Jaina Philosophy of Language

by
Prof. Sagarmal Jain

Translated by
Prof. Surendra Verma

Edited by
Dr. Shriprakash Pandey

Parshwanath Vidyapeeth

Prof. Sagarmal Jain's *Jaina Philosophy of Language* is a pioneering work on Jaina Linguistic Philosophy. Prof. Jain in this monumental work, by virtue of the short but self-contained discussions, has succinctly presented the contents of Jaina philosophy of language in a lucid manner. It throws new light on the basic problems of philosophical semantics based on analytical method. There is no gainsaying the fact that Prof. Jaina's this work will be of permanent value to the researchers and the linguists.

The pictures on the front cover depict the Brāhmī alphabates.

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Publisher's Note

Language has been one of the fundamental concerns of the Indian philosophy. Since, the language is one of the strong means of communication of one's thought and expressions, all scholars of thought began their philosophical discussions from the fundamental problems of communication. The Indian approach to the study of language and linguistic problems has been characterised by both analysis and synthesis. Out of these two, the analytical method is older and much popular on which the mansion of Jaina and Buddhist philosophy of language is erected. One can find out the seeds of this analytical method in the theory of *Vibhajyavāda*, the early theory adopted for denotation of words and sentences, in both Jaina and Buddhist traditions.

The present title '*Jaina Philosophy of Language*' is the English rendering of the '*Jaina Bhāṣā-darśana*', the first monograph on the Jaina philosophy of language authored by Prof. Sagarmal Jain which was originally published in Hindi from Bhogilal Laherchand Institute of Indology, Delhi in 1986. The book was well received by the scholars and the researchers. Keeping in view the importance of the work Parshwanath Vidyapeeth decided to bring out its English translation, which, on our request was prepared by Prof. Surendra Verma, Former Deputy Director, Parshwanath Vidyapeeth. We express our sincere thanks to Prof. Verma, for rendering this book into English.

We take this opportunity of expressing our sincere gratitude to Prof. Sagarmal Jain for entrusting this work to us for publication. In his monumental work, by virtue of the short but self-contained discussions, Prof. Jain has succintly presented the contents of Jaina philosophy of language in a lucid manner. On the occasion of publication of this book, we salute to him with heart-felt regards.

We are very thankful to Dr. Shriprakash Pandey, Assistant Director at Parshwanath Vidyapeeth for editing this work meticulously. He not only edited the present work but also translated some portions of the book, which were lost from the translated manuscript, and managed it also through the press.

We are thankful to Prof. Maheshwari Prasad, Director, Parshwanath Vidyapeeth for his valuable suggestions and co-operation made towards its publication.

We are thankful to the authorities of Bhogilal Laherchand Institute of Indology for permitting us to publish this English rendering.

Our thanks are also due to Rajesh Computers and Vardhaman Mudranalaya for excellent composing and printing respectively.

We hope that this work will arouse the interest of the scholars towards Jaina philosophy of language and further extensive studies will be instituted.

Indrabhooti Barar
Joint Secretary
Parshwanath Vidyapeeth

The Author's Preface

On the recommendation of Pt. Dalsukhbhai Malvania the Bhogilal Leherchand Bharatiya Sanskrit Sansthan, Patna invited me in 1983 to deliver few lectures. The subject of the lectures was left to my choice. I could have selected Jaina metaphysics, Jaina Logic or Jaina Ethics, but I thought, on these subjects enough is already said. I therefore, decided to select a subject, which was on the one hand related to the problems of contemporary Philosophy and on the other hand, which underlines the importance of the Jaina philosophy. Language analysis is one of the main forms of reflexion in the contemporary philosophical world. As such, I decided to deliver my lectures on Jaina philosophy of Language. The present work is an English translation of these very lectures. It gives me great satisfaction to note that some of the problems, which are confronted by the contemporary linguistic analysts, were the same, which the Jaina philosophers had already thought about some 2000 years back. What we are presenting today as a new form of contemporary philosophy was, in fact, a well-thought subject for the thinkers of Indian philosophy some 2000 years back. The present work is a pioneer work on the Jaina linguistic philosophy. I think, there is a need for serious thought and writing and comparative study in this field. In the present work I have given only some indications and suggestions for the relevant comparisons but hope on this basis, there will be more serious and comparative studies in future. The lectures have there own limitations and time considerations. As such, either I have not touched all the aspects of the subject or have presented them in very condensed manner as aphorism. The Jaina *Ācāryas* have written a lot on the subject right from Jaina Āgamic literature like *Bhagavatī-sūtra, Prajñāpanā* and *Anuyogadvāra-sūtra* to the *Bhāṣārahasya-prakaraṇa* of Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya (17th cent. AD). The present work is only an indicator.

Further, I very well know my own limitations of knowledge and studies. I cannot, therefore, claim to have given in the work the final and ultimate analysis of Jaina linguistic philosophy. The suggestions and guidance of the scholars are always welcome. I am not an expert of Western

linguistic philosophy too. As such in this context also my comments should open for further discussions.

In the first chapter of this work we have discussed development of linguistic philosophy and the problems of Jaina philosophy of Language. We have also discussed the theory of *vibhajyavāda*, which is an early form of the philosophy of language. The second chapter deals mainly with the origin of language, the relation between thought and language, the types and the fundamental materials of which the language is made. Besides, the question of script is also dealt with. The third chapter concerns itself with words, their nature, their atomic form, their transience, and their relation with their meaning, method of naming, their particularity and their universality. In this chapter the doctrines of *Sphoṭa* and *Apoha* are also critically examined. Along with it *Ākṛtivāda* and its relation with the Jaina philosophy is also made clear. The fourth chapter is mainly devoted to the nature of sentence. In this chapter various philosophical views regarding the nature of sentence as *Abhihitānvayavāda* and *Anvitābhidhānavāda* etc. are critically examined. In the fifth chapter the *Naya* (viewpoint) and the *Nikṣepa* (Positing) theories of Jaina philosophy regarding determination of meaning are discussed. The sixth chapter deals with the power of words in expressing meaning and the nature of the indescribable (*avaktavyaṁ*). The seventh chapter tries to make clear the relation between language and truth. It is also discussed as to which type of statements come under the category of 'truth' and 'falsehood', and which are above this category. Thus, an attempt is made in the work to present the various aspects of the Jaina philosophy of language.

At the time of the publication of this work, I express my gratitude first of all to Shri Pratap Bhai Bhogilal, the present Trustee of Bhogilal Laherchand Bharatiya Sanskriti Sansthan, Delhi and Dr. V. M. Kulkarni, the Former Director, who not only organized these lectures but also decided to publish them. In the root of all this there was the inspiration of Late Padmabhushan Pt. Dalsukh Bhai Malvania and therefore, I take this opportunity to express my heart-felt gratitude to him which is of course my primary duty. In the present work my articles ('*Sattā kitanī vācya kitanī avācya*'; *Vibhajyavāda: Ādhunika Bhāṣā-viśleṣaṇa kā pūrva rūpa*'; *Jaina Darśana men Jñāna aura Kathana kī satyatā kā Praśna*', which were previously published by '*Parāmarṣa*', and '*Dārśanika Traimāsika*', have

also been incorporated with some revisions. I thank the editors of both the journals for their kind permission to reproduce them.

I extend my hearty thanks to Prof. Surendra Verma who very kindly translated this work in English. Without him this work would have not seen the light of the day. I thanks to Dr. Shriprakash Pandey, the editor of this book who not only took pain of editing the book but also translated some of the portions of lost manuscript and managed it through the press.

It is my pious duty to express my devotion and gratitude to Late Svami Shri Yogindranandaji who very kindly wrote the ''Introduction'' for the book. The smooth publication of this book is really a result of the blessings of my respected father Late Shri Rajamalji Jain and mother Smt. Ganga Bai and the loving cooperation extended to me by my wife Smt. Kamala Jain. I would have not been able to complete this book if my two sons--Shri Narendra and Piyush have not freed me by my family liabilities. I thanks to both of them.

The Parshwanath Vidyapeeth and its quiet surrounding along with its rich library are also some of the important factors responsible in the writing of this book. I therefore, extend my thanks to respected Shri Bhupendra Nathji Jain, Former Secretary, Shri Indrabhooti Barar, the Joint Secretary and Prof. Maheshwari Prasad, Director, Parshwanath Vidyapeeth and the other personnel of the institution.

In preparing the press copy of the Hindi edition and in the proof reading, I was able to avail the cooperation of my colleagues and disciples like Dr. A.P. Singh, Dr. B. R. Yadav, Dr. Ravi Shankar Mishra, Shri Maheshji and others. I am obliged to all of them. I would also like to remember and thanks to all known and unknown friends who participated in the discussions during my lecturers and thus enriched me by their thoughts.

Sagarmal Jain

Forward

The Light of the East *(Prācī-Prabhā)*

The structure of Indian philosophy is such a unique musical instrument, that its all the cards begin to play by mere touch of any of its strings. The reason is obvious. The origin of all the philosophical streams of India is fundamentally one. Why the origins only, their level of flow and the centre of their confluence, are also identical. In the *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* (3.2.8) it is said:

> 'Yathā nadyaḥ syandamānāḥ samudre'staṁ gacchanti nāma rūpe vihāya'

This *mantra* has become all the more touching and attractive in Shri Siddhasena Divākara's words:

'*Udadhīviva sarvasindhavaḥ samudīrṇāstvadhinātha sarvadṛṣṭayaḥ*'

Every philosophical school of India has of course tried to abrogate the other schools but not maliciously. It is only a style of construction, as Shri Madhusudan Saraswati rightly observes:

Upapādanaṁ ca svapakṣasādhanaparapakṣanirākaraṇābhyāṁ bhavati.'

The book entitled, '*Jaina Bhāṣā-darśana*' is no doubt small in size but it has embraced in its fold the beats of the vast field of Sanskrit, Prakrīt and Pāli literature.

It is absolutely truth that our lexicography has its basis in a very ancient tradition. We have mention of a long chain of the *Ṛṣis* (seers) in the treatises dealing with *nighaṇṭu, nirukta, prātiśākhya* and classical grammar. Though there is a great difference between the linguistics and the lexicography, they are nevertheless, mutually infused and all the grand structures are erected on the foundation of words. It is a Herculean task to put together the vast and scattered literature of linguistics, in the Vedic, Jaina and the Buddhist Philosophies. The author of the present work '*Jaina Bhāṣā-darśana*', has confined himself to discuss the Jaina philosophers only but, at the same time, he has given due place to the

thoughts of the Vedic and the Buddhist schools also and has put them first as *pūrva-pakṣa* (plaintiff's statement) for sincere consideration.

Various views regarding the Nature of words

It is not possible to discuss all the aspects of philosophy of language here but I would like to give in brief a metaphysical analysis of 'words' only. What is the nature of a word? Two philosophical views have usually come forward to answer the question: (i) Substantive (*Dravyavādī*) and (2) Attributive (*Guṇavādī*). The Sāṃkhya-Yoga and the grammarians are totally of the substantive view. The Bhāṭṭa School of the Mīmāṃsakas is substantive and his Prabhākara Prasthāna is attributive. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is also attributive. As for as the Jainas are concerned, they can be called as substantive from the one and the attributive from the other point of view. They are substantive because they regard word as a particular mode of the 'material substance' and as also they regard substance and its modes as identical. But because they regard the attribute as non-eternal quality of the object, they can be called 'attributive' also.

The substantive Theories

(a) The word as the Brahman

If the Vedāntins are Brahmādvaitavādins (Absolute Monist) believing in a non-dual *Brahman*, the *Yogācāra Vijñānādvaitavādins* and the grammarians *Śabdādvaitavādins* all the non-duelists regard the living world as an illusion superimposed by the *avidyā* (ignorance). The *Śabdādvaitavāda* though a little different from *Vijñānādvaitavāda* is nevertheless similar to *Brahmādvaitavāda* because the word of the grammarians is identical with the *Brahman* of the Vedānta.

Anādinidhanaṃ Brahma śabdatattvaṃ yadakṣaraṃ /

Vivartate'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ //

Vākyapadīya 1.1

Śāntarakṣita endorse the same in a different manner -

Athāvibhāgamevedaṃ Brahmatattvaṃ sadā sthitaṃ /

Avidyopaplavālloko vicitraṃ tvabhimanyate //

Tattvasaṅgraha 144

In the appearances like *'ghatah san'; 'patah san'* the existence of *Brahman* as real proves to be the material cause of the world. Similarly, in the expressions like *'idaṁ rūpaṁ'*, *'ayaṁ rasaḥ'*, *idaṁ rūpamiti jānīte'*, *'ayaṁ rasa itī jānīte' (Nyāya Bhāṣya* 1.1.4) the word seems to be inherent hence the material cause of the world.

Na so'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte /

Anuddhamiva jñānaṁ sarvaṁ śabdena bhāsate //

Vākyapadīya 1.123

In the Vedānta it is clearly said - *'Ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ, śrotavyaḥ, mantavyaḥ (Bṛhadārańyaka Upaniṣad-*2.5) i.e. see the *ātman*, hear the *ātman*, contemplate the *ātman*...but hearing is possible only of the *'Śabda Brahma'* (Eternal Verbum). Therefore, the realisation of the *Brahman* will be at this lavel only. It is rightly said:

Yadekaṁ prakriyābhedaibahudhā pravibhajyate

Tad vyākaraṇāgamya paraṁ Brahmādhigamyate //

Vākyapadīya 1.22

In the open platform of Vedānta, *Brahman* as one, has appeared in its various roles, but Vedāntins were not able to recognise it. They remained only gazing at it; but as soon as He (the *Brahman*) entered the grammarian's courtyard, was able to be perceived by their auditory sense.

(B) Word defined as Sphoṭa

Another name of *'Śabda Brahma'* is *sphoṭa*. Shri Maṇḍana Miśra has established the existence of *sphoṭa*, besides that of letters and terms in the following one sentence:

''Pratyekamapratyāyakatvāt, sāhityābhāvāt, niyatakramavartinā-mayaugapadyena sambhūyakāritvānupaptte tasmād varṇavyatirekiṁ varṇebhyo'sammantarthapratyayaḥ svanimitta-mupakalpayati''

(Sphoṭasiddhi-p.28).

It means, if we regard letters (A, B, C, etc.) as word, how can then we shall be able to comprehend meaning? Neither the every letter nor the aggregates of the perishable letters are indicator of meaning? The terms *'rasaḥ'* or *'saraḥ'* etc. have two letters but their succession makes difference in the meanings. As the aggregates of letters can not give only

one meaning, in the similar way the comprehension of many different objects simultaneously from the word is not possible. *Śabda,* maintains Maṇḍana, cannot refer to the individual phonemes because in themselves they convey no meaning. In common experience the whole word is the unit of language that is taken to be meaning-bearing. The common man takes a noun or verb to be a unity signifying meaning- without reference to the plurality of letters and syllables, which are the products of speculative thought. As such, we have to recognize the essence of a word in the form of *sphoṭa,* which is different from words but which nevertheless, finds expressions in the form of terms and sentences etc. and manifest their meaning. In more philosophic terminology *sphoṭa* may be described as the transcendent ground in which the spoken syllables and conveyed meaning find them united as word or *śabda.* Maṇḍana makes clear that it is the *sphoṭa* or felt word-unity that is capable of conveying meaning and therefore, is the essential characteristic- without which it would cease to be what it is. This *sphoṭa* is unique, one without the other. But it is described in various ways - like *Varṇa-sphoṭa, Pada-sphoṭa* etc. in accordance with the degrees of expressiveness. In Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya,* we have systematic philosophical analysis of the *sphoṭa.* He, explaining the process of *sphoṭa* says that 'At first the word exists in the mind of the speaker as a unity or *sphoṭa.* When he utters it, he produces a sequence of different sounds so that it appears to have differentiation. The listener, though first hearing a series of sounds, ultimately perceives the utterance as a unity- the same *sphoṭa* with which the speaker began- and then the meaning is conveyed' (*Vākyapadīya* 1.44). Bhartṛhari has besides, mentioned three more views regarding word, which, accept word as mode of any substance:

Vāyoraṇūnāṁ   jñānasya   śabdatvāpattiriṣyate /

Kaiścid darśanabhedo hi pravādeṣvanavasthitaḥ //

Vākyapadīya 1.107

These views regard 'word' as function of *Vāyu* (Air), *Paramāṇu* (Atom) and *Jñāna* (Knowledge) respectively.

(E) Word as a function of Air

Ācārya Pāṇini in his work has mentioned the successive origin of word in the following manner:

''Ātmā budhyā sametyārthān mano yuṅkte vivakṣayā /

Manaḥ kayāgni māhanti sa prerayati mārutam //

mārutastūrasi caru mandraṁ janayate svaram.''

It means, whenever a person wants to say something, then he, in accordance with his desire through internal efforts makes his *Prāṇavāyu* (air which is instrumental in producing sound) hot and upward moving. Then it strikes the roof of the skull, and (rubbing the throats) converts into words. Bhartṛhari also supports the same process:

Labdhakriyaḥ prayatnena vakturicchānuvartinā /

Sthāsvabhihato vāyuḥ śabdatvaṁ pratipadyate //

Vākyapadīya 1.108

Thus the word is regarded as a function of air.

(D) Word as a Function of Atoms

The commentators of *Pātañjala Mahābhāṣya* regard this theory as belonging to the Sāṁkhya School, which maintains that the *Tanmātras* (rudimentary element viz. *Śabda* (speech), *Sparśa* (touch), *Rūpa* (form), *Rasa* (taste) and *Gandha* (smell) are of the form of atoms, which generates the words:

'' Sāṁkhyaśāstre ye tanmātrapadenocyanteḥ te^ca paramāṇu-padenābhipretā '' Vākyapadīya p. 168.

Bhartṛhari, himself said that there are numerous powers in atoms. They are having split and combination, and transform themselves in the form of shades, heats, darkness and words.

Aṇavaḥ sarvasaktitvād bhedasaṅsargavṛttayaḥ /

Chāyātapatamaḥ śabdaḥ bhāvena pariṇāminaḥ //

Vākyapadīya 1.110

Jaināchāryas endorse the same view. They also regard words as material (modes of matter). We will discuss it somewhere else but here it is worth noting as to why the author of *Vākyapadīya* has shown so much indifference towards the Jaina view, which is so detailed and is so clear.

(E) Word as a function of knowledge

The *vṛtti* of *antaḥkaraṇa* is called as *jñāna* here. It transforms itself into word. It is also accepted by the celebrated commentator *Ācārya* Patañjali, as he says -*athavā jyotirvajjñānāni (Mahābhāṣya* p. 366). Thus, all these three views also can be regarded in a way 'substantive' because to accept a word as a mode of a function or transformation of substance is to regard it in other sense, a substance. However, all these views accept the word as a transformation or a mode of reality, whether it is a transformation of *Brahman*, or that of *Pudgala* or *Prakṛti* (matter) or of *Vāyu* (air) or *Jñāna* (consciousness or knowledge).

Whether the word is a substance or an attribute, this is an old debate. On the one hand the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas support the substance theory of the word and on the other hand the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regard words as attribute.

Word: Substance or attribute

Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita reads:

> *Śrotamātrendriyagrāhyaḥ śabdaḥ śabdatvajātimān /*
>
> *Dravyaṁ sarvagato nityaḥ Kumārilamate mataḥ //*
>
> *Mānameyodaya p. 208*

The Vaśeṣikas regard word as an attribute of *ākāśa* (space), transitory (*kṣamika*) and non-all-pervasive (*avibhu*)-'*Śabdo 'ambaraguṇa kṣaṇikaḥ pradeśavṛtti' (Praśastapāda-bhāṣya* (p.692). The theory was refuted as the following aphorisms read- '*Guṇatvāsiddhe' (Nyāyaratna,* p. 738); '*Nityastu syāt '(Jaimini-sūtra* 1/1/18); '*sarvatrayaugapadyāt' (Jaimini-sūtra* 1/1/19*).* The Naiyāyikas also shared the debate and supporting the Vaiśeṣika's view said that the attributeness of the word (*ākāśaguṇatā*) cannot be refuted - *yadidaṁ nākāśaguṇaḥ śabdaḥ iti, ayamanumayantaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ, aasparśatvāt śabdāśrayasya (Nyāya-bhāṣya* p.100);'*upapadyante tarhi varṇavikārāḥ' (Nyāya- bhāṣya* p.108).

Thus the corresponding views supported their own stand and refuted the other's views. While establishing the words as 'substance' it was argued that the sense organs receive direct only the substance like '*ghaṭa*' etc. The word also is received directly through the relation of inherence with auditory sense (*śrota-samavāya*), hence the word is also

substance. Shri Udayanācārya has used a valid opposite argument to it: '*Śabdo na dravyaṁ, bahirindriyavyavasthāhetutvāt rūpādivat*' (*Nyāya-Kusumāñjali* 2/1). That is to say, as the eyes see the form and the tongue receives the taste, similarly, the sense organ by which a word is received is the auditory sense. Thus, like the attributes of form and the taste, a word also being received by the auditory sense is as an attribute and not the substance. Refuting the so-called fundamental-inference (*mūlāumāna*), Udayanācārya said -'*na hi śrotraguṇatve dravyatve vā'siddhe sākṣāt sambandhena śabdasya grahaṇe pramāṇamasti*'. This discussion regarding the merit and demerit is very old and long indeed. Bhāṭṭa are determined, however, in their contention that the word is one, eternal and permanent substance.

The speaker produces a short of vibration in air by his effort in pronouncing (the word) and the vibration tears the numb air in his orifice of the ear (*karṇaśaśkulī*) and gives expression to the word.

Pārthasārathī Miśra has gone so far as to say that if the word at all is to be regarded an attribute, it could be an attribute of air rather than of *ākāśa* -'*satyapi guṇatve vāyuguṇatvāt*' (*Nyāya-Ratnāvalī*, p. 738). Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, in this context has added a new dimension when he says that it would be better to regard direction (*diśā*) as *śrota* rather than the empty-space (*ākāśa*) covered by the orifice of the ear (*karṇa-śaṣkulī*), because in the *pralaya* every modification merges in its own nature (*Prakṛti*). The word (the heard-word) like wise get merged in the direction-'*Diśaḥ śrotaṁ*' (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* -3.2.13).

The word is an attribute

(a) **Prabhākara's opinion:** Śālikanātha Miśra says that we receive only those words, which are within our hearing-space. The word *prāpti* (to receive) here means *Samavāya* (inherence). The word is an attribute of auditory sense pervaded with *ākāśa* (empty-space)-'*Pariśeṣyāt samavāyaḥ prāptiḥ, ākāśaguṇaḥ śabdaḥ*' (*Prakaraṇa-pañcikā* p. 424).

(b) **Naiyāyika's opinion:** It is not reasonable to refute the fact that *Śabda* is an attribute of *Ākāśa*- '*yadidaṁ nākāśaguṇaḥ śabdaḥ iti pratiṣidhyate, ayamanupapannaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ, aasparśatvācchabdasya* (*Nyāya-bhāṣya*, p.100).'

(c) Vaiśeṣika's opinion: *Śabda* is an attribute but it is not an attribute of earth etc. Instead, it is an attribute of space- *'Pariśeṣālliṅgamākāśas/ya'* (*Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* 2/1/27). The word originates from combination (saṁyoga), division (*vibhāga*) and word (*śabda*) - *'Saṁyoganādavibhāgācca śabdācca śabda niṣpattiye'* (*Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* 2/3/31).

The debate on Sphoṭavāda (Theory of *Sphoṭa,*-a meaning bearing unit of language)

Sāṁkhya: Maharṣi Kapila, the founder of the Sāṁkhya School is opposed to the theory of *sphoṭa*. He asks whether does the word '*sphoṭa*' convey the meaning of *sphoṭa* or not? If yes, then the word itself is enough to convey the meaning and the postulation of *sphoṭa* is useless. If it does not, then the *sphoṭa* cannot be established because it fails to convey the meaning '*Pratītyapratītibhyāṁ na sphoṭātmakaḥ śabdaḥ*' (*Sāṁkhya-sūtra* 5/57). The three-fold *ahaṁkāra* (ego) is regarded as the origin of *Śabda* and this is quite reasonable - '*Taśmād guṇaśca ṣoḍaśakaḥ*' (*Sāṁkhyakārikā* -2).

. . **Yoga:** As in the field of grammar the word *Sphoṭa* is propounded, so also Maharṣi Patañjali accepts the significance of *sphoṭa* in the field of the Yoga - '*Śabdārthapratyayānāmitaretarādhyāsāt*' (*Yoga-sūtra* 3-17). It is only the *sphoṭa-śabda*, which is reflected in the form of the meaning (object) and the knowledge. All the three - word, meaning and knowledge are identical. Proper restraint on subtle difference between the three results in the cognition of the dialects of all the living beings.

Vijñāna Bhikṣu has raised three questions regarding *sphoṭa* - *Sphoṭākhyaḥ śabdaḥ kīdṛśaḥ? Kiṁ kāraṇakaḥ?* and *Kiṁ pramāṇakaḥ* (*Yoga-vāśiṣṭha* -3/16) i.e. What is the nature of *sphoṭa-śabda?* What is the cause of *sphoṭa* ? and what is the proof for *sphoṭa?*

1. What is the nature of Sphoṭa? In response to this question it is said that the manner in which a tree is different from its various stages of gradual development like seed, the sprout (*Aṅkura*) etc. and yet it becomes a single unitary organism '*ayameka āmravṛkṣaḥ*' (this is a mango tree), so also the three syllables of a word - 'cow'(c,o,w) - with their progressive stages emerges as one word -'cow' (*Gaurityekaṁ padaṁ*). Thus the unitary whole expressed 'word' is known as *sphoṭa.*

2. What is the cause of Sphoṭa? A particular sound produced by an effort is the cause of *sphoṭa*.

3. What are the proofs for Sphoṭa? The usage of the terms like *'Gaurityekaṁ padaṁ'* is a proof for *sphoṭa*. There are so many letters like *'c'*, *'o'* and so on. It is not possible to enfold them as one single linguistic unit. Moreover, the letters fail to convey the meaning individually and this also accomplishes the *'sphoṭa'*.

As far as the opinion of the Jaina philosophers regarding the word is concerned, they present a synthetic viewpoint.

The Jaina's view regarding the Nature of Word

The Jaina philosophers have regarded words on the one hand as modes of matter (*Pudgala-paryāya*) and on the other hand in a form of language, cognitive also. Ācārya Umāsvāti in his *Tattvārtha-sūtra* (5-24), while discussing the various modes of matter, has described the word also as a mode of matter. The *Uttarādhyayana-sūtra*, an ancient *Āgama* also depicts words etc. as characteristics of the matter.

Sadda'ndhayāra-ujjo-o pahā chāyā''tave i vā /

Vaṇṇa-rasa-gandha-phāsā puggalāṇaṁ tu lakkhaṇam //

(*Uttarādhyayana-sūtra* 28/12)

Ācārya Kundakunda has made this *Āgamic* concept more clear when he says:

Saddo khaṁdhappabhavo khaṁdhoparamāṇusaṅgasaṅdhādo /

Puṭṭhesu tesu jāyadi saddo uppādago ṇiyado //

(*Pañcāstikāyasāra* -79)

A word is born out of *Skandhas* (aggregates) and a *skandha* is produced by the combination of atoms. When there is a friction/collision between them, the word is produced. But to regard a word merely a mode of matter (*Pudgala-paryāya*) does not do justice with the Jaina contention. It is; of course true that the sound of word is a mode of matter and this sound is produced by the material friction (*gharṣaṇa*) of the material lumps (*Pudgala-Piṇḍas*). Again, the matter is of two kinds 'aṇavaḥ skandhāśca' (*Tattvārtha-sūtra* 5.25) i.e. (i) atom and (ii) aggregates of atoms. The matter, which is always the cause and never an effect, is called atom. The atoms are

eternal and subtle. The matter, which is an effect, besides being a cause, is a *skandha* (aggregates). *Skandha,* in Buddhism denotes a *rāśi* or collection or with the components. The transformations of atoms, received by ear (or auditory organ) are called word.

Sansargāt paramāṇavaḥ pariṇatā bhāvāḥ śrutergocarāḥ /

Tadbhedaḥ pratilabdhavarṇapadavākyātmābhilāpaḥ syataḥ //

(*Siddhiviniścāya-ṭīkā,* 9.1)

A word, being a mode (function) of the matter substance, is material. Again, the word has a quality of touch; hence it is a tangible or material. Anantavīryācārya has concluded thus "*skandha śabdaḥ, mūrtatve asmadādipratyakṣatve sati sāvayatvāt paṭādivat*" (*Siddhiviniścaya-ṭīkā* p. 594). As the fire bursts-forth stone-like concrete particles so also the matter produces the audible-words in all the directions. The only difference is that while there is no series of waves produced by fire, the material words do produce such wave series. This is really a miracle of the material power. Matter has infinite powers. All the qualities like form etc. do not necessarily emerge in all the modes of matter. In the (material) mode of word due to absence of the form, the words are not perceptible by eyes. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa has preferred to the Jaina materialistic theory of word as against the imaginative theory of word of the Vaiśeṣikas- '*Jainakapilanirdiṣṭaṁ śabdaśrotādisamarpaṇaṁ sādhīyaḥ,* (*Ślokavārtika-* p. 717). Further, in Jaina philosophy the scriptural knowledge (*Śruta jñāna)* is regarded, as a form of language or word, but it cannot be conceived absolutely a form of matter. The word, in its form of sound is no doubt material but in its form of meaning or comprehension, it is mode of the soul (or self). Therefore, a word particularly in the linguistic form, is neither absolutely material nor of the nature of knowledge, it is rather both. Its expression is material but its meaning is cognitive and as it is expressed through the efforts of the living being, it can also be regarded as a function of knowledge. As such, the Jaina view regarding the nature of word is not one-sided but has many-facets or non-absolutistic. Jainism regards word-sound as modes of matter (*Pudgala-paryāya)* and since the mode is non-separable from the substance it is substance also. In Jaina philosophy, thus, the word is regarded as both, attributive as well as substantive.

We have briefly discussed the different concepts regarding nature of the word. Though we find many differences of the opinion amongst the Indian philosophers regarding the word and its allied subjects, but it is neither our objective to discuss them here nor desirable. The Jainas have entered in the philosophical discussions regarding the word a little late but their main contribution lies in their attempt to synthesize various theories and opinions prevalent in Indian philosophy on the basis of their theory of non-absolutism (*Anekāntavāda*). This can be treated as special characteristics of the Jaina's word-philosophy.

In the present work Dr. Sagarmal Jain has not only discussed the Indian philosophy of language but has also raised many questions of contemporary Western philosophy of language from its perspective, and thus, has tried to make a bridge between the eastern and western philosophy of language. I expect that Dr. Jain's effort will be widely accepted amongst the scholars and attract their attention to this problem.

Swami Yogindranand

Kārtika Pūrṇimā, 2043

Varanasi

CONTENTS

its denotation, Transience of the relationship of word and its meaning, *Sphoṭavāda* (Theory of a meaning bearing unit of the language) and its criticism, Refutation of *Sphoṭavāda, Apohavāda* (Theory of exclusion or double negation) and its refutation, Criticism of *Apohavāda*, The Image theory and Jainism, Terms.

Introduction

Self-expression: Nature of Living Beings

Each and every living being wants to express his feelings and thoughts and thus naturally wants to share with others his knowledge and experience. This innate tendency of 'mutual sharing' is well expressed in *Tattvārtha-sūtra*[1] as '*parasparopagraho jīvānām* (mutual cooperation rendered by the living beings to one another is the law of life) by Jaināċārya Umāsvāti (3rd-4th cent. AD). As a matter of fact this tendency of mutual sharing is the very basis of all social life. We are social because we cannot live without communicating our feelings and experiences to others and the *vice versa*. A prisoner with all the comforts and amenities but without opportunities to express his thoughts and feelings, will of course, find his life totally meaningless and there is all possibility that he may become insane and may commit suicide after some time. Not only the human beings, but also animals and birds cannot live without expressing themselves. In short, it is instinctive, according to the Jaina philosophy, that through the self-expression one shares one's feelings and experiences with others and the others reciprocate them with a sympathetic understanding. Now the question arises as to how the thoughts and experiences are communicated.

Language: the means of Self-expression

All the living beings of the universe express their feelings and experiences in two ways - (I) through body and (2) through sound-signals. It is on the basis of sound signals that the dialects and the languages have been developed. Man is the most fortunate of all the beings that he is endowed with languages for the expression of his thoughts. It is a distinct characteristic of human beings that they are able to express their thoughts and feelings through word-symbols, which are really the systematised forms of meaningful sound-signals. No other living being can

communicate its feelings with such clarity as man can through his word-oriented language. Experience concerning taste for example, cannot be expressed through body or sound-signals with such a clarity. No doubt, language or expression through word symbols is also imperfect, partial and symbolic. Nevertheless, there is no other better medium of expression yet devised.

Language & Philosophy of Language

We have devised a few word-symbols for persons, things, facts, events, actions and feelings and our language is nothing but a well-planned game of these very word-symbols. In short, we have given names to the various things, and it is through these names that we communicate our feelings, thoughts and knowledge of facts to others. We, for example indicate by the word 'chair' a specific article or by the word 'love', a particular feeling. Besides, we have also devised word-symbols for persons, things, qualities, facts, events, activities, and feelings and for their various kinds of relations and for the absence of such relations also. The structure of any language is based on the warp and roof of these very meaningful word-symbols. The language is a structure of well-arranged word symbols, which communicates the knowledge or the feelings of the speaker. There are two branches of knowledge concerning the nature of language (i) linguistics and (ii) philosophy of language and their subject of study is also language. It is also correct that both of them do not study any particular language, they study the general features of language itself. Even then the respective viewpoints and the fundamental problems of these two branches are different. While linguistics is mainly concerned with the structure of language and the development of languages and scripts, philosophy of language deals with the power of expression of language, the relation of word and its expressions and the validity of statements. Linguistics and philosophy of language are thus different from each other. Philosophy of language critically analyses the philosophical problems of language while linguistics is mainly concerned with the structure and nature of language.

Development of philosophy of language in Western thought

Linguistic-analysis is the chief methodology of philosophy in the modern times. If we study the development of Western philosophy,

we find that in the West the philosophies of the ancient, the medieval, the modern and the contemporary periods have their own characteristics. In the ancient times, philosophy was confined to the metaphysics. The fundamental tendency of the ancient Greek philosophy was to discover the basic conceptions underlying life and the world. Philosophical discourses of that period were centered on such fundamental questions as what is the Ultimate Reality? What is its nature? How is the world created? What is the material cause of the world? and the like. The second phase of Western philosophy started with the establishment of Christian religion. It covers a long period starting from 2nd-3rd century AD to 15th century AD. In this phase philosophy was subjected by religion and its chief concern was to prove religious beliefs and the validity of scriptures. The main philosophical tendency of this age was only to prove the nature and existence of God. Reasoning became secondary and faith was primary in this age. The third phase of Western philosophy can be considered beginning with Descartes and Spinoza when the philosophy was emancipated from religion and was established on logico-scientific methodology. The main concern of these philosophers remained metaphysics and epistemology. The real change in the attitude of philosophy of this age started with Locke and Berkeley. The basic concern of these philosophers was not to understand the nature of ultimate Reality first, but to determine the potential and limitations of our knowledge. Before we could take an inquiry into Ultimate Reality, it was necessary to address ourselves first as what is the process of knowing? What is the subject matter of knowledge? Thus, instead of metaphysics or theology, it was epistemology, which became the focal point of philosophical inquiry. The object, the scope and the means of human knowledge became the central subject of discussion, which unfortunately culminated ultimately in scepticism and agnosticism.

The forth phase of Western philosophy starts with the first half of the 20th century A. D. The leading tendency of this period is linguistic analysis. The philosophers of this phase regard language as the basis of all-philosophical thinking, discourses and descriptions. It is contented that all the philosophical discourses are futile unless the nature of language and meaning of words are not properly determined. After all language is the basis of all we think, speak, understand or express. Therefore, we

will have to analyse the nature of language and the meaning it suggests. A prominent philosopher of linguistic analysis W. Wittgenstein says, " I believe that the reason why problems are posed is that the basic of our language is misunderstood"[2]. If we understand the logical process of our language, many of the philosophical problems will disappear themselves. Wittgenstein asserts emphatically that philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday."[3] In contemporary Western philosophy linguistic analysis, thus has become a principal method of philosophical investigation.

It should not be construed from the above-mentioned age-wise classification, however, that in those days other methodologies of philosophical investigations were completely absent. In Greek and the medieval Western philosophy the problems pertaining to philosophy of language were also discussed along with those of epistemology. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle have not only mentioned the philosophical problems of language, they have also tried to analyse the meaning of philosophical concepts. When Socrates, for example asks questions like what is justice? What is knowledge? What is the good etc., then his chief object obviously is to analyse the meanings of these philosophical concepts. When Plato says that there is a single common name for several particular objects, he discovers that common names are given not to particulars but to the ideas similar to them (*Republic* Vol. X. p.496). Similarly, Aristotle infers the independent existence of substance (*Dravya*) from the necessity of a subject in a meaningful sentence. He maintains that verbs denoting activity have no independent existence. We don't say 'sits' or 'walks' etc. but we make expression meaningful and say, 'He sits' or 'He walks' etc. This linguistic feature compels Aristotle to conclude that all activities presuppose some 'actor' who is independent and free. Aristotle calls it substance (*Metaphysics*, Chapter-1). It is interesting to note that Berkeley, a subjective idealist was probably the first Western philosopher who was of the opinion that language does not only communicate ideas (by describing them) but it has other functions also like stirring-up one's feelings, inspiring one for action or restricting one for actions, or giving rise to certain inclinations in the mind (*Introduction to Logic*, Copy p. 33).[4] Thus we see that philosophical analysis of language was prevalent in the past also, but it was at that time only a means and method of

philosophy. Today, however, language-analysis has become the sole function of philosophy. Philosophy now is only language-analysis and nothing else.[5] In every age there is one dominant trend in philosophical inquiry, which is followed by all other branches. In the medieval age, for example, theology became prominent and it influenced the metaphysical and epistemological discussions of the age. Similarly, in contemporary thinking, language analysis is the basic trend, which examines the validity of our metaphysical, epistemological and ethical statements.

Development of philosophy of language in Indian thought

So far as Indian philosophy is concerned, it too, of course begins with metaphysical questions. The ultimate reality, life and universe were in the centre of early Indian philosophical discussions. With the advent of the sixth century BC, bondage or sufferings, the cause of bondage and emancipation from sufferings and the means of emancipation became the basic issues, and the focus was shifted from metaphysics to ethics or moral philosophy. But with the development of philosophical thoughts from the very outset of the first century AD, serious discussions began on the various problems of epistemology and philosophy of language. Though in ancient Indian philosophical thoughts, along with metaphysical and epistemological problems, regarding defining the describability of the Reality, the philosophy had got entry in the field of linguistics to some extent. Thus, in the ancient Indian philosophical literature one could trace the various problems relating to the philosophy of language. Discussions about the limitations of the language and indescribability of Ultimate Reality are available even in the *Upaniṣads*. Pāṇini and Patañjali unveiled several problems pertaining to philosophy of language on the basis of which Bhartṛhari founded his philosophy of grammar. Further, in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school of orthodox systems and in the Buddhism and Jainism of heterodox systems, serious discussions were held on the problems of word and its denotation, validity of verbal testimony and validity and non-validity of linguistic statements. In the field of Indian philosophy, the whole school of grammarians had made the problem of language a principal problem, though, of course, by propounding *'Śabda-Brahma'* (Eternal Verbum) their thinking took a metaphysical direction. The Buddhists, likewise, had seriously discussed the meaning of word in connection with *'apohavāda'*. Similarly the Mīmāṁsakas had raised

many serious questions regarding philosophy of language while establishing the testimony of the *Vedas*.

As far as the Jainas regarding philosophy of language are concerned, they had entered into discussion with the eternity and the meanings of words much later than Mīmāṁsakas, Grammarians and the Buddhists; nevertheless, the indescribability of Reality, validity of the statements, etc. are such topics of linguistics on which the oldest Jaina *Āgamas* had thrown much light. *Ācārāṅga* clearly mentions the problem of word's expressive capability. In the tenth chapter of *Sthānāṅga* there is discussion on the truthfulness and untruthfulness of language. Similarly, the '*bhāṣā-pada*' chapter of *Prajñāpanā* and the '*nāma-pada*' chapter of *Anuyogadvāra* are very much related with the philosophy of language. *Bhagavatī-sūtra* also mentions some discussions regarding language. The debate regarding the problem of 'continuous-past' (*kriyamāṇa kṛta*) raised by Mahāvīra's son-in-law Jamālī during his lifetime which was also instrumental in spilt in the order, was also related with the philosophy of language. In the beginning of *Bhagavatī-sūtra* and afterwards in the context of Jamālī episode there is detailed discussion on it. All these discussions may be considered as basics of the Jaina philosophy of language. Again the concepts of *Nikṣepa* and *Naya* are also there in the Jaina *Āgamas*. The basic purpose of these concepts is to understand the implicit sense of the statements of the speaker or his intention. Thus, these concepts are also concerned with the science of meaning and philosophy of language. Jaina philosophers like Pūjyapāda, Māṇikyanandī and Prabhācandra have seriously discussed the relation of meaning and word in *Tattvārthavārtika, Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa* and *Nyāyakumudacandra* respectively. We thus find that the tendency of the analysis of language available in Jaina Āgmas has been developed later on in the treatises of Jaina logic. In this essay we have tried to present it systematically.

Problems of Jaina philosophy of language

Besides linguistical analysis, Jaina philosophy of language has dealt with the following fundamental problems like how does the language originate? What is its nature and structure? How does language convey its meanings? Is there any relation between word and its denotation? If so, then what kind of relation is it? Is the expressed meaning of word

general, or specific, universal or particular? What is the limitation of meaning that language can express? Is reality indescribable or inexpressible? What is the relation between language and truth? What is the criterion of judging the truthfulness of a sentence or a statement or a proposition? When is a statement true or false? What are the types of statements, which are beyond the categories of truthfulness or falsehood etc. In the present essay we will try to understand these problems in the Jaina perspective.

Analysis of language in Jaina Tradition: an old reference

It was because of a controversy over linguistic analysis that the first division of the Jaina order took place in the lifetime of Mahāvīra. This amply shows how important linguistic analysis was for the Jainas. The controversy was between Mahāvīra and his own son-in-law Jamālī regarding the meaning of the term *Kriyamāṇa* (Presento-continuous) as to whether it can be regarded as *kṛta* (past done) or not? Mahāvīra was of the opinion that *kriyamāṇa* is *kṛta* while Jamālī regarded *kriyamāṇa* as *akṛta* (not done). In the first explanatory (*uddeśaka*) of the first *śataka* (collection of hundred verses) of *Vyākhyāprajñapti-sūtra* Gautama presents these very questions to Mahāvīra.

"O Lord! Is it proper to call moving as moved, fructifying as fructified, feeling as felt, separating as separated, cutting as cut, piercing as pierced, burning as burnt, dying as dead and exhausting as exhausted?

Yes, Gautama it is so! Moving is moved, fructifying is fructified, feeling is felt, separating is separated, cutting is cut, piercing is pierced, burning is brunt, dying is dead and exhausting is exhausted."[6]

Contrary to it, Jamālī was of the opinion that any ongoing activity till it is accomplished, cannot be called as 'done' *(kṛta)*. In other words whatever is going on is not 'gone' and whatever is burning is not burnt. Jamālī was convinced of this view probably because of a real life-event.

While wandering from village to village Jamālī once arrived with his five hundred disciples at a city called Śrāvastī. He was taken ill there because of the unhealthy food and was suffering from unbearable pain. He asked his disciples to prepare deathbed (*sanstāraka*) for him. They started preparing but restless Jamālī was impatient. He kept asking

time and again whether the bed is ready. The reply was no, it is not yet ready, it is being prepared (*no kaḍe, kajjati*). This event made Jamālī opponent of Mahāvīra's theory of *Kriyamāṇa kṛta'*. He began thinking that Mahāvīra's declaration of moving as moved, fructifying as fructified, feeling as felt, separating as separated, cutting as cut, piercing as pierced, burning as brunt, dying as dead and exhausting as exhausted is not correct, because one can very well see that the deathbed is being prepared, it is really not prepared (*kajjamāṇe akaḍe*). Thus that which is moving is not to be regarded as moved". Thus moving is not 'moved' but 'not-moved', fructifying is not 'fructified' but not-fructified', feeling is not 'felt' but 'not-felt', separating is not 'separated', but not-separated', cutting is not 'cut' but 'not-cut', piercing is not 'pierced' but 'non-pierced', burning is not 'burnt' but 'not-burnt', dying is not 'dead' but 'not-dead' and each exhausting is not 'exhausted' but not-exhausted'.[7]

As a matter of fact, the controversy which took place between Mahāvīra and Jamālī was based on the linguistic-analysis. Mahāvīra was of opinion that though expressions like, being done, being burnt, being cut etc., were, no doubt, commonly used in everyday life, but in principle such linguistic usage were really not correct. What is known as 'present-continuous' is actually not circumscribed to the present only but is spread over the past, the present and the future. The meaning of the substance," I am writing' is that I have written something in the past, that I write in present and that the writing will continue in future also. Mahāvīra however emphasised the past aspect (of the present continuous) and propounded that, that which is 'being done' could be regarded as 'done' *(kriyamāṇa kṛta)*. Jamālī, on the other hand, emphasised the future aspect and regarded 'being done' as 'not yet done' *(kriyamāṇa akṛta)*. Jamālī's view that no activity till it is not fully completed can be regarded as 'done' was not acceptable to Mahāvīra. He was of opinion that before completion of *Kriyamāṇa-kriyā* (Presento-continuous act) at least some part of the work is already done, then how there can we regard the 'being done' as not done? For instance if an individual is walking, then at the time of the statement that 'He is walking', he had already walked a little. Similarly, if something is being burnt then at the time of the statement that 'It is burning', it had already burnt a little. Mahāvīra, therefore, was of the opinion that on the basis of the past aspect 'moving'

be regarded as 'moved' and 'burning' as burnt. In our common parlance also if somebody only leaves for a designation say for Kolkata, we say, he has gone to Kolkata, it does not matter whether he has actually reached there or not. Similarly, if a pant or a shirt is only burnt partly, then also we usually say that the shirt or pant is burnt. It is on the basis of this common usage of language that a worshiper of Mahāvīra named Dhaṅka, a potter by profession rejected Jamālī's contention.

Priyadarśanā, Mahāvīra's daughter and Jamālī's worldly wife was once staying with her fellow nuns at pottery of the potter Dhaṅka. Dhaṅka, one day deliberately put a burning coal on the border of Priyadarśanā's *Sārī*. As a result the corner of the border of *Sārī* was burnt. Seeing that Priyadarśanā exclaimed, Oh! My *Sārī* is burnt." Taking advantage of the occasion Dhaṅka said, "According to your own view, Madam, till an activity is not completed it remains 'not -done'. Burning is not burnt' it is rather 'non-burnt'. In that case till your whole *Sārī* is not burnt, you cannot say it is burnt. It would be false and contradictory to your theory.' Dhaṅka's argument had its right impact and Priyadarśanā could see the point's in Mahāvīra's theory (of *Kriyamāṇa kṛta).*[8]

As a matter of fact the terms like 'moving' 'turning', etc. do not really denote the completion of action, but they nevertheless, do indicate that some activity has already taken place. '*Dahyamāna*' as an imperfective participle (*kṛdaṅta-pada*) at least does denotes that the act of burning is partially accomplished. Further, we regard the act of 'burning' (*dahyamāna*) as of present tense but the present lasts for a moment only. Thus in momentary present to continue any activity is not possible. From the point of view of the momentary present, an activity will be considered either as 'done' or 'not-done'. The moment we make a statement about on going activity, some part of the activity is already accomplished. As such, we can very well regard 'moving' as 'moved'. The moment we pinpoint the activity in present, it becomes part of the past. In fact the term continuous present' is self-contradictory. The ongoing terms like burning, 'moving' etc. cannot literally be regarded as 'burning', moving and so on. For it would imply that the present is not momentary but is of more than a moment's duration. This, of course, is self-contradictory. From the point of view of the past of an action, in the present continuous, which is not yet accomplished, we can regard the activity as 'not-

performed' (*Akṛta*) but this non-performance does not absolutely negate the past accomplishment involved in the activity. As a matter of fact the "continuous present' is indicative of both, the past-performance (*kṛtatā*) and the non-performance (*akṛtatā*). Therefore, to term the present continuous absolutely as 'not-done'(*akṛta*) is not correct. When Mahāvīra rejects Jamālī's contention that action is not accomplished in the present continuous (*kajjamāṇe akaḍe*), he actually rejects the contention in its absolute sense. The moral of the whole discussion is that we must determine the meaning of a word in relation to the context and usage and not in absolute sense.

Vibhajyavāda: the early concept of contemporary philosophy of language

There were many philosophical trends prevalent in India at the times of Mahāvīra and the Buddha. According to Jainas[9], some 363 sects were present at that time in which 180 were *kriyāvādins* (activists), 84 *Akriyāvādins* (non-activists), 32 *Vinayavādins* (followers of prescribed code of conduct) and 67 *ajñeyavādins* (agnostics). Buddhist literature mentions 62 philosophical sects.[10] The Buddha and Mahāvīra studied all these sects and their philosophical controversies and found that all of them had their stand on the one-sided solutions of philosophical problems, and therefore, were against each other. But the one-sided and absolute answers to the metaphysical questions always give rise to misconceptions. The self is eternal or non-eternal? The body and mind are one and the same or different? When the answers of such questions are given with a one-sided view, the true nature of reality is always obscured. All existent and all the events of the world, are complex and complex facts need analysis for the right understanding.

Therefore, Mahāvīra and Buddha developed a method by which they could solve the complicated philosophical and (also) practical problems by analysing them in their different aspects. This method of analysing the questions for their solutions is known as *vibhajyavāda* (Analytic method based on Divisions) in the Jaina and the Buddhist traditions. It is also the analysis of the questions that can give us the real insight into the fundamental problems. It was the reason why the Buddha in many contexts, put aside the metaphysical questions like the

contemporary language-analysts and tried to solve these questions empirically. He maintained that when the metaphysical questions fail to be answered empirically, it is better to keep mum or remain silent. Mahāvīra also gave clear instruction to his disciples that they should adopt the method of analysis (*vibhajyavāda*) only to solve the fundamental as well as the practical questions. They should not make any statement of an absolute nature.[11] The Buddha also called himself a believer in the method of analysis *(vibhajyavādin)*.

The famous Buddhist scripture *Aṅguttaranikāya* presents four method of answering any question - (i) *Ekāṅśavāda* (categorical)- to answer a question with one-sided or absolutistic view; (ii) *Vibhajyavāda* (analytical method)- to answer a question by dividing or analysing its various aspects relatively; (iii) *Pratipraśna* (method of counter-questions) - instead of giving direct answer putting a counter question; (iv) *Avyākṛtavāda* (method of inexplicability)- to declare that the question is not describable or worth answering.[12] The Buddha, with reference to the metaphysical questions, adopted mainly the method of *avyākṛtavāda* and *vibhajyavāda*. Mahāvīra also to some extent, accepted both these methods. With the latter Buddhist philosophers, however, the inexplicability *(avyākṛtavāda)* became the end and the analysis the mean; the result was Nihilism (*Śūnyavāda*). But the latter Jaina philosophers from this very method of analysis developed *Syādvāda* (Doctrine of qualified assertion or Relativism) and *Saptabhaṅgī'* (Doctrine of Seven-fold predications) in which the *avyākṛtavāda* (inexplicable) became one of the predications (*bhaṅga*) as an *avyākṛta-bhaṅga* (indescribable predication). Along with it the "inexplicability' was also accepted in relative terms. Not only this, the Jaina masters synthesised the one-sided method of answering (*ekāṅśavāda*) and incorporated it under their theory of *Syādvāda*. We would of course, discuss latter on in the relevant context that as to how the elements of contemporary linguistic-analysis were already present in the Jaina theory of *Syādvāda* and *Nayavāda* (theory of view-points), but presently as an introductory statement it can be mentioned that the seeds of contemporary language-analysis were present even in the sixth century B.C. in the Buddhist and the Jaina traditions. The literal meaning of *vibhajyavāda* is analytical method. In both Jaina and the Buddhist traditions, *vibhajyavāda* culminated in the theory of *Syādvāda* (Relativism)

and *Śūnyavāda (Nihilism)* respectively and as such, it was the early form of the contemporary western linguistic-analysis.

In order to make the meaning of *vibhajyavāda* clearer, we would take a few philosophical and practical questions and try to show as to how does this method of analysis work? Suppose, some one asks whether the body and consciousness are the same or different. A *vibhajyavādin* will not give a straight answer to this question. He would first like to know what does the bearer of the question mean by 'difference' and 'non-difference' and also that in what context the question of non-difference or difference is being asked? Further, whether by the term 'difference' is meant the factual difference or the conceptual difference? Moreover, whether the difference in question is in the context of empirical or metaphysical level? Because, as the basis of each and every context the meaning of difference will differ and accordingly the answer of the question will also be affected. For example, we can differentiate the body and consciousness at the level of thought but factually we cannot differentiate them. They can be regarded as 'different' in our thinking but on the level of experience they are the one and the same for in our experiential world consciousness as something different from body is nowhere available. Again, in the context of a dead individual, the body can be regarded as independent of consciousness but it is not so in the context of a living individual. Mahāvīra and the latter Jaina masters therefore, maintained that the living and the non-living are 'different' but also are the same.[13] Similarly, in practical life we cannot give any categorical answer to the question, say, whether it is good to sleep, till of course, the meanings of 'sleeping' or 'waking' are not clear. Further, the context and the individual, with reference to whom the query is made is also to be mentioned. Motives behind sleeping or not sleeping are many. One can sleep to overcome tiredness and to revitalise oneself. One can also sleep first because of lethargy. Similarly, there are several conditions involved in sleeping say for sleeping in night, sleeping in day-time, sleeping in the class-room and so on. Further, the persons who sleep, are of many types, viz. the violent, the wicked, the gentle, the moral and the like. Here the question of why, when and whose are related with the meaning of sleeping and awakening. Without analysing them we cannot say in absolute terms whether sleeping is good or bad. It may be good to

sleep in night for the revitalisation of body but bad to sleep in daytime due to laziness. *Bhagavatī-sūtra* mentions that when Jayantī asked Mahāvīra whether sleeping is good or waking? The Mahāvīra replied that for some living-beings sleeping is good and for some others to remain awakened is good. Sleeping is good for the wicked and bad for the moral.[14] The function of analysis is first to clarify the relative meaning of questions and concepts by analysing them. In *Aṅguttaranikāya*, Lord Buddha says that a scholar knows both the right meaning (*artha*) and the false meaning (*anartha*) but one who accepts the right meaning, rejecting the false one, is known as scholar.[15] In this statement of the Buddha lies the crux of the contemporary linguistic-philosophy. The Jaina tradition also puts emphasis on the meaning rather than the word. A *Tīrthaṅkara* is supposed to be an advocate of meaning[16]. The today's linguistic-analyst also clarifies the meanings of concepts and words by analysing them, and explains them in context with the empirical world. Not withstanding the relative difference on the philosophical grounds, *vibhajyavāda*, as a method is similar to the linguistic-analysis and on the same ground we can very well say that it is a precursor of contemporary language-analysis.

References:

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3. *Philosophical Investigations*, P. 38.
4. (i) *Introduction to Logic* by Copi, p. 33.
   (ii) *Samakālīna Pāścātya Darśana* by Dr. Luxmi Saxena pp. 153-54
5. 'All Philosophy is critique of language.' *Tractatus Logico philosophicus*
6. *Bhagavatī-sūtra*, 1-1-11.
7. *Bhagavaī* (Jaina Vshwa Bharati, Ladnur) 9-33-228.
8. *Hāribhadrīya Vṛtti* (story 126) pp. 208-209)
9. *Nandīsūtra*, 84
10. *Dīghanikāya-Brahmajālasutta* , Pāli-English Dictionary p. 156.
11. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, 1-14-22.
12. *Majjhimanikāya*, vol. II p. 469 (*Subhasatta*)
13. *Aṅguttaranikāya*, vol. II, p.48.
14. *Bhagavatī*, 13-7, cf. Majjhimanikāya vol. II p. 175-177
15. *Bhagavatiī-sūtra*, 12-2.
16. *Àtthaṁ bhāsai arahā.....Āvaśyakaniryukti 192*

Chapter 2

Language and Script

Jaina accounts of origin of language

As far as the origin of language is concerned it is very difficult to say when did the language come in existence and who invented it. In the Jaina literature though Lord Ṛṣabhadeva is said to have invented the script but the invention of script, has nothing to do with the origin of the language. We fail to find a single reference in the Jaina literature by which we can know the creator and the date of the origin of language. In the Jaina canon *Prjñāpanā-sūtra,* the problem of the origin of language is raised and the Gautama in this connection asks four questions to Mahāvīra: (i) O Lord! What is the beginning of language; (2) What has caused its origin; (3) What is the structure of language and (4) Where does it terminate?

Replying to the first question Mahāvīra said," Language begins with the living-begins.[1] This reply of Mahāvīra is sustained by the linguistic discoveries of our times also. Language is possible only in the living-begins. The nature of language, of course, may differ in different living-begins and in different periods of human history, but there can be no doubt that language came into existence with the very existence of living beings. Language is a means of self-expression. The Jaina masters have distinguished the two aspects of language (1) *Akṣarātmaka-bhāṣā* (language consisting of syllables) and (2) *Anakṣarātmaka-bhāṣā*[2] (language consisting of no syllables). In the Jaina philosophy human language is regarded to be *akṣarātmaka,* and the language of living-beings other than human beings, and of infants and dump person is considered to be *anakṣarātmaka.*[3] The modern linguists have also accepted the fact that the world of animals and birds use sound and body signals for their self-expressions. Hence, the contention of the Jaina Philosophers that there exists a unmanifested language in the world of animals, seems to be correct. The function of language is communication of thought through

the medium of signs and signals. However, weak and undeveloped it may be, the animals do have the tendency of expression and communication. The recognition of Jaina thinkers therefore, that the language has its existence since the very advent of living beings, is right. The contention of *Prajñāpanā's* thesis is that the question of the origin of language is related with the very origin of the world of living-beings and it cannot be taken as separate from the origin of living beings. Since the Jainas regard the existence of the living-world without beginning, so also they regard the stream of language as eternal. Though from the point of view of time and space difference in languages is but natural. Jainas hold that the nature of language is ever transforming like the nature of Reality. Language subjects in the midst of change. There is no creator of language. It is existent from the very existence of life and yet it undergoes changes from time to time and places to places.

Whether language has a beginning or is without beginning, the answer of this question is given by the Jaina philosophers by the two-fold divisions of scriptures- *Sādiśruta* (Temporal scriptures) and *Anādiśruta* (Eternal scriptures). Scriptures are based on language. As such the question of their being eternal or temporal is linked with the question of the temporal or eternal nature of language. As in the Jaina philosophy the scriptures are regarded to be relatively temporal and relatively eternal, similar is the case with language also. The particular language from the point of view of being developed at a certain place, in a certain time, by certain class of people is of course temporal but from the point of view of tradition and flow, the concept of language in itself is eternal. To regard language as eternal means only that the language is existent from the advent of living-world or in other words the language functioning a medium of communication of thoughts and emotions through symbols. It is of course another story that modern scientists regard the advent of life in this world at a particular point of time; but by recognising the existence of life in this world as without beginning, we can regard language also as eternal not withstanding the changes that languages undergoe in different times and places.

In the Indian philosophy, the Mīmāṁsakas regard *Vedas* as eternal and the grammarians regards sound of the letters (phoneme) as temporal, nevertheless, the *sphoṭa* (the potentiality of conveying meaning)

is regarded as eternal and on this basis language is also recognised as eternal. On the contrary, the Nyāya system regards the origin of words through efforts, and the world created and on this basis Naiyāyika regards language also as having beginning or God created. Whereas the Jainas even after considering the language in generic sense or the denotative power of the symbols as eternal, regard a particular language having beginning or non-eternal.

Other doctrines of origin of language and Jainism

With regard to the origin of language, many theories are prevalent. The oldest one is the theory of divine origin according to which, the language is created by God. In the Indian Philosophies the *Nyāya* system regards language as created by God. In Christian and Islamic religions also God is said to be the creator of language. The Mīmāṁsakas, however, because of recognising world as eternal, regard language also as eternal. Recognising word itself as *Brahman,* the Śabdādvaitavādins regard language as without beginning (*anādi).* However, their idea of language as without beginning is different from that of the Jainas. When the Jainas say that the language has no beginning they only mean that it is difficult to say, when did language come into existence? They did not regard language as God-created. According to the Jainas the language is not created by God, but by the world of living beings. It is substantially proved by the multiplicity of language prove itself that they are not created by God rather created by the living beings. The multiplicity of language is based on the multiplicity of living beings. It is really strange that Dr. Bholanath Tiwari has depicted the Jaina view of language as of Divine origin. The very argument, by which he proves this, is enough to refute his own argument. He writes 'the Jainas have really gone far ahead of even Sanskrit Pandits and the Buddhists as according to them, *ardhamāgadhī* is not the language of human beings only but it is fundamentally the language of all the living-beings. He adds 'when Mahāvīra teaches in this language, everybody, irrespective of divine class or the class of animals and birds, enjoy his teachings.[4] Dr. Bholanath Tiwari's difficulty is in fact, because of not understanding the Jaina tradition properly. The Jainas never regarded *ardhamāgadhī* as fundamentally the language of all the living-beings. According to the Jaina philosophers all living beings have their own language, and they

understand the teachings of the *Tīrthaṅkara* in their respective languages only and not in the *ardhamāgadhī* language. In the *Samavāyāṅga-sūtra* it is clearly said, " The Lord teaches in *ardhamāgadhī* language; and this *ardhamāgadhī* transforms into their own language of expressions irrespective of the Āryans and the non-Āryans, animals and birds.[5] Thus, all the beings comprehend the sense of the teachings of the Tīrthaṅkara accordingly. It is clear that they have there own respective languages but how do they understand the sense (of Tīrthaṅkara's teaching) in their own languages, is a different question. The only possible answer of this question is that the *Tīrthaṅkaras* used to speak with certain sound-symbols alongwith specific bodily postures (*mudrā*) that could convey the sense of his discourses. Even today the behaviour of human beings is full of many bodilypostures and sound-signals, the sense of which is understandable to not only the different language-speaking people but also to the animals and birds. Again, it should be noted that as far as the Digambara tradition is concerned it regards the divine sound of the *Tīrthaṅkaras* as *Anakṣarātmaka*[6] (language consisting of no syllables). Thus, according to Jainas neither there is any Reality like God, which creates the language, nor the *Tīrthaṅkaras* are the creator of language. Language is not God-created; it is the creation of living-beings. As a generic concept or flow, however, it is eternal. Thus, the Jaina view with regard to the origin of the language is different from that of the Naiyāyikas.

The other views regarding the origin of language like- *Dhātu-siddhānta* (theory of elements of words/grammatical theory), *Nirṇya-siddhānta* (theory of judgement), *Dhvani-anukaraṇa* (theory of sound imitation), *Manobhāva-abhivyakti-siddhānta* (theory of sentiment expression) and *Iṅgita-siddhānta* (theory of Indication) are usually prevalent in linguists. But non of these theories are able to give an uncontroversial explanation of the origin of language. As a matter of fact language is a developing and a dynamic process. It is influenced by many a factors. As such we cannot prove its origin on the basis of any one particular theory only. According to the Jainas, the meaning- symbols and cognition of meaning of language are the result of the efforts of the living beings, which are influenced by many factors such as space, time and circumstances. Jaina philosophy accepts *Anekāntavāda* (theory of many-foldness of reality or non-absolutism) and therefore, it does not

regard any concept absolutely final and categorical. We can briefly say that language according to the Jainas is not God created, but it is created by conventions. The languages is not something readymade that human begins could get. Language goes on developing. It is never fixed and final and continuously dynamic. It is not a creation of one person-may it be God or *Tīrthaṅkara*. It developed in due course of time by traditions. This is the only theory regarding the origin of language that is acceptable to the Jainas.

Thoughts and Language

Is thought or thinking possible without language, it is an important question. Generally it is held that language or the use of words is necessary for thinking. No reflexion is possible without language or word application. In the Jaina philosophy the question of the mutual relation between language and thought is answered by the mutual relationship of *Matjñāna* (Sensory knowledge) and *Śruta-jñāna* (Scriptural knowledge). However, all the Jaina masters have accepted that the scriptural knowledge (language based cognition) is not possible without the sensory knowledge (sense cognition). The scriptural knowledge arises in the wake of sensory knowledge -*śrutaṁ matipūrvaṁ...(Tattvārtha-sūtra-1/20)*. As a matter of fact sense-cognition is necessary before thinking process takes place. It is sense-cognition which presents the raw materials for thinking and which is (afterwards) communicated to others. As such the Jainas contention seems to be right when they say, *śruta-jñāna* is preceded by *mati-jñāna*. In *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya*[8] it is said that the scriptural knowledge subsists on sensory-knowledge and sensory knowledge gives perfection to the scriptural knowledge because from the latter the scriptural knowledge is reproduced. Further, the scriptural knowledge is obtained through (by hearing or reading) sensory-knowledge and also transmitted to others by the sensory knowledge. In *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya* there is serious discussion regarding the relation between *mati-jñāna* and *śruta-jñāna*. This text also supports the view that scriptural knowledge is preceded by sensory knowledge, and not the *vice-versa*. But Maladhārī Ācārya Hemacandra is of the opinion that sensory-knowledge *(mati-jñāna)* also is preceded by the physical scriptural knowledge *(dravyaśruta)*. In fact before the discussion on this matter it is necessary to understand as to how the two types of knowledge (*mati-jñāna* and *śruta-jñāna*) contribute

to each other. The Jaina masters have included in *mati-jñāna* not only sensory and mental cognition but also reflexion, thought and logic. The question here arises whether thought and reflexion are possible without language? If not, then materialisation of *mati-jñāna* (sensory-knowledge) consisting of *avagraha* (perception), *īhā* (speculation), *apāya* (perceptual judgement) and *dhāraṇā* (retention) will not be possible because out of its four divisions, only *avagraha* is bereft of thought and reflection as it lacks language applications. We have to accept, therefore, that except *avagraha* (perception) all types of *mati-jñāna* follow to *śruta-jñāna*, because where there is language, *śruta-jñāna* is involved, and excluding *avagraha*, the *apāya* and *dhāraṇā* do have language applications. *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya* and *Jainatarkabhāṣā*, of course, have contented that *avagraha* (perception) itself is *mati-jñāna* (sensory knowledge) and its other folds being literal can not be regarded as *mati-jñāna* but as *śruta-jñāna*. However, in reply, it is said that though *īhā* and other folds are expressible in words yet they are not of word-form, because the expressible (*abhilāpya*) knowledge when expressed to others through words only, it is called *śruta-jñāna*.

The distinction between *mati-jñāna* and *śruta-jñāna* is made on the ground of manifest language-behaviour and use of letters. As a matter of fact in *mati-jñāna*, use of language is involved only in an indistinct manner, and not in a distinct way. Difference between *mati* and *śruta* is based on muteness and not-muteness. It can also be said that *īhā* etc. are really *śruta-niśrita* (backed by scriptural learning) because they cannot take place without following the words heard before. It is of course correct that *īhā* etc. are produced only in a person who has cultivated *mati-jñāna* through the impressions of *śruta-jñāna* and hence is called *śruta-niśrita*, but practically they do not follow *śruta-jñāna*, therefore, they cannot be called *Śruta-jñānī* (possessed of scriptural knowledge).[9] In thought and reflection though language is implicitly present, but utterance is totally absent there. It is on the basis of articulation and explicit symbolisation that a distinction between *mati-jñāna* and *śruta-jñāna* can be made. Thus while in *īhā* etc. folds of *mati-jñāna* there is implicit language-behaviour, in *śruta-jñāna* it is explicit.

Pt. Sukhlal Sanghvi in his interpretation of *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, distinguishing the *mati-jñāna* from *śruta-jñāna* writes that in *mati-jñāna*

there is no (explicit) mention of words whereas in *śruta-jñāna* it is there. As such it can be concluded that the type of knowledge caused by senses and mind having explicit language behaviour is *śruta-jñāna* and one which has no such behaviour is *mati-jñāna*. Clarifying the phrase 'mention of words' (*śabdollekha*), he further says that it refers to meaning generating capacity of words when used. At the time of the attainment of *śruta-jñāna*, it is expected that symbols, memories and scriptures are well followed, but such expectation is not there in *mati-jñāna*. Thus, it can be said that the knowledge, which can be rendered in language, is *śruta-jñāna*, and the one which remains devoid of such rendering, is *mati-jñāna*. If *śruta-jñāna* is the *khīra* (a sweet-dish made of milk, rice and sugar), the *mati-jñāna* is the milk. Jaina masters have also divided *śruta-jñāna* into two types (i) *Akṣara-śruta* (alphabetically originated scripture) and *Anakṣara-śruta* (non- alphabetically originated scripture). However, if *śruta-jñāna* (as we have already seen) is concerned with language, what, then is *anakṣara-śruta*? Would it not be a form of *mati-jñāna*? Regarding this Jaina's contention seems to be that when the knower himself knows then it is *anakṣara-śruta* and when he imparts this knowledge to others or gets knowledge from others, it is *akṣara-śruta*. In self-obtained knowledge, language is, of course, used but letters are not pronounced, hence it is *anakṣara-śruta*. *Anakṣara* does not mean that it is bereft of language but it is bereft of pronunciation. Another meaning of *anakṣara-śruta* is that there the meaning is conveyed not only by words (linguistic sound-symbols) but also by other signals or symbols. It is *anakṣara-śruta* because there is no (actual) use of words in it but it conveys the meanings nevertheless. It can therefore, be said that the difference between *śruta-jñāna* and *mati-jñāna* is really based on explicit and the implicit use of words.

The belief that there is no language involved in *mati-jñāna* is wrong. In my opinion, except *avagraha* in all the other types of *mati-jñāna* as *īhā* (speculation), *apāya* (perceptual judgement), *dhāraṇā* (retention), *smṛti* (memory), etc. language be necessarily involved. In the field of sense cognition the moment reflexion or thought begins, language comes naturally. Thus along with *śruta-jñāna*, in *mati-jñāna* also, after the stage of *avagraha*, language is involved in the whole cognitive process, as it causes thought and reflexion. It is an experienced fact that

the process of thinking takes place in language and not otherwise. As such, barring sensation and self-realisation, all cognitive behaviours are based on language. Similarly, the *mati-jñāna* of the Jainas is also to some extent, related with language.

The above analysis shows that amongst the five-types of knowledge namely *Mati* (Sensory knowledge), *Śruta* (Scriptural knowledge), *Avadhi* (Clairvoyance), *Manahparyaya* (Telepathy) and *Kevala* (Omniscience), *mati-jñāna* is partly and the *śruta-jñāna* is wholly related with language. While *avadhi, manahparyaya* and *kevala* as forms of direct self-realisation are not related with language. In *mati-jñāna,* only the *Vyañjanāvagraha* (Indistinct apprehension) and the Arthāvagraha (Apprehension) are not related with language. The rest *īhā*, *apāya,* and *dhāraṇā* are all indirectly related with language because they involve doubt, thinking and reflexion which are not possible without language. According to modern psychologists also thinking is only non-manifest language-behaviour. It can therefore be said that in Jaina philosophy language and thought are necessarily related to each other. Without language, thought and reflexion are not possible.

Types of Language

Generally, all the sound-signals, body-signals and other type of signals which communicate ones feelings and thoughts to the listener or the seer and through which the listener or the seer comprehend the meaning, are called language. In the Jaina tradition, the linguistic knowledge is known as *Śruta.* Defining *Śruta-jñāna* Jaina masters maintain 'when from one type of knowledge (sense-cognition) we get another type of knowledge (perception of meaning), it is called *śruta-jñāna.*[11] For example, by hearing the word 'cow' we comprehend the meaning of a living-being named 'cow'. The same is the characteristic of language. Language/scripture is of two types -(i) *akṣara-śruta* (alphabetically originated scriptures) and *anakṣara-śruta* (non-alphabetically originated scriptures) [12]. Sound and script symbols associated with vowels and consonants come under *akṣara-śruta* whereas audible unclear sounds devoid of vowels and consonants along with visual symbolic gestures come under *anakṣara-śruta.* The *Jaināchāryas* have also distinguished between two types of word-cognition - (i) *Bhāṣātmaka* (linguistic) and

(ii) *Abhāṣātmaka* (non-linguistic).[13] Word-sounds with letters which are capable of expressing meaning to the listener are necessarily linguistic and classified under *akṣara-śruta*. Besides, *akṣara-śruta* is more comprehensive because it includes the knowledge through the scripts and symbols also. Therefore, *akṣara-śruta* is both visual as well as audible, and both of them are *bhāṣātmaka.* As far as the word-sounds devoid of vowel and consonants are concerned, that can be *anakṣara-śruta* type or also different from it. If an *abhāṣātmaka* i.e.non-linguistic sound devoid of letters concerning vowel and consonant is able to express the meaning then it is of the form of *anakṣara-śruta* and if not, it cannot be called as *śruta.* In other words the word-sound devoid of vowel and consonant can be of both the forms-- *anakṣara-śruta* and *aśruta* (*mati-jñāna*) also. The whole scriptural knowledge (linguistic knowledge) is necessarily of the nature of *mati-jñāna* (sense-cognition) also. But it is not necessary that whole sense cognition (*mati-jñāna)* be of the nature of *śruta.*

Akṣara-śruta (alphabetically originated scriptural knowledge) and *anakṣara-śruta* (non-alphabetically originated scriptural knowledge) both are the forms of language. Spoken or written language with vowels and consonants is surely *akṣara-śruta* but the sound-signals devoid of vowels and consonants and other type of signals, if they are able to express the meaning, come under *anakṣara-śruta.* Modern linguists also have accepted both the forms of language. With a view of comprehensive definition of language, *anakṣara-śruta* is also one of the forms of language. It is also both audible and other than audible. According to Jainas symbolic sounds, symbolic movements, symbolic marks, and also the cognition of their meaning - both are the parts of language known as *dravya-śruta* and *bhāva-śruta. Dravya-śruta* is component of thinking while *bhāva-śruta* is thinking itself. *Dravya-śruta* is *sākṣara* when it consists of written or spoken words, and it is *anakṣara* when it consists of physical gestures. The *bhāva-śruta* is called *sākṣara* because it contains word *quá* concepts, it is also called *anakṣara* because it does not contains word *quá* external symbols written or spoken. Thus the language or *śruta* is a wider concept. It may, however, be noted that the Śvetāmbara tradition and its masters, Jinabhadragaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa, Haribhadra and Malayagiri do not include non-audible body movements in *anakṣara-śruta* (non-alphabetical language) for *śruta*, according to them is only that which is audible. The body

movements, which are not audible, cannot be called *śruta*.[14]. On the contrary, the masters of Digambara tradition hold[15] that sense-cognition (*mati-jñāna)* is the cause of *akṣara-śruta*, and as such, knowledge derived from both audio and visual signals should also be included in *śruta-jñāna*. To my mind this second opinion seems to be more logical because the written language is visual, and not audible, and we get its meaning by seeing (reading) it. Pt. Bechardasji has also accepted the same view. He writes, 'In my opinion, if the word '*śruta*' is taken in a wider connotation, there should be no objection in including both audio and visual signals alongwith bodily movements in *śruta-jñāna*'.[16] If we regard language as the expression of feelings and thoughts through sound signals, bodily movements and other kinds of symbols, then we must include all the forms of symbolic expressions in the fold of language and regard them the different forms of linguistic expressions. Jaina philosophers, on this basis, have classified the language as under:

Bhāṣā (language)

Akṣarātmaka (Alphabetical)	*Anakṣarātmaka* (Non-alphabetical)

Śravya (Pronunciated)   *Dṛśya* (Written)   *Śravya* (Audible)   *Śravyetara* (other than audible)

Types of Akṣarātmaka-bhāṣā (Alphabetical Language)

The language consisting of vowel and consonant is alphabetical language. This is of two types viz. (i) *Maukhika/Śravya* (audible), and (ii) *Likhita/Dṛśya* (visible). Almost all the languages and dialects of the world are covered under these two categories. [17] Ordinarily all the developed languages of human beings are alphabetical. Alphabetical language is the language made of meaningful words, terms and sentences that have vowels and consonants. According to the masters of the Jainism such language capability is formed only in rational five-sensed beings (*sañjñī-pañcendriya*) or human beings and other developed beings. The alphabetical language is classified by Jainas as *ārya* and *anārya* (civilised and uncivilised). Again, the Āryan languages, which are of Indian origin, are divided in the following eighteen languages:[19]

Three *Karṇāṭa* languages (languages spoken in Karṇāṭa region)

Three *Marahaṭṭha* languages (languages spoken in Maharastra region)

Three *Lāḍa* languages (languages spoken in Lāḍa region)

Three *Mālawa* languages (languages spoken in Mālawa region)

Three *Māgadha* languages (languages spoken in Magadha region)

Three *Gauḍa* languages ((languages spoken in Gauḍa region)

The various languages prevalent in India today are constructed and refined in due course of time by these above languages.

In the *anārya* class of languages all the non-Indian languages are included. According to *Jainācāryas*, there are some seven hundred such languages including Pārasī, Siṅghalī and Barbaric, etc.[20] It seems that the *Jainācāryas* were not familiar with all the non-Indian languages. That is why they could enumerate only some known non-Indian languages. It is difficult to say that how correct is the number of non-Indian languages that they have given, but looking to the prevalent languages and dialects today this number does not seem to be quite imaginary or exaggerated. It is expected that modern linguists will carry on research on the Indian and non-Indian languages, which are mentioned in Jaina Scriptures. As our concern is linguistic philosophy and not linguistics, it is not possible for us to go deep into such analysis.

Anakṣarātmaka Bhāṣā (Non-alphabetical Language)

According to Jainācāryas the meaningful sound-symbols and body-movements capable of giving expressions to thought but bereft of letters (vowels and consonants) are called non-alphabetical languages. They hold that the divine voices of the *Tīrthaṅkaras*, sound-symbols and body-movements of all the two, three and four sensed and five-sensed non-rational living beings, as well as of the dumb and the child, all are the forms of non-alphabetical language.[21] It is necessary to accept the existence of language in the two-sensed living beings and the like because all these animals understand the meanings of the sound signals etc. In *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya* it is clearly mentioned that sounds of exclamation, spitting, coughing, sneezing and clapping, etc. are non-alphabetical languages (*anakṣara-śruta*) because they carry the feelings.[22] Similarly, other body-movements, which are capable of expressing meaning, may be considered as a form of non-alphabetical language. It is possible to

count languages and scripts but is not possible to determine the number of symbolic movements and their respective meanings. There may be several forms of non-alphabetical languages (*anakṣarātmaka-bhāṣā*) according to species of living beings and the differences in their sounds and bodily movements etc.Regarding the question, whether voice of the Tīrthaṅkara is *akṣarātmaka* or *anakṣarātmaka*, there is a difference of opinion between the Śvetāmbaras and the Digambaras. Both of them nevertheless regard these voices as linguistic expressions because the different beings are able to draw meanings from them.

We arrive by the above discussion to the conclusion that the Jaina *ācāryas* adopt a very wide view concerning language and its various forms. They don't accept the conservative Brahmin's view that it is only Sanskrit words, and Sanskrit language, which have the capacity of conveying, right meanings. According to them languages is a wider concept which not only includes Sanskrit, Apabhraṁśa, Prakrit and other Indian languages but all the other languages and dialects of the world. In addition, by accepting what is called *Anakṣara-śruta* they have made language so very wide that not only the audio and visuals but also all the symbolic meanings came into its fold. Here, it may be noted that there is a difference between the sense perception of symbols and their meanings. According to the Jainas the sense cognition of a symbol is *mati-jñāna* and the meaning derived from it is linguistic knowledge (*śruta-jñāna*). When we perceive somebody giving red signal, it is sense-cognition but when we interpret that signal as 'Stop! The track is blocked 'it is *śruta* or linguistic knowledge. Thus, linguistic knowledge means to express thoughts and feelings by the medium of symbols/signals and to understand the meanings of those very symbols/signals.

Basic requisites of Language

The main function of language is *paropadeśa* i.e. to get others cognised by our expression of experience, emotions and thoughts expressed through the medium of symbols/signals. In technical terminology of Jainism, it is called *'paropadeśa'* (instructing/cognising others). To fulfil this purpose, language takes help of symbol/signals. When these symbolic terms/words are made of letters, then it is called alphabetical language (*akṣarātmaka-bhāṣā*). Though *Jaināćaryas* have accepted existence of such

languages, the symbols/signals of which are without alphabets. We have already discussed about the language without alphabets. In the present context we are concerned only with the alphabetical language (*akṣarātmaka-bhāṣā*) because ordinary people understand by the term language only language that has words and letters.

Generally speaking the human beings express their thoughts through sentences. These sentences are made of words/terms and the terms/words, are made of letters. Thus the fundamental or the final material cause of the language are letters.[23]

Definition of Letter (Varṇa)

Ordinarily, vowels and consonants used in a language are called 'letters' (*akṣara* or *varṇa*). Ācārya Jinabhadragaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa says that *akṣara* means that from which meaning falls off *(kṣaraṇa)* but which never falls down *(kṣarita)* it self: '*atthe ya kharai na ya jeṇa khijjai akkhara teṇa*' (*Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya-* 461). According to him to call vowels and consonants as *akṣara* (letters), is based on their conventional meaning (*rūḍhārtha*). As a matter of fact which falls off the meanings but does not shake off it self, or which does not loose own nature or identity, is letter (*varṇa*). From this point of view knowledge is called as *akṣara*. Thus, the consciousness or knowledge-potentiality of soul is really *eternal (Akṣara)*[24]. In the Jaina terminology, the knowledge or cognitive potentials of the soul is eternal (*(Akṣara)* in absolute sense. But from the pragmatic or substantial point of view, the sounds of vowels and consonants or the symbols pertaining to the scripts are also called as *akṣara*.

Types of letters

The Jainācāryas have recognised three types of letters namely *Ākṛtirūpa* (figure form), *Dhvanirūpa* (sound form) and *Jñānarūpa* (cognitive form). On the basis of these three forms there are three classes of the letters, viz. (i) *Saṁjñākṣara* (alphabets/script), (ii) *Vyañjanākṣara* (spoken letters) and *Labdhyakṣara*[25] (Power of attainment of meaning).

Saṁjñākṣara means the particular shape and form of the letters of a script. *Saṁjñākṣara* thus are the letters of scripts[26] (*lipyākṣara*). Maladhārī Hemacandra refers eighteen types of script prevalent at that time. *Vyañjanākṣara* means a word that expresses certain meanings. In other words, the sounds or the pronunciations of vowels and consonants

in different languages and dialects that suggest meanings are called *vyañjanākṣara*. Thus the sound form of pronounced letters of a language is *Vyañjanākṣara*.[27] *Saṁjñākṣara* and *vyañjanākṣara*, which are written and spoken forms of language respectively, are considered *śruta-jñāna* traditionally or by the usage only, they are *dravya-akṣara*. As a matter of fact they are inanimate objects *(jaḍa)* and are only means to convey the meanings. The meaning that we get from both of them is really *labdhyākṣara*. *Labdhi* is potentiality or capability. Technically the conscious activity of the soul or the functional consciousness (knowledge) is called *Labdhi*. The meaning denoting capacity of the letters is really *labdhyākṣara*.[27] *Labdhyākṣara* is the soul of language. It is also known as *bhāva-akṣara* (letter-suggestive of meaning).

If we see from the point of view of the knower, the meaning, which is derived from the written or the pronounced letters is *labdhyākṣara*. The Jaina *ācāryas* believe that *saṁjñākṣara* and *vyañjanākṣara* are means to convey feelings - are *dravya-śruta*. In these two forms of letters there lies mechanism of transferring power of language, because it is through written or uttered letters only that we can transmit our thoughts to others. The understanding of meaning in an individual is through the letters suggestive of meaning. The *bhāva-śruta* is that which is possible with or without the help of others. However, the cognition of meaning through written or pronunciated vowels and consonants are not possible without learning the language. Thus language, in traditional terminology should be cultivated through others (*paropadeśapūrvaka*) and considered as acquired quality according to the modern terminology. But the Jaina masters are of the opinion that if a person does not have in himself the capability of understanding meanings through symbols, he can not derive meanings and thus language can be regarded a natural or non-acquired phenomena. From the point of view of the modern linguistics it is, of course, true that language is something acquired or learned but psychology nevertheless tells us that intelligence quotient (*buddhi-labdhi*) is a non-acquired quality. The capability of understanding meaning through vowels and consonants of words is not equal in all the beings and individuals. As a matter of fact intelligence quotient is really *labdhyākṣara* and modern psychology regards it as something non-acquired. Jainas putting the same contention in different way say that *labdhyākṣara* (letters suggesting

meanings) is attained after destruction-cum-subsidence of verbal-knowledge-obscuring- *karmas* (*śruta-jñānāvaraṇa-karma*) hence it is subjective (*ātmaniṣṭha*) whereas *saṁjñākṣara* (shape and form of the letters of a script) and *vyañjanākṣara* (letters suggesting certain meanings) are external and objective. The *labdhyākṣara* is non-acquired in as much as it is capable of understanding the meaning but simultaneously it is dependent on *saṁjñākṣara* and *vyañjanākṣara* also and both being acquired are cultivated or learned. Thus *labdhyākṣara* can be regarded to the some extent as acquired or cultivated also.

Vowel & consonant

Jaina masters have classified letters into vowels and consonants. Jinabhadragaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa in his *Viśeṣāvaśyaka- bhāṣya* has defined vowel as that which follows letters[28]. The commentator regards *akṣara* as (expressive of knowledge and reality). A vowel because it follows or articulates reality or knowledge is called *svara*. The commentator further adds that, that which indicates the thing or idea and makes consonants pronounceable is *svara*. Without the *svaras* (vowels) consonants remain non-pronounceable. [29]

While defining the consonant, the Jaina *ācāryas* say that as the lamp reveals the pot so also that which expresses the object is consonants.[30] As a matter of fact all the objects are expressed or pronounced through vowels, consonants and words made by their different combinations. Thus the fundamental source of all alphabetical languages can be see in vowels and consonants, which construct the language.

Mātṛkākṣara (Matrix of the letters)

Whether the Jaina masters have ever thought seriously about the matrix of letters with respect to acoustics and scriptology, it is not known to me. We have mention about matrix of 46 letters only in the *Samavāyāṅga[31]*. However, there also it is not clear as to what exactly is the form of matrix. The commentator Abhayadeva has given the matrix of the following 46 letters, which exclude *ṛ ṝ ḷri* and *ḷ* (ॡ)

Vowels	*a ā i ī u ū e ai o au ṁ ḥ =*	12
Consonants	*ka kha ga gha ṅ*	
	ca cha ja jha ñ	

$$\underline{ta}\ \underline{tha}\ \underline{da}\ \underline{dha}\ \underline{n}$$

ta tha da dha na

pa pha ba bha ma   = 25

Semi-vowels   ya ra la va   = 4

Sibilants   Śa ṣa ha   = 4

$$\overline{45}$$

To complete the number 46, the commentator has added *kṣa* ४२ but *kṣa* is compound letter. Thus, if we take *kṣa*, we would have to add *tra* & *jña*. To my mind, we should include *ḷ* instead of *kṣa* because the farmer is an independent letter from the pronunciation point of view in the Prākṛta-Pāli languages. It is also a recognised letter in Marathi, Gujarati etc. even today.

As we have already seen that in the Jaina tradition letters are classified in three classes-

1. *Samjñā-akṣara* (letters suggesting shapes and form of the script), *Vyañjana-akṣara* (letters suggesting certain meaning), and 3. *Labdhyākṣara* (letters suggesting meanings denoting capacity). Out of these, the first is related with script.

According to the Jaina tradition the development of script is regarded to have begun from Tīrthaṅkara Lord Ṛṣabhadeva. It is believed that Lord Ṛṣabhadeva taught a script to his daughter Brāhmī for the first time, and therefore, that script is known by her name i.e. *Brāhmī* script. In the Jaina literature we find a mention of 18 scripts :

S. No.	Samavāyāṅga	Prajñāpanā	Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya
	(18th *Samavāya*)	(*Jīva Prajñāpanā-71*)	(Hemacandra's coment. 464)
1.	Bambhī (Brāhmī)	Bambhī (Brāhmī)	Javaṇi (Yavani)
2.	Javaṇāliya (yāvanī)	Javaṇāṇīya (yavanāni)	Haṁsa (Haṁsa)
3.	Dosa Ūriā (doṣa uparikā)	Dosāpuriā	Bhūya (Bhūta)
4.	Kharoṭṭhiā (kharoṣṭrīkā)	Kharoṭṭhī (kharoṣṭrī)	Jakhī (yokṣa)
5	Bhogavaiyā (Bhogavatikā)	Bhogavaiā (Bhogavati)	Rakhasī (rākṣasi)
6.	Paharāiā (Prahārātikā)	Paharāiā	Uḍḍī (Uḍiā)
7.	Kharasāviā (Kharaśrāvika)	Aṁtakkhariā	Turukkī (Turkī)
8.	Ucaatariā (Uccatarikā)	Pukharasāṅā	Kīrī (krīṭa)

9.	Akharaputthiā (Akṣaraprsthikā) Akharaputhiā	Dāviḍi (Drāviḍi)
10.	Venatiā (Venakiā)	Venaiā (Vainaikī)	Sindhavī (Sindhi)
11.	Ninhaiā (Ninhavikā)	Ninhaiā (Ninhavikī)	Mālaviṇī (Mālvi)
12.	Aṅka (Aṅka)	Aṅka (Aṅka)	Naḍi
13.	Gaṇia (Gaṇita)	Gaṇia (Gaṇita)	Nāgari (Nāgarī)
14.	Gandhawa (Gandharva) Bhūta (Bhūta)	Gandharva (Gandharva)	Laḍalivi (Lātā) Pārasī (Pārasī)
15.	Ādaṁsa (Ādarśa)	Āyaṁsa (Ādarśa)	Animitti
16.	Māhesari (Māheśwari)	Māhesari (māheśwari)	Cāṇakkī (Cāṅakyī)
17.	Dāmi (Dāmi)	Domi (Dromi)	Mūladevi (Mūladevi)
18.	Volinda (Polindī)	Polindi (Polindī)	

A comparative view of the above table of the names of scripts makes it clear that the lists of *Prajñāpanā* and *Samavāyāṅga* are almost similar. There is slight difference is only in two names. Where in *Samavāyāṅga, Kharsaviyā* script is mentioned, in *Prajñāpanā* it is mentioned in the name of *Antakkhariyā*. Similarly, at the place of *Uccatariā* mentioned in *Samavāyāṅga,* there is mention of *Pukkharsāriyā* in *Prajñāpanā.* So for as the comparison of the lists of *Samavāyāṅga* and *Prajñāpanā* with the list of name of scripts referred in *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya* is concerned, there is no similarity at all. Except *Javani (Yavanī)* the whole list is different. In this context one more point to be noted is that in the original text of *Prajñāpanā-sūtra,* all the scripts are said to be derivatives of *Brāhmī* scripts. It is clearly mentioned there that *Brāhmī-*script has eighteen varieties. The question arises whether scripts mentioned in *Samavāyāṅga* and *Prajñāpanā* are independent scripts are they are only subtypes of *Brāhmī* script? Most of the modern scholars regard *Kharoṣṭhi* as an independent script. There is a need of serious consideration regarding it. Most of the scripts mentioned in *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya* can however, be regarded as developed forms of *Brāhmī* script.

In a Buddhist treatise *Lalitavistara,* we have a list of scripts where some 64 scripts are mentioned - (1) *Brāhmī* (2) *Kharoṣṭhī* (3) *Puṣkarasāri* (4) *Aṅgalipi* (5) *Vaṅga-lipi* (6) *Magadha-lipi* (7) *Maṅgalya-lipi* (8) *Aṅgulīya-lipi* (9) *Śakāra-lipi* (10) *Brahmava-līpi* (11) *Pāruṣya-lipi* (12) *Drāviḍa-lipi* (13) *Kirāta-lipi* (14) *Dākṣiṇya-lipi* (15) *Ugra-lipi* (16) *Saṁkhyā-lipi* (17) *Anuloma-lipi* (18) *Avamurdha-lipi* (19) *Darada-lipi* (20) *Khāṣya-lipi* (21) *Cīna-lipi* (22) *Lūna-lipi* (23) *Hūna-lipi*

(24) *Madhyākṣaravistara-lipi* (25) *Puṣpa-lipi* (26) *Deva-lipi* (27) *Nāga-lipi* (28) *Yakṣa-lipi* (29) *Gandharva-lipi* (30) *Kinnara-lipi* (31) *Mahoraga-lipi* (32) *Asura-lipi* (33) *Garuṇa-lipi* (34) *Mṛgacakra-lipi* (35) *Vāyasaruta-lipi* (36) *Bhoumadeva-lipi* (37) *Antarikṣadeva-lipi* (38) *Uttarakurudvīpa-lipi* (39) *Aparagodānīya-lipi* (40) *Purṇavideha-lipi* (41) *Utkṣepa-lipi* (42) *Nikṣepa-lipi* (43) *Vikṣepa-lipi* (44) *Prakṣepa-lipi* (45) *Sāgara-lipi* (46) *Vajra-lipi* (47) *Lekha-Pratilekha-lipi* (48) *Anupadruta-lipi* (49) *Śāstrāvarta-lipi* (50) *Gaṇāvarta-lipi* (51) *Utkṣepāvarta-lipi* (52) *Nikṣepāvart-lipi* (53) *Pādāvarta-lipi* (54) *Dviruttarapadasaṁdhi-lipi* (55) *Adhyāhāriṇi-lipi* (56) *Sarvarutasaṁgahaṇī-lipi* (57) *Vidyunālomā-vimiśrita-lipi* (58) *Riṣitapastaptā-lipi* (59) *Rocamānā-lipi* (60) *Dharaṅiprekṣanī-lipi* (61) *Gaganaprekṣaṇī-lipi* (62) *Sarvouṣadhi-niṣyandā-lipi* (63) *Sarvasāra-saṅgrahaṇī-lipi* (64) *Sarvabhūta-rutagrahaṇi-lipi* (*Parivavrta-*10).

By comparison we find that the following scripts mentioned in *Lalitavistara* are also available at some places in the three lists of the Jaina tradition (1) *Brāhmī* (2) *Kharoṣṭhī* (3) *Puṣkarasārī* (4) *Drāviḍa* (5) *Saṁkhyā* (aṅka) (6) *Yakṣa* (7) *Gandharva* (8) *Antarikṣa* (9) *Asura-lipi* (*Rākṣasa*), etc.

It may also be noted that in the lists of the Jainas, there are several scripts, which are not included in the list of *Lalitavistara*. In the Buddhist scripture *Suttanta*, there is a mention of *akkharikākhe*. This may be possibly *antarikkhiyā* of *Samavāyāṅga* list. In the above lists there are so many scripts, which were existent in the past, but today we have no evidence of their existence. In the list of *Samavāyāṅga* and *Prajñāpanā*, only *Brāhmī, Kharosthī* and *Javani* scripts are such, which are found in inscriptions only. But it is difficult to say any thing with certainty about the rest of the scripts. *Nihnavikā* script, however is recognised as a secret or symbolic script. It could have been secret script because in the Jaina tradition the word *nihanava* is used in the sense of hiding. We cannot also reject downright the existence of *āṅka-lipi* and *Gaṇita-lipi* because a resident of Viśveśvara in the south, Yalappa Śāstrī had an important treatise comprising one crore verses. It was seen by the then President Dr. Rajendra Prasad and many others. This treatise was written in numbers. On the basis of numerical symbols many volumes of different subjects were included in it. Similarly, the *Gandharva* script

can be regarded the script of Gandhāra and *Bhūta-lipi* that of Bhutan. *Māheśvarī* script may be regarded the script of the *Māhesvaris, a* sub-caste of the business class of Vaiśyas. The scripts like *Yavanī, kīrī (krita), Turkī, Uḍiā, Mālavi, Lāṭa, Sindhavī, Pārasī, Nāgarī,* etc. mentioned in *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya* are recognised as independent scripts many of which are still in vogue.

Though the above discussion on scripts has no direct impact on the Jaina philosophy of language but this cannot be overlooked because script is suggestive of the potentiality of expression of language. Out of three forms of letters mentioned by the Jainas, the *Saṁjñākṣara* has direct relation with script while *Vyañjanākṣara* is related with sound. *Labdhi-akṣara* is concerned with the capability of meaning of the written or oral symbols. The core of language after all is comprehension of meanings. Language gives this meaning by vocal as well as written symbols. Script symbols and sound symbols are really the means of communication of meanings, and in that way they are very important. With the help of these script and sound-symbols the word, term and sentences are constructed which in turn are helpful to the reader or the hearer in understanding the meaning of expressions of the writer or the speaker.

References :

1. *Prajñāpanā- Bhāṣāpada*
2. *Bhāṣā lakṣaṇo vividhaḥ sākṣaro, nakṣaraśceti*
    Sarvārtha-siddhi- 5/24/294/12.
3. *Dhavalā -* 13/5-5-26/221/10
4. *Bhāṣāvijñāna* by Bholanatha Tiwari, p. 28
5. *Samavāyāṅga-* 34.1
6. *Pañcāstikāya- (Tātparya-vṛtti)* 79/135/7.
7. *Tattvārtha-sūtra* 1/20.
8. *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya-* 105
9. See. (A) *Jaina Tarka Bhāṣā* p.5 and (B) *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya* 940-104, Hemacandra's commentary (Gujrati translation p. 58-61)
10. *Tattvārtha-sūtra* p.25.
11. *Pañcasaṁgraha* 1/122.
12. *Sarvārthasiddhi* 5/24/294. 12 quoted by *Jainendra-siddhānta-kośa* pt. III p. 237.
13. *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya-* 120
14. See (a) *Jaina Sāhitya kā Bṛhad Itihāsa* Vol. I, P. 14
    (b) *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya- Gāthā* 116 to 153.

15. *Jainendra-Siddhānta-kośa* Pt. 4,p. 61.

16. *Jaina Sāhitya kā Bṛhad Itihāsa* Vol. I. P. 14

17. *Sarvārthasiddhi-* 5/24/295-1

18. *Dhavalā* 13/5, 26/221/11

19. *Ibid.,* 13/5, 5, 26, 221/11

20. *Ibid.-* 13/5, 5, 26/221/11

21. *(I) Ibid.* 13/5, 5, 26/221-10

    (ii) Pañcāstikāya (Tātparyavṛtti) 71/135/7

22. V*iśeṣāvāśyaka-bhāṣya* -501

23. *Varṇapadavākyātmakaṁ vacanaṁ.*

24. *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya-* 455 & 459

25. *(a) Ta saṇṇā vañjaṇa labdhisaṇṇiyaṁ tivihamakharaṁ, Ibid. -* 464

    (b) Se kiṁ taṁ akkharasuyaṁ? akkharasuyaṁ tivihaṁ pannattaṁ/

    Taṁ jahā- sannakkhara, vañjanakkhara, laddhikkhara//

26. *Ibid. -* 464

27. *Ibid. -* 466

28. *Akkharasareṇa sarā- Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya-461*

29. *Ibid.-* 462

30. *Ibid.-* 463

31. *Samavāyāṅga -*46

32. *Samavāyāṅga-* 46 (Commentary by Abhayadeva) p. 65.

Jaina Philosophy of Word

Language and word

The first question of *Prajñāpanā-sūtra* is related to the origin of language where as the second question is related to the expression of language. The Mahāvīra's contention with regard to expression of language was that the language is produced by body or bodily efforts[1]. Jaina philosophers have classified the words into two classes viz. *Prāyogika* (caused by efforts) and *Vaisrasika* (caused naturally)[2]. Simultaneously, he maintains that language is made of *prāyogika* words and not of *vaisrasika*. Language is the result of the bodily efforts of beings, so the contention of *Prajñāpanā* that the language is born of bodily efforts seems to be correct. For language not only sensible body is necessary but the intellect or thought expression capacity in speaker as well as listener is also necessary. The language is a scriptural or verbal knowledge, which is necessarily followed by sensory knowledge (*Mati-jñāna*). For sensory knowledge mind and senses are essential. Therefore, the language whether it is in the form of sound-symbols or bodily- signals, it is possible only through the senses and the mind. The living beings express their feelings, emotions and thoughts through their bodily efforts, which form the base for the origin and expression of language. From this point of view, *Prajñāpanā's* contention that the language is produced by bodily effort is correct. Though the comprehension of the meaning by all means of bodily signals and symbols, is language but when we talk of language in the context of human beings, we do not include all types of bodily symbols, except sound symbols. In this respect the human language can be called *akṣarātmaka* (alphabetical or letter-formed) or *śabdātmaka* (word-formed). Though it is true that language is *śabdātmaka* but all the words do not necessarily support language. The Jaina thinkers have classified the words in following manner. Firstly, from the point of view of its origin, words have been classified into two parts i.e. (i) *Prāyogika* (caused by efforts)

and (ii) *Vaisrasika* (caused naturally). *Prāyogika* words are those, whose sound is produced by the efforts of animate-beings while *Vaisrasika* are those whose sound is produced by mutual collision of inanimate beings. *Vaisrasika* words are necessarily non-linguistic while *prāyogika* words are both linguistic and non-linguistic. The linguistic *prāyogika* words are of two types viz. *Akṣarātmaka* (alphabetical) and *Anakṣarātmaka* (non-alphabetical). Among these two, the sound which is associated with letters/alphabets are called *akṣarātmaka* and the sound which is bereft of letters/alphabets are *anakṣarātmaka*. The sound produced by inanimate things is called non-linguistic practical word sound. They are of five types[3]:

1. *Tata*- word sounds produced by the instruments made of hide, e.g. drum.

2. *Vitata*- word sounds produced by string instruments e.g. Sārangī, Vīṇā, Sitāra etc.

3. *Ghana*- word sounds produced by hitting metal instrument e.g. cymbals.

4. *Suṣira*- word sounds produced by wind instruments live conch-shell, flute, etc.

5. *Saṅgharṣa*- word sounds exerted by the friction/collision of two inanimate things e.g. *Jhāñjha* (an instrument played by the friction of hand-palms.

Though, by nature all above types of sounds are considered as non-linguistic but being produced through efforts the resultant sound can be changed into linguistic form. These types of instruments necessarily produce the musical sounds, thus, they undoubtedly deserve to be changed into linguistic form. As *Dhavalā* mentions, the words produced by *Nagārā* (a musical instrument) etc. are conventionally of the linguistic form.[4]

Therefore, the sound produced by vocal instruments like *tata, vitata* etc. can be alphabetical to some extent. But on account of its illegibility it can not be included in linguistic word sound. Here it is to be remembered that the sound produced by the friction/collision of two things caused by living beings is *prāyogika*, whereas the sound emerging from the friction/collision of two things naturally, is called *vaisrasika*, e.g. sound produced by thunder, the sound of colliding clouds. It is totally non- linguistic.

Word
- Prāyogika (caused by efforts)
  - Bhāṣātmaka (Linguistic)
    - Akṣarātmaka (Alphabetical)
    - Anakṣarātmaka (non-alphabetical)
  - Abhāṣātmaka (Non-Linguistic) (Being caused by efforts can be changed in Language)
    - Tata (by the Instruments)
    - Vitata (by string Instrunt.)
    - Ghana (by hitting metal Instrunt)
    - Siṣira (by wind unstrunt.)
    - Collison
      - Sangharṣa (by collison)
- Vasrasika (caused naturally)
  - Abhāṣātmaka (Non-alphabetical) (No change in the form of Language)

Definition of word

Word is the sound-symbol, nevertheless, it is worth to remember that all types of sound cannot be regarded as word. In the context of language, the meaning of 'word' is 'alphabetical meaningful sound symbols'. *Abhidhānarājendra-kośa* mentions some definitions of word given by Jaina masters. Generally, sound of alphabets received by auditory sense in a successive manner as well as in a definite order is called 'word'.[5] Though this definition fails to define the meaning of word in its totality because the word is not only the alphabetical sound received by the auditory sense in an orderly manner but also more than that, it must be meaning oriented. In this regard, there are three important points to be noted:

i. Sound should be Alphabetical

ii. It should be arranged in a definite order and

iii. It should be meaningful

Abidhānarājendra-kośa maintains, 'that which is able to interpret or manifest the meaning is word'.[6] Patañjali defines word as that which has meaning. The commentary on *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali has the similar view regarding the definition of word. It reads, ''*Atha gaurityatra kaḥ śabdaḥ? Gakāraukāravisarjanīyāḥ iti bhagavānupavarṣaḥ/ Śrotra-grahaṇehyarthe śabdaśabdaḥ prasiddhaḥ/ Yadyevamarthapratyayo nopapadyate/ Ato gakārādivyatirikto'nyo gośabdo'sti, yato'rtha-pratipattiḥ syāt*''[7] i.e. the word is not mere a combination of sound, which forms the words but the word is that which has a meaning. In fact, the word denotes meaning. To interpret the meaning, is the power of word. If it fails to interpret the meaning then it is nothing more than the meaningless sound. The meaningful sound is called as word. Bhartṛhari maintains that the word is inseparable from its meaning.[8] The *Jaināryas* have also advocated the inseparable relation of word and its meaning but they do not consider them as identical. They maintain the expressed-expressive (*vācya-vācaka*) relation between the word and its meaning. I have discussed in detail the relation of word and its meaning in forth coming chapter, what I want to establish here that denotation of the object is the real quality of the word. According to Jainas the word has symbolic

power of denotation of the meaning. The word consists of the quality of expression but expressible is different from that. The word is expressive and the object is expressible.

The process of comprehension of meaning (*Artha-bodha*) in Linguistic knowledge

According to Jainas the knowledge produced by language is articulate (*Śrutajñāna*). After hearing the words to comprehend the meaning of the sentence and again to express the same in words, is the function of articulate knowledge. Thus, listening and pronunciation are the basis of the articulate knowledge. It is matter of deep consideration as to how the meaning of a word is grasped after hearing it. There are two forms of words used in the language viz. (i) written and (ii) uttered.

The meaning of written words is known through the eyes (the organ of sight), while the uttered word is known through the organ of hearing. If we take language in a wider term accepting non-alphabetical symbols there in, we find that in some circumstances comprehension of meaning is possible through the sense of touch also. Thus, there are three senses which provide meaning of the term viz. 1. Sense of touch, 2. Sense of sight and 3. Sense of hearing. Sense alone are not able to provide meaning if thought oriented mind and intellect are absent there. A blind man in absence of sense of sight comprehends the meaning of the term through sense of touch by touching the object, as they read Braille script easily. According to Jainas in *artha-bodha*, use of all above-mentioned three senses alongwith mind is important. Let us see the utility of these senses and mind in the process of cognition.

According to Jaina masters when a speaker wants to express his thoughts and feelings to others, it is mind, which first of all becomes active. After the mind, the speech becomes active. After speech the body and then after the speaker's sound system receives the atoms of speech variform (*Bhāṣā-varganā*). Then it transforms into language or in special word-sounds and finally excretes the form of sound and gets them out. These linguistic matters emerged in sound form, spread over the sky as sound waves. The *Jaināchāryas* have considered these sound waves as spreadable/transmissible (*Prasaraṇaśila*). *Prajñāpanā-sūtra* admits that the sound waves of speech variform go to the end of the universe. [9]

The transmission process of word-sound waves takes place in the following way. First of all, the departed matter (*pudgala*) in the form of sound, vibrates their near by aggregates and makes it articulated. In this way, gradually emerging sound-waves through the matters of speech variform reaches up to the end of the universe like wave undulation method (*Vīcītaranganyāya i.e.* the rule by which sound reaches the ear, a term used to denote successive operation). As a stone thrown into the water of a pond creates waves in the water and those waves, again by vibrating their nearby waves reach to the cool of the pond, in the same way the sound waves travel to the end of the universe[10]. The capacity of the transmission of sound depends upon the speaker's strength. Some of the sound-waves can be heard form a quite sufficient distance while some sound waves disappear after travelling a little distance. Thus it is not necessary to assume that all sound waves should reach up to the end of the universe.

This audible sound is of three types i. e. 1. *Uccarita* (uttered), *Vāsita* (infused), and 3. *Uccarita-vāsita* (uttered-infused) or mixed. The original word that the speaker speaks is *uccarita* (uttered). When this spoken word generates sound-waves similar to itself, which reaches to the listener, then it is called *vāsita* (infused sound), e.g. the words coming out from loudspeaker. The sound, which contains uttered and infused sound, are called uttered-infused (*uccarita-vāsita*) or mixed sound. Thus, from the point of view of the speaker, the sound or physical language (*dravya-bhāṣā*) is regarded of three types: *Grahaṇa* (receiving), *Nihsaraṇa* (coming out) and *Parāghāta* (shocked)[11]. Amongst, the matter of speech variform received by the speaker is *grahaṇa,* the matter of speech variform uttered by the speaker is *nihsaraṇa* and the matter of other speech variform impressed by the uttered matter of speech variform is *parāghāta* (shocked).

In this regard the first important question is that how the auditory sense receives the word? The Buddhists regard both, sense of sight and sense of hearing as *aprāpyakārī* (non-contactile). According to them like sense of sight, the sense of hearing also receives the object from distance without touching the object. Contrary to this, Jainas maintain that the sense of hearing is *prāpyakārī* (contactile). When the sound touches the sense of hearing, then only the cognition of word is occurred, it does not matter whether the sound is generated in near by or at distant place. The

sound due to its spreadable nature reaches to the sense of hearing and strikes to the listener for word meaning. According to Jaina philosophers, the sound-waves are material as well as spreadable by nature. Though the Mīmāṁsakas too, regard word as all-pervasive (*lokavyāpī)* but their contention is quite different from Jainas. They hold that the word is never generated, it is all pervasive by nature, whereas Jainas hold that the word is generated and then after, due to its spreadable nature pervades the universe and reaching to the end of the universe it vanishes.

Thus the Jainas, by considering word as material and wave-formed have given to word a scientific foundation. The modern scientists regard words as the same. So for as the audibility of language is concerned, the scientists maintain that the matters of speech variform are uttered in the form of word-sound by the efforts of living beings. In other words, the living beings, by their physical efforts, vibrate the matters of sound-waves spreaded over the universe and these waves reaching to the listener become audible. With regard to the meaning grasped through audition of words, it is worth to know that the speaker and hearer both carry the similar word and sound symbols pertaining to objects of the external world in their minds. When the hearer hears the word-formed sound-symbols of the speaker, then there emerges the image of the object in the mind of the hearer and on the basis of these images he comprehends the meaning.

So for as the cognition of the meaning obtained through reading the written language by sense of sight is concerned, Jainas contrary to Naiyāyikas and in accordance with Buddhists, hold that the sense of sight is non-contactile. Defining the process of cognition of word through writing and reading Jainas say that first of all, the author is inspired to express his thoughts and then he writes the word symbols of those thoughts on paper or any other writing materials. The cogniser first looks upon the word symbols then after, on the basis of previous experience, he identifies those objects for which word symbols are used and accordingly he cognises the meaning. Jainas hold that in the whole process, the mind plays an important role. They have considered mind as non-contactile. In the linguistic cognition the mind considered as *avyavahita* (direct) and senses as *vyavahita* (indirect) cause of cognition. In fact, the more a living being is spiritually developed, the more he has capacity to transform

the matters of speech variform in language as well as capacity of getting cognition of meaning from uttered and written word.. Our linguistic communications depend upon our physical and spiritual development which Jainas have taken for granted as the result of *ksayopaśama* (destruction-cum-subsidence) of *Nāma-karma* (body-making *karmas)* in their own terminology. The more a person will be able to destruct and subside his *nāma-karma*, the more he would be empowered to communicate and comprehend the language.

Is the word changed into language, material?

Generally, the Jaina philosophers have regarded word as *pudgala-paryāya* (mode of matter). The treatises like *Uttarādhyayana, Tattvārtha-sūtra*, etc. have considered word as material. Undoubtedly, the word sound is a mode of matter but the word transformed into language, which is able to communicate the meaning, cannot be regarded material or non-living in absolute sense. Because, according to Jainas the language is originated from living beings. At the same time, it is also accepted that *śabdātmaka-bhāṣā* (alphabetical language) is made of efforts. Since the words originated from efforts (*prāyogika*) are those, which are produced by living-beings with the help of non-living matter, hence the word cannot be regarded non-living in absolute sense. The word sound even if it is mode of matter, it is never originated without the efforts of living-beings. For the cognition of meaning and communication of language, a rational being is essentially required, thus the language is not the result of non-living matter. It is the result of combination of both living and non-livings. Word symbols and alphabets are the physical constructions indeed, but the cognition of meaning is not possible without the rational living beings. Jainas, on one hand regard the perfect soul or liberated one (*Siddha*) as bereft of language (*abhāṣaka*) and on the other hand, they regard the pure matter also bereft of language. The language is the result of the efforts made by living-beings but the living being must be embodied or corporal. Till the hearer and speaker both are not intellectual, it would be impossible to draw meaning from word symbols or other symbols.

The function of language is to get cognised and to make other to cognise, and this capacity is only in intellectual living beings. Thus, the language is the medium of communication of conscious world. Its apparatus are non-livings (*jaḍa*) but it is used only by living-beings.

The theory of molecular structure of the Word

Bhartṛhari, in his *Vākyapadīya*, has indicated about the theory of molecular structure of word but his commentators have not thrown any light on the subject as to who was the propounder of this theory? It is clear that the propounder of this theory were Jainas, because only Jainas regard words as physical construct or the modes of matter. It has been taken as granted by the Jainas that the language or word sound is generated through a special type of matter (*pudgala*). They regard word as one of the different modes of matter.

Naiyāyikas have refuted this theory of Jainas. They argue that if the word is material, it must possesses the quality of touch. Their second objection is that if the word is material (*paudgalika*) then it must be obstructed by any obstruction. They again object that if the words were material, they would have their organs/parts but the words are bereft of organs/parts. Similarly, their fourth objection is that if the word is a material structure then it must be collided by other atoms and their aggregates but there is nothing like this, therefore, to accept word as a materiel structure or mode of matter is anomalous imagination.

Against the objections raised by Naiyāyikas, Jainas say that these objections are not applicable to our theory, because:

(1) The words, in spite of their quality of touch, can remain unmanifested and unexperienced by our sense of touch. Because they are so minute material constructs unable to be grasped by our sense-organ of touch. It is crystal clear that the sensation of words depends upon the condition and direction of air. In many situations, when the air is in favourable condition, we can hear the words from distant place also. While in unfavourable condition of air we fail to hear even the words at hand. It proves that the words possess the quality of touch similar to the air and other material objects.

(2) Against the second objection of Naiyāyikas, Jainas hold that firstly, the material words must be obstructed by any obstruction is not necessary. As the atoms of fragrance enters the room even if it is closed, in the same way words enter. Again it can be proved on the basis of modern scientific equipments that in the condition of impregnable obstruction or in complete vacuum listening or motion of words are

obstructed. Hence, the Jainas contention that words are material, is scientifically relevant[12].

(3) Thirdly, to be composed of organs/parts is not an essential condition for being a word material. Light and molecules are material constructs but they are partless. What ever is material that all must be composed of organs/parts no such theory can be propounded. Thus, to be material, the words should be composed of organs, is not an essential condition.

(4) Replying the fourth objection of Naiyāyikas, Jainas argue that like the molecules of fragrance the molecules of sound too, have capacity to pass through smoothly without colliding with the other molecules. As without touching the nasal hairs, the molecules of fragrance enter the nose, so also the molecules of sound/word enter to the sense of hearing. Again, the Jaina philosophers do accept that the word sound is caused by mutual collision of material molecules of speech variform through efforts. They also maintain that material molecules of speech variform resume their motion articulating and infusing each other, and this proves word as material itself. [13]

The grammarians have criticised the Jaina concept of word, like Naiyāyikas. They have also framed the same objections against considering word as material as the Naiyāyikas had raised. Here, to give account of grammarian's criticism separately, is not necessary. Today we are living in the age of science and science has already proved word-sound as material. Therefore, there should be no objection in taking word-sound as material. It is to remember here that Jainas have established the material concept of the word, but that is established in respect of word-sound and not its meaning. If we relate word with the intention of speaker and listener, then definitely that is non-material. Actually the cause of this controversy is the linguistic ambiguity. In my opinion, there is no harm in accepting word as material and every one should accept it without any objection. Similarly, if we regard the intention of speaker and the meaning grasped by the listener as nature of word, then Jainas have no abjection in accepting word as psychic (*caitsika*) phenomena. Unfortunately, all the schools of Indian philosophy have used the word in different sense but when criticism were made, no school took care that in what sense and in which context the word is used. What the Jainas mean by word is

totally different from the meaning that of Mīmāṁsakas. If we properly understand the intention, sense and context in which the 'word' is used, there remains no ground for dispute. Jainas hold that the word is in sound form hence it is material, while according to Mīmāṁsakas and grammarians the word is non-material because it is a form of intellect which causes meaning through sound. Jainas according to their own contention maintain that the word is a real and not illusion (*vivarta*).

Transient existence of word[14]

Language is made of words. Words are the fundamental components of language. In this regard the important philosophical question needs to be answered is whether the word is eternal or transient. In Indian philosophy there are two main streams which discuss in detail the transience and eternity of word. The Mīmāṁsakas and grammarians regard word as eternal while the schools like Nyāya-vaiśeṣika, Sāṁkhya, Bauddha and Jaina hold word as transient. Jainas are very clear on this point that since the word is originated hence it is transient. So for as the question of spoken words (by human beings) are concerned, the Naiyāyikas and grammarians also consider them transient but they maintain that the basis of words or sounds uttered by a man is the infinite word (*anādi-śabda*). According to them, this very cause of sound (word) is eternal. They have accepted word as eternal because on the same ground they have advocated the eternity and super-humanness (*Apauruṣeyatā*) of the *Vedas*. The grammarians have regarded word as ultimate reality or *Śabda-Brahma* (Eternal verbum) and have proved its eternity. The Jaina philosophers have discussed in details the eternity and transiency of the word. However, they do not make any difference in word and sound. They maintain that the word is generated. *Prajñāpanā-sūtra* clearly mentions that the word is generated from body and perishes in the end of the universe. What ever is generated, its destruction is inevitable. If the word is generated, definitely, it is not eternal. Since the Jainas have taken word sound as the mode of matter (*pudgala-paryāya*), and no mode is eternal, the words are also not eternal.

In fact, the controversy of transience and eternity of word is only due to linguistic ambiguity. Those who regard word as eternal, maintain that the word is different from word-sound as well as cause of word-sound whereas those who take word as transient, regard word and

sound as one and non-different. According to first group, the word is the cause of the word-sound (*śabda-dhvani*); hence, it is superhumanly (*apauruṣeya*), whereas the second group maintains that the word in the form of sound is the result of human efforts. Jainas, alongwith the transience of word have discussed in details the relation between the word and its meaning, which we shall discuss in forth coming pages.

From the point of view of philosophy of language, the question of eternity and transiency of word is important because it is directly related with the expression of the meaning of word. The Mīmāṁsakas hold that if the word is considered as transient it can not express the meaning because with its origination, it perishes also. Hence the word by which the symbol is received will be absent at the time of use. In that case, denotation (*vācyārtha*) of word would not be possible. It is only the eternal word, which will be one and the same at the time of its indication as well as usage. To regard expressive word (*vācaka-śabda*) as eternal is necessary because only that eternal word can express the meaning on the basis of its all time expressed-expressive (*vācya-vācaka*) relation with the word.

Jainas criticising the Mīmāṁsakas contention argue that ability of expression of meaning in word is not due to its eternity but due to its resemblance (*sādṛśya*). The word 'cow' pronounced in the past is different from that of word 'cow' pronounced at present. Nevertheless, there is resemblance in both of them and on that very basis they give the meaning of their denoted object. Thus, there is no direct relation of eternity of word with the expression of its meaning[15]. The same word, in different tense carries different meanings. The meaning of word remains changing, it has been proved by today's linguists. If the meaning of the word is always changing, there is no reason to regard word as eternal for mere cognition of meaning (*artha-bodha*).

How does the word get meaning?

How the word has power to denote its meaning is also an important question with regard to the philosophy of language. In this context, there are two concepts prevalent. According to first conception, the natural power of expression and denotation of the object is inherent in the word. Meaning of 'natural power' means that every word is related with its object to be expressed (*vācya-viṣaya)* from the beginningless

time, and with the pronunciation of that very word, the object to be expressed, is denoted.

On the contrary, the second concept holds that the word has not natural power of denotation of the object but meaning is rather imposed on the word. The word gets its denotation (*vācyārtha*) by conventional and traditional usage. In other words, the words get their meaning by usage. There is no meaning inherent in the word, but the meaning is given to the word.

The Jaina philosophers did not accept both of the above mentioned concepts in absolute sense but clarified that the concept of word and its meaning is not based on any one-sided view. Many of the words are defined on the basis of their root (*dhātu*) and many on the basis of society or traditions and usage. While few words are etymological, few are conventional. According to Jainas, the determination of the meaning of the word is based on three principles viz. 1. *Sahaja-yogyatā* (Natural ability), 2. *Samketa* (Symbols) and 3. *Abhisamaya* (usage or tradition). The word is empowered to denote its meaning, which is traditionally or conventionally given to it[16].

Ascertaining denotation or meaning of a word (Naming)

Sentence is the medium of linguistic expressions, constructed by meaningful words. The letters are the constituents of words but the process of naming determines the primary meaning of a word. Jainas like Mīmāṁsakas neither hold that the primary meaning of the word is predetermined since beginningless time, nor like Naiyāyikas they maintain that the meaning of a word is determined by God. They maintain that the primary meaning of a word is determined by conventions. In other words it is the society which determines the meaning of the word. The *nāma-dvāra* (name disquisition) of *Anuyogadvāra*[17] (disquisition doors) refers to the method of naming. While defining the method of naming, ten types of name are mentioned there.

(1) Ekavidha-nāma (Single-fold name)

Reality with all its three components *dravya* (substance), *guṇa* (attribute) and *paryāya* (mode) is expressible through words. Basically all are names. The existence in its integrated form can named as *Sat* (Reality) on the basis of its common characteristics.

(2) Dvividha-nāma (Double-fold name)

In *Anuyogadvāra-sūtra*, double-fold classification of name have been done on the basis of following three aspects:

(i) On the basis of the numbers of alphabets

(a) *Ekakṣarika* (Single lettered) e.g. *Hṛ* (ही), *hī* (धी:), *srī* (श्री) etc.

(b) *Anekāṣarika* (Multiple lettered) e.g. Vīṇā, Latā, Mālā, etc.

(ii) On the basis of consciousness

(a) *Jīva-vācaka* (name denoting living beings) e.g. Devadatta, Yajñadatta, Somadatta, etc.

(b) *Ajīva-vācaka* (name denoting non-living beings) e.g. *Ghaṭa* (pitcher), *Paṭa* (cloth), *ratha* (chariot).

(iii) On the basis of Generality and Indivuduality

(a) *Vyakti-vācaka* (Proper names denoting particularity) e.g. Devadatta.

(b) *Jāti-vācaka* (Common names denoting generality) e.g. Man.

It is worth mentioning here that the name, which is common (general) from the one point of view, may be particular from another point of view e.g. 'Indian'. This name is common from the point of view of inhabitants of India, whereas from the point of view of human race, it is particular. *Anuyogadvāra-sūtra* defines this fact with multiple illustrations and concludes that general or particular or the concepts of common and proper are relative. We have mention of another two-fold classification of name in *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya* where the terms are classified into two types:

1. *Vācāka-pada* (expressive terms) e.g. 'The tree is standing.'

2. *Dyotoka-pada* (Denotative terms) e.g. Prof. (professor), Dr. (doctor), etc.

(3) Trividha-nāma (Three-fold name) The three-fold classification of name is done on the basis of two aspects:

(i) On the basis of substance, attributes and modes

(a) *Dravya-vācaka-nāma* (name denoting substance) e.g. soul, matters, space, etc.

(b) *Guṇa-vācaka-nāma* (name denoting attributes) e.g. cold, hot, black, blue, sweet, etc.

(c) *Paryāya-vācaka-nāma* (name denoting modes) -It denotes the particular states of the object, e.g. woman, man, child, old, young, etc.

(ii) On the basis of gender

(a) *Puṅliṅga-nāma* (name denoting masculine gender) e.g. Rāja, Viṣṇu, Giri, etc.

(b) *Strīliṅga-nāma* (name denoting feminine genders) e.g. Mālā, Laxmī, etc.

(c) *Napuṅsakaliṅga-nāma* (name denoting neuter gender) e.g. Vana, Madhu, Phala, etc.

(4) Caturvidha-nāma (Four fold name)

The four-fold classification makes to understand the word construction process on the basis of induction and deduction of letters in conjugation process.

(a) *Āgama* (Induction)- construction of word with induction of new letter during conjugation process, e.g. Padmāṇi.

(b) *Lopa* (Deduction) construction of word by deduction of any letter during conjugation process, e.g. *Ghaṭo'tra* (घटोऽत्र).

(c) *Prakṛti* (root)- Construction of word without induction or deduction of any letter. In this process in spite of all possibility of conjugation, the process is not completed, e.g. *māle +ime = māleime.*

(d) *Vikṛti* (declension)- During the process of conjugation the word construction process does not complete intact but in the form of declension, e.g. *sā+āgata=sāgatā.*

(5) Pañcavidha- nāma (Five- fold name)

Terms are divided in five types on the basis of their nature.

(i) **Nāma-pada** (pertaining to names)-The terms, which have ability of being subject (*uddeśya*) and predicate (*vidheya*) independently in a sentence, are *nāma-pada*. The *nāma-pada* are always with a case ending (*vibhakti*) denoting any object e.g. Aśva, Gaja, etc.

(ii) **Naipātika** (indeclinable words)- The words, which remain intact in all the seven cases, three genders and three numbers, are called *Naipātika,* e.g. *khalu.*

(iii) Ākhyātika (pertaining to verbs)- The verbal terms (roots) are called *ākhyātika*, e.g. *dhāvati* (to run).

(iv) Upasargika (pertaining to a Prefix). That, which causes change in the meaning of a term, is called *upasarga* (prefix), viz. '*pra*', '*sama*', *ni*, *vi*, etc. The words constructed by these prefixes are called *Aupasargika* viz. *Vijñāna, Adhivaktā*, etc.

(v) Miśra (a complex word)- The word constructed with the help of prefix, verb and participles, is called *miśra* or a complex word, e.g. *sañyata*.

Besides, *Anuyogadvāra-sūtra*, the same classification is found in *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya* also.

(6) Ṣaḍvidha-nāma (Six-fold names)

The union of *karma* particles with the soul produces six volitional conditions (*Bhāva*) of the soul. These conditions are called six-fold name in *Anuyogadvāra-sūtra*.

These volitional conditions are as under:

(a) *Audayika* (Realisational)- The condition of the soul on the realisation of a particular type of *karma* is called *audayika- nāma*, e.g. human being (*manuṣya*), celestial-being (*deva*), etc.

(b) *Aupaśamika* (Subsidential)- The condition of the soul on the subsidence (*upaśama*) of a particular type of *karma* is called *Aupaśamika-nāma*.

(c) *Kṣāyika* (Destructional)- The condition of the soul on the destruction of a particular type of *Karma* is *kṣāyika-nāma*.

(d) *Kṣāyopaśamika* (Destructional cum subsidential)- The condition of soul on the partial destruction and partial subsidence of a particular type of *karma* is called *kṣāyopaśamika-nāma*.

(e) *Pāriṇāmika* (Modificational)- The modificational names denote changes. They are of two types - 1. *Sādi* (with beginning) and 2. *Anādi* (without beginning). The changes occurred in a particular object due to time factor, are called *sādi-pāriṇāmika* (modification with beginning) e.g. old sweet stuff (*Guḍa*), old cloth etc. The continuous changing process witnessed in substance like matter (*pudgala*) etc. is called modifications without beginning.

(f) *Sannipātika* (Conjunctive)- The conditions emerged out of the conjunction of above mentioned five different conditions are called *sannipātika*.

(7) Saptavidha-nāma (Seven-fold names)

Anuyogadvāra-sūtra mentions seven-fold classification of names, which refers seven notes of music (*sapta-svaras*) i.e. Ṣadja, Ṛṣabha, Gāndhāra, Madhyama, Pañcama, Dhaivata, and Niṣāda. These notes of music are the medium of feeling expressions and in this way are related with language. The author has discussed in detail the *uccāraṇa-sthāna* (the place of articulation), *phala* (the point of piercing instrument), *grāma* (gamut), etc. I have referred these notes of music here because they are very important from the point of view of philosophy of language.

(8) Aṣṭavidha-nāma (Eight-fold-names)

Anuyogadvāra-sūtra defines eight-fold names based on eight cases (*vibhakti*). These eight cases are elaborately discussed in Sanskrit and Prakrit grammars. The case determines the place of the word in a sentence. Hence cases are very important with regard to the meaning of a word.

(9) Navavidha-nāma (Nine-fold names)

Anuyogadvāra sūtra refers nine-fold names based on nine types of *Rasas* (Sentiments) which are very important for the literature (poetic). These *Rasas* are ž1. *Vīra* (heroism), 2. *Sṛṅgāra* (love), 3. *Adbhuta* (wonder), 4. *Raudra* (anger or fury), 5. *Brīḍanaka* (terror), 6. *Vibhatsa* (disgust), 7. *Hāsya* (mirth), 8. *Karuṇa* (pity) and 9, *Praśānta* (tranquillity). But how these *Rasas* are related to the method of naming, it is not clear. From the point of view of language the six-fold, seven-fold and nine-fold names are not so important. With the point of view of *karma* theory the six-fold names, from the point of view of musicology the seven-fold names and from the point of view of literature, the nine-fold names are important but they are not directly related with philosophy of language. In eight-fold names based on eight cases are related with philosophy of language. The ten-fold names described in *Anuyogadvāra-sūtra* are directly associated with the method of naming and philosophy of language.

(10) Daśavidha- nāma (Ten-fold names)

Anuyogadvāra-sūtra[18] and *Dhavalā*[19] refer the following ten-fold names. Both are different in serial numbers only. This classification

meant to the method of naming so that their right meaning could be understood.

(i) **Gauṇyapada-nāma**- (Based on the attributes/qualities): That which indicates the disposition of attributes is *gauṇya*. When we name an object based on its etymological meaning according to accomplishment of its quality, it is called *Gauṇyapada-nāma* e.g. to call the sun as Bhāskara due to its quality of shining or brightness or to call a person Laxmipati who is wealthy.

(ii) **Nogauṇyapad-nāma** (Names not based on the attributes/ quality): The terms or names which are given without caring its etymological meaning or quality, are called *Nogauṇyapada-nāma*, e.g. to call an ugly women as Sundarī (beautiful women).

(iii) **Ādānapada-nāma** (Based on the adjectives): The names given on the basis of adjective of the object are called *Ādānapada-nāma*, e.g. *Pūrṇa kalaśa*. In this method of naming, the object depends on another term for expression.

(iv) **Pratipakṣapada-nāma** (Based on the absence of quality) When names are given to a substance/object on the basis of the absence of qualities, it is called *Pratipakṣapada-nāma* e.g. to call a women barren (*bandhyā*) as she lacks the quality of giving birth to a child.

(v) **Anādisiddhānta-pada** (Based on tradition or conventional usage): When a term is named on the basis of traditionally accepted particular meanings, it is called *Anādisiddhānta-pada,* e.g. Brahma, *Syādvāda*, etc. In many context they carry the meaning different from its etymological meaning.

(vi) **Þrādhānyapada-nāma** (Based on dominance): When a complex object is named on the basis of dominance or plurality of its unit, it is called *Prādhānyapada-nāma*, e.g. Āmravana (Mango forestry). In the mango forestry there can be trees of other fruits also but on the basis of the plurality of the mango trees, it is called mango forestry.

(vii) **Nāma-pada** (Based on the language): When a person or community is named on the basis of the language spoken, it is called *Nāma-pada* e.g.Hindi speaking people are called Hindi. In my opinion *Nāma-pada* or those terms which are named without any basis?

(viii) Parimāṇa-pada (Based on the quantity) :The names, which are given on the basis of the quantity or scale, are called *Parimāṇapada*, e.g. one thousand, crore, metre, litre, etc.

(ix) Avayava-pada (Based on components): It is of two types.

(a) Upacita-avayava-pada (Based on increased components) When a component of the substance is increased due to any reason, it is named as *Upacita-avayava-pada*, e.g. *Lambakarṇa* (the person with long ears.).

(b) Apacita-avayavapada (Based on the decreased components): When a constituent of on object is decreased due to any reason, it is named as *Apacita-avayava-pada*, e.g. *Chinnanāsika* (one, whose nose is cut).

(x) Saṁyoga-pada (Based on the union with other object) *Saṁyoga-pada* are those names, which are given on the basis of union with any other object. It is of following four types:

(a) Dravya-saṁyoga-pada (Based on the union with the substance) e.g. G*haṭa* (the pitcher).

(b) Kṣetra-saṁyoga-pada (Based on the union with Region/ space)- e.g. *Māthura* (one who belongs to the Mathura region).

(c) Kāla-saṁyoga-pada (Based on the union with time factor) viz. *Śāradīya* (Pertaining to autumn).

(d) Bhāva-Saṁyoga-pada (Based on psychical state) e.g. Greedy, Angry.

This description of the method of naming mentioned in *Anuyogadvāra-sūtra* cannot be considered as healthy one from the point of view of philosophy of language but definitely, it throws light on the method of naming.

Problem of determination of meaning of poly-semantic words

Another important question related to the philosophy of language is that, how the meaning of poly-semantic words is determined? It is proved by experience that in all the languages, the poly-semantic words are frequently used. Now the question is that if a word has several meanings, on what base its any particular meaning become primary and others secondary. *Jaināchāryas* have raised this question in their doctrine

of *Naya* (Viewpoint). They hold that in poly-semantic words the desired meaning of word is decided on the basis of speaker's intention and context in which the word is spoken. If we decide the meaning of the word without caring the intention of the speaker then chaos will take place in our behaviour, e.g. 'Bring *saindhava*'. Here the word *saindhava* carries two meanings i.e. (i) Horse and (ii) Salt. When a person asks for *saindhava* when he is on dining table and one brings the horse, it would be ridiculous. Similarly, on demand of *saindhava* by a person who is ready to go some where, one brings salt, it would be again ridiculous. Thus, the meaning of the poly-semantic words is always decided on the circumstances and intention of the speaker. Again the intention of speaker, which depends upon the total circumstances in which he has uttered the word is the deciding factor of the meaning. Even the contemporary western philosophers have accepted that the meaning of a word is not determined on the basis of the word- sound but on the total circumstances in which it is spoken. The ancient Indian philosophers have also accepted it. Bhartṛhari in his *Vākyapadīya* accepting this fact maintains that the words are of both types poly-semantic and synonymous. But which meaning of a word comes forward as expressive (*vācya*), is determined according to the intention of the speaker. In bringing forth the desired meaning of the speaker two factors work i.e. (i) *upacāra*; (ii) *praticāra*. *Upacāra* is that which brings forward the denotation of word (*vācyārtha*) eminently, while *praticāra* eliminates the unwanted meaning[20]. Thus, the intention of the speaker plays an important role in determination of denotation of a word. In addition, the denotation of a word is determined by the context also. This very context is designated as *Naya* (viewpoint) by the Jaina philosophers. What ever the speaker speaks, is always relative or with a particular viewpoint. If we determine the meaning of the word ignoring viewpoint or relativeness, it would not be possible to comprehend the exact denotation of the word. Because, the language, in no way is absolute and thus any effort made to understand the meaning of an expression in ay language can not be called as absolute.

Not only the poly-semantic words, but also the denotation of other words and sentences are determined by the circumstances or the context in which that particular word or sentence is spoken. When a mason while binding a wall asks 'brick' or 'stone', he from that single

word gives the meaning of the whole sentence i.e. 'Bring the bricks' or 'Bring the stones.' But when the same word 'brick' or 'stone' is pronunciated by a policeman at the sight of dispute with the students or during a riot, then it means 'Hit with brick or stone' or 'They are hitting with bricks or stones'. Thus the denotation of word and sentences are determined by the condition or the circumstance in which that words or sentence is spoken. *Jaināchāryas* introduced the doctrine of *Nikṣepa* (positing) and *Naya* (viewpoint) so that the listener could understand the intention of speaker or the readers could understand the intention of the author.

Denotation of word (vācyārtha)- universal or particular?

There has been a dispute regarding the denotation of word, whether it is universal (*sāmānya*) or particular (*viśeṣa*). The fundamental question is that the word denotes universal or particular. The Mīmāṁsakas maintain that the subject of the word is universal[21]. The particular (individual) cannot be the subject of the word as individuals are many but they are denoted by one word viz. cow, man, women, etc. Let us take one example of man. Men are numerous but the word 'man', by which the whole class is denoted, is one. Thus by word we take generality. A question can be raised here that the words, which are proper (*vyaktivācaka*), how their denotation (*vācyārtha*) can be universal or general? Here the advocates of universality may argue that the proper nouns also denote universality because whom they denote are general and not the particular, i.e. the person denoted by the word 'Sagarmal' is not that which is changing every moment but that which is intertwined in all-changing individuals.

Contrary to this contention of Mīmāṁsakas, the Buddhists negate the existence of the universal (*sāmānya*). They regard the universal as an intellectual fiction. The Buddhists hold that the function of a word is '*anyāpoha*' (elimination of all other than the object of the experience i.e. a negative apprehension or *Anya-vyāvṛtti* i.e. negation of all the other things of the world. The Buddhists call a word as '*apoha*,' because it excludes (*apoha*) the idea, which is different from its own *(Svākāra)*. There is thus no real counter part of a word. Now, when the word negates or excludes every thing then its denotation will be none other than

particular. Synthesising these two views Naiyāyikas and Jainas have accepted that the universal qualified by an individual or universal qualified by particular is the denotation of word[22]. If we accept word as universal then the day to day behaviour will not be possible, because universal is intangible. In fact, from word, we comprehend universal as well as individual also. The Jaina philosophers hold that the word is neither absolute universal nor absolute particular (individual), but it denotes the universalised particular. They accept that in fact, the question that whether the word denotes universal or particular is wrong in it self. This question may be possible only if universal and particular are considered as totally separate having their independent existence. But it is not so. Both can be separated in thought only; empirically they cannot be separated. No particular is existent without universal and no universal is existent without particular. The *manusyatva* (the aggregate of human qualities) or the (characteristics of man) can not be seen different from a human being. Neither we get any human being bereft of manhood i.e. *manusyatva*. Thus, the reality or being is universal qualified with particular (*sāmānya-viśeṣātmaka*) and if denotation of a word is experienced fact, then we must accept that the word neither denotes absolute-universal, nor absolute-particular but the particular (individual) qualified with universal (*Sāmānya-viśiṣṭa-viśeṣa*). Refuting the Mīmāṁsaka's contention that words can denote and receive universal only, *Jaināchāryas* maintain that the word denotes according to its symbols (*saṁketa*) and symbols can be possible only in particular qualified with universal. Only universal can not be *arthakriyākārī* (compatible of action or pragmatic). The universal '*gotva*' (cowness) can not give milk and *ghaṭatva* (pitcherness) can not hold water. What does the word denote is particular possessed of universal or universal possessed of particular?

Although the Jainas, with Naiyāyikas regard that, the word denotes particular qualified with universal (*sāmānya-viśiṣṭa-viśeṣa*) but they do not support the Naiyāyikas contention that the word first comprehends universal/common and then particular/individual. Had there been separate existence of universal and particular or cause and effect relation between the two, the Naiyāyikas view would have been considered as valid. When universal and particular are intertwined in one and single object, then to

say that the word comprehends universal first and individual later is not correct, because, this type of order is not seen at empirical level. If we consider universal as adjective (*viśeṣaṇa*) and individual as defined by adjective (*viśeṣya*) then both are proved identical and comprehended at a time, not separately. 'Bring the cow', hearing this sentence the listener brings the cow, a particular possessed of *gotva* universal (*jātyānvita*) and not only *gotva* universal. By word symbols, we comprehend subject and predicate simultaneously. The Mīmāṁsakas contention in this regard is invalid when they say that after hearing the word 'cow' the particular combined with the adjectives like black, white etc. is not experienced, hence the denotation of word is not a particular but universal. With the utterance of the word 'cow' one may not comprehend a cow with its black, white colour, but definitely, he has a picture of cow characterised with dewlap etc. in his mind.

Mīmāṁsakas contention that there is a cause effect relation (according to Prabhākara Miśra) and natural relation (according to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa) between the universal and particular, and hence from the denotation of word which is universal (*jāti*), the particular (*vyakti*) is cognised by its figurative expression. What ever may be the conditions as Prabhākara and Kumārila maintain but at the time of the pronunciation of word, the universal and particular are identical. Therefore, the denotation of word must be particular qualified by universal[23].

The very question of universality and particularity of denotation of word is formed by different philosophers on the ground of their metaphysical concepts. Empirically, we always experience the particular qualified by universal. Thus denotation of word is neither absolutely universal nor absolutely particular but particular qualified by universal. This concept is also supported by the western existentialists. According to them, only that language can be considered important, the subject of which is empirical fact. In other words, they consider only those words, objects meaningful, the denotation of which can be verified. In this regard Jainas and to some extent Naiyāyika's contention is seems to be appropriate that the denotations of words are the particular facts of experience possessed of universality.

In fact, the whole dispute of universality and particularity of the denotation of word exist only when the universal and particular are

considered as separate entity. This problem transpired because we overlooked the difference of distinguishable on the level of thought and separable on the level of experience. There are such things that we can separate them on thought level only but empirically they can not be separated e.g. universal and particular cannot be separated from each other. Universality is an intangible fact accepted in individuals on the basis of some similarities, but that cannot be seen separate from individuals. Therefore, the denotation of word can be particular qualified with universal.

In this whole discussion, we must care that the language is related with factual world. The entity, which is beyond experience and transient, can not be denoted by the words or language. The facts beyond the experience are described by language as '*neti-neti*', i.e. 'not this-not this' or the transcendental entity '*Brahman*' who defies all descriptions and as such the language fails to describe the same in words. Thus, beyond the empirical reality, there is no approach of words and language. That is why, the contemporary logical analyst called the metaphysical transient ideas as meaningless because they are unverifiable. In the opinion of Indian philosophers, they are inexpressible (*avācya*). The denotation of word is, no doubt, empirical fact or individual possessed of universal, hence that word can only be subject of denotation. According to Jainas, the subject of experience is individual possessed of universal (*jātyānvita-vyakti*), hence that is the denotation of word[24]. They call universal as analogical cognition.

However, this whole exercise of universality and particularity of the denotation of word is meaningless because the words have their own nature and accordingly they denote the universal or particular. Some words are of the nature of *jāti* (universal) viz. human being, and some are of the nature of *vyakti* (individual/particular) viz. Sagarmal. Simultaneously, the denotation of word does not depend exclusively on the nature of words but on the context in which the word is used. Thus the Jainas do not accept any one sided view in his regard.

The word and its relation with its denotation (meaning)[25]

What is the relation of word with its denotation, and the object denoted by it, is an important question to be discussed. It is fact that the

words indicate the individuals, objects, facts, events, activities and emotions. Generally the word *(śabda)*, its meaning (*vācyārtha*) and the object (*viṣaya*) all have their independent existence. Jainas hold that the word is different from its denotation and the objects to be denoted. There is relation of *vācya-vācaka* (expressed-expressive) in word and its meaning, and this relation means that both are neither absolutely identical nor absolutely different. Jainas opine that the two realities in spite of having their independent entity can be related to each other. According to them, neither the word is of objec-form nor the object is of word-form. Neither they accept that the real world is (*vastu-jagat*) generated by word (*Nāda*) nor they accept the identity between the real world and word. Similarly, the word and the meanings are neither evolved from each other (*tadutpatti*) nor they are identical. Yet, the Jainas do accept the expressed-expressive relation in word and its meaning. Because, if there is no relation, the word cannot denote its meaning. The relation between the word and its meaning does not mean that the word transforms itself in the from of meaning. According to Jainas, there is certain relation between the word and its meaning but no such relation, which could claim that the word takes place of its meaning. There may be following three types of relations between the word and its denotation.

(1) Tādātmya-sambandha (Relation of identity)

(2) Tadutpatti-sambandha (Relation of evolved their from)

(3) Vācya-vācaka-sambandha (Relation of expressed-expressive).

The grammarians maintain that there is identity between the word and its denotation. But the Jainas, refuting this contention argue that there can not be relation of identity between the word and its denotation, because in that case with the pronunciation of word the object denoted by it, must be realised. *Nyāyakumudacandra* has raised this question and describes that with the pronunciation of the word *modaka* (a kind of sweet) one does not realise its sweetness, thus, there is no identity between the word and its denotation. Similarly, in the word and its denotation the relation of *tadutpatti* (evolved there from) is also not possible. Neither the object of denotation is evolved from the word, nor the word is evolved from the object of denotation. The word and its denotation both have independent existence from each other. Thus, there can not be accepted the relation of *tadutpatti* between the word and the object of denotation.

Jainas accept the *vācya-vācaka* (expressed-expressive) relation between the word and its denotation. Buddhists deny any such relation and maintain that the word does not have any relation with the object of denotation. Jainas object this Buddhist contention and argue that if the word and its object of denotation do not have any relation with each other, then how can after the perception of object the memory of denoting word, and how on hearing the word the memory of the object can be justified. If we deny any relation between them, then we will have to accept that after hearing the word, recollection of its meaning or object would not be possible *vice-a-versa*. However, our day to day experience defers from it. Practically, we recollect the expressive (*vācya*) words after seeing the object and after hearing the word, we recollect the object. Buddhists in order to solve this riddle accepted that the word has a relation of *tadutpatti* (evolved therefrom) with its universal (*sāmānya*) and the universal becomes one and perseverant with the particular. Hence, even in the absence of direct relation of word with its particular object, the cognition of particular object after hearing the word and seeing the particular object, cognition of word is possible. But as per Buddhist philosophy, neither the word is perceptible nor it has relation with its object (*svalakṣaṇa*) because according to them, the universal is mere a name, it does not have any real existence. Again, they maintain that the perception *(pratyakṣa)* is indeterminate *(Nirvikalpaka)* and indeterminate is bereft of the contact with words. Thus, according to Buddhist philosophy, any relation of word with its universal and the object will not be possible. Again, if we deny any relation between word and its denotation as in the case of Buddhists, we will have to deny the power of expression of word also, and in that case the language would be meaningless. Thus, we must accept that the word and its meaning are neither identical nor totally different, but they have expressed-expressive relation. Here the word is expressive and the object is expressed.

Transience of the relationship of word and its meaning

The Mīmāṃsakas consider not only the word as eternal but also its relationship with denotation as eternal. This eternity of word and its relation with its denotation creates a new problem. If the relation between word and its denotation were eternal then any change in the meaning of a word would not be possible. But the linguistic study clearly accepts that

the denotation of word is always changing. In Prakrit literature, the word *Īsara* (*Īśvara*) indicates a prosperous person. After a due course of time the same word started to be used as a creator and controller of the world. The word *Brahma*, which was initially indicator of sacrifice (*yajña*), was later on described as ultimate reality. The word Buddha' which was initially indicator of intelligent (*Prajñāvāna*) was later on changed as *Buddhū* i.e. the foolish one. Similarly, the word *nagna* (naked) and *luñcita* (one whose hairs have been plucked) which were used particularly for Jaina *Munis* (ascetics) were changed as '*nangā*' (wicked) and '*luccā*' (wanton), and become the synonyms of wicked person. These are a few examples of words, which were changed to quite different meanings. The change in the meaning of a word is an usual phenomena. There are so many ways of change in the meaning of words, viz.

   (i) Extension of meaning- e.g. Ink. Initially it was used for black ink only but presently it is used for the ink of all colours.

   ii. Contraction of meaning- e.g. the word *vāsa* (smell). This word was used initially for all type of smells viz. good or bad but presently it is used only for foul (stinking).

   iii. Transfer of meaning- e.g. the word *Asura*. Formerly used as the indicator of gods was changed to the meaning of demons. Thus, the exaitation and degradation in the meaning of the word is a natural process. This discussion culminates that the denotations of words are always getting and loosing their meaning in the changing streams of time.

   Philosophically, the process of change of the meaning concludes that there is not any constant relation between the word and its denotation. The denotation of word is never determined by the roots of word only, but its meaning is changing according to the context. The famous linguistic analyst L. Wittegenstine propounded the use theory (*prayoga-siddhānta*) to illustrate the relation of the word with its denotation. According to this theory, the denotation of a word is determined by its use. Some times, the similar words or sentences give the different meanings due to style of predication. For example, if one says simply 'you are a over gentle man', but when this sentence is spoken putting stress on the word 'over,' it gives totally different meaning. That is why the Jainas formulated two

theories of philosophy of language, firstly, to accept the transfer of meaning (*arthāntaraṇa*) they admit that the relation of word and its denotation is not of absolutely invariable. Secondly, they also accept this fact that the denotation of the word is decided by its use. On this ground, they conclude that the relation of word and its denotation is non-eternal as well as changeable and not eternal or unchangeable.

Sphoṭavāda and its criticism[26]

Plaintiff's statement-

Sphoṭavāda is an important contribution of grammarians to the field of philosophy of language. According to grammarians, *sphoṭa* means ' *Sphuṭati arthoyasmāt sa sphoṭaḥ* ' i.e. the eternal and imperceptible element of sounds and words and the real vehicle of the idea which bursts out or flashes on the mind when a sound or word is uttered is *sphoṭa*. In other words on hearing the words or sentence, when the entire picture-unit of its meaning is presented before us, it is called *sphoṭa*. Thus, *sphoṭa* is a meaning bearing unit of the language. It is an element to clear the meaning or denotation of a sentence or word. According to grammarians, the denotation of word or sentence is not determined by letter-sound or phoneme but on completion of those phonemes, it automatically appears. The advocates of *sphoṭa* discuss this point with reference to a time-honoured illustration of simple word '*gauḥ*'. In this word, each one of the three sounds '*g*' '*au*' and '*ḥ*' reveals the same word, and it will be wrong to suppose that the word which finds its expression through the medium of three sounds, different in nature from one another, is different on each occasion. The Patañjali in his *Mahābhāṣya* says that as soon as the last letter is pronounced, the integral unit of object comes out and that is *sphoṭa*. He maintains that the sound is transient, it disappears after it is generated and thus, it is unable to convey the meaning because as soon as it denotes the object, it vanishes. Thus *sphoṭa* is permanent and unchanging and it is manifested by ephemeral sound uttered by the speaker and heard by the listener. In other words *sphoṭa* is that which manifests the meaning and which is different from the letter-sound or the phoneme.

There are two aspects of word: viz. (i) Sound, and (ii) Sphoṭa (a meaning-bearing unit of language). Sound appears in succession, from the sound of every letter (phoneme) their emerges a kind of dispositional

tendency or mental impression (*saṁskāra*). Supported by this mental impression or the dispositional tendency *(saṁsakāra)*, with the hearing of the last letter a mental term is produced, and that is termed as *sphoṭa*. Similarly, the sentence *sphoṭa* is also produced. *Sphoṭa* is the internal aspect of denotation. Prabhācandra in his *Nyāyakumudacandra,* presenting the plentiff's statement by the grammarian's end says that 'letters, words and sentences do not manifest the meaning because they are sound formed. Therefore, it is the *sphoṭa,* which manifests the meaning. The sound is transient where as *sphoṭa* is permanent. If *sphoṭa* were considered as transient, hearing the word 'cow' the manifestation of its meaning at any time would not be possible, because by the word bereft of indication, the manifestation of meaning is impossible. Therefore, that which is cause of producing one and partless integral unit of meaning (*sphoṭa*), is manifested by phoneme which ceases after the act of manifestation.

Refutation of Sphoṭavāda

(i) Jaina thinker Prabhācandra argues that if the last letter manifests the meaning of the term/word supported by dispositional tendencies (*saṁskāra*) of the previous letters then the assumption of *sphoṭa* is useless, because, even in absence of *sphoṭa* the meaning of the term can be obtained. He maintains that the *sphoṭa* doctrine is unnecessary, when the memory of latent disposition of the previous letter and the utterance of last letter are capable of denotation of word and the sentence, then to imagine an indirect cause for the same *(sphoṭa* doctrine) is illogical.

(ii) If the letters are unable to manifest the meaning either individually or collectively, then how can they manifest the *sphoṭa.* Again the question arises whether the dispositional tendency (*saṁskāra*) of the letters produced from letters itself is named as *sphoṭa* or it is a quality of the *sphoṭa.* If the dispositional tendency of the letters is *sphoṭa,* then it must be granted that *sphoṭa* is product of letters, and hence eternal. If the *saṁskāra* is not *sphoṭa* in itself but a quality of *sphoṭa,* then the question arises where the latent dispositions is identical with the *sphoṭa* or it is different from the *sphoṭa.* If we accept the dispositional tendency as a quality of *sphoṭa* and thus identical with *sphoṭa,* then we must accept the emergence of the quality through letters and in that case *sphoṭa* will be non-eternal (*Anitya*). If the quality (*Dharma*) produced from latent

disposition is different from the *sphoṭa* then their mutual relation will not be possible and in that case manifestation of *sphoṭa* from phoneme (letters-sound) will be impossible. Again, in the condition when both are identical, if phoneme is unable to produce meaning then the *sphoṭa* too can not produce the meaning.

The existence of *sphoṭa* cannot be proved. The ability of manifestation of meaning is only in the conscious entity and not in any element. If the conscious self is called as *sphoṭa*, Jainas have no objection because *sphoṭa* is that from which the meaning bursts out or manifested. Apart from the conscious entity-self, existence of any independent element named, as *sphoṭa* is not proved, hence it is better to accept that the power of manifestation of meaning is inherent in the word. It also implies that for the manifestation of the meaning, assumption of *sphoṭa* is not necessary.

Not only Jainas but Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṁsakas also refute the theory of *sphoṭa*. According to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, the words are combination of letters, which manifest the meaning. In word-sound, the previous sound can not be regarded as meaningless. Actually, the mental impressions (*saṁskāras*) of words collectively manifest the meaning. Thus, acceptance of independent *sphoṭa* is not necessary. Jainas also maintain that combination of relative letters make a word and combination of relative words make a sentence, which itself manifests its meaning. Thus in Jainas opinion, *sphoṭa* is nothing additional to the mental impression or dispositional tendency of the word or letters.

Buddhist Theory of Apohavāda (Theory of exclusion or double negation) and its refutation[27]
Buddhists contention

The question of denotation of word (*Vācyārtha*) has been one of the disputable questions of Indian philosophy. Buddhists have propounded a theory of *Apohavāda* in this regard. *Apoha* means exclusion of the idea which does not deserve it (*atadvyāvṛtti* or *anyavyāvṛtti*) or which is different from its own. In other words to exclude denotatum of one word from the denotatum of others or exclusion of others (*anyāpoha*) is *sphoṭa*. For example the word 'cow', implies the negation of 'not cow'. The

objective 'cow' is different from a horse, a buffalo or anything, which is 'not-cow'.

The negation of the opposite is the common element in the meaning of the word, and this is falsely interpreted and hypostatized as a positive universal. This is made by transcendental illusion, which can not be avoided. Thus according to Buddhists, the function of word is to exclude or eliminate all other meanings of the word, which are different from its own. They maintain that there is no real counterpart of the word. There is no real signifier (*vācaka*) and no real signified (*vācya*). The relationship between signifier and signified is really one and of the causation in the conceptual *apoha* himself. They hold that the denotatum of a word is neither particular nor universal. It cannot express a real object, as there is no real object, which could be denoted by the word. It is the subjective concept, which is the word on the one hand and when externalised, is its so-called object. Objects of absolute individuality (*svalakṣaṇa*) are momentary and substance, name, universal etc. are the linguistic behaviour only, and not real. The word and its denotation are imaginary or intellectual fiction only. They maintain that the words generate fictions and the fictions generate the words.

The main ground of considering word as real is the language, because in linguistic behaviour the word is considered as indicator of the external world. The words being companion of fiction (*vikalpa*) are useful in empirical world but they are not real but imaginary. If the object is momentary and of the nature of absolute individuality (*svalakṣaṇa*) then that can not be denoted by the word because in the period of receiving denotation the object will be absent. Thus, denotation of an object cannot be transient particular. Although, the denotation of the word can be universal, but universal (*sāmānya*) is non-existent. The meaning enunciated by the word can neither be universal nor particular. The transient particular/individual is unable to receive the denotation and universal, in spite of, being expressible, it is not real. There are so many problems in ascertaining universal as real.

Firstly, the universal is unreal like the horn of a rabbit (*khara-viṣāṇavat*), and unreal cannot be compatible of action (*arthakriyākārī*). According to Buddhists, universal inherent in all the cows (*gotva*) is unreal, because in different regions and different time there are millions

of cows in the world, and in other words as well and that these cows as individuals vary widely amongst themselves in respect of colour, age, configuration and the like. Then to infer only one *gotva* (universal) in all the cows, is contrary to our experience. As a student union has no existence without the students, so also the *gotva* (cowness), *manusyatva* (humanness), etc. are imaginary or the intellectual fiction only, not the reals. According to Buddhists the fictitious universal is the denotation (*vācya*) of the word which is of the nature of *anyāpoha* (exclusion of others or retrogression from others). Thus the word does not denote the external object (*artha*) because the object to be grasped by the senses and the meaning (*artha*) to be grasped by the words, both are different. We observe that a blind person cannot see the object but by hearing the word, he can understand the meaning. Again, a person who explains the term '*dāha*' (to burn) based on his personal feeling after touching the fire, will be totally different from that of the meaning denoted by the term '*dāha*'. Thus the denotation of the word is not the object grasped by the senses. 'This word denotes this object'; this statement is not possible in momentary absolute individual or particular because till the time of its manifestation, it is disappeared. As the word '*go*' (cow) does not have any relation with the word '*aśva*' (horse), thus the word 'cow' is unable to give the knowledge of the *aśva* (horse). Similarly, the word has no relation with the external objects of absolute individuality (*svalakṣaṇa*). The momentary absolute individual cannot be the subject of the word. Thus according to Buddhists, the words neither denote universal nor particular, they by exclusion of others, indicate the intellectual fictitious objects and not the real external objects. According to Buddhists, the words neither denote universal nor particular, they by exclusion of the idea, which does not deserve it (*atadvyāvṛtti*), denote only fictitious objects and not the real external object. This is the theory of *Apohavāda* of Buddhists.

Criticism of Apohavāda

Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa presents the Jaina's account of refutation of the Buddhist theory of *Apohavāda,* as under:

(1) The first objection of Jainas is that object of the word is not the fictitious universal but a real universal. It is true that apart from

individual, there is no existence of universal which is subjective but even then, it is real and not fictitious. According to Jainas the reality is multifaceted (*Anekāntātmaka*). An object has infinite qualities. Some qualities of every object are similar and some are dissimilar to the other objects. These similar qualities are called universal in Jainism. Jainas maintain that the universal is not followed by many but it is subjective. In other words universal is not a single element inherent all individuals but the similarity or resemblance in qualities/characteristics of every individual is called universal, which being present in every individual classify them in one class, cast or community. Similarity is the quality of an individual and in the form of a quality, it is real. As the subject of perception (*pratyakṣa*) is the individual possessed of universal (*jātyanvita-sāmānya*) or the object qualified by universal as well as particular, so also the subject of word is also real object qualified by universal as well as particular and not something imaginary. According to the *Mīmāṁsakas*, if we think that a word denotes only a universal, or, as the Buddhists believe an imaginary universal, then by hearing the word the individual will not be able to apply his mind towards the object denoted by word at all. When we hear the word 'cow' (universal) we look for individual 'cow' and not for the universal cowness (*gotva*). Thus, the word denotes a real thing qualified by class and not an imaginary universal.

(2) If we regard the meaning of word as something imaginary, it would not be possible to determine the truthfulness or the falsehood of a statement, because truthfulness or otherwise of a statement is based on the real experience that we get or don't get in the experiential world. The statement is regarded as truth, if the object corresponding to is found in the external world. If the object is not found corresponding to the statement, that is called false. According to the Buddhists, the basis of the validity of knowledge is its *avisaṁvāditā* (correspondence with the thing) and the *avisaṁvāditā* can be determined on the basis of the external meanings only and nothing else. We call the statement false if the objects corresponding to it are not found in the external world. Thus, the meaning of word can only be real objects, and not the imaginary one.

(3) Jainas further argue that if you (the Buddhists) regard *anyāpoha* the very reflection of the object reflected in determinate intellect,

then the question arises as to whose reflection is it? Is it the reflection of the objects of absolute individuality (*svalakṣaṇa*) or of the universal? It cannot be the reflection of *svalakṣaṇa* because absolute individuality is of the form of exclusion, hence negative, whereas reflection is unitary and positive. Further, if it is reflection of *svalakṣaṇa* (absolute individuality), then it should be identical with *svalakṣaṇa* but you deny the identity of word with *svalakṣaṇa*. Again, if it is reflection of universal, you have already denied the existence of universal, and which is not existent, how that can be reflected? If the Buddhists say that due to perseverance of object into non-object there may be inclination in external word, then it would be not valid. Contrary to it, if they consider perseverance to the external world, then they endorse the Jaina contention.

(4) If the function of the word is *atadvyāvṛtti* (exclusion of the idea, which does not deserve it) only, then it would be only of a negative form; but we find in everything both of existential and non-existential characteristics. According to the Jainas, the determination of the nature of an object is done by the affirmation of *Svacatuṣṭaya i.e. dravya* (substance), *kṣetra* (space), *kāla* (time) and *bhāva* (state) and the negation of *paracatuṣṭaya*. If the word denotes an object, we will have to determine its meaning by both the affirmative and negative processes, for every affirmation is relative to negation and every negation is relative to affirmation. Affirmation without negation and negation without affirmation are not complete. Therefore, the Buddhists have to accept an affirmative aspect in their theory of *apoha*. The function of a word is not only to negate the false or other meanings but also to present its own meaning. The word should be regarded as expressing the objects in its own nature.

(5) *Apoha* cannot be a negation. In practical life, also we find that on hearing the word, 'cow' we directly comprehend the meaning of cow. We don't reach to its meaning by the negating buffalo, horse etc. Though the meanings of the word cow can be understand by the negation of 'not cow' or other than cow, but this does also mean that all the cows have the same characteristics. The similarity of characteristics can be judged by the affirmative process only.

(6) Again, to postulate a relation between the word and its meaning does not mean that the both are the same. The Jainas have recognised the

distinction between the two. However, this is only relative distinction and not absolute one. The Jainas deny that the 'cow' is identical with the word 'cow'. Both are different and yet they have an expressive-expressed relation (*vācya-vācaka-sambandha*). Two different things or independent objects can also be related to each other, like husband-wife. It is therefore, right to believe that there is a relative difference and a relative similarity between the word and the meaning; and it proves expressive-expressed relation.

(7) Again, the theory of the exclusion of 'others' or the 'false' meaning (*anyāpoha* or *atadvyāvṛtti*) in Buddhism implies also the fallacy of interdependence *(anyonyaśrayadoṣa)*, because in the very refutation of not-cow *(ago)*, 'cow' is implied and by the negation of cow, not-cow is established. This double-negation ultimately proves itself to be positive. What is got from the negation or exclusion of other thing would of course be positive.

(8) Further, if one does not know the meaning of 'cow', he would be able to comprehend not the meaning of *'ago'* (not-cow). Therefore, for negation, positive knowledge is necessary.

(9) Further more, there can be many circumstances when we may fail to find two words which are diametrically so opposed that they may exclude each other, for example the opposite of word *sarva* i.e. *asarva* carries no meaning.

(10) If the denotation of a word is only exclusion or negation, then all the words, because of their negative character will become synonyms, as their objects of denotation being of little value will not be distinguishable. All having the same nature, that is, negative character and also being imaginary they will not have any difference whatsoever. Then no distinctions will persist of substance and attribute, past and future, masculine and feminine and also distinction between classes (Roses, cows etc.) and numbers (singular, plural etc.) will disappear. Moreover, if Buddhists accept the fact that the negation can be distinguished concept of double negation (*apoha*), it will not remain only a category (something imaginary), but will become a real and that would be in accordance with the Jaina view. In the opinion of Prof. G. C. Pande, the *apoha* (double negation) is not of a negative character. He writes, it is

a complicated complex of perception and imagination, thing and not-thing, affirmation and negation.[28]

The Image theory and Jainism

During the discussion whether the meaning of a word is particular or a universal, we have already seen that Jaina philosophy regards the denotation of a word as particular qualified by universal. This needs explanation as to what the particular/individual qualified by universal is? Whether it is the object or the comprehended meaning? By comprehended meaning, we mean the mental image or the reflections of the consciousness. Where the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regards it as an object, the grammarians and to some extent the Buddhists take it as comprehended meaning or a mental image, the Jainas adopt a middle path by synthesising the two views. According to them, the denotation of the word is neither the mental image nor the external object. It is rather the image of the object as formed in the consciousness. On the basis of perceptible cognition the theory can be called as the image-theory,' or a 'figure-theory (ākṛtivāda) [29]. By hearing the words, there appears or reflect a image of the object denoted by the word in our consciousness and the same image becomes the object of our perception or understanding. When we hear the word 'cow', we get reflected to the figure of cow which is different from that of a horse and we act accordingly with the help of this figure. Thus, the meaning of the word is an image or figure of the experienced object. By hearing the word 'cow' there appears in our consciousness a figure of an animal with a dewlap and so on and then, that figure of the cow acts as an object. Thus, according to Jainas, though the word refers to a real object, but what is the synonym of the word, is the image qualified by particular.

The Jainas are also of the view that the determination of the meaning of the word or the creation of its object's figure in consciousness is made possible by knowledge and teachings. It is only when teachers and parents by pronouncing the word, 'cow' indicate the object called, 'cow' (which has dewlap etc.), we learn the meaning of the word 'cow'. Again, the object denoted by the word 'cow' is a real object but its meaning is the figure of the cow. Jainas then distinguish the denoted object with the denotation. The object denoted by the word is external but its denotation is a figure or idea. It is the figure or an image, which is on the one hand,

related with the object and on the other hand with the meaning of the word.

The Naiyāyikas have criticised the theory of image. Firstly, according to them, as there are many individuals so also there should be many images or figures too. Moreover, the image of one individual is different from that of the other; as such one word cannot express many figures, which are naturally different from each other. Further, it is impossible for an individual that he may comprehend figures of all the individuals of a class because all the particulars or individuals are different and therefore, there cannot be a single image for them. The figure of a white cow will be different from that of a black cow. Thus, we will have to postulate multiple meanings of a word if we accept the theory of figure' (ākṛtivāda). Furthermore, the compatibility of action (artha-kriyā-kāritva) is ascertained by individual and not by the images, for example, where one individual asks another to bring a cow or to remove it, the other does not bring or remove the image of the figure of a cow. The Naiyāyikas therefore, do not regard the theory of figure as correct. The Jainas also have criticised its one-sided acceptance[30].

In fact, this theory of ākṛtivāda seems to be effort made towards the synthesis of the two trends of Indian tradition, viz. the Naiyāyika and the Grammarian. The Naiyāyikas regard the meaning of the word as the object and the Grammarians to some extent regard it as an image born of understanding. The Jainas in their figure theory (ākṛtivāda) synthesise the two in such a way that on the one hand the meaning acquires understanding and on the other hand the understood-meaning ceases to be imaginary. It is real because the figure of the image is always of some experienced real object. As far as the nature of the universal is concerned, ākṛtivāda is a compromise between nominatism (nāmavāda) and the realism (vastuvāda). It regards that the universal, which is taken as the denotation of word by the Mīmāṁsakas, is neither merely a name (mental image) nor as having a real existence independent of the individual or the particular. It is such a mental reflection or image which is created on the basis of similarity or resemblance between different individuals. It is though mental, yet is not imaginary or unreal. The Jainas regard such an image as the denotation of the word. They also believe that, that which is denoted by the image, is a real and particular object. There is a relative similarity

between the particular object comprehended by the word and its own class. On the basis of this similarity, we regard all the objects having similarity as denotation of one word.

The figure theory *(ākṛtivāda)* of the Jainas has to some extent a resemblance with the picture theory of Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein in the beginning believed that the proposition is a picture of reality and the waves of sound, all stand to one another is that pictorial internal relation which holds between language and the word."[31] He however, changed his view latter on, and brought the use theory (*upayoga-siddhānta*) which he thought to be more appropriate. According to the latter theory the meaning of the word is determined by the context and the usage of a word and not by its picture (image/figure) which is created (in our consciousness) when we hear it. Wittgenstein has emphasised the use theory in his latter work, '*Philosophical Investigations*'.[32]

In the Jaina concepts of *ākṛtivāda*, we find the seeds of both the theories of Wittgenstein. Jainas, on the one hand by taking the meaning of the word as an image (figure), support the picture-theory and on the other hand in determining the meaning of the word, they admit the role of the use-context (*Prayoga-sandarbha*) or the accustomed tradition (*Abhisamaya-paramparā*), and thus they also support the use-theory of Wittgenstein. In my opinion, there is in fact no contradiction between the two. By hearing a word their does appear an image or figure in our mind but what type of figure and image will be produced by hearing which word, will be determined by usage and tradition. It seems that the Jaina view of *ākṛtivāda* regarding the denotation of the word is an attempt to synthesise the different prevalent theories of the day. This is the special feature of the Jaina philosophy of language.

Terms

Words and terms are made of letters or sometimes of a single letter. It should also be kept in mind that only that group of letters, which denotes or expresses something, is called word or term. The group of letters, which is not expressive or indicator of any meaning, does not come in the category of a word. The term; *Kalama* (pen) thus, is a meaningful word because it denotes the object; but say, *makala'* having no sense, does not mean anything, hence is not a word or term. According

to the *Jainā`cāryas*, the term is that by which meaning is comprehended[33]. While defining term, Vādideva Sūri in his *Pramāṇanaya-tattvālokālaṅkāra*[34] says that a term is an absolute group of relative letters. In my opinion, this definition may be right in case of a 'word'; but cannot be regarded correct in the case of 'term' because a term is always relative to a sentence. In the Nyāya philosophy, defining the difference between a word and a term, it is said that if there is a case (*vibhakti*) at the end of the letters as per rule, it is designated as 'term'[35]. The difference between the word and term is that while the meaning of the word being bereft of case (*vibhakti*) is absolute or non-relative to the sentence, the meaning of the term, being associated with case, is relative to the sentence. In other words, a word, if used as a part of a sentence, is a term. A word does not require a sentence to express its meaning, but a term, being a part of a sentence, has its meaning relative to its sentence. For example the word 'cow' expresses its meaning irrespective of any sentence, but when we say 'the cow' - the term will not clear till the whole sentence 'bring the cow', is not present. This is the difference between a word and a term. The word used in a sentence with case is called as term. Term is a part of sentence, and its meaning is relative to the sentence whereas the word is non-relative to the sentence. A word when used in a sentence with the case (*vibhakti*) becomes a term. We will now discuss the nature of sentence in our next chapter.

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    (b) *Jaina-nyāya*, pp. 249-253

(25) (a) *Nyāyakumudacandra*, p. 543

    (b) *Jaina-nyāya*, p. 237-242

    (c) *The Philosophy of Word and Meaning* pp. 137-171

    (d) *The Problem of Meaning in Indian Philosophy*, pp 200-223

(26) (a) *Nyāyakumudacandra*, Ed. Mahendra Kumar p. 745-756

    (b) *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa*, pp. 451-457

    (c) *Jaina-nyāya*, Pt. Kailash Chandra Shastri, pp. 267-273

    (d) *Bhāṣātattva Aura Vākyapadīya*, p. 149

    (e) The Problem of Meaning In Indian Philosophy, R. C. Pandey Chapter-10

(27) (a) *Apohasiddhi* (Ratnakīrti), Trans. by Prof. G.C. Pande, p. 40

   (b) *Nyāyakumudacandra*, Ed. Mahendra Kumar p. 561-566

   (c) *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa*, pp. 431-451

   (d) *Jaina-darśana,* Pt. Mahendra Kumar p. 274-281

   (e) *Jaina-nyāya*, Kailash Chandra Shastri, pp. 243-249

(28) *Apohasiddhi* (Ratnakīrti), Trans. by Prof. G.C. Pande, p. 40

(29) *Indian Logic*, B. N. Singh, p.222

(30) *Tattvārtha-ślokavārtika*, 1/5/32-41

(31) (a) The proposition is a picture of reality- 4.01

   (b) The waves of sound, all stand to one another is that pictorial internal relation which holds between language and the world. 4.014, *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* (L. Wittgenstein)

(32) *Philosophical Investigation* -139, p.54

(33) (a) *Abhidhānarājendra-kośa*, Vol. 5, p. 502

   (b) *Dhavalā* 10/4, 2,4 1/18/6

(34) *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra*, Vādideva Sūri, 4/10

(35) *Te vibhattayantāḥ padaṁ, Nyāya-sūtra* 2/2/55

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Chapter 4

The Jaina Philosophy of Sentence

A sentence is an important unit of linguistic expression. A sentence is generally defined to be a collection of individual words, which culminate in and lead to a judgement consisting of concepts, brought into a relation with one another. Therefore, a sentence is nothing but the different individual words put in a certain juxtaposition and competent to express meaning which by virtue of their compatibility and harmony with one another cohere into one judgement. This definition of sentence is more or less endorsed by common sense. However, there is a difference of opinion among different philosophers regarding the definition of a sentence. In the present chapter, we will first discuss the nature of sentence as propounded by the *Jaināvāryas* and afterwards we will try to understand the views of other philophers and the Jaina reactions to them. Finally, we will discuss as to how for the Jaina formulations are logical.

Jaina contention of Sentence

Prabhācandra in his *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa* states that 'in order to make the denotation more clear, the non-relative unit of terms put as relative to each other, is called sentence.'[1] In this definition of a sentence, two things are clear. Firstly, the terms, which make the sentence, are mutually relative to each other to make their denotation comprehended and secondly, the sentence constructed by these words or terms depends on none, in order to express its meaning. The sentence, in other words, is capable itself in making the person to understand its meaning. But the terms lack such a capability. It is only when the relative terms together make a group, which can express its meaning independently, there emerges a sentence. In short, the sentence is a non-relative group of relative terms. The crux of (the structure of) a sentences is the relativity of its terms along with its own-non-relativity. Terms of a sentence need each other. It appears incomplete without the other. The term, which needs the other

in order to express itself, is called *sākāṅkṣa'* (with mutual expectancy) term; and the number of *sākāṅkṣa* terms, which fulfil the need together, make a unit called sentences. Thus, according to Jaina philosophers whereas the terms used in a sentence are relative, the sentence itself, in making the comprehension of its meaning, is non-relative. Thus, according to the Jaina philosophers, there is a relativity of terms but the group of terms remains non-relative. Terms are essential points of a sentence and the sentence produced by them is an absolute unit. The sentence is a whole structure made of part-units. It is a complete creation made of incomplete units.

Different views on the nature of sentence and their appraisal[2]

To present the different views of Indian philosophers regarding philosophy of sentence, Prabhācandra, in his *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa* has quoted two verses from *Vākyapadīya*, which briefly introduce the different concepts regarding the definition and nature of the sentence, prevalent in those days.[3]

Ākhyātaśabdaḥ, saṅghāto jāti-saṅghātavartinī/

Eko'navayava śabdaḥ kramo buddhyanusaṁhṛtiḥ //

Padmādyaṁ, pṛthakasarvapadaṁ, sākāṅkṣamityapi/

Vākyaṁ prati matirbhinnā bahudhā nyāyavādinām//

Vākyapadīya-2/1-2

In above mentioned verses Bhartṛhari says 'A sentence has been characterised by 'logicians' (*Nyāyavādins*) in at least eight ways: (1) as verb (*ākhyāta*), (2) as a collection of linguistic forms (*śabda-saṁghāta*), (3) as the proper universal (*jāti*), that occurs in the collection (*saṁghātavartinī*) , (4) as a single partless linguistic form, (5) as a sequence (of words) , (6) as what hangs together in the intellect (*buddhyanusaṁhṛti*) , (7) as the first word (*pada ādya*) , and (8) as all the words severally possessing expectancy (for each other, *pṛthakasarvapada-sākāṁsā*).

In Indian philosophy, we find two viewpoints regarding the nature of a sentence. According to the grammarians, a sentence is a whole unit. They don not regard terms in a sentence much important, for without a

sentence terms have no existence whatsoever. The second view held by Nyāya, Sāṁkhya, etc. regards a sentence as made of unit-parts, i.e. words and terms. According to them, the terms, which are independent units in themselves, are very important parts of a sentence. There are however, differences of opinion between these philosophers as to which is the crux of sentence. Is it the *kriyā-pada* or *ākhyāta-pada* (a verbal form or construct) or is it the subject (*uddeśya-pada*) of a sentence? Prabhācandra on the basis of *Vākyapadīya* has criticised the following theories regarding the definition and nature of a sentence.

(1) Kriyāpada (a verbal form or construct) as the crux of a sentence:

According to some philosophers, the verbal forms (*kriyā-pada* or *ākhyāta-pada*) is the crux of sentence. It is only capable of carrying meaning of a sentence. In the absence of a verb the meaning of a sentence cannot be made clear. Therefore, in the comprehension of meaning of a sentence, only the verb is primary and other terms are secondary.

While criticising this view, Prabhācandra asks whether the verbal construct is a sentence irrespective of other terms or it is a sentence relative to other terms? The first view can be criticised on two grounds, firstly, if the verb is not relative to other terms, it would cease to be a term and will not be able to take the form of a sentence. Secondly, if we regard verbal construct (*ākhyātapada*) non-relative to other terms itself as a sentence, then there will be complete absence of *ākhyātapada* in a sentence. Because, the verb is that which defines the natural relation between the subject and the predicate or say, between the subject and the verb itself. If the verb is non-relative to the subject or the predicate terms, it will lose its status being a verb because in that case it will not be able to indicate its relation with them. Further, if the verb is a sentence in relation to other forms, it is relative absolutely or partly? If it is sentence being partly relative then it will be quite similar to the Jaina view and if it is a sentence being absolute relative, then it will cease to be a sentence because of complete relativity it would lack the very quality of a sentence and the contextual meaning, which is derived from the verb. In that case it would only be a half sentence for being completely relative it will need some other entity to make its meaning understandable. Being dependent on some other entity, it will not fulfil the nature of a sentence because a

sentence, after all is an absolute complex (a unit) of relative terms. According to the Jainas, therefore, the verb can be a sentence only when it is partly relative and partly absolute. It means that it takes the form of a sentence only when it is combined with other terms. The verb, however important it may be, cannot be a sentence by itself.

It is, of course true that in many instances the very pronunciation of a verb communicates the meaning of the sentence, but there also the implicit presence of other terms cannot be ruled out. When, for example we say, 'eat', it indicates the eating activity, but at the same time it also implies some thing which is there to eat and also the eatable to be eaten, because without the eater and the eatable there is no meaning of the sentence, 'eat'. Similarly, in Sanskrit the verb '*gacchāmi*' or '*gacchati*' indirectly implies the subject '*aham*' or '*sah*' respectively. A verb, thus, always needs explicitly or implicitly a subject. Therefore, the meaning of a sentence is understandable only when the verb is partly relative with other terms. The Jainas of course accept this view.

(2) Sentence as a term-complex

According to the Buddhists, a sentence is nothing but a group or combination of terms. Of course, it is not merely a group of terms, for the terms collected together do not form a sentence. To construct a sentence "something else", is also required and this 'something else' points towards a special type of unity. Something else is more than the meaning of terms and something external to them. When terms are put together (in a particular way) there emerges *arthādhikya* (added meaning);' and this is regarded by those who believe in collective theory (*Saṅghātavādī*) as the meaning of a sentence. In the collective theory, thus, the sentence is regarded as a synthetic group of terms and the meaning of a sentence in the form of a synthetic-group of meanings. But what is important here, is the complex because this complex adds something new to the meaning of terms. According to this theory, there is something new in the complex (*saṅghāta*) which is not found in the separate terms. Take for instance the sentence. 'A horse eats grass'. Here the terms horse' 'eat' and 'grass', do not independently mean the same what their combination, 'A horse eats grass' does mean. The theory, therefore, regards the complex of the combined terms itself as the principal basis of the understanding of the meaning of a sentence.

While criticising the theory of complex (*saṁghātavāda*), Prabhācandra in *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa* asks whether the complex or the combination of term is space-oriented or time-oriented. If we regard it either as space oriented or as time-oriented, in both the cases, such complex would not be logically feasible for in hearing of a sentence, it is not possible for the terms to make a complex, which are produced and destroyed successively in the same space and time. Further, the question may also be raised as to the terms, which find the form of a sentence, are different from the sentence or the same. They cannot be different, for if they are regarded as different they will cease to the parts of the sentence. Moreover, the way in which say, a colour cannot be combined with another, the terms can also not be combined. Furthermore, if the complex is regarded as non-distinguishable (with the terms) it may be asked then, whether it is absolutely non-distinguishable or relatively non-distinguishable. If it is absolutely non-separable then it would be of the nature of the parts which make the complex. In other words, the very terms will take form of a sentence. In that case, the complex would become meaningless. If the complex were regarded partly as different and partly as the same, then it would be a position agreeable to Jaina thinkers. The *Jaināćāryas* also regard terms as relatively different and relatively identical with the sentence.

(3) Sentence as a Common-factor (Jāti)

Some thinkers believe that a sentence is not a complex of terms. It is rather than common-factor called *Jāti,* which is born out of the combination of terms. In a sentence, the terms lose their independent 'identity'. They instead, give together a meaningful understanding of a common-factor in which lies the meaning of the sentence. According to this theory, a sentence of course, is made of the complex of terms, but it does not recognise the potentiality of meaning in terms of independent of sentence. Though, every term in a sentence has its own individuality, yet the meaning of a sentence is an independent element and if terms have any meaning, they have it only within a sentence. It is just like the parts of a body, which can maintain their function within the body and not without it. Terms get their meaning only as parts of a sentence.

The Jaina philosopher Prabhācandra while criticising this view says that if the common-factor, *'Jāti'* means the absolute complex of the selective terms, we have no objection, for this is the Jaina view itself. But if *Jāti* is regarded as different from the terms, the theory will have all the limitations similar to that of the complex theory. Because, as a term-complex gives us the meaning remaining relatively different and relatively similar, so also the so called *Jāti* or the common factor can give us the meaning of the sentence remaining relatively different and relatively similar to the terms. The common-factor or the *Jāti* cannot be regarded as totally different or as totally identical to its individual parts. Terms, also, are neither totally different nor totally identical with the sentence. Their relative identity-cum-difference makes the perception of meaning in a sentence possible.

(4) A sentence is an indivisible unit

The grammarians regard a sentence as an indivisible unit. For them, a sentence is in itself a unit and terms have no existence apart from the sentence. As it is useless to search the meaning of terms in the letters that makes them, similarly, it is also useless to search meaning of sentence in the terms that makes it. The meaning of a sentence lies in its integration. According to this theory, the division between letters and terms is improper. The meaning expressed by a sentence is not there in the term or the term-complex. The Jainas also have no objection in regarding sentence as a unit because they themselves believe that a sentence is an absolute unit of relative terms. Their contention is only that, when we regard a sentence as an indivisible reality or an absolute unit, we must not forget the fact that in the structure of a sentence, terms enjoy an important place. To imagine whole apart from its parts, is wrong. Similarly, it is not possible to expect the comprehension of the meaning of a sentence by totally ignoring the terms. Even if a sentence is an absolute unity, it is after all, made of the combination of relative terms. As such, they (the terms) are also important factors of a sentence. They cannot be ignored in the comprehension of meaning.

Prabhācandra has criticised this theory of the indivisibility of a sentence and says that it is only a human fancy to regard a sentence as one unit having no terms (*apada*). Actually, there cannot be any sentence without its terms. It is very necessary that a sentence must have relative

terms. To ignore terms in a sentence or to think that there is no place for terms and objects (which are denoted by the terms) in a sentence is to become indifferent towards the experiential truth. Prabhācandra has labelled all those objections of this theory, which could be raised against the theory of *sphota*. Theory of the indivisibility of a sentence is really a variety of the *sphota* theory, which propounds that terms and sentences made of them are not expressive of meaning. It is the *sphota*, which is the carrier of the meaning of a sentence. But the theory of *sphota* is not the only and the final theory regarding the cognition of meaning because it is unable to answer as to why, after all, the *sphota* of meaning does not occur in the absence of terms of a sentence. We cannot, therefore, regard a sentence as indivisible or as without having parts. Terms, really are the essential constituents of a sentence and they as words, without sentence also have their own independent meanings. Moreover, there cannot be any sentence in the absence of terms. Hence, a sentence cannot be called as partless.

(5) Successivism *(Kramavāda)* and its criticism

Successivism is really a special variety of the theory of *Saṁghāta* (complex). In *Kramavāda* though terms are recognised as essential parts of a sentence but the theory makes order of the terms in a sentence much more important than their coexistence for the comprehension of the meaning of the sentence. Succession of the terms is sentence in itself. As if the letters are not in a definite series they cannot make a term, so also, if the terms lack the definite order, they cannot make a sentence. For a meaningful sentence, it is necessary that there be a serial order of terms. It is the order of the terms, which creates a sentence and makes us comprehend the meaning of a sentence. Terms have their meaning but they have a special meaning also. This special meaning is expressed only when they are oriented in an order. The appropriation of terms makes the terms of a sentence.

Successivism also emphasises continuity of time and maintains that if there is a break in time, the order of the terms also breaks down, which in tern ruins the sentence. In successivism, the second term which follows the first, is accepted as a sub-factor and this determinate order of terms itself is the expressive of meaning.

Prabhācandra does not see any difference between successivism and the theory of complex or aggregation. The only difference is that while the latter emphasises the coexistence of the terms, the former underlines their order. Successivism has all those limitations with which the theory of aggregation suffers. Here also the question of space and time arises. An order is not possible in a single space and in a single time. If we regard the existence of the terms in different spaces and times, there will be difficulty in the comprehension of meaning. Though in the structure of a sentence, the succession of the terms is an important element but this order is possible only in those relative terms, which are existent in a relatively different and relatively identical manner in a sentence.

(6) The comprehension theory of meaning of a sentence: nature and criticism

Some philosophers are of the opinion that words and word-complex are only external. They don't contain the meaning of a sentence. The sentence, therefore, is that which is comprehended by the intellect. We speak a sentence with an objective concentration of the intellect and we comprehend the meaning only with such an intellect. The cause and origin of a sentence is, in fact, the intellect-factor. A speaker speaks only when he has a desire to speak something in a coherent way. The intellect or the intelligence therefore, is the originator of a sentence. Without intelligence neither it is possible to pronounce a sentence nor it is possible on the part of the listener to comprehend its meaning. The basis of sentence is, therefore, the intellectual comprehension.

While criticising the view, Jaināsārya Prabhācandra asks, if the basis of a sentence is the intellect, the nature of sentence then is physical (*dravya*) or psychical (*bhāva*)? We cannot call intelligence as a physical sentence because the physical sentence is unconscious and is of the nature of word and sound while the intellect is conscious. Hence, there is contradiction in terms. We cannot regard intelligence as a physical sentence. Further, if we regard the intellect as psychical sentence then, there will be the fallacy of proving something, which is already proved. Because, the intellect as psychical sentence, is already established. The rationalists and the Jaina philosophers carry the same opinion in this regard. To

recognise the conscious or the physical aspect of a sentence as rational is acceptable to the Jaina philosophy also. To regard the psychic aspect and conscious aspect of the sentence as intellectual is accepted to Jainism and by this point of view this concept is not opposed to Jaina view.

(7) First term (*prathama-pada*) is a sentence: concept and criticism

Some philosophers are of the opinion that by the very pronunciation of the first term of a sentence, the total meaning of the sentence is expressed. The very first term makes the purpose of the speaker clear. The other terms only carry it. According to *Vākyapadīya* if the determination of case is possible by verb, then the verb can also be determined by the case. This theory though underlines the importance of the *Kāraka-pada* (the term denoting case) in a sentence, but it cannot be regarded as the whole truth. Jaināchārya Prabhācandra says, whether it is the first term of a sentence or is the last term, they make the meaning of a sentence clear always in relation to other terms. If only one term were capable of indicating meaning why should there be the need of other terms. In other words, their absence will always be noticed in the sentence. It is, of course, possible in many a cases where the very pronunciation of the first term may convey the sense. For example when a mason while preparing a wall says, 'brick', his helper understands well that he is asking for a brick. Here the very pronunciation of the first term carries the meaning of the complete sentence but it happens in certain context only. If the very same word was pronounced by, say, a police officer in a riot-situation, the word would have carried quite different connotation. Thus, we can safely say that pronunciation of the terms denoting case (*kāraka-pada*) cognise its meaning only in certain context and not in every context. It can not be made a rule. In addition, even in such cases the verb of the sentence is always implicit. Therefore, it is not advisable to regard the first-term *(prathama-pada)* as a sentence. The pronounciation of the word 'Rāma' carries meaning in a particular context only, not always. If we will regard the first term as a sentence without any qualification, the other terms of a sentence will become irrelevant. But this is not the case. In fact, terms are always relative and their relative terms make an absolute sentence. Terms, no doubt, have an important place in a sentence but they cannot be called sentence individually.

(8) Sākāṅkṣa-pada (term with mutual expectancy) is a sentence in itself

According to certain thinkers every term with mutual expectancy apart from being the part of a sentence, has its own independent existence nevertheless. In this theory, the independent individuality of every term is accepted. The terms do not loose their own meanings even when they have a collective existence (in a sentence). This theory emphasises the independent existence and importance of the terms in a sentence. It is different from the theory of the complex (*saṅghāta*) and that of the successivism (*kramavāda*) in the sense that whereas in both of the theories terms are primary and sentence is secondary, in this theory on the basis of mutual expectancy of term importance is given to sentence. It also believes, of course, that terms are relative and have their meaning only within a sentence and not out of it. In fact, this theory is very near to the Jaina concept, because the Jaina philosophers also regard sentence as an absolute collection of the terms with mutual expectancy.

The Jaina view

Jainism regards the sentence as an absolute collection of the terms with mutual expectancy, but it gives equal importance to both the sentence as well as the terms. According to it, neither a sentence is possible without the terms not the terms are capable to express their meaning without a sentence. Terms get their meaning only in a sentence, not independent of it. On the other hand, without the terms there is no existence of a sentence also. Terms and sentence both enjoy a relative existence and have relative importance. None of them can express its meaning in the absence of any of them. To make the meaning expressive, the sentence will have to be relative to the terms and vice versa. The Jaina philosophers have accepted the relative truth of all the theories but has not given undue emphasis on any one aspect. According to them, the term and the sentence are incapable of imparting meaning if are treated absolutely exclusive of each other. Their capability of expressing meaning lies in their mutual relativity. The expression of the meaning of the sentence is the relativity of term and the mental relativity between the sentence and the terms. Mutually non-relative terms, terms non-relative to a sentence and sentence non-relative to terms have neither their existence nor have capability of

expressing meaning. Therefore, it is more reasonable to regard a sentence as an absolute collection of relative terms.

Theory of Sentence Meaning

How do we get the meaning of a sentence? There are different theories regarding the meaning of sentence in Indian philosophy. The Naiyāyikas and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas propound the *Abhihitānvayavāda* (Denotation-relative theory). Against this theory, the Prabhākara School of Mīmāṁsā establishes *Anvitābhidhānavāda* (Theory of concomitant expression).

After analysing these theories and evaluating them in the light of Jaina contention, we shall try to examine as to which theory would be more appropriate regarding the meaning of a sentence.

Abhihitānvayavāda (Denotation-relative theory)

Speech is purposive in nature. People use words with the intention to convey a connected, unified sense. Hence, from the use of words in juxtaposition it is assumed that the speaker has uttered them with the intention of conveying a connected sense. The sentence is something more than the sum of the word meanings. *Abhihitānvayavāda* of Kumārila says that in a sentence, each word gives out its individual isolated meaning (which is universal) and their significative power is exhausted with that. Then with the help of *lakṣaṇā* (secondary significative power) the syntactic relationship that of word and object is obtained and thus the sentence meaning is obtained.

Thus, according to this theory, the meaningful terms themselves are the base of the sentence-meaning.[4] In brief, it is by the denotation-power of the two terms that recognise the objects and then we comprehend the mutual relation between them by the intention of the speaker, i.e. by the speaker's use of appropriate preposition and conjunction *(vibhakti)*. Afterwards, on the basis of the knowledge of the mutual relation of the terms, we comprehend the meaning of a sentence. This is the denotation-relative theory.

According to this theory, the sentence-meaning is obtained in three stages, viz. in first stage we get the cognition of objects after hearing the terms. Then in the second stage we understand the mutual relation

between the objects, and finally in the third stage, this understanding of the mutual relation gives us the meaning of the sentence. According to this theory, the words/terms independent of a sentence have their own meanings and the meaning of the sentence is determined on the basis of it (the meanings of words). In other words, the comprehension of the meaning of a sentence depends on the comprehension of the meaning of the terms. According to the denotation-relative theory *(Abhihitānvayavāda)* the terms have independent meanings also but the sentence has no meaning without the terms. The meaning of a sentence depends upon the meaning of the terms and their mutual relation (or the conjunction and prepositions etc). We cannot comprehend the meaning of a sentence if we are unable to understand the meanings of terms (i.e. objects that they denote) and their mutual relation. Thus, two things are necessary for the comprehension of meaning of a sentence. First, the understanding of the meaning of the first term and second the cognition of the mutual relation of other terms. Further, the mutual relations of the terms are also determined on the basis of four factors: (1) *Ākāṅkṣā* (expectancy), (2) *Yogyatā* (consistency of sense), (3) *Saṁniddhi* (contiguity) and (4) *Tātparya* (Purport).

(1) *Ākāṅkṣā* (expectancy) - When we hear a word, the expectation and curiosity of hearing another related word is called *ākāṅkṣā'*. The term aspires as if for another term. A sentence is not created by the manifold terms, which are not related to each other. For example, the pronouncing cow, horse, men, women, etc. does not make a sentence. According to the Jaina philosophers, it is only terms, which expect each other, that are capable of creating a sentence. According to Kumārila ' A group of words serving a single purpose, forms a sentence, if on analysis, the separate words are found to have *ākāṅkṣā* or mutual expectancy' *(Mīmāṁsā-sūtra* 2.1.46). By the word expectancy, the Mīmāṁsakas mean psychological expectancy where as grammarians and logicians take *ākāṅkṣā* as syntactic, as it is only the need for the syntactic completeness of the sentence.

(2) *Yogyatā* (consistency of sense or compatibility) - *Yogyatā* is the logical compatibility of the word's consistency in a sentence for mutual association. It refers to the possibility of mutual relation between the

objects, denoted by the terms. If there is hindrance for such a relation, the terms will then lack the consistency of sense. For example, we say 'wet with fire,' the phrase will mean nothing for the simple reason that there is no relation between 'fire' and 'wetting'. A sentence is not made of non related terms or of terms lacking the consistency of sense for mutual relationship. There is no unanimity of opinion regarding the exact role of *yogyatā* in the comprehension of the meaning from a sentence. Some Naiyāyikas hold that a decisive knowledge of *yogyatā* is pre-requisite for verbal cognition whereas Kumārila maintain that incompatibility with the actual facts does not prevent verbal comprehension, but the validity of the knowledge.

(3) *Saṁnidhi* (contiguity) - *Saṁniddhi* is generally explained as the condition that the words in a sentence should be temporally contiguous. It is the uninterrupted utterance or the unbroken comprehension of words. It means pronunciation of words/terms without long pause by the speaker. The sentences are neither made by the terms spoken by many persons without pause nor are they made by terms spoken by a single person but after long pause, say a pause of an hour after every term. Lack of *saṁniddhi* can occur in two ways viz. not being uttered together and being signified by words. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas hold that the verbal cognition is possible only when the necessary words are together in the mind. The Prabhākara considers that only the contiguity of cognition of the sense is necessary. Thus in the case of elliptical sentences, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas want the missing words to be actually supplied.

(4) *Tātparya* (Purport or intention)- The term *tātparya* refers to the meaning intended to be conveyed by an utterance, and its purport refers to the intention of the speaker. According to the *Naiyāyikas* this is also one of the necessary conditions for the comprehension of the meaning of a sentence. The right determination of the meaning of a sentence is impossible without the understanding of the speaker's intention especially when the term has more than one meaning. If a term is used in some special sense say ironically or when some terms are left unexpressed in a sentence, then also the intention of the speaker or his use of conjunctions etc., in the sentence becomes the basis of the understanding of meaning.

In a normal speech situation, there should be five different aspects of the meaning of an utterance viz. (1) what is in the mind of the speaker who makes the utterance?, (2) what the speaker wants the listener to understand ?, (3) what the utterance actually conveys?, (4) what the listener understands as the meaning of the utterance?, (5) and what is in the mind of the listener on hearing the utterance? Naiyāyikas hold that the *tātparya* is the intention or the desire of the speaker whereas the Mīmāṁsakas hold that it is the purport of the sentence.

Briefly speaking, after hearing the terms, first, there is a presentation of disconnected objects and then on the basis of expectancy, compatibility, contiguity and purport their mutual relation is comprehended and this is how the meaning of the sentence is understood.

Abhihitānvayavāda: a review[5]

The Jaina philosophers Prabhācandra in his treatise *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa* while criticising Kumārila's view writes that if by hearing a sentence we first cognise the mutually disconnected objects and then after their relatedness, the question arises that on what ground their connectivity is ascertained? Is the connectivity known through the terms external to sentence, or through the intellect? The first alternative cannot be accepted because there is no term, which can be the material cause of the meaning of all the terms. Further, the term that is not present in the sentence can also not establish the connectivity of the terms of a sentence. Moreover, if we say that the connectivity is effected by the intellect, then the view will not support the denotation-relative theory. It will rather be supporting its opposite theory, *Anvitābhidhānavāda* because the intellect which notices the two terms mutually connected, is itself the mental form of a sentence. It can be said on behalf of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa that even if the sentence is not regarded different from the mutually connected terms (because it is made of then), its comprehension of meaning, nevertheless, does depend upon the understanding of the meaning of the connected terms which seem to be mutually related or connected with the intellect. But the Prabhācandra argues that the terms are not different in their genders, roots, case, disjunction and conjunctions because whenever they are expressed, they are spoken with their components (affix, suffix, etc.) and the understanding of the meaning is derived from

their mutually connected parts. Thus the comprehension of meaning that we get, whether of the sentence, or of the terms, is always of the connected and not the non-connected terms. Kumārila in order to support his denotation-relation theory, can, of course, argue that it is only in profane practice and in the Vedas that we use the single (partless) word to propound the meaning of a sentence and roots, genders, suffixes and prefixes are not separately used. They are separately used only when their etymology is being explained. A word is always like a single (partless) letter. It is only to explain its meaning that we separate its parts in our imagination. Being single and partless, it is non-connected (*ananvita*) nevertheless, its connectivity is established. Prabhācandra contradicting this argument of Kumārila says that the very same argument, which makes a word/term a partless or single entity, can make a sentence also an undivided single whole. In that case, it can be said that it is only to explain the structure of a sentence that we separate it in imagination from its words. In fact, the sentence is an indivisible unit, in which the other connected terms are named. In the secular practices and in the *Vedas*, we use the sentences so that actions may proceed towards getting or not getting the objects. It is the meaning of a sentence, and not the objects, which inspires for action. Thus we have to regard a sentence as a unit and in this form, it will denote the connected terms only.

Prabhācandra thus reaches to the conclusion that, as the words/ terms are partly different and partly similar to their parts genders, conjunctions, prepositions etc. so also the terms are partly similar and partly different from their sentences. First, the term is connected to the component terms of a sentence, at the same time it is non-connected with the component terms of other sentence. In spite of being connected, it has its independent existence. Secondly, in other physical sentence, the words are separate but in the psychic sentences, they are connected.

In my opinion it should be kept in mind that even if the words have their own meanings, they lose their independent meanings when used in a sentence. In the game of chess, for example when we say that the 'king is beaten', the independent meaning of the separate terms of the sentence do not help us much in making sense to our preposition. Here the whole sentence has a special sense, which does not depend upon the meanings of the separate words/terms of the sentence. Thus, it is not

reasonable to accept that the meanings of non-connected words are the base for the comprehension of the meaning of a sentence. Many a times the sentence as a single unit determines the meaning of its components i.e. terms.

Anvitābhidhānavāda (Theory of concomitant expression): Plaintiff's thesis

The view of Prabhākara, the second eminent philosopher of the Mīmāṁsā School of thought, regarding the meaning of the sentence is known as the theory of concomitant expression (*Anvitābhidhānavāda*). Kumārila in his theory (*Abhihitānvayavāda*) states that in the comprehension of the meaning of a sentence, first we cognise the objects and then after with correlation of those objects the meaning of the sentence is obtained. But Prabhākara in his theory of *anvitābhidhānavāda* believes that correlated objects are comprehended through the primary denotative power of the word (*abhidhā-śakti*). It is mutually correlated words, which make the meaning of the sentence comprehended. The word apart from its position in a sentence is only an abstraction and rather a torso; yet its distinctive individuality cannot be denied without repudiating the clear verdict of understanding. Thus the words used in a sentence have a consolidated meaning; they have no sense without the sentence.[6]

The theory does not regard the recognition of the mutual relation of objects as dependent upon the cognition of the objects first. We rather get the understanding of the mutually related objects as soon as we hear the sentence. The theory therefore, does not need to postulate any purporting power (*tātparya-ākhyā-śakti*). According to it, the terms that we hear do not denote the unrelated objects but they indicate the objects as already related. Thus, the mutual relation is directly expressed and is not recognised after the cognition of separate object. This is the essence of the theory. According to this theory, the sentence meaning in itself is denotative, it does not require any power of purport to be cognised.

While playing cards, when we utter a sentence say, for instance, 'let us now move diamonds', it does not mean that in the meaning of this sentence first we know the unrelated meaning of the terms and then by establishing correlation the meaning is comprehended. But the meaning is directly comprehended. Because in this context by saying diamond we

do not mean by the diamond, the object as real but that which denotes the figure of diamond in the card. Similarly, the word 'let us now move' does not mean the movement (act of movement) but to put the card simply. On this very basis, the (*Anvitābhidhāna*) theory maintains that the words as members of a sentence are led to a judgement consisting of meanings related with one another. The precedent term gets related to its succeeding term and thus makes the sense of the sentence, which concludes that on hearing a sentence the correlated terms are comprehended.

The terms, no doubt, recollect their meanings, but in the cognition of a sentence they denote a concept as related, and an unrelated concept is an abstraction.

Prabhākara Miśra and his followers contend that it is the sentence, which has real significance. A single word in isolation is never found in use. The sentence is the real unit, which carries a useful meaning. Individual units are possessed of significance only in so for as they are elements of sentence. According to him, a sentence is a unit but it is an organic whole with parts correlated through their meanings. Prabhākara denies that the words convey a meaning except in the context of a sentence, even though he regards words as real and actual constituents of language. Like Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Naiyāyikas, Prabhākara accepts the reality of the individual words and their individual meanings, and agrees that the primary meaning expressed by the word is a universal (*jāti*).

Prabhākara's contention of the sentence meaning in nutshell, is that the meaning of a sentence is a consistent individual judgement and, though it is ultimately traceable to the individual component words and the meanings of words are concepts, but the latter are always understood as related concepts and an unrelated concept is imaginary.

The criticism of Anvitābhidhānavāda[7]

Prabhācandra in his treatise *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa* raises the following objections to *Anvitābhidhānavāda*. Firstly, if we accept that the only correlated terms are able to give the meaning of a sentence or they have meaning only when they are correlated, then on hearing the first term the meaning of the sentence should be comprehended. In that case, the pronunciation of the other terms will become useless. Then one word will suffice and the occurrence of other words in the sentence will

be absolutely redundant. In addition, the every individual term will represent the whole sentence independently. Because of the correlation with the former terms, any term in a sentence will be enough to reveal the meaning of the sentence. To counter this objection of Prabhācandra, it may be said in favour of the said theory that to negate the undesired terms, the pronunciation of other terms cannot be taken as useless. Jainas argue that in that case, the meaning already drawn by the correlated first term will be repeated by the other terms of the sentence, or there will be the fallacy of tautology. Here the followers of *Anvitābhidhānavāda* may say that what the first term principally denotes (sentence meaning), the other terms of the sentence as assistant of the first term, denote the same meaning as established by the first term, and as such there is no ground for tautology. However, the Jainas do not accept this argument.

It is also not reasonable to accept on the part of the advocates of *anvitābhidhānavāda* that the comprehension of sentence meaning is possible only by pronouncing the last term (in sentence) correlated with the meanings of the preceding terms. Prabhācandra criticises this contention by pointing out that if all the terms are mutually correlated, then what is the ground to regard only the meaning of the last related term as expressive of the sentence meaning, why not the meanings of other terms can denote the meaning of the sentence?

Prabhākara Miśra in order to protect his theory of concomitant expression *(Anvitābhidhānavāda)* may argue that in the process of meaning, the principal terms are interlocked with the preceding terms in a sentence and the preceding terms are related with the succeeding terms. In other words, every former term has its correlation with the later term and as such, it would not be possible to get the meaning of the sentence from any one of its terms. The Jainas however, do not agree with it for according to them it is not reasonable to think that the meaning of the preceding terms are determined only by their relation with the succeeding terms for the relation is not one-sided. The succeeding terms are also mutually related with the preceding terms. Therefore, to regard that it is only the final term, which cause the comprehension of the meaning of a sentence is not logical even for the theory of *Anvitābhidhānavāda.*

Prabhākara's reply to this argument is that there are two functions of a term: first, to state its own meaning and secondly, to give rise to a

recollection of their simple unrelated meanings, technically known as *Gamaka-vyāpāra*. This recollected meaning is understood as related by the denotative capacity of the words. Hence, there should not be any objection to accept *Anvitābhidhānavāda*. But the Jaina view does not regard it correct for even if the meaning of a sentence is similar in both the cases. It is not reasonable to think that some terms only express their own meaning and some other make the meanings of other terms intelligible.

Prabhākara may raise a question again whether the intelligent people use the terms to get the meaning of the terms or of the sentence? The use of terms is of course, not to get the meaning of the terms because the term does not causes inclination to words meaning. Now, if we accept the second alternative, it will then prove *Anvitābhidhānavāda*.

But the Jaināchārya Prabhācandra replying the argument says 'the term *vṛkṣa* (the tree) gives us the cognition of a tree along with its branches, leaves etc. and the term *'tiṣṭhati'* makes us to comprehend the place etc. The term 'tree' has nothing to do directly with the meaning particularly regarding place etc. Hence, it cannot be regarded as a helpful agent in the comprehension of a tree. If we regard that the term 'tree' is cause in comprehension of the term *'tiṣṭhati'*, conventionally or indirectly, then we will also have to accept that inference is only a matter of verbal knowledge for inference we reach at the conclusion viz. the major term through the middle term only.

Prabhākara Mīmāṁsakas in reply may say that because the middle term is verbal the comprehension by the middle term will also amount to verbal knowledge. But in fact the knowledge of the major term derived by the middle term is really an inference and is not mere verbal knowledge. Otherwise there would be the fallacy of *ati-prasaṅga* (over-wide term) and the Jaina philosophers will say that the comprehension of 'place' by the word 'tree' will also be a case of *ati-prasaṅga* fallacy. Because, as the middle term is restricted only to indicate its object so also the word, 'tree' will also denote the object for which it stands.

Another objection that the Jaina philosophers have raised against the theory of *Anvitābhidhāna,* is about the nature of the qualificand (*Viśeṣyapada*). Whether the *viśeṣyapada* denotes the universal qualifier, or particular or both i.e. universal-cum-particular qualifier? The first

alternative is not tenable because that will not make the comprehension of the particular meaning of the sentence possible. If we accept the second then the knowledge will cease to be determinate because (according to (Mīmāṁsakas) that determinate particular which is denoted by word will produce doubt while understanding the qualified (viśeṣya), because the qualified may have several qualifiers. On behalf of Prabhākara, it may be argued that if the qualifier determined by the intention of the speaker is combined by the qualificand, then it is not reasonable because the intention of the speaker cannot be regarded by the person to whom the word is spoken. Hence, the determination of qualifier regarding qualified is not possible. If it is said that the speaker himself knows his own intention, therefore, the determinate qualifier will also be determined by him. In that case, the verbal statement will be redundant, because a statement is always made to communicate the meaning to others and not for one's own self.

If the third alternative is accepted in which the qualificand is correlated with both the particular and the universal qualifiers, then it will also suffer from the demerits of both. In other words neither it will be able to communicate the specific meaning of the statement nor it will yield determined knowledge.

The similar objection may be raised if we accept that the qualificand is correlated with verb and adverb. If the Mīmāṁsakas argue again that from the denotation of a term, the denotation of other terms is determined and then it determinates the denotation of meaning, then by the knowledge of forms (rūpa), the determination of odour etc. would be possible which is illogical. In other words, in that case, the object of the sense of smell will be known by sense of sight, which is not tenable. Hence, the Prabhākara's view is not acceptable according to which a term depicts the meaning of other terms correlated with it and these correlated terms cause the comprehension of the meaning of the sentence. Hence, the theory of Anvitābhidhāna is not tenable.

In fact, both the theories of Mīmāṁsā - Abhihitānvayavāda and Anvitābhidhānavāda are one sided. The Jaina philosophers agree with the former that the terms/words have their own meanings but they also agree with the latter that every term used in a sentence is dependent upon other terms for the comprehension of its meaning i.e. the terms used in a sentence are correlated. We get the meaning of a sentence only after

hearing the complete sentence. Thus, the terms are correlated and relative, they are not absolute. It is not possible'to make a sentence by the absolute terms. As the words are dependent on the letters for their meaning, so also terms are relative to a sentence for their meaning. According to Jainācāryas, sentence is an absolute unit of relative terms.

There are two different points of views working behind the said theories. According to *Anvitābhidhānavāda,* the sentence is term-related. It emphasises the existence of terms in a sentence. Term is the unit on which the meaning of a sentence depends. *Anvitābhidhānavāda* on the other hand, regards terms as sentence-related. It accepts neither an independent existence of terms nor the significance of terms without a sentence. It accepts the sentences itself as a unit. In *Anvitābhidhānavāda,* the terms are primary and the sentence is secondary. But the Jainas regard both the terms and the sentences as mutually related and their contribution towards the understanding of the meaning of a sentence is equally necessary and important. They, thus strike a happy synthesis between the two views and regard both the term and the sentence as having important roles. To emphasise any one at the cost of other is not reasonable. Terms and sentences are neither different from each other nor they are identical. In the comprehension of the meaning of a sentence, both cannot be ignored.

References:

1. (a) *Padānaṁ tu tadapekṣāṇāṁ nirapekṣaḥ samudāyo vākyamiti- Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa p. 458*

   (b) *Syādvādaratnākara-* p. 941

2. (a) *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa* - pp. 458-465.

   (b) *Syādvādaratnākara-* pp.- 641-647

   (c) *Bhāṣātattva Evaṁ Vākyapadīya-* p. 85-96

3. (a) These two verses quoted in *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa* (p. 459) are incorrect. I have got them corrected.

4. *Padārthānaṁ tu mūlatvamiṣṭaṁ tadbhāvanāvataḥ/ Mīmāṁsā-śloka-vārtika- 111*

   (b) *Ibid.-* 336

5. *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa,* pp- 464-65

6. *Kāvya-prakāśa* (Ācārya Viśveśvara), p. 37

7. *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa* 3/101 pp- 457-464.

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Chapter 5

Theories for the Determination of Meaning : Naya & Nikṣepa

Meaning of word and Statement

To understand the correct meaning of a word or a sentence, it is necessary for the listener to consider not only the words but also the intention of the speaker. Many a times sentences of similar terminology convey different meanings because of the intention of the speakers, his style of utterance, and the immediate context. The Jaina *ācāryas* have presented two theories viz. *Naya (*viewpoint*)* and *Nikṣepa (positing)* to explain the intention of the speaker. The fundamental aim of the theories is to help the listener in understanding the correct meaning of the words and the statements of the speaker. *Naya* is defined by the Jaina *ācāryas* as the intention of the speaker" It is necessary to consider the intention of the speaker and the context to determine the right meaning of the statement. *Naya* theory tells us the method, on the basis of which one may correctly understand the speaker's intention and the immediate context of the statement. In Jaina philosophy, the concept of *naya* and *nikṣepa* dates back before the theories of *Syādvāda* and *Saptabhaṅgī* were developed. In the first chapter of *Tattvārtha-sūtra,* the concepts of *naya* and *nikṣepa* are clearly mentioned, although a clear exposition of the concepts of *syādvāda* and *saptabhaṅgī* is missing there. The aphorism '*arpitānārpite siddheḥ*'¹ of the fifth chapter of *Tattvārtha-sūtra* basically refers to *'Naya'* i.e. the general and the specific view point. *Syādvāda* and *saptabhaṅgī* were developed afterwards on the basis of the canonical theory of *Vibhajyavāda i.e.* the method of analytic answering and the philosophical theory of *'Naya'*(view-point). In fact, the Jaina theory of *naya, nikṣepa, syādvāda* and *saptabhaṅgī* are related to the philosophy of language and the science of meaning.

If by *naya* is meant the intention of the speaker or his style of expression, the question is raised as to how many types of *naya* would there be? It is said, there could be as many a *naya* as there were styles of making statements or the ways of speech.[2] In fact, the theory of *naya* is the theory of the analysis of meaning. There may be as many a *nayas* as there could be forms of linguistic expressions. But broadly speaking the Jaina philosophy recognises seven types of *naya*. Besides, *Niścaya-naya* (Transcendental viewpoint), *Vyavahāra-naya* (Practical-viewpoint), *Dravyārthika-naya* (Substantive view-point) and *Paryāyārthika-naya* (Model viewpoint) are also mentioned. But these *nayas* are fundamentally related with metaphysics and spiritualism. The *Naigama, Saṁgraha*, etc. sevenfold *nayas* are basically related with philosophy of language.

Naya and *nikṣepa*, both the doctrines are for the determination of meaning but there is a distinction between the two. *Nikṣepa* determines the meaning of the words, where as *naya* determines the meaning of the sentences. Amongst the seven *nayas- Naigama, Saṁgraha, Vyavahāra*, and *Rjusūtra* are called *Artha-naya* and the rest *Śabda, Samabhirūḍha* and *Evaṁbhūta* are known as *Śabda-naya*.[3] *Artha-naya* is concerned with the object (that the word denotes) and the *śabda-naya* is concerned with the meaning.

(1) Naigama-naya: Out of seven *nayas*, this is the first one. It considers only the definite intention of the speaker.[4] From the viewpoint of the *naigama-naya*, the determination of the meaning of a statement is made on the basis of the objective for which the statement is made. In the proposition regarding *naigama-naya*, the whole attention of the speaker is centered on the ultimate aim for which the activity is to be performed. He does not pay heed on the immediate aspect of the action but fixes his attention towards the ultimate aim of the action. The old Jaina *ācāryas* has given an example to illustrate it: 'If someone goes to a forest to bring some wood for making it a pillar and someone asks him why are you going to forest? The person may reply that he is going to forest to bring a pillar'. Now actually, he is not going to bring a pillar but to bring wood only. But as he wants woods for the pillar, keeping his intention in view he says, he is going to bring a pillar. In our everyday parlance, we quite

often make such statements in which we state the on going action projected on the basis of our intention. We call a medical student a doctor keeping in view his ultimate aim. In determining the meaning of the *naigama-naya*, we project in the statement the future objective. Similarly, in determining the making of the formal statement also *naigama-naya* is used. For example, we call every eighth day of the dark fortnight of the month of *Bhādra* as the birthday of Lord *Kṛṣṇa*. Here also we are projecting a past event in the present.

(2) **Saṁgraha-naya:** Our statements made on language many a times are primarily based on entire group (as distinct from its members) keeping in view the individual instances secondary. According to the Jaina ācāryas when a statement is made on the basis of common characteristics by ignoring the individual differences, it becomes the case of a *Saṁgraha-naya*.[5] In other words statements made on the basis of generalisation are called Saṁgraha-naya.

Suppose a person says, 'Indians are poor'. This statement applies not to the individuals but the whole Indians collectively. The *Prajñāpanā-sūtra* raises the question, whether such class-expressive language be regarded as true or false. The linguistic expressions of this type are made collectively for a class and reveal its qualities, nature etc. But the statements have their exceptions. Now, if the statements have exceptions the question may then be raised, on what basis could it then be regarded as true. Take for example the statement: 'The women are fearful'. This statement can of course, be regarded correct as far as women as a class are concerned but it is not necessarily correct in relation to one particular woman. Thus, the statements based on *saṁgraha-naya*, e.g. 'Indians are poor', or 'Women are fearful' etc. may be true in relation to a class collectively but are not true in relation to each and every individual of that class. Such statements cannot be treated as a ground for deduction. We cannot, for instance, say that: Indians are poor, Birala is an Indian, therefore, Birala is poor. The meaning of a general statement is true only in respect of a class. It is not true in respect of each individual of that class. *Saṁgraha-naya* therefore, suggests that we should interpret the meaning of the statement of general nature in the context of an aggregation (*samaṣṭi*) of a class and should not draw any conclusion in respect of any one member of the class.

(3) **Vyavahāra-naya:** *Vyavahāra-naya* can be regarded as the utilitarian viewpoint. Jaina *ācāryas* have called it also an individual dominating view (*vyaktipradhāna-dṛṣṭikoṇa*).[6] This view warns us not to regard the statements, made in reference to a few individuals as true in the context of all the individuals collectively. Moreover, this *naya* gives prominence to the intention of the speaker or the conventional meaning of word, which is used in a statement, instead of the word's actual meaning used in the statement.[7] We have already given many examples of *vyavahāra-naya.* When we say for instance, 'there are sweets in the *ghee* vessel, then the meaning of *ghee* vessel is not simple as vessel of *ghee* (earthen pot) only, but it means the vessel which was used earlier for keeping *ghee* (the clarified butter).

(4) **Ṛjusūtra-naya:** It is mainly considered as modal viewpoint which supports the theory of Momentaryness (*kṣaṇikavāda*) of Buddhist philosophy. While making a statement, the *ṛjusūtra-naya* keeps the present characteristics of the object in view.[8] For example, when it is said that 'Indian businessperson are not truthful' it is true only in the present context. We cannot make conclusion regarding the past or the future character of Indian businesspersons from this statement. *Ṛjusūtra-naya* tells us that any statement made on its basis is true only in the immediate context not in the context of past and the future. In which context a statement is made, the meaning of that statement should be determined in the same context.

(5) **Śabda-naya:** The above four varieties of *naya* are concerned with the denotational meaning (*vācyārtha*) of the word whereas rest of the three *nayas* are concerned with the actual meaning of the word. *Śabda-naya* accepts the difference in the meaning of the word on account of time etc. Time etc. include time, case, gender, number, person and preposition.[8] For example: when we say 'Banaras was a famous city of India' and 'Banaras is a famous city of India', in both of these sentences, the denotation of the word 'Bananas' is different. The first statement talks about the old Banaras, whereas the second statement is about the present Banaras. Similarly, in the sentences like 'Kṛṣṇa beat' and 'Kṛṣṇa was beaten' the denotation of the word is not one and the same. In the first statement, the

word 'Kṛṣṇa' denotes the name of a person who performs the act of beating, while in the second, 'Kṛṣṇa' denotes the person who had suffered from the act of beating. Thus, according to *śabda-naya*, the meaning of the word changes as per gender, affix, suffix, verb, subject etc.

(6) **Samabhirūḍha-naya:** *Samabhirūḍha-naya* accepts the different meaning of the synonym words by the difference of their etymology[9]. It overlooks the identity of the meaning of the synonyms. For example, the words like *Nṛpa, Bhūpati, Bhūpāla, Rājā* etc. denote a king. But the *Nṛpa* is one who takes care of the public, *Bhūpati* is the lord of land, *Rājā* is one who has the (Kingly) grace. The synonyms thus, though have etymologically different denotations acquire the same meaning in due course of time, as denoting one and the same thing. However, this *naya*, regards synonyms as having different meaning by the etymological point of view e.g. he, who has great power, is Indra; he, who is capable, is *Śakra* etc.

(7) **Evaṁbhūta-naya:** It determines the meaning of the word purely from the etymological point of view.[10] In other words that which accepts the meaning of the words indicated by them only when the object is engaged in the action, indicated by those words. For example, a king can be called *Rājā* at that time only when he is showing his splendour. A teacher is a teacher, when he is teaching. In the practical life however, this is not the case. A teacher is a teacher whether he is teaching or not at a particular time. According to this *naya*, individual, universal, adjective, conjunctive, substantive all these words are fundamentally of the nature of verbs.[11] The meaning of a word is expressive of the power of verb. We must therefore determine the meaning of words on the basis of their verbs.

We thus, find that the *naya* theory attempts to underline that the comprehension of right meaning of the statement should be made on the basis of the structural or forms of sentences. It emphasises the intentional meaning of word or a sentence; and this is revealed in form in which the statement is stated. The meaning of the statement is determined by the linguistic structure and the style of expression of the speaker and as such, there are as many *nayas* as there are ways of speech. The *naya* theory does not take any one-sided view, but tries to see the meaning of the word in the total perspective in which it is presented (spoken).

The Theory of Nikṣepa (Positing)

The Jaina philosophy presents two main theories regarding the meaning of words (i) The theory of *Naya* (Viewpoints) and (ii) The theory of *Nikṣepa* (Positing).

We have already discussed *naya.* Now we shall consider the *nikṣepa.* According to Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya, *nikṣepa* is that specific (verbal) construct which eliminates the irrelevant and applies appropriately the relevant meaning of the words as per context.[12] In other words, *nikṣepa* is a particular type of composition of words or objects for proper adjustment and removal of the lack of understanding. In *Laghiyastrayī nikṣepa* is defined as that which applies the relevant and disallows the undesired meaning.[13] In fact, the function of *nikṣepa* is to determine the meaning of the word in the same context in which the word is spoken. We use the word *Rājā,* for instance, in many a senses. *Rājā* may be the name of an individual, *Rājā* may be an actor playing the role of a king in a drama, it may be someone who happened to be a king in the past, the present king or the would be king. Similarly, we call a particular animal as cow and also a cow-shaped toy as cow. As such, it is necessary to determine the meaning of the word as per context. *Nikṣepa* makes us understand the meaning determination process. Pt. Sukhlal Sanghvi in his commentary on *Tattvārtha-sūtra* writes 'the chief medium of all the human conduct and transaction of knowledge is language. Languages are made of words. According to the intention of the speaker and the context, the same word may be used in different meanings. There are at least four senses in which words are used. These four are the four classes of words meaning in general. This classification is known as *Nikṣepa* by knowing which, the intention of the speaker becomes easily known.[13]

The Jaināryas have mentioned four types of *nikṣepa* (i) *Nāma* (Name); (2) *Sthāpanā* (Projection); (3) *Dravya* (Substance) and (4) *Bhāva* (Attribute).[14]

(1) Nāma-nikṣepa (Namal positing): It is the name given to a thing/person by the parents or some other individuals irrespective of etymological meaning or natural considerations. In *Nāma-nikṣepa* we neither consider the etymological meanings of a word nor the conventional one, nor even the corresponding attributive meaning. It is just to give a

name to thing or person.[15] For example, an ugly man may get the name of Sudarśana (the handsome one). While naming a person/object any conventional word, viz. Saraswati, Narayana, Vishnu, Indra, Ravi etc. or any unconventional word, like Tinku, Rinku, Pinku, Monu, Tonu etc. may be given and the word begins to indicate the person/object. Thus, the name given to a person/object is the indicative word, which has no direct relation with its etymological meaning or attribute. It may also be noted that in *Nāma-nikṣepa*, no word is synonym because one word denotes one object only.

(2) **Sthāpanā-nikṣepa** (Representational or Symbolic positing): To attribute any object in any symbol, statue and copy of the same object and to call it in the same name is *Sthāpanā-nikṣepa* (symbolic positing). For instance, to call a statue of *Jina* as *Jina* or the image of Kṛṣṇa as Kṛṣṇa is *sthāpanā-nikṣepa*. The cost of images, pictures, and the original things make example of *Sthāpanā-nikṣepa*. Jainācāryas have recognised two varieties of *sthāpanā-nikṣepa:* (i) *Tadākāra* and (ii) *Atadākāra-sthāpanā-nikṣepa*. When we attribute the name of an object to its copy, which resembles the original, we call it *Tadākāra Sthāpanā-nikṣepa*. But when we attribute a name of an object to something which does not have resemblance with the original, it is the *Atadākara-sthāpanā-nikṣepa* e.g. to call an uncovered piece of stone by the name of some deity or to call the chess pawns by the name of king, queen, etc.[16]

(3) *Dravya-nikṣepa* (Substantive positing): *Dravya- nikṣepa* is calling a thing by the name of its mode or attribute in which it existed in the past or which may be acquired by it in the future. If we call a person, professor because he was a professor in the past or we call a medical student 'doctor' because he is likely to become a doctor or we call an ex-legislator as 'legislator' -- these will form the examples of *dravya-nikṣepa*. We use such language quite often in our everyday life. A container of *ghee* may be called a container of *ghee* irrespective of the fact whether presently it actually contains *ghee* or not.[17]

(4) *Bhāva-nikṣepa* (Modal Positing): The meaning of word accomplished by its actual state or act is *bhāva-nikṣepa*. For example to call a rich man, as Lakṣmīpati (Lord of Lakṣmī- the goddess of wealth), or to call a person as servant who is actually serving one, or a teacher who is teaching in the class etc. are example of *bhāva-nikṣepa*.[18]

In order to understand the intention of the speaker or to comprehend the denotation of the word as per context, in which it is used, understanding of the concept of *nikṣepa* is most necessary. For example: seeing a student entering in the class, some one says (Mr.) 'Rājā has come'. Now the denotation of this statement is different from that of seeing a *Rājā* entering on a stage during a play. In the first instance, Rājā is the name of the student whereas in the second, *Rājā* is a character in the play. Even today, in India we use phrases like 'the *Mahārāja* of Banaras' or 'the *Mahārāja* of Gwalior, but these expressions do not carry the same sense as what they meant before 1947. Today the phrases have their meanings as per *dravya-nikṣepa*. Before 1947, they meant as per *bhāva-nikṣepa*. The word, king is sometimes the name of a person, sometime it is the name of a character of play. The theory of *nikṣepa* emphasises the fact that we must determine the meaning of word according to the context in which the word is spoken or used in a sentence. Otherwise, it may create misunderstandings. The theory of *nikṣepa* is the theory of correct determination of the meaning of a word. It is specially a Jaina contribution.

References :

1.   (a) *Vakturbhiprāyaḥ nayaḥ, Syādvādmañjarī* p. 243 (b) *Laghiyastrayī*- verse 55

2.   *Jāvaiyāvayaṇapahā, tāvaiyā honti nayavāyā, Sanmati-tarka*, 3/47.

3.   *Catvāro 'rthāśrayāḥ Śeṣāstrayaṁ śabdataḥ, Siddhiviniścaya*- 72

4.   *Saṅkalpamātragrāhi Naigamaḥ, Sarvārthasiddhi* -1/33

5.   *Sāmānyamātragrāhī parāmarśaḥ saṁgraha, Jainatarkabhāṣā, Naya pariccheda*, p.60

6.   *Ibid.* p. 61

7.   *Ibid.*- 61

8.   *Ibid.*- 61

9.   *Ibid.* - 62

10. *Ibid.* -62

11. *Ibid.* p. 63

12. *Laghiyastrayī*- 7/2

13. *Tattvārtha-sūtra*- p.6

14. *Ibid.*-1/1

15. *Ibid.* p.68

16. *Ibid.*-p.63

17. *Ibid.*-64

18. *Tattvārtha-sūtra*-p.7

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Chapter 6

Capability of Expression in Language

Do the word-symbols and language have the capability of expressing their objects or meaning? Are the words 'chair' or 'love' are capable of expressing the object 'chair' or the feelings of love in its entirety? There is no doubt that a word is an indicator of its object or meaning but the question is whether it can perfectly express it? Does a word present a complete picture of its object with all its characteristics and modes? These are the philosophical questions. It is in fact, difficult to answer these questions. If we think that a word is not an indicator of its object, the very validity of linguistic knowledge and the usefulness of language would become disputable. But at the same time we cannot regard languages capable of bringing out its meaning in its completion and as presenting to its listener a real picture of what it wants to express. As we have already pointed out that Jainācāryas have adopted middle-path regarding the relation between the word and its object. They, on the one hand do not agree with the Buddhists that a word does not even touch its object nor do they accept the Mīmāṁsaka's or the Grammarian's view that a word is able to present a complete picture of its object. According to the Jaina philosophers there, of course, does not exists a relation between the word and its object but it is not of that sort that a word may take the very place of its object. A word is no doubt an indicator of its object but cannot take its place. In the process of getting meaning a word can be regarded, as the representative of its object but it does not convey an identical picture. As a river shown in a map does indicate the actual river but is not the actual one, so also is a word. The latter represents its object but it is not an identical representation. Even then, we can very well say, a word with its innate power of expression does present a picture of its object before its listener or reader. As there is knower-known relation between a subject and an object, so there is an expressive-

expressed relation between the word and its meaning. Though the Jaina philosophers do recognise a relation between a word and its meaning but according to them, it is not an eternal relation. The Mīmāṁsakas regard it as eternal but the Jaina view is that the words by usage change their meanings (objects) quite often and that the two words with identical pronunciation may have different meaning in different languages. A word, no doubt, is the indicator of its object (meaning) but it has neither its origin in its objection nor is identical with it. The Jainas do not accept the like Mīmāṁsakas, an eternal relation between word and meaning nor they regard the relation as identical. As the hand movement etc. have a non eternal relation with what they want to say and yet are capable of expressing the desired meaning so also the words have non-eternal relation with their objects and yet convey their meanings[1].

According to the Jainas the words and their objects both are independent entities. Word is not inherent in object nor object is of the nature of word and yet the two are related (have a relation). Words have a limited capability of expressing its object. The Jainas disagree with the Buddhist's view that there is no relation between word and the object. Jainas contention is that if we do not recognise any relation between them, the whole validity of linguistic behaviour will breakdown and then there will be no medium for mutual communication. The Jaina philosophers, therefore, have postulated a limited and relative expressive-expressed (vācya-vācaka) relation between word and its object or meaning. A word though is indicative of its object, is not capable at the same time to express completely its all the characteristics. Words do have the capacity to express but this capacity is limited and relative. It is not unlimited and absolute. The word love, for example does express the feeling for which it stands but is not able to incorporate in its expression all the depths of the feeling of love. There are varieties of love. There are several degrees of the depth of love; and a single word love, cannot express all these. 'I love you' can be stated by a lover, a son, a brother, a friend but the sentence does not mean one and the same in all the cases. The different persons are, of course, using the same terminology but the feelings they are expressing are not the same. In two different contexts, the use of the same word does not have the same meanings. Moreover, the meaning of

a word may change with reference to different persons also. Further, with reference to one terminology also the meaning conveyed by the speaker and the meaning comprehended by the listener may also vary. In many a contexts, we take the others statements otherwise thus the meaning not only depends upon capability of the words,but it is dependent on the the capability of the listener also. In comprehending the meaning, first a relation is built between the word and its meaning. When we teach language to a child, we pronounce a word and at the same time show the thing also for which the word stands. Gradually, the child builds a relation between the two and thus whenever he listens or reads the word, he comprehends its object or meaning. We thus find that the comprehension of meaning of a word does not depend upon only the capability of the word but it is also relative to the previous impressions of the listener or the reader. It depends upon the past experience of the listener or the reader. That is why the words of the language that we have not learnt do not convey to us any meaning what so ever. The Jaina philosophers, therefore, refuse the Mīmāṁsakas view that words have an inherent capability to express themselves. In many a cases the intention of the speaker is misunderstood by the listener. We will have to accept therefore, that in spite of the expressive-expressed relation between the word and its meaning the meaning is also related to the listener's ability. Otherwise, it was not possible that the two individuals would have taken the same terminology in different senses.

Moreover, the capability of a word is also limited to express its object. The reason for this limitation is obvious. There are more varieties and shades of feelings than the words can express. The number of words and the capabilities of words both are limited in comparison of the objects that they denote.[2] Take for example, the word, 'sweet'. There are so many things called as sweet viz. sugarcane, mango, sweets, some dryfruits etc. and we call to all of them with one word 'sweet' but we very well know that the sweetness of all these things is not the same. In the statements like 'mango is sweet' and 'watermelon is sweet', the word, 'sweet' does not indicate the same experience. Compared to the sound and the body signals of animals, there is, of course, much more expressibility of feelings and objects in human word symbols, but they two have their own

limitations. To consider the limitations of words-symbols and language is therefore, very necessary. Objects, facts and feelings are infinite but word-stock is limited. Take the word, red, for instance. It denotes the red colour. But there are many shades, degrees and combinations of red. Is the single word red capable of denoting all varieties of red? Take another example, when a person who has actually tested *guda* (raw-sugar) tells someone else who has never tested it, that *guda* is sweet. Will the listener be able to comprehend the exact meaning of the word 'sweet', which the person wants to communicate? *Guda* has a unique taste of sweetness and this sweetness cannot be comprehended by another person who has never tested *guda*. A word may be general but the experience is always particular. General words may indicate to particular but cannot denote them in their entirety. Words are only suggestive of their objects. There is no similarity between the two. Words get their meanings according to the Jainas, by tradition or convention. The Buddhists have described word as born of the need for alternatives (of objects etc.): *vikalpayonayah sabdāh.* Though, the words are expressive of their meanings or objects, but there is no similarity between words and their objects. In fact, they cannot be regarded as even complete and real picture of their objects. A word does have the capability of presenting a picture of its meaning (object) on the basis of its pre-established expressive-expressed relation, but this capability is limited as well as relative.

Expressibility of Reality

Language and word-symbols are of course, the indicator of their objects or meanings but they have their own limitations also. It is because of this limitation that the object reality remains unexpressed to some extent. Moreover, if the general feelings and experiences are not expressed in their entirety, the question of the expression of the ultimate reality becomes at the more complex. The problem of expressibility and inexpressibility of reality has been shaking off the human mind from the very beginning of the Indian thought. The reason of the inexpressibility of reality, in fact, lies in the limitation of the word-stock, word-power and confinement of the language with the limitations of existence and non-existence. That is why, the voice regarding inexpressibility of reality has been much prominent from the distant past.

In the *Taittirīya-upaniṣad*, the Reality is described as '*Yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saḥ*'[3] i.e. the words come back from where, and that cannot be made an object of mind and expression. The same view is affirmed by *Kenopaniṣad*[4] also. *Kaṭhopaniṣad* describes Reality as non-comprehensible by the language and mind. We cannot comprehend the ultimate reality by our language and the mind'.[5] In *Māṇḍukyopaniṣad*, the reality is described as unseen, non-pragmatic, incomprehensive, unqualified, inconceivable and indescribable.[6] In the Jaina *Āgama* *Ācārāṅga*, it is said that the reality is neither the subject of inclination of any phonetic word, nor it can be described by the language. The speech becomes mute there. Logic, cannot reach there, intellect cannot comprehend it. As such, it is not the object of language, thought and intellect. It cannot be explained by any analogy. Simile becomes fail there. It is unique and formless existent. Bereft of words, it has no word, i.e. there is no word, which could describe it.[7]

All the above statements prove the limitation or insufficiency of language and the inexpressibility or indescribability of reality. The question nevertheless is, whether the reality cannot be made an object of language altogether. If that is so, the whole language behaviour will there be of no use. *Śrutajñāna*, scriptures and *Āgamas* etc. all will become futile. That is why the Jaina philosophers, while describing reality as indescribable, accepted that partially or relatively the reality can be described. To call reality as indescribable is also a sort of description about reality, we state that it cannot be stated. On the practical level therefore, we have to accept the expressibility or the describability of reality. That is the only ground on which we can accept the validity of *Śrutajñāna* or *Āgamas.*

Meaning of Indescribability

According to Jainism, the knowledge obtained through symbols is known as *Śrutajñāna*. All symbolic knowledge is called as *Śrutajñāna*. All those symbols expressing a person's feelings, thought and ideas in a meaningful manner, and which are received appropriately by another person to whom they are addressed to, make *Śrutajñāna*. Now, as *Śrutajñāna* is regarded a valid knowledge, we have to accept that word-symbols or language are capable of imparting valid knowledge of their objects/

meanings. In other words, the object or the reality is expressible also. The Jaina philosophy thus regards reality or the objects partially expressible or describable and entirely inexpressible and indescribable. What, then is the meaning of indescribability?

Dr. Padmarajiah suggests four stages in the development of the meaning of the indescribable.[8]

(1) Negative approach of the Vedic period: In the Vedic period, the *Ṛṣi* while searching for the cosmic cause explains it as neither existent nor non-existent. Both the objects are denied there. The describability of reality as sa*t* (existent) or *asat* (non-existent) is denied.

(2) Upaniṣadic approach: Here we find a sort of synthesis between the opposite elements viz. *sat* (existent) and *asat* (non-existent). The maxims like *'Tadejati tannejati'*, *'Aṇoraṇiyāna mahatomahīyāna'* *'Sadsadvareṇyam*, etc. point towards the acceptance of both the aspects simultaneously. Ascribed with the opposite characteristics here the reality is stated as inexpressible.

(3) The third approach: It recognises the reality as indescribable as such. We find reflections of this approach in the Upaniṣadic maxims viz. ' *Yatovāconivartante aprāpyamanasāsaḥ'* (*Taittirīya* 2/4), '*Naiva vācā na manas prāptuṁ śakyaḥ'* (*Kaṭhopaniṣad* 2/6/12) and so on. The influence of this approach can be seen on *avyākṛtavāda* (theory of indescribability) and the concept of *catuṣkoṭi-vinirmukta-tattva* (reality beyond the four categories of assertion: *asti, nāsti, ubhaya* and *nobhaya*) of *Śūnyavāda* (Nihilism) of Buddhist philosophy.

(4) The forth approach: This approach is developed in the form of relative indescribability in Jaina Logic. Here reality is stated as partially expressible but inexpressible in its entirety.

Generally, there can be following meanings of indescribability:

(i) Negation of the expressibility of reality as both -'*sat*' and '*asat*'.

(ii) Negation of the expressibility of reality in all the three forms viz. *'sat'* (existent), *'asat'* (non-existent) and '*sadasat'* (existent as well as non-existent).

(iii) Negation of the expressibility of reality in all the four forms viz. '*sat*' (existent), '*asat*' (non-existent), '*sadasat*' (existent as well as non-existent) and '*na sat-na-asat*' (neither existent nor non-existent).

(iv) To regard reality as naturally indescribable is fourth view. According to this view reality can be experienced but cannot be expressed in words.

(v) Acceptance of *sat* and '*asat*' both simultaneously but having no mode of expression for such applications, the reality is called indescribable.

(vi) The reality has infinite characteristics but words are limited. There is no word to describe each an every characteristic of the reality. As such, because of the lack of the words the reality is described as partly expressible and partly inexpressible.

Now, the question may be raised as to which of the meanings of 'indescribability' is acceptable to the Jaina tradition. Generally, the Jaina tradition does not accept the first three negative meanings. It also does not accept the application of *sat* and *asat* both simultaneously, as a result it regards the reality as indescribable. But, if we consider the old Āgamas, we shall find that this is not the only meaning of 'indescribability'. In the *Ācārāṅga-sūtra,* the self is stated as 'beyond-words' by nature. It also says that 'there is no word, which can describe that (reality).[9] We have to accept, therefore, that the very nature of reality is such that it cannot be made the object of language in its entirety. Again, on the basis of the infinite characteristics of reality and the limited word-stock, the reality is accepted as indescribable. Ācārya Nemicandra has mentioned *anabhilāpya-bhāva* in his *Gommaṭasāra.* He writes, 'it is only the infinitesimal part of the feeling or the experience expressed in words.' [10] This clearly shows that in the Jaina tradition there is only one meaning of indescribability.

Generally, it is the forth, fifth and the sixth meanings of indescribability which are acceptable in Jainism. It may also be noted that the Jaina view accepts the relative indescribability, rather than the absolute indescribability. Jainas are of the opinion that the things are not absolutely describable but at the same time they are also not absolutely

indescribable. If we accept the things as absolute indescribable, there will then be no way left for the exchange of thoughts in language. The Jaina philosophy, therefore, while recognising the indescribability of the things, believes that reality is relatively expressible also. The reality is partially expressible and partially inexpressible. This stand is congenial to Jaina theory of *Syādvāda* or Relativism also. The Jainas have no difficulty, thus in accepting the last three out of the six meanings (of indescribability) which are mentioned earlier.

In the seven-fold predications (*Saptabhaṅgī-naya*), 'indescribable' is one of the seven predications. There are two types of *naya* viz. *Maulika* (original) and *Sāṁyogika* (combinational). Original types of predications are three viz. (I) *Syādasti* (from a particular point of view a thing is existent), (ii) *Syādnāsti* (from a particular point of view a thing is non-existent), and (iii) *syād-avaktavya* (from both the existent and non-existent point of view attributed at one and the same time, the thing is indescribable). The rest are combinational which are made of the combinations and permutations of three original types of predications. Our objective is to make the meaning of indescribability clear. We have noted that, generally it is impossible to describe one and the same thing as existent and non-existent; eternal and temporal, the one and the many - both simultaneously, because there is no verbal term which can both affirm and negate the same statement simultaneously. It is to emphasise this very incapability of language to express negative and positive and self-contradictory characteristics of the thing in one statement, that the category of indescribability is put forward in Jainism.

In my opinion, the Jaina tradition has accepted many forms of indescribability. Firstly, the affirmation of 'is and is-not' simultaneously is not possible, hence the thing is indescribable. Secondly, there may be infinite viewpoints and as such with all the viewpoints simultaneously a thing cannot be asserted, and accordingly the thing is inexpressible or indescribable. Thirdly, the thing is possessed of multiple specific qualities and in language, there is no word to describe all the specific qualities, hence the thing is indescribable. Fourthly, the universal-word cannot express a particular thing in its entirety, with all its peculiarities. Thus,

in the Jaina philosophy though the reality is indescribable in its entirety and absolute sense, but at the same time, it is partially as well relatively describable.

References :

1.   *'Jaina Darśana'* Dr. Mahendra Kumar, 1974) p- 273.

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3.   *Taittirīyopaniṣad,* 2/4

4.   *Kenopaniṣad,* 1/4

5.   *Kaṭhopaniṣad,* 1/2/20

6.   *Māṇdukyopaniṣad,* 7.

7.   *Ācārāṅga,* 1/5/6.

8.   *Jaina theories of Reality and Knowledge.* p.p. 347-51.

9.   *Appayassa payaṁ natthi, Ācārāṅga* 1/5/6.

10. *Paṇṇavaṇijjā bhāvā aṇaṅtabhāgo du aṇabhilappāṇaṁ,*

     (a) *Gommaṭasāra (Jīvakāṇḍa)*-3335

     (b) *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya,* 141

Chapter 7

Language and Truth

Generally, the validity of a statement lies in the correspondence with its expressed-object. Though, there is, of course, another view with regard to meaning of validity of statement, is its compatibility with the very statement. Because a statement with internal contradiction is obviously false in terms e.g. to say that 'a thing which is being seen, is not visible' or 'Mohan is a son of a barren woman, etc. is false in itself. This type of statements have an inbuilt contradiction hence, are invalid. According to the Jaina philosophy, a statement is valid when it is not going astray (*avyabhicārī*) with its denotation. The statement should be non-contradictory in order to be valid. Here the question may be raised as to how the validity of a statement is judged. Does the statement reveal its validity in itself, or it depends upon some other statement or for the validity of statement correspondence in statement and its object is necessary.

The question of validity of Knowledge

The question of validity of a statement ultimately is, in fact, the question of the validity of knowledge, because the basis on which the validity of a statement is judged, is the mental image emerged in the consciousness of the listener and which in itself is a form of knowledge. Hence, the validity of a statement is fundamentally the validity of knowledge. The linguistic knowledge is after all a kind of *Śrutajñāna*.

In western philosophy, there are three theories regarding the validity of knowledge - (i) *Saṁvāditā-siddhānta* (The correspondence theory) (ii) *Saṅgati-siddhānta* (The coherence theory) and (iii) *Upayogitāvādī-siddhānta* (The pragmatic theory).

In Indian philosophy, the correspondence theory is recognised as *Parataḥ-prāmāṇyavāda* (being established by extrinsic proof) and the

coherence theory as *Svatah-prāmānyavāda* (being established by intrinsic proof). The Jaina philosophers have not taken any one-sided view and regard that the validity of knowledge can be determined intrinsically (*svatah*) as well as extrinsically (*paratah*). They also believe that the criterion of validity lies not in the knowledge itself but in the knowable. Vādidevasūri in his *Pramāna-naya-tattvāloka* says that 'the validity of knowledge consists in its agreement with the knowable.' With respect to their origination (i.e. validity and the invalidity of knowledge) are due to the other (something other than the self) while their consciousness is due to itself and the other.[1] In my opinion, Vādidevasūri's contention that the validly of knowledge can be judged absolutely on the basis of the objects of knowledge or by some other knowledge, is not appropriate. As far as the mathematical knowledge and the case of definitions are concerned, the criterion of knowledge, no doubt, is the internal coherence of knowledge. Similarly, in all that knowledge, where the object of knowledge is not other than the knowledge, its criterion of validity is not to be searched elsewhere; its validity will be intrinsic. In the type of knowledge where there is no subject-object dualism like an omniscient's self-realisation, we will have to accept the origin and validity of knowledge both intrinsically (*svatah*). The knowledge is relatively identical with the knowable e.g. self-perception and in that stage of identity, its origin and validity will be determined intrinsically. In my opinion, in the objective knowledge, we must regard the criterion of validity (origin) and ascertainment (*jñapti*) intrinsic (*svatah*) as well as extrinsic (*paratah*). When somebody, for example, states that in a certain maternity-home a barren women has given birth to a son, the determination of the invalidity of this statement lies in the very internal incoherence of the statement. It is not to be decided by some other piece of knowledge or extrinsically. Similarly, the definition of triangle, that it is a figure with three arms, depends upon the internal coherence (of the definition). Thus, the criterion of origin and ascertainment of validity and invalidity of knowledge or statement can be determined on the basis of knowledge or the nature of statement intrinsically or extrinsically in both the ways as the case may be.

In the knowledge as a whole (*sakala-jñāna*), the perfect knowledge (*Pūrna-jñāna*) and the subjective knowledge (*ātmagata-jñāna*) the

determination of validity is by itself, while in the deficient-knowledge (*vikala-jñāna*), the imperfect or partial knowledge (*āṅśika-jñāna*) or the objective knowledge (*vastugata-jñāna*) the determination of validity is made possible by some other knowledge. In the knowledge obtained by the transcendental perception, the comprehension of its validity is possible by itself, whereas knowledge gained through empirical perception or inference etc. the comprehension of validity of knowledge is possible in both the way i.e. by itself as well as other experiences. Moreover, in relative knowledge, the determination of validity will be by itself as well as other experiences and in absolute knowledge or self-realisation it will be by itself. Similarly, the origin of the validity of the omniscient's knowledge and its ascertainment can be in both the way i.e. by itself as well as other experiences. Thus, Vādidevasūri's this contention is applicable to the knowledge of ordinary people and not to the knowledge of Omniscient. As far as the validity of knowledge of the ordinary people is concerned, it is determined in the case of the past experience by the knowledge itself (*svataḥ*) and in cases where there is lack of past-experience, by some other factors (*parataḥ*) other than the knowledge, though the past experience, of course, is also a form of knowledge. It can be called 'by some other factors' only in a specific relative sense. As far as the origin of knowledge is concerned, baring self-experience, it is always by some 'other' knowledge (*parataḥ*), because it is dependent upon the 'object' which is other than knowledge. That is why, in the Jaina philosophy the criterion of the validity of knowledge is regarded as extrinsic or other than knowledge. As far as the validity of statement is concerned, barring the definitions, it is always established by other factors, because language is related to the listeners and the object to be expressed.

The question of the validity of a Statement

It is fact that man expresses his feelings and experiences through language. Language is an well-organised form of word-symbols and meaningful sound-signals. We have, in fact coined certain word symbols for persons, things, facts, events, actions and feelings. It is through these word-symbols that we communicate our thoughts, feelings and experiences. The question may be raised as to what extent our linguistic

expression can be concomitant with the truth. Modern Western philosophy has evolved a complete philosophical school concerning language and truth. Today, we determine the truth or the falsehood of a statement by the principal of verification. The contemporary philosophers believe that only the verifiable statements are liable of being 'true' or 'false'. The rest of the statements (that cannot be verified) have no relation with truth. A. J. Ayer in his treaties, '*Language, Truth and Logic*' has raised this issue. However, first we must consider as to what does the phrase, 'the verification of a statement' mean? According to the contemporary linguistic analysts, when a statement is confirmed by our sense-experience, then only it can be called verifiable. If we were not able to support or to refute the statements on the basis of sense-experience, they would become non-verifiable. But there are certain statements which can neither be called verifiable nor non-verifiable. For example, if we say that 'there is a possibility of life at *Mangala-graha* (Mangala planet), the statement is instantly non-verifiable; but it is likely that in future the statement be verified. Thus, the statement for the present is neither verifiable nor non-verifiable. But its verification could of course be expected. In *Bhagavatīārādhanā*, the *sambhāvānā-sat* (expectation-truth) is regarded as one of the forms of truth.[2]

Which of the statements is valid, it depends upon the fact, whether its verification is possible or not. In fact, what we call 'verification' (of validity or invalidity) is dependent upon the correspondence of the statement with the facts described by it, which is in Jaina tradition called as *paratah-prāmāṇyavāda* (extrinsic validity). It is generally believed that the statement corresponding to the fact is valid and not corresponding to the fact, is invalid. It is obvious that there is no statement, which can express the fact in its totality. The Jaina philosophers have clearly maintained that each and every statement gives only a partial knowledge about its object. Thus, any statement made with regard to the object will be the partial truth only. We have to keep in our mind the limitation of the linguistic capability and also that it is not the fact but it denotes the fact. Keeping in view this denotation only, its validity or invalidity can be determined. The more the language will be able to denote the facts clearer, the nearer it will be to 'truth'. The validity and invalidity is

correlated with its power of denotation. Words are suggestive facts/objects. They are not the exact representations of reality (objects/facts). They have only the capability of presenting the mental images in the minds of the listeners. Thus, if the mental image produced by the word corresponds with the fact, i.e. if it confirms the fact, it is regarded as valid or true, otherwise untrue. But here it may be noted that the conformity is always in between the present mental image and the former ones. When the mental image is verified by some subsequent image, then it is called *paratah-prāmāṇya* and when it is verified by the preceding image, it is called as *svatah-prāmāṇya* because conformity and non-conformity is subject to the mental image only. Though the images have their basis in the objects. That is why Vādidevasūri held the criterion of validity and invalidity as extrinsic (*paratah*). To say that the criterion of validity and invalidity is extrinsic, means only that the factor, which produces mental images, is something different from the mental images.

Some thinkers are also of the opinion that in the verification or the validity of a statement, there is comparison between the mental image produced by the word and the mental image produced by the experience. However, according to the realist point of view the determination of the validity of knowledge or the statement, is on the basis of the correspondence of the mental images with the object. Here, again, it may by noted that this correspondence is also in fact, not between the mental image and the object but it is between the mental image produced by the word and the mental image produced by some former experience. The comparison is between two mental images and not between the statement and what is stated (fact). Statements and facts are two different entities. There cannot by any comparison or correspondence between them. Words do not represent the objects in their entirety, they are only suggestive; and their suggestive or denoting power too, is dependent upon the linguistic usage. We give a name to a thing but through the usage, the name develops such a capability that by hearing or reading that name, an image gets created in our mind. If this image, produced by the word, has a correspondence with a subsequent experience, we call the statement 'true'. In language, the capability of comprehending meaning is developed on the basis of usage. In fact, there is no word or statement, which is 'true'

or 'false' by itself. A statement in English language may be true or false only for the person who knows English but for one who knows only Hindi, it is neither 'true' nor 'false'. The truthfulness or the falsehood of a statement is possible only when the listener is able to comprehend some meaning (the mental image of the object). Thus, there is no linguistic statement, barring tautology and definitions is absolutely true or false. Moreover, the truthfulness/validity or the falsehood/invalidity of a statement is possible in a specific context only.

The question of truth-value of a statement

Jaina philosophers have given serious thoughts to the question of the truth-value of a statement. In the *Prajñāpanā-sūtra* language is divided into two classes viz. (i) *Paryāpta-bhāṣā* (Developed language) and (ii) *Aparyāpta-bhāṣā* (Undeveloped language).[3] The *Paryāpta-bhāṣā* (developed language) is that language, the statements of which could be verified as true or false and the statements, which cannot be verified is called as *aparyāpta-bhāṣā*.[4] The probable and non-verifiable statements are the characteristics of undeveloped language. Comparatively the verifiable language, the mathematical language and the definitions of Western tradition can be regarded as equivalent to the developed language whereas rest of the linguistic behaviour falls under undeveloped language. There are two categories of developed language viz. (i) *Satya-bhāṣā* (True language) and (ii) *Asatya-bhāṣā* (False language). Similarly, there are two categories of undeveloped language also viz. (i) *Satya-mṛṣā* (True as well as false) and (ii) *Aasatya-amṛṣā* (Neither true nor false or neutral language).

True Language

The statements, which denote the real nature of a thing (fact, situation), are called true. The correspondence between the statement and the fact (object or meaning) is the fundamental criterion of truth. The Jaina philosophers, like the Western empiricists, accepted that the more compatible will be the statement to its fact, the more truthful will be the statement. The Jaina philosophers however, do not limit the truth of a statement to its objective verifiability only. The statement could be 'true' besides their empirical verifiability also. The statements, which are not

dependent on sense-experience but are objects of *aparoksānubhūti* (immediate experience) can be judged by the very immediate experience. *Aparoksānubhūti* has so many levels that it is very difficult to find out its factual compatibility. Jaina Philosophers have visualised truth in many forms. *Sthānānga*,[5] *Prasnavyākarana*,[6] *Prajñāpanā*[7] and *Bhagavatī-ārādhanā*[8] have enumerated the varieties of truth viz. (1) *Janapada-satya*, (2) *Sammata-satya*, (3) *Sthāpanā-satya*, (4) *Nāma-satya*, (5) *Rūpa-satya*, (6) *Pratīti-satya*, (7) *Vyavahāra-satya*, (8) *Bhāva-satya*, (9) *Yoga-satya*, and (10) *Upamā-satya*. Akalanka has used *Samyojana* and *Kāla-satya* instead of *Sammata-satya, Bhāva-satya*, and *Upamā-satya*.[9] Similarly, in *Bhagvatī-ārādhanā, Sambhāvanā-satya* is used for *Yoga-satya*[10].

(1) Janapada-satya (Truth pertaining to a country or community) To denote the object in the language or words prevalent in that particular region/place/country is called the *Janapada-satya*. Language used in one particular region/area may be untrue (false) in another region/area. For example, the word '*Bāījī*' is used in Malwa region in the sense of mother, whereas in many parts of Uttar Pradesh, the same word is used in the sense of a prostitute. Thus, the denotation made by the word, '*Bāījī*' in the sense of a mother will be true for a person of Malwa region but the same will be untrue for a person of Uttar Pradesh.

(2) Sammata-satya (Truth Pertaining to conventions) : To use the different synonyms of an object in one sense is called *Sammata-satya* e.g. for example *Rajā, Nrpa, Bhūpati* etc. (all used for a king). These synonyms may have different connotations as far as their etymology is concerned, but they are allowed to be used in one and the same sense. Both the *Janapada-satya* and *Sammata-satya* type of language, cognise the meaning on the basis of *Prayoga-siddhānta* (Use theory).

(3) Sthāpanā-satya (Representational truth) : To call the image/copy of an object with the same name, by which the object is called, is *sthāpanā-satya*. For example: to call the Mahāvīra's image as Mahāvīra or to call a piece of stone by the name of some deity or to call the chess pawns by the name of King, Queen, *Vajīra* etc.

(4) Nāma-satya (Truth pertaining to name) : This refers to the name given to a person, thing, etc. just to call only, irrespective of the

etymological meaning of his name or his real status. For example: to call a person as Laxmīpati who is not wealthy or to call a poor person as *Rājā* (the king).

(5) Rūpa-satya (Truth pertaining to external appearance) : This is calling a person by his external appearance, e.g. calling a person "Rāma" who is playing a role in a play of Rāma, or to calls person saint wearing an ochre robe.

(6) Pratīti-satya (Truth pertaining to comparison) : This is to regard convictions or relative truths as real truth, e.g. to say that the Anamika is tall, Mohan is small, etc. With a point of view of Modern Astronomical sciences, the statement that 'earth is immovable' is also an example of relative truth or *pratītya-satya*. This statement is relatively truth but not absolutely truth.

(7) Vyavahāra-satya (The pragmatic truth) : *Vyavahāra-satya* is to use linguistic phrases which are in vogue as truth but which literally are untruth, e.g. to say, 'This road goes to Bombay' or 'Varanasi has arrived' etc. We very well know that the road really does not go anywhere, it is immovable; and that the person concerned arrives at Varanasi and Varanasi itself can never be arrived, still we use such phrases.

(8) Bhāva-satya (Truth Pertaining to essential phrases) : It is to use a term for an object on the basis of its one principal quality, e.g. to say, 'grapes are sweet'. Though, all the grapes necessarily are not sweet, of course, some of them are sour, but we use such statements.

(9) Yoga-satya (Truth pertaining to association) : To name the things on the basis of the object with which it is associated, is *Yoga-satya*. For example to call a person *daṇḍī* on account of his association with the *daṇḍa* (a kind of stick), or to call that container as *ghee* container which was previously used for keeping *ghee* but presently which is not in use of keeping *ghee* but something else.

(10) Upamā-satya (Truth pertaining to simile or analogy) : This refers to the truth contained in a simile. The word *'Mṛganayanī'* (the beautiful woman with eyes like deer), *'Candramukhī'* (the beautiful woman with the face like moon) etc. denotes a simile of a beautiful face

given by the moon or eyes with that of the eyes of deer. Here, the moon and the face are two different entities but in simile this type of usage are common. In popular language such expressions are taken as true.

In all the above ten varieties of truth, emphasis is given on linguistic truth in stead of the factual truth. These 'truths' are 'true' only in language. No doubt, truth of a statement is ultimately dependent upon its correspondence with facts, but due to its pragmatic utility it is enumerated in the category of truth.

Untrue or false Language

The Jaina philosophers, alongwith the natures of truth have also discussed in detail the nature of untruth. A statement is untrue if it does not correspond with its fact. In *Praśnavyākaraṇa*, there is a wide discussion held on untruth. It gives thirty synonyms of untruth.[11] Mainly untruth statements are of four kinds:

1. **Alīka (False):** To say existent, which is non-existent.

2. **Avalopa (Taken off):** To describe a thing as non-existing, which is existent.

3. **Viparīta (Opposite):** To describe a thing in a different manner or contrary to its nature, is apposite untrue statement.

4. **Ekānta (One-sided):** To describe a thing in a one-sided manner, eliminating its other aspects, is called *ekānta*. It is also called as *durnaya*.

Besides, violent words, bitter words, deceitful words and faultfinding words are also described by the Jainas as kind of untruth statements.

In *Bhagavatī-ārādhanā* [12] the following four kinds of untruth statements are enumerated (i) rejecting something which really exists (ii) accepting something which is non-existent. (iii) the statement contrary to its nature (iv) speaking censurable, unpleasant and objectionable or disdainful statement.

Prajñāpanā-sūtra mentions ten types of untruth language (*mṛṣā-bhāṣā*) respectively caused by (1) anger (2) pride (3) deceit (4) greed (5) love (6) enmity (7) humour (8) fear (9) story and (10) injury.[13]

A philosophical question may be raised here as to why a language prompted by anger, fear, greediness, etc. is called false or untrue? The statements spoken under the influence of anger, fear etc. do not often correspond to the facts but many times, they are true also. Even then, the *Jainācāryas* have not included them in the category of truth. They regard them as false. The reason, in my opinion, is that the language spoken by bad intention in spite of its correspondence with the facts should not be regarded as correct. In fact, the above ten types of false language, instead of defining the truthfulness or falsehood of language tell us the situations in which we indulge in false speech. These are the situations, which give birth to falsehood. Whenever a person indulges in false-speech, he does it because of at least one such reason.

In the above classification, two of the ten-types of false language need further clarification. The language of a short narrative (*ākhyāyikā*) is called false. When a person depicts short narratives, he invariably enriches it with his hardly possible imagination and as the result, narratives lose its authenticity. In novel writing, such tendency is quite prevalent. Similarly, the satirical language is also false because in it, our faultfinding tendency works. We thus, find that the Jaina treatment of truth and falsehood is not based merely on the correspondence of language with facts. It goes deeper into those reasons, which are responsible for the authenticity of language.

True-false Statements

The statements, which are partly true and partly false are called *Satya-mṛṣā-kathana* (true-false statement). The famous narration of *Mahābhārata,* '*Aśvatthāmā maro-naro-vā-kuñjaro*' (Aśvatthāmā died either man or elephant) is a typical example of a true-false statement. It has a double meaning, hence called as "true-false". Similarly, the indefinite statements also come under this category. Some *Jainācāryas* have considered the probable statements as a type of truth but in my opinion, these statements should be enumerated under the category of 'true-false'. *Prajñāpanā-sūtra* enumerates ten varieties of 'true-false,' (mixed) language. They are[14]:

1. *Utpanna-miśritā* (Statements regarding estimates of birth)

2. *Vigata-miśritā* (Statements regarding estimates of death)

3. *Utpanna-vigata-miśritā* (Statements regarding estimates of birth and death)

4. *Jīva-miśritā*

5. *Ajīva-miśritā* — Statements regarding the estimated living and dead live-stacks

6. *Jīva-ajīva-miśriā*

7. *Ananta-miśritā)* — Indefinite statements regarding quantity and number

8. *Parimita miśritā*

9. *Kāla-miśritā* — Indefinite statements

10. *Akāla-miśritā*

(1) **Utpanna-miśritā** (Statements regarding estimates of birth): Due to lack of the definite information regarding births, when we roughly estimate the numbers of births on behalf of inference, such type of statements are called *Utappanna-miśritā*, e.g. "About ten children born in this village today''. In the present context, this statement can be said as mere presentation of inferred statistics. The inferred and uncertain statements neither can be called absolutely true nor false. They can be called only mixed language. For example: if we say that 'The population of Varanasi has reached to 10 lacs', then this statement neither be called as true nor false. Ordinarily when we make any statements with uncertainty or qualified with 'approximate', it falls under the category of *'utpanna-miśritā'*. We can call this type of statements as approximate presentation regarding birth. The number of births stated in such statements is only approximate and not confirmed.

(2) **Vigata-miśrita** (Statements regarding estimates of death) : According to the commentators, meaning of this type of statement is to submit an estimated number of deaths e. g. ''About ten persons have died in the town today' or 'Million of people perished in the war'. Such statements are instances of *Vigata-miśritā* statements. Such type of statements present an approximate statistics regarding past events. Like aforesaid *Utpanna-miśritā,* this type of language can also not be called 'true' or 'false' in the absolute sense. It comes under the mixed category. While giving examples of the mixed category statements, the commentators have used the number 10 which, seems as incorrect. In

fact, in these both types of language relatively indefinite numbers should be used about, like, thousands, millions, etc.

3. Utpanna-vigata-miśritā (Statements regarding estimates of birth and death) : Jaina masters give example for this category as, 'In India, thousands of children take birth and die every day'. Here in absence of any definite number, again it falls under the mixed category.

(4-6) Jīva, Ajīva and Jīva-ajīva-miśritā (Statements regarding the estimated living and dead live-stacks) : Commentators while giving an example for this category say, 'Seeing the mass of some living and some dead oysters, to say that this is the mass of living beings, is the example of this mixed language. From the point of view of living oysters, this language is true but from the point of view of dead one, it is untrue. In my opinion, there can be another interpretation of this statement. Such three types of languages, state only the one sided state of a thing which has characteristics of both, the living and the non-living. For example, we can not call our body absolutely non-living or living. Relatively it can be living, non-living and both living and non-living. Ignoring all these aspects of the body, to say absolutely living, non-living or both is the example of mixed language, because such language cannot be called absolutely true or false.

(7-8) Ananta-miśritā and Parimita-miśritā (Indefinite statements regarding quantity and numbers) : Commentators have usually defined the term '*ananta-miśrita*' with reference to a category of plants (*ananat-kāyika*) of vegetable kingdom. In my opinion, such languages do not deal with the life of vegetable kingdom. It rather concerns itself with the quantity or numbers. Many a times, in linguistic usage, we use the words 'limited' and 'unlimited' in the sense of 'indefinite'. For example, we can say 'there is infinite water in the sea' or 'there is no limit of his intelligence' and so on. Now, in fact, all such things do have their limit but the speaker only to denote the vastness of the things concerned, describe them as unlimited or infinite. Similarly, sometimes to denote the small amount or insignificance, we use the negative form of language; e.g. 'Today he did nothing'. Here the meaning of the said statement is not absolutely negative. Therefore, the tendencies of describing the things as

'some or 'many' 'finite' or 'infinite', 'limited' or 'unlimited' cannot be regarded true or false in absolute sense, hence will come under the category of mixed language.

(9-10) **Kāla-miśritā and akāla-miśritā** (Statements stating indefinite time) : Following statements are the examples of statements stating indefinite time: 'Before dawn, to awake a person when we say 'please get up, the day has already begun' or keeping in view the urgency of the things 'to say even at 10 or 11 am. that oh! It is mid-day already' Such types of usage in language are quite in vogue but they are in fact neither 'true 'no' false. They are called mixed language.

Neither True nor False statements

In *Prajñāpanā-sūtra* some forms of statements are called neither true nor false. In fact, such statements which cannot be verified as true or false fall under the category of 'neither true nor false' (*asatya-amṛṣā*). The prescriptive statements, for example, are such statements. *Prajñāpanā-sūtra* has enumerated twelve such varieties of languages[15].

(1) **Āmantrāṇī** (Statements extending invitation) : The statements extending invitation viz. 'Please come to my house' or 'you are invited in my marriage ceremony', are called as *āmantraṇī*. Such type of statements cannot be verified, hence, are out of the category of truth or untruth.

(2) **Ajñāpanīya** (Commanding Statements) : 'Shut the door', 'Switch on the lamp' and the like are examples of commanding statements. Such statements are also beyond verification. Modern logical positivists like A. J. Ayer also categorise such statements as non-verifiable. On the basis of linguistic analysis of moral statements, he has proved that in the form of acceptance and negation, such statements are not different from prescriptive statements, hence are neither true nor falsehood.

(3) **Yācanīya** (Statements making request) : 'Please give me some thing' and the like statements are beyond the category of truth or false.

(4) **Pṛcchanīya** (Statements asking questions) : 'Would you please tell me the meaning of this verse?' or 'where does this road go?

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The language of such statements is the language of questioning. It also does not affirm or negate any fact, hence, its verifications is also not possible. So this type of satements are neither true nor false.

(5) Prajñāpanīya or Upadeśātmaka (Statements to be asserted or didactic Statements) : Statements like 'You should not steal any thing, or 'you should not tell a lie' etc. being prescriptive and not descriptive are also beyond the category of truth or false. The modern language analysts regard all the philosophical and moral language ultimately as prescriptive language and therefore, beyond verification. The moral statements, which apparently seem to be factual, are really not factual according to them. The statement like 'It is bad to steal any thing' for example is not verifiable. Such statements only mean that 'you should not steal' or 'we do not like stealing'. It is really a pleasant surprise that what the modern linguistic analysts are doing today, its beginning was already done thousand years back by the Jaina philosophers. By categorising, the prescriptive and commanding statements as neither 'true' nor false' they have pointed out towards modern language analysis.

(6) Pratyākhyānīya (Refuting statements) : Not to accept one's demand, is another form of non-verifiable language known as *pratyākhyānīya.* It is to make statement like, 'you won't be able to get job (in this institution)' or 'you will not be given alms'. Such language is also not verifiable.

(7) Icchānukūlikā (Statements expressing liking and disliking): To recommend something or to express one's liking regarding any work, is *icchhānukūlikā,* e.g. 'you should do this work' or 'I like to do such work' or 'I do not like to tell a lie' etc. The emotive theory of modern ethics also regards moral statement as a variety of statements expressing liking, interests and considers them as not verifiable.

(8) Anabhigrahītā (Neutral statements) : 'Do as you wish' or 'Do what you think well,' such type of statements do not depict the favourable or unfavourable attitude of the speaker. In such type of statements, the speaker neither agrees nor disagrees with the matter concerned. Therefore, such statements stand as non-verifiable within the categories of true and false.

(9) **Abhigrahītā** (Approved statements) : It is making statements like, Yes! You should do like this.' Such statements are also not included in the 'True-false' category of language.

(10) **Saṅdehakāriṇī** (Statements producing doubt) : The statements having double meaning or producing doubts are also not verifiable. In the statement like '*Saindhava* is good', it is doubtful whether the speaker means by the word '*saindhava*,' the salt or the horse. Such statements cannot be called 'true' or 'false'.

(11) **Vyākṛtā** (The tautological statements) : It is not very clear as to what do the Jaina thinkers mean by the term *vyākṛtā*. It probably means definitions. The statement, which defines facts, may fall under this category. If we put them in the language of modern language analysts, such statements are called 'tautologies' which are unverifiable. Such types of statements neither have their own meaning (object) nor say anything new.

(12) **Avyākṛtā** (Language that states the indefinable) : It is a type of language, which neither clearly affirms nor denies the facts. For example, it cannot be said that the world is eternal or not eternal. Such languages are also beyond 'Truth-false' category.

Today the contemporary philosophers too, have recognised that the inviting, commanding, requesting, questioning, and didactic types of language are not verifiable. A. J. Ayer and others have regarded moral statements as prescriptive and hence unverifiable. This explanation is in accordance with the Jaina philosophy.

Relative Truth of Linguistic Expressions

According to the Jaina philosophy, the truth or the falsehood of statements is always relative. The absolute truth even if it is known, cannot be spoken. Whenever we try to express it in words, it becomes relatives and delimits itself. The Jaina *ācāryas* are of the opinion that all the words, irrespective of persons, express only the relative truth and not the absolute one. The omniscient might have the perfect knowledge but his expressions too are qualified. The facts might be known in their entirety but they cannot be expressed. That is why, it is said that even the words of perfect souls are also not devoid of '*naya*'.[16] Even the omniscient

has to take the help of the language, which is limited and relative, and is qualified by 'is' and 'is not'. Thus, whatever we say through language, is always qualified/relative and veracity of the statement is possible in the limited context only. Thus the linguistic expressions with respect to the their veracity are relative to the context in which they are said.

All the statements, which can be categorised as true, have their veracity in some particular context. It is only in their context that statements are 'true' are 'false'. For example: 'India has a vast population'. This statement will be true in the context of all the countries of the world except China. We, thus see that the linguistic statements are not absolutely 'true' or 'false'. They are so only relatively. The Jainas believe that the knowledge and statements of the ordinary people are limited and relative. Albert Einstein also said, ''we can only know the relative truth, the real truth is known only to the universal observer" (*Cosmology Old and New* p.13).

If all our knowledge is partial, imperfect and relative, we have no right to say that only ours statement is right or true. It is very likely that from some other perspective and in some other context the contradictory statement might also be correct. We might accept the absolute truth of *kevala-jñāna* but the statement regarding it, is never absolutely true. Whatever is said, is said only in any particular context. As such, its truth or falsity is relative to its context. We cannot find its truth outside the context. The veracity and falsity of the statement is always in some context.

Now, if our language is relative and its veracity is dependent upon some particular perspective or context, we have to then find out some method by which besides approving its own view could not negate the possibility of truth in other's statements. The *Jainācāryas* have developed such a methodology, and have called it *Syādvāda* and *Saptabhaṅgī*. I don't want to go into details of these theories, but my emphasis is that our statements must be true and the listener should not feel deluded by hearing our statements. Therefore, in our predications, we should place the affirmation and negation relatively. This relative method is known as *Syādvāda*. The *Jainācāryas*[17] have taken the word

"syat" as a sign of truth, because it makes our statements relative as well as beyond contradiction, thus true. At the same time, it makes the listener free from doubts. Lord Mahāvīra therefore, gave instructions to his disciples that they should use only such language, which is analytical *(vibhajyavādī). Vibhajyavada* (the theory of analysis) is that methodology of linguistic expressions which solves the questions by analysing them. Lord Mahāvīra and Lord Buddha both have given emphasis on the clarity of language. We have already discussed the theory of *vibhajyavāda* in chapter -1 in detail. It is that mode of proposition, which does not give one-sided judgements and analyse the question thoroughly. When it was asked to Buddha whether the householder is a seeker of *nirvāna* or the initiated one *(pravrajita),* the lord said if the householder and the *pravrajita* both are deceptive *(mithyāvādī),* they are not seeker of *nirvāna (ārādhaka).* Similarly, when Jayantī asked the Mahāvīra, whether is it good to sleep or to remain awake? He replied for some it is good to sleep and for some others, it is good to remain awake. It is good to sleep for sinners and good to remain awake for the religious people.[18] The above examples make it clear that the theory of analysis *(vibhajyavāda)* is nothing but the method of replying the questions after analysing them. This analytical method shapes the thoughts and makes the various facets of truth clear. The modern linguistic analysis also to some extent, accepts this method of analysing the propositions. The principle object of language analysis is to make the ultimate parts/constituents of a statement clearer which are called as logical atoms. This method, after analysing the proposition, tries to bring out is real import. It is of course, true that the modern linguistic analysis is now a developed philosophy but its seeds can be found in the *vibhajyavāda* of the Buddha and the Mahāvīra. Not only this, the various facets of the language philosophy propounded by the Jainas, the Buddhists and the Grammarians, need serious consideration. The problem of the meaning of a word is seriously discussed by the Indian philosophers and it is really very important. No philosophy of language can ignore it. It is the need of the day to examine the developing language philosophy of the West in the context of Indian philosophy of language. We hope that by such a comparative linguistic study of the East and the West we may reach the threshold of truth.

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3.   *Prajñāpanā-sūtra, Bhāṣāpada*-15

4.   *Ibid.* 16-19

5.   *Sthānāṅga-sūtra* -10/89

6.   *Taṁ śaccaṁ bhagavaṁ titthakarasubhāsiyaṁ dasvihaṁ Praśnavyākaraṇa-sūtra*- 7.24

7.   *Prajñāpanā-sūtra* (*Bhāṣāpada*), 17

8.   *Bhagavatī-ārādhanā*, 1187

9.   *Rājavārtika*- 1/20

10. *Bhagavatī-ārādhanā*, 1187

11. *Praśnavyākaraṇa-sūtra*, 1/2/6

12. *Bhagavatī-ārādhanā*, 818-823

13. *Prajñāpanā-sūtra* (*Bhāṣāpada*), 18

14. *Ibid.* 19

15. *Ibid.* 20

16. *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya*, 2277

17. *Jaina- Darśana* by Pt. Mahendra Kumar   p. 362

18. (a)   *Bhagavatī-sūtra*, 12/2

     (b)   *Vibhajyayāda: Samakālīna Bhāṣāviślesaṇa Darśana kā Pūrvarūpa*' an article
            by Dr. Sagarmal Jain, *Parāmarśa*, Vol. VI, issue-4, p-356.

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Appendix 'A'

The expressive-capability of meaning in Prakrit and
Apabhraṁśa words

The Mīmāṁsakas and the Grammarians believe that the Sanskrit words are the only right words possessing power of expression of its meaning. The words belonging to Prakrit, Apabhraṁśa and other dialects lack the capacity of expressing meaning. Thus, these philosophers do not postulate the power of expression of the meaning in any language or dialect except Sanskrit. As opposed to it, the Jaina philosophers postulate this power in all the languages and dialects. Prabhācandra in his *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa* and *Nyāya-kumudacandra* has tried to prove by many arguments that as there is power of expressions in the Sanskrit texts, so also the words of Prakrit, Apabhraṁśa and the dialects too have the capability of expression. It is also not correct that first, we only listen to the words of a dialect and then by understanding their Sanskrit synonyms, we elicit thier meanings. If we accept it, it would mean that those who do not know Sanskrit were not being able to understand the meaning of statements of other languages. But in our practical life we see that those who do not know Sanskrit they also can comprehend the meaning of words and realise their behaviour accordingly. In fact, the denotation of the world, is the primary factor in comprehending its meaning. People are able to understand the meaning of a word, the way in which they take the symbol, this is the general feature of a language. If the expression-power were exclusive to the Sanskrit words only, there would have not been many languages in the world nor they would have been able to carry on the practical affairs. The Jaina philosophers have taken in this connection a wider view, which takes us above the narrow considerations. Jaina *acāryas* have always given equal emphasis on the power of expression of dialects as well as the cultured languages. That is why, the Jaina *Tīrthaṅkaras* and *ācāryas* adopted the common language as medium of their discourses.Thus, to regard the expressive power

exclusively in the Sanskrit words and to believe that pronunciation of Sanskrit words only could cause to realise the weal, is downright prejudicial propagation. It is necessary to remain above it and show generosity.

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Appendix 'B'

Samavāyāṅga (35) describes thirty-five special characteristics of speech, which are as under:

1. **Saṃsakāratva :** Speech to be refined with grammar.

2. **Udātattva :** Speech to be spoken on high pitch (with lofty sound).

3. **Upacāropetatva :** Speech to be devoid of vulgarity.

4. **Gambhīraśabdatva:** Speech to be profound like clouds.

5. **Anunāditva :** Speech to be resonant.

6. **Dākṣiṇatva :** Speech to be easy.

7. **Upanītarāgatva :** Speech to be endowed with musical melodious mode or variations.

8. **Mahārthatva :** Speech to be impregnated with an expression of essential truth.

9. **Avyāhatapaurvāparyatva :** Speech to be non-contradictory to the preceding and following.

10. **Śiṣṭatva :** Speech to be decent.

11. **Asaṅdigdhatva :** Speech to be free from doubt propounding definite meaning.

12. **Apahṛtānyottaratva :** Speech to be free from any fault to be pointed out by others.

13. **Hṛdayagrāhitva :** Speech to be captivating.

14. **Deśakālāvyatītva :** Speech to be compatible with the time and space.

15. **Tattvānurūpatva :** Speech to be in accordance with desirous object.

16. **Aprakīrṇa prasṛtatva :** Speech to be well arranged and opposed to unnecessary extension.

17. **Anyonyapragrahīta :** Speech to be equipped with mutually related terms.

18. **Abhijātatva :** Speech, which could manifest the modesty and gentleness of the speaker.

19. **Atisnigdha-madhuratva:** Speech to be endowed with sweetness and love.

20. **Aparamarmabheditva:** Speech non-poignant to others secret.

21. **Arthadharmābhyāsānapetatava:** Speech, which could be useful to make money and fulfil the religious thirst.

22. **Udāratva:** Speech to be generous and devoid of frivolity.

23. **Paranindātmotkarṣaviprayuktatva:** Speech bereft of others condemnation and self-appreciation.

24. **Upagataślāghatva:** Speech to be appreciable.

25. **Anapanitatva:** Speech to be free from the grammatical defects of tense, case, gender, number, etc.

26. **Utvāditācchinnakautūhalatva:** Speech, able to generate curiosity amongst audience.

27. **Adbhutatva:** Speech creating wonder.

28. **Anativilambitatva:** Speech to be fluent.

29. **Vibhramādivimuktatva:** Speech to be free from illusion, deflections and fear of mind.

30. **Anekajātisṁśrayādvinvitratva:** Speech to be able to describe the facts in multiple manners.

31. **Āhitaviśeṣatva:** Speech to be peculiar than general speech.

32. **Sākāratva:** Speech, which could take the shape of the different letters, words and sentences.

33. **Satvaparigrahatva:** Speech to be bold and enterprising.

34. **Aparikheditatva:** Speech to be free from glumness or sadness.

35. **Avyucchedatva:** Speech which could provide desired and valid meaning.

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
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