

JAINISM

(SOME ESSAYS)

-Dalsukh Malvania

PRAKRIT BHARATI ACADEMY
JAIPUR

JAINISI
SOME ESSAYS

by

Dalsukh D. Malvania

Translated by

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Dalsukh D. Malvania

Foreward

Jainism teaches an all encompassing view of life. Life, it says, is a harmonical synthesis of knowledge, doctrine and conduct. None of these is autonomous and complete in itself. Its their proper combination which gives life its true meaning.

Syādvāda, also called, anekāntavāda is the Jain philosophy which propounds the idea that all knowledge is relative and interconnected, and that no single view-point is definitive. It is intimately connected with the Jain world view of harmony and Synthesis. It inspires tolerance and appreciation of different view-points.

Shri Dalsukh Malvania is a renowned scholar of oriental studies and Jain studies in particular. He is no mere scholar, for he not only brilliantly expounds Jain philosophy but also lives it. This gives to his words an authenticity and catholicity rare among the learned. In this collection of twelve essays written over a period of about 20 fruitful years. Malvania has dealt with different aspects of Jainism often comparing it with Hinduism and Buddhism in order to bring out its distinctiveness.

Prakrit Bharati feels privileged and deeply obliged to him in publishing this collection. We hope it will enlighten and inspire the readers. Prakrit Bharati is also thankful to Prof. A. S. Gopani for agreeing to translate these essays from Gujrati in which they had originally appeared. Our thanks are also due to Shri Jitendra Sanghi of Ajanta Printers for undertaking to print this book.

I request the reader to read 'anon' for the unfortunate misprint 'anons' in the title of the 7th essay (p.89).

Mahopadhyay Vinay Sagar

Joint Secretary

Prakrit Bharati Academy, Jaipur.

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PREFACE

This book is a collection of some of my articles, written mostly between 1946 and 1964. Most were written originally in Gujrati. They have been translated into English by my revered teacher Dr. A. S. Gopani. I find no words to thank him. I am thankful to Shri D. R. Mehta, Secretary, Prakrit Bharati Academy, Jaipur for publishing this book.

I am also thankful to Mahopadhyay Vinaya Sagaraji for his help in this publication.

8, Opera Society
Ahmedabad
18/2/1986

—**Dalsukh Malvania**

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Jain Religion

There are two forms of Jain religion : One noumenal and the other, phenomenal. When thinking about it, one has to take into consideration both these aspects. Moreover, it is the characteristic of all the Indian religions that each of them has its own philosophical system. Religion is a thing to be practised but underlying it there are some ideologies which are collectively called philosophy. Therefore, when we think about Jain religion, the thought about its philosophy is also automatically included.

1. ŚRAMANA AND BRĀHMAṆA

Indra's victory

Jain religion is the religion of the Jinas, meaning thereby that it is the religion of the conquerors. In ancient times, Indra was worshipped because he was the conqueror. But Jina as a conqueror and Indra as a conqueror are two widely different things. Indra, in his own times destroyed all his enemies and thus acquired the designation of a conqueror, became the leader of the Āryas and also the object of worship. This victory was merely extrinsic, the physical victory. What he obtained from such a victory was material prosperity. He set a great store by it and his dignity was merely due to it. This is not a new thing. From time immemorial, man was a worshipper of Śakti, the energy. But when one nation scored a victory over the other, Indra as its conqueror assumed peculiar significance and the civilization that developed due to this in India came to be known as the civilization of the sacrifice. Martial spirit and physical strength lay at the root of the development of this civilization. This later on became known as the Brāhmaṇa civilization when the intellectual element had the upper hand. When Āryans were advancing in Bhāratavarṣa attaining victory of this type, the urban civilization had well progressed in Bhāratavarṣa. It can be easily understood that the citizens who had settled down would possess physical strength less and intellectual energy more in comparison to the wandering Āryans who had more of bodily vigour and virility.

Intellectual strength could not resist physical strength and Indra achieved victory destroying many cities and towns. He, in this manner, got a win and the urban civilization thus came to a stop. We get references pointing to a conclusion that many a sage and saint were done to death. In Mohan-Jo-Daro and Harappā we come across many idols in which the

figures are seen absorbed in meditation. This leads us to infer that the religious leaders of the urban civilization of India studied Yoga. We can also conclude that the sages and saints killed by Indra were these very people. In the absence of any recorded evidence, it is difficult to hazard a guess regarding the name of the religion practised by these people; but in the times of Buddha and Mahāvira there were two distinct ideologies prevalent and a mention of this is found in the Buddhist and Jain works. The mention is about the Brāhmaṇa and Śramaṇa. The available works about the civilization of the sacrifice abounding in references in relation to sacrificial rites and rituals are recognized as the 'Brāhmaṇa'. This makes it clear that the ideology known as the 'Brāhmaṇa' had a connection with the civilization of the sacrifice. This also establishes the fact the other ideology had verily the relationship with the 'Śramaṇa'. We are thus in a position to suppose that in the times before Buddha and Mahāvira, there were two distinct types of religion, namely, the Brāhmaṇa and the Śramaṇa.

It has been said before that the civilization of the conquerors of the material world is the Brāhmaṇa civilization. As opposite to this, it can be naturally deduced that the civilization of the conquerors of the self is the Śramaṇa civilization. Just as gods, the conquerors of the external world of beings, became the objects of worship in Brāhmaṇa civilization, those of the self in the Śramaṇa civilization came to be known as the 'Jinas'. It can be safely presumed that the sculptures of the meditative postures in Mohan-Jo-Daro are suggestive of the attempt to conquer the self.

Indra had a martial spirit but it turned out to be of no use before the lustre of the Brahma. That civilization became known as the Brāhmaṇa civilization though the martial spirit lay at the root of it. This very martial spirit assumed the form of spiritual lustre in the Śramaṇas. Physical strength or lustre is not the real strength or lustre but the internal strength, the strength of the spirit is the real strength. This consideration was responsible in giving a new turn to the meaning of the martial spirit. Thus the Kṣatriyas played the exclusive role in the growth and development of the Śramaṇa civilization. If we are to judge from the available historical records we can safely say that it is the Kṣatriyas who developed the Śramaṇa civilization as they possessed newly acquired spiritual strength,

Synthesis of both the civilizations and its date

In the Upaniṣads we see that the Brahma Vidyā which was originally the Yajña Vidyā became known later on as the Ātma Vidyā. Its promulgators were the people of the Kṣatriya caste and not those of the Brāhmaṇa caste. The sages also well-versed in the Yajña Vidyā, went to the Kṣatriyas

to acquire the Ātma Vidyā. This indicates that the Śramaṇic traditions influenced the Brāhmaṇas on account of their spiritual strength and not because of the physical. This happened to such an extent that the self or the soul, and not the sacrifice, occupied a predominant place in the Brāhmaṇic civilization during the Upaniṣadic and post-upaniṣadic periods. This was the time of the synthesis of the Brāhmaṇic and Śramaṇic civilizations. It was the time of Bhagawān Mahāvira and Buddha. As a result of this synthesis, the Śramaṇas received much from the Brāhmaṇas and the Brāhmaṇas from the Śramaṇas. The Brahma, which formerly meant sacrifice or its sacred formulae or panegyrics, was now equated with self or soul. The Śramaṇas gave the name of Āryas to the best of their people and called their own religion as the religion of the Āryas. The concept of sacrifice was accepted by the Śramaṇas also but they gave it spiritual connotation. They experienced dignity in addressing the Śramaṇas, the members of their group, as Brāhmaṇas and to their code of conduct, they gave the name of Brahmacharya or Brahmavihāra—the “sojourn unto the Brahma”. The Brāhmaṇas meant by Brahmacharya the studies of the Vedas, while the Śramaṇas interpreted it as a form of conduct involving spiritual exercises. In the Brahmaṇic ideology there was no accommodation for the concept of renunciation or emancipation. But they borrowed it from the Śramaṇas and completely absorbed it in their own formulary. According to the Brāhmaṇas the gods such as Indra and others were superior in physical strength and were also the objects of worship for the men while the Śramaṇas knew them and described them as the worshippers or the servants of the Jinas who were human beings. On the other hand, the Brāhmaṇas gave up the worship of Indra and others and adopted that of the self or soul. Physical strength was substituted by spiritual strength. In short, Indra was replaced by soul. In sum, the religion of the Brāhmaṇas was now known as the religion of the Brahma or Soul. This attitude of synthesis put both—the Brāhmaṇas and Śramaṇas - on the road to development. The line of distinction which divided them consisted of belief or non-belief in the Vedas, meaning thereby that those who believed in the authority of the Vedas were considered advocates or adherents of the Vedic or the Brāhmaṇic traditions and those who did not so believe or who took the Jinas, born on this earth from time to time, as authorities, were known as the Śramaṇas.

Śramaṇic Traditions

Just as there is a variety of views in the Vedic school, there is also so in the Śramaṇic school. Just as various interpretations as regards Vedic teachings gave rise to a number of schools or sects in the Brāhmaṇic system, the same phenomenon worked with uniformity in the case of Śramaṇic

system also. Thus, as a result, the Ājivakas, Nirgranthas, Bauddhas and others came into existence. All these, being the worshippers of the Jina, were known as the Jains. It is a historical fact that the Bauddha religion was known as the Jain religion till the sixth century A. D. Another equally valid historical fact is that the Ājivakas were known in the history as the Digambaras or the Kṣapaṇakas. But today the custom prevails that only those who are the followers of Bhagvān Mahāvīra are the Jains. The second class of the Śramaṇas which professes to be the followers of Bhagawan Buddha is called the Bauddha. Today, the Ājivikas and the other sects or sections of the Śramaṇas do not exist at all. This makes possible the only conclusion that the term Jain, though comprehensive, has a limited meaning in the present context. In a broad sense, the term Jain means the follower of the Jina. Despite that, in a restricted application, one who follows the traditions laid down by Bhagwan Mahāvīra is the Jain. Bhagavān Mahāvīra has a number of applications such as Sugata, Śramaṇa, Tathāgata, Arhanta, Tirthaṅkara, Buddha etc. etc. Similarly, the Buddha. This is sufficient to suggest that both belonged to one and the same Śramaṇic ideology and traditions following from it. But one system of traditions puts more emphasis on the word Arhat of Jina and therefore it became famous as the Ārhat or the Jain system while the other following the same method became designated in course of time as the Bauddha system.

Difference between the two

Relation to the resemblance or otherwise between the two, namely, the Brāhmaṇas and Śramaṇas, it is necessary to point out that there existed a wide gulf, during the upaniṣadic period and even thereafter, between the Śramaṇas and Brāhmaṇas, notwithstanding the fact that the Brāhmaṇas had adopted the Śramaṇic science of the self or soul. There is no doubt that the Brāhmaṇas became increasingly inclined to the science of the self or soul and the sages of the Brāhmaṇas who knew the Brahma were held in esteem amongst the Brāhmaṇas. Even then a big difference was visible between the way of life of the sages who claimed to be the knowers of the Brahma and that of the Tirthaṅkaras who flourished at that time as also that of Bhagavān Mahāvīra and Buddha who flourished later on. This difference was occasioned by dissimilar viewpoints as regards the concept of knowledge and the concept of conduct. The sages of the Brāhmaṇas were, indeed, proficient in the comprehension of the Brahma but they were weak so far as the ideal conduct was concerned. If and when we take into account the incidents of the life of Yājñavalkya who was

the credited philosopher and the knower of the Brahma in his days and compare them with those of the lives of Mahāvira, Buddha or their predecessors, we will find the preponderance of detachment in the Śramaṇas, but not in the Brāhmaṇis. Even though Yājñavalkya was the knower of the Brahma, his knowledge could not stop him from getting up from the assembly and taking away the cows with him, thus displaying his pride about the superiority of his knowledge of Brahma to that of any one else. In contrast to this, Buddha and Mahāvira became houseless monks leaving aside everything the moment they become aware, howsoever little, of the Śramaṇic religion. Yājñavalkya, notwithstanding that he was a Brahmarṣi had two wives and he had a problem about the division of his property. One who owns property cannot be called the knower of the Brahma or of the self or soul. This difference distinguished the Śramaṇas from the Brāhmaṇas and it does so even today. Greater importance is attached to the stage of a householder in the Brāhmaṇic tradition which also accepts the stage of renunciation as one of the four. While, as a matter of fact, the Śramaṇic tradition knows no other stage than that of renunciation. No other stages have, according to it, any significance as the stage of the renunciation. Householder's stage is not thought of as necessary even as a stage preparatory to that of the renunciation. Householder's stage is to be avoided totally. This particular difference between the two systems of traditions is responsible for the presence of the concept of the Śrāddha ceremony and of that of the unavoidable necessity of progeny in the Brāhmaṇic system. Nothing like this exists in the Śramaṇic system.

Special prominence given to the institution of sacrifice amongst the Brāhmaṇas gave rise to that of priesthood. As a necessary corollary, the Brāhmaṇas were considered superior to all others. Due to this, the ideas of superiority and inferiority as regards caste came into existence in the society and these covered the field of religion also. This ended in clear-cut divisions of the society. On the contrary, there was, in the Śramaṇic system, no such scope for the rise of the institution of priesthood. In spite of this and because of the constant contact of the Brāhmaṇas and Śramaṇas with each other, the theory of superiority and inferiority in relation to the caste with which Śramaṇic ideology was at variance, was accepted by the Śramaṇas so far as the society at large was concerned, though it must be said in fairness that such a distinction was not visible in the Śramaṇic order in old days. But we see today that it also is invaded by the devil of caste distinction. As opposed to this, we come across references clearly indicating that there had flourished in the medieval times such sects and sages that did not, though owing allegiance to the Brāhmaṇic traditions, attach any weight

to the distinctions generally created by the caste. This is, in a way, triumph of the Śramaṇic ideology.

Subsidiary role played by the difference

A great difference between the Śramaṇas and Brāhmanas is there due to their attitudes towards no-activity and activity as such. Entire approach of the Śramaṇas concerning this problem was one of cessation of sinful activity in contra-distinction to that of the Brāhmanas which was characterized by total activity under any circumstances and at any cost. If we look to the Brāhmanas' institution of sacrifice, its rites and rituals and the outcome resulting therefrom, it will soon be clear to us that their effort in regard to this was exclusively directed to the attainment of heavenly bliss. Therefore, activity was necessary and not the cessation of activity. Against this, the Śramaṇas were the advocates and adherents of the theory of no-activity. They thus banned the whole network of ritualism. With them, the motto was not to do and not, to do. On thinking about the core of the whole of the ritualism as sponsored and adumbrated in and through the Brāhmanic ideology we find that it is required to be done collectively and not singly. This entitles us to conclude that the Brāhmanic religion was the religion of the society and not of the individual. In juxtaposition to this the Śramaṇic religion being mainly confined to no-activity became the religion of the individual only. Therefore, the whole code of conduct in the Śramaṇic system was formed and formulated with the sole object that an individual can and must perform his religious duty alone and without the help and co-operation of others. In such a philosophy of unadulterated individualism, there cannot be any special accommodation for the principle of mutual help, sympathy or compassion. The Brāhmanic philosophy which revolves round the central principle of cent per cent activity and throws the whole burden of responsibility for the result of activity, good or bad, on the deity which is worshipped, had been able to allot room to pity, or compassion. This trend of that philosophy creates a climate favourable for the play of good will, co-operation, aid and assistance. When with the passage of time and due to the action and interaction of these two ideologies, namely the Śramaṇic and Brāhmanic, a synthesis was evolved, the Brāhmanas incorporated into their concept of the stage of renunciation the Śramaṇic principle of no-activity and the Śramaṇas in reply welcomed the Brāhmanic theory of mercy and compassion. On account of this, the Śramaṇas accepted the superiority of the Jinas-Tirthaṅkaras to any other beings due to his compassion. This paved the way for a synthetical approach in place of individualistic one, in both, and they came nearer to each other. This development urged both to advance arguments pleading the cause of selecting only one

essential symbol of worship. The Śramaṇas transformed the whole network of the rites, ceremonies and rituals of the Brāhmaṇas so as to make it fit to be adopted by them in their own ethical structure. Similarly did the Brāhmaṇas also do. This give and take practically bridged the gulf of the differences existing between them. The civilization known as the Hindu civilization today is but a blend of these two. Though these two ideologies appear one and the same, it is merely on the surface as the undercurrents are different. In the society at large, the words 'naked', 'shameless', are not at all suggestive of respectability. Even though in the Śramaṇic ideology, to remain 'naked' and to overpower 'shame' have been considered big things, the words 'naked' and 'shameless' are condemned as scandalizing. Similarly, the word 'Bhāmaṭo' which is but a corruption of the word 'Brāhmaṇa' has undergone the same fate. Antagonism between the two ideologies has given currency to such objectionable words. A complimentary phrase 'Devānām Priya' used for Aśoka has been misinterpreted by the Brāhmaṇas so as to mean a "foolish animal" and it has been also popularized as such. Vedas lay great stress on social life as, according to them all the beings are ultimately linked up with "One Supreme". The origin of social code also lies in this. A social creature considering himself a unit of the society can never afford to behave against the society. This has created a code of social conduct. Naturally, therefore, individualism comes into conflict with socialism. The Śramaṇas, therefore, have no law books prescribing rules and regulations ensuring social order and stability. Now, on the other hand, individualism which is isolationism cannot help in leading a life in the group. This compelled the Śramaṇas also to form groups which are technically called Saṅghas. The necessity to regulate and govern these arose and as a result they also have now a codified system of ethics. As said before, synthetical approach brought both together in a way, there is also a dividing line based on their beliefs regarding the fallibility or otherwise of the Vedas. This has made a complete blend impossible and it will remain so in future also.

Causative factor in the difference of attitudes.

Let us now think about the cause of difference between the attitudes of both the ideologies. Along with it we have to find out the reason which comes in the way of accommodating the element of unity in both of them.

According to the Vedas, this whole universe is evolved out of one element only. This element is variously known as Brahma, Paramātmā, Īśvara etc. etc. Keeping this pronouncement of the Vedas as unalterable, a place has been assigned to the worship of this supreme element under various names and forms in all the schools of thought and tradition. Though in

order to explain that this whole universe is evolved from this supreme element or taking this supreme element as the basis or on account of this element, many systems of thought owing their origin or allegiance from and to the Vedas have later grown up and developed, faithful adherence to the principle of one supreme element has remained in all of them, constant and common.

In contrast to this, no such supreme element as a cause of this universe has been accepted as a hypothesis in the Śramaṇic ideology. It postulates a theory that this universe has neither beginning nor end and for its existence all the beings themselves and no body else, are accountable. In other words, there exist many elements, and not one only, from time immemorial. There is, thus, no necessity for the worship of that one element as the creator of the universe.

According to the traditions having their origin in the Vedas, the beings separated from that supreme element are again absorbed into it by it if at all they have won its grace. This means that it is but natural that the beings should worship the supreme element in order to attain the status of that supreme element. But, as there is no such hypothesis in the Śramaṇic ideology, there is no question of the beings getting merged into or becoming united with the supreme element. The Śramaṇic ideology rejects the Vedic theory of one supreme element but the contingency arising therefrom is successfully met with by it by postulating a theory that the wheel of this worldly existence which is eternally moving should be stopped from moving and an effort should be made in this direction. Herein lies the fulfilment. A person that has put forth such an endeavour secures the status of an ideal person. If any other person follows in the footsteps of such an exalted person, it should be understood that he merely imitates him.

The idea or element of worship got entry into the Śramaṇic ideology, as a result of the innate instinct in the Śāramaṇas as it is in anybody else, to copy the Brāhmaṇas. But the essential approach being different in the Śramaṇic ideology, the element of worship in it has remained one-sided. The object of worship is not able to do anything for the subject. That object of worship is only the highest symbol for the subject, the worshipper-keeping the object before him, decides his way. In other words it is no worship at all. Despite this, the pompous and the place which the temples and images have got in the Śramaṇic ideology just as in the Brāhmaṇic one, is to be thought of as relating to its external, and not the internal form. This can also be explained that the mode or method of

worship, whether of the supreme symbol or of its own, remains the same so far as the external form is concerned. The difference which is there is due to the fact that one aspires to reach the supreme symbol while the other his own pristine position. According to one, the supreme is not different from the subject, or the worshipper, while according to the other, the subject is not other from himself. According to one, the ideal supreme object which is worshipped is the same in the beginning and remains the same in the end. But according to the other, the object though not different from ones' own self in the beginning and in the end, is, indeed, different from others. On account of this difference, there is no possibility for total synthesis between both the ideologies. Whatever was possible in this connection has already been arrived at by both.

Śramaṇic religion is the original pattern on which the present form of Jainism is designed. After this short account, let us now turn to the history of today's Jainism which is but a branch of the original tree of Śramaṇic religion.

2. HISTORY OF JAINISM

Because Jainism was a sect or a system belonging to the Śramaṇic ideology and because there was resemblance between the other sects or systems belonging to the Śramaṇic ideology, the western scholars were under a mistaken impression that Jainism is not different from Buddhism. But scholars like Jacobi have since long invalidated that erroneous supposition. This delusion had never taken possession of the Indian scholars. On account of this, discussion about this is out of place here.

Jainism has a history of its own and a metaphysics too. History explains in its own way and the aim of metaphysics is the enunciation and examination of an eternal truth. Therefore in the history and metaphysical system of Jainism there is bound to be a scope for differences of opinion regarding the antiquity of Jainism.

Beginningless and Eternal

Let us first, investigate the nature of clarifications which Jain metaphysics has offered in relation to antiquity. The Vedas have propounded the theory of the existence of only one supreme reality in the beginning of the creation. Its natural corollary, therefore, is that the whole universe has emerged from that. But the Vedic metaphysics too, has no answer to give in the matter of definite time when the creation originated. Let us know this situation by the word 'beginningless', though this stand of ours is mutually

contradictory but it is not illogical. We have no option open to us and we are constrained to call a thing as having “no beginning” when we are not able to state positively about its actual beginning. This being the state of affairs similarly the Jain metaphysics has accepted that the beginning of the creation in point of time cannot be traced (न कदाचिद्नीदृशं जगत्) and that the universe is materially the same for all time. This limitless time has been divided into infinite divisions but for practical purposes it is divided into the cycle of the ascending eon (उत्सर्पिणी) and descending eon (अवसर्पिणी). Both these eons are blessed by the advent of twenty-four Tirthaṅkaras, who have preached in one and the same strain that all beings without exception are bound with kārmiic particles; that the reasons occasioning this bondage are attachment and hatred; and that the beings work out final release by removing these causes. All the Tirthaṅkaras have uniformly propounded and expounded this gospel truth. From this view-point, Jainism has neither the beginning nor the end and can claim to be ever-present. there are beings and just as they try to get entangled, they can also try equally well to get disentangled. This effort to be free from bondage is Jainism. Now if the beings are eternal, their religion also should necessarily be so. Reasoning founded on this vision establishes the eternality of Jainism. But this vision coming as it does at some point of time and the philosophical explanation of it having been attempted from a particular angle at some later stage after the events have occurred, it has no relevance with history. Therefore, it is out of place here, to discuss about it in details.

Historical proofs

Let us now take up the question regarding what history has to say about Jainism. In the opinion of some, the word “Ariṣṭanemi” occurring in the Brāhmaṇic works, refers to the Jain Tirthaṅkara having that name. But according to the Jain traditions, he was related to Śrīkṛṣṇa. This Jain tradition has no confirmation from the Vedas. But it is certain that the word “Ariṣṭanemi” was current in ancient times. It may be the name of the Jain Tirthaṅkara or it may not be. According to the Mahābhārata, Sahadeva, changing his usual dress told in the assembly of king Virāṭa by way of giving information about himself that he was Ariṣṭanemi (वैश्योऽस्मि नाम्नाऽहमरिष्टनेमि (Virāṭaparva, 10th chap. stanza—5) by name and he was a Vaiśya by caste. In the same Mahābhārata, Arṣṭanemi has been referred to as Jineśvara. This leads us to one inevitable conclusion that Ariṣṭanemi did exist. If we take him as a contemporary of Kṛṣṇa, it can be safely inferred that he flourished at the time of the Mahābhārata in about 1400 to 1500 B.C.

Bhagavān Rṣabhadeva was the first Tirthaṅkara of the Jainas. The Vedas of the Brāhmaṇic tradition also refer to some Rṣabha. Reading the

biographical account of Rṣabha as found in the Purāṇas, the reader will have no doubt that it is the biographical account of Rṣabha of the Jainas. According to the Brāhmanic tradition, Rṣabhadeva belonged to the fifth generation of Manu. So it is clear that he flourished in the Purāṇic times. It should therefore, be considered as falling beyond the purview of history. The Jain Purāṇas also indicate that Rṣabha flourished in very old times. Depending on the evidence recorded in the Purāṇas belonging to both—the Brāhmanas and Jainas—it can be safely said that Rṣabha was a very great ascetic. What is now known as civilization had its first birth in the days of Rṣabha who himself contributed to it in a great measure. We know also from it that our country was named as Bhāratavarṣa after the name of Bharata, the son of Rṣabha. It is not possible to fit these statements in the Purāṇas in the framework of history. In spite of this, the custom of marriage between brother and sister or intimacy of that type in the R̥gvedic times and that of the same between the Jugalias as found mentioned in the story of Rṣabha entitle us to conclude that Rṣabha's time was not very far from R̥gvedic time.

But references constituting irrefutable testimony about the existence of Jainism are seen for the first time there in the Pāli Piṭakas. Notices about the principles peculiar to Jainism in addition to the mention of Bhagavān Mahāvīra as Nirgrantha Nāthaputta or Nirgrantha Jñātaputra are for the first time met with in the Buddhistic works. On the ground of various statements in regard to some Jaina principles, Dr. Jacobi has proved that there existed teachings of Tirthaṅkara Pārśvanātha before Mahāvīra. The Buddhist works relate that Bhagavān Mahāvīra's teachings revolved round the pivotal point of four vows while, as a matter of fact, according to the Jain works themselves, Bhagavān Mahāvīra recognized five vows and Bhagavān Pārśvanātha, four which were increased to five by Mahāvīra. This small oversight on the part of the Bauddhas provides an indirect evidence about the actual existence of Pārśvanātha. The fact that Buddha had to meet the challenges everywhere from the Nirgranthas lends credence to the prevalence of the religion of the Nirgranthas in the eastern region of the country before Buddha. In this context, it should be noted that Jain religion was known as the religion of the Nirgranthas in the times of Buddha. Thus it is a historical fact that Mahāvīra and even Pārśvanātha did exist. It is now a settled fact that Mahāvīra, being contemporary of Buddha, flourished in the fifth or sixth century B.C. According to Jaina tradition, Pārśvanātha got emancipation, 250 years before Mahāvīra. This empowers us to fix the life-time of Pārśvanātha about 800 B.C. Something has already been said above about Rṣabhadevas and Ariṣṭanemi from amongst the Tirthaṅkar who flourished before Mahāvīra.

From the above discussion, we are now in an unassailable position to state categorically that Jain religion had evolved its definite shape and substance at least before 800 B.C. and it had carved out its name and fame as one of the sects representing Śramaṇic ideology. There is no source available to us other than the Jain scriptures to venture a guess about the form of Jainism which was prevalent in the days of Ariṣṭanemi or of Rṣabhadev even—Jain scriptures as they attach greater weight to the teachings of Mahāvīra give passing reference only to those of the other. No reliable and consistent history can be constructed on such a scanty material. Therefore, we should be satisfied with this much only.

3. PHILOSOPHY

Having taken a bird's eye view of Jain history, let us now turn our eyes to its form, contents and characteristics.

Theory of God replaced by the theory of Karma

God as a creator of the universe has no place in Jainism. The discussion that a religion that cannot accommodate God is no religion at all had taken place before amongst Western scholars. When they discussed this problem, they had before them Christian religion and other similar religions believing in the existence of such a God. When these Western scholars became acquainted with Buddhism and Jainism, they noticed that there can be a religion in which God had no place. This urged them to change the very definition of religion and they have now started including Buddhism and Jainism in the category of religion. What explanation can there be, they asked themselves, about the orderliness which we see in the universe at every step and stage, if we think that there is no God? Theistic religions have no trouble because they can say that omnipotent God is there to govern and guide this world of which He is the prime mover. But this very place of God is wholly assigned to the Law of Karma in the Jain system. It is a postulate of Jainism that the wheel of this world moves on and on due to the Karmic effect of the living beings in this world and the order also is due to it. This law of Karma as enunciated in the Jain religion has influenced the other systems believing in God so much so that they also have begun accepting that nothing is left to the sweet-will of God but God also gives fruits in accordance with the Karmas of each being. Thus the law of Karma as formulated in the Jain system is more effective, in a way, than the Almighty God because ultimately Gods's management also is regulated by or is subject to the theory of Karma. If there is anything peculiar to Jainism, it is this elaborate principle of Karma. When this law of Karma was adopted as the motive force behind the movement of the

world, it was imperative to explain all the events and the peculiarities of beings on this very ground, of the law of Karma. Not only this, but it was also equally important to find out the technique which can help in increasing spiritual strength and reducing Karmic impact. Jainism has, indeed, discovered, the explanation and the procedure and in them only the nature of Jainism lies embedded.

Types of living beings and the way to realization

The aim of every religion of the world is to create dissatisfaction for his present condition in every living being and thus to goad him on and on to his growth and development. This growth climaxes in liberation. This means that the living beings are primarily divided into worldly and liberated. Worldly beings are bound up with the Karmas while the liberated are those who have freed themselves from the bondage. Among the worldly beings, there are some who go on progressing continually as also there are others who are treading the path of fall and degradation. It can be inferred that there are in them idiots and also wide awake beings. In other words, there are those who are fast attached to the world and its pleasures while there are others who are all set for realization. It is the mission of religion to make the world-conscious inclined towards the liberation-conscious and to set the liberation-conscious on the way to liberation. It is because of this that the first and foremost place has been assigned to discrimination which is, to put differently, right vision lying at the root of every religion worth the name. Discrimination means analysis. It has been clarified in Jainism that a living being is able to cast off his ignorance if he can distinguish soul from non-soul which, here, is Karma. There is no similarity between the nature of the soul and that of the Karma. The former is consciousness and the latter is inert matter. However, they are both so intermixed that the soul has lost knowledge of its real nature. Therefore, the prime duty of a real guide is to inspire the being to regain his lost knowledge and understanding. The consciousness, the awareness of the living being will pave the way to discrimination, which, in its own turn, will generate a feeling of hesitation which will stop him from mistaking the conditions created by the Karmas and their effect as his own. Such an awareness will engender in him a sense that he is the soul and not the body which is, in fact, material and therefore the product of the Karmas. When such a wisdom dawns on him, he is on his way to realization. Such an effort for realization is what constitutes Jainism. As it is preached by the Jinas, it is called Jainism. Here the word Jina refers to Tirthankara Mahāvira.

Specific nature of the realization as formulated in Jainism : Principle of Non-injury.

All the religious systems do accept the doctrine of soul and non-soul and the realization based on this principle of discrimination between spirit and matter. When matters stand thus, what has Jainism to offer specially on this point? Moreover, in all the metaphysical systems underlying all religions, realization is attained only with a view to removing or completely annihilating attachment and hatred. Here also Jainism has nothing new to offer. Why then, the term Jainism has been given to it? This is the problem. It is, no doubt true that features such as the distinction between spirit and matter as also the removal or annihilation of attachment and hatred are common to all religious systems but the apprentice for emancipation undertakes the programme of realization with certain intentions or inclinations. This difference of attitudes, outlooks and approaches in respective apprentices creates a corresponding difference in aims and ends also. This difference is also responsible for the distinctive character of Jainism from others. This has occasioned its special existence.

The first such outlook of Jainism lies in its principle of non-injury.

In Mahāvīra's times, animal-slaughter had a place in the code of religious conduct. Man hankered after getting happiness through animal slaughter in the sacrifice and he sincerely believed that the slaughtered animal also got heaven along with him. Mahāvīra opposed this and proclaimed "सर्वे जीवा वि इच्छन्ति जीविउं न मरिज्जिउं । तम्हा पाणिवहं घोरं निग्गंथा वज्जयंति य ।" "सर्वे जीवा सुहसाया, दुखपडिकूला अप्पियवहा पियजीविणो जीविउकामा । सर्वेसि जीवियं पियं ।" "तुमं सि नाम तं चैव जं हन्तव्वं ति मन्नसि । तम्हा न हंता, न वि घायए ।"

"All beings want to live and not to die. Therefore, Nirgranthas prohibit the violence, thinking it to be dangerous".

"All beings take happiness as agreeable and misery as disagreeable. They like protection and dislike slaughter. All want to live; they consider life desirable".

"Moreover, it is you whom you want to kill. Therefore, do not injure any one; do not destroy any one."

Mahāvīra asked point blank the Brāhmins who indulged in killing for so called religious purposes whether they would like if they are harmed or injured. If you cannot enjoy it you should think that it cannot be enjoyed by the others too. While preaching the gospel of non-injury, Mahāvīra had before him the objective of spiritual identity. On the contrary, those

who considered all as spiritually one and the same and who identified themselves with Brahma have special reason to abhor injury because he whom he wants to kill is not different from him. Therefore, non-injury should be the only religious principle to be practised by both whether he belongs to the category of monistic creed or dualistic creed. Mahāvīra insisted that the principle of non-injury should occupy unconditional place in life. He also made it clear that even the slightest injury done with the least carelessness to the smallest possible living organism is irreligion.

This unexceptionable practice of non-injury is possible only if the rules of conduct are hard and fast. Due to his unqualified emphasis on this fact, the rules of conduct which Mahāvīra framed for the order of monks and others in the light of his experience differentiated Jainism from other religions and established its separate, independent existence. The practice of total non-injury is possible only if it is strengthened by that of other supplementary vows, namely, Truthfulness, Non-stealing, Continence and Possessionlessness. These vows are recognized by the other religious systems also but their practices will become living and forceful if only special attention is bestowed on the minutest details even. When we take into account the whole subtle set of laws and by-laws regarding minor matters of conduct and the observance of vows, it becomes immediately apparent where the Śramaṇa Nirgranthas differ from the other Śramaṇas.

Being externally the same in point of nudity, a naked Bhikkhu might be mortifying himself with ignited fire all around him and a spike in his hand, while a nude Nirgrantha would be thinking that he cannot and should not do so as there are living organisms called fire-bodies in fire, one of the five elements. This is the attitude shown in other respects also such as wanderings, alms, residence etc. etc. In short every form of Nirgrantha's conduct is based without fail on the cardinal principle of non-injury while the others do not bother about injury or non-injury.

For the elaboration of this principle of non-injury, the loose threads of the science of biology were collected and constructed into whole. In this connection, one is advised to refer to Ācārāṅga which contains the direct utterances of Mahāvīra. There we find, at first, the discussion of the "weapon", in others words, a discussion about what causes and constitutes the killing of a living organism. This necessitated a reorganization of the biological science. Mahāvīra posed a question : What is that place in the universe which is devoid of living organisms ? When Mahāvīra perceived through the eyes of his superhuman knowledge, the presence of living organism in even earth, water, fire, wind and vegetables, where others could

not, the question is out of place in the demonstrable case of birds, beasts, and human beings. Mahāvira has been careful enough to show how one can live his life, abandoning the sin of killing any living organism of any denomination and description. This whole formulary as propounded by Mahāvira gets the name of Jainism, pure and simple. In one word, 'equipoise' 'even-mindedness', 'even-sightedness' is Jainism. This very truth is found reflected in a line "आत्मनः प्रतिकूलानि परेषां न समाचरेत्" occurring in the Mahābhārata. Living beings of all types in the universe hanker after growth and progress; none wants a degradation. All have equal rights to exist and evolve. Therefore, it can be deduced that it is the duty of everyone that he should be helpful to the other, and not obstructing, in achieving growth and development. This is the basic attitude, outlook and approach of Jainism. and Bhagavān Mahāvira is chief exponent.

Tirthaṅkar

Here, the emphasis which I have laid on the word "Tirthaṅkara" is for the reason that the distinguishing feature between the other aspirants and emancipated souls on one hand and the Tirthaṅkaras on the other is just what has been referred to above. The ordinary aspirants became the liberated ones, having achieved their own aim without minding the other. They had not paid so much attention to others in their effort to secure the final end and aim as they had to their own, but they, having completely annihilated attachment and hatred, became detached and thereafter having finished the remaining span of life, became the Siddhas—the liberated ones. This is not the case with the Tirthaṅkars amongst whom Mahāvira is one. Amongst the Karmas accumulated by the Tirthaṅkaras, there is a category of Karmas responsible for their persistent cultivation of compassionate attitude to all living beings. Due to the operation of this law the Tirthaṅkaras preached their teachings to the world and earned the status of Tirthaṅkara.

Soul, Karma, Destiny and Effort

The soul and the Karmas are bound up with each other from time immemorial. Now, the question is whether it is predetermined or not? Is the relationship permanently fixed or merely temporary? If it is temporary, what is the reason? According to Ājivakas, a certain section of the Śramaṇas, the relationship was fixed for ever. Nothing that is new happens because of the individual's effort. Further, according to it, when the time is ripe, the Karmic effect will wear out in the order in which it is predetermined and the individual need not put forth any fresh effort for that. Against this, Mahāvira firmly believed that the connection between the soul

and the Karma was occasioned by the individual's effort. The soul's effort, which binds it with the Karma, can also make it free from it. Thus taking the facts of available history in our consideration, we can state that Bhagawān Mahāvīra is the first man who saved the other from getting entangled into the net of pradeterminism and made him dependent on his own endeavour. This is not a small job he did. If everything is predetermined and if there is a firm conviction regarding it, there is no scope for activity and aspiration in life. On the contrary, if we cultivate faith in our power to make continuous effort, the spring of that power does not dry up, irrespective of our success or failure. There will be no dejection and no despair. Uninterrupted enthusiasm will be a part and parcel of our life. Despite the fact that Mahāvīra had directed his effort to extricate himself and others from the tangles of fatalism and the fact that he wanted to firmly fix his attitude, outlook and approach on endeavourism, we should believe that he has not been able to totally free himself from the clutches of predeterminism if at all the available Jain scriptures which, as they are supposed to have been originally preached by Mahāvīra, are any indication. In the phraseology of Anakānta, we can say that Mahāvīra adopted the theory of pradeterminism in explaining certain matters while he took recourse to that of endeavourism in others as it suited his purpose. When he divided the beings into two broad categories, namely, Bhavya and Abhavya, it is obvious that he drew inspiration from the theory of fatalism but the attempt which the Bhavyas put forth for liberation illustrates his theory of endeavourism. It is fatalism, pure and simple, when it is formulated that it is the Bhavyas, and not the Abhavyas, who can work out their final release and redemption. When Mahāvīra propounds that the Bhavyas are entitled to emancipation if only they properly exert for it and not otherwise, it is hundred per cent endeavourism. The descriptions of the future births of some persons occurring in the Jaina scriptures in support of the omniscience of Mahāvīra are indicative of the wheel of fatalism moving as it does in them. Besides, this theory of fatalism also influences the belief regarding existence or non-existence of the Tirthaṅkaras at varying times and places. If a proof is required as to how the theory of predeterminism is requisitioned to serve in place of endeavourism which results from excessive emphasis on omniscience, read what is said by Shri Kanji Swami for being convinced that the glimpses of predeterminism have not completely disappeared from Jain religion.

In spite of all this, let it be cleared that Jainism does not subscribe to the theory of fatalism. It advocates endeavourism as we can conclude from the teachings of Mahāvīra which reveal a definite tilt towards it. Mahāvīra's discussions about the possible causes of Karmic bondage are symbolic of the

fact that according to him effort, and not fate, is the strong factor responsible for a person's final freedom. It is left entirely to the will of the person whether he wants to get into or out of the Karmic entanglements. If at all the Bhavya want to be free from them, there is no power on earth that can deter him from doing so. What else is this, if not endeavourism? This is fully illustrated by the life of Mahāvira himself and his teachings.

Relative form of all the things—sentient and non-sentient.

The varieties, divisions and subdivisions of the beings are self-evident. But if they all are identical by nature and if they all have potentiality to be a like in emancipated condition, what is it that is responsible for all the differences and disparities? It has been said that Karma is the causative factor or agent. Philosophers have variously explained as to how the soul and the Karmas come into contact, how the soul acquires different forms and shapes by its simply coming into company with the Karmas and how the worldly relationships are forged and fostered. Amongst all these explanations, Jain explanation is typical and is known as Anekānta.

According to certain philosophers, the soul does not undergo any change, even the least, when it comes into contact with the Karmas. Soul is eternal. Whatever modifications are found in it, they are merely the progeny of the non-sentient Prakṛti which is fast adhering to the soul. The properties such as the knowledge etc. belong to the Prakṛti and not to the soul. Prakṛti becomes dissociated from the soul and the soul becomes free at the moment when the knowledge about their totally disparate nature dawns in a being. The bondage and emancipation are the two phenomena concerned with Prakṛti and not with Puruṣa on which they are wrongly imposed. Puruṣa is eternal and does not undergo any modificatory changes. But there are other philosophers also who, holding opposite views, have pronounced that there is nothing like the saṃsāra or the emancipation, that the soul is not eternal, that the soul is born out of the mixing and inter mixing of the inert matter and that it dies along with the body when it dies. When this is the position where does the saṃsāra come in, they add? And when there is no saṃsāra, emancipation is out of question. While facing these two sets of views, Mahāvira took up the essential features from both of them and incorporated the same in his famous doctrine of Anekānta. He foresaw that there was no possibility of any modificatory change, worth the name, in the soul if it is entirely eternal and nothing else and nothing more. It is no use saying that the modificatory changes which are visible and which, it is experienced do not belong to the soul. Where is the necessity of postulating totally independent existence of such a Puruṣa as remains a mere spectator when as a matter of fact that the non-sentient Prakṛti becomes active only for the sake of Puruṣa? It, thus, becomes imperative to hypothe-

size that it is Puruṣa which is non-eternal and which undergoes transformations. On the other hand, if we believe that the soul exists until death only, we will not be able to account for the inborn disparities amongst all the beings of this world, except for the fact that they are due to the Karmas which are in the form of Vāsanās cherished during all the previous births taken together. This only has given rise to differences which are innate and inborn. This leads us to an inevitable conclusion that a being is involved in births and deaths about which we cannot say when this phenomenon of births and deaths started. The Karmic law will otherwise be invalidated if it is believed that a variety of small living beings undergoes various births and deaths leave aside various births and deaths one and the same being. One will do the deed and will escape from the result while the other who did not do the deed got the result. Such a disorder is bound to spring up. To avoid such a fallacy, it is necessary to make room for the eternity of a being. Mahāvīra was thus led to say that a being is both eternal and non-eternal. The soul is essentially eternal but phenomenally perishable. What is transitory cannot be everlasting. Therefore, such modificatory changes as are not natural but due to the Karmas can be removed and in removing them an efforts is required. This will provide a room for the theory of emancipation in the frame work of Mahāvīra's tenets and teachings.

Mahāvīra applied this principle of eternity and non-eternality not merely to the Jivas—one of the categories which is sentient—but to all the other which are non-sentient also. He envisioned that all the categories without exception are eternal and non-eternal both. Just as he propounded in the case of Jivas, he did also so in the case of all the non-sentient categories. If the Karma which is non-sentient, that is to say, material only, is eternal, it can never be separated from the soul. If this contingency arises, emancipation and consequently effort has no meaning, no place. From this again, a corollary follows that Karma, like the Jiva, is prone to modificatory changes. This will make it probable that Karma which is associated today with the soul, will become dissociated from the soul tomorrow.

Soul has the same size as the body

If the soul and the Karma are intermixed with each other from time immemorial, it is worth noting what independent attitude and faithful outlook and approach Mahāvīra and consequently Jainism showed about the size of the soul.

The soul is omnipresent according to the Vedic ideology. As opposed to this, Mahāvīra maintained that the soul has the same size as the body. The movement of the soul after death and rebirth will have to be considered as formal only, if the soul is supposed to be omnipresent. While, if we take the

soul as occupying the same size as the body, the soul's movement after death as well as rebirth will become real and not formal. No movement is possible in the case of an omnipresent thing. As the all pervading soul is a changeless entity, no modificatory changes are possible in it. Therefore, any habitat which the soul comes to be associated with is its rebirth, though as a matter of fact, it is the rebirth of the body only and not of the soul because the soul is changeless. From this conviction, the theory of the soul having the same size as that of the body and of its being enveloped with the Karmas, follows. This makes it possible for the soul to move anywhere else and to be theoretically reborn.

Dharmāstikāya, Adharmāstikāya and Ākāśa

The Jaina theories of the soul's movement and of rebirth as discussed before have given rise to two independent categories, namely, Dharmāstikāya and Adharmāstikāya. These two theories are not to be found in any other Indian systems of thought, Jaina philosophy becomes differentiated from the other systems on account of these two substances if not for anything else. If the soul has motion as stated before it must have some other substance to help it to move and this very substance is the Dharmāstikāya, the principle of motion. The soul will keep on going for ever and ever if there is no other substance to stop it from moving and the substance which does this is Adharmāstikāya. The former ensures motion and the later, stability.

Soul is charged with the power to move. In the emancipated condition, there is no Karma responsible to give direction to motion. Now where should the emancipated soul go? Naturally, a soul emancipated from the bondage rises above as is experienced. When the soul is freed from the Karmic bondage, it naturally rises above just as it happens exactly in the case of a gourd smeared with dust rising above from water when the dust goes away or of a castor seed shooting above when the sheaf in which it lies enclosed breaks open. Of course, the substance, Dharmāstikāya, is there all the time to help soul move. It has nothing in the way to obstruct it. Thus it will go on moving for ever and will never rest. In order to remove this anomaly, the ether (Ākāśa) which is a postulate in all the religious systems, is divided into two broad categories in Jainism, namely, the ether that pervades in this world of ours (Lokākāśa) and the ether that exists beyond this world of ours (Alokākāśa) and in addition to this it was also hypothesized that the substances such as Dharmāstikāya etc. existed in Lokākāśa only. This datum met well the contingency that the liberated souls would have otherwise remained moving and would not have been stable or fixed. This presumption, in the Jaina system, is peculiar to it only and is a logical corollary of the other Jaina theories relating to the motion, stability and ether pervading in the world. Or it must be said that

the theory of the ether concerning this world is a supposition contrived to make room for the Jaina Conception about the habitat of the Siddhas. Be that as it may, it is certain that the Jaina theories formulating the principles of motion, stationariness, the size of the soul, the ether and the habitat of the liberated souls, are interlocked. There is no doubt that one becomes void without the other and also that these are quite characteristic of Jainism only.

The Principle of Non-soul

Emancipation is the objective of metaphysics of any religious system and it is a relative term as it denotes a thing to be emancipated from, If these is saṃsāra, there must also be freedom from it. If there is no saṃsāra, there will be no emancipation also. Is the conception of saṃsāra possible in the case of sentient beings if we believe it to be abounding in them only and nothing else ? This question gave rise to necessity that there is substance other than the sentient being. The Upaniṣadic sages theorized that the saṃsāra existed in the case of living, sentient beings because of their nescience only. Nescience is not an independent substance but it is the perverted knowledge of the being. It is because of this that the being experiences the existence of soul and matter as different from it. Really speaking there is nothing else and nothing more than the soul. When the perverted knowledge disappears, the soul identifies itself with everything and then it finds nothing existing besides and beyond it. This very phenomenon is liberation itself. In other words, there is nothing else and nothing more than the soul in the opinion of the Upaniṣadic seers. But Mahāvira envisioned that there was no reason for the soul to display nescience or ignorance, if its very nature is constituted of knowledge and nothing else for all time and at all places. This modificatory change of the soul cannot be purely baseless. The cause of the perverted knowledge of the soul is Karma and it is a separate entity quite independent of the soul. This led him to enunciate the theory of the non-soul, that is to say, matter. The union of the soul and the matter results in the birth of nescience or ignorance. The significance of the exertion for liberation lies in removing this.

Mahāvira fell upon this discovery of the substance called matter when he was in search of a reason that could rationally explain the existence of the saṃsāra which is a bondage. The subtle thinking in regard to the substance named non-soul or Ajiva centring round the atom is nowhere to be found except in Jainism. Thoughts on the divisions and subdivision of the material particles responsible for giving rise to concrete and abstract things such as Karmas, language, mind, sense-organs, body and the like are the distinguishing features of Jainism only-There are scientists who have started believing that the Jaina seers were far more advanced in their theories of atom than what any scientists of today can boast of.

Thus an effort, albeit feeble has been made here to show the logical relationship and coherence between the fundamentals of Jainism. It is necessary to get the knowledge of these rudiments for going to the root of the intrinsic nature of the Jain philosophy and metaphysics. It is equally necessary, nay imperative to have the knowledge of external form also of any religion as it is of the internal one. Here I have to deal with that of Jainism.

(4) JAINA SAṄGHA AND SPREAD OF JAINISM

Jaina Saṅgha means a Community of those aspirants who cherish the goal of putting into practice the principles and tanats just described before. Jainism has laid more stress on the individual's practice. But because an individual cannot remain alienated from the society, it gave rise to the necessity of the formation of social groups which, besides doing religious performances singly, helped others also in their religious activities. This two fold nature of the performance of religious duty, individual and social, created possibility for Jainism to break its own confines and to journey its way into greater India.

The result of the internal and external forms of religious discipline

Jainism got prevalence and publicity in a proper manner as long as it kept before it Mahāvīra's own practices and disciplines, hard and real. It gathered momentum due to its own intrinsic worth and internal strength. Mahāvīra's intense spirituality attracted kings and rich persons also and the objectives which motivated these people to popularize Jainism were not always pure and unquestionable. The aim was ultra-spiritual, that is to say, they did it with a view to getting convenience and concessions from kings and the like to construct temples and instal idols and images as also to influence them to issue commands to observe Amāri (Non-injury) in their kingdoms as scrupulously as possible. Jainism did not come down from its exalted plane so long as its intrinsic and extrinsic forms for popularizing it moved in unison. The moment its internal vitality was lost sight of, the accent was shifted to external form and then there was a fall in the real value of Jainism. The soul of Jainism was neglected; the body flourished. It fared exactly as the body without soul—This phenomenon was a sufficient factor that wiped it out from greater India and there are no signs of its existence even in Eastern India where it grew, sprouted and blossomed. The bodies without souls are to be found there in the form of temples without worshippers. The Jainas of the West and South go there and worship. This is the condition in the eastern part of India. Really speaking, Jainism in Eastern India has been reduced to a situation exactly similar to that which the Aśokan edicts and inscriptions met with in India.

The Changing Character of Hinduism and Buddhism

Looking to the external and internal forms of Hinduism, we find it more different today than what it was in the Vedic times. Hinduism of the Vedic times is not at all existent today. Though the underlying inherent nature of it has not changed at all, its external forms have so radically altered that it would have been difficult, had the Vedic attitude not been stationary, to pinpoint that these different forms belonged to the original Hinduism. Buddhism also fared the same fate as Hinduism. But here also original Buddhist attitude, outlook and approach remained constant in all its external manifold manifestations. Had it been otherwise, it would have been wellnigh impossible to identify the external forms from philosophical and ethical standpoints.

Immobile nature of Jainism

But the case of Jainism is quite different, change is not known to it. It branched off into many sects, no doubt, but none of them presented any new system of philosophy. There are as many new philosophical systems as there are sects and schools in Buddhism. In Vedic religion also, there is a good number of philosophical schools. Though Jaina philosophy has developed at intervals, no novel viewpoints have been seen. There is the same philosophy and there is the same outlook, attitude or approach. Only different modes of conduct and different patterns of ethical behaviour have created different sects and sections, philosophy remaining the same throughout. It cannot perhaps be denied that this conservative attitude of Jain philosophy might have come in the way of its spread. The Jainas have never attempted to re-orientate their philosophy while all along the Vaidikas and Buddhists absorbed new ideas and views and incorporated them in their respective systems, overhauling their philosophies so as to be in rhythm with their times. To sum, the Jainas no doubt made their doctrine of Anekāntavāda full-fledged, working out a synthesis of the non-Jain philosophical deliberations and discussions which took place in their days. They stopped here and did not evolve any new philosophical formulae.

It is just possible that the Jaina Ācāryas honestly thought their philosophy a final word and believed that there was no need for putting a new complexion on it as it was the omniscient who envisioned it. But this argument of theirs is equally void so far as the Vaidikas and Buddhists also are concerned. They also thought the Vedas and the Buddha's teachings as infallible. Still, however, neither the Vedas nor the Buddha weighed with them while clothing the philosophy in a new garb. It is a problem, then, why the Jainas could not do so. The reason for this lies in this that the Jain philosophy is extremely realistic in outlook. In other words, it has never sought shelter in the Vedic theory of Illusion. Therefore it is but natural

that imaginary speculations might not have been accommodated in it. New philosophical thought has no chance at all when the play of imagination is totally banned. It can also be explained on the ground of love for the orthodox line of Jaina thinking. It has been constant endeavour of the founders of all the Jaina sects to reach the very core of Jainism removing the accretions which might have accumulated with the passage of time. A new stream of Jaina thought that might have started flowing because of the impact or exigency or contingency of time, cannot claim to be a real part of Jainism because of its being merely new. The scrupulous observance of all that has been preached by Mahāvira is Jainism. There is no scope for improvement or betterment. No modernization has any chance. This belief is time and again underscored. It has therefore deprived the Sthānakavāsīs and Terāpanthis of the heritage of Jain literature other than the canonical. They have nothing to do with the Jaina art or sculpture or places of pilgrimage. On the contrary, a deliberate attempt is made to go back to Jainism as it was in the early past. This is as good as reversing the flow of Ganges in the opposite direction. The belief that nothing new should be and can be done lies at the root of such a reactionary attitude as also a conviction that a man's intellect cannot have a free play in matters—philosophical and religious. But must be admitted that this goes against the goal of spiritual self-sufficiency as proclaimed by Jainism.

Recently, yet a new school has been started by Kanji Swami. Really speaking, its source is Sthānakavāsī sect of the Jainas, though it radically differs from the sister sect named Terāpanthī which also claims to be an offshoot of the Sthānakavāsī sect. It is stated by both these sects that they do not want to digress from the main spring. But in one of the two, the concept of the idol has a distinct place while in the other it has not. Moreover, one owes its allegiance to the Śvetāmbara section of the Jainas and the other calls itself Digāmbara. According to the section, founded by Kanji Swami, a greater emphasis is to be placed on the noumenal view-point technically called Niścaya Naya, thus ruling out the theory of endeavour so well laid down in Jainism proper. On one hand, it enjoins to adopt meditation as the only means to realization of the soul and to banish all the ceremonies, rituals and rites, while on the other, it has also enjoined to start building temples in which to instal the idol of Shri Śīmandhara Svāmi. Thus, new sets of traditions, rites, ritualism, and ceremonies have come into existence and operation, baring the contradiction.

(In Gujarti, Prabuddha Jivan, Dated 1st and 15th December, 1956 and dated 15th March, 1st April and 15th April, 1957).

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Fundamentals of the Jaina Code of Conduct

To arrive at a correct understanding and estimate of the Jaina ethical principles it is necessary, first of all, to get an idea of the same in the Vedas and Buddhist works. It is difficult, otherwise, to assess the real role played by the Jaina Code of Conduct. A major part of the individual's conduct depends on the society. It does not appear that the Jaina society or Saṅgha has ever remained isolated. It has always maintained its existence in the midst of Vedic society and in the intervening period it has done so along with the Buddhist Saṅgha also. When the situation is like this, it is a key to properly evaluate the Jaina ethical principles lies not only in the Jaina Scriptures but in the comparative study of the Vedic and Budhistic codes also. It is, therefore, consistent and proper to discuss about the Jaina code of conduct after a brief reference to the Vedic code of conduct and also to the Budhistic.

The sources of the Vedic Code of Conduct

Vedas are the source of Vedic traditions; therefore the earliest source of the Vedic code of conduct is the Śruti or the Vedas. Now even if the Vedas are revelations, or composed by God, they are just in the form of commandments in which logic has no place. It is not necessary to go into details regarding why an individual should behave in a particular manner and why he should not. Merely that is sufficient that it is propounded by the Vedas. In addition to Vedas, the Smṛtis also are an authority in respect of code of conduct. The reason why it is so is to be found in the fact that the Vedas are the original source of the Smṛtis. In the case of the code of conduct the roots of which did not lie in the available Vedas, it was argued that they did lie in the Vedas but that part of the Vedas is at present extinct. Thus, it is believed that the Smṛtis have supported the code of conduct as formulated in the Vedas, though really speaking, there are so many rules of conduct in the Smṛtis which are not only not found in the Vedas but are opposed to those which are enunciated in the Vedas. The later codifiers have attempted to explain this contradiction but in vain. Really speaking, the Smṛtis have given the form and shape of the rules to

the then prevailing beliefs and in order to inject the element of authority into them, they have invoked the help of the prestigious Vedas. Besides Śrutis and Smṛtis, the conduct of the distinguished people was also accepted as a standard. This meant that rules of ideal conduct observed by the distinguished people served as a beacon light to the followers in point of good conduct, even though they were not backed by both—the Śrutis and Smṛtis. Purāṇas also were the additional source for their code of conduct. The stories occurring in the Purāṇas guided them regarding what they should do and what they should not do. Thus the Purāṇas supplied them with information about the ideal conduct. Despite all this, whenever they were in a fix about what should be the standard conduct in a particular matter, they were guided by a decision in that particular matter arrived at in a Vedic or religious conference. Thus, there were many sources which guided them in point of model conduct but the Vedas were the principal source. Even when a definite mention about a particular point was not there in the Vedas, it was believed that it should not go contrary to what was implicit in the Vedas. Suppose, if a moral conduct seemingly went against the Vedas, it was anyhow so construed that it appeared as if it confirmed to them. So the prime source of the whole code of conduct is the Vedas, and that which goes against the Vedas can never stimulate religiosity or can never be a religion. Thus the Vedas are an authority for the Vaidikas in point of general conduct.

But it is a great mistake if one thinks that the moral code which the Hindu society at present has adopted as a basis is the same which was current in the days of the Vedas. But the situation is this that the law-givers and codifiers have supported the contemporary and also modified rules of conduct; not only this but they have, on the contrary, rejected some Vedic law of conduct though they were enjoined in the Vedas on the ground that they were not practicable in the Kali age and substituted the rejected rules by the contemporary and modified rules of behaviour. Despite this, one thing is clear then an attempt even than is made to emphasize that the modified moral code is one that has the backing of the Vedas. This leads us to say that for them, the exclusive original source of all the rules of conduct is the Vedas and because of this they are for them final and imperative. In short, they trace the origin of the whole ethical code to the Vedas, though there may not be anything of the sort according to us. It can be summed up that transformation in tune with time has always occurred beginning from the Vedic times till today. The erudite and the elan have made use of their scholarship in proving that the modification had all the sanction of the Vedas. But the matter as it stands is different because very little support is derivable from the Vedas for the current deep-rooted ethical code. What

is strange is that the orthodox Hindus oppose in the name of the Vedas whenever the amendments in the Hindu civil code are proposed even when they are not against the Vedas.¹

The Origin of the Buddhist Code of Conduct

Only Buddha has the right to formulate a code of conduct technically called Buddhist Vinaya. After Buddha's Nirvāṇa some of the Bhikkhus began to say that they had now become independent, that restraint on them is now off, and that they were now at liberty to behave as they liked. Hearing them saying so, the faithful and wise five hundred Sthaviras (elderly monks) convened a conference and drew up an ethical code of those rules and regulations which Buddha himself had put into action, This code is at present known as the Vinaya Piṭaka. Many schools and sects or sections sprang up later on in Buddhism but the common link that binds them all together is their belief that it is only the Buddha who has the right to promulgate a law of conduct. From this fact, the least that can be deduced is that the main, nay, the only source of the Buddhist ethical code is Buddha himself.

The revered Buddha had told at the time of his salvation to Bhikkhu Ānanda that very minor rules of the Buddhist ethical code can be made lax or can even be transgressed, if it is thought necessary by the Saṅgha. In spite of this, the Bhikkhus assembled in the conference could not find themselves in favour of transgression and decided that the observance of all the rules, major and even minor, was imperative, because Ānanda had not asked Buddha for a clarification regarding what rules he considered very minor.

Hundred years after Buddha's salvation, an element of laxity entered into some of the rules of certain Bhikkhus' conduct. They defended this laxity on their part advancing their supposed reason that it was so laid down as that or that it had the support of Buddha's word. This provided the ground to the seven hundred elderly monks to re-assemble in the form of a conference and to resolve that the so called remissness had no sanction of Buddha's word, and therefore the looseness in the observance which is against the Vinaya must be given up. Thus it is implied that the Buddhists have clearly accepted that Buddha is the originator of the code of conduct. No one is empowered to make any exceptions in it. Not only this, but the Saṅgha did not welcome the freedom given by Buddha himself to be less strict in the observance of minor rules or even to transgress them because

1. For detailed information, see "Sources of Hindu Dharma" by Dr. Altekar, published by Institute of Public Administration, Sholapur.

Buddha had left no specific instructions regarding what rules were minor and what rules were not. This shows that the Sangha had unshakeable faith in Buddha and believed that Buddha only was the infallible authority in matters of morality.¹

The ethical code propounded in the Vedas is in the form of commandments and therefore, there was not room for logic or arguments. While, on the contrary, they are found in the Vinaya Piṭaka episodes necessitating the formulation by Buddha of particular rules and explaining their *raison ditre*. It can be generally stated that Buddha has prohibited those actions and activities which are likely to evoke unfavourable response from the people and it is evident at every stage in the Vinaya that an attempt to establish the propriety of the observance of rules has been made. The fact that the observing individual is able to reap himself and show to others the concrete result of his observance constitutes a characteristic signaling the Buddhist code. In other words, Buddha has not put so much emphasis on invisible fruits he has on the visible. This is the difference deserving our attention between the two codes, Vedic and Buddhist.

JAINA CODE OF CONDUCT

Metaphysics and Conduct :

Jaina ethical code and Jaina metaphysics cannot be considered separately. This means that it must be accepted that the Jaina ethical code should be framed so as to conform to the Jaina Metaphysics. It is commonly experienced that a metaphysical thought is one and the ethical is just the opposite of it. There is a proverb that it is the thought that moulds the conduct. But it is specially so in India that the religionists have not made an endeavour to create a harmony covering a larger area of the metaphysical and ethical thought. The climax of metaphysical thought was reached by the Vaidikas in the formulation of the doctrine of absolute monism and it was decided and accepted by them in principle that whatever appears in this universe is Brahma or its manifestation. But if the actual life had been shaped in accordance with that doctrine, the condition in India would have been different from, that is to say, better than what it is today, India would not have been in the confused position in which it is today due to caste-distinctions, untouchability, statism, linguism etc. etc. Instead of this, an ideal social condition of which universal brotherhood was the essence would have come to be born in India. Unluckily, it is certain that ethical conduct has not been shaped after the metaphysical

1. See Vinaya-Piṭaka, Pañcaśatikā and Saptaśatikā skandhaks.

thought. The Jaina seers have drawn the attention of the Vaidikas to yet another defect in the metaphysical thought of theirs and it is this that the bondage and release in the case of the soul, rebirth, modificatory changes, and necessary discipline to effect a freedom from bondage will not be rationally explained if the soul is hypothesized, as by the Advaitins, as one which is immutable, unchangeable and perpetually the same. From social point of view, according to the theoreticians of the Advaitic doctrine, social reforms, changes in ethical code and moral conduct and reformulation of the political ideologies will not be possible. Their idea of the society will remain uniform and conservative through-out. Opposed to this, the theory of change or modification in the fields of individual, social, and political life and also in the field of economics will have a place only if the soul is believed to be undergoing changes phenomenally while remaining the same essentially.

Constitution of the Jaina Ethical Code According to Anekānta

When the Jainas accepted the metaphysical doctrine of Anāntavāda, it accepted at the same time the scope for change in every field of a man's life. The result that followed was this that it became renowned automatically as a progressive religion when it was at its Zenith. Jainism was practically and theoretically against the beliefs such as those of the Vaidikas, namely, the narrow caste-distinctions, class-divisions, the concept of the high and the low, untouchability, woman's inequality etc. etc. and this was in consonance with its metaphysics. Unluckily, this potentiality of Jainism went on decreasing with the passage of time due to the Vedic impact. It cannot be said that the Jaina society at present has a separate existence quite distinct from the Vedic one from the progressive or the revolutionary points of view. It is a fact that Jaina Society, like the Vedic one, does not entertain practices according to its principles today just as it also is a fact that its progressive and revolutionary attitude formerly was moulded by its metaphysical doctrine of Anekānta. In other words, the problem of the whole of India in the context of its current condition is to shape discipline, character and conduct after its theoretical pattern. It is entirely possible that the society as a whole will rise to a peak of perfection if both the Vaidikas and the Jainas adopt practices according to their respective principles.

Commandment is religion : Theory & Practice

A Commandment *आणान् धम्मो* is a statement on which an emphasis is placed in the matter of Jaina ethical code. It means that the Jaina religion is constituted of the commandment uttered from time to time by Mahāvīra. From this it appears, though apparently that the Vedic injunctions and the

Jaina's also are unchallengeable, being commandments but, really speaking, there is some distinction and it is this very distinction that divides the original structures of the Vedic and Jaina ethical codes.

In froming the ethical code of the Buddhists, some event was necessary to be the reason for making a rule. It is clear from the Vinaya Piṭaka that the code went on developing as the events arose and as a way out was to be found. But this is not meant to say that no basic principle of morality was at the back of the promulgation of the code. It is Buddha's principle of principles that a good work should be done and the bad should be avoided. Every rule can be tested in the background of this general statement. But who will be there to decide what is good and what is bad? Buddha has reserved this right to himself. The Saṅgha has not dabbled in this. But at the same time let this also be clear that Buddha's discrimination between good and bad was beyond logic. It was the claim of Buddha that he looked at everything through intuition but the hearers should surely exercise their power of reasoning and intelligence before accepting it and they should adopt it if they feel that whatever Buddha has said is true and beneficial. We can, then, say that even if Buddha's verdict was final in matters, moral and ethical, it was not that his directive was authoritarian. The situation is just the opposite in the case of Vedic injunctions.

It is now obvious from the discussion so far that the Vedic directives are mandatory while the Buddhist ones are discretionary. The element of authority is inherent in the former and that of reason in the latter. The Jainas are by nature and training wedded to the doctrine of Anekāntavāda. This makes it impossible for them to be dogmatic and dictatorial in the matter of enunciating their ethical code. It is, indeed, true that the Jain teachers and seers have said that it is Mahāvira's commands which constitute religion but it is equally true that the roots of those commandments lay in Mahāvira's uncommon omniscience and therefore, they cannot be tested from all points of view by the ordinary human knowledge. The jurisdiction of human knowledge is limited to certain, not all, things only and therefore, some only of Mahāvira's commandments can be explained on the ground of reasoning. While there are many things which are beyond the comprehension of human knowledge or logical power. Therefore, such matters cannot be tested on the touch stone of reasoning. This indirectly also means that the Jaina monks are not in favour of believing that all of Mahāvira's commandments, in their entirety, can and should stand logical scrutiny. They are partially logical and partially not. It is not possible to say that they are totally logical, nor is it so to state that they are totally without logic. The theory of this golden mean directly follows from the Jaina doctrine of Anekāntavāda.

Sources of the Jaina Code of Ethics

The doctrine of Anekāntavāda is operative in the field of Jaina ethics also so far as the structure and spirit of it are concerned. The initial source of the Jaina ethics is the scriptures preached and taught by the Jinas, that is to say, Tirthaṅkaras just as the Vedas in the case of the Vaidikas. In spite of this, it is not believed that the Jaina scriptures are the whole derivative main spring of the Jaina code, while in the case of the Vaidikas the case is contrary, that is to say, the roots lie in the Vedas even if they are not detectable in the available redaction of Vedas. Like the Bauddhas, the Jainas do not subscribe to the belief that the Tirthaṅkaras only can formulate the code and nobody else. The Jainas have tacitly accepted that the Tirthaṅkaras enunciate some rules only and that there are many such formulae which are not grounded in the scriptures, that is to say in the canon but the Jain saints have added from time to time, looking to the exigency or need, minor rules as corollaries to the main or basic rules. From this point of view it boils down to this that according to the Jainas, not merely the Tirthaṅkaras but the elderly saints also, ripe in knowledge and experience, are able and empowered to add rules and regulations which are conformatory to the Tirthaṅkaras' preachings, unlike the Bauddhas according to whom it is the Buddha alone in whose hands the sole right of enacting a code is vested. Āchārya Saṅghadāsa has even gone to the length of saying that the Tirthaṅkaras have not laid down any prescriptions or prohibitions but have merely proclaimed a broad and basic directive that what constitutes self-control should be practised and what is against it should be abandoned* and so have also given freedom to the aspirants to frame any subsequent or subordinate rules just in consonance with the original directive. This belief of Āchārya Saṅghadāsa is merely pertaining to the theoretical side of the whole problem. We should take its real meaning into consideration and not the verbal. The sum and substance of the whole discussion is that the Tirthaṅkaras do not elaborate all the rules and regulations as such an exhaustive exposition is not possible even. Therefore, all the prescriptions and prohibitions should be examined in accordance with the broad directive regarding duty and discipline, conduct and behaviour. The Brahma became absolutely in-describable when the various ideologies regarding the doctrine of absolutism went on becoming stronger day by day, when the metaphysicians realized the linguistic inefficiency and when the theory of inexpressibility or indefinability came to be supported. Not only this, but the full implication of the Upaniṣadic doctrine embodied into the statement "गुरोस्तु मौनं व्याख्यानं, शिष्यास्तु छिन्नसंशयाः" (the

*Bṛhatkṛpa-Bhāṣya, 3330.

silence of the teacher which, in fact, was a sermon in words, removed the doubts of the pupils) was apprehended clearly and in detail. At that time, it was also acknowledged about Buddha that he, throughout his whole life did not utter a single word of instruction or sermon and according to Digambara tradition, the Jaina Tirthankaras did not make use of the spoken language but merely uttered "Hum" which assumed the forms of respective languages understood by respective hearer. Therefore, the situation is bound to become more complicated than simpler if scriptural matters are interpreted in the light of the pronouncements of the Jaina teachers taking them as final. Therefore, the question will not be solved but will become knotty if and when we try to understand the aforesaid opinion of Sanghadāsa divested of its context.

The long and short of it all is this that the Tirthankaras are the initial source of the Jaina ethics. They are in a position to distinguish right from wrong through their uncommon intuitive powers and lay down prescriptions and prohibitions important for the spiritual aspirants. But the Jainas have not accepted that the Tirthankaras do this in the manner of Buddha and also they do not believe that all the prescriptive and prohibitory rules are found incorporated in the teachings of the Tirthankaras like the Vaidikas in the Vedas. But at the same time it has also been equally well accepted that the ethical and moral rules have also been framed and formulated, on the basis of moral conduct and behaviour as well as preaching of teachers other than Tirthankaras, avoiding conflict and contradiction with the original objectives of realization, with reference to contemporary times and places, and that they all form collectively the main spring of the general moral code of the Jainas.

The Fundamentals of Jain Ethics : Knowledge and Action

Dry and ignorant performance of religious activities do not deserve to be called ethics from the Jaina point of view. The essential requisite of good, ideal conduct is right knowledge. It is necessary that the vision or faith must be, first, clear. The knowledge can be correct or right if it follows from clear vision. Every one has the knowledge of an object but from the spiritual standpoint it can be called true only then when it flows from the correct assessment of a thing attempted from the extra-mundane and not the mundane, angle. The object of getting emancipation should invariably decide whether a particular action is permitted or prohibited. The knowledge without discrimination is not the right type of knowledge and a conduct is not right type of conduct if it is not based on the right type of knowledge. Keeping this in mind it has been said that the conduct without right knowledge is like a load of sandal wood sticks placed on the back of a donkey.

But on the other side, it has been said regarding the meaning of knowledge and its area or dimension that it is not necessary for the ideal conduct to have the knowledge of elements of all the things. But as much knowledge is required as is essential to ensure right conduct. Knowledge which helps us in discriminating between the soul and the non-soul, is a minimum requirement. But that discrimination is not of the type of realization. But that much discrimination is required as can intensify the craving for self-realization instead of that for the world (saṃsāra). Total knowledge is born as a result of the observance of major vows and of the practices of penance and is in the form of realization. It also becomes, moreover, the cause of perfect conduct. The meaning of knowledge, from this viewpoint in the phrase “पदमं नाणं तन्नो दया” (Dasaveāliya 4.10) “pity in the light of knowledge” is, generally, the discrimination between the soul and the non-soul, but not the simple perception. On the rise of such a discrimination, a human being cultivates a liking for emancipation and keeping this in view or according to it, whatever activity a human being does takes him nearer to emancipation. On the ground of such a belief only, the conduct of the monk, Māsatusa, can be rationally explained.¹ This monk had no knowledge of the scriptures. He had merely a craving for emancipation. He could not even remember the words of his Guru. In spite of this, only because of his hankering after final freedom, his conduct went on becoming purer day by day and ultimately acquired salvation.

Approach of Total Spiritual Identity.

The root-cause of the good conduct referred to very often in the Ācārāṅga Sūtra is the being's approach of total spiritual identity with other beings. What is the *raison d'être* for the unscrupulous observance of non-injury? The answer to this question is that none of the world's being at all wants pain. We ourselves do not want pain; then, why should we give pain to others? आत्मनः प्रतिकूलानि परेषां न समाचरेत्. We should not behave with others in a manner unsuitable to us. This is *sine qua non* of the principle of total spiritual identity. If our conduct is modelled on this line of thought, there is no alternative to the observance of five major vows. Total spiritual identity is the touch stone on which the nature of the action whether it is good or bad should be tested. This in other words, means Sāmāyika which is defined as the attitude of equipoise which is shown to all living beings, taking them as he himself, is characterized by the abandonment

1. For the story of this monk, see the commentary on the fourth chapter of Uttarādhyayana Sūtra.

of sinful activities and is the extended form of five major vows. Everything is achieved if equipoise is achieved. Life is nothing without it. This is how the foundation of Jain ethics is laid by equipoise.

Circumspection (apramāda)

On the basis of total spritual identity with others, it has been decided that injury to any living being for selfish ends is not good conduct. But according to Jain philosophy, the whole universe abounds in living organisms, and even the exhalation and inhalation of breath without which life is difficult can afflict the other living organisms. Under these circumstances, how it is possible to lead a life of non-injury? How can equanimity be achieved? By way of removing these doubts, it has been stated :

जयं चरे, जयं चिट्ठे, जयमासे, जयं सए ।

जयं भुजंतो, भासंतो, पावकम्मं न बंधई ॥

— Dasaveālia 4.8.

Which means that one, who behaves with carefulness, does not incur sin. The other words for carefulness are caution, vigilance, circumspection. It has been frequently said in the Ācārāṅga that carelessness is injury and vigilance is non-injury. There was no remedy available other than this to ensure non-injury. Therefore, complete caution, carefulness, awareness, zest for non-injury — all these taken together constitute total circumspection. It was believed that you are observing the principle of non-injury if you behave with carefulness and no intention to do harm and even if than you unwittingly inflict injury to other beings. Thus, circumspection also got a place along with total spiritual identity in the formulation of ideal code of ethics. Thus, the conduct of a being of constant awareness who is also enriched with total spiritual identity with other beings came to be considered as a model.

Preponderance of the cessation of activity.

Thus, equipoise or equanimity being at the root of good conduct in general, it was considered necessary to lead a life according as the principle of non-injury is fully observed and maintained. To limit the area of activities was considered the easiest way for a life of non-injury. It is but natural that the idea of delimiting the field of activity or of designing the pattern of life so as to make it more accommodative to cessation of activities became predominant as the framing of the rules of conduct for the monks was done keeping the concept of narrowing the field of activity in the forefront. The whole formulary of the rules for the monks was modelled in the initial stage from this angle as is testified by such canonical works as the Ācārāṅga. But this is only one of the aspects of the life of non-injury and generally the attention of all is directed to that. This has given rise to an erroneous belief that Jaina religion is the religion advocating the theory of

complete abstention from activities. But really speaking, it is not so if the whole set of factors is taken into consideration.

A student of Jain history knows that there are two categories, namely, the Jinakalpa and the Sthavirakalpa. It is true that there is no place for activity in the life of a Jinakalpi. But it is tantamount to not knowing the real meaning of Nivṛtti if the life of a Sthavirakalpi, which was shaped by rules as problems and contingencies arose, is considered as dedicated to Nivṛtti only. The Jinakalpi moving about alone adopted the principle of Nivṛtti in the final stage of his life and died as a desperado. Seclusion ruled and regulated his life. He wandered fearlessly and courted difficulties and disasters himself instead of putting others to hardships. But how many were there of this kind and category? They were very few who can be counted on fingertips. There were no groups of these monks and they cared more for their own soul rather than giving sermons to enlighten others. Therefore, they preferred even death to diluting their goal of Nivṛtti.

But there were groups and bands of the Sthavirakalpis—both monks and nuns. On account of this, manifold problems of various kinds such as those of, living eating, drinking, dressing, wanderings, treating the ailments, defending themselves; propagating religion and maintaining it arose in the wake. Those only who do not know the history of the institution of monks or who have not even cast a look at the chedagranthas or the commentaries thereon, will say that the way, that was found out by the monks taking into account the prevailing contemporary conditions and atmosphere was one of complete Nivṛtti¹. Despite this, it must be admitted that one can say that Jainism is characterized by total Nivṛtti, because the final aim and end of Jainism is one of Nivṛtti and there is a stronger desire to betake to that road.

If Nivṛtti means that one should not take the trouble of earning and maintaining the life but should sustain it by begging from others, the meaning is very narrow, though on the basis of this narrow meaning even, Jainism can be on the whole considered as characterized by Nivṛtti. But at the same time one should not forget that Nivṛtti means more than that.

Thus, generally speaking, activity based on and guided by knowledge, total spiritual identity with others and utter circumspection are the main constituents forming the structure and spirit of Jain Ethics. Everything else is subordinate and supportive.²

1. See the Preface to Niśītha cūrṇi by me.

2. Prabudha Jaina 16.7.1959 and 1.8.59 Translated from Gujarati by Dr. A. S. Gopani.

Jaina Theory and Practice of Non-Violence

The Vedic tradition upto the Upaniṣadas did not bother about the theory and practice of non-violence (*ahiṃsā*). Even the word *ahiṃsā* is not found in the Vedas and the Brāhmaṇas; it is found, for the first time, in the Upaniṣada (Chā. 3.17.4)¹. The religion of the Vedas mainly consisted of the sacrifices; and there were many types of the Vedic sacrifices which could not be performed without the killing of animals. Even the Smṛtis enforce the householders to serve not only the animal-meat but the beef to the guest. In such circumstances it would be proper to say that the theory and practice of *ahiṃsā* were not of the Vedic origin, but were propounded by the Jainas, the Buddhists and other Śramaṇas. In his '*Man in the Universe*' Prof. W. Norman Brown rightly concludes that "The ideas *Ahiṃsā* and the unity of all life did not have their origin in Vedic Aryan thought, but entered it from outside. The environment in which those ideas were at home was that of Jainism and Buddhism. In them *Ahiṃsā* was a dominant and original, not supplemental, feature"². Here in this short paper I want to discuss the *Ahiṃsā* doctrine of the Jainas in theory and practice.

As far as the literary evidence is concerned we can say that Lord Mahāvīra seems to be the first person who was convinced that not only the mankind but all the moving and non-moving living beings should be protected and should not be harmed because he was convinced that each of them, just like any human being, does not want any harm to be done to it. And not only this, Mahāvīra is the first person who endeavoured to mould his life in such a way that he may not be willingly harmful to any one. This is quite clear when we read his life as is described in the *Ācārāṅga*, the oldest Jaina text.

He preached to the people his conviction in these words : "All beings are fond of life, like pleasure, hate pain, shun destruction, like life, long to live. To all, life is dear."³ In order to emphasize this conviction the

1. Brown W. Norman : *Man in the Universe*, Calcutta. Pub. Oxford and I BH publishing company, 1966; p. 54.
2. Brown W. Norman : *Man in the Universe*, p 66.
3. SBE Vol. XXII, p. 19.
Sambodhi 2, 1.

Ācā āṅga declares that : “The *Arhatas* and *Bhagavatas* of the past, present, and future, all say thus, speak thus, declare thus, explain thus; all breathing, existing, living, sentient creatures should not be slain, nor treated with violence, nor abused, nor tormented, nor driven away. This is the pure, unchangeable, eternal law, which the clever ones, who understand the world, have declared.”⁴

The question is asked to the propagators of violence : “Ye professor ! is pain pleasant to you, or unpleasant ?” And on right reply it is clear that “For all sorts of living beings pain is unpleasant, disagreeable and greatly feared”⁵—So why should one kill others ?

In this way killing of living-beings of all types was denounced and non-violence was accepted as the principle of good life.

But was it possible to live without any harm to any body ? While answering this question the attention was given to the problem of sin. The violence or the killing itself is not the sin but the passion in the self is the cause of sin or the passion itself is sin. This theory of sin is found in *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* when it says that the *pamāya* (*pramāda*) is the *karma* or sin (*pamāyam kammaṁ āhamṣu* 1.8.3). The word *pamāya* is translated as *carelessness* but it means much more than that. We are convinced of this fact when we take into consideration the sayings of the Buddha regarding this *pramāda*. He says that all the *akuśalas* are due to *pramāda* : not only that but it destroys all the *kuśalas*, (*Aṅguttara*; 1.6,8-9). In *Sthānāṅga* (502) the Jaina text *pramāda* is described as having six types :— 1. *mada*—intoxication or arrogance, 2. *nidrā* - slumber, 3. *viṣaya*—sensuality, 4. *kaṣāya*—passion, 5. *dyūta*—gambling and 6. *pratilekhana* -*pramāda*—idleness in inspection.

Keeping in view this definition of sin we should *define* the violence which is counted as sin. This is the reason why Umāsvāti in his *Tattvārthasūtra* defined the violence as *pramattayogāt prāṇavyaparopaṇam hiṁsā* —

4. SBE Vol. XXII, p. 36. “जे य अतीता जे य पडुपन्ना जे य आगमिस्सा अरहंता भगवंतो ते सब्बे एवमाइक्खंति एवं भासंति एवं पणविति एवं परुविति—सब्बे पाणा सब्बे भूया सब्बे जीवा सब्बे सत्ता न हंतव्वा, न अज्जावेयव्वा न परिघितव्वा न परियावेयव्वा न उद्वेयव्वा, एस धम्मो सुद्धे नइए सासए समिच्च लोयं निउणेहि पवेइए.....”

आचा० 1.4.1.1.

5. SBE Vol. XXII, p. 39; Ācārāṅga 1.4.2 : “पत्तेयं पुच्छिस्सामो । हं भो पावाउया, किं भे सायं दुक्खं उयाहु असायं ? समिया पडिवण्णे थावि एवं बूया—“सब्बेसि पाणाणं सब्बेसि जीवाणं सब्बेसि सत्ताणं असायं अपरिनिव्वाणं मह्भयं दुक्खंति ।”

the killing which is done through the careless activity (of mind, speech and body) is violence. This is corroborated by the advice given to the monks with reference to their behaviour in the world, the smallest part of which is inhabited by innumerable living beings and so it was impossible to live without killing any living-being. The question was asked—“How should (a monk) walk, stand, sit and lie down? In what manner shall he eat and speak in order that he may not bind evil *karman*? “The answer is this—“He should walk, stand, sit, and lie down carefully; if he eats and speaks carefully, he does not bind evil *karman*. Evil *karman* does not attach itself to a man who identifies himself with all being (and by this) looks on the beings in the right manner, who has closed the doors of ‘influence’ and is content”.⁶ Schubring : *Dasaveyāliya* 6. (7-9.)

From all these Jaina canonical texts one thing is clear that one should identify himself with others and should try as far as possible not to harm any body with the intention of harming and should live in this world in such a way that one may kill the other living beings with the kind feeling for them and only when it is unavoidable. With this view of non-violence in their mind the propagators of non-violence have first tried to find out for what purpose the people resorted to killing of the living beings. They have noted that people resort to killing with no purpose at all. When we read the *Ācārāṅga* it is clear that for various purposes or without any there was killing of all types of living beings. In daily life the use of earth, water, fire, wind etc. was there without any sense of violence. For the purpose of food and drink and even for the religious ceremony the killing of living beings was allowed. Only for the sake of game and pleasure the performance of violence is noted in the *Ācārāṅga*. War was also one of the cause of violence. When Lord Mahāvira noted all these type of violence he renounced the world and took only such food, shelter etc. what was not prepared for him and that also only when there was utter necessity. He made a rule not to accept any food or shelter etc. in which the killing of any living being, for his sake, was involved. As a general rule he was not in favour of accepting the meat, fish or wine. In this way he became an example of non-violent life, and then he propagated the non-violence in daily life to the people of East India, and was really responsible for propagation of religion rooted in

6. kahaṃ care kahaṃ ciṭṭhe kahaṃ āse kahaṃ sae
 kahaṃ bhumjanto bhāsanto Pāvam kammaṃ na bandhaḥ (7)
 jayaṃ care jayaṃ ciṭṭhe jayaṃ āse jayaṃ sae,
 jayaṃ bhumjanto bhāsanto pāvam kammaṃ na bandhaḥ (8)
 savva- bhūyappa- bhūyassa sammam bhūyāi pāsao,
 pihiāsavasso dantassa pāvam kammaṃ na bandhaḥ (9)

non-violence. So we find that the Jaina religion is described as a religion rooted in non-violence.⁷

In this way in India the importance of *ahiṃsā* instead of *satya* (truth) was accepted in religion due to the propagation of the religion rooted in *ahiṃsā*. It may be noted here that before the time of Mahāvira and the Buddha in Vedic religion the *satya* was most important.

But after Mahāvira and Buddha we find the importance of *Satya* as well as of the *Ahiṃsā*, recognised in the Epic literature and the Purāṇas. It is quite clear that this is due to the influence of the Jaina and the Buddhist religion.

In view of the theory that the internal passion is the real violence and not the killing of the other living being it was clearly stated by Lord Mahāvira that —

purisā tumam eva tumā-mittam kiṃ bahiyaṃ mittam icchasi ?

(Ācā. 1.3.34)

tumam si nāma taṃ ceva jaṃ 'hantavyam' ti mannasi.....tamhā na hantā na vi ghāyae

(Ācā. 1.5.5.4.)

“Man, Thou art thy own friend; Why
Wishest thou for a friend beyond thy self”

(SBE. Vol. XXII p. 33)

“Thou art thy self the person to be killed.....so one should not be
the Killer or the murderer”

(Ācā. 1.5.5.4.)

Now let us see what the commentators and the other prominent Jaina Ācāryas have to say regarding the violence and non-violence.

Ācārya Siddhasena has clearly stated that though one kills the living being one does not have the sin of killing because of his *apramāda* (carefulness).⁸

Same sentiments are found in *Oghaniryukti* (748, 749) and in Ācārya Kundakunda's *Pravacanasāra* (3.17) when they say that those who are careful (*apramatta*) to them there is no sin even though the living being is killed.

The most profound discussion of the theory of non-violence is done by Ācārya Jinabhadra in his *Viśeṣāvāśyakabhāṣya* (Pub. L.D.S.) :

“One should not fear that because earth, etc. are so crowded with souls, there would be *hiṃsā* (injury) at every step whether one wills it or

7. so ya ahiṃsāmūlo : dhammo jiyarāgadosamohehim
bhanio jinehi.....Puspamālā, gāthā-5

8. Siddhasena : *Dvātrimśikā* 3.16.

not. It has been pointed out earlier that what is struck by a weapon is not possessed of a soul. There will not be injury simply because the world is crowded with souls. It is the intention that ultimately matters. From the real point of view, a man does not become a 'killer' only because he has killed or because the world is crowded with souls, or remain innocent only because he has not killed physically, or because souls are sparse. Even if a person does not actually kill, he becomes a killer if he has the intention to kill; while a doctor has to cause pain, but is still noninjurious, innocent, because his intention is pure. A wise man equipped with the five *samitis* and the three *guptis* and practising restraint thereby, is non-injurious, not one who is of just opposite type such a man of restraint is not regarded as injurious irrespective of whether he kills or hurts or does not; for it is the intention that is the deciding factor, not the external act which is inconclusive. From the real point of view it is the evil intention that is *himsā* (injury) whether it materialises into an evil act of injuring or not. There can be non-injury even when the external act of injury has been committed and injury even when it has not been committed. (2217-2222).

Does this mean that the external act of killing is never injury? Much depends on the evil intention. That external act of killing which is the cause of an evil effect, or is caused by evil intention is *himsā* (injury). But that which is not caused by evil intentions or does not result in an evil effect is not *himsā* in the case of the above-mentioned wise man. For example, sounds, etc. do not rouse the passions of a man free from attraction and infatuation because his mind or intention is pure, undefiled. A good man does not have infatuation for his mother however beautiful she may be; similarly, the external act of injury is not *himsā* in the case of a man of a pure mind. Thus that the world is crowded with souls does not mean that there is *himsā* at every step.

In order to inculcate this theory into practice the Jaina Ācāryas developed the theory of Karma and produced the story literature to show the results of virtuous and sinful life. And we can observe the penetration of this Karma-theory in the life of the mass of India. Even in Jain Canonical literature we find that as a result of the participation in war many persons are said to be born in hell and such other lower places. (*Bhagavati*. 7.9.300)

The theory that those who participate in the war are born in heaven is also repudiated in the canon. One can be born in heaven, only if he has regrets for participation in the war and becomes a monk in his last days, otherwise the hell is destined for such person. This is illustrated by the account of the life of one named Varua of Vaisali. (*Bhagavati* 7.9.303).

It is clearly stated in the story that during the war he was not ready to kill or harm any one who had not first offended him because of his vows as a house-holder. The question of participation in war for a monk does not arise. A person has to take in the beginning of his career as a monk a vow called *Sāmāyika* i.e. identification with all living beings so that he may not kill or harm any living being. This vow is a vow of not indulging in any evil doings. After testifying his capacity to follow the monkish life he is to take the five vows not to kill, not to tell a lie etc. It is explained that the first vow of not killing is the most important one and the other four vows are the auxiliary to the first vow of non-violence. Utmost importance is attached to the vow of non-possession by a monk. Because due to the idea to possess some thing, one is engaged in fair or unfair means, in order to have the desired thing. It was due to this reason that Lord Mahāvira decided to be a naked monk and advised his followers also to be naked. Even to the house-holders he advised to limit their possession and not to indulge in such business in which there was violence.

The result of emphasis on non-violence can be seen in the Jaina society as well as in the followers of Hindu religion that all the Jainas are strict vegetarians and most of the Hindus also are vegetarians. It can be accepted without doubt that vegetarianism in India is due to Jainism.

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4

Hindu Religion and Jaina Religion

It is not that easy to write about Hinduism and Jainism. The topmost question is why Jainism should be separated from Hinduism at all. There is no reason why it should be separated from Hinduism when the learned scholar like Anand Shankar Dhruva divides Hinduism into three classes, namely, Vaidic, Jaina and Buddha. Having accepted this division done by the late Dr. Dhruva, what I have to say is that the term Hinduism in and outside India, denotes that brand of Vedic religion, at least not Jainism and Buddhism at all which is specially current in the society at large. I have, therefore, in this article used the word "Hinduism" to stand for the Vedic religion which is at present followed in particular by the society as a whole. In this context it is not necessary to state that Jainism is decidedly different from it. There is unanimity amongst scholars regarding the fact that Jainism is not an offshoot of the Vedic religion, but an independent one. It is more probable that Jainism resembles more with that religious stream which flowed in India before the Aryans came, meaning thereby that before the Vedic religion was imported in India.

Hinduism—a comprehensive term

Thus, keeping aside what happened in the earliest times, there is much to be found that lays Jainism under debt during the whole later period marked with the mutual exchange between the Vedic religion on one hand and Jainism and Buddhism on the other. Also, there are many things for which the Vedic religion is indebted to Jainism. There is a transmutation brought about in the Vedic religion as it is today from what it was in the Vedic times, and it is in no small measure due to Jainism and Buddhism. Talks of spiritual sacrifices have today started taking place substituting sacrifices of the Vedic times involving injury to living beings and this is clearly due to the impact of Mahāvira and Buddha. A pariah can become a saint and deserve respect today according to the theory that religion is his who observes it—the theory that has replaced—the Vedic one which laid down that of all the four castes that of the Brāhmin was superior and that the Brāhmin was the teacher of all. Here also the stamp of Jainism and Buddhism is detected. While, on the contrary, in the society following Jainism the classification of the high and the low is made after the manner of the caste distinctions enjoined by the Vaidikas. A technique of pompous worship adopted in the Jaina temples is borrowed from the Vaiṣṇava religion. This is how the cultura give and take in a

number of ways has taken place. Thus, Hinduism is nothing else but the general form of religion that has evolved in all the three sections in Bhārat on account of the longstanding mutual cultural exchange amongst the Vaidikas, Jains and Bauddhas. The term 'Hinduism' here has a wider connotation and it is in this context that Dr. A. B. Dhruva and others have employed it and have named the Vaidika, Jaina, and Bauddha religions as its three Varieties.

General features of the Hindu Religion in a broad sense

Let us think about some characteristics of the Hindu religion in a broad sense before we do so about the same in restricted sense. All those religions of which India is the birth-place have been included in Hindu religion. Speaking in this strain, Jainism and Buddhism, being the products of Hindustan, are definitely called the Hindu religion. The religion of the Vaidak Āryās who came from outside India but who compiled the Vedic Saṁhiṭās in Hindustān itself is also called Hindu religion. But in the subsequent period it is this very Vedic religion that has secured a niche in the society as a whole. So whenever there is a talk about the religion of the Hindus, it principally means that only. It is because of this that we have in this article employed the term Vedic religion in the limited sense of the Hindu religion. In spite of this it is but proper to attempt a consideration of the general features of the Hindu religion in a broad sense. Let us, therefore, do it at first. It is as follows :—

Belief in the Law of Karma and rebirth, in bondage and release discontent about the present condition, consequent faith in the supreme condition from spiritual point of view, the original uniformity in the means to secure it such as devotion, meditation etc. etc. and worship of those personages who have realized it. According to scriptures, all the three religions are eternal. Therefore, in reality, the scriptures do not have anything in them conformatory to the history of these religions. On the contrary there are statements in them which purport to say that all those three religions flourished at all points of time. The continuity of the Hindu—Vedic religion was maintained through incarnations and that of Jainism and Buddhism through Tīrthaṅkaras and through a series of births of Buddha respectively. All these—incarnations, births etc. etc. are considered eternal.

The everlasting gospel of religions

But in the pronouncements of all these three religious systems, there is to be found the truthfulness of the ultimate truth, if not historical truth. This ultimate truth is this that even if the outward forms change, the essential nature does not undergo any alteration. This essential nature is

the unification of the individual soul (Jiva) with the universal soul. (Śiva) Here, I have used the word 'Śiva' intentionally. Its general meaning is 'good' or 'welfare' and special meaning is "that god who gives good". Both the meanings are taken there in the sense of ultimate goal or gospel of all religions. Yoga and Bhakti are the two currents of religion. The word 'yoga' also has two meanings. The process of unification with the universal soul is also called Yoga as the process in connection with one's own soul. No qualitative difference in the process arises even if the universal soul is considered to be one's own pure soul or a different entity. Total annihilation of the unethical propensities such as love and hatred is the essence of both the processes. Then, it becomes a matter of secondary importance whether one attains the highest status of a super-soul or one regains the pristine purity of his own soul. What is most important is to rid one's own soul of the impurities sullyng it. This is nothing else but the regaining of the most exalted and original status of one's own soul. Concerning Bhakti also, one should note that an aspirant can do it taking the over-soul as different from his own soul or taking his own soul as the over-soul. But this will be the difference in the final goal that one will come back to the original pure state of his soul as a result of the first type of his Bhakti or will attain the most exalted position of the over-soul as a fruit of the second type of his Bhakti. But in both the types of Bhakti, the purity of one's own soul is indispensable. Thus, the purity of one's own soul is the re-attainment of one's own soul and that is unavoidable. This is a thing of prime importance in the technical procedure and programme of Bhakti which goes unavailed of without it. On regaining the pristine purity of his own soul one enjoys the happiness of fulfilment while the other who reaches the most exalted position of the over-soul enjoys the highest bliss—the bliss of nearest proximity with the over-soul. But it is bliss in one or the other, the only difference being that one gets it, in one type, through merging in one's own soul and in the other through union with the over-soul. If this ever-abiding religious truth is well understood, there will be not the least difficulty in grasping the coherence of a variety of procedures regarding religions rites and rituals, injunctions and prohibitions.

Historical and Aspirational

Thus in all religious systems, there are statements claiming antiquity and eternity for themselves but the scholars of history are not thereby satisfied. It is natural for them to doubt who are interested in knowing with the spirit of neutrality the history of the birth and transformation of religious beliefs but not in religious realizations. The beliefs of a religious person push him forward while the curiosity of a historian gets him to know new vistas and views but after many pitfalls. It is not at all necessary

for a religious person to know when his religious performances and practices started but he has his eyes merely on whether his religious practices lead him on to the attainment of his goal. But the historian has not so much concern with that. His main interest is confined to finding out the underlying basis of a particular religious performance or practice. A religious person is satisfied to solve his doubts and problems on the strength of the evidence of his own spiritual self while a historian needs many more proofs to authenticate his conclusions. On account of this it so happens that what is acceptable for a religious person as a final simple truth is not so easily acceptable for a historian who subjects it to so many severe tests even before agreeing to it partially from the viewpoints of time and space—It is not easy to deceive the soul. One who behaves against his spiritual convictions or the dictates of his soul has always to bear the prickings of his conscience. Therefore, a religious person, if at all he is religious, goes on and on. It is a different matter if one wants to be known as a religious person having been deaf to a categorical imperative. But there is no doubt that the inner voice is a clear guide. Against this, the historical approaches suffer from a lack of conviction of the soul and a historian, for a large part, advances in the light of his likes and dislikes. On account of this, there is scope for differences of opinions in a number of matters though there is no dearth of material common to both. Due to this reason only, no unanimity has been established in the historical evaluation of religions. But much of what I will say here in this article will be for the most part acceptable to historians. I have no intention to give a blow to the feelings and beliefs of the religious people.

Limits of the present discussion.

After these prefatory remarks, I now start to say about some matters relating to the aforesaid Vedic religion and Jaina religion.

Hindu religion is a tall banyan tree which is so split into several branches in the form of sects that one lands himself into complications while searching its roots. Despite this, we have to think about it keeping in front of us its principal present form.

Speaking broadly, many sects such as the Śhaiva, Vaiṣṇava etc. etc. have come into existence in Hindustān and have spread their message. It is clear that the kṛṣṇa cult has occupied a high seat in the Hindu religion. The main form of Hindu religion as it is existing today is found in the synthesis of all types of devotion attempted so liberally in the Gītā which sings the song of devotion to kṛṣṇa only. Therefore, I will mainly discuss here in this article. while critically examining the Hindu religion, about

the stages through which that form of Hindu religion which has evolved in the Gṛā, has passed. While discussing about Jaina religion I shall refer to its literature, its Ācāryās, its code of conduct and its sects etc. etc. comparing it with the Hindu religion.

Five forms of Hindu religion from the historical point of view.

The Vedas as they are accepted by the Hindu religion have been recognized as the oldest not merely in Indian literature but in the literature of the world also while the matter is different in the case of available Jaina canon, Thus, it is obvious that the foundations of the historical material regarding Hindu religion are deeply laid while it is not so regarding Jaina religion. In spite of this difference relating to the material, the scholars believe that the religion propounded in the Vedas which has been the original source of foundation of the edifice of Hindu religion and the original source of Jaina religion—both are different. The Vedas and the religion propounded by the Vedas were imported into India while Jainism was not. Moreover, it has not come into existence because of the Vedas. It has been roundly accepted that it is an independent religion. The history of the origin and construction of Hindu religion is very interesting. It is true that it is born of the Vedas and the Vedic ideology has shaped it. However, it has later on grown into such a form that its connection with its ancestral lineage is almost nil. New accretions have become so much added to it from time to time that the hand of the Vedas is not visible even though the Vedas are able to sustain the loaded form. Disciplinary practices of today's Hindu religion have changed so radically from the old ones that they are now detected in name only. The old moral Vedic code consisted of sacrifice but between the sacrifices enjoined by the Vedas and the sacrifices as performed today, there is as much difference as there is between heaven and earth. The sacrifices as laid down by the Vedas are performed even today according to the procedure prescribed but they are merely for the sake of exhibition and not as a part and parcel of the moral life. I have used the words "for the sake of exhibition" to show that in cities like Poona, the sacrifices are sometimes organized at present on the old lines in order to give to the students the idea according to which they were in wont in the days of the Vedas. They are undertaken not with a view to reviving them but with a motive to satisfy the historical instinct and curiosity. The enthusiasm of Karapātri Mahārāja, also once an advocate of the cause of renewing the old pattern of sacrifices outlined in the Vedas, quailed when he saw the sacrifices in Poona. This proves how far today's Hindu religion has advanced from the Vedas and from what they have to say. There are following five forms of Hindu religion as we know it today and as we think about its history.

1. Vedic Religion

The thoughts and ethical code which the Āryans brought with them when they came to India, approximately three thousands and a half years before, are known as Vedic religion or Śrauta religion. Just as scholars believe, that religion should be understood in the spirit and light in which the religion imported into India from outside should be taken. According to that religious practices which were in the form of sacrifices involving injury to living beings and performed without elaborate rites and rituals, were laid down as also the propitiation of a number of gods, through the sacrifices. But a background had come about to stay in which those various gods, though different in names, were substantially one. This worship or propitiation had no lofty goal except that of destruction of the enemies and the increase of material prosperity. In the ancient Vedas, a desperate effort was made to satisfy the curiosity regarding the composition of the universe, its nature, the time and method of its creation, its creator etc. etc. But no definite explanation could be found. It is also found in them that there were four classes forming the society. This Vedic religion can be thought of as forming the foundation of Hindu religion.

2. Brāhmaṇa Religion

A developed form of the aforesaid Vedic religion in course of time has come to be known as the Brāhmaṇa religion. It is so named because its basis is the Brāhmaṇa works forming an Appendix to the Vedas. An attempt to know is made in these about how and where the original Mantras of the Vedas should be employed and how to harmonize the stories and episodes suggested in them. If the Vedas are the compositions of the Ṛṣis and the Brāhmaṇa works, the creation of the priests whose main aim was to organize the rites and rituals of which sacrifices were the chief constituents. The direct result of this was that the simple sacrifices of the Vedic times assumed a complicated form, becoming an improbability without the help of the experts. Because of this, the dignity of the priesthood became enhanced and the priests arrogated to themselves the status of teachers. In these sacrifices, the quantity of the material used in them swelled, the rites and rituals became elaborate and the varieties also grew. The whole society for a long time got into the grip of the institution of sacrifices. It so appeared that there was nothing else to do but the sacrifices in the whole life. The sacrifice and the sacrifice only became the world and also God for the people. The Brāhmaṇas who were the priests dominated the field. It does not appear that any special progress in the thinking was achieved during this period. An atmosphere in which the whole lot of ritualism was compressed into one

item, namely, the sacrifice, prevailed. This form of the Hindu religion that existed three thousands years before is today's Brāhmaṇa religion.

3. Transitional period.

The period that followed this was the period of transition marked by another form of Hindu religion which received the appellation of upaniṣadic or Vedāntik. As the Āryas advanced further and further from north to the east, their contact with the people of India deepened and as a result of this the Vedic religion was flooded with new thoughts. People revolted against the elaborate ceremonialism and the supremacy of the Brāhmaṇas. The thinkers who took an extreme stand that the sacrifice was a leaky boat, appeared on the field. An attitude, in which it was accepted that traditionalism should be replaced by progressive thinking, crystalized. Thus, we see that an attention was focussed more on Brahma than on sacrifice in the Upaniṣads. The interest in ceremonialism relating to sacrifice decreased and that in the thoughts about soul increased. A number of Doubts and queries began to be entertained freely regarding the origin and growth of this universe. In this period, the fact that the Kṣatriyās, not the Brāhmīns, led the thinking world shows that the Kṣatriyās had started dominating the religious world also, reducing the impact of the Brāhmīns on it. This was natural because the decrease of the effect of ceremonialism and ritualism must result in that of the same of the Brāhmīns. In these times, on one hand, there were Brāhmīns who were the supporters of ritualism while on the other, there were Kṣatriyās who espoused the cause of spiritual thinking—when these two—the advocates and antagonists of the ritualism and spiritualism—had gone to the last limit in pushing forward their views, there was a class which preferred the golden mean as it believed honestly that there was mush in both of them that was fit to be adopted and therefore it should not oppose them tooth and nail. If the complexities are removed from the sacrifice as also injury to living beings, the spiritualists had no reason to go against it because there was nothing wrong they thought, in removing the emphasis on excessive ceremonialism and ritualism from the code of conduct and in laying a greater stress instead on spiritualism. But this middle-roaders had not still established their hold on the society. A tug-of-war consisting of a ferment between thought and action characterized this Upaniṣadic age. Though the heat had not still generated the necessary and the expected alchemic product, it had succeeded in opening up, at least, a new direction. Therefore, it is not at all wrong if this period is described as the transitional period of the Hindu religion. That was the situation that prevailed, two thousand and a half years before.

Period of Synthesis

The form of Hindu religion which was prevalent in the aforesaid transitional period was the originating force of the Hindu religion of today. This outcome was not sudden; but during the last one thousand years, the cauldron of ferment boiled at top speed and intensity yielding ultimately the elixir of Hindu religion as we have today. The first glimpses of this elixir are seen in the Gītā. Because of this, Gītā has been acknowledged by every section of Hindu religion. The speciality of this renewed form of Hindu religion consists in its synthetical approach. This approach continued to be adopted for about thousand years and the outcome of it is seen in the current Hindu religion. The feature of this synthetical outlook and attitude ruled till the fourth or fifth century A. D.

(5) Synthesis—The ultimate resultant of the Hindu religion which can be named as the synthetical attitude as embodied and evolved in the Gītā continues till today. Despite several rises and falls of this attitude, the central original concept of synthesis has not only never suffered a set back but on the contrary has always been progressing further and further with the run of time.

Characteristics of the Hindu religion as shaped by the Gītā

Let us now think about those characteristics of that form of Hindu religion which is visible today and which was shaped by the Gītā.

(1) Devotion to Kṛṣṇa and the element of his all powerful nature—

The dignity of devotion to Kṛṣṇa which was the very centre of the new form of the Hindu religion is there on the run even today unabated. Basically, Sri Kṛṣṇa was the object of worship for the yādavas but he gradually penetrated into and pervaded the whole Hindu religion to such an extent that he was later identified with the Vedic Viṣṇu. This established the unity of a human being with the Vedic divine being and it resulted into the introduction of a new element of Incarnation in the Hindu religion. On account of this, a lofty and grand emotional tendency was firmly rooted into the minds of the religious people that any person of dignity deserves respectful worship and attention as an Incarnation of God. We see that the saints and sages of medieval times in whom majesty and divinity were evident were worshipped like the Incarnations of God. Even at present, there are not a few persons taking Gandhiji also as a symbol of Godhood. Thus God is not a distant invisible reality but a belief arose that one who was most powerful and dignified amongst people was considered God and was worshipped also as such. This created an occasion for the people to experience daily the presence of God amongst themselves.

(2) God is every where in the world :

Whatever may be the metaphysical speculations, all the religious people do have a faith, strengthened by the Gītā that whatever there is in this universe is created and permeated by omnipresent and all-pervading God. This removed the cause for the faithful to be affected by such conflicting emotions as love and hatred and made it possible for them to attend to their programme of cultivating equipoise or equanimity. A saint is even-minded to a dog and pariah—both and has no scope for a contempt. The idea of touchability or untouchability is existent, as a gift of the religion based on the Smṛtis, in the Hindu society specially there where there is a greater impact of the Brāhmins and it is small in intensity where the impact is small. The long and short of it all is that the principle of even-mindedness as adumbrated in the Gītā has become the principal concern or characteristic of the Hindu religion. This even may not be so visible in the so-called religious people as it is surely seen in the genuine saints such as Rāma Kṛṣṇa Paramahaṃsa.

(3) Enthronement of the Concept of Devotion

Granting that there is controversy amongst the scholars regarding the preponderance of the theory of knowledge, action or devotion in the Gītā, there is no doubt about the fact that it is the life's attitude of devotion preached by the Gītā that has become a closed matter in the Hindu religion. It is a devotional way of life that has been eulogized and elevated to day as a religious practice in the Hindu religion, the theory of knowledge and action being only subservient to it or merged in it. This principle of devotional way of life has spread its infection to all the religions of Bhāratavarṣa.

They were only the Brāhmins who adopted knowledge as way of life. The untouchable has no right even to betake to action as a way of life. But devotion was the only remaining means open to all. There all had equal rights without any distinction of male or female or any other thing. Due to this, it was possible that it caught the fancy more of the whole society.

(4) The welfare of the society at large :

The good of the whole society is the message of the Gītā. In Jainism and Buddhism, it was necessary to abandon the domestic life, having abstained from all activities as a prerequisite of complete renunciation. But in the Gītā, it is specifically laid down that one can get freedom only if one observes the religion he has inherited. (स्वधर्मो निधनं श्रेयः परधर्मो भयावहः) । All should do the actions prescribed for them and should strive for emancipation. All should do their duties prescribed for them. There is no way out. The reason of the bondage is not the Karma but the attachment. Therefore, giving up attachment and without expectation of any reward, to do the duty which is assigned to one is freedom or redemption or release itself. This

is the message of the Gītā that has become the core of the Hindu religion— And on account of this, there is social stability instead of disorder or instability. There can be no scope for the distinction of the high and the low in a staunch follower of Hindu religion, if at all he intends to base his conduct on the message of the Gītā. And we just now saw above that the low community and caste has produced saints of a high order, who have been respected as equally as the Brāhmin saints. This is because of the impact of Hindu religion the roots of which lie in the Gītā. From the Vedic times till today, all the various gods who were given places in the Hindu religious system were identified with Kṛṣṇa and all the saints were considered as the incarnations of Kṛṣṇa and therefore they all claimed equal respect as Kṛṣṇa. This concept got currency because of the Gītā and therefore, religious differences due to different duties could not get any accommodation. Hindu religion has adopted a generous attitude which is evidenced in the fact that any worship, offered anywhere and in any manner goes to Kṛṣṇa, that is to say, is the worship of Kṛṣṇa himself. Moreover, whatever action may be done, it is in the form of and as a part of devotion to God. This being the lesson conveyed by the Gītā, all the actions, more or less become divine and therefore, the idea of noble or ignoble from the actions will disappear—you may do anything you like, it is worship to God. Such a dignified thought became the kernel of Hindu religion. This completely removed the gulf of antagonism that divided various sects of Hindu religion. Such an exalted ideology spread that every one worshipped God in his own way and according to his own fitness. There was, therefore, no reason for quarrel under the pretext that God had various names and forms and should be worshipped in any of those forms and names. Thus the contribution of the Gītā in bestowing the universal character on the Hindu religion is, indeed, extraordinary.

Having so far thought about Hindu religion, let us now turn to Jainism.

Jaina Religion

There is no scope for any difference of thought and interpretation in Jaina literature it being one of unambiguous nature. Therefore, the basis of the various sects of Jainism is not ideological but ethical. Ideological uniformity or continuity is consistently maintained throughout as testified by the available literature. Having compared some of the matters of Jaina religion with those of the Hindu religion, we shall consider about Jainism, that is to say, about its literature, pontiffs and preceptors, ideology, ethical codes and sects.

No religion comes into existence, all of a sudden; nor does it assume organized form in a moment. It does not matter that it may be linked up

with some distinguished personage but really speaking, its roots lie deeper than that even. Even if they are not found in the contemporary conditions, they will definitely be met with elsewhere. He will be considered one of the promoter who having caught hold of the roots and having removed accretions and crusts points a finger at it. If we adopt this line of thinking, the available Jaina canonical works belong to a post-Mahāvira period. We have no literature that can be called belonging to pre-Mahāvira times. Therefore, whatever indications refer ring to the condition of pre-Mahāvira Jainism are there, they are there in those post-Mahāvira canonical works.

The beginning of Jainism, just as that of Hinduism is not known. Let us, therefore, leave that aside and try to get information about the ordinary matters relating to Jainism from the post-Mahāvira Jaina canonical works.

Non-injury and Renunciation

It is clear that the weightage attached to Truth is not assigned to Non-injury in the same degree and intensity during the period till the Mahābhārata of Hindu religion. This holds good in the case of possessionlessness and chastity even. Upaniṣadic sages also do not seem to be believing in Non-possession. The stories describing non-chastity of the sages are not wanting. No criticism of the flagrant breach of character is found in the religious works of that period. While, as a matter of fact, celibacy has been accepted as a way of life till the last moment in the stage of Sanyāsa (Renunciation). It has been said about the Brāhmins that it was they to whom Brahma, having created this universe, handed it over. It was because of their weakness that the others have usurped the right of ownership. Therefore, it is no theft even if the Brāhmins take away what is not properly given to them. On the contrary, it is like this that they are only arrogating to themselves what properly and originally belongs to them. Thus, it is seen that the Hindu religion of yore has underscored Truth only amongst the five vows. But contrary to this, the principle of Non-injury only has received the greatest recognition in Jainism as a religious principle according to the available history of Jainism and the remaining four have been deduced as the necessary corollaries of the first and the greatest vow called Non-injury. It has also been enjoined in it that all the five vows in which Non-injury is the first and foremost should be observed with equal and uniform care. It is not that the vow of renunciation should be undertaken and practised in the last stage only. It can be accepted at a time when religion is properly understood and the power to maintain it has been cultivated. It is because of this that renunciation undertaken when one is young and youthful has been specially appreciated and admired.

No importance is attached to the distinctions caused by caste or sex

In the beginning, Jainism had rejected distinctions due to caste. They are not honoured by Jainism. The destruction of relatives, father or teacher done by the Kṣatriyas as approved by the Gītā or Mahābhārata is not welcomed by Jainism as a religious duty. The crime committed by the Brāhmin even is a crime just as it is in the case of all. It is not acceptable to Jainism at all that the Brāhmins have only special rights. According to the law books of the Hindu religion, the pariahs or the outcastes cannot adopt a way of life based on renunciation; nor can they acquire the status of a teacher. But it is not so in Jainism. A way of life based on renunciation is open to all including females even. Some such matters as are fundamentally inconsistent with Jainism have crept into it on account of the inherent weakness of a human being to imitate what other powerful people do namely, distinctions on account of caste or community, the superior status of a monk to that of the nun etc. etc. The Digambara Jainas went to the length of even debarring the women from trying to get emancipation on the ground of sectarian belief that all those who want to be monks should move about naked and the women cannot and so they were not eligible for emancipation.

Many sidedness of Mataphysical Speculation

The edifice of the Jain ethical code to be observed by the monks and the laity has been raised on the ground of the principle of Non-injury, while it is not so with that of the Hindu religion. Jainism has developed its theory of manifold aspects from the metaphysical speculation derived from its cardinal principle of non-injury while in all the various philosophical systems of the Hindu religion, one main theory is observable or one chief attitude is visible. Jainism has constructed its theory of manifold aspects out of the synthesis of the theories or attitudes representing each philosophical school or system of Hindu religion.

Jaina literature : Difference between the Vedas and the Jain canon

Just as the Vedas are the bedrocks of the speculative and practical part of the Hindu religion, Jain canon in which Mahāvīra's instructions regarding metaphysics and ethics are stored, forms the foundation of Jainism. The knowledge of the fundamental difference between the Vedas and the Jaina Canon will give us a special idea about the nature of both these. The Veda is a name given to the compilation of philosophical ruminations of a number of sages. They are also called Mantras. On account of this, the word itself matters and not the meaning. This resulted in the status quo of the original words of the Vedas. The form of the compilation of the Vedas such as the Rig-Veda etc. which was once fixed at a particular time has remained the same even today. The phenomenon that the Vaidikas did not

attach any importance to the meaning, though the words were the same resulted into many differences of opinions as regards their import and explanations. These differences served as a basis for many subsequent systems of philosophical thought which came into existence and which contradicted each other. An intelligent man did not hesitate to call his own vision as Vedic. But it is not so with the Jain canon. There in it, it is not the words of the revered Mahāvīra that mattered so much as the meaning derived from them. Due to this, the subsequent pontiffs composed the Canon in the light of Mahāvīra's instructions. The words changed though the meaning remained intact and the substance was preserved. Verbal arrangement may be of any type, the difference in thinking found no place. Moreover, because the Vedic period is as old as three thousand and a half years and because the meaning and interpretation were overlooked, there is no wonder that controversies may arise. At the time of the composition of the Jain canon, words had acquired a settled meaning. This removed the possibility of difference of opinion in interpreting them. Because of this, we see that there is no difference in the metaphysical outlook or vision but whatever difference is there, it is regarding the moral or behavioural disciplines. The second inevitable result that flowed from this was that the canonical works composed by the Gaṇadharas could not be preserved like the Vedas.

Moreover, the language of the Vedas is Sanskrit and its words and forms are preserved intact. But the language of the Jain Canon is Prākṛit, the language of the people. On account of this, the Prākṛit that was used in Mahāvīra's times is not the same what is found in the Canon today. It is but natural that the Prākṛit language of the times when the final redaction of the Canon took place would have influenced the original Prākṛit of the Canon. The object of Mahāvīra and Buddha in adopting the Prākṛit, the language of the masses in place of Sanskrit, the language of the priestly order for their religious instructions, sermons and discourses was to save these from becoming the property of the few only and to ensure that they become the real instrument of mass education. This had an obvious result that the Vedas became the capital of some Brāhmins only following the Vedic religion and on the strength of this, they monopolized the leadership in the field of religions. But so far as Jainism is concerned, no body could do this as Mahāvīra preached in the language of the masses. There was one distinct advantage in this that it had a wide prevalence but a distinct disadvantage also on the other hand that nobody tried to preserve it it being no property of any one. Due to this, the language of the Canon has suffered a lot in its form and structure, though the meaning has not in its relevance and significance. The Vedas are not the works conveying instructions but they are the collections containing panegyries offered by the various sages to

the deities. This is the difference dividing them from the canonical literature of the Jainas. Though these panegyrics or eulogies are full of poetical essence, their main purport is the begging or praying for material prosperity. They do not contain any utterances or outbursts relating to their spiritual uplift, here or afterwards. They are replete with invocations for help from gods to destroy their enemies and to expand their territories. As opposed to this, a road has been shown in the Jain canon for spiritual uplift and a description of the insignificance of the material prosperity is found therein. Wherever a panegyric or an eulogy is come across in it, it only points to the intense craving for the attainment of emancipation getting rid of love and hatred which are the internal enemies. This is the fundamental difference between the Vedas and the Jain Canon.

Besides, the gods which are propitiated in the Vedas take the shape of love and hatred harboured by the Ṛṣis. They run, it is imagined, to the succour of the worshippers and they relish the same meal which is relished by the worshippers. The enemies of the worshipers become verily the enemies of gods also and they undertake on themselves the duty of destroying them on behalf of their worshippers. Contrary to this, the gods as imagined in the Jain canon dwell no doubt in the heaven but along with it, it is said there in it that they are not to be worshipped or propitiated. Those gods themselves come to wait on the Tirthankaras. One who is to be waited upon or to be attended to must be himself devoid of attachment and the object of worship or propitiation must be the attainment of the state of detachment. Thus these beliefs, thoughts and theories form the basis of difference between the Vedas and the Jain Canon. The Jain literature that has come into existence keeping the Canon as its model underscores the said dictum.

Founder-Personages :

In Hindu religion, Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, Śhiva or Śāṅkara are the three divines which are specially worshipped at present as God. Amongst these three also, it is Kṛṣṇa to whom a greater significance is attached. It is imagined that those three are the symbols or incarnations of one and the same Super-lord who has been supposed as liberated for ever. Moreover, the three religious systems or sects have been named after them, as for example, Śaiva, Vaiṣṇava etc. The various schools, sects, or systems which appeared on the stage later on such as the Rāmānujī, Caitanya, Rāmānandī and Kabīrapanthī etc. etc. were designated after the respective names of the saints who flourished later on. These saints also are worshipped as God himself as they are imagined to be a part of God.

Historically speaking, this theory of incarnation was conceived only when the human beings like Mahāvira and Buddha became the objects of

worship as God. In the Śramaṇa sect, the Tirthaṅkaras belonged to the caste of the Kṣatriyas and Rāma and Kṛṣṇa also who are worshipped as incarnations were of the same class. The word 'incarnation' is applied to him who is already a freed soul and therefore, he has nothing to strive after for his spiritual rise and growth and it has not been considered essential also. This differentiates the Śramaṇic Tirthaṅkaras from the incarnations. The effort for realization which is seen in the lives of the Tirthaṅkaras is not visible in those of Rāma and Kṛṣṇa. Of course, Śiva or Śaṅkara as he is also called did attempt for the soul's elevation in his life. But Śiva is not a vedic God. He has been included in the category of Gods because the Vaidicas counted him as powerful. Kṛṣṇa also seems to be antagonistic to the Vedas because he uplifted the mountain, Govardhana, in order to save the people from the harassments of Indra who occupies the highest position amongst the Vedic Gods. This is a pointer to the not altogether—friendly relationship between Kṛṣṇa and Indra. Kṛṣṇa would have put forth a fair amount of endeavour to root out the Vedic Gods such as Indra and others from the minds of people. The Vaidicas conferred the title of God through the theory of incarnation on such ordinary human beings as became the objects of veneration in the society at large. This inevitably resulted in the fact that they gradually ceased to be so in the masses. Rāma's contribution is by no means small in stabilizing social boundaries and limitations and therefore, it is not surprising at all if he is elevated to the status of God by the people. Similarly, the part played by Kṛṣṇa in politics, according to the Mahābhārata, entitled him to a leadership in his times. He also in course of times earned the title of God. His followers and devotees have never given a quarter to the thought that he ought to have striven and struggled for self-realization leaving the world for good.

Exactly reverse position prevails as regards the Śramaṇa's Tirthaṅkara and Buddha. They are not principally believed to be incarnations. But when an ordinary human being raising the level of his life reaches the peak of perfection, that is to say, attains the state of the detached, he is worshipped as an ideal human being and when such a detached personage makes attempts for the welfare of the society at large, he becomes reputed amongst people as a Tirthaṅkara or Buddha. In this phenomenon, it is not God that descends on earth but it is the human being who raises his level in order to reach the status of God. Such uplifted beings who work for the good of the people in the world are revered as Tirthaṅkaras in Jainism and it is they who are called the founding fathers of Jainism. They are twenty four in number but it is only in relation to the aeon in which we live at present. Such infinite cycles of twenty four Tirthaṅkaras have come and gone in the past and will come and go in future also. This sectarian belief has at least that much grain

of truth in it that a human being who can lift himself and lift others also has an equal right to reach the highest plane of a Tirthaṅkara. It is because of this that Jainism is not known as Jainism after the name or appellation of some founding father. On the contrary, it is so called because it is founded by the Jinas that is to say by those who have conquered love and hatred. All the detached beings do not do activities for the welfare of the humanity at large but those who cultivate compassion nurturing tendency to do good to the society from a series of past births can acquire the position of a Tirthaṅkara. Thus there is a common element between the mental attitudes of the Tirthankaras and the incarnated souls consisting of a desire to tone up the religion or to provide religious guidance to the people.

Jain Ethics based on non-injury :

Sentiment and not the bare outward form is at the root of Jain ethics. Internal state and not the external shape decides the character of Jain ethics. On account of this, external ceremonialism consisting of bath etc. has lesser use and meaning for a Jaina aspirant wanting to perform his religious activities. Importance of outward form has been considered necessary so long as it helps in purifying the internal state. If the attainment of this aim is not ensured, outward appearances of discipline etc. do not serve at all. Emphasis is placed on internal purity in the whole ethical code of the Jainas. Now, if it is asked about what type of internal tendency it is, regarding which a reference is made just before, I have to say that it is nothing but the concept of the equality of all souls or the concept of equanimity. The feeling of non-injury should arise as a result of this attitude of equanimity. It should dominate the whole ethical code, because Truth, Non-stealing, Continence and Non-possession are, verily, its offsprings. It is this very concept of non-injury which has been pressed into service for shaping the pattern of ethical code meant to be observed by the monks as well as the laity. Non-injury is of two types. Not to commit injury is one and the first type and is its negative aspect while to adopt a compassionate attitude to all living beings and to strive for their welfare is another and the second type which is its positive aspect—compassion, pity, mercy, charities etc. are all due to the positive aspect of the concept or theory, while renunciation or austerities flow from the negative aspect. We see that the hard austerities and long penance practised by the revered Mahāvira form the negative aspect but the establishment of the Tirtha, his own incessant wanderings here, there, and everywhere and the troubles he underwent in order to preach the gospel of initial, middle and terminal good to the people—all these constitute the positive aspect. The activities seen in the laity concerning penance etc. are the result of the adoption of the theory of cessation from harmful activities but the compassion, affection for the co-religionists and the proclamation of non-slaughter of

animals etc. are the manifestations of the adoption of the positive attitude. Meditation, study etc. are meant for the avoidance of injury which is the result of love and hatred. The worship which is offered is the worship of those great personages who have thrown off attachment and aversion and is meant for leading one further and further. This makes it clear that any pomposity, while offering worship, which comes in the way of onward march to the goal of total detachment is fit to be abandoned. When viewed from this angle of vision, the only objective of the whole code of Jaina Ethics consists in the attainment and cultivation of the attitude of complete cessation from injury to any living organism, great or small which is but another name of the Brahma. It must be admitted that this approach of Jainism to the problem of ethics had great impact on Hinduism.

The idea of equanimity which is current in Jainism and which is based on the belief that misery is unwelcome and happiness likeable to all beings and therefore no injury, howsoever small, should be inflicted on even an insignificant being—has had its influence clearly on the theory of equality as enunciated in the Gītā. There is no scope for doubt that the Śramaṇic concept of non-injury did shape the ideology the substance of which consists in the statement such as this in the Mahābhārata that one should not practise things, as regards others, which are disagreeable to his own self (“आत्मनः प्रतिकूलानि परेषां न समाचरेत्”).

Despite such a noble concept of non-injury of the Jainas, there is much that detracts this concept and is suggestive of the want of regard for this lofty principle in the commentarial literature on the Chedagranthas where the alternatives have been suggested in order to overcome the difficulties experienced in the practical application of this principle of non-injury. But the Jainas themselves have registered their protest against these alternatives. Not only this, but they have been constantly and continuously striving not to adopt these alternatives as far as possible, lest it may damage or even destroy the very spirit of the principle of non-injury.

Theory of Anekānta :

As said above, the principle of non-injury is at the basis of the Jaina ethics. This very principle gave rise to the theory of Anekānta when it was applied to the field of speculation. In Bhagwān Mahāvira's times, the sages of the Upaniṣads were spreading the doctrine of absolutism. According to it they said, that the whole universe was the manifestation of one soul only or of Brahma. Such a notion formed a special core of it. On the other side, there were such people also who did not go so far even to recognize an independent existence of an entity such as the soul. These two conflicting ideologies have been accommodated in Mahāvira's philosophical system. He has accepted both the categories—the sentient and the non-sentient. In the metaphysical

system of Mahāvira. this synthetical approach to the problems is evident at every stage. It is needless to dwell any longer on this point as it has been referred to very often. However, a necessity cannot be brushed aside to say about how the principle of non-injury occupied the central position of Mahāvira's approach. The passionate fanaticism which even a donor of many a lac of rupees has for his hopelessly trifling thoughts and opinions happens to be tremendous. Any one who forms opinion about any one else has for its basis some viewpoint or some ideology behind it. Then, it is but natural that he suffers a great shock when some one condemns his opinion without taking into consideration the viewpoint he has kept behind it. When one thoughtlessly gives a shock to the other, he is thereby committing a type of Himṣa (injury). Therefore, it is nothing but a mental Ahimṣā (non-injury) advocated by Mahāvira when he makes a specific pronouncement that a doctrine of manifold viewpoints should be adopted in the domain of thinking also.

The teachers have given the name of Jainism to the whole lot of misconceived Non-Jain beliefs, but it remains to be seen how this attains the appealation of right type of Jainism. It is the opinion of all the metaphysicians and philosophers for opposit view that is wrong and the reason of this is their obstinancy. One philosopher does not understand the viewpoint of the other. He believes that he alone is right. This leads him to disown the standpoint of the other and vice versa. But if a third person and a neutral one at that accepts what is true in both of them, his viewpoint is correct. The belief of person who has accepted the doctrine of Anekānta is correct while that of the person who ignores what is said by the other is incorrect. The belief of such an Anakāntavadin is neither scepticism nor indeterminism nor nescience. But it is a doctrine which accepts the truth, having examined all the aspects of the matter. This is therefore not absolutism but non-absolutism. It is not one-sided but it builds up the edifice of his belief from out of the bricks collected from all sets of people. It is not one-eyed; it is many-eyed. Not even that, it is infinite-eyed because it establishes that the thing or matter has more than one aspects.

Even in today's politics the concept of co-existence that we find, is rooted in the theory that a correct and comprehensive view of a thing could be had if at all it is looked at or considered from all possible angles.

In all the philosophical systems of the Hindus, Jaina theory of Non-absolutism is resorted to several times in order to avoid inconsistency or incoherence at the time of formulations. But it is only Jainism, doubtless, that has accepted it as a means to arrive at a total conception of a thing. Partial view of a thing is the result of wrong insistence and it has no place whatsoever in Jainism.

But this should never mean that complete catholicity prevails in all the speculations of Jaina philosophy and religion. This is not even possible in any system of ideology that assumes the form of sectarianism and is split into diverse types of ethical codes. These could not be synthesized into one uniform code by the Jain teachers. It is, indeed, surprising that the Jain teachers who could harmonize various conflicting philosophical systems could not even set their own house into order but, on the contrary, stuck fast to their own viewpoints. As a result of this, there arose a crop of many sects. In this phenomenon, merely the human weakness to cling to one's own standpoint is evident. Adherence to one's own viewpoint is not bad. But it is definitely bad not to take into account the opposite view. Had such an effort taken place, mushroom crop of sects and schools would not have been witnessed in Jainism and the Jaina Ācāryas would have been spared the trouble and ill luck of entering into controversies. But this is the strangeness of human nature and Bhagwan Mahāvīra was to make an attempt to remove it. He succeeded in bringing about a revolution of this type in the speculative field but failed so far its practical side was concerned.

Sects and factions

Before we take stock of the various sects of the Jainas, it is necessary, first of all, to consider about the heretics and their systems which have relationship, one way or the other, with the Jain Religion. These heretical systems are not the sects of the Jainas as their basic philosophy is in direct conflict with Jainism. They had declared their war against Mahāvīra himself, and his authority was disregarded by them. It is because of this that they were branded as heretics and were never accepted as the founders of the Jain sects. Sects or Sampradāyas, so to say, arise, or are formed or are organized only when different suitable interpretations are put on what is preached and taught by Mahāvīra, accepting, of course, what he said. It is not that these sects do not accept the authority of the original founder's preaching and teachings. But they accept it only to the extent that they do not go counter to the cherished beliefs or formulations. On account of this, they are sects though they may call each other heretics and designate their schools as heretical schools and not sects. Those heretical schools which have been described as such in the Canon are not all of them heretical schools, really speaking. Some of them are fit to be named as sects. In spite of this they have been branded as heretical schools due to animosity between one sect and another sect. We should not grudge to grant this.

Due to differences of opinion—major or minor—as also due to fixed residence in a particular territory or town, many sects or gacchas of the Jainas have come into existence. This is not the proper place to attempt

to renumrete them all. Here, we should refer in brief, only to highly influential sects worthy of evaluation. The two principal sects amongst these are the Śvetāmbara and the Digambara. The main difference of opinion here is with regard to clothes.

Śvetāmbara and Digambara

For centuries, scholars have been discussing as to which of these two sects is earlier and which follows the original path carved by Bhagavān. Let us consider the problem on the basis of the Ariga literature that is preserved and considered to be earlier than the beginning of the christian era. One clear fact is that Bhagavān Mahāvira was Anekāntavādi; he put on no clothes. There is yet no reason to believe that his Śramaṇa Sangha consisted only of clotheless Bhikṣus. Those who could not live without clothes on were permitted use of limited clothes. Again, when the Śramaṇas who followed i āśva took to spiritual initiation before Mahāvira, they were asked to accept the five Maha Vratas. Here however, there is no reference to change of clothes. But it is proved through Scriptures that they were living with clothes on. Even in the ancient Satkhaṇḍa Āgama of the Digambaras, fourteen guṇasthānas are accepted with reference to woman. We can therefore assume as quite late, the view of the Digambara Ācāryas that woman cannot win liberation. This is precisely the reason why Dhavalā, a commentary of the ninth century, experienced difficulty in interpreting the original Āgamas. Again, moderns found it proper to change the reading itself! These facts are sufficient to prove one thing. In course of time, when both the unavailability of clothes and total abandonment of clothes found support in the views of Bhagavān Mahāvira, the mental affinity between the two must have grown lesser and lesser. This must have led to separation of the two sects. It is not difficult here to understand that the Digambara sect separates itself from the original path when it states that the original scriptures are lost, and not that these scriptures are well-preserved. It may be true that there is no intensity of external conduct [bāhya acāra] with the Śvetāmbaras. It is yet a fact that they have, at all cost, preserved even those Scriptures that are against their own beliefs. This very fact keeps them closely associated with the original current of thought. It is true that they resorted to Scriptures and worldly conduct both, in order to nourish their own conduct (Ācāra). Still, they atleast did not state, like the Digambaras, that they did not accept the sacred Scriptures themselves! It should also be conceded that even though they added exceptions at will in the commentaries, they definitely made all efforts to preserve and keep in fact the original readings of the Scriptures. The Śvetāmbaras never tried consciously to delete from the Scriptures, what did not suit them. Even in the original Anga-Āgamas,

changes have been made, but we cannot state that the purpose at the root of these changes is simply to justify putting on of clothes. The systematic tradition of Ācāra and Karmakāṇḍ as, found in the Jaina conventions of old, is well-preserved amongst the Śvetambaras and not with the Digambaras. This proves their dissociation from the original thought-current and also the close association of the Śvetambaras with it. The very fact that even daily routines like Sāmāyika-Pratikramaṇa are not preserved by the Digambaras shows that they have uprooted themselves from tradition.


Thus, the credit of preserving the preachings of Bhagavān Mahāvira goes to the Śvetambaras. We must still concede that their looseness in conduct gave birth to the Digambara sect. In protest against the Śvetambaras or those who were loose in conduct, this Digambara sect arose with renewed vigour and made all efforts possible to preserve the intensity of the code of conduct given by Bhagavān Mahāvira. It is therefore natural that this should lead to new awakening in the Jainas. The Śvetambaras themselves raised a fierce struggle against caityavāsa. But intensity of conduct is not natural to human temperament; it always expects inspiration. When such inspiration slackens, looseness of conduct dominates again. Even in the Digambara sect, the tradition of Bhaṭṭārakas is in no way inferior to that of Mahanthood. Actually only the Bhaṭṭārakas mostly dominated the society. This was because, even in the Digambara sect, there was always a shortage of munis observing stiff Digambara code of conduct. This very fact proves that the middle path of the Śvetambaras is practical. The Śvetambaras had to resort to restoration of conduct now and again and this resulted in more and more new gacchas and sub-sects. Such restoration is found with the Digambaras also. Thus it is proved that complete observance of absolute intensity of conduct is very difficult indeed. This also proves that the belief of the Digambaras that intensity of conduct is only theirs and that the Śvetambaras are simply loose, is far from truth.

But the singularly excellent services rendered by the Digambaras to Jainism are these that they gave a distinct place to Sanskrit in the composition of their scriptures and that they made strenuous effort to raise the value and importance of the theory of Anekāntavāda in a special manner amongst the different systems of Bhāratīya philosophy in stead of long harangues on disciplinary practices. During the initial few centuries after the christian era, discussions on moral conduct and religious discipline drew scant attention, while the philosophical and metaphysical debates and deliberations engaged the minds of the people more. The Digambara Ācaryas seized this opportunity and plunged headlong in this activity as a result of which we got many philosophical works by them which can well stand com-

parision with those of the Vedic and Buddhistic systems. This secured a rightful place for the Jain Metaphysics and Philosophy in the Bhāratiya systems.

Non-idolatrous Schools and Sects

In course of time, in both these sects—Śvetāmbara and Digambara—the worship of the idol of the Tirthāṅkara had started and so far as the laymen were concerned, it had become the main item of their religious activities. Due to the Bhakti cult as preached by the Vaiṣṇavas, worship of the idol was done with great pomp and fanfare. This had a concomitant effect on the Jaina style of idol-worship. The excess of pomposity in idol-worship reached a stage when it became a nuisance in the achievement of tranquility of mind which was the very essence of Jainism. Just at this time the impact of the Muslim religion which is hostile to idol worship, due also to the Muslim rule, grew into intensity and it did not leave the Jaina religion also uninfluenced. As an inevitable corollary to this, the new sub-sects Sthānakavāsi in the Śvetāmbara section and Tāraṇa panthi in the Digambara section arose and both of them rejected the idolworship of the Tirthāṅkara. And the last sect is the Terāpanth which came out of the Sthānakavasi sect.



5

Jainism and Buddhism

When I speak of Jaina Religion what I mean is the Jaina Religion as propounded and preached by Mahāvira. So also when I refer to Buddhism, I mean Buddhism as formulated by Buddha. It is now an acknowledged truth that Jainism is earlier than Buddhism on the basis of many solid and valid arguments. However, so far as my narration and presentation in this Chapter are concerned, they have relation to Jainism not in its earlier form but to that which was conceived and enunciated by Mahāvira. So it should not be forgotten that my discussion in this chapter is to be understood in the light of Jainism of Mahāvira's conception and of Buddhism of Buddha's conception.

Common Characteristics of the Śramaṇic Ideology

Jainism and Buddhism have their roots in the Śramaṇic Ideology which is one of the two Ideologies, namely, Brahmanic and Śramaṇic current in Bhāratavarṣa from pre-historic times. Here below are mentioned some of the broad features of Śramaṇic Ideology.

The chief characteristic of the Śramaṇic Ideology is the attitude of renunciation towards the world, meaning in other words, the rejection, and not possession, of the material prosperity. The acceptance of God or Brahma as the prime cause or creator of the world is not tenable in the frame-work of this Ideology. Advitavādins or the Absolutists hypothesize that this mundane existence is nothing but the transformation of one basic element which remains the same throughout. Denying this the Śramaṇas subscribe to the view or the theory that there are more than one elements existing in this universe. According to it, there is no one Super-soul permeating the universe, but there are infinite souls. Moreover, the Śramaṇas had firm conviction that there were two broad entities, namely, the Soul and the Non-Soul, the latter, again being sub-divided into Bhūtas which were real and disparate. They had unshakable faith in the fact that the mundane existence was real, that the Jiva assumed worldly or physical form, that is to say, the soul became embodied and it got its release from it by adopting a Śramaṇic way of life which consisted of renunciation, penance, meditation, mental equipoise etc. etc. They stood by such theories that the cause of the mundane existence was Karma which again was responsible for births and deaths and that the removal of these was called Emancipation. Those who preached Emancipation were no other than human beings—they declared

emphatically and unambiguously and also said in the same breath that the Vedas were not divine revelations. These principal theories of theirs gave rise to subordinate ones such as the outright rejection of caste-system, acceptance of begging for alms and no fixed residence. They also accepted equal right to Emancipation of man and woman—both. Sanskrit which was the language of the elite did not find favour with them. All these characteristics of the Śramṇaic Ideology were almost common to both, Jainism and Buddhism.

Besides these, the words such as Arihanta, Tirthaṅkara, Śāstā, Jina, Buddha etc. etc. are similarly found in both. The protest against yajña, and the caste is met in Buddhism also as it is in Jainism. The individual's names such as Gautama, Sidhārtha etc. etc. distinguish both of them, equally. The concepts such as the Āśrava, Saṃvara, Mokṣa, Nirvāṇa, Punarjanma (Karmic influx, stoppage of Karmic influx, Emancipation, Extinction, Rebirth, respectively), religious rites, namely, uposatha and Pauṣadha (Full Fast), daily disciplinary exercises such as Pratikramaṇa (withdrawal from sins and sinful activities), vows of Ahimsā (Non-injury) etc. rules and regulations guiding the monks etc. expiatory directions, the greatness of the religious community (Saṃgha), its ruling head, and of the religion itself—all these features are identical in both. Despite these similarities, there is a basic difference between the Metaphysics and Philosophy of both as well as the Founders and followers of both of them. This is the reason why they both are called independent religions.

Tirthaṅkara and Buddha

It is evident from the very names, that the adoration of virtues and not the personalities is important. Even though it is so, they both have got a series of Tirthaṅkaras and Buddhas. As the revered Mahāvīra is the 24th Tirthaṅkara, Gautama Buddha is the 25th Buddha. Though they both were human beings, through spiritual elevation brought about by hard austerities and penances, they achieved the status of the Non-attached and Omniscient Superhuman being who in his role of the Redeemer of the universe, rules and directs the universe and earning the appellation of the Revered (Bhagavān), is ultimately worshipped and adored as Tirthaṅkara or Buddha. Both the systems have accepted it as a postulate that the attainment of the position of the Tirthaṅkara or Buddha is not the result of one birth only but it is the consummation of the spiritual potential brought out and developed through a series of existences. Both have got a separate class of Pratyekabuddhas who are also called Mūkakevalins. They enjoy the highest bliss through self-realization. What distinguishes the Pratyekabuddha from

the Tirthaṅkar-Buddha is that the former though he strives for self-realization from the point of view of his own personal interest, has got all the merits of the Tirthaṅkara-Buddha excepting the one to do good to others which the latter only has got. In other words, the Pratyeka-buddha is no doubt a perfect being and attains salvation ; still he does not do any activity that brings about the good of others. While the Tirthaṅkar-Buddha is engaged in activities doing good to himself as well as to others also. On account of this, the Tirthaṅkara-Buddha acquires those special powers which are not there in Pratyeka-buddha but which he only has got. The reason of this is that Tirthaṅkara-Buddha in his previous births has cultivated total compassion which in his birth as Tirthaṅkara inspires him to do welfare to others. He is not satisfied with his own good but is fully happy when he confers good on others. This entitles him to the status of a supreme ruler (Śāstā), or the enlightened one (Buddha) and of the revered (Bhagavān). The religious rule which he establishes is known after his name.

Jainism being old, historical information about the Tirthaṅkaras before Mahāvira is also available. It is not difficult to prove, therefore, that some Tirthaṅkaras flourished before Mahāvira as the number twentyfour of such Tārthasikaras is merely formal and due to convenience in the case of an organized religion. But this is not so in the case of Buddhas because the Gautama Buddha himself who is recognized as the twentyfifth says that the realization which he has achieved has not been achieved by any one so far and adds that the religious truth as envisaged by him is extraordinary. This leads us to a safe conclusion that Buddhism started with Gautama Buddha. But the organizers of the Buddha religion conceived the theory of the twentyfour Buddhas, beginning from the first seven to last twentyfourth and thus bestowed on it the character of antiquity just as the others also have done.

A critical perusal of literatures belonging to both the religions makes one thing clear that both Mahāvira and Buddha have been described as mere human beings in the earlier stage, while in the later as super humans, their human nature being subordinated. One who makes a comparative study of the literatures belonging to both the systems cannot help feeling that the race was started by the respective followers of both the religions regarding who was more superhuman and who was less. Just as biographical account of Mahāvira went on being written more and more by the subsequent writers, his life assumed extraordinary form so much so that certain ordinary human activities, more especially the physical ones, found no place in their account and the superhuman nature was presented in bold relief. While Buddha simply lost the character of a human being and

this was depicted more as a living symbol of religion. He was presented as such as if he was so from time immemorial.

The story literature about both of them with particular reference to their previous births is not found in ancient literatures concerning them. But it figured in the subsequent literature, pertaining to them. As a matter of fact, in the Buddhist literature at a later stage, a regular section was found added having the name and title of the Jātaka literature confined to relating the stories of the previous births of Buddha. It is a common feature of the lives of both of them that they were born as human beings after their last life as god. That they were born in a Kṣatriya family is also common. There is a difference between the traditions of both the systems, the Jain laying down that a Tīrthaṅkara has to take birth in a Kṣatriya family while the Buddhist shows a latitude to the effect that Buddha can be born in both the Kṣatriya and Brāhman families. Though both Mahāvīra and Buddha were born in a Kṣatriya family, they both lived as real Brāhmins practising Brāhmanism in its true sense and became known as ideal Āryans.

Mahāvīra inherited Jain Religion

Mahāvīra has nowhere put forward a claim that the Jain religion which he practised and followed was founded by him. He inherited Pārśvas tradition which served him as a basis of his practices and performances. The vision of truth came to him as a legacy from Pārśva, his predecessor, and what he did was merely to realize it in his life keeping his eyes open on the then prevailing atmosphere. He went on the way shown by Pārśva and exhorted others to do the same thing. This is what constitutes his Tīrthaṅkara-hood. He satisfied himself by making changes dictated by the contemporary environments of the external form of conduct as it was found by him in Pārśva's tradition. But he was cautious enough not to claim any originality for his vision of Truth. As a matter of fact the state of affairs also is like that. Mahāvīra practices austerities also for self-realization; he took journeys to a number of places on foot to achieve this object of his but in undertaking these activities his exclusive purpose was to confirm the vision personally. The whole matter boils down to one conclusion that he found no defect, not even the least, in Pārśva's concepts of the absolute Truth and therefore he attained the highest heights putting his steps on this ladder. The history tells us that he got total success in his attempt and got emancipation.

Buddha founded Buddha Religion.

Contrary to what is said just now, Buddha found no satisfaction with what he saw in his life, what he got from others and what the others

taught him indirectly. He made many his gurus such as Ālārakālām and others but he never hesitated in abandoning them also one by one. Dissatisfaction never leaves him even after having absorbed what he learnt from each of the gurus. He marches ahead believing that what training he received at the hands of his gurus did not unfold the sight of Truth. This mode of life of Buddha explains the fact that he made gurus one by one and came to possess various spiritual experiences handed over to him by each of them. In spite of this, he never enjoyed satisfaction, contentment. In the matter of self-realization, he tried a number of exercises, both easy and difficult. Finally, he bade a good-bye to all of them and evolved his own way of spiritual realization which he endeavoured to get through them. At the top of his voice he declared after this that no one so far has ever been able to achieve what I myself have through my experiences and experiments with Truth. My way of life and my vision are original and unforeseen before. From this point of view Buddha religion as propounded by Buddha is his own. It is his own invention and not traditionally handed down to him. He is the discoverer and not the follower.

This makes it abundantly clear that Mahāvira followed the traditions which he inherited from his predecessors while Buddha created his own; that Mahāvira's religious life reflected the image of the tenets and teachings of the previous Tirthankaras, while Buddhism was originated by Buddha himself and that he created his own traditions.

Propaganda of Jaina Religion and Buddha Religion—its outward causes.

It is but natural that advantages or disadvantages are to be found in both the ancient or the newly created tradition. This applies to Jainism and equally to Buddhism also. A zeal for propaganda so far as old traditions are concerned is always found waning while the same is manifest in a more intensified manner in the case of the newly created one. Negligence is the usual feature in the case of the ancient tradition but it cannot be tolerated if it were the recently started tradition. This rule is reflected in such utterances of Buddha as this : “चरथ भिक्खवे चारिका बहुजनहिताय बहुजनसुखाय. These words of Buddha enjoin upon the monks to take up propaganda of his gospel. But in the Jaina canon no such exhortation is met with or is possible to meet with. Here, in the Jaina canon the monks are advised or even ordered to move about here and there but unlike Buddhism they are to do it with a view to working out self-realization. By sticking to one place for a long time it was feared that the monks would thereby involve themselves in love and hatred and therefore a change of place off and on was considered necessary to avoid this evil. Propaganda of religion was a secondary development, a natural sequel to the

monk's wanderings. but it was never the aim or object. But Buddha, as opposed to this, had himself issued injunctions from time to time that the Bhikkhus should go on moving about in small groups with the exclusive goal of enlightening the people about Buddhism and thereby to ensure its favourable reception by the people. This resulted in Buddhism crossing the borders and boundaries of Asia and becoming popular beyond its original habitat. This did not happen in the case of Jainism because its avowed aim and end was to hit upon and achieve self-realization and not to bother about its spread. It must be admitted that Buddhism scored a point on Jainism in this particular respect. The spread of Buddhism received a setback gradually just when the ramblings of the Bhikkhus here, there and everywhere as advocated by Buddha, came to a stop, the Bhikkhus fixed up their permanent stay in the sanctuaries (Vihāras), their character and discipline became lax and loose, the sanctuaries were easily razed to the ground by the Muslims at a time when they were all-in-all, they being the rulers to them, and finally when the Buddhist scholars or scholars of Buddhism migrated to a foreign country. Buddhism relied more on propaganda than on self-realization and therefore it could not plant its seeds deep down in the soil. The case of Jainism had a different story to tell as it had secured a firm footing from ancient times through its advocacy and emphasis on self-realization and nothing less than that. But with the passage of time it did incorporate the element of propaganda also in its programme with the ultimate inevitable result that self-realization slowly receded in the background and propaganda occupied the main plank. This indeed made it a religion of choice in India. But it could not establish its stronghold on the ground of sheer propaganda and because the force of self-realization came to occupy a subordinate position. The antagonistic religious systems employed intense propagandistic force which resulted in the partial disappearance of Jainism in India even.

The real reasons of propaganda

It is important to consider about the inclinations and beliefs underlying the surface along with the external or obvious propagandistic factors floating on the surface. In Buddha's concept of compassion lay the seeds of universal welfare which Buddhism avows to do. Buddhism assumed the shape of Mahāyāna developing from its original, initial form which was at that time known as Hinayāna. This Mahāyāna form advanced the ideal of Bodhisattva and gave more importance to the others' good than to his own. Particularly the addition of this element in the main body of formulations has made significant contribution to the universal prevalence of Buddhism. As against this even though there is full accommodation of compassion and total non-

injury in Jainism, it practically took the form of abstention from injury and as a consequence to this, all sorts of activities were rejected, the daily dealings of life were based on the entire insistence of non-injury and the value of own welfare rather than of other increased. This lessened the scope of higher form of compassion and ultimately it remained as a negative force only which did attract some but could not find welcome from all. This proved to be a factor obstructing the free and full propaganda of Jainism.

Formation of outward behaviour in Jaina and Buddhistic Religion

The signs and features of the Śramaṇic ideology being common to both the above religions, it is not difficult to suppose that rules and regulations governing outward behaviour as well as rites and rituals would also be broadly common. Despite this general position, the formation of outward modes of conduct in both Jainism and Buddhism has been moulded according to the constitution of nature and temperament of Mahāvīra and Buddha respectively and this has been responsible for the difference that exists between them in both the religious systems. In Pārśva and his tradition renunciation and austerities had a place, indeed, but severity in it was injected by Mahāvīra himself. Pārśva allowed his monks to put on clothes while Mahāvīra prescribed nudity. Precepts can claim perfection only when they are put into practice. Personal action must find external expression in order to justify itself. Mahāvīra insisted on this. It is because of this that Mahāvīra thought it proper to keep a place for nudity, rejection of bath, uncleanness etc. etc. when he made an attempt to model his formulation of external discipline on the design of internal concept of possessionlessness. To wear clothes is not necessary; but it is one's weakness. Mahāvīra argued in this manner. Though of course, in the concept and constitution of the Samgha, Mahāvīra has given adequate place to both the categories, namely, those who believed in putting on clothes and those who did not, he, however, has made his desire known that those who accepted clothes, should ultimately reject them completely in course of time. Just contrary to this, Buddha did not make clothesless condition unavoidable even though he definitely believed in achieving a condition wherein desire and attachment have no role to play. Crux of Buddha's argument consisted in his theory that clothes or no clothes; what is important is the absence of desire for them. Even if one has put on clothes, he can have no desire for them. They could have been worn just for the sake of wearing them. This seems to be the belief of Buddha. Otherwise, the fact that Buddha did permit his monks to wear clothes reaching the knees, in keeping with the popular custom in those days, cannot be accounted for. In sum, it can be stated without any fear of contradiction that Buddha specifically laid down that nothing should be done to violate the existing popular

custom and convention as echoed in यद्यपि शुद्धं लोकविहृदं नाचरणीयं नादरणीयं (one should never practise, what is not according to the people's custom, howsoever it may be unobjectionable). Not only this, but he ruled out any need for a change in the custom. Thus, he gave no quarter to nakedness, bathlessness, and uncleanness which were disapproved by the people. Mahāvīra directly linked the abandonment of body with desirelessness and therefore he accepted as natural corollaries, nakedness, bathlessness and uncleanness which the people did not welcome at all. It is here where both Mahāvīra and Buddha differed. The former believed that the intense mortification of the body was a necessary adjunct to the internal weeding out of passions, desires etc. from the mind while the latter preferred golden mean in the matter of external discipline, though he believed completely in the quelling down of the internal passions. Thus, Buddhism, on one hand, discarded the Cārvāka system which favoured extreme sensualism and on the other did not approve last-degree physical mortification also. This made it necessary for it to adopt a middle way. A little thought on the results which occurred in both the Sanghas, namely, the Jaina and the Buddha, will make it obvious that a special effort was made by the Jainas to preserve the external structure of physical conduct in the Jaina Saṅgha, while in the Buddha Saṅgh laxity of discipline and looseness of conduct became the predominant features in the name of or under the pretext of Middle Way (Madhyama Mārga). It happened like that as the middle way between the two extremes runs a long course holding out sufficient scope for the flexible behaviour to develop. On one hand, Buddha and his followers did not see any thing but physical mortification figuring predominantly in the whole code of external behaviour. The Buddhas started accusing the Jainas that they gave more importance to the physical sin than to the mental and that they are engaged in the annihilation of Karmas through physical suffering only. The Jainas on their part led a counter-attack accusing the Buddhas as comfort-loving. It must be admitted that both are partially true.

Relationship between conduct and propaganda.

When we undertake to consider about the part played, by the rigidity or flexibility of conduct, in a propaganda of a particular religion we will have to come to a conclusion that the Middle Way as formulated by Buddha contributed not a little to popularising his religion. It is a fact that Buddhism has become universal but if we pause and consider the extent to which the Buddhism and other things allied to it have become popular we will find that its popularity has been achieved at the cost of Buddhism and other matters related to it. We will be surprised to find that it is not genuine Buddhism but pseudo-Buddhism that has become popular. It is on account

of this that there is no resemblance found between Indian Buddhism and Tibetan Buddhism excepting the fact that they both consider Buddha as their symbol of worship. Not only this but when we examine how far the noblest principle of compassion as preached by Buddha has been translated into action by them, we have nothing but disappointment in store for us.

On the other hand, the spread of Jainism was slow on account of severe rigidity in its behavioural rules as well as its approach which was not pragmatic. This is the reason why it could not bring a large section of people in its fold. It is a curious phenomenon that no traces of it are found in the land of its birth and where it is found, laxity and looseness has entered in its ethics and code of conduct, though an attempt has been made to keep the outer structure intact. In amongst the Digambaras who were strict advocates of stark nakedness, insistence on nakedness instead of rejection of all desires is on an increase and in amongst the Śvetāmbaras, outward show of clothes etc. has assumed such a proportion that they have now very little to do with Mahāvira's original concept of extreme type of physical mortification. This element of severity so far as behaviour—external and internal—is concerned, has created imbalance and has also slackened propaganda. This leads us to an inevitable conclusion that severity does not pay rich dividends in matters of propaganda.

Mahāvira's and Buddha's different means of Realization and its result

On one hand it is claimed that Bhagavān Mahāvira himself has established irrefutably the connection of equipoise and omniscience with rigid physical mortification. On the other, Buddha has proclaimed that highest intelligence cannot be achieved through austere penances. Buddha practised penance for a pretty long time so much so that his body was reduced to a mere bag of bones which audibly cracked. At last he realized that the attainment of supreme intelligence is in no way and not at all dependent on hard austerities. He, therefore, abandoned the way of life based on this and adopted, instead, meditation and mental tranquility to reach the highest peak of perfection and he did reach. These two dissimilar types of experiences which these two great personalities had had, became crystalized in their Saṅghas as they were transmitted through tradition as was natural. Elaboration of the concept of physical mortification as incorporated in such phrases as "देहदुःखं महाफलं" is found there in the Jaina scriptures while in the Buddhist works it is gradually ignored. More or less intensity in the outward form of discipline, and not the difference of thinking or vision, is responsible for the birth of sects and subsects in the Jaina Saṅgha in course of time. There are no points of difference between the Śvetāmbara and Digāmbara lines of thinking—philosophical and metaphysical. The major difference consists in

the matter whether the clothes should be worn or not. This difference gave rise to another difference whether the woman has a right or not to final release. In the non-idolatrous (Sthānakavāsīs) and idolatrous (Mūrtipūjaks) divisions of the Śvetāmbaras, the principal divergence is with regard to the worship of idols and also there is some dissimilarity as regards the wearing of clothes. The intensity in the outer form of conduct was carried to such an extent in the Sthānakavāsīs and Terāpanthis that it remained in the outer form only while, as a matter of fact, the principle of non-injury in amongst the Terāpanthis was put to test on the basis of the said intensity, it turned out to be a judicious principle having no core of compassion or a principle of non-compassion which created jeers in amongst the people. Thus, we can see to what a grievous extent the sacred principle of non-injury as preached by Mahāvīra, came to be reduced. Moreover, the form of meditation which is found described in the Jaina scriptures, some two thousand and a half years before, seems to have been rejected by the Saṅgha later on. This conclusion is necessary because no clarity is found in the old presentation of the process and procedure of meditation and even later on also no explanation of the method of meditation beneficial to him who undertakes it is available. This confirms our said deduction that Jaina Saṅgha had assigned a subordinate place to meditation and this state of affairs is also seen even today. The penance, the physical mortification, the fast etc. etc. have been classified and reclassified in such a laborious manner that they all can constitute a separate treatise. Moreover, in the preceding and subsequent stages of the undertaking of the fast, so much fuss and pomp are being made that the person who has undertaken the fast remains absorbed in the mere maintenance of the fuss and pomp, forgetting the main thing which is fast. Mahāvīra had linked intense austerities and meditation together. But in course of time they both were separated with the result that the former got more importance and the latter, less.

As opposed to this, if we examine the history of the Bauddha Saṅgha we will find that the detailed description of meditation based on one's own experiences as found in ancient Piṭakas, as also the subtle analysis of the various attitudes and aptitudes of mind is nowhere to be found. Not only this, but we find also the development of meditational way of life therein. It is because of this that we come across the experienced exponents of the meditational way of life even in the midst of current atmosphere of loose conduct and discipline that has percolated the Bauddha Saṅgha in and out. In addition to this we find amongst the Bauddhas a new and independent class practising the meditational way of life. But we must also bear in mind that undue and extreme emphasis put on the meditational way of life produced a reaction in the form of easy morals which ultimately culminated in the establi-

shment of a new order of the morally degenerate and depraved known as the Tantrayāna. This paved the way of exit for the Bauddha religion from Bhāratavarṣa.

If we look at this entire phenomenon from a different angle we will meet with an altogether new feature. The attempt of Bhagavān Mahāvīra was mainly directed at scoring a victory over love and hatred and such other pairs of passions. As a result of this, omniscience followed. This made it obligatory for him not to do anything that came in this way of his. In order to achieve this, he wandered from one place to another and undertook long fasts. This made it possible for him to obtain complete victory on attachment and aversion but his over-all intelligence never went beyond the mark reached by Pārśva. In other words Mahāvīra followed metaphysical and philosophical ideologies the foundation of which was laid by Pārśva, two and a half centuries before, and realized what was latent to him by completely mastering vicious pairs of passions such as love and hatred etc. etc. It is because of this that Mahāvīra's vision of Truth does not differ from that of Pārśva. Mahāvīra's principle aim was to root out love and hatred, attachment and aversion. He never hankered after originating a new line of thinking.

Contrary to this, Buddha concentrated on the attainment of supreme intelligence. He wanted, no doubt, to strip himself of passions and all that but his main anxiety was the cultivation of intelligence to a climax. Buddha came into contact with many erudite and contemplative persons in his effort for getting supreme intelligence. Having tested the experiences which the others had shown him, Buddha gave them up one after one. He never had satisfaction with what he got from others. Finally, about the realization of the Truth which he worked out in his own way through his own method of contemplation, he put forth his claim in clear terms that what he has achieved is extraordinary and was never achieved by any one before him. Thus, Buddha's endeavour to cultivate perfect and supreme intelligence was his own and his vision also was his own. He laid down a novel track and he was, thus, a path-finder. He was not at all inspired by any one in his approach to philosophy and metaphysics. This is what he emphatically declares and repeatedly. In this manner, when Buddha threw open the doors of supreme intelligence and released it, it was but natural that the result would not remain confined to him only. Bold and obvious efforts seem to have been made by the monks also to develop intelligence to its logical and legitimate limit. This inevitably resulted in laying down the foundations of a number of ideologies depending upon the philosophical basis that developed from the subtle form to the subtlest as time passed. Thus came into existence Vijñānavāda and

Śūnyavāda which made the gradual progress and growth of intelligence to its final degree, its avowed aim and object. In spite of the fact that Middle Way was at the centre in the theory of cultivation of supreme intelligence even, the freedom which the Buddha ācāryas took on the large canvas stretching from Hīnayāna to Mahāyāna so far as the philosophical speculation is concerned is an unparalleled example of Prajñāmārga in the history of Bhārattya philosophical systems. It is equally clear that the Jaina Ācāryas never enjoyed such a license and this proves our former conclusion that the goal of the Jainism is a conquest of passions and not the cultivation of supreme intelligence as that of Buddhism.

[Prabuddha Jivan, 15-5-58, 1-6-58. Translated by Dr. A.S. Gopani]

Bhaktimarga and Jainism

A quaternary of four Infinities, namely, Infinite Knowledge, Infinite Faith, Infinite Bliss, and Infinite Power is the common characteristic of all souls. Therefore *īśvara* or *Paramātmā* is not the soul of any special type. But those souls who have fully brought out the above-mentioned four-fold potentiality are fit to be addressed as *Siddha*, *īśvara* or *Paramātmā* while those whose four-fold Potentiality still lies covered are known as apprentices or amateur souls, mundane souls or *Samsārī* souls. These latter are qualified and competent to become *Siddha*, *īśvara*, or *Paramātmā* by dint of their own efforts. Looking from this point of view, some souls are mundane while others are extramundane. This difference is natural, not causal because it is due to the amount of effort the individual soul has put forth. Generally speaking, two classes of *Siddha* and *Sādhaka* souls are eternal but particularly speaking, this is not so from the point of view of an individual. As soul belonging to the *Sādhaka* category at the present moment can become *Siddha*, the next moment. This being the cardinal principle of Jaina philosophy and metaphysics, it is but natural that it should have a separate room for the way and means of realization. To fully understand this, it is quite necessary to always keep in mind the following things. If this is done, it will be easy to know what place Piety (*Bhakti*) occupies in the Jaina code for realization.

(1) **No one is the Master** :—A being or soul is his own master. No one else can be. It means in other words that happiness or misery, bondage or emancipation is dependent on the soul itself. If it wants, it can remain in bondage or if it wants, it can also free itself in a moment even. To adopt a way leading to bondage or to freedom concerns solely itself and nothing else. Against the will of a being, no one else or nothing else can keep it in fetters or can free it. What others can do for him is to show him the way that takes him to bondage or to release. To take that course or not to take it is within his own power. From this view-point it can be stated that if any one wants to show him the favour, it can be in the form of guidance only. Nothing more than this, can it do. In sum, the soul itself can be its own friend or foe as is conveyed through this *Sūtra* “*पुरिसा ! तुममेव तुमं मित्तं*, किं बहिया मित्तमिच्छसि ?” (“Oh ! man ! thou art thy own friend ; how is it that thou seekest him

outside ?” Ācārāṅga Sūtra, 118). It is only formally that one is called a friend or a foe, because the other person can only create a situation but to submit to it or not is in his own hands. One cannot enjoy happiness or experience misery so long as he does not identify himself with a situation. Therefore, the cause of happiness or misery lies in one's own reaction or identification with the situation. And to be influenced or to be identified with a particular occasion or situation is exclusively one's own matter. Therefore, the soul itself is, really speaking, its own friend or enemy and no one else.

(2) **One himself should destroy his own Karmas :—**All beings are originally similar. Whatever dissimilarity appears, is because of the Karmas done by them severally. It is they themselves who have to strive for freedom from them. No Iśvara or Tirthaṅkara can directly uplift the being. What utmost they can do is to show the road and establish the Tirtha or order. Ācārya Amitagati expresses the same opinion in this stanza :

स्वयं कृतं कर्म यदात्मना पुरा फलं तदीयं लभते शुभाशुभम्,
परेण दत्तं यदि लभ्यते स्फुटं स्वयं कृतं कर्म निरर्थकं तदा ।
निजाजितं कर्म विहाय देहिनो न कोऽपि कस्यापि ददाति किञ्चन,
विचारयन्नेवमनन्यमानसः परो ददातीति विमुञ्च शेमुषीम् ॥

In the programme of annihilation of the Karmas, self-control occupies a pre-dominant place. If all other things help accelerate the speed of self-realization and increase the degree of self-control, they have a place in the schedule; other wise not. To train the mind for equipoise or equanimity to all beings and to desist from every activity that militates against the feeling or idea of non-injury is named self-control or self-restraint. Detachment and egolessness will gradually evolve from this and an attitude of universal brotherhood or love will result. The outlook of no love, no hatred will be strengthened and the aspirant will reach his goal of supreme achievement. This climaxes his gain.

(3) **There is no disparity amongst the liberated souls :—**When a being reaches to top, he has, then, none to worship. There remains no difference between his nature and the nature of those who have got liberation before he did. All the liberated souls become equal and remain absorbed in contemplation of the self.

(4) **The liberated do no good and no bad :—**When a being works out his final freedom, his relationship with the mundane world automatically comes to a stop. He remains a mere spectator of the world like the Puruṣa

as hypothesized in the Sāṅkhya system of philosophy. He has nothing to do for the worldly beings. On account of this, his favour or his frown are meaningless in one's having a rise or fall. If a being wants to derive any advantage from a Siddha, he can have it through contemplation of his Siddhahood in the form of uncovering his own real nature of Siddha and as a final consummation of this, he himself can become a Siddha in course of time. Thus a being who has become a Siddha can become the instrumental cause of our development, he himself remaining a neutral.

(5) **Devotion also is one of the means** :—The aim of a being is emancipation. His whole effort is directed at this. The means of Emancipation are Knowledge and Conduct in short. They are diversified into Vision or Faith, Knowledge and Conduct to which sometimes penance is also added. Faith gets strengthened by devotion. This is why it has been given a legitimate place in the programme of realization as chalked out in Jainism when it is done especially in the form of service to the elderly people or in the form of panegyrics regarding the merits and qualities of the Tīrthaṅkaras and Siddhas, contemplation and worship.

A comparison of the basic principles of the cult of devotion with the above-mentioned ones of Jainism will make it obvious that the former have no place in Jainism. Despite this, the Jaina panegyrics and laudatory stanzas are suffused with devotional fervour. Let us now take up this point.

(1) The Bhagavān is the Superlord

The fact that the revered Bhagavān is the Lord of all beings lies at the root of the fundamental principle of the cult of devotion. This worldly existence is the auspicious creation of God and therefore, he is the lord of whole world. He is the supreme ruler of all the things of this world, animate and inanimate. According to this principle, the devotee considers himself the servant of God whether he is in this world or out of it. As has been suggested before, this tenet has no place in Jainism. Though it is so, the Jainas have not remained unaffected by the cult of devotion that has spread far and wide. In spite of the fact that Jainism does not look with favour at the idea that the Tīrthaṅkaras are the creators and rulers of this world, the Jaina Ācāryas have, in the panegyrics about the Tīrthaṅkaras, referred to their extraordinary power of lordship and also to the lowly position of servant which the devotees have. Not only this, but they have also prayed to give them shelter.

Amongst the Jainas, Jinasen's Jinasahasranāmastotra and Hemacandra's Arhannāmasamuccayastotra enjoy the same position which the Viṣṇusahas-

ranāmastotra does amongst the followers of the cult of devotion. In both of them, we find, in the qualifying epithets of Arhan, the inclusion of all the qualifying epithets of Ísvara or Paramātman, current in the various sects of the cult of devotion, beginning from the Vedic times till their own times. The epithets of God are formed of the various beliefs regarding God in various religious systems. All these have no place in Jainism. However, the Jaina Ācāryas have given place to all of them without making the least change even in any of them. Therefore, we must believe that the idea or the concept of Godhood as is current in various schools of devotion or among the masses has had its impact on the Jaina Ācāryas. They, therefore, adopted the epithets of other schools or systems as they were, instead of framing them in accordance with the theory regarding the highest Reality or Supreme Lord as put forth in Jainism. The original Jaina writers and commentators of these stotras have, no doubt, tried their utmost to put their own interpretations on those epithets but while doing so, to tell the fact, the desire of adoption, and not of synthesis, has played main part. They knew that the value of new epithets, expressive of the highest ideal or the logically valid quality will not be fully appreciated by the devotees at large. This left no alternative for them but to absorb in toto such epithets as were in conformity with their own idea, concept, or theory. This is why such names as are given below are found in Jinasahasranāmas by various Jaina writers :—

लक्ष्मीभर्त्रे नमो नमः, त्रिपुरारिः, त्रिनेत्रोऽसि, त्वामंघ्रकान्तकं प्राहुः, अर्धनारीश्वरः-
शिवः, हरः, शंकरः, अनन्तचक्षुः, विश्वात्मा, विश्वलोकेशः, विश्वतश्चक्षुरक्षरः विश्वयोनिः
विश्वदृश्वा, विभुर्धाता, विश्वेशो विश्वलोचनः, विश्वव्यापी, विधिर्वेधाः, शाश्वतो विश्वतो
मुखः ॥ विश्वकर्मा जगज्ज्येष्ठो, विश्वमूर्तिजिनेश्वरः । विश्वदृक् विश्वभूतेशो, विश्वज्योतिः,
जगदीशो जगत्पतिः, दृगादिपुरुषो ब्रह्मा. पञ्चब्रह्ममयः शिवः । परः परतरः सूक्ष्मः, परमेष्ठी
सनातनः स्वयं ज्योतिरजोऽजन्मा ब्रह्मयोनिः, अच्युतोऽनन्त, परमात्मा परं ज्योतिः त्रिजगत्पर-
मेश्वरः, प्रजापतिः, स्थाणुः, हिरण्यगर्भा, सर्वात्मा, सर्वलोकेशः, विश्वतः पादो, सहस्रशीर्षः,
सहस्रत्राक्षः, स्वपात् भूतभव्यभवद्भर्ता, महेश्वरः, विश्वभृत् विश्वसृष्ट, विश्वरूपात्मा,
सुयज्वा, ऋत्विग्, यज्ञपतिर्यज्ञो, 'व्योममूर्तिः. ब्रह्मनिष्ठः. परब्रह्मात्मा. ब्रह्मसंभवः, पुराण-
पुरुषोत्तमः, स्रष्टा, पद्मेशः पद्मसंभूतिः, पद्मनाभिः, पद्मयोनिर्जगद्योनिः हृषीकेशः, त्राता,
पुण्डरीकाक्षः, वेदविद्वेद्यो, अनादिनिधनः, महाप्रभुः, महेश्वरः चतुराननः जगद्गर्भो, शंकरः,
त्रिजगत्पतिः जगन्नाथो, लक्ष्मीपतिः, लोकपतिः, त्रिपुरारिः, त्रिलोचनः, त्रिनेत्र, त्र्यम्बकः ॥

A fraction of the Vinayapāṭha, by a Jaina poet, has been given below. Therein, the ideal and concept of the cult of devotion instead of the same of devotion in Jainism have been employed :—

मैं बंदों जिन देवको कर अति निरमल भाव ।

कर्मबंधके छेदने और न कछु उपाव ॥ ६ ॥

भविजनको भवकूप तैं तुम ही काढनहार ।
 दीनदयाल अनाथपति आतम गुण भण्डार ॥ ७ ॥
 तुम पदपंकज पूजतैं विघ्न रोग हर जाय ।
 शत्रु मित्र ताकों धरै विष निरविषता थाय ॥ ८ ॥
 तुम बिन में व्याकुल भयो जैसे जल बिन मीन ।
 जन्म जरा मेरी हरो करो मोहि स्वाधीन ॥ ९ ॥

(जिनवाणीसंग्रह, पृ० ६४)

The poet, who wants to cut off his Karmic bonds, does not think of any other remedy, to achieve his aim, except that of salutations to Lord Jina, the reason being devotional fervour. He is convinced that God alone is the lord of the helpless and destitute. This belief of his is contrary to Jainism which does not accommodate any one's overlord ship. According to it, one can become at the most, a guide or Tirthaṅkara. To become free once for all is, indeed, the concept of Jainism. The reason of his anxiety for not achieving his goal of freedom should be, according to it, his own inability but not the separation from God.

(2) God's favour-the sole means of achievement

Much importance has been given to God's favour in all the sects believing in devotion only. But Jainism believes in the theory of ripe time, instead. When a being chances upon a right moment, he comes up to a point where right road begins. On account of perverted knowledge, a being goes on wandering in the world since eternity. When a right moment for taking to a right course arrives, his perverted knowledge disappears. Just as a piece of rough stone being carred since long in a current of water and being tossed about here and there, becomes round and soft after some time, a being wandering since long in the cycle of worldly existence comes across a right moment when he moves in the right direction being helped by other favourable things. But, in the cult of devotion, God's favour has taken the place of maturity of time in Jainism. In the absence of God's favour, everything else, even if it is there, is of no use in the cult of devotion. It means, in other words, one's effort does not succeed if God's divine help is not there. This element of God's favour in the non-Jain cult of devotion, has found a place in Jaina literature in its own way. As the cult of devotion went on gathering momentum all religious systems had to absorb some of its elements into their frame-work, of course, in a manner that suited to them. We come across in Jaina literature descriptions stating that the beings of hell get a momentary happiness like the other beings on the five auspicious occasions celebrating five major events of Tirthaṅkara's lives, clearly, this is

nothing but an another version of non-Jaina element of divine grace. No explanation is available of this which satisfies the theory of the Law of Karman as formulated in Jainism. Persistent request to Tirthāṅkara to shower his favour on the devotee as found in the Jaina panegyrics reveals the impact of the non-Jaina cult of devotion because according to Jainism, Tirthāṅkaras are never in the habit of showing partiality to any one.

Buddhism also lays stress on one's own effort and the Karmic law. In spite of this, Buddhism is also influenced by the non-Jaina cult of devotion so far as this element of divine grace is concerned. Lalitavistara, a Buddhist work, refers to an event that happiness and quiet prevailed in a hell, named Avici, at the time of Buddha's birth, while in Saddharmapundarika, another Buddhist work, we find a mention that Avalokiteśvara himself has gone to Avici to remove the miseries of the hellish beings. About Jesus Christ also, such statements are found.

In order to show such divine grace, mercy or favour, God often takes births, according to the cult of devotion, in various forms technically called "incarnations". But according to Jainism, a being that has become a Siddha, a liberated one, has no reason to be born again and again. Despite this main fact, the Jaina poets and mystic writers of panegyrics have prayed, under the influence of the non-Jaina cult of devotion, to Tirthāṅkaras to take birth on the earth as follows :—

“मैं तुमको इत थापतु हौं प्रभु,
भक्ति समेत हिये हरखाई ।
हे करूणाधनधारक देव,
इहें अब तिष्ठहू शीघ्रहि आई (जिनवाणी संग्रह पृ० ३३३)

“ॐ ह्रीं श्री वर्धमान जिनेन्द्र ! अत्र अवतर अवतर । संवोषट् । ॐ ह्रीं श्रीवर्धमान जिनेन्द्र ! अत्र तिष्ठ तिष्ठ । ठः ठः । ॐ ह्रीं श्री वर्धमानजिनेन्द्र ! अत्र मम सन्निहितो भव भव वषट् ।” (जिनवाणी संग्रह पृ० ३३३)

Many a Jain writers introduced in their writings such elements of the cult of devotion as the divine favour etc. and have composed prayers to Tirthāṅkaras on this pattern. According to the tenets of Jainism, the wrong done by such misdeeds as the injury to living beings (Himsā) can be nullified by expiation or penitence etc. etc. In the face of this, a Jaina poet sings as follows :—

“जो प्रमादवशि होय विराधे जीव घनेरे ।
तिनको जो अपराध भयो मेरे अघ ढेरे ।
सो सब झूठो होउ जगन्पतिके परसादे ।
जा परसाद तैं मिलै सर्व सुख दुःख न लाधे ।”

(जिनवाणी संग्रह, पृ. ५०६)

The portion which has been given below refers to the permission given to the invoked god to go and points to the fact that every thing is achieved through divine favour. On both these features, the impact of the cult of the cult of devotion is easily obvious.

ज्ञानतोऽज्ञानतो वापि शास्त्रोक्तं न कृतं मया ।
 तत्सर्वं पूर्णमेवाऽस्तु त्वत्प्रसादात् जिनेश्वर ॥
 आम्हानं नैव जानामि नैव जानामि पूजनम् ।
 विसर्जनं न जानामि क्षमस्व परमेश्वर ॥
 मंत्रहीनं क्रियाहीनं द्रव्यहीनं तथैव च ।
 तत्सर्वं क्षम्यतां देव रक्ष रक्ष जिनेश्वर ॥

[जिनवाणी संग्रह, पृ० ११०]

One has to believe that Jain poet, named Vṛndāvana, is under the influence of Vaiṣṇavite religion of Vṛndāvana, when he is describing that the miseries of the devotees are removed by the infinite power of God, acknowledging in the same breath that he is devoid of attachment etc. His eulogy which has the title of दःखहरण, has a place properly in the mouth of a Vaiṣṇava and not of a Jaina. See, here is an example of it :—

“श्रीपति जिनवर करुणायतनं दुःखहनन तुम्हारा बाना है ।
 मत मेरी बार अबार करो मोहि देहु विमल कल्याणा है ॥
 काहूको भोग मनोग करो, काहूको स्वर्ग विमाना है ।
 काहूको नाग नरेशपती काहूको ऋद्धिनिधाना है ॥
 अब मों पर कयों न कृपा करते, यह क्या अंधेर जमाना है ।
 इनसाफ करो मत देर करो, सुखवृन्द भरो भगवाना है ॥
 यद्यपि तुमको रागादि नहीं यह सत्य सर्वथा जाना है ।
 चिन्मूरति आप अनंतगुनी नित शुद्ध दशा शिव बाना है ॥
 यद्यपि भक्तनकी भीड़ हरो सुख देत जिम्हें जु सुहाना है ।
 यह शक्ति अचित तुम्हारी का क्या पावे पारस याना है ॥
 कमलाधरजी कमलाकरजी करिये कमला अमलाना है ।
 अब मेरी विथा अवलोकि रमापति रंच न बार लगाना है ॥

(जिनवाणीसंग्रह, पृ० २२७)

This matter of God's favour is not restricted to Tirthaṅkara only but it belongs, it further says, to preceptor and scriptures also. It is boldly asserted therein that the divine favour is able to procure salvation—highest position or abode—also just as :—

“प्रथम देव अरिहंत सुश्रुत सिद्धांत जू ।
गुरु निरग्रन्थ महन्त मुक्तिपुर पंथ जू ॥
तीन रतन जगमाहिं सो ये भवि द्वाइये ।
तिनकी भक्ति प्रसाद परमपद पाइये ॥”

(जिनवाणीसंग्रह, पृ० ८४)

This element of divine favour is also seen in Bhaktāmara stotra and Kalyāṇamandirastotra which are daily recited by the devout Jain layman.

(3) Disparity seen in Salvation also.

According to the non-Jaina cult of devotion, a servants' attitude persists in an emancipated stage also. There is equality between God and an emancipated devotee because both are Brahma. However, God is God and the emancipated devotee still continues to be his servant, even in emancipation. Jaina view is just the opposite. According to it all the liberated beings are equal. There is no distinction whatsoever. In spite of the postulate of Jaina Philosophy being this, some Jaina Ācāryas have expressed a fervent desire that in their every birth they be put in circumstances which inspire them to pass their lives in praying and worshipping the Tirthankaras. Really speaking, emancipation, not devotion, should have been the refrain of their prayers. It is because of this that some devout Jaina poets have sung to this length only that they may preserve the attitude of devotion until they have got absolution. One poet has clearly said “भुवनत्रयपूज्योहं जिनेन्द्र ! तव दर्शनात्” “by seeing you only, I have become the object of veneration for the whole universe” “(जिनवाणीसंग्रह, p. 22)”.

(4) God is the shelter of all beings.

God is the only help or hope or helter. This also is one of the dicta of the devotionists. This is described as Prapatti (Surrender). There are two ways of self-realization. One is that of one's own effort. This is illustrated by the example of the monkey's kid which clings to the mother and does not loosen its hold on its mother. Here the effort is solely the kit's. The other is that of the other's effort. This is illustrated by the example of the cat which catches its kitten by the mouth and does not allow it to slip from the mouth. Here the effort is that of the cat not of the kitten. The devotionists have adopted the second alternative. He seeks his shelter by total dedication. God himself liberates his devotees by His sweet will. Nothing remains to be done by a devotee who is possessed by an entire devotional fervour. God comes to his rescue and releases him. That is all.

Contrary to this, Jainas have accepted the first alternative. Jaina Ācāryas have, indeed, talked about going to the shelter of Tirthaṅkaras ; but going to the shelter does not mean that one should have such faith or devotional intensity in or towards Tirthaṅkara as binds him to the worldly cycle, because such an attitude of Mahāvīra's principal pupil, Gautama, interfered in his effort to get emancipation. When Mahāvīra left this mortal coil once for all, Gautama's eyes opened. He saw that his boundless love for his guru, Mahāvīra, came in the way of his getting final release. When he realized that he will be able to secure final freedom through his own soul, he did get it. This means, in other words, that he has to depend on his own soul and nothing else for his rise or fall. Seeking the shelter of Tirthaṅkara means that one should walk with firm conviction on the way shown to him by Tirthaṅkara and for this what is primarily required is unshakeable faith in him who has shown the path. Without this it is not possible to keep firm and steady. When an aspirant starts walking on the path, his Karmic bondage gets loosened and, thus his faith becomes stronger. When it reaches climax, the aspirant realizes his goal. He becomes purified so much so that he gets emancipation even before Tirthaṅkara who may be at that time moving here and there to preach religion.

(5) Devotion is a goal.

All the devotionists of all hues and colours have taken devotion as an aim and not as a means. The devotee does not want emancipation. He wants that his devotion reaches a climax : emancipation is a necessary result of it. The devotee gets it by way of a right at a ripe time. But what is note worthy here is that a devotee hankers after cultivation of his devotion and not after salvation.

As opposed to this, the Jainas have utilized the element of devotion as a means only, the aim and end of a being being salvation. All his attempts have been directed towards emancipation. Amongst these is included, to a certain extent, the devotion also. But ultimately, this devotion which is but another name for attachment for others has also to be given up because it is after all attachment, though it may be of a purer form. According to the principle of Jainism, emancipation is not possible without detachment. This is the reason why a certain Jaina Ācārya has said :—

तव पादौ मम हृदये मम हृदयं तवपदद्वये लीनम् ।

तिष्ठतु जिनेन्द्र तावद्यावन्निर्वाणसंप्राप्तिः ॥

(जिनवाणीसंग्रह, पृ० १०८; २६३)

Impact of the element of devotion, is, no doubt, obvious in this stanza, but the poet is not in two minds as regards the final goal. Similarly, the statements such as these, namely, “the devotee calls himself the servant of God”, “the devotee seeks the shelter of God”, “the devotee begs for God’s mercy” – are no doubt those belonging to the cult of devotion which is after all and above all, a means and not an aim. The Jaina Ācāryas have not lost sight of this main fact. See :—

“त्रिभुवनगुरो जिनेश्वर परमानन्दैककारण कुरुष्व ।
मयि किंकरेऽत्र करुणा यथा तथा जायते मुक्तिः ॥
“त्वं कारुणिकः स्वामी त्वमेव शरणं जिनेश”
(जिनवाणीसंग्रह, पृ० १०९.)

“जगदेकशरण भगवन् नोमि श्रीपद्मनन्दितगुणौघ ।
कि बहुना कुरु कृष्णामत्र जने शरणमापन्ने ॥”
(जिनवाणीसंग्रह, पृ० २२०.)

Of course, the Jaina Ācāryas, like the Vaiṣṇavite Ācāryas, have, indeed, given importance to the item of devotion. See the following examples :—

जन्म जरा मिथ्यामत मूल जन्ममरण लागे तँह फूल ।
सो कबहुँ बिन भक्तिकुठार, कटे नहीं दुःख फलदातार ॥
(जिनवाणीसंग्रह, पृ० २६२)

‘यह संसार अपार महासागर जिनस्वामी ।
ता तै तारे बड़ी भक्तिनीका जगनामी ॥’
(जिनवाणीसंग्रह, पृ० ९१)

“तुम भक्तिनवका जे चढ़ै ते भये भवदधि पार ही ।”
(जिनवाणीसंग्रह, पृ० ६४)

Some Jaina Ācāryas have prayed to be endowed with devotional fervour in order to achieve emancipation. Just as :—

“अब होउ भव भव स्वामी मेरे मैं सदा सेवक रहों ।
कर जोड़ यों वरदान मांगू मोक्ष फल जावत लहों ॥”
(जिनवाणीसंग्रह, पृ० १२२; १२५)

But, really speaking, it is the general, good character only, and not the devotion or worship, which is important, according to Jainism. Therefore, it is the good character which ought to have been sought after instead of devotion or worship. Few Jaina Ācāryas have clearly said :—

किं बहुणा भणिणं नन्नं मग्गेमि देसु चारित्तं ।

जेण भणिज्जइ सव्वे पया पविट्ठा उ हत्थियए ।”

(जैनस्तोत्र संदीह, पृ० ८१)

Tradition of describing the physical beauty of God, the importance of reciting the name of God, the erotic description of emancipation as if it were a damsel, narration of Tirthankara as an incarnation and also of his grace, inclusion of Naivedya in a variety of forms of God's worship, the statement that one can obtain emancipation by simple recitation of God's name – all these factors found in the Jaina panegyrics besides the fundamental principles of the cult of devotion mentioned before illustrate the impact that has fallen on the Jaina panegyrics.

The secret of devotion according to Jainism.

The Jaina concept of devotion and piety has been elaborated thus according to R̥ṣbhajinastotra by Ācārya Devacandra.

Ācārya Devacandra is of the opinion that the element of affection lies deeply buried in human nature. So long as the object of affection is worldly, the soul's up-lift is not possible. Therefore, he who wants to put his soul on the highest pedestal of progress, he should change his object of love. If Vitarāga becomes the object of his love, devotion has a role to play here. But the question of all questions is as regards the possibility of attachment between a being and a Vitarāga, because Vitarāga has become Siddha and therefore, pure (Suddha), while a being belongs to the world and therefore, impure. A union between Vitarāga and Jiva (Being) is not possible from the point of view of a Substance, Place, Time and Mood. By sending a message also, this cannot be achieved. One who goes to Him carrying the message becomes identified with Him so that there is no possibility of his returning to hand over the reply to the message. The other difficulty is that love or attachment is never a one-way traffic. It is a two-way business. He who wants to show attachment is called "attached" and he to whom attachment is shown is "detached". The "attached" can show his attachment in any way he likes; but what about the "detached"? Thus it is bound to be one-way. The attachment shown by people in the world is a two-way business. There are two objects, namely he who loves and he who is loved. The former is worldly and the latter, extra-mundane. The love of the former for the latter assumes, in course of time extraordinary character. There is another reason also of this extra-ordinariness. The nature of love is the main thing. One's love for the worldly things is tinged with unholiness. It enlarges the cycle of births. The love for the "detached" is such as cuts down the recurrence of births. By adopting a devotional attitude to God,

the devotee does not beg for any of the virtues or properties of God, but he wants thereby to bring out in full form those very virtues which are latent in him. Due to strangeness of this type the problem that faces Devacandraji, the author, is as regards the manner and method of forming such a love with God.

Devacandraji himself answers this question by saying that if an affection for external things is withdrawn, it becomes automatically possible to show the same degree and amount of it to Vitarāga – the “detached”. In other words, both—the devotee and the Vitarāga—become equal, the quality of detachment being common to both. Thus the devotee becomes God himself by making God, the object of his exclusive love as is confirmed in the following line :—

“प्रभुजीने अवलंबतां निजप्रभुता हो प्रगटे गुणरास”

Thus the interpretation of the love or devotion to God is only this that one should put into practice what has been preached by Tirthaṅkara. In other words, one must fully carry out all the “dos” and “dents” set down by Tirthaṅkara. This is, in brief, devotion. The word आज्ञा (Ājñā) which is used in this connection does not mean “order”. It means that particular set of rules by observing which Tirthaṅkara who was an ordinary man before has reached the status of Tirthaṅkara finally and by putting into action that very formulary the other people also attain the same position.

The spiritualist, Devacandraji, has shown by this example how an aim is attained through devotion. He has proclaimed at the top of his voice that God does not do anything special for his devotee but just as a lion amongst goats seeing another lion comes to know that he himself is a lion, similarly a devotee amongst other people comes to know that he himself is God, seeing another God in his mind whom he is worshipping. Read the following stanza :—

“अजकुलगत केसरी लहे रे निज पद सिंह निहाल ।
तिम प्रभुभक्त भवि लहे रे आतमशक्ति संभाल ॥”

If, as said earlier, God himself cannot also give anything, what explanation can there be of the request made to Him to uplift him and also to give emancipation finally ? Shri Devacandraji tries to remove this doubt also as follows.

All the deeds are produced by the doer with the help of the material that is at hand. For the result or the effect called emancipation, soul itself is the doer and Arihantas are the instrumental cause. Even if this instrumental

cause be present, emancipation cannot be obtained if the soul does not put forth effort. Soul is the principal cause and the Arihantas are formally believed to be the givers of emancipation. Really speaking, soul itself begets emancipation for itself. It makes a number of attempts and one such attempt is the devotion to Arihantas. Thus Arihantas are formally spoken of as givers but really speaking, they are not. They are merely, the instruments as there are other instruments also. The Arihantas are described as uplifters, saviours, an emancipators but it is merely formally that they are so described. A being's knowledge of the real nature of the Arihantas helps him to elevate himself on a higher plane and this procures for him final liberation. It is from this point of view that they are called the instrumental causes as also the directors, cowherds, prop, and the givers of religiosity.*

*[Translated from original Hindi into Gujarati by Shri R. D. Desai and into English by Dr. A. S. Gopani)
 "Janavāṇī", April, 1949.]

Epithets of Lord Mahavira in Early Jaina anons

There were many groups of the Śramaṇas, each of them having a leader. This fact is proved sufficiently by the Pāli *Piṭakas*. All such leaders are given the following common epithets in the Pāli canon—

“संधी चैव, गणी च, गणाचरियो च, ज्ञातो, यसस्सी तित्थकरो, साधुसम्मतो बहुजनस्स, रस्तञ्जू, चिरपब्बजितो, अद्ध्यगतो, वयोमनुप्पत्तो” दीघनिकाय, सामञ्जाफलसुत्त ।

In addition to these common epithets in Pāli canon Lord Māhāvira, the leader of the group of Nigganthis, was further given such epithets as ; निगण्ठो, आबुसो नाटपुत्तो सब्बञ्जू सब्बदस्सावी, अपरिसेसं आणदस्सनं पटिजानाति, चरतो च मे तिट्ठतो च सुत्तस्स च जागरस्स च सततं समितं आणदस्सनं पञ्चुपट्ठितं ति”

—मज्झिमनिकाय, देवदहसुत्तं.

In this paper I want to discuss the epithets of Lord Mahāvira found in some of the texts of the Jain canonical literature. As these texts are not of the same time I shall take them one by one according to their chronological order. This procedure will help us to know as to how a cluster of epithets was developed in the course of time, as to how the final one was arrived at and as to how some of the common epithets became the property of a particular group-leader. The discussion will also make it clear that the epithets given to Lord Mahāvira in the Pāli *Piṭakas* do not belong to the early period of time. Again it will prove the *Ācārāṅga* part I to be earlier than the Pāli *Piṭakas*. It will also be clear from the discussion that as time passed on some of these epithets acquired the status of names having lost their status of adjectives.

The epithets, viz. Arihanta, Arhat, Buddha, Jina, Vira, Mahāvira and Tathāgata were not the sole property of a leader of a particular sect whether Brahmin or Śramaṇa. But it seems that they became popular amongst the Śramaṇic sects especially for Mahāvira, Gosāla and Buddha with the result that they were dropped by the Brahmin sects for their leaders. Similarly, the term Buddha (139, 177, 882, 204) was used for an intelligent person but after Gautama it became the sole property of Buddhism and

became the special name of Gautama. The term Buddha, though used as an epithet in early days for Māhāvira, does not denote him in later period. The terms, Vira and Mahāvira were common for a heroic person, but we see that they have become the real names of Lord Vardhamāna ; thus in course of time the original name Vardhamāna was thrown in background giving place to the terms Vira and Mahāvira. The terms Jina and Arhta were common for all the leaders of Śramaṇas and we see that the word Jaina was not the property of the followers of Lord Mahāvira alone. It should be noted that the followers of Buddha were known for a long time as Jainas, but now the case is not so and only the followers of Mahāvira are denoted by the word. Same is the case with the term Tathāgata, and we now see that only lord Buddha is denoted by it.

In this way the denotation of these words, though broad in early days, has become limited in course of time. In this context I shall try here to collect the various epithets given to Lord Mahāvira in the earlier canonical literature of the Jainas.

Ācārāṅga, Part I : As an ascetic

The first part of the *Ācārāṅga* can be sub-divided in two sections. The chapters in the beginning giving the gist of the preaching is the first section and the last chapter, depicting the ascetic life of Lord Mahāvira, is the second section. Let us now see the epithets used in them for Lord Mahāvira.

In his mendicant life Mahāvira calls himself a 'Bhikku' (9. 2. 12). He is also called 'Nāyaputta' (9. 1. 10.) and Nāyasuya indicating his clan, but both of these terms have become his names also.

He is sometimes given an epithet 'Muni' which is generally used for an ordinary ascetic or monk.

That even the Śramaṇas were using the term 'Māhaṇa' (Brāhmaṇa) for their respected persons is well-known from the *Dhommopada* of the Pali canon as well as from the *Uttarādhyayana* of the Jaina canon. So it is but natural that Māhaṇa be used as one of the epithets of Mahāvira (9. 1. 23; 9. 2. 16; 9. 3. 14; 9. 4. 1 ; 9. 2. 10; 9. 4. 3.). He is also called Nāni (9. 1. 10) and Mehāvi (9. 1. 16) which fact indicates that he was not only a person of good character but was endowed with knowledge also. He is again and again given the epithet 'Mahāvira' (9. 1. 13 ; 9. 3. 8 ; 9. 4. 14 ; 9. 2. 1 ; 9. 3. 13) for his valour shown with regard to his ascetic life. And we see that it has become his real name. He is respectfully called Samaṇa Bhagavaṃ (9. 1. 1.) and the terms Bhagavaṃ, Bhagavante, Bhagavayā occur so often that we can easily surmise that during the period he had become a highly

venerable person amongst many such ascetics (9. 1.4, 15; 9. 2. 5, 6. 15; 9. 3. 12, 16; 9. 4. 1, 3, 5; 9. 3. 7; 9. 4. 12; 9. 1. 23; 9. 2. 6.

Though he was not omniscient (*Chaumatthe vi* 9. 4. 15) he was *akasāi*-withot any defilement and was also *vigayagehi*-without any longing (9. 4. 15).

It is clear that though he is given an epithet like Bhagavaṁ, he is not called here in this portion Tīrthaṅkara. And as regards Bhagavaṁ we should note here that even in the later portion of the canon even the ordinary Śramaṇas and Sthavīras are called Bhagavanta (II. 71, 162). In fact, there was a rule that an ascetic should address even an ordinary woman as 'Bhagavati' (II. 134). This indicates that the term 'Bhagavam' was not used for a leader or the head of a sect, and though a term for showing respect it did not had the meaning of an exalted person.

As a preacher and a head of a sect

Now we turn to the preaching portion contained in the first eight chapters of the *Ācārāṅga* part I. Here in many places the terms 'Vira' and 'Mahāvīra' are used but it should be noted that they do not refer to Lord Mahāvīra but to other persons who have shown valour in their ascetic life. (1. 172; 1. 185, 188; 1. 140). We should also note that though while describing Mahāvīra's ascetic life he is called 'Vira' as well as 'Mahāvīra', as we have seen, we must conclude that there is the tendency towards the fact that Mahāvīra should become his name. This also is clearly established by the fact that the Pali *Piṭakas* mention Mahāvīra as Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta and not as Mahāvīra. So we can conclude that Lord Mahāvīra became famous by that name after the time of Pali *Piṭaka*.

In this part Lord Mahāvīra is referred to as 'Nāyaputta' (8. 8. 12), 'Māhaṇena maimayā' (200, 206), भगवया (1, 10, 15, 16, 23, 45, 52, 58, 90, 185, 215, 214, 216, 220.). Once he is referred to as भगवया पवेइयं आसुपन्नेण जाणया, पासया (200). Here we see that he is called *Ā'suprajña* and also having नाण and दंसण. At other place he is called 'Kausala' (166). But nowhere he is referred to as Tīrthaṅkara. In *Dīghanikāya* etc. though he is given the epithet Tīrthaṅkara, it is significant that in *Ācārāṅga* part I nowhere he is referred to as such. This may signify that this portion of the *Ācārāṅga* is anterior to *Dīghanikāya*.

Lord Mahāvīra in this part is called 'Muni' (153, 159) being ranked with other such 'munis'.

Here we find the use of 'Arahanta Bhagavanta' (126) and Jina (5.5) which shows that there were many such persons who were called Arihanta or Jina and Lord Mahāvīra was one of them.

The epithet 'Arahā' was also used for the Buddha and the use of this term was not absent in the Vedic literature. But when this word was used frequently for their leaders by the Śramaṇas the word was dropped by the Vedic writers.

Like Māhāṇa the term 'Veyavi' was also in vogue in ancient days for the learned and so it is used in such sense in the *Ācārāṅga* (139). Such is also the case with the terms Aria (146, 207, 187) 'Mahesi' (160) and Medhāvī (191). The term 'Jina' though used (162) in *Ācārāṅga* part I it is surprising that it is not used with reference to Lord Mahāvīra.

Satthā (118), though used only once for Mahāvīra, is frequently used for Buddha.

To conclude, we can say that here the terms Muni, Māhāṇa, Nāyaputta, Vīra, Mahāvīra and Bhagavān were main epithets for Lord Mahāvīra. But we must bear in mind that here also the epithet Tīrthaṅkara is not used.

In Pāli *Piṭaka*, as we have seen, Lord Mahāvīra is referred to again and again by the terms Savvaññū and Savvadassi, but in *Ācārāṅga* we do not come across such terms; instead, we find the terms such as अभिज्ञायदंशणे (9, 1.11), प्रायश्चित्तखू, लोगविपसी (93), परमचक्रू (150), अइविज्ज (3. 2. 9), सव्वसमसंरागयपत्ताण (155), Anelisaṇāṇi (9. 1. 116). Some of these terms may convey the meaning of omniscience, but it is significant that the proper term Savvaṇṇu is not used. We will see that this term is frequent in later Jaina literature. So we may not be wrong if we conclude that this term is introduced in the period later than the time of the *Ācārāṅga* part I and this will show that the *Ācārāṅga* part I is earlier than the portions of Pāli-*Piṭakas* in which this term occurs.

Sūtrakṛtāṅga, Part I

In *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* part I we see further development. Here we can have the common epithets like Samaṇa and Māhāṇa, but many more are added, and some of the early epithets have become names in this part of the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*. In *Ācārāṅga* Vīra and Mahāvīra were simple epithets but in *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* they have become the names (1. 1. 1; 1. 1. 27; 14. 2. 22; 1. 9. 24; 1. 14. 11.). For the first time Mahāvīra is given an epithet of 'Niggantha' (1. 14. 11) which appears in Pāli-*Piṭakas* as Nigaṇṭha, Nāṭaputta. Nāya, Nāyaputte and Nāyasuye are also used in *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* (1. 1. 27; 2. 3. 32;

2. 3. 31 ; 6. 26. 14, 23; 6. 21, 24). Like Mahāvīra now he is 'Mahāmuṇi' (1. 9. 24 ; 2. 2. 15 ; 2. 1. 14). In *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* Kās.ve indicating his *gotra* is added (2. 2. 7 ; 2. 2. 25 ; 2. 3. 20 ; 3. 3. 2. 3. 4. 21 ; 11. 5. 32 ; 15. 21 ; 5. 12 ; 6. 7). Showing his relation to Vaiśali he is also known as Vesālie (2.3.22). The previous tradition of Jina and Arahā and Bhagavā is also continued (2. 3. 19 ; 2. 3. 22; 6. 26; 6. 29; 2. 3. 22; 16. 1; 2. 3. 14). In *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* it is quite clear that there was an order or religion known as Jīṇasā aṇa (3. 4. 9) or Jīṇāṇa Dhammaṃ (6. 7) or Bhagavānusāsāṇa (2. 3. 14); and we find the mention of Jinavayaṇa (14. 13) and Jīṇāhiya (9. 6). The terms Buddha and Tathāgata are also not absent (11. 25; 11. 36; 12. 16; 12. 18; 15. 18; 13. 2; 15. 20) but as mentioned above later on they indicated only the Buddha and not Mahāvīra. Here also as in *Ācārāṅga* the term Savvannū is absent, but we find न नायपुत्ता परमत्थि नाणी, (6. 24), Aṇantaçakkhū (6. 6. 25), Savvadaṃsī abhibhūyaṇāṇī (2. 5) daṃsaṇa-nāṇasīlo (6. 24); Aṇantaṇāṇadaṃsī (9. 24) and evaṃ se udāhu aṇuttaraṇāṇī aṇuttaradaṃsī anuttaraṇāṇadaṃsaṇadhare arahā-Nāyaputte bhagavaṃ Vesālie (2. 3. 22), Tilogaḍaṃsī (14. 16) and Jagasavvadaṃsiṇā (2. 331).

A technical term for an omniscient person is used here for the first time. —पुच्छिसहं केवलियं महेसी-५. १. १, एवं केवलियो मयं ११. ३८, केवलियं समाहि १४. १५.

The following *gāthā* is curious because there is no mention of Jhānā-varaṇa :

जमईयं पडुप्पन्नं आगमिस्सं च नायओ । सव्वं मन्नइ तं ताई दंसणावरणंतए । १५.१

The following traditional terms are also present in *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* :— Niggaṇṭha (9. 24); Māhaṇa (11. 1; 9. 1), Mahesi (6. 26), परममहेसी (6. 17); Muṇi (6. 7 , पभू (6. 28) समणं (6. 14, 23). But it should be noted that the term तित्थयर is not used.

Ācārāṅga, Part II

In the second part of *Ācārāṅga* the life of Mahāvīra as a householder is given (II. 175). It should be noted that nothing of the kind is found in the *Ācārāṅga* part I and also in *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*. Here he is depicted as Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra (2. 75). The original name Kumāra Vardhamāṇa given by his parents is mentioned (2. 176).

The tradition that the epithet 'Mahāvīra' was given by the gods seems to have been established here for the first time (II. 1. 177). Here the whole varṇaka for Mahāvīra is thus : *Samāṇe Bhagavaṃ Mahāvīre Nāe Nayaputte Nāyakulaniuvatte Videhadinne Videhajacce Videhasumāle* (2. 179). Here we can see the tendency of depicting him with the epithets derived from

his parental names. We are sure that his mother was called Videhadinnā (2. 177). The epithets which were well established such as Jiṇa (2. 179), Jiṇavara, Vjira (2. 179) etc. are also found here. But here for the first time element of mythology enters into the field in the form that the gods performed the Titthayarābhisea (2. 176) and also that he was requested by the gods that : *titthaṃ pavattehi* (2. 179), which can be compared with such a request to the Buddha by the Brahmā. For the first time he is called here Titthayara (2. 179), and also Savvannū, the epithet by which he is known in Pāli *Piṭaka* as *Bhagavaṃ Arahaṃ Jiṇe Kevalī Savvannū Savvabhāvadarisī* (2. 179). And here we find 'Kevalipannatta dhamma' (2. 179) and again and again 'Kevali būyā' (2. 13, 17, 26, 36, 48, 115, 116, 14, 152, 179), which shows that due to his being an omniscient person his preachings were to be accepted.

Sūtrakṛtāṅga, Part II

On the authority of the Niryukti (6) on Ācā, we are sure that the second part of Ācārāṅga was added in later times. But such is not the case with the second part of Sūtrakṛtāṅga. Yet we can say that the second part of Sū. is later, because even the epithets for Mahāvira establish this fact. We can prove that it is not earlier than even the second part of Ācā. There is no mention of 'twelve aṅgas' in the Ācā. but the Sū. mentions the *Ganipiṭaka* (2. 1. 11). In Sū we find the mention of Dhammatittha (2. 1. 1) and Titthayara (2. 7. 11). The mention of *Coyae pannavagam evaṃ vayasī* (2, 3. 2) and 'Ācārya āha' (2. 4. 2, 4) definitely goes to prove its later date. The traditional epithets such as Samaṇa (2. 6. 1) Māhaṇa (2. 6. 4), Samaṇe Nāyaputte (2. 6, 19), and Nāyaputta (2. 6. 40) are found. And we also find the Buddha (2. 6. 42) Muni (2. 6. 4) etc. which are of the same type. Here even the pupil of Mahāvira, is called Bhagavaṃ (2. 7. 4.) The knowledge of the Lord is called *Kevalena puṇṇeṇa ṇāṇeṇa* (2. 6. 50). The teaching of Lord Mahāvira is described as Niggantha Dhamma (2. 6. 42) and Nigganthapavayaṇa (2. 2. 23; 2. 7. 2.) the epithet which is found in Pali *Piṭaka* also. Here for the first time we have the mention of three Jewels viz. Jñāna, Darśana and Cāritra (2. 7. 14). We are further told that the followers of Pārśva were known as Nigganthas and they were specified as 'pāsāvaccijjia' (2. 7. 4.)

In other Aṅgas and non-Aṅgas

In the Aṅgas which are later than Ācārāṅga and Sūtrakṛtāṅga generally we find Samaṇe Bhagavaṃ Mahāvire. But we must take note of a Varnaka which was well established during canonical period-समणे भगवं महावीरे¹

1. In *Mahāvvyutputti* one of the name of the Buddha is Vira.

आइगरे तित्थयरे सहसंबुद्धे पुरिसुत्तमे² पुरिससीहे पुरिसवरपुण्डरीए पुरिसवरगन्धहत्थीह³
 लोगुत्तमे लोगनाहे लोगोप्पदीवे लोगपज्जोयकरे अमयदए खक्खुदए मगदए सरणदए⁴ धम्मदेसए
 धम्मसारहा धम्मवरचाउरस्तचक्कवटी अप्पडिह्यवरनाणदंसणधरे विलट्टुत्ताउमे जिणे जवए बुद्धे
 बोहए मुत्ते मोयए सव्वणू सव्वदरिसी । भगवती सू० ५

Here we may remember the importance of Puruṣa since the *R̥gveda*. In various names of Viṣṇu we find Puruṣottama, Puruṣapūṇḍarīka and Puruṣavara. Gandhahasti is an epithet of the powerful elephant and Gandhagaja is found in *Caraka*. Lokanātha is also used for Viṣṇu etc. Lokapradīpa is used for the Buddha in *Buddhacarita* of Aśvaghoṣa.

With this Varṇaka we may compare the well-known Varṇaka of the Buddha which is explained in *Visuddhimagga* (p. 133)—सो भगवा अरहं
 सम्मासंबुद्धे विज्जाचरणसंपन्नो सुगतो लोकविदू अनुत्तरो पुरिसदम्मसारथी सत्था देवमनुस्सानं
 बुद्धो भगवा'—अंगुत्तर ३. २८५

2. In the *Mahāo* Buddha is called Narottama and Sakyasimha.
3. Bodhisattva is called—Gandhahasti—*Mahāo* 740.
4. In *Mahāo Saranya* and *Sarana*.

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A Note on Lord Mahāvīra's Clan

In Pāli text *Nigaṇṭha Nāthaputta* (or *Nātaputta*) and in Sanskrit Buddhist texts *Nirgrantha (Nigrantha) Jñātiuptra (Jnātaputra)* is used for Lord Mahāvīra (see Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary). In jaināgama texts also we have *Nāyaputta, Nāyasuya, Nāyaputta, Mahāvīra* etc. According to the comm. of Saṃyuttanikāya '*Nāta*' was the name of his father but Malalasekra says that *Nāta* is the name of the clan, and most of the Jaina texts and commentators are unanimous in saying that *Nāta* is the clan of the *Kṣatriyas*.

Recently Muni Nathmalji has opined that the Prakrit word *Nāya* or *Nāta* should be sanskritized as *Nāga*.¹ He may be correct to a certain extent as far as Prakrit word is concerned but when we see the word *Nāta* or *Nātha* used in pāli, there remains no possibility of sanskritizing it as *Nāga*. Still we can keep this question of sanskritizing the word *Nāya* open and find out some solution.

In *Ācārāṅga II* we find '*Nāyāṇam khattiyāṇam* (116) which shows that *Nāya*, were *Kṣatriyas*. This is corroborated by Kalpasūtra (20) also.

But in *Ācārāṅga I* which is the earliest text of the Jaina Canon Lord Mahāvīra is called '*Māhaṇa*' not once but four times at the end of all the four sub-section of the ch. IX wherein ascetic practices of the Lord are described—'एस विही अणुक्कन्तो माहणेण मईमया ।'

This statement may be right if we see the story in Bhagavatisūtra (9. 33. 380) where the Lord says—देवाणंदा माहणी मम अम्मगा । अहन्तं देवाणदाए माहणीए अत्तए ।'

Will it not be proper if we say that only after the introduction of the story of interchange of embryo the Lord was known as *Kṣatriya*? It can be assumed also that in order to validate the change of embryo this story in Bhagavatī is inserted but that possibility is not there because in that case the question of relation of *Triśalā* should arise which is not there.

Here we may mention the other possibility also. The Buddha and the Mahāvīra—both of them have propagated that only the right type of a

Bhikṣu can be called a *Brāhmin* or *Māhaṇa*. In this sense the Lord may have been called a *Māhaṇa*.

Now let us use what information we get from the Jalna literature about the clan of the Lord and the *Nāya kula*. It is certain that amongst the Vedic this *Nāya kula* was not well known. Hence we find its mention very rare in the Vedic Purāṇas.²

and it is surprising to note that even in Jaina literature the *Nāyavaṃśa* is given the prominent place in later times. An attempt is made to relate it with the famous *Ikṣvākuvaṃśa* or to separate it from the same. This shows that the authors were not certain about the real position of the clan *Nāya*.

There are two clear tradition regarding the prominent *Vaṃśas*. One is represented by Jaina Canonical literature and its *Niryukti* etc. and other is of the Jaina Purāṇas. This will be clear from the following table :

Āvaśyaka Niryukti. (193)	Ugga	Bhoga	Rāṇṇa	Kharīya	← These constituted the retinue of Ṛsabha.				
					Ikḥga	Nāya,	Korava	Harivaṃśa.	
<i>Viśeṣāvaśyaka</i> . (1610, 1829) ,,	,,	,,	x	,,	Ikḥga	Nāya,	Korava	Harivaṃśa.	
<i>Bhagavati</i> . (20.8)	,,	,,	,,	x	,,	,,	,,	x	<i>Bhaḍa</i>
(9. 33) ³	,,	,,	,,	,,	,,	,,	,,	x	
<i>Sihānāṅga</i> . (497)	,,	,,	,,	x	,,	,,	,,	x	
<i>Prajñāpanā</i> (104)	,,	,,	,,	x	,,	,,	,,	x	
<i>Kalpasūtra</i> (17)	,,	,,	,,	,,	,,	x	x	,,	
<i>Bṛhatkalpa</i> ⁴ (3265)	,,	,,	,,	,,	,,	,,	,,	x	
<i>Paumacariya</i> ⁵	Ikḥhāga	Soma	Vijāhara	Vanara	Rakkhasa	Harivaṃśa			

In the *Āvaśyakaniryukti* it is said that *Ikḥhāga* *Vaṃśa* began with *Ṛsabha* (181).⁶ So after *Niryukti* we find it mentioned as an important *Vaṃśa* in Jaina literature but question is—if it is a separate *Vaṃśa*, what is the relation between it and the *Nāyakula*? The authors are not unanimous about the answer. In *Bhagavati* etc. and even in *Viśeṣāvaśyaka*, as we have seen, two are separately mentioned. But *Umāswāti* and other commentators like *Abhayadeva* (ज्ञाता० 153) are of the opinion that *Nāya* is a branch of the

Ikkhāga : Umāsvāti says⁷ :-यज्ञे ज्ञातेश्वाकुषु सिद्धार्थनरेन्द्रकुलदीपः । तत्त्वार्थ-कारिका-११
The comm. on this is—‘ज्ञाता नाम क्षत्रियविशेषाः तेषामपि विशेषसंज्ञा इश्वाकवः’ It should be noted here that even तिलोयपण्णत्ति (4.550) mentions *Nāha Varṁsa* quite different from *Ikkhāgakula*. It speaks of these Varṁsas : Kuru, Nāha, Uggā Yādava and *Ikkhāku*. Āvaśyakacūrṇi explains the Nāta as—‘जाताः नाम जे उसभसामिस्स सयणिज्जया ते जातवंसा’—p. 245. Here we can see an attempt to relate the *Nāya kula* with Rṣabha.

It will be interesting to note the meaning given to *Ugga* etc. by the Āvaśyakaniryukti—*Uggas* were *ārakkhi*-guards, *Bhogas guru*-preceptors, *Rāiṇṇas* were *Vayaṁsa*-friends and the rest were *Khattiyas* (193). So the Āva. cū. follows the Āva. N. when it includes relatives of Rṣabha in the *Nāyas*.

Commentator Abhayadeva also follows him when he says जाताः इश्वाकुवंशविशेषभूताः (Comm. on *Nāyādhammakahā*, p. 153.). Jinasena does not mention *Nāya* or *Jñāta* but mentions *Siddhārtha*, the father of Lord *Mahāvīra* as belonging to the *Ikṣvākus*—(*Harivaṁśapurāṇa*, 2. 4. 13), so also is done by the author of *Cauppanamahāpurisacariya* (p. 271).

Observation of the above given table shows that *Harivaṁsa* was included in the list of the prominent *Varṁsas* for the first time by *Kalpsūtra* and it is quite clear that after the inclusion of *Kṛṣṇa* story in the *Jaina Canonical literature* it was necessary to include the *Harivaṁsa* in the list. The *Jaina purāṇas* have it from the beginning.

One more striking fact is to be noted that the *Riṇṇa* and the *Khattiyas* are removed from the list and the other ones are included. This also is a deliberate attempt to follow the Vedic North Indian tradition instead of the tradition which was followed by the people of the Bihar-East India, as such practice is not seen in the older *Jaina text* where we find—

“जे माहणे खत्तिय जायए वा तहुग्गपुत्ते तह लेच्छई वा ।

जे पव्वईए परदत्तभोई गोत्ते न जे यव्वइ माणबद्धे ॥

Sūyagaḍa, 1, 13. 10

Here we see that the *māhaṇa* and *Khattiya* are separately mentioned differentiating them from *Ugga* and *Lecchat*. Same tradition is followed by *Āva. Ni.* having a minor change, but not giving the place of reputation to the Vedic Puranic *Varṁsas*.

References

1. Anusandhāna Patrikā 1. 1.
2. प्राचीनचरित्रकोष (हिन्दी) पृ० 236.
3. Uvavāia also has this list, see Bhagavati 9.33. 382.
4. In the concerned gāthā number six is given so the comm, counts Nāya and Koravva as one.
5. Dr. Chandra : A Critical study of Paumacariyam, pp. 199, 226.
6. See also Vasudevahindī, p. 161 Cauppanamahāpurīśacariya, p. 37 and Āva. Cū, p. 152. But according to Paumacariya Ṛṣabha etc. are of Ikkhāgakula originated with the son of Bharata (5. 9).
7. Can the word 'ज्ञात' be taken to mean famous ?

Some of the Common Features in the Life-stories of the Buddha & Mahāvira

In this short paper I would like to draw the attention of the scholars to some striking common features found in the life-stories of the Buddha and Mahāvira.

(1) *The Story of bearing the Seed :*

Both these personalities became perfect in their final birth having undergone spiritual discipline in their previous births. They were not perfect in actuality from the time immemorial as is the case with God in some other systems. So, it is but natural that the life-stories of these two great personalities should be told from that particular previous birth that marks, in their journey to the Final Goal, a turning-point when they bore a seed that is to develop at last as Buddhahood and Tīrthānkarahood and to make them Buddha and Tīrthānkara, Founder of the Path of Liberation.

If we compare the stories we find that Bodhisattva Sumedha prepares the way for the Dīpaṅkara Buddha by putting himself into the mud, so that Dīpaṅkara may not have any trouble in passing through the mudpath. And by this benevolent action Sumedha sows the seed in him to become Buddha in future life.

Similar incidence is found in the story of Mahāvira. The head of a village (grāmacintaka), whose name is not given in the Āvaśyakacūrṇi but who is named as Nayasāra in later literature, shows the way to the monks who had lost their way in woods and who were hungry for many days. He also provides them with food and other necessary things. By this benevolent action Nayasāra bears the seed that is to develop and make him Tīrthānkara Mahāvira.

Both these stories contain a common feature, viz., the showing or preparing of the path. And this is very significant because both these persons were to found the Path of Liberation. Moreover, we find the feeling of

Compassion prominent in both the stories. This suggests the fully developed compassion in both of them.

(2) *Proclamation :*

Dīpaṅkara, the first Buddha proclaims that Sumedha is to become the Buddha. It is interesting to note that a similar element is present even in the story of Mahāvīra. Rṣabha, the first Tīrthaṅkara proclaims that Mārīci who was Nayasāra in his previous birth is to become the last Tīrthaṅkara Mahāvīra. It should be remembered that Gotama the Buddha is also the last Buddha of this age.

(3) *Kapila :*

The above mentioned Marīci was the grandson of Rṣabha and son of Bharata. It is said that he had a pupil named Kapila. And we find in the Buddha story also a person named Kapila after whose name the City of Kapilavatthu was established. This Kapila represents the previous birth of the Buddha. When we go into the details of the stories we find that both these Kapilas were born in the same age, when it was customary to marry one's own sister. And here we can safely say that the writers of both the stories had in their mind the sage Kapila, the Sāṅkhya leader of the hoary past. Further it should be noted that the Jaina story knowingly or unknowingly suggests that the Buddha in his previous birth as Kapila was the pupil of Marīci who was Mahāvīra himself in his previous birth.

(4) *Adoration by Gods :*

In both the stories the god's adoration of both these great personalities on all the auspicious occasions is described at length. Some of these occasions are the birth, the bathing, the renunciation, the austerities, the enlightenment, the liberation, etc. Here we should note that those story-tellers consider these two great men to be superior to gods and that is why they describe these great personalities as adored by gods when the occasion arose. By doing so they want the people to note that these persons were really worthy of adoration and that they were not like ordinary gods, who themselves have to worship them two.

Dreams :

In both the stories there are many places where the dreams are described and interpreted. In the life-story of the Buddha, it is narrated that the mother of the Buddha at the time of conception finds in dream an elephant entering into her womb. In the life-history of Mahāvīra it is narrated that the mother of Mahāvīra sees an elephant in one of her fourteen dreams at the time of conception.

(6) *Birth :*

It is reported that the Buddha was in full consciousness during his transfer from the divine life to the human life. Similar is the case with Mahāvīra.

Authors of both the stories are of the opinion that the Buddha and the Tīrthaṅkara should be born in some respected royal family. The Buddha while in heaven found out for himself the family of Kṣatriyas worthy of his birth. Though it is said that in the opinion of the Buddha both the Brahmin and the Kṣatriya families were worthy of the birth of a Buddha, the Buddha was not satisfied with any of the Brahmin families, which existed at that time, and hence he himself chose the Kṣatriya family for his birth.

As regards Mahāvīra it is said by the Śvetāmbara writers that first he was conceived by a Brahmin lady named Devānandā but Indra thought that birth of a Tīrthaṅkara should not take place in a Brāhmin family as the Brahmin caste was considered to be lower than the Kṣatriya caste. So Indra got the embryo removed from the Brāhmin lady and got it put in a Kṣatriya lady named Triṣalā.

We can conclude from both the stories that there was a conflict between the Brahmins and the Kṣatriyas and the writers favoured the Kṣatriyas and their favour towards Kṣatriyas is reflected in these stories. Here we should remember that these two great men denounced the Vedas. And the Brahmins were the custodians of the Vedas. So, it was but natural for them to denounce the Brahmins. However, it should be borne in mind that this antagonism was not deep-rooted, and we find that all the chief disciples of the Mahāvīra were Brahmins, and they are described as coming from respectable families.

(7) *Name :*

Not all the stories agree about the name of the Buddha. Some have it as Siddhārtha while the others have Sarvārthasiddha. But one thing is certain that on account of the Buddha's birth the family of Śuddhodana became prosperous in every respect, and so the name Siddhārtha or Sarvārthasiddha was given to the Buddha.

Similar is the case with Mahāvīra. On account of his birth the Kṣatriya Siddhārtha's property increased tremendously. So the name Vardhamāna was given to him. Here we should note the similarity between the name of the Buddha and that of the father of Mahāvīra. Both are called Siddhārtha.

(8) *Schooling :*

Writers of both the stories are of the opinion that for both of them there was no need of going to school. They have written that their teachers were astonished to find in them the type of knowledge which the teachers

themselves did not possess. It is reported that it is only for the sake of custom that they attended the school.

(9) *Marriage :*

Not all accounts agree as regards the marriage of the Buddha and the name of his wife. It is curious to note that even the Jaina writers differ as regards the marriage of Mahāvīra. The wife of the Buddha is named as Bhaddakaccā, Yaśodharā, Subhaddakā, Rāhulamātā, Yośovati, Bimbā and Gopā. Mahāvīra's wife is named Yaśodā. This name is some what similar to the name Yaśodharā. Moreover, it is curious to find that the Mahāvīra's dauhitrī (daughter's daughter) is named as Jasavaī. This name is very similar to the name of the Buddha's wife, Yaśovati.

(10) *Exhortation by gods :*

It is mentioned that when the gods of the Lokāntika Brahmaloḥa knew that Māhāvīra has decided to renounce the world, they came before him according to their custom. And after prayer they exhorted him to preach the path which would be beneficial to all the creatures.

In the story of the Buddha also this exhortation is accepted as customary and the gods themselves take the forms of an old man, etc, in order to rouse him. Here we should note that when the Buddha was enlightened and was hesitating to preach the path the gods came before him and requested him to preach the law and not to have any hesitation in doing so.

(11) *Māravijaya :*

Both the great men have passed through severe austerities in order to be enlightened. And we find the chapter on Māravijaya in the story of the Buddha. The story of the conquest of Saṅgama god in the life of Mahāvīra is similar to that of the Buddha's Māravijaya. Both these legends contain similar elements. The Buddha and Mahāvīra were not deprived of their inner peace and calmness even when Māra and Saṅgama inflicted tortures upon them and at last they conquered the evil, represented by Māra and Saṅgama.

Concluding remarks :

These and many other such common features should be noted and studied in detail in order to find out the kernel of their life-story which is overlaid with very many extra elements in the course of long period of time. This type of study enables us to recognise the interplay of the influence of one story on the other as they are found as present.

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Śramaṇa Samskr̥ti And God

The distinguishing characteristic of the Śramaṇic civilization is that it has not accommodated the deified elements of Nature, the heavenly gods, or the eternally free God as the doer or the agent or the creator. On the contrary, it avers that an ordinary man can progress to such an extent that he can become an object of worship or veneration not for common people but for gods even. It is because of this only that the gods such as Indra and others appear in Śramaṇic civilization as worshippers only and not as worshipped. In Bhāratvarṣa, people like Rāma and Kṛṣṇa became the objects of worship in Brāhmaṇic civilization and the Brāhmaṇas did not merely stop at taking them as pure human beings. They went further and bestowed divine character on them. They were treated as Gods, meaning thereby that they were considered as incarnations of God. As opposed to this, the Śramaṇic civilization recognised Mahāvīra as a fully integrated human being. He was never given, in the Śramaṇic civilization, a form of eternally enlightened or eternally emancipated supreme being. There is in the Śramaṇic civilization no place to God who is a supreme creator.

Negation of the Theory of Incarnation

When we find that an ordinary man can take re-birth according to his merits and deeds, there is no scope for the principle of God's incarnation just as it is conveyed through the following stanza :

यदा यदा हि धर्मस्य, ग्लानिर्भवति भारत ।

अभ्युत्थानमधर्मस्य तदाऽऽत्मानं सृजाम्यहम् ॥

The world has never assumed and also shall never assume the nature of heaven. This indicates that it will always need the presence of world-saviour for all time. There is every opportunity in this world and always for reformers and revolutionaries. The contemporaries are never able to appreciate their worth and capacity as the future generation. Let alone this, but they are not sufficiently eager to understand them even. These reformers and revolutionaries have to face in their life-time many an adversary. Every

great man has to fight relentlessly against contemporary bad customs and conventions, has to wage a war against many anti-social precedents and elements, has to start a revolution and to be a path-finder of a new order. His name remains on the lips of the people so long and so much as he has worked for bringing about a reformation.

It is a principal belief in the Śrāmaṇic Ideology that he, who achieves perfection in spiritual art by undertaking renunciation and practising hard penance, becomes a fully integrated being in course of time. The revered Mahāvīra did not find satisfaction in his own aggrandizement only but he applied himself to the works of social and national uplift and welfare. In order to achieve this aim of his, he himself and his pupils too undertook wanderings in every direction, gave the massage of freedom to the people and thus liberated them from the external and internal bondages.

Situation

It is necessary to briefly refer to the situation through which Mahāvīra had to pass. The Brāhmins had tightened their grip on religion and its practices so much so that a direct relationship between man and gods became impossible without the good will and blessings of the priests. There was no objection so long as the priest interfered as a mere helper; but he made his position as an arbiter secure in every religious performance if only for guarding his own interest. On one hand, the Brāhmin priests had injected the element of complexity in all the religious rituals to such an extent that it was impossible to do away with him altogether, on the other hand, in order to fulfil their own selfish purpose, they had made the rituals so costly as to ensure a very good income. Moreover, these rituals and religious ceremonies could not be performed without the supervision, direction and control of the Brāhmanic priests. This phenomenon generated very great caste arrogance. The ideal of equality of all human beings and the essential unity between all of them became the first casualty. The Brāhmins became possessed of the self-created standard of high and low so much so that the Pariahs (Śūdras) which formed one of the four castes were deprived of all the religious advantages.

The so-called superior caste took away the freedom of women so that their own white colour may not suffer in recognition and value. The woman in those days had no freedom of her own. In the field of religion she was accorded as if by way of favour the position of an associate only.

Individual interests did not leave the political field also unaffected. The republics were derecognized and their place was taken by the monarchical

system. This experiment created and perpetuated the atmosphere of suspicion all around.

Revolution in the domain of Religion

The relevance of religion and its practices consisted in those days in the belief that they could procure more happiness and of a higher quality than what was available, in this world and hereafter.

Among the means of religion, sacrifice was the main. In the sacrifices, excessive injury to living beings (*Himsā*) was perpetrated along with recitation of the Vedic sacred formulae. It was natural that the vernaculars such as *Prākṛit* etc. were looked down with contempt as the Vedic mantras were composed in Sanskrit. The sages were the poets who composed the mystical formulae in a poetical form. Nature which provided the means of happiness has been eulogized therein. The sages have sung in praises of various gods and deities and also have given vent to feelings of hope and despairs. These mantras by the sages have provided the basis of sacrifice. On account of this, there is no accommodation given to such things as the emancipation, *Nirvāṇa*, extreme bliss, or to the theory of cutting short the cycle of births etc. Endeavour to achieve *Dharma*, *Artha* (wealth) and *Kāma* (Passion) formed the centre of all the religious activities.

Regular opposition to all the things mentioned before had started before the advent of *Mahāvīra* even. We get glimpses of this in *Āraṇyakas* and earlier *Upaniṣads*. But the revolution which *Mahāvīra* made and the success he got are extraordinary, to say the least. It is because of this that his name dances on the tip of the tongues of millions and crores of people.

Short biographical Sketch

Mahāvīra was born in *Kṣatriya kuṇḍapura*—the present day *Basāḍa*, a few miles away from *Patna*. The name of his father was *Siddhārtha* and that of his mother, *Triśalā*. His father belonged to the *kṣatriya* clan called *Jñātr*. He must have been an influential man in his days as his wife *Triśalā* happened to be the sister of *Ceṭaka*, the lord of *Vaiśālī*. Because of this relationship of his, he had also the close relationship with the kings of *Magadha*, *Vatsa* and *Avantī* as all the daughters of *Ceṭaka* were give in marriage to those kings. One daughter of *Ceṭaka* was married to *Nandivardhan* also, the elder brother of *Mahāvīra*. It is just possible that on account of these various relationships *Mahāvīra* got some special convenience and success in the propagation of religion.

The original name given to *Mahāvīra* by his parents was *Vardhamāna*. This was because his birth was known to be the cause of all-round prosperity

of his father. But being urged by the futility of this very prosperity, Mahāvīra accepted the hard path of renunciation and austere life. This life of great self-control, asceticism, and austerity earned for him the epithet of Mahāvīra. Later on he became known as Mahāvīra only as the people forgot his earlier name that was Vardhamāna.

He attached importance to abstinence only and not to sensuous enjoyments and to so called peace and progress earned through wealth. Ultimately, he became an ascetic, leaving aside everything when he was barely a young man of thirty. The fact that he remained for thirty years as a householder had its origin in his respectful attitude towards the desire of his parents and his elder brother. Even though he was in the world, he was out of it as he was never absorbed in the thoughts of enjoyment of worldly objects and pleasures. In the final years of his life as a householder, he gave away everything he had to the deprived and destitute. He left the world keeping nothing—not even a pie—with himself.

The Secret of his Austerities

The revered Pārśvanātha had shown the easy way of self-purification of which non-injury, truthfulness, non-stealing and possessionlessness were the constituents, opposing the contemporary practices of senseless mortification and physical torture. He preached soul-lifting technique consisting of meditation, contemplation, trance, fast etc. etc. in place of senseless methods such as those of hanging from the tree, heating the body by five types of fire, sleeping on pointed iron spikes etc. etc. Vardhamāna Kumāra also had obtained omniscience through noble means and intense as well as continuous effort without any remissness, having first purified himself.

Bhagavan Buddha underrated penance, as it was according to him, a physical torture and therefore considered it as unhelpful in self-purification. He himself practised hard austerities for a very long time but could not succeed in obtaining enlightenment. The reason of this is not that one cannot get illumination through penance or that penance is not a bonafide remedy but that there should be some limit to it and it is this that it can be practised so long as quiet can be preserved and mental peace is not disturbed. Unlimited penance fails as it interferes with mental equipoise.

Without keeping an eye on his own power, Bhagwan Buddha practised penance to the extent that his mental balance was disturbed. It is no surprise if, therefore, he considered penance and austerities as somewhat useless. Contrary to this, Bhagavān Mahāvīra gave due and equal weightage to his own potentiality and to penance also. He did not undertake practices of penance beyond his own ability and capacity. This is the reason why Mahāvīra could get omniscience through those very

practices of penance which Buddha had ruled out from his programme. Even though the matter stands thus, Buddha did give place to certain disciplines and performances and practices.

Self Control

The secret of the efficacy of Mahāvīra's penances and austerities lies in his advocacy of self-restraint. It was his vow not to inflict injury, howsoever small, to maintain friendship and amity with all and to suffer silently all the obstacles and odds that beset his path with complete equanimity. He earned the epithet of Mahāvīra because he, like a brave, bold man, carried out his vow fully.

It is important to limit one's own activities in order to ensure complete self-control, because man, however he may wish, can never put forth such effort as will bring about benefit to all. He can, with very great difficulty, make some people around him happy at the most. How can he take, then, the responsibility to make all people happy? But this does not mean that he should not do anything in that direction. A person having at his heart a feeling of love, affection and friendship for all people in the world must try to enlarge it every time. He should reduce his physical activities and needs to such an extent that others may not be put to trouble at all. He should have those dealings only and should do those activities only which are absolutely necessary. His own unavoidable activities also should be done with complete carefulness. This is what is called self-control and that constitutes a way to renunciation.

Mahāvīra's Realization

With great awareness, Bhagavān Mahāvīra took to this road to realization. The oldest portion of Ācārāṅga called the first Śrutaskandha contains the description of the tremendous effort made by him to purify his soul, to fully invest it with knowledge, bliss and power and also to remove obstacles crippling the effort. Its perusal gives a clear insight into the herculean task which he had undertaken upon himself to achieve realization. In the description there is no mention of any divine or magical occurrence or of any such things as unbelievable or partly untrue or improbable. The description seems to be concerning with the life of an ordinary human being. We find there a biographical account of a man of self-control who is also full of vigilance and is unyielding as also of one who is marching ahead to his goal of perfection. By comparing this biographical account with the dos and don'ts of ethical conduct of the Jainas, it is abundantly clear that Bhagavān Mahāvīra has made an attempt to preach and to take others to the road of self-realization which he himself has resorted to.

After he left the house, he has not accepted even a single piece of cloth. On account of this, he put up with equanimity with all hardships and troubles caused by intense cold, scorchings heat, mosquitoes, gnats, and other small insects. He never made others' house his own. Cemetery, dilapidated buildings, and shades of the trees became his places of shelter. Because he moved about naked, the playful boys turned Mahāvīra into a plaything and threw stones and pebbles at him. However, he remained unaffected. Instead of sleeping at night he remained absorbed throughout in meditation. When he found that sleep is about to overtake him, he walked about a little to avoid it. Sometimes, the watch men also harassed him much. He pulled on with hot water and whatever little he got in alms. But he never accepted food and drink specially prepared for him. During twelve years of hard austerities, the tradition has it, he did not take his meals for more than 350 days. This self-absorbed extra-ordinary man, Mahāvīra, saw his good in silently and unaffectedly tolerating insults and humiliations. He was so much temperate in his habits and daily conduct that he was never in need of medicines whatsoever. When he undertook wanderings in Non-Aryan places the uncivilized and uncultured people living there let loose hungry dogs of hunt on him. Even then this magnanimous being did not mind these tormentations but on the contrary, he became all the more self-indrawn. At the age of forty-two, Bhagavān Mahāvīra shedded off his love and hatred, became a real conqueror and having realized the essential goal became the supremely enlightened being and also earned the epithet of Tīrthānkara by spreading illuminating light amongst people. In order to achieve all these things, he first brought under complete control his passions and reduced his faults to nothingness.

His Teachings

After Mahāvīra became Tīrthānkara the first event that occurred was that he had eleven pupils, who were, all without exception, learned Brāhmins. They were well-versed in the studies and the art of interpreting the Vedas in the light of the traditions. But they had their own doubts regarding their real significance. When the revered Mahāvīra revealed the inner core of their meanings to them and thus dispelled their doubts, they could get at the real nature of the religion of the spirit. Which is the true sacrifice? Which is the sacrificial fuel? Which is the sacrificial hole? To whom the oblations are offered? How should the ablution be performed? When Mahāvīra supplied answers, quite rational and spritual, to these questions and when he offered explanations removing contradictions inherent in traditional meanings, those erudite Brāhmin scholars of the Vedas had unerring glimpses of Mahāvīra's genius and gifted intelligence. They surrendered

themselves to him and accepted pupilhood. In the Jaina scriptures and religious literature, Vedas, as books of authority, have no place. They cannot serve as material to satisfy the spiritual appetite of religious people. But the coordination and compilation of Mahāvīra's teachings done by these Brāhmin pundits called Gaṇadharas is the real means of enlightenment. This whole compilation is collectively known as the Jaina canon. The Vedas and Vedāṅgas are not scriptures of extremely erroneous type, according to Jainism. But for a person of right vision and for a person who has assimilated the secrets of Jainism and absorbed the essence of it they are the bonafide books guiding properly but to those of perverted knowledge, they are misleading and erroneous.

Mahāvīra's Instructions on Equanimity

The vanity about their own superior caste and Sanskrit as well as erudition which those Brāhmins had come to entertain, disappeared before the supreme intelligence and genius of Mahāvīra. Those eleven Gaṇadharas started spreading Mahāvīra's message of even-mindedness in the vernacular language usually called Prākṛit. The Śūdras who, they earlier thought, had no right of religious performances and rituals, were initiated into the Jain order and were given adequate place into the monk's order. Not only this, but they were given the opportunity of becoming the gurus also. They helped the monk who belonged to the untouchable class and whose name was Harikeshi to rise to such a high level that he became the guru of the Brāhmins also. The story goes that a pariah-turned-Jain monk once went to the enclosure of the sacrifice for alms. In spite of his putting up with hate, humiliation, and insults with perfect mental peace, he began to explain the secret of that sort of sacrifice which involved no injury to the Brāhmins who attended the sacrifice. When they heard the explanation and enunciation they became so much overpowered with penitence that they begged his apology and became his followers, eulogizing penance and condemning caste-distinctions.

After becoming the Tīrthankara even, Mahāvīra kept up his rule of not staying at one place for a long time. He and his pupils undertook wanderings everywhere, near and far and propagated the message of non-injury. It was his directive that the people at large should be enlightened about peace, detachment, quiet, absolution, purity, straight-forwardness, egolessness, non-possession, non-injury etc. etc. keeping in mind the four view-points, namely, Substance, Place, Time and Attitude. This only constitutes a benevolent religion. People can get happiness and peace, knowledge and power by following the precepts of this religion. He made

the people conscious of the fact that there is fundamental antagonism between religion and injury. This is the substance of Māhāvīra's preachings.

Jaina Saṅgh

Having heard the religious sermons beneficial to the soul the eight contemporary kings named Vjṛāṅgaka, Vīrayasha, Sanjaya, Enayaka, Seya, Śīva, Udayana and Śāṅkha took initiation at his hands and many princes such as Abhayakumāra, Meghakumāra undertook vows renouncing the house etc. Many hermits accepted the pupilhood of Mahāvīra having got at the secret of penance from him. Many women also entered the nun's order realizing the worthlessness of the world. This order includes many princesses also. Śrenik the lord of Magadha and Konika Ceṭaka, the king of Vaiśālī and Caṇḍapadyota, the ruler of Avantī were also Mahāvīra's followers. Besides the merchant-prince, Ananda, Śakatāla who was a potter was amongst his lay followers, Arjunamāli, the worst of the robbers, gave up animosity, drank deep the cup of peace, cultivated forgiveness and became baptized into Jainism. The Śudras and Cāṇḍalas were given a place of pride in the Jaina Saṅgha.

Mahāvīra's Saṅgha had spread its roots far and wide into the places such as Rāḍha, Magadha, Videha, Kāśī, Kośala, Śūrasena, Vatsa and Avantī. The area of his wanderings extended upto Magadh, Videha, Kāśī, Kośala, Rāḍha and Vatsa etc etc.

Thirty years after Mahāvīra became Tīrthaṅkara, he wandered everywhere in the country. He got final emancipation at the age of seventy-two having preached about a religion which is auspicious in the beginning, auspicious in the middle and auspicious in the end. The people lighted the lamps and bade him last farewell. This event originated the present Dipotsavi—the festival of illumination.

Special need of character

At the time of Mahāvīra, many founders of religion, small and great, moved about but amongst all of them, Mahāvīra was extraordinarily brilliant. Jaina monks had made herculean efforts to strip the Brāhmanic religions of the element of injury with which they were pervaded out and out on account of this, injury committed in the name of religion came to be thoroughly wiped out. Sacrifices which did not come to a culmination without the slaughter of animals generally disappeared from the Bhāratavarṣa. The fanatic Hindu kings like Puṣyamitra attempted to revive these almost defunct sacrifices but they also met with failure due to irresistible spiritual powers of the monks and also due to the impact of their renunciation and

austerities. Thus the fate of the sacrifices in which Himsā or injury was involved became sealed.

Theory of Karma

The revered Mahāvīra snatched away from God and gods the fate of man, and put it in the hands of man himself. By worshipping gods or by pleasing them with the offering of animals, if happiness could be attained, people were wrong. Mahāvīra issued a stern warning that Himsā or injury begets Himsā of greater intensity, that it aggravates mutual enmity and that the hope of happiness is turned into misery. If happiness is the aim or end, form friendship with all, forge bonds of love and be compassionate. One can obtain genuine happiness in this way only. But take it for certain that God or gods will never be able to give you any happiness worth the name. You are happy or otherwise on account of your Karmas. You will get good result if your Karmas are good and bad if they are bad.

Soul itself is God

You yourself are God or god. You have got infinite power, infinite knowledge and infinite bliss. You can become God, by fully bringing them out. Then there is no fundamental difference to be found between one's soul and God. We all are, as a matter of fact, God. If you want to adore or worship God, adore or worship your soul. There can be no worship more powerful than that which is shown when you are able to strip yourself of love and hatred, infatuation and deceit, craving and fear. This stripping by itself is worship. The Brāhmins whom you make your intermediaries and invoke gods' help through them are no more than those who merely recite the Vedas without knowing the inherent meaning. I show you what the real Brahmin is.

Real Brahmin

He is a real Brahmin who is not attached to wealth, is not laden with grief when he loses what is dear to him, is as pure as heated gold, is devoid of attachment, aversion and fear, is devoted to penance and charities, is equanimous to all beings, does not inflict any injury to any living being, does not tell a lie out of anger, avarice, fun or fear, does not steal, keeps mind, speech and body under restraint, observes celibacy and has no possessions or belongings. Keeping company with a Brahmin of this description, realize yourself, your soul meditating, contemplating and pondering on it. This is worship; this is adoration; this is eulogy.

Real Sacrifice

He is a great maker of sacrifices, who gives up inflicting injury to all living beings; who abandons practising falsehood, stealing, indulgence; who bids fare well to women, ego, and deceit; who nurtures no hopes; who cherishes no love for the body; and who ultimately rejects all sorts of wickednesses such as the above. There is no need of all-consuming fire in the performance of a sacrifice. If there is any need of this type, it is one of the fire in the form of penances.

It is not necessary to make a sacrificial hole. The soul itself is that. A wooden ladle also is out of place here. The mental, verbal and physical activity is the ladle here. Why is burning the fuel required? Burn, instead, the Karmic fuel. Such a sacrifice in the form of self-control is peace-giving and is a real sacrifice praised by the sages.

Purity

The importance of external purity and the holy water as a means to achieve it had increased so much in those days that people believed they became extremely pure by taking bath in and with such waters. As a matter of fact, internal purity and external purity have nothing to do with each other. Bhagwan Mahāvīra has also explained the true nature of purity which is as this.

Religion is a real reservoir. Celibacy is a holy place or thing that affords tranquility of mind. Taking bath here in the holy water of celibacy makes the soul pure and quiet. By saying that it is non-sense to believe that purity is attainable by taking bath in holy waters, Mahāvīra has clearly stated in other words that if emancipation can be secured by taking bath in the morning and evening, the aquatic animals will be the first to get it.

“A New concept of Happiness”

It is true that people believed that the cause underlying the religious performances such as the sacrifice and worship etc. was to add to the prosperity of the people. Besides material pleasures, the belief that there was something as the presence of spiritual bliss and attainability of it was current in the forest-dwelling sages. But the voice of these forest-dwelling sages had not reached the ears of the common man. The theory of the spiritual happiness was something of a mystical secret. Moreover, sages only were the authors and custodians of this belief. But Bhagwan Mahāvīra thought it proper to acquaint the public of it. Therefore, instead of keeping it as a guarded secret, Mahāvīra made it public and propagated it amongst people.

Mahāvīra has made it categorically clear that this worldly happiness or the happiness derived from sensual pleasures is, as a matter of fact, not a happiness but a misery. How can it be called happiness at all as it ends in misery. The happiness derived from the renunciation of sensual pleasure is worth attaining as it lasts for ever. Every sensual pleasure is just like a drop of poison, like an iron spike. It is not possible to fulfil every desire, as desire, like sky, has no end. Howsoever much a greedy person may get, nay, the whole world may be put in his possession, even then his thirst for it will never be quenched. Therefore the happiness which is thought by possessionlessness will never be matched by that which is derived from sensual enjoyments.

When Mahāvīra put this new concept of happiness before people, the religious practices, the worship of deities, the sacrifices which were the instruments of momentary happiness only lost their significance. It was natural, therefore, that meditation, study, fast, avoiding luxurious dishes, courtesy, service and various types of penances may get currency as religious performances mentioned before.

The Duty of the Bania

Mahāvīra advised the members of the commercial community not to add to their material property as they liked. It is not necessary merely to earn your wealth honestly but it is also equally necessary to limit its bulk and size, too. He exhorted them to ruminate in their mind daily that they would be happy if only they see the day when they would be prepared to leave everything and become the bondless for ever.

One cannot argue that he would first amass wealth by questionable means even and then would spend much of it in charities so that the burden of sin can be lessened. This plea is fallacious inasmuch as it involves the soul into greater sins. Mahāvīra had no doubt eulogized charities but never to that extent that there is nothing superior to that in this world. On the other hand, he has unequivocally said for times without number that the self-restraint of the possessionless is far more excellent than the merit earned through charities given in forms of lacs of cows. Therefore, to limit the amount and extent of wealth and estates, to earn this also by just and fair means and ultimately to welcome voluntary penury by throwing out this also constitute Mahāvīra's religion.

The Duty of the untouchable

With reference to the members of the untouchable community, Mahāvīra has emphatically said that even if one is born in the caste that

is the lowest he can elevate himself by doing deeds, good and noble, to a status which is supreme. The fact that one is born in a family which is most inferior cannot force him to forfeit his right to live a religious life.

The Duty of a Kṣatriya

It is the common experience of every one of us that the Kṣatriya usually arrogates other's property to himself, sows seeds of discontent and enmity, quarrels and fights. Mahāvīra himself was a kṣatriya. Therefore, it is not out of place to refer to a Kṣatriya's duty which is outlined by him and which is potential enough to establish and maintain peace and order in the world. While explaining the kṣatriya's religion, he has said that he is on a wrong path who thinks he is victorious as he has been able to finish off millions of people in the war. A man may be able to score a win by doing away with external enemies but what is more important is to bring under control one's own self. So long as one does not establish mastery of his soul, the roots of all types of war cannot be removed. His war never comes to an end. Retaliation and counter-retaliation continue. What is the meaning of self-conquest? To control all the five sense-organs, to defy anger by forgiveness, to neutralize the effect of egoism by gentleness, to reduce hypocrisy to nothingness through adopting straight forwardness, to defeat avarice by contentment and to subjugate the monkeying mind—all these constitute real self-conquest. When the whole universe will apply itself to putting into practice this concept of self-mastery, permanent peace will prevail. Otherwise the suppression of one war will give rise to another war.

The bravery of the brave consists in giving up comforts of life and in remaining unaffected having quelled passions. It is a sheer bondage if one makes an effort to increase one's material prosperity involving slaughter of many an innocent life.

A way to Non-injury

The preachings and professions of Mahāvīra, though on the face of them straight and simple, are difficult to be practised. This is the reason why people do not give up wars though they see the dangerous results of wars with their own eyes and continue to believe that the war only is the instrument that can remove all quarrels. But a day is not far off when man will have to adopt a non-injurious way of life abandoning all the means and instruments which can cause war involving an untold loss of life. Otherwise he will have to remain ready to welcome his own destruction

through atomic and nuclear weapons etc. etc. Man will be able to liberate himself as soon as he cultivates a firm conviction in a way of life based on the principle on non-injury.

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Bhagavan Buddha and Bhagavan Mahāvīra

Three stages of their biographies

While considering the biographical accounts of Buddha and Mahāvīra, it will be noticed that they have passed through many stages. The trend and tilt of the life-history of both of them is the same in the oldest scriptures of the Jainas and Bauddhas, namely the Sūtrāgama and Piṭaka respectively, while the same is different in the Jaina commentaries and biographies so far as Mahāvīra's life is concerned as also Aṭṭhakathā and Budhacarita of the Mahāyāna branch so far as Buddha's life is concerned.

The First Stage

The account of Mahāvīra's life and Buddha's life which is found there in the Jaina canon and Piṭaka respectively reveals how the spiritual progress of a man reaches a climax after having passed through hardships and struggles. A common man also is able to understand from those books how an ordinary man becomes extra-ordinary and thus gets inspiration. But the life-stories of both of them change their tenor in the subsequent period after they became the acknowledged leaders of the religious systems founded by them. The accounts of both of them found in the Jaina canon and Piṭaka respectively belong to the same period in the cases of both and therefore it can be said that poetic imagination had no role to play there. But as times of biographies differed in due course, the concept of a biography also underwent modification. This made room for sectarian tinge.

Between the first and the subsequent stages, the fundamental change in the biographies of Buddha is obvious but not so as regards those of Mahāvīra. The reason of this is to be found in the fact that nothing worth noting relating to the details about the life of a Tīrthankara took place in the approaches of different sects. But concerning Buddha's life, it can be stated with fair amount of exactness, that the material widely differed with the

passage of time. This is responsible for a qualified attitude of various writers towards the Buddha of the Pīṭakas and that of Mahāvāna.

The earliest and basic theory of both Jainism and Buddhism is such that a being of this world, in one of his previous births entertains a feeling of doing some good to the people, conducts himself accordingly, and thus developing himself in every succeeding birth perfects himself as a Tīrthāṅkar or Buddha. The difference that divides that the common man and the uncommon Tīrthāṅkara and Buddha consists in the degree of spiritual excellence and this confers on them the fitness of leadership in the domain of divinity. Excepting this, there is no other difference. In sum, both—the Tīrthāṅkara and Buddha—are not pure and perfect from the beginning but they become so as time passes on and attain the status of a Tīrthāṅkara and Buddha. The earliest biographies of both these dignitaries were based on this belief or theory or approach. This made it essential for both of them to strain every nerve to achieve spiritual elevation. On account of this very fact, the descriptions of their giving up worldly life and accepting renunciation as also their practices of penance and austerities figure so prominently in their biographical accounts. Mahāvīra took penances and austerities as constituting the ideal way of life throughout while Buddha welcomed it not throughout but only in between. But this might have been the case because of difference in the essential natures of both of them. The impression which is gathered from the earliest biographies of both of them is to the effect that both the personages have advanced their growth like the ordinary man, who adopts a certain way of life being urged either by their own wisdom or by being enlightened by others.

Second Stage

But when the biographies enter the second stage—not the contemporary stage but that stage when the sects had taken firm roots—some extraordinary features get entry into them and the extent of the stories of previous births becomes enlarged. In Mahāvīra's biographies of this period, the narration starts from his birth preceeding the birth of R̥ṣabha even—the first Tīrthāṅkara. Therein we find the account also of Mahāvīra's efforts to cultivate his potentiality to become the Tīrthāṅkara. We come across in them the explanation of certain events and episodes which occurred in his last birth tracing on the basis of the Law of Karman their connection with those which previously happened such as his having been born as the grandson of R̥ṣabha, as also as chakravartti and also his pride which he entertained when he knew that he is to be the Tīrthāṅkara in future. Elaboration of the original principle of Mahāvīra as evidenced in the formulation of his favourite Law of Karman is the main aim of the narration.

The Law of Karman liberates one from the clutches of despotic God. The subsequent writers of the biographies of Mahāvīra have based them on this new pattern the essence of which is this Law of Karman as enunciated by Mahāvīra.

And now as the sect has become firmly formed, every opportunity, proper or improper is availed of when gods are depicted as serving Mahāvīra who was now an acknowledged leader of a well-formed sect. The object underlying this is to show to the people to focus their attention on Mahāvīra's main message of spiritualism comprised of renunciation of desires and on the fact that the gods whom people worship to get the material prosperity are serving Mahāvīra who is spreading the message of spiritualism amongst people, thereby showing that spiritual power is much more valuable than the material power consisting of estates, wealth etc. Therefore, Mahāvīra who is worshipped by gods even, should be worshipped, if at all one wants to do so.

The biographical literature concerning Buddha and belonging to the second stage consists of the stories of his births. This means in other words, that the stories of Buddha's previous births were linked up with those of Buddha's times which eulogized the effect and efficacy of the good deeds of people, the stories having been fittingly employed. The purpose of these stories is to illustrate how Buddha developed, before becoming Buddha, the Enlightened, the virtues of charities, compassion, love, forgiveness, tolerance, and genius etc. etc. as also to show how Buddha ultimately got Enlightenment. In these stories supernatural element of gods is introduced with the same objects and aims just as in the stories of Mahāvīra.

Considering from other point of view, the biographical stories of Mahāvīra and Buddha falling in the period of the second stage are in a way supplementary to each other. Though the inviolability of the Law of Karman figures in the stories of both, it has been projected in bold relief in the biographical stories of Mahāvīra, while a special treatment is given in the stories of Buddha as to how to cultivate those virtues which are useful in the spiritual development. The fact that a being becomes a Tīrthaṅkara or a Buddha ultimately, having passed gradually through various grades of development is a common feature in both of them. They are not so from time immemorial.

In the third stage, the biographies of Mahāvīra started to be written in Sanskrit in stead of in Prākṛit as before. The account of his life in these biographies clearly bears the stamp of the poetic imagination employed by the writers of Sanskrit in their compositions. This difference

distinguishes the third stage from the previous two, though the difference cannot be said so essentially. It is but natural to find similarity between some incidents and episodes described in these biographies of Mahāvīra and those occurring in the stories relating to Kṛṣṇa and Rāma. It can be safely stated that the biographies of Mahāvīra belonging to this stage can well enter into race with those concerning other personages. It is, therefore quite understandable that a due place is given in these later biographies to some very uncommon occurrences which are not found in those of the earlier stages written in Prākṛit. Besides, the difference that was formed in the biographies written from the Śvetāmbara and Digambara viewpoints, becomes very obvious in the biographies of this stage, as for example, the marriage of Mahāvīra and the food of Tīrthaṅkara. In spite of this, it is clear that no difference is found in the fundamental Jain theory according to which a soul achieves perfection passing through regular stages of development. Keeping this basic principle in mind, the narration of extraordinary episodes is attempted so that it is not violated.

The biographies of Buddha also differ on account of sectarian differences. According to writers belonging to Hīnayāna, Buddha is portrayed as a human being, while he assumes the size and status of the Buddha who is eternal and who is an incarnation according to the writers belonging to Mahāyāna. On account of this, the element of ordinary conduct of an ordinary human being finds entry into these biographies. Just as kṛṣṇa and Rāma in their incarnations behave like ordinary human beings, Buddha also does so, as for example, he goes to school, marries, does all other worldly works etc. etc. About learning also it is said in the biographies of Mahāvīra that Mahāvīra had no need to learn because he had special types of knowledge from the very infancy but along with this it is also true that he was neither God nor an Omniscient being at that time. We can take this feature as an extra-ordinary gift. But in the biographies of Buddha, it is mentioned that he possessed omniscience in childhood even or in his life as a householder. Besides, going one step forward, it is found there that Buddha tries like kṛṣṇa, to please his eightyfour thousand wives. This is nothing but his worldly experiences, which we come across here and there throughout the book. The name of Buddha's wife found in his biographies written in Pāli is Yashoda while in those written in Sanskrit it is Gopā which reminds us of Kṛṣṇa's Gopis. Not only this, but this Gopa occupies the top position as Rādhā.

Moreover, Buddha and Gopa have been portrayed as possessing all the virtues from the beginning and as undergoing them. There are many such elements providing reason to believe that the biography is not one of an ordinary human being but of a being who is an incarnation.

It was a goal set by the Hīnayāna that Buddha should be described as getting salvation at the end of an allotted span of life. Contrary to this, Mahāyānis describe that Buddha can have no salvation because he can not aspire for it as long as there is even one being in bondage in this world. Because of this belief of Mahāyānis, there is a change found in the biographies falling in the third stage.

Similarities found in both of them

(1) Protest against Vedic traditions.

Bhagawan Mahāvīra and Buddha flourished at one and the same time and both launched a campaign against the existing conditions and situations with a uniform vehemence. Both opposed Vedic traditions; both devalued the greatness of the Vedic gods and both gave separate forms and colours to the Bhāratiya religions. The contribution of both of them is noteworthy as regards gods to be propitiated. Vices such as are found in man, namely, anger, partiality, love, hatred etc. were, no doubt, there in the gods. Both planted a strong and grand belief in the minds of people to the effect that he only can be a symbol of god-hood in whom there are no vices mentioned before.

The credit of spreading the idea of unity between various sections of mankind in place of that of a high and low goes, indeed to both of them. In the domain of religion, the system of priest's intervention everywhere was in vogue. This they removed and declared unequivocally that intervention in matters religious was absolutely unnecessary. As there is inherent unity between various sections of humanity at large and as all human beings were equal, both made it be known that the status of a teacher or a preceptor which uptill now went to the Brāhmins be transferred generally to one who was superior in merits—though he may by birth be a chāṇḍāl in the order of monks. So far as spiritualism is concerned, they gave equal rights and consideration to both man and woman. Both underlined the superiority of spiritual wealth to material wealth and both preferred vernaculars to Sanskrit.

On account of many such similarities and on account of the fact that the names of the relatives of both of them were the same, there was a time once when it was believed that both Mahāvīra and Buddha were one and the same. But as the works bearing on Jainism and Buddhism began to come to light and to be studied by scholars that belief proved to be a delusion and now it is unanimously accepted that both are different personalities.

Similarity between their teachings Karma—Rebirth

Not only do they both believe in the theories of Karma and Rebirth but they both have presented the same in a real spirit. The Law of Karman is an axiomatic truth and God's intervention here is out of place. Karman itself yields the result and it is not entrusted to God. Both—Mahāvīra and Buddha—have preached that a being is the architect of his fortune—good or bad and that this world's cycle is dependent on the Law of Karman only. It is not in the hands of others, not in the hands of God even, to mend or mar one's prospects. It is in his own hands. Both have declared this with equal force and honesty.

2. Disproving the existence of God —

Mahāvīra and Buddha themselves can preach; both advance the cause of ideals and principles; both can show the way to liberation. But no one can get it through his favour only. They both have no right to oblige and one with the grant of freedom as they like. He who wants it should take to a road leading to it. Thus, in the real sense of the term, they are at best the guides only.

3. The Yoga —

Both have shown that emancipation is unobtainable without the help of mental peace existence through the performance of sacrifices. Both preached the performance of spiritual sacrifice in place of sacrifice which was performed with such means as animal slaughter etc. etc. This spiritual sacrifice was not dependent on any external help or means but on the contrary it could be performed only by dispensing with it. To remove internal agonies and vices and to achieve this to mediate as also to make an intense effort to purify the soul constitute the way to Yoga. It is sufficient to lead a life of solitude, of possessionlessness and of self-introspection in order to achieve this end.

4. Life of self-control —

There are no signs of renunciation seen in the lives of Rama and Kṛṣṇa, meaning thereby that they do not accept the importance of renouncing the world taking it to be unsubstantial. Not only this but they do not adopt renunciation as a way of life. As opposed to this, both these great men—Mahāvīra and Buddha—believe with equal intensity that the world is fit merely to be renounced and also think that they should kick it out when detachment is on the rise. They accepted a life of self-restraint in the very prime of life. Hereby, they gave the ideal of self-control, new and beneficial, to the world. The way of life based on material pursuits and pleasures is

common but that for which a ceaseless effort is required from the very birth is one of self-control which is but another name for renunciation. Life is not meant for enjoyment but it is meant to be devoted to the path of self-realization. In order to convince the people, they both accepted a life of restraint and renunciation and acquired emancipation leading a life of total self-abnegation, sterling character and stoicism, But there is a distinct difference between the ways of self-control adopted by both of them. It is this that while Mahāvīra believed in the way of life of hard austerities, Buddha believed in the golden mean. This is why in the religious communities of both of them, radical and middle path respectively have been adopted by both.

5. Abandonment of Desire and Ignorance —

Both declare with equal emphasis that it is due to Ignorance that we see reverse tendencies in a human life. Taking the Non-soul to be a soul, people lose their balance and discrimination and get entangled into the net of desires and hankerings. This gives rise to continuity or worldly cycle, drives him to entertain love and hatred and pushes him forward and forward in the worldly cycle. There is one remedy only for cutting short this vicious circle and it consists of cultivating understanding and thereby reducing ignorance. You will, thereby, be able to root out desires which are the main cause of this worldly existence.

Both are like-minded so far as this but they part their ways when the question of what is to be done after removing Ignorance comes. Buddha's vision claimed into the theory of momentariness and Mahāvīra's into that of versatility of aspects. In this connection it should not be forgotten that Buddha, like cārvāka, did not endorse the view that there is total annihilation though he put stress on the momentariness of every thing. Also did Buddha not accept the existence of ever-eternal and immutable soul like the Vedantins. This means that Buddha's theory was that the soul was ever-changing but imperishable. As opposed to this, Mahāvīra believed in the theory that the soul was both eternal and non-eternal. The difference distinguishing the theories of both was one of assertion and negation. Buddha did not subscribe to the view that the soul was eternal or was perishable while Mahāvīra did. On account of this both the philosophical systems differed later on from each other. But both of them are agreeable to the theories of Karmic Law and Rebirth. Theories of Karmic Law, Rebirth, World and Emancipation are acceptable to both of them though Buddha and Mahāvīra believed that the soul was non-eternal and imperishable as also eternal and perishable respectively. Thus barring the subtle distinction between the

theories of both of them there is no difference between them as regards the original concept of soul. This means that there is unanimity between them regarding the theory that the soul which is in bondage has to work out its emancipation putting forth hard labour and has to cut down the succession of rebirths by total annihilation of the Karmas.

Penance :

It is a fact that both Mahāvīra and Buddha practised external and internal penance. But that also is a fact that Buddha had to give up the austere way of life based on hardest penance. It is necessary to consider why this development occurred. When taking into account the biographies of both of them, one thing becomes immediately and amply clear that Mahāvīra accommodated in his system the external penance inasmuch as it helped internal penance. He undertook long fasts but his aim was one of meditation and tranquility of mind. In other words, he did this as it helped him in ensuring and securing meditation and mental peace and when it did not serve this purpose of his, he broke his fast. His biographies bear this out. It was a different thing altogether that he resumed fast when he did not get alms on the day when he broke his fast. It is also a kind of penance when one observes a fast on his not getting the alms during his begging-tour. This is an exercise in austerities to reduce a fascination for body. But Mahāvīra did accept a theory that what is necessary for the bare sustenance of the body even must be given to it. While begging, even if he did not get he was neither angry nor dissatisfied and if he got he was not at all elated.

Remaining naked, whatever experiences he had either on account of heat or cold, or of the stings of mosquitoes or gnats, he remained unaffected throughout. These were the austerities preached by Mahāvīra, give them whatever name you like. In short, the physical mortification as preached and practised by him had a definite role to play in ensuring equilibrium of mind and peace. Both the types of penance—external or internal as well ran simultaneously but accent was laid on the internal and therefore he was able to ensure and develop detachment, and renunciation and as a climax he got omniscience also.

Looking to the life of Buddha, we find that he seems to have given greater attention to meditation and contemplation before baptism. Due to this, Buddha's father had to create an atmosphere of luxury and lust in order to distract him from that path. But he was by nature contemplative and unattached. This urged him to betake to the path of renunciation and immediately adopted a meditational way of life. Having received what he could from one teacher, he goes to another to add to his knowledge, to enrich

his experience and to increase the bulk of his progress. Physical torture had no place so far in his formulary and technique. It is but inevitable to subject the body to pain as one has to remain in an erect position throughout the period of meditational practices but there is nowhere any mention of a fast. Having followed both the teachers so far as meditational way of life is concerned, Buddha felt that he has not got the adequate quantity of knowledge and enlightenment which he ought to have. Then he gave up meditational way of life in favour of fasting and starts a search for another teacher as is found in his biography. He fasted and fasted, so much so that any one who saw him could not ascertain whether he was a living body or dead. He was reduced to a mere skelton. These penances were mere penances unaccompanied by meditation. His teachers made no secret of it that physical mortification is the only surest way that led to salvation. This is why he replaced the former by the latter. But here he failed in the sense that he could not fatten his spirit, with the prospect of thinning his body. Having been finally disappointed beyond limit, as he was bound to be, he gave up the way of physical torture also and again resorted to his former plan and programme of contemplative life. He now emphatically declared that the way of extinction did not lie at least in bodily mortification.

After these discussions we are now in a position to say that Buddha, having undergone mental disciplines, then physical and thereafter mental again, came to a conclusion that mere physical disciplines had no meaning and utility. The theory of simple physical mortification has had an inherent limitation of its own, meaning thereby that it is not an end in itself but only a means. Losing sight of this main fact, Buddha adopted physical disciplines as the only instrument with which to work out salvation. It was because of this only that he failed horribly. But Buddha would not have to experience disappointment which he did had Buddha, like Mahāvīra, not given the same weightage to physical disciplines which he ought to have taken as merely helpful in the manner of Mahāvīra. Thus, the statement made by Buddha to the effect that the way of liberation is not constituted of mere physical disciplines is, in a way, true because physical torture as he believed was the main item of external penance. Mahāvīra's findings were just the reverse of this, meaning thereby that Mahāvīra accommodated it in his spiritual armoury as a mere adjunct to mental and spiritual exercises. This is why Mahāvīra has raised it in a due, deserving manner and Buddha has denounced it outright. In sum, Buddha in the beginning took physical torture as the sine qua non of spiritual salvation but later gave it up so disparagingly that he went in the opposite direction and declared that meditational way and not the physical disciplines as he said earlier was the

be-all and end-all. He was earlier on one extreme and later on the other. But Mahāvīra was from the very outset quite clear in his mind regarding the importance and utility of both which he distributed in due proportion between them.

On account of the middle way adopted by Buddha in this respect, looseness in the field of discipline made a dent in the Sangha very quickly and a time was not far off when it became on the many causes responsible for the disappearance of Buddhism from Bhārata. At the same time it cannot be said that Mahāvīra's Sangha did not become demoralized at all but the process was gradual. Besides, the Sangha tended, generally speaking not so much towards demoralization as towards the intense observance of external discipline. Due to this, ritualism, ceremonialism, formalism and discipline was not infrequently overhauled and elevated. This made it possible for Jainism to maintain a steady, incessant flow in Bharat some-time as a small current and sometimes as a big current. Buddhism having left the soil of its birth assumed a new form outside Bhārat which did not have the colour of the original so much as it had that of the culture and civilization of the non-Indian countries. Thus, though Buddhism remained alive, it remained so without its basic format and aim.

Characteristics of both

1. Basic or Natural

The characteristics of the natures of both divide themselves broadly into two categories, namely, those of reason and those of faith. Bhagawan Mahāvīra relied more on Faith while Buddha on Reason Mahāvīra's. plan of action was chalked out in alliance with the traditional force which he derived from his predecessors. His way was, thus, well laid. This enabled him to march ahead in the direction of this goal. Becoming a follower of the previous form of Jainism, Mahāvīra developed himself spiritually. He never cherished a desire to introduce or inject any thing new or extraneous into the spiritual legacy and philosophical heredity handed over by Pārśva and others to him. What he was up to was the fullest exploitation of it for his spiritual gains and consolidation. As the matter stands thus, he declared more often than not that he said this or that as Pārśva has said it. He also said that his Pārśva's teachings were in no way and in no degree different. There was of course some difference regarding code of conduct but it has been explained away on the ground of unity of aim with slight variations here and there in external form such as the insignia etc. etc. etc. Mahāvīra added a new lustre and vigour to the degenerate Sangh of Pārśva and merged it along with his own. This act of overhauling the

Saṅgha and remodelling it earned him Tīrthāṅkara-hood and henceforth Saṅgha became known after his name.

Mahāvīra did not make any one his guru though he underlined the element of faith much more than anything else. He blazed his own trail putting faith in things when he found it necessary being convinced of what was said and done by his predecessors. He, thus, worked out his own salvation getting rid of attachment and aversion. But this is not the case with Buddha. He no doubt welcomed faith, first and made some one his guru. But being wedded with Reason from the cradle, he changed his teachers one by one with the ultimate result that he himself became his own guru and guide. It is his own submission that the path he has found is new and extraordinary, but at the same time he has been cautious enough to warn his followers against accepting on mere faith what he said, preached and taught and has advised them not to give any quarter to those things which did not pass the test of their own Reason. Though the matter is like this, all the subsequent Ācāryas have decidedly affirmed, seeing that Buddhism has now taken deep roots, that all the previous Buddhas including the present Buddha who is twentyfifth have said so and nothing else.

The subsequent religious histories of both Jainism and Buddhism have been markedly influenced by both the personalities, Mahāvīra and Buddha in whom the element of Faith and the element of Reason was preponderating respectively. Jainism which took things on Faith did not start new schools of thought while Buddhism which was Rationalist founded many new schools of thought and during every period, threw challenges to the contemporary philosophical and metaphysical systems which were in vogue in Bhārata. This phenomenon gave it a scope to instil new vigour and vitality in them. Contrary to this, the followers of Jainism absorbed into their own system new and homogenous thoughts of the other schools and systems, clinging fast to their own.

One more peculiarity of nature and temperament divided them both. It was this. Bhagavān Mahāvīra showed a stiff attitude in framing and also observing rules and regulations, that is to say, he had the heart of a father while Buddha had the heart of a mother inasmuch as he showed a mild attitude so far as the formulations and practices were concerned. This was why we find that Buddha, during his own life-time, made more exceptions than rules. Mahāvīra, on the contrary, put more accent on the rules themselves and resorted to exceptions as few as possible and when it was absolutely necessary. These exceptions also were hard and fast compared with the rules made by Buddha.

Turning our eyes to the Jaina Canon, we find that Mahāvīra is fully engrossed in matters relating to the universe. Not only, this, but he is totally busy thinking about the eightyfour lacs of beings inhabiting the universe. He is not tired of taking into account the varying conditions of the soul dwelling in every being. On the basis of this knowledge and observation, one main thing he wants to say is that one should cultivate total detachment if one wants to be free from miserable experiences which these beings undergo and the untold sufferings to which they are subjected continually by the inexorable law of Karman. He adds further that no one should inflict any injury on any living being. For generating conviction he argues that none welcomes misery as it is never welcomed by you. Therefore, be cautious that you not to become the cause of unhappiness to others through harming them. Mahāvīra found every inch of space occupied by a living being and therefore what worried him most was how to save one-self from incurring the sin due to committing injury great or small. It is because of this that every sermon or exhortation delivered and given by him is marked with this cardinal note repeated non-stop lest one might miss it.

Surveying the Tripitakas, we notice that Buddha had no interest in thinking or discussing about the universe, the living beings indwelling it and the ailments and agonies besetting them. He was equally uninterested in matters relating to the soul or Brahman. He was, on the other hand, busy finding solution as to how best and how quickly can the evils of unhappiness and miseries with which the whole universe is afflicted here and now, be removed once and for all. Besides, he is interested in discussing how one can enjoy the fruits, here and now, of what he does in the name of religion. Every thing else is in vain, he adds. As it is so, Buddha, unlike Mahāvīra, does not have to worry at all about the universe and living beings inhabiting it. He is concerned wholly about how a man just in front of him knows his religious duty and enjoys its fruit. This enables us to state that Buddha was pragmatic in his approach and as such shows the direct path.

(2) Peculiarities of the Religion & Saṅgha

As said before, Mahāvīra has underscored the need of stern austerities in his religious system, while Buddha prefers to tread the path of golden mean. A limit can be put to stern austerities but not so to the golden mean. The road lying between the two extremes is very long and assumes various forms due to the fact that there are innumerable degrees to the extreme laxity and to extreme austerity. On account of this, we are not in

a position to ascertain which form of conduct prevailed in which period. This boils down to a Conclusion that we are able to know the precise limit or norm of Jaina code of conduct whether one is a monk or a mere layman as also we are able to know those who go beyond it. Jaina Saṅgha derived advantage from this and due to this fact a specific level or stage or standard as regards code of conduct has been possible to be pinpointed or fixed.

But, as Buddhism has preferred golden mean, the standard of code of conduct remained always fluctuating. This resulted in an inevitable fact that forms of Buddhist code of conduct were varying according to times and countries. This phenomenon was responsible for the result that Tibetan Buddhism and Sinhalese Buddhism though they both held the same views regarding the three jewels such as Buddha etc. etc. differed as regards code of conduct and still they both were considered as belonging to Buddhism. Contrary to this, Jainism, at any stage and in any country maintained uniformly a certain standard of conduct always.

Buddhism spread, no doubt, in the world but not in its original form while Jainism, though it lost its foothold in the soil of its birth, preserved its basic nature and existence. We can see with our own eyes the results of the insistence on a golden mean and an extreme attitude.

(“Prabuddha Jivan”, 1-11.64; 16.11.64).

—Translated from Gujrati into English

By Dr. A.S. Gopani

Theory of Manifold Aspects

(1) Indispensable in Life and Thought

Ekānta (एकांत) means 'extreme'. We say that he has gone to the last limit, meaning thereby that he has become too obstinate. To think about a thing in one way only and to ignore all other ways about it is Ekānta-vāda—the Theory of single viewpoint. This consists of stiffness or inflexibility shown in the comprehension of a substance soul, world, or God. Such stiffness, inflexibility, obstinacy, is singleness of viewpoint and the opposite of this is the Manifoldness of viewpoint (अनेकान्त) We cannot conduct our daily transactions through mere stiffness. One has to cultivate an attitude of compromise to face successfully the various problems confronting life. Just so, one has to be compromising in the field of philosophical speculations and this is called Anekāntavāda—Theory of Manifold Aspects.

For the vision of Truth, Theory of Manifold Aspects necessary.

Imagine a row of elephants. Its trunk is in the east and tail in the west. One who sees the trunk only will not have any idea that it has a tail also and vice versa. This is natural because he sees one side only. But this experience of a seer does not rob the elephant of its trunk or tail. This happened because of the seer's approach which consisted of seeing the elephant from an angle of vision from where the trunk only or the tail only was visible. But if the seer changes his angle, that is to say, if he places himself at a point from where the trunk and the tail both are visible, there will not be any controversy. This very thing applies to everything in the world, especially in the philosophical and metaphysical provinces. Just as a man enlarges his comprehension and widens the extent of his knowledge, he comes to know and perceive many new forms of a particular thing of which he might have seen only one before. Instead, if he clings fast to what he knows or perceives in part about a thing and does not go beyond it he must be called stiff, inflexible, obstinate, uncompromising, or adhering to the Theory of Single Aspect, while the other who considers about a thing from all possible points of view in accordance with his capacity, we would call him a follower of the Theory of Manifold Aspects.

If one adopts inflexible attitude or obstinacy, it will not be possible for him to live a day-to-day life and he will encounter difficulties at every step. This is enough to deter him from showing inflexibility. One can vouch this from his own experience. But this need of avoiding obstinacy etc. as in daily dealings is not recognized by the philosophers and metaphysicians to its fullest measure in their speculations. Sometimes, this principle seems to be operating, knowingly or unknowingly in the field of philosophical speculations also where they are cautions enough to dilute their inflexibility.

We come across in the scriptures an oft-quoted example of Blind Man And Elephant to illustrate fully this theory of manifold aspects. In the domain of philosophical speculations, when one perceives, in part only, a particular thing or subject, he incurs the charge of incomplete comprehension just as a blind man who describes the elephant on the basis of his viewing a trunk, tail, feet or ears which are merely its parts, that is to say, its limbs. But a seer, who has taken a full view of the elephant, describes it to the blind man, he will be able to put an end to the controversy that might be raging between them, regarding the description of the elephant, on account of each one's lopsided view of the elephant. Similarly a person employing the Theory of Manifold Aspects is able to remove the error of incomplete perception or partial representation.

This enables us to state that the Theory of Manifold Aspects reduces many contradictory statements about any given thing to nothingness. Though the rod of the scales is the same, its upness or downness is construed in a different manner by the buyer and the seller both. The customer thinks it to be in his own interest if one of the two scales goes down while it is definitely against that of the seller. These two beliefs—that of the buyer and the seller—will have no existence, if the rod of the scale remains in a straight line. It is but natural for the controversy to arise about whether the downward trend of the scale-pan is beneficial or not because none of the two—the buyer and the seller—tries to understand one another's view-point. Both of them are thinking of their own benefit, and nothing of the loss of the other. But if both the persons think of justice or propriety without minding their own profit, it will soon be clear to them that justice is possible if the scale-pans remain in a straight line. Same is the case with our thinking also. If we take our thoughts only concerning a certain thing to be true we will not be able to see truth inhering in other's thoughts. But if our mind adopts a synthetic approach or if our mind becomes neutral, we would be able to perceive truth in the thoughts of others also. Theory of Manifold Aspects finds expression or justification or evolves if there is an intense craving for seeing the truth.

Intolerance towards Religion.

There was only Buddhism in Tibet. Christians approached the king of Tibet to allow them to work for Christian religion there. The king was advised by the officers of the State as well as by the people who were traditionalists not to give such a permission as was asked for by them. To them the king replied that we would certainly hear them because it is not a fact that what was necessary to be told to us has already been told in our religion and now there is nothing new which remains to be known. We are going ahead on our road and they on theirs. We would only be too glad to hear their experiences and if there is anything true and proper in them, we would try our best to make it agreeable with ours. This will smoothen our way also. We will, indeed, be profited by hearing them. Then, why not give opportunity to them—he added ? Besides, our religion is deeply ingrained in us. It is not going to be thrown out. Therefore, we are not to lose anything if we give them a patient hearing—he further said.

The king, as seen before, showed catholicity but it was not reciprocated by the Christians. Wherever they go, they find faults with our religions. This renders it difficult for them to be one with our people of diverse religious professions. Exploiting fully the religious broad-mindedness of the king to their own advantage, he was finally got assassinated by them. Excepting Bible and allied literature, the literature of every other religion was committed to fire by them in Rome. This is imitated exactly by the Muslims. They do not find religion anywhere else except in the Koran. Though Koran itself reveals a great tendency to catholicity, it is the Muslims themselves who are cent per cent bigoted and intolerant to other religions and wherever they went, they did not spare to annihilate everything that belonged to other religions, culture and civilization. This is why they could not get absorbed in the indigenous mainstream.

If any religious person accepts what is true and proper—it may be anywhere—without getting confined in his own religion's fold due to inflexibility, he is thereby fortifying his own religion eventually. The veracity of this statement can be easily proved with reasons and evidences if we just care to turn our eyes to history of any religion. And that also is a fact that those religions which were unforgiving in their attitude were totally thrown out or could not establish their reputation fully.

Progressivism of Jainism.

That section of society which lets it be known as conservative does not care to introduce or inject new concepts into it or to reform itself

voluntarily, but it is obliged to go in for it by the extraneous forces or factors and finally its leaders accept due to exigency of time to adopt changes keeping the base of its ideology intact, though all along with this, their loyalty goes to the traditional beliefs which have taken deep roots. This is the characteristic of every religious society. Thus there is very little scope for the entry of the Theory of Manifold Aspects which insists to re-orientate the conservatism with ever-changing new forms and ideas. The utility of the Theory of Manifold Aspects naturally lies there only where the trend is towards progressivism. From this point of view Jainism is more progressive than the so-called conservative Hinduism or Vedic Religion. Followers of Jainism have been influenced by the Vedic ones not in a small measure. They also have started arguing about their no-change attitude but even then Jain philosophy and religion have always kept their doors open, as the whole history provides ample evidences, to welcome truth wherever they found, though they call themselves no-changers, The Jainas imported what was true and proper in the contemporary current professions and practices, into their own system and streamlined them as if they were their own and they experienced pride and dignity in doing this. This is because the nature of real Jain philosophy is fully charged with the spirit derived from the Theory of Manifold Aspects. Thus, the Jainas are, doubtless, in a position to say that of all the various Bhāratīya societies, theirs is in the vanguard so far as progressivism is concerned. No founders of philosophical system can do without taking the help or shelter from or under the Theory of Manifold Aspects. But the Jain philosophical system is the only one that is actually based on the bed-rock of the Theory of Manifold Aspects.

Founders of non-Jain philosophical systems are not as happy to subscribe to the Theory of Manifold Aspects as Jainas because it is erroneously believed to be the sole monopoly of the Jainas only. Leaving aside the consideration of the non-Jainas' attachment or aversion for the Theory, its value and importance do not decrease at all. There is no other option for any one excepting allegiance to it for the vision of truth and development of thinking if not for anything else.

(2) Principle of Non-injury (Ahimsā), the root-cause of the Theory of Manifold Aspects (Anekānta).

After this general discussion of the Theory, what is upto us now is to consider how the structure of Jain Metaphysics was raised on the ground of the Theory. Principle of non-injury was the only one for which Mahāvīra lived and died. Mahāvīra visualized that every atom of the universe was inhabited by a living being. His sensitive and equanimous

heart experienced that life was as dear to all living beings as it was to him and that misery was as unwelcome to all as it was to him. Therefore, he thought he should so live that not the least injury even to any living being is involved. This intense emotional reaction of Mahāvīra inspired him to organize his life in such a manner that no harm was inflicted on any living being, howsoever small, by him. To the people at large, he preached the way of self-control.

Assessment of this wealth of thought

Totally non injurious way of life naturally gives rise to an attitude which respects others' thoughts and views because it is a matter of daily experience of all of us that all have a value of their wealth of mind as they have of the material wealth. That also is our daily experience that we may be quickly ready to lose our material prosperity but not so easily our ideas and opinions. This proves that we all of us have a love, a passion for our own thoughts, beliefs, and convictions. When we thoughtlessly brand these thoughts of other as false, he suffers a rude shock, undergoes agony and prepares himself to deal a counter-blow and ultimately he becomes ready to cling fast to his beliefs and views, right or wrong, with greater force and firmness. In equal measure does the other person also maintain his own with vehemence. This gives intensity to the continuing-process of animosity generated from discussion and counter-discussions, deliberations, argumentations etc. etc. This is nothing but a subtle form of injury (Himsā). In order to eliminate effectively this element of injury from the ideological field, Mahāvīra thought it wise to develop the Theory of Manifold Aspects (Anekānta) in its full form, and based the metaphysics and philosophy of Jainism on its basis. When, on one hand, it is accepted to avoid at any cost injury to any living being, also, on the other hand, it is equally necessary to abandon a subtle type of injury which is involved in crushing to pieces and powder the statements of others. This danger makes it all the more necessary to try to discover the truth from others' professions and statements. So long as others' assertions are taken to be unbelievable, they have no right to be accepted and they cannot extract any approbation. Therefore, it is absolutely inevitable to attempt to locate and identify the grain of truth in them. This is possible only if the activity to observe a thing from all possible viewpoints is launched and intensified and this is designated as the theory of Manifold Aspects or Anekānta. Thus, we are now able to see that the whole edifice of the Theory rests on the principle of non-injury.

Elixir of Synthesis.

Ācārya Siddhasena has said that there are as many viewpoints (Nayas) as there are statements and there are as many philosophies as there

are statements. Enlarging this pronouncement of the Ācārya, Jinabhadra makes it clear that all the philosophies taken collectively constitute Jainism. Contradiction seems to be existing in the mutually exclusive statements so long as they are not harmonized and integrated with each other. Defective reasoning, fallacious arguments, and logical limits are the basic factors responsible for contradiction found in approaches, attitudes, outlooks and others' pronouncements.

But as there are limitations and defects, there are merits and peculiarities also. It becomes immediately clear that it is one of the viewpoints or forms for envisioning the truth when attention is focussed on a particular merit or characteristic and it plays its own part in a total perception of a thing. So long as the pearls of various kinds and colours lie scattered, our attention is drawn to its individual entity and our conviction goes on becoming stronger about its separateness instead of oneness. But when a necklace is made out of them, they lose their individual existence and become a part and parcel of the necklace. Their collective existence gives rise to a concept of homogeneity. Similarly, as long as the various philosophical systems harp on the same string about their individual claim to truth, they should be branded as false, because they seek satisfaction of having visualized the whole truth where, they might have, as a matter-of-fact, seen a mere partial truth. But they cease to be wrong or false, when each is described in Jain philosophy as a mere kind, a mere viewpoint, a mere part of the total perception, having first given up insistence for a part being the whole. Thus, an edifice of Jaina Philosophy is erected on the foundation of various viewpoints taken together. It is not false or wrong though it is evolved out of viewpoints which are false if taken singly and right if taken collectively. Not only this, but falsity is now filtered out from them which were false before.

The rivers coming from different directions merge themselves into one when they all set mixed together in the ocean. Their's is a collective existence now instead of separate one. Similarly, all one-sided statements or assertions lose their individual character when they are expressed through the medium of the Theory of Manifold Aspects. In other words, they were called 'false' or 'wrong' when each of them was separate or single but when they were synthesized, their individual existence was no more and remained merely as a part of truth. Thus, then, they cease to be 'wrong' or 'false'. The Theory of Manifold Aspect is just an Elixir giving vitality to the beliefs of others which afterwards appear in new forms. As it takes away the poison of one-sidedness from them, they cease to be wrong and false. They appear to be true.

Ācārya Haribhadra or Hemacandra in whose blood this elixir is coursing, does not find fault with wrong beliefs or gods who have wrong beliefs. On account of this, we find that Ācārya Haribhadra does not consider Kapila belonging to non-Jain school of philosophy as inferior to the Tīrthaṅkaras of the Jainas and Ācārya Hemacandra, who sings a panegyric to a Tīrthaṅkara with devotion, does the same with equal, if not more, devotional fervour to Śiva also who is not distinct or different for him from the Vītarāga, the non-attached. This attitude born of catholicity is the very essence of this elixir called Anekānta.

To perceive unity amongst various gods is perhaps possible, suppose, if at least the people are broad-minded but to harmonize diverse conflicting notions is on no count easy. To say in one sweep that all philosophies together make the Jain Philosophy is easy but to actually unify them and to evolve the well-organized Jaina Philosophy there from is extremely difficult. It is not an easy job to discover the element of unity which inheres in and binds them all. It has been the cherished goal of the Jaina Ācāryas, who are prominent in the field of philosophy, to endeavour to evolve a possible logical synthesis out of the earlier and contemporary schools of thoughts and then to accord to them a proper place in the lofty palace of the Theory of Manifold Aspects (Anekānta). In doing this, their logical capacity and impartiality are fully put to a hard test because they have to ascertain what place is occupied by a particular school of thought in the whole frame-work of all Bhāratīya philosophical systems, to assess their claim to a deserved position in the entire development of the philosophical thought, to find out the inevitable causes which gave rise to them, to evaluate their merits and demerits, to detect contradictions and antagonisms and to knit them all into one whole.

Without this it is not possible to allot a place to a non-Jain school of thought in this magnificent palace of Anekānta. A herculean effort to erect and build this attractive and majestic palace has been continually made during all these years beginning from Mahāvīra till Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya. We are, indeed, in a position to say that Jain Philosophy, absorbing and assimilating the rudiments of the philosophical systems of Bhārata, along with the individual growth of each of the systems, ultimately waves the banner of victory of those systems. A sincere study of Jaina Philosophy only, therefore, is able to present before the readers a living historical picture of the rise and growth of all the systems of Bhārata.

(3) Synthesis of various schools according to the Theory of Manifold Aspects.

After having thought this much about the Theory of Manifold

Aspects in Jainism, let us now take up in brief the question as to how much and where the Jains have employed it.

The prestige enjoyed by every religious system is unexcelled. This is true in the case of Jainism also. Its scriptures are inviolable. However, the Nandi Sūtra of the Jaina scriptures provides an example which illustrates how the Theory of Manifold Aspects can be applied without any vehemence or inflexibility. It (the Nandī) lays down the test which decides whether a particular scripture is right (सद्गुक्) or wrong (सिद्ध्या). It adds a commentary that if an individual himself is discriminating or has a right approach, the Jaina scriptures or non-Jaina Mahābhārat etc. etc. will be deemed equally bonafide by him. But, if the matter is reverse, that is to say, if the individual has developed and fostered a wrong approach, the scriptures, Jaina or non-Jaina, will be taken as malafide. The reason of this is that just as a thing assumes various forms according to the outlook, attitude, and approach of the seer, the scriptures also present themselves to the individual in the same colour which he wants to impose on them.

This makes it compulsory for us to lay down a rule that no scriptures, Jaina or non-Jaina, are exclusively right or wrong, true or false. It all depends as to how you take them.

The sun gives light, no doubt; but it is of no use to the owl and comes in the way of a thief who is addicted to stealing. Just so is the case with the Tīrthaṅkaras and big wigs. Even though they have in their hearts the good of the people, they do not become respectable to all alike because a like or dislike for them is dependent on the recipients who may be either fit or unfit, qualified or unqualified. This means that the Tīrthaṅkaras are no Tīrthaṅkaras to each and every one. This very rule applies to each and everything also. A thing may be the same; still it can bear various faces and wear various complexions according to the seers and spectators.

Noumenal View and Phenomenal Views.

The Jaina Ācāryas, following Mahāvīra, have classified into two broad categories all the diverse viewpoints from which a thing is perceived or cognized. One category aims at a collective, general or synthetic perception while the other at a divided, particular or analytic perception. Whatever may be the category, kind or type, it is bound to be either this or that. According to Jain terminology the first, that is to say, the general

perception is called Noumenal perception (Dravyārthika) and the second which is the particular perception is called Phenomenal perception (Paryāyārthika). It is the claim of the Jaina Ācāryas that any philosophical dictum whether it belongs to a Jain school or a non-Jaina, whether it is Indian or non-Indian, it must come within the range or compass of any one of these two. Not only this but they have actually justified this claim of theirs by successfully showing with the force of logic that all philosophical speculations of the world which have come into being so far and which have been known to them can be satisfactorily classified into any one of them. These two viewpoints have also been further sub-divided into seven. The whole world of philosophical thought belonging to the Indian schools is brought within the range of these seven. Vyavahāra Naya is one of the varieties or kinds of Dravyārthika Naya. It plays its role in the field of practical dealings. Without taking into consideration the subtle distinctions inherent in a thing, it moves about with its eyes fixed on the general aspect. It does not pay heed to the knowledge of a thing as it does to ignorance of it. Cārvākas believe in this Naya only as they recognize five elements only and not the sentient spirit because they conduct their daily dealings on the basis of this Naya only. A subtle entity like the 'Soul' is not accepted by them. Therefore, they take shelter in the theory of nescience. The other philosophers have opposed the Cārvākas believing in a substance called 'Soul'. Jain Philosophy recognizes both, namely, Soul and Non-soul. The cārvākas are right so far as their theory of matter is concerned but they are wrong when the matter of soul comes up. Therefore, one has to believe that they are the advocates of one Naya only. But integral view of truth is not possible from one Naya only. But it is to be had when all the Nayas are brought into play. Therefore, the Cārvāka philosophy is not exclusively wrong; but it is partially true. This is what the Jaina Philosophy has to say about it. A majority of the living beings is such as is not able to distinguish soul from non-soul. They behave as if the body is the soul. Such a behaviour is patterned on the theory of Cārvāka school which argues that the characteristics of the valid proofs, as have been fixed by the theoreticians, are mutually contradictory. Which should be, then, believed—they allege. What is valid proof? When it cannot be defined it is mere fun to depend on it in ascertaining the nature of a thing. The theory of nescience (ignorance) is born out of Vyavahāra Naya according to which the dealings which we do, taking them to be true, are proper, the correct knowledge of a thing is impossible and the nescience or ignorance is beneficial because knowledge is not possible.

In the world, this theory of nescience or ignorance is resorted to here and there and in the scriptures also the statements confirming this are found. In the R̥gveda itself it is said :—

‘को अद्धा वेद..... कुत आजाता.....कुत इयं विसृष्टि : ।.....

यो अस्याध्यक्षः परमे व्योमन् सो अङ्गं वेद यदि वा न वेद ।”

Bhartṛhari also has said :—

“यस्तेनानुमितोऽप्यर्थः कुशलैरनुमातृभिः ।

अभियुक्ततरैरन्यै-रन्यथैवोपपाद्यते ॥”

A certain intelligent person comes to know about a thing by inference, while another more intelligent person disproves it. Then, on whose inferential knowledge should we depend ? In Jain scriptures also, this Ajñānavāda (Theory of Nescience) is mentioned as one of the four kinds, namely, Kriyāvāda (Theory of Action) etc. etc. Thus, this Ajñānavāda is as old as mankind. Moreover, the Mīmāṃsakas also have given more importance to Karma (Action) than to jñāna (knowledge). What is not knowledge is Ajñāna (Nescience or Ignorance). Therefore, their Karmavāda (Theory of Action) is one type of Ajñānavāda (Theory of Nescience). In Jainism, all these kinds of Ajñānavāda (Theory of Ajñāna or Nescience) are included in Vyavahāra Naya and these conflicting theories have been synthesized in Jainism by postulating the existence of Jīva and Ajīva (Soul and Non-soul) both as also by postulating that of knowledge and ignorance in the worldly beings. Even if one may not have the direct knowledge of the supreme element but that does not mean that indirect knowledge is ignorance only. Besides, the advocates of Ajñānavāda (Theory of Nescience) have found contradiction in the characteristics enumerated by the philosophers. But their finding contradiction is itself knowledge because otherwise contradiction will not be established. Thus in our daily dealings we have to depend on knowledge and ignorance both, not merely on ignorance. Let the Mīmāṃsakas take Karma (Action) to be the essence of what has been said in the Vedas but the fact remains that the knowledge (it may be of Karma even) of something must be there. Thus, even if an act itself is not knowledge, how is it possible to engage in or desist from a particular activity to the exclusion of the other ? Therefore, the Mimāṃsakas also should not believe in the act or activity exclusively and not at all in knowledge. One cannot get rid of any ailment simply by taking medicines only but it is at the same time necessary for him to know which medicines he should take. This proves that it is beneficial to combine act and its knowledge both.

The Mīmāṃsakas seem to be taking shelter under the Theory of Nescience (Ajñānavāda), when they take the Vedas to be “revelations”. According to them, they are so because the date of their composition and authorship are not known. Contrary to this, the Jainas hold that we may call them “revelations” inasmuch as they are being transmitted from time immemorial and their first author is not known but at least we know that they were given new forms and shapes off and on by human beings like ourselves and they had knowledge also. We know of certain sages who were the seers of certain portion of the mantras embodied in Ṛks. Then what objection is there in taking the Vedas as composed by human beings? As regards the twelve canonical works of the Jainas, they believe that they have no beginning and no end. Still, the extant Aṅgas are taken as the compositions by the Pontiffs (Gaṇadharas) based on the teachings of Mahāvīra.

Saṅgraha Naya.

On one hand, there are Cārvākas who believed in one substance only, namely, Matter, while on the other, there are Vedāntins according to whom there is only one substance but it is Energy caitanya and not Matter. This very Vedānta philosophy is what is represented by the Saṅgraha Naya of the Jainas. Whatever exists in this universe is expressed by the word, ‘Sat’ in the Vedānta Philosophy. But this ‘Sat’ is only Energy and nothing else according to it. This Energy, it adds further, is the Puruṣa, Brahma, or super-soul whatever you want to call it. But in Jainism, it is constituted of both Energy and Matter, because otherwise it is not possible to account for bondage and release, world and salvation. In the Vedānta, Māyā, futility of the world, and nescience have been considered antagonistic to Energy (caitanya) but they do not describe Māyā as Sat. They call it, instead, indescribable. This because they take Māyā neither completely different nor identified from and with Brahma. Whatever it may be, this much is certain that they cannot do without Māyā even if Māyā may not be described as Sat. This is also what is believed by the Jainas that there is something like Matter through the agency of which the soul is bound up with the karmas. If the Vedāntins say that both Māyā and Brahma are Sat, there will be two Sats which the Vedāntins do not want as they are non-dualists. If Māyā is taken as Asat (non-existing), it will not be possible to hold it responsible for the belief that the world is real. The soul cannot get involved in bondage if it becomes united with soul. It can occur only if it unites with non-soul that is to say with matter. Therefore, it is necessary to hypothesize that there is soul and that there is matter also. Therefore, the Jainas have

included the Vedānta Philosophy in the Saṅgraha Naya, though partially. The Sāṅkhyas, like the Jains, believe in two substances, namely, Jīva & Ajīva. represented by Puruṣa and Prakṛti respectively. The evolution of the entire material universe owes its origin to Prakṛti in proximity with Puruṣa. The Nyāya Philosophy also accepts both the substances, Prakṛti and Puruṣa. Therefore, to believe in only one substance namely, Jīva (Soul) is a partial truth, according to Jainism and the entire truth consists only in believing both the substances, Jīva and Ajīva, Soul and Non-soul.

On this basis only, Vijñānavāda, Śūnyavāda, and Śabdādvaitavāda are included in the Saṅgraha Naya, they being mere partial truths.

Ṛjusūtranaya.

According to Vedānta, the Sat should exist for all the three times, namely, past, present and future. The Buddhist theory is just the opposite. It takes the Sat to be existing in the present only. According to the Vedānta, Brahma which is the only entity, accounts for everything. There is nothing beyond it and besides it. But in opposing this theory, the Buddhas said that there is nothing that is general; everything is particular and every particular or Viśeṣa is separate from the other. Every thing is momentary; there is nothing that is permanent. This theory of the Buddhas is echoed in the Ṛjusūtra which is one of the varieties of phenomenal viewpoint. The Buddhas and the Vedāntins are inimical to each other. But the Jain system has accommodated both of them in the view-points of Noumena and Phenomena taking them both as representing the partial truth only. The substance (Dravya) is true for all time but its various transformations as, that is to say, paryāyas (phenomena) are transient; thus they both have been accommodated. The Vedānta view is included by the Jains in the General view-point or the collective view-point and the Buddhist view-point in the Ṛjusūtra Naya, a variety of the Paryāyanaya. The Jains believe in both—General and Particular Aspects of a thing. This is the reason why it could assign room to both of them.

Naigama Naya.

According to Vedānta, what is existent for all time, is Sat. Contrary to this, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold the view that the soul etc. are existent for all time but not all the produced things. They are first, non-existent, then become existent and again become non-existent. Moreover, some substances are merely general (Sāmānya), while some are merely particular (Viśeṣa) and others are general and particular both. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas do not subscribe to the view of the Vedāntins according to whom what

exists, is and is the only Entity, general and all embracing. The theory of the Vaiśeṣikas is just similar to that of the Jainas which is known under the designation of Naigama Naya meaning thereby that they believe in both, General and Particular and not either of them singly. Still, however, they do not believe like the Jainas that a thing is having both the aspects, General and Particular together. Therefore their belief also is independent. The Jainas believe that general and particular—both co-exist. They are mutually dependent and therefore, not independent. They both are the aspects of a thing.

Like the Vedantins, the Sāṅkhyas also take the Sat to be eternal. On account of this, nothing new is produced according to them. But it comes into existence only just as oil from the sesamum seed. Like the Brahma of the Vedāntins, the Prakṛti of the Sāṅkhyas is the prime receptacle of all that is produced. New products or effects continually go on being brought out from the Prakṛti and again get merged into it. All these products taken together are of the same essence as that of Prakṛti. On account of this, nothing which is present was ever absent. Everything is every thing according to the Sāṅkhyas. This theory of theirs is described as Satkāryavād. Opposed to them are the Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas, and Bauddhas whose patent theory is Asatkāryavāda. According to them, if a thing is pre-existing before it came into existence, no effort is called forth to bring it out. Therefore, the effect before it was produced and after it disappeared was never existent, that is to say, it was Asat. The Jainas have tried to reconcile these two contrary views through Dravyārthika Naya and Paryāyārthika Naya (Noumenal and Phenomenal view-points) respectively. A thing was existent (Sat) as a substance and non-existent (Asat) as a phenomenon. The earth is the same but it is responsible for many things produced from it. Gold as gold remains the same, still many things are born out of it. Earth and gold are thus constant as earth and gold and are transitory as new things are continually being produced from them. This controversy also belongs to Dravya Naya and Paryāyanaya.

Artha Naya and Śabda Naya.

Artha Nayas think about things but there are various view-points from which to arrive at a correct meaning of the words used. All these are included in the Śabda Nayas. All the Nayas about which we thought above are Arthanayas, namely, Naigama, Saṅgraha, Vyavahāra and Rjusūtra. Śabda, Samabhirūdhā and Evambhūta are the Śabda Nayas. All these three are included in Paryāyārthika because their province is the paryāya (a modificatory change.)

According to the first Śabdanaya of these Śabdanayas, the meaning of the word "Indra" is the same as that of the word 'Śacīpati'. There is no difference from the view-point of Paryāya, though there is one due to case and time. But Samabhirūḍha is a 'Sabda Naya' which accepts a difference in meaning on the ground of Paryāya also. In other words, according to Samabhirūḍha, two words cannot have one and the same meaning. According to this, 'Indra' and 'Śacīpati' are not the same because their etymologies are different—Evambhūta Naya attempts to deduce the meaning even more minutely than the two mentioned before. According to it, one cannot use the word if it cannot convey the picture of the actual condition when the word is being used. As for example, the word "Gau". Its etymological sense is "motion". Now we cannot use the word "Gau", according to the condition of the Evambhuta Naya, for the cow which is sitting but we can surely use it for the cow which is moving. Thus these Śabdanayas also put emphasis on the partial truths. Still, however, they all have a definite place in the Theory of Manifold Aspects (Anekānta). It does not repudiate the claim of any one of them. On the contrary, it admits its claim and assigns a proper place to all of them in its frame-work.

As we saw above, the Theory of Manifold Aspects (Theory of Anekānta), thus, accepts the claims of all of them and, as a matter of fact, it comprises all of them. Ācārya Jinabhadra's statement to the effect that Jain Philosophy is an ocean in which all these rivers in the form of Nayas merge is thus proved correct.

In support of this "Theory of Manifold Aspects (Anekānta)" Jain Philosophy has evolved a special technique for explaining every behaviour of a thing through seven modes to express each one of which the word 'Syāt' is used, because it denotes that a thing is described from one particular point of view and is not an absolute statement but a relative one. It is because of this that the "Theory of Manifold Aspects (Anekānta)" is also called the "Theory of Relativity (Sāpekṣavāda)".

(4) Refutation of the charges

Repudiation of the charge of uncertainty.

It is improper and uncalled for that the philosophers of the non-Jaina schools of thought have tried to invalidate, being urged by sectarian fanaticism, the Theory of Manifold Aspects (Anekānta) which is, as it is natural, useful in the vision of the philosophical and metaphysical truth. It does not add at all to the wide fame and great prestige of a philosopher of

the stature of Śāṅkarācārya to detect faults and thereby to repudiate the well-deserved claims of the Theory of Manifold Aspects instead of acknowledging the obvious good points in it being driven by the hardened narrow sectarian outlook, attitude and approach. Śāṅkarācārya's refutation that Anekānta lands us in doubt will be thought valid only if and when the Jainas are wavering about both conclusions regarding any particular thing and are unable to offer any definite solution. On the contrary, the Jainas had been able to establish the truth of any one of the two conclusions on the basis of relative consideration, leaving no scope to uncertainty. There is no room for suspicion and uncertainty if the advocate of the theory of Manifold Aspects finds and has arguments for both the aspects, namely, the aspect of motherhood and the aspect of wifehood existing simultaneously in a woman standing in front of him. There is no contradiction also because the grounds are different. There will be contradiction, indeed, if motherhood and wifehood are believed to be existing from one and the same point of view. But the Jainas do not believe like this. When a thing is believed as one, whole and eternal it is because of the Dravyārthika Naya and when it is believed to be consisting of parts and ever-changing, it is due to the Paryāyārthika Naya. When this is so, where is the contradiction ?

Synthetic approach in the Vedas.

The concept of the manifold aspects is as old as Rgveda. When the Vedas started stating that there are many gods, discussions began to arise whether Indra was superior to Varuṇa or vice-versa. The devotees began to argue in favour of their choice and this is natural also. But the controversy ended when it was tested by Anekānta. Sage Dīrghatamā said "एकं सत् विश्वं बहुधा वदन्ति" (Rgveda, 1, 164, 46) which means there is but one truth and one only, but the learned give it different names. Thus, all the gods were represented by one. The seeming antagonism existing between Varuṇa and Indra and also between other gods was thus removed and all were stream-lined into one and the controversy was thus explained away. In doing this, the sage did not see in the Theory of Manifold Aspects the traces of the Theory of Nescience or Doubt and also did not find contradiction. Then the question arises as to why did Śāṅkarācārya, who was a philosopher-king see the defects in the Jainas' Theory of Manifold Aspects ? The reply to this is found in Śāṅkarācārya's sectarian view-point.

This very Śāṅkarācārya who saw so many faults as doubt, ignorance, and contradiction in the Jaina Theory of Manifold Aspects (Anekānta) forgot the same when he wrote commentary on the Upaniṣads. In it, he has

described Brahma as constituted of both Sat and Asat which are contrary to each other. Not only this but he has identified earth, water, wind etc. with Brahma and put Vedānta Philosophy on a firm basis harmonising with only one Brahma many opposite statements occurring in the Upaniṣads. The Brahma is smaller than the smallest and bigger than the biggest “अणोरणीयान् महतो महीयान्” (Kaṭha, 1, 2, 20); it is perishable and imperishable, manifest and unmanifest “क्षरमक्षरं च व्यक्ताव्यक्तम्” Śvetāśvatara, 1, 8); it is moving and stable (“तदेजनि तन्नेजति”—ईशावास्य)—thus the Brahma is narrated as having dissimilar attributes and Śaṅkarācārya has made a very great effort to bring all these disparate qualities in a line in his commentary on the various Upaniṣads. Here he has not hesitated to virtually make the fullest use of the Theory of Manifold Aspects which he so strongly denounced elsewhere. He detects several short comings such as doubt etc. in the Theory of Manifold Aspects when the Jaina philosophers on the basis of the theory state that a thing has got a number of opposite properties and qualities. This is nothing but the result of his sectarian approach.

Absolute and Non-Absolute

It is a special characteristic of our late Rāṣṭrapati, Dr. Radhakṛṣṇan that he was a great man of our times to have tried synthesizing contradictory points. It is seldom that an inflexible attitude is seen in him in regard to religious and philosophical matters of the east and the west like other philosophers and meta-physicians. It is because of this that he is considered the first and foremost of all the religious leaders and philosophical thinkers belonging to the east and west. It is but natural that he may not thus find faults with the Theory of Manifold Aspect (Anekānta). However, the impact of Advaita Brahma (Absolutism) is marked on him. Therefore, while examining Critically Anekānta, if there is any shortcoming in it, it is the absence of the absolute in it—he said. By way of repudiating this, it can be said with humbleness that the absence is not the defect but an ornament. In order to launch an attack of protest against ‘absolutes’, the Theory of Manifold Aspects which is but a theory of non-absolutism is devised. How can there be, then, a place for the absolute element as the supreme element in it? According to the followers of Anekānta, if there is any absolute, it is the non-absolute. Moreover, it is not true to say that there is no room for such an absolute in it, because, as said before, the concept of Brahman found in Advaitavedānta has been already included by the Jains in the Sangraha Naya as a partial truth and has given an account of Absolutism in the scheme of total truth according to Anekānta. If so many

absolutes are not kneaded together in one whole, there would have been no need for the Anekānta to rise. Therefore, there is thus no option but to believe that Dr. Radhakrishnan's aforesaid objection to the Theory of Manifold Aspect is occasioned by his partiality for the principle of Brahman.

It is true that controversy takes place on account of the use of words. Uninterrupted consciousness of knowledge prevails when there is no room left for any thought or option at the time of consummation of meditation and when the only object of meditation such as the soul etc. is experienced. This uninterrupted consciousness of knowledge is described as 'absolute'. When this 'absolute' condition is described, alternatives or options arise. Both—absolute condition and relative one—are acknowledged by the Anekānta. In other words, the describeable and the indescribable nature of a thing are taken note of by the Theory of Manifold Aspects. Thus, to allege that 'Absolute' has no place in the scheme of Anekānta is, according to my humble opinion, worth reconsideration. 'Absolute' also has a place but it is wrong to say that only 'Absolute' and nothing else has a place in the Theory of Anekānta. This is so because of the very nature of the theory which consists of the affirmation of the existence of an object of meditation or object of sense. According to the theory, Niscaya and Vyavahāra are equally true. Explanation of the objective or subjective world is not achieved only through Nīścaya Naya or through Vyavahāra Naya. It is because of this that the soul is affirmed as having taste or smell and as having no taste or smell. Both the conditions—free and fettered—of the soul are possibilities. What condition is worth achieving and what is not, constitutes difference. But there is no difference between any one of such a condition existing. Advaita—Vedānta and Jaina Philosophy part their ways here. According to the former, only Brahma is true and the world, untrue while, according to Jaina Philosophy, the emancipated and embodied condition of the soul—both—are true. It is the postulate of the Vedānta that the soul is eternally true but it does not accept that the soul's existence conditioned by Time is also true. The Jainas not only believe in the principle of Energy but they also believe in the various conditions such as human existence etc. which are but various conditions of Energy limited by Time and space. In short, the mundane existence which is taken as false by the Advaita Vedānta, is taken as true by Jainism. The principle of Supreme Lord (Parama Brahma) is included in the Nīścaya Naya and that of the worldly existence in the Vyavahāra Naya by Jainism and both Nīścaya and Vyavahāra are recognized as true in Jainism—an account of this, from the point of view of Nīścaya the Absolute of Advaita Vedānta has a place

and from the point of view of Vyavahāra the Non-absolute also has a place because both the view-points are true according to Jainism.

Shri Aravinda's Synthesis.

In the philosophy of Aravinda, one supreme element is postulated and it is said that it is indescribable. However, if a need arises to describe it, it can be described as Sat, Cit, Ānanda taken collectively. According to Shri Aravinda, the animate and the inanimate worlds originate from this Supreme element. In other words, there is no antagonism between the two worlds inhering together in one and the same Element. Like Śāṅkara, Aravinda does not take the inanimate world as illusionary. According to him, when the Supreme Element in its form of Energy lies dormant, it is named as the inanimate and when it begins evolving, Energy becomes active and goes on perfecting. The external world also is real, according to Shri Aravinda. According to Jainism also, there is only one Sat, though it has two forms, namely, the animate and the inanimate. What is this, if not the acceptance of the Theory of Manifold Aspects (Anekānta) of the Jainas, by Shri Aravinda?

Anekāntavāda in the Buddhist and other systems.

The Ācāryas, such as Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita, the firm followers of Buddha, have denounced Anekāntavāda as having contradictory elements, while Buddha himself who was Vibhajyavādi (divisionist), ruled out one sidedness and designated Buddhism, preached and taught by him, as a middle way (Madhyama Mārga). It is true that Buddha has described every thing as momentary. But, at the same time, Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita fit in the theory of rebirth with the eternal nature of the flow of momentariness. Thus, while rejecting the Jainas' theory of Manifold Aspects, the Buddhas accept it also indirectly.

While stating that the principles and tenets of the Jainas and Buddhas such as non-injury etc. are good, Bhaṭṭa Kumārila compares them with the water held in the bucket of leather and as such brands it as unusable because those principles emanate from the mouths of those who are hostile to the Vedas. The same Bhaṭṭa Kumārila, when he thinks about a thing, specially about soul, takes recourse to the principle of Identity and Difference which is so to say a corollary of Anekāntavāda of the Jainas in a way and thus establishes the eternal and transitory nature of a thing on the basis of Dravya and Paryāya respectively.

The Naiyāyikas also have a complaint against the Anekāntavāda but they give it a back-door entry when they call an intervening variety of the species as both General and Particular, as for example, the cowhood which, according to them, is General from the view-point of a cow in general but Particular from view-point of a horse.

Rāmānuja, Vallabha and others accept the Anekāntavāda of the Jainas in one form or the other as they believe in the evolutionary character of Brahma. Despite this, they join Śāṅkarācārya in denouncing Anekāntavāda. This shows at best their sectarian spirit only.

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Translated into English
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