JAINA THEORY OF PAROKSHA-JÑĀNA

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It is truly necessary to know what is pratyakṣa or an immediate knowledge before going to discussion on mediate knowledge or a Prokṣa-jñāna. Umāsvāti makes it clear that knowledge which depends exclusively upon ātman alone is pratyakṣa, while that which depends upon sense-organs and manas is parokṣa, of course, even in the case of parokṣa-jñāna, the instrumentality of Ātman is also accepted.

Knowledge derived through the sense-organs and manas was thus considered parokṣa-jñāna by Jaina Philosopher and this was directly against the views held by the other schools of Indian Philosophy, which generally held the views that the sense-organs give us immediate knowledge (Pratyakṣa-jñāna) whereas all the other ‘sources’ lead to only mediate knowledge.

But if we observe the stages of evolution in the Jaina canons, we find there are three stages. Among these three stages, third stage was influenced by the general tendency of Indian Philosophy that regards sensory knowledge as direct. (on this stage sensory knowledge has been placed in both categories, viz. direct and indirect. The sensory knowledge is direct in vyavahāra or practice or in the secondary sense).

Thus, according to early Jaina Philosophers, the knowledge which is derived from the self is pratyakṣa and knowledge which does not arise from the self alone is called parokṣa. But the later Jaina Philosophers came to accept the knowledge produced by the sense-organs also as pratyakṣa. According to later Jaina logicians perception is the knowledge obtained through the operation of sense-organs and the manas. Hemacandra defines ‘Viśadam Pratyakṣa as clear knowledge. Clarity is its special quality. Akalaṅka also held this definition.

Now, we come to our specific discussion on the Jaina theory of mediate or non-perceptual knowledge. Non-perceptual is that which is not clear. The Jaina logician Akalaṅka says ‘aviśadam parokṣam’. It is indistinct, unlike pratyakṣa, dependent on others. It is devoid of
perceptual vividness. Akalaṅka classified parokṣa-jñāna into following types: (1) Smṛti, (2) Pratyabhijñā, (3) Tarka, (4) Anumāna and (5) Āgama. All these being indirect knowledge. Let us discuss these five types of mediate knowledge one by one and see which of them is very important.

(1) Smṛti (memory)—Memory is the knowledge of an object perceived in the past as ‘that’ due to revival of its disposition (saṃskāra) which is a particular power of the self. It is revived. It is an effect of the revival of the disposition of the previous perception of an object. The object remembered must have been known in the past and it is experienced at the time of recalling it, in the form of ‘that’.

There is a controversy among the philosophers, whether memory is a pramāṇa or not. Some holds that memory is a pramāṇa and some holds it is not a pramāṇa. There are mainly two traditions on the point the Jaina and the non-Jaina.

According to the Jainas memory is a sub-class of pramāṇa. This is clearly a departure from the view usually held by other-schools of Indian Philosophy on the point. On the other hand, non-Jaina tradition, vedic as well as Buddhist Philosophers are not ready to accept it as an independent pramāṇa on the ground that it depends on the validity of earlier experience (grahitagrahitva).

On the other hand, the Jaina logicians unanimously accept the validity of Smṛti Pramāṇa. Their main argument is that the Saṃskāras recall for any particular purpose; the things experienced in the past, The memory of such things is a source of knowledge gained through senses. Therefore, memory is considered to be a pramāṇa because it is true facts (saṁvādin) just as perception etc. are treated as pramāṇas, because they are true facts.

The validity of pramāṇa can’t be ascertained merely by relation to its dependence or independence of experience. If this argument is accepted, even pramāṇa will cease to be a pramāṇa, for inference also depends on knowledge already acquired through direct emperical perception.

(2) Pratyabhijñān (recognition)—Recognition is the synthetic cognition, caused by experience and recollection and cognising the simi-
larity. It apprehends an object in the forms 'this is that', 'this is like that', 'this is different from that', 'this is correlated to that' and the like. It knows relations, identity, similarity, dissimilarity, relation of sign and signate, correlation and the like; between a present perceived object and object perceived in the past and remembered now. Recognition knows a present perceived object as known in the past, e.g. 'this is that Devadatta' perception knows 'this'. Recollection knows 'that'. But recognition knows 'this is that'.

In connection with the problem of recognition, philosophers have held divergent views on two points, viz as to whether it is pramāṇa and as to its nature. The Buddhist tradition treats recognition as no pramāṇa. They believe in the transitory nature of things and hold that Devadatta of to-day is not the same Devadatta as of yesterday. From their point of view, therefore, the recognition 'he is the same Devadatta' is wrong. For them, in fact, there is no question of recognition.

But the philosophers belonging to the two non-Buddhist traditions i.e. Jaina and Vedicist agree in treating recognition as pramāṇa. The Jaina Philosophers believe in 'change in permanance'. According to them an object changes but does not loose its identity. The change is therefore, partial and not absolute and thus recognition is possible. In fact, the very fact that we do recognise things in practice, has been used by the Jainas as well as Brahmanical Philosophers to refute the theory of transitory nature of things.

(3) Tarka (inductive reasoning)—Inductive reasoning is a knowledge of universal concomitance of the probane with the probandum in the past, present and the future arising from the observation of their co-presence and co-absence in the form of 'If this is present that is present' and 'if this is absent that is absent'.

Umaśvātī in his Tattvārtha Bhāṣya has used the words tarka (reasoning) and uha (logic) as synonyms of second variety of sensuous knowledge, the speculation (Īhā). It was Akalaṇka who first of all offered a logical definition of reasoning. Since then the Jaina logicians have been defining reasoning as an independent organ of knowledge for cognising all such concepts as an universal like that of the concomitance of probandum and probane.
Mīmāṃsakas do not accept Tarka as a separate pramāṇa. The Buddhists also deny its validity on the ground that tarka can only help one to know further an object which is already known through perception. The Naiyāyikas maintain that reasoning is only helpful in removing doubts about concomitance and is not independent organ of knowledge.

The Jaina logicians Akalaṅka recognised reasoning (tarka) as an independent organ of knowledge, since concomitance can not be known without reasoning. If we do not accept the validity of reasoning, we will not be able to accept either, as they both (influence and reasoning) depend on the same basis for their validity as pramāṇas.

(4) Anumāna (inference)—The most important method of knowledge is anumāna or inference. The Sanskrit word anumāna is usually translated as inference. Anumāna means a cognition which takes place after some other cognition, specially perception. The Vedic thinkers may have been the first to attempt a definition of anumāna and their definition influenced the the Jainas. Jainas hold that anumāna is the method of knowing an unperceived object through the perception of a sign (Hetu) recollection of its invariable concomitance with that object.

The Nyāya view is that anumāna is a type of secondary knowledge deduced from a prior knowledge. A knowledge of the invariability of concomitance between two things helps to deduce existence of one of them when the other is perceived. Vātsyāyana in his book Nyāyabhāṣya uses the term (अन्विक्षा) ‘anvikṣā’ as synonyms for the word ‘anumāna’. ‘Anvikṣā’ literally means knowledge which follows from other knowledge. It is always indirect or mediate knowledge. It is a complex process of knowledge is accepted by all schools of Indian thought except Cārvāka who denies it altogether.

Akalaṅka presents a comprehensive definition of anumāna as follows—cognition of sādhya produced by the sādhana is called Anumāna, which follows liṅga-grahaṇa and Vyāpti-Smaraṇa.

Hemachandra defines anumāna thus:

साधना सत्य विज्ञानम्—अनुमानम्

Anumāna is the knowledge of Sādhya from sādhana. Fire is inferred from smoke. Here ‘smoke’ is the sādhana and ‘Fire’ is the Sādhya.

Anumāna is based on the universal accompaniment of the probane (Sādhana) by the probandum (sādhya) in simultaneity or succession,
It is based on Vyāpti derived from induction (tarka), which is the logical ground of inference. In the early Jaina literature, the term 'avinābhāva' is frequently used as the equivalent of Vyāpti.

In Jaina philosophy there are two kinds of Anumāna: (1) Svārthānumāna (inference for one's own self) and (2) Parārthānumāna (inference for the sake of others) or syllogistic inference.

(1) Svārthānumāna consists in the knowledge of the probandum from/probante ascertained by one's own self, as having the sole and solitary characteristic of standing in necessary concomitance with the probandum. The organs of Svārthānumāna are said to be three in number, viz Sādhyā, Sādhana and Pakṣa.

(2) Parārthānumāna is the knowledge of the probandum derived from the statement of the probans having the characteristic of necessary concomitance. Philosophers of different schools hold different views as regards the constitution of syllogism. The Śāṅkhya maintains that a syllogism consists of three parts: Thesis (pakṣa), reason (Hetu) and example (dṛṣṭānta). The Buddhist philosopher Ācārya Dignāga also hold these three. The Mīmāṁsakas assert four parts with the addition of application (upanaya). The Naiyāyikas assert five part with the addition of conclusion (nigamana).

The Jaina holds that the thesis and reason constitute syllogism adequate for an intelligent person. Inference for less-intelligent persons, on the contrary, requires a long chain of premises. To teach such persons, the Jainas accept not only are all the five premises of the Nyāya-syllogism but they go even further than this and accept ten-limbed syllogism for such persons.

As regards the aspects of the nature of a hetu (reason), the Buddhists like the Vaiśeṣikas and Śāṅkhyas assert that there are three aspects of a hetu viz Pakṣadhartamata (presence in the subject), Sapakṣatva (presence in a homologues) and Vipakṣatva (absence from heterologues). The Naiyāyikas accept in addition to the above three, two more aspects of the nature of hetu, viz Abādhi-vaśayatva (absence of counterbalancing hetu) and Asat-Pratipakṣatva. The Jainas criticise all these views of Naiyāyikas and Buddhists. They admit that only the anyathanupopa-
nntva, also called avinābāva or Vyāpti is the only characteristic of a Valid hetu.

(5) Āgama (verbal testimony) is the fifth type of parokṣa pramāṇas. It is knowledge of objects derived from the words of a reliable person. A reliable person is one, who knows the object as it is and states it as he knows it. Such a person can never tell a lie. He is free from attachment and aversion. His words are in harmony with their objects. They do not contradict the nature of their object. He is called Āpta.

The words of an Āpta are called Āgama. The Jainas believe that their prophets were Āptas and therefore they accepted Āgamas as an independent pramāṇa. They did not restrict the definition of Āpta to the field of spiritual experiences and attainments. An āpta may according to Jaina logicians, be any authority on the subject even if it is only a secular subject.

All Indian Philosophers except the Cārvākas have recognised it as a source of valid knowledge. But there has raged a controversy as to whether it is an independent source of knowledge or merely a case of inference while the rest consider it to be an independent source of knowledge. As a matter of fact it should not be considered as a part of anumāṇa, since, unlike anumāṇa it arises without having perceived signs and their concomitance.

According to the Jaina logicians verbal testimony is of two kinds (1) Secular (Laukika) and (2) non-Secular (Lokottara). The Testimony of Janaka and others is secular. Testimony of Tirthaṅkaras is non-secular.

**Conclusion :**

Let us now put down in short the points that emerge from this whole discussion. According to the early Jaina Literature, knowledge is divided into pratyakṣa and Parokṣa. Although knowledge is divided as pratyakṣa and parakṣa, yet the words pratyakṣa and parokṣa are used in different sense.

The later Jaina logicians also divided knowledge as pratyakṣa and parokṣa. According to them pratyakṣa is of two kinds, while parokṣa is
of five kinds: Smṛti, pratyabhijñā, tarka, anumāna and āgama. They accepted each of these five kinds of knowledge as separate pramāṇa. But according to Naiyāyikas tarka is only helpful in removing doubts about concomitance and is not independent organ of knowledge. They are not ready to accept memory as an independent pramāṇa. But the Jainas considered both memory and Tarka as a separate pramāṇa. Therein lies the novelty of Jainism.

References:

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