 6. Ibid.
 7. D. M. Datta : Indian Philosophy, p. 90.
 8. 'स्यात्प्रधानो वादः स्याद्वादः', Jaina Darśana Sāra by Chāinsukha Das, p. 456.
 9. वाद सिद्धान्त, Ibid.
 10. S. Radhakrishnan : History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 302.
 11. Ibid; D. M. Datta : Indian Philosophy, p. 90.
 12. D. M. Datta : Ibid, p. 90.
 13. Ibid, p. 92.

etc. So Syādvāda with certain reservations¹ may be translated into Probablism.²

Syādvāda must be understood along with its metaphysical counterpart of Anekāntavāda and other complementary theorem of Nayavāda, Nikṣepavāda and Saptabhaṅgī which form a formidable part of Jaina philosophy, which was systematised in the second period of the evolution of Jaina Literature, namely Anekānta Yuga.³

Theory of Syādvāda

Definition : In the earliest Jaina work on pure logic by Siddhasena Divākara, the author holds “since things have many characters, they are the object of all sided knowledge.”⁴ The knowledge which determines the full meaning of an object through the employment in the scriptural method, of one sided Nayas, is called Syādvāda Śruta.⁵ Similarly Samantabhadra says that “Syādvāda discards all absolute-judgements.”⁶ Even sermonic sentences of Lord Mahāvīra had always a prefix of ‘Syāt’ for otherwise truth would have been violated.⁷ Scriptural knowledge is of three kinds—Scriptures of bad Tirthankars⁸, one sided method⁹ and all sided

1. Apart from suggestion of Scepticism.

2. Dr. N. K. Deoraj : History of Indian Philosophy (Hindi), p. 135.

3. Dalsukha Malvania — Essay ‘Jaina Dṛṣṭāna Sahitya Kā Simhavalokana, in Premi Abhinandan Grantha.

4. “अनेकान्तात्मकं वस्तुगोचरः सर्वं संविदाम्” न्यायावतार, श्लोक २९ (Trans. by S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa).

5. “सम्पूर्णार्थं विनिश्चयिष्याद्वाद्वाद् श्रुतमुच्यते”, bIid, Śloka, 30.

6. “स्याद्वादः सर्वथैकान्तत्यागात् किंवृत्ति चिद्विधिः-आप्तमीमांसा”, Quo-
ted from Premi Abhinandan Granth in स्याद्वाद और सप्त-
भङ्गी, लेखक : कैलाशचन्द्र सिद्धान्तशास्त्री ।

7. “स्याद्वाद केवलज्ञाने वस्तुतत्त्वप्रकाशने-आप्तमीमांसा”, Ibid.

8. न्यायावतार, श्लोक ३०; नयकर्णिका, विनय महाराज (Trans. M. D. Desai), Introduction.

9. “विकला देशोनय वाक्यम्”, श्लोकवार्तिक, पृ० १८१ ।

knowledge.¹ So Syādvāda holds that the knowledge of reality has got innumerable characteristics.² The reality is not simply Sat, nor simply Asat, nor simply Universal, nor simply Particular but both and also more.³ Even Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra⁴, the Bible of Jainism recognises the most important use of Naya as the theory of Syādvāda. Even Pramāṇa is defined as that which gives us knowledge of a thing in its various aspects.⁵ Sri Abhinava Dharmabhūṣaṇa in Nyāya-Dīpikā holds that all expressions are somehow real.⁶ Let us hold with Mallisena Sūri, the author of Syādvāda Mañjarī that all objects from a lamp to the sky are both eternal and non-eternal and hence do not disobey Syādvāda.⁷

Syādvāda and Anekāntavāda

A thing partakes the nature of both reality and unreality, Mallisena says, for example a man having characteristic of lion in one part and of man in other part is called Nṛsiṃh-havatāra.⁸ So Anekāntavāda is called Syādvāda, according to which the same object has got the presence of eter-

1. “सम्पूर्णार्थं विनिश्चयादि स्याद्वादश्रुतमुच्यते”, न्यायावतार, कारिका ३० ।
2. “अनेकान्तात्मकार्थकथनं स्याद्वादः”, अकलंक, ग्रन्थरत्नत्रयम्, लघी-यस्त्रये-प्रवचनप्रवेश, ८-२१ ।
3. “वस्तु न केवल सत्तादि केवलमसत् अपितु सदसदात्मकं”, Jaina Darśana Sāra by Cainsukha Das, pp. 45-60.
4. “प्रमाण नयैरधिगमः”, तत्त्वार्थ सूत्र, सू० ६, अध्याय १ ।
5. “अर्थस्यानेकरूपस्य धी प्रमाणं”, अण्टसाहस्री ।
6. “सर्ववाक्यं सावधारणम्”, न्यायदीपिका, परोक्षप्रमाण एवं प्रमाण “सिद्धमनेकात्मकं वस्तु”, श्लोक १५ ।
7. “आदीपमाव्योम समस्वभावं स्याद्वादत्रमुद्रानतिभेदि त्रवस्तुः”, स्याद्वादा-मंजरी (हिन्दी), श्लोक ५, पृ० २० ।
8. भागे सिंहो नरो भागे यो सुर्यो भाग द्वयात्मकः ।
तम भागं विभागेन नरसिंह प्रयक्षते ॥ स्याद्वादमञ्जरी, श्लोक ५

nality etc. All object have got innumerable characters.¹ So Maṇikyanandī in Parīkṣāmukham giving example of विरुद्ध स्वभाव अनुपलब्धि² Says that all things are Anekāntic (possessed of different aspects) because we do not find that these have only one aspect.³ A thing that is real has three characteristics of production, destruction and stability.⁴ Object according to Nyāya-Dīpikā has many qualities,⁵ which is proved on the basis of perception, inference and testimony.⁶ Nyāyavatāra of Siddhasena also holds that things have many characters.⁷ So substance is that which has qualities and modifications⁸ and the real is substantial.⁹ So substance has anything which has origin existence and destruction¹⁰

1. “स्याद्वादोऽनेकान्तवादो नित्यानित्याद्यनेक धर्मेश्वलैकवस्त्वभ्युपगम्”, स्याद्वादमञ्जरी, पृ० १२४ ।
2. प्रमाणनयतत्वालोकालंकार, III.XI, वादिदेवसूरि 12th A. D.
3. “अनेकान्तात्मकं वस्त्वेकांतस्वरूपानुपलब्धेः”, परीक्षामुखम्, English Trans. G. C. Ghoshal, p. 124.
4. (क) “उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्ययुक्तम् सत्”, तत्त्वार्थाधिगम सूत्र, ५-३० ।
(ख) “घटमौलिमुवर्णार्थीनाशोत्पादस्थितिष्वयम्”, आत्ममीमांसा, कारिका ५९-६० ।
(ग) द्रव्यसंग्रह, पृ० ४४ ।
5. “सर्वमनेकान्तात्मकं सत्वात्”, न्यायदीपिका-परोक्षप्रकाश, पृ० १२५ ।
6. “एवं प्रमाणसिद्धमनेकान्तात्मकं वस्तु”, न्यायदीपिका, परोक्षप्रकाश ।
7. “अनेकान्तात्मकं वस्तुः”, न्यायावतार, श्लोक २९, English Trans. S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa.
8. (क) “गुणपर्यायवद् द्रव्यम्”, तत्त्वार्थसूत्र, ५-३८ ।
(ख) लघीयस्त्रय, सू० २, १४२ ।
(ग) परमात्म-प्रकाश, गाथा ४७ ।
(घ) “गुण पञ्चयासय”, प्रवचनसार, कुंदकुंदाचार्य ।
9. (क) “सद्द्रव्यलक्षणम्”, तत्त्वार्थसूत्रम्, ५-२९ ।
(ख) “सत्त्वं द्रव्यं”, अकलंक ।
10. S. Radhakrishnan : History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 2, p. 313.

and which may be described by opposites.¹ The standpoint of Jainas is supported by Patañjali Yoga² and Mīmāṃsā.³ So reality to them is a unity in difference or *bhedābheda* or difference in unity. Substance perish through its own qualities and modifications. But the *Guṇas* or qualities are inseparably related to substance. The qualities continue while the forms change.⁴ Every object has innumerable characters and that which has not many character is also not real like sky lotus⁵, this is proved by the Method of Difference or *केवल व्यतिरेक*.⁶

Syadvāda and Nayavāda

Broadly, knowledge according to the Jaina is of two kinds—*Pramāṇa* and *Naya*; knowledge of a thing in itself and and knowledge of a thing in its relation.⁷ A *Naya* is a standpoint from which we make a statement about a thing.⁸ A thing conceived from one particular point of view is the object of *Naya* or one-sided knowledge.⁹ In *Saptabhaṅgi Naya*, where we find pluralistic doctrine of the Jaina Dialectics, Muni Jinavijaya says that the doctrine points to the rela-

1. “अनन्तधर्मात्मिकम् वस्तु”, हरिभद्र, षड्दर्शन समुच्चय, पृ. ५७ ।
2. “द्रव्यं नित्यम् आकृतिरनित्या”, इत्यादि, योग-महाभाष्य ।
3. “नोत्पादस्थितिभंगानामभावे स्यान्मतित्रयम्”, कुमारिल, मीमांसा-श्लोक-वार्तिक, २८ ।
4. S. Radhakrishnan : History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1, p. 314.
5. “अनन्तधर्मात्मिकमेव तत्त्वमतोऽन्यथा सत्यम् रूपपादम्”, स्याद्वाद-मञ्जरी, श्लोक २१, २२ ।
6. “यदनन्तधर्मात्मिकं न भवति तत् सदपि न भवति यथा विद्यदिन्दीवरम् इति केवलव्यतिकी हेतुः”, स्याद्वाद-मञ्जरी, श्लोक २३ ।
7. उमास्वाति : “प्रमाणनयैरधिगमः”, तत्त्वार्थाधिगम सूत्र, ६/१ ।
8. S. Radhakrishnan : History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1, p. 298.
9. (a) Nyāyavatāra, Eng. Trans. S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, Śloka, 29.

tivity of knowledge concerning all the objects of the world.¹ Champata Rai Jaina describes Naya as a Path or way which implies in connection with philosophy, the Method of accurate thinking, hence he calls Naya as the 'Science of thought'.² In Nyāya Karmika's introduction Mohan Lal Desai holds that Nyāya-Vidyā or Philosophy of Standpoints is an essential department of knowledge by itself, and bears the same relation to philosophy as logic does to thought or grammar to language or speech.³ Nathmal Taita calls Nayaways of approach and observation.⁴ Broadly Nayas are divided into Noumenal and Phenomenal, each further divided into ten and six sub-classes respectively.⁵ According to more popular scheme, the Nayas are seven, placed under two broad classes of Arthanaya and Śabdanaya, as they refer to object and meaning.⁶ So these

- (b) “प्रमाणागृहीतार्थे देशग्राही प्रमातुरभिप्राय विशेषः”, न्याय-दीपिका, १२५ ।
 (c) “नयोज्ञातुरभिप्रायः”, लघीयस्त्रय ४२ ।
 (d) स्याद्वादमञ्जरी, श्लोक २८ ।
 (e) “स्याद्वादप्रविभक्तार्थे, विशेषव्यञ्जकोनयः”, परीक्षामुखम् १९ ।
 (f) आप्तमीमांसा, १०६ ।

1. The Saptabhaṅgī Naya—Kannomal Jaina, Introduction.
2. Nyāya : The Science of Thought, C. R. Jaina, Ch. I.
3. Nyāya-Karmika, Eng. Trans. Mohan Lal.
4. Nathmal Taita : Article in Proceedings of Indian Philosophical Congress, Mysore, 1952.
5. (a) Nahar and Ghosh : An Epitome of Jainism, Ch III, Jaina Logic of Nyāya.
 (b) “एव नयोद्विविधो द्रव्याधिकः पर्यायाधिकश्चेति”, जैन दर्शन, पृ० ४२ ।
 (c) “द्रव्याधिकनयः पर्यायाधिकनयश्चेति”, न्यायदीपिका, १२५ ।
 (d) “नयोद्विविधः”, सर्वार्थसिद्धि १-६ ।
 (e) “द्रव्य पर्यायगोचरैः”, तत्त्वार्थ-श्लोक, पृ० २६२ ।
6. S. Radhakrishnan : History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 299.

seven Nayas may be in short called the heptagonal forms of our ontological enquiry¹ or one-sided method of comprehension of seven kinds.² In fact there may be as many kinds of Nayas as there are modes of speech.³

Full knowledge of all characters even of a particle of dust cannot be claimed by anyone of us, because of our limitation and bias for a particular angle of vision.⁴ Truth is relative to our standpoint. We cannot affirm or deny anything absolutely of any object owing to the endless complexity of things. Being is not of a persistent unalterable nature. Every statement of a thing is necessarily one sided and incomplete.⁵ A thing may be true or untrue or partake of both while being neither.⁶ The ordinary human being cannot rise above the limitations of his senses; so his apprehension of reality is partial and valid only from a particular point of view. Thus Nayavāda is an unique instrument of analysis.⁷

Seven Nayas and their Fallacies

Naigam Nayas or non-distinguished regards object as possessing both the general and the specific properties, because no one can live without the other⁸; all objects possess two

1. Epitome of Jainism, Ch. III.
2. Nyāyavatāra, Śloka 29.
3. “जावइया वचणपहा तावइआ चैव हँति णयवाया”, स्याद्वादमञ्जरी ।
4. Nathmal Tatia : Nayas, etc. p. 192.
5. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 12, p. 867, 14th. Ed.
6. Encyclopaedia of Religion & Ethics, Vol. I, p. 262, Ed. by Hoerunle.
7. A. N. Upadhye : Silver Jubilee, Vol. I, Jainism (Article), p. 134.
8. (क) नैगमोन्यते वस्तु तदेतदुभयात्मकम् ।
निविशेष न सामान्यं विशेषोऽपि तद्विना ॥

नयकणिका, श्लोक ५

(ख) न + एक + गम = Not + One + Aspect.

kinds of properties Sāmānya and Viśeṣa.¹ So this way of pantoscopic observation² criticises the one sided and wrong view of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism according to which Sāmānya and Viśeṣa have separate existences from the object. Thus there is the synthesis of long drawn conflict between the universal and the particular.³ Hence Nyāya-vaiśeṣika is accused of an abstractionist outlook technically called the Fallacy Naigamābhāsa (नैगमाभास).⁴

Nextly, Saṅgraha Naya (संग्रहनय) remedies the extremism of universal and particular. In fact there can be no universal apart from the particular and vice versa.⁵ For example, not a single nimb or mango or any other tree can be conceived apart from vegetableness, so finger cannot be considered apart from hands.⁶ So Advaitins and Sāṅkhyas⁷, Plato and Kant etc. are accused of the Fallacy of Saṅgrahābhāsa⁸ or who recognise universal alone as real.

An extremist assertion is likely to be met with a diametrically opposite view of analytic and particularistic approach where we will meet the Cārvākas to whom object possess only the specific properties which is non-existent like donkey's

1. "अर्थाः सर्वेऽपि सामान्य विशेषा उभयात्मकाः", नयकर्णिका, श्लोक २ ।

2. Nathmal Tatia : Ibid.

3. (क) नयकर्णिका, श्लोक १० ।

(ख) जैन-दर्शनसार, पृ० ४२ ।

(ग) "सामान्य विशेषात्मातदर्थो विषयः", परीक्षामुखम्, अध्याय ४, श्लोक १ ।

4. Naya-Karṇikā, Introduction.

5. संग्रही मन्यते वस्तु सामान्यात्मकमेव हि ।

सामान्य व्यतिरिक्तोऽस्ति न विशेषः खपुष्पवत् ॥ नयकर्णिका, श्लोक ६

6. "विना वनस्पति कोऽपि वृक्षादिर्न दृश्यते", नयकर्णिका, श्लोक ७ ।

7. विशेषात्मकमेवार्थं व्यवहारश्च मन्यते ।

विशेषभिन्नं सामान्यं सत्त्वरविषाणात् ॥ न्यायावतार, श्लोक ८

8. Naya-Karṇikā ; Introduction by Mohan Lal Desai.

horn. So this practical and particularistic view is to meet with the fallacy of wrong selection of species called Vyavahārābhāsa (व्यवहाराभास), where one eats vegetable without being it of any kind, mango¹ etc.

The particularistic approach sometimes forgets the past or the future aspect of a thing and confines only to the present, straight away referring to the natural thing.² To them past is defunct and the future is unborn.³ The reality is momentary being, a great flux. These are Buddhist and the Heraclitus, who must be charged with the fallacy of straight and direct glimpse, devoid of temporal determinations or Kālikanikṣepa (कालिकनिक्षेप⁴). This fallacy is called Rjusūtrābhāsa (ऋजुसूत्राभास).

But as the real is expressed and characterised by a word who must also examine the meanings of word. So comes Śabda Naya or verbal standpoint. Each name has its own meaning⁵ and different words or (Synonyms)⁶ may also refer to the same object. So the relation between terms and meaning is relative one, and when we take them to be absolute we commit the fallacy of Śabdābhāsa⁷, which we find among the nominalist and the grammarians.⁸

1. “वनस्पतिगृहाणेति प्रोक्ते गृहणतिकोऽपि किम्”, नयकणिका, श्लोक ९ ।

2. (क) “ऋजुसूत्रनयो वस्तुनातीतं नाप्य नागतम्”, नयकणिका, श्लोक ११ ।

(ख) “अतीते नानागतेन परकीयेन वस्तुना”, नयकणिका, श्लोक १२ ।

3. Nathmal Tatia : p. 195.

4. नयकणिका, श्लोक १२; न्यायदीपिका-परोक्ष प्रकाश, पृ० ८५ ।

5. S. Radhakrishnan : History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I.

6. अर्थ शब्दनयोऽनेकैः पययैरेकमेव च ।

मन्यते कुंभकलशघटाधेकार्थं वाचका ॥ नयकणिका, श्लोक १४

7. नयकणिका, Introduction.

8. न्यायावतार, श्लोक १९ : Explanations—अनेकान्तात्मकं वस्तुगोचर
..... २९ ।

So Samabhirūḍha Naya or Etymological aspect distinguish terms according to their roots.¹ With the difference of the words expressing the same object the significance of the object also differs as ghaṭa (घट) is, which makes noise like ghaṭa-ghaṭa (घट घट) and so on.² So the identification of reality with the root of the word by which it is denoted is the fallacy of Samabhirūḍhābhāsa³, again committed by grammarians.⁴

The grammarians reach the climax when they identify reality with such like⁵ or specialised form of sixth kind⁶ for it argues that if a thing is really recognised, even when it do not fulfil its function, then why can cloth be not called a yarn?⁷ If we go against it, we commit the fallacy of Evam-bhūtabhāsa.

Doctrine of Saptabhaṅgi

Now the Jainas claim to embody all these seven aspects in their philosophy⁸, hence treat it like a judge over all systems of philosophy which are separately one-sided. So this is the

1. S. Radhakrishnan : History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 300.
2. ब्रूते समत्रिरुद्धोऽर्थे भिन्न पर्यायभेदतः ।
भिनन्नार्थाः कुत्र कलशघटाघटपटादिवत् ॥ नयकर्णिका, श्लोक १५
3. Naya-karṇika, Introduction.
4. Nyāyavatāra, Śloka 29.
5. एक पर्यायाभिधेयमपि वस्तु च मन्यते ।
कार्यं स्वकीयं कुर्वाणमेवं भूतनयो ध्रुवम् ॥ नयकर्णिका, श्लोक १७
6. S. Radhakrishnan : History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 300.
7. यदि कार्यमकुर्वाणोऽपीष्यते तत्तया सचेत् ।
तदा पदेऽपि न घट व्यपदेशः किमिष्यते ॥ नयकर्णिका, श्लोक १८
8. सर्वे नया अपि विरोध भृतो मिथस्ते,
सभ्ययं साधूनामयं भगवान् भजन्ते ।
भूपा इव प्रति महाभुवि सार्वभौम
पादाम्बुजं प्रधान्युक्ति पराजिता प्राक् ॥ नयकर्णिका, श्लोक २२

doctrine of liberal pluralism as contrasted with dogmatic monism. To a realist pot exist as it is, independent of the mind, to an idealist, pot has no existence in the world outside. To a nominalist the pot is a sign in the outward world which calls up its image in the mind, to a Buddhist pot is nothing but a continuous stream of changes. So also to Bergson it is a great flux. Perceptionist regard the pot only as a bundle of qualities without any substratum containing them. But to a Spencerian Positivist pot is a vivid idea the causes of which are unknowable. However to the Vedāntins pot is a figment of illusion, a thing of nescience. All these philosophers look at the pot more or less from one dominating point of view, while neglecting the other.¹ The Jaina logicians welcome all the light that comes from different ways of approach and integrates them in one whole in which all these finite traits can co-subsist.² All philosophical disputes arise out of a confusion of standpoints.³ Even in practical life we find that a man is father in relation to a particular boy, in relation to another boy he is not father, in relation to both the boys taken together he is the father and is not the father, and since both the ideas cannot be conveyed in words at the same time, he may be called indescribable.⁴ Considering all these standpoints, a marvellous mechanism of Syādvāda or Saptabhaṅgī has been worked out which is an unique organon of knowledge to grasp the manifoldness of reality. When the reality is dynamic and truth is manifold, our task of knowing the truth becomes difficult for there is nothing certain on account of endless complexities of things⁵, and hence the expression of truth

1. Kannomal Jaina : Saptabhaṅgī Naya.

2. Nathmal Tatia : p. 198.

3. S. Radhakrishnan : History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 302.

4. Hira Lall Jaina : Jainism, its History, Philosophy and Religion, From Ramakrishna Centenary Volume I.

5. S. Radhakrishnan : Ibid, p. 302.

must be equally difficult if not more, for the words fail to describe the different characters of a thing at the same time.¹ So the speaker does describe one character which is prominent than the other characters in that object. Therefore, we have no right to make any absolute judgement. Every proposition gives us only a perhaps, a may be or a Syāt.² Absolute affirmation or negation of any object is therefore unreasonable. All propositions are only hypothetically true. Hence unlike ordinary logic Syādvāda recognizes conditional predication, which is expressed by the prefix Syāt. Logic of Syādvāda differs from ordinary logic in the fact that instead of two kinds of judgement as affirmative and negative it recognises as many as seven forms of judgement. So Syādvāda is also called Saptabhaṅgī.³

Syādvāda as a Doctrine of Seven Forms of Judgement

So far prefix Syāt is concerned, we must use, because any substance is unity-in-diversity, so if we insist on absolute predication without condition, the only course open is to dismiss either the diversity or the identity as a mere metaphysical fiction.⁴ So Anekāntavāda teaches that every single statement may have a partial truth⁵, hence even lord Mahāvīra, the Omniscient took recourse to a Syāt⁶ before every sermonic sentence, so much so the scriptural knowledge of the Jainas has been called as Syādvāda by Samantabhadra.⁷ Even Dr.

1. Kailash Chandra Siddhānta Shāstri — Saptabhaṅgī and Syādvāda, Premi Abhinandan Granth, p. 324.
2. S. Radhakrishnan : Ibid, p. 302.
3. “सप्तभिः प्रकारैर्वचनविन्यासः सप्तभङ्गीति गीयते”, स्याद्वादमञ्जरी, पृ० २७८ ।
4. Appaswami Chakravarti : Ram Krishna Centenary, Vol. 1.
5. Ibid.
6. स्याद्वाद और सप्तभङ्गी, लेखक - कैलाशचन्द्र सिद्धान्तशास्त्री, प्रेमी अभिनन्दन ग्रन्थ, पृ० ३३८ ।
7. आत्ममीमांसा : स्याद्वादकेवलज्ञानेवस्तुतत्त्वप्रकाशने ।

Hermon Jacobi calls Syādvāda a Synonym of Jainism.¹

Now, the seven forms of Saptabhaṅgī Syādvāda are predicative judgement regarding the same object according to the point of view of speech. As different aspect of reality can be considered from four different perspectives (Nikṣepa or Nayas) such as name, representation, privation and present condition², similarly seven modes of speech can be considered from four different points of view of its own matter, time, place and nature as well as from other point of view.³

Now a thing exists⁴ as itself under certain circumstances from the point of its own material, place, time and nature. This table exists as made of wood in this hall at the present moment with such and such shape and size, but this does not exist as made of gold, at another place or at another time of a different shape. So the table exists somehow, i. e., not always, everywhere, in every shape. Hence let us say somehow the table exists or simply स्यादस्ति. Similarly, somehow the table does not exist, when considered from its other point of view. So existence and non-existence are to be asserted accordingly as the element of one or the other is in predominance. Things are considered in relation to their importance and not.⁵ Hence Syād Nāsti.

But when can the table exist as well as not exist ? Yes the table can exist for me in certain form, place, etc. and does not exist in other form, place, etc. So we may say that the table somehow exists and not exists (स्याद अस्ति च नास्ति च).

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1. H. Jacobi : Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. 7, p. 465.
 2. “नाम स्थापनाद्रव्य भावस्तन्व्यासः”, तत्त्वार्थ-सूत्र, १-५ ।
 3. स्वद्रव्य, स्वकाल, स्वक्षेत्र, स्वरूप — परद्रव्य, परकाल, परक्षेत्र, पररूप ।
 4. S. Radhakrishnan : History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 302.
 5. Umāswatī : अपितानपितासिद्धेः ।

But what will we say when we are asked what is the real colour of this table always ? The only honest reply would be that the table cannot be described under conditions of the question.¹ Hence Syād Avyaktam. This seems to be something puzzling yet profound. Śāṅkara² in his *Brahma-Sūtra* charges the Jainas of contradiction. If reality is indescribable it cannot be expressed. To call something indescribable and again indulging in its verbal description are contradictory things. Some how Śāṅkara forgot that it is not called simply 'indescribable' but 'somehow indescribable' which means that the thing is not indescribable absolutely but only hypothetically. Therefore, Dr. Ganga Nath Jha³ charges Śāṅkara for not going through the Jaina text. Fani Bhusan Adhikari also for the same, charged Śāṅkara of injustice while presiding over the annual function of Syādvāda Mahāvidyālaya.⁴ This fourth character of indescribability point out that it is impossible to describe a thing without making any particular standpoint.⁵ Again, philosophical wisdom does not always lie in straight forward affirmative or negative answers. Sometimes the nature of things are such that they render any description impossible.

The other three of the *Saptabhaṅgī* are found by combining one by one each of the first three standpoints with the fourth, such as Syāt Asti ca Avyaktam; Syāt Nāsti ca Avyaktam and Syāt Asti Nāsti ca Avyaktam. So from scientific standpoint of combination, no other form is possible.⁶

1. D. M. Datta : *Indian Philosophy*, p. 95.

2. अचैवां पदार्थानामवक्तव्यत्वं सम्भवति अव्यक्तव्यश्चेन्नोचेरन् ।

उच्चन्ते यावक्तव्याश्चेति विप्रति विद्धिम् ॥ २-२-३३

3. Dr. G. N. Jha : '*Jaina Dharma*' by Kailash Chandra Jaina, p. 74.

4. Fani Bhusan Adhikari (Ex. Head, Department of Philosophy, Banaras Hindu University), *Ibid*, p. 74.

5. D. M. Datta : *Indian Philosophy*, p. 96.

6. Nahar and Ghosh : *Epitome of Jainism*, Ch, VII, VIII.

Naya is the analytic and the Saptabhaṅgī is the synthetic method of studying ontological problems.¹ So the defect of Nayavāda is supplemented of the method of Saptabhaṅgī, a better organon of knowledge.² Samantabhadra, the first exponent of Syādvāda³ has characterised Sāṅkhya, Mādhyamika, Vaiśeṣika, Bauddha as representing first four forms of judgement and Akalaṅka⁴ has completed by characterising Śāṅkara, Bauddha and Yoga as representing the last three. This doctrine insists on the corelation of affirmation and negation. All judgements are double-edged in their character. All things are existent as well as non-existent.⁵ Here three predicates make seven propositions.⁶

Examination of Criticisms against Syādvāda

(1) Fallacy of contradiction — Application of existence and non-existence to the same thing is contradiction.

Reply : Here existence and non-existence are asserted not from one standpoint. Calling a thing both table and bench is contradiction but when we ascribe to the table from the view point of its matter and non-existence to it from the view point of it changing frame, it is not contradiction.

(2) Fallacy of Vaidhikaran — There ought to be two receptacles for we assume existence and non-existence in the same thing.

Reply : Tree is only one receptacle though it contains both the qualities of stability and mobility.

1. Nahar and Ghosh : Epitome of Jainism, Ch. VII, VIII.

2. आत्ममीमांसा, कारिका १-२० ।

3. अष्टसाहस्री, पृ० १३८-१४२ ।

4. S. Radhakrishnan : History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 304.

5. H. Jacobi : Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. 7, p. 465.

6. “नैकस्मिन्नसम्भवात्”, ब्रह्मसूत्र, शांकरभाष्य २-५-३३ ।

(3) Fallacy of Anavasthā — Statement after statement is made without observing any established rule regarding the finality of things.

Reply : Things having innumerable characteristics need innumerable predication, hence no fallacy of infinite regress.

(4) Fallacy of Confusion (संकर) — Many confusing things are said of the same object.

Reply : What we say of it are actual.

(5) Fallacy of Vaitikar (Intermingling of Qualities) — We maintain both existent and non-existent in regard to a thing.

Reply : Existence is predicated from material standpoint, non-existence from phenomenal standpoint.

(6) Fallacy of Doubt — Cannot arise because we are definite from particular standpoint.

Where there is doubt, lack of understanding (Arthāpatti) cannot arise, hence no negationism (Abhāva) and no fraudism (chala), which also go contrary to its extreme realism.

Vyāsa and Śāṅkarācārya have also brought in their heavy artillery to damage one or the other angles of this fortification and force an entrance into the same. Their charges are of contradictionism¹, indeterminism², doubt³, uncertainty⁴, ridiculous. Self-contradiction, abandoning original position in describing the Avyaktam⁵ which are all treated above and elsewhere⁷ in this paper.

1. “नैकस्मिन् सम्भवात्”, ब्रह्मसूत्र-शंकरभाष्य, २-५-३३ ।
2. Knowledge would be of indeterminate character as doubt or diffidence.
3. The knowledge, the knowabilities, the knowing subject of all being indeterminate in themselves, Syādvāda cannot be a source of valid knowledge.
4. Heaven and freedom both are uncertain.
5. Ridiculous Self-contradiction.
6. Epitome of Jainism, Ch. IX; Śāṅkara and Syādvāda.
7. Sir Ashutosh Com. Vol. III, Art on Jainism.

Besides, contemporary thinkers confuse the pragmatic¹ and pluralistic but realistic attitude of Syādvāda with the same pragmatic and pluralistic but idealistic views of Messrs William James, Schiller, Dewey etc. One should remember that even Jaina metaphysics accept Vedic realism and even in the Upaniṣads² we have pluralistic trends. In the Upaniṣads also we have the glimpses of how the reality reveals itself in different ways at different stages of knowledge.³ However, Syādvāda is probably due to the Jainas⁴ and so it cannot be traced to the Vedas and Upaniṣads though the Jainas believe that their fundamental creed can be traced back even before the Veda.⁵

Then another case of confusion in comparing⁶ Syādvāda with the subjectivistic relativism of the Sophist, with the objective Relativism or Relative Absolutism⁷ like Whitehead, Bodin. However there is no similarity with Eienstien's relativity except in the most general attitude. To some extent we may find its parallel in old Pyrrhoneanism in the west. The Upaniṣadic Neti, Neti, the Advaita doctrine of the world as Anirvācyā, the yoga doctrine of Pradhāna as Nihsattvak-nirasat-Nihsadasat and the Śūnyavādin's doctrine of the self

1. D. M. Datta : Indian Philosophy, p. 97.

2. (a) अस्तिनादित्यस्ति नास्तीति नास्ति नास्तीति वायुनः ।

चलस्थिरो भयामवैशदृणोव्येव वालिशः ॥ माण्डूक्योपनिषद्, ४-३३

(b) “एकं सद्विप्रा बहुधा वदन्ति”, ऋग्वेद, प्रथम मण्डल ।

(c) “त्वं भक्तियोग परिभाषित”, श्रीमद्भागवत ।

(d) “यज्ञहू विष्णोः”, शतपथ ब्राह्मण ।

3. S. Radhakrishnan : History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 299.

4. Kalidas Bhattacharya : His letter to me.

5. Sir Ashutosh Com. Volume III, Article of Dr. P. C. Bagchi.

6. D. M. Datta : Indian Philosophy.

7. K. Bhattacharya : His letter to me.

or the ultimate reality as *Catuṣkoṭivinirmukta* may also be profitably compared. Even on deeper study, we may find something in Kant's thing-in-itself and modern existentialism including Kirkegaard in this connection. But Pyrrh's prefixing every judgement with a 'may be' must not be thought identical with Jaina *Syāt*, for Pyrrhonianism relapses into agnosticism or Scepticism, there is no room for Scepticism whatsoever in Jaina theory of *Syādvāda*.

Syādvāda does not lead to Scepticism. Scepticism means in the minimum, absence of assertion, where as *Syādvādin*s always assert, though what they assert are alternatives. Disjunctive judgement is still judgement, i. e., assertion. Many logicians believe that what a disjunctive assert is only the common character of the alternatives, the play with the alternatives being either intellectual experimentation or hesitation as a function of ignorance. Some Hegelians interpret it in terms of identity-in-difference. *Syādvāda* on the other hand just insists that there need be no element of identity, abstract or concrete. There is no reason why one blind man should reject the vision of another. Hence each vision is alternatively valid. So either there is no self complete Reality or any such Reality is wholly infinite, a mere demand that refuses to be actualised. The only Scepticism that there is concerning the so called self-complete Reality. So where as a Sceptic is Sceptical about any character of Reality, *Syādvāda* is quite definitely assertive in so far as *asti*, *nāsti* etc. are concerned. Yet he is more Sceptical than any Sceptic in the world so far as the definiteness of the ultimate Reality is concerned. He would go even beyond *avaktavya* (advaitin so far the world is concerned and *Śūnyavādin* so far ultimate reality is concerned — Kalidas Bhattacharya's letter to me). So at best *Syādvāda* is a form of Relative Absolutism, or objective relativism¹ but never Scepticism.

So *Syādvāda* stands against all mental absolutism. We can

1. D. M. Datta : Indian Philosophy.

substantiate this relativistic standpoint on the Cosmo-micro-physical ground supported by Einstienian Doctrine of Relativity¹ and Maxwell's equation of electromagnetism which go fundamentally against the notion of absolute truth. When we say, we know this, I am saying more than is strictly correct, because all we know is what happens when the waves reach our bodies.²

Similarly, researches in Psychology of thinking³, Perception of self and conception of self in Child Psychology⁴ and Psycho-analytical studies in Freudian Narcissism or Adlerian Power factor⁵ support relativism. The psychological researches into the nature of emotions was substantiated by the writing of Dostoevski, Kirkegaard, Neitzche, Freud, Jung and others who tried to reveal the force of conscious and subconscious feelings on the function of character and life. James uttered a definite activistic voluntaristic note in his Radical Empiricism. Graham Wallas showed how political aspect were dictated by emotional attachment to Party Shibboleths.⁶ Mc Dougall attacked the transcendent dextalism of the German idealistic rationalism as well as the sociological hedonism and the epicurean rationalism of the classical economist and the Benthamite liberals. Thus relativism in Psychology is a truism.⁷

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1. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 19, p. 89. Article on 'Relativity' by Sir James Hopwood Jeans. Article on Philosophical Consequences of Relativity by B. Russell.
 2. B. Russell : Outlines of Philosophy, Chapter on Relativity, p. 137.
 3. (a) Psychology of Thought, Two Vols., Brand Shard.
(b) Creative Thinking, Warthi mer.
(c) Psychology of Thinking, Dunlop; Humphry.
 4. Pia get : Work on Child Psychology.
 5. Dr. Mohasin : Oral discussion on this subject on 27-12-53.
 6. Dr. V. P. Verma : Rationalism, pp. 19-20.
 7. Dr. Mohasin : Oral Discussion on 27-12-53.

Again from socio-cultural standpoint, the doctrine of Syādvāda is justified for no smooth functioning of society is possible without mutual accommodation and adjustment which presupposes Catholicism in thought and sense of tolerance. In ethics and morality, we know how far relativism is dominating.

In Logic the Doctrine of the Universe of Discourse has a great justification for Syādvāda. Universe of Discourse is sometimes limited to a small portion of the actual universe of things and is sometimes co-extensive with that Universe.¹ “The particular aspect or portion of the total system of reality referred to in any judgement may be conveniently spoken as the Universe of Discourse.² Hence Carveth Read says that supposition (or Universe of Discourse) controls the interpretation of everyword.³ Logic of Relatives⁴ too recognises the truth of Syādvāda when it discusses all relations embodied in propositions.

So Syādvāda holds a position of liberal pluralism as contrasted with dogmatic monism.⁵ Much of the confusion either of Buddhism or Vedāntism is due to the false exaggeration of the relative principles of⁶ becoming and being into absolute truths. Same is the case with Parmendian being and Heraclitan flux. It seems that Syādvāda doctrine has been given to the world after carefully shifting out the truths of a vanity of Philosophical doctrines. It does not originate as some seem to think from a vague indefinite and doubtful mental attitude in regard to things. It gives a practically definite knowledge. Syādvāda is never a doctrine of

1. Boole : Laws of Thought, p. 166.

2. Keynes : Formal Logic, pp. 75-76.

3. Carveth Read : Logic.

4. A. C. Mitra : Deductive Logic, pp. 198-200.

5. Kannomal : ‘The Saptabhaṅgī.

6. S. Radhakrishnan : History of Indian Philosophy.

doubt.¹ Many-sidedness of the Jainas is the true secret of its irreputable perfection. Nayavāda is the touch stone of the dogmatic pronouncement of all one-sided scriptures.² It is the method of knowing a thing synthetically. Thus, the Philosophy of Anekāntavāda is neither self-contradictory nor vague or indefinite. On the contrary it represents a very sensible view of things in a systematised form. By means of it the seemingly warring ideas and beliefs of different faiths can very well be accommodated and reconciled to each other and then so many clashes would be avoided.

Syādvāda and World-tension

Peace is something which the world eagerly wants but which it does not know to secure.⁴ Peace needs a new civilisation, a new culture and a new philosophy, where there is no narrowness and no partiality. Huxley is correct to a great extent when he says that war exists because people wish it to exist.² We cannot check violence by remaining violent. But non-violence must precede non-violence in thought. And here Syādvāda gives us help to practice non-violence in thought. Prof. R. Prasad also holds that Syādvāda is an extension of Ahimsā in epistemology.⁵ Unless we resolve our differences, we are bound to face tension. Analysing the ultimate causes of world-tension, we had come to the conclusion that it is ultimately our divergent and conflicting ideologies that come in the way. Politico-socio-economic ideas are interrelated and all of them have definite ideological standpoint. The world is the store-house of great chaos in thought. All the confusion of thought which is prevailing in the world is the

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1. Prof. A. S. Dhruva : Syādvāda Maryar.
 2. Mohan Lall D. Desai : Naya-karṇikā, Introduction.
 3. E. Ashirvatham : 'Is Peace Possible' ? Journal of Political Science.
 4. Aldous Huxley : Ends of Means, p. 94.
 5. Prof. R. Prasad : Oral discussion.

outcome of inexhaustive research and the acceptance of a part for the whole. All most all our disputes only betray the pig headedness of the blind men¹ who spoke differently about an elephant. The outstanding personalities (like Aurobindo, Raman Maharshi etc.) spoke to us, in a world over organised by ideological fanaticism, that truth is not exclusive or sectarian. In fact, the spirit of India is a foe to every kind of fanaticism and intellectual narrowness.² Huxley asks us to persuade people that every idol however noble it may seem, is ultimately a Moloch that devours its worshippers. In other words, it is fatal to treat the relative and the home made as though it were the Absolute.³

Dr. Schillip also observes that humanity is tottering today on the brink of the principle of self-annihilation for lack of understanding.⁴ It is at the levels of human relationships that we reach the acme of misunderstanding.⁵ Prof. Tatia also holds that only intellectual clarity will resolve all conflict and rivalry.⁶ All dogmatism owes its genesis to this partiality of outlook and fondness for a line of thinking to which a person has accustomed himself.⁷ In his message to the Silver Jubilee Session of Indian Philosophical Congress, C P. Ramaswamy also observes that "work and sacrifice (for peace) can only be on the lines of an abandonment of the so called imperia-

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1. Mohan Lall D. Desai : Naya-karṇikā, Introduction.
 2. S. Radhakrishnan : Presidential Address, Silver Jubilee Session of Indian Philosophical Congress, Calcutta.
 3. Aldous Huxley : In his message to the Silver Jubilee Session of Indian Philosophical Congress.
 4. Paul Arthur Schillip : On Human Understanding, Silver Jubilee Vol. II.
 5. Ibid.
 6. Nathmal Tatia : Naya-ways of Observation, Approach, 198.
 7. Ibid.

lism and aggressiveness in thought¹, because peace demands a revolutionary desire, a new simplicity, a new asceticism.² Blavatsky thinks that when the one party or another thinks himself the sole possessor of absolute truth, it becomes only natural that he should think his neighbours absolutely in the clutches of Error or the Devil.³ These are obvious psychological roots of tensions⁴ proved by recent Psychological researches.⁵ Today one man or one country fight with the other because their views vary. Views are bound to differ, because we are guided by different condition, thought, modes and attitudes. Hence it is wrong to think oneself right and rest others wrong.⁶ Here we find that Syādvāda represents the highest form of Catholicism coupled wonderfully with extreme conservatism, a most genuine and yet highly dignified compromise better than which I cannot imagine.⁷ Extreme toleration is that all views as possibilities are equally (alternatively) valid and extreme conservatism, in that form the point of actuality (or existence, as the existentialist term it) only one of the definite categories is *mine*. I cannot always fly in the air of possibilities (or demands). I must have moorings in some one definite form of actuality.⁸



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1. C. P. Ramswamy Ayer : Silver Jubilee Vol. II, Message.
 2. S. Radhakrishnan : Quoted by Ramasury, Ibid.
 3. H. P. Blavatsky : The Secret Doctrine.
 4. Alva Mydral : Gandhian Seminar.
 5. (a) Tension Affecting International Understanding, Klinberg.
 (b) Tensions that cause war, Can tril.
 (c) Democracy in a world of tensions, Make on.
 (d) Ends and Means, Huxley (war).
 6. Nemicaandra Śāstrī : Viśwa-śānti or Jaina Dharma (Hindi).
 7. Kalidas Bhattacharya ; His letter to me.
 8. Ibid.

JAINISM AND YOGA

(I) Contribution of *Haribhadra* to the *Yoga-vidya*.

Chapter Eighteen

CONTRIBUTION OF HARIBHADRA TO THE YOGA-VIDYĀ

[I]

The Indian systems of thought and culture are not mere speculations on the external nature of things but also of the mysteries of our mind and soul. Even frankly realistic disciplines like Jainism, Nyaya-Vaiśeṣikas and the Mīmāṃsakas show most serious concern to fathom the depths of mind and unravel the mysteries of spirit. The common channels and sources of knowledge like perception, inference etc. are found to be inadequate and it has been the abiding spiritual ambition of man to extend the frontiers of his knowledge. Even to a scientist, any attempt to put a limit to our knowledge is the result of some wrong notions. Nothing is regarded as static or absolute. Even to the Marxists, 'there is nothing in the nature which cannot be explained'. Thus the growth of human knowledge has been a sort of progressive limitation of sceptical and agnostic attitudes. It seems that it can extend without assignable limits to knowledge of mankind.¹ A spiritual conviction and a constant urge for the ultimate truth is the mean of our common Sādhana. It is not only the perfection of the cognitive faculty of the self but also its ultimate end.² Hence 'know Thyself' (Ātmānam viddhi) has been reggraded as the climax of our spiritual Sādhana. There are obvious limitations to our sensory knowledge, there are antinomies of reasons. Hence, we have to transcend these usual sources of knowledge in order to realise the truth. This pro-

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1. Singh, Ramjee : The Concept of Omniscience in Ancient Hindu Thought, Oriental Publisher, Delhi, 1979, p. 336.
 2. Ibid, The Jaina Concept of Omniscience, L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, 1974, p. 221.

cess has a common term in Indian thought—Yoga. It is not against but beyond reason (Jñāna vijñāna sahitam).

[II]

The term Yoga symbolises the core of Indian Spiritual Sādhana. The four-fold social division of occupation (Varṇa-vibhājana), its trade and business, language and physical culture etc. are only the external signs of the Aryans¹; even the concept of other world (heaven-hell) is not its essential ingredients.² Its real and inner spirit lies in the absolute concentration of thought or one pointedness on the ultimate reality which is beyond the present space and time.³ Perhaps, on account of this distinctive feature, the Aryans have been judged as superior to all other races and climes.

In life, theory and practice, knowledge and action, empirical and the transcendental require a synthesis. As a matter of fact, the real practice of one's knowledge is called Yoga. Knowledge precedes, Yoga succeeds. But a knowledge without its practice or implementation is not only incomplete but also ambiguous. Thus Yoga is superior to the Tapas, Jñāna and Karma.⁴ It is the best of all the three and includes devotion also. Yoga or union with God which is attained through bhakti is the highest spiritual goal. Jñāna is scriptural learning (Śāstra pāṇḍitya)⁵ and not spiritual realization. Truly wise man is the Yogī. Without Yoga or concentration of mind, the human energies are frittered away in many directions and go waste. Hence, the spirit of man is the key for the success of

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1. Max Muller : Biographies of Words and the Home of the Aryans, p. 50.
 2. Bhagavad-Gītā, IX. 21, "They return to the world of mortals when their merit is exhausted."
 3. Max Muller : Sacred Books of the East, Vol. I, p. 23 (Introduction).
 4. Bhagavad-Gītā, VI. 46.
 5. Ibid (Śaṅkara Bhāṣya).

all practical activities. A man versed only in scriptural learning but lacking in yogic realisation is called as 'the friend of the learned'¹ but not a Yogi.

Then there are two dimensions of Yoga—the external and the internal. Even the process of concentration is regarded its outer frame, where as renunciation of all attachment and reducing oneself to zero is its inner spirit. The real Yoga, therefore, consists in the inner poise, self-mastery, its conquest of anger, sensitiveness, pride and ambition². So there are two types of Yoga—the Yoga of knowledge and the Yoga of action. The former consists in the knowledge about the Self, its bondage, liberation and the path of liberation. But mere knowledge or theoretical knowledge is no good. What is more important is the performance of work without any selfish attachment to results, with a view to securing the welfare of the world, with the realization that agency belongs to the modes of Prakṛti or to God himself.³ In fact, Yoga consists in practical realization of the self.

There are three-fold traditions of Yoga-literature in Indo-logical writings—the Vedic, the Jaina and the Bauddha. Though the term 'Yoga' has occurred many times in Ṛg-veda, it has always been used in the sense of 'Union' only and never in the sense of meditation or concentration of mind. Even such key-words of the Yoga-literature like meditation, non-attachment, breath control, withdrawal from external world etc. are absent in the Ṛg-veda.⁴ However, the Upaniṣads⁵

1. Yoga-Vāṣiṣṭha, Nirvāṇa Prakaraṇa, Ch. 21.
2. Bhagavad-Gītā, II. 48.
3. Ibid, III. 43 (View of Yāmuna-cārya in Gītārtha Saṅgraha).
4. The term Yoga has occurred many times in the Ṛgveda, I. 34. 9; X. 266. 5; I. 18. 7; I. 5. 3; II. 8. 1; IX. 58. 3.
5. Taittirīyopaniṣad, II. 4; Kaṭha Upaniṣad, II. 6. 2; Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, II. 2, IV. 3, I. 14; Chāndogya Upaniṣad, VII. 6. 2, VII. 7. 1, VII. 26. 1.

do abound in the mention of these concepts. There might be differences of opinion regarding the nature or number of the ultimate reality but there is a remarkable unanimity regarding the acceptance of yogic sādhanā for its realization. All the Vedic systems including the Nyāya¹-Vaiśeṣika², Sāṃkhya³, Yoga⁴ and Vedānta⁵ accept the utility and relevance of Yoga in their respective systems. Pūrva-mīmāṃsā is the only exception which does not ever refer to Yoga. It is interested in ritualistic action. The Gītā⁶ and the Mahābhārata⁷, the Bhāgavat⁸, the Yoga-vāśiṣṭha⁹ and the important works on Tantra¹⁰ including many works of Haṭha-yoga accept the place and importance of Yoga. Many medieval saints and scholars like Jñānadeva¹¹, Ambeya¹², Kabīra¹³ etc. have discussed the subject of Yoga with great seriousness.

[III]

Together with its tradition, the term Yoga has a chequered history. In the Ṛg-veda, it is used in the sense of 'union', later

1. Nyāya-sūtra of Gotama, I. 1. 1, IV. 2. 38, IV. 2. 42, IV. 2. 46.
2. Vaiśeṣika-sūtra of Kaṇāda, I. 1. 4, VI. 2. 2, VI. 2. 8.
3. Sāṃkhya-sūtra of Kapila, I. 1, III. 30-34.
4. Yoga-sūtra of Patañjali, IV. 33.
5. Brahma-sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa, 3rd chapter is known as Sādhanā Pāda.
6. The first six chapters deal with Karma-yoga, middle six to the Bhakti-yoga and the last six deal with Jñāna-yoga.
7. Mahābhārata, Śānti Parva, 193, 217, 246, 254 chaps. Anuśāsana Parva, 36, 246 etc.
8. Śrīmad-Bhāgavat-Mahāpurāṇa, Skandha III, Ch. 28; XI. 15, 19, 20 etc.
9. Yoga-vāśiṣṭha, chapters on Vairāgya, Mumukṣu-Vyabhara, Utapatti, Sthiti, Upāsana and Nirvāṇa.
10. Mahānirvāṇa Tantra, 3rd chap.
11. Jñāneśvarī, 6th chapter.
12. Siddhānta-saṃhitā of the Suhiroba Ambiya.
13. 'Bījaka' is an important treatise on Yoga & mysticism.

on in about 700-800 B. C., it is used in the sense of 'yoking a horse' (uncontrolled spiritual horses). It can be traced also in German-Joch, OE-Geoc, Latin-Jugum, Greek-Zugon.¹ In Pāṇini's time, the term 'Yoga' had attained its technical meaning of concentration. In Jainism, the term Carita (conduct) is the exact equivalent of the general term 'Yoga'.² Jaina tradition, predominantly being ascetic and world-negating lays stress upon wilful silence (mauna), austerities (tapas), and other yogic activities. The Jaina Āgamas describing about the conduct of the Sādhus (Sādhucarya) refer to many yogic activities like the abstenations and observances (*Yama* and *Niyama*), study (svādhyāya), austerities (*tapas*), withdrawal of the senses (pratyāhāra) etc.³ Even the acts of volition (Pravṛtti) has to be surcharged by the spirit of volition in the negative sense (nivṛtti), technically called as Aṣṭa-Pra-vacana-Mālā.⁴ Jaina Sādhus are directed to concentrate on study and meditation for the three-fourths of daily routine.⁵ In the Jaina Āgamas⁶ and the *Niryuktis*,⁷ the term 'Yoga' has been mostly used in the sense of concentration of mind with numerous classifications and sub-classifications. Even Tattvārtha⁸ refers to dhyāna and the Dhyāna-Śataka of Jinabhadra Gaṇi Kṣamā Śramaṇa is only explication of the notion of dhyāna. Hence, Yoga has been rooted in the Āgamic tradition.

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1. Das Gupta, S. N. : Philosophical Essays, Calcutta University, 1941, p. 179.
 2. Ibid, History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 226.
 3. Saṅghavī, S. : Darśana aur Cintana, Gujrat Vidya Sabha, Ahmedabad, 1957, p. 245.
 4. Uttarādhyayana-sūtra, Ch. 24.
 5. Ibid, Ch. 26.
 9. Sthānāṅga-sūtra, IV. 1; Samavāyāṅga-sūtra, IV; Bhagavati-sūtra, XXV. 7; Uttarādhyayana-sūtra, XXX. 35.
 7. Āvaśyaka Niryukti (Kāyotsarga), Gāthā 1462-1486.
 8. Umāswatī : Tattvārtha-sūtra, IX. 7.

[IV]

But it was Haribhadra who for the first time gave an altogether new dimension in the interpretation of Yoga. It is only Haribhadra who defined the term 'Yoga' in the sense of 'what leads one to emancipation' (*mukhena, jayano savvo vi dhammovavaro*).¹ Thus he has ushered a new era in the Yoga-literature of the Jains. He wrote important Yoga treatises like Yoga-bindu, Yoga-dr̥ṣṭi-sammuccaya, Yoga-vimśikā, Yoga-śataka and Śoḍaśaka. The term Yoga used in the general sense of subduing the senses and the mind and the process of concentration and ecstasy even in the earlier stages of the Jaina thought as well as the early Buddhist thought. But the terms Jñāna (dhyāna) and Sāmādhi were more in vogue than the term Yoga. It is only in the Yoga-sūtra of Patañjali that we find the proper location of dhyāna in the eight-fold process of Yoga, for the first time.² Haribhadra's in his characteristic catholic outlook did not discuss and interpret Yoga according to the Jaina tradition only but he made a comparative and critical study of Patañjali's Yoga³ etc. The description of eight-fold standpoints⁴ in the Yoga-dr̥ṣṭi-sammuccaya is altogether a new dimension in Yoga literature.

All spiritual and religious activities that lead towards emancipation are considered by Haribhadra as Yoga. His ingenuity lies in the yogic interpretation of the Jaina doctrine of Spiritual development (Guṇa-sthāna). The soul has inherent capacity for emancipation but this capacity remains dormant and inactive due to Kārmic influences. But the soul can be roused to active spiritual exertion which is nothing other than yogic activities. The Jains do not believe either in the

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1. Haribhadra : Yoga Vimśikā, Kārikā 1.
 2. Tatia, N. M. : Studies in Jaina Philosophy, Jaina Cultural Research Society, Varanasi, 1951, p. 261.
 3. Haribhadra : Yoga-binbu, 418, 420.
 4. Haribhadra : Yoga-dr̥ṣṭi-sammuccaya, Kārikā 13.

eternal revelation of the truth like the Mimāṃsakas and the Vedāntins, or, in its revelation by a Supreme Divinity like the Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas and the Patañjali-yoga. Only rare souls known as Tirthaṅkaras, who have acquired potency of revealing the truth and preaching it to the world by their moral and virtuous activities can also help in arousing us from moral slumber. The centrifugal tendency of soul to run away from the fetters of world existence is thwarted by a centripetal force of attachment (rāga), repulsion (dveṣa)¹ and perverted attitude (mithyātva). However, the soul, when it achieves purification feel uneasiness with the worldly existence and shows manifestation of energy known as Yathāpravṛttakaraṇa for the spiritual advancement. But the struggle between the two-fold processes, centrifugal and the centripetal² continues unless the soul develops such spiritual strength as is destined to lead it to final emancipation by reducing the duration and intensity and also the mass of Kārmic-matter through the triple processes of Yathāpravṛttakaraṇa, apūrvakaraṇa and anivṛttikaraṇa.³ The soul then starts climbing up the spiritual ladders of Upaśamaśreṇī (ladder of subsidence) and Kṣapakaśreṇī (ladder of annihilation) upto the final fourteenth stage of absolute motionlessness.

Haribhadra's style of describing the fourteen stages of spiritual development through the process of Yoga is original and illuminating. While discussing, he has mentioned the names of many Yogīs⁴ and treatises on Yoga. A crucial

1. Viśeṣaśāstra-bhāṣya, Yaśovijaya Jaina Granthamālā No. 35, Gāthā 1194.
2. Ibid, Gāthā 1204-1217.
3. (a) Tattvārtha-rāja-vārttika of Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka, Kāśī, 1935, p. 327.
(b) Labdhisāra of Nemicaṇḍra, R. J. S., No. 8, Nirṇaya Sagar Press, 1916, p. 35.
4. Gopendra (Yoga-bindu, Verse 200), Kālātīta (Yoga-bindu, Verse 300); Patañjali, Bhaṇḍanta Bhāskarabandhu,

problem is posed by Haribhadra to know the real point of the beginning of the spiritual development of soul desiring salvation in the timeless world of attachment. According to Haribhadra, when the influence of deluding Karma start decreasing, the process of spiritual development starts.¹ The state prior to this beginning, of the spiritual development is called 'Acaram Pudgala Parāvarta', while the posterior state is called 'Caram Pudgala Parāvarta'.² Between these two poles of *Acaram* and *Caram*, we have the different stages of spiritual development.³ Here in the process of Yoga begins, which causes simplicity, humility, catholicity, benevolence and other virtues in the soul. The emergence of these ethical virtues are the outer signs of the spiritual development of the soul.

The special feature of Haribhadra is his comparative studies in Yoga. For example, in *Yoga-vimśikā*, wherein five kinds of activities (*Sthāna*, *Ūrṇa*, *Artha*, *Ālambana* and *Anā-lambana*) divided into external activity (*Karma-yoga*) and internal spiritual activity (*Jñāna-yoga*)⁴, are discussed, Haribhadra has tried to correlate them with stages of spiritual development (*Guṇa-sthāna*). For example, these activities can be properly practised only by those who have attained the fifth or a still higher stage of *Guṇa-sthāna*. In this way, Haribhadra correlates the different stages of *Guṇa-sthānas* to the different stages of concentration (*dhyāna*).⁵ Haribhadra compares *anālambana-yoga* with *samprajñāta samādhi* in

Bhagavadantavādī (*Yoga-dṛṣṭi-sammuccaya*, Verse 16, *Ṭikā*).

1. *Yoga-nirṇaya* (*Yoga-dṛṣṭi-sammuccaya*, Verse 16, *Ṭikā*).
2. *Muktyādveśa-dvātriṃśikā*, Verse 28.
3. *Saṅghavī*, S. : *Ibid*, p. 264.
4. Haribhadra, *Yoga-vimśikā*, I. 2; *Ṣoḍaśaka-prakaraṇa* of Haribhadra with Yaśobhadra's commentary, Jamanagar, 1982, XIII. 4; XIV. I.
5. *Yoga-vimśikā*, I. 18.

Patañjali's system¹, the final consummation of anālambara concentration is Asamprajñāta samādhi. Similarly, the fourteenth stage of spiritual development corresponds to the dharmamegha samādhi of Patañjali's system, to amṛtātman of yet another system, to bhavaśatru of a third system, to Śivodaya of yet another, to Sattvānanda of yet others and to *para* of yet another school.² Similarly, Haribhadra tries to show the unanimity of the conception of final self-realization of all the systems of thought. Haribhadra enumerates eight primary defects³, from which the mind of a *yogin* must always be free. By practising the concentration of mind the soul realizes itself. This is known as Supreme bliss (Paramānanda) in the Vedānta, the extinguished lamp (vidhmatādīpa) of the Buddhists, extinction of animality (paśutvavigama), end of suffering (dukkhānta), freedom from the specific qualities (Nyāyavaiśeṣika), and detachment from the elements (bhūta-vigama).⁴ Like an impartial truth-seeker, Haribhadra asks the seekers to keep their minds open and investigate the truth with perfect detachment and freedom from prejudices.

Similarly, Haribhadra shows that there is a fundamental unity among all apparently conflicting systems of thought regarding the means to free from the worldly existence. He asks us to see unity in diversities. He lays down five steps as a complete course of Yoga, i. e., Contemplation of truth (adhyātma), Repeated practice (bhavanā), Concentration of mind (dhyāna), Equanimity (samatā) and Annihilation of all the traces of karman (Vṛttisaṃkṣaya).⁵ The same principle,

1. Yoga-vimśikā, I. 20.
2. Yaśovijaya's Tīkā on Yoga-vimśikā of Haribhadra, p. 20; Yoga-bindu of Haribhadra, Jaina Granthamala Prakashaṅkha Sabha, Ahmedabad, Series No. 25, 1940, p. 422.
3. Śoḍaśaka-prakarāṇa of Haribhadra with Yaśobhadra's Tīkā, XIV. 2-3; XVI. 14.
4. Ibid, XVI. 1-4.
5. Yoga-bindu, pp. 17-18 (with Svopajñavṛtti).

according to Haribhadra, is expressed by different terms. It is Puruṣa in the Vedānta as well as the Jaina system, as Jñāna in the Buddhist school, Kṣetravit in the Sāṃkhya system. Similarly, the fundamental ground of worldly existence is called Avidyā (Vedānta and Buddhism), Prakṛti (Sāṃkhya), Karman (Jainas). Similarly, the relation between matter and spirit is known as Bhrānti (Vedānta and Buddhism), Pravṛtti (Sāṃkhya) and Bandha in Jaina system¹. Haribhadra referring to Gopendra of the Sāṃkhya System holds that the Puruṣa does not even enquire about the path of realization unless the Prakṛti has turned her face from it. In other words, it is the nature of the Spirit to get disentangled from matter. For this requisite purification of the soul is very necessary. Then the soul becomes a Bodhisattva or Tīrthaṅkara.² When a man becomes a *bodhisattva*, there is no mere spiritual degeneration to him.³ He does not commit evil or sin, on the contrary, he is keen exclusively in the well-being of others, acquires wisdom, treads upon right path and appreciates merit.⁴ Haribhadra compares the Jaina conception of Tīrthaṅkaras with the Bodhisattvas.⁵ He distinguishes three categories of souls destined to be emancipated—Tīrthaṅkaras⁶, Gaṇadharas⁷ and Muṇḍa-kevalins.⁸ Haribhadra's contribution also lies in suggesting five-fold stages of preliminary preparation for Yoga as we find in Patañjali's scheme of *Yama and Niyama*. As we have referred earlier, the stages of the soul

1. Yoga-bindu of Haribhadra with Svopajñavṛtti, pp. 17-18.

2. Ibid, p. 270.

3. Ibid, p. 271.

4. Ibid, p. 272.

5. Ibid, p. 274.

6. Ibid, pp. 284-288.

7. Ibid, p. 289.

8. Ibid, p. 290.

are adhyātma¹, bhāvanā², dhyāna, Samatā³ and the last Vṛttisaṃkṣaya⁴. Here the accumulated and obscuring karmas are destroyed for ever and the soul attains omniscience⁵ and final emancipation.

In Yoga-dṛṣṭi-samuccaya⁶, Haribhadra presents a novel plan of classification of Yogic stages. The core of this scheme is the concept of Dṛṣṭi which means attitude towards truth. The most important feature of spiritual development is acquisition of love of truth (Saṃyag-dṛṣṭi). The gradual purification of its love of truth takes place corresponding to the purification of soul. So long the soul has not cut the knot and attained purification, our attitude is bound to be wrong, and perverse called as avidyā, mithyātva or darśana-moha. Without purification of the soul, we can have only common place attitude (ogha-dṛṣṭi) as opposed to right attitude (ṣaḍ-dṛṣṭi) or attitude of the spiritually advanced soul (yoga-dṛṣṭi). Haribhadra listed eight kinds⁷ of gradual development of love of truth (dṛṣṭi) corresponding to the eight-fold stages of Patañjali's Yoga. Haribhadra refers to the consensus of opinion of a number of authors regarding the stages of Yoga in his Svopajñavṛtti.⁸ His love of truth is so great that he can never be sectarian. Haribhadra asks us to realize the truth by means

1. Yoga-bindu of Haribhadra with Svopajñavṛtti, pp. 17-18, pp. 358-359.
2. Ibid, pp. 360-361.
3. Ibid, pp. 364-365.
4. Ibid, p. 31.
5. Ibid, pp. 366-367.
6. Yoga-dṛṣṭi-samuccaya of Haribhadra, ed. Prof. L. Suali, Ahmedabad, 1912, p. 12.
7. The eight love of truth (dṛṣṭis) are — 1. Mitra (YDS, p. 22, pp. 22-40), 2. Tārā (YDS, pp. 41-48), 3. Bala (YDS, pp. 49-50) 4. Dīpta (YDS, pp. 57-58), 5. Sthira (YDS, pp. 152-154), 6. Kānta (YDS, pp. 160-162), 7. Prabha (YDS pp. 168-169), 8. Para (YDS, p. 179).
8. Ibid, p. 16.

of all the three organs — scripture, logic and practice of *Yoga* in keeping with best tried and trusted tradition of India. The truth is one. It cannot be many. There is only the difference of angles or terminology. *Yoga* is not the monopoly of a particular sect or system. It is based on direct experience of the seers and lovers of truth. Differences in terminologies of different system about the same concept is illustrated by Haribhadra. For example, the state of final realisation is known as *Sadāśiva* in one system, *Parabrahmana* in another, *Siddhānta-tman* in the third and *tathatā* in another system.¹ Hence, there can be no conflict when the truth is realised. Controversies take place only when the truth has not been realized² as an empty pot sounds much. The various revelations have to be understood from various contexts and angles. The love of truth (*dr̥ṣṭis*) give us the power to cultivate faith in spiritual revelations. Similarly, referring to the seventh *dr̥ṣṭi* (*ṛabha*), Haribhadra compares it with *Visabhāga-Parikṣaya* in the Buddhist School, *Praśāntavāhita* in the *Sāṃkhya* and *Śivavartman* in the *Śaiva* system, and as *dhruvādhvan* in the *Mahāvartikas*.³

Besides these eight-fold *dr̥ṣṭis* corresponding to the eight steps of *Yogic-sādhana* in *Patañjali*, Haribhadra refers to the three-fold *Yoga* — The first stage is *Icchā Yoga* when in spite of knowledge and will, the *Yogic* practitioner falters in his practice on account of inertia (*Pramāda*).⁴ The second stage is called *Sāstra Yoga*⁵, wherein the practitioner does never falter in his *yogic* practices, strictly follows the scriptural injunctions and has developed penetrating insight. The third and the last stage of *Yoga* is *Sāmarthya Yoga*⁶, when

1. *Yoga-dr̥ṣṭi-samuccaya*, p. 157, p. 128.

2. *Ibid*, p. 130.

3. *Ibid*, pp. 173-174.

4. *Ibid*, p. 3.

5. *Ibid*, p. 4.

6. *Ibid*, p. 5.

he has fully mastered the scriptural injunctions and has developed the power to transcend them. There are the three broad divisions of all the possible stages of Yoga and the eight-fold *dr̥ṣṭis* are only the elaboration of these three.¹ Similarly, Haribhadra's four-fold classification of Yogins, viz., *gotra*, *kula*, *pravṛttacakra* and *niṣpanna*. The first are not incapable of emancipation while the last have already achieved their final state. Hence, it is only the *Kula* and *Pravṛttacakra* yogins who need yogic instruction.²

In spite of these resemblances, there are fundamental differences also with the mystical way adopted by the Jaina monk. Yoga-system of Patañjali has not recognised the imperativeness of mystical conversion. Probably, it confuses moral with the mystical conversion, the importance of initiation by a Guru, and the necessity of seeking his guidance at every step, the possibility of fall from certain heights, i. e., dark-nights of the soul, the significance of *Pratikramaṇa* and *Pratyākhyāna*. Haribhadra knew these differences but he wanted to establish a unity among the different systems of Indian thought. The process of spiritual development as traced in *Yoga-dr̥ṣṭi-samuccaya* is different from that we find in *Yoga-bīndu*. *Yoga-vimśikā* does not describe the preliminary stages of spiritual development but it discusses adequately about the later stages. Altogether, Haribhadra's studies in *Yoga-vidyā* is a landmark in Indian spiritual *sādhana*.



1. *Yoga-dr̥ṣṭi-samuccaya*, p. 12.

2. *Ibid*, pp. 206-207, pp. 208-210.

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About the Author

Dr. Ramjee Singh needs no introduction as a Jaina scholar. He has published his book on the *Jaina Concept of Omniscience* from L. D. Institute, Ahmedabad in 1974. Besides, he has presented many learned papers on Jainism both in India and abroad. His association with various Jaina institutions in the country and outside is well known. He has a Ph. D. and D. Litt. in Philosophy and also a D. Litt. in Political Science.



As a devoted and dedicated scholar, he has published more than 20 books and about 200 research papers. He has been Chairman of Akhila Bhāratiya Darśana Pariṣad for 6 years and its Secretary for 9 years. He was also a member of the Royal Institute of Philosophy (London), Mind Association (Oxford), Australian Society of Philosophy and Psychology (Sydney), World Jaina Mission, Jaina International, Anuvrat International and a pioneer of Jaina Viśva Bhārati (Jaina University), Ladnun. He is Secretary of Indian Society of Gandhian Studies and also Secretary for Asia of Afro-asian Philosophical Association. He has been nominated as a Member of Indian Council of Philosophical Research. At present he is the Vice-Chancellor of Jaina Viśva Bharati Samsthan, Ladnun, Rajasthan (Deemed to be University) and a former U. G. C. Member of the Panel on Gandhian Studies. He was invited by the World Philosophy Congress at Brighton to deliver a plenary speech. He has travelled far and wide on lecture-giving tour in Africa, Britain, U. S. A., Sri Lanka, Nepal, Paris, Rome etc. He has been also a former member of Indian Parliament.