



NAGIN J. SHAH

Jaina Theory
OF Multiple Facets OF
Reality AND Truth
(Anekāntavāda)

Anekāntavāda, the Jaina theory of multiple facets of reality and truth, is so fundamental and central to Jaina metaphysics, epistemology and logic that the entire Jaina system came to be known by the name of *Anekānta Darśana* (System). The theory constitutes its most original and brilliant contribution to philosophical thought and understanding. A critical student of philosophy, Eastern and Western alike, will find in it a master key to the problems which have engaged thinkers from the very ancient times. The present work is a collection of articles dealing with the theory and written by the eminent scholars like K.C. Bhattacharya, B.K. Matilal, A. Uno, and others. They elucidate, examine and evaluate the theory and bring out significant results implied in it. As pointed out by Prof. D.S. Kothari, the theory enriches our understanding of complementarity in physics. It convincingly demonstrates that what seems contradictory to simple mind is, in fact, not contradictory but complementary. It is competent to dive deep into the subtleties of metaphysics, to settle all the vexed questions of abstruse speculation, to reconcile the conflicting views, and to show that grandness of Truth consists in the very richness of its infinite aspects. It fosters intellectual toleration, emancipates man from attachment to inherited traditional views and preconceived notions, broadens his outlook, exposes him favourably to all possible philosophical views, and reveals to him the true significance of each view. It has meaningful bearing on man's psychological and spiritual life.

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**JAINA THEORY OF MULTIPLE FACETS OF
REALITY AND TRUTH**
(Anekāntavāda)

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Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth (*Anekāntavāda*)

Edited by
NAGIN J. SHAH

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FOREWORD

The present volume of the Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth (Anekāntavāda) does not need any further introduction, than the one written by Dr. Nagin J. Shah. He has taken pains to edit the articles submitted at the Seminar on 'Jain Logic and Epistemology', organised by the BLII, in 1990, under the stewardship of the late Dr. B.K. Matilal, Emeritus Professor, at Oxford, U.K.

The BLII is extremely happy that the matter is now going to the press. We are grateful to Dr. Nagin J. Shah to have taken up this onerous task and completed it much sooner than expected, with the addition of 2 more important articles of Dr. K.C. Bhattacharya and Atsushi Uno (Japanese scholar) without which this volume would have remained incomplete.

Dr. Nagin J. Shah's scholarly introduction is another valuable addition to this volume.

Hope, the publication, though delayed by so many years, will find the place it deserves, in the hearts and minds of the inquisitive readers.

Delhi: Tuesday,
the 26th Jan. 1999
50th Republic Day of India

VIMAL PRAKASH JAIN

INTRODUCTION

The central philosophy of Jainism is *anekāntavāda*. Ontologically it means that reality is many-sided, it has manifold aspects, it has infinite characters (*anantadharmātmaka*). As it has infinite characters, it possesses even opposite characters. It is both existent and non-existent, permanent and transient, one and many, describable and indescribable, etc. It is not difficult to find non-Jaina thinkers agreeing with the Jainas on this point. Ācārya Sāyaṇa accepts the possibility of co-existence of being and non-being.¹ Upaniṣads too maintain that reality has opposite characteristics.²

Epistemologically its meaning is as follows. Knowledge which comprehends reality in its entirety with all its infinite aspects or characters is the perfect knowledge embodying the whole truth. Knowledge which grasps all the infinite characters can do so simultaneously; it cannot grasp them successively.³ And such knowledge is possible in an omniscient one alone. It is impossible for an ordinary or normal human being to know reality in its entirety with all its infinite characteristics. As a man can attend to and know one aspect only at a time his knowledge is always partial and relative to that aspect. His knowledge embodies partial truth. The aspect which a man attends to is governed by his intention or purpose in hand. It is only because we forget this limitation and dogmatically regard our knowledge or view as unconditionally true, that we come to quarrel and become intol-

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1.*tathāpi bhāvābhāvayoḥ sahāvasthānam api sambhavati* / *Sāyaṇa-bhāṣya* on *R̥gveda* X.129.1.
 2. *tad ejati taṁ naijati tad dūre tad antike* / *Īśa*, 5, *aṇor aṇīyān mahato mahīyān* / *Kaṭha*, II.20, *sad asac cāmṛtaṁ ca yat* / *Praśna*, II.5.
 3. Samantabhadra accepts this possibility. See *Āptamīmāṃsā*, 105.

erant towards views of others. The descriptions of reality presented by the wise persons differ⁴ because they have in view different aspects of reality. Different systems of philosophy present conflicting world-views because they concentrate on different facets of the world. They separately do not embody the whole truth. They are but broken lights of the whole Grand Truth. They refute each other because they do not bear in mind that each world-view or account is true only from its own standpoint and is subject to certain conditions.

Logically *anekāntavāda* means theory of relative judgment. It warns us to be very mindful while translating our relative and partial knowledge into verbal expression. While making statement a man should be fully aware that his knowledge is relative and partial. As his knowledge is relative and partial, its expression in words should also reflect this relativity or conditionality. His every judgment or statement should be qualified by a particular term meaning 'relative to a certain aspect' 'from a certain standpoint' 'in a certain sense' 'somehow' etc. In Sanskrit one such term is 'syāt'⁵; it has been chosen by the Jaina logicians. Therefore, Jaina theory of relative judgment is called *syādvāda*. The unqualified judgement leaves the possibility of misunderstanding. The theory of *syādvāda* propounds that every judgement is true only of a particular aspect of the object attended to or concentrated upon and of the point of view adopted. No judgement is true in itself and by itself without reference to the conditions under which it is made.

4. *ekam sad viprā bahudhā vadanti* / *Rgveda*, I.164.46.

5. 'Syāt' is indeclinable particle. "Wrong interpretation of the term 'syāt' as 'may be' imparts a sceptical form to *syādvāda*. But in fact *syādvāda* is not scepticism. It is not the uncertainty of judgment, but its conditional or relative character, that is expressed by the qualifying particle 'syāt'. Subject to the conditions under which any judgement is made, the judgement is valid beyond doubt. So there is no room for scepticism. All that is implied is that every assertion which is true, is true only under certain conditions. *Syādvāda* is not of the nature of doubt arising from the difficulty or inability of ascertaining the exact nature of a thing in regard to existence and non-existence, permanence and impermanence, etc. It is not the doctrine of uncertainty. It is not scepticism." *Jaina Philosophy and Religion*, English translation of *Jaina Darśana* by Nagin J. Shah, B.L. Institute of Indology, Delhi, 1998, p. 345.

Anekāntavāda has respect for the view of others. It recognises truth in every view, idea or system. But it understands that every view, idea or system presents not the whole truth but partial truth. So it attempts to synthesise conflicting views to arrive at the whole truth — the harmony of conflicting views. It wants us to find out and see for ourselves truth inherent in every view, idea or system and to understand it with its full logic and then to synthesise or reconcile it with other different — even contradictory — views, ideas or systems, resolving the opposition or contradiction. It takes care not only to demonstrate that truths of different views, ideas or systems are relative and partial but also to relate and reconcile those truths properly and intelligently in order to arrive at more and more comprehensive, concrete and higher truth. This is the reason why Jaina philosophy considers itself as a synthesis of different systems of philosophy — materialism not excluded⁶. So, it becomes imperative on the upholders of *anekāntavāda* to study and understand as many philosophical systems as are possible and then to attempt their synthesis. They should not neglect any philosophical system — Indian or otherwise. Their task is stupendous but rewarding.

Jaina logicians do not accept that a thing is existent absolutely or that it is non-existent absolutely. They maintain that it is existent under certain conditions and that it is non-existent under certain conditions. So, for them it is both existent and non-existent. It is existent from the standpoint of its own substance, place, time and quality (or state or form). And it is non-existent from the standpoint of substance, place, time and quality of another thing. Here non-existence is asserted from the standpoint of alien characters. Thus the conflict of contradictory characters in one and the same thing is resolved. Similarly, they resolve the conflict of permanence and impermanence, identity and difference, etc.

Some have doubts about *anekāntavāda*'s roots in *ahiṃsā* (non-violence). To dispel their doubts the following words, I think, are enough: "The highest goal of all systems of Indian philosophy is

6. *bhaddaṃ micchādamsaṇasamūhamaiyassa amayasārassa / jīṇavayaṇassa bhagavaṃ saṃviggasuhādimagassa // Sanmati*, III. 65.

liberation (*mokṣa*). For the attainment of this goal they have prescribed their respective spiritual disciplines which do not differ much from one another. In all these spiritual disciplines the practiser is necessarily required to cultivate five prime virtues, viz. non-violence, truth, non-theft, celibacy and non-possession. And among these five, non-violence is supreme and fundamental. It is so fundamental that the rest depend on it and are included in it, not only that but it provides us with the sole criterion for determining as to what is truth, etc.⁷ That which involves violence is not truth even though it may be factually true, and conversely that which does not involve violence is truth even though it may be factually untrue. That which hurts others is never truth. So one should not speak what hurts others and should also respect the views of others.⁸ One should not be stubborn to state that what one says is the only truth. Not to hurt others in presenting one's view implies one's respect for views of others. So, one should be very cautious in one's statement of one's view. One should qualify one's statement by 'this is my faith' 'this is my view' etc. implying thereby that others may have different faith or view. By thus saying one protects truth, while making absolute statements one harms the truth.⁹ This spirit prevails in all the ethical systems of India. It is this spirit that has given rise to the theory of *anekāntavāda*.¹⁰

7. *tatrāhimsā sarvathā sarvadā sarvabhūtānām anabhidrohaḥ, uttare ca yamaniyamās tanmūlās tatsiddhiparatayā tatpratipādanāya pratipādyante, tadavadātarūp-akaraṇāyaivopādīyante / Vyāsabhāṣya, 2.30.*

ahimsāyā avirodhenaiiva satyādayo yamaniyamā anuṣṭheyā iti / Yogavārtika, 2.30.
yathā nāgapade'nyāni padāni padagāminām /
sarvāṇy evāpi dhīyante padajātāni kauñjare //
evam sarvam ahimsāyām dharmārtham api dhīyante //

—Mokṣadharmaparva

8. *eṣā (vāg) sarvabhūtopakārārtham pravṛttā na bhūtopaghātāya, yadi caivam apy abhidhīyamānā bhūtopaghātāparaiva syāt na satyam bhavet pāpam eva bhavet, tena puṇyābhāsenā puṇyapratirūpakeṇa kaṣṭatamam prāpnuyāt / Vyāsabhāṣya, 2.30.*

9. *saddhā ce pi, Bhāradvāja, purisassa hoti; 'evam mesaddhā' ti vadam saccam anurakkhati, na tveva tāva ekamsena niṭṭham gacchati, — 'idam eva saccam, mogham aññam' ti / Camkissutta, Majjhimanikāya.*

10. Introduction to *Samantabhadra's Āptamīmāṃsā — Critique of an Authority* by Nagin J. Shah, Sanskrit-Sanskriti Granthamālā No. 7, Ahmedabad, pp. 13-14.

Here I would like to suggest that the term ‘*āstikya*’ yields a meaning which is very much conducive to the spirit of *anekāntavāda*. The term ‘*āstikya*’ is derived from ‘*asti*’ (‘is’). It corresponds to acceptance, avoiding rejection. It says ‘yes’ to each and every view. It says ‘no’ to no view. It stands for the positive and constructive attitude and approach towards all views. It avoids outright rejection of views. It is our dogmatic and obstinate sticking to our traditionally inherited views and preconceived notions that urges us to reject outright views of others and makes our minds closed and narrow. *Āstikya* is that catholic attitude which respects views of others, tries to understand them and sincerely attempts to find out truth — however slight it may be — inherent in them. Attachment to one’s views is very harmful. It is very difficult even for the learned and the saints to destroy attachment to one’s views (*dr̥ṣṭirāga*), which is of a very evil nature.¹¹ Attachment to one’s views makes one blind to truth not only of views of others but also of one’s own views. Openmindedness and readiness to accept truth presented in any manner, in any language and by any one is what is meant by the term ‘*āstikya*’. This becomes possible when attachment is removed to a considerable extent. *Āstikya* is equated with *śraddhā*. And *śraddhā* primarily means spiritual purity due to the removal of attachment—purity which makes man capable of grasping truth in any view or system.¹²

Transcendentalist philosophers like *śūnyavādī* Buddhists reject all views. They do not have their own views also. Thus they are free from all views, rather they are above all views, and consequently they are free from attachment to views. They achieve freedom from attachment by rejecting all views. On the other hand, the Jaina empiricist accepts all views, includes them in his all-comprehensive philosophy. For him there exists no dichotomy of his views and views of others. So he is

11. *dr̥ṣṭirāgas tu pāpīyān durucchedaḥ satām api //*

—*Vitarāgastotra* by Ācārya Hemacandra

12. *śraddhā cetasaḥ samprasādaḥ / Vyāsabhāṣya*, I.20.

śraddhā cetasaḥ prasādaḥ / Ābhīdharmakośabhāṣya, II.20.

prasādo’nāsravatvam / Sphuṭārthā, 8.75.

yad dhi nirmalaṁ tat prasannam ity ucyate / Abhidharmadīpavṛtti, p.367.

free from attachment to views. He achieves freedom from attachment by accepting all views. While the transcendentalist sees peace in the Absolute which transcends all antinomies of intellect, the Jaina empiricist finds it in the fact of relativity of knowledge and consequent revelation of the many-sidedness of Reality which contains all antinomies, all pairs of contradictory characteristics—the one leading to spiritual mysticism, the other leading to intellectual toleration.

The present work is a collection of papers on *anekāntavāda*, read in the Seminar organised by B.L. Institute of Indology in the year 1990. Of them the two—one by Prof. K.C. Bhattacharyya and the other by Prof. A. Uno—, though not written for the Seminar are included in the work owing to their great importance.

Prof. B.K. Matilal's article "Anekānta: Both Yes and No?" is very important in several ways. It takes us to the new understanding of the theory and problems concerned with it. Prof. Matilal explains the sense in which the Jaina position 'Everything is non-one-sided' is meta-metaphysical, points out the affinity of *anekāntavāda* with *vibhajyavāda*, shows how both the Buddhist and the Jaina avoided two extremes, and extensively demonstrates how the charge of irrationality and unintelligibility against the Jaina theory of *anekānta* has been averted and answered by the powerful Jaina philosophers with the help of clear enunciation of the method of *saptabhaṅgī* (sevenfold predication) as well as the doctrine of *nayavāda* (standpoints). His explanation of the Jaina answer to the opponents' criticism is highly illuminating as it takes into account various pertinent views of modern logicians. He observes that the Jaina theory of *anekāntavāda* does not involve the rejection of the law of contradiction though it does not comply with the law of excluded middle. His interpretation of 'inexpressible (*avaktavya*)' in the fourth mode of the sevenfold predication is philosophically important and interesting. The whole article is gripping. Prof. K.C. Bhattacharyya in his fascinating article "The Jaina Theory of Anekānta" opens up new vistas to philosophical understanding of the theory of *anekānta*. He elucidates the theory with novel concepts and terminology, brings out important implications, raises interesting questions and answers them intelligently, explains Jaina Realism in the context of Hegelian and Nyāya standpoints, observes that Jaina

Realism not only asserts a plurality of determinate truths but also takes each truth to be an indetermination of alternative truths, explicates the development of the Jaina conception of indetermination into seven alternative modes of truth, reveals philosophical significance of the third and fourth modes which are called *kramārpaṇa* (consecutive presentation) and *sahārpaṇa* (co-presentation) respectively, describes the Jaina theory of *anekānta* as ‘theory of indeterministic truth’ but does not consider it to be a form of scepticism, and maintains that it represents toleration of many modes of truth. Prof. Atsushi Uno’s article ‘A Study of Syādvāda’ is a thoroughly text-based exposition of *syādvāda*, meticulously dealing with each and every traditional point. Prof. V.M. Kulkarni in his article ‘Relativity and Absolutism’ lucidly explains the theory of *anekānta* along with *saptabhaṅgī* and traditional seven standpoints, and also treats of genesis and evaluation of *syādvāda*. The next article ‘The Seven-plank Epistemological Frame—A Search for its Rationale’ by Prof. V. Venkatachalam is interesting as it suggests correlation or correspondence of seven members of *saptabhaṅgī* with seven types of experience—*pramā*, *vikalpa*, *saṁśaya*, *bhrama* of ordinary type and three types of *āhārya-sopādhika-bhrama*. Prof. Pradeep P. Gokhale in his article ‘The Logical Structure of Syādvāda’ discusses three models of sevenfold scheme (*saptabhaṅgī*), viz. the model of many-valued logic, the model of modal logic and the model of conditionality. He suggests a fourth model which he calls ‘the model of Existential Quantifier’, and shows how it is the most adequate one. The article is really important. The article ‘The Complementarity Principle and Jaina Theory of Syādvāda’ by Prof. D.S. Kothari ably and intelligently demonstrates how the principle of complementarity which ‘is perhaps the most significant and revolutionary concept of modern science’ corresponds to the theory of *syādvāda*, and the sevenfold quantum-mechanical representation to seven modes of *saptabhaṅgī*. Prof. L.V. Joshi’s article ‘Nyāya criticism of Anekānta’ shows what type of arguments were generally adduced against *anekāntavāda* by the rival Indian philosophers who were determined to refute the theory anyhow. Prof. D. Bhargava in his article ‘A Few Modern Interpretations of Non-absolutism’ shows how the serious modern scholars of Jainism understand and view the Jaina theory of

anekānta. Dr. Bhargava expresses his doubt about *anekāntavāda* having its roots in non-violence and giving rise to or being characterised by toleration. Prof. Bhagchandra Jaina's article 'Rudiments of Anekāntavāda in Early Pali Literature' attempts to demonstrate elements of *anekāntavāda* and *nayavāda* in the Pali Buddhist literature. Prof. Ramjee Singh in his article 'Relevance of Anekāntavāda in Modern Times' explains how the modern world needs the spirit of *anekāntavāda* most. The spirit of *anekāntavāda* can foster world-peace, can keep together the different peoples with their different cultures, outlooks, temperaments, ideas, sets of rituals and philosophies, can offer solution to the social, political, religious and cultural problems. This spirit is essential to the kind of philosophy needed to account for the complexities of the emerging world civilization.

I am, indeed, grateful to the management of B.L. Institute of Indology for giving me an opportunity to study and edit articles on the Jaina theory of *anekānta* read in the Seminar organised by the Institute in the year 1990.

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NAGIN J. SHAH

CHAPTER 1

ANEKĀNTA: BOTH YES AND NO

B.K. Matilal

I

A metaphysical thesis, in the context of classical Indian philosophy at least, usually (more often than not) takes the form of such a proposition as ‘Everything is *F*’ or ‘Nothing is *F*’. Philosophical rivalry springs from the varieties of such proposed positions, that is, varieties of such *F*’s. For example, the Advaita Vedānta says; ‘Everything is Brahman’, the Mādhyamika, ‘Everything is empty of its own-being or own-nature’, and the Yogācāra, ‘Everything is a *viññapti* ‘making of consciousness.’ We may add to the list even such positions as ‘Everything is non-soul, impermanent and suffering’ (the Buddhist in general), and ‘Everything is knowable and namable’ (the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika). If we have to add the Jainas to the list, then we can say that theirs is: Everything is ‘non-one-sided’ *anekānta*. However, I shall argue that at least on one standard interpretation, the Jaina thesis is held at a slightly different level; if the others are called metaphysical, this one may be called meta-metaphysical. The sense of it will be clear later on. I do not wish to claim this to be the ‘one-up-manship’ of the Jainas. The claim here is a modest one; it harks back upon the historical origin of the position.

It is rather hard to see how such metaphysical theses as illustrated above, in the form of ‘Everything is *F*’, can be proven in a straightforward manner. They are often presuppositions, sometimes accepted as an axiom of a system. The argument, if there is any, must be

indirect or *reductio-ad-absurdum*, it is persuasive and suggestive. It may be pointed out at this stage that according to the later Nyāya school any argument that has a conclusion (a thesis) of the form “Everything is *F*”, is fallacious, because it would be inconclusive. To use their technical vocabulary, the inferred conclusion of the form “Everything is *F*” (where “Everything” is the subject term, playing the role of a *pakṣa*), is faulty because it suffers from the defect called *anupasaṃhārin*. Such defect occurs when and only when the *pakṣa* (the subject locus) is *kevalānvayin* which corresponds to a universal class. Strictly speaking, we should say that the property that qualifies the subject locus here, that makes it what it is, a subject-locus, is a universal (or everpresent) property. Such being the case, we cannot *compare* or *contrast* it with anything else. The Indian theory of inference, on the other hand, depends essentially upon the possibility of such comparison (by the citation of a *sapakṣa*) and contrast (by the citation of a *vipakṣa*). This does not make the Indian or the Nyāya theory a theory of inference based upon analogy. It only certifies its empirical, that is its non-*apriori*, character. Proving something to be the case here means to make it intelligible and acceptable by showing how, (1) it is similar to other known cases and (2) what does it differ from and in what way. This demand on the proof is much stricter than usual. Otherwise, the Indians will say that something may actually be the case but it cannot be claimed or established as such. Hence the inconclusiveness (*anaikāntika*) of the said type of inferences was regarded as a defect, a *hetvābhāsa*.

A metaphysical thesis was usually expressed in the canonical literature of Buddhism and Jainism in the form of a question “Is *A* *B*?” “Is everything *F*”, to which an answer was demanded either yes or no. If yes, the thesis was put forward as an assertion, that is, the proposed position “*A* is *B*” or “Everything is *F*” was claimed to be true. If no, it was denied, that is, it was claimed as false. Therefore, ‘yea’ and ‘no’ were the substitutes for the truth-values, true and false. The Buddhist canons describes such questions as *ekāṃśa-vyākaraṇīya*, those that can be answered by a direct yes or no. However, both the Buddha and the Mahāvīra said that they were followers of a different method or style in answering questions. They were, to be sure, *vibhajya-vādin*, for

they had to analyse the significance or the implications of the questions in order to reach a satisfactory answer. For it may be that not everything is *F*, although it may not be true that nothing is *F*.

The followers of the Mahāvīra developed their doctrine of *anekānta* from this clue found in the canonical literature. This is the clue of *vibhajya-vāda*, which originally meant, in both Buddhist and Jain canons, a sort of openness—lack of dogmatic adherence to any viewpoint exclusively. The philosophy of Jainism has been called “Non-dogmatism” or “Non-absolutism.” I prefer the literal rendering “non-onesidedness”, for it seems to retain the freedom of the interpreter as well as its openendedness.

Metaphysical puzzle seems to have started in early period in India (as it did in Greece too) with a dichotomy of basic predicates or concepts such as, being and non-being, permanence and change, is and is-not, substance and modes, identity and difference. Although these five pairs just cited are not strictly synonymous, they are nevertheless comparable and often interchangeable depending, of course, upon the context. The first members of these pairs used to be captured by a common denominator, *a la* the Buddhist canons, called Eternalism or *śāśvata-vāda*, while the second members constituted the opposite side, Annihilationism or *uccheda-vāda* (sometimes, even Nihilism). Indulging in the same vein, i.e., the vein of rough generalization, we put the spirituality of reality on one side and the materiality of reality on the other. Looking a little further we can even bring the proverbial opposition between Idealism and Realism, in their most general senses, in line with the above pairs of opposites.

Avoidance of the two extremes (*anta* = one-sided view) was the hallmark of Buddhism. In his dialogue with Kātyāyana, the Buddha is said to have identified “it is” as one *anta* (=extreme) and “it is not” as the other extreme, and then he said that the Tathāgata must avoid both and resort to the middle. Hence Buddhism is described as the Middle Way. The Mahāvīra’s *anekānta* way consisted also in not clinging to either of them exclusively. Roughly, the difference between Buddhism and Jainism in this respect lies in the fact that the former avoids by REJECTING the extremes altogether while the latter does it by ACCEPTING both with qualifications and also by reconciling

between them. The hallmark of Jainism is, therefore, the attempted reconciliation between the opposites.

II

It would be better to start with some traditional descriptions of the concept of *anekānta*. An alternative name is *syādvāda*. Samantabhadra describes it as a position ‘that gives up by all means any categorically asserted view’ (*sarvathaikāntatyāgāt*) and is dependent (for its establishment) upon the method of ‘sevenfold predication’ (*Āptamīmāṃsā*, 104). Malliṣeṇa says that it is a doctrine that recognizes that each element of reality is characterized by many (mutually opposite) predicates, such as permanence and impermanence, or being and non-being. It is sometimes called *vastu-śabala* theory (SdM, p.13), that underlines the manifold nature of reality. Manifoldness in this context is understood to include mutually contradictory properties. Hence on the face of it, it seems to be a direct challenge to the law of contradiction. However, this seeming challenge should not be construed as an invitation to jump into the ocean of irrationality and unintelligibility. Attempts have been made by an array of powerful Jaina philosophers over the ages to make it rationally acceptable. We will see how.

Guṇaratna Sūri, in his Comm. on Haribhadra’s *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha* says that the Jaina doctrine is to show that the mutually opposite characterization of reality by the rival philosophers should be reconciled, for, depending upon different points of view, reality can be discovered to have both natures, being and non-being, permanent and impermanent, general and particular, expressible and inexpressible. The Jainas argue that there are actually seriously held philosophical positions, which are mutually opposed. For example, we can place the Advaita Vedānta at one end of the spectrum, as they hold Brahman, the ultimate reality, to be non-dual, permanent, substantial, and an all-inclusive being. This is where the ‘being’ doctrine culminates. The Buddhists, on the other hand, are at the other end of the spectrum. Their doctrine of momentariness (as well as emptiness) is also the culmination of the ‘non-being’ doctrine, which can

also be called the *paryāya* doctrine. Traditionally, in Jainism, *dravya* 'substance' ('permanence', 'being') is contrasted with *paryāya* 'modification', 'change' or even 'non-being'. One should be warned that, by equating Buddhism with the 'non-being', I am not making it nihilistic. For 'non-being' equals 'becoming'. *Paryāya* is what is called a process, the becoming, the fleeting or the ever-changing phases of the reality, while *dravya* is the thing or the being, the reality which is in the process of fleeting. And the two, the Jainas argue, are inextricably mixed together, such that it does not make any sense to describe something as exclusively 'permanent', a *dravya*, without necessarily implying the presence of the opposite, the process, the fleetingness, the impermanence, the *paryāya*. Being and becoming mutually imply each other, and to exclude one or the other from the domain of reality is to take a partial (*ekānta*) view.

The idea is not that we can identify some elements of reality as 'substance' and others as 'process' or *paryāya*. Rather the claim is that the same element has both characteristics alternatively and *even simultaneously*. It is the last part 'even simultaneously' that would be the focus of our attention when we discuss the sevenfold predication. The challenge to the law of contradiction that we have talked about earlier can be located, in fact, pin-pointed, in this part of the doctrine. The *anekānta* has also been called the *ākulavāda*, a 'precarious' doctrine. The idea is, however, that it challenges any categorically asserted proposition, ordinary or philosophical. Its philosophical goal is to ascribe a 'precarious' *value* to all such propositions. It condones changeability of values (i.e., truth-values). However, it does not amount to scepticism, for the manifoldness of reality (in the sense discussed above) is non-sceptically asserted. It is also not dogmatism, although it can be said that they were dogmatic about non-dogmatism.

III

How do the Jainas argue in favour of their position and answer that charge of irrationality and unintelligibility? Traditionally, their method *sapta-bhaṅgī* or 'sevenfold predication' as well as their doctrine of 'standpoints' (*nayavāda*) supplies the material for the constructive

part of the argument. To answer criticism, however, they try to show how contradictory pairs of predicates can be applied to the same subject with impunity and without sacrificing rationality or intelligibility. This may be called the third part of their argument. I shall comment on the last by following an outstanding Jaina philosopher of 9th century A. D., Haribhadra. In another section, I shall discuss the first part, the sevenfold predication before concluding with some general comments.

In his *Anekāntajayapatākā* (=“The Banner of Victory for Anekānta”), Haribhadra formulates the opponents’ criticism as follows (we will be concerned with only a few pages of the first chapter). He first selects the pair: *sattva* ‘existence’ or ‘being’ and *asattva* ‘non-existence’ or ‘non-being’. The opponent says (p.11, G.O.S, 1940 edn.):

“Existence is invariably located by excluding non-existence, and non-existence by excluding existence. Otherwise, they would be non-distinct from each other. Therefore, if something is existent, how can it be non-existent? For, occurrence of existence and non-existence in one place is incompatible....

Moreover, if we admit things to be either existent or non-existent, existence and non-existence are admitted to be properties of things. One may ask: are the property and its locus, the thing, different from each other? Or are they identical? Or, both identical and different? If different, then, since the two are incompatible, how the same thing can be both? If identical, then the two properties, existence and non-existence, would be identical... And if so, how can you say that the same thing has (two different) natures?” (p.11-12).

The main point of the argument here depends upon reducing the Jaina position to two absurd and unacceptable consequences. If the properties (or the predicates) are incompatible (and different), they cannot characterize the same entity. And if they are somehow shown to be not incompatible, the Jainas lose their argument to show that the same entity is or can be characterized by two incompatible properties. Haribhadra continues:

“If they are both, identical and different, we have also two possibilities. If they are different in one form or one way and identical in another way, then also the same cannot be said to have two different natures. However, if they are different in the same way as they are identical with each other, this is also not tenable. For there will be contradiction. How can two things be different in one way, and then be identical in the same way? If they are identical, how can they be different?” (p. 12-13).

This is the opponent’s argument. The formulation is vintage Haribhadra. Now the answer of Haribhadra may be briefly given as follows:

“You have said “How can the same thing, such as a pot, be both existent and non-existent?” This is not to be doubted. For it (such dual nature of things) is well-known even to the (unsophisticated) cowherds and village women. For if something is existent in so far as its own substantiality, or its own location, or its own time or its own feature is concerned, it is also non-existent in so far as a different substantiality, a different location, a different time or a different feature is concerned. This is how something becomes both existent and non-existent. Otherwise, even such entities as a pot would not exist.” (p.36).

The existence of an entity such as a pot, depends upon its being a particular substance (an earth-substance), upon its being located in a particular space, upon its being in a particular time and also upon its having some particular (say, dark) feature. In respect of a water-substance, it would be non-existent, and the same with respect to another spatial location, another time (when and where it was non-existent), and another (say, red) feature. It seems to me that the indexicality or the determinants of existence is being emphasized here.

To make this rather important point clear, let us consider the sentence:

“It is raining”.

This would be true or false depending upon various considerations or criteria. It would be true if and only if it is raining, but false if it happens to be snowing. This may correspond to the ‘substantiality’

(*dravyataḥ*) criterion mentioned by Haribhadra. Next the same would be true if and only if it is raining at the particular spot where the utterance has been made, otherwise false (at another spot, for instance). It would be likewise true if and only if it is raining now when it has been uttered, but false when the rain stops. Similarly, it would be again true if and only if it is raining actually from rain-clouds, for instance, not so when it is a shower of water from artificial sprinklers. It is easy to see the correspondence of these criteria with those other three mentioned by Haribhadra.

Haribhadra, in fact, goes a little further to conclude that a statement like “It is raining” or even “The pot exists” has both truth-values, it is both true and false, in view of the above considerations. In fact, it is better to talk in terms of truth-values (as will be clear below), rather than in terms of the contradictory pairs of predicates. For the law of contradiction, as it is usually stated in ordinary textbooks of logic, requires that the denial of a predicate, *F*, of a subject, *a*, be the same as the affirmation of the contradictory predicate of the same subject and *vice versa*. Besides, saying yes and no to such questions as “Is *a* *F*?” is equivalent to assign truth and falsity respectively to the statement “*a* is *F*”.

One may argue that discovery of the indexical elements on which the determinants of a truth-value depends, that is, of the indexical determinants for successfully applying a predicate, may not be enough to draw such a radical conclusion as the Jainas want, namely, co-presence of contradictory properties in the same locus or assigning of both truth and falsity to the same proposition. Faced with such questions where indexical elements play an important and significant role, we may legitimately answer, “yes and no. It depends”. However, to generalize from such evidence that the truth and falsity of all propositions, suffer from this indeterminacy due to the presence of the indexical or variable elements, and further that all propositions are therefore necessarily and omnitemporally (*sarvathā* and *sarvadā*) both true and false, may be an illicit jump. The successful application of any predicate to a thing on this view, depends necessarily upon a variable element such that it can or cannot be applied according as we can substitute one or another thing for these variable elements.

These elements which may remain hidden in a categorically asserted proposition, is sometimes called a point of view or a standpoint. It also amounts to a view which announces that all predicates are RELATIVE to a point of view;- no predicates can be *absolutely* true of a thing or an object in the sense that it can be applied unconditionally at all times under any circumstances. Jainism in this way becomes identified with a sort of facile relativism.

If the points in the above argument are valid, then it would be a sound criticism of Jaina philosophy. However, let us focus upon two related points. First, relativism. The reflexes of relativism are unmistakable in Jainism as they are in many modern writers. The familiar resonance of Jainism is to be found in Nelson Goodman (*The Ways of World-Making*). A typical argument is to show how the earth or the sun can be said to be both in motion and at rest depending upon the points of view. An obvious criticism of the facile relativism (though not that of Goodman) is that it can be shown to be self-inconsistent, for in trying to argue that all truths are relative to some point of view or other, it makes use of an absolute notion of truth. Will this charge hold against Jainism? I do not think so. For Jainism openly admits an absolute notion of truth, which lies in the total integration of all partial or conditionally arrived at truths, and is revealed to the vision of an omniscient being such as the Mahāvīra. The emphasis here is on the conditionality and limitedness of the human power and human vision and therefore it applies to all humanly constructible positions. The concern is somewhat ethical. Rejection of a seriously held view is discouraged lest we fail to comprehend its significance and underlying presuppositions and assumptions. The Jainas encourage openness.

Are the Jainas guilty of illicit generalisation? This is another point of the above critique. All predicates for which there is a contradictory one, are indeterminate as regards the truth and falsity of their application. In fact by claiming that the contradictory pairs are applicable they take the *positive* way out as opposed to the Buddhists, the Mādhyamikas, who take the *negativeway*. Of the familiar four Buddhist alternatives, yes, no, both, and neither, the Jainas may prefer the third, both yes and no, while the Mādhyamikas reject all four. If

unconditionality and categoricity of any predication, except perhaps the ultimate one, *anekānta* in this case, is denied, then this is a generalized position. The only way to counter it would be to find a counter-example, that is, an absolute, unconditionally applicable, totally unambiguous and categorically assertible predicate, or a set of such predicates, without giving in to some dogma or having some unsuspected and unrecognized presupposition. The Jainas believe that this cannot be found. Hence *anekānta*.

Haribhadra and other Jaina philosophers have argued that we do not often realize, although we implicitly believe, that application of any predicate is guided by the consideration of some particular *sense* or criterion (excessive familiarity with the criterion or sense makes it almost invisible, so to say). This is not exactly the Fregean *Sinn*. In the Indian context, there is a well-entrenched tradition of talking about the ‘basis’ or the ‘criterion’ for the application of a predicate or a term. This can be called the *NIMITTA* theory (the ‘basis’ or the ‘criterion’ theory). A predicate can be truly applied to something x in virtue of a particular or a specific basis. The philosopher, when he emphasizes upon the particularity or specificity of such a basis, indirectly and implicitly commits himself to the possibility of denying that predicate (i.e., of applying the contradictory predicate) to the same thing, x , in virtue of a different basis or criterion. Haribhadra says, (p.44):

(The Opponent says:) The lack of existence in virtue of being a watery substance etc., belongs to a particular earth-substance, a pot; however, this is because the locus of non-existence of something cannot be a fiction. We admit, therefore, that it is the particularity of the earth-substance, the pot, that excludes the possibility of its being existent as a water-substance (this does not amount to admitting the co-presence of existence and non-existence in one locus).

(The Jaina answer:) Oh, how great is the confusion! By your own words, you have stated the *anekānta*, but you do not even recognize it yourself! Existence in virtue of being an earth-substance itself specifies its non-existence in virtue of being a water-

substance (you admit this). But you cannot admit that the thing has both natures, existence and non-existence. This is a strange illusion! No object (or thing) can be specified without recourse to the double nature belonging there, presence of its own existence in it, and absence from it, the existence of the other.

The general point of the Jainas seems to be this. Any predicate acts as a qualifier of the subject and also a distinguisher. That is, its application not only refers to or, in the old Millian sense, connotes, a property that is present in the subject, but also indicates another set of properties that are *not* present in it at all. In fact, insistence, that is, absolute insistence, on the presence of a property (an essential property) in a subject, lands us invariably into making a negative claim at the same time, absence of a contradictory property, or a set of contrary properties from the same subject-locus.

At this stage, the opponent might say, with some justification, that the conclusion reached after such a great deal of arguing tends to be trivial and banal. All that we have been persuaded to admit is this. Existence can be affirmed of a thing, x , in virtue of our fixing certain determinants in a certain way, and if the contrary or contradictory determinants are considered, existence may be denied of that very thing. This is parallel to assigning the truth-value to a proposition when all the indexical elements in it are made explicit or fixed, and being ready to accept the opposite evaluation if some of their indexicals are differently fixed or stated. Realists or believers in bi-valence (as Michael Dummett has put it) would rather have the proposition free from any ambiguities due to the indexical elements—an eternal sentence (of the kind W. V. Quine talked about) or a thought or *Gedanke* (of the Fregean kind)—such that it would have a value, truth or falsity—eternally fixed. However, the Jainas can reply the charge of banality, by putting forward the point that it is exactly such possibilities which are in doubt. In other words, they deny that we can without impunity talk about the possibility of clearly and intelligibly stating such propositions, such eternal sentences, or expressing such thoughts. We may assume that a proposition has an eternally fixed truth value, but it is not absolutely clear to us what kind of a proposition would that

be. For it remains open to us to discover some hidden, unsuspected determinants that would force us to withdraw our assent to it.

IV

A more serious criticism of Jainism is that if the senses are changed, and if the indexicals are differently interpreted, we get a new and different proposition entirely, and hence the result would not be affirmation and denial jointly of the same proposition. If this is conceded then the main doctrine of Jainism is lost. It is not truly an *anekānta*, which requires the *mixing* of the opposite values. This critique, serious as it is, can also be answered. This will lead us to a discussion of *saptabhaṅgī*.

The philosophical motivation of the Jainas is to emphasize not only the different facets of reality, not only the different *senses* in which a proposition can be true or false, not only the different determinants which make a proposition true or false, but also the contradictory and opposite sides of the *same* reality, the dual (contradictory) evaluation of the same proposition, and the challenge that it offers to the doctrine of bi-valence realism.

Let us talk in terms of truth predicates. The standard theory is bi-valence, i.e., two possible valuations of a given proposition, true or false. The first step taken by the Jainas in this context is to argue that there may be cases where joint application of these two predicates, true and false, would be possible. That is, given certain conditions, a proposition may be either (1) true or (2) false or (3) both true and false. If there are conditions under which it is true and there are other conditions under which it is false, then we can take both sets of these conditions together and say that given these, it is both. This does not mean, however, the rejection of the law of contradiction. If anything, this requires only non-compliance with another law of the bivalence logic, that of the excluded middle (the excluded third). It requires that between the values, true and false, there is no third alternative. The law of non-contradiction requires that a proposition and its contradictory be not true together. This keeps the possibility of their being false together open. Only the law of excluded middle can

eliminate such a possibility. This is at least one of the standard interpretations of the so-called two laws of bivalence logic. In a non-bivalence logic, in a multiple valued logic, the law of contradiction is not flouted, although it disregards the excluded third. The Jainas however disregards the mutual exclusion of yes and no, and argues, in addition, in favour of their combinability in answer to a given question. We have shown above how such opposite evaluations of the same proposition can be made compatible and hence combinable.

It is the sameness of the proposition or the propositional identity that is open to question here. If the change of determinants of point of view, of the indexical element, introduces a different proposition, the change of truth-values from 'true' to 'false' would not be significant enough. However, we may claim that the proposition, whatever that is, remains the same and that it has both values, 'true' and 'false' depending upon other considerations. This would still be a non-significant critique of the classical standard logic of bi-valence. The Jainas, therefore, go further, in order to be true to their doctrine of 'precarious' evaluation (*ākulavāda*), and posit a separate and non-composite value called '*avaktavya*' ('inexpressible'), side by side with 'true' and 'false'. I shall presently comment on the nature of this particular evaluation. First, let us note how the Jainas get their *seven* types (ways) of propositional evaluation. If we allow combinability of values, and if we have three basic evaluative predicates (truth-values?), 'true', 'false' and 'inexpressible' (corresponding to 'yes', 'no' and 'not expressible by such yes or no') then we have seven and only seven alternatives. (Writing '+', '-' and 'o' for three values respectively):

+, -, +-, o, o+, o-, o+-

For the proper mathematical symmetry, we may also write:-

+, -, o, +-, +o, -o, o+-

This is following the principle of combination of three basic elements, taking one at a time, two at a time and all three. The earlier arrangement reflects the historical development of the ideas. Hence in most texts, we find the earlier order.

The 'Inexpressible' as a truth-like predicate of a proposition has been explained as follows: It is definitely distinct from the predicate 'both true and false'. For the latter is only a combination of the first

two predicates. It is yielded by the idea of the combinability of values or even predicates that are mutually contradictory. Under certain interpretation, such a combined evaluation of the proposition may be allowed without constraining our intuitive and standard understanding of a contradiction and consistency. “It is raining” can be said to be both true and false under varying circumstances. However, the direct and unequivocal challenge to the notion of contradiction in standard logic comes when it is claimed that the same proposition is both true and false at the same time in the same sense. This is exactly accomplished by the introduction of the third value—‘Inexpressible,’ which can be rendered also as paradoxical. The support of such an interpretation of the ‘Inexpressible’ is well founded in the Jaina texts. Samantabhadra and Vidyānanda both explain the difference between the ‘true and false’ and the ‘Inexpressible’ as follows: The former consists in the *gradual* (*kramārpaṇa*) assigning of the truth-values, true and false, while the latter is joint and simultaneous (“in the same breath”) assigning of such contradictory values (cf. *sahārpaṇa*). One pat suggestion is that the predicate is called ‘Inexpressible’ because we are constrained to say in this case both ‘true’ and ‘false’ in the same breath. Something like ‘truefalse’ or ‘yes-no’ would have been better, but since these are only artificial words, and there are no natural-language-words to convey the concept that directly and unambiguously flouts non-contradiction, the Jainas have devised this new term ‘Inexpressible’ to do the job—a new evaluative predicate, non-composite in character, like ‘true’ and ‘false’.

This metalinguistic predicate ‘Inexpressible’ as a viable semantic concept has been acknowledged in the discussion of logical and semantical paradoxes in modern times. Now-a-days, some logicians even talk about “para-consistent” logics, where a value like “both true and false simultaneously” is acknowledged as being applicable to the paradoxical propositions such as “This sentence is false” or “I am lying”. The third value is alternatively called “paradoxical” or “indeterminate” (this is to be distinguished from “neither true nor false” which is also called “indeterminate”, see Priest 1979). With a little ingenuity, one can construct the matrices for Negation, Conjunction, Alternation etc. for the system. The Jainas however do not do it.

I shall now emphasize the significant difference between the philosophical motivations of the Jainas and those modern logicians who develop multiple-valued logics or the para-consistent logics. First, the logicians assign truth to the members of a certain set of propositions, falsity to another set and the third value, paradoxicality, to the problem set, i.e. the set of propositions that reveal the various versions of the liar paradox and other paradoxes. The Jainas on the other hand believe that each proposition, at least each metaphysical proposition, has the value “Inexpressible” (in addition to having other values, true, false etc.). That is, there is some interpretation or some point of view, under which the given proposition would be undecidable so far as its truth or falsity is concerned, and hence could be evaluated as “Inexpressible”. Likewise the same proposition, under another interpretation, could be evaluated ‘true’, and under still another interpretation, ‘false’.

Second, my reference to the non-bivalence logic or para-consistent logic, in connection with Jainism, should not be over-emphasized. I have already noted that Jaina logicians did not develop, unlike the modern logicians, truth matrices for Negation, Conjunction etc. It would be difficult, if not totally impossible, to find intuitive interpretations of such matrices, if one were to develop them in any case. The only point which I wanted to emphasize here, is to show that the Jaina notion of the ‘Inexpressible’, or notion of *anekānta* in the broader perspective, is not an unintelligible or an irrational concept. Although the usual law of non-contradiction, which is by itself a very nebulous and vague concept, is flouted, the Jainas do not land us into the realm of illogic or irrationality.

Last but not the least, the Jainas, in fact, set the limit to our usual understanding of the law of non-contradiction. There are so many determinants and indexicals for the successful application of any predicate that the proper and strict formulation of the ways by which this can be contradicted (or the contradictory predicate can be applied to the same subject) will always outrun the linguistic devices at our disposal. The point may be stated in another way. The notion of human rationality is not fully exhausted by our comprehension of, and the insistence upon, the law of non-contradiction. Rational understanding

is possible of the Jaina position in metaphysics. In fact, one can say that the Jaina *anekānta* is a meta-metaphysical position, since it considers all metaphysical positions to be spoiled by the inherent paradoxicality of our intellect. Thus, it is a position about the metaphysical positions of other schools. It is, therefore, not surprising that they were concerned with the evaluation of propositions, with the general principle of such evaluation. In this way, their view rightly impinged upon the notions of semantics and problems with semantical paradoxes. And above all, the Jainas were non-dogmatic, although they were dogmatic about non-dogmatism. Their main argument was intended to show the multi-faceted nature of reality as well as its ever elusive character such that whatever is revealed to any observer at any given point of time and at any given place, would be only partially and conditionally right, ready to be falsified by a different revelation to a different observer at a different place and time. The Jainas think that in our theoretical search for understanding reality, this point can hardly be overstated.

CHAPTER 2

THE JAINA THEORY OF ANEKĀNTA

K.C. Bhattacharya

Analysis

(1) Jaina Realism not only asserts a plurality of determinate truths but takes each truth to be an indetermination of alternative truths. (2) Sometimes an ultimate plurality of truths has been taken as one truth in the sense that there is one cognition of the plurality. The objectivistic equivalent of this unity of cognition is the bare togetherness of the facts known. (3) This category of 'togetherness' is the fundamental category of realism but it is only a name for quite different aspects of truth which do not make a unity in any sense. (4-5) Taking the distinction between 'subjective' knowing and 'objective' knowing what precisely is the counterpart of the knowledge of this distinction? Now, since togetherness or bare distinction is the form of objectivity, the counterpart in question must be 'distinction from distinction'. (6) This distinction from distinction has been taken as a kind of identity and the problem arises as to the relation between this identity and distinction in the objective. The Hegelian subordinates distinction to identity; Nyāya assigns priority to distinction. But the Jaina theory admits identity as indeterminate non-distinction and takes the two relations to be co-ordinate.

(7-8) The Hegelian subordinates distinction to identity in the sense that the dialectical movement ends in an absolute identity and not in an absolute distinction. But then this identity comprises all differences and is thus in the relation of identity with the differences. Identity

would thus be at once a relation and a term. (9-10) To the Hegelian, identity as relation is nothing but mutual implication. But then the Identity of the Absolute synthesis with the retained being of the distinction within it is not identity as mutual implication. Apparently then the Hegelian has to admit two utterly different kinds of identity which cannot be reduced to further identity. This, however, is a contradiction. (11-14) There is a similar contradiction in the Nyāya view. We have synthetic identity of positives in this system in the form of *samavāya*. But this relation is a distinct existent only by self-identity. As a fact, it is only unrelated and cannot be even said to be definitely different from its terms. Relation, then, as an unrelated term is not even determinate and it is a contradiction to speak of it as self-related or unrelated and yet as determinate. (15-17) In the case of identity-in-difference then, the subordination of either relation to the other seems to lead to a contradiction. The relations of identity and difference may, however, be taken to be co-ordinate. But this would be no solution, for, on analysis it would be found that on this view, the identity of a determinate thing disappears and gives place to a dualism of the abstraction—thinghood and particularity.

(18) The only way of escape lies in taking the determinate thing to be 'simply given' i.e., to be existing as a distinct apart from distinguishing. This may be justified by the circumstance that the distinction between the subjective and the objective is itself a known object. But then distinction from the objective, taken as itself objective, implies that knowing is known as distinct from the known i.e., as *unknown*. This brings up the conception of the objective indefinite or the 'definite indefinite'. (19-22) What now is the relation indicated by the phrase 'definite indefinite'? According to the realistic postulate, the 'definite indefinite' is a fact with two elements incompatible in thought. The factual equivalent of this incompatibility would be no-relation. Here then we have togetherness of unrelated or undifferenced elements. In the case of the given definite, likewise, we have the definite definite or differenced togetherness. We have thus two modes of togetherness—differenced and undifferenced—which the Jaina calls *kramārpaṇa* and *sahārpaṇa* respectively.

(23-24) The different basal categories of objectivity corresponding to different forms of realism answer to the different aspects of the act of knowing. These categories are three in number, viz., distinction, distinction from distinction as other than distinction and the indetermination of the two. Ordinary realism is based on the first category. There are forms of realism that admit some kind of identity as distinct from distinction; and finally Jaina realism admits both in the form of indetermination. (25-30) The development of the Jaina conception of indetermination into seven alternative modes of truth analysed and assessed.

The Jaina Theory of Anekānta

1. The Jaina theory of *anekānta* or the manifoldness of truth is a form of realism which not only asserts a plurality of determinate truths but also takes each truth to be an indetermination of alternative truths. It is interesting as suggesting a criticism of present-day realism and indicating a direction in which its logic might be developed. It is proposed in the present paper to discuss the conception of a plurality of determinate truths to which ordinary realism appears to be committed and to show the necessity of an indeterministic extension such as is presented by the Jaina theory.

2. The truth that we actually know is a plurality of truths and philosophy, rightly or wrongly, sets itself the problem of finding the *one* truth which either denies or in some sense comprises the plurality. Whatever differences there have been as to the actual conception of the truth, the rejection of the faith that there is *one* truth has generally been taken to argue a scepticism about the many truths that we claim to know. Sometimes, however, an ultimate plurality of truths has itself been taken as the *one* truth and the apparent contradiction has been sought to be avoided by taking it to mean only that there is one *cognition* of the plurality. Elsewhere the cognition of a fact is a further fact but here the addition of cognition as a fact to plurality as a fact yields us nothing but the plurality. The realistic or objectivistic equivalent of the unity of a cognitive act is the bare togetherness of the facts known; and the togetherness of cognition as a fact with the fact cognised is the exemplar of this relation.

3. The difficulty is about the objectivity of this bare togetherness. When two objects other than knowing are known together, they are ordinarily taken to be in some kind of whole, specific relation or unity. This cannot be said of object and its cognition as together. Objects also may, however, be barely together: the relation of a whole to its elements, of a relation to its terms or of a unity to its factors is nothing more specific than togetherness. This then is the fundamental category of realism; and whole, relation or unity would be understood as particular cases of it. We propose to show on the lines of the Jaina theory that this category is itself manifold, being only a name for fundamentally different aspects of truth which cannot be subsumed under a universal and do not make a unity in any sense. Togetherness, as ordinarily understood by the realist, means distinction of determinate positive truths. The Jaina category might be formulated as distinction from distinction which, as will be shown, has a definite range of alternative values, only one of which answers to the distinction or togetherness of the modern realist.

4. Prima facie there is a difference between the relation of a composite fact with its components and the relation of the components themselves. We may overlook for the present the different forms of the composite—whole, relation or unity—which imply varying relations to the components and provisionally admit composite truth as a single entity. Now there is no difference between the togetherness of any one component with the rest and that of any other with the rest: the components in their various combinations are together in exactly the same sense. Taking, however, the composite on the one hand with the components on the other, we find that the two sides can be only thought alternately: while one side is thought by itself, the other can be thought only in reference to it; if the components are taken to be given, the composite can be understood as only *their* plurality; and if the composite is given as one, the components are known as only *its* analysis. Each side can be given by itself as objective and so it is not a cause of mere correlative *thoughts*. Neither side need be thought in reference to the other; but while one is thought as distinct by itself, the other has to be thought as only together with or distinct from it. We have in fact a correlation here between ‘distinct in itself’

and 'distinct from the other', between given position and what is sometimes called the negation of negation.

5. Is the necessity of thinking something *as other than its other* merely subjective? It would appear to be objective in the same sense and on the same grounds as the togetherness or bare distinction of positives admitted by the realist. Realism objectifies the subjective because it is *known* and is not simply transcendental. The question may be asked, is the distinction of subject and object, of knowing and the known, both taken to be facts—'enjoyed' and 'contemplated' respectively, to use Professor Alexander's phrase—a fact of the former or of the latter category subjective or objective? Now just as knowing is known, the absolute difference of the two forms of knowing—enjoying and contemplating is also known; and if the unity of the knowing act be taken to correspond to objective togetherness, this absolute difference must also be taken to have its objective counterpart. Togetherness or bare distinction is the form of objectivity in general. The counterpart then of the difference of 'subjective' knowing or 'enjoying' from objective knowing or 'contemplating' would be distinction from objectivity i.e., from distinction. Thus both distinction and distinction from distinction should be taken by the realist as objective. These two, however, are not ordinarily distinguished: both are called by the same name—togetherness.

6. If however, as shown, these two forms of togetherness are fundamentally different, what is their further relation? Now distinction from distinction has sometimes been taken as a determinate relation, as identity or some unique relation, like 'characterising' or adjectivity, which also for our present purpose we may call a peculiar form of identity. The problem is accordingly about the relation of identity and distinction in the objective. We may consider two forms of identity as presented by the Hegelian and the Nyāya systems respectively. The Nyāya is avowedly a realistic system and the Hegelian theory may also in some sense be taken to be realistic. Realism proper, as we conceive it, has no place for the relation of identity in the objective except in a factitious sense, although it should—what it ordinarily does not—admit distinction from distinction as a specific category. The above two theories, however, admit both identity and distinction though they

do not stress them in the same way. The Hegelian subordinates distinction to identity while the Nyāya assigns priority to distinction. The Jaina theory admits identity only in the sense of indeterminate non-distinction; and it takes the two relations to be co-ordinate without subordinating any one to the other.

7. In what sense does the Hegelian subordinate distinction to identity? No doubt he emphasises distinction to distinguish his concrete identity from abstract or formal identity but he does not admit—what a realist would admit—that an object can be distinct in itself and need not be in a comprising identity. The dialectic movement ends in an absolute identity, not in an absolute distinction. The thesis and antithesis at any stage are said to be reduced to ‘ideality’ in the synthesis, to be not only contained but also transformed by it. The identity progresses in concreteness in the sense that it dissolves in itself a deeper and deeper difference; but the absolute in the last resort is taken as the identity of the deepest differences, not as incommensurable bifurcations of an identity.

8. What, however, is this relation of *subordination* of distinction to identity? Distinction is in some sense negated by the identity; it is said to be dissolved or reduced to ‘ideality’ in the identity. Not that it is negated in the sense an illusory percept is said to be negated by a true percept: difference or the rich variety of the universe is not an illusion. If then difference still retains some kind of being, what is the name of the relation between this being and the being of the identity? Should it be called identity again, as apparently the Hegelian would call it? Identity then would occupy two positions: the synthesis or the composite, as we may call it, is the identity of the different factors and is also identical *with* them, being thus at once a relation and a term.

9. The Hegelian ordinarily understands identity as mutual implication or correlation. If A and B imply one another, each being wholly intelligible by the other, they are said to be identical. In this sense a synthesis would be taken as the identity of its factors. Is the identity of the synthesis *with* the retained being of the distinction within it also to be understood in the sense of mutual implication? The two implications that make up mutual implication must be envisaged as

substantially different truths and must not be a purposeless repetition of each other in different verbal order only. If a synthesis and its factors be mutually implicative, the synthesis implying the factors must mean some thing concretely different from the factors implying the synthesis. It cannot mean simply that the factors are *presupposed* by the unity; for that means substantially the same thing as that the factors presuppose the unity. The two sides are but the verbal explications of the same fact viz., the thought of identity-in-difference or synthesis. Synthesis³ implying the factors should mean then that the unity must break out *actually* into difference. In the last resort it will amount to saying that the Absolute should be *experienced*, not merely *thought*, as necessarily reproducing itself in actuality. But is the actual universe *experienced* as necessary? It is only thought to be necessary; and accordingly the implication by the Absolute of actual differences—the necessity of its self-reproduction—is not distinct as a substantial truth from the mere *presupposition* of the Absolute by the universe.

10. The identity then of a synthesis with the retained being of the distinction within it is not an identity in the sense of mutual implication. If the relation be still called identity, it must be taken as simply intuited, as all identity is taken to be in the Nyāya. Apparently then the Hegelian, while subordinating distinction to identity, has to admit two utterly different kinds of identity, corresponding to the difference of thought and intuition, which cannot be reduced to further identity. This, however, is a contradiction.

11. A similar contradiction may be brought out in the Nyāya view. Here, however, we start with the priority of distinction to identity and we have to end, as will appear presently, by admitting an identity that is not distinct from anything at all. Confining ourselves to positives, we have synthetic identity of positives in this system in the form of *Samavāya* or the relation of inherence. Without going into the subtle technicalities of the Nyāya in this connection, we may indicate that *Samavāya* is understood by it as the relation of attribute to its substratum and of a whole to its part. It is a relation of distinct objects and is regarded as what is presupposed by every other relation of existents. It is not a mere formal relation of identity: the distinction of the terms of this relation is taken to be real and to be in no sense

superseded by it. Hence it is not *called* identity in this theory but it is pointed out that one term of the relation (attribute or whole) exists inseparably from the other (substratum or part), the inseparability being eternal although no term may be infinite or permanent. This eternal inseparability may accordingly be regarded as a form of concrete identity.

12. Now this identity is taken as knowable by perception, unlike the implicational identity of Hegel which is supposed to be known only by necessary thought. As a percept it is a distinct among distincts, not as in the Hegelian theory comprehensive of the distincts. Ultimately there are objects like the simple atoms distinct in themselves and not inhering in anything beyond them. Other objects like attributes and wholes exist as distinct but inseparable from their substrata. Finally, the relation *samavāya* or this concrete identity is also a distinct object. Thus priority is assigned, as has been pointed out, in this system to distinction.

13. The relation of *Samavāya* implies three grades of distincts—objects that must be in some substratum, the substrata, and the relation itself. The question may be asked if relation is a distinct being in the sense in which the objects of the other two grades are distinct. These objects are distinct as the terms of the relation: objects which do not inhere in anything are still determinate as having attributes and wholes inhering in them. Not that the knowledge of a substance presupposes the knowledge of what inheres in it: it is known as distinct prior to the analysis. But in point of being, every object except relation must either have something inhering in it or itself inhere in something else or be in both these situations. Relation is not itself related to anything beyond, for then there would be a *regressus ad infinitum*. It is a distinct existent only by self-identity or *svasamavāya*.

14. Self-identity, however, is not a relation of distincts at all. Granting—what is not admitted by all—that *Samavāya* is known by perception, this self-identity or *Sva-samavāya* is not a perceptible fact but is only an artificial thought-content. ‘Self-related’ means unrelated in the objective. *Samavāya* is certainly known along with its terms but as a fact it is only unrelated and cannot be even said to be definitely different from its terms. Can it then be determinate in itself? It may

indeed be conceded that the determinateness of a related term does not in point of being depend on its relations: the relation of a term *presupposes* an intrinsic determination in the term. But that need not mean that the term is itself unrelated and has relation only added to it. In point of being the relation of *samavāya* is eternal and so the related term is never unrelated, though as a term it is distinguishable from the relation. Relation then as an unrelated term is not even determinate and it is a contradiction to speak of it as self-related or unrelated and yet as determinate.

15. In the two conceptions of identity-in-difference above considered, the subordination of either relation to the other appears to lead to a contradiction. Shall we then take the relations to be merely co-ordinate? We may take one type of such a view as presented by W. E. Johnson (*Logic*, Vol. I. Chapter vii). In the last two views, a term A can be both identical with and other than B. The present view denies it and keeps to the common-sense principle that distincts cannot be also non-distinct. Yet identity as a relation is admitted: a term X, viewed in connexion with the distincts A and B, would be said to be identical as against the distinction of A and B. Identity of X here practically means its self-identity: it is not merely the thing X but a relation in reference to the distinction. Identity of X thus implies a distinction outside X, viz., between A and B, not any distinction or plurality within itself.

16. The so-called mutual implication of the identity and distinction of two terms M and N means, according to this view, their identity *in one respect a* and their distinction in another *b*; the two relations are presented together, each being known independently. It amounts to saying that M and N are in the two relations the *same* two terms only in a factitious sense. They are two pairs of terms—*Ma*, *Na* and *Mb*, *Nb*—presented together; and the identity of *Ma*, *Na*, means that they are only different symbols of P.

17. But what does 'symbol of P' mean, it may be asked. Can we simply say that *Ma*, *Na*, are P as in connexion with i.e., as distinct from and together with *Mb*, *Nb*, respectively? Apparently P *has* to be thought in two positions. The difference of symbols is not accidentally together with the identity P: it cannot be got rid of and cannot in the last resort

be taken to be merely outside the identity, like the difference of Mb, Nb. In other words, a new relation—other than the mere co-ordinateness of distincts has to be admitted between P and its ultimate symbols or thought-positions. So far as the identity of P can be distinguished from this relation, it is only P-ness and not P; and the relation itself is but the particularity of P. The identity of a determinate thing then disappears and gives place to a dualism of the abstractions—thinghood and the particularity.

18. Ordinary realism starts with the determinate thing and would resist this analysis as artificial. But the alternative would appear to be to take the determinate thing as simply given, as implying no identity and to reject self-identity as only a meaningless phrase. What precisely is meant by 'simply given'? It can only mean 'independent of all particularising or symbolising thought'. It is to assume that the distinct exists apart from distinguishing. If this is justified simply by the circumstance that the distinction between the subjective and the objective is itself a known object, we come back to the old difficulty about distinction within the objective and distinction from the objective. Distinction from the objective, taken as itself objective, implies that knowing is known as distinct from the known i.e., *as unknown*. If this is not a contradiction, knowing can only be understood as the *indefinite* that is known (i.e., is definite or objective) *as the indefinite*. The realistic equivalent of the relation of object and subject then is the relation of the definite and indefinite.

19. The objective indefinite has been admitted by some logicians with a realistic tendency, e.g., by Hobhouse in his *Theory of Knowledge*. The content of simple apprehension which to him is the standard fact is at once definite and indefinite. What is apprehended is a definite with an indefinite background. The indefinite as apprehended is so far definite but it is definite *as* indefinite, not as superseding the indefinite. Yet to Hobhouse there is knowledge only so far as the content is defined by abstraction. The knowledge of the indefinite as such is not regarded as necessitating any modification of the forms of definite knowledge. The difference of the definite and the indefinite is not understood as other than the difference between two definites. There is the other obscure relation approximating to adjectivity or

identity indicated by the phrase 'definite indefinite'. But this relation, if not denied, is not considered by him at all. The Jaina recognises both these relations explicitly and obtains from their contrast certain other forms of truth, simpler and more complex.

20. The obscure relation in the content 'definite indefinite' requires elucidation. If the indefinite is definite *as such*, is this definiteness an objective character? To the realist, thought only discovers but does not constitute the object. Bare position corresponding to the simple positing act of thinking must then be objective. The indefinite is thought as *indefinite* and by the same logic the indefiniteness is also objective. The 'definite indefinite' is thus a fact but the two elements of it are incompatible in thought. The factual equivalent of this incompatibility would be disconnexion or *no-relation*. The two elements cannot be said to be related objectively even in the way of distinction. Yet as the elements have to be thought together, their togetherness is to be admitted as objective in the same abstract sense. Here then we have *togetherness of unrelated or undifferenced elements*. We cannot deny a plurality nor can we affirm a definite distinction: the relation is a magical alternation. This would be the Jaina equivalent of the relation of identity. We may call it non-difference, distinction from distinction or indeterminate distinction.

21. If the given indefinite is definite *as indefinite*, the given definite is definite *as definite*. The given definite thus turns out to be a manifold in contrast with the given indefinite. If the adjective 'definite' in 'definite indefinite' be objective, it is also objective in 'definite definite' and distinguishable from the substantive 'definite'. We use the terms adjective and substantive only in a provisional way. The adjectival definite is objective thought-position and the substantive definite as contrasted with it is objective given-ness or existence in general. As they are both distinct, their relation is definite distinction or differenced togetherness. Thus we have two modes of togetherness—differenced and undifferenced. The Jaina calls them *kramārpaṇa* and *sahārpaṇa* respectively—consecutive presentation and co-presentation, as they might be translated. To him the indeterminism or manifoldness of truth (*anekānta*) presents itself primarily in these two forms of difference and non-difference.

22. The two definites in the phrase 'definite definite' mean thought-position and given-ness. They answer precisely to the elements of the determinate existent—viz., particularity and thinghood—which we obtained from the co-ordinateness of identity and distinction. In order to avoid the apparently artificial analysis, the realist takes the determinate existent as merely given. It is indeed given but so is the indefinite also given and the contrast of the two brings out the circumstance that the determinate existent is manifold—the very analysis that was sought to be avoided. The determinate existent then implies the distinct elements and is at the same time distinct from them.

23. Such is the logical predicament that is presented everywhere in the Jaina theory. It may be generalised as a principle: the distinction from distinction is other than mere distinction and yet asserts the distinction. It is just the realistic equivalent of the simple statement that the subject is distinct from the object and *knows* this distinction, or as it may be put more explicitly, that the knowing of knowing is the knowing of knowing *as referring to the object*. As we have already suggested, the different basal categories of objectivity with which the different forms of realism are bound up answer to the different aspects of the act of knowing. If knowing is a unity, the known is a plurality, the objective category being distinction or togetherness. If knowing is itself a duality of 'contemplating' and 'enjoying', the known or the contemplated is a duality of distinction and distinction from distinction. If finally knowledge is *of* the object, *refers to* the known, the known must present an equivalent of this *of-relation* or *reference*.

24. What is this *of-relation*? It is the relation of knowing and its content, the knowing or assertive function which is sometimes identified with the function of meaning. It is a relation, not of two contents, but of content and no-content; of being and no-being—something that is neither the one nor the other and is intelligible only by the concept of *freedom that can neither be said to be nor not to be*. This freedom, stripped of its subjective associations, is but the category of indetermination. Distinction and identity in fact—or as we call them, differenced togetherness and undifferenced togetherness (of particularity and thinghood)—are themselves related in the way of indetermination or

alternation: particularity and thinghood are in *each* relation without being in the other relation *at the same time*. Identity is distinct from distinction and yet implies it, i.e., is in alternation with it. There are thus three basal categories—viz., distinction, distinction from distinction as other than distinction, and the indetermination of the two. Ordinary realism is based on the first category; there are forms of realism that admit some kind of definite identity as distinct from distinction; and finally, Jaina realism admits both in the form of indetermination, the identity being interpreted as indefinite.

25. The Jaina develops this category of indetermination into seven alternative modes of truth. The indetermination is ultimately of the definite and indefinite. Now, this yields two relations—definite distinction between them and indefinite distinction. But indefinite distinction between them is to our knowledge nothing other than the indefinite as a term of it: we do not know more of the indefinite than that it is indefinite. The most complex mode of truth then that we know is the definite distinction between the definite and the indefinite, or as we put it more explicitly, between the definite-definite and the definite-indefinite. Every other aspect of truth, as we shall see presently, is implied by it as distinct from and alternative with it.

26. Now the definiteness of the given indefinite, as has been shown already, though objective, sits lightly on the indefinite and is a detachable adjective. The conception of detachable definiteness being thus obtained, the given definite turns out to be a manifold, to be a togetherness or distinction of two definites—the detachable definite, on the one hand, or particular position which has no reference to existence or non-existence, and given-ness or existence in general, on the other, which as contrasted with the particular i.e., as characterless may be called its negation. No other negation is admitted by the Jaina to be objective: what is called absolute negation—one form of which is the contradictory—the negation of what it is not possible to affirm at all is to be rejected as not objective, as no truth at all. The definite-definite or the determinate existent may then be said both to be and not to be: particularity or pure position is its being and existence in general is its negation. There is no contradiction if we bear in mind that the being of pure position is not given existence

but only what must be thought, what is objective in this sense. The same logic is sometimes expressed by saying that a determinate existent *A* is in one respect and *is not* in another respect. This does not simply mean that *A* is *A* and is not *B*: it means that existent *A*, as existence universal, is distinct from its particularity.

27. The determinate existent is, in the sense explained, being and negation as distinguishably together, together by what the Jaina calls *kramārpaṇa*. The given indefinite—the ‘unspeakable’ or *avaktavya* as it has been called—as distinct from the definite existent, presents something other than this ‘consecutive togetherness’: it implies *sahārpaṇa* or co-presentation which amounts to non-distinction or indeterminate distinction of being and negation in the above sense. It is objective as given: it cannot be said to be *not* a particular position nor to be *non-existent*. At the same time it is not the definite distinction of position and existence; it represents a category by itself. The common-sense principle implied in its recognition is that what is given cannot be rejected simply because it is not expressible by a single positive concept. A truth has to be admitted if it cannot be got rid of even if it is not understood.

28. So far then we have obtained four modes of truth—being, negation, their distinction and their non-distinction—all implied by the distinction between the definite given and the indefinite given. Now this distinction is itself a mode of truth: and as the definite given is taken to be being and negation or particularity and existence together, the indefinite may be considered as together with or distinct from each of these elements taken singly. It may be taken *to be* a particular i.e., to be together with position, and it may be taken to be many undistinguishable negations, to be the universal—existence—as itself a confusion of the negations of many particulars, as not-*A*, not-*B*, not-*C* . . . indefinitely together. Thus we have altogether seven modes of truth—*bhaṅgas* as they have been called— viz., particular position or being, its negation or the universal—existence, position and negation as distinguishably together or the determinate existent, these as indistinguishably together or the indefinite, this indefinite as itself a being or particular position, as many negations together, and finally as distinct from the determinate existent. If there be an

eighth mode, it would be non-distinction of the definite and indefinite, which however is but the indefinite, nothing more specific than the fourth mode.

29. The value of these modes of truth for logic cannot be fully discussed within the limits of this paper. We may conclude by pointing out that these modes of truth are not merely *many* truths but *alternative* truths. The last mode may be regarded as implying the other modes but is not therefore in any sense a comprising unity. What is implied by a mode is a different mode. The implying relation in objective terms is but indetermination. The implying mode and the implied mode are at once distinct and indefinitely non-distinct. Truth as an indetermination or alternation of truths is but manifold possibility. Each mode of truth as alternative with the others is a *possible* though it has to be taken as objective.

30. There is the conception of indeterministic will to which there are many possibles, any of which can be really chosen by it. Here we have already the notion of manifold possibility as objective to the will. But the logic of this notion has not been sufficiently investigated, though the relations of objective possibles cannot be adequately expressed by the categories of ordinary logic. The Jaina theory elaborates a logic of indetermination not in reference to the will—but in reference to the knowing, though it is a pragmatist theory in some sense. As a realist, the Jaina holds that truth is not constituted by willing, though he admits that the knowledge of truth has a necessary reference to willing. His theory of indeterministic truth is not a form of scepticism. It represents, not doubt, but toleration of many modes of truth. The faith in one truth or even in a plurality of truths, each simply given as determinate, would be rejected by it as a species of intolerance. What is presented and cannot be got rid of has to be accepted as truth even though it is not definitely thinkable or is thinkable in *alternative* definite modes.

CHAPTER 3

A STUDY OF SYĀDVĀDA

(With special reference to *Syādvādamāñjarī*)

Atsushi Uno

The theory of *syādvāda* (literally ‘the doctrine of somehow’) is generally understood as synonymous with *anekānta-vāda* meaning non-absolutism, or rather, positive relativity. *Syādvāda* is a fundamental principle underlying the Jaina philosophy and sometimes denotes nothing but the whole scope of Jaina philosophy. Though its original idea might be traced back to Mahāvira and indeed there occur very often, in the Jaina *Āgama* texts, polemical expressions qualified with the term ‘*siyā*’, yet these expressions are not made up of seven formulae (*sapta-bhaṅga*) as are elucidated in later Jaina works. It is very likely that a set of seven formulae called *saptabhaṅgī* is of later invention, and its formal and substantive systematization has been brought about in gradual course of time.

However, the great concern here centres about what position the *syādvāda* does occupy in the field of Jaina logic, that has been traditionally understood to consist of *pramāṇa* and *naya*. On this point as well as on the definition of *syādvāda*, there is considerable divergence of opinion, and no such a uniform interpretation is available as is admitted unanimously by all the Jaina works. Shortly speaking, the notion of *syādvāda* comprises various significant problems in that it is intelligible only on the basis of multiformity. It is probably by Vācīdeva Sūri in the eleventh century that *syādvāda* was given a certain distinct position as a subject matter of Jaina epistemology and logic.

There remains much scope to be scrutinized whether Vādideva's interpretation was accepted almost intact by his successors. Though it is an undeniable fact that non-Jaina polemical works, almost without exception, give an intentional misinterpretation to the Jaina doctrine, there are found very often some misleading elucidations about the *syādvāda* in question even among modern Indologists. Such being the case, this article is intended for giving an outlined account of the theory of *syādvāda*, on the basis of a Jaina work *Syādvādamañjarī* of Malliṣeṇa, though paying little regard to its historical development.

Nevertheless, prior to taking up the question at issue, it might be advisable to give a brief account of various uses of *syādvāda* in chronological order of important Jaina logicians.

I

1. Mahāvira mentions, in Jaina *Āgama* texts, two kinds of knowledge or its means viz., *pramāṇa* and *naya*, but not a single word of *syādvāda* (Pkt. *siyā-vāya*). However, there occur in them often enough propositions qualified by '*siyā*', in reply to questions like 'Is the world eternal or transitory?'

*paramāṇu-poggale naṃ bhante eyati veyati jāva taṃ bhāvaṃ pariṇamati?/
siya eyati veyati jāva pariṇamati, siya no eyati jāva no pariṇamati/ (Viāhap.
V.7)¹*

And again, explaining to the effect that any entity can be expressed by manifold way in accordance as it has different location, time and mode etc., he mentions 'in some respect, it can be expressed as such and such' (*tti vattavvaṃ siyā*). And in case '*siyā*' is not in use, '*avattavvaṃ*' (inexpressible) is mentioned, but it has not a seven-fold formula.²

2. Umāsvāti describes in his *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra* 1.5 that 'Knowledge [of seven categories] is obtainable by means of *pramāṇa* and *naya*

1. Cf. *Nyāyāvatāravārttikavṛtti*, ed. by Dalsukh Malvania, Singhi Jain Series No. 20, Bombay 1949, Intr. pp.35-50.

2. Cf. Walther Schubring: *Die Lehre der Jainas*, Berlin u. Leibzig 1935, ss.1078.

(*pramāṇa-nayair adhigamah*)', but no term like *syādvāda* is mentioned in it. Some scholars suggest that the notion of *syādvāda* is implicitly shown in the aphorism V.32 'Because [the contradictory characteristics] are established from primary as well as secondary points of view (*arpitānarpita-siddheḥ*)'. Yet, the aphorism as such only indicates the manifold nature or point of view attributed to an entity, even according to most of the commentaries thereof, and it is quite unlikely that the author had in mind the notion of *syādvāda* composed of seven formulae.

3. Kundakunda (Dig. 3-4th cent. A.D.) does not mention the term *syādvāda* in any of his works, but the following two verses explicitly show the sevenfold formula.

*siya atthi ṇatthi ubhayam avattavvam puṇo ya tattidayam/davvam khu
sattabhamgam ādesa-vaseṇa sambhavadi* //(Pancatthikāyasāra I.14) *Atthi
tti ya ṇatthi tti ya bhavadi avattavvam idi puṇo davvam/pajjāyeṇa du
keṇa vi tad-ubhayam ādittham añṇam vā* //(Pavayaṇasāra II.23).

4. Siddhasena Divākara (Śvet. 6-7 cent.) describes in his *Nyāyāvatāra* as follows: 'Object of Omniscient knowledge is composed of infinite attributes, while that of *naya* (knowledge based on particular standpoint) consists of a single aspect. And since the *naya*, rolling on the course of the scriptural knowledge (*śruta*), determines the partial aspect of object, the knowledge which ascertains the whole aspect of object is called *syādvāda-śruta*.' (§29,30) Thus two kinds of *śruta* are accepted; one is *syādvāda*, and the other is *naya*. Though it is not clear, only from the above verses, whether the author had in mind three varieties of *śruta* as are mentioned in Siddhasena Gaṇi's commentary, viz. *mithyā-śruta* (=durnaya), *naya-śruta* and *syādvāda-śruta*, yet it might be safely concluded that such division appears only after Akalaṅka Deva. Siddhasena Divākara was, to the writer's knowledge, the first to use the term '*syādvāda*', and it is understood by him to be a specific means to comprehend an object, together with *naya*, both being dependent on verbal expression.

5. Samantabhadra (Dig. c. 600 A.D.) repeats in his *Āptamīmāṃsā* consisting of 115 stanzas, a stanza to the following effect: 'Even if those who hate the system of *syādvāda* maintain the absolute "inexpressibility" in saying

that the both (being and non-being) are not identical because of contradiction, it can be concluded that such an argument as “inexpressibility” is not here unutterable. (§13, 32, 55, 70, 74, 77, 82, 90, 94, 97)’ He further proceeds to elucidate it as follows: ‘*Syādvāda* is the assertion of an entity by some way or other (*kimvṛtta-cit=katham-cit*) by discarding “absolutism in every respect” (*sarvathaikānta*). It depends on seven-fold formula (*sapta-bhaṅga*) and view-point (*naya*), and ascertains what is to be taken and what is to be rejected. (§104) And right knowledge (*pramāṇa*) or the knowledge of reality is of two kinds; one manifests the whole aspect of an object simultaneously, and the other does successively: thus it is adorned with *syādvāda* and *naya*. (§101) *Syādvāda* and omniscient knowledge (*kevala-jñāna*) manifest the whole truth, but the distinction between the two lies in its intuitive and non-intuitive natures respectively. And any knowledge other than these two is false knowledge. (§105)’ He further explains as follows: Even the absolute view (*ekānta*) is of two kinds; one is false absolutism (*mithyaikānta*) which accepts one particular aspect only, totally discarding other aspects, while the other is true absolutism (*samyag-ekānta*) which holds fast to one aspect, without rejecting the other, each representing [*su-*]*naya* and *durnaya* respectively. The former is, to a certain extent, a true knowledge so long as it conveys the true nature of an object. And finally the right knowledge (*pramāṇa*) or its expression is accepted as valid, which is the view of non-absolutism or *anekānta-vāda* qualified by the term ‘*syāt*’. (§108, 112)

6. Akalaṅka Deva (Dig. 720-780? A.D.), well-known for his *Akalaṅka-nyāya*, undoubtedly occupies the highest place in the Jaina logical literature, as a logician and doughty controversialist against opponent schools. It may be said without exaggeration that he was the first to systematize the Jaina logic and philosophy, exerting the greatest influence on later Jaina literature on that line. He divides the forms of manifestation or of function of *śruta* (verbal and scriptural knowledge) into three groups: *durnaya*, *naya* and *syādvāda*. Out of them, *naya* is interpreted as incomplete and partial expression (*vikalādeśa*), and *syādvāda* as complete expression (*sakalādeśa*). (*Laghūyastraya* §30, 42, 43, 51, 62, 69) It is briefly stated that *syādvāda* consists of seven

formulae, being considered from two stand-points viz. affirmation and negation. (*Nyāyaviniścaya* §47) And three kinds of scriptural knowledge (*śruta*) are put forward as follows: i) that which is derived from one's own perception according to other's indication (*pratyakṣa-nimittaka*), ii) that which is derived from one's own reasoning and not from other's indication (*anumāna-nimittaka*), and iii) that which is produced by scripture (*āgama-nimittaka*). (*Pramāṇasaṃgraha* 1.1, p.97)³ On the other hand, Vādideva and others define *āgama* (or *śruta*) as cognition derived from words of reliable person (*āpta-vacana*), and thus Akalaṅka's interpretation seems more reasonable in covering wider range of *śruta* or *āgama*. Furthermore he puts forward eight kinds of apparent fallacies (*dūṣaṇa, doṣa*) and the refutation thereof, which will be later dealt with. (*Pramāṇasaṃgraha* III. 24)

In passing, Māṇikyanandin (Dig. c. 800 A.D.) wrote *Parīkṣāmukha-sūtra*, the first systematic compendium of Jaina logic, containing 207 *sūtras*, based on Akalaṅka's works like *Nyāyaviniścaya* etc., but he does not refer to *syādvāda* in it at all. It is also to be added here that Vidyānandin (Dig. c. 900? A.D.) and Prabhācandra (Dig. 980-1065 A.D.) made a great contribution to the development of later Jaina logic, by their logical treatises as well as commentaries on Akalaṅka's works.

7. Haribhadra (Śvet. First half of the 9th cent. A.D.) mentions, in his *Anekānta-jayapatākā* and autocommentary, the following terms synonymous with *syādvāda*: *anekānta-vāda, saṃhāra-vāda, sarva-vastu-śabala-vāda, ākula-vāda, tad-atad-vāda, vibhajya-vāda* (Pkt. *vibhajja-vāya*) etc.

8. Hemacandra (Śvet. 1089-1172 A.D.), well-known for his epithet Kalikāla-sarvajña, gives no detailed account of *syādvāda* in his uncompleted work *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*. In his *Anyayogavyavaccheda-dvātrīṃśikā* (or otherwise called *Vitarāgastuti*),⁴ he divides the knowledge into three: *pramāṇa, naya* and *durnaya*, probably on the model of

3. Cf. *Akalaṅkagranthatraya*, ed. by Mahendra Kumar, Singhi Jain Series No. 12. Bombay 1939, Intr. p.69.

4. Hemacanda composed two sets of 'Thirty-two Stanzas (*dvātrīṃśikā*) in Praise of Passion-free'; *Anyayogavyavaccheda* and *Ayogavyavaccheda*. The former has traditionally been called *Vitarāgastuti*, which was commented on by Malliṣeṇa

Akalaṅka's interpretation. According to him, *syādvāda* is considered nothing but *pramāṇa* which covers the whole range of Jaina doctrine or *anekāntavāda*.

9. Vādideva Sūri (Śvet. 1086-1169 A.D.) made a sort of compendium of Jaina logic *Pramāṇanayatatvāloka*, which consists of eight chapters and 378 aphorisms, modelling it, in matter and arrangement, after Māṇikyanandin's *Parīkṣāmukha*[*sūtra*]. But the difference between the two works lies in the following points. The former adds two additional chapters to the latter; chapter 4 dealing with the scriptural knowledge (*āgama*) in general and *syādvāda* or *saptabhaṅgī-pramāṇa* in particular, and chapter 7 treating of *nayavāda* exclusively. Though there are found in the Jaina *Āgama* texts various kinds of classification of knowledge, Vādideva follows the view of *Parīkṣāmukha* which is again based on Akalaṅka's opinion, in accepting the two-fold division of knowledge. That is, knowledge is of two kinds viz. direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) and indirect knowledge (*parokṣa*): the former consists of mere awareness of an object (*avagraha*), speculation (*ihā*), perceptual judgment (*avāya*), retention (*dhāraṇā*), clairvoyance (*avadhi*) and telepathy (*manahparyāya*); and the latter consists of recollection (*smaraṇa*), recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*), knowledge producing the cognition of invariable concomitance of probans with probandum (*tarka, ūha*), inference (*anumāna*) and scriptural knowledge (*āgama*).

The inconsistent use of the terms viz. *śabda*, *āgama* and *śrūta* is likely to be derived from the following reason. The *Āgama* texts comprise a confusion or disagreement in interpreting the notion of knowledge, since two different kinds of classification of knowledge have been prevalent side by side: one is *jñāna* and the other is *pramāṇa*, both being rooted in utterly different sources and traditions. In the *Āgama* texts of later period, however, some efforts were evidently made to adjust the differences, by including one into the other, or by identifying each subdivision of one category with that of the other. Umāsvāti seems

in 1293. This is utterly different from another work of his own, viz. *Vitarāgastava* (or *Vitarāgastotra*), consisting of 20 sections (*stava*), generally of 8 or 9 stanzas each, though both works resemble each other in name.

to be the first to be successful to compromise such diversity, to a certain extent, and many efforts were made for that purpose by his successors like Siddhasena Divākara, Jinabhadra, Akalaṅka etc. Take for instance the above-mentioned *śruta* which was originally included in the five-fold *jñāna*, it has come to be identified with the idea of *āgama* (=śabda), probably taking into allowance the conception of *pramāṇa* of other philosophical systems. Similar is the case of Vādideva, who identifies *śruta* with *āgama*. (IV.1 ff., VIII.1) And he explains that a word (*dhvani*, *śabda*) always conveys its meanings from affirmative and negative aspects, dependent on a set of seven-fold proposition. (IV.13) That is, according to him, *syādvāda* or *naya* is always based on the last-mentioned knowledge viz. *āgama* or *śruta*. It is not a mere knowledge or its resultant cognition, but it invariably has to assume a form of verbal expression.

Upon Vādideva's autocommentary *Syādvādaratnākara*, Ratnaprabha (Śvet.) made a short gloss (*Laghu-tīkā*) in 1181 A.D., or rather, an abridged compendium called *Ratnākarāvatārikā*, but the greater part of its descriptions are taken almost verbatim from the former work. Such reproductions are not only limited to *Ratnākarāvatārikā*, but are often enough referred to in the *Syādvādamañjarī* of Malliṣeṇa (written in 1292 A.D., on the afore-said *Vitarāgastuti*), *Saptabhaṅgī-taraṅgiṇī* of Vimaladāsa (Dig. 16-17th cent. A.D.) and *Nyāyakhaṇḍakhāḍya* of Yaśovijaya (Śvet. 1608-1688 A.D.).

As has been explained briefly in the preceding passages, the notion of *syādvāda* is interpreted in various ways, and its various uses might be, for convenience's sake, grouped under the following headings.

- (i) In the Jaina *Āgama* texts, the term 'siyā' is used only for polemical purpose, and the emphasis is laid on manifold nature of reality held by the Jaina metaphysics.
- (ii) Jaina logic is formally interpreted by three divisions: *pramāṇa* dealing with perception and inference; *naya* and *syādvāda* representing two kinds of expressional form of reality. That is, *syādvāda* and *naya* are regarded as the expressions of the whole aspect and of the partial aspect of reality respectively. Though it is quite uncertain to the writer which source the above trichotomy

is derived from, yet such interpretation is often found in popular and informative books about Jainism.

- (iii) *Syādvāda* is established as a knowledge or its expression based on words of reliable person (*āpta-vacana*) or *śruta* (= *āgama*) which constitutes a part of indirect knowledge (*parokṣa-jñāna*), and as such is always accompanied by verbal expression. Thus it represents, so to speak, a sort of verbal reflection of the Jaina doctrine of non-absolutism (*anekānta-vāda*). It is almost certain that such placement of *syādvāda* in the Jaina logic begins with Siddhasena Divākara and its systematization reaches to a height of perfection by Vādideva Sūri.
- (iv) *Syādvāda* is understood to be identical with *pramāṇa* (right knowledge) as contrasted with *naya* (right partial view) and *durnaya* (wrong partial view), as with the case of *Vitarāgastuti* of Hemacandra Sūri, and sometimes it is considered, in the widest sense, as identical with the Jaina philosophy itself.

Out of these alternative views of *syādvāda*, that which is dealt with in this article refers to the third one. Due to the nature of subject matter in question, the exposition should be chiefly based on the Vādideva's works, but the greater part of his autocommentary on the related aphorisms is extinct, and hence the lost portions (IV, §11-47) have been traditionally substituted by their equivalents of the sub-commentary *Ratnākarāvatārikā*, which are again, luckily enough, quoted almost *ad verbatim* in *Syādvādamañjarī* §23-25, to have been further quoted or utilised in *Saptabhaṅgītaraṅgiṇī* and *Nyāyakhaṇḍakhāḍya*.

Such being the case, *Syādvādamañjarī* is now taken up as chief source material for the present purpose, because it not only covers almost all important topics dealt with in *Ratnākarāvatārikā* but offers other connected problems of profound importance. Thus this article consists of interpretations of important segments *Syādvādamañjarī* §23-25, in order of Malliṣeṇa's descriptions, by supplementing them with Vādideva's and Vimaladāsa's interpretations, sources of which are mentioned in the parentheses at the end of paragraphs. However, from fear of prolixity in enumerating each and every source, only rough correspondence of it to its quotation is mentioned; and moreover

elucidations do not always follow faithful translation of original texts, due to writer's occasional insertion of explanatory notes.

II

‘Entity, when taken in its entirety, is without mode; and when taken in its part, it is without substance. You have seen fully the truth composed of seven formulae (modes) according to the distinction of expression—the truth which is knowable only by the typically wise. (VS XXIII) “Non-existence”, “existence” and “inexpressibility” in an entity are not contradicted, when accompanied by different conditions. Without thus understanding, the stupid, afraid of contradiction, fall slain by the view of non-absolutism (*anekānta-vāda*). (VSXXIV) In some respect, an entity is perishable and eternal; similar and dissimilar; expressible and inexpressible; existent and non-existent. Oh Master of the wise! This is the succession of eruptions which follows upon the nectar of deep-drunk truth. (VS XXV)’

Malliṣeṇa’s interpretation of *syādvāda* centres mainly on the above three verses. As the *syādvāda* composed of seven-fold proposition is called *saptabhaṅgī* (statement in seven-fold formula), so is the *naya* (stand-point) of seven kinds beginning with *naigama* etc. In order to distinguish the two kinds of *saptabhaṅgī*, the former is, strictly speaking, called *saptabhaṅgī-pramāṇa*, and the latter *saptabhaṅgī-naya*. (RA IV, 44, 45; SBT p.1)

As Umāsvāti describes ‘[Contradictory characteristics] are established from primary and secondary points of view (*arpitānarpita-siddheḥ* V, 32)’, so is one and the same entity explained in a varied way in accordance as its substance or mode is manifested or depressed. Attribute in a statement is expressible, only dependent on the distinction of expression, that is, with the primacy of either substance or mode. Therefore the cognition based on such a statement cannot but be partial.

Then what does it mean by ‘distinction of expression’ (*ādeśa-bheda*) and by ‘seven-fold formula’ (*sapta-bhaṅga*)?

‘Statement of affirmation and negation, singly or jointly, in seven different ways with the use of the term ‘*syāt*’, without such inconsistency

as arises from conflict [with perception], and in virtue of inquiry about each of the different attributes, with regard to one and the same entity like soul (*jīva*) etc. This is called '*saptabhaṅgī-pramāṇa*'. (PNT IV 14; SBT pp.3-4) It can be illustrated as follows:

1. *syād asty eva ghaṭaḥ*
2. *syān nāsty eva ghaṭaḥ*
3. *syād asti nāsti ca ghaṭaḥ*
4. *syād avaktavya eva ghaṭaḥ*
5. *syād asti cāvaktavyaś ca ghaṭaḥ*
6. *syān nāsti cāvaktavyaś ca ghaṭaḥ*
7. *syād asti nāsti cāvaktavyaś ca ghaṭaḥ*

As the Jaina metaphysics accepts that infinite attributes abide in a single entity, so does its epistemology, as a natural process, that infinite natures can be predicated of a single judgment, whose substantive pertaining to one particular entity. However, when one nature is predicated of a single entity, the expression of that nature is neither unconditional nor unlimited, but is composed of seven kinds of formula, taking into account every possible case. For instance, 'existence' predicated of one single entity is possible only on the presumption of another predicate 'non-existence'. Thus any predicate, being accompanied by its counterpart, is made up of a pair of natures of contradictory character, referring to the same entity. A set of seven propositions mentioned above are serving only the case of such correlative natures of 'existence' and 'non-existence', and besides, as well be mentioned later, there are number of such correlatives serving as predicate.

The first formula describes affirmation only.

The second formula describes negation only.

The third formula describes affirmation and negation successively.

The fourth formula describes affirmation and negation simultaneously. Since two natures cannot be uttered with equal primacy in the same breath, in regard to a single entity, the term '*avaktavya*' (inexpressible) comes into being.

The fifth formula describes affirmation only, and then both natures simultaneously.

The six formula describes negation only, and then both natures simultaneously.

The seventh formula describes both natures successively, and then simultaneously. (PNT IV, 15-21)

Eva and Syāt

The term ‘*eva*’ which is used in some of the formulae of *syādvāda* is intended for determination (*niścaya*, *avadhāraṇa*) or exclusion of others (*vyavaccheda*, *niṣṛṭti*, *vyāvṛtti*). The use of this term has been traditionally interpreted in three ways: (1) *ayoga-vyavaccheda-bodhaka*, (2) *anya-yoga-vyavaccheda-bodhaka* and (3) *atyantāyoga-vyavaccheda-bodhaka*, in accordance as the ‘*eva*’ is connected with or limits, in a proposition, qualifying attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*), substantive (*viśeṣya*, *uddeśya*) or verb (*kriyā*) respectively. To give a brief account of these uses:

The first one connotes ‘exclusion of unrelatedness’, and is defined as ‘not being counterpositive of [absolute] negation coexistent with the determinant attribute of substantiveness (*uddeśyatā*)’ (*uddeśyatāvachchedaka-samānādhikaraṇābhāvāpratiyogitva*). In a stock example like ‘This shell is simply white’ (*śaṅkhaḥ pāṇḍuraḥ eva*), the determinant attribute of ‘substantiveness’ is ‘shellness’, and the counterpositive of absolute negation coexistent with it is red colour, blue colour etc. Thus the purport of this indicator ‘*eva*’ is to show that the shell is invariably possessed of or accompanied by white colour; the definition is quite similar to that of *anvaya-vyāpti* of Navya-nyāya where probans invariably implies probandum. To explain it more explicitly, it corresponds to the ‘universal affirmative judgment’ viz. ‘All shells are white’. The class of shell is pervaded denotatively by the class of things white. However, it is distinguished from the second case of ‘*eva*’ and denotes *asama-vyāpti* where the denotation of substantive is smaller than that of qualifying attribute, though both signifying ‘universal affirmative judgment’. It seems unsafe, or rather, misleading to apply symbolic logic to this interpretation in question, because both systems of logic are rooted in utterly different sources and traditions, and the defining technique of ‘*eva*’ dealt here has less

logical accuracy and subtlety even as compared with the technical devices employed by the Navya-nyāya. Yet, this 'eva' can be somehow formulated as follows:

$$(\forall_x) \{S_{(x)} \supset P_{(x)}\}$$

The second 'eva' is intended for 'exclusion of relatedness to other thing' and is shown in a stock example like 'Only Pārtha (=Arjuna) is the archer' (*pārtha eva dhanur-dharah*). The purport of this definition rests in 'exclusion of anything other than substantive', which is again paraphrased as 'exclusion of the identity etc. with anything other than substantive' (*viśeṣya-bhinna-tādātmyādi-vyavaccheda*). When the definition and its additional qualification (*pariṣkāra*) are applied to the above example, it means 'The archer has the negation of identity with anybody other than Pārtha (=Arjuna)', or in other words, 'Arjuna is none other than archer who has the negation of identity with Arjuna'. Though this definition cannot exactly be formulated symbolically, yet the second 'eva' is, roughly speaking, equivalent to a particular case of 'universal affirmative judgment', denotations of both (*S* and *P*) utterly overlapping each other (*sama-vyāpti*).

$$\sim(\forall_x) \{\sim S_{(x)} \equiv P_{(x)}\} \longrightarrow (\forall_x) \{S_{(x)} \equiv P_{(x)}\}$$

The symbol '→' here does not signify logically rigid implication. The former formulation represents the textual interpretation, and the latter one stands for a particular case of 'universal affirmative judgment' or *sama-vyāpti*.

The third kind of 'eva' which is intended for 'exclusion of absolute non-relatedness' is shown in a stock example like 'The lotus simply is blue' (*nīlam sarojaṁ bhavaty eva*). This is defined as 'not being counterpositive of negation which pervades determinant of substantive' (*uddeśyatāvacchedaka-vyāpakāpratiyogitva*). In the present context, the determinant of substantiveness is 'lotusness', because the purport of the verb 'asti' refers to the thing limited by the determinant viz. lotus. The negation which pervades 'lotusness' is absolute negation, and not a mere negation of non-distinction of blue, since non-distinction of blue might exist in some lotus. Such being the case, the example of negation in question should be sought in the negation of a pot (*anyābhāva*) etc. Thus the counterpositiveness invariably exists in the non-distinction of blue. That is, the desired non-counterpositive

(*apratyogin*, which here pertains to *viśeṣaṇa* or 'blue') is neither pot nor cloth etc. which is absolutely non-related to lotusness; or in other words, it means that 'blue' is somehow related to lotus. Hence, the 'eva' in question corresponds to the negation of 'universal negative judgment', which is again traditionally reduced to 'particular affirmative judgment', by taking into allowance the first and the second uses of 'eva'.

$$\sim(\forall_x) \{S_{(x)} \supset P_{(x)}\} \equiv \sim[\sim(\exists_x) \{S_{(x)} \bullet P_{(x)}\}] \equiv (\exists_x) \{S_{(x)} \bullet P_{(x)}\}$$

Here the opponent might urge the following question. To the first formula like '*syād asty eva ghaṭaḥ*', the third use of 'eva' might be unduly applicable, because of its propositional structure. However, what is intended by this formula (in case where a certain pot does not exist), is vitiated by the third use viz. *atyantāyoga-vyavaccheda-bodhaka*. Similarly, a proposition like '*nīla-sarojaṁ bhavaty eva*' (in case where some lotus has blue colour) might be unduly employed, even when a certain lotus has actually no blue colour at all.

In reply the Jainas explain thus: In this context the first kind of use viz. *ayoga-vyavaccheda-bodhaka* is accepted, since it is sometimes experienced that the term 'eva' associated with verb is also used as *ayoga-vyavaccheda-bodhaka*. Even in a proposition like 'Knowledge simply cognizes object' (*jñānam arthaṁ grhṇāty eva*), the first kind of use is accepted, where *artha-grāhakatva* is not counterpositive of absolute negation coexistent with *jñānatva* (meant as determinant of substantiveness), that is, knowledge invariably implies the cognition of object. If the third kind of 'eva' is, by any means, accepted even in the present context, the very use of 'eva' can, like the above-mentioned proposition, apply admittedly to a proposition like 'knowledge cognizes silver' (*jñānam rajatam grhṇāty eva*), and thus there arises no contradiction. Therefore even associated with verb, the term 'eva' in this context is used as the first kind of use viz. *ayoga-vyavaccheda-bodhaka*.

In a proposition like '*syād asty eva ghaṭaḥ*', the purport of 'eva' is that a pot has existence (*astitva*) which is non-counterpositive of absolute negation coexistent with potness, because the non-counterpositiveness in question is connected with the meaning of verb viz. '*astitva*.' However, the negation under consideration coexistent

with ‘*astitva*’ should not be ‘*nāstitva*’ as is contrasted by its counterpositive ‘*astitva*’, but the negation of other entity like *paṭābhāva*, *ghaṭābhāva* etc.; otherwise such absolute negation as ‘*nāstitva*’ might, together with its counterpositive ‘*astitva*’, coexist in its locus viz. pot. Unless the absolute negation, in the present context, is understood by the additional qualification viz. *pratiyogi-vyadhikarāṇa*, or in other words, if the example of the absolute negation is sought in anything *coexistent with its counter-positive*, it is invariably led into one-sided dogmatism where a pot is always connected with ‘existence’ only. And in view to evading such absolute existence attributed to a pot, the term ‘*syāt*’ is to be added. To make it explicit, the term ‘*syāt*’ intends to denote equivocal (*anekānta*) aspect of reality from the universal point of view, and the term ‘*asti*’ etc. is employed in view to informing the reality from a particular point of view. (The interpretation of ‘*eva*’ is taken here from *SBT* pp. 25-30)⁵

To sum up, by way of verbs like ‘is’ (*asti*) or ‘is not’ (*nāsti*), particular nature ‘existence’ or ‘non-existence’ is unconditionally shown, and further its conception is made distinct and clear by limiting itself and excluding other alien natures, with the aid of ‘*eva*’. Though the term ‘*eva*’ is in use for such purposes, yet in a proposition like ‘A pot simply exists’ (*asty eva kumbhaḥ*) where ‘exists’ connotes absolute unrestricted existence, the pot might exist as a pillar or anything else alike, and, as such cannot have its own intrinsic nature. For the apprehension of that, the term ‘*syāt*’ is employed. The function of the term ‘*syāt*’

5. Such interpretation seems to have originally been started by Buddhist logicians like Dharmakīrti, Jñānaśrīmitra etc., and borrowed by other schools of Indian philosophy. With regard to Buddhist interpretation of ‘*eva*’ etc. found in Sanskrit and Tibetan sources, a reference should be made to ‘Interpretation of Propositions in Buddhist Philosophy—purport-determining function of *eva*’ (in Japanese language) by Yuichi Kajiyama, Commemoration Volume in Honour of Dr. E. Kanakura, Tokyo 1966, pp.423-38. Moreover it should be noted here that such interpretation of *eva* is, in a figurative sense, employed by Hemacandra in titling two works of his: *Ayogavyavacchedadvātrīṃśikā* (lit. a set of 32 stanzas in which the allegation that Jainism is wrong is disproved and *Anyayogavyavacchedadvātrīṃśikā* (lit. a set of 32 stanzas in which the allegation that other systems are right is disproved).

is to imply all possible stand-points and widen the scope of discourse. In this case, 'syāt' is not taken as verb ($\sqrt{\text{as}}$ opt. third, sg.), but as indeclinable particle signifying 'somehow' or 'in some respect' (*kathamcit*). However, it does not mean that *syādvāda* is invariably accompanied by the term 'syāt'. As the term 'eva' is used only when the emphasis is laid on limitation or exclusion, so can the term 'syāt' be omitted in each formula, when it is fully apprehended that the purport of the term is implicitly understood therein. (RA IV, 15; SBT pp.30-31)

First Formula

In a proposition like 'A pot simply exists in some respect' (*syād asty eva ghaṭaḥ*), what does it mean by 'in some respect'? The existence of any entity is affirmed by way of its intrinsic (*sva-*) properties, and is negated with regard to its alien (*para-*) properties. And such properties denote substance (*dravya*), place (*kṣetra*), time (*kāla*) and nature (*bhāva, rūpa*). Thus every entity like a pot etc. exists from one point of view viz. in view of its own substance, time, place or nature, while it does not exist in respect of substance etc. of other entity. For instance, a pot does exist as its own substance or earthen substance (*pārthiva*) etc., but does not exist as anything else's substance or as watery substance etc. With regard to 'place', a thing does exist as belonging to Pāṭaliputra, but does not exist as belonging to Kānyakubja. In reference to 'time', a thing does exist in winter, but does not exist in summer. And similarly in respect of 'nature', a thing does exist as being black, but does not exist as being white. Or otherwise, it will, through incidence of other properties, cease to have its intrinsic properties. (RA IV, 15; SBT pp.30-31)

Second Formula

As the 'existence' is affirmed from its intrinsic substance (*sva-dravya*) etc. in the first formula of *syādvāda*, so is the 'non-existence' of an entity is asserted in the second formula, like 'A pot does not exist in some respect' (*syān nāsty eva ghaṭaḥ*). In case this be not accepted, the entity might cease to possess its own character, since it has no definite character and can exist as anything else. That is, if it is not

granted that a single entity is possessed of both aspects of 'existence' and 'non-existence', a single entity might exist as anything, only the aspect of 'existence' being emphasized.

Nor should it be here held by the maintainers of absolute existence, that 'non-existence' is unestablished: because the necessity of recognizing two-fold aspect of 'existence' and 'non-existence' is, though in different capacities such as *svadravya* and *paradravya* etc., established by argument (*yukti*) like probans. If one wants to prove evanescence (*anityatva*) by means of probans, say 'existence', the latter cannot be probans without the notion of 'non-existence of it in its counter-instance' (*vipakṣāsattva*). Thus 'existence' of an entity is impossible without its counterpart viz. 'non-existence', and *vice versa*. Of these correlative natures 'existence' and 'non-existence', which is to be taken as primary (*pradhāna*) or as secondary (*upasarjana*, *guṇa*) chiefly depends on the intention of expounder. Such is the gist of the second formula. (RA IV, 16; SBT pp.9-11)

Third and Fourth Formula

When an entity is described successively in view of four kinds of standpoint in its intrinsic and extrinsic capacities, there comes into being the third formula of *syādvāda* like 'An entity like a pot does exist in one respect, and does not exist in another respect.' When 'existence' and 'non-existence' are, with equal primacy, predicated of a single entity simultaneously, there is no proper word to meet the demand. Thus a pair of attributes 'existence' and 'non-existence' cannot be expressed with regard to a single entity by the term 'exists', because that is incompetent for the expression of 'non-existence'; neither by 'does not exist', because that has no capacity for expressing 'existence'. Nor can it be urged that there is such a term capable of expressing both 'existence' and 'non-existence' simultaneously with equal prominence, as the term '*puṣpadanta*' denotes the sun and the moon in the same breath; because the term in question is competent for the expression of two things one after the other. Neither does the above argument apply to the case where '*saṭ*' as declared in the *sūtra* '*saṭ-sānayoḥ saṭ*' (*Pāṇini*, III, ii, 127) stands for both '*saṭ*' and '*sāna*' terminations simultaneously, because it does present both terminations

only in succession. And there is neither *dvandva* compound, nor *karmadhāraya* compound, nor a sentence which can give expression to the idea of simultaneous unification of 'existence' and 'non-existence'. Thus the fourth formula of *syādvāda* is brought about.

And further one cannot maintain an absolute judgment, with regard to the third formula, that any word is solely expressive of both affirmative and negative aspects in succession; since it is very often experienced that words denote either of these two aspects. Or neither can one hold an absolute contention regarding the fourth formula, that any word always refers to the inexpressibility of both the aspects at one time; since even the term 'inexpressible' in this context cannot be brought into use. Thus each of the seven formulae constitutes the whole *syādvāda*, but each and every formula suffices to be *syādvāda* so long as it is equipped with 'syāt'. However, if each formula is, as has been shown in the above examples, understood unconditionally (*aikāntyena*) without 'syāt', there occur invariably various kinds of fallacy. (RA IV, 17-28; SBT p.60ff.)⁶

III

When it is understood that a single entity is possessed of infinite attributes of affirmative and negative natures, there might exist, in principle, infinite number of formulae in accordance as attribute varies. Then what is the use of limiting its number to 'seven'?

In reply to this, the Jainas give the following explanation. Though there might be accepted as many propositions or formulae as there are attributes predicated of an entity, yet there is only a set of seven formulae or propositions in reference to each and every attribute. As has been explained, such a set of propositions, having the substantive (*viśeṣya*) in common, require a pair of correlative predicates which are of affirmative and negative natures. Like the afore-said example of 'existence' and 'non-existence', there can be invariably postulated

6. Though Malliṣeṇa explains four formulae only, *PNT* makes a detailed elucidation about contradictions which are supposed to result from absolute views pertaining to each formula of *syādvāda*, by assigning each to its corresponding doctrine of opponent systems. (*PNT* IV, 22-36).

such pairs of correlatives, or rather, apparently contradicted attributes serving as predicates of *syādvāda*; e.g. universality (*sāmānya*) and particularity (*viśeṣa*), transience (*nāśitva*) and perpetuality (*nityatva*), similarity (*sadṛśatva*, *sādrśya*) and diversity (*virūpatva*), expressibility (*vācya*) and inexpressibility (*na-vācya*, *avācya*).

Take for example a pair of universality and particularity, statement in seven-fold formula can be illustrated as follows: (1) *syāt sāmānyam*, (2) *syād viśeṣam*, (3) *syād ubhayam*, (4) *syād avaktavyam*, (5) *syād sāmānyāvaktavyam*, (6) *syād viśeṣāvaktavyam*, (7) *syāt sāmānya-viśeṣa-avaktavyam*. In this case, particularity (*viśeṣa*) signifying difference is understood as negative. However, if the particularity is held as primary, and the universality as secondary, the former is considered as affirmative and the latter negative. The same argument is applicable to the remaining attributes as mentioned above. Thus there takes place only a set of seven propositions with regard to each attribute predicated of an entity. (PNT IV, 37-38)

The above argument shows the constructural and logical ground on which the number 'seven' stands, and next its generative ground is shown as follows:

The 'seven-foldness' of formulae is derived from that the question (*paryanuyoga*) is of seven kinds in respect of each mode; the number 'seven' of the questions is because curiosity (*jijñāsā*) from which mode springs is of seven kinds; the number 'seven' of the curiosities is derived from the seven number of doubt (*saṁdeha*) giving rise to them; and the doubt is of seven kinds because character of thing (*vastu-dharma*) with regards which doubt arises is seven in number. As is shown in a series of 'character of thing'—'doubt'—'curiosity'—'question'—'proposition', the number of proposition expressive of cognition seeks its generative foundation in the metaphysical structure of the Jaina doctrine. (PNT IV, 37-42; SBT pp.1-7)

Statement in seven-fold formula is, in reference to each formula, divided into two: one is complete statement (*sakalādeśa*) and the other is partial statement (*vikalādeśa*) (PNT IV, 43) The former is a set of propositions based on the right knowledge (*pramāṇa-vākya*), while the latter represents a set of propositions based on particular points of

view (*naya-vākya*), each being synonymous with *saptabhaṅgī-pramāṇa* and *saptabhaṅgī-naya* respectively...

Pramāṇa-vākya is defined thus: 'A complete statement is simultaneously expressive of an entity, which is known to be of infinite natures through the right knowledge (*prāmāṇa*), by laying a primary emphasis upon what exists as being non-distinct, or by superimposing non-distinction upon distinction, according to time etc.' (*PNT* IV. 44; *SBT* p.36)⁷ That is, either by laying the primary emphasis on the non-distinctive features viz. uniform state of attributes (*dharma*) and their locus (*dharmin*), taking into account eight kinds of determinants 'time' etc., or by temporarily identifying attributes with their locus when viewed from 'time' etc., the complete statement expresses an entity composed of infinite natures simultaneously. On the other hand, the 'partial statement' is defined thus: Either by laying the primary emphasis on the distinction or by superimposing distinction upon non-distinction, the partial statement expresses in succession the attributes of an entity like a pot etc., which is known by means of particular view-point (*naya*). (*RA* IV, 45; *SBT* p.32)

The difference between the two statements lies in the following three points:

- (1) In the complete statement, the entire reality is comprehended synthetically, i.e. with all attributes taken together; while in the partial statement, the reality is considered analytically, i.e. with its attributes taken one by one.
- (2) In the former, primary emphasis is laid on the non-distinction (*abheda-vṛtti*) or union is superimposed on distinction (*abhedopacāra*), thus the distinction emerges into union, and in the latter the difference is primarily emphasized (*bheda-vṛtti*) or distinction is superimposed on the difference among attributes (*bhedopacāra*). Here non-distinction emerges into distinction, and thus the expression invariably assumes the individual or consecutive form.

7. *pramāṇa-pratīpannānanta-dharmātmaka-vastunaḥ kālādibhir abheda-vṛtti-prādhānyād abhedopacārād vā yaugapadyena pratīpādakaṁ vacaḥ sakalādeśaḥ* (*PNT* IV, 44).

- (3) The former is dependent on right knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the latter on particular point of view (*naya*).

Further, as will be explained later, in regard to the course of giving birth *abhedavṛtti* (or *abhedopacāra*) versus *bhedavṛtti* (or *bhedopacāra*), noumenal point of view (*dravyārthika-naya*) functions primarily, while in the latter phenomenal point of view (*paryāyārthika-naya*) operates as primary function. A mere collection of partial views cannot make a complete view or statement. Contrary to this, each formula of 'complete statement' is independently serving as a complete view, and hence a proposition like 'A pot exists in some respect' (*syād asty eva ghaṭaḥ*) is complete in itself, and is no such one as becomes completed by adding together. Statement in seven-fold formula is only intended, so to speak, for a sort of schematism of all logically possible alternatives. *Syādvāda* does not always require a mention of seven kinds of expression in practical dispute. Thus these two statements stand on utterly different bases.

Then what is the criterion on which to distinguish 'with simultaneity' (*yaugapadyena*) from 'in succession' (*kramaṇa*)? When attributes like 'existence' etc. are described as being distinct according to eight kinds of determinant viz. time etc., one term is incompetent for the expression of infinite diverse attributes in the same breath, and hence the term 'in succession' is employed. On the other hand, when own forms of these infinite attributes are said to be of non-distinct nature according to time etc., even a term, say '*asti*' signifying a single attribute 'existence', is capable of expressing an entity possessed of that attribute and remaining ones, in virtue of its implication. Thus the term 'with simultaneity' is employed. (*RA IV, 44; SBT p. 33*)

Next what does it mean by 'time etc.'? They are (1) time (*kāla*), (2) nature (*ātmarūpa*), (3) entity (*guṇin, artha*, locus of attribute), (4) relation (*sambandha*), (5) service (*upakāra*), (6) locality of the entity (*guṇi-deśa*), (7) contact (*saṃsarga*) and (8) word (*śabda*). They are briefly explained thus in order:

- (1) Time. Take for instance the first formula of the *syādvāda* like 'An entity like soul etc. exists in some respect.' (*syāj jīvādi-vastu asty eva*). At the time when 'existence' is cognized to abide in

- an entity, say a pot, only then all the remaining attributes also abide in the entity. Thus they exist as being non-distinct by time.
- (2) Nature. The own form which abides in the attribute of an entity, say [*ghaṭa-*] *guṇatva*, is also the own form of other infinite attributes. Thus they are non-distinct by own nature.
 - (3) Entity (or Locus of Attributes). The entity, which is the locus of 'existence' is also the locus of other remaining attributes. Thus they are non-distinct, holding the locus in common.
 - (4) Relation. As 'existence' is non-distinct from the entity, so are all remaining attributes. Thus due to the identity holding between attributes and the entity, they are non-distinct.
 - (5) Service. An attribute renders a service to its entity, say a pot, by tinging it with its self, say 'existence', and by producing a judgment composed of predicate and substantive; each pertaining to the attribute, say blue colour etc., and its entity (*dharmin*), say pot. Similarly other attributes render the same service to the entity, and thus due to the identity of 'service' they are non-distinct.
 - (6) Locality of Entity. As 'existence' abides in the place connected with the entity, so do all other attributes abide in the same place. Thus they are non-distinct in view of locality of entity.
 - (7) Contact. The relation which 'existence' bears to the entity, also holds between that very entity and all remaining attributes. Thus they are non-distinct due to contact. The difference between relation (*sambandha*) and contact (*samsarga*, *aviṣvag-bhāva*) is explained thus. In the former non-distinction is considered as primary, and in the latter distinction is taken as secondary.
 - (8) Word. The term '*asti*' denoting an entity which consists of 'existence', also denotes the entity composed of remaining infinite attributes. Thus they are non-distinct by word.

The above elucidation is intended for showing the foundation on which *abheda-vṛtti* of attributes stands, which forms a component part of the definition of *syādvāda* or complete statement. Such *abheda-vṛtti* is possible when and only when noumenal view-point (*dravyārthikanaya*) is taken as primary, and phenomenal view-point (*paryāyārthikanaya*) as secondary. If, on the contrary, phenomenal view-point is

primarily taken into account, attributes like ‘existence’ etc. are invariably considered as distinct and many, and hence *abheda-vṛtti* in question is impossible. Thence, in this regard, there cannot be distinct and many attributes belonging to one single entity at the same time. If that were possible, the locus viz. entity might be manifold according to the diversity of such attributes. Similarly the impossibility of *abheda-vṛtti*, on the assumption of the primacy of phenomenal view-point, applies to other seven cases also.⁸

Thus infinite attributes ‘existence’ and ‘non-existence’ etc. cannot abide in a single entity with distinction, according to time etc. However, when such diverse attributes as ‘existence’ etc. cannot exist with non-distinction in a single entity, or in other words, their unity is taken to be unreal, non-distinction is only superimposed on diversity of attributes (*abhedopacāra*). This is the reason why the term *abhedopacāra* is introduced in the definition of ‘complete statement’. (RA IV, 44; SBT p.36)

However, though both the statements have been discussed to be in different categories, standing on utterly different bases, in origination and structure, yet the complete statement postulates, in process of its origination, two kinds of means viz. *abheda-vṛtti* and *abhedopacāra*, the logical grounds of which are again sought in point of view (*naya*). So it might be urged that there is no distinct qualitative difference between the two statements. On this, no text seems to have discussed in full length. But it should be understood that it is in respect of each formula or proposition of categorical nature devoid of the idea ‘*syāt*’ that *abheda-vṛtti* or *abhedopacāra* is taken into account, in course of origination, by resorting to noumenal and phenomenal view-points respectively. And ‘complete statement’ becomes complete only when each proposition of categorical nature, established on the strength of such non-distinction, has come to possess the idea of ‘*syāt*’. To this effect Vimaladāsa explains thus: the complete statement, in its

8. Malliṣeṇa further proceeds to prove, quoting almost verbatim from RA IV. 44, the impossibility of *abheda-vṛtti* or non-distinction of attributes, on the strength of eight kinds of determinants viz. time etc., which arises when the primary emphasis is laid on phenomenal view-point. But here it is omitted.

construction, endowed with one term 'is' or 'is not' etc. denotes an entity composed of infinite attributes by means of the term '*syāt*'. (SBT p.38)

On the part of the opponents, the said correlative natures in 'complete statement' cannot abide together in a single entity, and they are considered to contradict each other. Thus such fallacy (*doṣa*, *dūṣaṇa*) is found in regard with the correlatives, or rather, contradictory attributes like '*astitva*' and '*nāstitva*', '*vidhi*' and '*niṣedha*', '*avaktavyatva*' and '*vaktavyatva*' etc.

According to the Jaina doctrine, however, any entity is composed of infinite attributes which apparently contradict one another. Though *syādvāda* consists in stating an entity as substantive and its attribute as predicate, yet the attribute in question possesses its counterpart which is apparently contradictory to it; that is, 'existence' always postulates 'non-existence', and 'non-existence' presupposes 'existence'. Thus the affirmative-negative relation holds between such correlative attributes. On the part of the Jainas, the restriction of substantive by its predicate is neither absolute nor unconditional (*ekānta*), but is based on different features (*aṁśa-prakāra*) or conditions (*upādhi*). When endowed with such determinant or condition, 'existence' and 'non-existence' do not exclude each other like the case of heat and cold. Attributes '*astitva*', '*nāstitva*' and '*avaktavyatva*' constitute the first three formulae of 'complete statement', but the remaining four formulae are also derived from the combination of the above three attributes. And such predication rests on the Jaina metaphysics based on a sort of empiricism.

Supposing that when absolute affirmation (*ekānta-sattva*) is accepted, both attributes 'existence' and 'non-existence' are not coexistent, one utterly excluding the other in reference to a pot etc. A pot cannot be negated even by its extrinsical nature (*para-rūpa*) say clothness, in relation to the pot, and, as such, might unduly exist as cloth. On the contrary, when absolute negation (*ekāntāsattva*) is accepted, a pot might be denied even by its own nature, say potness, and everything would be nothing, all a universal void. What is intended by *syādvāda* is to express neither 'existence', nor 'non-existence', nor 'absolute

identity of the both', from one and same point (*amśa*). 'Existence' is taken into consideration as having one condition, and 'non-existence' as possessing another condition; that is, an entity has 'existence' by *sva-rūpa* and 'non-existence' by *para-rūpa* etc. Take for instance the whole cloth composed of a single variegated colour, it is of blue from one stand-point, and it is of another colour from another stand-point; and in this the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas differ from the Jainas.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics, there cannot be several colours in one and the same object, colour being *vyāpya-vṛtti-dharma* (attribute pervaded by its locus) or attribute which does not coexist with its absolute negation (*sva-samānādhikaraṇātyantābhāvāpratiyogī dharmah*). Thus variegated colour present in the whole, say a cloth, is not a mere product or combination of particular colours present in each component part, and, as such, is a distinct variety of colour standing on the equal footing with other varieties of colour. This idea of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas is derived from the fact that a composite product (*avayavin*) is entirely different from its component part (*avayava*). According to the Jainas, however, even in a single whole variegated cloth the blueness is conditioned by the colour of indigo etc., and other colours are conditioned by such and such dyeing substance, various colours being coexistent in one and the same entity. Similar is the case of *mecaka* jewel (composed of different colours), where a variety is seen to be conditioned by matter of such and such colours. *Syādvāda* holds that many individual colours and their substratum, say cloth, is distinct and non-distinct by some way or other (*kathamcit, syāt*); and similar is the case of 'existence' and 'non-existence'. This is quite evident from the fact that a single person has attributes 'fatherness', 'sonness' and 'nephewness' etc., which do not contradict one another on different conditions. Here it should be borne in mind that this does not unduly lead to an arbitrary conclusion that a single person is somehow a father and a mother etc.

The opponents might urge that it is a fallacy to assign predicates (or attributes), which are mutually contradicted epistemologically (or ontologically), to a single substantive (or entity). According to the Jainas, however, such predicates or attributes do not yield any contradiction, and above-mentioned fallacy is not actual but apparent

on the principle of *syādvāda* doctrine. Eight kinds of such apparent fallacy are enumerated and then they are refuted one by one.⁹ They are (1) contradiction (*virodha*), (2) non-coexistence (*vaiyadhikarāṇya*, absence of common abode), (3) *regressus ad infinitum* (*anavasthā*), (4) confusion (*saṃkara*), (5) transfusion (*vyatikara*, exchange of function and attributes), (6) doubt (*saṃśaya*), (7) absence of determination (*apratipatti*), (8) renouncement of determination of subjective reality (*viśaya-vyavasthā-hāni*).

1. Contradiction

It is impossible that contradictory attributes, ‘universality’ and ‘particularity’ which are each affirmative and negative natures abide together in a single entity, as the case of heat and cold. This is the fallacy of contradiction.

2. Non-coexistence

The locus of affirmation cannot be locus of negation, since there might be also difference of locus because of their being of one form. This is the fallacy of non-coexistence. (*vaiyadhikarāṇya*=*vibhinnādhikarāṇa-vṛttitva*, SBT p.82)

3. Regressus ad infinitum

When a thing is universal from one aspect, say *sva-rūpa*, and particular from another aspect, say *para-rūpa*, both aspects are correlative due either to one nature or to double nature viz. *astitva* and *nāstitva*. In

9. The term ‘*virodha*’ is mentioned in the original stanza of Hemacandra (VS§24). It is understood to signify primarily a particular *virodha* in the narrow sense and then indicate, by way of implication, the remaining *doṣa* beginning with *vaiyadhikarāṇya*. Or it is understood in the general sense of *doṣa*, and thus includes each member viz. *virodha*, *vaiyadhikarāṇya* etc. There is divergence of opinion about the classification of *doṣa*, Vādideva defines only seven kinds of such fallacies, and quotes the following stanza:

*saṃśaya-virodha-vaiyadhikarāṇyam athobhayam doṣāḥ/
anavasthā-vyatikaram api jaina-mate sapta doṣāḥ syuh//* (SRA V, 8)

It is very likely that Akalaṅka is the first to put forward the refutation of such fallacies. (*Pramāṇasaṃgraha* op. cit., III 24, VI 55) Cf. *Akalaṅkagranthatraya* op. cit., Intr. p.105; *Anekāntajayapatākā* op. cit., pp.258-260.

the former case, the fallacy of non-coexistence (*vaiyadhikarāṇya*) remains *status quo*, and in the latter case two natures viz. *astitva* and *nāstitva* are required for the two aspects, and two again will be required for each of the two natures, and so on *ad infinitum*.

4. Confusion

When the aspect in which the thing is the locus of universality, is also the locus of universality and particularity, and similarly when the aspect in which the thing is the locus of particularity, it yields the fallacy of confusion, which consists in the incidence of opposite attributes in a single locus. (*sarveṣāṃ yugapat-prāptiḥ saṃkaraḥ*, *SRA* V, 8. p.738; *SBT* loc. cit.)

5. Transfusion

By the aspect in which 'existence' is affirmed the 'non-existence' is asserted, and by the aspect in which 'non-existence' is asserted the 'existence' is affirmed. This is the fallacy of transfusion, or the exchange of function and attribute. (*paraspara-viṣaya-gamanam vyatikaraḥ*, *SRA* loc. cit.; *SBT* loc. cit.)

6. Doubt

Due to the absence of definite determinant on which to distinguish between 'existence' and 'non-existence', it is impossible to ascertain the exact nature of thing. This is the fallacy of doubt.

7. The above fallacy results in that of absence of determination.

8. That also tends to yield the fallacy of renouncement of determination of subjective reality. (*SRA* V, 8. pp.737-743; *PRM* I, 130 p.28)

All these fallacies fail to apply to the *syādvāda* which is a philosophy of utterly different kind, for correlative concepts which are apparently contradictory to each other, are actually interdependent and non-contradictory concepts, when viewed from different stand-points.

Abbreviations

- VS* *Anyayogavyavacchedadvātrimśikā* (otherwise called *Vītarāgastuti*)
SM *Syādvādamañjarī* ad *VS*, ed by A.B. Dhruva, Bombay Skt. & Pkt. Series No. 83, Poona 1933.

PNT *Pramāṇanayatatvāloka*.

SRA *Syādvādaratnākara* ad *PNT*, ed. by Motilal Lādhājī, Poona 1928.
5 vols.

RA *Ratnākaraṇvatārikā* ad *SRA*, ed. by Hargovindas & others. Yaśovijaya
Granthamālā Nos. 21, 22. Benares 1911.

SBT *Saptabhaṅgītarāṅgiṇī*, ed. with Hindi Ṭīkā by Thākura Prasād,
Rāyacandra Jaina Śāstramālā No. 4, Bombay 1905.

PRM *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, ed. by Sukhlal Sanghavi and others, Singhi
Jaina Series No. 9, Bombay 1931.

CHAPTER 4

RELATIVITY AND ABSOLUTISM

V.M. Kulkarni

The *anekāntavāda* of the Jains is compared with the Western Theory of Relativity. And the two philosophical terms *anekāntavāda* and *ekāntavāda* are translated as ‘The Theory of Relativity’ and ‘The Theory of Absolutism’ respectively. *Anekāntavāda* is sometimes called *syādvāda*. Malliṣeṇa, the author of *Syādvādamāñjarī*¹, for example asserts:

*Syādityavyayam anekānta-dyotakam/
Tataḥ syādvādo 'nekāntavādaḥ/
Nityānityādyaneka-dharma-śabalaika-
vastvabhyupagama iti yāvat/*

It means: “The particle ‘syāt’ signifies manifoldness. Therefore *syādvāda* is *anekāntavāda*, the doctrine of manifoldness. And that means the acceptance of the view that a single entity is variegated by many and various attributes or properties (*dharma*) viz., eternal, non-eternal, etc.” In other words, reality is manifold and each entity has a manifold nature—consists of diverse forms and modes of innumerable aspects.

Jacobi translates *anekāntavāda* as ‘the theory of indefiniteness of Being’.² F.W. Thomas renders “*anekānta*” as ‘non-unequivocality’.³ But

1. Malliṣeṇa: *Syādvādamāñjarī*, edited by A. B. Dhruva, Bombay, 1933.

2. Jacobi, H., *Studies in Jainism* (Part I), Gurjar Grantharatna Kāryālaya, Gandhi Road, Ahmedabad, 1946 A.D., p.52.

3. Thomas F.W. *The Flowerspray of the Quodommodo Doctrine*, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1960.

about the *anekānta* doctrine there is no vagueness. It is not a philosophy of indefiniteness or indetermination or dubiety or scepticism or agnosticism. It is 'the theory that every (predication or) judgment is Relative' or 'the doctrine of sevenfold (or the seven forms) of conditional predication'. For, every ordinary judgment passed by imperfect human minds holds good only of the particular aspect of the entity or object judged and the point of view from which the judgment is passed. Every judgment relates to a particular context whose constituents or conditions are left unmentioned, partly because they are obvious and partly because they are too many to be enumerated exhaustively. So for the sake of precision or accuracy it is good to qualify the judgment or predication clearly by the word '*syāt*' ('somehow') which is paraphrased as '*kathañci*' ('somehow'). The particle '*syāt*' in *syādvāda* "is generally treated by commentators as an indeclinable noun or adjective connoting indefinite possibility".⁴ This particle is used by the Jain logicians in a very special sense: "in some respect" or 'from a certain point of view', or 'under a certain condition'. Thus the particle '*syāt*' in a sentence qualifies the acceptance or rejection of the proposition or predication expressed by the sentence."⁵ It indicates the *anekānta* nature of a predication or proposition. Its use indicates the limitation of the judgment passed and the possibility of other alternative judgments from other points of view. The doctrine of *syādvāda* "denies all absolute propositions, such as, something is absolutely *nitya* (eternal) or *anitya* (non-eternal or evanescent), every proposition, according to the Jain doctrine, being only relatively true, i.e., true from a certain point of view, and untrue from a different point of view. It is thus a doctrine of Relativity of Truth,..., and should not be confounded with any form of Scepticism or Agnosticism, ancient or modern."⁶

The doctrine of *syādvāda* is also known as *saptabhaṅgī* (seven-fold Predication, the Seven Forms of Judgment, The Theory of Conditional

4. *Syādvādamāñjarī* (edited by A.B. Dhruva) Notes, p.32.

5. Matilal B.K. *The Central Philosophy of Jainism (Anekāntavāda)*, L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad-380009, p.53.

6. *Syādvādamāñjarī*, Notes (by A.B. Dhruva) p.32.

Predication). “*Saptabhaṅgī* is defined as a statement in seven different ways—to be mentioned hereafter—of affirmation and negation, with the use of the word ‘*syāt*’, singly and jointly without inconsistency such as that arising from conflict with *pratyakṣa* (perception), as the result of inquiry about each of the different predicates (*dharma*) of a thing such as *sattva* (existence) etc.”⁷

Bhaṅga, in the term *saptabhaṅgī*, does not mean ‘paralogism’, which rendering was given by Cowell, but “turn” or varied form (of idea or expression). The seven predications may be stated as follows: (Please note that each statement in ‘A’ is to be read with its corresponding statement in ‘B’).

- (A) i. From a certain point of view (*syāt*), the jar exists.
 ii. From a certain point of view (*syāt*), the jar does not exist.
 iii. From a certain point of view (*syāt*), the jar exists and from another point of view, it does not exist.
 iv. From a certain point of view (*syāt*), the jar is indescribable.
 v. From a certain point of view (*syāt*), the jar both exists and is indescribable.
 vi. From a certain point of view (*syāt*), the jar both does not exist and is indescribable.
 vii. From a certain point of view (*syāt*), the jar exists, does not exist, and is also indescribable.
- (B) i. With reference to itself.
 ii. With reference to another.
 iii. With regard to the succession of reference to itself and reference to another (=i+ii).
 iv. With regard to simultaneity of reference to itself and reference to another.
 v. With regard to reference to itself and simultaneity of reference to itself and reference to another (=i+iv).
 vi. With regard to reference to another, and simultaneity of reference to itself and reference to another (=ii+iv).

7. *Ibid.* Notes, p.244.

- vii. With regard to reference to itself, reference to another, and simultaneity of reference to itself and reference to another (=i+ii+iv).

Now, according to the Jain doctrine of *anekānta*, a thing possesses infinite characters or properties (*dharma*). Therefore, there may be an infinite number of properties ascribable to an entity. But the above sevenfold formula will be applicable to each attribution of a property, i.e., to each individual predication or proposition. In other words, the forms of predication or judgment will be only seven, neither more nor less.

Kindred or allied to this doctrine of *syādvāda* or *saptabhaṅgī* is the doctrine of *nayavāda* (the seven stand-points):

1. *Naigama* (the common, the non-distinguished): is a method of referring to an entity where its generic and specific characteristics are not distinguished from each other. It recognises both the *sāmānya* (universal) and the *viśeṣa* (particular) but regards each of these as absolute and self-sufficient.
2. *Samgraha* (the general): is the viewpoint which ignores all particulars and takes note of the general (*sāmānya*) only.
3. *Vyavahāra* (the practical): This viewpoint presents things as they appear to the vulgar eye. It refers to reality such as is accepted and understood by the commonfolk.
4. *Ṛju-sūtra*: This viewpoint is the prototype (*mūla*) of “the modification (*pariyāya*) exists” point of view. It refers to the changing modifications only as distinguished from the abiding substance (*dravya*).
5. *Śabda* (the verbal): recognises differences of connotation of synonymous words in accordance with the differences in their genders, numbers, etc., such as *kalatram*, *dārāḥ*, *patnī*, etc.
6. *Samabhirūḍha* (the subtle): This viewpoint makes a subtle distinction in the meanings of synonymous words having the same gender, number, etc. in consonance with those of their different etymologies. As for example Indra, Śakra, Purandara.
7. *Evambhūta*: This viewpoint declares that a thing bears a particular name only while it performs the action (*kriyā*) which entitles it to bear that name, not always.

Of these, the first four viewpoints are classified as the viewpoint of thought or things (*artha*), while the remaining three are classified as the viewpoint of word (*śabda*). In these three (5 to 7) *nayas* exaggerated importance is attached to the form of expression, in the ascending order.

Each one of the seven viewpoints reveals a part or portion of the whole truth; but *pramāṇa*, as compared with a *naya*, reveals not a portion only but the whole truth.

The Genesis of Anekāntavāda or Syādvāda

In his Introduction to *Syādvādamañjarī*, (p.xxiv), A.B. Dhruva observes: “Both these doctrines, the *nayavāda* and the *syādvāda* are varieties of *anekāntavāda*”. A.N. Upadhye says in his Introduction to *Pravacanasāra*, (p.Lxxxvii), : “Philosophical evolution needs that *nayavāda* should come first and *syādvāda* next; but the references... do not warrant any conclusion like that; and even the Jain authors say that they are the two wings of *anekānta*.” Dr. B.K. Matilal says: “*Anekāntavāda* is sometimes called *syādvāda*, although the latter term is usually reserved for ‘the dialectic of sevenfold predication’ and in support of his statement quotes Malliṣeṇa’s authority—cited above (f.n.1). Pandit Dalsukh Malvania in his Introduction (Hindi) to *Nyāyāvatāra-vārtika-vṛtti* has shown how Mahāvīra has developed the *vibhajyavāda* (the method of analysis and differentiation, the method of ‘breaking up’ (*vibhajya*) the whole into its component parts) into his *anekāntavāda*. Dr. B.K. Matilal follows closely the suggestion of Pandit Dalsukh Malvania, discusses, in his work *The Central Philosophy of Jainism (Anekāntavāda)*, the *vibhajyavāda* as a philosophical method and concludes: “...there were, at least, two sub-varieties of the *vibhajyavāda*: (1) The first type operates by dividing the subject class into sub-classes. (2) The second one operates by specifying or relativizing the predicate. It seems to me that this second sub-variety of the *vibhajya* method was adopted chiefly by Mahāvīra, the Jina. And thus, this was developed into the *anekānta* method” (p.11). Elsewhere in the same work (p.19) he remarks “...the *vibhajya* method received a definite form in the hands of Mahāvīra and was finally transformed into the *anekāntavāda* of the Jains.”

Evaluation of Anekāntavāda or Syādvāda or Saptabhaṅgī

Different *darśanas* (philosophies) hold different philosophical views; and each one of them claims its own view alone to be true and all others untrue or false. This kind of attitude encourages dogmatism and intolerance in philosophy and breeds hatred and bitterness among the adherents or followers of the rival *darśanas*. The Jain *dārśanikas* perceived this evil resulting from ‘one-sided’ (*ekānta*) rival *darśanas*, and thought out a way: As Pandit Sukhlalji puts it: “An intense desire to bring about a synthesis of the contemporary, contradictory philosophical or metaphysical views inspired the Jain thinkers to expound this doctrine of *saptabhaṅgī*.... In the Vedic *darśanas*, etc., especially in Vallabha-*darśana* we have the conception of ‘*sarvadharmasamanvaya*’ [a synthesis of all *dharma*s (or *darśanas*)]. It is one of the forms of this very *saptabhaṅgī*.”⁸ According to the *anekānta* theory, Reality by its very nature is many-sided. Each and every thing or entity is endowed with infinite attributes or properties (*dharma*s). So apparently contradictory, philosophical or metaphysical, propositions, *made from different points of view with reference to one and the same thing*, are perfectly in order. This is how the theory of *saptabhaṅgī* or *syādvāda* or *anekāntavāda* of the Jains reconciles, harmonizes the seemingly, conflicting or contradictory views of the rival *darśanas*. This theory is “characterized by toleration, understanding and respect for the views of others. This is a unique character of Jain philosophy and religion....”⁹ The catholicity of outlook that is evinced by this theory is indeed admirable. This is how A.B. Dhruva evaluates the doctrine of *syādvāda*.¹⁰ “*Syādvāda* is not a doctrine of mere speculative interest, one intended to solve a mere ontological problem but has a bearing upon man’s psychological and spiritual life.”

8. Sukhlalji, Pandit: *Darśana ane Cintana* (Gujarati), Vol.2, Gujarat Vidyā Sabhā, Bhadra, Ahmedabad-1, 1957, p.1064.

9. Dr. B. K. Matilal, *ibid*, p.6.

10. *Syādvādamāñjarī*, *ibid*, Notes, p.272.

CHAPTER 5

THE SEVEN-PLANK EPISTEMOLOGICAL FRAME—A SEARCH FOR ITS RATIONALE

(With special reference to *Saptabhāṅgītarāṅgiṇī*)

V. Venkatachalam

The seven-pronged logic or *sapta-bhaṅgī-naya* as it is usually termed by traditional writers, is a unique feature of the methodology followed by Jaina thinkers to explain all forms of empirical knowledge. Its uniqueness lies in the fact that no other philosophical school in India had ever conceived an epistemological frame with seven planks. The maximum number of planks posited by other schools stood at four. The credit or discredit—in whatever way one might choose to call it—for raising the number of planks to four goes to the Mādhyamika Buddhists, who invented a *catuskoṭi* frame of logic, in line with their metaphysics. Earlier thinkers had contented themselves with trinary, binary or even unitary frames for their theory of knowledge. The steep climb from a four-plank epistemological frame to a seven-plank one, familiarly known as *sapta-bhaṅgī*, is the distinct contribution of Jaina philosophical thinkers. An attempt is made in this paper to discuss whether at all it is possible to find a rational basis for the seven planks of this *sapta-bhaṅgī* frame. As a part of this search for the rationale of *sapta-bhaṅgī*, we will have to find satisfying answers to the following questions:

1. Is the addition of the last three *bhaṅgas* of the *sapta-bhaṅgī* frame a logical 'must', to explain empirical knowledge? Is it logically impossible to explain empirical knowledge with the four-plank

or even three-plank frames of epistemology? If yes, what is the logical deficiency in those theories?

2. Even if there were some deficiencies in the four-plank frame, was it not possible to rectify the deficiency by adding just one or two more planks? That is, why was it found necessary to add three more planks at one stroke? In other words, will not a *pañca-bhaṅgī* or *ṣaḍ-bhaṅgī* frame be adequate to correct the deficiency of the *catuskoṭi* argument? Were the possibilities of five-plank and six-plank frames fully considered and found logically wanting, before settling for a seven-plank frame? If so, what is wrong with *pañca-bhaṅgī* or *ṣaḍ-bhaṅgī* frames?
3. Leaving aside questions such as these concerning the lower side of seven, it will be quite pertinent to ask: Why did the Jaina philosophers, who thought on this problem, not go beyond seven planks? Is it because they were convinced that the seven-plank frame of epistemology is the most rational one? Had they satisfied themselves that there was no justification for an epistemological frame with more than seven planks? Were such possibilities of *aṣṭa-bhaṅgī-naya* or *nava-bhaṅgī-naya* considered at all by Jaina philosophers at any stage?
4. Last, but not least important of all, when the basic norms for the epistemological frame are only three, namely, *sat*, *asat* and *avaktavya*, does it not stand to reason that there should be only a three-plank epistemological frame with *syād-asti*, *syād-nāsti* and *syād-avaktavya*? In other words, will not a trinary frame be the most rational, when the alternatives available are three, namely *asti*, *nāsti* and *avaktavya*?

If logically satisfactory answers could be found for these questions, a rational base for *saptabhaṅgī naya* may be taken as established. The present paper is an attempt to search for such a base. For the purpose of this paper, I shall confine myself to *Saptabhaṅgī-taraṅgiṇī*, which has sought to grapple with most of these problems.

Before we proceed to answer these questions in our search for rationale of the seven-plank logic of Jaina philosophers, it will be useful to have a brief conspectus of the background of this *sapta-bhaṅgī*

concept and see how the idea evolved from the position of one-plank to the level of the four-plank or *catuskoṭi* epistemological frame. The Sāṅkhyas, with their well known *satkāryavāda* (some prefer to call it *satkāraṇavāda*) postulated a unitary frame with only *sat* and no *asat* at all. Nothing is non-existent to them. The oil exists in an unmanifest state in the sesamum seeds even before they are crushed to separate the oil. Likewise, the seeds exist in the flowers, the flowers in the buds, the buds in the sprouts and so on. How the Sāṅkhyas would have explained the experience of the ‘*vikalpa*’ category, described as “*vastu-śūnya*” by their sister-school of Yoga is not quite clear. The early Sāṅkhya writers do not appear to have concerned themselves with the problem of the locus of illusory experiences like *śukti-rajata* or *rajju-sarpa* or the unsubstantial experience—if it can be called so—of *vandhyāputra* or *śaśaśṛṅga*, which existed only as words, with no substance behind them (*śabdajñānānupātī*).

The Nyāya school which introduced *abhāva* as a seventh *padārtha* or category after the earlier position of six *padārthas* paved the way for a two-plank epistemological frame. It is, however, necessary to remember that it will be an error to equate the *abhāva* of the Naiyāyikas with the *asat* of Vedāntic and Buddhist thinkers. All the same, some such equation did exist as is evident from the oft-quoted verse of *Bhagavad Gītā*, which vaguely speaks of *abhāva* as the opposite of *sat* and *asat* as the opposite of *bhāva*.

*nāsato vidyate bhāvo nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ/
ubhayaor api dṛṣṭo’ntas tvanayos tattvadarśibhiḥ//*

It may be observed in passing that this two-plank epistemological frame is perhaps the earliest in point of time, since references to *sat* and *asat* as parallel categories can be traced from the *Rgveda-mantra*—

na sad āsīt no’sad āsīt tadānīm tama āsīt

down to the Upaniṣadic declarations—

*asad vā idam agra āsīt. tato vai sad ajāyata asanneva sa bhavati,
asad brahmeti veda cet. asti brahmeti ced veda, santamenam tato viduḥ.*

and so on.

By adding a category of *anirvacanīya* to the twin-categories of *sat* and *asat*, the Advaita Vedāntins raised the number of planks in the epistemological frame to three. Three things must be noted here with regard to this three-plank frame of Vedānta. First, the germs of the *anirvacanīya* or *anirvācya* category are there in the *R̥gveda mantra* cited presently, since it speaks of the existence of *tamas* when *sat* and *asat* were non-existent, which naturally implies that *tamas* has an existence, apart from *sat* and *asat*. Secondly, this *anirvacanīya* (or *anirvācya*, as it is also called sometimes) category found its due place in the seven-plank frame of the Jains also, with a slightly modified name. Instead of calling it *anirvacanīya*, they called it *avaktavya*, that is all. Grammatically speaking, *anirvacanīya* or *anirvācya*, and *avaktavya* are more or less the same, with no denotational difference at all; the only superficial difference being that the *upasarga* ‘*nir*’ is dropped in the latter and the suffix ‘*tavya*’ has taken the place of its counterpart ‘*aniyar*’ or ‘*ya*’. Thirdly, the Mādhyamika Buddhists also did include this *anirvacanīya* in their fourfold epistemological frame by what they described as ‘*anubhaya tattva*’, that is, a category, which belonged to neither of the earlier-known categories of *sat* and *asat*. The parallelism of this ‘*anubhaya*’ category, as it is usually designated by the Buddhists and the *anirvacanīya* of Advaita Vedāntins is complete, since the term *anirvacanīya* of the Vedāntins is only a sort of abbreviation—adopted for convenience and brevity—of “*sad-asadbhyām anirvacanīya*” or “*sad-asad-vilakṣaṇa*”, which is nothing but another and more explicit way of describing the Buddhist term ‘*anubhaya*’. What is implicit in ‘*anubhaya*’ is made explicit in ‘*sad-asad-vilakṣaṇa*’; that is all.

Unlike the Vedāntins, the Mādhyamika Buddhists had no difficulty in positing *sat* and *asat* in the same thing, at the same time—a position, vehemently opposed by Śāṅkarācārya on the ground that the two conflicting attributes of existence and non-existence can never co-exist anywhere, at anytime, in anything. The Buddhists, therefore, recognised *sad-asat* as a separate category, thereby building up a four-plank frame for their epistemological theory. Thus, *sat*, *asat*, *sad-asat* and neither-*sat*-nor-*asat* constitute the four planks of their well known four-pronged (*catuskoṭi*) epistemological wheel. Here again, it must be observed that all these four planks have been bodily adopted by the Jains for their

famous *sapta-bhaṅgī naya* or seven-plank logic. But there is one fundamental difference. Jaina propounders of the *sapta-bhaṅgī* frame based the co-existence of *sat* and *asat* on the basis of their theory of *anekānta*, which admits existence and non-existence together at one locus at different times or conditions, unlike the Buddhists, thereby bypassing the objection regarding simultaneous co-existence of conflicting attributes in one object.

Now, I take up the four questions posed earlier. The conventional justification for the seven *bhaṅgas*, put forward by Jaina writers, which the *Saptabhaṅgī-taraṅgiṇī* has also followed is this. It is said that there are seven types of *dharma*s inherent in all objects and corresponding to these seven *dharma*s, there are seven types of *saṁśaya*s; corresponding to the *saṁśaya*s, there are seven forms of *jijñāsā*s; corresponding to the *jijñāsā*s, seven types of *praśna*s and corresponding to the *praśna*s, there are seven types of answers. The *Saptabhaṅgī-taraṅgiṇī* also quotes this verse—

*bhaṅgās-sattvādayaḥ sapta, saṁśayaḥ sapta tadgatāḥ/
jijñāsāḥ sapta, sapta syāḥ praśnāḥ saptottarānyapi//*

These seven inherent fundamental *dharma*s or aspects are stated as follows: *sattva*, *asattva*, *kramārpita sattvāsattva*, *avaktavyatva*, *sattvaviśiṣṭa avaktavyatva*, *asattvaviśiṣṭa avaktavyatva*, and *kramārpita sattvāsattvaviśiṣṭa avaktavyatva*.

After this, the author discusses at some length, some of the possibilities raised by me in my questions (2) and (3) above and shows the inadequacy of less than seven *bhaṅgas* and the futility of more than seven *bhaṅgas*. Of the former, he considers even a case, according to which all the six *bhaṅgas* from the second will be superfluous, which naturally implies the total collapse of the *saptabhaṅgī*. On the higher side too he considers cases of eight *bhaṅgas* and nine *bhaṅgas* and discounts them both in his own way.

Instead of repeating these prepositions contained in the texts, I propose to look at this *saptabhaṅgī* scheme in a new unconventional manner, with a view to examine whether such an approach can be of any help in our search for a rational base for the *saptabhaṅgī* logic. My approach is based on the types of our everyday experiences and

I wish to suggest a seven-plank frame for experience and relate them to the seven planks of *saptabhaṅgī* epistemology. Epistemology being a theory of knowledge has to be based on universal experience. I am placing these rough ideas as they occurred to me before scholars and it is for you to decide whether such an approach is also possible.

I have been an humble student of Vedānta. Students of Vedānta are aware that *Adhyāsa* is the bed rock of Advaita Vedānta and it is precisely for this reason that Śaṅkarācārya opened his monumental *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* with his famous thesis of *Adhyāsa*, though it has no apparent bearing on the first *sūtra* of *Brahmasūtra*. Now, taking different forms of knowledge like *pramā*, *bhrama*, *saṁśaya* and the *vikalpa* of the Yoga school into account, I wish to suggest a seven-plank frame for empirical experience and demonstrate the parallelism between the seven types of experience and the seven planks of the Jaina theory of *saptabhaṅgī* epistemology.

The seven types of experience, I have in mind, and their correlation or correspondence with the seven planks of the *saptabhaṅgī* frame may be put down as follows. For the sake of showing the correspondence with the *saptabhaṅgī-naya*, I am following the conventional order of *saptabhaṅgī* itself.

1. *Pramā* or valid experience. This projects the *sattva* aspect of a thing. Practically all our common everyday experiences will fall under this category, the most representative example being, *ayaṁ ghataḥ*.
2. *Vikalpa* experience, with no substantial substratum, resting only on words. This projects the *asattva* aspect, the classical examples being *śaśaśṛṅga* and *vandhyā-putra*. Sentences like *agninā siñcati*, which cannot communicate on account of the absence of *yogyatā*, may also perhaps be considered under this category.
3. *Samśaya* or doubt, which projects *sattva* and *asattva* of a thing in a sequence (*kramārpita*). The familiar example will be *sthānūr vā puruṣo vā*.
4. *Bhrama* or *mithyājñāna* of the ordinary type, where the object experienced defies description in terms of existence or non-existence (*sattuāsattuābhyaṁ anirvacanīya*), which corresponds to

the fourth *avaktavya* plank of *saptabhaṅgī*. Everyday experiences like *idam rajatam* or *ayam sarpaḥ* where there is no silver or snake will be the examples.

Before taking up the last three types of experience corresponding to the last three planks of *saptabhaṅgī*, it is necessary to remember that the ‘*avaktavya*’ element is common to all of them, along with the fourth, where *avaktavya* stands independently. As observed by me earlier *avaktavya* is the same as *anirvacanīya* of Advaita Vedānta. This naturally means that these last three *bhaṅgas* of *saptabhaṅgī* should correspond to different forms of *bhrama*. Working on this clue, I suggest the following forms of illusory experience for equation with the last three planks of *saptabhaṅgī* frame. Advaita Vedāntic thinkers who have made in-depth study of *bhrama* have classified *adhyāsa* or *bhrama* as *sopādhika* and *nirupādhika* and *sopādhika* has further been classified as *āhārya* and *anāhārya*. *Nirupādhika bhrama* which is the primary and most common form has already been assigned its rightful place, parallel to the fourth *bhaṅga*. The remaining three should, therefore, be different aspects of *sopādhika bhrama*. I propose the following tentative equations of the three types of *bhrama* for the last three planks of *saptabhaṅgī*—

5. *Āhārya-sopādhika bhrama* of the *ekaḥ candraḥ sadvīṭīyaḥ* type which can project the element of *avaktavyatva* along with *sattva* or reality. In this case along with the second illusory moon, the real moon is also part of the experience. Hence it can be a fitting case of *bhrama* coloured or qualified by *sattva*. This may, therefore, provide the parallel for the fifth plank of *saptabhaṅgī*, which is characterised by *sattva-viśiṣṭa avaktavyatva*.
6. *Āhārya-sopādhika bhrama* of the *lohitāḥ sphaṭikāḥ* or the *citra-turaga* type, which can project the element of *avaktavyatva*, qualified by *asattva* or unreality. The speciality of this type of *bhrama* is that the illusion of horse in the picture or of the redness of the crystal slab co-exists along with the full realisation of the unreality of the horse and the unreality of the redness.
7. *Anāhārya-sopādhika bhrama* of the *pīṭaḥ śaṅkhaḥ* type, which can project *avaktavyatva* along with reality and unreality in the

experience, since the jaundiced eye witnesses the reality of the yellowness in the conch simultaneously with the conviction of the unreality of the yellowness on the basis of the strong *samskāra* of previous experience of the same conch at home.

I have posed a problem. I believe I have posed the problem in all its fulness. I have also attempted a novel approach to solve the problem. But let me confess, I do not pose to have solved it. I leave it to scholars to judge my approach and its adequacy or otherwise for providing a rational base to the seven planks of the *saptabhaṅgī* frame of Jaina epistemology.

CHAPTER 6

THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF SYĀDVĀDA

Pradeep P. Gokhale

The Jaina doctrine of *syāt* is a doctrine central to Jaina philosophy. In Jaina theory of *pramāṇas* it is the doctrine which corresponds to *śabdapramāṇa* or *śrutapramāṇa* as understood by Jainas. The doctrine is closely connected with the Jaina ontology which highlights the infinite-fold character of reality. It is also closely connected with the Jaina theory of values because it provides us with a methodological tool for exercising non-injury in the intellectual field.

In this paper I want to concentrate upon the nature of the Jaina doctrine of *syāt*, popularly known as *syādvāda*, with special reference to the logical structure of the doctrine.

I have remarked above that *syādvāda* corresponds to the Jaina account of *śabdapramāṇa*. Naturally *syādvāda* is concerned with statements or propositions. In the articulations of *syādvāda* we are generally given a list of seven statements or statement forms (*bhaṅgas*) which are apparently inconsistent with each other. Every statement from the list contains the word *syāt* as a prefix. This inclusion of the word *syāt* in each statement implies amongst other things that the statements made as a part of the sevenfold scheme (*saptabhaṅgī*) are not contradictory at all, but they throw light upon the different aspects of reality. This raises a question regarding the logical structure of the *syāt* statements (that is, the statements containing *syāt* as a prefix) as understood by the Jaina thinkers. In order to solve this question and understand clearly the import of *syādvāda* some modern scholars of

Jainology and logic have suggested some logical models. In this paper I am going to discuss three such models which I have called the model of many-valued logic, the model of modal logic and the model of conditionality respectively. After discussing these models one by one, I am going to suggest a fourth model which, I feel, is the most adequate one.

The Model of Many-Valued Logic

Prof. S. L. Pandey in his article “Naya-vāda and Many-valued logic”¹ has conceived *nayavāda* and *syādvāda* as the two formulations of many-valued logic. In fact he claims that the logic of *nayas* is a three-valued logic of Lukasiewicz. He further claims that *syādvāda* being an instance of *nayavāda*, *syādvāda* too refers to many-valued logic. Here we are not concerned with the question whether his claim that *nayavāda* is Lukasiewiczian three-valued logic is correct, but we are concerned with his argument with regard to *syādvāda*. Apart from the question whether *nayavāda* is many-valued logic or not, it seems rather incorrect to hold that *syādvāda* is nothing but an instance of *nayavāda*. Because *nayavāda*, as has generally been held, gives us a class of ‘partial truths’, whereas *syādvāda* gives us a class of whole truths (or the whole truth). And the whole truth cannot be an instance of a partial truth. *Pramāṇa* cannot be an instance of *pramāṇāṁśa*.

But Prof. Pandey also presents some independent considerations in favour of his interpretation of *syādvāda* as many-valued logic. His main considerations may be briefly stated as follows:

1. Jainas accept that even contradictory statements like *p* and $\sim p$ could be true together. This implies that they challenge the law of contradiction. They give some truth-value (other than falsehood) to contradictory statements.²

1. Included in M.P. Marathe, Meena Kelkar, P.P. Gokhale (Ed.): *Studies in Jainism*, Indian Philosophical Quarterly Publication, Pune 1984, pp.156-166.

2. “.... Hence only that logic is indicated by *syādvāda* which challenges the law of contradiction and gives some truth value to contradictory statements”. *Ibid*, p.163.

2. *Avaktavya* or 'indeterminate' could be best understood as 'indeterminate', the third truth-value of Lukasiewicz's three-valued logic. But Prof. Pandey also claims: Jainas observe that the indeterminate compound statement is a conjunction of a positive statement and its negative form and that it challenges the law of contradiction.³

Both these considerations have one point in common viz. it is by challenging the law of contradiction that we arrive at the third truth-value. But do Jainas really challenge the law of contradiction? Do they hold that the two contradictory propositions like p and $\sim p$ could be true together? In that case there was no point in prefixing *syāt* to each statement in the seven-fold scheme. The import of the term *syāt* is that any given statement can be held to be true, but only in a certain respect or from a certain standpoint (*kathanācit*). Both p and not- p are true in some respect. But of course the respect in which p is true is different from the one in which not- p is true. In this way the role of the term *syāt* in *syāt*-statements is to dissolve the apparent contradiction between statements by pointing out that the truth of apparently contradictory statements is relative to the respective standpoints. The interpretation of *syādvāda* in terms of many-valued logic, especially Prof. Pandey's version of it, does not take due notice of this role of the term *syāt*.

Of course this criticism of Prof. Pandey does not answer the problem of the meaning of '*avaktavya*' which according to Prof. Pandey is the third truth-value. One can try to respond to this problem in two ways.

One, the question regarding the essence of *syādvāda* needs to be distinguished from the question regarding the nature of the seven-fold scheme. It would not perhaps be correct to suppose that *saptabhāṅgī* itself is the essence of *syādvāda*. One could accept *syādvāda* in its essence, but may not accept its articulation in terms of *saptabhāṅgī*.

3. *Ibid*, p.161.

Like Prof. Mohanlal Mehta⁴ one could say, *syāda* and *syāt-nāsti* suffice as the two basic forms. So it is perhaps incorrect to suppose that the category of *avaktavya* is essential to the Jaina theory of *syāt*.⁵

Secondly, even if the category of *avaktavya* is thought to be essential to *syādvāda*, the question remains whether it indicates 'indescribability' or 'indeterminateness' arising out of contradiction. Because the category of *avaktavya* does not seem to emerge simply because two contradictory statements happen to be made simultaneously (*yugapat*), but rather because the two standpoints from which the two apparently contradictory statements are asserted are considered at once and not sequentially. It is for instance odd to consider whether pot exists as pot and at the same time whether it exists as a cloth. But the oddity involved is more of epistemological kind than logical. The middle value designated by the term *avaktavya* is therefore better understood as epistemic middle rather than as the logical middle. It is closer to the middle truth-value called 'undeterminable' of Kleene's three-valued system⁶ rather than to Lukasiewiczian third truth-value called 'indeterminate'.

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4. See Mohanlal Mehta: *Jaina Dharma-Darśana*, (Hindi Book), Pārśvanātha Vidyāśrama Śodha Saṁsthāna, Benares, 1973, pp.373-374. Prof. Mohanlal Mehta points out that the seven-fold scheme of *syādvāda* is not a later addition. It is very much there in the Jaina canons. But he concludes the discussion by saying that out of the seven forms four are main: is, is-not, both and neither. And even out of these four, two are main: is and is-not.

The point is that one can present the essence of *syādvāda* even in terms of the two basic forms.

5. Prof. S. L. Pandey, however, contends that it is essential. He says, "The fourth *bhaṅga* i.e. the conjunction of a positive statement and its negative form needs a little more consideration as it is basic to Jaina logic. It is also called as *avaktavya* or indescribable", *Studies in Jainism*, Op. cit., p.161.
6. Nicholas Rescher remarks in the case of the three-valued system of Kleene: "In Kleene's system a proposition is to bear the third truth-value I not for fact-related, ontological reasons, but for knowledge-related, epistemological ones: it is not to be excluded that the proposition may *in fact* be true or false, but it is merely *unknown* or undeterminable what its specific truth-status may be."—Nicholas Rescher: *Many-Valued Logic* McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York (1969), p.34.

As a result, we can say that *avaktavya* is not the third truth-value in the logical sense of the term, because it does not arise out of the violation of the laws of logic such as non-contradiction and excluded middle.

The above discussion suggests that Prof. Pandey's attempt to interpret *syādvāda* as a kind of many-valued logic is not satisfactory. Now let us turn to the second model.

The Model of Modal Logic

We have seen that the interpretation of *syādvāda* as a kind of many-valued logic does not give an adequate account of the significance of the term *syāt* in *syādvāda*. In this second interpretation, however, there is an attempt to attach some special significance to it.⁷ According to this interpretation the term *syāt* means 'maybe', 'perhaps', 'possibly' or 'probably'. One can now formalise a *syāt*-statement by using some modal operator (say, M). But two points have to be noted at the outset before we try to formalise the seven-fold scheme in terms of the modal operator.

- (i) Although Jains use the same term *syāt* throughout the seven-fold scheme of *syādvāda*, the different occurrences of '*syāt*' point at different standpoints in different cases. '*Syāt*' in '*syāt asti*' does not point at the same standpoint as '*syāt*' in '*syāt nāsti*' does. Now although the third *bhaṅga* '*syāt asti nāsti ca*' contains only one occurrence of *syāt* we will have to analyse it as '*syāt asti syāt nāsti ca*' and also keep in mind that the two occurrences of *syāt* in this analysis do not point at the same standpoint. The same thing has to apply to our use of the modal operator M.

7. This interpretation was first suggested by Prof. S. S. Barlingay in his "A Modern Introduction to Indian Logic", National Publishing House, New Delhi, First Edition (1965). p.6, p.65. His suggestion was further developed in terms of the kinds of possibilities by Prof. M. P. Marathe in his paper "An Analysis of *Syāt* in *syādvāda*" (*Studies in Jainism*, Op. cit., pp. 141-155) The formalisation of the sevenfold scheme in terms of a modal operator was suggested and examined by me in a Marathi article "*Syādvāda, Svarūpa āṇi Maryādā*" in *Parāmarśa*, Vol. I No. 3, Deptt. of Philosophy, University of Poona (1979).

- (ii) We will have to use some special operator for indicating *avaktavya*. Just as we signify 'It is not the case that p' by ' $\sim p$ ' similarly we could signify 'It is indeterminable whether p' by ' ∞p '.

Now we are in a position to formalise the seven-fold scheme of *syādvāda* in the following way:

- (1) Mp
- (2) M $\sim p$
- (3) Mp. M $\sim p$
- (4) M ∞p
- (5) Mp. M ∞p
- (6) M $\sim p$. M ∞p
- (7) Mp. M $\sim p$. M ∞p

It is *prima facie* possible to justify this interpretation by relating it to the Jaina concept of *naya* and also with the notion of third truth-value as may be applied to *nayas*. Prof. S. L. Pandey for instance in his article mentioned above, tries to show that all *nayas* being partial truths can be assigned the third truth-value I of Lukasiewicz's three-valued system. Now Lukasiewicz himself relates the idea of the middle truth-value with some modal logical considerations.⁸ His attempt to combine the two considerations may be used for our purpose in the following way: "Possibly p" is true when p is indeterminate. "Possibly $\sim p$ " is true when $\sim p$ is indeterminate. But if p is indeterminate so is $\sim p$. [Jainas would add: if p is indeterminate, so is ∞p]. So given any proposition p which expresses a *naya* (which is indeterminate), Mp, M $\sim p$, Mp.M $\sim p$, M ∞p all are true.

8. Nicholas Rescher states this in the following way: "With a view to the future contingency interpretation of the third truth-value I, Lukasiewicz introduced a modal operator of possibility and necessity (symbolically \diamond and \square) into his three-valued logic. These are to be subject to the truth-table:

p	$\diamond p$	$\square p$
T	T	T
I	T	F
F	F	F "

—*Many Valued Logic*, Op. cit., p.25. For typographical convenience I have used M and L as the respective symbols for modal operators.

One could also add: If *p* is indeterminate, *Mp* is true, but *Lp* (i.e. Necessarily *p*) is false. And this is in tune with the basic insight of the Jaina logicians when they claim that *Ekāntavāda* (i.e. insisting upon partial truth as if it were the whole truth; insisting upon an indeterminate view as if it were necessarily true) amounts to a fallacy of *naya* (*nayābhāsa* or *durnaya*).

This justification seems to be *prima facie* intelligible, but it is doubtful whether it gives a true picture of what Jainas mean by the term *syāt* in *syādvāda*.

It seems rather incorrect to identify 'incomplete truth' or 'partial truth' with indeterminateness. That a *naya* is 'partially true' implies that it is true in a certain respect and certainly true in that respect. *Naya* is also partially false because it is false in some other respect and certainly false in that other respect. Truth or falsehood of *naya* does not imply any kind of uncertainty⁹, whereas indeterminateness does involve a kind of uncertainty. This partialness of truth in the case of *nayas* is made explicit in *syādvāda* by applying the prefix *syāt* to *naya*-statements. 'Syāt', therefore, does not mean 'may be', 'perhaps', 'possibly', or 'probably'. But it rather means 'in a certain way', 'in some respect' etc. This is the meaning of the term *kathañcit* which is generally used as the synonym for the term *syāt* in *syādvāda*. The modern scholars like Muni Nathmal and B.K. Matilal bring this out and also repudiate in a way the claim that *syādvāda* could be rendered as a case for modal logic.

But while interpreting *syāt* as 'in some respect', instead of 'possibly', some modern scholars also give a different explanation of *syādvāda* by rendering *syāt*-statements as conditional statements of a kind. This leads us to the third model, which I call the model of conditionality.

9. Muni Nathmal emphasises this point by distinguishing between *syādvāda* and *anīścayavāda*. See Muni Nathmal: *Jaina Darśana, Manana aurā Mīmāṃsā* (Hindi Book), Ādarśa Sāhitya Saṅgha Prakāśana, Churu, (Rajasthan), Revised Ed. 1973. Prof. B. K. Matilal too is insistent on this point. See his article "Saptabhaṅgī" included in J.N. Mohanty and S. P. Banerjee (Ed.) *Self, Knowledge and Freedom*, The World Press Private Ltd., Calcutta, 1978. pp.162-64.

The Model of Conditionality

Prof. Sagarmal Jain¹⁰ and Prof. B.K. Matilal¹¹ in their papers have interpreted independently *syādvāda* in terms of conditional propositions. Prof. Jain has even formulated a complete version of *saptabhaṅgī* in terms of conditional statements; but we need not go into the full details of it. The essence of the view of both Prof. Matilal and Prof. Jain is that the proposition of the form '*syāt ghaṭaḥ asti*' could be expressed as a conditional statement in which the statement 'the pot exists' is the consequent and the standpoint from which the consequent is asserted is expressed by the antecedent.

The first two forms in the seven-fold scheme could be instantiated with the help of another instance as follows:

1. If 'self' means the present act of consciousness then the self is impermanent.
2. If 'self' means the substance to which different acts of consciousness are attributed, then the self is permanent. The forms of the two statements are

$$C_1 \supset (S \text{ is } P)$$

$$C_2 \supset (S \text{ is not-}P)$$

This interpretation is better than the earlier two interpretations in an important respect. It takes the word *syāt* to mean 'under such and such condition' which is very close to 'in some respect', the meaning of '*kathañci*'.

However, the interpretation seems to have at least two major drawbacks.

- (i) *Syāt*-statements under this interpretation are supposed to appear as conditional or hypothetical statements. But actually *syāt*-statement does not have if-then form. A conditional statement does not exclude the possibility that its antecedent be false and yet the consequent be true. But a *syāt*-statement seems to

10. "Syādvāda: Eka Cintana" (Hindi Article), included in *Studies in Jainism*, Op. cit., pp.167-192.

11. "Saptabhaṅgī", included in *Self, Knowledge and Freedom*, Op. cit., pp.159-172.

presuppose the truth or at least admissibility of the standpoint from which the statement is claimed to be true. The logical difference between a conditional statement and a *syāt*-statement seems to be like the one between the following two forms:

- (a) If the standpoint c_1 is true, then p .
- (b) There is the standpoint c_1 from which p .
- (ii) A *syāt*-statement indirectly refers to *some* standpoint but does not specify any standpoint. Rendering *syāt*-statement as a conditional statement, however, demands on our part that we should specify the standpoint in the *syāt*-statement itself. Prof. Sagarmal Jain thinks it essential to specify the condition or the respect in which a proposition is true, in order to avoid certain confusions and misconceptions.¹² Indeed Prof. Jain is right if he means that when it comes to the justification of a *syāt*-statement, one will have to specify the standpoint from which the given statement is true. But if Prof. Jain means that the specification of the standpoint should be incorporated in the formulation of *syāt*-statement itself, then his suggestion amounts to distortion of the original logical form of *syāt* in *syādvāda*. The peculiarity and the beauty of *syādvāda* lies in indicating the existence of *some* standpoint, *some* condition or *some* respect which makes the given statement true, without specifying the exact standpoint or condition or respect which does so. The model of conditionality does not seem to preserve this peculiar logical form of *syādvāda*. Hence it fails to be fully satisfactory.

An Alternative Model: The Model of Existential Quantifier

It would not, therefore, be pointless to make an effort in search of an alternative formalisation, a more adequate formalisation of *syāt*-statements. The effort could be made on the following lines:

We have seen that Jaina logicians usually translate the prefix *syāt* as *kathañcit* and that *kathañcit* could be translated in English as 'from a standpoint', 'in a way', 'in some respect' etc. '*Syāt*' in this sense does

12. "*Syādvāda: Eka Cintana*", Op. cit., p.181.

not appear as an antecedent of a conditional but it looks more like an existential quantifier of the following sort

There is a standpoint such that.....

There is a way in which.....

There is a respect in which.....

Now let us try to analyse the *syāt*-statement:

Syāt jīvaḥ nityaḥ

in terms of the above interpretation of *syāt*. The statement would rather mean:

- (a) There is a standpoint such that 'that Self is permanent' is the case.

Now if we introduce x as a variable ranging over different standpoints and p as a constant which stands for the statement 'Self is permanent', then the same *syāt*-statement could be formalised as

- (b) There exists some x such that x makes p true.

Here I have presupposed that a relation can hold between a standpoint and proposition which could be described as 'the standpoint makes the proposition true' or that 'the proposition is true from the standpoint'. We can symbolically represent ' x makes y true' as xTy in which case the *syāt*-statement could be formalised as follows:

- (c) $(\exists x)(xTp)$

If we want to specify that ∞ ranges over standpoints and not anything else within the formalisation itself, then our formalisation will take a little complicated form, because we will have to introduce a propositional function S_x to mean ' x is a standpoint'. Now the *syāt*-statement would be formalised as follows:

- (d) $(\exists x)(Sx . xTp)$

This (d) would be our standard version of the first *bhaṅga* in *saptabhaṅgī*. By representing 'It is not the case that p ' by ' $\sim p$ ' and 'It is undeterminable whether p ' by ' ∞p ' we get the complete version of the sevenfold scheme of *syādvāda* as follows:

- (1) $(\exists x)(Sx . xTp)$
- (2) $(\exists x)(Sx . xT\sim p)$
- (3) $(\exists x)(Sx . xTp) . (\exists y)(Sy . yT\sim p)$

- (4) $(\exists x) (Sx \cdot xT \infty p)$
- (5) $(\exists x) (Sx \cdot xTp) \cdot (\exists y) (Sy \cdot yT \infty p)$
- (6) $(\exists x) (Sx \cdot xT \sim p) \cdot (\exists y) (Sy \cdot yT \infty p)$
- (7) $(\exists x) (Sx \cdot xTp) \cdot (\exists y) (Sy \cdot yT \sim p) \cdot (\exists z) (Sz \cdot zT \infty p)$

Although this formulation is more adequate than the earlier formulations, it does not seem to be perfectly adequate. One of the differences between the original sevenfold scheme of *syādvāda* and the above formulation is that all the statements in the above formulation are metalinguistic in character. They are statements about the statement *p*. Whereas the original *syāt*-statements are at least seemingly object-linguistic in character. One will have perhaps to search for an object-linguistic counterpart of the above metalinguistic formulation. The first *bhaṅga* could be restated now in the following way:

- (a) There is a standpoint such that 'that Self is permanent' is the case. (a) could be restated as
- (b¹) There is a standpoint from which Self is permanent. This looks like the original *syāt*-statement. Here we will have to introduce a three-term relation of the following sort:

Fxyz : y is z from x

Now (b¹) could be formalised as

- (c¹) $(\exists x) (Sx \cdot Fxsp)$ where S stands for Self and p for permanent.

It appears that we have succeeded in giving an object linguistic formalisation of the first *bhaṅga* of the *saptabhaṅgī*. But have we really succeeded? In order to pursue this question we may have to analyse the notion of 'standpoint' which is frequently used by Jainas. We can address ourselves to the question: What is there in a standpoint on account of which we can say that one and the same statement could be true from one standpoint and false from another?

In an answer to this question, I think the distinction between sentence and statement that logicians generally make is of crucial importance. According to this distinction, a statement is the cognitive content of an indicative sentence. It is the sense of an indicative sentence. The same sentence can be used for making different statements, some true, some false. In terms of this distinction we could say that standpoint is something like a sense of an indicative sentence

or at least that it has got something to do with the sense of a sentence. It is because of this, that the change in standpoint results into the change in the sense of the sentence and this could result into the change in the truth-value.

We could now say in response to the question we addressed ourselves to, that it is not the same *statement* which is true from one standpoint and false from another. It is rather the same *sentence* which expresses a true statement under one interpretation and a false statement under another. A standpoint in this sense is an interpretation of a given sentence or at least something that goes into the interpretation of a given sentence.

The above discussion supports an insight of Prof. B. K. Matilal which he exhibits when he translates *syāt* as 'in a sense'.¹³ But if there is a truth in this insight, then another consequence follows. A *syāt*-statement in so far as it is a statement *about* a sense of a sentence, is a metalinguistic statement and not an object-linguistic one. The *syāt*-statement like '*syāt jīvaḥ nityaḥ*' seems to be directly about Self, but it is in fact directly about a sentence 'Self is permanent' and about the sense in which the sentence could be construed as true. It is a metalinguistic statement in disguise.

This fact about the logical structure of *syādvāda* may have some important implications in the field of Jaina ontology and also in the Jaina theory of values. But it could be a matter for a separate discussion.

13. "Thus *syāt* means in the Jaina use a conditional Yes. It is like saying "in a certain sense, yes". B. K. Matilal, Op. cit., p.163.

CHAPTER 7

THE COMPLEMENTARITY PRINCIPLE AND SYĀDVĀDA

D.S. Kothari

The principle of complementarity, which we owe principally to Niels Bohr, is perhaps the most significant and revolutionary concept of modern physics. The complementarity approach can enable people to see that seemingly irreconcilable points of view need not be contradictory. These, on deeper understanding, may be found to be complementary and mutually illuminating—the two opposing contradictory aspects being parts of a “totality”, seen from different perspectives. It allows the possibility of accommodating widely divergent human experiences into an underlying harmony, and bringing to light new social and ethical vistas for exploration and for alleviation of human suffering. Bohr fervently hoped that one day complementarity would be an integral part of everyone’s education and would provide guidance in the problems and challenges of life.

Hideki Yukawa was once asked whether young physicists in Japan, like most young physicists in the West, found it difficult to comprehend the idea of complementarity. He replied that Bohr’s complementarity always appeared to them as quite evident: “You see, we in Japan have not been corrupted by Aristotle.”

The core of the profound ethical and spiritual insights propounded in the Upaniṣads, Buddhism, and Jainism rests essentially on the complementarity approach to the problems of life and existence, though the formulations vary. Sri Aurobindo, perhaps the greatest

exponent of the Upaniṣadic thought in our times, writes in his commentary on the *Īśa Upaniṣad*:

The principle it follows throughout is the uncompromising reconciliation of uncompromising extremes... The pairs of opposites successively taken up by the *Upaniṣad* and resolved are, in the order of their succession: (1) The conscious Lord and phenomenal Nature; (2) Renunciation and Enjoyment; (3) Action in Nature and Freedom in the Soul; (4) The One stable *Brahman* and the multiple Movement; (5) Being and Becoming; (6) The Active Lord and the indifferent *Akṣara Brahman*; (7) *Vidyā* (Knowledge) and *Avidyā* (Ignorance); (8) Birth and Non-Birth; (9) Works and Knowledge.

The Jain formulation of the complementarity approach is based on the *Syādvāda* dialectic (*Syād* means “somehow”). The *Syādvāda* logic is indispensable for the theory and practice of *ahimsā* (nonviolence) in thought, word, and deed. *Syādvāda* and *ahimsā* go integrally together. *Syādvāda* asserts that the knowledge of reality is possible only by denying the absolutistic attitude. What is new is the fact that relativity and quantum mechanics embody the same line of thought as one finds in the *Syādvāda* logic. Further, the *Syādvāda* approach enriches our understanding of complementarity in physics. As pointed out by P. C. Mahalanobis and J. B. S. Haldane, the foundations of the theory of probability are also in keeping with the *Syādvāda* logic.

The recognition that in atomic phenomena we are concerned with an application of complementarity which can be precisely formulated provides a basic motivation for eventually discovering deeper and richer levels of complementarity encompassing both matter and mind. Bohr concludes his essay “Causality and Complementarity” as follows:

In general philosophical perspective, it is significant that, as regards analysis and synthesis in other fields of knowledge, we are confronted with situations reminding us of the situation in quantum physics. Thus, the integrity of living organisms and the characteristics of conscious individuals and human cultures present features of wholeness, the account of which implies a typical complementary mode of description. Owing to the diversified use of the rich


vocabulary available for communication of experience in those wider fields, and above all to the varying interpretations, in philosophical literature, of the concept of causality, the aim of such comparisons has sometimes been misunderstood. However, the gradual development of an appropriate terminology for the description of the simpler situation in physical science indicates that we are not dealing with more or less vague analogies, but with clear examples of logical relations which, in different contexts, are met with in wider fields.

Bohr's first and continuing preoccupation with philosophical problems related to the use of language for unambiguously describing our experiences. A fundamental difficulty in this regard arises from the inescapable fact that man is both *actor* and *spectator* in the universe. Thus, when I am "seeing" a thing, I am also "acting": my choice to see the particular thing is an "act" on my part. We often use the *same* word to describe both a state of our consciousness and the associated accompanying behavior of the body. How to avoid the ambiguity? Bohr drew attention to the beautiful analogy between the concept of multiform functions and the concept of a Riemann surface: the different values of a multiform function are distributed on different planes of a Riemann surface. Similarly, we may say that the different meanings of the same word belong to different "planes of objectivity."

Bohr used to tell how the ancient Indian thinkers had emphasized the futility of our ever understanding the "meaning of existence." And he would add that the one certain thing is that a statement like "existence is meaningless" is itself devoid of any meaning.

As lucidly pointed out by Heisenberg, the concepts of ordinary or natural language have undergone changes due to developments of modern science. Further changes are to be anticipated as a result of continuing advancements. The ambiguities and contradictions faced in science have been attributed to the use of the terminology of natural language. Contradictions are inherent in natural language, as well as in precise scientific language. The role of the complementarity approach and of *Syādvāda* logic is to give a less ambiguous meaning to the terminology of natural language and to provide greater insight into the relationship between human mind and reality.

Consider the following idealized situation, or “thought experiment,” discussed by Heisenberg. There is an atom in a closed box that is divided by a partition into two equal compartments. The partition has a very small hole so that the atom can pass through it. The hole can be closed by a shutter, if desired. According to classical logic, the atom will be either in the left compartment (L) or in the right compartment (R). There is no third possibility. But quantum physics forces us to admit other possibilities to explain adequately the results of experiments. If we use the words “box” and “atom” at all, then there is no escape whatsoever from admitting that in some strange way, which totally defies description in words, *the same atom is, at the same time, in both compartments* (when the hole is open). Such a situation cannot be expressed properly in ordinary language—it is inexpressible (except mathematically). As we shall see, it is *avaktāvya* in the terminology of *Syādvāda*. It is an idea crazy beyond words. But there is no escape; for, totally unlike large objects, particles at the atomic level exhibit




a wave aspect as well as a particle aspect. These two aspects, which are contradictory and mutually exclusive in the everyday domain, are complementary in atomic phenomena.

Bohr’s famous analysis of a two-slit interference experiment made this complementarity quantitative. The figure here shows a slight variant of the thought experiment involved. A plate *P* receives the photons. If, as in (a) in the figure, the plate is rigidly fixed, the interference pattern is built up by the arrival of many photons. But with a very weak beam, in which photons cross the apparatus one at a time, and with *P* suspended so that it can recoil along the *y* direction, as in (b), one might try to infer whether an individual photon came through hole *A* or hole *B* by measuring the transverse momentum $\pm h\nu\theta/c$ transferred to *P*. This, however, will, by the Heisenberg

indeterminacy principle, make the y coordinate of P uncertain by an amount $\Delta y > h/(h\nu\theta/c)$: that is, $\Delta y > \lambda/\theta$. But for observation of interference fringes, it is necessary that this uncertainty be less than the fringe spacing, which requires Δy to be *less* than λ/θ . For interference fringes to be produced, photons must in some sense go through both holes, but this can happen only if we forgo any attempt to observe them. It is because of this mutual exclusiveness of the two setups (a) and (b) that the particle and the wave aspects are complementary and not contradictory.

A similar situation would apply if one observed Xrays scattered from the atom in the two-compartment box. One could either locate the atom as being in one compartment or the other, or one could observe an interference pattern arising from its partial presence in both compartments. Moreover, choosing at a given instant (“now”) to make one type of observation or the other would seem to imply that this decision influenced the state of the atom at an earlier time (earlier by the transit time of Xrays from the atom to the plate). This looks



utterly strange. The lesson is that the behavior of “small objects” is not visualizable. It is not describable in ordinary language. Nevertheless it is real. As Wheeler has remarked:

“There is no more remarkable feature of the quantum world [characterized by the Planck constant] than the strange coupling it brings about between future and past. Every observation which implies a freedom of choice (that is, free will) between mutually exclusive alternatives is, in a sense, a participation in genesis (giving a new meaning to our being “actors” and “spectators” in the drama of existence). Perhaps, as we probe deeper in our understanding of nature, other levels of complementarity may be discovered.

Let us now return to the *Syādvāda* formulation as applied to the wave-particle duality. According to the *Syādvāda* scheme, every fact of reality leads to seven ways or modes of description. These are combinations of affirmation, negation, and inexpressibility—namely, (1) Existence, (2) Nonexistence, (3) Occurrence of Existence and Nonexistence, (4) Inexpressibility or Indeterminateness, (5) Inexpressibility as qualified by Existence, (6) Inexpressibility as qualified by Nonexistence, and (7) Inexpressibility as qualified by both Existence and Nonexistence.





The fourth mode—the inexpressibility known as *avaktavya*—is the key element of the *Syādvāda* dialectic. This is especially well brought out by the foregoing discussion of the wave-particle duality in modern physics. As mentioned earlier, Mahalanobis and Haldane have discussed the significance of *Syādvāda* for the foundations of modern statistics.

The physical example of the atom and the box can be presented diagrammatically and compared with the seven modes of *Syādvāda*, as shown in the table on the following page. The quantum-mechanical description in the usual notation appears in the middle column. The atom when *observed* is either in the state $|L\rangle$ or $|R\rangle$. The *superposed state* $|P\rangle = |L\rangle + |R\rangle$ is not directly observable using the type of apparatus for observing $|L\rangle$ and $|R\rangle$ states.

Take any meaningful statement. Call it *A*. It may describe a fact of experience. It could be a proposition of logic or mathematics. The *Syādvāda* dialectic demands that in the very nature of things the negative of the given statement is also correct under certain conditions. Denote by *not-A* the negative statement of *A*. The conditions under which the two statements *A* and *not-A* are correct cannot, of course, be the same; in general, the respective conditions are mutually exclusive.

Given a statement *A*, it may not be at all easy to discover the conditions or situations under which *not-A* holds. It may even appear at the time impossible. But faith in *Syādvāda* should encourage one to continue the search. For example, in Euclidean geometry the sum of the three angles of a triangle is equal to the sum of two right angles. The negation of this theorem is a new geometry in which the sum of the three angles of a triangle is not equal to the sum of two right angles. Not until two thousand years after Euclid was non-Euclidean geometry discovered, in the nineteenth century; Einstein's theory of general relativity is based on this geometry.

For special relativity theory, the *Syādvāda* approach is directly applicable. Seven modes of *Syādvāda*, illustrated by the example of an atom in a box with two compartments.

<i>Atom in a box</i>	<i>Quantum-mechanical representation (in the usual notation)</i>	<i>Syādvāda mode of description</i>
1. Atom in left compartment(L) 	System in state $ L\rangle$	Existence (atom in L)
2. Atom in right compartment(R) 	System in state $ R\rangle$	Nonexistence (in L)
3. Cases (1) and (2), at different times; or two similar boxes at the same time 	Mixture of $ L\rangle$ and $ R\rangle$ represented by $ L\rangle\langle L + R\rangle\langle R $	Existence (in L) and Nonexistence (in L)
4. Atom in both compartments, at the same time, this wave aspect is nonvisualizable 	System in a state which is superposition of $ L\rangle$ and $ R\rangle$ $ P\rangle = L\rangle + R\rangle$	<i>Avaktavya</i> (Inexpressibility)

5.	(4) and (1) at different times; or two boxes at the same time, one box for (4) and another box for (1)	Mixture $ L\rangle\langle P + L\rangle\langle L $	<i>Avaklavya</i> and Existence (in L)
6.	(4) and (2), at different times; or two boxes at the same time	Mixture $ P\rangle\langle P + R\rangle\langle R $	<i>Avaklavya</i> and Nonexistence (in L)
7.	(4) and (3), at different times; or three boxes at the same time	Mixture $ P\rangle\langle P + R\rangle\langle R + L\rangle\langle L $	<i>Avaklavya</i> and Existence and Nonexistence

An object travelling with any velocity is at rest with respect to an observer travelling with the object. *Syādvāda* logic implies the existence of the negation of this proposition. Thus, according to *Syādvāda*, there must exist an entity such that to imagine an observer travelling with it must imply a logical contradiction. *Syādvāda* associates this with light, whose existence is the foundation of the relativity theory.

When we know that both *A* and *not-A* exist, we are ready to move on to a deeper layer or a new plane of reality corresponding to the simultaneous existence of both *A* and its negation. The new plane cannot be described in terms of the conceptual framework which described *A* and *not-A*. *Syādvāda* logic, indispensable for ethical and spiritual quest and for *ahimsā*, is also of the greatest value for the advancement of natural science.

For the quest of truth—scientific, moral, and spiritual—what is most important is the *Syādvāda* or the complementarity approach. The precise definitions and number of alternative modes are less important.

CHAPTER 8

NYĀYA CRITICISM OF ANEKĀNTA

(With special reference to the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*)

L. V. Joshi

After having completed the discussion on the means of valid knowledge in the third Pariccheda of the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, Bhāsarvajña takes up the topic of *prameya*. On this occasion the author asserts that *ātman* is different from body etc. and eternal.¹

Against the eternity of *ātman*, a Jaina thinker argues that if *ātman* is accepted as eternal, he becomes of one nature only. Consequently it would not be possible to occur to him happiness, misery, bondage, emancipation etc. in succession. Once *ātman* is regarded as happy, he would always be happy, since a nature can never be destroyed. On the other hand, *ātman* cannot be taken as non-eternal, because if it is so accepted, he would have to bear the fruits of the actions which he has not done. It is, therefore, justifiable to accept the *anekānta*. Samantabhadra has said to this effect—A good action or a bad action, bondage or emancipation would never occur in the case of those who are extremely attached to the *ekānta* and who are enemies of themselves as well as of others.²

1. *Nyāyasāra*, *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, Bhāsarvajña, editor—Swāmī Yogīndrānanda, Ṣaḍdarśana Prakāśana Pratiṣṭhānam, Varanasi, edn. I, 1968, p.543.

2. *Ibid*, p.552

See *Devāgama* or *Āptamīmāṃsā*, Swāmī Samantabhadra, Trans. by Jugalkiśora Mukhtara 'Yugavīra', Virasevāmandira-trust—Prakaśana. Delhi, edn. I 1967, p.9. Also See: *Aṣṭasahasrī-Tātparya-Vivaraṇam*, Part. I p. 130(a) (with

Anekānta is established on the basis of means of valid knowledge. Proving this, Samantabhadra asserts that a person is grieved with reason, when a bracelet is destroyed since he wanted it, and a person is pleased with reason, when a crown is produced because he wanted it; and a person remains neutral with reason since he sees the underlying substance, i.e. gold as permanent even in the form of a bracelet or a crown.³

In the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* we get the text *kaṭa* instead of *ghaṭa* and the editor Svāmī Yogīndrānanda corroborated the NyB text on the basis of the prevalent philosophical usage *kaṭamukuṭasuvārṇa*.⁴

Samantabhadra's *kārikā* mentioned above proves that every object has threefold nature, viz. origination, destruction and permanence. Here origination and destruction pertain to modifications or *paryāyas*; and the gold, which is *dravya* or substance is permanent.⁵ Now from the viewpoint of modifications, the gold can be described as non-permanent; whereas from the viewpoint of the gold itself it can be said to be permanent. This has led to the acceptance of *anekānta*, according to which we can have two contradictory propositions relating to the same object. With the help of knowledge of seven *padārthas*, *jīva* etc. a man can get emancipation.⁶ Bhāsarvajña explains the nature of *jīva* etc. on the basis of Akalaṅka's *Tattvārthavārtika*.⁷ Then the author gives the definition of *anekānta* on the same basis. The *anekānta* is defined as various alternative propositions, positive

Samantabhadra's *Āptamīmāṃsā*, Akalaṅka's *Bhāṣya*, Vidyānanda's *Aṣṭasahasrī-vṛtti*)—Yaśovijayaji, Editor—Vijayodaya Sūri, Jaina Granthaparakāśaka Sabhā, Ahmedabad, 1937 A.D.

3. *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, p.553. See *Āptamīmāṃsā*, 59-60.

4. *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, Fn.1, p.553.

5. *utpādavyayadhrauvayayuktaṃ sat/Tattvārthasūtra*, V.30
svajāti-aparityāgena bhāvāntarāvāptiḥ utpādaḥ/.... tathā pūrvabhāvavigamavyayanam vyayah/.... dhruveḥ sthairyakarmanah dhruvati iti dhruvaḥ/Tattvārtha-Rājavārtika
 of Akalaṅka-Deva, Pt.II, edited by M.K. Jain, Bhāratīya Jñānapīṭha, Kashi, edn. I, 1967, pp.494-495.

6. *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, p.553.

7. *Ibid*, p.553.

Comp. *Tattvārtha-Rājavārtika*, p.26.

and negative as well as mutually non-contradictory in regard to one and the same object, as a reply to some question, on the ground of means of knowledge which (means) is *dr̥ṣṭa* and desirable.⁸

Then Bhāsarvajña explains the application of *anekānta* following almost verbatim the text of Akalaṅka's *Tattvārthavārtika*. The editor, Svāmi Yogīndrānanda seems to believe that Bhāsarvajña has verbatim quoted the passage from *Tattvārthavārtika* and hence he puts the passage into inverted commas which (marks) are not found in the photostat of *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*.⁹ As a matter of fact, Bhāsarvajña has paraphrased the TAV text in his own way.

Now, according to the *anekānta*, a pot exists from the viewpoint of its own nature and it does not exist from the viewpoint of the nature of another thing. One's own nature means an indicative sign on the basis of which, the word 'ghaṭa' is employed and the cognition of *ghaṭa* arises. And *parātman* of a pot is that in respect of which the word 'ghaṭa' and its cognition are not employed.¹⁰

Now if a pot does not exist even from the point of view of its own nature, then the verbal communication such as 'a pot' would not be possible in respect of it. Similarly, if a pot is taken to be existing even from the viewpoint of the nature of another thing, then it would give licence to use the word 'paṭa' for 'ghaṭa' also. It is, therefore, concluded that a pot exists from the viewpoint of its own nature, and the same pot can be said to be non-existent from the viewpoint of the nature of another thing.¹¹

The potness and non-potness as desired to be described with the modes stated above, are not mutually different. Indeed if they are taken to be different, the words 'a pot' and 'a non-pot' cannot be employed in respect of the same object, and accordingly such cognitions also would not arise in regard to the same thing. And if the potness and non-potness are taken to be different, there would not be the same

8. *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, p.554.

9. *Ibid*, p.554.

See photostat p.276, L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad.

10. *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, p.554.

11. *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, p.554.

substratum for both of them to reside in. But that is not so. It is therefore established that the pot is of the twofold nature. Hence the same pot comes to be expressed in sequence by the words 'pot' and 'non-pot'.¹²

Now, if the object of twofold nature is stated exclusively to be a pot, then that statement is not essentially true because it does not include the nature of another thing. On the other hand, if the object is exclusively asserted to be non-pot, it would be false since it does not take into consideration the nature of the object itself. And there is not a single word which can describe both the natures of the object, and so it is called 'indescribable'.

And thus the doctrine of *anekānta* can be applied to everything in the world.¹³

Against this, it may be argued that the assertion that *ekānta* is not accepted and the *anekānta* is accepted is itself *ekānta*—a one-sided determination. How could it be said that the *anekānta* is applicable to all the things in the world?¹⁴

In answer to this it is said that even in respect of *anekānta*, the *ekānta* is not admitted. We can state—May be the *anekānta* somehow is, may be the *anekānta* somehow is not; and so on.

Now Bhāsarvajña criticises the doctrine of *anekānta*. It is said that a good or a bad action, bondage or emancipation etc. would not be possible in the case of those who are extremely attached to the *ekānta*. That is not proper. In fact, a good action etc. are possible only in the case of those who exclusively accept the *ekānta*. For example, if the doctrine of *ekānta*, e.g. that person alone who is the agent of a certain action can enjoy the fruit of that action is accepted, then and then only an intelligent person employs himself in activity to obtain a desired fruit and to avoid the undesired result.¹⁵

12. *Ibid*, p.555. In the text of *Tattvārtha-Rājavārtika* (pp.33-35), about ten different modes to describe the same object as pot or non-pot are mentioned, which are found absent in the text of *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*.

13. *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, p.555.

14. *Ibid*, p.555.

15. *Ibid*, p.555.

If *anekānta* is accepted, it would be possible that one does an action and another enjoys its fruit. An intelligent person may not employ himself even in the activity of dining etc. When a king and others would dine, the satisfaction would occur to the naked Jaina monk. And if argued that it would never happen, then one has to endorse the *ekānta*.¹⁶

Moreover it is contended that *ātman* is admitted either as eternal or non-eternal, both ways the faults are bound to arise. Hence *ātman* should be regarded as both eternal and non-eternal.¹⁷ But if it is accepted as both eternal and non-eternal, then the faults as pointed out on both the sides are bound to arise, and who else wiser than the naked Jaina monk is there to avert the faults?

It is, therefore, concluded that *ātman* is eternal alone. When a pleasure inhering in *ātman* is produced, he is called happy, and when a misery is produced, *ātman* is called miserable. Production and destruction take place only in respect of pleasure, pain etc., and not in respect of *ātman*. For example, when a staff is held by Caitra, he is called staff-bearer, and when it is not held by him, he is called staffless.¹⁸

Samantabhadra has attempted to establish the *anekānta* by citing an example of a bracelet, a crown etc. But it is not true. When a golden bracelet is broken, the person who wanted it becomes unhappy. And when a golden crown is made out of it, the man who wanted it becomes happy. The person who was interested only in gold remains neutral in both the events, as when a man deposits his object at the house of a merchant, he does not become unhappy, and when after having used that object, the merchant gives it back to him, he does not become happy, he remains neutral in both the events.¹⁹

Here according to the Nyāya view, all the three things, i.e. a bracelet, a crown and gold, are different from one another. And one cannot, therefore, assert that one and the same thing is eternal and non-eternal

16. *Ibid*, p.555.

17. *Ibid*, p.555.

18. *Ibid*, p.555-556.

19. *Ibid*, p.556.

both. Eternity and non-eternity cannot subsist in the same substratum, because they are mutually contradictory.²⁰

Though the bracelet-shape and the crown-shape are respectively destroyed and produced, and the gold-shape remains steady or permanent, yet not a single thing here can be proved as both, eternal and non-eternal, because the attributes of the three shapes are not in contact with one another. And if they are regarded to be in contact with one another, then the pleasure and neutrality also must occur to the person who wants a bracelet alone, as the grief occurs to him. This proves that the three shapes are not identical.²¹

If it is argued against this that the modifications such as a bracelet etc. being regarded as different from each other, they cannot be said to be residing in the same substratum, then the argument does not stand to reason. For, even when there is a difference among modifications, they could subsist in the same substratum, e.g. a staff and an ear-ring, though being different from each other can reside in the same person.²² Moreover, if the non-difference between a bracelet and a crown is admitted, then by merely apprehending the bracelet-shape, the crown-shape also must be apprehended. And it is not proper to hold identity between the shape apprehended and that which is not apprehended. And yet if the identity is somehow endorsed, there would not be any difference between a donkey and a Jaina monk.²³

Now, it may be contended that a Jaina thinker accepts the difference between two modifications, but he asserts that there is no difference between a modification and its underlying substance, viz. between a bracelet and gold. But this also cannot be maintained. For, the difference even between a modification and its underlying substance can be established on the basis of apprehension of one thing in the absence of another thing. Even when we apprehend a gold-shape, the bracelet-shape does not come to be apprehended inseparably. Hence

20. *Ibid*, p.556.

21. *Ibid*, p.556.

22. *Ibid*, p.556.

23. *Ibid*, p.556.

even a modification such as bracelet etc. is different from gold-shape, i.e. the underlying substance, just as a donkey is different from camel.²⁴

Again, it may be argued that there may be a difference, but we cannot say that there is a difference alone, because the *anekānta* could be applied to difference also. Accordingly, may be there is somehow a difference and so on. Thus the whole world is pervaded by *anekānta*; and no instance is found to corroborate the *ekānta* view.²⁵

But this is not proper. There is certainly an example to establish the *ekānta*. The nature of Jina, of being emancipated and omniscient is absolutely different from the lower types of nature belonging to a donkey, a camel, a boar and the like.²⁶ And the Jaina thinker cannot apply the *anekānta* here also. It cannot be said—May be the emancipated Jina is somehow the lowest type of soul, may be he is somehow not so and so on. And if someone insists on the *saptabhaṅgī* being applied here also, then that assertion would not please the mind of the learned, because it is bereft of scriptural and logical ground as well as it is stated in the spur of competition with jealousy.²⁷

Besides, if the Jaina thinkers are prepared to worship a donkey, a camel, a pig etc. as they worship Jina, or if they are ready to eat stones, excreta etc. as they take gur, curd, butter-milk etc, then the doctrine of *ekānta* can never be established. But that is not so. Hence it is proved that the *anekānta* cannot be applied everywhere.²⁸

And if in order to escape from the difficulty mentioned above, it is accepted that there is sometime *ekānta*, there is sometime *anekānta*, then the alternative that ‘there is sometime *ekānta*’ itself becomes an example to prove the *ekānta*.²⁹

Also *ekānta* can be established on the sound basis of inference. Whatever is different from something else, it is different absolutely,

24. *Ibid*, p.556.

25. *Ibid*, p.557.

26. *Ibid*, p.557.

27. *Ibid*, p.557.

28. *Ibid*, p.557.

29. *Ibid*, p.557.

because one thing is separate from another, just as Jina and the like are different from a donkey, a camel etc.³⁰

Again, it may be contended that there is certainly a non-difference between Jina and donkey from the viewpoint of existence. But this contention is not tenable. For, that shape, on the basis of which, the absolute non-difference is agreed upon by both the parties, has been here taken as an example in the syllogism.³¹

And if the absolute difference is not established in the case of any person, then there would be no rule to discriminate means from non-means, eatables from non-eatables etc. and as a consequence there would be no rule to employ any man in activity.³²

Now Bhāsarvajña takes up Akalaṅka's view for criticism. It was said that a pot existed from the viewpoint of its own nature, and it did not exist from the viewpoint of the nature of another thing. If this signifies that a single pot is associated with various attributes, then there is no controversy. For, the Naiyāyika also admits that a thing can be associated with various positive and negative attributes.³³

But if a thing is described as possessing twofold nature, then what does it signify? If it signifies that a pot itself is the absence of an object other than it, i.e. a cloth (viz. a pot is itself the negation of a cloth), then the Buddhist view comes to be accepted. According to which, a thing like negation, other than the thing negated, is not admitted. This has been refuted in details.³⁴

It may be argued that according to the Jaina view, a positive thing like a pot and the negation of an object other than that thing e.g. a cloth, are regarded as two different entities. For, the Jaina view accepts that a thing can be of twofold nature. A pot can be described as being of its own nature and of the nature of non-cloth. This is what a thing of two-fold nature signifies.³⁵

30. *Ibid*, p.557.

31. *Ibid*, p.557.

32. *Ibid*, p.557.

33. *Ibid*, p.557.

34. *Ibid*, p.558, also p.537.

35. *Ibid*, p.558.

But this cannot stand to reason, since nothing can be established merely by accepting something. One should establish one's view on the sound basis of means of valid knowledge. The Jaina thinker has not given any sound proof so that a thing can be established as being of twofold nature.³⁶

As a matter of fact, the negation of cloth etc. which is desired to be expressed cannot be said to be of the nature of a pot, because the negation of cloth etc. is the state of cloth etc. being absent, just like the absence of cloth etc. effected by its destruction.

A question may be raised here: How does then a cognition arise in the form of "a pot is 'not a cloth'"? In answer it may be said that this cognition is based on the mutual negation of the two.³⁷

Again, it may be asked: What is the relation between a positive thing and the mutual absence? How is a pot related to the negation of cloth? And if it is somehow related, it should be in the form—there is no cloth *on the pot*. What is that relation? The answer to this is this that there is a peculiar type of juxtaposition between a pot and the negation of a cloth, as they both are separately apprehended. You may give whatever name you like to that juxtaposition.³⁸

It is contended that if any relation between a positive thing and the negation of something other than that thing, is admitted, the cognition should arise in the form—there is no cloth on the pot, just like the cognition—there is no pot on the ground. But this contention is not proper. For, the difference in cognitions is possible owing to the particular type of relation; just as various positive things give rise to the variety of cognitions. We see the difference in cognitions, arising from the particular types of relation between two positive things. For example, "there is a blue substance in a *kunda*"—this is my cognition or we can say—thus the thing is cognised. Or we say—there is a blue cloth, this is my cognition or thus the thing is cognised. Here in the former there is a conjunction type of relation, and in the later there is an inherence type of relation. Thus the difference in relations brings

36. *Ibid.*, p.558.

37. *Ibid.*, p.558.

38. *Ibid.*, p.558.

about difference in cognitions also. Similarly, a particular kind of relation between negation and a positive thing produces difference in cognition.³⁹ Hence the cognition that 'a pot is not a cloth' does not prove that the pot is of twofold nature.

It is true that the apprehension of negation is dependent upon something else, i.e. its counterpart. As the counterpart of negation is presented in the cognition, exactly so arises the cognition of its negation. As for example, when a pot is presented in the mind as lying on the ground, the negation or absence of that pot also comes to the mind as subsisting on the ground, e.g. there is no pot here on the ground.⁴⁰

And if the counterpart, e.g. a pot is presented in the mind as being identical with a cloth, then the negation of the pot also comes to the mind as if being identical with the cloth, e.g. the cloth is not the pot. It is therefore concluded that a positive thing and the negation of anything else cannot be identical.⁴¹

And it was stated by Akalaṅka that potness and non-potness were not mutually different from each other.⁴² But this statement should be taken as made by an extremely deluded person. If somehow, the non-difference between injunctory and prohibitory statements is admitted, then it would be contradicted by the universal cognition of the difference between the two.

Even if we take into consideration the view which holds the negation of two types, i.e. *prasajya-pratiṣedha* (negation of applicable) and *paryudāsa-pratiṣedha* (negation signifying exclusion of something), then the non-difference between a pot and non-cloth cannot be explained. In the case of *prasajya-pratiṣedha*, the negation of potness is itself the state of non-pot. And a thing whatever it is, cannot be the negation of itself. If the absence of a serpent is also the serpent, then a man would be afraid of the absence of a serpent also, just as he is afraid of a serpent. And if it is so admitted, then there should be no difference

39. *Ibid*, p.558.

40. *Ibid*, p.558.

41. *Ibid*, p.558.

42. *Ibid*, p.558.

in two cognitions—one of the place devoid of serpent and the other of the place endowed with serpent.⁴³

And in the case of *paryudāsa* type of negation, the non-pot means something different from pot, i.e. a cloth. It is obvious that a cloth is different from a pot. If they are identical, then the use of the word i.e. 'a pot' and its cognition may take place even in respect of a cloth, and *vice versa*.

The statement that a pot is a non-pot from the viewpoint of the nature of a cloth is also not true. What is derived by making such a statement? When we see a pot, from the viewpoint of the nature of a cloth, is a pot *made* non-pot by doing so? or a pot is cognised as non-pot? In the case of the first alternative, there is no proof to prove it. For example, when a lump of clay is seen as being made into the form of a pot by pot-makers and the like, that lump of clay is never seen as being made into the form of non-pot by anybody that day or on any other day. And if argued that a pot becomes non-pot, then that will amount to the destruction of the pot, and in that case there will be no object which could be called 'a pot'. Hence it is proved that even when we see a pot from the viewpoint of the nature of a cloth, a pot can never be made non-pot.⁴⁴

Nor could the pot be *known* as non-pot even when one thinks of it from the viewpoint of the nature of cloth. And if the pot is somehow *known* to be non-pot, then there arises the contingency of that knowledge being an illusion, just as the cognition of silver arising in respect of non-silver is an illusion.⁴⁵

It may be contended that a pot is called non-pot, because it is not cognised in the form of a cloth. But this contention cannot be maintained, since it is contradictory to cognise a pot as non-pot. On the contrary, we can assert that the pot is not cognised as having the nature of a cloth; on this very ground, it can be stated that the pot is exclusively of one nature and is therefore called a pot alone.⁴⁶

43. *Ibid*, p.559.

44. *Ibid*, p.559.

45. *Ibid*, p.559.

46. *Ibid*, p.559.

Moreover, if a thing is somehow said as possessing twofold nature on the basis of that thing being a substratum of two attributes, then also it cannot be described as being of twofold nature by referring to its own nature and to that of another. For example, there is a lotus which is blue, this lotus may be stated as having twofold nature i.e. lotusness and blueness. However it is not so called by referring to the nature of something else, but by referring to the nature of its own. Similarly a thing may be described as existent and non-existent exclusively by referring to its own nature.⁴⁷

Neither existence nor non-existence of a thing can be described in the primary sense by referring to the nature of another thing. Indeed we cannot state that gold etc. are existent due to the form of clay, etc. Nor can we say that a sky-flower is non-existent from the viewpoint of the form of pillar etc., because it is non-existent owing to its own nature.

Hence if a positive thing is somehow regarded as possessing twofold nature, then it should be so exclusively due to its own nature, e.g. a thing may be said as a pot and non-pot both on the basis of its own nature. And if it is granted that a pot can be described as non-pot on the basis of the nature of another thing; then also that state of being non-pot should be taken in the secondary sense; just as we secondarily describe a boy as fire and a man as lion. Hence when an object is described as possessing twofold nature, that description should be taken in the secondary sense. But so far as the primary meaning of the word is concerned, a thing of whatever nature it is, is so determined exclusively on the basis of its own nature, and the thing should be taken as possessing that nature alone.⁴⁸

Again, it may be argued that an object can be described as possessing twofold nature on the basis of its own nature. But this argument cannot be maintained. For, there would arise the contingency of all practical dealings of human beings coming to standstill, as it would not be possible to ascertain the nature of things whether it is desired or undesired. For example, the people desire the presence of pleasure

47. *Ibid*, p.559.

48. *Ibid*, p.559.

etc. and do not desire its absence. Similarly, man does not wish the presence of pain, and he desires its absence.

As we know, the means of pleasure, pain etc. are discriminated as desired and undesired. But there would be no activity on the part of a man to obtain those things which are means of pleasure, and similarly there would not be cessation from activity in order to avoid certain things which are means of pain etc. because those things are said as possessing twofold nature, viz. as existent as well as non-existent owing to their own nature. A man infers that a certain thing is a means of pleasure etc., and consequently he employs himself to obtain that thing. However, he cannot do the activity, because at the same time he knows that the thing is non-existent also. In what a strange condition he would be put, being forcibly drawn this side and that side by the presence and absence of the means of pleasure. The poor chap is thrown by the naked Jaina monk endowed with devilish intellect into the calamity which is difficult to overcome.⁴⁹

After having refuted the views on *anekānta* held by Samantabhadra (7th century A.D. —*Darśana Ane Cintana*—Pt. Sukhlalji, p.894, Gujarat Vidyāsabhā, Ahmedabad, 1957) and Akalaṅka (Vikrama 8th or 9th Century, Pt. Sukhlalji, Intro. p.70, *Tattvārthasūtra*, Gujarat Vidyāpīṭha, Ahmedabad, edn. third 1949), Bhāsarvajña (950 A.D.)⁵⁰ now proceeds to criticise the general tenets of Jaina philosophy, by applying the *anekānta* to them.

The author asks a question whether *Tīrthaṅkara*'s word is true or not. If it is regarded as true alone, then it is not proper, because there would arise the contingency of the *ekānta* being admitted. And if the *saptabhaṅgī* is intended to be applied here also, then we can say—The *Tīrthaṅkara*'s word is somehow true, may be it is somehow not true and so on. As a result, there cannot be the demarketing line between *pramāṇa* and non-*pramāṇa*, since the *anekānta* can be commonly applied everywhere.⁵¹

49. *Ibid*, pp.559-560.

50. *A Critical Study of the Pratyakṣa Pariccheda of Bhāsarvajña's Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, p.12, Gujarat Uni. Ahmedabad, 1986. Dr. L.V. Joshi.

51. *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, p.560.

Moreover, by applying the *anekānta*, we can say—May be the Jaina *Tīrthaṅkara*'s ritual practice is censurable, or may be it is not censurable. And consequently there would not be any difference whatsoever between the *Tīrthaṅkara*'s ritual practice and the thief's practice.⁵² Besides, there cannot be the determined arrangement of the elements of *āsrava* etc. For example, the Jaina philosophy holds that those persons alone who strictly follow certain specific rituals can go through *saṃvara* (the closing of the entering of sins) and *nirjarā* (to dry away the evil actions); and consequently he gets an emancipation. But those who do not follow the sacred rituals, are bound to be exposed to *āsrava* (i.e. the entering of sins into *jīva*) and *bandha* (i.e. the bondage). But if the *anekānta* is applied here also, there would prevail the confusion.⁵³

Similarly, there would not be the firm establishment even in regard to *jīva* and *a-jīva*. When the *anekānta* is applied, we can start making alternatives, such as, may be the *jīva* somehow is *a-jīva*, may be the *a-jīva* is somehow *jīva*. How then could there be the determined classification of *jīva* and *a-jīva*? And if the Jaina thinker contends that even the state of non-determination is admitted, then a question may be asked whether that state of non-determination has been really accepted or it is done so only to deceive others.⁵⁴

It is, therefore, concluded that until and unless the doctrine of *ekānta* is admitted, there cannot be any determined classification of the elements. On whatever basis, the things are determined as belonging to certain class, that very basis is their essential nature, and an object which is not determined as having certain nature, cannot be accepted as real. Hence it is established that a thing cannot be accepted as possessing twofold nature, i.e. existence and non-existence both.⁵⁵

Likewise, a thing cannot be admitted as both, eternal as well as non-eternal. For example, if *ātman* is accepted as eternal from the point of view of its own permanent nature, then it must be essentially accepted as eternal alone. When *ātman* is regarded as non-eternal from

52. *Ibid*, p.560.

53. *Ibid*, p.560.

54. *Ibid*, p.560.

55. *Ibid*, p.560.

the viewpoint of its modifications (i.e. *paryāyas*, pleasure, pain etc.), it should be taken in the secondary sense only.⁵⁶

Thus we have seen that Bhāsarvajña, a revolutionary Naiyāyika (950 A.D.), has very boldly and logically criticised the *anekānta*. For presenting the *prima facie* view in the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, he has almost verbatim taken passages from the standard and authoritative works of Jaina philosophy, viz. Samantabhadra's *Devāgama* alias *Āptamīmāṃsā* and Akalaṅka's *Tattvārthavārtika* on Umāsvati's *Tattvārthasūtra* (1.6).

Bhāsarvajña's criticism of *anekānta* could be recapitulated as follows:

1. The principle of *ekānta* (i.e. absolute determination) alone can exhort a man to do an activity. That person alone, who is sure that whatever effort he would make he would infallibly get the result of that effort, will engage himself in activity.
2. The faults of both the sides—*ātman* is either taken to be eternal or non-eternal are bound to arise if *anekānta* is admitted.
3. In fact, production and destruction take place only in respect of pleasure, pain etc. and not in regard to *ātman*. *Paryāyas* are absolutely different from the underlying substance.
4. The famous instance of a bracelet etc. cannot prove that one and the same thing is eternal and non-eternal both.
5. In order to discriminate between an emancipated soul and the souls of donkey etc., between eatables and non-eatables, one has to admit the principle of *ekānta*.
6. A thing can never be of twofold nature in the primary sense. A thing itself can never be the negation of its own.
7. The description of negation as mutual one or as absolute one depends upon the presupposition in the mind, of its counterpositive. Hence the statement that a pot is not a cloth does not prove that the pot is of twofold nature.
8. If the twofold nature of a thing is somehow granted, then it should be taken in the secondary sense.
9. The *anekānta* being admitted, a person would be forcibly drawn to this side and that side and be put in a strange pitiable condition.

56. *Ibid*, p.560.

10. If *anekānta* is regarded as applicable everywhere, then there would prevail confusion in respect of *pramāṇa*, *jīva*, *āsrva*, *saṃvara* etc.

Thus Bhāsarvajña comes to the conclusion that *ātman* is absolutely eternal, and it cannot be accepted as both eternal and non-eternal on the basis of *anekānta* which cannot be logically maintained.

CHAPTER 9

A FEW MODERN INTERPRETATIONS OF NON-ABSOLUTISM

Dayanand Bhargava

To a great extent, the edifice of Jaina philosophy and epistemology stands on the pillar of non-absolutism and, therefore, it is no wonder that most of the serious modern scholars of Jainism should have contributed solidly towards a better understanding of this theory. The present paper concerns itself with the interpretation of non-absolutism by these modern scholars showing that there is still scope for further investigation in this field.

Though, the Truth was declared to be supra-logical by the Vedic tradition when the *Kāthopaniṣad* said: “*naiṣā tarkeṇa matir āpaneyā*”, and by the Śramaṇa tradition when the *Ācārāṅga* said: “*savve sarā niyaṭṭamti takkā jattha na vijjai*”. Yet the Vedic tradition accepted logic to be the substitute of a seer and the Śramaṇa tradition claimed rationality to be the bed-rock on which the edifice of Jaina philosophy stands. Paradoxical though it may appear, the Truth which transcends logic can be known only through logic. Dr. Satkari Mookerjee in his Preface to the *Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism* (p. X) rightly remarks: “Indian philosophy does not stand by mysticism, though it culminates in it. But the mysticism is not the result of dogmatic faith. It is reasoned out of logical thought and is rather an overflow”.

I

In fact, Dr. Mookerjee was the first modern scholar who not only

realised that ‘the philosophy of *Syādvāda* has been more maligned than understood’ but also took it upon himself to transvalue the ancient Jaina doctrine of non-absolutism in modern terminology. He, however, did not conceal the fact that his personal philosophical convictions were enlisted on the side of Śaṅkara’s Vedānta and yet after making a thorough investigation, he vindicates the approach of non-absolutism but concludes that ‘the difference of philosophers is, however, a matter of conviction deeper than reason can probe.’ (*op. cit.* p. 20).

This is, in short, what Dr. Mookerjee propounded: There are two groups of school of logic. The first group believes that “our knowledge of things and of their relations starts from experience, and reason can at best serve to organise the experienced data and build a system of thought, the elements of which together with their relation, must be ultimately derived from this fundamental source of knowledge, in other words, from direct acquaintance furnished by observation” (*op. cit.* p.1). The other group believes in the *a priori* validity of the Laws of Thought viz., the Law of Identity—“Whatever is, is”, the Law of Contradiction—“Nothing can both be and not be” and the Law of Excluded Middle—Everything must either be or not be” (*op. cit.* p.7). Whatever experience of ours does not confirm to these laws, is not dependable. The Vedāntist idealist, for example, has declared change to be illusory on the basis of Law of Identity. The Jainas, on the other hand, belong to the first group and insist that the validity of statement like “A is A” suffers from the defects of symbolism which become manifest as soon as we substitute a concrete substance for the symbol ‘A’, because a concrete substance like a pitcher is experienced to undergo constant change and the validity of our experience cannot be challenged on the ground of some pure logic the validity of which is held to be *a priori* i.e. independent of any experience. (*op. cit.* p.7) After having devoted his whole work to the vindication of the Jaina viewpoint, Dr. Mookerjee draws some conclusions, three of which deserve the attention of the scholars.

1. ‘I felt a close affinity of Jaina thought to Vedānta.’ (*op. cit.* preface p.X)

2. 'The difference of philosophers is, however, a matter of conviction deeper than reason can probe.' (*op. cit.* p.20)
3. "...my philosophical convictions are rather enlisted on the side of Śaṅkara's Vedānta'. (*op. cit.* pp.19-20)

These conclusions raise one major question to which, according to my judgement, the scholars should seriously pay attention: Is the difference of philosophers really a matter of conviction deeper than reason can probe? If it is so, ultimately all reasoning in the field of philosophy is an exercise in futility. Things have to be decided by 'conviction deeper than reason can probe'. Why, then, reasoning at all? In answer it may be said that though reasoning is not the final authority, yet it is helpful as it paves the way for coming to a conviction or it fortifies our convictions, which are themselves beyond reasoning. Thus logic is to be relegated to the secondary position in such a situation.

In case, however, we accept that logic can lead us to truth, the Jainas have to adduce some more arguments in favour of non-absolutism as against the absolutistic attitude of Vedānta. Almost all such arguments have been forcefully put forth by Dr. Mookerjee and yet, his 'convictions are rather enlisted on the side of Śaṅkara's Vedānta'. Can the Jainas put forth some more convincing arguments so that people like Dr. Mookerjee are forced to rethink? Or is it to be taken merely as a matter of personal liking?

II

On the historical plane, the question of the origination of the theory of non-absolutism is quite interesting. Dr. Nathmal Tatia in his D. Litt dissertation *Studies in Jaina Philosophy* has given some hints regarding this point which are developed by Dr. B.K. Matilal in his work, *The Central Philosophy of Jainism*. The difficulty lies in the fact that *Ācārāṅga*, the earliest work on Jainism, does not mention non-absolutism. The statement that 'one who knows one, knows all' hardly indicates non-absolutism, because the context where the sentence occurs, has no relation with non-absolutism but with conquest of the passions, meaning that in order to understand one passion, one has

to understand all passions and *vice versa*. The reference to *vibhajjavāda* in the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* (Matilal p.19) has led scholars like Pt. Dalsukhbhai Malavania (*Nyāyāvatāra-vārika-vṛtti*, Intr. p. 11-35) to trace the origin of *anekāntavāda* to *vibhajjavāda* which has been claimed by Buddha also (*op. cit.* p.7).

Dr. Matilal, in the first place, asserts that Pārśvanātha 'did not seem to uphold any philosophical thesis such as the *anekāntavāda*' and then he shows that the Nāsadiya hymn of the *Rgveda* and various assertions in the *Upaniṣads* such as 'it moves, it moves not' are not the forerunner of *anekāntavāda*. (*op. cit.* p. 3) He further makes a distinction between *vibhajjavāda* of Buddha, which was the 'exclusive' middle as it rejected the two extremes, and of Mahāvīra, which was the 'inclusive' middle as it accepted the middle course without rejecting the two extremes (*op. cit.* p. 18). The distinction, as Dr. Nagin J. Shah in his foreword to the work states, is interesting. Dr. Matilal, however, is clear that 'the Buddha was an *ekāntavādin*' (*op. cit.* p. 18). In such a situation, it is yet to be decided by the scholars, if it would be proper to trace the origin of *anekāntavāda* to the *vibhajjavāda* of Buddhism particularly when Dr. Matilal himself is against accepting the statements of Nāsadiya hymn and the *Upaniṣads* as forerunners of *anekānta* on the ground that 'the *anekānta* doctrine will be misunderstood if merely the joint assertion of contradictory predicates about an identical subject be itself taken to be a vindication of *anekānta* doctrine.' (*op. cit.* p. 3) In the third Chapter of his work, *Jaina Nyāya kā Vikāsa*, Muni Nathamal, has enumerated as many as eight pillars on which the edifice of *anekānta* stands. The first of them is the coexistence and invariable concomitance of the universal and the particular. The Buddhist will, however, accept only the particular. The second is the invariable concomitance of the permanence and transitoriness. The Buddhist will, here again, accept only the transitoriness. How can we, then, harp upon the theme of deriving *anekānta* of Jainism from the *vibhajjavāda* of Buddhism? And in case we do so, where lies the fault in taking back the origin of *anekānta* to the Vedic literature, for, as Dr. Mookerjee has pointed out, it must not be forgotten that Vedānta is frankly realistic in its logic and epistemology. And the logical evaluation of phenomenal reality as a mass of irrational surds and contradictions by Vedānta

is almost endorsed in toto by Jaina thought—” (*op. cit.*, preface p. x) I do not know if the tendency to associate many concepts of Jainism with that of Buddhism is justified on the ground that both of these traditions are śramaṇic. My own hypothesis is that Jainism is as nearer to or fartherer from Brahmanism as from Buddhism, as far as the question of logic goes. If Jainism cannot accept the Brahmanical immutability of self, it is equally opposed to the Buddhistic transitoriness of it. The scholars, with a Buddhistic background, therefore, should resist from finding similarity between Jainism and Buddhism in the field of logic at least on some superfluous grounds.

III

Dr. Tatia says, “non-violent search for the truth should inspire the enquiries of a thinker. It is this attitude of tolerance and justice that was responsible for the origin of the doctrine of non-absolutism (*anekānta*)” (*op. cit.* p. 22). Pt. Mahendra Kumar Shastri and Shri H.D. Kapadia followed by Dr. Matilal held the same view (Matilal p. 4). Dr. Matilal has elaborated this by saying that the Jaina principle of “respect for the life of others” gave rise to the principle of respect for the views of others (*op. cit.* p. 6). This view has been expressed by so many other modern scholars but I have not found any such hint in the ancient or medieval work. It is admirable if it could be shown that the doctrine of *anekānta* demonstrates a spirit of toleration, understanding and respect for the views of others but unless we get such sentiments expressed in the old writings, we can only accept this position as a modern extension of an old doctrine. Such an extension is always welcome but it requires an overhauling of the whole logical and epistemological literature of the Jains. I am afraid that this literature does not show any more catholicity of the Jaina outlook towards the non-Jaina systems than any other school of Indian philosophy shows. This position can be changed not merely by stating that the Jainas are tolerant towards their adversaries but by illustrating it, by reviewing the position of the Jainas *vis-a-vis* the non-Jainas in the light of the new meaning which is being attributed to *anekāntavāda* in the modern times viz. that it helps us in cultivating the attitude

of toleration. If some were to become secular to the extent that he cannot tolerate a communalist and tries to wipe him out of existence, the secularism may itself become a sort of another communalism. Similarly, if non-absolutism becomes intolerant towards those who are not non-absolutist, it itself assumes the form of an intolerant dogma and its characteristic of tolerance remains only in name and not in spirit. The scholars of Jaina logic and Jaina epistemology should review the ancient philosophical literature of the Jainas to decide as to whether (i) this literature is really more catholic than the literature of the non-Jains or (ii) the claim that *anekānta* is characterised by toleration is not valid or (iii) the portion dealing with the debate between the Jains and non-Jains have to be re-written.

IV

An excellent work on a comparative study of Jaina theories of reality and knowledge by Y. J. Padmarajah was first published in 1963. This discusses ontological problems of identity-cum-difference in different systems of Indian philosophy with special reference to Jainism. The Jaina position, when reviewed from non-absolutistic view point, is that reality is a unique and integral synthesis of identity in differences. Identity and differences co-ordinate in this synthesis, both having equal importance and not one subordinating the other. This combination of identity and difference in reality gives birth to a distinct category—*sui generis* (*jātyantara*).

The differences are either external or internal. The difference of one object from the other is external which may either be homogeneous or heterogeneous. The difference of one mode from another mode of an object is the first type of internal difference, whereas the difference between the object and its quality is second type of internal difference. A non-absolutist has to demonstrate that in all the above mentioned cases of difference there must be some identity also from one or more points of view out of the four determinate factors (i) the material factor (ii) the spatial location (iii) the temporal reference and (iv) the intrinsic nature. It would be observed that in external objects the difference may appear to be absolute when we look at two

objects existing at different space and time and having different mode also. The Jainas tried to establish identity on the basis that in such cases also both the objects exist and, therefore, there is 'identity of being'. Dr. Mookerjee, however, condemns it as 'a mean verbal quibble' (*op. cit.* p. 277). Here again it appears that theory of non-absolutism is in danger because there appears to be no bond of identity between two such heterogeneous objects as the soul of Mahāvīra, on the one hand and a dead piece of stone on this earth, on the other. I have dealt with this problem in an independent paper elsewhere and, therefore, refrain from going in detail of this problem at the moment.

I have touched upon some points here just to illustrate that there is still scope for creative mind to contribute to the advancement of knowledge in the field of Jaina logic and epistemology as in any another field of knowledge. It is, therefore, a misconception that the scholars can do hardly anything except repeating what has already been said. The earlier this misconception is removed, the better it is for the research in the field of Jaina logic and epistemology.

CHAPTER 10

RUDIMENTS OF ANEKĀNTAVĀDA IN EARLY PĀLI LITERATURE

Bhagchandra Jain

In the eyes of Jaina philosophy, everything is multifaceted. It is neither only true nor only false, neither eternal nor transitory. It can be true from some angle and false from some other. Different people think about different aspects of the same reality and therefore their partial findings are contradictory to one another. Hence, they indulge in debates claiming that each of them was completely true. The Jaina philosophers thought over this conflict and tried to reveal the whole truth by establishing the theory of non-absolutist standpoint (*anekāntavāda*) with its two wings, *nayavāda* and *syādvāda*.

The present paper will throw light on the rudiments of *anekāntavāda*, *nayavāda* and *syādvāda* found in the early Pali literature which will assist us in comprehending the earlier form of these theories.

1. *Anekāntavāda*

Rudiments of *anekāntavāda* are traceable in the Buddhist approach to a question. Pāli literature describes how the Buddha answered a question in four ways. The four ways are:¹

1. *Ekamsa-vyākaraṇīya* (answerable categorically).
2. *Paṭipucchāvvyākaraṇīya* (answerable by putting another question).
3. *Thāpanīya* (question that should be set aside).
4. *Vibhajjavvyākaraṇīya* (answerable analytically).

1. *Aṅguttaranikāya*, ii. 46; *Milindapañho*, iv. 2.5; Also see, A. i. 197.

The Buddha, who adopted these techniques in answering numerous metaphysical questions put to him by various disciples and disputants, himself claims to be a *vibhajjavādin*². The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* of the Jains requires the Jaina monk to explain a problem with the help of *vibhajjavāda*³. It shows that the Jains as well as the Buddhists followed the analytical method of explanation. It is possible that the earliest division of the above questions was made into *ekamsavyākaraṇīya pañhā*, and (2) *anekamsavyākaraṇīya pañhā* corresponding to the Jaina classification of two kinds of statements (*ekamsikā dhammā* and *anekamsikā dhammā*). Later, the latter class would have been subdivided into the (i) *vibhajjavvyākaraṇīya*, and (ii) *ṭhāpaṇīya*. *Paṭipucchāvvyākaraṇīya* is a sub-class of *vibhajjavvyākaraṇīya*.⁴

A point to be noted here is that the Buddha used the word *anekamsa* in his preachings. For instance—*ekamsikā pi mayā dhammā desitā paññattā*, *anekamsikā pi mayā dhammā desitā paññattā*.⁵ Here *anekamsika*, like *vibhajjavāda*, is similar to *anekāntavāda* of Jainism. But the fundamental difference between these two theories is that the Jainism accepts all statements to possess some relative (*anekāntika*) truth, while the Buddhism does not accept that all non-categorical statements (*anekamsikā*) can be true or false from one standpoint or another. *Anekāntavāda*, unlike *anekamsikavāda*, conceives of the possibility of knowing reality from one or more standpoints.

2. *Nayavāda*

Pāli literature indicates some of the characteristics of *Nayavāda*. The Buddha mentions ten possible ways of claiming knowledge in the course of addressing the Kālāmas. The ten ways are: (i) *anussavena*, (ii) *paramparayā*, (iii) *itikirāya*, (iv) *piṭakasampadāya*, (v) *bhavyarūpatāya*, (vi) *samaṇo na guru*, (vii) *takkihetu*, (viii) *nayahetu*, (ix) *ākāraparivitakkena*, and (x) *ditṭhinijjhānakkhantiyā*.⁶ Of these, the eighth way, viz. *nayahetu* is more important for our study. Here *naya*

2. *Majjhimanikāya*, ii. 46.

3. *Vibhajjavāyam ca vyāharejja/Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, 1.14.22.

4. *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge* by K.N. Jayatilleke, p. 292.

5. *Dīghanikāya*, i. 191.

6. *Anguttaranikāya*, ii. 191-3.

is a method of statement which leads a meaning to a particular judgement.⁷ The *Jātaka* says that the wise man draws a particular standpoint.⁸ In about the same meaning, *naya* is used in Jain philosophy. This *nayahetu* of Buddhism appears to indicate the Jain influence of *naya*, and it would have been made a part of its own in the form of two types of *saccas*, viz. *sammutisacca* and the *paramatthasacca*⁹, which are used in about the same sense as *vyavahāranaya* and *niścayanaya*. The words *sunaya* and *durnaya* are also found in Buddhism used in identical way.¹⁰

The *Suttanipāta* indicates that the *sammutisacca* was accepted as a common theory of Recluses and Brāhmaṇas, and the *paramatthasacca* was treated as the highest goal.¹¹ These two *saccas* are characterised as *nītattha* (having a direct meaning) and *nayyattha* (having an indirect meaning¹²). The Commentary on the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* says that there is no third truth (*latiyam n'ūpalabbhati*). *Sammutisacca* (conventional statement) is true because of convention and *paramattha* is true because of indicating the true characteristics of realities.¹³ The conception of *paccekasacca* (partial truth) of Buddhism is definitely influenced by the *nayavāda* of Jainism. There is no doubt that Jainism founded this theory earlier than Buddhism.

3. Syādvāda

The rudiments of the *syādvāda* conception are found in Vedic and Buddhist literature. It appears to have originally belonged to the Jainas, if we accept Jainism as pre-Vedic religion, and all the subsequent thinkers adopted it as a common approach to the nature of reality. That is the reason why various forms of *syādvāda* are found in the different philosophical schools.

7. *Nayena neti. Saṃyutta*, ii. 58; *anayena nayati dummedho. Jātaka*, iv. iv. 241.

8. *Nayam nayati medhāvī/Jātaka*, iv. 241.

9. *Milindapañha*, 160.

10. *Aṅguttaranikāya*, iii. 178; *Nettipakaraṇa*, 21; *Jātaka*, iv. 241.

11. *Suttanipāta*, 68, 219.

12. *Aṅguttaranikāya*, i. 60.

13. *Aṅguttaranikāya Aṭṭhakathā*, i. 95; cf. *Kathāvatthu, Aṭṭhakathā*, 34.

The *syādvāda* conception is found in a more developed form in early Pāli literature. The *Brahmajālasutta* refers to sixty-two *micchā-ditṭhis* of which four belong to the sceptics. They are known as *amarāvikkhepikās* who being questioned resort to verbal jugglery and eelwriggling on four grounds.¹⁴ The commentary of the *Dīghanikāya* presents its two alternative explanations. According to first, *amarāvikkhepikā* are those who are confused by their endless beliefs and words. The second explanation gives meaning that like a fish named *amarā*, the theory of *amarāvikkhepikā* runs hither and thither without arriving at a definite conclusion.¹⁵

The first of these schools realises that through fear of lying (*musāvādabhayā*), and the abhorrence of being lying, one does not assert anything to be good or evil and on question being put to him on this or that matter he resorts to verbal jugglery and eel-wriggling, saying: I do not say so, I do not say this, I do not say otherwise, I do not say no, I deny the denials (I do not say, “no no”)¹⁶. According to this school, it is impossible to achieve knowledge which is a hindrance to heaven or salvation (*saggassa c’eva maggassa ca antarāyo*)¹⁷.

The second and the third school of sceptics do not assert anything to be good or evil through fear of involvement (*upādānabhayā*) and a fear of interrogation in debate (*anuyogabhayā*). The fourth school of sceptics followed the philosophy of Sañjaya Belatṭhiputta who fails to give a definite answer to any question put to him. His fourfold scheme or the five-fold formula of denial is based on the negative aspects which are as follows:

- (i) *evam pi me no ... atthi paro loko.*
- (ii) *tathāpi me no ... natthi paro loko.*
- (iii) *aññathāpi me no ... atthi ca natthi ca paro loko.*
- (iv) *no no ti pi me no ... natthi na natthi paro loko.*¹⁸

14. *Dīghanikāya*, i. 24.

15. *Dīghanikāya*, *Aṭṭhakathā*, i. 115.

16. *Dīghanikāya*, i. 24-5.

17. *Dīghanikāya*, *Aṭṭhakathā*, i. 155.

18. *Dīghanikāya*, i. 27, 58-59.

These four propositions can be compared with the first four predications of the *syādvāda* theory of Jainas, viz. *syādasti*, *syānnāsti*, *syādasti nāsti*, and *syādavaktavya*. Observing this similarity, several scholars like Keith¹⁹ are ready to give the credit to Sañjaya for initiating this four-fold predication to solve the logical problems. On the other hand, some savants like Jacobi think that in opposition to the Agnosticism of Sañjaya, Mahāvīra has established *syādvāda*. Miyamoto asserts that Sañjaya's system is quite close to the Buddhist standpoint of the indescribable or inexpressible.²⁰

These views are not quite correct. As a matter of fact, the credit should not go only to Sañjaya for the adoption of the four-fold scheme, since there were other schools of sceptics who also accepted a similar scheme. Śīlāṅka refers to four groups of such schools *Kriyāvādins*, *Akriyāvādins*, *Ajñānavādins* and *Vainayikas*. These are further subdivided into 363 schools based on purely the nine categories (*nava padārthas*) of Jainism.²¹ These schools were mainly concerned with four questions. They are as follows:

- (i) *Sati bhāvotpatti ko vetti?*
- (ii) *Asati bhāvotpatti ko vetti?*
- (iii) *Sadasati bhāvotpatti ko vetti?*
- (iv) *Avaktavya bhāvotpatti ko vetti?*

These questions are similar to first four *syādvāda* predications. The main difference between the predications of sceptics and Jainas was that the former doubts or denies the logical problems altogether whereas the latter asserts that they are true to a certain extent.

Makkhali Gosāla, the founder of the Ājīvika sect and an earlier companion of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, has contributed to the development of the *syādvāda* conception. He considered the problem through the three-fold standpoints, called *trirāśis*,²² a short version of *saptabhaṅgī*. On the basis of the *Nandisūtra* commentary, Basham observes that the

19. *Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 303.

20. *Buddhism and Culture*, ed. Susuma Yamaguchi, Kyoto, 1960, p. 71.

21. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, Vol. 1, fol. 212.

22. *Ibid.*, 1.3, 11.34; *Vṛtti*, p. 45-46; *Samavāyāṅga*, 22.4.

Ājīvikas seem to have accepted the basic principle of Jaina epistemology, without going to the over-refined extreme of *saptabhaṅgī*, as in the orthodox Jaina *syādvāda* and *nayavāda*.²³

Three-fold scheme of predication is simpler than the four-fold scheme of the sceptics and Buddhists and the corresponding seven-fold scheme of the Jainas. As a matter of fact, the fourth predication must be added afterwards to the seven-fold predication of Jainas. The Dīghanakha, a follower of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, mentions the three kinds of theories upheld by him:

- (i) *Sabbam me khamati* (I agree with all views).
- (ii) *Sabbam me na khamati* (I agree with no views).
- (iii) *Ekaccam me khamati, ekaccam me na khamati* (I agree with some views and disagree with other views).²⁴

The Buddha criticises Dīghanakha's views in various ways and expresses his own views towards the problems. Dīghanakha's views are similar to the predication of *syādvāda*, and represent its first three *bhaṅgas* respectively, viz. *syādasti*, *syānnāsti* and *syādasti-nāsti*.

In the *Dīghanikāya*, the Buddha is reported to have said that he had taught and laid down his doctrines with categorical (*ekaṃsika*) and non-categorical (*anekaṃsika*) assertions. The theory of four-fold Truths is an example of the former, and the theory of *avyākṛtas* is of the latter. Then the Buddha adopted the four-fold scheme to answer the logical questions of that time as under:

- (i) *Atthi* (it is),
- (ii) *Natthi* (it is not),
- (iii) *Atthi ca natthi ca* (it is and it is not), and
- (iv) *Na ca atthi na ca natthi* (it is neither is, nor is not).

Miyamoto observes that the seven-fold scheme of the Jainas is equivalent to the four-fold scheme of Buddhists in the following manner: the first three predications of the Buddha are equivalent to the first three *bhaṅgas* of Jainas and the fourth predication of the

23. *History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas*, p. 275; *Nandi. Comm.* fol. 113.

24. *Majjhima Nikāya*, i. 498 ff.

Buddha can be treated as similar to the remaining four *bhaṅgaś* of Jainas. But this observation is not perfectly right, since the Jainas pondered over the problems more profoundly than the Buddhists. It would be more appropriate if we think of the first four propositions of the Buddhists similar to the first four propositions of the Jainas who considered the truth a little further. But there are differences between the Jaina and the Buddhist schemes. According to the Jaina scheme, all the seven propositions could be true from relative stand-points, while in the Buddhist scheme only one proposition could be true. The propositions are not considered logical alternatives in Jainism as considered in Buddhism.

It is more probable that the Buddha's *catuskoṭi* formula has been influenced by the four-fold formula of Sañjaya, although there are also traces of the influence of the seven-fold formula of the Jainas. Such formulas, it must be remembered, were commonly accepted at that time by teachers with different attitudes.

It appears that the Pāli Canon considers *anekāntavāda* or *syādvāda* a combination of both *ucchedavāda* and *sassatavāda*. Buddhaghosa was of the opinion that Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta presented his views in contradictory ways.²⁵ As a matter of fact, Buddhaghosa could not understand the real nature of *syādvāda*.

We know that Jaina philosophy considers problems neither by absolute eternalism nor by absolute nihilism, but by eternalism-cum-nihilism. Apart from the confusion regarding *sassatavāda* and *ucchedavāda*, there are no explicit references to *syādvāda* in the Pāli Canon. The absence of direct references does not mean that the *syādvāda* conception was not a part and parcel of the doctrines of the Nātaputta at that time. This conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that the Buddhist books appear to be aware of some characteristics of *syādvāda*, which might have belonged to the tradition of Pārśvanātha.

In the course of discussion, the Buddha says to Saccaka, who was a follower of the Pārśvanātha tradition and converted later to the Nātaputta's religion, that his former statement is not in keeping with

25. *Majjhimanikāya Aṭṭhakathā*, ii. 831; *DA*. iii. 906.

the latter, nor the latter with the former (*na kho te sandhiyati purimena vā pacchimam pacchimena vā purimam*)²⁶. Here attention is drawn to self-contradictions in Saccaka's statements. This might have been an early instance of adducing self-contradiction (*svātmavirodha*) as an argument against *syādvāda*. This has been an oft-repeated criticism against *syādvāda* by opponents of different times. Cittaḡāhāpati also blames on the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta for his self-contradictory conception.²⁷ But this criticism cannot be held true in the light of Jaina standpoint. The later Pāli literature even refers to the sevenfold predications as found in the Theragāthā (*ekaṅgadassī dummedho sattadassī ca paṇḍito*, 106).

It may be mentioned here that the Buddha divided the *ganthā*, the *akusala karma*, into four, viz. *abhijjhā*, *vyāpāda*, *sīlabbataparāmaso* and *idamsaccābhiniveso*. Of these, the last one *idamsaccābhiniveso* may be compared with *durnaya* (pseudo-standpoint) conception. It is treated as *mithyādr̥ṣṭi* which conceives one's own religion as containing complete truth and others' religions are consisted of no truth.²⁸ This thinking leads a person towards the *mithyādr̥ṣṭi*.

Thus in the light of all these references, we can draw the developmental stages of *anekāntavāda* as follows:

1. *Ekaṅsavāda-Anekāntavāda*.
2. *Sat-asat-ubhayavāda*.
3. *Avaktavya*.
4. *Saptabhaṅgī*, and
5. Two-fold *naya* and seven-fold *naya*.

26. *Majjhimanikāya*, i. 232.

27. *Saṃyuttanikāya*, iv. 298-99.

28. *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaho*, 7.6. cf. "*Idameva saccam moghamaññam*" *ti abhinivisanam dalhagaho idamsaccābhiniveso*. *Vibhāvanī*, p. 166.

CHAPTER 11

RELEVANCE OF ANEKĀNTA IN MODERN TIMES

Ramjee Singh

Modern times is an era of crisis in the realm of human civilization. The reason is that we give so much attention to short-range and local problems that long range and global problems continue to be neglected. Secondly, life has become more intricately interdependent and complex. So simpler solutions no longer suffice. A world civilization is fast emerging and we cannot afford to solve our problems with a parochial temper and sectarian outlook. For human survival, we need human cooperation on a planetary scale able to deal with rapidly increasing complexities. The critical problems are so complex that we need a philosophy equally complex to grapple with them. One dimensional man in a multidimensional world-crisis will be out of joint. Interexistence is the positive option for mankind. Either there is organic growth of mankind or there is organic destruction of human civilization. At any time in history it is impossible to convert all of mankind not only to Christianity, or Islam or Jainism (or to Communism, or Capitalism or any other isms), but also to some metaphysical principles which we have been cherishing since antiquity. The growth of scientific knowledge and outlook has destroyed most of our false dogmas and superstitions, not only that but it has failed to provide us knowledge that could sublimate our animal and selfish nature. Animality has been dominating our individual as well as social behaviour. Hence, our life has become full of tensions, turmoils and

disorders. Therefore, although we are outwardly pleading for world-peace and non-violence, yet we have been preparing for war. This is the crisis of modern time that we aspire for peace but prepare for the formidable funeral procession of mankind.

Humanity is tottering today upon the brink of self-annihilation for lack of understanding, which includes understanding ourselves and understanding each other. It is a time of tragic importance for the world because even before the shadows cast by one war is lifted fully, the skies become overcast with dark threatening clouds. Hence, at no period of human history man was in need of sound philosophy than today. As war begins in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defence of peace should be built. Today, if one person does not agree with me, he is wicked, if a country does not agree with my country, it is wicked as if there is no half-way, no neutrality. So ultimately it is our warring ideologies that are at the root of world-tension. But ideologies or philosophies depend upon our way of philosophizing. Hence Locke rightly felt that epistemological problems are prior to all others. An epistemological reorientation will influence metaphysical grounding which in turn will determine our socio-ethico-political views. Any solution can ultimately be achieved through knowledge free from confusion and prejudices.

Since things have many characters, they are the objects of all-sided knowledge. The knowledge which determines the full meaning of an object through the employment of one-sided knowledge is partial knowledge. Hence we should discard all absolute judgements, otherwise truth would be violated. Reality has got innumerable characteristics. A valid knowledge is defined as that which gives us knowledge of a thing in its various aspects. All expressions are somehow real. All objects have got innumerable characters, hence all things are multi-dimensional or *anekāntic*.

The world is the store-house of great chaos in thought. All the confusion of thought which is prevailing in the world is the outcome of inexhaustive research and acceptance of a part for the whole. Almost all our disputes only betray the pig-headedness of the blind men who spoke differently about an elephant. The outstanding personalities like Sri Aurobindo, Raman Maharshi etc. spoke to us, in a world over-

organised by ideological fanaticism, that truth is not exclusive or sectarian. Every idol, however noble it may seem, is ultimately a Moloch that devours its worshippers. It is fatal to treat the relative and the home-made as though it were the Absolute. It is only intellectual clarity which will resolve all conflict and rivalry. All dogmatism owes its genesis to the partiality of outlook and fondness for a line of thinking to which a person has accustomed himself. This is imperialism and aggressiveness in thought. When the one party or another thinks himself the sole possessor of absolute truth, it becomes natural that he should think his neighbours absolutely in the clutches of Error or the Devil. Today, one man or one country fight with the other because their views vary. Views are bound to vary because we are guided by different conditions, thought and attitudes. Hence, it is wrong to think oneself right and rest others wrong. Here *syādvāda-anekāntavāda* represents the highest form of catholicism coupled wonderfully with extreme conservatism, a most genuine and yet highly dignified compromise better than which we cannot imagine.

We must realise that there is other's view-point as our own. This can happen when one puts oneself into another's shoes or to get under the skin of others. This is called sympathy which is the act of reproducing in our minds the feelings of another. Gandhiji once told: "I advise a man not from my standpoint but from his. I try to put myself in his shoes. When I cannot do so, I refuse to advise". He once said: "I am myself a Puritan but for others a Catholic".

Syādvāda or *anekāntavāda* is adoption of the safe and secure middle path leaving the two extremes. It means that virtue has many facets. There is place for the penance of a saint, chastity of a woman, innocence of a child, bravery of a hero etc. As a lover of nature, one can equally enjoy the rains of rainy season, coolness of winter and heat of summer. Similarly, life is not one straight road. There are too many complexities in it. It is not like a train which once started keeps running. The real is a variable constant. It is being and non-being, unity and plurality, the universal and the particular rolled into one. A thing is neither an absolute unity nor split into an irreconcilable plurality. It is both unity and plurality all the time. There is no opposition between unity of being and plurality of aspects. Similarly,

things are neither exclusively particulars, nor are they exclusively universals, but they are a concrete realisation of both. The two elements can be distinguished by reflective thought, but cannot be rent asunder. A real is neither a particular nor universal in an exclusive manner, but a synthesis which is different from both severally and jointly though embracing them in its fold. A real is *sui generis*.

Although *syādvāda-anekāntavāda* is not a complete logic, it does involve a basic principle that seems to be essential to the kind of philosophy needed to account for, and to deal with, the complexities of our emerging world civilization. The two-valued logic developed presupposes the principle of excluded middle as most basic—X is either A or non-A but not both (because A and non-A are contradictions). The dynamic, dialectical, organic unities inherent in the increasingly intricate interdependent organisations constituting our emerging world require a more dynamic, dialectical organic logic than is presently available. Despite the fact that the two-valued logic has immense practical values when used judiciously, it is still not adequate to account for all of the vital developments in human society.

It is so difficult to say objectively anything fundamental about today's civilization or modern man because "all of us are caught in the same prejudices". Only a man who is "wholly of the present" can say something important about the present-day world, and only he who has the "most intensive and extensive consciousness" of himself and his situation can hope to be such a man. What is required is "essential thinking" (Heidegger) or "total seeing" (J. Krishnamurti) by competent persons for apprehending the problems and predicaments of contemporary civilization and for granting an inkling of their possible solutions. Karl Jaspers also talks of "luminous encompassive thinking", through which contemporary political consciousness must be transformed and a new kind of politics adequate to the threat of atomic doom should be created. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan while speaking on the future of civilization (*Kalki, the Future of Civilization*, 1929, first published) held that to avert periodic crises of civilization, what is required is religious idealism and "cooperation and not identification, accomodation to fellowmen and not imitation of them, and toleration and not absolutism". Thus if we want to save our civilization from *atomic*

annihilation, we have to encourage *anekānta* culture. However, *anekānta* philosophy of life should not be confused with contradictionism, indeterminism, scepticism or solipsism. When we look to the particular merits of each side, there is no contradiction. Application of existence and non-existence to the same thing is contradiction but when existence and non-existence are asserted from different standpoints, it is not contradiction. Even in the *Upaniṣads*, we have the glimpses of how the reality reveals itself in different ways at different stages of knowledge. Hence *anekānta* attitude should not be equated with subjective relativism of the Sophists. It is “objective relativism” or “relative absolutism” like Whitehead, Bodin etc. However, there is no similarity with Einstein’s theory of relativity. To some extent, we may find its parallel in old Pyrrhonianism in the West. But while Pyrrhonianism relapses into agnosticism or scepticism, there is no room for scepticism whatsoever in Jaina theory of *syādvāda* or *anekāntvāda*. Scepticism means, in the minimum, absence of assertion, whereas *syādvādin*s always *assert*, though what they assert are alternatives. Disjunctive judgement is still judgement. Each disjunction is alternatively valid. Either there is no self-complete Reality or any such reality is wholly infinite, a mere demand that refuses to be actualised. The only scepticism that is there is concerning the so-called self-complete reality. So whereas a sceptic is sceptical about any character of reality, *syādvāda* is quite definitely assertive. Yet he is more sceptical than any sceptic in the world so far as the definiteness of the ultimate reality is concerned. He would go beyond *avaktavya* or *Śūnya*, so far the Advaitins and Śūnyavādins are concerned with regard to their statements regarding ultimate reality.

Hence, *anekānta* stands against all mental absolutism. We can substantiate this relativistic standpoint on the cosmo-micro-physical ground supported by Einsteinian doctrine of relativity and Maxwell’s equation of electromagnetism which go fundamentally against the notion of absolute truth. When we say, we know this, we are saying more than is strictly correct, because all we know is what happens when the waves reach our bodies. Researches in psychology of thinking, perception of self and conception of self in Child Psychology and psycho-analytical studies in Freudian narcissism or Adlerian power-

factor support relativism. From socio-cultural standpoint, the doctrine of relativism is justified for no smooth functioning of society is possible without mutual accomodation and adjustment which presupposes catholicism in thought, and sense of tolerance. In ethics and morality, we know so far relativism is dominating. In the field of logic, the doctrine of the Universe of Discourse is sometimes limited to a small portion of actual universe of things and is sometimes co-extensive with that Universe. The Universe of Discourse controls the interpretation of every word. Logic of Relatives too recognises the truth of *syādvāda*-*anekāntavāda* when it discusses all relations embodied in propositions.

Much of the confusion either of Buddhism or Advaita Vedānta is due to false exaggeration of the relative principles of *becoming* and *being* into absolute truths. Same is the fault with Parmenidian *Being* and Heraclitan *Flux*. These may be called the variety of philosophical doctrines.

Hence *anekānta* doctrine is the exposition of the principle of 'comprehensive perspectivism'. No perspective is final or absolute unless it is understood in terms of relativity. Therefore, even *anekānta* (non-absolutism) is subject to *anekānta* (non-absolutism). If non-absolutism is absolute, it is not universal since there is one real which is absolute. And if it is not a non-absolute, it is not an absolute and universal fact. Tossed between the two horns of the dilemma, non-absolutism thus simply evaporates. But we can meet this difficulty by making a distinction between the *theory* and *practice* of *anekānta*. Every proposition of the dialectical sevenfold judgement is either complete or incomplete. In the former, we use only one word that describes one characteristic of that object and hold the remaining characters to be identical with it. On the other hand, in the incomplete judgement, we speak of truth as relative to our standpoint. In short, the complete judgement is the object of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the incomplete judgement is the object of aspectal knowledge (*naya*). Hence the non-absolute is constituted of the absolutes as its elements and as such would not be possible if there were no absolutes.

Here we can solve this difficulty by analysing the nature of unconditionality of the statement "All statements are conditional", which is quite different from the normal meaning of unconditiona-

lity. This is like the idea contained in the passage—"I do not know myself", where there is no contradiction between "knowledge" and "ignorance". In the sentence, "I am undecided", there is at least one decision that I am undecided. Similarly, the categoricity behind a disjunctive judgement (A man is either good or bad), is not like the categoricity of an ordinary categorical judgement like "The horse is red". True the basis is always categorical but this categoricity does never clash with the proposition being disjunctive. When a logical positivist says that "there is no metaphysics", philosophy enters through the back-door. In short, the unconditionality in the statement "All statements are conditional" is quite different from the normal conditionality. There are primarily two sources to understand the world - *senses* and *reason*, closely connected with two grades of reality - *existence* and *essence* (Existentialism) or *existence* and *reality* (Hegel). Existence is actuality or actual verification, which is unconditional, absolute and categorical. There is no alternation or condition. But on the level of *thought* or *reason* or *essence*, there may be alternatives. But we cannot live in the world of thought alone and forget *existence*. We must also have something other than thought or reason which is *unreason* or irrationality. Behind reason, there is always the *unreason*, which we can give the name of *faith* (as suggested by Kant, Herder, Jacobi etc.). There are many grounds of faith - one being the Scripture. Scriptures differ from one another. Jainas must stick to their position. Here is definiteness. However, we cannot expect such definiteness with reason because it only offers alternative pictures—Jaina, Advaita, Vaiśeṣika. All are equally possible. In order to avoid indefiniteness we stick to one such possibility which is chosen for us by the community to which we belong or by some superior intuition. Thus there comes unconditionality. However, another may choose another possibility as existence if he belongs to another community or if his genius moves into another direction. So there appears to be again alternation among existence. But this alternation rests only on thought level. We compare thought with other thoughts. And what is comparison? Comparison involves thinking and reasoning, so it is thought-process. Some are bound to admit alternation. My standpoint is only a possible one. But

I cannot always fly in the air of possibilities, I must have moorings in some actuality. I must adopt one standpoint.

Jainism is against all kinds of imperialism in thought. For each community there is a special absolute. But the absolutes themselves are alternatives so far as they are probables. But this is only on thought level. But when I have chosen one it is more than possible, it is existence or actual. So there is wonderful reconciliation between conditionality and unconditionality. Every thing is conditional on thought level, but not on the level of existence. Thus there is no real contradiction.

To avoid the fallacy of infinite regress, the Jainas distinguish between valid non-absolutism (*samyak anekānta*) and invalid non-absolutism (*mithyā anekānta*). Like an invalid absolute judgement, an invalid non-absolute judgement, too, is invalid. To be valid, *anekānta* must not be absolute but relative.

If we consider the above points, we cannot say that the “theory of relativity cannot be logically sustained without the hypothesis of an absolute”. Thought is not mere distinction but also relation. Everything is possible only in relation to and as distinct from others. Under these circumstances, it is not illegitimate to hold that the hypothesis of an absolute cannot be sustained without the hypothesis of a relative. Absolute to be absolute presupposes a relative somewhere and in some forms, even the relative of its non-existence.

Jaina logic of *anekānta* is based not on abstract intellectualism but on experience and realism leading to a non-absolutistic attitude of mind. Multiplicity and unity, definability and non-definability etc. which apparently seem to be contradictory characteristics of reality are interpreted to co-exist in the same object from different points of view without any offence to logic. They seem to be contradictory of each other simply because one of them is mistaken to be the whole truth. In fact, integrity of truth consists in this very variety of its aspects, within the rational unity of an all-comprehensive and ramifying principle. The charge of contradiction against the co-presence of being and non-being in the real is a figment of *a priori* logic.

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NAGIN J. SHAH, a renowned Sanskritist and eminent scholar of Indian philosophy, has edited the present work. His first work *Akalaṅka's Criticism of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy—a Study*, published in 1966, was widely acclaimed by scholars all over the world. At present he has several brilliant works to his credit. The following are the works in English: *Essays in Indian Philosophy*, *Samantabhadra's Āptamīmāṃsā—Critique of an Authority*, *A Study of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's Nyāyamañjarī—a Mature Sanskrit Work on Indian Logic* (in three parts). And the following works are in Gujarati: *Sāṅkhya-Yoga*, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, *Bhāratīya Tattvajñāna*, *Bauddha Dharma-Darśana*. He has also given an excellent English translation of Muni Nyayavijayaji's voluminous important Gujarati work *Jaina-Darśana* (English title: *Jaina Philosophy and Religion*). Moreover, he has edited, from the old original manuscripts, the unpublished *Nyāyamañjarī-Granthibhaṅga*.

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